Court Opinion

ID: 9834651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 01:45:43.284561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:03.051029
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
The petition for a rehearing filed by the defendant Lewis reargues at length the effect to be given the evidence in these cases. We gave full consideration to this matter before the original opinions filed herein were prepared. Our conclusion was that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court that a partnership existed between Lewis and Dinkelspeel, and a resurvey of the record in the light of what is now submitted in behalf of a rehearing does not lead us to a different result.
Our attention is now directed by the petition aforesaid to certain cases which deal with the right of one partner in a partnership composed of two members only, to restrict his liability for goods purchased by the other partner by giving express notice to the vendor and to his co-partner that he will not be bound in any way for the price of the goods thus obtained. See Dawson, Blackmore & Company v. Elrod, 105 Ky. 624, 49 S. W. 465, 88 A. S. R. 320; Leavitt v. Peck, 3 Conn. 125, 8 Am. Dec. 157; Monroe v. Connor, 15 Me. 178, 32 Am. Dec. 148. Aside from not being applicable *409because the facts in those cases were widely variant from those at bar, it would seem that by relying on decisions of this character' the defendant Lewis has undertaken to shift his ground. Heretofore he has strenuously asserted that no partnership existed between him and Dinkelspeel. He now appears to argue that as a partner he had the right to, and did, restrict Dinkelspeel’s authority to purchase certain of the merchandise, recovery for which was sought by the plaintiff, Intermountain Association of Credit Men.
But, as heretofore intimated, the evidence in these cases, as we understand it, is sufficient to authorize the trier of fact to decide with reasonable support that Lewis did not unequivocally undertake to restrict Din-kelspeel’s authority to make purchases of merchandise upon which he, Lewis, would be bound within the implied scope of the business in which they were engaged, i. e., the bar and restaurant business.
In I Bates on Partnership, Section 325, the author says:
“A partner may, within certain limits, revoke or restrict a copartner’s power as to future or executory contracts, or can dissent from a particular contract, and, by notice to the nonpartner, can relieve himself from liability as to it, if made in disregard of such dissent. It may be suggested, however, that such dissent is only possible of the implied powers of a partner, and not of those given by express contract in the articles, as to which the only revocation is by dissolution.
“The intention thus to interfere must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.”
And in Leavitt v. Peck, supra, the court states: “The plaintiff must have knowledge of the precise consequences to which the refusal would extend.”
Now, as pointed out in the original opinion, with reference to the refrigerators purchased from the *410Utah Power & Light Company, the manager of that corporation testified that these were purchased by both Lewis and Dinkelspeel, i. e., they both took part in negotiating the contract of sale. It is true the same witness says that Lewis told him to charge the articles to Dinkelspeel, but he also testifies that he was not told by Lewis that he was not in any way responsible for Dinkelspeel’s bills. We find substantially the same situation outlined in the testimony of the president of the Western Furniture Company relative to the item of $96.46, for merchandise furnished subsequent to the original purchase of property for use in the business. For example, on cross-examination, that official, to the question, “And Mr. Lewis told you then (July 1934) that he would not be liable for any more?” responded, “No. At that time he stated that in case the place bought anything more, or was ordered, not to hold him personally for it.” Whereupon counsel additionally interrogated, “To hold Joe Dinkelspeel for it?” and the witness answered, “No, not to charge it in his name personally. Joe was right there.” When we recall that Dinkelspeel’s testimony was to the effect that Lewis did not wish to be known as interested in the business after it started, the evidence above referred to would seem merely to evince an intention on Lewis’ part to have the bills charged to Dinkelspeel as the active manager of the business, but not to disclaim unequivocally any liability whatsoever therefor. None of the cases cited by Lewis disclose a situation where both the partners engaged in the purchase of merchandise and then, on the ground that one of them had notified the vendor not to charge the account to him personally, the partner thus acting undertook to disclaim all liability whatsoever for the goods purchased, and was upheld by the court in so doing. We did not undertake to set forth in the original opinions, and shall not now, any exhaustive review of the evidence *411which tended to support the conclusion reached by the trial court. To do so would have unreasonably lengthened the opinions.
It is intimated that the purchase of the refrigerators aforesaid was not within the scope of the partnership business. Inasmuch as the purpose of the firm was to carry on a restaurant and bar business, we quite fail to perceive that there is any room for such a contention, it being common knowledge that such devices are constantly used in business enterprises of this character for preserving and cooling supplies of food and drink.
The note and mortgage involved in Case No. 1961 were given voluntarily by Dinkelspeel to Lewis, as appears by Dinkelspeel’s testimony, with the idea of protecting Lewis against Dinkelspeel’s personal creditors, and thereby preventing, as far as possible, a loss to Lewis on account of his investment of funds in the business. In other words, it really defined and settled the rights of the partners as between themselves. Din-kelspeel, among other things, says in his testimony, “After he (Lewis) furnished the money, I certainly ought to furnish the note.”
The recent case of Washakie Livestock Loan Company v. Meigh, 50 Wyo. 480, 62 Pac. (2d) 523, is cited as indicating that no weight whatever should have been attached to the testimony of Dinkelspeel. It is said that his testimony is of similar character, so far as contradictions are concerned, with that of Meigh in the case last mentioned. We think counsel is mistaken. He directs our attention to the fact that through cards, advertising, etc., put out by him, the business was carried on in the name of Joe Dinkelspeel. However, the latter’s testimony was repeatedly to the effect that this was done solely at the instance of Lewis, because he desired to be unknown as a partner in the business. In the Washakie Livestock Loan Company *412case, supra, Meigh’s testimony and his sworn statement to obtain the loan he sought were diametrically opposed to each other. No explanation of the situation was attempted, even if one could have been supplied. The case is not in point.
We are convinced that with the alteration of the judgment in Case No. 1961, as directed in the original opinion, a result has been obtained in both cases consonant not only with the legal principles which should properly govern them, but with the equitable rights and duties of all parties to this litigation. A rehearing will be denied.

Rehearing denied.

Blume, Ch. J., and Kimball, J., concur.