Court Opinion

ID: 9781073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:22.197175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:51.708940
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0192
                             Filed August 30, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHAD REESE BENNETT,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, Dustria A. Relph,

Judge.

      Chad Bennett challenges the sufficiency the evidence supporting his

convictions and the district court’s refusal to recuse herself. AFFIRMED.

      Erin M. Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
                                            2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

       Chad Bennett was charged with sexual abuse of a ten-year-old girl. To

maintain confidentiality, we will call the girl Holly, though that is not her real name. 1

In conjunction with the charges, a no-contact order was issued prohibiting Bennett

from contacting Holly personally or through third parties. Despite the no-contact

order, while Bennett was in jail awaiting trial on the sexual-abuse charges he and

his mother hatched a plan to try to get Holly to recant her allegations against

Bennett. The plan was hatched via text messages2 exchanged between Bennett

(from jail) and his mother (who was not in jail). The plan called for the mother to

contact Holly to try to get her to say Bennett did not sexually abuse her. After the

plan was put into action and then discovered, the State charged Bennett with

stalking,3 conspiracy to commit stalking,4 tampering with a witness,5 and

conspiracy to tamper with a witness.6 Bennett’s mother was charged similarly as

a co-defendant.

       Bennett waived his right to a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. The district

court found Bennett guilty on all four counts.7 He appeals. He contends the

1 We used a random-name generator to come up with the name Holly.
2  The evidence at trial established that the jail housing Bennett had a
communication system that enabled inmates to use a kiosk in the jail to send
electronic messages to people outside jail. The people on the outside could then
communicate back to inmates via electronic message using the same system. For
ease of reference, we will refer to these electronic messages as text messages.
3 See Iowa Code §§ 708.11(2), .11(3)(a) (2020) (a class “C” felony as a third

offense).
4 See Iowa Code §§ 706.1(1), .3(2) (a class “D” felony).
5 See Iowa Code § 720.4 (an aggravated misdemeanor).
6 See Iowa Code §§ 706.1(1), .3(3) (an aggravated misdemeanor).
7 Bennett was tried jointly with his mother, who did not waive her right to a jury trial.

The mother’s case is not before us in this appeal.
                                           3

evidence is insufficient to support the guilty findings on all four counts and the

district court erred by refusing to recuse herself.

I.     Sufficiency of the Evidence

       We begin our discussion of Bennett’s sufficiency challenge by rejecting two

themes that permeate his arguments on appeal. The first theme is that Bennett

did not commit the crimes charged because all he did was try to get Holly to testify

to the “truth.” Of course, Bennett’s concept of truth is a narrative in which Bennett

did not sexually abuse Holly—the opposite of the narrative Holly told authorities

that resulted in the sexual-abuse charges against Bennett. We reject Bennett’s

suggestion that he is somehow insulated from criminal culpability for his efforts to

try to get Holly to change her narrative simply by labeling his preferred narrative

as “the truth.” See State v. Halleck, 308 N.W.2d 56, 59 (Iowa 1981) (“To improperly

influence a witness is not limited to asking a witness to lie.”).

       The second theme we reject is Bennett’s portrayal of isolated pieces of

evidence from the record as fact. We reject this theme because it asks us do the

opposite of what our standard of review requires us to do.           In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial we view the district court’s findings as

we would a jury verdict, meaning we are bound by the district court’s finding of guilt

if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 857

(Iowa 2021). Evidence supporting a guilty finding is substantial if, when viewed in

the light most favorable to the State, it could convince a rational fact finder that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. As the standard of review

requires us to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we reject

Bennett’s efforts to have us view the evidence in the light most favorable to him.
                                          4

       With this standard of review in mind, we address the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting each of the four charges of which Bennett was found guilty.

       A.     Stalking

       On the stalking charge, the State charged Bennett as a principal or as an

aider and abettor. As a result, the State was required to prove:

       1.     Bennett or someone he aided and abetted purposefully engaged in

       a course of conduct directed at Holly that would cause a reasonable person

       to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened; and

       2.     Bennett knew or should have known that a reasonable person would

       feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened by the course of

       conduct.

See Iowa Code § 708.11(2). As it relates to the facts of this case, “course of

conduct” means maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person without

legitimate purpose on two or more occasions. See id. § 708.11(1)(b), (d).

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the guilty finding, the evidence

establishes that Bennett and his mother exchanged text messages in which they

put together the plan to have the mother contact Holly to try to get her to say

Bennett did not sexually abuse Holly. Preying on Bennett’s belief that Holly was

religious, the plan included telling Holly she would go to hell if she didn’t tell the

truth—again, with the understanding that Bennett’s version of the truth was that he

did not sexually abuse Holly. The plan also included having the mother entice

Holly to talk to her by giving Holly specific types of candy that Bennett knew Holly

favored and offering to let Holly see Bennett’s kittens. The plan included details

about opportunities the mother should engineer to run into Holly.              Those
                                          5

opportunities included trying to find Holly at a city-sponsored Halloween event,

driving around the neighborhood where Holly lived around school-closing time,

hanging out at Holly’s neighbor’s house (Holly is a neighbor to Bennett’s brother)

until Holly could be spotted, and trying to get Bennett’s nephew (a neighbor to

Holly) to offer to buy a treat at a local coffee shop if Holly would come with him

while the mother waited at the coffee shop to talk to Holly and try to capture a video

or audio recording of Holly saying Bennett did not sexually abuse her.

       Evidence established that Bennett’s mother implemented the plan. Holly

testified that Bennett’s mother, who Holly did not know before the mother told Holly

who she was, approached Holly five to ten times. Holly provided details about two

of those contacts, during which the mother gave Holly candy (the exact type of

candy referenced in the text messages between Bennett and his mother) and gave

Holly a note that, among other things, said, “God bless you.” Holly became

frightened by these interactions with the mother—who Holly referred to as “the

creepy lady”—and told her own mother about them. Holly’s mother told Holly to

avoid any future contact with Bennett’s mother, so, when Holly would see her, she

would run away. Nevertheless, Holly saw Bennett’s mother driving very slowly

past Holly’s house several times, with Holly running away each time. Various

contacts and attempted contacts were confirmed not only by Holly’s testimony but

also by Bennett’s mother’s testimony, the testimony of a handyman working at

Holly’s house, and the text messages exchanged between Bennett and his mother.

       In the face of this evidence, Bennett contends the State failed to prove either

element of the offense. He launches three attacks on the evidence. First, he

contends the mother had a legitimate purpose to contact Holly because all the
                                          6

mother was doing was encouraging Holly to tell the truth. As previously noted, we

reject this contention. Bennett’s use of the word “truth” equates to having Holly

say Bennett did not sexually abuse her—the opposite of the information Holly

provided to law enforcement. A reasonable fact finder could find that having his

mother contact the key witness against him in violation of a no-contact order to try

to get the witness to change her narrative is not a legitimate purpose.

       Second, Bennett contends the contact between his mother and Holly would

not cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or

threatened. We disagree. A reasonable fact finder could easily conclude that a

reasonable ten-year-old child would feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or

threatened when the mother of the man the child accused of sexually abusing her

approaches with candy and talks to her about changing her accusations against

the accused.

       Third, Bennett contends that he did not know, nor should he have

reasonably known, that a reasonable person would feel terrorized, frightened,

intimidated, or threatened by the contact from his mother. Again, we disagree. A

reasonable fact finder could conclude that the no-contact order caused Bennett to

know that any type of contact with Holly was prohibited and that contact in violation

of the no-contact order for the purpose of trying to get her to change her account

of events would cause a reasonable ten-year-old child in that situation to feel

terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened.

       The district court’s finding that Bennett committed the crime of stalking is

supported by substantial evidence.
                                        7

      B.     Conspiracy to Commit Stalking

      To prove conspiracy to commit stalking based on the facts of this case, the

State had to prove:

      1.   Bennett agreed with his mother

             a. that one or both of them would commit the crime of stalking; or

             b. one or both of them would attempt to commit the crime of stalking;

      2.   Bennett entered the agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate

      the crime of stalking;

      3.   Bennett or his mother committed an overt act; and

      4.   Neither Bennett nor his mother were a law enforcement agent

      investigating the offense or assisting law enforcement agents in the

      investigation when the conspiracy began.

See Iowa Code § 706.1; Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 600.1.

      Bennett contends the State failed to meet its burden to establish these

elements because the evidence does not establish that Bennett or his mother

stalked or attempted to stalk Holly, there was a legitimate purpose for Bennett’s

mother to contact Holly, and there was no agreement to stalk Holly because

Bennett merely wanted her to tell the truth.       These contentions repeat the

arguments Bennett advanced in support of his challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence of his stalking conviction. For the reasons we rejected those arguments

regarding stalking, we also reject them with respect to conspiracy to commit

stalking. The district court’s finding that Bennett conspired to commit stalking is

supported by substantial evidence.
                                           8

       C.     Tampering with a Witness

       To prove Bennett guilty of tampering with a witness, the State was required

to prove that Bennett or the person he aided and abetted (i.e., his mother):

       1.   offered a bribe;

       2.   to a person who Bennett believed had been or may be summoned as a

       witness in a judicial proceeding;

       3.   with the intent to improperly influence the witness’s testimony.

See Iowa Code § 720.4; State v. LaPointe, 418 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1988).

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence establishes

that Bennett put together a three-page letter that he intentionally wrote to be

understood by a child. Bennett sent the letter to his mother, and she received it.

The letter lays out a narrative in which Holly is portrayed as having been tricked

into lying when she accused Bennett of sexually abusing her. The letter goes on

to explain ways in which Holly may get in trouble if she repeats her initial narrative

and how she can’t get in trouble if she refuses to answer any questions. The text

messages between Bennett and his mother confirm that the mother received the

letter, came in contact with Holly, had Holly look at the letter, and gave Holly the

specific candy Holly liked.8

       Although Bennett’s brief asserts the State failed to prove all three elements,

he makes no argument as to the second element, so we do not address it other

than to say the evidence is overwhelming that Bennett knew Holly had been or

8 Bennett’s mother testified that she didn’t actually do many of the things she

admitted doing in the text messages, claiming she just told Bennett she did things
so he would stop hounding her. The district court found Bennett’s mother’s
testimony not credible.
                                          9

may be summoned as a witness in his sexual-abuse case. Bennett’s focus is on

the first and third elements. He contends the candy supplied to Holly was not a

bribe but simply a method for his mother to “break the ice” with Holly as his mother

tried to convince Holly to change her account of events. He further contends that

urging Holly to tell the truth is not improper influence of Holly’s testimony.

       We reject both contentions. A bribe is “anything of value or benefit to induce

another to act improperly.”     Halleck, 308 N.W.2d at 58.       The text messages

between Bennett and his mother show that Bennett knew a certain type of candy

was Holly’s favorite, so he encouraged his mother to purchase that candy to give

to Holly as part of the plan to persuade Holly to change her narrative. A reasonable

fact finder could conclude that a special candy that the child favors is something

of value to a ten-year-old child. We are not persuaded by Bennett’s efforts to

reframe the giving of the candy as being merely an ice-breaking method. A

reasonable fact finder could find that the candy was offered as a thing of value

intended to induce Holly to change her account of the events leading to the sexual-

abuse charges against Bennett.

       As to Bennett’s claim that, even if the candy was a bribe, it was not intended

to improperly influence Holly’s testimony because all he was trying to do was get

her to tell the truth, we once again reject Bennett’s efforts to portray his efforts to

get Holly to recant her accusations against him as telling the truth. A reasonable

fact finder could conclude that Bennett was trying to improperly influence Holly to

change her version of events previously provided to law enforcement that led to

the sexual-abuse charges against Bennett. See id. at 59 (noting that improperly

influencing a witness “is not limited to asking a witness to lie” and “[a]n improper
                                         10

influence includes offers of a bribe to ‘persuade the witness to shade or color [the

witness’s] testimony in a certain way, without actually lying’” (quoting 4 J. Yeager

& R. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 445 (1979))).

       The district court’s finding of guilt on the charge of tampering with a witness

is supported by substantial evidence.

       D.     Conspiracy to Tamper with a Witness

       To prove conspiracy to tamper with a witness based on the facts of this

case, the State had to prove:

       1.   Bennett agreed with his mother

              a.     that one or more of them would commit the crime of tampering

              with a witness; or

              b.     attempt to commit the crime of tampering with a witness;

       2.   Bennett entered the agreement with the intent to promote or facilitate

       the crime of tampering with a witness;

       3.   Bennett or his mother committed an overt act; and

       4.   Neither Bennett nor his mother were a law enforcement agent

       investigating the offense or assisting law enforcement agents in the

       investigation when the conspiracy began.

See Iowa Code § 706.1; Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 600.1.

       Bennett’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

conviction on this charge is based on two arguments. First, he contends there is

insufficient evidence that either he or his mother tampered or attempted to tamper

with a witness. He incorporates by reference the arguments he used in support of

his challenge to the tampering-with-a-witness charge. For the same reasons we
                                          11

rejected his arguments to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the tampering

charge, we reject them with regard to the corresponding conspiracy charge.

       Bennett’s second contention is that there is insufficient evidence of an

agreement between his mother and him to promote or facilitate the crime of

tampering with a witness. We disagree. A reasonable fact finder could find that

the text messages between Bennett and his mother establish such an agreement.

       We find sufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that Bennett

committed the crime of conspiracy to tamper with a witness.

II.    Trial Court Recusal

       Bennett’s last contention is that the judge presiding over his case should

have recused herself because she had knowledge of Holly’s mental-health history

from a prior case. We review a district court’s recusal decision for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 433 (Iowa 2023). Abuse of discretion

occurs when the court’s decision is based on untenable grounds or the court has

acted unreasonably. Id. at 434.

       Bennett first raised this issue in his amended motion for new trial after the

district court issued its ruling finding Bennett guilty. Bennett complains that the

judge who presided over his bench trial also presided over a prior case in which

Holly’s mother sought termination of the parental rights of Holly’s father. Bennett

contends that, by presiding over the termination-of-parental-rights case, the judge

learned details about Holly’s “trauma, mental health, and behavioral issues.” He

further contends that this prior knowledge should have resulted in the judge’s

recusal, as it would impact the judge’s knowledge of Holly’s vulnerability, which he

argues is key to this case.
                                          12

         Bennett’s claim fails for two reasons. First, recusal is required only when

the judge’s alleged bias or prejudice stems from an extrajudicial source. Id.; see

also State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976) (“[E]vidence presented in

the trial of a prior cause, or definite views on the law, create no personal bias since

they do not stem from an extrajudicial source.”).          As Bennett asserts only

knowledge the judge learned from her work as a judge on a prior case, his claim

fails.

         Second, “actual prejudice must be shown before a recusal is necessary.”

State v. Millsap, 704 N.W.2d 426, 432 (Iowa 2005) (quoting State v. Sinclair, 582

N.W.2d 762, 766 (Iowa 1998)). Bennett makes no argument that he suffered

actual prejudice in this case as a result of the judge presiding over the prior matter,

and we see none. As the court explained in the verbal ruling denying Bennett’s

motion, Holly did not testify in the termination proceeding. Although the court did

hear some testimony regarding Holly’s mental health in the prior proceeding, the

focus was on the impact her father’s behavior had on her, which had no bearing

on the issues in Bennett’s trial. Further, there was a fair amount of evidence

presented regarding Holly’s mental-health and behavioral characteristics

throughout Bennett’s trial, so there is no reason to believe any findings in Bennett’s

case were based on the judge’s involvement in the prior case rather than the

evidence presented at Bennett’s trial.

         In short, Bennett has failed to meet his burden to show grounds for recusal.

See Trane, 984 N.W.2d at 434 (“The burden of showing grounds for recusal is on

the party seeking it.” (quoting State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002))).

As the judge had just as much obligation not to recuse herself when there was no
                                           13

basis for doing so as she did to recuse when there is a basis, see id., we find no

abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to recuse herself.

III.   Conclusion

       Bennett’s convictions for all four crimes are supported by substantial

evidence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to recuse herself

from this case due to having presided at a prior termination-of-parental-rights case

involving the child victim in this case.

       AFFIRMED.