Court Opinion

ID: 9540380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:15:28.461414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:30.798615
License: Public Domain

*741Lovxns, President,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I concur in the reversal of the judgment in this case, upon the ground that it was error to give plaintiff’s instruction No. 2 over the objection of the defendants; but I respectfully dissent from the reasoning that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. I think point 1 of the syllabus states a correct abstract principle of law, but, in my opinion, it is fallacious to apply that principle to the evidence in the instant case, and, in so doing, I think the Court is, in effect, passing on the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
It is the function of a court to consider and evaluate all the evidence to determine whether it is legally sufficient to sustain the verdict, but, in so doing, the evidence should not be so dissected and divided as to give each item thereof piecemeal consideration. I think the evidence in this case, considered as a whole, is such as establishes more than a ground for speculation and conjecture. Plaintiff’s witnesses testified that there was a windstorm of considerable force at the time plaintiff’s roof collapsed, and it is a reasonable inference, which the jury was authorized to draw, that the windstorm caused it to collapse. It will not do to say that such inference is wholly disproved by the evidence for the defendants, or by the so-called physical facts.
A comprehensive definition of a physical fact is as follows: “A fact considered to have its seat in some inanimate being, or, if in an animate being, by virtue, not of the qualities by which it is constituted animate, but of those which it has in common with the class of inanimate beings.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Third Ed., page 1359; 3 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third Revision, page 2586. The foregoing definition is derived from 1 Benth. Jud. Ev., page 45. See also Burrill On Circumstantial Evidence, page 130. Probably a more practical definition will be found in 1 The Modern Law of Evidence, Chamber-layne, page 67, wherein the author states: “Classifying facts in general, according to whether they are within or *742without the body of the observer, they may be divided into (1) physical, of which the knowledge of the observer comes through the 'perception of the senses; and (2) psychological, comprising feelings, emotions and other phases of the mind of which the latter is intuitively aware.”
There have been some loose expressions which seem to confuse the phrase “physical fact” with “real evidence.” Real evidence is an object “addressed to the sense of the tribunal, as where objects are presented for the inspection of the jury.” Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases, 3d ed., page 8. The “physical fact” rule is applied very sparingly by the courts. See Myers v. Transit Co., 128 W. Va. 564, 570, 37 S. E. 2d 281, 283; Webster v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co. (Vt.), 156 A. 524; Schmitt v. St. Louis Transit Co. (Mo. App.), 90 S. W. 421.
The “physical facts” alluded to by this Court rested in its observations made from a photograph of the damaged building. But when it is considered that the movement of objects to which the force of wind has been applied, a photograph thereof does not disclose with any certainty the condition of such object. Furthermore, it is well known that the location, course of movement and condition of objects moved by wind, or other force, natural or artificial, cannot be determined definitely by natural laws. We should refrain from applying the “physical fact rule” unless the facts are established beyond peradventure, and the person testifying as to the existence of such facts observed them within a short time after the fact under inquiry or at issue occurred.
I think the oral testimony of the witnesses in this case presented an issue of fact for determination by the jury, and, therefore, that this Court, in holding that the evidence was insufficient, rests its conclusion upon an unsound basis.
However, I think that it was error to give plaintiff’s instruction No. 2, and for that reason I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.