Court Opinion

ID: 9456577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:57:17.459491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:02.097703
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I believe that the majority opinion has correctly resolved all but the final issue it discusses. However, in discussing appellant’s second contention, I would not characterize the missing laboratory technician’s function as involving the performance of a test. If he had performed a test the issues of which were relevant, it would have been error not to have required him to testify because the test results would constitute an assertion,, verbal or otherwise, about a matter material in the litigation and evidence thereof would be hearsay. Nevertheless, it is clear that all the technician did was to apply a silver nitrate solution to the demand note to make patent the latent print. This was not an assertive act and as the majority opinion observes, it was only a routine task which was ob-' served by another officer who testified at the trial to what he saw. The critical testimony that appellant’s palm print matched that on the note was provided by an expert fingerprint examiner who was present at the trial and was thoroughly cross-examined by appellant’s counsel.
I believe the majority opinion is in error in its resolution of the final issue whether the record supports the finding that Beasley violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). That section reads as follows:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
This language clearly requires the commission of something more than the elements of the offense described in § 2113(a). , Subsection (a) punishes an attempt to take “from the person or presence of another any * * * thing of value * * * in the * * * custody * * * of any bank * * *” when that taking is done “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” Force and violence is the traditional language of assault, and something more than an assault must be present to authorize the additional five year penalty under § 2113(d).
I would hold that the aggravation required by the “assault” provision of § 2113(d) must be committed “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” just as a dangerous weapon must be employed in the alternative aggravating circumstance of putting in jeopardy the life of any person.
Although there is no controlling authority in our circuit on this issue (which, for all that appears, has never *1284been squarely considered by any circuit), the Supreme Court in Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957), stated that conviction of “robbery aggravated by assault with a deadly weapon” subjects one to the maximum of 25 years provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d). 352 U.S. at 329 n. 11 & 327 n. 6, 77 S.Ct. 403. See also United States v. Johnson, 401 F.2d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1968); Holbrook v. Hunter, 149 F.2d 230, 231 (10th Cir. 1945); Meyers v. United States, 116 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1941); United States v. Gebhart, 90 F.Supp. 509, 514 (D.Neb.1950).
If the assault involved in a violation of § 2113(a) could, at the whim of a prosecutor, also be made the aggravating element under § 2113(d) to authorize 5 years additional imprisonment, the principle of Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), would be offended. In order to give lawful meaning to Congress’ enactment of the aggravating elements in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), the phrase “by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” must be read, regardless of punctuation, as modifying both the assault provision and the putting in jeopardy provision. See United States v. Shreveport Grain & El. Co., 287 U.S. 77, 82-83, 53 S.Ct. 42, 77 L.Ed. 175 (1932); Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boyd, 117 F.2d 608, 611-612 (6th Cir. 1941).
Under this construction of the statute, the 25 year sentence cannot stand because it is clear that the indictment did not charge nor did the proofs show the use of a dangerous weapon or device.
Nevertheless, even if an unarmed assault should be deemed to satisfy § 2113(d), the aggravating factor is absent here. Criminal assault is not defined anywhere in the Federal Criminal Code and, in the absence of a statutory definition, we are referred to common law definitions. See Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Vol. 2, page 833 (July 1970); Guarro v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 97, 237 F.2d 578 (1956).
In the common law, the concept of criminal assault, according to one line of authority, has been understood to require two elements: a wilful attempt or threat to inflict injury upon someone and the ability to do so. United States v. Barnaby, 51 F. 20, 21 (C.C.D.Mont. 1892); 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery §§ 2-3. The tort concept of assault requires a wilful attempt or threat to inflict injury but is satisfied if only the apparent ability to accomplish it is present. Nevertheless, this concept requires the actual apprehension of danger by the victim, although the apprehension need not be reasonable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 27 (1965). A second concept of criminal assault has borrowed from the law of torts and involves intent by the actor and apprehension on the part of the victim as in the tort concept, and additionally requires that the apprehension be reasonable. It does not require that the actor actually be capable of inflicting harm. Cf. United States v. Rizzo, 409 F.2d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 1969); 2 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice Instructions § 48.-07 (2d ed. 1970).
None of these definitions of assault has been fully satisfied here. It is not contended that the beverage can with the attached flashcube could have inflicted harm or that the accused actually intended to inflict harm, and the trial judge made no express finding that the teller named in the indictment actually apprehended danger.1 Although the record might support a finding of apprehension on her part, the trial judge *1285refrained from making it and we can only speculate whether he would have done so.2
Accordingly, I would hold, regardless of which definition of assault is embodied in § 2113(d), that the prosecutor has failed to prove Count II of the indictment.
Of course the comment in the majority opinion that life may have been placed in danger because of possible invited deadly retaliation is inapposite since no dangerous weapon was used as § 2113(d) plainly requires under that aggravating alternative. And, of course, this was not the aggravating element charged in the indictment.
Nevertheless, the record supports the determination of guilt under the first count and instead of ordering a new trial I would vacate the sentence of 25 years and remand for resentencing under § 2113(a) for violation of which a sentence may not exceed 20 years. This result is indicated because the offense defined in the first count is included in the second count and the trial judge’s findings clearly establish all the elements of § 2113(a). See Gant v. United States, 161 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1947); Nolen v. United States, 190 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1951); Schmidt v. United States, 286 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1961); Gant v. United States, 308 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1962).

. The court stated in its findings that, “He did assault Eleanor Stylas by handing her what he contended was a bomb, whether it was a bomb or not, is immaterial if he presented it as a bomb, and if she had reason to believe it might be, that is sufficient to find he did commit an assault and, therefore, the court finds that the defendant is guilty of Count II of the indictment". Transcript at 241.

. Mrs. Stylas, the teller named in the indictment, testified on direct examination as follows:
Q (By Mr. McIntyre, continuing) : Mrs. Stylas, did you know whether or not it was a bomb?
A I had no way of knowing, no.
Q Did the thought cross your mind?
A Well, to be honest, the way it looked, I couldn’t figure out what it was.
Transcript at 23. Her testimony on cross-examination is no more helpful:
Q (By Mr. Arvan, continuing) : Do you know who did [ring the alarm buzzer]?
A The man had already left and everybody went outside the building because they were afraid the thing was a bomb and we were all standing outside and finally I asked Sharon, are you sure you pressed the alarm and she said, yes. I said something must be wrong because the police should be here by now. So, I proceeded to go back in the bank and there’s a desk right by the door and picked up the phone and I dialed our operator and told her that I had a man that attempted to hold me up at the bank and there is a note here stating that this is a bomb, whether it is or not, I have no idea.
Transcript at 41-42. The indictment did not alleged that anyone other than Mrs. Stylas had been assaulted.