Court Opinion

ID: 9461918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:27:44.450695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:19.206334
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Respectfully, I dissent. Judge Lum-bard has skillfully recited the facts and has commented on the worth of the brief filed with the Washington Court of Appeals. I agree that the brief is not an example of appellate advocacy at its' *114best. But, I see in this record that Mr. Munro found himself in a dilemma.
He could not say that the appeal taken by his client was frivolous, or lacked all merit. In such a case he would, we presume, have petitioned for withdrawal. Rather, counsel set forth the arguments of his client, and stated that he had “carefully read” the record, and had given “due consideration” to his client’s arguments.. Counsel then went on to set forth as the “sole question,” whether or not there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
Obviously he did not feel that there was any merit to any of the points raised by his client, for if he had, he would have raised such issue, together with the evidentiary one, in his brief. Yet counsel at the same time may not have been able to find the appeal to be wholly without merit or frivolous, so as to justify a petition for withdrawal under Anders.
I certainly cannot say, in any event, that counsel did not “support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability,” which is the Anders standard, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400.1.
Appointed counsel’s appraisal of the case was substantiated by two Washington appellate courts and the district court below. The Washington Court of Appeals might well have returned the brief of appointed counsel and requested him to expand it, cite legal authorities or support appellant’s contentions with references to the record. The court did not do so. Instead, it looked carefully at each of the assignments of error in counsel’s brief and in High’s pro se brief, examined the record of the trial, considered the effect of nine applicable Washington cases, and concluded that appellant’s trial had been fair and that his contentions were not supported by the record or applicable law.
The majority opinion notes that the Washington Court of Appeals “has given careful and thorough consideration to the very points which assigned counsel could make on a second appeal from High’s conviction.” The Washington court did more than that.
In an eight-page opinion, that court made a detailed analysis of the trial court’s findings of fact, the evidence supporting each, the arguments advanced by the appellant, and the controlling legal authorities. In the course of its thorough opinion affirming the trial court, the Washington Court of Appeals made the observations set forth in the margin.2
*115After High lost on that appeal, he petitioned for rehearing. His three-page petition cited numerous state and federal cases and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Washington Court of Appeals denied that petition and the Washington Supreme Court subsequently denied High’s pro se petition for review.
In his petition to the federal district court for writ of habeas corpus, appellant raised three issues: (1) incompetence of counsel, both at trial and on appeal; (2) that the state knowingly used false evidence; and (3) that there existed numerous small errors at trial amounting to a deprivation of due process.
In his order dismissing the petition, the district judge gave serious attention to the question of adequacy of counsel. He thoroughly reviewed the trial transcript and concluded that appellant was ably represented at trial. He also concluded that the state judge’s findings of fact were correct on the photographic identification issue and that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction. Appellant does not argue these points before us and has concentrated our attention on the adequacy of counsel in the state appellate process.
Considering the “careful and thorough consideration” already given by the Washington courts to the points already made and which could be made on High’s behalf, I see no need to remand for another appeal through the state system. If appointed counsel on the first appeal was not much of an advocate, the state appellate court more than made up for his deficiencies. Under these circumstances, I don’t believe that the Anders decision requires more.

. Also, it should be noted that counsel’s waiver of oral argument was under the circumstances quite proper. ABA Standards § 3.2(b)(ii). See also State v. Ortiz, 98 Ariz. 65, 402 P.2d 14, 16 (1965).

. “We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us, and conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact. We have considered the assignments contained in defendant’s hand-printed supplemental brief. Each of these assignments that predicate error in the findings has been considered fully and found to be without merit. Each of the defendant’s arguments has also been considered and rejected.
“The next question for review is whether the arresting officer’s failure to give Miranda warnings before questioning the suspect constitutes prejudicial error. At the outset, we note that during the trial the state did not introduce any evidence of a confession or statement against interest made by the defendant at any time. The conversation between the arresting officer and the defendant, as well as the arresting officer’s written report of the conversation, was elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination of Detective Dean. Moreover, the conversation and reports so introduced are devoid of any inference of guilt. * * * As the Supreme Court stated in State v. Baker, 78 Wn.2d 327, 474 P.2d 254 (1970) at page 331: ‘An error, considered in a vacuum, does not give rise to' an automatic reversal of a judicial determination. There must be some nexus with a right of the defendant substantially abridged by the error.’
* * * * * *
“The defendant contends that he was indigent, was not informed of his right to appointed counsel, and was questioned in the absence of counsel. The uncontradicted evidence in the record before us indicates that at the time of his arrest the defendant informed the police not only that he was represented by counsel, but also who that attorney was. Detective Dean’s further questioning of the defendant without the presence of *115the defendant’s counsel was unquestionably improper. The fact remains, however, that defendant did not confess nor inform the police of any material fact not already in their possession. We have no hesitancy in declaring that Detective Dean’s impropriety constitutes harmless error, beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Nist, 77 Wn.2d 227, 461 P.2d 322 (1969).
“Finally, we take up the photo lineup issue. * * * The trial court in two separate oral rulings reviewed the photographic identification procedure employed by Officer Brown and Detective Dean, and concluded that Mrs. Strand’s identification of the defendant’s picture while the defendant was not yet in custody was not accompanied by impermissible suggestions from the police. Constitutional facts must be reviewed de novo on appeal, but the credibility of witnesses may not be reevaluated. State v. Huston, 71 Wn.2d 226, 428 P.2d 547 (1967); State v. Cashaw, 4 Wn.App. 243, 480 P.2d 528 (1971). Our review of the record convinces us that Mrs. Strand’s in-court identification of the defendant was not tainted by improper pretrial suggestion from the police. From the record before us, we are unable to say that there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
******
“The first argument is that Mrs. Strand’s testimony establishes impermissible influence on her identification. We disagree. Even if we accept Mrs. Strand’s version as true and disregard the policemen’s testimony, the procedures employed did not taint the subsequent in-court identification. * * Moreover, even though the crime was committed at night and Mrs. Strand’s vision may have been impaired by the chemical sprayed in her face, the very nature of the crime assured her of a very good opportunity to observe the defendant’s facial features. There is no evidence that her vision was substantially impaired. On the contrary, she described her assailant, his bedroom, his car, his house, all with a high degree of accuracy. We reiterate that under the circumstances we cannot say that there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misiden-tification at the subsequent in-court proceeding. [citation omitted]
******
“ * * * We have completely reviewed the record and find no convincing evidence of a conspiracy to convict defendant of a crime that he did not commit. On the contrary, our review indicates clearly that the defendant’s guilt was established in a proper and constitutional manner.”
State v. High, Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two, Oct. 6, 1972 (unpublished opinion).