Court Opinion

ID: 9699330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:47.349214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:30.181903
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
While the Majority’s analysis might be a correct interpretation of the Uninsured Motorists coverage language contained in the Antique Auto Policy as it was originally issued on January 14,1982, it is the endorsement in effect on the date of the accident that controls. The Majority has failed to recognize that changes made in policy language in 1985, were significant and expressly altered those who would be “covered persons” under the antique automobile insurance policy. The 1985 endorsement does not contain the restricted language which was present in the original policy and it expressly provides coverage to Appellee as the named insured regardless of whether he was occupying the vehicle at the time of the accident. Because the express terms of the policy allow for coverage and because the Majority has failed to recognize this and has sought to interpret clear policy language by seeking to determine the intent of the parties, I dissent.
Appellee first acquired insurance for his antique automobile with St. Paul on January 14, 1982. The policy as originally issued provided uninsured motorist coverage under Part C. That section limited coverage to those who were occupying the antique automobile at the time of the accident by including the following definition of a “covered person.”
*66“Covered person” as used in the part means:
1. Any person occupying your covered auto.
2. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. above.
This provision continued to define the scope of the uninsured motorist coverage until January 14, 1985. At that time, following the passage of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, St. Paul issued a new endorsement, and increased the price of uninsured motorist coverage from $3.00 to $6.00. The new endorsement redefined the term “covered person” to read:
“Covered person” as used in this endorsement means:
1. You or any family member.
2. Any other person occupying your covered auto.
3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.
Appellee as the named insured qualifies as a “covered person” under paragraph one of the definition. The Majority, however, ignores the punctuation in the definition of “covered person” and concludes that “[paragraph one and paragraph two in the definition of covered person must be read together.” Majority Opinion at 31. The Majority reasons that by so reading the paragraphs, uninsured motorist coverage is restricted, as it was when originally issued in 1983, to the insured, his family members or any other person who is occupying the antique automobile at the time of the accident.
The Majority fails to realize that St. Paul made express alterations in the terms of coverage and, instead of listing a single class of covered persons (those occupying the vehicle,) it now provided two distinct groups and listed them in paragraphs one and two. Such a change would not have been necessary if coverage was to have continued to apply as before. The groups of “covered persons” in the 1985 endorsement are identified in separate paragraphs, and each clause defining a group ends in a period, not a comma or the *67conjunctive word “and.” The inclusion of a “period” indicates that the clauses were not meant to be read together; rather, each clause is independent of the other. Coverage applies to the named insured and his family members under paragraph one. Paragraph two extends coverage to any person who was occupying the covered vehicle. Paragraph three evidences the distinct nature of these two groups where it states that a covered person includes those persons “described in 1. or 2. above.” (emphasis added.) If the clauses were meant to be read together, as the Majority suggests, paragraph three would state that coverage applies to persons described in both 1. and 2. It does not.
The language contained in instant policy defining a “covered person” is found in many uninsured motorist policies issued throughout this Commonwealth. In cases involving policies with identical language, the clauses have never been read to modify each other as the Majority suggests. See: Caldararo v. Keystone, 393 Pa.Super. 103, 573 A.2d 1108 (1990); Wolgemuth v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 370 Pa.Super. 51, 535 A.2d 1145 (1988); Pirches v. General Accident Insurance Co., 354 Pa.Super. 303, 511 A.2d 1349 (1986.)
Because the restricted language of the original 1982 policy was changed in 1985 and, in clear terms, lists distinct classes of persons who are covered, and because these definitions have never been read together as modifying each other to create one identifiable group, I believe the Majority has erred in its reading of the policy language.
The Majority compounds this error by going outside the plain language of the policy in an effort to examine what Appellee could “have reasonably expected” his coverage to be. Majority Opinion at 9. It is elementary that when interpreting a contract which is clear and unambiguous, it must be construed only as written, and a court may not modify the plain meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation. Trumpp v. Trumpp, 351 Pa.Super. 205, 505 A.2d 601 (1985). The fact that the parties do not agree upon a proper interpretation does not necessarily render the contract ambiguous. Vogel v. Berkley, 354 Pa.Super. 291, 511 A.2d 878 (1986).
*68Because the express terms of the policy clearly afford Appellee relief, I believe the Majority’s discussion regarding the parties expectations is misplaced. Further, I would point out that the facts of the case do not support the Majority’s conclusion that Appellee could not have expected coverage in this case. The Majority bases its conclusion on the fact that premium charged for uninsured motorist benefits under the antique policy was much less than that charged for coverage on Appellee’s family auto policies. The Majority reasons that the antique policy was less expensive because it contemplated covering limited instances where the insured or a family member were traveling in the antique automobile. I disagree.
In seeking to identify the parties expectations the Majority has failed to consider the fact, as demonstrated by the record, that when St. Paul issued the expanded endorsement for uninsured motorist coverage in 1985, it doubled the uninsured motorist premium. Prior to 1985, the premium for uninsured motorist coverage under the antique automobile policy was $3.00. Following the renewal in 1985 with the expanded coverage, it rose to $6.00. Clearly, St. Paul anticipated a greater exposure from the new endorsement, and for that reason, it doubled the cost of uninsured motorist coverage for Appellee’s antique automobile.
The Majority’s forced interpretation of the policy’s clear and unambiguous definition of a “covered person” and its gratuitous assumption, without support in the record, of the Appellee’s economic expectation, cause me to strongly dissent from its ruling.
WIEAND, McEWEN and BECK, JJ., join.