Court Opinion

ID: 9747951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:45:08.257938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:29.408169
License: Public Domain

VOGEL, J., Concurring.
I concur but write separately to emphasize a few points.
A.
These are the pertinent facts.
Harold Lancer, the insured, owned a house on the top of a slope. Lawrence and Linda Rauch (collectively Rauch) lived at the bottom of the slope, which failed on February 27, 1998, at which time mud and debris flowed onto Rauch’s property. Rauch lost the use of his backyard and had to move some of his personal property into storage. The City of Los Angeles ordered Lancer to repair the slope but he did not comply with the order. In February 1999, Rauch sued Lancer and the other uphill owners for damages and injunctive relief on theories of negligence (failure to maintain the slope), trespass (by the mudslide) and nuisance (the continuing risk of “additional slippage”). Another action against the same defendants was filed by Rauch’s downhill neighbors and various cross-complaints were filed.
At the time of the landslide, Lancer was insured (1) by a $500,000 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company homeowners policy and (2) by a $5 million Safeco Insurance Company of America personal umbrella policy. The Fireman’s Fund policy was effective from June 1997 to June 1998, and was renewed annually for three years, through June 2001; the Safeco policy was effective from July 1997 to July 1998, and was renewed annually for two years, through July 2000.
*640Lancer notified both Fireman’s Fund and Safeco of the lawsuits, and Fireman’s Fund provided a defense in both Rauch’s action and his downhill neighbors’ action. Before Rauch’s action went to trial, Fireman’s Fund’s contributions to various settlements exceeded $500,000, and Fireman’s Fund took the position that its homeowners policy limits were exhausted. When Safeco disagreed, Fireman’s Fund continued to defend Lancer in Rauch’s action, subject to a reservation of its right to recover certain postexhaustion defense costs from Safeco.
Rauch’s action was tried in part to the court, in part to a jury. The court found there was a nuisance, ordered Lancer and his uphill neighbors to repair the slope according to a particular plan approved by the city, and determined that the cost of the repair would be about $3.8 million. The damage issues were then tried to a jury, which found for Lancer on the trespass claim but against him on Rauch’s negligence and nuisance causes of action. The jury awarded $75,500 to Rauch for his relocation costs and loss of use of his backyard, and $12,500 in noneconomic damages (annoyance and inconvenience), to which the court added interest, costs of developing the repair plan, and litigation costs. Fireman’s Fund contributed $265,000 in defense costs in Rauch’s action, and Safeco paid the remaining amounts owed by Lancer.
In 2002 (before Rauch’s action was concluded), Safeco filed this declaratory relief action against Fireman’s Fund, claiming that Lancer was covered not only by the 1998 homeowners policy in effect on the date of the landslide but also by the three successive policies—and that each policy provided $1 million in coverage, $500,000 for property damage and an additional $500,000 for personal injury, a total of $4 million. Fireman’s Fund cross-complained against Safeco for declaratory relief, equitable subrogation, and equitable indemnity, claiming it owed Lancer only $500,000 for a single occurrence and was entitled to reimbursement from Safeco for its postexhaustion defense costs ($265,000). Following cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts, the trial court rendered judgment for Fireman’s Fund. Safeco appeals.
B.
These are the pertinent provisions of the Fireman’s Fund policies.
“Coverage E” provides personal liability coverage for bodily injury, property damage, and personal injury: “If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an ‘insured’ for damages because of ‘bodily injury,’ ‘personal injury,’ or ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ to which this coverage applies, [Fireman’s Fund] will [][] 1. Pay up to our limit for insurance for the damages for which the ‘insured’ is legally liable . . . ; and [f] 2. Provide a *641defense at our expense .... Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from the ‘occurrence’ equals our limit of insurance.” (Boldface & italics added.)
“ ‘Property damage’ means physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property. HQ ‘Personal injury’ means injury, including bodily or mental harm, arising out of . . . [wrongful entry or eviction .... [1] ‘Occurrence’ is defined as: [f] (1) An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same or similar harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in ‘bodily injury ’ or ‘property damage[j[] (2) An act or series of acts of the same or similar nature that occurs during the policy period and which results in ‘personal injury.’ ” (Boldface, italics, & underscoring added.)
Under “Limits of Liability,” the policy provides: “Our total liability under Coverage E for all damages resulting from any one ‘occurrence’ will not be more than the limit of insurance for Coverage E as shown in the Declarations [$500,000], The limit is the same regardless of the number of ‘insureds,’ claims made or persons injured. All ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ resulting from any one accident or from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions shall be considered to be the result of one ‘occurrence.’ ” (Boldface & italics added.)
C.
Rauch’s losses (property damage and, if there were any, personal injuries) resulted from a single occurrence in 1998.
Under the plain language of the policy, the “occurrence” was the landslide (an “accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same or similar harmful conditions, which resulted], during the policy period, in ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ ”) which caused property damage (“physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property”). In order to determine coverage (as opposed to a duty to defend), the number of “occurrences” is calculated by reference to the event causing the injury. (EOTT Energy Corp. v. Storebrand Internat Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 565, 576 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 894]; Croskey, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶ 7:366, p. 7A-117, ¶ 7:369, p. 7A-117, ¶ 7:375, p. 7A-119 [for purposes of determining the number of successive policies available, “ ‘occurrence’ focuses on the event or events causing the injury”].)
The landslide was the event that caused the damages, all of which occurred in the 1998 policy year.
*642D.
Rauch’s continuing loss of the use of his property was neither an “event” nor a separate “occurrence” under the successive Fireman’s Fund policies.
Coverage is triggered under the policy in effect during the year in which an occurrence causes either physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of tangible property, in which event there is coverage for such damage to the extent of the policy’s limits. Rauch’s property, once damaged by the 1998 landslide, was covered by Lancer’s 1998 Fireman’s Fund policy—and the fact that Rauch’s loss of use of that property continued into successive policy periods does not mean there was coverage under Lancer’s subsequent policies.
The jury in Rauch’s case against Lancer found there was a nuisance, which Safeco characterizes as an eviction of Rauch from at least part of his property and a continuing loss during the periods of the successive Fireman’s Fund policies. Safeco’s argument confuses the causative event with the-resulting, damage. As noted in the majority opinion and above, the occurrence was the February 1998 landslide, which in one fell swoop damaged Rauch’s property, created a nuisance, and caused his partial eviction. The fact that the damage (partial eviction and loss of use) continued into subsequent policy periods does not mean there was more than one occurrence, without which coverage under the subsequent policies was not triggered. (Cf. Harbor Ins. Co. v. Central National Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1036-1038 [211 Cal.Rptr. 902]; see Interex Corp. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. (D.Mass. 1995) 874 F.Supp. 1406, 1411-1412.)
I think this point is best made with an example. Assume there was no landslide but in 1998 Lancer and Rauch discovered the hill was unstable and that there was a possibility the slope might fail (a threat of harm). If Rauch wanted to sell his property, he would have to disclose this known defect to a potential buyer and thus would suffer a loss from the diminution of the value of his property—and he probably could sue Lancer for injunctive relief and damages. But there would be no coverage under the Fireman’s Fund policy because there would not have been an occurrence (no act or accident resulting in physical injury to or destruction of the property or loss of its use, or personal injury), notwithstanding that there would have been damage and-that the damage might have continued over a period of years if Lancer refused to fix the problem.
*643In our case, there was a landslide, and there was coverage under the 1998 Fireman’s Fund policy for the damage (physical injury, destruction, and loss of use) caused and suffered during the policy period—but not for the continuing loss of use in subsequent policy periods, because there was no occurrence during any of the successive policy periods.
E.
For these reasons, I agree that the judgment must be affirmed, and that Safeco must reimburse Fireman’s Fund for its postexhaustion defense costs.
A petition for a rehearing was denied April 12, 2007.