Court Opinion

ID: 9587742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:25:49.149864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:32.314411
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
While I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 (a) of the majority, I must respectfully dissent to Division 2 (b), because I believe that there is insufficient evidence of actual malice on the part of Coach *612Adams toward Hazelwood to merit a trial and that he was entitled to summary judgment.
I note that, although the 1991 amendment to Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX of the Georgia Constitution provides that officials may be liable if they act with “actual malice or with actual intent to cause injury in the performance of their official functions[,]” Hazelwood made no allegation that Coach Adams acted with actual intent to cause injury, only that he “acted intentionally, deliberately, knowingly and/ or with careless disregard for the consequences thereof” in assigning Hazelwood to cut grass with dull scissors, an allegation that amounts, at most, to implied malice, not actual intent to cause injury.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Adams submitted his unequivocal statement that he did not intend to injure Hazel-wood, had no reason to believe that this use of scissors would injure him, and “did not act out of anger, vengeance or malice.”
In addition to the facts set out in the majority, Hazelwood’s testimony in May 1997 regarding the issue of malice and intent to injure is set out in detail here: “Q. [Wjhat facts or information do you have that Coach Adams intentionally gave you the scissors with the idea that you would hurt your wrist? ... A. They weren’t grass shears — cutting — for grass or garden tools at all. They were school scissors to cut paper. Q. But is it your testimony that Coach Adams gave you the scissors intending to hurt you? A. I believe so. Q. Why? A. They were dull and just old, like the worst pair of scissors you ever seen — possibly could imagine to give someone to cut grass with. Q. [I]t’s your opinion that he gave you the scissors with the express purpose of hurting your wrist? A. Maybe not to hurt my wrist but to somewhat teach me a lessfon] in his mind. Q. So maybe he was negligent and careless, too, like the principal? A. Yes. Q. So it’s your contention that in giving you the dull scissors and telling you to cut grass with dull scissors he was negligent? A. Yes. Q. And he was careless? A. Correct. Q. And he shouldn’t have done that? A. Correct. Q. But as far as giving you the scissors with the sole purpose of injuring your wrist or any other part of your body, you don’t believe he did that? A. He wouldn’t probably — would not know what was going to happen.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, Hazelwood had given an earlier deposition in his federal lawsuit in December 1996. There, he testified: “Q. Do you know that he was being merely negligent or careless, or do you feel that he was being malicious and intentional in what he did to you? A. Yes. . . . Q. And the basis for that is what? A. He thought about what he was going to do before he did it. Premeditated. Q. In other words, the motioning to you at some time before the scissors incident . . . and then him actually having you do it that day indicates to you intentional or malicious — A. Yes. Q. Is there anything else that goes *613into the feeling that he was intentional or malicious as opposed to merely being careless or negligent? A. Just the constant badgering that he did on me that I figured he didn’t like me. So I knew that there was going to be some type of punishment, severe punishment, that I would have to do. . . . Q. Do you have any reason to know or to suspect that Coach Adams could anticipate that you would have seriously injured yourself when he handed you the scissors and told you to go cut the weeds and the grass with the scissors? ... A. Well, I don’t think he would have done it if he didn’t think that it wouldn’t have hurt me somehow. But I don’t think he knew what, you know, was going to happen.” (Emphasis supplied.)
At best, this testimony is self-contradictory. “Prophecy Corp. [c. Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (343 SE2d 680) (1986)] stands for the position that self-contradictory testimony is construed against the equivocator, absent a reasonable explanation for the contradiction. Id., 256 Ga. at 30 (2). The holding ... is based on directed verdict and summary judgment cases which clearly state that the opposing party is entitled to judgment only where the favorable portion of the party’s self-contradictory testimony ‘is the only evidence of his right to recover. . . .’ (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 28 (1).” Korey v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 269 Ga. 108, 109 (498 SE2d 519) (1998). See also Lipton v. Warner, Mayoue &c., 228 Ga. App. 516, 517 (1) (492 SE2d 281) (1997).
Here, unlike in Korey, there is no other evidence of malice put forth except Hazelwood’s testimony. Even assuming, however, that this testimony is not contradictory, the most that it shows is that Coach Adams and Hazelwood had a bad relationship and that the coach used a method of cutting grass that was more punishment than intended to accomplish the task of cutting the grass and weeds. This is legally insufficient to show actual malice.
In Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390 (467 SE2d 336) (1996), the trial court had denied summary judgment on the ground of official immunity because, while the defendant had not acted with ill will or actual intent to injure, there had been a showing of reckless disregard for the safety of others. In rejecting this standard, the Supreme Court found that “in that context [official immunity], ‘actual malice’ requires a deliberate intention to do wrong. . . . While we recognize that our courts have defined ‘malice’ as involving reckless disregard for the rights of others, [cits.], it is ‘actual malice,’ not mere ‘malice,’ that is addressed in the 1991 amendment to Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX. We find the term ‘actual malice,’ as set forth in the 1991 amendment, to denote ‘express malice or malice in fact.’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990). Express or actual malice ... is found in criminal law and has long been distinguished from ‘implied malice,’ a term which has been defined to mean conduct exhibiting a ‘reckless disregard for *614human life.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 391, 392 (2). See also Smith v. Little, 234 Ga. App. 329 (506 SE2d 675) (1998).
Decided December 4, 1998
Mundy & Gammage, John S. Husser, for appellant.
Law Offices of Richard W. Littlefield, Jr., Steven J. Misner, Donald J. Grate, for appellees.
Actual malice does not encompass conduct exhibiting a reckless disregard for human life or the safety of others, which is the most that Hazelwood has alleged and shown. Daniels v. Gordon, 232 Ga. App. 811 (503 SE2d 72) (1998); Crisp County School System v. Brown, 226 Ga. App. 800 (487 SE2d 512) (1997); Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Bd. of Ed., 232 Ga. App. 892 (503 SE2d 43) (1998).
Therefore, I believe summary judgment for Coach Adams was appropriate and should be affirmed.