Court Opinion

ID: 9367232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 13:09:11.662408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.470789
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-21-00509-CV

                                 BEXAR APPRAISAL DISTRICT,
                                          Appellant

                                                   v.

                                LUCIFER LIGHTING COMPANY,
                                          Appellee

                      From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2021-CI-09696
                            Honorable Norma Gonzales, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 25, 2023

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

           Appellant Bexar Appraisal District (“the District”) appeals the trial court’s order denying

its plea to the jurisdiction. The District asserts the trial court erred because appellee Lucifer

Lighting Company failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Because the District’s notice of

appeal is untimely, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                             BACKGROUND

           In November 2020, Lucifer Lighting moved for a late correction of its appraisal rolls,

specifically arguing the appraisal rolls improperly included personal property designated as “small
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tools & dies” and “dies & tools” for the past five years. The Bexar Appraisal Review Board (“the

Board”) denied Lucifer Lighting’s request, and Lucifer Lighting filed suit against the District and

the Board, appealing the Board’s denial order. The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing

Lucifer failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The trial court held a hearing on the District’s

plea on September 15, 2021, and it denied the District’s plea in an order signed on October 8,

2021.

         The District filed a notice of interlocutory appeal and verified Rule 306a motion seeking

to extend the post-judgment deadlines on November 15, 2021. 1 When the clerk’s record was filed,

it did not include an order granting the District’s Rule 306a motion. As a result, the notice of

appeal appeared untimely, and we ordered the District to show cause why this appeal should not

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b) (requiring in accelerated appeal,

party must file notice of appeal within twenty days after order is signed). In response, the District

filed a “Motion to Show Cause,” which it subsequently amended, and we received a supplemental

clerk’s record showing the trial court denied the District’s Rule 306a motion. We ultimately

carried the District’s “First Amended Motion to Show Cause” with the case.

                                                   JURISDICTION

         We begin by considering the District’s “First Amended Motion to Show Cause,” which we

construe as a response to our show cause order, because it concerns our jurisdiction to review this

case on appeal. In its first amended motion, the District argues it timely filed its notice of appeal,

and the trial court abused its discretion by denying its verified Rule 306a motion to extend the

post-judgment deadlines. According to the District, the affidavit attached to its Rule 306a motion

1
  The Board also filed a notice of interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s order denying the District’s plea to
the jurisdiction, and this court dismissed the Board’s appeal in our opinion dated March 30, 2022, styled Bexar
Appraisal Review Board v. Lucifer Lighting Company, Cause No. 04-21-00556-CV.

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established a prima facie case it did not acquire actual knowledge of the trial court’s October 8,

2021 order until November 12, 2021, and therefore, it timely filed its notice of appeal on November

15, 2021.

       In response, Lucifer Lighting argues the District’s notice of appeal is untimely, and the

trial court properly denied the District’s Rule 306a motion to extend the post-judgment deadlines

because the affidavit attached to the Rule 306a motion was inadequate. According to Lucifer

Lighting, the affidavit did not establish when the District acquired actual knowledge of the trial

court’s signing of the October 8, 2021 order; at most, the affidavit only established when one of

the five attorneys representing the District received a copy of the order.

       “The time for filing a notice of appeal is jurisdictional in this court, and absent a timely

filed notice of appeal or timely filed motion for extension, we must dismiss the appeal.”

Korczynski v. Cowboy Up Ranch Furniture, LLC, 651 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022,

no pet.) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b), 26.1, 26.3; Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex.

1997)). Generally, in an accelerated appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days

after the judgment or order being appealed is signed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). However, when a

party or his attorney has neither (1) received timely notice from the court clerk of the judgment or

order being appealed nor (2) acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment or order,

then “the post-judgment procedural timetables run from the date that the party or his attorney either

received the notice . . . or acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the judgment, whichever

occurred first.” Korczynski, 651 S.W.3d at 604 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 4.2(a), TEX. R. CIV. P.

306a(4)).

       To modify the post-judgment procedural timetables, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(5)

requires the party adversely affected to “prove in the trial court, on sworn motion and notice, the

date on which the party or his attorney first either received a notice of the judgment or acquired

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actual knowledge of the signing and that this date was more than twenty days after the judgment

was signed.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(5); see In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig.

proceeding) (explaining Rule 306a(5) requires party alleging late notice of judgment to file sworn

motion establishing date party first learned of judgment). “The sworn motion establishes a prima

facie case that the party lacked timely notice and invokes a trial court’s otherwise-expired

jurisdiction for the limited purpose of holding an evidentiary hearing to determine the date on

which the party or its counsel first received notice or acquired knowledge of the judgment.” Lynd,

195 S.W.3d at 685; see Korczynski, 651 S.W.3d at 605. “Compliance with Rule 306a is a

jurisdictional prerequisite.” Korczynski, 651 S.W.3d at 605 (citing Mem’l Hosp. of Galveston

Cnty. v. Gillis, 741 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam)).

        Here, the trial court signed the order denying the District’s plea to the jurisdiction on

October 8, 2021, and the District filed its notice of appeal and Rule 306a motion on November 15,

2021. In its Rule 306a motion, the District alleged its counsel did not first acquire knowledge of

the trial court’s October 8, 2021 order until November 12, 2021 even though it had “periodically

checked in with the [trial] court.” The District’s counsel further explained on October 13, 2021,

it “filed a letter requesting a signed copy of the order,” and the trial court clerk returned the filing,

noting an order had not been “entered.” The District also stated on October 15, 2021, its counsel

corresponded with Lucifer Lighting’s counsel to determine whether an order had been signed by

the trial court, and Lucifer Lighting’s counsel stated it had not received a copy.

        To support its Rule 306a motion, the District attached an affidavit from one of its attorneys.

The attorney attested he represented the District and had “periodically instructed [his] support staff

to . . . inquire [with the court] whether a signed order had been entered” since the plea to the

jurisdiction hearing. He further attested the first day he or anyone on his staff received a copy of

the trial court’s order was on November 12, 2021. The attorney affidavit included as exhibits

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counsel’s email correspondence to the trial court clerk and opposing counsel inquiring about the

signed order.

        However, there is nothing in the District’s Rule 306a motion and affidavit negating the

possibility its other attorneys acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the October 8, 2021

order within twenty days after it was signed. See id. at 606 (holding plaintiff failed to negate

possibility other attorneys acquired actual knowledge of signing of order when Rule 306a motion

failed to include affidavit from all four attorneys representing plaintiff); City of Laredo v. Schuble,

943 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding) (holding affidavit from

one member of plaintiff’s legal team attesting did not know final judgment had been entered was

insufficient to show plaintiff did not receive either written notice or acquire actual knowledge of

entry of judgment). The record shows at the time the District filed its Rule 306a motion, it was

represented by five attorneys from the same law firm, but only one attorney attested when he or

anyone on his staff received a copy of the October 8, 2021 order. “Notice and actual knowledge

must be negated by all such parties and counsel in order to establish a prima facie showing that

notice was untimely.” Schuble, 943 S.W.2d at 126.

        Accordingly, because the District’s Rule 306a motion and affidavit fail to establish a prima

facie case indicating the District lacked timely notice of the October 8, 2021 order, the District

was not entitled to the extension permitted by Rule 306a. See Korczynski, 651 S.W.3d at 606;

Schuble, 943 S.W.2d at 126. Therefore, the District’s notice of appeal, filed thirty-eight days after

the signing of the trial court’s order, is untimely, and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

                                                   Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

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