Court Opinion

ID: 9574492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:05:23.612976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:37.669261
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
1.1 respectfully dissent with respect to the reversal of the conviction. Byrd v. State, 186 Ga. App. 446 (1) (367 SE2d 300) (1988), is correct and supports it.
Insofar as is pertinent here, Byrd enumerated as error the denial of his motion for directed verdict of acquittal and the court’s charging the elements of theft by taking (OCGA § 16-8-2). The charge was in accordance with the indictment, which charged theft by taking in two counts, by the two methods of committing that crime.
Byrd’s argument was two-fold. One was that he was charged with the wrong crime, and the jury was instructed on the wrong crime, in that if he was guilty of any crime, it would be theft by deception of the type specified in OCGA § 16-8-3 (b) (5). The second part of the argument was that there was insufficient evidence of the commission of either crime.
We rejected the proposition that Byrd had to be charged with violation of OCGA § 16-8-3 (b) (5), for the reason that the broad language of the theft by taking statute encompasses thefts by various manners, i.e., deception and conversion. This was based on authority cited in the opinion, one of which cases is quoted in the majority opinion here. The statute itself says “. . . regardless of the manner in which the property is taken or appropriated.” The Supreme Court has said of this clause: “While [it] renders the section sufficiently broad enough to encompass thefts or larcenies perpetrated by deception as prohibited under [OCGA § 16-8-3], and possibly broad enough to encompass other types of theft prohibited by other sections of the Criminal Code of Georgia, this is no impediment to an indictment thereunder. Martin v. State, 123 Ga. 478, 479 (51 SE 334) [1905].” Stull v. State, 230 Ga. 99, 101 (196 SE2d 7) (1973).
The issue was not whether Byrd should have been charged with OCGA § 16-8-15. It prohibits a particular type of conversion, that related to a specific industry. While the jury may have been authorized to indict under it, OCGA § 16-8-4 and OCGA § 16-8-15 are not mutually exclusive. The latter is narrower and, depending on the circumstances, may be included in the former. Just as there are species of theft by taking, so there are sub-species of theft by conversion.
In any event, the essential elements of the generic crime of theft by taking were present in the evidence in Byrd’s trial, when tested by the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Byrd contracted to do work and extracted an ad*5vanee payment for this specific work and the materials connected with it. He delivered a small amount of material and did no work. He promised to return the victim’s money, except a minor portion for those materials, but kept it.
Decided December 5, 1990.
Sexton, Turner & Moody, Lee Sexton, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Daniel J. Cahill, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
This is not a square peg in a round hole; it is a round peg in a large round hole into which other round pegs also fit. Hill’s situation is one of them.
2. Venue in Clayton County was proper. There was evidence that defendant and Ali were introduced at the realtor’s office in Jonesboro to arrange for defendant to obtain financing for the purchaser of Ali’s business. They met several times there in that connection. It was there that defendant advised that his fee would be $2,500, which would be returned if the loan was not placed. The financing did not materialize.
Defendant gave the victim a check for the return of the funds, in Clayton County, with instructions to hold it for a few days. The check, which showed Clayton County as the address of defendant’s corporation, was returned for insufficient funds by the time it was presented for payment. Thus there was evidence that defendant exercised control over the victim’s money, the subject of the theft, in Clayton County. OCGA § 16-8-11.
The two options which the court saw available to the State on the question of venue in the circumstances in Stowe v. State, 163 Ga. App. 535, 537 (4) (295 SE2d 209) (1982), are not the only possibilities as to an accused’s exercise of control over another’s property. That case involved unlawfully drawing down funds from a construction account. This case involves stealing $2,500 which originally had been given in cash in one county and then purportedly returning it by a check in Clayton County.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Pope join in this dissent.