Court Opinion

ID: 9844134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:58:12.737312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:28.388029
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, J.,
dissents.
Reversed and remanded for new trial as per this opinion. No costs or attorney fees.
BAKES, Chief Justice, dissenting as to Part I:
I respectfully dissent as to Part I of the Court’s opinion. I believe the courts below correctly sustained the conviction and sentence of the appellant Missamore. Specifically, as to Part I, I believe the Court errs when it concludes that because evidence of harassment is not an element of the crime of trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8), that evidence of the defendant’s intent to harass is not relevant. Furthermore, I believe the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting opinion evidence that the defendant Missamore was harassing the complainants.
The facts related in the majority opinion need some amplification. When evaluating the evidence on appeal, “the reviewing court will review the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent.” Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 698, 604 P.2d 51, 52 (1979); Glenn Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Constr. Co., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975). However, the majority opinion has related the facts primarily from the appellant Missamore’s point of view, contrary to our cases. When viewed most favorably to the Schmidts, a different picture unfolds. At trial the Schmidts testified that the appellant Missamore walked across the 10-foot wide strip that lies between the gravel shoulder of Hauser Road and the Schmidts’ property line and then continued several feet onto the Schmidts’ property. After refusing to leave after being requested to do so several times, the Schmidts called the sheriff. The Schmidts testified that Missamore had done this several times before, and on one occasion Missamore had driven her truck across the Schmidts’ lawn. Although the appellant Missamore denied at trial that she had trespassed onto the Schmidts’ property, the *37jury resolved that issue against Missamore, and found her guilty as charged.
On appeal the appellant Missamore has not raised any issue regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury’s finding that she trespassed onto the Schmidts’ property and refused to leave after demand was made upon her by the Schmidts. Accordingly, we are bound by the jury’s finding that Missamore did trespass onto the Schmidts’ property and did refuse to leave when requested to do so by the Schmidts. I.A.R. 35; Cline v. Roemer, 97 Idaho 666, 668, 551 P.2d 621, 623 (1976); Haggerty v. Western Barge, Inc., 94 Idaho 509, 492 P.2d 48 (1971); Oregon Shortline Ry. Co. v. City of Chubbuck, 93 Idaho 815, 474 P.2d 244 (1970).
I

Evidentiary Issues

A. Both Mr. and Mrs. Schmidt, together with the neighbor Mr. Sprague, were permitted by the trial court to testify, in the course of describing what the defendant Missamore had done, that Missamore “was just harassing” and that the harassment had been going on for a long time. The majority opinion acknowledges that in order to obtain a conviction under I.C. § 18-7008(8) the trespass must be done “willfully.”3 The Court then quotes the definition of “willfully” from I.C. § 18-101(1), which states that “[t]he word ‘willfully’, when applied to the intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” Ante at 31, 803 P.2d at 532. The Court then concludes that “this means that the defendant’s ‘intent to violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage ...’ is irrelevant. ... Mr. Schmidt’s response that Missamore was on Schmidt’s property to harass the Schmidts was irrelevant____” Ante at 31, 803 P.2d at 532.
While proof of an intent to harass is not an element of the crime of trespass under I.C. § 18-1008(8), it certainly does not follow that proof of intent to harass is irrelevant in a criminal prosecution under that section. The defendant Missamore pled not guilty to the allegation in the criminal complaint which alleged that she had trespassed onto the Schmidts’ property and refused to depart when requested by the Schmidts. I.C. § 18-7008(8) requires that the trespass be committed “willfully.” Thus, evidence that the defendant Missamore had previously been harassing the Schmidts by prior trespasses would be extremely relevant evidence for the jury to resolve the factual dispute raised by the defendant Missamore’s denial that she had trespassed onto the Schmidts’ property on the occasion charged in the criminal complaint. Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 401, “Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” I.R.E. 404(b) specifically permits the admission of evidence of other prior acts of trespass for the purpose of showing motive, in this case the defendant Missamore’s intent to harass. It is difficult to understand how the Court can conclude that a criminal defendant’s motive in committing a crime can be irrelevant. For example, in a murder prosecution, evidence of a motive for the murder — for example, revenge — is not an element of the crime under the statute, but evidence of the motive of revenge would certainly be relevant evidence. Intent to harass may not be an element of the crime of trespass under I.C. § 18-7008(8); however, the defendant Missamore’s motive for committing the crime, i.e., to harass the Schmidts, is certainly relevant. Additionally, Missamore testified that when she was ordered off the property by the Schmidts she responded, “ ‘Well *38isn’t this’ ... I go, ‘Isn’t this county road?’ ” Evidence of an intent to harass was therefore relevant to show that the defendant Missamore was not on the Schmidts’ property as the result of “mistake or accident.” I.R.E. 404(b). I believe the Court commits serious error when it concludes that evidence of Missamore’s intent to harass is irrelevant. It was relevant both for showing a motive and for showing lack of “mistake or accident.”
Our cases have consistently held that the determination of relevance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and that this Court will not reverse the trial court’s rulings on evidence absent a showing of a manifest abuse of that discretion. Marks v. Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 569, n. 9, 671 P.2d 473, 482, n. 9 (1983) (“Relevancy and materiality are to be determined by the trial court____ The determination is vested in the trial court’s discretion. Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb its determination.”); State v. Tierney, 109 Idaho 474, 708 P.2d 879 (1985); State v. Terry, 98 Idaho 285, 561 P.2d 1318 (1977). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that evidence of harassment was relevant and admissible. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 803 P.2d 993*.
B. The question of the competence of the witnesses to testify that the defendant Missamore was harassing them is another matter. That is a much closer question and may have influenced this Court’s determination that the evidence of harassment was irrelevant. As the Court’s opinion points out, under I.R.E. 701 a lay witness may render an opinion if an adequate foundation is laid, and if the opinion is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” Again, the decision to permit a lay witness to express an opinion rests in the discretion of the trial judge who presides over the trial and is in a much better position to judge the impact of such testimony than this Court on appeal. Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 297, 581 P.2d 339, 343 (1978) (“Admissibility of expert opinion testimony is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion."); Hansen v. Skate Ranch, Inc., 641 P.2d 517, 522 (N.M.Ct.App.1982) (“[TJhe admissibility of lay opinion testimony is within the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will not overturn the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion.”); Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash.2d 127, 606 P.2d 1214, 1221 (1980) (“The trial court has discretion in ruling on objections based on the [lay] opinion rule, subject to review for abuse of discretion.”).
In this case there was substantial evidence from several witnesses that the defendant Missamore had trespassed on the Schmidts’ property many times, including driving her truck across their lawn. The Schmidts testified that they had repeatedly requested the defendant Missamore to stay off their property, and she had argumentatively refused. With that foundation, the trial court permitted the lay witnesses to express their opinion that Missamore was harassing the Schmidts. The Court of Appeals, in its opinion in this case addressing this issue, recognized “that a witness may testify as to the state of mind of another person.” State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P.2d 93 (Ct.App.1986). The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that “absent an abuse of discretion the decision of the trial court to admit opinion evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Curry, 103 Idaho 332, 647 P.2d 788 (Ct.App.1982).” The Court of Appeals then recognized that “the testimony of both Schmidt and Sprague was based upon their perceptions of the events leading up to the trespassing incident. Schmidt’s testimony, that Missamore was ‘harassing’ him and his wife, was predicated upon his prior dealings with the defendant, and by the fact that, when asked to leave his property, Missamore refused. Likewise, Sprague’s testimony at trial was founded on his perception of hostility between Missamore and the Schmidts." Court of Appeals opinion *39at pp. 3-4. Based upon that analysis, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in permitting the opinion testimony by the lay witnesses as permitted by I.R.E. 701. I believe the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the law to be applied to this case.
It is an appellant’s duty to show error in the trial of a case, and no error will be presumed on appeal. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602, 604, 701 P.2d 222, 224 (1985) (“The appellants have the burden of showing reversible error on appeal. Error cannot be presumed on appeal, but requires an affirmative showing.”); Gaither v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 106 Idaho 675, 682 P.2d 628 (1984). Not only has the appellant not shown any error in the evidentiary rulings of the trial court, the record demonstrates that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, and the trial court should be affirmed.
BOYLE, J., concurs in Chief Justice BAKES’ dissent as to Part I.

. I.C. § 18-7008(8) requires that “[e]very person who willfully commits any trespass, by ... (8) ... being first notified in writing, or verbally by the owner or authorized agent of the owner of real property to immediately depart from the same and who refuses ...” is guilty of trespass. (Emphasis added.)

 Editor’s Note: The cited opinion, filed January 2, 1991, superseded an opinion filed August 8, 1991. At the request of the Court, the later citation is used.