Court Opinion

ID: 9598902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:06.67941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:38.557468
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
There is a rule of statutory construction followed in this state, that where earlier and later acts are not necessarily in conflict and may be reconciled by reasonable construction, enactment of a later act will not result in repeal of an earlier act. This is because repeals by implication are not favored. Ada County v. State, 93 Idaho 830, 475 P.2d 367 (1970); State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 375 P.2d 1005 (1962). The majority ignores this rule and instead resolves the matter in favor of I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) “since it is the more specific and the more recent rule.” The conclusion of the majority is incorrect for two reasons. The first reason is that I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) is the more recent rule, not I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3). While it is true that I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) was originally enacted in 1958 it was amended in 1976. In amending the rule the court recognized the validity of the rule, as written, as late as 1976, after the enactment of I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3).
The second reason that the majority’s conclusion is incorrect is that there is no conflict between I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) and 55(b)(2), so as to apply the doctrine of “repeal by implication.” These two rules can be construed to give viability to both. Under I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3), when an attorney is permitted to withdraw his representation of his client, he is obligated to serve his client with copies of the court order allowing the withdrawal, which order shall state that if the client “fails to appear within ... [a] 20 day period, such failure shall be sufficient ground for entry of default against such party or dismissal of the action of such party, with prejudice, without further notice .... ” Under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), when a party has appeared in an action, as appellant did in this case through his attorney, he “shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three (3) days prior to the hearing on such application.” There is a two step proceeding to obtain a default judgment. The first step is the entry of default. It is to this step of the proceeding that I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) applies. That rule provides that default may be entered without further notice, it does not provide that judgment may be entered without further notice. Once the default is entered the second step is the entry of default judgment. It is to this step that I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) applies. That rule requires notice to appellant that judgment will be entered against him.
Therefore, even if default may be entered under I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) the party is still entitled to an additional three days notice by reason of the fact that he has previously appeared in the action. This conclusion comes from construing the rules together instead of in conflict with each other and is also in keeping with the policy of this court that default judgments are not favored. Garren v. Saccomanno, 86 Idaho 268, 385 P.2d 396 (1963); Orange Transportation Co. v. Taylor, 71 Idaho 275, 230 P.2d 689 (1951); Mead v. Citizen’s Automobile Inter-Ins. Exch., 78 Idaho 63, 297 P.2d 1042 (1956).
*542(Submitted by McFADDEN, J., prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.)