Court Opinion

ID: 9751588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:38:16.160381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:52.538357
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I dissent. Appellant was denied his constitutionally-guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel. The reasons for my dissent are substantially the same as those expressed by Judge Packel in the Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Davis, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 434, 435, 295 A.2d 155, 156 (1972) (Packel, J., dissenting, joined by Hoeeman and Spaulding, JJ.):
“The constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a trial to determine guilt is denied if the defendant’s attorney admits guilt. The conduct of counsel for the appellant constituted such an admission.
*200“Defense counsel stipulated during trial that were the complainant present and sworn he would have testified that: at 4:00 p.m. on December 31, 1968, two men entered his milk truck, pointed a pistol at his head and demanded all of his money; after he complied, the thieves withdrew and he notified the police; and, at the preliminary hearing, he identified the appellant as one of the two robbers. The complete closing speech of appellant’s counsel was: ‘If Your Honor please, this man has been in jail for almost one year. This man has a narcotic problem.’
“The Commonwealth’s case hinged upon identification. Although one policeman testified that he saw a person running in the vicinity of the incident who fitted the general description later given by the complainant, it was the identification by the complainant himself which was the pivotal evidence in the case. Defense counsel gave up the opportunity to cross-examine and this was not part of a planned strategy based on availability of other witnesses to attack the identification.
“Competency of counsel is not to be measured by 20-20 hindsight, but rather by the determination of whether ‘the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests,’ Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604, 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967)....
“Under the circumstances of this case, the stipulation, particularly with reference to identification, amounted to an admission of criminal responsibility which was not consonant with a plea of not guilty. The determination of whether to plead guilty or not guilty or whether a plea should be changed is reserved to the defendant. A.B.A. Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Function, § 5.2 (1972). Even the sincere desire to minimize circumstances tending to aggravate *201the appellant’s case did not justify the adoption of a trial strategy which effectively altered a plea of not guilty.
“Defense counsel’s closing speech at the very least was an implied admission of the defendant’s guilt. Certainly, the important right to make a closing speech is not to be converted to a mere plea for leniency. It was improper for counsel to make an admission of guilt in order to give the interest in securing a favorable sentence, if convicted, a greater emphasis than the interest in securing an acquittal.” Id. at 435-36, 295 A.2d at 156-57.
Additionally, I would emphasize that a plea for leniency is proper only after guilt or innocence has been determined. After an adverse verdict, counsel’s role is to “present to the court any ground which will assist in reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused.” ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Function § 8.1 (Approved Draft, 1971). However, prior to verdict, it is counsel’s duty to advocate his client’s innocence “to the utmost of his learning and ability.” Id. § 1.1(b).
In this case, counsel’s trial behavior was inconsistent with his constitutionally-mandated “primary role ... to act as champion for his client.” Id., Introduction at 145. The judgment of sentence should be reversed and a new trial granted.