Court Opinion

ID: 9844787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:08:57.726093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:43.135113
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming the lower court’s order that the appellant herein pay the Title I loan. The majority opinion infers that the intent of the original divorce decree was to require the appellant to make such payment. I cannot agree. The original divorce decree awarded the respondent wife all of the household goods, fixtures and appliances, and required the appellant to pay all indebtedness against them. Respondent wife was awarded an automobile which was also subject to indebtedness, which the appellant was ordered to pay. Appellant was further required to maintain certain life insurance policies in force and to make the minor child the beneficiary of such policies. As to the dwelling of the parties, the respondent wife was awarded the “equity” therein. I believe the majority opinion misconstrues the intention of the court as indicated in the divorce decree. That court, in detail and with specificity, made clear its intent as to the requirements imposed upon the appellant husband. The contrast between the divorce decree’s treatment of all other types of indebtedness and its treatment of the residential indebtedness creates an inference exactly the opposite of that gained by the majority opinion. While a Title I loan does not result in an indebtedness against property in the conventional sense, it ordinarily results in an improvement to real property and presumably an enhancement in the value thereof. This improvement and enhancement in value, if any there was, inured to the benefit of the respondent wife, who the record shows has remarried and no longer occupies the residence. There is no showing in the record that the monies procured as a result of the Title I loan were utilized in any way other than improvements to the real property. Based on the above, I interpret the decree of the trial court as awarding the residence to the respondent wife and relieving *118the appellant husband of any further obligation in connection therewith. While I concede that a husband is responsible for the community debts, I suggest that the present question is substantially different than that of a husband being required to pay commmunity indebtedness such as medical bills, grocery bills, clothing bills, or other ordinary expenses of the community arising during the course of the marriage. I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.