Court Opinion

ID: 9826571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:09:55.761674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:29:46.187536
License: Public Domain

J-A18040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :         PENNSYLVANIA
              v.                          :
                                          :
 KENNETH TERRY                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :    No. 78 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 19, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-37-CR-0000444-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                    FILED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023

      Kenneth Terry appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his convictions for four counts of possession with intent to deliver and one

count of possession of drug paraphernalia. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (a)(32).

We affirm the convictions but remand for the trial court to correct a partially

illegal sentence.

      The trial court recounted the factual history of this case as follows:

            On May 26, 2021, law enforcement for Lawrence County
      was contacted by the management of . . . an extended stay hotel
      in Union Township, Lawrence County, Pennsylvania.              The
      management reported possible drug-related activity on the
      premises. The management became suspicious upon witnessing
      a large amount of foot traffic coming and going, specifically from
      Rooms 110, 111, and 202. Records supplied by the management
      indicated that these rooms were rented by individuals giving the
      names Bob Marley, Giovanni Johnson, and Angela Ragen,
      respectively. The rooms were paid for with cash.

            Detective Richard Ryhal viewed historical surveillance and
      conducted live surveillance from the view of the camera placed in
      the hallway of Rooms 110 and 111, the doors to which were
      located across from each other. As a result of his surveillance,
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      Detective Ryhal observed multiple individuals arriving at Room
      111, entering, staying inside for a few minutes, and then leaving
      Room 111 and the hotel. Further, a black male was observed
      walking between Rooms 110 and 111 between the visits of the
      individuals. The black male was seen carrying various items,
      including ice and cooking utensils. As Detective Ryhal testified,
      the totality of these observations is consistent with an indication
      of narcotics dealing. A search warrant was consequently applied
      for and granted at approximately 5:30 P.M. on May 26, 2021.

             At approximately 6:45 P.M. on May 26, 2021, law
      enforcement made entry into the hallway of Rooms 110 and 111
      at [the hotel] in order to execute the aforementioned search
      warrant. Simultaneously, [Terry] and his co-defendant [Keyon
      Lee] appeared in the doorway of Room 111 and spotted law
      enforcement entering. [Terry] and [Lee] then attempted to flee
      down the opposite end of the “L”-shaped hallway. Unbeknownst
      to [Terry], law enforcement had entered on both ends of the
      hallway, and [Terry] and [Lee] were quickly detained. A variety
      of bills were observed being discarded as the duo fled, however
      neither law enforcement nor the surveillance footage could
      definitively attribute the abandoned currency specifically to
      [Terry] or [Lee]. On [Terry’s] person at the time of his arrest was
      $28.00 in cash, a cell phone, a handheld video game player, and
      three room keys (two for Room 202, one for Room 111).
      Paperwork containing [Terry’s] name was discovered in Room
      202, however this was the only property specifically attributable
      to [Terry] from the three rooms searched.

           Inside Room 110, law enforcement recovered 56.3 gross
      grams of suspected crack cocaine; $51,836.00 in cash; a cell
      phone; a smart watch; a bag of suspected marijuana; and two
      spoons covered in suspected cocaine residue.

           Inside Room 111, law enforcement recovered three bags of
      suspected heroin, totaling 64 gross grams; two bags of suspected
      crack cocaine, totaling 44.2 grams; a digital weigh scale; a
      handgun; a bag of suspected marijuana; and multiple cell phones.

           Inside Room 202, law enforcement recovered a blender with
      suspected drug residue; a foil pan; $60,000.00 in cash; and the
      aforementioned paperwork containing [Terry’s] name.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 4–6.

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      The case proceeded to trial beginning June 14, 2022. Relevantly, the

hotel property manager testified that Terry had accompanied two of the other

individuals when they paid for the hotel rooms with cash and frequented the

hotel “[j]ust about every day” for four weeks before his arrest. N.T., 6/14/22,

at 28. For a week or two, Terry would go between the three rooms with the

same McDonald’s bag “multiple times a day.” Id. at 29–30.

       In his closing argument, Terry urged the jury to consider deficiencies

in the investigation:

             Think about this: We are one year later -- over one year
      later, and we don’t have anybody coming forth saying, Mr. Terry
      sold me drugs on that day. We don’t have a confidential informant
      saying this is what happened. We don’t have, prior to them
      making their arrest, them setting up any undercover officer to see
      what was happening. We don’t have any controlled buys to see if
      Mr. Terry was an individual who was selling any controlled
      substances.

             We don’t have -- we have the suspicion, but we have people
      who are leaving, we don’t have the officers stopping, which,
      by the way, it’s not just Detective Ryhal and Detective Ferrucci,
      it’s the Lawrence County Drug Task Force. It’s officers from
      Union. There are multiple officers available. None of them
      stopping and asking, hey, what’s going on? None of them
      saying, some guy with dreads sold me drugs. We got none
      of that.

            We don’t have a K-9 officer walking through the parking lot,
      confirming that -- having a hit that this person who just walked in
      there when Mr. Terry was alone now has drugs on him. We don’t
      have anything of that nature. It’s one year later. We’re at trial.
      They don’t have the evidence, because it’s not there.

N.T., 6/17/22, at 12–13 (emphasis added).

      The assistant district attorney objected, stating that the parties had

agreed not to address whether task force members spoke with anyone who

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visited the hotel room where the drugs were sold. Id. at 16–17.1 On the

Commonwealth’s motion, the trial court struck the objected-to portion of the

argument and provided the following instruction:

       I’m going to ask the jury to strike from your consideration the
       comments of [trial counsel] that the Lawrence County Drug Task
       Force did not speak to any of the individuals that went into Room
       111 that day and received information that [Terry] was dealing
       drugs. So if you’ll just strike that from your consideration, then,
       and we’ll hear from [the Commonwealth].

Id. at 22. Although Terry objected to the curative instruction, he did not move

for a mistrial.

       The jury convicted Terry of all five charges. On August 19, 2022, Terry

received his sentence, an aggregate of 8 to 16 years of imprisonment. The

trial court amended the restitution amount of Terry’s sentence on September

6, 2022. Terry filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied on

January 11, 2023.

       On January 18, 2023, Terry filed a notice of appeal. Terry and the trial

court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.             The

Commonwealth did not file an appellate brief.

       Terry challenges four actions of the trial court:

       I.     Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
              denying [Terry’s] post-sentence motion, by finding that the
              jury’s verdict was based on evidence sufficient to sustain his
              convictions beyond a reasonable doubt?

____________________________________________

1 On cross-examination, Detective Ryhal testified that he questioned one
individual who had visited the hotel room, “but I didn’t know if I could talk
about that or not.” N.T., Trial Vol. II, 6/15/22, at 31.

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      II.    Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
             failing to declare a mistrial, sua sponte, upon the
             [occurrence] of what [Terry] alleges was a Brady violation?

      III.   Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
             sentencing [Terry] consecutively, rather than concurrently,
             resulting in an unreasonable and excessive sentence?

      IV.    Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
             denying [Terry’s] post-sentence motion, by finding that the
             jury’s verdict was not against the weight of [the] evidence?

Terry’s Brief at 8–9 (capitalization omitted).

                                       I.

      Terry first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence at all counts. He

argues that his mere presence in a room with drugs, as well as his attempt to

flee when the police arrived, are legally insufficient to prove that he possessed

the drugs and paraphernalia. He notes that the Commonwealth did not call

the other people in the hotel to testify. Rather, Terry contends that the only

support for his involvement in the drug distribution is based on speculation

and conjecture. Therefore, he concludes that the trial court erred in denying

his post-sentence motion for judgment of acquittal.

      Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a
      question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
      of review is plenary. We review the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the verdict winner to determine whether there is
      sufficient evidence to allow the factfinder to find every element of
      a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Bathurst, 288 A.3d 492, 500 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2015) (brackets

omitted).

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      In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
      substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. In addition,
      we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
      Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
      as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its
      burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
      doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
      applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
      all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
      factfinder, while passing upon the credibility of the witnesses and
      the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
      none of the evidence.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cahill, 95 A.3d 298, 300 (Pa. Super. 2014))

(brackets omitted).

      The crimes at issue here are possessory. We have explained:

      The Commonwealth may meet its burden of proving a possessory
      crime by showing actual possession, constructive possession, or
      joint constructive possession. Commonwealth v. Thompson,
      428 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. Super. 1981). “Constructive possession”
      is “the ability to exercise a conscious dominion over” the
      contraband. Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 868 (Pa.
      Super. 2014). It usually comes into play when police find
      contraband somewhere other than on the defendant’s person.
      Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant had
      knowledge of the existence and location of the item. Thompson,
      428 A.2d at 224. The Commonwealth may prove such knowledge
      circumstantially. That is, it may prove that the defendant had
      knowledge of the existence and location of the items at issue
      “from examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding
      the case,” such as whether the contraband was located in an area
      “usually accessible only to the defendant.” Id.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 199 A.3d 954, 960–61 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

altered).

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      Generally, a defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime, while

probative, is not sufficient to establish guilt. Hall, 199 A.3d at 961 (citing

Vargas, 108 A.3d at 869). For a possessory offense, “a defendant’s mere

presence at a place where contraband is found or secreted is insufficient,

standing alone, to prove that he exercised dominion and control over those

items.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 255 A.3d 542, 553 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. 2018)).

      Likewise, a defendant’s flight from a crime scene is not sufficient to

prove guilt when the only additional evidence is presence. Commonwealth

v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20, 23–24 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citing Commonwealth

v. Goodman, 350 A.2d 810, 811–12 (Pa. 1976)). “The additional element of

flight, which is as consistent with fear as with guilt, does not convert presence

into proof of guilt.” Id. at 24 (quoting Goodman, 350 A.2d at 811).

      Here, however, the Commonwealth’s proof included more than Terry’s

presence in the hotel and attempted flight when police arrived. The hotel

property manager identified Terry as being at the hotel “[j]ust about every

day” for four weeks and appearing with two of the people who paid for the

hotel rooms in cash. N.T., 6/14/22, at 28. She saw him going between the

three rooms “multiple times a day” with the same McDonald’s bag for a week

or two.   Id. at 29–30.    Although the manager admitted she might have

mistaken Terry for other individuals, id. at 54, the jury was free to credit her

identification of him.

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      The manager’s description of Terry repeatedly carrying the same bag

between the rooms where police recovered drugs, money, and paraphernalia

supports the inference that he was actively involved in drug distribution, not

a passive observer. It tends to show that Terry was concealing drugs and/or

money. Combined, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude

that Terry constructively possessed the drugs and paraphernalia recovered

from the hotel rooms where he was observed.             Therefore, Terry’s first

challenge fails.

                                       II.

      Second, Terry challenges the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial sua

sponte during closing arguments. Terry’s counsel argued to the jury that the

police did not interview anyone who allegedly bought drugs at the hotel. At

sidebar, the prosecutor said he had told Terry’s counsel after his opening

statement that the drug task force did interview people who had visited the

hotel room. He said, however, that the parties had agreed not to address the

matter at trial.

      Terry now argues that this exchange showed that the Commonwealth

violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). He notes that in discovery,

the Commonwealth had not named any eyewitnesses. Terry maintains that

the failure to reveal the existence of witnesses before trial was a violation of

the Brady rule.    He contends that the trial court should have declared a

mistrial sua sponte when this Brady violation came to light at sidebar.

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      This Court reviews a claim that a trial court should have declared a

mistrial sua sponte to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion.

Commonwealth v. Cornelius, 180 A.3d 1256, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citing Commonwealth v. Kelly, 797 A.2d 925, 936 (Pa. Super. 2002)). A

trial court has “discretion to declare a mistrial sua sponte upon the showing

of manifest necessity,” which arises “only in very extraordinary and striking

circumstances.” Id. (quoting Kelly, 797 A.2d at 936, 939); see Pa.R.Crim.P.

605(B) (“[T]he trial judge may declare a mistrial only for reasons of manifest

necessity.”).

      The trial court noted that Terry never objected or moved for a mistrial

during closing arguments or when the issue arose during cross-examination

of Detective Ryhal. Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 10–11. The court found

that Terry had not developed a meaningful argument why manifest necessity

existed for it to declare a mistrial. Id. at 12. Rather, the trial court reasoned

that it acted within its discretion by providing a curative instruction based on

the representations of the parties. Id.

      Terry’s claim depends on whether the Commonwealth’s nondisclosure

of witness interviews violated Brady. The Supreme Court of the United States

held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of

the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Brady imposes a “limited” duty on

the prosecution and is not a general discovery rule.       Commonwealth v.

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Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey,

429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)). The three elements of a Brady violation are: “the

evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or

because it impeaches; the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either

willfully   or   inadvertently;      and       prejudice   ensued.”   Id.   (quoting

Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136, 1141 (Pa. 2001)).

       Here, Terry has not shown the first element of a Brady violation by

explaining how the evidence suppressed by the prosecution was “favorable”

to him. The evidence at issue was that the drug task force had spoken with

people who entered the hotel room and bought drugs from Terry.                 N.T.,

6/17/22, at 19. This evidence appears to be inculpatory, in that it makes it

more likely that Terry was actively involved in selling drugs from the hotel.

Terry has not argued how the existence of these witnesses to his crimes could

be favorable to him.2 Therefore, he has not demonstrated a Brady violation.

       Without a Brady violation, Terry has not shown how the prosecution’s

late disclosure of a witness constitutes a “manifest necessity” for the trial court

to declare a mistrial sua sponte. Cornelius, supra. We thus find no abuse

of discretion in the trial court’s actions. Terry’s second challenge fails.

____________________________________________

2 Terry suggested to the trial court that if he had known about this evidence

before trial, he might have agreed to plead guilty for a lesser sentence.
Concise Statement, 2/1/23, at 23. He has not included this analysis in the
argument section of his appellate brief.

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                                      III.

      Third, Terry challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences between two counts of possession with intent to deliver, which

resulted in an aggregate term of 8 to 16 years. He contends that this was

inappropriate because the trial court did not consider (1) his age, (2) his prior

record score of zero, and (3) the circumstantial nature of the evidence. This

claim implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing. Commonwealth v.

Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 535 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citing Commonwealth v.

Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014)).

      The following principles guide our review over a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of sentence:

             Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

            The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of
      a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a petition for
      permission to appeal. An appellant must satisfy a four-part test
      to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when challenging the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence.

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) whether
         the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
         motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether
         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
         and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
         sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
         Sentencing Code.

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Commonwealth v. Salter, 290 A.3d 741, 748 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting

Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132) (brackets omitted).       We will affirm the sentence

within the guidelines range unless “the application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable.” Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1274 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2)).

      Notably, a sentencing court has discretion under the Sentencing Code

to impose consecutive sentences.      Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d

1206, 1212 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Marts, 889 A.2d

608, 612 (Pa. Super. 2005), and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721). This Court “will not

disturb consecutive sentences unless the aggregate sentence is ‘grossly

disparate’ to the defendant’s conduct, or ‘viscerally appear[s] as patently

unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 994

A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. 2010)). This follows the principle that a defendant

is “not entitled to a ‘volume discount’” for multiple crimes. Commonwealth

v.   Bankes,   286    A.3d   1302,    1310    (Pa.   Super.   2022)   (quoting

Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571, 581 (Pa. Super. 2020)).

      Here, Terry raised a substantial question and met all the requirements

for this Court to review his claim. See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 535–36 (citing

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en

banc)) (finding a substantial question for an excessive sentence claim and an

assertion that the court did not consider mitigating evidence); accord Dodge,

77 A.3d at 1272 (finding a substantial question for consecutive sentences and

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an allegation that the court did not consider the nature of the offenses).3 We

therefore turn to the merits.

       In denying Terry’s post-sentence motion, the trial court explained that

it found a long sentence was appropriate “in light of the criminal conduct in

this case,” particularly “the quantity and type of the drugs at issue, combined

with the volume of foot traffic entering and exiting the hotel rooms containing

those drugs.” Opinion, 1/11/23, at 8. Furthermore, the court stated that it

was not inclined to give Terry a “volume discount” for the significant amount

of heroin and fentanyl that he possessed in separate hotel rooms. Id.

       Regarding mitigating factors, Terry’s counsel at sentencing stated that

Terry was 26 years old, had no prior convictions, and was minimally involved

in the drug distribution from the hotel. N.T., 8/19/22, at 7–8. The trial court

said that it considered the statements of counsel before imposing sentence.

Id. at 11. Therefore, the record reflects that the trial court considered the

factors that Terry claims it missed. Terry has not shown how his aggregate

8-to-16-year term of imprisonment is grossly disproportionate to his conduct

or how the imposition of sentences within the guidelines was clearly

____________________________________________

3  We treat Terry’s notice of appeal as timely filed due to (1) the
Commonwealth’s untimely post-sentence motion resulting in a bifurcated
sentencing proceeding, see Commonwealth v. Cochran, 244 A.3d 413 (Pa.
2021), (2) Terry’s post-sentence motion filed 30 days after the amended order
of sentence, (3) a breakdown in the operation of the court when the clerk of
courts failed to enter an order that the post-sentence motion was deemed
denied by operation of law, see Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734,
735 (Pa. Super. 2003), and (4) Terry filing his notice of appeal within 30 days
of the trial court’s order denying his post-sentence motion.

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unreasonable. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion at sentencing. Terry’s third challenge fails.

                                       IV.

      Fourth, Terry challenges the trial court’s denial of his post-sentence

motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. Terry incorporates

his argument that the evidence was insufficient to show his involvement in

selling drugs. He characterizes the testimony of the hotel property manager

that he passed from room to room every day as “speculation, conjecture, and

innuendo.” Terry invites this Court to ask why the Commonwealth did not

present any witness testimony directly implicating him, such as from his co-

defendant, confidential informants, undercover agents, or drug purchasers.

He concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in overlooking the flaws

in the record supporting his convictions.

      Our review of a weight-of-the-evidence claim follows these principles:

              The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears
      to lie in ensuring that the trial court’s decision has record support.
      Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
      court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

             A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
      against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
      of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
      mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
      facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
      role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the
      facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
      them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
      justice.

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           An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
     a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
     review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight
     claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
     question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
     evidence.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

     “To successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a defendant must

prove the evidence is ‘so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks

the conscience of the court.’” Id. (quoting Windslowe, 158 A.3d at 712).

Accordingly, when a trial court has found that a verdict did not “shock that

court’s own conscience,” an appellant must prove that the court abused its

discretion by showing “how the trial court’s ruling overrode the law, was

manifestly unreasonable, or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will[,] or

partiality.” Commonwealth v. Rogers, 259 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

     Here, the trial court rejected Terry’s weight claim:

     [The trial court] had the opportunity to hear and see the same
     evidence presented to the jury in the Commonwealth’s thorough
     case-in-chief. The Commonwealth’s evidence . . . included the
     testimony from the investigating police officers, the expert from
     the Pennsylvania Crime Lab, and the [hotel property manager];
     the drugs, the cash, and the drug paraphernalia recovered; and
     the multiple videotapes from [the hotel] surveillance systems.
     Clearly, the Commonwealth provided the jury with plenty of
     material to sift through and weigh as it reached its verdicts. When
     balancing the totality of the evidence against [Terry’s convictions,]
     this Court’s sense of justice was not then, and is not now,
     shocked by these verdicts.

Opinion, 1/11/23, at 17 (emphasis added).

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      We discern no abuse of discretion. The trial court, having observed the

presentation at trial, found that the verdict did not shock its sense of justice.

Rather, it regarded the Commonwealth’s case as particularly strong.          We

conclude that Terry has not shown how this decision was manifestly

unreasonable or was otherwise an abuse of discretion.            Terry’s fourth

challenge fails.

                                       V.

      As a final matter, we note that this Court may correct an illegal sentence

sua sponte. Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super.

2003) (en banc)).       Restitution is part of a criminal sentence.         See

Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 918–19 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106). Restitution is proper when a victim’s property is stolen,

converted, unlawfully obtained, or decreased in value or when a victim suffers

personal injury directly resulting from the crime. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a); see

Commonwealth v. Laur, 295 A.3d 241, 244 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding that

a restitution order to an entity that is not a victim and has not compensated

a victim is an illegal sentence).

      Here, the trial court ordered Terry to pay restitution to the Pennsylvania

State Police Crime Lab for lab fees of $428.00, later amended to $522.96.

Lab fees are properly classified as costs of prosecution, not restitution. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 1725.3. We will therefore vacate only the restitution portion of

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Terry’s sentence order and remand for the trial court to order lab fees as a

mandatory cost.

      Restitution portion of sentence vacated. Case remanded for entry of an

order of costs consistent with this memorandum.         Judgment of sentence

affirmed in all other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/1/2023

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