Court Opinion

ID: 9721997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:14:18.609106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.963875
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J.
I concur in the judgment only.
Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (b) provides that any agreement for spousal support “shall be subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court order... except to the extent that any written agreement... specifically provides to the contrary.” Contrary to the majority’s opinion, it does not provide that in order to make spousal support agreements nonmodifiable the parties must use certain magic words nor does it indicate that the language must refer to a court’s power to modify.
The degree of specificity envisioned by the Legislature could not have been made clearer than in Forgy v. Forgy (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 767 [134 Cal.Rptr. 75]. Faced with statutory language which was identical to that quoted above and was contained in Civil Code section 139, the predecessor of section 4811, the court stated: “To comply with the non-modifiable provisions of section 139 it is not necessary the parties to a separation agreement state categorically: ‘The provisions of this agreement for support are not subject to modification or revocation by court order.’ To the contrary, ‘no particular magic words are needed’ to provide the exception to modifiability contemplated by the statute. [Citations.]” (Id., at p. 771.) So, the question is whether the agreement specifically provides that it is not subject to later modification. The majority believes that the release clause alone does so provide. I agree.
But the majority reads more in Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (b) than I can find or the court in Forgy finds. Here what the parties said in at least three places in their agreement was that their agreement re spousal support was not modifiable, period. That is enough for me to believe that they meant what they said and my reading of Civil Code *880section 4811, subdivision (b) is identical to the Forgy interpretation, i.e., that is all the Legislature required them to say in order to guarantee that a court at a later time could not modify the agreement.
The majority opinion says it wants more: it wants specific exclusion of judicial modification in the agreement. Not only do I not find that in the statute I do not find it in the agreement. The provisions that the agreement “shall not depend for its effectiveness on [court] approval, nor be affected thereby” is not in any plain understanding of the English language a “specific” provision against subsequent court modification. Nor do the cases cited in the majority opinion say that such language is specific. Again, the Forgy decision reads Civil Code section 4811 exactly the way I do. That decision did not deal with a clause similar to the one focused on here: it provided “‘... such decree shall in no way affect this agreement or any of the terms, covenants, or conditions thereof, it being understood that this Agreement is absolute, unconditional and irrevocable.” (Id., at p. 770, italics added.)
But even assuming for purposes of argument that the clauses are similar, Forgy does not find that clause to be a specific provision precluding court modification but rather finds the preclusion to be implied: “The word ‘decree’ used therein impliedly includes the orders embodied in the decree and any modification of those orders. Any other interpretation would permit the court to comply with the agreement in its ‘decree’ but forthwith effect noncompliance therewith by a subsequent decree or order. As thus interpreted the agreement provides, a court decree incorporating its provisions and any modification thereof shall in no way affect the spousal support provisions thereof as to which the agreement ‘is absolute, unconditional and irrevocable.’” (Id., at pp. 770-771, italics added.)
If, as the majority claims, that is a holding by the Forgy court that the clause is a specific provision precluding judicial modification then why is the language just quoted immediately followed by “it is not necessary the parties to a separation agreement state categorically ‘The provisions of this agreement for support are not subject to modification or revocation by court order.’”?
In summary I conclude that the majority opinion asks the wrong question (i.e., did the agreement specifically exclude judicial modification?). But if the majority is asking the right question I believe it has *881answered it incorrectly. On the other hand the majority opinion seems to say that I am asking the wrong question (i.e., did the agreement specifically exclude modification?), but concedes that if I am asking the correct question that I have at least answered it correctly.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 6, 1980.