Court Opinion

ID: 9677115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:43:55.59418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.955432
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because there was sufficient evidence to support the decision of the jury and the opinion of the Court of Appeals is not in error. This case requires only the application of the principles established in Raine v. Drasin, Ky., 621 S.W.2d 895 (1981) to the facts.
This is a particularly fact-oriented situation. It involves the investigation of alleged child abuse, the execution of an emergency custody order and the efforts of the child’s mother to recover the child as well as the conduct of her pro bono attorney. The mother was not served with a copy of the emergency custody order but was subsequently notified to attend a hearing in district court. She did not attend the first hearing or the rescheduled hearing. She did meet with the social workers to develop a treatment plan designed to assist her in regaining custody. On August 13, the mother appeared and informed the district court that she had retained a legal aid attorney. She discharged that attorney soon thereafter and contacted private attorney Prewitt. She gave Prewitt a variety of papers she had received from the Department of Social Services, but she did not have a copy of the custody order. Prewitt testified that he did" not read any of the “bureacratie junk” given to him by the mother. He sent the mother to the courthouse to obtain any orders signed by the district judge. She was told the file was confidential and that it contained no orders signed by the judge. Prewitt then went to the courthouse and was also denied access to the file without an order from the district judge. When he asked what was in the file signed by the judge, he was advised *899“nothing.” He then went to the office of social services and was unable to speak with Ratliff who was out of the office. Prewitt refused to leave his name, wait or schedule an appointment.
At trial, Attorney Prewitt testified that he did not think it was worth his time to go to Morehead where the district judge was sitting in an attempt to obtain an order allowing access to the record. There is no evidence that he made any further attempts to investigate the situation, but instead, on September 6, prepared and filed a one paragraph petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a complaint seeking damages for violation of the mother’s civil rights. At a hearing on a motion to dismiss, Prew-itt was shown a copy of the emergency custody order, and he immediately moved for a voluntary dismissal which was subsequently granted. Thereafter, Sexton and Ratliff sued Prewitt for malicious prosecution. The basic elements to maintain such an action are described in Raine v. Drasin, supra.
At the time he filed the suit, Prewitt knew that the infant was in the custody of the Cabinet for Human Resources. He also knew that proceedings had been scheduled for a district judge in Bath District Court and that his client had appeared before the district judge and had been told to tell her lawyer to call the county attorney to schedule a hearing on the matter. He had been provided with numerous reports and summaries by the social workers regarding the juvenile proceedings and the emergency custody orders but he did not read the reports. He made no effort to obtain information about the case from the county attorney either by telephone or correspondence and his efforts to obtain information from the social workers was limited to stopping at their offices during lunch time, unannounced, without identifying himself and demanding to see the file. The office receptionist was correct in view of K.R.S. 199.335(9) and K.R.S. 194.060 in refusing to allow Prewitt to examine the records at that time. Raine establishes that an attorney has an obligation to make a reasonable investigation of the facts and law prior to filing suit, and that such failure is material to the question of probable cause in a malicious prosecution action.
The confidentiality of juvenile records at the time of this action was controlled by the old juvenile code, K.R.S. 208.030 and K.R.S. 208.060(1). The new juvenile code specifically provides that all juvenile court records are confidential. K.R.S. 610.340(1). This question has little significance in this case because neither Sexton nor Ratliff was responsible for the attorney’s failure to obtain the records he requested from the district court clerk.
The attorney admits that the purpose of bringing the initial suit against the social workers was to “attract their attention and force them to come to us."
The fact that counsel was in a “pro bono ” matter is not an excuse for his failure to make a sufficient investigation of the facts and law to establish probable cause prior to filing any suit. The practice of law is a profession and the fact that an attorney accepts a case without the expectation of receiving a fee does not excuse his conduct.
Clearly the award of damages is very high. But the evidence indicates that the attorney decided it would be cheaper to file the habeas corpus-civil rights action and to wait for the social workers to come to him than to drive to Rowan County, call the county attorney or otherwise get an order from the district judge permitting him to examine the file. The majority may be correct in indicating that there is a more appropriate relief against attorneys for the victims of groundless lawsuit by the use of Civil Rule 11 or a motion for relief under Civil Rule 73. However, the choice of forum and style of action still resides in the plaintiff. Here the plaintiff chose malicious prosecution, and I do not believe this Court can second guess that choice. I would affirm the jury verdict and the decision of the Court of Appeals.