Court Opinion

ID: 9681709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:55:05.254748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.526481
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(concurring).
Parasco v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 89, 323 S.W.2d 257 (1959), containing the language overruled by the majority, is in the middle of a line of cases including McNaulty v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 317, 135 S.W.2d 987 (1940); Wharton v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 326, 248 S.W.2d 739 (1952); Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), and Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). But the question complained of in that case was not of the kind involved in McNauIty, Wharton or this case. The opinion enlarged upon the rule stated in McNauIty, supra, upon which it was supposedly based. I can concur in the overruling of its language only on the understanding that the McNauIty reasoning, as it has been applied, is still valid.
The McNauIty Court reviewed the authorities at length and wrote about improper questions:
“Some may be harmless and some may be made harmless by a negative answer, but whenever the question is so stated that it amounts to an assertion of fact under the conditions here under discussion and it implies the commission of another offense, it may be said that its harmfulness cannot be cured by the answer and seldom by any instruction which the court is able to give the jury.”
Thus, in exceptional cases, an instruction to disregard can cure the error in the asking of such improper questions. The case at bar presents the limited exception to the above-stated rule. The objectionable question was not of the “have you heard” variety, but it was directed to a character witness and, taken in context, it did assert the misconduct as a fact. Furthermore, the court’s instruction to disregard was most thorough. I conclude that this case falls within the very limited exception to the rule stated in McNauIty, supra.
This Court’s unanimous opinion in Webber v. State, 472 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) underscores the continued vitality of *760the rule stated in McNaulty, supra. The Court held that the mere asking of a question which asserted an extraneous shoplifting offense as a matter of fact was reversible error, even though the jury was instructed to disregard.
While continuing to adhere to the rule of McNaulty and Webber, I agree that this case presents an exception thereto, and that the language of Parasco is too broad to admit of the exception. I therefore concur in the opinion of the majority.
ODOM, J., joins in this concurrence.