Court Opinion

ID: 9731975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:03:21.481028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:22.257313
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice and its reasoning. I believe that the result in this case is commanded by the Senecal rule as set forth in State v. Senecal, 145 Vt. 554, 558, 497 A.2d 349, 351 (1985), and its progenitors State v. Connolly, 133 Vt. 565, 569, 350 A.2d 364, 367 (1975), and State v. Blondin, 128 Vt. 613, 616-17, 270 A.2d 165, 166-67 (1970). Under this rule, a defendant who has lost a motion to suppress must renew it at trial if a different judge presides or new evidence is offered. We have justified the rule on the ground that pretrial rulings are tentative and that the trial judge must be given an opportunity to consider the issues if that judge has not done so previously. See, e.g., State v. Gonyaw, 146 Vt. 559, 562, 507 A.2d 944, 947 (1985). The rule also would apply where the judges are the same but new evidence is offered.
Although coerced by the Senecal rule, defendant made the motion to suppress at trial and obtained the ruling he would now like to ignore. It makes no sense to say that he can prevail *12as if the second motion and ruling never occurred based on the first motion. Such a holding would make the second motion a formalism — necessary to obtain review but wholly irrelevant to the result. Whatever I think of the Senecal rule, I cannot find that defendant can ignore the trial ruling in this case.
I write here to say, however, that Senecal is wrongly decided, and if this were a clear case in which to overrule it — that is, if the question were whether an error is preserved although not raised at trial — I would join the dissent. This case demonstrates the unfair results produced by Senecal and the lack of an overriding justification in judicial economy or control by the trial judge. Its application here allows the prosecution to keep presenting its position until it achieves a result that can stand on appeal.
In many Senecal situations, we are forcing a second evidentiary hearing on a matter already heard and decided. At the same time, we are facing a major problem managing the criminal caseload in the district court. Backlogs in both misdemeanors and felonies have risen substantially over the last few years.
In earlier times, most cases were resolved from start to finish by one judge. Even with rotation, that should be the norm in most criminal cases in most counties. The volume of cases has reached such a level in Chittenden County, however, that the workload is divided so that one judge specializes in pretrial motions and another in trials. The Senecal rule throws away much of the work of the motions judge as if it never happened. Ultimate control in the trial judge over all the issues gains nothing in accuracy or efficiency. Nor is that judge put in error by a ruling of a motions judge made without any involvement of the trial judge. The situation is uniquely exacerbated in this area because our rules require the issues to be raised by pretrial motions, see V.R.Cr.P. 12(b), and our decisions require pretrial rulings in many cases. See State v. Ritchie, 144 Vt. 121, 123, 473 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1984). Thus, a defendant cannot avoid double adjudication by raising a matter only at trial.
We rightfully give great weight to the need for finality of adjudication. Our normal concern for finality would never accept inconsistent factual adjudication on the same issue in the same case. The justification for doing so in Senecal cases is, at best, weak. On its face, it comes from an excessive concern that the *13trial judge should have the final say on every issue that arises in a criminal case and should never be put in error for something that judge did not do. We could accomplish the same end by saying that the trial judge has the right to reopen pretrial issues but there is no requirement that the defendant refile every motion to force that second examination. Ironically, a rule ostensibly justified in terms of fairness to the trial judge is very unpopular among trial judges, as demonstrated by their actions in the cases coming before this Court. Routinely, the trial judge refuses to consider refiled motions because of lack of time and discomfort with the role of reversing the decision of a colleague. In fact, compliance with Senecal has become a technical formality, used largely to avoid issues on appeal.
We should overrule Senecal and stop the waste of limited resources, as well as the unfairness that this case represents.