Court Opinion

ID: 9477268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:18:52.105606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:46.992027
License: Public Domain

COFFIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I think the jury should have been permitted to resolve the question whether Paglia’s proteinuria was a .disease or bodily infirmity. Although plaintiffs expert, Dr. Davis, could not rule out this possibility, it was nevertheless his opinion that the pro-teinuria was not a disease or infirmity. Asked whether Paglia’s proteinuria in any way impaired his bodily functions, Dr. Davis replied, “I have an opinion based on the autopsy report because I think there’s substantial evidence that except for hypo-plasia, he had no renal infirmity.” (As the insurer had never asserted that the protein-uria resulted from anything other than renal dysfunction, the jury reasonably could have understood Dr. Davis as having ruled out proteinuria as an infirmity of whatever sort.) Dr. Davis also testified that in his opinion Paglia did not have any bodily infirmity that directly or indirectly contributed to his death. This, in my view, was enough to create a jury question.
Nor am I able to concur in the result based on the panel’s suggested alternative ground: the distinction between “accidental means” and “accidental results.” An increasing number of jurisdictions are rejecting this distinction as artificial and confusing. See 10 M. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance 2d, § 41.31 (Rev. ed. 1982) (collecting cases). Interpreting the two terms as synonymous “is clearly the preferred construction of policy language.” Id. § 41.29 at 45. This issue has never been raised by the parties to this case, either below or on appeal. I think it would be unfair for us to base our decision on this ground without first having afforded the parties an opportunity to argue whether Rhode Island, which has not considered the issue since 1922, would follow the trend and abolish the distinction.