Court Opinion

ID: 9689463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:34:30.668824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:53.222781
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice. Appellants Jim Green and J. stice. Company, Inc. (Green), appeal an order of summary judgment in favor of appellee The City of Jacksonville. The order stated that Green failed to appeal action by the Jacksonville City Council in timely fashion and that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We agree with the circuit court and affirm. At issue is the development of Phase II of the Colleenwood subdivision, which is located within the city limits of the City of Jacksonville. Green first prepared a preliminary plat showing the improvements he intended to make in Phase II and submitted that plat to the city planning commission. On November 8, 1999, the preliminary plat was approved by the planning commission. Based on this approval, Green commenced construction on Phase II. On January 20, 2000, the Jacksonville City Council enacted Ordinance 1130, which required the construction of sidewalks in all subdivisions. Green’s preliminary plat did not include sidewalks. On December 11, 2000, Green’s final plat received final approval from the planning commission. The planning commission stipulated that if the Master Sidewalk Plan called for sidewalks, it would not require them in Phase II, as they were not practicable. On February 1, 2001, the Colleenwood Phase II improvements came before the City Council for dedication. The City Council, however, disagreed with the planning commission with respect to the sidewalk ordinance and approved the final plat “subject to the owner constructing sidewalks” pursuant to Ordinance 1130.  On May 22, 2001, Green filed an action against the City of Jacksonville and sought a declaration that the City Council’s action was void. Green also asked for an injunction to stop the City Council from forcing him to construct sidewalks. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Green argued that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, because the City Council acted ultra vires. The City argued that Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl. 1998), required that Green appeal the City Council’s action to the circuit court within thirty days, and because Green failed to do so, the circuit court was deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction. The circuit court granted the City’s motion. Green appealed to our court of appeals, and that court reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded the case. See Green v. City of Jacksonville, 82 Ark. App. 39, 110 S.W.3d 323 (2003). We granted the City’s petition for review. When this court grants a petition to review a decision of the court of appeals, we review the matter as if the appeal had been originally filed in this court. See Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 93 S.W.3d 681 (2002).  Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact at issue, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact. See id. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether an issue of material fact has been created and remains unresolved. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Spears v. City of Fordyce, supra. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. See Spears v. City of Fordyce, supra. The circuit court in its order concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Green’s declaratory-judgment action and action for injunction, because Green “failed to perfect a timely appeal of his Complaint of action to this Court within thirty (30) days in compliance with the terms of A.C.A. § 14-56-425[.]” Section 14-56-425 reads: In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies concerned in the administration of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure which applies to appeals in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the right of trial by jury. Green first maintains that the City Council’s conditional approval of his final plat was ultra vires. Under Green’s theory, he was not appealing the substance of the City Council’s decision but was asserting the Council acted beyond its statutory and procedural authority. He maintains that § 14-56-425 does not apply because his challenge is the type of “remedy provided by law” as contemplated by the statute. He further asserts that it was not necessary for him to appeal the City Council’s action as that action was void and, thus, was not appealable.  We disagree, as this court has already decided the issue of the applicability of § 14-56-425 to city council resolutions. See Ingram v. City of Pine Bluff, 355 Ark. 129, 133 S.W.3d 382 (2003). In Ingram, the issue was a city council resolution to raze the appellant’s property. After passage of that resolution, the appellant’s property was destroyed by the City. The appellant sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings for failure of the appellant to appeal within thirty days under Inferior Rule 9, and the circuit occur granted the motion. This court affirmed. We said: “Rule 9 applies to city council and planning commission resolutions via Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl. 1998)[.]” 355 Ark. at 134, 133 S.W.3d at 385. We added that the filing requirements of Rule 9 are mandatory and jurisdictional and that failure to comply prevents the circuit court from acquiring subject-matter jurisdiction. Along these same lines, this court has previously held that § 14-56-425 applies to appeals of actions of the city council, when the act complained of is the city’s application of its own zoning regulations. See City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 837 S.W.2d 286 (1992).  Based on this precedent, we affirm the trial court. Green was required to appeal the city council’s action taken on February 1, 2001, to approve his plat conditioned on compliance with the sidewalk ordinance. This he failed to do, and the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Affirmed. Court of Appeals reversed. Hannah, J., dissents.