Court Opinion

ID: 9565674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:25:37.773597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:49.491393
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result reached by the court but disagree with its formulations in *720two specific instances. First, the eviden-tiary analysis is slightly misdirected and, therefore, confusing. Second, the majority misstates the law of this circuit as established through recent precedent adopted by an en banc panel of the court.
With regard to the first proposition, the majority opines:
To establish a claim of intentional age discrimination, a plaintiff may present direct evidence of such discrimination or [in the alternative] may prove his claim through circumstantial evidence. See Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.2003).... Where the plaintiff presents only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, as Carraher does in the instant case, we apply the familiar burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. See 411 U.S. 792, 800-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Ante at 716.
A more accurate statement would be as follows — to establish a claim of intentional age discrimination, a plaintiff may present either “ ‘direct or circumstantial evidence’ ” of such discrimination. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3,103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). And, where this occurs, “the law makes no distinction between the weight or value to be given either to direct or circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 100, 123 S.Ct. 2148 (quotation omitted). Lacking evidence “ ‘showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated’ the adverse employment action,” Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1997)), the plaintiff may present evidence sufficient to establish a prima face case of discrimination under the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).
Evidence establishing a specific link to alleged discriminatory animus may be totally circumstantial yet wholly sufficient without use of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. Accordingly, a holding purporting to require the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis when a plaintiff presents “only circumstantial evidence,” is, after Desert Palace, imprecise.
Second, the majority refused to consider one of Carraher’s appellate arguments, stating:
As for Carraher’s second explanation [set forth only in his reply brief on appeal], he did not raise it before the district court in his opposition to summary judgment. Accordingly, we will not consider it. See Winthrop Res. Corp. v. Eaton Hydraulics, Inc., 361 F.3d 465, 469 (8th Cir.2004) (“We review de novo only the evidence and arguments that were before the district court when it made its determination in the [summary judgment] order[ ] challenged on appeal.”)
Ante at 717.
The court’s Winthrop quotation does not accurately reflect the law of this circuit following United States v. Lucas, No. 05-2165, 2007 WL 2386580 (8th Cir. Aug.23, 2007) (en banc). In Lucas, eight members of an en banc panel of this court considered, over Lucas’s objection, a government argument based on “a diminished expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment. Not only was this particular contention not raised in the district court, it was not even raised before the three-judge panel that first addressed the issues on appeal. Id. at *18. Accordingly, there is *721no precedential support for the majority’s refusal to consider Carraher’s “second explanation” in this case.
In Lucas, the en banc majority disregarded numerous circuit holdings that support the proposition stated above by Judge Shepherd. To reach its Lucas conclusion, the en banc court employed wholly inapplicable case law.
The Lucas majority considered the government’s newly minted Fourth Amendment theory by claiming to apply the “ ‘well-settled principle’ that a district court may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record.” Id. at *7 n. 5 (citing United States v. Pierson, 219 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir.2000)). Here, on the other hand, as noted above, the panel majority cites Winthrop, as follows — “[w]e review de novo only the evidence and arguments that were before the district court when it made its determination in the [summary judgment] order[ ] challenged on appeal.” Ante at 717. While this panel rejects Carraher’s newly stated contention, a majority of the recent en banc panel not only considered the government’s late-blooming legal theory in Lucas but actually decided the case by applying the new contention.
I confess that but for the new Lucas precedent, I would agree with Judge Shepherd’s statement here. In making this observation, I note that Pierson, a case that I authored, does not even remotely bear the weight placed upon it by the en banc majority in Lucas. Pierson, like Lucas, involved a Fourth Amendment search. In Pierson, the district court refused to suppress the contents of a garment bag because the evidence established that Pier-son was not its owner and thus lacked standing to assert a constitutional claim. 219 F.3d at 804-05. Pierson argued that ownership of the bag was not raised in the district court so it should not be considered on appeal. Noting that the issue of Pierson’s “standing” had been advanced by the government at all phases of the case, id. at 807 n. 9, the panel affirmed the district court, noting, unremarkably, that a court may affirm on any basis supported by the record.
Of course, in Lucas there was no support whatsoever in the record made in the district court or before the three-judge panel for the proposition that the government had advanced a diminished-expectation-of-privacy theory before the filing of its petition for rehearing en banc. In truth, it had not done so. Thus, Pierson is totally distinguishable from Lucas.
I also advance a couple of observations not directly related to this particular case. The new Lucas precedent presents procedural and substantive problems beyond those highlighted in this appeal. Advancing facts or legal theories not manifested in the district court deprives an adverse party of the opportunity to address and make a trial court record concerning disputed contentions. When this occurs, meaningful appellate review is almost impossible. It also severely disadvantages the appellate process because, under Lucas, to avoid the vacation of a three-judge opinion based upon the issues actually raised by the parties, a panel must now apparently recognize and apply, sua sponte, an arguably efficacious, but unas-serted, factual or legal theory- — even a theory, as raised in Lucas, not supported by controlling precedent. Such a rule undermines the “ ‘evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.’ ” United States v. Petersen, 276 F.3d 432, 439 (8th Cir.2002) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996)).
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the court. I dissent from the *722majority’s emanations on the two issues of law outlined above for the reasons stated.