Court Opinion

ID: 9695074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:05:49.79381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:08.126396
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
I agree that the petitioner is entitled to a new trial, but do not agree that the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial. In Pollitt v. State, 344 Md. 318, 686 A.2d 629 (1996), this Court was presented with the narrow issue of whether, “when a juror is excused immediately after the jury is sworn with no alternates, the trial judge may sua sponte select a replacement juror without allowing the defendant an additional peremptory challenge.” Id. at 319, 686 A.2d at 629. I agree with the holding in Pollitt: the trial court erred in denying the petitioner’s request for an additional peremptory challenge. I am persuaded, however, that the Pollitt Court did not have to opine that, “without the consent of all parties to the selection of a new juror, the court was bound to grant a mistrial on its own motion and to begin the jury selection process anew.” Id. at 326, 686 A.2d at 633. I would therefore overrule Pollitt to the extent that it purported to “hold that a court may not substitute a sworn juror with a new, non-alternate juror without the express consent of all parties.” Id.
In my opinion, although the trial court did not err in resuming jury selection after granting additional peremptory challenges to the petitioner, reversible error did occur when the trial court prohibited petitioner’s trial counsel from exercising a peremptory challenge against any of “the other 11 [jurors], [on the ground that] they have already been sworn, so I will not let you go and invade that panel at this point.” I am persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that if the trial court granted a mistrial on its own motion, petitioner would have moved for dismissal on the ground that a retrial is *696barred by double jeopardy because the “pool of potential jurors that remained in the courtroom and had not yet been dismissed” provided a “reasonable alternative to the decision to declare a mistrial.” Hubbard v. State, 395 Md. 73, 93, 909 A.2d 270, 282 (2006). There would be merit in that argument.