Court Opinion

ID: 9394434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 14:07:18.58866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.218673
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-675

                             BUGSBY PROPERTY, LLC

                                       vs.

                  ALEXANDRIA REAL ESTATE EQUITIES, INC.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff, Bugsby Property, LLC, appeals from a

 judgment entered by a Superior Court judge dismissing its claims

 for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment on statute of

 limitations grounds.       Concluding that, under choice of law

 principles, the California statute of limitations applies and

 that the plaintiff's claims are time barred, we affirm.

       1.   Background.     Although this case came before the motion

 judge on a motion to dismiss, the parties submitted, and the

 judge considered, matters outside the pleadings.              For the

 reasons stated below, we summarize the evidence before the judge

 in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

       The core of the plaintiff's complaint is that it provided

 the defendant, Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc., with a

 strategic plan called the Bugsby Blueprint that the defendant
used to regain its profitability.     The plaintiff asserts that it

reasonably expected to be compensated for its services if and

when the defendant successfully developed a project using the

plaintiff's advice.

       Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the

factual record demonstrates that the initial meeting between the

parties occurred in November 2013, when the plaintiff's manager,

Steven Marcus, was celebrating Thanksgiving at his parents' home

in California.    At the time, Steven's father, Joel Marcus,

served as the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of the

defendant.1   Joel asked Steven during his visit for advice on how

to improve the defendant's share price.     Steven agreed that his

company would provide advisory services to the defendant with

the objective of creating a new capital strategy to improve the

defendant's share price.

       Over the next few weeks, while in New York and London, the

plaintiff worked to identify the source of the defendant's

underperformance.2    Steven "worked to diagnose the causes of [the

defendant's] share price stagnation. . . .     [T]his work

primarily took place in New York City."     On December 4, 2013,

Steven attended the defendant's shareholder meeting (Investor

Day) in New York "as part of the work that Joel Marcus had asked

1   Joel served as the CEO until April 2018.
2   The plaintiff's principal place of business is in London.

                                  2
[him] to perform."     Later that same day, Steven emailed the

defendant an outline of the plaintiff's initial recommendation.

Steven "sent the email from New York City, and Joel Marcus

received the email while he was in New York City."

    Over the next few weeks, Steven met with or otherwise

communicated with numerous financial analysts and investment

bankers in New York City.     The plaintiff's "analysis and advice

was completed and delivered to [the defendant] by December 20,

2013."   "All work that went into Bugsby's creation . . . was

completed prior to December 27, 2013."     The defendant alleges

that the Bugsby Blueprint was first successfully used in

December 2015 when the defendant sold a seventy percent interest

in its property in Cambridge, Massachusetts to its new joint

venture partner.     The plaintiff alleges that the defendant

continued to use the Bugsby Blueprint for numerous other

transactions through at least 2019.

    The plaintiff filed its complaint on August 27, 2020.3

    2.   Standard of review.     Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6),

365 Mass. 754 (1974), if "'matters outside the pleading are

3 To the extent California law applies, the statute of
limitations would be tolled from April 6, 2020, until the filing
of the complaint because of the COVID-19 pandemic. See People
v. Financial Cas. & Sur., Inc., 73 Cal. App. 5th 33, 38-39
(2021). To the extent Massachusetts law applies, the statute of
limitations would be tolled from March 17 to June 30, 2020. See
Shaw's Supermrkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 338 (2021).

                                   3
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be

treated as one for summary judgment' rather than as one to

dismiss."    Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 460 Mass. 222, 224

(2011), quoting Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b).       See Abrahamson v.

Estate of LeBold, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 225 (2016) ("Although

heard as a motion to dismiss, . . . the motion was converted to

a motion for summary judgment by submission and consideration of

matters outside the pleadings").       Here, both parties submitted

affidavits with exhibits on the choice of law and statute of

limitations issues and argued the issues based on the facts in

those affidavits.     By considering those affidavits submitted by

the parties, the judge "implicitly treated the motion[] as one[]

for summary judgment under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824

(1974)."    Starkey v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 94 Mass.

App. Ct. 1, 6 (2018).

    On a motion for summary judgment, "our review is de novo."

DeWolfe v. Hingham Ctr., Ltd., 464 Mass. 795, 799 (2013).

"Drawing every inference from the record in favor of the

nonmoving parties, the plaintiff[], we must determine whether

there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether, as a

matter of law, the defendant[] [is] entitled to judgment."

Starkey, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 6.

    3.      Statute of limitations.    a.   Choice of law.   Under

choice of law principles, Massachusetts "will apply its own

                                   4
statute of limitations to permit a claim unless:

'(a) maintenance of the claim would serve no substantial

interest of the forum; and (b) the claim would be barred under

the statute of limitations of a state having a more significant

relationship to the parties and the occurrence.'"   Pacific Ins.

Co., Ltd. v. Champion Steel, LLC, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 794

(2020), quoting Nierman v. Hyatt Corp., 441 Mass. 693, 695-696

(2004).   "In assessing those interests, we focus only on the

interests that bear on the statute of limitations."   Andersen v.

Lopez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 813, 816 (2011).

    Here, based on the undisputed facts, the California statute

of limitations applies to the plaintiff's claims.   See Kahn v.

Royal Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 572, 574 (1999) (declining to apply

Massachusetts statute of limitations).   First, Massachusetts has

no substantial interest in maintaining the plaintiff's claims

because none of the work for which the plaintiff seeks

compensation was conducted in Massachusetts.   See id. at 575

(plaintiffs' "claim involves an insured under a Florida

insurance policy issued in Florida by a Florida producer to a

Florida motor vehicle owner, covering a vehicle bearing Florida

plates and operated by a vice-president of the Florida

insured").   The initial meeting where the plaintiff agreed to

provide advisory services to the defendant occurred in

California over the Thanksgiving holiday.   From late November to

                                 5
December 2013, the plaintiff met with Wall Street analysts,

conducted independent research, attended Investor Day, spoke

with the defendant's major shareholders, and prepared the Bugsby

Blueprint.   Although the plaintiff conducted some of its work in

London, the work was primarily performed in New York.    None of

the work was performed in Massachusetts.

    The plaintiff claims that the transaction is connected to

Massachusetts because the Bugsby Blueprint was first

successfully applied to one of the defendant's Massachusetts

properties and that event triggered the defendant's duty to pay

the plaintiff.    The fact that the blueprint was first applied to

a Massachusetts property, however, was happenstance.    See Kahn,

429 Mass. at 574-575 (1999) ("that the accident occurred in

Massachusetts and the plaintiffs are Massachusetts residents

provide Massachusetts no substantial interest in the insurance

policy claim").   In this case, virtually "all of the acts and

events that gave rise to this litigation occurred" outside of

Massachusetts.    Nierman, 441 Mass. at 698.

    Second, California has "a more significant relationship to

the parties and the occurrence," relative to Massachusetts.

Andersen, 80 Mass. App. Ct. at 815, quoting Restatement (Second)

of Conflict of Laws § 142 (Supp. 1989).    The defendant is

headquartered in California, its key employees are located

there, and the initial meeting where the plaintiff agreed to

                                  6
provide strategic advice to the defendant occurred in

California.   See Nierman, 441 Mass. at 697 (applying Texas

statute of limitations where alleged negligence occurred in

Texas, plaintiff suffered injuries in Texas, defendant "operates

a business there and employs Texans," and plaintiffs "had

traveled to Texas when the alleged accident occurred").

Accordingly, the California statute of limitations controls.4

     b.   Accrual of the plaintiff's claims.   Under California

law, a plaintiff has two years to bring a quantum meruit claim

and three years to bring an unjust enrichment claim.     See Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 339(1); Leighton v. Forster, 8 Cal. App. 5th

467, 490 (2017) (two-year statute of limitations for quantum

meruit claim); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dintino, 167 Cal.

App. 4th 333, 348 (2008) (three-year statute of limitations for

unjust enrichment claim).   Where a defendant moves for summary

judgment based on the statute of limitations, "once the

defendant establishes that the time period between the

plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff's complaint exceeds the

limitations period set forth in the applicable statute, the

plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts which would take

4 At no point, either below or on appeal, did either party
suggest that New York law should apply. Rather, the parties
suggested only that either California or Massachusetts law
applied. As such, "[w]e decline to address this issue." Ramzi,
Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 353, 362
n.19 (2014).

                                 7
his or her claim outside the statute."   O'Connor v. Redstone,

452 Mass. 537, 551 (2008), quoting McGuinness v. Cotter, 412

Mass. 617, 620 (1992).

    Here, the plaintiff argues that California's discovery rule

applies because it first became aware of the defendant's using

the Bugsby Blueprint successfully in December 2018.   Under the

discovery rule, "a cause of action accrues and the statute of

limitations begins to run when the plaintiff has reason to

suspect an injury and some wrongful cause, unless the plaintiff

pleads and proves that a reasonable investigation at that time

would not have revealed a factual basis for that particular

cause of action."   Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35

Cal. 4th 797, 803 (2005).   "Courts have relied on that rule to

toll or expand the statute of limitations in cases where

starting the limitations period on the date of the plaintiff's

injury would be '"manifestly unjust"' because '[t]he injury or

the act causing the injury, or both, have been difficult for the

plaintiff to detect.'"   Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution

Servs., Inc., 11 Cal. 5th 918, 946 (2021), quoting April

Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 826, 831 (1983).

Here, the plaintiff baldly asserts that it "reasonably was

unaware of [its injury] until December 2018," but presented no

evidence to suggest that a reasonable investigation at the time

of the 2015 transaction would not have revealed a factual basis

                                8
for its causes of action and, indeed, alleged in its complaint

that the 2015 transaction was "announced August 11, 2015."   Cf.

McGuinness, 412 Mass. at 624-625 (interrogatory responses

satisfied plaintiffs' "burden of responding to the defendants'

motion by alleging facts which, if proved at trial, would bring

[their] claims outside the impact of the statute of

limitations"); Castillo v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 38 Mass.

App. Ct. 513, 515 n.5 (1995) ("affidavits suffice to meet the

plaintiffs' burden, in the face of a motion for summary judgment

based on the statute of limitations").   Accordingly, the

plaintiff failed to place facts in dispute that would permit a

jury to find that the discovery rule applied.5

     We similarly reject the plaintiff's invocation of

California's continuous accrual doctrine.   The doctrine applies

"whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation."    Aryeh

v. Caron Business Solutions, Inc., 55 Cal. 4th 1185, 1199

(2013).   Again, "once the defendant establishes that the time

period between the plaintiff's injury and the plaintiff's

5 The plaintiff argues that, under California law, the statute of
limitations was tolled during the time that actions in New York
were pending. This is a complicated question of law, see, e.g.,
Hopkins v. Kedzierski, 225 Cal. App. 4th 736, 747 (2014), but we
need not reach it. The plaintiff represented to the Superior
Court judge that, even under the most generous application of
tolling under California law, the complaint's timeliness
requires that the plaintiff was reasonably unaware of its cause
of action prior to July 2017.

                                 9
complaint exceeds the limitations period set forth in the

applicable statute, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging

facts which would take his or her claim outside the statute."

O'Connor, 452 Mass. at 551, quoting McGuinness, 412 Mass. at

620.

       The summary judgment record is devoid of facts that would

support a recurring obligation.    Steven attested to "the

understanding that Bugsby would -- if successful -- receive

market-based compensation for its work" and made no reference to

any recurring obligation.    Moreover, the plaintiff does not

provide any California precedent to support the proposition that

quantum meruit or unjust enrichment damages can exceed the

reasonable value of the plaintiff's services, which were

completed by the end of 2013.     See, e.g., Pacific Bay Recovery,

Inc. v. California Physicians' Servs., Inc., 12 Cal. App. 5th

200, 214 (2017) ("Quantum meruit permits the recovery of the

reasonable value of services rendered"); Hernandez v. Lopez, 180

Cal. App. 4th 932, 939 (2009), quoting Dunkin v. Boskey, 82 Cal.

App. 4th 171, 195 (2000) ("the measure of damages . . . for

                                  10
unjust enrichment 'is synonymous with restitution'").

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Sullivan,
                                        Sacks & Ditkoff, JJ.6),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    May 15, 2023.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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