Court Opinion

ID: 9902550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:19:53.634624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.484935
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-1150
                 LT Case Nos. 2018-306213-CFDB
                              2018-306375-CFDB
                              2018-306413-CFDB
                  _____________________________

DEVON MARQUISE DAVIS,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Volusia County.
Raul A. Zambrano, Judge.

Devon M. Davis, Raiford, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

                        October 20, 2023

LAMBERT, J.

     Devon Marquise Davis appeals the summary denial of his
amended motion for postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.850, in which he raised five grounds. We
affirm the postconviction court’s denial of grounds two, three, and
five of the amended motion without further discussion. For the
following reasons, we reverse the summary denial of grounds one
and four and remand for further proceedings.

     Davis was charged in three cases below with committing a
total of four felonies. The cases were resolved by a negotiated,
global plea agreement with the State, with Davis pleading no
contest to three of the counts, as charged, and to one lesser charge
of attempted carjacking. Although the trial court imposed the
parties’ agreed-upon sentences, Davis nevertheless appealed; and
his judgments and sentences were affirmed without opinion.
Davis v. State, 289 So. 3d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020).

     Turning to the present proceeding, in ground one of his
amended motion, Davis alleged that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate viable defenses to the charges and in not
taking the depositions of various witnesses and one of the victims.
In ground four, Davis alleged that his counsel had failed to advise
him that his plea to the twenty-five-year prison sentence on the
charge of aggravated battery with a firearm causing great bodily
harm was to a mandatory minimum term and that his counsel had
misadvised him that he would be eligible for gain time.

     In summarily denying Davis’s amended motion, the
postconviction court’s one-page order adopted the State’s response
to the motion. The State’s response—which included copies of the
information filed in each case, the State’s notice of its intent to seek
habitual felony offender sentencing, plus copies of the written plea
agreement and the transcript of the change of plea hearing—was
attached to the denial order. Our review of this summary denial
is de novo. See State v. Coney, 845 So. 2d 120, 137 (Fla. 2003).

     To uphold a summary denial of a legally sufficient claim
brought under rule 3.850, the claim must be conclusively resolved
as a matter of law or by reliance upon the records in the case. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5). Additionally, an appellate court is
required to accept a defendant’s factual allegations in the motion
as true, to the extent that they are not refuted by the record. Peede
v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).

     As Davis sought relief for ineffective assistance of counsel
following a plea, his burden was to show that, but for counsel’s

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errors, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
pleaded guilty or no contest and would have insisted on going to
trial. See Brazeail v. State, 821 So. 2d 364, 367–68 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002). When determining whether this reasonable probability
exists, the postconviction court is to look at the totality of the
circumstances—including the plea colloquy, whether a defense
would succeed, and the difference between the sentence imposed
by the plea and the maximum sentence allowed if the defendant
was found guilty at trial. Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176,
1181–82 (Fla. 2004).

     Rule 3.850(f)(5) provides that if the summary denial is based
on the records in the case, a copy of that portion of the files and
records that shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief shall
be attached to the final order. Here, the court records attached to
the order do not conclusively refute the claims raised in either
ground one or ground four.

     As to ground one, the State’s response related that there was
significant incriminating record evidence that readily established
Davis’s guilt, making it unlikely that Davis would choose to go to
trial. However, these records were not attached to the final order;
and the transcript of the plea colloquy, which was attached to the
order, does not otherwise conclusively refute Davis’s claim made
in this first ground.

     Addressing ground four, there is no mention in the court
records attached to the order that Davis’s twenty-five-year
sentence was for a mandatory minimum term. As to the part of
Davis’s claim in this ground regarding misadvice from counsel, an
attorney has no duty to advise a client of gain time eligibility
because it is a collateral consequence, and a defendant cannot
withdraw his plea on that basis. Guerra v. State, 331 So. 3d 746,
747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (citing Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d 397, 400
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also Hampton v. State, 217 So. 3d 1096,
1099 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“Gain time, good time, provisional credit
time, and additional mitigating credits are all collateral
consequences of a guilty plea.”).        However, an attorney’s
affirmative misadvice about such a collateral consequence may
render a plea involuntary. Guerra, 331 So. 3d at 747.

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     Here, Davis averred that his counsel misadvised him that he
would be eligible for gain time regarding his twenty-five-year
mandatory minimum sentence imposed under Florida’s 10-20-Life
statute and that had he known that this was not the case, he would
not have tendered his no contest plea. The records attached to the
denial order do not conclusively refute this assertion.

     Accordingly, we reverse the summary denial of grounds one
and four and remand with directions that the postconviction court
either attach additional court records to its order that conclusively
show that Davis is entitled to no relief on these two grounds or hold
an evidentiary hearing. To be clear, our reversal of these grounds
should not be construed or interpreted by the postconviction court
as indicating that we have determined, on the merits, that Davis
is entitled to relief on either ground.

     AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED, with
directions.

WALLIS and SOUD, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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