Court Opinion

ID: 9905522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:11:07.622725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:42.477741
License: Public Domain

J-S38031-23

                                  2023 PA Super 243

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.O., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1510 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 18, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000292-2021

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.A.N.R., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: R.O., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1511 EDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 18, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000374-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2023

       In these consolidated cases, R.O. (Mother) appeals from the Decree and

Order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial

court) involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter A.R. born

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S38031-23

in November 2020 (Child) and changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.1

We affirm.

                                               I.

        The Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved

with the family when Child was born because of concerns regarding Parents’

ability to care for Child, who was born with extensive health issues. Child has

been diagnosed with CDK-13 (a rare genetic disorder marked by cardiac

issues), sleep apnea and lymphoma in the brain.            Child has difficulties

swallowing, is fed through a feeding tube, is at risk for aspiration and needs

constant monitoring. At the time Child was born, Mother resided in an assisted

living facility due to an intellectual disability and mental health issues and

Father did not have stable housing. Child was adjudicated dependent in April

of 2021 and was placed with her current Foster Parents in March of 2021 when

she was four months old. She has been in their continuous care since that

time.

        DHS filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father

and change Child’s custody goal to adoption in June of 2022. The trial court

held hearings and argument on the petitions on August 10, 2022, April 24,

____________________________________________

1 The parental rights of Child’s biological father, C.R. (Father) were also
involuntarily terminated and he has filed an appeal. We have issued a
Memorandum in that case at J-S38016-23 (1508 & 1509 EDA 2023). Mother
and Father (collectively, Parents) have another daughter, G.R., who is not a
subject of this appeal.

                                           -2-
J-S38031-23

2023 and May 18, 2023, at which several witnesses testified, including Mother,

Father, Foster Mother C.S., Dr. William Russell and Caseworkers Janay Pollard

and Michelle Jackson. At the time of the proceedings, Child was about two

years old.   Parents were residing together in a two-bedroom apartment in

North Philadelphia and Foster Parents’ home is located in Perkasie outside of

Philadelphia in Bucks County. Parents had been offered weekly supervised

visits at a Willow Grove facility with Child and her younger sister G.R., who

also resides with Foster Parents.

                                      A.

      At the August 2022 hearing, Mother testified that she and Father had

attended virtual and in-person visits with Child, but they missed some of the

visits because of illness and transportation issues. When Mother was asked

how she interacted with Child during the visits, she stated, “[Child] doesn’t

like me.” (N.T. Hearing, 8/10/22, at 19). Mother indicated that she does not

feed Child because Child eats through a feeding tube.        Although Mother

acknowledged that Child needs a great deal of medical care, she was unable

to identify Child’s specific medical needs. (See id. at 22). With regard to

Child’s numerous medical appointments, Mother explained that she and Father

did not regularly attend them because of problems with transportation. When

asked how she feels towards Child, Mother stated, “I love her to death. You

know, even though she doesn’t like me, I still love her.” (Id. at 36).

                                    -3-
J-S38031-23

      Father similarly testified that he and Mother did not attend several visits

with Child because of either illness or employment obligations. (See id. at

45-46). Father described Child’s medical condition as serious in that “she can

pass at any time if she doesn’t receive the right medicine.”       (Id. at 48).

However, Father was unable to list Child’s medications and has never fed her

using the feeding tube. At the time of the first hearing, Father had steady

employment at Rite Aid as a cashier. He testified that his parents and siblings

reside close by and are able to provide him with family support. (See id. at

56-57). Father testified that during visits with Child, he interacts with her

using music, books and toys and she has crawled towards him during some

visits. Father stated that he has a bond with Child and that if the trial court

permits reunification, he would be willing to do an in-depth study of Child’s

medical needs. (See id. at 60, 69).

      Caseworker Janay Pollard testified that she began working with the

family in January of 2022 and that she oversees the Foster Parents and

supervises the visits with Parents.     (See id. at 70-71).     For the virtual

sessions, Parents would typically log on for about five to ten minutes and then

log off because of connection issues.     During the in-person visits, Parents

needed prompting to remove soiled items during diaper changes and often did

not arrive with basic items they were expected to bring such as diapers,

change of clothes and toys. During the visits, Father interacted with Child and

Mother only with G.R, and Mother did not talk with Child at all. Ms. Pollard

                                      -4-
J-S38031-23

relayed that there were safety concerns during the visits, including an instance

where Child started to put a toy down her throat and Father insisted that this

was fine.   She opined that in the approximate six-month period she had

observed Parents, neither of their interactions with Child had improved and

they were unable to identify safety concerns or appropriately meet Child’s

needs. Ms. Pollard observed no bond between Mother and Child, and when

Child cried, Mother did not attempt to develop a bond with her and simply said

“she doesn’t like me.” (Id. at 87).

      Foster Mother described Child’s medical conditions in depth for the trial

court and explained that Child’s breathing has to be constantly monitored,

“when she sleeps, how she sleeps, when she’s raised.”        (Id. at 107).   An

overnight nurse comes to their home and she and her husband take turns

monitoring Child throughout the day.     Because of her brain abnormalities,

Child is globally developmentally delayed, any changes in her body have to be

monitored because of pituitary gland abnormalities, her heart rate has to be

monitored because of a heart defect, and she takes medications for asthma.

Foster Mother has attended all of Child’s medical appointments and she

estimated that in the last six months Child has had about 17 appointments

wherein Parents have called in only three times and attended in person twice.

(See id. at 113-115). During the appointments, Parents do not meaningfully

engage with the physicians or ask questions. Foster Mother testified on cross-

                                      -5-
J-S38031-23

examination that she has nine children in her care, five of whom have medical

needs.

                                       B.

      At the April 24, 2023 hearing, Dr. William Russell testified as an expert

in parenting capacity and forensic psychology.         Dr. Russell conducted a

parental capacity evaluation for Mother in September of 2022 and found that

Mother “was aware that she would not be able to handle raising” Child given

her medical needs and Mother did not think Father was capable of handling

them either. (N.T., 4/24/23, at 9; see id. at 10-11). Dr. Russell explained

that Mother has been diagnosed with an intellectual disability, bi-polar

disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder, and he opined that there were no

services or support that could be put in place to enable Mother to appropriately

care for Child. Dr. Russel clarified that he had not conducted an evaluation of

Father and he, therefore, could not draw any conclusions about Father’s

capacity to parent Child. (See id. at 23).

      Caseworker Michelle Jackson testified that she was assigned to this case

in March of 2021 when Mother was living in an adult facility and Father did not

have housing. Parents have since obtained suitable housing and Ms. Jackson’s

understanding regarding their plans was for Father to work while Mother

stayed at home.     (See id. at 30).        Ms. Jackson indicated that Father’s

employment with Rite Aid had ended and although he had advised her of new

employment at a carpet cleaning business, he had not provided paystubs.

                                     -6-
J-S38031-23

Regarding Parents’ attendance of Child’s medical appointments, she testified

that DHS provided bus passes to them to cover transportation and they were

given lists of all appointment times/doctors’ office locations.     During the

supervised visits, Ms. Jackson observed that Child did not engage with Mother

at all and she recalled one visit where Mother “was very overwhelmed [and]

was upset” and Foster Mother helped to calm Child down. (Id. at 49). Mother

needed prompting throughout the visit as to diaper changes and to begin

activities like reading books. Ms. Jackson testified that Foster Parents provide

Child with all of her basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing, take her

to all medical appointments and care for all of her special medical needs. She

also testified that Mother nor Father knows how to care for Child’s medical

needs.

      With regard to Child’s demeanor, Ms. Jackson described her as “very

feisty, very happy.   She is extremely determined . . . she’s accomplishing

more than what was expected at this time. She really has come a very long

way[.]” (Id. at 55-56). During visits, Child approaches and engages with her

Foster Parents and is “very attached and bonded to [Foster Parents], always

laughing, smiling.” (Id. at 56). Ms. Jackson opined that adoption is in Child’s

best interests because Foster Parents have been providing her with a “strong,

loving safe environment” and that termination of Parents’ parental rights

would not cause Child any type of emotional stress because “she does not

have a relationship with either parent.” (Id. at 58, 60).

                                     -7-
J-S38031-23

       Father testified concerning his employment that he is working at a

carpet cleaning company and that he has been the sole source of financial

support for him and Mother. (See id. at 134). If reunification were permitted,

their plan would be for Mother to be at home caring for Child while he works,

which he believes she is capable of doing. (See id. at 141-42).

                                               C.

       As part of closing arguments, counsel for Mother asserted that in this

case, application of the Adoption Act to terminate Mother’s parental rights

based on her intellectual disability violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the

Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions, citing In re D. L. R., 432 A.2d

196 (Pa. 1981).       (See N.T. Hearing, 5/18/23, at 22-24).     The trial court

rejected this argument and noted that counsel was relying on a non-binding

dissenting opinion to support her position.2 (See id. at 53-54).

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued its ruling

involuntarily terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to Child

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b) and changing

Child’s permanency goal to adoption. In doing so, the court noted the difficult

____________________________________________

2 Counsel relied on a dissenting opinion issued by Nix, J., stating:
                                                                “Today, the
majority of this Court has forged beyond the fundamental tenets of American
jurisprudence by approving the order of the Orphans’ Court of Erie County
which involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the mother, F. O. R.,
because of her [intellectual disability].” In re D. L. R., supra at 197
(dissent).

                                           -8-
J-S38031-23

circumstances of this case and found that all witnesses testified credibly;

Mother and Father are unable to parent Child and were unable to articulate

her basic medical needs and diagnoses; Mother had very limited interaction

with Child during their supervised visits and during that time Child would cry;

Mother herself expressed that she could not take care of Child; despite this

acknowledgment, Father indicated that there were no issues with Mother

caring for Child while he was working to support the family; Mother has no

bond with Child and termination of her parental rights would not have any

detrimental effect on Child; although Father and Child share some bond and

positive interaction, termination of his parental rights would not have a

detrimental impact given the missed visits and length of time Child has been

in care; Foster Parents have functioned and will continue to function as Child’s

parents; a goal change to adoption is appropriate for Child given her complex

medical issues, young age and placement in a medical foster home willing to

adopt. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/18/23, at 54-61). Mother timely appealed and

she and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)-

(ii).3

____________________________________________

3

         Our standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
         requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
         credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
         by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
         courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
         or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -9-
J-S38031-23

                                               II.

       We begin by outlining the basic legal principles that guide our review.

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs termination of parental rights and

requires a bifurcated analysis:

             Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
       seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
       that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
       termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the trial court
       determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
       or her parental rights does the trial court engage in the second
       part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination
       of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best
       interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare
       analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
       between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect
       on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

       “A child has a right to a stable, safe, and healthy environment in which

to grow, and the child’s life simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the

parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id.

(citation omitted). When a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to

conduct her life in a manner conducive to providing a safe environment for a

____________________________________________

       of   discretion    only   upon    demonstration       of    manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
       court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
       the record would support a different result. We have previously
       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

                                          - 10 -
J-S38031-23

child, and the behavior is irremediable as supported by clear and competent

evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified. See id. at 1105.

      In this case, the trial court terminated Parents’ rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

            (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
      six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition has
      either evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim
      to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
      or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
      essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his
      physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the
      incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
      remedied by the parent.

                                  *     *      *

            (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
      by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a
      period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the
      removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
      cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
      period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
      the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the
      removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of
      time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
      needs and welfare of the child.

                                  *     *      *

            (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
      by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12
      months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
      placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement

                                      - 11 -
J-S38031-23

      of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights
      would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

                                    *     *      *

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A §§ 2511(a) (1), (2), (5), (8) and (b).

                                         A.

      Mother first contends that the trial court’s application of the Adoption

Act to terminate her parental rights violated her right to equal protection

under the law pursuant to the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions

by terminating her parental rights based solely on her intellectual disability.

See App. Br. at 13, 16-28. Mother asserts that the trial court “did not address

the equal protection issue or conduct an equal protection analysis” and that

the trial court essentially required her to “alleviate her Intellectual Disability –

it’s not something that can be cured.” Id. at 16-17. Mother contends that

the net result is that the Adoption Act creates two classes of persons—those

that are disabled and incapable of parenting such as herself—and those who

are not disabled—and that the trial court failed to address her equal protection

argument during the proceedings. (See id. at 16-18, 28).

                                        - 12 -
J-S38031-23

        After review of the record, we conclude that it does not support Mother’s

claims. First, the notes of testimony show that the trial court did consider

Mother’s equal protection argument and expressly rejected it, as evidenced

by the trial court pointing out that Mother relied on a non-binding dissenting

opinion to support her contention. That dissenting opinion stated that that

case “presents a single issue: may mental incapacity justify a permanent,

involuntary termination of parental rights. Restated, does the Adoption Act

. . . . authorize the involuntary termination of a mother’s rights solely on the

grounds of [intellectual disability]. In re D. L. R. at 197 (1981).4 The trial

court did not terminate Mother’s parental rights just because she was

intellectually disabled, but because it found that she was unable to care for

____________________________________________

4 Our Supreme Court entered a very short opinion which stated in its entirety

that:

        The Orphans’ Court entered a decree terminating appellant’s
        parental rights in her child. Appellant contends that the evidence
        was insufficient to support the decree. After carefully reviewing
        the record, we find appellant’s contention to be without merit.
        Appellant’s continued incapacity has caused her child to be
        without essential parental care and such incapacity cannot or will
        not be remedied. See In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d
        1228 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880, 99 S.Ct. 217, 58 L.Ed.2d
        192 (1978); 1 P.S. s 311(2). The determination of the Orphans’
        Court is supported by competent evidence and will not be
        reversed. See In re J.L.Z., 492 Pa. 7, 421 A.2d 1064 (1980).
        Decree affirmed. Each party to pay own costs.

In re D. L. R., 495 Pa. 55, 56, 432 A.2d 196, 197 (1981).

                                          - 13 -
J-S38031-23

the needs of the Child. To hold otherwise would require us to focus on her

needs instead of the best interests of the Child.5

       Second, generally, an intellectually disabled person’s parental rights

may not be terminated without a showing that he or she is presently unable

to provide adequate care for a child and will continue to be unable to do so for

the foreseeable future. In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 528 (1990). This two-

pronged test applies in the case of intellectually challenged parents as well as

abusive or neglectful parents.         Id.     This test has to be met by clear and

convincing evidence as well as the fact that termination would be in the best

interests of the child. Because the factors used to determine whether parental

rights are to be applied equally to all persons whose parental rights are

terminated, there is no equal protection violation and that test was met here.

       We agree with the trial court that there was clear and convincing

evidence that Mother was unable to provide adequate care for the Child and

her incapacity could not be remedied making termination was warranted

under Section 2511(a)(2).” Mother testified that Child did not like her and

threw tantrums when she tried to hold her and otherwise did not meaningfully

____________________________________________

5 Though not raised here, we have previously rejected an Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) equal protection challenge to a termination of parental
rights. In Int. of J.J.L., 150 A.3d 475, 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016), where we
stated that to accept that “Mother’s assertion [that her rights were being
violated] would require the trial court and this Court to ignore the best
interests of the Child and focus instead on the needs of Mother. This we
cannot do.” See also In re D.C.D.,105 A.3d 662, 673–74 (Pa. 2014).

                                          - 14 -
J-S38031-23

interact with Child.   Mother acknowledged her inability to care for Child’s

complex medical needs and Father’s inability to do the same, leaving them

unable to parent her as a unit under the very difficult circumstances of this

case where Child’s life could be jeopardized by a relatively simple mistake.

Because Mother’s equal protection argument lacks both factual and legal

support, no relief is due.

                                      B.

      Mother next challenges the trial court’s best interests analysis pursuant

to Section 2511(b). (See Mother’s Brief, at 28-31). Mother acknowledges

that her bond with Child is “slight” but argues that any assessment of Child’s

long term emotional needs is premature and speculative. (See id. at 30).

      We begin by observing that the goal of the Juvenile Act is to “preserve

the unity of the family whenever possible or to provide another alternative

permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be maintained.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1). The Act is additionally intended to “prevent children

from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with its inherent lack of

permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental commitment.” Interest of

A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).             In

considering Section 2511(b), we are guided by the following principles:

            Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental
      rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
      emotional needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has
      explained, Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
      analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
      Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,

                                    - 15 -
J-S38031-23

      if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
      part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or
      her child is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest
      analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
      considered by the court when determining what is in the best
      interest of the child.

            In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
      emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
      the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
      the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this
      Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of
      continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child
      bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

D.R.-W., supra at 914 (citations omitted).

      In this case, although Mother claims that a best interests analysis is

premature and speculative, Child has resided with Foster Parents for more

than two years, from the time she was just a few months old, and has never

been parented by Mother and Father. Despite the opportunities for visits with

Child and to become actively involved in her medical care by attending

appointments, the record reflects that Parents have put forth minimal effort

to work towards establishing a parental role in Child’s life. Multiple credible

witnesses testified to their observation that Mother has no bond with Child,

that she is incapable of taking care of the Child, and that termination of

parental rights would have no detrimental impact on Child. Mother has agreed

with this bond assessment during her own testimony.          In contrast, Child

shares a close parent/child bond with Foster Parents who have provided for

her extremely complex and specialized needs during her entire life. Because

the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s

                                     - 16 -
J-S38031-23

parental rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare, we affirm its order

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

                                       C.

      Finally, Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

changing the goal of the dependency proceedings from reunification to

adoption, as this change was not in Child’s best interests. However, because

we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting

the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights, this issue is moot. See In

re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (“The effect of

our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily

renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change Child’s goal to

adoption.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the order changing the

permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

      Even if we were to reach the merits of this issue, we would conclude

that no relief is due.

            When deciding whether to change the permanency goal in a
      dependency action, the trial court must consider, inter alia: (1)
      the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
      placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service
      plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the
      circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the
      appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for
      the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might
      be achieved; (6) the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has
      been in placement for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two
      months.

           Additionally, a court is required to provide compelling
      reasons why it is not in the best interest of the child to return to

                                     - 17 -
J-S38031-23

     his or her parents and to instead be placed for adoption. 42
     Pa.C.S. § 6351 (f.1)(5)(iv)(C). The child’s best interest, safety,
     permanency and well-being must take precedence over all other
     considerations in a goal change proceeding. The parent’s rights
     are secondary and a goal change to adoption may be appropriate,
     even under circumstances where a parent substantially complies
     with a reunification plan. A court cannot subordinate a child’s
     need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claim of progress
     and goals for the future.

Interest of A.M., supra at 1273 (case citations omitted).

     Here, Child was adjudicated dependent shortly after she was born with

a rare genetic condition and Mother and Father did not have appropriate

housing or the ability to care for Child’s extensive medical needs. During her

time in their care, Foster Parents have helped Child make great progress, well

beyond what was expected by DHS. Child is bonded with Foster Parents and

is happy and thriving in their home. Because the record supports the trial

court’s decision to change the permanency goal to adoption, no relief would

be due.

     Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.

Date: 11/28/2023

                                    - 18 -