Court Opinion

ID: 9957632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 18:01:35.071636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.715831
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11429    Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 20

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11429
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JOHN OIRYA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MANDO AMERICAN CORPORATION,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00635-ECM-CWB
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 2 of 20

        2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11429

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Defendant Mando American Corporation (“Mando”)
        terminated plaintiff John Oirya for sleeping on the job.
        Subsequently, Oirya filed this action alleging that Mando failed to
        accommodate his medical conditions that caused drowsiness and
        retaliated against him for requesting an accommodation and
        complaining about disability discrimination, all in violation of the
        American Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
               On appeal, Oirya challenges: (1) the magistrate judge’s order
        denying Oirya’s second motion for leave to amend his complaint;
        and (2) the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
        favor of Mando on Oirya’s claims. After review of the parties’
        briefs and the record, we dismiss Oirya’s appeal of the magistrate
        judge’s denial of Oirya’s motion to amend because we lack
        jurisdiction to review it. We affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment because Oirya failed to establish a prima facie
        case as to his failure-to-accommodate or his retaliation claims.
USCA11 Case: 23-11429         Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 04/04/2024        Page: 3 of 20

        23-11429                  Opinion of the Court                               3

                                   I. BACKGROUND 1
        A.     Mando’s Employment Policies
              Oirya worked at Mando as a training coordinator under the
        supervision of April Regier, the corporate training supervisor.
                When promoted to training coordinator, Oirya was given
        Mando’s salary employee handbook. The handbook included an
        ADA policy that (1) instructed employees to request an
        accommodation for a disability by notifying Human Resources and
        (2) reserved the right to request medical documentation. Similarly,
        the handbook instructed employees to report discrimination or
        retaliation to Human Resources.
               The employee handbook also included a conduct policy that
        stated, “Some examples of misconduct, which may result in
        immediate termination, include, but are not limited to . . .
        [s]leeping on the job.” Salaried employees were supposed to take
        their lunch breaks around midday, and they could also take
        comfort breaks throughout the day as needed. Comfort breaks
        allowed employees to take a few moments to regroup, if needed.
        It was acceptable for employees to sleep during their lunch break,
        but not while working.

        1 These are the summary judgment facts, construed in the light most favorable

        to Oirya, as the non-moving party. See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320,
        1322 (11th Cir. 2018).
USCA11 Case: 23-11429       Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024      Page: 4 of 20

        4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11429

        B.     Oirya’s Medical Conditions Causing Drowsiness
               Oirya suffered from several medical conditions, including
        major depression and PTSD, for which he received treatment at
        Columbus Psychological Associates. And Columbus diagnosed
        Oirya with a sleep disorder. Oirya also had chronic bouts of
        gastrointestinal problems, including food poisoning, stomach flu,
        and severe stomach pains. Oirya maintained that he notified all of
        his supervisors, including Regier, of these disabilities. As a result of
        his conditions, Oirya sometimes had trouble sleeping at night and
        then could not stay awake at work. To treat his symptoms, Oirya
        took over-the-counter medications that also made him drowsy.
        C.     February 2, 2018: Oirya Disciplined for Sleeping on Job
               In late 2018 and early 2019, Oirya’s supervisor Regier was
        advised by Mando’s then-Human Resources manager, Darlene
        Schumacher, that three Mando employees, Brandon Yoon, Kayte
        Dulaney, and Felix Owen, had observed Oirya on multiple
        occasions sleeping at his desk while not on a break. Because
        sleeping on the job violated Mando’s conduct policy, Regier
        decided to issue Oirya a “Last Chance Agreement,” a decision
        approved by senior Human Resources manager, Gerald Wyatt.
               At a February 2, 2018 meeting, Regier presented Oirya with
        the Last Chance Agreement. In the Last Chance Agreement,
        Regier noted that on February 1, 2018, Oirya was witnessed
        violating Mando’s conduct policy “by sleeping on the job and
        abusing [his] designation [sic] lunch period.” The Last Chance
        Agreement stated that, in lieu of termination, Oirya was being
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 5 of 20

        23-11429              Opinion of the Court                        5

        placed under the terms of the Agreement and was required to
        review and sign Mando’s conduct policy. The Last Chance
        Agreement stated that Oirya’s continued employment was
        contingent on following Mando’s policies for conduct and behavior
        and would remain in effect for two years.
              Oirya denied the accusations of the other Mando employees
        that he had been sleeping on the job and challenged Regier to
        produce evidence supporting the accusations. In response, Regier
        conceded she had not investigated the accusations and did not have
        evidence to prove them.
               Oirya explained to Regier about his diagnosed medical
        conditions and that he “took frequent breaks whenever [his]
        medical disabilities were active, during which [he] took drowsy-
        causing stomach flu capsules to manage [his] bouts of stomach flu
        symptoms.” Oirya also told Regier he laid down on his back during
        those breaks until his stomach pains subsided. Oirya said that these
        accommodations—frequent breaks and lying down during
        breaks—“enabled [him] to resume the essential functions and
        responsibilities of [his] job.” Oirya pointed out that his prior
        supervisors when he worked as an operator 2 at Mando had
        “readily granted [him] the reasonable accommodation of breaks.”
               Oirya refused to sign the Last Chance Agreement. Oirya
        complained that it was “unfairly issued” and “devoid of any
        meaningful due process” since Regier did not obtain his side of the
        story and witness accounts. Oirya asked Regier to “grant [him] an
        interactive process” before taking disciplinary action that included
USCA11 Case: 23-11429      Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 6 of 20

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11429

        advanced notice in the form of a full written complaint, a “full
        evidentiary hearing,” a written decision, and an opportunity to
        appeal.
               Oirya also asked for an opportunity to respond to the Last
        Chance Agreement. Regier agreed and told Oirya she would place
        his response in the file with the agreement.
        D.     February 9, 2018: Oirya’s Written Response to Discipline
               A week later, on February 9, 2018, Oirya sent a written
        statement to Regier explaining why he had not signed the Last
        Chance Agreement. Oirya’s written explanation complained that:
        (1) there was a lack of meaningful due process before the Last
        Chance Agreement was issued; (2) the “alleged incident” was
        protected by Mando’s ADA policy; and (3) the “prescribed
        solutions were provided at the disciplinary meeting” rather than
        when the employees’ reports of sleeping on the job were made and
        could be investigated.
               Oirya’s written explanation also stated that at the time of the
        February 1 “alleged incident,” he “was suffering the effects of food
        poisoning with stomach flu symptoms, due to having eaten
        sandwiches that were ‘on sale’ at Walmart,” for which he had taken
        flu capsules and antacid medication. Oirya maintained that
        Mando’s ADA policy had “an inherent ‘accommodation for a
        disability’ within it, in the form of breaks. Accordingly, the food
        poisoning did not require [him] to ask for costly accommodation,
        since the company-provided breaks are already provided for in this
        policy.”
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 7 of 20

        23-11429              Opinion of the Court                       7

               Regier reviewed Oirya’s written explanation and gave a
        copy to Human Resources managers, including Schumacher and
        Wyatt, to review and to place it in Oirya’s file. Oirya’s written
        explanation did not change Regier’s position on the propriety of
        the Last Chance Agreement. Regier had received numerous
        reports of Oirya sleeping on the job and did not believe she needed
        to interview him before disciplining him. Regier also did not
        believe Oirya’s sleeping caused by food poisoning was protected by
        Mando’s ADA policy. In any event, Oirya had never asked Regier
        “for an accommodation for a medical condition, additional breaks,
        or any other changes to his job duties or responsibilities due to a
        medical condition.”
               Similarly, Schumacher did not consider Oirya’s written
        explanation to be a request for an accommodation. Schumacher
        read the written explanation as Oirya disagreeing with the Last
        Chance Agreement and complaining that he was not interviewed
        before being issued discipline. Schumacher said that Mando did
        not require employees to be interviewed before being disciplined
        and that it was not unusual for employees to be disciplined before
        being interviewed. Like Regier, Schumacher did not think Oirya’s
        food poisoning was a disability under the ADA, and Oirya never
        asked for additional breaks due to his medical conditions.
        E.    April 2018: Oirya Sent Home for Food Poisoning
               In April 2018, Oirya reported to Human Resources manager
        Schumacher that he was not feeling well after eating at a pizza
        buffet. Schumacher consulted with Regier and then sent Oirya
USCA11 Case: 23-11429        Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 04/04/2024      Page: 8 of 20

        8                         Opinion of the Court                   23-11429

        home, telling him to return to work with a doctor’s note. Oirya
        was treated at Auburn Urgent Care for stomach pains, diagnosed
        with food poisoning, and prescribed Zofran and acidophilus
        capsules.
        F.     December 3, 2018: Oirya Terminated for Sleeping on Job
                In November 2018, Mando’s new Human Resources
        manager, Audie Swegman, notified Regier that two Mando
        employees, Shinae Pak and Beth Yates, had witnessed Oirya
        sleeping on the job, and one of them had taken a photograph of
        Oirya sleeping at his desk. In particular, after the lunch break, at
        3:00 p.m., Pak observed Oirya sleeping for a long period of time at
        his desk. Yates also observed Oirya sleeping, “laid back in his chair
        at his desk,” and discussed it with Pak, who used her cell phone to
        take the picture. 2
               Based on the employees’ reports and the photograph, Regier
        and Swegman concluded Oirya had been sleeping on the job in
        violation of Mando’s conduct policy. Regier told Swegman about
        the Last Chance Agreement, and the two agreed that Oirya’s
        termination was warranted. Before concurring in Regier’s
        recommendation, Swegman reviewed Oirya’s personnel file,
        including the Last Chance Agreement and Oirya’s written
        explanation.

        2 Oirya did not dispute that he was sleeping at his desk.When asked at his
        deposition whether he fell asleep on the job in November 2018, Oirya said he
        could not recall.
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 9 of 20

        23-11429              Opinion of the Court                        9

               On December 3, 2018, after obtaining approval from senior
        Human Resources manager James Kendrick, Swegman and Regier
        met with Oirya. Swegman notified Oirya that he was terminated
        for sleeping on the job while on the Last Chance Agreement.
                    II. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT
               In September 2019, Oirya, proceeding with counsel, filed a
        complaint alleging two ADA claims. Count I alleged that Mando
        denied Oirya a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities of a
        “sleep disorder that was a symptom of clinical major depression
        and PTSD, and bouts of severe food poisoning and allergies.”
        Count II alleged that Mando terminated Oirya in retaliation “for
        requesting a reasonable accommodation, and for opposing or
        protesting against unlawful disability discrimination” when he
        complained to Mando about being deprived of the opportunity “to
        confront the disability-related allegations” during the disciplinary
        process.
               The deadline to amend pleadings was April 9, 2020. On
        November 24, 2020, seven months after the deadline, Mando filed
        a first motion to amend his complaint to add two new ADA
        claims—Count III alleging disparate treatment and Count IV
        alleging wrongful termination. As to the disparate treatment claim
        in Count III, Oirya’s proposed amended complaint alleged that a
        “similarly situated” employee, Veronica Alfa, was accused of
        sleeping on the job, and Mando treated her more favorably by
        giving her a reasonable accommodation for her disability, which
        required medication that caused drowsiness.
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 10 of 20

        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11429

               The district court denied Oirya’s motion to amend his
        complaint as untimely and concluded Oirya had offered “no good
        cause for the delay.”
               On March 14, 2021, Oirya filed a second motion for leave to
        amend his complaint. This time, Oirya sought to add two claims
        of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
        based on employee Alfa’s more favorable treatment. Specifically,
        Oirya’s proposed amended complaint alleged in Count III that he
        received disparate disciplinary treatment from Alfa and in Count
        IV that he was denied a reasonable accommodation that Alfa was
        granted.
                After briefing on Oirya’s second motion to amend
        concluded, Oirya’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the
        district court granted. In the same order, the district court referred
        the case to a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 “for all
        pretrial proceedings and entry of any orders or recommendations
        as may be appropriate.”
               Thereafter, on January 14, 2022, the magistrate judge
        entered an order denying Oirya’s second motion to amend his
        complaint as untimely. The magistrate judge found that Oirya
        lacked diligence in pursuing his proposed Title VII claims and had
        not shown good cause for failing to seek leave to amend earlier.
        Oirya did not appeal the magistrate judge’s order or otherwise
        object to it in the district court.
              On appeal, Oirya now challenges the magistrate judge’s
        ruling on his second motion to amend, arguing that he
USCA11 Case: 23-11429        Document: 17-1        Date Filed: 04/04/2024        Page: 11 of 20

        23-11429                  Opinion of the Court                             11

        demonstrated both diligence and good cause to excuse the
        untimeliness of his motion. 3 Before we can consider Oirya’s
        arguments that the magistrate judge erred, we must determine that
        we have jurisdiction to do so. See Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972,
        977 (11th Cir. 2022).
               We ordinarily have jurisdiction to review only decisions of
        the district court that are “final.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court has
        long held that when a magistrate judge is proceeding under the
        supervision of the district court pursuant to § 636(b), its decisions
        “are not final orders and may not be appealed until rendered final
        by a district court.” Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061,
        1066-67 (11th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d
        1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The law is settled that appellate courts
        are without jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from federal
        magistrates.” (quotation marks omitted)). Thus, where a party did
        not appeal a magistrate judge’s order to the district court, we lack
        jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s ruling on appeal. See
        Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1362-63.
              Here, the magistrate judge was proceeding under § 636(b)
        when he denied Oirya’s second motion to amend his complaint.
        Because Oirya did not challenge the magistrate judge’s January 14,
        2022 order in the district court, the order is not final and appealable
        under § 1291. We therefore lack jurisdiction to review the
        magistrate judge’s order denying the second motion to amend and

        3 On appeal, Oirya does not challenge the district court’s denial of his first

        motion to amend as untimely.
USCA11 Case: 23-11429        Document: 17-1         Date Filed: 04/04/2024        Page: 12 of 20

        12                        Opinion of the Court                       23-11429

        must dismiss Oirya’s appeal as to that ruling. See id.; Donovan, 693
        F.2d at 1066-67.
                             III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
               On appeal, Oirya, proceeding pro se, argues the district court
        erred in granting summary judgment to Mando on both his failure-
        to-accommodate and retaliation claims under the ADA. 4 We
        address each claim in turn. 5
        A.      Reasonable Accommodation Principles
               The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against
        an employee because of his disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To
        establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a
        plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is a qualified
        individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination
        because of his disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d
        1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007). An employer unlawfully
        discriminates against a disabled employee when it fails to provide
        reasonable accommodations for known physical or mental

        4 We have appellate jurisdiction to review the summary judgment ruling

        because the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
        recommendation over Oirya’s objection. See Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1359-60
        5 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing

        all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences, in favor of the
        nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp., 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
        shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
        is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
USCA11 Case: 23-11429      Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 13 of 20

        23-11429               Opinion of the Court                         13

        limitations unless the accommodation would impose an undue
        hardship on the employer’s business. Id. at 1262; 42 U.S.C.
        § 12112(b)(5)(A).
               A reasonable accommodation is a modification or
        adjustment that enables the employee to perform the essential
        functions of the position. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255
        (11th Cir. 2016); see also U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391,
        399-401 (2002). A reasonable accommodation depends on the
        circumstances, but can include modifying work schedules or
        policies. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402-03;
        Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255.
               “The employee has the burden of identifying an
        accommodation and demonstrating that it is reasonable.” Frazier-
        White, 818 F.3d at 1255. Further, an employer’s duty to provide a
        reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless the employee
        makes a specific demand for an accommodation. Gaston v.
        Bellingrath Gardens & Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir.
        1999). If the employee provides this information, the employer
        may need to “initiate an informal, interactive process” with the
        employee to identify the employee’s limitations resulting from the
        disability and determine the appropriate reasonable
        accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3); Frazier-White, 818 F.3d
        at 1257. However, absent a specific request for an accommodation
        and a denial, “there can be no failure to accommodate under the
        ADA.” Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir.
        2018).
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 14 of 20

        14                    Opinion of the Court                23-11429

        B.    Oirya’s Failure-to-Accommodate Claim
                The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        to Mando on Oirya’s failure-to-accommodate claim. For purposes
        of this appeal, we assume that Oirya met the first two prongs of a
        prima facie case—that is, that Oirya’s medical conditions qualified
        as a disability and that he was a “qualified individual” under the
        ADA.
              We agree with the district court, however, that Oirya did
        not satisfy the third prong because he failed to present evidence
        from which a jury could find that he made a specific demand for a
        reasonable accommodation. And absent such a showing, Oirya did
        not trigger Mando’s obligations to provide a reasonable
        accommodation or to engage in an interactive process with him
        and cannot prevail on his failure-to-accommodate claim.
               In the February 2, 2018 meeting with Regier and in his
        follow-up written explanation, Oirya explained that his medical
        conditions and the medications he took sometimes made him
        drowsy at work and that he managed his drowsiness by taking
        frequent breaks. Oirya also explained that he sometimes had
        gastrointestinal issues, which he managed by lying down on his
        back during his breaks. But Oirya denied sleeping at his desk when
        not on breaks and claimed that other Mando employees’ reports to
        the contrary were false.
              More importantly, Oirya did not request that Regier modify
        any of Mando’s work or break policies and schedules, such as
        asking for longer breaks or to be allowed to nap at his desk even
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 04/04/2024    Page: 15 of 20

        23-11429              Opinion of the Court                       15

        when not on a break. In fact, Oirya maintained that he did not need
        an accommodation from Mando because he was able to use the
        breaks that Mando already provided to manage his symptoms
        when they were active. In the February 2, 2018 meeting, Oirya
        specifically advised Regier that what he was already doing—taking
        frequent breaks and lying on his back during breaks—enabled him
        to perform the essential functions of his job.
               Instead, Oirya’s primary complaint to Regier was that it was
        unfair for her to issue a Last Chance Agreement without first
        investigating the employees’ (false) reports that he was sleeping on
        the job and giving him a chance to defend himself. Contending he
        was deprived of “meaningful due process,” Oirya asked Regier to
        change Mando’s disciplinary procedures to provide him with
        written notice of the complaints against him, a full evidentiary
        hearing at which Oirya could present evidence and cross-examine
        witnesses, and a chance to appeal the decision.
               Oirya’s request to modify Mando’s disciplinary procedures
        to give him due-process-type protections does not constitute a
        request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. A
        reasonable accommodation is one that enables the employee to
        perform the essential functions of his job. Holly, 492 F.3d at 1256;
        see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (defining “reasonable
        accommodation” to mean modifications or adjustments that
        enable an employee with a disability “to perform the essential
        functions” of a position).
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 16 of 20

        16                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11429

               Further, as part of the obligation to make a specific demand
        for an accommodation, “an employee must link her disability to
        her requested accommodation by explaining how the requested
        accommodation could alleviate the workplace challenges posed by
        her specific disability.” Owens v. Governor’s Off. of Student
        Achievement, 52 F.4th 1327, 1333-34, 1335 (11th Cir. 2022) (involving
        a failure-to-accommodate claim under Section 504 of the
        Rehabilitation Act, which, in the employment context, applies the
        same standards as an ADA claim). “[I]f an employee does not
        require an accommodation to perform her essential job functions,
        then the employer is under no obligation to make an
        accommodation . . . .” D’Onofrio v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 964 F.3d
        1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2020).
               Oirya’s requested modifications to Mando’s disciplinary
        procedures were not ones that would alleviate workplace
        challenges posed by his disability or enable him to perform the
        essential functions of his job as a training coordinator. Rather, they
        would enable Oirya to challenge Regier’s decision to discipline him
        for what Oirya said were false reports of sleeping on the job.
        Because, even under Oirya’s version of events, he did not make a
        specific demand for an accommodation, Oirya failed to show
        Mando denied him a reasonable accommodation or that Mando
        had a duty to initiate an interactive process with him to determine
        whether there was a reasonable accommodation. See Batson, 897
        F.3d at 1327, Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1255, 1257; Gaston, 167 F.3d
        at 1363.
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 17 of 20

        23-11429               Opinion of the Court                        17

        C.    ADA Retaliation Principles
               The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual
        “because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
        unlawful [by the Act] or . . . made a charge, testified, assisted, or
        participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
        hearing under [the Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).
                When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, courts
        evaluate an ADA retaliation claim using the same burden-shifting
        framework applied to Title VII retaliation claims. Todd v. Fayette
        Cnty. Sch. Dist., 998 F.3d 1203, 1219 (11th Cir. 2021). Under that
        framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
        retaliation. Batson, 897 F.3d at 1328-29. To establish a prima facie
        case of retaliation under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that:
        (1) he engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) he suffered an
        adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists
        between the two. Id. at 1329.
               Here, the parties agree that Oirya’s termination satisfied the
        second element, but dispute whether Oirya presented evidence of
        the other two elements of a prima facie case of retaliation.
                As to the first element, an employee participates in protected
        expression when he opposes a practice the ADA makes unlawful or
        when he makes a request for a reasonable accommodation.
        42 U.S.C. § 12203(a); Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258. To establish
        the first element, “it is sufficient that an employee have a good
        faith, objectively reasonable belief that his activity is protected by
        the [ADA].” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1328
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 18 of 20

        18                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11429

        (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa
        Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
               As to the third causation element, the plaintiff need only
        “prove that the protected activity and the adverse action are not
        completely unrelated.” Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th
        Cir. 2004) (quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). This
        element is satisfied if the plaintiff “provides sufficient evidence of
        knowledge of the protected expression and that there was a close
        temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse
        action.” Id. (quotation marks and ellipses omitted). For temporal
        proximity alone to be sufficient circumstantial evidence of a causal
        connection, it “must be very close.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
        “If there is a substantial delay between the protected expression
        and the adverse action in the absence of other evidence tending to
        show causation, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of
        law.” Id. This Court has concluded that a one-month period
        between the protected activity and the adverse action was “not too
        protracted,” but that “a three to four month disparity” was
        insufficient to show a causal connection. Id.
        D.    Oirya’s Retaliation Claim
               The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
        to Mando because Oirya failed to present evidence establishing a
        prima facie case of retaliation.
               As to the first element, Oirya contends he engaged in
        protected activity during the February 2, 2018 meeting with Regier
        and in his February 9, 2018 written statement. As we have already
USCA11 Case: 23-11429     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024     Page: 19 of 20

        23-11429               Opinion of the Court                        19

        explained, Oirya did not show that he asked for a reasonable
        accommodation during these February 2018 interactions with
        Regier. Thus, Oirya did not establish that he had engaged in
        protected activity on that basis. See Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at 1258.
                Opposing a practice that the ADA makes unlawful also
        constitutes protected expression. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Oirya
        contends he engaged in protected activity when he refused to sign
        the Last Chance Agreement. Even assuming Oirya’s conduct—in
        either the meeting or in his follow-up written explanation—
        qualified under the ADA’s opposition clause, we agree with the
        district court that Oirya did not present evidence establishing a
        causal connection between his February 2018 conduct and his
        December 3, 2018 termination. A span of ten months between
        Oirya’s conduct and his termination, without more, is too
        temporally remote to permit a reasonable inference that the two
        were causally connected. See Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220.
               Finally, Oirya suggests that the act of taking a company-
        provided break to manage disability-related symptoms is itself
        protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) and that Mando
        terminated him for taking such breaks. Oirya argues that
        terminating an employee for exercising his ADA-protected rights
        violates the ADA.
              This argument ignores that there was no evidence that
        Oirya requested additional breaks, was ever denied breaks, or was
        terminated for taking breaks. Even Oirya’s evidence showed he
        was terminated for sleeping on the job while under the Last
USCA11 Case: 23-11429      Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024      Page: 20 of 20

        20                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11429

        Chance Agreement, not for taking breaks. In any event, Oirya’s
        argument conflates an ADA interference claim under 42 U.S.C.
        § 12203(b) with an ADA retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C.
        § 12203(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (making it “unlawful to coerce,
        intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise
        or enjoyment of, . . . any right granted or protected by” the ADA).
        Oirya did not assert an ADA interference claim in the district court.
               Even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
        Oirya, a reasonable jury could not conclude that his termination
        was causally connected to any activity protected under the ADA.
        Because Oirya failed to establish a prima facie case, the district court
        properly granted summary judgment to Mando on his retaliation
        claim.
                                IV. CONCLUSION
              In sum, we dismiss Oirya’s appeal of the magistrate judge’s
        order denying his second motion to amend his complaint for lack
        of appellate jurisdiction. We affirm the district court’s grant of
        summary judgment in favor of Mando on Oirya’s failure-to-
        accommodate and retaliation claims under the ADA.
               DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.