Court Opinion

ID: 9700590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:36:41.078398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:10.969542
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HEFFERNAN
(on motion for reconsideration) (dissenting). Although I did not dissent on the occasion of the granting of reconsideration by the issuance of an opinion and mandate on August 27, 1992,1 should have done so.
While there appeared to be extenuating circumstances which impelled the court to issue as the majority opinion on August 27, 1992, the opinion which was the dissent to the opinion of the court dated May 20,1992,1 conclude that the new opinion should not have been issued without first following the salutary guidelines set forth in this court's Internal Operating Procedures.
The Internal Operating Procedures are not rules and may be altered or suspended without notice by a majority of the court at any time. They were sub silentio suspended in the instant case.
While there was no impropriety in the instant case, the court's failure to adhere to its operating procedures in respect to reconsideration constitutes the abrogation of a procedure that is designed to protect the court from nonsubstantive or frivolous motions for reconsideration. The failure to follow these procedures inflicts harm upon the court and is likely to encourage reconsiderations that have no merit.
We have, for as long as I have been a member of the court, purported to adhere to the guidelines that are now set forth in the Internal Operating Procedures:
*728A change of decision on reconsideration will ensue only when the court has overlooked controlling legal precedent or important policy considerations or has overlooked or misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in the record.
These are procedures to which the court has not always adhered. The Reports contain instances which demonstrate that the court has changed its mind and issued a new decision without any mention of the principles that are now embodied in our Internal Operating Procedures.
They now, however, are published formally for the guidance of the bar. The bar has the right to expect that these published procedures will be followed unless circumstances arise that impel a change and the court additionally states why it has decided not to follow its own procedures.
In the instant case, no reason was given by the court for its action. It is difficult to argue that authorities or facts were overlooked or that policy considerations not apparent on the original submission became apparent upon reconsideration when the reconsidered opinion was the verbatim dissent to the original opinion. Thus, no new material is contained in the opinion of August 27, 1992.
There remains, however, a reason that could have been set forth as justifying a reconsideration — that there was a misconstruction or misunderstanding of an important fact or the overlooking of a significant fact. It is at least arguable, and this I believe is an appropriate reason for reconsideration under some circumstances — that important facts were not dealt with sufficiently in the framework of the original opinion either by reason of inappropriate application of the law or in appropriate emphasis of the controlling facts. In addition, if a situa*729tion should arise when the court suspects sua sponte it had erred because it had improperly applied the law, I see no reason why there could not be a reconsideration while the case remained within the jurisdiction of the court. In that event, however, it would be appropriate to do so only if the parties were given the opportunity to rebrief the questioned issue.
In the present case, it is apparent that a majority of the court felt that it had erred in the May 20, 1992, decision. That "error," however, should have been confirmed or dispelled by additional briefing and, if necessary, oral argument.
While successive motions for reconsideration are frowned upon by this court, the motion now pending gives this court an opportunity to re-examine any arguable errors in both opinions.
I take no position on the merits of the controversy, but, in view of vacillating views of some of the members of the court, myself included, I believe it appropriate to grant the pending motion for reconsideration, ask for briefs from all parties, and, if necessary, schedule oral argument. Because the decisions of May 20, 1992, and August 27, 1992, each contain identical opinions, albeit reversed as to majority or dissent, a reconsideration now will enable the court to return to the position it was in prior to August 27,1992. While the course of this procedure obviously has been vexing to the parties, and cannot completely be rectified now, a grant of reconsideration and rebriefing, to the extent desired by the parties, appears to be the fairest and most reasonable disposition at this time. In addition, it would affirm the will of this court to adhere to the guidelines for reconsideration except in the case of unusual circumstances when such deviation is compelling and fully explained and justified. Also, it would support the long-established position of *730the court that it not be harassed by motions for reconsideration that are without merit.
Accordingly, I dissent from the order that would deny reconsideration of the opinion of August 27, 1992.
I am authorized to state that Justice BABLITCH joins in this dissent.