Court Opinion

ID: 9404705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 21:04:55.580109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:16.448823
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/23/23 P. v. Simpson CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080144

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF10002518)

 DARIONNE STEVEN SIMPSON,                                                OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Thomas E. Kelly, Judge.

Affirmed with directions.

         Eric Multhaup, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and

Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       Defendant, Darionne Simpson, appeals from a judgment summarily denying his

petition for resentencing, made pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6. Defendant was

convicted in 2011 of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code1, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a),

counts 1 and 3), one count of shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246, count 2), one count

of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner as a lesser included offense of

shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246.3, count 4), and one count of active participation

in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a), count 5), along with true findings that

defendant personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), respecting the first

attempted murder count, and that both attempted murder counts were willful, deliberate,

and premeditated.

       On appeal, defendant claims (1) the court erred in summarily denying his petition

for resentencing as to the second attempted murder conviction (count 3) because he was

an aider-abettor, and (2) the court erred in summarily denying his request for a Franklin

hearing (ref. People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261). We remand the case to allow

defendant an opportunity to make a record of youthful offender circumstances but

otherwise affirm.

                                          BACKGROUND

       Because the reporter’s transcript was destroyed before the hearing on the instant

petition, we include the background facts from our prior opinion in the original appeal,

People v. Simpson (Oct. 23, 2012, E054348 [nonpub. opn.]):

       1   Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
                                 “FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       “A.    Victim M.M.

       “On February 26, 2010, around 7:00 p.m., M.M. was driving his 1987 Camaro in

Moreno Valley, when he saw three young Black males in a black Ford Taurus staring at

him in a menacing manner. The vehicle followed M.M. and pulled in front of his vehicle.

When both vehicles came to a stop, M.M. saw a “gun come out the back window” and

shoot at him multiple times. M.M. ducked, made a U-turn, and sped away. A bullet hit

the front of M.M.’s vehicle. M.M. drove home and called the police.

       “Riverside County Sheriff’s deputies came to M.M.’s house, took a report, and left

about 10 minutes later. Approximately 20 minutes later, deputies came back to M.M.’s

home and took him to a location about a mile away for an in-field identification. M.M.

identified the black Taurus as the vehicle from which shots had been fired but was unable

to identify defendant as one of the suspects. Later in the evening, deputies searched the

area where the shots were fired and recovered .40-caliber shell casings.

       “B.    Victim M.J.

       “On February 26, 2010, around the same time as the incident in victim M.M.’s

case, the front passenger in the same black Taurus shot multiple times at M.J.’s silver

vehicle, hitting the driver’s side door and window. Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy

Acosta was on patrol in the area and heard four to five shots fired. Deputy Acosta then

saw M.J.’s silver vehicle following the black Taurus at a high rate of speed.

                                             3
       “M.J. pulled over, waved at the deputy, and continued to follow the black Taurus.

The deputy followed M.J.’s vehicle, and when M.J. came to another stop, the deputy

made contact with M.J. M.J. pointed in the direction the black Taurus was travelling, and

excitedly said, “‘Those guys in that black Ford Taurus just shot at me.’” Deputy Acosta

pursued the black Taurus but was unable to catch up with it. Deputy Acosta later located

the black Taurus parked in the area but did not find any suspects in the vehicle.

       “Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Pierson was on routine patrol when he

received a dispatch call of “shots fired.” Deputy Pierson responded to the area the black

vehicle was located, and as he approached the area, he saw a “[B]lack male adult walking

very briskly.” Deputy Pierson detained the suspect, identified as defendant, and noticed

that defendant was “breathing heavily.” Defendant lied to the deputy about his name.

       “Deputy Pierson subsequently searched the area and found a brown sweater and a

blue shirt in a nearby yard. A search of defendant’s person revealed a shell casing in his

pocket.

       “After defendant waived his constitutional rights, he admitted to being at the

liquor store. He also admitted to being the rear passenger in the black Taurus during the

shootings. He claimed the driver of the black Taurus was from a “Crip-affiliated” gang

in Los Angeles. Defendant also admitted to taking off his clothes after the shooting. He

denied being the shooter and evasively claimed the front passenger was the shooter.

                                             4
       “C.    Gang Evidence

       “A gang expert testified that the Perris Loc gang is a criminal street gang with

about 75 to 90 members. The gang’s territory is the southern portion of the City of

Perris, and its primary activities are assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and drug

sales. Members of the gang had committed numerous crimes that showed a pattern of

criminal gang activity.

       “Defendant had previously admitted that he was a member of the Perris Loc gang.

In addition, defendant had been contacted by law enforcement with members of the gang.

Defendant had multiple tattoos, such as “Front Line” and “Certified Goon,” which were

affiliated with the Perris Loc gang. The gang expert concluded that on the date of the

incidents, defendant was a member of the Perris Loc criminal street gang.” (People v.

Simpson, supra, E054348, pp. 2-5.)

       Defendant appealed from his conviction, which was affirmed on October 23, 2012,

in an unpublished opinion, People v. Simpson, supra, E054348. On October 3, 2022,

defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to then-section 1170.95 (now

§ 1172.6). On October 13, 2022, defendant filed a petition inviting the court to recall his

sentence pursuant to section 1172.1. That same day, the court summarily denied the

motion to recall the sentence pursuant to section 1172.1.

       On November 4, 2022, the court summarily denied the petition for resentencing

pursuant to section 1172.6. On November 7, 2022, defendant timely appealed the denial

of the petition for resentencing under section 1170.95 (1172.6).

                                             5
                                              DISCUSSION

       1.      Defendant is Ineligible for Resentencing Because His Conviction for

Attempted Murder in Count 3 Was Based on Findings of Specific Intent to Kill and Express

Malice.

       Defendant makes no challenge relating to his conviction of attempted murder in

count 1. As to count 3, he argues the trial court erred in summarily denying his petition

for resentencing because he was convicted as an aider and abettor on that count and the

instructions to the jury allowed a conviction without any finding of malice aforethought.

He also argues that the statement of facts in our 2012 opinion filed in the direct appeal

does not demonstrate defendant was the shooter because the shots were fired from the

front passenger window and there was no evidence defendant sat in the front seat. We

disagree.

       We begin by outlining the general principles governing review of summary

denials of petitions for resentencing. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437

amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e). It provides that a

participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was

the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct

aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with

reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842.)

       The Legislature also amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by

amending section 188, subdivision (a)(3), which now states that “[m]alice shall not be

                                                6
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.

(a)(3).) Effective January 1, 2022, the ameliorative statutory scheme was further

amended to clarify that the new procedures applied also to persons convicted of

attempted murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural and

probable consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted

of murder under the same theories. (Sen. Bill No. 775, eff. Jan. 1, 2022; People v.

Birdsall (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 859, 865, fn. 18; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84

Cal.App.5th 377, 388.)

       Under section 1172.6, a person convicted of felony murder or murder based on the

natural and probable consequences doctrine may petition the sentencing court to vacate

the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have

been convicted of murder because of these statutory changes. (See People v. Lewis

(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960.)

       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 changed certain aspects of felony

murder and the natural and probable consequences doctrine by amending sections 188

and 189, as well as by adding section 1170.95, later amended and renumbered as section

1172.6. Those sections provide a procedure by which those convicted of murder can seek

retroactive relief if the changes in law would affect their previously sustained

convictions. (People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 731.)

       In a subsequent amendment that became effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No.

775 clarified that the changes brought by Senate Bill No. 1437 also include attempted

                                             7
murder convictions. (People v. Porter (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 651-652; People v.

Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 193.)

       The amendments to section 188, subdivision (a)(3), prohibit imputing malice

based solely on participation in a crime, thereby removing the natural and probable

consequences doctrine as a basis to prove an accomplice committed attempted murder.

(Sanchez, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 196.) Likewise, the amended provisions of section

189 require proof that “[a] participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a

felony murder—such as robbery, kidnapping, or burglary—was (1) the actual killer; (2)

an aider and abettor of the killer with the intent to kill; or (3) a major participant in the

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in

section 190.2, subdivision (d). (§ 189, subds. (a) & (e).)

       A person may seek resentencing by filing a section 1172.6 petition. (§ 1172.6,

subd. (a)(3).) Upon such filing, the court must “determine whether the petitioner has

made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The petitioner is entitled to

relief if he alleges, as relevant here, (1) “[a] complaint, information, or indictment was

filed against [him] that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony

murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory

under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a

crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” (2) he

“accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted

of . . . attempted murder,” and (3) he “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted

                                               8
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)

       The prima facie inquiry is limited. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

The court must accept the petitioner’s allegations as true and “should not make credibility

determinations or engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the

exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Id.at p. 974.) “If the petition and record in the case

establish conclusively that the [petitioner] is ineligible for relief, the trial court may

dismiss the petition” as a matter of law. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, In

re Serrano (1995) 10 Cal.4th 447, 456.)

       “‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts

refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a

credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)

       Thus, at the prima facie stage, the trial court’s inquiry “‘is limited to readily

ascertainable facts from the record (such as the crime of conviction), rather than

factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion (such as

determining whether the petitioner showed reckless indifference to human life in the

commission of the crime).’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pacheco (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118,

125.) “If, accepting the facts asserted in the petition as true, the petitioner would be

entitled to relief . . . , then the trial court should issue an order to show cause.” (People v.

                                               9
Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980–981 [overruled on a different point in People v.

Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963].)

       “We independently review a trial court’s determination whether a petitioner has

made a prima facie showing”. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 656.)

Whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under

section 1172.6 is a “‘purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.’ [Citation.]”

(People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)

       Defendant argues that the instructions to the jury resulted in a conviction lacking

in a determination that defendant acted with malice aforethought, requiring an evidentiary

hearing. He also emphasizes the fact that from our prior opinion in the direct appeal, it is

unclear who was sitting in the front passenger seat, from which the shots at M.J. in count

3 were fired.2 From this, defendant argues he was convicted as an aider-abettor.

Whether the jury considered defendant an aider-abettor or not matters little in this case.

The jury expressly found he had an intent to kill and that his conduct in count 3 was

further accompanied by a mental state of willfulness, deliberation and premeditation.

       It is true that the amended provisions of section 188 direct that malice may not “be

imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.

(a)(3).) However, here, defendant’s attempted murder conviction was not based on the

felony murder doctrine. The section further provides that “to be convicted of murder, a

       2 We are precluded from making factual findings in reviewing a petition for
resentencing that was summarily denied. For this reason, we do not comment on
contradictory information in the trial transcripts or probation report.

                                             10
principal in a crime shall act with malice.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see also, People v.

Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 290.) Here, defendant’s convictions demonstrate

the jury found defendant acted with express malice.

        “Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill and the commission of a

direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Booker

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 177-178; People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123.)

“Intent to unlawfully kill and express malice are, in essence, ‘one and the same.’

[Citation.]” (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) In addition, the crime of

attempted murder is not divided into degrees, but the prosecution may seek a finding that

the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated for purposes of sentence

enhancement. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 740.) Thus, a conviction for attempted

murder requires the specific intent to kill. (Ibid.)

        The jury was correctly instructed that to find appellant guilty of attempted murder,

it had to find he acted with express malice, meaning the intent to kill. The jury

instructions given on aider-abettor liability were addressed to direct aiding and abetting,

and not on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Malice, therefore, was not

“imputed” to defendant; his conviction reflects his own mental state of express malice.

Thus, even though section 1172.6 was amended to permit a petition for resentencing of a

conviction for attempted murder, the record of conviction shows appellant was ineligible

for resentencing as a matter of law. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545-

547.)

                                              11
       The trial court correctly determined defendant had failed to make a prima facie

showing he was entitled to relief under section 1172.6.

       2.     Defendant is Entitled to a Remand for a Hearing to Preserve Evidence of His

Youthful Characteristics for Use in Determining Parole Eligibility.

       In addition to the resentencing petition filed pursuant to sections 1170.95 or

1172.6, defendant also filed a petition seeking recall of his sentence pursuant to section

1172.1. This petition included the assertion that in addition to recall of the sentence,

defendant is entitled to an evidence preservation proceeding under People v. Franklin,

supra, for purposes of parole consideration, showing that he was 17 years of age at the

time of the offenses. We agree he is entitled to a limited remand to make a record of his

youthful characteristics for purposes of parole consideration.

       We begin by noting that the People correctly point out that the petition “inviting”

the trial court to recall defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 1172.1 was properly

denied as untimely because a trial court lacks jurisdiction to recall a sentence pursuant to

that section where the “invitation” has been made more than 120 days from the date of

sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a).)

       However, the procedural impediment to seeking a recall of sentence by a youthful

offender did not preclude defendant from seeking a hearing to preserve evidence of his

youthful characteristics for consideration of the California Board of Parole Hearings.

The record establishes that defendant was 17 years and 9 months of age at the time of the

                                             12
commission of the crime: the offense was committed on February 26, 2010, and

defendant’s date of birth is May 26, 1992.

       As to this aspect of defendant’s “invitation,” filed in propria persona, we do not

consider the issue forfeited by failing to specifically refer to the denial of this request in

defendant’s notice of appeal.

       A notice of appeal must be liberally construed. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule

8.304(a)(4).) The policy of liberal construction authorizes reviewing courts to deem

another appealable judgment or order part of a timely filed appeal, so long as the other

judgment or order was made withing 60 days of the notice of appeal. (See In re Madison

W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450.)

       Given that the order denying defendant’s request under Franklin was denied the

same date as it was filed, it is entirely possible--even probable--that counsel on the

section 1170.95 proceeding, who was appointed on November 4, 2022, after the denial of

defendant’s earlier “invitation,” was wholly unaware of the other application at the time

of the filing of the notice of appeal, filed on November 7, 2022.

       The defendant filed two documents within 10 days of each other. The untimely

request for or invitation to recall the sentence under section 1172.1, which included the

Franklin request to preserve evidence, was filed and denied on October 13, 2022. The

petition for resentencing had already been filed on October 3, 2022, but counsel was not

appointed until November 4, 2022. The notice of appeal, which was filed on November

7, 2022, was filed within 60 days of the orders denying relief on both applications.

                                              13
       While defendant was not “entitled” to a recall of his sentence, he was entitled to an

opportunity to preserve evidence and information relating to his youthful characteristics.

(In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 450.) Under these circumstances, rather than hold that

defendant should make another, separate, application for Franklin-type relief, we will

construe the notice of appeal as encompassing both issues and address the merits.

       In cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to

conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin. (In re Cook

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 452.) That section, augmented by the court’s inherent authority to

craft necessary procedures under Code of Civil Procedure section 187, authorizes it to

preserve evidence as promptly as possible for future use by the Board. (In re Cook,

supra, at p. 455.) “Transmission of that record to the Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, in turn, enables the Board to ‘discharge its obligation to “give great

weight to” youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether the offender is “fit to

rejoin society.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Cook, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 455.)

       By overlooking this aspect of defendant’s pro se “invitation” to recall the sentence

and to order a proceeding at which defendant could preserve the information pertinent to

his youthful characteristics and immaturity, the court erred. We therefore remand the

matter to the trial court with directions to conduct such a hearing as required by Franklin

and its progeny.

                                             14
                                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment summarily denying defendant’s petition for resentencing pursuant

to sections 1170.95 and 1172.6 is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the superior court

to conduct a hearing at which information or evidence relevant to defendant’s youthful

characteristics may be preserved for consideration by the Board of Parole Hearings.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                                             RAMIREZ
                                                                                      P. J.

We concur:

MILLER
                         J.

CODRINGTON
                         J.

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