Court Opinion

ID: 9940389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 14:06:07.561563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:49.397562
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-526.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                           SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-526
THE STATE EX REL . CASSENS CORP., APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
                              OF OHIO, APPELLANT, ET AL.

  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No.
                                      2024-Ohio-526.]
Workers’ compensation—Violation of specific safety requirements—Ohio
        Adm.Code        4123:1-5-13(C)(4)—Industrial            Commission        abused      its
        discretion in granting additional award—Record did not contain some
        evidence supporting Industrial Commission’s finding that purpose of an
        outdoor yard where vehicles were stored or staged for transport was
        conducting type of work that would classify the outdoor yard as a
        “workshop” under Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5—Industrial
        Commission erred by deciding that claimant was injured in a “workshop,”
        and this conclusion precludes a finding that employer failed to comply with
        Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4)—Court of appeals’ judgment granting
        writ of mandamus affirmed.
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 (No. 2022-1208—Submitted November 14, 2023—Decided February 14, 2024.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
                              No. 21AP-93, 2022-Ohio-2936.
                                    __________________
         Per Curiam.
         {¶ 1} This case is a direct appeal from an original action in mandamus filed
by appellee, Cassens Corp., a self-insuring employer, in the Tenth District Court of
Appeals. The Tenth District granted a writ of mandamus compelling appellant,
Industrial Commission of Ohio, to vacate its order finding that Cassens had violated
a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”) and granting an application for an
additional workers’ compensation award. The commission appealed to this court.
Because the commission abused its discretion by finding that Cassens had violated
Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4), Cassens is entitled to a writ of mandamus. We
affirm the Tenth District’s judgment.
                                      BACKGROUND
         {¶ 2} Cassens provides transport services for automobile manufacturers by
transporting vehicles from the manufacturers’ factories to dealerships and other
sellers. In February 2018, Luis Ybarra1 was working as a driver for Cassens at the
Chrysler Group Yard in Toledo, which is completely enclosed by a gated and
guarded fence. On site is a Chrysler manufacturing plant, where new vehicles are
assembled and prepared for transport to sellers. Other new vehicles are transported
to a “drop zone” in the yard by an auto-carrier truck. Cassens’s employees drive
these vehicles from the plant or the drop zone to a large outdoor parking lot, where
the vehicles are temporarily stored until they are ready to be transported to sellers.
When the vehicles are ready to be transported, Cassens’s employees drive the

1. Ybarra, a named respondent in the mandamus action, did not file a notice of appeal from the court
of appeals’ judgment and has not filed a brief or otherwise appeared in this court in this matter.

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                                    January Term, 2024

vehicles from the parking lot to a staging area, where they are loaded onto auto-
carrier trucks or trains and then transported to their final destinations.
        {¶ 3} On February 5, 2018, after driving to and parking a vehicle in the
staging area, Ybarra was walking back in the yard to get another vehicle when he
was struck from behind by a Dodge Durango being driven by a coworker, causing
multiple injuries to Ybarra’s body. The coworker had failed to clear snow and ice
from the windshield of the Durango and had not seen Ybarra. By failing to clear
the windshield, the coworker violated Cassens’s company policy and contractual
rules, and the coworker was terminated from his employment. Ybarra’s workers’
compensation claim was allowed for numerous conditions.
        {¶ 4} In September 2019, Ybarra filed an application for an additional
workers’ compensation award, alleging that his injuries were the result of Cassens’s
violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4).2                  Ohio Adm.Code Chapter
4123:1-5 applies “to all workshops and factories subject to the Workers’
Compensation Act.” Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(A). At the time of the collision
that caused Ybarra’s injuries, former Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4) provided,
“General requirements for motor vehicles and mobile mechanized equipment. * *
* All cab glass shall be safety glass or equivalent with the vision unimpaired by its
condition.” 2015-2016 Ohio Monthly Record 2-4544, effective June 1, 2016.3
        {¶ 5} A staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the commission found that “the
Chrysler yard’s perimeter was fenced with gates for entry and exit, which were
guarded and not open to unauthorized people”; that Cassens’s “business operations

2. Ybarra subsequently amended his application to add a claim for an alleged violation of Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(7), pertaining to audible or visual warning devices on a motor vehicle.
Ybarra later withdrew this claim.

3. Today, Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4) similarly provides, “General specifications for motor
vehicles and mobile mechanized equipment. * * * All cab glass will be safety glass or equivalent
with the vision unimpaired by its condition.” 2022-2023 Ohio Monthly Record 2-3157, effective
June 30, 2023.

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

at the Chrysler yard were always conducted outside in the parking lot within an
approximately one-half mile area where vehicles were staged for transport by
railcar or carrier truck”; and that these “facts set forth are sufficient to classify the
Chrysler yard as a ‘workshop’ ” under Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(A). The SHO
further found that the Durango that struck Ybarra was a “motor vehicle” regulated
by Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4); that Cassens violated that regulation
because “the snow on the windshield created a condition on the [cab] glass which
impaired vision”; and that because Cassens did not comply with the specific safety
requirement, any issue of the coworker’s negligence, as argued by Cassens, was
rendered moot. The SHO granted Ybarra’s application for the additional award,
and the commission denied further review.
        {¶ 6} Cassens filed a complaint in the Tenth District requesting a writ of
mandamus to compel the commission to vacate the order that granted the additional
award and to refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens in accordance
with the commission’s order. The Tenth District granted the writ, concluding that
the commission had abused its discretion in finding that “the Chrysler outdoor yard
constituted a workshop within the meaning of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5”
and that in light of the commission’s abuse of discretion in finding the yard to be a
workshop, Cassens could not have committed a VSSR under Ohio Adm.Code
4123:1-5-13(C)(4). 2022-Ohio-2936, 195 N.E.3d 214, ¶ 14.
        {¶ 7} The commission appealed to this court as of right and asserts two
propositions of law:

                1. An enclosed, restricted, and fenced-in area, where motor
        vehicles are used as an integral and primary part of the Employer’s
        work process, constitutes a workshop or factory.
                2. The Tenth District was in error when it found that the
        place of the enclosed, outdoor staging area, where Ybarra did his

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                                January Term, 2024

       manual labor of moving motor vehicles, was not “a room or place
       wherein power-driven machinery is employed and manual labor is
       exercised by way of trade for gain or otherwise.”

We decline to adopt either proposition of law.
                                    ANALYSIS
       {¶ 8} Cassens is entitled to a writ of mandamus if it shows by clear and
convincing evidence that it has a clear legal right to the requested relief, that the
commission has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and that there is no adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Zarbana Industries, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm., 166 Ohio St.3d 216, 2021-Ohio-3669, 184 N.E.3d 81, ¶ 10.
       {¶ 9} R.C. 4123.512(A) provides for the right to appeal a commission’s
final order “in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to
the extent of disability.” Appellate review is limited to “decisions involving a
claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate” in the workers’
compensation fund. Afrates v. Lorain, 63 Ohio St.3d 22, 584 N.E.2d 1175 (1992),
paragraph one of the syllabus, citing former R.C. 4123.519 (renumbered as R.C.
4123.512, effective Oct. 20, 1993, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2990, 3153-3156). Because the commission’s decision regarding a VSSR does not
involve a claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate in the fund, it
is not appealable under R.C. 4123.512(A) and must be challenged by a writ of
mandamus. See State ex rel. B & C Machine Co. v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d
538, 540-541, 605 N.E.2d 372 (1992).
       {¶ 10} In a direct appeal of a mandamus action originating in a court of
appeals, we review the judgment as if the action had been originally filed here.
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 164, 228 N.E.2d 631
(1967). A writ of mandamus may lie when there is a legal basis to compel the
commission to perform its duties under the law or when the commission has abused

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

its discretion in carrying out its duties. State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus.
Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 9. “Where a
commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, even
evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the
order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.” State ex rel.
Mobley v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584, 679 N.E.2d 300 (1997). But “[a]
mandatory writ may issue against the Industrial Commission if the commission has
incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.” State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41
Ohio St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975).
       {¶ 11} Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution allows for an award
of additional compensation to a worker who sustains injuries as a result of a “failure
of the employer to comply with any specific requirement,” i.e., a VSSR. See R.C.
4121.47(A) (“No employer shall violate a specific safety rule adopted by the
administrator of workers’ compensation pursuant to section 4121.13 of the Revised
Code or an act of the general assembly to protect the lives, health, and safety of
employees pursuant to Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution”). A VSSR
award “is in the nature of a penalty, and it was the purpose of the Constitution to
impose such penalty upon the employer who failed to comply, and not upon him
who did comply.” State ex rel. Whitman v. Indus. Comm., 131 Ohio St. 375, 379,
3 N.E.2d 52 (1936). It is therefore imperative that a safety requirement “be specific
enough to ‘ “plainly * * * apprise an employer of [its] legal obligations towards
[its] employees.” ’ ” State ex rel. Double v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 13,
16-17, 599 N.E.2d 259 (1992), quoting State ex rel. Frank Brown & Sons, Inc. v.
Indus. Comm., 37 Ohio St.3d 162, 163, 524 N.E.2d 482 (1988), quoting State ex
rel. Holdosh v. Indus. Comm., 149 Ohio St. 179, 78 N.E.2d 165 (1948), syllabus.
“[A]n employer should not have to speculate as to whether it falls within the class
of employers to whom a specific safety requirement applies.” Double at 17; accord

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                               January Term, 2024

State ex rel. Johnson v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 95 Ohio St.3d 36, 39-40, 765
N.E.2d 323 (2002).
       {¶ 12} To prevail on a VSSR claim, the claimant must establish that an
applicable specific safety requirement was in effect at the time of the injury, that
the employer failed to comply with the requirement, and that the failure to comply
proximately caused the injury. State ex rel. Sunesis Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm.,
152 Ohio St.3d 297, 2018-Ohio-3, 95 N.E.3d 377, ¶ 23.
       {¶ 13} The specific provisions of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5 “apply
to all workshops and factories subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(A).       The commission premised its finding that Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4) applies here by reasoning that Ybarra was injured in
a “workshop,” which is a term not defined in any applicable Administrative Code
or Revised Code section. When a term is undefined in the Administrative Code or
in the Revised Code, it must be read in its context and in accordance with grammar
rules and common usage. R.C. 1.42 and 1.41; Harris v. Hilderbrand, 172 Ohio
St.3d 471, 2023-Ohio-3005, 224 N.E.3d 1118, ¶ 26; State ex rel. Internatl. Assn. of
Fire Fighters, Local 1536, AFL-CIO v. Sakacs, 172 Ohio St.3d 462, 2023-Ohio-
2976, 224 N.E.3d 1110, ¶ 17.
       {¶ 14} We have previously embraced the following dictionary definition of
“workshop” for purposes of Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5: “ ‘Within
Workmen’s Compensation Acts, a room or place wherein power-driven machinery
is employed and manual labor is exercised by way of trade for gain or otherwise.’
” State ex rel. Buurma Farms, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 69 Ohio St.3d 111, 113, 630
N.E.2d 686 (1994), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1781 (4th Ed.Rev.1968); see
Double, 65 Ohio St.3d at 15, 599 N.E.2d 259; State ex rel. Waugh v. Indus. Comm.,
77 Ohio St.3d 453, 455, 674 N.E.2d 1385 (1997). Under this definition, we have
held that while a “workshop” does not have to be located indoors, Johnson, 95 Ohio

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                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

St.3d at 41, 765 N.E.2d 323, it must be “located within some form of structural
enclosure,” Waugh at 454.4
         {¶ 15} As noted by the Tenth District, the Black’s Law Dictionary
definition of “workshop” is consistent with the definition set forth in Webster’s
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary: “ ‘[a] small establishment where manufacturing
or handicrafts are carried on.’ ” State ex rel. Wiers Farm Co. v. Indus. Comm., 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 92AP-391, 1993 WL 120068, *2 (Apr. 13, 1993), quoting
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1360 (1987), aff’d, 69 Ohio St.3d 569,
634 N.E.2d 1019 (1994); see State ex rel. Haire v. Indus. Comm., 154 Ohio App.3d
82, 2003-Ohio-4570, 796 N.E.2d 67, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). Similarly, Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 2635 (2002) defines “workshop” as “a small
establishment where manufacturing or craftwork is carried on by a proprietor with
or without helpers and often without power machinery.”
         {¶ 16} Here, the court of appeals determined that “there was not some
evidence to support a finding that the purpose of the outdoor yard was conducting
the type of work that would classify the outdoor yard as a workshop” and that “[t]he
commission placed too much emphasis on the presence of the perimeter fence.”
2022-Ohio-2936, 195 N.E.3d 214, at ¶ 14. We agree. The mere presence of a
guarded and gated perimeter fence, in and of itself, is not sufficient to classify the
enclosure as a “workshop” under Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5. There is no
evidence in this record that Cassens’s business is one of craftwork, trade, or
manufacturing, with or without power machinery. The vehicles are manufactured

4. An exception to the general terms of former Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5 (renumbered as
4123:1-5, 2003-2004 Ohio Monthly Record 1166-1169, effective Nov. 1, 2003) was recognized in
State ex rel. Parks v. Indus. Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 22, 706 N.E.2d 774 (1999). We held in that case
that the specific safety requirements of former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-5-23(E) (renumbered as
4123:1-5-23(E), 2003-2004 Ohio Monthly Record 1168, 1295-1296, effective Nov. 1, 2003) are not
limited to “workshops and factories,” because the special requirements of that provision “apply only
to the electric utility and clearance tree-trimming industries,” which are activities that cannot be
performed indoors, Parks at 25-26.

                                                 8
                                     January Term, 2024

and assembled by Chrysler’s employees, not by Cassens’s employees. Cassens’s
employees drive the new vehicles from either the plant or the drop zone to a large
outdoor parking lot for temporary storage, then to a staging area where the vehicles
are loaded onto auto-carrier trucks or trains. Indeed, the commission admits in its
reply brief that Cassens’s “primary business was only to move the manufactured
motor vehicles.” (Emphasis sic.)
        {¶ 17} The commission argues that the court of appeals erred by refusing to
follow State ex rel. Petrie v. Atlas Iron Processors, Inc., 85 Ohio St.3d 372, 708
N.E.2d 716 (1999), in which we held that perimeter fencing rendered the
employer’s outdoor scrapyard a “structural enclosure sufficient to classify it as a
‘workshop’ ” under former Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4121:1-5. Id. at 373.5 The
record in Petrie supported a finding that the fence “set forth the boundaries of work
activity,” “served to keep unauthorized nonemployees out,” and “established its
confines as a place accessible only to employees for the purpose of carrying out the
company’s business.” Id. The employee in Petrie was injured while removing ice
and frozen debris from a moving conveyor used for sorting scrap metal. Id. at 372.
Unlike here, there was no dispute in that case about whether the purpose of the
scrapyard was to conduct the type of work that would classify the scrapyard as a
“workshop,” and we did not make a determination in that regard. Thus, Petrie does
not control here.
        {¶ 18} We conclude that the commission erred by deciding that Ybarra was
injured in a “workshop.” Because this conclusion precludes a finding that Cassens
failed to comply with Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4), Cassens has a clear legal

5. The commission contends that we rejected prior case law in Petrie by not citing Buurma Farms,
Waugh, and Double. In Buurma Farms, the employee was injured within a three-sided building.
69 Ohio St.3d at 111-112, 630 N.E.2d 686. In Waugh, the employee was not injured within any
kind of structural enclosure. 77 Ohio St.3d at 453, 674 N.E.2d 1385. And in Double, the employer
was subject to regulations governing construction safety, not workshop and factory safety. 65 Ohio
St.3d at 16, 599 N.E.2d 259. We did not explicitly overrule these cases in Petrie. And because each
of these decisions are inapposite to Petrie, the commission’s contention has no merit.

                                                9
                                  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

right to an order finding it not liable for the alleged VSSR and the commission has
a clear legal duty to vacate its order that found otherwise. Cassens is entitled to a
writ of mandamus.
         {¶ 19} As alternative bases for affirming the court of appeals’ judgment,
Cassens asserts two propositions of law in its merit brief arguing first that Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4) does not apply to the temporary accumulation of
snow on the Durango that struck Ybarra and second that Cassens cannot be held
liable for the coworker’s actions when the coworker violated Cassens’s work rules
and Cassens had no knowledge of the violation. The court of appeals did not
address either of these arguments, determining that its holding on the “workshop”
issue rendered them moot. See 2022-Ohio-2936, 195 N.E.3d 214, at ¶ 15. R.C.
2505.22 allows an appellee to assert assignments of error without filing a cross-
appeal to preserve the lower court’s judgment, see, e.g., State ex rel. Chrysler Corp.
v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 158, 167, 689 N.E.2d 951 (1998), but the
assignments of error “may be considered by a reviewing court only when necessary
to prevent a reversal of the judgment under review,” Parton v. Weilnau, 169 Ohio
St. 145, 158 N.E.2d 719 (1959), paragraph seven of the syllabus. Because we hold
that the commission erred by finding that Ybarra was injured in a “workshop,” it is
not necessary to consider these additional arguments raised by Cassens.6
                                        CONCLUSION
         {¶ 20} We affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment granting a
writ of mandamus. As requested in Cassens’s mandamus complaint, Cassens is
entitled to a writ that compels the commission (1) to vacate its order that granted

6. Additionally, we need not decide the extent to which we should defer to the commission’s
interpretation of a specific safety rule, see, e.g., State ex rel. Internatl. Truck & Engine Corp. v.
Indus. Comm., 122 Ohio St.3d 428, 2009-Ohio-3502, 912 N.E.2d 85, ¶ 10, after TWISM Ents.,
L.L.C. v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 172 Ohio St.3d 225,
2022-Ohio-4677, 223 N.E.3d 371, ¶ 3, because the parties did not brief this point and the case can
be resolved on other grounds.

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                             January Term, 2024

Ybarra’s application for an additional workers’ compensation award and (2) to
refund all additional compensation paid by Cassens in accordance with the
commission’s order.
                                                          Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                            _________________
       Morrow & Meyer, L.L.C., Susan Chae Rank, and Corey V. Crognale, for
appellee.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellant.
                            _________________

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