Court Opinion

ID: 9526549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:19:51.117985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:30.599411
License: Public Domain

Liacos, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the court’s treatment of all but one of the various issues raised by these cross appeals. I do not agree, however, that a new trial on damages is required. Therefore, I dissent from the court’s order in this case and from that part of the court’s opinion which holds that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of Corsetti’s collateral source income.
As the court itself makes clear, this State has a “collateral-source rule” of long standing. Under that rule, evidence of a plaintiff’s income from collateral sources — accident or disability insurance, or workers’ compensation benefits, for example — may not be admitted at trial because such evidence is “prejudicial or irrelevant.” Chaves v. Weeks, 242 Mass. 156, 158 (1922); See Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454,457-458 (1934); Gray v. Boston Elevated Ry., 215 Mass. 143, 146 (1913). Cf. Goldstein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 808-809 (1974).
The court effectively holds today that there is an exception to the collateral-source rule whenever evidence of collateral source income is offered as evidence that the plaintiff is a malingerer. Although the court speaks of impeaching the credi*28bility of the plaintiff, it seems clear that the gist of the court’s holding is that the evidence of collateral income may be offered to show a claimant to be a malingerer. In reaching this result, the court substitutes, without justification, its discretion for that of an experienced trial judge. It also creates an open-ended exception to the collateral-source rule. Under this newly stated exception, evidence of collateral source income would be admitted to show that the plaintiff has a reason other than his or her disability for staying out of work, i.e., an adequate income from collateral sources.
The court finds justification for its position in McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1 (1954). In McElwain, this court merely held that “it was within the discretion of the judge to admit [evidence of collateral source income] on cross-examination to affect the weight of the plaintiff’s previous testimony that he was disabled from working on account of the accident.” Id. at 3. McElwain, contrary to the court’s position today, evinced considerable deference for the discretion of the trial judge. “It is elementary that the extent of cross-examination is generally within the control of the trial judge.” Id.
The Appeals Court, in two rescript opinions, has upheld the discretion of a trial judge to allow questioning of the plaintiff on cross-examination on the issue of collateral source payments. Centola v. Driscoll, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 817 (1976); Nassif v. Smith, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 814 (1976). Nassif is inapposite to the present case, however, because the plaintiff initially introduced evidence of his receipt of collateral source payments and subsequently objected to the introduction of a stipulation of the amount of the collateral source income. I note that Centola v. Driscoll, supra, cites only McElwain v. Capotosto, supra, as authority.
I do not believe that McElwain v. Capotosto and Centola v. Driscoll clearly establish the existence of a malingerer exception as matter of law. Moreover, I would be wary of establishing such an exception. I would adopt the view that evidence of collateral source income may not be admitted to show that the plaintiff is a malingerer. Even assuming such evidence to be relevant, the inherent risks of undue prejudice should require *29exclusion of such evidence.11 would adhere to the view of the Supreme Court of the United States when it stated: “In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be other evidence having more probative value and involving less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability pension. . . . [Petitioner's receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact.” Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963). That there generally will be other, better, and less prejudicial evidence of malingering than evidence of the receipt of collateral source income is demonstrated by the present case. The plaintiff’s own doctor was called to the stand by the defendants, and he testified that his findings as to the plaintiff’s physical condition did not bear out the plaintiff’s complaints.
Some hostility to the collateral-source rule has been engendered by the notion that with the exclusion of evidence of collateral source income plaintiffs could receive a double recovery. This ground of objection no longer has much basis. See generally Esdaile, The Collateral Source Rule, 68 Mass. L. Rev. 102, 103-104 (1983) (discussing statutory elimination of double recovery). Thus, given that evidence of collateral source income has a “substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact,” Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., supra, and that the fear that the exclusion of such evidence will result in double recovery has been largely eliminated, I see no reason to recognize such an exception to the collateral-source rule.
I also do not agree with the court’s conclusion that the judge erred in excluding the evidence of collateral source income. To my knowledge, this is the first case in which this court has held that a party is “entitled as a matter of right” tq the admission of evidence of collateral source payments. I would not so hold, particularly as each of the cases which purportedly establishes *30this malingerer exception is grounded in respect for the judge’s discretion. See Pemberton v. Boas, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1015, 1018 (1982) (“Both [McElwain v. Capotosto and Nassif v. Smith] recognize . . . that the admissibility of [evidence of collateral source income] for that purpose [to show malingering] is within the discretion of the judge, and we cannot say the judge abused his discretion in excluding it here”).
Last, even if we assume that the defendant was entitled to the admission of evidence of collateral source income, the court’s opinion is remarkably conclusory on whether the assumed error prejudiced the defendant. As Justice Abrams correctly points out in her separate opinion, there was other evidence of malingering without the evidence of collateral benefits. There is no basis for the court’s conclusion that a new trial is necessary. I would have thought that, at the very least, the court would adhere to the fundamental notion that a trial error does not require a new trial, absent a showing of prejudice to the party aggrieved. G. L. c. 231, § 119 (1984 ed.) (“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment. . . unless ... the supreme judicial court deems that the error complained of has injuriously affected the substantial rights of the parties”). See Moran v. School Comm. of Littleton, 317 Mass. 591, 597 (1945), Larson v. Jeffrey-Nichols Motor Co., 279 Mass. 362, 368 (1932), and Posell v. Herscovitz, 237 Mass. 513, 516-517 (1921). I would affirm the judgments.

 This is particularly so where, as here, the trial judge has made such a determination of undue prejudice.