Court Opinion

ID: 2965138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:35:56.348286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:58.118716
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2280

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                              MANUEL GONZALEZ-GONZALEZ,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                        Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                        _____________________

                                 ____________________

            Laura H. Parsky, Trial Attorney, with whom John C. Keeney, Acting
            _______________                            ______________
        Assistant Attorney General, and Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Chief of the
                                        ______________________
        Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section, Department of Justice, were on
        brief, for appellee.
            Lawrence E. Besser for appellant.
            __________________
            Manuel Gonzalez-Gonzalez on brief pro se.
            ________________________

                                 ____________________

                                   February 5, 1998
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  Manuel Gonzalez-Gonzalez was
                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge
                             _____________

            convicted  of  a major  drug  smuggling and  money laundering

            conspiracy based in Puerto Rico.   Gonzalez' defense at trial

            was that  such a conspiracy  did exist,  but that he  was not

            part of  it.   Gonzalez now  argues through  counsel that  an

            admittedly  improper definition of reasonable doubt argued by

            the prosecutor  in closing  requires a new  trial, as  does a

            jury  instruction on  the effect of  a guilty  plea by  a co-

            defendant.  Gonzalez also filed a brief pro se, arguing  that

            the district court  erred for  other reasons  in denying  his

            motion for a new trial.  We affirm.

                                          I.

                      Gonzalez  was charged  on  November  2,  1994  with

            conspiracy to possess  with intent to distribute  cocaine and

            marijuana, possession  with intent  to distribute  marijuana,

            possession with intent to  distribute cocaine, importation of

            marijuana  and  cocaine,  and  aiding  and  abetting  in  the

            laundering of  monetary  instruments.   After a  nineteen-day

            trial, the jury found  Gonzalez guilty as charged.   Gonzalez

            was  sentenced on September 20, 1996 to life imprisonment and

            was fined.

                      Because  this appeal  involves  admittedly improper

            remarks by the prosecutor, and because the verdict could have

            been tainted by  these remarks, we do not  consider the facts

            in  the light  most favorable  to  the jury's  verdict.   Our

            description of the facts is  "designed to provide a  balanced

            picture of  the evidence appropriate for  determining whether

            the remarks were harmless or  prejudicial."  United States v.
                                                         _____________

            Hardy,  37 F.3d  753,  755  (1st Cir.  1994).   See  Arrieta-
            _____                                           ___  ________

            Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 528 (1st Cir. 1993).
            ________    _____________

                      Several witnesses  testified that they  belonged to

            Gonzalez'  drug  smuggling  and  money laundering  operation.

            This extensive testimonial evidence  was corroborated by tape

            recorded  conversations,  surveillance  photographs, passport

            entries,  travel  records, and  telephone  records.   Ricardo

            Rivero  ("Rivero") testified that  Gonzalez recruited  him to

            retrieve  and repackage 900 pounds of marijuana imported from

            Colombia  in 1991.   Rivero  testified  that Gonzalez  stored

            cocaine and marijuana at a house belonging to Manuel Garrido,

            which  other  witnesses,  a co-defendant  and  an  FBI agent,

            subsequently confirmed.

                      Gonzalez transported 125  kilograms of cocaine from

            Puerto  Rico to  New  York for  distribution  with help  from

            Rivero.   Gonzalez  also  hired Roberto  Garraton-Rivera  and

            Alberto  Maysonet to  transport cocaine.   Garraton testified

            that  Gonzalez  came  to  his house  to  deliver  cocaine  to

            Maysonet.   Garraton and  Maysonet  traveled to  New York  in

            August of 1991 to deliver cocaine to  Gonzalez.  While in New

            York,  Gonzalez instructed Ricardo  on how to  distribute the

            cocaine and resolved  a dispute over  payment for the  drugs.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            After  the success of  this deal, Gonzalez  purchased several

            cars before returning to Puerto Rico.

                      Witnesses  described  other  drug  transactions  in

            1992.   Co-defendant  Luz  Marina-Giraldo testified  that she

            helped  Gonzalez import 6,500 pounds of marijuana into Puerto

            Rico.   Gonzalez stored  the marijuana at  a stash  house and

            sold it  in Puerto  Rico.  Rivero  also testified  about that

            marijuana shipment.  According to Rivero, Gonzalez supervised

            the unloading and transportation of the marijuana.

                      Both  Rivero  and   Marina-Giraldo  testified  that

            Gonzalez  was  involved  in  transporting  300  kilograms  of

            cocaine  from St.  Martin  to  Puerto Rico  in  1992.   These

            witnesses  also testified about  a major shipment  of cocaine

            and marijuana Gonzalez  had imported from Colombia  to Puerto

            Rico  in September of 1992.  Part of this shipment was seized

            by the police.

                      Several  witnesses   testified  that   they  helped

            Gonzalez' cousin,  Augustin Rivero  ("Augustin"), import  625

            kilograms of  cocaine in  November of 1992.   Ricardo  Rivero

            testified that Gonzalez  supplied a motor for a  boat to help

            bring  in  the  shipment.    Roberto  Sierra-Rivera,  a  paid

            informant, testified that  Gonzalez provided surveillance for

            this shipment,  which was later  sold in Puerto Rico  and New

            York.   Sierra-Rivera  testified that  Gonzalez and  Augustin

            agreed that  each  time one  of  them brought  in a  load  of

                                         -4-
                                          4

            cocaine, the other would be  given 10 kilograms of cocaine or

            $100,000.    There  was also  testimony  about  later cocaine

            smuggling operations conducted by Gonzalez' cousin Augustin.

                      Angel  Santiago-Mora,  a cooperating  witness,  and

            Martin Suarez, an FBI agent, testified that Gonzalez  and his

            associates often delivered money to them to be laundered.  On

            several  separate occasions  Gonzalez  delivered hundreds  of

            thousands of dollars to them.  Other people closely connected

            to Gonzalez also  delivered substantial sums  of money to  be

            laundered.

                      The government  also presented  tape recordings  of

            conversations  between Gonzalez  and his associates  in which

            Gonzalez  admitted his  involvement  in  drug  smuggling  and

            distribution.   This evidence  was supplemented  by tapes  of

            Gonzalez' associates  referring to  Gonzalez' involvement  in

            drug trafficking.  

                      Gonzalez testified and denied it all.

                                         II.

                      Gonzalez argues that  he was deprived of  his Sixth

            Amendment right to  a jury trial because  in the prosecutor's

            closing argument the prosecutor said:

                    [Y]ou heard [defense counsel]  say at the end
                    of his  argument, that  there was  reasonable
                    doubt as to  whether he was or was  not and I
                    am  going  to  tell you  something,  you will
                    listen to the instructions from the  judge as
                    to  what   reasonable  doubt  is  --   it  is
                    something very simple.   If in your  mind you
                    think   that  he   was   a   member  of   the

                                         -5-
                                          5

                    organization,  and in  your  heart, you  feel
                    that he  was a  member  of the  organization,
                    then he was a member of the organization, and
                    you  say so  with your  verdict.   Don't  let
                    yourselves be confused  by the definition  of
                    reasonable doubt.

            The government  appropriately concedes that  the prosecutor's

            remarks incorrectly  defined reasonable doubt.  Because there

            was  no objection  to  these  remarks  (which  the  defendant

            concedes), we  apply a plain  error standard of review.   See
                                                                      ___

            United  States  v. Crochiere,  129  F.3d 233,  237  (1st Cir.
            ______________     _________

            1997); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 972-73 (1st Cir.
                  ______________    ______

            1995).   The "decision  to correct  the forfeited  error [is]

            within the sound discretion of  the court of appeals, and the

            court  should not exercise  that discretion unless  the error

            'seriously  affect[s]  the  fairness,  integrity  or   public

            reputation of the  judicial proceedings.'"  United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Olano,  507 U.S. 725,  732 (1993)  (quoting United  States v.
            _____                                       ______________

            Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
            _____

                      Gonzalez relies on  a series of cases  holding that

            jury  instructions   which  misstate  the   reasonable  doubt

            standard  require   a  new  trial.     He  argues   that  the

            prosecutor's comments on reasonable doubt are the "functional

            equivalent"  of  jury   instructions,  especially  since  the

            prosecutor followed his incorrect definition with a statement

            that the  jury should  not be confused  by the  definition of

            reasonable  doubt.    Gonzalez  argues  that  the  prosecutor

                                         -6-
                                          6

            essentially  told the jury to ignore the judge's instructions

            on reasonable doubt  and to follow his "mind  and heart" test

            instead.  We start with the latter contention.

                      The remark,  "Don't let yourselves  be confused  by

            the definition of  reasonable doubt" is ambiguous,  and could

            have  at least  three  meanings.   It  could  mean "Don't  be

            confused by the definition that I, the  prosecutor, have just

            told  you."    It  could  mean, "Don't  be  confused  by  the

            definition you hear from either  lawyer."  And it could mean,

            "Don't  be  confused by  the  definition  you  hear from  the

            judge," with the implication that the prosecutor's definition

            governs.

                      In context, the  third meaning is by  far the least

            likely of the three.1  The prosecutor prefaced his remarks by

            telling  the jury to listen  to the judge's instructions, and

            his statement  that the  jury should not  be confused  by the

            definition   of  reasonable  doubt   is  subject   to  benign

            interpretation.   Furthermore, the  prosecutor concluded  his

            argument  by stating, "You will listen to the instructions of

                              
          ____________________

               1   We note  but need  not resort to  the rule  that when  a
          prosecutor's   comments  are   ambiguous,   and   there   is   no
          contemporaneous objection, the ambiguity is construed in favor of
          a proper meaning.  See Taylor, 54 F.3d at 979 ("[W]hen the target
                             ___ ______
          of  the  comments  does  not  interrupt  and  register  a  timely
          objection,  it seems especially  appropriate to 'give  the arguer
          the benefit of every plausible  interpretation of her words.' . .
          . Given the absence of  a contemporaneous objection, we must cede
          to   the  government  the  benefit  of  a  legitimate,  plausible
          interpretation  of  the  prosecutor's  words.")  (quoting  United
                                                                     ______
          States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1187 (1st Cir. 1993)).
          ______    _________

                                         -7-
                                          7

            the Honorable  Judge, as  he explains them  to you,  you will

            decide what the facts  in this case were [and] you will apply

            the  law . . . ."   The prosecutor's own comments went a long

            way  toward curing  any understanding  of the  comment as  an

            admonition to ignore the court's instruction.

                      The  problem  with   the  prosecutor's  error   was

            obviated  by the  court's instructions  on reasonable  doubt,

            which Gonzalez  concedes were correct, as well as the court's

            admonition to the  jurors that instructions  on the law  come

            only from the court, and not from counsel.  

                      We  flatly   reject  Gonzalez'   argument  that   a

            misstatement of the law by a prosecutor should be treated the

            same  way as a  misstatement of law  by the judge.   No juror

            would mistake a prosecutor for a judge.  Our law assumes that

            the  jurors follow  jury  instructions  and  thus  that  they

            followed the judge's, not counsel's, definition of reasonable

            doubt.  See  United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67  F.3d 993, 999
                    ___  _____________    ____________

            (1st Cir. 1995)  ("[O]ur system of trial by  jury is premised

            on  the assumption that  jurors will scrupulously  follow the

            court's  instructions.");  Refuse  &  Envtl.  Sys.,  Inc.  v.
                                       ______________________________

            Industrial  Serv. of  Am., Inc.,  932 F.2d  37, 40  (1st Cir.
            _______________________________

            1991) ("A basic premise  of our jury system is that  the jury

            follows  the  court's instructions.").    That  assumption is

            especially  so here, since the  prosecutor also told the jury

            to listen to the judge.

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      Whether  the prosecutor's  remarks amount  to plain

            error warranting a  new trial depends on  analysis of several

            factors: "(1) the  extent to which  the conduct is  recurrent

            and/or deliberate; (2) the extent  to which the trial judge's

            instructions  insulated the  jury against, or  palliated, the

            possibility of unfair prejudice; and (3) the overall strength

            of  the prosecution's  case, with  particular  regard to  the

            likelihood  that any prejudice might have affected the jury's

            judgment." Taylor, 54 F.3d at 977.  
                       ______

                      We make no determination on the first of the Taylor
                                                                   ______

            factors.  We do note a long history of improper statements in

            closing argument  from federal  prosecutors  in Puerto  Rico.

            See,  e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Carmona, 111 F.3d 122,
            __________  _____________    _________________

            1997  WL 157738,  at *4  (1st  Cir. 1997);  United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Fernandez,  94 F.3d  640, 1996  WL 469009,  at *17  (1st Cir.
            _________

            1996); United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo,  70 F.3d 706,
                   _____________    ______________________

            713 (1st Cir. 1995);  United States v. Levy-Cordero, 67  F.3d
                                  _____________    ____________

            1002, 1009 (1st Cir. 1995);   Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 527
                                          ________________

            (citing  cases); United  States v. Ortiz-Arrigoita,  996 F.2d
                             ______________    _______________

            436, 441 (1st Cir. 1993) ("We do not understand, however, why

            after  numerous warnings  from  this  court, the  prosecuting

            attorneys in the  District of Puerto Rico  persist in spiking

            their arguments with comments that put their cases at risk.")

            (collecting cases).  In light of this history, the government

            gains no advantage under the first factor. 

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      As to the second factor, we are persuaded the  jury

            was  not  led  astray.    That  is  because  of  the  court's

            concededly correct jury instructions on reasonable  doubt and

            the  direction to  disregard statements  about  the law  from

            counsel.  As  to the third factor, the government  had a very

            strong case against Gonzalez.  Given these considerations, we

            do not think the jury's judgment was affected and a new trial

            is not warranted.  Cf. Levy-Cordero, 67 F.3d at 1008 (holding
                               ___ ____________

            that several "obviously improper"  prosecutorial comments did

            not warrant a new trial).

                                         III.

                      In  his  counselled   appeal,  Gonzalez  says   the

            district  court committed  error  in  its  jury  instructions

            regarding  the  guilty  plea   of  co-defendant  Luz  Marina-

            Giraldo.2   Specifically,  Gonzalez argues  that the  court's

                              
          ____________________

               2   Before Marina-Giraldo testified as a  witness, the court
          instructed the jury:
                      [T]he government  must establish  each case
                    against each defendant separately.   Now, the
                    fact  that  this  co-defendant  is  going  to
                    testify,  you are going to hear from her that
                    she did enter a plea of guilty and now she is
                    testifying for the government.   Now the fact
                    that  a co-defendant  has entered  a  plea of
                    guilty  to  the  offense  charged, that  fact
                    also, the entering of a plea of guilty in and
                    of itself is not evidence of any guilt of any
                    other of  the co-defendants.  I  repeat that.
                    The  fact that  a co-defendant has  entered a
                    plea  of guilty to the offense charged is not
                    evidence in and of itself of the guilt of any
                    other  co-defendant  and I  cannot  emphasize
                    that enough.

                                         -10-
                                          10

            statement  that his co-defendant's guilty plea is not "in and

            of itself"  proof of  Gonzalez' guilt  implies that  the plea

            could be considered as evidence of guilt in conjunction  with

            other  evidence in the case.  There was no objection to these

            instructions, so we apply the plain error standard  of review

            (which  Gonzalez  concedes).   See  Taylor, 54  F.3d  at 976;
                                           ___  ______

            United States v. Colon-Pagan, 1 F.3d 80, 81 (1st Cir. 1993).
            _____________    ___________

                      The  phrase "in and of itself," in isolation, could

            be understood to  mean what Gonzalez  posits:  that  standing

            alone, the  guilty  plea  of  a  co-defendant  could  not  be

            evidence of guilt of the  defendant, but, in combination with

            such other evidence,  the plea could be taken  as evidence of

            the defendant's guilt.  That is, of course, not the law, nor,

            we are sure, was that the trial judge's intended meaning when

            he gave the instructions.

                              
          ____________________

                      The guilty  plea of Luz  Marina-Giraldo may
                    not  be   regarded  by  you   as  substantive
                    evidence of the  other defendant's guilt  nor
                    may you draw any inference of guilt as to the
                    remaining co-defendants.   The fact  that she
                    pled  is what I am talking about, that cannot
                    be  used   as  evidence  against   the  other
                    defendants  nor may  you  draw any  inference
                    from the fact that she pled guilty. . . . 
                      [W]hat you cannot consider is the fact that
                    she has entered  a plea of guilty,  that fact
                    cannot  be considered.   It  is not  evidence
                    against the  other defendants and  affords no
                    inference or suggestion  of guilt  as to  the
                    other defendants.

                                         -11-
                                          11

                      The trial judge may have relied on dicta in  United
                                                                   ______

            States  v. Rivera-Santiago, 872  F.2d 1073, 1083  (1st Cir.),
            ______     _______________

            cert. denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S.
            ____________                       ________________

            832  (1989).   In describing  the events  at the  trial, this

            court's opinion referred  to the following language  given by

            the  trial judge as a "standard accomplice" instruction: "the

            fact that an accomplice has  entered a plea of guilty  to the

            offense charged is not evidence in and of itself of the guilt

            of any other person."  The language of the instruction itself

            was not at  issue in Rivera-Santiago3 and this  Court has not
                                 _______________

            ruled  on the  propriety of  such language  in an  accomplice

            instruction.  We do so now and discourage the use of such "in

            and of itself" language.  There is no need for such language,

            as  the pattern  jury instructions  from other  jurisdictions

            make evident.4

                              
          ____________________

               3   The  Fifth Circuit also  described a similar  "in and of
          itself"  accomplice instruction in United States v. Abravaya, 616
                                             _____________    ________
          F.2d 250  (5th Cir. 1980).   The new District Court  Criminal Law
          Pattern Jury Instructions for this  circuit do not address guilty
          pleas by accomplices or co-defendants.

               4   The  pattern instructions  of  other circuits  are  more
          straightforward  and do not contain  "in and of itself" language.
          For example, Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction 7.08 reads as
          follows:
                    (3)    The  fact  that  ________ has  pleaded
                    guilty  to a crime  is not evidence  that the
                    defendant is guilty,  and you cannot consider
                                          _______________________
                    this against the defendant in any way.
                    _____________________________________
          The Seventh Circuit's pattern jury instruction 3.23 reads:
                    The witness, ________,  has pleaded guilty to
                    a crime  arising out  of the same  occurrence
                    for which the defendant is now on trial.  You
                    may  give his  testimony such  weight as  you

                                         -12-
                                          12

                      Despite  the potentially  misleading nature  of the

            "in and  of itself"  language, a new  trial is  not warranted

            here.   The  district court instructions,  taken as  a whole,

            repeatedly  and unequivocally told  the jury not  to consider

            the co-defendant's guilty plea as evidence of the defendant's

            guilt.5

                              
          ____________________

                    feel  it deserves,  keeping in  mind that  it
                    must  be considered  with  caution and  great
                    care.  Moreover, his guilty plea is not to be
                           ______________________________________
                    considered as evidence against the defendant.
                    ____________________________________________
          Pattern jury instruction 2.19 from the Eighth Circuit states:
                    You have  heard evidence that  witness (name)
                    has pleaded guilty to a crime which arose out
                    of the same events for which the defendant is
                    on  trial here.   You must not  consider that
                                      ___________________________
                    guilty   plea   as  any   evidence   of  this
                    _____________________________________________
                    defendant's  guilt.   You  may consider  that
                    __________________
                    witness' guilty plea only for  the purpose of
                    determining how much, if at all, to rely upon
                    that witness' testimony.
          Finally, Ninth Circuit pattern instruction 4.12 reads:
                    The witness, _________, has pleaded guilty to
                    a  crime arising out  of the same  events for
                    which the defendant is on trial.  This guilty
                                                      ___________
                    plea is  not evidence  against the  defendant
                    _____________________________________________
                    and you may consider  it only in  determining
                    _____________________________________________
                    this  witness'  believability.    You  should
                    _____________________________________________
                    consider this  witness' testimony  with great
                    _____________________________________________
                    caution,  giving it  the  weight you  feel it
                    _____________________________________________
                    deserves.
                    ________

               5  The court also instructed the jury:
                      Now,  the case  against  Luz Marina-Giraldo
                    has  been disposed of  and will no  longer be
                    before  you.  It  is very important  that you
                    realize  that  you  cannot  guess or  concern
                    yourselves  or speculate as to the reason for
                    the disposition of her case.  The disposition
                    cannot and should not  influence your verdict
                    with  reference to  the remaining  defendants
                    that are on trial here.

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      We  examine jury instructions in the context of the

            charge   as  a  whole   to  determine  whether   the  court's

                              
          ____________________

                      If you recall, I think I advised you on the
                    first day that each defendant, although being
                    tried  together, has a right to have the jury
                    consider  his case  separately  of the  other
                    defendants and considering  the evidence that
                    applies  or  that  is  admitted  as  to  that
                    defendant specifically. . . . [A]lthough [the
                    defendants]  are  being tried  together,  you
                    must  give  separate  consideration  to  each
                    defendant. . . . I repeat that you cannot and
                    you  must  not  consider the  fact  that  Luz
                    Marina-Giraldo  is  not  here  again  and  it
                    should not enter into your deliberations. . .
                    . [The  disposition of  her case] should  not
                    enter whatsoever in your  deliberations as to
                    the other two defendants.

                      In  its final instructions  to the jury,  the court
            said:
                    [D]uring   the  course   of   the  trial,   I
                    instructed  you  that  the  case against  Luz
                    Marina-Giraldo . . . [had] been  disposed of,
                    and  was no  longer  before  you.    And  the
                    disposition  of the case[]  . . .  should not
                    influence your verdict with  reference to . .
                    . Gonzalez  and you  must  base your  verdict
                    solely on the evidence  against Mr. Gonzalez-
                    Gonzalez.   In  other  words, the  government
                    must establish its  case against Mr. Gonzalez
                    separately of  the disposition  of the  cases
                    against the other two defendants.
                      And I  also instructed  you, the  fact that
                    co-defendant  Luz  Marina-Giraldo  entered  a
                    plea  of guilty to the offense charged is not
                    evidence in and of itself of the guilt of the
                    defendant  here   on  trial   and  I   cannot
                    emphasize this  enough.   The guilty  plea of
                    Luz Marina-Giraldo may not be regarded by you
                    as substantive evidence of the guilt [of] Mr.
                    Gonzalez-Gonzalez.  Nonetheless, you may give
                    her  testimony  such weight  as you  think it
                    deserves,  keeping in  mind that  it  must be
                    considered with caution and great care.

                                         -14-
                                          14

            instructions require a new trial.  See United States v. Rose,
                                               ___ _____________    ____

            104  F.3d 1408,  1416 (1st  Cir. 1997).   When  we  take this

            context  into  account,  it  is  apparent  that  the  court's

            instructions in  this case do  not warrant a  new trial.   We

            also  reject Gonzalez' claim  that the synergistic  effect of

            two errors requires a new trial.

                                         IV.

                      In  his  pro  se brief,  Gonzalez  argues  that the

            district court erred in denying  his motion for a new trial.6

            The motion based the request for a new trial on claimed newly

            discovered  evidence  and claimed  prosecutorial  misconduct,

            including presentation of false testimony.7

                      We review a trial judge's  ruling on a motion for a

            new  trial for  manifest  abuse of  discretion.   See  United
                                                              ___  ______

            States v.  Brimage, 115 F.3d  73, 79 (1st  Cir. 1997).   "The
            ______     _______

            remedy of a  new trial is rarely used; it  is warranted 'only

            where there would be a  miscarriage of justice' or 'where the

            evidence preponderates heavily against  the verdict.'" United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  Andrade, 94  F.3d 9, 14  (1st Cir.  1996) (quoting
            ______     _______

                              
          ____________________

               6  After oral argument in this case, Gonzalez filed a letter
          with this  court,  which we  accepted  as a  supplemental  brief,
          raising issues in  addition to those raised by  his able counsel.
          We requested the government to  file a responsive brief, which it
          has done.  We reach the merits of Gonzalez' pro se appeal.

               7   Gonzalez also complains  of a  factual error  concerning
          whether the name "Lin" appeared on any of the drug  packages from
          Loiza  beach, an  error contained  in  the transcript.   At  oral
          argument before us,  the government conceded this  factual error,
          saying the name did not appear.

                                         -15-
                                          15

            United  States v.  Indelicato, 611  F.2d  376, 386  (1st Cir.
            ______________     __________

            1979)).  See United States  v. Montilla-Rivera, 115 F.3d 1060
                     ___ _____________     _______________

            (1st Cir. 1997).   In  a motion  for a new  trial based  upon

            newly discovered evidence, the defendant must establish  that

            "the evidence was: (i) unknown  or unavailable at the time of

            trial, (ii) despite  due diligence, (iii) material,  and (iv)

            likely to  result  in an  acquittal  upon retrial."    United
                                                                   ______

            States v.  Tibolt, 72  F.3d 965,  971 (1st  Cir. 1995).   But
            ______     ______

            Gonzalez' complaints are largely about what happened at trial

            and were not newly discovered.

                      The district  court gave a  careful explanation  of

            its denial of Gonzalez' motion, and we affirm for the reasons

            stated in the court's Memorandum  and Order dated December 3,

            1996.  We add only  that the "new evidence" Gonzalez presents

            does not  come close  to "so  undermin[ing] the  government's

            case  as  to  give  rise  to  a 'reasonable'  probability  of

            acquittal  on retrial."    Tibolt, 72  F.3d  at 972  (quoting
                                       ______

            Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1220)).
            _________

                      The judgment is affirmed.
                                      _________

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                                          16