Court Opinion

ID: 9789228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:30:52.918665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:38.689675
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ
specially concurring:
I agree with the majority's analysis and conclusion under Miranda and the Fifth Amendment affirming the trial court's suppression of Taylor's pre-arrest statement and reversing the trial court's suppression of Taylor's post-arrest statement. However, I believe that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by the trial court's suppression order and was not raised in Taylor's motion to suppress. I thus find that the majority's discussion and analysis of the issues under the Fourth Amendment is unnecessary and improper under our precedent mandating that we limit our review of interlocutory appeals to the issue on which the suppression was based. See, e.g., People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 676 n. 5 (Colo.1996). Accordingly, I specially concur.
A review of Taylor's motion to suppress reveals that it was clearly limited in scope to the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Of the seven paragraphs that comprise the motion, the first three recount the factual ciream-stances giving rise to the motion. The remaining four paragraphs allege violations of Taylor's Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights and nowhere mention the Fourth Amendment. For example, the fourth paragraph that "a reasonable person in Defendant's position would believe that he was not free to leave and was in police custody." 1 In support of this assertion, Taylor cites Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091 (Colo.1986), and People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo.1984). All three of these cases address the Fifth Amendment.2 In the fifth paragraph, Taylor contends that "[the statements were not volunteered but were responses to police interrogation or its functional equivalent." To support this allegation, Taylor relies on Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), and People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583 (Colo.1981). Both of these cases address only the Fifth Amendment and Miranda and make no mention of the Fourth Amendment. 'In the last two paragraphs, Taylor contends that his questioning was "custodial" and "required the police to give Miranda warnings," and that the officers "deliberately elicited statements from [him] without a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel." Again, the cases cited by Taylor in support of these contentions all address the Fifth Amendment and Miranda, and those cases that also address the Fourth Amendment are clearly relied upon by Taylor to support his argument that he was subjected to custodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.
In addition to the limited seope of Taylor's motion to suppress addressing only the Fifth Amendment, it is clear that the trial court's ruling suppressing the statements was based wholly on Miranda and the Fifth Amendment and not on the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "[ojne of the factors on which the trial court premised its conclusion that *696the police violated Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights was its finding that Defendant had been impermissibly detained." Maj. op. at 685. To support its contention, the majority cites the following excerpt from the trial court's ruling:
To be honest ... I may have found differently if this was a situation where there was some legitimate reason to stop Mr. Taylor; [if] Mr. Taylor himself was suspected of having committed some kind of offense and they were going through this routine then, but under the cireumstances ... he's essentially an innocent bystander they have placed under restrictions.
. Id. at 685 n. 4 (citing R. vol. II at 181). However, a review of the entirety of the trial court's excerpt relied on by the majority reveals that the trial court did not base its Fifth Amendment analysis and conclusions on a Fourth Amendment inquiry or analysis. The complete trial court excerpt cited by the majority reads: .
To be honest ... I may have found differently if this was a situation where there was some legitimate reason to stop Mr. Taylor; [if] Mr. Taylor himself was suspected of having committed some kind of offense and they were going through this routine then, but under the cireumstances ... he's essentially an innocent bystander they have placed under restrictions, under these circumstances I think it was only reasonable for Mr. Taylor to conclude not only was Jennifer Tafoya placed under arrest-and that's what I wanted to mention.
R. vol. II at 1831 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court's excerpt implies that Taylor would have reasonably believed that he, too, was under arrest, a concept that implicates the Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, just seven lines after the foregoing excerpt, the trial court states in explicit terms that it is making its ruling based on the Fifth Amendment and Miranda when it states, "Anyway, I find this to be a custodial interrogation and not [MJlirandized, and for that reason, I find that the interrogation was illegal and the statements made at the scene in the Centennial Mall parking lot must be suppressed." Id.
Contrary to the majority's conclusion that the trial court considered the Fourth Amendment in reaching its conclusions, the trial court's oral ruling is peppered with statements that Taylor was in custody and was interrogated for the purposes of Miranda and that he was not Mirandigzed when he should have been. For example, the trial court stated: "I think the actions and words and context suggests that he was in custody. He was not free to leave." R. vol. II at 180. The trial court also stated: "I find this to be a custodial interrogation and not [MJiran-dized, and for that reason, I find that the interrogation was illegal and the statements made at the scene in the Centennial Mall parking lot must be suppressed." Id. at 131.
The trial court's use of several words and phrases that are commonly associated with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not convert either Taylor's motion or the trial court's ruling into ones that implicate the Fourth Amendment. These words, when viewed in the entire context of the hearing on the motion to suppress and the court's oral ruling on the motion, make it clear that the trial court decided Taylor's motion to suppress solely on Fifth Amendment and M/-randoa grounds. For example, the trial court's reference to "fruits of the poisonous tree" with regard to Taylor's statement to Trooper Hilling does not render the ruling or the motion ones that were based in the Fourth Amendments.3 Instead, as the majority correctly states, the trial court erred in applying the fruit of the poisonous tree doe-trine to Taylor's statement because that doe-trine "does not apply to confessions obtained *697after an initial confession that was voluntary but not preceded by Miranda warnings." Maj. op. at 693 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)). The express recognition by the majority that the trial court erroneously applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine because Taylor's Fifth Amendment and Miranda rights, as opposed to his Fourth Amendment rights, were implicated further supports my conclusion that the Fourth Amendment is not at issue in this interlocutory appeal.
The majority states that "the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues raised by this case are inextricable." Maj. op. at 686. However, a review of the majority's Fifth Amendment analysis reveals that very little in that analysis takes advantage of the majority's Fourth Amendment discussion. Instead, the majority's discussion of the Fifth Amendment analysis is grounded in Fifth Amendment and Mirando concepts such as "custody" and "interrogation" and does not utilize Fourth Amendment jurisprudential concepts to inform its discussion of the Fifth Amendment. See generally maj. op. at 689-693. Indeed, in its discussion of the Fifth Amendment, the majority expressly notes the distinct differences between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See id. at 690 n. 8 ("[ Wle have recognized that whether a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment and whether a person is 'in custody' for purposes of Miranda are constitutionally dis-tinet inquires."). The only benefit I see from the majority's lengthy Fourth Amendment analysis is the conclusion that this was not a routine traffic stop. I believe that such an observation could be made without such lengthy discussion of the Fourth Amendment, a belief that is supported by the majority's independent conclusion in its Fifth Amendment analysis that "[ulalike a routine traffic stop, Defendant was pulled over, not because he had violated the law, but because there was a warrant for Ms. Tafoya's arrest." Maj. op. at 692.
The majority also states that an analysis under the Fourth Amendment is necessary because if the statements could be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine an analysis under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda would be moot. However, we do not ordinarily consider and analyze issues not raised below, particularly when such consideration may leave the issues raised below, upon which the trial court based its decision, completely undiscussed. See, e.g., Melton, 910 P.2d at 676 n. 5.
I would limit our review of the trial court's suppression order to the grounds upon which that court granted the motion. We have customarily limited our decisions in interlocutory appeals in this manner. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 975 P.2d 160, 175 (Colo.1999); People v. Canton, 951 P.2d 907, 911 n. 4 (Colo.1998) (articulating the general principle that in an interlocutory appeal we do not address issues not resolved by the trial court); Melton, 910 P.2d at 676 n. 5 ("The trial court's sole reason for granting Melton's suppression motion was its finding that the police officers' initial approach and questioning of Melton was not supported by reasonable suspicion of eriminal activity.... Therefore, we limit our review of the trial court's rulings to whether the initial contact between the police and Melton was proper."). I would thus only consider the applicability of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment in considering the People's interlocutory appeal.4
Accordingly, I specially concur.
Chief Justice MULLARKEY joins in the special concurrence.

. - Although Taylor refers to "the roadside detention" in paragraph four, which may arguably be read as implicating the Fourth Amendment, see, e.g., People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 992-93 (Colo.2001), a review of the entirety of the fourth paragraph, as well as the fourth paragraph in the context of the motion as a whole, reveals that Taylor's assertion is that he was in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and Mirarida when he was pulled over, asked to leave his vehicle, and questioned by the police.

. Although Thiret also addresses the Fourth Amendment, the context in which Taylor cites it makes it clear that he relied upon the case to support his argument that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.

. By way of further example, the trial court stated that the interaction between Taylor and the police officers in the parking lot was an "encounter," which rings of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence's category of a consensual encounter. See, e.g., People v. Morales, 935 P.2d 936, 939 (Colo.1997). At another point, the trial court stated that there "was clearly some type of detention" in the parking lot. Like "encounter," the term "detention" is associated with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ortega, 34 P.3d at 992-93. As discussed above, these words and phrases, when considered in context, demonstrate that the trial court addressed Taylor's motion only on Fifth Amendment and Miranda grounds, and not on Fourth Amendment grounds.

. I would thus not reach, contrary to the majority, any conclusion regarding the admissibility of the cocaine found in Taylor's car. The admissibility of the cocaine was raised by neither Taylor in his motion nor by the trial court during the hearing and is not properly before this court. See, e.g., People v. De Baca, 736 P.2d 25, 27 n. 1 (Colo.1987).