Court Opinion

ID: 9587655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:46.147824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:57.655341
License: Public Domain

*168PLEICONES, Justice:
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority that Quality has shown a violation of the Freedom of Information Act. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the towing contract awarded to Auto Body Works was a franchise.
“[A] franchise is the privilege of doing that which does not belong to citizens of the country generally by common right....” State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. 1, 35, 153 S.E. 537, 548 (1929). “Traditionally, governmental franchises are obtained by service-type businesses which seek the municipality’s permission to do business with the municipality’s citizens, and are willing to pay the municipality for this privilege.” City of Cayce v. AT & T Communications of Southern States, Inc., 326 S.C. 237, 241, 486 S.E.2d 92, 94 (1997) (emphasis added). In the traditional franchise situation, the municipality’s residents and businesses are the franchisee’s primary clientele. Id.
The Service Contract between City and Auto Body Works provide “towing and storage services shall be provided when requested by the City.... ” It contains a provision specifically recognizing a vehicle owner may obtain towing and storage services from any wrecker service.
The Service Contract provides the City with specific services, and requires the City to pay for these services. Under the terms of the Service Contract, Auto Body Works provides services to City, not to City’s citizens or businesses. Accordingly, the agreement between City and Auto Body Works is a contract, not a franchise. While the agreement also provides that Auto Body Works is the “default” towing service for certain individuals and businesses, in my. view, this provision does not transform a routine procurement contract into a franchise. Similarly, as recognized by the majority, the 1995 Ordinance “instructed the City Manager to contract with one or more wrecker services to provide towing services for the City.” (emphasis added). While the 1995 Ordinance limited the businesses with which City contracted, it did not prevent other businesses from engaging in wrecker services for City’s citizens. The 1995 Ordinance did not contemplate the granting of a franchise.
*169Since I would not decide the appeal on the franchise issue, I find it necessary to briefly address Quality’s' remaining claims. Quality’s due process and inverse condemnation claims are predicated on its assertion of a “property interest” in remaining eligible to tow cars. The fact that Quality at one time had a definite term contract for towing services does not create a cognizable “property interest” in continuing to tow cars for the City. Further, I find no impropriety or violations of any procurement code in the award of this contract. Although the committee may not have conducted its activities in the most exemplary manner, the fact remains that its role was merely advisory. The contract was awarded by the City Manager and approved by the City Council. I can find no allegations or evidence of improprieties under those codes on their part. Finally, this three year contract is not impermissibly long. Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 459 S.E.2d 876 (Ct.App.1995), aff'd 324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996). I would affirm the referee’s rulings on these issues.
As noted above, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that there were two violations of the FOIA, and therefore concur in the majority’s decision to remand this matter to determine whether Quality is entitled to any relief under S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4^100 (1991).
BURNETT, J., concurs.