Court Opinion

ID: 9682285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:08:57.689106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.619690
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
As the majority opinion indicates, the sole question for review is whether the trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the counterclaims filed by Beech and Teledyne against Jinkins failed to state a cause of action for contribution. I disagree with the majority’s holding on that question.
Because Jinkins’ motion for summary judgment is directed solely at the pleadings, this court must accept as true the allegations of Beech and Teledyne that Jin-kins is a negligent tortfeasor. Gottlieb v. Hofheinz, 523 S.W.2d 7 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ dism’d). Applying this standard, if the counterclaims, when liberally construed, state a legal cause of action for contribution, this court must reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for a factual determination of the issues. Id. at 10; 4 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts sec. 17.26.8 (rev. 1984).
It is important to understand the procedural posture of the case at the time of the summary judgment hearing. Two separate lawsuits filed by Jinkins and Weiner against Beech and Teledyne had been consolidated, so that all the parties were before the court in one proceeding. Beech and Teledyne had each answered and had filed separate counterclaims, alleging Jin-kins’ negligence and asserting their rights to indemnity or contribution against him. *729Beech and Teledyne then settled with Weiner, and his suit against them was dismissed with prejudice. Weiner executed a release discharging not only Beech and Tel-edyne, but also Jinkins, from liability to him. Because Weiner had never sued Jin-kins, Beech and Teledyne did not have to obtain any court action with respect to Weiner’s release of Jinkins’ liability. In the settlement contract, Weiner released any claim he had against Jinkins, but Beech and Teledyne reserved the right to proceed against Jinkins for contribution or indemnity.
The majority opinion relies heavily on the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.1984). In my opinion, the circumstances of this case are distinguishable from those in Bonniwell, because there, the settling defendant settled only its own liability to the plaintiff. Here, Weiner discharged not only Beech and Tel-edyne’s liability by his release, but also that of Jinkins. Depending upon the ultimate factfinder’s allocation of causal responsibility, Beech and Teledyne would be entitled to contribution from Jinkins upon proving, among other matters, that they had paid a disproportionate share of Weiner’s damages. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 427 (Tex.1984); Lubbock Manufacturing Co. v. International Harvester Co., 584 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In my opinion, the summary judgment record does not conclusively dispose of the fact issues underlying the counterclaims filed by Beech and Teledyne against Jin-kins for contribution. The allegations of the counterclaims are legally sufficient to assert a cause of action for contribution, and the trial court improperly granted a take-nothing summary judgment against Beech and Teledyne, based solely on the legal sufficiency of their pleadings.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.