Court Opinion

ID: 9568900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:28.235127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:21.825852
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I concur with the majority opinion, additional observations regarding the application of Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 (405 SE2d 669) (1991), are appropriate.
As noted by the majority opinion, in Chandler, the Supreme Court required that “a defendant claiming justification and seeking to introduce evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim against third persons will notify the trial court of such intention prior to trial. The trial court will take reasonable steps to assure that the state has reasonable notice of such intention and of the nature of such evi- ' dence.” Id. at 408. Unlike the ten-day notice requirement imposed *190upon the State when it intends to present evidence of similar transactions pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3, or the State’s duty to produce scientific reports at least ten days before trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-211, there is no specific time frame involved with regard to notifying the State of the intent to produce evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim, nor is the requirement to do so statutorily provided.
In the instant case, the trial court made a thorough effort to determine whether the State had sufficient time to investigate the incidents listed in the notice given by the defendant four days before the trial. The court concluded that the defendant could present evidence of two prior incidents of the victim’s violence, because the State had ample opportunity to investigate, but not the other seven incidents listed. Under these circumstances, it appears that the trial court took “reasonable steps” to assure that the State had “reasonable notice,” consistent with the general guidelines provided in Chandler. (It should be noted, however, that unlike the victim in Chandler, the victim in this case was alive and readily available to the State for its investigation. An argument could be made that Chandler should be limited to those situations where the victim is dead or otherwise unavailable.)
In Chandler, the Supreme Court foresaw that specific procedures governing the admission of such evidence would eventually be incorporated into the Uniform Superior Court Rules. However, two years later, as indicated by the majority opinion, we are still “trusting” that appropriate procedures will soon be added to those rules. If we are to continue addressing this issue on a case-by-case basis until that indefinite eventuality, I suggest that we assimilate our evaluation employed in determining whether sufficient notice of intent to produce evidence of similar transactions, or other procedures where the duty to give notice or produce lies with the State.
In the latter situations, where the State has not complied with the applicable time requirements, “the appropriate remedy is for the trial court to grant a continuance or recess upon timely request by the defendant.” Shannon v. State, 205 Ga. App. 831, 832 (424 SE2d 51) (1992). See also Stephan v. State, 205 Ga. App. 241 (422 SE2d 25) (1992); Wilburn v. State, 199 Ga. App. 667 (405 SE2d 889) (1991). However, it should be noted that the application of that rule by trial courts and this court appears unbalanced at times. See, for example, Johnson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 395 (433 SE2d 638) (1993). In Johnson, the State produced a scientific report only two days before trial, contrary to the ten days required under OCGA § 17-7-211. The defendant did exactly what this court has indicated must be done in such a situation, i.e., ask for a continuance. The defendant quite reasonably requested one day’s recess, but the trial court merely granted *191a one-hour continuance, which action was affirmed by the majority of this court.
Decided August 20, 1993
Reconsideration denied September 8, 1993
John C. Swearingen, Jr., for appellant.
Douglas C. Pullen, District Attorney, Bradford R. Pierce, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
By comparison, it is difficult to argue that a level playing field exists when only a one-hour continuance is granted where the defendant has a statutorily created right to ten days’ notice on the one hand, while four days’ notice to the State is not deemed reasonable, where the State is only entitled to reasonable notice. We require the defendant to seek a continuance where the State fails to meet its statutorily imposed duty of ten days’ notice, while we preclude the defendant’s use of his evidence when the trial court determines the four days’ notice was not reasonable.
We shift the burden to the defendant to show harm by the State’s failure to follow the law in order to even obtain a continuance, while the State has no similar burden. Further, we do not provide for the exclusion of the State’s evidence upon its failure to comply with the law as we do upon a failure of the defendant to give “reasonable” notice. Why do we not require the State to seek a continuance as we do the defendant? How is it proper to impose a burden on the defendant for a failure by the State without a reciprocal responsibility? We seem to impose a strict compliance standard on the defendant, who is the only party at risk in a criminal trial and is presumed to be innocent at that stage of the prosecution, while only holding the State, with all its resources, to a substantial compliance standard. In matters of procedure, it would seem justice would be more appropriately served by reversing these requirements if we are unwilling to simply require equal compliance from each of the parties. “Like the sun, the law shines on all who are in the same place with equal warmth and splendor,” Boland v. Klink, 63 Ga. 448, 453 (1879), or at least it should.