Court Opinion

ID: 9578323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:44:08.230855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:32.272238
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would affirm the trial court in all respects. I concur with that said in the majority opinion except insofar as it finds a duty owed to pedestrian-appellant and imposed on appellees Johnson and Dresser by § 31-5-118, W.S.1977 (hereinafter referred to as “the statute”).1
The majority opinion correctly reasons that such duty was not imposed by § 31-5-959(a), W.S.1977. The same reasoning should result in a like determination with reference to the statute. The duty imposed by language of the statute has reference to circumstances other than those in this case. It does not impose a duty to take preventa*207tive action against injury to a pedestrian walking in the middle of the highway.
The following is from appellant’s deposition:
UJ^ * * *
“Suddenly, my right foot hit something and I woke up on the road.
“Q. Where did that take place?
“A. Approximately the center of the road, perhaps a little bit to the west of the center road.”
The entire tenure of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, §§ 31 — 5— 101 through 31-5-1214, W.S.1977, is with reference primarily to vehicular traffic. Section 31-5-605, W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) Where sidewalks are provided it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.
“(b) Where sidewalks are not provided any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall, when practicable, walk only on the left side of the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic which may approach from the opposite direction.”
It was practicable to walk on the left side of the road. In his deposition, appellant testified:
“ ‘ * * * So, I took the spotlight, walked on the left side of the road from the vehicle, because it was not so slippery there. * * *’
******
“ * * * then I began to cut down on an angle toward the truck when I was in a good position to do so.”
If the statute imposed a duty on appellees Johnson and Dresser to pick up the drill-bit box from the center of the highway, the duty was owed to the vehicular traffic properly using the center of the highway and not to appellant, since appellees Johnson and Dresser could expect him to obey the law and walk orf the left edge of the highway.
The principal design of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is to designate rights and duties for those operating vehicles on the highways. Provisions relative to pedestrians concern their obedience to traffic control signals, crossing highways at crosswalks and otherwise, prohibition against soliciting rides, etc., and the above-quoted directions for walking along highways. See §§ 31-5-601 through 31-5-607, W.S.1977.
The statute from which appellant and the majority opinion find the imposition of a duty to appellant on the part of appellees Johnson and Dresser to remove the drill-bit box from the center of the road (see n. 1) is just as devoid of reference to pedestrians under the circumstances of this case as is § 31-5-959(a). Subsection (a) of the statute has reference to a deliberate placing of substances on the highway. It has no application to the circumstances of this case. Subsection (c) thereof has reference to the necessity of removal of debris at the time a wrecked or damaged vehicle is taken from the site of an accident. It, too, has no application to the circumstances of this case. Subsection (b) thereof could be read to apply only to the prompt removal of material which would have a destructive or injurious effect on the highway itself. The placement and context of the adjectives in the sentence reflect such to have been the legislative intent. But even if the statute were taken to have for its purpose the prevention of damage to those using the highway, the resulting duty would be only to those properly using it — in this instance to vehicular traffic and not to a pedestrian in the middle of the highway. It should be borne in mind that the statute is a penal statute. It must be strictly construed. Baker v. Board of Com’rs of Crook County, 9 Wyo. 51, 59 P. 797 (1900); Brown v. Jarvis, 36 Wyo. 406, 256 P. 336 (1927); and Horn v. State, Wyo., 556 P.2d 925 (1976). Appellees Johnson and Dresser did not owe a duty to appellant under the circumstances of this case, and the summary judgment was proper.

. Section 31-5-118, W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) No person shall throw or deposit upon any highway any glass bottle, glass, nails, tacks, wire, cans, or any other substance likely to injure any person, animal, or vehicle upon such highway.
“(b) Any person who drops, or permits to be dropped or thrown, upon any highway any destructive or injurious material shall immediately remove the same or cause it to be removed.
“(c) Any person removing a wrecked or damaged vehicle from a highway shall remove any glass or other injurious substance dropped upon the highway from such vehicle.”