Court Opinion

ID: 6239580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-02-17 20:41:08.475839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:09.505230
License: Public Domain

Opinion,
Mb. Justice Gbeen:
In the case of Garbracht v. Commonwealth, 96 Pa. 449, which *156was an indictment for selling liquor without license, we held that “ the place of sale is the point at which goods ordered or purchased are set apart and delivered to the purchaser, or to a common carrier, who, for the purposes of delivery, represents him.” In that case the order for the liquor was solicited and obtained by the defendant in the county of Mercer, but was sent to his principal, who was a liquor dealer in the county of Erie. The order was executed by the principal, who, in the county of Erie, at his place of business, separated or set apart from his general stock the liquor ordered, and delivered it to a common carrier to be forwarded to its destination in Mercer county. We decided that this was no violation of the law prohibiting sales without license, although neither the defendant, who was a traveling agent, nor his principal, held any license for the sale of liquor in Mercer county. This decision was not changed in the least upon a subsequent trial of the same defendant upon a different state of facts, as reported in 1 Penny. 471. | In the case now under consideration, the liquor was sold upon orders sent by mail by the purchasers, living in Mercer county, to the defendant, who is a wholesale liquor dealer in Allegheny county. The goods were set apart at the defendant’s place of business in Allegheny county, and were there delivered to a common carrier, consigned to the purchaser at his address in Mercer county, and by the carrier transported to Mercer county, and there delivered to the purchaser, who paid the expense of transportation. Upon these facts alone, the decision of this court in the case of Garbracht, supra, is directly and distinctly applicable, and requires us to reverse the judgment of the court below, unless there are other, facts in the case which distinguish it from that of Garbracht.
It is claimed, and it was so held by the court below, that, because the goods were marked C. O. D., the sale was not complete until the delivery was made, and, as that took place in Mercer county, where the defendant’s license was inoperative, he was without license as to such sales, and became subject to the penalty of the criminal law. The argument by which this conclusion was reached was simply that the payment of the price was a condition precedent to the delivery, and hence there was no delivery until payment, and no title passed until delivery. The legal and criminal' inference was, that the sale was made in *157Mercer, and not in Allegheny. This reasoning ignores certain facts which require consideration. The orders were sent by the purchasers, in Mercer, by mail to the seller, in Allegheny, and in the orders the purchasers requested the defendant to send the goods C. O. D. The well-known meaning of such an order is that the price of the goods is to be collected by the carrier at the time of delivery. The purchaser, for his own convenience, requests the seller to send him the goods, with authority in the carrier to receive the money for them. This method of payment is the choice of the purchaser, under such an order; and it is beyond question that, so far as the purchaser is concerned, the carrier is his agent for the receipt and transmission of the money. If the seller accedes to such a request by the purchaser, he certainly authorizes the purchaser to pay the money to the carrier, and the purchaser is relieved of all liability to the seller for the price.of the goods if he pays the price to the carrier. The liability for the price is transferred from the seller to the carrier; and, whether the carrier receives the price or not, at the time of delivery, he is liable to the seller for the price if he does deliver. Substantially, therefore, if the delivery is made by the carrier, and he chooses to give credit to the purchaser for the payment of the price, the transaction is complete, so far as the seller is concerned, and the purchaser may hold the goods.
Of course, if the seller were himself delivering the goods in parcels upon condition that on delivery of the last parcel the price of the whole should be paid, it would be a fraud on the seller if the purchaser, after getting all the parcels, should refuse to perform the condition upon which he obtained them, and in such circumstances the seller would be entitled to recover the goods. This was the case of Henderson v. Lauck, 21 Pa. 859. The court below, in that case, expressly charged that if the seller relied on the promise of the purchaser to pay, and delivered the goods absolutely, the right to the property was changed, although the conditions were never performed; but if he relied, not on the promise, but on actual payment at the delivery of the last load, he might reclaim the goods if the money was not paid. The case at bar is entirely different. So far as the seller is concerned, he is satisfied to take the responsibility of the carrier for the price, in place of that of the *158seller. He authorizes the purchaser absolutely to pay the price to the carrier; and, if he does so, undoubtedly the purchaser is relieved of all responsibility for the price, whether the carrier ever pays it to the seller or not. But the carrier is also authorized to- deliver the goods. If he does so, and receives the price, he is of course liable for it to the seller. But he is equally liable for the price if he chooses to deliver the goods without receiving the price. It cannot be questioned that the purchaser would he liable also; but, as he had received the goods from one who was authorized to deliver them, his right to hold them even as against the seller is undoubted. In other words, the direction embodied in the letters C. O. D., placed upon a package committed to a carrier, is an order to the carriel' to collect the money for the package at the time of its delivery. It is a part of the undertaking of the carrier with the consignor, a violation of which imposes upon the carrier the obligation to pay the price of the article delivered, to the consignor. We have been referred to no authority, and have been unable to discover any, for the proposition that in such a case, after actual, absolute delivery to the purchaser by the carrier, without payment of the price, the seller could reclaim the goods from the purchaser as upon violation of a condition precedent.
If, now, we pause to consider the actual' contract relation between the seller and purchaser, where the purchaser orders the goods to be sent to him C. O. D., the matter becomes still more clear. Upon such an order, if it is accepted by the seller, it becomes the duty of the seller to deliver the goods to the carrier, with instruction to the carrier to collect the price at the time of delivery to the purchaser. In such a case it is the duty of the purchaser to receive the goods from the carrier, and, at the time of receiving them, to pay the price to the carrier. This is the whole of the contract, so far as the seller and the purchaser are concerned. It is at once apparent that when the seller has delivered the goods to the carrier, with the instruction to collect the price on delivery to the purchaser, he has performed his whole duty under the contract; he has nothing more to do. If the purchaser fail to perform his part ■of the contract, the seller’s right of action is complete; and he may recover the price of the goods from the purchaser, whether *159tbe purchaser takes, or refuses to take, the goods from the carrier. Hence it follows that the passage of the title to the purchaser is not essential to the legal completeness of the contract of sale. It is, in fact, no more than the ordinary case of a contract of sale, wherein the seller tenders delivery at the time and place of delivery agreed upon, but the purchaser refuses performance. In such case it is perfectly familiar law that the purchaser i's legally liable to pay the price of the goods, although, in point of fact, he has never had them. The order to pay on delivery is merely a superadded term of the contract; but it is a term to be performed by the purchaser, and has no other effect upon the contract than anjr other term affecting the factum of delivery. It must be performed, but performed by the purchaser, just as the obligation to receive the goods at a particular time or a particular place. Its nonperformance is a breach by the purchaser, and not bjr the seller, and therefore cannot affect the right of the seller to regard the contract of sale as complete, and completely performed on his part, without any regard to the question whether the title to the goods has passed to the purchaser as upon an actual reception of the goods by him. If this be so, the case of the commonwealth falls to the ground, even upon the most critical consideration of the contract between the parties, regarded as a contract for civil purposes only.
The duties which lie intermediate between those of the seller and those of the purchaser are those only which pertain to, and are to be performed by, the carrier. These, as we have before seen, are the ordinary duties of carriage and delivery, with the additional duty of receiving the price from the purchaser, and transmitting it to the seller. The only decided case to which we have been referred which presents the effect of an order C. O. E. to a carrier, is Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252. There the defendant employed the plaintiff'to manufacture for him a set of circus tents. When they were finished, the plaintiff shipped them to the defendant C. O. D., and they were destroyed by fire on the route. It was held that the defendant, who was the purchaser, should bear the loss; that the plaintiff had a lien on the tents for the value of his labor and materials, and his retaining his lien by shipping them C. O. D. was not inconsistent with, and did not affect his right to enforce the *160defendant’s liability. In the course of the opinion Chief Justice Church said: “ Suppose, in this case, that the defendant had refused to accept a delivery of the tent, his liability would have been the same, although the title was not in him. The plaintiff had a lien upon the article for the value of his labor and materials, which was good as long as he retained possession..... Retaining the lien was not inconsistent with his right to enforce the liability for which this action was brought. That liability was complete when the request to ship was made by the defendant, and was not affected by complying with the request, nor by retaining the lien the same as when the request was made. As the article was shipped at the request of and for the benefit of the defendant, (assuming that it was done in accordance with the directions,) it follows that it was at his risk, and could not impair the right of the plaintiff to recover for the amount due him upon the performance of his contract. .... As before stated, the point as to who had the title is not decisive. It may be admitted that the plaintiff retained the title as security for the debt, and yet the defendant was liable for the debt in a proper personal action.” It seems to us this reasoning is perfectly sound. Practically, it was ruled that the effect of the order C. O. D. was simply the retention of the seller’s lien, and that such retention of lien is not inconsistent with a right of recovery for the price of the article, though, in point of fact, it is not delivered to the purchaser. In other words, the literal state of the title is not decisive of the question of liability of the purchaser, and he may be compelled to pay for the article, though he never received it into his actual possession. The Chief Justice propounds the very question suggested heretofore, of a refusal by the purchaser to accept the article, and holds that his liability would be the same, though the title was not in him.
In Hutchinson on Carriers, at § 389, the writer thus states the position and duty of the carrier: “ The carrier who accepts the goods with such instructions [C. O. D.] undertakes that they shall not be delivered unless the condition of payment be complied with, and becomes the agent of the shipper of the goods to receive such payment. He therefore undertakes, in addition to his duties as carrier, to collect for the consignor the price of his goods.” And again, in § 390: “ When the goods are so *161received, the carrier is held to a strict compliance with such instructions; and, if the goods are delivered without an exaction from the consignee of the amount which the carrier is instructed to collect, he becomes liable to the consignor for it.” This is certainly a correct statement of the position and liability of the carrier. He becomes subject to an added duty, that of collection; and, if he fails to perform it, he is liable to the seller for the price of the goods. We have searched in vain for any text-writer’s statement, or any decision, to the effect that in such case no title passes to the purchaser. We feel well assured none such can be found. But, if this be so, the whole theory that the title does not pass if the money is not paid falls, and the true legal status of the parties results, that the seller has a remedy for the price of his goods against the carrier. In other words, an order from a seller to a carrier to collect on delivery, accepted by the carrier, creates a contract between the seller and the carrier, for a breach of which by the carrier the seller may recover the price from him. So far as the seller and purchaser are concerned, the latter is liable, whether he takes the goods from the carrier or not, and the order itself is a mere provision for the retention of the seller’s lien. While, if the goods are not delivered to the purchaser by the carrier, the title does not pass, that circumstance does not affect the character of the transaction as a sale; and the right of the seller to recover the price from the purchaser, if he refuse to take them, is as complete as if he had taken them, and not paid for them.
Thus far we have regarded the transaction between the parties in its aspect as a civil contract only; but, when viewed in its aspect as the source of a criminal prosecution, the transaction becomes much more clear of doubt. It is manifest, that when the purchaser ordered the goods to be sent to him C. O. D., he constituted the carrier his agent, both to receive the goods from the seller, and to transmit the price to the seller. When, therefore, the goods were delivered to the carrier at Pittsburgh for the purpose of transportation, the duty of the seller was performed, as we have already seen, so far as he and the purchaser were concerned, and as between them the transaction was complete. The duty of transportation devolved upon the carrier, and for this he was, in one' sense, the agent of the *162seller, as well as of the purchaser; but, as it was to be at the ' expense of the purchaser, the delivery to the carrier was a delivery to the purchaser; and this was ruled in Garbracht’s case. The injunction to the carrier to collect the money on delivery imposed an additional duty on the carrier, which the carrier was, of course, bound to discharge. This arrangement was a matter of convenience, both to the purchaser and the seller, relative to the payment and transmission of the price; but that is all. To convert this entirely innocent and purely civil convention respecting the mode of collecting the price of the goods, into a crime, is in our judgment, a grave perversion of the criminal law, to which we cannot assent. As a matter of course, there is an utter absence of any criminal intent in the case. The defendant had a license. The sale was made at his place of business, and both the sale and delivery were completed within the territory covered by the license. If, now, a criminal character is to be given to the transaction, it must be done by means of a technical inference that the title did not pass until the money was paid; and thus that the place of sale, which in point of fact was in Allegheny county, was changed to Mercer county, where no sale was made. Even granting that, in order to conserve the vendor’s lien, such a technical inference would be justified for the purposes of a civil contract, it by no means follows that the plain facts of the case must be clothed with a criminal consequence on that account. So far as the criminal law is concerned, it is only an actual sale without license that is prohibited. But there was no such sale, because all the essential facts which constituted the sale transpired in Allegheny county where the defendant’s license was operative. The carrier, being the agent of the purchaser to receive the goods, does receive them from the seller in Allegheny county, and the delivery to him for the purpose of transportation was a delivery to the purchaser. This is the legal, and certainly the common, understanding of a-sale. The statute, being criminal, must be strictly construed; and only those acts which are plainly within its meaning, according to the common understanding of men, can be regarded as prohibited criminal acts. We cannot consider, therefore, that a mere undertaking on the part of the carrier to collect the price of the goods at the time of' his delivery to the purchaser, though *163the payment of the price be a condition of the delivery, can suffice to convert the seller’s delivery to the carrier for transportation and collection into a crime. We therefore hold that the sales made by the defendant upon orders C. O. D. received from the purchasers, were not in violation of the criminal statute against sales without license, and the conviction and sentenceiin the court below must be set aside.
The judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions is reversed, and the defendant is discharged from his recognizance upon this indictment.