Court Opinion

ID: 9481945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:36:02.924416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:40.331782
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Lloyd Schlup was twenty-four years old when he was sentenced to die for his part in murdering Arthur Dade, a fellow inmate in the Missouri State Penitentiary. While I agree with the court that it is best to resolve this case by ruling on its merits, see ante at 638-39, I disagree with the court’s conclusion that Schlup was not prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffectiveness during the penalty phase. Accordingly, I dissent.
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Once the jury had convicted Schlup of capital murder, it was certain to find a statutory aggravating circumstance: that Schlup had committed the murder while an inmate.1 Consequently, Schlup’s life depended on whether his lawyer could marshal enough mitigating evidence to counteract that aggravating circumstance. At the penalty hearing, however, Schlup’s counsel called only two witnesses in mitigation: Schlup and his mother.
On direct examination, Schlup testified about the circumstances surrounding his previous assault convictions and denied participating in the Dade murder. The *643State cross-examined him about the circumstances of the Dade murder and his previous convictions.
Schlup’s mother testified that her son had suffered through a horrible childhood. She stated that as a young boy he had endured many beatings from his father, some of which were so severe that Schlup required hospitalization. She asserted his father had tried to sexually abuse Schlup on more than one occasion. She stated that Schlup developed a severe drug problem, and that he consulted psychiatrists, psychologists, and drug counselors in an attempt to rehabilitate himself. Schlup’s mother testified that her son had been planning to marry at the time the murder occurred and stated she thought her son was finally maturing.
Schlup’s trial counsel had interviewed Schlup’s mother before the penalty hearing. He testified at the 27.26 hearing that he never considered the use of testimony from a psychiatrist or a psychologist at the sentencing phase of the trial. Indeed, Schlup’s counsel stated that he had not even researched in any respect the possibility of presenting mitigating evidence from any source other than Schlup and Schlup’s mother.
As a result, Schlup’s counsel never consulted with professionals who could have testified about the effect that Schlup’s social history had on him. He never consulted the psychiatrists, psychologists, or counselors who treated Schlup.
Counsel’s performance fell far short of what reasonably competent counsel would do. His total lack of investigation was not the result of a strategic decision to present only limited mitigating evidence. This is not a case where counsel investigated the possibility of presenting mitigating evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state and family situation but concluded that the evidence would not be helpful. Compare Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 800, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991). This is not a case where counsel was instructed by the defendant not to investigate possibly mitigating evidence. Compare Bolder v. Armontr-out, 921 F.2d 1359, 1362 n. 4, 1366 (8th Cir.1990).
Rather, this is a case where counsel inexplicably failed to investigate even though he was aware generally of a psychological and social history that contained information indicative of severe disturbances. This history would have put reasonably competent counsel on notice to further investigate Schlup’s psychological condition.
“Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). While such evidence may in some cases be given little weight, it may be “particularly relevant” in cases involving young offenders. See id; see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397-99, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1823-24, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (family testimony and evidence of a difficult upbringing are all admissible as evidence of mitigating circumstances); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 F.2d 1298, 1304-07 (8th Cir.1991) (counsel ineffective in capital case for failing to thoroughly investigate defendant’s social history, psychiatric disorders, disadvantaged childhood, and drinking problems); Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 299, 300-03 (1983) (describing the tremendous impact such evidence can have in capital cases).
Here, the trial counsel’s failure to present psychiatric testimony was not a result of reasoned consideration. It was not a strategic decision. While the absence of mitigating evidence does not inexorably lead to a conclusion of ineffective counsel, counsel is ineffective when it fails to discover such evidence because of neglect. Laws v. Armontrout, 863 F.2d 1377, 1384-85 (8th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 415 (1989). Although this was counsel’s first penalty phase proceeding, he never consulted with more experienced counsel. Cf. Kenley, 937 F.2d at 1299-1301 (ineffective counsel was inexperienced and had *644never tried a capital case, yet sought little outside assistance in preparing his case).
The majority opinion does not seriously dispute the fact that Schlup’s counsel was ineffective for failing to develop Schlup’s social history and present testimony from professionals regarding the impact that history had on Schlup. The majority, however, states that “the undeveloped testimony would not have been of sufficient weight to have changed the outcome of Schlup’s trial.” See ante at 639. This record does not support this conclusion.
The district court ruled that the ineffective assistance of counsel issue was procedurally barred and denied Schlup’s request for a hearing on the matter. Consequently, there is nothing in the district court record concerning the nature of the undeveloped mitigating testimony. Under these circumstances, this court should not be the original fact finders on the issue. Instead, we should remand this case to the district court and leave it to develop the record and resolve the question in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision in Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987).
In Burger, the petitioner sought habeas relief and claimed that trial counsel did not make an adequate investigation of potentially mitigating circumstances. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. At this hearing, the petitioner set forth the evidence that could have been presented in mitigation. The hearing revealed that trial counsel had interviewed not only the petitioner’s mother, but also acquaintances, friends, and a psychologist who had examined the petitioner. The hearing also revealed that trial counsel had reviewed psychological reports. Id. at 789-92, 107 S.Ct. at 3123-26. After considering this evidence, the district court denied relief. After reviewing the evidence presented at the habeas hearing, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that trial counsel was not ineffective, as he had interviewed enough potential witnesses under the circumstances and had a reasonable strategic basis for not presenting some of the potentially mitigating evidence he had uncovered. Id. at 794-95, 107 S.Ct. at 3126-26.
The petitioner in Burger did not prevail on his claim after presenting evidence to the district court; likewise, Schlup might not prevail were we to remand his case for further findings. The merits of his claim, however, would be examined in light of a concrete record, and not on the basis of speculation.
Moreover, remanding the case would not be an empty exercise, for courts have found prejudice in situations similar to Schlup’s. In Kenley, we found prejudice when trial counsel presented virtually no mitigating evidence, even though the defendant’s past behavior could have been presented in a sympathetic light in the context of his family and medical background. Reasonable investigation would have revealed “significant evidence of medically significant conditions and disorders, suicidal tendencies, alcohol abuse and intoxication.” Kenley, 937 F.2d at 1309. In Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 872, 109 S.Ct. 189, 102 L.Ed.2d 158 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit found that trial counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence about the defendant’s mental condition was prejudicial. In Stephens, as here, the only testimony the jury heard about the defendant’s mental history and condition was presented by his mother. As in Schlup’s case, trial counsel did not even highlight this testimony in his final argument to the jury. Id. at 653-55. As here, the fact that nobody other than the mother testified about the defendant’s mental state “undoubtedly diminished the impact on the jury of the facts she described.” See id. at 654. As with Schlup, the Stephens prosecution was able to discount the mother’s testimony concerning her son; as the prosecutor in Stephens noted, virtually every mother will put in a good word for her son. Putting Mom up on the stand is simply not enough when others could corroborate and strengthen the facts presented in her testimony.
As a result of trial counsel’s failure to present expert psychiatric or psychological testimony, jurors in both Stephens and in *645this case had no guidance about how they “might take such facts into consideration in mitigation of punishment.” See id. at 655. The facts a remand could produce might well lead to the conclusion that Schlup’s death sentence should be vacated. See also Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433-34 (11th Cir.1987) (prejudice shown where trial counsel presented only limited mitigating evidence even though family members could have testified that defendant was not supervised as a child and had medical problems, and where an expert would have testified that defendant had organic brain damage).
DEFECTIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Schlup’s counsel did not object to jury instructions during the penalty phase even though the instructions unconstitutionally restricted the jury’s discretion to consider mitigating evidence. Schlup’s counsel’s failure to challenge these instructions also constituted ineffective assistance.
The instructions may have led the jury to believe that it could not consider a mitigating factor unless it unanimously agreed on the same mitigating factor. Schlup’s jury was given Instruction No. 19, which stated:
If you decide that a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to warrant the imposition of death ... it will then become your duty to determine whether a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist which outweigh such aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found to exist. In deciding that question you may consider all the evidence relating to the murder of Arthur Dade.
You may also consider:
1. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense.
2. Whether the defendant was an accomplice in the murder of Arthur Dade and whether his participation was relatively minor.
You may also consider any circumstances which you find from the evidence in extenuation or mitigation of punishment.
If you unanimously decide that a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by you to exist, then you must return a verdict fixing defendant’s punishment at imprisonment for life by the Division of Corrections without eligibility for probation or parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years of his sentence, [emphasis added]
The flaw in the above instruction is that it could have led a reasonable juror to think that no piece of mitigating evidence could be considered in the defendant’s favor unless all twelve jurors found it to be a mitigating circumstance. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384-89, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1870-72, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988) (similar instruction's). In other words, even if some or all of the jurors were to believe some mitigating circumstance or circumstances existed, unless they could unanimously agree on the existence of the same mitigating factor, the jurors might have concluded that they could not consider any mitigating evidence.
As this court explains, however, the Missouri Supreme Court has rejected claims under Mills in cases involving similar instructions. See ante at 637. The Missouri Supreme Court believes that a curative instruction similar to one given in Schlup’s case solves any Mills problem that Schlup and others in his situation may have had. See State v. Petary, 790 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Mo.1990), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 443, 112 L.Ed.2d 426 (1990). This “curative” instruction (No. 20) stated that the jury was not required to impose a death sentence even if it found that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances:
Even if you decide that a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances do not exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to exist, you are not compelled to fix death as the punishment. Whether that is to be your final decision rests with you.
*646In Mills, the jury was required to impose a sentence of death if it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances; in contrast, Missouri juries may decline to impose a death sentence even if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that the mandatory nature of the death penalty in Mills was not the guiding consideration in that case:
Our decision in Mills was not limited to cases in which the jury is required to impose the death penalty if it finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or that no mitigating circumstances exist at all. Rather, we held that it would be the “height of arbitrariness to allow or require the imposition of the death penalty” where 1 juror was able to prevent the other 11 from giving effect to mitigating evidence.
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, -, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1232, 108 L.Ed.2d 369, 379 (1990) (quoting Mills; emphasis added in McKoy).
The majority does not directly address the issue of whether the challenged jury instructions were defective; it simply notes that the Missouri courts have held that the Missouri jury instructions do not violate the Constitution as defined in Mills and McKoy. While I agree that the position of the Missouri Supreme Court on the issue is relevant as to Schlup’s motion for abeyance, we are not bound by the Missouri Supreme Court’s position on the constitutionality of the challenged jury instructions. In my view, the jury instructions plainly violated the Constitution, and I am not convinced by the Missouri Supreme Court’s attempts to limit and distinguish the Mills and McKoy decisions.
Given that the instructions violated the Constitution, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to them. As this court has noted, the Mills decision is not novel and was a “standard application of the rule that juries must be free to consider any and all evidence as a mitigating factor.” Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 545 (8th Cir.1989). The argument was available to counsel when this trial was held, and he should have raised it.
Schlup was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the jury instructions. Schlup was a young man of twenty-three when the crime occurred. Although the jury was not certain to have found Schlup’s age to be a mitigating factor, see Bolder, 921 F.2d at 1366, there is a reasonable probability that it would have made such a determination if the instructions had been free of error. Moreover, there is no evidence that Schlup stabbed the victim; at most, the evidence indicates that Schlup punched and grappled with the victim while another inmate did the stabbing. Consequently, there is a reasonable probability that the jury could have concluded that of the three co-defendants, Schlup was a minor participant in the crime, another mitigating factor. Finally, as detailed above, the jury had limited information about Schlup’s tragic upbringing, and it would have had more information had counsel been effective. Based even on the information presented, however, there is a reasonable probability that the jury could have found this a third mitigating factor but for the defective jury instruction.
In sum, there is a reasonable probability that a majority of jurors may have believed that some mitigating factor or factors existed, and that those mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating circumstances. This is not a case where there was no evidence that would support a finding of mitigating circumstances — some evidence was present, and some evidence should have been developed further. Due to the erroneous instructions, however, the jury may have believed that unless it agreed unanimously on the existence of the same mitigating factor or factors, it could not consider any mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Mills, 486 U.S. at 373-74,108 S.Ct. at 1870. This defect requires us to set aside the death penalty in this case.
CONCLUSION
This was a close case. There was conflicting evidence as to Schlup’s guilt, and *647Schlup was able to present a plausible alibi defense. While I believe that the evidence was sufficient to support Schlup’s conviction, the evidence was not overwhelming, and the jury deliberated several hours before it reached a verdict. Under such circumstances, it is particularly important that the penalty phase of a trial be free from prejudicial error.
Although this court suggests otherwise, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have imposed a death sentence had counsel rendered effective service at Schlup’s death penalty hearing. This case presents a scenario all too common in capital cases: trial counsel focused all of his energies on the guilt phase of the trial and virtually ignored the crucial “trial for life” during the penalty phase. Because counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence and to object to jury instructions constituted ineffective assistance that prejudiced Schlup’s defense, I would vacate the death sentence and remand this case for a new sentencing hearing.

. Mo.Ann.Stat. § 565.032.2(9) (Supp.1991) states that if a first-degree murder “was committed by a person in ... the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement,” that fact is a statutory aggravating circumstance.