Court Opinion

ID: 9838431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 14:08:04.93172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:25.249470
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kathleen Finsterbusch,                         :
                              Appellant        :
                                               :
               v.                              :   No. 970 C.D. 2021
                                               :
Pennsylvania Department of Health,             :   Submitted: April 22, 2022
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania                   :
and Douglas P. Koszalka                        :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                         FILED: September 6, 2023

               Kathleen Finsterbusch (Appellant) appeals from the final judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court) entered in favor of the
Pennsylvania Department of Health (Department), Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
and Douglas P. Koszalka (Koszalka) (collectively, Appellees) on May 5, 2021. Upon
review, we affirm.
                 I.     BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               This action stems from Appellant’s claim against the Department and
Koszalka, who was Appellant’s supervisor, for retaliation in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. Const. amend I, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act (PHRA)1 after she assisted her husband in his sex discrimination complaint against

      1
          Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963.
the Department. At issue in the retaliation claim was a written reprimand that
Appellant received from Koszalka nine months after her husband’s discrimination
claim for failure to answer and set up a voicemail on her Department-issued phone.
(Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 897a-98a.) After receiving this reprimand, Appellant
filed a complaint in the trial court against the Department asserting that the reprimand
was in retaliation for assisting her husband in his sex discrimination case. In the
complaint, Appellant argued that the retaliation violated Title VII, the First
Amendment, and the PHRA. (R.R. at 27a-37a.) The Department removed the matter
to federal court, but it was remanded to state court. (R.R. at 11a, 75a.) The matter
proceeded to a three-day jury trial.
   A. Pretrial Matters
             During jury voir dire, Appellant’s counsel, Cynthia Pollick, Esq.
(Attorney Pollick) asked two jury venire questions relevant to this appeal: (1) “Have
any of you, your family or close friends ever visited the website of thatfamily.com or
any of the site[s] created after the original? If so, please explain;” and (2) “Do any of
you know any Trozzolillos?” (R.R. at 47a.) The Department’s counsel, Deputy
Attorney General Karen Romano (Attorney Romano), objected to the first question
because when searching for thatfamily.com on the Internet, she found that it was
nonexistent. Id. Attorney Pollick explained that she was in divorce proceedings with
her husband, Anthony Trozzolillo, Esq. Id. Attorney Pollick suspected that Trozzolillo
was behind the website to “damage[ ] [her] reputation[,] [and] so she needed to ferret
out this information, unfortunately,” and that she was unsure of the subject of
thatfamily.com. Id. The trial court overruled Attorney Romano’s objection to the first
question, and because no objection was lodged to the question regarding the

                                           2
Trozzolillos, Attorney Pollick was permitted to ask both questions. (R.R. at 49a.) No
juror indicated they had visited the website or that they knew Attorney Trozzolillo. Id.
             Additionally, Attorney Pollick wanted to show the jury two documents:
(1) a letter she wrote to the trial court alleging that Attorney Romano “falsely certified”
the Department’s certificate of service when the Department moved for summary
judgment, and (2) the certificates of service themselves. (R.R. at 87a, 91a.) In the pre-
trial stage of the litigation, the Department moved for summary judgment and on the
certificate of service properly listed Attorney Pollick as Appellant’s counsel. (R.R. at
717a-18a.) When the Department filed a corrected motion for summary judgment, the
certificate of service listed Attorney Pollick as “Pro Se Plaintiff.” Id. Attorney Pollick
raised this error with the trial court, and Attorney Romano explained this was a “typo.”
(R.R. at 89a-90a, 717a-18a.) Attorney Romano objected to the relevance of these
documents, and the trial court found the issue to be irrelevant and precluded any
reference to the documents. (R.R. at 91a.)
   B. During the Trial
             During the trial, which took place from November 16, 2020, to November
18, 2020, jurors were socially distanced throughout the courtroom due to the COVID-
19 pandemic. Only four jurors were placed in the jury box and the remaining eight
jurors sat in the gallery. To accommodate the jurors’ arrangement, video screens were
placed throughout the courtroom so jurors could see witnesses more clearly, and both
sides agreed before the trial commenced that the jury would be distanced throughout
the courtroom. (R.R. at 474a, 483a-85a.)
             The first day of trial proceeded with four witnesses testifying, including
Appellant.    The second day of trial began with Appellant’s testimony. During
Appellant’s testimony, Attorney Pollick realized that Appellant was not being shown

                                             3
on the video screens for approximately two hours of her testimony. (R.R. at 365a.)
The trial court questioned the jury to see if it had viewed Appellant on the video
screens, and the jury stated it had not been able to see Appellant on the video screens
but could physically see her. (R.R. at 366a.) The jury indicated it could also hear
Appellant’s testimony. Id. Attorney Pollick noted her objection for the record. (R.R.
at 365a-67a.) The trial court asked if she was moving for a mistrial, and Attorney
Pollick answered, “No, no, no, no, no, no. I just want to have it so that it[’]s of record.”
(R.R. at 473a-75a.) The next day, Attorney Pollick moved for a mistrial because
without the video screens, the jurors could not “make out the visual . . . micro
expressions in [her client’s] face that” are part of making a credibility determination.
(R.R. at 481a.) The trial court determined that Appellant’s testimony was not viewable
on the video screens because it pertained to review of documentary evidence. (R.R. at
483a.) The trial court did not believe Appellant suffered any prejudice and, therefore,
denied her motion for a mistrial. (R.R. at 483a-84a.)
             At the conclusion of the trial, Attorney Pollick objected to Attorney
Romano’s proposed instructions on the adverse action element of the retaliation claim.
(R.R. at 497a.) Attorney Pollick argued that an adverse action did not need to rise to a
failure to hire, failure to promote, or termination; rather the adverse action only had to
dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in the protected activity. Id. Attorney
Pollick argued this was a different standard for a Title VII retaliation claim as opposed
to a Title VII discrimination claim. Id. The trial court concluded that Attorney
Romano’s instruction was the proper instruction and provided the instruction to the
jury. (R.R. at 643a-46a.) Appellant re-asserted her objection to the wording of the
instruction in the charging conference. (R.R. at 497a-98a, 981a.) The jury found that
the Department did not retaliate against Appellant under either Title VII or the First

                                             4
Amendment. (R.R. at 963a.) On November 18, 2020, the jury found for Appellees on
the retaliation claims under Title VII and the First Amendment. (Trial Court Pa.R.A.P.
1925 Opinion (1925 Op.) at 1.) The next day, on November 19, 2020, the trial court
found for Appellees on the PHRA claim. Id.
   C. Post-Trial
             On November 25, 2020, Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief.
(R.R. at 978a-85a.) On December 1, 2020, the trial court entered a briefing schedule
permitting Appellant 14 days after the trial transcript was completed to file a brief.
(R.R. at 972a-73a.) Attorney Pollick informed the trial court that due to the court
reporter’s health/workload, the trial transcript was still unavailable as of March 22,
2021. (R.R. at 15a.) On May 5, 2021, final judgment in favor of Appellees was entered
upon praecipe by Appellees pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b). (R.R. at 18a-19a.)
On May 21, 2021, Attorney Pollick was provided a copy of the trial transcript. (R.R.
at 967a.) On June 1, 2021, Appellant appealed the final judgment to the Superior Court
challenging the constitutionality of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b) as the Department filed its
praecipe for entry of final judgment in her case pursuant to that rule. (R.R. at 1a, 7a,
967a.) Upon request of the Department, the Superior Court transferred the appeal to
this Court on July 23, 2021. See Superior Court Order 7/23/21.
             Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the trial
court issued an opinion. In its opinion, the trial court does not discuss the issues with
the certificates of service or the constitutionality of Rule 227.4. (1925 Op. at 3-4.) The
trial court characterized the voir dire questions pertaining to Attorney Pollick as
“bizarre[ ].” Id. The trial court reaffirmed that Appellant was not prejudiced by her
testimony not appearing on the video screens. Id. at 3. Regarding the jury instruction
issue, the trial court determined Appellant’s claim to be in “vague, generalized, and

                                            5
conclusory terms” while the finalized jury instructions were “appropriate and
consistent with the applicable law.” Id. at 4.
                                            II.     ISSUES
               On appeal, Appellant presents four issues for review. First, Appellant
contends that she was prejudiced by Attorney Romano’s actions in listing Attorney
Pollick as “Pro Se Plaintiff” in the finalized certificate of service and by Attorney
Romano’s failure to object to the Trozzolillo jury voir dire question. Second, Appellant
argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a mistrial when Appellant’s
testimony failed to show on the video screens for the socially distanced jurors. Third,
Appellant argues the trial court erred by providing the jury with Attorney Romano’s
proposed instructions for the retaliation claim.                 Fourth, Appellant asserts her
constitutional rights were violated by the application of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b) when
final judgment was entered 120 days after Appellant’s post-trial motions but before the
final trial court transcript was made available to Appellant. Ultimately, Appellant
requests that this Court vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
                                        III.      DISCUSSION
   A. Prejudice2
           Appellant argues she was prejudiced by Attorney Romano objecting to the
“thatfamily.com” voir dire question and “intentionally” stating that Attorney Pollick
was the “Pro Se Plaintiff” on the finalized summary judgment certificate of service.
(Appellant’s Br. at 13.) From what the Court can surmise from Appellant’s brief, it
appears that she is arguing that she was deprived of a fair and impartial jury due to the
actions of Attorney Romano.

       2
        In an appeal seeking a new trial, “[t]he award of a new trial is proper only where a trial court
has committed an error of law or abuse of discretion which may have affected the verdict.” Boyle v.
Independent Lift Truck, Inc., 6 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa. 2010) (citing Department of General Services v.
United States Mineral Products Co., 956 A.2d 967, 970 (Pa. 2008)).

                                                   6
             Prejudice occurs when the error is fundamental and materially affects the
outcome of the trial where a different ruling would have happened but for the
fundamental error. Grove v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 218 A.3d 877, 888
(Pa. 2019). Irregularities or “harmless errors” during a trial do not rise to prejudice
without a clear showing that they materially altered the outcome of the case. Id.
“Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either . . . the error did not prejudice
the defendant[,] or the prejudice was de minimis.” Id. at 890 (citation omitted).
             Regarding prejudice, Appellant relies on two cases: United States v.
Sampson, 820 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D. Mass. 2011), and Long-Term Capital Holdings v.
United States, 2002 WL 31934139 (D. Conn. 2002), neither of which this Court finds
applicable to this case. Sampson involved a claim that a juror who was not excused
exhibited bias, and thus, is irrelevant primarily because Appellant has not identified a
juror who should have been excused due to bias. Appellant cites Long-Term Capital
in her brief and states “[a] party ‘may not use the privilege to prejudice his opponent’s
case or to disclose some selected communications for self-serving purpose.”’
(Appellant’s Br. at 13) (citing Long-Term Capital, slip op. at *6). Appellant misapplies
this quote which concerns how attorney-client privilege may be implicitly waived when
the privileged material is at the heart of the party’s claim in which case “fairness
requires examination of protected communications.” Id., slip op. at *6. Appellant also
cites to broad principles from the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, namely
knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal, 204 Pa. Code
Rule 3.3, and prohibiting, inter alia, the falsification of evidence or the unlawful
obstruction of another’s access to evidence, 204 Pa. Code Rule 3.4, and argues “[o]ne’s
opponent should take advantage of a litigant’s counsels’ known disadvantage.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 14.) This argument is entirely unavailing because Appellant has
not demonstrated that she actually suffered any prejudice that would have altered the
outcome of the case or identified a juror who should have been excused.

                                            7
              Accordingly, we conclude this issue is wholly without merit.
   B. Constitutionality of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b)3
              Appellant argues that the application of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b) violates
her constitutional rights because it allows a party to obtain final judgment without due
process. (Appellant’s Br. at 20.) In essence, Appellant argues that due to the court
reporter’s delay, the trial transcript she paid for was not available before the trial court
entered final judgment, and thus, Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4(1)(b) is unconstitutional for lack
of due process. Appellant relies on the three factors from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976), as applied in Hartner v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 836 A.2d 924
(Pa. Super. 2003). The Mathews factors for determining the constitutional sufficiency
of a statutory procedure are: (1) the nature of the interest at stake; (2) the risk of being
deprived of the interest at stake under the current procedure(s) in place balanced against
the value of “additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the government’s
interest in the additional or substitute procedural safeguard. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335;
Hartner, 836 A.2d at 927. Utilizing these factors, Appellant asserts that she was
deprived of due process because she was never heard by the trial court on claimed
errors, despite paying for the trial transcript, and therefore, she paid for and filed a
notice of appeal. (Appellant’s Br. at 20-21.) Appellant argues that this case is
distinguishable from the Superior Court’s decision in Hartner, 836 A.2d 924, because
she paid for a trial transcript. We disagree.
              In relevant part, Rule 227.4(1) provides:
              [T]he prothonotary shall, upon praecipe of a party:

       3
         Where an appeal involves questions of law, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope
of review is plenary. MERSCORP, Inc. v. Delaware County, 160 A.3d 961, 964 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017), aff’d, 207 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2019).

                                                 8
             (1) enter judgment upon a nonsuit by the court, the verdict of
                 a jury or the decision of a judge following a trial without
                 jury, if

                    (a) no timely post-trial motion is filed; or

                    (b) one or more timely post-trial motions are filed and
                    the court does not enter an order disposing of all
                    motions within one hundred twenty days after the filing
                    of the first motion. A judgment entered pursuant to this
                    subparagraph shall be final as to all parties and all
                    issues and shall not be subject to reconsideration.

Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(1)(b). Rule 227.4, which deals with the entry of judgment upon
praecipe of a party, states that post-trial motions are deemed denied if not decided
within 120 days of their filing, and judgment may thereafter be entered. This rule is
optional with the parties and “the rule provides the parties with the ability to ‘move the
case along.’” See Pa.R.C.P. 227.4, Explanatory Comment – 1995, §I(a).
             In Hartner, the Superior Court considered a constitutional challenge to the
application of Rule 227.4(1)(b). There, the defendant, Home Depot, had filed post-
trial motions, but because a decision had not been rendered within 120 days of the filing
of post-trial motions, the plaintiff, Hartner, filed a praecipe for judgment pursuant to
Rule 227.4(1)(b). The Superior Court noted that while not dispositive, “it [was]
inappropriate for Home Depot to complain that Rule 227.4(1)(b) had operated an
injustice when Home Depot never made attempts to protect itself.” Id. at 929. The
Superior Court concluded that, although under the Mathews factors Rule 227.4(1)(b)
did not deprive either party of the right to due process, Home Depot did not comply
with the appropriate rules of appellate procedure when challenging the constitutionality
of the rule. Id. at 928.
             Here, similar to Hartner, Appellant filed post-trial motions on November
25, 2020. After having issues with the trial transcript, Appellant did not request from

                                            9
the Department an extension of the 120-day timeline. See Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d
394, 397 (Pa. Super. 2004) (noting that the parties “explicitly agreed to extend the 120-
day deadline . . .”) Alternatively, Appellant could have requested the trial court to
extend the 120-day timeline given the court reporter’s delay in transcribing the
testimony. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 248 (“The time prescribed by any rule of civil procedure
for the doing of any act may be extended . . . by order of court.”). However, Appellant
did neither of these things. Thus, approximately six months after the completion of the
trial and the filing of Appellant’s post-trial motion, the Department filed a praecipe to
enter final judgment. As the Superior Court noted in Hartner, the duty was on
Appellant to take steps to protect herself from the entry of final judgment.
                Therefore, we conclude that Appellant’s argument that Pa.R.Civ.P.
227.4(1)(b) is unconstitutional as applied in this case is unavailing.
   C. Jury Layout and Motion for Mistrial
                Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for a
mistrial due to logistical problems. (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) Additionally, Appellant
contends that she was prejudiced by the fact the jurors were spaced throughout the
courtroom and could not see her facial expressions and demeanor on the video screens.
                Conversely, the Department argues that Appellant has waived this
argument for failure to timely object to the jurors’ seating arrangement.               The
Department further argues that the video screens issue was waived because Attorney
Pollick registered her objection mid-trial, and, thus, it was untimely. (Department’s
Br. at 24-8.)
                First, we review the standard of this Court when reviewing a trial court’s
denial of a motion for mistrial. “The decision to grant or deny a motion for mistrial
rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court.” Daddona v. Thind, 891 A.2d 786,
809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). “Absent a clear abuse of discretion, an appellate court will
not disturb the trial court’s ruling.” Id. Moreover, we note that “in order to preserve a

                                              10
trial objection for review, trial counsel is required to make a timely, specific objection
during trial.” Takes v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 695 A.2d 397, 400 (Pa. 1997)
(citations omitted).
             Requiring issues to be properly raised first in the trial court
             ensures that trial judges have the opportunity to consider a
             potential appellate issue and correct any error at the first
             available opportunity. It also promotes the orderly and
             efficient use of judicial resources, ensures fundamental
             fairness to the parties, and accounts for the expense attendant
             to appellate litigation.
Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 29 (Pa. 2020)
(citations omitted). Our review of the record reveals that Attorney Pollick’s objection
to the video screens was raised mid-trial when Attorney Pollick realized Appellant’s
face was not appearing on the video screen. The following relevant exchange occurred
regarding the jury’s visibility of Appellant during her testimony.
             MS. POLLICK: Your Honor, we don’t have it viewing for
             this jury. I don’t know how long it’s not been viewing. She’s
             testifying.

             MS. ROMANO: I don’t think it’s been on all day, actually.

             MS. POLLICK: So the [jurors] have not seen her testimony.

             THE WITNESS: I thought they saw them reading. Did you
             see? They saw.

             MS. ROMANO: I think the exhibits have been displayed all
             day. I’m not sure about the witness.

             MS. POLLICK: But your testimony has not been transcribed
             - - has not been visible to the jurors in the back of the room,
             which he have [sic] the majority. There’s only four up here
             in the jury box. And you have not - - the Court has not made
             sure her testimony was viewable to the jury? I just want to
             note my objection for the record.

                                           11
            THE COURT: That’s a mutual responsibility of counsel.
            Proceed.

            MS. ROMANO: Yes, sir. Can we maybe verify with the
            jurors if there is anybody who has been unable to observe her
            testimony today.

            THE COURT: That’s a fair question. Particularly as it relates
            to the jurors that are located in the rear of the railing. Is there
            anyone who has not been able to, on number, hear the
            testimony of [Appellant] during cross-examination? Let the
            record indicate no response.

            Is there anyone who was not able to observe [Appellant] on
            the various screens that are placed throughout the courtroom;
            raise your hand? Let the record indicate - -

            JUROR: Wait, you mean have we not been able to see her on
            the screen, but we physically can see her.

            THE COURT: Okay. And you’ve been able to observe her
            physically?

            Juror: Yes.

            MS. POLLICK: But you have not been able to hear her voice?

            THE COURT: They previously indicated they were able to
            hear her testimony. We have covered that.

            MS. POLLICK: Okay. I just want to make sure.

            THE COURT: Yes. So we’ll continue.
(R.R. at 365a-67a.)
            Importantly, Attorney Pollick’s mid-trial objection was to the
technological error with the video screens and not with the jury’s seating positions.
Before the trial commenced, the parties understood that due to the social distancing

                                           12
protocol, the jurors would be distanced, and neither party objected to the jury’s
seating arrangement. (R.R. at 474a, 483a-85a.) In its 1925(a) opinion, the trial court
stated that the jurors were placed throughout the courtroom “so that they could observe
the witnesses who testified” and that video screens were placed to aid the jury in
viewing witnesses’ testimony and exhibits. (1925 Op. at 3.) The jury was spread out
in the courtroom so that four members were in the jury box and the remaining members
were spread out throughout the gallery. (R.R. at 42a, 95a.) Attorney Pollick did not
object at this time prior to trial regarding the layout of the jury in the courtroom.
Because Appellant did not object prior to the trial regarding the jury layout, the
objection is waived.
             Moreover, as noted above, the trial court promptly addressed the issue
with the jury, which stated that although Appellant was not seen on the screen, the
jurors were physically able to see her. (R.R. at 366a.) The jurors also indicated that
they heard Appellant’s testimony. Id. The trial court indicated that Appellant’s
testimony was mostly to review documents, making examination of her facial features
less important. (R.R. at 483a.) Thus, the trial court determined that Appellant did not
suffer prejudice by her face not appearing on the video screens during part of her
testimony and denied Appellant’s motion for a mistrial. (R.R. at 483a-84a.)
             Accordingly, we do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion
in denying Appellant’s motion for mistrial.
   D. Jury Instructions
             Lastly, we address Appellant’s argument that the trial court erred when it
included the incorrect standard for “adverse action” in its jury charge. In response, the
Department contends that Appellant waived this issue as she failed to preserve it by
making a specific objection in post-trial motions. (Department’s Br. at 29.) We agree.
             To preserve an objection to a jury instruction, the litigant must lodge a
specific objection as general objections will not preserve the issue for appellate review.

                                           13
Pa.R.A.P. 302(b). It is well established that to preserve the issue for appeal, the litigant
must make a timely, specific objection at trial and must raise the issue in post-trial
motions. Municipal Authority of the Borough of Midland v. Ohioville Borough
Municipal Authority, 108 A.3d 132, 136-37 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). Issues not preserved
for appellate review cannot be considered by this Court, even if the alleged error
involves a “basic or fundamental error.” City of Philadelphia v. DY Properties, LLC,
223 A.3d 717, 722 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).
             Here, the trial court’s instructions included, in relevant part:
                    An adverse employment action is one which
             constitutes a significant change in employment status such as
             hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
             significantly different responsibilities or a decision causing
             significant changes in benefits. To be adverse, the
             employment action must be serious and tangible enough to
             alter the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or
             privileges of employment. Written reprimands do not
             constitute an adverse action if they do not [e]ffect a material
             change in the terms or conditions of employment.

                    In a retaliation claim such as this, an adverse
             employment action can be any action that would have
             dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
             charge of discrimination. Petty swipes, minor annoyances and
             simple lack of manners will not create such a deterrence.
             Rather retaliation is actionable only when it produces material
             injury or harm sufficient to deter opposition to or reporting of
             discriminatory practices.

(R.R. at 643a-46a.) It is undisputed Attorney Pollick, at trial, made a specific objection
to the proposed instruction arguing the adverse action did not need to rise to a failure
to hire, promote, or terminate, as the adverse action only had to dissuade a reasonable
person from engaging in the activity during the charging conference, which is the same
issue Appellant briefs to this Court. (R.R. at 497a-98a; Appellant’s Br. at 17-20.)

                                            14
However, Appellant did not include this specific objection to the proposed jury
instruction in the post-trial motion, and instead made a general objection. In her post-
trial motion, Appellant stated:

               The trial court gave erroneous jury instructions; and
               specifically related to a claim for retaliation which is motive
               driven and encompasses a totality of circumstances. By
               instructing the jury that a certain piece of evidence cannot
               support a claim of retaliation, the trial court erred since it did
               not accurately state the jury instructions for a claim of
               retaliation.

(R.R. at 981a.) Appellant did not mention the “adverse action” element in the post-
trial motion or provide a specific objection to the trial court’s jury instructions as she
did during the charging conference. Appellant did not reference that the trial court
erred in requiring the jury to find a “significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, [or] failing to promote,” and instead, Appellant made “vague,
generalized, and conclusory” statements about the trial court’s jury instructions. (1925
Op. at 4.) Therefore, this issue is not properly preserved for our review, and this Court
may not now address it.4

       4
          Even if the issue was properly preserved, we would conclude that the trial court did not err
in its jury instructions. Appellant argues the trial court erred in its instruction on the third element
regarding adverse action because the trial court erroneously charged the jury that “it had to find that
an action altered [her] employment in order for her to succeed on a claim for retaliation.” (Appellant’s
Br. at 19.)
         This Court’s review of a trial court’s jury instructions is limited to determining whether the
trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law; even if the trial court erred in its jury
instructions, we will not award a new trial “unless the jury charge in its entirety was unclear,
inadequate, or tended to mislead or confuse the jury.” Hall v. Jackson, 788 A.2d 390, 399 (Pa. Super.
2001) (citations omitted). In determining whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions, we must
consider the jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence presented. Volponi v. Borough of Bristol,
551 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (citation omitted). The elements of a Title VII retaliation
claim are: (1) the employee engaged in a protected activity; (2) the employer took adverse action
against the employee; and (3) there is a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  15
                                       IV.    CONCLUSION
               For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                  ________________________________
                                                  PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

and the employer’s adverse action. Daniels v. School District of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). An adverse action must be materially adverse, which is one that might
have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Moreover, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a written reprimand does not constitute an adverse action if it
does not affect the employee in any material way. Allen v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.
(Amtrak), 228 F. App’x 144, 148-49 (3d Cir. 2007).
         When the jury instructions are viewed as a whole, we would conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in issuing its instructions as to the adverse action element of a Title VII
retaliation claim. The trial court instructed the jury regarding what constitutes an adverse action.
(R.R. at 645a-46a.) Because this case involved workplace retaliation, the trial court instructed the
jury on adverse actions in the workplace. Id. Regarding Appellant’s argument that the trial court set
the burden too high, the trial court used “materially adverse” and twice added that this means the
action would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Id. Accordingly, we would conclude that the trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in its jury instructions as it adequately and fully conveyed the law.

                                                 16
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kathleen Finsterbusch,                 :
                         Appellant     :
                                       :
            v.                         :    No. 970 C.D. 2021
                                       :
Pennsylvania Department of Health,     :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania           :
and Douglas P. Koszalka                :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2023, the final judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County entered on May 5, 2021, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge