Court Opinion

ID: 9790989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:02:39.076573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:25.754337
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing asks this court to address whether or not the underlying felony, i.e., robbery, in a felony-murder case can be submitted to the sentencing jury as an aggravating circumstance in support of the death penalty as was done in the case at bar. This question was not addressed by the majority in its opinion. All that the court holds in that opinion is that (a) “murder * * * for pecuniary gain” and (b) “murder * * * commit-ed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of * * * any robbery” can both be submitted as aggravating circumstances in the sentencing part of a bifurcated capital-offense trial. But this decision does not touch the question raised by the petitioner. Engberg argues that the facts which establish the elements of capital murder in the guilt phase cannot be made to do double duty by also being utilized to establish an *564aggravating circumstance for life-or-death sentencing purposes.
Since the issue was not previously addressed, and since it is fundamental to the rights of the defendant, I would grant the petition, receive briefs and hear argument.
I write with deep concern about this court’s attitude toward capital appeals and particularly its order denying Engberg’s petition for rehearing in the case at bar. The order seems to say that, where capital punishment is the issue, the end justifies the means, there being a shared conviction among the members of the majority that the defendant is guilty as charged and therefore he does not deserve rehearing consideration. This is a dangerous trend. It can be seen in other instances. For example, I hold that State v. Heiner, 683 P.2d 629 (1984) is a result-oriented opinion because, while, under the law of evidence, it is arguable that the trial court may have been wrong when it entered its suppression order in that ease, the question is really not arguable which asks whether or not this court has appellate jurisdiction to entertain certiorari or any other interlocutory appeal not provided by statute — it plainly and simply does not.1 Yet certiorari was granted in State v. Heiner in the face of overwhelming underlying common-law precedent to the contrary and without even mentioning numerous opinions of this court which hold that we do not possess certiora-ri jurisdiction where the State seeks relief from an adverse decision where, as in Wyoming, a separate statutory procedure for appellate review is in place.
Result-oriented opinions are one thing where only freedom is at issue2 — but life and death call into question such profound considerations of human mortality, that most civilized nations of the world have concluded that mankind has no jurisdiction for decision-making in these areas and have left these profound contemplations to higher authority.
“ * * * must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
As it holds that the death penalty does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment,3 the majority of this court not only feels that we can dispositively resolve the unfathomable questions pertaining to the mortality of our brothers and sisters in the human family, but, in the matter at bar, the majority refuse to even address an issue which in truth was not considered by this court in the first instance but which is imperative to a full resolution of the rights of the petitioner in this life-or-death matter. The majority of the justices do this with an order that disposes of heretofore unresolved propositions of law without brief or argument when they say that the petition for rehearing is denied because it
(a) “seeks to present a point for the first time’’ (emphasis added), which, according to the law of rehearing, is to improperly come to a decision upon a plain-error point of law without brief or argument;
(b) “finds that the petition does not encompass any question or matter necessary to a correct decision which has been overlooked by the court” (emphasis added), when it is patently true that the majority of the court have not previously considered whether robbery can aggravate the crime of robbery-murder;
(c) “does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion. ” (Emphasis added.) What does this mean? Does it mean that it is all right to kill Engberg because he is a bad man even though we *565do it for impermissible reasons — reasons that will — when Engberg is gone — live to haunt all who survive by having their constitutional and statutory rights jeopardized?
What are we saying with the court’s order denying the petition for rehearing? It seems to me that we are saying the same thing we said in State v. Heiner, supra, and State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (1984), when we granted certiorari even though we had no jurisdiction, namely: Even if we have done it wrong — that is, without authority of law — even if we did not here consider whether or not robbery can aggravate the crime of robbery-murder, we are, nevertheless, satisfied with Engberg’s death sentence and we are therefore not even going to listen to the argument on the issue because no matter how valid the defendant’s legal position might be, we are convinced that Mr Eng-berg is such a despicable individual as should come to his death at the hands of the State whether or not he has received the right guaranteed to him by law.
This is too bad. It is too bad — not only because it holds life and death so lightly but because, it seems to me, it shows a sort of cavalier disrespect for the rights which are guaranteed to all of us by the Bill of Rights and it can hardly be denied that it does violence to the law of rehearing.
Having said this, I turn to the legal specifics of my objection to the order signed this day by the Chief Justice.
In denying the petition for rehearing, the majority say that the petition presents no matter necessary to a correct decision which the court overlooked and raises a point for the first time in the ease. The question presented, however, is central to a proper resolution of this appeal since it concerns sentencing guidelines mandated by the constitution in a capital punishment case. The matter implicates substantial rights of the accused and was properly before this court under the plain-error doctrine. Rule 7.05, W.R.A.P.; Browder v. State, Wyo., 639 P.2d 889, 895 (1982).
Furthermore, in death-penalty cases, the legislature has decreed that this court must consider the propriety of any aggravating circumstance found by the jury, even if the defendant presents no appeal whatsoever. Section 6-2-103, W.S.1977. Therefore, under the plain-error rule and statutory directive, this court is bound to examine all aggravating-circumstance considerations to determine whether they supplied a constitutionally permissible basis for imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, we may not now refuse to consider the question which has been called to our attention by a petition for rehearing on the ground that appellant failed to call the matter to our attention in the original appeal.
Although the majority refuse to hear the issue raised by petitioner, they nevertheless conclude — without briefing from the parties and without citing any authority whatsoever — that the petition “does not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court arrived at an erroneous conclusion.” In my judgment, this reason for denying the petition not only points to a result-oriented disposition of this matter, but it serves to violate petition-for-rehearing law in its most fundamental aspect. Without meeting or even considering the arguments and supporting authority presented by petitioner and discussed in my dissenting opinion, Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 563 (1984), the majority conclude that appellant’s position cannot prevail. Thus, the order denying rehearing impermissibly reaches a legal conclusion with respect to the underlying issue raised in the petition. In so doing, the majority not only deprive the justices of this court the right to have the law briefed and the points argued, but they also deprive the appellant of his right to know the basis for this court’s conclusions.
I would have granted this petition for rehearing in order that we might properly and fully consider an issue which we had a duty but failed to consider in the first instance and which is essential to a disposi-tive resolution in this case.

. See my dissenting opinions in State v. Heiner, supra, and State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521 (1984.)

. “Freedom" can be predicated by the adjective “only” in no other situation except when, as here, it is being compared to life or death.

. Only faintly heard and dimly remembered these days are the thoughts contained in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958), where Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, observed that the words of the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution are not precise and their scope is not static. The Chief Justice said that the cruel-and-unusual-punishment clause