Court Opinion

ID: 9833624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:53:46.051375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:05.283415
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We believe that we were in error in affirming the judgment of the tidal court in this case. We adhere to the view that the lots in question are primarily liable for the debt, and in addition to the authorities heretofore cited, refer to Harris v. Masterson, 91 Tex. 171, 41 S. W. 482; 27 Cyc. 1347, f, 1364, 1365.
[2, 3] We are also of the opinion that Mrs. Leola P. Hapgood and other’s first and second assignments should be sustained, which are to the effect that it was error to release B. J. Brothers, W. T. Pirtle, and J. W. Poole from the judgment. As to Pirtle and Poole, they did not ask to be released by a plea. There is no evidence that they did not consent to the extension, or that they did not have notice of the extension, and there is no plea to that effect on their part. Brothers having bought lots 11 and 12, and as a consideration therefor assumed the payment of the notes sued on, was bound therefor. He took his title with full notice of the lien, “and if he wished to protect himself he should notify the mortgagee of his purchase. The record is constructive notice only to subsequent purchasers, or those claiming under the same grantor.” 1 Jones on Mortgages (6th Iild.) § 723, last clause. It was not the duty of Wor-sham to investigate- and ascertain whether there was a junior conveyance or incum-brance. He should not be subjected to the constant necessity of investigating transfers between the mortgagor and third persons. Id. There is no pretense in this record that Brothers notified Worsham that he as a purchaser had assumed the debt, or had sold to Grogan. There is nothing in the record to charge Worsham with such fact, except the deed record, which is held by the courts no notice to the mortgagee. We were in error in holding that granting extension to Grogan was sufficient to charge Worsham with notice of Brothers’ rights. Worsham could not have been defeated in his right of foreclosure against lots 1 and 2, except on account of his negligence. He could not be charged with negligence in failing to get the consent of Brothers, when he was not charged with notice of Brothers’ connection with the title. Brothers cannot be released because he did not receive notice and did not give his consent when he negligently failed to notify Worsham of his purchase so that such notice could be given and his assent obtained. The fact that afterwards Brothers was sued by Worsham may be sufficient to show that Brothers’ assumption of the debt was accepted. This acceptance, however, was the acceptance of the debt as the conduct of the parties fixed it before the acceptance. The duty on Brothers’ part was to notify Wor-sham, which he did not do, and the extension, therefore, should not release him from .his obligation to pay. In this state the original vendor or obligor is regarded as the surety to his vendee who has assumed the note; especially so as between the parties— vendor and vendee. In so far as we are able to find, the question of extension by the in-dorser of the note, without the original obligor’s consent, releasing him on account of his suretyship, has not been directly decided in this state. On this question there is a conflict of authorities — one holding that he is released as a surety by extension (Jones on Mortgages [6th Ed.] § 742); while others hold that he is not released as to the creditor, recognizing simply that the relation of surety-ship exists between a grantor and grantee who assumed the payment of the mortgage, but does not affect the relations of the mortgagor and mortgagee (Id. § 742a). It occurs to us when the land stands as the primary security for the debt, and the creditor may resort to it for payment, that the owner of the lot so sought to be subjected to the debt ought not to be prejudiced by the acts of the parties over whom he has no control. It would seem to us that our courts sustain the latter view suggested by Mr. Jones. Montague County v. Meadows, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 256, 51 S. W. 556; Witt v. Amarillo National Bank, 135 S. W. 1108; Brandt on Suretyship, § 362.
[4] Worsham, by his act, could not affect Newby’s right of subrogation in extending the time. AVorsham would not be defeated of his lien because he did not give notice to Brothers, who had theretofore failed to give him notice of his relation to the title. Newby, therefore, has a right to be subrogated to the rights of creditors for whatever sum he shall be required to pay in order to free his land-from the lien. Judgment in this case should therefore be rendered against J.- W. Poole, and the subsequent vendees on their assumption, foreclosing the lien on the 12 lots in the block, directing that the lots be sold in the order named by the decree of the trial court, and if lots 3 to 12, inclusive, shall not sell for enough to pay olf the judgment on both notes sued upon, together with the interest, attorney’s fees, and costs, and Newby is compelled to pay and does pay the balance re*646maining to free Ms lots, then he should have the right to demand and have issued an execution in the name of the plaintiffs in the judgment, which shall direct the officers first to levy on the property of the parties in the order named, to wit, Richmond, Gro-gan, Brothers, Pirtle, and Poole; or if New-by shall pay the balance after the sale of the lots first required to be sold, the order of sale issued on the judgment shall inure to his benefit as an execution for the balance which he is required to pay and which he does pay, which shall be executed at his request upon the property of the parties in the order above suggested.
The motion for rehearing will be granted. The judgment of this court, affirming the judgment of the trial court, will be set aside, and the judgment of the trial court reversed and here rendered. Reversed and rendered.