Court Opinion

ID: 9529225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:48:59.869123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:42.757028
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in those parts of the opinion relating to the issues of double jeopardy, speedy trial, and pretrial publicity (change of venue). I respectfully dissent, however, to that part of the opinion relative to the use of allocution testimony.
I have reservations whether the right to allocution is constitutionally protected, although this court has said, in obiter dictum, it is. Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo.1987). In Christy, this court cited no legal authority and offered no cogent explanation in support of that proposition. A few states have implicitly elevated allocution to the level of a constitutional right, although allocution has not been so regarded in the federal system, or by the majority of states. See Arthur W. Campbell, Law of Sentencing, § 9.5 at 246, nn. 52-53 (2d ed. 1991), and accompanying text.
At this stage of my research, I am more inclined to agree with that said in State v. Saari, 152 Vt. 510, 568 A.2d 344, 351 (1989):
*1135The principle of allocution, which gives defendants in our courts the opportunity to address the bench prior to sentencing, is a tradition of the common law which developed when death was the penalty for felony convictions and the accused often was not allowed to testify. 3 W. LaPave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 25.1(f) (1984).
See also, Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo.L.Rev. 115-24 (1944).
Wyoming’s statutory recognition of allo-cution can be traced from Wyo.Sess.Laws 1869, title XIII, ch. 74, §§ 158-60, pp. 495-96, to Wyo.Stat. §§ 7-268 through 274 (1957). This court preserved allocution in Wyo.R.Crim.P. 33(a)(i), which superseded the 1957 statutory provisions.
Having stated my reservations about the constitutional derivation of allocution, I turn to the heart of the specific issue at hand. The sole purpose of the right of allocution today is to afford the convicted defendant the opportunity to effect the trial court’s sentencing decision. As conceived in the common law, developed under statutory recognition, and practiced today under court rules, allocution plays no role in the guilt-determination stage of the trial. Unlike the guilt determination stage of the trial, in which the focus is the presentation of evidence relating to the accused’s guilt or innocence, the allocution phase of the sentencing stage focuses on the presentation of information relating to imposition of punishment on a convicted person who no longer is an accused enjoying the presumption of innocence.
In considering the issue at hand, I note that in the context of a suppression hearing in the guilt determination stage, any testimony of the accused during the course of that process is inadmissible on the crucial issue of guilt or innocence. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); and see generally, 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.2(d), at 240-42 (2d ed. 1987). The primary purposes of the suppression hearing are to deter prosecution misconduct in the gathering of evidence and to promote public confidenc^in and preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system. When the suppression hearing process has served those purposes, the parties return to the level playing field, neither side having gained an unfair advantage as a result of the process.
Further, I would note that in the context of the plea agreement process, if the plea agreement fails, evidence of the accused’s statement relating to the failed plea is inadmissible on the crucial issue of guilt or innocence. Wyo.R.Crim.P. 15(e)(6). The primary purposes of the plea agreement process are to promote the conservation of criminal justice resources and to ensure that the accused’s rights have been protected. Ill ABA Standards For Criminal Justice, 14-3.1, p. 14.68 (2d ed. 1986); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S.Ct. 495, 497-98, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971). If the plea agreement fails, the parties return to the level playing field, neither side having gained an unfair advantage as a result of the process.
These foregoing instances in which the accused’s testimony, as a criminal justice policy matter, is declared inadmissible on the crucial question of guilt or innocence, in order that a legitimate, more immediate purpose may be served, appear useful in resolving the issue in question. The primary purpose of the sentencing process is to determine punishment based upon the humane principles of reformation and prevention. Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 15. The purpose of allocution in that process is to provide the convicted defendant, before he or she is advised by the court of the right to appeal, the opportunity to effect the sentencing decision. After allocution, the court decides and declares the sentence. After that, the court informs the sentenced convict of the right of appeal. If the conviction and sentence are reversed on appeal and the defendant once again put in jeopardy, why should not the parties return to the level playing field, neither side having gained an unfair advantage as a result of the process?
Our criminal justice system is built on the concept of fairness. We pride ourselves on having informed all participants *1136in advance by what ground rules our system operates; the system abhors surprise and ambush. I can find no fairness in what happened to Mr. Harvey as result of his allocution statement. I see only surprise and ambush. The sentencing court did not warn him that anything he said in allocution would be used against him in criminal prosecution; in fact, it was only after Mr. Harvey made his statement that the sentencing judge informed him of his right to appeal the conviction on which, moments before, he had been sentenced. I am unable to find that Mr. Harvey made a knowing, intelligent, and informed waiver of his right to remain silent.
I would hold that any allocution testimony of the convicted defendant is inadmissible on the question of guilt or innocence in the event the conviction and sentence are reversed on appeal and that defendant is again put in jeopardy for any conduct involved in the transaction which gave rise to the first prosecution.
I would reverse Mr. Harvey’s conviction on this ground and remand for retrial.