Court Opinion

ID: 9362988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 16:05:27.086712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:27.529262
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                           No. 125,118

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                              J.D.K.,
                                             Appellee,

                                                 v.

                                            D.D.B. JR.,
                                            Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Dickinson District Court; BENJAMIN J. SEXTON, judge. Opinion filed January 13,
2023. Affirmed.

       D.D.B. Jr., appellant pro se.

       Richard H. Seaton, of Seaton Law Offices, LLP, of Manhattan, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., BRUNS, J., and PATRICK D. MCANANY, S.J.

       PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from protection from stalking proceedings
initiated by J.D.K. against D.D.B. concerning various hostile encounters between them as
a result of a dispute over the boundary between their two properties in Herington. The
hostilities apparently began between D.D.B. and J.D.K.'s mother in 2020. Thereafter,
J.D.K.'s parents passed away and the hostilities continued in the spring of 2021 when
J.D.K., who lives in Kansas City, was taking care of her parents' home until the property
could be sold. D.D.B. lived next door.

       The district court granted an ex parte temporary order for protection from stalking,
and eventually a final order after a trial. D.D.B. appeals from the district court's
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temporary and final orders and the district court's failure to hold a hearing on D.D.B.'s
claim of immunity and his counterclaims against J.D.K. We find no error in the district
court's proceedings and affirm. J.D.K. has moved for the assessment of attorney fees on
appeal. We find merit in J.D.K.'s motion and assess her attorney fees on appeal against
D.D.B.

       The parties proceeded pro se during all the proceedings in the district court. Thus,
the parties are well acquainted with the dispute between them that led to these
proceedings, and it is unnecessary to recount it now in detail.

       On October 5, 2021, the day J.D.K. filed her petition, the district court entered a
temporary order of protection from stalking and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing
on October 19, 2021. The parties appeared by way of Zoom for the evidentiary hearing.
D.D.B. filed his answer and counterclaim on the day of the hearing but had not yet served
J.D.K. with a copy. In his responsive pleading D.D.B. denied J.D.K.'s allegations,
claimed he was entitled to immunity, and sought a protection from stalking order against
J.D.K. as well as $350,000 for his emotional distress. The court continued the evidentiary
hearing to November 16, 2021, to allow D.D.B. to serve J.D.K. with his answer and
counterclaim.

       On November 16, the district court conducted a Zoom evidentiary hearing at
which both parties testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that
J.D.K. met her burden to show that D.D.B. stalked her and granted a final protection from
stalking order.

       In his posttrial filing, which the court construed as a motion to reconsider, D.D.B.
argued that the court refused to hear testimony to support his counterclaim and hold a
separate hearing to determine that D.D.B. enjoyed immunity for his actions. At the
December 7, 2021 hearing on D.D.B.'s motion, the court conceded that it had not allowed

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D.D.B. to present his "full case, your full evidence . . . . I think I did cut you off." The
district court reopened the proceedings to allow D.D.B. to present his evidence and set
the matter for another evidentiary hearing on December 14 to address D.D.B.'s case.

       Following that second evidentiary hearing, the district court reaffirmed its finding
that J.D.K. met her burden to prove the stalking allegations and that D.D.B. was a
physical threat to J.D.K.'s safety. The court entered a final order of protection from
stalking. The district court also found that D.D.B. did not meet the burden to prove his
counterclaim. This appeal followed.

The Granting of a Temporary Protection Order

       D.D.B. argues that J.D.K's allegations of stalking were insufficient for the district
court to grant a temporary order of protection. Whether the allegations in J.D.K.'s petition
were legally sufficient to support the issuance of a temporary order of protection is an
issue of law over which we have de novo review. Wentland v. Uhlarik, 37 Kan. App. 2d
734, 736, 159 P.3d 1035 (2007).

       Under the Protection from Stalking, Sexual Assault, or Human Trafficking Act
(the Act), the district court may enter a temporary order of relief, upon good cause
shown, "as it deems necessary to protect the victim from being stalked . . . . Temporary
orders may be granted ex parte on presentation of a verified petition by the victim
supporting a prima facie case of stalking." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a05(b).

       "Stalking" is defined under the Act as the "intentional harassment of another
person that places the other person in reasonable fear for that person's safety." K.S.A.
2021 Supp. 60-31a02(d). "Harassment" is defined as "a knowing and intentional course
of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, torments or
terrorizes the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-

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31a02(d)(1). To establish a "course of conduct" requires a showing of "two or more
separate acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose
which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress." K.S.A.
2021 Supp. 60-31a02(d)(2).

       D.D.B. argues that the allegations in J.D.K.'s petition do not meet the definition of
stalking. He argues the allegations can be summed up as (1) digging a trench, (2)
dismantling a fence, (3) battery, and (4) staking a string. He contends that J.D.K. failed to
show two separate acts that have no legitimate purpose and that reveal a continuity of
purpose, causing a reasonable person emotional distress. He concludes that because the
petition was legally insufficient to allege stalking, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
enter a temporary order.

       J.D.K. counters that she established a prima facie case of stalking in the petition
when she alleged that D.D.B. harassed her generally, physically attacked her, and
destroyed her fence. She also alleged in her petition that D.D.B. interfered with
prospective buyers of the property in an effort to hinder J.D.K.'s efforts to sell the home
of her deceased parents. She argues that there were more than two incidents directed at
her that were intentional and that evidence showed a continuity of purpose to intimidate
and scare her. She alleged in her petition that she needed a protection order because of
her fear for her own safety. She contends that being harassed, assaulted, and insecure in
one's own property because of a neighbor's actions would cause a reasonable person
distress, worry, and fear for her safety or cause annoyance, torment, or terror to varying
degrees. She argues there was no legitimate or constitutionally protected reason for
D.D.B.'s actions. J.D.K. notes that D.D.B. himself testified that his purpose was to
intimidate her.

       In C.M. v. McKee, 54 Kan. App. 2d 318, 322, 398 P.3d 228 (2017), the court
explained that a valid stalking claim requires proof of the following elements:

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       •   "At least two separate acts;
       •   Directed at a specific person;
       •   Intentionally done;
       •   Showing a continuity of purpose that would cause a reasonable person to suffer
           substantial emotional distress;
       •   Placing the person in reasonable fear for his or her safety;
       •   Through conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, tormented, or terrorized the
           person; and
       •   That served no legitimate purpose and was not constitutionally protected."

       J.D.K. alleged at least three separate intentional acts by D.D.B. directed at her: (1)
he dismantled a longstanding fence on her property; (2) he yelled at her, physically
attacked her, and knocked her to the ground causing her bodily injuries; and (3) he
interfered with her efforts to sell the home of her deceased parents. J.D.K. said that she
feared for her safety. D.D.B.'s actions—destruction of and interference with J.D.K.'s
property and physically attacking her—would cause a reasonable person emotional
distress. These actions as alleged evidenced no self-evident legitimate or constitutionally
protected purpose. Thus, J.D.K's petition was legally sufficient, and the court did not err
by granting a temporary order of protection from stalking subject to the final hearing on
J.D.K.'s claim.

The Presentation of Evidence at Trial Not Specifically Referenced in the Petition

       D.D.B. argues that he was prejudiced in presenting his case when the district court
entered its final order based on evidence of events J.D.K. testified to at the initial
evidentiary hearing that were not in the petition and which he was not prepared to defend
against.

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       The district court was entitled to rule on J.D.K.'s request for a final order of
protection based on the relevant evidence admitted at trial. J.D.K.'s testimony was
admitted into evidence without objection. D.D.B. is precluded from now challenging the
admission of that evidence at trial. K.S.A. 60-404; Foster v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 50
Kan. App. 2d 1, 25, 327 P.3d 1014 (2012). Moreover, the challenged testimony was
clearly relevant to D.D.B.'s claim of stalking, and the district court did not err in
considering it.

       Besides, while all of D.D.B.'s conduct was not spelled out in minute detail in
J.D.K.'s petition, D.D.B. was put on notice of the claim that he was generally harassing
J.D.K. As stated in Redondo v. Gomez, No. 109,642, 2014 WL 802268 (Kan. App. 2014)
(unpublished opinion):

       "The petition need not state with particularity each and every detail of the purported
       stalking or harassment. A defendant in a proceeding under the Act has the right to use
       civil discovery to learn those details. . . . Gomez did not avail himself of those options to
       explore the particulars of what Redondo had asserted in the petition. Had he done so, he
       would have learned the details of the threat. Gomez cannot assert a valid due process
       claim based on his failure to use the tools the legal process has provided to avoid
       precisely what he now complains about on appeal." 2014 WL 802268, at *4.

       D.D.B. was present at the November 16, 2021 evidentiary hearing where J.D.K.
testified in detail about the claims raised in her petition. D.D.B. had until the reopened
hearing on December 14 to prepare to address J.D.K.'s claims. During the interim he
arranged for the testimony of a neighbor, who testified on his behalf about an encounter
with D.D.B. and two encounters between J.D.K. and D.D.B.'s significant other which the
neighbor considered to be of a harassing nature. D.D.B. also testified about J.D.K.'s
efforts to block him from building a fence. D.D.B. could have addressed J.D.K.'s claims
point-by-point at the reopened hearing and questioned J.D.K. by recalling her to the
stand. He chose not to. We find no prejudice to D.D.B. from the district court's ruling.

                                                     6
D.D.B.'s Defense that He Was Immune from Civil Liability on J.D.K.'s Claim

       One of J.D.K.'s allegations in her petition was that D.D.B. attacked her and
knocked her to the ground while she was on her property. In his answer D.D.B. asserted:
"Even if plaintiff did sustain injuries from the fall defendant claims immunity from
liability from any bodily harm that the plaintiff may have sustained while defendant was
defending himself."

       To support his claim of immunity, D.D.B. relies on K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5231,
which is contained in the Principles of Criminal Liability under Article 52 of our
Criminal Code. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5231 provides immunity "from criminal
prosecution and civil action" from the use of force that is deemed justified under certain
criminal statutes—K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5222, 21-5223, and 21-5225. These statutes
relate to one's defense against another's imminent use of unlawful force; to the defense of
one's home, place of business, or occupied vehicle against an unlawful entry or attack; or
to the defense of property in one's lawful possession against unlawful interference.

       D.D.B. contends that the district court erred in not holding a separate hearing to
determine whether he was immune from civil liability on J.D.K.'s claims under K.S.A.
2021 Supp. 21-5231.

       D.D.B. concedes that the immunity statute lacks direction as to how a
determination of immunity from civil liability should be conducted. His solution is a
pretrial motion to dismiss, though D.D.B. never filed a motion to dismiss based on a
claim of immunity. Nor is there any evidence in the record that he brought to the court's
attention, either before or during the initial evidentiary hearing on J.D.K.'s petition, the
claim that he was immune from civil liability for any of his actions. D.D.B. cites two
portions of the trial transcript where he claims he attempted to raise his immunity claim.

                                               7
We have examined those portions of the record, and they make no reference to a claim of
immunity.

       In his posttrial motion, which the court construed as a motion to reconsider,
D.D.B. contended that the court "refused to hold a hearing separate from trial and order
the plaintiff to demonstrate probable cause that the defendant's use of force was not
lawful." He cites nothing in the record where he asked for a hearing on the immunity
claim and the court refused a hearing.

       At the hearing on D.D.B.'s posttrial motion the court acknowledged that after
finding that J.D.K. had established a prima facie case at the initial evidentiary hearing on
her petition, the court cut D.D.B. off and did not allow him to present his defenses. The
court set a date for a rehearing to allow D.D.B. to present his defenses before deciding
whether to enter a final protection from stalking order. At the reopened evidentiary
hearing that followed, D.D.B. made no reference whatsoever to a claim of immunity.

       At the conclusion of the reopened evidentiary hearing, the court reaffirmed its
finding that J.D.K. had met her burden of proof to support a protection order. Because
D.D.B.'s claim of immunity was never brought to the court's attention at the hearing, the
court also found that it had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.

       Under these circumstances, D.D.B. having failed to request a separate hearing on
his immunity claim and having failed to address his immunity claim either before or
during the initial evidentiary hearing or at the rehearing, we find this claim of error to be
without merit.

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D.D.B.'s Counterclaim

       D.D.B. argues that, under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a08 of the Act, he was entitled
to assert a counterclaim to J.D.K.'s petition, that he did assert a counterclaim, and that the
district court failed to consider it. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a08 states:

               "Except as otherwise provided in the protection from stalking, sexual assault or
       human trafficking act, any proceedings under this act shall be in accordance with chapter
       60 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto, and shall be in addition to
       any other available civil or criminal remedies."

       The Act is to be liberally construed to protect victims of stalking by facilitating
access for them to judicial protection. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a01(b). Typically,
proceedings under the Act are expedited and not long and drawn-out before a final order
of protection is entered. In the meantime, and on a proper showing, the court can issue a
temporary order of protection. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a05(b). The Act calls for a final
hearing within 21 days following the filing of the verified petition. At that hearing, the
plaintiff must prove his or her allegation of stalking "by a preponderance of the evidence
and the defendant shall have an opportunity to present evidence on the defendant's
behalf." K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a05(a). But the Act does provide for a continuance of
the final hearing. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a05(c).

       Here, J.D.K. filed her verified petition on October 5, 2021. The hearing on J.D.K.'s
petition was set for October 19, 14 days later. At that hearing, the court noted that D.D.B.
had filed an answer and counterclaim that day, neither of which had been served on
J.D.K. An answer to the petition is not required under the Act, but J.D.K. was entitled to
prior notice of the counterclaim. Rather than bifurcate the proceedings and conduct a
final hearing that day under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a05(a) on J.D.K.'s petition, the
entire matter was continued to November 16, 2021.

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       D.D.B.'s counterclaim sought a protection from stalking order against J.D.K. He
began by paraphrasing the definitions of the terms in K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a02 that
are required to be shown to establish a claim of stalking. He alleges that J.D.K.'s

       "conduct over a period of time evidencing a continuity of purpose which has caused
       [D.D.B.] to suffer substantial emotional distress has been done knowingly and
       intentionally directed at [D.D.B.] and seriously alarms, annoys, torments and terrorizes
       [D.D.B.] and serves no legitimate purpose and has placed [D.D.B.] in reasonable fear for
       his safety."

He then recited a series of incidents related to the boundary dispute between the parties,
which he contends constituted harassment. He concluded:

               "The defendant has suffered because of the course of actions by the plaintiff to
       harass the defendant and the defendant believes that the plaintiff will escalate and cause
       the defendant or defendant's property harm if she does not succeed with the jailing of
       defendant or if this court denies her a protection order."

For the relief sought on his counterclaim, he asked the court to determine

       "that the court find that a PROTECTION FROM STALKING order against the plaintiff
       and in favor of the defendant to be necessary and proper, that the court order a protection
       order against the plaintiff."

D.D.B. also sought damages in the amount of $350,000 to be determined at a later date
by the court or jury.

       As the title "COUNTER-CLAIM" indicates in D.D.B.'s pleading, he stated a
single cause of action: a claim that he is entitled to a protection from stalking order
against J.D.K. He also sought monetary damages for J.D.K.'s conduct, which he claims

                                                    10
is the basis for a protection order in his favor. But the Act does not contemplate damages
as a form of relief. Under K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a06 the only relief available to a
successful litigant is a protection from stalking order. Moreover, a claim for relief under
the Act must be set forth in a verified pleading. K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 60-31a04. D.D.B.'s
counterclaim is not verified.

         Both parties testified at the initial evidentiary hearing on November 16, 2021.
J.D.K. testified generally about her conflicts with D.D.B. According to J.D.K., the
dispute between the parties related entirely to the disputed property line between their
adjoining properties. D.D.B. testified that "everything that [J.D.K.] says, everything she's
ever done has only been related to the property line." The court cut D.D.B. off as he
attempted to present his case and entered a protection from stalking order in favor of
J.D.K.

         At the hearing on D.D.B.'s posttrial motion, the court found that D.D.B. had not
been allowed to present his case at the initial trial, so the court reopened the proceedings
to allow D.D.B. to present his case on December 14, 2021. D.D.B. then asked the court
whether at the reopened trial "am I able to, um, do that together (unintelligible) a
counterclaim to a general . . . libel and slander?" The court answered that D.D.B. could
not. "[Y]ou have filed a counterclaim on a protection from abuse. . . . This is a very
narrow case . . . . [T]here is no libel claim or slander claim."

         D.D.B. contends that he had asserted a libel and slander counterclaim against
J.D.K., which the court refused to consider when the proceedings were reopened. D.D.B.
did not assert a counterclaim against J.D.K. for libel and slander. Examining D.D.B.'s
responsive pleading, we find nothing that would place J.D.K. on notice that she was
being sued for libel and slander for which she was in jeopardy of a judgment for damages
of up to $350,000. The words "libel" or "slander" or their equivalence appear nowhere in
D.D.B.'s responsive pleading. In the context of this case, even the barest of due process

                                              11
would require that a party be informed of the cause of action being asserted and the
resulting damages being sought.

       Accordingly, we find no error in the district court declining to hear D.D.B.'s
previously unspecified claim of libel and slander against J.D.K.

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

       Finally, D.D.B. argues that the district court erred in refusing to grant his motion
for judgment on the pleadings, which was raised for the first time after the initial
evidentiary hearing on J.D.K.'s claim. Our review of this issue of law is unlimited.
Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Services, 302 Kan. 625, 639, 355 P.3d 667
(2015).

       A motion for judgment on the pleadings is based on the premise that the moving
party is entitled to judgment on the face of the pleadings without the necessity of a trial to
determine the truth of the allegations they contain. To succeed on the motion, the movant
must assume for the purposes of the motion that the facts stated in the challenged
pleading are true but nevertheless are insufficient to establish a cause of action upon
which relief can be granted. 302 Kan. at 638.

       In his posttrial motion, D.D.B. recited a number of complaints about the
evidentiary hearing on J.D.K.'s petition, but he never claimed that he had moved for
judgment on the pleadings which the district court either denied or refused to consider. In
fact, our review of the record discloses that there was never a motion for judgment on the
pleadings filed. He simply included in his posttrial motion—without any argument, legal
authorities, or reference to the required elements of a cause of action for stalking—the
following prayer for relief on this nonexistent motion: "WHEREFORE, the defendant
motions this court with this MOTION FOR A FINAL ORDER ON THE PLEADINGS

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and moves this court to consider a final order in favor of the defendant according to the
pleadings filed within this court." This claim of error is totally without merit.

       The district court did not err by denying a request by D.D.B. for judgment on the
pleadings.

Attorney Fees

       While J.D.K. proceeded pro se before the district court, she wisely retained legal
counsel to represent her in this appeal. Now J.D.K. has moved under Kansas Supreme
Court Rule 7.07(b)(1) (2022 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 52) for an award of attorney fees she
incurred on appeal. Under this rule we have the authority to award attorney fees on
appeal in cases in which the district court has authority to award attorney fees. K.S.A.
2021 Supp. 60-31a06(f) authorizes the district court to award attorney fees to the victim
in cases in which a protection from stalking order is issued. Thus, we have the authority
to award fees in this case.

       J.D.K.'s counsel has provided his affidavit in support of the motion. Counsel has
charged J.D.K. $2,206.10 for services rendered in this appeal. This consists of 1.17 hours
at $250 per hour for attorney time and 23.92 hours at $80 per hour for paralegal time.
These hourly rates are the rates that have been in effect at the offices of J.D.K.'s counsel
for the past three years.

       As stated in Redondo:

       "The Act contemplates that successful petitioners will receive an award of attorney fees
       as part of a full and fair remedy for the harm the legislature intended to guard against.
       That is, a victim of stalking should be permitted to shift to the stalker the expense he or
       she has incurred for legal representation in obtaining an order of protection. The

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       legislative policy considerations that warrant attorney-fee awards in the district court are
       equally applicable and appropriate on appeal. The victim should not be required to bear
       the legal expense of successfully upholding an order of protection on appeal." 2014 WL
       802268, at *4.

       J.D.K. has prevailed in this appeal. We affirm based on the conclusion that the
district court did not commit reversible error in the challenged rulings in this case. D.D.B.
has not challenged J.D.K.'s right to fees in this appeal, nor has he challenged the
reasonableness of the fees D.D.B. seeks. Accordingly, we grant J.D.K.'s motion for
attorney fees in the amount of $2,206.10 and direct that judgment be entered against
D.D.B. in that amount.

       Affirmed.

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