Court Opinion

ID: 9848931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:30:16.964707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:54.375674
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT,
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Under the statutory scheme of the Teacher Employment Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990, §§ 22-63-101 to -405, 9 C.R.S. *795(1995) (the “1990 Act”), the chief administrative officer may recommend the dismissal of a teacher on the grounds stated in section 22-63-301, which must be set forth in “a written notice of intent to dismiss.” § 22-63-302(2), 9 C.R.S. (1995). If a teacher objects to the grounds given, the Board of Education may dismiss the teacher, but only after the “chief administrative officer [has met] the burden of proving that his recommendation for the dismissal of the teacher was for the reasons given in the notice of dismissal and that the dismissal was made in accordance with the provisions” of the 1990 Act. § 22-63-302(8) (emphasis added). A thorough examination of the record indicates that the notice of intent to dismiss (the “Notice”) was not made a part of the record below. Because the Notice was not included in the record, the Board’s action cannot be sustained as we are therefore unable to determine whether dismissal is on the grounds stated or in accordance with the 1990 Act. Thus, I agree that the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. However, I cannot join the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent to directions on remand that fail to require proceedings to supplement the record so as to permit a full and fair review.
Moreover, unlike the majority, because I find that the plain language of the last sentence of section 22-63-302(10)(c) violates the separation of powers doctrine of Article III of the Colorado Constitution, I would strike that sentence from the statute. I would do so because that sentence impermissibly grants the court of appeals the power to effect public policy as to teacher retention or dismissal decisions. The Colorado Constitution reposes such legislative authority in local school boards, which consist of politically ac-eountable, elected officials and not independent judicial officers.
I
Our order granting certiorari included the following question: ‘Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that its review of the record is limited to the hearing officer’s findings... ,”1 The majority states: “[w]e affirm the court of appeals’ determination that the record consisted in this case of the hearing officer’s findings since neither party challenged these findings.” Maj. op. at 789. Nonetheless, an item key to the administrative proceedings is the Notice prepared by the chief administrative officer.2 The parties have not questioned the absence of the Notice from the record before the court of appeals. Nevertheless, without the Notice, a full and fair review, as contemplated by the statute, cannot occur.
A
Before addressing the facts before us, a brief discussion of the teacher dismissal procedure may prove helpful. Under the 1990 Act, “a teacher shall [only] be dismissed in the manner prescribed by subsections (2) to (10)” of section 22-63-302, 9 C.R.S. (1995). § 22-63-302(1) (emphasis added). In accordance with those subsections, the chief administrative officer of the employing school district may initiate dismissal proceedings by recommending to the local school board that “the board dismiss a teacher based upon one or more of the grounds stated in section 22-63-301,” and the teacher “shall be given a written notice of intent to dismiss.” § 22-63-302(2).
*796The Notice “shall include a copy of the reasons for dismissal.” Id. If the teacher objects, a hearing “shall be conducted before an impartial hearing officer.” § 22-63-302(4).
The Notice initiates the teacher dismissal process. See § 22-63-302(2). Section 22-63-302(8) states in relevant part: “The chief administrative officer shall have the burden of proving that his recommendation for the dismissal of the teacher was for the reasons given in the notice of dismissal and that the dismissal was made in accordance with the provisions of this article.” Because the chief administrative officer’s action is, in fact, a decision which may result in termination based on the grounds given for the dismissal, see § 22-63-302(3), it is the Notice that is reviewed by the hearing officer, see § 22-63-302(3) & (4).
Under the 1990 Act’s explicit provisions, the Notice frames the hearing officer’s recommendation made to the Board, see § 22-63-302(2), and limits a teacher’s objection and right of appeal. What the majority does not address, but remains substantially important, is the fact that the “chief administrative officer shall have the burden of proving that his recommendation for the dismissal ... was for the reasons given in the notice .... ” § 22-63-302(8).
The Board, then, must “review the hearing officer’s findings of fact and recommendation, and ... shall enter its written order,” taking one of three actions: dismissal, retention, or probation. § 22-63-302(9). If, as here, the Board “dismisses the teacher over the hearing officer’s recommendation of retention, the board shall make a conclusion, giving its reasons therefor, which must be supported by the record.... ” Id.
Here, and presumably before the court of appeals, the record does not include the Notice as defined in section 22-63-302(2). If the chief administrative officer fails to carry the statutory burden, or if the Board does not act in conformance with the Notice, the dismissal process must be terminated. Thus, critical to appellate review of the Board’s dismissal action is whether the chief administrative officer has carried that statutory burden and whether the reasons for dismissal stated in the Notice are consistent with the Board’s written order as contemplated by section 22-63-302(9). Review of the Notice is the only means of determining this. When, as here, the Notice is not in the record, an “irregularity” exists and a reviewing court cannot determine whether the chief administrative officer has met the statutory burden nor whether the Board’s written order sets forth a basis for dismissal consistent with the Notice. Hence, in my view, the action of the Board cannot be upheld on this record.
B
We granted certiorari to decide “[wjhether the court of appeals erred in concluding that its review of the record is limited to the hearing officer’s findings when a school board dismisses a teacher contrary to the hearing officer’s recommendations and neither party asserts that those findings lack evidentiary support.” Thus, the proper question to be asked is whether on appeal a reviewing court need only review the findings of the ALJ. Our order granting certiorari raises the right question; however, the majority reaches the wrong conclusion.
The majority reasons that because the findings are not in dispute, the Board’s decision can be upheld even if its decision is not in accordance with the Notice, as mandated by section 22-63-302(8). Such a result is occasioned by the majority’s willingness to ignore the clear command of sections 22-63-302(2), 22-63-302(8), and 22-63-302(10)(d).
The majority’s holding, which does not address section 22-63-302(10)(d), may be misread to conclude that an appellate court may not sua sponte address the insufficiency of the record. Thus, what parties and attorneys learn today is that they proceed at then-own peril if they do not challenge the hearing officer’s findings of fact or the adequacy of the record.
II
In the instant case, the hearing officer entered findings of fact establishing two grounds for dismissal: insubordination and neglect of duty. Maj. op. at 788. Any one of *797these offenses may result in discharge under section 22-63-301, 9 C.R.S. (1995), of the 1990 Act. Despite the hearing officer’s recommendation that matters could be corrected by less drastic means than termination, the Board ordered that Heimer be dismissed. Maj. op. at 788-89. Pursuant to section 22-63-302(10), Heimer appealed the Board’s decision. The majority incorrectly presumes that the hearing officer’s decision forms a basis for this appeal. While understandable, based on the issues before us on grant of certiorari, such an approach leads to the majority’s rationale. To the contrary, however, it’s the Board’s action as opposed to the hearing officer’s recommendation that is on review.
Ill
Construing section 22-63-302(10)(e), the court of appeals held that the 1990 Act allows a court to supplant a local board’s decision to discharge the employee with its own judgment. I disagree.
A
The decision to retain or dismiss a public school teacher effects a public policy determination properly reposed in the politically accountable representatives of the people, the local board of education. However, under the 1990 Act, the General Assembly removes a policymaking decision from its proper domain, the local board of education, and misplaces the power in a branch of government that is intended to remain independent, the judiciary. As the majority admits, the final sentence of section 22-63-302(10)(c) “simply acknowledges that the practical result of the court of appeals’ exercise of judicial review authority will be a determination that the teacher will be retained as the hearing officer recommended, or that the teacher will be dismissed as the board decided_” Maj. op. at 793.
The court’s authority to make teacher retention or dismissal decisions spites article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, which states:
Section 15. School districts — board of education. The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.
(Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, section 22-63-302(10)(c) states:
The action for review shall be based upon the record before the hearing officer. If the decision of the board to dismiss the teacher was in accordance with the recommendation of the hearing officer, the court of appeals shall review such record to determine whether the action of the board was arbitrary or capricious or was legally impermissible. If the decision of the board to dismiss the teacher was made over the hearing officer’s recommendation of retention, the court of appeals shall either affirm the decision of the board or affirm the recommendation of the hearing officer, based upon the court’s review of the record as a whole and the court’s own judgment as to whether the board’s decision or the hearing officer’s recommendation has more support in the record as a whole.
(Emphasis added.) The last sentence of section 22-63-302(10)(e) effectively grants the court of appeals the power to retain or discharge a teacher; therefore, the statute im-permissibly conflicts with the constitutional provision to which it must be subservient. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 459, 444 P.2d 645, 647-48 (1968) (noting that the “constitutionally granted power to the General Assembly to thus establish inferior courts and judicial officers is subject to certain limitations which are themselves embedded in the Colorado Constitution”); People ex rel. Griffith v. Scott, 52 Colo. 59, 64-65, 120 P. 126, 128 (1911) (under article VI, section 1, “the general assembly is authorized to create a court of review, and as there is no express constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction that may be conferred upon such a court thus created, if the act is unconstitutional it must be because the jurisdiction sought to be conferred is by implication [or expressly] prohibited in some degree by other constitutional *798provisions”) (citation omitted); see also Mobile Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm’n, 417 U.S. 283, 311 & 311 n. 45, 94 S.Ct. 2328, 2347 & 2347 n. 45, 41 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974) (recognizing a court’s equity or judicial authority as distinguished from the exercise of legislative authority by a non-Article III court under statutory grant where there is no conflicting Constitutional provision).
The court of appeals, established “pursuant to section 1 of article VI of the state constitution,” § 13-4-101, 6A C.R.S. (1995 Supp.), is invested with judicial power only. See People v. Pate, 878 P.2d 685, 693 (Colo.1994). Thus, it does not have authority to make public policy determinations, and it can neither exercise legislative nor executive powers. See Federal Radio Comm’n. v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 469, 50 S.Ct. 389, 390-91, 74 L.Ed. 969 (1930) (the court of appeals “cannot be invested with jurisdiction of ... [legislative courts], whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested with judicial power only ... it [cannot] exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.”) (citations omitted).
The “historical development of public education in Colorado has been centered on the philosophy of local control.” Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1021 (Colo.1982) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the plain language of section 22-63-302(10)(c) requires the court of appeals to determine whether a teacher should be dismissed or retained. See maj. op. at 793. Rather than review the propriety of the Board’s decision, the court of appeals is'asked to make a policy decision, choosing between the order of the Board, a properly elected representative of the people, and the recommendation of the hearing officer. Id. This result improperly places the ultimate policy making power in the judiciary, a function more properly reserved to the political branches of government. That is, the statute directs the court of appeals to “either affirm the decision of the board or ... the recommendation of the hearing officer, based upon ... the court’s own judgment as to [which] ... has more support in the record as a whole.” § 22-63-302(10)(c). As a result, the last sentence of section 22-63-302(10)(c) delegates legislative authority to the court of appeals and meta-morphosizes the court of appeals into a super board of education or ultimate arbitrator with the authority to substitute its “own judgment” for that of the Board and ultimately to control instruction in the public schools.
In an effort to overcome Heimer’s constitutional challenge, the majority suggests that “own judgment” lacks explicit definition, and that the arbitrary or capricious standard provides sufficient restraint for any court of appeals’ decision as to teacher retention or dismissal. See maj. op. at 791-92. I disagree. Neither conclusion negates this unique statutory standard that gives the court of appeals, in fact, the nonjudicial ability to exercise its “own judgment,”3 as to teacher retention or dismissal: choosing between two policy alternatives, that of the Board or hearing officer. Even if the majority’s reading of the last sentence of section 22-63-302(10)(c) were valid, the result creates a legislative permit that allows the court of appeals to wield authority that our constitution properly reposes in local school boards.
B
Article III of the Colorado Constitution states:
Distribution of Powers[4]
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct depart*799ments,-the legislative, executive and judicial;and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
The improper transfer of power from the Board to the court of appeals effects a violation of the distribution of powers doctrine. Courts do not have authority to exercise executive or legislative powers. See General Electric Co., 281 U.S. at 469, 50 S.Ct. at 390-91; Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.1986). The decision to retain or terminate a public school teacher is not a judicial power and therefore is not one that the courts have the ability nor expertise to exercise. A statute that grants a court the power to use its “own judgment,” in choosing between two decisions that the record supports, empowers the court to resolve political or public policy matters and thus makes the court the ultimate political actor-the antitheses of how court judgments should be exercised. Unlike arbitrators in the political branches, courts are called upon to make rulings that will have as their genesis a recognized legal principle and provide a product that reflects reasoning that is intellectually coherent and politically neutral. Legal reasoning should bind the court of appeals’ judgments and not the ability to exercise nonjudi-eial power. I cannot subscribe, in effect, to authority that violates the distribution of powers provisions of Article III of our state constitution.
IV
In sum, I agree the court of appeals cannot be affirmed. However, whether on remand or otherwise, Jan Heimer, a teacher with twenty-five years of service, cannot be dismissed by the Board as long as the reviewing court “finds any irregularity” in the record. Here, the record did not include the statutorily required Notice; hence, dismissal cannot be carried out in accordance with the 1990 Act. In addition, section 22-63-302(10)(c), 9 C.R.S. (1995), violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, because boards of education and neither hearing officers nor judicial officers have primary responsibility for teacher hiring, retention, and dismissal in their school districts, the court of appeals cannot be affirmed. Nonetheless, the Board’s actions cannot be upheld unless on review it can be determined that the Board’s conclusions are consistent with the notice of intent to dismiss.

. While the parties have not raised before ns questions as to timeliness of notice or whether the Notice was defective, I believe the question as to sufficiency of the record by the exclusion of the Notice is raised if not implicated by the first question upon which we granted certiorari.

. A letter informing Heimer of the District Superintendent dismissal recommendation is attached to Heimer's Motion for Dismissal as exhibit A. The letter states that it "constitutes notice of intent to dismiss as required by Section 22-63-302(2) C.R.S.” and that “[a] copy of the Superintendent’s letter containing the recommendation and reasons for dismissal and a copy of § 22-63-302 C.R.S. are attached ... as required by statute.” Additionally, the letter states that copies of all exhibits that the School District intends to submit and a list of witnesses are included. However, a complete copy of the statutory Notice, including exhibits and a list of witnesses, is not a part of the record. I have no reason to believe that the Notice required by § 22-63-302(2) was not met; however, without the Notice, including the items mandated by § 22-63-302(2), the record has irregularities and is not complete.

. Because the phrase “own judgment” is not defined in this statute, I find the provision deficient. The majority's effort to cabin its unknown contours through statutory construction may prove successful today, but in the future ill-advised.

. The Colorado Constitution does not speak of the separation of powers doctrine; rather, our constitution references the allocation of authority between Colorado’s branches of government as the "Distribution of Powers.” Nonetheless, in light of popular usage, I will refer to the principal set forth in Art. Ill as the separation of powers doctrine.