Court Opinion

ID: 9957090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:02:55.019469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.173048
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                   STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2021-1857
                  _____________________________

THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and THE
FLORIDA BOARD OF GOVERNORS,

    Appellants,

    v.

LISA BROWNING, individually;
JULIANA BOISSE, JONATHAN
CHARLES, MAX CHERN, and
MICHELLE GRESSER, on behalf of
themselves and all other
similarly situated,

    Appellees.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.
Monica J. Brasington, Judge.

                          April 3, 2024

LEWIS, J.

     Appellants, the University of Florida Board of Trustees and
the Florida Board of Governors, challenge the trial court’s non-
final Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss, asserting that sovereign immunity bars the
claims against them for negligent misrepresentation, conversion,
and declaratory judgment. The Board of Governors argues, and
we agree, that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss
as to all those claims against it because, under the circumstances
of this case, there is no basis for waiving the Board’s sovereign
immunity under section 768.28, Florida Statutes (2021), and
holding it vicariously liable. We also agree with Appellants that
sovereign immunity bars the declaratory judgment claims against
them. We affirm the denial of the Board of Trustees’ motion to
dismiss as to the negligent misrepresentation and conversion
claims without discussion. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse
in part, and remand with instructions.

                          BACKGROUND

     Appellees, Lisa Browning, individually, and Juliana Boisse,
Jonathan Charles, Max Chern, and Michelle Gresser, on behalf of
themselves and all other persons similarly situated, filed a twenty-
two-count Third Amended Class Action Complaint against
Appellants, alleging that the University of Florida (“UF”) charged
prospective students a non-refundable application fee in excess of
the statutory maximum amount of $30 and charged admitted
students a preview orientation fee in excess of the statutory
maximum amount of $35 as set forth in section 1009.24(14),
Florida Statutes (2021). According to Appellees, the UF Board of
Trustees is responsible for setting the application and orientation
fees charged. Appellees did not allege any specific actions on the
part of the Board of Governors or its representatives or employees.
Nor did Appellees allege that they had any transactions or
interactions with the Board of Governors or its employees.
Instead, they based their claims against the Board of Governors
solely on vicarious liability given its constitutionally mandated
duties of oversight over the state university system.

     The Third Amended Complaint contained claims for breach of
contract, rescission of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, conversion, and declaratory judgment. In
addition to seeking damages for their tort claims, Appellees sought
in the declaratory judgment counts a declaration that the Board of
Trustees unlawfully charged non-refundable application and
preview orientation fees in excess of the statutory maximums and
that Appellees are entitled to repayment of those excess amounts.

                                 2
      Each Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, arguing in
part that the claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court
entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, in which it dismissed with
prejudice the breach of contract, rescission of contract, and breach
of fiduciary duty counts upon finding they are barred by sovereign
immunity because no enforceable written or express contract
exists between the parties. The court denied the motions with
regard to the negligent misrepresentation, conversion, and
declaratory judgment counts, which are the only counts at issue on
appeal, finding that they are not barred by sovereign immunity.
This appeal followed.

                             ANALYSIS

     Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a
complaint based on sovereign immunity is de novo. Desantis v.
Geffin, 284 So. 3d 599, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019). We must accept
as true the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations and draw
all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the
plaintiff. Medina v. Pollack, 300 So. 3d 173, 175 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020).

     Sovereign immunity, which derives from the separation of
powers provision of article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution,
protects the state and its subdivisions from civil liability unless
such immunity is waived by legislative enactment or
constitutional amendment. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation
Comm’n v. Hahr, 326 So. 3d 1165, 1167 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (citing
article X, section 13 of the Florida Constitution). The Florida
Legislature codified a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for
tort actions in section 768.28, Florida Statutes, which provides in
pertinent part as follows:

         (1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State
    Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or
    subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for
    liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this
    act. Actions at law against the state or any of its agencies

                                  3
    or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
    damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions
    for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death
    caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
    employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within
    the scope of the employee’s office or employment under
    circumstances in which the state or such agency or
    subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the
    claimant, in accordance with the general laws of this
    state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations
    specified in this act. . . .

         ....

         (9)(a) An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of
    any of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable
    in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for
    any injury or damage suffered as a result of any act,
    event, or omission of action in the scope of her or his
    employment or function, unless such officer, employee, or
    agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
    manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
    human rights, safety, or property. . . . The exclusive
    remedy for injury or damage suffered as a result of an act,
    event, or omission of an officer, employee, or agent of the
    state or any of its subdivisions or constitutional officers is
    by action against the governmental entity, or the head of
    such entity in her or his official capacity, or the
    constitutional officer of which the officer, employee, or
    agent is an employee, unless such act or omission was
    committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
    manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
    human rights, safety, or property. The state or its
    subdivisions are not liable in tort for the acts or omissions
    of an officer, employee, or agent committed while acting
    outside the course and scope of her or his employment or
    committed in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a
    manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of
    human rights, safety, or property.

§ 768.28, Fla. Stat. (2021).

                                  4
     We agree with the Board of Governors that there is no basis
for waiving its sovereign immunity under section 768.28 and
holding it vicariously liable.    An “employee” is defined as
“[s]omeone who works in the service of another person (the
employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under
which the employer has the right to control the details of work
performance.” Employee, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
Appellees have not alleged that UF employees are also the
employees of the Board of Governors. In fact, the Third Amended
Complaint is devoid of any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of
an employee of the Board of Governors or even the Board itself.

     Appellees’ claims against the Board of Governors for vicarious
liability were not based on an employer-employee or agency
relationship, but solely on the Board of Governors’ general
constitutional and statutory oversight responsibilities over the
state university system, which is insufficient for imputing liability
to the Board. See § 768.28, Fla. Stat.; see also McGhee v. Volusia
Cnty., 679 So. 2d 729, 733 (Fla. 1996) (“We thus conclude that the
intent behind the 1980 amendments [to section 768.28(9)(a)] was
to extend the veil of sovereign immunity to the specified
governmental employees when they are acting within the scope of
employment, with the employing agency alone remaining liable up
to the limits provided by statute.” (Emphasis added)). As such,
under the circumstances of this case, there is no basis for applying
section 768.28’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity to the Board
of Governors.

     We further agree with Appellants that they are immune from
Appellees’ declaratory judgment claims. Sovereign immunity is
the rule, not the exception, and a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be unequivocal and will not be found by inference. Hahr, 326
So. 3d at 1167. “Outside of claims brought under the federal or
state constitutions, sovereign immunity bars suit against the
State. This is an absolute rule with only two exceptions.” Univ. of
Fla. Bd. of Trs. v. Rojas, 351 So. 3d 1167, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA
2022). The first exception is when the Legislature waives the
State’s immunity by general law. Id. The second exception is
when the State enters into an express, written agreement with a
private entity. Id. Here, Appellees’ declaratory judgment claims
are not brought under the federal or state constitutions, and

                                 5
neither exception to sovereign immunity applies to the
claims. The claims are not based on an asserted contractual
relationship; indeed, the trial court found that no enforceable
written contract exists between the parties.

      “Sovereign immunity does not exempt the State from a
challenge based on violation of the federal or state constitutions . .
. .” Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. 1994).
Cases for declaratory relief against governmental entities that
proceeded without an express waiver of sovereign immunity
involved constitutional violations. City of Fort Lauderdale v.
Hinton, 276 So. 3d 319, 325 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also, e.g.,
Bradsheer v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 20 So.
3d 915, 916, 921 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (reversing the dismissal of
the count seeking declaratory or injunctive relief and remanding
for the trial court to consider whether the Department violated the
state prohibitions against depriving liberty or property without
due process and unauthorized agency penalties); City of
Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Mar. Ass’n, Inc., 492 So. 2d 770, 771–
72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (affirming the final judgment declaring
invalid the “user fees” provided in a City ordinance and directing
the City to refund certain fees paid under the ordinance because
the “user fee” was an illegal tax unauthorized under by the Florida
Constitution).      Claims for declaratory relief based on a
constitutional violation existed even before the enactment of
section 768.28. See Westwood Lake, Inc. v. Dade Cnty., 264 So. 2d
7, 8 (Fla. 1972) (reflecting that the plaintiff filed a declaratory
decree contesting the constitutionality of a county ordinance);
Rosenhouse v. 1950 Spring Term Grand Jury, in & for Dade Cnty.,
56 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. 1952) (explaining that the plaintiff’s bill
for declaratory decree and injunctive relief challenged the
constitutionality of certain statutes). Here, Appellees have not
alleged any constitutional violation. Instead, they alleged only a
violation of section 1009.24 and asserted that Appellants’
sovereign immunity is waived by virtue of section 768.28.

      A statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning when
its language is unambiguous, and courts may not extend, modify,
or limit the statute’s express terms or its reasonable implications.
Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley v. State, 209 So. 3d
1181, 1189 (Fla. 2017). Section 768.28 by its plain language waives

                                  6
sovereign immunity only for “liability for torts,” “to recover
damages in tort”; it does not waive immunity for declaratory
judgment claims. See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. Nor does section
1009.24 waive sovereign immunity or authorize a cause of action
for refunds of unlawfully charged fees. Cf. § 215.26(1), Fla. Stat.
(2021) (authorizing the Chief Financial Officer to refund any
moneys paid into the State Treasury that constitute “[a]n
overpayment of any tax, license, or account due,” “[a] payment
where no tax, license, or account is due,” and “[a]ny payment made
into the State Treasury in error”). Simply stated, the State has
not waived immunity from suit for Appellees’ declaratory
judgment claims pursuant to law.             Therefore, Appellees’
declaratory judgment claims are barred by sovereign immunity
because the claims do not seek to establish certainty as to some
aspect of a contractual relationship between the parties, the claims
are not based on an asserted constitutional violation, and the State
has not waived immunity from suit for the claims pursuant to law.

     In denying Appellants’ motions to dismiss as to the
declaratory judgment claims, the trial court cited Bill Stroop
Roofing, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 788 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2001), as a case where the court allowed a declaratory
judgment claim to proceed against the government under similar
circumstances. Bill Stroop Roofing, Inc. brought an action for
“declaratory decree and other relief,” contending that the County
charged state-certified contractors a fee in violation of section
489.113(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Id. at 366. The Third District
agreed, stating that “[t]he trial court should have so declared, and
enjoined the County from charging the forbidden additional fee.”
Id. The court further concluded that the government is “required
to refund taxes and fees illegally exacted, and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is inapplicable thereto.” Id. at 368. Without
citing any authority in support, the court rejected the County’s
contention that refunds of illegal tax or fee exactions are subject to
sovereign immunity defenses unless the action is based on a
constitutional violation. Id. at 367–68. To the extent Bill Stroop
Roofing, Inc. holds that sovereign immunity does not bar a
declaratory judgment action against the State even when the claim
is not based on an alleged constitutional violation and the State
has not waived immunity pursuant to law for such claim, we
certify conflict with the Third District’s decision.

                                  7
                           CONCLUSION

     For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial
of the Board of Governors’ motion to dismiss Appellees’ Third
Amended Class Action Complaint. We also reverse the court’s
denial of the Board of Trustees’ motion to dismiss as to Appellees’
declaratory judgment claims. Accordingly, we remand the case to
the trial court with instructions to dismiss with prejudice all
claims against the Board of Governors, as well as the declaratory
judgment claims against the Board of Trustees. We affirm the trial
court’s denial of the Board of Trustees’ motion to dismiss as to the
negligent misrepresentation and conversion claims.

     AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with
instructions; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.

LONG, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion;
TANENBAUM, J., concurs in result in part and dissents in part
with opinion.
                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                 8
LONG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

     I concur that the Board of Governors is not vicariously liable
for the actions of the Board of Trustees and is entitled to sovereign
immunity. I also agree to affirm the conversion and negligent
misrepresentation claims as to the Board of Trustees. The Court
correctly rejects Judge Tanenbaum’s theory that one’s money is not
one’s property.

     I dissent, however, from the Court’s decision on the
declaratory judgment claim. Appellees sought a declaratory
judgment in their complaint. They sought a declaration that the
fees charged exceeded the statutory maximums and were
unlawfully obtained, and a declaration that they were entitled to
a reimbursement. The trial court denied Appellants’ sovereign
immunity-based motion to dismiss this claim. The trial court
found that because Appellees were seeking money damages for loss
of property, section 768.28’s waiver of immunity applied. I agree
with my colleagues that section 768.28 does not waive sovereign
immunity for declaratory judgment actions. But I would affirm on
a different ground.

     I agree with Bill Stroop Roofing v. Metro. Dade Co., 788 So. 2d
365 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Actions to recover unlawful taxes and fees
were never barred by sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is
a separation of powers doctrine. And states do not enjoy sovereign
immunity when they act in violation of their controlling
constitutions. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 721
(Fla. 1994) (“Sovereign immunity does not exempt the State from
a challenge based on violation of the federal or state constitutions,
because any other rule self-evidently would make constitutional
law subservient to the State’s will.”). As recognized in Bill Stroop,
the Florida Constitution enshrines special protections against
unauthorized government takings and provides that “[n]o tax shall
be levied except in pursuance of law” and “[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law . . .
.” Art. VII, § (1)(a), Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. And Bill Stroop held
that an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the legality
of a tax or fee is necessarily a constitutional claim because “any
tax not authorized by law is unconstitutional.” Bill Stroop, 788 So.
2d at 367; see also Broward Cnty. v. Mattel, 397 So. 2d 457, 460

                                  9
(Fla. 4th DCA 1981). I view this as a straightforward application
of organic law: The constitution prohibits imposing unlawful fees
and taxes. A declaratory action can be used to declare a tax or fee
unlawful and therefore in violation of the constitution.
Supplemental relief can then be sought. 1

     I agree that our decision today conflicts with Bill Stroop, but
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the conflict. It is
not whether sovereign immunity bars “a declaratory judgment
action against the State even when the claim is not based on an
alleged constitutional violation.” Instead, it is about the nature of
the claim and whether it alleges a constitutional violation in the
first place. If it alleges a constitutional violation, then it is not
barred by sovereign immunity.

     The fees here are set out by the Legislature. While there is a
difference between a fee and a tax, 2 “once the illegality of either is
established, the prerequisites for recovery are the same.” Id. at
367; Ves Carpenter Contractors, Inc. v. City of Dania, 422 So. 2d
342, 344 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). Sovereign immunity does not
bar the declaratory judgment action against the Board of Trustees.

TANENBAUM, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.

    Both the University of Florida Board of Trustees (“UF”) and
the Florida Board of Governors (“BOG”) (collectively, the
“university defendants”) are sovereign state entities. There is no
dispute about that. Their sovereignty gives them total immunity
from suit in the State’s courts when plaintiffs, like the ones here,

    1 Whether a declaratory action can look backwards to address

a previous transaction is a question for another day. Here we
address only whether sovereign immunity bars the declaratory
action. The answer is no.
    2 For more detail, observe Jacksonville Port Auth. v. Alamo

Rent-A-Car, Inc., 600 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and
Contractors & Builders Ass’n of Pinellas Cnty. v. City of Dunedin,
329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).

                                  10
seek purely economic damages, and that is true regardless of the
labels they put on their putative causes of action. The whole
complaint against the university defendants should have been
dismissed. I concur, then, in vacating 1 the parts of the trial court’s
order that deny the entities’ motion to dismiss. Additionally, I
agree with Judge Lewis’s conclusion that the Legislature’s waiver
of sovereign immunity for “damages in tort” is not so broad as to
include the plaintiffs’ efforts to seek declaratory judgment against
the university defendants, so I join his certification of conflict with
Bill Stroop Roofing. Finally, I agree with Judge Lewis that section
1009.24, Florida Statutes, is not a waiver of immunity or an
authorization for suit to recover statutorily excessive fees.

    Otherwise, I must dissent insofar as the rest of the panel has
chosen to allow the plaintiffs and a putative class to go after these
two sovereign entities for purely economic loss allegedly suffered
from a supposed conversion of the plaintiffs’ funds and because of
putative negligent misrepresentations. The Legislature’s waiver of
sovereign immunity—strictly construed, as it must be—does not
extend so far.

                                   I

     As indicated in the opening, I support Judge Lewis’s
conclusion regarding dismissal of the declaratory judgment counts,
but I want to add a few comments. First, I take issue with Judge
Long’s recharacterization of the declaratory judgment counts
regarding $30- and $35-new-student fees as having some
constitutional dimension. The only way to get there is through
article VII, section 1(a), of the Florida Constitution: “No tax shall
be levied except in pursuance of law.” Seriously, though, the
student fees we all had to pay in college hardly resemble taxes. “In
common parlance a tax is a forced charge or imposition, it operates
whether we like it or not and in no sense depends on the will or
contract of the one on whom it is imposed.” State ex rel. Gulfstream
Park Racing Ass’n v. Fla. State Racing Comn’n, 70 So. 2d 375, 379
(Fla. 1953). Attendance at a university in Florida is a voluntary

    1 The main opinion uses the term “reverse” for the disposition,

but this is not technically correct because we do not have on review
a judgment or a dismissal with some res judicata effect.

                                  11
act. If a student does choose to attend, he or she will be subject to
several fees and costs to offset university expenses.

     Moreover, unlike taxes, fees taken in by a university are not
considered state revenue and are not deposited into the State’s
treasury. Compare § 1011.42(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring each board of
trustees to “designate the depositories in which any university
funds may be deposited”); id. (2) (requiring that all funds received
by a university, “from whatever source and for whatever purpose,
[] promptly be deposited in” the aforementioned depositories); id.
(6), (7), Fla. Stat. (allowing each university president to move
university funds around for different purposes and requiring each
board of trustees to “designate” check signatories “to pay legal
obligations of the university”), with § 215.31, Fla. Stat. (requiring
revenue, including fees, “collected or received under the authority
of the laws of the state” to “be promptly deposited in the State
Treasury,” not to be paid out without an appropriation); § 17.52,
Fla. Stat. (“No moneys shall be paid out of the treasury except on
such warrants or other orders of the Chief Financial Officer or
Comptroller.”); § 17.57(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (requiring the chief
financial officer to “deposit the money of the state or any money in
the State Treasury in such qualified public depositories of the
state”); § 17.58(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring that all moneys collected
by state institutions “be deposited” in the treasury, “except as
otherwise provided by law”).

      State universities, in fact, are not treated as typical state
agencies for budgeting purposes, and they are not appropriated
funds as if they were. See § 1011.41, Fla. Stat. (providing for
funding of “general operations” of universities by grant-in-aid).
Still, universities must charge the fees described in section
1009.24. See § 1009.24(2), Fla. Stat. (requiring that “[a]ll students
[] be charged fees”). Their compliance with the Legislature’s fee
policies is a condition of their receipt of funds granted from the
Legislature. See § 1011.41, Fla. Stat. (stating that legislative
funding is “contingent upon each university complying with the
tuition and fee policies established in the proviso language and
with the tuition and fee policies for state universities included in
part II of chapter 1009,” including section 1009.24). In turn, if a
university charges more for a fee than what the Legislature has
authorized, that is a matter between the university and the

                                 12
Legislature, not one to be battled out in the courts. It certainly is
not a matter of a constitutional dimension, as Judge Long
suggests.

     My next point regarding the declaratory judgment counts at
issue here is that they do not really seek declaratory relief.
Instead, they essentially ask the trial court to determine whether
a tort or some other wrong was committed in the past. They do not
express doubt about their “rights, status, or other equitable or
legal relations” being “affected by a statute, or any regulation
made under statutory authority,” such that they need determined
“any question of construction or validity arising under such statute
[or] regulation” or “a declaration of rights, status, or other
equitable or legal relations thereunder.” § 86.021, Fla. Stat. This
use of chapter 86 in the retrospective is not proper, because the
purpose of the chapter is to give trial courts the authority to
declare “the existence, or nonexistence,” of “any immunity, power,
privilege, or right” or any fact upon which the existence or non-
existence of one of these “right now exists or will arise in the
future.” § 86.011, Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied). 2 Regardless,

    2 See also § 86.051, Fla. Stat. (allowing for a declaration to be

“rendered by way of anticipation with respect to any act not yet
done or any event which has not yet happened” and providing that
“the judgment shall have the same binding effect with respect to
that future act or event”); Sheldon v. Powell, 128 So. 258, 263 (Fla.
1930) (“The common-law judgment cannot be secured until a right
has been invaded or an injury imposed, while the declaratory
decree contemplates that parties may be in doubt as to their rights,
and that they may have a judicial determination of them before
wrong has been committed or damage done.” (emphasis supplied));
id. at 262 (“In its inception, the purpose of the declaratory
judgment was to serve as an instrument of preventive justice, to
render practical help in determining issues, and to adjudicate the
rights or status of parties, without the peril of committing a crime
or resorting to violence or breach to put the legal machinery in
motion. It is inhibitory of injury.” (emphasis supplied) (internal
quotations omitted)); Seaside Town Council, Inc. v. Seaside Cmty.
Dev. Corp., 347 So. 3d 89, 100–01 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(Tanenbaum, J., dissenting) (providing historical context of the

                                 13
though, of whether these counts properly were pleaded under
chapter 86, to the extent the counts could be read as an alternative
means to recover in tort, the university defendants still are
immune because on the face of these counts, the plaintiffs clearly
seek to recover only for what they consider to be economic loss. And
that leads to a critical point, which I discuss in detail in the next
part: The Legislature has not waived sovereign immunity for suits
seeking such loss of funds, akin to contract or expectation
damages—i.e., the loss of value through some economic
transaction, as opposed to through some act causing physical harm
to property.

                                 II

     Now for why, in my view, no count pleaded in the complaint
fits within the limited immunity waiver set out in section 768.28,
Florida Statutes, thereby necessitating dismissal of the whole
thing (including, of course, the conversion and negligent
misrepresentation counts). Simply put, read narrowly, the
immunity-waiver text allows only for tort suits of the type that
seek recovery for damage to or destruction of real property or
chattel. Under this properly narrow reading, then, the waiver does
not include the suit that the plaintiffs bring: to recover funds they
say the university defendants improperly or tortiously obtained
from them as payment. The majority necessarily has applied—
without explicitly saying so—a more expansive reading of the
waiver-text, contrary to what the supreme court requires. 3

                                 A

    “The doctrine of sovereign immunity, which provides that a
sovereign cannot be sued without its own permission, has been a

declaratory judgment act and its prospective, preventative
purpose).
    3   Regrettably, the majority has opted not to provide an
explanation for its affirmance regarding the conversion and
negligent-misrepresentation counts. That means, however, there
is no court holding tied to the affirmance. The analysis that follows

                                 14
fundamental tenet of Anglo–American jurisprudence for centuries
and is based on the principle that ‘the King can do no wrong.’” Am.
Home Assurance Co. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So. 2d 459,
471 (Fla. 2005). It “was a part of the English common law when
the State of Florida was founded and has been adopted and
codified by the Florida Legislature.” Id. (citing section 2.01, Florida
Statutes).

     There are three policy justifications for this doctrine. First,
and perhaps most importantly, it preserves the “constitutional
principle of separation of powers.” Id.; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d
732, 737 (Fla. 1989) (reaffirming “that governmental immunity
derives entirely from the doctrine of separation of powers”); Com.
Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla.
1979) (stating that “certain functions of coordinate branches of
government may not be subjected to scrutiny by judge or jury as to
the wisdom of their performance”); see also Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.
3d 1035, 1044–45 (Fla. 2009) (characterizing sovereign immunity
in terms of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in that it “may
shield the government from an action in its courts”). Second,
sovereign immunity protects the public fisc. See Am. Home
Assurance Co., 908 So. 2d at 471; see also Spangler v. Fla. State
Tpk. Auth., 106 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. 1958) (noting that sovereign
immunity “is a part of the public policy of the state” that “is
enforced as a protection of the public against profligate
encroachments on the public treasury”). Finally, it maintains “the
orderly administration of government.” Am. Home Assurance Co.,
908 So. 2d at 471.

     In the light of these considerations, it makes sense that the
Florida Constitution gives the Legislature exclusive authority to
waive the State’s sovereign immunity. Id.; see Art. X, § 13, Fla.
Const. (“Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit
against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter
originating.” (emphasis supplied)). In other words, only the
Legislature gets to spell out the extent to which the State may be
sued and the parameters of such suits—and it will do so in the text

in this opinion hopefully will prove helpful to judges and counsel
when considering the scope of the immunity waiver in other cases.

                                  15
of the law it enacts. Section 768.28 is the Legislature’s waiver of
that immunity in tort. Because a law is required to waive
immunity, courts do not have the authority to redefine the scope of
any immunity waiver. Moreover, out of respect for the
Legislature’s exclusive role here and “to protect public funds,” the
supreme court directs that courts construe immunity waivers
narrowly, hewing closely to what is explicit in the text. Hardee
County v. FINR II, Inc., 221 So. 3d 1162, 1165–66 (Fla. 2017); see
Spangler, 106 So. 2d at 424 (noting that “statutes purporting to
waive the sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal,” and
that to enforce the State’s public policy, “[w]aiver will not be
reached as a product of inference or implication”).

      Indeed, there is a practical side to narrowly construing
immunity-waiver statutes. When we construe a word (or
combination of words) in a statute—like we supposedly are doing
here—we are considering that word as “the linguistic expression of
a term.” PETER KREEFT, SOCRATIC LOGIC 40 (2014 ed. 3.1); see id.
at 41 (explaining how “different words in many different
languages” can express “the same stable term”). A term,
meanwhile, “is simply any word or group of words that denotes one
object of thought.” Id. Every term has two components: its
“comprehension” (its “inner meaning” or “connotation”) and its
“extension” (its “denotation” or “all the real things the term refers
to”). Id. at 43–44. Assessing a term involves both components. Id.
at 44–45. Consideration of comprehension is qualitative and
involves “all the attributes or qualities or characteristics meant by”
the term—the “essential nature” of the object of thought being
expressed. Id. at 44–46; see also id. at 123 (“A definition tells us
what a thing is.” (emphasis removed)). A term’s extension, by
contrast, is quantitative: telling us what set of things is grouped
by the term based on its comprehension. The two components are
inversely related. Adding attributes to increase comprehension
gives more meaning to the term but narrows its extension, i.e., the
scope of things that the term references, and vice versa. Id. at 45.

    If we are to define a word itself, rather than the term it
represents, we are looking for a “nominal definition,” which really
“answer[s] the question, ‘How is this word used?’ rather than
‘What is this thing?’” Id. at 125. An argument over meaning with
respect to a nominal definition, then, will be in reference to

                                 16
“socially constructed conventions rather than universal objective
truths.” Id. at 127. There nevertheless will be the same two
inversely related components of definition: comprehension and
extension. If we define a word by its more general social usage, we
necessarily decrease its comprehension (i.e., its meaning) and
increase its extension (i.e., its usage, or scope of things to which it
refers). Contrariwise, if we define a word by how it has
conventionally been used in a more specific sense, we give the word
more meaning, because the narrower context of usage adds to the
“attributes or qualities or characteristics” included within the
word. This expansion of meaning in turn narrows the scope of
“things” to which the word refers.

     This philosophical understanding about what we are doing
informs the practical aspect of our interpretative endeavor. Take a
word with two usages, one general and one specific. 4 The set of
things within scope of the specific would include no more than
what would be within the set covered by the general usage. If we
apply a word’s specific usage in a case, then, we can be assured
that we have effectuated the whole of the policy adopted by the
Legislature—and nothing more. The same, however, cannot be
said about going with the general usage over the specific: The
general usage will include what the specific covers plus some
additional things that are not included under the specific usage.

     When it is called for, narrow construction of an ambiguous
word in a statute means choosing the more specific conventional
usage of the word over the more general. The specific usage carries
with it more comprehension, a richer meaning. A richer meaning,
in turn, narrows the scope of what is included within the word as
used in a statute. When we do this—say in the context of a
sovereign-immunity waiver—we significantly reduce the risk of
our erroneously expanding (read: judicially modifying) a legislative

    4 A word with different usages, or meanings, is ambiguous. See

PETER KREEFT, SOCRATIC LOGIC 47 (2014 ed. 3.1) (“Ambiguous
means having more than one meaning.” (internal quotations
omitted)). Statutory construction, at bottom, is a judicial exercise
in picking the usage that best reflects the policy enacted by the
Legislature.

                                  17
policy to include things that are outside the boundaries properly
enacted through the process set out in article III of the Florida
Constitution.

     Despite the absence of an explanation or holding from the
majority, its decision to sustain the conversion and negligent-
misrepresentation counts stands in contravention of this directive
to narrowly construe and preserve the Legislature’s decision to
waive immunity under only the circumstances that it specified. As
I am about to discuss, the waiver in section 768.28 contains a key
ambiguous word—“property.” I will demonstrate that the
historical usage of “property,” especially its usage in the context of
the words surrounding it in the statute, is more specific than the
more recent alternative usage that the majority implicitly adopts.
In its sustaining of the conversion and misrepresentation counts,
the majority necessarily has chosen a usage of “property” that
includes money (i.e., economic loss) within its scope of extension—
without any explanation as to why, or even an acknowledgment of
the ambiguity. 5 Whatever the reasoning, the majority’s approach
now effectively exposes the State’s coffers to these enterprising
litigants in a way the Legislature has not authorized.

                                   B

     The Legislature has chosen to waive immunity only for torts.
See § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. (waiving “sovereign immunity for
liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act”); Pan-
Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4, 5 (Fla. 1984)
(noting that “[t]here is no analogous waiver in contract”); see also
Ch. 73-313, § 1, at 711, Laws of Fla. (enacting waiver language

    5 Judge Long misses the mark with his passing quip (I can

only assume) that I somehow am suggesting a person’s money is
not his or her property. Nonsense. My analysis has nothing to do
with legal theory or political philosophy. All I address here is what
should be a faithful effort at narrowly discerning the meaning of
the word “property” as it is used in the immunity-waiver statute. It
should go without having to say that a word can be given a more
narrow meaning under an accepted canon of construction without
that construction being labeled an effective rejection of other,
broader meanings that the word could carry in other contexts.

                                   18
that now is section 768.28(1)). The waiver, however, does not
extend to all suits in tort.

     Rather, the Legislature has limited the waiver in terms of the
type of damages sought. The waiver allows the State to be subject
to suit in its own courts only for “[a]ctions at law” (as opposed to in
equity) and only “to recover damages in tort for money damages . . .
for injury or loss of property, personal injury, or death.” Id.
(emphasis supplied); cf. id. (5)(a) (excluding punitive damages and
prejudgment interest from the waiver). Had the Legislature
intended to waive immunity for all tort suits for damages, then
there would be no reason for the highlighted prepositional phrase.
This phrase, then, must be a further narrowing of the immunity
waiver, so we should pay careful attention to getting the meaning
behind this text right.

     That attention is particularly warranted here. The plaintiffs
seek recovery of funds they collectively paid over to the university
defendants. When looking at the limitation quoted in the preceding
paragraph, one can see that the university defendants’ immunity
claim turns on whether the recovery of ill-obtained funds
constitutes a “loss of property.” The plaintiffs do not seek recovery
for damage to or loss of their real property or chattel. They claim
a loss of their money, or the value of what they perceive to be their
contracted expectation. They seek to be made whole through
compensation, then, only for economic damage they claim to have
suffered. To address the university defendants’ immunity claim,
we should be analyzing whether the word “property,” as it used in
the waiver limitation, includes the concept of money 6 within its
scope of reference.

     It should be clear that “property” is an ambiguous word, as it
is used in the waiver. The history that I provide below highlights
this point. The ambiguity requires a proper textual construction to
find the correct meaning behind the waiver. The majority’s

    6  By “money” here, I mean the abstract concept of money
operating as a medium of exchange. This usage is distinguishable
from the word’s more specific usage, as will be discussed below, to
refer just to the physical, transportable representations of money
like coins or paper notes.

                                  19
disposition “without discussion” fails to address this question. For
the majority, apparently, “property” must include pretty much
everything that can be owned, even intangibles like money. This
unelaborated approach, however, would obviate any effect of the
highlighted text as a legislative limitation on the immunity
waiver, thereby running counter to at least a couple well-
established principles of textual analysis.

     The constitution requires a more robust judicial effort.
Economic loss is the obvious type of damage excluded by “injury or
loss of property.” If “injury or loss of property” includes economic
loss, what is left? We either read these words to exclude this
alternative type of damage, or we improperly render the words
surplusage. See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189,
198–99 (Fla. 2007) (“Moreover, a basic rule of statutory
construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact
useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would
render part of a statute meaningless.” (internal quotation and
citation omitted)). Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N. Y., 840 So.
2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003) (“It is an elementary principle of statutory
construction that significance and effect must be given to every
word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and
words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”);
Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1986) (“We are
compelled by well-established norms of statutory construction to
choose that interpretation of statutes and rules which renders
their provisions meaningful.”).

     There is a reasonable, more specific usage of “property” in this
space. If the majority were to abide by the supreme court’s
directive to narrowly construe an immunity waiver (and faithfully
effectuate the waiver only insofar as the Legislature enacted), it
would have no choice but to vacate (rather than affirm) the trial
court’s denial of the university defendants’ claims of immunity.
The remainder of this opinion addresses the specific usage of
“property” that should apply to support dismissal of the plaintiffs’
complaint.

                                 1

    The Legislature uses words to reflect state policy, and those
words carry certain specialized meaning, depending on the context

                                 20
and moment in history when they are enacted. The statute at issue
here was enacted in 1973. Discerning how the word “property” is
used in the statute requires consideration of the words
surrounding it. It is used in the prepositional phrase “for injury or
loss of property, personal injury, or death,” which modifies (read:
limits) the type of “money damages” (the antecedent of that
phrase) that may be recovered against the State. The prepositional
phrase itself is modified by the participial phrase that follows it:
“caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any [state]
employee. . . .” As I will show, all this language taken together,
including the word “property,” is rooted in the ancient common
law—a fact relevant both at the time of the waiver’s 1973
enactment and now. See § 59, Revised Statutes (1892) (declaring
the “common and statute laws of England which are of a general
and not of a local nature . . . down to the 4th day of July, 1776, . . .
to be of force in this State”); § 2.01, Fla. Stat. (1973) (same); § 2.01,
Fla. Stat. (2023) (same); cf. Waller v. First Sav. & Tr. Co., 138 So.
780, 784 (Fla. 1931) (analyzing and determining application of old
English common-law principles); Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40, 43
(Fla. 1971) (same); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 435–36 (Fla.
1973) (same); Tomlinson v. State, 369 So. 3d 1142, 1147 (Fla. 2023)
(looking to “settled legal meaning at English common law” to
interpret statute); id. (“Where Congress uses terms that have
accumulated settled meaning under either equity or the common
law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.” (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., a Div. of Amax, Inc., 453
U.S. 322, 329 (1981))). 7

     7 Cf. Tomlinson, 369 So. 3d at 1146 (“When, in discerning what

a statute requires, we encounter a word with more than one
meaning, we look for the original meaning of the statutory text to
keep us from overriding the bargain struck in the Legislature and
signed by the Governor, that is, the law that governs us.”); id.
(“And when (as often happens) a word had more than one accepted
meaning at that time, we decide which one is the law by looking to
the context in which it appears, and what history tells us about
how it got there.”).

                                   21
      The common law historically made a clear distinction between
recovery of “money” (i.e., economic losses), on the one hand; and for
bodily injury and damage or destruction of physical “property,” on
the other. As to the former, economic loss could stem, for instance,
from a failure of an expectation under contract. It could stem from
a deprivation of an ownership interest. In any case, though, the
common law did not equate “economic loss” with a loss of
“property.” See Property, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (1856) (“The
right and interest which a man has in lands and chattels to the
exclusion of others.”). Recompense for economic loss, in turn,
consistently has resembled contract damages, as contract law
developed first based on tort law, and later evolved separately from
tort law. In turn, recovery was not for “loss of property”; it was for
return of money owed. See BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF
COMMON-LAW PLEADING 39 (2d ed. 1895) (defining “debt” as “a
liquidated or certain sum of money due [the plaintiff]” and
describing action of debt as one to recover debt “based upon
contract,” either express or implied, or on “quasi-contractual
obligations having the force and effect of simple contracts”); id. at
41 (describing an action of debt as lying “to recover money lent,
money paid by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant, money had
and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff, or the
balance due on an account stated . . . for work and labor . . . [and]
for goods sold and delivered, or bargained and sold”); id. at 46–47
(describing “action of account” as one arising “ex contractu” and
lying “where one has received goods or money for another, to
ascertain and recover the balance due” (emphasis supplied)); see
also id. at 11–13 (describing “action of assumpsit” as a “proper
remedy for the breach of any simple or parole contract . . . whether
it is for the payment of money, or for the performance of some other
act, as to render services or deliver goods, or for the forbearance to
do some act”); id. at 19 (explaining that “general assumpsit” also
is called “the common counts,” which will lie to recover “for money
paid by the plaintiff for the use of the defendant,” “for money had
and received,” “for money lent,” and “for a balance due on account
stated”); id. at 20 (defining “money counts” as those common
counts relating “to money transactions as the basis of the debt”);
id. at 28–30 (describing how money counts under general
assumpsit provide vehicles by which to seek repayment of “money
so obtained” in situations “where one person by means of fraud,
duress, trespass, or any other tort, obtains another’s money, and

                                 22
converts it to his own use, or obtains his property and sells the
same, and converts the proceeds”; and also “to recover money paid
by mistake, as where money is paid as due upon the basis of
erroneous accounts”). 8

     The supreme court from early on has recognized these money
counts. See S. States Power Co. v. Pittman, 165 So. 893, 895 (Fla.
1936) (recognizing “common count” as lying “for money had and
received upon a consideration of money obtained through
imposition or through an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s
situation”); Cullen v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 58 So. 182, 184
(Fla. 1912) (recognizing common count “for money had and
received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff” as lying for
recovery of excess charges, “whether the charges exacted are in
excess of reasonable rates at common law or are in excess of rates
prescribed and made prima facie reasonable under statutory
authority” (emphasis supplied)); Gordon v. Camp, 2 Fla. 422, 428
(1849) (rejecting argument that action for money had and received
would not lie to recover money paid over, because “property paid or
received as money will support the action for money paid, or had

    8 Justice Holmes described these same common-law actions

for the recovery of money. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 269–70 (Dover ed. 1991) (explaining that “debt was
the time-honored remedy on every obligation to pay money
enforced by law, except the liability to damages for a wrong”); id.
at 252 (explaining that the “substance of the plaintiff’s claim as set
forth in the writ of debt is that the defendant owes him so much
[money] and wrongfully withholds it,” and that the claim is based
on “a duty to pay on any ground”); id. at 275–82 (describing
development of assumpsit as common-law vehicle for contract
damages based on trespass action and then action for trespass-on-
the-case, with the common-law action originally limiting liability
“to damage to person or property arising after the defendant had
entered upon the employment” under contract); id. at 322–24, 327–
39 (explaining how the common law treated damages for
misrepresentations and deceit (fraud) as contract, or expectation,
damages).

                                 23
and received, the same as if money itself had been paid or
received”). 9

     Actions for trover and conversion, meanwhile, differ in form
from the money counts described above, but the recovery these
actions allow—essentially for economic loss—are very similar. The
economic loss in these situations—through a common-law fiction—
are essentially for the wrongful transfer of a possessory interest in
the property taken. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
144 (describing trover and conversion actions as being based on an
interference “with the real owner’s right of possession”); id. at 98–
99 (describing damages for a defendant’s wrongful detention of
another’s chattel as the equivalent of requiring the defendant to
“pay over its value” as a sum owed). Notably, the “property” at
issue in a trover and conversion action is limited to chattel—
tangible, moveable goods. 10 Blackstone, in his treatment of this
area, expressly limits the definition of personal property to “goods,
money, and all other moveable chattels, and things thereunto
incident.” 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *144 (emphasis
supplied); see also 2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *384
(describing personal property as tangible, “things moveable”); id.
at *387 (defining “chattels personal,” as opposed to “chattels real,”
as “things moveable; which may be annexed to or attendant on the
person of the owner, and carried about with him from one part of
the world to another”).

    9 The Legislature recognized these counts as well. See § 2648,

Revised Gen. Statutes (1920) (setting sufficient statements of
declaration for causes of action for money counts and actions on
contract); §§ 51.01, 51.02, 51.03, Fla. Stat. (1949) (setting sufficient
statements of declaration for causes of action for money counts and
actions on contract). These provisions later were repealed as being
“superseded by the existing common law rules.” Ch. 26962, Laws
of Fla. (1951).
    10 The fact that the plaintiffs do not seek damages for
conversion of chattel—only for an historically unrecognized
conversion of funds—further highlights my point. The plaintiffs
seek only economic loss and not damages for harm to or loss of
“property,” as that term is more narrowly defined.

                                  24
     Blackstone, meanwhile, clearly makes a distinction between
“money” as a medium of exchange, and “money” as “personal
property,” referring to “money” in this context only in the physical
sense, because personal property at the time was considered to be
something “that can properly be put in motion, and transferred
from place to place.” 2 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *387; see also
3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *144 (referring to “money” as
something tangible—capable of “attend[ing] a man’s person where
he goes, and from thence receives its denomination.”). Trover and
conversion indeed required that “the thing detained” be
ascertainable, such that “it may be specifically known and
recovered.” 3 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES *151. “Therefore it
cannot be brought for money, corn, or the like: for that cannot be
known from other money or corn; unless it be in a bag or sack.” Id.
(emphasis supplied); see also BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF
COMMON-LAW PLEADING at 68 (explaining that an “action for
trover and conversion” requires, among other elements, that the
plaintiff have “property in the thing,” that he was “in the actual
possession, or entitled to the immediate possession,” and that the
conversion involved the taking, carrying away, wrongful
assumption or detention of “goods” (emphasis supplied)); id. at 70–
71 (explaining that trover and conversion is limited to “personal
property” and that such an action “will lie for so many pieces of
money taken and converted by the defendant” but not for “money
had and received generally”). For Blackstone, the taking of
property (as in conversion) is not the same as causing physical
“abuse or damage of the chattels.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *145; see also id. at *151–52. That is, the harm
involved in a conversion is the loss of possession and use of chattel;
the chattel itself has not been harmed or destroyed. The remedy in
that case is payment of the value of the chattel at the time it was
taken or detained.

    In contrast to these common-law actions for the recovery of
money owed in a variety of ways, there was really but one, distinct,
common-law action that allowed for recovery of damages for
physical harm. The ancient action of trespass traditionally was the
vehicle “for the recovery of damages for an injury to the person [or]
property.” BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW
PLEADING at 50. For “injury to property,” the property must have
been “in the actual or constructive possession of the plaintiff at the

                                 25
time of the injury,” and the injury had to be caused by “force, actual
or implied.” Id. at 50–51; see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 192, 195–96 (discussing “loss” in the context of
chattels or goods); see generally id. at 77–129 (describing evolution
of common-law action for trespass to hold defendant liable for
physical or tangible harm to person or property caused by his act);
but cf. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING at 86–93
(describing “action on the case,” “trespass on the case,” or just
“case” as a form of action that allows for damages for harm suffered
to intangible rights and interests, because there could be no
physical violence inflicted on such a right or interest, which is
required for trespass); id. at 93 (“If the injury is to corporeal
property, and is immediate, and committed with force, case will
not lie merely because that property was the means by which an
incorporeal right was enjoyed.”); id. (explaining that when an
“incorporeal right is invaded, the redress is by action on the case,”
but when “visible, tangible, corporeal property is injured, if the
injury be direct, immediate, and willful, trespass is the proper form
of action . . . .”); id. at 94–96 (consistently referring to tangible
personal property when referring to recovery for tortious injury to
property rather than equating intangible rights and interests with
such property). Notably, the distinction is woven through
Blackstone’s extended treatment of common-law suits for injury to
personal and real property. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *144–153 (distinguishing between financial loss
from lack of use when one’s property is dispossessed, on the one
hand, and damage suffered to the thing itself, which “tak[es] from
the value of any of [the owner’s] chattels or making them in a worse
condition than before”); id. at *223–29 (describing as “waste” a loss
to the substance of real property, rather than just economic losses
suffered from loss of use).

     I lay all this out to make a critical point about construing
section 768.28(1): Limiting the waiver to damages only for “injury
or loss of property, personal injury, or death,” and then only such
injury or loss “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission”
of a state employee, mirrors the common law’s clear, ancient
distinction between actions to recover for harm to or destruction of

                                 26
chattel and actions to recover economic losses. 11 This parallelism
amply supports a more specific usage of the word “property” here,
a usage that carries with it the additional “attributes” that the
historical context provides. These additional attributes increase
“comprehension” and narrow the word’s extension, or scope. A
narrow construction of the immunity waiver, which is mandated,
dictates that “property,” as it is used in the term “injury or loss of
property,” be treated and applied in this narrow sense to exclude
the purely economic losses that the plaintiffs sought in their
negligent misrepresentation and conversion counts.

                                  2

      If that were not enough, the supreme court’s long history of
making the distinction between recovery for tangible property
damage and for economic loss provides additional support. See,
e.g., Casa Clara Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.,
620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993) (“The [economic loss] rule is the
fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to
enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which
imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens
to avoid causing physical harm to others.” (internal quotation and
citation omitted)); id. (defining “economic losses” as “‘disappointed
economic expectations,’ which are protected by contract law, rather
than tort law”); id. at 1247 (holding that “contract principles [are]
more appropriate than tort principles for recovering economic loss
without an accompanying physical injury or property damage”
(emphasis supplied)); AFM Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So.
2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. 1987) (“We conclude that without some
conduct resulting in personal injury or property damage, there can
be no independent tort flowing from a contractual breach which
would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses.” (emphasis
supplied)); see also Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216,
1222 (Fla. 2010) (allowing fishermen to recover for loss of income

    11 I have not addressed the common-law’s treatment of actions

for damage to real property and interests related to real property
because doing so is not necessary in this analysis. Still, I
acknowledge that this waiver likely is broad enough to allow
actions for those damages as well.

                                 27
as “economic damages,” even though they “do not own any real or
personal property damaged by the pollution”); id. (distinguishing
between recovery “for damages to real or personal property” and
recovery for economic damages caused by damage to natural
resources under the statute); id. at 1223 (“As a general principle of
common law negligence, some courts have not permitted recovery
for purely economic losses when the plaintiff has sustained no
bodily injury or property damage.” (emphasis supplied)); cf. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 889 (Fla. 2007)
(noting how “faulty workmanship or defective work that has
damaged the otherwise nondefective completed project has caused
‘physical injury to tangible property’ within the plain meaning of
the definition in the policy,” but that “[i]f there is no damage
beyond the faulty workmanship or defective work, then there may
be no resulting ‘property damage’”); Peoples Gas Sys. v. Posen
Constr., Inc., 322 So. 3d 604, 614 (Fla. 2021) (treating the term
“losses” as synonymous for “damages” and noting that by itself, the
term would include “economic damages that are independent of
personal injury or property damage” (emphasis supplied));
Monsanto Agr. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla.
1st DCA 1982) (“Tort law imposes upon manufacturers a duty to
exercise reasonable care so that the products they place in the
marketplace will not harm persons or property.”). 12

     Finally, additional support for the narrower reading of
“property” can be found in the Legislature’s consistent statutory
distinction between “property” and “money.” The Legislature
routinely refers to money as “money” when it uses the word in the
medium-of-exchange sense. It rarely, if ever, uses the word
“property” to include a reference to money in that same sense,
instead using the words “monies” or “moneys” to refer to money as

    12  See also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918, 929 (May 1966)
(discussing how “property damage” and “economic loss” are
“usually readily distinguishable”); Fleming James Jr., Limitations
on Liability for Economic Loss Cause by Negligence: A Pragmatic
Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 43–46, 50 (Jan. 1972) (discussing
difference between recovery for physical damage to chattel and for
economic loss).

                                 28
tangible property. See, e.g., § 624.605(1)(a), (b), (d), (g), (l), (p) Fla.
Stat. (1973) (referring separately to insurance for “loss of or
damage to . . . property while contained” in a vehicle; insurance
against liability for “death, injury, or disability of any human
being, or for damage to property”; coverage for “loss of or damage
to moneys, coins, bullion, securities, notes, drafts acceptances or
any other valuable papers and documents”; coverage against “loss
or damage to property or interest”; and “insurance against liability
for any other kind of loss or damage to person or property”
(emphasis supplied)); § 716.02, Fla. Stat. (1973) (referring to “[a]ll
money or other property”); § 716.07(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (providing for
recovery of escheated “property, funds or money delivered to the
state,” and referring to “money or property” and “property, money,
or funds claimed”); § 116.23, Fla. Stat. (1973) (referring to
forfeiture of “personal property or chattels personal listed, used,
offered, or received in evidence”); §§ 402.17, 402.18, Fla. Stat.
(1973) (referring repeatedly to “money” and “funds” received or
held); see also § 513.114(1), Fla. Stat. (1983 Supp.) (exonerating
operator of recreational vehicle park from “obligation to accept for
safekeeping any physical “properties” like “moneys, securities,
jewelry, or precious stones of any kind belonging to any guest”); §
68.082, Fla. Stat. (1994 Supp.) (referring to “possession, custody,
or control of property or money”); § 550.1645, Fla. Stat. (1993)
(referring to “money or other property”); § 717.129, Fla. Stat.
(1987) (referring to “a claim for money or property”).

                                    3

     The way I see it, the university defendants are immune from
the plaintiffs’ suit because it claims nothing but economic
damages. The plaintiffs seek money that they contend the
university defendants should return because UF either
overcharged them or took advantage of them. Those claims are
classic money counts at common law, seeking the return of money
owed, not damages for “injury or loss of property.” See Pittman,
165 So. at 895 (recognizing “common count” as lying “for money
had and received upon a consideration obtained through
imposition or through an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff’s
situation”); Cullen, 58 So. at 183–84 (recognizing common count
“for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the
plaintiff” as lying for recovery of excess charges, “whether the

                                    29
charges exacted are in excess of reasonable rates at common law
or are in excess of rates prescribed and made prima facie reasonable
under statutory authority” (emphasis supplied)). The immunity
waiver, strictly construed, does not cover those claims. In the end,
we have a duty to construe the immunity waiver in section
768.28(1) as narrowly as reasonably possible while remaining true
to the text. I believe I have set out an approach that best fulfills
that duty.

     The majority takes the opposite tack: implicitly (but “without
discussion”) applying “property” in its broader sense and
presumably finding a waiver of immunity that a narrower-yet-still-
reasonable sense cannot support. As I noted at the beginning of
this part, the objective when we are narrowly construing an
immunity waiver is to minimize, if not eliminate, the risk that we
end up reading the waiver to include matters that it was not
drafted to include. In other words, our goal here should be to do no
harm to the Legislature’s carefully crafted waiver—to avoid
encroachment upon the Legislature’s exclusive authority to
precisely set the parameters of any waiver of sovereign immunity.
The majority’s disposition sustaining the conversion and negligent
representation counts—and the expansive reading of “property” on
which it has to have relied—seriously risks just such an
encroachment.

     At all events, that disposition cannot be reconciled with
centuries of history, supreme court directives, or statutory usage
with respect to the word “property.” I dissent from the majority’s
affirmance of the conversion and negligent misrepresentation
counts.

                                III

     Allow me to close with an observation. Reading the waiver to
exclude economic damages, like those sought by the plaintiffs in
this case, is commensurate with the textual purpose of the statute.
SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW 19–20 (describing how “the
textualist routinely takes purpose into account, but in its concrete
manifestations as deduced from close reading of the text”). As I
already explained, only the Legislature—and not the courts—has
the authority to waive sovereign immunity. The purpose of the
statute is there in its opening words (to exercise the Legislature’s

                                30
authority under article X, section 13 of the Florida Constitution),
and we should read the statute in a way that leaves control over
the scope of the immunity waiver with the Legislature.

     Florida’s courts over the decades have shown their willingness
to arrogate to themselves (at the expense of the legislative power)
the authority to expand quite liberally upon the English common
law adopted by the Legislature as the substantive law. Cf. § 2.01,
Fla. Stat. The courts repeatedly have found new duties and new
causes of action unknown to English common law. See, e.g.,
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So. 2d 334, 339 (Fla.
1997) (adopting Restatement’s position establishing negligent
misrepresentation as cause of action); McCain v. Fla. Power Corp.,
593 So. 2d 500, 503 (Fla. 1992) (expanding scope of duty based on
undertaker doctrine, in reliance on Restatement); Wallace, 3 So.
3d at 1052–54 (expanding the duty’s scope even further to avoid
sovereign immunity bar). If the Legislature were to set out a
waiver of immunity merely in terms of theories of tort recovery, it
would, for better or worse, effectively be ceding at least some of its
exclusive authority over sovereign immunity waivers (and the
treasury) to the judiciary.

     The Legislature instead wisely has put the limited waiver in
terms of types of damages: The State is not immune from suit in
its courts when a plaintiff seeks to recover for actual harm to real
property or chattel or to the plaintiff’s body (including death), but
it remains otherwise immune to efforts to recover any other type
damages, including for economic loss. This way, regardless of the
various novel tort theories that the judiciary may recognize in the
future, the waiver will remain fixed in scope, based on the type of
damages sought.

     As I already noted above, the plaintiffs here clearly sued to
recover only economic loss—indeed, based on several novel legal
theories. The trial court’s permissiveness toward this “creativity”
could prove destructive to the legislative effort to limit the scope of
the waiver. We should stay true to the Legislature’s prerogative in
this respect by narrowly applying the term “property” and putting
an immediate stop to these enterprising plaintiffs’ effort to gain
legislatively unanticipated access to public funds.

                                  31
                              * * *

    I would vacate the trial court’s order to the extent it denies
the university defendants’ motion to dismiss, and I would remand
with an instruction that the trial court dismiss the complaint with
prejudice. 13

                 _____________________________

Robert J. Sniffen, Matthew J. Carson, and Jeffrey D. Slanker of
Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Paul S. Rothstein of Paul S. Rothstein, P.A., Gainesville; Robert S.
Peck of Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C., pro hac vice,
Washington, DC, for Appellees.

    13 With respect to the majority’s disposition on the negligent

misrepresentation count, we at least should certify conflict with
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, which has adopted my more
limited reading of section 768.28(1). See City of Pembroke Pines v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., Inc., 274 So. 3d 1105, 1113 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
(holding that trial court erred in denying motion to dismiss on
immunity grounds because “waiver of sovereign immunity has not
been extended to include [a] claim [for] economic damages framed
in counts for declaratory relief, promissory estoppel, tortious
interference with contract, and tortious interference with
advantageous business relationship”); id. (relying on reasoning set
out in Brevard County v. Miorelli Eng’g, Inc., 677 So. 2d 32, 34–35
(Fla. 5th DCA 1996), quashed on other grounds, 703 So. 2d 1049
(Fla. 1997)). The majority offers no explanation for not certifying.
Because the majority also fails to offer any analysis for how it
resolved the ambiguity behind the use of “property” in the waiver,
the majority’s disposition likely will evade review by the supreme
court, leaving unresolved what is otherwise a clear and
irreconcilable conflict.

                                32