Court Opinion

ID: 9805129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:37:36.854127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:06.065299
License: Public Domain

Duffy, J.,
dissents, and votes to affirm the order of the Family Court with the following memorandum: I disagree with the majority’s reversal of the order of the Family Court and remittal of the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing and a new determination of the petition thereafter. In this case, the Family Court, which had presided over five prior neglect proceedings pertaining to the petitioner involving the subject child and the petitioner’s other children, had adequate relevant information to determine, without a hearing, that enforcement of the post-adoption contact agreement (hereinafter PACA) was not in the best interests of the subject child, especially because the petitioner had not seen the subject child, who was then seven years old, since he was four years old. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Family Court erred by failing to hold a hearing prior to deciding that visitation with the petitioner was not in the child’s best interests. I would affirm the Family Court’s order.
Notwithstanding any written agreement between the adoptive parents and the birth parent, a PACA does not confer on a birth parent an automatic right to visitation, and the Family Court cannot enforce an order incorporating a PACA unless it *821determines that such contact is in the best interests of the child (see Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]; Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [4]; Matter of Kristian J.P. v Jeannette I.C., 87 AD3d 1337, 1337 [2011]). Notably, Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [4] does not require a hearing before a court can determine whether enforcement of a PACA “is in the child’s best interests” (Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [4]; see Matter of Gerald T., 211 AD2d 17, 21 [1995]). In making a determination of best interests, when the Family Court has “adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed and provident determination as to the child’s best interest,” no hearing is required (Matter of Law v Gray, 116 AD3d 699, 700 [2014] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Zaratzian v Abadir, 105 AD3d 1054, 1054 [2013]; Matter of Hom v Zullo, 6 AD3d 536, 536 [2004]). Where the Family Court’s determination with respect to a petition to enforce a PACA has a sound and substantial basis in the record, it should not be disturbed (see Matter of Rebecca O., 46 AD3d 687, 688 [2007]).
Here, the Family Court, which has presided over a multitude of proceedings involving the petitioner for many years, had sufficient relevant information before it to make an informed and provident determination as to the subject child’s best interests without a hearing (see Matter of Law v Gray, 116 AD3d at 700; Matter of Zaratzian v Abadir, 105 AD3d at 1054-1055). In fact, simultaneously with proceedings on this petition, the Family Court was presiding over two other matters pertaining to this petitioner — a permanency hearing regarding a child as to whom the petitioner’s parental rights had recently been terminated and a neglect proceeding regarding the petitioner’s youngest child — and, together with this matter, was addressing issues in those matters. The Family Court also was fully familiar with the facts surrounding the judicial surrender of the subject child, which had occurred subsequent to a lengthy neglect proceeding, in which the petitioner had failed to comply with court-ordered services mandated by the order of disposition.
In dismissing the petition, the Family Court expressly noted that the petitioner had a long history before it, and that the court had made five prior findings of neglect against her, as well as terminated her rights with respect to two of her children. It was within the Family Court’s power to take judicial notice of its own prior and present proceedings and orders involving the petitioner, the subject child, and the petitioner’s other children (see Matter of Lane v Lane, 68 AD3d 995, 997 [2009]; Matter of Terrance L., 276 AD2d 699, 699 [2000]) in determining whether enforcement of the PACA was in the child’s best interests.
*822The Family Court also stressed that the petitioner had never been compliant with any of the services mandated by the dispositional orders that the court had issued in the multiple neglect proceedings. This Court has determined that suspension or even termination of parental visitation is in a child’s best interests when a parent is noncompliant with dispositional orders requiring participation in court-ordered services (see Matter of Gianni D.M. [Herbert M.], 118 AD3d 1003 [2014]; Matter of Anthony R. [Juliann A.], 90 AD3d 1055, 1056 [2011]; Matter of Peter C., Jr. [Peter C.], 88 AD3d 702, 702 [2011]).
In dismissing the petition, the Family Court also pointed to the more than two year lapse of time, which in fact was almost three years, between the petitioner’s filing of the petition and the last visit between the petitioner and the subject child. The Family Court noted that the petitioner had waited over two years since her last visit to commence this proceeding, even though the petitioner was very familiar with court proceedings. Moreover, the petitioner had been before the court frequently during those years on matters relating to her other children. The Family Court properly determined that it was not in the best interests of the child, who for most of his life did not have a relationship with the petitioner, to resume visits after an almost three year absence (see Matter of “Male” L., 82 Misc 2d 345, 349 [1975]). Almost half the child’s lifetime had occurred without any contact with the petitioner.
To that same end, given that the subject child was only seven years old, had been in the care of his adoptive parents since he was two years old, had been adopted before he turned three, and had not seen the petitioner since he was four, knowledge of the subject child’s current desire concerning visitation would not have been dispositive to the Family Court’s findings with respect to the best interests of the child (see Eschbach v Eschbach, 56 NY2d 167, 173 [1982]; Dintruff v McGreevy, 34 NY2d 887, 888 [1974]). Moreover, the attorney for the child supported dismissal of the petition and had represented to the court that the adoptive family had provided extremely good care of the child, who has special needs.
The Family Court also pointed to the petitioner’s history of disruptive visitation with the child when such visits had occurred, and the petitioner’s continued disruptive visits with her other children, as additional reasons for denying the petition.
The petitioner’s history of disruptive visits, together with the Family Court’s prior findings of noncompliance by the petitioner, and the fact that the petitioner had not seen the then seven-year-old child since he was four years old, constituted adequate *823relevant information for the court to determine, without a hearing (see Matter of Law v Gray, 116 AD3d at 700), that enforcement of the PACA was not in the subject child’s best interests. This determination had a sound and substantial basis and should not be set aside (see Matter of Rebecca O., 46 AD3d at 688).
Finally, to the extent that the majority has based its reversal on the brevity of the record before this Court, I note that the copies of the orders of disposition relied on by the Family Court and referenced in its order (see Hersch v Shapiro, 251 AD2d 456, 457 [1998]) were not included in the record before this Court. Notwithstanding, I find that the evidence in the record on appeal, even without these other relevant documents, is sufficient to establish that the Family Court had a sound and substantial basis for its dismissal of the petition. Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing the petition to enforce the visitation terms of the PACA.