Court Opinion

ID: 9396358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 07:09:28.29029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.363192
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00069-CV
     ___________________________

      MANISH MEHTA, Appellant

                    V.

      HANNAH MEHTA, Appellee

  On Appeal from the 367th District Court
         Denton County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 19-2889-367

   Before Kerr, Bassel, and Womack, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Manish Mehta (Husband) appeals from the trial court’s final divorce decree. In

two issues, he complains that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) awarding

spousal maintenance to Hannah Mehta (Wife) because the evidence was legally

insufficient to support the award and (2) failing to make a just and right marital-estate

division because the evidence was factually insufficient to support disproportionately

dividing the estate in Wife’s favor. We will affirm the trial court’s property division

but reverse the spousal-maintenance award.

                                    I. Background

      Husband and Wife married in July 2000. In September 2007, Wife gave birth to

29-week, preterm male triplets. One of the boys—A.M. (Andy)—is a “medically

fragile child” because he was born with complex medical issues—both physical and

neurological—that required, and continue to require, extensive medical care. 1 After

the boys were born, Wife left outside employment to care for them. Husband

continued to work.

      Wife was the boys’ primary caregiver and made medical decisions for them.

Facilitating Andy’s medical and educational needs and providing care to Andy—which

was left entirely to Wife—required a substantial amount of time. Wife unilaterally

made all of Andy’s educational decisions but made educational decisions concerning

      1
       We use a fictious name to identify A.M. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 109.002(d).

                                           2
the other two boys jointly with Husband. In 2016, Wife co-founded and began

volunteering for Protect TX Fragile Kids, a nonprofit that advocates for medically

fragile children in Texas.

       In March 2019, Husband filed for divorce. The trial court signed temporary

orders granting Wife exclusive use of the marital residence and required her to pay all

monthly living expenses for the residence. The trial court also ordered Husband to

pay Wife $2,760 per month in child support, as well as spousal maintenance of

$2,000 per month from March 1, 2020, to October 1, 2020, and then $1,000 per

month from November 1, 2020, to January 1, 2021.

       While the divorce was pending, Wife negotiated a paid executive-director

position with Protect TX Fragile Kids. The $30,000-per-year position was guaranteed

for a year, effective June 15, 2021.

       During a three-day bench trial in August 2021, the trial court heard from

13 witnesses and received testimony and exhibits regarding, among other things,

Husband’s and Wife’s parenting skills; Andy’s health conditions; Husband and Wife’s

disagreements over medical decision-making for Andy and over the severity of his

medical conditions; Husband’s and Wife’s salaries; the community estate’s assets and

debts; and attorneys’ fees. Both parties submitted proposed divisions of the

community estate, with Husband proposing a 50/50 split and Wife proposing a

58/42 split in her favor.

                                          3
          The trial court’s final divorce decree appointed Husband and Wife as joint

managing conservators, awarded Wife the exclusive right to designate the children’s

primary residence, and set out a possession and access schedule for the children. The

decree also awarded Wife $2,000 in monthly spousal maintenance for 36 months and

ordered Husband to pay Wife $2,760 per month in child support. Finally, the decree

divided the marital property, with Wife receiving a larger portion of the community

estate.

          At Husband’s request, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of

law to which Husband later objected, seeking additional findings and conclusions. His

request consisted of asking “what is the legal basis” for 14 of the trial court’s legal

conclusions. The trial court made no additional findings and conclusions.

          Husband timely appealed and challenges the spousal-maintenance award and

the marital-property division.

                                   II. Standard of Review

          We apply the same standard of review—abuse of discretion—to both

challenges. E.g., Sherman v. Sherman, 650 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2022, no pet.) (spousal maintenance); Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (property division).

          A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or if it

does not analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011).

Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by deciding based on conflicting

                                               4
evidence, sufficient evidence must nevertheless support the decision; therefore, the

traditional sufficiency-review standards are relevant to our review. Hamilton v.

Hamilton, No. 02-19-00211-CV, 2020 WL 6498528, at *3 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth

Nov. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.C., No. 02-17-00377-CV, 2018 WL 5289370,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). Stated another way,

when we review if the trial court abused its discretion by ruling based on legally or

factually insufficient evidence, “we must determine (1) whether the trial court had

sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion and (2) whether the trial court

acted    reasonably    in   applying   its   discretion   to   those   facts.”   Hamilton,

2020 WL 6498528, at *3.

        When, as here, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the

fact-findings have the same force and dignity as a jury’s answers to jury questions.

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991). As with jury findings,

a trial court’s fact-findings on disputed issues are not conclusive, and, when the

appellate record contains a reporter’s record, an appellant may challenge those

findings for evidentiary sufficiency. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.

1994). We review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting challenged findings using

the same standards that we apply to jury findings. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297.

        We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence

challenge—only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) legal or

evidentiary rules bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to

                                             5
prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere

scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn

v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient

evidence supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the

finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence

unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas,

228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.

2005). We indulge “every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in

support of the challenged finding. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v.

Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)). Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is

legally sufficient to support a finding. Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727–

28 (Tex. 2003).

      When reviewing whether the evidence is factually insufficient to support a

finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the

pertinent record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the

finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that

the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,

715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175,

176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). When the party

with the burden of proof appeals from a failure to find, the party must show that the

failure to find is against the great weight and preponderance of the credible evidence.

                                            6
Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor

Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988); see Gonzalez v. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc.,

195 S.W.3d 680, 681–82 (Tex. 2006).

      We begin with Husband’s second issue—the factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the property division—because the trial court’s property division is a

factor that we consider in reviewing the trial court’s spousal-maintenance award. See

Smith v. Smith, No. 02-20-00370-CV, 2022 WL 1682427, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 634 S.W.3d 335,

368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.)).

                               III. Property Division

      In his second issue, Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to make a just and right division of the marital estate because the evidence is

factually insufficient to support disproportionately dividing the community estate in

Wife’s favor.

A. Applicable Law

      In dividing a marital estate, the trial court must do so in a manner that it

“deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children

of the marriage.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. A trial court has broad discretion in

making a just-and-right division. Halleman v. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d 443, 452 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.—Fort

                                           7
Worth 2004, no pet.). Without a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb that

division. Halleman, 379 S.W.3d at 452; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 610.

       “Community property does not have to be divided equally, but the division

must be equitable.” Halleman, 379 S.W.3d at 452. The trial court may consider “the

disparity of incomes or of earning capacities of the parties,” as well as “the spouses’

capacities and abilities, benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from

continuation of the marriage, business opportunities, education, relative physical

conditions, relative financial condition[s] and obligations, disparity of ages, size of

separate estates, and the nature of the property.” Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698–

99 (Tex. 1981). “[N]o one factor is determinative,” and “it is the overall property

division   that   is   important.”   Felix-Forbes   v.   Forbes,   No.   02-15-00121-CV,

2016 WL 3021829, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

A disproportionate division, however, must have some reasonable basis. Halleman,

379 S.W.3d at 452.

B. The trial court’s property-division findings

       Regarding dividing the community estate, the trial court found2 that “there are

no disputes as to the characterization and value of the community estate, save and

except the following,” which we summarize:

           • Husband has a $8,194.11 judgment in his favor.

       2
         In its findings and conclusions, the trial court stated that “[a]ny finding of fact
that is a conclusion of law shall be deemed a conclusion of law” and vice versa.

                                             8
          • Wife “did not sign a document titled ‘Promissory Note’ in which
            [Husband]’s parents allegedly loaned [him]” $100,000. “Therefore, the
            Court did not assign a value to that alleged Promissory Note. Further, no
            evidence was produced or presented that this alleged Promissory Note
            was secured by any property of the parties.”

          • Husband “signed a document titled ‘Promissory Note’ and allegedly
            took out a [$50,000] personal loan from his parents . . . . Therefore, the
            Court did not assign a value to that alleged Promissory Note. Further, no
            evidence was produced or presented that this alleged Promissory Note
            was secured by any property of the parties.”

          • Husband was able to pay all his pretrial attorney’s fees because he had
            access to, and used, community funds. After trial, Husband owed
            $14,000 in outstanding attorney’s fees.

          • At the time of trial, Wife owed $62,000 in outstanding attorney’s fees
            because she could not access community funds to pay them. According
            to her attorney, “community funds existed that could be allocated to pay
            those attorney’s fees.”

          • According to a divorce-lending specialist’s testimony, Wife “would likely
            be able to qualify for a refinance of the marital residence if she were
            awarded the property division she requested and received child[-]support
            payments.”

      Husband has not challenged any of these fact-findings. Unchallenged fact-

findings are entitled to the same weight as a jury’s verdict and bind an appellate court

unless either the contrary is established as a matter of law or no evidence supports the

finding. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Inimitable Grp., L.P.

v. Westwood Grp. Dev. II, Ltd., 264 S.W.3d 892, 902 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2008, no pet.). In other words, we defer to unchallenged fact-findings having some

evidentiary support. Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518,

523 (Tex. 2014).

                                           9
        We have closely reviewed the evidence—among it the parties’ proposed

property divisions, the judgment in Husband’s favor, the promissory notes signed

only by Husband, and Husband and Wife’s attorneys’ billing statements and testimony

regarding attorneys’ fees—and have determined that some evidence supports these

fact-findings.

C. Analysis

        By Husband’s supposed calculations—which he does not include in his brief—

the trial court awarded $251,420.93 of the net community estate to Wife and awarded

$64,260.37 of the net community to him, yielding an 80/20 split in Wife’s favor.

According to Wife, who did include her calculations, the trial court awarded

$317,444.16 of the net community to her and $240,762.44 to Husband, yielding a

57/43 division in Wife’s favor.

        Using the trial court’s valuations in the divorce decree,3 the trial court’s

findings, and the parties’ agreed values reflected in their proposed property divisions,

we arrived at a division much closer to Wife’s, with Wife receiving 54% of the net

community and Husband receiving the remaining 46%. We show our calculations

here:

        Husband does not challenge these valuations.
        3

                                          10
      ASSET                VALUE                HUSBAND                WIFE
Chase Checking               $19,282.00            $19,282.00
Chase Savings                   $720.77               $720.77
Citi Retirement              $39,976.28            $39,976.28
Savings Plan
Janus Henderson                $1,354.73             $1,354.73
Traditional IRA
Janus Vanguard                $43,000.00            $43,000.00
IRA
GE 401(k)                     $47,611.52            $47,611.52
Toyota Motor                  $86,984.85            $10,000.00           $76,984.854
North America
Retirement
Benefits
1999 Lexus RX300                 $500.00               $500.00
Chase Checking                 $1,635.27             $1,635.27
(Veritaz
Photography)
Camera                         $2,000.00             $2,000.00
Equipment
(Veritaz
Photography)
Verizon Stock                      $0.00                     X
Options
Denton County                  $8,092.95             $8,092.95
Judgment
Delta SkyMiles                 Unknown                       X
2019 Income Tax                $7,879.00             $7,879.00
Refund
COVID-19                      $19,789.02            $19,789.02
Stimulus
AIG Term Life                  $1,478.55             $1,478.55
Insurance Policy

      4
       In the decree, the trial court explicitly awarded this portion of Husband’s
retirement benefits to Wife “[f]or attorney’s fees incurred by and awarded to [her]” in
the decree.

                                           11
Toyota Motor Life    Unknown                    X
Insurance Policy
Health Equity         $7,585.27          $7,585.27
Account
Emergency Relief     $58,000.00         $58,000.00
Distribution
Non-Roth Partial     $45,000.00         $45,000.00
Lump Sum
Distribution
50% of 2/3 of        Unknown                    X
Husband’s 2021
Bonus
Marital Residence   $400,000.00                      $400,000.00
Capital One Bank         $48.62                           $48.62
Account
Fidelity Rollover     $2,753.30                        $2,753.30
IRA
Janus Henderson      $36,431.76                       $36,431.76
Roth IRA #1
Ameritrade Roth       $3,126.40                        $3,126.40
IRA
Janus Henderson         $99.89                           $99.89
Roth IRA #2
Janus Henderson         $98.22                           $98.22
Traditional IRA
Verizon 401(k)       $31,231.73                       $31,231.73
Janus Henderson      $17,893.04                       $17,893.04
Investors Account
2018 Toyota          $31,148.00                       $31,148.00
Highlander
JetBlue Miles        Unknown                                  X
American Airlines    Unknown                                  X
Miles
50% of 2/3 of        Unknown                                  X
Husband’s 2021
Bonus
Mortgage Escrow       $3,822.10                        $3,822.10
Account Refund
TOTAL ASSETS        $917,543.27        $313,905.36   $603,637.91

                                  12
LIABILITY                   VALUE                 HUSBAND                 WIFE
Citi Credit Card                $130.31                $130.31
Chase Credit Cards              $171.58                $171.58
(Veritaz
Photography)
Alleged Debt            No value assigned                       X
Owed to
Husband’s Parents
Pledge Owed to                   $2,000.00             $2,000.00
Gospel of Asia
Fidelity Loan                  $27,600.94             $27,600.94
Husband’s                      $14,000.00             $14,000.00
Attorney’s Fees
Mortgage Owed                 $179,603.04                                  $179,603.04
on Marital
Residence
Note Secured by                $27,273.72                                    $27,273.72
2018 Toyota
Highlander
Gabriel Lawn                     $3,200.00                                    $3,200.00
Service
Wife’s Attorney’s              $62,000.00                                    $62,000.00
Fees
Chase Credit Card                $5,048.37                                    $5,048.37
2021 Estimated                   $9,068.62                                    $9,068.62
Property Taxes on
Marital Residence
TOTAL                         $330,096.58             $43,902.83           $286,193.75
LIABILITIES

      Based on these calculations, the total net community estate was $587,446.69;

Husband received $270,002.53 (46%), and Wife received $317,444.16 (54%).

      As noted, the trial court must divide community property equitably, not

equally, and if the division is reasonable, we will not disturb it on appeal. See Halleman,

                                             13
379 S.W.3d at 452. Here, several factors support the unequal property division,

including:

   • Husband has bachelor’s and master’s degrees in business while Wife has a
     bachelor’s degree in secondary education.

   • Wife left the workforce in 2007 to care for the couple’s children and did not
     return to the workforce until becoming executive director of Protect TX
     Fragile Kids in June 2021.

   • A disparity exists between Husband’s $140,000 annual salary and Wife’s
     $30,000 annual salary.

   • Wife assumed responsibility for the mortgage.

   • Wife is and has been the primary caregiver of the couple’s children, one of
     whom has medically complex needs.

      To successfully challenge a trial court’s property division, a party must

demonstrate from evidence in the record that the division was so unjust that the trial

court abused its discretion. Barber v. Barber, No. 02-21-00291-CV, 2022 WL 4105363,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Based on the factors

listed above, the trial court’s property division was not against the great weight and

preponderance of the credible evidence, and Husband has thus failed to show that the

slightly disproportionate property division in Wife’s favor was so unjust that the trial

court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we overrule Husband’s second issue.

                             IV. Spousal Maintenance

      Husband argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion by

awarding Wife spousal maintenance because the evidence was legally insufficient to

                                          14
support that award. Within this issue, Husband asserts that the trial court failed to

make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow him to present his

appeal. We start by discussing the law regarding spousal maintenance. We will next

address whether the trial court’s findings and conclusions were sufficient. Finally, we

will address the merits of Husband’s complaint.

A. Applicable law

      Spousal maintenance is “an award in a suit for dissolution of a marriage of

periodic payments from the future income of one spouse for the support of the other

spouse.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.001(1). Spousal maintenance’s purpose is “to

provide temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability to support

herself has eroded over time while engaged in homemaking activities and whose

capital assets are insufficient to provide support.” Sherman, 650 S.W.3d at 899 (quoting

In re Marriage of Hallman, No. 06-09-00089-CV, 2010 WL 619290, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).

      Section 8.051 of the Texas Family Code governs a spouse’s eligibility for

spousal maintenance. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051. As relevant here, a trial court

may order spousal maintenance only if (1) “the spouse seeking maintenance will lack

sufficient property, including the spouse’s separate property, on dissolution of the

marriage to provide for the spouse’s reasonable needs” and (2) the maintenance-

seeking spouse

                                            15
      (A) is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
      minimum reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or
      mental disability;

      (B) has been married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks
      the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s
      minimum reasonable needs; or

      (C) is the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who requires
      substantial care and personal supervision because of a physical or mental
      disability that prevents the spouse from earning sufficient income to
      provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.

Id. § 8.051(2). Here, the parties do not dispute that the trial court did not award

spousal maintenance under subsection (A), which does not apply here. See id.

§ 8.051(2)(A). We are thus concerned only with subsections (B) (the ten-year-marriage

subsection) and (C) (the disabled-child subsection). See id. § 8.051(2)(B)–(C).

      A spouse seeking maintenance under the ten-year-marriage subsection must

rebut the presumption that maintenance under that subsection is not warranted unless

she has been diligent in

      (1) earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
      reasonable needs; or

      (2) developing the necessary skills to provide for the spouse’s minimum
      reasonable needs during a period of separation and during the time the
      suit for dissolution of the marriage is pending.

Id. § 8.053(a). But if a spouse seeks maintenance under the disabled-child subsection,

“the presumption in [S]ection 8.053(a) does not apply and the spouse is not required

to present evidence that [she] ha[s] exercised diligence in earning sufficient income or

                                           16
in developing the necessary skills to provide for [her] minimum reasonable needs.”

Kelly, 634 S.W.3d at 366.

B. Findings of fact and conclusions of law

      In addition to its property-division fact-findings, the trial court made the

following findings and conclusions relating to the spousal-support award:

   • The trial court made numerous fact-findings concerning how Andy is a
     “medically fragile child” with special and chronic medical and educational
     needs and describing the substantial care and supervision that Wife—as Andy’s
     primary caregiver—provides.

   • Wife is “gainfully employed as the Executive Director of the non-profit
     organization she co-founded called Protect TX Fragile Kids,” her salary is
     $30,000, and the “position is guaranteed for one year, starting June 15, 2021.”

   • “The Court finds under the circumstances presented in this case, [Wife] is
     eligible for maintenance under the provisions of Texas Family Code [C]hapter
     8. Accordingly, [Husband] is ordered to pay as maintenance the sum of two
     thousand dollars ($2,000.00) per month to [Wife] . . . .”

      Husband objected to the trial court’s legal conclusion that Wife was eligible for

spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the Family Code because no evidence

supported the conclusion. In his request for additional findings and conclusions, he

asked the trial court to provide the legal basis for its spousal-maintenance legal

conclusion as well as for 13 other conclusions. The trial court made no additional

findings or conclusions. Husband complains that this failure has “left [him] to guess

as to the trial court’s decision on an ultimate issue in this case, where there are

                                         17
multiple grounds for Wife’s award of spousal maintenance under Chapter 8 of the

Texas Family Code.” 5

       Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 298 provides that, within ten days after a trial

court files original findings and conclusions, any party may request specified

additional or amended findings or conclusions.6 Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. But additional

findings are not required if the original findings and conclusions properly and

succinctly relate the ultimate fact-findings and legal conclusions necessary to give

adequate information for the party to prepare its appeal. Pakdimounivong v. City of

Arlington, 219 S.W.3d 401, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). An

ultimate fact is one that would have a direct effect on the judgment. Id. There is no

reversible error if the lack of additional findings does not prevent a party from

adequately presenting an argument on appeal. Id. “The controlling issue is whether the

circumstances of the particular case require the party to guess at the reasons for the

       Wife’s pleadings did not specify the statutory grounds within Chapter 8 upon
       5

which she was relying in seeking spousal maintenance, nor did the divorce decree state
the specific statutory basis for the spousal-maintenance award.
       6
        We express no opinion about whether Husband’s request directed at the trial
court’s spousal-maintenance-eligibility legal conclusion—“What is the legal basis for
Conclusion of Law 5?”—made alongside nearly identical queries directed at 13 other
legal conclusions is sufficiently specific. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 298; Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v.
Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 93 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.) (“A request for additional findings must be specific; it cannot be buried
among minute differentiations or numerous unnecessary requests.” (citing Vickery v.
Comm’n for Law. Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
pet. denied))).

                                             18
trial court’s decision.” In re Marriage of C.A.S. & D.P.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

      Here, the ultimate issue is whether Wife meets the statutory spousal-

maintenance-eligibility requirements under Chapter 8 of the Family Code. The trial

court divided the marital property and made findings and conclusions regarding the

characterization and value of the community estate, Wife’s annual salary, and Wife’s

eligibility for spousal maintenance under Chapter 8. And the parties agree that Wife

was theoretically eligible for spousal maintenance only under the ten-year-marriage or

the disabled-child subsection. We thus conclude that the trial court’s original findings

and conclusions are sufficiently specific to allow Husband to adequately present his

complaints on appeal—which he did by arguing Wife’s ineligibility for spousal

maintenance on all possible applicable bases—so we overrule Husband’s complaint

regarding the trial court’s not making additional findings and conclusions.

C. The Spousal-Maintenance Award

      To be eligible for spousal maintenance, Wife—as the requesting spouse—had

to prove that (1) she would lack sufficient property post-divorce to provide for her

minimum reasonable needs and (2) she met the requirements of either the ten-year-

marriage or the disabled-child subsection. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(B), (C).

Husband argues that the evidence is legally insufficient (1) to show Wife would lack

sufficient property going forward to meet her minimum reasonable needs; (2) to rebut

the presumption against a spousal-maintenance award under the ten-year-marriage

                                          19
subsection; and (3) to prove that caring for Andy prevents her from earning sufficient

income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs.

      Neither the Family Code nor caselaw defines “minimum reasonable needs.”

Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 WL 17986023, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d

850, 860 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.)). Rather, the trial court determines a

spouse’s minimum reasonable needs on a case-by-case, fact-specific basis. Id. “While a

list of expenses is helpful, such a list is not the only evidence upon which a trial court

can determine a person’s ‘minimum reasonable needs.’” Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251,

254 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g). Still, the key word

here is “evidence.”

      At trial, Wife provided no itemized list of monthly expenses, nor did she testify

about them. But some evidence exists concerning mortgage and property-tax

expenses of the marital residence that Wife was awarded. That evidence showed that

the monthly mortgage payment was about $2,032 and that based on the home’s

estimated 2021 property taxes, Wife could expect to pay about $756 per month in

property taxes. See Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at 255 (considering mortgage interest, property

taxes, and homeowner’s insurance costs in determining spouse’s minimum reasonable

needs). But no evidence established any other monthly expenses—although Wife

undoubtedly has them—such as food, utilities, clothing, medical expenses, child-care

costs, or the monthly automobile and insurance payments on the Toyota Highlander.

                                           20
See Howe v. Howe, 551 S.W.3d 236, 257 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (reversing

award of post-divorce spousal maintenance where “record [was] devoid of

information about whether Wife lacked minimal reasonable needs without spousal

support,” and “[t]here was no development of her monthly fixed and variable

expenses”); Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2002, no pet.) (considering transportation, clothing, and child-care costs in

determining spouse’s minimum reasonable needs); In re Marriage of Hale, 975 S.W.2d

694, 698 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.) (considering utilities, automobile-

payment, insurance, gas, groceries, credit-card, credit-union-dues, medical, and

clothing costs). Without any evidence of her non-housing-related expenses, based on

the actual trial evidence Wife’s monthly minimum reasonable needs were only $2,788.

      Regarding whether Wife’s property sufficed to meet her minimum reasonable

needs, Husband asserts that based on her salary and the property Wife received in the

divorce—the home, numerous retirement accounts, the investment account, child

support, and “various other assets”—Wife’s property was sufficient. In determining

the sufficient-property/minimum-reasonable-needs issue, courts consider the spouse’s

monthly income, the value of the spouse’s separate property,7 the value of the

property awarded to the spouse through dividing the marital estate, and child-support

payments. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051; In re Marriage of Elabd, 589 S.W.3d 280,

      7
       The parties agreed that there was “no separate estate from either party.”

                                          21
285 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.); Howe, 551 S.W.3d at 257; Diaz, 350 S.W.3d at

255. Also as part of its inquiry, “the trial court may consider the liquidity of the assets

awarded and their ability to produce income.” Schafman v. Schafman, No. 01-20-00231-

CV, 2022 WL 962466, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.). But “[w]hen considering the assets awarded in a divorce, the law does not

require the spouse to spend down long-term assets, liquidate all available assets, or

incur new debt simply to obtain job skills and meet short-term needs.” Id. Wife was

thus not required to sell the home or the Toyota Highlander to meet her present

needs. See id.; see also Smith, 2022 WL 1682427, at *11 (“Husband cites no authority for

the proposition that Wife was required to sell her ten-year-old vehicle—her only

transportation source—to show that she did not have sufficient property for her

needs. Husband provided no evidence that Wife had other transportation available to

her and does not explain how Wife would be able to find a sufficient job without

transportation.”). Wife was similarly not required to incur the penalties and tax

consequences from liquidating retirement accounts. See Martinez, 2022 WL 17986023,

at *5; Smith, 2022 WL 1682427, at *11.

      These assets aside, Wife was awarded (1) the $48.62 in cash in the Capital One

bank account; (2) the $17,893.04 in the Janus Henderson investment account; 8 and

(3) the $3,822.10 mortgage-escrow-account refund. After subtracting the $3,200 debt

       According to the account statement, this is a non-retirement account.
       8

                                            22
to the lawn service and the $5,048.37 in credit-card debt, Wife was left with about

$13,515 in liquid assets, which when divided over the 36-month-spousal-maintenance

term would leave her with about $375 per month in additional assets. Considering this

amount, along with monthly child support of $2,760 and Wife’s monthly salary of

$2,500,9 Wife has $5,635 in total monthly income, which exceeds her $2,788 in

evidence-based monthly minimum reasonable needs by $2,847. We must therefore

conclude that legally insufficient trial evidence supported the implied finding that

Wife would lack sufficient property on the marriage’s dissolution to provide for her

minimum reasonable needs. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by

awarding Wife spousal maintenance; we thus need not address Husband’s remaining

arguments within this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We sustain Husband’s first issue.

                                    V. Conclusion

      Having sustained Husband’s first issue, we reverse the spousal-maintenance

award in the final divorce decree and render judgment that Wife take nothing on her

spousal-maintenance claim. We affirm the remainder of the final divorce decree.

      9
        This amount represents Wife’s gross monthly salary. The only trial evidence of
her salary was of her gross annual salary ($30,000). No evidence of her net salary after
taxes and other deductions was presented.

                                          23
                               /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                               Elizabeth Kerr
                               Justice

Delivered: May 18, 2023

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