Court Opinion

ID: 9858313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:20:07.354336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:54.763871
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(concurring).
We granted this writ because there was a conflict in the jurisprudence between the Second Circuit Court of Appeal and the Third Circuit Court of Appeal. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal in In Re State in Interest of Elliott, 206 So.2d 802 (1968), declared R.S. 13:1579.1 unconstitutional insofar as it permitted “ * * * any character of evidence, including hearsay evidence and opinion evidence which the court, in its discretion, may deem proper * * * (Emphasis supplied.) Whether a juvenile court proceeding involves the possible custodial care of a juvenile in a state quasi-penal institution is immaterial in determining the application of this statute. In my opinion In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), cannot be distinguished on the basis that it applies only to a case involving commitment of a juvenile “to an institution in which his freedom is curtailed”. Every hearing involving the custody of a juvenile is a hearing in which that child’s future freedom is threatened. It is also a hearing at which fundamental parental rights may be threatened. The basic objection to hearsay testimony is that it contravenes the constitutional right to confront those who accuse or testify against a party. If hearsay testimony is to be admitted in juvenile hearings, a safeguard for the protection of this constitutional right of confrontation should be included. At least the names of those from whom the hearsay evidence has been acquired should be divulged to the party at interest so that if he desires, they may be subpoenaed into the juvenile court hearing for confrontation. In the absence of such a safeguard, a provision which gives to the court the vast discretion of admitting any character of evidence, including hearsay, is a denial of due process. The ills which such a statutory provision visits upon the parties appearing in these courts are apparent from the case before us.
*571I am of the opinion that the Second Circuit Court of Appeal in Elliott correctly-viewed the statutory provision, and that the Third Circuit was in error in its holding in the instant case. I also believe that although the majority opinion can stand upon the factual determination made, we are as a court remiss in our duty to settle the law when there are differences of opinion between the appellate courts.
For these reasons I respectfully concur.