Court Opinion

ID: 9949464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 19:01:20.492354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.575172
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1113     Document: 010111013377      Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 1
                                                          FILED
                                              United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS     Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 11, 2024
                          _______________________________________
                                                                      Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                          Clerk of Court
     MARY QUINTANA,

           Plaintiff - Appellee,

     v.                                                     No. 23-1113
                                               (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00214-WJM-KLM)
     JUSTIN DODGE, in his individual                         (D. Colo.)
     and official capacity; RICHARD
     EBERHARTER, in his individual
     and official capacity,

           Defendants - Appellants,

     and

     CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER,
     a municipality,

           Defendant.

                        ___________________________________________

                            ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                        _________________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________

 *
       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-1113   Document: 010111013377   Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 2

       This appeal involves immunity under state law. Like many states,

 Colorado generally protects its employees from civil liability for torts

 committed in the course of employment. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-

 118. An exception exists when the employee’s conduct is “willful and

 wanton.” Id. But what makes conduct willful and wanton?

       The parties agree that conduct is willful and wanton when an

 employee consciously disregards the harm. But what qualifies as conscious

 disregard of a harm? Here the issue arose when the police caused a fire.

 They didn’t expect the fire, but knew it was a possibility. Without

 awareness that a fire would take place, the police didn’t consciously

 disregard the harm. So the conduct wasn’t willful and wanton.

 1.    Colorado law-enforcement officers react to a gunman after he
       injures two other officers.

       This case arose from a standoff between a gunman and the Denver

 police. The gunman, Mr. Joseph Quintana, was in his mother’s house when

 someone called 9-1-1 to report gunshots. The police descended on the

 house and learned that the gunman had two arrest warrants. The police

 tried to approach Mr. Quintana; but he resisted, shooting and injuring two

 officers.

       The police tried to negotiate with Mr. Quintana, using loudspeakers

 from outside the house; but he refused to leave the house. To coax him

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 outside, the police put a robot inside the house to help in negotiating. But

 the police couldn’t connect to the robot.

       The police then tried using a canister of tear gas, putting it in a metal

 container to diffuse the heat and dropping the container in the house. Mr.

 Quintana reacted by firing shots inside the house and then going outside.

 But he quickly returned inside. The police responded by putting two more

 canisters of tear gas inside the metal boxes and dropping them inside the

 house. This time, Mr. Quintana stayed inside.

       The police noticed that the tear gas hadn’t spread throughout the

 house. So the police tried using smaller chemical munitions through

 different windows. But Mr. Quintana didn’t relent. So the police decided to

 use a fourth canister of tear gas. The police put the canister inside a fourth

 metal box, broke a window, and threw the canister inside. A fire erupted,

 engulfing the house. Mr. Quintana shot himself and later died from his

 injuries.

 2.    Mr. Quintana’s mother sues, and the district court denies the
       motion for summary judgment by two of the police officers.

       Mr. Quintana’s mother sued two of the police officers (Justin Dodge

 and Richard Eberharter) for negligence. 1 The officers moved for summary

 judgment, arguing that they enjoyed immunity under the Colorado

 1
      Mr. Quintana’s mother also sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
 The district court dismissed the § 1983 claims, and Mr. Quintana’s mother
 doesn’t appeal these dismissals.
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 Governmental Immunity Act. This motion turned on Colorado’s statutory

 exception for conduct that was willful and wanton. The district court

 concluded that a material dispute of fact existed, allowing a reasonable

 factfinder to regard the conduct as willful and wanton based on awareness

 that the tear gas could cause a fire.

       The two police officers appeal. Mr. Quintana’s mother argues that

             we lack jurisdiction because the district court’s order wasn’t
              final and

             the district court was correct on the merits.

 3.    We have appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order
       doctrine.

       Mr. Quintana’s mother moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that we

 lack jurisdiction. The mother acknowledges that she waited too long to file

 the motion to dismiss. Our rules state that motions to dismiss should be

 filed within fourteen days, and Mr. Quintana’s mother waited three months

 to file her motion to dismiss. See 10th Cir. R. 27.3(A)(3)(a). But even if

 we were to disregard the motion to dismiss, we would need to make sure

 that we have jurisdiction. Tennille v. W. Union Co., 774 F.3d 1249, 1253

 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014).

       We do have jurisdiction. For appellate jurisdiction, we ordinarily

 require a final order. 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765,

 771 (2014). But the two police officers invoke the collateral-order

 doctrine. This doctrine allows appellate courts to consider some orders as
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 final even though the action itself is ongoing. Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel

 Int’l, 36 F.4th 1021, 1033–34 (10th Cir. 2022).

       We’ve held that the collateral-order doctrine allows defendants to

 appeal the denial of immunity under a state law providing governmental

 immunity. Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270, 1287 (10th Cir. 2020); Aspen

 Orthopaedics & Sports Med., LLC v. Aspen Valley Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d

 832, 837 (10th Cir. 2003). 2 Under these holdings, the two officers could

 appeal the denial of immunity under Colorado’s law on governmental

 immunity.

       Mr. Quintana’s mother points out that we disallowed an interlocutory

 appeal in Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2019).

 There the district court denied immunity under the Colorado Governmental

 Immunity Act, and the defendant tried to appeal before the case was over.

 We reasoned that the defendant had needed to show a basis for appellate

 jurisdiction. Ceballos, 919 F.3d at 1223 (citing EEOC v. PJ Utah, LLC,

 2
       Sawyers and Aspen addressed motions for dismissal rather than
 summary judgment. Sawyers, 962 F.3d at 1287; Aspen, 353 F.3d at 837.
 But these opinions relied on the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’s
 function in providing “immunity from suit.” Aspen, 353 F.3d at 837;
 Sawyers, 962 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Aspen, 353 F.3d at 837). The denial of
 summary judgment subjects a defendant to suit, triggering the collateral-
 order doctrine—just as the denial of a motion to dismiss would—by
 “finally and conclusively determin[ing] the defendant’s claim of right not
 to stand trial on the plaintiff’s allegations.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
 511, 527 (1985) (emphasis in original).

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 822 F.3d 536, 542 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016)). But the defendant hadn’t invoked

 the collateral-order doctrine. As a result, we concluded that the defendant

 hadn’t shown a basis for appellate jurisdiction. Id. (stating that the

 defendant “offers no basis grounded in federal law that permits us to

 consider this portion of his interlocutory appeal”); see also Raley v.

 Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 642 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2011) (“It is the

 appellant’s burden, not ours, to conjure up possible theories to invoke our

 legal authority to hear her appeal.”). So we dismissed the defendant’s

 appellate argument involving immunity under Colorado law. Ceballos, 919

 F.3d at 1223.

       Our case is different because the two police officers have invoked

 the collateral-order doctrine, satisfying their burden to show the basis of

 appellate jurisdiction. Unlike the defendant in Estate of Ceballos, the

 defendants in our case haven’t waived reliance on the collateral-order

 doctrine.

       But even when the collateral-order doctrine applies, our jurisdiction

 is limited. We can consider abstract questions of law, but not the

 sufficiency of the evidence to survive summary judgment. Johnson v.

 Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307, 313–14 (1995). So we must determine whether

 the police officers are raising abstract questions of law or challenging the

 sufficiency of the evidence to survive summary judgment.

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       Here the district court relied on historical facts that had been

 undisputed. These facts include the police officers’ launch of a fourth tear-

 gas canister, knowing that it was flammable but not expecting a fire. The

 question is purely legal: Do the defendants’ actions, with an awareness of

 the risk, constitute willful and wanton conduct under the exception in

 Colorado’s law on governmental immunity? This abstract legal question

 creates appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. So we

 deny the mother’s motion to dismiss this appeal. 3

 4.    The officers enjoyed immunity under Colorado law because their
       actions were not willful and wanton.

       The district court concluded that the evidence created a dispute of

 material fact on whether the officers’ conduct had been willful and wanton.

 So the court rejected the officers’ argument for summary judgment based

 on sovereign immunity. But based on the undisputed historical facts

 underlying the district court’s decision, the officers’ actions had not been

 willful and wanton. So we reverse.

 3
       When assessing a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment,
 the district court must identify the facts that a reasonable jury could infer
 from the evidence. Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2010).
 In identifying these facts, the district court should provide “the who, what,
 when, where, and why.” Id. If a district court does not say what a
 reasonable jury could find at summary judgment, we may need to undertake
 a “cumbersome review of the record” to determine those facts. Johnson v.
 Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319 (1995). But the district court stated the facts
 underlying the denial of summary judgment. Appellants’ App’x at 265–66.

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       A.     We conduct de novo review of the district court’s denial of
              summary judgment.

       We conduct de novo review on questions of immunity under the

 Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270,

 1288 (10th Cir. 2020); see also Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061,

 1063 (10th Cir. 1995) (“We review de novo the legal question of when a

 party can assert sovereign immunity.”). We use the same standard applied

 by the district court. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461

 (10th Cir. 2013). Under this standard, we view the evidence favorably to

 the nonmovant (Mr. Quintana’s mother), and draw all reasonable

 inferences in her favor. Id.

       B.     Conduct is willful and wanton when the officer is aware that
              the alleged harm would result.

       Under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, public employees

 generally can’t incur liability for injuries arising from conduct in the

 course of employment. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-118. But an

 exception exists when the conduct was willful and wanton. Id.

       Conduct is willful and wanton when the defendant consciously

 disregards the danger. Estate of George v. City of Rifle, Colo., 85 F.4th

 1300, 1322 (10th Cir. 2023). But what level of awareness is required for

 conscious disregard of the danger? We answered this question in McDonald

 v. Wise, holding that conduct is considered willful and wanton under

 Colorado’s Governmental Immunity Act only when

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             the conduct had been specifically calculated to cause the
              alleged harm or

             the defendant had been aware that the conduct would cause the
              harm.

 769 F.3d 1202, 1218 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d

 276, 282–83 (Colo. App. 2005) (reasoning that the complaint had failed to

 allege willful and wanton conduct, for purposes of immunity, because the

 plaintiff hadn’t alleged facts showing that the defendant calculated her

 conduct to cause the harm or was aware that the conduct would cause the

 harm).

       We are bound by the McDonald panel’s interpretation of state law

 unless the state’s highest court later resolved the issue. Wankier v. Crown

 Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Koch v. Koch

 Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Following the doctrine

 of stare decisis, one panel of this court must follow a prior panel’s

 interpretation of state law, absent a supervening declaration to the contrary

 by that state’s courts or an intervening change in the state’s law.”). 4

 4
       The police officers don’t cite McDonald or argue that willful and
 wanton conduct requires an awareness that the harm will occur. Instead,
 the police officers argue that willful and wanton conduct requires proof
 that they “purposefully pursued an activity that they considered, more
 likely than not, would result in the alleged wrong.” Appellants’ Opening
 Br. at 24. But “once an argument is before us, it is our job to get the
 relevant case law right.” Flyers Rights Educ. Fund, Inc. v. FAA, 864 F.3d
 738, 748 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2017). So we must use our “full knowledge of [our]
 own and other relevant precedents.” Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516
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        Since our opinion in McDonald, the Colorado Supreme Court has not

  said anything inconsistent with our articulation of the test for willful and

  wanton conduct. For example, in Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, the Colorado

  Supreme Court declined to choose from a single definition of willful and

  wanton conduct. 379 P.3d 315, 323 (Colo. 2016). The court instead noted

  that all of the definitions share a requirement that the defendant

  consciously disregarded the danger. Id. 5

        Because the Colorado Supreme Court has not cast doubt on our

  articulation of the test in McDonald, we consider whether a reasonable jury

  could find that the police officers had been aware that a fire would result

  from the fourth canister of tear gas.

  (1994) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 n.9 (1984)) (cleaned
  up).
  5
        In McDonald, we cited City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231,
  245–46 (Colo. 1996) for the proposition that a determination of willful and
  wanton conduct involves a fact issue that must await a trial on the merits.
  McDonald, 769 F.3d at 1218. The Colorado Supreme Court later overruled
  the portion of Brace that we had cited in McDonald. Martinez v. Estate of
  Bleck, 379 P.3d at 321–22.

        But in McDonald, we didn’t rely on Brace for our conclusion that
  willful and wanton conduct exists only when defendants are aware that
  their conduct would cause the harm. 769 F.3d at 1218. For that conclusion,
  we relied on Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276, 282 (Colo. App. 2005). The
  Colorado appellate courts haven’t questioned the continued viability of
  Meyer, and the Colorado Supreme Court has not abrogated our conclusion
  in McDonald that conduct is willful and wanton only if the actor is aware
  that the harm will result. 769 F.3d at 1218.

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          C.   No reasonable jury could find that the officers had been
               aware that the fourth canister of tear gas would cause a fire.

          The historical facts are largely undisputed. Mr. Quintana refused to

  leave the house, the police officers tried to force him out, and the police

  officers threw four canisters of tear gas inside the house with awareness

  that a fire might result. But there’s no evidence that the police officers

  expected a fire from the tear gas.

          The district court concluded that a genuine dispute of fact existed,

  pointing to three pieces of evidence regarding the officers’ awareness of a

  risk:

          1.   The manufacturer of the tear-gas canisters had warned against
               using them on “rooftops, in crawl spaces, or indoors due to
               [their] fire-producing capability.”

          2.   The two officers had known that the tear-gas canisters could
               cause a fire.

          3.   One of these officers had thrown the fourth canister inside a
               window without looking to see where the canister landed.

  Appellants’ App’x at 265–66 (alteration in original).

          The district court correctly concluded that the police officers were

  aware that the tear gas could cause a fire. Id. at 262. But that conclusion

  wouldn’t satisfy the McDonald standard for willful and wanton conduct.

  Under that standard, Mr. Quintana’s mother needed to show that the police

  officers were aware that a fire would result. The mother didn’t present any

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  evidence that the police officers knew that the fourth canister of tear gas

  would cause a fire.

         The two police officers stated under oath that they

              regarded the risk of a fire as “highly unlikely based on [their]
               extensive experience with burn boxes,”

              had seen the deployment of several tear-gas canisters inside
               metal boxes without igniting, and

              didn’t know of any other instances where a fire had resulted
               from the deployment of a canister of tear-gas inside a metal
               box.

  Id. at 188–89. Mr. Quintana’s mother didn’t present any contrary evidence,

  and the district court didn’t identify any facts suggesting that the police

  officers had known that a fire would result from the fourth canister of tear

  gas.

         Granted, the factfinder could infer that the police officers had not

  adequately considered the extent of the risk. For example, Mr. Quintana’s

  mother points to evidence that the police officers had recognized the

  possibility of a fire when someone puts tear gas inside a metal box. And

  the officers admitted they had failed to

              consider the types and dimensions of the metal boxes or

              practice or experiment with the use of tear-gas canisters inside
               metal boxes.

  But negligence doesn’t imply willful and wanton conduct. See Martinez v.

  Estate of Bleck, 379 P.3d 315, 318 (Colo. 2016) (stating that willful and

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  wanton conduct requires more than a failure to reasonably recognize the

  danger). So the police officers’ alleged lapses couldn’t support an

  awareness that the fourth canister of tear gas would cause a fire.

        Because the plaintiff lacked evidence that the officers had recognized

  that the fourth tear-gas canister would cause a fire, no reasonable jury

  could have regarded the conduct as willful and wanton. So the police

  officers should have obtained summary judgment based on their immunity

  under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. We thus reverse the

  denial of their summary-judgment motion and remand with instructions to

  grant the police officers’ motion. 6

                                         Entered for the Court

                                         Robert E. Bacharach
                                         Circuit Judge

  6
        In the alternative, the police officers ask us to remand for an
  evidentiary hearing. We need not address this request because we’re
  reversing on the police officers’ primary argument involving the denial of
  their motion for summary judgment.
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  23-1113, Quintana v. Dodge

  TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge, concurring.

           I join the opinion in full. I write separately because I conclude the district court

  also erred by treating the § 24-10-118 immunity determination as a question for the jury

  to resolve.1

      I.      Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118

           The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) provides the following limited

  sovereign immunity to public employees:

                  A public employee shall be immune from liability in any
                  claim for injury . . . which lies in tort or could lie in tort . . .
                  and which arises out of an act or omission of such employee
                  occurring during the performance of his duties and within the
                  scope of his employment unless the act or omission causing
                  such injury was willful and wanton[.]

  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2)(a) (emphasis added).

           While § (2)(a) characterizes an employee’s immunity as being “from liability,” §

  24-10-118(2.5) refers to this immunity as “sovereign immunity.” The Colorado Supreme

  Court subsequently clarified that § 24-10-118 immunity is in fact “sovereign immunity”

  from “suit.” Martinez v. Estate of Bleck, 379 P.3d 315, 317, 320 (Colo. 2016) (Eid, J.).

           Section 24-10-118(2.5) further provides:

                  If a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity
                  prior to or after the commencement of discovery, the court
                  shall suspend discovery; except that any discovery necessary
                  to decide the issue of sovereign immunity shall be allowed to

  1
   While the opinion focuses on Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-105(1), the district court
  discussed the immunity determination in the context of Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-
  118. In any case, the CGIA analysis remains the same here.
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                proceed, and the court shall decide such issue on motion. The
                court’s decision on such motion shall be a final judgment and
                shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.

  Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-118(2.5) (emphasis added).

         As I understand this language and the cases interpreting it, Colorado trial courts

  must determine “all issues pertaining to sovereign immunity prior to trial, including

  factual issues . . . .” Martinez, 379 P.3d at 322 (emphasis added); see also L.J. v.

  Carricato, 413 P.3d 1280, 1288 (Colo. App. 2018) (“The district court must determine

  whether the conduct was in fact willful and wanton.”) (citing Martinez, 379 P.3d at 317–

  18, 322) (emphasis added). In considering whether a public employee’s conduct was

  willful and wanton, “the trial court should determine whether [the employee’s] conduct

  exhibited a conscious disregard for the danger.” Martinez, 379 P.3d at 323.

         In Martinez, the Colorado Supreme Court held, among other things, that pretrial

  determination of § 24-10-118 immunity is subject to certain procedures. 379 P.3d at 322

  (“[T]he determination regarding a public employee’s claim to sovereign immunity is

  subject to all of [Colorado’s] procedures applicable to sovereign immunity

  determinations.”). The question for our purposes, however, is whether the pretrial

  immunity determination is itself procedural. This is significant: since state procedural

  law ordinarily does not govern proceedings in federal court, if the pretrial immunity

  determination is procedural, then it does not apply to federal courts. See, e.g., Racher v.

  Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Erie

  doctrine instructs that federal courts must apply state substantive law and federal

  procedural law.”).

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            Because I conclude the determination itself is not procedural, I would hold that

  federal courts must determine whether § 24-10-118 immunity applies before trial.

      II.      Our Prior Cases Interpreting § 24-10-118

            State procedural law ordinarily does not govern proceedings in federal court. See,

  e.g., Racher, 871 F.3d at 1162. We have cited this principle in two nonprecedential

  opinions to generally conclude that § 24-10-118 does not apply in federal court. But

  neither case definitively answers the question posed above.

            In the first such case, Scott v. Cary, we wrote:

                   Defendants cite [Martinez] for the proposition that Colorado
                   requires courts to decide the issue of sovereign immunity on
                   motion before trial. But state procedural law ordinarily does
                   not govern proceedings in federal court; and in any event
                   there are adequate federal procedures for disposing of
                   immunity issues before trial without reliance on Rule
                   12(b)(1). We therefore agree with the district court that the
                   proper framework for addressing Defendants’ motion was
                   under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

  829 F. App’x 334, 336–37 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (emphasis added).

            Notably, Scott reasoned that the immunity determination need not be made

  immediately when raised “upon motion” (there a Rule 12(b)(1) motion)—unlike in

  Colorado—because “adequate federal procedures” existed for making the determination

  “before trial.” Id. at 337. In so reasoning, Scott explicitly acknowledged that the

  immunity determination should be made “before trial”—just not by the procedural

  mechanisms outlined in § 24-10-118 and Martinez.2

  2
    Scott also concerned the Plaintiff’s compliance with the CGIA’s notice provisions—a
  jurisdictional defect directly addressed by the federal rules and so inapplicable in federal
                                                   3
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         Shortly thereafter a panel of this court relied on that same reasoning in a second

  case, explaining “we recently rejected an argument that Colorado’s procedural rules

  governing the [CGIA] apply in federal court.” Schmitz v. Colo. State Patrol, 841 F.

  App’x 45, 50 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). Schmitz, like Scott, came to us before

  summary judgment—this time on the district court’s denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

  Also, like Scott, Schmitz turned on a procedural element of the CGIA in direct conflict

  with a federal rule—the heightened pleading requirements. Id. at 49.

         In Schmitz, moreover, we conceded to only conducting an “abbreviated review” of

  the CGIA’s procedural applicability to federal courts because the parties failed to

  adequately brief the issue:

                At the outset, we emphasize that, in crafting their arguments,
                the parties merely assume the state procedures apply without
                so much as a passing reference to the governing caselaw for
                assessing whether a state procedural law applies in federal
                court, namely Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct.
                817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938) and Shady Grove Orthopedic
                Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 130 S. Ct. 1431,
                176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010) . . . our abbreviated review suggests
                that Colorado’s procedural law doesn’t apply here.

  Id. at 50.

         Appellants here did not make the same mistake. Aplt. Br. 25–30. As I explain

  next, § 24-10-118 is substantive for Erie purposes because it immunizes public

  employees from suit prior to trial. Federal law provides no comparable procedure or

  protection. Accordingly, applying Erie and Shady Grove, federal courts are required to

  court. Id. at 336; Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393
  (2010).
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  make the immunity determination before trial, but the procedures for doing so outlined in

  §§ 24-10-118, 108, and Martinez are otherwise inapplicable.

     III.    Analysis

         A. Colorado Created a Right to Sovereign Immunity for Public Employees
            Absent Willful and Wanton Conduct.

         As detailed above, § 24-10-118(1) immunizes public employees from tort trials

  “unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.” Martinez, 379

  P.3d at 319. Thus, public employees in Colorado enjoy a right to be free from trial when

  their underlying conduct was not willful or wanton. Id.; Schmitz, 841 F. App’x at 49

  (“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden to prove that a public employee has waived the right to

  sovereign immunity.”) (citations omitted and emphasis added); see also Decker v. IHC

  Hosps., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1992) (“immunity from suit rather than a mere

  defense to liability” is a “right to be free from trial”).

         But realizing this right—and avoiding trial—presupposes that the immunity’s

  applicability will be determined before trial. Id. at 435 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472

  U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (immunity “is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to

  go to trial.”). The question for us is whether the antecedent pretrial determination is

  substantive, such that it applies in federal court, or procedural, such that it does not.

         B. Pretrial Determination of the Immunity’s Applicability Is So Bound Up in
            the Right that it Defines the Scope of that Right.

         The “Erie doctrine instructs that federal courts must apply state substantive law

  and federal procedural law” in diversity cases and when exercising pendent jurisdiction

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  over state law claims. See, e.g., Racher, 871 F.3d at 1162; Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S.

  131, 151 (1988).

         If a federal rule “answers the question in dispute” it “governs—[State] law

  notwithstanding . . . .’” Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398. The question in dispute here is

  whether a federal district court must make the § 24-10-118 immunity determination

  before trial. While the federal rules provide adequate procedures for making that

  determination—Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56, for example—no rule controls precisely how

  or when immunity determinations are to be made.

         But concluding that no federal rule controls pretrial immunity determinations does

  not answer the question of whether the § 24-10-118 immunity determination is

  procedural or substantive. “To decide whether a state law is substantive and therefore

  applicable in federal courts, courts must decide whether applying the law will

  significantly affect the outcome of the litigation.” Racher, 871 F.3d at 1164. In practice,

  a state law is substantive when it “bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely

  formally or negligibly.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945). “[T]he

  outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as

  legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.”

  Id. at 109.

         Determining immunity before trial significantly affects the outcome of the

  litigation. See Racher, 871 F.3d at 1162. If the immunity applies, there is no trial on the

  plaintiff’s state tort claims. If it does not, the public employee faces a trial and liability

  for those claims. Here, the district court left the resolution of the immunity determination

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  to the jury. Consequently, barring our intervention, Appellants “effectively lost” the

  immunity right because their “case [was] erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Decker,

  982 F.2d at 435 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).

         Colorado created a right for public employees to be free from trial provided their

  underlying putatively tortious conduct was not willful and wanton. Pretrial determination

  of willful and wantonness “bears on [that right] vitally” because it is a precondition for

  realizing that right. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110. Put another way, pretrial

  determination is inextricably bound to the right to be free from trial because it is a

  prerequisite to determining whether the immunity applies. See Racher, 871 F.3d at 1164

  (“[a] state procedural rule, though undeniably ‘procedural’ in the ordinary sense of the

  term, may exist to influence substantive outcomes, and may in some instances become so

  bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it defines the scope of that

  substantive right or remedy.”) (citing Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 419 (Stevens, J.,

  concurring)).

         Thus, the issue is one to be resolved by the district court prior to trial.

  In Most Circumstances District Courts Should Make the Immunity Determination by
     Summary Judgment.
         Precisely when and how the § 24-10-118 immunity determination is made will

  depend on the circumstances of the case and is at the district court’s discretion, subject to

  the federal rules. But what the court must do is make a final immunity determination

  before trial—it cannot leave the resolution of that determination to the jury.

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         Generally, this determination will have been made by the summary judgment

  stage. By then, record evidence of whether the employee’s “conduct exhibited a

  conscious disregard of the danger” either will, or will not, exist. Martinez, 379 P.3d at

  323. And after summary judgment, few—if any—“adequate federal procedures” exist

  for “disposing of immunity issues.”3 Scott, 829 F. App’x at 337.

         As the majority explained, Appellee failed to identify evidence proving the

  immunity’s inapplicability, entitling the officers to judgment as a matter of law regarding

  sovereign immunity. Schmitz, 841 F. App’x at 49 (“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden to

  prove that a public employee has waived the right to sovereign immunity.”) (citing Gray

  v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 284 P.3d 191, 195 (Colo. App. 2019)). But the district

  3
    It is possible that, in a narrow band of circumstances, the question of whether a state
  employee’s “conduct exhibited a conscious disregard of the danger,” Martinez, 379 P.3d
  at 323, “cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of a witness in order to
  evaluate their credibility.” See Advisory Committee Notes to 1936 amendment of Fed.
  R. Civ. P. 56. But “[o]n summary judgment, a district court may not weigh the
  credibility of the witnesses.” Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008).
  In those rare cases where the court decides immunity at summary judgment, and the
  applicability of immunity turns on a material dispute regarding a witness’s credibility, the
  rules do not permit courts to grant summary judgment based on its own credibility
  determinations. So, the proper course is to deny the motion on that basis and conduct a
  supplemental pretrial hearing—pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 104(c) or another applicable
  federal rule—to resolve the credibility issue and determine the immunity’s applicability.
  See, e.g., Martinez, 379 P.3d at 322 (“trial courts must resolve all issues pertaining to
  sovereign immunity prior to trial, including factual issues . . . [t]his may require the trial
  court to hold an evidentiary, or ‘Trinity,’ hearing in order to determine whether immunity
  applies”). Of course, a federal court may also hold a hearing analogous to a Trinity
  hearing earlier if it would be helpful to the court in making the requisite pretrial
  immunity determination.

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  court should not have left the willful and wantonness determination—and thus the

  immunity determination—for the jury to resolve.

     IV.      Conclusion

           For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the majority but separately conclude

  federal courts may not leave the § 24-10-118 immunity determination for the jury to

  resolve, and instead must make the determination before trial.

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