Court Opinion

ID: 9788756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:17:23.24535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.549688
License: Public Domain

BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
30 I respectfully dissent. I would conclude that under the "totality-of-the-cireum-stances test" required by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... [determining] that *1034probable cause existed." State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 119, 40 P.3d 1136 (quotations and citations omitted).
1 31 As a threshold matter, I disagree with the majority's application of the facts to controlling law. First, I conclude the affidavit establishes CT's reliability. As the majority acknowledges, CI's basis of knowledge was strong. The affidavit set forth facts personally observed by CI over a one-year period: CI observed Saddler using marijuana and cocaine; CI used marijuana with Saddler; CI within the last ten days observed three to four pounds of marijuana; CI observed scales in Saddler's home that Saddler allegedly used to weigh and package marijuana for re-sale; CI stated that Saddler admitted to him that he sells marijuana and cocaine; and CI observed Saddler selling controlled substances inside the named premises.
132 However, the majority dismisses this strong basis of knowledge and claims the veracity and reliability prongs are not satisfied. I disagree. Veracity and reliability can be buttressed by a high degree of detail presented by CI in the affidavit and independent corroboration of such detail by the police. See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Both are present here.
133 CI admittedly used drugs with Saddler in the past. However, CI was "[neither] promised nor paid for any of the information provided." This bolsters CJ's reliability and veracity. See State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("Because the confidential informant here received nothing in exchange for information about [the] illegal activities, the magistrate properly assumed that the informant was reliable."); State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (assuming reliability and veracity for citizen informant who "receive[d] nothing from the police in exchange for the information" (citations omitted)).
1 34 I further disagree with the majority's claim that we do not know if CI volunteered the information to Officer McCarthy. On the contrary, a fair reading of the affidavit establishes that he did. The affidavit plainly states that CI told Officer McCarthy the information out of "a sense of guilt and a desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances in the community." Further, the majority refuses to acknowledge CI told Officer McCarthy CT's name and was therefore not anonymous. Where an affidavit is ambiguous, we must defer to the magistrate where, given the affidavit's language, the magistrate could reasonably construe a meaning that favors a probable cause determination. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that ambiguity). Although Officer McCarthy did not directly state that he knew CI's name, a magistrate could reasonably construe Officer McCarthy's knowledge of CT's name from the affidavit's language. The affidavit clearly asks that the court not require Officer McCarthy to "publish the CT's name." One cannot publish a name one does not know.
T35 The majority is hyper-technical in claiming CI's admission that he used drugs with Saddler was not against his penal interest and thus did not bolster his reliability. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal interest" "carriied] their own indicia of credibility"). As previously stated, in my view, the affidavit establishes that CI did reveal his identity to the officer. I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that, because there is no other evidence against CI, there was no admission against penal interest. We simply do not know if there is other evidence against CI, nor should we expect such evidence in the affidavit CI made incriminating statements with both the possibility that such statements could be investigated and the possibility that other evidence could be found. "People do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of police in the form of their own admissions." Id. at 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. In Harris, the Supreme Court similarly found, without more, that an informant's disclosure that he purchased illegal whiskey from the defendant over a period of two years was a statement against penal interest that *1035"carrliedllits] own indicia of credibility." 8 403 U.S. at 575, 583, 91 S.Ct. at 2078, 2082.
136 As the majority acknowledges, an informant's veracity and reliability may be "boosted by the detail with which the informant described his personal observation of the [crime]." State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Utah 1984) (quotations and citation omitted). However, the majority finds the description of the ongoing use and sale of drugs over a period of a year, including the observation of scales, packaging material, and three to four pounds of marijuana within the previous ten days,9 to be insufficient detail. The majority requires the affidavit recite, for example, more detail about Saddler's residence, such as, presumably, where in the house CI saw the materials, The Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirements are not that burdensome. We "pay great deference to the magistrate's determination," Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1033, because " '[al] grudging or negative attitude ... toward warrants' is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ¶¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1136 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331).
137 The majority further complains CT's statements are conclusory. Again I disagree. The sufficient details include CI knowing Saddler for over one year and observing cocaine and marijuana in the home, including three to four pounds of marijuana within the previous ten days; observation of scales and packaging material; observation of Saddler selling drugs from the home; and numerous observations of Saddler using drugs in the home. Where, as here, " 'the affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of a protracted and continuous nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes less significant.'" State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citation omitted). In Stromberg, for instance, the court noted with approval under similar facts that "[the informant observed marijuana use and marijuana paraphernalia in the home on not one occasion, but on numerous visits to the home." Id.
138 Even if veracity and reliability were weak, this is not fatal under the totality-of-the-cireumstances test. See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987) (noting "an informant's 'reliability' and 'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence of probable cause," and concluding "[a] weakness in one [area] or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as" the affidavit, as a whole, provides a "substantial basis for finding probable cause"). In sum, however, under the totality-of-the-cireumstances, I conclude the affidavit established the veracity and reliability of CL
139 The majority also faults Officer McCarthy's corroboration of CT's information. A police officer "may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal activity or by finding [the material facts] substantially as described by the informant." Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 236 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citations omitted). The majority finds Officer McCarthy's corroboration unhelpful. On the contrary, I conclude Officer McCarthy met both prongs of the corroboration requirement.
1 40 Officer McCarthy both observed illegal activity and verified the facts as described by CI. On June 15, 2000, in early morning hours (as described by CI), Officer McCarthy observed short term traffic to and *1036from Saddler's house which, based on his nineteen years of experience and training in narcotics investigation, he believed indicated the sale of drugs in the home. See Purser, 828 P.2d at 516, 518 (concluding that where the detective "described his narcotics experience" and "observed persons enter defendant's residence and leave after only a few minutes, ... suggest[ing] narcotics trafficking," such corroboration was helpful in finding probable cause); State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1196-97 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (finding that where the detective stated in his affidavit "he had seen vehicles arrive at the [defendant's residence] and stay for a very short period of timel,] ... consistent with the buying and selling of nareoties," such corroboration supported the state's case).
{41 Further, Officer McCarthy had the West Valley Police stop one of the vehicles leaving the premises and the driver possessed one half ounce of marijuana. Police found no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle or on the driver, and based on his training and experience, Officer McCarthy concluded this indicated the driver had just purchased marijuana in Saddler's house.
1 42 In verifying the facts described by CI, Officer McCarthy observed the vehicles described by CI at Saddler's home, verified the registered owner of a vehicle was as described by CI, and verified that Saddler worked at BACTS. In my opinion, officer McCarthy made significant successful efforts to corroborate CI's information.
48 In conclusion, I reach a different result than the majority based on my application of the facts to the law. This can often happen in the fact sensitive area of the Fourth Amendment. However, what troubles me about the majority's analysis is that I think it is contrary to the deference we should afford to the magistrate in determining whether a search warrant is valid. See Vigh, 871 P.2d at 1033 (noting the "great deference" we pay to the magistrate's determination). "[The [Flourth [AJmendment does not require that the reviewing court conduct a de novo review of the magistrate's probable cause determination.] [Instead, it requires only that the reviewing court conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for ... [determining] that probable cause existed." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ¶ 9, 40 P.3d 1136 (alterations in original) (quotations and citations omitted). I believe the majority conducts a de novo review and gives no deference to the magistrate's determination.
144 Furthermore, although the majority pays lip service to the "totality-of-the-cireum-stances" standard for the review of search warrants, I believe it in reality applies the older and stricter Aguilar-Spinelli test. See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah 1983) (applying two-pronged Aguilar, Spinelli test requiring an affiant demonstrate both basis of knowledge and reliability/veracity). This has not been the law in Utah since 1983, when State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Utah 1983), first applied the "totality-of-the-cireumstances test" required by Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. See also State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (noting that "veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of confidential informants are no longer strict prerequisites for establishing probable cause," and are instead " 'relevant considerations, among others,"" under the totality-of-the-circumstances test (citation omitted)). The majority's approach undermines what should be our preference for searches conducted pursuant to search warrants. See Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 1136 (observing the Fourth Amendment has a " 'strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant' " (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331)).
45 In sum, I would deny Saddler's motion to suppress and uphold the search, which was conducted pursuant to a search warrant, because I conclude under the totality-of-the-cireumstances that the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search warrant established probable cause to search Saddler's residence.

. According to the Harris court, "[t}hat the informant may be paid or promised a 'break' does not eliminate the residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct." United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2082, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). Here, CI was "Ineither] promised nor paid for any of the information provided."

. The majority claims they could not reasonably infer CI saw marijuana within the last ten days. I disagree. The affidavit provides, "CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana." Although this language arguably does not link the observation of marijuana with CI's most recent visit to Saddler's premises, we "pay great deference to the magistrate's determination," State v. Vigh, 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah Ct.App.1994), and a magistrate could reasonably infer such a link. See State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989) (acknowledging ambiguity of an affidavit, but deferring to magistrate's "reasonable construction" of that ambiguity).