Court Opinion

ID: 9705357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:04:03.716991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.152490
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
-¶ 86. (concurring). I join the majority opinion. I write separately only to respond to the interpretation of Donaldson v. Urban Land Interests. Inc., 211 Wis. 2d 224, 564 N.W.2d 728 (1997), rendered by Justice Crooks' dissent, and to address that dissent's mischaracterization of the majority opinion.
¶ 87. According to the dissent, the majority opinion is "blatant[ly] inconsistent" with Donaldson. Justice Crooks' dissent at 156.1 disagree. Rather, I am convinced that any inconsistency between Donaldson and the majority opinion is the result of that dissent's errant reading of Donaldson.
¶ 88. The dissent asserts that the majority opinion is inconsistent with Donaldson because the opinion concludes that the pollution exclusion clause is unambiguous when "only two years ago [this court concluded] that the very same clause is ambiguous." Justice Crooks' dissent at 155 (emphasis in original). However, that is not what this court said in Donaldson. We said:
The pollution exclusion clause at issue here was intended. . .to have broad application. However, we are not satisfied that this fact brings exhaled carbon dioxide unambiguously within the policy definition of "pollutant." Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 231-32.
The focus of our inquiry was on the substance at issue — carbon dioxide — not on the terms of the policy.
¶ 89. Indeed, the unique substance at issue drove this court's decision in Donaldson. Quite simply, the *150involuntary exhaling of carbon dioxide cannot reasonably be considered the "release" of "pollution." As we said in Donaldson, the pollution exclusion clause of the policy does not encompass "claims that have their genesis in activities as fundamental as human respiration." Donaldson, 211 Wis. 2d at 232.
¶ 90. In assessing coverage for the release of a pollutant, the act of human breathing is in sharp contrast to the peeling of lead paint from residential surfaces. Lead is a substance that has been recognized for centuries as harmful. It is a substance that is heavily restricted by the modern regulatory state. As the majority correctly points out, while lead may have been intentionally added to paint, its release from the painted surface in the form of dust or chips is the release of a pollutant.
¶ 91. Finally, I address the mischaracterization of the majority opinion as an "apparent assault on child victims of lead poisoning." Justice Crooks' dissent at 165. Such an attack obfuscates rather than illuminates the discussion. This case is not about whether one is for or against "child victims." It is about the interpretation of an exclusionary clause in a policy of insurance.
¶ 92. In interpreting the language of this insurance policy it should make no difference if those seeking coverage are children or adults. It should make no difference if the claim involves one child or many children. The interpretation of the language of an insurance policy should not be influenced in such a result-oriented way. Accordingly, I concur.