Court Opinion

ID: 9538343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:35:22.361203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:46.737452
License: Public Domain

SIMPSON, Justice.
I dissent.
*355No law is declared or established, since only two’ agree with the opinion, the other two limiting agreement to the result, namely, reversing the trial court. I don’t think the law should operate to bring about that result, since there is no certainty as to the law- governing.
It will be my endeavor to rationalize a proper decision of the case, with certain well-established legal guideposts to set direction.
This is not a case where a court, having taken jurisdiction of a matter, tries to abdicate its powers in favor of another court. It is a case to revoke and annul letters of administration previously issued because, after due hearing, the court has become convinced that an administration on the estate is not necessary and that letters were improvidently issued. It is universally' held that, irrespective of statute, the court issuing such letters has inherent power to revoke them under such circumstances. Murphy v. Freeman, 220 Ala. 634, 637, 127 So. 199, 70 A.L.R. 381; 33 C.J.S., Executors and Administrators, § 84, p. 1018; Starlin v. Love, 237 Ala. 38, 185 So. 380; Curtis v. Williams, 33 Ala. 570.
In line with this principle it has been consistently held that where the estate owed no debts, or, owing debts, satisfactory arrangement for - taking care of them has been made between the creditors and heirs, and no other sufficient cause is made to appear for administering, an administration on the estate is not necessary and if, under suoh circumstances, letters 'have been issued, the issuing court will revoke them as improvidently granted. Murp'hy v. Freeman, supra.
The principle is here governing. The probate court in such matter is a court of general jurisdiction, Code 1940, Title 13, § 278, and’being so, and the transcript of the evidence taken at the hearing having been here stricken, any state of facts not contradicted by the record itself must be presumed in order to sustain the finding below.
Therefore, when the court found as a fact that the only debts and equities were those existing between the co-tenants in the partition suit (wherein other relief was also asked) already pending in equity when the letters were granted, and that an administration was unnecessary, resulting in the conclusion that the letters had been improvidently issued, this should 'be the end of the law in the case. We do not know what evidence induced that finding by the court, but we should not assume a state of facts to contradict it. The mere record-: ing of the claims of George Terry,’ who' procured letters of administration to,be issued to 'himself, cannot serve to contradict, the finding of the court: From aught appearing, after a full consideration of the evidence, the court might have become con-; Vinced — probably was — that such claims were spurious and that the sole purpose of Geoi-ge Terry in procuring letters to be issued to himself was to retain control’ of the estate against the lawful 'heir (to prevent which was one of the purposes of the equity suit she filed) and to load the estate with expenses of administration, such as his commissions, attorney’s fees, etc. Such an interpretation of the decree is not unwarranted by the record. Being so, the decree revoking the letters should be affirmed.
That the equities between the coparceners in the partition suit (where an accounting was prayed by Gresham against the Terrys) can be fully adjudicated and protected is not doubted. Code 1940, Title 47, §§ 186, 189; Thompson v. Heiter, 240 Ala. 347, 199 So. 239; Refuss v. McAndrew, 250 Ala. 55, 33 So.2d 16; Barker v. Barker, 249 Ala. 322, 31 So.2d 357; Hale v. Kinnaird, 200 Ala. 596, 76 So. 954.
FOSTER, J., concurs.