Court Opinion

ID: 9946161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 16:01:59.581943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.445151
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2031    Document: 37    Page: 1   Filed: 02/29/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                    HOLLY BERRY,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-2031
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:21-cv-01017-KCD, Judge Kathryn C. Davis.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 29, 2024
                 ______________________

    DONALD A. LEPP, Drummond Law PLLC, Tulsa, OK,
 argued for plaintiff-appellant.

     THEKLA HANSEN-YOUNG, Appellate Section, Environ-
 ment and Natural Resources Division, United States De-
 partment of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for
 defendant-appellee. Also represented by TODD KIM.
                 ______________________

  Before CHEN, STOLL, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-2031     Document: 37     Page: 2    Filed: 02/29/2024

 2                                                 BERRY v. US

 CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
     Ms. Holly Berry appeals from the decision of the United
 States Court of Federal Claims dismissing her amended
 complaint for failing to state a viable Fifth Amendment
 takings claim. Berry v. United States, 159 Fed. Cl. 844
 (2022) (“Decision”). For the reasons below, we affirm.
                      I.   BACKGROUND
     Ms. Berry owns land in Oklahoma. J.A. 31 ¶ 7; J.A. 38;
 Decision at 846. In July 2014, the Cherokee Nation sub-
 mitted an application requesting the United States Depart-
 ment of the Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs acquire in
 trust land (“the Cherokee Springs Site”) for gaming and
 other purposes, which was located adjacent to Ms. Berry’s
 land. See J.A. 42–43; Decision at 846.
     In January 2017, the Department of the Interior issued
 a letter approving the Nation’s application to acquire in
 trust the Cherokee Springs Site for the benefit of the Na-
 tion pursuant to Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization
 Act. See J.A. 42–44, 57; Decision at 846; 25 U.S.C. § 5108.
 The letter identified an environmental assessment, see J.A.
 53–57, which concluded that the Nation’s proposed “[c]on-
 struction of the casino/hotel would create a greater area of
 impervious surfaces than currently exists on the project
 site, potentially increasing surface flow rates.” J.A. 54; see
 Decision at 846. But the assessment also stated that “im-
 plementation of mitigation measures” and “Best Manage-
 ment Practices” would mitigate potential environmental
 impacts. See J.A. 54; Decision at 846.
     In March 2021, Ms. Berry filed suit against the United
 States, alleging that the federal government, as trustee of
 the Cherokee Springs Site, took a flowage easement and
 detention pond on Ms. Berry’s property. J.A. 18 ¶ 1, 19 ¶ 8
 & n.2, 22 ¶¶ 22–24; Decision at 846–47. The United States
 moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim
 and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Decision at 847.
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 BERRY v. US                                                 3

 Ms. Berry then amended her complaint. 1 J.A. 30–37; Deci-
 sion at 847. In the amended complaint, Ms. Berry alleges
 her land “experienced severe flooding, erosion, and im-
 poundment of water” “due to the failure of [the United
 States] to ensure properly designed water runoff” from the
 Nation’s property held in trust. J.A. 35 ¶ 20; see Decision
 at 846. Ms. Berry further alleges that “[s]ince the [Nation]
 commenced construction in 2016, diverted water has sub-
 stantially interfered” with her use of her land. J.A. 35 ¶ 20.
 Ms. Berry contends that the Nation entered her land, re-
 moved vegetation, and dug a drainage ditch without her
 permission, “creating a drainage easement for the commer-
 cial improvements” that are now at the Nation’s gaming
 facility on the Cherokee Springs Site. J.A. 35 ¶ 21; see De-
 cision at 846. In sum, Ms. Berry contends that “increased
 flooding, caused by [the United States’] actions and inac-
 tions, constitutes a taking” upon her property. J.A. 35 ¶ 22;
 see Decision at 846. The United States moved to dismiss
 the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Deci-
 sion at 847.
     In May 2022, the Court of Federal Claims granted the
 United States’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
 Id. at 846, 851. The Court of Federal Claims found that
 Ms. Berry’s takings claim failed because she did not allege
 direct governmental action effecting a taking. See id. at
 846–49, 851.
    Ms. Berry appealed.        We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo dismissal of a complaint by the
 Court of Federal Claims for failure to state a claim. Taylor

     1  The United States’ motion to dismiss the original
 complaint became moot after Ms. Berry filed her amended
 complaint. Decision at 847 n.1.
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 4                                                  BERRY v. US

 v. United States, 959 F.3d 1081, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (ci-
 tation omitted). “The complaint must allege facts plausibly
 suggesting (not merely consistent with) a showing of enti-
 tlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
 (quoting Palmyra Pac. Seafoods, L.L.C. v. United States,
 561 F.3d 1361, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). “[A]t this stage
 of the proceedings we must accept the facts alleged in the
 complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
 the plaintiff[.]” Palmyra, 561 F.3d at 1366 (citation omit-
 ted).
                        III. DISCUSSION
     On appeal, Ms. Berry argues that the Court of Federal
 Claims erred in dismissing her takings claim because the
 government took the Cherokee Springs Site into trust, al-
 lowing the construction of a gaming facility, which ulti-
 mately led to the flooding of Ms. Berry’s property. See
 Appellant’s Br. 5–6. Ms. Berry contends that such alleged
 acts constitute a viable takings claim that was wrongly dis-
 missed at the pleading stage. See id. We find Ms. Berry’s
 arguments unpersuasive.
                              A.
     Ms. Berry argues that she has pled a viable takings
 claim because the government’s affirmative acts of taking
 the Cherokee Springs Site into trust and allowing the Na-
 tion’s construction on the site resulted in the flooding of her
 property. See Appellant’s Br. 5–6, 8–15. We disagree.
     A taking may occur where the government “floods
 lands belonging to an individual as to substantially destroy
 their value[.]” Nw. La. Fish & Game Pres. Comm’n v.
 United States, 446 F.3d 1285, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cita-
 tion omitted). “The language of the Fifth Amendment itself
 requires that the United States, not a third party, commit
 the taking action.” Navajo Nation v. United States, 631
 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up) (quoting All.
 of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants v. United States, 37
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 BERRY v. US                                                 5

 F.3d 1478, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also id. (“A takings
 claim must be predicated on actions undertaken by the
 United States . . . .”). “In the flooding context, in particu-
 lar, both Supreme Court precedent and our own precedent
 have uniformly based potential takings claims on affirma-
 tive government acts.” St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United
 States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see also id. at
 1361 & n.4 (“In both physical takings and regulatory tak-
 ings, government liability has uniformly been based on af-
 firmative acts by the government or its agent.”) (collecting
 cases). By contrast, “takings liability does not arise from
 government inaction or failure to act.” Id. at 1361.
     A claim for a “taking of a flowage easement” requires
 proof that the invasion to the property was the “direct, nat-
 ural, or probable result” of the government’s actions. Id. at
 1359–60 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Ridge Line, Inc. v.
 United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It is
 the plaintiff’s burden to establish causation by “show[ing]
 that in the ordinary course of events, absent government
 action, plaintiffs would not have suffered the injury.” St.
 Bernard, 887 F.3d at 1362.
      When drawing all inferences in favor of Ms. Berry and
 accepting all alleged facts in her amended complaint as
 true, Ms. Berry has failed to state a claim for takings lia-
 bility against the United States. In the amended com-
 plaint, Ms. Berry at most alleges that the United States
 took the Cherokee Springs Site into trust. See J.A. 34 ¶ 18;
 Decision at 848. But Ms. Berry exclusively identifies the
 Nation’s affirmative acts as the direct cause of the flooding
 on her property. See J.A. 35 ¶¶ 20–21. For example, and
 as the Court of Federal Claims explained, Ms. Berry alleges
 that the Nation, not the government, began construction in
 2016, and diverted water has substantially interfered with
 her use of her real property since that time. Decision at
 848; J.A. 35 ¶ 20. Because this alleged construction activ-
 ity predates the United States’ January 2017 acquisition,
 see J.A. 42, the flooding to Ms. Berry’s property could not
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 6                                               BERRY v. US

 be a “direct, natural, or probable result” of the United
 States’ actions. See St. Bernard, 887 F.3d at 1359–60 (ci-
 tations omitted). Similarly, Ms. Berry alleges that the Na-
 tion, not the United States, unlawfully entered her
 property to remove vegetation and dig a drainage ditch.
 J.A. 35 ¶ 21; Decision at 848. Accordingly, when examining
 the “character of the government’s action” alleged in the
 amended complaint, we conclude that Ms. Berry failed to
 allege an affirmative action by the United States that was
 a direct cause of the flooding. See Alves v. United States,
 133 F.3d 1454, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)
 (finding no governmental action where the alleged taking
 was by livestock under the tribe’s direct control, despite
 government’s regulatory control over the livestock).
     Ms. Berry argues two cases relied upon by the Court of
 Federal Claims—Alliance of Descendants and Navajo Na-
 tion—support her allegation that the United States’ ap-
 proval of the Nation’s construction plans caused the taking
 on her land. See Appellant’s Br. 11. We disagree.
      Neither Alliance of Descendants nor Navajo Nation
 supports Ms. Berry’s argument because both involved an
 affirmative governmental act that directly caused the al-
 leged taking. In Alliance of Descendants, this court con-
 cluded that the United States’ ratification of a treaty
 satisfied the governmental action requirement of a takings
 claim. See 37 F.3d at 1481–82 (“The claimants’ takings
 claims thus accrued when the [treaty] went into effect.”).
 In Navajo Nation, this court similarly concluded that “the
 Navajo Nation’s takings claim, if any, accrued when the
 United States precluded it from developing land . . . with-
 out Hopi Tribe approval,” not when the Hopi Tribe decided
 “to impose a moratorium on approval of Navajo construc-
 tion projects.” 631 F.3d at 1274 (emphasis added). Unlike
 the governmental acts in Alliance of Descendants and Nav-
 ajo Nation, Ms. Berry did not plausibly allege that the
 United States’ acquisition of the Cherokee Springs Site
 into trust deprived Ms. Berry of “all or most of [her]
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 BERRY v. US                                                  7

 property interest.” Id. (quoting Nw. La. Fish, 446 F.3d at
 1289). Rather, Ms. Berry alleged that it was only upon the
 Nation’s development of the Cherokee Springs Site that the
 flooding occurred and any alleged taking arose of Ms.
 Berry’s property. J.A. 35 ¶¶ 20, 22; see Decision at 848; see
 also All. of Descendants, 37 F.3d at 1482 (holding that an
 action by a third party “is not a specific taking action of the
 United States” and “create[s] no liability for the United
 States”) (citation omitted).
     Ms. Berry also argues that the Court of Federal Claims
 erred by relying on Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S.
 84 (1962). Appellant’s Br. 9, 11. According to Ms. Berry,
 Griggs is inapposite because the court found that the
 county was solely responsible for the taking of an air ease-
 ment over plaintiff’s property. Id. at 11. We disagree that
 Griggs is so distinguishable from the case at hand. In
 Griggs, the Supreme Court held that Allegheny County,
 the owner of the airport, took an air easement over the land
 owner’s property because it was the county that ultimately
 decided where to build the airport. See 369 U.S. at 88–90.
 The fact that the county’s decisions were subject to federal
 regulatory approval did not make the federal government
 liable for the taking. See id. at 89–90. Similarly, the
 United States’ approval of the Nation’s proposed construc-
 tion here does not make the United States liable for the
 alleged taking on Ms. Berry’s property.
     In sum, Ms. Berry has failed to plausibly allege any af-
 firmative governmental action taken by the United States
 that was a direct cause of the flooding underlying Ms.
 Berry’s takings claim. Therefore, Ms. Berry has not stated
 a viable takings claim against the government based on the
 United States’ decision to acquire in trust the Cherokee
 Spring Site and allow the Nation’s construction plans on
 the site.
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 8                                                 BERRY v. US

                             B.
      Ms. Berry next argues there is a viable takings claim
 because the United States is liable for the Nation’s acts re-
 gardless of whether the government was directly involved
 in the design or construction of the casino facilities. Appel-
 lant’s Reply Br. 6–8; see also id. at 2–3; Appellant’s Br. 17–
 18. In particular, Ms. Berry contends the United States
 and the Nation have a quasi-agency relationship with
 “characteristics of both being an agency and coercive rela-
 tionship,” and therefore, the United States should be liable
 for the Nation’s actions. See Appellant’s Reply Br. 6–8. In
 other words, Ms. Berry argues that the Nation acts like an
 agent of the United States by engaging in gaming to fur-
 ther the “federal policy of creating Tribal self-determina-
 tion.” See id. at 2–3. We disagree that the Nation serves
 as a quasi-agent for the government here.
     Third-party takings claims may be brought where a
 “third party is acting as the government’s agent or the gov-
 ernment’s influence over the third-party was coercive ra-
 ther than merely persuasive.” A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v.
 United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (collect-
 ing cases). A third-party takings claim may also arise
 where an “agency relationship results from the manifesta-
 tion of consent by one person to another that the other shall
 act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
 the other to so act.” Navajo Nation, 631 F.3d at 1275 (cita-
 tion omitted).
     Here, Ms. Berry has not alleged any viable third-party
 takings claim because she does not allege that the Nation
 acted as the United States’ agent or was coerced by the
 United States to construct facilities on the Cherokee
 Springs Site. See J.A. 34–36. Nor does Ms. Berry allege
 any agency relationship between the Nation and the
 United States. See id.; Navajo Nation, 631 F.3d at 1275
 (“Here, the record contains nothing even to suggest that
 the Hopi Tribe was acting under the direction or control of
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 BERRY v. US                                                9

 the United States when it imposed a moratorium on Nav-
 ajo development efforts.”) (citation omitted). Ms. Berry
 also concedes that she did not allege that the Nation acted
 as a third party. J.A. 84 (Court of Federal Claims: “Does
 Plaintiff make any allegations that the tribe was coerced or
 is acting as an agen[t] of the United States?” Plaintiff’s
 Attorney: “No, no.”); Oral Arg. at 6:19–45, https://oralargu-
 ments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=22-
 2031_07132023.mp3 (counsel for Ms. Berry admitting that
 the Nation did not act as an agent of the United States
 when the alleged taking of a flowage easement occurred).
     Ms. Berry understandably wants compensation for the
 flooding on her property. However, this court cannot pro-
 vide such relief because the acts Ms. Berry points to in her
 amended complaint cannot sustain a viable takings claim
 against the United States. Although Ms. Berry will be un-
 able to obtain the relief she seeks from the United States,
 our decision does not preclude Ms. Berry from separately
 attempting to seek relief from the Nation.
                      IV. CONCLUSION
      We have considered Ms. Berry’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above, we
 affirm the dismissal by the Court of Federal Claims of Ms.
 Berry’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.