Court Opinion

ID: 9493590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:12:16.827504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:54.975369
License: Public Domain

SCHALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (the “Authority”) removed Mr. Litzenberger from his position for two reasons. The first reason was that he had caused the Authority to lose all confidence and trust in him because he had “displayed great antipathy towards the Authority and its management.” Specifically, the Authority charged that Mr. Litzenberger had “recklessly and without regard for the truth thereof accused Authority employees, attorneys, and contractors of improper and/or illegal and/or unethical conduct.” The Authority supported this charge with twelve separate specifications. The second reason for the removal was that Mr. Lit-*1338zenberger had violated the Authority’s Conduct and Discipline Directive (the “Directive”). The Authority specified that Mr. Litzenberger had violated the provision of the Directive which states, in part, that “[e]mployees are not permitted to make irresponsible, false, or defamatory statements which attack, without foundation, the integrity of other individuals or of an organization.” In support of the second reason for Mr. Litzenberger’s removal, the Authority relied upon the twelve specifications that it cited in support of the first reason. Each of the twelve specifications was based upon statements that Mr. Lit-zenberger made in a lawsuit that he filed against the Authority in state court in Virginia to require the Authority to remove allegedly false allegations of discrimination from his employment record. The suit ended in a jury verdict in favor of the Authority.
Mr. Litzenberger’s employment with the Authority was governed by Virginia law, while his retirement rights under the federal civil service system are governed by federal law. Mr. Litzenberger was removed from his position after he had exhausted all Authority grievance procedures that were available to him. Following his removal, he applied to the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) for a discontinued service annuity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d)(1). That statute provides that “[a]n employee who is separated from the service involuntarily, except by removal for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency ... after completing 25 years of service ... is entitled to an annuity.” OPM denied Mr. Litzenberger’s application because it determined that, although he had 25 years of service and had been separated involuntarily, he had been removed for misconduct. In its reconsideration decision OPM informed Mr. Litzen-berger:
While your allegations that statements which came out of litigation should not be considered may go to the propriety of your former agency’s action, it does not pertain to the fact the removal was for conduct. Any challenge of your removal is a separate matter, and OPM has no authority to make a collateral review of your removal in connection with your retirement application. If the removal as described is reversed, the matter may again be reviewed. But, OPM is required to make a determination based on the evidence of record.
Mr. Litzenberger appealed the denial of his application to the Board. Following a hearing, at which Mr. Litzenberger testified, the administrative judge (“AJ”) to whom the appeal was assigned affirmed OPM’s decision. The AJ’s decision became the final decision of the Board when the Board denied Mr. Litzenberger’s petition for review. The AJ held that Mr. Litzenberger had failed to establish his entitlement to a discontinued service annuity under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d)(1) by demonstrating that his separation from the Authority was not, as OPM had determined, “for cause on charges of misconduct.” The AJ concluded that, “on their face,” the Authority’s charges against Mr. Litzenber-ger and the supporting specifications constituted charges of misconduct. In so concluding, she noted, in particular, the fact that Mr. Litzenberger had been charged with making various accusations against Authority employees, attorneys, and contractors “recklessly and without regard for the truth thereof.” The AJ determined that this charge came within the scope of the provision of the Directive that prohibits an Authority employee from making “irresponsible, false, and defamatory statements which attack, without foundation, the integrity of other individuals or of an organization.” Finally, the AJ ruled that OPM had correctly determined that it had no authority to review the merits of the Authority’s removal action against Mr. Lit-zenberger.
I would affirm the decision of the Board sustaining OPM’s denial of Mr. Litzenber-ger’s application for a discontinued service annuity. In my view, this is a very straightforward case. Section 8336(d)(1) provides that an individual who has 25 *1339years of service and who is separated by his or her agency involuntarily is entitled to a discontinued service annuity unless the individual is removed “on charges of misconduct or delinquency.” The language of the statute makes it clear that, as far as the nature of Mr. Litzenberger’s involuntary separation was concerned, OPM had to do one thing and one thing only: determine whether the separation was based upon a charge of misconduct or delinquency. As both OPM and the Board recognized, OPM was not empowered to delve into the merits of Mr. Litzenberger’s separation. Rather, OPM’s sole task was to determine the nature of the separation. The statute uses the words “except by removal for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency.” It does not use the words “except when it is determined that the applicant was properly removed for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency.” Plainly, Mr. Litzenberger was involuntarily separated because he was removed for misconduct. One of the reasons why Mr. Litzenberger was removed was violation of the provision of the Directive that prohibits an employee from making irresponsible, false, or defamatory statements. Violation of that Directive provision obviously amounts to misconduct, a point which both OPM and the Board correctly recognized In my view, that should be the end of the case.
The majority states that OPM was correct when it concluded that “it could not make a collateral review whether the removal was justified.” However, the majority then goes on to state that OPM erred by deciding that the removal was for misconduct without addressing Mr. Litzenber-ger’s claim that the statements that gave rise to his removal were privileged because they were made in the state court litigation. Thus, the majority holds that “OPM could not deny an annuity for misconduct or delinquency without establishing or verifying the misconduct or delinquency, including verifying whether the assertedly culpable statements were privileged under Virginia law.” According to the majority, “the Board was required to determine whether such statements can support denial of an annuity under § 8336(d).” It remands the case to the Board for that purpose.
I do not believe that it was necessary for OPM to verify Mr. Litzenberger’s misconduct and determine whether the statements he made in the state court litigation were privileged. Indeed, I believe that it would have been improper for OPM to have done so. In my view, the majority is requiring OPM to do something that is contrary to the statute. Section 8336(d)(1) simply required OPM to determine whether, when the Authority removed Mr. Litzenberger, it did so because it (the Authority) believed that he was guilty of misconduct. As set forth above, OPM correctly determined that the Authority removed Mr. Litzenberger for misconduct, and the Board properly affirmed that determination. I believe that the majority errs in requiring OPM and the Board to go beyond that determination.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.