Court Opinion

ID: 9376769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:07:08.007392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.085449
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McConnell, 2023-Ohio-654.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                  Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
                                                  Case No. CT2022-0025
JUAN K.E. McCONNELL

        Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                               Pleas, Case No. CR2022-0155

JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        March 3, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

RON WELCH                                      ADAM D. VINCENT
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                           ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
JOHN CONNOR DEVER                              250 Broad Street
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                           Suite 1400
27 North Fifth Street, P.O. Box 189            Columbus, Ohio 43215
Zanesville, Ohio 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                  2

Wise, J.

       {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant Juan K.E. McConnell appeals his convictions and

sentence entered in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas on one count of

attempted murder, 23 counts of felonious assault, 23 counts of discharging a firearm into

a habitation, and 23 counts of discharging a firearm over a roadway, and attendant firearm

specifications, following a jury trial.

       {¶2}    Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio.

                             STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶3}    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

       {¶4}    On March 17, 2021, a grand jury indicted Juan K.E. McConnell on seventy

(70) counts: (Count 1) Attempted Murder, in violation of R.C. §2923.02(A) and R.C.

§2903.02(A); (Counts 2-24) Felonious Assault, in violation of R.C. §2903.11(A)(2);

(Counts 25-47) Discharging a Firearm Into a Habitation, in violation of R.C.

§2923.161(A)(1); and (Counts 48-70) Discharging a Firearm Over a Roadway, in violation

of R.C. §2923.162(A)(3). Each count included a firearm specification under R.C.

§2941.145.

       {¶5}    Said charges arose from the shooting of Robert Gladden following an

argument between Mr. Gladden and Appellant. Police officers recovered twenty-three

spent shell casings from the scene.

       {¶6}    Appellant was indicted as a co-defendant with his brother, Jamarr

McConnell, and cousin, Terrel McConnell. Jamarr and Terrel were indicted on the same

counts as Appellant, but both also faced additional charges. Jamarr and Terrel both
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                     3

accepted plea deals and received aggregate minimum sentences of twenty (20) years

and eleven (11) years, respectively.

       {¶7}   Appellant proceeded to trial wherein the jury heard the following testimony:

       {¶8}   On the morning of March 1, 2021, after getting off work at 7:00 A.M, Robert

Gladden returned to his home at 707 Bates Street in Zanesville, Ohio, where he lives with

his wife and five children. (T. at 182-183). Upon arriving home, he found a car parked in

front of his house blocking his driveway. (T. at 188). Gladden recognized the car, having

seen it before at the home of Gary Workman, who lived just two doors down at 725 Bates

Street. Id. Gladden testified to enduring years of continuous drug trafficking and

prostitution activity occurring out of Workman's home. (T. at 188). He further testified that

Workman's home was the most notorious crack-house in Zanesville, that drug abuse

instruments from that home were found on his property, and that there was plenty of short-

term traffic in-and-out of it. (T. at 186). Even though he had previously tried without

success to address the situation by calling the police and by asking the occupants of

Workman's home to keep their activities away from his home, he again went to

Workman's home to request that something specifically be done about the debris and

vehicle. (T. at 187, 190).

       {¶9}   Gladden saw Workman on the street and asked him to move the car and

clean up some broken pallets that were in the street by Workman's home. (T. at 188-89).

Gladden then took his children to school and, upon seeing the car had not been moved

when he returned, proceeded to Workman's to ask that the car be moved. (T. at 189).

Gladden testified that he was "not nice about it." Id. Gladden returned to his home and
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                     4

waited a short time, but when no one had yet come to move the car, he drove the two

doors down to Workman's address and knocked until someone answered. (T. at 190).

       {¶10} Appellant Juan McConnell answered the door, exiting Workman's trailer to

talk with Gladden. (T. at 191). Gladden was angry and yelling about the car parked in

front of his home, and the two began yelling at each other. Id. In the course of this

interaction, Gladden became increasingly more irate and eventually punched Appellant

in the face. Id. Gladden testified that he did not remember how many times he struck

Appellant. Id. Appellant began to move away from Gladden, at which point Gladden

grabbed a plank from one of the broken pallets outside the trailer and threw it at Appellant,

striking him. (T. at 191-192). Appellant then told Gladden "you're dead" and referenced

getting his brothers. (T. at 192). The altercation ended, and Gladden returned to his house

while Appellant went another direction. Id.

       {¶11} Appellant placed a FaceTime call to his brother, Jamarr McConnell, and told

him about Gladden beating him up. (T. at 451-452, 455). At the time of the call, Jamarr

was in his home with his cousin, Terrel McConnell - a home that Appellant, Jamarr, and

Terrel shared and which is only a couple of blocks away from Workman's home. After the

call with Appellant, Jamarr grabbed a loaded semi-automatic rifle and got into a vehicle

driven by Terrel, who drove him to an alley above Gladden's property where they were

seen by two witnesses. (T. at 459-461).

       {¶12} After Jamarr and Terrel were in the alley, Appellant began trying to get

Gladden's attention and succeeded in getting Gladden to open his door. Appellant then

ran. (Tr. 193) After Gladden saw Appellant flee, he saw a man in a ski mask on the hillside

about seventy yards away. (T. at 193). Jamarr then opened fire with 23 separate shots at
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                   5

Gladden, at his home, at his children's bedrooms, and at his porch. (T. at 193-94, 199-

204).

        {¶13} Gladden was struck in the arm and bled profusely. (T. at 194). Jamarr

returned to his home with Terrel, which they quickly fled from. (T. at 470-471).

        {¶14} Appellant called only one witness – his brother, Jamarr McConnell. Jamarr

admitted that he understood Workman's home was a crack house (T. at 444-445); that

there was a FaceTime call about the altercation (T. at 454-455); that he did travel to an

alley and move through a field prior to shooting (T. at 461-469); that he fired the gun 23

separate times (T. at 469-470); and that he was wearing a ski mask. (T. at 469-470).

        {¶15} Following deliberations, the jury convicted Appellant on all seventy (70)

counts.

        {¶16} On March 29, 2022, a sentencing hearing was held wherein the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate prison sentence of thirty-one (31) years, of which

twenty-eight (28) years are mandatory. He was also given two (2) to five (5) years of

mandatory post-release control and required to register as a Violent Offender for a period

of ten (10) years.

        {¶17} Appellant now appeals, raising the following assignments of error for review:

                                  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

        {¶18} “I. MCCONNELL WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL

TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW IN PROVIDING AN

ACCOMPLICE JURY INSTRUCTION.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                    6

       {¶19} “II. REPEATED AND PERVASIVE MISCONDUCT BY THE PROSECUTOR

PREJUDICIALLY AFFECTED MCCONNELL'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND DENIED

HIM A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL.

       {¶20} “III. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PROPERLY MERGE

ALLIED    OFFENSES       FOR     THE    PURPOSES        OF    SENTENCING        VIOLATED

MCCONNELL'S PROTECTIONS AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND WERE

CONTRARY TO OHIO LAW.

       {¶21} “IV. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT JUAN MCCONNELL

ACTED AS AN ACCOMPLICE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION UNDER THE UNITED

STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.”

                                                I.

       {¶22} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

providing an accomplice instruction to the jury. We disagree.

       {¶23} The determination of whether to give a jury instruction is a matter left to the

sound discretion of the trial court. A trial court is obligated to provide jury instructions

which correctly and completely state the law. Cromer v. Children's Hospital Med. Ctr. of

Akron, 142 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-229, 29 N.E.3d 921. The jury instructions also

must be warranted by the evidence presented in the case. Estate of Hall v. Akron Gen.

Med. Ctr., 125 Ohio St.3d 300, 2010-Ohio-1041, 927 N.E.2d 1112. The question of

whether a jury instruction is legally correct and factually warranted is subject to de novo

review. Id. An inadequate instruction which misleads the jury constitutes reversible error.

Marshall v. Gibson, 19 Ohio St.3d 10, 482 N.E.2d 583 (1985).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                  7

      {¶24} Our standard of review when it is claimed improper jury instructions were

given is to consider the jury charge as a whole and determine whether the charge misled

the jury in a manner affecting the complaining party's substantial rights. Lowder v.

Domingo, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2016CA00043, 2017-Ohio-1241, 2017 WL 1231724.

      {¶25} Concerning accomplice testimony, R.C. §2923.03(D) provides that:

             If an alleged accomplice of the defendant testifies against the

      defendant in a case in which the defendant is charged with complicity in the

      commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, an attempt to commit an

      offense, or an offense, the court, when it charges the jury, shall state

      substantially the following:

             “The testimony of an accomplice does not become inadmissible

      because of his complicity, moral turpitude, or self-interest, but the admitted

      or claimed complicity of a witness may affect his credibility and make his

      testimony subject to grave suspicion, and require that it be weighed with

      great caution.

             It is for you, as jurors, in the light of all the facts presented to you

      from the witness stand, to evaluate such testimony and to determine its

      quality and worth or its lack of quality and worth.”

      {¶26} The trial court in this case gave the above instruction to the jury. Appellant

herein argues that, in this case, the instruction was improper and should not have been

given because Jamarr testified on behalf of Appellant and not against him.

      {¶27} Upon review, we reject Appellant's contention that the statute applies only

when an accomplice testifies for the State. We find that same was consistent with the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                     8

legislative intent of the statute. In State v. Ramsey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83026, 2004-

Ohio-3618, 2004 WL 1532287, in support of its proposition.

              The legislative intent of the statute “is to warn juries of the

       motivations that accompany accomplice testimony in a strong and uniform

       manner.” State v. Williams, 117 Ohio App.3d 488, 495 [690 N.E.2d 1297]

       (1st Dist.1996). In short, the policy behind the practice of so instructing the

       jury is to alert the jury to the possibility of perjured testimony. United States

       v. Nolte, 440 F.2d 1124, 1126 ( [5th Cir.] 1971). “When an accomplice

       testifies for the prosecution he may have an interest in prevaricating in favor

       of the prosecution to obtain favors or even immunity. On the other hand,

       when one accomplice testifies for another, there is always the chance that

       each will try to ‘swear the other out of the charge.’ ” Id., citing Washington

       v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 21–23 [87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019] (1967).

       Thus, the charge should be given whether the accomplice testifies for the

       defense or the prosecution.

       Ramsey, supra, at ¶ 49.

       {¶28} We further find that the instructions read as a whole are not confusing or

misleading and did not prejudice Appellant's substantial rights. The instructions given to

the jury herein are legally correct, logically distinct and are not confusing.

       {¶29} Finally, the record contains substantial evidence that Appellant was

complicit in committing the crimes in this case. Consequently, even if the instruction was

erroneous, we would find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bleigh,
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                       9

Delaware App. No. 09-CAA-03-0031, 2010-Ohio-1182, ¶ 119, citing Neder v. United

States (1999), 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35.D

       {¶30} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  II.

       {¶31} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that prosecutorial

misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.

       {¶32} Appellant herein argues that the following actions by the prosecutor

deprived him of a fair trial: statements and questions concerning drug dealing, as well as

improper testimony and reliance in closing arguments on uncharged drug activity. He

argues that such statements and testimony were irrelevant and unsupported by the facts.

       {¶33} Appellant maintains that because Appellant was not charged with any

crime involving drugs and no evidence established that he was involved in drug activity,

such statements prejudiced the jury against him.

       {¶34} The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the prosecutor's comments

and remarks were improper and if so, whether those comments and remarks prejudicially

affected the substantial rights of the accused. Sunbury v. Sullivan, 5th Dist. Delaware No.

11CAC030025, 2012-Ohio-3699, 2012 WL 3525617, ¶ 30 citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio

St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). In reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct,

it is our duty to consider the complained of conduct in the context of the entire trial. Darden

v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). A trial is not unfair,

if, in the context of the entire trial, it appears clear beyond a reasonable doubt the jury

would have found the defendant guilty even without the improper comments. State v.

Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 2001-Ohio-4, 739 N.E.2d 749.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                     10

       {¶35} Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct implicate due process concerns,

and the touchstone of the analysis is the “ ‘fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor.’ ” State v. Newton, 108 Ohio St.3d 13, 2006-Ohio-81, 840 N.E.2d 593, ¶ 92,

quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

              If any misconduct occurred, the court must consider the effect it had

       on the jury “in the context of the entire trial.” State v. Keenan, 66 Ohio St.3d

       402, 410, 613 N.E.2d 203 (1993). With regard to each allegation of

       misconduct, we must determine whether the conduct was “improper, and, if

       so, whether [it] prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant.”

       State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). “[A]

       defendant's substantial rights cannot be prejudiced when the remaining

       evidence, standing alone, is so overwhelming that it constitutes defendant's

       guilt, and the outcome of the case would have been the same regardless of

       evidence admitted erroneously.” State v. Hicks, 194 Ohio App.3d 743,

       2011-Ohio-3578, 957 N.E.2d 866, ¶30 (8th Dist.2011), citing State v.

       Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 349–350, 528 N.E.2d 910 (1988).

       State v. Mammone, 139 Ohio St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 109.

       {¶36} Whether statements made by a prosecutor amount to misconduct and

whether such statements render a trial fundamentally unfair are mixed questions of law

and fact, which we review de novo. United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir.

2009) citing United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) citing United

States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1993).
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                  11

       {¶37} Upon review, we find drugs and drug dealing were relevant issues in this

case. Drugs were found in the house belonging to Garry Workman, which is where the

victim first encountered Appellant. Drugs were also found in his cousin Terrel’s room in

the home Terrel shared with Appellant and Appellant’s brother Jamarr.

       {¶38} According to the state's theory of the case, Gladden’s shooting was

intertwined in an overall scheme that involved drugs and/or drug dealing in the area.

Therefore, Appellant's involvement with Workman and Terrel, and the drug dealing taking

place in and around these actors and their respective homes, was not wholly independent

of the plan to shoot or kill Gladden. As a consequence, Appellant's involvement with those

people and places was relevant to a determination concerning Appellant's complicity in

the shooting of Gladden. Such evidence was also relevant to put the crimes in context

and to show motive or common purpose.

       {¶39} Evid.R. 401 provides that “ ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination

of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence”.

       {¶40} We find that the prosecutor's questions met the broad test for relevance

under Evid.R. 401

       {¶41} As to statements made during closing arguments, both the prosecution and

the defense have wide latitude during opening and closing arguments. State v. Edwards,

5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0083, 2022-Ohio-3534, ¶ 34.

       {¶42} Upon review, we find no error in the admission of the cited comments, in

the context of the entire trial, and it is evident beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would

have found Appellant guilty even without the comments.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                12

      {¶43} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                               III.

      {¶44} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

failing to merge the allied offenses. We disagree.

      {¶45} R.C. §2941.25, “Multiple counts,” states:

             (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to

      constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

      information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may

      be convicted of only one.

             (B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses

      of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of

      the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as

      to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such

      offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

      {¶46} In State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892,

syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held the following:

             1. In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar

      import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three

      separate factors -the conduct, the animus, and the import.

             2. Two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the meaning

      of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes offenses

      involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense is

      separate and identifiable.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                 13

             3. Under R.C. 2941.25(B), a defendant whose conduct supports

      multiple offenses may be convicted of all the offenses if any one of the

      following is true: (1) the conduct constitutes offenses of dissimilar import,

      (2) the conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately, or (3)

      the conduct shows that the offenses were committed with separate animus.

      {¶47} The Ruff court explained at paragraph 26:

             At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the facts

      of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant's conduct. The

      evidence at trial or during a plea or sentencing hearing will reveal whether

      the offenses have similar import. When a defendant's conduct victimizes

      more than one person, the harm for each person is separate and distinct,

      and therefore, the defendant can be convicted of multiple counts. Also, a

      defendant's conduct that constitutes two or more offenses against a single

      victim can support multiple convictions if the harm that results from each

      offense is separate and identifiable from the harm of the other offense. We

      therefore hold that two or more offenses of dissimilar import exist within the

      meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant's conduct constitutes

      offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each

      offense is separate and identifiable.

      {¶48} Appellant herein was charged of one count of attempted murder, 23 counts

of felonious assault, 23 counts of discharging a firearm into a habitation, and 23 counts

of discharging a firearm over a roadway. The trial court merged one count of felonious

assault and one count of discharging a firearm into a habitation with the sole count of
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                   14

attempted murder, explaining that those charges merged with regard to the single bullet

that struck Robert Gladden. (Sent. T. at 26).

       {¶49} We find the trial court did not err in determining that the remaining counts

do not merge. Jamarr McConnell admitted to firing 23 separate shots at Robert Gladden.

In addition to striking Gladden, those shots struck multiple objects in multiple rooms in

Gladden’s house, rooms where Gladden’s wife and children could have been present at

the time. Jamarr also fired those 23 shots over a roadway where cars and pedestrians

could have been struck.

       {¶50} We therefore find that each shot fired constituted a separate offense. As

such, we find the trial court properly determined that the remaining counts do not merge,

and Appellant could be sentenced on each count.

       {¶51} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶52} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Appellant argues that there was

insufficient evidence that he acted as an accomplice in this matter. We disagree.

       {¶53} The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is

set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two

of the syllabus, in which the Ohio Supreme Court held, “An appellate court's function

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to

examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed,

would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                   15

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

       {¶54} Ohio’s Complicity statute, R.C. §2923.03, provides,

              (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the

       commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:

              (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;

              (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;

              (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section

       2923.01 of the Revised Code;

              (4) ...

       {¶55} In the instant case, that culpability would be purposefully for attempted

murder, under R.C. §2923.02 and R.C. §2903.02, and knowingly for the charges of

felonious assault, discharging a firearm into a habitation, and discharging a firearm over

a roadway, under R.C. §2903.11, R.C. §2923.161, and R.C. §2923.162, respectively.

       {¶56} The testimony presented at trial included Mr. Gladden’s testimony regarding

his altercation earlier in the day with Appellant, Appellant’s warning or threat to Gladden

regarding calling his brothers and telling him “you’re dead”, Appellant knocking on

Gladden’s door and fleeing after he opened the door to a barrage of bullets, and being

struck by one of the bullets.

       {¶57} Further evidence was presented that a FaceTime call occurred between

Appellant and his brother Jamarr McConnell after Gladden first encountered Appellant at

Workman’s house and before the shooting took place.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                   16

       {¶58} It was also undisputed that Jamarr McConnell, wearing a ski mask,

strategically placed himself across the street from Gladden’s residence with the intention

to shoot Gladden, then proceeded to fire 23 shots at him after he opened the door for

Appellant, striking him once. Additionally, evidence was presented as to Appellant

demonstrating “consciousness of guilt” in jail calls wherein Appellant says “they can’t

charge all of us with shooting one gun and then later states that he is “willing to do time”

(T. at 324-326).

       {¶59} Based on the foregoing, we find that the state presented sufficient evidence

to support a finding of complicity as to all of the elements of the crimes charged including

the culpable mental states attendant to each charge.

       {¶60} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶61} Accordingly, the judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common

Pleas, Muskingum County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Delaney, J., concurs.

Hoffman, P. J., concurs separately.

JWW/kw 0222
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0025                                                     17

Hoffman, P.J., concurring

       {¶62} I concur in the majority’s analysis and disposition of Appellant’s second,

third, and fourth assignments of error.

       {¶63} I further concur in the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s first assignment

of error.   However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion giving the accomplice

instruction was not error. R.C. 2923.02(D) specifically applies when the accomplice

testifies against the defendant. Such was not the situation here.

       {¶64} Although I find it error to have given the instruction, I agree with the majority

there was substantial evidence of Appellant’s complicity in the charges. I would find the

error to be harmless.