Court Opinion

ID: 9539641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:07:38.42502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:05.582552
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I take a different view and a different analysis than that of the majority, I respectfully dissent. Plaintiff was awarded as her sole and separate property, an automobile worth approximately $7,000.00, and it was clearly the intent of the divorce decree that she was to receive that vehicle free and clear of the then existing encumbrance at Pioneer. That intent is demonstrated by the requirement contained in the decree that the defendant pay off the indebtedness at the rate of $197.00 per month.
It is well established in Idaho that an action for divorce is addressed to the equity jurisdiction of the court. Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983); Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 68 Idaho 275, 193 P.2d 391 (1948). Within doctrines to be applied by a court sitting in equity is that of unjust enrichment. In my view the doctrine of unjust enrichment is applicable and should be applied to the circumstances of the instant case. Here, due to the fortuitous circumstance of the defendant being the named insured on the insurance policy covering the vehicle awarded to the plaintiff, the defendant has been unjustly enriched by the amount of the insurance proceeds. Through that unjust enrichment he has been enabled to pay the indebtedness to Pioneer.
On the other hand, although the decree of the court intended plaintiff to have an automobile worth approximately $7,000.00 free and clear of any encumbrance, plaintiff now has no automobile nor the money with which to purchase one. It is my view that plaintiff should be able to acquire an automobile and have the indebtedness thereon paid off by the defendant. To that end I would hold that the Court should require the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of $5,517.77 at the rate of $197.00 per month, without interest.
BISTLINE, Justice, voting to affirm the judgment of the magistrate and to vacate the appellate judgment of the district court.
With due regard for the opinions of Justice Huntley and Justice Shepard, it is self-evident that the trial court, Judge John R. Sellman presiding, had the far better grasp of the legal aspects of the controversy. The divorce action went by default, and the plaintiff received exactly the relief which she had prayed for. (Under the decisions of this Court, she could not gain more *67where the defendant offers no contest.) As Judge Sellman pointed out, “(1) Plaintiff got the car, and (2) Defendant got the debt. Defendant lived up to his end of the obligation [of the decree], and it was through no fault of his own that Plaintiff no longer has the car.” He concluded that “the Court is without jurisdiction to re-open the matter to award Plaintiff something not provided for in the Decree.”
The issue of jurisdiction is dispositive, putting me s-.t a loss to understand why it is that now three upper echelon jurists have tried to find some other resolution. The divorce action terminated in a final decree on the 15th day of September, 1981, other than for the timely filing of post-judgment motions. None were filed. “In this case these time limits [for making post-judgment motions] have long since passed.” Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980).
A seldom-recognized fact is that when the ball game is over, it’s over. In Pero-vitz v. Perovitz, 94 Idaho 453, 490 P.2d 320 (1971), the Court had no trouble in realizing that a divorce action, where there is no provision for alimony, is no more subject to reopening for modification than any other action which is fully terminated. When the trial court’s jurisdiction has ended, it has ended. As counsel for defendant pointed out to the Court, the relief here sought by the plaintiff had to be by way of independent action, citing us to Compton, supra. An action which is no longer pending is a dead file. My surprise is that only Judge Sellman and I seeni to be aware of this rather basic principle.1 An action which is wholly terminated might be likened unto a streetcar without wheels — it will not carry any passengers anywhere. “There simply is no longer an action pending between the parties and hence the parties are no longer before the Court.” Mercer v. Mercer, 102 Idaho 816, 641 P.2d 1003 (1982).

. The theory advanced in the opinion authored by Justice Shepard is worthy of comment. Because a divorce action has been said to be on the equitable side of the court, he would do equity and enter a monetary judgment against the defendant. This he could do only by putting aside any notion of jurisdiction which was the sole basis of Judge Sellman’s decision — necessarily ignored simply because it cannot otherwise be circumvented.
Justice Shepard presumably paid more attention to the appellate opinion of the district court than to that of the trial court. The closest the district court came to the issue of jurisdiction was to recognize plaintiffs right to bring an independent action — which thought was turned aside because "it is more practical to permit plaintiff, in this divorce proceeding, to enforce the decree requiring defendant to pay the car loan.” R., p. 48. Practicality, while in many instances does suggest an expedient route, does not rise to the level of providing jurisdiction where none exists.