Court Opinion

ID: 9751221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:14:25.649638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:39.416811
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In my opinion, the evidence presented by the plaintiff, viewed in the light most favorable to her, was sufficient to present a jury question under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. I am therefore unable to join in my colleagues’ decision to affirm the trial judge’s direction of a verdict in the defendants’ favor.
I.
On May 22, 1992, the plaintiff, Doris Scott, went to Edna’s Beauty Salon, which is owned by the defendant Edna James, and requested a “hair relaxer” treatment. The treatment was provided by Ms. James’ codefendant, Sylvia Summer, who was employed at the salon. Ms. Scott testified that “before [Ms. Summer] could get half way done, it started to burn.” Ms. Summer reassured Ms. Scott that “it will be OK,” but, according to Ms. Scott, this assurance proved to be premature. Although her scalp briefly “stopped burning as much,” it started burning all over again when Ms. Summer began to blow-dry Ms. Scott’s hair. In Ms. Scott’s words, “[i]t felt like little pins were sticking in my head.”
After Ms. Scott’s hair was dry, Ms. Summer began to cut it short in order to remove what Ms. Summer characterized as the “damaged portion.” Altogether, Ms. Summer removed “maybe three or four inches all the way around.” Ms. Scott testified that when she came to the salon, her hair came down to her shoulders, and she had not been planning to have it shortened.
A few hours after Ms. Scott left the establishment, her hair began to “dry out and get brittle and it started to shed.” *408Within a couple of weeks, the condition of her hair had further deteriorated, and it “continued to shed and break and it was coming out in clumps.” Ms. Scott related that she was forced to purchase wigs and “tracks” of human hair to cover the damaged areas. Later, Ms. Scott decided to have her hair “weaved” and “braided.” Ms. Scott testified that prior to her visit to Edna’s Hair Salon, she neither used nor wished to use any of these styles or devices. It was not until Ms. Scott had all of her hair cut “really short” that her hair grew back healthy.
Ms. Scott testified that she relied entirely on the defendants in relation to the use of the hair relaxer. When she came to the salon, she asked Ms. Summer if it was safe to apply this treatment in light of the fact that Ms. Scott was “coming out of [a] geri curl.” The following colloquy ensued during cross-examination:
Q. And you knew, did you not, Ms. Scott, that there was a little bit of risk with any hair care product including a relaxer?
A. No. I didn’t really know that. That’s why I went to a professional.
II.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Standard of review.
In reviewing an order directing a verdict in favor of the defendants, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and this court, like the trial judge, must credit the testimony introduced by the plaintiff and must draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See, e.g., Phillips v. District of Columbia, 714 A.2d 768, 772 (D.C.1998). “Whether the evidence, viewed in the fight most favorable to [Ms. Scott], was sufficient to go to the jury is a question of law, which we consider de novo.” Id. (citations omitted).
B. The applicability of res ipsa loquitur.
In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must establish that “(1) [the] event would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the event was caused by an instrumentality in defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) there was no voluntary action or contribution on plaintiffs part.” District of Columbia v. Billingsley, 667 A.2d 837, 841 (D.C.1995). Whether this doctrine may properly be applied where, as in this case,a patron of a beauty salon claims that she has been injured as a result of treatment that she has received there, appears to be a question of first impression in the District of Columbia. There is, however, substantial case law on the subject in other jurisdictions, and the weight of authority strongly supports Ms. Scott’s position:
Where plaintiffs have sought to recover damages for injuries which they allegedly sustained as patrons of beauty salons, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been held applicable in numerous cases, the courts often emphasizing that the particular circumstances proved by the plaintiff constituted sufficient evidence (1) that the plaintiffs injuries were caused by what happened in the defendant’s beauty salon, rather than by some other cause; (2) that the beauty salon or its employees had exclusive control of the instrumentality which caused the injuries; and (3) that such injuries as the plaintiff sustained do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. Thus it has been held in various cases that under the particular circumstances involved, the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur was applicable where the plaintiff allegedly sustained such injuries as (1) scalp burns or loss of hair as a result of a permanent wave administered by means of electrical heat at the defendant’s beauty salon, or (2) burns, loss of hair, or dermatitis as a result of a cold wave permanent administered by means of a waving lotion at the defendant’s beauty salon, or (3) scalp pain or loss of *409hair as a result of having hair bleached at the defendant’s beauty salon, or (4) facial injuries following treatment at the defendant’s beauty salon for removal of superfluous facial hair, or (5) having hair change to an undesired color following treatment in the defendant’s beauty salon. ...
Timothy M. Hall, Annotation, Res Ipsa Loquitur—Beauty Salon Patron, 93 A.L.R.3d 897, 900 (1979); see also 11 Am. JuR.2d Barbers and Cosmetologists § 24, at 309 & nn. 34 & 35 (1997), and authorities there cited.
The principles summarized above are set forth in numerous decisions from various jurisdictions collected in the annotation. See, e.g., Glossip v. Kelly, 228 Mo.App. 392, 67 S.W.2d 513, 515-16 (1934) (Commissioner’s opinion adopted per curiam), Epps v. Ragsdale, 429 S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Mo.Ct.App.1968) (Commissioner’s opinion adopted per curiam); Morrison v. Steppe’s Beauticians Inc., 95 Ohio App. 1, 115 N.E.2d 868, 870 (1953); Traylor v. The Fair, 101 Ill.App.2d 268, 243 N.E.2d 300, 303-04 (1968). In my opinion, this court should follow the approach adopted in these cases.
C. The sufficiency of the evidence.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Scott, I entertain no doubt that she has satisfied the second and third elements of res ipsa loquitur as set forth in Billingsley, supra, 667 A.2d at 841. If Ms. Scott’s testimony is credited, as it must be for purposes of the motion for a directed verdict, then her injuries — a burning scalp and the subsequent loss of hair — were sustained during and immediately after the treatment provided by the defendants. Ms. Scott did not suffer from these conditions before she came to Edna’s Beauty Salon. Under these circumstances, an impartial trier of fact could reasonably decline to attribute this sequence of events to coincidence, see, e.g., Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C.1992), and could reasonably find that Ms. Scott’s injuries were caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendants. Similarly, a reasonable juror would not be compelled to believe, on this evidence, that Ms. Scott contributed to these injuries.
There remains the question whether Ms. Scott has satisfied Billingsley’s first prong, namely, that the injuries she sustained do not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. In my opinion, at least at the directed verdict stage, that question must be answered in the affirmative.
In Epps v. Ragsdale, supra, the plaintiff suffered scalp burns and loss of hair after she received a permanent wave at the defendant’s beauty shop. She presented no expert testimony regarding the standard of care, nor did she identify any specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant. On those facts, which are similar to the present record, the court sustained the plaintiff’s invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as follows:
Courts have said, on different but similar facts, that permanent waves do not ordinarily cause scalp burns and hair loss when carefully applied by a beautician.... In those cases the plaintiffs, injured by permanent wave treatments, properly submitted on res ipsa loquitur. Logic compels the same result here. It is common knowledge that many women have permanent wave treatments without damage to their scalps or hair; it is also commonly known that human hair and scalps are sensitive to caustic compounds and to heat. These two commonly known facts lead to a third: permanent wave treatments do not ordinarily cause scalp bums and hair loss of the severity shown here if carefully performed by a beautician. This fact, plus the defendant’s exclusive control and superior knowledge, satisfies the “doctrine of probabilities” to the extent that the trial court did not err by permitting the jury, *410if it was so persuaded, to infer negligence from the facts of the occurrence.
429 S.W.2d at 800-01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).1
In Glossip v. Kelly, supra, another case in which the plaintiff suffered burns as a result of a permanent wave treatment administered by the defendant, the court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable:
The evidence in this case shows that the plaintiff knew nothing about the means and processes or the instrumen-talities employed in administering a permanent wave of her hair. The in-strumentalities and appliances in the processes of administering the same, the manner in which they were used and applied, or other means and agencies employed were all peculiarly under the control and within the knowledge of the defendant and his servants and were such as to require special skill on the part of the operator.
That accident or injury of the character complained of does not ordinarily occur to the party obtaining the wave from the use of the instrumentalities and appliances used and the manner, methods, and processes employed in their application where proper care is used is abundantly shown by the evidence; and such fact, therefore, is sufficient for an inference where injury does occur that it was occasioned by reason of some imperfection in such instrumentalities or appliances or from some fault upon the part of the defendant or his employees in the use of the same or other agencies, processes, or methods employed and casts upon defendant the burden of exculpating himself from fault.
It, therefore, appears that this case, under the record, is within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and the principles applicable thereto.
67 S.W.2d at 516 (emphasis added); see also Morrison, supra, 115 N.E.2d at 870; Traylor, supra, 243 N.E.2d at 303.
Concededly, none of the cases cited above deals specifically with hair relaxers. This distinction, however, is not decisive. “The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases involving injuries resulting from beauty treatment does not depend on the type of treatment in question.” 39 Am.JuR. Proof of Facts 2d Negligent Beautician § 9, at 450 (1984). “The kinds of treatments that have given rise to the use of the doctrine span virtually the entire gamut of services provided by beauty salons, ranging from permanents and hair coloring or bleaching to electrolysis and other procedures for the removal of superfluous hair.” Id. (footnotes omitted). I am aware of no persuasive reason why a different analysis should apply to hair relaxer treatments.
According to my colleagues in the majority, the present case differs from those in which res ipsa loquitur has been applied in that lay persons are familiar with permanent wave treatments utilizing “familiar and historic heat-induced or electrical devices such as curling irons,” Maj. op. at 405, but not with chemical hair relaxers or straighteners.2 I am not at all sure that this is so,3 but even assuming the correct*411ness of the majority’s proposition, it does not determine the applicability of res ipsa loquitur. The result in cases like Epps and Glossip and others cited in the Annotation did not turn on whether a lay juror would be familiar with the processes utilized by the defendant in treating the plaintiffs hair. Rather, the courts recognized that the customer who goes to a beauty salon, and who relies on the beautician’s expertise, does not ordinarily suffer burns or hair loss if the beautician has exercised due care in carrying out her duties. If the customer does suffer such an injury, then the relevant facts are peculiarly within the beautician’s knowledge, and the burden shifts to her to rebut the inference of negligence arising from this unusual occurrence.4
In my opinion, the viability of Ms. Scott’s case does not turn on whether she has shown that “lay persons have common knowledge concerning the application of chemical hair relaxers.” Maj. op. at 406. Courts have permitted juries to find that an accident would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence even where a lay juror could not be expected to be familiar with the technology involved. In Slaughter v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., 104 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 261 F.2d 741 (1958), for example, the rear door of a bus closed on the minor plaintiffs foot as she was endeavoring to alight, injuring her ankle. The plaintiff sued the carrier, but she offered no expert testimony at trial identifying a specific defect or negligent act or omission. The trial judge directed a verdict for the carrier, but the Court of Appeals reversed. In an opinion by Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger, the appellate court concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable to the case. In the court’s view, a jury could reasonably find that “some negligence of appellee was the proximate cause of appellant’s injury.” 104 U.S.App.D.C. at 277, 261 F.2d at 748. Obviously, the average lay juror cannot be expected to know what has gone wrong with the machinery controlling a bus door, and the court’s application in Slaughter of res ipsa loquitur demonstrates that no such knowledge is required in order to satisfy the first element of that doctrine.
As I see it, the result reached in Epps, Glossip, and similar cases comports with common sense and justice. A customer who goes to a beauty salon, whether for a permanent wave or for a hair relaxer treatment, can reasonably expect that she will not lose her hair as a result. When a client’s long hair is suddenly “damaged” and cut, and when clumps of it leave her head forever, then it is surely the professionals, rather than the customer, who have ready access to the facts that will illuminate the cause of the plaintiffs injury. In such circumstances, it is appropriate to require an explanation from “the person who wishes to support [her] case by a particular fact which lies more peculiarly within [her] knowledge, or of which [she] is supposed to be cognizant.” Selma, Rome, & Dalton R.R. v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 568, 11 S.Ct. 688, 35 L.Ed. 266 (1891) (citations omitted); see also Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of America, 174 U.S.App. D.C. 60, 66 n. 12, 527 F.2d 843, 849 n. 12 (1975) (citation omitted). To compel the plaintiff, on this record, to retain an expert witness in order to litigate her claim seems to me to make the vindication of her rights unnecessarily, and perhaps prohibitively, expensive. I discern no injustice at all, on the other hand, in requiring an explanation from the defendants of the unfortunate events that allegedly followed their treatment of Ms. Scott.5
*412In my opinion, defendants’ motion for a directed verdict should have been denied.6 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority points out that, in Epps, there was "[h]ypothetical” medical opinion to the effect that the treatment had caused the plaintiff’s injury. 429 S.W.2d at 800. This "hypothetical” opinion, however, went to the question of causation, not to the standard of care. In the present case, the sequence of events precluded the direction of a verdict on the issue of causation.

. I find it revealing that, while attempting to distinguish Ms. Scott’s authorities, my colleagues have cited no case involving injuries to a patron of a beauty salon, in which a court has ruled, under circumstances such as these here, that res ipsa loquitur does not apply.

.There are surely many members of the general public whose knowledge of permanent wave technology (whether heat-induced, electrically administered, or chemically activated) is no greater than their comprehension of hair relaxer methodology.

. In light of the defendant's "exclusive control and superior knowledge,” Epps, supra, 429 S.W.2d at 801, Ms. Scott’s failure to name the chemical product used by Ms. Summer appears to me to be irrelevant to the applicability of res ipsa loquitur.

. In his opening statement, counsel for the defendants outlined a factual scenario dramatically different from that depicted by Ms. Scott. Because the trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, however, the *412defense version was never presented to the jury.

. Ms. James admits in her answer that she is the owner of Edna’s Beauty Salon. It is undisputed that Ms. Summer was the person who treated Ms. Scott at that establishment, and she was thus held out to be part of the salon’s operation. In fact, the attorney for both defendants referred to Ms. Scott in his opening statement as Ms. James’ customer. In my opinion, this reference amounted to a judicial admission that Ms. James was responsible for any negligence on the part of Ms. Summer, and there was therefore no basis for directing a verdict in Ms. James' favor on the grounds that Ms. James was not the person who treated Ms. Scott and that she was not vicariously liable. It is undisputed that Ms. Summer's work at Edna's Beauty Salon was "a part of [Ms. James’] regular business,” and Ms. James "should be required to bear the costs fairly incidental to [her] enterprise; that is, [s]he should be charged with the risks arising out of the operation of [her] business.” 5 Fowler V. Harper & Fleming James, Jr., The Law of Torts § 26.11, at 73 & n. 25 (2d ed.1986) (citations omitted).