Court Opinion

ID: 9531330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:09:52.696933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:25.014561
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent.
RCW 50.32.1501 still provides that on judicial review of departmental decisions, the decision of the commissioner shall be deemed prima facie correct, and places the burden of proof upon the party attacking such decision. In addition, we noted in Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn.2d 255, 461 P.2d 531 (1969), that on appellate review of such decisions neither the appellate court nor the superior court is entitled to simply substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency or ignore the expertise of that tribunal.
In the instant case, I fear the majority has ignored both of the foregoing tenets.
I do not disagree with the majority that the purpose of the unemployment compensation system is directed toward relieving “economic insecurity” and protecting “against this greatest hazard of our economic life.” Nevertheless, the principal thrust of the system is aimed at the “economic *554insecurity” of “involuntary” unemployment and the alleviation thereof. The temporary disqualification for benefits imposed upon “voluntary” unemployment by RCW 50.20.050 is consistent with the underlying purpose of the system, yet in keeping with a legislative effort to discourage indiscriminate job shopping and to thereby in some measure conserve the system’s funds for the primary benefit of the involuntarily unemployed. RCW 50.20.050 should not, therefore, be so generously interpreted and/or liberally disregarded as to defeat its plain legislative objective.
What amounts to a compelling personal reason which will exonerate a claimant from the temporary disqualification imposed by RCW 50.20.050 is essentially a factual question to be resolved, virtually on a case-by-case basis. In In re Bale, 63 Wn.2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963), we determined that the legal duty of a wife to follow her husband to the domicile of his choice constituted a compelling personal reason justifying the wife’s voluntary termination of her employment, thereby relieving her of the impact of RCW 50.20.050. Whether the equal rights amendment (Const. art. 31, § 1 (amendment 61)) shattered Bale as a viable precedent is debatable. Nevertheless, I do not deem it necessary to undertake in this dissent to resolve that question, for I am satisfied that under the undisputed facts of this case no compelling personal reason for the claimant to quit his temporary employment has been established. In short, the claimant has failed to carry his burden of proof.
At the expense of some repetition, the essential facts as revealed by the record must be related. On March 19, 1972, the claimant left the United States Air Force and with his wife moved to Richland. The evidence is silent as to the nature of the living quarters the couple procured in Rich-land. The claimant, on April 8, 1972, obtained temporary and seasonal employment paying approximately $480 per month. This employment was as a laborer with a landscaping company which had gotten behind with its orders. The claimant was due to be laid off as soon as the company *555gained currency or the landscaping season ended. In the meantime, the claimant’s wife, desiring to pursue a career in social work, applied for and was tendered employment in Olympia as a clerk-typist II at a salary of $412 per month plus some fringe benefits. She was advised of the availability of this position approximately a week,before the claimant quit his job. During the course of this week, the claimant and his wife
talked it over and we decided it would be better for me to quit my job and for her — for me to move over with her.
Based upon this mutual agreement, and without any kind of ultimatum from his wife, claimant quit his job on May 5, 1972, and, together with his wife, came to Olympia where his wife commenced her employment on May 8,1972.
The principal reason assigned for claimant’s action was that both he and his wife wished to be together and avoid the inconvenience of occasional trips between Richland and Olympia during the interval retention of his temporary employment would entail.
In our mobile society and economy it is not uncommon on change of employment sites or locations for families to be temporarily separated, all without adverse effect upon the family relationship. There is no evidence whatsoever in this case that the temporary separation which would have been involved would threaten the marriage, upset the domestic tranquility, or otherwise cause any unreasonable inconvenience. Neither is there any evidence that the couple had any children or, if they did, that the children would be adversely affected by a temporary separation. There is evidence, however, that the claimant simply desired to look for employment in the Olympia area or alternatively to enroll in college. Loss to the family coffers of the $480 monthly income, albeit temporary, seemingly did not influence his calculations.
Given the overall circumstances of this case, it appears the evidence clearly establishes that the claimant made a *556deliberate, conscious, and voluntary decision to quit his job for reasons of personal convenience. Whether he made a wise decision is not before us. In any event, the evidence amply sustains the commissioner’s ruling that he did not leave his temporary employment for compelling personal reasons within the contemplation of RCW 50.20.050. As did the Superior Court, I would accord the commissioner’s ruling the prima facie correctness to which it is statutorily entitled and refrain from simply substituting my judgment for that of the administrative agency.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Utter and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Hamilton, J.

RCW 50.32.150 provides in part:
“In all court proceedings under or pursuant to this title the decision of the commissioner shall be prima facie correct, and the burden of proof shall be upon the party attacking the same.”