Court Opinion

ID: 9572488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:09.07224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:14.463247
License: Public Domain

Garfield, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot concur in the majority opinion. I think the State’s cross-examination of defendant does not entitle him to a reversal. There is no claim the evidence of guilt is insufficient. Nor do his able and experienced counsel suggest it is not strong. The only error defendant asserts is the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial or direct an acquittal based upon the fact defendant testified on cross-examination he “w.as in Eldora Training School for Boys.” Clearly, the claimed error did not entitle defendant to a directed verdict of acquittal. I do not understand the majority holds it did. Presumably the majority’s reversal is based on what it feels was the trial court’s error in not sustaining defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
It is apparent that on his direct examination defendant carefully recited so much of his history back to 1942 as he and his counsel thought would place him in a favorable light before the jury. He testified: “I live at 812 41st Street and have lived there three years in July. * * * I was in service from 1942 to 1946 and served in the South Pacific. I am employed at the Iowa Pack and have worked there seven years.” Also, “While in the South Pacific I contracted a disease known as malaria.” He further said on direct examination, “I have never been in any trouble.”
Defendant’s examination in chief entitled the State to inquire further into his history, at least back to 1940, even though it may have brought out a matter less favorable to him than was shown on direct examination. The State was not compelled to accept what defendant said in chief as a verity.
Nor does the possibility the cross-examination might discredit him as a defendant, as well as a witness, and make his conviction more probable, render the cross-examination improper, as the majority suggests. The consideration suggested by the majority *998affords no sound basis for abridging the State’s right to cross-examine a defendant fully. If cross-examination of an accused is to be held to nullify a conviction merely because it may render it more probable, the State is at an unfair disadvantage in the trial of those charged with crime.
I think the State’s cross-examination of defendant insufficient basis for a reversal even though his .answer on direct, “I have never been in curny trouble”, be disregarded. By showing on direct examination the part of his history thought to be favorable to him the door was opened for the State to inquire further into his history, at least to the extent done here. But when the last quoted answer, which the majority virtually ignores, is considered there can be little doubt the cross-examination does not justify reversal.
The unequivocal assertion defendant was never in any trouble is an extremely broad statement relating to his entire past history. Its meaning is plain. It is not subject to interpretation or construction. It is not material what defendant may have had in mind in making this answer. It entitled defendant’s counsel to argue to the jury the evidence showed his client had never been in trouble before. I think it was proper for the State to show on cross-examination the statement was untrue.
Defendant’s having been in the Eldora school either fairly implies he was in trouble, as the majority seems to think, or it gives rise to no such implication. If the former, the cross-examination plainly contradicted or disproved this vital statement on direct examination. If the latter, prejudice sufficient for reversal does not appear.
The State did not violate section 781.13, Code, 1954, which provides: “When the defendant testifies in his own behalf, he shall be subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness, but the state shall be strictly confined therein to the matters testified to in the examination in chief.”
As I have tried to explain, the cross-examination, if it created the impression the majority fears it did, was strictly confined to defendant’s testimony in chief that he had never been in any trouble. In any event it clearly was confined to his past history gone into on direct examination,
*999Further, we have repeatedly and uniformly held up to now, notwithstanding section 781.13, “It is the well established rule in this state that, when a defendant in a criminal action is a witness in his own behalf, he stands upon the same footing as any other witness, in so far as his memory, history, motives, or matters affecting his credibility are concerned.” (Citing seven decisions, including State v. Wasson, infra, 126 Iowa 320, 101 N.W. 1125.) State v. Voelpel, 208 Iowa 1049, 1050, 226 N.W. 770, 771. Numerous other precedents to like effect include State v. Friend, 210 Iowa 980, 989, 990, 230 N.W. 425; State v. Williams, 238 Iowa 838, 850, 28 N.W.2d 514, 521.
State v. Watson, 102 Iowa 651, 654, 72 N.W. 283, 284, cited with approval in State v. Williams, supra, states: “The county attorney was allowed to cross-examine the defendant * * with reference to his, various, places of residence, his going under assumed names,, and his whereabouts at particular times, at considerable length. This examination was perfectly proper, and the court did not abuse the discretion vested in it in such matters.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Chingren (Ladd, J.), 105 Iowa 169, 173, 74 N.W. 946, 947, holds the State was entitled to show on cross-examina-' tion of defendant that at times he ran a bowery and “a jewelry spindle” at county fairs. The opinion says: “It has often been held that on cross-examination inquiry may be made concerning a defendant’s different occupations and places of residence. [Citations] The extent to which such inquiry may be carried must necessarily rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”
State v. Kuhn, 117 Iowa 216, 229, 230, 90 N.W. 733, 737, upholds the State’s right, notwithstanding what is now section 781.13, to cross-examine a woman charged with murder of her husband as to her relations with another man, to show her character, to develop a motive “and incidentally as matter of contradiction.” The opinion states: “Defendant had no right to pose on the witness, stand as a loving and dutiful wife if she was not entitled to that character.” So here defendant had no right to pose on the witness stand as never having been in any trouble if this were not true.
State v. Brandenberger, 151 Iowa 197, 204, 205, 130 N.W. 1065, 1068, in speaking of cross-examination of a defendant as *1000to Ms memory, history, motives, or matters affecting Ms credibility, says: “Again, it is quite generally held that tbe extent to wMcb such inquiries may be carried must necessarily rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”
State v. Bittner, 209 Iowa 109, 118, 227 N.W. 601, 605, in upholding a conviction for first-degree murder has this to say: “It is an elementary principle that counsel for the State is privileged to cross-examine the defendant as to his previous history, his prior conduct, habits, and ways of living, ,as affecting his credibility, and for the purpose of impeaching him. State v. Watson, 102 Iowa 651; State v. Brandenberger, 151 Iowa 197. This matter is largely within the discretion of the court.”
State v. Davis (Evans, J.), 212 Iowa 582, 593, 234 N.W. 858, 863, states: “Having opened up the ground in his [defendant’s] examination in chief, we can conceive of no reason why the State should not be permitted to enter upon the same ground and to pursue its further details.” (Emphasis added.)
State v. Ragona, 232 Iowa 700, 703, 5 N.W.2d 907, 909, in discussing Code section 781.13, says: “What may be said to be ‘strictly confined’ to matters testified to'in chief is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation] There was no such clear abuse of discretion herein as would warrant a reversal at our hands.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion seems contrary to the precedents just cited. In answering its own question, “Was the error prejudicial?” the majority concedes, “Were the proceedings civil instead of criminal, or the witness not the defendant, we might easily answer‘No’.” (Emphasis added.) But under our repeated decisions, in the matter inquired about, defendant stands on the same footing, notwithstanding section 781.13, as any other witness.
State v. Wasson, 126 Iowa 320, 323, 101 N.W. 1125, 1126, cited by the majority, holds it was proper cross-examination to ask a defendant (charged with robbery) questions that “elicited information from which it might be inferred that he had been an inmate of the reform school at Eldora.” Nothing in the Wasson opinion vndñcates defendant’s stay at Eldora was recent. The statutes in effect when the cited case was decided (sections 2708, 2709, Code, 1897) were such that much more stigma would then *1001ordinarily attach to a commitment to the Bldora school than to a commitment by the juvenile court under the law in effect in 1940 (chapter 180, Code, 1939) now chapter 232, Codes, 1950, 1954).
Further, when State v. Wasson, supra, was decided the Bldora school was commonly thought and spoken of as the reform school. The Wasson opinion so refers to it. The statutes then referred to it as the industrial school. In 1940 and now the school is called the Training School for Boys. Defendant here so referred to it. A case somewhat like State v. Wasson, supra, is State v. Meeks, 327 Mo. 1209, 39 S.W.2d 765, 769.
State v. Brandenberger, supra, 151 Iowa 197, 204, 205, 130 N.W. 1065, 1068, reaffirms State v. Wasson, supra, in these words: “In Wasson’s case, supra, defendant on his cross-examination was asked as to his former residence and occupation, and these questions elicited the fact that he had been an inmate of the reform school at Bldora. This was held proper, although it tended to disgrace and discredit him — — * * (Emphasis added.) The Brandenberger case says nothing about the qualification that the stay at Bldora must have been recent, which the majority here reads into State v. Wasson, supra.
In State v. Marinski (Weygandt, C. J.), 139 Ohio St. 559, 560, 41 N.E.2d 387, 388, defendant at one time was sent because of jtwenile delinquency to the Boys Industrial School. A statute provided such fact “ ‘shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in any other court, * * *.’ ” On his direct examination, in a trial for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, defendant testified “as to where and how he had spent the previous years of his life. In his narration of the schools he had attended and the places he had been employed, the defendant neglected to mention his incarceration at the Boys Industrial School.” In holding the State was entitled to show this fact on defendant’s cross-examination, the court says: “To place himself in a favorable light before the court and jury it was necessary for him to tell but part of his history and conceal the remainder. This he did. When this challenge confronted the court and the prosecuting attorney, did this statute render them impotent in their duty to reveal *1002the truth? The participating members o£ this court are unanimously of the opinion that it did not. The cross-examination was proper.”
The opinion just cited of the distinguished Ohio chief justice is persuasive authority here. It is one of the cases cited by the State which the majority dismisses with the statement, “But they are not helpful to us here.” The Marinski case cannot be distinguished on principle from the one now before us.
Defendant is in no position to argue that evidence he was at Eldora in 1940 is too remote in time to be admissible. He was careful to say on direct examination he was in the service from 1942 to 1946, served and contracted malaria in the South Pacific and was never in any trouble. This clearly opened the door for the State to cross-examine defendant as to his history at least as recently as 1940. The cross-examination the majority condemns as too remote is not materially more remote in time than the direct examination which goes back to 1942 as to his history and covers defendant’s entire lifetime in the matter of his having been in any trouble.
Aside from what is thus far said herein I think the single answer of defendant on cross-examination that in 1940 he was in Eldora Training School for Boys was not, under the circumstances here, sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. The majority concedes “The record as it stands does not indicate * * *any delinquency under Code section 232.3 as the reason or purpose of his commitment. Undoubtedly a boy may be sent to the Training School under circumstances which, if understood, reflect no discredit but only misfortune.” There is no suggestion in the record the jury did not clearly understand the circumstances under which defendant was sent to the training school and, as I shall presently point out, they reflect no discredit on him but only misfortune.
Under chapter 180, Code, 1939 (chapter 232, Codes, 1950, 1954), the juvenile court may send to the'Eldora school boys who are merely dependent or neglected, not delinquent or criminal. Thus having been at Eldora is no proof of delinquency or crime.
We seem to be committed to the rule that jurors are presumed to know the law in matters no more plain than the law *1003pertaining to who may be sent to Eldora. Keller v. Dodds, 224 Iowa 935, 942, 277 N.W. 467; Remer v. Takin Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 230 Iowa 290, 296, 297 N.W. 297, 299; Fagen Elevator v. Pfiester, 244 Iowa 633, 642, 56 N.W.2d 577, 582. See also Kessel v. Murray, 197 Iowa 17, 22, 196 N.W. 591, 33 A. L. R. 1346; Kowalke v. Evernham, 210 Iowa 1270, 1274, 1275, 232 N.W. 670. Thus the jurors here are presumed to have known (and it is quite evident they did in fact know) defendant’s having been at Eldora is not evidence he was delinquent or criminal.
Aside from the views just expressed, as the majority indicates, defendant fully explained to the jury why he was sent to Eldora. His father and mother separated when he was five. “It was the result of disobeying my father — -just not living with him when I was supposed to. My father had me placed in Eldora.” This explanation is undisputed. The jury had no occasion to speculate as to the circumstances surrounding defendant’s commitment to Eldora. There is nothing in them to indicate defendant was delinquent or criminal or that is reasonably calculated to prejudice the average juror against defendant. Indeed it would seem more probable the evidence pertaining to defendant’s stay in Eldora would naturally arouse sympathy for him.
It is true, as the majority thinks was significant, the trial court’s first reaction to the answer on cross-examination about having been at Eldora seemed to be there was prejudicial error. However upon further reflection, after full argument to the court with citation of authorities (including, as the record shows, State v. Wasson, supra, 126 Iowa 320, 323, 101 N.W. 1125), consideration of the matter of the prosecutor’s good faith and very likely a reading of defendant’s direct examination, it was decided no mistrial should be declared. The court adhered to this view upon more mature reflection in later overruling defendant’s motion for new trial based in part upon its refusal to grant a mistrial.
By overruling the motion for new trial the court virtually found the cross-examination was without prejudice. The trial court was in better position than we are to observe the effect of the cross-examination of defendant upon the jurors. I think an abuse of its discretion does not appear. Certainly no clear abuse is shown. See State v. Hogan, 115 Iowa 455, 458, 88 N.W. *10041074; State v. Ean, 90 Iowa 534, 537, 538, 58 N.W. 898; State v. Gadbois, 89 Iowa 25, 32-34, 56 N.W. 272.
Tbe majority indulges “tbe suspicion that had the witness not been the defendant the prosecutor would not have bothered to go into his teen-age history.” It seems equally proper to suspect that had the witness not been the defendant, his counsel on direct examination would not have bothered to show his service in the armed forces and in the South Pacific as far back as 1942 and that he had never been in any trouble. But if a witness other than defendant did so testify on direct examination, it is submitted such cross-examination as we find here would not constitute reversible error.
The majority cites State v. Wheeler, 129 Iowa 100, 106, 105 N.W. 374, 376, State v. Nugent, 134 Iowa 237, 240, 111 N.W. 927, 929, and State v. Asbury, 172 Iowa 606, 613, 154 N.W. 915, 918, Ann. Cas. 1918A 856, for the proposition that error is presumed to- be prejudicial. None of these cases involves any question of improper cross-examination of a defendant. The majority is mistaken in what it says concerning State v. Asbury, supra.
The statement the majority quotes from State v. Wheeler, supra, is followed by, “And there is nothing in the instant record, taken as. a whole, which can be said to rebut the presumption thus arising.” What the majority quotes from State v. Nugent, supra, is followed by, “If the error involves a material point in the case, prejudice must be presumed, unless on survey of the whole record the contrary affirmatively appears.”
If there were a sound basis for holding here there was error in the single respect urged by defendant’ and if any presumption of prejudice arose therefrom, I think the record clearly rebuts the presumption. However the rule here applicable, as stated in the decisions previously reviewed herein and as recognized by the majority, is that “the trial court has a considerable discretion in passing on the * * * propriety of cross-examination * * #» and we not reverse unless abuse of that discretion appears. State v. Ragona, supra, 232 Iowa 700, 703, 5 N.W.2d 907, 909, says there must be shown a clear abuse of discretion. See also, in addition to the previous citations herein, though not involving cross-examination of a defendant, State v. Propp, *1005193 Iowa 383, 385, 185 N.W. 90; State v. Archibald, 208 Iowa 1139, 1142, 226 N.W. 186.
The majority indicates much concern with “the duty of the court to protect the right of a defendant charged with crime to a fair and impartial trial * * Of course an accused is entitled to such a trial and any court should, if it can, see that he gets it. But this is not the extent of a, court’s duty in a criminal trial or upon appeal from a conviction. There are two parties to such an action. The State, no less than the defendant, has the right to a fair trial and it is a court’s duty to protect that right with evenhanded justice as much as the corresponding right of the accused. I think the trial court discharged that duty here. The majority virtually shuts its eyes to the rights of the State.
The right of the accused and the State to a fair and impartial trial is of course clear regardless of the nature of the crime charged. But perhaps there are special reasons why the protection of such right seems important in drunken driving cases. They are more numerous than all other criminal cases combined and there is a direct connection between drunken driving and the appalling carnage on our highways.
Of course I would affirm.
Bliss, Thompson and Larson, JJ., join in this dissent.