Court Opinion

ID: 9703511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:59:18.380952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:49.640192
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
On the facts of the case under review, I join in the majority’s finding that manifest necessity did exist for the trial court’s sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. I write separately, however, because I do not believe that the majority places the proper emphasis on the need to balance the societal interest in a fair trial against the defendant’s right to be tried with due dispatch by a jury of his peers which he has in fact selected.
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause of both the Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 1, the standard for declaring a mistrial without the defendant’s request or consent is whether “there is a manifest necessity for the [mistrial], or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 468 Pa. 338, 345, 362 A.2d 234, 238 (1976), quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 273 (1976). Thus, a court may declare a mistrial even over the objection of the defendant. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974), quoting Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1526, 6 L.Ed.2d 901, 904 (1961); An issue which I believe to be germane to the disposition of this case, however, *222has not been addressed: whether the defendant can preclude a finding of manifest necessity by a complete and competent “waiver” on the record upon the occurrence of prejudicial disclosures at trial, without defeating the ends of public justice.
That the “restraints society must observe consistent with the federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime” may be waived by the individual was established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1609, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 704 (1966). Speaking of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, the United States Supreme Court found “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.2 The case sub judice differs slightly in that it concerns the Double Jeopardy provisions of both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. But, given that this Court allows a defendant to waive the protections attending the privilege against self-incrimination, which have a greater direct effect on the determination of guilt or innocence, it should also accept a defendant’s waiver of potential prejudice pursuant to the Double Jeopardy clause, which may affect the determination of guilt or innocence in a less palpable manner.
This acceptance is consistent with the recognition of a defendant’s considerable interest in having his case heard by the jury which is impaneled. E.g., Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Walton v. Aytch, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 4 (1976). Failure to accept the waiver would impair the ability of a defendant to protect that interest. It would also deprive that defendant, whose liberty and perhaps life is at stake, from determining what, if any, impact a disclosure may have on a particular jury, for the sake of protecting what is characterized in Stewart as the public’s “compelling interest in justice for all.” *223Stewart, 456 Pa. at 453, 317 A.2d at 619. “[T]he judge must temper the decision [to declare a mistrial] by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 446 Pa. 24, 29, 285 A.2d 189, 191 (1971).
To declare a mistrial the incident must be of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the individual of a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 498 Pa. 405, 415, 446 A.2d 1268, 1273 (1982). The manifest necessity for a new trial has not been rigidly defined but is rather determined on the circumstances of each case. Commonwealth v. Bycer, 254 Pa.Super. 336, 385 A.2d 1367 (1978).
When a defendant and his counsel recognize the possible or actual prejudice and consent to it by placing a waiver on the record, it is difficult to see how the unavoidable effect of disclosure would be to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. To me the opposite conclusion follows; the defendant felt that this jury, even with its possibly prejudicial knowledge, was his best chance at a fair trial. Thus I would conclude that when a defendant has been made aware of the potential prejudice and asserts a competent waiver of record (see Lewis) the needs of society have been fulfilled and the manifest necessity is eliminated. I find it difficult to believe that the public’s interest in “fair trials designed to end in just judgments”, Stewart, 456 Pa. at 452, 317 A.2d at 619, quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 470, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1073, 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 434 (1973), is not only more compelling but also exclusive of the interest of the individual on trial. In my view, the public interest is satisfied by the knowledge that the defendant and his counsel appreciate the possible prejudice and accept it through a waiver.
Turning to the facts of the case sub judice, I find that there is no indication of record that there was a complete and competent waiver of the potential prejudice resulting from the prior representation of the defendant by the district attorney. The subject had been discussed prior to trial but I cannot determine in what detail the subject had been discussed or if a *224final understanding was reached during the course of the trial. That the defendant’s counsel was willing to continue with the trial does not constitute a waiver of the possible prejudice. This decision may have been designed to force the court to declare a mistrial and then bar retrial through a double jeopardy claim or it may have resulted from other undetermined strategies. Absent a clear waiver, I join in the opinion of the Court.
NIX, C.J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently interpreted Art. 1, § 10 to be co-extensive with the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Simons, 514 Pa. 10, 522 A.2d 537 (1987).

. For such a waiver of a constitutionally protected right to be effective, this Court has previously required the defendant or his counsel to take affirmative action to inform the court of that decision. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 528 Pa. 440, 598 A.2d 975 (1991).