Court Opinion

ID: 9551882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:01:32.588293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:53.992324
License: Public Domain

Doran, J.*
(dissenting) — The majority considers and decides three issues: (1) whether the impoundment of the vehicle under the facts and circumstances existing at the time of defendant's lawful arrest was reasonable and justifiable; (2) whether the scope of the preimpoundment inventory search which extended to items in the locked trunk of the vehicle exceeded the bounds of reasonableness; and (3) whether the inventory of items in a so-called "closed" toiletry kit found within a shopping bag of drugs in the locked trunk was unreasonable because the kit could have been inventoried as a unit.
The defendant contends on each of these issues that the troopers' actions were unreasonable. The majority agrees and reverses the convictions.
The majority's conclusion on the first issue that "the impoundment of defendant's vehicle was unreasonable and violative of his constitutional rights," requires that the convictions be set aside. Therefore, it is unnecessary for the majority to reach and render an advisory opinion on the two inventory search issues. Though the issues as framed may require a decision by the court sometime in the future, I would suggest that the majority withhold announcing any new, far-reaching rules until the proper factual case is presented. In this respect I believe the majority should be guided by the views expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in his concurring opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 768, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979):
*161My disagreement with the Court's opinion is very different from that of the dissenters. Our institutional practice, based on hard experience, generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in formulating constitutional rules broader than required by the facts to which they are applied.
(Italics mine.)
Impoundment of the Vehicle
The rule in this state is that, following a lawful arrest, an officer, in the absence of an authorizing statute or ordinance, may order impoundment of a vehicle only for reasonable cause. See, e.g., State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 567 P.2d 238 (1977); State v. Greenway, 15 Wn. App. 216, 547 P.2d 1231, review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1009 (1976); State v. Singleton, 9 Wn. App. 327, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973). "Reasonable cause" is to be determined by an examination and evaluation of all of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the arrest is made and the impoundment is ordered. See State v. Greenway, supra at 219.
In my opinion, the defendant by his own lies and deception created a rather unusual, if not unique, situation for trooper McNett. After stopping defendant for a traffic violation, McNett asked him for his driver's license. Defendant stated he did not have his license as he had left it at home. In response to the trooper's request for some identification, he provided from his wallet a Quinault Indian Reservation employee's permit bearing the name Anthony Kimber and an Oregon temporary vehicle registration showing that name. By running a radio check on the name of Anthony Kimber, McNett discovered Kimber's description did not match that of defendant. In the passenger's compartment in the front seat area, McNett found an insurance claim application form bearing the name of Lynn Houser. Checking this name, the trooper found the description matched that of the defendant. He also discovered Houser's driver's license had been suspended. Defendant was first lawfully *162arrested for making an improper lane change. Later, as a result of the investigation, defendant was lawfully arrested for obstructing a public servant and driving while his license was suspended. The trooper then faced the question of what should be done with the car.
Initially, Trooper McNett obtained from defendant the names of some people to whom he could release the vehicle. This procedure is consistent with the holdings in State v. Bales, 15 Wn. App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976) and State v. Hardman, supra. It does not appear from the record that Anthony Kimber's name was among those proffered by the defendant. Nevertheless, McNett called several of these individuals and finally reached Timothy Moss who agreed to take charge of the car.
Prior to the time when Moss arrived, McNett found the vehicle title and other information in the vehicle identifying the owner as Anthony Kimber. At this point he determined that, under the circumstances, releasing the car to anyone designated by defendant would be inadvisable and he ordered the car impounded. McNett testified that he believed the car should be held for a period of time to allow him to establish ownership. Although he had made a radio check to determine if the vehicle had been reported as stolen, the inquiry was based solely on the Oregon license plates and did not include a check of the vehicle identification number. As the trial judge observed, "license plates obviously are easily switched."
Defendant's sole contention in the trial court and before the Court of Appeals, and his principal contention here, was that the impoundment was not justified "where there was available a local resident (Mr. Moss) who was willing to take possession of the vehicle from the officers." I agree that where the owner of a vehicle is taken into custody an effort should be made to release the vehicle to the owner's agent rather than impound it. Here, the defendant was neither the apparent owner of the car nor did he ever claim, at the scene, prior to impoundment, that he was a friend of *163the owner from whom he had borrowed the car. More significantly, here, the defendant misrepresented himself as the owner and provided identification from his wallet in an attempt to conceal his true identity. Under these circumstances, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed with the trooper's decision not to turn the car over to Moss. I also agree and suggest the facts speak for themselves.
As the prosecutor states in his brief:
Imagine, if you will, explaining to the real Anthony Kimber that the State Patrol stopped his car, found it driven by Lynn Houser, who tried to claim he was Anthony Kimber, arrested Houser and then turned the car over to Houser's friend for safekeeping.
In reaching its conclusion that impoundment was not based on any reasonable ground, the majority states that as a reasonable alternative, the police could have left the car parked and locked in its location on the public street.6 The alternative which the majority now finds reasonable is based upon several assumptions which are not supported by the record. Specifically, the court assumes that the car was parked on a public street and that the defendant's arrest would involve only a temporary absence.7
*164I agree with the majority that the "community caretaking functions" recognized in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976) would have to be expanded to apply in this case; however, the inquiry does not end there because "reasonable cause" must be determined on the factual circumstances of this case. State v. Greenway, supra at 219. As the court stated in Opperman:
The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case must be decided on its own facts."
Opperman, at 373, quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 509-10, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971) (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). This requires, of necessity, some fine line drawing and a judgmental decision based upon the facts presented. See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra at 753 and State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 134, 559 P.2d 970 (1977).
It is clear to me from reading the testimony of Trooper McNett and the oral opinion of the trial judge that impoundment was ordered in good faith to protect the car and its contents for the owner. Thus, there is no basis for any "suspicion that it was a mere pretext for a general exploratory search of the car." Even counsel for defendant, in oral argument before this court, conceded that impoundment was not a pretext for an exploratory search of the car. Cf. State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 644-45, 374 P.2d 989 (1962); State v. Hardman, supra.
Trooper McNett did what he reasonably could be expected to do in attempting to ascertain the ownership of *165the vehicle. His roadside inquiry left him unsatisfied. While I agree that Trooper McNett did not have probable cause to believe the vehicle to be stolen so as to justify impoundment on that ground, I believe he acted responsibly and in good faith in taking the step of impounding the vehicle for the limited purpose of ascertaining the true ownership and status of the vehicle.
Although what I regard to be the "care-taking function" undertaken by the trooper in this case can be distinguished from the functions recognized in Opperman, such distinction is not critical. In my opinion the functions described in Opperman are not exclusive.
Because of the unique factual situation created by the defendant's duplicity and the unquestioned good faith of the trooper, I agree with the trial judge and Division Two of the Court of Appeals that the impoundment here met the Fourth Amendment test of reasonableness.
Inventory Search of Locked Trunk
After impoundment was ordered, a complete inventory search was made by Trooper O'Neill pursuant to the standard procedure of the state patrol. In the locked trunk of the vehicle the trooper discovered a shopping bag of drugs in which he found a small toiletry kit also containing some drugs.
While there is nothing in the record to disclose the basis for the state patrol standard inventory procedure, it is reasonable to assume it was based, at least in part, on the views expressed by this court in State v. Gluck, 83 Wn.2d 424, 518 P.2d 703 (1974). In that case this court stated:
We do not, however, feel that the state's assertion that the search was justified as an inventory of the vehicle and its contents prior to impoundment is a valid one in this context. While we have long recognized inventory searches as a practical necessity, State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968); State v. Olsen, 43 Wn.2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953); State v. Patterson, 8 Wn. App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973); State v. Jones, 2 Wn. App. 627, 472 P.2d 402 (1970); State v. Potts, 1 Wn. *166App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969), we have also insisted that they be conducted in good faith for the purposes of (1) finding, listing, and securing from loss during detention, property belonging to a detained person, (2) protecting police from liability due to dishonest claims of theft, and (3) protecting temporary storage bailees against false charges. State v. Montague, supra at 385-87; State v. Michaels, 60 Wn.2d 638, 644-46, 374 P.2d 989 (1962).
The record here reveals merely that the officers at trial asserted that they "pulled an inventory search of the vehicle for personal property." The record does not indicate that the officers made a complete list of other items in the vehicle nor was it asserted that the officers completely searched, both under the hood and in the trunk, the entire vehicle after they found the incriminating bag. Without more, it cannot fairly be characterized as an inventory search.
(Italics mine.) Gluck, at 428-29.
I believe the reference to "under the hood" is based upon the holding in State v. Olsen, 43 Wn.2d 726, 263 P.2d 824 (1953). The reference to "in the trunk" apparently is based upon the decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969).
In affirming the trial court in the instant case, Division Two of the Court of Appeals recognized the purposes of an inventory search as stated in State v. Gluck, supra, and State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968), and the impact of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in South Dakota v. Opperman, supra:
In order to effectuate these purposes, it was necessary for the police to check the car's trunk as well as its interior. We are aware of narrow interpretations of South Dakota v. Opperman, supra, wherein the Supreme Court upheld an inventory search of an unlocked glove box. However, we find nothing in Opperman which would invalidate our previous holding that inventory searches of locked trunks are constitutionally permissible. State v. Potts, 1 Wn. App. 614, 464 P.2d 742 (1969). See also Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973).
State v. Houser, 21 Wn. App. 30, 34, 584 P.2d 410 (1978).
*167Without considering Potts, without reference to the description of an inventory search in Gluck, and without citation of supporting authority, the majority establishes a new standard governing the scope of inventory searches. The majority has reached the conclusion that an officer may not examine the locked trunk of an impounded vehicle in the course of an inventory search absent a manifest necessity for conducting such a search. Anticipating the obvious question, the majority states in footnote 5:
We need not speculate the circumstances which would constitute a "manifest necessity" justifying the inventory search of a locked trunk without the owner's consent.
The court's single-minded emphasis in formulating this new standard is that the trunk of an automobile presents no great danger of theft. I disagree. To forbid entry into the trunk as part of a routine inventory search frustrates the very purpose of the inventory, since the trunk is a likely place for valuables to be stored. Accord, State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980). Unlike the majority's analogy to automobiles with locked trunks left on city streets, an impounded vehicle is more susceptible to theft because it is unattended for perhaps a number of days at a storage lot.8 More importantly, however, the majority fails to take into consideration the other objectives in conducting an inventory (i.e., the protection of public safety and the protection of the police from danger or from liability *168for claimed thefts. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976); State v. Gluck, supra). Finally, in formulating this new standard, the majority has brought about a subtle shift in emphasis away from a balancing of the competing interests in light of all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case toward compliance with a nebulous per se standard of law upon which the majority declines to elaborate.
I agree that the majority need not engage in any speculation on what constitutes manifest necessity. On the other hand, the majority need not and should not reach the issue. It appears that the majority has established a new standard that will require interpretation by trial judges in future cases without any guidance from the majority. The burden of proof is not simply one of necessity but of manifest necessity. As far as I am aware, no other court has adopted such a standard.9
I believe the inventory of items in the locked trunk of the vehicle ostensibly belonging to Anthony Kimber (and driven by defendant) was conducted in good faith, pursuant to standard state patrol practices, for the purposes recognized in State v. Montague, supra, and was reasonable and, therefore, constitutional under the facts of this case. See State v. Gluck, supra; State v. Potts, supra.
*169Inventory op Items in the Toiletry Kit
After finding two constitutional grounds for reversing the drug convictions, the majority proceeds to render an advisory opinion on the so-called closed toiletry kit issue. This issue was not raised in the trial court10 and, in the light of the holdings on the other issues, it is not necessary for the majority to reach the same.
The record is insufficient to establish that the toiletry kit was (1) closed or (2) the drugs upon which the charges were based were found therein. There is, thus, no factual basis for the conclusions reached by the majority. In an appropriate case, this court may be called upon to determine whether the holdings in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979) (involving a search of a closed but unlocked suitcase), United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977) (a double-locked footlocker) and United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979) (a securely sealed knapsack) should be applied to closed "luggage" found during an inventory search. This is not the case.
I would affirm the convictions by upholding the good faith impound and the search of the locked trunk under the unusual, if not unique, facts and circumstances of this case. Unlike the new public policy rule announced in State v. Hehman, 90 Wn.2d 45, 578 P.2d 527 (1978), which operated prospectively only, the new standard of the majority will have an impact and require reversal of a number of criminal cases decided under the prior rules. With the scope of the majority opinion in mind, I believe the views expressed by Justice Brachtenbach in his dissenting opinion in Hehman bear repeating here:
*170Under the majority ruling the officer almost needs an appellate court riding his patrol vehicle to advise of the changing nature of the rules.
State v. Hehman, supra at 51 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting).
I dissent.
Horowitz, J., concurs with Doran, J. Pro Tern.

Judge Robert J. Doran is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const, art. 4, § 2A (amendment 38).

The majority opinion may create some confusion as to how many alternatives to impoundment an officer must consider before impoundment may be ordered. Stated another way, is the majority holding, contrary to State v. Hardman, 17 Wn. App. 910, 567 P.2d 238 (1977), that an officer must exhaust all possible alternatives before his action will be considered "reasonable"? The only alternative specifically discussed by the majority — leaving the car in the street — was not considered by either the officer or the defendant at the time of the arrest. It was raised as an alternative for the first time on appeal. On the other hand, the only alternative considered and rejected by the trooper — releasing the car to defendant's friend Moss — is nowhere discussed in the majority's opinion. Without any explanation, the majority's failure to discuss the alternative of turning the car over to Moss suggests that they too find this alternative unreasonable under the circumstances.

In State v. Singleton, 9 Wn. App. 327, 333, 511 P.2d 1396 (1973), cited by the majority, the bail for the traffic offense was $25. Here bail according to JTR 2.03, the schedule adopted by this court, would be $275: (1) driving while license suspended, $250; and (2) improper lane change, $25. In addition, defendant was *164also arrested for obstructing a public servant, a misdemeanor offense for which there was no established bail and a court appearance would, therefore, be necessary to secure release.
It is also interesting to note that the impoundment of defendant's vehicle upheld in State v. Montague, 73 Wn.2d 381, 438 P.2d 571 (1968) followed the inability of the defendant to post bail in the amount of $34, without any showing that the officers prior to impoundment considered any alternative. See also State v. Greenway, 15 Wn. App. 216, 547 P.2d 1231 (1976) where bail on a felony charge in the amount of $250 was one of the facts considered in sustaining the impoundment of the defendant's vehicle.

 The difference was recognized by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Opperman:
The protection of the owner's property is a significant interest for both the policeman and the citizen. It is argued that an inventory is not necessary since locked doors and rolled-up windows afford the same protection that the contents of a parked automobile normally enjoy. But many owners might leave valuables in their automobile temporarily that they would not leave there unattended for the several days that police custody may last. There is thus a substantial gain in security if automobiles are inventoried and valuable items removed for storage. And, while the same security could he attained by posting a guard at the storage lot, that alternative may he prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller jurisdictions.
(Footnotes omitted.) South Dakota v. Opperman, supra at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).

 Application of the "manifest necessity" standard would appear to bar even an inventory search such as the one approved in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973), since the officers there only had reasonable grounds to believe that there was a revolver in the locked trunk of the vehicle. In discussing the Dombrowski case, the court in Opperman stated:
The sole justification for the warrantless incursion was that it was incident to the caretaking function of the local police to protect the community's safety. Indeed, the protective search was instituted solely because local police "were under the impression" that the incapacitated driver, a Chicago police officer, was required to carry his service revolver at all times; the police had reasonable grounds to believe a weapon might be in the car, and thus available to vandals. The Court carefully noted that the protective search was carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police department, a factor tending to ensure that the intrusion would be limited in scope to the extent necessary to carry out the caretaking function.
(Citations omitted. First italics mine.) South Dakota v. Opperman, supra at 374.

 It should be noted trial was held on May 13, 1977. On that date Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (decided June 21, 1977) and United States v. Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979), cited by the majority, had not yet been decided.