Court Opinion

ID: 9858156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:17:32.912478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:24.427219
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
HAMITER, Justice.
A further consideration of the evidence in this cause convinces us of the correctness of our conclusion reached on the original hearing that both plaintiff and defendant were in bad faith when they contracted the bigamous ceremonial marriage in Gulfport, Mississippi, in 1931. Accordingly, for the reasons heretofore assigned, we reaffirm that conclusion.
Whether their subsequent relationship as husband and wife, particularly that existing after the decree of divorce obtained by the *435first Mrs. Brinson in 1933, transformed the illegally commenced union into a common law marriage valid under the laws of Mississippi is a question we need not decide herein. Assuming arguendo that it did, such marital arrangement should not and cannot he recognized in this state.
As was pointed out in our original opinion, common law marriages valid and legal in the states where contracted will ordinarily be given recognition, as a matter of comity, by the courts of Louisiana. On that basis we have several times recognized their validity (although in no case has such been done where, as here, the union “is the outgrowth of a ceremonial marriage, void at its inception and contracted in bad faith by both of the parties”). But we are not bound to give effect to a common law marriage, even if valid in the state where contracted, when it contravenes the public policy of Louisiana and good morals generally. This concept is stated in 35 American Jurisprudence, verbo Marriages, Section 170, as follows: “ * * * Ordinarily, of course, when a person changes domicil, the personal status which he carries with him will be recognized by the courts of the state or country to which he changes his domicil, and this applies to the marital status of a person, but there are certain well-recognized exceptions to this general rule. If the marital status has been acquired by a violation of an express provision of the positive law of the state in which its recognition is asked, or if it is contrary to the spirit and genius of its institutions or opposed to its settled policy or the good order and well-being of its society, or to its conceptions of public morality and decency, in all such cases the status would not and should not be recognized by the courts of such state.” And in 55 C.J.S., Marriage § 4(2), this is said: “The rule that the lex loci contractus is controlling as to the validity of a marriage rests on comity alone, and an exception thereto exists where the marriage is repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties or is contrary to its positive laws.” (Italics ours.)
For us to recognize as a valid marriage the mere continuation of the meretricious relationship as existed between plaintiff' and decedent — that which commenced in bad faith and continued without those persons having entered into a ceremonial marriage or a specific marital agreement subsequent to the removal of the impediment — would be contrary to our public policy, opposed to the well being of society, and violative of the spirit of our laws concerning the institution of marriage.
For the reasons assigned the decree heretofore rendered is now reinstated and made the final judgment of this court.
PONDER, J., recused.
SIMON, J., dissents.