Court Opinion

ID: 9495992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:15:01.419211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:18.286537
License: Public Domain

GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I concur with the majority’s denial of Fowlkes’ Motion for Authority, but would do so upon alternative grounds. The majority is correct in finding that Petitioner’s claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and non-disclosure in contravention of Brady v. Maryland were raised in his original section 2254 motion before the district court, and are therefore barred under section 2244(b)(1). However, the majority unnecessarily relies upon our ambiguous and far from “apodictic” language in Fowlkes I regarding the “merits” of these claims. Furthermore, because the impartial jury claim was never presented before the district court, and because it is hardly clear that we considered this claim on the merits in Fowlkes I, I would analyze this claim under section 2244(b)(2)(B).
I.
As the majority notes, Fowlkes’ appeal incorporated the Stokes and Barbour affidavits, both to supplement his ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims and to add a new impartial jury claim.1 Ac*548cording to the majority, when we denied a certificate of appealability in Fowlkes I, we also reached the merits of each of the claims before the Court. The majority reaches this conclusion by citing our dicta in Fowlkes I, where we noted, “[W]e have considered the issues raised in [Fowlkes’] supplemental briefing; [and] we find those claims meritless.” As the majority notes, this seemingly gratuitous finding would appear “strange” and “incongruous,” not to mention incorrect, under the appropriate standard for reviewing an application for a certificate of appealability. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, — U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041-42, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). It is precisely in light of these observations by the majority that we should hesitate to attribute unwarranted clarity to this troublesome language. An equally plausible alternative reading of the text of our decision in Fowlkes I would follow from a more cautious analysis of the relationship between the terms “issues” and “claims,” particularly as our interpretation of this language should be informed by the procedural context of the discourse. Thus, given that we were not required to reach the ultimate “merits” of the legal claims before us in adjudicating the application, and because the antecedent of the term “claims” is “issues,” might we not have simply been referring to the Petitioner’s claim that his new evidence raised additional issues in furtherance of his pending application?
Petitioner raised the issues presented in order to strengthen his case for the issuance of a certificate of appealability, which would allow subsequent consideration on the merits. Hence, our use of the term “meritless” need not implicate substantive review of the merits of the legal claims presented. Instead, we appear to have been passing upon the meritoriousness of the issues presented in support of the application, and noting that even in light of this new evidence, we were not convinced that the application warranted revisiting. The majority is correct that under the law of the case, we are bound by our prior decision in Fowlkes I. However, where the meaning of that decision is unclear, and where we can adopt an equally compelling alternative understanding of the language of that decision, I see no need to assume the worst and reach our shared conclusion by buttressing a flawed basis of decision.
A.
AEDPA does not suffer kindly the relit-igation of tired claims. Although we have had little opportunity to interpret the meaning of the term “claim” under section 2244(b),2 the purpose of AEDPA as well as Supreme Court pronouncements upon the nature of this section allow us to apply modified principles of res judicata to its analysis. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (“The new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res *549judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice ‘abuse of the writ.’”). Additionally, our sister circuits have developed varying approaches to the analysis of this statutory question. See, e.g., Brannigan v. United States, 249 F.3d 584 (7th Cir.2001) (utilizing principles of claim preclusion to analyze successiveness of claim); Babbitt v. Woodford, 177 F.3d 744, 746 (9th Cir.1999) (“[A] ground is successive if the basic thrust or gravamen of the legal claim is the same, regardless of whether the basic claim is supported by new and different legal arguments ... Identical grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations.” (internal citations and quotation omitted)); Roberts v. Bowersox, 170 F.3d 815, 816 (8th Cir.1999) (reassertion of constitutional violations raised in first petition barred); In re: Medina, 109 F.3d 1556, 1565 (11th Cir.1997) (appearing to assume that the presentation of a new legal claim constitutes presentation ofa new claim). Of these varying analytical approaches, that developed by the Seventh Circuit in Brannigan offers an excellent model for the matter sub judice. Rather than adopting an excessively restrictive definition of “claim,” where any claim arising out of the same constitutional right is precluded, the Bran-nigan court offers a nuanced approach concomitant with traditional notions of res judicata.
Writing for the majority, Judge Easter-brook focused the court’s inquiry upon, “defin[ing] the ‘claim’ as a challenge to a particular step in the case, such as the introduction of a given piece of evidence, the text of a given jury instruction, or the performance of counsel.” 249 F.3d at 588. The Brannigan majority relied upon this distinction to reject the petitioner’s challenge under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), ruling that his weapons enhancement and drug quantity determination challenges presented only one claim. Because the petitioner had already presented the weapon possession claim under Ap-prendi, he was precluded under § 2244(b)(1) from presenting the drug quantity challenge. The court reasoned that both related to the same step of the case, to-wit, the sentencing enhancement.
In a separate concurrence, Judge Cu-dahy took issue with the majority’s approach to claim preclusion, and offered a more fact-intensive approach. Specifically, Judge Cudahy reasoned, “A claim, specifically in the context of the federal habeas statute, is a set of facts giving rise to a right to a legal remedy. A claim is therefore distinguished by its facts (specifically by its nucleus of operative facts), not just by the legal principle that it invokes or the body of law from which it derives.” 249 F.3d at 590 (internal quotations omitted). Applying either of these approaches to the Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims presented to the district court in Fowlkes I, we can dismiss the claims before us today as precluded. Under the step theory, Petitioner’s claims both go to the introduction of damaging testimony by the Commonwealth at trial. The new affidavits merely fortify Fowlkes’ challenge to this step of the litigation. However, because our inquiry should also account for the possibility of meaningful factual differences between claims, even where the claims concern the same step, I would adopt Judge Cudahy’s approach.
Under Judge Cudahy’s approach, Fowlkes’ new evidence fails to extricate him from the bonds of claim preclusion. The essencé of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and of non-disclosure of the leniency deal under Brady is that the testimony of Sheila Barbour was perjured. Assuming that this were true, there would be no independent corroboration of his conversation regarding driving *550to the scene of the crime and no corroborartion of the cleaning of blood from his car. Additionally, Fowlkes offers the testimony of Robert Stokes that his mother had perjured herself and that another individual had committed the crime. Here, the “common nucleus of operative fact” is clearly the assertion that Ms. Barbour perjured her testimony in exchange for a deal. Without this perjured testimony, the government may well have failed to convict Fowlkes. However, Fowlkes had presented this theory of perjury in his prior petition, even though he supported it with different affidavits. Although he now offers new evidence in support of the theory, the evidence seeks to establish the same operative fact, perjury for leniency. The mere offering of new evidence in support of the same theory cannot relieve Petitioner of the effects of res judicata. Were we to hold otherwise, habeas petitioners would earn a new hearing every time they adduced a new affidavit or piece of evidence in support of a previously litigated theory.
Under this analysis, the new affidavits do not render the claims previously adjudicated “new” for purposes of claim preclusion. Both claims can be dismissed therefore upon the basis of their presentation in the first application.
B.
As the majority notes, Petitioner first raised his impartial jury claim in his supplemental briefing before this court in Fowlkes I. Even though we did not reach the merits of this claim, petitioner clearly “presented” it in a prior petition, so we may again dismiss it under section 2244(b)(1). However, should we wish to treat the claim as “new,” and thereby avoid the question of whether presentation of the claim only on the application for a certificate of appealability is tantamount to presentation in the petition ab initio, we can reach dismissal through application of section 2244(b)(2). Here, I would concur with the majority’s analysis and the conclusion reached.3

. The treatment by Petitioner of this claim alternately as a generalized claim of actual innocence, and as the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, is a bit con*548fusing. In the final briefing papers supporting his Motion for Authority, Petitioner treats the claim exclusively as one of actual innocence. However, in the briefing submitted to the district court under § 2254, Petitioner argued that ineffective assistance of counsel had resulted in the conviction of one who was actually innocent. This inconsistency probably betrays Petitioner’s awareness of the claim preclusion effect of § 2244(b)(1), which he attempts to evade by fashioning the claim as one of "actual innocence” under Schlup and its progeny. For simplicity, from this point forward I shall refer to this hybrid claim as the "ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”

. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 380 (4th Cir.2002) ("[A] second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

. With respect to this analysis, I would note that the impartial jury claim is particularly suspect in light of the fact that the Petitioner has not alleged that the foreman was even aware that his relative may have been involved with the crime.