Court Opinion

ID: 9892245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-21 17:12:01.30688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:36.178296
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00237-CR

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JOSEPH MICHAEL SANDOVAL,                                                    Appellant,

                                               v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 117th District Court
                          of Nueces County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
             Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

       Appellant Joseph Michael Sandoval was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of

a young child, a first-degree felony, and sentenced to thirty-five years’ imprisonment. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts that his

trial counsel was ineffective. We affirm.
                                           I.      BACKGROUND

        The State indicted appellant on one count of continuous sexual abuse of a young

child, specifically alleging:

        [O]n or about October 9, 2009 . . . during a period that was 30 days or more
        in duration, to-wit: from on or about October 9, 2009 through October 9,
        2015, when [appellant] was 17 years of age or older, did commit two or
        more acts of sexual abuse against [J.S. 1], a child younger than 14 years of
        age, and said acts having been violations of one or more of the following
        penal laws including:

        then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the anus
        of [J.S.], a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of age, by
        defendant’s sexual organ;

        AND/OR

        then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the penetration of the
        mouth of [J.S.], a child who was then and there younger than 14 years of
        age, by the defendant’s sexual organ;

        AND/OR

        then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the mouth of [J.S.], a child
        who was then and there younger than 14 years of age, to contact the
        defendant’s sexual organ, against the peace and dignity of the State.

J.S. was nineteen years old at the time of trial. J.S. testified that the first instance of

inappropriate behavior occurred when he was younger than six years old. He recalled

being alone with appellant, his father, in appellant and J.S.’s mother’s bedroom while

appellant watched pornography on the television and J.S. could see what was happening

on the screen. J.S. stated the family moved to a new home when he was around seven

years old after his sister, A.S., was born. He testified that he could not recall exactly the

        1 To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to him and his relatives by their initials or an

alias. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with
respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
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first time that it happened, but that sexual assault began when they first moved into the

new home. J.S. stated that the first distinct memory he had of appellant sexually abusing

him by anal penetration was in second grade on a Boy Scout’s trip. J.S. explained that

appellant had already been sexually abusing him orally at the time, so J.S. expected it to

happen when they were alone on the trip. J.S. explained that because appellant used a

machine for his sleep apnea, they were unable to stay at the campground, and instead

rented a motel room near the campground during the trip. That evening was the first

instance that J.S. anally penetrated appellant.

       J.S. also testified about two separate incidents that occurred while he was

showering. Regarding the first incident, J.S. recalled he was in the shower when appellant

got in with him and J.S. performed oral sex on appellant. Regarding the second incident,

appellant anally penetrated J.S. According to J.S., in both instances, appellant did not

ejaculate while in the shower, but instead “it continued into the bedroom” where, in the

first instance appellant anally penetrated J.S., and in the second instance, J.S. performed

oral sex on appellant.

       J.S. explained that he was fearful of appellant. He explained that there were many

instances when the abuse physically hurt him, but that he would say he was “fine”

because he was afraid. J.S. testified that appellant had a DVD containing pornography

that appellant kept hidden in a closet. At one point, J.S. retrieved the DVD and broke it.

J.S. testified that when appellant confronted him, he told appellant “I don’t want to do this

anymore,” but nothing changed. J.S. also recalled there was a time when he performed

oral sex on appellant in the classroom where appellant taught. J.S. explained that this

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occurred during the summer and that they initially went to the classroom to clean it up to

prepare for the following school year. J.S. also recalled a time where they were in

appellant’s vehicle. Appellant was driving and J.S. was in the passenger’s seat. Appellant

told J.S. to unzip J.S.’s pants, and appellant began touching J.S.’s genitals. J.S. testified

that the acts of sexual abuse occurred approximately four times a month. Except for one

instance that he could recall, J.S. explained that his mother was not home when the abuse

would occur. The one time she was, he said the abuse occurred in the early morning

hours when his mother was in the shower.

       J.S. detailed additional, specific instances of abuse, including a time when

appellant had J.S. perform oral sex on appellant, and appellant then penetrated J.S.’s

anus with appellant’s fingers. J.S. also recalled a time when appellant penetrated him

anally and then began kissing his neck. J.S. stated that the kissing was different than the

usual abuse and he felt that was something beyond abuse that became a “weird, twisted

relationship” with appellant. As J.S. got older, the abuse was mostly appellant penetrating

J.S. or appellant performing oral sex on J.S.

       J.S. further testified that after the instances of abuse, appellant would often play

video games with him as a “reward” because that was something J.S. enjoyed doing with

appellant. J.S. also explained that in the third grade, he received a soccer ball as a prize

at school, and he and appellant would play a game on the stairs with the ball after

instances of abuse, again, as a “reward” of sorts.

       After the abuse stopped, before his outcry, J.S. explained that things felt fairly

normal in their household because he had a father that had ceased abusing him. He had

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mixed emotions about whether to “pretend nothing happened” and move on, or to tell

someone. On the night of his outcry to his mother, J.S. recalled that she confronted

appellant about the allegations after J.S. told his mother what had happened. That

evening, appellant tried to communicate with J.S., but J.S. refused to talk to him. J.S.

stated that he “was really scared at that point” because he had told his mother their

“secret.” J.S. did not speak to appellant that night, but recalled watching appellant through

his window as appellant packed his car and left. Appellant tried to contact J.S. by phone

after leaving, but J.S. did not want to speak with him. J.S. stated that he did communicate

with appellant through text message. Text exchanges between J.S. and appellant were

admitted without objection as evidence and published to the jury. Appellant sent several

messages to J.S., stating in relevant part: “I know you are hurting right now. And I’m sorry

for that. I pray that you can forgive me . . . I miss you[,] [A.S.,] and Mama so much right

now.” J.S. asked him in response, “[h]ow can you be okay with yourself? And just say

pray for forgiveness?” to which appellant stated: “I’m not okay with myself. That’s just it.

I’m not ok.” J.S. sent additional messages containing accusations about the abuse to

appellant, and appellant continued to ask for forgiveness.

       J.S. explained that, after his mother filed a police report regarding his outcry, he

was interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) where he was able to discuss

the abuse that occurred and write down his thoughts about what had happened. He was

also examined at the hospital, which he found to be “really embarrassing” because they

had to examine his genitalia and anus “in great detail.” He explained it was an unpleasant

experience. The examination revealed that he had contracted a sexually transmitted

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disease. J.S. testified that he had never been sexually active outside of the abuse at the

hands of appellant. J.S. testified regarding the ongoing emotional trauma he suffered

because of the abuse, explaining how he took a year away from school to be home-

schooled to avoid having to discuss with his friends what had happened. Because

appellant was a teacher in the system where J.S. attended school, J.S. knew that when

the information was released that appellant was arrested, it would lead to a lot of

questions and interest in the situation. Since his outcry, J.S. has been in counseling and

finds that it has helped him cope with what he went through.

      On cross-examination, J.S. stated that appellant was the main disciplinarian in

their household when it came to J.S.’s grades. Through J.S., two exhibits were admitted

wherein J.S. expressed love and care for appellant namely, a note to his mother and

appellant thanking them for everything they had done for him to have a good education,

and a Facebook post by J.S. wishing appellant a happy birthday and stating “Happy

birthday to the best dada in the world!! You’ve been such a great father and role model

that has shaped me to be the person I am today. Have a fabulous day. I love you.” The

Facebook post was made the month prior to J.S.’s outcry.

      J.S.’s mother and appellant’s wife, N.S., testified similarly to J.S. regarding the

child’s outcry. She also testified that when she confronted appellant regarding the

accusations, appellant admitted to sexually assaulting J.S. and informed her that he had

been sexually abused by his own brother as a child.

      Janeth Del Toro, a family nurse practitioner and sexual assault nurse examiner

(SANE), testified that she examined J.S. following his outcry. The SANE exam consists

                                            6
of taking a detailed medical history and a history of what the child experienced, a “head-

to-toe physical assessment,” and a detailed genital examination, looking for trauma. She

explained that J.S. reported the abuse was happening from the ages of approximately

seven until he was thirteen, and that it had stopped three years prior to his outcry. Given

the lapse of time, she was unable to collect forensic evidence. She also explained that

there is unlikely to be trauma during an exam that occurs more than three years after the

last abuse occurred “[b]ecause our bodies heal quickly.” J.S. did not show any physical

signs of injury or trauma. J.S. did test positive for chlamydia, a bacterial infection that is

sexually transmitted.

       Shawn Edgington, J.S.’s counselor from Hill Country Crisis Council, testified that

J.S. was referred to counseling following his interview with the CAC. Edgington testified

that J.S. met the criteria for trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy. According to

Edgington, J.S. “was really good at internalizing a lot of things,” but he had breaking

points, such as when the news made it to social media that appellant had been arrested

and when J.S. was informed that he had a sexually transmitted disease. While the

defense questioned whether J.S. may have been manipulating his responses to certain

assessments, Edgington explained that she believed what J.S. “was reporting to [her]

was real.”

       Appellant denied all allegations against him, stating he never abused J.S. While

he explained that he was not certain of the motive behind the lies, appellant testified that

he believed his wife wanted him out of the picture, and she and J.S. concocted this story

for that purpose. Appellant explained that he never told N.S. that he had been abused as

                                              7
a child, and he denied that he was ever abused. Appellant testified that it hurt him to hear

the lies his family told on the witness stand, and vehemently denied ever having any

inappropriate contact with J.S. On cross-examination, appellant was asked about the text

messages with J.S. Appellant explained that he was apologizing for leaving the house

and not being present in his son’s life at that time.

       The jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a young child. During

the punishment phase, N.S. and J.S. testified for the State and appellant’s father, W.S.,

testified for the defense.

       N.S. discussed the effects of this case on A.S., her daughter and J.S.’s sister. She

explained that the actions of appellant caused A.S. severe trauma, sadness, and anger.

A.S. has difficulty coping with what happened to her brother and is having sleep issues.

N.S. explained further that, as she looks back at photos of her son growing up, she feels

anger and sadness because she knows that behind his smile was the pain of the abuse

he was going through. She stated that she is indifferent toward appellant and will let “God

[] judge him” for his actions.

       J.S. explained he felt “mass amounts of gratitude” when he heard the verdict from

the jury. He testified that the abuse will always have an impact on his life, but that he is

going to use it to help others recover from similar situations, explaining that the people

who have helped him have “just been amazing.” He explained that he was angry that

appellant did not “turn himself in” so that he did not have to go through the trial process,

but now that it is over, he is ready to move forward with his life.

                                              8
       W.S. testified on behalf of appellant, his son. With no objection, appellant’s father

read a letter he wrote as part of his testimony wherein he explained that his son grew up

in a “loving family” including an older brother and sister. The family regularly attended

church and, according to W.S., appellant continued that faith-based lifestyle with his own

children. He described appellant as “gentle” and loving. He stated that even after the jury’s

verdict, he cares for and loves his son. He also described J.S., his grandson, as loving

and kind. W.S. testified on cross-examination that it was difficult for him to sit through the

trial. He stated that appellant was never abused as a child. He explained that he “cannot

fathom and believe all the things that ha[d] been said in th[e] trial about [his] son.” He

stated he would have no concerns about his son being around children.

       The jury assessed punishment at thirty-five years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a

motion for new trial claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the

motion, the trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

                       II.     INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       The United States and Texas Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the

right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 10; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051; Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To obtain a reversal of a conviction on grounds of ineffective

assistance of counsel, an appellant must show: (1) counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

the defense, resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding.

Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.

                                              9
at 687). “Deficient performance means that ‘counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.’”

Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). “The prejudice prong of Strickland requires showing ‘a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.’” Id. at 248 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

       The burden is on appellant to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a

preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999). Appellant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that his actions could be

considered sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “We commonly assume

a strategic motive if any can be imagined and find counsel’s performance deficient only if

the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.”

Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Counsel’s effectiveness

is judged by the totality of the representation, not by isolated acts or omissions.

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

       We review a trial judge’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of
       discretion standard. “We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial
       court; rather, we decide whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or
       unreasonable.” A trial judge abuses his discretion in denying a motion for
       new trial when no reasonable view of the record could support his ruling.
       We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling
       and presume that all reasonable factual findings that could have been made
       against the losing party were made against that losing party.

Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

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A.     Failure to Designate an Expert Witness

       By his first sub-issue, appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failure “to consult or retain experts and failed to move the trial court for funds to do the

same.” Appellant argues that his trial counsel should have consulted with and called an

expert witness in the field of forensics. He argues an expert was necessary to controvert

the testimony of Del Toro that J.S. having no sign of trauma was normal given the lapse

of time between the last incident of abuse and the outcry.

       The State, in a reply point on appeal, argues that the issue of whether an expert

should have been retained was not properly before the trial court in appellant’s motion for

new trial. Specifically, the State argues that because appellant did not provide an affidavit

supporting his claim related to the expert witnesses at the time he filed his motion for new

trial, the trial court could not have considered those claims at the motion for new trial.

Because of this, the State argues that this Court must consider the claim related to expert

witnesses as though it were raised for the first time on appeal, based solely on the record

and “without giving consideration to the evidence presented at the hearing on motion for

new trial.” See Cueva v. State, 339 S.W.3d 839, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2011, pet ref’d). We agree. Because the affidavits were not filed with the motion

for new trial to support the specific claims therein, we find that those issues were not

properly before the trial court. As such, we address appellant’s issues regarding the

retention of expert witnesses as though they have been presented for the first time on

appeal. See Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 21–22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (stating that

when new trial is founded upon matters not discernible from the record, the allegations in

                                             11
the motion must be supported by affidavit illustrating their accuracy before the movant is

entitled to a hearing).

       Appellant’s trial counsel testified at the motion for new hearing and when asked

about retention of an expert witness, trial counsel explained:

       Well, there was mention by [appellant] that he—he wanted to call a—a child
       doctor, a pediatrician and—but in the trial and in the discovery there was no
       scientific evidence, there was no—there was no evidence, no DNA, no
       blood, none of that, so I didn’t—it didn’t—I didn’t think it was wise to call an
       expert to rebut something that wasn’t going to come up. And I—and I
       expected that a doctor would want to, if anything, . . . ask him about DNA or
       blood, injuries, stuff like that.

When specifically asked if an expert should have been called to rebut Del Toro’s

testimony regarding the lack of injuries after a significant lapse of time, trial counsel

explained that it was his “experience [] that they always say that.”

       In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellate courts will not

second-guess counsel’s trial strategy; the fact that another attorney might have pursued

a different course also does not support a finding of ineffectiveness. Hernandez v. State,

84 S.W.3d 26, 35 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d). Trial counsel testified that he

had taken similar cases to trial and was prepared for what a SANE nurse would testify to,

as Del Toro did in this situation. Because counsel was aware that there was no physical

evidence, such as DNA involved in the case, he made the strategic decision not to call a

doctor or expert to rebut the testimony related to the SANE exam. While appellant’s

appellate counsel may have pursued the case differently, this does not overcome the

recognized presumption in favor of a viable trial strategy. See id.

                                             12
          Appellant also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert

witness at the punishment phase of trial. Specifically, he contends that a mitigation expert

or an evaluation to determine if appellant “possessed the characteristics of a sexual

predator” would have been beneficial at the punishment stage. Appellant also asserts that

counsel was ineffective for failing to seek funds to find an expert willing to examine the

evidence in the case and for mistakenly believing he could not do so. However, appellant

points to no specific evidence or testimony that should have been discovered or

presented regarding mitigating factors or appellant’s character traits, and therefore, he

does not explain how the testimony sought would have been beneficial to his defense.

See Crawford v. State, 355 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet.

ref’d).

B.        Failure to Call Material Witnesses

          Appellant next suggests that trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to interview

and call family witnesses at the guilt-innocence phase of trial. At the motion for new trial

hearing, appellant’s brother, father, and sister-in-law testified regarding the family life. On

appeal, appellant argues that trial counsel should have called these witnesses to

“combat[] [N.S.’s] testimony regarding the family history of abuse.” To obtain relief on an

ineffective assistance claim based on an uncalled witness, the defendant must show that

the witness was available to testify and the testimony sought would have been of some

benefit to his defense. See Ex parte White, 160 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);

see also Crawford, 355 S.W.3d at 199; Pinkston v. State, 744 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (“An attorney’s failure to investigate or present

                                                13
witnesses will be a basis for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel only where it

is shown that the witnesses would have been available and that the presentation of the

evidence would have benefitted appellant.”).

       Trial counsel testified that he did not think the witnesses were necessary to combat

N.S.’s testimony, and that they were not “relevant to the [d]efense.” Trial counsel

considered calling these witnesses and chose not to for strategic reasons, and we will not

second guess his trial strategy. See id. Additionally, the testimony that appellant states

would have combatted N.S.’s testimony regarding appellant having been sexually abused

was elicited when appellant took the stand in his defense. Appellant does not explain how

his brother’s cumulative testimony would have benefited his defense. Nor does he explain

how generalities related to his upbringing and family life as testified to by his family would

have benefitted his defense. In any event, much of the same information was testified to

by appellant himself. See Crawford, 355 S.W.3d at 199.

C.     Failure to Obtain Medical Records

       By his final sub-issue, appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to obtain J.S.’s medical and school records. He makes the blanket assertion that “each

visit to a doctor was an opportunity for J[.]S[.] to describe acts to his private parts that

caused injury, discomfort, and/or bleeding as a child would to a doctor or nurse.” Appellant

also argues that the symptoms of chlamydia could have been discovered. Appellant

presents no testimony or evidence regarding these records or what was contained in the

records that would have been admissible to prove what he alleges in his motion for new

trial. See id.

                                             14
       We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                        NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                        Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
19th day of October, 2023.

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