Court Opinion

ID: 9717092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:58:00.963618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.191525
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice.
While I join the majority opinion as to the offenses of indecency by exposure and indecency by contact with the anus, I must *472disagree with the- majority’s conclusion that the evidence is legally sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for indecency by contacting the complainant’s genitals because there is legally insufficient evidence of Appellant’s intent to arouse and gratify.
The thoughtful majority opinion reveals a subtle shift in appellate courts’ view of the burden of proof. Perhaps it is in response to a growing societal commitment to protecting children, but this shift is of constitutional magnitude. The State bears the burden of proving every element of the offense alleged beyond a reasonable doubt.1 The State’s burden of proof is a constitutional due process protection. As our sister court in Austin has explained,
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires every state crimi■nal conviction to be supported by evidence that a rational trier of fact could accept as sufficient to prove all the elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt....
“If, based on all the evidence, a reasonably minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, due process requires that we reverse and order a judgment of acquittal.” The.legal sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.2
This standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be a higher and more onerous standard than proof by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.3 The culpable mental state is an essential element of a criminal offense.4
In Cook v. State,5 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reminded us that
the most basic and fundamental concept of criminal law [is] ... that in order to constitute a crime, the act or actus reus must be accompanied by a criminal mind or mens rea. Perhaps this concept was best explained by the United States Supreme Court many years ago in Moris-sette v. United States.
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil....
Our Legislature recognized this fundamental concept by enacting four separate culpable mental states. , This Court has further recognized that the scope of those culpable mental states is limited by the type of offense. In McQueen v. State, we stated that our analysis of criminal conduct varies according to the *473“conduct elements” of the offense. We stated:
... V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 6.03 delineates three “conduct elements” which may be involved in an offense: (1) the nature of the conduct; (2) the result of the conduct; and (3) the circumstances surrounding the conduct. ... Any offense may contain any one or more of these “conduct elements” which alone or in combination form the overall behavior which the Legislature has intended to criminalize, and it is those essential “conduct elements” to which a culpable mental state must apply. For example, where specific acts are criminalized because of their very nature, a culpable mental state must apply to committing the act itself.... On the other hand, unspecified conduct that is crim-inalist because of its result requires culpability as to that result.... Likewise, where otherwise innocent behavior becomes criminal because of the circumstances under which it is done, a culpable mental state is required as to those surrounding circumstances .... 6
The intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of a person is an essential element of the offense of indecency with a child by contact.7 The majority states, “Here, I.R. testified to all the elements of the charged offense.”8 The record does not support this statement. Indeed, the majority then concedes that the intent to arouse and gratify could only be inferred. Although the majority correctly points out that “[t]he requisite specific intent for indecency with a child by contact can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and remarks and all the surrounding circumstances,”9 the majority then treats indecency with a child by contact as a strict liability offense, suggesting that in all cases, “the conduct itself is sufficient to infer intent.”10
Appellant was convicted of “intentionally, with the intent to ai’ouse or gratify the sexual desire of said defendant, engaging] in sexual contact by touching any part of the genitals” of I.R. I.R.’s mother testified that she had asked Appellant to serve as a father figure to I.R. Specifically, she asked Appellant to counsel I.R. in sex education. As part of the sex education, she anticipated Appellant’s discussing masturbation and intercourse with I.R. She said that she expected a father figure to treat the child as he would his own, in most instances.
The only evidence of this offense is Appellant’s statement to Leah Warren, the CPS investigator. In the statement, Appellant said that he and I.R. had a father-son relationship and that I.R.’s mother asked Appellant to help I.R. through his years of puberty because of I.R.’s own father’s advanced age. In the statement, Appellant said, “I have [checked] [I.R.j’s testicles to check for knots or [a] reason why he was not able to produce sperm by the age of 14 years, because it worried him that his friends could and he could not.” When he found no abnormality, Appellant suggested that I.R. contact a doctor if he was still concerned. This explanation of Appellant’s mens rea was uncontradicted.
The complainant testified on direct examination:
*474Q: Were you particularly worried about [whether you could produce sperm] when you were a child?
A: Yes, sir, I was.
Q: What made you worried about that? A: I was afraid maybe I wouldn’t be able to produce when I get older or something.
Q: Did you ever go to [Appellant] worried about that?
A: I remember when he talked to me about something[.] I went to my mom when I was httle[,] and I talked to her about it[,] and then she got mad at me. I can’t remember. She said I’m not supposed to ask her that kind of stuff because she is a girl.
Q: Mom didn’t want to hear about that?
A: Yeah.
Q: Did you go to [Appellant] then?
A: I believe I did go to him.
Q: At any point when you went to [Appellant], did he inspect you to make sure everything was okay?
A: I don’t remember him inspecting me.
This is not a case in which the evidence shows a touching or rubbing or penetration that could only be described as sexually stimulating in nature. I.R. did not recall that the touching happened at all. Appellant said in an out-of-court statement that the touching had been to determine if medical care was required and only because I.R. had voiced his concern and because the mother had asked Appellant to help I.R. through puberty. Although I.R. did not remember the touching, he and his mother both substantiated Appellant’s explanation that he had been asked to help I.R. through puberty and to discuss sexual matters and that I.R. had gone to him voicing his concern regarding his ability to produce sperm.
Although the majority correctly states that “[t]he requisite specific intent for indecency with a child by contact can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and remarks and all the surrounding circumstances,” 11 we have only Appellant’s explanation of the conduct, remarks, and circumstances. Additionally, other than the fact that I.R. was concerned about his ability to produce sperm and Appellant was checking for abnormalities, we do not know when or where or under what circumstances this touching happened, except that Appellant suggests that I.R. was fourteen years old. There is no evidence that the event occurred in Tarrant County or even in Texas. Appellant did state that, when he found no abnormality, he told Appellant to see a doctor if he was still concerned.
Additionally, no evidence, corroborates Appellant’s extrajudicial confession. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained,
[Every crime] reveals three component parts, first, the occurrence of the specific kind of injury or loss (as in homicide, a person deceased; in arson, a house burnt; in larceny, property missing); secondly, somebody’s criminality (in contrast, e.g., to accident) as the source of the loss, — these two together involving the commission of a crime by somebody; and thirdly, the accused’s identity as the doer of this crime.
In most American jurisdictions, including Texas, the corpus delicti rule requires some corroboration of the first two elements — an injury or loss and a criminal agent — -although it does not also require any independent evidence *475that the defendant was the criminal culprit. Its purpose is to ensure that a person is not convicted of a crime that never occurred, based solely upon that person’s extra-judicial confession. The rule was not intended, however, to ensure that all confessions are corroborated in specific details or to ensure that the suspect does not falsely confess to a crime that did occur but for which he had no culpability. Thus, it satisfies the corpus delicti rule if some evidence exists outside of the extra-judicial confession which, considered alone or in connection with the confession, shows that the crime actually occurred.12
The absence of independent evidence corroborating Appellant’s extrajudicial confession is yet another basis for holding the evidence legally insufficient.13 Because I believe that the evidence is legally insufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for indecency by contact with the complainant’s genitals, I would reverse Appellant’s conviction and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to acquit Appellant of that offense. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.01 (Vernon 2003) ("All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

. Reedy v. State, 214 S.W.3d 567, 579-80 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).

. Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) ("Satisfying a burden of proof necessarily involves weighing evidence. For a preponderance of the evidence,' any evidence that tips the scales is sufficient. For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must be 'highly probable or reasonably certain.’ And, as we all know, the highest burden is beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (footnote omitted).

. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.02(a)-(c) (Vernon Supp.2006).

. 884 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).

. Id. at 487 (citations omitted).

. Tex Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (Vernon 2003).

. Majority op. at 466.

. Id. at 467.

. Id.

. Majority op. at 467.

. Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 644-45 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (footnote omitted).

. See id. at 643; see also Smith v. State, 172 Tex.Crim. 554, 361 S.W.2d 390, 392 (1962) (reversing statutory rape conviction when the only evidence that fourteen-year-old had sexual intercourse was father’s extrajudicial confession).