Court Opinion

ID: 9686776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:06:02.625659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:12.038824
License: Public Domain

*334SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the factual dispute regarding the plaintiffs discovery of her claim against Donovan (the priest) should be determined at trial. I also conclude that the court should not, at this stage of the proceeding, decide the plaintiffs claims against the Archdiocese.
Before I proceed to discuss these issues, I must point out that this case is in an odd procedural posture. The court of appeals remanded the case for a full trial on the plaintiffs claims against Donovan. Donovan did not seek review in this court in a timely fashion. Only the Archdiocese sought review. After the time for the petition for review expired Donovan then petitioned this court to join the Archdiocese's petition for review. Because the time for his petition for review had expired and there was no procedure for extending that time, this court refused to allow Donovan to join in this review of the decision of the court of appeals. It would therefore appear that the cause of action against Donovan may proceed even after this decision. Should a circuit court absolve Donovan of liability, the plaintiffs claims against the Archdiocese necessarily fail. I therefore conclude that the majority opinion may very well be premature in deciding the cause of action against the Archdiocese.
With regard to the statute of limitations issue, the majority aptly acknowledges that the discovery rule "tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers . . . that he or she has suffered actual damage —" Majority op. at 316. The majority, however, deter*335mines that the rule does not apply in this case because it fails to apply the well-settled rule that courts liberally construe the allegations presented in the complaint and accept them as true for purposes of determining whether a claim is stated. Paskiet v. Quality State Oil Co., 164 Wis. 2d 800, 805, 476 N.W.2d 867 (1991).
The plaintiff claims that her coping mechanisms prevented her from being able to perceive the actual damage caused by Donovan's alleged sexual advances until April 1992. She also alleges that Donovan used his position as a priest to coerce her into a sexual relationship. Accepting both of these allegations as true leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not cognizant of the coercive nature of the relationship until 1992. If, as the plaintiff asserts, she . was unaware of actual damage until 1992, she could not have had a claim capable of enforcement in 1965, according to our prior cases.
Instead, the majority opinion states that sound public policy requires that the discovery rule is not applicable to the case. Majority opinion at 323. The majority suggests that claims of emotional and psychological injury are more easily subject to fraud than claims of physical injury. Majority op. at 324. Thus the majority opinion rests on grounds long discarded by this court in other cases. See, e.g., Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 636-61, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994) (discussing the history of the court's treatment of emotional distress in an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
The defendants counter Pritzlafif s claims in a more straightforward manner, suggesting that she could have discovered her injury and its cause at any time and that the statute of limitations therefore bars the *336suit. As the court of appeals concluded, "[t]he factual impasse between Pritzlaffs knowledge of the events and her professed inability to relate them to her injuries presents a factual issue inappropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss.... Therefore, it was inappropriate for the trial court to dismiss the action without a full determination of the facts." Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee and Reverend John T. Donovan, No. 93-1846, unpublished slip opinion at 7 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994).
After deciding that the Archdiocese cannot be held liable because the statute of limitations bars the cause of action against Donovan, the court reaches out to discuss other issues that do not affect the decision of the case.
The court refuses to decide a straightforward issue of state tort law, that is whether the state recognizes a tort of negligence in hiring, retaining, training or supervising employees. But, the majority eagerly reaches out to decide a federal constitutional issue. The majority holds that if such a tort existed in this state, it would be barred in this case by the First Amendment. Thus the court engages in a "double reach."
The majority's reaching out to decide a First Amendment constitutional issue in this manner violates basic rules of judicial decisionmaking. A court will ordinarily not consider constitutional issues unless such a decision is essential to the determination of the question before the court. State v. Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d 532, 540, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984). The majority concedes that its determination of this claim is not essential. Majority op. at 326.
A court should be especially reluctant to volunteer to tackle a First Amendment issue relating to establishment of religion and the prohibition of the free *337exercise of religion. It is generally acknowledged that this area of First Amendment law is in flux and the United States Supreme Court cases offer very limited guidance.
For the reasons set forth, I cannot join the majority opinion.