Court Opinion

ID: 9377809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 20:00:35.866887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.967396
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13356   Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 03/08/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 21-13356
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ROGER HALSTEAD,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       FIDEL ESPINOZA,
       in his individual capacity, & official capacity
       as a Lieutenant for The City of Dunwoody Police Dept ,
       BILLY GROGAN,
       in his individual capacity, & official capacity
       as Chief of City of Dunwoody Police Department,
       OLIVER FLADRICH,
       in his individual capacity, & official capacity
       as an Officer of The City of Dunwoody Police Department,
       THE CITY OF DUNWOODY,
USCA11 Case: 21-13356      Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 03/08/2023      Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13356

       Under color of State Law,
       LYNN DEUTSCH,
       in her individual capacity & official capacity
       as Mayor of The City of Dunwoody, et al.,

                                                        Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03474-SCJ
                           ____________________

       Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Roger Halstead appeals the district court’s order dismissing
       his amended complaint with prejudice and denying his motion for
       leave to file a second amended complaint. The district court dis-
       missed the amended complaint, which alleged a litany of claims
       stemming from Halstead’s employment as a police officer in the
       City of Dunwoody, as a shotgun pleading. And the court denied
       Halstead’s motion to amend because the proposed second
       amended complaint, rather than curing the pleading deficiencies,
       exacerbated them. On appeal, Halstead makes three arguments.
       First, he contends that because his original complaint complied
USCA11 Case: 21-13356      Document: 56-1     Date Filed: 03/08/2023     Page: 3 of 6

       21-13356               Opinion of the Court                         3

       with Georgia’s state-court pleading requirements, dismissal was
       improper. Second, he argues that the district court should have
       granted his motion for leave to amend or, at a minimum, dismissed
       the complaint without prejudice. Third, he contends that the dis-
       trict court erred by dismissing the case after it learned of an open
       Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigation. How-
       ever, Halstead has abandoned all relevant issues and, regardless, his
       arguments lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                      I.

              We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint as a
       “shotgun” pleading for abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm Beach
       Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). “Shotgun
       pleadings are those that incorporate every antecedent allegation by
       reference into each subsequent claim for relief . . . .” Wagner v.
       First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 2006).
       “The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one
       incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, lead-
       ing to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first)
       contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strate-
       gic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d
       1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002).
              On appeal, Halstead abandons any challenge to the district
       court’s dismissal of the amended complaint because he does not
       challenge the substance of the district court’s determination that
       the amended complaint was a shotgun pleading. He argues only
USCA11 Case: 21-13356      Document: 56-1      Date Filed: 03/08/2023     Page: 4 of 6

       4                       Opinion of the Court                 21-13356

       that his original complaint, which was not the operative complaint,
       complied with Georgia state-law pleading requirements. An appel-
       lant abandons an issue by failing to sufficiently argue the merits of
       the issue. Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316,
       1318-19 (11th Cir. 2012), overruled in part by United States v.
       Durham, 795 F.3d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly,
       Halstead abandons any challenge to the district court’s dismissal
       because he does not argue that the operative complaint was not a
       shotgun pleading.
              In any event, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
       dismissing the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. For start-
       ers, both Halstead’s complaints are quintessential shotgun plead-
       ings because they “contain[] several counts, each one incorporating
       by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situa-
       tion where most of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrele-
       vant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic Income
       Fund, 305 F.3d at 1295. Even more, the district court told Halstead
       how to cure his defective complaint, but Halstead failed to comply.
       Finally, Halstead’s argument that his original complaint complied
       with state-law pleading requirements has no bearing on the propri-
       ety of the district court’s dismissal. Accordingly, the district court
       did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the amended complaint
       as a shotgun pleading.
USCA11 Case: 21-13356       Document: 56-1       Date Filed: 03/08/2023      Page: 5 of 6

       21-13356                 Opinion of the Court                           5

                                        II.

              We also review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint
       for abuse of discretion. Corsello v. Lincare, Inc., 428 F.3d 1008,
       1012 (11th Cir. 2005). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
       15(a)(2), courts should freely grant leave to amend a complaint
       “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). District courts
       must give a litigant at least one chance to remedy any pleading de-
       ficiencies before dismissing a complaint on shotgun pleading
       grounds. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th
       Cir. 2018).
              Once a district court gives a plaintiff fair notice of the specific
       defects in the complaint and a meaningful chance to fix them, dis-
       missal with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds is proper if a
       plaintiff files an amended complaint afflicted with the same defects.
       Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358-59 (11th Cir.
       2018). It is futile to grant leave to amend once again “if an amended
       complaint would still fail at the motion-to-dismiss or summary-
       judgment stage.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323,
       1332 (11th Cir. 2020).
               Halstead abandons any challenge to the district court’s de-
       nial of his motion for leave to further amend his complaint and the
       prejudicial effect of the dismissal. On appeal, he does not address
       the district court’s determination that it would be futile to grant
       leave to amend. Instead, Halstead limits his argument to providing
       examples of cases in which district courts allowed plaintiffs to
USCA11 Case: 21-13356      Document: 56-1       Date Filed: 03/08/2023     Page: 6 of 6

       6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-13356

       amend their complaints multiple times. Halstead’s failure to specif-
       ically explain why the district court abused its discretion in this case
       is fatal to his appeal of that issue.
              Moreover, the district court acted within its discretion by
       dismissing with prejudice rather than allowing leave to amend.
       The court permitted Halstead to amend his complaint and pro-
       vided explicit instructions on how to correct the pleading deficien-
       cies. The court also denied Halstead’s motion only after determin-
       ing that the proposed second amended complaint would not cure
       the pleading deficiencies. Accordingly, dismissing the action with
       prejudice and denying Halstead’s motion to amend was not error.
       See L.S. ex rel. Hernandez, 982 F.3d at 1332.
                                       III.

               Finally, Halstead argues that the district court erred by dis-
       missing his complaint despite the existence of a pending EEOC in-
       vestigation. The pending EEOC investigation is irrelevant to our
       consideration of whether dismissal was proper and whether the dis-
       trict court erred by denying Halstead’s motion to amend. Our prec-
       edents do not preclude a district court from dismissing a deficient
       complaint because of a pending EEOC investigation, and Halstead
       makes no argument otherwise.
                                       IV.

              Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.