Court Opinion

ID: 9573301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:51:59.15528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:11.991710
License: Public Domain

UDALL, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case for the following reasons:
I agree that the evidence justifies the giving of an instruction on the charge of murder as perpetrated by means of torture. There was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant intended *173to hurt the deceased and to cause her extreme pain and suffering; and further, there was evidence the defendant’s motive for beating the decedent was to extort a confession from her. The physicians’ testimony regarding the condition of the body of the deceased, also justifies the conclusion that the decedent had met her death as a result of prolonged, brutal beatings that were inflicted upon her by defendant.
I disagree with the majority, however, that the torture instruction given by the court was erroneous. The first sentence of the instruction, namely:
“The Court instructs you that all murder which is perpetrated by means of torture is murder of the first degree”,
is a correct statement of the law. However, the balance of the sentence, which reads:
“and all other kinds of murder are of the second degree”,
is an incorrect statement of the law. It was error to give this part of the instruction, but it was not prejudicial to the defendant since the jury was not considering any accusation against him except murder by torture. The other classifications of first degree murder set out in A.R.S. § 13-452, which are, murder perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, were not involved in this case; therefore, it was not necessary for the court to instruct the jury on any of these crimes as constituting murder in the first degree, and by its instruction the court limited the jury as to the first degree murder charge to a consideration of the question of murder by torture. The error if any was not prejudicial to the defendant. Ariz. Const., Art. 6, § 27 (1960), A.R.S.
It is my opinion that the remaining part of the instruction correctly states the law. It reads:
“ * * * Murder which is perpetrated by torture is declared by the law to be murder of the first degree and if you should find that the defendant committed that crime you will have no choice but to designate the offense as murder of the first degree and essentially an element of murder by torture is that a person who commits the act causing the death of another human being does so with the intention to cause and does cause such other person to suffer pain and endure suffering from such acts.”
This portion of the instruction is the identical language used in California Criminal Jury Instructions at page 247; It is implicit in the instruction that an intent to cause pain and endure suffering must be for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or to satisfy some other untoward propensity.
Particular significance is attached to the instruction which has been adopted in the State of California, since Arizona’s § 13-452, A.R.S., was adopted from California. See West Ann.Calif.Pen.Code § 189.
Torture as used in § 189 of the California Penal Code has been interpreted to, mean the intentional infliction of grievous pain. People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72, 207 P.2d 51. The elements of murder by torture are (1) an intent to inflict pain, (2) actual pain suffered, and (3) some protraction in time. People v. Heslen, 163 P.2d 21 (Cal.1945), modf. 27 Cal.2d 520, 165 P.2d 250. The purpose or motive of the act must be for revenge, extortion, persuasion or to satisfy some sadistic impulse. The purpose or motive for doing an act is not one of the elements of the crime. As we stated in Singh v. State, 35 Ariz. 432, 441, 280 P. 672, 675, 67 A.L.R. 129, “Motive is not an essential element of crime and becomes important only when the evidence, direct and circumstantial, fails to make out a satisfactory case, and then only as evidence.” See also, State v. Tuttle, 58 Ariz. 116, 118 P.2d 88; State v. Eisenstein, 72 Ariz. 320, 235 P.2d 1011; People v. Bermijo, 2 Cal.2d 270, 40 P.2d 823.
While there may be a difference in meaning between motive and purpose, the majority opinion does not distinguish the two. *174The words are used interchangeably in the majority opinion and if they are of the same meaning, it was not error on the part of the trial court to omit from the instruction, to the jury the defendant’s motive or purpose, since the offense was clearly shown. It is for this reason, in my opinion, that • California has never included the matter of motive or purpose in the jury instruction on murder by torture.
The majority cite the following California cases in support of the their proposition that the instruction given by the trial court, on the question of murder perpetrated by torture; was erroneous: People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 256 P.2d 911, cert. den. 346 U.S. 827, 74 S.Ct. 47, 98 L.Ed. 352; People v. Anderson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 763, 406 P.2d 43; People v. Tubby, supra, and People v. Heslen, supra. It is respectfully submitted that not one of the cases cited deals with the problem of giving an. erroneous instruction on the question of torture. In each instance these cases discuss the elements that constitute the crime of murder by torture, and the majority — in its opinion — find that all of the elements of murder by torture are present in this case, including the intention to hurt the deceased and cause her extreme pain and suffering, and further, that the defendant in this case intended to extort a confession from the deceased as he beat her with his fists until she died from the effects thereof.
The majority cite the Colorado case of Townsend v. People, 107 Colo. 258, 111 P.2d 236, which does deal with the giving of an erroneous instruction in a charge of murder by torture. However, the instruction given in that case was erroneous on its face and is not in point here.
By its instruction No. 11 the Colorado court informed the jury “that conduct implying more than ordinary criminality and manifesting a degree of atrocity or cruelty which might be considered as peculiar and extreme, legally constituted ‘torture’ as that term is employed in section 32” of the Colorado statute, and the opinion stated, “[t]hus, the jury was told authoritatively that a murder committed with peculiar and extreme atrocity and cruelty amounted to a ‘murder perpetrated by means of torture.’ Neither in legal conception nor in ordinary usage does the primary meaning of the word ‘torture’ permit of the synonymy assumed in the instructions under consideration.”
The Colorado- Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the trial court was in error in giving an instruction that murder committed with peculiar and extreme atrocity and cruelty amounted to murder perpetrated by means of torture. It is patently clear that the holding of the Colorado court does, not provide an authority for the action now being taken by the majority, since these elements inserted in the Colorado instruction were outside the law as defined in the Colorado statute.
I therefore disagree that fundamental error was committed in the -giving of the instruction on murder by torture. Defense counsel claimed no such error during the trial, nor was such claim made in the motion for a new trial, nor does the majority cite any authority whatever that the giving of the instruction was fundamental error.
The majority implies, but does not say, that error was committed in the giving of the instruction on malice. Since the information charged defendant with the crime of murder by torture it was not necessary to give an instruction on malice. As has been stated:
“ * * * where a person is killed by another in the perpetration of torture, intentionally and unlawfully inflicted, such premeditated intent to inflict torture is by implication of law, transferred therefrom to the homicide actually committed so as to make the latter offense an unlawful taking of life with expressed malice aforethought and thus murder in the first degree, as is declared therein. In such case the turpitude of the act of torture supplies the place of deliberate and premeditated malice, is its legal equivalent, and the purpose to kill *175is conclusively presumed from the intention to perpetrate the torture unlawfully inflicted.” Townsend v. People, 107 Colo. 258, 111 P.2d 236. See also People v. Murphy, 1 Cal.2d 37, 32 P.2d 635.
Since there was some evidence tending to show that the defendant committed the killing under the heat of passion, the court correctly instructed the jury as to the crime of manslaughter.
Next, I disagree with the holding of the majority in reference to the defense of insanity. Again I would point out that neither of the learned counsel for defendant, who thoroughly briefed the claimed errors that were allegedly committed by the trial court, made any assignment that the court erred in giving the instruction on insanity.
The majority assert that the opening paragraph on this instruction is confusing, without stating wherein the instruction tends to confuse. The majority opinion fails to state that the following instruction was given first by the court as to insanity which states the elements of insanity:
“In arriving at the conclusion as to the sanity of the person accused of the crime you are to consider and weigh carefully all of the evidence in the case bearing upon the subject and ascertain therefrom whether at the time of the offense the defendant was in such a state of mind that he could not only distinguish between right and wrong but to realize the quality and nature of the act he was doing.”
The part of the instruction condemned by the majority was taken from CALJIC, Revised Edition, § 801. Both of the elements, referred to in State v. Schantz, 98 Ariz. 200, 403 P.2d 521, are contained in the instructions given and it is my view that it fully complies with the statement set forth by this Court in Schantz, which reads:
“Where insanity is an issue, the burden of the State is to establish beyond reasonable doubt * * * that the defendant knew the nature and quality of his act and that he knew what he was doing was wrong.” 98 Ariz, at p. 207, 403 P.2d at p. 525.
The majority opinion misconstrues the Schants case by taking the burden imposed upon the state to prove both elements of insanity and requiring the elements be set forth in the disjunctive in a definition of insanity. The definition adopted by the Court was correct particularly in view of the previous portion of the insanity instruction.
I am firmly of the opinion there was no reversible error committed by the trial court at the trial of this case, and I therefore would affirm the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court.
The majority, however, have reversed the decision of the trial court and have returned the case for a retrial with instructions that the trial court must apply the principles enunciated in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Again, I disagree with the majority since it is my opinion that the retrial should be conducted in compliance with the principles enunciated in the case of Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, which opinion was handed down one week later than the Miranda opinion. The retrial of this case deals precisely with the same crime and the same facts will be involved. In Johnson, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that the principles enunciated in Miranda would not apply to cases brought to trial before June 13, 1966. It is neither logical nor reasonable that the retrial of this cause should be conducted under different rules than prevailed when it was tried the first time. In Johnson the Supreme Court said, “We hold further *176that Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago.”
It was the intention of the high Court to give stability and uniformity to all cases that had been tried previous to June 13, 1966. It is contrary to the principle of fair play to change the rules in the middle of a case. It would work an extreme hardship on law-enforcement officers if all cases that are sent back for a new trial, because of some technical error, at most, in the trial of the case, must at the retrial be governed by the principles of Miranda rather than the principles enunciated in Johnson.