Court Opinion

ID: 9769739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:01:12.74281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:52.845209
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION

I am disturbed by the respondent’s attempt to apply the relator’s bond to a new judgment by way of a third-party turnover. Once the July 20, 1992 judgment secured by the relator’s supersedeas bond was reversed by this court, Employers Cas. Co. v. Graham, No. 04-92-00650-CV (Jan. 26, 1994)(not designated for publication), there was no final judgment to secure — the relator’s supersedeas bond was discharged as a matter of law. See Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 732 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)(surety discharged because there was no final judgment); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chair King, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ)(“a surety is not liable where the judgment awarding damages is reversed on appeal”).
Tex. R. App. 47 provides that execution on a final judgment may be suspended by the filing of “a good and sufficient bond ... conditioned that the judgment debtor shall prosecute his appeal ... with effect ...” The relator in this case has fully satisfied the conditions of its bond. The underlying appeal has been prosecuted “with effect;” the judgment was reversed by this court. The relator has no further obligation on the bond.
*734Real parties argue that the appeal was not prosecuted “with effect” because this court held that the underlying judgment was interlocutory and failed to reach the merits of the appeal, citing Lloyds Cas. Insurer v. McGee, 141 Tex. 384, 174 S.W.2d 314 (1943). Interestingly, McGee involves facts (and names) very similar to this case: McGee’s judgment against the defendant, United Employers Casualty Company, was secured by a Lloyds Casualty supersedeas bond while it was being appealed. United Employers failed to timely perfect its appeal, leading to the dismissal of the appeal. By the time the appeal was dismissed, United Employers was insolvent. McGee then sought to collect his judgment against the supersedeas bond. The supreme court held that because United Employers had failed to prosecute its appeal with effect, Lloyds Casualty was liable on the bond for the amount of the judgment. McGee, 174 S.W.2d at 316. McGee, of course, is distinguishable because the judgment of the trial court was left intact — the appeal was simply dismissed. In this case, however, the judgment below was vacated; it was reversed and the entire cause was remanded, thus extinguishing the liability of the surety.
Under the circumstances of this case, the facts and law permitted the trial court to make but one decision — discharge the surety on the bond. There was no discretion to exercise in this instance. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). That notwithstanding, by signing the turnover order the respondent has erroneously facilitated the real parties’ attempt to recover on a supersedeas bond already discharged by law. There is no basis in the facts or the law to support the respondent’s action. Thus, it is a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
But in order to be eligible for mandamus relief, the relator must establish that it has no adequate remedy by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992); Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917. That requirement has not been satisfied in this case. Indeed, the relator admits that it has appealed the turnover order made the basis of its complaint here.
As much as I disagree with the respondent’s attempt to apply the relator’s bond to the February 28, 1995 judgment, it is not subject to a mandamus order ‘“where the law has provided another plain, adequate, and complete remedy.’ ” Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1994)(quoting Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 60 S.W. 665, 666 (1901)).
Unfortunately, the turnover order is now on appeal; otherwise, I would hope that the trial court would reconsider its July 17, 1995 order in view of the authorities cited above. But at any rate, I am satisfied that the relator has an adequate remedy by appeal of the order and thus I concur with the denial of mandamus relief.
PAUL W. GREEN Justice