Court Opinion

ID: 9471949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:44:50.600322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:39.418660
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
with whom GOLDBERG, POLITZ, TATE and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
I.
To me, the facts of this case upon first reading, left the impression, immediately and intuitively, that the evidence should be suppressed under the general principles of the exclusionary rule. Yet, the panel’s analysis, scholarly though it is, gave the impression of a hunt in which the quarry had eluded the hunters. Now we have a majority opinion which is, oddly, so very right and so very wrong — right that the fourth amendment, under the current jurisprudence, does not directly protect the emission of the electronic signal here;1 *1526wrong that that issue is central at all to a determination of whether the marijuana is unconstitutionally tainted.
The issue, I think, is simple and straightforward. The marijuana is the fruit of a fourth amendment wrong committed by the government, that is, the breach of the search warrant. The seizure of the marijuana was brought about by the government’s exploitation of its wrong; and it is equally clear that the seizure of the marijuana is not so “attentuated” from the breach of the warrant that the taint of the fourth amendment wrong is “dissipated.”
II.
A search warrant was sought by the government agent to permit an intrusion into the cockpit of the airplane for the purpose of the installation of the transponder based on probable cause that the plane was being used in narcotics traffic.2 The district court issued a search warrant authorizing the search, but providing several conditions to the search, among them that the “[tjransponder or beeper to remain in aircraft for a period not to exceed thirty days.”3 On the basis of this search warrant, one night shortly after its issuance, at about 9:00 p.m., two government agents went to the airport where the plane was parked and in the cover of night, opened the main cabin door of the aircraft, entered into the cockpit of the airplane, and installed the transponder — all under the authority of the search warrant.
Under the terms of the warrant, the transponder was to be removed on July 19, 1981. The agents allowed the warrant to expire without removing that transponder. Two days after the thirty-day period had elapsed, customs agents, on July 21, 1981, asked the magistrate to extend the original warrant. This second warrant specifically ordered the agents: “You are also directed to remove the transponder from aircraft N4926B no later than 30 days from the expiration of the original court order (expiration date 07/19/81) that authorized the installation of the electronic equipment.” At the end of this second thirty-day period, notwithstanding the explicit command of the court, the transponder remained inside the plane as an active tracking device in violation of the explicit conditions of the warrant which had authorized the search.
As a result of the transponder’s remaining in the aircraft in violation of the conditions of the warrant, evidence of the plane’s location was obtained, the plane was tracked into Mexico and back into the United States, and upon return, shortly after landing, its pilot was arrested by customs officials who seized the bale of marijuana upon which this prosecution is based.
III.
In determining whether the marijuana in this case must be excluded as the inadmissible fruit of the poisoned tree, we turn first to the progenitor of this doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) and examine the facts in that case. There the federal narcotics agents arrested Horn Way, finding heroin in his possession. He stated that he had bought heroin from Blackie Toy. The agents, without probable *1527cause, invaded Toy’s bedroom and arrested him. He denied selling narcotics, but implicated Johnny Yee as someone who had sold the contraband. The agents then entered Yee’s residence and he voluntarily surrendered to them an ounce of heroin in his possession. Yee was arrested, and along with Toy, taken to the office of the Bureau of Narcotics where they implicated Wong Sun as a seller of heroin. Toy, Yee and Wong Sun were duly charged, arraigned and released on recognizance. Within a few days each was interrogated at the bureau where they gave incriminating statements.
When considered by the Supreme Court, at issue was the admissibility of: (1) the statements made by Toy in his bedroom, (2) the heroin obtained at Yee’s apartment, (3) Toy’s post-arrest statement, and (4) Wong’s post-arrest statement. The Court held that Toy’s statement made in his bedroom was the fruit of the unconstitutional invasion into his living quarters and was thus inadmissible. The Court further held that the exclusion of Toy’s bedroom declaration required the exclusion of the narcotics taken from Yee as the fruit of the unlawful invasion into Toy’s living quarters and could not be used against Toy. In holding that the narcotics were the fruit of the unlawful invasion into Toy’s quarters, the Court noted that the prosecutor had admitted that the drugs would not have been found except for the help provided by Toy in his bedroom declaration. The Court specifically noted that under these facts it could not be said that the narcotics were evidence derived from an independent source, nor was it a case in which the connection between the police misconduct and the evidence had become so attentuated as to dissipate the taint.
In evaluating the evidence that follows illegal police misconduct, the test to apply is not, Justice Brennan wrote, whether the evidence would have come to light “but for” the illegal actions of the police; rather, the question to be determined is whether the evidence results from exploitation of the illegality or whether it results from means sufficiently distinguishable from the illegality so as to be free of the initial taint. Applying that test, the Court concluded that the narcotics surrendered by Yee were the poisonous fruit of the unlawful invasion of Toy’s living quarters. The narcotics were, the Court held, the result of the exploitation of that original illegality and could not be introduced into evidence against Toy.
Turning to the two remaining issues of the post-arrest statements, the Court found it unnecessary to rule whether Toy's post-arrest statement was the fruit of the illegal arrest. Regarding Wong, however, the Court, while agreeing with the lower court that his initial arrest was illegal, held that his confession, made several days later while free on his own recognizance, was properly admitted. Since he was on his own recognizance and had voluntarily returned to the bureau several days later to make the statements, the connection between his initial arrest and the subsequent confession had “become so attentuated as to dissipate the taint.” Id. at 419.
Whether the connection between the illegal conduct and the questioned evidence is attenuated is largely a fact question to be determined and evaluated in each case. Our court, however, has undertaken such an evaluation on two rather recent occasions, and provided some factors to be considered. In United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.1980), Judge Vance (now of the Eleventh Circuit) wrote extensively on the subject. He pointed out that Wong Sun, supra, barred the fruits of the poisonous tree only if the fruit is sufficiently connected to the “illegal tree” Brookins, 614 F.2d at 1041. He outlined three forms of insufficient connection: where the link between the illegal conduct and the subject evidence had become attenuated; where the evidence had an independent source apart from the illegal conduct; and where the evidence inevitably would have been discovered during the police investigation without the aid of the illegal source. It was the court’s task in Brookins to evaluate the attenuation of the connection between illegal police conduct and a witness whose name was adduced in the illegally obtained statement and whose testimony *1528the defendant sought to suppress. Among the factors considered were whether the testimony was the act of the witness’s own free will; whether substantial time periods had elapsed between the illegal conduct and police contact with the witness; whether the identity of the witness would have been discovered by the police in a routine investigation, and whether the illegal conduct of the police in the first place was innocent or wilful. Even if the consideration of these factors indicated that the evidence was not attenuated from the illegal conduct, the court must weigh the application of the exclusionary rule against the social costs of suppressing the evidence, and in particular, the court should determine whether the application of the exclusionary rule provided some deterrent effect on the behavior of police officers. Id. at 1043.4
Obviously, most of these factors do not fit the facts of the case we consider here today, and simply underscore our earlier statement that whether the subject evidence has become so attenuated from the illegal conduct of the police is a fact question to be evaluated in each case. Perhaps of more significance to our consideration is the emphasis that Judge Vance gave, in the context of applying the fruit-of-the-poisoned-tree doctrine, to the general purpose of the exclusionary rule. He noted that recent Supreme Court decisions make it clear that the exclusionary rule does not rest upon the Constitution, but rather is a judicially created remedy to be applied only when it advances its judicial purpose. Id. at 1046. He further noted that the single and distinct purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police violations of that constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 1047.
A second recent case dealing with the subject we discuss today is United States v. Tookes, 633 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.1980). Tookes was an individual known to police as a convicted felon and drug offender. When the police approached him, he ran, was caught by the police, frisked from head to toe, found clean, but arrested anyway. The police officer began searching the area for anything that Tookes could possibly have thrown away while being chased. The officer’s search took him back to the vicinity of Tookes’ truck where he observed from the outside and in plain view on the seat next to the driver, a semi-automatic pistol. The defendant was then placed under arrest again, this time for possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, Tookes moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of the illegal first arrest. Judge Roney, writing for the court, held that the connection between the unlawful arrest and the seizure of the gun was not attentuated. He noted three factors to be considered in determining whether there was sufficient connection between the illegal conduct and the questioned evidence: (1) the proximity of the two in time and distance; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances between the arrest and the discovery of the evidence, and (3) the circumstances under which the arrest was made. He noted that the discovery of the evidence was soon after the arrest had been made and that there had been no significant intervening circumstances. He emphasized that the arrest was a gross violation of legal processes and the taint could not thus easily be removed. He admitted that the gun was in plain view and conceivably could have been discovered in the absence of the arrest but found that the “temporal” and “spatial” proximity of the illegal conduct and the discovery of the evidence made it clear that the two were interrelated. Id. at 716.5
*1529IV.
In determining the admissibility of the marijuana in this case, we turn to Wong Sun as the primary authority for our analysis. Wong Sun tells us that the facts are not to be analyzed pursuant to the approach that “but for the illegal conduct the evidence would never have been adduced”; rather, we are to determine whether the evidence here arises from the government’s exploitation of the warrant’s breach and whether the connection between the warrant’s breach and the marijuana is so attenuated that the illegal taint has become dissipated. Both Brookins, supra, and Tookes, supra, though in parts irrelevant to the facts we must examine today, are helpful in giving us some understanding of how we have discussed and applied the Wong Sun doctrine in other cases in this circuit.
First, we compare the fourth amendment wrong in Wong Sun and in our case. In Wong Sun, the fourth amendment wrong was the unlawful invasion into his living quarters without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that Wong Sun had committed a crime. In our case, there were no exigent or emergency circumstances, and the government agents properly went to the magistrate and applied for a search warrant. The court issued the search warrant permitting the agents to intrude into the cockpit of the plane at nighttime to “search and install said transponder and/or tracking beacon (beeper).” The terms of the warrant expressly provided that “[tjransponder or beeper to remain in aircraft for a period not to exceed thirty days.” A thirty-day extension of the warrant was granted. In granting the extension, the court specifically directed the customs agents to remove the transponder at the end of that period. The court said, in effect, to the government agents: it is reasonable to surreptitiously enter the plane, go into the cockpit, and install the transponder if you allow it to remain no longer than thirty days; if the tracking device remains in the plane longer than thirty days, this invasion scheme, which you seek to use as an investigative tool, is unreasonable.
The second thirty-day period expired on August 19, 1981. Three days later the transponder emitted the evidence leading to the location and seizure of the marijuana. Giving the term “exploit” its commonly accepted meaning of “taking advantage of” or “using,” there should be no quibbling that the government agents exploited their failure to act in accordance with the terms of the warrant. The government agents had been ordered by the court to remove the transponder; they had failed to act according to the terms of the warrant; because they had breached the terms of warrant, evidence, i.e., electronic emissions indicating the plane’s location, came into their possession; they immediately began acting on that evidence by tracking the plane; and ultimately, based on the evidence emitted in violation of the warrant, that is, emitted after the expiration of the thirty-day period, they located the marijuana. This conduct is exploitation of a fourth amendment wrong, in the clearest sense.
Furthermore, when we compare the chain of evidence in this case with that set out in Wong Sun, it is clear here that between the fourth amendment wrong and the evidence seized there is no attenuation which can be said to dissipate the taint. The chain of evidence is almost identical to that in Wong Sun. In Wong Sun, heroin was obtained from Yee because his location was known because of a statement that was given by Toy which resulted from the fourth amendment wrong of the police. Here, the marijuana was seized because the police knew of its location because of the electronic signal which resulted from a fourth amendment wrong of government agents. Thus, from the juxtaposition of the facts in this case with those in Wong Sun, it is clear that the authority of that case is “on all fours” that the subject evidence here was not attenuated from the breach of the warrant and the misconduct of the government in failing to remove the transponder.
While certainly it is clear that we need go no further than the authority of Wong Sun, we do note in passing that when applying the relevant criteria noted in *1530Brookins, supra, and Tookes, supra, the evidence here does not fit into any of the categories which should be excepted from the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. There was no significant amount of time which passed between the fourth amendment violation and the seizure of the evidence; there is no indication whatsoever in our case that the evidence would have been discovered by the police in the absence of the breach of the warrant; the breach of the warrant did not result from innocent activity on the part of the police who were, at best, wilfully negligent in complying with the terms of the warrant.
Finally, Brookins emphasizes as a major consideration the effect the exclusion of the evidence will have on discouraging illegal conduct on the part of law enforcement officers. In this regard the exclusion of the evidence here serves a major purpose. The majority opinion allows police to ignore the conditions of reasonableness imposed on their conduct by court-issued search warrants without adverse consequence. Under the court’s ruling today, police officers may, with immunity, allow transponders to track the comings and goings of an individual indefinitely, notwithstanding what the judge says. Court enforcement of protections against invasions through electronic devices is difficult enough to control effectively without further diluting the relevance of the fourth amendment as does the holding of the majority today. Thus, to me, application of the exclusionary rule to the marijuana in this case is all the more important for the effect it will have on future police conduct.
V.
In conclusion, I must dissent from the majority’s opinion. I should make it clear that I do not disagree that the fourth amendment does not protect Butts from the monitoring of the transponder in his airplane. I agree that Butts had no expectation of privacy to be free of the tracking of his plane in the airways. If the transponder had been warrantlessly attached to the exterior of the plane, I would have no occasion to complain about the admissibility of the evidence here in question. But the majority does not only focus on the monitoring as the source of the marijuana, it treats the monitoring as though it were an isolated, independent act without a history preceding it. The majority ignores that the monitoring and the recovery of the marijuana resulted from an exploitation of a fourth amendment wrong, the failure of the agents to comply with the specific conditions and terms of the search warrant. That is my difference with the majority, and that is why I dissent.

. While the actual monitoring of the signal is not subject to proscriptions of the fourth amendment, it is evidence which may be tainted, and hence inadmissible, as a result of its emanation from a "poisonous tree.”

. I assume, since the majority does not contest the proposition, that there is no disagreement that Butts had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cockpit of the plane and that the search warrant obtained was necessary to invade that privacy to "search and install" the transponder behind the instrument panel.
It is true that Butts did not own the plane. A person, however, may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a place or object he docs not own. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 629 (1980); United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir.1979). Butts met his burden of showing that his exercise of possession and control of the plane evidenced a legitimate expectation of privacy which was infringed by the installation and continued presence of the beeper. Moreover, on appeal, there was no contention that Butts lacked standing to complain of the use of the beeper.

. Whether the intrusion into the cockpit of the plane for the purpose of installing a beeper is a search, seems to be answered here, as a matter of fact, by this particular search warrant which commands the government agent to "search and install said transponder and/or tracking beacon (beeper) in the airplane. (Emphasis added.)

. In delineating the three forms of inadequate connection between fruit and tree, Judge Vance relied on four Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977).

. This same method of determining whether evidence falls within the general exclusionary bar against use of the fruits of an unlawful search, arrest, or seizure was used in United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1982).