Court Opinion

ID: 9629943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:54:00.176028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:27.657062
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Roberts,
concurring. I concur in the conclusion of the opinion expressed by the majority, but *536I reach it by a different path. I believe that two recent decisions by this court control the outcome here.
In State v. Welch, 112 R. I. 321, 309 A.2d 128 (1973), a criminal defendant offered to substitute a plea of nolo contendere for his prior plea of not guilty when the prosecutor promised to recommend a certain sentence. The trial justice did not participate in the plea negotiations or promise any particular sentence. In court the trial justice accepted the defendant’s nolo plea and the prosecutor recommended the negotiated sentence, but the trial justice then imposed a stiffer sentence. The defendant’s subsequent motion to vacate the sentence was denied. On appeal we found on the record that the defendant had pleaded nolo in bona fide reliance on the prosecutor’s unqualified representation that in exchange for the plea the state would give the defendant a lesser punishment than he might otherwise have received. We held that under those circumstances the plea was' not freely given. The denial of Welch’s motion to vacate his sentence was quashed, and the case was remanded to the Superior Court.
In Nardone v. Mullen, 113 R. I. 415, 322 A.2d 27 (1974), a criminal defendant’s plea of nolo contendere was accepted. Sentence was imposed and then vacated, and a second sentence was imposed. After rebriefing and reargument we held that the first sentence was void due to fraud by the defendant, so jeopardy as to the sentence did not attach. State v. Nardone, 114 R. I. 363, 334 A.2d 208 (1975). However, we stated unequivocally in the first Nardone opinion that jeopardy as to the plea attaches upon acceptance of a plea of nolo, regardless of whether sentence is imposed then or later.1
*537In the wake of Welch and Nardone, what may a sentencing judge do after accepting a criminal defendant’s plea of nolo made in bona fide reliance on the prosecutor’s unqualified representation that in exchange for the plea the state will give the defendant a lesser punishment than he might otherwise receive?
I believe that once the court accepts the plea of a Welch kind of defendant, the court may not thereafter impose a sentence stiffer than the one negotiated. To use language that may be inapposite, the court’s acquiescence to a defendant’s bona fide reliance estops it from imposing the stiffer sentence. And since under Nardone jeopardy attaches upon the court’s acceptance of a defendant’s nolo plea, subsequent trial on the charge would constitute double jeopardy. In short, I would hold that where the court accepts a criminal defendant’s plea of nolo made in bona fide reliance on the prosecutor’s unqualified representation that the state in exchange for the plea would impose a certain sentence, then the court thereafter must impose that sentence.2 Of course if the defend*538ant chooses to forego that sentence by voluntarily withdrawing his plea of nolo and reinstating his plea of not guilty, then he thereby waives jeopardy and may be tried on the charge.
This approach is consistent with the results in Welch and Nardone and would strengthen the institution of plea bargaining.3 A criminal defendant would know for sure that what he bargained away his rights for would in fact *539be delivered. And yet a simple inquiry by the court would prevent any usurpation of its rightful power over sentencing.
In the case at bar there appears ample evidence that defendants pleaded nolo in bona fide reliance on the state’s promise of the negotiated sentence. The defendants negotiated for over a full year. They were willing to go to trial as late as February 24, 1973. The trial justice promised to impose the negotiated sentence before he finally accepted defendants’ pleas. These circumstances convince me that this case comes under the rule of Welch whereby the court may not impose a sentence stiffer than the one bargained for.
When the trial justice accepted defendants’ pleas of nolo on February 26, 1973, jeopardy as to the pleas attached. Thereafter, defendants were faced with the alternatives of accepting a stiffer sentence or reinstating their not guilty pleas. On March 23, 1973, defense counsel voiced his clients’ jeopardy concerns in the course of arguing unsuccessfully for “specific performance.” The defendants withdrew their pleas of nolo under protest. Under Welch and Nardone I would find that this withdrawal was involuntary, since it was coerced by the prospect of an unlawful alternative. Consequently, jeopardy remained attached as to the plea.
Counsel repeated his clients’ jeopardy concerns in renewing their motions for specific performance on September 10, 1973, before the trial. In the wake of Welch and Nardone, those concerns are recognized and protected. I would hold that the trial commencing October 10, 1973, *540constituted double jeopardy and is, therefore, void.4 The negotiated sentence should be imposed unless the defendants voluntarily withdraw their pleas of nolo.
Aside from my belief in the soundness of this approach, I have been reluctant to join in the majority or dissenting opinions for at least three reasons. First, in light of our own case of Welch I see no need for the majority’s reliance either on the fact of the trial justice’s participation in the plea negotiations or on the inapposite case of Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Second, I share my brother Kelleher’s wariness of grafting contract analysis onto criminal plea bargaining situations. And third, unlike my brother Kelleher, I would not penalize the defendant for the prosecutorial “goof” but instead would adopt the standard of Santobello v. New York, supra at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433: “The staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of ‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done.”

"[A] plea of nolo contendere, once accepted, becomes an implied confession of guilt, and imposition of sentence follows as a matter of course. Thus, for' the purpose of the case in which it was entered, such *537a plea is equivalent to one of guilty, (citations omitted) And even the state concedes that the same consequences, including the attachment of jeopardy, attend the entry of a plea of guilty as attend the rendition of a jury verdict of guilty, (citations omitted) It follows that the entry .of defendant’s plea of nolo was as much a conviction as would have been a jury’s verdict of guilty against him, and that jeopardy attached in this case upon acceptance of his plea of nolo contendere.” Nardone v. Mullen, 113 R. I. 415, 417-18, 322 A.2d 27, 29 (1974).

To keep from being unwillingly bound by a prosecutor, a trial justice need only inquire of the defendant before accepting his plea whether he is pleading in reliance on any promises. The normal procedure in a criminal plea bargaining case may then resemble the provisions of paragraphs (e)(2) through (e)(4) of the new Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, effective December 1, 1975:
“(2) Notice of Such Agreement. — If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court or, on' a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the court may *538accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
“(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. — If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
“(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. — If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement.”

It may be argued that a Welch kind of plea is wholly involuntary and therefore void ab initio. In that case the original plea of not guilty would still be good. The court would have no discretion to change the plea or impose any sentence. Since the plea of nolo would be a nullity, jeopardy would not attach upon its purported acceptance. State v. Nardone, 114 R. I. 363, 334 A.2d 208 (1975). The result of this reading of Welch would be to announce that the only good criminal pleas of nolo are those made with full knowledge that the court may impose any sentence within the law without regard for the plea negotiations. In return for his plea of nolo, a defendant would receive only a certain recommendation by the prosecutor, a recommendation that would not bind the court in any way. Santobello v. New York, 404 U. S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). While this approach has merit, I find it unacceptable for the blow it would deal the institution of plea bargaining. To keep plea bargaining robust a criminal defendant must be offered an inducement sufficient to justify waiver of his constitutional rights to a public trial by a jury of his peers and to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Often enough the guarantee of a cer*539tain sentence is sufficient. But the guarantee only of a certain prosecutorial recommendation will be sufficient far less often. Consequently, I cannot read Welch to mean that the plea of nolo was so involuntary as to be void ab initio.

It should be noted that Welch was decided on August 28, 1973, after our denial of defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari to enforce the plea bargain commitment, State v. Freeman, 111 R. I. 937, 307 A.2d 542 (1973), and before commencement of their trial. Also, we decided Nardone on July 9, 1974, while defendants’ present appeal to this court was pending. Hence it is understandable that the trial justice below did not follow the path I have taken in this opinion.