Court Opinion

ID: 9830375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:09:37.455186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:20.587620
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing. _
Upon motion of appellee, Standard Lloyds, for a rehearing and upon a careful re-examination of the record herein we have concluded that we were in error in reversing and remanding that portion of the judgment of the trial court denying appellant recovery against appellee, Standard Lloyds.
As stated in our original opinion, the sole question involved in this appeal is whether there was any evidence in the record which would raise an issue of fact under which judgment might he rendered in favor of appellant.
Upon a review of the record we find that there is neither competent proof of the value of said automobile immediately prior to its injury, nor is there testimony of any kind as to its value in its injured condition immediately after its injury.
The correct measure of damages to personal property is the difference between its reasonable market value at the time and place of its injury immediately before its injury and its value immediately after the injury. If the injured property has no market value at such time and place, then the damage may be calculated upon the basis of its actual value. Standard Paving Co. v. Pyle, Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W. 2d 200; Anderson et al. v. Reichart et al., Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 772; Whitley v. Kinsel Motor Co., Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 202; Union City Transfer Co. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 637.
While appellant contends that the witness Charles E. Evans testified as to the market value of said car prior to its injuries, the record shows that this witness testified that he did not know the condition of the car in the fall of 1938. He testified that he had seen the car when it came into his place of business to be serviced, but that he had not paid particular attention to it; that he had heard that the car had been in a wreck, but that he did not know when the wreck occurred or when he had last seen the car, and that the only way that he could give his opinion as to its,market value would be to compare it with a car of similar age and then give his opinion as to its value. Based on these facts he testified that the value of the car was about $450 at the time of its injury.
In our original opinion we took into consideration the fact that said car had been injured and the reasonable cost of certain repairs and replacements.
While our courts have, under certain circumstances, permitted the recovery of replacements and repairs made necessary by an injury to personal property, this rule is based on the theory that, by such replacements and repairs, the injured property will be restored to its former condition immediately before the injury, and, if the injured property, after being repaired, is worth less than it was before the injury, the difference in its value before the injury and after said repairs may also be recovered. It follows that if the .injured article, after being repaired, is worth more than it was immediately before the injury, the party who has caused the injury or who is obligated to pay damages therefor is not required to pay the full cost of said repairs, but is only liable for so much of the expenditures made therefor as are necessary to put the injured property in its former condition immediately prior to its injury. Union City Transfer Co. v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 55 S.W.2d 637; Robson v. Zumstein Taxicab Co., 198 Ky. 365, 248 S.W. 872; White v. Beaumont Implement Co., Tex.Civ.App., 21 S.W.2d 559; 13 Tex.Jur., 160.
Since there was no competent proof in the record of the value of appellant’s car, either before or after its injury, nor was proof offered that repairs or replacements were made thereon, or, if made, that they did not put the car in a better condition than before its injury, there was no basis in the record for the submission of issues to the jury as to the amount of damages sustained by appellant, and it was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of appellee, Standard Lloyds.'
It follows that appellee Standard Lloyds’ motion for a rehearing must be granted and that the judgment of the trial court as to it must be affirmed.
Since no useful purpose can be served by remanding this cause as between appellant arid appellee, Mossier Acceptance Company, the order to that effect heretofore entered will be set aside and judgment *148here rendered that the cross-action of ap-pellee, Mossier Acceptance Company, be dismissed.
Rehearing granted.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and rendered.