Court Opinion

ID: 9522655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:30:20.765959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:29.112097
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Garrard, P.J.
I concur in affirming the convictions for malicious trespass and assault and battery.
However, I must dissent concerning the convictions for driving while suspended in violation of IC 9-1-4-52.
These offenses allegedly occurred on May 3 and May 30,1975. They are concededly based upon a suspension order issued May 15,1973. By the terms of that order the suspension was for one (1) year and expired, according to the order, on May 15, 1974.
IC 9-1-4-52 prohibits driving a motor vehicle on a public highway by someone while his license or permit is suspended or revoked. Baldock’s *360license had been suspended May 15,1973 and that suspension expired May 15,1974. Thus, on May 3 and May 30,1975 he simply was not driving while his license was suspended.
This is not altered by the provision of IC 9-2-l-ll(d) which prohibits restoration or renewal of operating privileges until a five dollar reinstatement fee is paid. That section (unlike the preceding ones dealing with suspensions concerning lack of financial responsibility) does not provide that the suspension shall remain in effect. It merely requires that the fee be paid if the driver wishes to restore his Indiana license.
Of course, under the facts Baldock was guilty of operating without a license. IC 9-1-4-26. But that is not the offense with which he was charged or convicted.
Accordingly the convictions for driving while suspended should be reversed. It follows that sentences for the remaining offenses should be served concurrently.
I would therefore remand with instructions to vacate the convictions for driving while suspended and to correct the sentences for malicious trespass and assault and battery by providing that they run concurrently.
NOTE — Reported at 379 N.E.2d 539.