Court Opinion

ID: 9931181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:02:43.765252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:18.475528
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                  SUMMARY
                                                            February 8, 2024

                                2024COA11

No. 20CA0727, People v. Torrez — Criminal Law — Jury
Instructions — Introductory Remarks, Juror Qualifications, and
Jury Selection — Empanelment Oath; Appeals — Standard of
Review — Plain Error

     As a matter of first impression, a division of this court of

appeals concludes that when a district court does not administer an

oath to the empaneled jury in a criminal matter, no party objects,

and the jury renders a verdict, the error is not structural requiring

automatic reversal, but instead the issue is reviewed for plain error.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                        2024COA11

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0727
Jefferson County District Court No. 18CR1985
Honorable Christie A. Bachmeyer, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Toni Theresa Torrez,

Defendant-Appellant.

           JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART,
                AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

                                 Division V
                        Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
                       Navarro and Welling, JJ., concur

                         Announced February 8, 2024

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Taylor J. Hoy, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Jurors in Colorado take two oaths. In the first, administered

 by the district court to prospective jurors, they vow to tell the truth

 during voir dire. In the second, administered by the district court

 to the empaneled jurors, they attest that they will decide the case

 based on the evidence presented at trial and on the law the court

 gives them (empanelment oath).1 We address for the first time in

 Colorado whether structural error applies when a district court

 does not administer the empanelment oath to the jury and the jury

 renders a verdict. We conclude that the district court’s failure to

 administer the empanelment oath, when not objected to, is reviewed

 for plain error.

¶2    Defendant, Toni Theresa Torrez (Torrez), appeals her judgment

 of conviction entered by the district court on jury verdicts finding

 her guilty of two counts of first degree burglary, one count of

 attempted first degree assault, and one count of second degree

 assault. The empaneled jurors never took the empanelment oath,

 and neither party brought this oversight to the court’s attention.

 1 We acknowledge that county courts also administer oaths to

 prospective and empaneled jurors. We use the term district court
 because this is the forum in which Torrez was tried and convicted.

                                    1
 But the overall trial record shows that the jury was otherwise

 properly instructed on the law and understood the gravity of the

 task before it. Accordingly, while we assume the error is obvious, it

 did not substantially undermine the proceedings so as to cast

 serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment. But we conclude

 that Torrez’s convictions must merge into a single conviction of first

 degree burglary. Therefore, we affirm the judgment in part, vacate

 it in part, and remand the case to the district court to amend the

 mittimus.

                           I.   Background

¶3    Beginning late one night, Torrez and the victim — Torrez’s

 friend Ramona Gilpin (Gilpin) — hung around various parts of town

 with some other friends. By early morning, Torrez and Gilpin had

 returned to Gilpin’s apartment, and Gilpin had asked Torrez to

 leave. According to Gilpin, Torrez refused, and in the course of

 Gilpin’s attempt to oust Torrez from the apartment, Torrez knocked

 Gilpin down and stabbed her repeatedly with a knife. Torrez was

 arrested and charged with two counts of first degree burglary, one

 count of attempted first degree assault, and one count of second

 degree assault.

                                   2
¶4    The trial lasted two days. Before voir dire, the court

 administered the first oath, and the entire venire swore to answer

 truthfully all the questions to assess juror qualifications. Once the

 jury was empaneled, the court broke for lunch, saying “I’ll swear the

 jury in when I get back.” But when the court reconvened the trial

 after lunch, it welcomed the jury back, gave it some orienting

 instructions, and proceeded to opening statements without

 swearing in the jury. The court and parties never raised the issue

 of the court’s failure to administer the empanelment oath following

 the lunch break or at any time thereafter.

¶5    The jury found Torrez guilty as charged and also determined

 that she had used a weapon during the crime. The court sentenced

 Torrez to ten years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

                       II.   The Unsworn Jury

                       A.    The Colorado Oath

¶6    Neither party disputes that the bailiff was sworn in before

 lunch and that the jurors took an oath before voir dire.2 The

 2 The voir dire oath says, “Do you solemnly swear or affirm under

 penalty of law to answer truthfully the questions asked by the
 Court or counsel concerning your service as a juror in this case?”
 COLJI-Crim. B:01 (2022).

                                   3
 suggested language that a district court should use when

 administering the empanelment oath is included in the

 recommended script for opening remarks in the model jury

 instructions. See COLJI-Crim. B:01 (2022). The empanelment

 oath, as set forth in Instruction B:01, states:

            Ladies and gentlemen, you have been selected
            as the jurors to try the case of “The People of
            the State of Colorado versus [ ].” You now
            have duties in addition to your obligation to
            answer our questions truthfully, so I must now
            administer an additional oath to you. Please
            stand and raise your right hands:

            Do you solemnly swear or affirm under penalty
            of law that you will well and truly try the
            matter before the court, and render a true
            verdict, according to the evidence and the law
            as I instruct you? If so, please say, “I do.”

¶7    On appeal, the parties agree that (1) the empaneled jury did

 not take this oath anytime during the trial or before deliberations

 and rendering its verdict, and (2) no Colorado case has directly

 dealt with this circumstance.

¶8    The closest that Colorado courts have come to addressing the

 circumstance we now face are situations in which the jury was

 sworn in — belatedly — after some evidence had been presented

 but before deliberations commenced. See People v. Smith, 848 P.2d

                                    4
 365, 371 (Colo. 1993); Hollis v. People, 630 P.2d 68, 69 (Colo. 1981);

 People v. Clouse, 859 P.2d 228, 233 (Colo. App. 1992). In Hollis,

 our supreme court said that “[w]hile there is no explicit statute or

 rule requiring the administration of an oath to a jury in this state,

 the need for such an oath [has] been judicially recognized.” 630

 P.2d at 69. Hollis held that the late administration of the

 empanelment oath — after the prosecution’s first witness had

 testified — did not constitute plain error. Id. at 70. In reaching this

 conclusion, the court in Hollis relied on United States v. Hopkins,

 458 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972), which held that it was harmless

 error for the jury to be sworn in after the prosecution’s case had

 been presented but before jury deliberations. Hollis, 630 P.2d at

 69-70.

¶9    Twelve years later, our supreme court reaffirmed that the

 empanelment oath was “judicially recognized.” Smith, 848 P.2d at

 371. The venire in Smith took two oaths: one to answer the jury

 selection questions truthfully, which was given before voir dire, and

 one to “truly try the case,” which was given after jurors were

 excused for challenges for cause but before the prosecution and

 defense counsel had exercised their peremptory challenges. Id. The

                                    5
  court in Smith noted that Colorado case law had “not articulated

  any guidelines as to when [the empanelment oath] must be

  administered.” Id. Although noting that it is the “better practice” to

  swear in only the jurors who will hear the case, the court concluded

  that “the administration of the oath to the panel of jurors accepted

  for cause before the exercise of peremptory challenges d[id] not

  constitute reversible error.” Id. at 372; see also Clouse, 859 P.2d at

  233 (relying on Hollis in holding that there was no “possible

  prejudice” to the defendant when the jury was sworn in after two of

  the prosecution’s witnesses had testified).

¶ 10   At minimum, the practice of swearing in the empaneled jury is

  “judicially recognized,” Hollis, 630 P.2d at 69, which means that the

  court’s failure to do so during Torrez’s trial was error. The question

  then becomes what is the standard of reversal when reviewing such

  an error? Torrez acknowledges that she did not contemporaneously

  object to the court’s failure to swear in the jury, but she argues that

  such an error “requires reversal even absent an objection” because

  the error is structural. Not surprisingly, the Attorney General

  contends that reversal is warranted only if the error is plain. We

  agree with the Attorney General.

                                     6
                B.    Applicable Law on Structural Error

¶ 11   Our supreme court has identified three standards of reversal

  applicable to criminal convictions: “(1) structural error requiring

  automatic reversal; (2) error requiring reversal for violation of an

  express legislative mandate; and (3) trial error requiring reversal

  under an outcome-determinative analysis only if the error was not

  harmless.” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106, ¶ 21; see also

  People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2 (“[R]eversal of a criminal

  conviction for other than structural error, in the absence of express

  legislative mandate or an appropriate case specific, outcome-

  determinative analysis, can no longer be sustained . . . .”).

¶ 12   Adhering to the general rule that not all federal constitutional

  errors require automatic reversal, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

  18, 22 (1967), the United States Supreme Court has applied a

  harmless error standard to a “wide range of errors and has

  recognized that most constitutional errors can be harmless,”

  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1991) (collecting

  cases).

¶ 13   Structural error is confined to errors “which require automatic

  reversal without individualized analysis of how the error impairs the

                                     7
  reliability of the judgment of conviction.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO

  63, ¶ 10. In other words, for there to be structural error, the error

  must “infect the entire trial process,” Neder v. United States, 527

  U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630

  (1993)), and “defy analysis by ‘harmless error’ standards,” id. at 7

  (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309). A structural defect “affect[s]

  the framework within which the trial proceeds, [it is not] simply an

  error in the trial process itself.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.

¶ 14   Therefore, structural error only applies to those constitutional

  rights that “[w]ithout th[o]se basic protections, a criminal trial

  cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of

  guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as

  fundamentally fair.” Id. (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-

  78 (1986)); see People v. Barajas, 2021 COA 98, ¶ 11 n.1 (“[W]e note

  that ‘structural error’ is a constitutional standard, not a statutory

  one.” (quoting Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶¶ 21-25)). The Supreme Court

  has described its jurisprudence on structural error as follows: “[W]e

  have found an error to be ‘structural,’ and thus subject to

  automatic reversal, only in a ‘very limited class of cases.’” Neder,

  527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468

                                     8
  (1997)); see also People v. Richardson, 2018 COA 120, ¶ 40(“We

  recognize that the ‘class of error to which bright-line rules of

  reversal’ apply has greatly narrowed.” (quoting Novotny, ¶ 21)),

  aff’d, 2020 CO 46.3

¶ 15   Most errors, even of constitutional dimension, may be treated

  by reviewing courts as trial error, meaning it is an “error which

  occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which

  may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other

  evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was

  harmless.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08; see also James v.

  People, 2018 CO 72, ¶ 15 (reversing Colorado precedent that had

  previously held the presence of an alternate juror in the jury room

  3 The limited class of errors that the United States Supreme Court

  has found to be structural are: the total lack of defense counsel at
  trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963); the
  lack of an impartial judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535
  (1927); racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury, see
  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1986); denial of self-
  representation at trial, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-
  78 (1984); the denial of a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467
  U.S. 39, 49 (1984); a defective reasonable doubt instruction, see
  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-82 (1993); the total denial
  of a defendant’s right to counsel of choice, see United States v.
  Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006); and a defendant’s right
  of autonomy to proclaim his innocence contrary to counsel’s advice,
  see McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422 (2018).

                                     9
  required automatic reversal because Colorado has “largely come to

  accept” the Supreme Court’s view that most errors involving a

  constitutional right are reviewed under the constitutional harmless

  error analysis). And preserved trial errors are reviewed under

  constitutional harmless error or nonconstitutional harmless error

  standards, which “differ by the degree to which they require that

  the error impair the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”

  Hagos, ¶ 9.4

¶ 16   This is why Colorado courts “review all other [nonstructural]

  errors, constitutional and nonconstitutional, that were not

  preserved by objection for plain error.” Id. at ¶ 14; cf. Howard-

  Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 25 (distinguishing structural error

  from cumulative error, the latter of which requires that a reviewing

  court “identify multiple errors that collectively prejudice the

  substantial rights of the defendant, even if any single error does

  not”).

  4 Constitutional harmless error analysis requires reversal of a

  conviction unless a court is “able to declare a belief that [the error]
  was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hagos v. People, 2012
  CO 63, ¶ 11 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
  (1967)).

                                     10
¶ 17   As recognized in Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 21, automatic reversal

  may also be required “for violation of an express legislative

  mandate” when a statute dictates reversal as the remedy. See also

  Novotny, ¶ 26 (noting that the only circumstance requiring

  automatic reversal besides structural error is when there exists an

  “express legislative mandate”).

¶ 18   Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 24, dealt with whether a violation of

  section 16-10-103(1)(k), C.R.S. 2023 — when a district court denies

  a defendant’s challenge for cause to an impliedly biased juror who

  ultimately sits on the jury — requires automatic reversal because of

  an express legislative mandate. In holding that section 16-10-

  103(1)(k) is not an example of an express legislative mandate

  requiring automatic reversal, the court said the statutory provision

  is “silent on the remedy for a violation” because the language does

  not contain “any indication that the statute dictates a particular

  remedy.” Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 25.

¶ 19   Both Abu-Nantambu-El and Novotny, however, pointed to

  Colorado’s speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. 2023, as

  an example of an express legislative mandate dictating a particular

  remedy. That provision states that if a defendant is not brought to

                                    11
  trial “within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of not

  guilty, he shall be discharged from custody . . . , the pending

  charges shall be dismissed, and the defendant shall not again be

  indicted, informed against, or committed for the same offense.” § 18-

  1-405(1).

                             C.    Analysis

¶ 20   We must first decide whether having a sworn jury is (1) a

  federal constitutional right, the denial of which should be included

  in the very limited class of errors deemed structural error; or (2) a

  requirement of an express statutory provision that mandates

  automatic reversal as a remedy for its violation.5 Because we

  5 Although Torrez references Colorado Constitution article II,

  sections 16 and 23, in her briefing to us, she has made no
  argument as to how the right to a fair and impartial jury under our
  state constitution differs from the analogous right protected by the
  federal constitution. See, e.g., Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699
  P.2d 930, 943 (Colo. 1985) (although the parties cited the Colorado
  Constitution’s search and seizure provision, the court declined to
  analyze a separate standard under the state provision when the
  parties raised no argument as to how the state provision differed
  from the federal one); People v. Landis, 2021 COA 92, ¶ 36
  (concluding that when the parties have not identified a conceptual
  difference between the state constitutional right analysis and
  federal constitutional framework, we rely on the U.S. Constitution);
  see also Sanchez v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2017 COA 71, ¶ 41
  (appellate courts do not address conclusory and underdeveloped

                                    12
  conclude that the right to a sworn jury satisfies neither of these

  criteria, we reject Torrez’s claim that the court’s failure to

  administer to the jury the empanelment oath requires automatic

  reversal of her conviction. Instead, we review her contention for

  plain error.

                  1.    No Federal Constitutional Right

¶ 21   To even reach the question of structural error, we must first

  determine whether a sworn jury is a recognized federal

  constitutional right. And then, even if such a right exists, because

  not all federal constitutional errors require automatic reversal,

  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, we would then need to apply the factors

  identified in Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017), to

  assess whether a violation of the constitutional right is structural

  error. Weaver identified at least three rationales that the United

  States Supreme Court has relied on to include a particular

  constitutional error among the “very limited class of cases,” Neder,

  527 U.S. at 8 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468), requiring

  arguments). Therefore, our analysis is solely confined to whether
  there is a federal constitutional right to a sworn jury and, if so,
  whether violation of that right is structural error.

                                     13
  automatic reversal. Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295-96. First, an error is

  structural “in some instances if the right at issue is not designed to

  protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead

  protects some other interest.” Id. at 295. Second, structural error

  has been applied to cases when “the effects of the error are simply

  too hard to measure.” Id. And third, structural error may exist

  when the “error always results in fundamental unfairness.” Id. at

  296 (emphasis added).6

¶ 22   Torrez urges us to recognize a constitutional right to a sworn

  jury as it protects the right to a fair and impartial jury as

  6 Because Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017), was

  decided relatively recently, there is little Colorado case law applying
  its three categories. To date, it appears that no Colorado appellate
  court has applied Weaver to recognize a new federal constitutional
  error requiring automatic reversal. See People v. Carter, 2021 COA
  29, ¶¶ 46-47 (applying Weaver categories to conclude that a
  constructive amendment is not structural error); People v.
  Richardson, 2018 COA 120, ¶ 40 (applying Weaver categories to
  conclude that the presence of the presiding judge’s spouse on the
  jury did not constitute structural error). But see Richardson v.
  People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 72 (Gabriel, J., dissenting) (relying on the
  second Weaver category — the error defies a harmless error
  analysis — to conclude that a defendant’s right to a fair trial was
  violated when the presiding judge’s wife sat on the jury because the
  defendant “could never show that the judge’s conduct, in fact,
  caused the other jurors to defer to his wife” or “establish that the
  judge’s conduct improperly influenced the independence of the
  jury”).

                                     14
  guaranteed by the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amends.

  V, VI, XIV. We decline to do so. Torrez has not cited, and we are

  not aware of, any controlling authority holding that a sworn jury is

  part of the federally protected right to a fair and impartial jury.

¶ 23   The United States Supreme Court has not recognized that a

  sworn jury is part of the constitutional right to a fair and impartial

  jury, although it has suggested that a sworn jury is relevant to that

  right. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986), the issue

  was whether a juror needed to be struck for cause due to the juror’s

  opposition to the death penalty. In that context, the Court observed

  that “the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair

  cross section of the community is impartial . . . so long as the jurors

  can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to

  apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” Id. at 184

  (emphasis added).

¶ 24   And no federal court has recognized a constitutional right to a

  sworn jury. In United States v. Turrietta, 696 F.3d 972, 973 (10th

  Cir. 2012) — relied on by the Attorney General — the Tenth Circuit

  dealt with a situation in which defense counsel failed to raise an

  objection to the unsworn jury until after the guilty verdict was

                                     15
  reached. Defense counsel admitted that he was aware the jury was

  unsworn, and his strategy was to wait for the verdict to decide

  whether to object. Id. at 973 n.1.

¶ 25   Applying plain error review, the Tenth Circuit noted that it

  found no binding authority, “whether in the form of a constitutional

  provision, statute, rule, or judicial decision, addressing whether the

  Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury necessarily requires the jury

  be sworn.” Id. at 981. And it concluded that “[n]o federal court in

  the history of American jurisprudence has held the constitutional

  guarantee of trial by jury to necessarily include trial by sworn jury.”

  Id. at 982.

¶ 26   In so ruling, the court in Turrietta reasoned that the handful of

  federal courts that have suggested the failure to swear in the jury

  would amount to an error do not agree as to the source of the error.

  Specifically, the Turrietta court cited case law in which some courts

  pointed to the Sixth Amendment, see Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d

  628, 629 (8th Cir. 1979); others to the Fifth Amendment’s Double

  Jeopardy Clause, see United States v. Little Dog, 398 F.3d 1032,

  1036-37 (8th Cir. 2005); or still others to the “dignity or

  effectiveness which should attend federal court trials,” United States

                                    16
  v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1358 (6th Cir. 1984). Turrietta, 696 F.3d

  at 982; see also United States v. Pinero, 948 F.2d 698, 700 (11th

  Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is not clear from the caselaw whether juries in the

  federal court system are required to be sworn in.”).

¶ 27   Yet Torrez relies on Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S.

  Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020), to suggest that if the Supreme Court were

  presented with the issue of whether the Sixth Amendment right to a

  jury trial includes a right to a sworn jury, the Court would conclude

  that it does. The basis for her argument is that because Ramos

  concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial requires a

  unanimous verdict, the Supreme Court continues to recognize new

  rights of a federal constitutional dimension.

¶ 28   But Torrez assumes that if the Supreme Court recognizes a

  federal constitutional right, then the Supreme Court would likewise

  determine that the denial of that right is part of the limited class of

  errors warranting automatic reversal. Two aspects of Ramos’s

  analysis cut against Torrez’s prediction. First, the opinion does not

  contain the word “structural” or the phrase “automatic reversal.”

  See id. Second, in recognizing that a right to a jury trial requires a

  unanimous verdict, which the defendant’s was not, Ramos said that

                                     17
  “[n]o one before us suggests that the error was harmless.” Id. at

  ___, 140 S. Ct. at 1408. Given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to

  identify new constitutional errors that require automatic reversal,

  the omission of any mention of “structural error” is telling.7

¶ 29   Torrez also relies on a litany of out-of-state cases to suggest

  that other jurisdictions have held that the failure to swear in the

  jury requires automatic reversal. This is true. But those cases

  were decided under either a state constitutional provision, see

  People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶¶ 62, 64, 215 N.E.3d 58, 80-81

  (holding that, as the state’s highest court, it may depart from

  federal structural error law, and that, given the “long and storied

  history” of a sworn jury in the state’s constitution, structural error

  applies because the “failure to swear the jury with a trial oath is an

  error of such gravity that it threatens the integrity of the judicial

  process”); case law involving the right to a fair trial in the context of

  7 We struggle to imagine a scenario where the failure to swear in the

  jury, even if a sworn jury were recognized as part of the Sixth
  Amendment right to a jury trial, would actually be reviewed for
  constitutional harmless error. This is because such review would
  only apply if the claimed error were preserved, and once a party
  objects to a court’s failure to administer the empanelment oath, it is
  implausible that a court would decline to administer it.

                                     18
  jury selection, see Barral v. State, 353 P.3d 1197, 1200 (Nev. 2015)

  (holding that the failure to administer the oath to prospective jurors

  constitutes structural error as it denies a criminal defendant their

  due process rights); or a state statutory provision, see Spencer v.

  State, 640 S.E.2d 267, 268 (Ga. 2007) (“[T]he failure to administer

  th[e] oath [required by state statute] to the trial jury requires the

  setting aside of any conviction based upon the decision of such an

  unsworn body and that there be a subsequent retrial.”).

¶ 30   As primarily an error correction court, we are reluctant to

  recognize a new federal constitutional right without a strong

  indication that our supreme court is likely to recognize the possible

  existence of such a right. See Richardson, 2018 COA 120, ¶ 40

  (“[A]s a court of error correction, it is not our prerogative to declare

  new classes of structural errors . . . .”). In declining to recognize a

  federal constitutional right to a sworn jury, we do not suggest that

  the empanelment oath is not important and should not be given to

  the jurors who will decide the case. But identifying a “judicially

  recognized” practice of swearing in a jury, as our supreme court did

  in Hollis, is a far cry from proclaiming that a sworn jury is essential

  to the federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Thus,

                                     19
  Torrez’s conviction cannot be automatically reversed based on

  denial of a right that has not been given constitutional significance.8

                  2.   No Statutory Right and Remedy

¶ 31   We further conclude that there is no express legislative

  mandate that requires automatic reversal as the remedy for an

  unsworn jury. Torrez has not cited, nor are we aware of, any

  Colorado statute that recognizes a defendant’s right to a sworn jury,

  much less any statutory provision that specifically mandates a jury

  to take an oath and requires reversal of a conviction if the court

  fails to administer one.

¶ 32   We acknowledge that there are statutory provisions — none of

  which the parties cite — that imply that a jury must take an oath.

  See § 16-10-105, C.R.S. 2023 (“Alternate jurors shall be drawn in

  the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be

  subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the

  same oath, and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities,

  and privileges as the regular jurors.”) (emphasis added); cf. § 13-72-

  8 Because we conclude that there is no federal constitutional right

  to a sworn jury, we need not address whether any of the structural
  error categories from Weaver, 582 U.S. at 295, apply.

                                    20
  105, C.R.S. 2023 (governing the swearing in of a grand jury

  foreperson and grand jury members before service commences).

¶ 33      But even if these provisions could be read as establishing a

  statutory right to a sworn jury — which they do not — the statutes

  do not contain an express legislative mandate that requires

  automatic reversal if the statute is violated. See Abu-Nantambu-El,

  ¶ 25.

¶ 34      Torrez also points us to the rules of criminal procedure to

  support her contention that there is a right to a sworn jury. True,

  Hollis recognized that such an empanelment oath requirement is

  implied in those rules. 630 P.2d at 69; see Crim. P. 23(a)(7) (“In any

  case in which a jury has been sworn to try a case, and any juror by

  reason of illness or other cause becomes unable to continue until a

  verdict is reached, the court may excuse such juror.”); Crim. P.

  24(b)(2) (“If either party desires to introduce evidence, other than

  the sworn responses of the prospective juror, for the purpose of

  establishing grounds to disqualify or challenge the juror for cause,

  such evidence shall be heard and all issues related thereto shall be

  determined by the court out of the presence of the other prospective

                                      21
  jurors.”); Crim. P. 24(e) (using the same language about alternate

  jurors as set forth in section 16-10-105).

¶ 35   But again, those rules do not mandate automatic reversal if

  violated and, regardless, those rules are not express legislative

  mandates as described by Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 25.

¶ 36   We acknowledge that other state legislatures have passed laws

  specifically mandating that jurors must be sworn in once they are

  empaneled.9 Our General Assembly is free to enact such a

  statutory requirement and even expressly provide for automatic

  reversal of a criminal conviction if such a right is violated. But we

  are not free to establish such a right or remedy simply because

  other states’ legislatures have done so. See People v. Diaz, 2015 CO

  28, ¶ 15 (“[I]n interpreting a statute, we must accept the General

  9 Examples include Arizona and Mississippi.    Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
  § 22-224 (2023) (“When the jury has been selected, the justice of
  the peace shall administer to it substantially the following oath: ‘Do
  you swear or affirm that you will give careful attention to the
  proceedings, abide by the court’s instructions and render a verdict
  in accordance with the law and evidence presented to you, so help
  you God.’”); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-71 (West 2023) (“Petit jurors
  shall be sworn in the following form: ‘You, and each of you, do
  solemnly swear (or affirm) that you will well and truly try all issues
  and execute all writs of inquiry that may be submitted to you, or left
  to your decision by the court, during the present term, and true
  verdicts give according to the evidence. So help you God.’”).

                                    22
  Assembly’s choice of language and not add or imply words that

  simply are not there.” (quoting People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391,

  393-94 (Colo. App. 2009))); Scoggins v. Unigard Ins. Co., 869 P.2d

  202, 205 (Colo. 1994) (noting that a court “will not judicially

  legislate by reading a statute to accomplish something the plain

  language does not suggest”).

¶ 37   And some state courts have declined to apply structural error

  even when that state has a statute mandating a sworn jury. In

  such cases, those courts have reviewed the issue for plain error

  when no objection was raised at trial. See, e.g., State v. Vogh, 41

  P.3d 421, 428 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (Even though Oregon has a state

  statute requiring the jury to take an oath, “[t]he oath does not stand

  alone as the sole procedure that guarantees that the jury will try

  the case based on the admissible evidence and applicable law. To

  the contrary, numerous additional mechanisms serve the same

  purpose . . . .”); People v. Cruz, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 86, 89 (Ct. App.

  2001) (stating that although the jury did not take the whole oath,

  that failure did not require automatic reversal because the jury

  “was not unmindful of its duty” and it was expressly instructed that

                                     23
  it must “render a verdict according to the instructions of the trial

  court,” which the trial court said was its “duty”).

¶ 38   Indeed, People v. Cain, 869 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2015) — a case

  neither party cited in their briefs — has similar facts to this case.

  The jurors in Cain were sworn in before voir dire to truthfully

  answer all questions about their qualifications to serve as jurors in

  the case, but they were never given the empanelment oath, as

  required by Michigan statute. Id. at 837-38. The Michigan Court of

  Appeals applied structural error, but the Michigan Supreme Court

  reversed, reviewing the issue for plain error and holding that the

  record “reveals that the error of failing to properly swear the jury

  did not undermine the proceedings with respect to the broader

  pursuits and values that the oath seeks to advance.” Id. at 836.

¶ 39   In reaching this conclusion, Cain relied on the fact that the

  district court had instructed the jury on reasonable doubt,

  explained to the jurors their duties and responsibilities, and

  reminded the jurors to “[r]emember that [they] have taken an oath

  to return a true and just verdict based only on the evidence and

  [the court’s] instructions on the law.” Id. at 837. The Cain court

  acknowledged that these statements and instructions were not a

                                    24
  substitute for the oath, but it concluded the record showed that the

  trial court had been “vigilant” to remind the jury to act fairly and

  impartially. Id. at 838. In other words, the repeated instructions,

  although not an oath, indicated “that the jurors were conscious of

  the gravity of the task before them and the manner in which that

  task was to be carried out.” Id. at 839.

¶ 40   Regardless of out-of-state authority, though, Abu-Nantambu-

  El, ¶ 25, governs, and because there is no Colorado statutory

  provision that mandates automatic reversal as a remedy when a

  defendant is found guilty by an unsworn jury, we do not apply

  structural error to Torrez’s claim. Instead, we will review her

  contention for plain error.

                         D.     Plain Error Review

¶ 41   Plain error is error that is obvious and substantial. Hagos,

  ¶ 14. “In general, to be plain, an error must ‘be so obvious’ at the

  time it is made ‘that a trial judge should be able to avoid it without

  the benefit of an objection.’” Cardman v. People, 2019 CO 73, ¶ 34

  (quoting Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16). For an error to be

  obvious, the action challenged on appeal ordinarily “must

  contravene (1) a clear statutory command; (2) a well-settled legal

                                     25
  principle; or (3) Colorado case law.” Id. (quoting Scott, ¶ 16). The

  substantiality prong of plain error review requires the obvious error

  to “so undermine[] the fundamental fairness of the trial itself so as

  to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

  conviction.” Id. at ¶ 39 (quoting Hagos, ¶ 14).

¶ 42    We assume, without deciding, that the error was obvious, as

  our supreme court in Hollis said that “the need for such an

  [empanelment] oath ha[s] been judicially recognized.” 630 P.2d at

  69.

¶ 43    But was the obvious error substantial? The courts in Cruz,

  Cain, and Vogh — the out-of-state cases in which the courts applied

  plain error review to the failure to follow a state law requiring a

  sworn jury — looked at the trial records to discern whether, in the

  absence of the timely empanelment oath, (1) the district court

  provided sufficient instructions to the jury; (2) the instructions

  conveyed the gravity and seriousness of the jury’s task; and (3) the

  record lacked any evidence of juror misconduct or other issues that

  would suggest the jury was acting contrary to the requirements set

  forth in the empanelment oath.

                                     26
¶ 44   The record here shows that the district court, despite not

  administering the empanelment oath, provided substantial

  comments, instructions, and guidance that secured the

  fundamental fairness of Torrez’s trial; thus, the error did not cast

  serious doubt on the reliability of the verdict. Such examples

  include the following:

           The court explained the prosecution’s burden of proof,

            the reasonable doubt standard, and the presumption of

            innocence at least six times. For example, the court said,

            “The defendant is presumed to be innocent. Therefore,

            the prosecution has the burden of proving the charges

            beyond a reasonable doubt.”

           There are also at least six instances when the court

            instructed the jury to decide the case based solely on the

            evidence presented, not to talk with the other jurors

            about the case until deliberations, and not to speak

            about the case or try to investigate any facts other than

            those presented in court. For example, the court said,

            “You still don’t have all the evidence, and you haven’t

                                    27
             heard closing arguments, and you don’t know the

             instructions, so please don’t discuss it.”

            The court gave other instructions throughout, such as

             those explaining the defendant’s right not to testify, that

             the court would give the jury the law that it had to apply,

             and that the verdict needed to be unanimous.

             Specifically, at one point, the court said, “[I]t is my job to

             decide what rules or law apply to the case. You must

             follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You cannot

             follow some and ignore others. Even if you disagree or do

             not understand the reasons for some of the rules, you

             must follow them.”

            The court obtained acknowledgment from the jurors after

             it said, “Everyone understand our civics lesson? Can

             everybody follow those basic rules? Everybody is shaking

             their head yes.”

¶ 45   Other factors that support our conclusion that the failure to

  swear in the jury in this case was not plain error include: (1) the

  trial was only two days long, so the number of jury instructions in

  relation to the length of the trial is significant; (2) Torrez has not

                                      28
  raised any other trial error that would call into question the

  reliability of the judgment; (3) the court thoroughly went through

  the jury instructions with the parties and even asked if there were

  any other instructions or objections to consider, to which defense

  counsel said no; and (4) Jury Instruction No. 1 directed the jurors

  to decide the case based on the evidence presented to them in court

  and that their verdict had to be based solely on jury deliberations

  and not outside individuals or materials. See Galvan v. People,

  2020 CO 82, ¶ 29 (appellate courts must presume that the jury

  followed the court’s instructions). On this record, we discern no

  plain error resulting from the court’s failure to administer the

  empanelment oath.

                               III.   Merger

¶ 46   Torrez contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we agree

  that Torrez’s convictions should merge into one count of first degree

  burglary.

              A.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 47   We review de novo a claim that a defendant’s conviction

  violates her protection against double jeopardy. People v. Lowe,

  2020 COA 116, ¶ 38.

                                      29
¶ 48   The double jeopardy clause protects defendants from

  multiplicity, which “is the charging of multiple counts and the

  imposition of multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct,”

  unless the General Assembly authorizes it. Woellhaf v. People, 105

  P.3d 209, 214 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 49   Multiple convictions not based on distinguishable acts must

  merge. Id. at 220. But double jeopardy does not bar multiple

  convictions under the same statute if the defendant committed the

  offense more than once. See People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶ 17. A

  defendant may be charged more than once under the same statute

  when (1) “the unit of prosecution prescribed by the legislature

  permits the charging of multiple offenses,” and (2) “the evidence in

  support of each offense justifies the charging of distinct offenses.”

  Quintano v. People, 105 P.3d 585, 590 (Colo. 2005); see People v.

  Williams, 651 P.2d 899, 902-03 (Colo. 1982) (citing Sanabria v.

  United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978)).

                              B.    Analysis

¶ 50   As mentioned previously, Torrez was convicted of two counts

  of first degree burglary, one count of attempted first degree assault,

  and one count of second degree assault. During the sentencing

                                    30
  hearing, the district court and parties agreed that both of Torrez’s

  convictions for attempted first degree assault and second degree

  assault should merge into the burglary convictions. We agree.

¶ 51   One element of first degree burglary requires proof that “the

  person or another participant in the crime assault[ed] or menace[d]

  any person.” § 18-4-202, C.R.S. 2023. There is no dispute that the

  assault convictions arose from the same factual incident when

  Torrez stabbed the victim with the knife. That is, both the

  attempted first degree assault count and the second degree assault

  count were based on Torrez’s causing bodily injury to the victim;

  they differed only as to whether Torrez intended to cause serious

  bodily injury or simply bodily injury. See § 18-3-202(1)(a), C.R.S.

  2023 (A person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if

  “[w]ith intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person, [s]he

  causes serious bodily injury to any person by means of a deadly

  weapon.”); § 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023 (A person commits second

  degree assault if “[w]ith intent to cause bodily injury to another

  person, he or she causes such injury to any person by means of a

  deadly weapon.”).

                                    31
¶ 52   Therefore, because one of Torrez’s first degree burglary

  convictions was premised on this one assault, she necessarily

  committed the lesser included offenses of attempted first degree

  assault and second degree assault. The lesser included offenses

  must merge into the greater. See Reyna-Abarca v. People, 2017 CO

  15, ¶ 65 (double jeopardy is violated when a defendant is convicted

  of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense for the same

  conduct); Page v. People, 2017 CO 88, ¶ 9 (the conviction of the

  lesser included offense must merge into the greater offense);

  Litwinsky v. Zavares, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (D. Colo. 2001)

  (“Where assault is the predicate offense, the elements of first-degree

  burglary necessarily include all of the elements of assault. Thus,

  . . . assault is clearly a lesser-included offense of first-degree

  burglary when assault is the predicate offense.”).

¶ 53   The parties at the sentencing hearing also agreed that Torrez’s

  two first degree burglary convictions should merge into a single

  conviction. The district court suggested that there might be

  sufficient facts showing two distinct episodes of first degree

  burglary. It said that the first episode could have occurred when

  Torrez “came to the house, . . . was asked to leave, [but] she refused

                                      32
  to.” And the second incident the court surmised was when Torrez

  was pushed outside, the victim tried to shut the door, and Torrez

  reentered the apartment and began to stab the victim. But the

  court also noted that the charges could be merged “because [it did

  not] think there [were] two different criminal episodes here, even

  though there’s two burglaries.”

¶ 54   We agree that Torrez’s two burglary convictions must also

  merge into one single conviction. Jury Instruction Nos. 13 and 14

  listed the two burglary counts as Burglary (Armed with a Deadly

  Weapon) and Burglary (Assault), respectively. Torrez committed

  first degree burglary when, in addition to committing the other

  elements of the offense, she assaulted the victim with the knife,

  which was considered a deadly weapon. Torrez’s initial refusal to

  leave the victim’s apartment was not a distinct act of first degree

  burglary from the first degree burglary when Torrez then assaulted

  the victim with a deadly weapon (the knife). Both incidents

  occurred within the same occupied structure, and the prosecution

  did not treat the two burglary counts as factually distinct acts.

  Rather, the two counts reflected alternative methods of committing

  the same first degree burglary.

                                    33
¶ 55   The district court indicated that it would merge all of Torrez’s

  convictions into one count of first degree burglary. But the

  mittimus reflects four separate convictions and four separate

  sentences. It also noted at that “ALL COUNTS RUN

  CONCURRENTLY AND MERGE FOR PURPOSES OF SENTENCING.”

  We agree with Torrez that, despite the district court noting that the

  sentences for all four convictions run concurrently with each other,

  the multiple convictions and sentences nonetheless violate double

  jeopardy because the mittimus should reflect a single conviction of

  first degree burglary and a single sentence for that conviction. See

  Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985) (recognizing that a

  second conviction that should be merged is not remedied by a

  concurrent sentence because the additional conviction could have

  collateral consequences involving parole eligibility or impeachment

  in a separate proceeding).

¶ 56   Therefore, on remand, the district court must amend Torrez’s

  mittimus to reflect a single conviction of first degree burglary with

  an imposed ten-year sentence in the custody of the Department of

  Corrections.

                                    34
                            IV.   Conclusion

¶ 57   The judgment of conviction is affirmed in part and vacated in

  part. The convictions for the second count of first degree burglary,

  the one count of attempted first degree assault, and the one count

  of second degree assault are vacated, as they are merged into a

  single conviction of first degree burglary. The remaining first degree

  burglary conviction is affirmed. The case is remanded to the

  district court to amend the mittimus consistent with this opinion.

       JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE WELLING concur.

                                   35