Court Opinion

ID: 9601626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:48:05.227844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:15.937352
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in result). I concur in the result. The Legislature enacted the Workmen’s Compensation Act a half century ago. By additions, amendments, and rewriting of its provisions, the Legislature has created a monster that often defies the wisdom of Solomon and the dexterity of Houdini. I write harshly to alert the Legislature to the need of a Workmen’s Compensation Act based upon common sense and clear language that meets the challenge of today; provided, of course, the Supreme Court does not deny publication of this opinion. The interplay of the words “accident,” “injury,” “accidental injury,” “disability,” “total and partial disability,” on a crossword puzzle would please the lawyers and the judiciary. But to use the interplay in the determination of workmen’s compensation benefits does not conform to the normal wisdom of the Legislature. We have resolved these puzzling problems by judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, there has been constant disagreement of what we believed to be fair and equitable in each case. Let us turn to the present case. The date of plaintiff’s accident was October 2, 1976. Effective July 1,1976, the rate of compensation to be paid the workman was 78% of the average weekly wage fixed by the Employment Security Commission. The Commission fixed the amount of compensation,' effective at the time of the accident, at $114.61 per week as the average weekly wage. The date of disability was August 28, 1977. Effective July 1, 1977, the rate of compensation to be paid the workman increased to 89% of the average weekly wage to be fixed by the Employment Security Commission. The Commission fixed the amount of compensation, effective at the time of disability, at $142.59 per week as the average weekly wage. See § 52-1-41, N.M.S.A.1978, enacted Laws 1975, ch. 284, § 8. Subsection B says: [T]he average weekly wage in the state shall be determined by the employment security commission * * *. Section 52-1-20, enacted in 1965, is entitled “Determination of average weekly wage.” It provides a formula by which the court shall determine the average weekly wage. The average weekly wage was computed by the remuneration the workman was receiving “at the time of the accident.” To me, this long and complicated section was impliedly repealed by § 52-l-41(B) enacted years later. The question for decision is: At what rate does an employer begin to pay the workman his average weekly wage, the rate in effect at the time of the accident or the time of disability? Let us note some of the statutory provisions. Section 52-1-40 entitled “Waiting period” reads: No compensation benefits shall be allowed * * * for any accidental injury which does not result in the workman’s death, or in a disability which lasts for more than seven days; provided, however, if the period of the workman’s disability lasts for more than four weeks from the date of his accidental injury, compensation benefits shall be allowed from the date of disability. [Emphasis added.] Section 52-l-41(C) reads: The average weekly wage in the state, determined as provided in Subsection B of this section, shall be applicable for the full period during which compensation is payable, when the date of the occurrence of an accidental injury falls within the calendar year commencing January 1 following the June 30 determination. [Emphasis added.] Section 52-1-48 reads: The benefits that a workman shall receive during the entire period of disability, and the benefits for death, shall be based on, and limited to, the benefits in effect on the date of the accidental injury resulting in the disability or death. [Emphasis added.] Section 52-l-41(A) begins: For total disability the workman shall receive, during the period of that disability [a rate of compensation] * * *. [Emphasis added.] Section 52-1-42, on partial disability, uses the same language. We note that the language used, as related to compensation benefits, speaks in terms of “disability,” not “accident.” Section 52-1-41 was in effect both at the date of the accident and at the date of disability. There was one accident and one disability. I choose to hold that the employer shall begin to pay the workman his average weekly rate from the date of disability because a workman is not entitled to compensation for the mere happening of an accident. My opinion in De La Torre v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 89 N.M. 683, 556 P.2d 839 (Ct.App.1976) must not be misinterpreted. In De La Torre, the first accident which occurred in 1967 was governed by a statute of limitations that did not toll the limitation period. Thereafter, plaintiff completely recovered. At the time of the second accident which occurred in 1974, the amended limitation statute of 1967 which did toll the limitation period,.was in effect. Because public policy demanded it, we held that the one year period of limitation was tolled and plaintiff’s complaint was filed in time. I said: * * * The 1967 statute applies because the date of disability is critical and the law effective at the time controls. [89 N.M. at 686, 556 P.2d at 842.] In Moorhead v. Gray Ranch Co., 90 N.M. 220, 224, 561 P.2d 493 (Ct.App.1977), we said: * * * Therefore, De La Torre is authority for the proposition that the rate of compensation should be based upon the applicable law on the date of disability. In this case, total disability commenced in January of 1975 and the rate of compensation should be based upon the statutory rate in effect at that time. [Emphasis added.] De La Torre was not authority for the proposition stated. De La Torre involved two separate accidents, disabilities, and two separate statutes. In the instant case, we are involved with one accident, one disability, and one statute that covers the date of the accident and the date of disability. However, I do agree in principle, the rule in De La Torre, that the law effective at the time of disability controls and should be applied to the instant case. In Herndon, cited in Judge Walters’ opinion, I said: * * * [Plaintiff] suffered total disability as of September 2,1975 and is entitled to disability benefits as of that date. [Not June 4, 1975.] In Lamont v. New Mexico Military Institute, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774 (1978), this Court, without reference to § 52-1-41 then in effect, decided that the amount fixed as the rate of compensation on January 21, 1977, the date of disability, was correct. Based upon the foregoing discussion, I concur with Judge Walters’ opinion. However, in my opinion, plaintiff should be awarded an attorney fee of $2,500 for services rendered in this appeal.