Court Opinion

ID: 9707406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:10:53.16507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.287967
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
concurring. Although I agree with the result, I concur separately because the Court’s analysis is overbroad and unnecessarily reaches a constitutional issue. State v. Clarke, 145 Vt. 547, 551, 496 A.2d 164, 167 (1985).
A simpler answer is that retroactive application of the repose provision to bar plaintiff’s action is prohibited by 1 V.S.A. § 214, .which deals with the effect of amendment or repeal of legislation on pre-existing rights and remedies. Under 1 V.S.A. § 214(b)(2), a statutory change shall not “[a]ffect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment or repeal.” At the time of plaintiff’s injury in 1972, he acquired a right of redress. The nature of that right — vested or inchoate — is not relevant. By the express terms of § 214(b)(2), that right cannot be affected — and certainly not eliminated — by a later change in the statute of limitations. Rather, the repose provision of 12 V.S.A. *182§ 521, enacted in 1978, is limited to prospective application; it cannot operate to affect plaintiff’s previously acquired right to bring this action. Stewart v. Darrow, 141 Vt. 248, 252, 448 A.2d 788, 790 (1982).
Likewise, the Court’s adoption of a rule providing plaintiff with a reasonable amount of time after the amendment of the statute of limitations to bring an action is unnecessarily uncertain. The more straightforward remedy is not to apply the offensive portion of § 521 — i.e., the repose period — against the plaintiff, but to enforce the remainder of the statute, giving plaintiff two years from the date the injury is or reasonably should have been discovered to bring an action.
I am authorized to say that Justice Barney joins in this concurrence.