Court Opinion

ID: 9896527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 17:00:50.456417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.758103
License: Public Domain

22-240-cv (L)
Omni Elevator Corp. v. Int’l Union of Elevator Constructors

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential eﬀect. Citation to a summary
order ﬁled on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by federal rule of
appellate procedure 32.1 and this court’s local rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary
order in a document ﬁled with this court, a party must cite either the federal appendix
or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a
summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 13th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:
            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
            DENNY CHIN,
            MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
                  Circuit Judges.
__________________________________________

OMNI ELEVATOR CORPORATION                                     and
CHRISTIAN GOETTING,

                            Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JOHN M. REGAN, JR., and REGAN &
MCLAUD, P.C.,

                            Appellants,

                   v.                                                22-240-cv (L),
                                                                     22-806-cv (Con)
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELEVATOR
CONSTRUCTORS, INTERNATIONAL UNION
OF ELEVATOR CONSTRUCTORS LOCAL 27,
ALAN     ROTHFUSS,    CRANE-HOGAN
STRUCTURAL SYSTEMS, INC., TRUSTEES OF
THE NATIONAL ELEVATOR INDUSTRY
PENSION,      HEALTH         BENEFIT,
EDUCATIONAL, ELEVATOR INDUSTRY
WORK PRESERVATION FUNDS, ELEVATOR
CONSTRUCTORS ANNUITY AND 401(K)
RETIREMENT PLAN,

                  Defendants-Appellees,

DELAWARE ELEVATOR, INC.,

                  Defendant.
___________________________________________

TRUSTEES OF THE NATIONAL ELEVATOR
INDUSTRY PENSION, HEALTH BENEFIT,
EDUCATIONAL, ELEVATOR INDUSTRY
WORK PRESERVATION FUNDS, ELEVATOR
CONSTRUCTORS ANNUITY,

                  Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,

            v.                                                  22-799-cv (Con)

THE   ELEVATOR   GUILD,          INC.,    and
CHRISTIAN GOETTING,

                  Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________________________

FOR APPELLANTS:                                 JOHN M. REGAN, JR., Regan & McLaud,
                                                P.C., Rochester, NY.

FOR APPELLEES:                                  ANDREW COSTA-KELSER, O’Donoghue
                                                & O’Donoghue LLP, Philadelphia, PA
                                                (Jennifer A. Clark, Blitman & King
                                                LLP, Syracuse, NY, on the brief).
                                          2
       Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of New York

(Charles J. Siragusa, Judge).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment and orders of the District Court are AFFIRMED.

       Plaintiﬀs-Appellants, Omni Elevator Corp., The Elevator Guild, and Christian

Goetting, 1 who are generally engaged in the business of repairing, maintaining, and

installing elevators in the State of New York, had two judgments rendered against them

in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“E.D.Pa.”)

related to unpaid pension contributions owed under the terms of a collective bargaining

agreement (“the E.D.Pa. judgments”), and one judgment rendered against them in New

York state court related to a contractual dispute with a general contractor (“the New York

judgment”). This consolidated appeal arises from two proceedings in the Western

District of New York (“W.D.N.Y.”) in which Appellants have sought to avoid liability on

those three underlying judgments.

       For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Appellants’ claims are without merit

and, accordingly, aﬃrm the judgment and orders of the District Court. Although we

assume the parties’ familiarity with the case, given the complexity of the procedural

history—namely, the three underlying actions against Appellants and the two federal

       Omni Elevator Corp. is the undisputed corporate successor to The Elevator Guild.
       1

Both entities are owned and operated by Goetting. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to
these parties, collectively, as Appellants.
                                            3
proceedings now consolidated on appeal—we pause to set forth the following facts and

procedural history in order to provide the necessary context.

       I.      UNDERLYING ACTIONS AGAINST THE APPELLANTS

               1.     The E.D.Pa. Judgments (“Elevator Guild I & II”).

       The ﬁrst two judgments against Appellants resulted from actions brought by the

Appellee Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Pension, Health Beneﬁt, Educational,

Elevator Industry Work Preservation Funds, Elevator Constructors Annuity and 401(k)

Retirement Plan (“Trustees”) in the E.D.Pa. In each of those two actions, the Trustees

alleged that Appellants had failed to make certain pension contributions required under

the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. In both actions, appellants failed to

appeal in the proceedings or ceased participating in the litigation and, therefore, were

defaulted. In the ﬁrst action, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

rendered a default judgment of $25,653.96 in favor of the Trustees, which they registered

in W.D.N.Y. pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963. 2 In the second action, the District Court for the

Eastern District of Pennsylvania ultimately rendered judgment for $184,538.45 in favor of

       2See Trustees of the Nat’l Elevator Industry Pension, Health, Beneﬁt, Educational, Elevator
Industry Work Preservation Funds, Elevator Constructors Annuity and 401(k) Retirement Plan
v. The Elevator Guild, Inc., Docket No. 2:09-cv-4578 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2010) (“Elevator Guild
I”).
                                                4
the Trustees on May 30, 2014, which they also registered in W.D.N.Y. pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1963. 3

               2.    Crane-Hogan’s New York Judgment

       In 2014, Appellee Crane-Hogan Systems, Inc., (“Crane-Hogan”) a general

contractor, hired Appellants for a construction project related to the renovation of

parking garages in the city of Rochester, New York. In 2016, Crane-Hogan brought a

breach of contract action against Appellants in New York state court. In order to settle

that case, Appellants stipulated to the entry of a judgment against them in the amount of

$386,300. That judgment was later ﬁled in New York state court on June 8, 2017, in

accordance with the parties’ stipulation.

       II.     APPELLANTS’ ACTIONS AGAINST APPELLEES - CONSOLIDATED
               APPEALS

               1.    Appellants’ Equitable Indemniﬁcation Action

       On September 19, 2019, Appellants commenced their own civil action in New York

state court seeking equitable indemniﬁcation on each of these three underlying

judgments—the E.D.Pa. judgments in Elevator Guild I & II and the New York judgment

obtained by Crane-Hogan—against Alan Rothfuss, International Union of Elevator

Constructors Local 27, and International Union of Elevator Constructors (collectively,

       3See Trustees of Nat. Elevator Indus. Pension, Health Ben., Educ., Elevator Indus. Work
Pres. Funds v. Elevator Guild, LLC, Docket No. CIV.A. 11-2870, 2013 WL 271888, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 23, 2013) (“Elevator Guild II”).
                                              5
“the Union Appellees”). Speciﬁcally, Appellants alleged that the Union Appellees were

responsible for a series of “grossly defamatory communications to [Appellants’]

customers, contractors and associates” that were allegedly undertaken for the purpose of

“engineer[ing]” the underlying litigation against Appellants and resulting judgments. J.

App’x at 50.

       Union Appellees and Trustees, with Crane-Hogan’s consent, ﬁled a timely motion

to remove Appellants’ civil action to the W.D.N.Y., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), 4

arguing that the state complaint—although ostensibly sounding in state law—was

“necessarily federal in character” in that: (1) it complained of alleged secondary

boycotting activities prohibited by § 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act

("LMRA"); 29 U.S.C. § 187; 5 and (2) it was predicated on an interpretation of a collective

       428 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides: “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.”
       5Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187, makes it unlawful for a labor

organization to engage in conduct deﬁned as an “unfair labor practice” in § 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act, which—in turn—provides that: “It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry aﬀecting commerce, where in either case
an object thereof is . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business
with any other person.” Such conduct is known more commonly as “secondary
picketing” or “secondary boycott activity.” See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Retail Store Emp. Union,
Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 612 (1980).
                                              6
bargaining agreement governed exclusively by § 301 of the LMRA; 29 U.S.C. § 185. 6

Appellants, in turn, sought remand to state court, arguing that removal was improper

because any question of federal law related to the E.D.Pa. judgments had already been

settled. All Appellees ﬁled motions to dismiss. In addition, Union Appellees and

Trustees also ﬁled a motion for sanctions against Appellants’ counsel, arguing that the

action was frivolous and commenced solely to delay enforcement.

      The District Court, Siragusa, J., denied Appellants’ motion to remand in an order

dated August 26, 2021. The District Court held that claims for equitable indemniﬁcation

asserted by Appellants with respect to the E.D.Pa. judgments required interpretation of

a collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, were subject to complete preemption

under § 301 of the LMRA. The District Court also reasoned that, to the extent Appellants’

state complaint implicitly asserted a state law tort claim relating to Crane-Hogan’s New

York judgment, such a claim was necessarily premised on secondary boycott activity

prohibited by § 303 of the LMRA. Finally, the District Court concluded that, to the extent

that the complaint asserted a cause of action that was outside of the court’s original

jurisdiction, such claims would inevitably fall within the supplemental jurisdiction

aﬀorded by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

      6 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) provides: “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry aﬀecting commerce as
deﬁned in this Act . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties.”
                                            7
      Following its denial of Appellants’ motion for remand, the District Court

converted Appellees’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and

ordered additional brieﬁng. 7 Subsequently, on January 3, 2022, the District Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Appellees on those converted motions, holding that all of

Appellants’ claims: (1) were not exhausted under the relevant provisions of the collective

bargaining agreement, (2) were untimely under the applicable statute of limitations, (3)

failed to adequately allege causation or agency, or (4) were barred by immunity

provisions of the LMRA. On March 15, 2022, the District Court imposed $5,000 in

sanctions against Appellants’ counsel. Appellants timely appealed from the District

Court’s judgment and order of sanctions to this court.

             2.     Appellants’ Motion to Vacate W.D.N.Y Registration of E.D.Pa.
                    Judgment

      On March 10, 2022—shortly after the District Court’s award of summary judgment

in its equitable indemniﬁcation action, and almost eight years after the completion of the

E.D.Pa. proceedings—Appellants also moved to vacate the July 31, 2014, registration of

the $184,538.45 judgment from Elevator Guild II in the Western District of New York. 8 On

March 16, 2022, the District Court, Siragusa, J., denied Appellants’ motion to vacate

      7 Although Appellants eventually did submit brieﬁng to the District Court, that
document merely continued to argue that removal of the action had been improper,
declining to address questions raised in the converted motions for summary judgment.
       8Appellants ﬁled neither a motion to vacate, nor a notice of intent to appeal in the

registration proceeding relating to the $25,653.96 judgment resulting from Elevator Guild
I.
                                            8
concluding, inter alia, that it was meritless and untimely. Appellants, again, timely

appealed to this court.

       III.   DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS ON APPEAL

       In this consolidated appeal, Appellants now seek review of: (1) the District Court’s

decisions and orders related to their civil action for equitable indemniﬁcation, and (2) the

District Court’s denial of their motion to vacate registration of the E.D.Pa. judgment from

Elevator Guild II in W.D.N.Y. We address Appellants’ various claims of error related to

those two distinct proceedings, in turn.

              1.     Claims Related to Appellants’ Equitable Indemniﬁcation Action

       With respect to their civil action seeking equitable indemniﬁcation, Appellants

claim that the District Court: (1) improperly denied their motion to remand the action to

state court, (2) incorrectly granted Appellees’ converted motions for summary judgment,

and (3) abused its discretion by imposing post-judgment sanctions pursuant to FED. R.

CIV. P. 11. We ﬁnd these claims to be unpersuasive.

       The District Court declined to remand the case because it concluded that

resolution of any claim for equitable indemniﬁcation against union oﬃcials on the E.D.Pa.

judgments—which related exclusively to unpaid pension contributions—would

necessarily require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Because any such

claim would present a question of federal law governed by § 301 of the LMRA, removal

                                             9
of the action was necessarily supported under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 9 Appellants do not

challenge the District Court’s conclusion. Instead, Appellants contend that removability

of their equitable claims relating to the E.D.Pa. judgments is simply irrelevant because

now—for the ﬁrst time on appeal—they have chosen to abandon those particular claims

and seek to pursue equitable relief only as to the judgment obtained by Crane-Hogan.

Such a belated abandonment by the Appellants does not, however, provide us with any

reason to believe that the District Court was incorrect to conclude that the equitable

claims relating to the E.D.Pa. judgments were properly removed to federal court in the

ﬁrst instance. 10

       Because the entirety of Appellants’ single-count complaint is rooted in the same

factual allegations of misconduct against the Union Appellees, an exercise of

supplemental jurisdiction over Appellants’ remaining claims was likewise warranted. 11

       9Indeed, Appellants concede on appeal “that LMRA § 301 will govern when a court
is required to interpret a collective bargaining agreement in order to resolve the dispute
between the parties” and that “the law is clear that LMRA § 301 entails ‘complete’
preemption and supports removal.”
       10Appellants also claim that the District Court should have never considered the

applicability of LMRA § 301 because registration of the underlying E.D.Pa. judgments
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 was improper. Because we reject that same contention in
considering the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to vacate, this claim
necessarily fails.
       11See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (“[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.”); see also City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165 (1997)
(holding that § 1367(a) “applies with equal force to cases removed to federal court as to
                                             10
As a result, we hold that the District Court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to remand their

equitable indemniﬁcation action to state court was appropriate.

       Appellants’ remaining challenges to the District Court’s orders on their equitable

indemniﬁcation action warrant little discussion. Although Appellants ﬁled a notice of

intent to appeal following the District Court’s grant of Appellees’ motion for summary

judgment, their brieﬁng contains no independent claims of error directed at that decision.

Likewise, with respect to the imposition of sanctions, Appellants’ brief includes only a

single, conclusory sentence arguing that the District Court’s award was “unwarranted”

because of other errors claimed on appeal. This argument necessarily fails on appeal

because it derives entirely from other claims that we reject. As a result, we hold that the

District Court’s grant of Appellees’ converted motion for summary judgment was proper,

and its award of sanctions did not constitute an abuse of the District Court’s discretion.

              2.     Claims Related to Appellants’ Motion to Vacate

       Appellants’ ﬁnal claim is that the District Court improperly denied their motion

to vacate the registration of the $184,538.45 E.D.Pa. judgment resulting from Elevator

Guild II in W.D.N.Y. As previously noted, the District Court denied that particular

motion as both lacking in merit and untimely. There is no error in either conclusion.

cases initially ﬁled there; a removed case is necessarily one ‘of which the district courts .
. . have original jurisdiction.’”).
                                             11
       Registration of federal judgments in federal courts is expressly authorized by 28

U.S.C. § 1963. See Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A. G., 629 F.2d 730, 732 n.2 (2d Cir.

1980). The underlying judgment in Covington was—like the judgments registered against

Appellants by the Trustees—rendered on default by a federal court of coordinate

authority. Id. at 733. Examples of such proceedings are commonplace. 12 Contrary to

Appellants’ claim, the registration of the E.D.Pa. judgments in the federal court of another

state—in this case, New York—pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 did not prevent them from

challenging any defects in personal jurisdiction of the court where those judgments were

originally obtained. Id. at 732–33.

       Finally, we note that Appellants have provided us with no reason to believe that

the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that their motion to vacate was

untimely. See Daily Mirror, Inc. v. New York News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976) (“the denial of a motion to vacate will be reversed only upon

a clear showing of an abuse of discretion”). It is undisputed that the Trustees registered

the $184,538.45 E.D.Pa. judgment in W.D.N.Y on July 31, 2014. Appellants’ motion to

vacate that registration was not ﬁled until March 10, 2022, almost eight years later.

        See, e.g., Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
       12

Negara, 500 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. PT Pertamina (Persero) v.
Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C., 554 U.S. 929 (2008); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162
F.3d 724, 730 (2d Cir. 1998).
                                              12
      For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying

Appellants’ motion to vacate the registration of the E.D.Pa. judgment in Elevator Guild II.

                                         *        *    *

      We have considered Appellants remaining arguments and consider them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment and orders of the District Court.

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                             13