Court Opinion

ID: 9607733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:01:33.089382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.806583
License: Public Domain

*23JACKSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. Although I agree that the interpretation of whether parole eligibility statutes are properly applied may be a question of law subject to the Declaratory Judgment Act, I would hold that the complaint in the instant case is properly a matter for a motion for appropriate relief, and that the trial court’s order was an impermissible collateral attack on plaintiff’s conviction. I also believe it is necessary to clarify the factual background of this case.
During a 24 June 1996 status review, a parole case analyst certified plaintiff’s parole eligibility date as 23 September 2012, and noted that his eligibility was limited to 270 days prior to his release date due to the second-degree kidnapping conviction. Subsequently, plaintiff’s parole eligibility date was recalculated erroneously as 10 December 2000 due to a computer error. As a result, plaintiff was transferred to a minimum security prison and granted work release.
The computer error was discovered on 26 July 2000. The error was corrected in the “test region” of the Offender Population Unified System (“OPUS”) — DOC’s inmate tracking system — on 4 August 2000, but the technician noted that he did not know when it would be “placed in production.” The 22 August 2000 letter informing plaintiff of a 10 December 2000 parole eligibility date was based on a review of plaintiff’s computer record on 11 August 2000 — apparently before the correction had been “placed in production.” As a result of the correction, plaintiff was returned to medium security, and his work release privilege was revoked. This correction was explained to plaintiff in a letter dated 28 November 2000. No parole eligibility date was given to plaintiff at that time. The 2 September 2011 parole eligibility date stated in the majority’s recitation of the facts is shown on a 5 June 2002 OPUS printout prepared as an attachment to a motion for summary judgment served on plaintiff on 17 June 2002 in conjunction with one of plaintiff’s federal cases explained below.
Between the time the computer error was corrected and the filing of the instant action, plaintiff made several attempts to clarify his parole eligibility date. Reference to the following facts is not intended to serve as part of our review. These facts are included merely to illustrate plaintiff’s history on this subject. Although the facts are not contained within the record on appeal brought before this Court in the instant appeal, as the majority opinion concedes, appellate courts may take judicial notice of their own filings in interrelated proceed*24ings, and on “any occasion where the existence of a particular fact is importantf.]” West v. Reddick, Inc., 302 N.C. 201, 203, 274 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1981) (citation omitted). I believe these facts are important to a clear understanding of the factual background of this case. To reiterate, I do not base my opinion on matters outside the record, but provide the information as background for a more complete history of events leading up to the instant appeal.
First, plaintiff filed a state habeas corpus action in Mecklenburg County on 3 January 2001, which was denied on 9 February 2001 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Second, he filed two prison grievances. The first was filed 28 January 2001 and alleged that plaintiffs case analyst had changed his sentence. It was denied, twice appealed, and ultimately dismissed on 21 March 2001. The second was filed 3 November 2001 and alleged his sentence was not properly reflected in DOC’s records. It was denied also, twice appealed, and ultimately denied on 11 January 2002.
On 29 March 2001, plaintiff filed a federal habeas corpus action in the Western District of North Carolina (“Western District”) pursuant to section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code. Plaintiff alleged that the recalculation of his parole eligibility date violated his Fifth Amendment rights and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment against plaintiff and dismissed plaintiff’s habeas corpus petition. Linberger v. York, No. 3:01CV151-1-MU (W.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2003).
Plaintiff also filed a federal discrimination action in the Middle District of North Carolina (“Middle District”), pursuant to section 1983 of Title.42 of the United States Code. The federal magistrate stated in his recommendation: “Under §.1983, Plaintiff cannot obtain the principal relief that he appears to seek — recalculation of his parole eligibility date to the December 2000 date that he believes is proper.” The magistrate recommended that summary judgment be granted against plaintiff and that the action be dismissed. Lineberger v. York, No. 1:02CV210 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2003). Plaintiff objected to the recommendation, and the district court made a de novo determination, adopting the magistrate’s recommendation. Lineberger v. York, No. 1:02CV210 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2003).
Both federal actions were appealed. The Western District appeal was dismissed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lineberger v. York, 81 Fed. Appx. 460 (4th Cir. 2003), and a petition for rehearing *25en banc was denied. Lineberger v. York, No. 03-6456 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2003). The Middle District decision was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit in Lineberger v. York, 76 Fed. Appx. 497 (4th Cir. 2003) and a petition for rehearing en banc was denied. Lineberger v. York, No. 03-6771 (4th Cir. Nov. 4, 2003).
Plaintiff also has filed five petitions with this Court. The first, filed 14 January 2004 and captioned “Petition to Compel and Instruct,” sought an order compelling DOC to comply with his sentence as he understood it — a forty year sentence as an habitual felon, not a forty year sentence for second-degree kidnapping. The petition was dismissed on 3 February 2004 without prejudice in order to allow plaintiff to file it in the Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Apparently unknown to this Court, an identical motion already had been filed in Mecklenburg County on 13 January 2004. It was dismissed on 20 January 2004 for failure to state a cause of action. The second petition, filed with this Court on 3 February 2004, sought review of the 20 January 2004 dismissal of plaintiffs Mecklenburg County “Petition to Compel and Instruct.” We denied the petition on 20 February 2004.
Plaintiff filed his third petition on 19 April 2004 and sought a writ of mandamus to force the Mecklenburg County court to rule on his 19 February 2004 motion for appropriate relief (“MAR”) and petition to withdraw plea. This Court dismissed the petition as moot on 7 May 2004, after the lower court denied the MAR.
Plaintiff sought review of the denial of his 19 February 2004 MAR by way of his fourth petition before this Court, filed 14 May 2004. This Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari to permit our review. In plaintiffs MAR, he sought to withdraw his plea pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, sections 15A-1415(b)(3) and (5). Section 15A-1415(b)(3).allows a defendant to file an MAR more than ten days after entry of judgment when “[t]he conviction was obtained in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(b)(3) (2003). Section 15A-1415(b)(5) permits the filing of an MAR more than ten days after entry of judgment when “[t]he conduct for which the defendant was prosecuted was protected by the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of North Carolina.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1415(b)(5) (2003). The Mecklenburg County Superior Court had denied plaintiffs MAR on 27 April 2004, concluding that it did not state a cause of action in the cause for which the court could provide relief.
*26Finally, plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus by his fifth petition, filed 14 February 2005, to compel a ruling in Wake County Superior Court as to whether he could proceed as an indigent in his declaratory judgment action. On 1 March 2005, this petition also was denied. Defendant had presented a pro se declaratory judgment complaint to the Wake County Superior Court on 25 June 2004. The complaint in the instant case was filed by plaintiffs attorney on 23 November 2005.
The majority contends that because the validity of plaintiffs sentence was not challenged in the declaratory judgment action, there is no collateral attack on the sentence imposed by Judge Lewis in Mecklenburg County on 5 January 1994. A collateral attack is “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal; especially] an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the ground of the proceeding (or a defense in the proceeding) is that the judgment is ineffective.” Black’s Law Dictionary 278 (8th ed. 2004).
Although he did not ask the trial court to invalidate his sentence by way of his declaratory judgment action, plaintiff effectively challenged the validity of his sentence in seeking to have his parole eligibility date determined, in part because of his allegation that his sentence violated the Fair Sentencing Act. Conclusions of law numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the trial court’s order discuss the statute allegedly violated and conclude that “the most that can be said is that fifteen (15) years of the forty (40) year sentence should be treated as a sentence for kidnapping.” The trial court could not reach this conclusion without attacking the sentence imposed on 5 January 1994. The order also concludes that plaintiff’s parole had been calculated erroneously, further evidencing the court’s intent to invalidate a portion of plaintiff’s sentence. Contrary to what the concurring opinion states, the trial court did take action or grant relief after making that “observation.” The trial court effectively ^consolidated plaintiff’s consolidated sentence.
Once a consolidated sentence is imposed, the offenses are inextricably intertwined. It is impossible for the reviewing court to go back on the cold record and parse out the intentions of the trial court at the time of sentencing. As noted in State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 213, 513 S.E.2d 57, 70 (1999), “we cannot assume that the trial court’s consideration of two offenses, as opposed to one, had no affect [sic] on the sentence imposed.” See State v. Parker, 143 N.C. App. 680, 684, 550 S.E.2d 174, 177 (2001).
*27The trial court’s conclusions of law numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 relate to issues that are properly the subject of a motion for appropriate relief. Their interrelationship with the other conclusions of law in the 23 May 2006 order render it impossible for this Court to separate the two for purposes of addressing them.
Central to the trial court’s determination in favor of plaintiff was that there was no plea agreement as to the sentence plaintiff would receive and that the sentencing court was required to make findings of aggravating factors prior to imposition of a sentence exceeding the presumptive term for each of the three counts. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4 (1993) (repealed effective 1 October 1994). However, a review of the Judgment and Commitment included in the record on appeal reveals that Judge Lewis made “no written findings because the prison term imposed is pursuant to a plea arrangement as to sentence under Article . . . G.S. Chapter 15A.” Therefore, in order to reach its conclusion that there was no plea agreement, the trial court in the instant case made a finding of fact in direct contravention of the sentencing court’s finding on 5 January 1994.
I believe that we are bound by the maxim that “[t]he power of one judge of the superior court is equal to and coordinate with that of another.” Bank v. Hanner, 268 N.C. 668, 670, 151 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1966). As such, it is well-established that one superior court judge “may not correct another’s errors of law.” State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (citation omitted).
As the trial court was bound by the sentencing court’s finding that there was a plea agreement, its conclusion that imposition of a sentence exceeding the presumptive term was incorrect. As this Court has noted previously, “Fair Sentencing . . . required written findings upon deviation from the presumptive sentence. However, Fair Sentencing provided an exception to that requirement if the court ‘imposed a prison term pursuant to any plea arrangement as to sentence.’ ” State v. Bright, 135 N.C. App. 381, 382, 520 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1999) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.4(a), (b) (repealed effective 1 October 1994)).
In interpreting plaintiff’s parole eligibility date, the trial court was bound by the sentence as given originally. The trial court was without authority to carve a fifteen-year kidnapping sentence out of plaintiff’s forty-year consolidated sentence, thus shortening the period of plaintiff’s incarceration.
*28The concurring opinion questions DOC’s characterization of plaintiff’s forty-year consolidated sentence as a “unified whole,” finding no support in Stonestreet and Brown. I find DOC’s argument compelling.
Where two or more indictments or counts are consolidated for the purpose of judgment, and a single judgment is pronounced thereon, even though the plea of guilty or conviction on one is sufficient to support the judgment and the trial thereon is free from error, the award of a new trial on the other indictment(s) or count(s) requires that the cause be remanded for proper judgment on the valid count. Presumably this (the single judgment) was based upon consideration of guilt on both charges. But the rule is otherwise when . . . separate judgments, each complete within itself, are pronounced on separate indictments or counts. In such case, a valid judgment pronounced on a plea of guilty to a valid count in a bill of indictment will be upheld.
State v. Stonestreet, 243 N.C. 28, 31, 89 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1955) (citations omitted). DOC contends, and I agree, that in essence, a consolidated sentence is a unified whole — the individual underlying indictments either stand together or fail together. As such, and because plaintiff failed to attack his sentence directly, the forty-year consolidated sentence stands as a whole, with all forty years attributable to his conviction for second-degree kidnapping, just as all forty years are attributable to his conviction for common law burglary, just as all forty years are attributable to his conviction for conspiracy to commit common law burglary.
I find no support to the contrary in Hemby or Nixon, cited in the concurring opinion. In Hemby, there were eight indictments, each carrying a presumptive term of one year. The consolidated sentences totaled eight years. Upon resentencing after six of the indictments were remanded, the new sentence remained eight years. Our Supreme Court held that this amounted to a sentence greater than that originally imposed — one year for each offense. Similarly in Nixon, there originally were three indictments carrying presumptive terms of twelve years each, consolidated for a total term of thirty-six years. When one of the indictments was invalidated, the resulting new thirty-six year sentence was held to be in violation of the Fair Sentencing Act.
These cases are inapplicable to the case before us. Here, the three indictments did not carry equal presumptive terms, but two *29terms of fifteen years and one of three years. The consolidated sentence did not total the sum of the three presumptive terms. It could not easily be divided into equal portions for each indictment. While in Hemby and Nixon there was a logical basis for apportioning the sentence evenly amongst the valid indictments, there is no such logical basis in the case sub judice. We simply cannot tell how the sentencing court apportioned the consolidated sentence among the three charges underlying it. The trial court was without authority to reapportion the sentence allocating only fifteen years of the forty to plaintiffs conviction for second-degree kidnapping.
Furthermore, North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1027, specifically prohibits such collateral attacks on convictions pursuant to guilty pleas, by stating that “[n]oncompliance with the procedures of this Article may not be a basis for review of a conviction after the appeal period for the conviction has expired.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1027 (2007). Within the appeal period, the General Assembly has provided three methods to review a guilty plea a defendant believes is inconsistent with his plea agreement. A defendant so aggrieved may (1) withdraw his plea pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1024; (2) appeal his conviction pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1444; or (3) file a petition for writ of certiorari, as provided in North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1444(e). See State v. Rush, 158 N.C. App. 738, 740, 582 S.E.2d 37, 38 (2003); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15Á-1024, 15A-1444 (2003). Although the majority distinguishes the facts of Rush from the instant case, the methods of review stated therein are correct statements of law.
Plaintiff in the case sub judice did not attempt to withdraw his plea pursuant to section 15A-1024. He did not appeal his conviction to this Court pursuant to section 15A-1444. Although plaintiff filed various petitions in this Court, none specifically alleged that the sentence he received upon his plea of guilty was in violation of the Fair Sentencing Act. Neither did his MAR allege such violations.
As explained above, plaintiff challenged his original sentence when he alleged in his complaint for declaratory judgment that his sentence violated the Fair Sentencing Act and sought to have the kidnapping charge separated from the other charges for purposes of determining his parole eligibility date. The alleged violation was based on his plea agreement. Because the appeal period has expired, plaintiff cannot now complain that his sentence was not in accord*30anee with his plea agreement, resulting in his kidnapping conviction being for no more than a term of fifteen years.
In part III of the opinion, the majority contends that DOC’s interpretation of the parole statutes is not reasonable. The majority agrees with plaintiff that pursuant to DOC’s interpretation, a person convicted of second-degree kidnapping as an habitual felon and sentenced to life imprisonment would be eligible for parole after serving twenty years, while the same person sentenced to forty years would not be eligible for parole until ninety days prior to completion of his forty-year term.
Pursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act, a Class C felon could be sentenced to a term of up to fifty years, or life. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-1.1(a)(3) (1994) (repealed effective 1 October 1994). Parole for Class C felons with a life sentence was governed by North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1371, which allowed parole after having served twenty years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(al) (1994) (repealed effective 1 October 1994). However, parole for Class C felons serving up to fifty years was governed by North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-1380.2, which allowed parole ninety days prior to the expiration of the sentence. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(a) (1994) (repealed effective 1 October 1994).
Both parole statutes incorporated the possibility of community service parole, except when the felon was convicted of, inter alia, kidnapping. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1371(h), 15A-1380.2(h) (1994) (repealed effective 1 October 1994). With appropriate findings of aggravating factors, a person could have been convicted solely of second-degree kidnapping as an habitual felon and sentenced to fifty years in prison. As such, he would not have been eligible for parole until he had served ninety days less than fifty years. That same person, if sentenced to life, would have been eligible for parole after serving twenty years. DOC’s interpretation is not unreasonable; the statutes themselves provide for the seemingly inconsistent result.
The majority concludes that the trial court properly applied the parole eligibility statutes. I believe the issue may be answered simply by examining North Carolina General Statutes, section 15A-I380.2(h) which states that “no prisoner convicted under... G.S. 14-39 . . . shall be eligible for community service parole.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1380.2(h) (1994) (repealed effective 1 October 1994). As *31part of his forty-year consolidated sentence, which I do not believe can be broken down into component parts, plaintiff was convicted pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 14-39. Therefore, he is not eligible for community service parole.
Finally, for the reasons stated above, I believe that we must reverse the decision of the trial court. Although the trial court could review the proper application of the parole eligibility statutes by DOC to plaintiff’s sentence, here, the trial court impermissibly engaged in a collateral attack on the underlying sentence. The majority misinterprets my position to mean that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief if DOC erroneously calculated plaintiff’s parole eligibility date. However, I believe that plaintiff would be entitled to relief if DOC erroneously calculated his parole eligibility date based on his original forty year consolidated sentence, as imposed on 5 January 1994. It is because the trial court impermissibly altered plaintiff’s sentence, in essence unconsolidating it, that the order effected a collateral attack.
Accordingly, I would reverse.