Court Opinion

ID: 9530515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:31.082696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.357262
License: Public Domain

Hunter, J.
(dissenting)—A more detailed statement of the facts is necessary to better understand the reasoning of this dissent.
The record discloses that the appellant lessees, in the conduct of their business, maintained and operated a motor-driven compressor as a part of their refrigeration equipment situated within the premises, which compressor required a constant supply of water for cooling purposes; that the lessees, in the conduct of their business, obtained water from the Building Company for various uses on their premises, for which they paid a monthly flat fee to the lessor; that they obtained their water supply by means of an entrance pipe through the floor of their premises, connected to the general building water supply system.
The testimony in the record, which the trial court was entitled to believe, discloses that immediately inside appellants’ premises on the entrance pipe was a hand-operated control valve by which the flow of water beyond that point *825could be turned off and on; that from that point on water was distributed to the various points of use within appellants’ premises by plumbing installed by previous tenants; that in order to supply cold water to the appellants’ refrigeration compressor, a pipe, connected with the other plumbing within the premises, was placed under the surface of the floor of their premises; that the floor was laid by a prior tenant; that the flow of water in the pipe was controlled by the same valve within the premises that controlled the flow through the rest of the plumbing; that one of the appellants, George Hoertrich, Jr., was the electrical contractor for the tenant who installed the floor and pipe, and did the electrical work incident to the installation of the compressor, which was the same compressor situated on the premises maintained and operated by the appellants, when the accident occurred on October 29,1956. The record further shows that the pipe was installed on the floor of the premises by being laid upon or partially recessed therein, and was covered with a one' to two-inch terrazzo floor, which is a type of floor laid similar to concrete with the same hardening characteristics; that the original floor was of twelve-inch reinforced concrete, and beneath this floor there is an area of approximately two feet followed by a false ceiling suspended over respondents’ premises. The space between the false ceiling and the concrete floor contains various utilities for the building. In its determination of the source of the escaping water, the trial court found that it resulted from a rupture in the pipeline in the terrazzo floor.
In view of the result of this dissent, it is necessary to discuss certain contentions of the appellants in addition to those considered by the majority. Hence, for continuity, all of the appellants’ contentions will be discussed in order, without reference to the majority opinion.
Appellants contend first, that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s finding that the instrumentality causing the damage was from a rupture of the pipe in the floor of appellants’ premises. I disagree. The building superintendent testified that the water was running through the ceiling directly beneath the appellants’ premises when the *826damage was discovered; that there was no other plumbing in that area except the appellants’ plumbing; and that he immediately notified the appellants. The record shows that the appellants thereupon called a plumber who shut off the water at the valve through which the water flows into the appellants’ plumbing from the line of the building supplying the water to appellants’ premises. The water leakage promptly subsided. The plumber bypassed the pipe in the floor, which went to the appellants’ compressor, with copper tubing to carry the water and there was no further difficulty encountered. The building superintendent further testified that, based on his years of experience in maintenance and plumbing work, he believed the break could be caused by a chemical reaction between the galvanizing of the pipe and the concrete floor.
Considering the testimony in its entirety and the inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the instrumentality causing the damage was a ruptured pipe in the floor of appellants’ premises.
The appellants further contend the trial court erred in finding that the appellants had exclusive possession and control of the premises and the instrumentality causing the damage. The appellants contend the control was in the lessor. I believe an examination of the record discloses the contrary. The lease expressly provides:
“Throughout the term of this lease, the lessee will take good care of the demised premises and appurtenances, alterations and improvements, and will keep the same in good repair, . . . and, at the end of the term, the lessee will quit and surrender the demised premises, with all alterations and improvements, in good order and condition, reasonable wear and damage by the elements excepted.” (Italics mine.)
The court found, as supported by the record, that the ruptured pipe was a part of the plumbing used exclusively in the operation of the appellants’ business. The pipe could be used for that purpose only, and was not in any manner related to the use of the remainder of the building. The *827ruptured pipe was clearly a part of, and appurtenant to the use of, the demised premises, which the appellants were bound to maintain and repair under the lease and over which they necessarily had control under these circumstances. The appellants argue, however, that they did not have exclusive control since they could not disturb the terrazzo floor without permission of the lessor, on the theory that it would constitute an alteration requiring the consent of the lessor, as provided in the lease. I disagree. The lease must be read in its entirety. The disturbing of the floor would only be an incident to the appellants’ obligation to repair the pipe and would not be an alteration, since the restoration of the floor would be required under the provision of the lease providing for the surrender of the premises in good order and condition at the end of the term (reasonable wear and damage by the elements excepted).
The appellants further contend that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case. The doctrine was recently considered by this court in the case of Klise v. Seattle, 52 Wn. (2d) 412, 325 P. (2d) 888 (1958). There we stated:
“Under our recent decision in Kind v. Seattle, 50 Wn. (2d) 485, 312 P. (2d) 811, the rule is:
“ Where a plaintiff’s evidence establishes that an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendants caused an injurious occurrence, which ordinarily does not happen if those in control of the instrumentality use ordinary care, there is an inference, permissible from the occurrence itself, that it was caused by the defendant’s want of care. Nopson v. Wockner, 40 Wn. (2d) 645, 245 P. (2d) 1022. Legal control or responsibility for the proper and efficient functioning of the instrumentality which caused the injury and a superior, if not exclusive, position for knowing or obtaining knowledge of the facts which caused the injury, provide a sufficient basis for the application of the doctrine. Hogland v. Klein, 49 Wn. (2d) 216, 298 P. (2d) 1099. When these circumstances are shown, the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, and it devolves upon the defendant to produce evidence to meet and offset the effect of the presumption. Hogland v. Klein, supra.’ ” (Italics mine.)
*828In the instant case, finding of fact No. 9 reads as follows:
“That the Defendants, Arthur Riebli and George Hoertrich, Jr., had exclusive possession and control of the premises and the instrumentality causing said damage, and that the cause of said occurrence has not been satisfactorily explained, nor have said Defendants shown that they exercised due care to prevent the happening of the occurrence or excused themselves for their failure to do so.”
The above finding, which is supported by the record, shows that (1) the appellants had exclusive control of the instrumentality causing the damage; (2) that no showing was made by the appellants of their exercise of due care to prevent the occurrence causing the damage; and (3) that no explanation has been made by the appellants to excuse them from failing to exercise due care in the control and operation of the instrumentality causing the damage.
Under the facts in the instant case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as stated in the Klise case, supra, applies. The appellants have failed to produce evidence to offset the effect of the presumption of the appellants’ want of due care and they should therefore be liable for the damage incurred.
The appellants contend the court erred in awarding judgment for damages to the building on the Building Company’s cross-complaint against the appellants, and in awarding the Building Company a judgment against the appellants for any damages it may sustain as a result of the judgment obtained by the Bank against the Building Company and the appellants. I do not agree. The covenant under the lease expressly provides the lessees will hold the lessor harmless from any and all damages occurring to the lessor whatsoever, as a result of the lessees’ use and occupancy of the premises. The lease states:
“The lessee shall keep, save and hold harmless the lessor from any and all damages and liability for anything and everything whatsoever arising from, or out of, the occupancy by, or under, the lessee, the lessee’s agents or servants, and from any loss or damage arising from any fault or negligence by the lessee, or any failure on the lessee’s part to comply with any of the covenants, terms and conditions *829herein contained, or otherwise, or whether it be caused by, or be due to, the failure of the lessee to perform any of the covenants herein, expressed or implied, that are to be performed by the lessee.”
The damage sustained by the Building Company, as alleged in the cross-complaint, and resulting from the judgment obtained by the Bank against the Building Company and the appellants, was a direct result of the lessees’ use and occupancy of its premises, and the court was therefore correct in its ruling.
The appellants contend the court erred in awarding damages to the Washington Camera Mart for the loss of anticipated profits from the Christmas business of that year. The trial court was justified in finding that, as a result of the damage occurring on October 29,1956, there was insufficient time for any of the stock of damaged merchandise to be replaced. The finding of lost profits was properly supported by the record, showing that the Camera Mart had been in operation since 1946, and that the Christmas seasons of 1955 and 1956 were comparable as far as general Christmas buisness was concerned.
Finding no error in the record, the trial court should be affirmed.
Mallery and Rosellini, JJ., concur with Hunter, J.