Court Opinion

ID: 9694699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:51:52.624348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:04.807687
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority for the reason that the court below erred in “molding” the verdict to find appellant guilty of the theft offense.
Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(d) “[a] person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the offense which it was his intent to commit after the burglarious entry . . . .” Instantly, appellant was charged with burglary and with the offense which he intended to, and did, commit after he had effected his entry, to-wit, theft. It was, therefore, improper for the jury to find appellant guilty of both offenses.
In Commonwealth v. King, 238 Pa.Super. 190, 357 A.2d 556 (1976), we reversed a conviction when the jury returned with a verdict finding the defendant guilty of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. Both offenses arose out of the same criminal episode. The court accepted the verdict but resolved the inconsistency by ignoring the theft conviction and sentencing the defendant on the burglary charge. This court reversed, holding that the lower court erred in permitting the jury to return a verdict contrary to its instructions.
Reviewing King, I would find that case dispositive of the instant proceeding. Although the majority in the last paragraph of its opinion attempts to distinguish King based upon the difference in the offenses charged, I submit that the attempted distinction is unsupported in either reason or the law. Initially, the jury returned with a verdict slip indicat*604ing guilt as to both offenses. The jury was instructed that it was required to choose one of the two offenses and returned for further deliberations. The jury again returned with a verdict slip indicating guilt on both offenses. In announcing the verdict, the foreman merely stated that the jury found appellant guilty of theft; no mention was made of the burglary charge. Further confusion was engendered when a poll of the jury revealed that all of the jurors found appellant guilty of the theft offense, but that only nine of the twelve jurors also believed him to be guilty of the burglary charge. In that situation, the court should have returned the jurors for further deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Komatowski, 347 Pa. 445, 32 A.2d 905 (1943). To adopt the majority’s conclusion that the court should have accepted the original verdict and sentenced appellant on the greater offense (burglary) would be to countenance a judgment and sentence based upon a verdict that was impeached by the jury poll. Such a result is clearly improper. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 237, 324 A.2d 350 (1974).
While the majority is correct that we have on occasion vacated the lesser sentence when a court sentenced a defendant on a burglary charge and on the offense which it was his intent to commit, such is not the situation in the instant case. The inconsistencies in the verdict slip, the oral pronouncements of the jury foreman, and the poll of the jury members clearly illustrate that the instant proceeding is not one in which the error could be corrected by simply ignoring the jury's pronouncement as to one of the offenses. I would hold that the action of the court was more akin to a judicial “molding” of the verdict in accord with what the court perceived to be the intent of the jury members.
While courts in criminal matters may “mold” verdicts in certain limited situations, the present case does not fit within any of the established situations. See Laub, Pennsylvania Trial Guide, § 244 (1959). If, as in this case, “the error is substantive, the court must send the jury back with additional instructions for further deliberation.” Commonwealth v. Dzvonick, 450 Pa. 98, 102-03 n. 4, 297 A.2d 912, 914 *605n. 4 (1972); see Commonwealth v. Craig, 471 Pa. 310, 370 A.2d 317 (1977); Commonwealth v. Komatowski, supra. The action of the court in putting appellant to the choice of accepting an improperly molded verdict or resubmitting the issue to the jury was improper. As such, I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.