Court Opinion

ID: 9487050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:06:59.677912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:04.528980
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I have no alternative but to dissent. Intent is an essential element of the crime of sports bookmaking, and the State failed to allege in the indictment that Max Weisberg had the necessary intent. The failure to allege intent was more than a “technical defect,” as the majority the very heart of the indictment and deprived Weisberg of due process.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that where specific intent is an essential element of a crime that intent must be alleged in the indictment. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962). This court has consistently taken the same position. See United States v. Opsta, 659 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir.1981) (failure to allege essential element of criminal intent renders indictment partially defective and requires dismissal); United States v. May, 625 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir.1980) (specific intent is a necessary element that must be alleged in the indictment); United States v. Denmon, 483 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir.1973) (indictment must set forth the essential elements of the offense charged or it is fatally defective). The majority seems to agree with this statement of the law, but holds that (1) by pleading guilty, Weisberg waived his right to challenge the validity of the indictment; and (2) in any event, the State of Minnesota had already decided that Weisberg had waived his right to challenge the validity of the conviction and our court is bound by that decision.
If an essential element of the crime has been omitted from the indictment, the omission may be cured if the indictment sets out the words of the statute itself, but only if “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.... [An] omission is not cured by a bare citation of the charging statute.” United States v. Zangger, 848 F.2d 923, 925 (8th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). A “bare citation” to the statute is precisely what we have here.
An objection that an indictment fails to state an essential element of a crime can be raised at any time. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2).1 See United States v. Wilson, 884 *1282F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1113, 105 S.Ct. 797, 83 L.Ed.2d 790 (1985). While some courts take the position that if the issue is not raised at trial the indictment will be read more liberally, United States v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842, 109 S.Ct. 113, 102 L.Ed.2d 87 (1988), this rule is of no avail to the State in this case because on any reading of the indictment, however liberal, the necessary intent element is nowhere to be found. It follows that Weisberg is entitled to habeas relief unless the majority’s alternate ground for affirming (e.g., that we are bound by the state court’s decision) has merit. In this regard, constitutional rights and jurisdiction are synonymous. Weisberg had a federal constitutional right to have all essential elements of the crime charged, and he cannot be deprived of that right by a state court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s view on the necessity of charging intent in an indictment where intent is an essential element of the crime is identical to that of the United States Supreme Court in Russell and this court in Opsta, May, and Denmon, see supra. Chief Judge Amdahl of the Minnesota Supreme Court in the seminal case State v. Serstock, made clear that “[t]he indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged,” and that failure to do so must result in a dismissal. 402 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Minn.1987); see also State v. Oman, 265 Minn. 277, 121 N.W.2d 616, 620 (1963) (“A statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged is indispensible [sic] to the validity of the indictment.”). In no reported case has the court departed from the rules in Serstock and Oman, nor could it because the issue is one of federal constitutional law.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in the instant case failed plainly and simply to follow Serstock and Oman, Minnesota law on the issue. Even if it had done so, the court’s decision could not be permitted to stand because the question is one of federal constitutional law. The court based its decision on the fact that “Weisberg acknowledged in extensive questioning before entering his plea that he knew the charges against him and had discussed these with his attorney.” State v. Weisberg, 473 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Minn.App.1991). While this may be true, it is not a basis for validating an indictment that fails to state the essential elements of an offense. Opsta, 659 F.2d at 805; May, 625 F.2d at 190; Denmon, 483 F.2d at 1095.
With due respect to my colleagues, the cases cited by them fall far short of supporting their position. In Sodders v. Parratt, 693 F.2d 811, 812 (8th Cir.1982), this court held that an information cannot be challenged after a plea of guilty unless the information fails to charge a crime. The case before us fits squarely into the Sodders exception. The indictment, by failing to allege intent, an essential element of the crime of sports betting, failed to allege a crime. In Perry v. United States, this court in a per curiam opinion simply restated the rule that a defendant cannot challenge the sufficiency of an indictment after entering a plea of guilty in contrast to a defendant’s ability to challenge an indictment where the indictment fails to allege an essential element of the offense. 576 F.2d 158, 159 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855, 99 S.Ct. 168, 58 L.Ed.2d 162 (1978). We reaffirmed this point in O’Leary v. United States when we stated that “[i]n order to establish a jurisdictional defect, [a defendant] must show that the indictment on its face fails to state an offense.” 856 F.2d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir.1988). O’Leary makes clear that an indictment that on its face fails to state an offense establishes a jurisdictional defect. In this case, we have a jurisdictional defect.
I take issue as well with the majority’s application of Gray v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 9, 14 (8th Cir.1970), Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 637 (5th Cir.1994), and Hailey v. *1283Dorsey, 580 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 1282, 59 L.Ed.2d 495 (1979). These cases simply hold that the sufficiency of a state indictment may be grounds on which to base federal habeas relief only when the convicting court is without jurisdiction (e.g., when the indictment fails to allege the essential elements of the crime). The majority can take some comfort in McKay v. Collins, 12 F.3d 66, 68 (5th Cir.1994), but even there the court states that “[t]he sufficiency of a state indictment is not a matter for federal habeas relief unless it can be shown that the indictment is so defective that it deprives the state court of jurisdiction.”
I would affirm the district court’s decision to grant the petitioner the writ of habeas corpus.2

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(2) states:
(b) Pretrial motions. Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. Motions may be written or oral at the discretion of the *1282judge. The following must be raised prior to trial:
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information (other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense which objections shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings)....
(Emphasis added).

. In light of my view that the indictment in this case is defective, it is not necessary for me to reach the other issues raised by the majority.