Court Opinion

ID: 9619899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:39.538933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:45.413309
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur entirely with Judge Beasley’s majority, I write specifically to address additional issues that I feel are important in this case.
On the law and facts, this case is on all fours with Bruno’s Food Stores v. Taylor, 228 Ga. App. 439 (491 SE2d 881) (1997), in which this Court recently affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the defendant grocery store, where: (1) the cleaning contractor was using the same kind of floor cleaning machine that was owned and maintained by the owner/occupier and that also left streaks of water that had to be mopped up, and (2) the knowledge of the water was imputed to the owner/occupier, because it had not sur*513rendered control of the premises to the independent contractor. In this case, the evidence shows that the floor cleaning machine did not vacuum up all the fluid it dispensed on the floor, but left approximately a foot of liquid behind, which required either the cleaning company or Piggly Wiggly to mop up the excess water. Piggly Wiggly was aware of the manner in which the machine operated, or failed to operate, and that the excess water had to be mopped up by an individual. Further, the plaintiff did not observe any cones or warning signs that would alert patrons to the danger presented by the wet floor. The record is silent as to what the cleaning company’s and the store’s policies were regarding the placement of cones or signs to warn patrons of a wet floor, and whether the excess water left on the floor was mopped up only after the cleaning company was through cleaning all the areas of the store with the floor cleaning machine or after each aisle or section.
Imputed or constructive knowledge of the condition of the floor is attributed to the cleaning company since it performed the cleaning services which caused the water to be on the floor, and therefore, it is presumed to have knowledge of the condition in which it left the floor. See Bruno’s Food Stores v. Taylor, supra; Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980); see Little v. Liberty Savings Bank, 191 Ga. App. 732 (382 SE2d 734) (1989). “Because the owner or occupier’s duties to keep the premises and approaches safe are statutory (OCGA § 51-3-1), those duties are non-delegable even though the owner has a contract for another party to provide [cleaning services]. OCGA § 51-2-5 (4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga. App. 241, 244 (4) (414 SE2d 265) (1991). An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor ... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.’ OCGA § 51-2-5 (4).” Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga. App. 1, 2 (1) (470 SE2d 474) (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga. App. 616, 617 (1) (394 SE2d 411) (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 196 (351 SE2d 718) (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Auto. Centers, 145 Ga. App. 200, 202 (2) (243 SE2d 565) (1978). Questions of fact exist for jury determination as to whether the cleaning company exercised due diligence in removing the excess liquid from the floor after going over the floor with the floor cleaning machine and in warning patrons of the danger of the wet floor by placing cones or warning signs in the appropriate areas until the excess water could be mopped up.
Piggly Wiggly, as an owner of the premises, cannot insulate itself from liability simply by hiring an independent contractor to clean its floors. If full possession and complete control of the floor is not delivered to the independent contractor, the acts of the independent contractor will be imputed to the owner of the premises. See Bruno’s Food Stores v. Taylor, supra at 442. In this case, full possession and *514control of the floor had not been delivered to the cleaning company by Piggly Wiggly. Piggly Wiggly was open to customers during the time that its floor was being cleaned, and the portion of the store in which the floor was being cleaned was not closed to customers. Both situations benefited Piggly Wiggly, as customers could shop in the entire store. Piggly Wiggly had directed the cleaning company to perform its services at times when there were fewer customers in the store, and Piggly Wiggly had actual knowledge that the floor of its store was being cleaned by an employee of the cleaning company at the time of Kelley’s fall. Therefore, knowledge of the puddles of the clear liquid on the floor would be imputed to Piggly Wiggly.
Further, separate from any imputed negligence, the evidence raises independent claims of negligent acts or omissions on the part of Piggly Wiggly. As shown by the testimony of Piggly Wiggly employee Curtis Holmes, Piggly Wiggly knew its floor cleaning machine regularly left water on the floor, which had to be mopped up. A jury could reasonably infer from Holmes’ testimony describing how the floor cleaning machine operated that Piggly Wiggly’s floor cleaning machine was not in proper repair. Further, there was a duty on the part of Piggly Wiggly to make a reasonable inspection of the floor and either to personally put out warning cones or signs, or to ensure the cleaning company put them out in areas where the floor was wet. This duty was particularly applicable because: (1) Piggly Wiggly knew that customers would be in the store during the time its floor was being cleaned; (2) Piggly Wiggly provided shopping carts for their customers’ use and it was reasonably foreseeable that the shopping carts, which may well be filled with a customer’s selections, could block the customer’s view of the floor directly in front of the buggy; (3) Piggly Wiggly knew its floor cleaning machine left liquid on the floor; and (4) Piggly Wiggly knew that standing water on the floor during cleaning created a danger.
Under the evidence, the defendants either (1) failed to pierce the allegations set forth by the plaintiff and show that no jury issue exists as to an essential element of the plaintiff’s claims; or (2) the plaintiff came forward with evidence in rebuttal. See Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997). Slight evidence is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of coming forward with evidence in rebuttal. Further, such evidence may include favorable inferences drawn by the court from the evidence presented. See Stuckey Diamonds v. Jones, 195 Ga. App. 351 (393 SE2d 706) (1990); Mealer v. Gen. Cinema Beverages of Ga., 190 Ga. App. 419 (379 SE2d 192) (1989).
While the defendants raised the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, they had the burden of proof on summary judgment, just as they would at trial, to make out prima facie each essential ele-
*515ment. Garrett v. NationsBank, 228 Ga. App. 114, 116 (491 SE2d 158) (1997); see also Robinson v. Kroger Co., supra. Kelley’s testimony that she was looking where she was going but was unable to see the puddle of clear liquid in which she slipped and fell from a standing position, and that the puddle blended with the light-colored tile floor, raised material issues of fact for jury determination. Kelley’s testimony that she was careful to look for puddles as she continued through the store after her fall but still almost stepped in another puddle in the meat department demonstrates how difficult it was, in the exercise of ordinary care, to discover the presence of such clear liquid on the floor. See Bruno’s Food Stores v. Taylor, supra at 445.