Court Opinion

ID: 9746061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:55:02.022073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:20.702274
License: Public Domain

GRIGNON, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Department) suspended petitioner’s on-sale alcoholic beverage license for 10 days because it determined petitioner had permitted a minor to remain in its bar for 10 minutes without checking the minor’s identification in violation of the California Constitution, article XX, section 22, and Business and Professions Code section 25665.1 The Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board affirmed the decision of the Department. Our review of this suspension is limited to a review for substantial evidence. When the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are stated in the light most favorable to the Department, the Department’s suspension of petitioner’s on-sale alcoholic beverage license must be upheld. It is not appropriate for the court of appeal to substitute its judgment for that of the Department. I would affirm the Department’s suspension order.
Procedural Background
On November 2, 2000, the Department filed an accusation against petitioner CMPB Friends, Inc., doing business as the Royal Room, a bar. The accusation alleged that petitioner, through its employee Jackie Wisniewfski, on June 15, 2000, permitted Celeste Jimenez, a minor, to enter and remain in the Royal Room in violation of section 25665. The accusation sought suspension of petitioner’s license under article XX, section 22 of the California Constitution and section 24200, subdivisions (a) and (b),2 on the grounds continuance of the license would be contrary to public welfare and *1260morals, and petitioner was in violation of section 25665. An administrative law judge of the Department found petitioner had violated section 25665 and ordered petitioner’s liquor license suspended for 10 days. Petitioner appealed to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, which affirmed the decision of the Department. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of review with this court.
Facts
At approximately 10:45 p.m. on June 15, 2000, Celeste Jimenez entered the Royal Room in Bellflower with some friends. She was part of a group of students from a nearby theatrical school, who frequently patronized the Royal Room following dress rehearsals of their productions. Jimenez sat at a table with three other students. Other students sat at other tables. Jimenez took beer from another table at which some of her group sat and drank it. There were approximately 40 to 60 patrons in the bar, and the only employees apparently present were a bartender and the waitress Jackie Wisniewfski. No one was at the door of the bar checking identifications. Wisniewfski had checked the identifications of members of the group previously and determined they were adults.
After Jimenez had been sitting at the table for 10 minutes, Wisniewfski approached her and requested to see her identification. Jimenez claimed to have shown the waitress her valid California identification card indicating she was 20 years old. Wisniewfski claimed Jimenez showed her the California identification card of Melissa Guzman indicating she was 27 years old. The administrative law judge did not resolve this conflict in the evidence. Shortly after the identification check by Wisniewfski, undercover Department investigators determined that Jimenez was underage.
The administrative law judge found that petitioner, through Wisniewfski, had permitted Jimenez to enter and remain in the bar for 10 minutes without checking her identification. The administrative law judge found that this 10-minute delay constituted a violation of section 25665.
*1261Discussion

Constitutional and Statutory Scheme

Regulation of the sale of alcoholic beverages in California is within the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to both constitutional and statutory provisions. “[T]he Constitution vests the Department with broad discretion to revoke or suspend liquor licenses ‘for good cause’ if continuing the license would be ‘contrary to public welfare or morals.’ (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22.) In the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, the courts will uphold the Department’s decision to suspend a license for violation of the liquor laws.” (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 566 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163].) “The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board are constitutional agencies.” (Los Robles Motor Lodge, Inc. v. Dept, of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 198, 204 [54 Cal.Rptr. 547].)
The courts have jurisdiction to conduct a limited review of orders of the Department. “ ‘[T]he findings of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control must be sustained if they are supported by substantial evidence . . . .’” (Lacabanne Properties, Inc. v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 181, 185 [67 Cal.Rptr. 734].) “ ‘Neither the appeals board nor the courts “may disregard or overturn a finding of fact of the Department ... for the reason that it is considered that a contrary finding would have been equally or more reasonable.” [Citation.] The function of an appellate court is likewise merely to determine whether the department’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] In making that determination, this court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the department’s decision and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to support it. [Citation.]’ ” {Ibid.)
Sections 23090.2 and 23090.3 expressly limit review by the court of appeal of an order of the Department. Section 23090.2 limits review, in pertinent part, to whether: “(c) The decision of the department is supported by the findings. flQ (d) The findings in the department’s decision are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record. HQ . . . flQ Nothing in this article shall permit the court to . . . exercise its independent judgment on the evidence.” Section 23090.3 makes the factual findings and conclusions of the Department final: “The findings and conclusions of the department on questions of fact are conclusive and final and are not subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the department.”
*1262Both the state Constitution and the Business and Professions Code prohibit the presence of minors in public drinking establishments. California Constitution, article XX, section 22 provides that “[n]o person under the age of 21 years shall be permitted to enter and remain in [public drinking establishments] without lawful business therein.” This language was added to the section in 1956 together with provisions prohibiting the sale of alcohol to and the purchase of alcohol by minors. The purpose underlying these provisions is to protect minors from exposure to the harmful influences associated with the consumption of alcoholic beverages. (Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 567.) “[Constitutional provisions ‘must receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction which will meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people. . . .’ ” (Ibid.) The construction must be consistent with the probable intent of the framers.3 (Provigo Corp., at p. 567.)
Section 25665, mirroring the constitutional language, provides: “Any licensee under an on-sale license issued for public premises, . . . who permits a person under the age of 21 years to enter and remain in the licensed premises without lawful business therein is guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person under the age of 21 years who enters and remains in the licensed public premises without lawful business therein is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”
These constitutional and statutory provisions evidence a compelling state interest in protecting minors from exposure to the harmful effects of alcohol. “ ‘The business of selling intoxicating liquor is one attended with dangers, and under the police power the state may limit the operation of such business to conditions which will minimize its evils. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] More particularly, it may be assumed that the provisions prohibiting certain transactions with minors are designed to protect them from harmful influences. [Citation.] HO There is an affirmative duty on the licensee to maintain and operate his premises in accordance with law, and failure to discharge this duty may amount to permitting any prohibited conduct to occur.” (Lacabanne Properties, Inc. v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control; supra, 261 Cal.App.2d at p. 188.) “The Legislature has recognized that the business of selling intoxicating liquors, unless strictly regulated, poses a threat to the welfare of minors.” (Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd. (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 895, *1263899 [73 Cal.Rptr. 352].) The Legislature lays down the conditions under which such businesses may be run in order to minimize the evils. (Ibid.) Good faith is not a defense to a violation of the liquor laws. (Ibid.)
Ballesteros v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Board (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 694 [44 Cal.Rptr. 633]
In 1965, this district affirmed an order of the Department suspending the on-sale alcoholic beverage license of a bar that had permitted a minor to enter the bar and remain on the premises for 10 minutes without checking her identification. (Ballesteros v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Board, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d 694.) The Court of Appeal concluded: “There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the department that petitioners permitted a person under the age of 21 years to enter and remain in the licensed premises.” {Id. at p. 701.)
The facts of Ballesteros are virtually identical to the facts in this case. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on February 15, 1961, Wilma Miller, a 20-year-old married woman, entered a bar with her husband and other members of a motorcycle club, who had been at the bar on prior occasions. Miller sat at a table, while her husband purchased drinks at the bar, including a soft drink for Miller. Miller’s husband returned to the table with the drinks. Miller had been sitting at the table in the bar for 10 minutes when a police officer asked for her identification. The bartender had not asked for her identification. The bartender had checked the identifications of members of the motorcycle club previously and determined they were adults. The bartender was the sole employee, the bar was busy and crowded, and the lighting in the bar was poor. The Court of Appeal noted: “[I]t is apparent that the bartender, who was the only one in charge of the barroom and was very busy selling beverages to the many patrons who were crowding around the bar, was inactive or passive with respect to his affirmative duty to ascertain the age of Mrs. Miller.” (Ballesteros v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Board, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at p. 701.)
Similarly in this case, Jimenez entered the bar in the late evening hours with a group of friends believed by Wisniewfski, the sole waitress, to be adults. Jimenez sat at a table for 10 minutes before Wisniewfski came to the table to check Jimenez’s identification. The bar was crowded and apparently understaffed. This delay of 10 minutes before checking a minor’s identification is sufficient evidence that Wisniewfski was inactive or passive with respect to her affirmative duty to prevent minors from entering and remaining in the bar.
*1264There is no meaningful distinction between this case and Ballesteros, which is still good law and has never been questioned. The administrative law judge expressly relied on Ballesteros in deciding this case. In both cases, a minor was permitted to remain in a bar for 10 minutes without lawful purpose. In this case, a waitress checked the minor’s identification after a 10-minute delay; in Ballesteros, a police officer checked the minor’s identification after a 10-minute delay. This distinction is merely fortuitous and of no relevance to the disputed issue: was a minor permitted to enter a bar and remain for 10 minutes without lawful purpose? In both cases, the answer to the question is yes. In both cases, the Department ordered a short suspension of the on-sale alcoholic beverage license of the bar.

Protection of Minors

California has evidenced a compelling interest in protecting its minors from exposure to the harmful effects of alcoholic beverages. The law of the state prohibits not only the sale or furnishing of alcohol to minors, but also permitting minors to remain in a public drinking establishment even if they are not permitted to drink. This compelling state interest is found not only in statutes adopted by the Legislature, but also in the state Constitution. Licensees have an affirmative duty to maintain their premises so that minors will not enter and remain. This affirmative duty includes adequate staffing of the premises in order to ensure prompt requests for identification to verify the age of the customers. Good faith, overcrowding, and inadequate staffing are not defenses to a failure of a licensee to perform this affirmative duty.
I note that Jimenez’s presence in the bar was neither fleeting nor transitory. She entered with friends, sat at a table, took beer from a friend’s table, and began to drink it. Ten minutes is a significant period of time. .
Most importantly, the Department found that Jimenez sat at a table in the bar for approximately 10 minutes before Wisniewfski approached the table and asked to see Jimenez’s identification. The Department further found that petitioner, by its employees, was inactive or passive with respect to its affirmative duty to ascertain the age of Jimenez. “Therefor[e], the fact that Ms. Jimenez entered [petitioner’s] bar and stayed for approximately ten minutes before someone asked to see her identification is evidence that [petitioner], as a legal entity, permitted Ms. Jimenez to do so. This permitting is a violation of Business and Professions Code section 25665 and constitutes cause for suspension of [petitioner’s] license . . . .” These findings of fact by the Department, including the ultimate fact that petitioner permitted Jimenez to remain in the bar in violation of section 25665, are *1265conclusive and final. We are not permitted to substitute our judgment for that of the Department. We are not permitted to determine the appropriate level of staffing for a public drinking establishment. We are not permitted to excuse a failure to perform an affirmative duty to timely ascertain the age of a bar’s customer on the ground of good faith. The Department’s findings of fact are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. The Department’s reasonable factual findings may not be reversed by this court even if other findings are equally or even more reasonable.
I would affirm.

All further statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.

Section 24200, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide as follows: “The following are the grounds that constitute a basis for the suspension or revocation of licenses: [U] (a) When the *1260continuance of a license would be contrary to public welfare or morals. However, proceedings under this subdivision are not a limitation upon the department’s authority to proceed under Section 22 of Article XX of the California Constitution. HQ (b) Except as limited by Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 25000), the violation or the causing or permitting of a violation by a licensee of this division, any rules of the board adopted pursuant to Part 14 (commencing with Section 32001) of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, any rules of the department adopted pursuant to the provisions of this division, or any other penal provisions of law of this state prohibiting or regulating the sale, exposing for sale, use, possession, giving away, adulteration, dilution, misbranding, or mislabeling of alcoholic beverages or intoxicating liquors.”

Prior to the 1956 amendment, the constitutional provision permitted the sale of alcoholic beverages only in public eating establishments, from which minors could not be excluded. This caused serious enforcement problems and encouraged minors to frequent bars which sold food. The purpose of the 1956 amendment was to create a class of public drinking establishments from which minors could be excluded. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 22; Amendments to Constitution, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1956) argument in favor of Sen. Const. Amend. No. 2, p. 9.)