Court Opinion

ID: 9689876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:09.269714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:39.987062
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 149. (dissenting). The court today overrules State *763v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997). I disagree with the court's overruling for three reasons:
(1) Today's majority opinion violates the rule of stare decisis, which requires a court to "stand by things decided." In other words, once this court has officially considered and settled a principle of law, this court must remain faithful to its precedent unless there are good reasons to overrule precedent. No such reasons exist to overrule Ramos. The Ramos court considered the authority and the rationale advanced by today's majority opinion and rejected them.
(2) Today's majority opinion violates a basic rule of statutory interpretation: Once this court has authoritatively construed a statute, the court maintains this construction unless and until the legislature either amends or repeals the statute. Ramos is based on this court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1995 — 96) governing peremptory strikes. The legislature has not changed this statute since the Ramos case, and the court should not change its interpretation of the statutes without new information.
(3) Today's overruling of Ramos leaves defendants with no satisfactory remedy for a circuit court's error in failing to strike a juror for cause.
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¶ 150. The simplest, easiest reason to dissent in the present case is to rely on the doctrine of stare decisis.1
*764¶ 151. And stare decisis is an especially good reason in the present case because nothing new has been brought to the court's attention since Ramos that would justify a departure from precedent in Ramos.
¶ 152. Today's majority opinion focuses on the harmless error statute and nineteenth-century case law. The dissent in Ramos urged a harmless error analysis, and the Ramos court declined the invitation. Likewise, the Ramos dissent focused on nineteenth-century cases such as Pool,2 Bergman,3 and Carthaus,4 which the Ramos court found unpersuasive.
¶ 153. Today's majority opinion has not added any new material for the court's consideration to justify overturning a 1997 decision of this court. To overturn a decision requires more than the majority opinion musters.
II
¶ 154. The second reason to dissent in the present case is that Ramos is a statutory interpretation *765case,5 and the legislature has not changed the relevant statutes since Ramos. The general rule of statutory interpretation is that once this court has authoritatively construed a statute, the court maintains this construction "unless and until the legislature either amends or repeals the statute."6
¶ 155. Today's majority opinion ignores this basic rule of statutory interpretation when it concludes that the legislature could not have intended the authoritative construction that the Ramos court gave the peremptory challenge statute.7 If the legislature does not overturn an interpretation of the statute, we assume the legislature agrees with our interpretation.8 The legislature has not overturned our construction of *766the statutes in Ramos. Legislative silence on this question is far more revealing than today's revisiting of nineteenth-century case law and the harmless error rule.
¶ 156. The Ramos decision rests on an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1995-96), which provides that "the defendant is entitled to 6 peremptory challenges. . . . Each side shall be allowed one additional peremptory challenge if additional jurors are to be impaneled under s. 972.04(1)."9
¶ 157. Today's majority opinion ignores these jury statutes directly at issue in the present case and in Ramos and instead turns the reader's attention to the harmless error rule.
¶ 158. Justice Donald Steinmetz, writing for the court in Ramos, focused on the defendant's substantive right to a full complement of peremptory challenges guaranteed by Wis. Stat. § 972.03. The Ramos decision refused to apply the harmless error rule as a matter of statutory interpretation. Justice Steinmetz's concluding words in the Ramos opinion are as follows:
Although it is a shame to have a new trial in this tragic first-degree murder case when a fair and impartial jury made the final decision, the error by the trial court requires that the defendant receive a new trial. We hold that the use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate *767grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a statutorily granted right.10
¶ 159. I joined Ramos, but that fact is irrelevant for purposes of this discussion. What is relevant is whether I have learned anything new to justify reconsideration of our statutory interpretation in Ramos. The answer to that question is no.
¶ 160. The majority opinion criticizes the Ramos court for reading too much into Ross v. Oklahoma11 and not anticipating the holding of United States v. Martinez-Salazar,12 But in Ross, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed our Ramos interpretation of the Wisconsin statutes.13 Moreover, there was no need for this court to anticipate Martinez-Salazar: that decision is based purely on an interpretation of the federal rules of criminal procedure and has no bearing on how state courts interpret their peremptory challenge statutes.14
I — I l-H h-1
¶ 161. The third reason to dissent in the present case is that the Ramos automatic reversal rule maintains a level playing field for both the State and the defendant. As a result of Ramos, each party is guaranteed a full complement of peremptory strikes, and the *768parties are not forced to take over the circuit court's role of removing jurors for cause.
¶ 162. With Ramos overruled, few if any practical remedies are available to a defendant, other than to "lose" a peremptory challenge when the circuit court errs in allowing a biased juror to sit. Three alternative courses of action have been suggested, none of which provides a firm foundation for ensuring both a defendant's right to an unbiased jury and a defendant's right to a statutorily guaranteed complement of peremptory challenges.
¶ 163. First, a defendant could allow a juror who should have been removed by the circuit court for cause to serve and then claim an unfair trial. In State v. Gesch,15 this court held that a defendant does not waive the right to challenge a conviction on the ground of an unfair trial if the defendant does not use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror whom the circuit court should have removed for cause. Although today's majority opinion relies on our holding in Gesch, some readers might, in the light of today's Ramos reversal, view Gesch as perched on a banana peel.
¶ 164. In his concurring opinion in Martinez-Salazar, Justice Antonin Scalia explains the practical problems a court faces in abiding by the Gesch rule. Justice Scalia wrote:
The difficult question, however, is. . .whether normal principles of waiver.. .disable a defendant from objecting on appeal to the seating of a juror he was entirely able to prevent. I would not find it easy to overturn a conviction where, to take an extreme example, a defendant had plenty of peremptories left but chose instead to allow to be placed upon the *769jury a person to whom he had registered an objection for cause, and whose presence he believed would nullify any conviction.16
¶ 165. Counsel for the defendant in the present case suggests that as a practical matter defense counsel would be reluctant to rely on Gesch:
Certainly Gesch is still the law in Wisconsin. However, it is hard to imagine sitting next to a client at defense table during voir dire and informing him that you cannot use a peremptory on a certain juror who just minutes earlier you were seeking to remove for cause in hopes that Gesch would not be overturned on waiver grounds.
¶ 166. A Gesch-h&sed approach seems to raise legal and practical problems, limiting its usefulness in most cases.17
¶ 167. Second, a defendant could try to show that the circuit court deliberately misapplied the law and the circuit court's purpose in misapplying the law was to force the defendant to use a peremptory challenge to correct the court's error.18 I view it as highly unlikely that a Wisconsin circuit court judge would act in this manner.
¶ 168. Third, a defendant who has used a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause and who has exhausted his statutory peremptory challenges could request a "make-up" peremptory challenge or could raise an objection to a sitting juror who would have been struck if the defendant had any remaining statutory challenges. The *770circuit court's denial of his request or objection would raise an issue not presented in this case.19 As the State points out, the defendant in the present case did not request additional peremptory challenges or object to any juror who sat. Of course the defendant did not. There was no need to do so. The defendant in the present case was relying on, and was justified in relying on, our Ramos rule of automatic reversal. The majority concludes, however, that the defendant cannot get the benefit of his reliance on the Ramos case.
IV
¶ 169. In summary, I am sorry to see Ramos overturned. Sorry not because Ramos was, in my opinion, a correct decision, but more importantly because overturning Ramos undermines confidence in the reliability of our decisions.
¶ 170. For the reasons stated, I dissent.
*771¶ 171. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins this opinion.

 See, e.g., State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441-42, 511 N.W. 2d 591 (1994) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) ("Fidelity to precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis 'stand by things decided,' is fundamental to 'a society governed by the rule of law.' Akron *764v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983). When legal standards 'are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results.' Appeal of Concerned Cor-porators of Portsmouth Savings Bank, 129 N.H. 183, 227, 525 A.2d 671 (1987) (Souter, J., dissenting, quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986), White, J., dissenting).").

 Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 69 N.W. 65 (1896).

 Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900).

 Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891).

 A defendant's right to peremptory challenges is a creature of state law. State law, not federal law, determines the number of peremptory challenges, their purpose, and the manner of their exercise. The right to peremptory challenges is" 'denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides." State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 19, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997) (citing and quoting Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988)).

 See State v. Anthony D.B., 2000 WI 94, ¶ 20, 237 Wis. 2d 1, 614 N.W.2d 435 ("Having authoritatively construed a statute, well-established principles of judicial decision-making require that the chosen construction be maintained unless and until the legislature either amends or repeals the statute.") (citing and quoting Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 470, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980)).

 See majority op. at ¶ 82.

 See also State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993) ("Legislative silence with regard to new court-made decisions indicates legislative acquiescence in those decisions.") (citing In Interest of R.W.S., 162 Wis. 2d 862, 880, 471 N.W.2d 16 (1991); State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 566, 455 N.W.2d 143 (1990)).

 The Ramos court expressly embraced the statutory claim. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 21. The Ramos court concluded that under the Wisconsin statutes the defendant was entitled to a set number of peremptory challenges. It further concluded that defendant Ramos was deprived of the statutory right to exercise a full complement of his peremptory challenges when he used a challenge to remove a juror whom the circuit court should have excused for cause.

 Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 24—25 (emphasis added).'

 487 U.S. 81 (1988).

 528 U.S. 304 (2000); see majority op. at ¶¶ 53, 83.

 See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 89 ("Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the [federal] Constitution, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise. As such, the 'right1 to peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides.").

 See majority op. at ¶ 91.

 State v. Gesch, 167 Wis. 2d 660, 482 N.W.2d 99 (1992).

 United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 318-19 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).

 See majority op. at ¶¶ 116-18.

 See Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316 (2000).

 See also Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 317 — 18 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter wrote:
I concur in the opinion of the Court. I write only to suggest that this case does not present the issue whether it is reversible error to refuse to afford a defendant a peremptory challenge beyond the maximum otherwise allowed, when he has used a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause and when he shows that he would otherwise use his full complement of peremptory challenges for the noncurative purposes that are the focus of the peremptory right. Martinez-Salazar did not show that, if he had not used his peremptory challenge curatively, he would have used it peremptorily against another juror. He did not ask for a make-up peremptory or object to any juror who sat. Martinez-Salazar simply made a choice to use his peremptory challenge curatively.