Court Opinion

ID: 9364203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 18:02:16.009983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.580587
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 Karimi v. Rombro CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 ALI KARIMI,                                                      B312606

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                               Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 18STCV05500
           v.

 S. ROGER ROMBRO et al.,

      Defendants and
 Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, John P. Doyle and Stuart M. Rice, Judges.
Affirmed.
      Nicholas Barton for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Rombro & Manley, S. Roger Rombro and Melinda A.
Manley for Defendants and Respondents.
                     ____________________
      Ali Karimi appeals the trial court’s order confirming an
arbitration award. The trial court correctly found Karimi
presented no valid reason for vacating the award. We affirm.
Undesignated citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
                                 I
      Karimi engaged attorney S. Roger Rombro and Rombro’s
firm Rombro & Associates to represent him in a marital
dissolution proceeding and a related domestic violence action.
We refer to Rombro and his firm collectively as Rombro. Karimi
fired Rombro after the attorney-client relationship soured.
Karimi sued Rombro to void the retainer agreement and for
breach of the retainer agreement, professional negligence, and
quantum meruit. The trial court granted Rombro’s motion to
compel arbitration.
      Pursuant to their written agreement, Karimi and Rombro
submitted the matter to the American Arbitration Association.
The AAA appointed Robert Brown as the arbitrator. After five
days of hearings, Brown issued an award finding against Karimi
and ordering him to pay Rombro $75,224.40 in attorney fees.
      Rombro petitioned to confirm the award. Karimi opposed
the petition and moved to vacate the award. Karimi argued the
award must be vacated because Brown had failed to disclose as
required Rombro’s participation at the 7th Annual Family Law
Practice Seminar held at the University of West Los Angeles
where Brown was president. The trial court found this disclosure
was unnecessary and affirmed the arbitrator’s award. Karimi
appealed.
                                II
      Karimi did not marshal an effective challenge to arbitrator
Brown’s impartiality.

                                2
                                   A
        California law favors the finality of arbitral awards.
(Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) Courts
may vacate such an award only under the specific circumstances
spelled out in Section 1286.2. (Speier v. Advantage Fund, LLC
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 134, 146.) One such circumstance is where
the arbitrator is aware of and fails to disclose a ground for
disqualification within the prescribed time. (§ 1286.2, subd.
(a)(6).) When this happens, the court must vacate the award.
(Speier at 146.) Section 1281.9, subdivision (a) describes the
matters an arbitrator must disclose, including “all matters that
could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a
doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be impartial.”
        Whether arbitrators failed to disclose information that
would cause a reasonable person to doubt their ability to be
impartial is a mixed question of law and fact we review
independently. (Haworth v. Superior Ct. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372,
385-386.) In making this determination, actual bias is irrelevant.
(Id. at p. 385.) We consider whether an objective person aware of
all of the facts would reasonably suspect bias; we do not consider
the matter from the perspective of the partisan litigant. (Id. at p.
389.)
                                   B
        Karimi advances several arguments why a reasonable
person would not believe Brown could be impartial. All stem
from Rombro’s and Brown’s involvement with the family law
seminar. To evaluate these arguments, we set forth what the
record does and does not show about Rombro, Brown, and the
seminar, keeping in mind it was Karimi’s burden to establish a
factual basis for his challenge to the arbitral award. (Rebmann v.

                                 3
Rohde (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1290 [party alleging bias has
burden of establishing facts showing it].)
       Karimi did not suggest Brown and Rombro had a
relationship of acquaintance or friendship, either before or during
the seminar or at any time before the arbitration. Before the
arbitration, Rombro did not know of Brown. No evidence showed
Brown knew of Rombro. Apart from the seminar, Karimi has not
suggested the two men were anything but strangers.
       Nothing shows Brown or Rombro were involved in
planning, producing, or managing the seminar. The Iranian
American Lawyers’ Association put on the seminar in association
with two other bar associations and the university. The seminar
had 20 named sponsors. Apart from Brown’s status as president
of the university, Karimi has not suggested Brown or Rombro
belonged to the Iranian American Lawyers’ Association or to
another planning or organizing entity.
       The seminar was a one-day event, lasting about eight
hours. The program featured 41 scheduled speakers, including
19 judges, 16 attorneys, and six other specialists. Rombro was
the moderator and panelist for one of five panels. Five other
people joined Rombro as participants for this panel. Brown was
not among them. A photo of this panel reveals an audience of
perhaps 40 people seated in a large classroom. Karimi does not
suggest Brown was in the audience for Rombro’s panel or
otherwise took note of this panel in some specific way.
       Brown spoke during the seminar but was not a scheduled
speaker; apparently his remarks were impromptu. Karimi offers
no evidence Rombro was in the audience at this moment.
       Apart from his own panel, Rombro did not attend or
participate in the seminar. Rombro and Brown did not come into

                                4
contact with each other during the seminar. Nothing shows
Brown had contact with or knew of Rombro as a result of the
seminar or at any time before the arbitration.
      In sum, Brown and Rombro were strangers before the
arbitration. They both attended the seminar, but they did not
meet, interact, or see each other there.
      In essence, Karimi argues Brown should have disclosed the
following: “I have no connection to Rombro. We both attended a
one-day seminar, but we did not know of each other beforehand
and we did not learn of each other as a result of it. We did not
meet or see each other at the seminar. I did not know Rombro
was there. He did not know I was there.”
      This situation did not create either a requirement of
disclosure or an appearance of bias.
                                  1
      Karimi argues Rombro’s participation as a panel moderator
represents a substantial business relationship between Rombro
and Brown. This argument is incorrect. Karimi has not shown a
business relationship. There is no evidence Rombro got money
from Brown or Brown’s university. Rombro presumably
consented to appear on this panel for the usual reasons lawyers
participate in such affairs: some combination of public service,
continuing education, marketing one’s practice, and generalized
networking. There is no evidence Brown or Brown’s organization
profited from Rombro’s panel participation. Members of the
seminar audience paid to attend, but the record does not show
where this money went. No evidence shows this university was
in the seminar business. It was Karimi’s burden to show bias or
an appearance of bias; we will not presume Brown or his entity
sought to profit financially from this seminar. (See Casden Park

                               5
La Brea Retail LLC v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.
App. 4th 468, 478 [business relationship must be substantial and
involve financial consideration to require disclosure].)
       To bolster this argument, Karimi submitted a copy of a
comment on the seminar’s website attributed to Rombro. The
comment states Rombro spent over 40 hours preparing for the
panel. Karimi argues Rombro’s participation therefore had a
value of at least $24,000 to Brown’s university. He arrives at this
figure by multiplying the 40 hours Rombro spent preparing by
the $600 hourly rate he charged Karimi for his services. But
Karimi has not established Brown or his university derived any
financial benefit from the ticket sales for this seminar.
       Karimi argues the trial court improperly based its
determination that there was no substantial business
relationship on the fact that there was only a single transaction.
While the trial court properly considered as part of its analysis
that Brown and Rombro did not have repeated contacts, the trial
court also focused on how attenuated the alleged contact was and
that Brown and Rombro did not meet at the seminar.
                                  2
       Karimi next argues Brown had a duty to disclose that both
Brown and Rombro are “extremely involved” in the practice of
family law, relying on Benjamin, Weill & Mazer v. Kors (2010)
189 Cal.App.4th 126 (Benjamin I) and Advantage Medical
Services, LLC v. Hoffman (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 806
(Advantage). Benjamin I is depublished and not citeable. (Cal.
Rules of Court 8.1115.) The later ruling, Benjamin, Weill &
Mazer v. Kors (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 40 (Benjamin II), is no
more helpful to Karimi’s argument than was Benjamin I. Brown’s
resume contains no references to family law. He has no

                                6
discernable connection to family law other than being the
president of a university that hosted this family law seminar.
Benjamin II and Advantage are inapposite.
                                  3
      Karimi also argues Rombro had an independent duty as a
judge pro tempore and attorney to disclose his connection with
Brown. Karimi admits there is no authority imposing such a
duty and asks us to create new law. Neither logic nor precedent
supports Karimi’s argument for disclosing a nonexistent
connection. We reject this argument.
                                  4
      Karimi argues Rombro owed him a duty as his former
attorney to disclose Rombro’s connection with Brown. Karimi
again acknowledges he has no authority on this point. He fails to
establish that a breach of this supposed duty would constitute
grounds to vacate the arbitration award, and Karimi has not
established there was any connection to disclose in the first place.
                                  5
      Karimi’s final argument is that the trial court should have
allowed him to conduct discovery to determine if there were
further connections between Brown and Rombro. Karimi asked
to depose Brown and Rombro. The court impliedly denied this
request.
      We review a trial court’s discovery rulings for abuses of
discretion. (Manela v. Superior Court (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
1139, 1145.) Karimi provided no evidence sufficient to support
his accusations against Brown. The trial court’s implicit refusal
to grant Karimi’s last-minute request for discovery in these
circumstances was well within its discretion.
///

                                 7
                        DISPOSITION
      We affirm the order and award costs to respondents.

                                           WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             HARUTUNIAN, J.*

*     Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                 8