Court Opinion

ID: 9882071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 22:00:17.295522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:58.503394
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 22-1643

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

EDGARDO QUIRÓS-MORALES, a/k/a Sealed Defendant 8, a/k/a Quirito,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

         [Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                  Montecalvo, Selya, and Lynch,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Marie Killmond, with whom Amelia T.R. Starr, Sharon Katz,
Kennedi Williams-Libert, and Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP were on
brief, for appellant.
     Sofia M. Vickery, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice, with whom Kenneth
A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H. Miller, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, W. Stephen Muldrow, United States
Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States
Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and Thomas F. Klumper,
Assistant United States Attorney, Senior Appellate Counsel, were
on brief, for appellee.
October 4, 2023
            SELYA, Circuit Judge.           As the name implies, courts of

appeals are courts of review.        A judicial system — like the federal

judicial system — functions best when the constituent courts within

that   system   stay    in   their   own    lanes.     So   when    a   factbound

determination is committed to the discretion of the district court,

the court of appeals ordinarily should stay its hand and refrain

from making that determination in the first instance.                Rather, the

court of appeals should allow the district court to exercise its

discretion and then review the resulting determination.                 Consonant

with this framework, we vacate the district court's denial of a

prisoner-initiated      motion    for     compassionate     release     filed   by

Edgardo Quirós-Morales (Quirós) but deny Quirós's request that we

jump the line and order his compassionate release.                 We remand the

matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                        I

            We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of

the case.

                                        A

            Quirós     was   a   member     of   a   gang   involved     in     the

distribution and sale of a broad array of drugs.                   On April 10,

1997, Quirós was indicted, along with several co-defendants, on a

charge of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of

heroin, cocaine, and cocaine base and 100 kilograms or more of

                                     - 3 -
marijuana.     See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.          On July 15, 1998, a

jury found Quirós guilty as charged.

           The       district   court    (Casellas,      J.)   convened     the

disposition hearing on December 11, 1998. According to the factual

recitals in the presentence investigation report (PSI Report),

which the district court adopted for purposes of the hearing,

Quirós served as a "triggerman" for the drug-trafficking gang.               In

that capacity, he used firearms "to provide protection to the

leaders   of   the    organization . . . and    to    engage   in    shootings

against members of rival drug-trafficking organizations pursuant

to the instructions of the leaders."         The PSI Report described two

murders that took place in furtherance of the conspiracy, but

Quirós was not among the individuals listed as participating in

the commission of either murder.

           The sentencing guidelines then in effect contained a

cross reference instructing that "[i]f a victim was killed under

circumstances    that     would    constitute   murder    under     18   U.S.C.

§ 1111," the first-degree-murder guideline should apply.                   USSG

§2D1.1(d)(1) (Nov. 1998).         Employing this cross-reference, the PSI

Report calculated a base offense level of 43.             This calculation,

coupled with a criminal history category of I, yielded a guideline

sentencing range of life imprisonment. The district court accepted

these guideline calculations and sentenced Quirós — who was then

twenty-four years of age — to a term of life imprisonment.                   We

                                     - 4 -
affirmed Quirós's conviction and sentence, noting that "a life

sentence was mandated" by the applicable sentencing guidelines.

United States v. Quirós Morales, No. 99-1115, slip op. at 13 (1st

Cir. Feb. 9, 2001) (unpublished opinion).

                                     B

            Over time, Quirós made numerous attempts to obtain post-

conviction relief.      We offer a representative sampling of those

attempts.

              •   In 2002, Quirós moved pro se for post-conviction

                  relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective

                  assistance of counsel and arguing in part that the

                  sentencing    court's    application    of   the    section

                  2D1.1(d)(1)     murder       cross-reference       violated

                  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)

                  (holding that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior

                  conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for

                  a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

                  must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

                  reasonable doubt").      The district court denied the

                  section 2255 motion in an unpublished decision,

                  concluding (among other things) that the Apprendi

                  rationale did not apply because "the statute under

                  which [Quirós] was convicted [already] exposed him

                  to   life   imprisonment."      See    Quirós-Morales    v.

                                   - 5 -
    United States, No. 02-2019, 2004 WL 7344743, at *2

    (D.P.R. May 24, 2004).

•   Following the Supreme Court's watershed decision in

    United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005),

    Quirós     petitioned        for        a     certificate        of

    appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), based in

    part on the contention that his sentence violated

    both Apprendi and Booker.           We denied his petition

    in an unpublished judgment, noting that even if

    Booker     applied       retroactively,         "there     is    no

    reasonable      indication       that       Quirós   would      have

    received a lesser sentence in a post-Booker regime

    of advisory guidelines."

•   Six years later, Quirós sought leave to file a

    successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

    his sentence.        See 28 U.S.C. § 2255.           This time,

    Quirós grounded his motion on "newly discovered

    evidence."      That evidence consisted of an affidavit

    from Daisy Trevino Ortiz, who had been convicted of

    shooting    a   woman    named     Marlena     Gotay.        Quirós

    alleged    that    the     affidavit        contradicted     trial

    testimony indicating both that he was involved in

    Gotay's murder and that the murder was related to

                       - 6 -
                  drug trafficking.      We denied Quirós's motion in an

                  unpublished judgment.

                                     C

          In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act (FSA), which

amended   the     compassionate-release      statute,    see       18   U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A), to allow prisoners to file their own motions for

compassionate release, see FSA § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239.                 On

April 5, 2021, Quirós — through counsel — moved for compassionate

release or, in the alternative, a sentence reduction pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).1        Quirós argued that various factors

supported his motion for compassionate release, including his

youth and lack of criminal history at the time of the offense of

conviction,     the   disparity   between   his   sentence   and    those   of

similarly situated co-defendants, the lack of danger that he posed

to the community, the fact that under current law he would not be

subject to an automatic life sentence for the same crime, the

absence of any factual basis for the section 2D1.1 murder cross-

reference, his rehabilitation and strong support network, and his

risk of contracting COVID-19 while incarcerated.             The government

opposed the motion.

     1 Although Quirós describes his requested relief as "a
sentence reduction or compassionate release," we have referred
interchangeably to such motions as "compassionate-release" and
"sentence-reduction" motions. See United States v. Saccoccia, 10
F.4th 1, 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 2021).

                                   - 7 -
              Because the original sentencing judge had died, Quirós's

motion was referred to a different trier.                     The district court

(Domínguez, J.) proceeded to deny Quirós's motion.                       The court

stated   in    an   electronic    order       that   "[Quirós]    has    failed   to

demonstrate that he suffers from a serious medical condition that

would constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for his

release.      Without that showing, [Quirós's] request cannot proceed

as a matter of law."          The court further stated that "[i]n any

event, the seriousness of the offense makes him illegible [sic]

for compassionate release as this case relates to drug conspiracy

and a related death by cross murder reference."

              This timely appeal ensued.

                                         II

              Shortly    before   the    district     court    ruled,    the   legal

landscape relating to compassionate release became better defined:

this court decided United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st

Cir.   2022).       Of   particular     pertinence     for     present   purposes,

Ruvalcaba held that because the Sentencing Commission had not yet

issued   any    policy    statement      applicable     to    prisoner-initiated

motions for compassionate release, district courts reviewing such

motions had discretion to "consider any complex of circumstances

raised by a defendant as forming an extraordinary and compelling

reason warranting relief," including non-retroactive changes to

the law.       Id. at 28.     But briefing on Quirós's compassionate-

                                        - 8 -
release motion had already been completed, and neither party called

the Ruvalcaba decision to the district court's attention.

           The district court denied the motion for compassionate

release.   Hot on the heels of its order, we decided United States

v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42 (1st Cir. 2022).             There, we fleshed out

our holding in Ruvalcaba and made pellucid that district courts

"may   conduct     a   holistic     review    to   determine     whether     the

[prisoner's] individualized circumstances, taken in the aggregate,

present    an    'extraordinary     and     compelling'     reason   to    grant

compassionate release."      Id. at 47 (quoting Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at

27).   We added that the types of appropriate circumstances for

district courts to consider may include alleged sentencing errors,

although    "classic    post-conviction        arguments,     without     more,"

generally will not succeed in this inquiry.            Id. at 48.

           Another relevant decision, United States v. Gonzalez, 68

F.4th 699 (1st Cir. 2023), came down after Trenkler.                    In that

decision, we further elaborated on the scope of the holistic review

permitted by Ruvalcaba and Trenkler, explaining that the district

court need not consider every potential configuration of grounds

for compassionate release but, rather, its analysis "should be

shaped by the arguments advanced by defendants."              Id. at 706.

                                      III

           On    appeal,   Quirós    argues    that   the   district      court's

denial of his compassionate-release motion flouted the teachings

                                     - 9 -
of Ruvalcaba and Trenkler.         The government does not put up a fight.

Acknowledging that it is at least unclear whether the district

court    employed     the   appropriate     legal   standard   for   assessing

whether a prisoner has presented extraordinary and compelling

reasons for compassionate release, the government has conceded

that the order appealed from should be vacated.

            But that is not the end of the matter.                   While the

government    seeks    to   have   us   remand   the   compassionate-release

motion for further consideration by the district court, Quirós

does not want to settle for half a loaf.            Instead, he entreats us

either to grant outright the motion for compassionate release or

to instruct the district court, on remand, to grant it.2

                                        A

            Before we turn to Quirós's entreaty, some background is

useful.    "Th[e] compassionate-release statute carved out a narrow

exception to the general rule that '[a] court may not modify a

term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.'"            United States v.

Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)).    The statute allows a district court to reduce a term

of imprisonment when extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant

a sentence reduction, such a reduction is consistent with any

     2 These are two ways of saying the same thing and — for
simplicity's sake — we will treat his prayer as a prayer to have
this court order compassionate release.

                                     - 10 -
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,

and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors counsels in

favor of a reduction.     See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also

United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2022).3

Whether    a    defendant's   circumstances    are   "extraordinary    and

compelling" is "guided by the plain meaning of those terms," United

States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561, 566 (1st Cir. 2021), and is

subject to relevant legal constraints.

           Before    proceeding   further,    we   note   two   preliminary

matters.       First, a prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate

release may be made only after the prisoner has exhausted all

administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons

to bring a motion on his behalf or after thirty days have elapsed

from the relevant facility's receipt of such request.               See 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).        The government does not gainsay that

Quirós has satisfied this requirement.

           Second, we note that there is no applicable policy

statement currently in effect with respect to a prisoner-initiated

motion for compassionate release.      See Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 23.

On April 27, 2023, however, the Sentencing Commission submitted to

     3 The compassionate-release statute also allows a district
court to reduce a term of imprisonment in two other circumstances.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(2). Those provisions are
not implicated in this appeal.

                                  - 11 -
Congress proposed amendments to its current policy statement on

compassionate-release           motions,         which   would    both    extend     the

applicability      of     its    policy      statement      to    prisoner-initiated

motions    and    expand    the      scope    of    what    can   be   considered     an

extraordinary       and    compelling         reason       warranting     a     sentence

reduction.       See United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 75 F.4th 1, 18

n.22 (1st Cir. 2023) (referencing proposed amendments).                            These

proposed amendments will not become effective unless and until

Congress declines to disapprove, revise, or otherwise modify them

within 180 days from the date of their submission.                       See 28 U.S.C.

§ 994(p).

            We "review a district court's denial of a compassionate-

release motion for abuse of discretion."                    Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at

4.   Under this standard, "we review the district court's answers

to legal questions de novo, factual findings for clear error, and

judgment calls with some deference to the district court's exercise

of its discretion."         Id. at 5 (quoting Akebia Therapeutics, Inc.

v. Azar, 976 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2020)).

                                             B

            Before turning to the beating heart of the appeal — the

remedy to which Quirós is entitled — we pause to make brief mention

of   the   legal    error       in   the     district      court's     order.       Most

importantly, the district court erred in determining that Quirós's

motion had to be denied "as a matter of law" because of his failure

                                        - 12 -
"to demonstrate that he suffers from a serious medical condition."

(Emphasis supplied).     As we held in Ruvalcaba and elaborated in

Gonzalez, "any complex of circumstances" identified by a prisoner,

subject to whatever constraints have been imposed by Congress or

the courts, may be considered by the district court as a basis for

compassionate release.    Gonzalez, 68 F.4th at 706; Ruvalcaba, 26

F.4th at 28.     "[T]he only exception to what may constitute an

extraordinary and compelling reason, as made explicit by Congress,

is rehabilitation."    Trenkler, 47 F.4th at 47 & n.11 (footnote

omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).       In view of these authorities,

it is apparent that the district court prematurely concluded that

Quirós's   compassionate-release   motion   could   not   proceed   as   a

matter of law.

           Because "[a] district court by definition abuses its

discretion when it makes an error of law," Koon v. United States,

518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996), we agree with the parties that the

decision below cannot stand.4      We must, therefore, vacate the

challenged order.

     4 Quirós argues that the district court made a second legal
error by stating that "[i]n any event, the seriousness of
[Quirós's] offense makes him illegible [sic] for compassionate
release as this case relates to drug conspiracy and a related death
by cross murder reference."     To the extent that this statement
could be read to imply that Quirós's particular crime of conviction
poses a categorical bar to compassionate release, we agree with
Quirós that no such categorical bar currently exists. Reading the
statement in context, though, it is unclear whether the district
court intended to assert such a categorical bar or merely meant to

                               - 13 -
                                    C

              Quirós insists that we should go the extra mile and grant

his motion for compassionate release.      We think not.    As we explain

below, the district court, not this court, is the appropriate forum

for consideration of such a first-instance determination.

              The district court enjoys a "wide compass" of discretion

when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion for compassionate

release.       Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th at 567 (describing district

court's decision to deny compassionate release as "a judgment

call"); see Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 57 (affording deference to

denial   of     compassionate-release   motion   when    "district   court

weigh[ed] the relevant considerations and ma[de] a reasonable

judgment call").      We believe that it would be both unbecoming and

contrary to the basic principles of appellate review for us to

usurp the district court's prerogative, decide the motion without

the benefit of the district court's insights, and simply substitute

our judgment for that of the district court.            Where, as here, a

district court must formulate a sentencing decision that requires

it to "make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the

outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience

invoke the seriousness of Quirós's conviction as weighing against
compassionate release on these specific facts.     Certainly, the
gravity of the underlying offense is relevant to a judge's
consideration when deciding a compassionate-release motion. See,
e.g., Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 9.

                                  - 14 -
in criminal sentencing," it has "an institutional advantage" that

an appellate court cannot match.5   Koon, 518 U.S. at 98; see United

States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 489 (1st Cir. 2005)

(explaining that for an appellate court to "do[] the sentencing"

in lieu of a district court would not be "an appropriate allocation

of functions").

          In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, Quirós

argues that "[t]his is a case where the District Court simply

applied the governing standard incorrectly" so that "remand to the

District Court with instructions to apply that standard again"

would be unlikely to "yield a different result."          This argument

fails on at least two levels.    For one thing, the record before us

is much more tenebrous than Quirós suggests:             for aught that

appears, the district court did not apply the correct standard at

all — and the better practice is to afford it the opportunity to

do so in the first instance.        For another thing, even if the

district court had misapplied the correct legal standard, an open-

ended remand would be the preferable course.             After all, the

allocation   of   functions   between    trial   and   appellate   courts

strongly suggests that the district court ought to be afforded the

     5 To be sure, there may be unusual circumstances in which this
general rule would not apply. This case, however, fits comfortably
within the general rule, not within the long-odds exception to it.

                                - 15 -
opportunity to apply that standard in the first instance, armed

with a clearer understanding of its proper application.

            Quirós     undervalues       both      the     district      court's

institutional competence and the desirability of allowing the

district court to make a first-instance determination.                In staking

out his position, he relies heavily on the decision in United

States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167 (4th Cir. 2023).              There, a divided

panel of the Fourth Circuit eschewed any need to obtain the

district court's views and directed the district court to grant

the appellant's motion for compassionate release.              See id. at 178.

In   that   case,    however,   the    appellant's       compassionate-release

motion was especially urgent because of his advanced age and grave

health conditions.      See id. at 169.          What is more, the appellant

had already been placed in temporary home confinement due to his

special susceptibility to death or serious illness from COVID-19,

and he made a persuasive case that he was unable to receive

government benefits (such as Medicaid) while in temporary home

confinement.    See id. at 172.        To add a further complication, his

health was in steep decline. See id. at 170-72.              Recognizing these

"dire     circumstances,"   the       majority    reversed    the     denial   of

compassionate release and remanded with instructions to grant the

compassionate-release motion.6          Id. at 177-78.

      6Through a letter submitted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 28(j), Quirós has also called our attention to

                                      - 16 -
          In our view, the Malone decision is a product of unique

circumstances, and Quirós's case is at a far remove from it.

Quirós is in his late forties and appears to be in stable health.

Unlike in Malone, Quirós has neither presented a near-conclusive

case for compassionate release nor made a convincing showing of

special urgency, counselling in favor of immediate action.

          Here, Quirós's arguments for compassionate release are

multilayered and require careful parsing of the record.   Moreover,

the district court never undertook an evaluation of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors.     Such an evaluation is an important component

of the compassionate-release process, and the district court is

better positioned than this court to perform that evaluation.

          To write at greater length would be to paint the lily.

What Judge Harris wrote in Malone fits this case like a glove:

"There may be cases where, in the end, no analysis or explanation

could persuade us that compassionate relief was appropriately

denied.   But before we put this case into that category, [we

should] allow the district court to consider the full record under

the proper framework."      Malone, 57 F.4th at 178 (Harris, J.,

concurring in part).

the Fourth Circuit's later decision in United States v. Brown, 78
F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2023). The majority opinion in Brown is of a
piece with the majority opinion in Malone, see id. at 134
(Quattlebaum, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of "usurp[ing]
the district court's assigned responsibility"), and does not
require any additional analysis.

                                - 17 -
                                IV

          We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

the district court's order denying the motion for compassionate

release is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and Remanded.

                              - 18 -