Court Opinion

ID: 9898608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:10:55.827609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:23.649392
License: Public Domain

J-S31030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TANIKA WASHINGTON                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 379 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0000259-2020

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023

       Appellant Tanika Washington appeals from the October 25, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County (“trial court”), following her negotiated guilty plea to simple assault

and conspiracy to commit simple assault.1 Upon review, we affirm.

       The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly,

following an altercation that resulted in Appellant reaching over and punching

a person in the face multiple times, she was charged with and pled guilty to

the above-referenced crimes on October 25, 2022. Consistent with the terms

of the negotiated guilty plea, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years’

probation. On November 4, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to

withdraw the guilty plea, which the trial court denied on January 24, 2023

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a) and 903.
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following a hearing. Appellant timely appealed. The trial court directed her

to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Appellant complied, challenging the validity of her guilty plea based on

improper advice of counsel. In response, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Appellant presents a single issue for our review.

      [I.] Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s post-
      sentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea where the record
      unequivocally shows that trial counsel incorrectly advised
      Appellant that she would be eligible to have the charges of
      conviction fully expunged when she finished her probation?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

      It is well-settled that the decision whether to permit a defendant to

withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Commonwealth v. Unangst, 71 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(quotation omitted); see Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 128

(Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that we review a trial court’s order denying a motion

to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion), appeal denied, 606 Pa.

644, 992 A.2d 885 (2010). Although no absolute right to withdraw a guilty

plea exists in Pennsylvania, the standard applied differs depending on whether

the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or after sentencing. When a

defendant seeks to withdraw a plea after sentencing, he “must demonstrate

prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Yeomans,

24 A.3d 1044, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97

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A.3d 337, 352 (Pa. Super. 2014), impliedly overruled on other grounds

by Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa. 3, 116 A.3d 1103, 1106 (2015), we

explained that a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing “only

where necessary to correct manifest injustice.”      Prendes, 97 A.3d at 352

(citation omitted). Thus, “post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject

to higher scrutiny since the courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas

as sentence-testing devices.” Commonwealth v. Flick, 802 A.2d 620, 623

(Pa. Super. 2002).

      “Manifest injustice occurs when the plea is not tendered knowingly,

intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Commonwealth v. Kpou,

153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). In determining

whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the totality of circumstances

surrounding the plea.    Id.   “Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who

entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant

bears the burden of proving otherwise.” Id.

      Thus, to be valid, a plea must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Commonwealth v. Persinger, 615 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1992). To ensure

these requirements are met, Rule 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure requires that a trial court conduct a separate inquiry of the

defendant before accepting a guilty plea. It first requires that a guilty plea be

offered in open court.    The rule then provides a procedure to determine

whether the plea is voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered. As the

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Comment to Rule 590 provides, at a minimum, the trial court should ask

questions to elicit the following information:

       (1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
       which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?

       (2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?

       (3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to
       trial by jury?

       (4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
       innocent until found guilty?

       (5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range or sentences
       and/or fines for the offenses charged?

       (6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not bound by the
       terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the judge accepts
       such agreement?

Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.2 In Yeomans, this Court explained:

       In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid, the guilty
       plea colloquy must affirmatively show that the defendant
       understood what the plea connoted and its consequences. This
       determination is to be made by examining the totality of the
       circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea. Thus, even
       though there is an omission or defect in the guilty plea colloquy,
       a plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances
       surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had
       a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea
       and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea.

Yeomans, 24 A.3d at 1047 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

       The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant may
       not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under
       oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies. A person who
____________________________________________

2The Comment also includes a seventh question, which is applicable only
when a defendant pleads guilty to murder generally.

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      elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in open
      court while under oath and may not later assert grounds for
      withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at
      his plea colloquy. . . . [A] defendant who elects to plead guilty
      has a duty to answer questions truthfully.

Id.   “The law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the

outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that

[his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.”

Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en banc)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      Here, our review of the record indicates that Appellant is not entitled to

relief because she failed to furnish credible evidence that her plea counsel

induced her into the negotiated guilty plea. As the trial court reasoned:

      On October 24, 2022, a jury was selected.              However, []
      immediately before the commencement of trial, Appellant opted
      to accept a plea bargain. Subsequently, after the trial court
      provided Appellant ample time to discuss matters with her
      counsel, Appellant was colloqued both orally and in writing
      regarding her rights and the legal effects of the guilty plea. The
      trial court found that Appellant ple[d] guilty knowingly, voluntarily
      and intelligently, and accordingly, accepted the plea. Appellant
      was sentenced pursuant to the negotiations between counsel and
      Appellant.

      During the oral colloquy, Appellant additionally affirmed that she
      was: (1) forty years old; (2) engaged in graduate school studies;
      (3) not under the influence of any medications, drugs or alcohol
      at present time; (4) never treated for a mental illness; (5) in no
      way threatened by anyone to enter into the plea; (6) not promised
      anything in exchange for entering the plea beyond its terms; (7)
      cognizant that entering into the plea would waive her right to a
      jury trial, to which a panel had already been selected for her; (8)
      that she understood the nature of the charges and the possible
      maximum sentences permitted by law for each count in the plea;
      (9) aware that her appellant rights would be limited as a result of
      entering the plea; (10) had reviewed the written colloquy with her

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     counsel prior to both initially and signing it on pages four and five
     of the colloquy[FN1]; and (11) satisfied with her attorney, Kendra
     McCrea, (hereafter “Attorney McCrea”) with whom Appellant had
     been provided an opportunity to confer and resolve any questions
     she may have had prior to signing and agreeing to the plea.

           [FN1: Appellant also affirmed on the written colloquy
           that Attorney McCrea, “explained to you the elements
           of each of the above offense(s), and that, for each
           offense, the District Attorney would have to prove
           those elements beyond a reasonable doubt at trial in
           order to convict you for that offense?”]
     Before sentencing, Appellant was presented with the opportunity
     to speak to the trial court at her discretion. Appellant stated, “this
     is an isolated incident that happened. And (sic) it won’t happen
     again.” On the count of simple assault, Appellant was sentenced
     to two (2) years reporting probation by phone. No further penalty
     was imposed on the count of conspiracy to commit simple assault.

     On November 4, 2022, by and through her new counsel Zak
     Goldstein (hereafter “Attorney Goldstein”), Appellant filed a post-
     sentence motion to withdraw guilty plea. On January 13, 2023, a
     hearing was held on the motion. Appellant testified that she
     sought the withdrawal of her plea because she was, “innocent for
     starters” and that she had been assured by Attorney McCrea that
     her entire criminal record would be expunged following the
     termination of her probation.

     During the hearing, the trial court asked several questions wherein
     Appellant again answered in the affirmative when asked if she
     agreed she was not forced to take the plea, was promised nothing
     beyond the contents in the offer, and if she was satisfied with her
     attorney. The trial court also inquired if Appellant had heard the
     facts asserted against her by the Commonwealth and admitted to
     them on October 25, 2022. Appellant claimed that she “admitted
     to self-defense.” However, when asked again by the court if she
     heard the specific allegation that she punched the complaining
     witness and had indeed admitted to it, she responded, “I don’t
     remember that.” Finally, the court asked Appellant about the text
     messages in which Appellant had asked Attorney McCrea, “is
     misdemeanor conspiracy able to be expunged as well or just the
     assault?” When asked about the discrepancy between her stating
     on direct examination that Attorney McCrea had assured Appellant
     she would receive “complete expungement” yet in her text

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      messages she inquired if a certain part of her record could be
      expunged, Appellant responded, “I’m not sure why I put that.” At
      the end of the hearing on the motion, the trial court rendered a
      finding that Appellant’s testimony to be incredulous and that, “the
      text message speaks for itself, it clearly indicates to [the court]
      that Miss McCrea at no point in time ever said complete
      expungement.”      The court further placed on the record a
      determination that Appellant was in fact properly advised by
      Attorney McCrea regarding the ability to obtain a partial
      expungement of the charges brought against Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 2-4 (unnecessary capitalizations and record

citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (unpaginated).

      Based on the forgoing, we discern no basis to disagree with the trial

court’s finding that Appellant’s trial evidence, including her testimony, was not

credible insofar as she invites us to believe that her plea counsel provided her

with incorrect legal advice regarding complete expungement and that she

relied upon that incorrect advice to enter into the negotiated guilty plea. See

Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 530 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(recognizing that “[a]s the fact-finder [is] in the best position to assess the

credibility of the witnesses’ testimony,” we “will not reverse a trial court’s

credibility determination absent the court's abuse of discretion as fact

finder.”). The trial court specifically found:

      Appellant offered no credible evidence to support a finding that
      Attorney McCrea provided Appellant with erroneous legal advice.
      [D]espite Appellant’s contention that the text messages vindicate
      her position that she was given incorrect legal advice regarding
      the expungement of her entire criminal record, the messages fail
      to support Appellant’s position.     In Appellant’s message to
      Attorney McCrea, Appellant asked “is misdemeanor conspiracy
      able to be expunged as well or just the assault?” The trial court
      correctly analyzed the phraseology “as well” as demonstrative
      Appellant was quite clear that she was not assured that the

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      entirety of her record would be expunged, but only part of it. As
      important, the trial court’s determination of Appellant’s credibility
      cannot be isolated to the text messages. It must be done through
      a totality of the circumstances analysis.        Through such a
      determination, it is evident that Appellant’s contradicting
      testimony is a clear indication that her assertion of the facts was
      indeed unreliable. Therefore, there is no basis to conclude
      Appellant was subjected to manifest injustice.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/1/23, at 6-7 (unpaginated). Separately, her claim that

her guilty plea was involuntary, unintelligent, or unknowing lacks merit, as it

was belied by her written questionnaire and oral colloquy, as detailed above.

Indeed, Appellant is bound by the statements she made at the time of her

guilty plea.   Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super.

2012) (A defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea colloquy,

and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that

contradict statements made when he pleaded guilty). Accordingly, we cannot

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s post-

sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Appellant does not obtain relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/14/2023

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