Court Opinion

ID: 9554268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 16:00:57.285677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:53.879936
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-2445
                        ___________________________

                               Dr. Melanie Jones

                                    Plaintiff - Appellant

                                       v.

                                Wellpath, LLC

                                   Defendant - Appellee
                                ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Arkansas
                                ____________

                          Submitted: January 11, 2023
                             Filed: August 8, 2023
                                 ____________

Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

GRASZ, Circuit Judge.

      Dr. Melanie Jones is a physician who provided medical care to Arkansas
correctional facility inmates through her employer, Wellpath, LLC. Wellpath
terminated Dr. Jones’s employment, and she sued Wellpath, claiming it unlawfully
terminated her employment because she reported suspected alterations to her
electronic patient medical records. The district court1 granted Wellpath’s motion for
summary judgment. Dr. Jones appeals, and we affirm.

                                   I. Background

        Wellpath contracts with jails and prisons across the country to staff them with
medical professionals and provide medical services. In 2014, Wellpath obtained a
contract to provide medical services to inmates housed in Arkansas detention
facilities. To maintain Arkansas inmates’ electronic patient records, Wellpath’s
medical providers used an electronic medical record system, eOMIS, provided by
the Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”). This electronic record system
could be accessed by Wellpath’s medical providers, ADC, and the software’s
development company, Marquis.

       Dr. Jones, who had already been serving the Arkansas correctional system
under Wellpath’s predecessor, was hired by Wellpath after the company obtained its
Arkansas contract. Though the name of Dr. Jones’s employer changed, she
continued to serve forty-eight hours per week at two facilities. This schedule
increased by another ten hours when Dr. Jones began working at a third detention
facility in 2019, taking her regular schedule up to fifty-eight hours per week.

       Wellpath had both a clinical management team for medical decisions and an
operational management team for administrative directions. Clinically, Dr. Jones
reported directly to Dr. Jeff Stieve. During her time at Wellpath, Dr. Jones received
positive peer reviews for her clinical ability. Indeed, on August 29, 2020, Dr. Stieve
conducted an annual clinical care review, giving Dr. Jones an overall positive
performance evaluation. Operationally, Dr. Jones reported to a facility health
services administrator, who in turn reported to a Wellpath regional manager. Vesta
Blanks was Dr. Jones’s health service administrator, and Rebekah Davis was
Blanks’s regional manager.

      1
        The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
                                        -2-
       In early 2020, the world experienced the outbreak of the COVID-19
pandemic. Wellpath administrators developed COVID response plans in alignment
with the needs of each facility. Given the unique requirements of providing medical
care in correctional facilities, Wellpath developed a response plan with security in
mind. The plan included coordinating schedules among ADC staff, inmates’
movements, medical providers’ hours, and quarantine guidelines. Though in 2020
Dr. Jones was the only Wellpath physician assigned to the units she served, Wellpath
scheduled nursing staff 24/7 to help perform inmate medical care and wellness
checks twice a day, and to ensure medical coverage overnight. Despite the
availability of around-the-clock nurses, Dr. Jones believed her presence was
required overnight to provide adequate care. Dr. Jones worked whenever and as
much as she thought was necessary. She routinely worked eighty to ninety hours
per week, working, as she testified in her deposition, “half or more” of her contracted
facility hours from home.

       As the COVID pandemic continued, Wellpath adjusted their response plan for
more sustainable operational approaches. Wellpath began this transition sometime
around July 2020. Whether or not Dr. Jones was previously granted wide
operational freedom, it is clear from an email sent from Blanks to Dr. Jones on July
27, 2020, this was no longer permissible. Beginning on July 27 at the latest,
Wellpath began requiring Dr. Jones to conform to standard operational procedures:
working predictable hours that would coincide with the schedules of the facilities’
health service administrator and warden; complying with ADC’s biometric facility-
access policy, the use of which documented healthcare providers’ working locations
and hours and enabled Wellpath to report where and when its medical providers were
performing services; and ceasing performing medical duties specifically assigned to
nursing staff so Dr. Jones could focus on clinical duties. But Dr. Jones largely
ignored Wellpath’s directives. 2 Among other things, she continued to work night
shifts and insisted she would work even more hours if she thought it was necessary.

      2
      We do not take sides on factual disputes when reviewing an appeal from
summary judgment.      The occurrence of the issues involving Dr. Jones’s
noncompliance with her supervisors’ instructions, discussed herein, is undisputed.
                                       -3-
Before the first full week of August had passed, Dr. Jones’s supervisors addressed
her at least three times within nine days regarding her disregard for Wellpath’s
operational plan.

       Throughout the end of July and into early August, Dr. Jones’s supervisors also
increasingly began dealing with issues involving Dr. Jones’s interactions with
inmates and other Wellpath providers. Multiple grievances were filed against
Dr. Jones. On August 4, Blanks emailed Dr. Jones regarding a grievance claiming
Dr. Jones communicated harshly with inmates and that she explicitly blamed her
disposition on being awake for thirty hours straight. Another grievance alleged
Dr. Jones was passing out medications to inmates when that was a task assigned to
the nurses. In a separate incident on August 6, Dr. Jones and a Wellpath director of
nursing, Farbergé Jones, conflicted over medication distribution, eventually taking
their discussion into Nurse Jones’s office. Though Nurse Jones told Dr. Jones twice
to leave her office, Dr. Jones refused. Nurse Jones then called Blanks, who
deescalated the situation via speaker phone. In response to this incident, Regional
Manager Davis collected statements from Dr. Jones, Nurse Jones, Blanks, and four
other witnesses, and reported the incident to human resources.

       The day following Dr. Jones’s incident with Nurse Jones, on August 7,
Dr. Jones noticed a patient’s electronic medical record in eOMIS had, in her belief,
been altered. Dr. Jones reported her concerns regarding the alteration to Wellpath’s
regional information technology director. Working jointly with ADC and software
developer Marquis, Wellpath began investigating Dr. Jones’s concerns. Dr. Jones
later contacted the FBI to report concerns that her personal email account had been
accessed. Ultimately, the FBI recommended Dr. Jones hire a private investigator.
At the time of her deposition, she had not done so. Wellpath’s Information Security
Team completed its joint investigation on or about October 7. Wellpath was unable
to confirm any unusual eOMIS activity indicative of abnormal alterations. On
October 26, Wellpath’s chief compliance officer told Dr. Jones in email the
investigation was complete, and the conclusion was that neither Dr. Jones’s

                                         -4-
computer nor her electronic medical record documentation had been tampered with.
In early November 2020, Wellpath terminated Dr. Jones’s employment.

       Dr. Jones sued Wellpath in Arkansas state court, alleging wrongful
termination, practicing medicine without a license, outrage, and identity theft.
Wellpath removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. The district court granted Wellpath’s motion to dismiss
Dr. Jones’s original four claims but permitted Dr. Jones to amend her complaint and
to assert a whistle blower claim, which Arkansas has recognized as providing a cause
of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. See Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385–86 (Ark. 1988). After Dr. Jones filed her
amended complaint, Wellpath again moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court denied the motion on the grounds that Dr. Jones’s amended
complaint pled facts sufficient for a wrongful termination claim, and the parties
completed discovery. Wellpath then moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion, reasoning that Dr. Jones: (1) failed to establish her conduct
fell within the public policy exception to at-will employment because she had not
reported illegal activity on the part of Wellpath; and (2) failed to establish a causal
connection between her reports of data alterations and her termination.

                                   II. Discussion

       Dr. Jones appeals, arguing the district court incorrectly interpreted Arkansas
law regarding what constitutes legally protected conduct under the public policy
exception to at-will employment and improperly determined at the summary
judgment stage that Dr. Jones failed to establish a causal link between her tampering
reports and her termination. “A federal court sitting in diversity applies state
substantive and federal procedural law.” Miller v. Honkamp Krueger Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 9 F.4th 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 2021). The parties agree the substantive law of
Arkansas governs this action. Accordingly, our application of that law is bound by
the decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Tipton, 796
F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2015).
                                         -5-
       This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the initial burden of establishing the basis for the
motion by identifying “those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042
(cleaned up) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once
that burden is met, “[t]he nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ and must come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986)).
If a genuine dispute exists as to a material fact, the “facts must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
557, 586 (2009)). But, “[m]ere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or
evidence beyond the nonmoving party’s own conclusions, are insufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.” Thomas v. Corwin, 483 F.3d 516, 527
(8th Cir. 2007); accord Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.

       Under Arkansas’s employment-at-will doctrine, employers may generally
discharge employees whose employment is for an indefinite term “for good cause,
no cause, or even a morally wrong cause.” Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp., 804
S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ark. 1991). Arkansas recognizes a limited exception to this
doctrine providing a cause of action to an at-will employee “for wrongful discharge
if he or she is fired in violation of a well-established public policy of the State.”
Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671, 679 (Ark. 2003). Such a public policy
must be outlined in the Arkansas statutes. Id. “The burden of establishing a prima
facie case of wrongful discharge is upon the employee, but once the employee has
met his burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that there was a legitimate,
nonretaliatory reason for the discharge.” City of Huntington v. Mikles, 240 S.W.3d
138, 143 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006).

                                          -6-
       Arkansas courts have addressed two requirements necessary to successfully
bring suit under a public policy wrongful termination claim. First, the claimant must
“identify a specific well-established public policy” sufficient to legally protect the
claimant’s conduct. Jenkins v. Mercy Hosp. Rogers, 633 S.W.3d 758, 765 (Ark.
2021). Second, the claimant must also establish by substantial evidence that the
defendant fired the claimant because of the claimant’s legally protected conduct.
See, e.g., Island, 103 S.W.3d at 680 (“[W]e hold that if she was terminated for
refusing [her employer’s] sexual propositions, appellant has a valid cause of action
for wrongful termination.”); see also Moyer v. DVA Renal Healthcare, Inc., 368 F.
App’x 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“A prima facie case of wrongful
discharge for violation of public policy requires substantial evidence that
discrimination or retaliation was the reason for the discharge.”). “Substantial
evidence is evidence of ‘sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one
way or the other with reasonable certainty and must force the mind to pass beyond
mere suspicion or conjecture.’” Johnson v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 545
S.W.3d 234, 240 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc., 369
S.W.3d 717, 719 (Ark. 2010)) (reviewing a directed verdict on an ADA retaliation
claim). Summary judgment is appropriate when a plaintiff fails to satisfy either
element. See, e.g., Lynn v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 280 S.W.3d 574, 579–80 (Ark.
Ct. App. 2008).

       Having moved for summary judgment, Wellpath produced uncontested
evidence “demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” as to the
validity of its reasons for terminating Dr. Jones. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042
(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Wellpath says it fired Dr. Jones because she
“create[ed] disharmony and discord that led to a lack of trust and confidence in her
work, and for her repeated failure to keep her standard working hours.” Def.’s
Resps. to Pl.’s First Set of Interrog. at 3 ¶ 1. The undisputed evidence shows
Dr. Jones clashed with others and openly undermined her superiors’ authority in a
series of escalating disputes before reporting any concerns regarding patient chart
alterations. First, email records show that by July 27, 2020, Wellpath management
had begun confronting Dr. Jones with concerns over the hours she worked. In the
                                         -7-
July 27 email, Blanks expressed appreciation for Dr. Jones’s past hard work and
indicated the goal was for Dr. Jones’s schedule “to return to normal”—a statement
Dr. Jones testified to understanding as meaning working daytime hours. According
to Dr. Jones, in their initial discussion about her hours, Blanks also told Dr. Jones to
work on-site and during the day because that coincided with Blanks’s schedule and
was when most ADC staff would be on site. However, Dr. Jones refused to comply.
Blanks followed-up, defining the specific hours Dr. Jones was expected to work in
an email to Dr. Jones dated July 31 and again in an email dated August 4. But
Dr. Jones disregarded the orders by working night shifts and not showing up for
portions of daytime hours for which Dr. Jones was scheduled. This insistence on
doing things her own way, contrary to Wellpath’s operational plan, escalated for
weeks. In an email dated September 28, Dr. Jones explicitly refused to comply with
Wellpath’s schedule.

       Second, in Blanks’s email dated July 27, and continuing until her termination,
Dr. Jones was instructed to conform with ADC’s policy and use ADC’s biometric
reader when entering and exiting the criminal correction facilities. Dr. Jones does
not claim she made any effort to follow procedure. She instead attempted to justify
her failure to comply. According to Dr. Jones, the biometric reader required ADC
staff to activate the reader to use it. She attempted to justify her noncompliance by
pointing out that she continued to work off-site and at all hours—when ADC staff
was not around to pull it up for her. In essence, she argued compliance with the
biometric instruction would not be possible because of her other refusal to follow
the instruction to work on-site during daytime hours.

     Third, Dr. Jones’s disregard for the COVID response plan developed by
Wellpath operational management infringed on the ability of other Wellpath
employees to provide their assigned medical duties.3 For example, on or about

      3
        Though Dr. Jones responded to this claim in her response to the Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts by stating “Denied,” she has not “come forward with
‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue,’” as to this claim or done “more

                                          -8-
August 4, 2020, a Wellpath nurse filed a grievance against Dr. Jones. The grievance
involved concerns over Dr. Jones’s noncompliance with operational processes and
medication distribution policies. Blanks handled the noncompliance as it caused
confusion about what care had been provided, what was still needed, and whose duty
it was to complete it. She talked to Dr. Jones about the grievance and laid out
Wellpath’s policy, but only a few days later, Dr. Jones and Nurse Jones had their
conflict over medication distribution. Dr. Jones’s refusals to follow Wellpath’s
instructions continued after Dr. Jones reported her record alteration suspicions, even
as an increasing number of supervisors were brought in to address her insistent
noncompliance. In sum, there is no dispute that Dr. Jones’s behavior created conflict
with management before she reported concerns about alterations to medical records,
and this conflict escalated until she was terminated.

       Dr. Jones fails to show anything beyond mere speculation or her own
conclusory allegations that call into question the legitimacy of Wellpath’s stated
cause for her termination. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042. Dr. Jones argues the
record reasonably supports an inference that Wellpath management raised the issues
discussed above with Dr. Jones as excuses manufactured in retaliation for her reports
of suspected patient chart alterations. She relies in part on the close temporal
proximity between her report filed on August 7 and her termination occurring in
early November. She also points to Northport Health Services, Inc. v. Owens, 158
S.W.3d 164 (Ark. 2004), to claim her good clinical performance history, in
combination with the close temporal proximity, indicates a causal link between her
reporting and her termination. We are unconvinced.

      In Northport, the employer appealed a jury verdict entered in favor of the
claimant on her wrongful discharge claim, arguing the judgment was in error
because the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 158 S.W.3d at
167. The employer argued the employee’s actions “did not fall within the public-

than simply show[ing] that there is some metaphysical doubt” regarding this
statement. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
                                       -9-
policy exception to the at-will employee doctrine.” Id. at 173. The Arkansas
Supreme Court considered the claimant’s good past work performance, the timing
of events, and the questionable veracity of the presented evidence of workplace
issues and determined the claimant showed a question existed for a jury
determination. Id. at 173–74. But distinguishable from the facts presented here, the
claimant’s supervisors had no job performance issues related to the claimant before
she filed her reports alleging abuse and neglect of nursing home residents, an act the
court determined was legally protected by Arkansas’s public policy. See id. at 174.

       Dr. Jones’s argument overlooks the critical distinction between her claim and
the facts of Northport: timing. Her argument fails to account for the fact her negative
dealings with her employer began before she made reports and continued until her
position was terminated. Nothing more than her own speculation supports her claim
the reason for her job termination was manufactured to hide an illegal reason.

       In sum, Dr. Jones failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
the causation element required for a public policy wrongful termination cause of
action. Reasonable minds could not believe an employer would see into the future
and begin preemptively generating evidence to support an impermissible basis for
terminating a whistleblower-to-be. Simply because Dr. Jones reported suspected
suspicious electronic activity while Wellpath administrators labored to resolve
ongoing employment disputes does not abrogate Wellpath’s broad right to terminate
her at-will employment under Arkansas law. See Lynn, 280 S.W.3d at 576–77; see
also Smith, 804 S.W.2d at 684 (discussing Arkansas’s broad at-will employment
doctrine). With no genuine issues existing as to the causation element of the
Arkansas public policy wrongful termination exception, her claim fails as a matter
of law.4 Thus, the district court appropriately granted Wellpath’s motion for
summary judgment.

      4
        Because we find the district court correctly determined Dr. Jones failed to
establish the requisite causation element necessary to submit a public-policy
wrongful termination claim to a jury, we need not reach the question of whether

                                         -10-
                                  III. Conclusion

       We affirm the district court’s judgment.
                          ______________________________

Dr. Jones’s activity was protected conduct under Arkansas law, and we express no
opinion as to the correctness of the district court’s interpretation of Arkansas law on
that question.
                                          -11-