Court Opinion

ID: 9737885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:36:27.322716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.348018
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, J.
(dissenting.) I would affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board.
As noted by the majority, the general rule is that injuries suffered by an employee while going to or coming from work are not compensable. Bush v Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich 444, 451; 320 NW2d 858 (1982); Thomas v Staff Builders Health Care, 168 Mich App 127, 129; 424 NW2d 13 (1988), lv den 430 Mich 886 (1988). MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) [formerly MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2)] creates *518an exception to this general rule when the employee’s injury occurs on the employer’s "premises”:
An employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises where the employee’s work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment. [Emphasis added.]
While earlier cases relied on by the majority expanded the meaning of "premises” to encompass areas outside the employer’s actual property, since McClure v General Motors Corp (On Rehearing), 408 Mich 191; 289 NW2d 631 (1980), this Court has been reluctant to extend the meaning of the word "premises” in MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301)(3) to include off-premises areas of injury such as that involved here. I am of the opinion that these post -McClure cases should control the disposition of this case.
In Tedford v Stouffer’s Northland Inn, 106 Mich App 493; 308 NW2d 254 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 928 (1982), the plaintiff had alighted from a bus and was walking to work across a parking lot that was not part of the defendant’s premises when she fell and was injured. The appeal board applied the "zone, environments and hazards” test of Fischer v Lincoln Tool & Die Co, 37 Mich App 198; 194 NW2d 476 (1971), lv den 387 Mich 755 (1972), and granted compensation. This Court reversed, noting that the premises rule is in the nature of a limitation and quoting McClure’s warning against judicial dilution of legislative limitations on compensation. Tedford, supra at 500-502. This Court held that, because the defendant had no control over plaintiff’s route or the condition of the parking lot where she fell, there was no logical justification for *519expanding the premises exception to the general rule of no compensation. Id. at 503.
Likewise, in Denny v Kostadinovski, 117 Mich App 517; 324 NW2d 19 (1981), the plaintiff slipped and fell in a public alley while on her way home from work. Id. at 518. The plaintiff was injured at a point ten to twenty feet from her workplace. Id. This Court cited the leading pre-McClure cases but distinguished them on the ground that the plaintiff was not crossing between areas controlled by the defendants nor was the alleyway controlled by the defendants. Id. at 521. The Denny Court concluded that the "zone, environments and hazards” test only applies to particular situations "where the employer has held out to employees designated parking areas and adjacent unowned property to be traveled over.” Id. at 521. The plaintiff’s injuries thus did not occur in the course of her employment, and the award of compensation was reversed. Id.
In Beneteau v Detroit Free Press, 117 Mich App 253; 323 NW2d 498 (1982), the plaintiff was struck by a car in a public street while walking from a parking structure to her workplace. Id. at 254. There was no claim that defendant owned or controlled the parking structure, that the street was anything other than a public road, or that the defendant had control over the route which the plaintiff traveled. Id. at 259. This Court concluded on the basis of Tedford that the plaintiff was not within the "zone, environments and hazards” of her work at the time of injury. Id.
Finally, in Upton v General Motors Corp, 124 Mich App 61; 333 NW2d 384 (1983), lv den 417 Mich 1100.12 (1983), the plaintiff was injured when his automobile was struck by another as he turned into the driveway of his workplace. Id. at 63. This Court held that McClure placed no limita*520tion on compensation for injuries arising out of on-premises lunchtime injuries. Id. at 67. The defendant argued that McClure created an absurd result by awarding compensation merely because the plaintiff’s automobile was struck in the driveway of the defendant’s plant, rather than the public street, where, under McClure, the injury would not be compensable. Id. This Court noted:
Although it may be arbitrary to rule that an employee injured within the employer’s gate during lunchtime sustains a compensable injury while another employee, also on his lunch break and injured several feet away but outside the employer’s premises, sustains a non-compensable injury, that is the result dictated by McClure and earlier case law. As Justice Levin observed: "A line must be drawn at some point.” [124 Mich App 67.]
In this case, although plaintiff was traveling from one part of defendant’s premises to another, defendant did not create a necessity that plaintiff involuntarily encounter traffic risks; there was evidence that plaintiff had two alternative routes available to him which did not involve crossing a public street. Defendant did not own or control the street where plaintiff was injured. There is no evidence that defendant had any control over the route plaintiff chose to take. In light of the McClure plurality’s unwillingness to further expand the premises exception, the McClure concurrence’s suggestion that an employee must be on the premises to qualify for workers’ compensation coverage, and the plain language of MCL 418.301(3); MSA 17.237(301X3), I would conclude that the appeal board did not err in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to compensation and would accordingly affirm.