Court Opinion

ID: 9562031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:20:38.789912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:11.102988
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Judge,
concurring. The majority opinion ably expounds the law applicable to1 this situation; there is little that could be added. A virtual adoption is not a legal adoption. It creates no legal rights, but simply enforces contract rights in equity. “[U]nder a virtual adoption, no relationship of parent and child is created, but it is only a court-given name to a status arising from and created by contract. . .” Foster v. Cheek, 212 Ga. 821, 827 (96 SE2d 545). “Counsel for the plaintiff has cited no case to this court, and we have found none, where an adopted child, under [the virtual adoption *643statute], has been held entitled as an heir to inherit . . .” Dye v. Ghann, 216 Ga. 743, 749 (119 SE2d 700). “A contract by a person to adopt a child of another as his own ‘is not self-operating; heirship does not grow out of it.’ Parnelle v. Cavanaugh, 191 Ga. 464, 465 (1) (12 SE2d 877); Crawford v. Wilson, 139 Ga. 654 (78 SE 30, 44 LRA (NS) 773); Baker v. Henderson, 208 Ga. 698, 702 (b) (69 SE2d 278).” Banes v. Derricotte, 215 Ga. 892, 895 (114 SE2d 12). “A court of equity has no power to grant the special prayer: ‘That your petitioner be declared by the court to be the child and heir at law of J. J. Collins and Lizzie Collins, both deceased.’ ” Stith v. Willis, 219 Ga. 62 (2) (131 SE2d 620).
Until the adoption of Lord Campbell’s Act there was no right of recovery for the wrongful death of one’s parent. The statute is in derogation of the common law, and cannot be extended by the courts to grant rights not specifically included by its terms. Bloodworth v. Jones, 191 Ga. 193, 194 (11 SE2d 658), and citations.
Code § 105-1302 provides for the recovery by “a child or children” for the wrongful death of a parent.1 Since neither the virtual adoption statute nor a court decree can create the relationship of parent and child, there can be no right of recovery here. It is not the kind of thing that was or could have been included in the contract for adoption, nor could it be extended under equitable powers of the court in enforcing rights under the contract.
Before giving a very liberal construction to the wrongful death statute it should be noted that in three recent cases (two whole court) this court has followed the previous decisions of this court and the Supreme Court in holding that the “wrongful death Acts, being statutory rather than common-law remedies, are strictly construed.” St. Paul Fire &c. Co. v. Miniweather, 119 Ga. App. 617 (1) (168 SE2d 341); Horton v. Brown, 117 Ga. App. 47 *644(159 SE2d 489), cert. denied, 117 Ga. App. 879; and Harrell v. Gardner, 115 Ga. App. 171 (154 SE2d 265). In the Miniweather case we held that for this reason a stepchild cannot recover under the wrongful death Acts for the death of a stepparent.
Code Ann. § 74-414 makes a legally adopted child the same as a natural child under the wrongful death Acts. However, the rub is that hnder the decisions of this court and the Supreme Court a virtual adoption is not a legal adoption and creates no legal rights.
The “law on this question is not simply what the judges of this coúrt think the law should be, but what the General Assembly has said it is.” Horton v. Brown, 117 Ga. App. 47, 49, supra.
Let us look at the last action of the legislature on this subject. A key to this intent is the right of a person to inherit. For example, a natural child, whether a minor or an adult, can recover under these Acts irrespective of the question of dependency. Prior to 1960, an illegitimate child could inherit from his mother but not his father; however, he could not bring an action for' the wrongful death of even the mother. The law was amended in 1960 by the legislature to allow a dependent illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of the mother. Code Ann. § 105-1306. The legislature did not see fit to extend the right of an illegitimate child to recover for the wrongful death of the father. Code § 105-1302. Nor did it even see fit to extend the right of an illegitimate' child (who could inherit) to recover for the wrongful death of the mother where there was no dependency. How, then, can it be said that it was the intent of the General Assembly to extend the right of a child that has no legal right to inherit and who has not been legally adopted to bring an action for the wrongful' death of a person whose relationship is less than that of one created by bastardy?
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Hall- concurs in these observations.

Prior to the amendment of 1924 (Ga. L. 1924, p. 60) it was held that a married daughter, though an only minor child, could not recover for the wrongful death of her father. Beale v. Ga. R. &c. Co., 150 Ga. 774 (105 SE 447).