Court Opinion

ID: 9749392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:41:14.478035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.968783
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring.
This matter involves the request by appellee Aldinger for the laying out of a private road over the property of appellants, the Zeaflas. Appellee instituted his request pursuant to 36 P.S. § 2731 (1927). As required by statute, a Board of Viewers (Board) was appointed, and the Board conducted two views of the site proposed for a private road. The Board held two hearings in order to take testimony from the parties interested in the laying out of the private *311road. A final report was issued in which the Board determined appellee’s requested private road should be established over appellants’ property and that appellee must first pay appellants $5000 compensation for the taking of their property. Appellants took exceptions to the Board’s final report, and appealed the Board’s determination to the court of common pleas. The lower court dismissed appellants’ exceptions and appeal, and entered judgment in accordance with the Board’s final report. The appellants now appeal.
I agree with the majority’s holding that the necessity of and location of the private road should be affirmed, and that the determination of damages must be vacated and reconsidered by the trial court. However, I write separately to explain further my reasons.
I first note that the current statutes providing the procedure for establishing a private road over another’s property substantially have been taken from an 1836 law. (Act of June 13, 1836, P.L. 551, entitled “An Act Relating to Roads, Highways and Bridges”). In the current restructured format, the statutory provisions describing the procedure are not abundantly clear.
Chapter 5 of Title 36 of the Pennsylvania Code specifically addresses “Private Roads.” The statutes within chapter 5 provide that upon petition a court shall direct that a view be made of the location where the requested private road is to be established, and that the viewers report their findings. 36 P.S. § 2731, originally enacted as P.L. 551, § 11 (June 13, 1836). If the viewers’ report shows that the requested private road “is necessary,” then the court shall direct the opening and laying out of the private road. 36 P.S. § 2732, originally enacted as P.L. 551, § 12 (June 13, 1836). In laying out a private road, the viewers must consider: (1) the shortest distance for a private road, (2) the best ground for a private road, (3) the road that will cause least injury to the private property being taken, and (4) the location proposed by the petitioners. 36 P.S. § 1785, originally enacted as P.L. 551, § 2 (June 13, 1836). The determination of damages sustained by the owner of the property over which the *312private road is established, “shall be estimated in the manner provided in the case of a public road.” 36 P.S. § 2736, originally enacted as P.L. 551, § 16 (June 13, 1836).
A reference to the provisions for determining damages in public road matters, chapter 4 of Title 36 entitled “Public Roads in General,” merely provides that the viewers shall “assess the damages and make a report thereof.” 36 P.S. § 1881, originally enacted as P.L. 164, § 1 (May 14, 1874).1
With this background I address appellants’ challenges. Appellants first complain that the Board erred in determining that the proposed private road over their property is necessary. Appellants however also correctly note that this court’s standard of review of a Board of Viewers’ findings is very limited. See, e.g., Driver v. Temple, 374 Pa.Super. 389, 394-95, 543 A.2d 134, 137 (1988) (en banc), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 607, 553 A.2d 969 (1988); Application of Little, 180 Pa.Super. 555, 558, 119 A.2d 587, 588 (1956). It is well established that
[a]ppellate review of [private road proceedings] ... is solely to ascertain the validity of the court’s jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, questions of law, and whether there has been an abuse of discretion. We cannot look beyond the record ... or consider questions of fact.
Driver, 374 Pa.Super. at 395, 543 A.2d at 137. Appellants contend the Board and the lower court abused their discretion in both determining the necessity of and the location of the private road over appellants’ property.
As noted above, the Board statutorily must consider four separate factors in determining the necessity and location of a requested private road. 36 P.S. § 1785. The findings of fact presented by the Board show that the Board con*313sidered each of these factors and did not abuse its discretion in determining the necessity for or the location of the private road in question.
The Board specifically found that appellee currently has access to his property by permissive use of a roadway over appellants’ property. It is this unimproved roadway that the Board determined should be the private road granted to appellee. The Board also found that no other access currently exists to appellee’s property. Moreover, the Board recognized that the appellants’ property is useful farmland, while an alternate location for a private road that was proposed by appellants, is recreational land. It is clear from the Board’s final report that the Board considered the differences between the potential locations for a private road and, in its discretion, decided the establishment of a private road where a current roadway already exists would cause the least injury to the surrounding private property.
Appellants emphatically challenged some of the Board’s findings of fact. Appellants specifically take exception to the Board’s findings that an alternate location for a private road was “overgrown,” had returned to its “natural state” and was “swampy.” Moreover, appellants asserted that this alternate location would in fact result in a shorter distance of travel to connect to a public road. Finally appellants argued that a taking of their property would severely impact their farmland and efforts to prevent soil erosion, while the above alternate route would be over property used only for recreational purposes.
Even if we accept these assertions as true, appellants still have not presented sufficient evidence to establish that the Board abused its discretion in finding that a private road over appellants’ property was necessary. See Driver v. Temple, 374 Pa.Super. at 396-98, 543 A.2d at 138 (holding the Board did not abuse its discretion by choosing one of three possible locations for laying out a private road). Therefore, I would affirm the Board’s findings simply because appellants have not met the burden required for this court to reverse the Board’s findings.
*314The appellants also argue that the Board erred in its determination of damages that appellee is required to pay prior to the final establishment of the private road. Specifically appellants contend that damages should be determined pursuant to Title 26, the Eminent Domain Code. Moreover, appellants assert that pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code appellee must present expert testimony regarding the damages sustained by the laying out of the private road. See 26 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1-702, 1-705 (1964). According to the appellants, because the Board did not follow proper procedures to determine damages and because appellee did not present expert testimony on the issue of damages, the Board's determination of damages must be reconsidered.
The question whether the Eminent Domain Code is applicable to private road proceedings need not be answered to resolve the issues in this case. Based on the record and the wealth of case law, the evidence shows that the Board failed to follow proper procedures for determining damages in a private road condemnation case.
As noted above, the statutory provisions for laying out a private road state that damages shall be estimated as in public road cases. 36 P.S. § 2736. However, the provisions under Title 36 for laying out a public road simply provide that the viewers are to assess damages and report such a determination. 36 P.S. § 1881. Case law has supplemented this general statutory provision and has developed a consistent and well established procedure for calculating damages in public condemnation cases. The common law procedure for calculating damages in public road cases is to measure the difference between the fair market value of the entire property immediately before and immediately after the taking. See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 399 Pa. 156, 158, 159 A.2d 881, 882 (1960); Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority, 383 Pa. 383, 389, 119 A.2d 79, 82 (1956); Butler Water Co.'s Petition, 338 Pa. 282, 284, 13 A.2d 72, 73 (1940).2 Because there is no indication in the *315instant case that the Board determined damages by this rule, I would remand this matter for a proper determination of damages.
Finally, the majority notes that appellants asserted the appellee is no longer a party in interest in this matter because he sold his property.3 Appellants therefore contend that appellee’s original petition for a private road should be dismissed. As correctly noted by the majority, appellee has not had the opportunity to respond to appellants’ allegations. The majority also writes that if appellee is not the proper party to the petition, “it must be dismissed.” Majority Opinion, at 348. However, the majority does not explain whether the entire matter should be dismissed or whether the alleged new owner could be simply substituted for appellee. The issue is one of standing and should be resolved by the trial court in the first instance. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc. v. Muscara, 394 Pa.Super. 251, 258-60, 575 A.2d 615, 619 (1990). The better course in my view is to remand and permit the trial court to consider the question.
*316I, therefore, would remand for further consideration by the trial court on the questions of damages and standing.

. As noted by one commentator, the rule for measuring damages in public road cases is the difference in fair market value immediately before and immediately after the taking. The rule is “so well established by a long line of cases in Pennsylvania that citations seem unnecessary." P.H. Lewis, Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, printed in Volume 26-29 of Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, at 32 (1958).

. The majority notes that the commonwealth court has held that Title 26, the Eminent Domain Code is not applicable to private road cases. *315Majority Opinion, at 306-307 n. 5 (citing Mattei v. Huray, 54 Pa.Commw. 561, 564-66, 422 A.2d 899, 901 (1980); Mandracchia v. Stoney Creek Real Estate, 133 Pa.Commw. 510, 513 n. 1, 576 A.2d 1181, 1183 n. 1 (1990)). In Mattei the commonwealth court specifically considered the issue whether an appellant in a private road case was entitled to a jury determination of necessity of the road. Mattei, 54 Pa.Commw. at 562-64, 422 A.2d at 900. The court concluded that the provisions of the Eminent Domain Code addressing appeals from a Board of Viewers’ findings “are not applicable to this case." Id., 54 Pa.Commw. at 564-66, 422 A.2d at 901 (emphasis added). In Mandracchia, the commonwealth court further explained this conclusion by noting that the Eminent Domain Code was not applicable to private road cases "except by analogy or perhaps, necessity.” Mandracchia, 133 Pa.Commw. at 513 n. 1, 576 A.2d at 1182 n. 1.
Because the private condemnation statutes do not provide a clear methodology for determining damages, reference to the Eminent Domain Code is not contrary to the above commonwealth court’s holdings. Moreover, my research reveals that the determination of damages pursuant to Title 36, the Eminent Domain Code (Title 26), and the common law each involve an application of the "before and after rule.”

. This assertion was made by appellants outside of the record in an "Application for Relief” filed four days before oral argument.