Court Opinion

ID: 9650524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:42:03.610575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:22.969291
License: Public Domain

SPARKS, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion in all matters except that part which holds that the venue of this prosecution was properly laid in the Western District of Wisconsin.
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy a trial by a jury of the State and- district wherein the crime shall have been committed.
The crime here charged is a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and may be prosecuted only in the district where the conspiracy was formed or where some overt act in furtherance or execution of that conspiracy was committed. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, Ann.Cas.1914A, 614; Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700, 50 A.L.R. 989. All acts in furtherance or execution of the conspiracy and none other are deemed overt acts. An act is not an overt act merely because it is related to the individual enjoyment of the personal benefits which a defendant hopes to, and in fact does, receive as the ultimate result of the completely executed conspiracy. See United States v. Black, 7 Cir., 160 F. 431; Lonabaugh v. United States, 9 Cir., 179 F. 476; Rose v. St. Clair, D.C., 28 F.2d 189.
Paragraph 18 of the indictment describes the conspiracy as the combining and conspiring together of the defendants “for the purpose of artificially raising and fixing the tank car prices of gasoline in the aforementioned spot markets (which are referred to in paragraph 16 as ‘the spot markets in the East Texas and Mid-Continent fields, and in Chicago, Illinois’) and, as intended by them, defendants have artificially raised and fixed said spot market *840tank car prices * * * at artificially high and non-competitive levels, and at levels agreed upon among them and have thereby intentionally increased and fixed the tank car prices of gasoline contracted to be sold and sold in interstate commerce as aforesaid in the Mid-Western area (including the Western District of Wisconsin).” (Italics supplied.)
Paragraph 17 of the indictment alleges.: “Spot market tank car prices of gasoline tend to, and do, directly and substantially influence the retail prices of gasoline, i. e., the prices which consumers are required to pay, in that an increase in the spot mar-' ket tank car prices of gasoline will, and usually does, result directly in an increase in the retail prices of gasoline.”
Paragraph 19 of the indictment then proceeds to state that the conspiracy thus described was effectuated by the defendants engaging and participating in two concerted gasoline buying programs, referred to as “(a) the East Texas buying program and (b) the Mid-Continent buying program,” for the purchase by the (defendants from the independent refiners in spot transactions of the distress gasoline in the spot, markets above referred to.
It is further alleged in paragraph 25 of the indictment that the conspiracy above referred to has 'operated and has been carried out in part within the Western District of Wisconsin, in the following manner: “In pursuance of said combination and conspiracy, defendant major oil'companies (with the exception of Standard of Indiana and Gulf) have contracted to sell and have sold and have delivered large quantities of gasoline in tank-car lots to jobbers within said district at the artificially raised and fixed and non-competitive prices aforesaid and have arbitrarily exacted from jobbers within said district large sums of money * * * all by virtue of said combination and conspiracy and pursuant to the purposes and ultimate objectives thereof.” (Our italics.)
Not one drop of the oil involved in the purchasing programs, which “effectuated” the alleged conspiracy, was purchased by any of the defendants in the State of Wisconsin, and yet, the Government contends that appellants’ subsequent sale in the Western District of Wisconsin of a part of this distress gasoline involved in appellants’ purchasing programs, should be considered as an overt act for the' purpose of giving jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. It is my belief that no such sale can rightfully be considered as an overt act within the accepted meaning of those words, because the alleged conspiracy was “effectuated” and completed with respect to the gasoline thus sold in Wisconsin long before such gasoline was sold or offered for sale in Wisconsin. The indictment does not allege, the Government does not contend, and the evidence does not disclose, that these sales in Wisconsin had any effect whatever on the raising, fixing, or maintaining of gasoline prices in Wisconsin, or elsewhere. These effects were alleged and conceded to be caused by appellants’ two purchasing programs which resulted in eliminating from immediate sale all distress gasoline on the tank car spot markets.
It is said that the Trenton Potteries case, supra, is authority for basing jurisdiction on sales. It must be remembered, however, that the conspiracy there was a sales conspiracy; that the defendants owned and controlled practically all of the product in the United States; and that by reason of that fact they were able to and did fix the price below which they had agreed not to sell any of the product. It is quite obvious that under those circumstances any sale of the product by any of the defendants in compliance with that agreement would be an act in furtherance and execution of the agreement, hence an overt act. In other words, the price was raised, fixed and maintained by the sales.
Here, however, the alleged conspiracy was effectuated by the defendants’ purchases, .and was in no manner furthered or effectuated by their subsequent sales or their sales contracts. The alleged crime would have been as completely and effectually proved under this record without the proof of appellants’ sales as it was with such proof.
It is suggested by appellee that the indictment alleges an intention and purpose on the part of the defendants to profit by the general rise in price levels over the entire area, which was caused by their unlawful purchasing programs. We would have assumed this even without such an allegation, but it adds no force to appellee’s argument. Suppose appellants had sold no gasoline in Wisconsin during the indictment period, would appellee contend that the venue would have been properly laid in Wisconsin? It has not so con*841tended, and we doubt that it would, because there would have been no overt act in Wisconsin. However, the alleged crime was committed and proved regardless of such sales; and its effect was to raise the price levels over the entire Mid-Western area, including the Western District of Wisconsin. The overt acts were those in furtherance and execution of the buying programs, and none of them was performed in Wisconsin. It is well settled that the venue must be laid in the district where the conspiracy was entered into, or in a district where some overt act was committed, and not in any district where the effect of the conspiracy was merely sensed.
It is further suggested that appellants concede that if defendants’ sales were in pursuance of the conspiracy, they should rightfully be considered as overt acts. This record does not disclose that appellants made such concession. Moreover, the court is not bound by an erroneous concession as to the law, if made by either party or both parties. The conclusion of the majority opinion is no doubt based on what the opinion terms as “appellants’ two tests for determining whether an act is overt: (1) Was the act in pursuance of the conspiracy; and (2) Did the act tend to achieve and advance the objects of the conspiracy?” Of course those tests were relied on by appellants, and their soundness cannot be questioned, for they are supported by an unbroken line of decisions covering many years. These tests, however, are not to be considered separately sufficient. The overt act must meet both tests, and this was appellants’ contention both in brief and in argument.
Appellee seems to proceed on the theory that the indictment charged a conspiracy to sell, merely because it is alleged that defendants intended to, and did afterwards, sell the gasoline which they had purchased unlawfully. This language constituted no effective part of the illegal conspiracy and was not described in the charge. It was merely a voluntary recital of what the defendants expected to do with the gasoline which they might illegally purchase. In any event, such sales would not be illegal because it is not alleged, proved, or contended that such sales had any effect whatever upon the sales price.
For these reasons, I think the venue of this prosecution was improperly laid in the Western District of Wisconsin, and that the cause should be dismissed,