Court Opinion

ID: 9662572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:13:27.455538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:40.809280
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of murder. A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 99 years’ imprisonment.
Advancing four points of error; appellant first contends that it was error for the trial court not to grant his motion to suppress the [evidence obtained as a result of the] search warrant if the search warrant was issued without probable cause and if the search warrant failed to comply with the requirements of TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(a), (b), (c) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The second and third points of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The last point of error is that appellant’s motion for mistrial, following the prosecutor’s statement during the jury argument at the punishment phase, should have been granted. The majority reverses the case on this last point. I would overrule the point of error.
In his fourth point of error appellant contends that the prosecutor’s arguments constituted error because it was a comment on his failure to testify.
The statement by the prosecutor at the punishment phase was:
Ladies and gentlemen, there are more people involved in this case than just Aaron Litaker. Is the act of deterrence an important consideration to determining what should be done in this case? Certainly that is an importance, too. You know, I think that it would be a very *750critical thing if I would hear a defendant get on this witness stand and say yes, I did it and I really am sorry about that and I’m trying to do something to get that straightened out. I’m seeing a doctor or I’m doing this and I know that that-^what was done was terrible, and I’m going to do something to get it straight. Well, you don’t hear that in this case. That didn’t happen.
Defense counsel objected, pointing out there were “very clear instructions not to refer to this defendant’s failure to testify.” The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement of counsel. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial and was overruled. The trial court then again instructed the jury:
Again, members of the jury, you are referred to paragraph number eight in the court’s charge, and you will not in any way allude to or refer to the fact that the defendant did not testify during the punishment phase of the case during the course of the deliberations. You are so instructed. The motion is overruled.
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The prosecutor never returned to the subject.
A prosecutor’s comment on a defendant’s failure to testify offends both our State and Federal Constitutions. Short v. State, 671 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). For a statement to constitute a comment on the failure to testify, the language of such a statement must be either manifestly intended, or of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. The implication that the language used has reference to the defendant must be a necessary one in order for this Court to hold that the statement was a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. Id. For an indirect comment to constitute reversible error, it must call for a denial of an assertion of fact or contradictory evidence that only the defendant is in a position to offer. Id. (citations omitted).
In the present case the defense vigorously attacked the evidence that was presented by the State and the testimony of the expert witnesses. Appellant testified and denied his guilt. He presented several defense witnesses. The defense theory was that the crime could just as well have been committed by another person whose fingerprints were not identified at the scene, and that the killer might have been the person who was with the deceased on the Mexico bridge or one of the men the deceased had dated. The forensic experts were questioned extensively concerning evidence they did not examine, but which they should have examined, according to appellant. Appellant explained his relationship with the deceased, his encounter with unknown assailants at the apartment of deceased, and his several injuries to his face, body, and hands. His mother, wife, sister, and friends also testified at the punishment phase regarding his reputation as a peaceful and law-abiding person. In fact, the testimony of his female relatives at that stage still addressed appellant’s innocence and his inability to commit this kind of crime.
While a prosecutor may comment on a defendant’s failure to produce evidence, this is limited in one major respect. Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2887, 101 L.Ed.2d 921 (1988). Such a comment cannot concern the failure to produce evidence of which only the defendant has knowledge. Id. (citations omitted) Examples of this kind of evidence would be alibi, why a defendant was in possession of such a large quantity of marihuana, affirmative consent during a sexual attack, and whether an act resulting in conviction for capital murder was done deliberately.
The comment by the prosecutor at the punishment phase in the instant case is an indirect allusion, when it is examined in the total context of the case, including all the evidence presented by appellant at the guilt/innocence phase, addressing the continuing pattern of denial by appellant and the lack of any sign of rehabilitation or deterrence on his part. Moreover, in this case both the mother and wife would have knowledge of any act of contrition or reha*751bilitation of appellant, such as going to see a doctor for treatment. Those two witnesses, both of whom testified at the punishment phase, could have presented this evidence to the jury; in other words, that evidence would not be something of which only the appellant had knowledge and to which only he might testify. We should not hold that the prosecutor’s remarks were “manifestly intended” as a comment on appellant’s failure to testify or that the jury would have naturally and necessarily taken them to be such.
I would hold that the argument was not of such a nature that the jury would or could not follow the instruction of the trial judge. See Jones v. State, 693 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Therefore, we should further hold that if an error was made, it was harmless error, subsequently and effectively cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.