Court Opinion

ID: 9862589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:23:28.788048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:01.026849
License: Public Domain

McDONALD, J., Dissenting.
The majority opinion completes the transmogrification of the crime of robbery from the offense defined in Penal Code section 2111 as the “taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence . . . , accomplished by means of force or fear” to the new offense of the taking or retaining personal property under those circumstances, a change accomplished by the court without legislative assistance.
Section 211 defines “robbery” as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Italics added.) “The taking element of robbery itself has two necessary elements, gaining possession of the victim’s property and asporting or carrying away the loot. [Citation.]” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165 [282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742].) However, Cooper further stated: “Although the ‘immediate presence’ language comes directly from section 211, this language does not pertain to the duration of robbery. . . . Taking from the ‘person’ and from the ‘immediate presence’ [in section 211] are alternatives. These terms are spatially, rather than temporally, descriptive. They refer to the area from which the property is taken, not how far it is taken. [Citations.] Put another way, these limitations on the scope of the robbery statute relate to the ‘gaining possession’ component of the taking as distinct from the ‘carrying away’ component.” (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1166.) In People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577 [276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376], the Supreme Court adopted the following definition of “immediate presence:” “ ‘ “[a] thing is in the [immediate] presence of a person, in respect to robbery, which is so within his reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.” ’ (Commonwealth v. Homer (1920) 235 Mass. 526, 533 [127 N.E. 517]; [citations].)” (People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 626-627.) “Immediate presence” means at least an area within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over his or her property. (Id. at p. 627; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 440 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) Under the Supreme Court decisions in Cooper, Hayes and Webster, a necessary element of a section 211 robbery is the victim’s presence in a location in which he or she could reasonably expect some physical *226control of the personal property at the time the perpetrator gained possession of the property. In this case, Higareda was not in that location; he was outside the public restroom at the time Miller gained possession of Higareda’s trousers and the items contained in those trousers. An element of the charged robbery, as described by the Supreme Court, is absent in this case. Miller may have been guilty of burglary, assault, theft or other criminal offenses, but he was not guilty of robbery. (See Hayes, at p. 627.)
The majority opinion agrees that Miller did not gain possession of Higareda’s personal property from either his person or from his immediate possession. It also concludes that Miller retained possession of Higareda’s personal property in his immediate presence during the asportation phase of the incident, and that retention of the personal property during the asportation phase of the incident satisfied the taking “from the person or immediate presence” element of robbery.
The majority opinion’s conclusion that the victim’s presence during the asportation phase of the incident is sufficient to satisfy the elements of robbery is directly in conflict with language of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper. It seeks to obviate that conflict by describing the Supreme Court cases as representing the “traditional” view of robbery (maj. opn., ante, at p. 221), which has evolved into a new and different rule creating a new and different offense known as an “Estes robbery.”
The majority opinion’s reference to an “Estes robbery” emanates from People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909]. The Estes court stated: “Defendant further alleges that the merchandise was not taken from the ‘immediate presence’ of the security guard. The evidence established that appellant [forcibly] resisted the security guard’s efforts to retake the property and used that force to remove the items from the guard’s immediate presence. By preventing the guard from regaining control over the merchandise, defendant is held to have taken the property as if the guard had actual possession of the goods in the first instance. (See People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633 [51 Cal.Rptr. 238, 414 P.2d 366].)” (People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 27.) In Estes, a security guard observed the defendant shoplifting items inside a store and then attempted to stop him about five feet outside the store as he left without paying for those items. (Id. at p. 26.) The defendant pulled out a knife, swung it at the security guard, and threatened to kill him. (Ibid.) The language from Estes quoted ante is effectively dicta because the guard was present and observed the defendant gain possession of the property; the defendant in Estes gained possession of the property in the guard’s immediate presence under the Hayes test and Estes is factually inapposite to this case. The court in Estes unnecessarily stated the element of “immediate presence” was satisfied retroactively by the defendant’s use of *227force during the asportation phase of the incident after he gained possession of the property. To the extent Estes stated the element of immediate presence can be satisfied by a victim’s presence during a defendant’s asporting or carrying away of property, it is inconsistent with Cooper, which concluded immediate presence applies only to the gaining possession component and not to the asporting or carrying away component. (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1166.) Estes does not establish the immediate presence element was satisfied in this case.2 Rather, Estes, under its facts, established only that the force or fear element of robbery could be satisfied if present during the asportation phase of the incident.
The majority opinion notes that Estes was decided before Cooper and that Cooper cites Estes without disapproval. However, Cooper’s reference to Estes was in the context of the duration of the asportation element of robbery. Cooper referenced Estes by footnote after the statement “asportation is not confined to a fixed point in time.” (People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1165.) The footnote stated: “This reasoning is consistent with a long line of Court of Appeal cases, left undisturbed by this court, holding that mere theft becomes robbery if the perpetrator, having gained possession of the property without use of force or fear, resorts to force or fear while carrying away the loot. (See, e.g., People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 27-28 [194 Cal.Rptr. 909]; People v. Kent (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 207, 213 [178 Cal.Rptr. 28]; People v. Perhab [(1949)] 92 Cal.App.2d 430, 434-436 [206 P.2d 1133].) In order to support a robbery conviction, the taking, either the gaining possession or the carrying away, must be accomplished by force or fear. . . .” (Cooper, supra, at p. 1165, fn. 8.) The approval by Cooper of Estes was limited to the temporal aspect of the force or fear element of robbery and confirmed the holding of Estes, but not its dicta, that the force or fear element of robbery may be supplied by conduct during the asportation phase of the incident even if not present at the gaining possession phase of the incident. That is an Estes robbery. Cooper gave no approval to the language of Estes, which was unnecessary to its decision, that the immediate presence element of robbery could be satisfied during the asportation phase of the incident although not present at the gaining possession phase.
*228I do not agree with the majority opinion that the crime of robbery has evolved into a retention rather than a taking crime and, because bound by my understanding of Cooper and Hayes, I conclude the preliminary hearing evidence does not support a reasonable inference that the property was on Higareda’s person or in his immediate presence at the time Miller gained possession of it. The trial court therefore erred by denying Miller’s section 995 motion to dismiss the robbery charge against him. (People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 242].) I would let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining the San Diego County Superior Court from taking further action on the robbery charge against petitioner, other than to dismiss it.
Petitioner’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 17, 2004. Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Brown, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.

 Estes’s citation to People v. Anderson, supra, 64 Cal.2d 633 does not persuade me to reach a different conclusion. Anderson stated: “[I]f one who has stolen property from the person of another uses force or fear in removing, or attempting to remove, the property from the owner’s immediate presence . . . , the crime of robbery has been committed.” (Id. at p. 638.) Because Anderson deals with the element of force or fear and not the element of taking from the victim’s immediate presence, it does not provide support for Estes’s apparent conclusion that the immediate presence element can be satisfied during the asporting or carrying away of property. Based on the same reasoning, People v. Kent (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 207 [178 Cal.Rptr. 28], also cited by Estes, is inapposite.