Court Opinion

ID: 9929383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 16:03:43.706117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:09.817668
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8007     Document: 010110993968   Date Filed: 02/02/2024   Page: 1
                                                                             FILED
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                    February 2, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  CHRISTOPHER D. HARRELL,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  and

  PAUL A. RENAUD,

        Plaintiff,

  v.                                                       No. 23-8007
                                                 (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00212-SWS)
  GEORGE ROSS, Administrative Sergeant,                     (D. Wyo.)
  Wyoming Department of Corrections
  Medium Correctional Institution, in his
  official and individual capacity;
  NATHANIEL OLENICK, Security
  Officer, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in his official and individual
  capacity; KAELI HANSEN, Security
  Officer, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in her official and individual
  capacity; JOSHUA WAGNER, Property
  Manager, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in his official and individual;
  JEREMY LIRA, Security Sergeant,
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution,
  in his official and individual capacity; LEN
  DIMAS, Security Lieutenant, Wyoming
  Medium Correctional Institution
  Lieutenant, in his official and individual
  capacity; STEVEN CHULSKI, Security
  Captain, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in his official and individual
  capacity; GEORGE KIRKIKIS, Security
  Major, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in his official and individual
  capacity; MARLENA MCMANIS, Deputy
Appellate Case: 23-8007    Document: 010110993968       Date Filed: 02/02/2024   Page: 2

  Warden, Wyoming Medium Correctional
  Institution, in her official and individual
  capacity; MICHAEL PACHECO, Warden,
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution,
  in his official and individual capacity;
  DALTON VAN PELT, Security Sergeant
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution,
  in his official and individual capacity;
  SARA TRAPP, Security Sergeant,
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution,
  in her official and individual capacity;
  CHRISTOPHER LIEN, Security Sergeant,
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution,
  in his official and individual capacity;
  CRYSTAL EVERSOLE, Security Captain,
  Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution
  Security, in her official and individual
  capacity; NEICOLE MOLDEN, Former
  Deputy Warden, Wyoming State
  Penitentiary, in her official and individual
  capacity; MICHAEL HARLOW, Former
  Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, in
  his official and individual capacity;
  SCOTT ABBOTT, Division Administrator,
  Wyoming Department of Corrections, in
  his official and individual capacity;
  HEATHER BABBITT, Deputy Director,
  Wyoming Department of Corrections, in
  her official and individual capacity;
  DANIEL SHANNON, Director, Wyoming
  Department of Corrections, in his official
  and individual capacity,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
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                           _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Christopher Harrell, a Wyoming inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the

 dismissal of his civil rights suit against numerous officials of the Wyoming

 Department of Corrections (WDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Wyoming

 Constitution. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the

 dismissal of the claims under § 1983, affirm the dismissal of the official-capacity

 claims under the Wyoming Constitution, and vacate the dismissal of the

 individual-capacity claims under the Wyoming Constitution and remand for further

 proceedings.

                                   BACKGROUND

       While Harrell was incarcerated at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP) in

 2021, prison officials seized his Xbox gaming console, allegedly because it contained

 digital pornography. He was cited for three violations in a Conduct Violation Report

 (CVR) designated #21-0613. A hearing officer found him guilty of all three

 violations, ordered him to relinquish the Xbox, and barred him from buying another

 one for a year. In addition, he lost 45 days of good time credit. He shipped the Xbox

 out of WSP to a friend.

 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

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        Harrell later was transferred to the Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution

 (WMCI). A co-plaintiff, Paul Renaud, also was an inmate at WMCI. Officials there

 seized Renaud’s PS4 gaming system because he was in possession of an unauthorized

 game. Harrell helped Renaud challenge the seizure. In May 2022, both he and

 Renaud were disciplined for sharing legal materials, with the CVR issued to Harrell

 designated as #22.05.003.

        CVR #22.05.003 alleged that by providing legal documents to Renaud, Harrell

 violated a policy that prohibited inmates from “[t]rading, bartering, lending or

 otherwise engaging in any personal transaction with any . . . inmate . . . when such

 transaction has not been specifically authorized.” R. Vol. 2 at 223. A hearing officer

 found Harrell guilty of the violation and imposed a $10 fine.

        Harrell and Renaud filed a civil rights suit in Wyoming state court alleging

 prison officials, acting in their official and individual capacities, violated federal and

 state constitutional rights. Defendants removed the suit to Wyoming federal district

 court and moved for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

 Harrell and Renaud responded in opposition, and defendants filed a reply.

        The district court granted the motion. As relevant to this appeal, it held that

 (1) sovereign immunity barred the state constitutional claims; (2) Harrell had not

 adequately pleaded his federal constitutional claims against defendants in either their

 individual or official capacities; and (3) the defendants were entitled to qualified

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 immunity on the individual-capacity § 1983 claims. The court dismissed the claims

 without prejudice.1

        Harrell now appeals.2

                                       DISCUSSION

 I.     Standards of Review

        We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d

 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2012). “[A] complaint must contain enough allegations of fact,

 taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal

 quotation marks omitted). “Although we must accept as true all factual allegations

 asserted in the complaint, dismissal is appropriate where the well-pleaded facts do

 not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at

 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Because Harrell proceeds pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Davis v.

 Clifford, 825 F.3d 1131, 1134 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016). “This liberal treatment is not

 without limits, and this court has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the

 same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214,

 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We do not . . . take on the

        1
         A without-prejudice dismissal is final and appealable only if it “finally
 disposes of the case so that it is not subject to further proceedings in federal court.”
 Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001). We are
 persuaded the district court’s decision finally disposed of the case.
        2
         This court dismissed Renaud as an appellant. Harrell explicitly declines to
 address the dismissal of several counts as pertaining solely to Renaud, and we do not
 consider the disposition of those claims.
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 responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and

 searching the record.” Davis, 825 F.3d at 1134 n.1 (internal quotation marks

 omitted).

 II.   Federal Claims

       A.     Individual-Capacity § 1983 Claims

              1.     First Amendment Claims

                     a.     Retaliation

       Harrell claimed that Sergeant George Ross issued CVR #22.05.003 in

 retaliation for filing grievances and assisting Renaud in legal matters. In addition to

 holding that Harrell had not plausibly pleaded the causation element of a First

 Amendment retaliation claim, see Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203

 (10th Cir. 2007), the district court held that the claim was barred by Requena v.

 Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1211 (10th Cir. 2018), in which this court held a prisoner

 cannot maintain a retaliation claim based on a disciplinary report if a hearing officer

 finds him guilty of the violation and there is evidence to sustain the violation. The

 district court further held the claim was precluded by the claim-splitting doctrine.

       We need not consider causation or claim-splitting because the record supports

 the district court’s determination that Requena bars a retaliation claim. The

 complaint pleads that the hearing officer found Harrell guilty of the offense charged

 in CVR #22.05.003, and in admitting that Harrell gave legal documents to Renaud,

 the complaint establishes there was evidence of a violation. Accordingly, the district

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 court correctly held that Requena precludes Harrell from maintaining a retaliation

 claim based on CVR #22.05.003.

                      b.     Freedom of Speech/Petition for Redress

        Harrell’s complaint also asserted defendants violated his First Amendment

 rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. It

 appears these allegations rest on his belief that he has a constitutional right to assist

 other inmates with their legal work. The Supreme Court, however, has “decline[d] to

 cloak the provision of legal assistance with any First Amendment protection above

 and beyond the protection normally accorded prisoners’ speech.” Shaw v. Murphy,

 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001). To plead a plausible claim, therefore, Harrell must plead

 facts to plausibly show that defendants’ restriction of his speech is not reasonably

 related to legitimate penological interests. See id. at 232 (stating that “the proper

 constitutional test is the one we set forth in Turner [v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)],”

 which held that a prison “regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate

 penological interests,” 482 U.S. at 89); Al-Owhali, 687 F.3d at 1240 (requiring a

 prisoner to plead sufficient facts to allow for a plausible inference that a policy does

 not satisfy the Turner test). Harrell’s allegations failed to meet this pleading

 standard.

               2.     Eighth Amendment Claim

        Harrell alleged that defendants violated his right to be free from cruel and

 unusual and excessive punishments by disciplining him and imposing a monetary fine

 for aiding Renaud with legal matters. The district court held that the challenged
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 actions were not sufficiently serious to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment

 violation and that Harrell failed to allege facts to plausibly plead that defendants

 knew he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk.

       Harrell asserts the district court erred because “assisting one another with legal

 work is a protected right under the Constitution, therefore when both Plaintiffs

 (Mr. Harrell) were punished, it is an Eight[h] Amendment violation.” Aplt. Opening

 Br. at 17. As stated above, however, he has no greater protection for providing legal

 assistance to other prisoners than for other types of speech, and he did not plead a

 plausible claim that his First Amendment rights were violated. And even if he

 plausibly pleaded a First Amendment claim, Harrell fails to support his assertion that

 a violation of another constitutional right necessarily becomes an Eighth Amendment

 violation.

              3.     Fourteenth Amendment Claims

                     a.     Due Process

       Harrell claimed that he did not receive due process with regard to the CVRs.

 To state a claim for a violation of due process, he must plead facts to establish (1) he

 was deprived of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) he did not

 receive the appropriate level of process. See Elliott v. Martinez, 675 F.3d 1241, 1244

 (10th Cir. 2012).

       The district court gave several reasons for concluding that Harrell failed to

 state a due process claim with regard to CVR #22.05.003. We need consider only

 one: Harrell received an appropriate level of process. “The requirements of due
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 process are flexible and depend on a balancing of the interests affected by the

 relevant government action.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill,

 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). For prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in a loss of

 good-time credits, due process requires (1) “advance written notice of the

 disciplinary charges”; (2) “an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety

 and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [the

 prisoner’s] defense”; (3) “a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied

 on and the reasons for the disciplinary action,” and (4) “some evidence in the record”

 to support the decision. Id. Given that CVR #22.05.003 resulted in a $10 fine, which

 is less serious than a deprivation of good-time credits, process that satisfies Hill

 would be adequate (or more than adequate) in this case. The complaint failed to

 plead that Harrell did not receive advance written notice, a hearing, or a written

 statement of the decision, and it indicated there was some evidence to support the

 decision. Harrell therefore failed to state a plausible due process claim with regard to

 CVR #22.05.003.

       The district court also gave multiple reasons for rejecting a due process claim

 as to CVR #21-0613. Again, we need consider only one: whether Harrell adequately

 pleaded he did not have a meaningful postdeprivation remedy. “[A]n unauthorized

 intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation

 of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

 Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”

 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). “Inmate grievance procedures can be

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  an adequate postdeprivation remedy,” Requena, 893 F.3d at 1212, even if they

  ultimately are denied, id. at 1213. See also Chapman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr.,

  366 P.3d 499, 508 (Wyo. 2016) (holding prisoner “did, in fact, have a meaningful

  postdeprivation remedy available to him in the form of the [W]DOC’s grievance

  procedure”). The filings in this case indicate the Wyoming prison grievance

  procedure can result in relief—in another proceeding, Harrell was able to obtain

  reversal of an initial decision to confiscate his PS4 gaming system. Because Harrell

  did not show he lacked an adequate postdeprivation remedy, he failed to state a

  plausible due process claim with regard to CVR #21-0613.

                      b.     Equal Protection

        Harrell also claimed defendants violated his right to equal protection of the

  laws in CVR #21-0613 by punishing him more severely than other inmates. He

  alleged that his violations were not major violations, and the punishments imposed

  were not authorized by WDOC policy. He also alleged two other inmates who were

  found to have pornographic images on their Xbox consoles did not receive CVRs.

  The district court held that Harrell failed to plausibly plead the other inmates were

  similarly situated to him: “Plaintiff[’s] allegations regarding these other unidentified

  inmates are totally lacking of any details, are conclusory at best and therefore, cannot

  form the basis of an equal protection claim.” R. Vol. 2 at 397.

        As the district court recognized, to proceed with this claim, Harrell must

  plausibly plead that defendants treated him differently from similarly situated

  inmates. See Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1173 (10th Cir. 2018).
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  “Individuals are similarly situated only if they are alike in all relevant respects.” Id.

  (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must do more than make conclusory

  allegations to establish an equal protection claim. See Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d

  967, 972 (10th Cir. 1995). Harrell’s allegations were merely conclusory and failed to

  establish the other inmates who purportedly received better treatment were similarly

  situated to him.

               4.     Qualified Immunity

        “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from

  liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

  statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

  “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government

  official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed

  questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When a defendant

  asserts qualified immunity, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish (1) the defendant

  violated a constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time.

  See id. at 232. The court may address either prong first. See id. at 236.

        The district court held that Harrell failed to establish either prong. Because we

  have affirmed the determination that Harrell failed to plausibly plead the violation of

  a constitutional right, we need not consider whether the law was clearly established.

  We affirm the district court’s award of qualified immunity on the individual-capacity

  § 1983 claims.

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         B.    Official-Capacity § 1983 Claims

         “An official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a

  suit against the entity.” Prince v. Sheriff of Carter Cnty., 28 F.4th 1033, 1048

  (10th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “neither a State nor its

  officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich.

  Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). They may be sued under § 1983 only

  for injunctive relief. See id. at 71 n.10; Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.18

  (1985). Further, “a governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity

  itself is a moving force behind the deprivation.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (internal

  quotation marks omitted). Harrell failed to plead specific facts to satisfy these

  requirements, particularly that any WDOC policy was a “moving force” behind the

  alleged constitutional violations.3

  III.   State Claims

         Harrell alleged violations of §§ 6, 14, 16, and 21 of Article 1 of the Wyoming

  Constitution. The district court held the state’s sovereign immunity barred these

  claims.

         “[T]he general rule in Wyoming is that the government is immune from

  liability, and, unless a claim falls within one of the statutory exceptions to

  governmental immunity, it will be barred.” State Dep’t of Corr. v. Watts, 177 P.3d

         3
         Although Harrell requested invalidation of the CVRs and restoration of his
  good-time credits, the district court could not order such relief in this § 1983 suit
  because a ruling in Harrell’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the
  punishment. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
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  793, 798 (Wyo. 2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The

  decision of whether to waive immunity for a governmental entity belongs to the

  Wyoming Legislature, not [the Wyoming Supreme] Court.” Craft v. State ex rel.

  Wyo. Dep’t of Health, 465 P.3d 395, 403 (Wyo. 2020).

        The Wyoming Constitution provides that “[s]uits may be brought against the

  state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law direct.” Wyo.

  Const. art. 1, § 8. The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, has held this provision “is

  not self-executing; that no suit can be maintained against the State until the

  legislature makes provision for such filing; and, that absent such consent, no suit or

  claim could be made against the State.” May v. Se. Wyo. Mental Health Ctr.,

  866 P.2d 732, 737 (Wyo. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Harrell has not

  identified any provision by the Wyoming legislature allowing the State to be sued

  under §§ 6, 14, 16, or 21 of Article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution. Accordingly, the

  district court correctly applied sovereign immunity to dismiss the state constitutional

  claims as to defendants in their official capacities. See May, 866 P.2d at 737

  (holding that plaintiff’s “civil rights claims, based on the Wyoming Constitution, fail

  because of no implementing legislation”).

        This leaves the state constitutional claims against defendants in their

  individual capacities. In discussing the authorities regarding immunity, defendants

  address claims “against the State (and its employees),” Aplees. Resp. Br. at 20, but

  they do not distinguish between defendants’ official capacities and their individual

  capacities. A claim against an employee in an individual capacity is not necessarily a

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  claim against the state. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167-68 (“A victory in a

  personal-capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than

  against the entity that employs him.”); Norton v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah &

  Ouray Rsrv., 862 F.3d 1236, 1250 n.5 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Sovereign immunity does

  not bar claims against a state officer sued in his individual capacity as long as the

  relief sought would not operate against the sovereign.”). It may well be that a

  plaintiff cannot bring claims under the state constitution against employees in their

  individual capacities in the absence of some enabling legislation—akin to the role

  § 1983 plays for federal constitutional claims—or that some other immunity applies.

  Defendants do not clearly brief these arguments, however, and it appears that the

  district court’s decision did not rest on any ground other than sovereign immunity.

  We therefore vacate the judgment in favor of defendants in their individual capacities

  on the state constitutional claims and remand for the district court to conduct further

  proceedings, which in its discretion may include declining to exercise supplemental

  jurisdiction over those claims. See Crane v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 15 F.4th 1296,

  1314 (10th Cir. 2021) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed, the court may,

  and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.”

  (internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                      CONCLUSION

        We affirm the dismissal of the claims under § 1983 and the official-capacity

  claims under the Wyoming Constitution. We vacate the dismissal of the

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  individual-capacity claims under the Wyoming Constitution and remand for further

  proceedings.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Carlos F. Lucero
                                           Circuit Judge

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