Court Opinion

ID: 9963542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 17:23:52.813526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:52.169180
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     APRIL 25, 2024
                                                              In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                             WA State Court of Appeals Division III

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                              DIVISION THREE

SEATTLE HISTORIC WATERFRONT                 )
ASSOCIATION, and MADISON                    )         No. 39610-0-III
TOWER CONDOMINIUM                           )
ASSOCIATION,                                )
                                            )
                    Appellants,             )
                                            )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
      v.                                    )
                                            )
AMLI RESIDENTIAL, WOLDSON                   )
ALASKAN WAY 01, LLC, WOLDSON                )
WESTERN 01, LLC and CITY OF                 )
SEATTLE,                                    )
                                            )
                    Respondents.            )

      COONEY, J. — Seattle Historic Waterfront Association and Madison Tower

Condominium Association (collectively “Historic Waterfront”), filed a petition under the

Land Use Petition Act (LUPA), chapter 36.70C RCW, challenging the approval of a

master use permit (MUP) issued by the Seattle Department of Construction and

Inspections (SDCI) to AMLI Residential1 (AMLI) for the development of a 17-story,

245-unit apartment building (Project) located near Seattle’s downtown waterfront.

      1
       The respondents, AMLI Residential, Woldson Alaskan Way 01, LLC, Woldson
Western 01, LLC, and the City of Seattle are collectively referred to as “AMLI.”
No. 39610-0-III
Seattle Historic Waterfront Ass’n, et al. v. AMLI Residential, et al.

       On appeal, Historic Waterfront assigns error to the superior court’s order

dismissing its shoreline permitting issues, denying its motion to allow additional

discovery and to supplement the record, and affirming the city of Seattle’s Office of the

Hearing Examiner’s (Examiner) decision approving the design review.

       We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND

       In 2014, Gonzaga University acquired real property located between Alaskan Way

and Western Avenue and Spring Street and Seneca Streets in the city of Seattle (City).

The property is owned by Woldson Alaska, LLC, and Woldson Western, LLC, which are

wholly owned subsidiaries of Gonzaga University. The western 32 feet of the property is

located within 200 feet of the Alaskan Way seawall, subjecting it to the Shoreline

Management Act of 1971 (SMA), chapter 90.58 RCW, and the City’s Shoreline Master

Program (SMP), chapter 23.60A Seattle Municipal Code (SMC).

       In 2019, Gonzaga University obtained a lot boundary adjustment that divided the

property into four lots (hereinafter lots A, B, C, and D). Lots C and D are located within

200 feet of the Alaskan Way seawall. Lots A and B are situated beyond 200 feet from

the Alaskan Way seawall. AMLI leased lots A and B from Woldson Alaska, LLC, with

the intent of constructing a 17-story, 245-unit apartment building with retail and

commercial space and parking for over 150 vehicles.

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       Before AMLI could make application for a MUP, the Project had to be reviewed

by the City’s Design Review Board (DRB) under the Downtown Design Guidelines

(Guidelines). At the first Early Design Guidance (EDG) meeting, held on March 19,

2019, architect Jon Hall discussed the applicable guidelines, zoning patterns, how the

proposed design of the building fit with the surrounding area, and provided the DRB with

design options that adhered to the Guideline’s massing requirements.

       At a second EDG meeting, held on July 9, Mr. Hall proposed alternative design

options in response to massing concerns that were raised by the DRB at the first meeting.

Both EDG meetings allowed for public comment. Eventually, the DRB voted for the

Project to advance to the recommendation stage of design review.

       On September 6, AMLI applied for an MUP. The application contained revised

plans that addressed design concerns raised by the DRB at the earlier EDG meetings. On

September 19, the SDCI entered notice of AMLI’s application into the public record.

The notice provided that the SDCI was not requiring AMLI to undergo shoreline

permitting.

       In an initial administrative recommendation, dated June 18, 2020, SDCI Senior

Land Use Planner Joseph Hurley recommended the Project comply with additional

design requirements before the MUP be issued. A follow-up design recommendation

meeting was held before the DRB on November 17. At the meeting, Mr. Hall addressed

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the concerns raised by Mr. Hurley by setting back and extending the façade of the south

tower, extending the south tower’s roofline, and recessing the entryway and extending its

canopy.

       The DRB concluded that, with the inclusion of proposed changes, the Project

complied with the Guidelines. However, the DRB recommended several options to better

meet Guidelines A-2 and B-4. Design approval and issuance of the MUP were

conditioned on these issues being resolved. Previous comments concerning Guidelines

B-2 and B-3 were not included in the DRB’s priorities and recommendation.

       AMLI adjusted the design of the Project to address the DRB’s priorities and

recommendations. Following the adjustments, on April 29, 2021, the SDCI issued AMLI

its MUP. In its decision, the SDCI concluded the Project incorporated the DRB’s

recommended conditions and complied with all design guidelines, laws, and permits.

       APPEAL TO THE HEARING EXAMINER

       On May 12, Historic Waterfront filed a notice of appeal to the Hearing Examiner.

Historic Waterfront claimed the SDCI issued the MUP even though the Project failed to

meet numerous Guidelines, including A-1, A-2, B-1, B-2, B-3, and B-4. On the same

date, Historic Waterfront requested a land use interpretation from the SDCI Director

(Director) regarding the applicability, or lack thereof, of the SMP to the Project.

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       On June 11, the Director responded to Historic Waterfront’s land use

interpretation request. The Director concluded the matter was not subject to

interpretation because Historic Waterfront had “not identified any section of the code

applicable to the subject site.” Administrative Record (AR) at 91. In light of the

Director’s decision to not issue an interpretation, the Examiner dismissed Historic

Waterfront’s SMP appeal. On August 16, the Examiner conducted a one-day appeal

hearing. At the hearing, AMLI presented the testimony of Mr. Hall, the City presented

the testimony of Mr. Hurley, and Historic Waterfront presented the testimony of architect

John Adams.

       Mr. Hall testified that AMLI had made several adjustments to the overall design to

account for the concerns flagged by the DRB, such as adjusting the heights, massing, and

setbacks of the north and south towers, and adjusting the façade by the color of the glass,

the color of the mullions, and the color of raised metal panels. Mr. Hall testified that

through the evolution of the design review process, the Project gained compliance with

the Guidelines. Mr. Hurley testified about the design review process and that the Project

met the Guidelines.

       Mr. Adams testified that the Project lacked the “distinctive pallet of materials”

necessary to enhance the City’s skyline. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 404. Mr. Adams noted

the Guideline’s use of the Watermark Tower as an example of a building that truly

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enhanced the City’s skyline. He testified that the addition of a dark stripe at the top of

the tower was insufficient to make the tower distinctive. Mr. Hall responded that the

Watermark Tower was only one example and “plenty of other examples of more modern

buildings than⎯than these, which use different elements to articulate the roofline and

provide that interest that the⎯the guidelines have in mind.” Id.

       After considering the testimony of the witnesses and the entire record, on

September 24, the Examiner issued a decision. In part, the Examiner concluded:

       3. The question before the Hearing Examiner is not whether alternative
       project designs would be preferable or are more aesthetically pleasing
       within the subjective view of an Appellant (or the Examiner); it is whether
       the City erred in approving the design review for the Project. In addition,
       where, as here, legal argument presented by the Appellants is largely
       limited to generalized references to testimony from its witness Mr. Adams,
       and conclusory statements about the Project design with no reference to the
       record, the Appellants cannot adequately meet their burden of proof.

AR at 252. The Examiner concluded that “the Director’s design review Decision was not

shown to be clearly erroneous” and affirmed the Director’s design review decision. Id.

       APPEAL TO THE SUPERIOR COURT

       Historic Waterfront appealed the Examiner’s decision to the superior court under

the LUPA and moved the court for an order authorizing limited discovery and allowing

supplementation of the record regarding its SMP issue. In response, AMLI moved for

partial summary judgment or, alternatively, summary judgment on the SMP and

Guideline claims.

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       The superior court granted the motion for partial summary judgment, concluding

that Historic Waterfront’s SMP issue was time barred under the LUPA because it was

not filed within 21 days of the final land use decision. Since the SMP issue was time

barred, the court denied Historic Waterfront’s motion for limited discovery and for

supplementation of the record. The court then examined the remaining LUPA claims

by reviewing the entire record pursuant to RCW 36.70C.110. Ultimately, the court

concluded that Historic Waterfront had failed to satisfy its burden under RCW

36.70C.130(1) and denied the LUPA petition.

       Historic Waterfront appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

       On appeal Historic Waterfront assigns error to the superior court’s order

dismissing its SMP issues, denying its motion to allow for additional discovery and to

supplement the record, and affirming the decision that approved the design review.

       I. APPEAL OF SHORELINE PERMITTING ISSUE

       Historic Waterfront argues that the superior court erred in dismissing the SMP

issue as untimely⎯that, under RCW 36.70C.040, it had 21 days from the Examiner’s

decision (September 24, 2021) to file its appeal of the SMP issue. We disagree. The

SMP issue was not properly before the Examiner. Under the LUPA, the SDCI’s decision

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on the SMP became a final land use determination prior to the Examiner issuing his

decision.

       The superior court’s dismissal of the SMP issue represents a legal conclusion. We

review legal conclusions de novo. See Birgen v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 186 Wn. App.

851, 856, 347 P.3d 503 (2015); Nickum v. City of Bainbridge Island, 153 Wn. App. 366,

374, 223 P.3d 1172 (2009).

       The LUPA was enacted to ensure timely judicial review of land use decisions and

to prevent parties from delaying judicial review following the administrative process of a

local jurisdiction. Habitat Watch v. Skagit County, 155 Wn.2d 397, 406, 120 P.3d 56

(2005); RCW 36.70C.010. The LUPA requires that challenges to a land use decision be

filed with the superior court within 21 days of the decision. RCW 36.70C.040(3). In

accordance with the LUPA’s purpose, courts have applied a strict adherence to its 21-day

filing period. Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 67, 340 P.3d 191 (2014).

Failure to follow the 21-day filing period mandates a holding of untimeliness and makes

the land use decision unreviewable by the courts. Id. at 67-68 n.7; Habitat Watch, 155

Wn.2d at 407.

       For a superior court to acquire authority over a LUPA petition, the land use

decision must be from a final decision from a local jurisdiction. Chelan County v.

Nykreim, 146 Wn.2d 904, 938, 52 P.3d 1 (2002). A land use decision is “a final

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determination by a local jurisdiction’s body or officer with the highest level of

authority to make the determination” on an “application for a project permit or other

government approval required by law before [a] property may be . . . developed.”

RCW 36.70C.020(2). Finality is necessary because “[i]f there was not finality, no . . .

land owner would ever be safe in proceeding with the development of his [or her]

property.” Samuel’s Furniture, Inc. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 147 Wn.2d 440, 458, 54 P.3d

1194, 63 P.3d 764 (2002) (first alteration in original).

       A decision is “final” if it “‘leaves nothing open to further dispute and which sets at

rest the cause of action between the parties.’” Id. at 452 (quoting BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 567 (5th ed. 1979)). A judgment shall be “‘considered final on appeal if it

concludes the action by resolving the plaintiff’s entitlement to requested relief.’” Id.

(quoting Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass’n v. State, 92 Wn. App. 381, 387, 966 P.2d 928

(1998)). By contrast, an interlocutory decision is “‘intervening between the

commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a

final decision of the whole controversy.’” Id. (quoting BLACK’S, supra, at 731).

       A MUP is “the document issued to an applicant that records all land use decisions

that are made by the Department on a master use application.” SMC 23.84A.025. To be

issued a MUP, the applicant is required to submit a master use permit application to the

SDCI Director. SMC 23.76.010.A.1, .010.B. The Director then notifies the applicant

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within 28 days if the application is complete or if additional information is required.

SMC 23.76.010.E.1.

       The SMC divides land use decisions into five categories, only two of which are

relevant to this appeal. “Procedures for the five different categories are distinguished

according to who makes the decision, the type and amount of public notice required, and

whether appeal opportunities are provided.” SMC 23.76.004.A. Of the five categories,

only Type I and Type II decisions are consolidated within an MUP. SMC 23.76.004.B.

       Type I decisions include development standards not otherwise designated as

Types II, III, IV, or V. SMC 23.76.004, Table A. Type I decisions are issued “at the

time of the Director’s decision that the [permit] conforms with all applicable laws.”

SMC 23.76.028.B. The Director is not required to provide notice of Type I decisions.

SMC 23.76.020.C.1. “Type I decisions are decisions made by the Director [and] are not

appealable to the Hearing Examiner.” SMC 23.76.004.B. However, a “Type I

decision[ ] may be subject to administrative review through a land use interpretation

pursuant to [SMC] 23.88.020.” SMC 23.76.022.A.1. The parties agree that the

applicability of the SMP is a Type I decision. Br. of Appellants Historic Waterfront

Ass’n & Madison Tower Condo. Ass’n at 13; Resp. Br. of Resp’ts City of Seattle &

AMLI Residential at 2; Br of Resp’ts Woldson Alaskan Way 01, LLC & Woldson

Western 01, LLC at 6-8.

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       Type II decisions are larger “discretionary decisions” that require public notice

and comment. SMC 23.76.004.B; 23.76.012.A.2. Design decisions are classified as

Type II under SMC 22.76.004, Table A. When the Director issues a decision on an

MUP, notice of all Type II decisions must be provided by:

       a. Inclusion in the Land Use Information Bulletin;
       b. Publication in the City official newspaper;
       c. Notice provided to the applicant and to persons who provided an
          address for notice and either submitted written comments on the
          application, or made a written request for notice; and
       d. Filing of DNSs with the SEPA Public Information Center and
          distribution of DNSs as required by Section 25.05.340; and
       e. Filing of any shoreline decision in a Master Use Permit with
          the Department of Ecology according to the requirements in
          WAC 173-27-130.

SMC 23.76.020.C.2. The notice shall contain “the nature of the applicant’s proposal,

a description sufficient to locate the property, and the decision of the Director.”

SMC 23.76.020.D. Type II decisions are subject to review by the Examiner. SMC

23.76.022.C.

       A land use interpretation is “[a] decision by the Director as to the meaning,

application, or intent of any development regulation in Title 23 [SMC] . . . as it relates to

a specific property or decision by the Director.” SMC 23.88.020.A. An interpretation

arms the Director with the authority to “affirm, reverse, or modify all or any portion of a

Type I or Type II land use decision.” Id. Should the Director decide that an issue is not

subject to an interpretation, the Director’s decision is “final and not subject to

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administrative appeal.” Id. However, interpretation requests “are not administrative

remedies that must be exhausted before judicial review of a decision.” Id.

       An interpretation request that relates to a project application that requires no

public notice must be filed within 14 days after the MUP application is deemed complete.

SMC 23.88.020.C.2.a. If an interpretation request involves a Type I decision and a Type

II decision, the request may combine the Type I request with the Type II request. SMC

23.88.020.C.3.c. However, the requester must state “with specificity: 1) How the

Director’s construction or application of the specified code sections is in error; and

2) How the requester believes those sections should be construed or applied.” Id.

       On May 12, 2021, Historic Waterfront filed its appeal with the Examiner. Historic

Waterfront appealed “the April 29, 2021 decision to approve the Master Use Permit

application” and the “forthcoming code interpretation that has been requested from the

Director.” AR at 4. On the same day, Historic Waterfront also made an interpretation

request to the Director. On June 11, the Director found that Historic Waterfront had

failed to specify which provision of chapter 23 SMC or chapter 25 SMC it sought an

interpretation of and denied the interpretation request.

       An interpretation request is not required before judicial review of the Director’s

decision becomes available. SMC 23.88.020.A. However, should the Director issue an

interpretation related to a Type I decision, then the Director’s interpretation may be

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appealed to the Examiner along with any Type II decisions. Id. Accordingly, if the

Director refuses to issue an interpretation then that decision is final and unappealable to

the Examiner. SMC 23.88.020.A. On June 11, the Director declined to issue Historic

Waterfront’s Type I interpretation request. Therefore, the Type I decision was not

subject to review by the Examiner.

       In promoting a single review process before the Examiner, Historic Waterfront

contends that all land use issues, including whether permitting is required, fall under the

MUP. Historic Waterfront argues that requiring Type I decisions to be immediately

appealable under the LUPA would inundate the courts with appeals. Historic Waterfront

advocates for the LUPA’s 21-day appeal period to apply to all permitting issues and to

commence upon entry of the Examiner’s decision.

       Although a single review process may prevent piecemeal litigation, such a holding

would run contrary to the LUPA’s and the SMC’s expedited review. SMC 23.76.002;

Habitat Watch, 155 Wn.2d at 406-07. A stated purpose of chapter 23.76 SMC is to

“minimize delays and expense in appeals of land use decisions.” SMC 23.76.002.

Similarly, the LUPA was enacted, in part, to ensure timely judicial review and “to

prevent parties from delaying judicial review.” Habitat Watch, 155 Wn.2d at 406.

       Under the LUPA, a land use decision is issued by either “a local jurisdiction’s

body or officer with the highest level of authority to make the determination.” RCW

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36.70C.020(2) (emphasis added). RCW 36.70C.020(2) extends the definition of “final

determination” to those with authority to hear appeals. SMC 23.76.004.B is rigid,

preventing Type I decisions made by the Director from being subject to appeal to the

Examiner. Absent the issuance of an interpretation by the Director, the Examiner lacked

jurisdiction over the Type I decision. Consequently, the Director was the officer with the

highest level of authority to make the Type I decision.

       On June 3, 2022, nearly three years after the SDCI’s decision that the Project was

not subject to shoreline permitting, the superior court dismissed Historic Waterfront’s

LUPA petition related to the SMP issue. Seeking judicial review of a Type I decision

years after the SDCI’s decision is contrary to chapter 36.70C RCW’s and chapter 23.76

SMC’s directive to minimize delay.

       On April 29, 2021, the SDCI issued AMLI its MUP, again providing notice that

the Project was not subject to the SMP. The MUP prompted Historic Waterfront to

request an interpretation from the Director. On June 11, the Director declined Historic

Waterfront’s interpretation request due to its failure to comply with SMC 23.88.020.A.

Because the Director refrained from issuing an interpretation, the Type I decision was

final as it was not subject to administrative appeal.

       On September 24, the Examiner issued his decision upholding the Director’s

issuance of the MUP. The only issue before the Examiner was the Director’s decision on

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the design review. Historic Waterfront filed its LUPA petition on October 13, within 21

days of the Examiner’s decision upholding the issuance of the Director’s approval of the

design review. However, the petition was filed more than 21 days after the SDCI’s

decision on the SMP (September 19, 2019), the Director’s issuance of the MUP

(April 29, 2021), and the Director’s declination of the interpretation request (June 11,

2021).

         Although Historic Waterfront timely filed its LUPA petition in relation to the

Examiner’s decision, its petition for review of the Type I decision was untimely.

         II. DISCOVERY AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD

         Historic Waterfront argues that, if we reverse the superior court’s order that

dismissed its SMP issue, we should grant it the opportunity to engage in further discovery

and to supplement the record.

         The superior court denied Historic Waterfront’s motion to allow further discovery

and to supplement the record, finding the issue was moot. An issue is moot when a court

can no longer provide effective relief. In re Marriage of Homer, 151 Wn.2d 884, 891, 93

P.3d 124 (2004) (citing Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793

(1984)). Customarily, an appeal should be dismissed “‘where only moot questions or

abstract propositions are involved.’” In re Dependency of H., 71 Wn. App. 524, 527, 859

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P.2d 1258 (1993) (quoting Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wn.2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d

512 (1972)).

       Because Historic Waterfront’s appeal of its SMP issue was untimely, as discussed

above, allowing further discovery and supplementation of the record are rendered moot.

       REQUEST FOR REMAND FOR A LAND USE INTERPRETATION

       Alternatively, Historic Waterfront argues the SMP issue be remanded to the

Director with instructions to issue an interpretation. This contention is grounded in

Historic Waterfront’s assertion that the Director erred in failing to issue an interpretation.

       The LUPA permits review of land use decisions. Durland, 182 Wn.2d at 64.

Under RCW 36.70C.020(2)(b), a land use decision shall include a final determination by

a local jurisdictional body or the highest level officer capable of making decisions on

decisions such as an interpretative decision regarding specific development of a property.

Absent an avenue of administrative appeal, the highest level official’s decision is a final

determination subject to review under the LUPA.

       The Director was the local jurisdictional body capable of issuing an interpretation.

Historic Waterfront filed its LUPA petition challenging his decision on October 12, 2021,

more than 21 days after the Director’s decision. As discussed above, Historic Waterfront

failed to timely appeal the Type I decision.

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       Historic Waterfront argues the Examiner’s decision on design review must be

reversed because the Examiner failed to enter adequate findings to support his decision,

applied the incorrect standard of review, misapplied the clearly erroneous standard of

review, and because the Project’s design lacks compliance with the Guidelines. We

address each contention in turn.

       III.   DESIGN REVIEW GUIDELINES

       When reviewing a LUPA petition, this court sits in the same position as the

superior court. Ellensburg Cement Prod., Inc. v. Kittitas County, 179 Wn.2d 737, 742,

317 P.3d 1037 (2014). “Under LUPA a court may grant relief from a local land use

decision only if the party seeking relief has carried the burden of establishing that one of

six standards listed in RCW 36.70C.130(1) has been met.” Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass’n

v. Chelan County, 141 Wn.2d 169, 175, 4 P.3d 123 (2000). Historic Waterfront seeks

relief under RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b), (c), and (d) without referencing the standard of

review that ought to be applied to the various design review issues.

       RCW 36.70C.130(1)(b) allows relief if “[t]he land use decision is an erroneous

interpretation of the law, after allowing for such deference as is due the construction of a

law by a local jurisdiction with expertise.” The erroneous interpretation standard is a

question of law reviewed de novo. Phoenix Dev., Inc. v. City of Woodinville, 171 Wn.2d

820, 828, 256 P.3d 1150 (2011). Under the statute, deference is owed to the local entity’s

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expertise. Ellensburg Cement Prod., 179 Wn.2d at 753. However, “a local entity’s

interpretation of an ambiguous local [statute] may be rejected.” Id. A local entity

“‘bears the burden to show its interpretation was a matter of preexisting policy.’” Id.

(quoting Sleasman v. City of Lacey, 159 Wn.2d 639, 647, 151 P.3d 990 (2007)).

       RCW 36.70C.130(1)(c) allows relief if “[t]he land use decision is not supported by

evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.”

Under the substantial evidence standard there must be a “sufficient quantum of evidence

in the record to persuade a reasonable person that the declared premise is true.”

Wenatchee Sportsmen Ass’n, 141 Wn.2d at 176 (citing Wilson v. Emp. Sec. Dep’t, 87

Wn. App. 197, 200-01, 940 P.2d 269 (1997)). “When reviewing a challenge . . . under

subsection (c), we view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party that

prevailed in the highest forum exercising fact-finding authority.” Phoenix Dev., 171

Wn.2d at 828-29.

       RCW 36.70C.130(1)(d) allows relief if “the land use decision is a clearly

erroneous application of the law to the facts.” If, after applying the facts to the law, the

court is left with a definite firm conviction that a mistake has been committed then

reversal is permitted. Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston County, 131 Wn. App. 756,

768, 129 P.3d 300 (2006). When applying the facts to the law, we defer to factual

determinations made by the highest forum below that exercised fact-finding authority. Id.

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       A. ADEQUACY OF THE EXAMINER’S FINDINGS OF FACT

       Historic Waterfront argues the Examiner failed to enter findings adequate to

support his decision. Without adequate findings, Historic Waterfront claims this court is

unable to determine the basis on which the Examiner decided the issues.

       Historic Waterfront cites Weyerhaeuser v. Pierce County, 124 Wn.2d 26, 873 P.2d

498 (1994), and In re Welfare of Woods, 20 Wn. App. 515, 581 P.2d 587 (1978), to

support its contention that the Examiner was required to enter findings delineating what

aspects of each witness’s testimony he found persuasive and why. In part, the

Weyerhaeuser court held that the purpose of entering adequate findings is to allow the

appellate court to be fully informed as to the basis for the decision-maker’s conclusions.

Weyerhaeuser, 124 Wn.2d at 35. Similarly, the Woods court held that adequate findings

are necessary for judicial review. Woods, 20 Wn. App. at 516. However, neither

Weyerhaeuser nor Woods specifically held that the trier of fact was required to explicitly

state what aspect of one witness’s testimony it found more credible than a competing

witness’s testimony.

       Unlike the Examiner’s findings of fact, in Weyerhaeuser the hearing examiner’s

findings were insufficient to explain how he reached his conclusions. Weyerhaeuser, 124

Wn.2d at 36. As later noted by our Supreme Court, “Weyerhaeuser was an extreme case

of noncompliance.” Citizens All. to Protect Our Wetlands v. City of Auburn, 126 Wn.2d

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Seattle Historic Waterfront Ass’n, et al. v. AMLI Residential, et al.

356, 369, 894 P.2d 1300 (1995). By contrast, when a decision-maker’s findings provide

an analysis on each issue, the findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient for

appellate review. Id.

       Historic Waterfront lacks authority supporting its assertion that the Examiner was

required to articulate the basis for finding the testimony of one expert witness more

persuasive than another’s. Moreover, “[w]e defer to the hearing examiner’s assessment

of the ‘credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given reasonable but competing

inferences.’” Friends of Cedar Park Neigh. v. City of Seattle, 156 Wn. App. 633, 641-

42, 234 P.3d 214 (2010) (quoting State ex rel. Lige & Wm. B. Dickson Co. v. Pierce

County, 65 Wn. App. 614, 618, 829 P.2d 217 (1992)). Consequently, the Examiner

possessed the latitude to decide the persuasiveness of Mr. Adams’s testimony against Mr.

Hall’s and Mr. Hurley’s testimony.

       The record sufficiently enables us to determine the basis on which the Examiner

entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Examiner issued a seven-page,

single-spaced decision. In his decision, the Examiner recognized that the party appealing

the Director’s determination had the burden of proving the determination was clearly

erroneous. The Examiner noted the question before him was “not whether alternative

project designs would be preferable or are more aesthetically pleasing; . . . it is whether

the City erred in approving the design review for the Project.” AR at 252. The Examiner

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explained that competing opinions from different professionals do not amount to

affirmative evidence of error and that Historic Waterfront had failed to meet its burden of

demonstrating that the Project lacked fulfillment to the challenged Guidelines.

       B. THE EXAMINER APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Historic Waterfront asserts the Examiner incorrectly applied the clearly erroneous

standard of review rather than de novo review. Historic Waterfront contends that even

under the clearly erroneous standard, the Examiner failed to consider the entire record

and the public policy underlying the legislation.

       Historic Waterfront’s argument fails to recognize the difference between scope of

review and standard of review. SMC 23.76.022.C.6 provides, “Scope of Review.

Appeals [for Type II decisions] shall be considered de novo.” SMC 23.76.022.C.7 states,

“Standard of Review. The Director’s decisions made on a Type II Master Use Permit

shall be given substantial weight, except for determinations on variances, conditional

uses, and special exceptions, which shall be given no deference.”

       Frequently, “scope of review” and “standard of review” are used as synonyms, but

each possesses its own definition. “Scope of review” generally means the scope of

evidence that can be considered while “standard of review” describes the “intensity of

review applied to [the] decision.” Port of Seattle v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 151

Wn.2d 568, 595 n.7, 90 P.3d 659 (2004).

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       While the SMC is clear that the scope of review (the evidence a hearing examiner

had the power to consider) was de novo, the question of what standard of review to apply

lingers. SMC 23.76.022.C.7 requires a hearing examiner give substantial weight to the

director’s decisions. In Norway Hill, our Supreme Court held that the clearly erroneous

standard would allow a reviewing court to give substantial weight to an agency decision,

while allowing a reviewing court to still consider the public policy behind the legislative

act at issue. 87 Wn.2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).

       Historic Waterfront contends Norway Hill should not be read to equate substantial

weight with the clearly erroneous standard, but rather it should be read to view

substantial weight in the context of a larger assessment of whether the decision was

clearly erroneous. Historic Waterfront relies on Moss v. City of Bellingham, 109 Wn.

App. 6, 19, 31 P.3d 703 (2001), to support its interpretation of Norway Hill. However,

Moss does not stand for the proposition that substantial weight does not equate to the

clearly erroneous standard of review. Rather, the issue in Moss was whether an

environmental impact survey was necessary. The Moss court recognized the clearly

erroneous standard was appropriate for review because it provides substantial weight to

the agency decision. Id. The substantial weight requirement under Norway Hill compels

us to review SDCI’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard. Clallam County

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Citizens for Safe Drinking Water v. City of Port Angeles, 137 Wn. App. 214, 224-25, 151

P.3d 1079 (2007).

       The public policy of design review is to “[e]ncourage better design and site

planning to help ensure that new development enhances the character of the city and

sensitively fits into the neighborhoods, while allowing for diversity and creativity.”

SMC 23.41.002.A. The Examiner acknowledged this public policy when discussing the

applicable law in his findings. Further, the Examiner found that the DRB considered the

policy issues, recommended the Project be approved, and the Director approved the

Project based on this recommendation. The Examiner gave proper deference to the

Director’s decision when he found that Historic Waterfront offered no affirmative

evidence showing error on the part of the Director.

       SMC 23.76.022.C.7’s directive that substantial weight be given to the Director’s

decision indicates that the standard of review is the clearly erroneous standard. The

Examiner applied the correct standard of review when he considered the entirety of the

record and the public policy underlying the legislative act before concluding that the

Director’s decision was not clearly erroneous.

       C. THE EXAMINER’S DECISION COMPLIES WITH THE DESIGN GUIDELINES

       Historic Waterfront contends the Examiner’s decision on design review should be

reversed because the Project’s design lacks compliance with Guidelines A-2, B-2, B-3,

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and B-4. As it relates to each of the challenged Guidelines, Historic Waterfront argues

the Examiner’s findings do not support his conclusions and that Mr. Adams’s testimony

should have been afforded greater weight.

       Guideline A-2 promotes design that enhances visual interest and variety in

downtown Seattle’s skyline. Guideline B-2 fosters design that creates a transition in bulk

and scale. Guideline B-3 encourages design that reinforces the positive urban form and

architectural attributes of the immediate area. Guideline B-4 focuses on architectural

expression as it relates to neighborhood context.

       On review, Historic Waterfront fails to disclose the standard of review that ought

to be employed. Presumably, given that the crux of its argument is that the facts were not

properly applied to the law, it is seeking review under the clearly erroneous standard.

When applying the clearly erroneous test under RCW 36.70C.130(1)(d), the facts are

applied to the law. Cingular Wireless, 131 Wn. App. at 768. If the court is left with a

definite firm conviction that, after applying the facts to the law, a mistake has been

committed then reversal is permitted. Id. When applying the facts to the law, the court

shall defer to factual determinations made by the highest forum below that exercised fact-

finding authority. Id. The Examiner was the highest forum that exercised fact-finding

authority. As noted earlier, we grant deference to the Examiner’s determination of

credibility.

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       Here, the Examiner recognized there was nothing in the record to suggest that Mr.

Adams’s testimony “should be . . . given greater credence than the Applicant and City’s

witnesses.” AR at 253. After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the Examiner

found that, although Mr. Adams presented alternative designs for the Project, he failed to

establish that the current design of the building violated the Guidelines. Id.

Consequently, the Examiner found Mr. Adams’s testimony unpersuasive. Id.

       Moreover, an examination of the record reveals AMLI was proactively following

the DRB’s recommendations on Guidelines A-2, B-2, B-3, and B-4. Mr. Hall testified

the Project gained compliance with Guideline A-2 through, among other alterations,

differing tower elevations, setbacks, and the location of mechanical equipment. Mr. Hall

testified about compliance with Guidelines B-2 and B-3 through adjustment of the scale

and setbacks of the building, the color of the glass, the color of the mullions, the color of

the metal panels, and finish patterns. Concerning Guideline B-4, AMLI addressed the

DRB’s concerns by proposing changes to the massing of the roof, transitions from north

to south towers, revising tower elevations, adjusting the parking level, and by adding a

perforated metal screen at the parking level.2

       2
        Many of the same design issues pointed out by the DRB in regard to the A-1
Guideline also applied to the B-4 Guideline.

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       Certainly Mr. Adams disagreed with AMLI’s proposed modifications, but his

objections to the Project being a “big three-dimensional box” fails to discount the other

architects’ testimony. CP at 430. The Examiner recognized that Mr. Adams

demonstrated that his opinion differed from the other architects’, but his statements

“offered no affirmative evidence showing clear error on the part of the Director.” AR at

253. Historic Waterfront’s argument boils down to a disagreement with the Examiner’s

credibility determinations. Historic Waterfront may disagree with the Examiner’s

credibility determinations, or the weight it afforded to the testimony of competing

witnesses, but that does not render such determinations error. We will not reweigh the

evidence to reach a different conclusion. The Examiner properly applied the facts to the

law. The Examiner’s decision was not clearly erroneous.

       IV. ATTORNEY FEES

       AMLI requests an award of attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.84.370. RCW

4.84.370 mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party, provided the

prevailing party on appeal was the prevailing party before the city and in all prior judicial

proceedings. A prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees only if they successfully

defend the decision in at least two courts. Durland, 182 Wn.2d at 77. A private party

does not have to prevail solely on the merits to be awarded attorney fees. Id. at 77-78.

Rather, a party may prevail on any issue, jurisdictional or otherwise. Id. at 78.

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       A different test applies to public entities. A public entity shall be awarded

attorney fees if its decision is upheld in superior court an on appeal. RCW 4.84.370(2).

This rule implies that the public entity’s decision is upheld on the merits. Durland, 182

Wn.2d at 78. Here, AMLI and the City are the prevailing parties on appeal. AMLI

prevailed on both a jurisdictional issue and on the merits, and the City prevailed on the

merits. Consequently, both are awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs.

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

Staab, J.

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