Court Opinion

ID: 9561624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:13:02.736037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:04.816610
License: Public Domain

Moon, J.,
dissenting.
*166I dissent because I cannot find that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to strike Mrs. Allen as a juror. As the majority points out, whether a juror is capable of laying aside a preconceived opinion and rendering a verdict lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s finding should not be disturbed on appeal absent manifest error. Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 256, 258, 307 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1983). Further, the true test of impartiality lies in the mental attitude of the proposed juror, and the proof that he is impartial and fair should come from him uninfluenced by persuasion or coercion by anyone. Id.
In Parsons v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 764, 773, 121 S.E. 68, 70 (1924), relied upon by the majority, both prospective jurors stated that they had formed fixed opinions that the defendant was guilty and each said that he would go into the jury in a frame of mind such that it would take evidence to change his mind. Each essentially only responded “yes” to a series of leading and argumentative questions from the court in its effort to rehabilitate them.
In this instance, I believe the trial judge was in the best position to weigh Mrs. Allen’s qualifications to serve. Mrs. Allen revealed that she had some preconceived idea of the defendant’s guilt based upon what she read in the newspaper. However, in addition to affirmative responses to non-argumentative questions by the court, she stated in her own words that she could put aside what she had read in the newspaper and decide the case based solely upon the evidence presented at trial. She also responded similarly to a number of leading questions propounded by defense counsel. The record would support a finding that she was a reasonably informed juror who had read something in the newspaper and who admitted that she came away from that reading with the point of view that the defendant was guilty. However, the court could reasonably have found that she could put such feelings aside and try the case solely upon the evidence. I fail to find in this record that Allen had the same fixed opinion of appellant’s guilt, or that she had essentially declared that appellant would have to prove his innocence, as had the prospective jurors in Parsons. These were among the significant circumstances in Parsons that caused the Supreme Court to rule that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to strike the jurors there. Therefore, because, in my opinion, those circumstances do not exist here, I would affirm the conviction.