Court Opinion

ID: 5155931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-02 02:19:26.201848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:20.396270
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, joined by BURKE, Justice.
I am in agreement with the court’s construction of AS 20.15.070(b) and its holding that here the natural mother must be afforded a hearing concerning her withdrawal of consent to the adoption of her minor child. However, in my view, the decree of adoption in the case at bar must be permanently vacated, since the natural mother’s consent to adoption is invalid.
In Delgado v. Fawcett, 515 P.2d 710 (Alaska 1973), we stated:
The correlative rights and duties inherent in the parent-child relationship are natural rights of such fundamental importance that it is generally held that parents should not be deprived of them ‘except for grave and weighty reasons.’ In an adoption proceeding, where an absolute severance of this relationship is sought, the consent provisions are designed to protect the natural rights of a parent to the custody, society, comfort, and services of the child.1
In recognition of the substantial rights of a natural parent which are implicated in adoption proceedings, the legislature in part has provided that:
A consent to adoption may be withdrawn before the entry of a decree of adoption, within 10 days, by delivering written notice to the person obtaining the consent.2
Given the “essential” nature of a parent’s right to conceive and raise his or her children,3 I am of the view that unless the natural parent receives actual notice of the protection afforded by AS 20.15.070(b) his or her consent to adoption is invalid.
In past decisions, this court has stressed the importance of adequate notification of a party’s rights in cases involving economic relations. Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). In Aguchak, a summons to appear in a small claims proceeding did not mention the receiving party’s right to file a written pleading rather than make a personal appearance. We held the summons to be defective and a denial of due process because it did not adequately inform the receiving party of his option of filing a written pleading and therefore failed to convey the constitutionally required information sufficient to afford the party an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 1356. Surely notification of a natural mother’s rights, when that parent is involved in adoption proceedings which could sever, for all time, her rights and interests as a natural parent, is equally, if not more, significant. As the Supreme Court said in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972):
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made *657to liberties which' derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.’4
The consent to adoption form which the natural mother signed in this case did not contain an advisement that she had the right to withdraw her consent within ten days. This omission was particularly important here because placement of the child with the adoptive parents and execution of the consent occurred simultaneously.5 I consider it of further significance that the consent to adoption was executed by the natural parent, without the advice of independent counsel, in the office of the adoptive parent’s attorney and acknowledged by that attorney.6 For these reasons, I conclude that the natural mother, in the factual context of this case, was denied due process of law under Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution and thus that her consent was invalid.7
One further observation is appropriate. I agree with the majority that, to avoid future injustice, it would be helpful to include a statutory provision in AS 20.15.070 similar to the provisions governing relinquishment of parental rights,8 which would provide that a consent to adoption is invalid unless it includes a statement that the parent has a ten-day right of withdrawal.

. 515 P.2d at 712, quoting In re Parks’ Petition, 267 Minn. 468, 127 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn.1964) (footnotes omitted).

. AS 20.15.070(b).

. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. *6571208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972).

. 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. at 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d at 558, quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95, 69 S.Ct. 448, 458, 93 L.Ed. 513, 527 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

. Where placement and consent occur at the same time, the 10-day withdrawal provision of AS 20.15.070(b) provides an opportunity for reflection upon the consent decision beyond the potentially emotional moment of placement.

. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the natural parent had notice of her withdrawal right in time for her to exercise it within the 10-day period.

. Although the consent to adoption form that the natural mother signed contained a “waiver of notice” provision, this waiver was invalid because it contained no description of what actual rights and provisions were being waived. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94-96, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 2001-02, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, 578-79 (1972).
Unlike the authorities referred to in the court’s opinion, we are dealing here with an explicit legislative grant of a right to withdraw a consent to adoption. Given the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship and the right of withdrawal, granted by AS 20.15.-070(b), I find the authorities cited by the majority unpersuasive.

.See AS 20.15.180(b)(1). Compare Indian Child Welfare Act §§ 103(a), (c), 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1913(a), (c) (West Supp.1980).