Court Opinion

ID: 9638378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:42:32.176011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:06.129356
License: Public Domain

TODD, Judge,
partially dissenting.
The principal opinion is correct in all respects except as to the amount of the verdict.
The measure of damages for wrongful death is the pecuniary value of the life of the deceased plus funeral expenses, where there was no proof of any pain and suffering. Templeton v. Quarles, 52 Tenn.App. 419, 374 S.W.2d 654 (1963).
The pecuniary value of a life is to be determined from the expectancy of life, age, condition of health and strength, and capacity, if any, for earning money, and personal habits as to sobriety or industry. Sou. Ry. Co. v. Sloan, 56 Tenn.App. 380, 407 S.W.2d 205 (1965).
The estimation of compensation for wrongful death must take into consideration not only the most optimistic expectations, but also the most pessimistic, and all uncertainties between the extremes. Smith v. Bullington (Tenn.App.1973), 499 S.W.2d 649.
Damages recoverable for wrongful death do not include grief, mental anguish, or loss of moral aid, comfort counsel or companionship. Davidson Benedict Co. v. Severson, 109 Tenn. 572, 72 S.W. 967 (1902).
In estimating the pecuniary value of the life of a minor child, there is good reason and logic in the insistence that the anticipated expenses of rearing, support, training and education should be considered in mitigation of the value of future earnings during adulthood. The decisions on this subject are not uniform. See 25A C.J.S. Death § 114, pp. 962, 963; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Death, § 170, pp. 727, 728.
In Hildreth v. Key, Mo.App., 341 S.W.2d 601 (1960), it was held that the measure of damages for the wrongful death of a minor child is the value of its services during minority plus burial expenses and other incidental expenses, less the expense of support and maintenance during minority.
Even though juries are not ordinarily instructed to consider support and maintenance in mitigation of anticipated earnings, it is obvious that they do so, for verdicts for the death of children with a long life expectancy are uniformly less than verdicts for death of adults.
In addition to considerations of expense of rearing and uncertainty of life and future development of earning capacity, there is, in the present case, the unequivocal report of the jury on remote negligence which must mitigate the recovery.
Furthermore, the amounts awarded in similar cases must be given some consideration in order to preserve some sensible consistency in verdicts of juries and resultant judgments. To this end, a tabular analysis has been prepared showing dates, age of deceased, and approved damages in cases annotated in 8 Tenn.Digest, Death ®=»99(3), (supplement), and same is reproduced as follows:
1951 - 6 years - $20,000.00
1952 - 8 years - 15,000.00
1956 - 8 years - 20,000.00
1960 - 11 years - 22,500.00
1961 - 3 years - 17,500.00
1961 - 16 years - 19,000.00
1963 - 22 months- 25,000.00
1963 - 4 years - 10,000.00
1965 - 9 years - 50,000.00
1966 - 11 years - 20,000.00
It is recognized that no amount of money can compensate a parent for the loss of a child. Without the wrongful death statute, there could be no recovery at .all. The statute allows limited damages for wrongful death, described as “the pecuniary value of the life” (not value to the survivors, but value to the deceased).
The limited recovery allowed by statute should not be permitted to expand beyond the bounds of reason and the intent of the statute.
*638To approve a verdict of $75,000.00 where remote negligence required a mitigation would have the effect of approving compensation substantially in excess of $75,000.00 in a comparable case where remote negligence was not present.
Accordingly, this Court should suggest a remittitur of $25,000.00 and grant a new trial if same is not accepted.