Court Opinion

ID: 9593113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:19:50.437485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:18.554333
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent.
I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in including defendant’s inheritance from his father’s estate as part of the marital estate and in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff. I would, however, agree with the majority and affirm the distribution of the marital assets, not including the *115inheritance, and the award of alimony based on the trial court’s finding of fault.
The parties had agreed to separate before plaintiff’s diagnosis of cancer. In fact, this marriage appears to have been star-crossed from the beginning. In 1984 or early 1985, the parties agreed that they would stay together until their daughter was married and their son graduated from college. Defendant moved out of the marital home in October 1985. The divorce complaint was filed in February 1986. The marital estate was computed at $168,500 and plaintiff was awarded three-fourths of that estate. Plaintiff’s complaint for divorce preceded the death of defendant’s father, and preceded by a year any distribution from the estate to the defendant. There simply can be no argument that the wife contributed to the inheritance or relied on it. If the gender of the parties were reversed and the trial court invaded the wife’s inheritance, oh how the rafters would ring. If the rule in Charlton v Charlton, 397 Mich 84, 94; 243 NW2d 261 (1976), and Grotelueschen v Grotelueschen, 113 Mich App 395; 318 NW2d 227 (1982), is gender neutral, then the defendant’s inheritance was his sole and separate property.
In Lee v Lee, 191 Mich. App 73, 78-79; 477 NW2d 429 (1991), our most recent word on the subject, we held that "[plaintiff’s inheritance was her separate property and should have been distributed as part of the marital estate only if the remaining property was insufficient for the suitable support and maintenance of defendant, MCL 552.33; MSA 25.103, or if defendant had contributed to its acquisition, improvement, or accumulation.” In this case, the court was concerned about the wife’s standard of living and therefore awarded alimony. There was no need to invade defendant’s inheritance to maintain plaintiff’s *116standard of living, and I believe it was an error of law to invade the inheritance to increase the plaintiff’s standard of living.
The trial court also erred in awarding attorney fees. This is not the first time a majority of a panel of this Court has diluted or disregarded the hitherto long-established rule regarding attorney fees. I quote from my own dissent in Wilcher v Wilcher, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided August 27, 1991 (Docket No. 123315):
Attorney fees are not awarded as a matter of right but only when necessary to allow a party to carry on or defend an action. Vaclav v Vaclav, 96 Mich App 584, 593; 293 NW2d 613 (1980); Zechlin v Zechlin [sic, Zecchin v Zecchin], 149 Mich App 723; 386 NW2d 652 (1986). The trial judge in this case did not make a finding as to the necessity of an award of attorney fees. Clearly on this record she could not. The majority notes that defendant’s monthly take home pay is considerably less than plaintiff’s and then concludes, ipso facto, that that necessitates an attorney fee award. I think that is plain wrong. It was clearly erroneous for the trial judge to base her determination of defendant’s ability to carry on or defend the action on a comparison of defendant’s income to plaintiff’s. It is defendant’s financial status alone which must be examined to determine her ability to pay. See, e.g., Tomblinson v Tomblinson, 183 Mich App 589, 593; 455 NW2d 346 (1990). Plaintiff’s financial position is of absolutely no consequence to such a determination. Besides the alimony, half the house, and considerable assets, only one of which establishes her ability to pay—a fidelity Michigan tax-free account in the amount of $75,191 defendant was employed as a legal secretary grossing $27,000 yearly in salary. Defendant made no showing that these assets were inadequate to allow her to carry on or defend the action.
*117The reasons for awarding attorney fees in this case are no better than the reasons described above. Reliance on the elastic language in Vollmer v Vollmer, 187 Mich App 688; 468 NW2d 236 (1991), and Curylo v Curylo, 104 Mich App 340; 304 NW2d 575 (1981), gives unmerited support to what I consider to be a discredited line of authority. A trial judge should not have unlimited discretion relative to the award of attorney fees in a divorce case. Divorce litigation is expensive for both parties. To the extent possible, each party should be responsible for its own attorney fees absent an inability to carry on or defend the action. To hold otherwise is to encourage excesses.
I would reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees and its inclusion of defendant’s inheritance from his father’s estate.