Court Opinion

ID: 9559991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:40:21.837579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:57.351293
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
dissenting: The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides protection identical to that provided under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, 591, 952 P.2d 1351 (1998).
A traffic stop of a vehicle by a law enforcement officer is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Without violating the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a law enforcement officer may stop a vehicle on the public highway based upon reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts that the driver of the vehicle has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985).
The majority recognizes that reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, like probable cause, is dependent upon the content of information possessed by the officer and the degree of reliability of that information. In this case, because the officer who stopped the defendant’s vehicle had not observed facts sufficient to conclude that the driver had commited a crime, the majority notes that the question is whether the anonymous tip of a “possible drunk driver” at a specific location coupled with a detailed description of the vehicle and its license tag number, supplemented by the address of the registered owner of the vehicle obtained by the dispatcher, provided sufficient facts to cause a reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle to determine if the driver was intoxicated. In its analysis, the majority acknowledges that the quality and quantity of the specific, articulable facts stated by the tipster must be taken *708into account by the courts when evaluating whether reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to stop a vehicle.
Where an officer stops a suspect’s vehicle based on information supplied by an anonymous tip, a two-step analysis is required to determine whether the stop was constitutionally valid. First, a court must determine if the officer had sufficient information of a crime being committed to stop the particular vehicle. Second, the court must decide whether the description of the vehicle given by the anonymous caller was sufficient for the officer to stop that vehicle. I agree with the majority’s statement of law as to investigatory stops of a vehicle. I disagree with the majority’s application of assumed facts in this case to the balancing test and its conclusion that the stop of the defendant’s vehicle was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The facts as to why the officer stopped the defendant’s pickup are not in dispute. At 12:29 a.m., on February 15, 1997, Officer Matthew McNemee received a dispatch from the Hays police dispatcher. The dispatcher advised all officers of a possible drunk driver leaving Burger King in a black pickup registered to Walter Slater at 2212 Downing bearing license tag HEK 477. I concede that the description of defendant’s vehicle was sufficient for the officer to stop the particular vehicle.
Within minutes, McNemee arrived at the Burger King. Mc-Nemee did not find the black pickup at that location. He then proceeded to the defendant’s home address, a short distance from Burger King. Approximately a block from defendant’s address, McNemee observed a black pickup bearing license tag HEK 477. McNemee activated his emergency lights and followed the truck for a block. McNemee testified that although he had observed no signs of bad driving, he stopped the defendant’s vehicle to ascertain whether the driver was intoxicated.
In its analysis of whether the anonymous tip provided probable cause to stop the vehicle, the majority first observes that the reliability of the information or the tip given to the officer (“possible drunk driver”) depends upon what can be ascertained about the individual who provided the tip. The majority then notes that the most favored of the tips are those which are, in fact, not anony*709mous. These tips occur when the person giving the information provides the police his or her name and address, or identifies himself or herself in such a way that he or she can be held accountable (evaluated as to reliability) for the tip. Second on the scale of reliability are those tips in which, although the informant does not identify himself or herself, the informant gives sufficient'information that his or her identity may be ascertained. This occurs where the informant states that he or she is calling from his or her place of business or where the informant personally contacts the officer. The majority acknowledges that, as in this case, the least reliable information is a truly anonymous tip and the veracity of the informant cannot be assessed. The majority then observes that information received from an anonymous caller whose identity cannot be ascertained, standing alone, will seldom provide a reasonable suspicion for the officer to make a stop.
The majority concludes that where the anonymous tip is based upon personal observation by an anonymous caller that the driver of a vehicle has committed or is about to commit a crime is corroborated in part by the officer before the stop, the information may provide a basis for reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. The majority cites for its conclusion the following cases where the anonymous person stated he or she had personally observed the criminal behavior: State v. Tucker, 19 Kan. App. 2d 920, 878 P.2d 855, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1007 (1994); Goodlataw v. State, 847 P.2d 589, 590-91 (Alaska App. 1993) (anonymous informant identified a driver by name, stated the driver had just left her house and was driving home, described her car, and stated driver had a great deal to drink and was intoxicated); State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Ind. App. 1994) (officer informed of the truck’s description and license plate number and that the truck was being driven erratically); State v. Markus, 478 N.W.2d 405, 408-09 (Iowa App. 1991) (anonymous informant gave a description of the truck, license number, direction of travel and location, and stated that the truck was “all over the roadway”); State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 202-03, 665 A.2d 338 (1995) (anonymous informant provides officer with a description of the car, license plate number, and direction of travel, and stated that the car had run into a field); *710Taxation and Revenue Dept. v. Van Ruiten, 107 N.M. 536, 538, 760 P.2d 1302 (1988) (anonymous informant reported that a person had left a store intoxicated and described the vehicle and direction of travel); People v. Ranee, 227 App. Div. 2d 936, 644 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1996) (anonymous informant reported that an intoxicated person was leaving a business and provided a description of the car and license number); State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 900 (S.D. 1993) (anonymous informant reported the name of a driver, the description of the motorcycle, and direction of travel, and that the driver was intoxicated).
The majority proceeds by observing that in evaluating whether an anonymous tip has provided a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle by an officer, the court focuses on three factors: (1) the type of tip or informant involved, (2) the detail given about the observed criminal activity, and (3) whether the police officers personal observations corroborate the information supplied in the tip. Based upon these standards, the majority applies the “well-reasoned opinion authored by Judge Robert L. Lewis” of the Court of Appeals in Tucker to make its determination. Therefore, we must review Tucker.
In Tucker, the defendant’s vehicle was stopped by law enforcement officer based on an anonymous tip. The anonymous caller was subsequently identified after Tucker’s arrest. The anonymous caller informed the police dispatcher that he had observed a white male driving a red 1960’s model Ford pickup southbound on K-61 Highway from Inman. As in this case, Tucker did not claim that the description given was insufficient to stop his vehicle. The caller also stated to the dispatcher that the driver appeared to be drunk and was running other vehicles off the roadway. Based on this information, the officer headed north on K-61. The officer observed a red 1960’s model Ford pickup. The officer followed the pickup. Although the officer did not observe erratic driving, he stopped the vehicle to investigate whether the driver was intoxicated.
The Tucker court stated that public safety reasons alone may justify an investigative stop of a motor vehicle if the safety reasons are based upon specific and articulable facts. It noted that in de*711termining whether the stop of a motor vehicle violates a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, the courts must balance the rights of an individual to privacy and freedom of movement with the right of the public to be protected from unreasonable dangers. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 923.
The Tucker court pointed out that in evaluating whether an anonymous tip has provided a sufficient basis for a safety or investigatory stop of a motor vehicle by police, the greater and more immediate the risk to the public revealed by such a tip, the less important is the corroboration and reliability of the tip. It concluded that an anonymous tip of a possibly intoxicated driver driving erratically and running other vehicles off the road provided a sufficient basis for police to stop the vehicle for safety reasons where the tip was also verified as to the description of the vehicle, the description of the driver, and the highway on which the vehicle was traveling. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 923, 931-32.
Here, three facts provide the basis for analyzing the investigative stop of the defendant’s vehicle: (1) an anonymous caller who was never identified; (2) the statement of “a possible drunk driver” without details of any observed erratic driving or criminal activity to support the “possible” conclusion of the driver’s drunken condition; and (3) lack of observations by the officer of poor driving or any immediate danger to the public before he stopped the defendant’s vehicle.
After stating it was relying upon Tucker, the majority completely disregards the rationale of Tucker in its analysis. It does so by shifting the focus from specific articulable facts relating to the offense — to the quality of the description of the vehicle to be stopped. The majority recognizes that although specific details supporting a conclusion that the suspect was intoxicated would have increased the reliability of the tip, the mere assertion that the driver was “possibly drunk” does not foreclose our determination that the anonymous tip was rehable. It reaches this decision based on the fact that the vehicle the officer stopped corroborated the anonymous tip’s description of the vehicle.
In its evaluation of the three factors considered in determining whether the anonymous tip provided a sufficient basis for investi*712gatoiy stop of the defendant’s vehicle, the majority first observes that while the tipster did not state what he or she observed to conclude that the driver was possibly drunk, the tipster did provide the police with information that the driver was leaving Burger King in a black pickup with tag HEK 477. It then concludes that this detailed information (description) of the vehicle to be stopped, its location and direction of travel, raises the inference that the informant personally observed the vehicle. Then the majority concludes that an informant who has personally observed incriminating behavior has a stronger basis of knowledge than an informant who relates only what he has heard third parties say regarding a possible drunk driver. In making this statement, the majority ignores the fact that the anonymous tip stated no details of observed criminal behavior — the tip merely states the possibility of a drunk driver. At this point the majority has not only inferred that the anonymous informant personally observed something, without a factual basis, it determined that the tipster observed sufficient activity to conclude the driver was possibly drunk.
The majority completes the third step of the evaluation by noting the information provided by the anonymous tip as to the description of the vehicle to be stopped was corroborated by the observation of the police officer who discovered the truck matching the description and license number in the area described in the tip. This fact is not relevant to criminal activity observed by the officer; it merely proves that the officer stopped the vehicle described in the tip.
Even after going this far, the majority concedes that the danger posed to the public in this case might not be perceived to have been great in that the defendant was actually in front of his own house when stopped and presumably was going home. Then, to create a clear and immediate danger to the public for justification of the stop, the majority opines that if the officer had not stopped the defendant’s vehicle there was no guarantee that the defendant was actually going to stop and remain at home, i.e., there was a possibility the defendant would continue driving and could later be a danger.
*713After assuming the individual who provided the anonymous tip had (1) personally observed (2) unknown specific and articulable facts that would have provided a reasonable suspicion that the driver of a vehicle “was possibly drunk,” and (3) there was a possible danger to the public if the officer had not stopped the vehicle because there was no guarantee that the driver was actually going to stop and remain at home, the majority observes that under the totality of circumstances, the anonymous tip of a “possible drunk driver” and the officer’s subsequent corroboration of the description and license number of the vehicle was sufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. This observation allows the majority to conclude that even though the reliability of information obtained from an anonymous caller is at the lower end of the reliability scale, the anonymous tip of a “possible drunk driver” posed a possible clear and immediate danger to the public, and balancing private and public rights in this case, the equation must be weighed in favor of protecting the public and removing the danger.
I agree with Judge Lewis’ observation in Tucker that the risk of danger presented to the public by a drunken driver is so great that we cannot afford to impose strict, verifiable conditions on an anonymous tip before an investigatory stop can be made in response to such a tip. To require time-consuming verification of the tip in all aspects might well result in the death of an innocent user of our highways. I do not believe that the Fourth Amendment requires the public to accept such risk, and I decline to impose that risk upon the public. The limited intrusion on time and freedom of travel occasioned by a “safety stop” is minimal. The risk to the public if the tip is accurate is extremely high. The balance requires that a safety stop of the nature involved in this action be approved.
Judge Lewis cautioned that the type of tip provided to the law enforcement officer in Tucker may not be sufficient where the risk to the public is not urgent and the time exists to verify all aspects of the tip, including the caller’s reliability. Reliance on this decision to justify the use of an anonymous tip under other circumstances would be unwise, and I strongly discourage any attempt to expand this decision beyond the perimeters indicated. I agree with Judge *714Lewis. Because the majority has expanded Tucker far beyond its perimeters by assumptions and possibilities — I must dissent. It is not the province of the appellate court to make assumptions and posit possibilities.
Allegrucci and Abbott, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.