Court Opinion

ID: 9391282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 19:02:44.30034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.484518
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/1/23 P. v. Sanford CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C095503

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. 21CF04465,
                                                                                        21CF04671)
         v.

SAMUEL SANFORD,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

         After the trial court found defendant Samuel Sanford guilty of attempted arson and
resisting a peace officer, it imposed a sentence that included the three-year upper term on
the attempted arson conviction. On appeal, defendant argues insufficient evidence
supports his attempted arson conviction and the case must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court’s imposition of the upper term sentence does not satisfy the new
requirements of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which
took effect while his appeal was pending and applies retroactively to his case. We

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conclude sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction, and Senate Bill 567 is an
ameliorative statute that applies retroactively to defendant’s nonfinal case, but that any
error in imposing the sentence was harmless. Thus, we affirm the judgment.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY        OF THE   PROCEEDINGS
       This appeal involves the joint sentencing in two cases. In case No. 21CF04465,
defendant pleaded no contest to bringing methamphetamine into a jail facility. (Pen.
Code, § 4573.5; statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.) Before defendant was sentenced, the prosecution charged him with
attempted arson (§ 455, subd. (a)), resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), and
possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) in case No.
21CF04671. The prosecution also alleged defendant committed the attempted arson
while he was released on bail or his own recognizance. (§ 12022.1.) The prosecution
later dismissed the count charging possession of drug paraphernalia.
       At trial, two witnesses testified for the prosecution. The first, a city park
employee, testified she saw defendant in a park one morning. She saw defendant bent
over a stump with an open flame. Defendant was holding the flame “towards the stump,
like he was trying to light something on the stump on fire.” Defendant did the same thing
a “couple of times.” She could not tell if defendant was using a lighter or just a lit match.
The witness called police and continued to watch defendant. She was concerned
defendant was going to start a fire on top of the stump, although she did not see if there
was anything on top of the stump.
       Police Sergeant John Sanzone testified he responded to a report of a man trying to
start a fire in a local park. When he arrived at the park, he saw defendant crouched near a
tree stump in a field holding an open flame. The flame was less than an inch from the
ground. Sergeant Sanzone noted there was dry vegetation in the area. There was
currently an active forest fire burning in the area and there had been a recent arson

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nearby. The sergeant arrested defendant and found a lighter in his pocket. He also found
a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine.
       The trial court found defendant guilty of attempted arson and resisting a peace
officer and found true the enhancement allegation. At the sentencing hearing, the court
noted it had read and considered the probation report, which noted defendant had
received three felony convictions and three misdemeanor convictions since 2011.
Defendant had served terms in state prison and had multiple probation and parole
violations. Defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s “prior history,” but noted the
offenses in the current case were drug related and asked defendant be placed in a
treatment program. The prosecutor argued defendant had received ample opportunities to
seek treatment and had a track record that included 12 separate violations during his most
recent parole term.
       In aggravation, the court found defendant had numerous prior convictions; had
served prior prison terms; and his prior performance on probation and parole was
unsatisfactory. The court found no mitigating factors. Thus, the court imposed the upper
term of three years for the attempted arson conviction, for a total aggregate sentence of
five years eight months.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                             I

                                   Insufficient Evidence

       Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the specific intent of
the attempted arson conviction because no evidence shows defendant was trying to light
the vegetation on fire, rather than his methamphetamine pipe.

       When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the entire record
to assess whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond

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a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Thus, “we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       Section 455 defines attempted arson, saying, “Any person who willfully and
maliciously attempts to set fire to or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the
burning of any structure, forest land or property, or who commits any act preliminary
thereto, or in furtherance thereof, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison . . .
[¶] The placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive or combustible material or
substance, or any device in or about any structure, forest land or property in an
arrangement or preparation with intent to eventually willfully and maliciously set fire to
or burn same, or to procure the setting fire to or burning of the same shall, for the
purposes of this act constitute an attempt to burn such structure, forest land or property.”
“ ‘In order to establish an attempt, it must appear that the defendant had a specific intent
to commit a crime and did a direct, unequivocal act toward that end; preparation alone is
not enough, and some appreciable fragment of the crime must have been
accomplished.’ ” (People v. Archibald (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 629, 633.)
       Adequate evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant intended to
set fire to the stump or other vegetation in the park. An eyewitness testified that she saw
defendant holding an open flame close to a tree stump in the park, as if he was “trying to

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light something on the stump on fire.” Her testimony was corroborated by Sergeant
Sanzone, who arrived shortly thereafter and saw defendant doing the same thing very
close to the ground near dry vegetation. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude, based
on defendant’s continued efforts to hold an open flame near flammable objects, that he
intended to start a fire. That defendant failed to do so in the observed time does not mean
that he lacked the necessary intent. Nor does the fact that defendant could have been
attempting to light a pipe to smoke methamphetamine; our task in substantial evidence
review is not to determine whether there are alternative conclusions the trier of fact could
have reached, but only whether the trier of fact’s actual conclusion is reasonable. (People
v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
       We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Carrasco
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978 and People v. Archibald, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d 629. In
both cases, the respective courts found sufficient evidence for attempted arson
convictions, but neither set a floor for the amount or type of evidence required for such a
conviction, and thus neither requires a contrary finding in this case. (Carrasco, at
pp. 983-984; Archibald, at p. 633.) And neither case established a requirement of
“statements” by defendant or proof of specific motive to find specific intent. We
conclude substantial evidence supported the attempted arson conviction.

                                              II

                                       Senate Bill 567

       Senate Bill 567 became effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731; Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) The bill introduced changes generally prohibiting a trial
court from imposing an upper term sentence except where there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify imposing the upper term, and the facts underlying
those circumstances (1) have been stipulated to by the defendant, or (2) have been found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

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(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) An exception to this rule
authorizes the court to consider defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing
based on certified records of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to the
jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3), added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       We agree with the parties that Senate Bill 567 is retroactive and applies to this
nonfinal case. The act provides an opportunity for defendant to receive a lesser penalty,
and there is no indication the Legislature intended the act to apply prospectively only. (In
re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746.)
       The facts underlying the court’s three findings for imposing the upper term for the
attempted arson conviction (1) that defendant had numerous prior convictions (2) had
served prior prison terms, and (3) had unsatisfactory performance on probation and
parole -- were not found true by a trier of fact or stipulated to by defendant. Accordingly,
applying Senate Bill 567 retroactively, it was error to consider those factors as supporting
the imposition of an upper term sentence.
       Notwithstanding the Attorney General’s concession that this error requires
remand, we conclude any error is harmless.
       Senate Bill 567 is now the statutory means by which California provides criminal
defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on upper-term sentencing factors.
Defendant raises no Sixth Amendment violation here. He solely focuses on his state right
under Senate Bill 567. To find harmless error for state law error, we apply the standard
set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). Under that standard, “we
must find that the trial [court] would have imposed the upper term sentence even absent
the error. In particular, we must consider whether it is reasonably probable that the trial
court would have chosen a lesser sentence in the absence of the error.” (People v.
Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1112.)
       To apply this test, we ask two questions. For each aggravating fact, we must
consider “whether it is reasonably probable that the [trier of fact] would have found the

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fact not true. We must then, with the aggravating facts that survive this review, consider
whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence
had it considered only these aggravating facts.” (People v. Zabelle, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.) “A reasonable probability . . . does not mean more likely
than not; it means a reasonable chance and not merely a theoretical or abstract possibility.
[Citations.]” (People v. Woods (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 461, 474 [applying Watson
standard to omission of instruction on lesser included offense].)
       Defendant’s criminal record was not subject to significant dispute. The probation
report indicated defendant had received three felony convictions and three misdemeanor
convictions since 2011, had been incarcerated in state prison for three of those
convictions, and had been unsuccessful on probation and parole in that he had violated
probation, parole, or community supervision 18 times. While we are mindful that
defendant’s incentive and opportunity to contest the probation report was “not necessarily
the same as they would have been had the aggravating circumstances been tried to a
jury,” defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s “prior history” at the sentencing
hearing and did not respond when the prosecution pointed out defendant’s poor
performance under supervision. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 839.)
Moreover, none of these factors rested on a “somewhat vague or subjective standard,”
and it is thus unlikely a trier of fact would assess the facts differently. (Id. at p. 840.) We
conclude there is not a reasonable probability the court or a jury would have found these
facts not true.
       Because these facts are the only facts the trial court relied on to impose the upper
term, and the trial court found no mitigating circumstances, we have no doubt the trial
court would have imposed the upper term had the facts been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, we conclude any error here is harmless.

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                                   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                            HULL, J.

I concur:

ROBIE, Acting P. J.

                                        8
MAURO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.

       I fully concur in the majority opinion with the exception of part II, as to which I
dissent. In part II, the majority concludes that although the imposition of the upper term
sentence does not now comply with the amended statutory requirements of Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b), the lack of statutory compliance is nevertheless harmless.
I disagree.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term without the benefit of Senate
Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b) to provide that a trial court may only impose an upper term sentence if
aggravating circumstances are stipulated to by the defendant, have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt, or are based on a certified record of conviction. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(1)-(3); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) I do not agree that the trial
court’s findings of aggravating circumstances were harmless given the current statutory
requirements.

                                                    _________________________
                                                    MAURO, J.

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