Court Opinion

ID: 9592664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:16:09.699498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:49.098247
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, because in my opinion the Little Miller Act is the law to be applied in this case. The flesh and bone of the Act, ignored by the majority in order to reach its result, may be found at OCGA § 36-82-100 et seq. For an excellent discussion suggesting how this case should be decided under our statutory scheme, see J. W. Bateson Co. v. Bd. of Trustees, 434 U. S. 586, 601 (98 SC 873, 55 LE2d 50) (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).2 In short, I would hold that *58a mere supplier to a supplier is not covered under a statutory payment bond given pursuant to OCGA § 36-82-100 (2). See generally J. W. Bateson Co., supra.
The majority explains that in the beginning, a general contractor assumes full responsibility for the entire government contract. Subsequently, “it hires others to provide the things it needs.” All of these persons are “subcontractors,” according to the majority. For this reason, they are to be afforded the same degree of protection. This, of course, is nothing new. It is axiomatic that persons in privity of contract with the prime contractor are covered under the statutory payment bond, whether they be subcontractors or materialmen. In this sense, then, the majority has accomplished nothing. ProFab, the bankrupt materialman in this case, is certainly made no better off as a result of the decision reached today, although the majority apparently disagrees.
The intent appears to be to label ProFab a subcontractor as a means of declaring our claimant, Metro, to be more than a mere supplier to a supplier. I believe the majority’s effort has been more successful than may appear at first blush. Its holding must be harmonized with OCGA § 36-82-100 (2), which prevents us from limiting subcontractor status only to those with whom the prime contractor deals directly. Accordingly, it would appear that Metro is not covered under the payment bond merely because it is in privity of contract with a subcontractor; rather, it is covered because Metro is a subcontractor under the majority’s holding. After all, Metro performs a function no different than ProFab. ProFab assumed the full responsibility to fill Barton Malow’s purchase order and “subcontracted” with Metro to provide some of the pipe that it needed to fill the order. Metro, which appears to have fulfilled its subcontracting duties from St. Louis, Missouri, undoubtedly subcontracted with other subcontractors throughout the country, whose efforts likewise found their way into the Scott Candler Filter Plant Expansion project in DeKalb County, Georgia.
In short, unless the majority’s holding today is somehow narrowed in scope in future cases, it would appear that “all persons supplying labor, materials, machinery, and equipment in the prosecution of the work provided for in the contract” will be “subcontractors,” regardless of whether they are in privity of contract with the prime contractor. OCGA §§ 13-10-1 (a) (2); 36-82-100 (2). This will mean that any language in the Little Miller Act implying a contrary result is mere surplusage. See OCGA §§ 13-10-1 (a) (2); 36-82-102; 36-82-104 (f). “The assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these *59days apace.”3
Decided July 15, 1994.
White, Smith, Howard & Ajax, Michael D. St. Amand, for ap-pellee.
Alston & Bird, Robert L. Crewdson, Bovis, Kyle & Burch, John V. Burch, for appellants.

 I believe Justice Stevens’s dissent is applicable to the Little Miller Act because in it he argues that the term “subcontractor” under the federal Miller Act should not be limited to those in privity of contract with the prime contractor. This is precisely the view adopted by our General Assembly in OCGA § 36-82-100 (2). The most striking feature of Justice Stevens’s dissent, however, is the fact that it is consistent with every case decided under our Little Miller Act until now, including Tom Barrow Co. v. St. Paul Fire &c. Ins. Co., 205 Ga. App. 10, 11 (1) (421 SE2d 85) (1992), the case on which the majority relies so heavily.

 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 180 (174 NE 441) (1931) (Cardozo, J.).