Court Opinion

ID: 9912459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:06:38.787017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:26.670729
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3045-20

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MARKITA A. NORRIS, a/k/a
MARKITA ANITA NORRIS,
MAKITA A. NORRIS, and
MONROE ZYIRE QURAN NORRIS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

                   Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Sabatino, Marczyk, and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-07-0774.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Andrew Robert Burroughs, Designated
                   Counsel, on the briefs).

                   William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
                   for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Markita Norris appeals from a February 25, 2021 order denying

both her petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") and motion for a new trial.

We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Regina Caulfield in

her well-reasoned ninety-six-page written opinion.

                                       I.

      We incorporate the facts leading to defendant's May 30, 2012 convictions

from our decision on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Norris, No. A-1561-12,

(App. Div. Nov. 30, 2015), 2ertify. denied, 226 N.J. 213 (2016), where we

previously affirmed defendant's conviction but remanded for resentencing , and

State v. Norris, No. A-3008-15, (App. Div. May 15, 2017), where we again

remanded for resentencing. The facts underlying defendant's conviction are

detailed in our previous opinions and need not be repeated in their entirety.

Rather, we recount the facts relevant to defendant's petition and motion.

      The State established at trial that in March 2010, during a fundraiser at

the Black United Fund in Plainfield, the victims were dancing when defendant

"bumped shoulders" with decedent. When the parties saw each other outside,

defendant and her uncle instigated another verbal altercation with the surviving

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victim and decedent. The verbal altercation became physical when defendant's

uncle punched the surviving victim.

        At trial, the State called five eyewitnesses who saw defendant attack the

victims during the fight.     Four of the eyewitnesses' testimony collectively

established that defendant was the only one who fought with and stabbed the

decedent, who collapsed on the sidewalk. The testimony of these witnesses also

established that while defendant's uncle fought with the surviving victim,

defendant stabbed the surviving victim twice in the left arm and once in the

back.    The surviving victim suffered a collapsed lung and other injuries.

Defendant then went back and kicked the decedent in the head before leaving in

her uncle's car.

        The fifth and final eyewitness, Mahalia Frieda Fowler-Stewart, testified

she saw decedent prior to the fight standing by a tree when defendant "just

swung on him, hit him in his stomach." She watched them fight for "a minute

and then he just fell, and the tree came out of the ground." Fowler-Stewart ran

over to decedent and saw that he had a stab wound in his chest. Fowler-Stewart

also saw defendant kick decedent after he fell to the ground. She testified

defendant then went over to the surviving victim and "hit him in the back." The

surviving victim then walked to a wall, called to Fowler-Stewart, and said, "I

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think she stabbed me." Fowler-Stewart testified that she attempted to help the

decedent by holding him in her arms. The decedent spoke to her and said, "why

she stab me? [P]lease don't let me die." Decedent repeatedly said he could not

breathe. Fowler-Stewart testified that the paramedics arrived and put decedent

in an ambulance.

      The surviving victim also testified about the initial bump, the beginning

of the fight, and his fight with defendant's uncle. He testified that at some point

during the fight he began to "feel weak and didn't know why." He saw defendant

dance in the middle of the street before she and her uncle drove away in his car.

      Plainfield Police Officer Candis Grant testified that she responded to the

scene before the victims were taken to the hospital. An individual in the crowd

yelled to her and pointed in the direction of defendant's uncle's car. Officer

Grant attempted to stop the car; however, she failed, and a pursuit ensued.

During the five-minute pursuit, Officer Grant observed a handgun thrown out of

the passenger window of the vehicle.         When the vehicle finally stopped,

defendant and her uncle were arrested. Defendant had $234 in cash on her, and

the police found thirty-four bags of cocaine in the backseat of the patrol car

where defendant had been sitting. At trial, the parties stipulated that the gun

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thrown from the car belonged to defendant's uncle, and he pled guilty to

possessing it. Defendant did not testify.

      On May 30, 2012, the jury found defendant guilty of murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3a(1); attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3;

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d);

possession of a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a

(1); possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1);

possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of school property,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7; and unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d).

      Initially, defendant's convictions were affirmed, but her eighty-year

sentence was remanded for resentencing.         She then appealed her second

sentence, which was also remanded. Defendant was eventually sentenced to

forty years of incarceration and a consecutive fifteen-year term of incarceration,

both subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 with an additional

five-year term to run concurrently for possession of CDS with the intent to

distribute within 1,000 feet of a school.

                                        II.

      In March 2019, defendant filed a petition for PCR and a motion for new

trial. Defendant argued she was entitled to post-conviction relief due to several

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errors committed by her trial attorney constituting ineffective assistance of

counsel, and she was entitled to a new trial due to the fabricated testimony

provided by Fowler-Stewart.

      First, in regard to her PCR, defendant alleged her counsel was ineffective

for allowing the State to present evidence related to her uncle's guilty plea to

possession of a handgun; for failing to make a pretrial motion to sever the

unrelated drug counts into separate trials; for allowing the admission of certain

hearsay statements in violation of the evidentiary rules and her right to

confrontation; and for failing to properly investigate and cross-examine a

witness with respect to their claim that an unknown male was involved in the

altercation. Defendant further contended the cumulative errors established her

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As these arguments were decided on

direct appeal, the court declined to revisit them.

      Regarding the motion for a new trial, the court heard testimony from

November 2019 to February 2020. First, the court heard the testimony of Shohin

Ghaffari, a family friend of defendant. Ghaffari testified defendant was a "friend

of the family" and was his "fiancé's cousin." Ghaffari did not believe defendant

committed the alleged offenses, and he began conducting his own investigation.

Ghaffari spoke to ten people as part of his investigation, but only Fowler-Stewart

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was cooperative. Ghaffari decided to take further action after Fowler-Stewart

"broke out and started crying in tears" when asked about defendant's case.

Ghaffari brought Fowler-Stewart to PCR counsel's office on two occasions. He

denied making any threats or promises to Fowler-Stewart in exchange for

meeting with PCR counsel. Ghaffari explained, to his understanding, Fowler -

Stewart met with PCR counsel freely and voluntarily. Ghaffari had no training

in the practice of law, legal research, law enforcement, security, or

investigations.

       The trial court determined Ghaffari was not a credible witness due to his

inability to recall key information, his refusal to provide names of individuals

from whom he obtained information regarding defendant's innocence, and his

noted recollection of only information he felt was important to the case. The

court also noted Ghaffari's body language and hesitation when answering certain

questions posed by the State. Further, the court found Ghaffari was "often

inconsistent and non-responsive, was often evasive and, at other times

defensive, and insisted he could not recall certain information when

pressed . . . ."   The court ultimately rejected Ghaffari's testimony as being

mostly untrue, particularly as it related to his conversations with Fowler-Stewart

and his contact with certain alleged witnesses during his investigation.

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      Following Ghaffari, Fowler-Stewart testified intermittently before the

PCR court over several months. Fowler-Stewart testified that upon meeting with

Ghaffari, she confessed she fabricated decedent's dying declaration. Fowler-

Stewart explained when she ran over to decedent as he was lying bleeding on

the ground, he had not made the declaration to her. When asked why she

previously lied about the statement, Fowler-Stewart said she felt compelled to

do so due to a detective on the case harassing her and threatening to remove her

from Recovery Court if she did not testify. Fowler-Stewart thought she should

"tell them what they wanted to hear." Fowler-Stewart denied seeing defendant

swing at decedent's stomach, and insisted she did not see anything besides

defendant kick decedent and swing towards the surviving witness.

      The court compared Fowler-Stewart's statements, demeanor, and behavior

when she originally gave statements to police to her testimony at trial where she

recanted her testimony.     When giving statements to police following the

incident, the court found Fowler-Stewart to be clear, consistent, alert,

responsive, focused, and cooperative. The court noted Fowler-Stewart was

polite and respectful to the officers and, without being asked to do so,

demonstrated defendant's motions towards both victims during the fight. In

considering Fowler-Stewart's behavior at trial, after both reading the transcript

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and listening to the same testimony, the court found it easy to understand why

the jury found Fowler-Stewart believable. The court found Fowler-Stewart's

trial testimony completely credible, cooperative, responsive, and consistent in

providing her answers.

      The court found fowle—Stewart's demeanor took a noticeable turn during

the motion for new trial. The court determined Fowler-Stewart's testimony to

be not credible, as Fowler-Stewart gave no basis for her previous statements

being forced on her by police officers.         The court noted her repeated

inconsistencies, that she contradicted herself during the hearing, and displayed

abrupt behavior, indicating a lack of truthfulness.

      The court held the trial testimony recanted by Fowler-Stewart to be

material; however, the court reasoned defendant's recantation "must be placed

in context with the trial evidence" and considered alongside the State's solid

circumstantial case against defendant for both stabbings. The court noted that

had Fowler-Stewart not testified, the court and jury would have been able to

compile the remaining witnesses' testimonies to determine it was defendant who

was in the altercation with decedent and likely the assailant, as no other

testimony   identified   another   person   fighting   during   the   altercation.

Additionally, even without Fowler-Stewart's testimony, if defendant was

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granted a new trial with the other witnesses presenting the same testimony as

they did in 2012, defendant would likely be convicted.          The court opined

defendant's presentation of Fowler-Stewart's recantation as "new evidence" in

her motion for new trial was "completely incredible." According to the court,

the recantation did not cast serious doubt upon the truth of the testimony that

Fowler-Stewart gave at trial.

      On February 25, 2021, the court denied defendant's motion for a new trial

and denied the PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.          This appeal

followed.

                                      III.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following issues for our consideration:

            POINT I

            AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN THAT SHE
            RECEIVED PREJUDICIAL INEFFECTIVE . . .
            ASSSISTANCE OF PCR COUNSEL, THE PCR
            COURT ERRED BY DENYING HER PCR PETITION
            WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING

                        (1) Defendant was prejudiced when
                  trial counsel failed to object to the
                  introduction of evidence that co-defendant
                  Malcolm Hunter entered a guilty plea to
                  unlawful possession of a handgun.

                         (2) Trial counsel was ineffective by
                  failing to move to sever the drug charges.

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                                     10
                        (3) Trial counsel's cumulative errors
                  denied     defendant      effective   legal
                  representation.

                        (4) As there were genuine issues of
                  material facts in dispute, an evidentiary
                  hearing was required.

            POINT II

            AS DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN THAT THE
            INTERESTS OF JUSTICE WARRANT A NEW
            TRIAL, THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT
            DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
            TRIAL.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to deny both the PCR

petition without an evidentiary hearing and the motion for a new trial. We add

the following comments.

                                       A.

      When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that she is entitled to the requested

relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451,

459 (1992). To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the defendant is obligated to show not only the particular way counsel's

performance was deficient, but also that the deficiency prejudiced h er right to a

fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz,

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                                       11
105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). We review a judge's decision to deny a PCR petition

without an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion. Preciose, 129 N.J. at

462.

       Collectively, Rules 3:22-4(a) and 3:22-5 provide procedural bars such that

"a defendant may not employ PCR to assert a new claim that could have been

raised on direct appeal, . . . or to relitigate a claim already decided on the merits."

State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002) (citing respectively R. 3:22-4 and -

5). Under Rule 3:22-5, "[p]reclusion of consideration of an argument presented

in PCR proceedings should be effected only if the issue raised is identical or

substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 150 (1997) (quoting State v. Bontempo, 170 N.J. Super.

220, 234 (App. Div. 1979)).

       Defendant raised the following issues in her direct appeal: 1) her uncle's

plea to possession of the handgun should not have been admitted at her trial; 2)

trial counsel's agreement to stipulate to this information amounted to ineffective

assistance of counsel; and 3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for

severance of drug charges that were unrelated to the murder and attempt charges.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding defendant was not entitled

to re-argue the same issues at her PCR hearing as she had in her direct appeal.

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Since none of the individual actions of defendant's trial attorney had been

deemed improper or ineffective, but rather strategic, the cumulative effect of

such alleged actions would not be improper.

                                        B.

      "[Appellate courts] review a motion for a new trial decision for an abuse

of discretion," State v. Fortin, 464 N.J. Super. 193, 216 (App. Div. 2020) (citing

State v. Armour, 446 N.J. Super. 295, 306 (App. Div. 2016)), and will not

interfere with the decision "unless a clear abuse has been shown." State v.

Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 137 (App. Div. 2000) (State v. Artis, 36 N.J. 538,

541 (1962)). "[Appellate courts] must keep in mind that the purpose of post -

conviction review in light of newly discovered evidence is to provide a

safeguard in the system for those who are unjustly convicted of a crime ." State

v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 188 (2004). "Newly discovered evidence must be

reviewed with a certain degree of circumspection to ensure that it is not the

product of fabrication, and, if credible and material, is of sufficient weight that

it would probably alter the outcome of the verdict in a new trial." Id. at 187-88.

      Appellate courts apply a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings

by a judge. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-

Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019). In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate

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courts "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the

competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of

Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). "Appellate courts owe deference to the trial

court's credibility determinations as well because it has 'a better perspective than

a reviewing court €n evaluating the veracity of a witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248

N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998))).

      The court denied defendant's motion for new trial based on its

determination that Fowler-Stewart's testimony at the hearing was not credible

and would not set aside the jury's sound verdict if presented at trial. The court

further found that even if Fowler-Stewart had not testified, the court and jury

would have been able to compile the remaining witnesses' testimonies to identify

defendant in the altercation with decedent and that she was likely the person

responsible for his murder. The court thus reasonably concluded defendant

would likely still be convicted at a new trial. Thus, defendant failed to meet her

burden to warrant the granting of her motion. In adhering to the deferential

standard of review for a court's factual findings on its review of live witness

testimony, there is no reason to deviate from the court's denial of defendant's

motion for new trial.

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      Defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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