Court Opinion

ID: 9402887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-18 14:12:19.265106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.260050
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                            ══════════
                             No. 22-0030
                            ══════════

                   Schindler Elevator Corporation,
                               Petitioner,

                                    v.

                            Darren Ceasar,
                              Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Ninth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                      Argued February 1, 2023

      CHIEF JUSTICE HECHT delivered the opinion of the Court.

      Plaintiff Darren Ceasar alleges he was injured in a hotel elevator
that ascended rapidly, then came to an abrupt stop. He sued the
building’s elevator-maintenance contractor, Schindler Elevator, and the
jury found for Ceasar. The main issue in this appeal is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by including in the jury charge an instruction
on res ipsa loquitur. We conclude that it did. We hold that Ceasar
presented no evidence to support the doctrine’s first element—the type
of accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur absent negligence—
because the relevant testimony of Ceasar’s elevator expert is conclusory.
We further hold that the instruction’s submission was harmful in this
case and address Schindler’s remaining challenges to the judgment.
      We reverse the part of the court of appeals’ judgment relating to
the trial court’s judgment on the jury’s verdict for Ceasar, and we
remand to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the part of the court
of appeals’ judgment relating to discovery sanctions that the trial court
imposed on Schindler.
                                       I
      Darren Ceasar,         a   barber from     Louisiana,       checked   into
Beaumont’s MCM Eleganté Hotel for a vacation, went up to his seventh-
floor room briefly, then left the hotel to get a pizza. 1 Upon returning,
Ceasar took the elevator back up to his room.
      As the elevator ascended, it started speeding up, went past the
seventh floor to the ninth floor, came to an abrupt stop, and started
shaking. The abrupt stop jarred Ceasar’s body, but the events transpired
so quickly that he is unsure whether he fell down or collided with the
side of the elevator. Ceasar pushed buttons to open the elevator doors,
but they remained closed. He also activated the elevator’s alarm, but the
alarm was not loud enough and failed to summon help. After a few
minutes, Ceasar called 911 from his cell phone. Firefighters arrived
within half an hour and extracted him.
      After settling in to a new room on the main floor, Ceasar started
to feel pain in his neck and back. He drove to a hospital in nearby Port

      1   We take Ceasar’s trial testimony as true, as we must.

                                       2
Arthur, where he was examined and then prescribed pain medication. A
few months after the incident, he sought care from a neurosurgeon in
Louisiana, who eventually performed lumbar-disc surgery on Ceasar.
He was also treated by a psychiatrist for PTSD.
      Ceasar sued       the   Eleganté   and its elevator-maintenance
contractor, Schindler. After the trial court granted a final summary
judgment for the Eleganté, Ceasar’s claims against Schindler proceeded
to a week-long jury trial. Schindler’s counsel acknowledged in opening
argument that “something happened” when the elevator “didn’t stop at
7. It stopped at 9.” But Schindler challenged whether the incident was
really as dramatic as Ceasar portrayed it to be. The other main issues
at trial were whether the incident was caused by Schindler’s negligent
maintenance of the elevator and whether Ceasar’s injuries predated the
incident.
      In a 10–2 verdict, the jury answered “yes” to the question whether
Schindler’s negligence proximately caused the elevator incident and
awarded Ceasar more than $800,000 in actual damages. 2 Schindler
appealed, raising several discrete issues that challenged the jury charge,
the court’s admission and exclusion of evidence, its management of
discovery, and its imposition of discovery sanctions on Schindler. The
court of appeals affirmed. 3 We granted Schindler’s petition for review.

      2 A question on gross negligence was also submitted. The jury answered
that question “no”.
      3   666 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2021).

                                     3
                                          II
       We first address Schindler’s challenge to the court’s submission
of a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur —Latin for “the thing speaks
for itself”. Over Schindler’s objection, the instructions in the jury charge
included this paragraph:
       You are instructed that you may infer negligence by a party
       but are not compelled to do so, if you find that the character
       of the accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen
       in the absence of negligence and if you find that the
       instrumentality causing the accident was under the
       management and control of the party at the time the
       negligence, if any, causing the accident probably occurred.
We have approved this exact language for a res ipsa instruction to be
given in appropriate cases. 4 But Schindler argues that this is not an
appropriate case because the evidence does not support the submission
of a res ipsa instruction.
                                          A
       Res ipsa is an evidentiary doctrine that “relieve[s] the plaintiff of
the burden of proving a specific act of negligence by the defendant when
it is impossible for the plaintiff to determine the sequence of events, or
when the defendant has superior knowledge or means of information to
determine the cause of the accident.” 5 The doctrine applies only rarely,
when the way in which an accident occurred furnishes circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s negligence. 6 The classic example of a case

       4   Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 257 (Tex. 1974).
       5   Jones v. Tarrant Util. Co., 638 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex. 1982).
       6     See Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 250 (“[M]eaning ‘the thing speaks for
itself,’ . . . [res ipsa] has come to signify that in certain limited types of cases[,]

                                          4
that “invite[s] res ipsa loquitur treatment” is when a foreign object is left
in a patient after surgery. 7
            Our caselaw has articulated two mandatory elements for the
doctrine’s application:
      (1)         the character of the accident must be such that it would not
                  ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and
      (2)         the instrumentality causing the injury must be shown to have
                  been under the management and control of the defendant. 8
To request a res ipsa instruction, “the plaintiff must produce evidence
from which the jury can conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that both the ‘type of accident’ and ‘control’ factors are present.” 9 In
other words, the plaintiff must introduce sufficient evidence to “survive
[a]     no-evidence . . . challenge[]”        on   the    question    whether     the
circumstances of the accident alone provide sufficient evidence of
negligence. 10 Contrarily, a defendant’s challenge to a res ipsa

the circumstances surrounding an accident constitute sufficient circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s negligence to support such a fact finding.”); see also
Porterfield v. Brinegar, 719 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1986) (“Res ipsa loquitur
means simply that the nature of the occurrence itself furnishes circumstantial
evidence of negligence.”); id. (“Although an accident is no evidence of
negligence, the character of the accident, and the circumstances and proof
attending it, may reasonably lead to the belief that without negligence the
accident would not have occurred.”); Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d
571, 573 (Tex. 1982) (characterizing the cases to which res ipsa applies as
“limited”).
            7   Walters v. Cleveland Reg’l Med. Ctr., 307 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. 2010).
         See, e.g., Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (citing
            8

Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251).
            9   Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 252.
            10   Id. at 251.

                                              5
instruction is “essentially [a] ‘no evidence’ point[]”. 11
       Evidentiary support for the “type of accident” and “control”
factors is the minimum requirement for a res ipsa instruction and will
not entitle the plaintiff to an instruction in every case. 12 “[I]n any Res
ipsa case, the particular facts surrounding the event are extremely
important.” 13 That means that determining the applicability of res ipsa
is a case-specific exercise. In two cases involving injuries to a worker
caused by exposure to gas or chemicals at the defendant’s plant, we
concluded that res ipsa applied in one 14 but not the other 15 because of
differences in the record evidence. Similarly, though we have previously
affirmed a lower court’s application of res ipsa in a case involving a free-
falling elevator, 16 we have also held “that the mere occurrence of an
unintended acceleration incident [involving a car] is no evidence that a

       11   Id. at 253.
       12   The American Law Institute has explained:
       A risk of error is involved in permitting such an inference . . . .
       But there is a risk of error whenever circumstantial evidence is
       relied on in reaching findings of negligence. To be sure, res ipsa
       loquitur does produce an element of discomfort, inasmuch as the
       defendant can be found negligent without any evidence as to the
       nature or circumstances of the defendant’s actual conduct. This
       discomfort leads to some circumspection in the application of res
       ipsa loquitur.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010).
       13   Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 248.
       14   Id. at 253.
       15   Sterner, 632 S.W.2d at 573-574.
       16   Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1965).

                                         6
vehicle is defective.” 17 A res ipsa instruction should not be given when it
is used to suggest that liability for an accident can be imposed without
negligence.
      With that background we turn to the evidence in this case.
                                        B
      Schindler challenges the evidence to support each element of res
ipsa. Because this is “essentially a no evidence point”, we apply the same
standard of review and look to the record to see if it contains “more than
a mere scintilla” of evidence to support each one. 18 “The record contains
more than a mere scintilla of evidence when the evidence rises to a level
that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions. Conversely, the record contains less than a scintilla when
the evidence offered to prove a vital fact’s existence is ‘so weak as to do
no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion.’” 19 We view the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ceasar, “crediting favorable
evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence
unless reasonable jurors could not.” 20 Because we conclude that the
evidence offered to support the first element of res ipsa is legally
insufficient, we need not address the second element.
      The first element is that the character of the accident must be

      17   Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2004).
      18   See, e.g., Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018).
      19 Id. at 658 (quoting King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742,
751 (Tex. 2003)).
      20   City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2005).

                                        7
such that it would not normally occur in the absence of negligence. 21
Ceasar relies on the testimony of his elevator expert, J.R. Freeman, to
satisfy his burden of proof on this element. 22 Freeman testified three
times on direct or redirect examination that an elevator’s behaving the
way Ceasar described ordinarily occurs due to negligence in the
elevator’s maintenance. But in each instance, his testimony was
conclusory.
          Conclusory testimony “is considered no evidence.” 23 “An expert’s
testimony is conclusory when the expert asserts a conclusion with no
basis”; 24 when “‘the basis offered provides no support’ for the opinion”; 25
or when the expert “offers only his word that the bases offered to support
his opinion actually exist or support his opinion.” 26 An expert “must link
his conclusions to the facts” and “explain[] the basis of his assertions.” 27
“Asking the jury to take the expert’s word for it because of his status as

          21   Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 950 (citing Bell, 517 S.W.2d at 251).
          Expert testimony is not always required to prove this element, but it
          22

“is clearly admissible and may be necessary to the plaintiff’s case.” Bell, 517
S.W.2d at 252.
          Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. SPEP Aircraft Holdings, LLC, 572
          23

S.W.3d 213, 222 (Tex. 2019) (citing City of San Antonio v. Pollock, 284 S.W.3d
809, 818 (Tex. 2009)).
          24   Id. at 223 (citing Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 818).
         Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 787 (Tex. 2020)
          25

(quoting Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 818).
          26   Id. at 790 (quoting Windrum v. Kareh, 581 S.W.3d 761, 769 (Tex.
2019)).
           Bombardier Aerospace Corp., 572 S.W.3d at 223 (citing Earle v.
          27

Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Tex. 1999)).

                                             8
an expert will not suffice.” 28
       Ceasar’s counsel first asked Freeman on direct examination
whether it is “normal operation for a properly functioning elevator to go
to the wrong floor and even above the top of the top floor”. Freeman
responded, simply: “No, it’s not.” Later in the same examination, counsel
asked Freeman to opine “[a]s an elevator expert” whether “the type of
accident that happened here normally occur[s] when maintenance is
being done properly”. Freeman responded, “[n]o, it wouldn’t” and then
added that only two to three “callouts” (service calls) per year are normal
for a properly maintained elevator.
       On cross-examination, Schindler’s counsel elicited from Freeman
other possible explanations for the incident Ceasar described.
       Q. Okay. Now, there’s lots of reasons that an elevator can
       have a harder than normal stop. Would you agree?
       A. Yes.
       Q. Give me some examples.
       A. A clip in a door lock that you mentioned earlier.
       Q. Yes, sir.
       A. A run up on a final limit.
       Q. Okay.
       A. A stop switch being engaged.
       Q. By a passenger inadvertently or otherwise?
       A. Or key -- yes.
       Q. So, there’s a lot of ways an elevator can stop?
       A. That is correct, sir.

       28   Id. (citing Pollock, 284 S.W.3d at 816).

                                          9
Later, Schindler’s counsel asked whether “elevators [can] get stuck
without anybody being negligent”. Freeman acknowledged that, “[y]es,
that can happen.”
      Ceasar’s counsel tried to rehabilitate Freeman’s testimony on
redirect examination by asking whether “[a]n abrupt stop like the one
that Mr. Ceasar experienced . . . happen[s] when elevators are properly
maintained”. Freeman responded, “[n]o, it doesn’t”—but again gave no
further explanation.
      Freeman thus testified three times that a properly maintained
elevator would not go to the wrong floor or stop abruptly, while also
agreeing with defense counsel’s statement that “there’s lots of reasons”
why an elevator may make a “harder than normal stop.” He never
reconciled these statements or explained the basis for his testimony on
direct and redirect examination other than to say that only two to three
callouts per year are typical for a properly maintained elevator. Even if
it is true that a properly maintained elevator malfunctions only two to
three times per year, it does not follow that a fourth or subsequent
malfunction must be due to improper maintenance.
      To satisfy the first element of res ipsa, Ceasar was required to do
more than just “[a]sk[] the jury to take [Freeman’s] word for it because
of his status as an expert”. 29 Ceasar was required to elicit from Freeman
the basis for his assertions that properly maintained elevators
ordinarily do not malfunction, especially in light of Freeman’s own
concessions on cross-examination that negligent maintenance is not the

      29   Id.

                                   10
only potential cause of an abrupt stop. Because the only evidence Ceasar
offered to support the first element of res ipsa is conclusory testimony,
there is no evidence to support a finding that an elevator ordinarily does
not malfunction in the way Ceasar alleges in the absence of negligence,
and the trial court erred by submitting the instruction.
                                         C
      The court of appeals declined to address the merits of Schindler’s
challenge to the res ipsa instruction because it concluded that Schindler
had failed to establish that the instruction “probably caused the
rendition of an improper judgment.” 30 The court pointed out that the
charge included a separate instruction on circumstantial evidence 31 and
reasoned that “[b]ased on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could
have decided that Schindler was negligent from either the direct or
circumstantial evidence in the case.” 32 That is, “[t]he jury could have
believed the testimony provided by the Plaintiff’s expert that Schindler’s
inadequate or improper maintenance and repair to the control board
caused the accident even without relying on the res ipsa loquitur

      30   666 S.W.3d at 61; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1), 61.1(a).
      31   This instruction states:
      The term “circumstantial evidence” means a fact may be
      established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or
      both. A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by
      documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or
      heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial
      evidence when it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from
      other facts proved.
      32   666 S.W.3d at 61.

                                        11
instruction.” 33 We disagree that the inclusion of the res ipsa instruction
in the charge was harmless.
       Ceasar presented two theories of negligence to the jury. The first
was res ipsa, which, if proper, would have enabled the jury to infer
negligence purely from the way that the accident happened. The second
theory, which was also presented through the testimony of expert
Freeman, was that Schindler performed negligent maintenance on a
component called the SDI board, which controls the elevator’s position
and velocity. Schindler’s service-call records reflected that the SDI board
for the elevator had malfunctioned several times in the months leading
up to Ceasar’s accident, that Schindler had replaced the board ten days
before the accident, that Schindler had adjusted the board again only
two days before the accident, and that the board was “not
communicating” on some additional occasions in the first few months
after the accident. Freeman testified that this failure rate was not
typical for an SDI board. He opined, based on this service history, that
Schindler “couldn’t figure out what was wrong with [the board] and just
kept patching it or putting a Band-Aid on it and trying things.”
       “Charge error is generally considered harmful if it relates to a
contested, critical issue.” 34 Both of Ceasar’s negligence theories were

       33   Id.
       34 Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Columbia
Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 856 (Tex. 2009)); see
also Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001) (“An
improper instruction is especially likely to cause an unfair trial when the trial
is contested and the evidence sharply conflicting . . . .”).

                                       12
hotly contested by Schindler, and the jury returned a 10–2 verdict. 35
Ceasar’s res ipsa theory was also critical to his case. In closing
argument, Ceasar’s counsel told the jury that res ipsa lowers Ceasar’s
burden of proof. 36 Counsel said that the case involves “a little bit of
unique law” because Ceasar “[doesn’t] have to prove exactly how [the
elevator accident] happened.” Counsel directed the jury to the res ipsa
instruction, which he characterized as setting forth “a little bit lighter”
standard than negligence. Counsel then stated:
       All we have to prove in here is that, hey, an elevator doesn’t
       go up past the floor it’s supposed to stop on and come to an
       abrupt stop unless someone neglected -- there was
       negligence involved, whatever it was.
       Finally, the presence of the circumstantial-evidence instruction
cannot render the res ipsa instruction harmless. The circumstantial-
evidence instruction permits the jury to find any fact by making fair and
reasonable inferences from evidence presented. 37 But the res ipsa
instruction permits the jury to find negligence when there is no evidence
that the defendant breached a duty of reasonable care, only evidence
that the accident would not ordinarily have happened the way it did
absent negligence. The instructions are not the same.
       We hold that the improper submission of Ceasar’s res ipsa theory

       35See In re Est. of Poe, 648 S.W.3d 277, 292 (Tex. 2022) (holding that an
erroneously submitted jury question was harmful error and noting that
evidence related to the question was hotly contested and that the jury returned
a 10–2 verdict).
        See Glenn v. Leal, 596 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Tex. 2020) (stating that the
       36

standard of negligence a jury is asked to apply is a critical issue).
       37   See supra note 31.

                                      13
probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict. Accordingly, we
reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and remand for a new trial.
                                   III
      We briefly address Schindler’s remaining arguments.
                                    A
      Schindler complains about the trial court’s ordering Schindler to
produce documents during trial and its imposition of a $25,000 sanction
on Schindler (not Schindler’s counsel) for failing to produce the
documents during pretrial discovery. A letter ruling by the trial court
provides background and explains the reason for the court’s decision.
      According to the court, Ceasar specifically requested in discovery
Schindler’s policy or procedure manuals for servicing elevators as well
as its work orders, tickets, and service requests for the elevators at the
Eleganté. Schindler failed to identify, disclose, or produce a policy
manual and certain work orders that were responsive to the requests.
The existence of the missing documents came to light during the
deposition of Schindler’s corporate representative, James Hoover. After
the deposition, Ceasar’s counsel requested the missing documents from
defense counsel by email. Several months later, Schindler produced
some, but not all, of the work orders, while maintaining that it did not
have any policy manuals responsive to the request.
      At the pretrial conference, the court admonished both sides to
make sure that all relevant evidence had been tendered to opposing
counsel before the commencement of trial. Nonetheless, it emerged
during Hoover’s trial testimony that a policy manual does, in fact, exist
and that there are additional relevant work orders that were never

                                   14
produced during discovery. Defense counsel eventually obtained those
items from Schindler and turned them over to Ceasar.
      The court determined that the fault lay with Schindler, not
Schindler’s counsel. The court found that counsel had timely forwarded
the pretrial discovery requests to Schindler, that counsel had reasonably
relied on the representations made to him by Schindler, and that counsel
had learned of the missing documents’ existence during trial.
      The court concluded that Ceasar had not waived its request for
sanctions because the existence of the missing documents was not
established until mid-trial. The court further concluded that Schindler
violated Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.1 38 by failing to supplement
its discovery responses after Ceasar’s post-deposition email and by
failing to inform its counsel of the documents’ existence. The court also
found that Schindler had several opportunities to remedy the
deficiencies in its earlier discovery responses.
      Though Ceasar requested sanctions in the amount of $100,000,
the court found that $25,000 was appropriate. The court explained that
it was not imposing a greater amount “because of the commendable
efforts by [Schindler’s] attorney . . . to remedy the discovery violation
mid-trial.” The court further found “that a lesser sanction would have
been ineffective given the circumstances of the violation, the volume of
litigation in which Schindler participates across various jurisdictions,
and the amount of the sanction in comparison with the overall cost to
defend the underlying litigation.”

      38 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.1 (requiring a party to make “a complete
response” to written discovery requests).

                                     15
       Schindler contests the discovery and sanctions orders on several
grounds, including that the specific documents the court ordered
Schindler to produce mid-trial had not expressly been requested
pretrial; that Ceasar failed to file a motion to compel pretrial; and that
the mid-trial discovery order was burdensome, distracting, and violated
the rule that “discovery must be conducted during the [pretrial]
discovery period” for Level 2 cases. 39
       The court of appeals concluded that the discovery and sanctions
orders were not an abuse of discretion. 40 We agree. We reject Schindler’s
complaint about the trial court’s requiring discovery during trial
because “[t]he court may modify a discovery control plan at any time and
must do so when the interest of justice requires.” 41 The record reflects
that the trial court was within its discretion in determining that justice
required Schindler to produce the policy manual and missing work
orders despite the trial’s having commenced.
       We likewise reject Schindler’s challenge to the court’s $25,000
sanctions order. Any sanctions order must be “just”, which we
“measure[] by two standards.” 42 “First, a direct relationship must exist

       39   See TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.3(b)(1)(B) (“All discovery must be conducted
during the discovery period, which begins when the first initial disclosures are
due and continues until[] . . . the earlier of (i) 30 days before the date set for
trial, or (ii) nine months after the first initial disclosures are due.”).
       40666 S.W.3d at 56, 59; see Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex.
2004) (“A trial court’s ruling on a motion for sanctions is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.”).
       41   TEX. R. CIV. P. 190.5.
       42   TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991).

                                       16
between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed”, which
requires the court to “attempt to determine whether the offensive
conduct is attributable to counsel only, or to the party only, or to both.” 43
“Second, just sanctions must not be excessive.” 44 “A sanction imposed for
discovery abuse should be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its
legitimate purposes”, and “courts must consider the availability of less
stringent sanctions and whether such lesser sanctions would fully
promote compliance.” 45 The record reflects that the court carefully
adhered to these standards. The court determined that the fault lay with
Schindler and not its counsel. And it imposed a far lighter sanction than
Ceasar had requested, while reasoning that anything less than $25,000
would be ineffective under the circumstances.
       We affirm the part of the court of appeals’ judgment relating to
this discovery sanction.
                                      B
       Schindler challenges (1) the trial court’s exclusion of evidence
that three years before the elevator accident, Ceasar applied for federal
Social Security Disability benefits and his application was denied; and
(2) the court’s exclusion of evidence that Ceasar had filed a personal-
injury lawsuit for injuries to his neck and back caused by a car accident
in 2014. With respect to each ruling, the court of appeals concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion or that any error was

       43   Id.
       44   Id.
       45   Id.

                                     17
harmless. 46 We agree.
       Schindler argues that Ceasar’s federal benefits application is
relevant to demonstrate that Ceasar claimed to have neck and back
injuries years before the elevator incident. The trial court concluded that
the application lacked probative value and that its admission would be
unduly prejudicial. 47 But while excluding the application itself, the court
allowed Schindler to cross-examine Ceasar on statements made in the
application. Ceasar testified to having received treatment for back pain
prior to the elevator accident. Ceasar’s treating neurosurgeon also
testified that Ceasar had been “very open” with him about back
problems that predated the elevator accident. Finally, there are many
reasons why an application for disability benefits might be denied; the
mere fact of the application’s denial is not probative of Ceasar’s
credibility.
       Schindler also argues that the lawsuit arising from Ceasar’s 2014
car accident demonstrates that Ceasar’s neck and back injuries occurred
before the elevator accident. The court allowed Schindler to examine
Ceasar about any injuries resulting from a prior car accident but
reasoned that “whether or not the plaintiff had initiated legal
proceedings or had filed the lawsuit or had to seek legal redress in
regards to that purported injury, ultimately, that is not very
relevant . . . absent a specific and particularized showing of relevance.”
These rulings were within the trial court’s discretion.

       46   See 666 S.W.3d at 50-51.
       47   TEX. R. EVID. 401-403.

                                       18
                                     C
      Schindler’s final challenge is to the court’s refusal to instruct the
jury on spoliation despite Ceasar’s having deleted a Facebook live video
that he made while trapped in the elevator. Ceasar broadcast live on
Facebook while he was trapped in the elevator, but he turned the video
off when he exited. Ceasar testified that he recorded the video “to let
people know this is where [he was]” because he was “scared” that the
elevator “was going to drop”. He further testified that the video showed
him “screaming for help”, “knocking on the door”, and “kicking on the
door”. Ceasar testified that he deleted the video the day after the
accident because he “just didn’t enjoy . . . the way it made [him] feel” and
because it caused him to “reliv[e] the moment . . . again.” Finally,
Ceasar testified that if he had known he would be filing a lawsuit, he
would have kept the video to “show[] everybody.”
      The Eleganté’s on-duty manager, Elizabeth Pearson, testified
that she saw the video and that Ceasar did not appear to be injured but
that he did appear agitated and was kicking the elevator door to try and
open it. Schindler requested the following jury instruction, which the
court declined to include:
      Plaintiff, Darren Ceasar, destroyed/failed to preserve his
      Facebook Live video. You must consider that the Facebook
      Live video would have been unfavorable to the Plaintiff,
      Darren Ceasar, on the issue of his description of the
      incident, his injuries, his frame of mind, as well as his
      credibility.
      To impose a remedy for spoliation, “the trial court must

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determine, as a question of law, whether a party spoliated evidence”. 48
The determination requires two findings: “(1) the spoliating party had a
duty to reasonably preserve evidence, and (2) the party intentionally or
negligently breached that duty by failing to do so.” 49 “Upon a finding of
spoliation, the trial court has broad discretion to impose a
[proportionate] remedy . . . .” 50 The court’s factual findings and
imposition of a remedy, if any, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 51
       In denying the instruction, the court reasoned that the inclusion
of a spoliation instruction requires “an extremely high showing” that the
destruction of evidence was “done maliciously or intentionally in order
to hinder the opposing party’s presentation of the case.” The court stated
that it “[did not] find” that this was “established from the evidence or
from the briefing.” The court noted additionally that there were
witnesses besides Pearson who had seen the video but that Schindler
had never presented their testimony to the jury. The court explained
that it would have given Schindler latitude to present that witness
testimony and that it would allow Schindler some leeway in closing
argument to address the video’s deletion.
       After reviewing the record, we agree with the court of appeals
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining Schindler’s
request for a spoliation instruction. 52

       48   Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. 2014).
       49   Id.
       50   Id.
       51   Id. at 27.
       52   666 S.W.3d at 64.

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                         *      *        *    *     *
      We affirm the part of the court of appeals’ judgment relating to
the sanctions imposed on Schindler. We otherwise reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment, and we remand to the trial court for a new trial.

                                         Nathan L. Hecht
                                         Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 16, 2023

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