Court Opinion

ID: 9363939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 22:00:55.036005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.941642
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11413    Document: 41-1      Date Filed: 01/17/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11413
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        SEAN PATRICK FARRELLY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cr-00044-MMH-PDB-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                21-11413

        Before BRANCH, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Sean Patrick Farrelly pleaded guilty to “recruit[ing], en-
        tic[ing], transport[ing], obtain[ing], maintain[ing], patroniz[ing],
        and solicit[ing]” a minor “to engage in a commercial sex act,” in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1591(a)(1). He moved to withdraw
        his plea, and the district court denied the motion. Farrelly was then
        sentenced to thirty years in prison, followed by ten years of super-
        vised release. He appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
        and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
                           FACTUAL BACKGROUND

               Farrelly lived with his girlfriend, Vicky Cole, and her teen-
        aged boy and girl for several years. From March 2018 to February
        2019, when he was arrested, Farrelly had sex with the girl. She was
        sixteen years old at the time.
               Farrelly texted the victim from a cell phone to set up their
        sex acts. Before sex, he “primed [her] up” by having her “drink
        alcohol or smoke marijuana.” After sex, he paid her in cash and
        cigarettes.
              Eventually, the victim cooperated with law enforcement
        and made controlled calls to Farrelly to catch him. Law enforce-
        ment also uncovered incriminating evidence after executing a
        search warrant on Farrelly’s residence and truck.
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        21-11413               Opinion of the Court                         3

                            PROCEDURAL HISTORY

               The section 1591(a)(1) charge was the only count against
        Farrelly. The magistrate judge appointed Assistant Federal De-
        fender Maurice Grant to represent him. Farrelly pleaded not guilty
        at his arraignment and went before the magistrate judge a couple
        of months later to change his plea to guilty.
               During the change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge ad-
        vised Farrelly of the rights he would be giving up by pleading
        guilty, the elements of the charge against him, the penalties and
        consequences of pleading guilty, and the sentencing process. Far-
        relly was also allowed to ask questions of Grant. At the end of the
        hearing, the magistrate judge noticed “from [Farrelly’s] facial ex-
        pression” that he “might be a little hesitant” about changing his
        plea. The magistrate judge told Farrelly that he “need[ed] to feel
        really comfortable with” the decision, and he responded that he
        “d[id]n’t feel comfortable.” The magistrate judge noted that “if
        [Farrelly] plead[ed] guilty, [he] really [would] have limited oppor-
        tunities to withdraw the plea.” Then, the magistrate judge decided
        “not [to] go further” so Farrelly could have time to discuss his de-
        cision with Grant and “really think about” what he was doing.
               About a week later, Farrelly asked for—and received—an-
        other change of plea hearing. During the hearing, he said that no
        one had forced him to plead guilty, but that law enforcement had
        “indirectly . . . threatened” his family, including his adult daughter
        and Ms. Cole. He assured the magistrate judge that the threats
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-11413

        hadn’t caused him to plead guilty. The magistrate judge found that
        Farrelly entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
        and that he received “the advice and counsel of a competent law-
        yer,” i.e., Grant. Farrelly agreed with those findings. The magis-
        trate judge mentioned that Farrelly had fourteen days to object to
        the forthcoming recommendation that the district court accept his
        guilty plea. The objection period, though typically waived, was
        not waived in this case. During the hearing, Farrelly asked Grant
        if he could “withdraw [his] plea later on,” and Grant responded that
        he could not. Grant emphasized that Farrelly should plead guilty
        only if he was in fact guilty.
               Farrelly didn’t object to the magistrate judge’s recommen-
        dation, and the district court accepted his guilty plea and found him
        guilty of the section 1591(a)(1) charge. About a month later, pro-
        bation submitted the initial presentence investigation report,
        which showed a guideline range of thirty years to life in prison.
        Less than two weeks after the report, Grant moved to withdraw as
        Farrelly’s counsel because their attorney-client relationship “ha[d]
        devolved to the point” of being irreparably “severed.” The magis-
        trate judge granted the motion and appointed Ronald Maxwell as
        Grant’s replacement. Because Mr. Maxwell required “significant
        time to review the case” to address multiple issues that Farrelly had
        raised, the district court continued the sentencing hearing for about
        four months. About two months into the continuance, Farrelly
        moved to withdraw his guilty plea because he hadn’t entered it
        knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
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        21-11413                Opinion of the Court                         5

                In the motion, Farrelly contended that he had pleaded guilty
        because government agents threatened and coerced both him and
        those closest to him: Ms. Cole, his children, and his ex-wife. “[H]e
        felt he had no viable choice,” he said, “but to proceed with a [guilty]
        plea and thus protect himself and others from further harassment
        and possible unfounded criminal charges.” Farrelly claimed that
        he wanted to withdraw his plea for a while but didn’t know how
        and that Grant didn’t help him or tell him that he could object to
        the magistrate judge’s recommendation or withdraw his plea “at
        any time”—“for any reason or no reason”—before the district
        court accepted it. Farrelly “denie[d] the allegation of sex with a
        minor” and “the concept of money for sex.” He complained that
        “[h]e was never advised” that his guideline range could be thirty
        years to life after sentencing enhancements. And he asserted that
        the withdrawal of his plea wouldn’t prejudice the government or
        waste judicial resources and that he moved to withdraw at the “ear-
        liest reasonable time” given the change in his legal representation.
        Under “the totality of the circumstances,” said Farrelly, he “demon-
        strated . . . a fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea.”
              The district court held three hearings on the motion: two in
        January 2020 and one in December 2020. During the hearings,
        Grant testified that he told Farrelly during the second change of
        plea hearing that Farrelly couldn’t withdraw his guilty plea later
        on. Grant also testified that he didn’t advise Farrelly that Farrelly
        could withdraw his plea for any reason during the fourteen days
        that he had to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11413

        And Farrelly testified that he would have withdrawn his plea if he
        had been properly advised.
                 After the hearings, the district court denied the motion be-
        cause Farrelly hadn’t shown a fair and just reason to withdraw his
        plea. The district court explained that Farrelly entered his plea
        knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, as reflected in his answers
        under oath during the two change of plea hearings. The district
        court didn’t credit “his belated and wholly inadequate and illogical
        explanations for providing those answers.” The district court
        found that Farrelly didn’t want to withdraw his plea until after the
        district court accepted it and that he wouldn’t have withdrawn his
        plea earlier if Grant had provided him better counsel. The presen-
        tence investigation report, the district court determined, had
        “prompted . . . Farrelly’s desire to withdraw his guilty plea.” The
        district court considered the factors in United States v. Buckles, 843
        F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988), and concluded that they weighed
        against allowing Farrelly to withdraw his plea. The district court
        explained that Farrelly received close assistance of counsel from
        Grant, pleaded guilty “with full knowledge of the potential penalty
        he faced,” and failed to “present a compelling explanation” for the
        five months between the entry of his plea and the filing of his mo-
        tion to withdraw the plea. And the second change of plea hearing,
        the district court emphasized, had “readily satisfied all of the core
        concerns of Rule 11.” The district court also noted that granting
        the motion “would prejudice the victim” by requiring her to “relive
        . . . traumatic experiences.”
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        21-11413               Opinion of the Court                         7

               At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated the guide-
        line range of thirty years to life in prison. Keeping the calculations
        as they were, the district court gave Farrelly credit for acceptance
        of responsibility and didn’t enhance his sentence for obstruction of
        justice, despite the need for multiple hearings on his motion and
        his false testimony during the hearings. Before the parties dis-
        cussed sentencing, the victim’s father testified on her behalf. He
        described Farrelly as a “great manipulator” who “groomed” her to
        perform sex acts, and he shared the “tumult” that Farrelly had
        caused her, including “depression, outbursts of anger, . . . thoughts
        of suicide,” and a panic attack in the courtroom before the hearing.
               The government sought “a guideline sentence of imprison-
        ment followed by a lifetime of supervised release” to “reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just
        punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal
        conduct, and protect the public from further crimes” by Farrelly.
        The government pointed out Farrelly’s “long history of domestic
        violence” that “appear[ed] to increase with age,” and argued that
        time in prison hadn’t deterred him from “harm[ing] women.” In-
        stead, the government said, he “moved on to a younger, more vul-
        nerable person, someone . . . he should have been caring for, pro-
        tecting[,] and parenting.” The government noted that the victim
        “had no escape from him” because he “lived in her home,” ap-
        proached her in her bathroom and bedroom, and posed “as a pa-
        rental figure” to her. And Farrelly, the government contended,
        presented a high risk of reoffending based on his criminal history.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                21-11413

        The government also asserted that Farrelly contacted his children
        and Ms. Cole to “coerce . . . or tamper with [the victim] in some
        way so she would change the case against him.”
                Farrelly asked the district court to vary downward from the
        guideline range to between twelve and fifteen years in prison based
        on the average sentences in similar cases according to the 2019 Fed-
        eral Human Trafficking Report. He argued that his criminal his-
        tory really boiled down to the domestic violence. And the domes-
        tic violence, he said, involved only two victims—his ex-wife (the
        “one primary victim”) and Ms. Cole—and stopped after he served
        time in prison. He emphasized that he had mostly been “well em-
        ployed” and “a good provider for his family.” In fact, his son testi-
        fied: “[M]y dad’s always been the best father anybody could ask
        for. And he’s not a danger to the community or a predator.” Far-
        relly asked the district court to consider that he had been doing
        “hard time” in the county jail for over two years related to the sec-
        tion 1591(a)(1) charge. He introduced into evidence a report by an
        expert stating that his risk of committing another sexual offense
        was low. And he noted that his offense didn’t involve “physical
        abuse or threats,” and that he hadn’t committed “this type of con-
        duct” before. He also argued that he “w[ould] suffer punishment
        beyond” his imprisonment because he would “be required to reg-
        ister as a sex offender” and, thus, his crime “w[ould] follow him his
        whole life.”
              The district court denied Farrelly’s request for a downward
        variance and “impose[d] the low end of the guidelines”: thirty
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        21-11413               Opinion of the Court                        9

        years in prison. The district court began by listing the sentencing
        factors in 18 U.S.C. sections 3553(a)(1), (2), and (4). The district
        court regarded the first factor, the nature and circumstances of Far-
        relly’s offense, as “extraordinarily serious.” The district court ex-
        plained that Farrelly was one of the victim’s caregivers, in a sup-
        posedly committed relationship with her mother, and thus should
        have told her to abstain from marijuana and alcohol. Instead, the
        district court noted, he plied her with those very substances to get
        her to have sex with him “over and over and over again.” By pay-
        ing the victim for sex, Farrelly inflicted unfathomable damage on
        her, the district court said. And the district court discerned “very
        little mitigation in . . . Farrelly’s personal history and circum-
        stances” because he had “a good childhood” and engaged in “inci-
        dent after incident of domestic violence” as an adult, revealing “a
        complete lack of respect for the law in almost all of the . . . inci-
        dents.” The district court questioned the value of Farrelly’s expert
        report because he lied to the expert when she assessed his risk of
        recidivism. He told her that he hadn’t used drugs, paid for sex, or
        had sex with a minor.
                The district court didn’t vary downward for three reasons:
        “the guidelines [we]re correctly calculated,” Farrelly received the
        benefit of acceptance of responsibility (and no obstruction of jus-
        tice) even though he didn’t really accept responsibility or show any
        remorse, and his “hard time” in jail was mainly “self-inflicted” due
        to his motions to withdraw his plea and to continue the proceed-
        ings. The district court determined that Farrelly needed “very
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-11413

        serious consequences to reflect the seriousness of [his] offense, to
        promote respect for the law, to accomplish any sort of deterrence,
        to accomplish just punishment for destroying the life of a child, and
        to protect the public.” After observing that it had heard from the
        parties and the victim, read letters submitted by family and friends,
        and reviewed the expert report and the presentence investigation
        report, the district court sentenced Farrelly under 18 U.S.C. sec-
        tions 3551 and 3553 to thirty years in prison, followed by ten years
        of supervised release. “[H]aving considered all of the various sen-
        tencing factors and the specific facts regarding the actual offense
        conduct,” the district court expressly concluded that this sentence
        was “sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy the statu-
        tory purposes of sentencing.”
                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

               We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
        a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. United States v.
        Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). We will find an abuse
        of discretion only if “the denial [wa]s arbitrary or unreasonable.”
        Id. (quotation omitted). We also review for abuse of discretion the
        substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the district
        court. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (en banc). We will find an abuse of discretion only if the district
        court (1) didn’t consider “relevant factors that were due significant
        weight,” (2) gave “significant weight to an improper or irrelevant
        factor,” or (3) made “a clear error of judgment in considering the
        proper factors.” Id. at 1189.
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        21-11413                   Opinion of the Court                               11

                                       DISCUSSION

              Farrelly appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
        withdraw his guilty plea and the substantive reasonableness of his
        sentence. We address these issues in turn.
              The Denial of the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
               Farrelly argues that he showed a fair and just reason to with-
        draw his guilty plea. He contends that Grant, his first attorney,
        provided ineffective assistance of counsel in telling him that he
        couldn’t withdraw his plea instead of advising him about his abso-
        lute right to withdraw his plea for any reason before the district
        court accepted it. Farrelly would have moved to withdraw his plea
        sooner, he claims, if Grant hadn’t misinformed him about his rights
        but had instead explained to him the importance of either the pro-
        cedural rule governing the withdrawal of guilty pleas or the four-
        teen-day period for objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommen-
        dation that the district court accept his plea. 1 Farrelly also says that
        he only entered his plea because law enforcement threatened his
        family. If he could withdraw his plea, he argues, his trial wouldn’t
        expend any more judicial resources than a typical trial would, and
        the government wouldn’t suffer any prejudice because state and

        1
         For the first time in his reply brief, Farrelly argues that Grant also failed to
        advise him about sentencing enhancements and several other issues. But, be-
        cause these arguments come too late, we don’t consider them on appeal. See
        Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Because he raises th[e]
        argument for the first time in his reply brief, it is not properly before us.”).
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11413

        federal law enforcement have been involved in the case for a while
        and all (or almost all) witnesses are local. Farrelly also asserts that
        he filed his motion “in a reasonably timely manner” given his
        change in counsel.
                “A defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty . . . after the
        court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the de-
        fendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the with-
        drawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). To determine whether the
        defendant showed a fair and just reason, we “consider the totality
        of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Buckles, 843 F.2d at
        471–72. Generally, we focus on four factors: (1) “whether close
        assistance of counsel was available”; (2) “whether the plea was
        knowing and voluntary”; (3) “whether judicial resources would be
        conserved”; and (4) “whether the government would be prejudiced
        if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Id. at 472.
        The first two factors are the most important. See United States v.
        Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987) (giving little
        weight to the third and fourth factors). We commit to the district
        court’s discretion any determinations about the “good faith, credi-
        bility[,] and weight of a defendant’s assertions in support of” his
        motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472.
                After weighing the testimony, the district court found that
        Farrelly didn’t want to withdraw his guilty plea until after the
        presentence investigation report came out—over a month after the
        district court accepted Farrelly’s guilty plea. This finding is sup-
        ported by the record and within the district court’s discretion. Id.
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        21-11413                Opinion of the Court                        13

        Because Farrelly didn’t want to withdraw his plea until well after
        the district court accepted it, Grant’s failure to inform him that he
        could withdraw it before its acceptance or to explain the signifi-
        cance of objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation
        didn’t have any effect.
                In all other respects, Grant provided Farrelly close assistance
        of counsel. During both change of plea hearings, Farrelly testified
        that Grant told him about the section 1591(a)(1) charge and an-
        swered all his questions. During the first hearing, he also testified
        that he talked to Grant about the sentencing guidelines. And dur-
        ing the second hearing, he testified that he discussed his case fully
        with Grant, had enough time to talk to Grant, and was satisfied
        with—and didn’t have any complaints about—Grant’s representa-
        tion. Also during the second hearing, when the magistrate judge
        asked whether Farrelly agreed that he had “the advice and counsel
        of a competent lawyer” in Grant, Farrelly said yes. Further, during
        the second hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Grant tes-
        tified that Farrelly could—and did—call him from behind bars to
        discuss his case. Given Grant’s availability and the “strong pre-
        sumption” that a defendant’s statements during change of plea
        hearings are true, United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th
        Cir. 1994), the first Buckles factor weighs against finding a fair and
        just reason to withdraw the plea.
               Although Farrelly now claims that his “primary reason for
        entering a guilty plea centered around the threats” against his fam-
        ily, he testified to the contrary during his second change of plea
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11413

        hearing. He testified—twice—that no one threatened or coerced
        him to plead guilty. And he said that he was “confident” the threats
        against his family weren’t causing him to plead guilty. The district
        court credited this testimony over the assertions Farrelly made in
        support of his motion to withdraw his plea, and it was within its
        discretion to do so. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. Farrelly doesn’t
        give any other reason for doubting the knowing, voluntary, and
        intelligent nature of his plea, and none is apparent from the record.
        Indeed, from the extensive change of plea hearings, we see that
        Farrelly’s guilty plea was free from coercion and that he under-
        stood the nature of the charge against him and the consequences
        of his plea, including that his sexual offense carried registration re-
        quirements. See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1289
        (11th Cir. 2003) (“When a district court accepts a guilty plea, it must
        ensure that the three core concerns of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
        of Criminal Procedure have been met: (1) the guilty plea must be
        free from coercion; (2) the defendant must understand the nature
        of the charges; and (3) the defendant must know and understand
        the consequences of his guilty plea.” (quotation omitted)). Thus,
        the second Buckles factor weighs against finding a fair and just rea-
        son to withdraw the plea.
              Because the first two factors are the most important and
        they both weigh against a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea,
        we do not discern an abuse of discretion in the district court’s
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        21-11413                Opinion of the Court                          15

        denial of Farrelly’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, we
        affirm.2
                   The Substantive Reasonableness of the Sentence
               Farrelly contends that his sentence of thirty years in prison
        is substantively unreasonable and that twelve to fifteen years
        would suffice to punish him. In imposing its sentence, the district
        court “fixate[d],” he says, on the seriousness of his offense even
        though, “in terms of sex trafficking cases, this case involved typical
        but somewhat mild mannered . . . conduct.” Farrelly explains that
        he didn’t bind or kidnap the victim, take her from her home, im-
        prison her, inflict physical violence on her, use a firearm, or employ
        “any particularly aggravating circumstances.” As to his criminal
        history, Farrelly notes that since his release from prison for his most
        recent domestic violence incident, he “had a clean record,” and he
        had no history of “inappropriate sexual conduct with anyone,
        much less a minor.” Farrelly describes himself as a good provider
        and “a family man” and points to his expert’s report as evidence of
        his low risk of sexually reoffending. In his view, the district court
        abused its discretion when it gave undue weight to the seriousness
        of his offense; disregarded his age, low risk of recidivism, and lack
        of criminal history for sexual offenses like prostitution; and created
        a disparity between his sentence and the average sentences for sex

        2
          We also note that “enough judicial resources have been expended in this
        case.” Buckles, 843 F.2d at 474.
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        16                          Opinion of the Court                        21-11413

        trafficking involving minors according to the 2019 Federal Human
        Trafficking Report. 3
                The district court considered not only all section 3553(a) sen-
        tencing factors, including the guideline range for Farrelly’s sen-
        tence, but also the “specific facts” of his case. United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2015). Then, it im-
        posed a sentence at the bottom of the guideline range. We gener-
        ally expect a sentence in the guideline range to be substantively
        reasonable. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir.
        2014). That the sentence fell well below the statutory maximum
        of life imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), also sup-
        ports its substantive reasonableness, see United States v. Croteau,
        819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A sentence imposed well be-
        low the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of reason-
        ableness.”).
               Farrelly complains that the district court paid too much at-
        tention to the seriousness of his offense. But “[t]he decision about
        how much weight to assign a particular sentencing factor is ‘com-
        mitted to the sound discretion of the district court.’” Rosales-
        Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254 (quoting United States v. Williams, 526
        F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)). And because “[c]hild sex crimes
        are among the most egregious and despicable of societal and

        3
          Farrelly argues, for the first time in his reply brief, that the district court’s
        sentence duplicated enhancements that he received. This argument also
        comes too late for us to consider. See Lovett, 327 F.3d at 1183.
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        21-11413                Opinion of the Court                        17

        criminal offenses, . . . courts have upheld lengthy sentences in these
        cases as substantively reasonable.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d
        1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009). In Farrelly’s view, his offense wasn’t
        that serious because he didn’t force his victim from her home or
        become physically violent with her. But the district court observed
        that she wasn’t safe from him in her home and that he inflicted
        plenty of damage on her, even though it wasn’t through physical
        violence. We discern no abuse of discretion in treating Farrelly’s
        offense as particularly serious.
                Farrelly also faults the district court for overlooking his low
        risk of recidivism and his criminal history. But the district court
        didn’t overlook these factors. It explicitly rejected his expert report
        as evidence of his risk of recidivism because he lied to the expert,
        and it agreed with the government that his criminal history was a
        better indicator of his risk of recidivism. Farrelly focuses on how
        likely he is to commit another sexual offense like this one. But the
        district court didn’t have to approach the issue so narrowly. The
        statutory purposes of sentencing more broadly include “pro-
        mot[ing] respect for the law” and “afford[ing] adequate deterrence
        to criminal conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(B). The district
        court determined that Farrelly’s sentence was “sufficient but not
        greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentenc-
        ing.” And the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in making
        this determination. Cf. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1222 (finding a sentence
        set at the statutory minimum to be substantively unreasonable
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  21-11413

        because the district court “discounted the value of general deter-
        rence for sexual crimes against children”).
                Finally, Farrelly says that the district court created an unwar-
        ranted sentencing disparity between him and similar defendants.
        He points to average sentences as support. But “the statistics [he]
        cites are bare numbers without context and, therefore, do not per-
        suade us that his sentence[ is] unreasonable.” United States v.
        Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306, 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).
               Because Farrelly’s sentence is not one of the “rare” substan-
        tively unreasonable sentences resulting from an abuse of a district
        court’s “very broad discretion” in sentencing, United States v.
        McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2013), we affirm.
                                   CONCLUSION

               Because the district court didn’t abuse its discretion when it
        denied Farrelly’s motion to withdraw his plea or when it imposed
        his sentence, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.