Court Opinion

ID: 9757154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:20:47.019386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:32.020656
License: Public Domain

*579VERNIERO, J.,
dissenting.
This case is not about an uninsured motorist whose car accidentally collided with an unsuspecting pedestrian. Rather, as the trial court explicitly found, it is about a perpetrator who escaped arrest by using an automobile as ah instrument to injure a police officer acting in pursuit of the perpetrator himself. The trial court’s finding was consistent with an investigative report filed by the officer’s partner, an eyewitness to the incident. That report indicates that “[t]he driver ... with disregard to human life deliberately steered for and struck [the officer] sending him to the ground as he attempted to seek cover.”
On those facts, I do not believe that the trial court erred in following this Court’s dictum in Lindstrom v. Hanover Ins. Co. that courts must view uninsured-motorist (UM) coverage from the perspective of the uninsured tortfeasor. 138 N.J. 242, 249, 649 A.2d 1272 (1994). Assume for the moment, however, that it did. In an alternate portion of its ruling, the trial court also considered events from the perspective of the officer, the injured plaintiff. The trial court explained:
From the testimony of Shaw and taking into account the narrative of the event in question as is contained in the police reports (J3EYD), I find as a fact that the incident causing Shaw’s injury was not an “accident” within the contemplation of the applicable law or the NJM policy (P2EVD) such as would entitle him to recover UM benefits. Moreover, even if considered from the perspective of plaintiff, I find that Shaw’s injury was caused by the clearly intentional conduct of the uninsured tortfeasor who tried to run Shaw down so as to escape arrest. Accordingly, it is my determination that plaintiff Shaw is not entitled to recover UM benefits from NJM because Shaw did not sustain an injury caused by an “accident” involving an uninsured vehicle, which is the predicate, according to the policy language, for such recovery.
[ (Emphasis added).]
Thus, the trial court explicitly found that plaintiffs assailant intentionally caused plaintiffs injuries. Adopting either the motorist’s or victim’s perspective, the trial court was satisfied that no accident had occurred. (I acknowledge that under the majority’s approach the intentional aspects of a tortfeasor’s conduct are of no moment to a victim. Because I would adhere to Lindstrom, the *580trial court’s findings in that regard are still relevant to my analysis.)
Writing for the unanimous panel below, Judge Lintner correctly stated: “Applying ... principles [of appellate review], we are satisfied from our review of the evidence that [the trial court’s] finding, that plaintiffs injuries were caused by intentional conduct when an uninsured hit-and-run driver tried to run him down in order to effectuate his escape, is unassailable.” Shaw v. City of Jersey City, 346 N.J.Super. 219, 232-33, 787 A.2d 268 (App.Div.2002). I would follow those basic tenets that require us in these circumstances to accept the trial court’s determination. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471, 724 A.2d 234 (1999) (observing that appellate court cannot disturb lower court's finding that “could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The analogy to the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund (UCJF or Fund) is imperfect and, in my view, unpersuasive. “Accident” under the UCJF merely denotes a procedural term or timing mechanism, e.g., that a claim under the Fund must be filed “within 90 days after the accident.” N.J.S.A 39:6-65. The Fund’s substantive provision does not refer to “accident” at all, requiring only that the injury “arises out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle[.]” N.J.S.A 39:6-78. In contrast, the UM statute requires as a claim element that a claimant’s injuries be “caused by aecident[.]” N.J.S.A 17:28.1.1a. Those textual distinctions are critical. They evince a legislative intent, more fully described in Lindstrom and by the Appellate Division in this case, to exclude recovery for intentionally-inflicted injuries in the UM context.
Although I agree with the majority that the Legislature designed the UM endorsement to unburden the UCJF, I remain unconvinced that lawmakers intended to provide the type of remedy sought here. Courts have declined to read “accident” into the UCJF’s substantive provision, instead allowing recovery for *581intentional torts. Proskurnja v. Elder, 73 N.J.Super. 466, 476, 180 A.2d 200 (Law Div.1962) (refusing to impose Fund restrictions not expressly contained in statute). Declining to draw a restrictive inference in the UCJF context, however, is not the same as declining to enforce a plainly-written limitation, such as the one evident in the UM statute. The differences in language between the UM and Fund provisions are sufficient to warrant our affirming the judgments below.
Without question, a police officer injured in the line of duty is entitled to compensation and relief. In that regard, plaintiff received a workers’ compensation award arising from his injuries. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 104 N.J. 1, 13, 514 A.2d 832 (1986) (observing that when automobile insurance coverage is denied to claimant, system often provides “other sources of recovery, such as ... workers’ compensation benefits”). Absent a clearer statement by the Legislature, I would not engraft onto the present system an ability to recover under the UM statute when the underlying conduct unquestionably is intentional in nature.
As an alternate basis for the Court’s holding, the majority cites the doctrine of reasonable expectations. Generally, that doctrine becomes relevant when an insured’s policy contains ambiguous language. See Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595, 775 A.2d 1262 (2001) (stating that courts rely on expectations of insured “[wjhen there is ambiguity in an insurance contract”). Briefly put, I would not invoke the doctrine because “accident” is unambiguous when considered in the ordinary sense of that term and through the prism of simple common sense. Ibid, (observing that “[i]n the first instance, the words of an insurance policy are to be given their plain, ordinary meaning”).
One way to resolve this dispute is to view the incident from neither party’s perspective, but rather, as suggested above, to consider whether it was an “accident” within the commonly-understood meaning of that term. The Supreme Court of Washington essentially adopted that approach in Roller v. Stonewall, 115 Wash.2d 679, 801 P.2d 207 (1990). The court stated, “[a] loss *582is accidental when it occurs without design, intent, or obvious motivation.” Id. at 210 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It added: “Thus, the perspective of the insured as opposed to the tortfeasor is not a relevant inquiry. Either an incident is an accident or not.” Ibid.
After today’s holding declaring that a perpetrator’s attempt to run down a police officer constituted an “accident” under the UM law, I have difficulty discerning any future fact pattern that would not be subject to the same determination. This Court once warned, albeit within the context of personal injury protection (PIP), “that section four [of the PIP statute], however broad its protection for injuries substantially related to the use of an automobile, is not designed to function as general crime insurance.” Lindstrom, supra, 138 N.J. at 253, 649 A.2d 1272. I believe that the same is true of the UM statute.
One final point. That New Jersey has struggled with the high costs of automobile insurance is no secret. See, e.g., In re Am. Reliance Ins. Co., 251 N.J.Super. 541, 545, 598 A.2d 1219 (App.Div.1991) (tracing history of this State’s “intractable” insurance problems), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 556, 606 A.2d 369 (1992). Given that reality, I would exercise restraint before overruling that portion of Lindstrom that has been on the books for nearly a decade without objection from the Legislature. I adhere to a prior sentiment: “The Legislature has spoken time and again on the issue of insurance reform. Perhaps it is time for another look; if so, lawmakers, not judges, must drive any effort to revise the statute.” Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 343, 744 A.2d 175 (2000) (Verniero, J., dissenting).
To summarize: In a noble effort to interpret the term “accident” with all favorable inferences to the insured, the Court effectively has written that term out of the UM statute. I would affirm the dictum, carefiilly expressed in Lindstrom, supra, that UM coverage does not apply “to injuries caused by an act that is an accident from the victim’s perspective but that is intended by the actor.” 138 N.J. at 249, 649 A.2d 1272. I would not disturb *583the trial court’s finding, based on testimonial and documentary evidence, that from either the tortfeasor’s or victim’s perspective, plaintiff did not sustain an injury “caused by accident” for purposes of UM coverage. For the above reasons, as well as for those expressed in Judge Lintner’s meticulous and persuasive opinion, I would affirm the Appellate Division’s judgment in all respects.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and PRESSLER — 6.
For affirmance — Justice YERNIERO — 1.