Court Opinion

ID: 9931381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 21:00:53.737999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:31.809671
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-6516      Doc: 13         Filed: 02/07/2024    Pg: 1 of 3

                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-6516

        JESSE KYLE KEITH,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        J. C. STREEVAL; JOHN DOES,

                            Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Roanoke. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (7:23-cv-00040-JPJ-PMS)

        Submitted: January 9, 2024                                        Decided: February 7, 2024

        Before THACKER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Jesse Kyle Keith, Appellant Pro Se.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jesse Kyle Keith, a federal prisoner housed in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at

        United States Penitentiary Lee, appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his

        complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

        of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), Keith’s complaint raised claims of

        unconstitutional prison conditions in the SHU and violation of his procedural due process

        rights. He sought both damages and injunctive relief. We affirm in part and vacate and

        remand in part.

               We “review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure

        to state a claim, applying the same standards as those for reviewing a dismissal under Fed.

        R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). “To survive

        a motion to dismiss under that rule, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

        accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               We find that the district court properly dismissed Keith’s Bivens claims for

        damages. See Tate v. Harmon, 54 F.4th 839, 841 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding no Bivens cause

        of action for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement); Mays v. Smith, 70 F.4th

        198, 203 (4th Cir. 2023) (rejecting Mays’ procedural due process claim arising from

        placement in administrative segregation). However, the district court did not separately

        consider Keith’s claims for injunctive relief, and Bivens does not govern claims for

        injunctive relief. See Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016). We find

        that, liberally construed, Keith’s complaint may state a claim for injunctive relief or Keith

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        may be able to do so following amendment. In any event, the district court should consider

        these claims in the first instance. *

               Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Keith’s claims for money damages, vacate

        the dismissal of his claims for injunctive relief, and remand for further proceedings. We

        deny Keith’s motion for injunctive relief on appeal. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                 AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                                  VACATED IN PART,
                                                                                   AND REMANDED

               *
                 The district court rejected Keith’s procedural due process claim as unexhausted
        and conclusory, rather than on the basis that the claim sought to expand Bivens. We find
        that any claim for damages is not authorized by Bivens. Regarding Keith’s procedural due
        process claim, the district court did not address Keith’s exhaustion allegations or explain
        why they were insufficient. To the extent that Keith’s claims were conclusory, the district
        court did not explain why it failed to grant Keith an opportunity to amend. See Coleman v.
        Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that, if a pro se complaint
        contains a potentially cognizable claim, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to
        particularize his allegations).

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