Court Opinion

ID: 9579554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:07.344842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:34.964271
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from part v of the majority opinion regarding mediation sanctions. I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not including attorney fees for work performed during the first trial. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s award of sanctions under MCR 2.403(0).
Whether a party is entitled to sanctions and the amount of actual costs are to be determined by the trial court within its discretion. Dean v Tucker, 205 Mich App 547, 551; 517 NW2d 835 (1994). While it is correct that actual costs include a *419"reasonable attorney fee based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate as determined by the trial judge for services necessitated by the rejection of the mediation evaluation,” MCR 2.403(0)(6)(b), the cases cited by the majority do not support the proposition that plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees as part of the meditation sanctions for work performed for the first trial.
In Keiser v Allstate Ins Co, 195 Mich App 369; 491 NW2d 581 (1992), the mediation award was in the plaintiff’s favor, which the defendant accepted and the plaintiff rejected. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in an amount greater than the mediation evaluation. This Court reversed the jury’s verdict, ruling that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The defendant sought meditation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(0). This Court held that it is the ultimate verdict that the parties are left with after appellate review is complete that should be measured against the mediation evaluation to determine whether sanctions should be imposed on a rejecting party pursuant to MCR 2.403(0). Keiser, supra, pp 374-375. Thus, because the defendant won on appeal, the defendant was entitled to mediation sanctions.
In Michigan Basic Property Ins Ass’n v Hackert Furniture Distributing Co, Inc, 194 Mich App 230, 235; 486 NW2d 68 (1992), this Court only stated that the phrase "necessitated by the rejection” is intended as a temporal demarcation to permit recovery of reasonable attorney fees incurred after mediation is rejected, but not before. This Court further noted that the losing party should not be forced to pay for litigation hours expended through no fault of its own. Id., p 236.
Because Keiser indicates that it is the ultimate verdict that the parties are left with that should *420be measured against the mediation evaluation, I do not agree that Reiser supports the majority’s holding. Therefore, I would compare the outcome of the second trial to the mediation evaluation to determine the mediation sanctions that plaintiffs are entitled to in this case. It is patently unfair to force defendant to pay attorney fees as mediation sanctions for the first trial where the defendant successfully sought and received a new trial. The second trial was not necessitated by rejection of the mediation evaluation; rather, it was necessitated by an error in the proceedings of the first trial.
The mediation sanction rule should not be applied in such a manner as to penalize parties for successfully seeking a new trial or appellate reversal of the first trial. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling not to award attorney fees as part of mediation sanctions for work performed by plaintiffs’ attorneys in the first trial.
With respect to the remaining portions of the majority’s opinion, I concur.