Court Opinion

ID: 9429287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:19.455319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.977621
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
concurring in the judgment.
The Court’s recent decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), has resulted in disagreement as to whether it announced a new per se rule.1 My hope had been that this case would afford an opportunity to clarify the confusion. As evidenced by the differing readings of Edwards by Justices Marshall and Rehnquist in their respective opinions, my hope has not been fully realized. Justice Marshall, and the three Justices who join his opinion, would affirm the Oregon Court of Appeals because it “properly applied Edwards.” Post, at 1053. Justice Rehnquist, and the three Justices who join him, would “conclude that the Oregon Court of Appeals misapplied our decision in Edwards.” Ante, at 1043. In view of the disagreement here, it is not sur*1048prising that courts have differed as to whether Edwards announced a per se rule, and if so what rule. I joined the judgment in Edwards because on the facts “it [was] clear that Edwards [had been] takén from his cell against his will and [improperly] subjected to renewed interrogation.” 451 U. S., at 490 (opinion concurring in result). I did not join the Court’s opinion because I was “not sure what it mean[t].” Id., at 488.
The opinions today reflect the ambiguity of some of the Edwards language, particularly on the meaning of “initiation.” Justice Marshall reads Edwards as requiring not only that the accused initiate further communication, but also that the communication be “about the subject matter of the criminal investigation.” Post, at 1053 (emphasis in original). Justice Rehnquist, however, would require only that the suspect “evinc[e] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” Ante, at 1045-1046. This formulation would include an “initiation” of conversation “in the ordinary dictionary sense” of the word, ante, at 1045, excluding “inquiries . . . that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire ... to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation,” ibid.
Both Justices agree in one respect. They view the “initiation” question as the first step of a two-step analysis, the second step being the application of the Zerbst standard that requires examination of the “totality of the circumstances.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938). Justice Marshall puts it this way:
“If an accused has himself initiated further communication with the police, it is still necessary to establish as a separate matter the existence of a knowing and intelligent waiver under Johnson v. Zerbst . . . Post, at 1055, n. 2.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion observes that the initiation and the voluntariness of the waiver under Zerbst “are sepa*1049rate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together.” Ante, at 1045.
This bifurcating of the Zerbst standard is not compelled by Edwards or any of our other cases. The inquiry in Edwards did focus on the reopening of communication with the accused by the police — a reopening that properly was held to be coercive. As there were no other significant facts or circumstances bearing upon the waiver question, there was no occasion for the Court to consider whether a two-step analysis is required in the more customary case.2 An incarcerated person, accused of crime, does not remain silent and speak only when conversation is initiated by others, whether by fellow prisoners, guards, or law enforcement officers. Jail or prison confinements prior to indictment or trial may extend over days and weeks, and numerous conversations customarily occur, often accompanied by collateral facts and circumstances. Rarely can a court properly focus on a particular conversátion, and intelligently base a judgment on the simplistic inquiry as to who spoke first.
In this case, for example, Bradshaw’s initiating question (“what is going to happen to me now?”) was not an isolated event. It was immediately followed by a renewal of Miranda warnings and additional conversation. The following day there was further conversation, a third reading of Miranda rights, and finally Bradshaw’s signing of a written waiver of those rights. Only then did he confess. Justice Marshall would hold that there can be no waiver of the right to counsel unless the accused himself opens a dialogue “about the subject matter of the criminal investigation.” Post, at 1054; see also post, at 1053, 1055-1056. He states that “unless the accused himself initiates further communica*1050tion with the police, a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be established.” Post, at 1055, n. 2. Under this view of the two-step analysis, a court never gets to the second step— however relevant subsequent facts and circumstances may be to a waiver — unless the accused was the first to speak and to say the right thing. This is illustrated by the reasoning in the dissenting opinion in this case. Since Justice Marshall concludes that Bradshaw had not initiated the dialogue, he does not consider the subsequent facts and circumstances that were found by the trial court to satisfy the Zerbst standard. Justice Rehnquist, however, moves from the first to the second step to conclude that the facts and circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, clearly establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel. To this extent, I agree with his plurality opinion.
My concern is that a two-step analysis could confound the confusion evident from the differing views expressed by other courts, see n. 1, supra, and indeed evidenced by the conflicting reading of Edwards by Justices Marshall and Rehnquist.3 The Zerbst standard is one that is widely understood and followed. It also comports with common sense. Fragmenting the standard into a novel two-step analysis — if followed literally — often would frustrate justice as well as *1051common sense.4 Courts should engage in more substantive inquiries than “who said what first.” The holding of the Court in Edwards cannot in my view fairly be reduced to this.
We are unanimous in agreeing in this case, as in Edwards, that “the right to counsel [is] a prime example of those rights requiring the special protection of the knowing and intelligent waiver standard.” Edwards, 451 U. S., at 483. We also agree that once the accused has requested counsel this right requires additional safeguards, particularly against any coercive form of custodial interrogation. But the question of whether a suspect has waived this important right to counsel is uniquely one of fact, and usually must and should be left to the judgment of the trial court that has had the benefit of hearing the evidence and assessing the weight and credibility of testimony. In the circumstances of this case, I agree that Bradshaw knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and that the judgment below therefore should be reversed.

 Compare Fields v. Wyrick, 682 F. 2d 154, 158 (CA8) (Edwards “creat[ed] a per se rule”), rev’d and remanded, 459 U. S. 42 (1982) (per curiam); United States v. Thierman, 678 F. 2d 1331, 1338 (CA9 1982) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (reading Edwards as applying per se rule); State v. Willie, 410 So. 2d 1019, 1028 (La. 1982) (recognizing per se rule in Edwards); State v. McCloskey, 90 N. J. 18, 25, 446 A. 2d 1201, 1205 (1982) (“Edwards established a per se rule”); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P. 2d 218, 226 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, C. J., dissenting) (Edwards “Court fashioned a per se rule”), with Richardson v. State, 274 Ark. 473, 477-478, 625 S. W. 2d 504, 506-507 (1981) (applying “totality of the circumstances” test rather than per se rule); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 671, 448 A. 2d 163, 175 (1982) (“we do not read Edwards to prescribe a per se rule”); Leuschner v. State, 49 Md. App. 490, 497, 433 A. 2d 1195, 1199 (1981) (Edwards does not create per se rule); State v. Scott, 626 S. W. 2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (applying “totality of the circumstances” test rather than per se rule). See also Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 376, 290 S. E. 2d 442, 446 (“[ajccepting that [Edwards] established a per se exclusionary rule,” but expressing reservation), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1092 (1982); Leuschner, supra, at 497, 433 A. 2d, at 1199 (recognizing uncertainty whether Edwards created per se rule).

 Perhaps what has caused some confusion is a failure to recognize that the only new element in Edwards was the emphasis on the prosecution’s burden of proof in cases where — in the absence of relevant subsequent facts — the critical question of waiver focuses on whether the initial communication by the police was proper.

 We recently found it necessary to clarify uncertainty that had resulted from decisions of this Court that had undertaken, in Fourth Amendment cases, to draw lines that were too refined to be applied consistently. Last Term in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798 (1982), the Court considered it necessary to “reject the precise holding” in Robbins v. California, 453 U. S. 420 (1981), and some of the language in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U. S. 753 (1979). 456 U. S., at 824. In my concurring opinion in Ross, I said it was “essential to have a Court opinion . . . that provides ‘specific guidance to police and courts in this recurring situation.”’ Id., at 826 (quoting Robbins, supra, at 435 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment)). The needed clarification and guidance were undertaken, successfully I think, in Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court. If the opinions today, when read together, do not provide reasonable clarification for law enforcement officers and courts, we have a duty — one that I think is compelling— to provide more specific guidance, much as we did in Ross.

 I therefore prefer to read Justice Rehnquist’s opinion merely as an analytical framework that — except in a case like Edwards — would not inhibit courts from a full examination of all relevant facts and circumstances.