Court Opinion

ID: 9693708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:57:53.773079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:17.508583
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I agree that reversal is required in this case for the reasons stated in the opinion of the court. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with Chief Judge Rogers’ concurring opinion, and especially with Part I thereof.1
I
Chief Judge Rogers would hold that the revocation of Plummer’s outpatient status was invalid because the Hospital failed to file a timely revocation petition. She takes this position because more than five years ago, on November 6, 1986, the Hospital filed that petition seven days rather than five days after Plummer was returned to inpatient status.2 The drastic remedy of invalidating the revocation so long after the fact is required, according to the Chief Judge, because the Hospital’s timely notice of rehospitalization, the trial court’s 1983 commitment order, and language in In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 481 (D.C.1984), all required that the revocation petition be filed within five days.3
*750Plummer, who was represented by a Public Defender Service (PDS) attorney specializing in mental health cases, made no objection in the trial court to the filing of the allegedly untimely petition.4 Indeed, the issue was not raised by the defense at all until three and a half years later, when PDS submitted its brief in this court.
The Hospital’s obligation to file the revocation petition within five days of hospitalization does not appear in the Ervin Act, but is at most a requirement of the case law. Moreover, since a notice of rehospi-talization, which automatically triggers the initial judicial review of the legality of the patient’s detention, was timely issued, the two-day delay in filing the revocation petition did not prevent prompt review. See In re Feenster, 561 A.2d 997, 999 (D.C.1989).5 According to Chief Judge Rogers, however, these considerations make no difference, because the Hospital’s alleged lateness of two days is said to have invalidated all subsequent proceedings in the case. I respectfully but most emphatically disagree.
In general, a party who proposes to raise on appeal an issue which has not been presented to the trial court may do so only upon a showing of circumstances so exceptional that a clear miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988). In the present case, no such showing has been made or even attempted. There is no evidence that the hearing on the revocation petition would have been held sooner if the petition had been filed two days earlier, or that the delay affected Plummer’s liberty.
Indeed, if the concept of manifest injustice is implicated at all, it is the Hospital and the community who are threatened by it. If the revocation of outpatient status could be set aside, years after the fact, on grounds initially eschewed but belatedly asserted by the patient, the Hospital would *751be severely prejudiced. By deferring any allusion to the issue of timeliness until the filing of his brief on appeal, Plummer at least potentially inhibited the ability of the Hospital to explain what occasioned the alleged untimeliness.
Moreover, as a result of counsel’s failure to object at the time the petition was filed, there have been numerous subsequent proceedings in the case. These proceedings, which Plummer apparently expects us to treat as null and void, have been costly to the Hospital, and indeed to all concerned, in terms of time, money and effort. Assuming that Plummer’s claim of untimeliness is correct on the merits, all of this unnecessary expenditure of effort could have been avoided if a contemporaneous objection had been made. If there was ever a case in which the equities dictate a finding that the point has been waived by a litigant represented by competent counsel, this is surely it.
Chief Judge Rogers asserts that the alleged untimeliness was “jurisdictional.” The authorities on which she relies, however, do not support her position. All of them deal with issues of subject matter jurisdiction. In Clay v. Faison, 583 A.2d 1388, 1390 n. 2 (D.C.1990), the court’s remark that “jurisdictional issues may always be raised” related to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Family Division of the Superior Court. The passage in 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1393, at 772-73 (2d ed. 1990), to which the Chief Judge also alludes, has to do with the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. In his dissent in In re Inquiry into Allegation of Misconduct Against Juveniles Detained at and Committed at Cedar Knoll Institution, Dep’t of Human Resources, 430 A.2d 1087, 1100 (D.C.1981), Judge Ferren remarked that “[t]he parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction.”
The present defect, if any, does not go to subject matter jurisdiction. The legislature may, of course, make a court’s subject matter jurisdiction contingent on timely action on the part of the litigant seeking to invoke it. See, e.g., Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 651, 653-54 (D.C.1989). In this case, however, Plum-mer points to no statute which purports so to limit the Superior Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and I know of none. Indeed, even the District’s elected legislature is precluded from “enactfing] any act, resolution or rule with respect to any provision of Title 11 (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts).” D.C.Code § l-233(a)(4) (1987); see also Jones & Artis Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 549 A.2d 315, 318 (D.C.1988). Accordingly, I simply do not see how a few words in our decision in Richardson, or in prior orders by the trial judge in this case, could divest the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction which it previously possessed.6
The cases under the Ervin Act on which Chief Judge Rogers relies are all readily distinguishable. In none of them did the court hold that an appellant may raise on appeal an argument that he failed to present below.7 See In re Reed, 571 A.2d *752801, 802 (D.C.1990); In re Feenster, supra, 561 A.2d at 1000; In re DeLoatch, 532 A.2d 1343, 1344 (D.C.1987) (per curiam). Moreover, both Reed and DeLoatch were grounded on the untimeliness of the petition in light of “plain and clear” statutory deadlines. Reed, supra, 571 A.2d at 803-04; DeLoatch, supra, 532 A.2d at 1345. There is no claim that a statutory deadline has been missed in this case.
In Feenster, in which the appellant was held for ten days (rather than for a maximum of twenty-four hours, as required by Richardson, 481 A.2d at 480) without ex parte judicial consideration of the legality of his detention, the Hospital’s failure to file a timely Notice of Rehospitalization led to the denial of timely judicial review. 561 A.2d at 998-99. Here, on the other hand, it is undisputed that the Notice of Rehospital-ization was timely filed, and Plummer has made no showing that the alleged lateness by two days of the filing of the revocation petition prejudiced him.
There is nothing in the Richardson decision (which as I have noted, is itself less than consistent on the subject, see note 3, supra) to suggest that a failure by the Hospital to comply with the five-day directive was intended, without any proof of prejudice, to have the draconian consequences which Plummer now demands. Indeed, since Richardson, the Superior Court’s Board of Judges has adopted, and this court’s Board of Judges has approved, the Superior Court’s Mental Health Rule 16(c), which provides in pertinent part:
If the affidavit [of rehospitalization] indicates that the respondent was involuntarily rehospitalized, the hospital must either release the respondent after the fifth day of inpatient care and observation, or thereafter promptly move, but no later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of rehospitalization, for a judicial hearing seeking permanent revocation of the respondent’s outpatient commitment.
(Emphasis added.) Obviously, this Rule is not retroactive, but it sheds some light on the question whether the Hospital’s two day delay in this case was a fundamental defect, and therefore “jurisdictional,” as Chief Judge Rogers suggests. In any event, I am satisfied that the revocation of Plummer’s outpatient status cannot reasonably be invalidated on grounds first raised on appeal three and a half years after the fact.
II
I also disagree with Chief Judge Rogers’ conclusion that the trial judge violated Plummer’s rights when he committed him as an inpatient for an indefinite period. The judge predicted that Plummer would be “out of there in eight weeks or a little bit more.” The doctor testified that Plum-mer “needs some more time, at least a couple of months or so.” No guarantee was or could be given as to the exact period of time that it would take for the patient’s condition to improve sufficiently to permit his release without danger to him or to others.
Reacting in a seasoned and humane manner to this situation, the trial judge ordered Plummer’s commitment for an indefinite period, but at the same time set an early review. The propitious scheduling of that review ensured that Plummer would be released to the community if all went as planned. A sympathetic and experienced judge who demonstrated sincere concern for Plummer’s liberty interest and welfare adopted what he reasonably regarded as a practical way of handling the problem. We ought not to second-guess him. I discern no failure here to abide by the “least restrictive alternative” principle.
The judge heard the testimony. He observed the witnesses, as well as the patient. I do not think that we can reasonably say from our lofty appellate perch that the judge’s decision was “clearly erroneous,” or, indeed, erroneous at all. Accordingly, I would not reverse on the ground that the commitment for an indefinite period was illegal.8

.We must resolve this issue, for if Plummer's contentions with respect to it are correct, it goes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Whether that court had subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue which we are required to address even when it is presented to us for the first time on appeal. Eisler v. Stritzler, 535 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.1976). Indeed, if that question had not been raised at all by the parties, we would be obliged to consider it sua sponte. Lee v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals and Review, 423 A.2d 210, 215 (D.C.1980). Where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it should so hold, without attempting to resolve the substantive questions presented. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2178, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). If the trial judge should not have gone beyond the jurisdictional question, then neither should we.

. Plummer conceded in his brief that weekend days may not be counted and that the Hospital may have been only two days late, rather than four. See Chief Judge Rogers’ concurring opinion, note 1.

. Richardson is not as clear as it might be on the point. The opinion first states that the patient must be informed that
the Hospital must either release him after the fifth day of institutional care and observation, or thereafter move for a prompt adversary judicial hearing seeking the permanent revocation of his outpatient status.
*750Id., 481 A.2d at 481 (emphasis added). The use of the word “thereafter" suggests that the Hospital has a reasonable time after the expiration of five days to file the petition for revocation. Later in the opinion, however, the court stated that
[t]he Hospital may detain the patient without a full judicial hearing for a maximum of five days.... [I]f the Hospital determines that further institutionalization is required, it must move for the hearing no later than the fifth day of examination and observation.
Id. at 482-83 (footnotes omitted). I assume for present purposes that it is the second passage that controls.

. Although the three and a half year delay in raising the point makes inquiry into the question difficult, there is good reason to believe that counsel made a tactical decision not to object. Plummer, now approximately thirty-eight years old, had been receiving treatment at various hospitals for paranoid schizophrenia and related disorders, including narcotics abuse, at least since 1974. According to records of prior hospitalizations, he had engaged over the years in bizarre and dangerous conduct, including disrobing in public, attempting to assault a police officer, throwing a knife at his nephew, and threatening his sister. In July, 1986, Plummer was hospitalized after his father reported that he had been lying in the street in front of passing traffic, and police observed him doing the same thing. According to the father, Plummer had failed to take his medication for two months. The danger to him was therefore palpable. Cf. In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 896-98 (D.C.1991) (en banc).
After Plummer was treated with psychotropic medication, he was released to outpatient status but declined to cooperate with his outpatient regimen or to take his medication. It was for these reasons that Plummer was rehospitalized on October 28, 1986. Under these circumstances, his attorney might well have thought it unwise, from the perspective of Plummer’s safety, to insist that his client be released or to make an issue of the filing of the petition two days late, especially since a timely notice of rehospi-talization had already been given and prompt judicial review of Plummer's detention was assured. When an objection has been withheld in the trial court for tactical reasons, it may not thereafter be asserted on appeal. See Hopkins v. United States, 595 A.2d 995, 996 n. 3 (D.C.1991).

. With respect to what triggers what, however, it is interesting to compare the Hospital's brief in Plummer with its submission in Feenster. In the present case, which centers on the lateness of the revocation petition, the Hospital stated at page 34 of its brief that "[ujnquestionably, it is the notice of rehospitalization, not the petition, that requires a prompt judicial review." In Feenster, where it was the notice of rehospitali-zation that was alleged to be untimely, the Hospital assured this court that “it is the filing of the petition to revoke, the outpatient commitment, not the notice of rehospitalization, which triggers the setting of the adversary judicial hearing required by Richardson.” Appellee’s brief in No. 86-985, at 8. So much for neutral principles of law!

. Generally, in the absence of a statutory provision making subject matter jurisdiction contingent on the timely institution of proceedings, a defense based on lack of timeliness must be properly preserved in the trial court, both in civil and criminal cases. See, e.g., Mayo v. Mayo, 508 A.2d 114, 116 (D.C.1986) (statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and failure to plead it results in its waiver); Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1098 (D.C.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064, 106 S.Ct. 814, 88 L.Ed.2d 788 (1986) (prompt assertion of right to speedy trial is a significant factor in determining whether criminal defendant has been denied that right).

. Chief Judge Rogers says that this court’s decision in Feenster, "made no reference to whether the patient had contended in the trial court that the Hospital's notification was untimely.” An examination of the briefs in Feenster, however, reveals that the patient had specifically argued to the trial court in that case that the Hospital was obliged to give his counsel timely notice of rehospitalization, but had failed to do so. See Brief for Appellee in No. 86-985, at 10, quoting from page 32 of the Feenster transcript. Moreover, "[qjuestions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 423 n. 14 (D.C.1988), quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 149, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925).

. In light of my views as expressed in this opinion, I would join Judge Wagner in voting to affirm in Appeal No. 86-FM-1697, in which Plummer challenges the revocation of his outpa*753tient status and his indefinite inpatient commitment, if I thought that that appeal were still alive. Indeed, Judge Wagner and I form a majority on the merits (or lack thereof) of Appeal No. 86-FM-1697. Since Chief Judge Rogers and I — a majority of the division — have both voted to return Plummer to outpatient status, however, I agree with the Chief Judge that No. 86-FM-1697 is technically moot.