Court Opinion

ID: 9960953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:11:15.241635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:05.516391
License: Public Domain

No. 241               April 17, 2024                    89

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                In the Matter of E. C. S.,
                         a Child.
          DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                 Petitioner-Respondent,
                            v.
                         N. A. S.,
                        Appellant.
              Wheeler County Circuit Court
                  21JU02419; A179842

  John A. Wolf, Judge.
  Argued and submitted June 08, 2023.
   Sean Connor, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief
Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General,
and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  HELLMAN, J.
  Affirmed.
90   Dept. of Human Services v. N. A. S.
Cite as 332 Or App 89 (2024)                                 91

        HELLMAN, J.
        In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals a
judgment that changed the permanency plan for her child,
E, from reunification to guardianship. Mother contends
that the juvenile court erred when it determined that she
had made insufficient progress to ameliorate her pattern of
substance abuse and, as a consequence, that it erred when
it changed E’s permanency plan. Because the record sup-
ports the juvenile court’s determination that mother’s prog-
ress was insufficient, we conclude that the court did not err.
Accordingly, we affirm.
          Mother does not request that we exercise our discre-
tion to undertake de novo review and we decline to do so. See
ORAP 5.480(8)(c) (providing that we exercise our discretion
“only in exceptional cases”). “We therefore are bound by the
juvenile court’s findings, so long as there is any evidence in
the record to support them. Whether mother’s progress was
sufficient for purposes of ORS 419B.476(2)(a) is a legal ques-
tion that we review for legal error.” Dept. of Human Services
v. C. W., 312 Or App 572, 574, 493 P3d 74 (2021) (citation omit-
ted). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.
          In December 2016, when E was eight years old, E
and several family members were involved in a car accident
that killed E’s father and one of her siblings. Mother, who
had driven the car, tested positive for methamphetamine at
the hospital. After the crash, mother spent most days locked
in her bedroom with her boyfriend. E was frequently absent
or late to school and community members reported that they
saw E walking alone at night between different homes.
         In April 2021, when E was 12, mother was hospi-
talized for breathing problems, leaving E unsupervised at
home. While mother was in the hospital, she tested posi-
tive for methamphetamine. DHS thereafter removed E from
mother’s custody. That summer, the juvenile court asserted
jurisdiction over E based on mother’s admissions that her
“pattern of substance abuse interferes with her ability to
safely parent [E]” and that E’s father was deceased. After
she was removed, E was diagnosed with severe depression
that had been untreated for several years.
92                      Dept. of Human Services v. N. A. S.

        In January 2022, mother completed a mental health
and substance abuse assessment that recommended, among
other things, that she participate in weekly therapy and
that she provide urinalysis tests (UAs).
         In July 2022, DHS requested that the juvenile court
change E’s permanency plan from reunification to guardian-
ship. E supported the change of plan. The juvenile court held
a permanency hearing in September 2022 and heard testi-
mony from mother and DHS regarding the foregoing facts.
Mother disputed that she had failed to supervise E, testi-
fied that her children “have a tendency to over exaggerate,”
and argued that illness often prevented her from helping E
prepare for school. Mother also testified that she had used
methamphetamine only “a couple dozen” times in the last 25
years, that she had not used substances since she was hos-
pitalized in 2021, and that “it was the hospital who told [her
children]” that she had used drugs. Further, mother repre-
sented that she had consistently participated in therapy for
three months but that she stopped in July 2022 when she
learned that her counselor was leaving the following month.
         DHS presented evidence that mother had been hos-
pitalized three times in the past four-and-a-half years and
that she had tested positive for methamphetamine each
time. The court also heard testimony that, even though DHS
referred mother to Addiction and Recovery Team (ART)
services three times, mother did not engage in those ser-
vices. Moreover, a DHS caseworker testified that, on the few
occasions that mother agreed to meet with DHS employees
in-person, she refused to provide UAs. DHS also offered sev-
eral exhibits into evidence, including case notes and moth-
er’s mental health and substance abuse assessment.
         After considering the testimony and exhibits, the
juvenile court determined that DHS had made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family and that mother had not made
sufficient progress to ameliorate her pattern of substance
abuse. Specifically, the court found that mother’s substance
abuse assessment “recommended significant therapy to
address the [substance abuse disorder] issues, including
random UAs.” However, the court found that mother “missed
many of her treatment sessions and did not provide any UAs
Cite as 332 Or App 89 (2024)                                      93

(most sessions were virtual)” and “decline[d] to provide a UA
or a swab on the few occasions one was offered.”
        Further, the court found that,
   “[mother] frequently demonstrated a failure to recognize
   how her [substance abuse disorder] impacts her ability to
   parent. For example, she is quoted as saying she will use if
   she wants because it is fun. She also continues to attempt
   to excuse her use saying that while she used the children
   were not around. Which, even if true, fails to recognize
   the impact her use has on [E]. [Mother] has failed to reen-
   gage with treatment after her counselor left CCS and has
   not made any significant progress in understanding the
   impact her [substance abuse disorder] has on her ability
   to parent.”
Therefore, the court determined that E could not be safely
returned to mother’s care and changed E’s permanency plan
to guardianship. This appeal followed.
         We begin with a brief overview of the relevant ana-
lytical framework. “Absent exceptions not applicable here,
to change a child’s permanency plan from reunification to
another permanent plan, the juvenile court must determine
that (1) DHS has made reasonable efforts to reunify the fam-
ily; and (2) notwithstanding those efforts, parents have not
made sufficient progress to permit reunification.” Dept. of
Human Services v. L. M. K., 319 Or App 245, 252, 510 P3d 278
(2022); ORS 419B.476(2). As the proponent of the permanency
plan change, DHS bore the burden of proving both elements by
a preponderance of the evidence. See Dept. of Human Services
v. M. K., 285 Or App 448, 455, 396 P3d 294, rev den, 361
Or 885 (2017) (so explaining). Because mother does not dis-
pute the juvenile court’s determination that DHS made rea-
sonable efforts to reunify the family, the sole issue before us
is whether the juvenile court erred when it determined that
mother’s progress was insufficient to permit reunification.
         “The determination of whether a parent has made
sufficient progress is measured in the context of the factual
bases for jurisdiction as set forth in the jurisdictional judg-
ment.” Dept. of Human Services v. D. W. C., 258 Or App 163,
171, 308 P3d 316, rev den, 354 Or 490 (2013). “In determin-
ing whether the parent has made sufficient progress, the
94                               Dept. of Human Services v. N. A. S.

juvenile court gives the highest priority to a child’s health
and welfare.” M. K., 285 Or App at 460.
          We have explained that a juvenile court “must take
into consideration whether a parent has attempted to make
appropriate changes and whether he or she has ignored or
refused to participate in plans suggested or required by the
state.” D. W. C., 258 Or App at 171. “[A] parent’s failure to
complete treatment, in and of itself, does not establish that
the deficit continues.” C. W., 312 Or App at 582 (emphasis
added). Conversely, “a parent’s mere participation in services
* * * is not sufficient to establish adequate progress toward
reunification.” Dept. of Human Services v. S. N., 250 Or App
708, 718, 282 P3d 901, rev den, 352 Or 564 (2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also M. K., 285 Or App at 460
(“[R]egardless of mother’s completion of and progress in the
required programs, if mother was still engaging in behav-
iors that would be harmful to her children, the court could
conclude that mother’s progress was not sufficient for them
to safely return home.”).
         On appeal, mother contends that the juvenile court
erred when it determined that she had made insufficient
progress toward ameliorating her pattern of substance
abuse because DHS failed to present evidence that she had
used substances since she was hospitalized in 2021. Mother
argues that her “lack of engagement in court-ordered and
department-requested services was not sufficient for the
department to meet its burden” and that the evidence did,
in fact, establish that she had ameliorated her substance
abuse. Mother also takes the position that DHS could have
conducted an investigation and gathered information from
“individuals that were part of mother’s community” to estab-
lish that she had used substances, and that its failure to do
so resulted in an insufficient record to support the juvenile
court’s decision.1 We are unpersuaded.
     1
       Mother also argues that “to the extent the juvenile court relied on mother’s
estrangement from [E] in ruling to change her plan away from reunification,
it erred.” We decline to address that matter because no legal argument is suf-
ficiently developed in mother’s brief. See Beall Transport Equipment Co. v.
Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193 (2003) (“[I]t is not this
court’s function to speculate as to what a party’s argument might be. Nor is it our
proper function to make or develop a party’s argument when that party has not
endeavored to do so itself.”).
Cite as 332 Or App 89 (2024)                              95

         To support her argument, mother relies on C. W.,
312 Or App at 581-83. In that case, we concluded that the
mere fact that the parent was unwilling to engage in the
same treatment program that she had already completed
four times—despite her willingness to provide UAs—was
insufficient to prove that the parent’s progress toward ame-
liorating the effects of her substance abuse was inadequate.
Id. at 578, 581-83. In doing so, we observed that the record
demonstrated that the parent had made significant prog-
ress toward understanding and addressing her substance
abuse problem and that she consistently engaged in fam-
ily therapy to support the child. Id. at 579, 581. In addi-
tion, DHS had previously determined that the parent did
not pose a safety threat to the child, even when the parent
had relapsed, and DHS did not contradict evidence from the
child’s foster provider and therapist that the parent could
support the child’s needs. Id. at 582-83. Therefore, we con-
cluded that the juvenile court erred when it changed the
child’s permanency plan. Id. at 583.
         We conclude that C. W. is readily distinguishable
from this case and that the juvenile court did not err when
it determined that mother had made insufficient progress.
Here, mother’s mental health and substance abuse assess-
ment recommended, among other things, that mother par-
ticipate in weekly therapy and that she provide “random
UAs.” However, the record demonstrates that mother did not
consistently participate in therapy, that she frequently can-
celled or missed sessions, and that she discontinued ther-
apy before her therapist moved. On the few occasions when
mother met with DHS employees in-person, she refused
to provide UAs. Further, the record contained specific evi-
dence—including mother’s failure to engage with multiple
ART referrals, her quoted statement that she will use drugs
if she wants because it is fun, and her testimony minimizing
the effect of her drug use on her children—that supports
a determination that, unlike the parent in C. W., mother
did not make sufficient progress toward understanding and
addressing her substance abuse problem.
       Finally, to the extent that mother argues that
DHS needed to offer more concrete or direct evidence of
96                       Dept. of Human Services v. N. A. S.

contemporaneous substance abuse, we reject that argu-
ment. When, as here, the basis for jurisdiction is a parent’s
pattern of substance abuse, we have never held that DHS
must present direct evidence of contemporaneous substance
abuse before the juvenile court can determine that the par-
ent has made insufficient progress toward ameliorating the
jurisdictional basis. In fact, the opposite is true. A juvenile
court may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support its determination. E.g., Dept. of Human Services v.
D. M., 310 Or App 171, 185, 483 P3d 1248 (2021); M. K.,
285 Or App at 461. Here, DHS presented evidence of moth-
er’s long-standing pattern of substance abuse, her failure
to engage in treatment, her refusal to provide UAs, and her
consistently evasive conduct. That evidence, coupled with
the absence of any evidence demonstrating a substantial
change in mother’s behavior, permitted the juvenile court
to reasonably infer that mother’s pattern of substance abuse
was unchanged.
        In sum, we conclude that the record provides an
adequate legal basis for the court’s determination that
mother did not make sufficient progress to ameliorate her
pattern of substance abuse to allow E to return home safely
as required by ORS 419B.476(2). The juvenile court did not
err when it changed E’s permanency plan from reunification
to guardianship.
        Affirmed.