Court Opinion

ID: 9632682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:21:47.447199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:21.180565
License: Public Domain

MACY, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
I dissent. I cannot disagree with the majority’s recitation of established law as it is applied to insurance agreements. The problem is that the majority is not looking at the contract between the parties to the insurance contract to determine their intent but is looking at the livestock boarding *952contract between Eisenbarth and Brooks to determine what they intended. What they intended has nothing to do with what Hartford Fire Insurance Company intended when it drafted the insurance agreement.
The care, custody, and control exclusion states:
This policy does not apply:
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2. Under Coverage G — Personal Liability:
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d. to property damage to property occupied or used by the Insured or rented to or in the care, custody or control of the Insured or as to which the Insured is for any purpose exercising physical control[.]
This language is clear and unequivocal and means what is says; i.e., if Eisenbarth had either the care, custody, or control of Brooks’ livestock, Hartford Fire Insurance Company would not be liable for any loss of Brooks’ livestock. It is that simple. The facts clearly show that Eisenbarth, at a minimum, had custody of Brooks’ livestock regardless of what Eisenbarth and Brooks intended by their contract.
We should not torture the meaning of words in order to create an ambiguity so that a different result can be achieved. Absent any ambiguity, the policy should be enforced according to its terms.