Court Opinion

ID: 9684542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:00:31.56901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:56.989415
License: Public Domain

*434NYE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion accurately sets out the facts of this case. The majority has apparently determined that there was no evidence of probative force that Cynthia Hickl had an equal right of control with her older brother to direct and control his actions in operating the car during the trip in question. And second, that Cynthia’s older brother’s negligence could not be imputed to her because she was an eighteen year old minor.
The jury found from a preponderance of the evidence that on the occasion in question Edward L. Hickl, Jr. and Cynthia Hickl had a joint interest in the object and purpose of the trip and an equal right, express or implied, to direct and control each other in the operation of the vehicle.
The trial court disregarded this finding of the jury. The trial court is authorized to disregard a jury finding only when there is no legally probative evidence sufficient to raise such factual issue for submission to the jury and to support the jury’s finding of fact. In making this determination, all evidence must be considered in a light most favorable to the jury’s finding of fact and every reasonable inference deductible from the evidence is to be indulged in favor of the jury’s finding of fact. Harbin v. Seale, 461 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Sup.1970); Lynch v. Ricketts, 158 Tex. 487, 314 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.Sup.1958).
Following this dictate we find that
Edward Hickl, Jr. and his sister Cynthia were students at Texas A & I University at Kingsville. The car was given to both of them. They shared in the expenses in connection with its maintenance and upkeep while at school. Their family shared in their expenses incurred in trips to their home. On direct examination Edward Hickl, Jr. replied “We kept it at school.” “We drove home for semester breaks at our vacation time.” The clear and reasonable inference from this admission alone is that the father loaned his car jointly to his son and daughter for their joint use “we kept it . . . we drove home . . . ”.
Even Edward Hickl, Jr. admitted that his sister had as much right to control the car as far as going home was concerned as he did.
Upon cross examination, Edward L. Hickl, Jr. testified:
“Q Okay. She did have as much right to control that car, as far as going home, as you did, didn’t she ?
A She had the right.
Q All right. And if you had decided, by golly, we’re going to take this car and turn around and go to San Antonio, you did not have that right, did you? You all had an equal right, is what I am saying, didn’t you ?
A More or less.”
On redirect, the following was elicited:
“Q But she was not controlling the car as far as driving it; she was just — you both were going home ?
A Right. We just both — she had finished exams. She was tired and she was ready to go home, and she was — we were on our way home from school.
Q But as far as the right to control the way you drove the car, she did not exercise that, did she ?
A No.”
On recross, appellee’s brother testified:
“Q Okay. One question more. It’s not whether she exercised it or not; very few of us exercise it. But she had the right to say, ‘We are not going anywhere but home’, she had that right equally with you, didn’t she ?
A That’s correct. (Emphasis supplied).
Q And also, she had the right to say, if you suddenly decided that you were going to drive ninety miles an hour on this foggy night, to say, ‘Slow down, brother’, didn’t she have that right ?
A Oh, yes.”
Finally, on redirect:
“Q If she had told you that, would you have done it ?
*435A Yes, I probably would have.”
The evidence clearly showed that Edward Hickl, Jr. admitted that his sister had the right to tell him to slow down if he was driving too fast; that if she told him to slow down he would have obeyed; that he did not have the right in opposition to his sister to go to a different destination; and that she had as much the same right to say where they were going on the occasion in question as he did. The evidence as set forth above is legally sufficient to raise the factual issue of joint enterprise for submission to the jury and by disregarding the other evidence it is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fact of joint enterprise.
A distinction is drawn between the right of control and the actual power or physical capacity to control. The latter may be lacking without affecting the question. The right of control and not actual physical control is the usual test applied in such cases. Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Company, 460 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1970, reversed on other grounds.)
If the evidence in this case demonstrates that on the occasion in question that Cynthia and her brother Edward, Jr. had an equal right to direct and control the operation of the car and each had a joint interest in the object of their trip such would constitute a legal bar to her recovery. There is no dispute as to the latter element being satisfied. The brother and sister were travelling home to Bay City after semester exams. They shared the expenses of the car. It is uncontestable that the brother and sister had a common purpose and a joint interest in making the trip.
The majority cite the Fuller v. Flanagan case, supra, as authority that a brother cannot impute his negligence to an une-mancipated (14 year old) minor. However, I believe that this case is no authority for refusing to impute negligence from a brother to a 18 year old woman because she is a minor. An 18 year old woman is sufficiently emancipated to escape this fiction.
I agree that the trend is away from finding that a joint enterprise exists except where there is some pecuniary interest involved such as an actual principal agent, employer-employee, business partners or joint adventurers engaged in the prosecution of their business is concerned. However, until Texas abolishes the “equal right of control” test, I feel that we must follow such authority. Straffus v. Barclay, 147 Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.1949); El Paso Electric Co. v. Leeper, 60 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Comm’n App.1933, judgment adopted); Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Arnspiger, 449 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Civ.App.—1969 no w. o. e.); McCormick v. Stowe Lumber Co., 356 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.Civ.App.1962, error refused n. r. e.) and see Bonney v. San Antonio Transit Co., 160 Tex. 11, 325 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tex.1959).
I would reverse and render judgment for the defendant.