Court Opinion

ID: 9760046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:39:28.166023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:07.960352
License: Public Domain

*117McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
The Court today applies a “totality of the circumstances” test,1 rather than the per se “interested adult” rule2 to justify the suppression of a juvenile’s inculpatory statement. Although I approve of application of the broader standard, I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe appellee’s statement should be suppressed under neither test.
Appellee Dale Barry, then sixteen years and nine months of age, was arrested in New York by the Niskayuna Police Department as a fugitive from justice in connection with a Pennsylvania homicide. Appellee, an adult under New York state law, was verbally advised on his Miranda rights during his ride to the police station, and was further advised through a written waiver form at the station. Appellee, indicating that he had read each line of the waiver form, signed the form and gave a statement. The suppression hearing judge concluded that appellee’s waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and the statement was admitted at trial. Appellee was convicted after a jury trial of second degree murder, robbery, theft and conspiracy.
On post-trial motions, the court en banc concluded that appellee’s statement should have been excluded, and awarded appellee a new trial. The basis for this conclusion was the court’s determination, after an exhaustive analysis, that the “interested adult” rule, was applicable even to statements obtained in other jurisdictions, and must be given per se effect. The court’s further assertion that the statement was inadmissible under the totality of the circumstances was something of an afterthought. To characterize that assertion as an alternative ground for decision, and thus deflect the challenge to the continuing validity of our “interested adult” rule, misrepresents the proceedings below.
*118I would hold, as did the court of common pleas en banc, that if the “interested adult” rule applies to exclude the statements of any juvenile tried in Pennsylvania, it must apply to statements made outside the Commonwealth. I would, however, go on to overrule our decision in Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), and its progeny, and follow the “totality of the circumstances” standard announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).
The McCutchen rule is not required by the federal Constitution, but is simply another example of the truth-deterring road blocks placed by the Court between the fact-finder and the facts. As Mr. Justice Kauffman stated in Commonwealth v. Henderson, 496 Pa. 349, 437 A.2d 387 (1981):
Although we have long recognized that the waiver of constitutional rights by an accused of tender years must be closely scrutinized, I believe that society would be far better served by a rule inquiring into the validity of each particular waiver in view of all of the circumstances. The majority’s mechanical rule will result in blanket exclusion of trustworthy evidence vital to the truth determining process, not because the juvenile’s will has been overborne or his understanding has been inadequate, but because the police did not follow a rigid procedure in obtaining his statement. A totality of the circumstances rule, on the other hand, not only would adequately protect the rights of the accused by disregarding any waiver of constitutional rights not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, but would also protect the interests of society by precluding exclusion of relevant, trustworthy evidence simply because of a failure to comply with a rigid per se rule.
496 Pa. at 362-63, 437 A.2d at 394 (Kauffman, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
The facts of this case demonstrate the deficiencies of this Court’s current inflexible approach. In neither age, maturity, nor experience does appellee warrant the special protections necessary for some juveniles. Operation of the per se *119rule in such cases undermines the truth-determining process without concomitant benefit. Moreover, nothing in the law of this Commonwealth mandates the inflexible McCutchen rule. We should join the thirty-six states and the United States Supreme Court which reject this rigid approach, and evaluate the validity of such waivers in view of all the circumstances.
Furthermore, even applying the totality of the circumstances test to the instant case, I would uphold the decision of the suppression court admitting appellee’s statement.
The suppression judge concluded that appellee’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent and voluntary. The record shows that appellant was twice informed of his rights; read and signed a written waiver; acknowledged that he had read each line of the waiver form; and read, corrected, and initialed each page of his statement. The conclusion of the suppression judge had ample support in the record. Under the totality of the circumstances approach, the court en banc had no valid basis for disturbing the judgment of the suppression court. Appellee’s statement was properly admitted for consideration by the jury in its search for the truth.
Per se, prophylactic rules, in almost every instance foreclose the truth of a case. They are the classics of “technicality,” a galvanic, judicial punch board; wonderful for arithmetic, “mechanical” jurisprudence. If people were digits and cases geometric, if the totality of the circumstances were all squares and circles, such rules might have provided a shorthand. They have proved a failure of justice, however, in more instances than they ever were designed to serve.
LARSEN and HUTCHINSON, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).

. See Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975). See also, Commonwealth v. Henderson, 496 Pa. 349, 437 A.2d 387 (1981).