Court Opinion

ID: 9850000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:51.527265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.237109
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. The majority opinion holds the insurance coverage was not effective in this case, because the car, which became involved in a traffic mishap as it was being returned to the owner, was within the exclusion clause of the policy. The exclusion clause provided that no insurance coverage would be afforded if at the time of the injury the insured automobile was being "maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.” (Emphasis supplied). It was stipulated between the parties in this case that at the time of the traffic incident the repairs to the car *848had been completed, and the auto repairman was having the car returned to the owner as a matter of accommodation. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority opinion cites and relies on three Georgia cases and one foreign case, in each of which the facts are quite different and readily distinguishable from the facts in the case sub judice.
In Public Indemnity Co. v. Yearwood, 50 Ga. App. 646 (179 SE 232), there was no question as to whether the automobile was being used in the business of the automobile repairman, it being stipulated by the parties that it was being so used, at the time the car ran over and killed plaintiffs son. Of course, the exclusion clause in the policy thus prevented coverage.
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. McBride, 117 Ga. App. 592 (161 SE2d 415), the automobile at the time of the injury was being road-tested by an independent contractor after the installation of a timing chain. Clearly such use was "while engaged in the automobile business,” and the exclusion clause in the policy prevented coverage.
In Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 209 (173 SE2d 407), the automobile was used first to transport the owner from the áutomobile place of business to the owner’s place of work; the owner then relinquished the car to the driver (an employee of the auto repairman) for the purpose of his returning it to the place of business of the auto repairman, to be repaired, and the collision occurred while traveling towards such auto repair place. The act of carrying the car by an employee to the auto repairman was held to be a part of the auto repairman’s business; and the exclusion clause in the policy prevented coverage in this case.
The majority opinion also cites a foreign case, to wit Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co. of Milwaukee, 306 FSupp. 437, in which case a car was being returned to the owner, and it was held that during such return the employee who drove the car was engaged in the automobile business. But the facts in the Universal case are quite different and are readily distinguishable from the facts in the case sub judice. In Universal, supra, the owner returned to the automobile place of business in a car such repairman had loaned him, about noon on September 8, 1965, to pick up his car after repairs had been completed, but he was told that the repairs would not be completed until some time during the afternoon. In view of the owner’s having made one trip to the repairman’s place of business for the purpose of picking up his car — and finding the repairs not completed — the auto *849repairman became obligated to deliver the car to the owner, and while enroute the car was involved in a traffic mishap. This completely differentiates this case from the case sub judice.
But in the case sub judice the facts are quite different from those in each of the four cited cases on which the majority relies, for here it was stipulated between the owner and the repairman, after the repairs were completed, that the repairman "as accommodation to his customer” would return the car to the place where the owner worked. Of course, the owner could have gone to the repairman’s place of business and picked up his car after repairs were completed, but the repairman "as accommodation to his customer” (and not as a part of the contract — not as a part of the consideration of making the repairs and being paid therefor) agreed to return the car strictly as a matter of accommodation. This was not a part of repairing the car — such as driving the car to the auto repairman’s place of business would have been — but was an act of accommodation to the owner after the repairs were completed, and after the repairman had earned the money due for repairs. If he had failed to return the car as promised, no recourse would have been available to the car owner except to tell the repairman that he had failed to "accommodate” the owner, as he had said he would do.
Thus, the car was not being "maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business... ” Any person who could drive the automobile, even though not an auto repairman, could have performed this service as an accommodation to the owner. The person driving the automobile towards the owner’s place of work at time of the injury was not at that time "employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business,” but to the contrary, was performing an act of accommodation to the owner, after completion of the repairs to the automobile. The repairman was to be paid for repairing the car, but not for returning it to the owner.
It would have been easy for the insurer, when writing the policy, to define the meaning of the term, "engaged in the automobile business,” and if it wished this language extended to include the return of the car to the owner, then it could have added language substantially as follows, to wit: "As used in this policy, the language 'engaged in the automobile business’ shall be held to include the return of the automobile to the owner after repairs have been completed.” Then we would be relieved of the tedium *850of inquiring as to what "engaged in the automobile business” means, and how far it extends, and whether it includes the return of the car to the owner after repairs are completed. But the insurer elected to leave this language vague and ambiguous, when it could have removed all doubt so easily.
When an insurance policy is couched in terms that are vague or ambiguous, such ambiguity must be construed most strongly against the insurance company, whose experts wrote the policy, and most strongly in favor of the insured, who simply bought the policy and had no part in writing it. See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Croom, 96 Ga. App. 264, 265 (99 SE2d 554). In Raynor v. American Heritage Ins. Co., 123 Ga. App. 247, 249 (180 SE2d 248), this court held: "The general rule ... is that policies of insurance are to be liberally construed in favor of the object to be accomplished and in favor of the insured except when the language is so unmistakably clear and unambiguous as to allow but one meaning.”
We have previously pointed out that the three Georgia cases relied on, and the foreign case cited and relied on, in the majority opinion, are not applicable and are clearly distinguishable on their facts from the case sub judice. Further, as to the foreign case, of course, this court is not bound by decisions from other states or from federal courts, except decisions by the U. S. Supreme Court. Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459; Thompson v. Eastern Air Lines, 200 Ga. 216, 222 (39 SE2d 225). The cited case is not one in the United States Supreme Court and is in no wise binding on this court.
I therefore dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the judgment of the lower court in holding that the insurance coverage was effective in this case.