Court Opinion

ID: 9538853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:42:44.065026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:12.424737
License: Public Domain

GREENWOOD, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ opinion concluding that the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger was justified by reasonable suspicion of illegal drug activity.
I agree with the trial court that Trooper Eldredge’s initial stop of the Fiero was legally justified. A traffic stop based on even a minor traffic violation is justified, regardless of the officer’s motivations or suspicions which are unrelated to the traffic offense. See State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Utah 1994). Nevertheless, the detention following a routine traffic stop is generally limited to examining the driver’s license and vehicle registration, conducting a computer check, and issuing a citation. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 481, 435 (Utah Ct.App.1990). “Unsupported by further probable cause or reasonable suspicion, inquiries by the officer to investigate suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense unconstitutionally extend the detention beyond the scope of the circumstances that rendered it permissible.” Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1135.
In this case, Trooper Eldredge legally stopped the Fiero due to the missing front plate and the obscured taillights. However, once Trooper Eldredge determined that defendant had a valid driver’s license, completed the computer check, and otherwise fulfilled the purpose of the traffic stop, he should have allowed defendant and Nicki to proceed on their way without any further detention or questioning. See Robinson, 797 P.2d at 435; State v. Castner, 825 P.2d 699, 703 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Instead, Trooper Eldredge improperly expanded the stop’s scope to question defendant about drug-related activity, which led to the pat-down search of defendant’s coat and the subsequent discovery of drugs.
I disagree with the majority that reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate for drug activity supported Trooper Eldredge’s initial stop.1 To justify an investigatory stop of a vehicle, an officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are, at that moment, engaged in criminal activity. See Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. The majority identifies five factors it contends establish reasonable suspicion of present drug activity in this case.
Factors four and five — Trooper Peterson’s information that Nicki was a drug user and that she had previously admitted to transporting drugs from Phoenix to Grand Junction — are the only factors relating to criminal activity. However, this information does not indicate that Nicki was transporting drugs at the specific time she was stopped. See State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (refusing to consider fact that suspect was under ongoing investigation for drug distribution in determining whether police had probable cause to search for drugs); State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (refusing to consider facts that suspect had been investigated for drug activity and had been previously convicted of drug crimes when considering probable cause to search for drugs).2 Furthermore, this infor*145mation is accorded especially little weight considering its vague nature. The record does not reflect that Trooper Peterson indicated exactly when Nicki had transported drugs in the past, nor did he say that she had ever transported drugs in her own car.3 Cf. Brooks, 849 P.2d at 644 (noting that evidence of prior drug convictions and being subject of prior drug investigation are due little weight “especially” in light of facts that criminal record was approximately two years old and last event relating to prior drug investigation occurred nine months prior to search, when suspect living at different address).
The remaining factors considered by the majority are consistent with innocent behavior and are not, either singly or in the aggregate, strongly indicative of transporting drugs. Cf. Provo City Carp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 487, 440 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (“[Wjhere a defendant’s conduct is ‘conceivably consistent with innocent ... activity,’ but is also ‘strongly indicative ’ of criminal activity, we will not hesitate to conclude that reasonable suspicion exists.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Many people travel to and from Phoenix. Moreover, even assuming traveling to and from Phoenix is indicative of drug activity, there is no evidence that Nicki traveled to or was returning from Phoenix on the day of the stop. She could have been traveling to or from any number of destinations, for any number of reasons. Cf. State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 945 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (noting negligible probative value of vague itinerary evidence which did not indicate specific cities where suspect had been).
Similarly, defendant’s nervousness and angered admonishment that Nicki refuse consent to search dining the first stop provides little support for reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Cf., e.g., United States v. Manuel, 992 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir.1993) (“[T]he exercise of a right to refuse consent alone cannot be the basis of reasonable suspicion.”); Potter, 860 P.2d at 957 (noting that nervous behavior alone does not establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Indeed, defendant’s reaction could just as easily be attributed to indignation that an officer would request consent to search the car after having pulled the pair over for the minor violation of not having a front license plate attached.
In my opinion, the State has not met its burden of demonstrating Trooper Eldredge’s suspicions that Nicki and defendant were transporting drugs were based on reasonable articulable facts. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and accordingly reverse defendant’s conviction.

. As the majority apparently concedes, nothing happened from the time of the initial traffic stop to the time the computer check was completed to increase the reasonable suspicion present at the time of the initial stop. Having been stopped for the second time within hours for the license plate violation, the nervousness displayed by Nicki as Trooper Eldredge interrogated her about transporting drugs simply does not justify further detention. See State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct.App.1992).

. Although the analyses for reasonable suspicion and probable cause determinations differ in terms of the degree of suspicion necessary to establish each one, the analyses are analogous in terms of what types of evidence establish suspi*145cion. See, e.g., State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah Ct.App.1994).

. During direct examination, Trooper Eldredge stated he did not remember what Trooper Peterson had said with regard to how long it had been since Nicki had transported drugs. On cross-examination, Trooper Eldredge indicated he thought it may have been a couple of months prior to the day of the stop. Any suggestion that Trooper Eldredge relayed more specific information with regard to the prior instances of Nicki transporting drugs is not supported by the record.