Court Opinion

ID: 9890667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 21:00:45.757921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:39.792305
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764    Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023   Pg: 1 of 43

                                              PUBLISHED

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1764

        BRIAN BOWEN, II,

                           Plaintiff – Appellant,

                    v.

        ADIDAS AMERICA INC; JAMES GATTO; CHRISTIAN DAWKINS; MUNISH
        SOOD; THOMAS GASSNOLA; CHRISTOPHER RIVERS,

                           Defendants – Appellees.

                                              No. 21-2029

        BRIAN BOWEN, II,

                           Plaintiff – Appellant,

                    v.

        ADIDAS AMERICA INC.; JAMES GATTO; CHRISTIAN DAWKINS; MUNISH
        SOOD; THOMAS GASSNOLA; CHRISTOPHER RIVERS,

                    Defendants – Appellees.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:18-cv-03118-JFA)

        Argued: September 16, 2022                                Decided: October 12, 2023

        Before KING, RUSHING, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764     Doc: 84        Filed: 10/12/2023    Pg: 2 of 43

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
        Heytens joined. Judge King wrote a dissenting opinion.

        ARGUED: William Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville, South Carolina,
        for Appellant. William H. Taft, V, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New
        York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: W. Mullins McLeod, Jr., Colin V. Ram, MCLEOD
        LAW GROUP LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew T. Richardson,
        Mary Lucille Dinkins, WYCHE, Columbia, South Carolina; Andrew M. Levine, Nathan
        S. Richards, Matthew D. Forbes, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, New York, New
        York, for Appellee adidas America, Inc. Cory E. Manning, Columbia, South Carolina,
        Robert L. Lindholm, Charlotte, North Carolina, Wesley T. Moran, NELSON MULLINS
        RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for Appellee
        Christopher Rivers. Terry A. Finger, FINGER, MELNICK, BROOKS & LABRUCE,
        Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, for Appellee Christian Dawkins. Deborah B. Barbier,
        DEBORAH B. BARBIER, LLP, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee James Gatto.
        Richard J. Zack, Thomas H. Cordova, TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS
        LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Wilbur E. Johnson, CLEMENT RIVERS, LLP,
        Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee Munish Sood.

                                                  2
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84        Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 3 of 43

        RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

              In 2017, Brian Bowen II was a promising high-school basketball player who aspired

        to play professionally. At the end of high school, Bowen committed to play NCAA

        Division I basketball for the University of Louisville (Louisville) in exchange for a full,

        four-year scholarship. Bowen hoped that by playing Division I basketball, he could

        become a top NBA prospect. Those hopes were dashed when a college basketball bribery

        scheme unraveled, exposing that Bowen’s father, Brian Bowen Sr., accepted a bribe in

        connection with Bowen’s decision to play for Louisville. As a consequence, Bowen lost

        his NCAA eligibility, and Louisville cut him from the team. Bowen sued the central figures

        in the bribery scheme under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

        (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., to recover treble damages, including lost future

        professional earnings and the attorney’s fees and costs he incurred trying to restore his

        NCAA eligibility.    The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,

        concluding that Bowen did not demonstrate an injury to his business or property, as

        required for a private civil RICO claim. The district court later denied Bowen’s motion for

        reconsideration. Bowen appeals both rulings, and we affirm.

                                                    I.

                                                    A.

               In high school, Bowen was an exceptional basketball player. As a McDonald’s All-

        American and five-star recruit, Bowen was a sought-after prospect for many NCAA

        Division I schools. At one point, ESPN ranked Bowen thirteenth overall in the 2017 class.

        Bowen Sr. and an aspiring sports agent, Christopher Dawkins, helped Bowen during the

                                                    3
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 4 of 43

        recruitment process and accompanied him on university visits. Dawkins hoped that by

        helping Bowen get to the NCAA, he could later represent Bowen in the NBA. One of the

        schools recruiting Bowen was Louisville. As an assistant coach told Bowen in a text

        message, Louisville wanted him to have “immediate playing time” and be a “featured

        scorer” on the team. J.A. 1702.

               Bowen committed to play basketball for Louisville and signed a scholarship

        agreement to that effect in June 2017. Under the agreement, Louisville awarded Bowen a

        full, four-year scholarship covering tuition, fees, books, housing, meals, and miscellaneous

        expenses in exchange for Bowen’s commitment to play on the men’s basketball team. By

        signing the agreement, Bowen certified he understood the agreement could “be

        immediately reduced or canceled at any time if” he became ineligible to compete or

        voluntarily withdrew from the team. J.A. 292. The scholarship agreement also promised

        that Bowen’s scholarship would “not be reduced, canceled, or non-renewed at any time”

        because of his “athletics’ ability, performance, condition, or contribution [to] the team’s

        success,” or “for any other athletics reason.” J.A. 292.

               To play NCAA Division I basketball, Bowen had to comply with the NCAA’s

        eligibility rules, including its amateurism rules. See NCAA Bylaws § 12.01.1 (2016)

        (“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in a

        particular sport.”). Under the amateurism rules, “student-athletes -- and their families --

        may not accept payments of any form for the student-athletes’ playing or agreeing to play

        their sport,” subject to certain exceptions. United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, 111 (2d

        Cir. 2021). Shortly after committing to play for Louisville, Bowen affirmed that, “to the

                                                      4
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 5 of 43

        best of [his] knowledge, [he had] not violated any amateurism rules.” J.A. 297. The NCAA

        Eligibility Center certified Bowen’s eligibility to play, and his eligibility remained intact

        through August and early September 2017 as Bowen began practicing with the team.

               But before Bowen could play his first college game, his plans were derailed. In

        September 2017, federal prosecutors unveiled a criminal complaint against Dawkins,

        James Gatto, Merl Code, and Munish Sood. The complaint charged that these defendants

        (and one other) facilitated bribes to student-athletes or their family members to entice the

        athletes to play basketball at Division I schools sponsored by apparel company Adidas

        America, Inc. Prosecutors separately charged Thomas Gassnola for his role in the scheme.

               Gatto was Adidas’s director of global sports marketing for basketball. He “managed

        the sports marketing budget,” and his responsibilities included “ensur[ing] the success of

        the sponsorship agreements Adidas had signed with” universities like Louisville. Gatto,

        986 F.3d at 111. Gassnola and Code were both Adidas consultants. See id. Sood was a

        financial advisor. Gatto, Gassnola, and Code colluded with Sood and Dawkins to pay “the

        families of top-tier high school basketball recruits” to persuade the players to enroll at

        Adidas-sponsored universities. Id. Their goal was to “lur[e] the best basketball players to

        Adidas-sponsored schools to better market [the Adidas] brand.” Id. at 116.

               The criminal complaint accurately charged that Bowen’s decision to play for

        Louisville was tainted by one such bribe. Around the same time Bowen committed to play

        for Louisville, Bowen Sr. agreed to accept $100,000 from Adidas, which Dawkins

        facilitated. See id. at 112. On July 13, 2017, Sood delivered the first payment—$19,400

        in cash—to Bowen Sr. The FBI arrested Gatto, Dawkins, and Code before they made any

                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 6 of 43

        additional payments. See id. Evidence suggests Bowen was ignorant of his father’s

        misdeeds. Nevertheless, Bowen Sr.’s decision to accept the bribe and his receipt of the

        first installment violated NCAA rules and undermined Bowen’s eligibility to play NCAA

        basketball. See NCAA Bylaws §§ 13.01.1, 16.01.1, 16.02.3, 16.02.4 (2016).

               When the criminal investigation became public, Louisville withdrew Bowen from

        the men’s basketball team. Louisville declined to officially declare Bowen ineligible and

        then seek his reinstatement with the NCAA. In a letter, the interim athletics director

        explained that Bowen would “not be allowed to practice with or compete for [the] men’s

        basketball team at any point in the future.” J.A. 751. However, Louisville allowed Bowen

        to “continue to receive [his] athletics scholarship” if he chose to remain enrolled. J.A. 751.

               Bowen did not stay at Louisville. Instead, he voluntarily withdrew after his first

        semester and transferred to the University of South Carolina, where he began practicing

        with the basketball team. The University of South Carolina declared Bowen ineligible and

        petitioned the NCAA to reinstate his eligibility, but to no avail. Bowen and his family

        incurred nearly $30,000 in legal fees for their failed effort to restore his eligibility. After

        twice declaring for the NBA draft, briefly playing professionally in Australia, and playing

        several seasons on NBA two-way contracts, Bowen’s professional basketball career has

        not taken off as he had hoped.

                                                      6
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764        Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023   Pg: 7 of 43

                                                     B.

               In August 2019, Bowen filed an amended complaint in the District of South

        Carolina against Adidas America, Inc., Gatto, Code, 1 Dawkins, Sood, Gassnola, and

        Christopher Rivers, 2 alleging two substantive RICO violations, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a),

        (c), and two RICO conspiracies, see id. § 1962(d). The defendants moved to dismiss. They

        argued, in part, that Bowen had not alleged a cognizable injury to his business or property

        as necessary to pursue a private civil RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and that even

        if he had, he had not plausibly alleged that the defendants proximately caused his injuries.

        The district court granted the motion in part; however, the court determined that Bowen

        “alleged sufficient facts concerning causation and injury required for RICO to enable him

        to proceed beyond the pleading stage of this case.” Bowen v. Adidas America, Inc., No.

        3:18-3118-JFA, 2020 WL 13076108, at *11 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2020).

               After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, again arguing

        Bowen had not demonstrated that they proximately caused a cognizable injury to his

        business or property under Section 1964(c). This time, the district court agreed and granted

        summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Bowen v. Adidas America, Inc., 541 F. Supp.

        3d 670 (D.S.C. 2021). The court later denied Bowen’s motion for reconsideration. Bowen

        v. Adidas America, Inc., No. 3:18-3118-JFA, 2021 WL 3711131 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021).

               1
                   Code is not a party on appeal.
               2
                Rivers was an Adidas employee who Bowen alleges was part of the bribery scheme
        and knew about the efforts to influence Bowen to attend Louisville. Rivers was not
        criminally prosecuted.
                                                      7
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 8 of 43

                                                    II.

                                                    A.

               We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment, applying

        the same legal standards as that court. See Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d 344,

        349 (4th Cir. 2020). Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in

        the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment is appropriate if “there

        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

        matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Ballengee, 968 F.3d at 349. “Facts are ‘material’

        when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue’ exists when the

        evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News

        & Observer Publ’g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir.

        2010). If the nonmoving party “has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential

        element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof,” summary

        judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

                                                    B.

               Congress made the civil RICO cause of action for treble damages available only to

        plaintiffs “injured in [their] business or property” by a defendant’s RICO violation. 18

        U.S.C. § 1964(c); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495–497 (1985);

        Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 2001). 3

               3
                Section 1964(c)’s injury and proximate cause requirements are sometimes called
        “standing” requirements. See, e.g., Potomac Elec. Power Co., 262 F.3d at 264. Despite
        that label, those statutory requirements do not implicate a court’s subject-matter

                                                     8
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84        Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 9 of 43

        Without an injury to “his business or property,” even a plaintiff who can prove he suffered

        some injury as a result of a RICO violation lacks a cause of action under this statute. 18

        U.S.C. § 1964(c).

               The “word ‘property’ has a naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary

        definitions and in common usage ‘property’ comprehends anything of material value

        owned or possessed.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (interpreting

        “business or property” in Section 4 of the Clayton Act and citing Webster’s Third New

        Int’l Dictionary (1961)); see Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267 (1992)

        (“Congress modeled § 1964(c) on . . . § 4 of the Clayton Act”). The word “business” in

        this context connotes “a commercial or industrial enterprise” or “commercial or mercantile

        activity customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood.” Webster’s Third New Int’l

        Dictionary 302 (1971). Although a plaintiff’s “business” and his “property” may overlap,

        Section 1964(c) covers two distinct types of injury. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338–339.

               The phrase “business or property” does not, however, encompass all possible

        injuries. It excludes, for example, personal injuries and “pecuniary losses occurring

        therefrom.” Bast v. Cohen, Dunn, & Sinclair, PC, 59 F.3d 492, 495 (4th Cir. 1995); see

        Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339. Courts have also held that injuries “to mere expectancy interests”

        do not suffice. HCB Fin. Corp. v. McPherson, 8 F.4th 335, 345 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal

        jurisdiction because they do not concern a court’s power to adjudicate a civil RICO case.
        See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014).
        Instead, injury to business or property and proximate causation are elements a plaintiff
        must prove to avail himself of RICO’s private cause of action. See CGM, LLC v. BellSouth
        Telecomms., Inc., 664 F.3d 46, 52–53 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing “statutory standing”
        generally).
                                                    9
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 10 of 43

        quotation marks omitted); see Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., 387 F.3d 721, 728–729 (8th

        Cir. 2004).

               Bowen contends the defendants caused him to suffer three cognizable business or

        property injuries: (1) loss of benefits secured by his scholarship agreement with Louisville;

        (2) loss of his NCAA eligibility; and (3) loss of money spent on attorney’s fees attempting

        to regain his eligibility. We consider each argument in turn.

                                                     1.

               Bowen first claims a business or property interest “in the contractual benefits he

        secured from [Louisville] through his” scholarship agreement. Opening Br. 28. According

        to Bowen, that agreement obligated Louisville to provide him with certain basketball-

        related benefits—including “elite coaching, preferred playing positions on the court,

        athletic training, strength and nutrition services, competitive playing time, and experience

        reading game film,” Opening Br. 29—that he lost because the defendants’ conduct

        disqualified him from playing on the team.

               We may grant that Bowen had a business or property interest in the contractual

        benefits of his scholarship agreement with Louisville. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d

        1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding the “transaction” between a student-athlete and a

        university offering a scholarship is commercial because “both parties to that exchange

        anticipate economic gain from it”); Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2005) (en

        banc) (concluding RICO plaintiff alleged harm to a property interest because his

        allegations amounted to tortious interference with a contract under state law). But Bowen

        has not demonstrated an injury to that interest because the benefits he lost were not

                                                     10
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 11 of 43

        promised in the scholarship agreement. To the contrary, Bowen received everything to

        which his scholarship entitled him.

               As the parties agree, to determine whether Bowen has shown an injury under this

        theory, we must interpret Bowen’s scholarship agreement according to Kentucky contract

        law. Under Kentucky law, “in the absence of ambiguity, a written instrument will be

        enforced strictly according to its terms, and a court will interpret the contract’s terms by

        assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Maze

        v. Bd. of Dirs. for Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Tr. Fund, 559

        S.W.3d 354, 363 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).            If a contract is

        unambiguous, a court “look[s] only as far as the four corners of the document to determine

        the parties’ intentions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, “‘[w]here a

        contract is ambiguous or silent on a vital matter, a court may consider parol and extrinsic

        evidence involving the circumstances surrounding execution of the contract, the subject

        matter of the contract, the objects to be accomplished, and the conduct of the parties.’” In

        re Conco, Inc., 855 F.3d 703, 711 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty

        Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002)).

               The agreement between Bowen and Louisville was entitled “Athletics Financial Aid

        Agreement for Student-Athletes.” J.A. 291. It listed Bowen’s sport as “Men’s Basketball.”

        J.A. 291. In exchange for committing to play basketball, the agreement promised Bowen

        the maximum compensation then allowed under NCAA rules: a full, four-year scholarship

        covering tuition and fees, books, room and board, and miscellaneous expenses. See Oral

        Arg. at 02:00–02:22 (Bowen’s counsel acknowledging Bowen received the maximum

                                                    11
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 12 of 43

        compensation allowed under NCAA rules). Nowhere did the agreement promise athletic

        training or services, elite coaching, preferred positions, or playing time.

               Bowen did not suffer any injury under the scholarship agreement’s unambiguous

        terms. After federal prosecutors exposed the defendants’ bribery scheme, Louisville

        allowed Bowen to keep his scholarship, even though it withdrew him from the team.

        Louisville continued to give Bowen exactly what the agreement promised.             Bowen

        relinquished the scholarship when he transferred to the University of South Carolina, and

        he cannot now sue under RICO to recover benefits he voluntarily surrendered.

               Resisting this conclusion, Bowen argues that although “the agreement is silent as to

        the basketball related benefits promised,” we should “‘imply an obligation to carry out the

        purpose for which the contract was made,’” which he claims was “the provision of

        basketball career development to [Bowen] in exchange for his commitment to play for

        [Louisville].” Opening Br. 34 (quoting In re Conco, 855 F.3d at 712). In support, Bowen

        cites parol evidence, such as the text message an assistant coach sent him during recruiting

        saying Louisville wanted Bowen to get “immediate playing time” and be a “featured

        scorer” for the team. J.A. 1702.

               But unlike In re Conco, on which Bowen relies, the agreement here is not “silent or

        ambiguous” as to what Louisville promised Bowen in exchange for his commitment to play

        basketball for the school. 855 F.3d at 712. Indeed, Bowen’s articulation of the “obvious

        purpose” of the agreement contradicts the agreement’s terms. Reply Br. 7. Louisville did

        not promise Bowen career development and immediate playing time in exchange for his

        commitment to play for the school. Rather, the agreement unambiguously promised

                                                     12
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 13 of 43

        Bowen the full cost of tuition and fees, room and board, books, and miscellaneous expenses

        in exchange for his commitment. Because the scholarship agreement is unambiguous on

        this point, we must construe it according to its terms and “without resort to extrinsic

        evidence.” Maze, 559 S.W.3d at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Bowen emphasizes that the scholarship agreement required him to offer his athletic

        labor to the school. But that obligation on Bowen did not impose a reciprocal obligation

        on Louisville to use his labor or provide him with certain athletic benefits to improve his

        skills. See, e.g., Giuliani v. Duke Univ., No. 1:08CV502, 2010 WL 1292321, at *6

        (M.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010) (“[E]ven contractual athletic scholarships do not ensure a

        student’s right to play a sport but only constitute a promise by the university to provide the

        student with financial assistance in exchange for the student’s maintenance of athletic

        eligibility.”); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (holding

        an unambiguous scholarship agreement that was silent on “the right to play basketball” did

        not implicitly contain such a right).

               We don’t doubt that, as Bowen contends, the best college basketball recruits choose

        among the schools vying for their labor based on a comparison of coaching staff, predicted

        playing time, anticipated training, and the like, rather than by comparing financial aid

        packages. None of those enticements, however, are guaranteed in the written agreement.

        If Bowen didn’t receive immediate playing time, or if Coach Pitino left the school, Bowen

        would have had no breach of contract claim based on this scholarship agreement. Although

        the prospect of those benefits motivated Bowen to agree to play basketball at Louisville,

        those additional benefits are not listed in the agreement. And, under Kentucky law, “[t]he

                                                     13
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 14 of 43

        fact that one party may have intended different results . . . is insufficient to construe a

        contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.” Maze, 559 S.W.3d at 363

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Because the scholarship agreement is unambiguous, we decline to consider parol

        evidence to interpret it. And because Louisville allowed Bowen to keep his scholarship

        even after withdrawing him from the team, he did not suffer an injury to his business or

        property interest in the agreement. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that

        Bowen has not demonstrated he suffered a cognizable injury under his scholarship

        agreement with Louisville.

                                                      2.

               Next, Bowen contends that the loss of his NCAA eligibility was a cognizable

        business or property injury for purposes of Section 1964(c). We disagree.

               We may easily dispose of the argument that Bowen had a property interest in his

        NCAA eligibility. A student-athlete’s eligibility is a status, not a thing “of material value”

        the athlete “own[s] or possess[es].” Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338. For example, there is no

        indication Bowen could sell, lease, or otherwise transfer his eligibility to another person.

        See Property, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1818 (1971) (defining “property” as

        “something that is or may be owned or possessed” and “the exclusive right to possess,

        enjoy, and dispose of a thing”); cf. United States v. Adler, 186 F.3d 574, 577 (4th Cir. 1999)

        (interpreting the word “property” in the wire fraud statute according to “the common sense

        notion that property is anything in which one has a right that could be assigned, traded,

                                                     14
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 15 of 43

        bought, and otherwise disposed of” (internal quotation marks omitted)).               Although

        eligibility may be valuable to the individual student-athlete, it is not property.

               Moreover, being eligible to play Division I college basketball did not confer on

        Bowen a right—much less a property right—to do so. Rather, Bowen’s eligibility gave

        him only the opportunity to play college basketball. And we have previously concluded,

        consistent with the decisions of other courts, that student-athletes do not have “a property

        interest in intercollegiate athletic participation.” Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ.,

        639 F.3d 91, 109 (4th Cir. 2011) (emphasis omitted). 4 Bowen does not identify any courts

        that have held to the contrary.

               As for whether loss of his NCAA eligibility injured Bowen “in his business,” 18

        U.S.C. § 1964(c), his claim is a moving target. To the extent Bowen claims he was in the

        business of playing college basketball, he suffered no cognizable injury because, despite

        losing his eligibility, he continued to receive the maximum compensation allowed at that

        time to a student-athlete: a full scholarship. If he had retained his eligibility and continued

               4
                 Our ruling in Equity in Athletics came in the context of resolving a due process
        claim. Bowen would have us disregard that decision and others like it because RICO does
        not require a plaintiff to show a constitutionally protected property interest. But the
        property interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment must “stem from an
        independent source such as state law.” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
        577 (1972). In Equity in Athletics, for example, we agreed with the district court’s
        conclusion that state law did not recognize a property interest in intercollegiate athletic
        participation. See 639 F.3d at 109; Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 675 F. Supp.
        2d 660, 680–681 (W.D. Va. 2009). Courts have similarly consulted state law when
        assessing claimed property interests for purposes of Section 1964(c), and we think a limited
        recourse to decisions assessing state property law for guidance is not inappropriate here.
        See Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2013) (en
        banc); DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 96–97 (1st Cir. 1997).
                                                       15
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764         Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 16 of 43

        playing, Bowen could not have received any greater compensation than that for playing

        college basketball. And his voluntary surrender of the full scholarship does not create an

        injury.

                  In support of this version of his claim, Bowen relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s

        decision in NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). There, a group of student-athletes

        filed an antitrust action challenging the “NCAA rules that limit the compensation they may

        receive in exchange for their athletic services.” 141 S. Ct. at 2151 (internal quotation marks

        omitted). The district court enjoined certain NCAA rules that limited the education-related

        benefits schools could offer student-athletes but left undisturbed rules limiting athletic

        scholarships and compensation related to athletic performance. See id. at 2147. The

        Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at 2166. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that “the

        NCAA’s Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and

        basketball” and “student-athletes have nowhere else to sell their labor.” Id. at 2152, 2156

        (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Bowen, because the Supreme Court

        never questioned whether the Alston plaintiffs had suffered a business or property injury,

        which is a prerequisite to maintaining an antitrust action, the Court implicitly recognized

        that “the labor and skill provided by NCAA athletes” is a business or property interest.

        Opening Br. 26.

                  Even so, none of this helps Bowen. In Alston, the student-athletes (whose eligibility

        was not in question) claimed NCAA rules unlawfully limited the compensation they could

        receive for their labor. See 141 S. Ct. at 2147, 2152. Lost compensation is a concrete

        injury to business or property. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338 (“Money, of course, is a form

                                                       16
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 17 of 43

        of property.”). Bowen, however, does not assert the loss of compensation for services

        rendered playing NCAA basketball—after all, he continued to receive the maximum

        compensation allowed and does not challenge the NCAA compensation limits that applied

        to him. Rather, he asserts the loss of his eligibility to participate in the NCAA labor market,

        untethered to any concrete interest like compensation.

               Much of Bowen’s argument, however, reaches beyond the business of college

        athletics. His main theory is that losing his NCAA eligibility prevented him from playing

        college basketball, thereby improving his basketball skills, and increasing his prospects of

        being selected in the NBA draft. This is not the sort of tangible business loss that supports

        a RICO cause of action.       Bowen did not have an existing or prospective business

        relationship with any NBA team. Bowen emphasizes his expectation, shared by an NBA

        scout, that if he had retained his eligibility and played two years for Louisville, he would

        have been drafted by an NBA team and enjoyed a profitable professional basketball career.

        But injury to a “mere expectancy” or the loss of an opportunity is insufficient for a civil

        RICO cause of action. HCB Fin. Corp., 8 F.4th at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted);

        see, e.g., id. at 344–345 (lost investment opportunity); In re Taxable Mun. Bond Sec. Litig.,

        51 F.3d 518, 522–523 (5th Cir. 1995) (lost opportunity to obtain a loan); Taylor v. Bettis,

        976 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737–738 (E.D.N.C. 2013) (delayed or hindered realization of

        expected damages recovery in other litigation), aff’d, 693 Fed. App. 190 (4th Cir. 2017)

        (per curiam); Strates Shows, Inc. v. Amusements of Am., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826–

        828 (E.D.N.C. 2005) (not being awarded an expected contract or lease that was “highly

        certain” based on past awards).        The problem is not that Bowen lacks evidence

                                                      17
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 18 of 43

        demonstrating his expectancy or fails to articulate the damages flowing from his claimed

        injury. Rather, the problem “is the nature of th[e] loss.” HCB Fin. Corp., 8 F.4th at 345

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Harm to Bowen’s anticipated future professional

        basketball career due to the loss of his NCAA eligibility and consequent opportunity to

        improve his skills while playing college basketball is not an “injur[y] in his business or

        property” cognizable under Section 1964(c).

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s determination that Bowen’s lost NCAA

        eligibility cannot support his RICO action against the defendants.

                                                      3.

               Finally, Bowen contends that the nearly $30,000 in attorney’s fees and costs he and

        his family incurred trying to restore his NCAA eligibility is an injury sufficient to maintain

        a RICO cause of action. Certainly, lost money is a concrete injury to business or property.

        See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 338. But pecuniary losses flowing from a non-cognizable injury do

        not satisfy Section 1964(c)’s requirement. See, e.g., Bast, 59 F.3d at 495; Jackson, 731

        F.3d at 564–565 & n.4; Dickerson v. TLC The Laser Eye Ctr. Inst., Inc., 493 Fed. App.

        390, 394 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Because Bowen’s lost NCAA eligibility is not an

        injury to a business or property interest under Section 1964(c), the legal fees and expenses

        he incurred attempting to restore his eligibility are similarly not cognizable.

                                                     III.

               Bowen also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration,

        which we review for abuse of discretion. See United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton

        Co., 866 F.3d 199, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). Where, as here, “the district court’s initial decision

                                                     18
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023       Pg: 19 of 43

        was correct, the denial of a motion to reconsider cannot be clearly erroneous or manifestly

        unjust.” Wojcicki v. SCANA/SCE&G, 947 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we

        affirm the district court’s denial of Bowen’s motion for reconsideration.

                                                    IV.

               We have no doubt that Bowen Sr.’s decision to accept a bribe, and the defendants’

        corrupt decision to offer one, upended Bowen’s basketball career and dramatically altered

        his life. But RICO is not the avenue through which Bowen may seek relief. Thus, for the

        foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

                                                                                     AFFIRMED.

                                                     19
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 20 of 43

        KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

               The main issue we must resolve today is whether plaintiff Brian Bowen, II — a

        former McDonald’s All-American high school basketball player who lost his NCAA

        eligibility when his father was bribed by defendant Adidas America Inc. and its associates

        — satisfies the statutory injury requirement for his claims against Adidas and the other

        defendants under the civil provisions of the RICO Act. On the premise that Brian cannot

        satisfy RICO’s injury requirement, the district court and the panel majority have deemed

        the defendants to be entitled to summary judgment. As explained further herein, however,

        I would rule that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility constitutes an injury under RICO. I

        would therefore vacate the summary judgment award and remand for further proceedings.

        As such, I respectfully dissent from the decision of my friends in the majority.

                                                     I.

               I will begin by summarizing the facts pertinent to Brian Bowen, II’s civil RICO

        claims. And I do so in the light most favorable to Brian. See Aleman v. City of Charlotte,

        80 F.4th 264, 270 n.1 (4th Cir. 2023) (“Of course, pursuant to the applicable summary

        judgment standard, we must view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom

        in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”).

                                                    A.

               For at least a couple of years before and during 2017, Brian — at 6’7” or 6’8” —

        was an exceptionally talented young basketball player in Michigan and Indiana. Brian’s

        athletic skills were widely noticed, and he collected an impressive array of accolades,

                                                    20
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 21 of 43

        including being a McDonald’s All-American high school player and a 5-star (on a 1 to 5

        scale) college recruit. What’s more, it was universally forecast that Brian would be selected

        in the first round of the NBA draft, just as soon as he became eligible. Brian was a good

        student as well, and he received more than 25 scholarship offers from major NCAA

        Division I basketball programs.

               By his senior year of high school, Brian had narrowed his college basketball options

        to about a dozen major Division I programs. After nearly opting to attend the University

        of Oregon, Brian decided, in late May 2017, to devote his basketball skills to the University

        of Louisville (“UofL”).

                                                     1.

               Unbeknownst to Brian, defendant Adidas and several of its employees and advisors,

        including defendants James Gatto, Christian Dawkins, Munish Sood, Thomas Gassnola,

        Christopher Rivers, and Merl Code (collectively the “Adidas Schemers”), were involved

        in an ongoing fraud and bribery scheme involving NCAA college basketball. 1 The primary

        goal of that scheme was to target elite young talent in the basketball world and have the

        best high school athletes commit to NCAA university programs that were sponsored by

        Adidas. At those universities, Adidas athletic shoes and apparel were — by virtue of

        contractual arrangements — the mandated gold standard.

               An impetus for the fraud and bribery scheme was that Adidas had fallen behind its

        major competitors, particularly Nike and Under Armour, in the multibillion-dollar athletic

               1
                Although Code was initially named as an appellee herein, Brian later voluntarily
        dismissed Code from this appeal.
                                                     21
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 22 of 43

        shoe and apparel market. To remedy its poor performance in that market, Adidas was

        seeking to increase its brand loyalty in the United States through athlete and celebrity

        endorsements.

               By successfully placing the most outstanding young basketball players at Adidas-

        sponsored NCAA universities — which included, inter alia, UofL, Kansas, and North

        Carolina State — Adidas would secure and utilize the contractual right to display the

        Adidas logo by way of those athletes during their college basketball careers. Adidas would

        also gain a valuable opportunity to ingratiate its brand with the basketball players

        themselves, thereby affording Adidas the likelihood of obtaining additional sponsorships

        if the players later moved on to the NBA.

               The Adidas Schemers primarily targeted the parents and guardians of talented young

        African American athletes — largely from poor backgrounds — and used an array of

        unlawful means to secure their attendance at Adidas-sponsored NCAA universities. With

        an utter lack of tact, the Schemers described their secret strategy as the “Soul Patrol” and

        the “Black Ops.”

               In executing the fraud and bribery scheme, the Adidas Schemers travelled

        extensively to meet with the targeted players and their families. The Schemers would then

        sometimes secretly offer and make monetary payments to the players’ family members. In

        order for those payments to be covertly made, the Schemers would sometimes disguise

        Adidas funds by passing them through youth basketball teams in the Amateur Athletic

        Union (“AAU”).

                                                    22
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 23 of 43

                                                     2.

               Adidas and its associates were aware by 2015 of Brian’s stellar prospects as a

        basketball player. And Brian was identified by early 2017 as one of the top uncommitted

        high school players that Adidas sought to have enroll at one of its sponsored NCAA

        universities.   Brian was then considering playing basketball at several non-Adidas-

        sponsored schools, however, including the University of Oregon, which was sponsored by

        Nike. When the Adidas Schemers learned that Brian might not commit to an Adidas-

        sponsored university, they scrambled to arrange otherwise. Their efforts included a plan

        to funnel a $100,000 payment to Brian’s father to secure Brian’s commitment to UofL,

        which was then under contract as Adidas’s business partner in a major sponsorship

        agreement worth approximately $160 million over a 10-year period. The Schemers

        communicated to Brian’s father a promise to make the bribe payment, without specifying

        the amount.

               On June 1, 2017, when he was 18 years of age, Brian committed to UofL and signed

        an “Athletics Financial Aid Agreement for Student Athletes” (the “UofL Agreement”). See

        J.A. 291. 2 Pursuant to the UofL Agreement, Brian expected to exchange his athletic labor

        for, among other things, the best possible coaching and playing experience, plus a

        scholarship covering tuition and other costs for four years. To play college basketball,

        Brian was obliged to comply with the NCAA’s eligibility requirements. In fact, Brian had

        been certified by the NCAA as an eligible amateur before he committed to UofL, and he

               2
                 Citations herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by
        the parties in this appeal.
                                                    23
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 24 of 43

        confirmed in the UofL Agreement that, “to the best of [his] knowledge, [he had] not

        violated any amateurism rules.” Id. at 297.

               Brian made his decision to commit to UofL based on basketball reasons alone. That

        is, Brian had been advised by UofL coaches that he would promptly be in the Louisville

        starting lineup and would see immediate playing time. Meanwhile, Brian was unaware of

        the payment that the Adidas Schemers had promised his father.

               From the perspective of the Adidas Schemers, it was essential to keep Brian in the

        dark about the bribe payment. And the Schemers needed to keep UofL in the dark as well.

        The Schemers needed to prevent public disclosure of the bribery not only to protect

        themselves from criminal liability, but also to keep Brian from being declared ineligible to

        play NCAA basketball. Put simply, a declaration of Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility

        would undermine the Adidas fraud and bribery scheme. Again, the scheme’s primary

        purpose was to earn Adidas large sums of money by associating it with stellar college

        basketball players on the very best teams, such as UofL. 3

                                                      3.

               In July of 2017, about a month after Brian committed to UofL, the Adidas Schemers

        began coordinating by text and phone to make a $25,000 first installment on the bribe

        payment to Brian’s father. They soon faced difficulties, however, in implementing their

        plan to funnel Adidas’s money through an AAU team, the “Karolina Khaos” in South

               3
                 Brian’s father confirmed under oath — in testifying for federal prosecutors in a
        2019 criminal trial of three of the Adidas Schemers in New York — that he had hidden the
        bribery effort from Brian. And he had done so because of the danger that Brian would be
        declared ineligible to play NCAA basketball.
                                                      24
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84       Filed: 10/12/2023    Pg: 25 of 43

        Carolina. Lacking sufficient funds and not knowing that they were then being actively

        investigated by the FBI, Schemers Dawkins and Sood borrowed $25,000 in cash from an

        undercover FBI agent. On July 13, 2017, $19,400 of that cash hoard was delivered by

        Sood to Brian’s father. 4

               Less than a month thereafter, on August 1, 2017, through the use of fraudulent

        invoices (fake expense reports) sent by email, the Karolina Khaos received a $30,000 wire

        transfer from Adidas. And on the very day of the Adidas payment to the Karolina Khaos,

        a $25,000 check from the Karolina Khaos was issued to Dawkins. The payment to

        Dawkins was meant to be used to repay the cash loan made to Dawkins and Sood by the

        undercover FBI agent.

               Around the same time, the Adidas Schemers planned to engage in a similar

        fraudulent process and make a second installment on the bribe payment to Brian’s father.

        Before the next installment could be paid, however, several of the Schemers were arrested

        on criminal charges in the Southern District of New York. Those charges were lodged

        against five Schemers — Gatto, Dawkins, Sood, and Gassnola, and Code — and publicly

        revealed on September 25, 2017.

               On November 22, 2017, after public disclosure of the Adidas fraud and bribery

        scheme and the payment promised to Brian’s father, UofL declared Brian ineligible to play

               4
                 The sum of $5,600 was skimmed by the Adidas Schemers from the $25,000 cash
        loan made by the undercover FBI agent. Of that $5,600, $2,600 was used for flight
        expenses of the Schemers, and the other $3,000 was deposited into a Dawkins bank
        account.

                                                   25
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764        Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 26 of 43

        NCAA basketball and banned him from practicing or playing basketball there. Under the

        NCAA rules, UofL’s decision to declare Brian ineligible meant he was barred from playing

        any college basketball, unless the NCAA reinstated him at the request of a member

        institution.

                 Seeking to salvage his basketball career, Brian transferred to the University of South

        Carolina, which had offered to request his reinstatement. On May 25, 2018, the NCAA

        declined to reinstate Brian. During the process of challenging the loss of his NCAA

        eligibility, Brian hired a lawyer and incurred more than $28,000 in fees and costs. Being

        denied the opportunity to utilize his athletic labor in NCAA basketball, Brian played in

        minor basketball markets — particularly in Australia — and was never drafted by the

        NBA. 5

                                                       B.

                 Ultimately, the five indicted Adidas Schemers were convicted of criminal offenses

        in the Southern District of New York. Gatto, Dawkins, and Code were convicted after a

        jury trial in January 2019, and Sood and Gassnola pleaded guilty. Gatto was convicted of

        two wire fraud offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, plus conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

        Dawkins and Code were each also convicted of § 1343 wire fraud, plus conspiracy to

        commit wire fraud. Sood was convicted of bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery, and

        conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and Gassnola was convicted of conspiracy to commit

        wire fraud alone. Each of the charges of conspiracy to commit wire fraud alleged that an

               Brian briefly played in the NBA on contracts that allow undrafted players to join
                 5

        NBA team rosters on a short-term basis.
                                                       26
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 27 of 43

        object of the Schemers’ conspiracy was the coverup of bribe payments made to the families

        of student-athletes. The victims of the criminal offenses were specified as the defrauded

        universities, including UofL.

               In the sentencing proceedings in March 2019, however, the New York district court

        recognized the adverse impact and serious injuries that the Adidas Schemers had inflicted

        upon Brian and the other college basketball players. Strikingly, it was Brian who the court

        emphasized and singled out. The veteran and distinguished presiding jurist, Judge Kaplan,

        pronounced that “probably the worst victim, [the] most seriously injured victim, of the

        Louisville scheme was [Brian] Bowen.” See United States v. Gatto, No. 1:17-cr-00686, at

        39 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2019), ECF No. 297 (the “N.Y. Sentencing Transcript”). 6

               Gatto, Dawkins, and Code appealed their convictions and sentences to the Second

        Circuit. Resolving those appeals, the court of appeals affirmed the convictions and

        sentences of each defendant. See United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2021). As

        the court related, the defendants “admitted [at trial] that they engaged in the scheme and

        broke NCAA rules, but argued that what they did was not criminal.” Id. at 110. On appeal,

        the defendants reiterated that they intended to help, rather than defraud, the universities

        “by bringing them top recruits to ensure winning basketball programs.” Id.

               6
                 Of the five Adidas Schemers convicted in the New York proceedings, Gatto
        received the most substantial punishment, that is, a prison term of nine months. Dawkins
        and Code each received six months. Sood and Gassnola, who testified for the prosecution
        and pleaded guilty, were treated more leniently.

                                                    27
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 28 of 43

                                                     C.

               Repetition generally being helpful to explaining a complex multi-party conspiracy,

        the pertinent facts relating to the fraud and bribery scheme and Brian’s innocent role therein

        are partially summarized:

               •      The Adidas Schemers had a compelling financial interest in having
                      Brian play basketball for UofL;

               •      The Schemers planned to make a $100,000 payment, in multiple cash
                      installments, to Brian’s father — without Brian’s or UofL’s
                      knowledge — to secure Brian’s commitment to play basketball for
                      UofL;

               •      Brian thereafter committed to UofL, where, pursuant to the UofL
                      Agreement, he expected to exchange his athletic labor for college
                      basketball coaching and playing experience, plus a scholarship
                      covering four years of tuition and other costs;

               •      Brian’s decision to commit to UofL was based solely on basketball
                      reasons, and not on the Schemers’ promise of a payment to his father;

               •      It was an essential aspect of the fraud and bribery scheme that neither
                      Brian nor UofL would know of the bribe payment;

               •      UofL and Brian had no knowledge of the fraud and bribery scheme
                      until the September 2017 arrests of several Schemers;

               •      Upon disclosure of the fraud and bribery scheme, UofL declared Brian
                      to be ineligible to play NCAA basketball; and

               •      As recognized by the New York district court, Brian was “probably
                      the worst victim, [the] most seriously injured victim, of the Louisville
                      scheme.”

                                                     28
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 29 of 43

                                                    II.

                                                    A.

               In November of 2018, Brian Bowen, II initiated this lawsuit against the Adidas

        Schemers in the District of South Carolina, principally seeking damages with respect to the

        fraud and bribery scheme. The operative Amended Complaint was filed in August 2019,

        after the New York trial and sentencing proceedings of several Schemers had been

        concluded. See Bowen v. Adidas Am. Inc., No. 3:18-cv-03118 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2019),

        ECF No. 84 (the “Complaint”). In the Complaint, Brian alleges four civil RICO claims

        under § 1964(c) of Title 18 based on violations of subsections (a), (c), and (d) of § 1962,

        including both substantive and conspiracy offenses. 7

               The Adidas Schemers promptly filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, arguing to

        the district court in South Carolina that Brian cannot satisfy RICO’s injury and causation

        requirements under § 1964(c). In setting forth those requirements, § 1964(c) limits a civil

        RICO recovery to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation

        of section 1962.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 8 In February 2020, the court rejected the

               7
                  Section 1964(c) provides for a damages recovery by a successful RICO plaintiff
        that is “threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
        attorney’s fee.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). That provision provides a mix of compensatory
        and punitive damages to a successful RICO plaintiff. See PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v.
        Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406 (2003).
               8
                  As the panel majority recognizes, some federal courts have used the term
        “standing” to refer to RICO’s injury and causation requirements. The use of “standing” in
        that way is somewhat of a misnomer, however, and should not be confused with
        constitutional standing to sue.

                                                    29
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764        Doc: 84       Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 30 of 43

        Schemers’ dismissal effort, but advised the parties and counsel that the Schemers could

        reassert their contentions as to the injury and causation requirements after discovery was

        completed.

               The parties thereafter engaged in extensive discovery proceedings.          Multiple

        depositions were taken and approximately 300,000 documents were exchanged. Among

        the various depositions, Brian and his father were each examined.

               Of significance, the discovery proceedings included a report from an expert named

        Michael Bratz, who had 36 years of experience in the NBA as a player, coach, scout, and

        manager. Bratz’s unchallenged opinions included his view that “NCAA basketball is the

        proving ground for a player’s career,” and that “[t]here is no other comparable product in

        North America where a player can get premium training and acquire experience playing

        against the best players in their age group.” See J.A. 1218. Describing UofL in particular,

        Bratz related that

               Louisville is a top tier basketball program, one of the blue blood schools in
               the nation. It is a place where elite prospects want to play. Louisville is a
               member of the Atlantic Coast Conference, the ACC, one of the best
               basketball conferences in the country. The team plays its home games in the
               state of the art KFC Yum! Center, which seats 22,090 fans, the 3rd largest
               arena in college basketball. Forbes Magazine ranked the Louisville
               basketball program as the most valuable in college basketball. No college
               basketball team makes more money.

        Id. at 1208. Bratz also opined that, had Brian not lost his NCAA eligibility, he “would

        have been a first round pick in the NBA draft.” Id. at 1219. But because of the NCAA

        eligibility bar, Brian “missed 18 months of competition after high school,” i.e., the period

        of development “that is critical to a young player. Id. Moreover, Brian was deprived of

                                                    30
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 31 of 43

        college coaching — a “level of coaching that . . . can’t be matched anywhere else” — and

        he “wasn’t able to play against the best competition and improve his basketball skills.” Id.

        According to Bratz’s expert evidence, Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility was accompanied

        by the loss of highly valuable college basketball coaching and playing experience.

               Following the discovery proceedings, the Adidas Schemers moved the district court

        for an award of summary judgment. In pursuing that motion, they again contended that

        Brian cannot satisfy RICO’s injury and causation requirements. In response, as to the

        injury requirement, Brian asserted multiple injuries to a business or property interest.

        Those included the loss of his NCAA eligibility, as well as the loss of the contractual

        benefits of college basketball coaching and playing experience that he expected to receive

        under the UofL Agreement.

               In May 2021, the district court filed its Memorandum Opinion and Order awarding

        summary judgment to each of the Schemers, ruling therein that Brian has not sustained a

        qualifying injury. See Bowen v. Adidas Am. Inc., No. 3:18-cv-03118, at 8-14 (D.S.C. May

        26, 2021), ECF No. 265. For its conclusion that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility does not

        constitute an injury to a business or property interest under RICO, the court invoked

        authority “in the due-process context” that “flatly reject[ed] the notion that student-

        athletes’ expectations of future athletic careers are constitutionally protected” or that there

        is “a constitutionally protected property interest in intercollegiate athletic competition.” Id.

        at 10. Additionally, with respect to the loss of contractual benefits under the UofL

        Agreement, the court determined that because the Agreement made no explicit promise of

        college basketball coaching and playing experience, Brian had a mere expectancy interest

                                                      31
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84           Filed: 10/12/2023    Pg: 32 of 43

        in those lost benefits that cannot satisfy RICO’s injury requirement. Finally, although it

        criticized Brian’s theory of causation, the court declined to decide whether he can satisfy

        RICO’s separate causation requirement, as its ruling on the injury requirement was “fatal

        to his RICO claims.” Id. at 14-15.

                                                     B.

               Less than a month thereafter — on June 21, 2021 — the Supreme Court handed

        down its landmark decision in NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021). The Alston

        plaintiffs were NCAA Division I basketball and football players who initiated a federal

        antitrust action against the NCAA in California to contest its restrictions on student-athlete

        compensation as violative of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2151. That is, the plaintiffs

        challenged the “NCAA rules that limit the compensation they may receive in exchange for

        their athletic services.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The unanimous Alston

        Court affirmed the judgment of the California district court that certain restrictions on

        benefits that NCAA member schools can provide to student-athletes contravene the

        antitrust laws.

               In so ruling, it was significant to the Supreme Court that the NCAA accepted “that

        its members collectively enjoy monopsony power in the market for student-athlete

        services, such that its restraints can (and in fact do) harm competition.” See Alston, 141 S.

        Ct. at 2156. 9 As the Court explained, the NCAA did not dispute the proposition “that

               9
                 In an economic monopsony, a single buyer controls and dominates the demand for
        goods and services. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154. In a monopoly, on the other hand, a
        single seller retains the control. Id.

                                                     32
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 33 of 43

        student-athletes have nowhere else [other than NCAA member schools] to sell their labor.”

        Id. (emphasis added). Or, in the words of the California district court, the “NCAA’s

        Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and basketball,” such

        that there are no “viable substitutes.” Id. at 2152 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-

        Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1067, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019)).

               Largely relying on the Supreme Court’s Alston decision, Brian and his counsel

        sought the South Carolina district court’s reconsideration of its summary judgment award

        to the Adidas Schemers in these proceedings.             Brian argued in his motion for

        reconsideration that, inter alia, Alston “confirm[ed] that Division I athletes have valuable

        business and property interests in their NCAA eligibility.” See Bowen v. Adidas Am. Inc.,

        No. 3:18-cv-03118, at 1 (D.S.C. July 6, 2021), ECF No. 274. The motion underscored that

        Sherman Act claims are subject to an injury requirement like RICO’s — allowing an

        antitrust claim to be brought by “any person who shall be injured in his business or

        property,” see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) — yet neither the NCAA nor any court, including the

        Supreme Court, questioned whether the Alston plaintiffs had sustained a qualifying injury

        to a business or property interest. According to the motion, the district court consequently

        erred in ruling that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility is not an injury to a business or

        property interest in satisfaction of RICO’s injury requirement.

               Nevertheless, by its Memorandum Opinion and Order of August 2021, the district

        court denied Brian’s motion for reconsideration. See Bowen v. Adidas Am. Inc., No. 3:18-

        cv-03118 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021), ECF No. 286. Regarding the Supreme Court’s Alston

        decision, the district court determined that Alston “did not address, let alone change, the

                                                     33
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 34 of 43

        law on [RICO’s injury requirement] or whether NCAA eligibility is a business or property

        interest.” Id. at 8. Accordingly, the court rejected Alston as a basis for reconsideration and

        denied Brian any relief.

                                                      C.

               On appeal, Brian challenges both the district court’s award of summary judgment

        to the Adidas Schemers and its denial of reconsideration in the wake of the Supreme

        Court’s Alston decision. Our panel majority has decided to affirm, agreeing with the

        district court that Brian cannot satisfy RICO’s injury requirement, without ruling on

        whether he can make a sufficient showing of causation.

               With respect to Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility, the panel majority reasons that it

        is not a cognizable property injury in that, “[a]lthough eligibility may be valuable to the

        individual student-athlete, it is not property.” See ante at 14-15. The majority further

        reasons that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility is not a cognizable business injury in that,

        “despite losing his eligibility, he continued to receive the maximum compensation allowed

        at that time to a student-athlete: a full scholarship.” Id. at 15. It is on that basis that the

        majority distinguishes Alston and deems it wholly unhelpful to Brian. As the majority

        explains:

               In Alston, the student-athletes (whose eligibility was not in question) claimed
               NCAA rules unlawfully limited the compensation they could receive for their
               labor. Lost compensation is a concrete injury to business or property.
               [Brian], however, does not assert the loss of compensation for services
               rendered playing NCAA basketball — after all, he continued to receive the
               maximum compensation allowed and does not challenge the NCAA
               compensation limits that applied to him. Rather, he asserts the loss of his

                                                      34
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 35 of 43

               eligibility to participate in the NCAA labor market, untethered to any
               concrete interest like compensation.

        Id. at 16-17 (citations omitted).

               Relatedly, the panel majority acknowledges Brian’s argument “that losing his

        NCAA eligibility prevented him from playing college basketball, thereby improving his

        basketball skills, and increasing his prospects of being selected in the NBA draft.” See

        ante at 17. The majority concludes, however, that — unlike lost compensation — “[t]his

        is not the sort of tangible business loss that supports a RICO cause of action.” Id. In so

        doing, the majority emphasizes that Brian “did not have an existing or prospective business

        relationship with any NBA team,” while nonetheless insisting that the problem for Brian

        is “the nature of the loss” rather than a lack of “evidence demonstrating his expectancy [of

        a profitable professional basketball career]” or a failure “to articulate the damages flowing

        from his claimed injury.” Id. at 17-18.

               Of course, I see things differently. For the reasons explained below, I would rule

        that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility satisfies RICO’s injury requirement. 10

               10
                  In light of my view that Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility constitutes a qualifying
        injury to a business or property interest, I have not unnecessarily considered whether the
        loss of contractual benefits he expected to receive under the UofL Agreement —
        specifically, college basketball coaching and playing experience — also constitutes such
        an injury. Like the district court, however, the panel majority has concluded that Brian
        cannot show a qualifying injury based on the lost contractual benefits because the UofL
        Agreement did not explicitly promise them.

                                                     35
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023     Pg: 36 of 43

                                                     III.

               In § 1964 of Title 18, which is entitled “Civil remedies,” the Criminal Code spells

        out four statutory subsections that govern the conduct of civil RICO proceedings.

        Subsection (c) thereof is important here, in that it identifies the elements of a civil RICO

        claim. Generally, in order to establish a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show the

        following: (1) a violation of RICO, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 1962; (2) an injury to a

        business or property interest; and (3) that the injury was caused by the RICO violation. See

        Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187 (4th Cir. 1988) (“To make out a civil action

        for damages under the RICO statute a private plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the

        defendants have violated § 1962, but also that he has been ‘injured in his business or

        property by reason of [the alleged] violation of section 1962.’” (alteration in original)

        (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)).

                                                     A.

               The second element of a civil RICO claim, the injury requirement, is where the

        district court and the panel majority have focused. RICO’s injury requirement is derived

        from the statute itself, which limits a RICO civil remedy to “[a]ny person injured in his

        business or property.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added).

               Among the injuries alleged by Brian, I readily and easily see his loss of NCAA

        eligibility as a qualifying injury to a business or property interest. And that is because, as

        the Supreme Court recently related in its Alston decision, the “NCAA’s Division I

        essentially is the relevant market for elite college football and basketball,” and “student-

        athletes have nowhere else [other than NCAA member schools] to sell their labor.” See

                                                     36
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 37 of 43

        141 S. Ct. 2141, 2152, 2156 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second emphasis

        added). In other words, without NCAA eligibility, a young athlete has absolutely no

        market for his athletic labor. Consequently, that athlete most certainly has a business or

        property interest in his NCAA eligibility. Indeed, it is absurd to say that a person can be

        left without a market for his labor without sustaining a business or property injury.

               Yet the panel majority says just that, reasoning that Brian suffered no “concrete

        injury” such as lost compensation (as he “continued to receive the maximum compensation

        allowed at that time to a student-athlete: a full scholarship”). See ante at 15-17. The

        majority acknowledges Brian’s loss of college basketball coaching and playing experience,

        but deems that loss to be “not the sort of tangible business loss that supports a RICO cause

        of action” (particularly since he “did not have an existing or prospective business

        relationship with any NBA team”). Id. at 17.

               The panel majority’s fundamental error is its failure to appreciate that Brian’s

        scholarship was only part of the compensation he received from UofL in exchange for his

        valuable athletic labor. Of great significance to Brian, he was also compensated with

        college basketball coaching and playing experience. Brian has been clear that he did not

        commit to UofL simply to obtain a scholarship and pursue an academic degree. Rather, he

        committed to UofL because he would be compensated with, inter alia, elite coaching and

        immediate playing time that would prepare him for a career in the NBA.                  That

        compensation was exceedingly valuable to Brian — regardless of whether he had an

        existing or prospective NBA contract — and it was something Brian was actively receiving

        before he was stripped of his NCAA eligibility. But along with the NCAA eligibility bar,

                                                     37
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 38 of 43

        Brian lost all compensation in the form of college basketball coaching and playing

        experience, thereby suffering a “concrete” and “tangible business loss” in satisfaction of

        RICO’s injury requirement. 11

               There is ample support for the proposition that college basketball coaching and

        playing experience constituted valuable compensation to Brian, including the expert

        evidence of Michael Bratz. Based on his 36 years of NBA experience, Bratz described

        NCAA Division I basketball as “the proving ground for a player’s career,” where the player

        would receive an unmatched “level of coaching” and would be “able to play against the

        best competition and improve his basketball skills.” See J.A. 1218-19. 12

               Moreover, the value of Brian’s lost college basketball coaching and playing

        experience was obviously apparent to the New York district court in the Adidas Schemers’

        federal criminal proceedings.     That is, Judge Kaplan pronounced at sentencing that

        “probably the worst victim, [the] most seriously injured victim, of the Louisville scheme

               11
                  That is not to say Brian had a contractual or constitutional right to college
        basketball coaching and playing experience. But it cannot be disputed that he agreed to
        provide his athletic labor in exchange for such compensation, and one need not have a
        contractual or constitutional right to compensation in order for its loss to satisfy RICO’s
        injury requirement. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has instructed, “RICO is to be read
        broadly.” See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985)
        (underscoring “Congress’ self-consciously expansive language and overall approach,” as
        well as “its express admonition that RICO is to be liberally construed to effectuate its
        remedial purposes” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
               12
                   Although the Adidas Schemers indicated in the district court that they intended to
        move to exclude Bratz from testifying at trial, they relied in the summary judgment
        proceedings on aspects of Bratz’s expert report that they deemed to be helpful to them. As
        such, it is appropriate to consider the report herein. See Humphreys & Partners Architects,
        L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 538-39 (4th Cir. 2015).

                                                     38
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 39 of 43

        was [Brian] Bowen.” See N.Y. Sentencing Transcript 39. And the court did not perceive

        Brian to be unharmed because he kept his UofL scholarship.

               The Supreme Court’s Alston decision similarly evinces an understanding that —

        despite the NCAA’s limits on other forms of compensation — many student-athletes opt

        to provide their athletic labor to universities for the coaching and playing experience that

        they can get in return. As the Alston Court recognized, “the NCAA enjoys near complete

        dominance of, and exercise[s] monopsony power in,” the market for athletic labor in

        basketball and football. See 141 S. Ct. at 2151-52 (internal quotation marks omitted,

        alteration original). At the same time, NCAA Division I schools are able to attract “the

        most talented athletes.” Id. at 2150 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the NCAA

        has been able to do those things while “restrain[ing] student-athlete compensation.” Id. at

        2152 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plainly, that is because there are student-athletes

        — particularly those aspiring to professional athletic careers — who see great value in

        coaching and playing experience that they cannot obtain anywhere else. 13

               13
                  According to Brian, the Alston precedent further suggests that he can satisfy
        RICO’s injury requirement because no court, including the Supreme Court, questioned
        whether the Alston plaintiffs satisfied the similar injury requirement for their Sherman Act
        claims. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (allowing an antitrust claim to be brought by “any person
        who shall be injured in his business or property”); see also Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp.,
        503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (explaining that, because Congress “used the same words” for
        the injury requirements in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO) and 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (antitrust),
        “we can only assume it intended them to have the same meaning”). I do not delve into that
        theory because Alston otherwise establishes Brian’s loss of NCAA eligibility as a
        qualifying injury to a business or property interest.

                                                     39
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 40 of 43

               To be sure, it may be difficult to assess the specific damages that Brian has suffered

        as a result of his NCAA eligibility bar and the accompanying loss of college basketball

        coaching and playing experience. But even the panel majority recognizes that any failure

        “to articulate the damages flowing from his claimed injury” is not a problem for Brian, see

        ante at 17-18, and at least on that point I agree with my colleagues. As our Court has

        recognized, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) authorizes a civil RICO claim by “‘any person injured in

        his business or property,’ not any person who can quantify the amount of the injury.” See

        Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2001).

        For it is “[t]he best reading of § 1964(c)’s injury to business or property requirement . . .

        that it refers to the fact of injury and not the amount.” Id. 14

               At bottom, when Brian lost his NCAA eligibility, he was grievously “injured in his

        business or property.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). It takes a tortured reading of the term

        “business or property” to maintain that the term does not include Brian’s ability to

        participate in the sole market for his athletic labor and to obtain valuable compensation in

        the form of the elite coaching and playing experience offered nowhere but an NCAA

        Division I basketball program.

               14
                   An aspect of his damages that Brian does quantify is the more than $28,000 in
        attorney’s fees and costs he incurred in challenging the loss of his NCAA eligibility. The
        panel majority rules that those expenses are unrecoverable “pecuniary losses flowing from
        a non-cognizable injury.” See ante at 18. But because I see Brian’s loss of NCAA
        eligibility as a qualifying injury, I would allow him to recover the attorney’s fees and costs
        along with other damages.

                                                       40
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764      Doc: 84          Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 41 of 43

                                                     B.

               Finally, although the district court and the panel majority have not ruled on the other

        elements of a civil RICO claim, I believe they merit brief discussion. Notably, the Adidas

        Schemers have not even argued that they are entitled to summary judgment based on an

        insufficient showing on the first element, i.e., a RICO violation. I am confident that is

        because Brian has compelling evidence to support his allegations of violations of

        subsections (a), (c), and (d) of 18 U.S.C. § 1962. For example, central to each of the alleged

        RICO violations is proof of a “pattern of racketeering activity,” which is defined in § 1961

        of Title 18 as “at least two acts of racketeering activity” that may include wire fraud under

        18 U.S.C. § 1343 and bribery. Those are some of the very crimes that the Schemers were

        convicted of committing in the Southern District of New York.

               As for the third element of a civil RICO claim — the causation requirement — the

        Schemers have raised it as an alternative basis for summary judgment. Specifically, the

        Schemers argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because Brian cannot make the

        mandatory showings of “but for” and proximate causation. See Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot.

        Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (explaining that, in order to satisfy the causation

        requirement, a plaintiff must show “that the defendant’s violation not only was a ‘but for’

        cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well”).

               According to the Schemers, Brian cannot show that any of their RICO violations

        was a “but for” cause of his loss of NCAA eligibility because — by the time the first

        installment of their bribe payment was delivered to his father in July 2017 — Brian had

        been rendered ineligible to play NCAA basketball due to earlier violations of NCAA

                                                     41
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764        Doc: 84         Filed: 10/12/2023      Pg: 42 of 43

        amateurism rules that occurred while he was in high school. The Schemers interpose that

        ground for summary judgment notwithstanding that the alleged violations of the

        amateurism rules went undiscovered and have never been the basis for an ineligibility

        determination by the NCAA or an NCAA member school (and despite that Brian contests

        that the alleged violations occurred as a matter of both fact and interpretation of the relevant

        amateurism rules).

               Meanwhile, the Adidas Schemers contend that Brian cannot establish proximate

        cause because it was the discovery that the Schemers had bribed Brian’s father — and not

        the bribe itself — that injured Brian, by resulting in UofL’s declaration of his ineligibility

        to play NCAA basketball. Without support from any controlling authority, the Schemers

        argue that “a plaintiff’s claimed harms are indirect if they were caused by reason of the

        fraud’s discovery, not the fraud itself.” See Br. of Appellees 47 (internal quotation marks

        omitted).

               Strikingly, the Adidas Schemers’ proximate causation argument (that Brian’s injury

        was caused by the discovery of the bribe, not the bribe itself) is directly at odds with their

        “but for” causation argument (that Brian was already ineligible to play college basketball

        by the time the first installment of the bribe was paid, on account of prior NCAA rules

        violations that had not then been discovered). Suffice it to say I am not at all impressed

        with those “heads I win, tails you lose” theories as to RICO’s causation requirement. In

        any event, I adamantly disagree with the rulings of the district court and the panel majority

        that the Schemers are entitled to summary judgment based on Brian’s failure to satisfy the

        injury requirement.

                                                      42
USCA4 Appeal: 21-1764       Doc: 84      Filed: 10/12/2023    Pg: 43 of 43

                                                 IV.

               Pursuant to the foregoing, I would vacate the district court’s award of summary

        judgment to the Adidas Schemers and remand for further proceedings.        I therefore

        respectfully dissent.

                                                  43