Court Opinion

ID: 9492721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:49:03.449479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:27.904737
License: Public Domain

*762WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case, but would base this decision on a more straightforward rationale. My conclusion is that plaintiff Long’s claims of wrongful discharge simply did not sufficiently raise a federal question in order to provide jurisdiction in the district court. I agree with my colleague, Judge Moore, at the outset that the burden in this case is upon plaintiff and that removal statutes are strictly construed. Plaintiff must show that he is relying on a claim “arising under the Constitution ... or laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
I also agree with Judge Moore’s analysis that we have jurisdiction to review the action taken by the district court, and that remand was within the sound discretion of the district court once lack of a federal question was determined.
The substance of Long’s claims against his former private employer is clearly wrongful discharge essentially by a state action since no federal employment discrimination law action is asserted. Nor does defendant Bando claim federal preemption under the circumstances of this case.
There are several reasons why I believe this case is essentially controlled by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). That case affirmed this court’s decision at 766 F.2d 1005 (6th Cir.1985). Merrell Dow, I believe, despite some ambiguous language, affirmed our holding that “[fjederal question jurisdiction would, thus, exist only if plaintiffs’ right to relief depended necessarily on a substantial question of federal law.” 766 F.2d at 1006. Merrell Dow cites Justice Holmes’ opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916), that a “suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” 478 U.S. at 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229. It cites with approval Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983), that “a case may arise under federal law ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on some construction of federal law.’ ” Id. Finally, Merrell Dow emphasized “prudence and restraint in the jurisdictional inquiry,” and that where Congress provided no “private, federal cause of action for the violation [of the federal statute]” relied upon in the complaint, jurisdiction fails, and a federal question is not raised. Id. at 810, 817, 106 S.Ct. 3229.
Plaintiffs right to relief did not necessarily depend on any of the federal statutes relied upon in the complaint. There was no substantial question of federal law presented. None of the federal statutes cited (and discussed by the district court) created plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim. Congress provided no private federal remedy for plaintiff with respect to 'any of these statutes. There was no implied federal cause of action created by or necessarily springing from any federal statute cited. The district court, in short, exercised prudence and restraint in denying federal jurisdiction. I am not persuaded by Bando’s attempts to distinguish Merrell Dow, and I find no basis under the several principles expressed and approved in that case to overturn the district court’s decision. See Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 834 F.2d 556 (6th Cir.1987).1
I see no need to pursue any state law rationale asserted by Bando to create jurisdiction in this case. I would, accordingly, AFFIRM the district court.

. I see no conflict with the decision in this case with Milan Express Co. v. Western Surety Co., 886 F.2d 783 (6th Cir.1989), or MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Graham, 7 F.3d 477 (6th Cir.1993).