Court Opinion

ID: 9791681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:15:57.0856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.897573
License: Public Domain

*822Neill, J.
(concurring) — I concur that summary judgment should not have been granted, but disagree with the court’s continuation of the rationale used in Prins v. Holland-North America Mortgage Co., 107 Wash. 206 181 P. 680, 5 A.L.R. 451 (1619).
Clarity and effective analysis require that the term “publication” in slander and libel suits be restricted to the physical concept of publication in fact. See, W. Prosser, Torts § 108, at 786 (3d ed. 1964). Thus understood, the requisite element of publication in defamation actions consists of the communication of the defamatory matter to a person other than the one defamed. Restatement of Torts § 577 (1938).
In Prins, supra, there was a communication of defamatory statements between corporate officials which was also read by other corporate employees. This court properly held for the defendant under the circumstances but, in doing so, issues of qualified privilege and publication were, unfortunately, intermingled. There can hardly be a doubt that under the facts of Prins there was a publication. The letter or memorandum defamatory of the plaintiff was actually read by at least two other employees of the defendant company. Thus, the holding in Prins was properly on the basis of qualified privilege.
In the present case, there does not appear to be any dispute of fact that the purportedly defamatory words were spoken to the assembled housekeepers, some of whom were union members and some of whom were not. It follows that there was a publication of the allegedly defamatory words to nonunion housekeepers concerning housekeepers who were union members.
There remains, however, the matter of the possible defense of qualified privilege. I disagree with the statement of the majority that “Mrs. Skiff had no duty to comment upon the ideology of unions.” Such a statement goes to the very heart of the issue of qualified privilege. The purpose of the meeting, the content of the remarks by Mrs. Skiff, and the relationship between those remarks and her responsibilities *823and duties, are all very much in issue, are unresolved by the present record and involve questions of fact. See, Ward v. Painters’ Local 300, 41 Wn.2d 859, 252 P.2d 253 (1953).
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.