Court Opinion

ID: 9593856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:25:24.603466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:04.236780
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In my view the majority opinion in this case seizes upon the facts of a tragic accident to impose a liability upon a municipality, which has been hitherto unknown. The facts are simple and straightforward. The defendant/municipality maintained a park for recreational use. Through the park ran *275a water course which is dry during the majority of the year. Presumably the water course is man-made, and there is no indication here that the municipality in any way controlled the flow of water. There is no evidence, or even assertion, that the water course constituted in any way a hidden or concealed danger. Although water flowed during only part of the year, the municipality maintained a bridge over the water course which included a handrail thereon.
There is no indication in the record of any but the following facts. The two-year-old child was permitted to wander unattended from his home across the street from the park. The child, with its family, had been in the park earlier the same day. The child was found floating in the water course. There is nothing but speculation to indicate how the child came to be in the water course.
There is no question in my mind that this action falls within the purview of the Idaho recreational use statute, I.C. sec. 36-1604 et seq. The majority acknowledges the existence and purpose of the statute, i.e., to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public without charge for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes. To assert that the two-year-old child in question entered upon the premises for any other purpose than recreation is in my view totally unfounded. This Court most recently, in McGhee v. City of Glenns Ferry, 111 Idaho 921, 729 P.2d 396 (1986), clearly held that the operation of a city park falls within the scope of “recreational purposes” as contemplated in I.C. sec. 36-1604.
In my view the majority seriously errs when it asserts that the statute is inapplicable in the case at bar because there has been alleged the “willful and wanton conduct” of the municipality. I find nothing in the record to support that assertion of the majority. There is no assertion, nor any basis in the record, to indicate that the defendant/municipality willfully caused the injury to the child. The majority postulates that the child was playing on the bridge and fell into the water. There is no support in the record therefor. Even assuming the course of events postulated by the majority, there must be found more than a negligent breach of duty. Perhaps minds could differ as to whether a municipality could reasonably anticipate that an unattended two-year-old child would wander into the park and onto the bridge. The concept of liability could be stretched by requiring the operating authority to provide not only a bridge railing, but an impenetrable barrier which could not be scaled to prevent such tragedy. One could also postulate that the entire course of the stream through the park should be likewise fenced with an impenetrable barrier. In short, by stretching common sense it could be said that a municipality must anticipate the unattended presence of two-year-old toddlers and guard against any and all eventualities that might result from their presence. However, I suggest that all such concepts are part and parcel of the concept of ordinary negligence, and not related to willful and wanton conduct.
I would take judicial notice that the state of Idaho is blessed with lakes, streams and water courses both natural and man-made. Federal, state and local units of government maintain recreational areas adjacent thereto for the benefit of the public. There is nothing in the record here to indicate that the water course in question constituted any hidden or concealed danger, nor that it differed in any way from thousands of other locations in this state. The ultimate question which is posed but unanswered by the majority opinion is how any unit of government within this state is to cope with the pronouncement of the majority in this case. The majority, in my view, has converted that which at best is simple negligence, into willful and wanton conduct. I am led to the clear conclusion that the majority disagrees with the legislative limitation of the liability of landowners in the state of Idaho in the public use of public lands for recreational purposes. I dissent.