Court Opinion

ID: 9537051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:53.742472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:50.901994
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal by the State from an order of the district court suppressing evidence of a confession by defendant Culbertson on the basis that the State failed to prove defendant’s waiver of his right not to incriminate himself and defendant’s waiver of his right to have an attorney present. *129We reverse and remand for an additional hearing and findings of fact.
Culbertson was incarcerated in the Payette County Jail following an assault conviction and was allowed to participate in a work release program. On the morning of December 16, 1981, at 6:30 a.m., he left the jail in an attempt to find work. At some time between 6:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. of that morning, Fred Gamble was killed and his house set afire. According to Culbertson’s confession, he visited Gamble at his home, became angry with Gamble for remarks made about Culbertson’s wife, clubbed Gamble with a pipe, stabbed him, took his money, set fire to the house, went to Ontario for a cup of coffee, returned to Gamble’s house and was seen by the police.
When the police arrived at the Gamble house at approximately 8:30 a.m., Lieutenant Cordes recognized Culbertson and, knowing him to be away from his scheduled work release program, promptly revoked his work release and had him transported back to jail. The testimony of the officer is unwavering that Culbertson was not placed under arrest for anything relating to the death or fire. When asked if he was placed under arrest, Culbertson indicated, “I’m not sure if I was or not. They didn’t say I was under arrest or nothing.” Later that morning, Cordes went to the Payette County Jail and, together with police chief Moyer, questioned Culbertson. Both officers testified univoeally that the Miranda rights were read to Culbertson from a card carried by Moyer, which was introduced as an exhibit at the hearing. Culbertson was not asked to nor did he sign the card carried by Moyer from which the Miranda rights were read. When questioned thereon, Moyer merely indicated he routinely did not request such signature. Culbertson testified equivocally as to having been read his Miranda rights and, on cross-examination, indicated that he did not remember if he had been advised of his Miranda rights and that he “may have” been told he had a right to counsel. We emphasize that the trial court made no finding as to whether Culbertson was orally advised of his Miranda rights. However, the written confession signed by Culbertson stated that he had been advised of his rights.
The police officers testified unequivocally that during one point in the interrogation, Culbertson made a statement which they believed might be a request for an attorney.1 The trial court made no finding as to whether Culbertson indeed made a request for an attorney, and if such request was made, whether Culbertson subsequently re-initiated communications with the officers.
Following the hearing on defendant Culbertson’s motion to suppress the confession, the trial court granted that motion, indicating that there was conflict regarding the giving of the Miranda warnings, whether those warnings were understood, whether the defendant voluntarily resumed the conversation, and whether the confession was otherwise voluntary, and that the court could find “no basis to resolve this conflict.” The trial court opined that, although there was no lack of credibility on the part of the officers, their testimony alone could not satisfy the great burden of proof placed on the State.
We hold that the suppression of the statements in issue is governed primarily by *130Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The Supreme Court there stated that when the accused has specifically invoked his right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless he initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. It is clear that the burden rests upon the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983); State v. Padilla, 101 Idaho 713, 620 P.2d 286 (1980).
In Wyrick v. Fields,-U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), it was emphasized that Edwards does not state a per se rule but that the totality of the circumstances is controlling. See State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 661 P.2d 311 (1983); State v. Monroe, 103 Idaho 129, 645 P.2d 363 (1982). This Court, however, has not specifically defined the standard, i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, to be used in determining if an accused has waived the rights enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), the Court stated, “the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.” The Court continued:
“the exclusionary rules are very much aimed at deterring lawless conduct by police and prosecution and it is very doubtful that escalating the prosecution’s burden of proof in Fourth and Fifth Amendment suppression hearings would be sufficiently productive in this respect to outweigh the public interest in placing probative evidence before juries for the purpose of arriving at truthful decisions about guilt or innocence.”
In those other jurisdictions which have considered the matter, a majority have held that the facts in a suppression hearing may be established by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Johnson, 304 N.C. 680, 285 S.E.2d 792 (N.C.1982). See, e.g, United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Phillips, 640 F.2d 87 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991, 101 S.Ct. 2331, 68 L.Ed.2d 851 (1981); United States v. Dodier, 630 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.1980); Martinez v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411 (8th Cir.1978).
We agree with the policy reasons enunciated in Lego, and hold that the State’s burden of proof that there was a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, once an accused expresses a desire for counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation unless he initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Proof that the defendant reinitiated communication must be established by the State by a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent Culbertson also asserts that the instant appeal should have been dismissed since the Payette County prosecutor, without joining the Idaho Attorney General, filed a notice of appeal from the order suppressing the evidence. State v. Biggs, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980); State v. Ott, 100 Idaho 795, 605 P.2d 973 (1980). In the instant case, however, the Attorney General of the State of Idaho has joined and acknowledged the notice of appeal and has briefed and argued the cause. We find no error.
In accordance with the foregoing, we reverse the cause and remand it for further proceedings. Since the district judge who ordered the suppression of the evidence is now retired, we direct that a new hearing be held and that testimony be taken regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the events leading up to the defendant’s execution of the purported confessions. Following such hearing, we direct the entry of specific findings of fact determining those facts and circumstances, specifically: whether defendant Culbertson was advised of his Miranda rights, whether *131defendant Culbertson asserted his right to counsel, and if such right to counsel was asserted, whether the defendant thereafter initiated further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police officers. From those findings, the district court is directed to conclude whether any waiver of rights or privileges was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Although counsel for respondent failed to raise below or on appeal, in brief or oral argument, the possible ramifications of I.C. § 19-853, the court sua sponte has considered the possible application of said statute to the instant facts and circumstances. By the enactment of I.C. § 19-853, the Idaho legislature has codified the requirements laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). However, our legislature, in the enactment of the statute, has gone beyond the United States constitutional requirements enunciated in Miranda and has required that a person accused or detained be given such Miranda warnings in writing and that the receipt of the warning should be acknowledged. Here the Miranda warnings were not given to the defendant Culbertson in writing, although the opportunity to deliver the written warnings was clearly available to the officers. Insofar as the written acknowledgment of the receipt of such rights is concerned, the confession recites that the warnings were received and the signature of Culbertson is attached to that confession. It was held in State v. Powers, 96 Idaho 833, 537 P.2d 1369 (1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1089, 96 S.Ct. 881, 47 L.Ed.2d 99 (1976), that for the purpose of I.C. § 19-853, a person was not “detained by a law enforcement officer” when he was already incarcerated on a separate offense, and that under such circumstances a person is “detained by a law enforcement officer” only when the criminal investigation has focused on the person being interrogated and in effect the person being interrogated has become an accused. Hence, upon remand, the district court shall determine whether the investigation had “focused” on Culbertson at the time of the interrogation and thus whether I.C. § 19-853 requires in the instant case that, for the Miranda warnings to become effective, there be compliance with the requirements of the statute regarding the warnings being furnished in writing, acknowledgment by the accused, and a filing thereof.2
The order of the district court suppressing the evidence is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ„ and McFADDEN, J. Pro Tern., concur.

. “Q. At any point in the proceeding, did he request an attorney?
“A. Yes, sir. At one point during the proceedings when he made a statement to the effect that ‘maybe I did do it. Is it possible that I could do it without knowing it’ and I said ‘yes, it is, but not very likely.’ And he said, ‘maybe I need an attorney.’ And I said, ‘fine.’ I said ‘Leroy, let’s take him back and contact his attorney.’
“Q. Okay, by meaning ‘take him back,’ where were you referring to?
“A. Take him back to his cell. And at that time he said, ‘no, no, no.’ He says, ‘I don’t want one.’ He says, ‘I want to stay here and talk.’
“Q. And at that time did the discussions pertaining to the matter continue?
“A. Yes, sir, it did.
“Q. And did the defendant make any further request for an attorney?
“A. Absolutely none.
“Q. And did he make any requests that the questioning cease?
“A. No, sir, he did not.”

. Although opportunity was furnished therefor, neither party has provided the court with authority relative to the effect of a possible violation of I.C. § 19-853. Although there have been continued criticisms from both within and without the United States Supreme Court of the continued application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured without compliance with the rights enunciated in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), at the present time at least, we deem it clear that the exclusionary rule continues to be applicable in circumstances of non-compliance with the standards of Miranda. Those Miranda rights are, of course, afforded under the aegis of the United States Constitution; it does not necessarily follow that non-compliance with the standards afforded by a statute such as I.C. § 19-853 requires the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence secured without conformance with such statute.