Court Opinion

ID: 9722088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:16:41.377519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:30.625994
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s finding that the Michigan Freedom of Information Act1 applies to Department of Corrections disciplinary hearings and join in that holding. However, because the majority eviscerates § 11 of the foia by holding that it does not permit public access to records *253independent of § 3 of the foia, I respectfully dissent.
I
Even before the enactment of the foia, "Michigan had an established history of requiring public agency disclosure . . . .” Evening News Ass’n v Troy, 417 Mich 481, 494-495; 339 NW2d 421 (1983). In Nowack v Auditor General, 243 Mich 200, 203-204; 219 NW 749 (1928), this Court explained that the citizens of Michigan possess a common-law right to access government documents:
If there be any rule of the English common law that denies the public the right of access to public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions. Ours is a government of the people. Every citizen rules. . . . Undoubtedly, it would be a great surprise to the citizens and taxpayers of Michigan to learn that the law denied them access to their own books for the purpose of seeing how their money was being expended and how their business was being conducted. There is no such law and never was either in this country or in England. Mr. Justice Morse was right in saying:
"I do not think that any common law ever obtained in this free government that would deny to the people thereof the right of free access to, and public inspection of, public records.” Burton v Tuite, 78 Mich 363, 374 (7 LRA 73) [44 NW 282 (1889)].
There is no question as to the common-law right of the people at large to inspect public documents and records. The right is based on the interest which citizens necessarily have in the matter to which the records related.[2]
*254The foia was enacted to continue this tradition of openness:
It is the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the aifairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process. [MCL 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1X2).]
Hence, the foia mandates disclosure and publication of public records. Section 3(1) of the act, in pertinent part, mandates:
Upon an oral or written request which describes the public record sufficiently to enable the public body to find the public record, a person has a right to inspect, copy, or receive copies of a public record of a public body, except as otherwise expressly provided by section 13.[3]
Section 54 delineates the specific mechanics of obtaining a § 3 request, and provides that members of the public may file an action in circuit court, pursuant to § 10 of the act,5 to compel an agency to disclose records when in violation of §§ 3 and 5._
*255Furthermore, § 11 mandates that "[a] state agency shall publish and make available to the public” public records.6 Such publication "may be in pamphlet, looseleaf, or other appropriate form in printed, mimeographed, or other written matter.” Not unlike § 5, § 11 authorizes a cause of action "to compel a state agency to comply with this section.”
As found by the majority, disciplinary hearings by the Department of Corrections clearly fall within the foia’s mandate of public access. The majority also found that " 'make available to the public’ simply means that members of the public can obtain access to documents required to be published by following the procedures set forth in § 3. In short, § 11 describes what is to be published and the acceptable form of publication, while § 3 describes the rights and opportunities publication creates.” Ante at 250.
II
A
The role of this Court regarding statutory analysis is to determine and enforce the Legislature’s intentions. People ex rel Platt v Oakland Co Bank, 1 Doug 282, 287 (Mich, 1844). Because the Legislature is presumed to understand the meaning of its statutes, "[statutory analysis necessarily begins with the wording of the statute itself.” Carr v General Motors Corp, 425 Mich 313, 317; 389 NW2d 686 (1986). Each word of an act, therefore, is "presumed to be made use of for some purpose,” and "so far as possible, effect must be given to every clause and sentence.” Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents v Auditor General, 167 Mich 444, 450; *256132 NW 1037 (1911).7 Moreover, unless circumstances dictate otherwise,8 the Court should utilize the common understanding of words and phrases. Oakland Co Bank, supra.9 Accordingly, the Court may not substitute or redefine a word. People v Crucible Steel Co of America, 150 Mich 563, 567; 114 NW 350 (1907).10 Thus, a cardinal rule of statutory construction is that "[legislative intent is to be derived from the actual language of the statute, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is necessary.” Storey v Meijer, Inc, 431 Mich 368, 376; 429 NW2d 169 (1988).11 Hence, "[p]ossible or even probable meanings, when one is plainly declared in the instrument itself, the courts are not at liberty to search for elsewhere.” 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), pp 125-127.
*257If, however, the plain meaning of a statutory provision is unclear, then legislative intent may be determined by an examination of the statute’s purpose, In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich 242, 248; 439 NW2d 246 (1989), as well as the entirety of the statute’s structure and framework. Joslin v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 359 Mich 420, 426; 102 NW2d 584 (1960).
B
The unambiguous language of § 11 provides that "[a] state agency shall publish and make available to the public” certain records. The majority’s analysis distorts the common meaning of "publish” by interpreting it as the mere retention of records. Ante at 250. If the Legislature intended to so tailor § 11, it certainly could have utilized more precise terms such as "store,” "maintain,” "keep,” or "retain.” The Legislature, however, chose and enacted the term "publish.” Because the Legislature did not define "publish” in its definition section of the foia,12 an examination of its common meaning is appropriate. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Second Unabridged Edition, p 1563, defines "publish” as: "to issue (printed or otherwise reproduced textual or graphic material, computer software, etc.) for sale or distribution to the public,” "to issue publicly the work of,” "to announce formally or officially; proclaim; promulgate,” and "to make publicly or generally known.”13 Similarly, Roget’s International Thesaurus (New York: 1961), 531.7 publication, p 363, notes "propagate, promulgate, circu*258late, spread, spread about or abroad, broadcast, diffuse, disseminate,” "divulge,” "make known, make public,” "put forth,” "issue,” "declare,” "announce,” "proclaim,” et al., in the primary listing for the term. Common legal definitions do not differ. For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1233, includes "[t]o make public; to circulate; to make known to people in general,” "[t]o issue; to put into circulation,” "[a]n advising of the public or making known of something to the public for a purpose.” The vast array of legal authorities compiled in Corpus Juris Secundum concur.14 None of these sources define the term as mere storage or retention. The common understanding of "publish” certainly includes at least the production of information that is readily available for public review, if not the outright binding or distribution of materials for public consumption.
More important, the majority misconstrues "make available to the public” to mean "make available to the public as solely delineated in § 3.”15 No such limitation exists in the statutory *259language of § 11 or elsewhere in the foia. Each section is independent, and neither refers to the other for definition — there simply is no statutory language to justify intertwining the sections.16 Moreover, examining the statute as a whole, the majority’s interpretation of § 3 renders the phrase superfluous: §§ 3 and 5 already ensure that records are available to the public through a specific request to a governmental agency. Furthermore, both §§ 3 and 11 provide for a cause Of action to compel an agency to disclose information unlawfully withheld from the public, evidencing a scheme intended to grant § 11 an independent mechanism for public access to documents.
The public, therefore, may gain public access to public records independent of § 3 by obtaining documents published as mandated under § 11. Hence, the foia permits public review of records in two fashions: (1) through a specific search utilizing §§ 3 and 5, and (2) through general access utilizing § 11. A member of the public may gather information through a § 3 request that relates to a specific person or topic, or he may perform wide-ranging general research by examining materials published through § 11. For example, a reporter wishing to gather information regarding the dnr’s activities regarding Detroit’s Belle Isle could file a § 3 foia request specifically asking for such information. On the other hand, another reporter wishing to thoroughly research dnr practices, perhaps to search for a pattern of corruption or abuse,17 could examine published materials via § 11. Con*260trary to the assertions of the majority, this construction of the statute does not render § 3 meaningless. In fact, this interpretation is the only one that maintains the integrity of both sections by preserving the meaning of the phrase "publish and make available to the public.”
Furthermore, the majority’s interpretation conflicts with the broad mandate of the foia, which is to ensure that "all persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government ... so that they may fully participate in the democratic process.”18 The inability of a citizen to formulate a specific § 3 request should not deny him the ability to examine records, otherwise government practices unknown to the general populace could never be exposed to public scrutiny because no member of the general public could possess the exact knowledge to formulate a specific § 3 request.19
Hence, I respectfully dissent.
Levin, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq.

 See also Int’l Business Machines Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 71 Mich App 526, 542; 248 NW2d 605 (1976).

 The section continues:
This act does not require a public body to make a compilation, summary, or report of information, except as required in section 11.
This act does not require a public body to create a new public record, except as required in sections 5 and 11, and to the extent required by this act for the furnishing of copies, or edited copies pursuant to section 14(1), of an already existing public record. [MCL 15.233(3); MSA 4.1801(3)(3).]

 MCL 15.235; MSA 4.1801(5).

 MCL 15.240; MSA 4.1801(10).

 MCL 15.241(1); MSA 4.1801(H)(1).

 See also Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119, 133; 191 NW2d 355 (1971) ("[e]very word should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory if at all possible”).

 For instance, if a statute defines a term, the statute’s definition must be followed. See, e.g., MCL 15.232(a), (b), (c); MSA 4.1801(2)(a), (b), (c) (defining, inter alia, "[pjerson,” "[pjublic body,” and "[pjublic record” for foia purposes). Similarly, when a legal term of art is utilized, then the technicalities of that term should be referenced. Cf. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed), p 132 (noting that legal terms in constitutions must be interpreted in light of their history).

 See also Cooley, n 8 supra at 130.

 We cannot assume the legislature made a mistake and used one word when it in fact intended to use another. The language of the statute is plain as it reads and we do not feel authorized to change its meaning by substituting another word for the one the legislature used.

 Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. [Fisher v Fisher, 6 US 358 (2 Cranch) 399; 2 L Ed 304 (1805), quoted in Cooley, n 8 supra at 125. See also Sam v Balarado, 411 Mich 405, 417-418; 308 NW2d 142 (1981); Jones v Grand Ledge Public Schools, 349 Mich 1, 9; 84 NW2d 327 (1957); People ex rel Twitchell v Blodgett, 13 Mich 127, 167 (1865) (Cooley, J.).]

 MCL 15.232; MSA 4.1801(2). Contrary to the assertions of the majority, "publish” is not defined by the act, only the acceptable modes of publication.

 Dictionary definitions from the era of the foia’s enactment do not differ substantively.

 As commonly understood, the word "publish” means to give to the public. While the meaning of the term may depend on the subject with which it is connected, it has been said that the word is usually associated with printing by pamphlet or news- • paper.
"Publish” is defined as meaning to make public, to make public in a newspaper, book, circular, or the like; to make public announcement of; to bring before the public, as for sale or distribution; to make known; to make known to people or mankind in general; to disclose, reveal. The term is further defined as meaning to print, or cause to be printed, and to issue from the press, either for sale or general distribution, as a book, newspaper, piece of music, engraving, etc.
"Publish” is also defined as meaning to circulate; to put into circulation; to put in general circulation; to disseminate; to issue; to advertise; to utter. [73 CJS 551-552. Citations omitted.]

 The majority correctly notes that § 11 mandates that "agencies . . . create certain records,” ante at 251, and that many *259dilferent methods of complying with the publication requirement exist.

 When one section of the foia is defined by another, the foia often specifically refers to that other section. See, e.g., the explicit reference in § 5 to § 10 procedures.

 As a hypothetical, I do not mean to suggest that such a pattern exists.

 MCL 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1)(2).

 Moreover, even if the foia did not permit general access to public records, our common law would almost certainly permit such access. Nowack, supra at 203-204.