Court Opinion

ID: 9654197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:09:36.395661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:06.659778
License: Public Domain

DIXON, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur in affirming the trial court’s judgment.
Appellant’s first point on appeal is based on this wording in the exclusion provision *259of the policy: “The policy does not apply: (d) Under any coverage — to loss resulting from * * * the insured voluntarily parting with title and possession of an automobile if induced so -to- do by any fraudulent scheme, trick, device, false pretense, * * =M>
The undisputed evidence shows that ap-pellees had not parted with title to the automobile. The conveyance of title had not yet been effected when the thief disappeared with the car. The Certificate of Title was in the possession of the Oak Cliff Bank & Trust Company with whom it had been placed as security for a loan. The conveyance of title to Davis was therefore postponed until next day so appellees could obtain the certificate and properly endorse it as required under our Certificate of Title Act, Vernon’s Ann.Penal Code, Article 1436-1, §§ 33, 52, and 53.
Appellant says that we should not narrowly interpret the word title, as used in the exclusion provision, but should broadly interpret the word to mean ownership. I am unable to accept appellant’s viewpoint. If the language of the policy were sufficiently uncertain to require interpretation (which I do not believe it is) it would be our duty to interpret it, so far as reasonably possible, in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Proffitt, 150 Tex. 207, 239 S.W.2d 379: I concur in overruling appellant’s first point.
Appellant’s second point on appeal is based on the second part of the exclusion provision, “ * * *, or from embezzlement, conversion, secretion, theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage committed by any person, including any employee, entrusted by the insured with either custody or possession of the automobile”. (Emphasis • supplied.) It is appellant’s contention that the car was entrusted to Davis.
This was a trial before the court without a jury. Appellant requested and the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Here is the trial court’s finding of fact 'No. 11: “The plaintiffs did not entrust the automobile to Davis.”
There were no exceptions filed to the above quoted finding of the trial court. It was not attacked on the ground that there was no evidence to support it, or that there was insufficient evidence to support it. Appellant’s second point merely asserts that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for appellees' because “said'loss resulted from embezzlement,' conversion, secretion, theft, _ larceny, robbery or pilferage committed by a person entrusted by the insured with either custody or possession of the automobile and such loss was excluded under the policy of insurance.” 'In its discussion under the above point appellant quotes two questions and answers from one witness as support for its contention that the court erred in finding that the second part of the exclusion did not apply to the loss in question. But no grounds are pointed out to us which under the law would permit us to ignore the trial court’s adverse finding that there was no entrustment. Evans v. Rush, Tex.Civ.App., 254 S.W.2d 799;- .Zapata County v. Llanos, Tex.Civ.App., 239 S.W.2d 699. Therefore I concur in overruling appellant’s second point, and- in affirming-the trial court’s judgment.