Court Opinion

ID: 9365776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 07:10:42.437236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.621010
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 23, 2023

                                    S  In The
                              Court of Appeals
                       Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-21-00882-CV

                 IN THE INTEREST OF N.W.C., A MINOR CHILD

                  On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District Court
                               Dallas County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-01933

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
                               Opinion by Justice Smith
      This is an appeal from an order in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship

under Texas Family Code chapter 156. In three issues, Mother appeals the order’s

restrictions on geographic residency and international travel and the trial court’s

decision to exclude the testimony of Mother’s expert witness. We affirm the trial

court’s order.

                                    Background

      Mother and Father divorced in November 2016. The divorce decree gave

Mother the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of N.W.C., their two-

year-old son, within Dallas County, Collin County, or Southlake Independent School

District. When N.W.C. turned three, the decree gave Father the right of possession
on the second, fourth, and fifth weekends of each month and Thursday evenings

during the school year. Father also had the right of possession for spring break in

even-numbered years and extended possession in the summer. Mother had the right

of possession at all other undesignated times. Mother also had the independent right

to make decisions concerning N.W.C.’s education after consulting with Father, but,

if unable to agree, they were to attempt to resolve the disagreement through a

parenting facilitator. The decree also required them to provide written notice to each

other if they intended to travel with N.W.C. outside the United States during their

period of possession.

      In July 2017, Mother married Stepfather, who lived and worked in Oklahoma

City, Oklahoma. Thereafter, Mother and N.W.C. spent as much time as possible

with Stepfather in Oklahoma.

      In December 2017, Mother filed a petition to modify the parent-child

relationship. The petition did not identify the modifications Mother sought. Instead,

it indicated that the parties, pursuant to the divorce decree, were to first mediate

issues regarding modification to the conservatorship of, possession of, or access to

N.W.C.

      In July 2018, Father filed a counter-petition. Believing Mother had relocated

her primary residence outside the geographic area set forth in the divorce decree,

Father requested the right to designate N.W.C.’s primary residence within the

already-existing geographic residency area.

                                         –2–
       Thereafter, Mother advised Father that she wanted to permanently relocate

with N.W.C. to Oklahoma City. She and Father were unable to reach an agreement

and, in October 2018, Mother amended her petition, seeking to remove the

geographical residency restriction and be named the conservator with the exclusive

right to make educational decisions for N.W.C. In a November 2020 supplement to

his counter-petition, Father requested to be appointed the conservator with the

exclusive right to make educational decisions for N.W.C. with the condition that the

trial court “confirm that the parties must agree on education decisions” and, “in the

absence of agreement . . . [, N.W.C.] shall continue in his present school for so long

as he is eligible.”

       In May 2021, the trial court held a bench trial, and both parties presented

evidence related to the parents’ disagreements over N.W.C’s education and travel

and whether relocation to Oklahoma City would be in N.W.C.’s best interest.

Afterward, the trial court filed a Rendition on Request for Modification, denying

Mother’s petition and granting in part and denying in part Father’s counter-petition.

Mother filed motions for reconsideration of the rendition and the trial court’s

exclusion of her expert witness’s testimony at trial. The trial court denied her

motions and, in July 2021, issued a final order. The order provided that Mother

retained the exclusive right to designate N.W.C.’s primary residence so long as

Mother resided in Dallas County and contiguous counties, except Ellis County;

should Mother elect to reside outside of this geographic area, Father would have the

                                         –3–
exclusive right to designate N.WC.’s residence within Dallas and contiguous

counties; Mother and Father were to consult and agree on the school N.W.C. would

attend following the 2021-2022 school year; and there must be written agreement

regarding N.W.C.’s international travel. Finding that Mother’s actions regarding the

modification and relocation issues were deceptive and disingenuous, the trial court

ordered her to pay $100,000 of Father’s reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.

      Mother subsequently requested, and the trial court issued, findings of fact and

conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

                      Modification of Residency Restriction

      In her first issue, Mother asserts the trial court abused its discretion in deciding

not to lift the geographical residency restriction to allow Mother and N.W.C. to

relocate to Oklahoma City. Specifically, Mother argues the trial court failed to

properly balance the relevant factors set out in Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10 (Tex.

2002), imposed an elevated burden of proof on Mother, and reached an arbitrary

decision unsupported by the evidence.

      A trial court may modify a conservatorship order if the movant proves by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the modification would be in the best interest

of the child, and (2) the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other person

affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the date of the

rendition of the prior order. In re W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2011, no pet.) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101); Zeifman v. Michels, 212

                                          –4–
S.W.3d 582, 589 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). In this case, Mother

challenges only the trial court’s determination that lifting the geographical residency

restriction was not in N.W.C.’s best interest.

      The best interest of the child is always the primary consideration in issues of

conservatorship. W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d at 514 (citing FAM. § 156.101). Generally,

courts have moved “from a relatively strict presumption against relocation and

toward a more fluid balancing test that permits the trial court to take into account a

greater number of relevant factors.” Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14–15. There is “no bright-

line test,” however, because determining whether relocation is in a child’s best

interest is “intensely fact driven.” Id. at 19.

      When a primary custodial parent seeks to relocate, a court is guided by

imperatives to:

      (1)    assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact
             with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest
             of the child;

      (2)    provide a safe, stable, and nonviolent environment for the child;
             and

      (3)    encourage parents to share in the rights and duties of raising their
             child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.

See id. at 14 (citing FAM. § 153.001(a)). In Lenz, the supreme court also identified

a number of factors that may help give meaning to the best-interest standard in the

context of relocation. Id. at 15-16, 19. These factors include the reasons for and

against the move; education, health, and leisure opportunities afforded by the move;

                                          –5–
accommodation of the child’s special needs or talents; the effect on extended family

relationships; the effect on visitation and communication with the noncustodial

parent; the noncustodial parent’s ability to relocate; and the child’s age.1 Id. at 15–

16.

          We review a trial court’s decision to modify a conservatorship order for an

abuse of discretion. W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d at 513; In re S.E.K., 294 S.W.3d 926, 930

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Under this standard, we determine whether

the trial court acted unreasonably; that is, did the court act in an arbitrary manner or

without reference to any guiding rules or principles. W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d at 513.

          Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a parent-child

relationship order are not independent grounds; instead, they are relevant factors in

assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id.; Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at

587–88. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, we consider

whether the trial court (1) had sufficient information on which to exercise its

discretion, and (2) erred in exercising its discretion. Zeifman, 212 S.W.3d at 588.

We conduct the applicable sufficiency review under the first prong. Id. We then

determine whether, based on the evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision

      1
       The factfinder also may consider general factors relevant to the best interest of a child, including the
child’s desires; the child’s current and future physical and emotional needs; any physical or emotional
danger to the child in the present or future; the parental abilities of the individuals involved; the programs
available to those individuals to promote the child’s best interest; the plans for the child by these individuals;
the stability of the home; acts or omissions by a parent tending to show that the existing parent-child
relationship is not a proper one; and any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. In re Z.R.P., No.
05-12-00134-CV, 2013 WL 2157237, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 20, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).
                                                      –6–
that was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Id. If some evidence of a substantial

and probative character supports the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of

discretion. W.C.B., 337 S.W.3d at 513.

      A trial court’s written findings of fact and conclusions of law have the same

dignity as a jury’s verdict. In re S.D.S.H., No. 05-15-00564-CV, 2016 WL 3398074,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). Findings of fact are

subject to review under the same legal and factual sufficiency standards as jury

findings. Id.

      “[T]he trial court is in the best position to observe and assess the witnesses’

demeanor and credibility and to sense the ‘forces, powers, and influences’ that may

not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal.” In re C.M.C., No. 05-

15-01359-CV, 2016 WL 7166415, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 9, 2016, no pet.)

(mem. op.). Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s resolution of underlying facts

and credibility determinations that may have affected its decision and do not

substitute our judgment for the trial court’s judgment. Id.

      Here, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in determining that

relocation to Oklahoma City was not in N.W.C.’s best interest. She first asserts the

trial court’s findings of fact indicate that the court imposed an elevated burden on

Mother and, therefore, incorrectly weighed the evidence related to relocation.

Specifically, Mother argues the following findings of fact reflect that the trial court

                                         –7–
required her to establish certain factors relevant to whether relocation would be in

N.W.C.’s best interest:

      21.   [Mother] failed to establish that relocation to Oklahoma City
            would improve her financial situation and ability to provide a
            better standard of living for [N.W.C.];

      22.   [Mother] failed to establish that any benefit that may inure to her
            based upon the move would outweigh the detriment or negative
            impact to [N.W.C.’s] future relationship with [Father];

      23.   [Mother] failed to establish that the move would not negatively
            impact [N.W.C’s] existing relationship with [Father];

      24.   [Mother] failed to establish that relocation to Oklahoma City
            would improve the educational opportunities for [N.W.C.];

      25.   [Mother] failed to establish that [N.W.C.’s] relationship with and
            the presence of extended family and friends would be enhanced
            by the move;

      26.   [Mother] failed to establish that [N.W.C.’s] current relationships
            with extended family and friends would not be negatively
            impacted or damaged by the move;

      27.   [Mother] failed to establish that the move would not have a
            negative effect on [Father’s] visitation and communication with
            [N.W.C.]; and

      28.   [Mother] failed to establish that [Father] has the ability to
            relocate to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

Mother had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that lifting the

geographic residency restriction was in N.W.C.’s best interest. See In re T.M.P.,

417 S.W.3d 557, 562 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). She did not have to

establish that any particular factor weighed in favor of relocation. However, we

                                        –8–
interpret the trial court’s findings not to reflect an additional burden of proof on

Mother, but to show that the court considered the factors and found that they did not

weigh in favor of relocation.

        Mother next argues that the trial court failed to give weight to factors favoring

relocation, reached conclusions unsupported by Texas law on factors weighing

against relocation, and improperly weighed irrelevant factors.2 Mother further

asserts that there is no evidence of a substantial and probative character to show that

the trial court’s order would advance the best interest of N.W.C.

        The evidence at trial showed that, although claiming a primary residence in

Dallas, Mother and N.W.C. spent as much time as possible in Oklahoma City

following her July 2017 marriage to Stepfather.3 Although Mother testified that they

intended for Stepfather to relocate to Dallas, Stepfather did not request a relocation

from his employer until the end of 2018. His request was denied. Stepfather’s

position as vice-president and general counsel for an Oklahoma holding company

was unique, and he did not believe he could replicate his position and salary in Dallas

or anywhere else.

    2
       To the extent Mother complains about the trial court’s findings that she considers irrelevant or the
lack of findings favoring relocation, Mother has waived her complaint. A party that believes the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law are deficient in some way may request amended or additional
findings and conclusions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 298. If a party does not request amended or additional
findings, it waives its right to complain on appeal about irrelevant or omitted findings. See, e.g., Villalpando
v. Villalpando, 480 S.W.3d 801, 809–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.); Dallas Morning News Co. v.
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 861 S.W.2d 532, 538 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ
denied). Mother did not request additional or amended findings.
    3
       Their residence in Dallas was the upstairs of Mother’s parents’ home, which Mother and Stepfather
leased.
                                                     –9–
      Mother tried to comply with the residency restriction in the divorce decree,

but “her heart and life” were in Oklahoma with Stepfather. Mother, who was not

employed, testified that Stepfather supported her financially and emotionally. It

would be very difficult if she and N.W.C. could not relocate and live as an intact

family with Stepfather. Stepfather testified that relocation would benefit Mother

and, as a result, N.W.C. because of the very close bond he and Mother shared.

Stepfather also testified, however, that he could commute between Oklahoma City

and Dallas and would meet Mother’s financial needs wherever she lived.

      Father worked from home for a pharmaceutical company. Although he

previously lived and worked in Oklahoma City, Father held a different position with

responsibilities in Dallas, an important Texas client, and needed to live near DFW

Airport to accommodate his work travel requirements.

      Mother testified to a number of educational and fun activities that N.W.C. did

in Oklahoma City. Stepfather and N.W.C. had a good relationship, and N.W.C. also

built relationships with Stepfather’s extended family, including a number of relatives

in Sharon, which is a two-hour drive from Oklahoma City. Father testified to

activities that he did with N.W.C. during his possession periods, including spending

time with Father’s extended family. Mother acknowledged that N.W.C. also could

participate in the activities and lessons he enjoyed in Oklahoma City in Dallas. And,

N.W.C. had close relationships with both his maternal and paternal grandparents, a

number of other relatives, and Father’s fiancé, all of whom lived in the Dallas area.

                                        –10–
      Mother and Father were unable to agree regarding N.W.C.’s education and,

despite both parents stating that they wanted N.W.C. in school, he did not attend

preschool. Ultimately, the trial court became involved and ordered that N.W.C.

attend kindergarten at a private school in Dallas. Father, who met with N.W.C.’s

teacher several times, testified that N.W.C. had a good kindergarten experience

despite attending virtually. According to Mother, N.W.C. attended kindergarten

virtually because Mother had autoimmune issues and was concerned about exposure

to Covid-19. Mother, however, also testified to a number of activities that she and

N.W.C. did in public places as well as several trips they made during the same time

period. Father did not believe Mother put N.W.C.’s education first, noting occasions

when N.W.C. attended school from the backseat of Mother’s car on Thursdays when

she was driving N.W.C. from Oklahoma City to Dallas for Father’s possession

periods. Mother, on the other hand, testified that Father did not keep up with

N.W.C.’s school assignments during his Thursday night possessions.

      The evidence showed that communication between Mother and Father had

been poor. Although Mother told Father she was engaged, she did not tell him when

she remarried because she did not think it was relevant. Instead, Father learned of

the marriage in an email from Stepfather almost two months after the fact. And,

despite Father’s inquiries, it was not until Stepfather’s relocation request was denied

before Mother was forthcoming to Father about her and N.W.C. spending most of

their time in Oklahoma City. Based on their history, Father did not have confidence

                                        –11–
that their co-parenting relationship would allow them to work together on issues if

Mother lived in Oklahoma City.

      The evidence showed that Mother generally accommodated Father on the few

occasions his work conflicted with a possession period.         She also facilitated

FaceTime visits for Father and N.W.C. However, Father feared that, if she and

N.W.C. moved, it would be more difficult for his relationship with N.W.C. to

continue.

      Carrie Beaird, who served as parent facilitator, testified that both Mother and

Father were engaged parents and really loved N.W.C., but they struggled to

communicate and disagreed about what was in N.W.C.’s best interest. Beaird had

concerns about Mother’s tendency to make unilateral decisions about N.W.C.

Beaird also had concerns about Mother’s honesty and transparency in

communicating about where she and N.W.C. were living. Discussions regarding

N.W.C.’s education and activities became complicated because Mother and Father

were living in different cities. Beaird explained that parents residing in the same

geographic location, where they are able to work together more closely and both

regularly attend activities, reduced pressure on the child.

      Dr. Victoria Harvey, the child custody evaluator in this case, observed that

both Father and Mother appeared to have a positive relationship with N.W.C. She

also observed N.W.C. with extended family, finding his relationship with Father’s

family to be positive and with Mother’s family to be good. N.W.C.’s relationship

                                        –12–
with Stepfather also appeared positive, but Dr. Harvey did not believe it outweighed

the social relationships available to N.W.C. in the Dallas area.

      Dr. Harvey had concerns about N.W.C.’s socialization and ability to maintain

attention; she believed he should attend school in person. His experience attending

virtually, and even in the backseat of a car, was not in his best interest. Dr. Harvey

also had a concern about N.W.C’s speech and recommended an evaluation, but

Mother disagreed that an evaluation was needed.

      According to Dr. Harvey, Mother was a “parallel parent,” which caused Dr.

Harvey significant concerns about her ability and willingness to co-parent with

Father. Dr. Harvey believed that Mother would exclude Father from N.W.C.’s life

if she and N.W.C. relocated. Dr. Harvey also considered Mother a potentially

restrictive gatekeeper, meaning that her attitudes, beliefs, and/or behavior were not

supportive of N.W.C.’s relationship with Father. Observing inconsistencies in

Mother’s reporting, Dr. Harvey had concerns about Mother’s pattern of not

responding to Father’s communications as well as providing evasive or insufficient

responses. One example of this was Mother’s lack of veracity regarding her intent

to stay in Dallas while spending her time in Oklahoma City. Mother, however, did

not see a problem with her pattern of not responding to Father’s communications. If

Mother and N.W.C. were to relocate, there would be a greater need for transparency

and cooperation so Father could stay informed and involved and, based on their

history, Dr. Harvey believed N.W.C.’s relationship with Father would suffer.

                                        –13–
      Ultimately, Dr. Harvey concluded that it was in N.W.C.’s best interest that he

and both parents remain in the Dallas area. Dr. Harvey concluded that the costs

associated with Mother and N.W.C. relocating greatly outweighed its potential

benefits, especially in light of Mother’s stated intention of living in the Dallas area

should N.W.C. not be allowed to relocate. On cross-examination, Dr. Harvey

acknowledged that her report was almost two-years old and a lot had happened since

then. However, she believed her report was reliable and valid when she wrote it and

stood by her recommendation.

      Mother contends that the trial court’s findings of fact indicate the court failed

to give weight to or recognize factors and evidence in support of relocation,

including Mother’s quality of life and the positive effect it would have on N.W.C.,

the impact it would have on Mother’s and N.W.C.’s financial, economic, health, and

leisure opportunities, and the presence of extended family and friends in Oklahoma.

To the contrary, the findings show the court considered these factors, but in weighing

them, found evidence that any benefit that would inure to Mother did not outweigh

the negative impact to N.W.C’s relationship to Father.

      Mother’s desire to live as an intact family with Stepfather, who supported her

and helped with N.W.C., was a valid reason weighing in favor of relocation. And,

it is reasonable to infer that Mother’s happiness would benefit N.W.C. But, the

evidence also shows that Stepfather was prepared to commute and would support

                                        –14–
Mother no matter where she lived.4 And, although there was evidence that N.W.C.

had ample educational, health, and leisure opportunities in Oklahoma, Mother

acknowledged that those same or similar opportunities were available to N.W.C. in

the Dallas area.

        The evidence showed that N.W.C. had close relationships with extended

family in both the Dallas area and Oklahoma, and the trial court concluded that the

presence of extended family did not weigh in favor of relocation. Mother asserts

there is no evidence that N.W.C. would be deprived of time spent with his Dallas

area relatives if they relocated to Oklahoma City because Mother visits her family

regularly and N.W.C. could see Father’s family during his possession periods. But,

likewise, there is no evidence that N.W.C. would not be able to visit and maintain

his relationships with Stepfather’s extended family during Mother’s possession

periods.

        The trial court heard substantial evidence of concern that, due to Mother’s

communication patterns and parenting methods, relocation posed a threat of

continued problems between Mother and Father as well as to N.W.C.’s relationship

    4
         Citing In re D.M.D., No. 05-07-01045-CV, 2009 WL 280465, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6,
2009, no pet.) (mem. op.), Mother asserts that the trial court’s primary consideration should have been on
the quality of life for N.W.C. and Mother, the custodial parent. See also Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 18 (“[b]ecause
the custodial parent provides the child with a basic quality of life, a child’s best interest is closely
intertwined with the well-being of the custodial parent”). However, in D.M.D., the record was “almost
devoid” of evidence concerning what the child’s life would be like if his mother abided by the residency
restriction in order to maintain her right to designate his primary residence. 2009 WL 280465, at *4. That
is not true in this case.

                                                  –15–
with Father. The parents’ difficulty in communicating and working together was

clearly important to the trial court’s analysis and, along with other evidence,

supported the court’s findings that it was in N.W.C.’s best interest to remain in the

Dallas area, an opinion shared by Dr. Harvey, a neutral professional who performed

an extensive child custody evaluation.

      As Lenz makes clear, there is “no bright-line test” for determining whether

relocation is in a child’s best interest. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 14–15. Here, the record

indicates that the trial court heard evidence relevant to, and considered, the factors

set out in Lenz and the imperatives of section 153.001(a).           Although Mother

disagrees with the weight the trial court assigned to the evidence, the court had great

latitude in determining the best interest of N.W.C. See T.M.P., 417 S.W.3d at 563,

566. We must defer to the trial court’s resolution of the underlying facts and

credibility determinations, id., including the court’s findings in this case that Mother

was not a reliable source of information and her testimony was contrived.

      After reviewing the evidence in light of the relevant factors for determining

whether relocation is in a child’s best interest, we conclude the trial court’s findings

of fact are supported by evidence of a substantial and probative character, as is the

trial court’s ultimate finding that relocation was not in the best interest of N.W.C.

We further conclude that the trial court’s decision was neither unreasonable nor

arbitrary. Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s first issue.

                                         –16–
                             Expert Witness Testimony

      In her second issue, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding the expert witness testimony of Dr. Jonathan Gould on rebuttal. Father’s

counsel objected to, and moved to strike, Dr. Gould’s testimony as improper rebuttal

testimony and for lack of foundation because Dr. Gould had not interviewed N.W.C.

or any of the witnesses. The trial court sustained Father’s objection.

      Whether to admit or exclude evidence, including expert testimony, is within

the trial court’s discretion. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.

2000). We uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis

for the ruling. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex.

1998); State Bar of Tex. v. Evans, 774 S.W.2d 656, 658 n.5 (Tex. 1989).

      Texas Family Code section 104.008 precludes a person from offering an

expert opinion or recommendation relating to conservatorship of, possession of, or

access to a child at issue in a suit unless that person has conducted a child custody

evaluation under Family Code chapter 107.          FAM. § 104.008.       The excluded

testimony need not be an opinion on custody; section 104.008 authorizes exclusion

of testimony “relating to” the conservatorship of, possession of, or access to the child

at issue. See In re Gopalan, No. 03-21-00209-CV, 2021 WL 2964263, at *2–3 (Tex.

App.—Austin, July 15, 2021) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (no abuse of discretion

to exclude potential testimony of expert witness who did not perform custody

                                         –17–
evaluation when witness’s report criticized the scope of information considered by

child custody evaluator and opined that evaluation had substantive problems).

      In this case, Dr. Harvey was appointed as the child custody evaluator, and she

undertook an evaluation meeting the requirements of Family Code chapter 107.

Both parents consented to the evaluation, and, at trial, Dr. Harvey testified to her

findings and recommendations.

      Dr. Gould did not conduct a child custody evaluation, but Mother offered his

testimony to critique Dr. Harvey’s conservatorship opinion. Specifically, Dr. Gould

sought to testify to Dr. Harvey’s failure to look critically at certain factors, including

parenting attributes, the educational and psychological needs of N.W.C., and the fit

between those needs and what Mother and Father provided. Because the offered

testimony clearly related to the conservatorship of, possession of, or access to

N.W.C. and Dr. Gould did not conduct a child custody evaluation, we conclude the

trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Gould’s testimony at trial.

See, e.g., id.; FAM. § 104.008. We overrule Mother’s second issue.

                          International Travel Restriction

      In her third issue, Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing an international travel restriction that was not requested by either party,

tried by consent, or in N.W.C.’s best interest. We disagree.

      A judgment, absent issues tried by consent, must conform to the pleadings.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (“The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings,

                                          –18–
the nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give

the party all the relief to which he [or she] may be entitled either in law or equity.”).

See also FAM. § 102.008(b)(10) (requiring parties to include in their pleadings a

“statement describing what action the court is requested to take concerning the child

and the statutory grounds on which the request is made.”). The purpose of pleadings

is “to give fair notice of a party’s claims and the relief sought.” James v. Comm’n

for Lawyer Discipline, 310 S.W.3d 598, 608 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.).

Pleadings may be liberally construed to support the judgment. Bos v. Smith, 556

S.W.3d 293, 305–06 (Tex. 2018).

      If issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of

the parties, they shall be treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. TEX. R.

CIV. P. 67. To determine whether an issue was tried by consent, the trial court

examines the record not for evidence of the issue, but rather for evidence of trial of

the issue. Case Corp. v. Hi-Class Bus. Sys. of Am., Inc., 184 S.W.3d 760, 771 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied).

      The divorce decree required that Mother and Father provide written notice if

they intended for N.W.C. to travel internationally during their period of possession.

Mother’s live petition requested that the trial court enter a parenting plan consistent

with her simultaneously-filed proposed parenting plan, which provided that Mother

could designate a two-week possession period during the summer for N.W.C. to

accompany her on Stepfather’s international work trip. The proposed plan also

                                         –19–
provided for Mother and Father to provide certain information when they planned to

travel with N.W.C domestically by airline.         The trial court’s order, however,

included a modified provision requiring that N.W.C.’s international travel be by

written agreement. Although the trial court did not order the particular provisions

Mother requested, we cannot conclude that Mother, who requested modification

related to both domestic and international travel, lacked fair notice of trial on the

issue.

         Even if the issue were not raised by the pleading, we conclude it was tried by

consent. There was considerable evidence at trial from witnesses for both Mother

and Father about conflicts and poor communication regarding both international and

domestic travel. There was testimony that Father traveled in-state with N.W.C. on

one occasion without informing Mother.           Stepfather testified to disagreement

regarding whether a trip Mother and N.W.C. made to Italy in 2018 occurred during

Father’s weekend possessions. Father filed a motion for contempt during the trip,

and, ultimately, a mediation was necessary to resolve make-up possession time for

Father. Mother’s counsel elicited Father’s testimony about the incident. The trial

court also questioned Father about the incident and both parties’ “intellectual

dishonesty relative to these issues,” even commenting on the difficulty in entering

an effective order. There was evidence that Mother tended not to communicate, or

communicate only minimally, in general and with respect to travel information.

According to Dr. Harvey, Mother did not seem to understand how she could have

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handled communications about the trip to Italy any differently. Dr. Harvey also had

a general concern about Mother planning things, like the trip, and then seeking

permission. On this record, it is apparent that there was trial by consent on

modification to the divorce decree’s international travel provisions.

          Mother also contends that the record does not show the international travel

restriction was in N.W.C.’s best interest.5 Specifically, Mother argues there is no

case law to support an international travel restriction based on “communication

challenges.” Citing Messier v. Messier, 389 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.), Mother notes that such a restriction has been deemed

required only where the safety of the child was at issue or where there was a risk of

international abduction. In Messier, the trial court, although finding no credible

evidence of risk of abduction, determined that limiting the mother’s control over the

children’s international travel was in the children’s best interest when there was

evidence of “irrational and threatening behavior” by the mother. 389 S.W.3d at 908–

11.

          A trial court may impose restrictions to a conservator’s rights with respect to

a child so long as the restrictions are necessary, and not excessive, to protecting the

      5
       Mother asserts that the international travel restriction is not supported by the trial court’s findings of
fact, but she did not file a motion requesting additional or amended findings of fact. Accordingly, we
presume the court impliedly made findings, supported by the record, necessary to support its order. Vickery
v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 258 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied);
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 299; Collins v. Walker, 341 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2011, no pet.) (losing party may request additional findings on omitted elements to prevent them from being
deemed on appeal).
                                                     –21–
best interest of the child. Messier, 389 S.W.3d at 910 (citing FAM. § 153.072). A

trial court had broad discretion in determining a child’s best interest, see id. at 909,

and we are aware of no authority requiring a court to find a risk to a child’s safety

before imposing a requirement that parents agree to the child’s travel.

       The trial court was in the best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor

and personalities and understand influences on family dynamic that cannot be

discerned simply by reference to the record. Id. at 909-10. We conclude there is

some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the trial court’s

decision to require each parent to obtain written permission for international travel.

The trial court reasonably could have found that requiring Mother and Father to

communicate well in advance about both the timing of international travel and any

related changes to possessory periods was necessary, but not excessive, to protect

N.W.C.’s best interest. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing the restriction on international travel. We overrule Mother’s

third issue.

       We affirm the trial court’s order in the suit to modify the parent-child

relationship.

                                            /Craig Smith/
                                            CRAIG SMITH
210882F.P05                                 JUSTICE

                                         –22–
                                       S
                              Court of Appeals
                       Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      JUDGMENT

 IN THE INTEREST OF N.W.C., A                      On Appeal from the 330th Judicial District
 MINOR CHILD                                       Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                                   Trial Court Cause No. DF-16-01933.
 No. 05-21-00882-CV        V.                      Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                                   Justices Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
                                                   participating.

     In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee recover his costs of this appeal from appellant.

Judgment entered this 23rd day of January, 2023.

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