Court Opinion

ID: 9368237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 15:05:33.13898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.447091
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2021-CA-1512-MR

DOUGLAS HODGE                                                           APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-00814

KENTUCKY PAROLE BOARD                                                      APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Douglas Hodge (hereinafter “Hodge”) appeals the Kenton

Circuit Court’s affirmance of the Kentucky Parole Board’s revocation of his parole

after finding he violated his parole by absconding. Having reviewed the record,

the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the circuit court.
                                          FACTS

              Hodge was convicted in 2012 of various non-violent offenses and was

sentenced to serve a total term of twenty (20) years’ imprisonment.1 He was

recommended for parole by the Kentucky Parole Board (hereinafter “the Board”)

in February of 2020.

              In August of 2020, Hodge began having issues which affected his

ability to remain compliant with the requirements of his release. Hodge had been

paroled to his father’s home upon his release from prison; his father was the victim

in his underlying crimes of theft, which caused concern for his parole officer when

he started having a difficult time living with his father. The parole officer

recommended that it would be best if Hodge found another place to reside, and he

later reported to her that he had moved into his cousin’s apartment.

              On August 27, 2020, the parole officer attempted a home visit at this

new address, but no one answered the door. The officer left a door tag directing

Hodge to report to her office but later that day received a call from the resident of

1
 Hodge was convicted of two counts of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the
Second degree; Theft by Deception over $500 but less than $10,000; Tampering with Physical
Evidence; Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition over $500 but less than $10,000 by
complicity; Operating a Motor Vehicle while under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs, fourth or
greater offense; and Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First degree, first offense.

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the apartment who told her that he did not know Hodge and he didn’t live at the

address.2

              When Hodge called his parole officer later that day, he would not tell

her where he was staying. The officer told him he must come to her office to

report in person the next morning, but he said he would instead come to her office

several days later. The parole officer obtained a parole violation warrant on

August 31, 2020, due to Hodge’s refusal to inform her of his present residence, as

is required. He thereafter failed to appear at her office several days later on the day

when he had told her he would report.

              The warrant charged that Hodge had violated his parole by:

              1. Absconding;

              2. Failing to report change in home address to parole officer;

              3. Leaving the state without permission of parole officer.3

              Following a preliminary hearing, the Administrative Law Judge

determined that probable cause had been established that Hodge was in violation

for absconding and failing to report the change in home address. A final

2
 Apparently, the tag was left on the door of apartment #1 and the cousin and Hodge lived in
apartment #3.
3
  This allegation was based upon a conversation Hodge had with an employee of Recovery
Works, an intensive outpatient addiction treatment provider. He indicated to the employee that
he was in Ohio. The Recovery Works employee reported this to his parole officer. Additionally,
the parole officer discovered through investigation that Hodge had used his father’s credit card,
without his father’s permission, to buy a Greyhound bus ticket.

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revocation hearing was held before a different Administrative Law Judge who

determined a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that Hodge

had violated his parole only by absconding. The Board upheld this finding and

concluded, based upon Hodge’s failure to inform his parole officer of his

whereabouts, that he had absconded. The Board determined that Hodge was

therefore not able to be managed on supervision and posed a significant risk to the

community and deferred reconsideration of parole for twenty-four months.

              Hodge filed a petition for declaration of rights in Kenton Circuit

Court. The Parole Board moved to dismiss the petition while Hodge moved for

summary judgment. The Kenton Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss,

which Hodge hereby appeals. We affirm.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

              When we are reviewing the dismissal or entry of summary judgment

by a lower court on appeal from an administrative action, appellate review consists

of a determination of whether the petition before the lower court raised specific,

genuine issues of material fact sufficient to overcome the presumption of the

propriety of the agency’s action. See Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Ky.

App. 1997).

                                          -4-
                                     ANALYSIS

             Hodge alleges that the procedures employed by the Parole Board in

determining whether his parole should be revoked did not meet minimal due

process standards. The circuit court held that the two-hearing process, followed by

review of the decisions of the Administrative Law Judges by the full Board,

complied with the dictates of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593,

33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972). We agree with the circuit court.

             Hodge complains that because the full Board relied upon the record

developed by the Administrative Law Judges at the two hearings, and did not itself

receive evidence or argument concerning the allegations, the procedure failed to

provide him adequate due process. He complains he was not provided an

opportunity to argue that revocation was not the appropriate result and was forced

to argue against both the underlying allegations and the proper determination at

once. He claims this is deficient to satisfy the dictates of procedural due process.

We disagree.

             The first administrative hearing held in the matter met the dictates of

Jones v. Bailey, 576 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2019). The first hearing is held only to

determine if probable cause exists to proceed with the revocation. “This minimal

inquiry is to determine if probable cause or reasonable grounds exist to believe that

the offender did in fact commit the acts that constitute a violation, with the

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probable cause determination being sufficient to hold the parolee for the Parole

Board’s final revocation decision.” Id. at 137 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485,

487, 92 S. Ct. at 2602).

             After a determination that probable cause has been established, a

second, fuller hearing is held before the decision to revoke can be made.

             Tasked with deciding the minimum due process
             requirements and noting that writing a procedure code is
             the responsibility of each state, the Morrissey Court held
             that the final, fact-finding hearing must be held within a
             reasonable time after the offender is taken into custody,
             and then summarized the final hearing minimum
             requirements as including:

                   (a) written notice of the claimed violations of
                       parole . . . ;

                   (b) disclosure to the parolee . . . of evidence against
                       him;

                   (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
                       witnesses and documentary evidence;

                   (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse
                       witnesses (unless the hearing officer
                       specifically finds good cause for not allowing
                       confrontation);

                   (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body such as a
                       traditional parole board, members of which
                       need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and

                   (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
                       evidence relied on and reasons for revoking
                       parole[.]

                                         -6-
                       408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593.

Id. at 138.

Neither Morrissey nor Jones require that this second, final hearing be conducted

before the Board; only that it be conducted with proper notice and procedures.4

               Hodge was notified in writing of the alleged violations found after the

first hearing was held. The notification included a recitation of the proof against

him, which was the testimony of the parole officer and the employee of Recovery

Works. Hodge was provided an opportunity to provide evidence and did so. He

was also able to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The Administrative Law

Judge was a neutral and detached hearing officer who provided written findings

supporting his conclusion. This second hearing complied with the requirements of

due process.

               He argues that compliance with the dictates of Morrissey would

require that the Board inform the parolee concerning their determination of

4
  “Unless the Board has received new evidence or information submitted in writing in advance
of the final revocation hearing or a special hearing is held at the Board’s discretion, and unless an
exception is met, the Parole Board considers only the evidence in the administrative record made
before the ALJ to determine what action should be taken . . . .” Jones, 576 S.W.3d at 141.

“We have no thought to create an inflexible structure for parole revocation procedures. The few
basic requirements set out above, which are applicable to future revocations of parole, should not
impose a great burden on any State’s parole system. Control over the required proceedings by
the hearing officers can assure that delaying tactics and other abuses sometimes present in the
traditional adversary trial situation do not occur.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490, 92 S. Ct. at 2604-
05.

                                                -7-
whether the allegations against him or her had been established in the record

below, to support a finding of a violation before a hearing is held on the proper

disposition given the violation. We disagree and find that so long as the

procedures employed give the parolee adequate notice of the allegations against

him, and an opportunity to respond thereto, adequate due process is provided. That

hearing does not have to be before the full Board. And it is not improper for the

Board to consider both the adequacy of proof of violation and proper disposition at

the same hearing.

              Hodge next alleges that there was insufficient evidence that he

absconded from parole. As the circuit court observed, it is not the place of that

court or this Court to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the Board.

“This Court will not normally reverse the decisions of the Board absent a clear

mistake in the law.” Murrell v. Kentucky Parole Board, 531 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Ky.

App. 2017). The record established by substantial evidence that when directly

asked by his parole officer where he was during the phone call, Hodge refused to

provide his location. When ordered to report to the parole office, he refused and

did not appear. We cannot say that the Board wrongfully held such amounted to

absconding.

              Likewise, it is the Board’s place to determine the appropriate

disposition once a finding of violation has been made. The Board determined that

                                         -8-
due to his intractability Hodge could not be successfully managed in the

community. We will not upset that determination.

                                      CONCLUSION

             The procedures utilized in revoking Hodge’s parole met minimal

procedural due process standards and the Board’s determination was supported by

substantial evidence. We affirm the Kenton Circuit Court’s order dismissing his

petition for declaration of rights.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Phillip West                              Edward A. Baylous II
 Frankfort, Kentucky                       Frankfort, Kentucky

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