Court Opinion

ID: 9375637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 16:00:32.445935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.580590
License: Public Domain

20-1761
    Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Navarro, IJ
                                                                           A208 614 139

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
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IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
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         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on th2 28th day of February, two thousand twenty-
    three.

    PRESENT:
             JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
             BETH ROBINSON,
             MYRNA PÉREZ,
                  Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    PARJEET SINGH,
             Petitioner,

                       v.                                        20-1761
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                    Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond
                                       Hill, NY.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                       Attorney General; Anna E. Juarez,
                                Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay
                                Marshall, Trial Attorney, Office
                                of Immigration Litigation, United
                                States Department of Justice,
                                Washington, DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

    Petitioner Parjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a May 21, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming

an April 19, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”),

which denied Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”).     In re Parjeet Singh, No. A208 614 139 (B.I.A. May

21, 2020), aff’g No. A208 614 139 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. April

19, 2018).      We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

Cir. 2005).     We review an adverse credibility determination

under   a   substantial   evidence        standard,    Hong   Fei   Gao   v.

Sessions,    891   F.3d   67,    76       (2d   Cir.   2018),   and   “the

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

                                      2
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

     “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of the

applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the

applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,

[and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence

of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

claim,     or     any    other    relevant    factor.”        Id.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).     “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility

determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,

it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

adverse credibility ruling.”         Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534

F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d

at   76.        Substantial   evidence   supports   the   agency’s

determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim

that members of the Akali Dal Badal party (the “Badal Party”)

attacked and threatened to kill him if he did not leave the

Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (the “Mann Party”).

     The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between

                                 3
Singh’s statements at his credible fear interview and his

hearing testimony.1     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh

made inconsistent statements regarding Khalistan, which is a

proposed Sikh state that the Mann Party supports.                 At the

credible fear interview, Singh stated that he had never heard

of Khalistan, but he testified at his hearing that he was

persecuted by the Badal Party for advocating for Khalistan.

The agency was not required to accept Singh’s explanations—

that he initially was afraid to mention Khalistan because the

Badal Party considers people who mention Khalistan to be

terrorists and people in India cannot talk about Khalistan

openly—because Singh also testified that Khalistan posters

were   hung   openly   at   Mann    Party   events.      See   Majidi    v.

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005).               Singh’s argument

that the IJ stated there were “several inconsistencies,” but

then   only   identified     one,       ignores   the   fact   that     his

explanations during the hearing were inconsistent with other

testimony.

1  Singh does not challenge the reliability of the credible fear
interview record, and, even if he had, the record was sufficiently
reliable as it included a list of questions by the immigration
officer relating to Singh’s asylum claim and Singh’s responses to
those questions, and there is no indication that Singh had
difficulty with the interpreter. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585
F.3d 715, 723–25 (2d Cir. 2009).

                                    4
     The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s inability

to recall the name of any other Mann Party member.               The agency

may consider “the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s

. . . account.”     8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).           We defer to

an implausibility finding so long as it “is tethered to record

evidence, and there is nothing else in the record from which

a   firm   conviction   of   error       could   properly   be    derived.”

Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007).                   The

IJ’s conclusion that it was implausible that Singh could not

recall the names of any Mann Party members is tethered to the

record because Singh testified that he attended approximately

20 party meetings and volunteered at weddings, advocated

against drug use, provided books to schoolchildren, provided

medicine to farmers, and collected donations for the party.

     Finally, Singh testified that his father was threatened

by members of the Badal Party who were looking for Singh after

he fled to New Delhi.        However, Singh’s father’s letter did

not mention any such threats.            Although omissions “are less

probative    of   credibility   than inconsistencies             created   by

direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,” Hong Fei

Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted), the

IJ did not err in relying on this omission in light of the

                                     5
“totality of the circumstance,” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167

(quoting § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)).        Singh’s father’s failure to

mention the alleged threats undercuts Singh’s credibility

because he has no corroboration of the threats.              See Biao

Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An

applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

that has already been called into question.”).

      In   sum,   the   inconsistent   statement     and   explanation

regarding Khalistan, the implausibility related to Singh’s

political activities, and the omission and lack of reliable

corroboration of continuing threats constitute substantial

evidence for the adverse credibility determination.                 See

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

The   adverse     credibility   determination   is    dispositive   of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

three forms of relief are based on the same discredited

factual predicate.      See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–

57 (2d Cir. 2006).

                                  6
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                            FOR THE COURT:
                            Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                            Clerk of Court

                              7