Court Opinion

ID: 9949610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 13:07:34.091924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.723685
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Plaza v. Black, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-853.]

                                        NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.

                         SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-853
               PLAZA, APPELLANT, v. BLACK, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
       may be cited as Plaza v. Black, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-853.]
Habeas corpus—Parole revocation—Appellant’s petition failed to state with
        sufficient specificity facts that would entitle him to habeas relief—Court of
        appeals’ judgment granting warden’s motion to dismiss affirmed.
  (No. 2023-0762—Submitted December 12, 2023—Decided March 12, 2024.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County,
                         No. 22CA011932, 2023-Ohio-1787.
                                  ________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Robert Plaza, who is serving an indeterminate prison
sentence of ten years to life at the Grafton Correctional Institution (“GCI”), appeals
the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against appellee, Jennifer Black, the warden of the Lorain
Correctional Institution (“LCI”). Plaza argued, among other things, that he was
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denied a preliminary hearing to determine whether there was probable cause to
believe that he had violated the conditions of his parole, that he was denied due
process of law, and that he was entitled to immediate release from prison. The
Ninth District granted the warden’s motion to dismiss. Plaza has appealed as of
right. We affirm the lower court’s judgment, but we do so on alternative grounds.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} In December 2022, Plaza was incarcerated at LCI in Lorain County
for convictions arising out of multiple cases in Cuyahoga County in 2003. Plaza
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for Lorain
County, which falls within the Ninth Appellate District. His petition alleged several
claims stemming from the Adult Parole Authority’s (“APA”) decision to revoke his
parole in June 2022. In January 2023, the warden filed a motion to dismiss Plaza’s
petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
       {¶ 3} In March 2023, while his petition was still pending, Plaza filed with
the court of appeals a notice of change of address indicating that he had been
transferred to the Richland Correctional Institution (“RCI”) in Richland County,
which falls within Ohio’s Fifth Appellate District. Then, on May 22, the court of
appeals docketed Plaza’s second notice of change of address, which stated that
Plaza had been transferred to GCI, a facility located in Lorain County. Just over a
week later, the Ninth District issued its opinion, dismissing Plaza’s petition for lack
of territorial jurisdiction. 2023-Ohio-1787, ¶ 5. Specifically, the court cited Plaza’s
first notice of change of address and explained that “Mr. Plaza is no longer
incarcerated in Lorain County in the territorial jurisdiction of the Lorain County
Court of Appeals.” Id. at ¶ 3. The court of appeals made no mention of Plaza’s
second notice of change of address.
                                    ANALYSIS
       {¶ 4} To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, Plaza “must show that he is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty and that he is entitled to immediate release

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from prison or confinement.” State ex rel. Ellison v. Black, 165 Ohio St.3d 310,
2021-Ohio-3154, 178 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2725.01 and State ex rel. Cannon
v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10. We review
de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss a habeas petition under Civ.R.
12(B)(6). State ex rel. Slaughter v. Foley, 166 Ohio St.3d 222, 2021-Ohio-4049,
184 N.E.3d 87, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 5} The court of appeals dismissed Plaza’s petition based on R.C.
2725.03, which states:

               If a person restrained of his liberty is an inmate of a state
       * * * correctional institution, the location of which is fixed by statute
       and at the time is in the custody of the officers of the institution, no
       court or judge other than the courts or judges of the county in which
       the institution is located has jurisdiction to issue or determine a writ
       of habeas corpus for his production or discharge.

       {¶ 6} We have strictly construed the rule regarding territorial jurisdiction
and have dismissed noncomplying habeas corpus petitions. See, e.g., Brown v.
Hall, 123 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-5592, 916 N.E.2d 807, ¶ 1 (holding that “even
though [the habeas] petition reached the same district court of appeals it would have
had it been filed in the correct county, the court of appeals still lacked jurisdiction
to determine the merits”); Goudlock v. Voorhies, 119 Ohio St.3d 398, 2008-Ohio-
4787, 894 N.E.2d 692, ¶ 17 (affirming ruling dismissing habeas corpus petition that
was filed in a county in the correct appellate district but not in the county where the
inmate was housed).
       {¶ 7} Plaza, however, argues that because he was transferred back to GCI
in Lorain County before the court of appeals disposed of his habeas petition, the
court erred when it dismissed his petition based on R.C. 2725.03. Plaza reasons

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that his brief incarceration at RCI, which falls within the Fifth Appellate District
instead of the Ninth Appellate District, did not defeat the court’s jurisdiction over
his petition.
        {¶ 8} Plaza’s argument has merit. When Plaza filed his petition, he was
incarcerated at LCI in Lorain County; therefore, he correctly filed his petition in
the Court of Appeals for Lorain County in the Ninth Appellate District. And
because Plaza was incarcerated at GCI, also located in Lorain County, when the
court “determine[d] [his] writ of habeas corpus,” R.C. 2725.03, its dismissal on the
ground of territorial jurisdiction was incorrect. To be sure, the warden’s brief
acknowledges that “the lower court appears to have possessed both territorial
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,” but nonetheless, the warden urges this court
to affirm based on alternative grounds relating to Plaza’s choice to pursue habeas
relief rather than a writ of mandamus.
        {¶ 9} We find the warden’s argument persuasive. Despite the court of
appeals’ error, in reviewing the petition de novo, we conclude that Plaza’s
allegations do not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. We have held that in
the context of parole revocation, “habeas corpus will lie as a remedy for a due-
process violation only in ‘extreme circumstances involving unreasonable delay.’ ”
Ellison, 165 Ohio St.3d 310, 2021-Ohio-3154, 178 N.E.3d 508, at ¶ 13, quoting
Scarberry v. Turner, 139 Ohio St.3d 111, 2014-Ohio-1587, 9 N.E.3d 1022, ¶ 14.
        {¶ 10} Foreclosing relief in habeas corpus here, Plaza’s petition alleges that
he was entitled to a “preliminary probable cause hearing” upon his reincarceration,
that the APA improperly “treat[ed] the conditions of supervision as a strict liability
offense,” that the APA’s use of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is an
inadequate burden of proof, that his violation was not supported by a preponderance
of the evidence, and that the APA’s five-year sanction is fundamentally unfair and
therefore beyond the scope of its authority and jurisdiction. Thus, the crux of each
of Plaza’s arguments is that the manner in which the parole-revocation procedures

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were conducted violated his right to due process. But generally speaking, “the sole
remedy for such a violation * * * is a writ of mandamus compelling the parole
authority to conduct a second hearing.” Ellison at ¶ 12. Moreover, Plaza concedes,
“I have not raised an unreasonable delay with my parole hearing.”
       {¶ 11} Plaza’s petition fails to state with sufficient specificity facts that
would entitle him to habeas corpus relief, and we hold that the court of appeals
properly dismissed the petition, despite its erroneous rationale.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 12} The Ninth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Plaza’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
                                                                    Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                               _________________
       Robert Plaza, pro se.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
                               _________________

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