Court Opinion

ID: 9588107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:30:12.025396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:58.347820
License: Public Domain

Spratley, J.,
dissenting:
I agree with the learned trial judge that there was sufficient evidence of negligence on the part of the Virginia Electric and Power Company to carry the case to the jury. In his written opinion refusing to set aside the verdict, the judge said: “* * * there was evidence tending to show negligence on the part of the defendant with respect to the following points among others:
“1. Notice was given to the defendant by the owner of the sewage disposal plant with an offer to give further information.
“2. There was evidence of other comparable sewage disposal plants in the area at Aragona Village, Birch wood Gardens, Poplar Halls and Foxhall where, in the operation of the plants, workmen used long ‘squeegees’ from the catwalks on the roof to break up sludge.
“3. A mere casual observation from the exterior of the plant would reflect steps going from the ground to the top of the plant with an iron railing, numerous pipes and valves on the top of the building. See plaintiff’s exhibits 4 and 1. Bearing in mind the high degree of care required by law of the defendant in erecting and maintaining its facilities for the distribution of electricity, the jury could well conclude from these facts that the defendant was put on inquiry to ascertain in what manner the top of the plant was used in its operation.
“4. The defendant through its agent, The C & P Telephone Company, erected two energized wires 16 feet 1 inch above the top of the tanks where the plaintiff was working with a ‘squeegee’ some 20 feet 6 inches long. These wires were only some 12 feet 7 inches above an iron railing and even a less distance above some piping constituting the topmost part of the plant. Furthermore, there was a neutral wire strung some 7 feet 6 inches below the energized wires, placing this neutral wire only 8 feet 7 inches from the top of the tanks and 5 feet 1 inch above the iron railing. It is to be noted that in these calculations the height of the iron railing is estimated by the court to be 3 feet 6 inches from the photographs, plaintiff’s exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4. The scale drawing prepared by the defendant and *135admitted in evidence as defendant’s exhibit 2 does not show the railing.”
Virginia Electric and Power Company, herein referred to as VEPCO, is a very large industrial organization in the field of electric power. It is an expert in manufacturing electric energy for ,comr mercial use, and in distributing power over high tension electric wires. It is aware of the high degree of care to be exercised by it to prevent injury to persons and property coming into contact with such wires. It is undisputed that there were several other sewage disposal plants in the area near the Carolanne plant, serviced by VEPCO with electric power, and that squeegees were used in the operation of at least one of those plants, Birchwood Gardens.
In response to questions, Warranch, an officer of the corporate owner of the Carolanne plant and its builder, testified as follows:
“Q. Now, Mr. Warranch, when you request power from the power company to start these plants, are they on notice of any type of equipment that you are going to use there?
“A. Yes, sir, when we started building the plant we notified the power company that we were building the plant and advised them that if they needed any information that they could get it either from our office or from the designing engineer.
“Q. Did they request from you or from your engineer to your knowledge any information as to the use of these squeegees?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Are the use of these squeegees standard procedure in filtration sewerage disposal plants?
“A. Yes, sir. We have the same system at Birchwood and we have the same squeegees.
“Q. How often do the people from the Virginia Electric and Power Company visit the plant, or their agents?
“A. I know they go once a month to send us a bill, but other than that I don’t know how often they come out there.”
The evidence shows the following facts and circumstances:
Upon request from the owner of the Carolanne plant for electric power, VEPCO had its uninsulated high tension wires strung over the plant by the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company on the telephone poles of the latter. At the time the wires were strung,the plant had been practically completed. Persons installing the wires-could plainly observe a ladder and its steps extending from the ground to the top of the plant, the ledge or platform for workmen to stand on around the tanks, and an iron railing surrounding the pipes, valves *136and tanks on the top, indicating that workmen might be expected to be employed on the top of the budding around the tanks in the maintenance and operation of the plant. It was shown “the same squeegees were used at the other plants with the same length,” and that their use was a “standard procedure in filtration sewerage dis-disposal plants.” VEPCO was notified of the building of the plant, and told that it would be furnished any information it desired as to its operation. No request for information was made. Notwithstanding the indicated use of the top of the plant by its employees, and the occasional visits of representatives of VEPCO to the plant, where they could observe the situation and condition, no change was made in the location or height of its high tension wires.
Thus, I think, every reasonable inference from the facts and circumstances tends to show that VEPCO was put on inquiry as to the building of the plant and its mode of operation, and that it made no inquiry which, if it had been made, would have acquainted them with the danger involved in stringing the wires over the top of the plant and the probable injury to persons who might reasonably be expected to go there for work or business connected with the maintenance and operation of the plant.
Here, we have a jury’s verdict, approved by the trial judge. Embedded in our rules of decision is the principle that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff in error to show error on the part of a trial judge when he refuses to set aside the verdict of a jury. It is unrealistic to hold, under the facts and circumstances stated, that VEPCO, charged with a high degree of care commensurate with the danger involved, was not aware of, and could not have been aware of the mode of operation of the Carolanne plant. It should not be allowed to close its ears to offered information and shut its eyes to an obvious situation.
It has been long settled in this jurisdiction that, “if reasonably fair-minded men may differ as to the conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence,” the verdict of the jury is final and conclusive, and cannot be disturbed either by the trial court or by this Court. Every reasonable inference should be made in favor of a verdict fairly rendered under proper instructions from the court, and a verdict should not be set aside unless the evidence is plainly insufficient to support it, or it is contrary to law.
The facts in Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Company, 192 Va. 776, 66 S. E. 2d 441, distinguish it from this case. In Trimyer, there was “nothing in the evidence to charge the company with knowl*137edge” of facts that would have suggested danger. (192 Va., supra, page 786). Here, VEPCO was notified of the building of the plant, and invited to ask for information of the type of equipment to be used in its operation. VEPCO, without making any such inquiry, authorized the stringing of its uninsulated high tension wires by a telephone company upon that company’s poles carrying telephone wires not ordinarily having a dangerous voltage. It should not be overlooked that we pointed out in the Trimyer case, (192 Va., supra, page 783) that, “* * * at places where others have a right and may reasonably be expected to go for work, business or pleasure, there is a duty to keep wires carrying a dangerous voltage properly insulated.”
In Elliott v. Black River Electric Cooperative, 233 S.C. 233, 104 S. E. 2d 357, 74 A.L.R. 2d 907, the facts are strikingly similar to those in the case before us.
There, in an action against an electric power company for the wrongful death of one electrocuted while removing a lift rod from a well when electricity from an uninsulated high voltage line came in contact with the rod, the Court said that: “the care. . . required of power companies means more than mere mechanical skill. It includes foresight with regard to reasonably probable contingencies.”
The Court accepted the proposition that the electric company, engaged in the business of furnishing electric service to rural areas, knew or should have known, that it was necessary to once a year remove the lift rods from the wells, that compliance with the minimum clearance requirements of the National Electrical Safety Code was not conclusive as to due care on the part of the electric company, and the jury had a right to conclude the power company could have reasonably foreseen that someone, in removing the rods from the well, through no negligence of his own, might come in contact with the uninsulated wire.
In Northern Virginia Power Company v. Bailey, 194 Va. 464, 73 S.E. 2d 425, we held to the same effect. Quoting 14 A.L.R. 1023, the Court said: “A high-tension wire is one of the most dangerous things known to man. Not only is the current deadly, but the ordinary person has no means of knowing whether any particular wire is carrying a deadly current or is harmless. Therefore, one who attempts to make use of such appliances is bound to see that no injury comes to persons rightfully in proximity to them and who are themselves guilty of no wrong.”
*138Yet, and notwithstanding the evidence in the present case, the duties and obligations imposed upon VEPCO, and long established precedents of this Court, the majority of the Court disregards a jury’s finding upon a factual question.
Having decided that the evidence was insufficient to charge VEPCO with negligence, the court did not consider the assignments of error relating to the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff,. or the instructions to the jury; and I shall not do so.
Justices Buchanan and I’Anson concur in this dissent.