Court Opinion

ID: 9664877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:32:29.10593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.926757
License: Public Domain

*536DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I would have required the parties to brief the question of whether the child support guidelines are a rule, and if so, whether the rule was validly enacted. I also dissent because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats.

Guidelines as Rule

Section 767.395(3), Stats., reads “The department [of Health & Social Services] shall adopt a standard for determining a child support obligation based upon a percentage of the gross income and assets of either or both parents.” Section 227.014(2) (a), Stats., permits agencies to adopt rules. Section 227.01(9) defines a rule:
“Rule” means a regulation, standard, statement of policy or general order (including the amendment or repeal of any of the foregoing), of general application and having the effect of law, issued by an agency to implement, interpret or make specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency or to govern the organization or procedure of such agency.
Section 227.01(11) is a list of exceptions to sec. 227.01 (9), none of which apply to the child support guidelines adopted by DH&SS. Section 227.023(1) provides: “A certified copy of every rule adopted by an agency shall be filed by the agency in the office of the secretary of state and in the office of the revisor of statutes. No rule is valid until a certified copy thereof has been so filed.”
The child support percentage guidelines were not filed in the office of the revisor of statutes.1 Calling regulations “guidelines” does not avoid the requirements of *537chapter 227. Will v. H&SS Department, 44 Wis. 2d 507, 517, 171 N.W.2d 378, 383 (1969). Sex discrimination guidelines were considered rules and because not properly filed, were held invalid in Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. ILHR Dept., 68 Wis. 2d 345, 366, 228 N.W.2d 649, 660 (1975). Mimeographed instructions for renewal of real estate brokers licenses were held to be rules in Frankenthal v. Wisconsin R.E. Brokers’ Board, 3 Wis. 2d 249, 253-54, 88 N.W.2d 352, 355 (1958). The validity of the child support guidelines should be determined as soon as possible because the issue affects many paternity and divorce cases. I would direct the parties to brief this issue.

Construction of Sec. 767.51(5m), Stats.

The majority concludes that trial courts are prohibited from using sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats., as an alternative method of support setting where support recipients reside in separate households. It gives two reasons for this conclusion. (1) Using percentage standards can lead to inequitable results, and (2) a letter from the secretary of an executive branch agency interprets the statute to apply only to “intact families.” I conclude that neither reason supports the majority’s conclusion.
A. Inequitable Results
The majority states that the construction of sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats., adopted by the trial court leads to the conclusion that the father would pay $502.00 of his $1,280 monthly gross income for support. The arithmetical basis for the majority’s conclusion is incorrect. The trial court found the father’s gross income to be $1,280 per month, and applied that amount to the guideline multiplier of .29, resulting in a $377.00 monthly support obligation, or $125.00 per month per child. The trial court *538ordered $125.00 per month support for the child involved in this action. The children are treated equitably.2
B. Reivitz Letter
Section 767.51 (5m), Stats., became effective for actions commenced or judgments revised after July 1, 1983. On December 20, 1983, Linda Reivitz, Secretary of the State of Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services wrote a letter to “Members of the Wisconsin Judiciary,” explaining that the percentage standard is “our best estimate of the amount spent on children if a family were to remain intact.” The majority concludes that this letter shows that the Department of Health and Social Services did not intend the application of percentage standards to support payors whose children live in separate households.
The legislature, not the Department of Health and Social Services, permitted the courts the option of using percentage standards when setting support in paternity cases. I am unconvinced that the interpretation placed on sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats., by what Secretary Reivitz describes as “experts and related agency personnel, and . . . members of the judiciary and legal professions” is significant when determining whether the legislature intended sec. 767.51 (5m) to be optionally available to trial courts in paternity actions. It is inappropriate for a court to rely on the statements of a member of the *539legislature as to what the legislature intended when enacting a statute. Labor & Farm Party v. Elections Board, 117 Wis. 2d 351, 356, 344 N.W.2d 177, 180 (1984). Statements of an agency secretary ought not occupy a higher status than statements of legislators.

Separation of Powers

The majority in effect excises sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats., from the statutes, without either the usual analysis of a statute’s meaning or a conclusion that the statute violates a constitutional limitation on legislative power. It does so because, in its judgment, the use of sec. 767.51 (5m) is inappropriate in cases including serial families. This court does not review the wisdom of legislative judgments, only whether that body exceeded its constitutional authority. Milwaukee County v. District Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 30, 325 N.W.2d 350, 357 (Ct. App. 1982). I do not believe a court is empowered to invalidate a statute because the court believes the statute, or its use, is inappropriate.
Courts are to uphold statutes if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the statute. Wis. Tel. Ass’n v. Public Service Comm., 105 Wis. 2d 601, 611, 314 N.W.2d 873, 877-78 (Ct. App. 1981). The legislature could reasonably conclude that equity between support payors leads to greater compliance with court orders. The legislature could reasonably conclude that a percentage standard benefits children because consistent payment is more likely, absent disparate treatment of identically situated payors. The legislature could reasonably enact a non-discretionary support system to avoid the criticism that individual judges are able to cover unstated policy decisions under the nearly opaque blanket of judicial discretion.
I cannot presume, as does the majority, that the percentage standards were neither designed nor intended by *540the legislature3 to cover successive family units. This is a paternity case, not a divorce case. The legislature must have known that sec. 767.51 (5m) applies to paternity cases, not divorce cases. The legislature is presumed to know that wives do not frequently commence paternity suits against their husbands to establish the paternity of the couple’s children and provide for child support. The notion of a father being liable for support of children born to two mothers is not so unique or improbable that I can conclude, as does the majority, that application of percentage standards to children in more than one household was not foreseen when the legislature directed the optional use of percentage standards in paternity actions.
I am not sure what the legislature must do should it still intend that courts use percentage standards in paternity actions or in cases involving serial families. The policy behind their use remains, because the current legislature has adopted 1985 Wis. Act 29, secs. 2402 and 2403b. This legislation mandates that trial courts use percentage standards in setting child support in paternity cases unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that use of the standards is unfair to the. child or the requesting party. It does not exempt fathers of children living in successive households from its operation.4
I would analyze sec. 767.51 (5m), Stats., to determine whether the legislature intended to permit the use of percentage standards in paternity suits involving multifamily considerations. The primary source of statutory construction is the statute itself. Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 *541Wis. 2d 503, 510, 362 N.W.2d 182, 186 (Ct. App. 1984). If the statutory language is plain and clearly understood, that meaning must be given to the statute. Id. I conclude the statute is clear and means what it says. I reach the same result under the plain meaning rule adopted in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 236, 332 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1983) (the spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used). The spirit or intent of sec. 767.51 (5m) is to permit trial courts the option of using percentage standards, with no limitation on that discretion. Because neither party has asserted any constitutional infirmity in the use of sec. 767.51 (5m), I would not address that issue. The statute being clear and not proven unconstitutional, I would uphold its use by the trial court.

 I have not considered whether the hearing required by secs. 227.021 and 227.02, Stats., was properly held. Rules enacted without compliance with statutory rule making procedures are invalid. Sec. 227.05(4) (a).

 Though a first child receives 17 percent of a support payor’s income, and two children each receive 12% percent of the income, those figures merely reflect reality. The more people sharing an income, the less each receives. This is true as a matter of arithmetic, not family law. Though a support payor could pay differing amounts of support to successive children, that would occur only if the payor does not obtain a revision of the support judgment when another child is born. Section 767.32, Stats., permits revision of child support judgments. A support payor who voluntarily pays more support than required works no inequities on children.

 The majority examines the intent of DH&SS, and does not address legislative intent. I have explained why I do not consider agency intent relevant.

 1985 Wis. Act 29, sec. 3023(7) permits the Department of Health & Social Services to adopt support percentage standards which consider that child support is paid to children in two or more families.