Court Opinion

ID: 9591703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:06:51.77567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:32.830993
License: Public Domain

Brickley, C.J.
(dissenting). In this case, we look at whether the trial court’s refusal to give an instruction to the jury that misstated the law, but which defense counsel expected to be given, is error requiring reversal. The lead opinion concludes that the judge erred by not giving the erroneous instruction because the defendant was prejudiced. The position of the lead opinion is based, in part, on the possibility that the defendant might have been acquitted if the erroneous instruction had been given. See ante, p 591. I do not agree that prejudice can be based on the defendant’s missed opportunity to be acquitted under an erroneous standard. Further, the defendant was not prejudiced by the change in juiy instructions because the difference between the instructions did not undermine the defendant’s arguments. Because I conclude that the trial judge was under no duty to give the modified instruction, in that it was an incorrect statement of law and did not satisfy the requirements of MCR 6.414(F), I respectfully dissent.
*607I
In chambers, before either closing argument, the parties agreed to use CJI2d 16.18 for the element of gross negligence. After the prosecution finished its closing argument, however, defense counsel called for a sidebar conference and orally moved to amend the third element of the gross negligence instruction from “likely to be serious injury” to “likely to cause death.” The prosecution and the trial court initially agreed to the change. The defense then presented its closing arguments. Before the trial court instructed the jury, the prosecution objected to the changed instruction, noting that it misstated the standard for gross negligence. The defense objected, stating that it had relied on the changed standard in its closing argument. The court offered to reopen argument. The defense declined, stating that reargument would further accentuate the inconsistency. The court subsequently instructed the jury with the standard jury instruction on gross negligence on which the parties originally had agreed. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
n
In both civil1 and criminal2 trials, the Michigan Court Rules require that all requests for jury instructions must be (1) in writing, (2) served on the other party, and (3) brought to the court’s attention before closing arguments. MCR 6.414(F) states:
Before closing arguments, the court must give the parties a reasonable opportunity to submit written requests for jury *608instructions. Each parly must serve a copy of the written requests on all other parties. The court must inform the parties of its proposed action on the requests before their closing arguments.
The intent of MCR 6.414 is apparent: both parties, should have sufficient notice of how the court will instruct the jury so that they can frame their arguments appropriately. By requiring that requests be submitted in writing, both parties and the trial court will have time to reflect on the proposed instructions. Had defense counsel complied with MCR 6.414(F), it is doubtful that this case would be before us today.
Defense counsel’s proposed modification did not satisfy any of the requirements of MCR 6.414(F). The proposed modification was not written.3 It was brought to the court’s attention at sidebar, outside of the hearing of the jury, and was not recorded. Written copies were not served on the prosecutor. The prosecutor first learned of defense counsel’s proposed departure from the standard jury instructions after her closing argument. The request was brought after the prosecution had made her closing argument. Thus, the prosecutor was unable to frame her argument to this new standard.
Because defense counsel’s modification of the standard jury instructions was brought too late, and was not in writing, it was an ineffective request. As an ineffective attempt to modify the jury instructions, the judge was under no duty to give the instruction. MCR 6.414(F). By giving effect to the defense coun*609sel’s ill-timed request, the lead opinion disregards the clear dictates of MCR 6.414(F).
III
The court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel cannot agree to change the threshold burden of proof for gross negligence because it is the trial court’s duty to correctly instruct the jury on the law. MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052; People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). The fundamental flaw in the reasoning of the lead opinion is that it fails to distinguish a judge’s refusal to give an instruction on which the parties have agreed that correctly states the law from one that misstates the law. The difference between the two is significant. If a request for a jury instruction is brought pursuant to MCR 6.414(F) and correctly states the law, it is error for a trial judge to refuse to give the instruction after closing arguments if counsel’s reliance on the instruction would be prejudicial. People v Swejkowski, 90 Mich App 366; 282 NW2d 5 (1979). But where the instruction misstates the law, as in People v Patskan, 387 Mich 701; 199 NW2d 458 (1972), the judge is under no similar duty. Although Patskan’s precedential value is limited because of its fractured opinion, it is undisputed that four justices rejected the approach that the lead opinion now recommends.
The erroneous standard that defense counsel used in his closing argument raised the threshold burden of proof for gross negligence. The dilemma the lead opinion faces is that it would hold that the judge erred by not committing error. This paradox was noted in People v Patskan, supra at 716, relied on by *610the lead opinion, where defense counsel’s closing argument was based on a misstatement of law.
The anomaly in my Brother’s position is that had the instruction been given, and defendant been convicted thereunder, we would have no choice but to reverse the conviction. [T. G. Kavanagh, Williams, JJ., concurring.]
In Patskan, the trial court refused to give an instruction on attempted assault with intent to commit armed robbery on which the parties agreed. Defense counsel argued on appeal that he had relied on that instruction in his closing argument.
As in the present case, defense counsel in Patskan also relied on an erroneous instruction. Before closing arguments, defense counsel requested the trial court to instruct the jury on the offense of attempted assault with intent to commit armed robbery. Michigan, however, does not recognize such a crime. Attempted assault is considered a logical impossibility because it is an “attempt to attempt.” People v Jones, 443 Mich 88, 93; 504 NW2d 158 (1993). During closing arguments, defense counsel urged the jury to find his client not guilty, or, in the alternative, guilty of attempted assault.
Although the defendant in Patskan was granted a new trial by this Court, it is not clear that the failure to instruct the jury on attempted assault was essential to the judgment. The holding was based on two errors. One was the failure to give an instruction on which the parties agreed. The other was the failure of the judge to instruct on the lesser included offense of attempted armed robbery.
*611The Patskan Court produced three opinions, but no clear majority. Only one justice supported the proposition that the lead opinion now proposes. Two other justices, however, disagreed with that conclusion. Writing separately, and joined by Justice Williams, Justice T. G. Kavanagh stated that the judge had no duty to give the instruction because the defense’s proposed instruction misstated the law.
Although defense counsel’s closing argument indicates reliance on the court’s promise to give the instruction he requested, he should not be heard to complain that the court somehow escaped the error he invited. [387 Mich 716-717.]
The lead opinion finds support from Patskan, yet only one — arguably three — justices supported its position. On the other hand, four justices rejected the very same position. Moreover, two of those four addressed the issue before us now in their concurring opinion, stating that a judge is under no duty to give an erroneous instruction, regardless of what he tells defense counsel. Consequently, Patskan does not require this Court to grant a new trial in the present case.
People v Swejkowski, supra, is distinguishable from the present case because the instruction on which the parties relied was a correct statement of the law.
The lead opinion’s reliance on People v Paxton, 47 Mich App 144; 209 NW2d 251 (1973), is also misplaced. In Paxton, a new trial was ordered in a case in which the jury was incorrectly charged regarding the elements of self-defense. The lead opinion argues that Paxton is “helpful” because it demonstrates that it is error when a jury instruction does not support *612the theory relied on by the defense. Instead, the decision in Paxton is based on the principle that it is error for the trial court to misstate the law in the instructions to the jury. Further, the opinion even undermines the position of the lead opinion.
One of the primary functions of the trial judge is to inform the jury correctly of the law applicable in a given case. [Id. at 149.]
Thus, Paxton supports a conclusion opposite that to which the lead opinion proposes: that a primary function of the judge is to correctly instruct the jury. Instead, the lead opinion concludes that the judge erred by not misinstructing the jury.
MCR 6.414 is modeled after and incorporates provisions from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30.4 Federal courts have upheld a rule requiring “substantial compliance” with Rule 30 and have reversed convictions where the defendant establishes prejudice. United States v Clark, 732 F2d 1536 (CA 11, 1984). Federal courts have rejected, however, the proposition that a defendant has a right to an incorrect jury instruction merely because defense counsel argues an inappropriate standard. In upholding a change of a jury instruction that properly informed the jury of the *613charge, United States v Pena, 897 F2d 1075, 1085 (CA 11, 1990) stated:
We do not believe that the requirements of Rule 30 function as a limitation on the district court’s obligation to inform the jury of the law which properly governs a case. Nor do we believe that the limitations contained in Rule 30 operate to empower counsel, through the mechanics of the Closing argument, either to dictate the law by which a verdict is reached or to create a mistrial by erroneously stating the legal principles applicable to a given situation.
The same principle is applicable in the case before us.
IV
The lead opinion erroneously believes that the defendant was prejudiced because it focuses on the difference between the two jury instructions, instead of the effect of that difference on the jury’s verdict. An inquiry into prejudice “focuses on the nature of the error and assesses its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence.” People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891 (1996). Therefore, if we are going to find prejudice, there must be some evidence that the alleged error affected the outcome.
In the beginning of the defense’s closing argument, counsel argued that the defendant had acted reasonably under the circumstances. He claimed that, despite difficult circumstances, the defendant had acted responsibly, and in a manner that other reasonable people might have also. Further, because there were no physical signs of distress, the defendant was said to have had no reason to conclude that depriving her son of water would cause him to be dehydrated.
*614And I say to you if medical people, who are trained to figure these things out, cannot tell us, how can a reasonable layperson like Bertha Clark or you know what to do?
* * *
And so it’s reasonable for her to conclude, and I think any reasonable person to conclude, that you have the right, should reduce water intake, particularly at night.
Notably, defense counsel was not relying on the difference between the standard of death and serious injury. Instead, defense counsel presented the defendant as a person who had acted reasonably. If the jury had accepted this claim, it could have returned a verdict of not guilty under either jury instruction. Therefore, with regard to this argument, the difference between the two instructions was irrelevant.
The defense also advanced the theory that Rodney did not die of dehydration. Defense counsel emphasized the inconsistencies in the testimony of the doctors who either treated Rodney or performed his autopsy. In addition to alluding to the possibility that Rodney had died of a seizure, defense counsel also argued that Rodney had died, not of dehydration, but of diabetes insipidus. Because these arguments presented a different theory of the cause of Rodney’s death, the jury could have acquitted the defendant regardless of whether the defendant was negligent. Accordingly, the effect of the change in instructions was negligible, with regard to this argument because it advanced a different theory.
Finally, defense counsel attempted to shift the blame for Rodney’s death.
*615The medical personnel in this case blew it. Dr. Ponstein didn’t handle it correctly. The Department of Social Services did not act in a prudent manner. The schools slipped somewhat, and all of — and even the prosecutor’s office fumbled the ball. And now they are all coming together, and although they are culpable and we can point to it, they say: Don’t think about that. We didn’t know what was happening there. Bertha Clark should have, and it is all her fault. The facts don’t support that. She acted as best she could and it surely wasn’t in a grossly negligent manner.
Like each of the preceding arguments, this argument did not rely on the difference between the two instructions. If the jury had chosen to place the blame for Rodney’s death on his teachers, doctors, or social workers, it could have acquitted the defendant regardless of whether the court gave the original or the modified instruction.
Thus, the defendant was not prejudiced by the use of the original, correct instruction. Defense counsel’s closing argument had four themes: the defendant acted reasonably; Rodney did not die of dehydration; Rodney’s death was caused by a seizure or diabetes insipidus; and it was the fault of dss, his teachers, and the doctors who treated him. These arguments did not rely on the distinction between “death” and “serious injury.” Instead, each one attempted to deny negligence, refute the alleged cause of death, or shift the blame.
This case is analogous to United States v White, 27 F3d 1531 (CA 11, 1994). In White, a trial judge similarly refused to give an instruction on which the parties agreed. Defense counsel, as here, referred to the standard during closing argument. After closing argument, the trial court withdrew the instruction after *616discovering that the instruction misstated the law. The trial court did not give the instruction that defense counsel had referred to in closing argument and, in fact, “expressly informed the jury of the deletion when delivering its oral charge.” White, supra at 1537. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant had not been prejudiced. The defendant’s argument was based on a defense of good faith, noted the court, which was not affected by the withdrawal of the instruction.
The fact that the Medicare program never authorized payment for diagnostic tests ordered or furnished by a chiropractor did not preclude the jury from finding that the Whites had a good faith belief to the contrary. By its verdict, however, the jury rejected the Whites’ claim that they had acted on the basis of such a belief. [Id. at 1539.]
In the present case, the jury likewise rejected the defendant’s claims that she had acted reasonably, that Rodney had died of a cause other than dehydration, and that others were to blame for his death. The jury was not precluded from acquitting the defendant as a result of the change in the jury instruction.
If defense counsel’s closing argument had hinged on the difference between the two instructions, the defendant might have been prejudiced by the use of the original instruction. For example, her attorney might have argued that the defendant may have known that depriving Rodney of water might seriously injure him, but never would have thought that death could result. In that case, the distinction would be important. Once the judge changed the instruction *617from “death” to “serious injury,” the defendant’s argument would have been “eviscerated,” as the lead opinion contends happened here. Nothing would have remained for the jury to acquit the defendant.
Instead, defense counsel’s closing argument was based on a theory that the defendant acted reasonably, that Rodney died of causes other than dehydration, and that others were to blame for his death. Because defense counsel’s closing argument did not rely on the difference between the two instructions, I would find no prejudice. Had the jury believed any of defendant’s arguments, it could have acquitted the defendant, despite the change in instructions. By its verdict, the jury rejected all the defendant’s claims, none of which relied on the difference between the two instructions.
The lead opinion states that the trial court erred when,
after agreeing to a modified instruction, [it] subsequently decided to charge the jury with the unmodified instruction after defense counsel relied on and conformed his closing arguments to the modified instruction. [Ante, p 590.]
I cannot agree that the trial judge’s decision to correctly instruct the jury, regardless of what he promised defense counsel, constituted error. Any “duty” that the trial court owed to defense counsel to honor its ill-timed request for a change from the standard jury instructions, previously agreed to in chambers, was superseded by the court’s responsibility to correctly instruct the jury. Further, the defendant was not prejudiced by the change in jury instructions *618because the difference between the two instructions did not undermine her arguments.
This Court should vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the verdict of the trial court.
Boyle and Weaver, JJ., concurred with Brickley, C.J.

 MCR 2.516(A)(1).

 MCR 6.414(F).

 Under appropriate circumstances a trial court may comply with an oral request; however, the facts of this case demonstrate the pitfalls of doing so.

 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 provides in part:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to all parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to the jury. The court may instruct the jury before or after the arguments are completed or at both times.