Court Opinion

ID: 9903332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:34:54.022759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:12.774552
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                     NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                     FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                     DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CAROL T. HOLLAND,

            Appellant,

v.                                        Case No. 5D23-36
                                          LT Case No. 2019-DR-1941

JAMES R. HOLLAND, II,

            Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed April 6, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Duval County,
Daniel F. Wilensky, Judge.

William S. Graessle, of William S.
Graessle, P.A., Jacksonville, for
Appellant.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer,
P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.

EDWARDS, J.
       Appellant, Carol T. Holland (“Former Wife”), raises several issues on

appeal. 1   One primary issue, the trial court’s exclusion of her treating

physician’s testimony about whether she was able to work, and the related

issue of imputing more income to Former Wife than she ever earned, require

reversal and remand for further proceedings. The other issues raised by

Former Wife, such as the exclusion of her financial expert who had no final

opinions shortly before trial, and the denial of her post-trial proffer of

documentary proof that the Social Security Administration determined she

was disabled, do not support reversal under the circumstances as they

existed when the rulings were made; however, the trial court may need to

revisit those rulings if there will be a new trial on remand, which seems most

likely. 2

       1
        For those who are interested, the oral argument of this case on March
8, 2023, was the first one conducted in the Fourth Judicial Circuit by the Fifth
District Court of Appeal following the January 1, 2023 realignment of this
Court’s geographical jurisdiction in connection with the creation of the Sixth
District Court of Appeal.
       2
        It is our understanding that the judge who tried this case has retired,
suggesting that the normal solution of having the original trial judge
reconsider matters is unavailable. If our understanding is correct, a new trial
will be required. Given the often dynamic flow of parties’ financial, health,
and employment circumstances, the parties and new judge may find need
for additional, updated evidence or issues to be presented and addressed in
the new trial.

                                       2
      After more than twenty years of marriage, Appellee, James R. Holland,

II (“Former Husband”), filed his petition for dissolution of marriage, following

which Former Wife filed her counter-petition seeking child support, alimony,

and an equitable distribution of marital assets. Former Wife is an optometrist

who, until recently, operated Holland Eye Care, LLC. Former Husband is an

experienced plaintiffs’ personal injury trial lawyer with his own law firm and

an affiliation with a local law firm with a similar, but larger practice.

      The parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement that

resolved many issues related to their children, equitable distribution of

marital assets, possession of the marital home, and other matters, but it did

not resolve alimony issues.

      Not surprisingly, the parties disputed their relative financial needs and

ability to provide for themselves or their former spouse. Each expressed

certainty that the opposing former spouse was financially secure, while both

claimed near financial disaster for themselves.            Former Wife, as an

optometrist, had never worked a full-time schedule during the parties’

marriage, as she had also fulfilled many of the parties’ parenting

responsibilities. Her typical annual earnings up to the commencement of

dissolution proceedings had been in the neighborhood of $50,000; she

closed her practice during the litigation.

                                         3
     Former Husband’s income varied substantially from year to year,

depending on when settlements were achieved and whether he won or lost

large cases in which he had advanced the costs on behalf of his injured

clients. The trial court found Former Husband’s income to be “unpredictable,”

denied Former Wife’s request to average his income earned during the past

several years, and ultimately determined Former Husband’s income to be

approximately $240,000 for 2020. 3

     The COVID pandemic negatively impacted both spouses’ income.

Former Wife had to close her office for approximately two months. Due to

the courts being unable to conduct jury trials during the pandemic, Former

Husband reported that many insurance companies lost interest in settling

cases, thereby affecting his cash flow dramatically.

     Former Wife reported that her monthly expenses were roughly

$25,000, leaving her with a monthly deficit of approximately $22,000. She

retained Mark Hand to perform forensic accounting and designated him as a

trial expert concerning Former Husband’s income, expenses, and resulting

ability to pay her alimony. Former Wife also stated that Hand would be giving

     3
        The day after Former Wife’s counsel deposed the managing partner
of the law firm with which Former Husband was affiliated, he was told to
leave. According to Former Husband, this resulted in his business overhead
reaching $50,000 per month.

                                      4
opinion testimony regarding a lifestyle and accounting analysis of Former

Wife’s earnings and expenses. At Hand’s deposition, approximately two

weeks prior to trial, he indicated that he had no final opinions. Former

Husband moved to exclude Hand, relying on both Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 4 and Binger v. King Pest Control, 5 and the trial court

excluded his testimony entirely, relying on both cases. The exclusion of

Hand’s testimony on Daubert grounds is difficult to analyze, given that he

had not formed any opinions. However, we find neither error nor abuse of

discretion    in   excluding   Hand’s   trial   testimony,   based   on   Binger

considerations, given that same lack of final opinions shortly before the trial.

Former Wife’s argument, if factually supported, that Hand’s inability to timely

formulate opinions was due to Former Husband’s failure to produce

requested financial documents, may have been grounds for a motion to

compel, but she did not file one. Under the circumstances existing below,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Hand. The trial court

will need to evaluate the relevant circumstances as it sets disclosure and

discovery deadlines leading up to conducting a new trial.

      4
          Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
      5
          Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981).

                                        5
      Former Wife’s treating physician, Dr. Bradley Tran, expressed in his

deposition the opinion that she had certain medical conditions that would

render her disabled from a full-time practice as an optometrist. Former

Husband, stating that he was relying on Daubert, moved to exclude Dr.

Tran’s opinions on her disability. 6   He did not challenge Tran’s overall

qualification to render medical opinions regarding Former Wife’s physical

abilities. Former Husband’s primary argument to exclude Dr. Tran was that

contained within Tran’s medical records was the report of an abnormal nerve

conduction test performed on another person, the otherwise unidentified

“D.R.” Furthermore, Former Husband pointed out that the nerve conduction

test performed on Former Wife was essentially normal.

      In moving to exclude or limit Tran’s testimony, Former Husband also

pointed to the facts that: (1) Tran had not seen the video surveillance of

Former Wife that arguably showed her to be physically able to do a wide

variety of activities; 7 (2) Tran had not consulted with the surgeon who opined

that Former Wife’s bilateral carpal tunnel surgery was completely successful,

leaving her able to engage in light duty work which is arguably consistent

      6
       We note that Former Husband was an active attorney-participant in
these hearings to exclude Former Wife’s experts’ testimony.

      The surveillance was conducted and video-taped by Former
      7

Husband’s investigator.

                                       6
with being an optometrist; (3) Tran was unaware of Former Wife’s vigorous

exercise program; and (4) Tran did not conduct an in-person physical exam,

relying instead on a telemedicine interview. Based on that, Former Husband

claimed there was an insufficient basis for Tran’s disability opinion.

      Dr. Tran was not permitted to testify at the Daubert hearing to explain

to the court about the “other patient’s” report; however, he did file an affidavit

saying that this “mystery report” was not part of his file, that he had no patient

with the name found on that report, and that he had not relied on the “mystery

report” in reaching his opinions regarding Former Wife’s disability. Former

Husband also filed affidavits from his own experts who criticized Tran’s

methodology as not being generally accepted given that he relied on another

patient’s nerve testing. Those experts’ affidavits also criticized Tran’s failure

to engage in the accepted practice of making a differential diagnosis. Former

Husband’s experts in their affidavits described Tran’s resulting opinions as

being without proper factual or medical foundation, thus being completely

unreliable. 8

      8
        Former Husband filed an affidavit from his paralegal saying that the
abnormal nerve conduction test report of patient “D.R.” was indeed turned
over by Dr. Tran as part of his records, to counter Former Wife’s suggestions
that perhaps “somebody” planted that “mystery report” to gain an advantage.

                                        7
      The trial court concluded that Tran’s disability opinion was so lacking

in several of the Daubert criteria that it would be excluded.9 Under the

circumstances present in this case, the potential problems with the bases for

Tran’s disability opinion, such as considering the wrong patient’s test results

and failing to consider other available information, would have been proper

fodder for an intense cross-examination of Dr. Tran, but they do not

demonstrate a basis for disqualification under Daubert in this bench trial. We

are compelled to agree with Former Wife that the trial court abused its

discretion in excluding Tran’s disability opinion testimony, and we reverse for

further proceedings.

      On a related issue, the trial court imputed annual earnings of $106,525

to Former Wife which assumed full-time employment, despite the undisputed

evidence showing she had earned no more than $55,000 while working a

reduced schedule each year during the marriage. The court’s imputation of

income must be based on competent substantial evidence regarding several

factors, not the least of which is whether the spouse “is actually capable of

performing the work for which it is imputing income.” Burkley v. Burkley, 911

So. 2d 262, 269 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). By completely excluding Dr. Tran’s

      9
       Dr. Tran was permitted to testify about other matters; only his opinion
regarding Former Wife’s disability was excluded.

                                      8
disability testimony, Former Wife was unable to fully address that issue.

Reversal is required. We need not address the additional bases for reversing

imputation of income urged by Former Wife.

      Former Wife argues, finally, that the trial court abused its discretion in

denying her post-trial request to reopen the case so she could offer into

evidence a letter from the Social Security Administration, stating that it had

determined she was disabled “based . . . on information you gave us.” The

specific ruling was more a consideration of timing and finality in an effort to

bring the former litigation to a close. If proffered again during a new trial, the

trial court can entertain all appropriate arguments for and against its

admissibility.

    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.

LAMBERT, C.J. and WALLIS J., concur.

                                        9