Court Opinion

ID: 9693560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:50:06.531921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.445543
License: Public Domain

Parskey, J.
(concurring). I agree that the court’s instructions on conspiracy to commit robbery were in error and that a new trial is required. I cannot agree, however, that “there was no evidence whatsoever offered to show that a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the robbery” and that the court erred in admitting the gun into evidence.
Section 53a-3 (6) of the General Statutes defines the term “deadly weapon” as used in § 53a-134 (a) (2) as follows: “ ‘Deadly weapon’ means any weapon, whether loaded or unloaded, from which a shot may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon or metal knuckles. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The victim testified that after he had closed the store and walked to his car with the cash box, he heard a distracting noise, turned to look, and saw a figure *271pointing something at him. He then heard a squirting noise and felt a hot liquid spray which he did not think was water. He did not know how many people were in the shadow but he knew it was more than one. As he ducked from the liquid, he was hit and felt punches, he was hit over the head, and went limp as the cash box was pulled away from him. He did not know what the object was which hit him over the head, but he knew that it was harder than a fist, and the blow produced a gash which required seven stitches to close. Evidence of a blow to the head of this magnitude, which causes a person to “go limp” and inflicts a gash requiring seven stitches to close, certainly constitutes evidence that at least one of the participants in the crime was armed with a deadly weapon.
For precisely this reason, it would appear, none of the defendants has challenged his conviction on these grounds. Instead they attack the trial court’s admission of the gun on the grounds that the gun found in Kyles’ coat pocket between twenty and twenty-five minutes after the commission of the crime, while he was still wearing his coat, was not sufficiently connected by other evidence to that crime. If we decide the issue raised under the cases briefed, which in my opinion constitute controlling precedent for this case, then the gun was properly admitted because: (1) it tended to establish a fact in issue, whether a deadly weapon was used, and (2) it tended to corroborate other direct evidence in the case, the victim’s testimony regarding the manner in which he was attacked when his money was taken. State v. Acklin, 171 Conn. 105, 114, 368 A.2d 212 (1976). There we said: “ ‘Evidence as to articles found in the possession of an accused person subsequent to the time of the commission of *272a crime for which he is being tried is admissible only if it tends to establish a fact in issue or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case; otherwise the law does not sanction the admission of evidence that the defendant possessed even instruments or articles adapted to the commission of other crimes. . . . The reason is analogous to that applicable to evidence of other crimes committed by a defendant but unrelated to the offense under investigation.’ State v. Groos, 110 Conn. 403, 407, 148 A. 350; see State v. Brown, 169 Conn. 692, 364 A.2d 186, and cases and authority therein cited; 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 712 (c).” In my view, the issue should be determined on the grounds raised and decided on well-established precedents of this jurisdiction which lead to the conclusion that the court’s decision to admit the gun was not in error.