Court Opinion

ID: 9366220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 15:02:53.085786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.917290
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 20-CV-0746

                         OVERDRIVE, INC., APPELLANT,

                                        V.

                      THE OPEN EBOOK FORUM, APPELLEE.

                         Appeal from the Superior Court
                          of the District of Columbia
                             (2016-CA-007768-B)

                        (Hon. José M. López, Trial Judge)

(Argued March 29, 2022                                Decided January 26, 2023)

      Andrew G. Fiorella, with whom Erin L. Hamilton and Martin J. Amundson
were on the brief, for appellant.

      David G. Ross, with whom Benjamin Takis was on the brief, for appellee.

      Before MCLEESE and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and GLICKMAN, ∗ Senior
Judge.

      DEAHL, Associate Judge:      The Open eBook Forum, doing business as

International Digital Publishing Forum (IDPF), is a nonprofit corporation focused

      ∗
       Judge Glickman was an Associate Judge of the court at the time of argument.
He began his service as a Senior Judge on December 21, 2022.
                                         2

on advancing electronic books and digital publishing. IDPF is the developer of

EPUB, a popular file format for e-books. About a decade ago, IDPF’s board of

directors—faced with precarious finances, declining membership, and competitive

threats—determined the organization’s long-term viability was in jeopardy. After

considering a variety of options, the board negotiated a merger with the World Wide

Web Consortium (W3C), a much larger organization with the broader purpose of

establishing standards for the World Wide Web to ensure its long-term growth.

      OverDrive, Inc., a member of IDPF, opposed the merger and lobbied against

it. When IDPF’s board nonetheless approved the merger and put it to a membership

vote, OverDrive petitioned the Superior Court to preclude that vote and—when that

failed and IDPF’s membership approved the merger—to block the merger until a

new vote could be held. OverDrive brought its petition under D.C. Code § 29-

401.22(a), which permits members of nonprofit corporations to challenge corporate

actions in certain circumstances.    But the court’s review authority under that

provision does not extend to instances where the “nonprofit corporation has provided

in its articles of incorporation or bylaws for a means of resolving a challenge to a

corporate action.” Id. § 29-401.22(c). The Superior Court found that to be the case

here, as IDPF’s bylaws permitted any group of fourteen members—equal to the

number of directors on the board—to petition the board for a rescission vote, which
                                           3

would trigger a new vote of the full membership. Because IDPF’s bylaws provided

a mechanism for OverDrive to raise an internal challenge to the merger, the trial

court concluded that its own review under § 29-401.22(a) was limited to ensuring

that the merger complied with IDPF’s articles and bylaws. It did, in the court’s view.

      In this appeal, OverDrive argues that (1) this court already rejected the trial

court’s reasoning when, in a prior appeal, we concluded that § 29-401.22(c) is not a

jurisdiction-stripping statute; (2) the provision in IDPF’s bylaws permitting a

challenge to a corporate action is too ineffectual to strip the Superior Court of its

authority to entertain OverDrive’s challenge under § 29-401.22(a); (3) even if the

trial court’s statutory authority was limited to reviewing only the merger’s

compliance with IDPF’s bylaws and articles, as the trial court reasoned, this merger

was non-compliant because those documents required that any transfer of IDPF

assets be to organizations that “engage in activities substantially similar to those of”

IDPF, and W3C does not meet that description; and (4) putting § 29-401.22(a) aside,

the trial court also had freestanding equitable authority to block the merger and it

should have done so for a host of reasons. We disagree as to each point and affirm.
                                         4

                                         I.

      IDPF is a nonprofit corporation, formed in the District of Columbia, dedicated

to developing and promoting digital publishing. Its members include other nonprofit

organizations, educational institutions, publishers, and technology companies. IDPF

was formerly known as the Open eBook Forum, and its original articles of

incorporation (adopted in 2000) stated that its purposes were to “create and maintain

standards and promote the successful adoption of electronic books; to provide a

forum for the discussion of issues and technologies related to electronic books; [and

to] develop, publish, and maintain common specifications relating to electronic

books.” About five years after it was incorporated, IDPF modestly expanded that

mission statement to focus on digital publishing more generally, rather than just e-

books. IDPF’s most important contribution to digital publishing is the EPUB file

format, the “most widely supported non-proprietary” e-book standard in the world.

EPUB “allows publishers to produce and send a single digital publication file”

providing “consumers interoperability between software/hardware” platforms for

digital books and other publications.

      OverDrive is a leading platform for e-books, audiobooks, and other digital

media. It was among IDPF’s members, of which there were about 130 in good
                                           5

standing at the time of the relevant membership vote discussed below. OverDrive’s

founder and CEO is Steven Potash, who also helped found IDPF and served as one

of its board members during its first decade of existence.

      Bill McCoy became IDPF’s executive director in 2011.               McCoy grew

concerned about IDPF’s finances and declining membership over the years, and

during his tenure he and the board considered strategies to ensure IDPF’s long-term

viability. By the spring of 2016, he and other directors believed the best option

available was to merge with W3C, a joint collaborative project between the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology and three other educational institutions.

W3C and its member organizations “work together to develop Web standards” and

seek “to lead the World Wide Web to its full potential.” While W3C was not focused

exclusively on e-books or digital publishing, it had a digital publishing interest group

and collaborated with IDPF to adopt and implement digital publishing standards.

IDPF’s board was concerned that if it did not merge with W3C it risked getting

pushed out of the digital publishing space altogether by larger and better-resourced

competitors (including W3C itself). In April 2016, IDPF’s board notified its

membership of the proposed merger and solicited input. The following month, IDPF

issued a public notice of the proposed merger and held a meeting in Chicago, open

to both members and the public, where the proposed merger was discussed.
                                         6

      The merger negotiations between IDPF and W3C continued throughout the

spring and summer of 2016. By late September 2016, the organizations agreed to a

memorandum of understanding under which the merger would take place in two key

steps: (1) W3C would acquire IDPF’s members under a so-called “membership

exchange,” see D.C. Code § 29-409.03, and (2) W3C would acquire IDPF’s assets,

including EPUB, in an asset transfer, see id. § 29-410.02. W3C also agreed to hire

McCoy as an independent contractor as part of the deal, with a base compensation

of $125,000 per year plus an annual bonus capped at $90,000 per year (McCoy’s

IDPF salary was $165,000). After the membership exchange and asset transfer were

completed, IDPF would dissolve. The board then sent its membership a notice of

intent to approve the merger, which included a draft plan for the merger and

disclosed that W3C would hire McCoy as part of the deal, in September 2016. The

notice explained that if the board approved the merger as anticipated, it would then

go to a vote of the full membership.

      OverDrive opposed the merger and tried to thwart it. Its position was that the

proposed merger was a “self-serving, poorly conceived, and improperly executed”

deal which would lead to IDPF’s “self-immolation” and “destroy” the organization.

About a week after the board sent the draft plan out to IDPF’s members, an attorney

for OverDrive sent a six-page letter to McCoy posing questions about the
                                         7

transaction, requesting documents from the board, and threatening litigation.

OverDrive’s view was that IDPF was giving away EPUB to W3C and receiving

nothing in return, and it was also violating IDPF’s articles of incorporation, which

provided that IDPF could transfer its assets only to entities “engaged in activities

substantially similar” to IDPF’s, a criterion it asserted that W3C did not meet. Two

days later, Potash (OverDrive’s CEO) asked to present the board with an alternative

business plan to grow membership, solicit funding, and collaborate with other digital

publishing standards organizations. The board granted Potash’s request and heard

his presentation later that week, but nonetheless approved the merger with W3C and

put the matter to a vote of its full membership. The three-week voting period for the

members in good standing lasted from October 14 to November 4, 2016.

      Potash contacted IDPF’s President, George Kerscher, and requested the email

addresses for all primary representatives of IDPF’s member organizations, i.e., the

individuals with authority to vote on behalf of those organizations. Kerscher agreed

to provide a list of IDPF’s member organizations and their general mailing

addresses, but indicated that he was under no obligation to provide the primary

representatives’ names or email addresses to Potash. Kerscher nonetheless offered

to provide that information if Potash agreed to forgo any litigation regarding the

proposed merger, so that the merger would be “in the hands of all of IDPF’s
                                         8

members to decide on the merits.” Potash rejected that offer and did not receive the

email addresses of the primary representatives.

      Aside from contacting Kerscher, Potash made little effort to identify IDPF’s

primary representatives on his own. OverDrive also did not make any push to

rescind the board’s approval of the merger; IDPF’s bylaws permitted any group of

members equal in number to the board of directors (fourteen) to call for a rescission

vote, with a simple majority of a quorum then needed to rescind the board’s action.

Instead, OverDrive filed suit in D.C. Superior Court, invoking the court’s authority

under D.C. Code § 29-401.22 to enjoin the membership vote because the board’s

approval of the merger was “an improper nonprofit corporate action.” The court

declined to enjoin the vote, which proceeded as planned.

      Of IDPF’s roughly 130 member organizations in good standing, 81 cast votes

for or against the merger, with 71 in favor and 10 (including OverDrive) against.

That was substantially more than enough for the “simple majority of a quorum”

necessary to approve the merger. Within months of the membership’s approval,

IDPF and W3C had executed a “Membership Exchange and Asset Transfer

Agreement,” but the two organizations agreed to extend the deadline for IDPF’s
                                          9

dissolution and to clarify the terms of an interim intellectual property license

concerning W3C’s use and development of EPUB.

      Meanwhile, OverDrive’s suit continued in Superior Court. The court initially

concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. While the court

recognized that § 29-401.22(a) generally permits members of nonprofits to

challenge corporate actions in court, § 29-401.22(c) removes that authorization in

cases where the “nonprofit organization has provided in its articles of incorporation

or bylaws for a means of resolving a challenge to a corporate action.” That was the

case here, in the court’s view, because IDPF’s bylaws provided an avenue for any

of its members, including Overdrive, to challenge the board’s action by seeking a

rescission vote. The court concluded that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain

the suit. OverDrive appealed that ruling, and we reversed and remanded for further

proceedings, holding that § 29-401.22(c) is not of jurisdictional import. OverDrive

Inc. v. Open eBook Forum, No. 17-CV-101, Order at 3 (D.C. Feb. 23, 2018). On

remand, OverDrive filed an amended petition seeking a permanent injunction to

block the transfer of EPUB to W3C and to prevent IDPF and W3C from completing

the merger.
                                          10

       After extensive discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment for

IDPF, finding that: (1) D.C. Code § 29-401.22(c) curtailed the court’s “statutory

power to overrule IDPF’s Board and members,” allowing it only to “enforce[], as

appropriate,” IDPF’s articles and bylaws; and (2) the transaction did not violate

IDPF’s articles or bylaws because, contrary to OverDrive’s arguments, W3C

“engage[d] in activities substantially similar to those of” IDPF. OverDrive now

appeals. 1

                                          II.

       The threshold dispute between the parties centers on the extent to which the

trial court had authority to entertain IDPF’s claims. In the trial court’s view, its

authority to “hear and determine the validity of [a] corporate action” under § 29-

       1
         In addition to its suit in Superior Court, OverDrive also filed a federal
copyright infringement case against IDPF that is tangentially relevant to this appeal.
In sum, OverDrive asserted that it retained copyrights in its “separate and
independent contributions to EPUB,” which it had never agreed to transfer to W3C.
OverDrive Inc. v. Open E-Book Forum, 986 F.3d 954, 956 (6th Cir. 2021). The
federal district court did not cast doubt on the premise of the claim that a transfer of
EPUB to W3C would violate OverDrive’s copyright, but it nonetheless granted
summary judgment for IDPF because: (1) at the time of the suit, IDPF had not yet
dissolved and had only licensed W3C to use and develop EPUB, rather than
transferring it; and (2) any future infringement claim based on an actual transfer of
EPUB from IDPF to W3C was not ripe for review. The Sixth Circuit agreed as to
both points and affirmed. Id. at 959.
                                           11

401.22(a) was severely circumscribed by § 29-401.22(c), because IDPF “provided

in its . . . bylaws for a means of resolving a challenge to a corporate action,” namely,

by permitting members to call for a rescission vote. That internal dispute resolution

mechanism meant, in the trial court’s view, that it was permitted only to “enforce

the articles or bylaws if appropriate,” D.C. Code § 29-401.22(c), and it concluded

that the merger was compatible with IDPF’s articles and bylaws. Beyond that

narrow authorization, the court reasoned that it had no authority to invalidate the

membership’s vote to approve the merger simply because that vote was “unfair” or

contrary to IDPF’s interests in the variety of ways that OverDrive contends.

      OverDrive raises several challenges to that reasoning, which fit roughly into

four categories: (1) that this court, in the prior appeal from these proceedings, already

rejected the trial court’s reading of § 29-401.22(c); (2) in any event, IDPF’s bylaws

did not in fact provide a means of resolving a challenge to a corporate action within

the meaning of § 29-401.22(c), so that limitation on the court’s authority does not

apply; (3) even if the trial court was correct that it could review the merger only for

compliance with IDPF’s articles and bylaws, the merger violated the articles’

requirement that IDPF’s assets transfer upon dissolution only “to one or more

organizations which engage in activities substantially similar to those of” IDPF; and

(4) putting § 29-401.22 aside, the trial court was permitted to exercise its equitable
                                         12

authority to invalidate the merger and had jurisdiction to do so per the general grant

of jurisdiction in D.C. Code § 11-921. We consider these arguments in turn.

                                         A.

      OverDrive argues that we have already rejected the trial court’s conclusion

that it lacked statutory authority to hear this dispute under D.C. Code § 29-401.22.

We disagree. In the trial court’s 2017 order, unlike the one now on appeal, the trial

court ruled that § 29-401.22(c) deprived it of jurisdiction to hear this dispute. We

reversed that ruling in a three-page order explaining that § 29-401.22 “should not be

read as a jurisdiction-stripping statute.” Order of Feb. 23, 2018, supra, at 2. At the

same time, we acknowledged that § 29-401.22(c) “circumscribes [the] cause of

action” authorized by § 29-401.22(a), but explained that it is wrong to conflate a

statutory narrowing of a cause of action with stripping jurisdiction. Id. at 2-3. That

erroneous conflation was the narrow basis for our reversal of that 2017 order.

      It is now OverDrive that mistakenly conflates the two concepts. It misreads

our prior ruling that § 29-401.22(c) is not a jurisdiction-stripping statute as

foreclosing the trial court’s subsequent ruling that § 29-401.22(c) curtails the cause

of action codified in § 29-401.22(a). OverDrive asserts that the two concepts—

stripping jurisdiction and narrowing statutory authority to hear a case—“are
                                          13

indistinguishable.” Not so. Our precedents draw a clear distinction between them,

emphasizing that “statutory restrictions governing the cases courts may hear are not

to be deemed jurisdictional unless” that is the clear “intent of the legislature.” Neill

v. D.C. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 93 A.3d 229, 238 n.37 (D.C. 2014) (citing Sebelius v.

Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013)). This is because, contrary to

OverDrive’s assertions, there are significant practical consequences to attaching

jurisdictional import to such restrictions. For instance, courts are obliged to satisfy

themselves that they have jurisdiction, even if no party has cast any doubt on the

matter and even if the parties affirmatively agree that the court has jurisdiction. See

Rolinski v. Lewis, 828 A.2d 739, 742 (D.C. 2003). Conversely, non-jurisdictional

limitations on courts are generally “subject to waiver, estoppel,” and other

exceptions. Kidwell v. District of Columbia, 670 A.2d 349, 353 (D.C. 1996) (citation

omitted).

      In short, “[c]haracterizing a rule as jurisdictional renders it unique in our

adversarial system,” with distinct practical effects. Auburn, 568 U.S. at 153. Both

this court and the Supreme Court have therefore, in recent years, “attempted to ‘bring

some discipline to the use’ of the term ‘jurisdiction.’” Gatewood v. D.C. Water &

Sewer Auth., 82 A.3d 41, 47-48 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Auburn, 568 U.S. at 153). Our

ruling in the previous appeal did no more than police that important line between
                                          14

jurisdiction-stripping statutes and more routine statutory limitations on causes of

action, such as statutes of limitations and other waivable restrictions like the one in

§ 29-401.22(c). Our prior ruling thus did not foreclose the trial court’s conclusion

that § 29-401.22(c) substantially restricted its authority to adjudicate the present

dispute.

                                          B.

      We next consider OverDrive’s argument that § 29-401.22(c) should not apply

on the particular facts of this case. Recall that § 29-401.22(a) permits members of

nonprofit corporations to petition the Superior Court to “hear and determine the

validity of [a] corporate action.” Section 29-401.22(c) then instructs that this grant

of authority “shall not apply if a nonprofit corporation has provided in its articles of

incorporation or bylaws for a means of resolving a challenge to a corporate action,

but the Superior Court may enforce the articles or bylaws if appropriate.” The trial

court ruled that IDPF’s bylaws provided a means of resolving a challenge to a

corporate action by way of a rescission vote. As a result, the court lacked authority

to hear OverDrive’s claims under § 29-401.22(a), except to the limited extent

OverDrive claimed the merger did not comply with IDPF’s articles or bylaws.
                                         15

      OverDrive counters that IDPF’s bylaws did not in fact provide a means of

resolving a challenge to a corporate action within the meaning of § 29-401.22(c). Its

arguments come in two types. First, it argues that the bylaws by their very terms

provide too ineffectual a mechanism for challenging a corporate action to displace

the court’s authority to hear such a challenge under § 29-401.22(a). Second, it

argues that IDPF’s conduct in obstructing OverDrive from effectively challenging

the merger should render § 29-401.22(c) inapplicable here.

                                         i.

      OverDrive argues that the bylaws by their terms provide too ineffectual a

“means of resolving a challenge to a corporate action” to trigger § 29-401.22(c)’s

limitation on the court’s authority under § 29-401.22(a). We do not doubt, nor does

IDPF dispute, the premise of OverDrive’s argument: that an internal mechanism for

challenging corporate actions may be so illusory that § 29-401.22(c)’s limitation on

court review does not apply. But we are unpersuaded that this is the case here.

      First, OverDrive points out that the bylaws’ rescission provision permits only

rescission of “action[s] by the Board of Directors,” whereas D.C. Code § 29-401.22

enables challenges to all manner of corporate actions, including those by a board,

officer, employee, or the entire membership.        That distinction is immaterial,
                                          16

however, where OverDrive’s suit is very much challenging the board’s actions.

OverDrive’s amended petition, for instance, challenges the board’s actions

approving the transaction documents and sending them to a membership vote on

October 13, 2016. The board also had to execute the “Membership Exchange and

Asset Transfer Agreement” after the membership approved the merger but before

any merger could commence. The bylaws thus gave OverDrive direct routes to

challenging the merger that it sought to block through its petition, so its complaint

that it could not challenge other types of actions is of no moment.

      Second, OverDrive complains that the rescission provision allows challenges

only by those members who are well-connected enough to succeed through the

rescission process, whereas § 29-401.22(a) permits any single member to challenge

corporate actions. That is also of no import. Section 29-401.22(c)’s strictures apply

when a nonprofit corporation provides “a means of resolving a challenge to a

corporate action”; while we agree with OverDrive that these means cannot be

illusory, nothing in the statutory text (or any other authority that OverDrive can point

to) requires that the internal mechanism for a challenge be as sweeping and

permissive as the challenges otherwise permitted by § 29-401.22(a). That accords

with the principle that “courts ordinarily will not interfere with the management and

internal affairs of a voluntary association.” Blodgett v. Univ. Club, 930 A.2d 210,
                                         17

225 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Levant v. Whitley, 755 A.2d 1036, 1043 (D.C. 2000)).

While that principle may bend where “an organization fail[s] to follow its own

rules,” Levant, 755 A.2d at 1044, OverDrive has not demonstrated that IDPF

violated its own rules (a point discussed below in Part II.C).

                                          ii.

      OverDrive next argues that IDPF “actively and intentionally prevented

OverDrive from contacting other members,” a “calculated refusal” which

“deprive[d]” OverDrive of its ability to use the rescission process ahead of the

membership vote. IDPF should therefore not be able to invoke § 29-401.22(c)’s

restrictions on the court’s authority, or so OverDrive’s argument goes. We again do

not doubt the premise that a corporation cannot affirmatively obstruct its members

from raising a challenge permitted by its articles or bylaws, and where it does so,

§ 29-401.22(c)’s restriction on the court’s authority may not apply. After all, § 29-

401.22(c) itself provides that “the Superior Court may enforce the articles or bylaws

if appropriate,” and a corporation obstructing its members from exercising their

rights under the articles’ or bylaws’ provisions would be grounds for enforcing them.

OverDrive’s argument is nonetheless unpersuasive because there is simply no

factual basis for concluding that IDPF engaged in such obstruction.
                                            18

      The substance of OverDrive’s complaints is not really about obstruction at all,

but about a lack of facilitation that IDPF was under no obligation to provide.

OverDrive complains that IDPF did not, when requested, disclose the identities and

email addresses of the representatives of its member organizations. That complaint

rings hollow for two reasons. First, OverDrive offers no authority for the proposition

that it was entitled—under IDPF’s articles, bylaws, or any other authority—to the

identities and email addresses of IDPF’s primary representatives.             Second,

OverDrive made virtually no independent effort to obtain those identities and contact

information, and the record provides no support for its contention that this would

have been a futile task for it to undertake on its own. Potash testified that he and an

OverDrive employee tried to locate the information only by using Google “on and

off” for a period of time, possibly “less than an hour,” before giving up on the

endeavor. They did not, for instance, contact the general counsel’s offices of IDPF’s

members (of whom they had a complete roster) and request the contact information

of the primary representatives to IDPF. 2

      2
        Also recall that Potash was a founding member of IDPF and had served on
its board for a decade, departing several years before the events underlying this
appeal. One would think that Potash would have personal knowledge of some
number of IDPF’s primary representatives, or contacts beyond Kerscher who might
shed light on the matter, though the record is not clear on that.
                                         19

      In short, we agree with the trial court’s assessment that IDPF did not

impermissibly obstruct a rescission vote. Instead, OverDrive did not “even attempt[]

to avail itself of th[at] remedy provided for in IDPF’s Bylaws.” We see no basis for

circumventing § 29-401.22(c)’s limitations under these circumstances.

                                         C.

      OverDrive next contends that even if the trial court’s authority under

§ 29-401.22 was limited to ensuring the merger’s compliance with IDPF’s articles

and bylaws, the merger did not comply with IDPF’s articles. It highlights a provision

in IDPF’s articles that requires, upon its dissolution, that IDPF’s assets (like EPUB)

be “transferred to one or more organizations which engage in activities substantially

similar to those of” IDPF. The trial court concluded that W3C is engaged in

activities substantially similar to IDPF because it (1) formed a digital publishing

interest group in 2013, (2) has collaborated with IDPF to adopt and implement

certain digital publishing standards, and (3) has worked to ensure the digital

publishing industry’s input in creating open web standards.         While the court

acknowledged that W3C engages in many activities beyond digital publishing, it did

“not see any provision in the Articles that suggests IDPF may not merge with a larger

corporation that engages in numerous activities as long as at least one of those
                                          20

activities is substantially similar to those of IDPF.” OverDrive counters that W3C’s

mission is so expansive that it cannot meaningfully be said to engage in activities

substantially similar to IDPF’s discrete focus on e-books and digital publishing.

      We note at the outset that it is not clear that § 29-401.22(c) gives a court carte

blanche to enforce a nonprofit corporation’s bylaws and articles, as the trial court

seemed to reason. That provision—which generally divests a court of authority to

entertain a challenge to a corporate action where a nonprofit corporation has an

internal mechanism for resolving it—permits a court to nonetheless “enforce the

articles or bylaws if appropriate.” D.C. Code § 29-401.22(c). One might read that

provision as permitting a court to enforce only those articles and bylaws that

themselves create the internal mechanism for challenging a corporate action, i.e.,

that it is only appropriate to enforce the corporation’s own internal dispute resolution

mechanisms. Under this understanding of § 29-401.22(c), it was not for the court to

determine whether W3C engaged in activities substantially similar to IDPF—the

“substantially similar” clause is not a component of IDPF’s internal dispute

resolution mechanism—and that question would be better left to IDPF and its

membership. With that said, IDPF does not dispute the trial court’s broader reading

that § 29-401.22(c) permitted it to enforce any of IDPF’s bylaws or articles—
                                          21

notwithstanding that IDPF provides an internal means to challenge corporate

actions—so we take that point as conceded in this appeal. 3

        On the merits, we agree with the trial court that the record establishes that

W3C engages in activities substantially similar to IDPF. There is no dispute that

among W3C’s many endeavors are its efforts to develop and implement open digital

publishing standards, which aligns with IDPF’s core mission of being “the trade and

standards association for the digital publishing industry.” OverDrive’s only bone of

contention is that W3C does much more than that, and that W3C’s sheer size and

expansive mission preclude it from being “‘substantially similar’ to IDPF.” But that

misstates the articles’ requirement, which is not that IDPF transfer its assets to an

organization substantially similar to it—perhaps, as OverDrive contends, W3C does

not fit that bill—but rather that it need only transfer its assets to an organization

engaged in activities substantially similar to IDPF’s. 4 W3C unquestionably does

that.

        3
         Circling back to Part II.A, supra, it is only because § 29-401.22(c) is non-
jurisdictional that we may accept this point as conceded, rather than needing to
resolve it sua sponte. See Kidwell, 670 A.2d at 353 (non-jurisdictional restrictions
are subject to waiver).

        OverDrive, both in its trial court pleadings and its briefs to this court,
        4

materially misquotes the articles on this point. The articles require that IDPF’s assets
be transferred, upon dissolution, to organizations “which engage in activities
                                          22

                                          D.

      Finally, OverDrive argues that besides the authority granted by

§ 29-401.22(c), the trial court also had the inherent equitable authority to remedy the

various alleged improprieties associated with the merger. See D.C. Code § 11-921

(granting the Superior Court “jurisdiction of any civil action . . . at law or in

equity”). 5 While we doubt that the trial court had such authority outside of the suits

permitted by the District’s Nonprofit Corporation Act, D.C. Code §§ 29-401.01 to

414.04, we need not conclusively resolve that point. Even assuming that the trial

court had some residual authority to hear challenges to nonprofit corporate actions

beyond what the Act provides, OverDrive has not sufficiently articulated a basis for

such a claim.

substantially similar” to IDPF’s, whereas OverDrive repeatedly quotes the provision
as requiring the assets be transferred to “organizations which are substantially
similar” to IDPF.
      5
         Among the various improprieties OverDrive alleges are that: (1) IDPF made
material misrepresentations to its membership to secure the merger’s approval; (2)
IDPF’s failure to dissolve was a material deviation from the approved merger that
never received membership approval; (3) McCoy, as IDPF’s executive director, had
a conflict of interest because he secured a job for himself at W3C upon the merger;
(4) the voting period was unduly rushed; and (5) IDPF suppressed alternative options
to the merger and censored discussion before the membership vote, in part by
holding the only open meeting to discuss the merger in Portugal rather than in the
District.
                                         23

      The District’s Nonprofit Corporation Act carefully circumscribes the types of

challenges to nonprofit corporate actions that can be raised in court, and it further

details who can raise those challenges and under what circumstances. In addition to

§ 29-401.22, discussed at length above, the Act authorizes court actions that include:

(1) derivative suits, subject to a variety of requirements, § 29-411.02(a); (2)

challenges to acts as being beyond the corporation’s power (so-called ultra vires

acts), § 29-403.04(b); (3) actions to compel meetings, § 29-401.21(a); (4) actions to

inspect corporate records, § 29-413.04; (5) actions for removal of a director,

§ 29-406.09; and (6) actions for judicial dissolution of a corporation, § 29-412.21. 6

That exhaustive scheme for challenging nonprofit corporate actions is incompatible

with OverDrive’s view that the Superior Court retains the unfettered power to

adjudicate any and all challenges that come before it in this area.

      It is true, as OverDrive notes, that the Nonprofit Corporation Act provides that

“principles of law and equity shall supplement” it, D.C. Code § 29-107.02, but that

is not to say that equitable causes of action survive the Act’s passage, as OverDrive

would have it. The courts’ residual equitable powers might be constrained to

fashioning remedies not expressly provided for in the statutory scheme, rather than

      6
        While OverDrive complains of IDPF’s failure to dissolve as planned, it has
never invoked § 29-412.21 or otherwise sought to compel IDPF’s dissolution.
                                          24

supplementing the causes of action permitted under the Act. See Thanos v. District

of Columbia, 109 A.3d 1084, 1093 (D.C. 2014) (our courts “have the broad authority

to fashion equitable relief” (second emphasis added)); see also Glasgow v. Camanne

Mgmt. Inc., 261 A.3d 208, 215-16 (D.C. 2021) (“A suit in equity does not lie where

there is a plain adequate and complete remedy at law.” (citation omitted)).

      And even if there are some causes of action to preclude nonprofit corporate

actions beyond what the Act authorizes, OverDrive never specifies what cause of

action it might have (either at law or in equity). Instead, to paraphrase, it invokes

our plenary equitable authority to dispense justice as we see it, and that is authority

we do not have. OverDrive has never identified a specific and freestanding claim

that could exist alongside the Act’s carefully tailored scheme for challenging

nonprofit corporate actions. That is no doubt why the trial court did not expressly

address the extent of its equitable authority, despite OverDrive’s scattershot and

perfunctory invocations of it. We thus reject OverDrive’s view that the trial court

had freestanding equitable authority to address and remedy any “unfair” practices.

To the extent some narrower cause of action survived the Nonprofit Corporation

Act’s passage, OverDrive has not even attempted to articulate its scope or

parameters, and we will not take up that task sua sponte. See Comford v. United

States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. 2008) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory
                                        25

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed

waived. It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal

way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument,

and put flesh on its bones.” (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st

Cir. 1990))).

                                       III.

      The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

                                                         So ordered.