Court Opinion

ID: 9952635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:12:49.225794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.458053
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ryan Mull,                                      :
                              Petitioner        :
                                                :
                      v.                        :    No. 675 M.D. 2019
                                                :    Submitted: May 5, 2023
John E. Wetzel, et al.,                         :
                              Respondents       :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                      FILED: March 20, 2024

       Presently before the Court are preliminary objections (POs) filed by
Respondent John E. Wetzel, et al., (Respondents)1 to the pro se amended petition for
review (Petition)2 filed by Ryan Mull (Mull). In his Petition, Mull challenges the
implementation of the Violence Reduction Initiative (VRI)3 at the State Correctional

       1
          In his original petition for review, Ryan Mull (Mull) named John E. Wetzel, Secretary of
Corrections; Barry Smith, Facility Manager at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at
Houtzdale; Dorina Varner and Keri Moore, Chief Grievance Officers for the Department of
Corrections; Rebecca Reifer, Grievance Coordinator at SCI-Houtzdale; and Brook Kelly, Acting
Unit Manager and Unit Counselor at SCI-Houtzdale, as respondents. In his amended petition for
review, Mull sought to add Bobbie Jo Salamon, Deputy; Susan Hnatkovich, Grievance Officer;
Vincent Defelice, Unit Manager; and Timothy Little, Acting Unit Manager, as respondents.
        2
          Mull’s amended filing, titled “Supplemental/Supplementation of Petition for Review,”
sought to add exhibits and parties and correct the spelling of names.
        3
          VRI has also sometimes been referred to as the Violence Reduction Strategy or VRS.
See, e.g., Rokita v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 182 M.D. 2020, filed Nov. 20, 2020).
Institution at Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale), where Mull is currently housed, on
multiple bases. Upon review, we sustain the POs and dismiss Mull’s Petition.
       As a preliminary matter, when ruling on preliminary objections, the Court
must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, along with any inferences
reasonably deduced therefrom. Neely v. Dep’t of Corr., 838 A.2d 16, 19 n.4 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2003).          The Court is not bound, however, “by legal conclusions,
unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of
opinion encompassed in the petition for review.” Williams v. Wetzel, 178 A.3d 920,
923 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). Preliminary objections should not be sustained unless it
“appear[s] with certainty that the law will not permit recovery and any doubt should
be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.” Neely, 838 A.2d at 19 n.4.
       With this standard in mind, we consider the facts as alleged by Mull.

I.     THE PLEADINGS
       On December 13, 2019, Mull initiated this action in the Court’s original
jurisdiction against Respondents, numerous employees of the Department of
Corrections (Department). Therein, Mull averred as follows.4
       On May 11, 2019, there was a fight between inmates during the evening pill
line. (Petition ¶ 29.) As a result of the fight, SCI-Houtzdale locked down one of the
units from May 11 through May 14 pursuant to its VRI policy. (Id. ¶ 30.) The policy
was invoked following subsequent altercations, resulting in an additional lockdown

       4
           Initially, we note that Mull repeatedly lists the denial of his two grievances as the orders
under review. (See, e.g., Petition, Introductory Paragraph; Mull’s Brief, “Order[s] in Question.”)
It is well settled, however, that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction over the Department’s denial
of inmate grievances. Bronson v. Cent. Off. Rev. Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1998).

                                                  2
between August 9, 2019 and August 13, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 49, 555-62.) Mull alleged use
of the policy interfered with his “privileges and rights as defined by 37 Pa. Code
§ 93.10.” (Id. ¶ 32 (emphasis omitted).) Mull also averred he was denied the right
to outdoor exercise under Section 5901 of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 5901, and his rights to shower, participate in visits, use the law library, attend
religious services, use the phone, and participate in work detail were “suspended.”
(Id. ¶¶ 33-34. 47, 54, 58, 64.)
      According to Mull, before imposing “any sanction,” especially for a third
party’s conduct, the Department must comply with the due process requirements set
forth in its regulations. (Id. ¶ 33.) Mull further avers that the Department-wide
policy, DC-ADM 801, controls inmate discipline and cannot be superseded by SCI-
Houtzdale’s VRI policy. (Id. ¶¶ 42-45.) To the extent the Department contends the
lockdown was necessary due to a state of emergency, Mull avers the Secretary did
not declare a state of emergency and “every 3[-]man fight does not constitute a state
of emergency.” (Id. ¶ 49.) Mull grieved implementation of the policy, asserting
Respondents lacked the authority to do so, but the grievances were denied. (Id.
¶¶ 31, 35-37 47-50, 52-54.)
      In Count 1, Mull asserts Respondents’ invocation of the VRI policy
constitutes official oppression under Section 5301 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 5301. (Petition ¶ 69.) In Count 2, Mull claims the Facility Manager lacks authority
under the Administrative Code of 1929 (Administrative Code)6 to implement the
VRI policy as it is inconsistent with the Department’s statewide policy on inmate
discipline found in DC-ADM 801, the Department’s regulations, Section 5901 of

      5
          The Petition contains two paragraphs numbered 55. This refers to the second paragraph
55.
      6
          Act of April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, as amended, 71 P.S. §§ 51-732.

                                                3
the Prisons and Parole Code, and precedent. (Id. ¶ 70.) In Count 3, he alleges
Respondents’ use of the VRI policy sanctions or punishes inmates for the conduct
of third parties in violation of DC-ADM 801 and the Department’s regulation, 37
Pa. Code § 93.10. (Id. ¶ 71.) In Count 4, Mull asserts the VRI policy violates Section
5901 of the Prisons and Parole Code by denying him his right to two hours of daily
exercise. (Id. ¶ 72.) In Count 5, Mull avers the VRI policy is arbitrary or irrational
and violates the Administrative Code and Department regulation 37 Pa. Code
§ 93.10(b) by depriving him of procedural due process. (Id. ¶¶ 73-74.) Lastly, in
Count 6, Mull again asserts a claim of official oppression. (Id. ¶ 75.) In his prayer
for relief, Mull requests various forms of declaratory and injunctive relief, along
with compensatory and punitive damages.
      Respondents filed POs to the initial petition for review, which were rendered
moot after Mull sought, and the Court granted, leave to amend. In response to the
amended pleading, Respondents filed new POs. Therein, Respondents assert Mull
failed to comply with this Court’s December 1, 2020 order granting Mull leave to
file an amended pleading in that Mull did not serve all Respondents as directed.
Respondents request Mull be required to serve the Petition or face dismissal of his
action. In their second PO, Respondents assert demurrers to each of Mull’s claims.
As to counts 1 and 6, Respondents argue the Court cannot issue a criminal charge of
official oppression. Count 2 also fails to state a claim, according to Respondents,
because the Department is empowered to promulgate rules and regulations or enact
policies related to the administration, management, and supervision of its prisons.
Next the Department asserts Count 3 fails as this Court has already rejected an
argument that the VRI policy constitutes punishment to trigger the requirements of
37 Pa. Code § 93.10 and DC-ADM 801. For similar reasons, Respondents assert

                                          4
Count 4, which alleges a violation of 61 Pa.C.S. § 5901 (requiring two hours of
exercise for inmates), fails, as this Court has previously rejected similar claims.
Respondents argue that Count 5 should be dismissed as the VRI policy does not
violate any due process principles.
      In their third PO, Respondents assert Mull has not established personal
involvement by Respondents; instead, Mull merely asserts, at most, involvement in
the inmate grievance procedure, which is legally insufficient.               Therefore,
Respondents claim the Petition lacks specificity that would enable them to prepare
a defense. In their fourth PO, Respondents contend the Department’s regulations do
not create a cause of action. Finally, Respondents argue that they are entitled to
sovereign immunity on any state law claims.

II.   DISCUSSION
      We begin with Respondents’ PO asserting demurrers as to each count of the
Petition because, if sustained, it is unnecessary to reach Respondents’ other POs.

      A.     Demurrers as to Counts 1 and 6
      Respondents demur to Counts 1 and 6 of the Petition, which seek a
determination that Respondents engaged in official oppression in violation of
Section 5301 of the Crimes Code. Respondents assert the Court is without the
authority to issue criminal charges. Mull responds that Respondents’ actions are
criminal acts and if this Court does not possess the authority to issue criminal charges
for official oppression, it should transfer Counts 1 and 6 to the proper tribunal.
      Section 5301 provides:

                                           5
       A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking
       advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor
       of the second degree if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he:

               (1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure,
               mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other
               infringement of personal or property rights; or

               (2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of
               any right, privilege, power or immunity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5301.
       In Tillman v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 327
M.D. 2016, filed June 9, 2017),7 aff’d per curiam, 189 A.3d 423 (Pa. 2018), the
petitioner alleged numerous Department officials committed official oppression
while investigating the petitioner’s complaint. The Department lodged a PO to this
claim, which we sustained, concluding “th[e] Court cannot, sua sponte, issue
criminal charges.” Id., slip op. at 9 (italicization omitted). Similarly, in Barner v.
Correctional Officer Pientka (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1679 C.D. 2016, filed June 12,
2017), slip op. at 4-5, we held that official oppression is a crime and there is no civil
cause of action for it. See also D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 429-30 (Pa.
Super. 2000) (analyzing Section 5103 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103, and
holding that “[w]hile [the] appellants may have a civil claim based on the same
conduct the statute makes criminal, that claim does not lie pursuant to the statute”).8
Thus, even if we could charitably read Mull’s Petition to ask for civil liability under
Section 5103 of the Judicial Code, we would still have to reject that suggestion.

       7
          Unreported panel decisions of this Court may be cited for their persuasive value pursuant
to Rule 126(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1), and
Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
        8
          In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

                                                6
       In the event the Court finds it was without the authority to address Counts 1
and 6 of his Petition, Mull asks the Court to transfer those counts to the tribunal that
does. Section 5103 of the Judicial Code provides for transfers of erroneously filed
matters. It provides in relevant part:

       If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court or
       magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does not have
       jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial
       district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall
       transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this
       Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if
       originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the appeal or
       other matter was first filed in a court or magisterial district of this
       Commonwealth. . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a) (emphasis added). “[T]ribunal” is defined as “a court or
magisterial district judge or other judicial officer of this Commonwealth vested
with the power to enter an order in a matter[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(d) (emphasis
added).
       To the extent Mull seeks to hold Respondents civilly liable for official
oppression, as the Court held in Barner, slip op. at 4-5, and the Superior Court held
in D’Errico, 763 A.2d at 430, there is no civil cause of action. Therefore, there is
no tribunal to which such a matter could be transferred. To the extent Mull seeks to
bring a private criminal complaint against Respondents, we likewise conclude there
is no “tribunal” to which we could transfer the matter.
       Rule 506 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pa.R.Crim.P. 506,
governs the process for approval of private complaints.9 It provides:

       9
        Rule 504 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the requirements of
all complaints, whether the affiant is a law enforcement officer or a private citizen, including that
the complaint contain a verification by the affiant that the facts set forth in the complaint are true
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  7
        (A) When the affiant is not a law enforcement officer, the complaint
        shall be submitted to an attorney for the Commonwealth, who shall
        approve or disapprove it without unreasonable delay.

        (B) If the attorney for the Commonwealth:

            (1) approves the complaint, the attorney shall indicate this decision
            on the complaint form and transmit it to the issuing authority;

            (2) disapproves the complaint, the attorney shall state the reasons on
            the complaint form and return it to the affiant. Thereafter, the affiant
            may petition the court of common pleas for review of the decision.

Id.
        While      district     attorneys      are       considered      quasi-judicial        officers,
Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Martin, 232 A.2d 729, 736 (Pa. 1967), they are not
judicial officers and, thus, not a “tribunal,” for purposes of the transfer statute, 42
Pa.C.S. § 5103.10 Therefore, we cannot transfer these claims under Section 5103 of
the Judicial Code.
        As we lack the ability to address Counts 1 and 6 of Mull’s Petition, seeking
to charge Respondents with official oppression, a criminal offense, we must sustain
Respondents’ demurrer to those counts.

and correct to the affiant’s personal knowledge, information, or belief, and any false statements
are subject to penalties for unsworn falsification to authorities. Pa.R.Crim.P. 504.
        10
           Nor are district attorney offices considered judicial agencies under the Right-To-Know
Law (RTKL), Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104. Phila. Dist. Att’y’s
Off. v. Williams, 207 A.3d 410, 412 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (reasoning “[b]ecause ‘judicial power
is not vested in the [district attorney’s] office,’ it is not a judicial agency,” which is defined as “[a]
court of the Commonwealth or any other entity or office in the unified judicial system” (quoting
Miller v. County of Centre, 135 A.3d 233, 236 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), and Section 102 of the RTKL,
65 P.S. § 67.102).

                                                     8
       B.      Demurrer as to Counts 2 through 5
       Respondents also demur to Counts 2 through 5 of the Petition,11 in which Mull
alleges they lacked authority to implement the VRI policy on the bases it is
inconsistent with Department policy, regulations, and state law, and results in a
denial of due process.           Respondents dispute this contention, asserting the
Department has the legal authority to implement such a policy, as it relates to the
administration, management, and supervision of prisons, and noting this Court has
rejected similar claims in the past. Mull responds that while Respondents have the
authority to make rules and regulations under the Administrative Code, they do not
have the authority to institute the VRI policy as it is inconsistent with the law.12
       Section 206 of the Administrative Code provides: “[e]ach administrative
department shall have as its head an officer who shall, either personally, by deputy,
or by the duly authorized agent or employe of the department, . . . exercise the
powers and perform the duties by law vested in and imposed upon the department.”
71 P.S. § 66.13 Section 506 of the Administrative Code provides:

       The heads of all administrative departments . . . are hereby empowered
       to prescribe rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the
       government of their respective departments . . . , the conduct of their
       employes and clerks, the distribution and performance of their business,

       11
           Respondents separately address these Counts, but because of the overlap in analysis, the
Court will address them together.
        12
           Mull contends in his brief that Respondents are not demurring as to a conflict between
the VRI policy and the Department’s regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10 or Section 5901 of the
Prisons and Parole Code, based on a statement in Respondents’ previously filed POs. However,
those POs were rendered moot by the amended filing. Respondents have properly raised the
arguments in the instant POs. Moreover, we note that Respondents’ original POs predated our
decision in Rokita, which as discussed more fully herein, addressed many of the claims Mull makes
herein.
        13
           Section 206 identifies the Secretary of Corrections as the head of the Department. 71
P.S. § 66.

                                                9
       and the custody, use, and preservation of the records, books,
       documents, and property pertaining thereto.

71 P.S. § 186 (emphasis added). Further, Section 901-B of the Administrative Code
provides:

       The Department . . . , which is hereby established as an administrative
       department, shall have the powers and duties granted to and imposed
       upon it by this article and by any other statutory provisions. In addition,
       the Department and Secretary of Corrections shall have all the powers
       and duties granted to and imposed upon the former Bureau and
       Commissioner of Correction prior to the effective date of this article
       and shall also have all the powers and duties formerly vested in and
       exercised by the General Counsel and the Office of General Counsel
       insofar as such powers and duties related to the administration,
       management and supervision of penal and correctional facilities,
       programs and services.

71 P.S. § 310-1.14
       These provisions grant the Department authority to implement policies that
relate to the administration, management, and supervision of its prisons, which the
VRI policy does. Our inquiry does not end there, though. Rather, we must consider
whether the VRI policy is “inconsistent with [the] law.” 71 P.S. § 186. Mull asserts
it is inconsistent with Department policy, DC-ADM 801,15 the Department’s

       14
          Section 901-B was added by Section 4 of the Act of December 30, 1984, P.L. 1299.
       15
              The     most    recent  version   of    DC-ADM      801     is    available  at
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/801%20Inmate%20Discipli
ne.pdf (last visited March 19, 2024).

                                             10
regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10, 16 and Section 5901 of the Prisons and Parole
Code.17
       This Court previously determined SCI-Houtzdale’s VRI policy did not violate
DC-ADM 801 or 37 Pa. Code § 93.10. In Rokita v. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 182 M.D. 2020, filed November 20, 2020), the
petitioner filed a petition for review in our original jurisdiction challenging the VRI

       16
            This regulation governs inmate discipline and provides, in relevant part:

       (b) Written procedures which conform to established principles of law for inmate
       discipline including the following will be maintained by the Department and
       disseminated to the inmate population:

             (1) Written notice of charges.

             (2) Hearing before an impartial hearing examiner or an informal resolution
             process for charges specified by the Department in the Department of
             Corrections Inmate Handbook, or any Department document that is
             disseminated to inmates. The informal resolution process is described in DC-
             ADM 801--Inmate Discipline. The process gives inmates the option to meet
             with staff to resolve a misconduct rather than proceed with a hearing.

             (3) Opportunity for the inmate to tell his story and to present relevant evidence.

             (4) Assistance from an inmate or staff member at the hearing if the inmate is
             unable to collect and present evidence effectively.

             (5) Written statement of the decision and reasoning of the hearing body, based
             upon the preponderance of the evidence.

             (6) Opportunities to appeal the misconduct decision in accordance with
             procedures in the Department of Corrections Inmate Handbook.

37 Pa. Code § 93.10(b).
        17
           Section 5901(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: “[a] chief administrator . . . in charge [of]
any inmate . . . shall provide the inmate with at least two hours of daily physical exercise in the
open, weather permitting, and, upon such days on which the weather is inclement, with two hours
of daily physical exercise inside of the correctional institution.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 5901(a)(1).

                                                  11
policy on various constitutional bases after being subject to a number of lockdowns
for altercations in which the petitioner was not involved. Similar to Mull, the
petitioner asserted the VRI policy was punitive in nature and the consequent
lockdowns prevented him from communicating with family, showering, exercising,
using the law library, and attending religious services.
      In response to his assertion that he was being denied due process by the
lockdowns, we held that the petitioner did not state a claim. In doing so, we
explained:

      Such constraints on due process rights reflect the reality that “[t]he
      operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily
      difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
      This undertaking is impossible without adequate deterrence of and
      control over violence inside a prison’s walls; as such, we must
      recognize that “central to all other corrections goals is the institutional
      consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities
      themselves.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). “Within this
      volatile ‘community,’ prison administrators are to take all necessary
      steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and administrative
      personnel, but also visitors. They are under an obligation to take
      reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves.”
      Hudson[ v. Palmer], 468 U.S. [517,] 526-27 [(1984)]; accord Farmer
      v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“Having incarcerated ‘persons
      [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often
      violent, conduct,’ Hudson . . . , 468 U.S. at 526, . . . having stripped
      them of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their
      access to outside aid, the government and its officials are not free to let
      the state of nature take its course.”).

      In light of the standard set forth in Sandin[ v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
      (1995)], as well as the inherently perilous security conditions found in
      prisons and the paramount interest in assuring internal institutional
      safety, we cannot deem the two lockdowns complained of by [the
      petitioner] to have “impose[d an] atypical and significant hardship on
      [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” [Id.] at 484.
      Both lockdowns were implemented in response to violent altercations
      involving inmates, incidents that self-evidently required responses from

                                          12
       SCI-Houtzdale’s staff members to ensure they maintained control over
       both the prison itself and the inmates housed there.

Rokita, slip op. at 12. We further noted that “the lockdowns did not punish [the
petitioner], in the sense that they were not imposed as a penalty in response to some
prohibited act he had perpetrated.” Id. at 13 n.9. We find the reasoning of Rokita
persuasive. Because the Rokita Court concluded the lockdowns pursuant to the VRI
policy did not violate due process and were not punitive in nature, it necessarily
follows that the VRI policy would not trigger either DC-ADM 801 or 37 Pa. Code
§ 93.10. Therefore, because the VRI policy is not inconsistent with DC-ADM 801
or the Department’s regulation at 37 Pa. Code § 93.10, we conclude Mull did not
state a claim on that basis.
       Having concluded no constitutional violation occurred, we next turn to
Section 5901(a)(1) of the Prisons and Parole Code, which provides an inmate is to
be provided two hours of exercise, outside when weather permits and inside when it
does not. 61 Pa.C.S. § 5901(a)(1).18 This is not without restraint, however. The
statute also provides “[t]he physical exercise must be safe and practical, and the
judges of several courts are to be the judges thereof.” 61 Pa.C.S. § 5901(a)(2).
       Under Section 5901’s predecessor statute,19 we held “it [wa]s for this Court to

       18
          The regulations set forth a similar requirement for county jails. 37 Pa. Code § 95.238(1).
       19
           Section 1 of the Act of June 14, 1923, P.L. 775, formerly 61 P.S. § 101, commonly
referred to as the Prison Exercise Act, was repealed by Section 11(b) of the Act of August 11,
2009, P.L. 147. It provided, in pertinent part:

      Every warden, board of prison managers, prison inspectors, or any other person in
      authority, in charge of any prison or penitentiary, who may or shall have in charge
      any person confined therein whether such person be a tried or untried prisoner, shall
      provide that such person shall have at least two hours daily, physical exercise in the
      open, weather permitting, and upon such days on which the weather is inclement,
      such person shall have two hours, daily, of physical exercise indoors of such prison
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                13
decide, as a matter of law, whether it is safe and practical . . . .” Shoats v. Owen,
563 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989) (emphasis added).
      In Buehl v. Beard, we explained that a “Section 5901 proceeding [is] a unique
statutory proceeding[,] . . . [t]he scope and limits of [which] are [] set by the
legislature in Section 5901 . . . .” 54 A.3d 412, 417 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). The Court
explained that the question of safety and practicality “is the only question subject to
judicial review.” Id. However, the Court continued,

      [i]t does not follow that a “safe and practical” review permits the courts
      to review each decision of the chief administrator with respect to
      physical exercise on a particular day. Indeed, it is well []established
      that prison administrators must be afforded wide-ranging deference in
      adopting and carrying out policies that in their reasonable judgment are
      necessary to preserve order, discipline, and security.

Id.
      There, the petitioner alleged the Department regularly cancelled outdoor
physical exercise by falsifying reports of inclement weather and then refused to
provide indoor exercise when it did. Id. at 415. Consistent with the above principles,
we held that “[r]evisiting a weather determination on a given day is beyond the
Section 5901 ‘safe and practical’ remedy.” Id. at 418. In so concluding, we reasoned
that “weather determinations require the exercise of discretion” and “[i]t is not for
the courts to decide whether the weather is very inclement or slightly inclement.”
Id.
      Although Section 5901 was not expressly addressed by Rokita, the petitioner
in that case did aver he was denied the ability to exercise as a result of the VRI

      or penitentiary: Provided, however, The same is safe and practical, and the judges
      of the several courts are to be the judges thereof.

Id.

                                             14
policy, and, as discussed above, we ultimately held the petitioner there did not state
a claim for constitutional violations. Instead, in sustaining the POs in that case, we
concluded that the policy was necessary for prison officials to maintain control and
security over the prison. Rokita, slip op. at 12. Consistent with that logic and with
Section 5901(a)(2)’s requirement that the exercise be “safe and practical,” which is
within this Court’s role to review, 61 Pa.C.S. § 5901(a)(2), Mull has not pled
sufficient facts to show implementation of the VRI policy is not within the
Department’s purview of ensuring safety and practicality, particularly in light of its
“wide-ranging deference,” Buehl, 54 A.3d at 417. In his Petition, Mull admits the
purpose of the VRI policy is “alleg[edly] to preserve order, discipline[,] and security
of staff and inmates,” (Petition ¶ 6), though he asserts it is also being used to punish
inmates for the conduct of others, (id. ¶ 60). Therefore, we sustain Respondents’
demurrer as it relates to Section 5901, as well.
       Because the VRI policy is not inconsistent with the law, we sustain
Respondents’ PO in the nature of a demurrer to Counts 2 through 5.

III.   CONCLUSION
       Based on the foregoing, the Court sustains Respondents’ PO in the nature of
a demurrer as to each count of Mull’s Petition and dismiss Mull’s Petition.20

                                            __________________________________________
                                            RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

       20
         Given our disposition, it is unnecessary to reach Respondents’ remaining POs, which are
dismissed as moot.

                                              15
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ryan Mull,                                :
                          Petitioner      :
                                          :
                    v.                    :   No. 675 M.D. 2019
                                          :
John E. Wetzel, et al.,                   :
                          Respondents     :

                                       ORDER

      NOW, March 20, 2024, Respondents’ preliminary objection (PO) in the
nature of a demurrer as to each count of the Amended Petition for Review (Petition)
filed by Ryan Mull is SUSTAINED, and the Petition is DISMISSED.                The
remaining POs are DISMISSED AS MOOT.

                                        __________________________________________
                                        RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge