Court Opinion

ID: 9493645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:13:57.09748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:56.684480
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately only to express my reservations about the practice of permitting juries to submit questions to witnesses during the course of a trial. This record provides no basis for a finding of error as a result of the trial judge permitting jurors to submit written questions to witnesses. The issues in this case are complex and the trial judge utilized sufficient precautions to reduce any possibility of unfair prejudice. However, my view is that the practice of permitting jurors to submit questions to witnesses should be relegated to rare or extraordinarily complex cases in which it is clearly necessary. Few trials fit this category. I agree with the Seventh Circuit that the practice should not be encouraged, but discouraged. See United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir.1996).
Other Circuits agree. The Second Circuit “strongly discourage[s]” its use, for the very same reason that Richardson objected to its use in the present case — it “risks turning jurors into advocates, compromising their neutrality” and “is a subliminal invitation to launch prematurely into evaluating the evidence.” United States v. Bush, 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995). These dangers are considerable and “can undermine the orderly process of the trial to verdict.” DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516, 517 (4th Cir.1985).
The most troubling problem associated with juror questioning is the potential to convert jurors into partial advocates. See Bush, 47 F.3d at 515. This threatens the foundation of our judicial system and the jury’s role as a neutral factfinder. See DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516. Remedial instructions by the court cannot always *1295remedy the adverse effects that may ensue from jurors’ questions, especially when counsel waives issues on appeal by not objecting to questions for fear of antagonizing the jury. See Bush, 47 F.3d at 515.
In Richardson’s case, the district court employed appropriate safeguards to minimize the risks associated with the practice. The judge required the jurors to reduce their questions to writing for their consideration by the judge prior to their submission to the witnesses. Counsel’s objections were heard at sidebar outside of the hearing range of the jurors and the questions were not of such number and character to rise to an objectionable level so as to compromise the fairness of Richardson’s trial. As a general rule, however, “the risks outweigh the benefits.” Feinberg, 89 F.3d at 337.
The First Circuit has held that the practice of permitting jurors to submit questions to witnesses during the course of a contested trial “should be employed sparingly and with great circumspection.” United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir.1992). This is particularly true in a criminal trial where:
The dynamics ... are extremely sensitive. Innovations that carry the potential for disrupting those dynamics are risky. Juror participation in the examination of witnesses represents a significant innovation, transferring the jurors’ role from a purely passive one to a partially interactive one. The practice also delays the pace of the trial, creates a certain awkwardness for lawyers wish-. ing to object to juror-inspired questions, and runs a risk of undermining litigation strategies.
Id. Although the trial judge may take precautionary measures similar to those employed in the present case to avoid unfair prejudice,' such measures may have the potential to “embarrass or even antagonize the jurors if they sense that their pursuit of the truth has been thwarted by rules they do not understand.” Bush, 47 F.3d at 515. Even with remedial instruc-:the poison introduced by an improper inquiry from a fellow juror has already been absorbed by the entire jury.” Id. tions,
I concur in the panel opinion, given well-established authority that permitting juror questions in a criminal case is a matter that is vested within the sound discretion of the trial court. See id. at 514; Sutton, 970 F.2d at 1005. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) permits the trial court to “ ‘exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses.’ ” Bush, 47 F.3d at 514. Courts must balance the benefits and risks of juror questioning and their respective effect on litigants, witnesses, attorneys, jurors and the judicial system. My study of the issue leads me to believe that, in most cases, the dangers of the practice outweigh the benefits. Although this case presents no reversible error resulting from its use, I believe that the practice should be used sparingly.