Court Opinion

ID: 9588579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:53.52434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:22.157985
License: Public Domain

Harwell, Justice
(dissenting):
Under our scope of review after a grant or denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), “any evidence” of probative value to support the court’s findings is sufficient to uphold those findings on appeal. Griffin v. Warden, 277 S. C. 288, 286 S. E. (2d) 145 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 942, 103 S. Ct. 255, 74 L. Ed. (2d) 199 (1982). The majority opinion ignores this scope of review and apparently abandons it. Rather than searching the record for evidence to support the trial court’s findings, the majority has substituted its view of the facts for that of the trial judge. Certainly, the majority of this court cannot conclude that no evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
A PCR judge must analyze the trial record and the testimony introduced at the PCR hearing to determine whether a guilty plea was taken in accordance with constitutional standards. Vickery v. State, 258 S. C. 33, 186 S. E. (2d) 827 (1972).
The trial record amply supports the lower court’s finding that the pleas were not voluntarily and intelligently entered under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. (2d) 274 (1969). This Court has stated that the judge taking a plea must be certain that the accused understands the charge and the consequences of the plea and that the record indicates a factual basis for the plea. “The court’s warning should include an explanation of the defendant’s waiver of constitutional rights and a realistic picture of all sentencing possibilities. Furthermore, abandonment of these rights cannot be due to ignorance or incomprehension for a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct, it is a conviction.” State v. Armstrong, 263 S. C. 594, 211 S. E. (2d) 889 (1975).
*135The trial record is devoid of any indication that the respondents understood the possible consequences of their pleas. The trial j udge asked respondent Moses his age, marital status, education, occupation, and whether he was in jail. He then informed him of the indictment and asked, “Are these your pleas?” and “Are you guilty?” The judge asked respondents Harres and Lanford a similar series of questions, and added, “Did you enter these pleas freely and voluntarily?” The judge made no inquiry or warning concerning a waiver of constitutional rights; nor were the respondents given a realistic picture of sentencing possibilities. In fact, they were not informed of the maximum permissible sentences, and the sentences the judge imposed exceeded those authorized by the Code.1
The record from the PCR hearing also contains evidentiary support for the finding that the pleas were not entered intelligently. The respondents’ lawyer, a general practitioner who “doesn’t handle a large number of criminal cases”, testified that he did not inform the respondents of the sentencing possibilities. He told them that, by entering a plea before Judge Timmerman, they would probably not have to serve time. He could not recall whether he was even aware, at the time, of the maximum permissible sentence. The respondents testified that they did not see their attorney until the day they pled. Two of them dealt with him by telephone but did not discuss sentencing possibilities. The other respondent did not talk to the lawyer until the day of the plea.
The majority relies upon the respondents’ testimony at the PCR hearing. This testimony reflected at most a layman’s general familiarity with criminal justice system. The majority refers to the respondent Lanford’s testimony that he would, in any event, have pled guilty, citing Whetsell v. State, 276 S. C. 295, 277 S. E. (2d) 891 (1981). However, Lanford *136merely stated that he would have pled even had he been told he was waiving appellate rights. In Whetsell v. State, the trial judge had advised the defendants of their right to a jury trial and of the maximum possible sentence.
My brethren make much of the respondents’ judge-shopping. This factor is irrelevant in our scope of review. We must only determine whether any evidence supports the PCR court’s finding that the pleas were not intelligently entered. The evidence, from both the trial record and the PCR hearing, supports the grant of PCR. This Court’s scope of review does not allow us to substitute our judgment of the facts for that of the trial judge when his findings have evidentiary support.
I would, accordingly, affirm.
Ness, J., concurs.

 The trial judge sentenced respondents Moses and Harres to four years incarceration and a $4,000 fine, suspended upon service of nine months and five years probation. Respondent Lanford was given concurrent sentences pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act and ordered to be confined for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years. All of these sentences were improper. Code §§ 16-15-160 and 16-15-220 (1976) were repealed by Act No. 495 (§§ 16-15-310 and 16-15-430).' The maximum permissible punishment for a first offense is a fine no greater than $1,000 or imprisonment for no more than one year, or both.