Court Opinion

ID: 9850646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:00:54.094563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:40.977728
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
The question presented is whether we affirm the trial court’s decision that the 3-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ claims, or the Court of Appeals’ holding (5 Mich App 452) that *320the 6-year statute is applicable and plaintiffs’ causes should hot have been dismissed.
Plaintiff State Mutual Cyclone Insurance Company, on July 15,1964, filed the following complaint:
“1. That the plaintiff, State Mutual Cyclone Insurance Company, is a Michigan insurance corporation, doing business in the State of Michigan, and the assignprs of the plaintiff, Charles A. Baker and Euth M. Baker, are residents of Hersey township, Osceola county, Michigan. That the defendant is a Michigan nonprofit corporation with principal place of business in Newaygo county, Michig’an, and is in the business of supplying electric current to various customers throughout Osceola county and other adjoining areas.
“2. That previous to the 10th day of May, 1961, the defendant agreed to sell to plaintiff’s assignors electric current to be used for lighting and power purposes on the farm belonging to the plaintiff’s assignors.
“3. It was the agreement on the part of the defendant to the plaintiff that it would supply such current and the current would be supplied in quantities to serve the purposes of light and power in voltages acceptable to the use of such appliances owned by the plaintiff’s assignors either of 110-volt or 220-volt current.
“4. That on the 10th day of May, 1961, the defendant supplied to the lines entering the property of the plaintiff’s assignors current in much greater voltages than that agreed upon by the parties, which current when so supplied was unusable and very dangerous, which caused damage to the plaintiff’s assignors’ premises.
“5. That this supplying of such excessive surges of electric current in contravention of the contract between the plaintiff’s.assignors and.the defendant carised the death of 10 head of the plaintiff’s assignors’ cattle. ' .
*321“6. That the plaintiff as insurers of the plaintiff’s assignors paid to the plaintiff’s assignors $3,350 in payment for said cattle and took an assignment from the assignors to this plaintiff. * * *
“7. That the special damage incurred by the assignors included the loss of 10 head of cattle.”
Plaintiff Pioneer Mutual Insurance Company, on the same date, filed a similar complaint, with the exception that it alleged that it had paid its assignors, Albert A. Zimmerman, Mary Lou Zimmerman, and Eldon Zimmerman, $3,850 as compensation for their loss of 11 head of cattle.
Defendant 0 & A Electric Cooperative filed two third-party complaints against Wolverine Electric Cooperative, alleging that Wolverine contracted to maintain the necessary switching and protective equipment so that 0 & A Electric could furnish proper electric power to the Baker and Zimmerman farms, and asked judgment against Wolverine Electric Cooperative for any sum which may be recovered by plaintiffs against defendant. A motion was made for accelerated judgment in each case.
The cases were consolidated at pretrial.
The trial court, relying upon Coates v. Milner Hotels, Inc. (1945), 311 Mich 233; and Baatz v. Smith (1960), 361 Mich 68, concluded its written opinion as follows:
“It is the opinion of this court that defendants -have timely raised the defense of the statute of limitations as set out in CLS 1961, § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805) ;1 that plaintiffs seek re*322covery for injury to personal property; that plaintiffs have failed to commence their actions within three years of May 10, 1961, when their actions accrued; and that plaintiffs’ actions are barred by said statute of limitations.
“Therefore, defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment in each of these cases is hereby granted.”
In Coates v. Milner, supra, plaintiff sued the hotel for damages sustained when assaulted by another guest of the hotel, claiming damages because of breach of an implied contract to protect plaintiff against intrusion. The question presented was whether an action to recover damages for personal injuries was subject to the 3-year limitation statute (CLS 1943, § 13976; Stat Ann 1944 Cum Supp § 27.605). This Court answered in the affirmative.
In Baatz v. Smith, supra, plaintiff claimed damages in assumpsit against a hotel for injuries caused by a former guest who exploded dynamite in the hotel, injuring plaintiff. "We held that the 3-year statute of limitations controlled.
In a written opinion, the Court of Appeals first set forth CLS 1961, § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805), quoted above, which the trial court held was applicable, and then. CLS 1961, § 600.5807 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5807),2 and stated:
*323“From a reading of these statutes we are convinced that the first was intended to apply to tort actions and the second to apply to contract actions.”
The Court of Appeals then called attention to the fact that a party injured by a breach of an express contract involving negligence may waive his contract action and sue in tort, that Coates and Baats were not controlling because they were assumpsit actions based upon implied contract, and concluded (p 459):
“We perceive the rule to he that where an action is brought to recover damages for injury to person or property on a claim arising out of a tort or an implied contract the 3-year statute applies. If an action is brought on an express contract the 6-year statute applies, even though damages are sought for injuries to person or property.”
The Court of Appeals did not cite a single Michigan case, or a case from any other jurisdiction, in *324support of its conclusion, and its decision is contra to the great majority rule in the United States.3
When this Court decided Baats, we stated that if a plaintiff seeks recovery for damages for injury to person or property the 3-year rule applies irrespective of how plaintiff proceeded to seek such recovery, and we said (pp 70, 71):
“Plaintiffs suggest that Coates should be re-evaluated and overruled. The only question is the meaning of the statutory language. It limits, in express and plain words, to 3 years, actions to recover damages for injuries to person. Such was the nature of the action in Coates. The statutory language permitted of no other holding in the case. It was right then. It still is. And so, here, whether brought in tort or assumpsit, these are actions to recover damages for injuries to person. Accordingly, the 3-year limitation applies.”
When we compare the statute in effect when the Baats decision was handed down, which provided:
“Actions to recover damages for injuries to person or property and actions for trespass upon lands shall be brought within 3 years from the time said actions accrue, and not afterwards," 
with the same thought expressed in the rule-written version in the 1961 revised judicature act (set forth above and applicable in this case), it becomes apparent that the legislature expressed approval of this Court’s decision in Baats to the effect that it makes no difference what form of action the plaintiff institutes in seeking recovery for damages to property or person, but in all cases such action comes within *325the 3-year limitation rule. There is a total absence of any legislative mandate or thought that we distinguish between actions on express contracts to recover damages for injury to person or property and actions based upon implied contract, as called for by the Court of Appeals opinion.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court agree that plaintiffs are seeking a recovery for damages to property. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly applied the 3-year rule, and reverse the Court of Appeals. Costs to appellants.
Dethmers, C. J., and Black and T. E. Brennan, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.

 “No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of' time prescribed by this section.
“(1) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging assault, battery, and false imprisonment.
“(2) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malicious prosecution.
*322“(3) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging malpractice.
“(4) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions against sheriffs charging misconduct or negleet of office by themselves or their deputies.
“(5) The period of limitations is 2 years after the expiration of the year for which a constable was elected for actions based on his negligence or misconduct as constable.
“(6) The period of limitations is 1 year for actions charging libel or slander.
“(7) The period of limitations is 3 years for all other actions to recover damages for injuries to persons and property.” CLS 1961, § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805).

 “No person may bring or maintain any action to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract, or to enforce the specific performance of any contract unless, after the elaim first accrued to *323himself or to someone through whom he claims, he commences the action within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
“(1) The period of limitations on actions charging any surety on any bond of any executor, administrator, guardian is 4 years after the discharge of the executor, administrator, or guardian.
“(2) The period of limitations is 10 years for actions founded upon bonds of public officers.
“(3) The period of limitations on actions founded upon bonds executed under sections 41.80 and 41.81 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, is 2 years after the expiration of the year for whieh the constable was elected.
“(4) The period of limitations is 10 years for actions founded upon covenants in deeds and mortgages of real estate.
“(5) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions charging any surety for costs.
“(6) The period of limitations is 2 years for actions brought on bonds or recognizances given on appeal from any court in this state.
“(7) The period of limitations is 10 years for actions on bonds, notes, or other like instruments whieh are the direct or indirect obligation of, or were issued by although not the obligation of, the state of Michigan or any county, city, village, township, school district, special assessment district, or other public or quasi-publie corporation in the state of Michigan.
“(8) The period of limitations is 6 years for all other actions to recover damages or sums due for breach of contract.”

 34 Am Jur, Limitations of Actions, §103, pp 83, 84; 53 OJS, Limitations of Actions, § 74, pp 1042, 1044; 1 ALR, p Í313; 62 ALR, p 1417, and 157 ALR, pp 763, 766.