Court Opinion

ID: 9712369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:52:27.465477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.666016
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
dissents with opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the trial court erred in denying Young's motion to discharge made pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C).
I believe that the time period from December 22, 1999, to June 18, 2000, is not chargeable against the Criminal Rule 4(C) one-year time limitation. Criminal Rule 4(A) and (C) provide that "a trial court may take note of congestion or an emer-geney without the necessity of a motion, and upon so finding may order a continuance." It is apparent from the record that the trial court continued Young's criminal case by "taking note" of court congestion. However, the trial court failed to adhere to the prerequisite for the tolling of the Criminal Rule 4 timetable in a criminal case which has been continued by the trial court "taking note" of court congestion. Criminal Rule 4(A) and (C) further provide that "[alny continuance granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial within a reasonable time." In the present case, the trial court failed to issue an order and the docket is silent as to why Young's trial did not commence on April 4, 2000.
However, I believe that the facts and cireumstances support the finding that the trial court adhered to the mandates of Criminal Rule 4. The State's April 6, 2000, motion references the fact that the trial court calendar was congested on April 4, 2000, and that said congestion was the result of a different trial commencing on that date. See Appellee's Appendix at 1. On the date the State filed the motion to reset, the CCS indicates that the trial court reset Young's criminal trial for June 13, 2000. I have no doubt that the trial court relied upon the State's motion when resetting Young' criminal trial for June 13, 2000. It follows that Young's trial did not commence on April 4, 2000, because of court congestion as referenced in the State's motion. Therefore, I find that the substance of the State's motion was essentially "adopted" by the trial court when it continued Young's criminal trial, This inference coupled with the CCS entry noting that the trial court reset Young's trial for June 13, 2000, leads me to the conclusion that the trial court complied with the requirements of Criminal Rule 4 when continuing Young's trial by "taking note" of court congestion. Therefore, I believe that the Criminal Rule 4 timetable for bringing Young to trial was tolled for the period from April 4, 2000, to June 13, 2000, a total of seventy days.8
*681I agree with the majority opinion that the time period from June 13, 2000, to the date the case was reset for trial, March 6, 2001, a period of 266 days, is chargeable to the State and counted against Criminal Rule 4(C)'s one-year time limitation. Because I believe that the period from April 4, 2000, to June 13, 2000, was tolled, the March 6, 2001, trial setting was five days outside the one-year period of Criminal Rule 4(C). Young filed with the trial court his motion to discharge on February 22, 2001. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Young's motion. Although Young filed the motion to discharge within the "technical" time period of Criminal Rule 4(C), I believe 'that he waived his right to discharge under this rule because he did not object to the trial date at the "earliest opportunity."
In order to hamper and discourage the practice by defense attorneys of waiting until last minute to file a motion to discharge, the Indiana Supreme Court has provided that:
It is well settled that a defendant is not required to take affirmative action to obtain a trial date within the period set by [Criminal Rule 4(C)]. However, when, prior to the expiration of the period set by the rule, the court sets a trial date which is beyond that period and the defendant is or should be aware that the setting is beyond that period, it is his obligation to object at the earliest opportunity so that the court can reset the trial for a date within the proper period. If the defendant sits idly by at a time when the court could yet grant him a trial within the proper period and permits the court, without objection, to set a date beyond that period, he will be deemed to have acquiesced therein. By failing to object at the earliest opportunity, defendant waived his right to be discharged under [Criminal Rule 4(C) ].
Little v. State, 275 Ind. 78, 415 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind.1981) (citations omitted). Thus, a defendant is required to object to a trial date that is set beyond the applicable time limitation and the objection must be made at the "earliest opportunity" in order that the trial court may reschedule the trial within the applicable time period of Criminal Rule 4. Id; see also Utterback v. State, 261 Ind. 685, 810 N.E.2d 552, 554 (1974) (defendant must call the improper trial date to the court's attention "in time to permit a correction"); Rhoton v. State, 575 N.E.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied.
The trial court reset Young's criminal trial on January 5, 2001. Young waited until February 22, 2001, or forty-eight days, before he filed with the trial court his motion to discharge. The date he filed the motion to discharge was only five working days from the expiration of the one-year period under Criminal Rule 4(C). Therefore, I believe that Young failed to object at the "earliest opportunity" and thus, waived his right to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court properly denied Young's motion to discharge.

. Although I believe the facts and circumstances of the present case support the inference that the trial court essentially "adopted" the substance of the State's motion to reset ' when continuing Young's trial, I do not condone this practice and strongly encourage a trial court to enter its own order when continuing a criminal trial by "taking note" of court congestion. Because of the simple nature of such court orders, I do not deem such a requirement that a court enter an order explaining the reason for continuing a criminal trial unduly oppressive. A trial court's strict adherence to the procedural dictates of *681Criminal Rule 4 in granting a continuance will help prevent future problems at both the trial and appellate level. Nonetheless, under the facts and circumstances of this case, I believe find that the Criminal Rule 4 timetable for bringing Young to trial was tolled for the period from April 4, 2000, to June 13, 2000.