Court Opinion

ID: 9396056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 13:06:59.664295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:13.835685
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
05/19/2023 08:06 AM CDT

                                                      - 298 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                         SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                                             Cite as 314 Neb. 298

                                  Richard G. Schuemann, appellant, v.
                                   Brent D. Timperley, M.D., appellee.
                                                 ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed May 19, 2023.     No. S-22-268.

                 1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court affirms a
                    lower court’s grant of summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted
                    evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
                    as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts and that
                    the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
                 2. ____: ____. An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of sum-
                    mary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most favorable
                    to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in that
                    party’s favor.
                 3. Limitations of Actions: Pleadings: Waiver. The statute of limitations is
                    an affirmative defense that is waived if the defendant fails to plead it.
                 4. Limitations of Actions: Motions to Dismiss. A motion to dismiss
                    for failure to state a claim based on the statute of limitations can suc-
                    ceed only when the face of the complaint shows that the action is
                    time barred.
                 5. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. The grant of a motion for
                    summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to the trial
                    court, even if it is not the same reasoning the trial court relied upon.

                 Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J.
               Michael Coffey, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further
               proceedings.
                 Theodore R. Boecker, Jr., of Boecker Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
               appellant.
                 Robert A. Mooney and Betsy Seeba-Walters, of Mooney,
               Lenaghan & Westberg Dorn, L.L.C., for appellee.
                             - 299 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
   Papik, J.
   Dr. Brent D. Timperley, an ophthalmologist, performed cata-
ract surgeries on Richard G. Schuemann’s eyes. Schuemann
later experienced pain and reduced vision and filed a lawsuit
against Timperley. The district court granted summary judg-
ment to Timperley on statute of limitations grounds. In this
appeal filed by Schuemann, we find that the district court erred
in its grant of summary judgment and therefore reverse the
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
                       BACKGROUND
Parties’ Pleadings.
   Schuemann filed his lawsuit against Timperley on April 2,
2020. In his complaint, Schuemann alleged that Timperley
had performed a cataract surgery on Schuemann’s right eye on
April 2, 2018, and a cataract surgery on Schuemann’s left eye
several weeks later. Schuemann claimed that after each proce-
dure, he experienced pain and reduced vision.
   According to Schuemann, he had undergone another eye
procedure prior to his cataract surgeries, and it was recog-
nized within the medical community that individuals that had
undergone that procedure were at a greater risk of suffering
adverse results from cataract surgery. Schuemann asserted that
Timperley failed to inform him of the risk cataract surgery
posed to him and that if he had been informed of that risk,
he would not have proceeded with the cataract surgeries.
Schuemann also alleged that his pain and reduced vision
were caused by Timperley’s failure to perform the surger-
ies in accordance with the standard of care used by similarly
trained physicians.
   Timperley filed an answer in which he denied breach-
ing the standard of care in any respect. He also alleged
that Schuemann’s complaint failed to state a cause of action.
                            - 300 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

Timperley’s answer did not allege that any claims were barred
by the statute of limitations.
Summary Judgment Motion.
   Following discovery, Timperley filed a motion for summary
judgment. Because the scope of that motion is an issue relevant
to this appeal, we summarize the substance of that motion in
some detail here.
   The introductory paragraph of Timperley’s motion asserted
that he was seeking summary judgment “for the reason that
[Schuemann’s] Complaint fails to state a claim against him for
which relief can be granted.” In the next six numbered para-
graphs, Timperley made various assertions regarding the gov-
erning statutes of limitations and the timing of Schuemann’s
surgeries. Specifically, Timperley stated that under Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 44-2828 (Reissue 2021) and 25-222 (Reissue 2016),
Schuemann was required to file his lawsuit within 2 years
after the alleged act or omission giving rise to his claim.
Timperley contended, however, that evidence he would offer,
including Schuemann’s responses to requests for admissions,
would show that Timperley performed a cataract surgery on
Schuemann’s left eye on March 19, 2018. While Timperley
conceded that he performed cataract surgery on Schuemann’s
right eye on April 2, he claimed that Schuemann’s complaint
was inaccurate to the extent it asserted that the medical care
giving rise to his claim of professional negligence occurred on
that date.
   In paragraph 7 of the motion, Timperely stated that for
the reasons set forth in the preceding six paragraphs, he was
entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
Paragraph 8 then stated as follows:
      Timperley moves for an order granting summary judg-
      ment in his favor for the reason that the various plead-
      ings, discovery including [Schuemann’s] Responses to
      Request for Admissions and the affidavits submitted in
      this matter create no genuine issue as to any material
                             - 301 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

      fact and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pur-
      suant to Neb. [Rev.] Stat. §25-1332.
   In a later paragraph, Timperley stated that in the alternative
to summary judgment as to all issues in the case, Timperley
moved for partial summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds as to Schuemann’s claim of damage relating to the
left eye surgery. In a concluding prayer for relief, Timperley’s
motion stated that he sought summary judgment “for the
reason that [Schuemann’s] claims against Dr. Timperley are
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and for such
other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.” Timperley’s
concluding prayer for relief added that, in the alternative, he
sought partial summary judgment as to claims relating to the
left eye surgery “for the reason that such claims are barred by
the applicable statutes of limitations, and for such other relief
as the Court deems just and equitable.”
Summary Judgment Hearing.
   At a hearing on Timperley’s motion for summary judgment,
the district court received an affidavit of Timperley. In the
affidavit, Timperley testified that he first performed surgery on
Schuemann’s left eye on March 19, 2018; that Schuemann ini-
tially had a good outcome from that procedure; that Timperley
subsequently performed surgery on Schuemann’s right eye
on April 2; and that after the April 2 procedure, Schuemann
began to experience complications in both eyes. Timperley
also averred in his affidavit that based on his education, train-
ing, experience, and review of the medical records, he met the
applicable standard of care both as to his performance of the
surgeries and as to his securing Schuemann’s informed con-
sent. Timperley also opined that any complications Schuemann
suffered were not the result of any breach of the standard of
care on the part of Timperley.
   Schuemann objected to the portions of Timperley’s affida-
vit in which he expressed opinions as to his compliance with
the standard of care and causation of damages. Schuemann
                            - 302 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                  SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                      Cite as 314 Neb. 298

objected on the grounds that the motion for summary judgment
was based on the statute of limitations.
   Schuemann did not offer any expert testimony countering
Timperley’s opinions, but the district court did receive an
affidavit by Schuemann. In that affidavit, Schuemann acknowl-
edged that Timperley performed a surgery on his left eye on
March 19, 2018, but asserted that his lawsuit was not alleging
negligence with respect to that procedure. Schuemann averred
that Timperley also performed a surgery on his right eye on
April 2 and a second surgery on his left eye on August 23.
Schuemann asserted that he was alleging that Timperley failed
to obtain his informed consent for and negligently performed
those later surgeries.
   During the summary judgment hearing, Timperley’s counsel
primarily argued that Timperley was entitled to summary judg-
ment on statute of limitations grounds. But after acknowledg-
ing that Timperley’s motion “focuses on the statute of limita-
tions,” Timperley’s counsel noted that the motion also asked
for “such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable,”
and proceeded to mention an alternative basis for summary
judgment. Timperley’s counsel stated that Timperley’s affi-
davit opined that he did not breach the standard of care and
that Schuemann failed to counter that opinion with contrary
expert testimony.
   Schuemann’s counsel responded that Timperley was not
entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds
for various reasons. As for the alternative basis for sum-
mary judgment offered by Timperley, Schuemann’s counsel
argued that Timperley’s motion was based solely on the statute
of limitations.
Summary Judgment Order.
   The district court issued a written order granting summary
judgment in Timperley’s favor. The district court described
the case as “a medical malpractice suit which [Schuemann]
alleges arises out of ophthalmic surgery on his left eye on
                             - 303 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

March 19, 2018 and on his right eye on April 2, 2018.” The
district court concluded that any claims as to the March 19
surgery were “clearly barred by the statute of limitations,” and
that because Schuemann did not file his lawsuit by April 1,
2020, claims as to the April 2 surgery were also barred by the
statute of limitations. The district court’s order did not refer
to the alternative basis for summary judgment mentioned by
Timperley’s counsel at the summary judgment hearing.
   Schuemann unsuccessfully moved the district court to alter
or amend its summary judgment ruling and then filed this
appeal. We moved the case to our docket. See Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 24-1106 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
                 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Schuemann assigns several errors, all of which challenge
the district court’s entry of summary judgment on statute of
limitations grounds. Among those assigned errors are conten-
tions that the district court’s entry of summary judgment was
erroneous because (1) Timperley did not plead the statute of
limitations as an affirmative defense, (2) there were disputed
issues of fact as to when the alleged malpractice occurred,
and (3) the district court misapplied the statute of limitations
by finding that an action filed exactly 2 years to the date
of the alleged malpractice was barred by the 2-year statute
of limitations.
                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1,2] An appellate court affirms a lower court’s grant of
summary judgment if the pleadings and admitted evidence
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or
as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from the facts
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Mai v. German, 313 Neb. 187, 983 N.W.2d 114 (2023).
An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. Id.
                             - 304 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

                           ANALYSIS
Statute of Limitations.
   [3] As discussed above, Schuemann offers multiple reasons
why the district court erred by granting summary judgment
on statute of limitations grounds. We begin with Schuemann’s
contention that because Timperley did not assert in his answer
that Schuemann’s claims were barred by the statute of limi-
tations, Timperley was precluded from raising the statute of
limitations in his summary judgment motion. On this point,
Schuemann correctly observes that we have consistently held
that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that is
waived if the defendant fails to plead it. See, e.g., Bonness
v. Armitage, 305 Neb. 747, 942 N.W.2d 238 (2020); Strode
v. City of Ashland, 295 Neb. 44, 886 N.W.2d 293 (2016);
McGill v. Lion Place Condo. Assn., 291 Neb. 70, 864 N.W.2d
642 (2015).
   Despite this longstanding rule and his failure to mention
the statute of limitations in his answer, Timperley argues that
he preserved his statute of limitations defense by asserting in
his answer that Schuemann’s complaint failed to state a cause
of action. In support of this contention, Timperley points to
our decision in Bonness, supra. Timperley reads our decision
in Bonness to stand for the proposition that a defendant fully
preserves a statute of limitations defense by pleading that
the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Timperley misreads Bonness.
   [4] In Bonness, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss a
complaint pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6) on
statute of limitations grounds. In discussing that motion, we
observed that under our precedent, we analyze “a challenge
to a pleading on statute of limitations grounds [as] a chal-
lenge that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Bonness, 305 Neb. at 754, 942 N.W.2d
at 244 (emphasis supplied). But nowhere in Bonness did we
suggest that any contention that an action is barred by the
statute of limitations can properly be framed as an argument
                             - 305 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or that a defendant can fully preserve a statute of
limitations defense by pleading that the complaint fails to state
a claim. After all, some assertions that a cause of action is
barred by the statute of limitations depend on evidence outside
the complaint. As our opinion in Bonness explained, a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on the statute of
limitations can succeed only when the face of the complaint
shows that the action is time barred.
   Timperley’s summary judgment motion was not based solely
on the face of Schuemann’s complaint. Timperley asked the
court to consider his affidavit and other evidence extrinsic
to the complaint in order to determine that Timperley was
entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds.
Because he relied on evidence outside the complaint, Timperley
did not truly assert that “the pleading fail[ed] to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” § 6-1112(b)(6) (emphasis
supplied). Timperley could rely on such extrinsic evidence
only by pleading the statute of limitations in his answer. See
Strode, 295 Neb. at 52, 886 N.W.2d at 302 (“[t]he general
rule is that where a complaint does not disclose on its face
that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant must
plead the statute as an affirmative defense and, in that event,
the defendant has the burden to prove that defense”); John
P. Lenich, Nebraska Civil Procedure, § 5:35 (2023) (explain-
ing that if complaint does not show on its face that action
is time barred, defendant must plead statute of limitations to
preserve defense).
   Given the foregoing, the most that Timperley possibly pre-
served with respect to the statute of limitations was the right
to contend that it was apparent from the face of Schuemann’s
complaint that his claims were barred by the statute of limita-
tions. But as we will explain, any such argument would have
failed on its merits.
   Timperley’s brief on appeal refers to two possible stat-
utes of limitations—the professional negligence statute of
                             - 306 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

limitations set forth in § 25-222 and the statute of limita-
tions in the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act set forth
in § 44-2828. There appears to be no substantive difference
between those statutes of limitations as they relate to this
case. Both statutes generally provide for a 2-year limitations
period that is triggered by the alleged act or omission provid-
ing the basis for the action. The only specific date mentioned
in Schuemann’s complaint is April 2, 2018, a date on which
Schuemann alleged that Timperley negligently performed cata-
ract surgery on Schuemann’s right eye. But if the act or omis-
sion upon which Schuemann’s action is based occurred on
April 2, 2018, the lawsuit was timely filed.
   The “general rule for computing time” in Nebraska is found
in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2221 (Reissue 2016). Fuelberth v.
Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning, 307 Neb. 1002, 1010,
951 N.W.2d 758, 763 (2020). That statute provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
         Except as may be otherwise more specifically pro-
      vided, the period of time within which an act is to be
      done in any action or proceeding shall be computed
      by excluding the day of the act, event, or default after
      which the designated period of time begins to run. The
      last day of the period so computed shall be included
      unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a day during which
      the offices of courts of record may be legally closed as
      providing in this section, in which event the period shall
      run until the end of the next day on which the office will
      be open.
§ 25-2221.
   Timperley does not direct us to any more specific rule for
computing time in either the professional negligence statute
of limitations or the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability
Act. In the absence of a more specific rule, § 25-2221 directs
that its rule for computing time should apply. See Fuelberth,
supra (applying § 25-2221 to compute whether action was
barred by statute of limitations). And under that rule, if the
                            - 307 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

act or omission forming the basis for the action occurred on
April 2, 2018, that date would be excluded and the 2-year
clock would begin to run the following day. The last day of
the 2-year period in which suit could be filed would be April
2, 2020—the day that Schuemann filed his complaint.
   Because Timperley waived the right to seek dismissal on
statute of limitations grounds based on evidence outside the
complaint, and it was not apparent from the face of the com-
plaint that Schuemann’s claims were barred, the district court
erred by granting Timperley summary judgment on statute of
limitations grounds.
Alternative Basis for Summary Judgment?
   Although we find the district court erred by granting sum-
mary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, our analysis
does not end there. Our analysis continues because Timperley
argues that we can and should affirm the district court’s entry
of summary judgment on alternative grounds. According to
Timperley, he was entitled to summary judgment for an addi-
tional reason—the district court received his affidavit opining
that he complied with the standard of care and Schuemann
offered no expert testimony to the contrary. Timperley con-
tends that Schuemann thus failed to show that he would
be able to establish an essential element of his claims that
Timperley failed to obtain informed consent and negligently
performed surgeries.
   [5] We have recognized that the grant of a motion for sum-
mary judgment may be affirmed on any ground available to
the trial court, even if it is not the same reasoning the trial
court relied upon. Choice Homes v. Donner, 311 Neb. 835,
976 N.W.2d 187 (2022). The question this case presents,
however, is whether the alternative basis for summary judg-
ment Timperley offers on appeal was, in fact, available to the
trial court. Schuemann argues that Timperley’s motion sought
summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds alone
and that consequently, the trial court could not have granted
                              - 308 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   314 Nebraska Reports
                    SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 298

summary judgment on the alternative basis Timperley offers
on appeal.
   We agree with Schuemann that a party opposing summary
judgment is not obligated to present evidence pertaining to
issues or theories not raised by the motion. This principle is
expressed in our precedent. In In re Freeholders Petition, 210
Neb. 583, 316 N.W.2d 294 (1982), we reversed a judgment to
the extent it granted summary judgment on an issue on which
the moving party did not seek summary judgment. Under those
circumstances, we explained, the nonmoving party “could not
reasonably be expected at the hearing on the motion for sum-
mary judgment to meet that issue.” Id. at 589, 316 N.W.2d
at 298. As the Nebraska Court of Appeals has stated, “When
an issue is not presented in a summary judgment motion,
the opposing party does not have notice to defend against
the issue.” Livingston v. Pacific Realty Commercial, 18 Neb.
App. 13, 17, 773 N.W.2d 169, 172 (2009). See, also, Box
v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that appellate court can affirm summary judgment on alterna-
tive ground only if that ground was adequately presented in
trial court).
   For his part, Timperley does not seem to dispute that we
could affirm on the alternative basis he proposes only if that
basis was presented in the trial court. He maintains, however,
that the alternative basis was presented in the trial court,
that Schuemann had adequate notice summary judgment was
sought on that alternative basis, and that Schuemann simply
failed to offer evidence to create a genuine issue of material
fact. We thus turn to consider whether Timperley adequately
presented his alternative basis for summary judgment in the
district court.
   At the outset, we note that it does not appear that the district
court believed that Timperley had presented his alternative
basis for summary judgment. As we have noted, Schuemann
did not offer any expert testimony contradicting Timperley’s
opinion that he had complied with the standard of care.
                             - 309 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

Generally, the failure to rebut expert testimony that a medi-
cal professional complied with the standard of care will result
in summary judgment for the medical professional. See, e.g.,
Carrizales v. Creighton St. Joseph, 312 Neb. 296, 979 N.W.2d
81 (2022). Here, however, the district court did not mention the
absence of expert testimony countering Timperley’s opinion in
its summary judgment order. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment on statute of limitations grounds alone.
   We also observe that Timperley’s counsel acknowledged at
the summary judgment hearing that the motion “focuses on
the statute of limitations.” That strikes us as something of an
understatement. All the substantive assertions in the motion
pertained to either the statutes of limitations at issue or the
dates of Schuemann’s various procedures. And in both the
numbered paragraphs and the concluding prayer for relief,
Timperley expressly requested summary judgment on statute
of limitations grounds without mentioning any other basis on
which summary judgment was sought.
   Despite no mention in the summary judgment motion of
any other basis on which summary judgment was sought,
Timperley argues that the motion provided adequate notice
that he sought summary judgment on an alternative ground. At
oral argument in this case, Timperley argued that paragraph 8
of his motion provided such notice. Additionally, at the sum-
mary judgment hearing, Timperley’s counsel suggested that
the district court could grant summary judgment on a basis
other than the statute of limitations because his summary judg-
ment motion, in addition to requesting summary judgment on
statute of limitations grounds, asked for “such other relief as
the Court deems just and equitable.”
   We disagree that the language Timperley relies upon pro-
vided sufficient notice that Timperley sought summary judg-
ment on a basis other than the one he expressly identified.
Timperley’s reliance on paragraph 8 would be compelling if
that paragraph was accompanied with introductory language
like, “As an alternative basis.” But in the absence of such
                             - 310 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
                   SCHUEMANN V. TIMPERLEY
                       Cite as 314 Neb. 298

language, paragraph 8 is nothing more than a recitation of
the summary judgment standard, a standard that applied to the
contention expressed in the preceding seven paragraphs that
he was entitled to summary judgment on statute of limitations
grounds. As for the motion’s request for “such other relief
as the Court deems just and equitable,” we find this kind of
catchall language insufficiently specific to provide notice that
Timperley sought summary judgment on a basis other than the
ground expressly identified in the motion.
   We emphasize that this opinion should not be understood to
hold that every motion for summary judgment must precisely
identify the specific grounds upon which summary judgment
is sought. This case does not involve a motion for summary
judgment in which the moving party asserts only that the evi-
dence would show that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Instead, the motion in this case sought summary
judgment for a specifically identified reason and included no
language apprising the court and the nonmoving party that
summary judgment was sought on an alternative basis. Under
those circumstances, we find that the alternative ground was
not adequately presented to the district court. Accordingly, we
decline to consider whether to affirm on that basis. We are
aware of nothing, however, that would preclude Timperley
from properly seeking summary judgment on the alternative
basis presented here after the cause is remanded to the dis-
trict court.
                        CONCLUSION
   The district court erred in granting summary judgment for
Timperley on statute of limitations grounds. Finding no alter-
native grounds on which to affirm the judgment, we reverse
the judgment and remand the cause to the district court for
further proceedings.
                               Reversed and remanded for
                               further proceedings.