Court Opinion

ID: 9958208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 15:02:18.540321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:03.025781
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1421    Document: 90           Page: 1       Filed: 04/08/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                        SONOS, INC.,
                          Appellant

                                  v.

      INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
                  Appellee

                        GOOGLE LLC,
                          Intervenor

           -------------------------------------------------

                        GOOGLE LLC,
                          Appellant

                                  v.

      INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
                  Appellee

                      SONOS, INC.,
                        Intervenor
                  ______________________

                   2022-1421, 2022-1573
                  ______________________

    Appeals from the United States International Trade
 Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1191.
Case: 22-1421    Document: 90     Page: 2    Filed: 04/08/2024

 2                                          SONOS, INC. v. ITC

                  ______________________

                   Decided: April 8, 2024
                  ______________________

     E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
 LLP, New York, NY, argued for appellant. Also repre-
 sented by ALEXANDRA BURSAK, EDMUND HIRSCHFELD;
 ALYSSA MARGARET CARIDIS, Los Angeles, CA; ABIGAIL
 COLELLA, JORDAN COYLE, MARK S. DAVIES, ROBERT
 MANHAS, Washington, DC; BAS de BLANK, Menlo Park, CA;
 CLEMENT ROBERTS, San Francisco, CA; GEORGE I. LEE,
 COLE BRADLEY RICHTER, RORY PATRICK SHEA, JOHN DAN
 SMITH, III, SEAN MICHAEL SULLIVAN, Lee Sullivan Shea &
 Smith LLP, Chicago, IL.

     DAN L. BAGATELL, Perkins Coie LLP, Hanover, NH, ar-
 gued for cross-appellant. Also represented by ANDREW
 DUFRESNE, Madison, WI; NATHAN K. KELLEY, JONATHAN
 IRVIN TIETZ, Washington, DC; TARA LAUREN KURTIS, Chi-
 cago, IL; THERESA H. NGUYEN, Seattle, WA; JEFFREY
 NARDINELLI, SEAN S. PAK, CHARLES KRAMER VERHOEVEN,
 OGNJEN ZIVOJNOVIC, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sulli-
 van, LLP, San Francisco, CA; JARED WESTON NEWTON,
 Washington, DC; LANCE YANG, Los Angeles, CA.

     RICHARD P. HADORN, Office of the General Counsel,
 United States International Trade Commission, Washing-
 ton, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by WAYNE
 W. HERRINGTON.
                 ______________________

      Before DYK, REYNA, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 STARK, Circuit Judge.
     Sonos, Inc. (“Sonos”) filed a complaint at the Interna-
 tional Trade Commission (“Commission”) alleging that
 Google LLC (“Google”) was violating Section 337 of the
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                           3

 Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, by importing audio
 players and controllers that infringed five of Sonos’ pa-
 tents: U.S. Patent Nos. 10,439,896 (“’896 patent”),
 9,195,258 (“’258 patent”), 9,219,959 (“’959 patent”),
 10,209,953 (“’953 patent”), and 8,588,949 (“’949 patent”).
 The Commission instituted an investigation and ulti-
 mately issued a final determination, holding that certain
 originally-accused products infringed each of the asserted
 patents. The final determination also held, however, that
 certain non-infringing alternatives (“NIAs” or “redesigns”)
 proposed by Google did not infringe any of the claims of the
 Sonos patents. Sonos timely appealed the Commission’s
 findings of non-infringement by the redesigns, and Google
 cross-appealed the Commission’s findings of infringement
 by the originally-accused products. We affirm.
                                 I
     On January 7, 2020, Sonos filed a complaint with the
 Commission, alleging violations of Section 337 in the im-
 portation into the United States, the sale for importation,
 and the sale within the United States after importation of
 certain audio players and controllers, components thereof,
 and products containing the same. On February 11, 2020,
 the Commission instituted an investigation based on
 Sonos’ complaint, to determine:
     whether there is a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B)
     of section 337 in the importation into the United
     States, the sale for importation, or the sale within
     the United States after importation of certain
     products . . . by reason of infringement of one or
     more of claims 17, 21-24, and 26 of the ’258 patent;
     claims 7, 12-14, and 22-24 of the ’953 patent;
     claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the ’949 patent; claims 5, 9,
     10, 29, and 35 of the ’959 patent; and claims 1, 3,
     5, 6, and 12 of the ’896 patent, and whether an in-
     dustry in the United States exists as required by
     subsection (a)(2) of section 337[.]
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 85 Fed. Reg. 7783 (Feb. 11, 2020). The Commission named
 Alphabet Inc. and Google as respondents, although Alpha-
 bet Inc. was later terminated from the investigation. The
 Commission’s Office of Unfair Import Investigations was
 also named as a party.
     On March 12, 2021, the Commission partially termi-
 nated the investigation after Sonos withdrew allegations of
 infringement as to certain claims in each of the asserted
 patents. The remaining patents and claims at issue at the
 time of the Commission’s evidentiary hearing were as fol-
 lows:

 J.A. 4.
     After the evidentiary hearing, the chief administrative
 law judge (“CALJ”) made an initial determination that
 each of the asserted patents was infringed by one or more
 of the originally-accused Google products. The CALJ also
 found, however, that redesigns of each of these products
 avoided infringement and were, hence, NIAs. J.A. 58-255.
 The Commission declined the parties’ petitions for review
 of the initial determination and issued a final determina-
 tion adopting the CALJ’s determination while also provid-
 ing “supplemental reasoning” as to how Google’s originally-
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 accused products infringed the ’258 and ’953 patents. 1
 J.A. 2, 18-22. The Commission then entered a limited ex-
 clusion order, “precluding the importation of audio players
 and controllers . . . that infringe one or more of [Sonos’]
 claims.” J.A. 23; see also J.A. 37-40.
     Sonos appealed the Commission’s final determination
 finding non-infringement of the ’896 patent, ’258 patent,
 and ’959 patent by Google’s redesigns that were labelled
 ’896 NIA 2, ’258 NIA 1, and ’959 NIA 4, respectively.
 Google cross-appealed the Commission’s final determina-
 tion that found infringement of each of the asserted patents
 by certain of the originally-accused products. We have ju-
 risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).
                                II
      We review the Commission’s legal determinations de
 novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See
 Guangdong Alison Hi-Tech Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 936
 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In particular, the
 “[d]etermination of the meaning and scope of patent
 claims” is a matter of law reviewed de novo (when based
 entirely on intrinsic evidence) and “[i]nfringement of cor-
 rectly construed claims” is “a question of fact” reviewed for
 substantial evidence. Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362
 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence
 “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
 accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edi-
 son Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). “[W]here two
 different, inconsistent conclusions may reasonably be
 drawn from the evidence in record, an agency’s decision to

     1   Because the Commission adopted the CALJ’s ini-
 tial determination in full, we do not distinguish between
 the findings in the CALJ’s initial determination and the
 findings in the Commission’s final determination. We treat
 both as the findings of the Commission.
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 6                                            SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 favor one conclusion over the other is the epitome of a de-
 cision that must be sustained upon review for substantial
 evidence.” In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
 2002).
     “[W]e review the factual findings underlying the Com-
 mission’s invalidity determinations for ‘substantial evi-
 dence’ by ascertaining whether those findings ‘were
 established by evidence that a reasonable person might
 find clear and convincing,’ and whether those findings
 ‘form an adequate predicate for the legal determination of
 invalidity.’” Guangdong, 936 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Check-
 point Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 54 F.3d 756,
 761 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
                              III
                              A
     We first address issues in Sonos’ appeal, which chal-
 lenges the Commission’s findings that certain Google rede-
 signs do not infringe the ’896 patent, ’258 patent, and ’959
 patent. We are not persuaded by Sonos’ contentions that
 the Commission misconstrued disputed claim terms or
 lacked substantial evidence for its findings. Accordingly,
 we affirm.
                              1
     The ’896 patent is directed to techniques enabling us-
 ers to easily add new smart speakers to an existing home
 network in a way that requires a “minimum of human in-
 tervention and technical ability.” ’896 patent 2:48-50; see
 also id. at 2:16-27, 17:60-18:35. Pertinent to Sonos’ appeal,
 claim 1 of the ’896 patent requires, among other things,
 “transmitting, to the given playback device via the initial
 communication path, at least a second message containing
 network configuration parameters, wherein the network
 configuration parameters comprise an identifier of the se-
 cure WLAN [i.e., wireless local area network] and security
 key for the secure WLAN.” Id. at 18:19-24 (emphasis
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                          7

 added). The Commission construed this limitation as re-
 quiring transmission of at least one single “second mes-
 sage” containing both the claimed “identifier” and the
 claimed “security key.” J.A. 304. Because, in Google’s re-
 designed ’896 NIA 2, the identifier and the security key are
 transmitted in two separate messages, the Commission
 found that the redesign does not infringe the ’896 patent.
 J.A. 230-32.
     On appeal, the parties do not dispute that, in ’896 NIA
 2, the identifier and the security key are sent in two differ-
 ent messages. See e.g., Google Br. 2 at 11 (“Google’s ’896
 NIA 2 sends the two network configuration parameters in
 separate messages rather than together.”); Sonos Br. at 28.
 Sonos’ challenge on appeal is directed to the Commission’s
 construction of the “transmitting” step as requiring the
 same “second message” to contain both the identifier and
 the security key. Sonos argues the correct construction
 must permit the identifier and security key to be distrib-
 uted among multiple second messages. Specifically, Sonos
 argues the “transmitting” limitation requires at least one
 second message, where the one or more second messages
 collectively contain the identifier and the security key. See
 Sonos Br. at 28-32; J.A. 3624-28 (Sonos proposing limita-
 tion be construed as “one or more additional messages that
 collectively contain an identifier of the secure WLAN and a
 security key for the secure WLAN”) (emphasis added).

     2   We refer to the various briefs as follows: “Sonos
 Br.” (ECF No. 20) is Sonos’ principal brief; “Google Br.”
 (ECF No. 28) is Google’s principal brief in its cross appeal
 and response brief in Sonos’ appeal; “ITC Br.” (ECF No. 40)
 is the Commission’s response in both the Sonos appeal and
 Google cross-appeal; “Sonos Reply Br.” (ECF No. 42) is
 Sonos’ reply brief in its appeal and response brief in
 Google’s cross appeal; and “Google Reply Br.” (ECF No. 48)
 is Google’s reply brief in its cross-appeal.
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 8                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

     Google counters, citing both the plain language and the
 specification, that the claim limitation requires “a second
 message containing network configuration parameters,”
 each of which contains both the identifier and the security
 key. In Google’s view, “at least” indicates there can be more
 than one such “second message. 3 See Google Br. at 53 (ad-
 vocating for construction where “a ‘second message’ must
 include both recited network configuration parameters
 even though there may be more than one such ‘second mes-
 sage’”).
     Google has the better reading of the claim language,
 and much the better reading of the specification. The claim
 recites network configuration parameters, which are de-
 fined to include both an identifier of the WLAN and a secu-
 rity key. We agree with the CALJ that this language
 “makes clear that ‘at least a second message’ has the net-
 work configuration parameters and that the network con-
 figuration parameters include both” the identifier and the
 security key. J.A. 304 (quoting ’896 patent cl. 1).
     The specification provides strong support for this con-
 struction, and essentially none for Sonos’ proposal. Google
 and the Commission point to the patent’s Figure 3B and
 the patent’s description of it, which both teach a single
 message containing both the identifier and the security
 key. See Google Br. at 54-57; ITC Br. at 18-20; see also ’896
 patent Figure 3B & 14:15-17; J.A. 3699 (Sonos conceding
 that specification describes sending network identifier and
 security key “in a single ‘SetNetParams message’”). Google
 also identifies a passage in the specification that

     3   The possibility of more than one “second message,”
 provided that each “second message” contains the identifier
 and the security key, suggests that the “at least” portion of
 the disputed claim term is not superfluous, contrary to
 Sonos’ contention. See Sonos Br. at 34-35.
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                           9

 contemplates resending a message containing both the
 identifier and the security key. See Google Br. at 56 (citing
 ’896 patent Fig. 3B & 13:38-42, 19:5-7). A person of ordi-
 nary skill in the art would view these examples as evidence
 that the patentee understood the claims as involving one
 or more “second message,” where each second message con-
 tains both the identifier and the security key.
     By contrast, Sonos does not identify any passage or fig-
 ure in the specification supporting its proposed construc-
 tion. Sonos merely argues “[n]othing in the specification
 modifies the claim language,” Sonos Br. at 33 (emphasis
 added), but this does not aid its case.
      Rather than the specification, Sonos directs us to prec-
 edent, arguing that in 01 Communique Laboratory, Inc. v.
 LogMeIn, Inc., 687 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2012), we con-
 strued claim terms similar to the one at issue here as hav-
 ing their “ordinary meaning.” Sonos Br. at 31. The issue
 in LogMeIn was whether the claim term “a locator server
 computer” encompassed multiple servers and, if so,
 whether the recited functions for the “location facility” soft-
 ware could be distributed among them. While we held
 there that the term “a computer” must be interpreted – as
 a matter of “ordinary meaning” – as “one or more comput-
 ers,” our holding that a “location facility” may be distrib-
 uted among “more than one computer” was based on the
 express disclosure in the specification there, to the effect
 that “‘such facilities can be sub-divided into separate facil-
 ities.’” LogMeIn, 687 F.3d at 1297 (quoting specification);
 see also id. (“[T]he disclosures that facilities may be subdi-
 vided . . . support a construction that the location facility
 may be distributed among multiple physical computers.”).
 Here, however, Sonos does not identify any similar disclo-
 sure in the ’896 patent.
     We do not agree with Sonos that the Commission im-
 properly imported a limitation from the specification into
 the claims. Instead, we agree with the Commission, and
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 10                                          SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 Google, that the claim language and specification support
 the Commission’s construction. 4
     Since Sonos does not dispute that the ’896 NIA 2 sends
 the identifier and the security key in separate messages,
 and the proper construction of the “second message” term
 does not encompass such an embodiment, we affirm the
 Commission’s finding that ’896 NIA 2 does not infringe the
 ’896 patent.
                              2
     The ’258 patent is directed to techniques for ensuring
 that multiple wireless speakers play in unison. Pertinent
 to Sonos’ appeal, the patent claims a technique for synchro-
 nizing smart speakers with each other by transmitting
 “clock time information.” ’258 patent 40:14-21. The clock
 time information enables the wireless speakers to adjust
 for sound mismatches resulting from the speakers’ inde-
 pendent internal clocks. At the Commission, Sonos and
 Google agreed that “clock time information” means “infor-
 mation representing a time value indicated by a device’s
 clock,” J.A. 280, a construction the Commission adopted,
 see J.A. 95-96. Based on this agreed-upon construction, the
 Commission found that one of Google’s redesigns, ’258 NIA
 1, does not infringe the ’258 patent because it used an in-
 crementing counter. J.A. 95-97. In the Commission’s view,
 this incrementing counter/integer is not information repre-
 senting a time value and, thus, cannot be the claimed “clock
 time information.” J.A. 95.
     On appeal, Sonos challenges this finding, which it
 frames as a claim construction issue. It is not. Instead,
 “whether the accused device [or a redesign] infringes
 properly interpreted claims” is a factual issue – which is

      4  Neither party argues that the prosecution history
 or any extrinsic evidence impact the proper construction.
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                        11

 just how it was presented to the Commission. 5 Martin v.
 Barber, 755 F.2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Thus, we re-
 view the Commission’s finding for substantial evidence,
 which we find.
     In support of its non-infringement finding, the Com-
 mission cited testimony from one of Google’s engineers and
 other testimony from Google’s expert. See J.A. 94-96. To-
 gether, these individuals explain that the redesign trans-
 mits an incrementing counter and that such a counter does
 not represent a time value – and, therefore, cannot repre-
 sent a time value indicated by a device’s clock. This consti-
 tutes substantial evidence for the Commission’s finding
 that the incrementing integer in ’258 NIA 1 is not “clock
 time information” as that term was construed by the Com-
 mission, based on the parties’ agreement. Thus, we affirm
 the Commission’s finding of non-infringement. 6
                              3
     The ’959 patent is directed to techniques for pairing in-
 dividual playback devices to create a multi-channel listen-
 ing environment and to performing equalization of audio
 data depending on the type of pairing. On appeal, Sonos
 challenges    the      Commission’s      construction      of

     5   Among the indications that this is a factual issue,
 and not a claim construction dispute, are that neither side
 sought to modify the agreed-upon construction but, in-
 stead, presented expert testimony on whether ’258 NIA 1’s
 transmitted integer satisfied the agreed-upon construc-
 tion.
     6   Given our conclusions, we need not reach Sonos’
 additional contention that the Commission erred in finding
 that the redesign would not infringe even if the increment-
 ing integer were “clock time information.” See Sonos Br.
 49-58.
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 12                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 “equalization,” recited in claim 10, as requiring “alteration
 of the relative strength of certain frequency ranges in the
 audio data by performing one or more of the following: ad-
 justing one or more parameters related to speaker drivers,
 such as gain, frequency response, channel output, phase,
 or time delay; adjusting amplifier gain of the playback de-
 vice; or using one or more filters.” J.A. 312 (internal em-
 phasis omitted). Sonos argues the Commission construed
 the term too narrowly. In Sonos’ view, “equalization” in-
 cludes any “modifying” of the output audio data, including
 changing of channel output without changing the strengths
 of a frequency range. Sonos Br. at 60-62.
      We agree with the Commission’s construction. Relying
 in part on Google’s expert testimony and various dictionar-
 ies, the Commission found that “‘[e]qualization’ is a well-
 known technique that allows one to emphasize or diminish
 a specific range of frequencies.” J.A. 307. The Commis-
 sion’s subsidiary factual finding on this point was not
 clearly erroneous. See DeLorme Publ’g Co. v. Int’l Trade
 Comm’n, 805 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We review
 claim construction de novo except for subsidiary facts
 based on extrinsic evidence, which we review for clear er-
 ror.”). 7
     The specification confirms that the patent is not using
 the term “equalization” in a way that departs from its well-
 known meaning. In particular, the specification discloses
 that, when “both mid-range drivers and both tweeters have
 the same equalization (or substantially the same equaliza-
 tion), . . . they are both sent the same frequencies, just from
 different channels of audio.” ’959 patent 8:36-39 (emphasis

      7  Sonos did not meaningfully challenge this factual
 determination. See J.A. 307 (CALJ noting “[n]either Sonos
 nor Staff appear to dispute that ‘equalization’ has a well-
 known meaning to persons of ordinary skill in the art, at
 least outside the context of the patent itself”).
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 added); see also id. at 16:57-59 (“[T]he equalization of each
 S5 device is changed in an attempt to reduce or eliminate
 certain constructive or destructive interference.”); id. at
 12:15-16 (describing equalization in terms of adjusting
 bass and treble). These passages suggest that “equaliza-
 tion” necessarily includes alteration of a speaker’s frequen-
 cies and that changing the “channels of audio” does not
 necessarily result in “equalization.”
     The well-known meaning of the term “equalization” is
 also consistent with the specification passage Sonos argues
 “defines equalization to include changes to channel output
 and, separately, changes to frequency response.” Sonos Br.
 at 22; see also id. at 63 (quoting ’959 patent 16:20-27). That
 passage teaches:
     Changing the equalization of the playback device
     might include any of: turning on or off (or effec-
     tively muting) one or more specific speaker drivers,
     changing the channel output of one or more
     speaker drivers, changing the frequency response
     of one or more specific speaker drivers, changing
     the amplifier gain of any particular speaker driver,
     [and] changing the amplifier gain of the playback
     device as a whole.
 ’959 patent 16:20-27. We do not read this passage as defin-
 ing “equalization.” “To act as its own lexicographer, a pa-
 tentee must clearly set forth a definition of the disputed
 claim term other than its plain and ordinary meaning” and
 must “clearly express an intent to redefine the term.”
 Thorner v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362,
 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The passage on which Sonos relies,
 instead, merely provides a list of operations that equaliza-
 tion “might include.” This non-exclusive recitation does not
 evince the required clear intent to adopt a definition differ-
 ent from the term’s ordinary meaning. See J.A. 305-12
 (Commission construing “equalization” to mean “alteration
 of the relative strength of certain frequency ranges in the
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 14                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 audio data by performing one or more of the following: ad-
 justing one or more parameters related to speaker drivers,
 such as gain, frequency response, channel output, phase,
 or time delay; adjusting amplifier gain of the playback de-
 vice; or using one or more filters”) (internal emphasis al-
 tered).
     The language of other claims further supports the
 Commission’s construction of “equalization.” In particular,
 claims 2, 26, and 34 require “equalization” to be performed
 using a “pass filter to modify the audio data.” J.A. 10149
 (1:21- 29); J.A. 10151-52 (6:64-7:5, 7:50-59). Sonos agrees
 that a pass filter is a “mechanism for altering the relative
 strength of frequency ranges.” Sonos Br. at 70 (citing J.A.
 311 n.19). Thus, these dependent claims confirm that,
 while equalization can be performed using different mech-
 anisms (e.g., pass filter), the process of equalization is
 about altering the relative strengths (i.e., emphasizing or
 diminishing) of certain frequencies in audio.
     The prosecution history does not alter our conclusions.
 Sonos points to the examiner’s statement that “the subject
 matter ‘equalization’ is defined as including” the five tech-
 niques listed in the specification. Sonos Br. at 66-67 (citing
 J.A. 17198 n.2). The examiner was required to apply the
 broadest reasonable interpretation standard, which is dif-
 ferent from the Philips v. AWH Corporation standard the
 Commission and we apply. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
 see also MPHJ TECH. v. Ricoh Americas Corp., 847 F. 3d
 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (noting that at Patent Office
 “claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation
 consistent with the specification”) (internal quotation
 marks omitted). In any case, “arguments based on the
 prosecution history which allegedly shows that the exam-
 iner viewed claim [differently] . . . are insufficient . . . to
 overcome our strong sense” of claim scope based on claim
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                        15

 language and the specification. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
 v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1578 (Fed Cir. 1996). 8
     In sum, we agree with the Commission that the term
 “equalization” means “alteration of the relative strength of
 certain frequency ranges.” Sonos does not dispute that, un-
 der this construction, ’959 NIA 4 does not infringe claim 10.
 Thus, we affirm the Commission’s finding that ’959 NIA 4
 does not infringe claim 10.
                              B
     We turn now to Google’s cross-appeal, which challenges
 the Commission’s findings relating to the ’896 patent and
 ’949 patent.
                              1
                              a
     While Sonos’ appeal with respect to the ’896 patent in-
 volved the claim element “transmitting . . . at least a sec-
 ond    message     containing   network       configuration
 parameters,” Google’s cross-appeal – of the Commission’s
 finding that its originally-accused products infringe –
 arises from the ’896 patent’s recitation of “receiving . . .
 user input indicating that a user wishes to set up a

     8    Sonos also argues its construction is supported by
 the examiner’s rejection of several proposed claims requir-
 ing “equalization,” based on references teaching “changing
 channel output only, with no mention of altering frequency
 response.” Sonos Br. 66-67. These rejections, Sonos as-
 serts, indicate that the Patent Office understood equaliza-
 tion as requiring either “changing the channel output” or
 “changing the frequency response. Id. As Google and the
 Commission point out, however, Sonos did not present this
 argument to Commission, see Google Br. 80; ITC Br. 42, so
 it was forfeited, see In re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980
 F.3d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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 16                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 playback device to operate on the secure WLAN.” ’896 pa-
 tent 18:3-9. At the Commission, the parties agreed that
 “user input” means “an ‘objectively verifiable indication’ of
 the user’s desire to use the controller’s secure network.”
 J.A. 60329-31; J.A. 70103. The claim also recites “trans-
 mitting a response . . . that facilitates establishing an ini-
 tial communication path with the given playback device,”
 which the parties agree must occur after the “receiving”
 step. ’896 patent 18:14-16.
      The Commission found that Google’s originally-ac-
 cused products practice the “receiving” step based on a
 screen called “Device Found Screen,” which appears after
 a user selects on her mobile controller (e.g., a mobile phone,
 tablet, or laptop) a button that says “[s]et up new devices
 [i.e., speakers] in your home.” J.A. 220-21; see also J.A.
 225.
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                           17

     In the Device Found Screen, J.A. 221 (reproducing J.A.
 60501), which is shown above, the user is asked, “Would
 you like to set up this device?” and given the options of
 choosing “Yes,” “Skip,” or “Set up a different device.”
 J.A. 220-21. If the user selects “Yes,” the mobile controller
 retrieves “the Wi-Fi network that the mobile [controller] is
 connected to.” J.A. 227 (citing J.A. 70118 (452:7-453:5)).
 This information is “save[d] . . . so it can be fetched later in
 the setup process.” Id. Then, the mobile controller per-
 forms a step that the parties agree is the “transmitting”
 step, as it establishes the “initial communication path”
 with the new device (i.e., speaker) being added. J.A. 223.
     Thereafter, at a screen called “Connect to Wi-Fi
 Screen,” the mobile controller lists the Wi-Fi networks that
 are available for the new speaker device to connect to.
 J.A. 70078 (299-300).

 J.A. 222-23 (reproducing J.A. 60504).
     As shown above, on this list, the network that was pre-
 viously saved – that is, the network the mobile controller
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 18                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 was connected to when the user selected “Yes” at the De-
 vice Found Screen – is highlighted (in blue) and pre-se-
 lected among the list of available Wi-Fi networks.
 J.A. 70078-79; J.A. 70252.
     Also pertinent to the Commission’s analysis is a setup
 instruction that Google formerly provided to users, direct-
 ing them to “[c]onnect your mobile [controller] device to the
 Wi-Fi network that you’ll use for your speaker or display.”
 J.A. 226 (reproducing J.A. 50706). In the Commission’s
 view, this instruction confirmed that Google’s originally-ac-
 cused products “were designed to assume that the playback
 device [i.e., the new speaker] should be connected to the
 same network as the computing device[i.e., the mobile con-
 troller].” J.A. 226. It is undisputed that Google deleted
 this step from its published instruction prior to the Com-
 mission’s hearing and that the Commission was presented
 with no evidence that any user of the accused devices (i.e.,
 the mobile controllers) had ever seen the instruction. See
 J.A. 226 n.81.
     The Commission’s finding that Google’s originally-ac-
 cused products infringe the ’896 patent is based on its de-
 termination that a user’s selection of “Yes” at the Device
 Found Screen satisfies the “receiving” step. Substantial
 evidence supports the Commission’s application of the
 claim construction to the Google accused product. As the
 Commission explained, when a user selects “Yes” on the
 Device Found Screen, the accused products are “designed
 to assume that the user wishes to set up the playback de-
 vice on the same Wi-Fi network” the accused devices are
 actually connected to at that moment. J.A. 225. 9 In

      9   We are not persuaded by Google’s insistence that
 the Commission clearly erred by allowing a mere “assump-
 tion” to serve as the objectively verifiable “indication.” The
 Commission relied on substantial evidence to reach its
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                        19

 support of its conclusion, the Commission relied on testi-
 mony from Google’s expert, who opined that after the user
 selects “Yes” on the Device Found Screen, and thereafter
 clicks “Next” on the Connect to Wi-Fi Screen, the user “con-
 firm[s] that the network [he] wanted to use was high-
 lighted or selected” and there is no need to “make another
 selection.” J.A. 225-26 (citing J.A. 70252) (alterations in
 original). In other words, while the “receiving” step (in-
 cluding the required verifiable indication that the user
 wishes to set up a playback device on the controller’s net-
 work) is completed at the Device Found Screen, further
 confirmation of the fact that step has been completed is
 provided in connection with the Device Connected and Con-
 nect to Wi-Fi Screens.
     The Commission also cited Google’s setup instructions,
 which provide further support for its finding. See J.A. 226
 (reproducing J.A. 50706). The instruction expressly di-
 rected the user to “[c]onnect your mobile device to the Wi-
 Fi network that you’ll use for your speaker or display,” be-
 fore launching the Google Home application and reaching
 the Device Found Screen. J.A. 226. In this way, the in-
 struction to users is probative of the fact that a user’s se-
 lection of “Yes” on the Device Found Screen is an indication
 that the user wishes to set up a playback device to operate
 the same network as the mobile controller.
     Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s finding that
 Google’s originally-accused products infringe the claims of
 the ’896 patent.

 conclusion that the user’s selection of “Yes” at the Device
 Found Screen is an objectively verifiable indication that
 the user wishes to use the network to which the new device
 is then connected.
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 20                                           SONOS, INC. v. ITC

                               b
     Google also challenges the Commission’s conclusion
 that it failed to prove that the challenged claims of the ’896
 patent are invalid as obvious over the prior art “cd3o” sys-
 tem, which is “a portable, networked MP3 player, one or
 more of which could be placed anywhere throughout a res-
 idence and used to play audio streamed over a home net-
 work from a personal computer.” J.A. 213 (internal
 quotation marks omitted). Once again, we affirm.
     The Commission held that Google failed to identify in
 the cd3o system the “initial communication path” compo-
 nent of the ’896 patent claims’ “transmitting” step. The
 Commission did not expressly construe “initial communi-
 cation path.” But Google argues that the Commission “ef-
 fectively,”    and     erroneously,     construed    “initial
 communication path” as the first-ever communication path
 between the controller and the playback device. Google Br.
 at 38-39, 54. That erroneous construction, according to
 Google, led the Commission to overlook Google’s conten-
 tions that, even after the user plugs in an ethernet cable
 between the controller and the playback device, there are
 “other, later-created paths provid[ing] that capability [i.e.,
 enabling communication between the controller and de-
 vice] and thus satisfied the ‘initial communication path’
 limitation.” Google Br. at 38. Specifically, Google argues
 that even if the prior art ethernet connection does not meet
 the “initial communication path” limitation (because the
 ethernet connection is made too soon, i.e., before the re-
 quired “user input” and “first message” have been received)
 the Commission should have assessed whether other con-
 nections – specifically, a “point-to-point UDP” connection
 or a TCP connection – which are established at later times,
 might satisfy the “initial communication path”
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                         21

 requirement. Google Br. at 42-44. 10 In Google’s view, how-
 ever, the Commission never considered or discussed these
 contentions.
      We disagree. The Commission, in agreeing with Sonos
 that the ’896 patent claims do not “require connection with
 a particular application or on a specific layer of the network
 stack,” J.A. 240 (internal quotation marks omitted), neces-
 sarily had to have considered – and rejected – Google’s con-
 tention that UDP and TCP connections (made at non-
 physical layers within a network stack) can create new
 communication paths distinct from the communication
 path formed when an ethernet cable is plugged in (a con-
 nection that occurs at the physical layer of a computer net-
 work). See Oral Arg. at 19:46-20:04 (Commission counsel:
 “[i]f by using an addressing protocol such as UDP or TCP,

     10   To the extent Sonos or the Commission are con-
 tending that Google failed to adequately present these al-
 ternative theories to the Commission, we disagree. It is
 clear from the record that Google repeatedly argued that
 the connections at the UDP and TCP layers could satisfy
 the “initial communication path” requirement even if the
 ethernet connection did not. See, e.g., J.A. 1877 ( “[U]sing
 point-to-point UDP messages . . . thereby establishing an
 initial, point-to-point UDP communication path”); J.A.
 1904 (“TCP SYN-ACK message facilitate[s] establishing a
 TCP connection (‘the initial communication path’)”); J.A.
 4635 (“cd3o discloses this limitation because it establishes
 an initial point-to-point UDP path after receiving the re-
 quired ‘user input’ and ‘first message.’”) (internal emphasis
 omitted); J.A. 4637 (“If the CALJ finds that cd3o’s point-to-
 point UDP path is not ‘an initial communication path,’ it
 would have been obvious to use a TCP connection . . . to
 send network configuration parameters . . . and obvious to
 replace cd3o’s wired ‘initial communication path’ with a
 wireless path . . . .”).
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 22                                          SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 if that doesn’t create a new communication path, then we
 are left with what the communication path is – the plug-
 ging in of the ethernet cable”). That is, UDP and TCP are
 merely parts of the communication path established when
 the ethernet cable is plugged in, so when the Commission
 rejected the ethernet cable as being the claimed initial com-
 munication path it was likewise rejecting the UDP and
 TCP meeting this same requirement.
     The ’896 patent specification, as well as testimony from
 the co-founder of cd3o, provide substantial evidence sup-
 port for the Commission’s conclusion. See ’896 patent
 10:18-19 (explaining that “communication path” may oper-
 ate over “Ethernet protocols”); id. at 6:39-52 (describing
 “TCP” as example of protocol (or special set of rules) that
 facilitates data flow); id. at 6:53-61 (describing “Ethernet
 cable” as means to provide network interface functions,
 where network interface functions are used to communi-
 cate with other devices using communication protocol); J.A.
 70130 (cd3o co-founder testifying and rejecting characteri-
 zation of UDP and TCP as communication paths).
     Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s determina-
 tion that the claims of the ’896 patent are valid over the
 cd3o system.
                              2
     The ’949 patent is directed to techniques allowing both
 collective and individual adjustment of the volumes of play-
 ers within a group. Pertinent to Google’s cross-appeal, the
 original claims in the application that became the ’949 pa-
 tent required the ability to adjust player volumes individ-
 ually and by group. See J.A. 58045. During prosecution,
 in view of a prior art reference, Isely, 11 Sonos amended the
 claims to require “independent” playback devices.

      11 U.S. Patent        Application    Publication     No.
 2002/0124097 A1.
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                         23

 J.A. 58044-53. After multiple discussions with Sonos, the
 examiner allowed the amended claims on the basis that
 Isely disclosed “tethered or interdependent” operation ra-
 ther than “independent” operation.        J.A. 58066-69;
 J.A. 58145. Google argues that Sonos disclaimed certain
 claim scope during prosecution.
     Google’s argument is predicated on a series of three
 statements contained in the prosecution history. First, the
 examiner summarized his interview with Sonos as follows:
     Discussed support for the independent operation of
     the claimed individual player and Applicant distin-
     guished the individual operation over the tethered
     or interdependent operation[]of [Isely].
 J.A. 58069 (emphasis added). Second, in his Reasons for
 Allowance, the Examiner discussed Isely’s disclosure and
 clarified how Sonos had distinguished the reference:
     [T]he prior art is enabling for an individually ad-
     dressable independent playback device, such as
     that depicted in Figure 2A of the instant applica-
     tion, functionally grouped into ad hoc networks for
     designation, receipt and playback of particular au-
     dio streams in concert with user directed charac-
     teristics such as volume (see at least [Isely]:
     20020124097: ¶ 6, 60-64; Figure 2, 5, 6: zones are
     formed and volume control applied to a zone and
     thereby selectively to individual zone players
     based on a user determined relationship). How-
     ever where [Isely] controls volume in an interde-
     pendent manner the instant application . . . teaches
     the system functional to provide groupwise and in-
     dividual control of each of the groupwise addressa-
     ble and independently addressable playback
     devices.
 J.A. 58066-58067 (emphasis added). Third, Sonos summa-
 rized its telephone interview with the examiner as follows:
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 24                                          SONOS, INC. v. ITC

 “Applicants’ representative discussed the Isely reference
 and reiterated that the reference did not disclose or suggest
 independent playback devices.” J.A. 58145.
      Based on these statements, the Commission found:
      [w]hile the Examiner used the language “tethered
      or interdependent operation,” there is not a clear
      intent to disavow all systems that can be charac-
      terized as either “tethered” or “interdependent.”
      Rather, the patentee disclaimed the devices as de-
      scribed in Isely – a system in which the volume of
      one individual device could not be adjusted without
      also adjusting the volume of other devices in the
      group.
 J.A. 191 (citing J.A. 58069). Google argues the Commission
 erred finding that Sonos only made a narrow disclaimer.
 Instead, in Google’s view, Sonos broadly disclaimed all
 “tethered or interdependent operation.”
      “The party seeking to invoke prosecution history dis-
 claimer bears the burden of proving the existence of a clear
 and unmistakable disclaimer that would have been evident
 to one skilled in the art.” Genuine Enabling Tech. LLC v.
 Nintendo Co., 29 F.4th 1365, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (inter-
 nal quotation marks omitted). We review the Commis-
 sion’s assessment of a prosecution disclaimer de novo. See
 id. at 1372.
     Undertaking such review here, we agree with the Com-
 mission that the three statements quoted above do not
 amount to a “clear and unmistakable disclaimer” of all
 “tethered or interdependent operation.” The examiner’s
 statement in the Reasons for Allowance indicates that both
 the examiner and Sonos understood that a system provid-
 ing “groupwise and individual control of each of the group-
 wise addressable and independently addressable playback
 devices,” which is a form of a “tethered or interdependent
 operation,” was within the scope of the allowed claims.
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 SONOS, INC. v. ITC                                       25

 J.A. 58066-67. This point alone is sufficient to cast doubt
 on the breadth of the disclaimer argued for by Google, as
 the record is far from “clear and unmistakable” as to such
 scope.
     Google offers no argument for non-infringement if its
 broad disclaimer contention is rejected. Hence, we affirm
 the Commission’s finding that Google’s accused controllers
 installed with the Google Home application infringe the
 ’949 patent.
                              C
      Finally, Google argues the originally-accused products
 do not infringe the ’896, ’949, ’959, ’258, and ’953 patents
 because Sonos’ infringement theories rely on features or
 steps that are added or performed by users after Google
 imports the devices into the United States. Google asserts
 that the Commission’s authority under section 337 “is lim-
 ited to cases in which the accused articles infringe at the
 time of importation, and that district courts are the proper
 forum for allegations of inducing post-importation infringe-
 ment.” Google Br. at 51. As Google concedes, however, we
 have already rejected this contention. See Suprema, Inc. v.
 Int’l Trade Com’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc);
 see also Google Br. at 50. We are bound by this precedent
 and, accordingly, reject Google’s argument.
                             IV
      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. Because we reject each of the
 challenges raised by Sonos in its appeal and by Google in
 its cross-appeal, we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.