Court Opinion

ID: 9797703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:27:29.428275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:48.642423
License: Public Domain

GERBER, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 33 I respectfully dissent on whether the commutation decision constitutes an “official act” requiring the governor’s signature and attestation by the secretary of state.
¶ 34 Under the controlling statutes, the governor must act officially, within ninety days, on a unanimous recommendation from the Board; otherwise the Board’s recommendation automatically becomes effective. A.R.S. § 31-402(D). The secretary of state must attest all “official” acts of the governor. A.R.S. § 41-101(B).
¶ 35 The action required under A.R.S. section 31-402(D) is an “official” act, which means any act of the governor under color or by virtue of his office. Weidler v. Arizona Power Co., 39 Ariz. 390, 396, 7 P.2d 241, 243 (1932); see also Kerby v. State ex rel. Froh-miller, 62 Ariz. 294, 311, 157 P.2d 698, 706 (1945). No distinction exists between acts under color of office and those by virtue of office; both are “official” acts.
Much mental energy has been expended in drawing distinctions between acts of public officers done colore officii and acts done virtute officii, and we shall not undertake to assemble definitions. Our understanding is [... ] if his office gives him authority to act, he is acting in virtue of his office, although, in the performance of a specific duty, he [might] improperly exercise[ ] his authority.
Weidler, 39 Ariz. at 396, 7 P.2d at 243.
¶ 36 Pardon, clemency, and commutation are longstanding executive powers. “Official” presidential acts arise from the perfor-*598manee of the important functions of that office. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693-94, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997).
[T]he term “official act” means any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or profit.
18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2000).
¶ 37 The United States Supreme Court has described the presidential pardon power precisely as an “official” act: “A pardon is ... the private, though official act of the executive magistrate. . . . ” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 413, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall’s explication of the presidential pardon power in United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160-61, 7 Pet. 150, 8 L.Ed. 640 (1833) (mem.) (emphasis added)). It is difficult to view former President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon as anything other than an official act.
¶ 38 What is true of the nation’s president in federal commutation decisions is also necessarily true of the governor’s state commutation decisions because the executive powers are parallel. A governor’s state commutation decision mirrors the identical presidential power. The Arizona constitution empowers solely the governor to grant or deny commutations. Ariz. Const. art. V, § 5. A governor who delegates the investigation is not thereby relieved of the final commutation decision. See State ex rel. Ariz. St. Bd. of P. & P. v. Superior Court, 12 Ariz.App. 77, 79, 467 P.2d 917, 919 (App.1970); see also Woratzeck v. Arizona Bd. of Exec. Clemency, 117 F.3d 400, 403 (9th Cir.1997) (interpreting governor’s duty as “official” discretion).6
¶ 39 “All official acts of the governor, except approval of laws, shall be attested by the secretary of state.” A.R.S. § 41-101(B). “The governor’s signature can almost be viewed as a warrant for the secretary of state to sign and seal ... ”. Op. Ariz. Att’y Gen. 190-111. Here, denying commutation of McDonald’s sentence, being an “official” act, required 1) the governor himself, not a representative, to act on and sign the recommendation within 90 days, and 2) the secretary of state to attest the signature as that of the governor.
¶ 40 The letter7 purporting to be the governor’s denial of commutation does not begin to meet the requirements for an official act. It does not show any act at all by Governor Symington (he did not sign it) nor the attestation of the secretary of state. The letter, which is not on the governor’s stationary, does not allow for proper signatures of the governor and secretary of state, but it does allow for signature by a “representative” of the governor, as the illegible signature suggests occurred.
¶41 The Majority’s view that the clear statutory requirements, if enforced, would inconvenience the governor is misguided in its largesse. This Court is not the governor’s handmaid. The issue is not whether the governor is inconvenienced by the law but whether he satisfied it. Convenience is the standard of interpretation neither for this Court nor for the executive. If the statutory requirements for an official act trouble the governor’s office, relief can be sought in the legislature. Until that happens this Court cannot soften the statutory commands in order to excuse the governor from his constitutional obligation to sign and have attested his commutation decisions.' When “the plain language ... is clear and unequivocal, we find it determinative.” Barry v. Alberty, 173 Ariz. 387, 390, 843 P.2d 1279, 1282 (App.1992).
¶ 42 One of the most important reasons for the signature and attestation requirements is to prevent gubernatorial activity from slipping below public scrutiny. The Majority’s declaration in ¶ 29 about judicial review misses the point; the issue is not judicial review but the public’s assurance of personal gubernatorial action. Far from pomp and ceremony, the requirements of signature and attestation reflect the need for assurance of personal decision-making. The Majority’s opinion leaves the governor to de*599cide, at his whim, which decisions are “official” enough to be attested by the secretary of state; worse, it allows someone other than the governor to make these decisions. It is indiscernible from the attached document whether the governor or someone else decided this commutation issue; the illegible scrawl suggests it was not the former.
¶ 43 This “official” commutation denial reflects no gubernatorial involvement at all and lacks both the governor’s signature and attestation by the secretary of state. Therefore, I find no proper gubernatorial decision within the ninety-day period, and accordingly in my view the recommendation of the Board should become effective.
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. The discussion is truncated; it focuses on due process considerations within the context of a clemency hearing.

. See attached.