Court Opinion

ID: 9641757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:39:50.74408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:39.593361
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

dissenting in part and concurring in part:

While I agree with that part of the Court’s opinion affirming the convictions in this case, I do not agree that the death sentence imposed upon Harris must be vacated on the ground that his election to waive the intervention of a jury at the capital sentencing hearing was not knowing and voluntary.
The majority reasons that Harris’jury waiver was ineffective because the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that he was advised of the provisions of Maryland Code (1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413 (k) (2), i.e., "If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of *341imprisonment for life.” The Court, adopting Harris’ arguments, concludes that the failure of the trial judge to specifically inform Harris of the substance of this section, when explaining the capital sentencing procedure to him, resulted in his being unaware of what he was relinquishing in waiving a jury, namely, a sentencing proceeding where jury unanimity would be required for death, but only one holdout would result in the imposition of a life sentence. Because I believe the majority’s reasons for vacating the death sentence to be badly strained and totally at odds with the governing law, I respectfully dissent.
I
Maryland’s death penalty statute requires a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life. Section 413 (b) (3) of Art. 27 specifies that the sentencing hearing may be held "[b]efore the court alone, if a jury sentencing proceeding is waived by the defendant.” Maryland Rule 735 b prohibits the court from accepting a jury trial waiver "until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court by the court, by the State’s Attorney, by the attorney for the defendant, or by any combination thereof, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived a jury trial.” While this rule, by its terms, is applicable only at the guilt or innocence stage of the trial process, and not at a capital sentencing proceeding, nevertheless I think it properly states the substance of the controlling law in this case, i.e., that to constitute an effective waiver of the statutory right to a jury in a capital sentencing proceeding, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary.
The determination of whether a jury is knowingly and voluntarily waived turns on whether the waiver constitutes an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, namely, that the defendant had full knowledge of his l ight to a jury and a basic understanding of the nature of a *342jury proceeding; the imparting of detailed information regarding the functioning of the jury is not an essential prerequisite to a valid waiver. See Dortch v. State, 290 Md. 229, 428 A.2d 1220 (1981); Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 1302 (1979); State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 273 A.2d 156 (1971). Whether a jury was knowingly and voluntarily waived is not governed by any precise litany or fixed ritual as it once was under former Rule 735. See Countess v. State, supra. Rather, that determination now depends upon the particular facts in each case, taking into account the relevant circumstances in their totality as disclosed by the record. Dortch v. State, supra, 290 Md. at 235.
The record in this case discloses that at the outset of the sentencing proceeding the trial judge advised Harris that he had a right to a jury trial. The court explained:
"[A] jury trial means that you have a right to participate, along with the State, in selecting twelve people who would be the jury in the case. Once they are selected, they are sworn in and they become the jury, and they hear all the testimony and all the evidence in the case . . . .”
Thereafter, the trial judge extensively outlined the substance of the capital sentencing procedure as set forth in § 413, explaining in detail the provisions of that section. He told Harris that the jury would have to determine whether the State proved the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. The court advised Harris that the State relied on only one aggravating circumstance, which it explained to him. The court next told Harris that "[i]f all twelve of the jurors agree that that aggravating circumstance has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then, the sentence in this case would be life.” Asked by the court if he understood, Harris said that he did. The trial judge next stated that if the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance was so proven, it would then consider whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, any of eight mitigating cir*343cumstances set forth in § 413 were established. The court explained each of the mitigating circumstances to Harris, advising him that "if all twelve of the jurors should find that there are not any mitigating circumstances, then, the sentence would be death.” The court continued its explanation, stating:
"If all twelve of the jurors agree that there is a mitigating circumstance or more than one mitigating circumstance, then, they would then proceed to weigh the mitigating circumstance or the mitigating circumstances to see whether the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Now, if the jury finds that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then, the sentence shall be death. If the jury were to find that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence would then be life imprisonment.”
Asked by the court if he understood, Harris said that he did. The court next advised Harris that "just as much as you have a right to a jury trial, you have a right to waive the jury trial ... or the right to have the jury make this determination in this sentencing procedure.” The trial judge explained that if Harris waived his right to a jury, the court would decide the same issues as would the jury had he elected to have a jury pass upon his sentence. Again asked whether he understood, Harris said that he did. The court then stated: "Fm not telling you what you should do ... 1 want you to make your decision as to whether you want to have a jury trial here this morning or do you want to waive your right to a jury trial.” Harris replied: "I will waive my right to a jury trial.” Asked again whether he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, Harris replied, "Yes, sir.” The court then asked both the State’s Attorney and defense counsel whether there was anything he had not explained; each answered in the negative.
*344It is clear to me that the trial judge painstakingly explained to Harris the choice between a jury and a court sentencing proceeding. None of the court’s advice was erroneous and nothing which it said could possibly have misled Harris in making his decision. Knowing of his right to a jury sentencing proceeding, and being afforded a basic understanding of the nature of that proceeding by the court, I conclude that Harris intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily relinquished his statutory right to a jury sentencing hearing.
That the record does not disclose that the court told Harris of the provisions of § 413 (k) (2) does not, of itself, render his jury trial waiver unknowing or involuntary. To so conclude is to construct a per se rule out of thin air, requiring that that item of information must be imparted to the defendant in all cases as an absolute prerequisite to a jury trial waiver in a capital sentencing proceeding. Such a rule, as I see it, represents an abrupt departure from our recent cases which espouse the principle that no particular litany need be followed in adjudging whether a jury trial has been knowingly waived or, in like vein, whether a guilty plea was knowingly or voluntarily entered. See Dortch, supra; State v. Priet, 289 Md. 267, 424 A.2d 349 (1981); Davis v. State, 278 Md. 103, 361 A.2d 113 (1976). Under the rudderless rule adopted by the majority, trial judges are left to their own devices in attempting to ascertain what other bits of information concerning jury functions, deliberations and actions must be imparted to the defendant before a jury waiver can properly be declared as knowing and voluntary. The majority’s holding today carries us over the edge of a slippery slope — a slope without contours, without any clearly marked path, a slope without any definitive bottom.
II
At the very least, the majority should, instead of vacating the death sentence, apply the rule set forth in State v. Zimmerman, supra, and leave resolution of the question of *345whether Harris knowingly waived a jury sentencing proceeding for consideration under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, Code, Art. 27, § 645A, cl seq. In Zimmerman, as here, it was claimed that the right to a jury trial had not been knowingly and voluntarily waived. We there focused on "the time and place for challenging the knowingness of ... [a jury] waiver,” concluding that the matter was best resolved in a post conviction proceeding where evidence could be taken and facts developed to ascertain whether a jury trial waiver was knowing and voluntary. 261 Md. at 12-13. Under the Zimmerman rationale, after the facts have been fully developed at the post conviction evidentiary hearing, the appellate court will have a full record before it and "will not be placed in the position of speculating as to whether the complaint may be appellate afterthought.” See Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 545, 386 A.2d 336 (1978). As we recently pointed out in Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), the provisions of the Post Conviction Procedure Act apply to any person "under sentence of death or imprisonment.” Section 645A (a). Indeed, in Johnson, we affirmed the continuing viability of the principle enunciated in Zimmerman. We declined in Johnson to consider on direct appeal an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, stating that such a claim, not having been raised at trial, was more appropriately considered in a post conviction proceeding. That same course should be followed in the present case to permit a studied evaluation, upon a proper record, as to whether Harris’ jury trial waiver was, in fact, knowing and voluntary.
It is by no means unlikely that Harris was fully advised by his attorney, or otherwise understood the provisions of § 413 (k) (2). If so, it would be a travesty to afford him a new sentencing hearing on the ground that he did not know of the provisions of this section when he so clearly waived his jury trial right. To insist that an appellate court reach its conclusion with full information before it in no way deprives Harris of any rights. As in Covington, supra, 282 Md. at 545-46, we think this procedure is "by far the sounder approach to the administration of justice.”
*346Judge Smith authorizes me to say that he joins in the views expressed herein. Judge Rodowsky concurs with the views expressed herein, except as to Part I of this dissenting and concurring opinion.