Court Opinion

ID: 9917147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 18:01:09.886886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:58.875736
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JAN 11 2024
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No.   22-10187

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              D.C. No.
                                                 3:18-cr-00061-WHO-1
 v.

ROSS GORDON LAVERTY,                             MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of California
                 William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted December 5, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: COLLINS, FORREST, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Ross Gordon Laverty appeals his conviction and sentence for two counts of

mailing explosive devices with the intent to kill or injure in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1716(a) and (j)(2), two counts of receiving or possessing a destructive device in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and two counts of using or carrying an explosive

device to commit the charged offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h)(1) and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      1. We decline Laverty’s invitation to adopt a heightened competency

standard. Laverty argues that the Supreme Court’s decision McCoy v. Louisiana,

138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), impliedly abrogated the application of the Dusky

competency standard in cases, such as this, where the defendant refuses to plead

guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.

402 (1960). We disagree. Given “the Supreme Court’s repeated admonitions that it

is that Court’s ‘prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents,’” Kashem v.

Barr, 941 F.3d 358, 376 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), we generally do not

find abrogation by implication. Further, we do not see a basis for implied

abrogation here. In McCoy, the Court held that counsel could not override the

defendant’s decision to assert innocence, even though counsel believed that the

evidence of guilt was overwhelming and conceding guilt would best serve the

defendant’s interest in avoiding the death penalty. McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508–09.

In so holding, the Court explained that where the trial court has determined that the

defendant is competent under the Dusky standard, counsel cannot override the

defendant’s “steadfast[] refus[al] to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming

evidence.” Id.; see also id. at 1509 (“In this case, the court had determined that

McCoy was competent to stand trial, i.e., that McCoy had ‘sufficient present

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

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understanding.’ If, after consultations with [counsel] concerning the management

of the defense, McCoy disagreed with [counsel]’s proposal to concede McCoy

committed three murders, it was not open to [counsel] to override McCoy’s

objection.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we see no basis for Laverty’s argument that

McCoy demands a higher standard of competency than the Dusky standard.

      2. The district court did not err in not ordering a pretrial evidentiary hearing

on competency. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a),

             the defendant or the attorney for the Government may file
             a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency
             of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall
             order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is
             reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may
             presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect
             rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
             is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
             proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
             defense.

      The district court complied with these requirements. In response to Laverty’s

motion, the court ordered a competency evaluation to be performed by the parties’

agreed-upon expert, Dr. Chamberlain. After receiving the evaluation, which

indicated Laverty was competent, the court held a status hearing and asked Laverty

whether an evidentiary hearing was needed. Laverty’s counsel indicated he did not

see a need at that time, but asked for “a brief period” to make objections to the

report if further review revealed issues. Counsel never filed objections, requested a

hearing, or took any additional steps concerning competency pretrial.

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      Further, the court did not plainly err by deciding not to sua sponte conduct

the evidentiary hearing. Given Dr. Chamberlain’s competency evaluation, and the

absence of any dispute regarding that evaluation, the district court reasonably

found no genuine doubt regarding Laverty’s competency. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a);

United States v. Garza, 751 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Failing to sua sponte

hold a competency hearing is plain error only if the evidence of incompetence was

such that a reasonable judge would be expected to experience a genuine doubt

respecting the defendant’s competence.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Ordering an examination does not itself mandate an evidentiary hearing. Garza,

751 F.3d at 1138.

      3. The district court did not err in denying Laverty’s request for a post-trial

evidentiary hearing to determine his current and past competency to stand trial.

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion for a competency hearing, we

use “a practical standard” that asks “whether a reasonable judge, situated as was

the trial judge who denied the motion, should have experienced doubt with respect

to the defendant’s competence.” United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1247

(9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “We engage in a comprehensive review of the

evidence, and we are not limited by either the abuse of discretion or clearly

erroneous standard.” Id. (quotations omitted). Here, in response to Laverty’s post-

trial motion, the district court ordered another expert competency evaluation, and

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then properly considered all the experts’ competency evaluations, the

representations of Laverty’s attorneys, and the court’s own observations of

Laverty. Id. Based on that evidence, the district court again reasonably found that

there was no doubt with respect to Laverty’s competence.1

      4. The district court’s factual findings regarding Laverty’s competence were

not clearly erroneous. United States v. Turner, 897 F.3d 1084, 1105 (9th Cir.

2018). In defense counsel’s view, it was “irrational” for Laverty to reject the plea

offer and proceed to trial, but that alone cannot establish a defendant’s

incompetence. See McCoy, 138 S. Ct. at 1508.

      5. Laverty’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are premature. “[A]s a

general rule, we do not review challenges to the effectiveness of defense counsel

on direct appeal.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2005),

overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957

(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). There are two “extraordinary exceptions” to that general

rule: “(1) where the record on appeal is sufficiently developed to permit

determination of the issue, or (2) where the legal representation is so inadequate

1
 The government argues that the district court lacked authority to hold an
evidentiary hearing under Section 4241 to address Laverty’s past competency
because Section 4241 concerns only present competency. We do not reach the
merits of this argument because, even assuming that the district court had authority
under § 4241 to hold a retrospective competency hearing, the district court
correctly concluded that no such hearing was warranted here.

                                          5
that it obviously denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. at

1156. Neither of those exceptions apply here. To determine whether Laverty’s

attorney, Babcock, was constitutionally ineffective when he declined to pursue an

evidentiary hearing regarding Laverty’s competence, or when he declined to

conduct further investigation of an insanity defense, a court would need additional

evidence regarding Babcock’s reasons for making those decisions. See, e.g.,

Washington v. Shinn, 46 F.4th 915, 921–22, 928 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, we dismiss

Laverty’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim “without prejudice to its being

raised in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United States v. McGowan, 668

F.3d 601, 603 (9th Cir. 2012).

      6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laverty’s Rule 45

motion. Laverty filed this motion eight months after the verdict. Therefore, Laverty

must demonstrate that his failure to file the motion within the 14-day limit was the

result of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2) & 45(b)(1)(B). To assess

whether the neglect was excusable, a court considers at least four factors: “(1) the

danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its

potential impact on the proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether

the movant acted in good faith.” Bateman v. United States Postal Serv., 231 F.3d

1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs.

Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993)). The district court’s analysis shows that it

                                          6
properly considered the Pioneer factors and considered the complete record,

including its prior orders, in determining that Laverty’s failure to timely file was

not the result of excusable neglect.

      7. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Laverty’s final

motion to continue sentencing. A defendant “establish[es] a Sixth Amendment

violation based on the denial of a motion to continue” by “show[ing] that the trial

court abused its discretion through an ‘unreasoning and arbitrary’ insistence upon

expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Turner, 897 F.3d at

1102 (quoting Houston v. Schomig, 553 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Where

a denial of a continuance implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel,” we consider the five Turner factors: “(1) whether the continuance would

inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; (2) whether other

continuances have been granted; (3) whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay;

(4) whether the delay is the defendant’s fault; and (5) whether a denial would

prejudice the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the district court

appropriately considered the effect of an additional continuance on the victims of

the crime, the fact that sentencing had already been continued several times, and

the court’s reasonable determination that Laverty’s additional counsel was capable

of effectively representing Laverty at sentencing. The majority of the Turner

factors support the district court’s decision.

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AFFIRMED.

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