Court Opinion

ID: 9712197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:48:41.691465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.760439
License: Public Domain

*993EAKIN, Judge,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 I must dissent from the appealing analysis of my colleagues. While the casos cited are compelling at first blush, the situation here was different and in my judgment warrants a different result.
¶ 2 The prosecution did not bring out information about appellant’s refusal to supply an address. This came to light on cross-examination of the officer by appellant’s counsel,3 as testimony of appellant telling an officer he would not provide, an address during booking. It did not come in as a reference to appellant’s silence. It was brought up by the defense before the witness Malloy took the stand. Once in evidence, it is no longer “post-arrest silence” that everyone must pretend did not occur.
¶ 8 That is, the defense evidence established that appellant affirmatively refused to provide an address. After establishing that refusal, the defense put on a witness who said he really did have an address, very close by. Can the prosecution challenge that witness’ credibility with the pri- or evidence brought out by the defense, that appellant said he had no address, much less this address? I think so, and find no error, much less one of constitutional magnitude, in the limited reference made here.4
¶4 I find the scenario here different than the cases cited, because the defense brought in the affirmative refusal to provide routine information, which is not silence. Because its very limited exposure to the jury was in the legitimate attempt to challenge the credibility of the alibi witness, I see no error in the questioning.
¶ 5 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. The officer testified "he said he didn’t have” or "wasn’t giving" an address. In the light most favorable to the verdict winner, I must conclude appellant told police he would provide no address; in such a light, the conclusion he said nothing is at best interpretive and speculative.

. The majority implies this "back door” tactic is the next thing to allowing suppressed evidence to impugn the defense. Suppressed evidence can be used in certain circumstances, as where the defense itself brings it up, denies its existence, or testifies contrary to a suppressed confession. The same reasoning applies here: once the defense introduces something, excludable or not, it can no longer complain of its further explanation and use. If a back door, it is a door opened by appellant.