Court Opinion

ID: 9382454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 18:08:03.516551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.475428
License: Public Domain

J-S36006-22

                                   2023 PA SUPER 50

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    COREY LEE MCLENDON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 298 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 24, 2021
                   In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
                Criminal Division at No: CP-25-CR-0002584-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:                                      MARCH 27, 2023

        Appellant, Corey Lee McLendon, appeals from the November 24, 2021

judgment of sentence imposing 75 to 150 months of incarceration for

aggravated assault.1 We affirm.

        The trial court recited the pertinent facts and procedural history in its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

                [Appellant] was originally charged with one count each of:
        strangulation, aggravated assault, simple assault, false
        imprisonment, harassment, terroristic threats (F3), and unlawful
        restraint; three counts of terroristic threats (M1); and two counts
        of possessing instruments of crime. The charges arose out of an
        incident wherein [Appellant] assaulted and terrorized his then-
        girlfriend over the course of two days by striking her in the face
        and body with his fist, throwing items at her with such force that
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702.
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      they broke upon hitting her, strangling her, holding a pair of
      scissors to her neck and slicing it superficially while threatening to
      kill her, beating her in the skull with a broomstick handle, and
      threatening to shoot up her father’s residence where her two
      minor children lived.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/22, at 1.

      The record reveals a contentious relationship between Appellant and his

appointed counsel throughout this case. That relationship pervades the issues

on appeal. At the originally scheduled preliminary hearing on September 17,

2020, Appellant refused to proceed because he did not wish to be represented

by a public defender. The trial court continued the preliminary hearing for two

months to give Appellant time to retain private counsel. As of the November

20, 2020 rescheduled preliminary hearing, Appellant had yet to retain private

counsel. Instead, he objected to the rescheduled hearing because he had yet

to sign a contract with his public defender, Michael A. DeJohn.                N.T.

Preliminary Hearing, 11/20/20, at 5-6.         Appellant also claimed he had

inadequate time to explain his defense to DeJohn. Id. DeJohn stated that his

investigator talked to Appellant and asked him to sign an application to be

represented by the public defender’s office, but Appellant refused to sign it.

Id. at 8. The trial court read a printed waiver of counsel form into the record,

but Appellant refused to sign it, saying it was against his constitutional right.

Id. at 10. The trial court declined to delay the preliminary hearing any further,

and directed that Appellant proceed pro se at the preliminary hearing. Id. at

6, 8-10.

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       On August 6, 2021, Appellant pled guilty to aggravated assault in

exchange for dismissal of all other charges. On October 11, 2021—the day of

his scheduled sentencing hearing—Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw

his plea. Appellant was represented by DeJohn at that time and did not ask

DeJohn to file the motion on his behalf. As a result, the trial court delayed

the scheduled sentencing and scheduled a hearing to address whether

Appellant wished to withdraw and whether he wished to proceed with DeJohn.

Two days later, on October 13, 2021, DeJohn petitioned to withdraw.

       At an October 26, 2021 hearing, the trial court permitted counsel to

withdraw and permitted Appellant to argue his plea withdrawal petition pro

se. The trial court did not conduct a waiver of counsel colloquy pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.2       Sentencing was scheduled for November 24, 2021. On

November 23, 2021, the day before the scheduled sentencing, the trial court

conducted a telephone hearing on Appellant’s claim that he recently tested

positive for Covid. Appellant’s testimony about the timing and documentation

of his alleged positive rapid test (or tests) varied, and he was unable to

forward electronic verification to the court. The trial court determined the

next day’s sentencing hearing would proceed as scheduled unless Appellant

appeared with documentation of his positive Covid test. Appellant appeared

for the November 24, 2021 sentencing without any such documentation and

____________________________________________

2 Rule 121(A)(2) states mandatory areas of inquiry before a trial court may
permit a criminal defendant to proceed without counsel.

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admitted on the record that he had tested negative for Covid. The trial court

imposed sentence as set forth above. Appellant filed post-sentence motions

and this timely appeal with the assistance of private counsel.

       Appellant presents three questions:

              1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s pre-
                 sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the
                 record establishes that the plea was never voluntary and
                 there would have been no prejudice to the
                 Commonwealth had the court granted the motion?

              2. Whether the trial court erred in finding either forfeiture
                 or waiver of the right to counsel and requiring Appellant
                 to proceed pro se where Appellant showed that he and
                 his court-appointed attorney suffered from irreconcilable
                 differences, Appellant could not afford private counsel,
                 Appellant did nothing to significantly delay the
                 proceedings, and the trial court failed to conduct the
                 required colloquy before requiring Appellant to proceed
                 pro se?

              3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred in
                 considering improper factors and sentencing Appellant to
                 an excessive, unreasonable sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at 8.3 We consider these issues in turn.

       The law governing pre-sentence plea withdrawals is well-settled. Rule

591 permits withdrawal of a plea as follows: “At any time before the imposition

of sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the

defendant, […] the withdrawal of a plea of guilty […] and the substitution of a

____________________________________________

3  We note with extreme disapproval that the Commonwealth failed to file a
brief in this case, even after requesting and receiving an extension of time
within which to do so.

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plea of not guilty.”     Pa. R. Crim. P. 591(A).4   Thus, the standard for pre-

sentence plea withdrawal is a very liberal one, governed by the following

considerations:

              (1) there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; (2)
       trial courts have discretion in determining whether a withdrawal
       request will be granted; (3) such discretion is to be administered
       liberally in favor of the accused; and (4) any demonstration by a
       defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a grant,
       unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the
       Commonwealth.

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 280 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2022). “The

trial courts in exercising their discretion must recognize that before judgment,

the courts should show solicitude for a defendant who wishes to undo a waiver

of all constitutional rights that surround the right to trial—perhaps the most

devastating waiver possible under our constitution.” Commonwealth v. Elia,

83 A.3d 254, 262 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted),

appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014). We will not reverse a trial court’s

decision absent abuse of discretion. Id. at 261.

       Appellant relies on Elia, wherein the defendant attempted to withdraw

his plea of guilty to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and statutory sexual

assault. As in the instant case, the defendant’s withdrawal motion was pro

se. Id. at 258. He also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and requested

____________________________________________

4  Rule 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure governs guilty
pleas and plea agreements, and the official comment thereto lists seven
inquiries for the trial court to make at a plea colloquy. Pa.R.Crim.P. 590

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new counsel. Id. The trial court permitted the defendant to withdraw the

plea, but substitute counsel eventually sought to withdraw the withdrawal and

have the plea agreement reinstated. Id. at 261. On appeal, the defendant

claimed the trial court erred in permitting withdrawal based on an assertion

of innocence when the defendant did not actually assert his innocence. Id. at

263. This Court agreed that it was unclear that the defendant asserted his

innocence, but his assertions that counsel bullied him, and that he wanted to

test the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence, were fair and just

reasons to permit withdrawal of the plea. Thus, the Elia Court concluded that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting plea withdrawal or in

denying substitute counsel’s request to reinstate the original plea agreement.

      Here, Appellant claims he should have been permitted to withdraw his

plea because he had a poor relationship with counsel and entered the plea

under duress. Given these apparent similarities between this case and Elia,

Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his petition to

withdraw his plea. We disagree.

      While the instant record reflects a strained relationship between

Appellant and his counsel, there is no indication in the record that Appellant

believed the Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient or that he wished to

test the Commonwealth’s evidence. The record establishes the contrary.

      At the outset of the plea hearing, Appellant agreed that he was pleading

guilty to aggravated assault in exchange for the Commonwealth’s agreement

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to nolle pros the remaining charges against him. N.T. Guilty Plea, 8/6/21, at

7. After the prosecutor recited the facts supporting the plea, Appellant signed

a document indicating his guilty plea.     Id. at 8-9.   Appellant indicated his

understanding of plea agreement and the elements of his offense, and he

agreed that he was guilty. Id. at 9-10.

      At that point, the following exchange occurred:

            THE COURT: Anyone forcing you to do this or promise you
      anything or threaten you anything [sic]?

            THE DEFENDANT: No, but I am signing under duress. First
      I have to – that I have reasons of my own the reason I want to
      speak on the record today.

             THE COURT: Okay, well, this is a plea, I mean I don’t know
      if you – you have to admit one way or the other whether you’re
      guilty or not.

           THE DEFENDANT: I mean I – well, yea, I’m admitting,
      I’m admitting guilt.

            THE COURT: All right.

            THE DEFENDANT: I am saying that I am guilty. But as
      you can see the documents, I have signed it under duress. There’s
      discrepancies in this case that have not been followed and there’s
      been protocol that the DA’s office, as well as Mr. DeJohn [defense
      counsel], has totally missed.

                                     […]

            THE COURT: I just want to make sure you’re –

            THE DEFENDANT: I’m fully aware.

            THE COURT: Is it still your intention to –

            THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

            THE COURT: -- plead guilty?

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            THE DEFENDANT: Yes. My only intentions [sic] was to
      get a plea deal period. It’s just the process that the DA’s office
      and Mr. DeJohn has going that – again, this is the reason why I
      want to speak on open record. So it is on also [sic] record because
      nobody seems to want to get back to me on the things that have
      gone on in this case or hear the things that I have to say, so this
      is my time to speak on the record so I can get those things out
      there.

            THE COURT: All right, now, what’s going to happen is
      there’s going to be a sentencing on October 11th at 9:00 a.m. I’m
      not going to sentence you today.

            THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

            THE COURT: That will be in front of Judge Ridge and you
      can say anything you need to on your own behalf –

            THE DEFENDANT: Okay.

            THE COURT: -- at that time.

            THE DEFENDANT: Cool.

Id. at 10-12.

      Thus, Appellant was consistently clear about his guilt and his wish to

plead guilty. He nonetheless wished to go on the record venting his frustration

with defense counsel and the prosecutor.        The trial court concluded by

informing Appellant that he would have an opportunity to speak on his own

behalf at sentencing, and Appellant indicated his satisfaction with that

arrangement. There is no indication that Appellant’s apparent dissatisfaction

at the communication between himself and defense counsel affected

Appellant’s decision to enter a guilty plea. Furthermore, as we will discuss

regarding Appellant’s second assertion of error, Appellant’s disagreements

with counsel and dilatory behavior persisted throughout the trial court

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proceeding. His vague assertions of dissatisfaction with counsel at his guilty

plea colloquy, detailed above, are just one example. We discern no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

        In his second assertion of error, Appellant claims the trial court erred in

permitting him to proceed pro se after the withdrawal of counsel because the

trial court failed to conduct a waiver of counsel colloquy. In the alternative,

Appellant argues the trial court erred in determining that Appellant’s

obstructive and dilatory conduct resulted in the forfeiture of his right to

counsel. Because the trial court never conducted a waiver-of-counsel colloquy

in this case, and because the trial court found instead that Appellant forfeited

his right to counsel (Trial Court Opinion, 4/19/22, at 6), we confine our

analysis to forfeiture.

        The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

§ 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right

to assistance of counsel. “However, the constitutional right to counsel of one’s

own choice is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173,

1178 (Pa. 2009). “Rather, the right of an accused individual to choose his or

her own counsel, as well as a lawyer’s right to choose his or her clients, must

be weighed against and may be reasonably restricted by the state's interest

in the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice. Id. “Thus, while

defendants are entitled to choose their own counsel, they should not be

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permitted to unreasonably clog the machinery of justice or hamper and delay

the state’s efforts to effectively administer justice.” Id. at 1179. Forfeiture

of counsel does not require the intentional relinquishment of a right, as in the

case of waiver. Id. Forfeiture is the result of a defendant’s “extremely serious

misconduct” or “extremely dilatory conduct.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 362 (3d Cir. 2004)). Where a defendant forfeits his

right to counsel, Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 and its waiver colloquy requirements do not

apply. Id. The alleged denial of a constitutional right is a question of law for

which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at 1178.

      Our Supreme Court addressed forfeiture of counsel in Lucarelli. There,

after the hiring and withdrawal of two attorneys, the trial court provided the

defendant with an application for a public defender. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d at

1176. The defendant did not file the application and then failed to appear for

jury selection. Id. at 1177. The trial court rescinded its bench warrant after

the defendant appeared and filed a pro se motion for the appointment of

counsel. Id. The trial court did not appoint counsel, instead reducing the

defendant’s bail by $20,000 and directing him to use that money to hire

counsel. Id. Appellant subsequently appeared for trial without an attorney

and proceeded pro se with assistance of stand by counsel.

      The Lucarelli Court concluded that the defendant forfeited his right to

counsel. “[W]here a defendant’s course of conduct demonstrates his or her

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intention not to seek representation by private counsel, despite having the

opportunity and financial wherewithal to do so, a determination that the

defendant be required to proceed pro se is mandated because that defendant

has forfeited the right to counsel.” Id. at 1179. The Supreme Court held that

the defendant engaged in extremely dilatory conduct because he had more

than 8½ months to prepare for trial, had hired several attorneys who withdrew

their representation, and was given access to $20,000 shortly before trial with

which to obtain counsel. Id. at 1180. The trial court therefore did not err in

forcing the defendant to proceed pro se.

      This Court in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 5 A.3d 370 (Pa. Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 32 A.3d 1276 (Pa. 2011), considered forfeiture of counsel in

the case of an indigent defendant. After pleading guilty, the defendant filed a

pro se seeking withdrawal of his plea and challenging plea counsel’s

effectiveness. Id. at 372. The trial court granted the plea withdrawal motion

and ordered appointed counsel to serve as standby counsel. Id. at 373. On

the day of trial, the defendant alleged an irreconcilable breakdown between

himself and standby counsel. He requested appointment of another attorney

to represent him at trial. Id. at 373-74. The trial court continued the trial

and appointed another attorney. Id. at 374. One month later, the newly

appointed attorney filed a petition to withdraw, alleging that the defendant

was uncooperative and had accused counsel of working for the Commonwealth

and repeatedly lying to the defendant. Id. After a hearing, the trial court

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permitted counsel to withdraw and ordered the defendant to proceed pro se.

Id. at 376. The trial court did not conduct a waiver colloquy pursuant to Rule

121. Id. at 378. The defendant eventually pled guilty again. Id. at 376.

      On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that he did not

waive or forfeit his right to counsel. The Kelly Court disagreed, noting that

the defendant failed to cooperate with all three lawyers assigned to him and

repeatedly accused them of ineffective assistance. Id. at 381. The defendant

“wanted a counsel, but only one who would please him”[.]: Id. The Kelly

Court quoted the following with approval:

            We have recognized a right of a defendant to proceed
      without counsel and to refuse the representation of assigned
      counsel…. He may not use this right to play a ‘cat and mouse’
      game with the court … or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek
      to have the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along
      the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily
      depriving the defendant of counsel.

Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Davis v. McCann, 386 F.2d 611, 618-19

(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968)).                 See also,

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 905 A.2d 1003 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that

that the defendant forfeited her counsel after hiring and dismissing several

attorneys and refusing to hire another), appeal denied, 923 A.2d 409 (Pa.

2007); but see Commonwealth v. Fill, 202 A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(holding that the defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel where, after an

initial disagreement with the public defender, the defendant maintained the

same court-appointed counsel throughout the remainder of the case).

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        As explained above, the instant record reflects that the trial court

continued the preliminary hearing for two months after Appellant asked for

time to retain private counsel. In the interim, Appellant did not retain private

counsel and refused to sign an application to be represented by the public

defender’s office. At the rescheduled preliminary hearing, Appellant declined

to be represented by the public defendant and declined to sign the waiver of

counsel for the trial court read into the record. The trial court declined to

delay the preliminary hearing any further, and directed that Appellant proceed

pro se at the preliminary hearing. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 11/20/20, at 6,

8-10.

        After his August 6, 2021 counseled guilty plea, Appellant, on October

11, 2021—on the morning of his scheduled sentencing—filed a pro se motion

to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming, among other things, that DeJohn

“ushered” him into a guilty plea without sufficient investigation of the case.

Shortly thereafter, on October 13, 2021, DeJohn filed a petition to withdraw

as counsel, citing the deterioration of his relationship with Appellant and

Appellant’s repeated attempts to undermine the judicial process.

        The trial court conducted a hearing on these matters at the beginning

of the previously scheduled October 11, 2021 sentencing hearing. The trial

court first explained to Appellant that he had not read Appellant’s pro se plea

withdrawal request because Appellant was still represented by counsel. N.T.

Hearing, 10/11/21, at 4. DeJohn stated that he did not believe withdrawal of

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the guilty plea was warranted and noted that a waiver of counsel colloquy

would be necessary if Appellant wished to proceed without him.      Id. at 5.

Appellant objected to the sentencing proceeding, claiming alternately that he

was unrepresented or that DeJohn was ineffective. Id. at 7-9, 15-17. The

prosecutor noted that she was unaware of Appellant’s pro se plea withdrawal

request until the beginning of the scheduled sentencing hearing. Id. at 6.

She also noted that the victim was present and that a delay would be a burden

to her. Id. Finally, the prosecutor noted that Appellant had used the same

tactic—demanding different counsel—to delay his preliminary hearing by two

months. Id. at 11. The trial court elected to schedule another hearing to

address Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his plea, and to

determine whether Appellant would proceed pro se or with private counsel.

Id. at 18. Appellant was informed that if he intended to proceed with private

counsel, he would need to have private counsel present at the next hearing.

Id. at 19.

      On October 26, 2021, more than two weeks after the originally

scheduled sentencing hearing, the parties proceeded to a hearing on

Appellant’s petition to withdraw his guilty plea and DeJohn’s motion to

withdraw as counsel. Appellant claimed, alternatively, that DeJohn was never

his counsel, that DeJohn was ineffective, and that his pro se filings were

necessary because DeJohn failed to respond to Appellant’s calls to the public

defender’s office. N.T. Hearing, 10/26/21, at 2, 4-6, 12. He also accused

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DeJohn and the prosecutor of impersonating government officials. Id. at 6.

The trial court found Appellant’s arguments frivolous and permitted DeJohn to

withdraw. Id. at 7. The court then permitted Appellant to argue his motion

to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting any further colloquy. Id. at 7.

      The next proceeding was a pre-sentence telephone hearing regarding

Appellant’s medical condition. Appellant claimed he was exposed to Covid and

that two of his three rapid tests came back positive. N.T. Hearing, 11/23/21,

at 2-3.   Appellant claimed he had documentation from an urgent care

documenting his positive results. Id. at 4. The court offered several means

by which Appellant could document his illness for the court, but Appellant

failed to do so. Id. at 12, 16-18.

      At the sentencing hearing the following day, Appellant admitted he

never tested positive for Covid. N.T., 11/24/21, at 10. Appellant claimed he

did not understand how he was pro se, and the trial court reminded him of his

counsel’s withdrawal.    Id. at 5.   In his statement to the court, Appellant

claimed he did not understand why he was there and challenged the court’s

jurisdiction on grounds that there was never an arrest warrant. Id. at 14.

Nonetheless, Appellant maintained that he wanted to take accountability for

his actions, but also claimed that the victim was at least partially at fault (“I

know what I’ve done wrong, just like the victim knows what she’s done

wrong.”). Id. at 15.

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      In summary, Appellant never cooperated with DeJohn from before the

preliminary hearing up through counsel’s eventual withdrawal.        Appellant’s

conduct delayed the preliminary hearing by two months. Then, after his guilty

plea and on the morning of his scheduled sentencing, Appellant filed a pro se

plea withdrawal motion. That motion delayed the sentencing proceeding and

precipitated DeJohn’s petition to withdraw as counsel. Appellant expressed

his desire to retain private counsel and did not do so, despite the trial court’s

warning that it would not delay the proceedings any further if Appellant arrived

without counsel. Finally, Appellant, now acting pro se, tried to further delay

his sentencing with a false claim that he tested positive for Covid. Appellant

throughout these proceedings, commencing with his preliminary hearing and

continuing through sentencing, played his request to have counsel and then

not to have DeJohn as counsel to delay and obstruct these proceedings. Under

these circumstances, we discern no error in the trial court’s finding of

forfeiture of counsel.

      Here, as in Lucarelli, Appellant’s refusal to cooperate with counsel and

the trial court persisted throughout the trial court proceeding.      And while

Appellant had only one lawyer in this case, whereas the defendants in

Lucarelli and Kelly had several, the end result was the same—unnecessarily

drawn out proceedings brought about by a defendant’s refusal to cooperate

with counsel. Appellant’s dilatory conduct spanned eleven months in this case,

whereas the Lucarelli Court found forfeiture based on the defendant’s 8½

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month course of conduct. We therefore conclude that the dismissal and/or

withdrawal of multiple attorneys, while common in forfeiture of counsel cases,

is not a necessary precursor to concluding that a defendant has forfeited the

right to counsel.     Our focus is upon a defendant’s conduct and not on the

number of counsel that may lead to a forfeiture decision. The duration and

persistence of the defendant’s dilatory conduct, and the delays occasioned

thereby, can lead to forfeiture of counsel even though only one attorney was

involved in the case. Here, as in Kelly, Appellant engaged in a “cat and mouse

game” throughout the trial court proceeding and now claims that the trial

court, to bring the case to a conclusion, arbitrarily deprived Appellant of the

right to counsel. Kelly, 5 A.3d at 381 (quoting McCann).5

       In addition, we are mindful of the Commonwealth’s assertion that

Appellant was playing games not only with the trial court, but with the victim.

At the November 23, 2021 telephone hearing, at which Appellant was

attempting to prolong his sentencing hearing with his false claim of a positive

Covid test, the prosecutor explained that the case had become “borderline

unbearable for the victim[,]” who was prepared to appear at sentencing the

____________________________________________

5 We are cognizant that the Lucarelli Court cabined its analysis to cases in
which the defendant had the means to procure private counsel. Kelly,
however, expanded the forfeiture of counsel analysis to include indigent
defendants. The instant record demonstrates that Appellant was eligible for
a public defender, inasmuch as the trial court appointed DeJohn to represent
him. Nonetheless, Appellant retained private counsel to file post-sentence
motions and to represent him on appeal. Appellant’s financial status is not
pertinent to our disposition of this appeal.

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following day and put the matter at an end. N.T Hearing, 11/23/21, at 11-

12. This after the victim was present for the previously scheduled sentencing

hearing which was delayed by Appellant’s plea withdrawal petition on the

morning of.

      In support his argument that he did not forfeit his right to counsel,

Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Neal, 563 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Super.

1989), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 564 (Pa. 1990), in which the defendant

asked for dismissal of counsel and appointment of new counsel after jury

selection. Id. at 1239. The defendant claimed he lacked confidence in his

first appointed attorney to represent his best interests. Id. The trial court

noted that the defendant’s allegations indicated a long-standing problem, yet

the defendant did not raise them until the commencement of trial. Id. The

trial court dismissed the defendant’s counsel but refused the defendant’s

request to appoint another attorney, which would have delayed the trial. Id.

Instead, the defendant was forced to proceed pro se with the assistance of

appointed standby counsel to answer the defendant’s procedural questions.

Id. at 1240-41. The Neal Court opined that the trial court would not have

abused its discretion in refusing the defendant’s request to dismiss the public

defender. Id. at 1242. But forcing the defendant to proceed pro se without

a proper waiver of counsel colloquy was error, as the defendant clearly stated

he did not wish to proceed pro se. Id. at 1243.

           Appellant may not frustrate or obstruct the orderly
      procedure of the court and the administration of justice by

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      continual insistence o[n] representation by private counsel, even
      though unable to afford such representation, or the continual
      refusal of the services of the public defender. However, as in the
      instant case, the intransigent behavior by the appellant does not
      negate the requirement for a full and complete colloquy in order
      that appellant may make a competent and intelligent waiver of his
      right to counsel.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Grant, 323 A.2d 354, 358-59 (Pa. Super.

1974) (citations omitted).

      Appellant claims Neal is directly on point because, regardless of his

intransigent behavior in this case, the trial court failed to conduct a proper

waiver colloquy.    Appellant’s reliance on Neal is misplaced, in our view,

however, because it is a waiver of counsel rather than a forfeiture case.

Furthermore, the facts of Neal are distinct, as there is no indication in the

Neal opinion that the defendant’s repeated lack of cooperation with counsel

resulted   in   repeated   delays   throughout   an   unnecessarily    prolonged

proceeding. Rather, the defendant in Neal decided on the eve of trial that he

lack confidence in his attorney.

      Based on all the foregoing, we discern no error in the trial court’s finding

that Appellant forfeited his right to counsel.

      In his final argument, Appellant challenges the trial court’s sentencing

discretion. He argues the trial court relied on improper factors in imposing an

excessive sentence. We disagree.

      In order to preserve a challenge to the trial court's sentencing discretion,

an appellant must raise it in a post-sentence motion or during the sentencing

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proceeding. The appellant must also file a timely notice of appeal and the

appellate brief must include a concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).      The Rule 2119(f)

statement must explain why the argument presents a substantial question to

the trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion.   If the appellant fails to

comply with any of the foregoing, we will not address the issue on its merits.

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010).                    “A

substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the

fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.            Id.      Here,

Appellant claims the sentence was disproportionate to his conduct and that

the trial court failed to articulate reasons to support it. Appellant’s Brief at

17-18.   Appellant also argues the trial court relied on improper factors.

Appellant’s Brief at 18.    These assertions raise a substantial question.

Commonwealth v. Parlante, 823 A.2d 927, 929-30 (Pa. Super. 2003);

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. super. 2009).

      Turning to the merits, we review for abuse of discretion.

            An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
      judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
      discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
      was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
      bias or ill-will. In more expansive terms, our Court recently
      offered: An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because
      an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but
      requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

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      prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
      erroneous.

             The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
      concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review is that the
      sentencing court is in the best position to determine the proper
      penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
      individual circumstances before it.

Moury, 992 A.2d at 169–70 (quoting Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d

957, 961 (Pa. 2007)).

      The trial court explained its sentence as follows:

             A review of the sentencing proceeding indicates that this
      court took all appropriate factors into consideration prior to
      determining and pronouncing sentence.           The defendant’s
      background and rehabilitative potential were reviewed as was the
      impact of the crime upon the victim, as well as the protection of
      the community. With a prior record score of “1” and an offense
      gravity score of “11”, the standard range minimum periods of
      incarceration were 51 months in the lower end, and 69 months in
      the upper end of the standard range. An aggravated range
      sentence had a minimum period of 81 months of incarceration.
      Deadly Weapon Enhancement was applied and a written notice of
      DWE was provided in the defendant’s statement of understanding
      of rights, which was executed by the parties on August 16, 2021,
      before Judge Mead.

             Therefore, the sentence of 75 months to 150 months was
      neither excessive nor unreasonable. This was a very serious,
      violent crime and the specific sentence was appropriate and took
      all factors into consideration.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/23/22, at 2.

      Appellant argues that, in relying on Appellant’s lack of remorse, the trial

court effectively used Appellant’s silence against him. He cites Bowen for the

proposition that the sentencing court may consider lack of remorse but may

not hold the defendant’s silence against him.        Bowen, 975 A.2d at 1122.

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Appellant’s reliance on Bowen is misplaced. The trial court did not discern

Appellant’s lack of remorse from his silence, but from his statements. At the

sentencing hearing, Appellant said, “I know what I’ve done wrong, just like

the victim knows what she’s done wrong.” N.T. Sentencing, 11.24.21, at 15.

Thus, Appellant admitted wrongdoing but in the same breath placed blame on

the victim. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant

lacked remorse.

      Next, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732

(Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 14 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2010), wherein this

Court vacated the judgment of sentence because the trial court obtained police

reports never admitted into evidence and relied on their contents in fashioning

a sentence. Instantly, Appellant complains that the sentencing court received

a previously undisclosed letter from the victim’s friend. Appellant’s Brief at

41. Appellant does not note whether he objected to the letter at sentencing,

nor does he discuss the substance of the letter, or any evidence that the letter

influenced the sentence imposed. Appellant has failed to articulate any basis

on which he is entitled to relief on this basis.

      For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s

exercise of sentencing discretion fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2023

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