Court Opinion

ID: 9387671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:07:39.819565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.946429
License: Public Domain

J-S06036-23

                                   2023 PA SUPER 69

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RAYMOND CHARLES ROWE                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 649 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 21, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-36-CR-0004108-2018

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED: APRIL 18, 2023

        Raymond C. Rowe (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County denying his motion for post-

conviction DNA testing, filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1 of the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), in which he requested DNA collection and

testing of potential Touch DNA samples from various items recovered from

the murder scene of his victim. After careful consideration, we affirm.

        The present matter stems from the December 21, 1992, rape and

murder of Christi Mirack in her Lancaster County home. During her autopsy,

swabs were taken from her body and sent to the Pennsylvania State Police for

testing. Although a DNA profile was obtained and uploaded into a nationwide

database of offenders and unknown subjects, nearly 26 years would pass until

a match was found.
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S06036-23

      Specifically, on May 19, 2018, Appellant was identified as a strong viable

suspect after a genetic analysis of the DNA profile collected from the carpet

sample provided a significant match to a national database sample belonging

to him. Affidavit of Probable Cause at ¶ 24. The Pennsylvania State Police

initiated an undercover investigation of Appellant that included a surreptitious

acquisition and DNA testing of a water bottle and chewing gum he had used

and discarded.   The DNA results matched those obtained from the sperm

fraction found on the carpet. Subsequent testing of swab samples of semen

and sperm taken from Ms. Mirack’s body showed all samples came from one

contributor and matched the DNA profile taken from the water bottle and

chewing gum. Id. at ¶¶ 26-29. A final, post-arrest DNA profile obtained from

a buccal swab of Appellant also matched DNA taken from the carpet and swabs

from Ms. Mirack’s body.

      The PCRA court sets forth the pertinent post-arrest facts and procedural

history, as follows, with this Court’s supplementation provided in brackets:

      On January 8, 2019, the Petitioner-Appellant tendered a guilty
      plea [pursuant] to a negotiated plea agreement. The Petitioner
      pleaded guilty to Criminal Homicide, three (3) counts of Rape by
      Forcible Compulsion, two (2) counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual
      Intercourse—Forcible Compulsion, and Burglary. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§
      2501(a); 3121(1); 3123(A-1); and 3502(A), respectively. The
      Court accepted the negotiated plea agreement and the
      [Petitioner-Appellant] received life in prison without the possibility
      of parole with a consecutive period of incarceration of sixty (60)
      to one hundred and twenty (120) years pursuant to the terms
      negotiated in the plea agreement. . . . No direct appeal to the
      Superior Court was filed. The Petitioner’s sentence became final
      on February 8, 2019.

                                      -2-
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       On November 21, 2020, the [Petitioner-Appellant], through his
       attorney, filed an untimely Motion for Post-Conviction Relief
       (“PCRA”) and a Post-Conviction DNA Testing Petition. Although
       the PCRA Petition was filed nine (9) months beyond the PCRA time
       requirement pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b), the one-year
       time bar does not apply to motions for the performance of forensic
       DNA testing. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1. [1]
       ...
       [Specifically, [Petitioner-Appellant]’s motion for DNA testing
       sought Touch DNA testing on several items recovered from the
       murder scene in Ms. Mirack’s home. These items included a
       wooden cutting board believed to have been used to batter the
       victim, a toaster that was typically placed atop the cutting board
       and presumably moved by the assailant, and items of Ms. Mirack’s
       clothing that were forcibly removed from her body during the
       apparent rape and/or used to asphyxiate her.]
       The PCRA Court held an evidentiary hearing [on [Petitioner-
       Appellant]’s motion for Post-Conviction DNA testing] that spanned
       three days: August 26, 2021, September 2, 2021, and September
       8, 2021.
       ...
       [At the DNA hearing, the following relevant facts regarding the
       1992 murder were recounted:]
              On . . . December 21, 1992, [the victim, Ms. Christy
              Mirack, was found dead in her home.] Ms. Mirack’s
              roommate [had] left the residence [earlier that
              morning] at 7:00 a.m. for work[, after observing Ms.
              Mirack getting ready to head to work and preparing
              Christmas presents for her co-workers and students.
              N.T. 1/8/9, at 6;] Affidavit of Probable Cause at ¶ 14.
____________________________________________

1 In Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 835 A.2d 747 (Pa. Super. 2003), we
explained that a motion for DNA testing under section 9543.1 was not a PCRA
petition but, instead, a separate instrument that “allows for a convicted
individual to first obtain DNA testing which could then be used within a PCRA
petition[.]” Id. at 750, quoting Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194,
1196 (Pa. Super. 2003). Accordingly, such a motion is not subject to the
PCRA's one-year time bar for petitions under Section 9545.             Accord
Commonwealth v. Tyler, 234 A.3d 750, 753 (Pa. Super. 2020).

                                           -3-
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          Neighbors heard “a high pitched, unexpected scream”
          coming from Ms. Mirack’s apartment between 7:10
          and 7:20 am. Id. at ¶ 15. At around 9:20 a.m.,
          Lancaster County-Wide Communications received a
          phone call from [the Principal of Ms. Mirack’s school]
          who arrived at her home to perform a wellness check
          due to her absence from work and found her
          unconscious on the living room floor. Id., at ¶ 5-7.
          Within minutes, first responders arrived at the
          residence and observed Ms. Mirack lying on her back
          with facial injuries, clearly deceased with a wooden
          cutting board located next to her head. Id. at ¶ 10.
          Packages were strewn about the foyer and living room
          area which is consistent with a struggle taking place
          just in front of the front door of the residence. Id. at
          ¶ 13.
          Upon further observation, the clothes on [Ms.
          Mirack’s] torso were pushed upwards on her body and
          the only piece of clothing [she] was wearing from the
          waist down was socks. Id. at ¶ 10. Ms. Mirack’s pants
          had likely been forcibly removed as evidenced by the
          inside button laying on the floor near her body. Id.
          at ¶ 12. Notably, among the limited amount of
          clothing that she was still wearing was a brown leather
          jacket and burgundy gloves; a factor that led
          investigators to opine that she was attacked as she
          was preparing to leave her home. Id. at ¶ 13.
          An autopsy was then conducted the following day on
          December 22, 1992, by Dr. Wayne Ross, Forensic
          Pathologist of Lancaster County.        Id.   Dr. Ross
          determined that the abrasions and bruising on Ms.
          Mirack’s lower body were consistent with being a
          victim of sexual assault. Id. at ¶ 16. Sperm and
          semen were also found on and in her body. Id.
          Several swabs collected from Ms. Mirack’s body during
          the autopsy, including but not limited to vaginal, anal,
          oral, back, and leg swabs, as well as [section of carpet
          appearing stained with bodily fluids directly below Ms.
          Mirack’s body] were packaged and sent to the
          Pennsylvania State Police DNA Laboratory for DNA
          analysis. Id. at ¶ 17. Dr. Ross ruled Ms. Mirack’s
          cause of death as strangulation and the manner of
          death as a homicide. Id. at ¶ 16.

                                   -4-
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     Upon review of discovery and the autopsy report, trial counsel also
     opined [at the DNA hearing] that [the defense team had
     concluded] that a sexual assault had occurred. Specifically, when
     asked on direct examination if the [defense team determined that]
     discovery supported the theory of consensual sex between Ms.
     Mirack and the [Petitioner-Appellant], trial counsel answered, “no,
     not that we determined.” N.T., DNA Hearing, 9/2/21, at 151. On
     cross-examination, when asked about Defense theories and the
     discovery in this case, trial counsel again stated that “consensual
     doesn’t seem really compatible with the absolute beating and
     trauma that [Ms. Mirack] suffered.” N.T. at 170-71.
     ...
     [Regarding Appellant’s alleged confession, the record reflects that
     the] day after the [Petitioner-Appellant]’s arrest on June 26, 2018,
     a capital case team assembled by the Defender Association that
     consisted of three attorneys, a paralegal, and an investigator went
     to the prison to meet with the [Petitioner-Appellant]. N.T. at 140,
     142. While discussing the circumstances of his arrest in a private
     room within the prison, the [Petitioner-Appellant] [indicated to the
     Defender Association investigator that he was in a relationship
     with Ms. Mirack and that one morning before work he went to her
     apartment where they began having sex. (Def. DNA Exhibit 13,
     at 4). At some point, however, Ms. Mirack wanted the sexual
     encounter to stop. (Def. DNA Exhibit 13, at 4). According to the
     investigator, when Appellant reached that point in describing his
     encounter with Ms. Mirack, he simply stated,] “I snapped. I just
     snapped.” N.T. at 123-124, 126. This confession was then
     disclosed to trial counsel immediately after the interview and then
     memorialized in the investigator’s report written the following day.
     N.T. at 133-34, 138.
     [Petitioner-Appellant] himself at the DNA hearing explained that
     the reason why he was going to see Ms. Mirack on the morning of
     her murder was to not only have sex but also break things off.
     N.T., DNA Hearing, 8/26/21, at 55. [the Defender Association
     investigator’s] report also indicates the [Petitioner-Appellant] told
     him that on the day of Ms. Mirack’s murder, his intention was to
     speak with her in hopes of breaking it off between them. N.T.,
     DNA Hearing, 9/2/21, at 132.           Specifically, the [Petitioner-
     Appellant] informed [the Defender Association investigator] that
     he was upset that Ms. Mirack was going to tell his wife about the
     affair and he went to her home to break things off. N.T. at 133.

                                     -5-
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     Trial counsel also testified that on several occasions the
     [Petitioner-Appellant] indicated to him personally as well as co-
     counsel that he was guilty of this offense. N.T. at 145. The
     [Petitioner-Appellant] indicated his guilt with counsel during case
     discussions when he explained he and Ms. Mirack had a
     consensual, ongoing relationship, and “he did it and he snapped.”
     Id.     Although the [Petitioner-Appellant] now denies the
     confession, the description provided by trial counsel at the DNA
     hearing as well as in reports conducted the day after his arrest
     mirror some of the same details provided by the [Petitioner-
     Appellant] himself.
     ...
     [At the DNA hearing, testimony indicated that] [i]n the days
     leading up to [Petitioner-Appellant]’s guilty plea, trial counsel
     informed the [Petitioner-Appellant] of what was going to be said
     at the hearing and provided guidance on what he should expect
     from the process. N.T. at 158. Trial counsel described the
     [Petitioner-Appellant] as a person who is “very bright” and
     “engaging” and a person who is “very calculating and weighs
     options.” N.T. at 146. Counsel also stated that the [Petitioner-
     Appellant] was frightened by the possibility and certainty of a
     death notice being filed and was concerned about the living
     conditions of death row. Id.
     [In considering Petitioner’s petition for DNA testing, the PCRA
     court also factored statements made at] Appellant’s guilty plea
     hearing.     Prior to the plea acceptance, the Petitioner
     acknowledged that he understood all of the charges he was
     pleading guilty to and he understood that the Commonwealth
     would have to prove he committed each charge beyond a
     reasonable doubt.      N.T., 1/8/19, at 4-6.     Petitioner also
     acknowledged that he signed the last page of the guilty plea
     colloquy form. N.T. at 14.
     The Commonwealth then read aloud a comprehensive recitation
     of the facts of the case that included the following: “and [Ms.
     Mirack] never showed up for work because shortly after [her
     roommate] left the apartment the defendant forced his way into
     her home, attacked her, physically attacked her, sexually
     assaulted her both anally, vaginally, and orally with his penis and
     then strangled her causing her death.”           N.T. at 7.     The
     Commonwealth further informed the trial court that at the time of
     the offense, the Petitioner was living four (4) miles away from Ms.
     Mirack and was working at a company located down the road from

                                    -6-
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      her residence. N.T. at 10-11. Finally, the Commonwealth stated
      that multiple witnesses saw a car that matched the description of
      the Petitioner’s vehicle the morning of the murder. N.T. at 11.
      ...
      When given the opportunity to address the court [at the guilty
      plea], trial counsel stated, “He is here. He has admitted that he
      did it. He’s told us, he has told other people since his arrest that
      he, in fact, is guilty of this charge.” N.T. at 18. Counsel further
      commented, “he is here today saying, I am the one who did this.
      Back then I was not the same person that I am now.” Id.
      Following statements made by counsel, the Petitioner voluntarily
      addressed the court and stated, “I’d like to apologize to the Mirack
      family. . . . And to the family, I can’t imagine what you’re going
      through. I apologize.” N.T. at 22.
      ...
      At the conclusion of the [Post-Conviction DNA Testing] hearing,
      the PCRA Court ordered both parties to file briefs[, and both
      parties complied].

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/21/22, at 1-2, 10-11, 12, 13.

      By the PCRA Court’s Order of April 12, 2022, it denied Appellant’s motion

for Post-Conviction DNA Testing. First, it determined that Appellant failed to

meet the statutory threshold requirements of Section 9543.1(a)(2), see infra,

because he had never attempted to test the items prior to his guilty plea

despite the availability of effective Touch DNA collection methods and analysis.

The PCRA court reasoned that even assuming the requested Next Generation

Sequencing (“NGS”) test that Appellant seeks is better able to distinguish

between multiple contributors in a DNA sample than is the standard STR test,

neither his expert witness nor the Commonwealth’s could assert definitively

that NGS would represent a more reliable or advantageous test compared to

STR under the circumstances of this case because the items had never been

                                     -7-
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tested in the first place. As such, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant

failed to establish that effective Touch DNA collection and analysis of the items

in question was unavailable at the time of his guilty plea.

       In the alternative, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant had failed

to carry his burden under Section 9543.1(c)(3)(ii)(A) of presenting a prima

facie case that the requested DNA testing of the specific evidence, assuming

exculpatory results, would establish his actual innocence.2 In this regard, the

PCRA court explained:

       The Petitioner baldly asserts his actual innocence, however, the
       foundation of this claim rests on baseless excuses and denials that
       have been conjured up, years later, for his benefit. Petitioner
       alleges that he is not on a fishing expedition and “the items to be
       tested in this case could conclusively establish who the real
       perpetrator of these crimes is.” Petitioner’s Motion in Support of
       DNA Testing, November 30, 2021, p. 26. At least five (5) other
       suspects, however, were investigated and all were cleared via
       DNA through testing of the blood and semen in the living room
       area. Id. at 169-70.

       A murder suspect may be convicted on wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 547 (Pa.
       Super. 2005). The trial court in the instant matter is satisfied that
____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court properly observed that Section 9543.1(c)(3)(ii)(A) is
reinforced by Section 9543.1(d)(2)(i), which provides in relevant part:

(2) The court shall not order the testing requested in a motion under
subsection (a) if, . . . after review of the record of the applicant's guilty
plea, the court determines that there is no reasonable probability[] that
the testing would produce exculpatory evidence that: (i) would establish
the applicant's actual innocence of the offense for which the applicant
was convicted . . . .

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(d)(2)(i).

                                           -8-
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      there is no reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce
      the exculpatory evidence needed to establish the Petitioner’s claim
      of actual innocence. Upon review of the record and consideration
      of the circumstantial evidence of the crime scene, the Petitioner’s
      multiple confessions, and the non-disputed facts and apology at
      the guilty plea, the trial court finds that the Petitioner’s claim of
      actual innocence is not satisfied.

PCRA Court Opinion, at 9

      In this timely appeal, Appellant raises two questions for this Court’s

consideration:

      1. Did the PCRA Court err by concluding that Appellant had not made a
         showing that his actual innocence could be established by DNA
         testing of specific items pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1?

      2. Did the PCRA Court err by concluding that the newly formulated
         methods for conducting “touch DNA” analysis and “Next Generation”
         testing do not satisfy the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1?

Brief of Appellant, at 4.
      Our standard of review in this case is as follows:
      Generally, the trial court's application of a statute is a question of
      law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court
      committed an error of law. When reviewing an order denying a
      motion for post-conviction DNA testing, this Court determines
      whether the movant satisfied the statutory requirements listed in
      Section 9543.1. We can affirm the court's decision if there is any
      basis to support it, even if we rely on different grounds to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248, 1252–53 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation omitted).

      We begin by addressing Appellant’s second issue, as it is dispositive of

the present appeal. Requests for post-conviction DNA testing are governed

by statute at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a) which sets forth, inter alia, three

                                      -9-
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alternative threshold requirements that an applicant must establish to obtain

requested DNA testing:

      § 9543.1. Postconviction DNA testing

      (a) Motion.—
      (1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a court of this
      Commonwealth and serving a term of imprisonment or awaiting
      execution because of a sentence of death may apply by making a
      written motion to the sentencing court for the performance of
      forensic DNA testing on specific evidence that is related to the
      investigation or prosecution that resulted in the judgment of
      conviction.
      (2) The evidence may have been discovered either prior to or after
      the applicant's conviction. The evidence shall be available for
      testing as of the date of the motion. If the evidence was
      discovered prior to the applicant's conviction, the evidence shall
      not have been subject to the DNA testing requested because the
      technology for testing was not in existence at the time of the trial
      or the applicant's counsel did not seek testing at the time of the
      trial in a case where a verdict was rendered on or before January
      1, 1995, or the evidence was subject to the testing, but newer
      technology could provide substantially more accurate and
      substantially probative results, or the applicant's counsel sought
      funds from the court to pay for the testing because his client was
      indigent and the court refused the request despite the client's
      indigency.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a).

      Our jurisprudence interpreting subsection 9543.1(a)(2) has recognized

that an applicant’s motion for DNA testing of evidence discovered prior to the

applicant’s conviction meets the threshold requirement with respect to

untested evidence only if “it was not already DNA tested because (a)

technology for testing did not exist at the time of the applicant's trial; (b) the

applicant's counsel did not request testing in a case that went to verdict before

                                      - 10 -
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January 1, 1995; or (c) counsel sought funds from the court to pay for the

testing because his client was indigent, and the court refused the request

despite the client's indigency. Commonwealth v. Williams, 35 A.3d 44, 49

(Pa. Super. 2011).       See also Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1254 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding PCRA

counsel was not ineffective for declining to pursue post-conviction DNA testing

where technology for testing existed at time of trial, verdict came after

January 1, 1995, and court had not refused request for funds for testing;

consequently, appellant could not have met his threshold burden under

Section 9543.1(a)(2)).

      Herein, Appellant posits that the requested Touch DNA collection and

testing methods are presently accepted as sound science in criminal forensics

but were not available at the time of his 2019 guilty plea. At the PCRA hearing,

Appellant advanced this position through the expert testimony of Ms.

Katherine Cross, a forensic biologist and the technical DNA leader at Guardian

Forensic Sciences in Abington, PA.

      According to Ms. Cross, the requested Touch DNA collection method,

called “combination method”, relates to how skin cells are gathered for

traditional Short Tandem Repeat, or “STR”, analysis.         The “combination

method” of collecting skin cells simply takes collection methods such as

scraping, vacuuming, or swabbing that traditionally have been used in

                                     - 11 -
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isolation and now employs them together at the outset to gather a larger

sample of cells for testing. N.T., 8/26//21, at 17-20.

      On   cross-examination,    however,     Ms.   Cross   clarified   that   “the

combination method” really does not constitute a new method but simply

applies multiple existing methods together at the beginning of a collection.

N.T. at 46.   Whereas the traditional process consists of employing each

traditional collection method separately and then combining the samples at

the end, the combination method applies all traditional methods at the

beginning of the process to minimize interpretational issues when conducting

analysis. N.T. at 46-47.

      The requested Touch DNA testing method addressed by Ms. Cross is

Next-Generation Sequencing, or NGS, which goes beyond the traditional STR

testing of a DNA fragment. Whereas STR looks at DNA fragment repeats to

determine identity, NGS testing looks at the building block base pairs within

the repeats and sequences them. According to Ms. Cross, NGS enables the

analyst to differentiate between contributors to a Touch DNA sample: “So

what [NGS] allows us to do is potentially determine more accurately the

number of contributors to a sample and if there are any differences in those

contributors so that we don’t have this problem of overlapping like we have

now [with STR].” N.T. at 21.

      Ms. Cross agreed, however, that in 2018 and 2019 Touch DNA STR

testing “was being utilized in cases effectively” and was available to Appellant

                                     - 12 -
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and his defense team to use on all relevant crime scene items. N.T. at 35.

She also conceded that NGS is not needed in a case where there are strong

DNA links available, and she opined that traditional STR testing is reliable in

testing samples involving two contributors and even three contributors where

one contributor is prominent. N.T. at 36.         When asked whether NGS is

indicated in every case, she answered, “Oh, absolutely not.” N.T. at 36, 42.

      In further testimony, Ms. Cross stated that “the only technological

improvement in Touch DNA testing was the approval and acceptance of the

next-generation sequencing technology for samples that have low levels of

DNA.” N.T., 9/8/21 at 271. She added that compared to a body fluid sample,

there is significantly less DNA in a touch sample. N.T. at 272. Asked if NGS

is something that could be useful in a case like the present one, Ms. Cross

replied, “It could be. It’s – any testing, the best you could say is it could be[,]

until you see what the results are. It is available and is another technology

that can be used.” N.T. at 273.

      The Commonwealth’s cross-examination of Ms. Cross sought to develop

further the discussion regarding when a NGS test is appropriate, asking Dr.

Cross whether NGS testing “would have, again, only been implicated should

they not have been able to get a good STR result?” N.T. at 275. Dr. Cross

answered,

      [NGS] is something that can either supplement STR results that
      were partial, or it is something that can be used for low level in
      place of STR. If you have a good solid STR result, then, no, you
      would not need to proceed to the next generation sequencing.

                                      - 13 -
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     ...
     With Touch DNA samples, I would expect it to be low-level and
     potentially partial profiles, not full independent profiles.
N.T. at 276.

     The PCRA court followed up on this answer by asking questions that

underscored how the lack of any STR testing on the items in question impaired

her ability to opine whether NGS would have been needed in this case:

     PCRA Court:        . . . I understand what you’re saying is if these
     items had been submitted in 2018 and for whatever reason they
     were not able to obtain samples that readily resulted in a DNA
     profile being obtained, that there is [sic] scientific advances since
     then that might enable somebody to get a sequence from them
     today?
     Ms. Cross:        That’s correct.
     PCRA Court:      But we don’t know whether or not DNA could
     have been obtained from any of them because they’ve [the items]
     never been submitted for analysis?
     Ms. Cross:        That’s correct.
N.T. at 276-277.

     The Commonwealth’s expert, Michael Biondi, the Quality Assurance

Program manager for the Pennsylvania State Police Forensic DNA Division,

also answered the PCRA court’s questions regarding the significance of the

absence of prior Touch DNA testing of the items in question:

     Mr. Biondi:       I’m not entirely sure, because all of those items
     could have been tested with STR technology, the same technology
     we’re using that’s widely in use in the forensic community now.

N.T at 267.

                                    - 14 -
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       In that respect, Mr. Biondi noted that Appellant’s lawyers could have

submitted the items for reliable Touch DNA testing but elected not to do so.

N.T. at 269. When the PCRA court asked him if there was anything newly

available that would make Touch DNA testing any more productive in this case

than it would have been back in 2018, Mr. Biondi answered, “Not to my

knowledge, but it’s hard to say because you don’t know what the results of

the testing would have been.” N.T. at 269.

       On this record, we discern no error with the PCRA court’s determination

that Appellant failed to meet the threshold requirement of establishing the

unavailability of effective DNA collection and testing capable of producing

probative results under the circumstances at the time he pleaded guilty. STR

technology for testing Touch DNA samples inarguably was in existence,

effective, and known to Appellant and his team of defenders at the time of

Appellant’s plea, see N.T., 9/2/21, at 120-21, but they elected to forego such

testing.3 In addition, Appellant failed to establish that the STR technology
____________________________________________

3  Indeed, one counsel on Appellant’s Defender team insinuated that
incriminating circumstantial evidence militated against sending the items out
for testing, suggesting by analogy that if an arrested client threw a gun on the
ground and the prosecution did not send it out for testing, “I am not going to
ask the DA’s Office to send that gun out to be tested because I don’t want my
client’s DNA to be found on it. So that’s a strategic decision that I would make
that I would say I’d be really careful about whether or not I was going to do
that.” N.T., 9/2/21, at 195-96. This statement dovetailed with testimony
from other counsel who acknowledged concern amongst themselves and
Appellant about the accumulation of inculpatory evidence and its potential to
prompt a Commonwealth decision to pursue a capital trial. N.T. 9/2/19 at
146, 151, 170-171.

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available at the time of his plea would have produced inferior results compared

to the requested NGS technology, as both experts conceded they could only

speculate about the quantity and quality of the Touch DNA samples capable

of collection from the items since no testing had been attempted.

       This rationale aligns with relevant decisions of this Court. For instance,

in Commonwealth v. Hardy, 2022 PA Super 54, 274 A.3d 1240, 1251

(2022), reargument denied (June 7, 2022), appeal granted, No. 185 WAL

2022, 2022 WL 17827949 (Pa. Dec. 21, 2022),4 the applicant Hardy was tried

by jury in 1998 and convicted of first-degree murder for the death-by-

strangulation of his co-worker and former girlfriend (the “Victim”) at their

worksite. Nearly 20 years after his judgment of sentence was affirmed and

his collateral appeal denied on the merits, Hardy filed a 2020 motion for Post-

Conviction DNA testing in which he sought to apply new and allegedly more

probative DNA technology to re-test previously tested items and test never-

before-tested items found in and around the Victim's car. Id. at 1245.

       The PCRA court denied Hardy’s petition without a hearing. With respect

to the untested items, and despite the applicant Hardy’s claim of newer

technology that would render more probative results, the PCRA court opined

____________________________________________

4 On December 21, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a per curiam
order granting allowance of appeal on three issues, including the issue asking,
“Did Appellant satisfy the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(2), with
regard to evidence previously tested for DNA and evidence not previously
tested for DNA?”.

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that Appellant had not met the threshold requirements.        It noted that the

items were all known before trial, effective DNA testing was available at the

time of trial, the verdict was rendered after January 1, 1995, and the court

did not refuse funds for DNA testing. Id. at 14.

       On appeal, Hardy asked, inter alia, whether the trial court erred with

respect to never-before-tested evidence when it concluded that he did not

meet the threshold requirement of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a)(2).            Hardy

argued that using newer DNA technology to test the “never-before-tested

evidence ... could yield the identity of the true perpetrator in this case.” Id.

at 1249. On this issue, we affirmed the trial court without further discussion,

stating that we discerned no error with the trial court’s factual findings and

legal conclusions after careful consideration and review.5

       In Walsh, the applicant was tried and convicted in 2004 of aggravated

assault and related offenses for attacking his wife with a claw hammer in the

presence of witnesses, who testified Appellant had landed several hammer

blows to his wife’s head. After several failed direct and collateral appeals, the

applicant filed a 2014 PCRA petition seeking post-conviction DNA testing under

Section 9543.1(a)(2). The crux of his petition was that testing would reveal

an absence of his wife’s DNA on the hammer, which result, he maintained,
____________________________________________

5 The Hardy decision went on to address and reject on the merits the
applicant’s claim that he had established a prima facie case of actual innocence
as set forth in Section 9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in Section 9543.1(d)(2).
Id. at 1250-51.

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would establish he did not directly strike his wife and thus prove his “actual

innocence” on the charge of aggravated assault.

       Upon review of the record, this Court determined Appellant had failed

to meet the threshold requirements as needed to obtain relief under Section

9543.1, as he had not subjected the hammer to available DNA testing at the

time of trial:

       Instantly, [Walsh’s] trial took place on May 6–7, 2004. At trial,
       the Commonwealth introduced testimony concerning [Walsh’s]
       assault on Victim using a claw hammer and admitted into evidence
       the hammer used in the attack. Thus, the evidence [Walsh] seeks
       to have DNA tested was discovered and available before [Walsh’s]
       trial. Additionally, DNA testing technology was available at the
       time of [Walsh’s] trial in 2004, the jury reached its verdict after
       January 1, 1995, and the court did not refuse a request for funds
       for DNA testing. Consequently, [Walsh] is unable to satisfy the
       threshold requirements necessary to obtain post-conviction DNA
       testing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543.1(a)(2); B. Williams, supra;
       Perry, supra.

Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       Most recently in Commonwealth v. Goyette, 287 A.3d 869 (Table),

282 WDA 2022 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. filed October 17,

2022),6 a three-judge panel of this Court upheld a PCRA court’s order denying

the applicant Goyette’s 2021 request for DNA testing of two previously

untested blood-covered items—his steering wheel cover and a pair of sneakers
____________________________________________

6 Under amended Pa.R.A.P. 126, non-precedential decisions are not binding
but may be cited as “persuasive” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2) (stating
that unpublished non-precedential decisions of the Superior Court filed after
May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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found in his apartment house’s dumpster—recovered by investigators shortly

after his 2005 brutal attack of an elderly victim.    Goyette contended that

testing would reveal the absence of his DNA from the items and, therefore,

lend support to his claim of actual innocence.     The Commonwealth filed a

response arguing, inter alia, that Goyette was not entitled to further DNA

testing because testing was available at the time of his trial and he chose to

forego it.

      In affirming the PCRA court’s order, our panel found that Goyette’s

failure to establish any of the alternative threshold requirements of Section

9543.1(a)(2), alone, provided grounds to deny his motion for DNA testing. Of

particular note for our purposes was the observation that Goyette could not

obtain requested testing with purportedly more reliable new methods of

testing because he had not sought available DNA testing on such items

previously:

      Goyette has not established any of these requirements.
      Technology for DNA testing was undisputedly in existence by the
      time of his 2007 trial, as items of evidence were submitted for
      testing and introduced at his trial. His trial took place well after
      the January 1, 1995, cut-off date for testing items when trial
      counsel failed to previously request it. The inner portion of the
      sneakers and the steering wheel cover were not previously
      subjected to testing, so he may not seek additional testing on the
      basis that new methods are more reliable. Finally, the record
      reveals that he did not previously file a motion for DNA testing
      that was denied despite his indigency. As Goyette cannot meet
      any of Section 9543.1(a)(2)’s threshold requirements, the PCRA
      court was entitled to deny the petition on this basis alone.
Goyette, 287 A.3d 869 at **2 (emphasis added).

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      Consistent with this jurisprudence, we conclude Appellant has failed to

meet the threshold requirement under Section 9543.1(a)(2) that the items

proposed for testing were not already DNA tested because technology for

testing did not exist at the time of his guilty plea. The record established that

Appellant was aware of the items, that they could have undergone the STR

method of Touch DNA testing that has proven effective, and that expert

opinion refrained from positing that the STR method would have been

inadequate so as to require recently available NGS Touch DNA analysis. For

these reasons, we affirm the order of the PCRA court denying Appellant’s

motion for Post-Conviction DNA testing.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/18/2023

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