Court Opinion

ID: 9627235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:40:11.874551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:43.898098
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J.
I dissent.
Sections 23171-23175 of the Government Code provide an administrative procedure and sections 51000-51009 of that code provide a judicial procedure for determining disputed boundaries. Plaintiff was therefore entitled in the first instance to invoke one procedure or the other. (City of Susanville v. Lee C. Hess Co., 45 Cal.2d 684, 689 [290 P.2d 520]; Scripps Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. California Emp. Com., 24 Cal.2d 669, 673 [151 P.2d 109, 155 A.L.R. 360]; see River Plate & Brazil Conferences v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 227 F.2d 60, 64.) Since it elected to proceed before the State Lands Commission before this action was commenced, the trial court correctly concluded that the alternative remedy was not available. When “two or more tribunals in this state have concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the action might have been initiated. . . . One reason for the rule is to avoid unseemly conflict between courts that might arise if they were free to make contradictory decisions or awards at the same time or relating to the same controversy; another reason is to protect litigants from the expense and harassment of multiple litigation.” (Scott v. Industrial Accident Com., 46 Cal.2d 76, 81-82 [293 P.2d 18].) The Scott case makes clear that the rule is equally applicable when one of the tribunals is an administrative agency. (See also Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421, 423-424; Majors v. Thompson, 235 F.2d 449, 452; United States v. Interstate Commerce Com., 337 U.S. 426, 434 [69 S.Ct. 1410, 93 L.Ed. 1451].)
*800This rule makes good sense and should be followed, in the present case. Pursuant to plaintiff’s request, the State Lands Commission held extensive hearings and it has approved findings that are sufficient to permit an accurate survey to be made. By holding that it has no jurisdiction to resolve the boundary dispute, the majority not only render the commission’s work nugatory, but permit plaintiff to harass defendants by compelling them to relitigate the dispute in another proceeding after the tribunal first selected by plaintiff made findings adverse to it. The orderly administration of justice demands that plaintiff abide by its election. Having chosen the administrative remedy, it must seek judicial relief by way of review of the commission’s decision, not by an independent action.
Government Code, section 23175, providing that “Any survey finally approved pursuant to this article is a conclusive ascertainment of the lines and corners included in the survey,” does not negate the right to judicial review of the commission’s action, for if review is available, approval of a survey is not final until the commission’s action has been affirmed or the time for seeking review has elapsed. People v. Boggs, 56 Cal. 648, is not to the contrary, for in that case the survey was not attacked in a proceeding brought to review the agency’s action, but in a collateral proceeding brought to recover taxes paid under protest. Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, now expressly provides for the review of the commission’s proceedings, even though it is not one of the agencies enumerated in the Administrative Procedure Act. (Gov. Code, § 11501.) “The framers of section 1094.5 intended it to set forth ‘the procedure by which judicial review can be had by the writ of mandate after a formal adjudicatory decision by any administrative agency.’ (Emphasis added; see Tenth Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, Appendix A, p. 45.) ” (Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 101 [280 P.2d 1].) By its terms section 1094.5 applies “for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer.” Commission determination of the location of a disputed landmark or whether a boundary had been mutually recognized or used for a period sufficient to “legally establish” it (Gov. Code, *801§§ 23170, 23177) is a quasi-judicial function and accordingly, in the absence of any provision to the contrary, the requirement of a hearing is implied. (Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal.2d 260, 271 [246 P.2d 656]; Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal.2d 226, 230 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R.2d 826]; La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47, 53 [162 P.2d 13]; Steen v. Board of Civil Service Com., 26 Cal.2d 716, 723-725 [160 P.2d 816]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, 16 Cal.2d 164, 168 [105 P.2d 110]; cf., Keeler v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 596, 599 [297 P.2d 967]; DiGenova v. State Board of Education, 45 Cal.2d 255, 259-260 [288 P.2d 862].) Moreover, since the commission has been granted the power of the head of a department of the state under Government Code, sections 11180 to 11191 (Pub. Res. Code, § 6103), it is fully equipped to meet the hearing requirement. Its powers include the power to make investigations concerning all matters relating to the subjects under its jurisdiction; to inspect books and records; to hear complaints; to administer oaths; to issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers, books, accounts, documents and testimony in any inquiry, investigation, hearing or proceeding pertinent or material thereto in any part of the state; to delegate its investigative and hearing powers to an officer of the commission; to petition the superior court in the county in which the hearing is pending for an order compelling witnesses to attend and testify or produce the papers required; and to cause the depositions of persons residing within or without the state to be taken by petitioning the superior court of Sacramento County. Any party to a commission hearing has the right to the attendance of witnesses in his behalf at the hearing or upon deposition. Such provisions are adequate to enable the commission to proceed and they demonstrate that it has the power sought to be exercised here.
The majority hold, however, that the administrative remedy “provided by sections 23171-23175 is to be availed of only where the language of the boundary statute is clear and only ministerial action on the part of the surveyor in adequately marking the line is required. In other words, where the language used by the Legislature is ‘indefinite or uncertain,’ construction of such language is a matter exclusively for the courts, and the location of the boundaries is a question of fact to be judicially determined.” Such a limitation on the commission’s power is unworkable, productive of waste, and casts a cloud on the validity of all of its determinations. *802Whether the language of the statute is indefinite or uncertain may appear only after it is sought to be correlated with objects on the ground. Apparent clarity may disappear only in the light of extensive surveys undertaken by the commission that will then go for nought, and disputants will be enabled to relitigate settled boundaries, not because they were erroneously determined, but only because ambiguity in the statutory language can be demonstrated. The applicable statutes themselves refute any such limitation on the commission’s powers.
There is no occasion to invoke sections 23171 to 23175 unless there is a dispute as to the location of the landmarks and lines establishing boundaries. Not only are those sections included in the article of the Government Code entitled ‘1 Settlement of Boundary Disputes” (tit. 3, div. 1, ch. 2, art. 3) but their very purpose is the settlement of such disputes. If there is any need to have a boundary ‘‘definitely established” it can arise only because of doubt as to its location, either because, in the language of section 23171, ‘‘all common boundaries and common corners” are ‘‘not adequately marked by natural objects or lines” or because such boundaries and corners are not adequately marked by ‘‘surveys lawfully made.” It is only because of uncertainty as to the adequacy of the markings of common boundaries and corners or the legality of previous surveys that boards of supervisors of the counties affected are authorized to apply to the commission and the commission is given jurisdiction definitely to establish such ‘‘common boundaries” and “common corners.” Section 23172 explicitly provides for reports by county surveyors “to the State Lands Commission, with surveys, maps, notes, and explanations touching disputed points.” (Italics added.) If these reports are insufficient to enable the commission to collate a satisfactory description therefrom, the commission “shall cause surveys to be made, and when approved by it, the surveys establish the common boundaries and corners.” (Gov. Code, § 23173.) There would be no purpose in reporting to the commission about “disputed points” with “surveys, maps, notes, and explanations” if the commission did not have power to settle the ‘‘disputed points.” The commission’s jurisdiction to establish by surveys common boundaries and corners necessarily includes jurisdiction to determine in the first instance the meaning of the statutory language defining the boundary or the existence of facts bringing into play the mutual recognition and use statutes (Gov. Code, §§ 23170, *80323177), for only after it has decided such preliminary questions, can a final survey be undertaken. “A public officer or board has not only the powers expressly enumerated by law, but also those implied powers which are necessary to the exercise of the powers expressly granted.” (Crawford v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 200 Cal. 318, 334 [253 P. 726].) The majority concede that if the language of the boundary statute were clear, the commission could act upon it to establish a boundary by survey. The power to do so is just as essential to the commission’s function when the language is unclear, and nothing in the statutes justifies the distinction that the majority make. It is ironic that the commission is denied authority to act in the very situations in which the disputes it is empowered to settle are most likely to arise.
Language in County of Sierra v. County of Nevada, 155 Cal. 1 [99 P. 371], unquestionably supports the position taken by the majority herein. In that case, however, the court was reviewing a judgment that had determined a disputed boundary after a full trial in the trial court. The plaintiff had not invoked the administrative remedy but after an adverse judgment sought to switch to another tribunal. It may reasonably be assumed that the court was reluctant to reverse a judgment entered after a full and accurate determination of the issues solely because another remedy had not been invoked. In any event, to sustain its decision it was only necessary for the court to hold that the administrative remedy was not exclusive. It was not necessary to hold that the administrative remedy did not exist. The precise problem there presented is now governed by statutes allowing the plaintiff an election of remedies in the first instance (Gov. Code, §§ 51000-51009), so it is unnecessary to determine whether the court erred in the Sierra case in holding in effect that the administrative remedy was not exclusive. Obviously, however, the language in that decision indicating that the Legislature could not constitutionally invest the State Lands Commission with authority in the first instance to determine the questions involved in this case should be disapproved. The power to find facts upon which the application of a statute depends is an essential part of administrative authority. In 1917 this court said, ‘ ‘ from necessity, if for no better grounded reason, it has become increasingly imperative that many gwcm'-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, which in smaller communities and under more primitive conditions were performed directly by the legislative or judicial branches of the government, are *804intrusted to departments, boards, commissions, and agents. No sound objection can longer be successfully advanced to this growing method of transacting public business. These things must be done in this way or they cannot be done at all, and their doing, in a very real sense, makes for the safety of the republic, and is thus sanctioned by the highest law. For, as the supreme court of the United States declares: ‘Indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right, under the Constitution, to delegate the power to determine some fact or the state of things upon which the enforcement of its enactment depends, would be “to stop the wheels of government” and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct of the public business.’ ” (Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433, 436-437 [166 P. 348].)
More recent decisions of this court resting on the premise that “judicial functions” cannot constitutionally be given to a state-wide agency have at most given a broad scope to judicial review of agency action. (Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 6 Cal.2d 557 [59 P.2d 119]; Whitten v. California State Board of Optometry, 8 Cal.2d 444 [65 P.2d 1296, 115 A.L.R. 1]; Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal.2d 75 [87 P.2d 848]; Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com., 17 Cal.2d 321 [109 P.2d 935]; Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831 [123 P.2d 457]; Dare v. Board of Medical Examiners, 21 Cal. 2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Sipper v. Urban, 22 Cal.2d 138 [137 P.2d 425]; Moran v. Board of Medical Examiners, 32 Cal.2d 301 [196 P.2d 20].) They have not gone so far as to deny any administrative agency the power in the first instance to pass upon questions of law or fact. Certainly, fixing the location of a disputed landmark or determining whether a boundary line has been mutually recognized for a sufficient time legally to establish it is no more an exclusive function of courts than determining the extent of the penalty for violation of the Insurance Code (Nardoni v. McConnell, 48 Cal. 2d 500, 507 [310 P.2d 644]) or determining whether there is unappropriated water available for an applicant (Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works, 44 Cal.2d 90, 106 [280 P.2d 1]), to cite but two recent instances in which this court has upheld the exercise of quasi-judicial power by a state-wide administrative agency. (See also dissenting opinion in Laisne v. California State Board of Optometry, 19 Cal.2d 831, 859-862 [123 P.2d 457] and cases cited.) Clearly *805the reasons given for the decision in the Sierra case were aberrational, and they should not be given fresh currency now merely because this is another boundary dispute case.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 2, 1958. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.