Court Opinion

ID: 9908135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 19:08:03.860287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.932515
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Hook-N-Haul, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2023-Ohio-4432.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Hook-[N]-Haul, LLC,                       :

                 Relator,                               :

v.                                                      :                        No. 22AP-29

Ohio Department of Public Safety et al.,                :                  (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Respondents.                           :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on December 7, 2023

                 On brief: Cassone Law Offices, LLC, and Joshua J. Brown,
                 for relator.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Michelle L. Kazar,
                 and Hilary R. Damaser, for respondents.

                 On brief: David Taynor, for Association of Professional
                 Towers, amicus curiae in support of relator.

                 On brief: Kyle A. Cramer, and Louis M. DeMarco, for non-
                 party Judith Wynn-Neel.

                                      IN MANDAMUS
                            ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

BEATTY BLUNT, P.J.

        {¶ 1} On January 11, 2022, relator filed a complaint in the instant mandamus
action, seeking a writ to direct respondents, the Ohio Highway Patrol and/or the Ohio
Department of Public Safety, to undo its action in removing relator from the agency’s tow
rotation list. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
this matter was referred to a magistrate, and on July 6, 2023, respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the relator’s complaint. After briefing and on review, the magistrate recommended
that we grant amici’s motion for leave to file a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss,
No. 22AP-29                                                                                   2

that we grant respondents’ motion to dismiss, and that we deny relator’s motion for leave
to file a second amended complaint.
          {¶ 2} Relator has not filed any objection to the magistrate’s decision. “If no timely
objections are filed, the court may adopt a magistrate’s decision, unless it determines that
there is an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision.”
Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c). Our review of the magistrate’s decision reveals no error of law or other
evident defect. See, e.g., State ex rel. Alleyne v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 03AP-811,
2004-Ohio-4223, ¶ 32-33 (adopting the magistrate’s decision where no objections were
filed).
          {¶ 3} As we have found no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate’s
decision, we adopt it as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law as
they are set forth in the decision. In accordance with the magistrate’s recommendation, the
amicus curiae’s motion for leave to file a brief in support of the relator is granted, the
respondents’ motion to dismiss is granted, and relator’s motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint is denied.
                                                  Amicus Curiae’s motion for leave granted;
                                                   Respondents’ motion to dismiss granted;
                                                     and relator’s motion for leave denied;
                                                                          action dismissed.

                             MENTEL and JAMISON, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-29                                                                          3

                                    A P P E N D I X

                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Hook-[N]-Haul, LLC,             :

              Relator,                        :

              v.                              :                No. 22AP-29

Ohio Department of Public Safety et al.,      :             (REGULAR CALENDAR)

              Respondents.                    :

                           MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

                              Rendered on August 15, 2023

              Joshua J. Brown, for relator.

              Dave Yost, Attorney General, Michelle L. Kazar, and
              Hilary R. Damaser, for respondents.

              Kyle A. Cramer, and Louis M. DeMarco, for amicus curiae, in
              support of relator.

                                   IN MANDAMUS
                         ON RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

      {¶ 4} Relator, Hook-N-Haul, LLC, has filed this original action seeking a writ of
mandamus ordering respondents, Ohio Department of Public Safety (individually “ODPS”)
and Ohio State Highway Patrol (individually “OSHP”), to undo their action in removing
relator from the OSHP’s tow-rotation list and restore it to the tow-rotation list.
Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss.
No. 22AP-29                                                                                 4

Findings of Fact:
       {¶ 5} 1. Relator is a vehicle and equipment recovery and towing company based in
Ohio but doing business all over the United States.
       {¶ 6} 2. OSHP, a law-enforcement agency in the State of Ohio, is a division of
ODPS, which is a governmental agency in the State of Ohio.
       {¶ 7} 3. Relator originally filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Ninth
District Court of Appeals on September 3, 2021. In its petition, relator requested that
respondents be directed to restore relator to OSHP’s tow-rotation list, which is a list of
recovery and towing companies that OSHP contacts when towing or recovery services are
needed. Relator alleged that OSHP unlawfully removed relator from its tow-rotation list on
January 7, 2021, after a dispute about the fee charged by relator for a particular tow service
completed on December 24, 2020.
       {¶ 8} 4. On November 30, 2021, relator filed a motion for leave to file an amended
complaint, praying for the court to direct respondents to restore relator’s rights and undo
their action in removing relator from the tow-rotation list. In the amended petition, relator
alleges that the removal was based on false allegations; the removal was an abuse of
discretion; the removal was based upon a rule that was not promulgated pursuant to Ohio’s
rulemaking process; the removal violated due process; the policy under which it was
removed was unconstitutionally vague; respondents breached their contract with relator;
and respondents’ removal of relator from the tow-rotation list was illegal under the doctrine
of promissory estoppel.
       {¶ 9} 5. On December 9, 2021, the Ninth District Court of Appeals issued a journal
entry, finding venue was not proper in the Ninth District Court of Appeals and transferring
the case to the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
       {¶ 10} 6. On January 11, 2022, relator filed its original September 3, 2021, petition
for writ of mandamus with this court.
       {¶ 11} 7. On April 25, 2022, a magistrate of this court granted relator’s
November 30, 2021, motion for leave to file the first amended complaint originally filed in
the Ninth District Court of Appeals.
       {¶ 12} 8. On June 23, 2023, respondents reinstated relator to the tow-rotation list.
No. 22AP-29                                                                                  5

       {¶ 13} 9. On July 6, 2023, respondents filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(1), claiming that the matter is now moot based upon their reinstatement of relator to
the tow-rotation list.
       {¶ 14} 10. On July 21, 2023, relator filed a brief in opposition to respondents’ motion
to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion to file a second amended complaint.
       {¶ 15} 11. On July 21, 2023, the Association of Professional Towers-Ohio
(“association”) filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to
respondents’ motion to dismiss, along with the amicus curiae brief. The magistrate grants
the motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief.

Conclusions of Law:
       {¶ 16} For the reasons that follow, it is the magistrate’s decision that this court
should grant respondents’ motion to dismiss and deny relator’s motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint.
       {¶ 17} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus, a relator must ordinarily
show a clear legal right to the relief sought, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent
to provide such relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967).
       {¶ 18} In considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, a trial court “determines whether the claim raises any action cognizable in that
court.” Moore v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-599, 2019-Ohio-767,
¶ 4, citing Brown v. Tax Commr. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-349, 2012-Ohio-5768;
Robinson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-550, 2011-Ohio-713, ¶ 5.
“Subject-matter jurisdiction involves ‘ “a court’s power to hear and decide a case on the
merits and does not relate to the rights of the parties.” ’ ” Moore at ¶ 4, quoting Robinson
at ¶ 5, quoting Vedder v. Warrensville Hts., 8th Dist. No. 81005, 2002-Ohio-5567, ¶ 14.
Furthermore, “in making a determination regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, ‘[t]he trial
court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint,’ and ‘it may consider material
pertinent to such inquiry without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.’
” Id., quoting Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211
(1976), paragraph one of the syllabus.
No. 22AP-29                                                                                   6

       {¶ 19} A claim for writ of mandamus may be rendered moot when the requested
relief is attained. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 74 Ohio St.3d
278 (1996). Mandamus may not be used to compel the performance of a duty that has
already been performed. Martin v. Judges of the Lucas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 50
Ohio St.3d 71, 72 (1990), citing State ex rel. Breaux v. Court of Common Pleas, 50 Ohio
St.2d 164 (1977). “An event that causes a case to become moot may be proved by extrinsic
evidence outside the record.” State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite
Info. Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, ¶ 8.
       {¶ 20} In the present matter, the parties agree that respondents have reinstated
relator on their tow-rotation list. Because respondents have now performed the act that
relator sought to compel in its prayer for relief, i.e., to restore relator’s rights and undo
respondents’ action in removing relator from the OSHP’s tow-rotation list, the matter is
moot and mandamus will not lie. Relator has received all the relief to which it is entitled in
this action. There is nothing left for this court to direct respondents to do. As a result, the
action is moot.
       {¶ 21} Relator and the association contend that this matter meets an exception to
the mootness doctrine because it involves an issue that is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. They argue that respondents have a history of removing companies from the tow-
rotation list and then reinstating them after litigation ensues. The Supreme Court of Ohio
recently found that “[t]he mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition, yet
evading review applies only in exceptional circumstances, when these two factors are both
present: (1) the challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its
cessation or expiration and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining
party will be subject to the same action again.” (Internal citations omitted.) State ex rel.
Burkons v. Beachwood, 168 Ohio St.3d 191, 2022-Ohio-748, ¶ 17. In the present case, the
magistrate is not persuaded that the issue under review meets this exception to the
mootness doctrine. As for the first factor, the challenged action is not too short in its
duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration. Respondents’ action of
removing towing providers from its rotating list is not necessarily limited in duration, and
such removal does not expire or cease after any established duration. A towing provider
could remain removed from the list indefinitely. In this case, respondents removed relator
No. 22AP-29                                                                                  7

from the list on January 7, 2021, and reinstated relator on the list on June 23, 2023, a period
of over two and one-half years. Respondents explained that they were unable to reinstate
relator to the tow-rotation list until recently because relator’s certification with the Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio was suspended, but the reasons for the suspension were
subsequently resolved. Thus, it is clear that relator could have remained on the list
indefinitely or could have been reinstated sooner. In other words, there is no set period for
reinstatement that would necessarily render a company’s removal too short in duration to
be fully litigated.
       {¶ 22} As for the second factor, there exists no reasonable expectation that relator
will be subject to the same action again. Should relator again be subject to removal from
the tow-rotation list, the circumstances and facts surrounding such removal could be
completely different than those forming the basis of relator’s removal here. See Catudal v.
Catudal, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-951, 2013-Ohio-2748, ¶ 25 (the exception for capable of
repetition, yet evading review does not apply because any new stay will necessarily involve
a different set of circumstances and determinations than those forming the basis of the first
stay). While the association argues that its member towing companies complain about the
arbitrary nature of respondents’ removal of them from the tow-rotation list, such is not a
relevant factor in determining whether an issue should be excepted from the mootness
doctrine based upon it being capable of repetition, yet evading review. The exception
focuses on the same party being subject to the same action, and removal from the tow-
rotation list for its hundreds of Ohio members is not relevant to the present inquiry.
Therefore, the magistrate finds relator’s argument as to the applicability of the capable of
repetition, yet evading review exception unpersuasive.
       {¶ 23} Alternatively, relator requests that the court grant it leave to amend its
complaint to include a prayer that respondents be required to remedy their illegal tow-
rotation system. Civ.R. 15(A) provides, in pertinent part:
               A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course
               within twenty-eight days after serving it or, if the pleading is
               one to which a responsive pleading is required within twenty-
               eight days after service of a responsive pleading or twenty-
               eight days after service of a motion under Civ.R. 12(B), (E), or
               (F), whichever is earlier. In all other cases, a party may amend
               its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
No. 22AP-29                                                                                8

              the court’s leave. The court shall freely give leave when justice
              so requires.

       {¶ 24} After the time has passed in which a responsive pleading may be served, a
party may amend its pleading only by leave of court or written consent of the adverse party.
Morrissette v. DFS Servs., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-633, 2011-Ohio-2369, ¶ 30. Civ.R.
15(A) nonetheless “favors a liberal policy when the trial judge is confronted with a motion
to amend a pleading beyond the time limit when such amendments are automatically
allowed.” Wilmington Steel Prods., Inc. v. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 120,
122 (1991). Because Civ.R. 15(A) expresses a preference for liberality with respect to
amendments, a motion for leave to amend should be granted absent a finding of bad faith,
undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party. Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St.3d 1,
6 (1984). The “spectre of prejudice” arises when a plaintiff requests leave to amend the
complaint after a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss. State ex rel. N. Ohio Chapter of
Assoc. Builders & Contrs., Inc. v. Barberton City School Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist. No. C.A.
24898, 2010-Ohio-1826, ¶ 28, quoting Brown v. FirstEnergy Corp., 9th Dist. No. C.A.
22123, 2005-Ohio-712, ¶ 6.
       {¶ 25} In the present case, the magistrate denies relator’s motion for leave to file a
second amended complaint. Respondents face undue prejudice by forcing them to spend
significant time and resources updating their motion to dismiss. This court previously
granted relator leave to file a first amended complaint. Respondents have undergone time
and expense for a significant period, with the case pending four months in the Ninth
District Court of Appeals, and the case pending for a total of 22 months in both courts prior
to the filing of the second motion to amend complaint. Furthermore, respondents had a
pending Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss at the time relator moved to file a second
amended complaint. As such, the “spectre of prejudice” to respondents resulting from the
filing of an amended complaint is heightened in this matter. See N. Ohio Chapter of Assoc.
Builders & Contrs., Inc., at ¶ 28. See also Gustinski v. Pleasant View Health Care Ctr., 9th
Dist. No. C.A. No. 29880, 2022-Ohio-1928, ¶ 12 (plaintiff’s motion to amend complaint was
filed in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss, thereby raising the “spectre of
prejudice”). Therefore, relator unduly delayed filing its motion for leave to file a second
amended complaint, and respondents would be unfairly prejudiced if relator was granted
No. 22AP-29                                                                                  9

leave to file a second amended complaint at this stage of the litigation. See, e.g., Fisk v.
Rauser & Assocs. Legal Clinic Co., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-427, 2011-Ohio-5465, ¶ 15-
16 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for leave to amend
complaint where it found that nothing new had been revealed in discovery that would have
made the claims more cognizable than at the time of the initial filing and the one-year delay
between the filing of the original complaint and the proposed amended complaint allowed
appellants to pursue the legal theory set forth in the original complaint, and yet when
confronted with obstacles to that theory reinvent the case on separate alternative legal
grounds, resulting in prejudice to the opposing parties and inefficient use of the judicial
system’s time and resources); Robertson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 8th Dist. No. 81150,
2002-Ohio-6508, ¶ 17-22 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend third amended complaint to add a new claim that could have
been presented in prior amendments where proposed amendment would have necessitated
more time to conduct discovery directed toward the newly introduced cause of action,
causing an expenditure of time and money that, in major part, would have been
unnecessary had these issues been raised earlier); Hamilton v. Abcon Constr., 12th Dist.
No. CA97-03-027 (Nov. 24, 1997) (concluding that the trial court could have reasonably
determined that plaintiffs would be prejudiced by granting defendants leave to amend to
assert a counterclaim where counterclaim would have required additional litigation and
noting that while Ohio courts recognize a policy that cases should be decided on the merits,
they also adhere to a policy that disputes be resolved in a timely manner); Johnson v.
Norman Malone & Assoc., Inc., 9th Dist. No. 14142 (Dec. 20, 1989) (a plaintiff must move
to amend under Civ.R. 15(A) in a timely manner; an attempt to amend a complaint
following the filing of a dispositive motion raises the spectre of prejudice; plaintiffs should
not be permitted to sit by for this period and bolster up their pleadings in answer to a
dispositive motion). Therefore, relator’s motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint is denied.
       {¶ 26} Accordingly, the magistrate recommends that this court grant the
association’s motion for leave to file amicus curiae brief in opposition to respondents’
motion to dismiss, grant respondents’ motion to dismiss, and deny relator’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. All other substantive motions pending at the time
of this decision are denied.
No. 22AP-29                                                                        10

                                              /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                              THOMAS W. SCHOLL III

                              NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

              Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
              error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or
              legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
              finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),
              unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual
              finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).