Court Opinion

ID: 9378092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 17:02:49.028795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.021667
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE                      )
                                       )
        v.                             )
                                       )     ID No. 2204003966
JAMES MCDOUGAL,                        )
    Defendant.                         )

                           Submitted: February 10, 2023
                             Decided: March 7, 2023

                         Memorandum Opinion & Order

                 Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress – DENIED.

        This 7th day of March, 2023, having considered Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress, the State’s Response and the record in this matter; it appears to the Court

that:

        1.    Defendant James McDougal (hereinafter “Defendant”) was arrested on

April 8, 2022, and ultimately indicted on May 9, 2022, for the charges of Possession

of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited,1 Possession of Ammunition by a Person

Prohibited2 and Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon.3

1
        11 Del. C. § 1448.
2
        Id..
3
        11 Del. C. § 1442. See also Indictment, State v. James McDougal, ID No.
        2204003966, D.I. 15.
      2.     Defendant filed the instant motion on December 12, 2022, seeking to

suppress the evidence obtained following his detention.4 The State responded in

opposition on January 21, 2023. 5 The motion was heard on February 12, 2023.6

Judgment was reserved.

      3.     Defendant’s motion challenges the basis for his initial detention with

police under Terry v. Ohio, arguing that the officers did not possess the required

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity under both the Delaware and

United States Constitutions.7

      4.     The relevant facts and record were developed from the filed motions

and at the motion hearing. Officers Leonard Moses and Shauntae Hunt of the

Wilmington Police Department (hereinafter “WPD”) testified. In addition, Body

Worn Camera (hereinafter “BWC”) of Officers Rosaio and Hunt were played as

State’s Exhibits.8 As a result of this record, it was revealed that in late March, 2022,

a Confidential Informant (hereinafter “CI”) told WPD that four (4) individuals were

involved with street-level drug dealing at the area of 24th and Carter Streets in

Wilmington. The CI additionally told police that these individuals were known to

carry firearms either on their person or would use a ground stash, due to a high police

4
      D.I. 8.
5
      D.I. 13.
6
      D.I. 12.
7
      See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, D.I. 8.
8
      D.I. 8, 12, 13.
presence in the area.9 This CI was not past proven reliable, however following the

initial tip, WPD identified the four individuals the CI referenced by nickname as

Jamir Coleman, Rashad Acklin, Demy Lee and Dashawn Smith. The CI did not

identify Defendant. Through their research, WPD learned that prior to the CI tip,

two of the named individuals (Demy Lee and Dashawn Smith) had been located with

weapons in the area of 24th and Carter Streets.

      5.     On the date of Defendant’s arrest, WPD officers were on proactive

patrol in the area of 24th and Carter Streets when they observed Defendant and two

others, Jamir Coleman and Rashad Acklin, standing idle at the intersection of 24th

and Carter Streets on the sidewalk. These individuals were blocking the flow of

traffic on the sidewalk. Because of his prior research into the CI tip, Officer Moses

was aware that the people with Defendant – Coleman and Acklin – did not live in

the area. Officer Moses and the other WPD officers on scene were unfamiliar with

Defendant at the time of their initial observation. The officers then parked and exited

their patrol vehicle, with Officer Hunt approaching Jamir Coleman and Officer

Moses approaching Defendant. Another, unidentified officer approached Acklin.

9
      Officer Moses defined a ground stash as an area close to where a drug dealer
      will stand in which a firearm and/or drugs can be concealed. This area can
      be behind a trash can, under wheels, broken stoop or any other area where
      contraband can be concealed, yet easily accessible. D.I. 12.
       6.     Upon approaching Defendant, Officer Moses immediately noticed

Defendant was dressed in baggy clothes with multiple layers, a characteristic of an

armed individual, according to his training.         Officer Moses noted it was

unseasonable attire for the weather and that it appeared Defendant was wearing

multiple pairs of pants. According to Officer Moses, armed individuals will wear

multiple layers of clothing to prevent a firearm they are carrying from “printing”.

Printing is when the firearm is visible from outside of the clothing. Multiple layers

additionally helps secure an unholstered firearm from moving around.          Moses

contacted Defendant, explained to him his concerns about loitering in the area and

asked Defendant if he was armed. Defendant replied that he was not and was asked

if he would consent to a pat down. Defendant said he would not. Officer Moses

then asked Defendant for his name and explained that the purpose was to identify

him, so that he could be given his warning and “be sent on his way.” Defendant

refused to give Officer Moses his name. At that time, Moses instructed Defendant

sit down on a nearby stoop out of concerns for officer safety, while he attempted to

learn his identity.

       7.     As Defendant was taken to the stoop, both Coleman and Aklin were

given a warning to move on pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 1321. Both individuals had

given their names to the officers and moved along accordingly. Upon being placed

on the stoop, Officer Moses observed a “unusual” bulge in Defendant’s waistband.
Defendant was asked about the bulge and in response pulled out a medical facemask

and a hair cap. The bulge was still present, so Officer Moses conducted a pat down

of Defendant. During the pat down, a loaded pink and black 9mm firearm was

located in his clothes at his waistband. Defendant was subsequently arrested and

identified and charged with the instant offenses.

      8.     The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, §

6 of the Delaware Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by the

State. A seizure occurs under the Delaware constitution “when a reasonable person

would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence.” 10 The

police may stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer

has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may

be afoot.”11 An officer has reasonable suspicion to stop a person for investigative

purposes if the detaining officer is able to “point to specific and articulable facts

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant

the intrusion.”12 Reasonable, articulable suspicion is a less demanding standard than

probable cause and requires “a showing considerably less than a preponderance of

the evidence.”13 In determining whether an officer had reasonable, articulable

10
      Jones v. State, 745 A.2d at 869.
11
      U.S. v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 7).
12
      Coleman v. State, 562 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
      392 U.S. 1 (1968).)
13
      Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263 (Del. 2001)
suspicion, the Court may look to the totality of the circumstances and determine

whether a reasonable officer and considers the facts using an objective standard.14

The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

stop comported with both the Delaware and Federal Constitution.15

      9.     Here, the State concedes that a detention occurred when Defendant was

instructed to sit down on the stoop, therefore, the analysis is limited to Officer

Moses’ observations prior to that point and whether the initial questioning of

Defendant constituted a seizure.    Defendant argues the detention occurred when

Officer Moses approached Defendant which required reasonable, articulable

suspicion at that point in time. There is no body cam video of the initial approach

to Defendant, as the recording begins once Defendant is already seated on the stoop.

      10.    The State purports, through the testimony of both Officers Moses and

Hunt, that the officers, after having observed the three men loitering, were

attempting to give Defendant the requisite loitering warning and have him move on,

as they did with Coleman and Acklin.

      11.    A stop does not occur upon any encounter between a citizen and the

police. Police may ask questions of or approach a citizen without it being considered

14
      Jones v. State, 28 A.3d 1046 (Del. 2011), see also Lopez-Vazquez v. State,
      956 A.2d 1280 (Del. 2008),
15
      Hunter v. State, 783 A2d. 558, 560 (Del. 2001).
a detention.16 This is what initially occurred here. Delaware law does not prohibit

an officer from approaching a citizen and asking questions and police officers “are

permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of asking

questions.”17 Therefore, when the officers initially approached the group and simply

asked for their names, it cannot reasonably be said that the individuals did not feel

free to ignore the police presence. This is further supported by the fact that the

officers did not further question or ultimately detain Coleman and Acklin.

      12.     However, at the point that Defendant was told that if he gave his name,

he would be allowed to move along, a reasonable person in Defendant’s shoes would

not have free to ignore the police presence, due to the officer’s own words.18

      13.    That being so, 11 Del C. § 1321 is important here. This section requires

an officer to give a warning prior to any arrest for a loitering violation, “[u]nless

flight by the accused or other circumstances make it impracticable.” Officer Moses

testified that it is his practice, consistent with the statute, to identify the person by

name when giving a warning to ensure that, if a citation is given in the future, it was

to the correct person. Officer Moses testified that this was his intention when

approaching Defendant.      This is consistent with the evidence that the other two

16
      Woody v. State, 765 A.2d 1257, 1263-64.
17
      Brown v. State, 35 A.3d 418, 2011 WL 5319900, at *2 (Del. Oct. 31, 2011)
      (TABLE) (quoting Jones, 28 A.3d at 1051).
18
      See Williams v. State, 962 A.2d 210, 215-216 (Del. 2008).
individuals were similarly approached and released with their warning once their

names were provided. It was only upon Defendant’s refusal, coupled with the

observation of his clothing and a concern for officer safety, did Officer Moses

require Defendant to sit on the nearby stoop.

      14.    Because Moses was investigating a potential violation of the loitering

statute, 11 Del. C. § 1902, allows further detention if Moses possessed a “reasonable

ground to suspect” Defendant was “committing, has committed or is about to

commit” that crime.19 In viewing the totality of the circumstances, Officer Moses’

ability to articulate that the three men were impeding the flow of pedestrian traffic,

two of the three individuals did not live in the area and had no known lawful purpose

to be there, the background information provided by the CI that street level drug

sales were occurring at that location, 20 as well as the observations of Defendant’s

baggy, layered clothes in which it appeared he was wearing two sets of pants, a

“reasonable trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances” would be

justified in suspecting criminal activity. Thus, he possessed reasonable, articulable

suspicion at that point to detain Defendant.

19
      11 Del. C. § 1902(a).
20
      In this analysis, appropriate weight is being given to the credibility of the CI
      information. While not challenged in Defendant’s motion specifically, it is
      not lost on the Court that the CI was not past proven, and relayed
      information that potentially could have been revealed through public arrest
      records.
      15.    Accordingly, no violation under either Article I, § 6 of the Delaware

Constitution, or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution occurred

when the officers approached, and eventually detained Defendant. Further, under

Terry v. Ohio and its Delaware progeny, once reasonable, articulable suspicion is

had for the initial detention, Officer Moses appropriately engaged in the pat down

of Defendant once on the stoop, no further analysis is required.21

      IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is

DENIED.

                                       ________________________________
                                       Danielle J. Brennan, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

Cc:   Karin Volker, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General
      James Turner, Esquire, Office of Defense Service

21
      Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999).