Court Opinion

ID: 9852735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:35:44.659402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:33.622509
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent' and would remand the case for a new trial because the lower court erroneously refused to *139allow counsel for the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff relative to his prior inconsistent pleadings. In my view, the same was both erroneous and prejudicial.
The majority opinion holds that “. . . the trial judge should have permitted the cross examination on the pleadings.” It proceeds, however, to rule that the refusal to allow the cross-examination “is not reversible error,” and concludes the discretion of that issue by ruling, “. . . any impeachment would have been of no value and constitutes harmless error.”
My disagreement is with the conclusion that cross-examination would not have affected the result of the trial.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion concedes the error, I need not belabor the point, except to add that this issue was dealt with by our Court in the case of Young v. Martin, 254 S. C. 50, 173 S. E. (2d) 361 (1970), wherein we cited, with approval, 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 303, to the effect that prior pleadings, verified or unverified, prepared by a litigant’s attorney, with or without the knowledge of the party, are a proper subject of cross-examination.
The majority opinion goes far toward removing the confusion at the bench and bar relative to the handling of cases wherein a tort feasor has been eliminated from a case by reason of a covenant not to sue. Powers v. Temple, 250 S. C. 149, 156 S. E. (2d) 759 (1967), does not stand for the proposition that evidence relative to a covenant not to sue is always inadmissible. In Powers, it was held that evidence relative to the covenant not to sue and the amount paid was proper. In McCombs v. Stephens, 252 S. C. 442, 166 S. E. (2d) 814 (1969), it was held that reference to the covenant not to sue was improper. The method suggested in Powers as being preferable should never be used if there is good reason to handle the covenant otherwise in order to protect the rights of the parties. I interpret Powers to merely mean that the covenant should not be aired before the jury unless there *140is good reason to do so. In the trial of this case, it was not necessary to mention the amount of the covenant in order to assure the defendant a fair trial. It was necessary to permit counsel for the defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff relative to his inconsistent representations to the court, as set out in previous pleadings. Plaintiff and witness, Robert W. Lucht, whom counsel sought to cross-examine, was the administrator of the estate and one of the two beneficiaries of the litigation.
His original complaint was brought against the Young-bloods alone, and in that complaint he alleged that the driver of the Youngblood Mustang drove across the yellow line and had a head-on collision with the Volkswagen in which plaintiff’s intestate was a passenger.
Later, in a first amended complaint, he joined the driver of the Volkswagen and represented to the court, through his pleading, that the Volkswagen in which the intestate was riding was also across the center line. On the basis of these representations a.nd these pleadings, the Patricks, who owned and operated the Volkswagen, paid $7,500 for a covenant not to sue.
Still later, in a second amended complaint, he eliminated the Patricks as defendants and alleged that only Youngblood, driving the Mustang, was across the center line, and took the position that the Volkswagen was on its proper side of the street.
The cross-examination was particularly important to the defendant, because the evidence indicating negligence on the part of Youngblood was largely circumstantial and because the two surviving passengers in the Volkswagen did not testify. It was the contention of Youngblood and his passenger that he swerved across the center line in an effort to avoid a collision with the Volkswagen, which was crossing the center line. The only real issue in the case was: Was the Volkswagen on the wrong side of the street? That plain*141tiff suffered damages was not in dispute, nor was it in dispute that the collision proximately caused the damages.
Therefore, the defendant was denied the right of cross-examination on the only vital issue. If the jury had been told that the plaintiff had previously represented to the court in a prior pleading that the Volkswagen was across the center line, the result might have been different. Unfortunately, whether or not the result would have been different cannot be proved or disproved to a mathematical certainty. I am convinced that the result might likely have been different if the cross-examination had been permitted.
In treating the prejudice issue in plaintiff’s brief, it is contended, first, that the judge had a discretion to exercise, secondly, that the first amended complaint was not verified and, thirdly, that Powers, supra, controlled. The argument is without merit because, first, this is not a discretionary matter; under the facts, the defendant had the right to cross-examine. Secondly, the fact that the pleading was not verified is inconsequential and, thirdly, Powers does not apply, as shown hereinabove.
Being convinced that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, I would reverse and remand.