Court Opinion

ID: 9578849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:49:11.24174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:31.216613
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Chief Justice,
specially concurring
I concur in the above opinion which holds that the respondent be suspended from the practice of the law for a period of one year.
I feel that I must specially concur, however, because of the time which it has taken to dispose of this matter. I do so not to embarrass the State Bar of Arizona or this court. I do so because I believe that to acquiesce silently in the unnecessary delay, is, in the long run, more embarrassing. In this position I am not without precedent. See concurring opinion in State v. Classen, 285 Or. 221, 590 P.2d 1198 (1979).
Although the acts out of which this complaint arose occurred in July of 1973, the matter of respondent’s conduct was first brought to the attention of the State Bar of Arizona in January of 1974, over five and one-half years ago. After an investigation lasting over two years, the local administrative committee, on 7 May 1976, issued a formal complaint against the respondent. Formal hearings on the complaint did not commence until 9 February 1977 and ended on 29 March 1977. After objections by the respondent, the matter was heard by the state bar disciplinary board on 30 July 1977. Respondent was notified by letter on 24 August 1977 of the decision of the state bar disciplinary board in upholding the findings of the administrative committee. Respondent objected and the matter was filed with this court on 6 September 1977. Respondent’s briefs were filed by respondent on 7 November 1977, the bar counsel’s responding brief was filed on 9 January 1978, and the respondent’s reply brief was filed on 28 February 1978. The matter was heard by this court in oral argument on 13 April 1978.
In all it took over four years — from January 1974 until February 1978 — for the matter to be at issue before this court, the greatest period of time being the over two *87years it took to investigate the matter. This is too long.
This is not the first time that we have commented on the delay in investigating and deciding bar disciplinary matters:
“ * * * we want it known that we disapprove of long delays such as occurred here, in bringing to a conclusion charges against a member of the bar for professional misconduct. It is most unfair to the accused as well as bringing our disciplinary procedure into disrepute.” In Re Everett, 80 Ariz. 124, 128, 293 P.2d 928, 931 (1956). See also In Re Moeur, 82 Ariz. 185, 310 P.2d 508 (1957).
Although the time it took to investigate and determine the matter is to be deplored, it should also be remembered that lawyers in this state serve as members of the bar administrative committees, the bar disciplinary board, and in other capacities free of charge. These attorneys donate their time unselfishly to the betterment of their profession. In the instant case, the facts were admittedly more complicated than usual, and the delay by the bar may be understandable. I would hope, however, that in the future greater efforts will be taken by the bar to speed up the disciplinary process.
If the delay in the investigation of this matter by the state bar is in part understandable, the delay which occurred in this court is not. The basic internal operating procedures of this court are not mysterious nor should they be. See “Internal Operating Procedures of the Arizona Supreme Court,” 17 Ariz.L.R. 643 (1976). This matter was argued orally to us on 13 April 1978. On the same day, after oral argument, the matter was assigned to the author of this opinion for writing. It was not until 5 September 1979, over seventeen months later, that a proposed opinion was circulated to the other members of this court for approval.
The “Standards Relating to Appellate Courts” of the American Bar Association’s Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration provide in Standard 3.52:
“(4) Decision. For a court sitting in panels of three judges, the average time for rendering decision should not exceed 30 days; the maximum time for any case, except one of extraordinary complexity, should not exceed 60 days. For a court sitting in larger panels, the average time should not exceed 60 days; the maximum time, except in cases of extraordinary complexity, should not exceed 90 days.”
Even assuming for a moment that the fact situation here is one of extraordinary complexity, seventeen months is too long a time for this court to take in disposing of the matter. Admittedly, as judges, we are required to decide the dull as well as the interesting cases — the case of no concern to any but the litigants and their attorneys as well as the case that is of keen interest to the public. There are some cases, however, in which it is just as important that the matter be disposed of quickly as it is that it be decided correctly. Bar discipline cases are frequently such cases.
The purpose of bar discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public. Matter of Lurie, 113 Ariz. 95, 546 P.2d 1126 (1976); In Re Moore, 110 Ariz. 312, 518 P.2d 562 (1974). If an attorney is guilty of misconduct for which he must be disciplined, the public is entitled to that determination as soon as possible. Not only is confidence in the legal profession eroded by unnecessary delay in the determination of disciplinary matters, but the attorney is left to “turn slowly in the wind” while the matter is being determined. If an attorney is not guilty of misconduct, he certainly is entitled to have this questioning of his professional conduct quickly erased.
The delay in the instant case is made all the more regrettable by events which occurred after the conduct disapproved of in the above opinion. In July of this year, approximately six weeks before the opinion was circulated to the other members of this court, it was announced that the lawsuit out of which respondent’s questionable conduct arose had been tentatively settled. During all this time the respondent has been a member in good standing of the State Bar of Arizona and as such was entitled to and did actively participate in that *88settlement. He stands now to reap a handsome reward for his misconduct, due, in no small measure, to the failure of this court to reach a decision within a reasonable period of time.