Court Opinion

ID: 9840581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 15:01:19.121638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:36:01.645331
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1133    Document: 32    Page: 1   Filed: 09/19/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                JASON ANTOINE BROCK,
                       Petitioner

                            v.

       DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                        2023-1133
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-0752-20-0542-M-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: September 19, 2023
                  ______________________

   FLORENCE M. JOHNSON, Johnson and Johnson, PC,
 Memphis, TN, for petitioner.

     DANIEL BERTONI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

     Before DYK, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
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 2                  BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 PER CURIAM.
     Mr. Jason Brock worked for the Department of Trans-
 portation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an
 Airway Transportation Systems Specialist (ATSS) at the
 Nashville System Support Center before the FAA removed
 him for insubordination. Mr. Brock appealed to the Merit
 Systems Protection Board, disputing the charge of insubor-
 dination, alleging that the FAA’s removal was retaliatory,
 and alleging harmful procedural error. The Board affirmed
 the FAA’s decision. For the reasons below, we affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
      Mr. Brock began his federal service in 2006 and most
 recently held the position of ATSS. As an ATSS, Mr. Brock
 was expected to maintain FAA buildings, roads, and
 grounds. Mr. Brock’s disciplinary history includes a 12-
 day suspension for misusing a government credit card; a 5-
 day suspension for failing to follow instructions (specifi-
 cally, failing to complete driver’s training); and a 30-day 1
 suspension for negligent work performance and giving in-
 accurate information in a government record. On April 10,
 2020, the FAA issued a proposed removal letter to
 Mr. Brock, providing two specifications to support a charge
 of insubordination. Brock v. Dep’t of Transp., 2022 MSPB
 LEXIS 3305, at *2 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 31, 2022) (Decision).
     In the first specification, the agency alleged that
 Mr. Wesley Ivory—Mr. Brock’s first-level supervisor—had
 instructed Mr. Brock to purchase lights and to replace
 emergency lighting. Mr. Brock objected because he be-
 lieved this task was outside the scope of his duties, but of-
 fered to “carry out [the] request on overtime.” J.A. 382.

     1    Management officials later reduced this suspen-
 sion to fourteen days. J.A. 152.
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                     3

 Mr. Brock did not purchase the emergency lighting or re-
 place the emergency lighting.
     For the second specification, the agency alleged that
 Mr. Ivory instructed Mr. Brock to troubleshoot the lighting
 system on a landing runway and update the control center
 accordingly. J.A. 386. Mr. Brock responded that because
 he had not passed the theory requirement for the lighting
 system, he would not troubleshoot the lighting system.
 J.A. 387. Mr. Ivory explained that troubleshooting the
 lighting system was within the scope of Mr. Brock’s duties
 in accordance with FAA Order 6000.15 and again directed
 Mr. Brock to troubleshoot the lighting system. Decision
 at *9–10; J.A. 389–90. Mr. Brock did not comply with this
 instruction. Based on these two specifications, Mr. Eric Al-
 exander, the deciding official, determined that removal was
 the appropriate penalty. After considering Mr. Brock’s re-
 sponse, Mr. Alexander sustained Mr. Brock’s removal, ef-
 fective May 20, 2020.
      Mr. Brock appealed to the Board, disputing the charge
 of insubordination, also arguing that the FAA retaliated
 against him for his protected whistleblowing disclosures
 and that the FAA had committed harmful procedural er-
 ror. 2
     The Board sustained the insubordination charge. Re-
 garding Mr. Brock’s whistleblower defense, the Board ex-
 plained the burden-shifting framework for whistleblower
 cases:
    To prove a prima facie case of retaliation for whis-
    tleblowing or other protected activity, the

    2    Mr. Brock also claimed the FAA had removed him
 based on his race, religion, gender, age, and previous Title
 VII activity. Decision at *24. The Board rejected this de-
 fense. Id. at *24–28. Mr. Brock does not challenge the
 Board’s determination in this regard.
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 4                  BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

     appellant must prove by preponderant evidence
     that: (a) he engaged in activity protected by
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D);
     and (b) it was a contributing factor in the personnel
     action being appealed. If the appellant meets this
     burden, the agency must prove by clear and con-
     vincing evidence that it would have taken the same
     action even absent the disclosure or other protected
     activity. In determining whether the agency has
     proven by clear and convincing evidence that it
     would have taken the same action against the ap-
     pellant in the absence of this protected activity, the
     Board and its reviewing court have stated that they
     will consider all of the relevant factors, includ-
     ing: 1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in
     support of its action; 2) the existence and strength
     of any motive to retaliate on the part of agency of-
     ficials involved in the decision; and 3) any evidence
     that the agency takes similar actions against em-
     ployees who are not whistleblowers but who are
     otherwise similarly situated.
 Decision at *13–14 (citations omitted).
     The Board then found that the first of the six alleged
 protected disclosures was indeed protected. By email dated
 February 7, 2020, Mr. Brock disclosed to management that
 a coworker had told a contractor to “shut up.” J.A. 83. For
 this single protected disclosure, the Board determined that
 Mr. Brock had proved that it was a factor contributing to
 the agency’s decision to remove him because it occurred
 close in time to Mr. Alexander’s decision to remove
 Mr. Brock. In determining whether the FAA had proved
 by clear and convincing evidence that it would have re-
 moved Mr. Brock in the absence of his disclosure, the
 Board considered the seriousness of the insubordination in
 light of the FAA’s ability to carry out its objectives;
 Mr. Brock’s disciplinary history; the potential for retalia-
 tory motive; and the FAA’s actions against “employees with
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                     5

 a prior disciplinary history who were not whistleblowers.”
 Decision at *16–17. The Board concluded that the FAA
 proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
 removed Mr. Brock in the absence of his protected disclo-
 sure. For each of the remaining five allegedly protected
 disclosures, the Board determined either that it was not
 protected or that Mr. Brock had not shown that it was a
 contributing factor to his removal.
      The Board also considered Mr. Brock’s defense that the
 FAA committed harmful procedural error by “mis-
 appl[ying] Executive Order 13839 in effectuating his re-
 moval,” “assign[ing] him the tasks which were the subject
 of its insubordination charges,” and “violat[ing] its proce-
 dures by charging him with insubordination instead of fail-
 ure to follow instructions.” Decision at *22–24. The Board
 explained that there was no evidence that the agency relied
 on Executive Order 13,839, that Mr. Brock failed to specify
 which agency procedures were allegedly violated by assign-
 ing him the particular tasks, and that no agency procedure
 prohibited the insubordination charge in favor of failure to
 follow instructions. The Board thus did not find this de-
 fense persuasive.
      Turning to whether the agency’s removal decision “pro-
 motes the efficiency of the service,” the Board found that
 there was a nexus between the removal and promoting the
 efficiency of the FAA’s service. The Board found the nexus
 “self-evident” because the insubordination “took place at
 work.” Id. at *28.
     Finally, the Board analyzed the reasonableness of re-
 moval in light of the relevant factors set forth in Douglas
 v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981). Id.
 at *28–30 (citing Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 331–33). The
 Board considered and credited Mr. Alexander’s testimony
 that Mr. Brock’s insubordination was “serious, intentional,
 and repeated” and hindered the FAA’s operation; that
 other insubordinate employees had been removed and
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 6                  BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 removal was in the agency’s table of penalties; that
 Mr. Brock’s repeated misconduct and lack of remorse
 showed his inability to be rehabilitated; and that Mr. Alex-
 ander had not considered suspension—rather than re-
 moval—due to past discipline. Id. at *29. The Board also
 noted that Mr. Alexander believed Mr. Brock’s fourteen
 years of service was a mitigating factor, but this was out-
 weighed by the other Douglas factors. The Board accord-
 ingly affirmed the FAA’s action.
    Mr. Brock timely appeals under 5 U.S.C. § 7703. We
 have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its
 fact findings for substantial evidence. See Smith v. Gen.
 Servs. Admin., 930 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2019). “To
 determine whether substantial evidence supports the
 Board, we must determine whether ‘considering the record
 as a whole, the agency’s evidence is sufficient to be found
 by a reasonable factfinder to meet the [agency’s] eviden-
 tiary burden.’” Id. at 1367 (quoting Leatherbury v. Dep’t of
 the Army, 524 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). The
 Board’s decision must be affirmed unless it is found to be
 “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
 not in accordance with law”; “obtained without procedures
 required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed”;
 “or unsupported by substantial evidence.”           5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c).
      On appeal, Mr. Brock argues that the Board erred
 by: (1) sustaining the two specifications of the agency’s in-
 subordination charge; (2) concluding he failed to prove his
 affirmative defense of retaliation; (3) concluding that he
 failed to prove his affirmative defense of harmful proce-
 dural error; (4) finding a nexus between the insubordina-
 tion charge and Mr. Brock’s ability to accomplish his
 duties; and (5) determining that removal was a reasonable
 penalty. We address each argument in turn.
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                      7

                               I
     We first address Mr. Brock’s argument that the Board
 erred in sustaining the FAA’s charge of insubordination.
 We review the Board’s decision to sustain such charges for
 substantial evidence. See Bieber v. Dep’t of Army, 287 F.3d
 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Insubordination is “a willful
 and intentional refusal to obey an authorized order of a su-
 perior officer which the officer is entitled to have obeyed.”
 Phillips v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 878 F.2d 370, 373 (Fed. Cir.
 1989) (emphasis omitted). The “obey now, grieve later”
 rule states that “government employees may not refuse to
 do work merely because of disagreements with manage-
 ment and failure to perform their duties is done at the risk
 of being insubordinate.” Bigelow v. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
 Servs., 750 F.2d 962, 965 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (cleaned up); see
 Larson v. Dep’t of Army, 260 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
 2001). The two recognized exceptions to this rule are
 when: (1) an order places an employee in a dangerous sit-
 uation; and (2) when an order to make a disclosure would
 cause irreparable harm. In addition, personnel action may
 not be taken against an employee for “refusing to obey an
 order that would require the individual to violate a law,
 rule, or regulation.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D).
     The FAA supported its charge of insubordination with
 two specifications. We address the Board’s analysis of each
 specification in turn.
                              A
     The first specification alleges that on February 19,
 2020, Mr. Ivory verbally instructed Mr. Brock to purchase
 LED emergency lights and replace emergency lighting at
 the air traffic control tower. The next day, Mr. Ivory
 emailed this instruction to Mr. Brock with a deadline of
 February 27, 2020, along with the advisement that “failure
 or delay in completing this assignment could result in dis-
 ciplinary action.” Decision at *4. Mr. Brock did not pur-
 chase or install the lights.
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 8                 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

     As the Board correctly noted, because there was no dis-
 pute that Mr. Brock’s supervisor gave him an instruction
 which he intentionally failed to obey, “the only question is
 whether the agency order was proper.” Id. at *6. In con-
 sidering the propriety of the order, the Board relied on
 Mr. Ivory’s testimony that: following an Occupational
 Safety and Health Administration inspection that found
 some emergency lights out of service, he decided to upgrade
 the lights and fixtures; he instructed Mr. Brock with the
 assistance of a colleague to purchase and install these
 lights; Mr. Brock responded that such tasks were not
 within his job scope; Mr. Brock offered to perform these
 tasks if he was paid overtime; operational risk manage-
 ment (ORM) was only necessary where harm was likely to
 result from the task; and ORM was unnecessary because
 the instruction would merely require turning off the power
 and replacing the lights, “a procedure which all environ-
 mental specialists knew to safely execute.” Id. at *6–8.
 The Board considered Mr. Brock’s explanations as to why
 he was entitled to disobey—the task was outside the scope
 of his duties; he was too busy; he had no assistance; and
 there was no ORM for the task—found that based on
 Mr. Ivory’s testimony, the task was not dangerous and thus
 did not fall within that exception to the “obey now, grieve
 later” rule.
     On appeal, Mr. Brock argues that the Board “improp-
 erly discounted” his testimony and should have discounted
 Mr. Ivory’s testimony. Appellant Br. 11, 13–14. Mr. Brock
 further argues he should be protected under the Follow the
 Rules Act of 2017 because following Mr. Ivory’s order would
 have required him to violate a law, rule, or regulation. Ap-
 pellant Br. 9. We disagree. The Board was entitled to
 weigh the evidence in reaching its fact findings, which we
 review for substantial evidence. Here, the Board consid-
 ered both Mr. Brock’s and Mr. Ivory’s testimony and, based
 on that testimony, found that the task assigned was not
 dangerous. The Board emphasized Mr. Brock’s testimony
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                        9

 that he did not perform the task because it was outside the
 scope of his duties. After reviewing the record, we conclude
 that substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that
 the task was not dangerous, and that Mr. Brock has failed
 to show that performing the task would have required him
 to violate a law, rule, or regulation. Accordingly, we affirm
 the Board’s finding that Mr. Brock’s intentional refusal to
 perform this task was insubordinate.
                               B
     The second specification alleges that on March 12,
 2020, Mr. Ivory directed Mr. Brock to “troubleshoot and re-
 port an update to Atlantic Operations Control Center
 (AOCC) on the UQU Approach Lighting System (ALS) Re-
 mote Monitoring and Logging System (RMLS) no later
 than 14:00 CST,” but Mr. Brock “did not comply with the
 directive.” Decision at *8–9.
       In finding that the FAA had proven that Mr. Brock
 failed to carry out an instruction, the Board relied on
 Mr. Ivory’s testimony that: an ALS on a runway helps pi-
 lots find the runway on approach for landing; “UQU” iden-
 tifies the runway on which these ALS lights are located;
 Mr. Ivory assigned Mr. Brock the task of troubleshooting
 the ALS at UQU monitoring and logging system to find the
 cause of the malfunction, which he believed was due to “a
 blown light bulb or a loose battery”; Mr. Brock refused be-
 cause he was not certified to work on the system; Mr. Ivory
 responded to Mr. Brock that Mr. Brock was certified and
 therefore should perform the instruction. Id. at *9–10.
 Again, the Board found, based on Mr. Brock’s “statements
 . . . expressly refusing to obey his supervisor’s instruction,”
 that Mr. Brock’s failure to obey was “intentional.” Id.
 at *10.
      In assessing whether the instruction was improper—
 i.e., would have placed Mr. Brock in danger or would have
 required Mr. Brock to violate a law, rule, or regulation—
 the Board considered Mr. Brock’s contention that he lacked
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 10                  BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 certification on the “Airflow” system; evidence that the ALS
 system was a “Godfrey” system with Airflow components,
 that Mr. Brock was certified to work on Godfrey systems,
 and that Mr. Brock had previously worked on Airflow sys-
 tems; and Mr. Alexander’s testimony that Mr. Brock could
 safely troubleshoot the system without certification, that
 the Godfrey system at issue having an Airflow component
 does not require Airflow certification, and that Mr. Brock
 “had previously worked on this very system in May of
 2019.” Id. at *11–12. The Board also considered the FAA
 rule pertaining to maintenance duties:
      Maintenance personnel without active certification
      authority may perform maintenance and logging
      duties. If these duties affect a certification param-
      eter, an ATSS with active certification authority
      must follow up with the appropriate certification.
 Id. at *12 (quoting FAA Order 6000.15H § 5-5(d)). The
 Board ultimately found that “no evidence” showed that
 Mr. Brock would have been in a dangerous situation, that
 the “obey now, grieve later” rule applied, and that
 Mr. Brock’s intentional refusal to perform the instruction
 was insubordinate. Id. at *12–13; see Larson, 260 F.3d
 at 1354 n.3.
     The above-described record evidence is sufficient to be
 found by a reasonable factfinder to demonstrate that the
 instruction was proper (i.e., not dangerous and did not re-
 quire Mr. Brock to violate a law, rule, or regulation).
 Smith, 930 F.3d at 1367; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(D). As such,
 we conclude that substantial evidence supports the Board’s
 finding that, for the second specification, the agency proved
 that Mr. Brock’s failure to follow instructions to trouble-
 shoot the ALS and report an update was insubordination.
                           *   *   *
     Substantial evidence therefore supports the Board’s
 decision to sustain the FAA’s charge of insubordination.
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                     11

                              II
      We now address Mr. Brock’s arguments regarding his
 affirmative defense of retaliation. Before the Board,
 Mr. Brock alleged he had made six protected disclosures to
 the FAA. On appeal, he challenges the Board’s determina-
 tions regarding three of these disclosures. First, on Febru-
 ary 7, 2020, Mr. Brock reported to management about a
 colleague, Mr. Phillips, telling a contractor to “shut up” in
 violation of agency policy to treat others with decorum (dis-
 courtesy disclosure). Decision at *15. In another disclo-
 sure, Mr. Brock alleges he disclosed the requirement of an
 ORM concerning the instruction in the first specification of
 the insubordination charge (ORM disclosure). Finally,
 Mr. Brock emailed Mr. Ivory on February 24, 2020, alleg-
 ing that Mr. Phillips was “sabotaging” his work and gear
 (sabotage disclosure). Id. at *21.
      On appeal, Mr. Brock specifically argues that (1) the
 Board erred when it “inexplicably” determined that the
 agency would have removed Mr. Brock even absent the dis-
 courtesy disclosure; (2) Mr. Brock should be “given the ben-
 efit of a ruling in his favor” as to the ORM disclosure
 because all but one of the lights were operational; and
 (3) as to the sabotage disclosure, the Board should have re-
 viewed the entire timeline for context as to the alleged sab-
 otage. 3 Appellant Br. 14–17. We find these arguments
 unavailing.

     3   Mr. Brock also challenges the Board’s credibility
 determinations in the whistleblower analysis as violative
 of Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458
 (1987). Appellant Br. 11–13, 18. The Board need not thor-
 oughly and explicitly discuss Hillen in every decision. See
 Joseph v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 497 F. App’x 26, 28
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 12                 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

                               A
     We start with Mr. Brock’s argument that the Board
 “inexplicably” determined that the agency met its burden
 to show it had removed Mr. Brock even in the absence of
 the discourtesy disclosure. Because substantial evidence
 supports the Board’s determination that the FAA showed
 independent causation by clear and convincing evidence,
 we affirm.
     The Whistleblower Protection Act prohibits retaliation
 against an employee for whistleblowing. See 5 U.S.C.
 § 2302(b)(8). An employee who believes he was subjected
 to prohibited retaliatory action must prove by a preponder-
 ance of the evidence that he made a protected disclosure
 that contributed to the agency’s action against him. See
 Smith, 930 F.3d at 1365. “If the employee establishes this
 prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing, the burden
 of persuasion shifts to the agency to show by clear and con-
 vincing evidence that it would have taken ‘the same per-
 sonnel action in the absence of such disclosure.’” Whitmore
 v. Dep’t of Lab., 680 F.3d 1353, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quot-
 ing 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)).
     In determining whether the FAA has met its burden of
 showing by clear and convincing evidence it would have
 taken the same action in the absence of the whistleblowing
 disclosure, we have instructed the Board to consider three
 nonexclusive factors:
      [1] the strength of the agency’s evidence in support
      of its personnel action; [2] the existence and
      strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of
      the agency officials who were involved in the deci-
      sion; and [3] any evidence that the agency takes

 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have not required a formalistic dis-
 cussion of the Hillen factors in every Board decision.”).
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                     13

     similar actions against employees who are not
     whistleblowers but who are otherwise similarly sit-
     uated.
 Carr v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
 1999).
     Here, the first Carr factor—the strength of the agency’s
 evidence in support of its action—requires an analysis of
 the strength of the FAA’s evidence purporting to show in-
 dependent cause for Mr. Brock’s removal. See Miller
 v. Dep’t of Just., 842 F.3d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The
 Board considered the seriousness of insubordination on the
 FAA’s ability to operate efficiently, which it characterized
 as “quite strong” evidence, and Mr. Brock’s prior discipli-
 nary history. Decision at *16–17. Based on this record, we
 conclude that substantial evidence—including Mr. Brock’s
 disciplinary history and the testimony of his supervisor
 Mr. Ivory and the deciding official Mr. Alexander regard-
 ing the seriousness of the offense—supports the Board’s
 conclusion that this factor favors the FAA.
      The Board also found the second Carr factor—the ex-
 istence and strength of any retaliatory motive on the part
 of the FAA officials involved in the decision—to favor the
 FAA. The Board considered that the discourtesy disclosure
 did not accuse any management official involved in
 Mr. Brock’s removal of wrongdoing and that Mr. Ivory tes-
 tified that he communicated with Mr. Phillips about the
 unacceptable behavior. The Board also noted that alt-
 hough “an institutional motive to retaliate against
 [Mr. Brock] could arise,” this discourtesy disclosure was an
 isolated incident that did not warrant concern. Decision
 at *16 (citing Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370). In view of the
 record evidence, we cannot say that the Board’s fact finding
 was unreasonable and we therefore find that substantial
 evidence supports the Board’s finding that this Carr factor
 favors the FAA. See Smith, 930 F.3d at 1365.
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 14                 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

     For the third Carr factor—evidence that the agency
 takes similar actions against similarly situated employees
 who are not whistleblowers—the Board found this factor to
 be neutral as there was no evidence presented that the
 FAA “did not remove insubordinate employees with a prior
 disciplinary history who were not whistleblowers.” Deci-
 sion at *16–17. The Board’s conclusion for the third Carr
 factor was reasonable as the FAA “need not produce evi-
 dence with regard to each of the factors, nor must each fac-
 tor weigh in favor of the agency for it to carry its burden.”
 Rickel v. Dep’t of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Robinson v. Dep’t of Veterans
 Affs., 923 F.3d 1004, 1018–19 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
     We disagree with Mr. Brock’s assertion that the
 Board’s thorough analysis was inexplicable. Having con-
 sidered the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial
 evidence supports the Board’s finding that the FAA would
 have removed Mr. Brock independent of the discourtesy
 disclosure.
                               B
     We next address Mr. Brock’s argument that the Board
 erred in its findings regarding his ORM disclosure and sab-
 otage disclosure. Specifically, Mr. Brock argues that he
 should have been “given the benefit of a ruling in his favor”
 as to the ORM disclosure “for several reasons including
 that the lights . . . were all operational with one excep-
 tion.” 4 Appellant Br. 16. Similarly, Mr. Brock asserts that,

      4  Mr. Brock has not explained how the operation of
 lights entitles him to “the benefit of a ruling in his favor.”
 We have explained that “[a]n issue that is merely alluded
 to and not developed as an argument in a party’s brief is
 deemed waived.” Rodriguez v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs.,
 8 F.4th 1290, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing cases); see also,
 e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1341
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                      15

 when considering the sabotage disclosure, Board should
 have reviewed the entire timeline for context and, had it
 done so, it would have found in his favor. 5
     Our review of Mr. Brock’s arguments reveals that what
 he really seeks is for this court to reweigh the evidence and
 make factual findings in his favor. But “[i]t is not for this
 court to reweigh evidence on appeal.” Rickel, 31 F.4th
 at 1366.    Because substantial evidence supports the
 Board’s findings concerning the ORM disclosure and sabo-
 tage disclosure, we affirm.
                              III
     We now address Mr. Brock’s challenge to the Board’s
 conclusion that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of
 harmful procedural error. Appellant Br. 18–20.
     To prove an affirmative defense of “harmful error,”
 Mr. Brock must show that an error was “likely to have
 caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the
 one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the er-
 ror” and that the error “caused substantial harm or preju-
 dice.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r); Ward v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
 634 F.3d 1274, 1281–82 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing 5 U.S.C.
 § 7701(c)(2)(A) and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1)).

 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“In order for this court to reach the merits
 of an issue on appeal, it must be adequately developed.”).
 In this case, Mr. Brock’s undeveloped argument, “unsup-
 ported by . . . citation to any authority,” Rodriguez, 8 F.4th
 at 1305, is therefore waived.
     5   Mr. Brock does not elaborate on what part of the
 timeline the Board neglected to consider. As previously ex-
 plained, Mr. Brock thus waives this underdeveloped and
 unsupported argument. See Rodriguez, 8 F.4th at 1305.
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 16                 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

     The Board, in considering Mr. Brock’s allegation that
 the FAA misapplied Executive Order 13,839 6 during his re-
 moval proceedings, found there was no evidence that the
 FAA relied on this executive order. Decision at *22; see
 Exec. Order No. 13,839, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,343 (May 25,
 2018). In addressing Mr. Brock’s allegation that it was
 “harmful error for the agency to assign him the tasks which
 were the subject of its insubordination charges,” the Board
 explained that Mr. Brock did not specify what procedures
 the FAA violated by assigning him these tasks. Decision
 at *23. As for Mr. Brock’s allegation that the FAA violated
 its procedure by “charging him with insubordination in-
 stead of failure to follow instructions,” the Board noted that
 Mr. Brock did not show which agency procedure required a
 charge of failure to follow instructions, instead of insubor-
 dination. Id. at *23–24.
     Here, Mr. Brock’s argument—that the Board improp-
 erly determined that the executive order was inapplica-
 ble—is not supported by the record evidence. Mr. Brock
 contends that Executive Order 13,839 was not rescinded by
 Executive Order 14,003 until January 21, 2021, and thus
 should have applied to his removal proceedings. Appellant
 Br. 19; see Exec. Order No. 14,003, 86 Fed. Reg. 7231
 (Jan. 22, 2021). Mr. Brock also alleges that the FAA 7 failed

      6   Executive Order 13,839 aimed to “promote civil
 servant accountability” by reducing the opportunities for
 an employee to demonstrate acceptable performance; not
 requiring “progressive discipline”; and not requiring sus-
 pension before proposing removal. 83 Fed. Reg. at 25,343.
     7    Mr. Brock’s briefing states that “the ALJ did not
 properly . . . follow established policy within FAA.” Appel-
 lant Br. 19. We believe Mr. Brock misspoke as the admin-
 istrative judge or Board is not governed by FAA policy and
 therefore interpret his argument to mean that the FAA did
 not follow its own policy.
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                      17

 to follow its policy entitled “Procedures for Disciplinary and
 Adverse Actions.” Appellant Br. 19. We find Mr. Brock’s
 arguments unpersuasive.
     As an initial matter, we see no harmful error in the
 Board’s analysis regarding the FAA not applying Executive
 Order 13,839. Mr. Brock’s removal proceeding fell within
 the FAA’s personnel management system. Executive Or-
 der 13,839 pertains to Title 5 disciplinary procedures not
 applicable to the FAA’s personnel management system;
 thus, under these facts, Title 5 does not apply to
 Mr. Brock’s removal proceeding.             See 49 U.S.C.
 § 40122(g)(2) (stating that absent certain exceptions, “pro-
 visions of title 5 shall not apply to the [FAA] personnel
 management system”); Roche v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
 596 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same). Furthermore,
 Mr. Brock does not elaborate on what policy the FAA vio-
 lated or how it violated its own policy. Substantial evi-
 dence therefore supports the Board’s conclusion that
 Mr. Brock failed to prove an affirmative defense of harmful
 procedural error.
                              IV
     We turn now to Mr. Brock’s challenge to the Board’s
 finding that there was a nexus between his conduct and his
 removal. Appellant Br. 20–22.
     The agency must establish a nexus—“a clear and direct
 relationship”—between the sustained charge and the “em-
 ployee’s ability to accomplish his or her duties satisfacto-
 rily or some other legitimate government interest.”
 Decision at *28. A nexus may be presumed when “egre-
 gious circumstances (falsification of records, theft, assault
 at work, insubordination)” make the connection between
 misconduct and the efficiency of the service “speaks for it-
 self.” Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1539
 (Fed. Cir. 1984). “It is not our duty to find nexus but rather
 to decide . . . whether the MSPB affirmance of the agency
 conclusion on the nexus issue meets the statutory criteria
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 18                 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 for our affirmance,” i.e., whether the Board abused its dis-
 cretion in affirming the FAA’s conclusion. Id.; 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c).
      The Board here found that the “nexus is self-evident
 because [Mr. Brock]’s misconduct took place at work.” De-
 cision at *28. Mr. Brock argues that the Board erred in
 finding a nexus existed because the insubordination “‘took
 place at work’ without further discussion.” Appellant
 Br. 20 (quoting Decision at *28).
     Although the Board’s analysis is brief, we find no re-
 versible error. We have “held that where an employee’s
 misconduct is contrary to the agency’s mission, the agency
 need not present proof of a direct effect on the employee’s
 job performance.” Allred v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
 786 F.2d 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1986). And as we explained
 in Hayes, insubordination at work is one of those circum-
 stances in which the nexus is so apparent that it may be
 presumed. Hayes, 727 F.2d at 1539. As Mr. Brock’s insub-
 ordination was an impairment to the FAA’s ability to carry
 out its objectives efficiently, the Board’s nexus determina-
 tion was rational and made within reasonable discretion.
                              V
     Finally, we consider Mr. Brock’s challenge to the
 Board’s determination that the FAA acted reasonably in
 removing Mr. Brock. In determining the reasonableness of
 the penalty imposed by the FAA, the Board must consider
 whether the penalty represents a responsible balance of
 the relevant factors articulated in Douglas. Mr. Brock ar-
 gues that Mr. Alexander’s “self-serving” testimony and
 mitigating factors, including that this was Mr. Brock’s first
 charge of insubordination, should have caused the Board to
 find the agency’s penalty unreasonable. Appellant Br. 22–
 23. Mr. Brock also reargues the charge of insubordination,
 asserting that he credibly testified that he thought the or-
 ders were dangerous. We are not persuaded that the Board
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 BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION                     19

 erred in its review of the record and in sustaining the
 agency’s choice of penalty.
     An agency determines the appropriate penalty based
 on the relevant Douglas factors. See Holmes v. U.S. Postal
 Serv., 987 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2021). The Board’s
 role is to “assure that the agency did conscientiously con-
 sider the relevant factors and did strike a responsible bal-
 ance within tolerable limits of reasonableness.” Norris
 v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 675 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir.
 2012) (quoting Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 329). Which Doug-
 las factors are applicable lies primarily within “the
 agency’s broad discretion to determine the appropriate
 penalty for a particular case.” Holmes, 987 F.3d at 1047
 (quoting Zingg v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 388 F.3d 839, 844
 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We review a penalty determination for
 clear excess or an abuse of discretion. Coleman v. U.S. Se-
 cret Serv., 749 F.2d 726, 729 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
      Mr. Alexander, the deciding officer, testified regard-
 ing: the seriousness, intentionality, and frequency of
 Mr. Brock’s insubordination; his loss of trust in Mr. Brock
 because the ATSS position requires integrity for public
 safety; removal of other FAA employees for insubordina-
 tion; removal being in the FAA’s table of penalties; his be-
 lief that Mr. Brock could not be rehabilitated due to a lack
 of remorse; and not considering suspension in lieu of re-
 moval because prior discipline did not change Mr. Brocks
 behavior. Mr. Alexander also testified that he considered
 Mr. Brock’s fourteen years of service, but “ultimately de-
 termined this factor insufficient to outweigh the [other] ag-
 gravating factors.” Decision at *29–30 (citing J.A. 140).
 Based on Mr. Alexander’s testimony, which the Board was
 free to credit, the Board found the agency’s choice of re-
 moval to be reasonable.
     We cannot say, considering the record evidence and the
 Board’s analysis, that the FAA’s determination to remove
 Mr. Brock was outside the “tolerable limits of
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 20                BROCK v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

 reasonableness.” Norris, 675 F.3d at 1355 (quoting Doug-
 las, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332–33). We therefore conclude that the
 Board did not err in concluding that removal was within
 these limits.
                       CONCLUSION
      We have considered Mr. Brock’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
 affirm the Board’s decision.
                       AFFIRMED