Court Opinion

ID: 9650444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:37:42.564516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:56.001963
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Regarding the proper standard of review, the majority fails to address the fact that appellant Summers, in briefing the matter to the Superior Court, advanced an “abuse of discretion” standard of review. Appellant cannot now complain that the court applied the wrong standard if that was the standard he asked for. To complain of it now raises a new complaint, not addressed below, for reasons of appellant’s own making. I cannot see the efficacy of granting relief because a party got what he asked for.
Further, although the Superior Court’s Opinion in Support of Affirmance (OISA) did not explicitly set forth a de novo standard of review, it did review the record in its entirety, as well as the applicable case law, before affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The majority’s finding the OISA erred in using an abuse of discretion standard of review hinges on its perception the OISA “deferred to the trial court’s resolution of the legal question of whether genuine issues of material fact existed.” Majority Op., at 307, 997 A.2d at 1160. In contrast, I find the OISA merely relied on Superior Court precedent for the conclusion appellants could not meet their burden of demonstrating their asbestos exposure caused impairment or disability beyond breathlessness attributable to smoking and other non-asbestos related causes. See Summers v. Certainteed Corporation, 886 A.2d 240, 242-43 (Pa.Super.2005).
In Giffear v. Johns-Manville Corporation, 429 Pa.Super. 327, 632 A.2d 880 (1993), Giffear had asymptomatic asbestos-related pleural thickening.1 Giffear, at 882. The trial court *325granted the defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id., at 883. The Superior Court affirmed, holding “as a matter of law, that pleural thickening, absent disabling consequences or manifest physical symptoms, is a noncompensable injury and is therefore not a cognizable claim in the Commonwealth.” Id., at 884. The court concluded, “[wjithout evidence that such a condition is causing ascertainable physical symptoms, impairment, or disability, pleural thickening is a non-compensable injury and, therefore, does not give rise to a cause of action.” Id., at 888.
This Court affirmed Giffear in Simmons. In Simmons, we were asked to determine “whether asymptomatic pleural thickening, i.e., unaccompanied by disabling consequences or physical impairment, is a compensable injury.” Simmons, at 236. This Court concluded “asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a compensable injury which gives rise to a cause of action.” Id., at 237. In reaching that conclusion, we noted no physical injuries had been established by the appellants. Id.
Between the time Giffear was decided and reviewed in Simmons, the Superior Court decided Taylor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 446 Pa.Super. 174, 666 A.2d 681 (1995), which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor as to three of the four consolidated plaintiffs. Id., at 684. The court stated the three plaintiffs who were diagnosed with asymptomatic asbestosis-related disease had not suffered any discernible physical symptoms or functional impairment. Id., at 684-85. The court explained: *326cer, excessive cigarette smoking, heart disease, obesity, asthma, emphysema and allergic reactions.
*325Shortness of breath alone is not a compensable injury under Giffear ... because it is not a discernible physical symptom, a functional impairment, or a disability. It is common knowledge that breathlessness is also associated with any number of non-asbestos-related ailments including lung can-
*326Id., at 687 n. 2.
The condition the majority herein describes as compensable injury is “shortness of breath.” Majority Op., at 315, 997 A.2d at 1164. Despite Simmons, let us assume this is a compensable injury; there is divided authority on that point, but the issue is not before us. Both appellants have shortness of breath, and both have Dr. Gelfand saying “each and every” exposure to asbestos was not just a factor, but a substantial contributing factor to that shortness of breath. Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Nybeck, 8/19/03, at 2; Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Summers, 6/25/03, at 3 (emphasis added). Based on that conclusory statement alone, must we send the case to the jury?
It is certainly true that further discovery or proceedings could discredit the doctor’s “every breath is substantial” theory — then again, further proceedings might bolster that theory. We, however, review the trial court’s decision on the record at the time of the motion. Neither position is substantiated at this point, and we cannot tell if support or destruction of the doctor’s expansive theory may be forthcoming.
The true question is whether it is the burden of the proffering party, appellants here, to support that theory at this stage, or whether it is the burden of the defense to challenge the conclusion by means of a Fiye hearing or the like. If a conclusion that forms the basis of liability is founded on a manifestly questionable causation theory,2 does the trial court have the authority to grant summary judgment when there is no support of the theory in the record?
There are two reasons I would find the trial court’s actions appropriate. First, the “every breath” theory is indeed suspect on its face. See Summers, at 244. Secondly, each *327appellant has so many other conditions that finding the asbestos exposure to be a significant contributing factor is difficult even if Dr. Gelfand’s theory were facially plausible.
Judge Klein’s analogy to the bucket of water in the ocean is spot on. See id. Each exposure may contribute, but no single exposure can be substantial — by definition, “substantial” cannot modify every bucket of water in the ocean, and while each bucket counts, no bucket is substantial. Each and every exposure can be no more a significant contributing factor than is each and every cigarette, or each and every meal that led to the obesity.3 That is, the medical conclusion offered is, on its face, not credible in terms of the legal notion of “substantial contributing factor.” Each asbestos fiber, each cigarette, each cheeseburger is literally but a drop in the proverbial bucket— a bucket unquestionably full, but to call each drop substantial mocks the legal concept of that word. Common sense tells us the doctor simply overstated the matter. As such, I can find no error in rejecting the proffered opinion on its face.
Even ignoring this basic failing in the doctor’s premise, was appellant’s proffer sufficient for a jury to conclude the product was a “substantial contributing factor” to the injury alleged? The injury is shortness of breath, a condition each appellant undoubtedly has. The material facts are not at issue — appellant’s best case is Dr. Gelfand’s report. If it suffices, they prevail, and if it does not, they do not. The case is, therefore, appropriate for summary judgment.
According to Dr. Gelfand, Mr. Summers’ exposure to asbestos was a significant contributing factor to diffusion abnormality and dyspnea on exertion, and was the cause of his pleural thickening. See Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Summers, 6/25/03, at 3. However, Mr. Summers also suffers from moderately severe chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) as well as emphysema, asthma, and obesity. Id., at 2. *328The doctor opines that his 40 pack-year smoking caused the COPD and is a “substantial contributing factor” to the other conditions. Id., at 3. He does not rule out his asthma, COPD, or obesity as possible causes of Mr. Summers’ shortness of breath.
Mr. Nybeck has twice the smoking history of Mr. Summers and quit later. Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Nybeck, 8/19/03, at 1. He has severe emphysema, hyperinflation of the lungs, and a more intensive medical history. See id., at 2; Deposition of Richard Nybeck, 10/16/03, at 402-04. Dr. Gelfand’s conclusions for this appellant are couched in exactly the same terms as with Mr. Summers. Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Nybeck, 8/19/03, at 2. He does not rule out the emphysema, bronchitis, and pneumonia as other causes of Mr. Nybeck’s shortness of breath. See Deposition of Richard Nybeck, 10/16/03, at 402-04.4
Thus, with Mr. Summers, Dr. Gelfand believes asbestos was the cause of pleural thickening, and was a substantial contributing factor to diffusion abnormality and dyspnea. He opines that smoking was the cause of Mr. Summers’ chronic obstructive lung disease, and a substantial contributing factor to diffusion abnormality and dyspnea. He allows that either COPD, or asthma, or obesity could be the cause of his shortness of breath.
With Mr. Nybeck, the doctor again opines that asbestos exposure was the cause of pleural thickening and asbestosis, and was a substantial contributing factor to diffusion abnormality and dyspnea. Smoking was the cause of severe chronic lung disease, and a substantial contributing factor to pulmonary function abnormalities, hyperinflation, and dyspnea. He allows that the shortness of breath could also be caused by emphysema, bronchitis, or pneumonia.
In sum, asbestos caused pleural thickening, the non-compensable condition, while smoking caused the lung disease. He *329opines both contributed to other problems but cannot rule out other causes. If the “compensable injury” is shortness of breath, or dyspnea on exertion, what caused it? If there are two significant contributing factors, the majority would be correct in allowing the fact-finder to assign causation. Where there are three legitimate potential causes, the significance of each lessens. Where there are five potential causes, the significance of each is necessarily diluted — it is still easy to call each “significant” but in a strict liability products case, mere speculation about actual causation cannot be overcome by saying every event every day is legally substantial.
Having an expert say the words “sufficient to establish legal causation” is not enough — the court has some obligation to examine the conclusions, not merely accept them as inviolate on their face. Where the expert’s opinion cannot assign causation beyond stating the obvious — each party had a lot of problems for a lot of reasons, the opinion is of little help to a jury. Where the basis for the opinion itself is manifestly suspect, that “each and every” exposure is not just a factor but a substantial one, the opiner’s credibility unravels.
The trial court did not reject the conclusion that appellants suffer from asbestos-related disease; in fact, that is not the conclusion Dr. Gelfand makes. What the court did do was find insufficient the proffered connection between the relevant symptoms and the amount of asbestos exposure that actually happened. With that conclusion, I cannot disagree and hence dissent.

. In Simmons v. Pacor, 543 Pa. 664, 674 A.2d 232 (1996), we defined asbestos-related pleural thickening as follows:
Asbestos-related pleural thickening has been defined as the formation of calcified tissue on the pleura, the membranes surrounding the lungs. The condition may be objectively determined in the sense that *325it is revealed on an x-ray. Pleural thickening may occur independent of or in conjunction with asbestosis. When the pleural thickening is asymptomatic, individuals are able to lead active, normal lives, with no pain or suffering, no loss of an organ function, and no disfigurement due to scarring.
Id., at 236 (citations omitted).

. As amicus points out, there is considerable authority in the medical community rejecting the "every breath" theory; other courts have rejected this as well. See Brief of the BOC Group, et ai, at 10-13. There is apparent agreement that some threshold exposure is needed before exposure causes injury. Id.., at 10-11.

. Dr. Gelfand’s report indicated, among Mr. Summers’ medical problems other than those from asbestos, that he was 5'8" tall and weighed 235 pounds. See Report of Dr. Gelfand Concerning Summers, 6/25/03, at 2.

. Dr. Gelfand’s report does not address the bronchitis or pneumonia.