Court Opinion

ID: 9956319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 19:08:46.077501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:50.345826
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Dickenson v. Jackson, 2024-Ohio-1236.]

                                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                         WARREN COUNTY

 CHRISTOPHER DICKENSON,                           :

        Appellee,                                 :   CASE NO. CA2023-09-073

                                                  :          OPINION
     - vs -                                                   4/1/2024
                                                  :

 MELISSA JACKSON,                                 :

        Appellant.                                :

        CIVIL APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                       DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
                           Case No. 08DR032193

Melanie Walls Law, and Melanie B. Walls, for appellee.

Caparella-Kraemer & Associates, LLC, and Courtney N. Caparella-Kraemer, for
appellant.

        S. POWELL, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Melissa Jackson ("Mother"), appeals the decision of the Warren

County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting the motion for

contempt filed by her ex-husband, appellee, Christopher Dickenson ("Father"). Mother

also appeals the domestic relations court's decision ordering her to pay attorney fees and
                                                                              Warren CA2023-09-073

litigation expenses to Father. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the domestic

relations court's decision in both respects.

                                  Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} Mother and Father were married in Litchfield, Illinois on June 9, 2001. There

was one child born issue of the marriage, a girl, Anna, born on March 28, 2008. 1 Father

filed a complaint for divorce from Mother on August 1, 2008. After entering a shared

parenting plan, Mother and Father were subsequently divorced on April 10, 2009. The

parties' shared parenting plan provided Father, as the resident parent, parenting time with

Anna in accordance with the domestic relation court's "Basic I" parenting time schedule.

That schedule provided Father parenting time with Anna while she was between the ages

of two through 12 years old as follows:

                1. Weekends: Alternate weekends beginning Friday at 6:00
                p.m. and ending Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

                2. Weekdays: Every Wednesday (or other day by agreement)
                from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

        {¶ 3} Father was then to have the following parenting time with Anna when she

was between the ages of 13 years old through 15 years old:

                Weekends and Weekdays: It is recommended that the
                above schedule for children age two through twelve be
                continued through age fifteen if possible. However, parents
                should respect a teenager's need to spend time with peers
                and in organized activities, and less time with each parent,
                especially during weekends and summer holidays. Quality of
                time is more important than a rigid schedule. Flexibility in
                scheduling is necessary. When possible, it is preferable to
                consider the teenager's wishes as long as the parents agree.
                At a minimum, the non-residential parent may spend time with
                children in this age bracket every Wednesday from 5:30 p.m.
                to 8:30 p.m. and at least one overnight and day on alternating
                weekends.

1. To protect the child's privacy, this court has changed the child's name to "Anna" for purposes of issuing
this opinion. Anna was always either 13 or 14 years old relevant to this appeal.
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       {¶ 4} The shared parenting plan further provided Father with parenting time with

Anna from 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. on the July 4th holiday during even years. This would

include, for instance, the July 4, 2022 holiday.            This was in addition to the shared

parenting plan stating the following with respect to Anna's activities:

               Although it is in the best interests of the Child to take part in
               activities which provide enrichment for the Child, the parties
               acknowledge that they shall not, without the other's consent,
               schedule activities for the Child which interfere with the time
               that the other has possession of the Child. The parties will
               discuss the enrollment of the Child in extra-curricular activities
               prior to said enrollment and the other parent shall be provided
               with a schedule of these events.

       {¶ 5} On April 12, 2022, Father filed a motion for contempt against Mother. Within

that motion, Father alleged that Mother should be found in contempt for denying him his

parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022. Father also alleged that Mother

should be found in contempt for having "clearly and unambiguously" notified him that she

would be denying him extended parenting time with Anna during the upcoming summer

of 2022. This included, but was not limited to, Father's parenting time with Anna on the

upcoming July 4, 2022 holiday.

       {¶ 6} The matter ultimately came on for a two-day hearing before a domestic

relations court magistrate on January 19 and March 6, 2023.2 During this hearing, the

magistrate heard testimony from both Mother and Father. This included Father testifying

that, in addition to Mother being in contempt for denying him his parenting time with Anna

on Friday, January 21, 2022, Mother should also be found in contempt for denying him

his parenting time with Anna on the July 4, 2022 holiday. Father further testified that,

although it was not included within his contempt motion, Mother should be found in

2. Mother did not appear at the second hearing date, March 6, 2023, claiming she did not receive notice
of the hearing. Mother's attorney, however, was present at the March 6, 2023 hearing date, during which
she dismissed all of Mother's then pending motions that were to be addressed at that hearing.
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contempt for scheduling activities for Anna during Father's parenting time without first

discussing the matter with Father.

       {¶ 7} On April 6, 2023, the magistrate issued a decision finding Mother in

contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022.

In so holding, the magistrate stated:

              First, on Friday, January 21, 2022, Mother allowed [Anna] to
              choose which basketball game she wanted to attend [Milford
              or Lakota East/West]. This was during Father's parenting
              time. Mother admitted this. This caused Father to lose his
              Friday overnight parenting time. Mother's defense that her
              interpretation of the Warren County Basic Parenting
              Scheduled allowed Mother to do this is incorrect. Mother
              interpreted the rule for twelve (12) year olds as one weekend
              night and one weekend day, and that is what [Anna] chose.
              Mother failed to consider the fact that the Warren County
              Basic Parenting Schedule also states, in this same paragraph
              on page two (2), letter D., "When possible, it is preferable to
              consider the teenager's wishes as long as the parents agree."
              Father disagreed with the evening of January 21, 2022. There
              was testimony about whether this was the correct basketball
              game but that is irrelevant to the fact that Father was denied
              his overnight parenting time on January 21, 2022. Mother is
              in contempt of the [parties' shared parenting plan].

       {¶ 8} The magistrate also found Mother in contempt for denying Father his

parenting time with Anna on the July 4, 2022 holiday. This was in addition to the

magistrate finding Mother in contempt for scheduling activities for Anna during Father's

parenting time without first discussing the matter with Father. This included Mother

signing Anna up for cross-country, track, and basketball.

       {¶ 9} Upon finding Mother in contempt, the magistrate then ordered Mother to

pay a total of $2,250 in attorney fees to Father; $750 in attorney fees "for being found in

contempt," plus an additional $1,500 in attorney fees and litigation expenses for having

filed "numerous motions" that "were voluntarily withdrawn on the second day of hearings,"

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March 6, 2023, for which Father was billed a total of $3,374.10.3                     The magistrate

determined that this additional award of attorney fees and litigation expenses was

"equitable" given "Mother's conduct, and the withdrawal of all of her motions the second

day of the hearings," when also taking into consideration Father had also "switched

attorneys" while these proceedings were ongoing, thereby requiring Father's newly

retained counsel "to do some repetitive work."

        {¶ 10} On April 18, 2023, Mother filed an objection to the magistrate's decision. To

support her objection, Mother provided a general, boilerplate objection to the magistrate's

decision finding her in contempt. Specifically, Mother stated within her objection the

following:

                Plaintiff (sic) objects to the Magistrate's finding of contempt.
                Defendant also reserves the right to object to other Orders
                contained within the Decision, after full review of the
                transcript.

                Defendant respectfully requests more time to allow for the
                preparation of the transcript. Once the transcript is complete,
                counsel for Defendant will review said transcript, which will
                allow counsel to lay a more solid foundation and appropriately
                supplement the objection.

        {¶ 11} On July 24, 2023, Mother filed supplemental objections to the magistrate's

decision finding her in contempt. This included Mother arguing against the magistrate's

decision finding her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on

Friday, January 21, 2022 and on the July 4, 2022 holiday. This also included Mother

arguing against the magistrate's decision finding her in contempt for scheduling activities

for Anna that occurred during Father's parenting time without first discussing the matter

with Father. This was in addition to Mother arguing against the magistrate's decision

3. The "numerous motions" the magistrate was referring to included Mother filing her own motion for
contempt against Father, as well as Mother filing a motion to modify Father's child support obligation, a
motion requesting the domestic relations court conduct an interview with Anna, and a motion to modify her
and Father's shared parenting plan.
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                                                                    Warren CA2023-09-073

ordering her to pay $2,250 in attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father.

       {¶ 12} On August 10, 2023, the domestic relations court issued a decision on

Mother's objections. Within that decision, the domestic relations court initially overruled

Mother's objection to the magistrate's decision finding her in contempt for denying Father

his parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022. In so doing, the domestic

relations court determined that the parties' shared parenting plan, along with the domestic

relations court's own applicable "Basic I" parenting time schedule, did not "give Mother

the authority to override Father's decision on the events of a particular weekend." The

domestic relations court instead found the language set forth within its "Basic I" parenting

time schedule for children aged 13 years old to 15 years old was:

              a statement designed to encourage Father to recognize that,
              on his weekends, a child may have other plans or activities,
              and Father should try to accommodate those other events.
              Thus, it was possible for Father to exercise his weekend time
              that weekend, and therefore [it was] Father, not Mother, [who]
              should have been afforded the choice of whether to use all of
              it or not.

       {¶ 13} The domestic relations court also overruled Mother's objection to the

magistrate's decision finding her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with

Anna on the July 4, 2022 holiday. In so holding, the domestic relations court rejected

Mother's argument that she could not be held in contempt for denying Father his parenting

time on that date because "no specific motion was filed by Father that alleged contempt

regarding that holiday." In reaching this decision, the domestic relations court determined

that Father's motion for contempt:

              sufficiently put Mother on notice of what she needed to defend
              when the matter came before the Court. As a result, Mother's
              argument that an allegation of anticipatory contempt of court
              is not ripe for adjudication, the Court finds that it was when the
              hearing on the motion occurred after the violation.

       {¶ 14} The domestic relations court further overruled Mother's objection to the

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magistrate's decision finding her in contempt for scheduling activities for Anna that

occurred during Father's parenting time without first discussing the matter with Father.

The domestic relations court did this by finding "this was not specifically objected to" in

Mother's initial objection to the magistrate's decision filed on April 18, 2023. This was in

addition to the domestic relations court overruling Mother's objection to the magistrate's

decision ordering her to pay $2,250 in attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father.

                   Mother's Appeal and Four Assignments of Error

       {¶ 15} On September 12, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the

domestic relations court's decision finding her in contempt and ordering her to pay

attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father. Mother's appeal now properly before this

court for decision, Mother has raised four assignments of error for review.

                                Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOTHER BY

FINDING MOTHER IN CONTEMPT FOR NOT PROVIDING FATHER PARENTING TIME

THE WEEKEND OF JANUARY 21, 2022.

       {¶ 17} In her first assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations court

erred by finding her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on Friday,

January 21, 2022. We disagree.

                      Rule of Law: Contempt and R.C. 2705.02(A)

       {¶ 18} "Disobedience to court orders may be punished by contempt." Cottrell v.

Cottrell, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-10-105, 2013-Ohio-2397, ¶ 11. This rule is

codified in R.C. 2705.02(A), which provides that, a person guilty of any of the following

acts may be punished as for a contempt, "[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ,

process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or officer[.]"          "To support a

contempt finding, the moving party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that

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a valid court order exists, that the offending party had knowledge of the order, and that

the offending party violated such order." Delgado v. Delgado, 12th Dist. Clermont No.

CA2018-03-007, 2018-Ohio-4938, ¶ 36. "Clear and convincing evidence is 'that measure

or degree of proof which is more than a mere "preponderance of the evidence," but not

to the extent of such certainty as is required "beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal

cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as

to the facts sought to be established.'" State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d

288, 2009-Ohio-5327, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus.

                         Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion

       {¶ 19} "This court reviews a domestic relations court's determination of a contempt

motion for an abuse of discretion." Wiest v. Carmosino, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-

10-073, 2019-Ohio-3536, ¶ 17. "An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of

law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable." Maloney v. Maloney, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-10-098, 2016-

Ohio-7837, ¶ 14, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "Most

cases in which an abuse of discretion is asserted involve claims that the decision is

unreasonable." Schaible v. Schaible, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-06-029, 2022-

Ohio-4717, ¶ 24. "A decision is 'unreasonable' when there is no sound reasoning process

to support it." Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2007-02-021, 2007-Ohio-

6569, ¶ 12, citing AAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Redevelopment Corp.,

50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).        "An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate

determining principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standard." Crawford v.

Fisher, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-366, 2015-Ohio-114, ¶ 5. "An unconscionable

decision may be defined as one that affronts the sense of justice, decency, or

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reasonableness." Fernando v. Fernando, 10th Dist. Franklin No. Franklin No. 16AP-788,

2017-Ohio-9323, ¶ 7.

                            Mother's Argument and Analysis

       {¶ 20} Mother argues the domestic relations court erred by finding her in contempt

for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022 because

Father received parenting time with Anna beginning the next morning, Saturday, January

22, 2022 at 6:00 a.m. through Sunday, January 23, 2022 at 6:00 p.m.             Therefore,

according to Mother, the domestic relations court erred by finding her in contempt for

denying Father his parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022 because "the

minimum suggested weekend parenting time schedule of one overnight and day was

adhered to." However, just as the domestic relations court found, Mother's understanding

of what is required by the domestic relations court's "Basic I" parenting time schedule for

a 13-through-15-year-old child like Anna is flawed.

       {¶ 21} Contrary to Mother's claim, the domestic relation court's "Basic I" parenting

time schedule for Anna recommended Father, as the nonresidential parent, to continue

having parenting time with Anna in accordance with the same parenting time schedule

that Father had with Anna when she was between the ages of two and 12 years, if

possible. That being, every Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and on alternate

weekends beginning on Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. The only difference

between the two schedules⎯the two-to-12-year-old schedule and the 13-through-15-

year-old schedule⎯was the domestic relations court's notice to both Mother and Father

that they "should respect [Anna's] need to spend time with peers and in organized

activities, and less time with each [of them], especially during weekends and summer

holidays," thereby making "[f]lexibility in scheduling * * * necessary." But, even then,

neither the parties' shared parenting plan nor the domestic relations court's "Basic I"
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parenting time schedule, provided Anna with the ultimate authority over her schedule,

irrespective of what Father may (or may not) have planned during his weekend parenting

time with her. This includes Father's parenting time with Anna on Friday, January 21,

2022.

        {¶ 22} Rather, the domestic relations court's "Basic I" parenting time schedule for

the then 13-through-15-year-old Anna simply noted that it would be "preferable" for both

Mother and Father to consider Anna's wishes "[w]hen possible" and "as long as the

parents agree." Father clearly did not agree with Mother as it relates to Anna's wishes

for Friday, January 21, 2022. The fact that Father received parenting time with Anna

beginning on Saturday, January 22, 2022 at 6:00 a.m. through Sunday, January 23, 2022

at 6:00 p.m. does not change this fact. Again, the domestic relation court's "Basic I"

parenting time schedule for Anna recommended Father, as the nonresidential parent, to

continue having parenting time with Anna in accordance with the same parenting time

schedule that Father had with Anna when she was between the ages of two and 12, if

possible. That being, every Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. and on alternate

weekends beginning on Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. It is only "when

possible" and "as long as the parents agree" that Father should receive anything less.

This holds true even if Anna's wishes diverge from that of Father's. It was not error,

therefore, for the domestic relations to find Mother lacked "the authority to override

Father's decision on the events of a particular weekend," including that of Friday, January

21, 2022.

        {¶ 23} In so holding, we note that at the first day of the two-day hearing on Father's

motion for contempt, Father testified that he did not "think it's too much to ask for a parent

to tell a thirteen year old girl what they can or can't do." Father also testified that:

               In this case, I have shown time and time, again, where I do

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                respect [Anna's wishes for what she does during his weekend
                parenting time]. But in the case in question, I did not. It
                doesn't say that every time your teenage daughter asks can I
                go out Friday night, you have to say yes.

       {¶ 24} This is in addition to Father testifying that nowhere within the domestic

relations court's "Basic I" parenting time schedule for 13-through-15-year-old children

"does it say the nonresidential parent will do anything the teenage daughter asks. And

I'm following my Basic I weekends. So…" We agree with Father. This is because, as

stated above, neither the parties' shared parenting plan, nor the domestic relations court's

"Basic I" parenting time schedule, provided either Anna or Mother with the ultimate

authority over her schedule, irrespective of what Father may (or may not) have planned

during his weekend parenting time with her. Accordingly, finding no error in the domestic

relations court's decision finding Mother in contempt for denying Father his parenting time

with Anna on Friday, January 21, 2022, Mother's first assignment of error lacks merit and

is overruled.

                                Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 25} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOTHER BY

FINDING MOTHER IN CONTEMPT WHERE NO MOTION RELATING TO THE

CONTEMPT WAS EVER FILED OR SPECIFICALLY PLED.

       {¶ 26} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations

court erred by finding her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on

the July 4, 2022 holiday. To support this claim, Mother initially argues that it was error for

the domestic relations court to find her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time

with Anna on this holiday because the "first reference to the Fourth of July at all was

during the trial in the within proceedings." We disagree. This is because, while not

explicit, Father's motion for contempt specifically stated that Mother should be found in

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contempt for "clearly and unambiguously" notifying him that she would be denying him

extended parenting time with Anna during the then upcoming summer of 2022. Given the

notice that Father provided to Mother, this included, but was not limited to, Mother denying

Father his parenting time with Anna on the impending July 4, 2022 holiday. Therefore,

just as the domestic relations court found, and with which we agree, Father's motion for

contempt "sufficiently put Mother on notice of what she needed to defend when the matter

came before the Court." Mother's claim otherwise lacks merit.

       {¶ 27} Also lacking merit is Mother's claim that the domestic relations court erred

by finding her in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on the July 4,

2022 holiday because Father's motion for contempt was filed approximately three months

prior to that date, on April 12, 2022, thereby rendering Father's contempt motion a request

for "anticipatory contempt" based upon her "prospective conduct" rather than on any past

conduct on her part. It is well established that "'[t]here is no doctrine of anticipatory

contempt in our legal system. An adjudication of contempt relates to past conduct, not

prospective conduct.'" Hetterick v. Hetterick, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2012-02-002, 2013-

Ohio-15, ¶ 42, quoting Kirk v. Kirk, 172 Ohio App. 3d 404, 2007-Ohio-3140 ¶ 5 (3rd Dist.).

       {¶ 28} However, just as the domestic relations court found, "Mother's argument

that an allegation of anticipatory contempt of court is not ripe for adjudication, the Court

finds that it was when the hearing on the motion occurred after the violation." We agree.

This makes sense when considering the domestic relations court issued its decision

finding Mother in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on the July 4,

2022 holiday over a year later, on August 23, 2023, well after Mother had, in fact, denied

Father his parenting time with Anna on that date. Therefore, contrary to Mother's claim,

the domestic relations court did not err by finding Mother in contempt for denying Father

his parenting time with Anna on the July 4, 2022 holiday where Father's motion for

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contempt was filed prior to that date. Mother's claim otherwise again lacks merit.

       {¶ 29} In so holding, we note that this decision shall be limited to the specific facts

and circumstances of this case and should not in any way be considered as this court

approving contempt motions being filed based solely upon one party's belief that the other

party is going to violate the court's order at some point in the future. "To hold otherwise

would result in the dockets of the courts being filled with antagonistic parties filing motions

to show cause merely because they believe the other party is going to violate the court's

orders." Kirk, 2007-Ohio-3140 at ¶ 5. In this case, however, the record indicates that

Mother "clearly and unambiguously" notified Father that she would be denying him

extended parenting time with Anna during the then upcoming summer of 2022. This

included, but was not limited to, Father's parenting time with Anna on the impending July

4, 2022 holiday.     Therefore, the domestic relations court's contempt finding, which

occurred long after the contempt actually occurred in this case, is neither anticipatory nor

error that necessitates reversal.

       {¶ 30} Mother's express notice to Father that she would be denying Father his

parenting time with Anna on the July 4, 2022 holiday prompted Father to file his motion

for contempt in hopes that the domestic relations court could resolve the issue prior to

that date. We cannot fault Father for filing his motion for contempt prematurely given

Mother's prior history of denying Father his parenting time with Anna. This is particularly

true here when considering the July 4, 2022 holiday was the lone prospective date in

which Father's motion for contempt was based, whereas others were past dates in which

there was no dispute that Mother had already denied Father his parenting time with

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Anna.4 Accordingly, finding no error in the domestic relations court's decision finding

Mother in contempt for denying Father his parenting time with Anna on the July 4, 2022

holiday, Mother's second assignment of error also lacks merit and is overruled.

                                    Assignment of Error No. 3:

        {¶ 31} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MOTHER DID NOT

SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT RELATING TO

ENROLLMENT OF THE MINOR CHILD IN ACTIVITIES.

        {¶ 32} In her third assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations court

erred by finding she had not specifically objected, as part of her original and supplemental

objections to the magistrate's decision filed on April 18 and July 24, 2023, respectively,

to the magistrate's decision finding her in contempt for scheduling activities for Anna that

occurred during Father's parenting time without first discussing the matter with Father.

We agree with Mother. That is to say, we agree that Mother specifically raised this issue

as part of her supplemental objections to the magistrate's decision filed with the domestic

relations court on July 24, 2023.

        {¶ 33} However, contrary to Mother's claim, the fact that Mother raised this issue

as part of her supplemental objections to the magistrate's decision does not necessarily

mean this matter must be reversed and remanded to the domestic relations court for

consideration of the issue. This is because, although raised as part of her supplemental

objections, Mother never raised any challenge, at either the first or second day of the two-

day hearing on Father's motion for contempt, to the question of whether Mother could be

found in contempt for scheduling activities for Anna that occurred during Father's

4. The past dates included Friday, January 21, 2022 as discussed under Mother's first assignment of error,
as well as October 29 through October 31, 2022, days in which Father later received make-up parenting
time with Anna from Mother.
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parenting time without first discussing the matter with Father. By failing to object in the

first instance, Mother implicitly acquiesced to that issue being litigated and made a part

of what the magistrate was to decide when ruling on Father's motion for contempt.

       {¶ 34} In the absence of a timely objection at the two-day hearing held on Father's

contempt motion, and when considering there is a complete lack of any reluctance on

Mother's part to allow Father to testify on the issue of whether Mother could be found in

contempt for scheduling activities for Anna during Father's parenting time without first

discussing the matter with Father, we find Mother has waived the right to contest this

issue on appeal. This holds true even though Mother raised that issue as part of her

supplemental objections to the magistrate's decision filed with the domestic relations

court on July 24, 2023. See generally Courtney v. Courtney, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 94-

T-5049, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5423, *10 (Dec. 2, 1994) ("In the absence of a timely

objection, appellant has waived the right to contest this issue on appeal. Certainly, this

should still be the case when there is a complete absence of even a hint of any reluctance

to the taking of testimony").

       {¶ 35} In so holding, we note the well-established principle that, "[u]nder the invited

error doctrine, a party will not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself

invited or induced the trial court to make." Klein v. Dietz, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 95 CA

47, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6196, *22 (Dec. 16, 1998). Such is the case here. It was

Mother's failure to object, at either the first or second day of the two-day hearing on

Father's motion for contempt, that ultimately resulted in the question of whether Mother

should be found in contempt for scheduling activities for Anna during Father's parenting

time without first discussing the matter with Father being litigated and presented to the

magistrate for decision. Therefore, finding no error that warrants reversal of the domestic

relations court's decision, Mother's third assignment of error likewise lacks merit and is

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                                                                  Warren CA2023-09-073

overruled.

                                Assignment of Error No. 4:

       {¶ 36} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MOTHER IN

AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS TO FATHER BASED UPON IMPROPER

FINDINGS OF CONTEMPT.

       {¶ 37} In her fourth assignment of error, Mother argues the domestic relations

court erred by ordering her to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father. We

disagree.

         Rule of Law: Attorney Fees, Litigation Expenses, and R.C. 3105.73(B)

       {¶ 38} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B), in any postdecree motion or proceeding that

arises out of an action for divorce, a domestic relations court is authorized to "award all

or part of reasonable attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court

finds the award equitable." In determining whether such an award is equitable, the

domestic relations court "may consider the parties' income, the conduct of the parties,

and any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not consider the

parties' assets." Id. However, although statutorily authorized to do so, the domestic

relations court is not obligated to make such an award in every case. Davis v. Davis, 6th

Dist. Wood No. WD-15-028, 2016-Ohio-1388, ¶ 31. The decision instead rests within the

domestic relations court's sound discretion. Theurer v. Foster-Theurer, 12th Dist. Warren

Nos. CA2008-06-074 and CA2008-06-083, 2009-Ohio-1457, ¶ 57.

       {¶ 39} Given these principles, it is now well established that the domestic relations

court's "decision to award attorney fees will be reversed only if it amounts to an abuse of

discretion." Coomes v. Coomes, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-10-076, 2020-Ohio-

3839, ¶ 12. "An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law; it implies that the trial

court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably." Combs v. Ellington, 12th Dist.

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                                                                  Warren CA2023-09-073

Butler CA2022-01-001, 2022-Ohio-3514, ¶ 18, citing Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219.

"The vast majority of cases in which an abuse of discretion is asserted involve claims that

the decision is unreasonable." Bonifield v. Bonifield, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-02-

022, 2021-Ohio-95, ¶ 11. "A decision is 'unreasonable' when there is no sound reasoning

process to support it." Vaughn, 2007-Ohio-6569 at ¶ 12.

                            Mother's Argument and Analysis

       {¶ 40} Mother argues that, since the domestic relations court's decision finding her

in contempt was "not proper," the domestic relations court's order requiring her to pay

attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father was also not proper. We agree that, had

the domestic relations court erred by finding Mother in contempt, upholding the domestic

relations court's order requiring Mother to pay attorney fees and litigation expenses to

Father would be inequitable. See Manker v. Manker, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2005-

12-106, 2006-Ohio-6545, ¶ 25 (finding a domestic relations court's decision ordering

appellant to pay attorney fees to appellee was "inequitable" where the award of attorney

fees "was based on the contempt finding which we found was error in the first assignment

of error"). However, as noted above when overruling Mother's first, second, and third

assignments of error, the domestic relations court's decision finding Mother in contempt

was proper, thereby rendering Mother's argument without merit.

       {¶ 41} Moreover, to the extent that Mother is arguing the domestic relations court's

decision is impossible to decipher, thus making it "impossible to know whether there was

a multiplication of the fee awarded based upon the number of original contempt findings,"

we agree with the domestic relations court when it stated, "[r]egarding that argument, the

Court finds the attorney fee was not multiplied because of multiple violations. The amount

awarded was the same as it would have been for just one violation." Mother's argument

otherwise lacks merit. Accordingly, finding no merit to any of the arguments raised by

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Mother in support of her fourth assignment of error, including those arguments raised by

Mother not directly addressed herein, Mother's fourth assignment of error similarly lacks

merit and is overruled.

                                      Conclusion

      {¶ 42} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of Mother's four

assignments of error presented to this court for review, Mother's appeal from the domestic

relations court's decision granting Father's motion for contempt and ordering Mother to

pay attorney fees and litigation expenses to Father is denied.

      {¶ 43} Judgment affirmed.

      HENDRICKSON and PIPER, JJ., concur.

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