Court Opinion

ID: 9601872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:50:24.551129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:59.615266
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the trial court did not err in denying Martin’s motion to sever and also in admitting testimony as to Bolds’ polygraph examination. Martin and Bolds were jointly tried for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery. Co-defendant Bolds’ first trial counsel stipulated to the admission of the polygraph testimony. Upon trial the polygraph examiner testified that he had asked Bolds the following questions during the polygraph examination: “Did you help anyone damage that man’s car at Cleve’s?” and “Did you rob that man at Cleve’s on Friday night in April?” Bolds answered “no” to each question. The examiner’s opinion was that the answers indicated deception.
Martin objected on the ground that there was a reference to another person in the examination and that the admission of such evidence prejudiced him. The trial court overruled the motion for mistrial and motion for severance and stated that in view of the tenuous nature of the reference to the third party in the questions, the court’s proposed instructions pursuant to State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76 (239 SE2d 324) (1977), would adequately protect Martin’s rights. Martin also objected as to the admissibility of the polygraph testimony because the attorney for Bolds who stipulated that such evidence could be used was no longer counsel for Bolds.
*707Testimony at trial given by Bolds’ previous counsel indicated that Bolds was fully informed of his rights concerning the stipulation to admit the polygraph evidence and freely and voluntarily agreed for him to enter into such stipulation. Since no evidence to the contrary was offered at trial, a challenge by Bolds to the court’s ruling admitting the evidence was without merit. See People v. Garcia, 13 Cal. App. 3d 486 (91 Cal. Rptr. 671) (1970). Likewise, Martin’s derivative objection was meritless.
In determining whether the trial court erred in admitting such evidence we must consider if there was a danger that the polygraph evidence admissible against Bolds would be considered against Martin despite an admonitory instruction by the trial court. There was no showing that Martin was mentioned by name in either the polygraph questions or answers. Moreover, the trial court, in addition to charging pursuant to Chambers, supra, charged the jury that while some evidence was applicable to both defendants, other evidence applied only to one or the other. The jury was instructed in 'determining guilt or innocence to carefully consider only that evidence applicable to both defendants or that applicable only to the individual defendant under consideration. Under these circumstances, Martin has failed to make a clear showing of harm or prejudice regarding the introduction of the polygraph evidence and also has not shown an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See Jones v. State, 243 Ga. 584 (4) (255 SE2d 702) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this special concurrence.