Court Opinion

ID: 9557448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:20.160937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.542960
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in the result) — This case poses an old, philosophically debatable, problem. It involves a head-on collision between two diametrically opposite opinions or ideas as to moral values.
The problem may be dramatically illuminated by the following: (1) Is war and the killing of human beings therein moral or immoral? (2) Is (a) refusal to bear arms for one’s own country, or alternatively, (b) refusal to serve in a work or labor camp in time of war, moral or immoral?
On the one hand, emphasizing patriotism, majority rule and welfare in a democratic society such as ours, there is the view, held by most citizens, that all have a duty or obligation — in essence a moral or morally defensible one— to support and defend our country in time of war. Contrariwise, underlining good faith matters of individual conscience or religion, there is the view held by Mr. Brooks (the applicant herein) and, generally, by conscientious objectors that (paraphrasing Voltaire) the killing of human beings in wartime is immoral, and nonetheless murder, *70despite the numbers involved and the sound of trumpets.
The fact that the differing viewpoints are by their proponents held most strongly and in good faith, and that each view can be rationalized in terms of well meaning, constructive social objectives, complicates rather than simplifies the problem.
Generally speaking, in a legal context of standard and orthodox dimensions, recognition of an inconsistency in moral values may seem surprising, with even an appearance or sound of strangeness. However, in terms of common experience, differences of opinion as to moral values actually should not seem too surprising. In any event, with the problem in this appeal in the above-indicated posture, it follows that it is not one to be resolved by reference to absolute or objective standards; nor is it a matter of compromise and attempting to work out a nice balance between competing or conflicting ideas. The case simply has no easy, black-or-white solution. Decision requires a clear-cut choice and approval of one or the other of two inconsistent moral values, each having strong, persuasive, emotional overtones. In other words, I am convinced that the decisional function herein is purely and simply a matter of value emphasis and personal judgment. While philosophical discussion can be intense and spirited, usually stress and strain, in terms of conscience, emotions, and personal responsibility, is minimal. In contrast, judicial decision herein has been most troublesome for me, in terms of conscience, emotions, and personal responsibility, and I daresay for other members of this court.
In the instant case it is clear that the applicant, Robert Boland Brooks, has for many years, as a matter of conscience or religion, been opposed to war and military service, labor, or work camps, and to conscription of any kind in times of war. During World War II, he made his position known forthrightly and unequivocally to his local draft board and to the local office of the United States district attorney. He did register for the draft; but, when ordered to report for his physical examination, he refused to comply and duly notified the draft board of his intention. He was, *71in fact, classified as a conscientious objector (4-E) by his local draft board. Thereafter, he was ordered to report to a, labor camp for conscientious objectors which was maintained under the selective service system at Mancos, Colorado. Mr. Brooks again forthrightly advised both his draft board and the United States attorney’s office that he would not comply with the order. Thereupon, he was indicted and convicted for violation of the selective service act. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction (Brooks v. United States, 147 F. (2d) 134); and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (324 U. S. 878, 89 L. Ed. 1430, 65 S. Ct. 1027). It should be pointed out that Mr. Brooks was convicted not because he refused to serve in the armed forces of his country, but solely because of his refusal to report to the wartime labor or work camp for conscientious objectors.
At the time of trial, Mr. Brooks waived a jury. His only defense was that the selective service act, which he admitted having violated, contravened what he conceived to be his constitutional rights. He made a formal statement, setting forth his reasons for refusing to report to the Colorado work camp, saying among other things:
“I do not believe that under the Constitution Congress has the right to deny freedom of conscience, or to compel men to do an act which their conscience tells them is morally wrong.” (Italics mine.)
Incidentally, he further stated that he hoped to convince others, by his example, to share his views.
Finally, at the hearing before the board of Governors of the State Bar Association on his application for admission to the practice of law in the state of Washington, Mr. Brooks, in effect, represented that he did not think the situation which confronted him during World War II could occur again because of his age, and otherwise; but, if it should, he felt that his course of conduct would likely be the same as before, although his experience in prison (upon his conviction he served twenty-two months of a three-year sentence) was one he would not wish to undergo again.
*72As will be gathered from the foregoing, our task is to determine whether Mr. Brooks’ conduct and attitude, and his felony conviction for violating the Selective Service Act, disqualifies him on moral grounds for the practice of law in this state.
The authority of this court to promulgate rules setting forth the qualifications to be met by an applicant for the practice of law in this state is unquestioned. Of course, the qualifications set forth must bear some rational connection to the applicant’s overall fitness for the practice. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico (1957), 353 U. S. 232, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 796, 77 S. Ct. 752, 64 A. L. R. (2d) 288.
The dissenting opinion herein states the case for Mr. Brooks, in terms of positive moral values, as strongly as could be done. It refers to the history of conscientious objection to war in our country. In effect, the dissent concludes that good faith matters of conscience supervene and transcend policy and law of temporal governments; that conscientious objection to war, and conduct patterned accordingly, is not immoral, but, on the contrary, is highly moral in nature. I certainly can understand and wish for the universal acceptance, application and legal validity of this point of view. However, the dissent’s thesis is the statement of an ideal, which, unfortunately, has not yet been achieved. We do not live as individuals; nor do nations exist in an ideal world society, free from war, controlled and ordered by an ideally conceived world rule of law.
The Selective Service Act accorded to Mr. Brooks the status of a conscientious objector. As a matter of national policy, it excused him from compulsory military service. However, the act did not excuse him, as a matter of policy or otherwise, from noncompliance with its conditional requirement that he report to a work camp for conscientious objectors. This conditional requirement was, I think, under all the circumstances, a reasonable, rational, and even a morally justifiable one. The Selective Service Act actually did not outlaw Mr. Brooks’ freedom of belief; in fact, in *73giving him the status of a conscientious objector and excusing him from compulsory military service, the act recognized his freedom of belief and, I think, provided reasonable latitude relative to action and conduct. In my judgment, with emphasis on the practicabilities of the far-from-ideal world society in which we live, the refusal of Mr. Brooks to comply with the conditional requirement of the act— that he report to a work camp — was unreasonable and not morally justifiable. Furthermore, I believe a rational connection exists between Mr. Brooks’ conduct and his fitness to practice law. At the same time, I cannot agree with the rather broad implication of the majority opinion that a conscientious objector per se is morally unfit to practice law in this state.
The crux of this matter as I see it is Mr. Brooks’ past and present basic position — that the government cannot compel him to do any act which, in terms of conscience or religious concepts, he personally believes to be morally wrong — manifested by (a) his affirmative conduct in refusing to report to the work camp in Colorado when ordered so to do, (b) his felony conviction, and (c) his current affirmation of views and previous conduct, evidenced by testimony at the hearing before the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association.
Undoubtedly, under the advocacy concept of our legal system, attorneys are expected to question and, in a sense, to oppose government policies and law in a legal, orderly manner in seeking to protect either their own personal interests or those of their clients. However, at the same time, members of the legal profession are officers of our courts. As such they, perhaps more than other citizens, have a basic duty of obedience to the law and a fundamental obligation to sustain and support the government of which they are citizens — particularly in times of national emergency.
In my best judgment, Mr. Brooks has, by his attitude and conduct (evidenced by the record), demonstrated traits of character which do not have to be approved and countenanced by the members of the legal profession of our *74state. I believe that, under the “rational connection” test announced in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, supra, the particular traits of character displayed by Mr. Brooks disqualify him for the practice of law in the state of Washington.
Parenthetically, or by way of epilogue: If, as understandably may happen, this matter should be the subject of further appellate review by the United States Supreme Court, we, as a state court, shall of course accede to the resolution of this matter as reached in that court. However, in my opinion, one would be hard put to find any significant basis for making a distinction between the nature of the judicial function here and there, insofar as the instant case is concerned. In other words, review on the merits would simply mean nothing more than a substitution of personal value emphasis and judgment by a majority of the members of the United States Supreme Court for the personal value emphasis and judgment of a majority of the members of our own state supreme court. Lastly, if there should be further appellate review, it can be hoped that the result, whatever it is, may be articulated as realistically as has been attempted herein.
On the basis indicated hereinbefore, I concur in the disposition of this matter recommended by the Board of Governors, and in the result reached in the majority opinion.