Court Opinion

ID: 9800361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:12:31.159754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:37.972952
License: Public Domain

Friedman, J.
(dissenting in part). Before us are appeals from judgments for plaintiffs in two unrelated asbestos-related personal injury actions that were consolidated for trial in Supreme Court, New York County. The majority affirms each judgment. I concur in the affirmance of Konstantin v 630 Third Ave. Assoc. (index No. 190134/10, appeal No. 11498), although, because we have not been provided with the record upon which the motion for consolidation was decided, I would not consider the argument by the appealing defendant (Tishman Liquidating Corporation) that the two actions should not have been consolidated. Upon the other appeal, Dummitt v A.W. Chesterton (index No. 190196/10, appeal Nos. 11499-11500), I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the judgment for plaintiff because the trial court erred (1) in excluding certain evidence offered by the appealing defendant (Crane Co.) on the issue of causation and (2) in its charge to the jury on that issue. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment for plaintiff in Dummitt and order a new trial on the issues of whether Crane’s failure to issue warnings about the danger of asbestos-containing gaskets, packing, and insulation used with its valves was a proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff’s decedent and, if so, what percentage of fault is attributable to Crane.
I turn first to Konstantin. While I am in substantial agreement with the majority’s resolution of the substantive issues raised on this appeal, I would not address Tishman’s challenge to Supreme Court’s pretrial order consolidating Konstantin and Dummitt for trial.1 The consolidation order would be reviewable upon Tishman’s appeal from the final judgment (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]) if the record upon which that order was made were before us. Tishman, however, has not provided us with any of the papers upon which the consolidation order was made. Although it has prosecuted its appeal by the appendix system authorized by CPLR 5528 (a) (5) and 22 NYCRR 600.5 (a), Tishman has neither caused the original record of the consolidation motion to be transmitted to this Court by the clerk of Supreme Court, as required by 22 NYCRR 600.5 (a) (1), nor included the record of that motion in the reproduced appendix it has filed with this Court pursuant to CPLR 5528 (a) (5). All we have before us is the consolidation order itself. Tishman’s failure to *257place before this Court, in any form, any of the papers or exhibits submitted on the consolidation motion, either in support or in opposition, as required by CPLR 5526, renders ££[m]eaningful appellate review of the [granting] of that motion . . . impossible” (UBS Sec. LLC v Red Zone LLC, 77 AD3d 575, 579 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 17 NY3d 706 [2011]).
The majority appears to take the position that the record for the review of the consolidation order, while perhaps “incomplete,” is “sufficient” to allow us “to meaningfully determine whether consolidation was properly granted.” In fact, the record before us on the consolidation order is not merely “incomplete”; there is no record before us at all upon which to conduct a review of that order. The majority cites no authority permitting consideration of an appeal in the absence of any part of the record upon which the appealed order was made. Notably, while CPLR 5527 allows an appeal to be prosecuted upon a statement in lieu of a record on appeal, Tishman has not availed itself of that method, which would have required that the statement in lieu of the record be agreed upon by the parties and approved by the court from which the appeal is taken. I do not understand why the majority insists on addressing the consolidation issue on the merits, in the absence of any record, when we are all agreed that the Konstantin judgment should be affirmed. When before has this Court addressed an issue for which the parties have not seen fit to provide a record?2 Had Tishman’s appeal challenged only the consolidation order, Tishman’s ££fail[ure] in its obligation to assemble a proper appellate record” for review of that order would have warranted dismissal of its appeal for want of proper perfection (UBS, 77 AD3d at 579; see also Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Vargas, 288 AD2d 309 [2d Dept 2001]). Since Tishman’s appeal raises additional issues unrelated to consolidation, I believe that we should decide those other issues without addressing Tishman’s challenge to the consolidation order. Accordingly, while I concur in the affirmance of the judgment in Konstantin, I take no position on the views expressed by the majority in its discussion of the consolidation issue.
In Dummitt, as discussed at greater length by the majority, plaintiffs decedent, Ronald Dummitt, in the course of his work from 1960 to 1977 as a boiler-room technician on United States *258Navy ships, was exposed to asbestos from gaskets, rope-like “packing” material, and insulation (also called “lagging pads”) installed on valves manufactured by Crane, the sole appealing defendant in this action. It is undisputed that Crane, which manufactured and sold the valves to the Navy many years before the start of Mr. Dummitt’s service (the ships on which he served were of World War II vintage), has not been shown to have been the manufacturer, seller, or distributor of any of the asbestos-containing material that was the source of plaintiffs exposure.3 The asbestos-containing gaskets, packing, and insulation used in conjunction with the Crane valves had to be replaced periodically, and any such material that Crane had originally supplied with the valves had been removed long before Mr. Dummitt began his service. Mr. Dummitt’s asbestos exposure arose from the removal from the valves of worn-out gaskets, packing, and insulation, a process that generated large amounts of dust. Again, it is undisputed that Crane neither manufactured nor sold nor distributed the particular materials that gave rise to Mr. Dummitt’s asbestos exposure.
The jury was asked to determine whether Crane had breached a duty to warn those working with its valves about the danger of asbestos in the gaskets, packing, and insulation used in conjunction with the valves. In this regard, the court propounded the following instruction to the jury, over Crane’s objection: “[A] manufacturer’s duty to warn extends to known dangers or dangers which should have been known in the exercise of reasonable care of the uses of the manufacturer’s product with the product of another manufacturer if such use was reasonably foreseeable.”
The foregoing instruction was erroneous, as the majority appears to recognize, but I think we should say so more forthrightly. Under precedent of this Court, a firm’s duty to warn about dangers arising from products that it neither manufactured nor sold nor distributed, but which could be used in conjunction with products that the firm did manufacture, sell, or distribute, does not extend to all such uses of other products that might be “reasonably foreseeable.” For example, in Tortoriello v Bally Case (200 AD2d 475 [1st Dept 1994]), we held that *259the manufacturer of a walk-in freezer had no duty to warn users of the slipping danger posed by quarry tile flooring, manufactured and sold by others, that could be used in the freezer, notwithstanding that this kind of flooring was depicted in the freezer manufacturer’s sales literature as “one of three available floor materials for walk-in freezers” (id. at 477). In view of that sales literature, it was plainly reasonably foreseeable to the manufacturer in Tortoriello that quarry tile flooring would sometimes be used in its walk-in freezers, and yet we held that the manufacturer had no duty to warn users of the freezers about the hazards of that kind of flooring.
The error in the court’s instruction on the scope of Crane’s duty to warn was, however, harmless, inasmuch as “there is no view of the evidence under which appellant could have prevailed” (Marine Midland Bank v Russo Produce Co., 50 NY2d 31, 43 [1980]) on the issue of whether Crane had a duty to warn people working with the valves in question of the danger of asbestos exposure from gaskets, packing, and insulation used in conjunction with those valves. This is because the record establishes — indeed, Crane itself does not dispute — that use of perishable asbestos-containing materials in conjunction with certain of its valves was a known certainty, not merely “reasonably foreseeable.” Crane emphasizes that the Navy, not Crane, chose which gaskets, packing, and insulation it would use on the valves, and points to evidence that non-asbestos-containing versions of these items were available and sometimes used by the Navy during the period in question. Nonetheless, the evidence is uncontroverted that, as Crane knew very well, Navy specifications dictated that asbestos-containing components be used with many of the Crane valves with which Mr. Dummitt worked. In a previous asbestos case, we held that a manufacturer of pumps on Navy ships was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing a failure-to-warn claim against it, notwithstanding that it did not manufacture or install the asbestos-containing insulation on its pumps, because an issue of fact was raised as to whether the manufacturer “knew [that the insulation to be installed on the pumps] would be made out of asbestos” (Berkowitz v A.C. & S., Inc., 288 AD2d 148, 149 [1st Dept 2001]; see also Rogers v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 268 AD2d 245, 246 [1st Dept 2000] [the manufacturer of a grill had a duty to give users adequate warnings about the dangers arising from the use of a *260propane tank, which it did not manufacture or sell, “where its grill could not be used without the tank”]).4
Although I believe that the Dummitt plaintiff is entitled, on this record, to prevail on the issue of duty, I believe that errors relating to the issue of proximate cause require us to reverse the Dummitt judgment and order a new trial as to causation-related issues. First, over Crane’s objection, the trial court’s charge to the jury on the issue of proximate cause erroneously included the following instruction: “Mr. Dummitt is entitled to the presumption that had proper and adequate warnings been given regarding the use of the product, the warnings would have been heeded and injury avoided.” This charge is contrary to precedent of this Court holding that, in a failure-to-warn case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving “that the user of a product would have read and heeded a warning had one been given” (Sosna v American Home Prods., 298 AD2d 158, 158 [1st Dept 2002]). Further, to the extent certain federal court decisions purporting to apply New York law have applied such a presumption (contrary to this Court’s precedent), that presumption is rebuttable (see Santoro ex rel. Santoro v Donnelly, 340 F Supp 2d 464, 486 [SD NY 2004]), which is not the charge the jury was initially given. While the court subsequently attempted to cure its error by adding that the presumption could be rebutted,5 it remains the case that, regardless of what some trial courts and federal courts applying New York law may have held, this Court has never held such a presumption, whether rebuttable or not, to apply in a personal injury case based on a failure-to-warn theory. Further, since the erroneous presumption charge was part of the instructions the jury actually received, it was prejudicial to Crane whether or not counsel for the Dum*261mitt plaintiff — who requested the charge — made express reference to it in his argument to the jury.6
I do not believe that the error in the charge on causation can be deemed to have been cured by the court’s subsequent “clarification” that the presumption the jury had been instructed to indulge in the Dummitt plaintiffs favor was rebuttable. Whether rebuttable or not, the presumption charge had the effect of shifting the burden of proof on the causation issue and was contrary to precedent of this Court by which the trial court was bound. However, even if it were possible to deem the erroneous instruction to have been rendered harmless by the curative instruction, the trial court compounded its error by improperly precluding Rear Admiral David Sargent, U.S.N. (ret.), who was called by Crane to testify as an expert on naval operations, from giving testimony highly relevant to the question of whether Crane’s failure to give asbestos warnings was a proximate cause of Mr. Dummitt’s injuries. Specifically, Crane sought to show through Admiral Sargent’s testimony how the Navy would have reacted to an attempt by Crane to issue warnings about the dangers of asbestos used on its valves. This witness was prepared to testify that the Navy would have forbidden Crane to place asbestos warnings on its valves because they were not contained in the Navy equipment specifications. Although this testimony would have tended to show that the hypothetical warnings, even if given, would not have reached Mr. Dummitt, the court refused to allow the jury to hear it.
I do not take issue with the majority’s statement that the Dummitt plaintiff presented evidence that Mr. Dummitt would have received “[a]ny warning . . . and . . . clearly testified that he would have heeded those warnings and taken steps to protect himself.” Still, Crane was entitled to present its own proof rebutting this evidence, as well as the presumption that the *262jury had been erroneously instructed to indulge in the Dummitt plaintiffs favor. Given that the excluded evidence was relevant and material, its preclusion constituted reversible error.
The majority mistakenly relies on a nearly quarter-century-old federal court decision — which neither side has cited on this appeal — in support of its view that the trial court’s preclusion of Admiral Sargent’s testimony did not constitute reversible error. In fact, In re Joint E. & S. Dist. N.Y. Asbestos Litig. (897 F2d 626 [2d Cir 1990] [hereinafter Grispo]) provides no support either for the preclusion of Admiral Sargent’s testimony or for the majority’s inappropriate and groundless speculation that this expert witness’s testimony “would have made [no] difference” to the outcome of the trial had the jury been allowed to hear it. In Grispo, while the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment to the defendant cement manufacturer (Eagle-Picher) on its military contractor affirmative defense, it also vacated the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs dismissing that defense and remanded for reconsideration by the District Court of whether certain evidence in the record “establish[ed] a genuine issue of material fact [whether] the Government might have precluded Eagle-Picher from including any product warnings” (id. at 637). At the trial of the Dummitt case, on the other hand, the court effectively granted the plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of causation by refusing to allow the jury to hear Admiral Sargent’s expert testimony, based on his knowledge of the Navy’s practices during the relevant period, that any warnings by Crane about the use of asbestos-containing materials in conjunction with its valves would not have reached Mr. Dummitt. Nothing in Grispo supports the preclusion of this testimony, since there is no indication in the Second Circuit’s opinion that Eagle-Picher offered expert testimony similar to that of Admiral Sargent in support of its military contractor defense. Thus, while the Grispo court was unpersuaded by the raw documentary evidence EaglePicher offered in support of the defense (see id. at 632-633), it had no occasion to consider whether expert testimony about military practices, such as Crane sought to present to the jury here, would raise an issue of fact. Manifestly, Admiral Sargent’s testimony — which is not even mentioned in the portion of the Dummitt plaintiffs appellate brief addressing the causation issue — raised such an issue and should have been heard by the jury. There is nothing in Grispo that suggests otherwise.
The majority also apparently takes the position that Crane’s failure to present evidence that it warned the Navy about the *263dangers of asbestos in materials used with its valves should preclude Crane from contesting that its failure to provide such warnings to naval personnel was a proximate cause of the harm to Mr. Dummitt. Even if one joins the majority in its dubious assumption that the Navy (unlike its product vendors) was in the dark about the dangers of asbestos during the relevant period, what the majority overlooks is that Admiral Sargent would have testified, based on his long experience in naval procurement practice, that, even if Crane had sought to provide such warnings, the Navy would have disallowed them. Stated otherwise, the Navy, according to Admiral Sargent, would have been unmoved by any warnings presented by Crane for transmission to servicemen like Mr. Dummitt. The jury might well have rejected Admiral Sargent’s testimony on this point, but Crane had a right to present it to them. The preclusion of this expert testimony (the admissibility of which the Dummitt plaintiff does not dispute) constituted reversible error.
Finally, given my view that a new trial is required on the question of whether Crane’s failure to give warnings was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Dummitt’s injuries, I would direct that, should the causation issue be resolved in the Dummitt plaintiff’s favor, the issue of Crane’s percentage of fault for the harm suffered by the plaintiff and her decedent be determined afresh at the new trial.
Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ., concur with Mazzarelli, J.R; Friedman, J., dissents in part in a separate opinion in which DeGrasse, J., concurs.
Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County, entered November 28, 2012, and October 26, 2012, affirmed, without costs. Appeal from order, same court, entered October 4, 2012, dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the October 26, 2012 judgment.

. Crane, the appellant in Dummitt, does not challenge the consolidation order on appeal, although it did oppose consolidation in Supreme Court.

. In response to the majority’s statement that the Konstantin plaintiff should have moved to dismiss the appeal or to supplement the record, I note that it is the obligation of the party seeking appellate relief — here, Tishman — to provide this Court with a record upon which to consider its appeal.

. While the majority notes that Crane did distribute and sell an asbestos-containing material known as “Cranite,” which was manufactured by other companies, it was stipulated at trial that “Mr. Dummitt does not allege [that] he was exposed to asbestos from Cranite products.”

. By contrast, in an asbestos case against Crane in which the United States District Court determined that the record would not have supported a finding that Crane knew for certain that the Navy would place asbestos-containing insulation on its boilers, the court granted Crane summary judgment dismissing the failure-to-warn claim, distinguishing our decision in Berkowitz on the ground that the latter case “involved more than a mere possibility that asbestos might be used” (Surre v Foster Wheeler LLC, 831 F Supp 2d 797, 802 [SD NY 2011]).

. After the initial charge, the court called back the jury and added the following “clarification” concerning the presumption the jury had been instructed to entertain in plaintiffs favor: “This, however, is a rebuttable presumption. In other words, you can consider other evidence in the case to see if that other evidence rebuts this presumption to which Mr. Dummitt is entitled.”

. Union Carbide Corp. v Affiliated FM Ins. Co. (101 AD3d 434 [1st Dept 2012]) did not change this Department’s law on this point. Union Carbide was an insurance coverage dispute, in which the insurer sought to avoid coverage for asbestos-related bodily injury claims against the policyholder on the ground that the policyholder “expected or intended” the injuries giving rise to the claims (id. at 434). In rejecting the insurer’s appeal, we noted that the policyholder “offered, as further proof of any lack of intent, evidence that it . . . provided information regarding the dangers of asbestos, as well as guidance concerning its proper usage, to its clients and potential customers,” after which we cited Santoro for the proposition that “New York law presumes that users will heed warnings provided with a product” (id.). In the context of the issue that was before us in Union Carbide, that decision’s citation of Santoro and recitation of the Santoro holding was plainly dicta.