Court Opinion

ID: 9579107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:51:29.530164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:17.680827
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
The trespass statute in effect on the dates of Anthony Miller’s arrests for trespassing in an alley states in pertinent part as follows:
If any person without authority of law goes upon or remains upon the lands, buildings or premises of another, or any portion or area thereof, after having been forbidden to do so, either orally or in writing, by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge thereof, or after having been forbidden to do so by a sign or signs posted by such persons or by the holder of any easement or other right-of-way authorized by the instrument creating such interest to post such signs on such lands, structures, premises or portion or area thereof at a place or places where it or they may be reasonably seen . . . [that person] shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
Code § 18.2-119.
The statement of facts succinctly outlines the circumstances concerning the two occasions on which Miller was arrested:
Officer D. K. Serven of the Alexandria Police Department . . . testified that on January 31, 1988, about . . . “0627am,” he observed [Miller] in the company of another person walking through the alleys and courtyards of the property of Alexandria Redevelopment, located on the west side of 800 block of N. Alfred St. He testified that there were “No Trespassing” signs posted by Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority on the ends of the buildings and at the ends of the alleys, which were plainly visible. He testified that when [Miller] was stopped, [Miller] said that he lived at 410 N. Alfred St., and was in the area looking for a check. Officer Serven identified a map of the area, admit*477ted without objection, and traced the route [Miller] took on the day in question. He also stated that he did not observe [Miller] making any noise or acting in a disorderly manner. . . . Officer Serven [also] testified that he had observed [Miller] in the area of the 800 to 900 blocks of N. Alfred Streets, prior to midnight on February 7, 1988. He testified that he observed [Miller] engage in a conversation with another person who was seated in a parked car, although he could not hear any of the conversation. He then testified that [Miller] left the vicinity of the car, walked down the sidewalk and walked through the alley behind the 900 block of Madison St., the property of Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority. He testified that there were visible “No Trespassing” signs at the ends of the alley through which [Miller] passed. He testified that [Miller] was alone, and was not making noise or acting in a disorderly manner, or doing anything illegal that he could observe, other than walking through the alley. [Miller] was stopped as he exited the alley, and was arrested. Officer Serven said [Miller] gave no reason for his presence in the alley.
On these facts the trial judge acquitted Miller of the charge of trespass for the incident which occurred on January 31. That acquittal was mandated because the evidence did not establish that prior to January 31 Miller had been forbidden to walk in the alley. Moreover, the posting of “No Trespassing” signs did not reasonably warn that the alley was not a public thoroughfare. These same reasons compel a conclusion that the February 7 conviction for trespass must be set aside.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that an alley is distinguishable in some significant manner from the public streets, driveways, and walkways. Alleys and alleyways have always been thought of as thoroughfares. The term “alley” is commonly defined to be “a passageway between buildings; a lane wide enough only for persons on foot: a narrow street wide enough for only one vehicle[;] a thoroughfare through the middle of a square or block giving access to the rear of lots or buildings.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 56 (1986). Alleys have an apparent public characteristic, similar to sidewalks and streets. The evidence did not establish that the alleys at issue in this case are *478somehow atypical.
I agree with the majority that the evidence established that the alley in which Anthony Miller was walking had been “vacated by Ordinance 752 of the City of Alexandria.” Although the ordinance is not in the record, presumably the alley was no longer owned and maintained by the City of Alexandria. However, the alley was vacated to another political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority. See Code § 36-3(a). The Housing Authority is statutorily authorized to own and maintain land, streets, and alleys in connection with its mandate “to provide decent, safe and sanitary ... accommodations for persons of low income.” Code § 36-3(i). Thus, standing alone, the city’s act of vacating the alley neither deprived the alley of its “public” character nor converted it into something other than a “thoroughfare.”
Although the trespass statute has been held to apply to publicly owned property, “thoroughfares” were exempted from that holding. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 579, 582, 186 S.E.2d 53, 55, cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972); see also Price v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 383, 388, 164 S.E.2d 676, 680 (1968); Miller v. Harless, 153 Va. 228, 242, 149 S.E. 619, 623 (1929). That exemption exists because the term “premises” ordinarily does not apply to city streets and other thoroughfares. Price, 209 Va. at 388, 164 S.E.2d at 680. “[U]se of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.”,Hall v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 72, 88, 49 S.E.2d 369, 377 (1948)(quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
When Miller was arrested, signs with the warning “No Trespassing” were posted on the ends of buildings and at the ends of the alleys. The alleys are found throughout the housing development and connect parallel streets. While the record is silent with respect to the design of the houses in the development, I believe that it can be reasonably inferred from the map that most, if not all, of the houses that border the alleys have outside doors that lead to an alley. Certainly, where the Housing Authority is attempting to forbid passage over an alley that indisputably once was a public thoroughfare, more notice is required to warn the public than a simple statement “No Trespassing.” Such signs do not reasonably inform persons that alleys and other thoroughfares *479that cross the lands of the Housing Authority are not open to visitors or other travelers. A sign which states “No Trespassing” obviously would be ineffective to give notice that the sidewalks and streets that traverse the several blocks of housing are not open to the general public as they walk, jog, bicycle, skate, drive, or generally wander about.
Although the January arrest of Miller might suggest that his state of knowledge may have been different on February 7, the evidence contains no indication Miller was warned by the arresting officer in January of the nature of the violation or that Miller was ever informed that the alley was closed to the public. The summons that was issued to Miller following his arrest on January 31 merely recites “trespassing” and gives the location of the offense as “800 Blk N. Alfred St.” This evidence does not meet the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the offense. Sargent v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 143, 148, 360 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1987); see also Reed v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 65, 70-71, 366 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1988).
Because the general warning, “No Trespassing,” provides insufficient notice to persons that an alleyway which was once a public thoroughfare has been closed to the public, I would reverse and dismiss Miller’s February trespass conviction.