Court Opinion

ID: 9851873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:20:51.507535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:18.459989
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. The very learned trial judge wrote an opinion in this case which states my view in this matter. The opinion, which I adopt and use as the basis of this dissent, is as follows:
"This court finds that the doctrine of 'concurrent similar employment’ has been adopted in Georgia (St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., vs. Idov, 88 Ga. App. 697; 210 Ga. 256). While this *139court is required to follow the rule of stare decisis, there appears no valid reason why the employment must be similar as long as such employment is concurrent and all employers know of such concurrent employment. The theory of Georgia’s Workmen’s Compensation law is to compensate the employee based on his earning capacity. As stated so succinctly in the above cited case, '. . . The one high aim constituting the foundation of this law is compensation for an injured employee, in proportion to his loss on account of injury. . . We think the fairest yardstick by which his compensation to cover his injury can be measured is what he was able to earn and was actually earning when the misfortune came upon him. . . It cannot be doubted that, at the time of his death, this employee’s earning capacity was the total of his wages from the three jobs he was doing . . . rather than the wage received from part-time employment. . . Where an employee is working for several different employers and is injured, in order that he may be reasonably compensated for the loss of his earning powers, his total wages must be taken into consideration. Any other construction of the statute would result in great injustice and lead to absurdities.’
"There appears to be another compelling reason why 'concurrent employment’ should be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Act. It is difficult to say how any court, with any degree of uniformity, can judicially determine just when employment is or is not 'similar.’ 30 ALR 1002. All concurrent employment has some similar characteristics and, conversely, has some dissimilar characteristics. Our Georgia courts, as early as 1924, have held that it is not necessary that an employee work exclusively for his employer in order to qualify for compensation. Empire Glass and Decoration vs. Bussey, 33 App. 464. The difficulties attending the construction of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are numerous enough without being greatly increased by imposing upon this court the obligation of deciding judicially how far one employment contract may or may not be ejusdem generis with another employment contract. In the St. Paul-Mercury case, supra, the employee in that case had three concurrent jobs. In two jobs, he sold liquor at retail and in the third job, he sold clothing at retail. Undoubtedly, an overwhelming majority of retail clothing salesmen would *140take offense to a bald assertion that selling clothing at retail was the same or similar to working in a liquor store as a retail salesman. While the liquor store jobs and the clothing store job do have similarities, they also have many dissimilarities. Georgia Code Annotated, § 114-402, specifically provides that 'If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury, whether for the same or another employer, during substantially the whole of 13 weeks preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall be 1/13 of the total amount of wages earned in such employment during the said 13 weeks.’ This code section further provides that 'Except as otherwise provided in this Title, the average weekly wages of the injured employee at the time of the injury, shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute compensation. . .’ It does not state 'whether for the same or another similar employer.’ It thus appears that concurrent employment by an employee, with the knowledge and consent of all employers, should be sufficient to justify an award to the employee for disability based on his total wages. Georgia Code Annotated §114-101, in defining the word 'employee,’ is as follows: 'Employee shall include every person in the service of another under any contract of hire . . .’ It does not state that the contract of hire has to be similar. It is not contended in the case at bar that the employee was not injured, nor is it contended that he was not in the employment of both concurrent employers for the requisite period of time required by the statute.
"In the case at bar, the claimant’s duties in his concurrent employment in many ways were similar; however, if the test of 'job classification’ apparently adopted in the St. Paul case, supra, is the criteria, then claimant’s concurrent jobs were dissimilar.
"This court can see no valid reason for the continuance of a doctrine in Georgia known as 'concurrent similar employment’ under the facts in the case at bar. This court is of the opinion that the Georgia doctrine should be one of 'concurrent employment.’”
It is my opinion that so much of the holding in the St. Paul case requiring concurrent employment to be "similar” should be overruled. Such a holding is not required under the Workmen’s *141Compensation Act.
I am authorized to state that Judge Evans concurs in this dissent.