Court Opinion

ID: 9390640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 05:07:36.472188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.925292
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   April 27, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                  No. 353646
                                                                   Tuscola Circuit Court
DAVID ALLAN LUCYNSKI,                                              LC No. 20-015154-AR

              Defendant-Appellee.

                                        ON REMAND

Before: LETICA, P.J., and RIORDAN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This case returns to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court. Once more, we reverse
the district court’s order denying the motion for bindover and suppressing the evidence against
defendant, David Allan Lucynski.

                I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Lucynski was charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”), third offense,
MCL 257.625(9)(c); operating a motor vehicle while license suspended or revoked (“DWLS”),
second offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b); and possession or transportation of an open alcoholic
container in a vehicle, MCL 257.624a(1). In People v Lucynski, unpublished per curiam opinion
of the Court of Appeals, issued December 17, 2020 (Docket No. 353646) (Lucynski I), we
described the relevant case history:

               On January 20, 2020, Tuscola County Sheriff Deputy Ryan Robinson was
       on duty when he observed “two vehicles stopped in the middle of the roadway,
       facing opposite directions[.]” Deputy Robinson noted that the vehicles were
       positioned so that the driver’s side windows were facing each other. According to
       Deputy Robinson, the vehicles were impeding traffic even though there was no
       other traffic in the area at that time. As Deputy Robinson approached the vehicles,

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one of the vehicles traveled westbound and the other vehicle traveled eastbound.
Lucynski was driving the vehicle that traveled westbound. Deputy Robinson
followed Lucynski for 300 to 400 feet before Lucynski pulled into a driveway.
Thereafter, Deputy Robinson parked his police cruiser behind Lucynski’s vehicle
and exited the cruiser. Lucynski was already out of his vehicle.

         Deputy Robinson approached Lucynski, who smelled like marijuana and
“intoxicating beverages[.]” Deputy Robinson noted that Lucynski had bloodshot
eyes and that his demeanor was “pretty laid back.” Lucynski admitted that he had
consumed alcohol about 20 minutes before. Lucynski also admitted that he had
marijuana in his vehicle and that he did not have a driver’s license because it was
suspended. Lucynski submitted to field sobriety tests, which supported Deputy
Robinson’s suspicion that Lucynski was intoxicated. After Lucynski refused to
submit to a preliminary breath test, Deputy Robinson placed Lucynski under arrest.
Thereafter, Lucynski submitted to a preliminary breath test, which revealed that
Lucynski had a blood alcohol content of .035. Later, Lucynski’s blood was drawn
to test for intoxicants, and the sample reflected the presence of THC.

       Lucynski was charged with OWI, third offense; DWLS, second offense; and
possession or transportation of an open alcoholic container in a vehicle.[] The
preliminary examination was held on March 4, 2020. In relevant part, the People
presented the testimony of Deputy Robinson, and Deputy Robinson’s body camera
footage was admitted into evidence. At the close of proofs, the People argued that
bindover of the OWI charge was appropriate because there was sufficient cause for
Deputy Robinson to conduct the traffic stop under MCL 257.676b(1).[] Lucynski
opposed bindover on the OWI charge, arguing that there was “an issue in regards
to the actual stop.” The district court took the matter under advisement and
permitted the parties to file written briefs on the issue of whether Lucynski’s Fourth
Amendment rights were violated.

         In a March 27, 2020 opinion and order, the district court concluded that
Deputy Robinson lacked both probable cause and the requisite articulable,
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. In relevant part, the district court
analyzed the plain language of MCL 257.626b(1) and concluded that Deputy
Robinson could not have had an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Lucynski
was “actually impeding or obstructing actual traffic” because Deputy Robinson
testified that “Lucynski’s vehicle was not actually impeding or obstructing any
actual traffic[.]” Based on the district court’s conclusion that the stop was
unconstitutional, the district court held that “the evidence obtained after the Traffic
stop [w]ould be excluded from evidence” for purposes of the preliminary
examination. The district court then found that probable cause did not exist to bind
Lucynski over on the OWI charge and dismissed it. The district court indicated
that it would set the remaining misdemeanor counts for trial. In doing so, the district
court held that “the evidence found as a result of th[e] stop is not admissible in any
subsequent hearing o[r] trial on those two misdemeanor counts.” [Id. at 1-2
(footnotes omitted).]

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        As noted, this Court concluded that a Fourth Amendment violation did not occur and
therefore “the district court erred by excluding evidence from the preliminary examination
proceeding and by holding that the evidence produced by investigatory stop and arrest would be
excluded from future proceedings concerning Lucynski’s DWLS and open intoxicant charges.”
Id. at 7. We also determined “the district court abused its discretion by denying the People’s
motion for bindover on the OWI charge and by dismissing the OWI charge.” Id. We therefore
reversed the district court’s denial of the motion for bindover, and its decision to suppress the
evidence against Lucynski. Id.

        Lucynski appealed to our Supreme Court. The Court granted leave to appeal as to three
limited questions:

       (1) whether [Lucynski] impeded traffic, in violation of MCL 257.676b(1), where
       there was no actual traffic to impede at that time; (2) if not, whether [Deputy
       Robinson] made a reasonable mistake of law by effectuating a traffic stop of
       [Lucynski] for violating MCL 257.676b(1), see Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S.
       54, 135 S Ct 530, 190 L Ed 2d 475 (2014); and (3) whether [Deputy Robinson]
       seized [Lucynski] when he pulled his patrol vehicle behind [Lucynski’s] vehicle in
       a driveway. [People v Lucynski, 508 Mich 947 (2021) (Lucynski II).]

        Our Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, concluding “there is no
evidence in the record to sustain the accusation that defendant” impeded traffic in violation of
MCL 257.676b(1). People v Lucynski, 509 Mich 618, 650; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Lucynski III).
Similarly, the Court determined Deputy Robinson did not make a reasonable mistake of law in
effectuating the traffic stop because “one cannot be guilty of violating MCL 257.676b(1) without
evidence that the ‘normal flow’ of actual traffic was disrupted, and [Deputy] Robinson admitted
that no disruption occurred.” Id. at 652-653. As to the third question, the Court decided Lucynski
was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment because a reasonable person in Lucynski’s place
would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave—indeed, his only options “would have
been to attempt to enter a home that [he] did not own (and without knowledge whether the owner
was home) or wander off into a frozen field some distance from town in a rural area.” Id. at 645-
646.

       On the basis of these conclusions, our Supreme Court resolved:

       [T]hat [Lucynski] was seized the moment [Deputy] Robinson blocked the driveway
       and prevented egress, [Lucynski’s] incriminating statements and [Deputy
       Robinson’s] visual and olfactory observations that the Court of Appeals relied upon
       to justify further inquiry and an eventual arrest were obtained in violation of
       [Lucynski’s] Fourth Amendment rights. Prior to [Deputy] Robinson blocking
       [Lucynski] in, [Lucynski] had not made any incriminating statements, and thus such
       statements could not have justified a seizure. A seizure could have been justified
       if [Deputy] Robinson had reasonable suspicion to believe that [Lucynski] had
       violated the law, but as the district court previously held, there was no evidence to
       support [Deputy] Robinson’s hunch that an illegal drug transaction had taken place
       on the road, and that ruling was not appealed. A suspected violation of MCL
       257.676b(1) also could not serve as reasonable suspicion given our previous

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       conclusions. Accordingly, we have not been presented with any lawful justification
       for the seizure, and the district court did not err by holding that the seizure violated
       [Lucynski’s] constitutional rights. [Id. at 656-657.]

        Therefore, the question for this Court is whether, in light of the Fourth Amendment
violations against Lucynski, “application of the exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy.”
Id. at 658.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings for clear error. People v Williams, 472
Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). Clear error exists where “we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” People v Muro, 197 Mich App 745, 747; 496
NW2d 401 (1993). “But the application of constitutional standards regarding searches and
seizures to essentially uncontested facts is entitled to less deference; for this reason, we review de
novo the trial court’s ultimate ruling on the motion to suppress.” Williams, 472 Mich at 313.

                                   III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        The Fourth Amendment to the United States constitution states, in relevant part: “The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” US Const, Am IV; see also Const 1963, art 1,
§ 11. In line with these principles, the exclusionary rule prohibits “[t]he introduction into evidence
of materials seized and observations made during an unlawful search.” People v Stevens, 460
Mich 626, 633; 597 NW2d 53 (1999). The exclusionary rule also bars “the introduction into
evidence of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search,
the so-called ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine.” Id. at 633-634, citing Wong Sun v United
States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).

        However, the exclusionary rule is a remedy of last resort. Herring v United States, 555 US
135, 140; 129 S Ct 695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009). Even when evidence is the product of an illegal
search, it does not follow that the evidence is necessarily subject to the exclusionary rule. Stevens,
460 Mich at 635; see also United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 348; 94 S Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d
561 (1974) (“Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted
to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.”). In
determining whether the exclusionary rule applies, a court must “evaluate the circumstances of
th[e] case in the light of the policy served by the exclusionary rule.” Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590,
604; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975). “The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its
purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Id. at 599-600.

       In Herring, 555 US 144-145, the United States Supreme Court considered a circumstance
where evidence was discovered as the result of a faulty warrant. In determining whether the
exclusionary rule provided a sufficient deterrent effect, the Supreme Court stated:

               To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
       deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
       such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our

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       cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
       conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in
       this case does not rise to that level.

                                              * * *

               If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant
       system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future
       false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such
       misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation . . . .

                                              * * *

               Petitioner’s claim that police negligence automatically triggers suppression
       cannot be squared with the principles underlying the exclusionary rule, as they have
       been explained in our cases. In light of our repeated holdings that the deterrent
       effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the justice
       system, we conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence such as
       that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
       requirements, any marginal deterrence does not “pay its way.” In such a case, the
       criminal should not “go free because the constable has blundered.” [Id. at 144-148
       (footnote and citations omitted).]

         Here, Deputy Robinson testified that he initiated a traffic stop of Lucynski’s vehicle
because he thought Lucynski was impeding traffic in contravention of MCL 257.626b(1).
Lucynski I, unpub op at 1. Although our Supreme Court later concluded that this belief was not
objectively reasonable because there was no traffic on the road, Lucynski III, 509 Mich at 652, it
is also true that Deputy Robinson did not demonstrate any deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct. There is no evidence in the record showing that Deputy Robinson acted in bad faith when
he effectuated a traffic stop of Lucynski. Nor was there any evidence this stop was part of a
systemic effort to subvert Lucynski’s constitutional rights.

        Moreover, Deputy Robinson’s decision to stop the vehicle aligned with this Court’s
reasoning in People v Salters, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 26, 2001 (Docket No. 215396), p 2. Although Lucynski III clarifies Salters to the extent
that “some evidence of actual interference with the normal flow of traffic is required,” Lucynski
III, 509 Mich at 654, that does not mean suppression is mandated in this case. Deputy Robinson
could not have predicted the outcome in Lucynski III and to suppress the evidence would
impermissibly hold law enforcement officers to a higher standard than the judiciary. Therefore,
there is simply not enough evidence in this case showing how suppression of the evidence would
deter any future misconduct by police officers. Thus, application of the exclusionary rule was not
the appropriate remedy and the district court erred when it concluded otherwise.

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      Reversed and remanded to the district court for an opinion consistent with this analysis.
We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                          /s/ Anica Letica
                                                          /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                          /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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