Court Opinion

ID: 9913908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:08:59.97367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:33.372967
License: Public Domain

J-S34027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID WILLIAMS                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 135 WDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 21, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0005055-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: December 28, 2023

       Appellant, David Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed on October 21, 2021 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny

County, placing him on three years’ probation stemming from a conviction for

persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).1 Appellant claims

that the trial court erred by failing to give him credit for the time he was

____________________________________________

1 As this court reiterated in Commonwealth v Chambers, 55 A.3d 1208 (Pa.

Super. 2012), “Probation is a form of authorized supervision ‘aimed at
rehabilitating and reintegrating a law breaker into society as a law-abiding
citizen [and] is deemed a constructive alternative to imprisonment.’” Id. at
1212 (quoting Commonwealth v. Colon, 708 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa. Super.
1998)). “[P]robation rehabilitates a defendant in a less restrictive manner
than total confinement. As such, logic would lead to the conclusion that a
term of probation cannot be served while the defendant is imprisoned on an
unrelated sentence[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 145 A.3d 184, 188 (Pa.
Super. 2016), appeal denied, 165 A.3d 892 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).
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incarcerated before this Court vacated a portion of an earlier sentence

imposed by the trial court in 2020. Following review, we affirm.

      As the trial court explained:

      On January 7, 2016, Appellant . . . pled guilty to one count each
      of possession of firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried
      without a license, and possession of marijuana. [On August 19,
      2016, t]his court sentenced Appellant to two years of State
      Intermediate Punishment (“SIP”), followed by three years of
      consecutive probation at the possession of a firearms prohibited
      count and no further penalty at the remaining counts. On
      September 11, 2020, this court found that Appellant had been
      expelled from SIP as a result of absconding from the program and
      subsequently, [Appellant] pled guilty at two new criminal
      informations. This court revoked SIP and[, on September 11,
      2020,] resentenced Appellant to four to eight years of
      incarceration.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 2 (some capitalization omitted).          The

September 11, 2020 sentence did not include a consecutive probationary

sentence, but did provide time for credit served totaling 581 days, from March

29, 2016 until October 30, 2017.

      Appellant filed an appeal to this Court from the September 11, 2020

judgment of sentence. On August 27, 2021, this Court vacated Appellant’s

sentence and remanded with instruction to reinstate the original order of

probation. Commonwealth v. Williams, 263 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2021). The

Court held that the trial court did not have authority to revoke a SIP sentence

and impose a term of incarceration after the SIP statute was repealed in its

entirety. The panel noted:

      Although we find that Williams’ SIP revocation proceeding was
      void for lack of statutory authority, we also find that Williams

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      cannot continue to serve the original SIP sentence where the SIP
      statute has been repealed and substituted with the State drug
      treatment program, and where there is no saving clause
      applicable to Williams’ case.     See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1971(a).
      Therefore, the only remaining valid portion of Williams’ original
      sentence is the consecutive term of three years’ probation. See
      [Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512, 528 (Pa. Super.
      2021 (en banc)] (remanding with instruction to reinstate valid
      portions of defendant’s original sentence following appellate
      determination that resentencing was void).

Id. at 7 n. 16.

      On remand, and following a hearing, the trial court reinstated

Appellant’s three-year sentence of probation as directed by this Court. Order

of Sentence, 10/21/21, at 1. By that time, Appellant had been incarcerated

for 405 days, from September 11, 2020, when he was expelled from SIP, until

October 21, 2021, when the trial court reinstated his sentence of probation.

      Appellant filed an appeal to this Court from the October 21, 2021

judgment of sentence. After his appeal was quashed as untimely on July 15,

2022, Appellant filed a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, seeking reinstatement of his post-

sentence motion and direct appeal rights.     By order entered November 4,

2022, the PCRA court granted the motion, specifically reinstating Appellant’s

post-sentence motion rights. Order, 11/4/22, at 1.

      Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, seeking 405 days’ credit for time

served from September 12, 2020 until October 21, 2021. The Commonwealth

agreed that Appellant was entitled to that credit. On January 4, 2023, the

PCRA court entered an order granting Appellant 405 days’ credit for time

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served. However, the order was silent as to applying the credit to Appellant’s

sentence of probation imposed on October 21, 2021. Order, 1/4/23, at 1.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant asks us to consider one issue on appeal:

      Whether the Sentencing Court committed an error of law when it
      failed to give [Appellant] credit for time spent incarcerated when
      reconsidering his probation sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      As this Court has recognized:

      A challenge to the trial court’s failure to award credit for time
      served prior to sentencing involves the legality of a
      sentence. Commonwealth v. Menezes, 871 A.2d 204, 207 (Pa.
      Super. 2005)[.]
      It is well established that there is no constitutional right to credit
      for time served prior to trial or sentence. Martin v.
      Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 576 Pa. 588,
      840 A.2d 299, 304 (2004)[.]

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 967 A.2d 1001, 1003 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(additional citations omitted).

      In accordance with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1),

      [c]redit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be
      given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of the
      criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a result
      of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit shall include
      credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during trial, pending
      sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) (emphasis added).

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      Appellant contends that he was “in custody” during the 405-day period

between September 12, 2020 and October 21, 2021. We agree. However, at

the conclusion of that period, the trial court reinstated his sentence of

probation. No prison sentence was imposed. Moreover, that time spent in

custody was not “prior to trial, during trial, pending sentence, [or] pending

the resolution of an appeal,” as set forth in Section 9760(1). Rather, it was

time spent in custody because he absconded from and was subsequently

expelled from SIP, leading the trial court to impose a sentence of incarceration

that was ultimately vacated by this Court in light of the repeal of SIP. Had

Appellant been sentenced to a new period of incarceration after the time spent

in custody, credit could be appropriately awarded.       However, he was not

sentenced to prison. Rather, the previously imposed consecutive sentence of

probation was reinstated.

      To award credit against Appellant’s probationary sentence would, in

essence, be to reward him for absconding from SIP.           More importantly,

because Appellant’s sentence is one solely of probation, there is no maximum

or minimum term against which credit can be applied under Section 9760(1).

This determination is consistent with this Court’s holding in Commonwealth

v. Walk, 238 A.2d 32 (Pa. Super. 1967). In Walk, this Court rejected the

appellant’s contention that he was entitled to credit against his probationary

sentence for time served in prison.      The Court looked to 19 P.S. § 898

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(repealed), the predecessor statute to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1) at issue in the

instant case. Section 898 provided:

      Any person who has been convicted of an offense in any court in
      this Commonwealth and sentenced to a term of imprisonment
      shall be given credit toward the service of his sentence for any
      days spent in custody on this offense prior to the imposition of his
      sentence, including any days spent in custody on this offense prior
      to the entry of bail.

Id. (emphasis added). In Walk, the appellant argued that the time he served

in prison under a vacated sentence should be credited against his remaining

sentence. This Court rejected his argument, stating that “[s]ince [appellant’s

remaining] sentence was to five years probation, not imprisonment, the Act

does not provide for credit against his new sentence.” Walk, 238 A.2d at 34.

      Although the language of the prior statute varies slightly from the

statute in currently in place, we find this Court’s reasoning and conclusions in

Walk applicable to the instant case. Because Appellant’s October 21, 2021

sentence does not include any time in prison and, therefore, does not include

any time in custody, we conclude he is not entitled to credit against his

sentence of probation. Again, his sentence of probation was to begin only

after he completed his SIP sentence, a sentence he did not complete because

he absconded.

      We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant was not

entitled to time credit against his probationary sentence. While our reasoning

for affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence differs from that offered by the

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trial court,2 we may affirm on any basis supported by the record.        See

Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 62 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing

Colon, supra, 708 A.2d at 1282 n.1).

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

    12/28/2023

____________________________________________

2 The trial court cited case law that considered whether time spent on
electronic monitoring could be credited against a prison sentence, rather than
whether time in prison could be credited against a sentence of probation. See
Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 3-4.

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