Court Opinion

ID: 9519124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:09:37.799686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:47.656819
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDBERG, specially concurring. I am entirely in accord with the result reached in the above opinion on substantive legal grounds. However, I would prefer to reach the identical result by traveling a different road — the theory that this court has no jurisdiction of the appeal. On July 17,1975, on “plaintiff s motion for a preliminary injunction” the trial court ordered defendant restrained and enjoined from taking any action with regard to the Texas litigation “until further order of this Court.” On August 7,1975, defendant filed a motion for rehearing on the issuance of the injunction. On August 7, 1975, the trial court denied the motion for rehearing. On August 11,1975, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the orders of July 17, 1975, and August 7, 1975. The trial court record on appeal was filed in this court on October 6, 1975. On October 15,1975, plaintiff obtained the entry of a further order by the trial court that there was no just reason for delaying the enforcement of or appeal from the court’s order for injunction entered “July 16,1975”; apparently referring to the order stamped “July 17,1975” by the clerk. The jurisdiction of this court necessarily depends upon whether the injunctional order entered July 17,1975, is final or interlocutory. I am firm in the belief that this order was merely interlocutory. Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) refers to interlocutory orders granting an injunction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 307(a)(1).) The order of July 17, 1975, is expressly stated to be until further order of the court. The trial court therefore retained the power to modify, amend or vacate these orders at any time after the entry thereof. It is only where the order appealed from completely disposes of the entire controversy on the merits and finally terminates the litigation so that if the order should be affirmed the trial court need proceed only with execution of the judgment that an order may be classified as final. Roddy v. Armitage-Hamlin Corp. (1948), 401 Ill. 605, 83 N.E.2d 308, cited in Block v. Block (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 277, 278, 319 N.E.2d 116. See also Rotogravure Service v. R. W. Borrowdale Co. (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 606, 609, 344 N.E.2d 554; Factor v. Factor (1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 594, 596, 327 N.E.2d 396. It follows necessarily that this appeal was interlocutory and could have been perfected only under Supreme Court Rule 307. The Rule is clear and definite that, “[t]he record must be filed, in the Appellate Court” within 30 days from the entry of the interlocutory order, unless the time for filing the record is extended by the appellate court or a judge thereof. The record here was filed almost three months after the order, originally entered on July 17,1975, and very close to two months after the order of August 7, 1975, denying defendant’s motion for rehearing. No extension of time was ever requested or granted for the late filing of the record. It has been specifically held that this type of late filing of the record creates good reason for dismissal of the appeal. (Renfield Importers, Ltd. v. Modern Liquors, Inc. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 546, 549, 304 N.E.2d 626.) Renfield involved Rule 326 dealing with appeals from final judgments which provides that the record “shall be filed in the reviewing court within 63 days ° ° I can see no distinction between this Rule and Rule 307 which provides that the record “must be filed in the Appellate Court” within a 30-day period. I have considered Supreme Court Rule 301 which provides that, “The appeal is initiated by filing a notice of appeal. No other step is jurisdictional.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 301.) However, Rule 301 applies by its terms to final judgments. The former practice prior to January 1,1964, did not provide for a notice of appeal from interlocutory orders. It provided instead for perfection of the interlocutory appeal in the trial court by filing a bond for costs. Then also the filing of the record in the appellate court within 30 days was mandatory. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 110, par. 78.) In my opinion, consideration of this factor leads to the conclusion that the language of the present Rule 307, that “the record must be filed” within the designated time is necessarily mandatory. It is correct that before oral argument this court denied a motion of plaintiff to dismiss the appeal. However, I am of the opinion that this order was improvidently entered. Furthermore, this order was not final beyond correction. The jurisdiction of this court to proceed with an appeal is always an open question and may, and should, be raised by the court of its own motion at any time. Weber v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. (1973), 10 Ill. App. 3d 625, 629, 295 N.E.2d 41. As above shown, defendant attempted to salvage its right to appeal by requesting and obtaining the entry by the trial court of an order on October 15, 1975, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304 that there was no just reason for delaying enforcement of, or appeal from, the injunctional order. This order cannot serve to confer jurisdiction upon this court. Supreme Court Rule 304 by its terms is applicable only to appeals “from a final judgment.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 304(a); see Crane Paper Stock Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 61, 66, 344 N.E.2d 461. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.