Court Opinion

ID: 9850567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:59:26.669389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:39.371819
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. This day will stand in history as one on which all the voters ,in free Georgia were, for the first time since 1824 deprived of their right to choose with their votes the Governor who will rule over them. This was done by a majority of the Supreme Court which has a long and proud record of guarding and upholding the rights of the individual. They base their decision upon what they sincerely believe the Constitution demands. But I, with equal sincerity, believe they are wrong and I shall set forth in this dissent my reasons for so believing and which I have urged upon my honorable colleagues as strongly as I know how.
There can be no escape from the fact that the amendment of 1824 (Ga. L. 1824, p. 41) had but one main purpose, which was — to empower the people to elect their Governor by their votes in a state-wide election for that purpose. It repealed outright Sec. 2 of the 1798 Constitution which empowered *17the General Assembly to elect a Governor and adopted the provision for election by the people. It also provided for election by the General Assembly in case no one had received a majority in the election, all of which has been kept in the Constitution, and is now found in Art. V, Sec. I, Pars.. II, III and IV of the present Constitution (Code Ann. §§ 2-3002, 2-3003, 2-3004; Const, of 1945).
The majority base their decision on the provisions for sealing and transmitting the returns for the election, and if no one has a majority, “then from the two persons having the highest number of votes, who shall be in life, and shall not decline an election . . . the General Assembly shall immediately, elect a Governor.”
If this foundation does not support the decision, as I confidently believe I shall demonstrate, then the judgment they render is clearly erroneous. I shall call to my support, some of the most eminent Justices who ever served here by quoting their exact words.
It is suggested that if we allow to stand as valid Code Ann. § 34-1514 (Ga. L. 1964, Ex. Sess., p. 26) which provides that the indispensable requisite to any election is that someone receive a majority of the votes, and it prescribes the procedure for securing such majority, and hence avoid a no-election by requiring the two receiving the highest number of votes in all cases where there is no majority to oppose each other in a runoff, then there would never be a need for the constitutional provision for the General Assembly to elect. One complete answer is that when it was put in the Constitution, there was no statute requiring a majority to elect, consequently, should the election fail to produce a person receiving a majority as the Constitution demanded, election by the General Assembly was the only way left to obtain a Governer. And since the question of ever having legislation requiring election by a majority was and still is a matter over which the Constitution, Art. Ill, Sec. I, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-1301; see also § 2-1920; Const, of 1945) gives the General Assembly exclusive jurisdiction, it could not then be seen if such legislation would ever be enacted; consequently, the provision for election by the Gen*18eral Assembly was intended as a safety measure, and unquestionably was not intended to undo and nullify the sole purpose of the 1824 amendment which was indisputably to take from the General Assembly and place in the hands of the people the right to choose a Governor. Another obvious answer is that if in the runoff the candidates receive the same number of votes, there might be a need for it; and another complete answer would be: Well, what? No one would suffer, but the voters will have elected a Governor as the Constitution intends.
Another argument is advanced that the Constitution, Art. V, Sec. I (Code Ann. Ch. 2-30; Const, of 1945), after fixing the term and time of electing a Governor, states further that the date there fixed shall be the time for the election “until another date be fixed by the General Assembly” in some mysterious way restricts the legislature to fixing only one day when the election shall be held and completed. This contention is so obviously without substance or merit that no argument is necessary to refute it. Ample authority is there given to designate a week or even a month, or longer, if necessary to complete the election. But I take that constitutional provision as conclusive evidence that the Constitution intends for the legislature to have absolute control in setting forth essentials to an election and procedure by which such essentials may be met as provided by the 1964 Act for a runoff as well as when.
Finally, the argument is made that the requirement that the returns for the election for Governor be sealed up by the managers, separate from other returns, and sent to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House, through the Secretary of State, precludes a discovery of whether or not someone received a majority of the votes. The fatal fallacy in such contention is a lack of recognizing what are election returns. Obviously, no returns from a portion of an incomplete election would be election returns. There can be no completed election under the 1964 Act until the procedure there prescribed for completing an election has been followed when necessary to secure someone with a majority. Too, the Constitution contains precisely the requirement in election of all the executive offices, and if that argument is sustained, all these offices will *19be vacant if the General Assembly finds, none of them has a majority, since there is no provision for the General Assembly to elect them and the statute says — no majority, no election. This strawman is knocked down when the truth is recognized, which is, that the Constitution refers only to returns from an election that has been completed as required by law. This means that the law requires counting the first votes and determining if a runoff is necessary to secure candidates with majorities, and if so, go forward with the election by runoffs, and only when this has been done can there be produced “returns for every election of Governor,” which can be lawfully sealed and directed as the Constitution requires.
With the foregoing contents of the Constitution and the election law before it, this court’s first duty is to apply and scrupulously observe certain rules for construction which this court has adopted by countless unanimous decisions. The cardinal rule requires diligent judicial search for the intent as disclosed by the Constitution or statute, and once this is discovered, render judgment giving it full effect. Among such cases are: Henderson v. Alexander, 2 Ga. 81, 85; Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361; Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 120 Ga. 268, 276 (48 SE 15, 1 AC 734); Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (187 SE 371, 106 ALR 498); Carroll v. Ragsdale, 192 Ga. 118 (15 SE2d 210); Thacker v. Morris, 196 Ga. 167, 173 (26 SE2d 329); and Thompson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 200 Ga. 216 (39 SE2d 225).
Listen to what the late Chief Justice Russell wrote for the court in Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30 (3) supra: “In the construction of a statute a court may decline to give a legislative Act such construction as will attribute to the General Assembly an intention to pass an Act which is not reasonable, or as will defeat the purpose of the proposed legislation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Here is what Chief Justice Reid in Thacker v. Morris, 196 Ga. 167, supra, quoted from Columbus R. Co. v. Wright, 89 Ga. 574, 586 (15 SE 293): “The law is too wise, too just, and too important to be defeated by sticking in the bark and adhering to the literal meaning of words, when by so doing we would not only set at naught the . legislative will, but impute *20to our lawmakers the folly of making a provision at once mathematically absurd and legally impracticable.” Our duty is to follow those teachings. If done we would allow the literal meaning of no words in either the Constitution or •.statute to defeat the undeniable intent of both, that the voters elect the Governor, and that the elective process be carried out to secure persons receiving a majority of the votes cast. There can be no challenge to the statement that the courts have a solemn duty if the statute will bear it to hold statutes constitutional, and if they are susceptible to more than one construction, give them that construction which will render them constitutional rather than unconstitutional. Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, supra; Moore v. Robinson, 206 Ga. 27 (55 SE2d 711); Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38 (70 SE2d 360).
Far from censuring the brilliant Mr. Hill, the Assistant Attorney General representing the appellee, I praise him for, while acting in his capacity of a partisan advocate, “fly-specking” and pointing out every provision of the Constitution and statute that when taken at its literal meaning, with Qomplete disregard for the duty to effectuate the intent — to sustain rather than strike down as unconstitutional, all statutes — and the old law and the remedy, that might raise questions of validity. But a different duty is inescapably imposed upon every Justice of this court who must be neither partisan nor advocate. We can not escape the duty we bear to effectuate the intent if possible, and to consider the old law, the mischief, and the remedy, and render a construction that “represses the mischief and advances the remedy.” On this last duty I wish to quote what Judge Nisbet, one of this- court’s most capable jurists wrote in Henderson v. Alexander, 2 Ga. 81, at page 85, supra. He said: “It is the duty of judges so to construe remedial statutes as to repress the mischief and advance the remedy. 11 Coke, 71b; 1 Kent, 464; and in the application of this rule they are to consider the law as it stood before the act — the mischief against which it did not provide — the remedy which the legislature has provided, and the reason of the remedy.” See also Code § 102-102 (9), and cases annotated thereunder such as Walsh v. City Council of Augusta, 67 Ga. 293; Barrett & Caswell v. *21Pulliam, 77 Ga. 552 (2); Board of Tax Assessors v. Catledge, 173 Ga. 656, 658 (160 SE 909); and Gazan v. Heery, 183 Ga. 30, supra.
As to the 1824 amendment to the Constitution of 1798, allowing the General Assembly to elect a Governor, the Constitution was mischievous because it disfranchised the voters, and the amendment was the remedy to enfranchise them. According to Judge Nisbet by whose opinion every present Justice is bound, our duty is crystal clear — “repress the mischief” which was legislative election of a Governor, 'and “advance the remedy,” which is the 1824 amendment to allow the people to choose whom they wish to be Governor. Application of the rule announced by Nisbet, J., to the 1964 election code and particularly Sec. 34-1514 (Code Ann. § 34-1514; Ga. L. 1964, Ex. Sess., pp. 26, 174) thereof, it seems to me, gives this court no choice but to recognize the mischief of no law requiring a majority for someone for Governor in the election and the consequent choosing of a Governor by the General Assembly, and the remedy by the 1964 Act by requiring that someone receive a majority of the votes cast before there is an election, and then proceeding to stipulate the further procedure in that same election to find a candidate who received a majority which is required by the Constitution. I pose the question with all due respect to each of my respected associates of the majority, do you have even a shadow of doubt as to the mischief of both the old Constitution and the old statutes, which indisputably contained the potentials for robbing the people of Georgia of their right to choose, by their own votes, the person who should rule over them as Governor? That question is followed by the question as to whether the remedy for that mischief is abundantly found in Sec. 34-1514 of the 1964 Act? Finally, has the duty imposed by law upon each of us to “suppress the mischief and advance the remedy” been performed by the majority opinion? Subsequent enactments that are in irreconcilable conflict with previous statutes repeal previous statutes by implication; also the 1964 statute being expressly intended to constitute a comprehensive treatise of the entire election laws would likewise repeal by implication previous laws *22on the subject. Leonard v. State of Ga., 204 Ga. 465 (50 SE2d 212); Mosley v. Lanier, 213 Ga. 373 (99 SE2d 118). This disposes of all previous statutes cited by counsel and the majority.
There are two more questions that have been raised. (1) Did the Supreme Court in Forston v. Morris, 385 U. S. (87 SC, 17LE2d 330), decide this case? The answer is so plainly, no, that even a law student could give this answer. (2) Does failure to call the runoff within 14 days stated in the 1964 Act, supra, prevent a runoff? The object of this clause is to elect someone by a majority, and the time stipulation is incidental and merely directory. To effectuate the intent if necesary the 14-day provision may be disregarded. The “tail can not wag the dog.” In Wood v. Arnall, 189 Ga. 362, 371 (6 SE2d 722), it is said: “The question here involved is not whether an official regularly elected by the people at the time and place prescribed by law could be deprived of his office by virtue of the mere failure of the General Assembly to canvass and declare the result as directed by the Constitution, for manifestly the will of the people could not be thus defeated.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing constitutes my legal reasons for dissenting. But when this court does as the majority, in my opinion, has done here, turned the clock back 143 years to 1824, and takes from the hands of the Georgia voter, his ballot, which is the only sure defense against dictatorship, it thereby snatches it from the hands of the brave Georgia soldiers, airmen and sailors, who are now wading the swamps of Vietnam and facing death in the skies over that country, bleeding and dying, to place the ballot in the hands of the Vietnamese, although their own State denies by court judgment that privilege to them at home. Strip the citizen of his right to vote and you render him a helpless victim of a dictator. I cherish as my priceless blessing the confidence Georgia citizens have manifested in me by freely electing me as their humble servant as a Justice of their highest court five times, and I would suffer my arms severed from my body before I would betray their trust, or deprive them of their liberty to choose freely all officers who rule over them in the absence of compelling law that demands such after a *23soul-searching examination fails to reveal, by observance of established rules of law, a way to hold such inhuman law did not require a judgment so openly in defiance of freedom and liberty.
Holding as I do the foregoing unshakable convictions, I am allowed no choice but an emphatic dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Cook concurs in this dissent.