Court Opinion

ID: 9844411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:02:23.23056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:34.520002
License: Public Domain

WOOD, J., Dissenting.
I dissent. This is an appeal by plaintiffs, legal representatives of the estate of Albert B. Washko, deceased, from a judgment in favor of Howard Automobile Company of Los Angeles. Albert B. Washko, a pedestrian, was killed in the evening of November 9, 1933, while in the act of crossing the intersection at Virgil Avenue *355and Lockwood Street in the city of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs sued the owner of the car, defendant Binkert, the driver of the car, defendant Stewart, and the Howard Company, alleging that Stewart was an employee of the Howard Company engaged at the time of the accident in the line of his duty. The cause was tried before the court without a jury. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs against Binkert in the sum of $5,000 and against Stewart in the sum of $12,000 and in favor of defendant Howard Automobile Company of Los Angeles. On a separate appeal filed by defendant Stewart we are this day filing an opinion and order affirming the judgment as to defendant Stewart. (Washko et al. v. Stewart. et al., ante, page 345 [67 Pac. (2d) 151.)
Defendant Binkert purchased a Pontiac automobile from the Howard Company under an agreement which provided for the servicing of the ear by the seller after it had been driven 500 miles. The car was delivered to the Howard Company and after the completion of the servicing was being returned to Binkert when the accident occurred. The issue involved in this appeal concerns the nature of the arrangement under which Stewart was returning the car, whether in the capacity of employee or independent contractor.
Stewart and one Phillips had formerly organized a corporation known as the Cycle Auto Corporation and had engaged in the business of delivering automobiles at a flat rate which varied in accordance with the zones in which the deliveries were made. The corporation had made deliveries for the Howard Company, but it became bankrupt and thereafter Stewart and Phillips individually applied to the Howard Company for work. An arrangement was made whereby Stewart should deliver automobiles at the same rates which had been formerly charged according to the zones of delivery, the rate for the delivery of the car in the zone of the Binkert residence being 50 cents. Stewart was to furnish his own motorcycle and gasoline. The Howard Company carried compensation insurance upon Stewart as an employee. Stewart was obliged to report for work at the Howard Company’s plant each morning at 8 o’clock and was obliged to take instructions from the foreman as to the order in which pick-ups and deliveries were to be made. Stewart was required to remain on duty until the deliveries and pick-ups for the day were completed. Other deliverymen besides Stewart and *356Phillips were engaged in the same work. When Stewart was not engaged in deliveries and picking up automobiles he would do other work about the shop of the Howard Company, such as washing cars and running errands, and for this work he was paid on an hourly, basis. Testimony was offered on the part of the defense that the performance of this other work was not compulsory. Stewart was listed on the books of the Howard Company as a deliveryman and was paid with salary checks of the company which were in the same form as checks used in the ease of the employees of the company. On the face of a salary check admitted in evidence appears the following: “.Indorsement of this check by payee acknowledges receipt in full of salary to October 31, 1935, inclusive.” On the books of the Howard Company appears the following: “Date employed 3/15/33.”
In my opinion the uncontradicted testimony conclusively shows that Stewart was an employee rather than independent contractor. (Civ. Code, sec. 2009.) An independent contractor is one who in rendering services exercises an individual employment or occupation and represents his employer only as. to the results of the work and not as to the means whereby it is to be accomplished. (May v. Farrell, 94 Cal. App. 703 [271 Pac. 789].) A well-considered opinion is to be found in Chapman v. Edwards, 133 Cal. App. 72 [24 Pac. (2d) 211], where the court upheld a verdict based on the allegation that the owner of a truck who was engaged to haul dirt by the load was an employee rather than an independent contractor. In that case the court gave this definition: “An independent contractor is one, who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of the work.” It was pointed out that ‘‘there was no obligation upon him (the driver) to take any dirt nor was there any liability imposed upon or assumed by him if he chose not to haul. Likewise, there was no obligation upon Edwards Bros, to furnish sufficient dirt to load the truck nor was there any obligation on Edwards Bros, to continue the employment for any period. It seems generally conceded that a test in determining whether a person employed to do certain work is an independent contractor or a mere servant is the control over the work which is reserved by the employer. The power of the employer to terminate *357the employment at any time is a strong circumstance tending to show the subserviency of the employee, since it is incompatible with the full control of the work usually enjoyed by an independent contractor. Perhaps rto single circumstance is more conclusive to show the relaticnship of an employee than the right of the employer to end the service whenever he sees fit to do so.” The court fu'ther pointed out that the real test by which to determine w? jther a person is acting as the servant of another is to ascer in whether he was subject to such person’s orders and coi. rol and was liable to be discharged for disobedience or mise mduct.
In May v. Farrell, supra, the issi 3 turned on the question whether one Farrell was an employe of the appellant corporation. Farrell was employed to sel automobiles for the corporation on commission. He was re [uired to report at a fixed hour each morning and attend a dail sales meeting. He used his own automobile. In case his services were not satisfactory he could be discharged at any time. In upholding the implied finding of the jury that Farrell was in employee the court said: ‘ The fact that a certain amount . freedom of action is inherent in the nature of the work do<-s not change the character of the employment where the employ v ~ has general supervision and control over it.” The court further 1 °ld that the fact that the salesman furnished his own transportation did not affect- his status as an employee. In Weinberg v. Clark, 120 Cal. App. 362 [8 Pac. (2d) 164], a ease in which the trial was without a jury, the court found that the driver of the automobile involved in the accident, who was an automobile salesman working on a commission basis, was not an employee of his codefendant. The judgment in favor of the employer was reversed, the reviewing court holding that the evidence failed to establish that the driver was an independent contractor. In Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com., 199 Cal. 577 [250 Pac. 570], a ease in which a workman was engaged in shingling at a certain price per thousand shingles the court said: “One of the best tests to determine whether the relation is that of an independent contractor or that of employer and employee is the right of control. It is not the fact of actual interference with the control, but the right to interfere, that makes the difference between an independent contractor and a servant or agent.” In Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 93 Cal. App. 313 [269 Pac. 733], the applicant was *358injured while soliciting prospective purchasers for a real estate company. She received as compensation $2 for each person whom she might interest in the property and cause to visit the land held for sale, plus commission on any sale she might make. She was not limited to any territory in which she might work and the company did not furnish her with the names of people' to interview. She had no specific hours in which to work but was required to telephone the office each morning and attend a meeting for the instruction of salesmen each Monday morning. She was not permitted to work for any other real estate company. The court upheld an award in her favor based on the finding of the commission that she was an employee rather than an independent contractor. (See, also, Dillon v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 75 Cal. App. 266 [242 Pac. 736]; George v. Chaplin, 99 Cal. App. 709 [279 Pac. 485] ; Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 190 Cal. 114 [210 Pac. 820] ; Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist., 118 Cal. App. 673 [5 Pac. (2d) 930].)
Respondent relies upon the case of Hammel v. Keehn, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 387 [63 Pac. (2d) 1165], That case is easily distinguishable from the case at bar. The driver, Keehn, was an employee of a copartnership which contracted with two different automobile, houses to make deliveries of automobiles. One of these houses was the defendant Kaiser Bros. The court said: “They charged a flat rate by zones for the service thus rendered, presenting bills twice a month to each agency, then dividing the proceeds among the partners. So far as appears, there was no agreement which bound them to respond to a call nor which required either service agency to call them rather than obtain or return an automobile by some other medium. Bach call was thus a new contract, although its terms were to be found not in freshly uttered words, but in the recognized practice which repeated contracts had established.” Under its contracts with the copartnership, Kaiser Bros, could not call upon Keehn for his individual services, nor was Keehn subject to discharge by Kaiser Bros. Keehn was not required to devote all of his time to Kaiser Bros, who had no right to exercise control over his work. On the other hand, Keehn was subject to control by the co-partnership which employed him. In the case at bar Stewart, as also the other deliverymen, was required to remain on duty *359at the plant of the Howard Company until his work was finished for the day. He was required to furnish individual services and to take instructions from the company’s foreman. The company had the right to exercise control over his work and could terminate his employment at any time. The company carried compensation insurance upon Stewart, listed him among its employees, and paid him for his labor by the hour when he was not engaged in delivering cars. The Howard Company stresses the point that Stewart had the right to select the route he should take in making deliveries of cars. As is pointed out in May v. Farrell, supra, the fact that a certain amount of freedom is inherent in the nature of the work does not change the nature of the employment where the employer has general supervision and control over it. Certainly the Howard Company was required to deliver Binlcert’s car promptly and had no right to divert the car to some other direction than that which would promptly bring about its return to the owner. Likewise Stewart was obliged to return the car to the owner promptly and by the most feasible route. A chauffeur regularly employed on a full-time basis to drive a car for his employer would not lose his status as an employee in following directions to meet his employer at a certain location if in doing so he should be given the right to select the street route by which to drive the car to its destination. Even mechanics who are employed by the hour to perform labor are given a certain amount of freedom of action as regards the tools to be used. Such freedom of action is inherent in the nature of their work. So, also, such freedom of action as was allowed Stewart was inherent in the nature of his work.
During the portion of the day in which Stewart was washing cars and receiving compensation on an hourly basis he was unquestionably an employee. The change in his work from washing a car on an hourly basis to making a delivery at a flat rate did not transform him from employee to independent contractor.
In finding VIII the trial court found that Stewart was not engaged in the performance of his duty as an employee of the Howard Company. This finding involves a question of mixed law and fact. (Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra.) But in findings VII and IX the court detailed the facts of the employment substantially as set forth herein. In Wallace *360Ranch W. Co. v. Foothill D. Co., 5 Cal. (2d) 103 [53 Pac. (2d) 929], the court said: “It was formerly the rule in this state that where two findings on an essential fact are conflicting, neither can be relied upon to support the judgment. (Moody v. Newmark & Edwards, 121 Cal. 446 [53 Pac. 944] ; Fanta v. Maddex, 80 Cal. App. 513 [252 Pac. 630].) It is also well settled, however, that when a general finding conflicts with a special finding, the latter controls. ’ ’ The finding contained in finding VIII is a finding of an ultimate fact which in my opinion is inconsistent with specific facts found in findings VII and IX. In my opinion finding VIII is not supported by the evidence and must give way to the specific facts elsewhere found by the court. Under the circumstances here shown the purported finding number VIII should be treated as an erroneous conclusion of law. “A general finding, drawn as a conclusion from facts previously found, cannot stand if the specific facts do not support it.,” (Savings & L. Soc. v. Burnett, 106 Cal. 514 [39 Pac. 922]). See, also, McKay v. Gesford, 163 Cal. 243 [124 Pac. 1016, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1253, 41 L. R A. (N. S.) 303].)
In my opinion the judgment as to defendant Howard Automobile Company of Los Angeles should be reversed.
A petition by appellants to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on June 10, 1937.