Court Opinion

ID: 9728206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:02:04.134436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.849077
License: Public Domain

ELKINGTON, J.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which strikes the support and attorney’s fee provisions of the final judgment of divorce.
The case concerns the marital rights of a wife who, waiving future support, secured an interlocutory decree of divorce upon grounds of extreme cruelty, and then, upon her husband’s insistence gave him another chance and entered upon a conditional reconciliation with resumption of marital relations. The majority opinion holds, in effect, that the husband, with or without cause and even wrongfully, may terminate the conditional reconciliation and leave his wife without any means of support, temporary or otherwise. It further holds that a court of equity having jurisdiction over the parties in a pending divorce action is powerless to order otherwise. This in my opinion is not the law, nor is it equity.
It seems proper at this juncture to point out what I believe to be legal and factual errors upon which the majority, at least in part, base their conclusion.
A factor relied upon is “that it had been recommended that [the pending] action be dismissed so that the plaintiff could proceed in the new *354action [and thus seek alimony]. The plaintiff declined to do so.” But it was beyond the power of the plaintiff to so dismiss the action after entry of the interlocutory decree. Civil Code section 131 provided; “After the entry of the interlocutory judgment, neither party shall have the right to dismiss the action without the consent of the other.” It is clear from the record that defendant having given no legal grounds for denial of a final decree was not about to consent to the action’s dismissal. Since the reconciliation had been conditional, as he at all times conceded, he was permitted himself to seek the final decree (Civ. Code, § 132), which under the majority’s theory would foreclose any alimony. Indeed, failure to grant him such a decree would have been an abuse of discretion. (See Kelley v. Kelley, 272 Cal.App.2d 379, 381 [77 Cal.Rptr. 358]; Kern v. Kern, 261 Cal.App.2d 325, 330-332 [67 Cal.Rptr. 802]; and Angell v. Angell, 84 Cal.App.2d 339, 344-345 [191 P.2d 54].)
Next is the majority’s premise—that since “The plaintiff has never taken any steps to set aside the interlocutory judgment,” the alimony award was somehow erroneous. Since the reconciliation was conditional, as found by the trial court, and as conceded by the parties and now by the majority, there were no legal grounds for such a motion. An order setting aside the earlier decree, over the to be expected objection of defendant, would have been certain error.
The majority say: “The plaintiff’s argument confuses the obligation of husband to support a wife with whom he is living . . . , and the obligation for future support following separation and/or divorce which is dependent upon an adjudication in appropriate proceedings. . . .” The attempted distinction is without legal justification. It is said in 24 Am.Jur. 2d, page 649 (Divorce and Separation, § 524) that “[A]limony is founded ... on the natural and legal duty of a husband to support his wife; it is an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful act in driving her to seek a legal separation or divorce. ...” And the editors of that work point out that alimony is not a “debt in the the strict legal sense of that term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a [preexisting] duty made specific by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction.” California’s courts agree that such is the nature of alimony. In Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal.2d 735, 743-744 [344 P.2d 295], it was said: “A wife’s right to support arises from the marriage and is recognized by statute. (Civ. Code, § § 155, 174.) It is not created by a divorce decree; the decree is simply one means of enforcing the right. . . .” (Italics added.) The court continued: “Defendant contends that our courts can grant alimony only in an action for divorce, on the ground that it is only in such an action that the statutes provide for alimony. This *355contention was answered adversely to defendant as early as 1869. In Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, a wife sued her husband for alimony without asking for a divorce. The statute contained no provision for alimony save in an action for divorce. The husband contended that the statutes were exclusive and that the court lacked power to grant alimony in any other case. The court held that it had general equity powers to grant alimony in cases aside from those specifically provided for by statute and answered the husband’s contention in these words; ‘The Legislature was not dealing with the general subject of alimony, as an independent subject-matter of legislation; but only, as one of the incidents of an application for divorce. It saw fit to define the power of the Court over the allowance of alimony on an application for divorce; but was not considering the subject of alimony in any other class of cases. . . . [A] provision for alimony in a suit for divorce is not to be considered as a declaration that alimony shall not be allowed in other actions.’ . . .”
We are not assisted to a proper resolution of this case by the majority’s notation (fn. 2) that plaintiff had “ ‘certain moneys and property in Canada’ ” and for other reasons she might promptly have commenced supporting herself upon the reconciliation’s failure. We are here bound by the “substantial evidence” rule. (See Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 66 Cal.2d 782, 784-785 [59 Cal.Rptr. 141, 427 P.2d 805].) It is conceded that there was substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s discretion, if legally permitted, in making the support award. Even if this be a “hard case” (I think not) it should not be the vehicle for creating “bad law.”
The pertinent facts of the case before us are simple. After a marriage of less than a year’s duration plaintiff, waiving alimony, obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce. Thereafter at her husband’s importuning she consented to a conditional reconciliation. The husband thereupon, as the majority concede, reassumed the legal responsibility and duty of supporting his wife. The reconciliation lasted two and a half years, and was ended through no fault (although fault would seem irrelevant) of the wife. Under the law she or the husband was entitled to a final decree of divorce. (Civ. Code, § 132; see also Kelley v. Kelley, supra, 272 Cal.App.2d 379, 381; Kern v. Kern, supra, 261 Cal.App.2d 325, 330-332; Angell v. Angell, supra, 84 Cal.App.2d 339, 344-345.) The reconciliation having been conditional, the wife was not entitled to commence, or continue, another action for divorce, or to dismiss the pending action, or to have the interlocutory decree of divorce set aside. She applied for the only relief available to her, a final divorce decree, and for temporary alimony. In the pending divorce action, “historically equitable in nature” (Stille v. Stille, 273 Cal. App.2d 665, 666 [78 Cal.Rptr. 442]) and on substantial evidence, the *356trial court found her equitably entitled to temporary support and so exercised its discretion.
The majority say: “The salient question is whether that obligation [for plaintiff’s support] persists after the entry of a final interlocutory judgment, which has not been set aside, when that judgment adjudicated that no alimony should be payable following the time of its entry,” and “the wife’s right to future support on dissolution of the marriage could not .survive the final interlocutory judgment.”
These observations, I believe, are also founded on error for plaintiff’s right to support, or lack of such right, is in no way related to, or derived from, the interlocutory decree of divorce. Instead it is founded on an agreement of the parties, the conditional reconciliation entered into following the entry of that decree. By that agreement, as conceded by all, defendant reassumed the husband’s obligation of support. And by the same agreement the parties mutually rescinded plaintiff’s previous waiver of support.
It has been repeatedly held that an unconditional reconciliation of the parties even though finally unsuccessful, after a waiver of alimony by the wife and an interlocutory decree awarding no alimony, has the effect of cancelling the waiver and reviving the husband’s obligation of support.
In Tompkins v. Tompkins, 202 Cal.App.2d 55 [20 Cal.Rptr. 530], the superior court’s conclusion (at p. 57) that an “agreement waiving alimony had been cancelled by subsequent reconciliation leaving it free to award future support” was affirmed. It was said that “neither party relied upon the waiver of support nor intended either to abide by it or that it should deprive her of marital support thereafter; and plaintiff having regained her marital rights, defendant having exercised his, and both having performed their marital obligations, the obligation of the husband to support his wife was revived.” (P. 60.)
In Purdy v. Purdy, 138 Cal.App.2d 402 [291 P.2d 1005], a wife had waived alimony but following a futile attempt at reconciliation was nevertheless awarded support. Affirming, the appellate court stated (p. 405): “It is evident from the terms of this agreement that the parties were not then contemplating a reconciliation and ... we cannot say that the trial court erred in drawing the inference that in view of the subsequent reconciliation, there had been no waiver of the rights of second party to future support and attorneys’ fees under a different set of circumstances.”
In a similar factual situation the court in Morgan v. Morgan, 106 Cal.App.2d 189, 193 [234 P.2d 782], said: “The crucial question was whether the agreement should be given prospective effect as concerned the claim and the right of Mrs. Morgan to receive support. That is the question *357involved on the appeal. Findings were waived. The decree, insofar as it cancels the agreement, rests upon implied findings that the parties understood that Mr. Morgan, in joining in the reconciliation and resumption of marital relations, abandoned his contractual rights of freedom from the obligation of support, and assumed anew the legal obligations of a husband; also that Mrs. Morgan abandoned her right, which was expressly given by the agreement, to live separate and apart from her husband, and assumed and was restored to the customary obligations and rights of a wife. There was ample evidence to sustain such findings. Mrs. Morgan testified she believed the reconciliation to be permanent. Mr. Morgan’s declarations and conduct certainly indicated that he shared that belief. Good faith of the parties was to be presumed. It is scarcely conceivable that a reconciliation with resumption of marital relations such as the one in evidence would have been entered upon under circumstances that would have enabled the husband to refuse to support his wife and to leave her without cause at any time, and without liability or obligation to her as long as the marriage existed, or after it should be terminated by divorce. In the absence of any evidence of her express agreement continuing the freedom of the husband from liability for support it was reasonable to infer that the parties intended to resume a normal married life and the legal obligations that go with it. . . .” (Italics added.)
But the case before us differs from Tompkins v. Tompkins, Purdy v. Purdy, and Morgan v. Morgan. In those cases the reconciliation was unconditional, not conditional as here. And the question before us, the effect of the parties’ conditional reconciliation, insofar as we have been able to determine is one of first impression.
The majority’s view seems condensable to a holding that, upon a conditional reconciliation following an alimony waiver and a consistent interlocutory decree, the husband’s obligation to support his wife is terminable at his will or at least upon the entry of a final decree available to him at his will. I find myself wholly unable to see any reasonable basis for this distinction between conditional and unconditional reconciliations.
Reconciliations, unconditional and conditional, are favored by the law; each tends to continue the marriage relationship intact.
When a husband seeks reconciliation which is granted by the wife upon condition of decent behavior, it seems to me that he simply reassumes “the natural and legal duty of a husband to support his wife.” (24 Am. Jur.2d, p. 649, quoted ante.) His promise, is to live up to the agreed condition, and he expressly or at least impliedly, agrees that he will thereafter support his wife. It cannot reasonably be said that his promise, or that implied by law, is to continue that support just so long as he shall choose *358to do so. Instead he has again assumed the obligation of any married man to support his wife until ended by death, by agreement, by her desertion, or by a court of law. And as heretofore pointed out (24 Am.Jur.2d, p. 649, quoted ante; Hudson v. Hudson, supra, 52 Cal.2d 735, 743-744), this duty does not rest on statute, or technicality, or on a narrow concept that it applies only while the parties shall dwell together.
Procedurally, also, the matter before us is of first impression. But it is said that the “absence of a precedent for the giving of relief in a case where it is evident that under general principles of equity relief should be granted is of no consequence and presents no obstacle to the exercise of the jurisdiction of an equity court.” (27 Am.Jur.2d, p. 648.) Mills v. Mills, 147 Cal.App.2d 107, 118 [305 P.2d 61], states: “Equity does not wait on precedent which exactly squares with the facts in controversy, but will adjust itself to those situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its intervention.” And “It is a well established principle that once the jurisdiction of a court of equity is invoked, it has the power to pass on all questions raised which affect the parties before it.” (McKeon v. Santa Claus of California, Inc., 230 Cal.App.2d 359, 364 [41 Cal.Rptr. 43].)
Here, the conditional reconciliation having failed, plaintiff, as previously pointed out, was entitled to a final decree of divorce. She was also, as found by the trial court, entitled to continued support for a limited period of time. It became the duty of the court to enter judgment accordingly. For as said in Stille v. Stille, supra, 273 Cal.App.2d 665, 666, “A divorce case is historically equitable in nature and, as it is improper to adjudicate equity cases by piecemeal, the presiding jurist owes a duty not to leave some of the mutual property rights undisposed of. . . .”
Since plaintiff was entitled to the alimony award it follows that the attorney’s fee award was also proper.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 10, 1971.