Court Opinion

ID: 9472832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:12:03.543009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:10.312738
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by Judge Edwards, although I write separately to express my views. Another panel of this court, under similar factual circumstances, albeit without adequate discussion of the jurisdictional problems involved, considered the merits of an appeal from a district court order disqualifying counsel in a civil context. General Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Service, Inc., 697 F.2d 704 (6th Cir.1982). This case, however, did not mention Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 101 S.Ct. 669, 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981), and it was decided prior to Flanagan v. United States, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). Because I believe that the rationale of these latter cases indicates a view of the Supreme Court that immediate appeals from orders dealing with disqualification of counsel come only under very “narrow exceptions” to the finality rule, see Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and that departures from that rule will be permitted only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all, see Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940), I agree that the appeal should be dismissed. I am therefore not prepared to consider the issue here presented on disqualification of defendant-appellant’s counsel on its merits. I believe it is “enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the cause of action.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978).
On the other hand, one must recognize that another circuit court, post Flanagan, has held that an order granting disqualification in a civil case is immediately appeal-able, and indicated persuasive reason for this holding. See Judge Wald’s opinion in Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C.Cir.), cert. granted, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 290, 83 L.Ed.2d 226 (1984). The Second Circuit, while reaching the same result as in Roller, did so without full discussion of the impact of Flanagan. Interco Systems, Inc. v. Omni Corporate Services, Inc., 733 F.2d 253 (2d Cir.1984).1 Post Firestone decisions have also permitted immediate appeals of disqualification orders in civil cases. See Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir.1982); Duncan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895, 102 S.Ct. 394, 70 L.Ed.2d 211 (1981); LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255 *340(7th Cir.1983);2 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, 658 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 990, 102 S.Ct. 1615, 71 L.Ed.2d 850 (1982).
A very recent Fifth Circuit opinion, Gibbs v. Paluk, 742 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.1984), reaches the same conclusion as do we. That court held that the trial court’s granting of a motion to disqualify was not a final appealable order in a civil case, thereby rejecting its prior holdings before the Supreme Court’s Flanagan decision. This Gibbs decision also rejected the rationale of Interco Systems, Inc. and of Koller.
Plaintiff-appellee concedes in his supplemental brief that circuit court decisions have held with unusual unanimity that orders granting motions to disqualify are immediately appealable. However, in light of this recent Fifth Circuit decision, this is no longer the case. Under these circumstances, I concur with the disposition here, recognizing a divergence of viewpoints on this issue.

. The Interco Systems panel included only one active judge of the Second Circuit, and based its decision on the rationale of Armstrong v. McAl-pin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir.1980) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106, 101 S.Ct. 911, 66 L.Ed.2d 835 (1981). It did observe, however:
Flanagan might well be a call to reexamine this circuit’s established rule permitting interlocutory appeal of disqualification orders in civil cases.

. This case relies upon prior Seventh Circuit precedent to this effect. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 720 (7th Cir.1982).