Court Opinion

ID: 9378693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-12 22:09:28.065617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.844792
License: Public Domain

In the Court of Criminal
           Appeals of Texas
                           ══════════
                           No. PD-0936-20
                           ══════════

                    JEREL CHINEDU IGBOJI,
                              Appellant

                                   v.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
        On State’s Petition for Discretionary Review
          From the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
                     Fort Bend County
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

      YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J., and
KEEL, J., join.

      The Court remands this case to the court of appeals to continue
to wrestle over whether the officer’s conduct in this case was justified
                                                                      IGBOJI – 2

under the Fourth Amendment. I am inclined to be more decisive. This
appeal was first filed in the court of appeals in 2017—nearly five years
ago! 1 The court of appeals’ majority opinion has already expressly
acknowledged: (1) the existence of facts that demonstrate probable cause
to believe that evidence relevant to the crime would be found on
Appellant’s phone; (2) the existence of facts showing that Appellant was
aware that police considered him a suspect; and (3) the existence of facts
demonstrating that Appellant had both the ability and incentive to
destroy any incriminating evidence on the cell phone had he been able
to retain it while a search warrant was being sought. We should simply
acknowledge that those facts demonstrate that the seizure of the phone
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment, and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Because
the Court does not, I respectfully dissent. 2

       1 If the court of appeals takes another year to dispose of this case on
remand, and then a second round of petitions for discretionary review ensues,
this case could last up to seven years in appellate orbit.

       2  Because the Court nevertheless remands this case for further
examination by the court of appeals, it may also be important to observe that
Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence was denied by the trial court. That
being the case, the court of appeals was bound to uphold the trial court’s
decision to deny the motion to suppress on any basis supported by the facts
and the law. See State v. Castanedanieto, 607 S.W.3d 315, 327 (Tex. Crim. App.
2020) (“The ‘Calloway rule’ dictates that a claim of reversible error on direct
appeal should be rejected if the trial court’s ruling is correct ‘on any theory of
law applicable to the case’ even if ‘the trial court did not purport to rely on that
theory’ and the prevailing party did not explicitly raise the theory.”) (quoting
State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 85−86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). But the court
of appeals does not yet seem to have considered whether the trial court’s
decision to deny the motion to suppress might have been correct for other
proper reasons.
                                                                   IGBOJI – 3

FILED:                                      March 8, 2023
PUBLISH

        For example, even assuming the officer’s seizure of Appellant’s cell
phone was technically erroneous, did the seizure itself actually lead to the
discovery of any evidence admitted against Appellant at his trial? See Segura,
468 U.S. at 815 (“The illegal entry into petitioners’ apartment did not
contribute in any way to discovery of the evidence seized under the warrant; it
is clear, therefore, that not even the threshold ‘but for’ requirement was met
in this case.”) (majority opinion). And, even if it did, was any taint from that
erroneous seizure attenuated by the fact that the contents of the phone were
not searched until after a warrant was executed authorizing the search? See
Id. at 814 (concluding that a “valid warrant search was a ‘means sufficiently
distinguishable’ to purge the evidence of any ‘taint’ arising from the [unlawful]
entry”). If, on remand, the court of appeals persists in concluding that the
seizure of the cell phone in this case was unlawful, it ought to then consider
such questions. My resolution of the case would obviate that need.