Court Opinion

ID: 9908133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 19:08:02.19453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:54.257863
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Clark, 2023-Ohio-4434.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                                   No. 22AP-433
v.                                                :            (C.P.C. No. 20CR-5890)

John A. Clark, Jr.,                               :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on December 7, 2023

                 On brief: G. Gary Tyack, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L.
                 Gilbert for appellee. Argued: Seth L. Gilbert.

                 On brief: Campbell Law, LLC, and April F. Campbell for
                 appellant. Argued: April F. Campbell.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, John A. Clark, Jr., appeals from the judgment of

conviction and sentence entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, after a

jury found him guilty of one count of election falsification, and the trial court sentenced him

to 120 days in jail and 5 years of community control. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} On December 16, 2020, a Franklin County Grand Jury returned a four-count

indictment charging Mr. Clark with two counts of election falsification in violation of

R.C. 3599.36, each a fifth-degree felony, and two counts of tampering with records in

violation of R.C. 2913.42, each a third-degree felony. The offenses related to financial
No. 22AP-433                                                                              2

reports submitted on July 31, 2019 and August 15, 2019 on behalf of the Columbus Clean

Energy Initiative (“CCEI”).

       {¶ 3} On December 17, 2020, the Chief Prosecutor with the Columbus City

Attorney’s Office filed a notice of appearance indicating he had been appointed to serve as

a special prosecutor in this case. (Dec. 17, 2020 Notice of Appearance. See also May 9,

2022 Tr. Vol. I at 11-12.)

       {¶ 4} During trial, three of CCEI’s semiannual campaign finance reports for 2019

were admitted into evidence without objection. (See May 11, 2022 Tr. Vol. III at 586-87;

State’s Exs. A, B, and C.) CCEI’s 2019 semiannual finance report filed on July 31, 2019 was

marked as State’s Exhibit A. An amended semiannual campaign finance report filed on

August 15, 2019 was marked as State’s Exhibit B. And a second amended campaign finance

report filed on October 14, 2019 was marked as State’s Exhibit C. Each of these reports

contained three forms: Form 30-A (described at trial as a summary cover sheet (May 10,

2022 Tr. Vol. II at 339)); Form 31-A (a statement of monetary contributions received by the

campaign); and Form 31-B (a statement of the campaign’s expenditures).

       {¶ 5} In each of the three reports, Form 30-A showed $53,000 in monetary

contributions, while the amount of expenditures varied ($50,199 in State’s Exhibit A,

$44,977 in State’s Exhibit B, and $41,977 in State’s Exhibit C). (See State’s Exs. A, B, and

C; Tr. Vol. II at 311-24.)

       {¶ 6} The data in Form 31-A varied widely across the three reports (five

contributions from five individual donors listed in State’s Exhibits A and B, and only one

contribution from Mr. Clark himself listed in State’s Exhibit C). (See id.) Relevant to Mr.

Clark’s count of conviction, Form 31-A in the amended campaign finance report filed on

August 15, 2019 (State’s Ex. B) listed the following monetary contributions:
No. 22AP-433                                                                                  3

                  1. $10,000 from Eunice Heard on June 1, 2018

                  2. $10,000 from Christina Gonzaga on June 1, 2018

                  3. $13,000 from George Cooper on June 1, 2018

                  4. $10,000 from Udell Hollins on June 1, 2018

                  5. $10,000 from Sonia Martinez on June 1, 2018

(See State’s Ex. B at 2; Tr. Vol. II at 320-21.)

       {¶ 7} Renata Ramsini, Chief Ethics Officer and Campaign Finance Administrator

for the City of Columbus, testified about her role reviewing campaign finance reports for

the city, the functions of the online filing database, and the three reports Mr. Clark

submitted on behalf of CCEI. The state did not present images of the database as it existed

in 2019 for the jury to consider. In an email to defense counsel, Ms. Ramsini explained that

she could not provide images in response to a public records request because the “system

does not give [her] the ability to take screenshots or images of previous versions of the site.”

(Ct.’s Ex. 2 at 1.) Therefore, the state had to rely on Ms. Ramsini’s testimony to establish

how a user would have experienced the database in 2019. With respect to the database in

existence in 2019, Ms. Ramsini testified that an election falsification attestation would have

appeared on-screen prior to final submission of a report. (Tr. Vol. II at 304-05.) Ms.

Ramsini acknowledged that the website has been modified since 2019 and now includes a

final checkbox with “the same language” before a filer can click to submit their report. (Tr.

Vol. II at 337.) But she unequivocally testified that users of the online database in 2019

would have seen an election falsification attestation before clicking to submit their final

reports. (Tr. Vol. II at 328-30, 339.)
No. 22AP-433                                                                                                 4

        {¶ 8} The lead detective on this case, Detective Todd Schiff, testified about his

conversations with four1 of the individuals listed as contributors in the August 2019 report

and his review of bank accounts belonging to Mr. Clark, CCEI, and ProEnergy Ohio, LLC.

Critically, Detective Schiff testified that all of the individuals he spoke with denied having

made monetary contributions to CCEI. (See Tr. Vol. II at 396-400.) And, he noted, over

the course of the relevant time periods, none of the bank records he gathered reflected any

deposits or withdrawals corresponding with the amounts listed in State’s Exhibits A, B, and

C. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 404-08.)

        {¶ 9} Mr. Clark’s attorney, Patrick Quinn, also testified at trial. Mr. Quinn

explained that while he educated Mr. Clark about the campaign finance filing requirements,

he did not have any role in filing the three reports on behalf of CCEI (Tr. Vol. II at 452, 472),

he did not have access to the campaign’s online database account (Tr. Vol. II at 470), and

he was not aware he had been designated as CCEI’s treasurer until he received a letter about

deficiencies in the campaign’s first semiannual report (Tr. Vol. II at 478-79). Mr. Quinn

testified that he did not keep financial records for the campaign and he had no personal

knowledge about the campaign’s contributions or expenditures. (Tr. Vol. II at 470, Tr. Vol.

III at 544.) He acknowledged that before Mr. Clark filed the July 2019 report, he reached

out to Mr. Quinn with a completed draft for his review. (See Defense Ex. 2.) Because he

saw no formatting errors or missing information, Mr. Quinn responded, “Hi John, these

look good to me. Let em rip.” (Id.; Tr. Vol. III at 543-44.)

        {¶ 10} Eunice Heard and Sonia Martinez, who were listed as contributors in CCEI’s

July and August 2019 filings, also testified as part of the state’s case. Ms. Martinez testified

1 He was unsuccessful in his attempt to reach the fifth listed contributor—George Cooper. (Tr. Vol. II at 400.)
No. 22AP-433                                                                                 5

that she and her husband volunteered for CCEI by gathering petition signatures for one day

and by validating signatures.      (Tr. Vol. III at 557-58.)   She testified that she never

contributed money to CCEI and only learned she was listed on the campaign’s finance

report when police officers came to speak with her as part of their investigation in this case.

(Tr. Vol. III at 557, 566.) Ms. Heard testified that she contributed a significant amount of

volunteer time to Mr. Clark’s statewide and citywide endeavors from 2015 to 2019, by

entering data, cross-referencing signatures, and managing signature gatherers while Mr.

Clark was on vacation. (Tr. Vol. III at 571-72.) But, she unequivocally asserted that she did

not keep track of her volunteer hours, she did not make any monetary contributions to

CCEI, and she was not aware she would be listed as a contributor on the campaign’s finance

report. (Tr. Vol. III at 573-75, 577.)

       {¶ 11} Once the state concluded its case, Mr. Clark testified in his own defense. Mr.

Clark described his interest in clean energy and his previous attempt at getting a statewide

initiative on the ballot. (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. III at 599-603.) He then testified about CCEI

and the three relevant campaign finance reports.

       {¶ 12} With respect to the first report filed on July 31, 2019, Mr. Clark explained that

he was on vacation and only learned from Mr. Quinn that he had to complete a report

shortly before the deadline. (Tr. Vol. III at 609-10.) He had never submitted a campaign

finance report, so he did the best he could to follow instructions and submit the necessary

information. (Tr. Vol. III at 610-11.) He testified that although he knew Ms. Heard, Ms.

Martinez, and the others had not contributed money, he listed them anyway because they

had contributed their time to the campaign. (Tr. Vol. III at 617-21.) He described sending

a draft of the filing to Mr. Quinn for his review and being told he could later amend the

report with more accurate information. (Tr. Vol. III at 615-16, 622.)
No. 22AP-433                                                                                6

       {¶ 13} Similarly, with respect to CCEI’s August and October 2019 amended filings,

Mr. Clark admitted he knew the campaign had not yet received monetary contributions

when he submitted these reports, the five listed campaign volunteers did not contribute any

money to the campaign, and he did not contribute $53,000 to the campaign. (Tr. Vol. III

at 633, 651-53, 658, 661-62.) He also acknowledged he was the person who input the

relevant information that populated Forms 30-A, 31-A, and 31-B, and he was the person

who clicked to submit each report. (Tr. Vol. III at 613-14, 655-58, 670.)

       {¶ 14} Following deliberations, the jury found Mr. Clark guilty of one count of

election falsification related to the August 15, 2019 filing and not guilty of election

falsification and tampering with records related to the July 31, 2019 filing. Upon the state’s

request, the trial court ordered that a nolle prosequi be entered as to the tampering with

records charge related to the August 15, 2019 filing. (July 18, 2022 Decision and Entry at

1.)

       {¶ 15} On July 12, 2022, the trial court sentenced Mr. Clark to 120 days in jail and a

five-year period of community control. (July 18, 2022 Decision and Entry at 1-2.) Mr. Clark

timely appeals.

II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 16} Mr. Clark asserts the following four assignments of error for our review:

              [I.] THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
              BY PERMITTING THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, WHO WAS
              THE VICTIM, TO TRY CLARK.

              [II.] THE STATE’S EVIDENCE THAT CLARK COMMITTED
              ELECTION FALSIFICATION WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT
              AS A MATTER OF LAW.

              [III.] CLARK’S CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE REVERSED
              BECAUSE HIS COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE, RESULTING
              IN PREJUDICE TO CLARK.
No. 22AP-433                                                                                   7

              [IV.] CLARK WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
              THROUGH CUMULATIVE ERROR.

III. Analysis

       A. First Assignment of Error—Role of Special Prosecutor

       {¶ 17} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Clark takes issue with the “dual role” he

believes the City of Columbus played in his case. Specifically, he claims the appointment of

a special prosecutor from the Columbus City Attorney’s Office “ ‘warped the framework

within which the trial proceeded.’ ”         (Appellant’s Brief at 11-12, quoting State v.

Montgomery, 169 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 23.) He asserts the trial court

committed structural error by permitting a prosecutor with the Columbus City Attorney’s

Office to serve as special prosecutor in his case. For the following reasons, we disagree.

       {¶ 18} Because Mr. Clark did not object to the special prosecutor’s appointment

below, he has forfeited all but plain error review of his argument. See, e.g., State v. Barnes,

94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), a plain error is one that affects

substantial rights and may be noticed by an appellate court although not brought to the

attention of the trial court. “To warrant reversal under plain error review, this court must

find: (1) ‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule;’ (2) the error is plain or obvious; and

(3) the error affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Columbus v. Carmichael,

10th Dist. No. 22AP-306, 2023-Ohio-1386, ¶ 11, quoting Barnes at 27.

       {¶ 19} In Montgomery, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a criminal defendant’s

right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution is violated when the trial court permits an alleged victim to sit at the

prosecutor’s table throughout trial and be formally introduced to the jury as the state’s

representative.   The court was concerned that this designation and location in the
No. 22AP-433                                                                               8

courtroom “risked misleading the jury into thinking that just as defense counsel represents

the defendant, the prosecuting attorney represents the alleged victim, or even more

harmful, that the alleged victim as the complaining witness and the prosecution are one

and the same.” Id. at ¶ 23. The court concluded that such a “dual role” for a victim “warp[s]

the framework within which the trial proceed[s]” and undermines a criminal defendant’s

right to a fair trial. Id. And, because this error is so pervasive and its effect on the

fundamental fairness of a trial is too difficult to gauge, the court held that it constitutes

structural error requiring reversal. Id. at ¶ 31-33.

       {¶ 20} We cannot agree that the special prosecutor’s role during Mr. Clark’s trial was

akin to the facts presented in Montgomery. Critical to Montgomery’s holding was the

potential harm that comes from a jury hearing and seeing a victim in this “dual role.” But

here, regardless of whether the special prosecutor was actually playing a dual role—a point

the state contests in its brief and we need not resolve in this appeal—the jury never heard

anything about it. Mr. Gibson introduced himself to the jury as one of two attorneys

representing the state, and his employment with the City of Columbus never came up at

trial. (See Tr. Vol. I at 11-12.)

       {¶ 21} Mr. Clark reads Montgomery to hold that “a prosecutor cannot represent the

interest of the complaining witness, nor vice versa.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellant’s Brief at

13.) But as Mr. Clark acknowledges in his brief, the Montgomery court was concerned with

the impact such a dual role could have on a jury. (Appellant’s Brief at 13, quoting

Montgomery at ¶ 23.) Because Mr. Gibson’s role as prosecutor with the City Attorney’s

Office was never revealed to the jury and therefore none of the concerns associated with

Montgomery are present here, we must reject Mr. Clark’s first assignment of error.
No. 22AP-433                                                                                 9

       B. Second Assignment of Error—Sufficiency of the Evidence

       {¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Clark argues the state’s evidence was

legally insufficient to support his conviction for election falsification. For the following

reasons, we disagree.

       1. Controlling Law and Standard of Review

       {¶ 23} The issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction as a

matter of law involves a determination of whether the state met its burden of production at

trial. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-1157, 2004-Ohio-4786, ¶ 16; State v.

Frazier, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1323, 2007-Ohio-11, ¶ 7; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 386 (1997). We do not weigh the evidence but instead determine “ ‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”

State v. Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. We essentially assume the state’s witnesses

testified truthfully and determine if that testimony satisfies each element of the crime.

State v. Watkins, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-142, 2016-Ohio-8272, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Hill, 10th

Dist. No. 07AP-889, 2008-Ohio-4257, ¶ 41. Thus, evidence is sufficient to support a

conviction where, if believed, that evidence would allow any rational trier of fact to conclude

that the state proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Frazier at ¶ 7,

citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 24} The jury found Mr. Clark guilty of election falsification relating to CCEI’s

August 15, 2019 amended campaign finance report. (July 18, 2022 Decision and Entry at

1.) R.C. 3599.36 defines election falsification, in relevant part, as follows:
No. 22AP-433                                                                               10

              [n]o person, either orally or in writing, on oath lawfully
              administered or in a statement made under penalty of election
              falsification, shall knowingly state a falsehood as to a material
              matter relating to an election in a proceeding before a court,
              tribunal, or election official, or in a matter in relation to which
              an oath or statement under penalty of election falsification is
              authorized by law.

              ***

              Every paper, card, or other document relating to any election
              matter that calls for a statement to be made under penalty of
              election falsification shall be accompanied by the following
              statement in bold face capital letters: “Whoever commits
              election falsification is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree.”

Therefore, to convict Mr. Clark of election falsification, the state had to present sufficient

evidence that Mr. Clark (1) knowingly, (2) stated a falsehood, (3) regarding a material

matter, (4) and the statement was made under penalty of election falsification.

       {¶ 25} Mr. Clark concedes in his merit brief that the state’s evidence was sufficient

to demonstrate the information contained in CCEI’s August 15, 2019 report was false.

(Appellant’s Brief at 18.) Instead, Mr. Clark raises two arguments on appeal. First, he

argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the false statements in the

August 2019 report were made under penalty of election falsification. Specifically, he

claims “[i]t is clear by the statute’s language that [Mr.] Clark had to be under th[e] penalty

[of election falsification] at the time he wrote the information uploaded onto 31A and 31B—

not after the fact.” (Appellant’s Brief at 18.) And second, he asserts the evidence was

insufficient to establish that the falsehoods in his August 15, 2019 report pertained to a

“material matter.” (Id. at 20.)

       {¶ 26} The state makes several arguments in response. First, the state argues that

whether an attestation was provided at all is a red herring. According to the state, because

Mr. Clark provided false information in statements governed by R.C. 3517.10(A)(4), and
No. 22AP-433                                                                               11

R.C. 3517.10 requires “statements of contributions and expenditures” be made “under

penalty of election falsification,” the state has met its burden and need not prove that an

election falsification attestation appeared on the screen when Mr. Clark input the data or

when he clicked to submit the August 2019 report. Second, the state asserts that even if

R.C. 3599.36 does, in fact, require that an attestation accompany the relevant documents,

there was sufficient evidence to establish that such attestation appeared on Form 30-A and

was visible before Mr. Clark submitted his filing. And with respect to the materiality of Mr.

Clark’s statements, the state asserts a rational trier of fact could easily have concluded the

gravity and number of falsehoods in the August 2019 report satisfied that requirement.

       2. Whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Clark’s
       statements were made under penalty of election falsification

       {¶ 27} Pursuant to the first paragraph of R.C. 3599.36, no person shall knowingly

make a false statement as to a material matter when that statement is subject to penalty of

election falsification. Separate and apart from these elements of the offense, R.C. 3599.36

states in its third paragraph that an election falsification attestation must accompany every

“paper, card, or other document” relating to a “matter that calls for a statement to be made

under penalty of election falsification.” We cannot see how the knowledge requirement in

the statute’s first paragraph relates to the attestation requirement in the third paragraph.

Instead, the statute instructs that, to convict a person of election falsification, the state

needs to prove only that a false statement was knowingly made and the statement is one

that must be made under penalty of election falsification per some other section of the

Revised Code.

       {¶ 28} The state presented sufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Clark knowingly

submitted false information regarding contributions and expenditures when he clicked to
No. 22AP-433                                                                               12

formally submit that information as part of CCEI’s amended campaign finance report. Mr.

Clark reported in CCEI’s amended campaign finance report that Ms. Heard and Ms.

Martinez contributed $10,000 to the campaign. (State’s Ex. B at 2.) However, when both

women were called to testify, they denied making monetary contributions to the campaign.

(Tr. Vol. III at 556-57, 573-75.) And, Mr. Clark, too, conceded that neither Ms. Heard nor

Ms. Martinez contributed money to the campaign, and he was aware of that fact in 2019.

(Tr. Vol. III at 633. But see Tr. Vol. III at 656-57 (despite these concessions, he denied the

information he provided was false)).

       {¶ 29} But even if R.C. 3599.36 required proof that an election falsification

attestation accompanied the documents, the state presented sufficient evidence that one

did. R.C. 3599.36 states that “[e]very paper, card, or other document relating to any election

matter that calls for a statement to be made under penalty of election falsification shall be

accompanied by the following statement in bold face capital letters: ‘Whoever commits

election falsification is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree.’ ”

       {¶ 30} The statute merely requires that an attestation accompany each paper or

document that calls for a statement to be made under penalty of election falsification.

Forms 30-A, 31-A, and 31-B all make up a single document—a campaign finance report.

Although the record does not establish that Mr. Clark would have seen the election

falsification attestation at the time he typed the data into the database, there is sufficient

evidence to establish that, prior to submitting the information to the government as one

campaign finance report document, Mr. Clark would have seen the attestation displayed on

the screen. Ms. Ramsini testified that in August 2019, a person using the campaign finance

database would have seen the attestation before clicking to submit a report. (See Tr. Vol. II

at 304-05, 339.) Although Ms. Ramsini also testified that the database has changed, and
No. 22AP-433                                                                              13

now includes a checkbox with the attestation language (Tr. Vol. II at 337-38), that does not

undermine her testimony that, in 2019, an attestation would have appeared onscreen

before Mr. Clark clicked to submit the first amended campaign finance report. And that is

all that would be required under this reading of R.C. 3599.36.

       3. Whether the state presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Clark’s
       statements pertained to a material matter

       {¶ 31} Mr. Clark also argues the state failed to prove the false statements he made

in the August 2019 report related to a material matter, as is required by R.C. 3599.36. Mr.

Clark asserts that because Ms. Ramsini did not explicitly testify that these falsehoods were

significant to the “energy issue,” the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support

that element of the offense. (Appellant’s Brief at 20.)

       {¶ 32} Although R.C. 3599.36 does not define “material,” it is axiomatic that “words

should be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning unless the legislature has

clearly expressed a contrary intention.” State v. Singer, 50 Ohio St.2d 103, 108 (1977).

“Material” is defined as “having real importance or great consequences.”          Merriam-

Webster.com           Dictionary,         Material,                 https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictiuonary/material (accessed Dec. 6, 2023).

       {¶ 33} Ms. Ramsini’s opinion that the falsehoods were significant was not required

to sustain Mr. Clark’s conviction. R.C. 3517.10(A) mandates the filing of “a full, true, and

itemized statement, made under penalty of election falsification, setting forth in detail the

[campaign’s] contributions and expenditures.” The state presented sufficient evidence,

including testimony from two listed contributors and Mr. Clark, that CCEI’s August 2019

amended report included numerous false statements, including: (1) the existence of

monetary contributions; (2) the amounts of those claimed monetary contributions; (3) the
No. 22AP-433                                                                                 14

names of contributors who made those monetary contributions; (4) the campaign’s

expenditures; (5) the amounts of those expenditures; and (6) to whom and for what those

expenditures were made. Nearly all of the substantive information in the August 2019

report was false. For these reasons, we believe a rational trier of fact could have concluded

these falsehoods fall within the definition of “material” and therefore the state presented

sufficient evidence to meet the materiality requirement.

       {¶ 34} Because the state presented sufficient evidence to support Mr. Clark’s

election falsification conviction, we overrule Mr. Clark’s second assignment of error.

       C. Third Assignment of Error─Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       1. Controlling Law and Standard of Review

       {¶ 35} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must

establish (1) counsel’s performance was deficient or objectively unreasonable, as

determined by “ ‘prevailing professional norms’ ” and (2) he was prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance. State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, ¶ 77,

quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).

       {¶ 36} To show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable, a

defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent

representation and must show counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by

reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998). Tactical

or strategic decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991). Rather, the errors complained

of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s essential duties to his client. See

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989).
No. 22AP-433                                                                                15

       {¶ 37} Prejudice results when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”

Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694. “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id., quoting Strickland at 694.

       {¶ 38} When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellate court

“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the

prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland at

697. See also State v. Wade, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-456, 2021-Ohio-4090, ¶ 19. “If it is easier

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice * * * that

course should be followed.” Strickland at 697.

       {¶ 39} Mr. Clark raises several arguments under this assignment of error. First, he

claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the special prosecutor’s dual role

as both prosecutor and victim.       Second, he asserts trial counsel was ineffective for

consistently failing to object to certain testimony under the hearsay rules, the Best Evidence

Rule, and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

       2. Whether the failure to object to the special prosecutor’s role
       constituted ineffective assistance of counsel

       {¶ 40} As we have already noted above under Mr. Clark’s first assignment of error,

the trial court did not err in permitting an attorney from the Columbus City Attorney’s

Office to serve as special prosecutor in this case. Therefore, even had Mr. Clark’s trial

counsel raised this issue below and objected to what he views as the dual role of the

prosecutor, the objection would have been overruled. As such, we cannot say counsel’s

failure to raise the issue at trial constituted deficient performance. See State v. Issa, 93
No. 22AP-433                                                                               16

Ohio St.3d 49, 68 (2001) (“Counsel is certainly not deficient for failing to raise a meritless

issue.”).

       3. Whether the failure to object under the hearsay rules, the Best
       Evidence Rule, and the Confrontation Clause constituted ineffective
       assistance of counsel

       {¶ 41} With respect to his hearsay, Confrontation Clause, and Best Evidence Rule

claims, Mr. Clark takes issue with his trial counsel’s failure to object throughout Detective

Schiff’s testimony when he described his discussions with four of the individuals listed as

contributors in the August 2019 report and their statements denying having made

monetary contributions to CCEI. (Appellant’s Brief at 26-27.) Additionally, he takes issue

with Detective Schiff’s testimony about the contents of various bank records that were not

produced at trial, information he learned from Regus about ProEnergy Ohio LLC’s link to

Mr. Clark, information he learned from emails between Ms. Ramsini’s predecessor and Mr.

Quinn, and the contents of an article that ran in the Columbus Dispatch. (Appellant’s Brief

at 27-29.) And he takes issue with the state’s reliance on Ms. Ramsini’s testimony about

how the online filing database worked in 2019 without producing the actual database or

images of the database for the jury to view. (Appellant’s Brief at 29.)

       {¶ 42} Because we cannot agree that Mr. Clark has demonstrated prejudice as to any

of the alleged errors of trial counsel, we address that prong of Strickland first. See

Strickland at 697; Wade at ¶ 19.

       {¶ 43} Although Detective Schiff did testify about his conversations with four of the

five individuals listed as contributors and that may have constituted impermissible hearsay

testimony that might have implicated the Confrontation Clause, two of the listed

contributors, themselves, testified at trial. Both Ms. Heard and Ms. Martinez testified that

they did not contribute to CCEI. (Tr. Vol. III at 556-57, 573-75.) Additionally, even Mr.
No. 22AP-433                                                                                 17

Clark admitted on the witness stand that none of the five listed individuals contributed

money to the campaign. (Tr. Vol. III at 633. But see Tr. Vol. III. At 656-57.) So, regardless

of whether Detective Schiff’s summary of his conversations constituted impermissible

hearsay or implicated the Confrontation Clause, we cannot say Mr. Clark suffered any

prejudice because the information necessary to convict him of fifth-degree felony election

falsification (the falsity of at least one of his statements on a material matter) came directly

from Ms. Heard, Ms. Martinez, and himself.

       {¶ 44} Because the state presented overwhelming evidence regarding the falsity of

statements in CCEI’s August 2019, we also cannot say Mr. Clark was prejudiced by trial

counsel’s failure to object to Detective Schiff’s description of bank records or other

documents that were not produced at trial. Detective Schiff’s testimony about the relevant

bank records and other documents went to the falsity of the information contained in the

August 2019 report. But because Mr. Clark, himself, admitted to filing campaign finance

reports containing false statements about CCEI’s number of contributions, amounts of each

contribution, and identity of the individuals who he claimed contributed money to the

campaign, even without bank account information, the state easily presented compelling,

uncontroverted evidence that Mr. Clark made false statements about material matters in

the report.

       {¶ 45} As to Mr. Clark’s Best Evidence Rule challenge regarding the state’s failure to

produce the actual database or images of the database to prove the presence of the election

falsification attestation, we have already concluded that such evidence was not required to

support his conviction. Ms. Ramsini’s testimony about the database could not have been

prejudicial because it went to something that is not an element of the offense.
No. 22AP-433                                                                                18

       {¶ 46} But even if the attestation was required by the statute, and therefore Ms.

Ramsini’s testimony was necessary to support the state’s case as to one of the elements of

the offense, Mr. Clark cannot show ineffective assistance of counsel. Pursuant to Ohio’s

Best Evidence Rule, as set forth in Evid.R. 1002, “[t]o prove the content of a writing,

recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except

as otherwise provided in these rules or by statute.” However, the original is not required if

any of the following apply:

                  (1) Originals lost or destroyed.
                  All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
                  proponent lost or destroyed them in bath faith; or
                  (2) Original not obtainable.
                  No original can be obtained by any available judicial
                  process or procedure; or
                  (3) Original in possession of opponent.
                  At a time when an original was under the control of the
                  party against whom offered, that party was put on notice,
                  by the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be
                  subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not
                  produce the original at the hearing; or
                  (4) Collateral matters.
                  The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related
                  to a controlling issue.

(Emphasis removed.) (Evid.R. 1004; See also State v. Voltz, 7th Dist. No. 21 JE 0020,

2022-Ohio-4351, ¶ 88.)

       {¶ 47} The record below contains an email Ms. Ramsini sent in response to defense

counsel’s request for images of the 2019 version of the database. In her email, Ms. Ramsini

explained that she could not produce the requested images because the “system does not

give [her] the ability to take screenshots or images of previous versions of the site,”

including what it would have looked like for a user in 2019. (Ct.’s Ex. 2 at 1.) Therefore, the
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trial court would have overruled any Best Evidence Rule objection to Ms. Ramsini’s

testimony under Evid.R. 1004(2). For that reason, we cannot say counsel’s failure to raise

the issue was prejudicial to Mr. Clark’s defense.

       {¶ 48} Because Mr. Clark cannot satisfy Strickland’s prejudice requirement, we

need not consider whether his trial counsel provided deficient performance.                See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Wade, 2021-Ohio-4090 at ¶ 19. We therefore overrule his third

assignment of error.

       D. Fourth Assignment of Error─Cumulative Error

       {¶ 49} In his fourth and final assignment of error, Mr. Clark argues that even if we

conclude none of the above alleged errors is sufficient to be individually prejudicial, the

cumulative effect of these errors nonetheless resulted in Mr. Clark being denied a fair trial.

       {¶ 50} Under the cumulative error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed when the

cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though each of

the numerous errors does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Graham,

164 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-6700, ¶ 169. “To affirm a conviction in spite of multiple

errors, we must determine that the cumulative effect of the errors is harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. The errors may be considered harmless if there is overwhelming

evidence of guilt, if [the] [a]ppellant’s substantial rights were not affected, or if there are

other indicia that the errors did not contribute to the conviction.” (Internal citation

omitted.) State v. Anderson, 7th Dist. No. 03 MA 252, 2006-Ohio-4618, ¶ 80.

       {¶ 51} As noted above, the state presented strong direct evidence of Mr. Clark’s guilt.

Even without Detective Schiff’s testimony about his conversations with the five campaign

volunteers and the various bank records, Ms. Ramsini’s testimony about the database and

its display of the election falsification attestation, the Columbus Dispatch article, the Regus
No. 22AP-433                                                                             20

records, and Mr. Quinn’s emails, the state presented overwhelming evidence of Mr. Clark’s

guilt. To convict Mr. Clark of election falsification under R.C. 3599.36, the state did not

have to prove Mr. Clark acted with the intent to mislead or defraud or that he saw an

election falsification attestation before he submitted the August 2019 report. The state had

to prove only that Mr. Clark knew he made a false statement and the statement was one the

Revised Code requires be made under penalty of election falsification. The state satisfied

this burden with the August 2019 amended report, Mr. Clark’s own testimony that he

completed the report and knew the campaign did not have any monetary contributions

from the listed individuals, and the testimony of Ms. Heard and Ms. Martinez that they did

not make monetary contributions to the campaign. We therefore overrule Mr. Clark’s

fourth and final assignment of error.

IV. CONCLUSION

       {¶ 52} Having overruled Mr. Clark’s four assignments of error, we affirm the

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.
                           JAMISON and BOGGS, JJ., concur.