Court Opinion

ID: 9526067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:11:25.085971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:18.876364
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. Generally, a sentence on review will not be disturbed unless it is greatly at variance with the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly in excess of the proscription of the Illinois Constitution which requires that all penalties should be proportioned to the nature of the offense. (People v. Fox (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 239, 251, 269 N.E.2d 720, 728.) There are cases, however, that call for the court to modify sentences which have been imposed, even when such, sentences are within the statutory limit. (See People v. Wilkins (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 761, 344 N.E.2d 724; People v. Gill (1972), 7 Ill. App. 3d 24, 286 N.E.2d 516; People v. Golden (1971), 1 Ill. App. 3d 947, 274 N.E.2d 892 (abstract of opinion).) The consecutive sentences given defendant, although within the statutory limits, are not required to protect the public from future criminal conduct by defendant and, furthermore, do not reflect the objective of the Illinois Constitution of imposing sentences with a view toward restoring the offender to useful citizenship. The Illinois Constitution directs that all penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 11.) A 60-year sentence and a 40-year sentence to run concurrently would reflect the seriousness of the instant offenses committed and would allow defendant a chance of returning to useful citizenship as a senior citizen. The consecutive sentences, which the majority concludes are justified, equal an aggregate 100-year sentence. The consecutive sentences eliminate any possibility of defendant’s restoration to useful citizenship. His demise in prison is guaranteed. Moreover, the aggregate sentence is 70 years more than the average sentence of a convicted murderer in this State. (See Illinois Criminal Sentencing Commission Annual Report (1982).) This cannot be justified no matter how heinous the conduct of the defendant might have been. Finally, consecutive sentences are rarely appropriate (People v. Meints (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 215, 221, 355 N.E.2d 125, 130); consecutive sentences should be imposed sparingly (People v. Zadel (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 681, 683, 387 N.E.2d 1092, 1093). This court has not hesitated to modify sentences from consecutive to concurrent terms where the circumstances so require and where the objective of further protecting the public from future criminal conduct by an offender is not served. People v. Griffin (1982), 113 Ill. App. 3d 184, 193-94, 446 N.E.2d 1175, 1182. Consecutive sentences are imposed to further protect the public from future conduct of criminal offenders. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—4(b).) As indicated, defendant received a 60-year sentence for rape and a 40-year sentence for deviate sexual assault. These sentences imposed to run concurrently instead of consecutively will more than serve the purpose of protecting the public from future criminal conduct by defendant.