Court Opinion

ID: 9488287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:41:21.916633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:48.600288
License: Public Domain

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
We are asked to consider the single question of whether the proper unit of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) is the use of a firearm or the predicate drug trafficking offense. As I can see no principled basis upon which to choose between these compete ing interpretations, I conclude that the rule of lenity provides the only basis for decision.
In this case, the textual debate has reached stalemate not merely because the judges on either side are effective advocates for their positions, but because of the deep ambiguity actually present in section 924(c)(1). “When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). To rely on the rule of lenity in this case is not to set a trap for the legislature, as the dissent implies. Dissent at 1340-41. Rather, it is to recognize that “[i]t is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.).
In this case, where the government proved four separate uses of a firearm but alleged only a single predicate offense, the rule of lenity dictates that Anderson may be convicted of only one section 924(c)(1) violation. Cf. United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 676 (2d Cir.1993) (invoking rule of lenity and concluding defendant who uses multiple firearms in relation to a single predicate offense may be charged with only one § 924(c)(1) violation). To find otherwise would be to risk punishing Anderson more severely than Congress intended.