Court Opinion

ID: 9365425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 10:09:08.895085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:45.623266
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                     NO. 03-22-00435-CV

                                        J. M., Appellant

                                                v.

                Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

                 FROM THE 146TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
       NO. 321,340-B, THE HONORABLE JACK WELDON JONES, JUDGE PRESIDING

                             CONCURRING OPINION

               The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support the (D) and (E)

statutory grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights.           See Tex. Fam. Code

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). I cannot join the majority opinion because I disagree that the evidence

is sufficient to support termination under (D). Because I agree that the evidence is sufficient to

support termination under (E), however, I concur in the judgment affirming the termination of

Father’s parental rights.

               Subsection (D) authorizes termination of parental rights if clear and convincing

evidence establishes that the parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to

remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the

child.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Subsection (E) authorizes termination of parental rights if clear

and convincing evidence establishes that the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child.”     Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).     Although both grounds require proof of

endangerment, they are otherwise separate and distinct grounds. See A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam.

& Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 713 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.); In re S.H.A.,

728 S.W.2d 73, 85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also In re J.K.N.G.,

No. 04-21-00310-CV, 2022 WL 689095, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 9, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). The primary distinction between subsections (D) and (E) is the cause of the

endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d at 85. Under

subsection (D), the focus is on “conditions or surroundings” that endanger the child, while under

subsection (E), the focus is on “conduct” that endangers the child. Id.; see also In re J.A.J.,

225 S.W.3d 621, 626 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006) (“[A]bsent a notable history of

abuse or a specific instance which clearly endangers a child, we should be careful to maintain the

critical distinction between ‘conditions or surroundings’ required under subsection (D) and

‘conduct’ required under subsection (E).”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 243 S.W.3d 611

(Tex. 2007).

               Also, subsection (D) always requires proof of scienter, i.e., evidence that a parent

“knowingly” placed or “knowingly” allowed his child to remain in endangering conditions or

surroundings. See In re T.H., 131 S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied);

cf. In re I.D.G., 579 S.W.3d 842, 851 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (“Scienter is not

required for an appellant’s own acts under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), although it is required when

a parent places her child with others who engage in endangering acts.”). “Subsection D is not a

basis for terminating parental rights if the parent was unaware of the endangering environment.”

In re A.L.H., 468 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). “So, in

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scrutinizing the endangerment finding, we focus not only on evidence of endangerment but also

on evidence showing the parent’s awareness of the endangering environment.” In re J.E.M.M.,

532 S.W.3d 874, 881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

              Additionally, “[s]ubsection (D) primarily considers the environment as it existed

at the time the child was removed, while the relevant time period for subsection (E) is wider and

considers parental conduct occurring ‘both before and after the child has been removed by the

Department.’” D.N.-B. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00092-CV,

2020 WL 4462327, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 24, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (internal

citations omitted). Thus, we must limit our analysis under subsection (D) to the evidence of

what Father knew at the time of Child’s removal.

              In this case, Father was sixteen years old when Child was born and seventeen

years old when Child was removed from Mother’s care. According to the Department’s removal

affidavit, Father had “limited involvement in [Child’s] life and only occasionally [saw] him” at

the time of removal. The Department caseworker testified that she did not believe Father and

Mother were “in a relationship” at the time of removal, and she did not know whether Father was

aware at that time of Mother’s drug issues. The caseworker also testified that although Father

knew that Mother was staying with Maternal Grandmother at the time, she did not believe that

Father “knew the circumstances of her CPS case,” and the caseworker added that Father “may

not have known that there was an issue.” Moreover, the caseworker acknowledged that at the

beginning of the case, Father “didn’t even know that [Child] was his.”

              Father testified that when the case began, he did not know that Child was his and

that he had “nothing to do with” Mother running away from her home and using drugs. He

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denied hiding Mother when she was on the run and giving her drugs. On cross-examination,

Father maintained that he had no knowledge of Mother’s drug use:

       Q.     Sir, did you ever see [Mother] use cocaine or marijuana?

       A.     Uhm, I ain’t never seen her do none of that.

       Q.     Did you know that she was using cocaine and marijuana?

       A.     No.

       Q.     Did you ever use methamphetamine with [Mother]?

       A.     No.

       Q.     Were you aware that when your child came into the care of the
              Department he tested positive for cocaine?

       A.     I didn’t know that until that day you had came to visit me at my house and
              told me.

       Q.     But you never saw [Mother] doing cocaine?

       A.     No.

       Q.     Is that because you didn’t see [Mother] until after this case began?

       A.     Yes. Because it was kind of family issues going on from her side and
              towards me, so, like, a lot going on.

Father explained that Mother’s family did not want him around and that as a result, he did not

have much contact with either Mother or Child after Child was born. If he wanted to see them,

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he would have to “sneak over” to Mother’s house late at night, “at, like, 3:00 something in the

morning or something like that” and then leave “in the morning time.”

              I cannot conclude that this evidence is sufficient to prove that Father knowingly

placed or knowingly allowed Child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered

Child’s physical or emotional well-being, and I believe the Court errs by concluding otherwise.

As Father argues in his brief, although Child’s “conditions or surroundings may have been

dangerous, [Father] did not know that, did not place [Child] in those circumstances, and did not

knowingly allow [Child] to remain in those circumstances.”

              Nevertheless, Section 161.001 requires proof of only one statutory predicate

ground to support termination, see In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003), and I agree with

the Court that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Father engaged in conduct that endangered

Child, see Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). I would affirm the district court’s judgment

terminating Father’s parental rights on that ground alone. Accordingly, I concur only in the

Court’s judgment.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            Gisela D. Triana, Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne and Justices Triana and Smith

Filed: January 17, 2023

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