Court Opinion

ID: 9920878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:02:31.74162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:38.543750
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Meza CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085771
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. SC063320A)
                    v.

    ALICIA ROSINA MEZA,                                                                   OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany
Organ-Bowles, Judge.
         Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Jennifer M.
Poe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and DeSantos, J.
                                      INTRODUCTION
         In 1996, a jury convicted petitioner Alicia Rosina Meza of the first degree murder
of Isidro Soto Cardinas (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a), count 1).2 On count 1, the jury
found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder while engaged
in the commission or attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i))
and that she personally used a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of the
offense (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). For this offense, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a
term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. (People v. Meza (Oct. 30, 1997,
F025822) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza I).)
         In 2019, petitioner filed her first petition for resentencing on her murder
conviction pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).3 The trial court
summarily denied this petition without providing a statement of reasons. On May 6,
2022, this court affirmed the denial and “conclude[d] petitioner cannot demonstrate
prejudice because the special circumstance finding [(§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i))]
establishe[d] she is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.” (People v. Meza
(May 6, 2022, F081612) [nonpub. opn.] (Meza II).)4
         On September 21, 2022, after this court issued remittitur in Meza II, petitioner
filed a second petition for resentencing in response to our Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong). In Strong, our Supreme Court held a

1        All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2        Petitioner was convicted of additional offenses and enhancements, as described
below.
3     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the current section 1172.6 in this
opinion.
4     On May 25, 2023, this court took judicial notice of the record on appeal in
Meza II, supra, F081612.

                                               2.
pre-Banks/Clark5 felony-murder special circumstance finding does not render a
section 1172.6 petitioner ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Id. at p. 721.)
Subsequently, the trial court summarily denied the second petition at the prima facie
stage.
         On appeal, petitioner contends that because of Strong, she has established a prima
facie case for entitlement of relief because the special circumstance finding cannot
establish her ineligibility for resentencing as a matter of law because her conviction
predates Banks/Clark. Therefore, she argues she has established a prima facie case for
relief under section 1172.6 entitling her to an evidentiary hearing.
         We conclude that based on Strong and our Supreme Court’s recent decision in
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), we must vacate the trial court’s order
and remand the matter for the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d).6

5        People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.
6       Petitioner further contends she should not be precluded from filing a “successor
petition citing new authority” and that the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) finding did not
preclude relief under section 1172.6. The People concede that the “Strong holding is a
significant intervening change in the law which provides an exception to issue
preclusion” (see People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 951 [“ ‘Because of the
change in the applicable law … the petition is not subject to the procedural bar of
successiveness’ ”], and that the “jury finding on the firearm enhancement under section
12022.5, subdivision (a) does not preclude a prima facie finding under section 1172.6.”
We accept the People’s concessions and do not address these additional contentions in
this appeal.

                                              3.
                           PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND7
       On July 27, 1995, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information charging
petitioner with the first degree murder of Cardinas (§ 187, subd. (a), count 1), with the
special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder while engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i)) and a
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and two counts of robbery (§ 212.5,
subd. (c), count 2 (Alfredo) & count 3 (Fermin)).
       On January 22, 1996, a jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a), count 1), two counts of robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c), counts 2 & 3) and found
true the robbery special circumstance and firearm enhancement. As to count 1, the trial
court sentenced petitioner to a term of life without the possibility of parole, with a
four-year term for the firearm enhancement. On count 2, the court sentenced petitioner to
the middle term of three years to be served consecutive to count 1. On count 3, the court
sentenced petitioner to the middle term of three years to be served consecutive to count 2,
with all but one year stayed until successful completion of counts 1 and 2.
       In her direct appeal in Meza I, petitioner argued there was insufficient evidence to
support the robbery special circumstance because the evidence did not show the murder
was committed to carry out or advance the commission of the robbery. (Meza I, supra,
F025822.) This court disagreed and concluded:

              “The evidence was such that a rational trier of fact could have found
       that [petitioner] murdered Cardinas to prevent him from escaping and going
       for help, the arrival of which could have thwarted the robbery.
       Accordingly, the evidence sufficiently showed that the robbery was not
       merely incidental to the murder, but that the murder was performed to
       advance the commission of the robbery. The requirements of section 190.2,

7      The facts from our prior nonpublished opinion in petitioner’s direct appeal
(Meza I, supra, F025822) are irrelevant for resolving the issues presented in this appeal.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see generally People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974,
987–988.) Therefore, we do not include a statement of facts in this appeal.

                                              4.
       subdivision (a)(17) … have thus been met and the special circumstance
       finding is valid.” (Meza I, supra, F025822, fn. omitted.)
       On June 24, 2019, petitioner, in propria persona, filed her first petition for
resentencing on her murder conviction pursuant to section 1172.6. In the form petition,
petitioner stated a complaint, information, or indictment was filed against her that
allowed her to be prosecuted under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine; she was convicted of first or second degree murder
at trial; and she could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of
changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. She also requested the
court appoint counsel during the resentencing process. Petitioner did not check the boxes
stating that she was not the actual killer; she did not, with the intent to kill, aid, abet,
counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree; or that she was not a major participant in the felony or did not
act with reckless indifference to human life during the course of the crime or felony.
Lastly, petitioner did not check the box stating the murder victim was not a peace officer
in the performance of his or her duties. (Meza II, supra, F081612.)
       On June 28, 2019, the trial court appointed counsel to represent petitioner. The
People then filed a response, arguing the petition should be dismissed based on the
unconstitutionality of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437).
Petitioner, through appointed counsel, filed a reply. The court denied the People’s
motion to dismiss based on the unconstitutionality of Senate Bill 1437. The People then
filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing the jury found petitioner was the actual
killer and that she was a major participant acting with reckless disregard for human life,
thereby establishing petitioner’s ineligibility for resentencing relief. Petitioner submitted
on the declarations made in her petition. On August 10, 2020, the court denied
petitioner’s petition for section 1172.6 resentencing without providing a statement of
reasons. (Meza II, supra, F081612.)

                                                5.
       A timely appeal followed. On November 18, 2020, appellate counsel filed a
Wende8 brief that summarized the facts of the case, raised no issues, and asked this court
to independently review the record. In an unpublished decision, we independently
reviewed the record and concluded that no reasonable arguable factual or legal issues
existed, and therefore, we affirmed the trial court’s denial of the petition for resentencing.
(Meza II, supra, F081612.)
       On September 21, 2022, after Strong was decided, petitioner, in propria persona,
filed a second petition for resentencing on her murder conviction pursuant to
section 1172.6. In the form petition, petitioner stated a complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against her that allowed her to be prosecuted under a theory of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; she was
convicted of first or second degree murder at trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial; she could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019; and she requested the trial court
appoint counsel during the resentencing process.
       On September 29, 2022, the trial court reappointed counsel to represent petitioner.
No further motions were filed by appointed counsel or the People. On February 15,
2023, after both parties submitted on their previous motions, the court denied the second
petition for section 1172.6 resentencing. Specifically, the court stated the following:

              “At this time the [c]ourt does deny the petition pursuant to
       [section] 1172.6. This case is a bit unique in that it has actually gone up on
       appeal before, and the appeal affirmed the lower [c]ourt’s ruling. It also
       contemplated the new change in law, the change from [former
       section] 1170.95 to [section] 1172.6 and, yet again, affirmed that the denial
       of the petition was proper. At this time I concur with the appellate [c]ourt
       and deny the petition.”
       A timely appeal followed.

8      People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.

                                              6.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law
       Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187,
subd. (a).) “Under the felony-murder doctrine as it existed at the time of [petitioner’s]
trial, ‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed] someone during the commission, or
attempted commission, of an inherently dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found
guilty of the crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill, or even implied
malice, but merely an intent to commit the underlying felony.’ [Citation.] Murders
occurring during certain violent or serious felonies were of the first degree, while all
others were of the second degree.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 704.)
       The Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder
liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) “As amended by
Senate Bill [1437], the text of section 189 provides no additional or heighted mental state
requirement for the ‘actual killer’ prosecuted under a felony-murder theory; it requires
only that ‘[t]he person was the actual killer.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 956, 967.) “In our view, the Legislature’s purpose in revising the law as
it relates to felony-murder liability was to ensure proportionate punishment for
accomplices in the felony-murder context, and that the term ‘actual killer’ is meant to
distinguish the person who actually caused the victim’s death, including in circumstances
where two or more persons participated in the felony.” (Id. at p. 968.)
       “Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedural mechanism for those convicted of
murder under prior law to seek retroactive relief. [Citations.] Under section 1172.6, the
process begins with the filing of a petition declaring that ‘[t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to

                                              7.
[s]ection 188 or 189’ made by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] The trial court then reviews
the petition to determine whether a prima facie showing has been made that the petitioner
is entitled to relief. [Citations.] ‘If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the
petition. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869, fn. omitted.)
       “At the prima facie stage, a court must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that
he or she could not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019, unless the allegation is refuted by
the record. [Citation.] And this allegation is not refuted by the record unless the record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense. If only one element of the offense
is established by the record, the petitioner could still be correct that he or she could not
currently be convicted of the relevant offense based on the absence of other elements.”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463, italics omitted.)
       “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie
inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential
merit from those that are clearly meritless.… [¶] While the trial court may look at the
record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to determine whether a petitioner
has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry under
subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.” ’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

                                               8.
(Lewis).) “The jury instructions are part of the record of conviction and may be reviewed
to make the prima facie determination.” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193,
1200.)
         We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima
facie stage. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez).)
II.      Analysis
         Petitioner contends she has established a prima facie case for entitlement of relief
because the robbery special circumstance finding cannot establish her ineligibility for
section 1172.6 resentencing relief as a matter of law.
         In Strong, our Supreme Court articulated that a pre-Banks and Clark special
circumstance finding does not negate the showing a petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder due to changes to sections 188 or 189 “because
the finding alone does not establish that the petitioner is in a class of defendants who
would still be viewed as liable for murder under the current understanding of the major
participant and reckless indifference requirements.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 718.)
However, “Senate Bill 1437 relief is unavailable if the defendant was either the actual
killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life .…’ ” (Id. at p. 710, italics added.)
         The People contend petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law because “the record of conviction establishes that [petitioner] was convicted as the
actual killer.” In support of this contention, the People direct this court to both the jury
instructions and the trial testimony provided in the record. Irrespective of the underlying
facts of this case, which we do not consider (see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974 [“[A]t
the prima facie stage, … the court should not make credibility determinations or engage
in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion’ ”]), the
People argue “[t]he jury was instructed on first and second degree murder [citations], first
degree felony-murder [citation], special circumstance murder [citation], and robbery

                                               9.
[and] [t]he only theory presented by the prosecutor was that [petitioner] shot Cardinas
during the commission of the robbery and was therefore guilty of first degree
felony-murder.” Therefore, “the record of conviction establishes that [petitioner] was the
undisputed sole perpetrator of the murder, foreclosing relief on her second petition for
resentencing.” From the record, we find it difficult to perceive petitioner was not the
actual killer. Nonetheless, the current state of statutory interpretation of sections 188,
189, and 1172.6 leads us to conclude petitioner must be accorded an evidentiary hearing.
       Here, while the jury found true the robbery special circumstance allegation, the
jury instructions permitted a true finding on the special circumstance under the now
invalid felony-murder doctrine. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471 [“[U]nder the jury
instructions here, the findings the jury must have made are insufficient to conclusively
establish that [petitioner] is liable for murder under current law”].) For example, in
Lopez, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, dealt with a similar factual scenario:

       “[The] [d]efendant was prosecuted solely under the theory he was the actual
       killer and committed the robbery alone. The jury was not instructed on
       accomplice liability, aider and abettor liability, or on liability under the
       theory [the] defendant counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
       requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the
       first degree or robbery. The jury was not instructed on liability by virtue of
       [the] defendant having been a major participant in the underlying felony.
       The instructions for felony murder [citation] and robbery-murder special
       circumstance [citation] had been modified to eliminate all theories of
       liability other than [the] defendant having committed robbery. Those
       instructions had been modified to tell the jury the prosecution had to prove
       ‘[t]he defendant committed robbery’ … which is the language
       recommended by the bench notes to CALCRIM No. 730 if the
       prosecution’s theory is the defendant committed the underlying felony.
       [Citation.] The prosecutor argued in closing that [the] defendant was the
       actual killer and committed the robbery. The prosecutor argued, ‘[N]ot
       only did this man, [the defendant], take [the victim]’s life, he took his
       wallet and he took his wife’s jewelry.’ [¶] … [¶]

       “The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 540A that to find [the]
       defendant guilty of felony murder, it had to find he committed robbery and

                                             10.
       ‘[w]hile committing robbery, the defendant caused the death of another
       person.…’ The jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 730 that to find
       the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation to be true, the jury had
       to find [the] defendant ‘did an act that caused the death of another
       person.…’ On the subject of causation, the trial court instructed the jury as
       follows: ‘An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and
       probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened
       without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a
       reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
       intervenes.’

       “Thus, by returning guilty verdicts and a true finding on the
       robbery-murder special circumstance, the jury necessarily found that [the]
       defendant ‘caused the death of another person’ and ‘did an act that caused
       the death of another person.’ The jury necessarily found that the victim’s
       death was the direct, natural, and probable consequence of [the] defendant’s
       act and the death would not have happened without the act.” (Lopez, supra,
       78 Cal.App.5th at pp. 15–16, italics omitted.)
       Although the “jury necessarily found that [the] defendant ‘caused the death of
another person’ and ‘did an act that caused the death of another person’ ” (Lopez, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 16), the court concluded that “[t]he record of conviction … does not
permit us to say as a matter of law the jury found [the] defendant personally killed the
victim.” (Id. at p. 19.) The court reasoned “[t]he jury instructions created the possibility
the jury convicted [the] defendant of felony murder and found to be true the
robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation without finding him to have been the
actual killer.” (Id. at p. 20.) Specifically, “[t]he jury was not instructed it had to find
[the] defendant personally killed the victim to convict him; the jury was instructed it only
had to find [the] defendant committed an act that caused the victim’s death.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘[T]he jury could have taken a realistic view of the prosecution’s circumstantial
evidence and determined beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] was involved in
the robbery that resulted in the death, but that [the defendant] may or may not have been
the actual killer.’ ” (Ibid.)

                                              11.
       This case is analogous to Lopez. Here, the trial court instructed the jury on murder
(CALJIC No. 8.10), as well as first degree felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21). Further,
the jury was instructed regarding aider and abettor liability (CALJIC No. 3.01). As to
first degree felony murder, the jury was instructed that “[t]he unlawful killing of a human
being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the
commission of or attempted commission of the crime of robbery is murder of the first
degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. That is, to
commit the crime of robbery.” (Italics added.) With respect to the special circumstance
instruction, the court instructed the jury as follows:

              “To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these
       instructions as murder in the commission of [r]obbery, is true, it must be
       proved:

               “1a. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged
       in the commission or attempted commission of a [r]obbery; or

             “1b. The murder was committed during the immediate flight after
       the commission or attempted commission of a [r]obbery to which the
       defendant was an accomplice; and

              “2. The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the
       commission of the crime of [r]obbery or to facilitate the escape therefrom
       or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to
       in these instructions is not established if the [r]obbery was merely
       incidental to the commission of the murder.”
       As to each of these instructions, the jury was permitted to find the special
circumstance true even if it concluded petitioner was not the actual killer. “The jury
instructions created the possibility the jury convicted [petitioner] of felony murder and
found to be true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation without finding [her]
to have been the actual killer.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.) To find the
special circumstance true, the jury was only required to conclude “the murder was
committed while [petitioner] was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of

                                             12.
a [r]obbery” or “the murder was committed during the immediate flight after the
commission or attempted commission of a [r]obbery to which [petitioner] was an
accomplice[.]” Nothing in this instruction required the jury to find petitioner was the
actual killer, but rather permitted the jury to find petitioner guilty of special circumstance
murder if it concluded a killing occurred as a result of her aiding and abetting in the
robbery9 (i.e., the old felony-murder rule).
       The prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments support this conclusion.
Although the prosecutor’s primary theory was that petitioner shot the victim in the
back,10 he also instructed the jury it could convict petitioner if the victim died during the
commission or attempted commission of the robbery, regardless of whether petitioner
was the actual killer. Specifically, he argued the following:

9     As noted above, a petitioner is also ineligible for section 1172.6 resentencing relief
as a matter of law if it is determined the petitioner “aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission
of murder in the first degree” (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)). However, the prosecutor never
argued petitioner aided and abetted murder, but rather argued she “aid[ed] and abett[ed]
the commission of that robbery.”
10   For example, the prosecutor argued the following in his closing and rebuttal
arguments:
            “[Petitioner] shoots and kills him, shoots him in the back.
       [¶] … [¶]
               “And whether [petitioner] pointed the gun and fired it intentionally
       or just pulled the gun out and holding it level … fired it and killed
       [Cardinas] makes no difference, either one of those is the felony murder
       rule because he dies during the commission of that robbery. [¶] … [¶]
             “I don’t know if [petitioner] intended to pull the trigger or not, but it
       doesn’t make any difference, [petitioner] killed somebody. [¶] … [¶]
              “Well, you’ve got to stop and ask yourself who was in the best
       position to know from the position of where the gun was fired. Person
       holding the gun, looking down the barrel at the target that got shot would
       know. And that person was [petitioner].”

                                               13.
              “I submit that if you find that [the robbery victim] was being robbed,
       and that’s what the evidence supports, what you—then automatically what
       follows from that is you have to find that [Cardinas] died during the
       commission of that robbery while he was trying to assist [the robbery
       victim]. That’s the felony murder rule, that’s why it is a first degree
       murder. It automatically follows that that is a killing during the
       commission of a felony under the special circumstance rule. [¶] … [¶]

       “Now, the first degree murder, if there was a robbery of [the robbery
       victim], if the robbery is still ongoing, then the death of [Cardinas] is a first
       degree murder.”
       Nonetheless, the People refer this court to numerous portions in the trial testimony
to support their contention petitioner was the actual killer. However, “[i]n order to
conclude [petitioner] is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, we would have to weigh
the evidence and find [petitioner] to have been the actual killer, which would be
impermissible at this [prima facie] stage.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.)
Although petitioner was likely the actual killer, the record of conviction does not
establish as a matter of law she was the actual killer.
       Accordingly, because these instructions did not require the jury to conclude
petitioner was the actual killer, but rather allowed it to find petitioner guilty if it
concluded a death occurred during the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery, the section 1172.6 petition satisfies the low threshold for a prima facie showing.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [Holding that the threshold for a prima facie case for
resentencing is “ ‘very low’ ”].) For these reasons, we conclude the trial court erred by
denying petitioner’s petition for resentencing without issuing an order to show cause.
“Our opinion should not be read as indicating whether or not the trial court should grant
[petitioner] resentencing relief. We make no comment on that issue: Exercising de novo
review, we conclude only that [petitioner] has met [her] low burden of making a prima
facie case for relief under section [1172.6].” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.)

                                               14.
                                     DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying the petition for resentencing under section 1172.6
is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions to the court to issue an order to show
cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                                           15.