Court Opinion

ID: 9461398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:13:50.19036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:02.835301
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court on the basis of Judge Larson’s well reasoned opinion. He found that the government had, by means of circumstantial evidence, established a knowing violation of § 462(a), citing the district court’s opinion United States v. Klotz, No. 4 — 73-Criminal 130 (D.Minn., Nov. 7, 1973) in which Judge Neville said:
The government was able to show the general publicity given to registration requirements through the media and by the posting [of] bulletins and disseminating information through the high schools. It does not strain this court’s thinking to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew as have all competent 18 year olds of the requirement to register for the draft on reaching his 18th birthday.
I recognize that this Court reversed Judge Neville’s holding in United States v. Klotz, 500 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), rehearing denied, 503 F.2d 1056 (8th Cir. 1974). I voted for a rehearing in that case because I felt it was erroneously decided by the panel. I still believe it to be an incorrect decision. In Klotz, as in this case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show defendant’s knowledge of the duty to register upon reaching his 18th birthday.
The government might have presented a stronger circumstantial case by producing evidence that the Selective Service’s ongoing public relations program had actually reached into the defendant’s community or school. However, on appeal our role is not to reverse the determination of the trier of fact merely because the government’s case was weaker than it might have been. Rather, we must ascertain whether the evidence was sufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict. United States v. Gaskill, 491 F.2d 981, 982 (8th Cir. 1974). When viewed in this light, it is clear that the evidence of the general state-wide public relations program is sufficient to support Judge Larson’s inference that Boucher must have known of the registration requirement.
Additionally, one cannot logically ignore the obvious fact that Boucher became 18 shortly before the end of the fighting in Vietnam and did not register until several months after the end of the war and after the announcement that there would be no more inductions under the Selective Service Act.
This Court, in determining Klotz and this case, has made it extremely difficult for the government to show the requisite intent in failure to register cases. While this may not be critical at this time, it will become very important if and when it becomes necessary to resume inductions under the Selective Service laws.