Court Opinion

ID: 9591758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:07:25.121037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:11.635256
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.
(dissenting)—The majority says that the reason for the allowance of alimony in the amount of one hundred fifty dollars a month is found in a quoted portion of the memorandum opinion of the trial judge. The opinion referred to is actually an oral opinion rendered at the conclusion of the trial on April 21, 1954. Then the majority states that the problem is whether the disparity between the training and earning power of the parties justifies the allowance of alimony to the wife under the factual circumstances of this case.
I would agree that the reason given in the oral opinion does not justify an award of alimony, and would also agree that the the alimony award should not be based upon the disparity between the parties as to their training and earning power. That, in my opinion, is not the problem before us.
We have many times held that a trial court may change its mind after delivering an oral or written opinion and be*502fore making its findings and conclusions. Liming v. Teel (1955), 46 Wn. (2d) 762, 284 P. (2d) 1110. Whatever the trial judge may have said in his oral opinion, there is nothing in the findings made three months later that suggests that the alimony allowance is based upon anything except the necessities of the wife and the husband’s ability to pay, which are the criteria which we have consistently laid down. Herrett v. Herrett (1914), 80 Wash. 474, 478, 141 Pac. 1158; Bartow v. Bartow (1942), 12 Wn. (2d) 408, 412, 121 P. (2d) 962; Murray v. Murray (1946), 26 Wn. (2d) 370, 378, 174 P. (2d) 296; Patrick v. Patrick (1953), 43 Wn. (2d) 139, 144, 260 P. (2d) 878.
The basic assignment of error is as to finding of fact No. IX, which reads as follows:
“It is proper that defendant be required to pay to plaintiff the sum of $150.00 per month as alimony, which sum is a reasonable sum to be allowed for plaintiff’s support and which sum defendant is able to pay.”
The problem confronting the trial court and confronting us is, Does Mrs. Young need alimony and, if so, how much?
Mrs. Young’s “necessities” after thirty years of married life terminated by the husband’s fault are something more than food, clothing, and shelter. A wife is, under such conditions, entitled to enjoy substantially the same standard of living that she had prior to the decree of divorce. Hogan v. Hogan (1943), 196 Ga. 822, 28 S. E. (2d) 74; Boggs v. Boggs (1910), 45 Ind. App. 397, 90 N. E. 1040; Barnett v. Barnett (1942), 292 Ky. 840, 168 S. W. (2d) 17; Krause v. Krause (1953), 26 N. J. Super. 424, 98 A. (2d) 329; 27 C. J. S. 971, Divorce, § 236; 17 Am. Jur. 470, Divorce and Separation, § 602; 2 Nelson on Divorce (2d ed.) 45, 49, §§ 14. 34, 14. 39.
See Theis v. Theis (1938), 196 Wash. 667, 670, 84 P. (2d) 369, in which we indicated that, although the wife was at fault, she should have an “allowance sufficient to maintain her in the modest luxury to which she became accustomed as the wife of respondent.”
I agree with the majority that both Mrs. Young’s earning capacity and whatever income the property awarded to her will earn if wisely invested should be considered in deter-. *503mining whether or how much alimony should be paid. Such additional amount as will enable her to enjoy substantially the same standard of living that she had prior to the divorce would, in my opinion, be the measure of her necessities under the circumstances in this case. McAllister v. McAllister (1865), 1 Ky. Opin. 333. Mr. Young’s ability to make such payment is conceded.
The appellant makes no direct attack upon the finding as to the amount Mrs. Young needs for her support by such a standard, or by any standard, but adroitly avoids that issue by making his attack upon a statement in the trial court’s oral opinion, and argues that no alimony should be allowed on the basis there indicated. I find nothing to indicate that alimony was allowed on that basis.
The appellant, having failed to show that Mrs. Young does not need the one hundred fifty dollars a month, or that he is not able to páy that amount without hardship, has failed in his attack upon the finding of fact quoted above.' The conclusion and' judgment complained of are predicated upon that finding. No abuse of discretion has been shown, and I would affirm the trial court.
Hamley, C. J., and Rosellini, J., concur with Hill, J.