Court Opinion

ID: 9863238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:16:55.114539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:39:20.389267
License: Public Domain

SAM D. JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
This dissent is respectfully submitted.
The majority has interpreted Section 21.-912(b) of the Texas Education Code in a manner which effectively grants immunity to professional school employees for acts of negligence that result in bodily harm to students. This interpretation is clearly contrary to the legislative intent and prevailing legal authority.
A statute should be construed to give effect to the legislative intent. Minton v. Frank, 545 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.1976); Jones v. Del Andersen and Associates, 539 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1975). Where the wording of a statute is ambiguous or leaves the meaning obscure, the courts must resort to the legislative history to resolve the ambiguity. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 145 Tex. 541, 200 S.W.2d 626 (1947); Austin Road Company v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.). In the instant case the majority notes that the language utilized in Section 21.912(b) is ambiguous. Section 21.-912(b) provides:
“No professional employee of any school district within this state shall be personally liable for any act incident to or within the scope of the duties of his position of employment, and which act involves the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee, except in circumstances where professional employees use excessive force in the discipline of students or negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.” [Emphasis added.]
As noted by the majority opinion, the language in the last clause of subsection (b) is ambiguous in its use of the term “negligence.” Bernhard argues that this clause means that professional school employees may be personally liable where their negligence results in bodily injury to students. The individual defendants, however, argue that the clause means that professional school employees are subject to personal liability only when they use excessive force or negligence in the punishment of students which results in bodily injury to a student.
In order to resolve this ambiguity, this court is required to determine the legislative intent. The legislative history of Section 21.912 is explicit in conveying the intent of the Legislature. In its committee report to the House of Representatives, the Committee on Judiciary submitted a “bill analysis” which provided the following background statement or statement of purpose of the bill, which was enacted and codified as Section 21.912:
“School employees performing certain duties may be individually liable for certain actions. As there are often no specific guidelines for their duties, their responsibilities are not clearly defined.
“This bill would allow Boards of Trustees of independent schools to set school standards and also exempt these persons from individual liability for acts within the scope of their duties except for individual negligence.” [Emphasis added.]
This “bill analysis” further summarized each subsection of Section 21.912, analyzing Section 21.912(b) as follows:
“No employee shall be personally liable for Acts incident to or within the scope of their duties of employment, and which act involves the exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee, except where the employee uses excessive force or is negligent.” [Emphasis added.]
This statement in the legislative history clearly demonstrates that the personal liability exemption extended by Section 21.-912(b) does not extend to negligent actions of professional school employees. Professional school employees remain liable for their negligent conduct which results in bodily injury to a student.
In effect, this statute merely codifies the prevailing authority with respect to liability of professional school employees for their negligence. Wesley v. Page, 514 S.W.2d 697 (Ky.1974); Copley v. Board of Educa*851tion, 466 S.W.2d 952 (Ky.1971); Station v. Traveler’s Insurance Co., 292 So.2d 289 (La.Ct.App.1974), 32 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1953). See also E. Bolmeier, Teachers’ Legal Rights, Restraints and Liabilities § 8 (1971); Seitz, Legal Responsibility Under Tort Law of School Personnel and School Districts as Regards Negligent Conduct Toward Pupils, 15 Hastings L. J. 495 (1964); 78 C.J.S. Schools & School Districts § 238. At least one Texas case has considered this point and ruled in accordance with the prevailing law. In Sewell v. London, 371 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1963, no writ), the court was concerned with a student in a vocational training program who was injured while operating a power saw. The student alleged that the power saw was defective, that he was given improper supervision in its use, and that the teacher did not take the power saw out of operation until the alleged defects were corrected. The teacher was sued in his individual capacity and no claim was asserted against the school district. The trial court granted the teacher’s motion for summary judgment, but the court of civil appeals reversed and remanded on the basis that fact issues were raised by the evidence concerning the alleged negligence of the teacher. Consistent with the majority of states, the court of civil appeals’ decision indicated that professional school employees could be held personally liable for their negligent acts which resulted in bodily injury to students.
The individual defendants did not establish as a matter of law that they were immune from liability under the doctrine of governmental immunity. The judgment of the court of civil appeals should therefore be affirmed.
POPE, J., joins in this dissent.