Court Opinion

ID: 9750294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:47:19.419782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:06.658137
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the Majority Opinion because I believe that the rules of Criminal Procedure and the relevant case-law, from both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this court, require a contrary result. Where the Commonwealth makes a non-binding recommendation as part of the plea bargain and the trial court elects to reject that recommendation, the court should advise the defendant of its decision refusing to adopt the recommendation and allow the defendant’s plea to be withdrawn. Any contrary result creates a situation where a defendant has, in fact, received no plea “bargain” and may give up substantial rights on a promise which has no effect.
In the instant case the charges lodged against Appellant stemmed from two separate bank robberies in which it was alleged that Appellant demanded a certain sum of money from a bank teller. Appellant entered a guilty plea to both charges pursuant to an agreement that the Commonwealth would come before the court at sentencing and recommend that the sentences on the two counts run concurrently. During the colloquy Appellant was advised that the sentencing judge could “reject our recommendations and impose any sentence up to the maximum allowed by law.” N.T. 5/6/89 at 9. Likewise the Appellant signed a form which contained the following language:
I understand that the Judge is not bound by the terms of any plea bargain unless he chooses to accept it. The Judge will announce his decision at the conclusion of the plea colloquy which follows my signing this paper. If the Commonwealth agrees to make a sentencing recommendation on my behalf, the Judge will not be bound by this recommendation and I understand that I will not be *488permitted to withdraw my guilty/no contest plea if this should occur.
A nearly identical form was presented to a defendant in the case of Commonwealth v. Osteen, 381 Pa.Super. 120, 552 A.2d 1124 (1989). In that case, as in the one before us, the defendant was told that the judge was not bound by the Commonwealth’s recommended sentence. On appeal the defendant made a claim that his sentences were excessive since the court had rejected the prosecution’s sentencing recommendations. This court found that the appellant’s claim was not a challenge to the excessiveness of the sentence; rather, it was addressing the validity of the plea. The court ruled that “[i]f, in fact, the plea agreement had been violated, the proper course for appellant to have taken would have been to move to withdraw his ‘no contest’ plea within ten days of sentencing. No such motion was filed.” Id., 381 Pa.Superior Ct. at 552 A.2d 1127 (citations omitted.) Although not instrumental to its decision, the Osteen court further stated, that a motion to withdraw would not have been appropriate in the case because “appellant received precisely what he was promised under the plea agreement.” Id. Since the prosecutor did as promised and made the recommendation, the court found that the plea bargain created no expectation as to the actual sentence and that the appellant could not have been permitted to withdraw his plea “based upon the the trial court’s rejection of the prosecution’s recommendation____” Id., 381 Pa.Superior Ct. at 522 A.2d 1128.
I conclude that this language contained in Osteen was contrary to established case-law and, to the extent that it provides otherwise, Osteen should be overruled. A refusal to permit a withdrawal of a plea after a court refuses to accept the terms of a plea agreement, including a sentencing recommendation, violates Pa.R.Crim.P. 319(b). That rule provides:
(b) Plea Agreements.
(1) The trial judge shall not participate in the plea negotiations preceding an agreement.
(2) When counsel for both sides have arrived at a plea agreement they shall state on the record in open court, in *489the presence of the defendant, the terms of the agreement. Thereupon the judge shall conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether he understands and concurs in the agreement.
(3) If the judge is satisfied that the plea is understandingly and voluntarily tendered, he may accept the plea. If thereafter the judge decides not to concur in the plea agreement, he shall permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
(emphasis added.)
In the case before us, unlike Osteen, Appellant did file a motion to withdraw his plea within 10 days of his sentencing. Appellant alleged that his plea agreement was well reasoned since in return for the recommended concurrent sentences the Commonwealth obtained his guilty plea to robbery in a case where the facts indicated little evidence of force or threat of force. In his motion Appellant states that the court was apprised of the fact that the plea agreement recommended concurrent sentences and that the court did not give any indication that it would reject this recommendation when accepting his plea; but later, at sentencing, made such a rejection.
Appellant’s allegations are supported by the record. At sentencing the court went on to discuss that Appellant a 30 year old married father of six children, who was employed and had obtained an associates degree from college, had no prior criminal history whatsoever. Nevertheless, despite these facts and the Commonwealth’s recommendation, the court stated: “having considered all of those things, [the cou:V] finds that it cannot accept the position of the Commonwealth that concurrent sentences are in order.” N.T. 5/12/89 at 17. Although the court was free to refuse to accept the Commonwealth recommendation which was the basis of the plea bargain, Appellant was entitled to withdraw his plea in this event.
Rule 319(b)(3) states that a judge may accept the plea, but that if he or she later decides not to concur in the plea *490agreement, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw the plea. The “agreement” of which Rule 310 speaks encompasses situations such as the instant one where the basis of the agreement is a promised recommendation. In Commonwealth v. Bennett, 512 Pa. 525, 517 A.2d 1248 (1986) our supreme court stated:
The Commonwealth initially argues that Rule 319(b)(3) does not apply to the type of plea agreement involved herein, which it characterizes as a mere non-binding, open-ended recommendation. The Commonwealth’s argument is without merit. The comment to Rule 319 states that the terms of a plea agreement as contemplated by the rule include promises of a charge reduction, the dropping of charges, and the promise of ‘a recommendation of a lenient sentence. ’
Id., 512 Pa. at 532, 517 A.2d at 1251. (emphasis added.)
The Bennett court in its decision cited with approval a superior court case, Commonwealth v. Fazenbaker, 248 Pa.Super. 433, 375 A.2d 175 (1977). Therein the trial court accepted a guilty plea and then later sentenced the defendant in excess of the Commonwealth’s promised recommendation. The judge at sentencing stated that he acknowledged the recommendation made by the district attorney, but declined to follow the plea bargain. Upon review the superior court found that Rule 319(b)(3) requires that when a court rejects the terms of a plea agreement, it must grant a timely petition for withdrawal of the guilty plea. The Fazenbaker court stated:
It is necessary corollary to Rule 319(b)(3) that if the court decides not to accept the recommended disposition of the plea agreement it must make its decision known to the defendant and his counsel before sentencing so that the defendant has an opportunity to petition to withdraw the plea.
Id., 248 Pa.Superior Ct. at 436, 375 A.2d at 176.
The same rationale was applied by this court in an earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Sutherland, 234 Pa.Super. *491520, 340 A.2d 582 (1975). There the court acknowledged that “a sentence recommendation is among the ‘terms’ of a plea bargain and the Rule provides that if the judge cannot concur in the bargain, he must afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw.” Id., 234 Pa.Superior Ct. at 525, 340 A.2d at 584-585.
As these cases demonstrate, Rule 319(b)(3) requires the judge to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea where the judge is unable to comply with the agreement on which the plea was based. The agreement in this case recommended that concurrent sentences be imposed. The sentencing court acknowledged this recommendation but refused to accept it. Under these circumstances rule 319(b)(3), and the case-law interpreting it, require that Appellant be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The Rule grants Appellant this right which he sought to exercise, and he must be permitted to withdraw his plea despite being informed otherwise. Appellant gave up his right to a jury trial in return for a recommended sentence. Although Appellant was promised only a recommendation, when the court determined that it would not carry through with this recommendation, it should have advised appellant of its decision and should then have called upon him to affirm or withdraw his plea. By doing this before imposing sentence, the defendant would not be using the plea to test the sentence. Also, I would point out that the Majority’s distinction between an agreed to sentence and a recommended sentence is a distinction without a difference, since the Commonwealth cannot guarantee that the trial court would be bound in either case. Even a sentence agreed to by the Commonwealth is only a recommendation to the trial judge. In my view, the defendant is not bargaining for a recommendation but is, in reality, bargaining for a sentence. Because the court did not agree with the recommendation and did not inform Appellant of its position before sentencing, I would vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to permit Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
FORD ELLIOTT, J., joins.