Court Opinion

ID: 9618025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:05:18.021315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:22.445894
License: Public Domain

Madsen, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the result reached by the majority because it is limited to accomplices who are present in the drug-free zone when the crime is committed. My concern, however, is that by rejecting the careful analysis outlined in State u. McKim, 98 Wn.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982), the majority has blurred the distinction between accomplice liability for substantive crimes and punishment of accomplices under enhancement provisions. This is a necessary distinction which the majority unjustifiably seeks to avoid. Applying the McKim analysis to the drug zone enhancement statute reaches the same result suggested by the majority without blurring the distinction between punishment predicated on complicity and punishment for the accused’s own misconduct.
At issue in McKim was the application of the deadly weapons enhancement to an unarmed accomplice. This court first examined RCW 9A.08.020G), the accomplice liability statute, for a basis to apply the sentence enhancement to an accomplice. After determining that the complicity statute contained no equal punishment provision for accomplices, this court concluded that applicability of the accomplice statute is limited to accountability for crimes. McKim, at 116. Thus, the McKim court stated, because an accomplice is "equally liable only for the substantive crime — any sentence enhancement must depend on the accused’s own misconduct”. McKim, at 117.
After rejecting accomplice liability as a basis for imposition of the sentence enhancement for deadly weapon, the McKim court looked to the language of the enhancement itself, RCW 9.95.015. Since RCW 9.95.015 required "a finding of fact of whether or not the accused was armed with a *485deadly weapon”, the McKim court concluded that the accused (there the accomplice) must himself have been armed in order to trigger imposition of the enhancement. McKim, at 116. McKim went on to find that an accomplice was armed for purposes of the enhancement statute if the accomplice was either actually armed or constructively armed with such a weapon. McKim, at 117. The court then found that an accomplice’s knowledge that the principal was armed was sufficient for a finding that the accomplice was constructively armed. McKim, at 117.
The majority attempts to distinguish McKim by stating that unlike the deadly weapon enhancement, the drug-free zone enhancement under RCW 69.50.435(b) does not require knowledge by any participant. With this statement it is clear that the majority fundamentally misunderstands the holding of McKim. McKim did not hold that the weapons enhancement statute required knowledge. Rather, faced with the language of the enhancement statute which, by express terms, applied only to an accused who was armed, the McKim court developed a principled analysis, to justify application of the deadly weapons enhancement to an accomplice, of which knowledge was a part. Under this analysis, the court first held that an accused could either be armed in fact or constructively armed. Next, the court determined that constructive possession of a weapon is satisfied if the accused has knowledge that another participant in the crime is armed. Thus, the court found the accomplice was armed and it was his own conduct which brought him within the enhanced penalty provision.
The majority’s misunderstanding of McKim is further evidenced when it asserts that the McKim court excluded accomplices from the operation of the deadly weapons enhancement "in order to avoid strict liability”. Majority, at 483. The McKim court did not exclude accomplices from operation of the enhancement. The Legislature had spoken clearly — only an accused who was "armed” was subject to the sentence enhancement. As stated above, faced with that clear language and the limitations of the complicity statute, *486the court introduced a theory of constructive possession of a weapon so that an accomplice could meet the requirement of being armed in RCW 9.95.015 and the enhancement would then apply to an accomplice.
The accomplice liability statute, RCW 9A.08.020(1), has not been amended since McKim and its application is still limited to imposing accountability for crimes. Complicity, therefore, remains foreclosed as a basis for the imposition of a sentencing enhancement despite the majority’s implication to the contrary. Following the McKim analysis, we must instead look to the language of the enhancement statute at issue to determine its applicability to an accomplice.
On its face, the school zone enhancement applies to "any person” who commits one of several enumerated crimes within the zone. The statute provides enhanced penalties for
Any person who violates RCW 69.50.401(a) by manufacturing, selling, delivering, or possessing with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver a controlled substance listed under that subsection or who violates RCW 69.50.410 by selling for profit any controlled substance or counterfeit substance classified in schedule I, RCW 69.50.204, except leaves and flowering tops of marihuana to a person in a school or on a school bus ... or within one thousand feet of the perimeter of the school grounds . . ..
RCW 69.50.435(a). If an accomplice is a "person” who meets the requirements described in RCW 69.50.435(a), then the enhancement can be imposed. In this case, the Defendants/ accomplices were actually within the school zone when the crimes to which they were accomplices were committed. Therefore, the enhancement may be applied to increase their penalties.
The majority unjustifiably rejects this straightforward analysis and instead relies on State v. Davis, 101 Wn.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984), a case which the majority admits involves accomplice liability for the substantive crime of first degree robbery, not the application of a sentence enhancement to an accomplice. The majority also cites RCW 69.50.435(b) in support of its rejection of McKim. This statute, however, merely states that application of the enhancement to a person committing certain listed crimes in a drug-free *487zone is not triggered by knowledge. This section in no way supports the leap made by the majority that an accomplice may receive an enhanced penalty simply because knowledge is not required. The strict liability nature of the enhancement cannot alone serve as the basis for extending a sentence enhancement to an accomplice. Rather, it is the language of the enhancement provision which is determinative.3
Central to the application of the enhanced penalty at issue here, and what the majority fails to address in its analysis, is thát the accomplice must be a "person” who commits one of the enumerated crimes within the drug-free zone. It is of no consequence whether that "person” is a principal or an accomplice. It is presence within the drug-free zone which is determinative. This is the fundamental holding of McKim,: because the complicity statute makes an accomplice equally liable only for the substantive crime — any sentence enhancement must depend on the accused’s own misconduct. McKim, at 117. The drug-free zone enhancement statute imposes strict liability only for those persons whose conduct takes place within the zone.
Utter and Johnson, JJ., concur with Madsen, J.

As the majority points out, the Legislature added the term "accomplice” to the deadly weapon enhancement after McKim. Unfortunately, the majority then speculates that the Legislature did not include the term "accomplice” within the drug-free zone enhancement because that enhancement provides for strict liability. However, as pointed out by amicus curiae, this assumption is contra to the rules of statutory construction. The Legislature is presumed to be familiar with the decisions of this court. In re Foreclosure of Liens, 117 Wn.2d 77, 86, 811 P.2d 945 (1991). The purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Cherry v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 116 Wn.2d 794, 799, 808 P.2d 746 (1991). " '[W] here the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” In re Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21, 27, 793 P.2d 962, 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (quoting United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Department of Rev., 102 Wn.2d 355, 362, 687 P.2d 186 (1984)). Had the Legislature intended the enhancement provisions of RCW 69.50.435 to apply to accomplices by virtue of their complicity, it is likely that it would have included the term "accomplice” within the provision as it did with the deadly weapons enhancement following McKim.