Court Opinion

ID: 9913321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 18:00:35.234015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:33.428023
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ-                              No. 21-456
HERNANDEZ,
                                               Agency No.
                                              A208-444-360
               Petitioner,
  v.
                                               OPINION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

               Respondent,

----------------------------------------

NORTHWEST IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS PROJECT;
WASHINGTON DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION,

               Amici Curiae.

          On Petition for Review of an Order of the
              Board of Immigration Appeals

             Argued and Submitted April 20, 2023
                      Portland, Oregon

                    Filed December 27, 2023
2               RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Carlos T. Bea, and Jennifer
                  Sung, Circuit Judges.

                 Opinion by Judge Rawlinson

                          SUMMARY *

                          Immigration

    Denying Victor Rodriguez-Hernandez’s petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the panel concluded that: 1) Rodriguez-Hernandez’s
harassment conviction, in violation of Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) § 9A.46.020(1), was categorically for a
crime of violence aggravated felony that made him ineligible
for discretionary relief from removal; and 2) substantial
evidence supported the denial of relief under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT).
    The panel explained that the Washington statute, as
interpreted by the Washington courts, is not divisible. Thus,
the panel concluded that the BIA correctly applied the
categorical approach and, likewise, the panel could not look
to the underlying facts to determine which subsection
Rodriguez-Hernandez violated.
   Rodriguez-Hernandez maintained that his conviction
was not categorically for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) because RCW § 9A.46.020(1) criminalizes conduct

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND               3

that does not involve the use of physical force. Rejecting
that contention, the panel explained that the statute, as
interpreted by Washington courts, requires the “threatened
use of physical force against the person or property of
another,” as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). In addition, the
panel explained that Rodriguez-Hernandez had not shown a
realistic probability that Washington would apply RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) to de minimis contact rather than force
capable of causing physical pain or injury. As a result, the
panel concluded that the BIA properly held that Rodriguez-
Hernandez’s conviction was for a crime of violence
aggravated felony that made him ineligible for cancellation
of removal, asylum, and voluntary departure.
    As to CAT relief, the panel concluded that Rodriguez-
Hernandez did not establish that it was more likely than not
that he would be tortured with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official. Although Rodriguez-Hernandez
testified that his family received a threatening call warning
that he would be kidnapped when he visited Mexico,
Rodriguez-Hernandez was unable to identify who made the
threats, his family did not make any payments, and he did
not plan on visiting Mexico.

                        COUNSEL

N. David Shamloo Esq. (argued), The Law Office of N.
David Shamloo LLC, Portland, Oregon, for Petitioner.
Andrew B. Insegna (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony P.
Nicastro, Assistant Director; Brian Boynton, Principal
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of
Justice, for Respondent.
4                RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

                               OPINION

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge:

    Victor Rodriguez-Hernandez (Rodriguez-Hernandez), a
native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissing his appeal of the denial by an Immigration Judge
(IJ) of cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT).            Rodriguez-
Hernandez contends that the BIA erred when it held that his
harassment conviction in violation of Revised Code of
Washington (RCW) § 9A.46.020 was categorically for a
crime of violence, thereby rendering him ineligible for
cancellation of removal, asylum, and voluntary departure. In
addition, Rodriguez-Hernandez asserts that substantial
evidence does not support the denial of CAT relief. 1
I. BACKGROUND

    In 2015, Rodriguez-Hernandez was served with a notice
to appear alleging removability on the basis that he was not
admitted or paroled into the United States. Rodriguez-
Hernandez conceded removability and applied for
cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT relief. Rodriguez-Hernandez maintained that he
faced persecution in Mexico due to threats made against his
family.

1
 The agency also denied withholding of removal. Rodriguez-Hernandez
has forfeited any challenge to that ruling due to his failure to raise it in
his Opening Brief. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.
2020).
             RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND            5

    In his application for cancellation of removal,
Rodriguez-Hernandez acknowledged that, in 2009, he was
convicted of “misdemeanor [h]arrassment-[domestic
violence],” and “sentenced to 365 days in jail.” When
Rodriguez-Hernandez entered his guilty plea, RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1), the statute of conviction, provided that:

       (1) A person is guilty of harassment if:
          (a) Without lawful authority, the person
          knowingly threatens:
              (i) To cause bodily injury
              immediately or in the future to the
              person threatened or to any other
              person; or
              (ii) To cause physical damage to the
              property of a person other than the
              actor; or
              (iii) To subject the person threatened
              or any other person to physical
              confinement or restraint; or
              (iv) Maliciously to do any other act
              which is intended to substantially
              harm the person threatened or another
              with respect to his or her physical or
              mental health or safety; and
          (b) The person by words or conduct
          places the person threatened in
          reasonable fear that the threat will be
          carried out. Words or conduct includes, in
          addition to any other form of
6               RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

            communication or conduct, the sending
            of an electronic communication.

RCW § 9A.46.020(1) (2009).
    During his removal hearing, Rodriguez-Hernandez
testified that he left Mexico in 1989. Rodriguez-Hernandez
related that his cousin in Mexico received a threatening
telephone call in 2011. His cousin was not harmed and
subsequently moved. Rodriguez-Hernandez’s family also
received a call threatening that Rodriguez-Hernandez would
be kidnapped when he visited Mexico if his family did not
pay “25,000 pesos.” Rodriguez-Hernandez was not able to
identify who made the threats, and his family did not make
any payments. Rodriguez-Hernandez confirmed that his
family was never harmed, and that he feared “[j]ust the
violence” if he was removed to Mexico.
    The IJ denied Rodriguez-Hernandez’s applications for
cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT relief. The IJ found Rodriguez-Hernandez
ineligible for cancellation of removal, asylum, and voluntary
departure because his conviction under RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) was for an aggravated felony.
    Although the IJ opined that RCW § 9A.46.020(1) was
not categorically a crime of violence because subsections
(a)(iii) and (iv) could “potentially be violated without
involving physical force,” the IJ concluded that the statute
was divisible because it delineated “alternative elements” of
the offense. Applying the modified categorical approach, 2

2
  When the statute of conviction is divisible, a court may, using the
modified categorical approach, “look at charging documents, jury
instructions, plea agreements, colloquies, and other equally reliable
documents to determine which elements underlie a . . . conviction.”
                RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                         7

the IJ held that Rodriguez-Hernandez was convicted of a
crime of violence for “knowingly threatening to cause bodily
injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened
or to any other person.”
    The IJ denied withholding of removal because
Rodriguez-Hernandez did not establish that he was a
member of a cognizable particular social group. The IJ
concluded that Rodriguez-Hernandez’s proposed social
group comprised of “victims of extortion” was not
sufficiently distinct to support withholding of removal.
    The IJ denied protection under the CAT because
Rodriguez-Hernandez failed to establish that it was more
likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to
Mexico.
    The BIA dismissed Rodriguez-Hernandez’s appeal. The
BIA agreed with the IJ’s determination that Rodriguez-
Hernandez’s conviction for harassment in violation of RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) was for an aggravated felony, thereby
rendering Rodriguez-Hernandez ineligible for cancellation
of removal, asylum, and voluntary departure. The BIA
concluded that an offense in violation of RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) was categorically a crime of violence,
requiring the offender to knowingly “threat[en] to use
physical force against the person or property of another.”
    The BIA also determined that Rodriguez-Hernandez was
not entitled to withholding of removal because he failed to
sufficiently demonstrate that he would be persecuted on
account of a protected ground.

United States v. Tagatac, 36 F.4th 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).
8               RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

    Finally, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of CAT relief
because Rodriguez-Hernandez did not establish that it was
more likely than not that he “would be tortured in Mexico
by, or with the consent or acquiescence . . . of a public
official.”
    Rodriguez-Hernandez filed a timely petition for review.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    We review de novo whether Rodriguez-Hernandez’s
harassment conviction is for an aggravated felony. See
Amaya v. Garland, 15 F.4th 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2021).
   “[W]e review the BIA’s denial of CAT relief for
substantial evidence.” Gutierrez-Alm v. Garland, 62 F.4th
1186, 1201 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
    A. Rodriguez-Hernandez’s Harassment Conviction
    Rodriguez-Hernandez contends that the BIA erred in
holding that his harassment conviction in violation of RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) was for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a). 3     Rodriguez-Hernandez maintains that his
conviction was not categorically for a crime of violence
because RCW § 9A.46.020(1) criminalizes conduct that
does not involve the use of physical force.
    Rodriguez-Hernandez       “bears     the    burden    of
demonstrating he is eligible for discretionary relief from
removal.” Valdez v. Garland, 28 F.4th 72, 78 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted) (addressing cancellation of removal); see

3
 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” as “an offense that has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.”
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                9

also Rendon v. Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 2008),
as amended (addressing asylum relief). “To do so, he must
show that he: (i) satisfies the applicable eligibility
requirements; and (ii) with respect to any form of relief that
is granted in the exercise of discretion, that he merits a
favorable exercise of discretion.” Valdez, 28 F.4th at 78
(citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).
“To meet the first requirement, he must show that he is not
an aggravated felon.” Id. (citation omitted). “A noncitizen
convicted of an aggravated felony is not only deportable, but
also ineligible for discretionary relief.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
    “In the crime of violence context, we compare the state
statute to 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), rather than a generic assault
statute, and we will only find a categorical match if every
violation of the statute necessarily involves violent force.”
Amaya, 15 F.4th at 980 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphases in the original). “Unlike
comparing a prior offense to one of the enumerated offenses,
which is an exercise in mapping a state crime onto a federal
crime, we need not compare the elements of the crime of
conviction with the elements of the generic federal crime
when analyzing whether an offense qualifies as a crime of
violence pursuant to [18 U.S.C.] § 16(a).” United States v.
Alvarez, 60 F.4th 554, 559 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “As long as the
underlying offense requires one of the specified uses of
force—actual, attempted, or threatened—it qualifies as a
crime of violence.” Id. at 558 (citation omitted).
    The BIA correctly applied the categorical approach in
determining whether Rodriguez-Hernandez had been
convicted of an aggravated felony because RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) is not a divisible statute. Under Washington
10              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

law, “[a]n alternative means crime is one that provides that
the proscribed criminal conduct may be proved in a variety
of ways.” State v. Espinoza, 474 P.3d 570, 575 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2020) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted). “When a defendant is charged with an alternative
means crime, the jury need not be unanimous as to the means
by which the crime was committed, so long as there is
sufficient evidence to support each of the alternative
means. . . .” Id. (citation omitted). Washington courts have
recognized that RCW § 9A.46.020(1) “is an alternative
means crime, with the four alternatives set forth in
subsection (1)(a)(i)-(iv).” Id. at 577 (citation omitted).
Additionally, Washington Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction
(WPIC) 36.07 provides that, for convictions under RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1), “the jury need not be unanimous as to which
of alternatives [(1)(a),] [(1)(b),] [(1)(c),] or [(1)(d)] has been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as long as each juror
finds that at least one alternative has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” WPIC 36.07.
    Absent a requirement that the jury “unanimously agree
on which of the statutory alternatives a defendant committed
to return a conviction, the alternatives are means.” Valdez,
28 F.4th at 78 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation
marks omitted). As the Washington statute as interpreted by
the Washington courts is not divisible, “we cannot look to
the underlying facts to determine which subsection
[Rodriguez-Hernandez] violated.” Id. at 78-79 (citation
omitted). 4

4
  Rodriguez-Hernandez asserts that our decision in United States v.
Werle, 877 F.3d 879 (9th Cir. 2017) is dispositive of the crime of
violence issue because we held in Werle that Washington’s harassment
statute was not categorically a crime of violence. In Werle, we opined
                RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                        11

    Amici rely on two factual hypotheticals which they
believe demonstrate that the statute criminalizes conduct that
does not rise to the level of “violent force.” First, Amici
argue that the statute criminalizes unlawful imprisonment by
deception, which they contend does not rise to the level of
“violent force” because unlawful imprisonment by
deception can be accomplished without the use or threatened
use of force. Second, Amici argue that the statute
criminalizes applying graffiti to property or defacing
property, which they argue does not rise to the level of
“violent force” because applying graffiti to property or
defacing property requires only “the slightest application of
[force] to push the button on the spray can.” We address
each argument in turn.
    “[A] crime of violence requires physical force against the
person or property of another. . . .” Alvarez, 60 F.4th at 562
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a
crime of violence “does not require any particular degree of
likelihood or probability that the force used will cause
physical pain or injury; only potentiality.” Id. (citation

that RCW § 9A.46.020 “as a whole is not categorically a crime of
violence under [United States Sentencing Guideline] § 4B1.2(a)(1).” Id.
at 882. However, § 4B1.2(a)(1) does not include the “threatened use of
physical force against the . . . property of another” language present in
18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Cf. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Thus,
Werle is not dispositive of the categorical analysis of RCW § 9A.46.020
that we must perform in this case. Our ruling in Werle that the statute’s
“knowing threat” requirement satisfies the mens rea for a crime of
violence nonetheless forecloses Rodriguez-Hernandez’s contention that
his harassment conviction was not for a crime of violence based on its
mens rea. Id. at 883; see also State v. J.M., 28 P.3d 720, 725 (Wash.
2001) (en banc) (explaining that, in RCW § 9A.46.020, “knowingly
modifies threaten, and thus relates to each part of the applicable
definition of threat”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
12             RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

omitted). “The standard is force capable of causing physical
pain or injury. . . .” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis in the original).
     In assessing whether there is “a realistic probability that
a state statute exceeds the generic definition,” we may
consider whether the statute “expressly defines a crime more
broadly than the generic offense.” Lopez-Aguilar v. Barr,
948 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). A statute also is not a categorical
match to the generic definition “if the petitioner can point to
at least one case in which the state courts applied the statute
in a situation that does not fit under the generic definition.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    RCW § 9A.46.020(1) is not facially overbroad because
it does not “expressly define[ ] a crime,” id., in a manner
lacking the “actual, attempted, or threatened” use of force.
Alvarez, 60 F.4th at 558 (citation omitted). For example, in
Lopez-Aguilar, the Oregon robbery statute was facially
overbroad because “the text of the statute expressly
include[d] situations involving consensual takings,” whereas
the federal statutory definition of a generic theft offense was
limited to the “taking of property . . . without consent.”
Lopez-Aguilar, 948 F.3d at 1147-48 (citation omitted)
(emphasis in the original); see also Barrera-Lima v.
Sessions, 901 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding
that “Washington’s indecent exposure statute” was “not
categorically a crime involving moral turpitude” because it
lacked the “critical” element of lewd intent).
    “The Supreme Court has pointedly instructed that the
categorical approach should not be applied in a legal vacuum
and that a finding of overbreadth requires a realistic
probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                13

apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic
definition of a crime. . . .” United States v. Rodriguez-
Gamboa, 972 F.3d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court
explained in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007):

       to find that a state statute creates a crime
       outside the generic definition of a listed crime
       in a federal statute requires more than the
       application of legal imagination to a state
       statute’s language. It requires a realistic
       probability, not a theoretical possibility, that
       the State would apply its statute to conduct
       that falls outside the generic definition of a
       crime. To show that realistic probability, an
       offender, of course, may show that the statute
       was so applied in his own case. But he must
       at least point to his own case or other cases in
       which the state courts in fact did apply the
       statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for
       which he argues.

Thus, “in applying the categorical approach to a state
offense, we are bound by the state courts’ interpretation of
state law, including their determination of the elements of an
offense.” Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 863 (9th
Cir. 2022) (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
14            RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

  Construing the reach of RCW § 9A.46.020, the
Washington Supreme Court has explained that:

        The words “the threat” are key to [RCW
        § 9A.46.020(1)’s] meaning. In the case of a
        misdemeanor violation of the statute, “the
        threat” allegedly made is one of the four
        threats listed in subsection (1)(a), and the
        statute says that the State must prove that the
        person threatened was placed in reasonable
        fear of “the threat”—the actual threat made.
        Thus, to obtain a misdemeanor conviction
        based upon one of these threats, the State
        must prove the threat made and the threat
        feared are the same.

State v. C.G., 80 P.3d 594, 596 (Wash. 2003) (en banc). The
Washington Supreme Court elaborated that “[w]hatever the
threat, whether listed in subsection (1)(a) or a threat to kill
as stated in subsection (2)(b), the State must prove that the
victim was placed in reasonable fear that the same threat, i.e.,
the threat, would be carried out.” Id. at 597 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
    The Washington Supreme Court has also explained that
RCW § 9A.46.020 for our analysis requires a “true threat,”
which “is a statement made in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee
that the statement would be interpreted as a serious
expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take
the life of another individual.” State v. Williams, 26 P.3d
890, 896 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (citation, alterations, and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Washington Court
of Appeals applied this rule in State v. Hosier, 103 P.3d 217
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND               15

(Wash. Ct. App. 2004), an instructive case involving
threatening notes “referenc[ing] confinement and restraint of
young women.” Id. at 223. The defendant maintained in
Hosier that the note he left at a cosmetology school,
“although it referenced confinement and restraint of young
women,” was not a true threat because the victim “did not
believe that [the defendant] intended to kidnap her, tie her
up and sexually assault her.” Id. The defendant also asserted
that another note placed at a drug store was not a true threat
because it “did not physically threaten anyone.” Id.
    The Washington Court of Appeals concluded that “[t]he
content of [the] notes, in the context of [the defendant’s]
strategic placement of them, create[d] a reasonable inference
of an explicit physical threat to [the victim].” Id. The
Washington Court of Appeals explicated that:

       The reason that true threats are not protected
       speech is because there is an overriding
       governmental interest in the protection of
       individuals from the fear of violence, from
       the disruption that fear engenders, and from
       the possibility that the threatened violence
       will occur. We have adopted an objective test
       of what constitutes a true threat: A true threat
       is a statement made in a context or under such
       circumstances wherein a reasonable person
       would foresee that the statement would be
       interpreted as a serious expression of
       intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to
       take the life of another person. A true threat
       is a serious threat, not one said in jest, idle
       talk, or political argument. Under this
       standard, whether a true threat has been made
16              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

         is determined under an objective standard
         that focuses on the speaker.

Id. at 224 (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks
omitted).
    Similarly, in State v. Allen, 255 P.3d 784 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2011), the Washington Court of Appeals explained that
“Washington courts interpret statutes criminalizing
threatening language as proscribing only true threats.” Id. at
795 (citation omitted). The Washington Court of Appeals
elaborated that a “true threat is merely the definition of the
element of threat which may be contained in a separate
definitional instruction,” and “the jury must be instructed
that a conviction requires a true threat and must be instructed
on the meaning of a true threat.” Id. at 798 (citations,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Washington Court of Appeals noted that “the Washington
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee amended the pattern
instruction defining ‘threat’ so that it matches the definition
of ‘true threat.’” Id. at 796 (citation omitted). 5
    The requirement that the victim “be placed in reasonable
fear that the threat would be carried out,” State v. Kiehl, 113
P.3d 528, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), coupled with the true
threat requirement, militates against a conclusion that RCW

5
  As early as 2008, prior to Rodriguez-Hernandez’s guilty plea, the
Washington Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions provided that “[t]o be a
threat, a statement or act must occur in a context or under such
circumstances where a reasonable person, in the position of the speaker,
would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious
expression of intention to carry out the threat rather than as something
said in [jest, idle talk, or political argument].” WPIC 2.24 (2008).
               RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                 17

§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iii) could be committed by deception in
the same manner as is possible with false imprisonment.
    Under Washington law, “[a] person commits the crime
of unlawful imprisonment when he knowingly restrains
another person. To restrain means to restrict a person’s
movements without consent and without legal authority in a
manner which interferes substantially with his liberty.” State
v. Lansdowne, 46 P.3d 836, 839 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Restraint is
without consent if it is accomplished by (a) physical force,
intimidation, or deception.” Id. (citation, alteration, and
internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast to false or
unlawful imprisonment, RCW § 9A.46.020 requires a “true
threat” involving “a serious expression of intention to inflict
bodily harm upon or to take the life of another individual,”
Hosier, 103 P.3d at 223 (citation and alteration omitted), and
that the victim “be placed in reasonable fear that the threat
would be carried out.” Kiehl, 113 P.3d at 531. Due to the
true threat requirement, there is no indication in Washington
precedent that harassment may be committed based on
deception.
    With respect to RCW § 9A.46.020(a)(ii), criminalizing
threats “[t]o cause physical damage to the property of a
person other than the actor,” Rodriguez-Hernandez “must
show a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility” that
Washington would apply RCW § 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii) “to de
minimis contact rather than force capable of causing
physical pain or injury.” Alvarez, 60 F.4th at 563 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the
original). “He has not done so,” particularly in light of
Washington’s true threat requirement. Id.
18                RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

   We are also unpersuaded that convictions for malicious
mischief, which are criminalized in different statutes, 6
demonstrate that Rodriguez-Hernandez’s harassment
conviction is not categorically a crime of violence. Under
Washington law, there are significant distinctions between
malicious mischief offenses and harassment in violation of
RCW § 9A.46.020(1). For malicious mischief offenses, the
Washington statute specifically provides that:

         in addition to its ordinary meaning, [physical
         damage] shall include the total or partial
         alteration, damage, obliteration, or erasure of
         records, information, data, computer
         programs, or their computer representations,
         which are recorded for use in computers or
         the impairment, interruption, or interference
         with the use of such records, information,
         data, or computer programs, or the
         impairment, interruption, or interference with
         the use of any computer or services provided
         by computers. Physical damage also includes
         any diminution in the value of any property

6
  It is true that, “[t]hough the statute of conviction is inextricably tied to
the defendant’s conviction, nothing confines the categorical analysis to
a single statute.” Alfred v. Garland, 64 F.4th 1025, 1032 (9th Cir. 2023)
(en banc). However, Rodriguez-Hernandez does not demonstrate that
malicious mischief offenses, with entirely distinct statutory elements,
“contribute to [the] meaning” of harassment offenses in violation of
RCW § 9A.46.020. Id.
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                19

       as the consequence of an act and the cost to
       repair any physical damage.

RCW § 9A.48.100(1). Washington’s harassment statute
does not reference or adopt a similar definition of physical
damage. See RCW § 9A.46.020(1).
    Adding to the distinction between the statutory offenses,
“malice” and “maliciously” are defined as “import[ing] an
evil intent, wish, or design to vex, annoy, or injure another
person,” and “[m]alice may be inferred from an act done in
willful disregard of the rights of another, or an act
wrongfully done without just cause or excuse, or an act or
omission of duty betraying a willful disregard of social
duty.” RCW 9A.04.110(12). A threat in violation of RCW
§ 9A.46.020 is not limited to acts that “vex” or “annoy . . .
another person.” Id. Instead, a conviction under RCW
§ 9A.46.020 requires a “statement . . . that . . . would be
interpreted as a serious expression of intention to inflict
bodily harm upon or to take the life of another person.”
Hosier, 103 P.3d at 224 (citation, alteration, and internal
quotation marks omitted). In sum, malicious mischief and
harassment are distinct statutory offenses. See, e.g., State v.
Gutsch, 117 Wash. App. 1078, at *3-*4 (2003)
(unpublished) (vacating second degree malicious mischief
conviction while affirming harassment conviction).
    We conclude that, based on the true threat requirement
and definition of “threat” under Washington law, threats to
cause “physical damage” to property sufficiently meet the
standard for threatened use of physical force against property
under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Although Amici contend that RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii) may be violated based on threats to use
graffiti, Amici do not cite to any Washington cases adopting
such       an    expansive       application     of      RCW
20               RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii). Even assuming that Amici’s de
minimis property damage argument is properly before us, 7 it
appears that spray painting property is charged under
Washington’s malicious mischief statutes. See State v.
J.A.V., 501 P.3d 159, 161, 163-64 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021)
(delineating, in a case in which the defendant was charged
with spray painting a tunnel, that “RCW § 9A.48.090
outlaws malicious mischief in the third degree” if an
individual “[w]rites, paints, or draws any inscription, figure,
or mark of any type on any public or private building or other
structure or any real or personal property owned by any other
person unless the person has obtained the express permission
of the owner or operator of the property, under
circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the
first or second degree.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis
omitted). Moreover, harassment based on threats of physical
damage to property has been criminalized in RCW
§ 9A.46.020 since at least 1985, see RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii)(1985), yet Amici “provide no citation
to any court proceedings reflecting charges or convictions”
under RCW § 9A.46.020(1)(a)(ii) based on graffiti or other
de minimis property damage. Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland,
55 F.4th 697, 711 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
    Our decision that Rodriguez-Hernandez’s conviction
was for a crime of violence is not inconsistent with United
States v. Bowen, 936 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2019) or United
States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2001).

7
 “An amicus curiae generally cannot raise new arguments on appeal,
and arguments not raised by a party in an opening brief are waived. . . .”
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1177 n.8 (9th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted).
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND                 21

    In Bowen, the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant’s
convictions for witness retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(b)(2) were not crimes of violence. See 936 F.3d at
1101. The Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he Supreme Court
has held that the term ‘physical force’ requires more than
offensive touching; it means ‘violent force—that is, force
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another
person.’” Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). The Tenth
Circuit opined that “property crimes of violence . . . are those
that require violent force, not merely the force required to
damage property.” Id. at 1103-04 (emphasis omitted).
Critically, the defendant in Bowen provided precisely what
is missing from the present appeal—a citation to a case in
which a defendant was actually convicted under the
challenged statute “for spray-painting a witness’s car.” 936
F.3d at 1104. The government did not “argue otherwise.”
Id. On these facts, the Tenth Circuit “easily conclude[d] that
the act of spray-painting another’s car d[id] not entail the use
of violent force.” Id. (citations omitted).
    Landeros-Gonzales is also distinguishable. In that case,
the Fifth Circuit considered whether the defendant’s
conviction for criminal mischief in violation of Texas law
was for a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), i.e., an
offense that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that
physical force against the person or property of another may
be used in the course of committing the offense.” 262 F.3d
at 426 (citation omitted). Notably, the Texas statute
criminalizing criminal mischief “provide[d] that a person
commits [the] offense if he intentionally (1) damages or
destroys another’s property, (2) tampers with property in
such a way as to cause inconvenience to the owner or to
some third person, or (3) makes markings on another’s
property.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
22            RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

omitted). The Fifth Circuit emphasized that “it [was] clear
that [the defendant] pleaded guilty to subsection (3) of the
statute,” and that “the relevant offense [was] the intentional
marking of another’s property with inscriptions, slogans,
drawings, or paintings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
    The Fifth Circuit held that the offense was not a crime of
violence because there was not “a substantial risk that a
vandal will use destructive or violent force in the course of
unlawfully making marks . . . on another’s property.” Id. at
427. Landeros-Gonzales is inapposite because the Texas
statute, unlike RCW § 9A.46.020, explicitly criminalized
conduct that did not involve use of physical force. See id. at
426.
    In United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018), as
amended, the defendant maintained that his conviction for
Hobbs Act robbery was not a crime of violence because “a
perpetrator could rob a victim by putting him in fear of injury
to his property through non-forceful means. He offer[ed]
hypotheticals such as threatening to throw paint on the
victim’s house, to spray paint his car, or, most colorfully, to
pour chocolate syrup on his passport.” Id. at 57 (citation,
alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). The
Second Circuit observed that “the categorical approach must
be grounded in reality, logic, and precedent, not flights of
fancy.” Id. at 56 (citation omitted).
    We agree with the reasoning of the Second Circuit and
conclude that there is not a “realistic probability,” as
opposed to “a theoretical possibility,” that Washington
“would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside” the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Lopez-Aguilar, 948 F.3d at 1147
(citation omitted). Rodriguez-Hernandez “has not identified
              RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND              23

any case holding that” a conviction under RCW
§ 9A.46.020(1) “is not a crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 16(a), and “[t]o the extent one could devise obscure
hypotheticals suggesting that it might be theoretically
possible to carry out the completed offense . . . without the
attempted use of force, that legal imagination cannot carry
the day.” United States v. Linehan, 56 F.4th 693, 704 (9th
Cir. 2022) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Because Rodriguez-Hernandez was convicted of a crime
of violence, he was ineligible for cancellation of removal or
asylum. See Valdez, 28 F.4th at 78; see also Flores-Vega v.
Barr, 932 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2019). Accordingly,
substantial evidence supports denial of those applications.
See Flores-Vega, 932 F.3d at 887-88.
   B. CAT Relief
    Substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief.
Rodriguez-Hernandez testified that his family received a
threatening call warning that Rodriguez-Hernandez would
be kidnapped when he visited Mexico, but Rodriguez-
Hernandez was not able to identify who made the threats, his
family did not make any payments, and Rodriguez-
Hernandez did not plan on visiting Mexico. Rodriguez-
Hernandez also confirmed that his family was never harmed,
and that he feared “[j]ust the violence” if he was removed to
Mexico. There is no indication that Rodriguez-Hernandez
suffered from past torture, and “the record . . . does not
compel the conclusion that [Rodriguez-Hernandez] faces
any ongoing or particularized threat of torture.” Tzompantzi-
Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 707 (9th Cir. 2022), as
amended (emphasis in the original).
24            RODRIGUEZ-HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND

IV. CONCLUSION
    Rodriguez-Hernandez’s conviction for harassment in
violation of RCW § 9A.46.020 is categorically for a crime
of violence because, as interpreted by Washington courts,
the statute requires the “threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another,” and Rodriguez-
Hernandez does not “show a realistic probability” that
Washington would apply RCW § 9A.46.020(1) “to de
minimis contact rather than force capable of causing
physical pain or injury.” Alvarez, 60 F.4th at 558, 563
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
in the original). As a result, the BIA properly held that
Rodriguez-Hernandez was not “eligible for discretionary
relief from removal.” Valdez, 28 F.4th at 78; see also Flores-
Vega, 932 F.3d at 884.
    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of CAT
relief because Rodriguez-Hernandez did not establish that it
was more likely than not that he would be tortured with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official.          See
Tzompantzi-Salazar, 32 F.4th at 707.
     PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.