Court Opinion

ID: 9779247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:41:20.881687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:24.320186
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant, in his motion for rehearing, states that this Court erred in overruling his first point of error because there is no necessity to offer a bill of exception to show what the testimony would have been where a party is cross-examining an adverse witness. See Beckham Development Co. v. Bruce Clark & Associates, 492 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas 1973, no writ). But in our case there is no showing that Appellant’s own child was an adverse witness. As noted in our original opinion, both sides had rested their respective cases when the trial Court decided to interrogate the children in chambers. These children were not called as witnesses by Appellee and there was no showing that they were adverse witnesses even though their testimony was not favorable to Appellant. And as to Cynthia Lynn De La Hoya, no questions were ever asked. Thus there was no showing what questions counsel would have asked, much less what the answers would have been.
Also, Appellant still insists that where a parent is a fit and proper person to have the custody, and has not voluntarily surrendered care, custody and control of his children, he is entitled to their care, custody and control as a matter of law. This is not so. In Tiller v. Villasenor, 426 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston (1st Dist.) 1968, no writ), the Court, at page 258, said:
“The trial court may award custody of the children to someone other than the surviving parent even though such parent is not unfit. This exact point was decided by the Texas Supreme Court in Herrera v. Herrera, Tex., 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966). The rule is stated in Taylor v. Taylor, 42 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Civ.App., 1931, no writ hist.):
‘The presumption is that the best interest of the children will be subserved by awarding them to the natural parent, but this is a rebuttable presumption, and it is not necessary that the respondents prove that the natural parent is disqualified by immorality or misfortune.’
When this rule was earlier announced in Dunn v. Jackson, 231 S.W. 351 (Tex. *264Com.App., 1921, opinion adopted), its application was to a family in which the father had voluntarily surrendered custody of an infant two weeks old to her maternal grandmother; but the rule is also applied where there has been neither a voluntary relinquishment nor an abandonment of custody. Taylor v. Meek, 154 Tex. 305, 276 S.W.2d 787 (1955); Ham v. Cavette, 357 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ.App., 1962, writ ref., n. r. e.); Taylor v. Taylor, supra.” (Emphasis added)
The Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.