Court Opinion

ID: 9690189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:56:15.100064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.971814
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(concurring). I agree that State v. Quiroz, 149 Wis. 2d 691, 439 N.W.2d 621 (Ct. App. 1989) requires that we affirm the judgment convicting Fonder of battery to a corrections official, contrary to sec. 940.20(1), Stats. I suggest, however, that we should certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to allow it to consider Quiroz and State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983), in light of the legislation entitling each inmate to mandatory release on parole. Section 53.11(1), Stats. (1987-88).1 Section 53.11, Stats. (1987-88), provided in part:
(1) The warden or superintendent shall keep a record of the conduct of each inmate, specifying each infraction of the rules. Except as provided in subs, (lm), (7) and (10), each inmate is entitled to mandatory release on parole by the department. The mandatory release date is established at two-thirds of the sentence . . ..
*600(2) (a) Any inmate who violates any regulation of the prison or refuses or neglects to perform required or assigned duties is subject to extension of the mandatory release date as follows: 10 days for the first offense, 20 days for the 2nd offense and 40 days for the 3rd or each subsequent offense.
(b) In addition to the sanctions under par. (a), any inmate who is placed in adjustment, program or controlled segregation status shall have his or her mandatory release date extended by a number of days equal to 50% of the number of days spent in segregation status ....
The WCI disciplinary committee imposed upon Fonder eight days adjustment segregation, 360 days program segregation, and a ten-day extension of his mandatory release date.
Fonder claims that he was subjected to multiple punishment, contrary to the double jeopardy bars of the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution and art. I § 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.2 Fonder has no claim if the imposition of punishment under the prison disciplinary rules does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct. It is said in 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 248 at 444 (1981): "[Pjrison disciplinary measures or administrative sanctions imposed upon a prisoner for violation of a prison rule of conduct do not raise the bar of double jeopardy to his prosecution for a statutory offense arising from the same act that was the basis of the prison discipline." (Footnote omitted.) The impressive list of authorities cited by the majority, majority op. at 596 n.3, establishes a per se rule.
*601The drafters of the inmate disciplinary code, Wis. Adm. Code ch. HSS [DOC] 303 considered that imposing discipline under the code did not bar criminal proceedings for the same conduct. The introductory note to the disciplinary code states in part:
The experience in Wisconsin has been that disciplinary proceedings are a more effective way of dealing with most crimes committed in prison than prosecution is. In extreme cases, of course, cases are referred for prosecution. However, in these cases as well as in less serious cases, prison officials need to have the authority to isolate or punish individuals in order to prevent a recurrence of violence. The U.S. supreme court has approved the practice of bringing both disciplinary and criminal proceedings against an individual based on a single incident, implying that no double jeopardy problems are raised by this practice. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
The Baxter court did not, however, approve the practice of subjecting an inmate to both disciplinary action and a criminal prosecution for the same conduct. The issue in Baxter was whether certain procedures used in disciplinary proceedings at San Quentin violated the inmate's constitutional rights. One of the questions was whether the inmate's fifth-amendment silence at his disciplinary hearing could be used against him. The Court held that it could. An argument which the inmate made was that, if he testified, his statements could be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding. It is true that the Court did not reject the inmate's argument on the grounds that he could not be prosecuted in a subsequent criminal proceeding; however, the issue of whether jeopardy attached by reason of the disciplinary proceedings was not raised and was not decided by the Court. So far as I have been able to determine, the *602United States Supreme Court has never directly faced the issue.
The United States Supreme Court has, however, rejected the proposition that the double jeopardy clause does not apply to a proceeding which is civil in nature. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989). Therefore, those cases applying a per se rule to prison disciplinary proceedings, simply because they are civil proceedings, are not entitled to persuasive weight.
In Halper, the Court held that a civil penalty may constitute punishment under the double jeopardy clause. Halper was criminally prosecuted for filing sixty-five false claims under the federal Medicare program. The total overcharges were $585. Halper was sentenced to imprisonment for two years and fined $5,000. The government then brought an action against him under the civil False Claims Act and insisted that it was entitled to a statutory penalty of more than $130,000. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Halper was protected by the double jeopardy clause from a sanction so disproportionate to the government's damages that it constituted a second punishment.
In Killebrew, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not make the mistake which has been made by so many other courts; it did not blindly follow ancient precedent based on the civil nature of prison disciplinary proceedings.3 Rather, it looked at the disciplinary action taken *603against the inmates and concluded that the action was not punishment under the constitution and therefore the double jeopardy clause did not bar the criminal prosecution.
Killebrew was placed on 360 days program segregation and five days of his earned good time was forfeited. In the case consolidated with Killebrew's appeal, the adjustment committee imposed on another inmate eight days of adjustment segregation, 180 days of program segregation, and forfeited all of the inmate's accumulated good time.
Killebrew may signal that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will ultimately adopt a per se rule that any disciplinary action taken under the inmate disciplinary code is not punishment under the double jeopardy clause. However, Killebrew did not adopt such a rule; a case-by-case analysis is required.
In Killebrew, the punishment imposed on the inmates included loss of good-time credit. The Constitution does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). In Wolff, the Court stated that because the state had created the right to good time and recognized its deprivation as a sanction for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest "has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Id. However, protection against the arbitrary abrogation of earned good-time credit under the due process clause does not necessarily elevate such deprivation to punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
*604The case for elevating extension of a prisoner's mandatory release date to punishment under the double jeopardy clause is stronger. Under sec. 53.11(1), Stats. (1987-88), each inmate is entitled to mandatory release on parole when he or she has served two-thirds of his or her sentence. That date is established when the inmate is admitted into the system. When Killebrew was decided, the accepted wisdom was that the grant or denial of good-time credits was a matter of grace rather than of right. 60 Am. Jur. 2d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 228 at 1295 (1987). Section 53.11 was amended by 1983 Wis. Act 66 and 1983 Wis. Act 528. The Legislative Reference Bureau drafting record for these acts contains the following note which states that the proposed amendments make two substantial changes to the current statute. One change was the abandonment of statutory good-time.
[T]he term "good time1' is abandoned for two reasons. First, to eliminate the present notion that "good time" is a benefit tied to work performance . . .. The use of different language is also intended to underscore the change from the current system which has created confusion concerning whether "good time" vests or not. . ..
The legislative intent is clear that mandatory release on parole is a right and is not a mere benefit conferred by the grace of the corrections and parole officials. See Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau to 1983 A.B. 1011.
The change in legislative philosophy from good-time conferred as a matter of grace to mandatory release or parole is enough to ask the supreme court to take another look at Killebrew and Quiroz. The effect of extending a prisoner's mandatory release date is to *605increase his or her sentence. One of the components of the multiple-punishment doctrine prevents increasing the defendant's punishment after he or she has begun to serve his or her sentence. Note, A Definition of Punishment for Implementing the Double Jeopardy Clause's Multiple-Punishment Prohibition, 90 Yale L.J. 632, 637 (1981).
There is, however, another factor under the revised legislation which suggests that the Wisconsin Supreme Court may wish to consider whether the extension of an inmate's mandatory release date for disciplinary reasons is punishment under the double jeopardy clause. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) holds that a severe civil penalty may constitute "punishment" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. While the fixed extension of an inmate's mandatory release date under sec. 53.11 (2)(a), Stats. (1987-88), is relatively modest and is discretionary, the mandatory extension under sec. 53.11(2) (b) may be substantial, as it is in this case. Under Halper and, parenthetically, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963), the civil penalty imposed under sec. 53.11(2)(b) may constitute "punishment" for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.
The Yale Law Journal note states that state and lower federal courts have used an intent test to deny double jeopardy coverage to nontraditional sanctions within the criminal process. Note, Definition of Punishment, 90 Yale L.J. at 642. The Note suggests that "[a]n effects test that focuses on the burden a sanction places upon its recipient would avoid the problematic nature of the intent test and would fulfill the purposes of the double jeopardy clause." Id. In Halper, the Court rejected the intent test as "not well suited to the context of the 'humane interests' safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of' multiple punish*606ments." 490 U.S. at 447. The Court said further: "This constitutional protection [against double jeopardy] is intrinsically personal. Its violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Yale Law Journal note states that the Supreme Court has identified two distinguishing characteristics of criminal punishment: stigma and deprivation of liberty or property. Note, A Definition of Punishment, 90 Yale L.J. at 649. See Breed u. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 (1975) (proceeding is essentially criminal if possible consequences include stigma and loss of liberty for several years). 90 Yale L.J. at 649. The Note suggests that under an effects test, probation should be deemed punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 650. A Boston University Law Review Note reaches the same conclusion with respect to federal parole release proceedings. See Note, Violations of the Double Jeopardy Prohibition under the Federal Parole Release System, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 673, 712 (1983). I suggest that the automatic extension of an inmate's mandatory release date has the characteristics of criminal punishment for purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
For these reasons, I would certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.

 Section 53.11, Stats. (1987-88) was renumbered sec. 302.11 by sec. 1629, 1989 Wis. Act 31.

 I am concerned only with Fonder's claim that the double jeopardy clauses barred punishing him for violating Wis. Adm. Code § HSS [DOC] 303.12 (battery) and prosecuting him criminally for the same.

 Virtually all of the cases cited by the majority in footnote 3 trace back to Pagliaro v. Cox, 143 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1944). See Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 247, 340 N.W.2d at 473. In Pagliaro, the court said that, "The allowance of good time, until earned for the entire term is a privilege which is conditioned expressly by . . . statute . . . allowing it upon a record of conduct showing 'that he has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been subjected to punishment.' " Pagliaro, 143 F.2d at 901 (citations omitted).