Court Opinion

ID: 9705443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:06:24.698149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:11.425018
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Judge,
dissenting.
As I see it, the effect of the majority opinion is to hand codefendants jointly represented at trial a giant bootstrap with which they can win reversal of convictions at the appellate level by remaining silent at trial, and then asserting conflicting theories of defense on appeal. This legerdemain is accomplished without a showing of actual prejudice. The cases, however, do demand a showing of actual prejudice.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718, 64 L.Ed.2d 333, the United States Supreme Court declared that, "[in order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 1 (Emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court has also addressed this issue. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pivarnik observed that "[iln raising such an issue, tke defendant must show that where there was no objection at trial, such as here, the joint representation resulted in actual prejudice." Bean v. State (1984), Ind., 460 N.E.2d 936, 945 (emphasis supplied).
I cannot accept the majority's assertion that the defendants were presumably prejudiced because the focuses of their defenses were different. Tate contended that, although he had been inside the Kroger store, he met Mitchell outside the store and that Mitchell already had the grocery cart full of unpurchased merchandise. Record at 111-12. Tate also claimed to have been drinking all day. When asked if he knew what was occurring on the day of the incident he replied "[nJot really. I wasn't staggering drunk but I can't remember much. I remember parts." Record at 112. Mitchell, on the other hand, contended that he had no memory whatsoever of the incident because of his intoxicated state and continuing alcoholism. Record at 116-17. I can see no real conflict between these theories of defense. Mitchell's defense of no recollection effectively precluded any conflict with Tate's effort to paint Mitchell as the principal actor in the crime. Moreover, Tate's alternate claim of a faulty memory because of drunkenness is entirely consistent with Mitchell's similar defense. Furthermore, there is no showing that counsel's cross-examination of Tate and Mitchell was in any manner curtailed by his dual representation of the men. Indeed, *1152there is no suggestion in the record as to what areas of inquiry might have been opened had each defendant not been represented by the same lawyer.
The factual conflicts regarding which man possessed the wine bottle and the divergence between Tate's testimony and that of the witness who placed him in the store with the grocery cart do not establish actual prejudice as a result of joint representation. It is not unusual for a defendant's version of an incident to differ from that of a witness. Conflicts in the evidence are matters exclusively for the trier of fact's determination.
Finally, I reject any claim of actual prejudice because the evidence of Tate's and Mitchell's guilt is overwhelming. Eyewitness testimony established that groceries were removed from the Kroger store without benefit of payment and that both men were active in the attempted appropriation or the ensuing flight. Regardless of which defendant was in the store or which carried the wine bottle, both men could be found guilty of the offense under the provisions of Ind.Code 35-41-2-4 (1982) which provides that "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense...."
In Bean, supro, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the defendants' convictions despite their similar complaints about joint representation. The conclusion in Bean is apropos here:
''There is no showing that any of the evidence that helped one defendant hurt the other. Defendants do not show they were prejudiced in any way by the fact that they were tried and represented together, nor did they ever indicate in any manner during the trial that they felt they were. There is no merit to this issue."
Id. at 946. Thus, I cannot concur in the majority's attempt to infer prejudice when none is affirmatively established.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

. - Notwithstanding the majority's suggestion that no showing need be made of the adverse effect of a conflict of interest on the attorney's representation, the Supreme Court continues to require such proof. See Burger v. Kemp (1987), — U.S, —, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638, which considered both the alleged conflict of interest and its effect on the attorney's performance.