Court Opinion

ID: 9480564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:51:38.646286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:45.972087
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Thomas A. Munz has presented to the district court a miscel*272laneous group of claims based upon his loss of eight days of earned good-time credit as well as his loss of the right to act as a jailhouse lawyer for a year.
The loss of good-time credits directly affects the period of Munz’s confinement and, under Offet v. Solem, 823 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir.1987), is an issue which must be exhausted in state court. I read our opinion in Bressman v. Farrier, 900 F.2d 1305 (8th Cir.1990), to hold that, in mixed cases such as this, involving both habeas corpus and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a stay is required for the state court to consider the confinement issues. See Bressman, 900 F.2d at 1308-09 (discussing Mahers v. Nix. In addition to stare decisis, the desire to conserve judicial resources supports such a holding. After this issue is determined and the case is ripe for consideration by the district court, the issues involving Munz’s jailhouse lawyer rights could conceivably require consideration by the Gavin court. It seems that the most orderly way to proceed would be to have the state issue decided first and then permit the district court to determine the best way to proceed from that point.
Concerning the jailhouse lawyer issue, the entire thrust of Munz’s claim is that he was deprived of the right to serve as jailhouse lawyer for other prisoners. In Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706 (8th Cir.1988), we held that “an inmate simply does not have the right to provide his fellow inmates with legal assistance.” Id. at 708. Gassler answers in full Munz’s jailhouse lawyer claim. We need not consider today whether the Gavin decree may be contrary to the later decisions of this court.
Because remanding this case to the district court at this point essentially involves an exercise in futility, I would affirm the stay, and after state procedures have been exhausted, allow the district court to consider the remaining issues.