Court Opinion

ID: 9689507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:37:40.019789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:49.562216
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, concurring. I believe we should take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law interpreting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994). In Davis, the Court stated that it was unwilling to extend the protection afforded by Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which requires that law enforcement immediately cease questioning upon a suspect’s clear assertion of the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. The Davis court refused to require yet another layer of protection that would prevent continued interrogation when the accused might want a lawyer. Davis, 512 U.S. 452. Thus, it declined to extend Edwards to require that police cease questioning when the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for the assistance of counsel. Id. The Court’s opinion in Davis makes clear that the standard of unequivocality is applicable only after the accused initially waives his or her rights and begins to make a statement: A suspect who knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to counsel after having that right explained to him has indicated his willingness to deal with the police unassisted. Although Edwards provides an additional protection — if a suspect subsequently requests an attorney, questioning must cease — it is one that must be affirmatively invoked by the suspect. Id. at 460-61. The Court held that, “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461. As noted by the majority, Robinson never waived his rights. Thus, his statement, “I don’t want to say anything right now,” was not required by Davis to be unequivocal. Rather, it was sufficient because it was made “in any manner.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.5 (2007); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966). Our prior case law seems to suggest a requirement of unequivocality even before a defendant waives his Miranda rights. In order to differentiate the standard applicable to the invocation of rights before waiver from the standard applicable when the defendant invokes his rights after waiver, it is necessary to review our decision in Bowen v. State, 322 Ark. 483, 911 S.W.2d 555 (1995). In Bowen, the accused was read his Miranda rights but made no indication that he understood or waived those rights. Id. The accused declined to sign a waiver-of-rights form, saying he “wanted to think about” whether to waive his rights and make a statement. Id. at 502, 911 S.W.2d at 564. However, the sheriff continued to question him, and the accused ultimately gave an inculpatory statement. Id. We held that the accused waived his rights by implication, as he continued to answer questions even after acknowledging his rights. Id. (citing Bryant v. State, 314 Ark. 130, 862 S.W.2d 215 (1993); Ward v. State, 308 Ark. 415, 827 S.W.2d 110 (1992); Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987)). We also suggested that the accused’s initial invocation was not sufficiently specific under Davis: “Our view of this matter is that, by saying he wanted to ‘think about’ waiver, Mr. Bowen indicated an understanding of what was at stake. We do not regard the statement as an invocation of his rights, however. In a recent case, the Supreme Court has held that the invocation of the right to counsel-must be made with specificity, [citing Davis.]” Bowen, 322 Ark. at 504, 911 S.W.2d at 565. I disagree with this characterization of Davis, because Davis does not mandate an unequivocal invocation before a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights. Davis, 512 U.S. 452. Nonetheless, Bowen is distinguishable on its facts. We stated in Bowen that the relevant question was not whether the accused’s statement that he wanted to “think about” waiver amounted to an invocation of his right to remain silent, but “whether a subsequent statement may imply waiver.” Bowen, 322 Ark. at 503, 911 S.W.2d at 565. Thus, we disposed of Bowen by dealing with waiver, whereas we approach the case at bar as a question of invocation. The majority is correct in refusing to extend the standard of unequivocality beyond the parameters set forth in Davis.