Court Opinion

ID: 9473144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:20:36.251149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:20.773263
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
On September 4, 1981, defendants were indicted for impeding Internal Revenue Service agents in carrying out a lawful levy on the property of defendant Harvey Annis. Count I of the indictment charges violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and Count II of the indictment charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).2
Defendant Afflerbach was convicted and sentenced to seven years on Count I of the indictment and was sentenced to a period of five years probation under Count II of the indictment. Defendant John Cotton was sentenced to two years under Count I of the indictment and to probation for a period of five years under Count II of the indictment. Defendant Michael Cotton was sentenced to incarceration for 18 months under Count I of the indictment and to four years probation under Count II of the indictment. Defendants Harvey Annis and Murray Watson were both convicted only under Count I of the indictment and were sentenced to three years custody.
1. Defendants were improperly sentenced under a general criminal statute when their conduct violated a specific statute.
The sentencing in the present case violates the time-honored rule of statutory construction that “a more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence.” Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980). This rule has long been followed to prevent a defendant from being convicted under a general statute when a specific statute more particularly describing his criminal conduct has been enacted. Enzor v. United States, 262 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1958) (conspiracy to sell narcotics must be punished under statute respecting con*872spiracy to violate narcotics laws, 26 U.S.C. § 7237(b), rather than under general conspiracy statute); United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.1970) (conspiracy to sell narcotics must be punished under 26 U.S.C. § 7237 rather than under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general conspiracy statute); Robinson v. United States, 142 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.1944) (property stolen from the post office must be punished under 18 U.S.C. § 313 rather than 18 U.S.C. § 99, which prohibits stealing personal property belonging to the United States).
The continued reliability of this doctrine of statutory construction has been called into question by a recent United States Supreme Court opinion. In United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979), the Court held that the U.S. Attorney had the discretion to choose which of two statutes prohibiting receipt of firearms by a convicted felon he would proceed under, even though the statute he proceeded under carried a longer maximum term of imprisonment for its violation. Since Batchelder some courts have held that there is no federal rule limiting the government’s discretion to proceed under a general statute in opposition to the provisions of a specific statute. See United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Simon, 510 F.Supp. 232, 237 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
I find this reliance on Batchelder improper and decline to follow the reasoning of these cases. Batchelder did not involve a general and a specific statute but dealt with two statutes which proscribed, in almost identical terms, the conduct for which the defendant was convicted. Thus the holding in Batchelder does not undermine the longstanding rule that a specific statute governs over a general statute, particularly in light of the Busic Court’s subsequent reliance upon this doctrine in holding the general enhancement statute section 924(c) inapplicable in face of the specific enhancement provision found in section 111.
Moreover, the rule that a specific statute should govern over a general statute should not be lightly disregarded. As the Court explained in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), the rule that a specific statute should prevail is a corollary to the rule of lenity (“ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity”, United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)), and has “special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions____ [The rule is] an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative directive.” Simpson, 435 U.S. at 15.
I therefore conclude that, despite Batchelder, the rule remains that where a defendant is convicted of a specific crime for which Congress has intentionally proscribed a more lenient punishment, the prosecution and the courts are not at liberty to defy that specific congressional mandate.
Title 18 U.S.C. § 111 is a general statute that prohibits interference with federal officers in the conduct of their duties, whereas 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) prohibits the forcible interference with the duties of IRS agents.3 *873The indictment and evidence at trial proved a violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the defendants were convicted under the wrong statute and were therefore improperly sentenced.
II. Defendants’ sentences violated Busic v. United States
While normally (as the majority has noted) Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398 (1980), would require reversal of the section 924(c) sentence, properly analyzed this case does not require this remedy. Title 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) under which defendants should have been sentenced does not contain an enhancement provision for the use of firearms. Thus, sentencing under this provision can be accompanied by an enhanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) without violating Busic.
III. Remedy
The remedy for sentencing under the wrong statute is to remand the case to the district court for resentencing under the proper statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212. See Enzor v. United States, 262 F.2d 172,175 (5th Cir.1959); United States v. Bates, 429 F.2d 557, 559-60 (9th Cir.1970).
I concur in the court’s opinion as it relates to the first six issues addressed therein. I would affirm but remand the ease for resentencing on Count I under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).

. Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in § 1114 [including agents of the I.R.S.] of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
Whoever, in the commission of any such acts uses a deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 111.

. Whoever—
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

. (a) Corrupt or forcible interference.
—Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, except that if the offense is committed only by threats of force, the person convicted thereof shall be fined not more than $3,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both. The term "threats of force”, as used in this subsection, means threats of bodily harm to the officer or employee of the United States or to a member of his family. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).