Court Opinion

ID: 6332054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-04-15 07:12:52.350032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:16.267179
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              ________________

                              NO. 09-21-00366-CV
                              ________________

                    IN THE INTEREST OF K.S. AND K.S.

________________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                        Montgomery County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 19-03-03578-CV
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to

her children, “Kim” and “Karson” based on Texas Family Code subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) and a finding that termination was in Kim and

Karson’s best interest. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O),

                                         1
(b)(2).1,   2
                The trial court also appointed the Department of Family and Protective

Services (“the Department”) as permanent managing conservator for both children.

In one issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s conservatorship decision and

complains the trial court erred by refusing to consider Mother’s grandmother as a

conservator. Specifically, Mother asks, “Did the trial court err by declining to

consider maternal great-grandmother as managing conservator due to the court’s

unfounded belief that a non-party relative could not be appointed as conservator?”

We dismiss Mother’s appeal.

       “[A]n order terminating a parent’s rights to a child divests the parent and child

of all legal rights and duties[.]” Id. § 161.206(b). Mother does not appeal the trial

court’s findings regarding the grounds for termination or its finding that termination

of the parent-child relationship is in Kim’s and Karson’s best interest. See id. §

161.001(b)(1)–(2). Therefore, these findings are binding on Mother. See In re A.M.,

No. 02-21-00313-CV, 2022 WL 325473, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 3,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining where parent did not challenge termination

findings, they were binding, parent consequently became a former parent with no

       1
         In parental rights termination cases, to protect the identity of the minors, we
refer to the children and their family members by a pseudonym or initials. See Tex.
R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
       2
         The trial court also terminated the parental rights of individuals named by
Mother as possible biological fathers of Kim and Karson, after finding they received
notice and wholly made default, but they are not parties to this appeal.
                                             2
legal rights to the child and lacked standing to challenge post-termination

conservatorship); In re S.C., No. 02-18-00422-CV, 2019 WL 2455612, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); In re T.Y., No.

05-18-00287-CV, 2018 WL 3130652, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 25, 2018, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (same).

      Upon termination of the parent-child relationship, Mother lost all legal rights

with respect to Kim and Karson. See In re A.G., 2017 WL 655954, at *1. Because

Mother’s parental rights to the children were terminated, she has no justiciable

interest in this suit. See In re P.M.S., 12-05-00280-CV, 2006 WL 1459993, at *4

(Tex. App.—Tyler May 26, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining because father’s

parental rights were terminated, he had no justiciable interest in conservatorship

suit). “Former parents do not have standing to invoke the trial court’s continuing

jurisdiction over managing conservatorship issues.” In re Lambert, 993 S.W.2d 123,

132 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.). As a former parent and absent a

justiciable interest, Mother lacks standing to challenge the trial court’s

conservatorship decision. See id.; see also In re H.M.M., 230 S.W.3d 204, 204–05

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); In re S.C., 2019 WL 2455612, at

*3; In re T.Y., 2018 WL 3130652, at *1; In re A.G., 2017 WL 655954, at *1. Given

Mother’s lack of standing, we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over her claim.

See generally Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46

                                         3
(Tex. 1993) (explaining standing is non-waivable component of subject-matter

jurisdiction that can be raised sua sponte by court); see also In re H.M.M., 230

S.W.3d at 204–05; In re T.Y., 2018 WL 3130652, at *1; In re A.G., 2017 WL 655954,

at *1. Accordingly, we dismiss Mother’s appeal. See In re T.Y., 2018 WL 3130652,

at *1; In re A.G., 2017 WL 655954, at *1.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

                                                 ________________________
                                                   W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                         Chief Justice

Submitted on March 8, 2022
Opinion Delivered April 14, 2022

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.

                                        4