Court Opinion

ID: 9394300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-13 00:00:40.731102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.518782
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20093      Document: 00516749270         Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/12/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                         FILED
                                                                     May 12, 2023
                                   No. 22-20093                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk

   Philip Angell; Steven Brown; Tonnie Beck; Tammy
   Morris; Dawn Burnham,

                                                             Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                       versus

   GEICO Advantage Insurance Company; Geico Indemnity
   Company; Government Employees Insurance Company;
   GEICO County Mutual Insurance Company; GEICO
   Choice Insurance Company,

                                                         Defendants—Appellants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:20-CV-799

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   King, Circuit Judge:
          Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of insureds claiming that GEICO
   failed to fully compensate them for the total loss of their vehicles under their
   respective insurance policies. The district court held that Plaintiffs had
   standing to sue on behalf of the proposed class and subsequently granted class
   certification. GEICO now appeals both holdings. We AFFIRM.
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                                         No. 22-20093

                                               I.
           This appeal arises out of a class-action lawsuit filed by Plaintiffs-
   Appellees Philip Angell, Steven Brown, Tonnie Beck, Tammy Morris, and
   Dawn Burnham (the “Plaintiffs”) against Defendants-Appellants GEICO
   Advantage Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, Government
   Employees Insurance Company, GEICO County Mutual Insurance
   Company, and GEICO Choice Insurance Company (collectively,
   “GEICO”). Each Plaintiff possessed a vehicle that was subject to a private
   passenger auto insurance policy with a different Defendant-Appellant
   (collectively, the “Policies”). Each Plaintiff’s vehicle was involved in an auto
   collision while insured under one of the Policies.
           The contractual language at issue in this case is identical across all of
   the Policies. The Policies provide collision and comprehensive coverage for
   a “loss” sustained by a covered vehicle. The Policies define a “loss” as a
   “direct and accidental loss of or damage to: a. The auto, including its
   equipment; or b. Other insured property.” The Policies limit GEICO’s
   liability for a “loss” to the lesser of the: “a. Actual cash value of the stolen or
   damaged property; b. Amount necessary to repair or replace the property
   with other of like kind and quality; or c. Amount stated in the Declarations of
   this policy.” “Actual cash value” (“ACV”) is defined as “the replacement
   cost of the auto or property less depreciation and/or betterment.”1
           In March 2020, Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint, which they
   amended twice. In their second amended complaint (the “Complaint”),
   Plaintiffs allege that the Policies require GEICO to remit the ACV for a

           1
            “Depreciation” is defined as “a decrease or loss in value or condition to the auto
   or property because of use, disuse, physical wear and tear, age, outdatedness, or other
   causes.” “Betterment” is defined as “improvement of the auto or property to a value or
   condition greater than its pre-loss condition.”

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   covered vehicle involved in a covered loss if the amount necessary “to repair
   the vehicle (plus any salvage value) exceeds the value of the vehicle prior to
   the loss,” that is, if there is a complete or “total” loss of the vehicle. The
   Complaint further alleges that under Texas law, ACV includes a covered
   vehicle’s sales tax, title fees, and registration fees (collectively, the
   “Purchasing Fees”). It also alleges that Plaintiffs—who were all entitled to
   ACV payments under the Policies following their respective collisions—did
   not receive ACV payments that included the entirety of their Purchasing
   Fees. No Plaintiff claims that he or she has been denied payment of all three
   Purchasing Fees.
          The Complaint contains six causes of action. The first five counts,
   each brought by a specific named Plaintiff against his or her respective
   insurance company and on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated
   individuals, allege that GEICO breached the Policies by failing to pay the
   entirety of their corresponding Plaintiff’s Purchasing Fees. Of the five named
   Plaintiffs, not one claims that he or she was denied payment of all three of the
   individual fees that collectively comprise the Purchasing Fees. Specifically,
   Angell, Beck, Morris, and Burnham (all of whom owned their vehicles),
   allege that they are owed registration fees (having received payments for their
   sales tax and title fees), while Brown (who leased his vehicle), alleges that he
   is owed both his registration fees and sales tax. No named Plaintiff alleges
   that he or she is owed his or her title fees. The sixth count, brought by all
   Plaintiffs against GEICO on behalf of the entire proposed class, alleges a
   violation of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (the “TPPCA”).
          In July 2021, Plaintiffs moved for class certification, seeking to
   represent a class defined as: “All individuals insured under a Texas auto
   physical damage policy issued by GEICO who (1) made a first-party property
   damage claim from March 5, 2016 through the date on which the Class is
   certified, (2) where such claim was determined to be and adjusted as a total

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   loss,” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district
   court issued an order granting class certification in November 2021. In its
   order, the court first addressed GEICO’s argument that Plaintiffs lacked
   standing to represent their proposed class, determining that each Plaintiff
   met Article III’s standing requirement because he or she alleged an
   “underpayment of ACV . . . traceable to GEICO’[s] alleged breach of
   contract.” The court then turned to the issue of class certification, ruling that
   Plaintiffs could adequately represent their proposed class and that the
   proposed class satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. The
   court also certified the class with respect to Plaintiffs’ TPPCA claim, stating
   that there was no reason to distinguish between that claim and the other
   claims for breach of the Policies because “[n]othing in the TPPCA would
   excuse an insurer from liability for TPPCA damages if it was liable under the
   terms of the policy but delayed payment beyond the applicable statutory
   deadline.”
            After granting Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the court later
   clarified that the proposed class definition be modified so that it extended
   “only to covered total-loss claims and claims submitted under collision
   and/or comprehensive coverage.” Therefore, the amended class includes:
            All individuals insured under a Texas auto physical damage
            policy issued by GEICO who (1) made a first-party property
            damage claim under collision and/or comprehensive coverage
            determined by GEICO to be a covered total-loss claim from
            March 5, 2016 through the date on which the Class is certified,
            (2) where such claim was determined to be and adjusted as a
            total loss.
   Compare ROA.672, with ROA.1570.
            GEICO subsequently appealed the district court’s order certifying the
   class.

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                                           II.
          GEICO challenges both Plaintiffs’ standing as class representatives
   and the district court’s certification of the class pursuant to Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 23. We begin by addressing Plaintiffs’ standing because
   resolving that issue “is an inherent prerequisite to the class certification
   inquiry.” Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 294 (5th Cir.
   2001); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[S]tanding . . . is
   the threshold question in every federal case . . . .”). To demonstrate
   standing, “a plaintiff must show (i) that he suffered an injury in fact that is
   concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely
   caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
   judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021)
   (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
          The parties disagree as to whether GEICO’s standing argument is
   more appropriately characterized as one regarding class certification. GEICO
   concedes that each Plaintiff has standing to bring a claim on his or her own
   but that the nature of each Plaintiff’s injury does not extend to the scope of
   the injury alleged under the class’s definition, making Plaintiffs unsuitable
   class representatives. This is because, although Plaintiffs seek to represent a
   class of individuals who are owed all Purchasing Fees, no named Plaintiff
   alleges that he or she is owed title fees, and only one alleges that he is owed
   sales tax. Plaintiffs counter GEICO’s standing argument by asserting that
   they each must merely demonstrate that they individually have standing to
   bring their claims, and whether their individual claims sufficiently align with
   those of the class is a matter for class certification.
          There has yet to be a bright line drawn between the issues of standing
   and class certification. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 263 n.15 (2003)

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   (noting “tension in our prior cases in this regard”).2 We have likewise never
   ruled on the appropriate means by which to evaluate whether a plaintiff has
   standing to represent a class. Sister circuits that have addressed this issue
   have typically taken one of two approaches: the more intensive “standing
   approach” or the more forgiving “class certification approach.” See 1
   William B. Rubenstein, Newberg and Rubenstein on
   Class Actions § 2:6 (6th ed. 2022). A court utilizing the class
   certification approach only assesses a named plaintiff’s individual standing;
   if that is satisfied, any remaining analysis is considered a matter of class
   certification under Rule 23. Id.; see Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162
   F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Once his standing has been established,
   whether a plaintiff will be able to represent the putative class, including
   absent class members, depends solely on whether he is able to meet the
   additional criteria encompassed in [Rule 23].”); Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d
   1254, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2015) (adopting the same approach); Prado-Steiman
   ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[P]rior to the
   certification of a class, . . . the district court must determine that at least one
   named class representative has Article III standing to raise each class
   subclaim. . . . ‘Only after the court determines the issues for which the named
   plaintiffs have standing should it address the question whether the named
   plaintiffs have representative capacity, as defined by Rule 23(a), to assert the
   rights of others.’” (quoting Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1482 (11th Cir.
   1987)))
           In contrast, courts that employ the standing approach compare the
   injuries or interests of the named plaintiff with those of the putative class and

           2
             Although acknowledging this uncertainty in Gratz, the Supreme Court declined
   to take up the issue, holding that regardless of whether the issue was best framed in terms
   of adequacy or standing, the plaintiffs satisfied the requirement. 539 U.S. at 263.

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   will hold that the named plaintiff lacks standing for the class claims if his or
   her harms are not sufficiently analogous to those suffered by the rest of the
   class. See Rubenstein, supra; In re Asacol Antitrust Litig., 907 F.3d 42, 49
   (1st Cir. 2018) (“So the question of standing is not: Are there differences
   between the claims of the class members and those of the class
   representative? Rather, the pertinent question is: Are the differences that do
   exist the type that leave the class representative with an insufficient personal
   stake in the adjudication of the class members’ claims?”); NECA-IBEW
   Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 162 (2d Cir.
   2012) (“[A] plaintiff has class standing if he plausibly alleges (1) that he
   ‘personally has suffered some actual . . . injury as a result of the putatively
   illegal conduct of the defendant,’ . . . and (2) that such conduct implicates
   ‘the same set of concerns’ as the conduct alleged to have caused injury to
   other members of the putative class by the same defendants . . . .” (first
   quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982)); and then quoting Gratz,
   539 U.S. at 267)); see also Boley v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 36 F.4th 124,
   131–33 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that named plaintiffs who had invested in
   different funds than the class had standing where all of the funds were part of
   same “suite” of products, in which investing was “allegedly imprudent due
   to the same decisions or courses of conduct” of the defendants).3

           3
              While we have previously affirmed the usage of the class certification approach,
   Cooper v. Univ. of Tex. at Dall., 482 F. Supp. 187, 190–91 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“[A]s the
   relationship between a class representative and the class members becomes increasingly
   drawn out, Article III concerns start to rise. Even if this is so, this concern . . . is only a
   prudential limitation of Article III because the class representative at the least alleges an
   injury in fact. At the same time, Rule 23 . . . must be viewed against the nature and purpose
   of the substantive law underlying the claims at issue. In an employment discrimination case,
   the court must apply Rule 23 in such a way as to fulfill Congress’ purposes in enacting Title
   VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1974 [sic].”), aff’d, 648 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981)
   (per curiam), we did so before the Supreme Court decided the trio of cases most often used

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           Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have standing under
   either approach, we need not decide which of the two controls in this circuit.
   It is clear that each Plaintiff individually satisfies the less stringent class
   certification approach. Indeed, there is no dispute that each Plaintiff alleges
   that he or she has suffered some injury; the disagreement between the parties
   concerns how those injuries relate to those of the class.
           Plaintiffs also meet the more intensive standing approach. We
   evaluate standing “on a claim-by-claim basis.” James v. City of Dall., 254
   F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2001). Counts I through V of the Complaint contain
   vastly similar claims. In each of these counts, the Complaint alleges that each
   Plaintiff is entitled to Purchasing Fees from his or her corresponding
   defendant insurer. No Plaintiff, though, alleges that he or she was deprived
   of all three Purchasing Fees. GEICO argues that Plaintiffs allege three
   separate injuries: a deprivation of sales tax, of title fees, and of registration
   fees. GEICO emptily asserts that its liability for each Purchasing Fee will
   need to be “separately analyzed because the business practice associated with
   whether that [Purchasing Fee] was paid and whether that [Purchasing Fee]
   is covered is different.” GEICO contends that its liability for taxes versus
   fees is fundamentally different, pointing to Plaintiffs’ use of different experts
   to prove GEICO’s liability for each.
           We disagree with the contention that Plaintiffs have alleged three
   separate injuries. GEICO’s failure to remit any of the three Purchasing Fees
   amounts to the same harm—a breach of the Policies. Whether GEICO is
   liable to Plaintiffs for any of the Purchasing Fees is dependent on an
   interpretation on the same language in the Policies and how the Policies

   to support the standing approach, see Blum, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
   343 (1996); Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

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   calculate ACV. Although each of the Purchasing Fees may accrue differently,
   e.g., through the acquisition of a vehicle or upon the expiration of a vehicle’s
   registration, the complained injury stems from GEICO’s failed remittance,
   not the costs as assessed by the State. Plaintiffs’ injuries in Counts I through
   V are thus best defined as the failure to be fully compensated for their
   respective Purchasing Fees on account of breaches of the Policies. This is
   essentially the same injury that the putative class is alleged to have suffered:
   an underpayment of their Purchasing Fees due to breaches of the Policies. As
   with Plaintiffs’ injuries, the class’s injuries also depend on an interpretation
   of the Policies as they apply to Purchasing Fees and GEICO’s failure to remit
   those fees. We are also convinced that due to the similarity between the
   injuries, Plaintiffs’ interests are sufficiently aligned with those of the class.
   Plaintiffs thus satisfy the standing approach as well.4
           The remaining elements of standing are not in dispute, i.e., causation
   and redressability. If Plaintiffs were indeed harmed, no one contests that this
   harm must have been caused by GEICO’s underpayment of ACV. And such
   an underpayment may be remedied through money damages. Accordingly,
   Plaintiffs have demonstrated their standing under either the class
   certification or standing approach.
                                              III.
           Because Plaintiffs have class standing, we turn to the remaining issues
   concerning class certification. We review an order certifying a class for an

           4
              In disputing Plaintiffs’ standing, GEICO also argues that the alleged harms and
   the calculation of damages originating from its liability would be claim-specific. This
   argument is meritless largely for the reasons given above. The alleged harm suffered by
   Plaintiffs and the class is fundamentally the same—damages resulting from a breach of the
   Policies. Whether the calculation of damages is too claim-specific is a matter better suited
   for class certification, which we address below. See infra Part III.C.

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   abuse of discretion. Cleven v. Mid-Am. Apartment Cmtys., Inc., 20 F.4th 171,
   176 (5th Cir. 2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs only when all reasonable
   persons would reject the view of the district court.” Id. (quoting Union Asset
   Mgmt. Holding A.G. v. Dell, Inc., 669 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2012)). “Implicit
   in this deferential standard is a recognition of the essentially factual basis of
   the certification inquiry and of the district court’s inherent power to manage
   and control pending litigation.” Id. (quoting M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry,
   675 F.3d 832, 836 (5th Cir. 2012)). “A district court also abuses its discretion
   if its decision is based on ‘an erroneous understanding of governing law.’”
   Id. (quoting Ahmad v. Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 698, 702 (5th
   Cir. 2012)). “‘A district court must conduct a rigorous analysis of the rule 23
   prerequisites before certifying a class,’ but ‘[t]he decision to certify is within
   the broad discretion of the court’ as long as ‘that discretion [is] exercised
   within the framework of rule 23.’” Cleven, 20 F.4th at 176 (alterations in
   original) (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740 (5th Cir.
   1996)).
          Rule 23 prescribes four prerequisites for certification of a class action:
          (1)    the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
                 impracticable;
          (2)    there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
          (3)    the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
                 typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
          (4)    the representative parties will fairly and adequately
                 protect the interests of the class.
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Here, the district court certified the class under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). A class action certified under this
   rule may be maintained if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact
   common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
   individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available

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   methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
                                          A.
          As an alternative to its standing argument, GEICO contends that the
   class does not otherwise fulfill Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement.
   Typicality “focuses on the similarity between the named plaintiffs’ legal and
   remedial theories and the theories of those whom they purport to represent.”
   Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting James v.
   City of Dall., 254 F.3d 551, 571 (5th Cir. 2001)). “[A] complete identity of
   claims” is not required; “[r]ather, the critical inquiry is whether the [named
   plaintiff’s] claims have the same essential characteristics of those of the
   putative class. If the claims arise from a similar course of conduct and share
   the same legal theory, factual differences will not defeat typicality.” Id.
   (quoting James, 254 F.3d at 571).
          GEICO’s contentions regarding typicality are nearly identical to those
   that it raises regarding standing above. Specifically, GEICO asserts that
   because no Plaintiff alleges that he or she was deprived payment for all of the
   Purchasing Fees, his or her claims are not typical of those of the class. Again,
   GEICO argues that there are three separate injuries, and thus three separate
   claims, for the failure to receive payment for each of the types of Purchasing
   Fees. And, adopting this multi-claim framework, GEICO avers that each
   claim is attributable to a distinct course of conduct. Our conclusion, however,
   is the same as in our standing analysis, even when assessing the nature of
   Plaintiffs’ claims in greater detail. The course of conduct here is virtually the
   same across the alleged deprivations of each Purchasing Fee, i.e., whether
   GEICO breached the Policies. GEICO asserts that different legal questions
   will be implicated for each of the Purchasing Fees at issue in the Policies but,
   as with its standing arguments, provides no concrete examples for why this

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   might be. Such speculation is an insufficient basis for us to rule that the
   district court abused its discretion. We accordingly affirm the district court’s
   ruling as to typicality.
                                          B.
          GEICO next challenges Plaintiffs’ adequacy as class representatives.
   A court considers three factors when adjudging the adequacy of named
   plaintiffs:
          (1) “the zeal and competence of the representative[s’]
          counsel”; (2) “the [willingness] and ability of the
          representative[s] to take an active role in and control the
          litigation and to protect the interests of absentees”; and (3) the
          risk of “conflicts of interest between the named plaintiffs and
          the class they seek to represent.”
   Slade v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 856 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
   Feder v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 429 F.3d 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2005)). “When the
   class representative proposes waiving some of the class’s claims, the decision
   risks creating an irreconcilable conflict of interest with the class.” Id. But not
   all conflicts of interest will defeat adequacy. Id. Consequently, if a class
   representative chooses to forego certain claims, a court must assess:
          (1) the risk that unnamed class members will forfeit their right
          to pursue the waived claim in future litigation, (2) the value of
          the waived claim, and (3) the strategic value of the waiver,
          which can include the value of proceeding as a class (if the
          waiver is key to certification).
   Id. at 413. The first of the Slade factors invokes the doctrine of claim
   preclusion, which “bars the litigation of claims that have been or should have
   been raised in an earlier suit.” Snow Ingredients, Inc. v. SnoWizard, Inc., 833
   F.3d 512, 521 (5th Cir. 2016). The test for claim preclusion has four elements:

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          (1) the parties are identical or in privity; (2) the judgment in the
          prior action was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
          (3) the prior action was concluded by a final judgment on the
          merits; and (4) the same claim or cause of action was involved
          in both actions.
   Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005). We
   utilize a transactional test in determining whether the same claim is
   implicated in two suits. The transactional test asks “whether the facts in the
   two suits are ‘related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form
   a convenient trial unit,’ in short, whether they are based on the ‘same nucleus
   of operative facts.’” Snow Ingredients, 833 F.3d at 521 (citation omitted) (first
   quoting Test Masters, 428 F.3d at 571; and then quoting N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
   Gillispie, 203 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 2000)).
          Here, GEICO argues that Plaintiffs’ suit risks waiving potentially
   valuable claims related to how GEICO initially valued a class member’s
   vehicle before accounting for Purchasing Fees, i.e., the Adjusted Vehicle
   Value (“AVV”). According to GEICO, some class members may want to
   contest GEICO’s original assessment of their vehicles’ AVV; however,
   claims related to AVV underpayment are absent from this litigation. GEICO
   contends that if AVV underpayment claims are not brought in this suit, then
   class members will be precluded from bringing them in a future action.
   GEICO also avers that including claims for AVV underpayment would
   jeopardize Plaintiffs’ chances of achieving class certification, and therefore,
   Plaintiffs strategically omitted these claims from the present action despite
   their viability. Consequently, GEICO argues that an irreconcilable conflict of
   interest exists between Plaintiffs and the class, making Plaintiffs inadequate
   class representatives.
          Turning to the Slade factors, GEICO begins by contending that the
   risk of claim preclusion is high because the calculation of a class member’s

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   vehicle’s sales tax—a component of Purchasing Fees—necessarily relies on
   the class member’s AVV. As to the value of the AVV claims, GEICO asserts
   that the potential AVV claims are more valuable than the present ACV
   claims. According to GEICO, approximately 95% of the class would be
   entitled to roughly $100 each if Plaintiffs’ ACV claims are successful.
   Meanwhile, GEICO contends that cases claiming AVV miscalculations
   allege multiples more in damages on a per-plaintiff basis. Accordingly,
   GEICO suggests that the strategic value of waiving the claims (to achieve
   certification of this class) does not outweigh the value of the waived AVV
   claims.
           We are unconvinced, however, that such a conflict exists. We are
   particularly skeptical of the purported value of these potential AVV claims.
   Plaintiffs assert that the Complaint does not include a theory of AVV
   underpayment because there is no merit to such a claim. And while GEICO
   directs us to district court cases where such a theory was employed, it fails to
   explain how those cases are akin to ours or why such claims would be similarly
   viable here. It is often possible that by becoming part of a class, a class
   member will waive potential claims. But it is also true that many of those
   potential claims never make the leap from hypothetical to asserted claims due
   to their dubious value. Here, we find GEICO’s explanations to be somewhat
   lacking in trying to overcome this hurdle and thus ascribe limited value to the
   potential AVV claims.5
           Any residual concerns we have regarding preclusion are assuaged by
   the ability of Rule 23(b)(3) class members to opt out. See Slade, 856 F.3d at

           5
             GEICO also asserts that class members will be unable to bring claims in a future
   action relating to any other fees associated with ACV not covered in the present litigation.
   We likewise find this argument highly speculative as GEICO provides no suggestions as to
   what these other fees might be.

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   414 (“We note that the risk to unnamed class members is smaller than usual
   here because of the opportunity for opt outs.”). GEICO counters that the
   ability to opt out insufficiently mitigates the risk of uninformed preclusion
   because no form of notice can provide class members with adequate
   information to calculate the value of their possible AVV claims. This
   argument is too speculative. GEICO provides no further explanation why this
   would be the case, and we see this as a minimal risk due to the questionable
   value of the AVV claims. We also consider that “courts have inconsistently
   applied claim preclusion to class actions,” meaning waiver is far from a
   foregone conclusion here. Id. at 413–14 (collecting cases). The risk of
   preclusion is thus far from certain to the extent that the AVV claims are
   viable.
             Lastly, the parties agree that Plaintiffs would likely be unable to certify
   the class had they included the AVV claims in their suit, due to the highly
   individualized nature of those claims. Therefore, given the speculative value
   of the AVV claims, the impediment they pose to class certification, and the
   uncertainty surrounding this suit’s preclusive effect, we conclude that the
   strategic value of these claims’ waiver is considerably greater than their
   inherent worth. It was accordingly within the district court’s discretion to
   rule that Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives.6
                                             C.
             In opposing class certification, GEICO also contests the class’s ability
   to meet Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.

             6
            While many of GEICO’s arguments have been rejected for being too speculative
   or underdeveloped, the district court may of course decertify the class if evidence
   supporting GEICO’s arguments is unearthed at a later date. See Slade, 856 F.3d at 414;
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

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          “Determining whether legal issues common to the class predominate
   over individual issues requires that the court inquire how the case will be
   tried.” O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 738 (5th
   Cir. 2003). “This entails identifying the substantive issues that will control
   the outcome, assessing which issues will predominate, and then determining
   whether the issues are common to the class.” Id.
          An individual question is one where “members of a proposed
          class will need to present evidence that varies from member to
          member,” while a common question is one where “the same
          evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie
          showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide
          proof.”
   Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (alteration in
   original) (quoting 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class
   Actions § 4:50 (5th ed. 2012)). “Even where plaintiffs seeking class
   certification show that common issues predominate on questions of liability,
   they must also present a damages model ‘establishing that damages are
   capable of measurement on a classwide basis.’” Cruson v. Jackson Nat’l Life
   Ins. Co., 954 F.3d 240, 258 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
   569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013)). Some degree of individual calculation, however, is
   not fatal to satisfying predominance. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d
   790, 815–16 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[N]othing in Comcast mandates a formula for
   classwide measurement of damages in all cases.”); Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of
   Cont’l Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that “[a]lthough
   calculating damages will require some individualized determinations, it
   appears that virtually every issue prior to damages is a common issue” in
   holding that predominance was satisfied).
          Like its earlier argument regarding adequacy, see supra Part III.B,
   GEICO contends that the AVV of each class member will be at issue in

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                                         No. 22-20093

   determining whether GEICO is liable for an underpayment of ACV. GEICO
   asserts that re-calculating AVV would be a highly intensive and
   individualized process that would not be predominated by the other legal
   issues common to the class. We find this argument unpersuasive for similar
   reasons that we did above. Plaintiffs represent that they do not intend to
   challenge GEICO’s prior AVV determinations. Furthermore, GEICO has
   not convincingly shown how AVV calculations could become a relevant issue
   in this case without them being raised by Plaintiffs.7 There is thus little
   indication that individualized AVV calculations will become an issue in this
   litigation based on this action’s current construction.
           GEICO also disputes that Plaintiffs’ damages are necessarily capable
   of classwide measurement. See Cruson, 954 F.3d at 258. But the need for
   individual calculation here is relatively minor when compared to the common
   issues that predominate. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 815–16
   (5th Cir. 2014); Bertulli, 242 F.3d at 298. And Plaintiffs articulate a
   reasonably ascertainable formula. Sales tax is equivalent to 6.25% of AVV, see
   Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 152.021, and Plaintiffs contend that it can be
   calculated for almost 97% of the class without resort to individualized review.

           7
             For the first time on appeal, GEICO argues that AVV calculations will be relevant
   to its defense, based on a theory of ACV overpayment due to overvaluing some class
   members’ AVV. Specifically, GEICO asserts that even if it is liable for payment of all
   Purchasing Fees, some class members whose AVV was overvalued may have already
   received ACV payments that meet or exceed an adjusted ACV accounting for GEICO’s
   Purchasing Fees liability and a correctly reduced AVV calculation. This argument is
   forfeited because GEICO failed to raise it in the district court. See Rollins v. Home Depot
   USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it
   in the first instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal.”).
   GEICO contends that its new overpayment theory inhered in its predominance arguments
   below regarding the individualized nature of Plaintiffs’ claims. We disagree. GEICO’s
   argument below did not fairly notice either Plaintiffs or the district court to this
   overpayment theory.

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   Additionally, Plaintiffs’ expert included a table in his expert report that may
   be used to calculate class members’ title and registration fees. Therefore, the
   district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the class satisfies
   Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.
                                          D.
          Lastly, GEICO challenges the district court’s certification of
   Plaintiffs’ TPPCA claim.
          Under the TPPCA,
          if an insurer, after receiving all items, statements, and forms
          reasonably requested and required . . . delays payment of the
          claim for a period exceeding the period specified by other
          applicable statutes or, if other statutes do not specify a period,
          for more than 60 days, the insurer shall pay damages and other
          items as provided by Section 542.060.
   Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 542.058. To prevail on a TPPCA claim, a
   plaintiff must establish: “(1) the amount for which [the insurer] is
   contractually liable under the insurance policy; (2) that [the insurer] failed to
   comply with statutory deadlines; and (3) statutory damages based on the
   amount contractually owed less the amounts paid within the statutory
   deadline.” Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds, 619 S.W.3d 651, 658–59 (Tex. 2021).
   “Nothing in the TPPCA would excuse an insurer from liability for TPPCA
   damages if it was liable under the terms of the policy but delayed payment
   beyond the applicable statutory deadline.” Barbara Techs. Corp. v. State Farm
   Lloyds, 589 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. 2019).
          Here, the district court determined that if the underlying claims for
   breach of the Policies merited certification, so too did Plaintiffs’ TPPCA
   claim because the TPPCA is a strict liability statute. GEICO does not
   seriously contest that, if failure to remit the Purchasing Fees is a breach of

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   the Policies, it likely failed to comply with the 60-day statutory deadline for
   most of the class. GEICO counters that it still may have complied with the
   Texas Insurance Code if it made a reasonable payment within a reasonable
   time. For a payment to be reasonable, it “must ‘roughly correspond’ to the
   amount ultimately owed.” Randel v. Travelers Lloyds of Tex. Ins. Co., 9 F.4th
   264, 269 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Hinojos, 619 S.W.3d at 658). GEICO has
   already paid each class member roughly the same proportion of his or her
   total ACV. If the class were to succeed on its claim for breach of the Policies,
   each class member would be owed roughly the same proportion of Purchasing
   Fees relative to the AVV GEICO has already paid. Therefore, a judgment as
   to whether GEICO complied with the TPPCA should not vary across class
   members, and thus whether GEICO’s payments were reasonable does not
   preclude class certification.8
           GEICO also contends that the district court’s analysis regarding
   certification of the TPPCA claim did not meet the rigor that is required. See
   Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011). “[T]o satisfy the
   rigor requirement, a district court must detail with specificity its reasons for
   certifying.” Chavez v. Plan Benefit Servs., Inc., 957 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir.
   2020). “It must explain and apply the substantive law governing the
   plaintiffs’ claims to the relevant facts and defenses, articulating why the
   issues are fit for classwide resolution.” Id. “The court should respond to the

           8
              GEICO also argues that whether each class member complied with the TPPCA,
   i.e., provided the necessary documentation as requested by GEICO to process his or her
   insurance claim, will be a highly individualized process and it will thus be difficult to
   determine GEICO’s liability across the class. GEICO’s concern here is purely speculative.
   Indeed, it is hard to fathom how an insured would be able to join the class without already
   submitting her claim and having it successfully processed by GEICO. We doubt that
   GEICO would process an insured’s claim if the insured failed to submit the required
   documentation.

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                                     No. 22-20093

   defendants’ legitimate protests of individualized issues that could preclude
   class treatment.” Id.
            Here, the entirety of the district court’s analysis regarding the TPPCA
   reads:
            This Court agrees with plaintiffs that the Texas Prompt
            Payment of Claims Act (TTPCA [sic]) is a strict liability
            statute. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court recently held
            “Nothing in the TPPCA would excuse an insurer from liability
            for TPPCA damages if it was liable under the terms of the
            policy but delayed payment beyond the applicable statutory
            deadline.” Barbara Techs., 589 S.W.3d 806, 819 (Tex. 2019).
            As such, there is no reason to distinguish between certification
            of the underlying breach of contract claim and the TTPCA [sic]
            claim.
   Relying on the reasoning we affirmed above, the court explained that a more
   thorough analysis regarding the TPPCA was unnecessary because it is a strict
   liability statute. We agree. GEICO’s arguments against class certification for
   this claim largely track its arguments opposing certification of Plaintiffs’
   other claims—mainly, that either ACV or AVV require too individualized of
   an assessment across the class. The district court addressed this in its analysis
   concerning the claims for breach of the Policies. Repeating this analysis again
   for the TPPCA claim would be a redundant exercise. The court’s analysis
   here meets the requisite rigor when read in the broader context of its decision.
   Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the
   class as to the TPPCA claim.
                                          IV.
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

                                          20