Court Opinion

ID: 9696349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:45:30.096163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.511929
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting).
. I. The facts regarding nonsupport by Michael, the father, are similar to those in numerous contempt proceedings brought to compel support. This case, however, con*154tains a vital difference: the objective is not to compel Michael to support his child but to end his parentage of Cody totally and permanently on account of his failure, without good cause, to pay support. That Michael did not pay in accordance with the dissolution decree, and that the nonpayment was without good cause in law, are undisputed facts.
Beyond this case lies an adoption proceeding by Cody’s stepfather. Present section 600.3(2) of the statute on adoptions, requiring either consent of the present parent or termination of the parent-child relationship, changes the prior law. See In re Adoption of Gustafson, 240 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 1976).
Our statutes now permit termination of the parent-child relationship for nonsupport without good cause in section 600A.8(4), The Code 1979:
The juvenile court shall base its findings and order under section 600A.9 on clear and convincing proof. The following shall be, either separately or jointly, grounds for ordering termination of parental rights:

4. A parent has been ordered to contribute to the support of the child or financially aid in the child’s birth and has failed to do so without good cause.
In the application of such a statute, the conduct of parents upon which forfeiture of the parental relationship is asked may range from a slight violation of section 600A.8(4) to a very aggravated violation evincing complete rejection of parental interest and responsibility. In practice, cases of nonsupport cover the full spectrum. I do not believe the General Assembly intended that a person lays his or her parentage on the line if he or she ever fails to make a required payment without good cause in law. Such a rule would undermine parentage in countless cases. See In re Griffin, 210 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1973) (“It is a fearful thing to terminate the relationship between a parent and child.”). The practical and customary procedure in the nonsupport case, although not sought here, is to bring the delinquent parent before the court, if necessary, on contempt charges. No doubt we all agree that courts are not to decree termination, robot-like, in every case where termination is asked and nonsupport without good cause appears, irrespective of the circumstances. I believe the General Assembly had the severe cases in mind, where the circumstances of the nonsupport persuade the tribunal that the parent has practically shrugged off the parent-child relationship. The care the General Assembly expressed for that relationship in the companion section in the Juvenile Code, section 232.116, demonstrates its solicitude for the relationship.
The question then is this: where does the present case fall in the spectrum? The record reveals the strife which frequently exists in marital breakup. Michael states he desired to visit the child during the two-year dissolution period, and he professes a desire to continue to do so. His father supports him in this, and both of his parents desire to visit the child. See § 598.35. Michael claims he tried unsuccessfully six or eight times, through calls to the parents of his former wife, Connie, to locate Connie and the child; Connie moved several times. Michael testified:
Q. Do you want to visit the child? A. Yes.
Q. How long have you wanted to visit the child? A. Ever since he was born.
Q. What efforts have you made to secure visitation? A. Everything I could think of. My hands were tied for a while. Nobody was giving me any cooperation.
Q. Are you willing to pay child support? A. Yes sir.

Q. You love your child? A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever had an address of Connie so you could send the money there? A. Just her folks’ address is all I ever knew.
Q. Do you want your relationship with your child terminated? A. No, sir.
Q. Do you want to maintain the relationship with the child? A. Yes.
Q. As he grows up? A. Yes.
*155On the other hand, Connie says she and her present husband were listed in the telephone directory, and Michael could have located her. She also testified, however:
Q. In fact, you don’t want him to know where you are living, do you? A'. No, not particularly.

Q. You don’t want him to visit the child, do you? A. In the best interests of Cody, no; I do not.

Q. Your parents did not tell him where you were living at your request? A. Yes.
Connie also sought to show that Michael was violent, but this attempt appears- to have ended in a draw. She testified:
A. He had a violent temper at times. I felt he was very irresponsible. During the separation he was free to come and see Cody any time, and most of the time he did he was violent and caused physical damage to not only my home I was living in but bodily damage to me.
Q. To you? A. Yes.
Q. Is it safe to say you were afraid of Mike Abbot? A. Yes.
Later this occurred on cross-examination:-
Q. Let me ask you this. You were testifying to Mike’s temper before you got divorced. A. Yes.
Q. At that time was he mad at you. because you were using drugs?
Mr. Meyer [one of the attorneys of Cody’s stepfather]: Objection. Irrelevant. ''
Mr. Holmes [Michael’s attorney]: They went into it.
Mr. Meyer: No, we didn’t, Your Honor.
The Court: I don’t think you took any. part in the examination of the witness;
Mr. Meyer: I believe I can object though, can I not?
The Court: Not ordinarily.
Mrs. Meyer [stepfather’s co-counsel]: Would you like me to make the objection?
The Court: I believe I do.
Mrs. Meyer: I do object to this as totally irrelevant. I don’t see what this has to do with it.
The Court: I don’t want to get into that issue if I can avoid it.
Mr. Holmes: Can we call it a draw on the temper then?
The Court: Fairly well.
Michael testified on the issue of injury:
Q. Have you ever harmed the child? A. No, sir.
Q. Would you ever harm the child if visitation was set out for you? A. No, sir.
The real reason for the present proceeding appears to be the prospective adoption by the stepfather, to which Michael will not consent. See § 600.3(2). Connie testified:
Q. He didn’t get visitation because he didn’t pay the hundred dollars a month? A. No. Not at all. I never took him to court to get the money.
Q. You have never tried to get the money? A. No.
Q. The reason was you didn’t want him to find out your address? A. That wasn’t the reason.
Q. You just said it a minute ago. A. That wasn’t the reason I didn’t take him to court to get the money. So far as him paying the money, it didn’t make any difference. It is in Cody’s best interests that Mike Abbott didn’t see him.
Q. We are in court today not because of the money; you don’t think the money has anything to do with it, is that correct? A. Yes; I do. He has not supported the child. He has abandoned the child.
Q. Didn’t you say it didn’t make any difference to you? A. I said before I have not made any attempt to come to court to get $200 the first 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 months we were married. It has been 2 years. The boy is 3 years old. I am remarried. We have a family. It is now not just 3 or 4 months. It is 25 months.

Q. The major reason, aside from the fact that you are not getting any child support that is ordered to be given to you, that you are bringing, or Mike [stepfather] is bringing this action is so that *156you can — Mike can adopt Cody? A. Yes; that is exactly correct.
Looking’ at finances, Michael admitted that he could pay $100 monthly support. He grosses $400 weekly as a factory worker and has about $200 weekly net:
Q. You are telling me you only bring home 50 percent of your wage? A. Yes. 85 goes into my credit union, 50 into savings, 25 to a loan, 10 into paying to work.
Q. What is paid into the credit union? Is that a loan? A. Yes.
Q. What is the loan for? A. Rent.
Q. I don’t understand how that works. A. I had a bad month one time. I was laid off 30 days without pay and I needed the rent so I borrowed the money.
Q. How much did you borrow? A. 250, 265.
Q. How much do you have in your savings account?
A. A little over $500.
Q. This is added to at $50 per week? A. Yes.
Q. Where is the savings account? A. With my credit union.
Q. Is that the John Deere credit union? A. Yes.
Q. There is $50 and $65. That has you down to about 290. I assume the rest goes for taxes? A. Yes. Union dues, things like that.
Q. In other words, it wouldn’t have been very difficult for you to pay $100 a month? A. Not at all.
Q. Why did you refuse to pay? A. She wasn’t letting me see him.
In answering questions by this court, Michael’s attorney also candidly stated at the oral argument that he had “relieved” Michael of funds, undoubtedly as a payment on fees.
The record contains other evidence regarding the circumstances of the case, of the kind commonly found in contempt proceedings.
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court summed up the case as follows:
The Court: The record in this matter shows that decree of dissolution was entered on September 19,1977, it being DM No. 324, on the petition of Connie Lee Abbott and concerning Michael David Abbott.
The provisions of the decree entered in that case require Mr. Abbott to contribute to the support of his child, Cody Michael Abbott, at the rate of $100 per month, but the decree is silent with respect to the place and time that the monthly payments had to be made.
It appears satisfactorily from the record, so far as the Court is concerned, there hasn’t been anything paid on the requirements as far as child support is concerned since the entry of the decree in September 1977. Apparently part of this disinclination or refusal to pay child support is attributed to difficulties over visitation, with which the Court is not particularly concerned in this cause of action.
I think in view of the record made here, there isn’t clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights between Mr. Abbott and his child, Cody Michael Abbott, should be terminated.
Under these circumstances, the Court is going to make the following ruling. In the event the delinquent child support is paid to the Clerk of the District Court by October 22, 1979, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice at the petitioner’s costs. If that child support, as required by the decree, has not been paid on or before October 22,1979, the allegations of the petition will be considered sustained, his parental rights will be terminated and Connie Lee Klobnock will be appointed as guardian and custodian of the child, Cody Michael Abbott.
Michael did not raise $2400 within the fourteen-day period allowed by the court; he paid $400. The court set the proceeding for further hearing, and the parties entered into the following stipulation:
Come now the parties and stipulate that if called upon to testify, Michael David Abbott would testify as follows:
*1571. That on October 8,1979, the Honorable A. V. Hass, Judge ordered Michael David Abbott to pay his delinquent child' support in full on or before October 22, 1979. The sum amounted to approximately $2,400.00.
2. That in an effort to raise this sum, Michael David Abbott sought to borrow money from Cash Credit, Dial Finance, and Beneficial Finance Companies of Des Moines, Iowa, and was refused credit.
3. That he sought to borrow money from his parents and friends and was unable to do so.
4. That he managed to borrow $295 from the John Deere Credit Union and paid that sum together with $105 to the Court as child support.
5. That he has made an honest effort to comply with the Court order and has done so to the best of his ability.
After the second hearing, the court terminated Michael’s parentage of Cody. The court stated in its conclusions:
If an able parent opts to ignore his support obligation, there is no constitu-'-tional reason why his parental rights' should not be severed. The Court finds .' that the Petitioner is Cody’s stepparent, that the evidence is clear and convincing that Michael David Abbott was ordered to contribute to the support of his son,. Cody Michael Abbott, at the rate of $100 monthly when the marriage of Cody’s parents was dissolved on September 19; 1977, that the father was aware of his obligation to provide such support, that he failed to contribute appreciably to' such support until the commencement of the present proceeding, that such failure was without good cause, that the father ‘ was afforded an opportunity to eliminate the deficiency in support payments, that he failed to do so and that he has made no representation that he will perform h: the future as required by the decree of. dissolution. His failure without good cause to support his child is the equivalent of abandonment. In the Interest of Kelley, 262 N.W.2d 781.
Michael appealed.
II. I am in complete agreement with the view that vigorous efforts should be made to compel parents to support their children. The whole legal apparatus for compelling support has been too lax. In the process of increasing our diligence, however, we should not swing the pendulum too far to the other extreme and unduly undermine parent-child relationships. A typical factual context in which to consider termination on the basis of nonsupport is illustrated by the decision cited by the trial court, In re Kelley, 262 N.W.2d 781 (Iowa 1978). The circumstances there were far more aggravated than here. We quoted the trial court as concluding:
“That the state has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parents of said child have substantially, continuously and repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon them by such parent-child relationship; that the mother of the child is palpably unfit to continue in her parent-child relationship due to her consistent pattern of specific conduct detrimental to the physical and mental health of the child; that the parents, as directed by the court, have failed to correct the conditions which brought about the adjudication of neglect in December of 1974, that all efforts by the Linn County Department of Social Services have failed to remedy those conditions; that, further, the natural father, Michael Kelley, has abandoned the child and failed to pay support as ordered so as to meet substantially the requirement of his intent to permanently abandon the child.”
Id. at 784.
I think that the present case is a proper one for severe contempt strictures — which have never been sought — but that it falls considerably short of clear and convincing proof of aggravating circumstances which are essential to warrant the drastic step of terminating the relationship altogether on account of nonsupport without good cause. Michael should have paid the child support, but total termination, under the circumstances here, seems too harsh. I would thus reverse the judgment.