Court Opinion

ID: 9712566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:56:26.096073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.079292
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Givan, J.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. The search warrant in this case was obtained upon the affidavit of one Ronald L. Kemp, police officer of Clarksville. In his affidavit Officer Kemp stated that he had received information from Robert Gutman, Narcotics Bureau of the Louisville Police Department, that the appellant and another were positively identified in Clinton, Iowa, as a suspect in a drug store burglary. The information recited in the affidavit, which is set out in full in the majority opinion, would be sufficient official police communication which, if received by any officer while on patrol, would be probable cause for him to arrest a suspect without a warrant. See Patterson v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 499, 20 Ind. Dec. 290, 255 N. E. 2d 520, Manson et al. v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 53, 11 Ind. Dec. 293, 229 N. E. 2d 801.
I see no reason why this type of information when received through official police communication channels should not be sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant.
I think the rule recited in the majority opinion is applicable to situations where the information received is from other than official sources and is of doubtful validity. However, to say that police officers of one city cannot obtain a search warrant based upon official police communications from another city is to create a situation which would require bringing witnesses from a distant city to testify before a magistrate before a search warrant could be issued. This would result in an impossible situation. Rapid communication systems would be totally useless for the apprehension of criminals over long distances if such information cannot be relied upon for the obtaining of a search warrant.
The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that *36observations of fellow officers engaged in a common investigation are a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number. U. S. v. Ventresca (1965), 380 U. S. 102, 111, 13 L. Ed. 2d 684, 85 S. Ct. 741.
The Court of Appeals of New York in citing Ventresca observed:
“The controlling principle seems to be that it is not necessary for the officer making the arrest to know of the reliability of the informer or to be, himself, in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause provided that he acts upon the direction of or as a result of communication with a superior or brother officer or another police department provided that the police as a whole were in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause to make the arrest. * * *”
People v. Horowitz (1967), 21 N. Y. 2d 55, 233 N. E. 2d 453, 455.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in facing this same situation has observed:
“ ‘There is a great difference between that which is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and probable cause for arrest and search, as well as in the tribunals which determine such matters, and therefore, a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish such guilt or probable cause. Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879. Probable cause for arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of which he had reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested is guilty. * * *’ ”
People v. Brinn (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 232, 204 N. E. 2d 724, 730.
I would, therefore, hold that the search warrant was properly issued and therefore the trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress the evidence obtained thereby.
*37I would affirm the lower court.
Arterburn, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 262 N. E. 2d 523.