Court Opinion

ID: 9495172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:56:24.329127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:51.735705
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in Judge Gilman’s opinion affirming the judgment of the district court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but write separately to underscore that the holding in this case is limited to the habeas context and does not foreclose a plaintiff from litigating constitutional claims pertaining to a sex offender registration statute in a non-habeas proceeding. Thus, although Petitioner claims that the Ohio sexual predator statute was unconstitutional as applied to him on the ground that it violated the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, we do not reach the merits of these claims since Petitioner cannot satisfy the “in custody” requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Nevertheless, while the classification, registration and notification requirements of the Ohio sexual predator statute are viewed as collateral consequences of a conviction rather than a restraint on liberty sufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement for purposes of federal habeas review, these same consequences might be considered punitive for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir.2001) (classifying the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act as punitive for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, and thus applicable only to sex offenders whose crimes were committed after its enactment). The holding in the present case also does not prevent a plaintiff from bringing a constitutional challenge to a sexual offender registration statute in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, see id.; asserting that a sexual .offender registration statute is violative of the Due Process Clause, see Doe v. Dep’t of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 62 (2d Cir.2001) (finding that the Connecticut sexual predator statute violated the Due Process Clause because the statute did not provide a hearing to determine whether an individual was currently dangerous before he was classified as a sex offender), cert. granted, Conn. Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, — U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 1959, 152 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2002); or claiming governmental defamation entitling the plaintiff to the procedural safeguards of the Due Process Clause, see Fullmer v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 207 F.Supp.2d 650 (E.D.Mich.2002) (find*524ing that the notification provisions of the Michigan Sex Offenders Registration Act violated procedural due process). In short, the holding in the present case is strictly limited to the habeas context.