Court Opinion

ID: 9392887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 16:07:06.692786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:49.679931
License: Public Domain

[Cite as A.J. Constr. Co. v. Steel Valley Paving & Concrete, Inc., 2023-Ohio-1537.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 TRUMBULL COUNTY

A.J. CONSTRUCTION CO., et al.,                          CASE NO. 2022-T-0098

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                                        Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                          Girard Municipal Court

STEEL VALLEY PAVING &
CONCRETE, INC.,                                         Trial Court No. 2021 CVF 00551

                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                               OPINION

                                         Decided: May 8, 2023
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

David A. Detec, Manchester, Newman & Bennett, 201 East Commerce Street, Level 2,
Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Plaintiffs-Appellees).

James E. Lanzo, 4126 Youngstown-Poland Road, Youngstown, OH 44514 (For
Defendant-Appellant).

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Steel Valley Paving & Concrete, Inc. (“Steel Valley”),

appeals the judgment of the Girard Municipal Court overruling its Civ.R. 60(B) motion for

relief from judgment. The trial court awarded judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellees,

A.J. Construction Co., Anthony J. Guerrieri, and Tina M. Guerrieri (collectively, “the

plaintiffs”), in the amount of $15,000 plus interest and costs, following a bench trial at

which Steel Valley failed to appear.
       {¶2}   Steel Valley asserts one assignment of error, contending the trial court

abused its discretion in overruling its Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without

a hearing.

       {¶3}   After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, we find the trial court

did not abuse its discretion. Steel Valley’s alleged unawareness of the trial date did not

constitute excusable neglect because it had a duty to keep itself informed of the status of

the case after its attorney withdrew. Therefore, Steel Valley could not meet all of the

necessary requirements to obtain relief from judgment, and the trial court did not err in

failing to hold a hearing.

       {¶4}   Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Girard Municipal Court.

                             Substantive and Procedural History

       {¶5}   In July 2021, the plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against Steel Valley in the

Girard Municipal Court, asserting claims for breach of contract and negligence relating to

Steel Valley’s paving of asphalt on the plaintiffs’ property. Steel Valley, through counsel,

filed an answer denying the plaintiffs’ allegations.

       {¶6}   On February 11, 2022, the trial court held a pretrial. The parties appeared

through their respective attorneys. The trial court filed a pretrial report and judgment entry

scheduling a bench trial for June 13, 2022. On the same date, the clerk of courts filed a

hearing notice. The docket states the clerk sent the hearing notice to Steel Valley’s

attorney and to Steel Valley, “c/o Brenda Iamurri, Statutory Agent[,] 5355 West Radio

Road, Youngstown, OH 44515.”

       {¶7}   On May 25, 2022, Steel Valley’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw on the

grounds Steel Valley had ceased communication, failed to respond to numerous

telephone messages and faxes, refused to cooperate in the defense of the case, and
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failed to honor financial commitments. Counsel’s certificate of service states he served

his motion on Steel Valley, “c/o Cosmo Iamurri,” at the address listed above. On June 6,

2022, the trial court filed an order granting counsel’s motion to withdraw.

       {¶8}   On June 13, 2022, the plaintiffs appeared for trial. Steel Valley failed to

appear. The plaintiffs presented evidence in support of their claims and damages. The

trial court filed a judgment entry granting judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor in the amount of

$15,000 plus interest and costs.

       {¶9}   On August 4, 2022, Steel Valley, through new counsel, filed a “motion to set

aside” the trial court’s judgment entry pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Steel Valley asserted,

“Defendant did all the work that was required of him in a satisfactory manner”; its motion

was timely filed; and “this motion is due to excusable neglect, Defendant was never

served with a hearing date and was there for [sic] unaware of said hearing on June 13th,

2022.” In support of its motion, Steel Valley attached an affidavit from Cosmo Iamurri.

       {¶10} The plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to Steel Valley’s motion.

       {¶11} On September 16, 2022, the trial court filed a judgment entry overruling

Steel Valley’s motion.

       {¶12} Steel Valley appealed and raises the following assignment of error:

       {¶13} “The trial court abused its discretion by summarily ruling on the Appellant’s

Civil Rule 60(B) motion which alleges operative facts which would warrant relief under

Civil Rule 60(B) without holding a hearing on the same.”

                                   Standard of Review

       {¶14} The decision to grant or deny a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is entrusted to the

sound discretion of the trial court. MCS Acquisition Corp. v. Gilpin, 11th Dist. Geauga

No. 2011-G-3037, 2012-Ohio-3018, ¶ 20. Thus, our standard of review is whether the
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trial court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to

exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2d Dist.

Clark No. 09-CA-54, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (8th

Ed.2004).

                                        Civ.R. 60(B)

       {¶15} Civ.R. 60(B) provides in relevant part, “On motion and upon such terms as

are just, the court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceeding for

* * * (1) * * * excusable neglect * * *. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,

and for reason[] (1) * * * not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding

was entered or taken.”

       {¶16} “To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must

demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is

granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1)

through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds

of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order

or proceeding was entered or taken.” GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.,

47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. “These

requirements are independent and in the conjunctive; thus[,] the test is not fulfilled if any

one of the requirements is not met.” Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d

914 (1994).

       {¶17} “Although a movant is not required to support its motion with evidentiary

materials, the movant must do more than make bare allegations that he or she is entitled

to relief.” Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996).

To successfully establish a claim under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must present “operative
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facts” which would warrant relief from judgment.        Gregory v. Abdul-Aal, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2002-T-0176, 2004-Ohio-1703, ¶ 22.

       {¶18} Here, there is no dispute regarding the timeliness of Steel Valley’s motion

(the third prong).   The parties dispute whether Steel Valley alleged operative facts

regarding a meritorious defense (the first prong) and excusable neglect under Civ.R.

60(B)(1) (the second prong). We find the second prong to be dispositive.

                                   Excusable Neglect

       {¶19} “The term ‘excusable neglect’ is an elusive concept which has been difficult

to define and to apply.” Kay at 20. “[T]he concept of ‘excusable neglect’ must be

construed in keeping with the proposition that Civ.R. 60(B)(1) is a remedial rule to be

liberally construed, while bearing in mind that Civ.R. 60(B) constitutes an attempt to

‘“strike a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought

to an end and justice should be done.”’” Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St.2d 243, 248, 416

N.E.2d 605 (1980), quoting Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Ohio St.2d 9, 12, 371 N.E.2d 214

(1978), quoting 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 2851, at 140.

The inquiry as to whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable “must of necessity take into

consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances.” Id. at 249.

       {¶20} Here, Steel Valley was a defendant in a civil action. Its attorney withdrew,

and Steel Valley subsequently failed to appear for the scheduled bench trial. In its Civ.R.

60(B) motion, Steel Valley asserted it was never served with a hearing notice.

       {¶21} Even if we assume Steel Valley did not receive the hearing notice the clerk

of courts purportedly sent, Steel Valley’s neglect was not excusable. Excusable neglect

is not present if the party seeking relief could have prevented the circumstances from

occurring. Am. Express Nat. Bank v. Bush, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2019-L-130 and 2020-
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Case No. 2022-T-0098
L-029, 2020-Ohio-4424, ¶ 32. This court has recognized “‘[l]itigants have the obligation

to know what is on the court’s docket.’” White v. White, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-

0052, 2015-Ohio-5342, ¶ 27, quoting Davis v. Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92336,

2009-Ohio-4717, ¶ 5. “[I]t is the duty of a party, once he has been made a party to an

action, to keep himself advised of the progress of the case and of the dates of hearings,

including the date of trial * * *.” Metcalf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps., 2 Ohio App.3d 166,

167, 441 N.E.2d 299 (10th Dist.1981). “‘A party involved in litigation cannot simply sit

back and claim ignorance of the proceedings.’” White at ¶ 27, quoting PHH Mtge. Corp.

v. Northup, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA6, 2011-Ohio-6814, ¶ 22.

       {¶22} For example, in Nick v. Cooper, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-1109, 2016-

Ohio-5678, the appellants were parties to a civil action. Their attorney withdrew, and they

subsequently failed to respond to a summary judgment motion. See id. at ¶ 6-8. The

Tenth District found no excusable neglect, stating the appellants “provided no explanation

for their own failure to contact the court regarding the status of their case or to check the

docket to determine whether any action was required in the six-month period in which

they were unrepresented.”      Id. at ¶ 26.   The “appellants could have prevented the

circumstances that resulted in the judgment against them by either hiring counsel to

represent them in this matter following [their] attorney[’s] * * * withdrawal or otherwise

defending the action.” Id. at ¶ 30. Thus, the “appellants completely disregarded their

duty to keep themselves informed of the status of this action after [their] attorney * * *

withdrew.” Id. at ¶ 26.

       {¶23} Here, Steel Valley had a duty to keep itself informed of the status of the

case after its attorney withdrew. However, there is no indication Steel Valley contacted

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the court or checked the docket. Therefore, Steel Valley’s alleged ignorance of the case’s

status did not constitute excusable neglect.

       {¶24} Since Steel Valley could not demonstrate excusable neglect, the issue of

whether it established a meritorious defense is moot. See State ex rel. Yost v. Orlando,

11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2022-A-0003 and 2022-A-0013, 2022-Ohio-4053, ¶ 47. In

addition, since Steel Valley was not entitled to relief from judgment, the trial court did not

err in failing to hold a hearing. See id.; Coleman v. Cleveland School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 84274 and 84505, 2004-Ohio-5854, ¶ 79 (“If the motion for relief

fails to allege operative facts that would warrant relief, the court need not conduct a

hearing.”).

       {¶25} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Steel

Valley’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion without a hearing. Steel Valley’s sole assignment of error is

without merit.

       {¶26} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Girard Municipal Court is

affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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