Court Opinion

ID: 9943221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:03:55.771181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:37.276487
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Ward CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B326448
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. SA066108)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 JAMES VERNON WARD,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       James Vernon Ward appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61. He contends the
trial court erred by conducting the evidentiary hearing without

         1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the

Penal Code. Appellant filed his petition under former section
1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We refer to the statute throughout as section
1172.6.
him present. We will affirm because as the actual killer he was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
       Appellant lived with his wife Deshawn Ward, and three
children: his wife’s six-year-old son J. and two-year-old daughter
K., and her and appellant’s infant son J.W. On the morning of
September 7, at approximately 5:00 a.m., Mrs. Ward awoke and
left for work. Later that morning, appellant walked J. to school
accompanied by K. and J.W. At 1:00 p.m., appellant telephoned
his wife and reported that K. and J.W. were sleeping. Shortly
thereafter, appellant telephoned his wife and told her K. would
not wake up. At his wife’s direction, appellant called 911. Police
reached the home at 2:05 p.m. K. was lying on the floor. An
officer could not find a pulse and began performing CPR.
Paramedics arrived two or three minutes after the police.
       K. was taken to a hospital where she was treated by
emergency room physician Dr. Covington, who restarted K.’s
heart and placed her on a ventilator. Dr. Covington’s
examination revealed that K.’s abdomen was large and rigid, her
rectum was prolapsed, her vaginal opening was larger than
would be expected in a two-year-old, and she did not see a hymen.
Dr. Covington concluded that K.’s injuries were the result of
trauma and reported to the police that K. had been abused.

      2 The following summary of the factual and procedural

background is drawn from this court’s unpublished opinion in
People v. Ward (Apr. 25, 2013, B231332) [nonpub. opn.]. We
previously granted appellant’s unopposed request for judicial
notice of the record in his direct appeal. (Evid. Code, § 452.) We
provide this background to give context to our analysis of
whether the jury instructions and verdicts foreclose the existence
of a prima facie case.

                                2
       K. was sent to another hospital for surgery. Pediatric
surgeon Dr. Sydorak concluded that K. had visible signs of abuse
and was critically ill and near death. Dr. Sydorak opined that
K.’s injuries had been sustained within one to six hours before
the operation. K. was removed from the ventilator, and died on
September 9, 2007.
       On September 11 and 12, Los Angeles County Deputy
Medical Examiner Dr. Whiteman performed an autopsy of K. Dr.
Whiteman found organ damage and other injuries, and he opined
that the cause of death was multiple traumatic injuries, including
injuries to her abdomen, rib cage, and head. Dr. Whiteman
concluded that most of K.’s injuries, including bruises inside her
rectum, occurred between six and 12 hours before K. was placed
on a ventilator at the hospital.
       Dr. Heger participated in the autopsy and testified that
acute trauma extended around and across the base of her hymen
and in her rectum. She concluded that the injuries to K.’s hymen
were “fairly recent,” and that K. had been penetrated at least
once in the anus and at least once in the vagina. Dr. Heger could
not determine what object made the penetrations.
       A jury convicted appellant of the first degree murder of K.
while engaged in the commission of sexual penetration (rape by
instrument) (§§ 187, subd. (a), 289); count 1), assault on a child
causing death (§ 273ab; count 2), and child abuse (§ 273a, subd.
(a); count 3). As to count 1, the jury found true the special
circumstance that the murder was committed during the
commission of a rape by instrument. (§§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(k),
289.) Appended to count 3 and also found true was the allegation
that appellant willfully harmed or injured a child resulting in the
child’s death (§ 12022.95). Appellant was sentenced to life
without possibility of parole for the murder, plus a consecutive

                                3
three-year term for child abuse and four-year term for child
abuse pursuant to section 12022.95. We affirmed the judgment
in People v. Ward, supra, B231332.
       Appellant petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6
and requested appointment of counsel. The trial court granted
the request for counsel and each side submitted briefs. It found
appellant’s petition made a prima facie case for relief, ordered
additional briefing, and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At an
evidentiary hearing for which appellant was not present, the
court denied the petition. The court found appellant’s record of
conviction established he was K.’s actual killer beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court noted the jury was never instructed
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any theory
of aiding and abetting.
                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred when
it denied his resentencing petition at the evidentiary hearing
without him present. (See People v. Basler (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
46, 58.) We conclude that because the record of conviction
conclusively establishes the jury convicted appellant as the actual
killer, any error in holding an evidentiary hearing in appellant’s
absence was harmless under any standard. (See People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973 (Garcia); People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [“the harmless error doctrine provides a
reasonable method to avoid protracted hearings in past cases
that are final and should stay that way”].)
                           Section 1172.6
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) narrowed the felony-murder rule’s
scope. The bill added section 189, subdivision (e) (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 3; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708

                                 4
(Strong)), which provides that defendants are liable on a felony-
murder theory only if they (1) were the actual killer; (2) were not
the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, aided and abetted the
actual killer in committing first degree murder; or (3) were a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (See Strong, at p. 708.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also established a procedure for
defendants convicted under prior law to petition for relief.
(§ 1172.6.) Under section 1172.6, the petition must contain a
declaration that all eligibility requirements are met, including
that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) After
receiving a compliant petition, the trial court “hold[s] a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Upon a successful prima facie
showing, the court issues an order to show cause and conducts an
evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) At that hearing,
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner is guilty of murder under the law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437. (Ibid.; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 709.)
       The prima facie inquiry is “limited.” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The court accepts the petitioner’s factual
allegations as true but may consider the record of conviction,
which includes jury instructions, closing argument, verdict forms,
and prior appellate opinions. (Ibid.; see also People v. Lopez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) However, “the probative value of an
appellate opinion is case-specific, and ‘it is certainly correct that
an appellate opinion might not supply all answers.’” (Lewis, at
p. 972.) In relying on the record of conviction, the court “should

                                 5
not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or
the exercise of discretion.’” (Ibid.)
        Appellant is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
       The record of conviction conclusively demonstrates the jury
convicted appellant as the actual killer. Appellant is, therefore,
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
       At trial, the prosecution proceeded solely on a felony-
murder theory with appellant as the lone perpetrator. The court
instructed only on first degree murder under a felony-murder
theory. The court did not instruct on liability as an aider and
abettor, accomplice, or major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless indifference to human life. Nor did the
court instruct on malice or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
       While the felony-murder conviction did not require a jury
finding that appellant was the actual killer, the jury’s verdicts on
both the section 12022.95 allegation and section 273ab charge
cement appellant’s actual killer status. As to section 12022.95,
the court instructed: “If you find the defendant guilty of the
charged crime of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a) in
Count 3, then you must determine whether the following
allegation pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.95 is true or not
true. [¶] That, under circumstances or conditions likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, the defendant willfully
caused or permitted any child to suffer that resulted in the child’s
death or inflicted upon the child unjustifiable physical pain or
injury that resulted in the child’s death; or [¶] [t]hat, having care
or custody of any child under circumstances or conditions likely
to produce great bodily harm or death, the defendant willfully
caused or permitted that child to be injured or harmed, and that
injury or harm resulted in the child’s death.”

                                  6
       A true finding under this instruction theoretically allows
for the possibility that appellant only permitted or indirectly
caused, without personally perpetrating, an injury or harm
resulting in K.’s death. However, the verdict form states: “We
further find [true] the allegation that the defendant willfully
harmed or injured the child, which harm or injury resulted in the
child’s death, within the meaning of Penal Code Section
12022.95.” The plain meaning of this language confirms the jury
found appellant personally harmed or injured K., which resulted
in K.’s death. The record supports this conclusion. Personal
perpetration of harm or injury is consistent with the jury’s
finding that appellant “committed the murder of [K.] while he
was engaged in the commission of the crime of forcible sexual
penetration . . . .” Moreover, the prosecution argued appellant’s
physical blows during a beating caused K.’s death. The defense
disagreed but did not argue appellant only permitted or indirectly
caused a fatal harm or injury without perpetrating it. In finding
true the section 12022.95 allegation, therefore, the jury found
appellant personally perpetrated a harm or injury resulting in
K.’s death. Only the actual killer could do so.
       The section 273ab conviction further identifies appellant as
the actual killer. That conviction required a finding appellant
committed an assault upon K. “by means of force that to a
reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury.”
(CALJIC No. 9.36.5.)3 The jury necessarily concluded appellant’s

      3 On the section 273ab charge, the court instructed that

proof of the following elements was necessary: “1. A person had
the care or custody of a child under eight years of age; [¶] 2. That
person committed an assault upon the child; [¶] 3. The assault
was committed by means of force that to a reasonable person

                                 7
assault resulted in K.’s death. Accordingly, by finding appellant
committed the section 273ab “offense of child abuse homicide,”
the jury determined appellant was K.’s actual killer. (People v.
Wyatt (2010) 48 Cal.4th 776, 780.)
      Appellant argues the record of conviction does not establish
he was the actual killer. Appellant catalogs evidence of K.’s
preexisting medical conditions and accident history, as well as
injuries potentially produced during medical treatment.
Appellant contends the jury, as instructed on causation, could
have convicted based on proximate causation without finding
appellant was K.’s actual killer. We disagree.
      The court instructed on causation with CALJIC Nos. 3.40
and 3.41. CALJIC No. 3.40, the more general instruction,
provided: “To constitute the crimes of Penal Code section 187(a)
in Count 1 and Penal Code section 273ab in Count 2 and the
allegation in Count 3 pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.95,
there must be in addition to the death an unlawful act which was
a cause of that death. [¶] The criminal law has its own
particular way of defining cause. A cause of the death is an act
that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct,
natural and probable consequence of the act the death and
without which the death would not occur.”
      CALJIC No. 3.41 provided specific direction on concurrent
causes: “There may be more than one cause of the death. When
the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently as a
cause of the death, the conduct of each is a cause of the death if
that conduct was also a substantial factor contributing to the
result. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the moment of

would be likely to produce great bodily injury; and [¶] 4. The
assault resulted in the death of the child.” (CALJIC No. 9.36.5.)

                                8
the death and acted with another cause to produce the death. [¶]
If you find that the defendant’s conduct was a cause of death to
another person, then it is no defense that the conduct of some
other person contributed to the death.”
       Our Supreme Court recently affirmed these instructions in
clarifying proximate causation for concurrent cause cases.
(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1138-1142.) When
evidence of concurrent causes exists, to be a proximate cause, a
defendant’s conduct must be a substantial factor contributing to a
victim’s death. (Carney at p. 1138, 1142; see also CALJIC No.
3.41.) The death must also be foreseeable—that is, the “‘“direct,
natural and probable consequence”’” of the defendant’s conduct.
(Carney at pp. 1138, 1142; see also CALJIC No. 3.40.)
       Instructed in line with these principles, the jury could have
found appellant’s conduct “resulted in” K.’s death if it was a
substantial factor contributing to K.’s death, not the sole cause
thereof. The jury may have believed K.’s preexisting conditions
or medical injuries contributed to the death as well. In that case,
the question is whether a defendant who commits an act that
operates as such a proximate cause, along with concurrent
medical causes, is an actual killer. We conclude yes.
       Longstanding precedent establishes that a victim’s
preexisting medical condition does not relieve a defendant of
liability for murder so long as the condition “‘is not the only
substantial factor bringing about [the] death.’” (People v. Catlin
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 155.) Likewise, inadequate medical
treatment has not traditionally discharged murder liability
unless “the maltreatment is the sole cause of death and hence an
unforeseeable intervening cause.” (People v. Roberts (1992) 2
Cal.4th 271, 312.) As explained in People v. Garcia, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th 956, nothing in Senate Bill No. 1437 evinces a

                                 9
legislative intent to modify longstanding concurrent causation
principles. (Id. at p. 967.) Instructed under those principles, the
jury found appellant’s conduct proximately caused K.’s death,
even if preexisting or ensuing medical factors may have also
contributed. The jury’s finding suffices to identify appellant as
the actual killer. (See id. at pp. 970-971 [because the defendant’s
acts were a substantial factor in bringing about the victim’s
death, the defendant “‘personally killed’” and was the “‘actual
killer’” under section 189].) We fail to see how or why external
factors like a preexisting medical condition or negligent medical
treatment would routinely absolve an actual killer.
       Appellant also contends a recent accident K. suffered
“provides precedent” for a similar accident possibly contributing
to her death. Even granting this possibility, such an accident
would simply function as another concurrent cause along with
appellant’s conduct. Furthermore, “the primary purpose of the
felony-murder rule . . . is ‘“to deter felons from killing negligently
or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for the
killings they commit.”’ [Citations.]” (Garcia, supra, 82
Cal.App.5th at p. 969.) Given this core purpose, an accident, like
a concurrent medical cause, does not discharge appellant as the
actual killer. In short, the possible concurrent causes in this case
do not undermine the jury’s finding that appellant’s acts—
namely, his assault and perpetration of harm or injury—were at
least a substantial factor contributing to K.’s foreseeable death.
That finding establishes appellant as K.’s actual killer.
       Finally, appellant’s reliance upon People v. Vang (2022) 82
Cal.App.5th 64 (Vang) is misplaced. In Vang, the victim died
after jumping from a moving car to escape her kidnapper. (Id. at
pp. 79-80.) Vang held an actual killer must personally commit
the homicidal act. (Id. at p. 80.) The trial court’s instructions

                                 10
allowed the jury to convict based on general causation principles,
even if it did not find the defendant personally committed the
homicidal act. (Id. at p. 91.) Vang reversed the first degree
felony-murder conviction and vacated the special circumstance
finding because “the evidence [did] not permit any inference that
defendant was the direct cause of [the victim’s] death.” (Ibid.)
      Appellant’s case is distinguishable. The jury found
appellant personally perpetrated a harm or injury resulting in
K.’s death, as well as an assault upon K. resulting in her death.
Thus, appellant’s situation diverges from Vang, where the
victim’s death resulted from her own volitional act of jumping
from a moving car. Although appellant criticizes the evidence of
his acts as circumstantial, the species of evidence is irrelevant
and does not undermine the jury’s findings. (Cf. People v.
Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 930.)
                            DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      YEGAN, J.

                                11
                   Michael E. Pastor, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.