Court Opinion

ID: 9736085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:43:01.936953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:54.508908
License: Public Domain

*288DISSENTING OPINION
Martin, J.
I cannot agree with the results of the majority opinion. I can agree that the only question in this appeal is the proper construction of Chapter 309 of the Acts of the General Assembly, approved March 15, 1913, and that this Act has not been construed by the higher courts of this state.
The legislature, in writing this law covering the subject of revocation of wills by subsequent marriage, divided wills into two classes, those which were executed by persons while they were married, and those executed by persons while they were unmarried. This law grants to persons who were married when they executed a will privileges and immunities which are not granted to that class of persons who were unmarried at the time they executed a will.
In the case of Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler (1927), 199 Ind. 95, 101, 155 N. E. 465, the court said:
“The question of classification is primarily for the legislature and does not become a judicial question unless it clearly appears that the legislative classification is not based on substantial distinctions with reference to the subject-matter, or is manifestly unjust or unreasonable. Denny v. City of Muncie (1925), 197 Ind. 28, 149 N. E. 639; Koplovitz v. Jensen (1926), 197 Ind. 475, 151 N. E. 390; Maercker v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. (1912), 151 Wis. 324, 139 N. W. 199.
“In determining the legality of classification, the subject to be regulated, the character, extent and purpose of the regulation, the classes of persons or corporations legally and naturally affected by the regulation should all be considered. One of the essential requirements in order that the classification may not violate the constitutional guaranty as to equal protection of the laws, is that it must be reasonable and natural and not capricious or arbitrary. 12 C. J. 1128-1130; 6 R. C. L. 373-386, and cases cited.
*289“The law requires something, more than a mere designation of characteristics which will serve to divide into groups. Arbitrary selection or mere identification cannot be justified by calling it classification. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Ellis (1896), 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255, 41 L. Ed. 666; Rosencranz v. City of Evansville (1924), 194 Ind. 499, 143 N. E. 593; McKinster v. Sager (1904), 163 Ind. 671, 72 N. E. 854, 106 Am. St. 268, 68 L. R. A. 273. The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification must be such as to show an inherent difference in situation and subject-matter of the subjects placed in different classes which peculiarly requires and necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them. Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough (1907), 168 Ind. 671, 80 N. E. 529, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418; Selvage v. Talbott (1911), 175 Ind. 648, 95 N. E. 114, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen (1912), 177 Ind. 1, 97 N. E. 1; Dixon v. Poe (1902), 159 Ind. 492, 65 N. E. 518, 60 L. R. A. 308; Billings v. Illinois (1902), 188 U. S. 97, 23 Sup. Ct. 272, 47 L. Ed. 400; Alexander v. City of Elizabeth (1893), 56 N. J. Law 71, 28 Atl. 51, 23 L. R. A. 525; State v. Sheriff of Ramsey County (1891), 48 Minn. 236, 51 N. W. 112, 31 Am. St. 650; State v. McFarland (1910), 60 Wash. 98, 110 Pac. 792, 140 Am. St. 909.
“A proper classification must embrace all who naturally belong to the class — all who possess a common disability, attribute or qualification and there must be some natural and substantial difference germane to the subject and purposes of the legislation between those within the class included and those whom it leaves untouched. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v Westby (1910), 178 Fed. 619, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 97; Selvage v. Talbott, supra; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, supra; Kraus v. Lehman (1908), 170 Ind. 408, 83 N. E. 714, 84 N. E. 769; Barrett v. Indiana (1913), 229 U. S. 26, 57 L. Ed. 1050; Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers (1907), 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct. 28, 52 L. Ed. 108; Maercker v. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co., supra. The legislature cannot take what might be termed a natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the orig*290inal unit as two classes, and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each. State v. Julow (1895), 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781, 50 Am. St. 443, 29 L. R. A. 257; State v. Miksicek (1910), 225 Mo. 561, 125 S. W. 507, 135 Am. St. 597.”
In the recent case of Hayes v. Taxpayers Research Ass’n. (1947), 225 Ind. 242, 72 N. E. 2d 658, the legislature passed an Act and limited its application to those townships that had purchased fire-fighting equipment prior to the taking effect of the Act. As in the case now before the court, an effort was made to sustain the legislation upon the theory that the legislature had a right to thus classify townships for legislative purposes. Beginning at page 246 of the opinion the court said:
“As a result we have a classification that is rather narrow and which hardly answers to the test of reasonableness. As we view it, the legislature can declare a taxing unit that is equal to, greater or less than the unit of the township, at least for some purposes, but it must be a classification that is reasonable and that inheres in the subject-matter of the legislation.
“Article 1, §23 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana is as follows:
“ ‘The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.’
“Under Article 4, §22 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, it is stated that:
“ ‘The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: (( Í f
“ TO. Regulating county and township business; (( C t
“ ‘12. For the assessment and collection of taxes for State, county, township, or road purposes;’
*291“Article 4, §23 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana is as follows:
“ ‘In all the cases enumerated in the preceding Section, and in all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State.’
“In discussing a tax statute this court in Board, etc., v. Johnson (1909), 173 Ind. 76, 87, 89 N. E. 590, 594, said:
“ ‘The classification itself must be based upon natural reasons, upon reasons which naturally inhere in the subject-matter, upon a real difference existing between the classes, so as to produce no distinction between members of the same class.’
“In Crawford’s Statutory Construction, p. 118, §82, it is said:
“ ‘In many instances, therefore, the validity of a general law will depend upon the basis for the classification of the subject-matter to which it applies. We have already stated that the classification must be a reasonable one. Moreover, it must be founded upon substantial distinctions, inherent in the subject-matter, which make one class really different from another; and the characteristics which form the basis of the classification must be germane to the purpose of the law.’
“In Sutherland’s Statutory Construction by Horade (3rd ed.) Vol. 2, p. 20, §2106, the author in discussing classification makes this statement:
“'. . . Thus, classification must be prospective and permit the future entrance into the class when its qualification and standards have been met. The restrictions may place either wide or narrow limits on the class, but the nearer a classification comes to total generality the more susceptible it is to attack.
“ ‘A valid classification must include all who “naturally” belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be some natural and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the courts as “natural,” it can not be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the *292original unit designated with different rules of government established for each.’
“The recent case of Perry Civil Twp. v. Indianapolis Power and Light Co. (1943), 222 Ind. 84, 91, 51 N. E. 2d 371, 374, involved a question of classification and in that case this court said:
“ ‘Pass a law of general nature, without any words of application, and it operates uniformly throughout the state. Pass such a law and attempt to limit its operation (by a proviso or exception in the nature of a special act) and either the law or the limitation will be void. Darling v. Rodgers (1871), 7 Kan. 592.’
“In the case of Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Robinson (1901), 157 Ind. 232, 236, 61 N. E. 197, 198, it was said:
“ ‘Interdicted, local and special laws are all those that rest on a false or deficient classification; their vice is that they do not embrace all the class to which they are naturally related; they create preference, and establish inequalities; they apply to persons, things or places possessed of certain qualities or situations, and exclude from their effect other persons, things or places which are not dissimilar in these respects.’ ”
In conclusion the court further said:
“The mere incident of having already purchased equipment gave to those townships a right to tax the whole township for the use of a lesser unit. That mere incident gave to those townships a right not granted to all townships under the same or similar conditions. Certainly the mere purchase before a given date could not instill into those townships a difference in character that reasonably could be said to inhere in the subject of fire-fighting in the favored townships. It is both artificial and arbitrary and in conflict with the constitutional inhibitions of Art. 1, §23 and Art. 4, §§22 and 23 of our basic law. Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler (1927), 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465; State v. Wiggam (1918), 187 Ind. 159, 118 N. E. 684; Davis Construction Co. v. Board, etc. (1922), 192 Ind. 144, 132 N. E. 629; Ettinger v. Studevent; Hole *293v. Dice (1942), 219 Ind. 406, 38 N. E. 2d 1000; Heckler v. Conter (1934), 206 Ind. 376, 187 N. E. 878.”
In the case of Dowd, Warden v. Stuckey (1943), 222 Ind. 100, 51 N. E. 2d 947, our Supreme Court states the rule as follows:
“But this power is limited by the requirement that the classification must rest upon some rational and substantial basis inherent in the subject-matter, some difference in situation which distinguishes those within the class from those without, and which rationally justifies different or unequal treatment. Unless there is such a legal basis for classification, penalties imposed by criminal statutes must apply equally, without privileges or immunities on the one hand or additional burdens upon the other. These principals are fundamental.”
In the case of Kostanzer v. State ex rel. Ramsey (1933), 205 Ind. 536, 187 N. E. 337, the court said:
“One of the statutory ‘good and just’ causes is insubordination, which is defined as ‘wilful refusal to obey the school laws of this state or reasonable rules prescribed for the government of the public schools of such corporation.’ If the rule respecting marriage is a reasonable rule then appellee’s marriage was an act of insubordination and constituted good and just cause for cancellation of her contract. The reason for our holding in School City of Elwood v. State ex rel. Griffin, supra, that marriage of a woman teacher is not legal cause for cancellation of her contract is that her marriage bears no reasonable relation to her fitness or capacity to hold the position of teacher in the public schools and to discharge the duties thereof. For the same reason we conclude that a rule forbidding marriage' óf a woman teacher or declaring that her marriage must ‘automatically terminate her services as a teacher’ is not a reasonable rule. Consequently appellee’s refusal to obey the rule in question was not insubordination and did not constitute ‘good and just pausp’ for cancellation of her contract,”
*294For a classification based upon the marriage status of persons at the time a will was executed, the reasons for a law which provides that a subsequent marriagé shall annul a will is equally applicable to a will inade while a person is married and then becomes single and remarries, as where a person was never married and makes a will and then becomes married. A classification of this kind could not be sustained because it would clearly violate §23 of the Bill of Rights which provides: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens,” and would also violate the provision of the Constitution against special legislation.
“In construing statutes, courts will seek a construction that avoids unconstitutionality.” State ex rel. Robertson v. Circuit Court of Lake Co. (1939), 215 Ind. 18, 29, 17 N. E. 2d 805.
We must look to the title of the act for the scope of the enactment. Dowd, Warden v. Johnston (1943), 221 Ind. 398, 401, 47 N. E. 2d 976; City of Indianapolis v. Evans (1940), 216 Ind. 555, 567, 24 N. E. 2d 776; State ex rel. v. Markey, Judge (1937), 212 Ind. 59, 63, 7 N. E. 2d 989; Zoercher v. Indiana Associated Telephone Corp. (1937), 211 Ind. 447, 7 N. E. 2d 282; Cyrus v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 346, 348, 145 N. E. 497; State v. Shelton (1906), 38 Ind., App. 80, 88, 77 N. E. 1052.
If we are to be guided by the title of this act in determining the purpose and scope of the enactment, there is little room for controversy. This title states that it is an act to render null and void all wills executed before marriage, if the maker afterwards becomes married. There are no limitations, classifications or exceptions suggested. The nullifying fact is marriage after the will is executed. It clearly applies to all wills *295whether made by males or females and suggests no distinction based upon the status of the maker, married or single, at the time the will was executed. There is not the slightest suggestion that the act would have no application if the maker was married at the time the will was executed. Such a distinction would be unreasonable, arbitrary, contrary to public policy and subject the legislature to the charge of attempting to make distinctions without a difference. Such a distinction could not be applied without giving special privileges, destroying equality of rights and subjecting the act to the constitutional inhibitions against special legislation. Intentions of this character cannot be attributed to the legislature if by any reasonable possibility it can be avoided.
In the case of Dowd, Warden v. Johnston, supra, beginning on page 401, we find the following language :
“In construing a statute it is necessary to consider the whole act and all other law relating thereto, and, if possible, give effect to it in all its parts. Huff v. Fetch (1924), 194 Ind. 570, 143 N. E. 705.
“Furthermore that construction should be favored which grants equality of rights and which is against restrictions of liberty. Helms v. American Security Co. (1939), 216 Ind. 1, 6, 22 N. E. 2d 822, 824; In re Petition of Leach, Ex Parte (1893), 134 Ind. 665, 671, 34 N. E. 641, 642, 21 L. R. A. 701, 706.
“When a statute is doubtful or ambiguous, the title thereof may be a guide. Garrigus et al. v. The Board of Commissioners of Parke County (1872), 39 Ind. 66.
“In McNamara v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 596, 601, 181 N. E. 512, 514, this court said:
“ Tn construing a statute, a court will not only look to the particular words used to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, but will also consider the. title of the act, . . .’
“The construction that should be given to a statute is one that will accomplish the intent of the *296Legislature, even though such construction might be contrary to the strict letter thereof. Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Lincoln Nat. Bank (1911), 47 Ind. App. 98, 107, 92 N. E. 384, 387.”
In the case of City of Indianapolis v. Evans, supra, it is stated:
“The purpose and scope of the act must be determined from the title. Rexing v. Princeton Window Glass Co. (1912), 51 Ind. App. 124. Courts will look to the general purpose of the statute and the evil to be remedied. Board, etc. v. Given (1907), 169 Ind. 468; Thorn v. Silver (1910), 174 Ind. 504; Kelso v. Cook (1916), 184 Ind. 173. The evil to be remedied and the purpose of the act is clear. From the title of the act it is evident that the legislature intended that when an obstruction, such as is here in question is erected, it should be painted white, or with black and white stripes alternating, in the absence of any showing why it could not have reasonably been so painted.
“Courts are not always bound by the strict literal meaning of the words used.”
In the case of Zoercher v. Indiana Associated Telephone Corp., supra, it is stated as follows:
“In 2 Lewis’s Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d Ed.) Sec. 348, we find the following language: ‘Not only may the meaning of words be restricted by the subject-matter of an act or to avoid repugnance with other parts, but for like reasons they may be expanded. The application of the words of a single provision may be enlarged or restrained to bring the operation of the act within the intention of the legislature, when violence will not be done by such interpretation to the language of the statute.’ In Endlich, Interp. of Stat., Sec. 73, it is said: ‘The words of a statute are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view.’ It is also said in 2 Lewis’s Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) Sec. 347, ‘When the intention can be col*297lected from the statute, words may be modified, altered or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such intention. . . . The inquiry, where any uncertainty exists, always is as to what the' legislature intended, and when that is ascertained, it always controls.’ In the case of Arnett v. State ex rel. (1907), 168 Ind. 180, 188, 80 N. E. 153, it said, ‘It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that it is the intent or spirit of an enactment, rather than its letter, which is to govern. A construction will not be adopted which leads away from the true intent.’ The intent of the legislature should be given effect, though the strict letter of the statute may not be followed. Penn. Co. v. Mosher, supra. And ‘. . . the legislative intention, as collected from an examination of the whole, as well as the separate parts, of a statute, will prevail over the literal import of particular terms, and will control the strict letter of the statute, where an adherence to such strict letter would lead to injustice, to absurdity, or to contradictory provisions.’ Stout v. The Board of Com’rs. (1886), 107 Ind. 343, 347, 8 N. E. 222. In the case of Cooper v. Metzger (1881), 74 Ind. 544, 550, 551, it is said: ‘The intention of legislators and the purpose of a statute ought not to be made to yield to one or more phrases, when the whole act evinces a different intention and purpose. ... We are to look, not to isolate clauses, but to the entire statute, to ascertain the legislative intention.’ ”
In the case of State v. Shelton, supra, the court said:
“The rule is that where the title of the act limits its effect to certain things, the act itself cannot extend beyond such limitation. Dixon v. Poe (1902), 159 Ind. 492, 60 L. R. A. 308.”
The cases cited also establish this familiar rule:
“Courts are not bound by the strict literal meaning of words or phrases, but must read them in harmony with the general purpose and subject-matter as- shown by the title and the evil to be remedied.”
*298In. the case of State ex rel. v. Markey, Judge, supra, the court said:
“In construing an Act, we must look both to the title and the body of the Act. We think the title of the act, when considered with the body, gives a clear idea of the intention of the legislature. As said in Steiert v. Coulter (1913), 54 Ind. App. 643, 652, 102 N. E. 113, 103 N. E. 117:
“ ‘If the meaning of an act is doubtful, the title if expressive, may serve the purpose of removing the doubt either by extending the purview of the body of the act or by restraining or limiting it to the evident intention of the legislature.’
“There can be no question here that the title is expressive. It is clear that it meant the act to apply to both civil and criminal cases. To hold that it is not applicable to civil cases, would contradict the evident intent of the legislature and if two constructions are possible, that one should be adopted which makes effectual, rather than one which defeats the purpose of the act. Steiert v. Coulter, supra.”
Applying this statement to the present act, we may say that the title is expressive. It is clear that it is meant to apply to all wills which were made before a marriage. To hold that it is not applicable to wills made. during some other marriage and where the person becomes single and then remarried, would contradict the evident intent of the legislature.
It is a universal rule that all statutes will be read, construed and applied in favor of equality of rights, against special privileges, to prevent absurdity, hardships or injustice, and it is the duty of the courts to make statutes conform to the accepted principles of order' and justice. Helms v. American Security Co. (1939), 216 Ind. 1, 5, 22 N. E. 2d 822; Dixon v. Poe (1902), 159 Ind. 492, 65 N. E. 518; Lee v. Burns (1932), 94 Ind. App. 676, 679, 182 N. E. 277; In re *299Petition of Leach, Ex Parte, supra; Dowd, Warden v. Johnston, supra.
In the case of Helms v. American Security Co., supra, the court said:
“We cannot agree with the appellee with respect to the functions of this court. It would lead to serious and evil consequences if courts should be powerless to say or to do anything if the legislative branch of the government should assume to enact unjust and oppressive laws, calculated to prejudice legitimate enterprise and create absurd situations. To meet such situations, if and when they arise, there have been estabilshed rules of statutory construction which may be applied to make statutes conform to the accepted principles of order and justice. It has accordingly been held that statutes should be construed in the most beneficial way the language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice and to favor public convenience and oppose all prejudice of public interests. Gaebler v. Town of Rockville (1933), 96 Ind. App. 715, 185 N. E. 318. All statutes are to be construed as far as possible in favor of equality of rights and against restrictions of human liberty and claims for special privileges. Lee v. Burns (1932), 94 Ind. App. 676, 182 N. E. 277.”
The majority opinion relies on the case of Hibberd v. Trask (1903), 160 Ind. 498, 67 N. E. 179. In that case there was no question of classification involved, therefore, that case cannot be considered as an authority in favor of the validity of a classification such as we have in the Act before the court.
I am of the opinion that the intention of the legislature, by Chapter 309 of the Acts of 1913, rendered null and void a will made by either a male or a female who afterwards becomes married and marriage voids all wills made before the marriage, regardless of the testator’s married or unmarried status at the time the will *300was executed. The judgment in this case is contrary to law and should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 101 N. E. 2d 830.