Court Opinion

ID: 9366628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 16:00:34.101004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.051166
License: Public Domain

20-3348-ag
Lucero Pina v. Garland

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed
on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 27th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:
                   PIERRE N. LEVAL,
                   JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
                   WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                                Circuit Judges.

JUAN JOSE LUCERO PINA,

                          Petitioner,                            20-3348-ag

                          v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL

                          Respondent.

FOR PETITIONER:                                       Reuben S. Kerben, Kerben Law Firm,
                                                      P.C., Kew Gardens, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                                       Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                                      Attorney General; Anthony C. Payne,
                                                      Assistant Director; Jennifer A. Bowen,
                                                      Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                                      Litigation, United States Department of
                                                      Justice, Washington, D.C.

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       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) order is DISMISSED.

        Petitioner Juan Jose Lucero Pina, a native and citizen of Ecuador, seeks review of a decision
by the BIA (1) adopting and affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to deny
cancellation of removal and (2) denying his motion to remand. We assume the parties’ familiarity
with the underlying facts and procedural history.

        Where, as here, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ and merely supplements the IJ’s
decision . . . we review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Chen v. Gonzales, 417
F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The IJ in Lucero Pina’s case denied his application for cancellation of
removal because he did not show that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, his daughter Wendi. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). The BIA
agreed. Our jurisdiction to review the affirmance of a denial of cancellation of removal due to an
applicant’s failure to satisfy § 1229b’s hardship requirement is limited to colorable constitutional
claims or questions of law, which we review de novo. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Barco-
Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2008); Pierre v. Holder, 588 F.3d 767, 772 (2d Cir.
2009).

         Questions of law may include the application of law to undisputed facts. See Guerrero-Lasprilla
v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1070 (2020). They may also arise where the BIA “totally overlooked” or
“seriously mischaracterized” evidence, Mendez v. Holder, 566 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 2009), or applied
“a legally erroneous standard,” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dept. of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006).
They do not, however, extend to factfinding, the weighing of evidence, or the exercise of discretion.
See Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1623, 1627 (2022); Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 113 (2d Cir.
2010); Barco-Sandoval, 516 F.3d at 39. A petitioner cannot “us[e] the rhetoric of a ‘constitutional
claim’ or ‘question of law’ to disguise what is essentially a quarrel about fact-finding or the exercise
of discretion.” Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 330.

         We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s decision because Lucero Pina
fails to present a colorable constitutional claim or question of law; instead, his challenges amount to
quarrels with the agency’s factfinding and its weighing of evidence. Lucero Pina argues that the BIA
failed to consider the hardship evidence in the aggregate. He also contends that the BIA failed to
afford adequate weight to the dangerous conditions in Ecuador and the racial persecution Lucero
Pina and Wendi would be subject to as people of indigenous heritage. These arguments are, in
essence, ones that the BIA improperly weighed the evidence and thus insufficient to establish
jurisdiction.

        Lucero Pina further asserts that the BIA overlooked several hardship factors: (a) that Wendi,
aged fifteen at the time of the IJ’s decision, would have difficulty adapting to life in Ecuador because

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she did not speak Spanish fluently and was unfamiliar with Ecuadorian culture; and (b) how the
financial hardship Lucero Pina would experience would affect his ability to care for his daughter’s
special dietary needs (unfried food) and medical supplies (a prescription medication for
gastrointestinal problems and a nonprescription eczema cream). The record reveals that the BIA did
not “totally overlook” these factors. Mendez, 566 F.3d at 323. The BIA acknowledged that Wendi
would “suffer some difficulties in having to relocate to a new environment and culture” and that she
would face “economic difficulty” in Ecuador because of her father’s removal. Ct. Administrative R.
4. Nonetheless, it concluded that Lucero Pina did not meet the standard necessary to succeed on a
claim based on Wendi’s health. “[W]e presume that [the agency] has taken into account all of the
evidence before [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise,” which here it does not. Xiao
Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 336 n.17. Without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision, we must dismiss
Lucero Pina’s petition.

        The limitations on our jurisdiction to review the affirmance of a denial of cancellation also
apply to denials of motions to remand based on new evidence in support of an application for
cancellation. See Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2005). Here again, we lack jurisdiction
to review the BIA’s denial of Lucero Pina’s remand motion absent a colorable constitutional claim
or question of law.

         Lucero Pina argues that, in denying his remand motion, the BIA did not adequately consider
how care and expenditures associated with his wife’s medical needs—follow-up treatment for a
sarcoma removed from her thigh—would affect Wendi. But there is no indication that the BIA
“totally overlooked” or “seriously mischaracterized” any evidence relevant to the impact of his wife’s
condition or the financial strain of removal on their family. The BIA applied the proper standard to the
motion to remand: it concluded that Lucero Pina had not met his “heavy burden” given that the
proffered evidence would not establish his prima facia eligibility for relief or affect the outcome of his
case. See In re L-O-G-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 419 (B.I.A. 1996). In contending that his wife’s medical
condition warranted remand, Lucero Pina alleges that the BIA weighed the evidence incorrectly.
Accordingly, he has failed to raise a constitutional claim or question of law that would permit this Court
to assert jurisdiction over the BIA’s order denying his motion to remand.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Petitioner on appeal and found them to be
without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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