Court Opinion

ID: 9474201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:50:35.556439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:57.342839
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This case involves two distinct sentencing matters. In the first, the appellant challenges the district court’s November *13491983 denial of his motion to reduce his sentence under Rule 35(b). In the second, the appellant challenges the district court’s treatment of his January 1985 motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a). Because I disagree with the majority’s disposition of both of these matters, I respectfully dissent.
I
The first of these claims — the motion for reduction in sentence under Rule 35(b) — is properly treated by the court as a close and complex question. The court’s recent and, in my view, regrettable decision in Gaertner v. United States, 763 F.2d 787 (7th Cir.1985), makes it so. Interpreting the version of Rule 35(b) in force before August 1, 1985, Gaertner held that the district court was obliged to act on a motion to reduce a sentence within 120 days of the triggering event (receipt of the mandate of the court of appeals or final disposition by the Supreme Court of the United States). Failure to observe those time limits, the Gaertner court held, resulted in the district court’s loss of jurisdiction.
Under usual circumstances, I would consider myself bound by the doctrine of stare decisis and follow the holding in Gaertner despite my disagreement with it. Overruling any precedent — especially such recent precedent — should be undertaken very rarely. However, effective August 1,1985, the Supreme Court, with the full knowledge and consent of the Congress,1 adopted an amendment to Rule 35(b) which was explicitly designed to disavow the position of this circuit.
In conforming the “language to the non-literal interpretation which most courts have already placed upon the rule,” the Advisory Committee Notes disclose that “a change in the language is deemed desirable to remove any doubt which might arise from dictum in some cases____” The Advisory Committee then cites, as an example of this errant view, this court’s decision in United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 104 S.Ct. 721, 79 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984) where, in dicta, the later holding of Gaertner was foreshadowed. In my view, the failure of the Congress to take affirmative action to amend or postpone the submission of the Supreme Court, despite its at least constructive knowledge of this court’s decision in Gaertner, justifies and indeed compels our reassessment of that holding. The effective date of the interim rule has come and gone. The Congress has, at least passively, declined to alter the text, thus concurring in the correction of this circuit’s position by the rules process. It is appropriate for us to reevaluate the situation.2
The most forthright — and respectful— way of remedying our error would be to overrule Gaertner and acknowledge that, in this area, we have an obligation to follow the mandate of the rule-making process. In my view, respect for the responsibilities of the Judicial Conference of the United *1350States, the Supreme Court, and the Congress requires that we so proceed. To maintain a circuit conflict which results in unequal treatment of those who have been subject to the criminal process is serious enough. To continue to maintain that position after the rule-making process — including the Congress — has found that our position is wrong is even more serious.
If the court is unwilling to overrule Gaertner, it should at least decline to apply it retroactively. The general rule is, as the majority points out, that jurisdictional holdings are to be applied retroactively. However, the Supreme Court has recognized, as the majority also notes, that such an approach is not always indicated. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973) (refusing to apply retroactively O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969), which limited the jurisdiction of courts martial). Indeed, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), the Supreme Court declined to apply retroactively its holding significantly limiting the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Applying the criteria developed in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Court decided against retroactive application of its jurisdictional holding. 458 U.S. at 87-89, 102 S.Ct. at 2880-81.
The Chevron criteria also militate against the retroactive application of the Gaertner holding. Such a deviation was certainly not clearly foreshadowed by earlier caselaw; the district judge ought to be charged with following the holdings of our previous cases — not their dicta. The retroactive application of Gaertner frustrates the established policy of the rule-making process. Finally, the retroactive application of the Gaertner holding is bound to work substantial injustice on many criminal defendants in this circuit and place them in a less advantageous position than those in the other circuits. By acting now and rejoining the rest of the country on this matter, we would demonstrate proper respect for the rule-making process. We would also ensure that justice is administered even-handedly.
Since I would hold that the district court had jurisdiction to act on the motion before it, I would reach the merits of the appeal. Here, I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district judge and I would affirm his judgment.
II
While the disheveled state of this record makes it difficult to understand exactly what transpired in the district court, I am nonetheless troubled by the majority’s disposition of the appellant’s Rule 35(a) claim. As the district court and the majority note, it is quite proper to handle multiplicitous charges by merging the convictions. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir.1982). However, this court has also held that, when the multiplicity is discovered after the initial sentencing, a resentencing is required since the judge may have been influenced by his erroneous belief that the defendant had committed two offenses rather than one. McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277, 1279 (7th Cir.1972). The same rule is applied when the sentences are concurrent rather than consecutive. See United States v. Harris, 729 F.2d 441, 449 (7th Cir.1984). I do not understand the majority to contest either of these propositions.
The appellant’s contention turns on whether the district judge actually resentenced him. On this record, I am not prepared to hold that the action of the district judge amounted to a full and independent evaluation of the sentence. See Paul v. United States, 734 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Eddy, 677 F.2d 656 (8th Cir.1982); Johnson v. United States, 619 F.2d 366 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.1976).
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 35(b) motion. I would reverse the denial of the Rule 35(a) motion and remand for resentencing.

. In 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1976), the Congress gave the Supreme Court of the United States power to prescribe “rules of practice and procedure with respect to any or all proceedings after verdict____” Further, this section provides that the "Supreme Court may fix the dates when such rules shall take effect and the extent to which they shall apply to proceedings then pending____” However, as our court noted in Gaertner, 763 F.2d at 789 n. 2, Congress retains the ability to prevent these regulations from taking effect.
For a summary of the procedures used by the Advisory Committee, see Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure, reprinted in Federal Criminal Code and Rules (West, rev. ed. 1985).

. The Gaertner opinion, delivered in June 1985, did not raise the same direct confrontation with the rule-making process. The same considerations apply to the July 11, 1985 denial of the petition for rehearing en banc. At that time, the Rule 35(b) interim provision (valid from August 1, 1985 through November 1, 1986) had not yet taken effect. Therefore, since the Congress was still in session through July, it was possible for it to alter or delay the interim provision.
However, our case is born into a world entirely different than Gaertner’s. The Rule 35(b) interim provision is now in effect; the time for amending or postponing it has long since passed. In essence, the Congress and the Supreme Court have conclusively decided — without any indication of waiver or retreat — that our circuit’s Gaertner decision was wrong.