Court Opinion

ID: 9942638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:51.453649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:22.925740
License: Public Domain

J-S46026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  HARLEY MISCUK                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 458 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 17, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-04-CR-0001937-2021,
                          CP-04-CR-0001938-2021

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: February 21, 2024

       Harley Miscuk (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of possession with intent to deliver a

controlled substance (PWID), possession of a controlled substance, possession

of drug paraphernalia, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and

recklessly endangering another person;1 and the trial court convicted him of

driving under the influence of alcohol–general impairment, reckless driving,

driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked, and possession of

a small amount of marijuana.2 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), 780-113(a)(32); 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3733(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3736(a), 1543(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31).
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     The trial court competently summarized the trial evidence in its opinion:

           Sergeant Steven Roberts and Officer Andrew Golletti of the
     Aliquippa Police Department testified that, on August 26, 2021[,]
     between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, they and other officers were
     at the intersection of Wade Street and Burton Street in Aliquippa
     investigating a crime scene involving a vehicle that had been
     [struck with gunfire,] when they heard five or six gunshots fired
     nearby. [N.T., 8/30/22,] at 27-29, 63-64. They then saw a red
     pickup truck coming up Burton Street towards them at a high rate
     of speed. Id. at 29-30, 63-67. Sgt. Roberts tried to [signal] the
     truck to stop but it did not stop[,] and he had to jump out of the
     way to avoid being hit, with the truck coming within two feet of
     him. Id. at 30, 64-67. The truck then went up onto the sidewalk
     to get around a police vehicle that was parked on Burton Street.
     Id. Sgt. Roberts and Officer [] Golletti each got into their
     [respective] police vehicles and pursued the truck, which
     continued to travel at a high rate of speed, running through
     numerous stop signs and red [traffic] lights. Id. at 31-32, 67-72.
     The speed limit on the residential streets involved was 15, 25, and
     40 miles per hour, but the officers had to go between 50 and 75
     miles per hour to catch up to the truck. Id. at 32-33, 69-70.
     There were other cars, pedestrians, and bicyclists present [in] the
     area at the time.       Id. at 70.     The pursuit continued for
     approximately two miles from Wade Street to several other streets
     and finally ended on Sheffield Avenue, where a Pennsylvania State
     Constable’s vehicle was blocking the road and Sgt. Roberts’s and
     Officer Golletti’s vehicles pulled to the side of and behind the
     truck, boxing it in. Id. at 33-34, 67-72.

           [Appellant] was the driver and only occupant of the truck.
     Id. at 35, 73. [Appellant] did not comply with police commands
     to show his hands or exit the truck and the officers had to
     physically remove him from the truck. Id. at 34-35, 72-73.
     Officer Golletti smelled the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage
     coming from [Appellant’s] mouth and Sgt. Roberts observed an
     open can of beer in his center console and a ballistic vest in the
     backseat, and smelled the odor of marijuana in the truck. Id. at
     36-38, 74, 83. The officers could not perform field sobriety tests
     because [Appellant] was angry, combative, and noncompliant.
     Id. at 39, 75-76. [Appellant] said something about having been
     shot at, but ultimately did not want to talk to the police about it.
     Id. at 35, 76-78. He also refused to consent to a blood test after
     having been read the DL-26 [PennDOT chemical test warnings]

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     form, with [Appellant] communicating his refusal by saying “Fuck
     you.” Id. at 79-82.

            The truck was towed and [] later found to be registered to
     [Appellant’s] uncle. Id. at 83-84, 93-94. After Officer Golletti
     obtained a search warrant, he searched the truck and recovered
     a ballistic vest, two baggies of marijuana, … about fifty empty
     plastic baggies, a digital scale, and a cell phone. Id. at 84-93,
     118-20. He also found a duffle bag that contained a grocery bag
     full of loose[,] white powder that later tested positive as cocaine.
     Id. at 93-98, 108-13. Officer Golletti testified that he had never
     before encountered such a large quantity of white powder in one
     vehicle. Id. at 161. The two bags of marijuana were unofficially
     weighed at 8.36 and 13.02 grams. Id. at 98-99. Officer Golletti
     contacted [Appellant’s] uncle, who indicated that he had no
     intention of retrieving the truck. Id. at 161-62.

            Warden William Schouppe of the Beaver County Jail testified
     that, on December 2, 2021, [Appellant] sent a text message using
     an inmate communication system stating: “The cops found
     vitamins in my uncle[’]s truck that were mine and lied and said
     the vitamins tested positive for cocaine…[.] I have to wait for lab
     results that prove it[’]s not drugs which can take up to 9 months
     if they want to be dicks[.]” Id. at 169-72.

            Alyshia Meyers, a drug analyst with the Pennsylvania State
     Police Greensburg Regional Lab, was qualified to testify as an
     expert in the field of chemistry and analysis of [] narcotics. Id.
     at 177-82. She testified that, on June 2, 2022, Detective Bonnie
     Sedlacek of the Beaver County Detective Bureau submitted for
     testing a knotted grocery bag containing white powder. Id. at
     188-89. Ms. Meyers tested the white powder, which tested
     positive as cocaine and weighed 56.3 grams. Id. at 189-90. Ms.
     Meyers used generally accepted scientific methods and rendered
     her opinions with[in] a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.
     Id. at 185-87, 192.

            Detective Sergeant Aldo Legge of the Center Township
     Police Department was qualified to testify as an expert in the field
     of illegal narcotics and methods used by drug traffickers in the
     sale and distribution of controlled substances. [N.T., 8/31/22,] at
     5-11. He testified that cocaine is sold on the street for about $100
     per gram and that heavy users might use two or three grams in a
     day. Id. at 13-15. In Det. Legge’s experience, the 56.3 grams

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       of cocaine recovered from [Appellant’s] truck was a large bulk
       amount [that was not] consistent [] with personal use but
       [rather,] with sale. Id. at 17-19, 23. He also testified that drug
       dealers typically package drugs in plastic baggies and use digital
       scales to weigh their products, and the … fifty empty baggies and
       the digital scale found in [Appellant’s] truck were also consistent
       with the sale of drugs rather than personal use. Id. at 15, 19-20,
       23.

              When the Commonwealth rested its case, [Appellant’s]
       counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing[, inter
       alia,] that … there was insufficient evidence that [Appellant]
       possessed the drugs or paraphernalia because the truck was
       owned by [Appellant’s] uncle. Id. at 34-35. The court denied the
       motion. [Id. at 38.]

Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/23, at 2-5 (some capitalization modified).

       After the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal, Appellant

testified in his own defense.          See N.T., 8/31/22, at 46-106.   Appellant

emphasized that his uncle owned the truck in question. Id. at 65. Appellant

responded to defense counsel’s question about “the contents of the vehicle”

by stating, “I don’t know what [Appellant’s uncle] does with his vehicle.” Id.

at 65-66. After the close of evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty of all

counts.3

____________________________________________

3 As we discuss further below, the trial court instructed the jury regarding the

possessory offenses against Appellant (i.e., PWID, possession of a controlled
substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a small
amount of marijuana – collectively, “the possessory offenses”). See N.T.,
8/31/22, at 146-56. These instructions included the law on possession, as
well as the mens rea required for a conviction of PWID. Id. at 146-47, 151-
53.

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       On October 17, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of

30 to 60 months in prison. Appellant filed a handwritten, pro se post-sentence

motion (PSM) ten days later.4 Counsel filed an amended PSM on November

16, 2022, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. PSM, 11/16/22, ¶ 6, I. The trial

court denied the PSM on March 14, 2023.          This timely appeal followed.5

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

4 The trial court rejected Appellant’s PSM and forwarded it to his appointed

counsel (Counsel). See Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 355
(Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that the pro se post-sentence motion filed by the
counseled defendant “was a nullity, having no legal effect.”) (citing
Commonwealth v. Piscanio, 608 A.2d 1027, 1029 n.3 (Pa. 1992)).

5 Counsel filed the notice of appeal on April 13, 2023, more than 30 days after

entry of Appellant’s judgment of sentence. However, the trial court had
previously granted Counsel a 30-day extension in which to file a PSM, upon
Counsel’s petition (which she had filed within the ten-day post-sentence
motion period of Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (mandating that “a written post-
sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of
sentence.”)). Thus, this appeal is timely. See Commonwealth v. Horst,
481 A.2d 677, 677-78 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding a defendant may toll the
time in which to file an appeal where the defendant requests an extension of
time in which to file a post-sentence motion, within ten days of the judgment
of sentence).

      We further note that Appellant’s single notice of appeal listed two trial
court docket numbers, implicating Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d
969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal
from single orders that resolve issues on more than one docket) (overruled in
part by Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (holding
that “where a timely appeal is erroneously filed at only one docket, [Pa.R.A.P.]
902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the
error, where appropriate.”)). Nevertheless, we conclude that Appellant did
not violate Walker, based on a breakdown in the trial court.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant presents a single issue for review:

       The Trial Court erred by not granting Appellant’s motion for
       judgement [sic] of acquittal, at the conclusion of the
       Commonwealth’s case, on the basis that there was insufficient
       evidence to support all the charges.

Appellant’s Brief at 8.

       “A defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a

conviction … in … a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(1).

       The test for ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal is
       whether the prosecution’s evidence, and all inferences arising
       therefrom, considered in the light most favorable to the
       prosecution are insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
       that the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.

Commonwealth v. Powanda, 304 A.3d 1284, 1288 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citations,    quotation      marks,      and    brackets   omitted);   see   also

Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 420 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“A

____________________________________________

       In Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019),
the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA,” see 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546),
court had advised the appellant that he could appeal the dismissal of his
petition by filing “a notice of appeal.” Stansbury, 219 A.3d at 160 (emphasis
added).     This Court held the trial court’s misstatement constituted a
breakdown of the PCRA court’s operation, “such that we may overlook the
defective nature of [a]ppellant’s timely notice of appeal rather than quash
pursuant to Walker.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d
350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury). Instantly,
pursuant to Stansbury, we may overlook Appellant’s defective notice of
appeal, as the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s PSM required the filing
of “an appeal within thirty (30) days.” Order, 3/14/23 (emphasis added).

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motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only in cases in

which the Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding that

charge.” (citation omitted)).

      A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “presents a question of

law, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.” Commonwealth v. Packer, 168 A.3d 161, 166 (Pa. 2017).

             In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all
      reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in
      the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
      was sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the
      Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense
      beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its
      burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the
      trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Sunealitis, 153 A.3d at 419 (citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Lake, 281 A.3d 341, 346 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Any doubt about the defendant’s

guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from

the combined circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

      Instantly, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion in

denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence was insufficient

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to convict him of the possessory offenses.6 See Appellant’s Brief at 15-21.

Appellant emphasizes that he did not own the truck in which police discovered

the contraband.      Id. at 18-20; see also id. at 21 (claiming “[t]here is a

realistic plausibility that the narcotics belonged to the owner of the vehicle,”

Appellant’s uncle). According to Appellant,

       while driving the vehicle, [he] did not control or intend to control
       the narcotics in the center console or back seat of his uncle’s
       vehicle. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, there is no
       information to prove that the [A]ppellant knew the narcotics were
       in there.

Id. at 19; see also id. at 20 (“There is no information concerning the period

that [Appellant] had received the vehicle, if he had permission to use the

vehicle, or if he knew what was inside the vehicle.”).

       The Commonwealth counters that the trial court properly denied

judgment of acquittal, and the evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of

the possessory offenses. See Commonwealth Brief at 5-14. According to the

Commonwealth,

       [i]t has never been a requirement that to prove possession … [of]
       narcotics found in a vehicle[,] the Commonwealth must prove that
       the vehicle actually belonged to or was registered to the individual
       charged. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108,
       122 (Pa. Super. 2005) (finding the evidence was sufficient [to
       sustain appellant’s conviction of PWID, where he] was the
       operator of a rental vehicle, the named lessee was not in the

____________________________________________

6 Appellant states that his “argument will only address the convictions related

to [his possession of] the narcotics and drug paraphernalia. The [A]ppellant’s
claims associated with the other offenses are withdrawn.” Appellant’s Brief at
15.

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      vehicle, and drugs were found in a grocery bag under the
      passenger seat where appellant’s girlfriend was seated).

Id. at 8-9 (citation modified); see also id. at 10 (“Appellant hangs his hat on

exactly one fact: that he was not the registered owner of the vehicle.”). The

Commonwealth claims that it presented sufficient evidence for the fact-finder

to properly find that Appellant constructively possessed the contraband, where

he

      was the sole occupant of the vehicle at the time of the stop. There
      were no other individuals but himself who had the ability to
      exercise control over the narcotics. The items were all within his
      immediate reach and control inside the vehicle. And, Appellant
      then made a statement [through the inmate communication
      system] claiming ownership of the cocaine found inside of his gym
      bag in the backseat of the truck.

Id. at 4.

      The statute governing PWID, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), prohibits “the

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a

controlled substance by a person not registered under this act….” Id. With

respect to possession of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth was

required to prove Appellant “[k]nowingly or intentionally possess[ed] a

controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this

act….”   Id. § 780-113(a)(16).    Possession of drug paraphernalia prohibits

“[t]he use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the

purpose of … introducing into the human body a controlled substance in

violation of this act.” Id. § 780-113(a)(32). Finally, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)

prohibits

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      (i) the possession of a small amount of marihuana only for
      personal use; (ii) the possession of a small amount of marihuana
      with the intent to distribute it but not to sell it; or (iii) the
      distribution of a small amount of marihuana but not for sale.

Id.

      “When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the

Commonwealth must establish constructive possession….” Jones, 874 A.2d

at 121 (citation omitted). This Court has explained,

      [c]onstructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct
      to deal with the realities of criminal law enforcement.
      Constructive possession is an inference arising from a set of facts
      that possession of the contraband was more likely than not. We
      have defined constructive possession as conscious dominion. …
      We subsequently defined conscious dominion as the power to
      control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control. …
      To aid application, we have held that constructive possession may
      be established by the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation

and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 26

A.3d 1078, 1094 (Pa. 2011) (stating that “circumstantial evidence may be

used to establish constructive possession of the [contraband].”). However, a

defendant’s mere presence at the scene does not establish constructive

possession.   Commonwealth v. Vargas, 108 A.3d 858, 869 (Pa. Super.

2014) (en banc); see also Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (stating that the location and proximity of an actor to the

contraband alone is not conclusive of guilt).

      With respect to PWID, we have stated that to sustain a conviction, “the

Commonwealth must establish the defendant knowingly or intentionally

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possessed a controlled substance without being properly registered to do so,

with the intent to manufacture, distribute, or deliver it.” Commonwealth v.

Dix, 207 A.3d 383, 390 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to deliver
      a controlled substance from an examination of the facts and
      circumstances surrounding the case. Factors to consider in
      determining whether the drugs were possessed with the intent to
      deliver include the particular method of packaging, the form of the
      drug, and the behavior of the defendant.

Jones, 874 A.2d at 121 (citation omitted). “Thus, possession with intent to

deliver can be inferred from the quantity of the drugs possessed and other

surrounding circumstances[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

      In its opinion, the trial court determined it properly denied Appellant’s

motion for judgment of acquittal, as the evidence established all elements of

the possessory offenses. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/23, at 6-9, 11. The

trial court cogently reasoned as follows:

      [PWID] and possession of cocaine

                                    ***

               [The trial] evidence showed that a grocery bag containing
      56.3 grams of cocaine was found in the backseat of the truck, of
      which [Appellant] was the driver and only occupant. The
      cocaine was within his reach and, though the truck was
      owned by his uncle, [Appellant] was in possession of the
      truck and was the only person with the power to exercise
      control over the cocaine. Moreover, in his December 2, 2021[,]
      inmate text message [detailed above, Appellant] referred to the
      alleged cocaine by saying “The cops found vitamins in my uncle[’]s
      truck that were mine...” [N.T., 8/30/22, at 171] (emphasis
      added). While [Appellant] may have disputed whether the white
      powder was in fact cocaine, the Pennsylvania State Police’s drug
      analyst tested it and testified that it was cocaine. Taking the

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     evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there
     was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that [Appellant]
     possessed the cocaine.

              As for intent to deliver, “[i]t is well settled that all the
     facts and circumstances surrounding possession are relevant in
     making a determination of whether contraband was possessed
     with the intent to deliver.” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 573 A.2d
     1027, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1990). Factors in this analysis may
     include “the quantity of drugs possessed” and “the presence of
     drug paraphernalia.” Commonwealth v. Parsons, 570 A.2d
     1328, 1335 (Pa. Super. 1990). “[T]he intent to deliver may be
     inferred from possession of a large quantity of controlled
     substance.” Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 560 (Pa.
     Super. 2008) [(citation omitted)].         Here, the quantity of
     cocaine was very large, and the digital scale and fifty empty
     baggies were sale-related paraphernalia that further
     bolster the case for [Appellant’s possession of the
     contraband with] intent to deliver. This evidence, coupled
     with the expert opinion offered by Det. Legge[, detailed supra],
     was sufficient to support a finding [that Appellant] possess[ed the
     contraband] with intent to deliver.

     Possession of [a small amount of] marijuana

             [Appellant] was charged with possession of marijuana
     under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)[, detailed supra]…. A small
     amount is defined as “thirty (grams) of marihuana.” [Id.] Here,
     two bags of marijuana, unofficially weighed at 8.36 and 13.02
     grams, were found in the center console of the truck solely
     occupied by [Appellant], and Sgt. Roberts smelled the odor of
     marijuana. These facts were sufficient to support the charge of
     possession of a small amount of marijuana.

     Possession of drug paraphernalia

              [Appellant] was charged with possession of drug
     paraphernalia under 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32)[, detailed supra]….
     The fifty plastic baggies and digital scale found in the truck,
     coupled with the large quantity of cocaine, were sufficient
     evidence to support the charge of possession of drug
     paraphernalia.

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Trial Court Opinion, 6/9/23, at 7-9 (emphasis added; citations modified;

paragraph numbering omitted).           Our review discloses that the trial court’s

foregoing reasoning is supported by the record and the law. See id.

       From the totality of the circumstances described above, we conclude the

evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant constructively possessed

the contraband, and the Commonwealth proved all elements of the possessory

offenses.    See, e.g., Jones, 874 A.2d at 122 (upholding the defendant’s

conviction of PWID against sufficiency challenge and holding Commonwealth

proved constructive possession of narcotics, where (1) police conducted a

traffic stop of the rental car driven by the defendant; (2) “police found []

cocaine in the cabin of the car, in plain view”; (3) the defendant “had $481.00

in small denominations [on his person], which is common for someone

involved in a drug distribution scheme”; and (4) the Commonwealth “also

presented evidence in the form of … expert testimony” from a police officer

qualified in the field of narcotics distribution “to establish that the drugs found

in the rental car were intended for distribution.”).7 Moreover, Appellant’s flight

____________________________________________

7 The primary authority upon which Appellant relies, In the Interest of J.B.,

189 A.3d 390 (Pa. 2018), is inapposite and unavailing. See Appellant’s Brief
at 16-18. In J.B., the juvenile court adjudicated the defendant delinquent of
first-degree murder and homicide of an unborn child, in connection with the
shooting death of the defendant’s stepmother inside the family’s home. J.B.,
189 A.3d at 393. The defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, the evidence
was insufficient to support his adjudication of delinquency. Id. at 405, 407.
This Court affirmed the juvenile court. Id. at 407. Our Supreme Court
reversed, holding “the Commonwealth’s forensic and eyewitness testimony,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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from police, and refusal to comply with their attempts to stop his vehicle,

provided additional circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See

Commonwealth v. Perez, 220 A.3d 1069, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc)

(holding flight from police can constitute circumstantial evidence of

consciousness of guilt). Finally, we reiterate that the trial court thoroughly

instructed the jury on the elements of the possessory offenses, as well as the

law governing possession. See N.T., 8/31/22, at 146-56. It is presumed the

jury followed the court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Speight, 854 A.2d

450, 458 (Pa. 2004) (“It is presumed the jury follows [a trial] court’s

instructions.”).

       Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, viewed in a light most
favorable to it, was, at best, in equipoise, as it was equally consistent with
two possibilities….” Id. at 421; see also id. (detailing the “two possibilities”
(which are not relevant to our disposition in the instant case)). The Supreme
Court stated, “[w]hen a party on whom rests the burden of proof in either a
criminal or a civil case, offers evidence consistent with two opposing
propositions, he proves neither.” Id. at 412 (citation omitted).

      We conclude J.B. is completely irrelevant to the instant case. Here, the
Commonwealth never presented the fact-finder “with two opposing
propositions.”   Rather, as the Commonwealth correctly argues, it had
“presented facts in furtherance of one theory, those being that Appellant
possessed [contraband and] a large amount of cocaine for the purpose of
delivering that narcotic to others.” Commonwealth Brief at 11.

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DATE: 02/21/2024

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