Court Opinion

ID: 9915906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 22:06:27.572383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:35.466484
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A22-1608

                                   In re the Marriage of:

                              Any K. Arensberg, petitioner,
                                      Appellant,

                                            vs.

                               Nicholas Shamus Arensberg,
                                      Respondent.

                               Filed January 8, 2024
                  Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                                  Bratvold, Judge

                             Hennepin County District Court
                                File No. 27-FA-21-4526

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Nicholas Shamus Arensberg, Burnsville, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

       Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Cleary,

Judge. *

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BRATVOLD, Judge

       In this appeal from the district court’s post-dissolution order awarding custody and

establishing child support, appellant argues that the district court erred by awarding joint

*
 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
physical custody and in determining the amount of child support. First, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody. Second,

we conclude that the district court committed several errors in its calculation of child

support. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                                          FACTS

       Appellant Any K. Arensberg (mother) and respondent Nicholas Shamus Arensberg

(father) married in 2018. They have one joint child, born in 2015. The parties separated on

March 1, 2019, and mother petitioned for dissolution on August 31, 2021. In mother’s

petition, she requested joint legal custody, sole physical custody, and “appropriate levels

of child support pursuant to the guidelines,” along with retroactive child support. Father’s

answer sought joint legal custody and joint physical custody.

       The district court held a bench trial on July 28, 2022, on the issues of custody and

parenting time, child support, and property division. During trial, mother sought joint legal

custody and sole physical custody, subject to father’s parenting time. Both parties testified,

and no other witnesses were called. The district court issued findings of fact, conclusions

of law, and an order for judgment on October 3, 2022, granting the parties joint legal and

joint physical custody, setting parenting time, 1 awarding child support, and resolving the

property division.

1
  The district court established a parenting-time schedule that gave each parent seven days
in a fourteen-day period.

                                              2
         Mother appeals. 2

                                           DECISION

I.       The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding joint physical
         custody.

         Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that

joint physical custody was in the child’s best interests. She contends that the district court

erred by applying a presumption of joint physical custody.

         When determining custody and parenting time, a district court must evaluate the

best interests of the child, including “all relevant factors.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)

(2022). Minnesota law explicitly identifies twelve best-interests factors. 3 Id. “The court

2
  Father did not file a brief in this appeal, and this court ordered that the appeal would
proceed on the merits as provided in Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
3
    The twelve best-interests factors are as follows:
                       (1) a child’s physical, emotional, cultural, spiritual, and
               other needs, and the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
               child’s needs and development;
                       (2) any special medical, mental health, developmental
               disability, or educational needs that the child may have that
               may require special parenting arrangements or access to
               recommended services;
                       (3) the reasonable preference of the child, if the court
               deems the child to be of sufficient ability, age, and maturity to
               express an independent, reliable preference;
                       (4) whether domestic abuse, as defined in section
               518B.01, has occurred in the parents’ or either parent’s
               household or relationship; the nature and context of the
               domestic abuse; and the implications of the domestic abuse for
               parenting and for the child’s safety, well-being, and
               developmental needs;
                       (5) any physical, mental, or chemical health issue of a
               parent that affects the child’s safety or developmental needs;

                                                3
must make detailed findings on each of the factors in paragraph (a) based on the evidence

presented and explain how each factor led to its conclusions and to the determination of

custody and parenting time.” Id., subd. 1(b)(1) (2022). Reversal is appropriate where a

district court fails to apply relevant statutory criteria that would have weighed in favor of

the appellant. See Weatherly v. Weatherly, 330 N.W.2d 890, 892-93 (Minn. 1983).

       The application of these factors is governed by related statutory provisions.

Relevant to this appeal, the district court “shall consider that it is in the best interests of the

child to promote the child’s healthy growth and development through safe, stable, nurturing

                       (6) the history and nature of each parent’s participation
               in providing care for the child;
                       (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to provide
               ongoing care for the child; to meet the child’s ongoing
               developmental, emotional, spiritual, and cultural needs; and to
               maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time;
                       (8) the effect on the child’s well-being and development
               of changes to home, school, and community;
                       (9) the effect of the proposed arrangements on the
               ongoing relationships between the child and each parent,
               siblings, and other significant persons in the child’s life;
                       (10) the benefit to the child in maximizing parenting
               time with both parents and the detriment to the child in limiting
               parenting time with either parent;
                       (11) except in cases in which domestic abuse as
               described in clause (4) has occurred, the disposition of each
               parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent
               and to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact
               between the child and the other parent; and
                       (12) the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate
               in the rearing of their child; to maximize sharing information
               and minimize exposure of the child to parental conflict; and to
               utilize methods for resolving disputes regarding any major
               decision concerning the life of the child.
Id.

                                                4
relationships between a child and both parents.” Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(b)(2) (2022)

(emphasis added). And,

              [t]he court shall consider both parents as having the capacity to
              develop and sustain nurturing relationships with their children
              unless there are substantial reasons to believe otherwise. In
              assessing whether parents are capable of sustaining nurturing
              relationships with their children, the court shall recognize that
              there are many ways that parents can respond to a child’s needs
              with sensitivity and provide the child love and guidance, and
              these may differ between parents and among cultures.

Id., subd. 1(b)(3) (2022). Importantly, “[t]here is no presumption for or against joint

physical custody.” Id., subd. 1(b)(7) (2022).

       A district court has broad discretion to provide for the custody of children. Hansen

v. Todnem, 908 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Minn. 2018). The “law leaves scant if any room for an

appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”

Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000). “A district court abuses

its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying

the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.

Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022). Appellate courts will defer to the district

court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and defer to the district court’s

credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

       Here, the district court analyzed the best interests of the child under Minn. Stat.

§ 518.17, subd. 1 (2022), and found that eight factors favored joint physical custody (i.e.,

factors 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12) and that four factors were neutral (i.e., factors 2, 3, 4,

                                                5
and 5). After balancing these factors, the district court concluded that the child’s best

interests supported an award of joint physical custody.

       Before turning to mother’s arguments, we note that mother does not challenge the

district court’s analysis of the four neutral factors. Nor does mother challenge the district

court’s determination that factors 9, 11, and 12 favor joint physical custody. We briefly

review the district court’s analysis of factors 9, 11, and 12. The district court found that

factor 9, “the effect of the proposed arrangements on the ongoing relationships between

the child and each parent,” favored joint physical custody because both mother and father

have extended family with whom it would be in the child’s best interests to maintain

relationships. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(9). The district court found that factor 11,

“the disposition of each parent to support the child’s relationship with the other parent,”

favored joint physical custody. Id., subd. 1(a)(11). In part, the district court stated that it

had “significant concerns about mother’s willingness to support the child’s relationship

with father” and noted that mother “appears to have disdain towards father.” The district

court found that factor 12, “the willingness and ability of parents to cooperate in the rearing

of their child,” favored joint physical custody. Id., subd. 1(a)(12). The district court stated

its “concerns” about mother’s “ability to co-parent with father,” even though it believed

that completing a bridging conflict course would “significantly help the parties co-parent.”

       With these three best-interests factors in mind, we consider mother’s arguments that

the district court erred in evaluating five other best-interests factors.

                                               6
       Factor 1: Child’s Physical, Emotional, Cultural, Spiritual, and Other Needs

       Mother argues that the district court effectively imposed a “presumption in favor of

joint physical custody” by “requiring a showing that joint physical custody will not harm

the child” in its discussion of factor 1.

       In considering factor 1, the district court found that “[t]he parties do not have

significantly different abilities to meet the needs of the child” and that “both parties

testified that they would be able to get the child to and from school.” In this section of its

analysis, the district court found that “the child will be able to explore his cultural and

spiritual needs at both parents’ houses” and would “not be harmed by an equal parenting

time schedule” regarding the child’s cultural and spiritual needs. (Emphasis added.) The

district court concluded that “[b]oth parents are able to support the child’s physical,

emotional, cultural, spiritual and other needs,” which favored joint physical custody.

       Mother’s challenge focuses on the district court’s reference to the child not being

harmed by an equal parenting-time schedule. We are not persuaded that the district court

imposed a presumption in favor of joint physical custody when we review all of the district

court’s analysis of factor 1. The district court evaluated both parties’ testimony about the

child’s needs and each parent’s ability to meet the child’s needs and concluded that both

parents were capable. The district court found that Lao culture and the child’s education in

a Chinese immersion school were important and that there was no evidence that father did

not support these needs. And both parents testified that they would support the child’s

needs. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

factor 1 favored joint physical custody.

                                              7
       Factor 6: History and Nature of Each Parent’s Participation in Providing Care for
       the Child

       Mother argues that the district court erred in its analysis of factor 6 because it

“effectively imposed a presumption in favor of joint physical custody by changing this

factor to mean that any ‘significant care’ is sufficient to favor joint physical custody.” She

also argues the district court erred in weighing this factor in favor of joint physical custody

based on mother’s role in bringing the child to medical appointments and mother’s

involvement in the child’s activities. Mother also argues that the district court speculated

by implying that she withheld father’s parenting time without justification.

       In analyzing factor 6, the district court found that mother limited father’s time with

the child because she “held a grudge against father for some perceived slight.” The district

court described mother’s limitation of parenting time as a “unilateral decision” that was

not in the child’s best interests. The district court first found that father was the primary

caregiver initially after separation and that mother has been the primary caregiver since

August 2020. The district court also found that after August 2020, mother limited father’s

access to the child. The district court explained that the parties’ testimony reflected

“different narratives” on parent participation and credited father’s testimony that he was

the primary caregiver when the parties first separated.

       We are not persuaded that the district court imposed a presumption of joint physical

custody in its analysis of factor 6. First, we note that mother’s brief to this court appears to

concede that she limited father’s parenting time and argues about her reasons for doing so.

Second, the district court found that both parents provided care for the child and that

                                               8
father’s testimony was more credible about his role as primary caregiver after the initial

separation. We defer to a district court’s credibility determination. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at

210. Third, the record supports the district court’s finding that both parents have

participated in the care of the child, and so the finding is not clearly erroneous. Although

the district court’s order does not specifically mention some of the evidence summarized

in mother’s brief, it need not do so. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in finding that factor 6 favored joint physical custody.

       Factor 7: Willingness and Ability of Each Parent to Provide Ongoing Care for the
       Child

       Mother argues that the district court “did not find that both [parents] were willing

and able to maintain consistency and follow through with parenting time.” She contends

that the record shows father “has had difficulty with consistency and follow through with

parenting time.” She also urges that joint physical custody is “undermined” by the parties’

demonstrated “lack of ability to communicate and coordinate.”

       In its discussion of factor 7, the district court found that father “will likely be an

active and committed parent and will support the child in all areas of his life.” The district

court summarized father’s testimony that he would help with homework, do projects, and

support the child’s activities. Although the district court did not address every aspect of

factor 7 in the order, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that factor 7 favored joint physical custody.

                                              9
       Factor 8: The Effect on the Child’s Well-Being and Development of Changes to
       Home, School, and Community

       Mother argues that the district court adopted “an interpretation of the best interest

statute that effectively creates a presumption in favor of joint physical custody” when it

evaluated factor 8 and found there would be “minimal changes” for the child under either

parent’s custody proposal. Mother appears to imply that a finding of minimal change

should make this factor neutral and that the district court erred by concluding that it favored

joint physical custody.

       In analyzing factor 8, the district court found that father has had parenting time every

other weekend since August 2022, the child “is familiar with both parents’ homes,” and

the child will “stay enrolled in his current school.” The district court concluded that there

would be “minimal changes” for the child under either joint or sole physical custody.

       We agree with mother that finding “minimal changes” should not weigh in favor of

joint physical custody. But mother must prove error and prejudice to obtain relief on

appeal. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring courts to ignore harmless error); Grein v. Grein,

364 N.W.2d 383, 387 (Minn. 1985) (concluding that remand was unnecessary where the

district court would ultimately reach the same result). Even though the district court erred

by finding that factor 8 favored joint physical custody, we conclude that mother was not

prejudiced by this error. As discussed above, seven of the twelve best-interests factors favor

an award of joint physical custody and no factors favor sole physical custody.

                                              10
       Factor 10: Benefit to the Child in Maximizing Parenting Time with Both Parents

       Mother argues that “there is no basis for the court’s statement that ‘the child

consistently saw his father up until July 23, 2020.’” She also argues that “[c]onsistent

adherence to parenting time in the sole custody arrangement will better further the

relationship between father and son without the drastic detriment of removing him from

his regular schedule and support.”

       In considering factor 10, the district court again discussed the “conflicting testimony

as to how much parenting time father had up until July 2020.” The district court found

credible father’s testimony that he had the child for three months after the parties’

separation and on a week-on, week-off schedule for at least a year. The district court also

found mother’s testimony not credible because she provided inconsistent explanations

about who cared for the child more recently. We defer to the district court’s findings of

fact unless they are clearly erroneous and defer to the district court’s credibility

determinations. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210. The district court also discussed that mother

limited father’s parenting time and that joint physical custody would benefit the child’s

relationship with father and allow them to “repair any damage to their relationship.”

       In her brief to this court, mother acknowledges that the district court’s determination

that father credibly testified about his role in caring for the child until July 2020 was

“entitled to deference on appeal.” Still, mother argues that father did not prove any

“interaction” with the child during the time that father worked “out of town.” And she

argues that the district court had no evidence of “damage” to father’s relationship with the

child. We are not persuaded. As discussed, not only does the record support—and mother

                                             11
concede—that she limited father’s parenting time, but also, father credibly testified that he

participated in caring for the child before mother limited his parenting time. The district

court also did not specifically find “damage” to the father-child relationship; it considered

whether joint physical custody would allow repair of “any damage.” (Emphasis added.)

We conclude that the record supports the district court’s analysis of this factor. Therefore,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that factor 10 favored joint physical

custody.

       In sum, because at least seven of twelve best-interests factors favor joint physical

custody, at least four factors are neutral, no factors favor awarding mother sole physical

custody, and the record supports the district court’s findings of fact, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding joint physical custody.

II.    The district court erred in its calculation of child support.

       Mother argues the district court abused its discretion in setting child support in four

ways: (1) erroneously calculating father’s gross income, (2) improperly requiring mother

to pay father for the child’s healthcare insurance, (3) erroneously determining father’s

share of childcare expenses, and (4) erroneously declining to award retroactive child

support.

       The district court found that mother’s gross monthly income is $3,810 and that

father’s gross monthly income is $4,503. It found that each party testified that their

healthcare insurance would cover the child, but father had been providing healthcare

insurance for the child, and mother asked for this to continue. The district court found that

father’s healthcare insurance costs $200 per month for the child. The district court

                                              12
concluded that father must pay $52 per month to mother in basic child support, father must

provide healthcare insurance for the child, mother must pay $92 per month to father for

healthcare insurance for the child, and mother incurs childcare costs of $98 per month. The

district court’s analysis resulted in a net payment of $40 per month from mother to father.

The district court also denied mother’s request for retroactive child support.

       We consider each of mother’s four arguments in turn.

       Father’s Gross Income

       Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion in calculating father’s

gross income. Father did not file a financial affidavit. 4 At trial, father testified that he is

employed, makes $26 an hour, and works at least 40 hours per week. The district court

found that father’s monthly gross income is $4,503, father’s hourly pay rate is $26, and he

works 40 hours per week.

       Mother points out that father testified he works 40-45 hours per week, but that the

district court calculated father’s income based on a 40-hour week. She argues the district

court did not make the findings necessary to omit father’s additional five hours of income

per week. Minnesota law provides that gross income does not include compensation

4
  “In any case where the parties have joint children for which a child support order must be
determined, the parties shall serve and file with their initial pleadings or motion documents,
a financial affidavit, disclosing all sources of gross income . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518A.28(a)
(2022). But if a parent does not serve and file a financial affidavit, “the court shall set
income for that parent based on credible evidence before the court or in accordance with
section 518A.32.” Id. (c) (2022). The district court may consider “credible evidence” such
as “documentation of current or recent income, testimony of the other parent concerning
recent earnings and income levels, and the parent’s wage reports filed with the Minnesota
Department of Employment and Economic Development.” Id.

                                              13
received by a party for employment in excess of a 40-hour work week, as long as certain

requirements are met, and the court makes certain findings. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b)

(2022). 5 We agree with mother that the district court did not make the specific findings

required by section 518A.29(b).

       Still, we are not persuaded that the district court erred by not finding that father

worked 45 hours a week. Rather, the district court found that father worked 40 hours per

week, and the record supports that finding. Father testified that he worked “40, sometimes

45, at most, usually” hours per week. (Emphasis added.) The district court’s finding that

father worked 40 hours per week was not clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not

omit or exclude five hours per week from father’s gross income, nor did it err by failing to

make findings under Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(b).

5
  Section 518A.29(b) provides the following requirements and findings:
                    (1) child support is ordered in an amount at least equal
             to the guideline amount based on gross income not excluded
             under this clause; and
                    (2) the party demonstrates, and the court finds, that:
                            (i) the excess employment began after the filing
             of the petition for dissolution or legal separation or a petition
             related to custody, parenting time, or support;
                            (ii) the excess employment reflects an increase in
             the work schedule or hours worked over that of the two years
             immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
                            (iii) the excess employment is voluntary and not
             a condition of employment;
                            (iv) the excess employment is in the nature of
             additional, part-time or overtime employment compensable by
             the hour or fraction of an hour; and
                            (v) the party’s compensation structure has not
             been changed for the purpose of affecting a support or
             maintenance obligation.
Id.

                                            14
       Mother also argues the district court erred by not including as gross income bonuses

that father receives. “[G]ross income includes any form of periodic payment . . . .” Id. (a)

(2022). “[B]onuses are forms of periodic payment and therefore income.” Novak v. Novak,

406 N.W.2d 64, 68 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. July 22, 1987). “[T]he public

policy giving children the right to enjoy the benefit of their parents’ increased income is

paramount.” Desrosier v. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1996).

       In Desrosier, we determined the district court erred by not including a parent’s

annual bonus when calculating child support. Id. We reasoned that the parent’s annual

bonus payments were a dependable form of periodic payment that the children were

entitled to share, even though the bonuses may not be guaranteed or certain as to amount.

Id. We also considered that the record showed the bonuses were a “high percentage” of the

parent’s income and therefore reversed and remanded for a recalculation of child support.

Id. We note that Desrosier was interpreting a previous child-support statute, Minn. Stat.

§ 518.54 (1994). Id. Still, both the previous and the current child-support statutes define

income as “any form of periodic payment to an individual.” Id. (quoting former section

518.54); Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a). Desrosier is therefore still applicable today.

       Here, mother argues that father receives regular bonuses of up to $1,000 per month.

Father testified that his employer had started a bonus structure, which he described as a

“monthly bonus.” In response to questioning from the district court, father clarified that

the bonus is based on his performance and is not automatic. Father stated that he receives

up to $1,000 in monthly bonuses.

                                            15
       We observe that father’s monthly bonus is about 22% of father’s monthly income

and, if included in the child-support calculation, would increase father’s share of parental

income from 54% to 59%. In Desrosier, as in this case, the bonuses were not guaranteed

and were uncertain as to amount. Thus, we conclude the district court erred by not including

father’s bonuses in its calculation of father’s gross income.

       Cost of the Child’s Healthcare Insurance

       Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion by requiring her to

contribute to the cost of health insurance for the child. In support of her argument, mother

cites Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d) (2022), which provides that a district court must

not order a parent to contribute to healthcare-insurance costs under certain circumstances:

                     If the party ordered to carry health care coverage for the
              joint child already carries dependent health care coverage for
              other dependents and would incur no additional premium costs
              to add the joint child to the existing coverage, the court must
              not order the other party to contribute to the premium costs for
              coverage of the joint child.

Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d) (emphasis added).

       Mother contends that the record shows the required circumstances. Mother points

to father’s testimony about his out-of-pocket costs for healthcare insurance.

              THE COURT: Let me ask you: Do you know how much extra
              you pay each month for [the joint child] to be covered under
              your plan?
              FATHER: I cover my [non-joint] daughter, as well. So, it’s a
              family plan, like, I couldn’t really say. I know an individual
              plan is, like, $400, or something, and I pay, like, $800; so,
              maybe $200 extra, if I would split the extra $400 in half
              because two kids.

                                             16
              THE COURT: So, for the family plan, it doesn’t matter how
              many kids you have. If you’ve got two on it, it’s $800, if you
              have four on it, it would be $800. Am I getting that right?
              FATHER: I—I believe so. I don’t know how far—how high it
              goes.
              THE COURT: Okay.
              FATHER: But I know two is the same as one.
              THE COURT: So, you’d say about $200 of that, you would
              attribute to money that you’re paying for [the joint child] every
              month, in terms of the medical coverage?
              FATHER: Yeah.

       We agree with mother’s view of the record. Father’s statement, “I know two is the

same as one,” indicates that father does not pay an extra premium cost to include the child

on his healthcare plan. The district court found that it “costs approximately $200 per month

[for father] to have the [c]hild on his plan.” While it is true that $200 is half of the $400

father pays to include dependents on his healthcare plan, the district court’s reasoning

misapplied the statute. Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d at 506 (stating that a district court abuses its

discretion if its findings improperly apply the law). Here, the record establishes that father

pays the same premium whether he includes one child or two on his healthcare plan. Thus,

under Minn. Stat. § 518A.41, subd. 5(d), the district court abused its discretion in ordering

mother to contribute to the child’s healthcare premium.

       Childcare Expenses

       Mother argues that the district court clearly erred in finding childcare expenses were

$98 per month because she testified that they were $300 per month.

       The district court findings on this issue cited an exhibit showing mother’s historic

childcare costs, and the district court noted that it placed “greater weight on the

documentary evidence” than on mother’s testimony. The receipts mother submitted show

                                             17
childcare costs of $1,240 over ten months, or $124 per month. The district court did not

abuse its discretion in electing to use the exhibits proffered by mother and rejecting

mother’s testimony. Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence when reviewing findings

of fact. In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021). But the

record does not support the district court’s finding of $98 in childcare costs per month

because the receipts show an average cost of $124 per month. Thus, the district court

clearly erred in determining the amount of childcare expenses.

       Retroactive Child Support

       Mother argues that the district court erred by not awarding her retroactive child

support of $19,000. The district court reasoned that the parties’ testimony conflicted about

how much parenting time each party had as well as how much child support father paid

mother before the dissolution trial. The district court concluded that it “was not presented

with enough evidence to comfortably establish [retroactive] child support during the

pendency of this action.”

       The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that “a parent’s obligation to support

[their] children commences with the child’s birth.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303, 305

(Minn. 1981); see also Korf v. Korf, 553 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. App. 1996) (ordering,

in a final decree, retroactive child support dating back to the parties’ date of separation). A

district court generally “may not order retroactive child support for dates prior to the

commencement of an action under chapter 518.” Korf, 553 N.W.2d at 710. Under the

Minnesota Child Support Guidelines Worksheet, several factors determine the amount of

                                              18
child support, one of which is the percentage of parenting time each party receives. Minn.

Stat. §§ 518A.34(b)(6), .36 (2022).

       Here, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence to establish

retroactive child support. The district court focused on the lack of evidence showing the

amount of parenting time each party had received. As we have already discussed, the

parties’ testimony was very general and conflicted. Mother testified that before the

dissolution, she was the sole caregiver, that parenting time was week-on, week-off for a

few months, and that she eventually limited father’s parenting time. But the district court

found mother’s testimony inconsistent and not credible. The district court found credible

father’s testimony that he was the sole caregiver when the parties separated, followed by a

week-on, week-off parenting-time schedule. Father testified that after the dissolution, he

received inconsistent parenting time: “whenever [mother] feels like it . . . [she is] not

allowing me [to see] him every other weekend.” Based on our review of the record, the

evidence does not establish how much father had paid to mother in child support before

the dissolution trial. Thus, we conclude that district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the evidence was insufficient to establish retroactive child support and

therefore declining to award it.

       In sum, we agree with the district court’s determination that father’s basic income

is $4,503 monthly. We reverse and remand for the district court to recalculate child support

and to include father’s bonuses in its calculation of father’s gross income, to remove the

requirement for mother to reimburse father for the child’s healthcare insurance, and for a

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revised calculation of childcare expenses based on the record evidence. We affirm the

district court’s decision to deny retroactive child support.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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