Court Opinion

ID: 9573793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:59:09.626534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:22.487848
License: Public Domain

WALKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion which reverses for failure to direct a verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the defendant on the grounds that plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to establish his prima facie case of negligence for personal injury against Colonial Associates, L.L.C. (Colonial).
This Court recently reaffirmed the general rule that:
In order to recover at common law for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, a plaintiff must show both “(1) that the animal *419was dangerous, vicious, mischievous, or ferocious, or one termed in law as possessing a vicious propensity; and (2) that the owner or keeper knew or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensity, character, and habits.”
Joslyn v. Blanchard, 149 N.C. App. 625, 628-29, 561 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2002) (quoting Sellers v. Morris, 233 N.C. 560, 561, 64 S.E.2d 662, 663 (1951)).
Inherent in this common law rule is the requirement that the plaintiff present evidence to support the inference that the landlord is either an owner or a keeper of the animal that caused the injury. Our Supreme Court has defined “keeper” as “one who, either with or without the owner’s permission, undertakes to manage, control, or care for the animal as owners in general are accustomed to do.” Swain v. Tillet, 269 N.C. 46, 51, 152 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1967) (emphasis added). Although the Court did not define “control,” a common definition of “control” is “[t]o exercise authoritative or dominating influence over; direct.” The American Heritage College Dictionary 303 (3d ed. 1997).
By virtue of the landlord-tenant relationship, a landlord has control over the premises and the tenant’s conduct on the premises. Lease provisions define the extent of the landlord’s control by either permitting or prohibiting certain conduct by the tenant.
In this case, the lease, executed on behalf of Colonial by its agent, Management Associates (Management), contained the following provision:
The tenant may keep as a pet the following: one Rottweiler dog. . . . The tenant shall remove any pet previously permitted under this paragraph within forty-eight hours of written notification from the landlord that the pet, in the landlord’s sole judgment, creates a nuisance or disturbance or is, in the landlord’s opinion, undesirable.
This provision evidences Colonial’s ultimate authority over the tenant’s dogs on the premises, thereby demonstrating Colonial’s ability to control.
The majority relies in part on Joslyn, supra, where this Court affirmed summary judgment for defendants because the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that defendants were keepers. Joslyn, 149 N.C. App. at 630, 561 S.E.2d at 537. In Joslyn, the plaintiff’s *420complaint and affidavits made “no allegations whatsoever to support any connection between defendants and the dog, beyond the fact that they permitted the [tenants] to keep the dog on the property.” Id.
In contrast, here, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that Colonial “failed to address a dangerous condition and require their tenant, Defendant Olson, to adequately restrain and control his vicious animals.” Further testimony revealed that Colonial instructed Management to order the tenant to remove the dogs after this incident and, thus, maintained ultimate responsibility for the conduct on the premises. Unlike Joslyn, these facts demonstrate a connection between Colonial and the dogs and, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, tend to support an inference that Colonial is a keeper by virtue of its control evident in the lease.
In addition to demonstrating the landlord’s keeper status, an injured plaintiff must establish the landlord’s knowledge of the animal’s vicious propensities to recover under the common law rule. In an agency relationship, a principle is chargeable with and bound by the knowledge held by his agent with respect to matters within the scope of the agency, even if the agent does not inform the principle of such knowledge. Norburn v. Mackie, 262 N.C. 16, 24, 136 S.E.2d 279, 285 (1964); Reinninger v. Prestige Fabricators, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 255, 261-62, 523 S.E.2d 720, 725 (1999). Here, plaintiff argued and the jury found that Management was Colonial’s agent. Further, as the majority points out, the evidence showed a Rottweiler dog, owned by defendant Olson, exhibited vicious propensities toward Mr. Feild, a neighbor, in 1994. Management learned of this previous incident prior to the attack on the plaintiff. Management’s knowledge of the previous incident is imputed to Colonial under the principles of agency. Swain, 269 N.C. at 53-54, 152 S.E.2d at 303. Thus, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence on the issue of Colonial’s knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities to overcome a motion for directed verdict.
However, I believe the able trial judge erred in submitting issue three as to the negligence of Management. Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence on the prima facie elements of his case against Colonial, I would award plaintiff a new trial in which the jury should be instructed on whether Colonial was a keeper by virtue of its control of the premises through the lease and whether Colonial was negligent by reason of being charged with knowledge of the vicious propensities of defendant Olson’s Rottweiler as imputed by *421its agency relationship with Management. I would affirm that portion of the judgment in which the jury found plaintiff to be a lawful visitor at the time and place of the injury.