Court Opinion

ID: 9889707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:08.138436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:17.600720
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: October 11, 2023

                        S23A0589. SOSEBEE v. THE STATE.

        ELLINGTON, Justice.

        A Hall County jury found Christopher Sosebee guilty of felony

murder in the death of Brian Hayes resulting from a car wreck.1

        1 The wreck occurred on July 22, 2020. On May 5, 2021, a Hall County

grand jury returned an indictment charging Sosebee with felony murder
predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Count 1),
homicide by vehicle in the first degree, predicated on driving under the
influence (Count 2), homicide by vehicle in the first degree, predicated on
reckless driving (Count 3), homicide by vehicle in the first degree, predicated
on fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Count 4), serious injury by
vehicle (Count 5), felony fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer (Count
6), driving under the influence of drugs (less safe) (Count 7), reckless driving
(Count 8), misdemeanor obstruction of an officer (Count 9), speeding (Count
10), failure to maintain lane (Count 11), driving with expired license (Count
12), affixing plate to conceal or misrepresent identity (Count 13), and improper
tires (Count 14). Following a February 2022 trial, a jury found Sosebee guilty
on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, as well as several of the other offenses not at issue
in this appeal. On February 11, 2022, the trial court sentenced Sosebee as a
recidivist to serve life in prison without parole on Count 1. The trial court
determined that Count 6 merged with Count 1 for purposes of sentencing. The
trial court also declared that Counts 2, 3, and 4 were vacated as a matter of
law. Sosebee filed a timely motion for a new trial, which he amended on
September 15, 2022. The trial court denied Sosebee’s motion for a new trial on
September 22, 2022. Sosebee filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was
docketed in this Court to the April 2023 term and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
Sosebee contends that Count 1, felony murder, and Count 4,

homicide by vehicle in the first degree, which were both predicated

on Count 6, fleeing or attempting to elude, defined exactly the same

criminal conduct. Sosebee argues that the rule of lenity therefore

requires that he be sentenced within the range for homicide by

vehicle in the first degree, rather than for felony murder. He also

contends that his sentence of life without parole violates the

prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution because neither

felony murder nor homicide by vehicle in the first degree, when

predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude as in this case,

requires malice or specific intent to harm, and because the prior

felonies that triggered his sentencing as a recidivist were non-

violent. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.

     The facts relevant to Sosebee’s claims of error are not disputed.

The record shows the following. On July 22, 2020, a Hall County

sheriff’s deputy was looking for a black car that had been spray-

painted and was missing its front grill, in order to serve arrest

                                  2
warrants on a person who, the day before, had reportedly been

driving a vehicle matching that description. The deputy saw an SUV

matching that description, called it in, and followed the vehicle while

requesting additional officers to assist with a traffic stop. After a few

minutes of following the SUV at 45 to 50 mph in a 45 mph zone, the

deputy activated his blue lights and siren. The SUV accelerated and

pulled away from the patrol car. At a curve, the SUV’s right rear tire

left the road, then the SUV veered sharply to the left, crossed the

oncoming lane, traveled up an embankment, hit some boulders,

flipped, landed on top of an approaching truck, and then rolled off.

The driver of the truck showed no signs of life when the deputy

reached him, and Sosebee’s girlfriend, Tiffany Franklin, who had

been a passenger in the SUV during the incident, was very badly

injured.

     Franklin testified about the day of the wreck as follows. She

and Sosebee were visiting a friend that day when they saw a police

car parked near their friend’s house. They left their friend’s house

with Sosebee driving Franklin’s Chevrolet Equinox. When Franklin

                                   3
saw the patrol car’s blue lights, she screamed at Sosebee to stop.

Sosebee did not stop; he accelerated. Sosebee said, “Baby, I am sorry.

I love you.” Franklin felt the SUV go off the road, and then it flipped

and hit another vehicle. Franklin testified that Sosebee believed he

had an outstanding warrant and that, on some date prior to the

incident, he told her “that they would have to kill him before he went

back to prison.” A test of Sosebee’s blood after the wreck revealed

methamphetamine, at an impairment level, as well as marijuana.

     An expert in collision reconstruction with the Georgia State

Patrol testified that the SUV was traveling approximately 80 mph

in the seconds before the wreck. The speed limit in force at that

location was 45 mph.

     Count 1 of the indictment charged that Sosebee,

     while in the commission of a felony, to wit: Fleeing and
     Attempting to Elude a Police Officer as alleged in count 6
     of this Indictment, cause[d] the death of Brian Hayes, a
     human being, by striking said person’s vehicle, in
     violation of OCGA [§] 16-5-1 (c)[.]

     Count 4 of the indictment charged that Sosebee,

     without malice aforethought, cause[d] the death of Brian
     Hayes, a human being, through a violation of OCGA
                                  4
     [§] 40-6-395, Fleeing and Attempting to Elude, as alleged
     in count 6 of this Indictment, in violation of OCGA [§] 40-
     6-393 (a)[.]

     Count 6 of the indictment charged that Sosebee

     did willfully fail to bring his vehicle to a stop after having
     been given an audible and a visual signal, to wit: lights
     and sirens, to bring his vehicle to a stop by Deputy Shaw,
     said officer at the time giving such signal, being in
     uniform prominently displaying his badge of office, and
     his vehicle being appropriately marked showing it to be
     an official police vehicle, and did operate his vehicle in
     excess of 20 miles per hour above the posted speed limit
     and strike or collide with another vehicle and flee in
     traffic conditions which placed the general public at risk
     of receiving serious injuries, in violation of [former]
     OCGA [§] 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A)[.]

     1. Sosebee contends that “as indicted” the statute defining

felony murder and the statute defining homicide by vehicle in the

first degree impose “different punishments for identical criminal

conduct.” Sosebee argues that an ambiguity therefore exists

between the two statutes and that the trial court erred when it failed

to apply the rule of lenity and sentence him to the lesser of the two

penalties.

     The rule of lenity applies when a statute establishes, or

multiple statutes establish, different punishments for the same
                                   5
offense and, consequently, “uncertainty develops as to which penal

clause is applicable[.]” Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 606, 607-608 (2) (581

SE2d 35) (2003) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Peacock

v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 723 (5) (878 SE2d 247) (2022). The rule of

lenity provides that any ambiguity or uncertainty as to the

punishment to be imposed in such a case “is resolved in favor of the

defendant, who will then receive the lesser punishment.” Peacock,

314 Ga. at 723 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Dixon

v. State, 278 Ga. 4, 7 (1) (d) (596 SE2d 147) (2004) (According to the

rule of lenity, when “any uncertainty develops as to which penal

clause is applicable, the accused is entitled to have the lesser of [the]

two penalties administered.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Importantly, “[t]he rule of lenity is a rule of construction that is

applied only when an ambiguity still exists after having applied the

traditional canons of statutory construction.” State v. Hanna, 305

Ga. 100, 102 (2) (823 SE2d 785) (2019) (citation and punctuation

                                   6
omitted).2 Therefore, “the rule does not apply when the statutory

provisions are unambiguous.” Banta v. State, 281 Ga. 615, 617 (2)

(642 SE2d 51) (2007).

      The statutes at issue here are not ambiguous and do not

require different punishments for the same conduct. The offense of

felony murder under OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) criminalizes causing the

death of a human being “in the commission of a felony,”3 but the

offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-

6-393 (a) does not. The latter Code section criminalizes causing the

death of another person through the violation of OGGA §§ 40-6-163

(a), 40-6-390 through 40-6-391, or 40-6-395 (a).4 Pertinent to this

      2 See Green v. State, 311 Ga. 238, 242 (1) (857 SE2d 199) (2021) (“When

presented with a question of statutory interpretation, we begin by examining
the statute’s plain language, reading the text in its most natural and
reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. Thus,
when considering the meaning of a statute, we must afford the statutory text
its plain and ordinary meaning, viewed in the context in which it appears. If
the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its
plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end.” (citations
and punctuation omitted)).
       3 OCGA § 16-5-1 (c) provides: “A person commits the offense of murder

when, in the commission of a felony, he or she causes the death of another
human being irrespective of malice.”
       4 The 2008 version of OCGA § 40-6-393, applicable at the time of

Sosebee’s offenses, provides in subsection (a): “Any person who, without malice

                                      7
case, OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) is a misdemeanor.5 Felony-level fleeing

aforethought, causes the death of another person through the violation of
subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-163, Code Sections 40-6-390 through 40-6-
391, or subsection (a) of Code Section 40-6-395 commits the offense of homicide
by vehicle in the first degree[.]” OCGA § 40-6-393 was amended effective May
3, 2021, after the date of Sosebee’s offenses. See Ga. L. 2021, p. 228 (Act 152),
§ 7. One aspect of the amendment was to include a new offense, reckless stunt
driving, among the predicate acts for homicide by vehicle in the first degree set
out in OCGA § 40-6-393 (a). See id.; Ga. L. 2021, p. 228, § 6 (adding a new Code
section, OCGA § 40-6-390.1).
      5 The 2012 version of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (1), applicable at the time of

Sosebee’s offenses, provides:
             Any person violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this
      Code section shall be guilty of a high and aggravated misdemeanor
      and:
             (A) Upon conviction shall be fined not less than $500.00 nor
      more than $5,000.00, and the fine shall not be subject to
      suspension, stay, or probation, and imprisoned for not less than
      ten days nor more than 12 months. Any period of such
      imprisonment in excess of ten days may, in the sole discretion of
      the judge, be suspended, stayed, or probated;
             (B) Upon the second conviction within a ten-year period of
      time, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which
      convictions were obtained to the date of the current arrest for
      which a conviction is obtained, shall be fined not less than
      $1,000.00 nor more than $5,000.00, and the fine shall not be
      subject to suspension, stay, or probation, and imprisoned for not
      less than 30 days nor more than 12 months. Any period of such
      imprisonment in excess of 30 days may, in the sole discretion of
      the judge, be suspended, stayed, or probated; and for purposes of
      this paragraph, previous pleas of nolo contendere accepted within
      such ten-year period shall constitute convictions; and
             (C) Upon the third or subsequent conviction within a ten-
      year period of time, as measured from the dates of previous arrests
      for which convictions were obtained to the date of the current
      arrest for which a conviction is obtained, shall be fined not less
      than $2,500.00 nor more than $5,000.00, and the fine shall not be
      subject to suspension, stay, or probation, and imprisoned for not

                                       8
under former OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), which was charged in

Count 6, has elements in addition to those required to prove a

violation of misdemeanor fleeing under OCGA § 40-6-395 (a).6 As a

       less than 90 days nor more than 12 months. Any period of such
       imprisonment in excess of 90 days may, in the sole discretion of
       the judge, be suspended, stayed, or probated; and for purposes of
       this paragraph, previous pleas of nolo contendere accepted within
       such ten-year period shall constitute convictions.
       We note without comment that, effective July 1, 2022, a fourth or
subsequent conviction of fleeing under OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) is a felony. See Ga.
L. 2022, p. 100 (Act 646), § 1; OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (1) (D). Similarly, reckless
stunt driving is a felony for a fourth or subsequent conviction in a ten-year
period of time. See Ga. L. 2021, p. 228, § 6; OCGA § 40-6-390.1 (a) (4). In
addition, a fourth or subsequent conviction, within a ten-year period of time,
of driving under the impairing influence of alcohol or drugs under OCGA § 40-
6-391 is a felony. See OCGA § 40-6-391 (c) (4).
       6 The 2012 version of OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A), applicable at the time

of Sosebee’s offenses, provides:
               Any person violating the provisions of subsection (a) of this
       Code section who, while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing
       police vehicle or police officer:
              (i) Operates his or her vehicle in excess of 20 miles an hour
       above the posted speed limit;
              (ii) Strikes or collides with another vehicle or a pedestrian;
              (iii) Flees in traffic conditions which place the general public
       at risk of receiving serious injuries;
              (iv) Commits a violation of paragraph (5) of subsection (a) of
       Code Section 40-6-391; or
              (v) Leaves the state
       shall be guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of $5,000.00 or
       imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years
       or both.
Effective July 1, 2022, this subparagraph was redesignated as subparagraph
(c), and additional aggravating factors were included. See Ga. L. 2022, p. 100,
§ 1.
                                       9
greater offense, felony fleeing is a distinct offense from a violation of

OCGA § 40-6-395 (a) that is specified as one of the predicate offenses

of homicide by vehicle in the first degree. But, as in this case, the

same set of facts that give rise to a greater offense also give rise to

an included offense. See Soto v. State, 303 Ga. 517, 521 (2) (b) (813

SE2d 343) (2018); OCGA § 16-1-6 (1).

     As explained above, the rule of lenity applies only when there

are different potential punishments for the same conduct, that is,

where differently punished offenses have the same statutory

elements. See Sillah, 315 Ga. at 755 (5) (b); Brown, 276 Ga. at 607-

608 (2). In regard to felony murder and fleeing in particular, this

Court concluded in State v. Tiraboschi, 269 Ga. 812 (504 SE2d 689)

(1998), that “when the General Assembly created the felony level

crime of fleeing or attempting to elude, it knew that a violation of

[former] OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A) would expose an accused to a

charge of felony murder when death resulted.” Id. at 814. In

Tiraboschi, we rejected the argument that an indictment charging a

defendant with homicide by vehicle in the first degree and felony

                                   10
fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer could not also charge

the defendant with felony murder predicated on felony fleeing. Id.

See also Chester v. State, 262 Ga. 85, 87-88 (2) (414 SE2d 477) (1992)

(rejecting argument that the vehicular homicide statute precludes a

murder charge in vehicular deaths; holding that malice murder and

vehicular homicide are offenses of the same nature that differ only

in degree, in that malice murder requires proof of malice, and

vehicular homicide does not; and affirming denial of special

demurrer to a count of malice murder).

     In this case, even though misdemeanor fleeing and attempting

to elude is a sufficient predicate for vehicular homicide in the first

degree, the way that the State drew up the indictment charging

Sosebee with vehicular homicide in the first degree in Count 4

required the State to prove the statutory elements of felony fleeing

to prove that count. That does not change the fact that, as a matter

of statutory interpretation, felony murder predicated on felony

fleeing and attempting to elude is a different offense than homicide

by vehicle in the first degree and, therefore, there is no ambiguity

                                 11
between the statutory definitions of felony murder and homicide by

vehicle in the first degree predicated on a violation of OCGA § 40-6-

395 (a). As we have explained, “that a single act may, as a factual

matter, violate more than one penal statute does not implicate the

rule of lenity.” Smallwood v. State, 310 Ga. 445, 452 (3) (851 SE2d

595) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). In the absence of a

textual ambiguity between the statutes at issue, our review of

Sosebee’s rule-of-lenity argument must end, despite the way the

offenses were indicted in his case. The rule of lenity simply has no

application in this case, and this claim of error fails. See Peacock,

314 Ga. at 723 (5); Banta, 281 Ga. at 618 (2); cf. Dixon, 278 Ga. at 7

(1) (d) (holding that rule of lenity required that the defendant be

sentenced for misdemeanor statutory rape under OCGA § 16-6-3 (b),

rather than felony aggravated child molestation under OCGA § 16-

6-4 (a), because both statutes criminalized an act of sexual

intercourse between a 14- or 15- year-old victim and a defendant

who was no more than three years older than the victim and the

Code sections proscribed different punishments for the same

                                 12
conduct).

     2. Sosebee contends that the trial court imposed a sentence in

violation of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically,

he argues that life without parole on a conviction for offenses that

do not require proof of malice or specific mens rea as to harm is

unconstitutionally excessive. Similarly, he argues that life without

parole under a recidivist sentencing statute is unconstitutionally

excessive where all of the prior felonies that trigger the enhanced

punishment were non-violent.7

     As an initial matter, Sosebee’s sentence is within the statutory

range for felony murder when the defendant is sentenced as a

recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) and (c).8 “The legislature’s

     7 The trial court sentenced Sosebee to recidivist punishment pursuant to

OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) and (c) based on the following prior convictions: (1) 2017
convictions for possession of methamphetamine and forgery in the second
degree; (2) a 2014 conviction for theft by taking; (3) a 2010 conviction for
possession of alprazolam; (4) another 2010 conviction for possession of
alprazolam; (5) a 2013 conviction for entering an automobile or other motor
vehicle; and (6) a 2016 conviction for entering an automobile or other motor
vehicle.
      8 OCGA § 16-5-1 (e) (1) provides: “A person convicted of the offense of

                                     13
choice of sentence is insulated from judicial review unless it is

wholly irrational or so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

crime that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment” which is

prohibited by the Eighth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 401 (3) (c) (807 SE2d 425)

(2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[C]ourts must defer to

the legislature in determinations of sentencing parameters unless a

sentence is so overly severe or excessive in proportion to the offense

as to shock the conscience.” Winslow v. State, 315 Ga. 133, 143 (3)

(880 SE2d 530) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). See

murder shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, or
by imprisonment for life.”
     OCGA § 17-10-7 provides, in pertinent part:
            (a) . . . [A]ny person who, after having been convicted of a
     felony offense in this state . . . commits a felony punishable by
     confinement in a penal institution shall be sentenced to undergo
     the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the
     subsequent offense of which he or she stands convicted, provided
     that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his
     or her discretion, probate or suspend the maximum sentence
     prescribed for the offense. . . .
            (c) . . . [A]ny person who, after having been convicted under
     the laws of this state for three felonies . . . commits a felony within
     this state shall, upon conviction for such fourth offense or for
     subsequent offenses, serve the maximum time provided in the
     sentence of the judge based upon such conviction and shall not be
     eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.
                                     14
Pierce, 302 Ga. at 401-403 (3) (c) (rejecting both facial and as-applied

Eighth Amendment challenges to a sentencing scheme).

     A   court    determines    whether     a   sentence   is   grossly

disproportionate to the crime committed first by comparing the

severity of the sentence and the gravity of the offense, including the

statutory elements of the offense and “the particular circumstances

of the crime committed as shown by the record.” Sillah v. State, 315

Ga. 741, 755 (5) (b) (883 SE2d 756) (2023). See also Conley v. Pate,

305 Ga. 333, 337 (3) (825 SE2d 135) (2019) (“[W]e look to the

underlying facts of the offense to determine whether a given

sentence is grossly disproportionate” to the crime.).

     In the rare case that this threshold comparison leads to
     an inference of gross disproportionality, a court next
     compares the defendant’s sentence with the sentences
     received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and
     with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other
     jurisdictions.

Sillah, 315 Ga. at 755 (5) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     With regard to recidivist sentencing in particular, the Supreme

Court of the United States explained that “the point at which a

recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary
                                  15
propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be

isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the

punishing jurisdiction.” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (III)

(100 SCt 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980). In Rummel, a case where the

defendant’s three prior felony convictions were non-violent thefts in

small amounts,9 the Supreme Court held that a recidivist statute

providing a life sentence for a third felony conviction did not violate

the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual

punishment. Id. See also Ortiz v. State, 266 Ga. 752, 753-754 (2) (a)

(470 SE2d 874) (1996) (holding that a sentence of life imprisonment

without possibility of parole under OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) does not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment).

      In this case, the evidence showed that Sosebee willfully put his

girlfriend, the motoring public, and other innocent bystanders at

     9 The defendant had pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of a credit card to

obtain $80 worth of goods or services, passing a forged check in the amount of
$28.36, and felony theft by obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. Rummel, 445
U.S. at 266-267 (III).
                                     16
risk of grave injury or death simply to avoid a traffic stop. Under the

circumstances, we cannot say that Sosebee’s sentence is so overly

severe or excessive in proportion to his offenses as to shock the

conscience. Sosebee’s claim of error under the Eighth Amendment

therefore fails at the threshold comparison of the severity of the

sentence and the gravity of the offense. See Winslow, 315 Ga. at 143

(3) (concluding that punishing the possession of child pornography

under OCGA § 16-12-100 (f) (1) the same as offenses involving the

sale, distribution, or manufacturing of child pornography did not

arise to a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment in the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution); Pate, 305 Ga. at 336-338 (3) (concluding that, despite

the youth of the defendant at the time of the offense, the sentence of

20 years’ imprisonment for statutory rape “[did] not meet even the

threshold inference of gross disproportionality” so as to constitute

cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, where the 13-year-old victim repeatedly

refused the 15-year-old defendant’s demands for sex and submitted

                                  17
only after the defendant brandished a knife and threatened to kill

the victim’s father, who was asleep in an adjoining bedroom).10

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      10 Cf. Bradshaw v. State, 284 Ga. 675, 683 (671 SE2d 485) (2008) (holding

that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed under OCGA § 42-1-
12 (n) for the defendant’s second failure to register as a convicted sex offender
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, considering that the failure to
update information on the sexual offender registry involves “neither violence
nor threat of violence to any person” and, as such, “is a passive felony that
neither caused nor threatened to cause harm to society;” that violent crimes
including voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault with intent to murder,
rape, or rob, or aggravated battery may result in a sentence of as little as 1
year under Georgia law, a far lesser punishment than life imprisonment; and
that Georgia’s mandatory punishment of life imprisonment is the clear outlier
when compared to other states’ sentencing parameters for the same offense);
Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 526-532 (3) (c) through (g) (652 SE2d 501)
(2007) (holding that a sentence of 10 years in prison without the possibility of
parole followed by 1 year of probation for aggravated child molestation under
former OCGA § 16-6-4 constituted cruel and unusual punishment, where the
defendant was 17 years old at the time of the crime, the victim was 15 years
old, and the sexual act involved the victim willingly performing oral sex on the
defendant, considering that the conduct was reduced to a misdemeanor under
a subsequent amendment to the Code section, based on the General Assembly’s
changed view of the appropriate punishment for consensual teenage oral sex;
that violent crimes including voluntary manslaughter, involuntary
manslaughter, aggravated assault with intent to kill, or aggravated battery
may result in a sentence of as little as 1 year under Georgia law; that
molestation of a young child may result in a sentence of as little as 5 years, and
even forcible rape may result in a sentence of as little as 10 years; and that
most other states either would not punish oral sex between willing teenagers
at all or would punish it as a misdemeanor, as under Georgia’s amended law,
and those states that retain a felony designation for such conduct do not impose
a minimum punishment nearly as severe as 10 years in prison with no
possibility of probation or parole).
                                       18