Court Opinion

ID: 9911908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 23:12:56.212727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:59.409605
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 147

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                       TIMOTHY RICHINS,
                          Appellee,
                             v.
                        MARK WELDON,
                          Appellant.

                            Opinion
                        No. 20220522-CA
                     Filed December 7, 2023

        Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department
                The Honorable Jared Eldridge
                         No. 210300134

           Walter A. Romney Jr. and Trenton L. Lowe,
                    Attorneys for Appellant
              Chris A. Dexter, Attorney for Appellee

  JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1     Mark Weldon admits he doesn’t like Timothy Richins. But
they had to deal with each other because Weldon managed the
building in which Richins’s employer is located. Richins filed a
petition for a stalking injunction after becoming aware of direct
and indirect communications Weldon had allegedly made
concerning Richins. After being served with a temporary stalking
injunction, Weldon requested a hearing. At the conclusion of that
hearing, the district court made the injunction permanent. Now
Weldon appeals, claiming that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the injunction and that the district court
erroneously applied the facts to the law. We reject Weldon’s
arguments and affirm the district court.
                         Richins v. Weldon

                         BACKGROUND

          Petition and Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction

¶2      Richins was a vice president at a company (Company), and
his duties included facility management and ensuring that lease
obligations were being fulfilled. In this capacity, he had known
Weldon since November 2020. Weldon is the manager of the
business that leased an office building to the Company. The
Company leased space on the second floor and shared the first-
floor server room with another tenant. According to Richins, the
primary communications between him and Weldon were
“discussions about the warehouse that was in current
construction that [the Company was] going to . . . lease or move
into once that construction was completed” and “any type of
office facilities requirement, because it was a full-service lease.”
At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, Weldon and
the business he managed were “involved in civil disputes with
[the Company] regarding the lease and other disputes.”

¶3     Richins filed a request for a civil stalking injunction against
Weldon in September 2021. In his civil stalking petition, Richins
alleged that Weldon had “become increasingly hostile” and
engaged in the following actions:

       1. “On April 15, 2021, Mr. Weldon texted Mr.
          Richins at home and threatened to have him
          arrested and told [Richins] he was going to come
          see him personally.”

       2. “On July 8, 2021, Mr. Weldon sent a harassing
          email calling Mr. Richins by various names and
          calling him a liar.”

       3. “On July 8, 2021, Mr. Weldon sent an email with
          an implied threat that he ‘will be at the

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                        Richins v. Weldon

          warehouse and he better not see any oil from a
          forklift.’”

       4. “Additional emails were sent on July 8 and July
          9, 2021 and again on July 27, 2021 harassing Mr.
          Richins and insulting him.”

¶4     The petition also outlined various events that occurred on
August 27, 2021—as detailed below—that ultimately prompted
Richins to file a statement with the police and that became the
focus of Richins’s civil stalking injunction hearing.

¶5     The district court issued a temporary civil stalking
injunction against Weldon. Soon thereafter, Weldon requested a
hearing.

     Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Permanence of Injunction

¶6      The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
if the injunction would be modified, revoked, or continued. See
Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(a). At the hearing, most of the testimony
surrounded the events that occurred on August 27 at the
Company’s office building; unlike the events in April and July,
Richins was not present for the August events and therefore had
no personal knowledge of what occurred. Richins called six
employees of the company as witnesses: a computer programmer
(Programmer), a software engineer (Engineer), a software
architect (Architect), the Company’s CEO (CEO), an executive
assistant (Assistant), and himself; Weldon called two witnesses:
the property manager for the building (Manager) and himself.

A.     Programmer

¶7      Programmer was present on August 27 for a meeting (the
first meeting) with Weldon, Manager, Engineer, and Architect in
the first-floor server room. Programmer, Engineer, and Architect

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                         Richins v. Weldon

were there to retrieve keys to the second-floor server room from
Weldon and Manager and to transfer the servers there.

¶8    Programmer testified that when someone mentioned
needing to get a key from Richins, Weldon expressed a lot of
anger toward Richins, used “angry and aggressive language,”
swore, claimed that Richins “was doing wrong to him,” said that
“he wasn’t going to let [Richins] get away with it,” and stated that
he was “watching” Richins and CEO.

¶9     After the first meeting, Programmer sent an email to
Richins and CEO to notify them that Weldon had complained
about Richins, “was verbally aggressive, [used] harsh language
and repeatedly [dropped] F-bombs.” The email explained that
Weldon asked Architect “to tell” Richins that he was “an asshole.”
Programmer continued, “I don’t remember at what point during
his rant this was brought up, but he also said that he knows what
[Richins] did in the warehouse and that he’ll never get away with
it. He said that he has private investigators following [Richins]
and [CEO] and that he’ll always be coming for them.”
Programmer understood this statement to mean that Weldon
“would pursue legal recourse and other means if . . . deemed by
him necessary until he got what he wanted.” Programmer also
expressed “concern” because Weldon “frankly . . . seemed a little
unhinged and . . . unpredictable,” stating that it made him fear for
his safety at work.

¶10 Programmer further described a part of the first meeting
where a screwdriver was needed to complete the task at hand.
After the tool was located, Weldon informed Programmer that he
would lend it to him but if Programmer “didn’t give it back to
him, [Weldon] was going to have to go out to his car, get in his
trunk, grab a gun, and bring that gun upstairs and shoot
somebody.” When Programmer returned the screwdriver,
Weldon said, “Good. Now I don’t have to shoot anybody,” which
Programmer took as “an implied threat,” largely directed against

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                           Richins v. Weldon

Richins. Programmer explained that Weldon’s anger “the entire
time” was aimed at Richins. Moreover, Weldon’s anger was
unsolicited: “[H]e brought it up and kept going off on it.”
Programmer explained that “given the context,” he understood
the phrase “shoot somebody” to mean that Richins was the object
of the threat. However, Programmer clarified that Weldon never
directly said that he would shoot Richins.

¶11 Programmer revealed that he was “in fear” for himself and
Richins after the first meeting. He told Richins “everything” he
had included in the email and that he “thought” Weldon was
“unstable” and the interaction was “scary.” In response to
Programmer’s concerns, Richins explained that some of his past
dealings with Weldon had been unpleasant and “scary to him.”

B.     Engineer

¶12 Engineer also testified about the first meeting, including
the screwdriver incident. Engineer expressed that the incident
was “very odd” and “very uncomfortable” because Weldon, with
whom Engineer had never interacted, was “threatening violence
in a very . . . serious manner.” Engineer clarified that Weldon’s
vitriol was directed at Richins. Weldon had called Richins “an
effing tool,” “an A-hole,” and other “very similar things using
similar vulgar language.” Engineer said, “[W]eldon expressed his
hatred of [Richins] very clearly. . . . It sounded pretty serious . . . .
[H]e did not sound like he was joking.” Engineer testified that the
incident left him feeling “pretty nervous” and “scared.”

¶13 After the first meeting, Engineer sent an email to Richins
and CEO summarizing the encounter. Engineer wrote that
Weldon was “spewing F-bombs,” “telling us he’s never going to
stop going after” Richins and CEO, saying “that he has private
investigators following” them, and stating that Richins “is a
fucking asshole.” Engineer’s email also recounted the screwdriver
threat, noting that (1) Weldon told him that if it was not returned,
“he would go out to his car, grab his gun, and come upstairs and

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                         Richins v. Weldon

have to shoot someone” and (2) after returning the screwdriver,
Weldon responded, “Good. Now I don’t have to shoot someone.”

¶14 Engineer testified that he interpreted Weldon’s statement
about going after Richins and CEO to mean that he was “stalking
and following them,” intending to maybe do “harm to them in
some way” or pursue legal remedies against them. Engineer
interpreted these statements as threatening. Engineer noted in his
testimony that Richins “remained upstairs” during the first
meeting and that Weldon talked about shooting “someone” but
did not specifically mention Richins.

C.     Architect

¶15 Architect also testified about the first meeting. He stated
that upon hearing Richins’s name, Weldon “became extremely
angry” and “agitated.” Architect testified that Weldon “started
ranting” and saying, “[Richins] is an effing tool. I effing hate him.
. . . I’ve been watching him. I know what he did. I’m never going
to stop coming for him.” Architect explained that he perceived
Weldon’s statements as “threats” that made him “very
concerned” for his own safety and especially for Richins’s safety.
Architect was not privy to additional statements Weldon made
because he “extricated” himself from the situation at that point.
However, when he later recounted the first meeting to Richins,
Architect indicated that Richins “seemed very uncomfortable”
and “frightened.”

D.     CEO

¶16 CEO testified about his interactions with Weldon at a
separate meeting (the second meeting) that took place a few
minutes after the first meeting on August 27. Weldon, Manager,
CEO, and Assistant were present at this second meeting, which
was called to discuss some misunderstandings regarding the
ownership of various equipment. At some point during the
second meeting, Weldon “mentioned that he was very upset with

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                         Richins v. Weldon

. . . Richins,” said that CEO should fire Richins, expressed that he
“wanted to kill” Richins, and stated that since he was “going to
die anyway, . . . he should take some people out with him.”

¶17 After finding out the other things Weldon had said during
the first meeting, CEO called the police. In his police statement,
CEO explained that Weldon’s words made him “immediately
fearful” for Richins’s safety, other employees’ safety, and his own
safety. CEO elaborated that during the second meeting, Weldon
offered him some furniture for free and expressed his hope that
their civil dispute would be settled “quickly and fairly.” CEO felt
that for Weldon “to threaten [Richins] and others generally to
[CEO’s] face,” while asking for “a quick and fair settlement[,]
came off as an effort to intimidate [them] into settling.”

¶18 CEO explained that the situation “felt threatening . . .
against [Richins] specifically” and that Richins was “visibly
disturbed and worried” when CEO communicated the situation
to him.

E.     Assistant

¶19 Assistant, who was present at the second meeting, testified
that she became “uncomfortable” because “Weldon started
saying things that [she] felt were threatening” toward Richins.
Specifically, Assistant heard Weldon say that “he didn’t want to
die over the issues that they were having, but that he was willing
to,” and she said his tone sounded “kind of agitated.” She also
heard him say that “other people would die too before he did.”
She thought he was “serious,” and she understood what he said
“to be a threat.” Assistant clarified that when Weldon referred to
“other people” dying, he never specifically mentioned Richins’s
name, but she understood that “this was a threat of death” specific
to Richins because Weldon was referring to Richins beforehand.

¶20 Assistant drafted an email to CEO stating these same views
immediately following the second meeting. And when Assistant

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                        Richins v. Weldon

told Richins about what Weldon said, Richins said that “he was
concerned for his safety,” that he “had put . . . more cameras up
around his house,” and that he “was afraid to come to work.” She
also testified that she knew Richins well enough to know that he
was “in fear.”

F.    Richins

¶21 Richins read the April 15 text exchange with Weldon into
the record. In that exchange Weldon said, ”[I]f you do not let
[Manager] into my building that I own immediately, we will call
the police. We will also . . . write out a report to the police and
have you arrested.” Richins responded, “I don’t appreciate you
threatening me . . . .” Then Weldon replied, “This a threat. It—
what we have done already. You locked us out of our building.
What is wrong with you? We have work to do at the building. . . .
I will come see you personally when I’m back in Utah, and we
need to talk about it.”

¶22 Richins noted that this text exchange was the first
“[d]ocumented incident” where he felt threatened by Weldon but
stated he had “multiple interactions with . . . Weldon, and he is a
very hostile person.” Richins testified that he did not understand
why Weldon was texting him at home “early in the morning” and
“threatening to have [him] arrested” when he had not done
“anything wrong.” He explained that Weldon was “coming after
[him] for no reason” and that he had “no control over this
situation.” And Richins saw the text as threatening: “[C]oming to
see me personally is [a threat]. He could call me on the phone. He
didn’t need to come see me personally. [T]hat’s an implied threat,
[especially with] the context previous to this and the hostility
previous to this.”

¶23 Regarding the August 27 interactions and why he was not
present at the meetings, Richins testified that he purposely “took
[himself] out of that situation because of previous fear, and [he]
didn’t want to interact with [Manager] or [Weldon].” When

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                        Richins v. Weldon

Richins first learned from Architect about the events surrounding
the first meeting with Weldon, he testified that it made him feel
“fearful” and “more scared.” He said that he does not “want to go
to work” and relies on “multiple locks” on his door for security.
Moreover, he said,

      My wife doesn’t want to leave her house. . . . [T]his
      has been the most terrifying thing I have ever gone
      through, and I am not making that up. I’m fearful to
      be doing this right now and what retaliation may
      come from this, and I never want to go through this
      again. And I am still scared. I am sorry, but this is
      hard, and it’s hard on my family, and it’s hard on
      me. And I’m just trying to be a professional that is
      trying to do his job, and I am being terrorized
      because of it.

¶24 Richins explained what he has done in response to the fear
he has felt:

      I’ve installed a complete security system in my
      house. . . . [N]ow I have motion-activated cameras
      all the way around my house. I had somebody come
      and install a [reinforced] door frame, new locks . . .
      around my house. . . . I don’t let my kids play
      outside anymore by themselves. They don’t walk to
      school by themselves. My wife is in fear. We don’t
      go out and do recreational things like we used to.
      We’re afraid that we’re being followed, because
      we’ve been told we’re being followed and that
      people are coming after us, and I need somebody to
      protect me from . . . this.

¶25   Richins continued,

      I don’t sleep well. I have bad anxiety. I fear every
      day I go to work. I carry a flashlight so I can look

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                         Richins v. Weldon

       underneath my vehicle when I go out . . . . I don’t
       like working late at night. It has impeded my work.
       It has impeded my personal life. It has impeded my
       entire family so I can make an honest living, and
       that’s wrong.

G.     Manager

¶26 Manager, who had known Weldon for about fifteen
months, performed work directed by Weldon and was present at
both meetings. Regarding the first meeting, he testified, “I don’t
know if [Weldon] called [Richins] an asshole or referred to him
. . . as an asshole. I just remember ‘asshole’ and ‘[Richins]’ in the
same sentence,” and that was “the only time” he remembered
Weldon “talking about” Richins. Regarding the screwdriver
incident, Manager testified that Weldon “looked around, found a
screwdriver and made mention that the screwdriver needed to be
replaced or that [another tenant] could come after us with a gun
and shoot us.” Manager believed this comment was directed at
Weldon and himself and “perceived it as funny.” He further
testified that Weldon never said he would get a gun out of his car
and shoot somebody.

¶27 Regarding the second meeting, Manager “vaguely
recall[ed]” Weldon saying something about not wanting “to die
over something, but he was willing to,” but Manager said Weldon
was “referring to stress” and his ability to “outlive everybody
else, kind of like a cockroach would outlive Armageddon.”
Manager further testified that Weldon’s statement was not
directed at Richins and “was not a threat.” Manager also testified
that Weldon did not say he was going to kill Richins.

H.     Weldon

¶28 Weldon testified that the April 15 text message to Richins
“certainly [was] not a threat.”

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                        Richins v. Weldon

¶29 With regard to the first meeting on August 27, Weldon
testified that he was frustrated no one had a key or tools, and so
he said, “[Richins] is acting like an asshole. Why aren’t you
prepared?” And regarding the screwdriver incident, he testified
as follows:

      I said, “You can borrow these tools, but don’t forget
      the rules of the universe. You take another man’s
      tool, you don’t put it back, they’re going to come
      shoot us.” Not me shoot [Richins]. Not me shoot
      anybody else. [The other tenant will] come shoot all
      of us, including me, so put the tool back, not only in
      the tool box but in the right way and method it came
      out. The Phillips-head goes back here. The flat-head
      goes back there. The pliers go back here. . . . And one
      of the fellows said, “Oh, don’t let him shoot. Don’t
      shoot me.” And they were all joking and laughing.

¶30 When asked about whether he said he was going to kill
Richins, he testified, “No, absolutely no. Absolutely not. That
would be a felony, and I would never talk like that.” He also
testified that he did not “recall” claiming that he had a gun.

¶31 About making “any threat” against Richins, Weldon
explained that he was merely telling Programmer, Engineer, and
Architect that his attorneys were good and that they were “not
going to stop” because the Company owed Weldon “a lot of
money.” And he clarified that when he said, “We’ll always be
coming [for] you,” he meant that they were “going to go to every
court possible.”

¶32 About the second meeting, Weldon testified that he told
CEO, “The stress is going to kill everybody, including me,
including all of us.” He claimed that he told CEO to “do the right
thing” and settle the lawsuit.

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                         Richins v. Weldon

¶33 Regarding Richins, Weldon said that he told CEO that
there were “some issues with the way [Richins] handles himself.”
And Weldon admitted he “may have” told others that he
“hate[d]” Richins and that Richins was “acting like an effing A-
hole.”

                      District Court’s Ruling

¶34 The district court ruled that “the key point here is whether
or not there was a course of conduct,” which the court explained
required “two or more acts directed at or toward a specific
person,” citing Utah Code section 76-5-106.5. In that regard, the
court agreed with Weldon that the April 15, 2021 incident did not
rise “to the level of something” that would be considered “as part
of a course of conduct for stalking” and concluded that “the only
behavior that . . . could potentially satisfy the statute [occurred]
on August 27.”

¶35 At that point, the court parted ways with Weldon, finding
that the two meetings on August 27 constituted two separate acts
for purposes of the stalking statute. The court explained, “These
[meetings] seem . . . to be two distinct events. They didn’t happen
simultaneously. They seem to be distinguished by both the parties
that were involved in the events, as well as a separation of a short
period of time. So, really, those are the two incidents . . . .”

¶36 The court then explained that the first incident was made
up of two comments from the first meeting when Weldon went
into a “tirade” at the mere mention of Richins’s name. The first
comment involved how Weldon was surveilling Richins and how
he “would keep coming for him.” The court found Weldon’s
explanation of this comment—that “he had attorneys that were
hired, and he didn’t really know what the attorneys were doing,
and maybe they had hired private investigators, [that he] didn’t
really know, that was up to the attorneys”—not credible. The
court found that the second comment to make up the first incident
was when Weldon said he would get his gun and shoot someone

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                         Richins v. Weldon

if the screwdriver was not returned properly. And although
Weldon did not identify who “someone” was, the court found
that “from the context of the conversation, it appears to be pretty
clear that Mr. Richins was upstairs, and that . . . comment was
likely directed toward Mr. Richins.”

¶37 Next, the district court found that the second incident
occurred when Weldon told CEO that he was going to kill Richins.
Despite the fact that Assistant did not hear those exact words, the
court found her testimony that she heard Weldon say he was
going to die but would first take others out and her testimony that
she interpreted those words to be directed toward Richins as
supportive of CEO’s testimony.

¶38 Referring to the statements from both meetings
cumulatively, the court also found that “Weldon made those
statements either intentionally or knowingly, and [they were]
directed toward a specific person, although they were made to
third parties.” Additionally, after explaining that Utah Code
section 76-5-106.5 required a showing “that the course of conduct
would cause a reasonable person to fear for the person’s own
safety or to suffer other emotional distress,” the court found that
“those statements were concerning enough that Mr. Weldon
should have known . . . that course of action would cause Mr.
Richins extreme distress.”

¶39 Concluding that the findings of fact supported the
elements of stalking, the district court made the civil stalking
injunction permanent.

             Events Following the Evidentiary Hearing

¶40 Subsequently, Weldon filed two motions under rules 52
and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing, in part, that
the court’s findings were inadequate, that insufficient evidence
existed to support the injunction, and that, therefore, the findings
should be struck and the entry of the permanent civil stalking

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                         Richins v. Weldon

injunction should be dismissed with prejudice. These motions
were denied, and Weldon appeals.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶41 All the issues Weldon raises focus on the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Utah stalking statutes. See
Utah Code §§ 76-5-106.5, 78B-7-701. Weldon’s initial set of issues
surrounds the first element of stalking. In that regard, Weldon
contends that the district court “erred in determining that [his]
alleged conduct amounted to a ‘course of conduct’ under Utah
law.” “Whether someone has engaged in a course of conduct
under the stalking statute is a question of law, which we review
for correctness.” Hardy v. Hardy, 2020 UT App 88, ¶ 4, 467 P.3d
931, cert. denied, 474 P.3d 948 (Utah 2020). Weldon further asserts
that the court erred in determining that certain statements “were
directed at or toward Richins to satisfy the civil stalking statute,”
which we also review for correctness. See Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT
App 150, ¶ 16, 136 P.3d 1242 (“The proper interpretation and
application of a statute is a question of law which we review for
correctness, affording no deference to the district court’s legal
conclusions.” (cleaned up)).

¶42 Weldon also takes issue with the district court’s handling
of the second element of stalking—that the respondent knew or
should have known that his course of conduct would cause a
reasonable person in the petitioner’s position to fear for his safety
or suffer other emotional distress. Related to this element, Weldon
first asserts that the district court “erred in determining that [he]
made a death threat toward Richins.” “We review challenges to
findings of fact for clear error.” Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App
56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837. Weldon also argues that the district court
“erred in determining that [his] alleged conduct could cause a
reasonable person to fear for his safety or suffer other emotional
distress.” “Although the question of whether the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person in a petitioner’s

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                           Richins v. Weldon

circumstances to suffer fear or emotional distress is a question of
fact that we review for clear error, we review the district court’s
interpretation of the underlying legal standard for correctness.”
Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d 945 (cleaned up).

                              ANALYSIS

¶43 Individuals who believe they are victims of “stalking may
file a . . . petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged
stalker with the district court.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(1)(a)(i). If
the district court “determines that there is reason to believe that
an offense of stalking has occurred,” it may issue a temporary
injunction based on the petition alone, restraining the person from
behaviors such as coming near or contacting the petitioner. Id.
§ 78B-7-701(3)(a). The accused may then request an evidentiary
hearing to dispute the injunction, and if this request is timely, “the
burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that stalking . . . has occurred.” Id. § 78B-7-701(4)(a),
(b)(ii). Thus, Richins maintained the burden of proof in this case.

¶44 To satisfy this burden, Richins had to establish the two
elements of stalking, which are (1) that a person “intentionally or
knowingly” engaged “in a course of conduct directed at a specific
person” and (2) that the person knew or should have known “that
the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for
the person’s own safety or suffer other emotional distress.”
Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d 835 (cleaned up). A
petitioner must prove both elements for a district court to enjoin
an alleged stalker’s behavior after the hearing. Id.; see also Utah
Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a).

¶45 Here, the district court concluded that the evidence at the
hearing supported a finding that stalking occurred and made the
civil stalking injunction permanent. We agree with the district
court and address each issue in turn.

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                         Richins v. Weldon

      I. Course of Conduct Directed at a Specific Individual

A.     Course of Conduct

¶46 The stalking statute defines a course of conduct as “two or
more acts directed at or toward a specific individual.” Utah Code
§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). These acts may include those where the
“actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils,
threatens, or communicates to or about an individual” and may
be performed “directly, indirectly, or through any third party.” Id.
§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A)(I). These acts also can include those where
the actor “appears at the individual’s workplace or contacts the
individual’s employer or coworker.” Id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(II).

¶47 “As the statute makes clear, a single isolated act cannot
qualify as a course of conduct.” Butters v. Herbert, 2012 UT App
329, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 826. “When interpreting a statute, our primary
goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, the best evidence of
which is the plain language of the statute itself. And when reading
a statute’s plain language, we presume the legislature used each
term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted
meaning.” Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 29 (cleaned up). Under the facts
of this case, the district court concluded that two separate acts
occurred on August 27 to make up a course of conduct as the
statute requires. 1 The court found that the first act occurred at the

1. The district court also concluded, “I don’t think that the April
incident really rises to the level of something that I would
consider as part of a course of conduct.” The April 15 incident,
however, most likely could have been considered an “act” for
purposes of the statute. An act does not need to rise to any level
of threat or concern to be considered an act. Our court explained
in Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, 530 P.3d 945, that while
“acts might well be threatening, . . . they don’t have to be.” Id.
¶ 25. “As our supreme court has made clear, establishing a course
                                                     (continued…)

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                          Richins v. Weldon

first meeting during the conversation among Programmer,
Engineer, Architect, Weldon, and Manager and that the second
act happened at the second meeting during a separate
conversation among CEO, Assistant, Weldon, and Manager.

¶48 Regarding the first act, the court highlighted how the
testimony of Programmer, Engineer, and Architect demonstrated
“that the mention of [Richins’s] name seemed to send Mr. Weldon
. . . into a tirade.” And the court noted that “during this tirade, Mr.
Weldon made a comment that he was surveilling Mr. Richins and
that he would be coming for him.” Also, the court observed that
Programmer and Engineer both testified how Weldon expressed
that if they did not return a borrowed screwdriver, “he would go
get a gun and that he would go upstairs and shoot someone.”

¶49 The court found that the second act occurred after
Programmer, Engineer, and Architect had gone back upstairs and
CEO and Assistant had joined Weldon and Manager for the
second meeting a few minutes later. This, the court found, was
when CEO heard Weldon say he was going to kill Richins and
when both CEO and Assistant heard Weldon say that “if he was
going to die, he was going to take out others first.”

¶50 The court concluded that the conversations that took place
during the first and second meetings constituted a course of
conduct because they were “two distinct events,” they “didn’t
happen simultaneously,” they seemed “to be distinguished by . . .

of conduct is the first step in the stalking analysis. This step should
not be conflated or combined with the second part of the analysis,
which involves a determination as to whether the course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person fear or emotional
distress.” Id. ¶ 26 (cleaned up). To the extent that the district court
did not consider the April 15 incident an act because it was not
threatening in nature, the court erred in its interpretation of the
stalking statute.

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                         Richins v. Weldon

the parties that were involved in the events,” and they appeared
to be separated by “a short period of time.”

¶51 Weldon argues that the district court erred in its conclusion
that these separate conversations constituted a course of conduct
because all the statements about which the witnesses testified
were “made in the heat of the moment,” “occurred in the same
location . . . to a revolving cast of participants over a period of 13
to 19 minutes from start to finish,” were separated by “a very brief
pause,” made up “one continuous episode,” and therefore were
not “distinct in time.” Weldon cites Hardy v. Hardy, 2020 UT App
88, 467 P.3d 931, cert. denied, 474 P.3d 948 (Utah 2020), in support
of his argument.

¶52 In Hardy, an ex-husband believed his ex-wife was taking
their child to see a certain therapist in violation of their divorce
decree. Id. ¶ 2. In response, the ex-husband went to the therapist’s
office, observed his ex-wife sitting in her vehicle, and
photographed her. Id. In concluding that the ex-husband’s acts of
observing and photographing—two potential stalking
behaviors—did not constitute two separate acts, the court
explained that “[j]ust because observing and photographing are
listed separately in the statute does not mean that they are distinct
acts when they occur simultaneously and where one is inherent in the
other.” Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added); id. (explaining that
photographing “cannot be accomplished without some degree of
. . . observing”). Because the district court here found that the two
meetings were not simultaneous, Hardy is distinguishable, and
Weldon’s reliance upon Hardy fails.

¶53 Moreover, “we do not consider individual acts in a
vacuum.” Butters v. Herbert, 2012 UT App 329, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 826.
“Instead, when determining whether a person’s acts constitute a
course of conduct, our cases require that we consider the acts
cumulatively in light of all the facts and circumstances.” Id.
(cleaned up). When doing so, “we consider the time elapsed

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                         Richins v. Weldon

between individual incidents,” while “also [bearing] in mind,
however, that course of conduct is defined broadly and does not
require that the actions that constitute a course of conduct be
committed within a certain period of time” or that they be
separated by a certain period of time. Id. ¶ 13 (cleaned up).

¶54 This principle is highlighted well in Anderson v. Deem, 2023
UT App 48, 530 P.3d 945, where the stalker sent the victim a series
of Instagram messages, which included an apology followed by
multiple messages over a period of three hours. Id. ¶ 7. Two
messages—sent after the apology and minutes apart from each
other—rescinded the apology and contained a litany of
grievances. Id. ¶ 8. In the next two messages—sent some hours
after the first two messages and minutes apart from each other—
the stalker told the victim that he would be “waiting” for her in
hell and then directed a common profanity at her. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Our
court explained that this “incident likely established a course of
conduct” because, along with each message having a different
purpose, “a single event with multiple distinct acts . . . separated
by some amount of time might constitute a course of conduct.” Id.
¶ 26 n.8 (cleaned up); see also State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶ 126, 527
P.3d 1087 (explaining that sending emails “in the same thread . . .
does not convert each of [the] separate emails into a single act”
when they were sent over multiple days); State v. Kitches, 2021 UT
App 24, ¶ 50, 484 P.3d 415 (emphasizing that “although a single
incident may not appear to be a qualifying act directed at the
victim, an objective evaluation of all the circumstances—
particularly the nature and timing of the acts—may indeed show
that the incident was part and parcel of a broader course of
conduct directed at the victim”), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah
2021).

¶55 Likewise, even if, for argument’s sake, we agreed with
Weldon that the two meetings make up one continuous episode,
they were distinct in time. Considering “the acts cumulatively in
light of all the facts and circumstances”—namely, that the acts

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                         Richins v. Weldon

were not simultaneous, were separated by a period of time, were
not each inherent in the other, and involved separate parties to
separate conversations—we conclude that the district court
correctly determined that the two conversations constituted two
separate acts for purposes of establishing a course of conduct
under the stalking statute. Butters, 2012 UT App 329, ¶ 12 (cleaned
up).

B.     Directed at a Specific Individual

¶56 Weldon alleges that even if a course of conduct existed,
neither of the conversations that took place in the meetings were
“directed at or toward a specific individual,” namely, Richins, as
required by Utah Code section 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i).

¶57 We first note that, to the extent Weldon asserts it is
significant that Richins was not in the server room during these
conversations, we agree with the district court that it is not
relevant to our analysis. As the court observed, Utah Code section
76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A)(I) allows the course of conduct to be
performed “directly, indirectly, or through any third party.” See
State v. Miller, 2021 UT App 88, ¶ 20, 496 P.3d 282 (discussing that
the “statute does not require that the perpetrator intend for his
message to reach the victim through the victim’s employer or co-
workers”), aff’d, 2023 UT 3, 527 P.3d 1087; Carson v. Barnes, 2016
UT App 214, ¶¶ 16–17, 385 P.3d 744 (explaining that “the statute
does not require the victim to be physically present for an act to
be considered in the ‘course of conduct’” and “[b]y the plain
language of the statute, the threatening act need not be direct, and
it includes situations in which the actor comes to the ‘person’s
workplace’ or ‘contacts the person’s . . . coworkers,’ without
requiring the presence of the victim”). “In other words, the person
toward whom a respondent’s behavior is ‘directed at’ . . . is
determined by an objective assessment of whether the respondent
engaged in conduct prohibited by the stalking statute. And this is
true even where a respondent directs his or her conduct at a

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                          Richins v. Weldon

petitioner ‘indirectly or through a third party.’” Ragsdale v. Fishler,
2021 UT 29, ¶ 37, 491 P.3d 835.

¶58 Weldon alleges that because some of his threats did not
name Richins specifically, they could not be directed at Richins.
In support of this argument, Weldon highlights how Programmer
and Engineer both testified that during the first conversation,
Weldon stated that if they did not return the screwdriver, he was
going to go upstairs and shoot “somebody” or “someone.” And
regarding the second conversation, Weldon points out how both
CEO and Assistant testified that Weldon said because he was
going to die anyway, he should take out “other people” or “some
people” first.

¶59 Our court has explained that, just as with determining
whether a course of conduct exists, it is appropriate “to analyze
the entire course of conduct between the parties,” i.e., consider the
course of conduct “cumulatively in light of all of the facts and
circumstances of the case,” “in determining whether [the alleged
stalker’s] conduct was ‘directed at’ [the petitioner].” Ellison v.
Stam, 2006 UT App 150, ¶ 38, 136 P.3d 1242. One significant aspect
of the facts and circumstances Weldon fails to mention is that the
district court found that during both conversations, Weldon
directed a threat specifically toward Richins in addition to these
more general threats. For example, the district court found that
during the first conversation “Weldon made a comment that he
was surveilling Mr. Richins and that he would keep coming for
him.” The district court also found that during the second
conversation, Weldon threatened to kill Richins by name.

¶60 Furthermore, the witnesses also testified regarding
disturbing language and statements that Weldon directed toward
Richins during both conversations. For example, Programmer
testified that Weldon directed “angry and aggressive language,”
including swearing, toward Richins, “saying things that he
claimed [Richins] was doing wrong to him and that he wasn’t

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                        Richins v. Weldon

going to let him get away with it.” Similarly, Engineer testified
that Weldon called Richins “an effing tool” and “an A-hole,” said
other “similar things using similar vulgar language, typically
directed at [Richins],” and “expressed his hatred of [Richins] very
clearly.” Likewise, Architect testified that Weldon “became
extremely angry . . . [and] agitated” when he heard Richins’s name
and “started ranting” about Richins, saying that Richins was “an
effing tool” and that he “effing hate[d] him.” And in light of this
testimony, the district court found that “it appears to be pretty
clear that Mr. Richins was upstairs, and [the comment about
somebody was going to be shot] was likely directed toward Mr.
Richins.” -

¶61 Finally, the witnesses testified that, despite Weldon’s
general references to “other people,” “somebody,” or “some
people,” they understood these threats to be directed toward
Richins. For example, Assistant clarified that even though Weldon
never specifically mentioned Richins’s name in reference to
people dying, she understood that there was “a threat of death”
toward Richins because Weldon was referring to Richins
beforehand. And regarding this statement, the district court
expressed that given Assistant’s “interpretation of that
conversation, based on the context and the other comments that
were made,” it “was expressed and directed toward Mr. Richins.”

¶62 Programmer also interpreted these statements as a threat
against Richins because of “the anger” that Weldon had expressed
“the entire time” they were with him. Programmer testified that
Weldon’s comments about Richins were unsolicited: “[N]o one
was asking about this. . . . [Weldon] brought it up and kept going
off on it.” Programmer said that “the implication of ‘shoot
somebody’” was that Weldon meant Richins. Also, when asked if
he was concerned about anyone else’s safety besides his own in
light of the circumstances, Architect replied, “Yes. Particularly
[Richins] . . . .”

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                          Richins v. Weldon

¶63 Therefore, taking all these circumstances into
consideration, namely, the threats specifically directed at Richins,
the disturbing language about Richins, and the witnesses’
interpretation that the indirect threats were aimed at Richins, we
agree with the district court that the conversations as a whole
were directed at Richins.

     II. Reasonable Person Fearing for Own Safety or Suffering
                        Emotional Distress

A.      Weldon’s Threat to Kill Richins

¶64 As an initial matter, we address Weldon’s contention that
the district court erred in finding that Weldon threatened to kill
Richins. “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the
court must find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). “Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due
regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of
the witnesses.” Id. R. 52(a)(4). “A trial court’s factual
determinations are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict
with the clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Henshaw v.
Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837 (cleaned up).
Therefore, “we give great deference to the trial court and do not
lightly disturb its factual findings.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶65 The court based its finding that Weldon threatened to kill
Richins on the evidence before it and by determining that Weldon
lacked credibility. For example, CEO testified that Weldon
“mentioned that he was very upset” with Richins, that CEO
“should fire” Richins, and that Weldon “wanted to kill” Richins.
The district court found CEO’s testimony to be credible. And the
district court already had questioned Weldon’s credibility as a
witness when Weldon denied saying that he was surveilling
Richins and instead testified that he said his attorneys might have

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                         Richins v. Weldon

hired private investigators to surveil Richins. In response, the
court stated that it was “not really persuaded that that’s the
conversation that took place.”

       [T]rial courts are often faced with the necessity of
       making factual findings based exclusively on oral
       testimony. Moreover, trial courts have the benefit of
       viewing the witnesses firsthand, to assess their
       demeanor and to consider their testimonies in the
       context of the proceedings as a whole, making them
       much better equipped to make credibility
       determinations based on conflicting oral evidence
       than an appellate court that has access only to the
       cold record.

Id. ¶ 12. Here, the district court assessed Weldon’s and CEO’s
demeanors and considered their testimonies in the context of the
proceedings as a whole. And in the face of their conflicting
testimonies, the court found CEO to be the more credible witness.
Weldon has thus failed to show that the district court’s finding
was clearly erroneous.

B.     Emotional Distress

¶66 Weldon alleges that the district court “only tied its
emotional distress ruling to the surveillance comment” 2 and “did

2. Weldon seems to be referring to the district court’s statement,
“I think the evidence I have is that Mr. Richins, in fact, has
experienced extreme distress, that he’s taken steps to protect
himself and his family, including the installation of surveillance
equipment on his house and limiting their public presence and
taking other actions.” “Under the second stalking element, a
petitioner must show that the respondent knew or should have
known his or her conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear
for the petitioner’s own safety or suffer other emotional distress.”
                                                     (continued…)

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                         Richins v. Weldon

not address any emotional distress caused by the screwdriver
comment, which made up the court’s ‘first incident,’ or by the
purported ‘death threat’ or ‘taking others out’ comment, which
made up the court’s ‘second incident.’” We understand this
argument to mean that the district court should have decided
whether a reasonable person would suffer fear or emotional
distress for each act that makes up a course of conduct, separately
from each other. But this argument misconstrues the law, as this
court has held that a district court should not consider each act “in
isolation.” Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 27, 530 P.3d 945.
Instead, “a district court should consider the course of conduct
cumulatively.” Id. ¶ 28. If the court had looked at each aspect of
each conversation separately, then it might have found that each
aspect of the conversation in isolation would not have caused a
reasonable person to feel fear or emotional distress. See id. ¶ 31
(“[W]hile the profanity alone might not be enough to cause fear
or emotional distress, when considered in conjunction with [the
respondent’s] wish to see [the petitioner] in hell and his earlier
communication that she was a ‘bitch’ that he would like to see
‘die,’ a different picture emerges.”). The district court’s conclusion
here, “that those statements were concerning enough that Mr.
Weldon should have known . . . that course of action would cause
Mr. Richins extreme distress,” indicates that the court correctly
analyzed all of Weldon’s statements throughout both

Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45, 491 P.3d 835 (emphasis added)
(cleaned up). This is an objective standard under which the
subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is
not the relevant question. See id. Thus, whether Richins actually
experienced extreme distress is not relevant to our analysis, and
the district court should not have implied that it was. As our
analysis demonstrates, however, the court ultimately based its
decision on a reasonable person standard.

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                         Richins v. Weldon

conversations cumulatively in deciding this element of stalking.
(Emphasis added.) 3

¶67 Furthermore, the Anderson court elaborated that under the
stalking statute, a “petitioner must establish . . . that the
respondent’s conduct would cause emotional distress to a
reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances.” Id. ¶ 29
(cleaned up). And by “including ‘in the victim’s circumstances’ as
part of the ‘reasonable person’ definition, the statute provides for
an individualized objective standard, meaning that a court must
consider the entire context surrounding the defendant’s conduct.”
Id. (cleaned up). “Courts applying this individualized objective
standard have considered such factors as the victim’s
background, the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the
defendant, any history of abuse between the parties, the location
of the alleged stalking,” and “the cumulative effect of [the]
defendant’s repetitive conduct.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, ¶ 27,
322 P.3d 728 (cleaned up). Another consideration could be
whether the behavior “might cause damage to one’s reputation,
relationships, or livelihood.” State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶ 84, 527
P.3d 1087 (cleaned up). In other words, to “properly apply the
stalking statute’s objective standard,” a district court should
analyze a defendant’s “conduct in light of the specific facts and
circumstances of [the petitioner’s] individual case.” Ragsdale v.
Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 48, 491 P.3d 835.

3. We acknowledge that it would have been better for the court to
have said “a reasonable person in Richins’s circumstances” rather
than “Mr. Richins.” That said, we interpret the district court to
mean a reasonable person. Given the court’s restatement of the
law that the statute requires the course of conduct to “cause a
reasonable person to fear for the person’s own safety or to suffer
other emotional distress,” we are confident the court understood
and applied the appropriate standard.

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                        Richins v. Weldon

¶68 Here, the entire context includes more than just the two
conversations that occurred on August 27. Weldon and Richins
knew each other and had a contentious relationship since
November 2020, as the text messages of April 15 and Richins’s
testimony demonstrated. And in his civil stalking petition,
Richins included other interactions with Weldon that he alleged
were “acts” under the stalking statute, such as emails that Weldon
sent to Richins on July 8, July 9, and July 27.

¶69 Also significant was the location of the two August 27
conversations. Given the fact that Weldon was saying very
negative things about Richins to his fellow employees and boss,
including telling CEO that he should fire him, Weldon’s behavior
could have damaged Richins’s work relationships and reputation
as well as his livelihood. See Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶¶ 84–86. Thus,
ample evidence existed for the district court to conclude that a
reasonable person in Richins’s circumstances would feel
emotional distress.

                         CONCLUSION

¶70 In light of all the facts and circumstances in this case, the
district court correctly concluded that Weldon intentionally or
knowingly engaged in a course of conduct that was directed at
Richins and that Weldon knew or should have known that such a
course of conduct would cause a reasonable person in Richins’s
circumstances to fear for his own safety or suffer other emotional
distress. Therefore, we affirm the district court in all respects.

 20220522-CA                   27              2023 UT App 147