Court Opinion

ID: 9648043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:00:22.526474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:55.306672
License: Public Domain

HUTSON-DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
• I dissent. The majority finds that the police reports attached to the Hartsfields’ *152summary judgment response did not controvert McRee Ford’s summary judgment evidence that it had taken reasonable precautions to prevent automobile theft. Therefore, the majority finds that Mitchell Dale’s affidavit for McRee Ford conclusively negated an essential element of the negligence upon which the Hartsfields’ cause of action rested. I disagree. Considering the summary judgment evidence in a light most favorable to the Hartsfields, Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt, 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985), I believe that McRee Ford has not conclusively proven that its security measures rendered it unforeseeable that an unknown person or persons would steal an automobile from the dealership and injure an innocent third party by negligently operating the automobile.
I. Facts
As noted by the majority, the Hartsfields’ cause of action rested on the assertion that McRee Ford was negligent and grossly negligent. McRee Ford moved for summary judgment and contended that it had evidence to conclusively disprove the following elements of the Hartsfields’ cause of action: (1) a legal duty owed to the Hartsfields; and (2) damages proximately caused by its alleged breach of a duty to the Hartsfields. McRee Ford’s summary judgment evidence consisted of an affidavit of Mitchell Dale, general manager of the dealership, detailing the security measures that McRee Ford employed both prior to and at the time of the accident in question. Dale asserted that, in light of the cumulative deterrent effect of these measures and the presence of other people on the dealership lot at the time the automobile in question was stolen, it was not reasonably foreseeable that an unknown person would steal an automobile.
In response to McRee Ford’s motion for summary judgment, the Hartsfields attached 19 police reports detailing prior criminal incidents regarding vehicles at the McRee Ford dealership between April 1987 and September 1991. Eleven of these reports involved incidents that occurred before February 17, 1991, the date the automobile was stolen that was involved in the accident resulting in Shawn Michelle Hartsfield’s death. The incidents recorded in these reports included burglary, attempted burglary, theft, and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The Harts-fields contended in their response that the occurrence of these incidents, despite McRee Ford’s security measures, made McRee aware that its security precautions were inadequate to prevent the theft and subsequent misuse of its vehicles.
II. Analysis
McRee Ford moved for summary judgment on the basis that it owed no duty to the Hartsfields, and its conduct, even if negligent, was not the proximate cause of Shawn Michelle Hartsfield’s death. The determinative factor regarding both duty and proximate cause in a negligence case is foreseeability. See Midkiff v. Hines, 866 S.W.2d 328, 331-33 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). Therefore, in my view, the question that must be answered in deciding whether the trial court erred in granting McRee Ford’s motion for summary judgment is this: Despite the security measures that McRee Ford took to prevent theft of its automobiles, did the police reports introduced by the Hartsfields raise a material fact issue as to whether McRee Ford’s measures were reasonable? I believe the police reports raised such a fact issue, and the proper forum for deciding whether McRee Ford’s security measures were adequate is a trial on the merits.
Generally, a thief s criminal act in stealing a car is a superseding cause of harm that relieves the owner of liability for negligent operation of the car by the thief, even when the owner’s conduct created a situation that gave the thief an opportunity to commit the crime. Stephens v. Crowder Inv., Inc., 841 S.W.2d 947, 948-49 (Tex.App.-Waco 1992, no writ); Simmons v. Flores, 838 S.W.2d 287, 288 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Wolf v. Friedman Steel Sales, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 669, 672 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, if the owner, from his conduct, knew or should have known that a third person might take advantage of the opportunity to commit such a crime, he may be liable. Stephens, 841 *153S.W.2d at 949; Simmons, 838 S.W.2d at 288; see also Bicknell v. Lloyd, 635 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) (evidence supported finding that owner of cart should have reasonably foreseen unauthorized use of vehicle by children in the area, and that harm was likely to result from its use unless key was removed from ignition switch). The owner’s potential liability hinges on whether, under the facts and circumstances surrounding the location and the conduct, a prudent person would have behaved more cautiously than the owner and could have foreseen that to act, or fail to act, as the owner did could result in the theft of the automobile and subsequent damage to a third party. Simmons, 838 S.W.2d at 289; see also Finnigan v. Blanco County, 670 S.W.2d 313, 317-18 (Tex.App.-Austin 1984, no writ); Bicknell, 635 S.W.2d at 152. Evidence that may support a finding of negligence and foreseeability when the act that causes the harm is a third party’s intentional or criminal act includes the following: (1) the act occurred in a high-crime area; (2) the place where the act occurred had been the site of thefts or previous crimes; or (3) the place where the act occurred was unprotected and susceptible to criminal acts. Simmons, 838 S.W.2d at 289; see also Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550; Stephens, 841 S.W.2d at 949.
The police reports tendered by the Harts-fields as summary judgment evidence describe numerous instances of criminal incidents involving automobiles at the McRee Ford dealership.1 I would find that these reports raised an issue of material fact as to whether McRee Ford’s security measures were reasonable in light of the continuing occurrence of crime on McRee Ford’s lot despite such measures. The majority avoids this issue by stating that “nothing in the police reports indicates that identical or similar security measures were in effect at the time of the other instances of auto theft from McRee Ford.” However, Mitchell Dale’s own affidavit states that McRee Ford had always taken every possible precaution to protect its inventory of automobiles from theft, both prior to and at the time of the automobile accident in question. (Emphasis added.)
Issues such as reasonableness and foreseeability are fact sensitive, and therefore, inherently issues for a jury to decide. Hunsucker v. Omega Indus., 659 S.W.2d 692, 698 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1983, no writ.) In Hun-sucker, a case factually similar to the present case, the court stated:
[U]nder certain circumstances leaving the keys in the ignition of a vehicle in a locked garage may be negligence, depending upon all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. On the other hand, after all of the facts and circumstances have been developed, a court may conclude, as a matter of law, that no negligence existed. Because of variations of the circumstances which may be shown at a trial on the merits, summary judgment is rarely justified in such eases.
Id. If McRee Ford were to present evidence at trial establishing the facts detailed in Dale’s affidavit, I am aware that a jury could reasonably find that McRee Ford’s security measures were adequate, and thus it was not reasonably foreseeable that a third party would steal an automobile and injure someone by negligently operating the automobile. However, in light of the summary judgment evidence before the trial court, ie., the 19 police reports attached to the Hartsfields’ summary judgment response, I believe that this is an issue of material fact within the province of the jury.
I would reverse the take-nothing summary judgment and remand this case for trial.

. Although not all of the reported incidents involve automobile theft, this is irrelevant in determining whether McRee Ford’s measures were reasonable. In order for a defendant to be held liable to a plaintiff for the intentional or criminal act of a third party, it is not required that the particular accident complained of should have been foreseen. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 550-51. Rather, all that is required is the following: (1) the injury must be of such general character as might reasonably have been anticipated; and (2) the injured party must be situated with relation to the wrongful act such that injury to him or someone similarly situated could have reasonably been foreseen. Id. at 551.