Court Opinion

ID: 9781522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:50:25.03528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.572074
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur with most of the majority’s opinion, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s analysis in Parts II and VII. Specifically, I believe that Hyland v. Pikes Peak Capital Corp., 714 P.2d 914 (Colo.App.1985), correctly held that the former attorney fees provision of the Wage Claim Act, the former § 8-4-114, Colo. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 398, § 80-8-14 at 861 (repealed Colo. Sess. Laws 2003, ch. 286, § 2 at 1850), supports an award of attorney fees to a defending party only when an employee brings a claim. I further conclude that application of the relevant principles of statutory construction demonstrates that Hyland was correctly decided.
In Hyland, a division of this court concluded that a real estate salesman was not an employee and thus, attorney fees could not be awarded to the defendant company. Although the Hyland decision has sparse reasoning, I believe that the division nevertheless reached the proper conclusion.
As the majority notes, this appeal concerns a dispute between plaintiff, Brenda M. Vol-ler, and her wholly owned company, BMV Consulting, Ltd., and three defendants, including Harmony Group, Ltd. Although the jury found in favor of BMV on its breach of contract claim and awarded it over $65,000 in damages, the jury also found that Voller was an independent contractor, not an employee of Harmony. Thus, the jury found against Voller on her wage claim and the court awarded attorney fees to Harmony under the former § 8-4-114.
To consider whether the former § 8-4-114 should apply to individuals who are not employees, examination of the relevant statutory language is necessary. Former § 8-4-114 provided:
Whenever it is necessary for an employee to commence a civil action for the recovery or collection of wages and penalties due as provided by [the former] sections 8-4-104 and 8-4-105, the judgment in such action shall include a reasonable attorney fee in favor of the winning party, to be taxed as part of the cost of the action.
When construing a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000). To discern that intent, we must first examine the plain language of the statute. United Airlines, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 993 P.2d 1152 (Colo.2000). In so doing, words and phrases *1136should be given their plain and ordinary-meaning, unless the result is absurd. Dover Elevator Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 961 P.2d 1141 (Colo.App.1998).
First, the plain language of the former § 8-4-114 applies to disputes between an employee and an employer and not to other labor disputes. The entire Wage Claim Act concerns various aspects of this relationship, including time limits for payment of wages, § 8-4-103, C.R.S.2004; payroll deductions, § 8-4-105, C.R.S.2004; and termination of employment, § 8-4-109, C.R.S.2004.
Also, it is immaterial that the former § 8-4-114 provided that the “winning party” could be awarded attorney fees, because that clause only applies when a civil action is brought by an employee.
The jury here specifically found that Voller was not an employee. The parties do not dispute this factual finding. Accordingly, under Hyland and the plain language of the statute, Harmony is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under the former § 8-4-114.
Further, the legislature is presumed, in amending a previously construed statute without changing the portion that was construed, to have accepted and ratified the prior judicial construction. See Vaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404, 409 (Colo.1997); Tompkins v. DeLeon, 197 Colo. 569, 571, 595 P.2d 242, 243-44 (1979)(“When the legislature reenacts or amends a statute and does not change a section previously interpreted by settled judicial construction, it is presumed that it agrees with judicial construction of the statute.”).
Significantly, when the General Assembly adopted a comprehensive modification of the Wage Claim Act in 2003, it limited and revised the attorney fees provision, but did not modify its applicability to employers and employees. Under § 8-4-110, C.R.S.2004, both employees and employers are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees in limited circumstances. See § 8-4-110(1), C.RIS.2004. Accordingly, it is presumed that the General Assembly was aware of the decision in Hyland v. Pikes Peak Capital Corp. interpreting the former § 8-4-114. Although it amended the attorney fees provision in significant respects, it did not modify the reference to an employee or an employer, for example, by adding language that a putative employee may be subject to an award of attorney fees if unsuccessful in a Wage Claim Act lawsuit. Nor did the General Assembly extend the statute to independent contractors.
Contrary to the majority’s decision, I do not believe that Hyland leads to an unwarranted result. Although it is true that the Wage Claim Act is intended in part to protect an employer against nuisance litigation, see Hartman v. Freedman, 197 Colo. 275, 591 P.2d 1318 (1979), there is no suggestion here that Voller’s Wage Claim Act litigation was in that category. Rather, Voller and her wholly owned company had an unusual and complicated relationship with the defendants, leading to various claims, and on one claim brought by BMV, BMV obtained a judgment of more than $65,000. Further, it is difficult to conceive that one who is not actually an employee would bring a claim under the Wage Claim Act against a putative employer for nuisance purposes, without otherwise running the risk of sanctions for frivolous and groundless litigation under either § 13-17-102, C.R.S.2004, or C.R.C.P. 11. Indeed, it is unlikely that one would file litigation under the Wage Claim Act without a good faith belief that one was indeed an employee.
Finally, if the concern about nuisance litigation resulting from application of Hyland were indeed substantial, the General Assembly could have amended the statute long ago to overrule that decision legislatively.
The majority also suggests that the Hyland division’s interpretation of § 8-4-114 would never support an award of attorney fees to a defendant, because a finding that a plaintiff did not recover under § 8-4-114 would always mean that it was not “necessary” to sue under the Wage Claim Act. I think this argument goes too far. Reasonably interpreted, the first phrase of the former § 8-4-114 simply meant that it applied when an employee was required to file litigation to recover unpaid wages, when other efforts to recover those wages short of litigation had proved unsuccessful. If, in a good faith dispute over payment of wages, an employee was nevertheless unsuccessful, the employer would clearly have been entitled to *1137an award of attorney fees under the former § 8-4-114.
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Harmony for defending against Yoller’s wage claim. For the same reason, I would conclude in part IIB that Voller was not entitled to attorney fees under the Wage Claim Act, because she was not an employee. Finally, based on this analysis, I would not address the amount of attorney fees to which Harmony is entitled under the Wage Claim Act, because, in my view, it is not entitled to any attorney fees.