Court Opinion

ID: 9946180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 16:02:34.658937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:29.912103
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2119    Document: 77     Page: 1   Filed: 02/21/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

 W. J., BY HIS PARENTS AND LEGAL GUARDIANS,
                   R.J. AND A.J.,
                 Petitioner-Appellant

                             v.

       SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
                   SERVICES,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                       2022-2119
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:21-vv-01342-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 21, 2024
                 ______________________

    W. J., Staten Island, NY, pro se.

     CASEN ROSS, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United
 States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for
 respondent-appellee.   Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, ABBY CHRISTINE WRIGHT; C. SALVATORE
 D’ALESSIO, LARA A. ENGLUND, HEATHER LYNN PEARLMAN,
 SARAH BLACK RIFKIN, Torts Branch, Civil Division, United
 States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

     ANGELA M. OLIVER, Haynes and Boone, LLP, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued as amicus curiae counsel.
                  ______________________
Case: 22-2119    Document: 77      Page: 2    Filed: 02/21/2024

 2                                                 W. J. v. HHS

      Before LOURIE, DYK, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     This is a case brought under the National Childhood
 Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300a-1 to -34, as
 amended (“the Vaccine Act”). R.J. and A.J., acting on be-
 half of appellant W.J. (“Appellant”), their son, and appear-
 ing without counsel, appeal from a decision of the United
 States Court of Federal Claims denying their petition for
 review and affirming a special master’s grant of a motion
 to dismiss as untimely under the Vaccine Act’s statute of
 limitations. We affirm.
                               I
     W.J. was born on February 4, 2004. Although he is now
 over the age of 18, his parents, R.J. and A.J. (“Parents”),
 remain his legal guardians, a role they have held through-
 out his life. W.J. was administered a Measles, Mumps, and
 Rubella (“MMR”) vaccine on February 24, 2005. About a
 year later, on March 7, 2006, W.J. was diagnosed with a
 speech delay. Another year later, on January 5, 2007, W.J.
 was diagnosed with autism. In the years that followed,
 W.J. experienced several bouts of immune-related blood
 disorders, including at least one resulting in hospitaliza-
 tion. After genetic testing in February 2019, Parents were
 informed that W.J. had been born with a chromosomal ab-
 erration known as an Xq28 duplication.
     On May 7, 2021, Parents filed a petition on behalf of
 W.J. requesting compensation under the Vaccine Act for
 chronic encephalopathy and immunodeficiency issues
 caused either by the MMR vaccine or by its significant ag-
 gravation of pre-existing injuries relating to W.J.’s chromo-
 somal abnormality. Parents argued that due to W.J.’s
 Xq28 chromosomal duplication, the MMR vaccine was in-
 appropriately administered to him in contravention of the
 vaccine’s warnings.
     Parents filed the petition in the Court of Federal
 Claims without the assistance of counsel. As is required by
 the Vaccine Rules, the petition was assigned to a special
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                 3

 master. See Vaccine Rule 3(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
 12(d)(1). On June 3, 2021, the special master held an ini-
 tial status conference, largely focusing on the petition’s re-
 quest for equitable tolling. During the conference, the
 following exchange occurred:
    [Special Master]: Okay. So I know you probably are
    aware of this based on the petition, there is a statute
    of limitations issue that we will need to address
    since that’s a threshold issue, that is, if the statute
    of limitations has expired, then the case will be dis-
    missed because it can no longer be brought. And I
    think that is something we probably need to deal
    with sooner rather than later so that we don’t use a
    lot of your time, energy, and money and the Court’s
    time and energy litigating a case where the statute
    of limitations has expired.
    And by talking about this I’m not diminishing in any
    way the experiences and the difficulty that your fam-
    ily has had. I just don’t want to lead you to have any
    unrealistic expectations about how the case may pro-
    ceed.
    So I think the best course of action, [Government
    Counsel], is probably for the Government to file a
    Rule 4 report with any motion to dismiss or other
    legal filing with regard to the statute of limitations.
    And then I can ask [R.J.] to file any reply or response
    which he may [wish] to do so, and then I can rule on
    that issue.
    [Government Counsel], what are your thoughts
    about that plan?
    [Government Counsel]: Yes, Special Master, that
    sounds like an appropriate plan.
    [Special Master]: [R.J.], does that plan – is that plan
    acceptable with you?
    [R.J.]: That sounds fair. Yes.
 App’x 68-69 at 4:6-5:9.
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 4                                                 W. J. v. HHS

     On August 2, 2021, the Secretary of the Department of
 Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) filed a motion to
 dismiss the petition as untimely. Parents responded to the
 motion, arguing that equitable tolling was appropriate due
 to fraudulent concealment and/or extraordinary circum-
 stances.
      Upon review, the special master noted that the latest
 possible time at which any timely claim could have been
 filed, based on the dates of manifestation asserted in the
 petition, was in April 2017, with many of the other claims
 having become untimely a decade earlier. 1 The special
 master found that Parents’ petition, which was not filed
 until May 7, 2021, thus exceeded the Vaccine Act’s 36-
 month statute of limitations. The special master rejected
 Parents’ equitable tolling arguments on the grounds that
 (1) W.J.’s mental incapacity did not qualify as an extraor-
 dinary circumstance because Parents failed to plead facts
 demonstrating that they, as W.J.’s legal guardians, were
 unable to file a claim on his behalf; and (2) Parents failed
 to demonstrate that the government’s alleged fraudulent
 concealment prevented them from timely pursuing com-
 pensation. Accordingly, the special master granted the
 Secretary’s motion and dismissed the case as untimely.
      Parents then filed a motion for review of the special
 master’s decision in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing
 that the special master inappropriately raised the statute
 of limitations issue sua sponte, relied on an incorrect legal
 standard to reject their equitable tolling arguments, and
 impermissibly ruled on the merits of their claims. The
 court affirmed the special master’s decision and denied the
 motion for review, rejecting Parents’ arguments and find-
 ing that the special master acted within her discretion,

     1    Parents alleged that W.J. suffered (1) an encepha-
 lopathy Table injury, (2) a chronic encephalopathy injury,
 (3) a variety of immunodeficiency issues, and (4) significant
 aggravation of pre-existing cerebral and immunological
 damage. These different alleged injuries had different
 dates of manifestation.
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 W. J. v. HHS                                               5

 properly applying both the correct standard of review and
 precedent governing equitable tolling.
     Parents, continuing to act pro se and on behalf of W.J.,
 timely appealed to us. We appointed amicus counsel (“Ami-
 cus”) to elaborate on certain issues in this appeal, and she
 has done so admirably. 2
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) and
 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f).
                              II
     The Court of Federal Claims may only set aside a spe-
 cial master’s findings of fact or conclusions of law if they
 are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
 wise not in accordance with law.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
 12(e)(2)(B). Findings of fact receive deferential review un-
 der an “arbitrary and capricious” standard, legal conclu-
 sions are reviewed de novo under the “not in accordance
 with the law” standard, and discretionary rulings are re-
 viewed for “abuse of discretion.” Munn v. Sec’y of Health &
 Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 870 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1992). We
 apply the same legal standards when reviewing a Court of
 Federal Claims judgment affirming that of a special mas-
 ter. See id. at 870. “That is, we may not disturb the judg-
 ment of the [Court of Federal Claims] unless we find that
 judgment to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
 tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id.
     It is within a special master’s discretion to weigh evi-
 dence. See id. at 871. For this and other reasons, “reversi-
 ble error is extremely difficult to demonstrate” unless the
 special master has failed to consider the relevant evidence
 of record, drawn implausible inferences, or failed to provide
 a rational basis for the decision. Lampe v. Sec’y of Health
 & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (in-
 ternal quotation marks omitted); see also Munn, 970 F.2d

     2     The court expresses its gratitude to Angela Oliver,
 who accepted the amicus representation and, in that capac-
 ity, filed three briefs and delivered oral argument.
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 6                                                 W. J. v. HHS

 at 870 (noting that arbitrary and capricious standard is
 “well understood to be the most deferential possible”).
    A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
 which relief may be granted “is appropriate when the facts
 asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal rem-
 edy.” Lindsay v. United States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed.
 Cir. 2002). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual
 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
 570 (2007)).
    This appeal concerns numerous issues, most raised by
 Parents but others introduced by Amicus or raised sua
 sponte by the court. We address each in turn below.
                              III
     Before turning our attention to the arguments initially
 raised by Parents and Amicus, we address two questions
 that arose as this case proceeded before us: (i) whether a
 non-lawyer may proceed pro se in pressing an appeal of a
 Vaccine Act claim that was filed in the Court of Federal
 Claims on behalf of another person, and (ii) whether the
 general statute of limitations and tolling provision set out
 in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 applies to Vaccine Act claims.
                              A
     R.J. and A.J., the parents of W.J., are not lawyers. In
 the Court of Federal Claims, they filed a petition setting
 out a Vaccine Act claim on behalf of W.J. and proceeded to
 prosecute that claim pro se in front of the special master
 and then again before a judge. Doing so is, at present, ex-
 pressly authorized by the Rules of the Court of Federal
 Claims (“RCFC”), see RCFC 83.1(a)(3) (“An individual who
 is not an attorney may represent oneself or a member of
 one’s immediate family.”), and Vaccine Rule 14(a)(2)
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                 7

 (same). 3 The Court of Federal Claims held in Kennedy
 v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 99 Fed. Cl. 535, 542
 n.7 (Fed. Cl. May 16, 2011), aff’d, 485 F. App’x 435 (Fed.
 Cir. 2012), that because the Vaccine Act “authorizes par-
 ents to file petitions on behalf of their offspring it also au-
 thorizes parents to prosecute those cases once filed” (citing
 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(1)(A)) (emphasis added).
     When the panel reviewed the appellate briefing sub-
 mitted by Parents and the Secretary, we determined we
 would benefit from appointment of Amicus counsel to ad-
 dress the issue of equitable tolling. When Amicus and the
 Secretary appeared at oral argument, 4 we inquired, sua
 sponte, as to whether pro se representation by one family
 member of another is permitted in federal courts. See Oral
 Arg. at 1:01-2:26. 5 Our inquiry was based on 28 U.S.C.
 § 1654, which provides that in all United States courts
 “parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally
 or by counsel,” which other circuit courts have interpreted
 as prohibiting non-lawyer parents from “litigat[ing] the
 claims of their minor children in federal court.” Myers
 v. Loudon Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir.
 2005); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2503(a) (“Parties to any suit in
 the United States Court of Federal Claims may appear be-
 fore a judge of that court in person or by attorney.”). It is
 also true that Fed. Cir. R. 47.3 provides that “[a]n individ-
 ual . . . may choose to be represented by counsel or to pro-
 ceed without counsel but may not be represented by a non-

     3   The Vaccine Act directed the Court of Federal
 Claims to promulgate procedural rules for Vaccine Act
 cases to “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and in-
 formal proceeding for the resolution of petitions.” 42
 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A).

     4   Parents did not participate in oral argument but
 did submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument. See
 ECF No. 58.
     5   Available     at     https://oralarguments.cafc.us
 courts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-2119_09262023.mp3.
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 8                                                   W. J. v. HHS

 member of the bar of this court,” and our court has on at
 least one occasion applied this rule to deny parents the op-
 portunity to represent their child in appealing denial of a
 Vaccine Act claim. See Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human
 Servs., 358 F.3d 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[C]iting Federal
 Circuit Rule 47.3, the Clerk of Court informed [the minor
 Vaccine Act claimant]’s parents that they could not repre-
 sent their son’s interests . . . in this court.”). Moreover, the
 Vaccine Act includes a provision for reimbursement of at-
 torney’s fees, which permits courts to award attorney’s fees
 and costs even for unsuccessful petitions “brought in good
 faith” and prohibits attorneys from charging their clients
 more than the fees that are awarded. See 42 U.S.C.
 § 300aa-15(e); see also Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 373-
 74 (2013).
      Following argument, the court ordered supplemental
 briefing on the representation question. See ECF No. 60.
 Having reviewed the supplemental briefing, we have deter-
 mined that this case does not require us to answer our own
 question. As we have already noted, no party raised this
 issue. Even after we ordered supplemental briefing, the
 government does not ask us to dismiss this appeal based
 on lack of a proper representative for Appellant. Addition-
 ally, in permitting Parents to proceed before us pro se, we
 are acting consistent with some of our own non-preceden-
 tial decisions. See, e.g., Miles v. Sec’y of Health & Human
 Servs., 769 F. App’x 925, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Rogero
 v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 748 F. App’x 996, 997
 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Padmanabhan v. Sec’y of Health & Hu-
 man Servs., 638 F. App’x 1013, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
 Moreover, it would be highly inefficient, and we think un-
 fair to Parents – who proceeded precisely as the Vaccine
 Rules and RCFC prescribe, and then proceeded here in a
 manner we have previously permitted, all without objec-
 tion from the government – to dismiss this now fully
 briefed and argued appeal, especially as it relates to a pe-
 tition filed nearly three years ago (based on injuries alleg-
 edly suffered beginning more than 17 years ago).
    We are aware that at least one judge of the Court of
 Federal Claims has recently suggested that the RCFC
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                  9

 permitting this type of pro se representation may need to
 be reexamined. See Ricks v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl.
 823, 824 n.1 (Fed. Cl. May 6, 2022) (contending that RCFC
 83.1(a)(3) “creates a disturbing uncertainty, i.e., whether
 [a claimant] consents to [a family member’s] representa-
 tion,” and consequently advocating that “[t]he Court’s
 Rules Committee should examine and potentially reform
 RCFC 83.1(a)(3)”). Nevertheless, for the reasons we have
 given above, we do not find it appropriate in this case to
 decide the representation question we alone injected into
 this appeal.
                               B
     A question first raised in Parents’ memorandum in lieu
 of oral argument is whether the tolling provision of 28
 U.S.C. § 2501, which sets out the statute of limitations that
 applies generally in the Court of Federal Claims, has ap-
 plicability in Vaccine Act cases. See Memorandum in Lieu
 of Oral Argument of Appellant W.J., ECF No. 58 at 1-2
 (Sep. 6, 2023). We received post-argument briefing on this
 subject as well. Because resolution of this issue could be
 dispositive, and it presents a pure question of law, we will
 resolve it. We decide that § 2501’s statute of limitations
 and tolling provision are not applicable here.
     Section 2501 sets forth the general statute of limita-
 tions, and a tolling provision, for claims filed in the Court
 of Federal Claims. It provides that:
     [1] Every claim of which the United States Court of
     Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred un-
     less the petition thereon is filed within six years af-
     ter such claim first accrues. . . .
     [2] . . .
     [3] A petition on the claim of a person under legal
     disability . . . at the time the claim accrues may be
     filed within three years after the disability ceases.
 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (numbers added). Paragraph [1] sets the
 statute of limitations at six years after the claim accrues,
 but not for a person under legal disability at the time his
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 10                                                 W. J. v. HHS

 claim accrues; paragraph [3] permits such a person to file
 his claim as late as three years after his disability ceases,
 a time which could be far longer than six years after it ac-
 crues. If paragraph [3], the tolling provision of § 2501, is
 applicable here, Appellant’s claim is timely because it is
 undisputed that W.J. still suffers from a legal disability
 and has at all pertinent times. We conclude, however, that
 neither § 2501’s statute of limitations nor its tolling provi-
 sion applies to Vaccine Act petitions.
     As an initial matter, paragraphs [1] and [3] go along
 with one another, such that claims subject to the six-year
 statute of limitations are also subject to the three-year toll-
 ing provision. Likewise, only claims that are governed by
 paragraph [1] are also governed by paragraph [3]. Para-
 graphs [1] and [3] are directly related to one another. Alt-
 hough in isolation paragraph [3] may appear as if it applies
 broadly to all claims filed in the Court of Federal Claims,
 in context it is clear that paragraph [3] only applies to
 claims with statutes of limitations established by para-
 graph [1]. These conclusions about the relationship be-
 tween paragraphs [1] and [3] are confirmed by the
 statutory history leading up to the present version of
 § 2501.
     Initially, the tolling provision appeared in § 1069 of the
 Revised Statutes of the United States as a proviso that was
 plainly linked to the six-year statute of limitations set out
 in that same section. See United States v. Greathouse, 166
 U.S. 601, 602-06 (1897) (discussing former statute); see also
 United States v. Morrow, 266 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1925) (“The
 general office of a proviso is to except something from the
 enacting clause, or to qualify and restrain its generality
 and prevent misinterpretation. Its grammatical and logi-
 cal scope is confined to the subject-matter of the principal
 clause. And although sometimes used to introduce inde-
 pendent legislation, the presumption is that, in accordance
 with its primary purpose, it refers only to the provision to
 which it is attached.”) (internal citations omitted). In 1911,
 the tolling provision was explicitly incorporated into the
 Tucker Act as a proviso to that statute’s six-year statute of
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                11

 limitations. See Judicial Code of 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475,
 § 156, 36 Stat. 1087, 1139 (1911). In 1926, when the stat-
 ute of limitations was codified in the first version of the
 U.S. Code as 28 U.S.C. § 262 (1926 ed.), the proviso lan-
 guage was omitted. Finally, in 1948, the current version of
 28 U.S.C. § 2501 incorporated the phrase “person under le-
 gal disability” but, consistent with the U.S. Code in 1926
 (and the 1940 ed.), left out the proviso language. Pub. L.
 No. 80-773, § 2501, 62 Stat. 869, 976 (1948).
     Notwithstanding the change in the codified language,
 we see no reason why the tolling provision in § 2501 should
 not still be read as a proviso to the six-year statute of limi-
 tations. The change in language between the Statute at
 Large and the U.S. Code in 1926, and thereafter, appears
 to be a purely editorial one. Furthermore, the parties have
 pointed to no authority nor any persuasive argument for
 reading the tolling provision of § 2501 independent from
 the six-year statute of limitations provision. Thus, the par-
 agraph [3] tolling provision is inapplicable to any petition
 not governed by the paragraph [1] six-year statute of limi-
 tations.
      Next, we conclude that § 2501’s six-year statute of lim-
 itations does not apply to Appellant’s Vaccine Act claim. In
 the Vaccine Act, Congress established a specific statute of
 limitations for claims based on vaccines (including MMR)
 set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table: 36 months after “the
 occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset
 or of the significant aggravation of such injury.” 42 U.S.C.
 § 300aa-16(a)(2). The Vaccine Act contains no tolling pro-
 vision. As we have previously explained, § 2501’s general
 provisions may be superseded by specific statutes setting
 out different periods for particular types of claims. See,
 e.g., Adams v. United States, 350 F.3d 1216, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
 2003) (holding that two- or three-year statute of limitations
 under Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) governs FLSA
 violation claims brought in Court of Federal Claims); Inter-
 Coastal Xpress, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1357, 1367-
 68 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that three-year filing period
 under Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”), rather than six-
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 12                                                W. J. v. HHS

 year period of § 2501, governs all actions brought under
 ICA); Pathman Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573,
 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Once a contractor elects to proceed
 under the Disputes Act, the six-year statute of limitations
 in 28 U.S.C. § 2501 is not applicable.”). As specific statutes
 typically control over more general ones, see, e.g., First Na-
 tionwide Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed.
 Cir. 2005), it follows that the specific limitations provision
 in the Vaccine Act governs Vaccine Act claims and the gen-
 eral provision of § 2501 does not.
     Since § 2501’s six-year statute of limitations does not
 apply to Vaccine Act claims, the tolling provision of § 2501
 is equally inapplicable. To be timely, then, Parents must
 have filed the petition no later than 36 months after the
 “occurrence of the first symptom or manifestation of onset
 or of the significant aggravation of” W.J.’s MMR vaccine-
 related injuries.
                              IV
      We now turn to the principal arguments raised by Par-
 ents and Amicus. We begin with equitable tolling, which
 is the focus of this appeal, and then address additional is-
 sues pressed by Parents.
                               A
     Parents and Amicus argue that the statute of limita-
 tions should have been equitably tolled, which would result
 in their petition being treated as having been timely filed.
 As we have already noted, Section 16(a)(2) of the Vaccine
 Act governs claims resulting from vaccines administered
 after October 1, 1988, and reads:
      if a vaccine-related injury occurred as a result of
      the administration of such vaccine, no petition may
      be filed for compensation under the Program for
      such injury after the expiration of 36 months after
      the date of the occurrence of the first symptom or
      manifestation of onset or of the significant aggra-
      vation of such injury.
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                13

 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2). This statute of limitations be-
 gins to run from “the first symptom or manifestation of an
 alleged vaccine injury,” regardless of whether or not that
 symptom is sufficient for diagnosis. See Carson v. Sec’y of
 Health & Human Servs., 727 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
 2013).
      Parents and Amicus assert that the petition filed on be-
 half of W.J. was timely because of equitable tolling. Equi-
 table tolling pauses or “tolls” a statutory limitations period,
 serving to extend otherwise explicit time limitations on fil-
 ing set by Congress. See Arellano v. McDonough, 598 U.S.
 1, 6 (2023). Such tolling is generally available “when a lit-
 igant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordi-
 nary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely
 action.” Lozano v. Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014). We have
 previously found that a court may equitably toll the Vac-
 cine Act’s limitations period, Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Hu-
 man Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc),
 and that mental incapacity may be a basis for equitable
 tolling, K.G. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 951 F.3d
 1374, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The doctrine of fraudulent con-
 cealment may also toll a statute of limitations. See, e.g.,
 Simmons Oil Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 86 F.3d
 1138, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
     Parents and Amicus assert that equitable tolling is
 warranted here based on (1) W.J.’s mental incapacity and
 inability to communicate, creating an extraordinary cir-
 cumstance, (2) W.J.’s minority status, and (3) the govern-
 ment’s fraudulent concealment of a connection between the
 vaccine and autism. We address each argument in turn.
                               1
     In support of their contention that W.J.’s mental inca-
 pacitation warrants equitable tolling, Parents and Amicus
 point to K.G. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 951 F.3d
 at 1382, in which we held that equitable tolling may be
 available to mentally incapacitated individuals under the
 Vaccine Act even if they had an appointed legal guardian
 during their incapacitation. There, K.G., an adult peti-
 tioner, had suffered from alcoholism, anxiety, depression,
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 14                                                 W. J. v. HHS

 and memory loss so severe that it ultimately resulted in a
 stay at an in-patient facility for three years. See id. at
 1377. K.G. was also found to have had such a strained and
 incommunicative relationship with her sister, her then-act-
 ing legal guardian and conservator, that the sister ulti-
 mately withdrew from those roles.           K.G.’s cognitive
 function ultimately improved and her conservatorship was
 terminated, after which she filed a petition for compensa-
 tion under the Vaccine Act. The Court of Federal Claims
 initially affirmed the special master’s denial of equitable
 tolling on the basis that the petitioner, K.G., had an acting
 legal guardian at the time of her mental incapacitation. On
 appeal, we declined to adopt a “per se rule” that the pres-
 ence of a legal guardian alone foreclosed equitable tolling.
 Id. at 1381-82. We then remanded for the special master
 to determine whether equitable tolling was appropriate in
 light of “all relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. In doing
 so, we explained that the special master would have to “an-
 alyze[] the facts to determine whether [the] legal guardian-
 ship alleviated the extraordinary circumstance” of the
 petitioner’s mental incapacity. Id. at 1381.
     K.G. further establishes that, in considering whether
 equitable tolling may be appropriate, the fact that “a men-
 tally incapacitated individual has a legal representative is
 just one of many factors that may further inform the dili-
 gence inquiry.” Id. at 1382. We also held:
      [t]he significance of a legal guardian may depend
      on a number of factors, including: the nature and
      sophistication of the guardian (parent, lawyer,
      family member, or third-party), the timing of the
      institution of the guardianship (before or after the
      vaccination, for example), the nature of the guard-
      ian’s rights and obligations under state law, the ex-
      tent to which the claimant’s mental incapacity
      interferes with her relationship and communica-
      tion with her guardian, the quality and nature of
      the guardian’s relationship with the claimant, and
      any conflicts of interest that would inhibit the
      guardian from bringing a Vaccine Act claim on the
      claimant’s behalf.
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 W. J. v. HHS                                                   15

 Id.
     Parents and Amicus contend that, here, the special
 master applied a per se rule, directly contrary to our hold-
 ing in K.G. We disagree. Instead, in her decision, the spe-
 cial master compared W.J.’s circumstances to those
 presented in K.G., correctly distinguishing them:
       Unlike K.G., W.J. was an infant at the time of his
       vaccination, and the petitioners, W.J.’s parents,
       were capable of filing a claim on his behalf. W.J.’s
       parents have not filed any evidence to suggest that
       they were incapacitated in any way during any
       time frame relevant to their petition. While the
       Court in K.G. confirmed an equitable tolling right
       for incapacitated individuals, nothing in the deci-
       sion negated a legal representative’s rights and re-
       sponsibilities under the Vaccine Act. . . .
       [P]etitioners had the right and responsibility to
       bring a timely claim on W.J.’s behalf. . . .
       W.J.’s “mental incapacity” does not serve as an “ex-
       traordinary circumstance.” Petitioners, as W.J.’s
       legal representatives [and] his parents, had the
       ability to file a petition 36 months from the onset
       of the earliest symptom or manifestation of W.J.’s
       injury. The same is true for all petitions brought
       on behalf of all minors. Parents or other legal rep-
       resentatives must file the petition on behalf of a mi-
       nor within the applicable statute of limitations.
 App’x 38.
     This analysis amounts to more than application of the
 per se rule we declined to adopt in K.G. The special master
 did not simply invoke the presence of legal guardians and,
 as a consequence, decline to apply equitable tolling. In-
 stead, in compliance with our instruction in K.G., the spe-
 cial master considered whether W.J.’s mental incapacity
 constituted an extraordinary circumstance notwithstand-
 ing Parents’ guardianship and found, based on a lack of ev-
 idence, that it did not. We find the special master’s
 extraordinary circumstance findings, and the subsequent
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 16                                                W. J. v. HHS

 affirmance by the Court of Federal Claims, were not an
 abuse of discretion.
      Furthermore, we agree that the facts here do not sup-
 port equitable tolling. R.J. and A.J. are the parents and
 legal guardians of W.J. and have been throughout W.J.’s
 life, including when he received the MMR vaccine. As
 W.J.’s parents and legal guardians, Parents were expressly
 authorized to bring a claim on W.J.’s behalf. See 42 U.S.C.
 § 300aa-11(b)(1)(A) (permitting legal representatives of mi-
 nors or disabled individuals to file petitions on their be-
 half);    42 U.S.C. § 300aa-33(2) (defining             “legal
 representative” to include “a parent or an individual who
 qualifies as a legal guardian under State law”). Unlike in
 K.G., here, Parents have not shown any reason why they,
 as legal guardians, could not have filed the petition within
 the statutory timeframe, despite W.J.’s mental incapacita-
 tion. Indeed, Parents made other medical decisions on be-
 half of W.J. throughout this exact timeframe. See, e.g.,
 App’x 180-84. There is no suggestion that Parents have a
 strained relationship with their son or that there are any
 conflicts of interest that would have dissuaded them from
 filing a petition earlier. Although, as we held in K.G., men-
 tal incapacity of an individual with a legal guardian may
 still merit equitable tolling, it does not always.
     Therefore, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims
 and the special master that Parents failed to plead facts
 establishing that W.J.’s mental incapacitation constituted
 extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling.
                               2
     Amicus argues that minority tolling should apply, con-
 tending that the statutory purposes underlying the Vaccine
 Act demonstrate Congress’ intent for a child’s minority sta-
 tus to qualify as a per se extraordinary circumstance war-
 ranting tolling. We are unpersuaded.
     The plain language of the Vaccine Act does not include,
 or even suggest, minority tolling, and Amicus does not con-
 tend otherwise. Instead, Amicus points to legislative his-
 tory to demonstrate the pro-child and pro-claimant nature
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 W. J. v. HHS                                               17

 of the Act. But the passages on which Amicus relies only
 support Congress’ general intent to compensate injured
 children or its consideration of staying co-pending state law
 actions during the pendency of Vaccine Act claims. See
 generally H.R. Rep. No. 99-908 (1986). Even assuming leg-
 islative history could make up for a lack of statutory text
 (a dubious proposition we need not reach), Amicus points
 to no statements by any individual legislator specifically
 contemplating minority tolling. Given that Congress cre-
 ated the Vaccine Act to “protect [the Nation’s] children,”
 H.R. Rep No. 99-908, at 4 (1986) (emphasis added), and set
 forth an explicit statute of limitations for filing petitions,
 we conclude that the lack of any statutory provision provid-
 ing for minority tolling is conclusive proof that Congress
 did not intend to provide for such tolling.
                               3
     Fraudulent concealment may toll a statute of limita-
 tions where, “assuming due diligence on the part of the
 plaintiff . . . the misconduct in question has been concealed,
 or is of such character as to conceal itself.” Simmons, 86
 F.3d at 1142 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] mere
 failure to come forward with facts that would provide the
 plaintiff with a basis for suit does not constitute fraudulent
 concealment.” Id. at 1143.
     Parents argue they have shown that the government
 “fostered and promoted the scientific finding” that there is
 no link between the MMR vaccine and autism. App’x 19
 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this way, they con-
 tend, the government concealed the evidence Parents
 needed to file their petition in a more timely manner. Even
 reading Parents’ petition in the light most favorable to
 W.J., it defeats their contention of fraudulent concealment.
 By Parents’ own account, their petition includes “hard evi-
 dence of a link between vaccines and autism,” including
 reference to over 5,100 cases filed by parents seeking com-
 pensation for their child’s autism on the basis of a vaccine-
 related injury. App’x 19, 41; see also App’x 39, 58, 102-04.
 Hearings for these cases took place between 2007 and 2009,
 confirming that evidence of the type Parents contend was
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 18                                               W. J. v. HHS

 fraudulently concealed by the government was available in
 the timeframe when W.J.’s petition would have been
 timely. Parents have failed to adequately allege that their
 exercise of reasonable diligence could not have revealed to
 them the basis for their claim at that time.
     Parents have additionally failed to plead any facts to
 suggest intentional concealment by the government; in-
 deed, to the contrary, they have disavowed any allegation
 that the government engaged in intentional fraud. App’x
 59 (“[Appellants] do not explicitly claim that these denials
 of any connection between vaccines and autism by the fed-
 eral government and the vaccine manufacturers are inten-
 tionally fraudulent.”).    But equitable tolling is only
 warranted when the “fraud has been concealed” and the
 party alleging concealment has exercised due diligence “in
 coming to the knowledge of the fraud.” Bailey v. Glover, 88
 U.S. 342, 349 (1874); see also Simmons, 86 F.3d at 1142.
     For these reasons, fraudulent concealment cannot
 serve as a basis for equitable tolling in this case.
                              B
    Parents assert additional errors by the special master,
 some of which we discuss below. None has merit.
                              1
     Parents argue that Congress declined to authorize spe-
 cial masters to entertain or rule upon Rule 12(b)(6) motions
 to dismiss. They point to Section 300aa-12(d)(2)(C) of the
 Vaccine Act, which specifically entrusts special masters
 with the power to rule on summary judgment motions but
 does not refer to motions to dismiss. However, the lan-
 guage of the statute is merely exemplary, pointing to pro-
 cedural rules that may be adopted “includ[ing] the
 opportunity for summary judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-
 12(d)(2)(C) (emphasis added). The Vaccine Rules reiterate
 this inclusiveness, explaining that “[t]he special master
 may decide a case on the basis of written submissions with-
 out conducting an evidentiary hearing,” and that “[s]ub-
 missions may include a motion for summary judgment.”
 Vaccine Rule 8(d) (emphasis added). Nothing in this
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 W. J. v. HHS                                              19

 language, nor any other provision of the Vaccine Act, ex-
 cludes 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.
     Additionally, “[t]he statute and the Vaccine Rules give
 the special masters broad authority in conducting proceed-
 ings under the Act.” Simanski v. Sec’y of Health & Human
 Servs., 671 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This broad
 authority is embodied in, for example, Vaccine Rule 1(b),
 providing that “[i]n any matter not specifically addressed
 by the Vaccine Rules, the special master may regulate ap-
 plicable practice, consistent with these rules and with the
 purpose of the Vaccine Act, to decide the case promptly and
 efficiently.” Moreover, Vaccine Rule 1(c) provides that the
 RCFC, which include RCFC 12(b)(6), apply to the extent
 that they are consistent with the Vaccine Rules. That
 these authorities all contemplate and certainly do not pro-
 hibit motion to dismiss practice is confirmed by the long
 experience of special masters entertaining such motions in
 countless proceedings.
     We therefore find that special masters have jurisdiction
 to rule on motions to dismiss.
                              2
     The doctrine of separation of powers did not bar the
 special master from dismissing W.J.’s claims. As an initial
 matter, we do not agree with Parents that the special mas-
 ter raised the statute of limitations issue sua sponte. In-
 stead, as the special master observed during the initial
 status conference, the possible untimeliness of W.J.’s
 claims is evident on the face of the petition. See App’x 68.
 The petition alleges that W.J. received his first MMR vac-
 cine in 2005. As the petition was not filed until 2021, 17
 years later, the special master – who, after all, solely han-
 dles cases arising under the Vaccine Act – noticed that the
 question of whether W.J.’s claims were timely was an obvi-
 ous concern.
     In any event, special masters, just like judges, have
 wide latitude in managing their docket. See Landis v. N.
 Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (“[E]very court [has
 inherent power] to control the disposition of the causes on
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 20                                                 W. J. v. HHS

 its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
 counsel, and for litigants.”). This broad discretion is explic-
 itly outlined in the statute and the Vaccine Rules. See, e.g.,
 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2)(A) (stating that Vaccine Rules
 shall “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and infor-
 mal proceeding for the resolution of petitions”); Vaccine
 Rule 3(b) (“The special master is responsible for . . . con-
 ducting all proceedings . . . [and] endeavoring to make the
 proceedings expeditious, flexible, and less adversarial.”).
 Special masters, like judges, can prioritize potentially case-
 dispositive issues at the start of a case, in an exercise of
 their discretion. See, e.g., Vivid Tech., Inc. v. Am. Sci. &
 Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“When a
 particular issue may be dispositive, the court may stay dis-
 covery concerning other issues until the critical issue is re-
 solved.”).
     Here, the special master acted well within her discre-
 tion in identifying a concern regarding the statute of limi-
 tations at the outset of the case. That the government
 happened to be the party filing the motion to dismiss,
 which they very likely would have filed regardless of the
 special master’s inquiry and which Parents had the oppor-
 tunity to oppose, does not convert the special master’s rou-
 tine case management action into a separation-of-powers
 issue.
                               3
     Parents next argue that the trial court and special mas-
 ter erred in dismissing their fraudulent concealment claim
 because they misapplied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading
 standard and considered material outside the pleadings.
 We disagree. Rather, the court and special master merely,
 and appropriately, found that the facts pleaded in the peti-
 tion did not provide the support necessary to adequately
 allege fraudulent concealment. The court and special mas-
 ter properly evaluated Parents’ petition, including by as-
 suming all pleaded facts to be true, and reached the
 conclusion that the petition did not state a fraudulent con-
 cealment claim on which relief could be granted, a conclu-
 sion we have reviewed and now uphold.
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 W. J. v. HHS                                           21

     We therefore affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ con-
 clusion that equitable tolling was not appropriate and,
 thus, that Appellants’ petition was not timely filed under
 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(a)(2).
                             V
     We have considered Parents’ remaining arguments but
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.
                       AFFIRMED
                          COSTS
 No costs.