Court Opinion

ID: 9909798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 09:09:02.731196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:00.139223
License: Public Domain

In The
                              Court of Appeals
                     Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                   No. 07-23-00159-CV

                            FELICIA BROWN, APPELLANT

                                            V.

                     ELYSIUM GRAND APARTMENTS, APPELLEE

                     On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. One
                                   Travis County, Texas
           Trial Court No. C-1-CV-22-004098, Honorable Eric Sheppard, Presiding

                                   December 8, 2023
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Appellant, Felicia Brown, proceeding pro se, challenges a judgment of eviction

granted in favor of Appellee, Elysium Grand Apartments (“Elysium”). She raises the

following issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award of

possession of the premises; (2) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award of

unpaid rent; (3) conduct of Elysium, the trial clerk, and the county clerk during the

pendency of the trial; (4) exclusion of evidence of retaliation by the trial court; (5) the
timeliness of Elysium’s bill of exception; (6) a claim of “abuse of process”; and (7)

Elysium’s right to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. We affirm.1

        During the pendency of this appeal, Brown also filed a motion for sanctions and a

petition for writ of mandamus seeking relief from a temporary injunction order entered in

a separate matter. We deny both the motion for sanctions and her petition for the reasons

stated below.

                                             BACKGROUND

        We recite only those facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal. TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.1. Felicia Brown, as tenant, entered into an agreement with Elysium, as landlord,

to lease a residential apartment in Austin, Texas. The initial term of the lease at issue

began on November 1, 2021, and ended on October 31, 2022.2 By December 2021,

Brown fell behind in her rent payments and, despite receiving some rental assistance,

was unable to cure her default.

        On August 8, 2022, Elysium gave a notice of proposed eviction to Brown which

gave her twenty-eight days to cure the default. Brown did not make any additional

payments of rent during the twenty-eight days following the delivery of the notice.

        1 Originally appealed to the Third Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by the

Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. Should
a conflict exist between precedent of the Third Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, this
appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.

         2 Brown has lived in the apartment complex since 2020 under prior leases which are not relevant

to this appeal.
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        On September 6, 2022, Elysium delivered a notice to vacate by affixing the notice

to the front of Brown’s apartment door in a sealed envelope and mailing a copy of the

notice by regular mail on the same day.3 The notice to vacate also stated Elysium elected

to terminate Brown’s right to possess and occupy the apartment. Brown did not make

any additional payments after receiving the notice to vacate, and Elysium filed its suit for

eviction and unpaid rent on September 13, 2022. On October 2, 2022, the justice court

heard the eviction suit and rendered judgment in favor of Elysium. Brown appealed to

the county court at law for a trial de novo. At the conclusion of the trial de novo in early

2023, the county court rendered judgment in favor of Elysium, awarding it possession of

the leased premises, rent in the amount of $10,503.75, and attorney’s fees in the amount

of $14,190.50. This appeal followed.

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A legal and factual sufficiency challenge to a bench trial verdict is reviewed under

the same standards as a jury verdict. Anderson v. Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794

(Tex. 1991). When both legal and factual sufficiency challenges are raised on appeal,

the reviewing court must first examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Glover

v. Tex. Gen. Indemnity Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1981). Ordinarily, a court of

appeals will not address the factual sufficiency of the evidence if it determines the

evidence is legally insufficient. Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 781 (Tex. 2019)

(citations omitted). A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an

        3 The lease automatically renewed unless either party provided notice sixty days before the end of

the lease term, which Elysium did on August 17, 2022. However, because the lease also states a notice
to vacate constitutes a termination of Brown’s right to possession, which was delivered prior to the end of
the lease term, the notice of nonrenewal and termination is irrelevant to the eviction proceeding.
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issue on which it did not have the burden of proof must demonstrate that there is no

evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348

S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011).

       Evidence is legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people

to reach the verdict under review.” Id. (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,

827 (Tex. 2005)). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must consider the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge ever reasonable inference that

supports the verdict. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 821–22. The reviewing court may not

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, so long as the evidence falls within the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 822. But if the evidence allows only one

inference, neither the trier of fact nor the reviewing court may disregard it. Id. Evidence

is legally insufficient “when (1) the record discloses a complete absence of evidence of a

vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the

only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is

no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite

of a vital fact.” Bustamante ex rel. D.B. v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 455–56 (Tex. 2017)

(quoting Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016)).

When considering a factual-sufficiency challenge, we consider all the evidence and set

aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence

that it is clearly wrong and unjust. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Tex. Contract Carpet,

Inc., 302 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.).

                                              4
                                               ANALYSIS

Sufficiency of the Evidence of Right to Possession

       Brown’s first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial

court’s judgment of possession in favor of Elysium.4 To prevail in a forcible detainer

action, the plaintiff has the burden to prove (1) a superior right to possession of the

property; (2) the occupant’s right of possession has been terminated; (3) the plaintiff

delivered a notice to vacate to the occupant before filing suit; and (4) the occupant refused

to surrender possession. Samarripa v. Related Mgmt., No. 03-22-00070-CV, 2023 Tex.

App. LEXIS 6281, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 17, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing TEX.

PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002; Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 478 (Tex.

2017)). “Because forcible detainer is a statutory cause of action, a landlord must strictly

comply with [the statutory] requirements.”              Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Andover Place

Apartments, 203 S.W.3d 495, 497 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)).

       4 Brown specifically complains the evidence is insufficient as follows:

                 •     no evidence the notice to vacate was actually received by Brown;

                 •      no evidence of a second notice to vacate was delivered prior to the
                 institution of the de novo appeal to the county court at law;

                 •      a notice of non-renewal and termination of the lease was delivered prior
                 to the expiration of the twenty-eight days given in the notice of proposed eviction;

                 •     no evidence the alternative method of delivery of the notice to vacate was
                 authorized by statute; and

                 •     Elysium did not follow the statutory procedures for a forcible detainer
                 action rather than a forcible entry and detainer action.

                                                    5
       Brown contends Elysium could not prevail on its forcible detainer action as a matter

of law because it failed to properly deliver the notice to vacate. In support of her

argument, she points to the fact the lease deems a notice to vacate sent by regular mail

delivered “3 days after the notice is deposited in the U.S. Postal Service with postage.”

Brown argues because there is no evidence of when she received the notice to vacate,

the notice mailed on September 6, 2022, was deemed delivered by September 9, and the

notice should have stated a deadline to vacate three days later on September 12.

Because the notice instead stated a vacate date of September 9, she concludes the notice

was ineffective and did not meet the statutory requirements.

       Brown’s argument is misplaced. The forcible detainer statute requires the landlord

provide “at least three days’ written notice to vacate the premises before the landlord files

a forcible detainer suit, unless the parties have contracted for a shorter or longer notice

period in a written lease or agreement.” § 24.005(a). The statute does not require the

notice to vacate contain a deadline to vacate the premises, only that the landlord wait the

statutorily required time before filing suit. In this case, the parties contracted for a shorter

notice period: the lease states “we may end your right of occupancy by giving you at least

a 24-hour written notice to vacate.” Thus, Elysium had to wait only one day to file suit

after delivering the notice to vacate. Id. Elysium waited three days to file its suit for

eviction on September 13, 2022, making the notice to vacate effective. The evidence

was legally sufficient to show Elysium complied with the requirements of the forcible

detainer statute. Cf. Blessing v. Balderas, No. 03-22-00613-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS

1243, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (landlord’s failure to

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serve notice to vacate under procedures either in statute or in lease made the notice

ineffective).

       Brown also contends Elysium failed to follow the notice procedures by not

delivering a second notice to vacate prior to the institution of the trial de novo in the county

court. Her understanding of the nature of the “eviction suit” in the justice court and the

“forcible detainer” trial de novo in the county court is mistaken. The “eviction suit” in the

justice court is the same action as the “forcible detainer” action under Chapter 24 of the

Texas Property Code, and the justice court applies its procedures in an “eviction suit”

pursuant to the forcible detainer statute. § 24.004(a)(“. . . a justice court in the precinct in

which the real property is located has jurisdiction in eviction suits.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.1

(“Rule 510 applies to a lawsuit to recover possession of real property under Chapter 24

of the Texas Property Code.”). Also, the forcible detainer statute does not require a

second notice to be delivered when the matter is appealed from the justice court to the

county court. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.001 et seq.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.09, 510.10.

Elysium was not required to provide a second notice to vacate when the matter was

appealed by Brown to the county court at law. Accordingly, her first issue is overruled.

Sufficiency of the Evidence of Rent Owed

       For her second issue, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of unpaid

rent awarded. She asserts in 2021 Elysium illegally charged her for water, fees, increased

her rent, and misapplied rent relief payments. She also claims she had a credit of $753.54

for the month of December 2021 before the rent was due. Regarding the legality and

propriety of the charges in 2021, there is no evidence in the record to support Brown’s

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assertions. While she references several addendums and contracts Elysium allegedly

entered under federal and state affordable housing programs, no contract appears in the

record demonstrating the lease was subject to additional rules and regulations. Further,

Elysium stipulated to the trial court it only sought recovery of monthly unpaid rent of

$1,141.00 per month stated in the lease, and waived all other charges, including fees and

utilities. Thus, the additional charges complained of were not at issue. We may not

surmise what evidence would support Brown’s claims regarding the propriety of Elysium’s

charges in 2021, and, without any contradicting evidence, we presume the charges by

Elysium were correct and justified. United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d

627, 640 (Tex. 2023) (“. . . all the record evidence must be considered in the light most

favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered.”). We overrule

Brown’s second issue.

Trial Court Complaints

      Brown’s next issue identifies the following complaints about the proceedings at the

county court at law:

             •         her filings were rejected by the trial court clerk;

             •         the county clerk made errors with her trial brief filing;

             •     Elysium’s lead counsel failed to inform her the evidence she
             emailed to him was blank;

             •       Elysium’s associate counsel e-filed its second amended
             petition while lead counsel signed the body of the pleading; the
             second amended petition also did not have attached to it Elysium’s
             exhibit number 9, which was presented at trial;

                                                8
              •      Elysium’s property manager gave false testimony regarding
              repair efforts in 2021;

              •       Elysium’s exhibit 8 from the trial and a letter from Elysium to
              the trial court are not part of the record; and

              •      Elysium altered exhibit 9 before offering it into evidence.

To preserve these issues for appeal, however, Brown was required to make a timely

request, objection, or motion regarding these issues and permit the court to rule upon her

request, objection, or motion. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. We do not find in the record where

she made any request, objection, or motion regarding the above complaints to the trial

court. Brown failed to preserve these complaints for review, and we may not consider

them on appeal. Her third issue is overruled.

Evidence of Retaliation

       Brown’s fourth issue complains her evidence regarding retaliation was excluded

while Elysium’s defensive evidence regarding retaliation was admitted. However, as

defined by statute, an eviction suit filed after providing a notice to vacate for nonpayment

of rent is per se not retaliation. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.332(b). Because we have

already concluded Elysium met its burden to prove rightful possession to the apartment

due to Brown’s failure to pay rent, Elysium as a matter of law did not retaliate against

Brown by filing its lawsuit for eviction. As a result, the issue of admission or exclusion of

evidence relevant to her retaliation defense is moot. Brown’s fourth issue is overruled.

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Bill of Exception

       In her fifth issue, Brown complains Elysium was permitted to make a bill of

exception after the permitted deadline. A matter which otherwise would not appear in the

record may be preserved and introduced into the record through a formal bill of exception.

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.2. A party must file the bill of exception within thirty days of the filing

of the notice of appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.2(e)(1). Brown filed her notice of appeal on

March 28, 2023, making the deadline to file a bill of exception April 27, 2023. The record

reveals Elysium filed its bill of exception on April 27, 2023, and therefore its filing was

timely. Brown’s issue number five is overruled.

Abuse of Process

       Brown’s sixth issue claims Elysium engaged in “abuse of process.” “Abuse of

process” is a cause of action which can be raised as a claim or a counterclaim. See

generally Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. Jones, 538 S.W.3d 781, 815–16 (Tex. App.—Austin

2017), aff’d, 611 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2020). However, the only issue permitted to be litigated

in a forcible detainer action is the right to possession of the property in question. TEX. R.

CIV. P. 510.3(e); Eckman v. Northgate Terrace Apartments, LLC, No. 03-18-00254-CV,

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 4794, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin June 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). No counterclaims are permitted in an eviction suit, and they may only be brought in

a separate proceeding. Id. Brown also did not bring her abuse of process claim in the

trial court, and she is not permitted to raise it for the first time on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1; Hatch v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 03-22-00489-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 6780,

at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Carrizales v. Tex. Dep’t of

                                              10
Protective & Regulatory Servs., 5 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied).

Her sixth issue is overruled.

Elysium’s Right to Recover Attorney’s Fees

       Brown’s last issue challenges Elysium’s right to attorney’s fees.        She argues

because Elysium did not strictly adhere to the statutory requirements for providing the

notice to vacate, it did not prevail in the underlying eviction suit as a matter of law and

was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.006(b). As we

discussed above, the record demonstrates Elysium properly delivered the notice to

vacate as required by statute and thus sufficiently proved its right to possession of the

premises.   Accordingly, Elysium, as the prevailing party, was entitled to recover its

attorney’s fees. Id. We overrule Brown’s seventh issue.

Motion for Sanctions and Petition for Writ of Mandamus

       Finally, during the pendency of this appeal, Brown filed a motion for sanctions and

a petition for writ of mandamus. Regarding her motion for sanctions, Brown’s motion

mirrors the complaints in her third issue of conduct which occurred during the trial court

proceedings. The record does not contain a motion for sanctions filed by Brown with the

trial court. By failing to file a motion for sanctions in the trial court when the complained

of conduct occurred, she waived her right to seek sanctions, and she is not permitted to

bring the motion for the first time on appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Meyer v. Cathey, 167

S.W.3d 327, 333 (Tex. 2005) (post-trial sanctions may not be awarded based on pretrial

conduct). We deny her motion for sanctions.

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       Regarding her petition for writ of mandamus, Brown seeks relief from a temporary

injunction granted in favor of Elysium in a new case in county court. However, the petition

does not contain a copy of the order complained of or a reporter’s record of the proceeding

from which the order was issued. Mandamus relief is appropriate when a petitioner

demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion and has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re

Geomet Recycling, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. 2019) (citations omitted). On the

mandamus record before us we cannot determine whether the trial court abused its

discretion, and Brown has failed to demonstrate her right to mandamus relief.

Accordingly, we deny her petition for mandamus.

                                       CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court. We deny Brown’s motion for sanctions,

and we deny her petition for writ of mandamus.

                                                        Alex Yarbrough
                                                            Justice

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