Court Opinion

ID: 9476359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:54:01.82752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:16.548390
License: Public Domain

POOLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
Concededly, the defendant was not brought to trial until 14 days beyond the time prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act, considering the period in which delay was excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). Where a defendant is not brought to trial within 70 days from the date the indictment is returned or (in case of information) from the date of an initial appearance before a magistrate in the district of the prosecution, dismissal is mandatory. But the court has discretion, and is obligated, to determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. The district court dismissed the indictment (and with it the entire case against the defendant) with prejudice. I believe this was entirely uncalled for and constituted an abuse of allowable discretion.
Taylor was scheduled for trial on very serious charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846) and for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), and for aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2). He was to have been tried in Seattle, Western District of Washington, on November 19, 1984. He did not show up for trial and a fugitive warrant was issued. He successfully avoided capture for 78 days, until February 5, 1985, when he was taken into custody on state charges by the Sheriff of San Mateo County, California. Two days later the Sheriff delivered Taylor to the United States Marshal pursuant to an outstanding writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum which had been issued out of the United States District Court, Northern District of California, where his testimony was required in another narcotics prosecution, United States v. Seigert. Under that authority he was detained in federal custody through February 22, 1985. Thereafter, on February 28, the state charges upon which the Sheriff had arrested Taylor were dismissed, and on March 1 the Federal Marshal was informed that the “holds” on Taylor were dismissed. As of that date Taylor was a fugitive in custody in the Northern District of California charged in a complaint under the Federal Fugitive Act with having fled from the Western District of Washington, Seattle. On April 3, a United States Magistrate entered an order directing the Marshal to transport Taylor back to Seattle. That Friday (April 5) began the Easter weekend and on Monday, April 8, Taylor was transferred from jail in San Francisco to Sutter County jail in Northern California. He remained there until April 17 while the Marshal assembled other prisoners for transport to the districts of Oregon and Washington. On April 17 Taylor arrived in Portland, but on the next day, April 18, the district court in San Francisco issued a second writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum requiring Taylor to be brought back to San Francisco for the second trial of defendant Seigert. He was returned to San Francisco on April 23 and was held there during the trial which began on May 7. On May 17 Taylor was returned to the Western District of Washington.
The district court concluded that the period of detention between February 23 and March 5, 1985 constituted 11 days of federal custody following Taylor’s appearance in the Seigert trial, and rejected the government’s contention that he had only been temporarily in federal custody for the 6 day period between February 23 and February 28 because he was to have been returned to state custody.
*1387It is true that Taylor was not “effectively in state custody” during this time. A state court judge cannot “order” the United States Marshal to deliver a prisoner to the state court. However, all the San Mateo County authorities had to do in order to exercise state custody was to come to the San Francisco county jail with the required papers and take custody of the prisoner after notifying the United States Marshal, who would then “sign off.” The record does not indicate why San Mateo did not physically transport Taylor across the county line from San Francisco to San Mateo. Under the circumstances, however, informed as it was of the state holds and that its custody of Taylor could be interrupted at any moment, the government cannot be found “lackadaisical” see Maj. Op. at 1383 n. 9, or irresponsible in not immediately having taking advantage of these few days of Taylor’s presence to begin proceedings against him.
Furthermore, when on March 1 the Marshal was notified that the state petty theft charges against Taylor had been dismissed and the “local holds” should be released, there was another outstanding federal charge (violation of the Federal Fugitive Act) pending against Taylor. On March 6 he came before a federal magistrate for arraignment on that charge and for removal proceedings under Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial judge and the majority find the period between March 1 and March 5 an unjustifiable delay necessitating dismissal with prejudice. See Maj. Op. at 1383. This approach is likewise unduly harsh. March 1 was a Friday. We do not know at what time of day the Service was notified of the release of local holds on Taylor, but if it was in late afternoon, the ability to process and move Taylor before the following Monday, March 4, would be doubtful. For some reason not apparent in the record, Taylor could not be brought before the charging magistrate until Wednesday the 6th. If Taylor appeared on the morning of that day, the majority’s rationale for dismissal with prejudice in this case would have been founded upon a mere 24-hour delay. The district court does not exercise the discretion of the statute in coming to such a Draconian result.
The other critical period of time was that which elapsed between the date of April 3 when the Magistrate signed the papers transferring Taylor back to Washington, and April 18 when he was ordered to return from Portland back to San Francisco. The majority has found that most of this delay occurred while the Marshal waited to collect a larger number of prisoners for simultaneous transport in order to effect economy of expenses.
It seems clear to me that none of the delay shown in this case — although admittedly non-excludable under the statute— was of such studied, deliberate, and callous nature as to justify dismissal with prejudice. The Marshal was not indifferent to the duty to move prisoners so as to invite the harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice, barring forever a public trial of the defendant on very serious violations of the narcotics laws. Congress intended to give to district judges some substantial leeway in deciding how to treat delays in bringing a defendant to trial. This case presents the incongruous situation where a defendant can be the instrument of his own deliverance. Taylor fled the day before his scheduled trial. He created his own 78-day “excludable time” by his own will, traveling from Seattle to California where he became the subject of criminal charges in two jurisdictions 800 miles away from the place of trial. It is ironic that the statutory scheme which would have assured his orderly trial in November 1984, is resorted to, five months later, as the reason for “springing” him to freedom and conferring upon him complete absolution from further prosecution. The delay we review in this case — a few days — rises to no level of constitutional wrong. The majority says that in opening the door to freedom for this defendant, the trial judge sought “to send a strong message.” The context of that message reflects badly upon our notions of sound, evenheaded administration of justice. Consequently, I write this dissent.