Court Opinion

ID: 9730641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:19:13.071617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:57.479306
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Gilkison, J.,
Concurring. — I concur with the majority opinion of Flanagan, J., and submit herewith some additional ideas of my own which I think are applicable to the situation presented in this appeal.
This is not a civil action and procedural rules and laws with respect to the power of the trial court to hold in abeyance its finding and judgment after the *403evidence is fully heard and both sides have rested in a civil action, do not apply to this case.
This is a criminal action in which the right to liberty of a human being is at issue. From the time the action was filed until final judgment, the defendant was entitled to have the benefit of all the remedies constituting due course of law as guaranteed by the constitution of Indiana, Art. I, Sec. 12. Among other things this section of our state constitution provides: “Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” The last two clauses noted, apply forcibly to the situation presented in this appeal. Any statute, any reasonable rule or course a court may adopt or follow that will aid or compel a complete and speedy trial of a criminal case is lawful and constitutional.
But any statute, or any rule or course a court may follow that prevents a complete trial and denies a final judgment for an unusual period, without good cause shown by the record, is a violation of the rights vouchsafed to every human being by the constitutional provisions noted. These rights are among the highest, most valuable, and dearest to the hearts of all free men. Their protection by the courts is absolutely essential if human liberty shall continue.
After a criminal case is tried by a judge without the intervention of a jury, the speedy rendition of a finding and a final judgment thereon is an essential part of the due course of law provision of the Indiana Constitution Art. 1, Sec. 12, and-the due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution. Todd v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 664, 693, 101 N. E. 2d 45. In such a situation the court cannot keep the finding and judgment in fieri longer than the last *404day of the term of court at which the trial was had. Grundel v. People (1905), 33 Colo. 191, 192, 79 Pac. 1022, 108 Am. St. Rep. 75; In re Flint (1903), 25 Utah 338, 341, 71 Pac. 531, 95 Am. St. Rep. 853; People ex rel. Smith v. Allen (1895), 155 Ill. 61, 62; Commonwealth v. Maloney (1887), 145 Mass. 205, 209; People v. Barrett (1903), 202 Ill. 287, 289; Smith v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 64, 68, 121 N. E. 829, 3 A. L. R. 999. See interesting annotation, 3 A. L. R. 1004; People v. Felker (1886), 61 Mich. 110, 27 N. W. 869.
I do not think that by the simple device of not making a finding during the term, without a sufficient reason for the delay being shown by the record, the court could withhold judgment indefinitely. By so withholding judgment in this case the trial court forfeited jurisdiction of appellant.
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the defendant should be discharged.