Court Opinion

ID: 9397256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 20:00:38.287045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.744926
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12883    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12883
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       WILFREDO RODRIGUEZ,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-20759-MGC-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12883

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Wilfredo Rodriguez, who is counseled on appeal, appeals
       the District Court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release
       under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by § 603(b) of the First
       Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21,
       2018) (the “First Step Act”). He argues that the District Court erred
       when it found that he did not establish an extraordinary and com-
       pelling reason for compassionate release based on the availability
       of COVID-19 vaccines and that it abused its discretion when it
       weighed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors because it disregarded
       highly relevant and significant factors.
              We review de novo a district court’s determination about a
       defendant’s eligibility for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction.
       United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. de-
       nied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). However, we review a district court’s
       denial of a prisoner’s 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion under an
       abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908,
       911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion when it
       applies an incorrect legal standard or makes a clear error of judg-
       ment. Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).
              A concession of law is not binding on us. United States v.
       Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir. 2021). Under the prior panel
       precedent rule, we are bound by prior published decisions that
       have not been overruled by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting
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       22-12883              Opinion of the Court                        3

       en banc. United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th
       Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
              District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a term
       of imprisonment but may do so within § 3582(c)’s provisions.
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1251. As amended by
       § 603(b) of the First Step Act, § 3582(c) now provides, in relevant
       part, that:
             [t]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bu-
             reau of Prisons [(the “BOP”)] or upon motion of the
             defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all
             administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP]
             to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the
             lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by
             the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is
             earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . af-
             ter considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
             § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable if it
             ﬁnds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons
             warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduc-
             tion is consistent with applicable policy statements is-
             sued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing
       Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The application notes to
       U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 list four categories of extraordinary and compel-
       ling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical condition, (B) his age,
       (C) his family circumstances, and (D) other reasons. Id., comment.
       n.1(A)–(D). The defendant’s medical condition qualifies as an
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12883

       extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release if
       he is “suffering from a serious mental or physical condition” that
       “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide
       self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from
       which he or she is not expected to recover.” Id., cmt. n.1(A). In
       addition to determining that extraordinary and compelling reasons
       warrant a reduction, § 1B1.13 states that the district court must also
       determine that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of others
       or the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Id.
       § 1B1.13(2).
               In Bryant, we held that § 1B1.13 “is an applicable policy state-
       ment that governs all motions under Section 3582(c)(1)(A),” includ-
       ing those filed by defendants. 996 F.3d at 1262. Likewise, we held
       that, following the enactment of the First Step Act, § 1B1.13 con-
       tinued to constrain a district court’s ability to evaluate whether ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons were present and that Applica-
       tion Note 1(D) did “not grant discretion to courts to develop ‘other
       reasons’ that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.”
       Id. at 1248.
              Additionally, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires the district court to
       consider the § 3553(a) factors before granting a motion for compas-
       sionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The § 3553(a) factors
       include: (1) the offense’s nature and circumstances and the defend-
       ant’s history and characteristics; the need to (2) reflect the offense’s
       seriousness; (3) afford adequate deterrence; (4) protect the public;
       (5) provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
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       22-12883               Opinion of the Court                          5

       or medical care; to reflect (6) the kinds of sentences that are availa-
       ble; (7) the advisory guideline range; (8) the pertinent U.S. Sentenc-
       ing Commission policy statements; and the need to (9) avoid un-
       warranted sentencing disparities, and (10) provide victims with res-
       titution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(a)(7).
              Nevertheless, a district court does not need to specifically
       articulate the applicability of each of the § 3553(a) factors, “as long
       as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken
       into account by the district court.” United States v. Eggersdorf,
       126 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1997). Further, “[t]he district court
       has discretion to determine how much weight to grant to a specific
       § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Frazier, 823 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th
       Cir. 2016). Although the district court need not exhaustively ana-
       lyze every factor in its order, it must provide enough analysis for
       meaningful appellate review, including what factors it relied on.
       United States v. Cook, 998 F.3d 1180, 1184–85 (11th Cir. 2021). We
       have held that, although a district court “made no mention of evi-
       dence that arguably mitigated in [defendant’s] favor under
       § 3553(a), we [could not] say that the court’s failure to discuss this
       mitigating evidence means that the court erroneously ignored or
       failed to consider this evidence in determining [his] sentence.”
       United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (quota-
       tion marks omitted) (addressing a direct criminal appeal).
             “Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must find that all necessary
       conditions are satisfied before it grants a reduction.” United States
       v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12883

       Accordingly, the absence of any one of the necessary conditions—
       support in the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and com-
       pelling reasons, and adherence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy state-
       ment—forecloses a sentence reduction. Id. Additionally, we have
       held that nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires
       a court to conduct the compassionate release analysis in any partic-
       ular order. Id.
               Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
       denied Rodriguez’s motion for compassionate release. The District
       Court provided suﬃcient analysis for meaningful appellate review
       because it explained which factors it relied upon, including the vi-
       olent nature and circumstances of Rodriguez’s oﬀense, his violent
       history both in and out of custody, and the need to reﬂect the seri-
       ousness of his oﬀense, aﬀord adequate deterrence, and protect the
       public. Further, the District Court’s failure to discuss his mitigating
       evidence—such as Rodriguez’s enrollment in courses in the past
       twelve years, his improved discipline history since 2009, his work in
       UNICOR, and his stellar work observations—is not evidence that
       it failed to consider or ignored such evidence.
              The Court pointed to the violent nature of Rodriguez’s con-
       viction; speciﬁcally, that he and his associate brought semi-auto-
       matic pistols, handcuﬀs, and gloves to commit a planned robbery.
       The Court also noted that many of Rodriguez’s sixteen prior con-
       victions involved violent conduct, and that Rodriguez’s conduct did
       not improve while he was incarcerated—he smuggled heroin into
       the Federal Detention Center, and was disciplined for setting a ﬁre,
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       22-12883               Opinion of the Court                         7

       ﬁghting, and possessing a dangerous weapon. He was also con-
       victed of assaulting another inmate. Referencing other § 3553(a)
       factors, the Court said: “Early release would not promote respect
       for the law, just punishment, or the deterrence objectives of sen-
       tencing.”
              Rodriguez also argues that the District Court abused its dis-
       cretion when it disregarded the government’s concession that he
       exhibited an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassion-
       ate release. As an initial matter, this Court is not bound by the gov-
       ernment’s concession of law. See Colston, 4 F.4th at 1187; United
       States v. Linville, 228 F.3d 1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (per cu-
       riam). But beyond that, this concession does not tell the whole
       story. Even though the government conceded that Rodriguez’s
       medical conditions qualiﬁed as an extraordinary and compelling
       reason for early release, the government opposed Rodriguez’s mo-
       tion for compassionate release based on the § 3553(a) sentencing
       factors and the continuing danger it argued that Rodriguez posed
       to the community. And in any case, to be eligible for relief, Rodri-
       guez needed to show all three of the necessary conditions. See
       Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. We have already held that the District
       Court did not err in holding that the § 3553(a) factors did not sup-
       port Rodriguez’s compassionate release. Because that ﬁnding
       alone means that one of the necessary conditions for relief is miss-
       ing—and thus Rodriguez’s requested relief is foreclosed—we need
       not address whether he demonstrated an extraordinary and com-
       pelling reason for compassionate release.
             AFFIRMED.