Court Opinion

ID: 9471449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:32:52.648766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:01.715225
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Robert Holleman was convicted in federal court on February 4, 1977. A crucial piece of evidence leading to Holleman’s conviction was a confession made by Holleman to FBI Special Agent Edward Traeger. Holleman claimed at a suppression hearing in the federal court and on direct appeal from the federal conviction that the confession was not voluntary because, at the time it was given, Holleman was suffering severe symptoms of heroin withdrawal. On each occasion, the court was persuaded that the confession was voluntary by Traeger’s testimony that Holleman appeared “pale” but in “good health.”
Subsequent to the federal .trial and conviction; Holleman was tried in an Indiana state court. During this trial, Officer McAlister of the St. Joseph County Police Department testified that Holleman was suffering common drug withdrawal symptoms, including shaking, sweating, and doubling over, during his interrogation by state officers. The interrogation of Holleman by McAlister occurred on the same day that Holleman was interrogated by Traeger.
The testimony of McAlister was not available during Holleman’s trial in the district court. Thus, it was not a part of the record on direct appeal. Holleman now seeks to have a federal court examine, for the first time, the testimony of Traeger in light of McAlister’s testimony to determine whether Traeger perjured himself in federal court. Because I believe that the testimony of McAlister raises a material question of fact concerning the veracity of Trae-ger’s testimony that cannot be determined on the present record, I would remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing at which the state court testimony could be fully considered.
A federal prisoner is entitled to postconviction relief under section 2255 if the government knew or should have known that one of its witnesses was giving perjured testimony.* See United States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 279 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 2171, 60 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1979). The district court is required to hold a hearing on a section 2255 petition, “[ujnless the motion and files and records of the ease conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See also Machibroda v. United States, 868 U.S. 487, 494-95, 82 S.Ct. 510, 513-14, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). The record in this case consists of the 1977 federal transcripts and a memorandum of law prepared by Holleman with the aid of Richard Lee Owen, a fellow prisoner. These documents raise far more questions than they answer.
The testimonies of Holleman and Traeger recorded in the transcript of the federal suppression hearing contain serious conflicts. Holleman testified that during the interrogation Traeger asked about Holleman’s heroin addiction, and offered Holleman a candy bar with the explanation that candy bars help ease withdrawal symptoms. Holleman testified that he requested food and medication and was told he would receive both only after the interrogation was completed. Traeger testified that Holleman was offered food but declined it. Traeger also testified that Holleman requested medication and that medication was administered to Holleman by a county jailer approximately twelve minutes into the interview. Traeger stated that he was unaware at that time that Holleman was a heroin addict and did not know why Holleman was requesting medication. (It is slightly incredible that an FBI agent, in the *1141process of interrogating a federal prisoner suspected of bank robbery, would not question the prisoner’s request for medication and would not at least suspect a drug dependency problem.) These conflicts were resolved against Holleman at trial and on direct appeal, but a substantiated claim that Traeger’s testimony was perjured may compel reconsideration of that determination. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214 (1942); Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593, 594-95 (5th Cir.1977); Teague v. United States, 499 F.2d 1381, 1384-85 (7th Cir.1974).
Holleman attempted to substantiate his claim in a memorandum of law consisting of excerpts from the state trial juxtaposed with excerpts from the federal trial. The excerpts contain testimony of McAlister that Holleman was a rumored heroin addict and that on October 18th, Holleman was shaking, sweating, and doubled over. Trae-ger testified that he did not know that Holleman was an addict and that on October 18th, Holleman did not look ill.
The majority opinion concludes that the differences between McAlister’s and Trae-ger’s observations are due “to the fact that the two officials observed Holleman at different times and under different conditions.” The majority concedes, however, that the record fails to indicate at what time McAlister saw Holleman. The majority then explains that even if McAlister saw Holleman immediately prior to Traeger’s interrogation of Holleman, the difference in Holleman’s condition may be explained by the fact that “Holleman received medication to ease withdrawal at the outset of the Traeger interview.” The only basis in the record for concluding that Holleman received medication at the outset of the interview is the testimony of Traeger, the very testimony which Holleman is alleging was perjured.
Even assuming that Holleman did receive medication to ease his withdrawal symptoms, the record fails to indicate what transpired between Traeger and Holleman before the medication was administered or what effect the medication had on Holle-man. The majority notes that Holleman testified at the federal suppression hearing that the medication “kept back” his withdrawal symptoms. Holleman’s testimony, however, cannot substitute for expert analysis. Moreover, Holleman did not testify and the record does not indicate when the medication begins to take effect or how long the effect of the medication lasts. An evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve these questions.
The district court found and the majority here affirmed that Holleman’s section 2255 petition was fatally defective because it failed to allege that the government had actual or constructive knowledge of Trae-ger’s alleged perjury. This court has held that pro se motions of prisoners should be viewed liberally and the specificity expected of a lawyer should not be required. Zu-rita v. United States, 410 F.2d 477, 480 (7th Cir.1969). The district court at least should have given Holleman an opportunity to amend his petition to plead the government’s knowing and intentional use of the allegedly perjured testimony.
There is an additional difficulty with dismissing Holleman’s petition for failing to allege knowledge on the part of the government. At oral argument, petitioner’s counsel suggested that a constitutional deprivation requiring postconviction relief occurs when an FBI agent investigating a criminal case intentionally commits perjury in federal court. This is a question of first impression for this court and warrants serious consideration.
An investigative officer who works closely with a prosecutor in gathering and presenting the evidence against a defendant is not in the same position as other prosecution witnesses. At least three other circuits have recognized a link between investigative officers and the government in considering a claim of perjured testimony. In Schneider v. Estelle, 552 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1977), the Fifth Circuit decided a case very much like the one before this court. Petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus presented the district court with newly discovered evidence indicating that a state police officer deliberately committed perjury at trial concerning petitioner’s use of a firearm. The *1142district court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The court of appeals found that petitioner stated facts which, if true, required postconviction relief, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. In response to the state’s contention that the state was not liable because the prosecutor had no knowledge of the officer’s perjury, the court held, “[i]f the state through its law enforcement agents suborns perjury for use at the trial, a constitutional due process claim would not be defeated merely because the prosecuting attorney was not personally aware of this prosecutorial activity.” Id. at 595; see also Wedra v. Thomas, 671 F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109, 102 S.Ct. 3491, 73 L.Ed.2d 1372 (1982) (“the knowledge of a police officer [that a key prosecution witness committed perjury at trial] may be attributable to the prosecutor if the officer acted as an arm of the prosecution”); Curran v. State, 259 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir.1958) (habeas corpus relief granted because “the knowingly false testimony” of a state detective “was sufficient to cause the defendants’ trial to pass the line of tolerable imperfection and fall into the field of fundamental unfairness”).
A link between investigative officers and the government has been recognized in other contexts as well. The intentional concealment of material information by government investigators has been held attributable to the government. See Freeman v. State, 599 F.2d 65, 69-70 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir.1978) (per curiam); United States v. Esposito, 523 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916, 96 S.Ct. 1517, 47 L.Ed.2d 768 (1976); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.1964). In United States v. Butler, supra, the Ninth Circuit explained the rationale: “Since the investigative officers are part of the prosecution, the taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the prosecutor, were guilty of nondisclosure.” 567 F.2d at 891; accord Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d at 846; see also United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1971) (“suppression of evidence by investigative officials — no less than by the prosecution — corrupts the truth seeking function of the trial.”) This rationale applies with equal force in the case of perjury by a government investigator.
The argument for postconviction review and relief is particularly strong in this case. Holleman is requesting a district court to review a claim that an FBI investigator perjured himself at a federal trial. Perjury is always an affront to our system of criminal justice. A federal reviewing court must be especially concerned by a claim that a federal officer intentionally committed perjury in federal court. A holding that such perjury, if it occurred, affords a basis for postconviction relief would not impose a federal rule on state officers or state judicial proceedings. Finally, this case requires the court to draw only a single link between a governmental investigator and the government rather than a chain between a prosecution witness, an investigator, and the government. In sum, section 2255 relief on the basis suggested by petitioner may be necessary to vindicate our federal justice system and to deter future misconduct by federal officers.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion. I would remand the case to the district court with an order to grant petitioner’s motions for an expanded record and an evidentiary hearing.

 Some courts have held that a section 2255 petitioner must also show that the perjured testimony was material. See, e.g., Elliott v. Beto, 474 F.2d 856, 857 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 985, 93 S.Ct. 2284, 36 L.Ed.2d 963 (1973); McBride v. United States, 446 F.2d 229, 232 (10th Cir.1971). Agent Traeger’s testimony was clearly material, thus materiality is not an issue in this case.