Court Opinion

ID: 9954188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:00:48.249567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.751056
License: Public Domain

BLD-086                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                      No. 24-1057
                                      ___________

                                   ADAM I. MURSE,
                                              Appellant

                                             v.

                                 MARY L. MURSE
                       ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 5-23-cv-03829)
                      District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl
                      ____________________________________

       Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
        Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                                   March 14, 2024

                 Before: BIBAS, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 25, 2024)
                                       _________

                                        OPINION*
                                        _________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

       Adam Murse, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte

dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. We will summarily affirm.

       Murse filed suit against his mother, Mary Murse, in relation to his role as his father’s

caregiver and to the ownership of the family home. Dkt. No. 2 at 2-3 & 60-64. He alleged

numerous violations of, inter alia, his federal constitutional rights, the Fair Labor Standards

Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and multiple federal criminal statutes. Id. at 100-

03. He sought monetary and injunctive relief. Id. at 104-08. The District Court screened

the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed it with prejudice as frivolous.

Dkt. Nos. 7 & 8. Murse filed a timely notice of appeal. Dkt. No. 9.

       We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the

dismissal of the complaint. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020). Upon

review, we will affirm because no substantial question is presented on appeal. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4.

       Murse’s constitutional claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

requires a plaintiff to allege that the defendant acted under color of law in violating his

constitutional rights. See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000)

(per curiam). As the District Court explained, these claims were premised on Murse’s

mother’s actions as a private person, including her choice to separate from his father and

move out of the family home. Dkt. No. 2 at 13 & 47. There is no indication that she was

acting under the color of state law when those events occurred, see Leshko v. Servis, 423

F.3d 337, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2005), so the District Court’s dismissal of the claims was proper.

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       To bring claims under the FLSA, Murse was required to allege an “actionable

employer-employee relationship,” Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, 748 F.3d

142, 148 (3d Cir. 2014), wherein the employer exercises “significant control” over the

employee, In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp. Pracs. Litig., 683 F.3d 462,

468-69 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). But Murse’s allegations fail to demonstrate that

his mother acts as his employer: she never hired or paid him to care for his father, no

contract exists between them, she does not live in the home or otherwise monitor the

caregiving, and Murse characterized his “staying at [his parents’ home] . . . . to become a

caregiver” when his mother left as an “honorable” and “sacrificing” decision reflective of

his “moral ground.” Dkt. No. 2 at 4, 67, 83-84; see Enterprise, 683 F.3d at 469 (outlining

the non-exhaustive list of factors courts should consider when determining whether an

employment relationship exists under the FLSA). Accordingly, because Murse failed to

allege the requisite relationship, the District Court properly dismissed his FLSA claims.

       Murse alleged that his mother violated his rights under numerous criminal statutes,

but “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or

nonprosecution of another.”1 Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also

Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of claims

       1
         The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §
1961 et seq., which Murse cites, does provide for civil damages. Id. at § 1964(c). However,
Murse’s conclusive assertions about his mother’s conduct fall short of alleging the requisite
facts needed to state a plausible RICO claim. See id. at § 1961(1) & (5); In re Insurance
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2010). He also cites the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1581 et seq., which provides a civil
remedy, id. at § 1595, but Murse failed to allege any facts that his mother subjected him to
forced labor, human trafficking, or the like.

                                             3
alleging violation of criminal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 241, because “these are

criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of action and are thus not enforceable

through a civil action”). Despite Murse’s requests that it do so, Dkt. No. 2 at 104-07, the

District Court properly concluded that it lacks authority to compel an investigation by a

law enforcement agency.2 Cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (reasoning

that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal

process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion”).

       Lastly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that amendment

was futile.3 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir 2002).

       Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4

       2
          Murse also alleged that his mother violated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
failing to include him in a state action related to the sale of the family home, Dkt. No. 2 at
51-64 & 102, but those rules do not create a private cause of action.
        3
          To the extent Murse brought claims under state law, the District Court acted within
its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). Both
Murse and his mother are citizens of Pennsylvania, Dkt. No. 2 at 2, so no independent basis
for jurisdiction over his state law claims existed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
        4
          Murse’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied. See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d
147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993).

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