Court Opinion

ID: 9701262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:13:21.733677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:21.853795
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority’s refusal to compel the trial judge to do what he has an absolute duty to do, issue a writ to which Relator has an absolute right, is mystifying. The time taken to reach that decision in this original proceeding while the Relator has *112remained in jail without a hearing is troubling.
Relator’s petition for a writ of mandamus was filed in this court on February 7, 2003. On February 12, we asked Respondent and the State to respond not later than February 26. We received no response. Although Relator is in jail awaiting trial, more than a month has passed before he will be informed that he must file another application for a writ of habe-as corpus with another judge to attempt to obtain a hearing on his request for a reduction in bail.
• Respondent is the judge of the 18th District Court of Johnson County (See Justice Gray’s Opinion);
• A felony indictment against Relator is pending in the 18th District Court (See Justice Gray’s Opinion);
• Relator is confined in the Johnson County jail in lieu of bail of $50,000, an amount which he asserts to be excessive (See Justice Gray’s Opinion);
• “A petition for writ of habeas corpus is a proper means to challenge the amount of bah” (See Justice Gray’s Opinion, citing three cases);
• Article 11.08 directs Relator to file his petition for writ of habeas corpus to contest the amount of bail set with the “judge of the court in which he is indicted” (See Justice Gray’s Opinion, citing Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 11.08);
• Relator filed such a petition with Respondent, conforming to the requirements for such petitions (See Justice Gray’s Opinion, citing Id. art. 11.14);
• Respondent had “a mandatory duty to issue the writ of habeas corpus ..., to let the writ be served upon the sheriff of Johnson County, and timely to hear the merits of [Relator’s] complaint” (See Justice Gray’s Opinion, citing Id. arts. 11.05, 11.08, 11.10, 11.11, 11.27, 11.31, 11.40) (“It is beyond question that [Respondent] has a duty to issue the writ.”);
• Relator’s right to the writ is “constitutional” and the “granting of it is made an imperative duty by statute” (See Justice Gray’s Opinion, citing Click v. State, 118 Tex.Crim. 404, 407-08, 39 S.W.2d 39, 41 (1931) (also stating “It should be granted without unreasonable delay.”));
• No appeal can be had from a refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus (Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (citing cases back to 1900)).
Because neither the Respondent nor State has controverted Relator’s assertions, we should accept them as true. Whitehead v. Julian, 476 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex.1972) (citing Patton v. Terrell, 101 Tex. 221, 105 S.W. 1115 (1907)).
The majority believes that filing a petition in another district court, a county court, or the Court of Criminal Appeals is such adequate relief that we cannot direct Respondent to do his statutory duty to issue a writ of habeas corpus, to which Relator has a constitutional right. I disagree. The El Paso case cited by Justice Gray addresses conflicts of jurisdiction, not the right of the accused to challenge the amount of his bail. See Garber v. State, 667 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1984, no pet.). The “Great Writ” case cited by Justice Gray addresses the scope of post-conviction writs, not challenges to bail. See Ex parte Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
As Relator points out, we have held that “the theoretical habeas remedy available [by presenting the petition to another judge] is inadequate” in circumstances where a second trial was imminent. In re *113Davis, 990 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding); see also Von Kolb v. Koehler, 609 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1980, orig. proceeding) (“such a possibility is no defense to our issuance of a writ of mandamus”). We observed: “A technically available legal remedy will not defeat a petitioner’s entitlement to mandamus relief when the remedy is ‘so uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate.’ ” Davis, 990 S.W.2d at 457 (citing State ex rel Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Kozacki v. Knize, 883 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.App.-Waco 1994, orig. proceeding)). We also observed that “under proper circumstances” relief by mandamus might be appropriate. Id. (citing Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d at 868); see also Kozacki, 883 S.W.2d at 762 (Mandamus is available to “correct judicial action that ignores clear, binding precedent” because “[tjrial judges do not enjoy the freedom to ignore the law.”).
Relator’s has a right; Respondent has a duty. The majority does not dispute that the duty to issue the writ is ministerial, in that it does not involve the exercise of any discretion. Relator is in jail awaiting a decision on his attempt to have the amount of bail lowered. Requiring him to prepare another petition and find a judge willing to issue the writ that Respondent had a ministerial duty to issue is “so uncertain, tedious, burdensome, slow, inconvenient, inappropriate or ineffective as to be deemed inadequate.” Davis, 990 S.W.2d at 457. I would conditionally grant the relief requested, so that hereafter Professors Dix and Dawson would have a basis for changing “defendant’s recourse may be to seek mandamus rather than attempting to invoke the Court of Criminal Appeals’ original habeas corpus jurisdiction” to “defendant’s recourse is to seek mandamus to require the judge before whom the case is pending1 to issue the writ.” G. Dix & R. Dawson, Texas Criminal Practice and Procedure § 47.56 (2d ed.2001). Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

. Article 11.08 provides an alternative when there is no judge within the district. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.08.