Court Opinion

ID: 9602399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:54:13.387868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:03.288257
License: Public Domain

*816Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I cannot concur in the ruling that the giving of a right-turn signal by one driving an automobile on a favored highway approaching an intersection with an unfavored highway, even at a slow speed, constitutes an indication of intention to yield the right of way to an automobile upon the unfavored highway stopped at a stop sign at such intersection and to the right of the favored vehicle. All it could possibly indicate is an intention to make a right turn. The authority for the majority holding is a quotation from 60 CJS 897 in the third headnote. The case cited in 60 CJS 897 as authority for the statement (Widman v. Ashcraft, 117 Colo. 373, 188 P2d 889) was a case wherein the favored vehicle stopped and the driver motioned the unfavored vehicle across the intersection relieving the unfavored vehicle only of negligence per se arising out of a charge of violating the right of way rule. The cases cited in 42 CJ to sustain the same quotation are of similar import. In DeMarey v. Brugas, 103 Conn. 667, 669 (131 A 392), where a bus, having the right of way, slackened its speed at an intersection to let a passenger alight, and when this happened the driver of the automobile proceeded into the intersection and the driver of the bus, instead of stopping merely slowed to permit the passenger to alight and struck the automobile on its rear right-hand wheel, it was held: “Under such circumstances the jury could reasonably have found that the automobile had the right of way into the intersection, since under the apparent situation, the driver of the automobile acting with reasonable care, could reasonably have believed that he could proceed across the intersection without risk of collision.” (Emphasis ours). In Hammond v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co. (Mo.) 240 SW 170, it was stated in discussing the question of right of way and negligence of the parties that start*817ing to stop by the favored vehicle- involves a suggestion to the other to go ahead, increase his speed and pass in front of the favored vehicle. This case involved a left turn in front of the favored vehicle. In Clark v. Wilson, 108 Wash. 127 (183 P 103), the favored vehicle slowed down, the other driver changed course and proceeded. It was held that the favored driver, after slowing down and after seeing the other driver change course and proceed, was negligent in proceeding in front of the other driver. None of these cases is authority for the ruling in the present case. In my opinion, the provisions of § 74 of Art. IX of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (Ga. L. 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 590; Code Ann. § 68-1652), which provide that the unfavored driver at a stop intersection shall yield to vehicles “within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard,” control the case before this court.
There can be no doubt that the favored vehicle in the present case was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Under these circumstances, there was a duty upon the driver of the unfavored vehicle to wait until the favored vehicle, either in crossing the intersection or in making the right turn, had progressed to the point that it did not constitute a hazard. For the reasons above stated, I cannot concur in Divisions 4, 5 and 6 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Felton, C. J., Frankum and Eberhardt, JJ., concur in this dissent.