Court Opinion

ID: 9831512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:09:07.111563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.427727
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION TOR REHEARING.
Counsel for appellees adroitly, and with much force, present the contention that the conclusion we have reached is violative of the rule Avhich forbids “the piling of one presumption upon another.” They put the matter in this way. The liability of appellees depended upon proof (1) of their receipt of'the check, and (3) upon its acceptance by them, or else an undertaking by them to collect it. That the receipt of the check, if proved at all, Avas established by circumstantial evidence, and, as there was no direct proof either of acceptance or an undertaking to collect, these facts could alone be inferred, either entirely or in part, from the fact that the check had actually reached them.
If the proposition is sound, then the proof of the receipt of the check becomes valueless to the appellants, for it is not conceivable that -any other circumstance could be adduced tending to show acceptance Avhich Avould not depend to some extent on the receipt of the check, or else *378establish it in an independent way which would, of course, include the receipt of the check. The vice in the proposition does not clearly appear at a mere glance, but upon analysis its unsoundness becomes apparent.
While the rule recognized in Railway v. Porter (73 Texas, 304) and kindred cases undoubtedly prevails, it does not forbid the legal inferences and presumptions which may arise from a fact established alone by circumstances. Thus, if by circumstantial evidence alone a man is shown to be the master of a servant, the reciprocal duties and responsibilities imposed by law upon that relation- apply without any further showing. So, in this case, when it is established by circumstances that the check reached appellees, the law at once imposed upon them the duties which arose out of their new relation to the appellant.' These duties were either to use due diligence to collect the check or to promptly advise appellants that they would not undertake it.
The issue as to whether the check was received was presented by the circumstances, and, if found in favor of appellant, the law imposed the obligations which arose upon this fact. The issue of failure to discharge these' obligations was presented by other and independent circumstances. The case of Curtis & Co. v. Douglass (79 Texas, 167) is very much in point. In that case the liability for the draft depended upon the date of its receipt, and that fact was established wholly by the date of mailing. The motion for rehearing is overruled.

Overruled.