Court Opinion

ID: 9693687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:57:04.687805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.579073
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom, DANA, J. joins, dissenting.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent. After careful consideration of the extensive record in this case, the Superior Court vacated the decision of the Board of Environmental Protection. In its conclusion, the Superior Court stated:
The potential use of the dock by Han-num and her family and the impact it will have upon Long Cove is speculative. Once again a finding that the dock in question would result in increased boat traffic and therefore result in damage to aquatic life and habitat requires “reasonable extrapolation” from present facts. BEP’s finding in this case suffers from the same short comings that were discussed in Hannum v. Board of Environmental Protection, 832 A.2d 765 (Me.2003). The Hannum court in its decision stated the following:
Although the Board could reasonably conclude that the Hannum dock itself would generate additional boat traffic, there was no evidence that the granting of this permit would reasonably be anticipated to result in the building of more docks. At 770.
Even the Hannum court found that the BEP could reasonably conclude that the dock would result in additional boat traffic; however, it did not sustain BEP’s decision based on their finding that the Board could, “reasonably conclude” that the dock would generate additional boat traffic. The record fails to make the connection between the additional boat traffic from the Hannum dock and the harm to aquatic life and habitat. There is no evidence as to how the increased boat traffic from the Han-num dock would harm aquatic life other than general statements made by the experts presented by the intervenors in this case indicating that any increased boat traffic would harm the aquatic life and habitat.
[¶ 28] I agree with the Superior Court’s opinion in this matter. In so doing, I note three matters in particular. First, one *403reason that the Board denied the application was its speculative finding that the dock might interfere with the public’s viewing of the terns and seals. Increased public viewing of the terns and seals, particularly if that viewing is by boat, would seem to promote the very harm the Board’s action purportedly seeks to avoid.
[¶ 29] Second, the principal evidence relied upon by the Board for its finding of harm to the tern colony was presented by an individual who makes it his business to monitor the tern colony by physically invading the colony, scaring the birds off their nests so he can count the eggs therein. This tern monitoring activity would seem to be far more disruptive to the tern colony than occasional boating activities of Hannum and her grandchildren at a dock at least 1400 feet from the colony.
[¶ 30] Third, while Hannum’s original application was pending, the Board was engaged in an ultimately successful effort to convince us that most docks on salt water frontage were of so little environmental consequence that permits could be handed out administratively by Department of Environmental Protection staff with no Board review. In Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 2003 ME 62, 823 A.2d 551, we approved a permit by rule process for salt water docks, noting that “[t]he practical effect of the permit by rule process ... is that the builder of a pier or wharf that meets the standards and requirements of the rule may be granted a permit to construct it without going through an individual application process.” 5 Id. ¶ 8, 823 A.2d at 556. There appears to be no practical difference between Hannum’s proposed dock and the docks that, at the time, the DEP was approving by rule.
[¶ 31] The Board disapproved Hannum’s application, based on six-year-old evidence 6 that (1) the “likely harm to aquatic life and the aquatic habitat” was unreasonable; (2) the “likely disturbance to an endangered species” (actually one Roseate tern that observers speculated might be nesting with the Common terns in the summer of 2000) and the “inability of the resource to recover” resulted in “an unreasonable impact on the coastal wetland”; and (3) there would be unreasonable interference “with existing scenic and aesthetic uses pertaining to the viewing of those wildlife species [seals and terns].” The findings of unreasonableness were significantly based on the Board’s determination that Hannum had available, reasonable alternatives to achieve the boating uses she desired with the dock.
[¶ 32] The flaws in the Board’s findings are quickly apparent. First, in denying approval based on speculation about “likely” future impacts, including speculation about whether, or not, in 2000 one Roseate tern might consider permanently moving in with the “common” tern colony, the Board repeated the error of relying on speculation rather than evidence that led to the remand in Hannum v. Board of Environmental Protection, 2003 ME 123, ¶ 15 n. 6, 832 A.2d 765, 769-70. If the record developed in 2000 could not support anything better than the speculative findings in the Board’s original order, that same evidence certainly did not get any better when considered on remand several years later.
*404[¶ 33] Second, if the Board is correct in its determination that Hannum could reasonably accomplish the boating activities she desired without use of the dock, then there would be little or no net increase in Hannum’s boating activities as a result of the dock, and consequently, no adverse environmental impact, because it was the boating activities, not the dock itself, that were speculated to create the environmental impacts.
[¶ 34] Finally, nothing in the Board’s findings indicates any objective criteria to support the disparate treatment given Hannum’s application compared to the numerous dock construction projects that, at the time and since, were being approved under the permit by rule process.
[¶ 35] In Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 2000 ME 106, 752 A.2d 183, we reminded land use regulatory agencies that individuals seeking to make improvements to their property “are entitled to know with reasonable clarity what they must do under state or local land use control laws to obtain the permits or approvals they seek.” Id ¶ 12, 752 A.2d at 186. We previously struck down an ordinance reliant on a “compatible with existing uses” standard as failing “to articulate the quantitative standards necessary to transform the unmeasured qualities ... into specific criteria objectively usable by both the Board and the applicant.” Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me.1987).
[¶ 36] As we noted in Kosalka, a land use control, to pass the due process test, must answer two questions: (1) “what must an applicant do to obtain a permit,” and (2) “under what set of facts should the [Board] grant or deny the application”? 2000 ME 106, ¶ 16, 752 A.2d at 187.
[¶ 37] The Board’s standards applied to Hannum’s application do not offer answers to either of those questions. Whether something unreasonably interferes with existing scenic and aesthetic uses is a question that can be answered only in the eyes of the beholder. That standard and its application by the Board offer no “quantitative standards necessary to transform the unmeasured qualities ... into specific criteria objectively usable by both the Board and the applicant.” Wakelin, 523 A.2d at 577. As every dock, every development, will have some scenic impact and some impact on the environment and wildlife in the area, pursuant to the Board’s standards, any dock or development can be approved or disapproved purely on the whim of the reviewer, without any objective criteria to guide either the decision-maker or future applicants. The Board’s approval criteria provided insufficient notice to Hannum, the Board, the courts, or anyone else of the criteria she had to meet for approval. Denial of her application was improperly based on findings that amounted to subjective speculation about the future, unsupported by any objective facts in the record. This administrative process did not meet due process standards.
[¶ 38] I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

. The Department of Environmental Protection may have recently ceased approving new dock construction through the permit by rule process.

. The record relating to Hannum's application was developed in 2000. On remand the Board took no new evidence and decided the issue based on the evidence in the record from 2000.