Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:55.686381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:49.671561
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 95-2057

                                     RYAN ALLEN,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                       ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              _________________________

               Wayne R.  Foote, with whom Foote &  Temple was on brief, for
               _______________            _______________
          appellant.
               Joseph A. Wannemacher, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
               _____________________
          Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
          _______________

                              _________________________

                                    March 26, 1996
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.  Invoking federal  habeas corpus
                    SELYA, Circuit  Judge.
                           ______________

          jurisdiction, petitioner-appellant Ryan Allen  seeks to block the

          State of Maine from prosecuting him for operating a motor vehicle

          under  the influence of alcohol (OUI) in violation of 29 M.R.S.A.

             1312-B  (West  Supp.  1994).1    He   insists  that  continued

          prosecution of  this charge  will transgress the  Double Jeopardy

          Clause.   See  U.S. Const.  amend. V.   Because  the petitioner's
                    ___

          arguments,  though ingenious,  are  without  intrinsic merit,  we

          affirm the district court's dismissal of his habeas petition.

                                          I
                                          I

                    On December  11, 1994,  a state trooper  arrested Allen

          for  committing an  OUI  offense.   The  State preferred  charges

          against him.   As directed  by law, the  Secretary of State  (the

          Secretary)  then suspended  Allen's driver's  license  for ninety

          days.  See 29 M.R.S.A.   1311-A, reprinted in the appendix.
                 ___

                    It  is  said that  every action  produces an  equal and

          opposite  reaction.  Having  felt the lash  of the administrative

          suspension, the petitioner moved  to dismiss the pending criminal

          charge on double jeopardy  grounds.  The nisi prius  court denied

          the motion,  relying upon  an opinion  issued by  Maine's highest

                              
          ____________________

               1The  state  legislature  recently  repealed,  substantially
          reenacted, and recodified  the statutes in question.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          29-A  M.R.S.A.     2411  (West Supp.  1995)  (providing  criminal
          penalties  for OUI);  id.    2451  (providing for  administrative
                                ___
          suspension  of driver's  licenses following  OUI arrests);  id.  
                                                                      ___
          2403  (ensuring  credit for  an  administrative  suspension if  a
          suspension is later ordered  as part of a  corresponding criminal
          sentence).   Because all the relevant events took place under the
          previous regime, we cite  exclusively to the 1994 version  of the
          statutory scheme.

                                          2

          tribunal  (the Law  Court)  two months  earlier.   See  State  v.
                                                             ___  _____

          Savard, 659  A.2d 1265,  1268 (Me.  1995) (holding  in materially
          ______

          identical circumstances that an administrative license suspension

          did not  constitute  punishment for  double  jeopardy  purposes).

          Instead  of appealing the ruling to the Law Court, the petitioner

          (who had been released on bail and was, therefore, technically in

          the state's  custody, see Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st
                                ___ _________    ____

          Cir. 1987)),  applied for a writ  of habeas corpus in  the United

          States District Court for the District of Maine.

                    The federal district  court consolidated this  petition

          with a  petition brought by  Lori Thompson (a  similarly situated

          individual).  After due consideration, Judge Brody concluded that

          the license suspension and indictment arose from the same offense

          and constituted  separate proceedings,2  but that there  could be

          no multiple  punishment (and, hence, no  double jeopardy) because

          the   administrative  sanction   served  remedial,   rather  than

          punitive, ends.    See Thompson v. Maine Atty. Gen., 896 F. Supp.
                             ___ ________    ________________

          220,  221-22  (D.  Me.  1995)  (explaining  that  the  suspension

          provision "is  designed primarily to ensure the  public safety of

          drivers  in Maine").    Accordingly, Judge  Brody dismissed  both

          habeas petitions.  See id. at 223.  This appeal ensued.
                             ___ ___

                                          II
                                          II

                    Before  turning to  the merits  of the  double jeopardy

          claim, we discuss two potential procedural obstacles.

                              
          ____________________

               2The State does not challenge either of these determinations
          on appeal.

                                          3

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                    The   first  procedural   hurdle  is   easily  vaulted.

          Ordinarily,  a state criminal case is  ripe for the ministrations

          of  a federal  habeas court  only after  completion of  the state

          proceedings  (that  is,  after  the  defendant  has  been  tried,

          convicted,  sentenced, and has pursued available direct appeals).

          See,  e.g., Fay  v. Noia, 372  U.S. 391, 418  (1963); Nadworny v.
          ___   ____  ___     ____                              ________

          Fair, 872 F.2d 1093, 1096 (1st Cir. 1989).  In this instance, the
          ____

          petitioner knocked on  the federal court's door  before his state

          trial began.  But because of  an exception to the ripeness  rule,

          this case evades the bar.

                    A petition  for habeas  relief that raises  a colorable

          claim  of former  jeopardy need  not invariably  await  trial and

          conviction in  the  state court.    Such claims  are  distinctive

          because the Constitution insists that "courts may not impose more

          than  one  punishment  for   the  same  offense  and  prosecutors

          ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than

          one trial."  Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1995)
                       _____    _____________

          (quoting Brown  v. Ohio, 432 U.S.  161, 165 (1977)).   To realize
                   _____     ____

          the solemn  promise  of  this  constitutional  guaranty,  federal

          habeas courts will in appropriate circumstances entertain a claim

          that permitting  a nascent  (but as  yet incomplete) state  court

          prosecution  to  go forward  would  violate  the Double  Jeopardy

          Clause.   See, e.g., Justices of Boston  Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466
                    ___  ____  ______________________________    _____

          U.S. 294, 302-03  (1984) (plurality op.);  Gilliam v. Foster,  75
                                                     _______    ______

          F.3d  881, 904  (4th Cir.  1996); Mannes  v. Gillespie,  967 F.2d
                                            ______     _________

                                          4

          1310, 1312 (9th Cir.  1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S.  1048 (1993).
                                       _____ ______

          This  is  a nearly  classic  case  for invoking  the  exception.3

          Thus,  we hold that the petitioner may seek federal habeas corpus

          relief   without  first  undergoing   trial  on   the  challenged

          indictment.

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                    The   second   procedural  hurdle   results   from  the

          petitioner's bypassing of  the Law  Court en route  to a  federal

          forum.  This shortcut  flouts the general rule that  a petitioner

          must exhaust  all available state remedies  before federal habeas

          jurisdiction attaches.  See, e.g., Scarpa v. DuBois, 38 F.3d 1, 6
                                  ___  ____  ______    ______

          (1st Cir. 1994), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 940  (1995); Nadworny,
                           _____  ______                          ________

          872 F.2d at 1096-97; see generally 28 U.S.C.   2254(b).  We think
                               ___ _________

          that the shortcut is permissible in this case.

                    Although the  exhaustion rule  is important, it  is not

          immutable:    exhaustion  of  remedies is  not  a  jurisdictional

          prerequisite  to a  habeas petition,  but, rather,  a gatekeeping

          provision  rooted in  concepts  of federalism  and  comity.   See
                                                                        ___

          Nadworny, 872 F.2d at 1096 ("Requiring that remedies be exhausted
          ________

          in state courts is merely  comity's juridical tool, embodying the
                              
          ____________________

               3There are three general  classes of double jeopardy claims.
          See  United States  v. Rivera-Martinez,  931 F.2d  148,  152 (1st
          ___  _____________     _______________
          Cir.) (explaining that the  Double Jeopardy Clause "safeguards an
          individual against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense,
          following  an acquittal;  (2) a second  prosecution for  the same
          offense, following a conviction; and  (3) multiple punishments"),
          cert. denied, 502 U.S.  862 (1991).  While immediate  recourse to
          _____ ______
          federal habeas  most  commonly occurs  in successive  prosecution
          cases,  we see  no  reason  why  such  recourse  is  not  equally
          propitious in  a multiple  punishments case where,  as here,  the
          alleged punishments have their origins in separate proceedings.

                                          5

          federal sovereign's  respect for the state  courts' capability to

          adjudicate federal  rights.").   Consistent with  this rationale,

          the federal courts have carved a narrow futility exception to the

          exhaustion  principle.   If stare  decisis looms,  that is,  if a
                                      _____  _______

          state's highest court has ruled unfavorably on  a claim involving

          facts  and issues  materially identical  to those  undergirding a

          federal  habeas  petition and  there  is no  plausible  reason to

          believe  that a  replay will  persuade the  court to  reverse its

          field, then the  state judicial process becomes  ineffective as a

          means   of  protecting   the  petitioner's   rights.     In  such

          circumstances,  the  federal courts  may  choose  to relieve  the

          petitioner of the obligation  to pursue available state appellate

          remedies  as a condition precedent  to seeking a federal anodyne.

          See  Piercy v.  Black, 801  F.2d 1075,  1077-78 (8th  Cir. 1986);
          ___  ______     _____

          Robinson v.  Berman, 594  F.2d 1,  3 (1st Cir.  1979).   The law,
          ________     ______

          after  all,  should  not require  litigants  to  engage in  empty

          gestures or to perform obviously futile acts.

                    Here, Judge Brody recognized  that the Law Court's very

          recent  decision  in  Savard   propelled  this  case  within  the
                                ______

          perimeter  of  the futility  exception  to  the exhaustion  rule.

          Thus,  the judge  determined that  it would  be bootless  for the

          petitioner to invite  state appellate review and excused him from

          doing  so.   See  Thompson, 896  F. Supp.  at  221.   Because the
                       ___  ________

          finding of  futility cannot  be faulted,  we  uphold the  court's

          decision to allow the habeas case to proceed.

                                         III
                                         III

                                          6

                    Turning  to the  merits of  the controversy,  we borrow

          heavily from our decision  in United States v. Stoller,  ___ F.3d
                                        _____________    _______

          ___ (1st Cir. 1996) [No. 95-2175].  Stoller involved a challenge,
                                              _______

          on  double  jeopardy  grounds,  to  a  criminal  prosecution  for

          misapplication  of  bank funds  following  the  imposition of  an

          administrative  sanction (a  debarment  order precluding  Stoller

          from employment or other  participation in the banking industry).

          See  id. at  ___  [slip op.  at 2-3].    In addressing  Stoller's
          ___  ___

          challenge, we  delineated the  analytic framework that  governs a

          court's  appraisal of most civil sanctions that are alleged to be

          disguised punishments.4  We explained that, in such cases, courts

          must examine  "the totality  of the circumstances,  including the

          source  of  the authority  under  which the  [civil  sanction] is

          imposable, the  goals underpinning  the authorizing statute,  the

          order  itself,  the purposes  it  serves,  and the  circumstances

          attendant to its promulgation."  Id. at ___ [slip op. at 21].  If
                                           ___

          this holistic  examination indicates that the  sanction is better

          characterized as remedial rather than as punitive, it will not be

          deemed  to constitute  punishment  for double  jeopardy purposes.

          See id. at ___ [slip op. at 7].
          ___ ___

                              
          ____________________

               4A  different  framework  governs  a  court's  appraisal  of
          "monetary penalties designed to make the sovereign whole for harm
          or  loss that is  quantifiable in actual  or approximate monetary
          terms."  Stoller,  ___ F.3d at  ___ [slip op. at  12].  In  those
                   _______
          cases, the  proper test requires  a determination of  whether the
          sanction   can  fairly   be   seen  as   remedial  (and,   hence,
          nonpunitive), or whether  it is only  explicable in deterrent  or
          retributive  terms (and, hence, punitive).   See United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________
          Halper, 490 U.S.  435, 448-49  (1989); Stoller, ___  F.3d at  ___
          ______                                 _______
          [slip op. at 12-13].

                                          7

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                    The  first step  a  court must  take  in assessing  the

          aggregate circumstances is to inspect the statute under which the

          sanction has been imposed.  See id. at ___  [slip op. at 21].  In
                                      ___ ___

          this instance  the  statute, 29  M.R.S.A.    1311-A,  contains  a

          statement of  purpose that  simplifies the  judicial  task.   The

          proviso serves to safeguard  travelers on the state's  roads, see
                                                                        ___

          29  M.R.S.A.    1311-A(1)(A),  by  "remov[ing]  quickly from  the

          public highways . . . those persons who have shown  themselves to

          be a safety hazard  by operating or attempting to  operate" motor

          vehicles  after  imbibing  quantities  of alcohol,  id.     1311-
                                                              ___

          A(1)(B).   So viewed, the  license suspension proviso  furthers a

          quintessentially   remedial  goal  (public  safety)  and  it  is,

          therefore,  not punitive  in the  relevant  constitutional sense.

          Accord State v. Hickam, 668 A.2d 1321, 1328 (Conn. 1995) (finding
          ______ _____    ______

          similar statutory scheme to  be remedial in nature);  Savard, 659
                                                                ______

          A.2d at  1268 (finding 29  M.R.S.A.    1311-A to  be remedial  in

          nature).

                    The petitioner  does not dispute that  public safety is

          both the driving force  behind the statute and a  legitimate area

          of legislative concern.  Still, he attempts a  flanking maneuver.

          This statute, he  argues, must  have a punitive  aim because  the

          suspension period increases with the  number of violations.   See
                                                                        ___

          29  M.R.S.A.      1311-A(5)(B),   1312-B(2).    The  argument  is

          unconvincing.

                    While  tying the severity of a penalty to the number of

                                          8

          offenses perpetrated  may indicate  a retributive intent,  such a

          linkage  may  also  indicate  a protective  intent.    Here,  for

          example, the escalating suspensions  plainly reflect, at least in

          part, a desire to  safeguard the public by ousting  those who, on

          average, present  the greatest  safety hazard    recidivist drunk

          drivers    from the highways  for longer periods of  time.  Given

          this perspective, we  believe that the  escalating length of  the

          authorized administrative suspensions is  not so clearly punitive

          as to require us to characterize the statute as penal  in nature.

          See, e.g.,  Bae v.  Shalala, 44  F.3d 489,  495  (7th Cir.  1994)
          ___  ____   ___     _______

          (explaining that "the duration or  severity of [a civil sanction]

          will not mark it as punishment  where it is intended to further a

          legitimate governmental purpose").

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                    We  turn next  to the  design and structure  of Maine's

          statutory scheme.  Pointing  out that a driver loses  his license

          under  29 M.R.S.A.   1311-A  only after first  being arrested and

          charged with an OUI offense, the petitioner asseverates that this

          fact  is  a  telltale  indication  of  punitive  intent.     This

          asseveration,  which rests in large part upon a misreading of the

          Court's opinion in Department  of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,  114 S.
                             ______________________    ___________

          Ct. 1937 (1994), does not withstand scrutiny.

                    The  petitioner contends  that,  under  Kurth Ranch,  a
                                                            ___________

          civil  sanction   predicated  in  terms  on  a  prior  arrest  is

          necessarily  punitive.    But  the  Kurth  Ranch  Court  examined
                                              ____________

          numerous factors (including the  provenance of the legislation at

                                          9

          issue, the extent of  the sanction, and the relation  between the

          sanction  and  the criminal  law,  see  id. at  1946-47)  without
                                             ___  ___

          attaching talismanic significance  to any  one of them.   To  the

          contrary, Kurth Ranch  makes it pellucid that these factors serve
                    ___________

          as  harbingers which, when  aggregated, will  cast a  sanction in

          either a remedial or a punitive light.  See id. at 1947.  In this
                                                  ___ ___

          case,  given the  legitimate  remedial purpose  that the  license

          suspension  proviso serves, we do  not find the  nexus between an

          individual's arrest and the  imposition of the sanction to  be of

          overriding importance.  See Stoller, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at
                                  ___ _______

          21] ("Because our  interest is in deterrating  the overall nature

          of the sanction,  no one factor, standing alone,  is likely to be

          determinative.").

                    In  a related  vein, the  petitioner contends  that the

          legislature's inclusion  of the  license suspension proviso  in a

          broader bill that  mandated several changes  in the criminal  law

          portends  a punitive intent.  The contention is nothing more than

          a  makeweight.    Legislatures  routinely  combine  punitive  and

          remedial measures in  a single piece  of legislation, see,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          id.  at  ___ [slip  op. at  25-26],  and that  unremarkable fact,
          ___

          without  more, tells  a  court very  little  about the  intrinsic

          nature of a particular administrative sanction.

                    The  petitioner's parting  structural shot  targets the

          link  that  the statutory  scheme  forges  between administrative

          license suspensions and court-ordered license suspensions imposed

          as  part of convicted OUI  defendants' criminal sentences.   If a

                                          10

          defendant is found guilty  on an OUI  charge, the court not  only

          must   impose   a   suspension    identical   to   that   imposed

          administratively following the initial  arrest, see 29 M.R.S.A.  
                                                          ___

          1311-A(5)(B),5 but also  must give the  defendant credit for  the

          full elapsed period of the  administrative suspension, see id.   
                                                                 ___ ___

          1311-A(5)(C).    This   interleaving,  the  petitioner  suggests,

          signifies that the civil sanction must itself be punitive.  We do

          not  accept  this   syllogism.    A  remedial  sanction   is  not

          transmogrified  into  a  punishment   simply  because  a  similar

          sanction sometimes may be imposed as part of a criminal sentence.

          See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631, 636 (1988)
          ___ ____________________    ______

          (explaining that  the characterization of a  sanction as remedial

          or punitive depends on the nature of the sanction itself, not the

          proceeding in which it is imposed); United States v. Salerno, 481
                                              _____________    _______

          U.S. 739,  746-47 (1987) (holding that,  although imprisonment is

          generally  thought to  be  the paradigmatic  form of  punishment,

          pretrial detention  to  protect the  public  is not  regarded  as

          punitive).

                    In  all  events,  the  credit  provision,  fairly read,

          buttresses  the State's  position  on appeal.    If a  driver  is

          convicted  of OUI,  the credit  provision effectively  merges the

          administrative   sanction   and   the  subsequent   court-ordered

          suspension,  thereby  ensuring  that   the  "punishment"  is  not
                              
          ____________________

               5There is  an exception  to this identicality  that involves
          persons arrested for  OUI while accompanied  by minors under  the
          age  of sixteen.  See 29 M.R.S.A.   1311-A(5)(B-1) (providing for
                            ___
          an  additional administrative  suspension  in such  cases).   The
          exception is not implicated here.

                                          11

          "multiple"; and if a driver is acquitted, there will be no court-

          ordered  suspension  and,  hence,   no  possibility  of  multiple

          punishment.    Either  way  the  credit  provision  deflates  the

          petitioner's  double jeopardy challenge  by guaranteeing  that no

          more than  a single punishment can be imposed.  At the same time,

          the insertion  of this feature bears witness to the legislature's

          apparent desire  to avoid  any significant punitive  impact while

          striving to protect the motoring public.

                    For these reasons, we conclude that the architecture of

          the statute  tilts in the same  direction as the text.   Both are

          indicative of an intent to serve remedial ends.

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                    The  petitioner insists that state legislators intended

          the license suspension proviso to punish drunk  drivers, and that

          this  intention demonstrates  the proviso's  true character.   We

          acknowledge  that  the legislative  history of  a statute  can be

          telling in  a close case.   Here, however, the case  is not close

          and,  at  any rate,  the legislative  history  does no  more than

          confirm what the  language and structure  of the statute  already

          suggest.6
                              
          ____________________

               6We undertake independent review of the legislative history,
          mindful that  federal courts  must make their  own constitutional
          assessments.  See, e.g., Siegfriedt v. Fair, 982 F.2d 14, 16 (1st
                        ___  ____  __________    ____
          Cir.  1992).   Nevertheless, while  we  do not  defer to  the Law
          Court's  determination  that the  Maine  legislature  set out  to
          fashion a remedy, not a punishment, see Savard, 659 A.2d at 1268,
                                              ___ ______
          a  strong  argument  can be  made  that  a  federal court  should
          hesitate before disavowing a  state supreme court's exposition of
          the  purposes  animating a  state statute.    See, e.g.,  Hamm v.
                                                        ___  ____   ____
          Latessa,  72  F.3d 947,  954  (1st  Cir.  1995) (reaffirming  the
          _______
          general proposition  that federal  courts must  defer to a  state

                                          12

                    The  petitioner's proffer  consists of  a few  snippets

          culled  from the legislative record.  As a general matter, courts

          must  be chary  of  overvaluing isolated  comments by  individual

          solons.  See Rhode  Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe,  19 F.3d
                   ___ _____________    _________________________

          685,  699  (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied,  115  S.  Ct. 298  (1994).
                                  _____  ______

          Moreover, most  of the comments  collected by the  petitioner are

          attributable  to  opponents  of   the  measure.    Statements  of

          legislators  who  oppose a  bill  ordinarily  add  little to  the

          explication of  legislative intent,  see Selective Serv.  Sys. v.
                                               ___ _____________________

          Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 855  n.15
          ________________________________________

          (1984), and such is the case here.

                    Brushing   aside  the   parsley,   the  meat   of   the

          petitioner's  entire proffer  comprises only  two comments.   See
                                                                        ___

          Legislative  Record   House, L.D.  1749, at 1240  (June 10, 1983)

          ("I  don't deny  that .  . .  [suspension] is  a very  strict and

          severe punishment") (statement of Rep. Hayden);  id. at 1245 ("It
                                                           ___

          is time  to suspend those  who are playing for  time through this

          court system under the present  law.") (statement of Rep. Smith).

          These blemishes  are insufficient to alter the  complexion of the

          challenged statute.  A reading of the entire debate regarding the
                                                ______

          desirability of immediate license suspensions leaves no doubt but

          that  the Maine legislature meant the statute to serve a remedial

          end.

                    One  of  the bill's  principal  sponsors  advocated its

          passage  on the  ground  that  an  OUI  arrest,  whether  or  not
                              
          ____________________

          supreme court's interpretation of a statute of the state).

                                          13

          sufficient for  conviction, indicated a likelihood  that a person

          was  in the habit of drinking and  driving, and therefore posed a

          threat  to others.   See id. at 1240  (statement of Rep. Hayden).
                               ___ ___

          Other proponents of  the bill  urged its passage  to satisfy  the

          legislature's "grave  obligation to remove  th[e] drunken  driver

          from the  road," id. at  1242 (statement of  Rep. Joyce),  and to
                           ___

          insulate  the populace from harm at the hands of individuals who,

          having been  "picked up for drunken driving . . . keep on driving

          afterwards  awaiting  trial,"  id.  at 1241  (statement  of  Rep.
                                         ___

          Smith).  The debate  in the state senate proceeded  along similar

          lines.   See Legislative Record    Senate, L.D.  1749, at 1318-20
                   ___

          (June 15,  1983).  In the  face of statements such  as these, the

          random  remarks  singled out  by  the  petitioner constitute  too

          fragile a foundation on  which to build a credible  argument that

          the license suspension proviso  was designed to punish offenders.

          See,  e.g.,  Bae,  44  F.3d  at  494  (concluding  that  isolated
          ___   ____   ___

          references  to  individual legislators'  deterrent aims  will not

          indelibly mark a sanction as punitive).

                    The  petitioner  strives   to  reinforce  his   tenuous

          argument by touting a letter submitted to the chairs of the House

          and Senate judiciary committees  by the Governor's Highway Safety

          Representative.   Allen emphasizes the letter's  suggestion "that

          this bill  would be an added deterrent if a person knew that they

          [sic] would be suspended within the short period of time proposed

          rather  than  some unknown  date  in  the unforeseeable  future."

          Letter from Albert L. Godfrey, Sr., April 15, 1983, at 2.  But in

                                          14

          the very next sentence, the author writes that the bill is needed

          "[i]n the interests of  highway safety."  Hence, we  discount the

          letter for two reasons.   First, there is no plausible basis  for

          imputing the  views of  the Executive  Branch to the  Legislative

          Branch.   See Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. FERC, 730
                    ___ ______________________________________    ____

          F.2d 1509, 1519 (D.C.  Cir. 1984) (according little weight  to an

          administrator's statement to a congressional committee).  Second,

          the  blend of concerns evinced in the letter renders it ambiguous

          and divests  it of any dispositive  effect.  See Bae,  44 F.3d at
                                                       ___ ___

          494   (explaining  that   legislative  history   reflecting  both

          deterrent and  remedial concerns neither requires  nor prevents a

          finding that a sanction is punitive); cf. Stowell v. Secretary of
                                                ___ _______    ____________

          HHS,  3 F.3d  539, 542-43  (1st Cir.  1993) (explaining  that "an
          ___

          ambiguous  statute cannot  be  demystified by  resort to  equally

          ambiguous legislative history").

                    We add an  eschatocol of sorts.  Even if  we were prone

          to give  the Godfrey letter  more weight,  it would  not tip  the

          balance.  When applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to

          a  civil  sanction,  the fact  that  the  sanction  may be  aimed

          partially at deterrence  is merely  one factor to  be taken  into

          account  in the  decisional calculus.   See  Bae, 44 F.3d  at 494
                                                  ___  ___

          (explaining that "a deterrent purpose does not automatically mark

          a civil  sanction as  a form of  punishment").   That factor  may

          militate in favor of a finding of punitive intent, but it is not,

          by itself, determinative.  See  Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at  1947;
                                     ___  ___________

          Stoller, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at 19].
          _______

                                          15

                    We  conclude  that the  legislative  archives, overall,

          support the  suggestion that  the license suspension  proviso, 29

          M.R.S.A.    1311-A, is intended  primarily to achieve  a remedial

          goal.

                                          IV
                                          IV

                    In the final analysis,  the force of a double  jeopardy

          claim  depends   upon  the   particular  circumstances  of   each

          individual case.  See United States  v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448
                            ___ _____________     ______

          (1989)  (mandating "a  particularized assessment  of the  penalty

          imposed  and the  purposes  the penalty  may  fairly be  said  to

          serve"); Stoller, ___  F.3d at  ___ [slip op.  at 26]  (similar).
                   _______

          The pivotal question is whether the sanction, as  applied, exacts

          rough remedial justice.7  See Halper, 490 U.S. at 446.
                                    ___ ______

                    Evaluated  from this  standpoint, we  believe  that the

          administrative sanction  Maine imposed  on the  petitioner passes

          muster.  In purpose and effect, the ninety-day license suspension

          can fairly be  viewed as  remedial inasmuch as  it is  rationally

          related to the apprehended  danger and the potential harm.   That

          is, the State could reasonably conclude from the petitioner's OUI

          arrest  alone  that preservation  of  public  safety warranted  a
                              
          ____________________

               7The State disagrees, proposing  that we examine instead the
          universe of license suspensions in order to determine whether the
          temporary  loss of  driving  privileges is,  in  the abstract,  a
          punishment.  We reject  this approach.   Unlike the State, we  do
          not  believe that the Court's opinion in Austin v. United States,
                                                   ______    _____________
          113  S.  Ct. 2801  (1993), changed  settled  law in  this regard.
          There the Court held that, because  of the peculiar nature of the
          forfeiture implicated by Austin's appeal, that  forfeiture should
          be examined  in general and  not merely as  applied.  See  id. at
                                                                ___  ___
          2812 n.14.  We believe that this special approach is best limited
          to certain civil forfeitures.  It has no applicability here.

                                          16

          breathing  spell   (in  the   form  of  a   temporary  ninety-day

          cancellation of driving privileges).

                    The  petitioner  protests  that the  Secretary  neither

          undertook  an individualized  determination of  his dangerousness

          nor  offered him  a  chance to  show  that he  had  rehabilitated

          himself  prior  to  the end  of  the  suspension  period.   These

          allegations are true   but neither fact undermines the conclusion

          that the  license suspension  is essentially remedial.   For  one

          thing, the ninety-day suspension  is subject to relaxation should

          the  petitioner  apply for  a  work-restricted license.    See 29
                                                                     ___

          M.R.S.A.   1311-A(5-A).   Limitations of this ilk are  typical of

          remedial suspension provisions.   See, e.g., Butler v. Department
                                            ___  ____  ______    __________

          of Pub. Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 797 (La. 1992).  For
          ____________________________

          another thing,  the Secretary's  order is limited  temporally and

          the  period of  suspension    in Allen's case,  ninety days    is

          reasonable in relation to the future  harm the offender's conduct

          might  portend.    In  other  contexts,  the  courts  have  found

          debarments of fixed duration, based on prior misconduct, aimed at

          protecting  the public  from possible  future shenanigans,  to be

          nonpunitive.   See, e,g., Manocchio  v. Kusserow, 961  F.2d 1539,
                         ___  ____  _________     ________

          1542 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding remedial an order banning a doctor

          from  participating in Medicare for  at least five years); United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) (discerning
          ______    _______

          no  punitive intent  undergirding a  two-year ban  from accepting

          government  contracts).   Such  durationally  rigid restrictions,

          although   they  may  bear  the  sting  of  punishment  from  the

                                          17

          recipient's   perspective,   plainly   serve   the   government's

          prophylactic interest.  See Stoller, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op. at
                                  ___ _______

          28].  

                    We need go no further.  The key to cases  of this genre

          is  to  "distinguish  carefully  between  those  sanctions   that

          constitute impermissible exercises  of the government's  power to

          punish  and those  that constitute  permissible exercises  of the

          government's remedial authority (even  if effectuating a specific

          remedy  sometimes carries  with  it an  unavoidable component  of

          deterrence  or retribution)."  Stoller, ___ F.3d at ___ [slip op.
                                         _______

          at 30-31].  After analyzing the totality of the circumstances, we

          conclude that the civil  sanction at issue here    the suspension

          of the petitioner's  driving privileges ordered  administratively

          by  the Secretary   represents a reasonable effort to protect the

          public  from   motorists  who   have  demonstrated   a  dangerous

          propensity to drink before they drive.  The sanction therefore is

          principally in service to  a remedial goal.  Because  the license

          suspension does  not  constitute a  punishment under  appropriate

          double  jeopardy  analysis, the  district  court did  not  err in

          refusing to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

                                          18