Court Opinion

ID: 9896603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 20:04:28.136023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.622381
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/13/23 P. v. Landeros CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080190

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. SCN395720)
JASON DANIEL LANDEROS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
James E. Simmons, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
         Patrick Dudley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Stephanie A. Mitchell, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         After pleading guilty to felony charges related to driving under the
influence, causing great bodily injury to several victims, the court sentenced
Jason Landeros to 14 years in prison. On appeal, Landeros contends the trial
court erred in failing to consider a lower term for his sentence, pursuant to
amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). He also argues that the
trial court erred when it concluded that Senate Bill No. 81 did not require the
court to dismiss Landeros’s strike prior. We conclude that the trial court did
not err, and accordingly, we affirm.
                                           I.
                 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
      On January 18, 2019, while driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.11
percent, Landeros caused a head-on collision that resulted in serious injuries
to four people, including a four-year-old child who is now permanently
disabled as a result of the collision. This was not Landeros’s first experience
with drunk-driving consequences; on two prior occasions, he was convicted for
driving under the influence of alcohol, including an offense in 2016 involving
a collision and great bodily injury to the driver of the other vehicle. As a
result of that conviction, he was sentenced to two years in prison. The 2019
collision is the subject of this appeal.
      On June 12, 2019, the prosecution filed an amended complaint which
charged Landeros with violating Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a)
[driving under the influence of alcohol causing injury], and subdivision (b)
[driving with a measurable blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more causing
injury]. For each count, the amended complaint added additional special
allegations: Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) [personal infliction of
great bodily injury for each of two victims]; and subdivision (d) [personal
infliction of great bodily injury on a child under the age of five years old];
Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c) [causing great bodily injury as to
each of three victims]; Vehicle Code section 23566, subdivision (a) [two or
more prior DUI convictions within the past 10 years]; and Vehicle Code

                                           2
section 23558 [causing bodily injury to more than one victim]. The amended
complaint also alleged a first prison prior [pursuant to Penal Code sections
667.5, subdivision (b) and 668]; a first serious felony prior (“nickel prior”)
[pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (c)(1), 668, and 1192.7,
subdivision (c)]; and a strike prior [pursuant to Penal Code sections 667,

subdivisions (b)–(i), 1170.12, and 668],1 all based upon the 2016 conviction.
      Landeros pled guilty to the amended complaint. In the plea form, he
admitted that on the date charged, “I unlawfully drove a vehicle under the
influence of alcohol, while driving that vehicle I went over the double yellow
line causing great bodily injury to 4 individuals which [included] one who was
under the age of 5. Also [I have] two prior dui convictions within the last 10
years. [I admit] strike prior pursuant to [Penal Code section] 667(b)–(i) and a
nickel prior pursuant to [Penal Code section] 667(a)(1).” He admitted his
blood alcohol reading was 0.11 percent.
      The probation report prepared for the sentencing hearing stated that
Landeros was 26 years old at the time of sentencing. Based upon the date of
birth in the report, Landeros committed the 2019 offense when he was 24
years old; he committed his previous DUI convictions when he was 19 and 21
years old. The probation officer recommended a sentence of 26 years in
prison.
      In his supplemental sentencing brief, Landeros submitted a
psychological report from Dr. Judith Meyers which concluded that he had a
diagnosis of Personality Disorder NOS and Alcohol Use Disorder. Landeros
also submitted a letter addressed to the court and to the victims of the
offense, in which he stated that he had been raised without a father in a

1    All further statutory references shall be to the Penal Code (unless
otherwise noted).

                                         3
home “devoid of any love or nurture,” who turned to drugs and alcohol at a
young age.
      At the sentencing hearing on January 26, 2022, in addition to hearing
from Landeros, his counsel, and counsel for the People, the court heard the
statements of a witness to the aftermath of the collision and from a person
who was injured in the collision—the mother of the minor child. The victim
noted her own ongoing pain from the collision. She emphasized that her
daughter, who was four years old, no longer could do “anything a normal
child should be able to do. She has brain damage from the accident. She
can’t speak properly. She can’t read or write. She can’t go play. She sees all
these kids doing what normal kids do and she can’t do any of that.”
      In conjunction with his sentencing briefs, Landeros made a Romero
motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
arguing that the court should exercise its discretion to dismiss his strike
prior and his nickel prior by finding that Landeros was outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law because of his youthfulness and alleged childhood
trauma. The court denied the motion and declined to strike the strike prior,
noting that Landeros was on parole for the strike prior at the time of his
current offense and the strike prior was for a similar offense.
      In imposing sentence, the court applied Vehicle Code section 23566 to
determine the available base terms, chose the upper term of four years as a
result of the stipulated circumstances in aggravation, doubled the base term
pursuant to the strike prior, and then added a single six-year enhancement
pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (d). Pursuant to section
1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), the court struck the other enhancements,
concluding that it was required by law to strike all but a single enhancement.

                                       4
Based upon these calculations, the trial court sentenced Landeros to 14 years
in state prison. Landeros timely appeals.
                                        II.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Landeros first argues that the trial court erred when it failed to
expressly analyze whether he might have been eligible for a lower term as a
result of certain lower-term considerations enumerated in section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). More specifically, he contends that “there is nothing in the
record that indicates the trial court ever considered Mr. Landeros’s youthful
age at the time of the offense, [and further that] the sentencing court’s only
analysis of Mr. Landeros’s trauma/mental illness impact on its sentencing
discretion fell under the ‘substantially contribute’ standard of section 1385,
subdivision (c) and not the ‘contributing factor’ standard of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6).” He further argues that the strike prior constituted an
enhancement that should have been dismissed pursuant to Senate Bill No.
81’s amendment to section 1385. After discussing the standard of review, we
examine each of these contentions.

A. Standard of review
      On appellate review, appellant has the burden to clearly show an abuse
of discretion, i.e., that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
(People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988 (Fredrickson).) “ ‘To
meet this burden, the defendant must “affirmatively demonstrate that the
trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.” ’ ” (Ibid., citing People v.
Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)

                                        5
B. The court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sentence
   Landeros to the lower term
      In 2021, the Legislature approved Senate Bill No. 567, which amended
section 1170, subdivision (b) by making the middle term the presumptive
sentence; and Assembly Bill No. 124, which required the court to select the
lower term if certain contributing factors are found. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3 [adding § 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2)]; and Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5, adding
§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) The statutes became effective as of January 1, 2022,
which was shortly before the date of Landeros’s sentencing hearing.
      Here, to be clear, Landeros does not contend that the trial court erred
in its analysis of the factors supporting the selection of the upper term.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) permits the court to select the upper term
“only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” In his plea, Landeros stipulated to the
circumstances justifying the upper term, namely that he had “caus[ed] great
bodily injury to 4 individuals which [included] one who was under the age of
5;” and that he had “two prior dui convictions within the last 10 years,” a
“strike prior pursuant to [Penal Code section] 667(a)–(i) and a nickel prior
pursuant to [Penal Code section] 667(a)(1).” Thus, it is not disputed that the
court did not err in its analysis of the applicability of the upper term
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). Nonetheless, on appeal,

                                        6
Landeros contends that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) required the court to

further consider whether the lower term should have been imposed.2
      Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) provides in pertinent part that “unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to
the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual

violence” [or] (B) the person is a youth or was a youth[3] . . . at the time of the
commission of the offense.” Appellant now argues that the court failed to
consider whether youth or trauma was a contributing factor in the offense.
      Landeros is correct when he points out that section 1170, subdivision
(b) was not a topic of much discussion during Landeros’s sentencing hearing.
At that hearing, there was only a single specific reference to section 1170,
when Landeros’s counsel referred in passing to changed laws, including
“Senate Bill 567, which changed the law in [section] 1170 [of the] Penal
Code.” Instead, both the parties and the court focused in detail on the
changes to section 1385, no doubt because the multiple enhancements before
the court had the potential to “raise the range [of sentence] quite
significantly.” Specifically, Landeros never argued to the court that youth or

2     We assume, without deciding, that if a court correctly determines that
there is a basis to impose the upper term, nonetheless section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) requires that it must separately consider whether it is
required to order the lower term.

3     For purposes of this statute, a youth is a person under age 26. (See
§ 1016.7.) Landeros was 24 when he committed the offense.

                                         7
psychological trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense, such that the court should impose the lower term in accordance with
section 1170, subsection (b)(6). Further, nowhere in Landeros’s sentencing
brief or his supplemental sentencing brief is there a single reference to
section 1170. Yet Landeros faults the court for failing to undertake the
analysis that he now requests.
      As a result, Landeros has forfeited this argument on appeal.
      The California Supreme Court has held that “the waiver doctrine
should apply to claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or
articulate its discretionary sentencing choices. Included in this category are
cases in which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular
case, and cases in which the court purportedly erred because it double-
counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed the various factors, or
failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.”
(People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott).) As the Court explained,
“Our reasoning is practical and straightforward. Although the court is
required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with
understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at
the hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are easily
prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention.” (Ibid.)
      If at sentencing, Landeros’s counsel had asked the court to rule on the
applicability of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) and to select the lower term,
the trial court would have been readily able to address the issue, as is clear
by its detailed rulings on the Romero motion and on the applicability of the
amendments to section 1385 with respect to the multiple enhancements
facing Landeros. By failing to argue the applicability of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) in the trial court, Landeros did not enable the trial court to

                                        8
do so, and therefore he is precluded from now raising the claim on appeal.
(See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.)
      But even if Landeros had not forfeited the issue, we would conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose the
lower term.
      We start with the presumption that the trial court knew and applied
the correct law, including the recent amendments to Penal Code section 1170.
(See People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) We do not presume that
the trial court failed to specifically discuss section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
because it was unaware of the amended statute’s requirements. Instead, we
presume the judgment is correct and indulge all presumptions to support it
on matters about which the record is silent. (People v. Giordano (2007)
42 Cal.4th 644, 666.)
      As to Landeros’s status as a youth, the court was well aware that
Landeros was a “youth” at the time of the offense. The probation report,
which the court reviewed, stated that Landeros’s current age was 26, and the
offense had occurred two years earlier. Landeros’s counsel emphasized his
youth at sentencing. Thus, in declining to sentence Landeros to the low term,
the court must necessarily have concluded either (1) that youth was not a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense; or (2) that “aggravating
circumstances outweigh[ed] the mitigating circumstances [such] that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.”
(§ 1170, subdivision (b)(6).) The record amply supports either finding.
      Further, nothing in the record suggests that Landeros’s age played any
role in the commission of the offense. The offense before the court was
Landeros’s third conviction for driving under the influence, the first of which
occurred when he was 19, the second when he was 21, and the most recent

                                           9
when he was 24. Landeros’s conduct over the years necessarily has evolved
from youthful folly to something more serious. Further, in the absence of any
argument at sentencing that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B) applied and
where “ ‘[t]here was no explicit indication in the record that appellant’s youth
contributed to the commission of the offense,’ ” the court was not required to
make an express finding regarding the applicability of that section.
(Fredrickson, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994.)
      As to childhood trauma, defense counsel argued that Landeros suffered
from trauma, based upon a report written by Judith Meyers, a licensed
clinical psychologist, and on Landeros’s letter to the court. Landeros told Dr.
Meyers that his parents had been in conflict during his childhood and “it was
not a loving home.” Dr. Meyers diagnosed him with Alcohol Use Disorder
and Personality Disorder NOS. In Landeros’s letter to the court, he
recounted that had had been abandoned by his father growing up and lacked
other father figures, and was considered the “black sheep” of his family. (He
had previously told the probation officer that his childhood was “not good but
not hard.”)
      The court specifically noted the statements regarding Landeros’s family
life growing up but found that these factors were not related to the current
case, noting that the court did not see a basis to conclude that Landeros’s
childhood led to his Personality Disorder or Alcohol Use Disorder, further
noting that “I don’t see the connection to the case with the personality use
disorder.”
      Beyond whether youth or trauma were alleged to have contributed to
the offense, the court’s analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors make
clear that the court also found the one additional point under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)—namely that imposition of the lower term would be

                                      10
contrary to the interests of justice. The court specifically discussed
aggravating factors (causing great bodily injury to three individuals,
engaging in conduct that indicated a danger to the community, and
committing the offense while on parole for a previous DUI conviction) and the
sole mitigating factor (early acceptance of guilt), noting that “the
circumstances in aggravation far outweigh the circumstances in mitigation.”
It cannot be said that because the court did not add to the analysis an explicit
statement “that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice” that the court erred in failing to consider a lower term.
(§ 1170, subdivision (b)(6).)
      The record makes clear that the court would have concluded that the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. At sentencing, the
court specifically noted the significant benefit that Landeros received because
otherwise-applicable enhancements were not imposed as a result of the
recent amendments to section 1385, and added:
         “So I have to follow [the] Legislature whether I agree with
         it or not. And frankly, I’m in a position where this court
         has to strike GBI allegations for two of the individuals who
         are seriously hurt based on the actions of Mr. Landeros,
         which I don’t think is right. I don’t think it’s fair. But it’s
         the law and I have to follow the law.”

      Remand is not required where, as here, “the record contains a clear
indication that the court will not exercise its discretion in the defendant’s
favor.” (People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 427) Remand is said
to be an “idle act” in such a situation. (Ibid.)

                                        11
C. The trial court did not err in declining to treat Landeros’s strike prior
   as an enhancement subject to Senate Bill No. 81
      Landeros further contends that the trial court erred when it denied his

request to dismiss his strike prior4 pursuant to Senate Bill No. 81, which

amended section 1385.5 The People argue that section 1385 as amended
applies by its terms to enhancements, not to an alternate sentencing scheme,
such as the application of strike priors. We agree.
      We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. (People v. Burke
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242 (Burke) [“Whether the amendments to
section 1385 apply to prior strike convictions is a question of statutory
interpretation which we review de novo.”].)
      At sentencing, the court specifically considered and rejected
Landeros’s argument that Senate Bill No. 81’s amendments to section
1385, concluding that the newly-amended section 1385 did not apply to
strike priors.
      By its terms, section 1385 applies to enhancements. Courts have made
clear that the term “enhancement” is not synonymous with factors such as
strike priors that are part of the base term. For example, in Burke, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at 243–244, the court held that whereas an enhancement is

4      Section 1170.12, subdivision (c) defines a strike prior: “For purposes of
this section, and in addition to any other enhancements or punishment
provisions that may apply, the following apply if a defendant has one or more
prior serious or violent felony convictions: [¶] (1) If a defendant has one
prior serious or violent felony conviction as defined in subdivision (b) that has
been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum term for an
indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction.”

5     Landeros does not challenge the denial of his Romero motion.

                                       12
an additional term of imprisonment added to a base term, as stated in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.405, sentencing under the Three Strikes law
is an alternative sentencing scheme. The court in Burke concluded that
factors in aggravation such as prior strike convictions are not enhancements
for purposes of Senate Bill No. 81 and its amendments to section 1385.
(Burke, at pp. 243–244; see also People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
932, 939–940 [factors in aggravation are not enhancements, but are part of
the base term]; People v. Williams (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, 744 [the
“Three Strikes law is a penalty provision, not an enhancement”].)
      Accordingly, the trial court correctly declined to construe Landeros’s
strike prior as an enhancement that could be dismissed under section 1385.
      On appeal, Landeros argues that principles of equal protection give the
court authority to dismiss his strike prior, because section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2)(G) authorizes the court to strike enhancements for offenses committed
as a juvenile, and he argues that he is similarly situated with juvenile
offenders. Landeros did not present this argument to the trial court, and we
decline to consider it on appeal. (See Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 353.) We
will note, however, that the courts have held that it is not a denial of equal
protection to make sentencing distinctions based on the age of the offender.
(See, e.g., People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 273, 285, review granted
Jan. 11, 2023, S277487 [“there is a rational basis for the Legislature’s
decision to treat these two groups [juveniles and young adults] differently”].)
      Similarly, in his reply brief, Landeros briefly contends that in his
sentencing, the court “seems to run afoul of the prohibition on dual use of
facts,” citing People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 233. This argument was
not presented to the trial court nor developed before us. We decline to
consider it. (See People v. Guzman (2019) 8 Cal.5th 673, 683, fn. 7 [“Although

                                       13
defendant mentions due process in passing, he does not develop the
argument, choosing instead to focus on his equal protection claim. We adopt
the same focus and hold that any due process claim has been forfeited.”].)
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                  KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

                                      14