Court Opinion

ID: 4069682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 00:46:13.020351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:32:58.097156
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                  13-14-00380-CR
                                                  THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                         CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
                                                             9/23/2015 1:24:07 PM
                                                                 Dorian E. Ramirez
                                                                            CLERK

           NO. 13-14-00380-CR-CR

                  IN THE                  FILED IN
                                  13th COURT OF APPEALS
                               CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
            COURT OF     APPEALS   9/23/2015 1:24:07 PM
                                    DORIAN E. RAMIREZ
                                           Clerk
           THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

          CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

           LAWRENCE JAMES, JR.

                    v.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

      ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 12-14114

          252ND DISTRICT COURT

THE HONORABLE LARRY GIST, JUDGE PRESIDING

BRIEF FOR STATE
                   BOB WORTHAM
                   CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                   JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

                   WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT
                   CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                   JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
                   TBL # 19959725
                   1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300
                   BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701
                   (409) 835-8550
                   (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us)
           IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(a), a complete list of the names of all

interested parties is provided below so the members of this Honorable Court may

at once determine whether they are disqualified to serve or should recuse

themselves from participating in the decision of the case.

Lawrence James, Jr., Appellant

Defense Attorney on the Trial:               Judge Presiding:
     Nathan Lee Reynolds, Jr.                      The Honorable Larry Gist
     3500 Memorial Blvd.
     Port Arthur, Texas 77640

Defense Attorney on the Appeal:
     Kevin Sekaly Cribbs
     7705 Calder Avenue
     Beaumont, Texas 77706

Prosecutors on the Trial:
      Eric Houghton
      Jefferson County Courthouse
      1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300
      Beaumont, Texas 77701

Prosecutor on the Appeal:
      Wayln G. Thompson
      Jefferson County Courthouse
      1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300
      Beaumont, Texas 77701

Bob Wortham, Criminal District Attorney
     Jefferson County Courthouse
     1085 Pearl Street, Suite 300
     Beaumont, Texas 77701
                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................2

ISSUES PRESENTED...............................................................................................3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................4

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. ONE .......................................5

        Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by
        being denied effective assistance of counsel.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. TWO ......................................8

        Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law by
        being denied an open and public trial.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. THREE ..................................9

        Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because
        he was not given notice of the changes of trial judge and
        prosecutor.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FOUR ....................................9

        Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law because
        based upon the arguments of the prosecutor at the sentencing
        hearing and by the trial court by relying on the pre-sentence
        report and its contents relative to extraneous offenses and
        victim statements.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. FIVE ....................................10

        Appellant claims that the trial court erred in accepting
        Appellant's guilty plea without providing the necessary
        admonishments and therefore the plea was involuntary.

                                                       i
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SIX.......................................11

         The Appellant claims his due process rights were violated when
         he was not provided a complete record/statement of facts from
         his court proceedings.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. SEVEN ................................12

         The Nunc Pro Tunc admonishments and unagreed plea
         agreement does not properly correct the trial court's clerical
         error [date of documents] and should be withdrawn and
         replaced with an Order Nunc Pro Tunc.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. EIGHT .................................14

         The trial court abused its discretion in not granting Appellant's
         motion to dismiss court appointed counsel prior to trial.

STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S ISSUE NO. NINE....................................16

         The Appellant's case should be remanded and returned to his
         prejudgment status in order that he may be allowed to file a
         motion for new trial.

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................18

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................18

                                                            ii
                                        INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES

TEX. R. APP. PROC., Rule 33.1.............................................................................10

TEX.R.APP. PROC., 33.1(a)(1) ..............................................................................11

TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) .............................................................................7,8.9

TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g).............................................................................7,8,9

UNITED STATE CASES
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
  (1984) ......................................................................................................................5

Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S ––––, ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) .....................7

TEXAS CASES

Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) ....................................13

Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) ........................................6

Cooper v. State, 500 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973.................................11

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) ...............................11

Ex parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex.Crim.App. 2012)..............................5

Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) ................................7

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) ............................7

Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) ...........................5

King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)......................................15

                                                              iii
Malcolm v State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982)......14,15

Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) .....................................13

Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2012)...............................6

Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011) ...........................................11

Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996)......................................11

Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) ....................................16

Rogers v. State, 488 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973) ................................15

Rylander v. State, 101 S .W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2003)...............................7

Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977)...................................14

Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)..................................6

                                               iv
                               NO. 13-14-00380-CR-CR

                                      IN THE

                                COURT OF APPEALS

                           THIRTEENTH DISTRICT

                          CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS

                               LAWRENCE JAMES, JR.

                                        v.

                               THE STATE OF TEXAS

                     ON APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 12-14114

                           252ND DISTRICT COURT

            THE HONORABLE LARRY GIST, JUDGE PRESIDING

          BRIEF FOR STATE
      The State does not believe that oral argument would significantly aid the

Court in determining the legal and factual issues. However, should the Court grant

any request for oral argument by Appellant, then the State requests the opportunity

to respond in oral argument.

                                         1
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

      COMES NOW, the State of Texas and makes and files this, its Brief,

respectfully showing to this Honorable Court as follows:

                         STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      Appellant was indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury for commission of

an alleged murder. [Enhanced] (CR:5-6.) The record indicates that voir-dire was

conducted on April 29, 2014, but that before evidence was presented, Appellant

entered a plea of guilty to the trial court. (RR.Plea:II:5.) The trial court found

Appellant guilty and reset the case for preparation of a pre-sentence report. The

State recommended a life sentence.       Appellant asked for a 25 year sentence.

(RR.Plea.II:6; CR. Supplemental:5-7.) On June 2, 2014, the trial court assessed a

life sentence. (RR.III:11.) The trial court certified that this is not a plea-bargain

case and the defendant has the right of appeal. (CR:60.) Timely, written notice of

appeal was filed on June 5, 2014. (CR:72.)

                                          2
                              ISSUES PRESENTED

      Appellant presents nine issues for review, while conceding in the summary

of his brief that the first six (6) issues do not warrant reversal. He first claimed he

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He also claims he was denied due

process of law because he was allegedly denied an open public trial, that he was

not given notice of the change of trial judge and prosecutor, and arguments at

sentencing relied upon extraneous offenses and victim statements from the pre-

sentence report. In issue five, Appellant claims he was not properly admonished.

In issue six, he claims he was not provided a complete record of facts from his

court proceeding. In issue seven, Appellant complains of an alleged clerical error

regarding the dates of his plea admonishments. In issue eight, he alleges the trial

court abused its discretion in not granting his motion to dismiss court appointed

trial counsel prior to trial. Finally, in issue nine, Appellant argues that his case

should be remanded to the trial court to enable him to file a motion for new trial.

                                           3
                       SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

      Appellant concedes in his first two issues there are no meritorious issues

regarding ineffective assistance of counsel or an alleged closed courtroom that are

supported by the record. In his third issue, Appellant fails to state a factual basis

for an argument and concedes he is unable to set forth an argument to support that

he was harmed by a change of judge and prosecutor. In issue four, Appellant

concedes that no objections were made to the pre-sentence investigation report and

that any alleged error regarding the pre-sentence report was waived. In issue five,

Appellant concedes that no error occurred regarding an allegation that he was

denied a complete record/statement of facts from his court proceedings and that

any alleged error was not preserved.

      As to issue seven, written plea admonishments appear to have been executed

on both April 28th and 29th of 2014, the day of the pretrial hearings and the day the

trial started and halted for his plea following voir-dire. In either or both instances,

the admonishments were provided. The State believes no further correction is

therefore needed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's

request to fire his trial lawyer the day before trial. Finally, as to issue nine,

Appellant is not entitled to hybrid representation. Thus, the trial court was not

required to rule on his pro se motion for new trial. Relief requested in all issues

should be denied.

                                           4
                     STATE'S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                             ISSUE NO. ONE

Appellant Asserts:

            Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law
            by being denied effective assistance of counsel.

A.    Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:

      Appellate courts measure a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel against

the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Hernandez v.

State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55–57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (applying Strickland test). A

person claiming that counsel was ineffective must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that (1) counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an “objective

standard of reasonableness,” and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Ex

parte Jimenez, 364 S.W.3d 866, 883 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (quotation omitted).

      Appellate courts “indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell

within the wide range of reasonable assistance and that the challenged action might

be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. “The mere fact that another attorney might

have pursued a different tactic at trial does not suffice to prove a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id.       “The Strickland test is judged by the
                                          5
‘totality of the representation,’ not by counsel's isolated acts or omissions, and the

test is applied from the viewpoint of an attorney at the time he acted, not through

20/20 hindsight.” Id.    Thus, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly

founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged

ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to

show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or

strategic decision-making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct

was reasonable and professional.         Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833

(Tex.Crim.App.2002) Rarely will the trial record contain sufficient information

to permit a reviewing court to fairly evaluate the merits of such a serious

allegation. Id. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. In the majority of cases, the record

on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately reflect the failings of

trial counsel. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833. “Trial counsel should ordinarily be

afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as

ineffective.” Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). “If

trial counsel is not given that opportunity, the appellate court should not find

deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Id.

                                          6
      Appellate courts ordinarily will not declare trial counsel ineffective where

there is no record showing counsel had an opportunity to explain himself. See

Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App.2005).                   Without

evidence of the strategy employed, appellate courts will presume sound trial

strategy. See Rylander v. State, 101 S .W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

Texas procedure makes it “virtually impossible” for appellate counsel to present an

adequate ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim on direct review. Trevino v.

Thaler, 569 U.S ––––, ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013). This is because the

inherent nature of most ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims means the trial

court record “will often fail to contain the information necessary to substantiate’

the   claim.”   Id.   (quoting    Ex   parte    Torres,   943 S.W.2d 469,    475

(Tex.Crim.App.1997) (en banc)).

B.    Allegations of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Are Not Supported By
      the Record:

      Appellant conceded in his brief that there are no meritorious issues regarding

ineffective assistance of counsel in this cause that are supported by the record.

Other than providing general law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, his

brief fails to state concise issues or points to be presented in that regard as required

by TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as

required by TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g). He concedes that any allegedly

                                           7
meritorius “claims should be litigated after the full development of supporting

evidence for those claims and that such full development is not currently in this

record.” (See App. Brief – p.21.) The State concurs.

                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                             ISSUE NO. TWO

Appellant Asserts:

             Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law
             by being denied an open and public trial.

      Appellant concedes in his brief that the record does not support an allegation

that the courtroom was closed to the public. (See App. Brief – p.22.) His brief fails

to state concise issues or points to be presented in that regard as required by TEX.

R. APP. PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as required by

TEX. R. APP. PROC., 38.1(g).

                                          8
                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                            ISSUE NO. THREE

Appellant Asserts:

             Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law
             because he was not given notice of the changes of trial
             judge and prosecutor.

      Appellant concedes in his brief that he is unable to set forth an argument on

Issue No. Three and that he cannot establish that he was harmed by the change in

trial judge and prosecutor. (See App. Brief – p. 22.) His brief fails to state concise

issues or points to be presented in that regard as required by TEX. R. APP.

PROC., 38.1(f) or any factual basis entitling him to relief as required by TEX. R.

APP. PROC., 38.1(g).

                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                             ISSUE NO. FOUR

Appellant Asserts:

             Appellant claims that he was denied due process of law
             because based upon the arguments of the prosecutor at
             the sentencing hearing and by the trial court by relying
             on the pre-sentence report and its contents relative to
             extraneous offenses and victim statements.

      Appellant conceded in his brief that there were no objections made to the

presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing and that there are no

preserved grounds to complain of the report or its use on appeal. (See App. Brief –

                                          9
p. 26.)   Failure to object to the pre-sentence report waives any error in the

admission of the P.S.I. contents. TEX. R. APP. PROC., Rule 33.1.

                      STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                              ISSUE NO. FIVE

Appellant Asserts:

            Appellant claims that the trial court erred in accepting
            Appellant's guilty plea without providing the necessary
            admonishments and therefore the plea was involuntary.

      Appellant concedes in his brief that, “The trial court's admonishments were

both orally and in writing, and completely apprise Appellant of all requisite

admonishments under the statute.       There is no trial court error regarding

admonishments resulting in Appellant's complained of involuntary plea.       (No

meritorious argument of trial court error relative to an involuntary plea are

supported by the record.”) (See App. Brief – p.30; See also, CR:29-31 and CR.

Supplemental: 5-7.)

                                        10
                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                              ISSUE NO. SIX

Appellant Asserts:

             The Appellant claims his due process rights were violated
             when he was not provided a complete record/statement of
             facts from his court proceedings.

      Appellant concedes either that no such error occurred, or that if error

occurred it was not preserved, because of lack of objection. (See App. Brief – p.

32-33.) To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must timely object, stating the

specific legal basis. TEX.R.APP. PROC., 33.1(a)(1); Rhoades v. State, 934
S.W.2d 113 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). To be timely, an objection must be raised at

the earliest opportunity or as soon as the ground of objection becomes apparent.

Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). The objection

must simply be clear enough to provide the judge and the opposing party an

opportunity to address and, if necessary, correct the purported error. Pena v. State,

353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). Without a timely objection, nothing is

presented for appellate review.       Cooper v. State, 500 S.W.2d 837, 841

(Tex.Crim.App. 1973).

                                         11
                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                            ISSUE NO. SEVEN

Appellant Asserts:

            The Nunc Pro Tunc admonishments and unagreed plea
            agreement does not properly correct the trial court's
            clerical error [date of documents] and should be
            withdrawn and replaced with an Order Nunc Pro Tunc.

      This Cause was called for pre-trial matters on April 28, 2015. Voir-dire

commenced on April 29, 2014. (RR.II.)         There are two sets of written plea

admonishments found in the record. The first is found at CR:29-31 that is dated

April 28, 2014. From the scrawled writing it is easily identified as a computerized,

tablet generated document utilized by our courts. The second is the Nunc Pro Tunc

written plea admonishments found at CR.Supplemental:5-7, dated April 29, 2014.

That document is clearly one that has handwritten notations. Appellant entered his

plea of guilty on April 29, 2014. (See CR:5.) Appellant complains of the April 29th

documents, asking the appellate court to order the trial court to adopt the original

document of April 28, 2014, and to nunc pro tunc that document to correct the date

as April 29, 2014, as the correct document. The State here argues that the two

documents just as easily work in conjunction with each other.         The original

document dated April 28th, and the document dated April 29th both contain the

same proper admonishments, although the April 28th documents contain all the

necessary signatures. Substantial compliance with the admonishment requirements

                                         12
is satisfied by both documents. The April 29th document (nunc pro tunc) appears

to have been a subsequent effort by the trial court to insure Appellant was again

admonished after voir dire in order to further facilitate the plea. The State urges

that no further correction is therefore needed. Substantial compliance with

admonishment requirements is sufficient to inform a defendant about plea

consequences.    Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).

Appellant has not established that the admonishments themselves are incorrect,

much less that he was in any way misled or harmed. See Anderson v. State, 182
S.W.3d 914 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).

                                        13
                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                            ISSUE NO. EIGHT

Appellant Asserts:

            The trial court abused its discretion in not granting
            Appellant's motion to dismiss court appointed counsel
            prior to trial.

      Trial began on April 29th, 2014. (RR.II) Appellant waited until April 28th, at

a pretrial hearing to present a motion to dismiss trial counsel. (RR.I-Pretrial

Hearing:6.) At that hearing Appellant alleged his appointed lawyer had a conflict

of interest (with no supporting information), that his lawyer was not properly

representing him, had not filed any motions on his behalf or given him “full

disclosure” or “presented anything.” His lawyer responded that time that he had

filed for the standard discovery order, the State had complied, and that he had

received a plea offer and gone over the range of punishment with his client. Trial

counsel added he had received the DNA report and a video he could show his

client. (See CR:7 – Docket sheet reflecting Nathan Reynolds was appointed trial

counsel; See RR.I-Pretrial Hearing: 4-6.) Based upon trial counsel's comments, the

trial judge denied Appellants attempt to dismiss the lawyer.

      Appellant had no right to an appointed counsel of his choice. See Thomas v.

State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). A trial court has no duty to

search for an attorney until it finds one suiting Appellant's liking. See Malcolm v

                                         14
State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982); Rogers v. State,

488 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). Criminal defendants unhappy with

their court-appointed attorneys have the burden of proving to the trial court that

they are entitled to a change.      The burden includes requesting a hearing.

Personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy are typically not

valid grounds for withdrawal.       See King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566

(Tex.Crim.App. 2000). There is little, if anything, in the record to assist an

appellate court in reviewing Appellant's claim that the trial court erred by not

allowing him to fire this appointed counsel on the day before trial began. The

record reflects instead that trial counsel had done everything required of him.

      Appellant also has made no showing of harm by the denial of his request to

fire trial counsel. Appellant changed his plea after voir-dire. Appellant's Eighth

Issue is without merit and should be overruled.

                                        15
                     STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S
                             ISSUE NO. NINE

Appellant Asserts:

            The Appellant's case should be remanded and returned to
            his prejudgment status in order that he may be allowed to
            file a motion for new trial.

      Appellant filed a pro se motion for new trial while represented by counsel.

(See App. Brief – p.41; See also RR.III:11; see CR:61-69 wherein the Pro se

Motion for New Trial filed before trial counsel permitted to withdraw; see CR:80 –

Trial courts Order allowing withdrawal of trial counsel not signed until June 12,

2014). Note that Appellant admits in his brief on p.41, that Notice of Appeal was

filed after the Motion for New Trial was filed and trial counsel was permitted to

later withdraw on June 12th. It appears from the record that the trial court never

ruled on the pro se Motion for New Trial, therefore Robinson v. State is not

controlling. See Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919 (Tex.Crim.App.

2007)(holding that when a trial court rules on the merits of a pro se motion

presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel, such ruling is subject to

appellate review).   Appellant's Pro Se Motion For New Trial was apparently

overruled by operation of law. There is no indication from the record that trial

counsel or appellate counsel adopted the motion for new trial. A defendant has no

right to “hybrid representation,” and the trial court was free to disregard the

                                        16
motion. Appellant may not raise this issue on appeal. Appellant's Ninth Issue

should be overruled and the requested relief denied.

                                    PRAYER

      WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully prays

that this Honorable Court, upon consideration of the record, the briefs, and law,

overrule the Appellant’s points of error and affirm the judgment.

                                      RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

                                      BOB WORTHAM
                                      CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                                      JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

                                        /s/ Wayln G. Thompson

                                      WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT
                                      CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                                      JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
                                      TBL # 19959725
                                      1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300
                                      BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701
                                      (409) 835-8550
                                      (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us)

                                         17
                       CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

        In compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I certify

that the number of words in this brief, excluding those matters listed in Rule

94.(i)(1) is 2,859.

                                         /s/ Wayln G. Thompson

                                        WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT
                                        CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                                        JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS
                                        TBL #19959725
                                        1085 PEARL STREET, SUITE 300
                                        BEAUMONT, TEXAS 77701
                                        (409) 835-8550
                                        (thompson@co.jefferson.tx.us)

                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
        A copy of this brief has been sent by United States Mail to Kevin Sekaly

Cribbs, 7705 Calder Avenue, Beaumont, Texas 77706, and the State’s brief has

been eFiled with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, this 23rd day of September,

2015.

                                         /s/ Wayln G. Thompson

                                        WAYLN G. THOMPSON, ASSISTANT
                                        CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY
                                        JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

                                          18