Court Opinion

ID: 6922769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-23 23:07:35.932523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:06:50.869578
License: Public Domain

PICKETT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which deals with the class action. After the liability of the defendants had been established by verdict, the trial court interpreted Rule 23(a) (3) as authorizing individuals who had not been named as parties but were alleged to have been damaged by defendants’ unlawful acts to take full advantage of the verdict by filing claims within a specified period, appointed a master to determine the amount of their damages, and directed attorneys for the class to notify them of the verdict in their favor and the court’s judgment. This section of the rule defines as a class action one involving numerous persons whose rights are several, but are affected by a common question of law or fact, and in which a common relief is sought. The action defined is neither a true class action nor one in which an adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action is sought. The section permits the adjudication of in personam claims in one action when there is no privity between the members of the “class” and the right or liability of each is distinct, and suits brought under it are usually referred to as “spurious class actions.” I find no case in which it has been held that the rights of a non-appearing member of the “class” would be affected by a judgment entered in the action. Instead the law appears to be as stated in Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 387, 390:
“[W]e recently supported such a class action and adverted to the settled rule in the Second Circuit that members of the class who are not joined in such a class suit will not be affected by the decision. In other words, the decision will only be res judicata as to the plaintiffs and the parties who have intervened.”
The history of Rule 23(a) (3) illustrates, I think, without any doubt, that the class suit contemplated was no more than a permissive joinder device, in cases in which federal jurisdiction has been established, to permit the disposition of claims having common questions of law or fact in one action, without further jurisdictional limitations. The rule was not intended to create a procedure whereby a judgment would determine the rights of non-appearing class members as in other class actions. Professor Moore, who was a dominant force in the formulation of the rule, says:
“The spurious class suit is a permissive joinder device. The presence of numerous persons interested in a common question of law or fact warrants its use by persons desiring to clean up a litigious situation. While a purist may not like to have the third type of class action termed spurious, this label serves to direct attention to the practical realities of litigation. The character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
*602‘“(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.’
“There is no jural relationship between the members of the class; unlike, for example, the members of an unincorporated association, they have taken no steps to create a legal relationship among themselves. They are not fellow travellers by agreement. The right or liability of each is distinct. The class is formed solely by the presence of a common question of law or fact. When a suit is brought by or against such a class, it is merely an invitation to joinder — an invitation to become a fellow traveller in the litigation, which may or may not be accepted. It is an invitation and not a command performance.” (Footnote omitted) — 3 Moore’s Federal Practice § 23.10 (2d Ed. 1948.) In All American Airways, Inc. v. Eldred, 2 Cir., 209 F.2d 247, 248-249, Judge Clark, who was the official reporter for the Advisory Committee preparing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in commenting on actions contemplated by 23(a) (3), said:
“In justice to the litigants it must be admitted that there still seems considerable confusion as to the meaning and effect of the third group of class actions authorized by F.R. 23(a), 28 U.S.C.A., a confusion not lessened by the load it bears in its popular legal cognomen of ‘spurious class action.’ There is perhaps something anomalous in apparent legal participation in a lawsuit by persons unnamed and unidentified as individuals who, unless they show themselves by intervening, remain legally unaffected by any action taken in the case. The legal rationale lags behind the practical utilities found in the device and its ‘psychological value’ (3 Moore’s Federal Practice 3445, 2d Ed. 1948) on courts and potential litigants. It stands as an-invitation to others affected to join in the battle and an admonition to-the court to proceed with proper circumspection in creating a precedent which may actually affect non-parties, even if not legally res judicata as to them. Beyond this, as we in common with other courts have pointed out, it cannot make the case of the claimed representatives stronger, or give them rights they would not have of their own strength, or affect legally the rights or obligations of those who do not intervene. Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 387; California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, 2 Cir., 162 F.2d 893, 174 A.L.R. 481, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 816, 68 S.Ct. 156, 92 L.Ed. 393; 3 Moore’s Federal Practice 3447-3456 (2d Ed. 1948). True, in Dickinson v. Burnham, 2 Cir., 197 F.2d 973, 979, certiorari denied 344 U.S. 875, 73 S.Ct. 169 [97 L.Ed. 678], we noted a query advanced by text writers to the possibilities of extending the scope of res judicata, where adequate notice and specific opportunity to come in have been accorded the persons represented; but it is obvious that here in any event no such compulsive notice as the writers visualize is possible as to the unascertained property owners.” (Footnote omitted.)
In Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 2 Cir., 248 F.2d 319, 327, Judge Clark said the rule “is in actual effect really little more than an invitation to non-parties closely interested to intervene.” In an earlier case, Judge Clark referred to the effect of the rule in these words:
“It does not grant authority to adjudicate finally rights as to nonappearing parties or to confer any additional substantive rights upon the plaintiffs suing. Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 387; 2 Moore’s Federal Practice 2235-2245, 2291; 46 Col.L.Rev. 818, 55 Yale L.J. 831; cases cited in Clark on Code Pleading, 2d Ed. 1947, 405, 407. Hence the rights of the rest of *603the 4,500 potential plaintiffs are actually not to be settled here, and we cannot give judgment as though they were. We stress this point because at times there appear to be suggestions that the representative character of a suit may aid in recovery.” (Footnotes omitted). California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 2d Cir., 162 F.2d 893, 897, cert. denied 332 U.S. 816, 68 S.Ct. 156, 92 L.Ed. 393.
Other courts have taken the same view. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 2 Cir., 204 F.2d 331, cert. denied 345 U.S. 994, 73 S.Ct. 1133, 97 L.Ed. 1401; Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 737, cert. denied 344 U.S. 820, 73 S.Ct. 17, 97 L.Ed. 638; Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 9 Cir., 183 F.2d 685, cert. denied 340 U.S. 827, 71 S.Ct. 64, 95 L.Ed. 608; Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., supra; Athas v. Day, (D.C.Colo.) 161 F.Supp. 916, 186 F.Supp. 385. Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L.Ed. 22. It is obvious that Buie 23(a) (3) furnishes a useful but limited vehicle for the effective disposition of claims for injuries to the number of parties from the unlawful conduct of others. As pointed out by those who knew what was intended by the section, it merely provides a procedure which permits the disposition of all claims in one action in the instances defined, it did not create a new “class action” as that term is used in the law 3 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 23.10, 23.11, (2d Ed. 1948).
The plaintiff ridicules the doctrine of mutuality and estoppel of judgments as no longer having vitality, thoroughly discredited, and slowly dying. The doctrine has in some instances been justly criticized, but not in cases such as we have here, in which the claimants stand by, with no concern for the statute of limitations or the expense of litigation, waiting for an opportunity to take advantage of a favorable judgment without being bound by one that is adverse to their interest.1 See Moore and Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, Tulane Law Review, Vol. XXXV, pp. 301-330 (Feb.1961). It might well be possible to devise a procedure which would bind non-intervening members of the “class,” but the rule does not in its present form purport to accomplish this.
While as pointed out by Judge Murrah, some students and writers have advocated that Rule 23(a) (3) should be applied as it was by the trial court in this case, and the plaintiff has very eloquently espoused that theory, so far the courts have not looked upon the theory with favor, and we will be the first to fully accept and apply this novel interpretation. As so aptly put by our Chief Judge on another occasion, “It all sounds very well, but questions of law should not be disposed of on noise.” I am convinced that the adoption of this concept of the rule will not only lead to its unfair use, but will be conducive to the undesirable solicitation of claims in tort cases in which there are multiple injuries.

. In actions by third parties after a judgment unfavorable to them, the defense of the statute of limitations might be effective.