Court Opinion

ID: 9394347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-13 17:10:00.807221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.456942
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00117-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHARLES EDWARD HOLLINS,                                                       Appellant,

                                                v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                            Appellee.

                     On appeal from the 25th District Court
                          of Lavaca County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

       A jury convicted appellant Charles Edward Hollins of unlawful possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04(e).

The indictment included two enhancement paragraphs, increasing the potential

punishment range to that of a first-degree felony. See id. § 12.42(d). Appellant elected for
the trial court to assess punishment. The trial court found the enhancement paragraphs

“true” and sentenced appellant to thirty-five years’ incarceration in the Correctional

Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. By two issues on

appeal, appellant argues that: (1) “the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that no

adverse inferences should be drawn from appellant’s failure to testify”; and (2) clerical

errors in the judgment exist that “should be corrected.” We modify the trial court’s

judgment and affirm it as modified. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b).

                                    I.     BACKGROUND

       Trial commenced on January 25, 2022. Officer Byron Powe of the Hallettsville

Police Department testified that on June 10, 2021, he initiated a traffic stop of appellant’s

vehicle after a scan of the vehicle’s license plate indicated its owner, appellant, had an

active warrant for his arrest. Officer Powe approached appellant’s vehicle and asked for

appellant’s license. After he detected the scent of marijuana originating from appellant’s

vehicle, Officer Powe requested that appellant exit his vehicle. Officer Powe’s body

camera footage was admitted at trial and shows appellant complying with Officer Powe’s

requests. Officer Powe asked appellant if he had any weapons on him, and appellant

replied that he possessed a firearm. Officer Powe placed appellant in handcuffs, removed

a loaded handgun from appellant’s right pocket, and detained appellant pending

confirmation of the arrest warrant. While running appellant’s information through dispatch,

Officer Powe asked appellant, “Are you allowed to have a gun? Are you a convicted felon

or anything like that?” Appellant answered, “Convicted felon.” Officer Powe then formally

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placed appellant under arrest.

       Following Officer Powe’s testimony, the trial court read a stipulation of evidence

into the record, in which appellant stipulated to a prior felony conviction in August 2006.

The State then rested its case. A jury charge conference was held, and neither side

objected to the jury instructions. The jury deliberated and found appellant guilty of

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court set the punishment

phase of trial for March 11, 2022, to allow time for the community supervision department

to prepare a presentence investigation report.

       On March 11, 2022, the trial court began the punishment phase of trial, found the

enhancement paragraphs in the indictment to be true, and sentenced appellant as

described above. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on March 23, 2022, which the trial

court denied eight days later. This appeal followed.

                      II.    “NO ADVERSE INFERENCE” JURY CHARGE

       By his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct

the jury that “they could make no adverse inferences from appellant’s failure to testify.”

Acknowledging that his trial attorney never requested such an instruction and “that current

case law holds that failure to request such an instruction results in no error when it is

omitted from the jury charge,” appellant nonetheless “asserts that because the Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination is a basic constitutional right, a charge

instructing the jury not to make an adverse inference in a case where the defendant does

not testify[] should be automatic.” Accordingly, appellant requests that this Court “revisit

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this area of the law and rule that such an instruction is mandatory unless affirmatively

waived by defense counsel.”

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       A trial court is required to give the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the

law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14. In reviewing a

challenge to a jury charge, we first determine if the jury charge contained error. Price v.

State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). If error is found, we then “analyze

the harm resulting from the error” to determine if a reversal is required. Id. When alleged

charge error is not preserved at trial, as here, any error will result in reversal only upon a

showing of “egregious harm” to the appellant. Id. But “[b]efore a harm analysis there must

be error.” Michaelwicz v. State, 186 S.W.3d 601, 622 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d).

       “Upon request from a defendant, a trial judge must instruct jurors that they may not

draw any adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to testify.” Beathard v. State, 767

S.W.2d 423, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (citing Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305

(1981) (“The freedom of a defendant in a criminal trial to remain silent ‘unless he chooses

to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will’ is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment

and made applicable to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth. And the

Constitution further guarantees that no adverse inferences are to be drawn from the

exercise of that privilege.” (cleaned up))); see Michaelwicz, 186 S.W.3d at 622; see also

Solis v. State, No. 13-97-462-CR, 2000 WL 34249402, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg May 25, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A criminal

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defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed to disregard his failure to testify, provided

the defendant requests such an instruction or objects to its omission.”). Absent such a

request or objection, “the failure to include a no-adverse-inference instruction is not jury

charge error.” Duke v. State, 365 S.W.3d 722, 727 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet.

ref’d); see Michaelwicz, 186 S.W.3d at 624; see also Foster v. State, No. 11-21-00175-

CR, 2022 WL 5237134, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 6, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication); King v. State, No. 09-18-00196-CR, 2019 WL 5406433,

at *7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Oct. 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Cox v. State, No. 12-15-00228-CR, 2016 WL 4538610, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Tyler Aug. 31, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ramirez v. State,

No. 13-05-785-CR, 2009 WL 1567340, at *15 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan.

22, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

B.     Analysis

       Appellant acknowledges that he failed to request a “no adverse inference” jury

instruction or object to the instruction’s absence. And, indeed, appellant concedes that

under current case law the trial court did not err by failing to so instruct the jury. We agree

with appellant’s assessment of current case law, see Beathard, 767 S.W.2d at 432; Duke,

365 S.W.3d at 727; Michaelwicz, 186 S.W.3d at 624; see also Ramirez, 2009 WL

1567340, at *15; Solis, 2000 WL 34249402, at *2, and lack the authority to “revisit” or

amend that law. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have

final appellate jurisdiction . . . , and its determinations shall be final, in all criminal cases

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of whatever grade . . . .”); Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2003, pet. ref’d) (“It is axiomatic that a Court of Appeals has no power to ‘overrule or

circumvent [the] decisions, or disobey [the] mandates,’ of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”

(quoting State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)).

Accordingly, finding no error in the jury charge, we overrule appellant’s first issue. See

TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14; Carter, 450 U.S. at 305; Price, 457 S.W.3d at

440; Beathard, 767 S.W.2d at 432; Michaelwicz, 186 S.W.3d at 622.

                             III.   JUDGMENT MODIFICATION

       By his second issue, appellant argues that the judgment contains clerical errors

that require correction. Specifically, he contends that the judgment improperly lists “N/A”

under “Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” and “Findings on 2nd Enhancement

Paragraph” when, in fact, the trial court found “true” the enhancement paragraphs in the

indictment.

       We have the power to modify a judgment to speak the truth when we are presented

with the necessary information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). There is no dispute that the trial court found

that the enhancement paragraphs in the indictment were true. Accordingly, we modify the

judgment as follows:

       1. We delete “N/A” following “Finding on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” and insert

          “True”; and

       2. We delete “N/A” following “Finding on 2nd Enhancement Paragraph” and insert

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          “True.”

       We sustain appellant’s second issue on appeal.

                                  IV.    CONCLUSION

       We modify the trial court’s judgment as stated above and affirm the trial court’s

judgment as modified.

                                                            DORI CONTRERAS
                                                            Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
11th day of May, 2023.

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