Court Opinion

ID: 9684434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:57:09.293263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:55.889509
License: Public Domain

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the plurality opinion that appellant’s sole point of error should be overruled and the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed. Even if the evidence concerning the Crime Stoppers tip were inadmissible and even if trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, appellant has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The second prong of Strickland requires the appellant *89to show prejudice resulting from the deficient performance of his attorney. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). To establish prejudice, the appellant must prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings.” Id.
As the plurality opinion points out, the testimony of the eyewitness to the offense was unequivocal and unimpeached. The testimony about the Crime Stoppers tips, including the one regarding appellant, was in the context of a routine explanation as to how the police investigation proceeded. At a minimum, the State was entitled to elicit some testimony regarding the Crime Stoppers tip as the reason why the police included appellant’s picture in the photo spread. See Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Even if we presume the inadmissibility of the police officer’s statement that the tip indicated appellant was responsible for the robbery, the evidence in the record does not show there is a reasonable probability that, but for the admission of this statement into evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Appellant has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland. For this reason, the court is correct in overruling appellant’s sole point of error and affirming the trial court’s judgment.