Court Opinion

ID: 9368896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 14:02:21.282529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.627521
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
 Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
 opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
 prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 7, 2023

                      S22A0916. RUTLAND v. THE STATE.

       LAGRUA, Justice.

       Appellant Israel Rutland was convicted of felony murder in

connection with the deaths of Kelly Marie Prescott and Matthew

Dean Horton resulting from a vehicular collision following a high-

speed police chase.1 On appeal, Appellant contends in two related

       1Prescott and Horton died on November 12, 2013. On February 2, 2015,
a Berrien County grand jury indicted Appellant for the following counts: felony
murder of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police
officers (Count 1); felony murder of Horton, predicated on fleeing and
attempting to elude police officers (Count 2); homicide by vehicle in the first
degree of Prescott, predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude police officers
(Count 3); homicide by vehicle in the first degree of Horton, predicated on
fleeing and attempting to elude police officers (Count 4); serious injury by
vehicle of Heidi Mancil (Count 5); fleeing and attempting to elude a police
officer (Counts 6-11); aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12-13);
reckless conduct (Count 14); reckless driving (Count 15); driving under the
influence (Count 16); driving while license suspended (Count 17); and failure
to stop at a stop sign (Count 18).
       Prior to trial, the driving under the influence count (Count 16) was
dismissed. Jury selection occurred from September 20 to 21, 2016, and
Appellant was represented by counsel during jury selection. At a trial from
claims that his convictions for felony murder and homicide by

vehicle in the first degree constitute “inconsistent verdicts”

requiring reversal. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

      The evidence presented at trial showed that on November 12,

2013, Appellant was driving through Tift County when a law

enforcement officer attempted to pull him over to execute a pending

arrest warrant. Appellant refused to pull over and led officers on a

high-speed chase spanning multiple counties. Once in Berrien

County, the Nashville Police Department deployed “stop sticks.”

Though Appellant ran over the “stop sticks,” he never reduced his

speed, lost control of his vehicle, or left his lane of travel. Shortly

December 6 to December 15, 2016, Appellant represented himself, and his
stand-by counsel presented closing argument. The jury found Appellant not
guilty of two counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer (Counts 12 and 13)
and reckless conduct (Count 14), but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial
court merged the two counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Counts
3 and 4) into the two felony murder counts (Counts 1 and 2), and Appellant
was sentenced to serve life in prison plus six years. Appellant filed a timely
motion for new trial. After the motion-for-new-trial hearing, the trial court
vacated one of Appellant’s convictions for fleeing and attempting to elude a
police officer (Count 6), re-sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison plus five
years, and otherwise denied the motion for new trial. Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2022 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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thereafter, he drove through an intersection with a stop sign and

collided with a Trailblazer driven by Heidi Mancil. Mancil’s siblings,

Prescott and Horton, were also occupants of the vehicle. Prescott and

Horton were declared dead at the scene, and their cause of death

was determined to be severe trauma as a result of the collision.

Although Mancil survived, she suffered serious injuries and had to

be life-flighted to the nearest hospital to treat her injuries.

     1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it

accepted the jury’s guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by

vehicle in the first degree because they were “inconsistent verdicts.”

He argues that these verdicts were “inconsistent” because the felony

murder convictions required a finding that Appellant “acted with

criminal intent” and the homicide by vehicle convictions required a

finding that Appellant “acted . . . [with] criminal negligence.” For

the reasons explained below, this claim has no merit.

     “As a general rule, inconsistent verdicts occur when a jury in a

criminal case renders seemingly incompatible verdicts of guilty on

one charge and not guilty on another.” McElrath v. State, 308 Ga.

                                   3
104, 108 (2) (a) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (emphasis in original). See

also State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 216 (1) (a) (862 SE2d 125) (2021).

An example of inconsistent verdicts is when a defendant is convicted

of possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of

aggravated assault, but found not guilty of aggravated assault. See

Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291, 295-296 (4) (687 SE2d 427) (2009).

Although this Court once viewed inconsistent verdicts as

impermissible, we now allow inconsistent verdicts to stand,

reasoning that “it is not generally within the court’s power to make

inquiries into the jury’s deliberations, or to speculate about the

reasons for any inconsistency between guilty and not guilty

verdicts.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 109 (2) (a) (citation and punctuation

omitted). But, we have acknowledged that “repugnant verdicts”

require reversal. See id. at 111 (2) (c). “Repugnant verdicts” “occur

when, in order to find the defendant not guilty on one count and

guilty on another, the jury must make affirmative findings shown

on the record that cannot logically or legally exist at the same time.”

Id., at 111 (2) (c). An example of “repugnant verdicts” is when a

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defendant is found guilty but mentally ill of felony murder and

aggravated assault and not guilty of malice murder by reason of

insanity. See id. at 112 (2) (c) (“Put simply, it is not legally possible

for an individual to simultaneously be insane and not insane during

a single criminal episode against a single victim, even if the episode

gives rise to more than one crime.”).

     Here, Appellant contends that, although we no longer hold that

inconsistent verdicts necessarily require reversal, the verdicts in

this case should nonetheless be reversed. However, the guilty

verdicts on felony murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree

cannot be classified as “inconsistent verdicts” or “repugnant

verdicts” because the felony murder and homicide by vehicle verdicts

consist only of guilty verdicts, rather than a guilty verdict and a not

guilty verdict. Thus, Appellant’s claim has no merit.

     Although two or more guilty verdicts cannot be “inconsistent

verdicts” or “repugnant verdicts” as we have defined those terms,

they could be “mutually exclusive.” See McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2)

(b). But guilty verdicts are not mutually exclusive with one another

                                   5
unless they “cannot legally exist simultaneously.” Id. An example of

“mutually exclusive” verdicts is when a defendant is convicted of

malice murder, an offense requiring a showing of the presence of

malice aforethought, and vehicular homicide, an offense requiring a

showing of the absence of malice aforethought. See Dumas v. State,

266 Ga. 797, 799 (2) (471 SE2d 508) (1996).

     Here, the guilty verdicts on felony murder and homicide by

vehicle involve levels of mental culpability that are different in

degree but not ones that, as in Dumas, “cannot legally exist

simultaneously.” McElrath, 308 Ga. at 110 (2). See also OCGA § 16-

5-1 (c) (defining felony murder as “in the commission of a felony,

caus[ing] the death of another human being irrespective of malice”);

OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) (defining first-degree homicide by vehicle as

“caus[ing] the death of another person through [certain traffic

offenses]” “without malice aforethought”). We have made clear that

“multiple guilty verdicts for the same conduct that are based on

varying levels of mens rea are not mutually exclusive.” Springer v.

                                 6
State, 297 Ga. 376, 382 (1) (774 SE2d 106) (2015).2 Accord Hinkson

v. State 310 Ga. 388, 391-392 (2) (850 SE2d 41) (2020). Thus, the

verdicts here are neither inconsistent nor mutually exclusive, and

Appellant’s claim also fails for this reason.

         2. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing

to instruct the jury that it could not find Appellant guilty of both

felony murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree. This claim

fails.

         “Where a defendant does not request that the trial court give a

jury instruction,” as Appellant did not here, “this Court only reviews

for plain error.” Munn v. State, 313 Ga. 716, 722 (3) (873 SE2d 166)

(2022).

         To show plain error, the appellant must demonstrate that
         the instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was
         obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the
         outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the
         fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
         proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this standard is

       We note that Springer explicitly overruled Walker v. State, 293 Ga. 709
         2

(749 SE2d 663) (2013), which reversed the defendant’s convictions for felony
murder based on aggravated assault and homicide by vehicle based on reckless
driving because they were “mutually exclusive.” See Springer, 297 Ga. at 383
n.4.
                                      7
     difficult, as it should be.

Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 325 (1) (877 SE2d 202) (2022). This

Court does not have to analyze all elements of the plain-error test

where an appellant fails to establish one of them. See id.

     For the reasons set forth in Division 1, we conclude that there

was no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial court’s failure to

instruct the jury that it could not find Appellant guilty of both felony

murder and homicide by vehicle in the first degree and that any such

instruction by the trial court would have been error. Cf. Booth v.

State, 311 Ga. 374, 376 (1) (858 SE2d 39) (2021) (concluding that the

trial court made an “incorrect determination at trial that the

verdicts were mutually exclusive” when it vacated the verdicts and

“charged the jury that they could not enter guilty verdicts on both

felony murder and involuntary manslaughter and could not enter

guilty verdicts on both neglect to an elder person and reckless

conduct”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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