Court Opinion

ID: 9497559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:49.231603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:15.609811
License: Public Domain

LEAVY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Salvador-Calleros has established no claims of denial of due pro*966cess. Because Salvador-Calleros’ motion to stay voluntary departure was filed after the expiration of her voluntary departure period, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the motion to stay voluntary departure was timely filed.
Authority to grant a period of voluntary departure is limited to an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The voluntary departure period in this case could have been for any number of days not exceeding 60 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). The BIA granted Salvador-Calleros a voluntary departure period of 30 days.
Authority to extend a period of voluntary departure is limited to the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f).1
The courts have no authority to grant or extend the period allowed for voluntary departure. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.2003) (“It is executive rather than judicial officers who decide when an alien must depart. Neither the statute nor the regulations give courts any designated role in this process of setting the deadline for departure.”). In Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir.2004), we concluded that a court could only stay the period allowed for voluntary departure on a motion made during the voluntary departure period allowed by the Immigration Judge or the BIA. See id. (“Thus, while we are stopping the clock from running on the time petitioner has to depart voluntarily, we are not adding more time to that clock.”).
Salvador-Calleros was granted 30 days to voluntarily depart. Saturday, June 15, 2002, was the last day of the time allowed. Neither Fed. R.App. P. 26(a) nor Fed. R.App. P. 20 has any application to Salvador-Calleros’ status as of Sunday, June 16, 2002. No filing of any paper was necessary to the expiration of the time period for voluntary departure.
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure make Salvador-Calleros’ petition for review timely on Monday, June 17, 2002. That filing would have been timely if Salvador-Calleros’ time for voluntary departure were 29 days, 28 days, or, for that matter, one day.
Because this court lacks power to grant a new voluntary departure period, it lacks power to breathe life into an expired voluntary departure period. Salvador-Calle-ros’ motion for stay of voluntary departure filed on Monday, June 17, 2002, should be denied. See Garcia v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.2004).

. Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs. An immigration judge or the Board may reinstate voluntary departure in a removal proceeding that has been reopened for a purpose other than solely making an application for voluntary departure if reopening was granted prior to the expiration of the original period of voluntary departure. In no event can the total period of time, including any extension, exceed 120 days or 60 days as set forth in section 240B of the Act.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (emphasis added).