Court Opinion

ID: 8782295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 13:23:14.968203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:53.827267
License: Public Domain

SEVERENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I am unable to agree with the majority of the court or with the reasoning on which their conclusion is based. Inasmuch as the statement of facts contained in the opinion of the other judges is not, as I think, sufficiently full to disclose the whole case and omits to mention several important facts material to the proper disposition of it, I am constrained to state the case in my own way.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court dismissing a bill of review which was allowed to be filed there by the consent of this court given upon a petition filed here August 6, 1907. The decree which was complained of was made by this court on an appeal, July 13, 1900, affirming the decree of the Circuit Court. The reasons which induced this court to affirm the decree of the court below are stated in the opinion by Judge Lurton reported in 103 Fed. 532, 43 C. C. A. 296. The object of the original bill was to obtain an injunction to restrain trespassers on certain described lands alleged by the complainant to be in Tennessee and to belong to him, and to obtain a decree quieting the complainant’s title to said lands. The compl. in-ant claimed title under a grant from the state of Tennessee. The answer of the defendants averred that the lands were not in Tennessee* but were in North Carolina, and claimed title in themselves under grants from the latter state. The lands lie along the boundary line between the two states, and the question was which of the two lines claimed by the respective parties to.be the boundary was the true boundary line, for the lands in controversy lie between those lines. This was the sole question in controversy. The regularity of the derivation of the titles was not disputed on either side. The following excerpt from the statement of facts prefacing the opinion of the court will explain the history of the respective grants, the steps which had *313been taken by the public authorities of the two states to ascertain and settle the boundary line and the character of the lands in controversy:
"The territory now comprising the state of Tennessee was ceded by the state of North Carolina in 1789 [2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. p. 171] to the United States. The Session Act describes the eastern boundary line as follows: ‘Beginning on the extreme height of the Stone Mountain, at the place where the Virginia line intersects it, running thence along the extreme height of the said mountain to the place where the Wautauga river breaks through it; thence a direct course to the top of the Yellow Mountain, where Bright’s road crosses the same; thence along the ridge of said mountain, between the waters of Doe river and the waters of Rock creek, to the place where the road crosses the Iron Mountain; from thence along the extreme height of said mountain to where Noliehuclty river runs through the same; thence to the top of the Bald Mountain; thence along the extreme height of the said mountain to the Painted Rock, on French Broad river; thence along the highest ridge of the said mountain to the place where it is called the “Great Iron” or “Smoky” Mountain; thence along the extreme height of the said mountain to the place where it is called “Unicoy” or “Unaka” Mountain, between the Indian towns Cowee and Old Chota; thence along the main ridge of the said mountain to the southern boundary of this state.’ The line here to be ascertain is included within the call beginning ‘thence along the extreme height, of the said mountain to the place where it is called Unicoy or Unaka Mountain.’ The mountain whose extreme height is to be followed until Unaka Mountain is reached is the ‘Great Iron or Smoky Mountain.’ The necessity for a definite location and marking of the lino became evident to both states, and in 1821, under acts passed by each state, a joint commission was appointed for the purpose of settling, running, and re-marlcing the boundary line. The Tennessee commissioners were appointed under an act which provided that the commissioners should ‘settle, run and remark the boundary line between this state and the state of North Carolina, agreeably to the true intent and meaning of the said act of the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, entitled: “Ail act for the purpose of ceding to the United States of America certain western lands therein described.” ’ Acts Tenn. 1820, c. 22 [2 Scott’s Laws, p. 635]. The North Carolina act, providing Cor the running of the line, was substantially identical with the Tennessee statute above set out. 2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. N. C. p. 94. The joint commissioners did run and re-mark the line, and each state passed an act ratifying, confirming, and adopting the line as run and reported by the commissioners. Acts Tenn. 1821, p. 45, c. 35: 2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. N. C. p. 96.”
It will be sufficient for the present purpose to state that the line run by the commissioners as claimed by the plaintiff in the original suit would be a line starting from a known point where the disputed lines separate northeast of the land in controversy and extending south-wardly and somewhat westwardly over what is known as Hangover Rock to another known point where the disputed lines converge. If this were the true line, these lands lie in Tennessee. The line which the defendants in the original suit claimed was the one run by the commissioners starts from or near the same point as the other, but diverging therefrom extends more to the right, as one looks to the southwest, and passes over the Fodder Stack range of heights to the converging point. This line lies west of these lands and would locate them in North Carolina. The evidence in the original case showed that there were signs and marks along each line, the character of which is stated in Judge Hurton’s opinion on the original case. On the Fodder Stack ridge line there were 41 trees marked like those on the general and undisputed line established by the commissioners. This court *314thought the probability was that these trees were thus marked by the commissioners, but concluded that this line was only temporarily run, and was afterwards abandoned, and the Hangover Rock line substituted. We need not go into the various reasons which led the court to conclude that the Hangover Rock line was the true boundary line. The necessary result was that the land in question passed by the Tennessee grant, and that, therefore, the complainant was the true owner; and the court decreed accordingly. Counsel for the defendant remind the court with great earnestness of the importance to the public of the stability of judgments. But it is of even higher interest to the public that the citizen shall not be despoiled by a wrong judgment. It is for the prevention of such unjust consequences that the law gives to the courts the power of correction by a bill of review. It is an ancient principle of equity that, if a man shall lose his property to his adversary by the decree of the court, he still retains the right to regain it, if, by subsequent discovery of hitherto unknown proof bearing directly on the issue, he is able to convince the court that its decree was clearly wrong. This right is one to which the right acquired by the decree is subordinate, and neither the opposite party nor any one claiming under him can successfully deny that right, so long as the true owner has done no act either of commission or omission, whereby he should be estopped from claiming it. '
When the former suit was pending nothing of the work of the commissioners was to be found in the archives of either state, although diligent search was made. The state house of North Carolina at Raleigh was burned in 1831, and its archives nearly all destroyed. But what had become of the report of the commissioners which came to the state of Tennessee no one could explain. The court had only scant means for locating the line, and was in doubt about the conclusion to be drawn from what it had, but based its judgment upon the probabilities as they seemed to be. But about the beginning of the year 1904 and after the three years which a statute of Tennessee prescribes as a limitation for bills of review had elapsed, the report of the commissioners and the map which accompanied it belonging to the state of Tennessee were discovered in a barrel of rubbish in the basement of the capítol of the state at Nashville, which the state authorities had ordered to be cleaned out. The rumor of this discovery spread abroad and came to an agent of the defendants residing in North Carolina. The-grants of these lands by the state of North Carolina were made upon sales made during the years 1853, ’54, ’55, and ’56. That by the state of Tennessee was made in 1892, and probably was at a time subsequent to the time of the disappearance of the commissioners’ report and map. I say “probably,” because it is hardly to be credited that the official who had charge of the making of the grant would have allowed it if he had knowledge of the action of the commissioners. But it is possible that the making of this grant was the result of the seemingly loose practice of the land department of that state which is stated thus by Judge Caruthers in State v. Crutchfield, 3 Head (Tenn.) 113, at page 115:
“The^ state does not warrant the title to the land which she grants. She opens her offices, and permits individuals to enter, at their own risk, any *315lands they clioose, and she Issues her grants. They must beware of the titles they get.”
The lands were wild, rough, and uncultivated, and almost unsettled, and were valuable mainly for their ore mines and timber.
The state of Tennessee at one time caused a survey and sectioniz-ing to be made of lands in this locality. Of this survey Judge Clark in his opinion in the original case said:
“That the state has through the Ocoee District commissioners established its line on ¡Slick Rock creek, and has sectionized all the territory supposed to belong to the state.”
This survey and sectionizing took place in 1836, and Slick Rock creek is on the line running over the Fodder Stack range. Aside from the making of the grants, neither state had made any distinct claim of territorial dominion. Taxes have been assessed upon them by the state of North Carolina, and they have been paid by the appellants or their predecessors in title. And recently the appellees have paid taxes to the state of Tennessee. The complainant in the original suit alleged that he was in possession, but this statement was not supported by the evidence. Judge Clark, in the opinion on which he based his decree, said:
“After careful consideration of this case, I reach the conclusion that I am not warranted upon tbe facts in differing from the commissioner in the view which he takes of the case. It is a very close one on the facts, and the equity of the case is rather with the defendants in view of the fact that they obtained their grants earlier, and have been paying taxes upon the property while the plaintiff's grant was only recently obtained.”
The report and map of the commissioners above mentioned were put in evidence in the court below in this proceeding, and are now before us. The authenticity of them is not disputed. The map shows the line run by the commissioners in distinct color, and it shows the line as it was contended to be by the defendants in the original case, and is the line running over the Fodder Stack ridge, and is on the line of the 41 marked trees above mentioned. The inevitable conclusion is that the original decree was erroneous. The appellees contend vigorously that these documents are not conclusive, and still insist that the true line runs over by Hangover Rock. But it is, as I think, a. hopeless contest, and my conviction that the map shows the true line is in no wise shaken. What is the result of this conclusion if it is correct? It must be that these lands lie in North Carolina, that the appellees had no title, and that the appellants are the lawful owners of them.
Counsel for appellants urge that, 'where it is found that the lands are not within the territorial limits of Tennessee, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court fails, and that the order should be that the bill be dismissed on that ground. This objection was presented to the Supreme Court in boundary cases at an early day, and was overruled, the court being of opinion that, if upon the allegations of the bill the land is within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, that is enough, and that its authority will not be divested by its final conclusion that the land is located in an adjoining state. Fowler v. Miller, 3 Dall. *316411, 1 L. Ed. 658; New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dall. 1, 1 L. Ed. 715; Handly v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374, 5 L. Ed. 113; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 726, 727, 9 L. Ed. 1233; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 How. 381, 14 L. Ed. 189.
On the merits' the conclusion above stated is fatal to the claim of the appellees. The bald, but perfectly true, state of the case is this: The real owners of the property have defended it against a claimant having in truth no interest in it by all the lawful means available to them, but by the adverse decision of the court the owners have lost it. The court has been the instrumentality by which this grievous miscarriage had been accomplished. It does, indeed, sometimes happen that by error or accident such injustice is done and is irremediable; but it certainly ought not to happen by the conscious act or omission of the court while it yet has the power and opportunity to prevent the mischief.
The only question in the case at the original hearing was that of the location of the boundary line between the states. The new evidence seems to be conclusive of that question. It is difficult to conceive of a case more suitable for the remedy now invoked.
But the. appellees, apprehending that perhaps the court would come to the foregoing conclusion in respect to the boundary line upon the new facts, interpose á great variety of objections to the relief prayed, among them these: First, it is urged that these complainants are not persons aggrieved by the original decree; and, further, as they contend, the parties in whose behalf the bill of review is filed are assignees, in whose favor the court will not review the decree. These contentions are directed to the ultimate 'question, namely, whether they have any interest affected by the decree which entitles them to the relief which they seek. The first of these, that these complainants were not aggrieved, does not merit prolonged discussion, certainly not, if this bill is to be treated as a bill by the original defendants as I think it should. The second, concerning the rights on such a bill, is more serious, and is the principle ground as I understand on which the court is to affirm the decision of the court below. The general rule is stated by the Rord Chief Baron Gilbert in his book on the Chancery Practice entitled Eorum Romanum at page 186, which is this:
“None but parties and privies, such as heirs, executors, or administrators, can have this bill of review, since nobody else can be aggrieved by such decree because it can only be revived upon such privies.”
Mr. Justice Story in his work on Equity Pleadings, note to section 409, in quoting this language uses the word “by” instead of “upon” in the last line. But I suppose this is an error, as the original publication has it “upon.” This rule has been stated and followed in many judicial opinions, and is no doubt the foundation of the practice of the court. Some qualifications to its generality,, however, have been made where the special circumstances require it, which is an incident to all general rules. And Mr. Justice Story in the note above méntioned says: “This language is very broad, and requires qualification.” And he proceeds to state several of such.
*317The majority of the court treat this bill of review as one brought by assignees, and not as one brought by the parties to the original decree to enforce their own rights. While it is true that the petition filed in this court for permission to make application to the Circuit Court for leave to file it was presented by the “assignees,” as we will call them, the bill which was allowed by the Circuit Court to be filed is the bill of the original defendants themselves as complainants, and they pray in their bill that they may be allowed to file it. The case stated is the case of those parties. The relief prayed is in their own behalf, and the bill is signed by their solicitors. No statement of any facts in behalf of any other persons than themselves is made — nor, indeed, is there any reference to the rights or interests of any other person. They thus became parties to the suit, and subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and would be bound by the decree which the court should render. The discretion of the Circuit Court as to whether leave to file should be granted was invoked and exercised and at no time was its permission to file the bill recalled. Nor does the fact that the other parties assisted in the promotion of the suit con-situte an objection. They had an interest which they might subserve without censure.
It would seem from the rule approved by the Supreme Court upon the authority of the Lord Chief Baron Gilbert’s book that the original parties and their privies by representation who were bound by the decree are the only ones properly joined in the suit. Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U. S. 397, 24 L. Ed. 481; Gies v. Green, 42 Mich. 107, 3 N. W. 283. Nevertheless, a purchaser subsequent to the decree was allowed to intervene as defendant.
But, passing by this objection for the present, I proceed to inquire whether the parties complainants are so affected by the original decree that they are entitled to maintain a bill of review. The original defendants are aggrieved because the decree cut them out of the interest they had in the lands subject to the deed in trust to Archer and McGarry, and so affected the value of the title conveyed iu trust as to materially depreciate the price that could be obtained for it, and the extent to which their debt would be paid. This deed in trust was made pendente lite. , The deed of the trustees was offered in evidence: by the defendant, and is therefore evidence of any disserving statements made in it. 1 Wharton’s Evidence, § 619. Turning to the deed itself, it appears to have been given to carry into effect certain trust agreements entered into before .the making of the final decree. It was of these and other lands to secure a large indebtedness, a very considerable portion of which was due to Archer, one of the trustees. It contained a power of sale, the power being coupled with an interest, and was irrevocable. The good faith of the transaction is not questioned. It was therefore perfectly valid in law and iu equity. Hartley v. Russell, 2 Simons & Stuart, 244; Hartington v. Long, 2 Myl. & K. 590. To be sure, the grantees would be bound by the decree if one should be finally entered against the grantors. This because of the rule which the court applies for the maintenance of existing conditions and consequently of its jurisdiction to make an ef*318fective decree. The fact that the grant was made pendente lite has no other consequence. In earlier times the courts looked with disfavor upon a purchase pendente lite, not only because of its disturbance of the status quo, but also because it afforded an opportunity for maintenance and champerty. To avoid the first of these objections, the rule that the purchaser should be bound by the judgment was applied. With respect to the subject of maintenance and champerty, the objection has lost much of its force, and is now only sustained upon a plain case. It is not sustained where the purchaser has an interest in the subject of the litigation, but only when he comes in as a volunteer, to assist the party from whom he buys. 6 Cyc. 865, where the subject is fully treated and numerous authorities are cited in support of the rule just stated.' After the transfer by the defendants, they, to the extent of the interest transferred, continued as representatives of the transferee as was said by Chief Justice Waite in Stout v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66, 26 L. Ed. 428, and repeated by Mr. Justice Brewer in Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 386, 14 Sup. Ct. 122, 37 L. Ed. 1113. Archer and the other creditors sought to obtain this security for their debt, and, if we look to ultimate justice, it would be more just that the debt of the real owner should be paid to his creditors, rather than that the fund should go to a stranger to that ownership. If the purchasers from the trustees would have no other means of protection, it would seem that they should have such a right as the trustees had. It was necessary that there should be purchasers, else the power of the trustees could not be executed. The title would not be marketable, and would remain stagnant in their hands. But we need not pursue this subject. It is enough that the original defendants are in due form before the court, and were injured by the decree. And it is of no concern whatever to the defendant in this bill what use the complainants make of the fruits of the decree, as, for instance, whether they shall thereby make good their own conveyance to their grantee. Counsel for defendants maintain in effect that, notwithstanding the original decree had the effect to pass the title from the defendants to the complainant, no one was aggrieved thereby.
I have been induced to discuss these questions touching the interests of parties deriving such interests from one of the parties to the original suit, but who were not themselves parties because the case" has been presented and argued as if such questions were open on a bill of review. It is only by such an assumption that the presence of the Smoky Mountain, etc., Company can be recognized; for its rights are only such as it has derived since the decree sought to be reviewed. Thus on both sides proofs have been introduced as if new issues could be raised and decided in this proceeding, a proposition which I doubt. There are some precedents cited by counsel wherein, as is claimed, such a broad jurisdiction has been exercised on a bill of review. But it seems manifest that this practice destroys the proper limitations of such a proceeding, and confounds it with the proceedings of an ordinary suit in equity; and it is inconsistent with the equity practice of the federal courts. It is a singular circumstance *319that in this case the defense is made a party who, under the rule referred to, could not properly be made a party to the proceeding at all. But proceeding, further, another objection is that:
“A bill of review will not affect the title of a bona fide purchaser (of the property in controversy) from tlie successful party after a final decree and without notice that a bill of review is to be filed.”
Now, whatever application such a rule may have to a bill filed to review a decree for error apparent on the face of it, it can have none to a case where the bill is filed on account of newly discovered evidence of which the plaintiff in most -ase.;; would have no knowledge and no definite hope of discovery, thereover, how is lie to give notice of ati intention to file such a hill? And to whom must the notice he given? How is he to know who is an intending purchaser? In this connection it may be worth while to remark that the original complainant lost no time in disposing of the lands to another after the decree of this court was entered. Only a few days elapsed after the decree before he had sold it, and it was conveyed before the time had elapsed for moving for a rehearing or applying for a cer-tiorari. If in such circumstances a man may cut off the true owner by forthwith conveying away the properly, then, as said by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, a hill of review is of little value. Clark’s Heirs v. Farrow, 10 B. Mon. 446, 451, 52 Am. Dec. 552. This point is made in the interest of the Smoky -M ounl ain, etc.., Company, which claims to be a bona fide purchaser. Admitting it to have that character, for the sake of argument, it would not suffice to defeat the claim of the complainants; for it never acquired the title to the property, and it is only in such case that a bona fide purchaser can have protection. 1 Story’s Eq. Jnr. § 64. The grant of the state of Tennessee conveyed no title, legal or equitable, and the grantor of the Smoky Mountain, etc.., Company, had no title to sell and nothing passed by the deed. Non dat qui non habet is a maxim of the law, as well as sound logic. An apparent title is not always enough; as, for instance, when the name of the true owner has been forged, or the grantor was under a disability, or when, for any reason, the deed conveyed no title. The defendants in the former suit, who are complainants here, derived the true title from-the state of North Carolina. It was of a fee simple absolute, the highest and best title known to the law. The owner of property cannot he deprived of it v ithout some fraud or fault on his part by a bona fide purchase of it by another from some other party than the owner. In 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 735, the author says:
“A subsequent bolder, even i'or a valuable consideration and without notice, has certainly no higher right than a prior holder equally innocent and with an equally meritorious ownership. American courts seem sometimes to have acted upon exactly the opposite notion, and to have assumed that a subsequent title was necessarily file better one. When the original legal owner has done or omitted something by which it was made possible that his property should come into the hands of a bona fide holder by an apparently valid title, it may be just to regard him as estopped from asserting his'ownership, and thus to protect the subsequent; purchaser. But when the prior legal owner is wholly innocent, has done and omitted nothing, it *320certainly transcends, even if it does not violate, the principles of equity to sustain the claims of a subsequent and even bona fide purchaser.”
And again, after an extended discussion of the subject, he says at the close of section 739:
“The foregoing description shows that it is wholly unwarranted by the settled principles of equity for a court to sustain and enforce the subsequent legal estate acquired by A. in any lrind of property or thing in action merely because he is a bona' fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice against the prior legal and equally innocent owner, B., or even to sustain A.’s defense as a bona fide purchaser in a suit brought by B.”
It seems to me that this doctrine rests upon a fundamental principle, and is indisputable. It has been recognized and enforced by the federal courts in several cases. Vattier v. Hinde, 7 Pet. 252, 8 L. Ed. 675; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 212, 9 L. Ed. 388; Smith v. Orton, 131 U. S. Appendix lxxviii, 18 L. Ed. 62; Texas Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Branch, 60 Fed. 201, 8 C. C. A. 562. Lindblom v. Rocks, 146 Fed. 660, 77 C. C. A. 86. Judge Gilbert, in this last case, puts the matter in a nutshell when he says:
“The doctrine of bona fide purchaser without notice does not apply where the purchaser buys no title at all. His good faith cannot create title.”
In the case of Texas Lumber Mfg. Co. v. Branch, supra, the deed to the bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration stated that the grantors were the heirs of the deceased owner, and the purchaser supposed that to be so. But it turned out that another was the lawful heir, and the property was decreed to him. See, also, Latham v. Barney (C. C.) 14 Fed. 433, 446. The doctrine concerning bona fide purchaser has been built up and has always rested upon the assumption that the purchaser paying value, has acquired a title, in the enjoyment of which a court of equity will protect him. At one time the court of chancery pressed the rule so far as to permit the purchaser to get hold of the title by seizing the evidence of it by any means in his power, even by trespass if he could. This excess was subsequently disallowed. But the requirement that the purchaser must have a title in order to enable him to call for the protection of the court has always continued to be regarded as an essential con-' dition; and, indeed, upon sound reason, it must be so.
The cases of Rector v. Fitzgerald, 59 Fed. 808, 8 C. C. A. 277, and Ohio R. Co. v. Fisher, 115 Fed. 929, 53 C. C. A. 411, which are relied on by the defendants, decide nothing opposed to this. In the first of these cases it appears from Judge Thayer’s statement that the bona fide purchaser had acquired the legal title. And the references which Judge Thayer makes indicate that Rector had been seeking to defeat the title which the defendant who was the grantor of the bona fide purchaser, had acquired, and to obtain a declaration that he was himself entitled to it. The case finally turned on the question of the laches of the plaintiff in filing his bill. The other case, that of Ohio River R. Co. v. Fisher, was not one of a bill of review, but it involved facts and proceedings occurring after an original decree and the filing of a bill of review. The railway com*321pany had become a purchaser for value through a sale and conveyance by the trustees under a will. The trustees held the legal title and the railway company had acquired it by their deed, judge Si-monton referred to the case of Bank v. Ritchie, 8 Pet. 146, 8 L. Ed. 890, where Chief Justice Marshall distinguished such a case from one where the title had not been acquired by the purchaser, at least that was the interpretation of it by the learned judge. The same observations apply to the case of Perkins v. Pfalzgraff, reported in 60 W. Va. 121, 53 S. E. 913.
The notion that, because at the time these lands were purchased of the complainant in the original suit he had obtained a judgment in his favor which precluded the defendant from asserting title to the lands, he might ever afterwards rely upon the estoppel by which the defendant was then bound, is unsound. On the contrary, the true rule is that, when the ground on which the estoppel of the judgment rests is removed and the truth is let in, the estoppel collapses and the structure built upon it falls to the ground; whereupon there must be restitution of that which by the previous error of the court the party has been unjustly deprived of. 2 Foster’s Federal Practice (4th Ed.) 1132; Mitford’s Ch. Pl. 107, 89. Cases where judicial sales made in pursuance of decrees, and before the reversal of such decrees have been protected in the hands of purchasers at such sales, rest upon the security which must be afforded to the purchaser in relying upon the action of the court. It is necessary that the purchaser should have such confidence or sales could not be made for the proper value. Moreover, the price inures to the benefit of the true owner. What would be thought of such a case, if the court in addition to divesting the owner of his title should also deprive him of the proceeds? The rule itself results from a balance of inconveniences, the one which the owner suffers from a forced sale of his property and the other in depriving the purchaser of the necessary safeguard which the general interest of the public requires. Such cases have no application to an ordinary sale made after the court lets go its hold, and leaves the property to the ordinary incidents of business transactions. The distinction is stated bv Gilfillan, C. J., in Lord v. Hawkins, 39 Minn. 73, 38 N. W. 689, as follows:
“The second question in this case is, Does a imrchaser in good faith from a successful party in a judgment determining the title to real estate come within the rule which protects a bona fide purchaser under a judicial sale: that is, a sale made pursuant to a judgment or to enforce a judgment, from the effect of a subsequent reversal or vacation of the judgment? The reason for the rule is obvious, and suggests the answer to the question. It is founded upon considerations of public policy, which require that property shall not he sacrificed at sales that the law makes, that at such sales purchasers shall he encouraged to hid a fair price. And this cannot be effected if the title they acquire is subject to be defeated in consequence of errors or irregularities in the judgment under or pursuant to which the sale is made. This is no such case. Here was no sale nor anything equivalent to a sale. The judgment did not asstime to pass any title. It passed on only the previously existing title like an action in trespass or ejectment. The appellant purchased from the parly and took only the title that he had.”
*322In 24 Cyc. 6, it is said:
“A sale is not a judicial sale, properly speaking, unless it is made under an order of the court, and subject to confirmation of the court [citing a number of cases].” u
This distinction is highly important in the present case.
Another ground taken in defense, but not alluded to by the other judges, is that the bill of review is barred by a statute of limitations of the state of Tennessee which is as follows:
“No bill of review shall be brought, or a motion made therefor, except within three years from the time of pronouncing the decree; saving to infants, married women, persons of unsound mind, imprisoned or beyond the limits of the United States, a right to a bill of review within three years after such disability has been removed.” Shannon’s Code, § 4848.
I should suppose that this statute was intended to apply only to bills of review for errors appearing of record; for, if it be applicable to bills filed because of newly discovered evidence, the result would be that parties who have no knowledge of such evidence would be cut off at the end of three years, and many cases might arise where the new evidence might not have been discovered before the period of this limitation should elapse, and yet be of such a character as to show that great injustice had been done. It has always been a favorite doctrine in courts of equity that the time for limiting recourse to those courts should begin when the cause of action is discovered, and some of the states have enacted statutes extending this rule to all cases whether at law or equity. But I am of opinion that, if it be conceded that this 'statute was meant to include all bills of review, it is not a law which binds the courts of the United States. It was enacted for the regulation of the procedure in the courts of the state. The Legislature of the state had not the power to regulate the procedure of the courts of equity of the United States. Nor, indeed, has it the power by its own authority to regulate the procedure in any actions in the federal courts. Congress has power to adopt such legislation, and has done so in respect to actions at law. But the act expressly excludes suits in equity and in admiralty from the rules prescribed by state legislation for actions at law. Nor can a state prescribe a law which restricts the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts. It may indirectly extend the jurisdiction of those courts by supplying new conditions wherein the federal courts, without departing from their own fundamental principles, 'may exercise equitable jurisdiction. The consequence of applying the statute of Tennessee to cases such as this would defeat the exercise of jurisdiction by the equity court of the United States in all cases of bills of review filed after three years from the original decree, although the courts of equity have hitherto and through a long period of time taken jurisdiction and decreed relief in many cases where a much longer period had elapsed. And this further result would happen; that the power of the court existing in other states would be restricted in the state of Tennessee to a part only of its familiar jurisdiction. As we said in Kentucky Coal & Timber Co. v. Kentucky Union Co. (C. C. A.) 187 Fed. 948:
*323“State statutes of limitation are prescribed for the tribunals of tlie state. They are not ex proprio vigore of any force in the courts of the United States. They may be, and in many instances have been, adopted by acts of Congress as laws of the United States. There is no general statute ol' limitations in the laws of the United States relating to suits in equity. But, speaking now of the equity courts of the United States, there has been, for the sake of conformity, a disposition to accept the statutory regulations of the states prescribing the time within which suits may be brought. And this practice has ripened into a rule which will be enforced whenever by observing it the court is not required to abrogate its own principles, in which ease it will protect its own jurisdiction. Alsop v. Riker, 155 U. S. 448, 460 [15 Sup. Ct. 162, 39 L. Ed. 218]; Patterson v. Hewitt, 195 U. S. 309 [25 Sup. Ct. 35, 49 L. Ed. 214], Instances are found where those courts have enforced the doctrine of laches in favor of defendants where the lapse of time has been shorter than that prescribed by state laws, but where the peculiar circumstances gave rise to an equity which the court was bound to protect. By the same token it would allow a longer period for bringing suit than that prescribed, when by fraud or concealment of the cause of action had not been discovered, or would not by reasonable diligence have been discovered.”
This brings us to the last defense which the defendants make, which I think it material to notice. This is, that the complainants have been guilty of laches in taking measures to obtain leave to file the bill. There is no statute of the United States which limits the time for filing a bill of review. The general rule is that the party should move within a reasonable time after discovering the new evidence. It is a question of laches. In many cases it has been tested by the analogy of statutes fixing the time for taking an appeal from the original decree. But this has never been regarded as an absolute rule in applying the doctrine of laches. But, by whatever rule the matter is to be tested, I think there was in this case no such delay as should bar the remedy. The complainants were nonresidents. They had an agent in Cherokee Comity, N. C., who had charge of lands they held in that state, and apparently of those in Tennessee. He testified that he first heard a rumor that the map had been found in February, 1906; that he at once set about verifying it; that in March of that year he obtained a copy of the map; that he tried to find out whether the field notes of the commissioners could be found at Nashville: that he made trips to .Raleigh, N. C., and made thorough search of the state archives there, for the map, the report and the field notes of the North Carolina commissioners, which he hoped to find there, but failed to find them; that, when he had secured all that he could find, the matter was placed in the hands of local attorneys The details of his search are stated more at length in his testimony. It appears that subsequently counsel at Cincinnati was employed to assist. The petition for leave to file the bill of review was filed by the counsel at Cincinnati, August 6, 1907. It does not appear that any change of conditions occurred meantime.
Reference is also made in the opinion of the majority of the court to the character of the appeal, and it is suggested that it is the appeal of the “assignees.” But I think, when construed by the whole record, it may properly be regarded as the appeal of the original parties. The privilege of prosecuting the suit in the court below would *324seem to carry with it /the right to appeal if there should be occasion. As elsewhere said, the bill presented only a controversy to which the original defendants were parties plaintiff, and it is plain that that was the controversy intende. to be removed to the appellate court. Evidently the parties have.so understood it. There has been no motion to discuss the appeal, and it has been argued and submitted without any controversy on that point. This court has, instead of dismissing the appeal as it should have done if it was deemed fatally defective, entertained it, considered the case on its merits and now affirms the decree.
Restoration of the premises is, as I have said, an incident to the remedy. The remedy of the grantee of the baseless title in such a case would seem to be an action against his grantor to recover the consideration paid.
The proper order would be to reverse the decree of the Circuit Court, and to direct-that the original decree be reversed, and the original bill dismissed, and for a restoration of the possession of the premises.