Court Opinion

ID: 9850288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:54:35.471206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:34.558147
License: Public Domain

*768Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. “The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly ór through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when purchasing to detect defects, and, provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary: 1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended. 2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed.” Ga. L. 1957, p. 405, Section 1 (former Code Ann. § 96-307.) This court has interpreted this Code section as follows: “ ‘Use intended,’ as used in the Code section relied upon, means not the particular use intended by the purchaser, even though known to the seller, but means only such uses as the article may have been manufactured for by the manufacturer.” Mons v. Republic Steel Corp., 113 Ga. App. 135 (147 SE2d 473). Under the facts of this case, the automobile in question was not being used for a purpose intended when it was driven off the highway into a concrete abutment. The petition as worded shows that the accident was not a result of any defect in the automobile or its construction, but was caused by the unintended use of the automobile. It is well settled that so long as an allegation remains in a plaintiff’s petition, such allegation is conclusive against him. Carter v. General Finance &c. Corp., 96 Ga. App. 423, 426 (100 SE2d 99). Georgia is not one of the strict liability states in product liability cases.
While I have no argument with the rule as set out in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 45, or the rule as set out in Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236 (1) (160 SE2d 260), I think the true rule is set out in Poole v. City of Atlanta, 117 Ga. App. 432 (2) (160 SE2d 874): “ ‘A (complaint) may be dismissed on motion if clearly without any merit; and this want of merit may consist in an absence of law to support a claim of the sort made, or of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or in the disclosure of some fact which will necessarily defeat the claim. But a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.’ 2A Moore’s Federal Practice 2245, § 12.08. De Loach v. Crowley’s, 128 E2d 378, 380.”
*769“A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident proof or foolproof; nor must he render the vehicle ‘more’ safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.” Campo v. Scofield, 1950, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 NE2d 802, 804. Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but that would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation of existing law. Campo v. Scofield, supra, 805. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F2d 822, 824 (U.S.C.A. 7th 1966). Mrs. Friend’s case, which is under the theory of negligence of the manufacturer and not under the implied warranty theory as is the case of her husband, would, under the above rules, be subject to dismissal under the demurrer which was treated as a motion to dismiss for the same reasons that the manufacturers were not required to insure against the possibility of injury through misuse of their product. I would affirm the lower court’s dismissal.
I am authorized to state that Judges Quillian and Whitman concur in this dissent.