Court Opinion

ID: 9731757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:57:20.385198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:20.982270
License: Public Domain

WALLIN, J., Concurring.
This case graphically illustrates the difficulties caused by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. — [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405], recognizing a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. John Higgason’s home was invaded under the authority of a search warrant obtained solely on information supplied by uncorroborated anonymous informants. This court unanimously agrees the evidence seized under this warrant must be excluded. However, I am not in complete agreement with either of my learned colleagues (nor they with me) and therefore write separately.
Since pronouncement of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was unnecessary to the decision in Leon,1 we must conclude the Supreme Court was eager to embrace the good faith standard and intends that it have broad application.2 Nevertheless, I do not see how it can be applied to save a search pursuant to a warrant which is totally unsupported by credible information.3 Not every Fourth Amendment sin can be forgiven by wrap*953ping it in a good faith package. Every citizen is entitled to be secure from the possibility that angry neighbors, misguided practical jokers, ex-spouses, heartbroken ex-lovers or other personal enemies will provide anonymous information leading to police intrusion into their homes and personal effects. Were we to permit introduction of this evidence, a whole new field would be opened for dealing with one’s personal “enemies list.” As even an inexperienced police officer knows, courts have always required corroboration of anonymous information because of its inherent unreliability. Nothing in the Leon decision can be read to suggest a different result or excuse a lack of corroboration merely because an overworked or inattentive magistrate sanctions the entry.
Since the diversity of our views prevents this decision from having any significant precedential value, we postpone until another day our effort to capture the will-o’-the-wisp and define the good faith exception.

Justice Crosby’s opinion, ante, at page 946.