Court Opinion

ID: 9376715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 17:07:39.616775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.627918
License: Public Domain

J-S44016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS :           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    TO: Y.A.C., A MINOR            :                PENNSYLVANIA
                                   :
                                   :
    APPEAL OF: M.L.B., FATHER      :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :
                                   :           No. 1330 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered August 17, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans’ Court at No(s):
                                2021-0144a

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED: MARCH 3, 2023

        M.L.B. (“Father”) appeals from the decree terminating his parental

rights as to his minor child, Y.A.C. (“Child”). We affirm.

        A panel of this Court previously summarized the facts as follows:

           Child is the son of Father and T.N.C. (Mother), who are not
           married. In January 2020, Child came into the custody of
           [York County Office of Children, Youth & Families (“CYF”)]
           on an emergency basis. The order was based on evidence
           which demonstrated that continuation or return of Child to
           the home of Mother and Father was not in the best interest
           of Child. Child was then placed in foster care, where he
           remains with a half-sibling.

           At a hearing on January 28, 2020, the court adjudicated
           Child dependent and awarded legal and physical custody of
           Child to CYF. Father did not attend this hearing and he did
           not file an appeal. His whereabouts were unknown to CYF
           until May 2020 when he was discovered to be in the York

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44016-22

       County prison, where he was being held for charges of
       criminal homicide and possession with intent to deliver.

       The court held numerous permanency review hearings
       between July 2020 and May 2021. Due to Father’s
       incarceration, he did not make any progress toward
       alleviating the circumstances that resulted in Child being
       dependent. His requests for visits and for telephone visits
       with Child were denied by the York County Prison. CY[F] also
       provided Father with a Family Service Plan relating to Child
       which he did not object to until January 2021, wherein he
       raised concerns about certain family findings and requested
       visitation for the first time. Nevertheless, Child knows
       Father and recalls living with him. Father provided no
       monetary support or gifts to Child but did send some
       clothing items. He also never requested any photographs of
       Child.

       At some point during the dependency proceedings, Father
       submitted a request, through the Interstate Compact for the
       Placement of Children (ICPC), to assess his sister as a
       possible resource for Child. The sister was located in North
       Carolina. The sister traveled to Pennsylvania and met with
       Child two times for three hours per visit. The CYF
       caseworker stated the visits went “well” with the second
       visit being “a little bit more natural and easy going.”

       On June 18, 2021, CYF filed a petition for involuntary
       termination of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
       pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8).

       The court held a termination hearing on August 31, 2021.
       Child, then age six, was represented during the proceeding
       by T.L. Kearney, Esquire, whom the court appointed to
       represent Child as legal counsel.

       At the hearing, CY[F] indicated it was not going move Child
       upon approval of the ICPC because it “would like to see th[e]
       relationship [with Father’s sister] explored more before [it]
       would consider placement in her care.” Moreover, CY[F]
       stated while it did receive verbal approval, it never received
       an official transmittal with Pennsylvania state approval
       regarding Father’s sister because her local ICPC office did
       not send the transmittal through the proper channels.
       Father requested the court delay its decision pending the
       formal outcome of the ICPC process. The court denied his

                                   -2-
J-S44016-22

         request but noted his position – that he desired his sister to
         have custody.

         That same day, the court then terminated Father’s parental
         rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8).
         The court also found termination will best serve Child’s
         developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare,
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.]§ 2511(b).

In the Int. of Y.A.C., No. 1255 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 907285, unpublished

memorandum at 1-2 (Pa.Super. filed March 29, 2022) (citations and footnote

omitted).

      Father appealed. We vacated the termination decree and remanded for

further proceedings because there was no indication on the record that the

court had made the requisite determination that Child’s legal and best

interests did not conflict when it appointed Attorney Kearney to serve as both

Child’s legal counsel and guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Id. at 4. On remand, the

court determined that there was no such conflict and granted the petition to

terminate Father’s parental rights. See Trial Court Order, April 22, 2022, at

3.

      Father thereafter filed an appeal of the April 22, 2022 order, docketed

at 777 MDA 2022. We vacated the April 22, 2022 order as a nullity and

quashed the appeal. We determined that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction

because it had entered its April 22, 2022 order before we had remitted the

record after the prior appeal. See Order, June 21, 2022.

      The court then on August 17, 2022, after a hearing, again determined

that there was no conflict in Attorney Kearney representing Child’s legal and

                                     -3-
J-S44016-22

best interests and issued an order granting CYF’s petition for involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights. Father filed the instant timely appeal.

      Father raises the following issue:

         Did the trial court commit reversible error [by] involuntarily
         terminating the parental rights of the natural father when
         the Child’s needs and welfare could have been met by giving
         custody to a paternal aunt and preserving the parent/child
         relationship?

Father’s Br. at 5.

      We review an order involuntarily terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion. In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 399 (Pa.Super. 2018). In

termination   cases,    we   “accept   the   findings   of   fact   and   credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record.” In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47

A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings have support in the record,

we then determine if the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018).

We will reverse a termination order “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” In re Adoption of

S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under this

provision, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to

terminating parental rights:

                                       -4-
J-S44016-22

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
         Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
         the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
         One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
         concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
         between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
         effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. (citations omitted).

      Father does not challenge the court’s determination that sufficient

grounds existed for terminating Father’s parental rights under Section

2511(a). Rather, in his sole issue, Father contends the court erred by

terminating his rights under Section 2511(b) because his sister was

purportedly available to care for Child. Father argues:

         [W]hile Father’s incarceration and pending charges caused
         him to be unavailable as a resource for the Child, he offered
         his sister in North Carolina as a resource for the Child. A
         formal investigation under the ICPC was undertaken and
         informal approval was had, awaiting only final paperwork for
         approval. The Aunt from North Carolina traveled to
         Pennsylvania for two visits with the Child, and at least the
         second of those went well. Giving custody to the Aunt in
         North Car[o]lina until Father could become available to
         parent once again could have preserved the unity of this
         family.

Father’s Br. at 10.

      Under   Section      2511(b),   the   trial   court   must   consider   “the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child” to

                                      -5-
J-S44016-22

determine if termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). This inquiry involves assessment of “[i]ntangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability[.]” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,

1287 (Pa.Super. 2005). The court must also examine the parent-child bond,

“with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that

bond.” Id. However, the “mere existence of an emotional bond does not

preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103

(Pa.Super. 2011). Rather, the trial court must consider whether severing the

bond “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id.

(citation omitted). The court must also examine any pre-adoptive home and

any bond between the child and the foster parents. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at

268.

       Here, Father conflates the issue of termination of his parental rights with

the issue of placement/adoption of Child. The issue of who eventually adopts

Child has no bearing on whether Father’s parental rights were properly

terminated. Indeed, pursuant to Section 2512 of the Adoption Act, an agency

need not aver in its petition to terminate that an adoption is presently

contemplated or that a person with a present intention to adopt exists. 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2512(b)(3). “Furthermore, no particular adoption plan need be

shown before the trial court is permitted to terminate a parent’s rights. In

fact, the Supreme Court has noted that one of the purposes of the adoption

laws is to allow the agency to proceed with termination proceedings

independently of an adoption.” Monroe Cty. Children and Youth Servs. v.

                                       -6-
J-S44016-22

Werkheiser, 598 A.2d 313, 316 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citing In re Burns, 379

A.2d 535, 541 (Pa. 1977)). The only issue before the trial court was the

determination of the termination of Father’s parental rights — not the issue of

possible custody of Child to the paternal aunt. The court therefore properly

limited its decision to the termination issue.

      The court found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in

Child’s best interests pursuant to Section 2511(b). The record supports the

court’s finding. Child had been in care for 19 months at the time of the

termination hearing on August 31, 2021. N.T. 8/31/21, at 75. There was

evidence that Child’s daily needs were entirely being met by the foster family,

who are a pre-adoptive resource. Id. at 85. Child has required significant

dental care and emotional support, which has been managed exclusively by

the foster parents. Id. at 85-86, 96-97. Child is strongly bonded to his brother,

with whom he lives with at the foster home, and there was testimony that

Child would be detrimentally impacted if he was separated from his brother

and his other siblings. Id. at 54, 90-91. The foster mother testified that she

loves Child and is greatly bonded to him, and Child is stable and thriving in

her care. Id. at 94-96. Further, Child’s counsel and GAL indicated that Child

wants to be adopted by his foster family and fully understands that Father’s

parental rights need to be terminated before adoption could occur. N.T.

8/17/22, at 9.

                                      -7-
J-S44016-22

      We conclude that CYF presented sufficient evidence under Section

2511(b). We see no reasonable basis to disturb the court’s decision that

termination of Father’s parental rights would be in Child's best interests.

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/03/2023

                                     -8-