Court Opinion

ID: 9755868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:56:52.555841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:12.421749
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice ABRAMSON.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly found that Officer Bailey lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion that “criminal activity [was] afoot” and Marr posed a threat to the officers’ safety. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 911. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The following portions of the Court of Appeals opinion reflect what I conclude is the proper analysis of this case:
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the United States Supreme Court recognized an exception to the warrant requirement by sanctioning both investigatory stops and limited pat-down searches of suspects. When there is a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, a police officer may briefly detain an individual on the street, even though there is no probable cause to arrest him. Id. at 30-31, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911.
Terry also held that “[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,” the officer may conduct a pat-down search “to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Id. at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881-82, 20 L.Ed.2d at 908. Frisking a suspect during a Terry stop is strictly limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby. Commonwealth v. Crowder, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 649 (1994), citing Terry, supra. Furthermore, in Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the United States Supreme Court cautioned that the narrow scope of the Terry ex*629ception does not permit a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place. “Nothing in Terry can be understood to allow a generalized ‘cursory search for weapons’ or indeed, any search whatever for anything but weapons.” Id. at 93-94, 100 S.Ct. at 343-44, 62 L.Ed.2d at 247.
The Fourth Amendment requires some minimum level of objective justification for the officer’s actions measured in light of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994). When considering the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court should take care not to view the factors upon which police officers rely to create reasonable suspicion in isolation. Rather, courts must consider all of the officer’s observations, and give due weight to inferences and deductions drawn by trained law enforcement officers. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 272-75, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 749-51 (2002). See also United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir., 2002). The test for a Terry stop and frisk is not whether an officer can conclude that an individual is engaging in criminal activity, but rather whether the officer can articulate facts [giving rise to a reasonable suspicion] that criminal activity may be afoot and that the suspect may be armed and dangerous. Commonwealth v. Banks, Ky., 68 S.W.3d 347, 351 (2001) citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911.
The trial court compared the facts of the present case to those presented in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). In that case, the police received information from an anonymous telephone caller that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Upon arriving at the bus stop, the police saw three black males “ ‘just hanging out [there]’.” Id. at 268, 120 S.Ct. at 1377, 146 L.Ed.2d at 259. When the police frisked J.L., who was a juvenile and was wearing a plaid shirt, they discovered a handgun in his pocket. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. Subsequently, the trial court granted J.L.’s motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.
In agreeing with the state court, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), and distinguished the situation in J.L. based on the facts. The Court relied in large part on the predictive aspects of the information, rather than a particular physical description of the suspect, as a major element in facilitating corroboration by the police and creating “ ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop.’ ” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. at 1378, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 327, 110 S.Ct. at 2414-15, 110 L.Ed.2d at 301). The Court stated:
The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White and essential to the Court’s decision in that case. The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left *630the police without means to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisk, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search. All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L. If White was a close case on the reliability of anonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the line. Id., 529 U.S. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1378, 146 L Ed.2d at 260-61.
The facts of the present case present a very close question regarding whether Officer Bailey had a reasonable and ar-ticulable suspicion to justify a pat-down search of Marr....
⅝ ⅝ ⅜ H: ⅝ ⅛
The trial court found that, as was the case in Florida v. J.L, there was no evidence concerning the source of the original tip or the reliability of the informant. The informant’s tip merely advised the police that someone who matched Marr’s description would be at the scene. The informant provided no predictive information about his conduct, nor did the police surveillance corroborate the tip that Marr was trafficking in methamphetamine.
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the body shop was located in a high-crime area. While the surveillance did raise a legitimate suspicion of drug activity at the body shop, none of the surveillance corroborated the information that Marr was involved in the trafficking. In addition, Officer Bailey admitted that the marijuana seized from one of the vehicles leaving the body shop was not connected to this investigation.
The events occurring inside the body shop were no more conclusive. Although the owner lied about Marr’s presence in the building, his denial of Marr’s presence in the building did not directly implicate Marr. Indeed, Marr made no attempt to hide from the officers. Furthermore, there was no evidence, even from the unidentified informant, that Marr possessed a weapon. Thus, all that remained was Marr’s resemblance to the very general description given by the informant, his presence at the scene of suspected drug activity, and Officer Bailey’s perception of Marr’s nervousness.
We agree with the trial court that these circumstances were insufficient to justify the pat-down search of Marr. Marr’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, was not a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop. Simpson v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 834 S.W.2d 686 (1992); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570, 576 (2000). And while an individual’s nervousness or suspicious behavior can contribute to the establishment of an articulable suspicion, Simpson, 834 S.W.2d at 688, (footnote omitted) Marr’s nervousness alone was not sufficient to create a reasonable inference that he was involved in criminal activity. Consequently, the trial court properly granted Marr’s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search.
In any event, even if “reasonable and articulable suspicion” had existed, the majority opinion is not dispositive of Marr’s *631suppression motion. The case should be remanded for the trial court to address whether the items found on Marr are admissible under the “plain feel” doctrine. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky.2002).
LAMBERT, C.J.; and SCHRODER, J., join.