Court Opinion

ID: 9711712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:37:32.390769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.004523
License: Public Domain

Dissenting
Bierly, J.
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion in this cause, and respectfully dissent therefrom.
Appellant, plaintiff below, filed his complaint of four legal paragraphs in the DeKalb Circuit Court. On plaintiff’s amended first paragraph of complaint the trial court entered its finding and judgment in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $1690.00.
The trial court further found against the plaintiff on legal paragraph two, three and four of his complaint that he take nothing thereby.
The substance of appellant’s amended first legal paragraph of complaint is as follows; that on January 24, 1961, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract. Plaintiff performed his services to the .corporation as set out in the contract, from February 1, 1961, until August 1, 1961, whereupon the defendant discharged him. That during plaintiff’s employment with the defendant, plaintiff expended the sum of $1,362.46 in connection with the performance of his services to the defendant, and tendered an itemized statement of such to the defendant. That plaintiff had been paid $4,800.00 for his services, but the defendant refused and failed to perform the remainder of the contract. Plaintiff obtained other employment during 1961 and was paid $1,-945.50 in connection therewith.
The last three rhetorical paragraphs of said amended first legal paragraph of .complaint are set out as follows:
*615“9. By its breach of said contract as aforesaid, the defendant injured the reputation of this plaintiff among the customers of said Griscer Industries and in the business community in which this plaintiff operated, thereby damaging the earning capacity of this plaintiff in the amount of $25,000.00.
“10. By its said breach of said contract, the defendant made it impossible for this plaintiff to purchase the remainder of the capital stock of the defendant corporation to this plaintiff’s damage in the sum of $25,000.00, “Wherefore, plaintiff asks judgment against the defendant in the sum of $60,000.00 and for all other proper relief in the premises.”
The trial court further found for the defendant relative to its fifth affirmative paragraph of answer, but against the defendant upon its sixth affirmative paragraph.
The formal judgment was silent in respect to the findings in the foregoing paragraph.
Said formal judgment reads as follows:
“IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED, DECREED AND ORDERED that the Plaintiff have and recover judgment against the defendant in the sum of $1,690.00 and that the defendant shall pay the costs made and taxed herein in the amount of $-.”
The substance of the appellee’s fifth affirmative paragraph of answer is as follows: That the contract referred to in plaintiff’s complaint contains the following:
“In the event the foregoing conditions are not met by the buyers this contract shall be null and void and the money deposited with the buyer shall be retained as liquidated damages.
“2. That the money deposit to be used as liquidated damages, to be retained by the defendant is the money represented by the aforesaid promissory notes dated, July 24, 1961, for $2,284 and September 22, 1961, for $4,000.
The appellee in said fifth affirmative paragraph of answer alleged:
*616“3. That the ‘foregoing conditions’ in said contract were not performed by the plaintiff, in that:
“ (a) The plaintiff did not diligently pursue and obtain additional profitable business for Griseer Industries amounting to no less than $2,000 a month within approximately eight weeks from the starting date of this full time active employment, and
“(b) All old trade creditors were not and have not been paid in full or on a current 30-day basis or all notes have not and were not paid or satisfied without the signature or securities of Herbert A. Clemans, and
“(c) The plaintiff has failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care, skill and judgment in the performance of his duties in said contract.
“WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully prays that the plaintiff take nothing by its complaint, and that the defendant be granted all other proper relief in the premises.”
It appears evident, upon an examination of the pleadings, findings and judgment, that the trial court has entered inconsistent findings and judgment. It has, in effect, found for both the plaintiff and defendant on the breach of the written contract. By the court’s findings for the defendant on its fifth affirmative paragraph of answer, the defendant is able to retain certain monies advanced to it by the plaintiff, as liquidated damages. But yet the court’s actions in finding for the plaintiff on its first amended paragraph of complaint gives the plaintiff $1690.00, apparently on the theory that the defendant had breached the contract in question. This appears to be a legal impossibility, that both the parties were guilty of the breach and both should be awarded damages.
I would also like to note in passing, that the defendant’s sixth paragraph of answer alleged substantially identical failures on the plaintiff’s part, to perform said contract, as did the fifth paragraph, but yet the trial court found against defendant on this sixth paragraph of answer, but for him on his fifth paragraph. This is inconsistent in itself.
In the case of National Cash Reg. Co. v. Price (1908), 41 Ind. App. 274, 83 N. E. 776, at page 277, a jury returned a *617verdict which amounted to a compromise. The court held in that instance, that:
“Manifestly the verdict found for both the plaintiff and defendant. It could not, therefore, sustain the judgment. . . . The jury fixed the terms of a compromise. This they could not do.”
Although in the case at bar I am not concerned with a verdict of the jury, as there was none, a finding of the court and a verdict of a jury are closely related. Both are the basis for the judgment which the court renders.
An earlier case which is applicable to the case at bar is Baughan et al. v. Baughan (1887), 114 Ind. 73, 15 N. E. 466, (17 N. E. 181 Reh. Denied). In this case the jury returned two verdicts. The first found for the plaintiff in the sum of $800.00; the second found for the defendant on its counter-claim and set-off in the sum of $300.00. The court then rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $500.00.
The Supreme Court reversed, stating: “The rule is almost elementary which requires that the judgment must follow the verdict.”
On rehearing the Supreme Court stated that:
“It is not possible on the face of the verdict to determine what the judgment shall be, for it can not be ascertained whether the jury intended to award a recovery to the plaintiff or to the defendant. If the defendant was entitled to three hundred dollars, as the jury find, on his counter-claim, then of course, the plaintiff could not recover; if, on the other hand, the plaintiff was entitled to recover eight hundred dollars — and so the jury find — the defendant could not recover anything on his counter-claim.”
This is the situation that exists in the case at bar. I can not determine who the trial court found for. Thus, I am of the opinion the case should be reversed. To do otherwise would necessitate our weighing the evidence and substituting our judgment for that of a trial court to determine what the trial *618court intended its findings and judgment to be. This, of course, .can not be done.
I am of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed, and that appellant be granted a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 54.