Court Opinion

ID: 9538789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:41:41.546583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:09.795138
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
dissenting:
The majority holds that the Initiative Title Setting Board (the “Title Board”) is required by statute to act upon the petitioners’ motion for rehearing on an initiative considered during its last meeting in May 1995 within forty-eight hours of filing of the motion. The majority’s holding is based on the language in sections 1^10-106(1), 1-40-107(1), IB C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), and a construction of section 1-40-108(1), IB C.R.S. (1995 Supp.). I disagree. I would approve the Title Board’s action because I find that the forty-eight hour rehearing requirement is not triggered in an odd-numbered year where the Secretary of State (“Secretary”) makes a preliminary determination that the initiative is a non-Amendment 1 measure which may appear on the ballot only in a general election held in an even-numbered year. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I would base my conclusion on the following. First, the statutory scheme, as amended in 1993, creates two schedules pursuant to which the Title Board considers initiatives, a one-year schedule and a two-year schedule. These two alternate schedules are required by the enactment of Article X, Section 20 of the Colorado Constitution (“Amendment 1”).
Second, although only the Secretary has the statutory authority to place a measure on the ballot, that authority is not in question in this case. Here, the Secretary made a preliminary determination that the subject initiative was not eligible to be placed on the ballot in 1995. Actual placement of the initiative on the ballot cannot be determined until the proponents file the circulated petitions with the Secretary and the Secretary determines there are sufficient signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Accordingly, sections 1-5-203 and 1 — 10-122, IB C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), pursuant to which only the Secretary can certify the ballot and ballot title, are not implicated.
Third, section 1-40-108 has no bearing on when the Secretary determines whether a proposed initiative is an Amendment 1 measure or not. The Secretary’s preliminary determination that the initiative was not eligible to appear on the ballot in 1995 was not premature and, in accordance with her determination, the forty-eight hour requirement was not invoked. Therefore, I would hold that the petitioners’ motion was properly scheduled for consideration at the Title Board’s next regularly scheduled meeting following its May 17, 1995 meeting. See § 1-40-107(1).
Article V, Section 1 of the Colorado Constitution, adopted by popular vote in 1910, created the initiative and referendum process.1 *577Initiatives could appear on the ballot only in an even-numbered election year because, historically, statewide general elections were held biennially in even-numbered years.2 For more than eighty years, all statewide initiatives were considered on a two-year schedule. This system was changed in 1992 by the enaetmént of Amendment 1, which permitted statewide elections for limited purposes to be held in odd-numbered years. Colo. Const, art. X, § 20(3). Amendment 1, however, generated considerable confusion. In particular, Amendment 1 did not address what types of measures were eligible to appear in an odd-year election. In 1993, to clarify a perceived ambiguity in the language of Amendment 1, the General Assembly passed Senate Bill 93-98 (“S.B. 98”), subsequently codified at Article 41 of Title 1 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, specifying that only measures pertaining to debt, tax, and spending were eligible to appear on the ballot in an odd-year election (“Amendment 1 measures”). § 1-41-102, IB C.R.S. (1995 Supp.) (Amendment 1 measures relate to debt, tax, or spending). Other initiatives (“non-Amendment 1 measures”) continue to follow the historical two-year cycle and may appear on the ballot only in general elections. It is this difference in the content of even-numbered and odd-numbered year elections with respect to initiatives that caused the scheduling dispute that is at issue in this case.
Prompted by the increasingly prohibitive costs of the initiative process, the Secretary proposed Senate Bill 93-135 (“S.B. 135”) which was intended to streamline the initiative process and reduce costs. While S.B. 135 was winding its way through the legislative process, S.B. 98 was in the process of final enactment.3 As a result, the Secretary sought to amend S.B. 135 in order to bring Article 40 into conformity with S.B. 98. The amendments suggested by the Secretary were incorporated into S.B. 135 by the House Committee on Business Affairs & Labor and now appear in section 1 — 10-106(1).
During the hearings before the Senate and House Committees on Business Affairs & Labor (respectively the “Senate Committee” and the “House Committee”), then-Secretary of State Natalie Meyer addressed the Senate Committee and her representative, Donetta Davidson, addressed the House Committee on S.B. 135. Their comments are instructive on the two-fold effects of the 1993 amendments to Article 40, specifically, rendering the initiative process more cost efficient and conforming Article 40 to S.B. 98.
In her comments before the Senate Committee, the Secretary explained that S.B. 135 amended section 1-10-107(1) in three respects: (1) it extended the time period that proponents had to file a petition for rehearing from 48 hours (after the Title Board set the title and summary) to seven days; (2) it decreased the time frame that an opponent had to file a rehearing petition from fifteen days to seven days; and (3) it granted the Title Board additional time in which to prepare for petitions for rehearing (from forty-eight hours to its next regularly scheduled meeting). Hearing on S.B. 93-135 Before the Senate Comm, on Business Affairs & Labor, 59 Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 93-6, February 8, 1993, at 3:39 p.m.) (statement of Natalie Meyer, Secretary of State).
The Secretary explained that these changes were proposed because the Title Board was overwhelmed with rehearing petitions. Under the time frames existing prior to 1993, the Title Board was required to hear all motions for rehearing within forty-eight hours of the motion. The Title Board potentially faced successive challenges by the proponents and the opponents of an initiative. *578Each contest would have to be considered by the Title Board within forty-eight hours. Hearing on S.B. 9S-135 Before the Senate Comm, on Business Affairs & Labor, 59 Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 93-6, February 8, 1998, at 3:39 p.m.) (statement of Natalie Meyer, Secretary of State). Consequently, the Title Board had insufficient time in which to research and prepare for rehearings. Id.
The purpose of S.B. 135, as well as the Secretary’s comments before the Senate Committee, support the proposition that the General Assembly amended section 1 — 40— 107(1) because it recognized that the Title Board could not adhere to the expedited time requirements for rehearing petitions. It follows that the forty-eight hour rehearing requirement for titles and summaries set by the Title Board in its last meeting in May was not intended to include those measures that would not be on the ballot that particular election year. This intent is amply reflected in the House Committee amendments to S.B. 135, which created the two schedules required by Amendment 1.
The House Committee hearings on S.B. 135 were held after passage of S.B. 98 was assured. In her comments before the House Committee, Donetta Davidson explained that the Secretary was proposing amendments to S.B. 93-135, affecting section 1-40-106(1), in order to bring it into alignment with S.B. 98. Addressing the odd-year and even-year time frames for different types of initiatives that flowed from S.B. 98, Ms. Davidson made the following statement:
Also, what is not in the amendments that I feel that it also should be changed because of [S.B. 98] ... after “being held no later than the third Wednesday of May,” we should add in that area “in the year in which the measure is to be voted on.” If it’s a tax issue the way [S.B. 98] is written, they would have to have it [the election] within each year. But if it’s not a tax issue that has to be placed on the ballot within the year then it would go — the Title Board would continue from December after the election clear through the odd year into the even year into May. So, there would not be a cutoff on any other type of initiative process.
Hearings on S.B. 93-135 Before the House Comm, on Business Affairs & Labor, 59 Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (hearing tape 93-21, March 30, 1993, at 3:03 p.m.) (statement of Donetta Davidson, representative of the Secretary of State).
The language suggested by Ms. Davidson was incorporated into section 1-40-106(1) so that, as enacted, the relevant sentence reads:
The first meeting of the title board shall be held no sooner than the first Wednesday in December after an election, and the last meeting shall be held no later than the third Wednesday in May in the year in which the measure is to be voted on.
§ 1-40-106(1), IB C.R.S. (1995 Supp.) (emphasis added). Notably, the majority also emphasizes this language. See maj. op. at 5.
These comments plainly indicate that the Secretary contemplated two schedules, a one-year cycle for Amendment 1 measures and a two-year cycle for non-Amendment 1 measures. The House Committee incorporated the Secretary’s suggested language into S.B. 135 and the bill was so enacted. The General Assembly intended the Title Board to follow two different cycles depending on the nature of the initiative proposed. Under the two-cycle dichotomy, the Title Board can consider proposed Amendment 1 measures beginning with the date of its first meeting of the year which is no sooner than the first Wednesday in December after an election, whether that election is a general or odd-year election. Its last meeting, for purposes of proposed Amendment 1 measures, must be held no later than the third Wednesday in May of the following year. For proposed non-Amendment 1 measures, the Title Board is on a two-year cycle. It meets no sooner than the first Wednesday in December following a general election (held in an even-numbered year) and holds its last meeting on the third Wednesday in May in the year of the next general election (the next even-numbered year).
The majority’s holding significantly affects the Title Board’s operations in a manner that contravenes the General Assembly’s intent in implementing the 1993 amendments to Arti-*579ele 40. Under the majority’s holding, the Title Board (1) is precluded from designating titles and summaries on any proposed initiatives (whether Amendment 1 or non-Amendment 1 measures) between its last meeting in May and its first meeting in December of the same year, and (2) is required to consider all motions for rehearings on titles and summaries designated during its last meeting in May within forty-eight hours regardless of whether the proposed initiative is an Amendment 1 measure or a non-Amendment 1 measure. The latter renders meaningless the language in section 1-40-106(1) requiring the Title Board to hear motions for rehearing within forty-eight hours of the last meeting in May only for those initiatives to be voted on in that year. The former is a restraint on the power of initiative because it curtails the circulation of initiative petitions. Proponents cannot circulate petitions until the title and summary have been set. In my view, these constraints offend the statutory scheme and are unnecessary and impractical.
The circumstances warrant a finding that the Secretary made the preliminary determination that the initiative now before us fell into the non-Amendment 1 category and could not be placed on the November 1995 ballot. Under section 1-40-106(1), the Secretary convenes all of the meetings of the Title Board. As a member of the Title Board, the Secretary is well acquainted with all of the initiatives before the Title Board. Therefore, by scheduling the petitioners’ motion for rehearing for June 7, 1995, the Title Board’s next regularly scheduled meeting, she preliminarily determined that the subject initiative was a non-Amendment 1 initiative and did not have to be considered within forty-eight hours.
The Secretary’s preliminary determination triggered the two-year cycle. Thus, the subject initiative was not eligible to appear on the ballot in November 1995, an odd-year election, and the proponents of the initiative were not harmed by the Title Board’s failure to hold a rehearing within forty-eight hours. “[T]he last meeting,” referenced in section 1-40-106(1), would not have been the meeting held on May 17, 1995, since, pursuant to section 1-40-106(1), the initiative was not going to be “voted on” in 1995. Rather, the initiative would be “voted on” in the next general election to be held in November 1996. Consequently, the Title Board was required to hear “[t]he motion for rehearing ... at the next regularly scheduled meeting.” § 1-40-107(1). The “next regularly scheduled meeting” of the Title Board after its May 17, 1995 meeting was held on June 7, 1995. The Secretary appropriately scheduled the petitioners’ motion for rehearing for that meeting.
I agree with the respondents that the two alternative schedules created by the General Assembly to accommodate Amendment 1 require the Secretary to preliminarily determine the nature of the initiative in advance of the filing of circulated petitions complete with qualifying signatures.
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion by incorrectly construing section 1-40-108(1). Section 1-40-108(1) mandates that: (1) a petition must be filed with the Secretary within six months of the date that a title and summary have been fixed; and (2) a petition must be filed with the Secretary within the time required by the state constitution. This provision does not preclude the Secretary from making a preliminary decision on the nature of the initiative. Nor is such a restraint compelled by our prior decisions.4
*580As a member of the Title Board, the Secretary is actively involved throughout the initiative process, including setting titles and summaries. By virtue of this involvement the Secretary is fully familiar with an initiative before the signed petitions are filed and is well-positioned to render a preliminary determination.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would approve the Title Board’s action.

. By proclamation of the governor, a special session of the General Assembly was convened in *577August 1910 in which an amendment to the constitution, entitled the "Initiative and Referendum Law,” was proposed to be submitted to the people at the general election to be held in that year. See Pearce v. People, 53 Colo. 399, 399-400, 127 P. 224, 225 (1912).

. Article V, Section 1(4) of the Colorado Constitution states that "[a]ll elections on measures initiated by or referred to the people of the state shall be held at the biennial regular general election....”

. S.B. 98 was on a fast track and was considered first by the Senate Affairs Committee on January 19, 1993, second by the Senate Judiciary Committee on January 25, 1993, and last by the House Affairs Committee on February 4, 1993.

. The petitioners cite two of our prior decisions as support for the proposition that the Secretary cannot make a preliminary determination of the initiative's eligibility for a given election year until petitions have been filed. In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary Pertaining to the Proposed Election Reform Amendment, 852 P.2d 28 (Colo.1993) ("Election Reform Amendment"); In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary Pertaining to the Workers Comp Initiative, 850 P.2d 144 (Colo.1993) ("Workers Comp Initiative ”).
Election Reform Amendment and Workers’ Comp. Initiative are irrelevant to our present analysis because they arose prior to the effective date of the 1993 amendments to Article 40. Thus, they do not address the statutory language at issue here which was added by virtue of those amendments. Moreover, these cases pertain specifically to our ability to review a substantive decision that only the Secretary is authorized to make, i.e., placement of a measure on a given ballot. In both cases, we did not undertake substantive review because we held that the deci*580sion had not been effected. Accordingly, substantive review by this court was found to be premature. Similarly, the Secretary has not placed the initiative at issue here on the ballot and hence, substantive review is premature.
In sum, these cases simply do not support the proposition that it is premature for the Secretary to contemplate an initiative’s eligibility while the title and summary are under consideration.