Court Opinion

ID: 9682115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:05:35.521283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.546787
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion declares that the source of “outside influence” must be one other than a juror. It further asserts that information that a juror deliberately gathers from outside the courtroom, after the commencement of the trial, and shares with other jurors, in direct violation of the trial court’s oral and written instruction, is not outside influence. This is contrary to logic.
The character of information contained in a newspaper article is the same whether the article is handed to a juror by the bailiff, handed to the juror by a third party, or brought into the jury room by a juror of his own volition. In any case, the information contained in the article is outside the record. Similarly, information gathered by a juror’s personal inspection of the scene of the incident is brought into the jury room from outside the record. To the extent that the evidence in either instance affects another juror’s assent to or dissent from the verdict, it is influence.
The rule itself does not restrict the term influence to third persons. Another form of the word appears in the rule: “A juror may not testify as ... to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict....” As used in this portion of the rule, that which influences is that which induces one to form an opinion; it is not restricted to that introduced by third parties.
Case law rather than common sense has brought the majority to the conclusion that outside influence must be initiated by a non-juror. The time has come to recognize this is not what the plain language of the rule states and does not conform to the instructions of the trial court. The record reflects that these jurors, as most jurors, were read the following admonition, tracking the language of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:
Do not make any investigation about the facts of this case. Occasionally we have a juror who privately seeks out information about a case on trial. This is improper. All evidence must be presented in open court so that each side may question the witnesses and make proper objection. This avoids a trial based upon secret evidence.
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Do not make personal inspections, observations, investigations, or experiments nor personally view premises, things or articles not produced in court. Do not let anyone else do any of these things for you.
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Do not seek information contained in law books, dictionaries, public or private records or elsewhere, which is not admitted into evidence.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a (emphasis added).
This case is distinguishable from those cited by the majority: Robinson Elec. Supply Co. v. Cadillac Cable Corp., 706 S.W.2d 130 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Clancy v. Zale Corp., 705 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Robinson Elec. Supply Co. and Clancy dealt with improper jury discussions concerning special information or experiences acquired by the jurors before they became jurors. Although jurors are instructed not to relate special information (such as what constitutes reasonable attorneys fees or prejudgment interest), the courts have long recognized that we cannot purge each juror of his personal experiences. Here, the influential data was unknown to the jurors until after the trial had commenced. Deliberate effort was required to obtain the information. In defiance of the trial court’s instruction, two jurors, Emerich and Madden, conducted their own investigations. They then presented the results of their “fact finding” expeditions to the other jurors. Eme-rich stated that the lighting in Judge’s was not as it had been represented to the jury in the courtroom. After seeing the inside of Judge’s, Madden instructed her fellow jurors that additional security at the nightclub would not have made any difference. There could not be a more blatant example *321of trial by secret evidence, nor a more flagrant disregard for appellants’ right of cross examination. Shortly after these revelations were made to the other jurors, juror Edwards changed her vote on proximate cause to favor the defendants.
A second incident compounded the infraction of the trial court’s admonitory instructions. Another juror, Wander, brought a newspaper article into the jury room. The essence of the article was that a trial judge had the right to change a jury verdict without regard for the decision made by the jury. The testimony of the jurors was that as a result of the article the jurors perceived their vote as unimportant. After discussing the article, juror Pinto changed her vote on proximate cause from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant, thus ending a nine to three jury deadlock.
By defining outside influence in the narrowest of terms, thereby precluding judicial inquiry into blatant and impermissible jury conduct, the majority denies appellants their right to a fair trial and, unwittingly, condones similar violations in the future. The admonitions of the trial court provided in Rule 226a are rendered meaningless. A rule not enforced is not a rule. Robinson Elec. Supply Co., 706 S.W.2d at 135 (Draughn, J., dissenting). I would sustain appellants first, second, tenth, and fifteenth points of error and remand the cause for a new trial.