Court Opinion

ID: 9616687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:48:58.372312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:00.262896
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
dissenting.
It is my view that Ga. L. 1941, pp. 487-489 (Code Ann. §§ 67-1308 — 67-1314) is not only a statute of reversion, but also a statute of limitation "for the bringing of any action or proceeding in court,” as contemplated by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (50 USCA, Appendix, § 525).
Section 4 of the 1941 Act (Code Ann. § 67-1311) *300provides: "No suit shall be brought to recover property upon title of a conveyance of real property to secure debt when a suit to foreclose and the exercise of power of sale are barred.”
Section 6 of the 1941 Act (Code Ann. § 67-1313) provides: "No suit to foreclose, and no suit to recover property under, a conveyance of real property to secure debt shall be commenced, and no power contained in or conferred by a conveyance of real property to secure debt shall be exercised, after title thereby conveyed has reverted as provided in this law.”
Both federal and state courts have liberally construed the provisions of 50 IJSCA, Appendix, § 525, to promote the beneficial purpose of the statute. See 26 ALR2d, pp. 284-296.
Construing the 1941 Act in its entirety, including those sections barring the bringing of actions to enforce a security deed the title to which has reverted, the reverter provision is an integral part of a statute of limitation for the bringing of an action, and within the provisions of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act.
I would hold that the trial judge erred in striking the second defense of the answer of W. A. Newman.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Undercofler and Justice Hall concur in this dissent.