Court Opinion

ID: 9770717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:55.562185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.046873
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opimon only because we are bound by the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Watson v. State, 924 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). I write to urge that court to reexamine its decision in Watson.
The applicable rule of appellate procedure requires additional statements in the notice of appeal “if the judgment was rendered upon his plea of guilty ... and the pumshment assessed does not exceed the pumshment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his attorney.” TEX.R.App.P.40(b)(l). In a case in wMch a defendant was originally placed on deferred adjudication pursuant to a plea bargain, but was later adjudicated on the basis of a State’s motion to adjudicate, I believe “it is clear” that the judgment is based not on the original plea, but rather on the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to adjudicate in a contested proceeding. The Watson opimon concluded the judgment in such a case is based on the plea of guilty because “it is clear.” 924 S.W.2d at 714. In other words, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not really examine the issue I raise here.
It could be argued that the original plea forms the legal basis for the ultimate adjudication without requiring the State to further prove the defendant’s guilt. The reality, however, is that only the original judgment, in wMch the defendant was placed on deferred adjudication, was based on the plea of guilty. The ultimate judgment, assessing a term of years in prison and replacing the original judgment, is based on the trial court’s sustaining the State’s motion to adjudicate.
I also disagree with the issue the Court of Criminal Appeals did examine in Watson, namely, that a term of 10-years confinement was within the pumshment recommended by the prosecutor. 924 S.W.2d at 714-15. Indeed, the majority opimon in Watson ac*926knowledged that “the prosecutor is making no recommendation at all concerning the term of years [the defendant] may be required to serve if his probation is later revoked and the trial court proceeds to adjudicate him guilty of the charged offense,” Id, at 714.
As did the El Paso Court of Appeals in Watson v. State, 884 S.W.2d 836, 837-38 (Tex.App-El Paso 1994), rev’d, 924 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), I would hold the scope of appellate review is governed not by rule 40(b)(1), but by the Helms1 rule. While this would not allow appellant to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, it would at least allow appellant to appeal the sentence imposed.
Therefore, I respectfully concur.

. Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). The Helms rule restricted the scope of appeal for one entering a voluntary plea of guilty to jurisdictional defects. In Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), the Court of Criminal Appeals enlarged the Helms rule to allow appeal of matters occurring after entry of the plea of guilty.