Court Opinion

ID: 9731102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:33:32.401555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:13.274785
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: Implicit in the principal opinion is the conclusion that defendant was not a trespasser as was found by the trial court. The testimony of the State land agent, Forrester, is that he would procure possession of the premises by giving a 30 day notice or obtaining a surrender of possession. The conclusion is that defendant enjoyed a present possessory interest in the entire parcel of land and the improvements. Assuming arguendo that the State retain some form of joint possessory interest, the purported consent to search by the State (Shaw) does not come within the rule of United States v. Matlock (1974), 415 U.S. 164, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988, and People v. Stacey (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 83, 317 N.E.2d 24. In each of such cases the consent to search was given by an individual with a sufficient possessory interest who was on the premises at the time when the defendant was absent. Here, the defendant whose property was seized was on the premises and the person who gave consent as one with a copossessory interest was not present. I doubt that we can rationally support a rule which permits peace officers to search without the consent of a person with a possessory interest who is on the premises upon the authority of a consenting person with a possessory interest who is absent. In a second aspect, one can find no factual basis which distinguishes the rights of the defendant in his possession of the barn from his rights arising from the possession of the house. For such reason the judgment should be reversed without remandment.