Court Opinion

ID: 9960091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:02:08.903852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.391772
License: Public Domain

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Page 2A                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                              April 16, 2024

          2               APRIL, 2024                      224 Conn. App. 668
                           Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

                    MATHEW BURR ET AL. v. GROSSMAN
                        CHEVROLET-NISSAN, INC.
                             (AC 45867)
                                Cradle, Seeley and Norcott, Js.

                                            Syllabus

          The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant
             car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation
             of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et
             seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the
             managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed
             an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow
             truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and
             B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported
             contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to
             the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant’s salesmen, to
             return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B
             was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and
             E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection
             with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into
             evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified
             the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales
             price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that
             which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into
             the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged
             their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also
             alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney
             sticker, did not reflect the vehicle’s true price. D died sometime after
             the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action.
             G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the
             plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge
             of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D
             and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that
             reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the January
             21, 2015 contract. She stated that two contracts were signed in connec-
             tion with the sale of the plow truck, the first on January 21, 2015, and
             the second on January 26, 2015; however, she claimed that both contracts
             reflected the same cash price of the truck and the same amount financed.
             She stated that the January 26, 2015 contract was signed because the
             defendant was able to secure more favorable approval terms with a
             second lender, A Co., and that D had asked the plaintiffs to return to
             the defendant to rescind the January 21, 2015 contract so they could
             take advantage of those terms. The trial court rendered judgment in
             favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiffs failed to sustain their
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          224 Conn. App. 668                           APRIL, 2024                       3
                            Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
               burden of proof regarding their claims of breach of contract, fraud, and
               theft and that they failed to establish that the defendant engaged in
               unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the plaintiffs appealed to this
               court. Held:
          1. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court misinterpreted their legal claims
               was unavailing: to the extent the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court
               failed to make certain factual findings or that it overlooked claims made
               by the plaintiffs, this court did not agree with such claims, and the
               plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification,
               or a motion for articulation seeking to have the trial court address the
               alleged deficiencies; moreover, in its memorandum of decision, the trial
               court explicitly addressed each of the counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint,
               and each of the claims B asserted at trial when the court asked him to
               summarize their claims, before holding that the plaintiffs had not met
               their burden of proof as to each count.
          2. The plaintiffs’ arguments challenging the trial court’s credibility determina-
               tions were not convincing: contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there
               was no indication that the trial court did not base its credibility determi-
               nations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude of the witnesses; more-
               over, after finding G’s testimony credible, the trial court stated that
               her testimony was supported by documentary evidence and properly
               explained its determination by citing to various portions of her testimony
               and the other evidence admitted at trial, and it was not the role of this
               court to second-guess the trial court’s credibility determinations.
          3. The plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court made findings contrary to the
               evidence that undermined appellate confidence in the trial court’s fact-
               finding process and required a new trial failed:
              a. This court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that the
              trial court had erred in finding that there was no evidence to support
              the plaintiffs’ claims and that the plaintiffs had signed the documents
              related to the sale of the plow truck: the trial court’s finding that it
              ‘‘defie[d] common sense’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs
              to drive the truck off the defendant’s property without a deal in place was
              not clearly erroneous because the court explicitly credited G’s testimony,
              which supported a finding that the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo
              scam and that the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of a
              plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises on January 21, 2015;
              moreover, in asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the evi-
              dence did not support their claims because they had been forced to
              return to the defendant the only copy of the alleged original contract,
              the plaintiffs misapprehended the burdens of proof related to their com-
              plaint, implying that the defendant had the burden of proving that the
              plaintiffs had signed the documents in evidence when, in fact, the burden
              was on the plaintiffs to prove that the signatures were not genuine;
              furthermore, the plaintiffs did not submit any credible evidence that
              their signatures on the documents in evidence had been forged, that any
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          4                 APRIL, 2024                       224 Conn. App. 668
                            Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.
              of the documents in evidence had been improperly fabricated or changed,
              that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with A Co., or that any
              of the defendant’s behavior amounted to a CUTPA violation, and they
              offered only the testimony of B and E in support of their complaint,
              which the trial court found not to be credible.
              b. This court declined to review the plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to
              the trial court’s findings: in making their claims that it was clearly errone-
              ous for the trial court to find that it was not logical or reasonable that
              E would make payments to A Co. with respect to a January 26, 2015
              contract that he had never signed and that the trial court could not
              reconcile the claim that someone else put E’s name, as a member of M
              Co., on the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that M Co. bought
              the plow truck, the plaintiffs were questioning the trial court’s interpreta-
              tion of their claims at trial, which they should have addressed by filing
              a motion to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion articulation;
              moreover, the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs ratified the January
              26, 2015 contract was unnecessary to its holding because the court had
              already found that M Co. agreed to the contract, and, as such, the plaintiffs
              could not have been aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s
              finding; furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to preserve for appellate review
              their claim that the trial court erred in finding that the defendant’s failure
              to supplement the Monroney sticker on the plow truck to reflect that
              the truck had been equipped with a plow was insignificant because, in
              the trial court, they did not cite to any law or make any argument to
              explain the significance of affixing an addendum to the Monroney sticker.
                     Argued January 16—officially released April 16, 2024

                                        Procedural History

            Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of
          contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
          Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, and tried
          to the court, Hon. Edward S. Domnarski, judge trial
          referee; judgment for the defendant, from which the
          plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed.
              Jack G. Steigelfest, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
            Michael R. McPherson, with whom, on the brief, was
          Laura Pascale Zaino, for the appellee (defendant).
                                              Opinion

            CRADLE, J. The plaintiffs, Mathew Burr, Elmer
          Blackwell, and MPK Property Maintenance, LLC (MPK),
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          224 Conn. App. 668                         APRIL, 2024                      5
                           Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered
          in favor of the defendant, Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan,
          Inc.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred
          in (1) misinterpreting their legal claims, (2) relying on
          the testimony of the defendant’s representative to reach
          its conclusion, and (3) finding certain facts in support
          of its judgment for the defendant. We affirm the judg-
          ment of the trial court.
             The plaintiffs’ four count complaint, dated September
          6, 2018, alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and
          violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
          (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Following
          a three day bench trial, the court, Hon. Edward S.
          Domnarski, judge trial referee, set forth the following
          relevant procedural and factual history in a memoran-
          dum of decision dated September 12, 2022. ‘‘The plain-
          tiffs’ claims arise out of MPK’s purchase, in January,
          2015, of a 2015 Chevrolet Silverado truck equipped with
          a snowplow (plow truck). The court heard evidence on
          April 26 and 27 and May 3, 2022. The parties filed post-
          trial briefs on August 15, 2022.
             ‘‘The complaint contains 126 paragraphs; the first
          seventy-three paragraphs contain allegations related to
          the plaintiffs’ purchase, from the defendant, of another
          vehicle, a 2014 Chevrolet Silverado dump truck (dump
          truck), in May of 2014. Although much of the testimony
          and many of the exhibits related to the purchase of the
          dump truck, the court finds that the plaintiffs’ claims
          against the defendant relate to the purchase and sale
          of the plow truck.
            ‘‘Burr, the managing member of MPK, testified to
          the following events. On or about January 21, 2015,
            1
             References in this opinion to the defendant are to Grossman Chevrolet-
          Nissan, Inc. References in this opinion to Grossman are to the defendant’s
          representative, Linda Grossman, who testified at trial on behalf of the defen-
          dant.
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          6               APRIL, 2024                      224 Conn. App. 668
                           Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          he discussed purchase of the plow truck with Lewis
          Davidson, a salesman at the defendant. The court notes
          Davidson has since passed away and was never deposed
          in this action. Davidson quoted Burr a price of $41,916
          for the plow truck. The evidence established the plow
          had previously been installed on the truck by a company
          known as Dejana Truck & Utility Equipment Company,
          Inc. . . . Financing for the purchase of the plow truck
          was arranged by Davidson. Davidson told Burr that the
          financing would be at a rate of 4.3 percent spread out
          over seventy-two months. Burr signed an instalment
          contract on behalf of MPK on January 21, 2015, and
          drove the plow truck off the defendant’s lot. A few days
          after purchasing the plow truck, Burr was asked to
          return to the defendant’s showroom. Burr met with
          Davidson who told Burr that he needed to return the
          purchase documents to Davidson so that corrections
          could be made to the documents. Burr gave his pur-
          chase documents to Davidson, who assured Burr that
          the terms of the purchase documents would not be
          changed. In their posttrial brief, the plaintiffs refer to
          the [January 21, 2015] contract returned to Davidson
          as ‘Contract #1.’ The plaintiffs did not submit this pur-
          ported contract as an exhibit. Burr testified he did not
          return to the defendant to sign any other documents.
          . . .
             ‘‘Blackwell, who is described as a very close family
          friend, testified that he cosigned documents to help
          Burr purchase the dump truck and the plow truck.2
          Blackwell also testified that he went to the defendant’s
          showroom on January 21, 2015, to cosign the documents
          so Burr could purchase the plow truck. Blackwell also
          testified that he never went back to the defendant after
          January 21, 2015. It should be noted that on a retail
            2
              The plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Blackwell cosigned the docu-
          ments in his individual capacity and that Blackwell was never a member
          of MPK.
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          224 Conn. App. 668                        APRIL, 2024                     7
                           Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          instalment contract dated January 26, 2015 . . . Black-
          well is listed as a co-buyer of the plow truck, along
          with MPK.
             ‘‘Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have submitted
          a retail instalment contract dated January 26, 2015,
          which identifies the [plow truck]. . . . The contract
          contains the following relevant terms. The cash price
          for the vehicle, without tax, is $45,509. The amount
          financed is $43,745.16, with an annual percentage rate
          of 5.45 percent, payable by seventy-five monthly pay-
          ments of $691.10. Burr and Blackwell both testified that
          they never signed the retail instalment contract . . .
          dated January 26, 2015.
             ‘‘It is the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant created
          new purchase and financing documents for the plow
          truck that were never signed by the plaintiffs. The new
          financing documents stated an increased sales price for
          the plow truck, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer
          loan period than had been quoted by Davidson. The
          plaintiffs also claim that the defendant forged the plain-
          tiffs’ signatures on the documents. In addition, the plain-
          tiffs claim the window sticker on the plow truck, known
          as a Monroney sticker,3 did not reflect the true price
          of the plow truck.
            ‘‘The plaintiffs did not provide a computation of their
          claimed damages at the trial. In their posttrial brief, the
          plaintiffs state that the improper actions of the defen-
          dant imposed a higher debt burden on the plaintiffs,
          which entitles them to compensatory damages for
          breach of contract in the amount of $9909.
            ‘‘[Linda] Grossman is the owner and general manager
          of the defendant. Although she did not have firsthand
            3
              A Monroney sticker is ‘‘the label placed on new automobiles with the
          manufacturer’s suggested retail price and other consumer information, as
          specified at 15 U.S.C. [§§ 1231 through 1233] (also known as the ‘Automobile
          Information Disclosure Act label’).’’ 49 C.F.R. § 575.401 (c) (4) (2015).
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          8                   APRIL, 2024                   224 Conn. App. 668
                               Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          knowledge of the events surrounding the plaintiffs’ pur-
          chase of the plow truck, she was familiar with the cir-
          cumstances of the transaction and the numerous docu-
          ments involved that were admitted as exhibits.4 . . .
          Grossman testified that there is no indication that there
          was a deal or contract for the defendant to sell the
          plow truck for a price of $41,916 with financing at 4.3
          percent interest, payable over seventy-two months.
          . . .

             ‘‘[Grossman] testified that two retail instalment con-
          tracts were prepared for [the] sale of the plow truck.
          The first contract was dated January 21, 2015, in which
          financing was provided by [JPMorgan Chase Bank,
          National Association (Chase)]. . . . That contract
          showed an amount financed of $43,745.16, an annual
          percentage rate of 7.59 percent, eighty-four payments of
          $674.95, with total payments of $56,695.80. The second
          contract, dated January 26, 2015, provided for financing
          by [Ally Financial, Inc. (Ally)]. . . . This second con-
          tract also showed an amount financed of $43,745.16 but
          had a lower annual percentage rate of 5.45 percent,
          seventy-five payments of $691.10, with total payments
          [of] $51,832.50—$4863.30 less. Both contracts show a
          cash price of the vehicle, excluding sales tax, of $45,509.

             ‘‘[Grossman] also testified that after the first contract
          was signed, the defendant’s business manager was able
          to secure more favorable approval terms with Ally. A
          representative of the defendant reached out to the plain-
          tiffs to let them know of the favorable terms and asked
          them to come back to the defendant to rescind or
          ‘unwind’ the Chase contract to take advantage of the
          Ally contract terms. She understood that the Ally con-
          tract was signed on January 26, 2015.’’ (Citations omit-
          ted; footnotes added.)
              4
                  Grossman testified that she spoke with Davidson about this case.
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          224 Conn. App. 668                  APRIL, 2024          9
                       Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

            After considering the testimony of the parties and
          reviewing the exhibits, the court concluded that the
          plaintiffs ‘‘have not sustained their burden of proof
          regarding their claim of breach of contract set forth in
          count one. After careful consideration of the evidence
          presented and the elements of fraud, the court finds
          the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof
          regarding the claim of fraud set forth in count two.
          The plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof
          regarding their claim of theft contained in count three.
          As to count four, which alleges violation of CUTPA, the
          plaintiffs have failed to establish that the defendant
          engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices.’’ The
          court, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the
          defendant. This appeal followed.
                                         I
             The plaintiffs first claim on appeal that the court
          misinterpreted their legal claims. Specifically, the plain-
          tiffs contend that the court erred by deciding claims
          that they never made and by failing to decide the claims
          they did make. We disagree.
             The following additional facts and procedural history
          are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In the first
          125 paragraphs of their complaint, the plaintiffs made
          allegations as to the events surrounding their purchase
          of the dump truck and the plow truck and then incorpo-
          rated those allegations by reference in their counts of
          breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of CUTPA.
          Paragraph 126 of each count in the complaint alleges
          that, as a result of the defendant’s behavior, the plain-
          tiffs suffered financial harm. At the conclusion of trial,
          after the plaintiffs had presented numerous exhibits
          and offered the testimony of Grossman, Blackwell, and
          Burr, the court asked Burr, who was on the stand, to
          summarize the plaintiffs’ claims. Burr testified that the
          defendant had improperly (1) signed Blackwell’s name
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           10           APRIL, 2024                  224 Conn. App. 668
                        Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           to MPK’s articles of organization in order to get the
           plaintiffs a loan that should not have been approved,
           (2) failed to include the price of the plow on the plow
           truck’s Monroney sticker, and (3) manipulated the
           plaintiffs’ signatures to create a January 26, 2015 con-
           tract that the plaintiffs had never signed. The plaintiffs’
           posttrial brief largely reflected these claims and further
           alleged that, ‘‘on January 21, 2015, the plaintiffs agreed
           to purchase the plow truck for specific terms and condi-
           tions’’ and that the defendant ‘‘destroyed [the January
           21, 2015 contract] and manufactured a new one . . .
           showing a later purchase date of January 26, 2015,’’
           with ‘‘a higher price . . . a higher interest rate . . .
           and a longer loan period . . . .’’ In their posttrial brief,
           the plaintiffs, for the first time, provided legal citations
           to specify which laws they accused the defendant of
           violating.
               In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that
           it could not ‘‘reconcile [the claim that Blackwell had
           no authority to sign documents on behalf of MPK] with
           the fact that MPK bought a truck from the defendant,
           drove it off the lot, made all of the payments due to
           Ally under the financing arranged by the defendant, and
           still is in possession of the plow truck. If Blackwell was
           not authorized to buy the plow truck, there was no
           reason for MPK to keep and pay for the plow truck.’’
           As to the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the Monroney
           sticker, the court found that ‘‘[i]t is not logical for the
           plaintiffs to think they were getting [the plow] for free.
           The plaintiffs and the defendant agreed on a price for
           the plow truck, which included a snowplow. The court
           cannot attach significance to the fact an addendum that
           showed the price of the plow may or may not have
           been a part of the [Monroney] sticker.’’ Regarding the
           plaintiffs’ claim that they did not sign the January 21
           and 26, 2015 contracts in evidence, the court found that
           ‘‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would
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          224 Conn. App. 668                          APRIL, 2024                       11
                            Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          allow Burr to drive the truck away without a signed
          deal being in place.’’
              On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court ‘‘never
          decided the actual issues presented by the pleadings
          and evidence.’’ The plaintiffs specifically contend that
          the court failed to make findings as to whether (1)
          ‘‘[the] documents [in question] were or were not signed
          by . . . Burr and . . . Blackwell,’’ (2) the defendant
          ‘‘altered [MPK’s articles of organization],’’ and (3) the
          Monroney sticker reflected the price of the truck with
          the plow. The plaintiffs also claim on appeal that the
          trial court, in some instances, ‘‘ignore[d] the plaintiffs’
          actual claim . . . and substitute[d] a wholly invented
          scenario . . . .’’ Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that
          certain of the court’s findings respond to a claim that
          the plaintiffs did not make—i.e., that they never entered
          into a contract to buy the plow truck—instead of to
          their actual claim that the terms under which they pur-
          chased the plow truck had been illegally altered.5 The
          defendant, in its appellate brief, suggests that the plain-
          tiffs should have filed a motion to reargue and then a
          motion for articulation if the court had not addressed
          their causes of action. We agree with the defendant.
            ‘‘It is well established that a party cannot obtain
          appellate review of a claim challenging a finding or
              5
                To support this claim, the plaintiffs point to the court’s findings that
          ‘‘ ‘[i]t defies common sense that the defendant would allow Burr to drive
          the truck away without a signed deal being in place’ ’’ and that ‘‘MPK kept
          and paid for the plow truck it bought . . . .’’ They explain that ‘‘the plaintiffs
          never claimed that [the defendant] allowed . . . Burr to drive the truck off
          the lot without a signed deal in place. To the contrary, the plaintiffs explicitly
          alleged that MPK had entered into a contract to purchase the plow truck
          before driving the truck off the lot. . . . [T]heir disagreement was over
          the terms of that deal.’’ (Citation omitted.) Further, they argue that the
          observation that MPK kept and paid for the truck ‘‘does not remotely refute
          the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the terms under which MPK bought
          the plow truck or the allegations that the defendant substituted forged
          documentation in place of the original terms.’’
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                        Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           determination that the court did not make. It is the
           responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate
           record for review. . . . It is well established that [a]n
           articulation is appropriate where the trial court’s deci-
           sion contains some ambiguity or deficiency reasonably
           susceptible of clarification. . . . [P]roper utilization of
           the motion for articulation serves to dispel any . . .
           ambiguity by clarifying the factual and legal basis upon
           which the trial court rendered its decision, thereby
           sharpening the issues on appeal. . . . Our role is not
           to guess at possibilities . . . but to review claims based
           on a complete factual record developed by a trial court.
           . . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclu-
           sions furnished by the trial court . . . any decision
           made by us respecting [the appellant’s claims] would
           be entirely speculative. . . . It is, therefore, the respon-
           sibility of the appellant to move for an articulation or
           rectification of the record where the trial court has
           failed to state the basis of a decision . . . to clarify
           the legal basis of a ruling . . . or to ask the trial judge
           to rule on an overlooked matter.’’ (Citations omitted;
           emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
           D2E Holdings, LLC v. Corp. for Urban Home Owner-
           ship of New Haven, 212 Conn. App. 694, 712–13, 277
           A.3d 261, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 904, 282 A.3d 981
           (2022).

              Here, to the extent the plaintiffs claim that the court
           failed to make certain factual findings or that it over-
           looked claims made by the plaintiffs, a determination
           we do not make, the plaintiffs failed to file a motion
           to reargue, a motion for clarification, or a motion for
           articulation seeking to have the trial court address those
           alleged deficiencies. ‘‘If the defendant believed that the
           trial court overlooked individualized proof required for
           any particular element of any particular cause of action
           that was of such consequence that it outweighed those
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          224 Conn. App. 668                         APRIL, 2024                   13
                             Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          cited by the trial court, it was free to seek an articula-
          tion.’’ Standard Petroleum Co. v. Faugno Acquisition,
          LLC, 330 Conn. 40, 66, 191 A.3d 147 (2018).
             Moreover, we note that the court, in its memorandum
          of decision, explicitly addressed each of the counts of
          the plaintiffs’ complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had
          not met their burden of proof as to each count. The
          court also addressed each of the claims Burr asserted
          when the court had asked him to summarize the plain-
          tiffs’ claims at trial. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim
          that the court misinterpreted their legal claims is
          unavailing.
                                                II
             The plaintiffs next claim that the court ‘‘erred in rely-
          ing upon the testimony of . . . Grossman to defeat
          [their] claims and to impugn the testimony of . . . Burr
          and . . . Blackwell.’’ They argue that there are limits
          to this court’s deference to a trial court’s credibility
          determinations and that the bases upon which the court
          found Grossman credible were improper.6 We are not
          persuaded.
             The following additional facts and procedural history
          are relevant to the resolution of this claim. In its memo-
          randum of decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[a]s is often
          the case, the outcome of this trial is determined by the
          credibility of the witnesses that testified.’’ The court
          further stated: ‘‘Having considered the testimony of the
          parties, and after reviewing the exhibits, the court finds
          . . . Grossman’s testimony regarding the events sur-
          rounding the sale of the plow truck to be credible. Her
          version of events is supported by the exhibits related
          to the transaction. . . .
            ‘‘The terms of the January 26, 2015 contract with
          Ally does have more favorable financing terms than the
            6
                We note that Grossman’s testimony was offered by the plaintiffs.
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                        Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           January 21, 2015 contract with Chase. [Grossman’s]
           testimony that the [defendant] wanted to save an estab-
           lished customer money by way of reduced financing
           charges is credible. It is undisputed that Ally provided
           the financing for the plow truck. The plaintiffs made
           payments to Ally pursuant to the contract and, in fact,
           have paid Ally in full.
              ‘‘The court takes no pleasure in stating that it finds
           Burr’s testimony regarding the terms of the sale and
           financing is not credible. . . . [T]here is a lack of docu-
           mentation to support Burr’s testimony as to the sales
           price of the truck and the financing terms. The only
           document that supports the plaintiffs’ version of events
           is [an] Ally offer to the defendant for financing [that
           states the pricing and financing terms the plaintiffs
           argue applied to the deal]. [Grossman] has credibly
           explained how this offer is between the [defendant]
           and Ally and was not an offer or agreement between
           Ally and the plaintiffs. . . .
              ‘‘Blackwell repeatedly testified that he did not sign
           the documents related to the January 26, 2015 transac-
           tion. The court does not find Blackwell’s testimony to be
           credible. The documents appear to bear his signature.
           When asked if he could identify his signature on the
           documents at his deposition, and at trial, Blackwell
           gave evasive and contradictory answers. The court was
           struck by the fact that Blackwell testified that, before he
           could identify his signature on a document, he needed
           to know the date of the document and the contents of
           the document.’’ (Citations omitted.)
             On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improp-
           erly made its credibility determinations by comparing
           the testimony of the witnesses to the documentary evi-
           dence instead of on the basis of an assessment of the
           demeanor of the witnesses. ‘‘[A]s a reviewing court
           [w]e must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the
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                       Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis
          of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor
          and attitude. . . . The weight to be given to the evi-
          dence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within
          the determination of the trier of fact.’’ (Internal quota-
          tion marks omitted.) McLeod v. A Better Way Wholesale
          Autos, Inc., 177 Conn. App. 423, 450, 172 A.3d 802
          (2017). ‘‘[I]t is the sole province of the trial court, as
          the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of the
          witnesses. . . . The court’s determination that [a par-
          ty’s] witnesses were credible is beyond the scope of
          this court’s review.’’ (Citation omitted.) Fishbein v.
          Menchetti, 165 Conn. App. 131, 136, 138 A.3d 1061
          (2016).
            Here, contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, there is
          no indication that the court did not base its credibility
          determinations on the conduct, demeanor and attitude
          of the witnesses. After stating that it found Grossman’s
          testimony credible, the court simply stated that it was
          supported by the documentary evidence. The court then
          properly explained that determination by citing to vari-
          ous portions of Grossman’s testimony and the other
          evidence admitted at trial. Although the plaintiffs argue
          that the court should have rejected Grossman’s testi-
          mony as not credible and, thus, come to a different
          conclusion on the basis of the evidence admitted, it is
          not the role of this court to second-guess a fact finder’s
          credibility determinations, nor do we ‘‘review the evi-
          dence to determine whether a conclusion different from
          the one reached could have been reached.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Osborn v. Waterbury, 197
          Conn. App. 476, 482, 232 A.3d 134 (2020), cert. denied,
          336 Conn. 903, 242 A.3d 1010 (2021). Accordingly, we
          are not convinced by the plaintiffs’ arguments challeng-
          ing the court’s credibility determinations.
                                         III
             We now turn to the plaintiffs’ claim that the court
          ‘‘erred in making findings contrary to the evidence’’ and
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                             Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           that those findings, ‘‘[t]aken independently or together
           . . . undermine appellate confidence in the trial court’s
           fact-finding process and require a new trial.’’ We dis-
           agree.
              ‘‘The trial court’s findings are binding upon this court
           unless they are clearly erroneous in light of the evidence
           and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . We
           cannot retry the facts or pass on the credibility of the
           witnesses. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
           when there is no evidence in the record to support it
           . . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
           the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
           the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
           committed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
           AAA Advantage Carting & Demolition Service, LLC v.
           Capone, 221 Conn. App. 256, 279–80, 301 A.3d 1111,
           cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023), and
           cert. denied, 348 Conn. 924, 304 A.3d 442 (2023). The
           plaintiffs challenge several of the court’s findings on
           appeal. We address them in turn.
                                                  A
              Only two of the plaintiffs’ challenges to the court’s
           findings are reviewable.7 First, the plaintiffs contend
           that the trial court’s finding that it ‘‘ ‘defies common
           sense’ ’’ that the defendant would allow the plaintiffs
           to drive the truck away without a deal in place was
           ‘‘wholly unsupported by the evidence’’ because
           ‘‘allowing a customer to drive off with the car is the
           first step in a yo-yo scam—there is nothing about it
           that defies common sense.’’8 Taking this claim at face
             7
                We address the plaintiffs’ unreviewable claims in part III B of this opinion.
             8
                The plaintiffs explain yo-yo scams in their posttrial and appellate briefs.
           ‘‘In a yo-yo scam, the consumer drives off with the car before financing is
           finalized, often with the dealer’s assurances that everything will be fine and
           that there is just a little final paperwork to be received from the lender. A
           few days later, however, the dealer then contacts the consumer to say that
           the loan was not approved, so the consumer will have to return the car
           unless the consumer will agree to different and more onerous loan terms.
           Sometimes this is because the original loan was not in fact approved by
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                           Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          value, we conclude that the court’s finding is not clearly
          erroneous. A yo-yo scam likely works because it defies
          common sense that a dealer would allow a purchaser
          to drive away before a deal has been struck. Moreover,
          this claim fails because the court explicitly credited
          Grossman’s testimony, which supports a finding that
          the defendant did not engage in a yo-yo scam and that
          the plaintiffs executed a contract for the purchase of
          the plow truck before leaving the defendant’s premises
          on January 21, 2015.
             Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in
          finding that the evidence did not support their claims
          because they had been forced to return to the defendant
          the only copy of the alleged original contract. Similarly,
          they claim that ‘‘there was no basis for the trial court
          to reach the . . . conclusion . . . that the [plaintiffs’]
          signatures were genuine,’’ asserting that ‘‘[t]here was
          no evidence before the trial court that . . . Blackwell
          or . . . Burr signed the [January 26, 2015] agreement
          form or any documents related to it.’’
            As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs misapprehend
          the burdens of proof related to the counts of their com-
          plaint. They imply here that the defendant had the bur-
          den of proving that the plaintiffs had signed the docu-
          ments in evidence. The cases they cite in support of
          the assertion that a signature on a document is not
          proof of the signature’s authenticity, however, relate
          to the authentication of documents for admission as
          evidence. See United States v. Vigneau, 187 F.3d 82,
          85 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that certain documents were
          improperly admitted into evidence in criminal money
          laundering case, in part, because government had not
          offered direct or circumstantial evidence that defendant
          the lender, but it can also simply be an opportunity for the dealer to increase
          its markup.’’ (Footnote omitted.) A. Levitin, ‘‘The Fast and the Usurious:
          Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses,’’ 108 Geo. L.J. 1257, 1304 (2020).
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                        Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           had completed those forms); State v. Jones, 8 Conn.
           App. 177, 183–84, 184 n.5, 512 A.2d 932 (1986) (stating,
           in response to defendant’s claim that handwriting exem-
           plars were not properly authenticated, that ‘‘the admis-
           sion of the document, did not, in and of itself, establish
           the authenticity of the defendant’s signatures on the
           documents’’). The plaintiffs do not argue on appeal that
           the court improperly admitted the contracts as evi-
           dence. Where, as here, the plaintiffs accuse the defen-
           dant of fraud, the burden was on the plaintiffs to prove
           that the signatures were not genuine. See Wieselman
           v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn. App. 591, 595 n.7, 930 A.2d 768
           (‘‘[i]n common-law fraud cases, the plaintiff has the
           burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evi-
           dence’’), cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245
           (2007). Similarly, the plaintiffs bore the burden of prov-
           ing that there had been a January 21, 2015 contract
           with Ally. See Downing v. Dragone, 216 Conn. App.
           306, 330–31, 285 A.3d 59 (2022) (‘‘[i]t is well settled
           that the party seeking to establish the existence of an
           enforceable contract bears the burden of proving a
           meeting of the minds between the parties’’ (internal
           quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903,
           287 A.3d 601 (2023).
              Here, the plaintiffs submitted no credible evidence
           that (1) their signatures on the documents in evidence
           had been forged, (2) that any of the documents in evi-
           dence had been improperly fabricated or changed, (3)
           that there was ever a January 21, 2015 contract with
           Ally, or (4) that any of the defendant’s behavior
           amounted to a CUTPA violation. In support of the four
           counts in their complaint, the plaintiffs offered only the
           testimony of Burr and Blackwell, which the court found
           not to be credible. Therefore, we are not left with a
           definite and firm conviction that the court erred in
           finding that there was no evidence to support the plain-
           tiffs’ claims and that they had signed the documents
           related to the sale of the plow truck.
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                       Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

                                         B
              We decline to address the plaintiffs’ remaining three
          challenges to the findings of the court. First, the plain-
          tiffs claim that it was clearly erroneous for the court to
          find that it was not logical or reasonable that Blackwell
          would make payments to Ally with respect to a January
          26, 2015 contract he never signed and, similarly, that
          the court could not reconcile the claim that someone
          else put Blackwell’s name, as a member of MPK, on
          the January 26, 2015 documents with the fact that MPK
          bought the plow truck. The plaintiffs explain that
          ‘‘[t]here is no dispute [that] the plaintiffs bought the
          plow truck, drove it off the lot and made payments on
          it . . . .’’ In making this claim on appeal, the plaintiffs
          question the court’s interpretation of their claims at
          trial. In part I of this opinion, we disposed of the same
          claim. Thus, we will not review it further here.
             Second, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in
          finding that they ratified the January 26, 2015 contract.
          At trial, the plaintiffs asserted that Blackwell never had
          been a member of MPK despite the appearance of his
          name on a copy of MPK’s articles of organization used
          in the loan application process and the word ‘‘member’’
          written next to his signature on contracts in evidence.
          In its memorandum of decision, the court found that,
          ‘‘[w]hatever the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim regarding
          Blackwell’s authority to purchase the truck on behalf
          of MPK, the claim is rendered moot by MPK’s implied
          ratification of the transaction by keeping and paying
          for the vehicle.’’
             The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts that the
          court’s finding as to ratification was not necessary to
          its holding and was, therefore, dictum. We agree with
          the defendant. ‘‘A party is not aggrieved by a court’s
          statements that are considered dicta.’’ Healey v. Man-
          tell, 216 Conn. App. 514, 525, 285 A.3d 823 (2022). ‘‘Dic-
          tum includes those discussions that are merely passing
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                        Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

           commentary . . . those that go beyond the facts at
           issue . . . and those that are unnecessary to the hold-
           ing in the case. . . . [I]t is not dictum [however] when
           a court . . . intentionally takes up, discusses, and
           decides a question germane to, though not necessarily
           decisive of, the controversy . . . . Rather, such action
           constitutes an act of the court [that] it will thereafter
           recognize as a binding decision.’’ (Internal quotation
           marks omitted.) Cruz v. Montanez, 294 Conn. 357, 376–
           77, 984 A.2d 705 (2009). Here, the court’s finding that
           the plaintiffs ratified the January 26, 2015 contract was
           unnecessary to its holding because the court had
           already found that MPK agreed to the January 26, 2015
           contract. Thus, the plaintiffs could not have been
           aggrieved by any alleged error as to the court’s finding
           of ratification, and we decline to review their claim to
           that effect.
              Last, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred in finding
           ‘‘that the [defendant’s] failure to supplement the Monro-
           ney sticker is insignificant.’’ They argue that they had
           ‘‘offered evidence that the Monroney sticker on the
           [plow truck] did not in fact show the suggested retail
           price of the vehicle because the [plow truck] had been
           equipped with a plow that added approximately $5000
           to its cost.’’ Although, in their appellate brief, the plain-
           tiffs provide legal citations that allegedly support their
           contention that a failure to supplement the Monroney
           sticker constitutes a violation of CUTPA, the plaintiffs
           cited no such law and made no such argument before
           the trial court. ‘‘Our rules of practice provide that we
           are not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly
           raised at trial or arose subsequent to the trial. Practice
           Book § 60-5. . . . A claim is distinctly raised if it is so
           stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise
           matter on which its decision is being asked.’’ (Emphasis
           omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A & R
           Enterprises, LLC v. Sentinel Ins. Co., Ltd., 202 Conn.
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                            Burr v. Grossman Chevrolet-Nissan, Inc.

          App. 224, 229, 244 A.3d 660, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 921,
          246 A.3d 2 (2021). In light of the plaintiffs’ failure in
          the trial court to cite any law or to make any argument
          that would have explained the significance of affixing
          an addendum to the Monroney sticker, this claim is not
          preserved for appellate review and we decline to review
          it. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ claims fail.9
             The judgment is affirmed.
             In this opinion the other judges concurred.

             9
               The defendant, in its appellate brief, asserts as an alternative ground for
          affirmance that the plaintiffs’ fraud, theft, and CUTPA claims are barred by
          the applicable three year statutes of limitations. We need not address that
          alternative argument in light of our affirmance of the trial court’s decision
          on other grounds.