Court Opinion

ID: 9454832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:00:44.185359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:20.024986
License: Public Domain

BYRNE, Senior District Judge
(dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority that that part of the Board’s decision finding unfair labor practices by reason of interference with the election should be affirmed. However, that part ordering respondent to bargain should be reversed and a new election ordered.
The union obtained fifteen signed authorization cards over the weekend of April 23-25, 1965. At the hearing before the trial examiner, the respondent questioned seven of those cards. The trial examiner determined that fourteen of the cards were valid. Using this number and the size of the unit, the trial examiner concluded that the union had a majority on April 26, 1965, and thus that the respondent could be ordered to bargain with the union. On review the respondent questions the determination of the trial examiner made with regard to five of the employees.
The trial examiner apparently followed the “only” rule established in the Sixth Circuit. NLRB v. Cumberland Shoe Corp., 351 F.2d 917. Under that rule it was held that an authorization card is valid to show representation unless the employer can show that solicitors represented to the employee that the “sole” or “only” purpose in signing the card was to obtain an election. A very mechanical interpretation of this rule was made which required that the actual *368words “sole” or “only” be used and so the court modified its rule. In the case of NLRB v. Swan Super Cleaners, Inc., 384 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1967), the court explained that no special words were necessary and that any card was invalid where representation had been made which conveyed the thought that the sole and only purpose of the card had been to obtain an election. The Board generally has followed those decisions in what has been recognized as the Board’s Cumberland rule.
Subsequent to the Board’s decision in the instant case, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (June 17, 1969). In Gissel the court held, “In resolving the conflict among the circuits in favor of approving the Board’s Cumberland rule, we think it sufficient to point out that employees should be bound by the clear language of what they sign unless that language is deliberately and clearly cancelled by a union adherent with words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature.” (emphasis supplied). The Court further admonished, “We agree, however, with the Board’s own warnings in Levi Strauss, 172 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 68 L.R.R.M. 1338, 1341, and n. 7 (1968), that in hearing testimony concerning a card challenge, trial examiners should not neglect their obligation to ensure employees free choice by a too easy mechanical application of the Cumberland Rule.”
The problem here is whether there has been “a too easy mechanical application of the Cumberland Rule.” The trial examiner himself recognizing “words calculated to direct the signer to disregard and forget the language above his signature” rejected the card of Marx Ceder. He found that a union adherent had told Ceder that the card was to bring about an election and that the authorization language on the card meant nothing. Strangely, although he made similar findings with respect to other employees, he did not reject the cards of such employees.
The majority of this court adhering to the teaching of Gissel, follows the Cumberland doctrine and properly holds that the card of employee Erickson should not have been accepted as establishing that he desired to be represented by the Guild.
Applying the same test as the Board applied in the case of Ceder and the majority of this court applied in Erickson, the cards of several other employees, particularly Cole and Gray, should also be invalidated.
Of paramount importance in determining the credibility of Cole and Gray, but apparently given little thought by the trial examiner, the Board, or the majority of this court, is the fact that the entire record clearly shows, and is not disputed, that the original purpose in obtaining signatures on the cards was to bring about an election.
The trial examiner found that even Rinehart, who was one of the two men assigned to solicit the cards from the other employees, when he questioned the language of the cards, was told by the Guild representative that the “cards indicate the employees are interested in the Guild and that they want an election”, and when Rinehart was asked, “Did Mr. Schrader say at this meeting that one of the purposes of signing the card was to have the Guild as a bargaining representative without an election?”, he replied, “I don’t recall that, no.” And so one of the solicitors was a man who, himself, believed that the only purpose of the cards was to obtain an election. The other solicitor was Gillis, who incidentally was the employee referred to in Part I of the majority opinion, who pilfered the document from the Editor’s desk.
After reading the majority’s discussion of Gray’s situation, it is difficult to understand how it concluded that *369Erickson’s card should be rejected but Gray’s accepted. Both were solicited by Gillis and the misrepresentations were almost identical. Both were told the purpose of the cards was to obtain an election — both testified as to their reliance on the misrepresentations and that their sole purpose in signing the card was to bring about an election.
It is interesting to note that the solicitation of Marx Ceder by Gillis follows the same pattern and is almost identical with that of Erickson, Cole and Gray. The trial examiner, while holding the misrepresentations made to Erickson and Gray did not warrant the rejection of their cards, concluded, “Ceder was asked to sign ‘at least for an election’ and ‘simply to bring about an election’. Ceder was thereby induced to sign the card and I conclude and find that his card should not be counted.” It should further be noted that the word “only” was not used during the solicitation of Ceder, Erickson, Gray or Cole. In short, the trial examiner did not apply “a too easy mechanical application of the Cumberland rule” to Ceder, but for some strange reason he did to Erickson, Gray and Cole.
With respect to Cole, the trial examiner found that Gillis specifically told him that he could disregard the authorization language as the sole purpose was to have an election. However, the examiner concluded that, because Cole testified that he was impressed by the solicitation, he probably would have signed anyway. This is not only irrelevant, since he in fact signed in response to the representation, but it is also unsupported by the evidence since there is no indication of what he might have done in the absence of the misrepresentations which the trial examiner himself said warranted rejection of his card. (R. 83).
I would reverse that part of the Board’s decision ordering respondent to bargain and remand with directions to order a new election.