Court Opinion

ID: 9897272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:31.207528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.094560
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                Sep 29 2023, 8:34 am

                                                                                    CLERK
                                                                                Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                                     and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Margaret M. Christensen                                    Brett T. Clayton
Sarah K. Jackson                                           Reminger Co., L.P.A.
Dentons Bingham Greenbaum LLP                              Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, IN                                           Alex M. Beeman
                                                           Reminger Co., L.P.A.
                                                           Evansville, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cave Quarries, Inc.,                                       September 29, 2023
Appellant/ Cross-Appellee-Plaintiff,                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CT-1916
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Orange Circuit
                                                           Court
Warex LLC,                                                 The Honorable Steven L. Owen,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant-Defendant.                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           59C01-2109-CT-191

                             Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                       Judge Crone and Senior Judge Robb concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                        Page 1 of 16
      Case Summary
[1]   Cave Quarries, Inc. (“Cave Quarries”) owns real estate in Paoli, Indiana, on

      which it conducts a limestone quarrying operation. Warex LLC (“Warex”)

      provides explosives and blasting services. On March 3, 2021, Warex carried

      out a blast on Cave Quarries’ property at Cave Quarries’ request. The resulting

      explosion destroyed an asphalt plant on the property.

[2]   Cave Quarries filed a complaint for damages against Warex alleging strict

      liability and negligence, and later sought summary judgment declaring Warex

      strictly liable for Cave Quarries’ damages. Following a hearing, the trial court

      determined strict liability was not the applicable standard and denied the

      motion.

[3]   In this interlocutory appeal, Cave Quarries alleges the trial court erred because

      “[s]trict liability is the long-established standard applicable to blasting activities”

      and “applying any standard other than strict liability in this case is contrary to

      Indiana law.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. We conclude the trial court did not err in

      denying Cave Quarries’ motion for summary judgment.

      Facts and Procedural History 1
[4]   Cave Quarries extricates limestone from its quarry for use as gravel or asphalt.

      To get the limestone, holes are drilled in the stone according to a “shot design”

      1
       We heard oral argument at the Indiana Statehouse on July 25, 2023. We commend counsel for their
      preparation and oral presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                     Page 2 of 16
      created by the blaster2 identifying—among other things—the number, diameter,

      depth, and location of the holes. Explosives are then placed in the holes to blast

      the stone loose. Until 2015, Cave Quarries employed a licensed blaster and did

      its own blasting at the quarry. Warex provided explosive materials to Cave

      Quarries during this time. When Cave Quarries’ in-house blaster became

      unavailable, Warex began to also conduct the blasts. Cave Quarries and Warex

      did not have a written contract; Cave Quarries would contact Warex when it

      needed blasting done and tell Warex “where they want it and what they want

      [it] to do.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 50. Warex would mark the area to be

      blasted and Cave Quarries would engage a third-party drilling company to drill

      the holes.

[5]   Typically, limestone is blasted from the back of Cave Quarries’ property and

      transported as needed to a crushing plant at the front of the property. Some of

      the crushed stone is then transferred to the adjacent asphalt plant to be

      manufactured into asphalt. The asphalt plant is within twenty to twenty-five

      feet of a wall (the “high wall”) that descends to the floor of the quarry. At some

      point, Cave Quarries decided to blast the high wall so it would have a stockpile

      2
        A blaster is “the person that is in charge of loading the blast holes . . . and setting off the shots.” Appellant’s
      App. Vol. 2 at 37; see also 675 Ind. Admin. Code 26-1-1(10) (defining a blaster, in part, as an individual who
      “supervises or directs and performs the loading and firing of explosives materials[.]”) Blasters are
      individually licensed by each state they work in and are subject to annual education requirements. See
      Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 38.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                                   Page 3 of 16
      of stone near the plants and could maintain production during the winter when

      weather conditions prohibited transporting stone from the back of the quarry.

[6]   Because the wall had to be lowered in phases, Warex conducted multiple small

      blasts on the high wall beginning in 2018. In early 2021, Cave Quarries erected

      steel plates around the bottom of the asphalt plant to protect the natural gas

      lines and gauges and meters from damage “just in case a big rock were to go

      over there.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 57. Cave Quarries knew the asphalt plant

      was within the “radius of risk” from high wall blasts. Id. at 94.

[7]   On March 3, 2021, Warex conducted a blast on the high wall at Cave Quarries’

      request. Joshua Collins, a Warex employee and licensed blaster, was in charge

      that day and had the “final say-so.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 82. But many

      aspects of the blast were “mutual decision[s]” between Collins and Randy Key,

      Cave Quarries’ superintendent, including the decision to have a larger blast. Id.

      Cave Quarries had become concerned about the cost of smaller blasts because it

      paid “so much [per] shot fee.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 60. The blast did not go

      as planned and the asphalt plant was destroyed.

[8]   The blast was designed to “draw itself away from the plant and . . . fold into

      itself as it continue[d].” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 86. Collins explained the blast

      did not perform as designed because “[t]here was a mud seam at the bottom of

      the shot and as [the blast] was initiated it slipped out on the mud seam.” Id. In

      this context, “mud” means “any kind of a soft material.” Id. at 100. The mud

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023     Page 4 of 16
       seam was unknown before the blast—“all the holes were drilled solid according

       to the drill reports” provided by the third-party drilling company. Id. at 89.

[9]    Cave Quarries filed a complaint for damages against Warex, alleging Warex

       was strictly liable for Cave Quarries’ damages, or, alternatively, was negligent

       in its use of explosives. Warex, in its answer, admitted it was from time to time

       engaged by Cave Quarries to provide services involving explosives in the

       quarrying operation, that it provided those services on March 3, 2021, and that

       the explosion caused damage to Cave Quarries’ property. Warex denied it was

       negligent in its use of the explosives, and denied it was liable for Cave Quarries’

       damages.

[10]   After the parties conducted discovery, Cave Quarries moved for partial

       summary judgment in its favor on the strict liability claim asserting there was

       “no issue as to any material fact concerning liability and causation.” Id. at 24.

[11]   Warex responded to Cave Quarries’ motion and filed its own motion for

       summary judgment. Warex disputed that strict liability was the appropriate

       standard, but alleged if it was, then Warex was entitled to summary judgment

       on the strict liability claim because Cave Quarries assumed the risk of damage

       to its plant. In the alternative, Warex requested an order of partial summary

       judgment “finding that a negligence standard applies, and . . . that material

       issues of fact remain which preclude the entry of summary judgment in Cave

       Quarries’ favor.” Id. at 129.

[12]   Following a hearing, the trial court issued an order stating:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023    Page 5 of 16
                [T]he cases cited by [Cave Quarries] are distinguishable from the
                case at hand in that [Warex] was contracted and employed by
                [Cave Quarries] to engage in blasting activities for the benefit of
                [Cave Quarries]. [Cave Quarries] was not a mere innocent
                bystander to [Warex’s] actions nor the harm that resulted.
                [Warex’s] actions, looking at the facts in the non-moving party’s
                favor, were done at the direction of [Cave Quarries]: the location
                of the charges, the number of charges, and the amount of
                explosives used were all the result of [Cave Quarries’] decisions.
                Thus, the Court finds that the application of a strict liability
                standard that has traditionally been associated with the use of
                explosives should not be extended to the facts of this case, that
                rather the negligence standard with comparative fault should be
                the applicable law.

       Id. at 9–10. The trial court found material issues of fact exist regarding Cave

       Quarries’ negligence claim that should be determined by a jury and stated it was

       denying both parties’ motions for summary judgment. Cave Quarries then

       perfected this discretionary interlocutory appeal. 3

       Summary Judgment Standard of Review
[13]   We review a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo, using the same

       standard as the trial court. Performance Servs., Inc. v. Randolph E. Sch. Corp., 211

       N.E.3d 508, 511 (Ind. 2023). We consider only the evidence designated to the

       trial court and construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-

       moving party. Ebert v. Ill. Cas. Co., 188 N.E.3d 858, 863 (Ind. 2022). Summary

       3
        Warex cross-appeals, raising contingent issues in the event we reverse the trial court’s decision. Because we
       affirm, we need not address Warex’s cross-appeal issues.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                            Page 6 of 16
       judgment is appropriate only when the designated evidence shows “there is no

       genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a

       judgment as a matter of law[.]” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). When parties file cross-

       motions for summary judgment, “we consider each motion separately to

       determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

       SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind. 2015).

[14]   The party appealing the trial court’s summary judgment determination must

       persuade us the ruling was erroneous. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Eng’rs/Contractors,

       Inc., 72 N.E.3d 908, 913 (Ind. 2017). A trial court’s findings of fact and

       conclusions of law in its summary judgment ruling aid our review, but they do

       not bind us. Matter of Supervised Est. of Kent, 99 N.E.3d 634, 637 (Ind. 2018).

       Trial Court Did Not Err Regarding Strict Liability
[15]   Cave Quarries contends the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying its

       motion for summary judgment on its strict liability claim.

[16]   Strict liability assumes no negligence by the defendant but imposes liability

       anyway. See Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 276 (Ind. 2003). The

       common law concept of strict liability was first articulated in the English case of

       Rylands v. Fletcher, holding a defendant is liable regardless of negligence for

       damages caused when he uses his land in an unusual way likely to injure a

       neighbor. 1868 WL 9885 (H.L. 1868). The rationale behind the doctrine “is

       that in terms of the comparative fault of the parties, the defendant acting for the

       defendant’s own profit or pleasure is more at fault than the innocent plaintiff

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023     Page 7 of 16
       who has no part in the creation of the abnormal risk.” 57A Am. Jur.2d

       Negligence § 360. Later, this concept was incorporated into the Restatement of

       Torts. In general, we now look to Sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement

       (Second) of Torts to determine whether an activity is subject to strict liability.

       Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)

       (determining the manufacture of chlorine bleach is not an abnormally

       dangerous activity under Sections 519 and 520), trans. denied.

[17]   Section 519 provides:

               (1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is
               subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
               another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the
               utmost care to prevent the harm.

               (2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the
               possibility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.

       Restatement (Second) of Torts: Abnormally Dangerous Activities § 519 (1977).

       In turn, to determine whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous,” we

       generally look to the factors set forth in Section 520. See Fechtman v. U.S. Steel

       Corp., 994 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (applying the Section 520

       factors in determining step of steel manufacturing process which caused release

       of carbon monoxide fumes was not an “abnormally dangerous activity”), trans.

       denied. Historically, however, blasting has been considered an abnormally

       dangerous activity in Indiana without specific reference to the Section 520

       factors. See Hedges v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 396 N.E.2d 933, 936 n.4 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023     Page 8 of 16
       Ct. App. 1979) (“Without explicitly adopting [Section] 520 we have applied the

       doctrine of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities[ 4] in cases involving

       blasting operations.”).

[18]   In Indiana, strict liability for blasting activities finds its origins in the law of

       trespass. “At common law, absolute liability exists when there is a physical

       invasion (a trespass) of another’s property, as by falling debris from an explosion.”

       Enos Coal Mining Co. v. Schuchart, 188 N.E.2d 406, 407 (Ind. 1962) (emphasis

       added). Thus, in Wright v. Compton—where a person was injured by flying

       debris from a quarry blast while traveling on an adjacent road—the Court found

       the defendant was liable for the plaintiff’s damages without proof of negligence

       because the “act of casting fragments of rock upon the plaintiff, to his injury”

       was unlawful even though the act of blasting and quarrying rock was a lawful

       trade. 53 Ind. 337, 340–41 (1876). And in Enos—where a home was damaged

       by vibrations from blasting at a nearby strip mining operation—the Court found

       “neither logic nor reason” supported a difference in liability when damage is

       caused by a vibration rather than debris, concluding “there is in fact a trespass

       under the law, whether it be caused by falling debris or by a vibration or

       4
         Section 519 of the first Restatement of Torts stated one who carries on an “ultrahazardous activity” is liable
       to another for harm even though “the utmost care” was exercised to prevent it. Restatement of Torts § 519
       (1938). In Erbich, we noted the “difference in nomenclature” between “ultrahazardous” and “abnormally
       dangerous” is “of no importance.” 509 N.E.2d at 853 (citing W. Prosser and W. Keeton, Handbook of the Law
       of Torts § 78 at 555–56 (1984)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                             Page 9 of 16
       concussion as a result of an explosion on nearby land.” 188 N.E.2d at 407,

       410. 5

[19]   The Court in Enos explained the policy behind finding blasting activities subject

       to strict liability:

                A business should bear its own costs, burdens, and expenses of
                operation, and these should be distributed by means of the price
                of the resulting product and not shifted, particularly, to small
                neighboring property owners for them to bear alone. We can
                understand no sensible or reasonable principle of law for shifting
                such expense or loss to persons who are not involved in such
                business ventures for profit.

       Id. at 408. In other words, “strict liability places the loss from an activity

       proven to generate risk of loss on the one who benefits from the activity rather

       than an innocent party.” Haseman v. Orman, 680 N.E.2d 531, 535 (Ind. 1997).

[20]   This Court in Galbreath v. Eng’g Constr. Corp. then considered the case of a

       person whose injury was caused indirectly by a blast. 273 N.E.2d 121, 122

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1973), trans. denied. The defendant detonated dynamite near a

       gas main and the main ruptured. The plaintiff, an employee of the gas

       company, was repairing the main and was injured when the escaping gas

       5
         An earlier Appellate Court of Indiana decision held a plaintiff’s complaint alleging blasting by a strip-
       mining company “violently and severely” shook and caused damage to a nearby building housing their auto-
       repair shop did not state a cause of action in part because it did not allege a physical trespass. Boonville
       Collieries Corp. v. Reynolds, 163 N.E.2d 627, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 1960). Enos explicitly overruled Boonville,
       noting transfer had not been sought in that case. 188 N.E.2d at 410.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                         Page 10 of 16
       ignited and exploded. Acknowledging no cases in Indiana or elsewhere had

       permitted recovery for blasting damage without a trespass by debris or damage

       directly inflicted by concussion vibrations, the Court nonetheless found it

       “absurd to reject such absolute liability for damage or injury also proximately

       caused though not immediately or directly so.” Id. at 124. Accordingly, the

       Court adopted a rule of strict liability for damages proximately caused by

       blasting:

               We now therefore hold that if acknowledged extra-hazardous
               activity, e.g., blasting, proximately causes damage, whether by
               direct impact of debris or by concussion waves, or otherwise, the
               actor is absolutely liable for such damage without regard to his
               exercise of reasonable care in the carrying out of such activity.

       Id. at 125. The Galbreath Court acknowledged the breadth of this ruling:

               [W]e have employed our understanding of the spirit as well as
               the letter of the law, and a dash of what we hope to be common
               sense, to reach the result in the case before us. We have
               extended—knowingly so—the absolute liability doctrine to all
               instances in which the damage or injury is proximately caused by
               the extra-hazardous activity.

       Id. at 129.

[21]   Indiana appellate courts have decided no blasting cases since Galbreath,

       although several cases addressing other facts have noted the general rule that

       blasting is an abnormally dangerous activity. See, e.g., Bridges v. Ky. Stone Co.,

       Inc., 425 N.E.2d 125, 126 n.2 (Ind. 1981) (noting Indiana “accords absolute

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023    Page 11 of 16
       liability” to the use and explosion of dynamite, but liability for the storage of

       dynamite must be determined case-by-case under the Section 520 factors).

[22]   Cave Quarries asserted to the trial court that “[t]his is a strict liability in tort

       case, as every case involving damage by blasting in Indiana has been.”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 122. It contends on appeal the trial court erred “by

       blatantly refusing to apply strict liability and instead considering whether to

       ‘extend’ strict liability to the facts at hand.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Cave Quarries

       essentially argues strict liability automatically applies here based solely on the

       nature of the activity without consideration of the accompanying facts. 6 We

       disagree.

[23]   Just as the courts in Enos and Galbreath before us, we are asked to decide if a set

       of facts not previously addressed by our appellate courts subjects the blaster to

       strict liability. Unlike the courts in Enos and Galbreath, however—each of

       which found no logical reason not to extend the rule of strict liability to the facts

       of those cases—we do find such reason here.

[24]   We agree with Cave Quarries’ general premise that blasting has long been

       considered an ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activity subject to a

       6
         Cave Quarries also points to Indiana Administrative Code provisions regulating the use and licensure of
       explosives as supporting the imposition of strict liability. See 675 Ind. Admin. Code 26-3-1(l) (stating the
       blaster “shall be responsible for the results and consequences of any loading or firing of explosive materials”).
       But Cave Quarries acknowledged at oral argument that the Administrative Code does not create substantive
       law or a private right of action.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                             Page 12 of 16
       strict liability standard in Indiana. 7 But two important points distinguish this

       case from Wright, Enos, and Galbreath.

[25]   One, this case is not “the classic example of an abnormally dangerous activity

       historically subject to strict liability.” Selby v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 851 N.E.2d

       333, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. The “classic example” includes

       harm caused “to another”: a traveler on a road passing by a quarry, owners of a

       home near a blasting site, or a person repairing a gas line that was ruptured by a

       blast. To the extent Cave Quarries argues Galbreath held the mere act of

       blasting—anytime, anywhere—makes the blaster strictly liable to anyone

       impacted, Cave Quarries reads Galbreath too broadly. The court in Galbreath

       did extend the strict liability doctrine by moving beyond trespass, see 273

       N.E.2d at 129, but did so within the rubric of the law announced in Wright and

       Enos. That is, all three cases applied strict liability to protect unsuspecting

       neighbors or innocent third parties. 8

[26]   And two, applying strict liability in those situations appropriately placed the

       risk of loss from a dangerous, unpredictable activity “on the one who benefits from

       the activity rather than an innocent party.” Haseman, 680 N.E.2d at 535

       7
        For this reason, we decline to accept Warex’s invitation to analyze its blasting activity under the Section
       520 factors and independently determine whether it is an abnormally dangerous activity. See Appellee’s Br. at
       20.
       8
        Cave Quarries also points out that both this court and the trial court are “obliged to follow precedents
       established by the Supreme Court of Indiana.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. We have no quarrel with this
       proposition but note Galbreath is not an Indiana Supreme Court decision and therefore not binding on this
       panel.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023                          Page 13 of 16
       (emphasis added); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519, comment d (stating

       strict liability “is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon anyone

       who for his own purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the

       responsibility of relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur”)

       (emphasis added). The same considerations are not at play when the plaintiff is

       involved and stands to benefit from the activity. Cf. Enos, 188 N.E.2d at 408

       (finding “no sensible or reasonable principle of law for shifting [the expenses of

       operation] to persons who are not involved in such business ventures for profit”)

       (emphasis added).

[27]   Here, Cave Quarries is not an unsuspecting neighbor or an innocent third party.

       Cave Quarries is in the business of quarrying limestone, a business which

       requires regular blasting activity. The blasting on March 3 was conducted at

       Cave Quarries’ request, on Cave Quarries’ property, for Cave Quarries’

       business purposes. Cave Quarries decided where the blast would take place,

       directing Warex to conduct blasts on the high wall even knowing its asphalt

       plant was within the “radius of risk” from high wall blasts. Appellant’s App. Vol.

       3 at 94. And it asked for a larger blast on March 3 because of concerns over the

       cost of multiple smaller blasts. Cave Quarries understood there was a risk to its

       property and asked Warex to conduct the blast anyway. See Carroll-Boone Water

       Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 661 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Ark. 1983) (noting “[s]trict

       liability is a harsh rule” and should not be applied “when blasting is conducted

       on the property damaged with the knowledge and consent of the owner”); cf.

       Guido v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023        Page 14 of 16
       argument that property owners could not recover in strict liability for damage

       caused to their own property by blasting because owners were unaware their

       request for installation of underground utilities would require blasting).

[28]   Our decision is grounded in Indiana law imposing strict liability for blasting as

       an abnormally dangerous activity as applied to the unique circumstances of this

       blast. But we note the language of Restatement Section 519 also supports our

       decision. Section 519(1) does not say the general principle of strict liability for

       abnormally dangerous activities is that “one who carries on an abnormally

       dangerous activity is strictly liable for harm.” Instead, it states the principle as,

       “one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict liability

       for harm.” This language implicitly acknowledges the default is not simply

       absolute liability in every situation. Because there is not “another” here, and

       because Cave Quarries requested the blasting be done for its own business

       purposes with full knowledge of the nature of the activity, subjecting Warex to

       strict liability for its blasting activities is not consistent with our prior cases or

       the purpose of the rule.

[29]   The trial court did not err in denying Cave Quarries’ motion for summary

       judgment. Because Warex’s blasting activity is not subject to strict liability

       and a negligence standard will apply going forth, the trial court effectively

       granted Warex’s motion for summary judgment with its order, and on remand

       we direct the trial court to explicitly enter judgment in Warex’s favor on the

       strict liability count.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023        Page 15 of 16
       Conclusion
[30]   We accept the historical rule in Indiana that blasting is an abnormally

       dangerous activity, but we decline to find Warex is subject to strict liability

       under these facts because neither the purpose nor the policy behind imposing

       strict liability for blasting activities would be served by doing so here.

       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying Cave Quarries’

       motion for summary judgment on strict liability and remand for further

       proceedings on Cave Quarries’ remaining count of negligence.

[31]   Affirmed and remanded.

       Crone, J., and Robb, Sr.J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1916 | September 29, 2023       Page 16 of 16