Court Opinion

ID: 9677069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:42:56.87217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.612582
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I agree the conviction should be reversed and agree in part with the reasoning set forth in the Majority Opinion. I respectfully disagree with the Opinion, as follows:
I. DEAN’S RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT DEPOSITION
This is a right that can be waived, if not tacitly, certainly if done by defendant’s counsel knowingly and explicitly. Such was the case here.
Richmond v. Commonwealth, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 642 (1982), is specific authority re*910futing the statement in the Majority Opinion that “the right to be present and to confront [the witness at deposition] is personal to the accused” and “only the defendant can waive this right.” In Richmond, we held to the contrary:
“A great flap is raised over the use of [the] deposition. The only constitutional aspect of it is that [the defendant] was not present so as to exercise his right of confrontation when the testimony was given. As we have said, however, obviously his absence was by choice. He could have been there. It is our opinion that he waived the right of confrontation.” Id. at 646.
The Majority Opinion fails to confront this holding in Richmond, which is squarely in point.
Powell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 346 S.W.2d 731 (1961), cited as authority, is inapposite. In Powell, it was the defense attorney, not the accused, who was absent, and it was at the time when the verdict was returned and received by the court. We stated “the right to poll the jury in criminal cases is an essential part of the right of trial by jury,” and we should not assume counsel would waive this right. Id. at 733.
Here the waiver was explicit, and was made by counsel, presumably competent to judge whether his client was needed. I see no reason, constitutional or otherwise, to create a rule that counsel cannot waive his client’s presence at depositions.
II.THE WIFE’S TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE
I agree that the wife’s testimonial privilege was violated at the Grand Jury proceedings. This probably constituted a defect in the indictment, but such defect is waived if not timely raised.
Mrs. Dean did not refuse to testify at trial. She testified as both a prosecution witness and a defense witness without asserting her privilege. Such privilege is personal to the witness, and as such, is not subject to a motion in limine made by the defendant. Further, in Taylor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 614, 615 (1967), we stated that “we know of no reason or authority which would require the court to admonish” the spouse of her testimonial privilege.
III.THE INSANITY DEFENSE
I would reverse appellant’s conviction on this ground. As stated in the Majority Opinion, citing Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 547 A.2d 1054, 1058 (1988), the defendant has the right to make “the ultimate decision” as to whether or not to rely on the insanity defense, disregarding his counsel’s advice if he chooses to do so. To me this means if the defendant is competent to stand trial, he is competent to waive this defense which is almost always, and necessarily, inherently inconsistent with denying one committed the act. The Majority Opinion states the conflict between the claim of innocence and the insanity defenses was more apparent than real. I disagree and point to the effective way the Commonwealth Attorney ridiculed the accused’s claim of innocence, using the insanity defense as a weapon.
I fully agree with the Majority Opinion that at a new trial the “trial judge must conduct an inquiry designed to assure that the defendant has been fully informed of the alternatives available, comprehends the consequences of failing to assert the defense, and freely chooses to raise or waive the defense.” Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 380 (D.C.1979).
Following this reasoning, permitting these inconsistent defenses at the last trial, over the defendant’s objection, was prejudicial error. Contrary to the Majority Opinion, I fail to see how a defendant can be found competent to stánd trial if the trial judge finds he is “unable to comprehend the consequences of choosing not to use the insanity defense.”
IV.THE INSTRUCTION ON THE DEFINITION OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
I continue to protest the McClellan definition of extreme emotional disturbance, which the Majority Opinion directs will be utilized at the next trial. McClellan v. *911Commonwealth, Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464 (1986). Extreme emotional disturbance, if present, represents diminished mental capacity reducing the criminality of the act. Instead of defining it in these terms, McClellan defines it in terms equivalent to temporary insanity: “to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance, rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” [Emphasis added].
The underlined words require the absence of criminality, rather than simply diminished criminality as contemplated by the Penal Code.
We should utilize the present case to redefine extreme emotional disturbance in line with the structure of the Penal Code, by deleting the terminology underlined above, so that the parts will fit as the Penal Code prescribed.