Court Opinion

ID: 9400421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 14:03:53.771155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:45.169350
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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 19-CO-1171

                       TIMOTHY D. DUGGER, APPELLANT,

                                       V.

                           UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

                         Appeal from the Superior Court
                          of the District of Columbia
                              (2015-CF1-012558)

                       (Hon. Judith Bartnoff, Trial Judge)

(Submitted January 21, 2022                                  Decided June 8, 2023)

      Vincent A. Jankoski and Christine Pembroke were on the briefs for appellant.

       Michael R. Sherwin, Acting United States Attorney at the time, Channing D.
Phillips, Acting United States Attorney at the time of supplemental briefing,
Elizabeth Gabriel, Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Elizabeth H. Danello,
and Ellen D’Angelo, Assistant United States Attorneys, for appellee.

      Before EASTERLY and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, ∗ Senior
Judge.

      Opinion of the court by Associate Judge DEAHL.

      Opinion by Senior Judge GLICKMAN, dissenting in part, at page 43.

      ∗
        Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of
submission. He began his service as a Senior Judge on December 21, 2022.
                                          2

      DEAHL, Associate Judge: Timothy Dugger was convicted of assault with

intent to kill while armed and a dozen related charges after he shot his friend, Samuel

Wright. Dugger claimed that he acted in self-defense after Wright shot at him first.

While Dugger’s direct appeal was pending, he filed a motion under D.C. Code

§ 23-110, arguing that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective

assistance of counsel. The Superior Court denied that motion. The court concluded

that counsel had not been deficient in some of the ways alleged, assumed that he had

been in others, but ultimately concluded that Dugger could not show the requisite

prejudice to entitle him to a new trial. Dugger now appeals that ruling. We reverse

and vacate the majority of Dugger’s convictions.

      The performance of Dugger’s now-disbarred trial counsel, Raleigh Bynum II,

fell far below prevailing professional norms in many respects. From the beginning,

Bynum lied to the court and to Dugger about his qualifications to take on the

representation.   The trial judge, before permitting Bynum to take over the

representation from far more experienced counsel, pressed Bynum on his

qualifications to defend against the serious charges. Bynum assured the court (and

Dugger) that he had experience trying serious felonies, including assaults with intent

to kill, when in fact all evidence indicates that Bynum had never appeared in court

in a criminal case of any stripe. In fact, Bynum was in the midst of disciplinary
                                           3

proceedings for similarly misrepresenting his qualifications to take on a medical

malpractice case in South Carolina (where he was not barred), leading to his

disbarment. During those disciplinary proceedings, and just one month before he

began representing Dugger, Bynum admitted that he lacked the ability to take on any

clients in any legal matter due to various medical issues.

      Bynum’s unfitness was, unsurprisingly, evident during Dugger’s trial. While

Dugger raises nearly a dozen largely substantiated deficiencies with Bynum’s

performance—ranging from Bynum’s failure to even retrieve predecessor counsel’s

trial file to his decision not to retain an investigator—three deficiencies in particular

stand out. First, Bynum elicited testimony during his cross-examination of a witness

that Dugger was a drug dealer, and rather than moving to strike that testimony, he

repeated and highlighted it for the jury. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, he had

no conceivable strategic reason for that course of action. Second, Bynum failed to

impeach Wright with any of his criminal convictions, including for the violent

offense of second-degree assault and for drug possession.             The government

acknowledges these convictions were “favorable impeachment evidence” and does

not dispute that Bynum was deficient for failing to put evidence of them before the

jury. Third, Bynum did not object when the trial court instructed the jury, at the

government’s request, that it could consider the evidence of Wright’s peaceful
                                          4

character when assessing who was the first aggressor. As the government concedes,

and as we previously determined in the direct appeal, no such evidence had been

introduced and the instruction was erroneous.

      But for the combination of these deficiencies, we conclude that there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of Dugger’s trial would have been different,

at least as to the lead counts against him. Where the defense was predicated on a

theory that Wright shot at Dugger first, Bynum’s deficiencies were prejudicial where

he (1) highlighted evidence that his client was a drug dealer rather than striking it,

(2) failed to introduce evidence of Wright’s own violent and drug-related

convictions, and (3) permitted the jury to be instructed about the non-existent

evidence of Wright’s peaceful character without objection. We therefore reverse the

denial of Dugger’s § 23-110 motion and vacate most of his convictions.

                                          I.

      Timothy Dugger was convicted of assault with intent to kill, or AWIK, while

armed, and related offenses. Dugger shot his friend, Samuel Wright, though Dugger

contended that he acted in self-defense after Wright shot at him first. For more than

a year, Dugger was represented in the pretrial proceedings by an experienced defense

attorney, Dana Page of the Public Defender Service. But as the expected trial date
                                         5

approached, Page asked to withdraw her representation.          She explained her

understanding that Dugger wished to retain new counsel, Raleigh Bynum II.

           Bynum Takes Over the Representation Under False Pretenses

      The trial judge, the Hon. Lynn Leibovitz, was wary of the request to substitute

counsel. Judge Leibovitz explained to Dugger that Page was “as good a lawyer as

Mr. Dugger could ever have,” whereas she had never even seen Bynum before

despite having been a Superior Court judge for well over a decade. Judge Leibovitz

asked Bynum whether he was a member of the District of Columbia Bar or if he had

previously defended clients against charges as serious as Dugger’s in any court.

Bynum claimed that he had represented clients in Superior Court on “[v]arious—

felonies, misdemeanors, drugs, assault,” and that he had “done assaults with—

assaults with intent to kill.” When asked, Bynum struggled to name any Superior

Court judge whom he had appeared before, and then pivoted to saying that he had

“done stuff in the Federal Court” in the District, though he could not name a judge

he had appeared before in federal court either. Bynum also clarified that he had

never spoken with Dugger himself, but that Dugger’s father had retained his services

on his son’s behalf.
                                          6

      Before permitting the substitution, Judge Leibovitz gave Bynum a chance to

speak with Dugger while admonishing him to “be extremely candid with [Dugger]

about the fact you haven’t necessarily done an assault with intent to kill while armed

case.” Bynum retorted by again insisting that he had in fact represented a client

against an AWIK charge, but simply could not say where he had done so without

“look[ing] at [his] dossier.” After speaking with Bynum privately, Dugger agreed

to retain him, and Judge Leibovitz dismissed Page.

      Only after trial did it become apparent that Bynum had never tried a criminal

case. While Bynum suggested that he had tried criminal cases in the Superior Court

and the federal District Court for the District of Columbia—the only jurisdiction

where he was barred—independent searches of the relevant electronic databases by

both a defense investigator and a deputy clerk in the Superior Court revealed no

instance where Bynum was counsel of record in any criminal matter. Bynum also

failed to mention to the trial court—and, it seems, to Dugger—that when he accepted

the representation he was in the midst of serious disciplinary proceedings for

misrepresenting his qualifications to take on another matter. See In re Bynum, 197

A.3d 1072, 1074-75 (D.C. 2018). 1        Those proceedings continued throughout

      1
        Dugger highlighted Bynum’s disciplinary proceedings in the § 23-110
hearings, noting that Bynum had been disbarred for “flagrant dishonesty” for
                                         7

Dugger’s trial and would ultimately lead to his disbarment for, among other things,

“flagrant dishonesty.” Id.

      Bynum’s Contemporaneous Disciplinary Proceedings and Disbarment

       The misconduct that led to Bynum’s disbarment bears a telling resemblance

to how he came to represent Dugger in this case. In 2011, an incarcerated man

named William Reid, Jr., on another inmate’s recommendation, sought Bynum’s

representation in a South Carolina medical malpractice action against the hospital

where Reid’s wife died shortly after childbirth. In re Bynum, Board Docket No. 16-

BD-029, *3, *5 (BPR Apr. 4, 2018). Reid had been represented by a different

attorney in initiating that medical malpractice suit, but that counsel sought to

withdraw his representation due to disagreements with Reid. Id. at *5. Bynum

agreed to represent Reid after failing to inform him that he was not licensed to

practice law in South Carolina and telling him, falsely, that he had experience

litigating medical malpractice actions. Id. at *6. After securing the representation,

conduct that closely resembled his conduct in this case. We have looked to the
record in the disciplinary proceedings themselves in fleshing out some of the more
granular points above, as we may “judicially notice proceedings in related cases.”
See In re Marshall, 549 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1988) (citing Coleman v. Burnett, 477
F.2d 1187, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
                                           8

Bynum “did nothing to undertake discovery or [] litigate the case,” and the South

Carolina court dismissed Reid’s suit for failure to prosecute in 2014 after concluding

that Bynum had not “done anything to prosecute the case in the last two years.” Id.

at *8-9 & n.8.

      In June of 2016, the District’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a litany of

charges against Bynum in relation to Reid’s case, including: failure to provide

zealous and diligent representation, intentional failure to seek the lawful objectives

of clients, and conduct involving dishonesty and misrepresentation. In re Bynum,

Board Docket No. 16-BD-029, *4-5 (HC Rep. Apr. 27, 2017). A disciplinary

hearing was held two months later, in August 2016. Id. at *5. Bynum asserted

various illnesses as mitigation. He stated that, as a result of his illnesses, he was

“heavily medicated and was unable to focus [or] concentrate,” that “his practice was

severely limited due to his inability to focus and lack of energy and drive to attend

to clients,” and “that he ha[d] not taken on new clients due to his illness.”

      Nonetheless, Bynum began representing Dugger less than two months later,

in October 2016, assuring Dugger and Judge Leibovitz of his qualifications to do so.

Several months after he began representing Dugger, but still two months before trial,

a Hearing Committee considering the disciplinary charges found that the evidence
                                          9

established that Bynum committed a variety of infractions and recommended that he

be suspended from the practice of law for three years with a requirement that Bynum

prove his fitness before reinstatement. Id. at *62. Bynum did not contest that

recommendation, though he made no mention of it to the trial court and proceeded

to represent Dugger at trial two months later.

      Disciplinary Counsel took exception to the Hearing Committee’s

recommendation, however, and in the midst of Dugger’s trial it filed a brief with the

Board on Professional Responsibility requesting that Bynum be disbarred. Again,

Bynum made no mention of this to the trial court, nor apparently to Dugger. The

Board agreed that Bynum should be disbarred and, the following year, we adopted

the Board’s recommendation and disbarred Bynum. In re Bynum, 197 A.3d at 1074-

75.

                        The Government’s Evidence at Trial

      At Dugger’s trial, the evidence showed that on the day of the shooting, Dugger

drove his friend, Wright, and Wright’s wife and son home. Because Dugger and

Wright planned to go out for drinks, Dugger waited in the car while Wright escorted

his family into their apartment. When Wright came back out of the apartment
                                          10

building, Dugger shot him. The central issue at trial, presided over by the Hon. Judith

Bartnoff, was whether (as Dugger contended) Wright shot at Dugger first.

       Wright testified that when he exited his apartment building, Dugger was

parked on the far side of the street and, with his arm extended out of the driver’s side

window, began firing at him without provocation. Wright claimed that he was

unarmed and responded by running across the street toward the car, around the back

of it, and trying to enter the car through its passenger’s side in an effort to wrestle

the gun away from Dugger. When Wright failed to disarm Dugger, Dugger made a

U-turn and fired several more shots before driving away. Wright suffered two

gunshot wounds, causing injuries to his back, chest, and right arm. As for Dugger’s

motive, the government theorized that Dugger shot Wright because he suspected

Wright of having an affair with Dugger’s fiancée, Angel Wiggins. The government

introduced text messages that Dugger sent to Wiggins prior to the shooting, accusing

her of cheating on him, and a petition for a civil protection order that Wiggins had

filed against Dugger just three days before he shot Wright.

      In addition to Wright, the government called two witnesses who testified that

they saw the end of the shooting, though they did not claim to see who fired the

initial shots. A hearing-impaired neighbor, Anthony Napier, felt the vibrations of
                                        11

the first round of gunshots from his nearby apartment, though he did not see who

fired them. Napier went to the window to investigate and saw Wright “teetering

back and forth” as if trying to dodge something as Dugger made a U-turn, and Napier

again felt the vibrations of subsequent gunshots. Napier said that Wright appeared

to be unarmed. A police officer, James Huff, was also in the area and heard the

initial gunshots, but did not see who fired them. When Officer Huff arrived on the

scene, he saw Dugger make a U-turn and fire shots at Wright. Like Napier, Officer

Huff also thought Wright appeared to be trying to dodge gunfire. As Dugger fled,

Officer Huff gave chase on his motorcycle. Eventually, Dugger lost control of his

vehicle, crashed, and attempted to flee on foot, though officers apprehended him.

Officers recovered a 9-millimeter handgun and its magazine along his flight path.

Uncontested forensic evidence established that Dugger’s thumbprint was on the

gun’s magazine.

      The government also called Mark Vanderhall, an inmate who shared a cell

with Dugger for three days after he was arrested in this case. Vanderhall had a long

criminal history and had routinely cooperated with the government—six times by

his count—often in exchange for lighter sentences for his own offenses. Vanderhall

testified that he knew Dugger from the neighborhood for years before they briefly

shared a cell together. He claimed that Dugger confessed to shooting Wright and
                                        12

throwing a 9-millimeter gun out of the car window as he fled. According to

Vanderhall, Dugger mentioned that he believed that Wiggins was “messing with”

Wright.

                          Bynum’s Performance at Trial

      Dugger testified in his own defense. He explained that he and Wright were

like “best friends” for about twenty years. Two weeks before the shooting, an

unknown person shot at Dugger outside of his parents’ home, putting him on edge.

Because of that incident, Dugger purchased a gun to protect himself. Wright then

mentioned to Dugger that “he had laid some shots at somebody that he didn’t like,”

which Dugger suspected was a veiled admission that Wright was the person who had

shot at him. On the day of the shooting, Dugger dropped off Wright and his family

at their apartment. Wright then came out of the building and, as he was crossing the

street and within about 10-15 feet of Dugger’s car, pulled out a revolver and fired

two shots at Dugger before the gun jammed. Dugger explained that, in a state of

panic, he fired back at Wright and then made a U-turn and drove off.

      Aside from Dugger’s own testimony, Bynum did little to bolster the claim of

self-defense, despite clear opportunities to do so. While Wright testified, and

thereby left himself open to impeachment with certain prior convictions, Bynum did
                                          13

not attempt to introduce Wright’s Maryland convictions for second-degree assault

or possession of narcotics (non-marijuana).       Bynum did attempt to introduce

Wright’s past conviction for misdemeanor destruction of property during the cross-

examination of a different witness, though the trial court precluded him from doing

so.

      Bynum also affirmatively undermined Dugger’s defense in powerful ways. In

cross-examining Vanderhall, for instance, Bynum asked several dozen questions

probing the extent to which he and Dugger were friends before their brief stint as

cellmates. Vanderhall offered that they were good friends and saw each other “every

day . . . for three or four years” in their shared neighborhood. Bynum continued to

press Vanderhall about the nature of their interactions, despite the obvious peril that

Vanderhall might reveal that Dugger—who had previously been convicted of

possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance—was once a drug dealer.

Eventually, when Bynum asked, “[W]hen you say you would see him every day . . .

it wasn’t like you actually were hanging?” Vanderhall responded, “I was on drugs

back then. [Dugger] sold drugs.” Bynum, seemingly caught unawares, repeated,

“Oh, he sold drugs then,” to which Vanderhall replied, “Yeah.”
                                         14

      When it came time for jury instructions, the government requested that the

court instruct the jury that it had heard evidence of Wright’s peaceful character,

which it could consider in assessing who was the first aggressor. There was no such

evidence—as we noted in Dugger’s direct appeal, “the jury heard evidence to the

contrary, including from Wright himself,” such as when Wright testified about his

“tendency to put [his] hands on people.” Yet Bynum did not object when the court

instructed the jurors that they had “heard evidence about the peaceful character of

Samuel Wright” and that they “may consider such evidence only as bearing on the

likelihood that Samuel Wright threatened Timothy Dugger with imminent bodily

harm; that is, on the issue of who was the aggressor.” In fact, Bynum stated that the

“[d]efense has no issue with that” instruction.

      The jury found Dugger guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him

to fourteen years of imprisonment. We affirmed Dugger’s convictions on direct

appeal. Dugger v. United States, 17-CF-1035, Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. June 30, 2020)

(“Dugger I”). During the pendency of Dugger’s direct appeal, he filed the instant §

23-110 motion.
                                         15

                            The Post-Trial Proceedings

      Dugger filed a § 23-110 motion arguing that Bynum had rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel. First, Dugger pointed to three aspects of Bynum’s pretrial

conduct that he argued were deficient: (1) Bynum had misrepresented his

qualifications to take on the matter; (2) Bynum never retrieved Page’s trial file

despite her year’s worth of preparation in the case; and (3) Bynum never retained an

investigator to work on the case, nor did it appear that Bynum had done any

investigation of his own. Dugger also claimed that Bynum was deficient in his trial

performance when he, among other things: (4) allowed testimony that Dugger was

once a drug dealer to be introduced without objection; (5) failed to impeach Wright

with any of his several past convictions, including convictions for second-degree

assault and drug possession; and (6) failed to object to the erroneous instruction

telling jurors they could consider non-existent evidence of Wright’s peaceful

character in assessing who was the first aggressor.

      Judge Bartnoff, who remained on the case during post-trial proceedings, held

an evidentiary hearing on the § 23-110 motion, though no party called Bynum as a
                                        16

witness. 2 Two witnesses testified on Dugger’s behalf. First, a defense investigator

testified that he could find no record of Bynum having ever appeared in a criminal

case in D.C. Superior Court, 3 despite running multiple searches including a number

anticipating potential misspellings of Bynum’s name. The government had already

stipulated that there was “no record of [Bynum] practicing in Federal Court in D.C.”

Second, an experienced defense attorney who had tried more than 50 criminal cases,

Jenifer Wicks, testified. She explained the professional norms relating to each of

the six alleged deficiencies outlined in the prior paragraph—save for the fourth,

which she was not asked about. While the court precluded her from offering an

ultimate opinion on the matter, the court accurately described it as “self evident”

from her testimony that she believed Bynum’s conduct fell below the norms she had

described as to each alleged deficiency. Dugger also submitted an affidavit from his

predecessor counsel, Dana Page. Page explained her extensive efforts to hand her

trial file off to Bynum, including contacting Judge Leibovitz to explain that Bynum

had not retrieved it, prompting a hearing the month after Bynum began his

      2
        The government told the court: “[W]e are not planning to put on any
witnesses. . . . [W]e were not preparing to call Mr. Bynum.”
      3
        The government likewise had a deputy clerk in the Superior Court search the
court’s records and could find no record of Bynum having ever appeared in a
criminal case in Superior Court. Even still, the government maintained that the
Superior Court’s records may have been incomplete.
                                          17

representation where Page explained to him that it was waiting for him just a block

away from the courthouse. Yet Bynum still never retrieved the file.

      The trial court denied the § 23-110 motion. As to the six deficiencies outlined

above, the court reasoned, in turn: (1) that while it “in no way condone[d] any

misstatements by Bynum with regard to his experience or anything else,” “even

accepting that Mr. Bynum misstated or exaggerated his experience, it [wa]s not at

all clear that such conduct necessarily related to any aspect of [his] performance at

trial”; (2) it acknowledged that “it presumably would have been prudent for Mr.

Bynum to obtain Ms. Page’s [trial] file,” but it could not conclude his failure to do

so “in and of itself constituted deficient performance”; and (3) it recognized “that it

generally is prudent for defense counsel to hire an investigator, but there is no

explicit requirement in Strickland for counsel to do so.” As for Bynum’s alleged

trial deficiencies, as relevant here, the court: (4) found that Dugger had “not shown

that [Bynum’s] failure to move to strike” Vanderhall’s testimony that Dugger was a

drug dealer “was anything other than a strategic choice”; (5) assumed that Bynum

was deficient for failing to impeach Wright with his prior convictions, but concluded

that Dugger could not show the result of the trial would have been any different but

for that deficiency; and (6) assumed that Bynum was deficient for failing to object
                                         18

to instructing the jury about Wright’s “peaceful character,” but again found that

deficiency did not prejudice Dugger.

      Dugger now appeals the denial of his § 23-110 motion.

                                         II.

      On appeal, Dugger argues that Bynum provided constitutionally ineffective

assistance of counsel. We agree.

      The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel.

U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-86 (1984).

Effective assistance is “the means through which the other rights of the person on

trial are secured.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984). In Strickland,

the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having

produced a just result.” 466 U.S. at 686.

      An ineffective assistance claim has two prongs. The first is the deficiency

prong, which requires the defendant to show that “counsel made errors so serious
                                          19

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. Counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. The second is the prejudice

prong, which “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive

the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687. In other

words, to demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

      Both prongs of an ineffective assistance claim are mixed questions of law and

fact. Id. at 698; see also Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007)

(en banc). While we defer to the trial court’s factual determinations unless they are

unsupported by the record, its ultimate deficiency and prejudice determinations are

legal in nature and are reviewed de novo. Id. “To determine whether reversal is

warranted” where there are multiple alleged deficiencies, we evaluate whether the

“cumulative impact” of the deficiencies prejudiced the defendant. See Gardner v.

United States, 140 A.3d 1172, 1197 n.38 (D.C. 2016).
                                          20

                                          A.

      Before we address the deficiencies in Bynum’s trial performance, we consider

Bynum’s pretrial conduct, which Dugger argues infected the entire representation

and amounted to a type of structural ineffectiveness. The argument is not without

force, particularly as to Bynum’s blatant misrepresentations regarding his basic

qualifications to represent Dugger.

      In denying Dugger’s § 23-110 motion, the trial court “accept[ed],” seemingly

arguendo, “that Mr. Bynum misstated or exaggerated his experience.” To the extent

that falls short of a finding that Bynum misrepresented his qualifications to the court

and Dugger, in our view the record evidence allows for but one conclusion: He did.

Bynum told the court that he had handled “various . . . felonies” in Superior Court,

including “assaults with intent to kill.” When he could not name what judge he had

appeared before when doing so, he pivoted to having “done stuff in the Federal

Court.” Two comprehensive record searches—one by a defense investigator and

one by a deputy clerk of the Superior Court at the government’s behest—both turned

up zero instances of Bynum having ever filed an appearance in a criminal case in the

District, the only jurisdiction where he claimed to have handled such a case and the

only jurisdiction where he was barred. The government had the opportunity to call
                                          21

Bynum as a witness if it thought he could provide any contrary evidence of an

instance where he had previously appeared in court in a criminal matter, or it could

have informally asked him to identify such a case and introduced independent

evidence of his representation (a docket sheet, for instance) if any existed. It did not

do so. There was thus no evidence at the § 23-110 hearing that Bynum had ever

previously appeared in a criminal matter, leaving unrebutted the strong evidence that

he had never done so.

      While the trial court intimated that we do not know that Bynum similarly

misrepresented his qualifications to Dugger, respectfully, we do. Dugger had never

previously spoken to Bynum and was present as Bynum misrepresented his

qualifications in open court. Those misrepresentations were not just to the trial

court, but to Dugger himself. The notion that Bynum might then have confided in

Dugger that he had committed a blatant fraud on the court in misrepresenting his

qualifications—absent any evidence to that effect—is beyond far-fetched; it is

preposterous. Couple all of that with the fact that Bynum was in the midst of

disbarment proceedings for his “flagrant dishonesty” to another client, similarly

misrepresenting his qualifications represent them in a matter, and we think the

inescapable conclusion is that Bynum lied to the court and Dugger about his basic

qualifications to represent Dugger in this case.
                                          22

      In some limited scenarios, courts have found that gross misrepresentations

about one’s basic competence to handle a criminal matter amount to ineffectiveness

per se. See, e.g., United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 887-90 (2d Cir. 1990)

(counsel who gained admission to bar by fraudulent means was per se ineffective);

United States v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2010) (adopting a “per se

rule of ineffectiveness where a defendant is, unbeknownst to him, represented by

someone who has not been admitted to any bar based on his ‘failure to ever meet the

substantive requirements for the practice of law’”); United States v. Mouzin, 785

F.2d 682, 697 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel

would be violated where he is represented by a person posing as a lawyer who had

not been admitted to any bar.”). Notably, though, each of those cases involved an

attorney who had not been “duly admitted” to the bar where they were practicing,

whereas here, there is no contention that Bynum was not duly admitted to the

District’s Bar, only that he had otherwise misrepresented his qualifications while in

the midst of disciplinary proceedings for similar misrepresentations. See United

States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Instead of extending a

per se rule to cover various states of attorney licensure, courts have considered the

facts of the cases to determine if counsel was ineffective.”).
                                           23

      This court has never confronted what approach to adopt in this scenario. We

might (1) adopt a rule of per se ineffectiveness for gross misrepresentations of

counsel’s core competence to handle a matter, (2) adhere to a typical Strickland

analysis, including the presumption that trial counsel’s decisions were part of a

sound strategy, or (3) tread some middle path where we apply a modified Strickland

analysis, stripped it of any presumption that counsel acted strategically. Without

foreclosing the first route in a future case, we take the third path here, as we conclude

that Bynum’s misrepresentations and pretrial conduct were such gross deviations

from professional norms to at least dispel any presumption that his trial conduct was

the result of sound trial strategy. The D.C. Circuit reached similar conclusions in

United States v. Butler, 504 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a pre-Strickland case that

remains persuasive.

      In Butler, the court rejected any rule that counsel was per se ineffective by

virtue of “misrepresent[ing] his membership in the [local] bar to the court . . . and to

his clients.” 4 Id. at 224. But it found on the facts of the case that counsel was

      4
         In Ransom v. United States, we adopted Butler’s rejection of any per se
ineffectiveness rule for counsel who was not a member of the local bar (but was
barred elsewhere). 947 A.2d 1127, 1129 & n.4 (D.C. 2008). We distinguished
Butler on its facts, because, unlike here, there was not even an allegation “that
counsel had no [] relevant trial experience.” Id. Indeed, we found that Ransom’s
counsel “was qualified in every respect” other than his failure to file a specific form
                                           24

ineffective where he “apparently had no previous trial experience” and where “the

record of the trial itself reveal[ed] significant errors on the part of counsel.” Id.

Though the trial errors “may arguably [have] be[en] the product of tactical

decisions”—which are not typically “germane to an ineffectiveness claim”—they

were nevertheless “highly relevant where . . . other factors . . . independently raise[d]

the question of ineffectiveness.” Id. In other words, Butler adopted the view that

counsel’s serious dishonesty and lack of qualifications to undertake a representation

may serve as a sort of wholesale rebuttal that their trial conduct was “the product of

tactical decisions as opposed to being the result of inadequate preparation.” Id. 5

      We agree with that approach, and think it is more sensible than entirely

discounting Bynum’s gross misrepresentations about his core qualifications as

stating that he was a nonmember of the D.C. Bar being supervised by a D.C.
attorney. Id.
      5
         Cf. Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[S]omeone
insensitive to the duty not to undertake representation in a criminal proceeding
without a license is hardly likely to be more sensitive to his or her duty of undivided
loyalty to the client.”); People v. Atkinson, 786 N.Y.S.2d 690, 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2004) (“[T]he conduct of a lawyer who has been suspended should be scrutinized
very carefully.”); Massachusetts v. Thibeault, 556 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Mass. Ct. App.
1990) (“[S]crutiny should be particularly careful and discriminating where the
attorney at the time was under suspension or other bar from practice” because “sound
representation comprises not only legal proficiency on the part of the advocate but
fidelity to ethical standards.”).
                                           25

simply irrelevant to the Strickland analysis, as the trial court seemed to do. Bynum’s

pretrial conduct—(1) misrepresenting his core qualifications to the trial court and

his client, (2) failing to even retrieve predecessor counsel’s trial file, and (3) failing

to retain a defense investigator—closely resembles the type of unprofessional

conduct that Butler reasoned should undercut any notion that counsel otherwise

acted tactically. See Butler, 504 F.2d at 224. Here, too, Bynum’s pretrial conduct

fell so far below professional norms, and he so blatantly lied about his core

qualifications to take on this representation, 6 that the presumption that he otherwise

acted strategically throughout trial is simply not warranted. Put another way, the

presumption has been rebutted wholesale. That conclusion is bolstered by the fact

that Bynum was in the midst of disciplinary proceedings stemming from similar

misrepresentations in another case—in which he caused his civil client’s suit to be

dismissed for want of prosecution through his clearly non-strategic inaction—

leading to his disbarment.

      6
        We stress Bynum’s misrepresentations because a defendant who knowingly
engages unqualified defense counsel would likely forfeit their right to complain
about that informed choice (though they might have more pointed complaints about
their counsel’s conduct). In any event, the presumption that defense counsel has
engaged in sound trial strategy could only arguably apply to one of the alleged
deficiencies here—Bynum’s failure to move to strike testimony that Dugger was a
drug dealer. We doubt this could be deemed sound trial strategy even if we applied
the ordinary presumption that it was, for reasons explained further below.
                                           26

                                           B.

       We now turn to the alleged deficiencies with Bynum’s trial performance and

their prejudicial effect on Dugger’s trial. While many of the alleged deficiencies

concern us, we focus on three in particular that are sufficient to resolve this case: (1)

Bynum did not move to strike Vanderhall’s testimony that Dugger was a drug dealer,

but instead highlighted it; (2) Bynum failed to impeach Wright with any of his

numerous prior convictions; and (3) Bynum failed to object to instructing jurors,

counterfactually, that they had heard evidence of Wright’s peaceful character and

could consider that evidence in determining who was the first aggressor. Together,

each of these deficiencies contributed to a narrative that Dugger was a violent drug

dealer and Wright a peaceful man, a narrative that substantially undercut the entire

defense theory that Wright was the first aggressor. We address each deficiency, and

its corresponding effect on the trial, in turn, before considering their cumulative

effects on the trial.

  1. Failing to Strike and Highlighting Evidence that Dugger Was a Drug Dealer

       Dugger was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled

substance in 2009, several years before the shooting at issue here. While the

government never sought to admit evidence of that conviction in its own case,
                                         27

Bynum—seemingly inadvertently, and apparently unaware of his own client’s prior

conviction—introduced evidence of Dugger’s past drug dealing when he cross-

examined Vanderhall, the jailhouse informant to whom Dugger supposedly

confessed. Vanderhall testified that he first met Dugger in 2004 and would see him

“every day or every other day” for about “three or four years” (i.e., until around the

time when Dugger was arrested on the distribution charge). Despite the obviously

treacherous territory he was wading into, Bynum asked Vanderhall more than two

dozen questions—spanning five pages of transcripts—about the extent and nature of

his interactions with Bynum. Vanderhall was initially fairly opaque in his answers.

When Bynum asked him “in what regard” he saw Dugger nearly every day,

Vanderhall answered, “In the neighborhood.” When Bynum asked if they had “any

deep conversation[s] about anything,” Vanderhall answered, “probably.” When

Bynum asked what those conversations were about, Vanderhall answered, “Just

neighborhood stuff, you know.”

      Bynum would not relent and eventually posited that “it wasn’t like you

actually were hanging,” and Vanderhall answered: “Yeah. See, I was on drugs back

then. He sold drugs.” Bynum, seemingly caught unawares, responded: “Oh, he sold

drugs then[?]” Vanderhall replied, “Yeah,” to which Bynum said, “Oh, okay.”
                                        28

      Bynum’s failure to move to strike this testimony, coupled with his own

highlighting of it, was deficient performance. The government does not dispute that

a motion to strike would have been successful. It instead echoes the trial court’s

reasoning that Dugger had “not shown that his counsel’s failure to move to strike

that response was anything other than a strategic choice not to highlight or lend

credence to that information and not to appear to be seeking to keep information

from the jury.” We are not persuaded.

      Assuming that (1) this was a nonresponsive answer that (2) Bynum could have

successfully moved to strike—points the parties do not dispute 7—the trial court’s

      7
         We doubt both of those points, though we proceed based on the parties’
shared view of them. In fact, Vanderhall’s answer was perfectly responsive to the
repeated questions about how he came to know Dugger, so it is unlikely that Bynum
could have successfully moved to strike the testimony. See Gonzalez v. United
States, 697 A.2d 819, 826 (D.C. 1997). But the government does not offer that
defense of the charged “failure to move to strike” deficiency, no doubt because to
do so only makes Bynum’s deficiency much clearer. Bynum steered heedlessly into
dangerous territory when he questioned Vanderhall at length about the nature of his
neighborhood interactions with Dugger, despite Vanderhall’s initial opaqueness that
their interactions were just “neighborhood stuff.” Bynum should have known in
advance how Vanderhall and Dugger knew one another and tailored his questioning
to avoid the very testimony he elicited. Bynum’s seeming surprise at Vanderhall’s
answer—“Oh, he sold drugs then[?]”—reveals that he was caught unawares by his
own client’s drug dealing. No competent attorney would have been. Our dissenting
colleague would find that there was no deficiency here on a basis that the
government does not advance: that Bynum elicited this testimony and so could not
have successfully moved to strike it. If we were to follow the dissent’s approach of
overlooking the government’s failure to make that argument, then we should
                                           29

finding that this was a strategic choice does not withstand scrutiny. As explained

above, the presumption that Bynum was acting strategically is not warranted in light

of Bynum’s lack of qualifications to handle this matter and his misrepresentations

about the same. And even if that presumption could survive those core deficiencies,

“the mere incantation of ‘strategy’ does not insulate . . . from review” a decision that

no reasonable attorney would make. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369

(10th Cir. 1994).

      Bynum’s failure to move to strike the testimony cannot be chalked up to a

desire not to highlight it when, in fact, Bynum did highlight it by repeating it. While

defense counsel might in some instances strategically choose to let a “fleeting

reference” to criminal conduct go unchallenged, rather than risk drawing attention

to it, Harris v. United States, 366 A.2d 461, 464 n.7 (D.C. 1976), 8 that justification

likewise forgive Dugger’s failure to frame this claim as a deficiency in the elicitation
of this testimony. And if it were framed that way, we would hold that Bynum was
deficient in eliciting the testimony.
      8
         There is no general rule that it is always within the realm of reasonable
strategy not to seek to strike references to such criminal conduct, and the trial court’s
incantation of “strategy” as to this charge was devoid of any consideration of
whether the strategy was reasonable on the facts here. It would be one thing if
Bynum forwent a curative jury instruction that would draw the jury’s attention back
to damaging testimony that occurred some hours or days earlier in the trial, where it
would be readily apparent why counsel might want to avoid reminding the jury of
distant testimony. See Atkinson v. United States, 121 A.3d 780, 789-90 (D.C. 2015).
                                          30

loses all force when defense counsel repeats it, as if surprised by the revelation that

his client dealt drugs despite a criminal record that should have alerted him to that

history.

      While the government tries to discount the prejudicial effect of this testimony

as “completely unrelated” to the AWIK charge, that description is inapt. “[A]s has

been often observed, drugs and weapons go together.” Peay v. United States, 597

A.2d 1318, 1321 (D.C. 1991) (en banc); see also Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26,

31 (D.C. 1989) (quoting expert testimony that “when you relate to drugs and guns

it’s like a marriage”). Part of Dugger’s defense was that he had only acquired a

firearm after somebody had shot at him about two weeks before the shooting here,

and then only used the firearm after Wright shot at him first. That account became

considerably less plausible once the jury learned that Dugger was a drug dealer,

given the close association between drug dealers, guns, and violence. See United

States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[I]t has uniformly been

It is more difficult to understand why counsel would strategically forgo an
immediate motion to strike testimony like this, where there is an “almost invariable
assumption” that jurors can and will follow instructions that are “prompt, complete,
persuasive, and to the point.” Id. at 789 (citations omitted). And the only
conceivable justification for such a strategic choice—to avoid highlighting the
testimony—is not viable here, in light of the fact that Bynum then repeated the
damaging testimony.
                                        31

recognized that substantial dealers in narcotics possess firearms and that such

weapons are as much tools of the trade as more commonly recognized drug

paraphernalia.”).

             2. Failure to Impeach Wright with His Prior Convictions

      We next consider, in juxtaposition to Bynum highlighting his own client’s

criminal past, Bynum’s failure to impeach Wright with any of his own prior

convictions. Putting aside Bynum’s unsuccessful attempt to introduce Wright’s

conviction for misdemeanor destruction of property, he did not even attempt to

introduce Wright’s convictions for second-degree assault or for possession of a non-

marijuana controlled substance.

      Neither the government nor the trial court dispute Dugger’s claim that

Bynum’s failure to impeach Wright with these convictions constituted deficient

performance. Instead, they both reason that this failure did not prejudice Dugger. 9

While we might therefore treat deficiency as a conceded point, we nonetheless pause

      9
         The trial court seemed to think that Wright had also been convicted of
“carrying a dangerous weapon, armed robbery, attempted possession with intent to
distribute ecstasy, and grand larceny.” Those were actually Vanderhall’s
convictions.
                                         32

on the deficiency prong of the analysis because there is one aspect of it that we are

compelled to elaborate on. It is not entirely clear if Bynum was in fact aware of

Wright’s prior convictions—as we noted in the direct appeal, there is reason to doubt

that the government disclosed Wright’s convictions, save for the destruction of

property conviction that Bynum tried to introduce at one point. That potential failure

to disclose underlies Dugger’s Brady claim, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), which he included in his § 23-110 motion and now reiterates on appeal,

though we do not reach that claim.

      Ultimately, it is really of no moment whether Bynum was aware of these

convictions. There are two possibilities, and both lead to the same result. Bynum

either knew about Wright’s convictions, in which case he was deficient for failing

to introduce them. See Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2013) (abrogated

on other grounds) (“A key prosecution witness’s prior criminal history . . . clearly

constitute[s] important impeachment evidence.          It is beyond the range of

professionally reasonable judgment to forego investigation of, and impeachment

based upon, such evidence absent some apparent strategic reason that might explain

or excuse counsel’s failure.”) This was not a matter of cumulatively adding minor

convictions on top of more serious ones that had already been introduced, but a

matter of doing the bare minimum to alert the jury to Wright’s violent criminal past.
                                         33

       The alternative is that Bynum did not know about these convictions, in which

case he was deficient in failing to discover them because, as the government points

out, a simple search of Maryland judiciary’s publicly accessible website would have

revealed them. Competent defense counsel, in a case of this magnitude when

claiming self-defense, would run at least a rudimentary criminal history check on

the complainant and lead government witness, particularly one with an admitted

“tendency to put [his] hands on people.” See Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1128 (“[W]e have

no doubt that any competent defense attorney would have appreciated the need to

investigate [the complainant’s credibility].”); Kigozi v. United States, 55 A.3d 643,

655 (D.C. 2012) (“[I]t cannot be gainsaid that credible evidence impeaching the

government’s key witness is an elementary component of a proper defense.”); see

also Grant 709 F.3d at 234 (“A key prosecution witness’s prior criminal history . . .

clearly constitute[s] important impeachment evidence” that it is deficient not to

investigate). If Bynum failed to do such a barebones investigation into Wright’s

past—recall that he did not retain an investigator—he was deficient in his

investigation. 10

       10
         Even if one were to conclude that a failure to uncover these convictions was
not deficient because defense counsel might reasonably rely on the government to
disclose its witnesses’ past convictions, that would not materially change our
analysis. The government does not dispute that it had an obligation to disclose these
convictions under Brady. Its responses to Dugger’s Brady claim are that (1) the
government did in fact disclose them, and (2) even if it did not, the convictions were
                                         34

      As for prejudice, we disagree with the Superior Court’s suggestion that raising

Wright’s convictions only stood to inflict “minimal incremental damage to [his]

credibility.” Bynum had recklessly introduced evidence of his own client’s criminal

past and then inexplicably failed to introduce evidence of Wright’s violent and

criminal past. In a case where the central question was who was the first aggressor—

and no witness saw who fired the initial shots except for Dugger and Wright, each

of whom pointed the finger at the other in their testimony—failing to introduce

evidence of Wright’s violent criminal past, even if only as impeachment, 11 seriously

undermined the defense.

not “material.” If Bynum was unaware of these convictions that eliminates the first
possibility, that the government in fact disclosed them. That leaves only an
assessment of Brady’s materiality prong, which is in all relevant respects identical
to Strickland’s prejudice prong, asking whether there is a “reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different” but for the
transgression. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (adopting the
Strickland prejudice standard for Brady materiality). Thus, if Bynum did not know
about and was not deficient for failing to discover these convictions, we would be in
the same position of assessing the harm from their omission, only via a Brady
analysis.
      11
          Wright’s prior convictions would have been admissible only for
impeachment purposes, not to show his violent propensities. See Harris v. United
States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C. 1992) (“The rule in this jurisdiction is that only in
homicide cases may prior violent acts of the victim be introduced as evidence to
prove that the victim was the first aggressor.”). But it would have been difficult for
a jury to separate the proper from the improper use of this evidence, where an
assessment of Wright’s veracity boiled down to an assessment of whether the jury
believed his claim that he was not the first aggressor. The two uses of the evidence
thus have a tendency to collapse into each other, and impeachment evidence could
                                          35

  3. Failure to Object to Erroneous Instruction on Wright’s Peaceful Character

      Bynum also failed to object to the court erroneously instructing the jury that

the government presented evidence of Wright’s peaceful character. The government

requested that the trial court instruct the jury that they had heard evidence of

Wright’s peaceful character and that it could consider such evidence “as bearing on

. . . the issue of who was the aggressor,” i.e., the central issue in the case. In fact

there was no evidence that Wright had a peaceful character, yet Bynum said the

“[d]efense has no issue with” the requested instruction.

      Neither the government nor the trial court dispute that Bynum was deficient

in this respect. Instead, they both contend that the erroneous instruction was not

prejudicial because it was only a brief and general statement and we usually assume

easily—even if improperly—affect jurors’ opinions about Wright’s propensity for
violence. See, e.g., Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study of Rule 609 and Suggestions
for Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 993, 994, 1013 (2018) (noting the widespread
scholarly critiques of admitting prior convictions for impeachment purposes with
“by far the strongest” critique being that jurors will use prior convictions for an
“improper purpose”); Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence:
Psycho-Bayesian (!?) Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 637
(1991). Even presuming that the jury could have confined its consideration of these
convictions to its pure impeachment value, impeaching Wright would have made
serious inroads against the government’s case, which depended predominantly on
Wright’s testimony.
                                           36

that jurors do not consider non-existent evidence in their decision-making. While

that is the usual assumption, see Garcia v. United States, 848 A.2d 600, 602-03

(D.C. 2004), there is a countervailing assumption that jurors follow the court’s

instructions and will give “great weight” to a judge’s “lightest word or intimation.”

Headspeth v. United States, 86 A.3d 559, 564 n.7 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Watkins v.

United States, 379 A.2d 703, 705 (D.C. 1977)); see also Starr v. United States, 153

U.S. 614, 626 (1894) (“Deductions and theories not warranted by the evidence

should be studiously avoided. They can hardly fail to mislead the jury and work

injustice.” (citation omitted)). When those two assumptions point in contrary

directions, as they do here, the latter is probably the dominant of the two, and at the

very least it offsets the former so that it is no longer warranted.

      Still, the government emphasizes that it did not capitalize on the instruction

in its closing arguments and that Wright himself acknowledged some violent

tendencies. And the trial judge also instructed the jury that it had “heard evidence

about past acts of violence by” both Wright and Dugger, as bearing on the

reasonability of any fear that Dugger harbored (which was not the subject of any

serious dispute, as the reasonability of his fear rose and fell with whether Wright

shot first). But that does not entirely mitigate the potential harm from the erroneous

peaceful character instruction. One can have a generally peaceful character despite
                                          37

having engaged in some past act of violence: the judge’s two instructions were not

contradictory. The jury thus still could have been swayed by the implication that it

had evidence before it that Wright was generally peaceful, particularly given trial

judges’ unique position of authority vis-à-vis jurors. Headspeth, 86 A.3d at 564 n.7.

      Even still, the government argues that Dugger was not prejudiced because, in

Dugger I, we “soundly rejected [Dugger’s] assertion that the peaceful-character

instruction prejudiced his defense.” That is not quite right. In Dugger I we held that

the trial court’s error in issuing the peaceful character instruction did not constitute

plain error. See Dugger I, Mem. Op. & J. at 8-9. In addition to prejudice, plain error

requires a separate showing that manifest injustice resulted from the error. See

Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1189-90 (D.C. 2008). Also, in Dugger I,

we considered the erroneous instruction’s prejudicial impact sans any consideration

of the impact of the other deficiencies articulated above (which were not at issue in

Dugger I), whereas here we must consider the cumulative impact of Bynum’s many

deficiencies. To be sure, this error, standing alone, would not sufficiently prejudice

Dugger to warrant vacatur of his convictions. But we are required to assess whether

Bynum’s various deficiencies, in the aggregate, prejudiced Dugger. See Gardner,

140 A.3d at 1197 n.38 (assessing the “cumulative effect” of alleged deficiencies).

We now turn to that assessment.
                                         38

                                         C.

      While we have explained how each of the above deficiencies hampered the

defense in isolation, we now examine whether they were prejudicial in combination.

In considering the cumulative impact of these deficiencies, we ask whether there is

a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of

the proceeding would have been different.” Cosio, 927 A.2d at 1132.

      The trial turned on whether Wright or Dugger was the first aggressor. Each

of Bynum’s deficiencies contributed to the government’s core narrative that Dugger

was the initial aggressor. Because of Bynum’s errors, the jury found out that Dugger

was a drug dealer, with the corresponding inference that he was the type of person

who would carry a gun for a violent purpose. 12 By contrast, the jury never found out

that Wright had been convicted of a violent assault and possession of a non-

marijuana substance; instead, as far as the jury knew, Wright had no criminal record.

And the jury was told by the court, counterfactually, that it had heard evidence about

      12
         The dissent suggests this testimony was not so damaging because it was
undisputed that Dugger had a gun and, in fact, shot Wright. But there is a world of
difference between somebody who carries a gun to facilitate the oft-violent drug
trade—the narrative Bynum fed into when he elicited and failed to strike this
testimony—and somebody who procures a gun for use in self-defense after having
been shot at, as Dugger claimed.
                                              39

Wright’s peaceful character that it could consider when determining the central issue

in the case, of who was the first aggressor. Together, the deficiencies contributed to

a picture of Dugger as the dangerous criminal and Wright as the law-abiding and

peaceful victim. We thus conclude that, but for Bynum’s errors, there is a reasonable

probability the outcome of the trial would have been different.

        While the government admittedly had a fairly strong case against Dugger, 13 it

was no slam dunk. Wright’s testimony was the cornerstone of its case, and he was

        13
             In Dugger I, we highlighted the most salient strengths of the government’s
case:

                 (1) Napier and Huff confirmed that Wright was unarmed
                 and that, after the initial shooting, appellant turned and
                 drove back in order to shoot at Wright a second time; (2)
                 there was no bullet damage to appellant’s car (despite his
                 claim that Wright fired twice at him); (3) appellant’s flight
                 in a high-speed chase, attempted abandonment of his gun,
                 and efforts to avoid and resist arrest bespoke his
                 consciousness of guilt; (4) Vanderhall testified that
                 appellant confessed to him in jail, and this testimony was
                 substantiated by the specific details Vanderhall said
                 appellant had shared with him (such as appellant’s motive
                 and his disposal of a 9 millimeter handgun during the
                 police chase); (5) appellant’s alleged motive for shooting
                 Wright—his belief that Wright had been sleeping with
                 Wiggins—was proved by abundant evidence, including
                 appellant’s own admission.

Dugger I, Mem. Op. & J. at 7-8. That is a fair description of the evidence, though
we clarify it in two respects. First, while there was abundant evidence that Dugger
                                         40

not what anybody would call an unimpeachable witness. There were reasons to

doubt his testimony. For instance, Wright testified that, after Dugger opened fire,

he ran straight toward Dugger’s car, around the back of it, and then tried to enter it

because his “man instincts” were to “put some blood up in that damn seat.” A jury

might have reasonably doubted that account, as the more natural response to being

shot at would seem to be seeking cover, or retreating back inside the nearby

apartment that Wright had just exited, rather than running headlong at the gunman.

In particular, if we add the fact that Wright had previous convictions for a violent

assault 14 and a drug offense, and remove the implication that there was evidence he

had a peaceful character and that Dugger was a drug dealer, then Wright’s version

suspected Wiggins of having an affair, at no point did he admit to suspecting that it
was with Wright. Second, when we said that Dugger “turned around and drove back
to shoot at Wright,” that should not be misunderstood to mean that Dugger left the
immediate vicinity before making his U-turn. The evidence was that Dugger simply
made a U-turn to the other side of the street as Wright “grabbed the [car] door.”
      14
         The dissent surmises that Wright’s second-degree assault conviction was a
misdemeanor, citing to Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 3-203(b). But the next
subsection of that provision, § 3-203(c), makes clear that second-degree assault in
Maryland can also be charged as a felony punishable by 10-years imprisonment (if
perpetrated against an officer or other first responder). In the § 23-110 proceedings
before us, Dugger asserted that Wright’s second degree assault was “punishable by
a term of incarceration of ten years,” and the government offered no evidence to the
contrary because it was “unable to locate its trial file and therefore was not aware”
whether Wright’s conviction was for a felony or a misdemeanor. In light of the
record, we will not speculate on the point; it suffices to say that the government
concedes it was a violent conviction that Wright could have been impeached with.
                                          41

of events becomes significantly more suspect. If the jury doubted Wright’s account,

that would translate into a reasonable probability that it would not have convicted

Dugger.

      None of the other pieces of the government’s case draw that conclusion into

doubt. Though Napier and Huff testified that they did not see Wright with a gun,

they both looked at Wright only after the initial volley of shots had been fired. If

Dugger was telling the truth about Wright’s gun jamming, there is little reason to

think he would have kept the gun on open display by the time Napier and Huff saw

him. And the evidence showed that officers never searched Wright or his nearby

apartment, where he retreated after being shot, for a weapon. Huff instead chased

after Dugger when he fled, leaving Wright with an opportunity to hide any weapon

he might have had on him.

      The fact that Dugger fled the scene is not particularly damning evidence given

that it was undisputed that Dugger unlawfully possessed the firearm that he just fired,

giving him ample reason to flee the scene even if he had acted in self-defense. See

Headspeth, 86 A.3d at 565 (noting minimal probative value of flight evidence where

accused “had reasons to flee that were consistent with innocence”). And a jury could

certainly be skeptical of Dugger’s supposed motive for targeting Wright. Wiggins
                                        42

testified that, while Dugger had accused her of sleeping with somebody else, Wright

was not the object of his suspicions. Only Wright, Wright’s wife, and Vanderhall

said otherwise, and aside from the aforementioned reasons to doubt Wright,

Wright’s wife had a clear motive to support her husband’s version of events, and

Vanderhall was teeming with credibility problems. He had at least half a dozen prior

convictions—ranging from armed robbery to grand larceny—and a long history of

cooperating with the government in exchange for lower sentences. As the Supreme

Court has noted, “[j]urors suspect informants’ motives from the moment they hear

about them in a case, and they frequently disregard their testimony altogether as

highly untrustworthy and unreliable.” Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 702 (2004)

(quoting Stephen S. Trott, Words of Warning for Prosecutors Using Criminals as

Witnesses, 47 Hastings L.J. 1381, 1385 (1996)).

      In sum, we think there is a reasonable probability that Bynum’s deficiencies

tilted the balance in the government’s favor, and that but for his unprofessional

errors, there is a reasonable probability that the jurors would not have convicted

Dugger of most of the charges against him. We note five exceptions. There is not

a reasonable probability that the deficiencies affected Dugger’s convictions for (1)

unlawful possession of a firearm, (2) possession of an unregistered firearm, (3)

unlawful possession of ammunition, (4) reckless driving, or (5) fleeing a law
                                         43

enforcement officer. Even if jurors thought Wright had fired at Dugger first, there

is little reason to conclude that would have affected the jury’s assessment of those

particular charges.

                                        III.

      We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and vacate Dugger’s

convictions, except his convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm, possession

of an unregistered firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, fleeing, and reckless

driving, which we affirm.

                                                                         So ordered.

      GLICKMAN, Senior Judge, dissenting in part: I agree with a good deal of the

majority opinion, notably including its important conclusion that Bynum’s

misrepresentations of his qualifications to the court and to appellant, combined with

his pretrial neglect of appellant’s defense, were such gross deviations from

professional norms that we cannot indulge the usual “strong presumption” that

defense counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in
                                            44

the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” 1 Indeed, it is tempting to say that

no further inquiry into Bynum’s performance is necessary for us to conclude that

“counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process

that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” 2 However, Bynum

was then a member of the court’s bar, and appellant, after being cautioned

appropriately by the court, freely made the choice to retain Bynum to replace his

court-appointed counsel.         Given those circumstances, I also agree with my

colleagues that this is not the case in which to “adopt a rule of per se ineffectiveness

for gross misrepresentations of counsel’s core competence to handle a matter.” Ante

at 23.

         Where I part company with my colleagues is over their conclusion that Bynum

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at appellant’s trial based on three

omissions on his part: his failures (1) to move to strike Vanderhall’s testimony that

appellant had been a drug dealer, (2) to impeach Wright with his prior convictions,

and (3) to object to an erroneous instruction allowing the jury to consider evidence

of Wright’s peaceful character.        I am not persuaded that, but for those three

         1
             Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-90 (1984).
         2
             Id. at 686.
                                            45

omissions, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted appellant

on any of the counts of the indictment. 3

      In assessing whether counsel’s alleged errors were prejudicial, “a court

hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the

judge or jury.” 4 The evidence that appellant shot Wright without provocation, and

not in self-defense, was quite strong, as my colleagues acknowledge. See ante at 39

n.13. There are a few things I think worth emphasizing. First, while there was

compelling evidence of appellant’s hostility and motive to kill Wright, 5 there was

      3
        See id. at 694-95 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. . . . When a defendant challenges a conviction, the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.”).
      4
        Id. at 695; see also id. at 695-96 (“Some of the factual findings will have
been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been
affected in different ways. Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, and
some will have had an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than
one with overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected findings as a given,
and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of
showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different
absent the errors.”).
      5
        Wright and his wife testified that appellant had accused Wright of having an
affair with Wiggins (appellant’s girlfriend). Vanderhall testified that appellant told
him this affair was why he shot Wright. Wiggins confirmed that appellant had
                                          46

no evidence that Wright had any motive to shoot at his “best friend” (as both men

described their long relationship). Second, there was no evidence, apart from

appellant’s own testimony, that Wright was armed at any point during the

encounter. 6 Third, after shooting Wright in the initial encounter and starting to drive

away after he was out of danger, appellant turned his car around (making a U-turn

in the middle of on-coming traffic, according to Officer Huff) and drove back to fire

a second, unprovoked volley of shots at the wounded Wright, who was then on the

sidewalk across the street from appellant and not threatening him. Officer Huff

testified that Wright appeared to be trying to dodge the bullets. 7

accused her of “sleeping with somebody else,” whom he did not name, and
appellant’s contemporaneous accusatory text messages to Wiggins were introduced
in evidence. When he testified at trial, appellant admitted having accused Wiggins
of cheating on him just a few days before he shot Wright. Moreover, appellant
testified that he obtained the handgun he used to shoot Wright only two weeks
earlier, after someone had fired a shot at him outside his parents’ home. Although
appellant said he did not know the identity of his assailant, he began to suspect it
was Wright.
      6
       Although appellant claimed that Wright shot at him from close range while
he was sitting in his car, appellant was not hit and there was no bullet damage to the
car. None of the witnesses to the encounter saw Wright with a gun at any time. They
saw appellant shoot at an apparently unarmed man. At trial, Wright denied that he
was armed.
      7
         This was after appellant allegedly saw that Wright’s gun had jammed. At
trial, appellant denied shooting at Wright at all after he made the U-turn and drove
back toward Wright. This denial, contradicted by all the witnesses, was hardly
credible.
                                         47

      Thus, as the prosecutor pointed out in closing argument, even if the jury

thought Wright might have been the first aggressor in the initial shooting encounter

with appellant, the evidence still proved that appellant was guilty of assault with

intent to kill while armed and the other charges against him, based on his shooting

at Wright after that initial encounter had ended and appellant then returned to shoot

Wright.

      Given what I perceive to be the strength of the evidence against appellant, it

is difficult for me to conclude that Bynum’s three cited omissions made any

difference to the outcome of the trial. None of the omissions went to the heart of the

government’s case. Subtract them all and it seems to me there would still have been

no reasonable likelihood of a different verdict.

      The first cited omission is Bynum’s failure to move to strike Vanderhall’s

testimony that appellant sold drugs “back then,” i.e., when Vanderhall associated

with appellant for a period of three to four years beginning in 2004. (This was quite

a number of years before appellant shot Wright, which occurred on September 11,

2015.) As the majority opinion concedes, however, Vanderhall’s testimony “was

perfectly responsive” to the questions he was asked, ante at 28 n.7, and a motion to
                                         48

strike it therefore should not have been granted. 8 Bynum’s failure to make a motion

that properly would have been denied cannot be deemed either deficient

performance or prejudicial for purposes of evaluating an ineffective assistance

claim.

         Furthermore, and in any event, the prejudicial impact of Vanderhall’s

testimony that appellant dealt drugs many years earlier was surely de minimis. The

casus belli between appellant and Wright had nothing to do with drug dealing, and

whether appellant was involved with drugs was no part at all of the strong

prosecution case against him. 9 The majority opinion cites the damaging implication

         See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“The assessment of prejudice should
         8

proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously,
and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.”). The fact that the
government does not make this point does not mean we should ignore it.
“[P]rejudice determinations are legal in nature and are reviewed de novo.” Ante at
19 (citing Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1123 (D.C. 2007) (en banc)).

      Recognizing that the trial court should not have granted a motion to strike, the
majority opinion pivots and faults Bynum for inadvertently eliciting Vanderhall’s
testimony that appellant dealt drugs through careless questioning on cross-
examination. Ante at 28 n.7. This presupposes a claim of ineffectiveness based on
professionally deficient and unreasonable cross-examination, which has not been
made in this appeal and which the government has not had the opportunity to
address. We therefore should not address the claim sua sponte.
         9
          The government did not take advantage of Bynum’s elicitation of
Vanderhall’s testimony that appellant dealt drugs. It did not pursue that topic in
redirect examination of Vanderhall or in cross-examining appellant after he testified
that he and Vanderhall had been mere acquaintances; nor did the government
                                          49

that drug dealers have guns, but there was no dispute that appellant had a gun. If

anything undercut his claim that Wright shot him first, it was not the possibility that

appellant had the gun because he was a drug dealer; it was appellant’s own testimony

that he went and acquired the gun just two weeks before the shooting, which

suggested appellant obtained the weapon to take revenge on the person whom he

then believed was having an affair with Wiggins. 10

      The second cited omission is Bynum’s failure to impeach Wright with his

prior convictions in Maryland for second-degree assault and possession of a non-

marijuana controlled substance. Here too, I am not persuaded by my colleagues’

assertion that this failure “seriously undermined the defense.” Ante at 34. The trial

judge perceived that Wright’s convictions would have inflicted only “minimal

incremental damage” to his credibility, and I think the record supports that

assessment. So does the law.

impeach appellant with his prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance. And the government made no mention of appellant’s past drug
dealing in its closing or rebuttal arguments.
      10
         This inference is all the stronger given the weakness of appellant’s own
explanation that he obtained the gun because an unknown person shot at him outside
his home for unknown reasons — an incident that appellant admittedly did not report
to anyone.
                                         50

      As the majority opinion states, Wright’s prior convictions would have been

admissible, if at all, only for whatever value they would have had to impeach his

credibility. Ante at 34 n.11. That value would not have been great. There is no

claim that Wright’s convictions (which apparently were for offenses designated by

Maryland as misdemeanors 11) would have been probative of a motive to curry favor

with the government or other bias, and they were not of the kind that bears directly

and adversely on a witness’s testimonial veracity. 12

      My colleagues acknowledge that Wright’s prior convictions would not have

been admissible “to show his violent propensities.” Ante at 34 n.11. The majority

opinion also concedes that “[t]he rule in this jurisdiction is that only in homicide

      11
          See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law §§ 3-203(b), 5-601(c). The majority
opinion correctly notes that Wright’s second-degree assault conviction would have
been a felony if it was committed against a police officer or first responder. See id.
§ 3-203(c). However, there is no indication in the record that this was so, and
appellant has not claimed that Bynum could have impeached Wright’s credibility
with a felony offense.
      12
         See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“In
common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example,
are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man’s honesty and
integrity. Acts of violence on the other hand, which may result from a short temper,
a combative nature, extreme provocation, or other causes, generally have little or no
direct bearing on honesty and veracity. A ‘rule of thumb’ thus should be
that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those
of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not[.]” (footnote omitted)); see also
United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 617-18, 621 (2d Cir. 2005).
                                           51

cases may prior violent acts of the victim be introduced as evidence to prove that the

victim was the first aggressor.” 13 Nonetheless, my colleagues contend that Bynum

was ineffective in failing to introduce and use Wright’s prior convictions for that

very purpose. “In a case where the central question was who was the first aggressor,”

the majority opinion asserts, “failing to introduce evidence of Wright’s violent

criminal past, even if only as impeachment, seriously undermined the defense.” Ante

at 34 (footnote omitted).      The majority’s premise for this claim of Bynum’s

ineffectiveness is that “it would have been difficult for a jury to separate the proper

from the improper use of this evidence,” and the “impeachment evidence could

easily — even if improperly — affect jurors’ opinions about Wright’s propensity for

violence.” Ante at 34-35 n.11.

      As the Supreme Court made clear in Strickland, this line of reasoning is an

improper basis on which to rest a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel:

               In making the determination whether the specified errors
               resulted in the required prejudice, a court should presume,
               absent challenge to the judgment on grounds of
               evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury acted
               according to law. . . . A defendant has no entitlement to

      13
           Ante at 34 n.11 (quoting Harris v. United States, 618 A.2d 140, 144 (D.C.
1992)).
                                             52

                 the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless
                 decision cannot be reviewed.[14]

Thus, our “assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant

must exclude the possibility” that the jury would have made improper use of

evidence of Wright’s (supposedly) violent criminal past. 15 The majority opinion’s

surmise as to “the actual process of decision” in which the jury would have engaged

“should not be considered in the prejudice determination.” 16

      In any event, the majority opinion surely exaggerates the potential impact on

the jury of Wright’s two prior misdemeanor convictions (which did not involve any

weapons and only one of which, it should be noted, was for assaultive conduct of

any kind).       And Wright’s doubtful and violent character was manifest in his

testimony even without mention of his prior convictions, to the point that even the

prosecutor had to acknowledge and address it at the outset of the government’s

closing argument, as follows:

                 Now, let’s talk about Samuel Wright for a second. You
                 don’t have to like him. You don’t have to want to leave

      14
           Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694-95.
      15
           Id. at 695.
      16
           Id.
                                         53

            your kids with him. You don’t have to want to be his best
            friend. . . . And when you’re thinking about who you
            believe, think about the fact that you got the good, the bad,
            and the ugly with Samuel Wright. He didn’t tell you
            everything you wanted to hear. He sat up on that stand
            and he told you, if I had gotten into that car and I had
            gotten that gun, I would have shot him.

(Wright had memorably testified that when appellant opened fire on him, his “man

instincts” were to “put some blood up in that damn seat,” and he had admitted having

a tendency to “put [his] hands on people” and having been shot himself twice before.

It was Bynum who, on cross-examination, elicited this vivid testimony from Wright,

and Bynum returned to it in his closing argument. 17)         The majority opinion

acknowledges, as it must, that Wright “was not what anybody would call an

unimpeachable witness,” and that there were significant reasons for the jury to

consider his testimony implausible. Ante at 39-40. It was hardly necessary for

Bynum to add Wright’s past misdemeanor convictions to those reasons; they would

have added virtually nothing.

      17
         Bynum argued to the jury the seeming incongruity of Wright’s behavior if,
as Wright claimed, he was unarmed and appellant shot at him first: instead of
running and ducking for cover, he “continued to approach the vehicle, trying to get
into the vehicle that somebody was shooting at him from. . . . Who tries to get in a
vehicle when somebody is shooting at you, especially if he’d been hit?”
                                          54

      The third cited omission is Wright’s failure to object to the instruction that the

jury had heard and could consider evidence of Wright’s peaceful character. It was

a mistake to give this instruction, but for several reasons we can be confident that

the error was utterly innocuous. First, immediately before the court gave the

“peaceful character” instruction, it specifically instructed the jury that “You’ve

heard evidence about past acts of violence by Samuel Wright and that Timothy

Dugger knew about those past acts. You may consider such evidence as bearing on

the reasonableness of Timothy Dugger’s fear for his own safety.”               Second,

immediately after the instruction, the closing arguments of counsel reminded the

jury of Wright’s aggressiveness. Third, there was no evidence of Wright’s peaceful

character, and neither the court nor the prosecutor purported to identify such

evidence. Fourth, Wright himself acknowledged his violent tendencies and never

claimed to be a peaceful individual. Fifth, the government did not rely on or even

mention the “peaceful character” instruction in its closing arguments. Sixth, there

is no indication, such as a jury note, that the jury attached any significance

whatsoever to that instruction.

      For these reasons, I see no likelihood that the erroneous, isolated “peaceful

character” instruction misled the jury into “recollecting” evidence it never received
                                        55

and giving weight to non-existent “evidence” of Wright’s peacefulness. If anything,

Wright’s aggressive character was a given, acknowledged at trial by all.

      In sum, Bynum’s three omissions were not prejudicial to appellant’s defense;

they were tangential to the case and inconsequential, individually and in

combination. The record in my opinion does not support a conclusion that but for

those omissions, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have doubted

the government’s strong proof of appellant’s guilt.