Court Opinion

ID: 9964204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 09:10:00.63353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:13.948045
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 25, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00492-CR
                           ———————————
              FLORIBETH SANDOVAL BENJUME, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 461st District Court
                          Brazoria County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 92061-CR

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found Floribeth Sandoval Benjume guilty of manslaughter, an offense

for which she was indicted after the vehicle she was driving fatally collided at an

intersection with Bruce Watson, a sergeant with the Harris County Sheriff’s Office
who was operating a motorcycle. The jury assessed her punishment at two years of

incarceration. Sandoval appeals from her judgment of conviction, arguing that:

      (1) a new trial is required because digital or electronic exhibits admitted into
          evidence at trial are missing, inaccessible, or unidentifiable on appeal;

      (2) her conviction must be reversed because the evidence is legally
          insufficient to prove she grossly deviated from the standard of care that an
          ordinary person would have exercised under the circumstances;

      (3) a new trial is required due to the trial court’s error in denying her request
          to appoint an interpreter to translate recordings from Spanish into English;

      (4) a new trial is required due to the trial court’s error in denying her request
          to admit a written translation of one of the aforementioned recordings; and

      (5) a new trial is required due to the trial court’s error in excluding evidence
          from expert witnesses regarding the issue of concurrent causation.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                  BACKGROUND

      A grand jury indicted Sandoval for manslaughter, alleging she recklessly

caused the death of Watson while driving a motor vehicle and colliding with

Watson’s motorcycle. The indictment alleged Sandoval was reckless in four ways:

by entering an intersection in disregard of a red traffic signal, going around other

vehicles that stopped at the red traffic signal, entering the intersection from the left-

turn lane and failing to turn left, and failing to keep a proper lookout.

      Sandoval pleaded not guilty, and the case was then tried to a jury.

      The State’s first witness was Jacob Garcia Perez, a licensed security contractor

who owns and operates Southern Technologies Unlimited, a company specializing

                                           2
in surveillance cameras and monitored security. His company installed two cameras

near the intersection where the collision occurred that recorded the event. At its

request, Perez gave these recordings to the Pearland Police Department.

      The surveillance footage from both cameras was played for the jury. The

footage shows the intersection of Kingsley Drive and Shadow Creek Parkway. On

both of these roadways, a median separates traffic traveling in opposite directions.

Prior to the collision, Sandoval was traveling northbound on Kingsley Drive, which

at the intersection has three lanes: a left-turn lane, middle lane, and right lane.

      One of the surveillance cameras provided a clear view of the traffic signal

governing the flow of traffic traveling northbound on Kingsley Road. This traffic

signal remained red continuously for several minutes before the collision. During

this time, the left-turn signal cycled through more than once, allowing some

northbound traffic to turn west onto Shadow Creek Parkway. Due to the red

northbound signal, however, traffic began to accumulate on Kingsley Drive.

      Sandoval, who was behind the wheel of a Cadillac Escalade, was one of the

motorists who became stopped at the intersection. Initially, she pulled up behind

some other vehicles in the middle northbound lane of Kingsley Road. After several

minutes elapsed, Sandoval steered into the left-turn lane, which had since emptied.

Like the traffic signal for northbound traffic, the left-turn signal was red at this time.

Nonetheless, Sandoval proceeded into the intersection. But she did not turn left,

                                            3
despite being in the left-turn lane. Instead, she steered her Escalade to the right and

drove northbound through the intersection from the left-turn lane. Before Sandoval

had completely cleared the intersection, Watson traveling westbound on Shadow

Creek Parkway collided with her Escalade, which then crashed into the median.

      Earlier footage shows that the signal for northbound traffic on Kingsley Drive

cycled infrequently, remaining red for relatively lengthy periods of time. This earlier

footage also shows that several motorists traveling northbound on Kingsley Drive

responded to the delay by driving through the intersection against the red signal

when motorists traveling east and west on Shadow Creek Parkway were stopped.

None of these other motorists, however, proceeded northbound through the

intersection from Kingsley Drive’s left-turn lane the way that Sandoval later did.

      The State’s next witness was Dr. Merrill Hines, a forensic pathologist

employed by the Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences. Hines conducted an

autopsy on Watson and concluded that he died as a result of an accident, determining

that Watson’s cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries he sustained. Based

on the combination of injuries Watson sustained, Hines opined that it was not

possible to save his life through any kind of medical intervention. Hines also opined

that classification of the cause of death as an accident was for statistical purposes,

not a legal determination about anyone’s criminal responsibility, if any.

      The State next called Michael Miller to the stand. Miller saw the collision.

                                          4
      Miller previously served for over three decades as a peace officer with the

Harris County Sheriff’s Office, retiring at the rank of lieutenant. Immediately before

the collision, Miller was traveling westbound on Shadow Creek Parkway behind

Watson. Miller had not yet reached the Kingsley Drive intersection, but he was not

far from it, estimating that it was no more than 75 to 100 yards distant. He had an

unobstructed view of the intersection, Watson on his motorcycle ahead of him, and

the westbound Shadow Creek Parkway traffic signal, which had changed to green.

      Miller testified that Sandoval’s Escalade came “out of nowhere” and Watson

on his cycle then “crashed into the [Escalade] as it entered into the intersection.”

      The State’s next witness was Zaricka Prater, a business analyst with the

Houston Independent School District, who also saw the collision. She was traveling

northbound on Kingsley Drive and was stopped at the intersection with Shadow

Creek Parkway due to the red traffic signal when the collision occurred. Her vehicle

was fourth in line in the middle lane, right behind Sandoval’s Escalade. Prater

testified that the driver of the Escalade, Sandoval, eventually changed lanes into the

left-turn lane. But instead of turning left, Sandoval veered right “to get in front of all

the cars that were at the light waiting” and went straight through the intersection.

Prater then saw the motorcycle cop, Watson, collide with the Escalade. Like Miller,

Prater testified that the traffic signal governing westbound traffic on Shadow Creek

Parkway, and thus Watson’s movement, was green at the time of the accident.

                                            5
      On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Prater to confirm that she could

not say one way or another what Sandoval herself saw before the collision. But Prater

refused, testifying that Sandoval had to have seen Watson approaching the

intersection on his motorcycle because Prater and everyone else could see him.

      Dr. Eugene Stautberg, an orthopedic surgeon, was then called by the State. He

too was an eyewitness to the collision. At the time, he was traveling southbound on

Kingsley Drive and was slowing to stop near the intersection with Shadow Creek

Parkway because the traffic signal there was red. As Stautberg was slowing to a stop,

he saw Sandoval’s Escalade “pull out into the intersection” traveling in the opposite

direction as him—northbound on Kingsley Drive. He then heard a “very loud

impact” and briefly saw the motorcycle cop, Watson, “above the SUV in the air.”

      Being a doctor, Stautberg rendered aid to Watson after the collision. Stautberg

checked for a pulse, and detected what he described as “a thready pulse,” which

means “there’s [a] little pulse there, but it’s not very strong at all.” He tried to

communicate with Watson to no avail, and Watson’s pulse became weaker. Watson

was lying face down, so Stautberg and others at the scene turned him over. Watson

remained nonresponsive and they could no longer detect a pulse, so a nurse at the

scene began to provide CPR. Once she tired, Stautberg took over providing CPR.

Shortly afterward, paramedics arrived and took over Watson’s medical care.

                                         6
      Next, the State called Robert Upton, a civil engineer employed as the Director

of Engineering and Public Works for the City of Pearland. He oversees services

relating to the operation, maintenance, and repair of traffic signals in Pearland. After

the collision, the equipment relating to the traffic signals at the intersection of

Kingsley Drive and Shadow Creek Parkway was inspected. Upton also reviewed the

video surveillance footage of the collision. Based on his review, he concluded that

the traffic signal in question “was working.” He testified that there were some

misdetections in which equipment did not detect traffic and thus did not prompt the

signal to turn green on a given cycle but did eventually detect traffic resulting in a

green signal. In addition, Upton noted that during this period the left-turn arrow

continued to cycle. Under these circumstances, in which the traffic signal continued

to cycle and detect traffic, Upton testified that the signal functioned as intended.

      On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Upton about two conflict

log entries as to the traffic signal in question from the morning before the collision.

Upton testified that they reflected a two-second interruption in power to the traffic

signal. He further testified that this was of no significance. Indeed, Upton stated that

it was so brief that it may not have affected the traffic signal’s functionality at all.

      Watson’s widow took the stand next. She briefly testified regarding how she

learned about the collision as well as her late husband’s duties as a peace officer.

                                            7
      Jeffrey Rando then testified for the State. Rando, a project manager at the

University of Texas, witnessed the collision. At the time, he and his wife were

traveling northbound in the middle lane on Kingsley Drive. They were stopped about

four to six cars back from the intersection of that road and Shadow Creek Parkway.

Rando saw Sandoval’s Escalade steer into the left-turn lane from the middle one.

Afterward, the Escalade “pulled up to the light, and a second or two later it pulled

into the intersection.” Instead of turning, the Escalade “pulled back to the right in

front of the line of cars in front of [Rando and his wife].” Rando then momentarily

lost sight of the Escalade, after which he heard “a loud impact and saw the SUV jerk

in a very unusual way. Not changing lanes, but a very sharp jerk to the left.” Rando

then saw the Escalade travel up and onto the median, hitting a pole that is on it. He

had previously seen Watson on his motorcycle traveling westbound on Shadow

Creek Parkway, but Rando could no longer see Watson after he heard the collision.

The vehicles immediately in front of him obstructed his view. His wife dialed 911.

      The next witness was B. Rusk, a peace officer employed by the Pearland

Police Department who held the rank of sergeant when the collision happened. At

the time, Rusk was a patrol supervisor, and he was out on patrol when a motorist

flagged him down a couple of blocks from the intersection of Kingsley Drive and

Shadow Creek Parkway and informed him of the collision. Rusk then immediately

went to the scene of the collision, and he was the first peace officer to arrive there.

                                           8
      Rusk testified that he first saw the “crashed motorcycle” and “a downed rider”

whom he did not know but who was wearing a Harris County Sheriff’s Office

uniform. As the downed rider, Watson, had a “very sporadic and very faint” pulse,

Rusk requested medics. Bystanders, including a couple of medical professionals,

were also present, and these medical professionals thought it would be best to begin

CPR immediately. The medical professionals performed CPR until EMS arrived.

      Rusk was wearing a body camera, and part of its footage was played for the

jury. Among other things, the footage, which is accompanied by audio, shows the

scene in the immediate aftermath of the collision and captures the efforts that Rusk

and medical professionals at the scene made to administer medical care to Watson.

      Once EMS had removed Watson from the scene by ambulance, Rusk

requested that officers trained in accident reconstruction be dispatched. More

patrolmen had arrived, and Rusk had them interview witnesses. Meanwhile, Rusk

contacted the Harris County Sherriff’s Office to identify the motorcycle cop.

      After Rusk testified, the State called C. Giron, a peace officer with the

Pearland Police Department. When the collision took place, Giron was at another

accident scene. Dispatch informed him of the serious collision between Sandoval

and Watson, and Giron went to scene. When he arrived, Rusk was already there.

      Upon arrival, Giron saw many bystanders, the motorcycle, debris from the

collision, and Watson lying on the ground. Giron put Life Flight on standby.

                                         9
      After EMS arrived, Giron began investigating. He determined that Sandoval’s

Escalade was the other vehicle involved in the collision and interviewed witnesses.

      Like Rusk, Giron was wearing a body camera, and a portion of its footage was

played for the jury. The initial footage, which does not have audio, shows Giron, at

the previous accident scene and in route to the scene of the collision. Once he arrived

at the collision scene, the footage, now accompanied by audio, shows events there.

Among other things, the footage captured Giron’s interview of an eyewitness.

      The eyewitness, Anthony Cooper, was a motorist who, like Watson, was

traveling westward on Shadow Creek Parkway. Watson originally had been behind

Cooper, but Watson then changed lanes to the right and sped past Cooper. Cooper

stated that as he and Watson approached the intersection with Kingsley Drive, they

had a green traffic signal at the time, and that Sandoval’s “Escalade ran the light”

for northbound traffic on Kingsley Drive. Cooper saw the resulting collision.

      Giron suspected that a crime may have been committed. He did not speak with

Sandoval at the scene or at the hospital afterward, where she was questioned by

another, but Giron did eventually assist in arresting her about a month later.

      The State called R. Guajardo to the stand next. At the time of trial, Guajardo

was a detective with the Pearland Police Department, but he was a patrol officer at

the time of the collision. When informed of the collision, he went to the scene.

                                          10
      When Guajardo arrived, EMS was performing CPR on Watson. So he began

trying to secure the scene, ascertain who was involved in the collision, and identify

witnesses. In particular, he interviewed Prater and Sandoval at the collision scene.

      According to Guajardo, Sandoval preferred to speak in Spanish. He testified

that accommodating her preference was easy, as Spanish is his “first language.”

      Guajardo wore a body camera, which recorded his interview of Sandoval, and

portions of its footage were played for the jury, including this interview. As it was

played for the jury, Guajardo summarized and translated it into English. When

Guajardo began to do so, defense counsel objected on two grounds. First, counsel

objected that Guajardo’s translation was “inaccurate” and did not reflect “what was

actually said.” Second, counsel objected that Guajardo was “not a court-certified

translator” and asked the trial court “to have a certified court interpreter translate the

Spanish to English.” The trial court overruled these objections but granted defense

counsel a running objection as to Guajardo’s translation of Sandoval’s statements.

      According to Guajardo’s translation, Sandoval told him that “she made a left

turn and was hit” by Watson. Guajardo testified that Sandoval told him she did not

know what had happened but that someone hit her while she was turning left.

Guajardo said that her explanation did not make sense, given the location of the

collision deep into the intersection, so he tried to clarify what she was saying. But

Sandoval continued to tell him that she was making a left turn when the collision

                                           11
occurred. Guajardo stated that Sandoval remained consistent on this point during the

interview, even though he repeatedly asked her to confirm this particular detail.

      Sandoval subsequently went to the hospital, and Guajardo was assigned to

accompany a detective to the hospital to conduct a further interview of Sandoval.

Like the previous interview, this one was recorded by Guajardo’s body camera, and

Guajardo again spoke with Sandoval in Spanish, interpreting for the detective. When

the State sought to introduce this body camera footage into evidence with Guajardo

summarizing and translating it, in part, for the jury, defense counsel urged the same

objections, which the trial court overruled. But the trial court again granted defense

counsel a running objection as to Guajardo’s translation of Sandoval’s statements.

      During the hospital interview, Sandoval stated that she did not know what

happened but that the motorcycle struck the Escalade on the passenger side. At one

point Sandoval seemed to acknowledge that she was traveling straight through the

intersection at the time of the collision, but then stated she was trying to turn left.

Because Sandoval’s explanation was not clear, Guajardo gave her a picture of the

intersection and asked her to draw her route on it. Sandoval did so, indicating that

she had been trying to turn left and veered to the right only after the collision. The

drawing made by Sandoval showing her route was admitted into evidence.

      Sandoval also stated either that the traffic light was green or that she had a

green arrow to turn during the hospital interview. But by this time, the Pearland

                                          12
Police Department had access to the surveillance camera footage that recorded the

collision at the intersection, and Guajardo showed the video to Sandoval on a phone.

The video was inconsistent with Sandoval’s claims about the traffic signals.

      On cross-examination, Guajardo agreed that he had not taken an oath as an

interpreter and was not licensed as an interpreter by the judicial branch or otherwise.

But he had taken and passed a departmental Spanish-language proficiency test.

      Defense counsel questioned Guajardo at length about his interviews of

Sandoval, often asking him to translate them into English statement by statement.

But the defense also requested that the trial court admit into evidence affidavits made

by translators who translated Guajardo’s interviews with Sandoval into English. The

trial court ultimately refused to allow these affidavits and translations into evidence.

      The State then called C. O’Neil as a witness. O’Neil is a detective with the

Pearland Police Department who was assigned to investigate the collision.

      O’Neil is trained in “crash reconstruction.” In addition to his training on the

subject, he had performed about 24 crash reconstructions by the time of trial.

      O’Neil testified that his investigation showed Watson was traveling 64 miles

per hour on Shadow Creek Parkway and had slowed to 51 miles per hour by the time

of the collision. He calculated the former figure based on the time it took Watson to

travel a particular distance between two points, as shown in the surveillance footage.

                                          13
O’Neil based the latter figure on the motorcycle’s speedometer, which stopped

functioning on impact and continued to read 51 miles per hour after the collision.

      The speed limit on Shadow Creek Parkway is 50 miles per hour, and O’Neil

agreed that Watson was not responding to an emergency or another type of call in

his role as a peace officer that might have justified his speed. But O’Neil opined that

the collision would have occurred even if Watson had been observing the speed

limit. According to O’Neil, his investigation showed that the cause of the collision

was Sandoval’s disregard of the red traffic signal and lane markings. He concluded

that if she had not run the red light, then the collision would not have happened.

      It was clear, dry, and sunny the day of the collision. Based on his investigation,

O’Neil testified that from Sandoval’s position in the intersection, she would have

been able to see a little under half of a mile down Shadow Creek Parkway.

      Finally, the State called D. Calhoun, a sergeant with the Harris County

Sheriff’s Office. He is an instructor on motorcycles and teaches the basic motorcycle

operator’s course for the Sheriff’s Office. On the day of the collision, he and Watson

acted as a funeral escort. Afterward, they went their separate ways. Calhoun was

subsequently notified about the collision, and he went to the scene afterward.

      Calhoun testified that at speeds of 50 miles per hour or more, there is no

evasive maneuver that a motorcyclist can safely execute to avoid a collision. He

explained that because motorcycles have just two tires in contact with the road, an

                                          14
evasive maneuver at such speeds could result in loss of control of the motorcycle.

Calhoun opined that the only thing a cyclist can do at these speeds is apply the brake,

if it is possible to do so under the circumstances. But he also testified that braking at

a high speed poses its own risk: the brakes can lock and cause the cycle to skid.

      The State rested, and the defense then began calling its witnesses.

      The first witness for the defense was James Davis, an expert on motorcycle

safety and dynamics. Davis opined that Watson could have avoided the collision had

he braked in time. According to Davis, the surveillance footage showed evidence of

modest braking at most. Davis disagreed that Watson had slowed down to 51 miles

per hour immediately before the collision. Davis also opined that Watson was

speeding and that he could have avoided the collision if he had not been speeding.

      In addition, Davis testified that Watson did not maneuver in an effort to avoid

the collision. Based on a zoomed-in version of the surveillance footage (that the trial

court declined to admit into evidence based on the State’s objections), Davis testified

that Watson had been looking down shortly before the collision occurred.

      Next, the defense called Paulino Serrano. He testified that on the day of the

collision, he observed the traffic signal at the intersection at issue was not cycling.

Serrano said the signal governing northbound traffic on Kingsley Drive “wouldn’t

turn green” often and did not remain green for long when the signal did do so.

Serrano, however, did not witness the collision between Sandoval and Watson.

                                           15
      Robert Saylor then took the stand. He is a research engineer for the Texas

A&M Transportation Institute, or, in layman’s terms, a traffic signal engineer.

      Saylor testified that the traffic signal for northbound traffic on Kingsley Drive

“was not operating in a way that would be consistent with good timing practices” on

the day of the collision, in that it was not properly cycling through to a green light.

He explained, based on the surveillance footage, “that there were phases that had

vehicles waiting to be served that were not served in certain cycles,” an indication

that “there was something wrong.” In other words, Saylor opined that the traffic

signal often left vehicles waiting for a green light that never came but should have.

During the ten cycles captured by the surveillance footage admitted into evidence,

the northbound direction should have been served green ten times,” but “it was only

served green three times out of those ten.” The green was “skipped seven times.” As

a result, the northbound signal remained red for eight minutes and three seconds

immediately before the collision because the signal was not cycling to green.

According to Saylor, the most likely cause of this malfunction was a hardware

failure, though he conceded that it was possible a camera was not detecting vehicles.

      On cross-examination, Saylor agreed that a motorist confronted with a red

traffic signal must remain in place and that no law exists that would allow a motorist

to do otherwise. He added that motorists do not expect a light to remain red for more

than eight minutes, and they will “do something” out of frustration if the traffic

                                          16
signal is not cycling properly to allow them to proceed at regular intervals. But

Saylor agreed that disobeying traffic signals can create very dangerous situations.

      Next, the defense called Jason Staton, a detective assigned to the Pearland

Police Department’s crime scene unit. His job responsibilities include the processing

and storing of evidence. In this case, Staton extracted data from both Sandoval’s and

Watson’s cell phones. During his testimony, the defense introduced Watson’s cell

phone into evidence. Based on his examination of the cell phone, Staton testified

that he could not see any data that he “determined to be relevant to this case.”

      Mike Andrews, who has a doctorate in physics and is employed as a forensic

physicist specializing in traffic accident investigation and reconstruction, then

testified for the defense as an expert witness. He analyzed the collision.

      Using the same basic technique that O’Neil had, Andrews calculated that

Watson’s speed as he approached the intersection was almost 70 miles per hour,

rather than 64 miles per hour. The difference was in part attributable to the use of

slightly different measurements of distance than O’Neil used as well as the use of an

electronic timing mechanism in lieu of the stopwatch method used by O’Neil. Based

on the Escalade’s electronic data recorder’s data on the force of the impact, Andrews

calculated that Watson was traveling 60 miles per hour at the time of the collision,

as opposed to O’Neil’s figure of 51 miles per hour. Unlike O’Neil, Andrews did not

                                          17
think one could rely on the fact that the speedometer still read 51 miles per hour after

the collision as an accurate indicator of Watson’s speed when he hit Sandoval.

      On cross-examination, the prosecution asked whether Watson would have

died had Sandoval not proceeded into the intersection when she did. Andrews replied

that he did not see how Watson could have died absent Sandoval’s presence there.

But Andrews also noted that the collision would not have occurred if Watson had

been traveling at a lower speed, even one that was still in excess of the speed limit,

like 60 miles per hour, because Watson would have been able to brake more

effectively and Sandoval would also have had more time to exit the intersection.

Ultimately, he thought both Watson and Sandoval together caused the collision.

      The defense then called John Laughlin, a biomechanical engineer and human

factors expert. He made an analysis identifying factors contributing to the collision.

      Laughlin testified that at the time of the collision it was sunny and midday, so

there were “no real sight obstacles.” Both Sandoval and Watson had a clear view.

Nonetheless, Laughlin thought Watson would have been less visible or recognizable

due to the size, shape, and coloration of his motorcycle as well as his clothing.

      Further, Watson was being followed by an SUV. According to Laughlin, a

motorist could become fixated on this more distant but larger, more visible vehicle.

                                          18
      Laughlin also opined that the traffic signal contributed to the collision. He

testified that “without the traffic light being broken,” northbound traffic on Kingsley

Drive would have had the opportunity to safely move through the intersection.

      In addition, Laughlin testified that Watson’s excessive speed contributed to

the collision. In essence, he testified that cross-traffic’s expectations in terms of the

risk posed by the intersection would be based on the speed limit set by the law.

      Finally, the defense recalled Perez, who had been the State’s first witness, to

the stand. Perez testified about some of the specific features of the surveillance

footage, such as an encrypted digital watermark that ensures footage is unaltered.

      The jury found Sandoval guilty. After hearing additional evidence relevant to

punishment, the jury assessed her punishment at two years of incarceration. The trial

court entered a judgment in conformity with the jury’s verdict and punishment.

      Sandoval appeals.

                                    DISCUSSION

I.    Appellate Record

      Sandoval contends the record is incomplete or otherwise inadequate in three

ways. First, she asserts the clerk of this court does not possess all the video exhibits

that were introduced into evidence at trial. Second, she contends one of the video

exhibits the clerk does have is unplayable. Third, Sandoval contends none of the

video exhibits on file are properly labeled so as to be identifiable.

                                           19
      Based on our review of the reporter’s record, the following video exhibits,

which are in digital or electronic format, were admitted into evidence at trial:

      ●   State’s Exhibit 1, which consists of surveillance footage from two
          different angles that recorded the intersection, including the collision;

      ●   State’s Exhibit 14, which consists of approximately eight minutes of
          footage from Sergeant Rusk’s body camera;

      ●   State’s Exhibit 15, which consists of approximately ten minutes of footage
          from Officer Giron’s body camera;

      ●   State’s Exhibit 16, which consists of footage from Officer Guajardo’s
          body camera, including his interview of Sandoval at the collision scene;

      ●   State’s Exhibit 17, which consists of footage from Officer Guajardo’s
          body camera recording his later interview of Sandoval at the hospital; and

      ●   Defendant’s Exhibit 6, which consists of the entirety of the footage from
          Sergeant Rusk’s body camera at the collision scene.

Of these exhibits, State’s Exhibits 16 and 17 are recordings of interviews conducted

in Spanish, and Guajardo translated relevant portions into English at trial. Though

admitted into evidence, Defendant’s Exhibit 6 was not published to the jury.

      As to Sandoval’s contention about missing and unplayable exhibits, the

preceding exhibits are all in the appellate record. This court received and reviewed

digital or electronic copies of State’s Exhibits 1, 14, 15, and Defendant’s Exhibit 6.

Thus, we do not agree that these exhibits are missing or unplayable.

      Regarding State’s Exhibits 16 and 17, the trial court ordered that these exhibits

be made available on request to the court of appeals in physical format because the

district court lacked the technical resources or expertise to convert them into an

                                          20
acceptable digital or electronic format for inclusion as exhibits. The clerk of this

court requested these two exhibits, and, like the other exhibits, we reviewed them.

Thus, Exhibits 16 and 17 are neither missing nor unplayable. Assuming for the sake

of argument that the physical format of these two exhibits could be construed as

somehow rendering them missing or otherwise inaccessible in some meaningful

sense on appeal, Sandoval nonetheless cannot show reversible error on this basis.

       As noted, Exhibits 16 and 17 are recordings of Spanish-language police

interviews. Texas judicial proceedings are conducted in the English language.

Garcia v. State, 210 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948); Zunago v. State, 138

S.W. 713, 719 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911). At trial, these two interviews were translated

into English by a witness—the officer who conducted the interviews in Spanish—

while he testified in front of the jury. As an appellate court, we cannot conduct our

own independent review of the underlying Spanish-language recordings for their

content or reevaluate the accuracy of the translations put before the jury. Garcia v.

State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Galvan-Cerna v. State, 509

S.W.3d 398, 409 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Consequently, the

record on appeal is the English translation made at trial. See Galvan-Cerna, 509

S.W.3d 408–09 (rejecting appellate complaint that would have required appellate

court to accept translation other than interpreter’s translation at trial); Flores v. State,

299 S.W.3d 843, 855–56 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. ref’d) (stating that English-

                                            21
language translation of foreign-language recording provided by interpreter

constitutes record and “ultimately serves as the basis for any potential appeal”).

Therefore, even if the Spanish-language interviews had become lost or unplayable,

their unavailability would be harmless because the English translations are in the

record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (providing that appellate court must disregard

non-constitutional defects and irregularities that do not affect substantial rights).

      We acknowledge that the jury could have also considered the footage from

the recorded interviews in assessing Sandoval’s demeanor and credibility. See

Peralta v. State, 338 S.W.3d 598, 604–06 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.)

(indicating jury can view video from Spanish-language recording for purpose of

evaluating demeanor of witnesses, but cannot interpret Spanish for themselves). But

assessments of demeanor and credibility are the exclusive province of the jury, and

we may not revisit them on appeal when reviewing for legal sufficiency or otherwise.

See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (admonishing that

it is jury’s role to assess credibility and demeanor of witnesses and appellate court

cannot usurp this role by reassessing credibility and demeanor for itself). Thus, once

again, even if the recordings themselves had become lost or unplayable, the

availability of the English-language translations is all that is necessary on appeal.

      Finally, with respect to Sandoval’s complaint about exhibit labels, she argues

in particular that the digital or electronic exhibits do not conform to the filename

                                           22
conventions imposed by the Uniform Format Manual for Texas Court Reporters.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the exhibit filenames do not conform to these

conventions and that this failure to conform may constitute reviewable error, any

error here is not reversible because it does not affect Sandoval’s substantial rights,

given that the exhibits at issue are all identifiable based on their filenames and the

way in which they are described by the parties in the reporter’s record. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.2(b) (providing that appellate court must disregard non-constitutional

defects and irregularities that do not affect defendant’s substantial rights).

      For example, State’s Exhibit 1—the surveillance footage of the collision—

consists of two digital or electronic files that include the following in their filenames:

“KingsleySCP_004_IP Camera 04” and “KingsleySCP_007_IP Camera 07.” At

trial, the two files were referred to as Camera Angle 4 and Camera Angle 7. In

addition, the approximate running time of the footage from each camera was stated

at trial. The other filenames are equally straightforward when viewed in the context

of trial, and the number of digital or electronic exhibits admitted are also few in

number, such that identifying them with the aid of the reporter’s record is not a

laborious chore. Accordingly, we reject Sandoval’s rather hyperbolic contention that

“which digital file corresponds to which exhibit is impossible to discern to any

observer.”

      We overrule Sandoval’s first issue.

                                           23
II.   Legal Sufficiency

      Sandoval contends the evidence is legally insufficient as a matter of law to

establish that she was reckless, one of the elements of the offense of manslaughter.

In particular, she posits that her conduct could not constitute a gross deviation from

the standard of care that an ordinary person would have exercised under the

circumstances because several other motorists proceeded through the intersection

while the traffic signal was red because the signal was malfunctioning at the time.

      A.     Standard of review

      In reviewing a jury’s verdict for evidentiary sufficiency, we must uphold its

verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the

offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The jury’s verdict is irrational under this standard only if it

is based on evidence that is not legally sufficient to support a conviction. Id. at 655–

56; see Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (stating appellate

court’s role is not to act as thirteenth juror but rather is confined to ensuring jury’s

verdict is rational one that is based on more than mere modicum of evidence).

      In a legal-sufficiency review, we consider all the admitted evidence and view

it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 913–

14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This standard recognizes it is the jury’s prerogative to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable

                                          24
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 914. So, we must defer to the

jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to

various evidence. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing

a logical consequence from them. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013). The jury may draw inferences from the evidence so long as the

evidence supports each inference. Carter v. State, 620 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021). When the evidence supports reasonable but conflicting inferences, we

presume the jury resolved the conflict in favor of its verdict, and we defer to the

jury’s resolution of the conflicting inferences. Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477,

482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). However, the jury’s verdict cannot rest on conjecture

or speculation, which are mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of

the facts and evidence presented, as opposed to reasonable inferences that can be

drawn from the evidence admitted at trial. Anderson, 416 S.W.3d at 888.

      Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt, so long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances suffices to support the jury’s

verdict. Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Thus, in our

review, we must not use a divide-and-conquer strategy, evaluating individual bits of

evidence in isolation, because this approach does not consider the cumulative force

of the evidence. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Nor

                                         25
does the evidence need to negate every conceivable alternative to the defendant’s

guilt to be sufficient. David v. State, 663 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

      The law does not require a particular type of evidence. Johnson v. State, 560

S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Direct and circumstantial evidence are

equally probative. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone can be legally sufficient. Id. We

apply the same standard of review with respect to both direct and circumstantial

evidence. Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      B.     Applicable law

      A defendant commits the offense of manslaughter if she “recklessly causes

the death of an individual.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04(a). But the defendant need

not be the sole cause of the individual’s death to commit manslaughter. See id.

§ 6.04(a) (“A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred

but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause . . . .”).

      Manslaughter is a result-oriented offense. Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518,

520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Accordingly, the defendant’s recklessness must relate

to the result of her actions—death. Id.; see also Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398,

400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (stating that for murder, which is another result-oriented

offense, culpable mental state must relate to result, which is causing death).

      The defendant acts recklessly with respect to the result of her conduct when

she is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

                                           26
the result will occur. TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c). Manslaughter therefore entails

conscious risk creation, rather than mere inattentiveness. Stadt v. State, 182 S.W.3d

360, 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 751

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (characterizing recklessness as entailing calculated decision

to gamble with other people’s lives). Conscious risk creation may be inferred from

the surrounding circumstances. See Couthren v. State, 571 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2019) (stating jury may infer reckless driving from evidence); see also

Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (observing that, absent

confession, defendant’s mental state must be inferred from his words and actions).

      Furthermore, the known risk the defendant consciously disregards “must be

of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the

standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances

as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c). Whether the

defendant’s conduct grossly deviates from the standard of care is generally a

question of fact. Phillips v. State, 588 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).

      Texas courts have addressed whether a given set of circumstances entailed a

gross deviation in the context of automobile-related fatalities. By way of example,

the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that evidence of the following circumstances

was legally sufficient to prove the defendant grossly deviated from the standard of

care that an ordinary person would have exercised in a given situation:

                                         27
      ●   an abrupt lane change without signaling and failure to maintain a proper
          lookout, in part due to distraction resulting from the use of a cell phone;

      ●   a failure to properly secure a trailer being towed by a truck;

      ●   driving at an excessive speed without regard for a red light at an upcoming
          intersection while engaged in street racing; and

      ●   a failure to stop at a red traffic light while driving at a high rate of speed
          and in excess of the speed limit.

Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 194–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (abrupt lane

change without signaling and failure to maintain lookout); Tello v. State, 180 S.W.3d

150, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (failure to secure trailer); Graham v. State, 657

S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (speeding, ignoring red light, and racing);

Lopez v. State, 630 S.W.2d 936, 940–42 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (failure

to stop at red light while driving at excessive speed and faster than speed limit).

      In general, however, the Court has indicated that a defendant’s conduct need

not be as egregious as the preceding examples to qualify as a gross deviation. For

example, the Court has suggested that excessively speeding, standing alone, may

constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care an ordinary person would

exercise under a particular set of facts. See Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 630–

31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (noting that evidence in case failed to show motorist

“grossly deviated from the standard of care, for example, by excessively speeding”

and distinguishing between routine mistakes or lapses in judgment made by

motorists, like mere failure to control one’s speed or maintain safe interval between

                                          28
vehicles, and gross deviations from ordinary standard of care involving “more

extreme, aggressive, or foolish driving acts”); see also Simms v. State, 629 S.W.3d

218, 223–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (explaining that if defendant causes fatal

collision through excessive speeding this conduct satisfies recklessness element of

aggravated assault, which, like manslaughter, is result-oriented offense).

      C.     Analysis

      Sandoval maintains that because “many other ordinary people engaged in the

exact same conduct” she did “around the same time” as her—proceeding through

the intersection despite the red traffic signal—she did not grossly deviate from the

standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under the circumstances,

which included the fact that a traffic signal “was stuck red for over eight minutes.”

      To the extent Sandoval maintains that whenever there is evidence several

other motorists engaged in the exact same conduct as the defendant, this fact, in and

of itself, negates the possibility the defendant grossly deviated from the standard of

care an ordinary person would have exercised under the circumstances, we disagree.

Consider, for example, a scenario in which multiple motorists gather to engage in

street racing, an occurrence that is not uncommon in Houston. See Tatum v. State,

Nos. 01-23-00091-CR & 01-23-00092-CR, 2024 WL 86511, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 9, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting deputy’s testimony that

she was on patrol “as part of an initiative to police illegal street racing”). If one of

                                          29
these motorists is involved in a fatal collision, she could not rely on the similarly

unsafe driving of the other racers to establish that her conduct was not sufficiently

out of the ordinary to constitute a gross deviation from the standard of care.

Similarly, a motorist who strikes and kills a pedestrian as a result of excessive speed

could not negate the element of recklessness simply by putting on evidence that the

stretch of road she was driving is notorious for traffic traveling at excessive speeds.

In short, that many motorists engage in certain conduct does not, standing alone,

establish as a matter of law that this conduct is not reckless. See Queeman, 520

S.W.3d at 630–31 (indicating that several common behaviors engaged in by

numerous drivers—excessively speeding, talking on cell phone, texting—might

constitute gross deviation from standard of care ordinary person would exercise).

      Turning to the circumstances of this particular case, the evidence does not

show that multiple other motorists engaged in the exact same conduct as Sandoval.

While multiple other motorists did proceed through the same intersection against a

red traffic signal before Sandoval did, the surveillance camera footage shows that

the conduct of Sandoval and these other motorists differed in several ways.

      Unlike other motorists, Sandoval did not stop at the intersection and then

proceed through the intersection against a red traffic signal from the forefront of the

lane in which she was traveling. Instead, Sandoval was stopped three cars back from

the intersection in the middle lane. She then changed lanes into the left one, which

                                          30
was then unoccupied by any traffic. Though the left lane was a turn-only lane,

Sandoval did not turn left. Without making a full stop, she proceeded into the

intersection, steering right so that she effectively went around the two vehicles ahead

of her that were stopped at the light. She then drove straight through the intersection

even though cross-traffic had a green traffic signal at the time and cross-traffic was

speeding toward the intersection. This cross-traffic included Watson on his

motorcycle, whom one eyewitness—the motorist who initially was immediately

behind Sandoval in the middle lane—described as being impossible to not see.

      At trial, there was no evidence anyone else made the same series of maneuvers

that Sandoval did. Of special note, there was no evidence that any other driver

proceeded through the intersection against a red light while cross-traffic had a green

light. Sandoval’s driving conduct was unique in this regard and in other ways.

      Under these circumstances, a jury could reasonably find that Sandoval grossly

deviated from the standard of care an ordinary person would exercise. The Court of

Criminal Appeals has indicated the question of whether conduct constitutes a gross

deviation from ordinary care belongs to the jury “as long as there is some evidence

of gross deviation,” which the Court described as “more extreme, aggressive, or

foolish driving acts than are ordinarily engaged in by drivers and accepted as

reasonable risks in exchange for the social utility provided” by automobiles.

Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 631. The Court distinguished such gross deviations from

                                          31
mundane “driving errors” that “are often made by many drivers who also accept

these same risks from other drivers” as an inherent part of motorized transit. Id. at

630.

       Sandoval’s conduct before the collision included changing lanes to go around

traffic stopped at a red light, entering the intersection against the red light without

first coming to a full stop, driving straight through the intersection from a turn-only

lane, and doing all this in quick succession while cross-traffic had a green light. As

justification for this conduct, Sandoval cites the inconvenience of sitting at a red

light for more than eight minutes. While that is undeniably inconvenient, the

evidence at trial showed that the traffic signal in question was periodically cycling,

albeit somewhat erratically, and that the left-turn signal was regularly cycling.

       Viewed in their totality, we cannot say these facts establish as a matter of law

that Sandoval’s conduct amounted to no more than routine driving errors made by

many drivers who likewise accept these same risks from other drivers as part and

parcel of the costs and benefits that inhere in motorized transportation. Therefore,

the question of whether Sandoval grossly deviated from the standard of ordinary care

was for the jury, and the evidence is legally sufficient to support its verdict. See id.

(advising that so long as there is some evidence of gross deviation, when viewed in

light most favorable to verdict, appellate court should defer to jury’s determination).

       We overrule Sandoval’s second issue.

                                          32
III.   Interpreter Request

       Citing article 38.30 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and caselaw

applying it, Sandoval contends the trial court erred in denying the defense’s request

to appoint an interpreter to translate into English the recorded statements she made

to Detective Guajardo in Spanish. She maintains that it was reversible error for the

trial court to allow the jury to listen to her recorded statements in Spanish, over her

timely objection, accompanied only by Guajardo’s inaccurate English translation.

       A.    Standard of review

       In essence, Sandoval faults the trial court for allowing the detective who

interviewed her in Spanish to translate recordings of these interviews into English

during his testimony as the recordings were played for the jury, rather than

appointing a credentialed interpreter to translate them. We review complaints about

the competency of a person to act as a translator for an abuse of discretion. Castrejon

v. State, 428 S.W.3d 179, 188 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

       B.    Applicable law

       Article 38.30 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure generally requires a

trial court to appoint and swear in an interpreter for a witness or defendant who does

not understand and speak the English language. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

38.30(a). While this provision does not expressly address situations like the one

before us, which involves foreign-language recordings admitted into evidence, the

                                          33
Court of Criminal Appeals has held the safeguards of article 38.30 apply. Leal v.

State, 782 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Therefore, upon request, an

interpreter must be sworn to translate a foreign-language recording in conformity

with the requirements imposed with respect to witnesses and defendants who do not

understand and speak the English language. Id. These requirements are rather

minimal though. Article 38.30 provides that “[a]ny person” may act as an interpreter,

under the same rules and penalties that apply to witnesses, so long as he or she

possesses “adequate interpreting skills for the particular situation.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 38.30(a). The article does not require an interpreter to be certified or

licensed to provide an admissible translation. Castrejon, 428 S.W.3d at 188.

      C.     Analysis

      The trial court did not err in implicitly ruling that Guajardo had adequate

interpreting skills for the particular situation. Guajardo testified that Spanish is his

first language, he had passed a departmental Spanish-language proficiency test, and

he is the one who interviewed Sandoval in Spanish at the scene and at the hospital.

Guajardo was on the witness stand and under oath when he translated the recordings

into English for the jury, and he was subject to cross-examination by defense counsel

about the accuracy of his translations. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by allowing Guajardo to translate, rather than appointing and swearing in

an interpreter who was licensed or possessed some other professional credentials.

                                           34
See Castrejon, 428 S.W.3d at 186, 188–89 (concluding that trial court did not err by

allowing peace officer to translate parts of recorded interview she had conducted

from Spanish into English while testifying before jury over defendant’s objection

that recording could not be admitted without “proper certified interpreter”); see also

Mendiola v. State, 924 S.W.2d 157, 161–63 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, pet.

ref’d) (upholding trial court’s ruling that bailiff was qualified to interpret for

defendant on trial for murder and court’s refusal to appoint another over defendant’s

objection that he wanted interpreter who could provide word-for-word translation).

      To the extent Sandoval disputes the accuracy of Guajardo’s translation,

disputes about the accuracy of a translation present an issue for the jury to resolve.

See Garcia, 887 S.W.2d at 875 (holding accuracy of translation “is a factual question

which ultimately only the jury can answer”). Sandoval’s trial counsel challenged the

accuracy of Guajardo’s translation through cross-examination, which is a proper

means of challenging ostensible translation inaccuracies. See id. (stating that

accuracy of translation must be impeached through cross-examination or by some

other means during trial). On appeal, we cannot independently reassess the accuracy

of Guajardo’s translation. See id. (holding that defendant cannot preserve error by

objecting to accuracy of particular translation in trial court and appellate complaints

about accuracy of translation therefore present nothing for review).

      We overrule Sandoval’s third issue.

                                          35
IV.   Written Translation

      Citing Rule 1009 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, Sandoval contends the trial

court erred in denying admission of a sworn, written English translation of one of

the two recorded interviews she gave to Detective Guajardo. Specifically, Sandoval

maintains that the trial court should have admitted into evidence a written translation

made by Sarah Hudson of the second interview that took place at the hospital.

      A.     Standard of review

      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including those involving the

admissibility of foreign-language translations under Rule 1009 of the Texas Rules

of Evidence, for an abuse of discretion. Castrejon, 428 S.W.3d at 184.

      B.     Applicable law

      Rule 1009 of the Texas Rules of Evidence provides that a translation of a

foreign-language document is admissible, so long as its proponent serves on all

parties the translation, the document being translated, and a qualified translator’s

affidavit setting forth her qualifications and certifying the translation’s accuracy at

least 45 days before trial. TEX. R. EVID. 1009(a). But on a party’s motion and for

good cause, the trial court may alter this deadline. TEX. R. EVID. 1009(f). Moreover,

this deadline does not bar a party from offering the testimony of a qualified translator

to translate a foreign-language document. TEX. R. EVID. 1009(e); Castrejon, 428

                                          36
S.W.3d at 184–85. Finally, though Rule 1009 refers to documents, we apply it to

translations of foreign-language recordings too. Castrejon, 428 S.W.3d at 183–86.

      C.     Analysis

      The recorded Spanish-language interview at issue predated Sandoval’s

indictment. She did not satisfy the pretrial deadline by serving a copy of her proposed

translation and the other required papers on the prosecution 45 days before trial. See

TEX. R. EVID. 1009(a). Because Sandoval did not satisfy the rule’s deadline for

introducing the affidavit into evidence, the trial court’s decision to exclude the

affidavit was neither arbitrary nor without reference to guiding rules or principles.

      Moreover, Sandoval still had the option of calling the interpreter in question,

Hudson, as a trial witness to translate the interview from Spanish into English in the

same manner that the State had done during Guajardo’s testimony. See TEX. R. EVID.

1009(e). But Sandoval did not do so, and has not explained why she did not. Having

foregone this opportunity, she cannot show the trial court’s refusal to admit the

written translation affected her substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2.

      We overrule Sandoval’s fourth issue.

V.    Expert Testimony

      Sandoval contends the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony from

five defense witnesses that bore on the subject of concurrent causation, that is, other

                                          37
possible causes of the collision. Sandoval maintains that the trial court’s exclusion

of this evidence violated the rules of evidence and her right to due process of law.

      Sandoval has waived this complaint. First, she does not identify anywhere in

the record where she asserted a due-process violation in the trial court, and due-

process complaints not made in the trial court are waived on appeal. See Clark v.

State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding defendant forfeited

denial-of-due-process claim by not properly preserving error on issue at trial).

Second, Sandoval’s appellate brief merely outlines the basic contours of her

evidentiary and due-process complaints. The brief lacks substantive discussion of

these issues, accompanied by appropriate citation of supporting authorities, and

Sandoval therefore has not preserved these issues for review on appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument

for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities”); Bohannan v.

State, 546 S.W.3d 166, 179–80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (declining to address due-

process complaint due to conclusory nature of briefing unsupported by authority).

      We overrule Sandoval’s fifth issue.

                                         38
                                 CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Gordon Goodman
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Hightower.

Justice Landau, concurring in the judgment without separate opinion.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           39