Court Opinion

ID: 9478289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:45:14.49257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:20.904953
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I fully concur in the majority opinion as to Parts I, II, III, IV-B, Y-A, and V-B, my concurrence as to Parts IV-A and V-C is only as to the result.
In part IV-A, the majority places heavy reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). In my view, the facts in the instant case are readily distinguishable from those in Elstad. In particular, whereas in Elstad the relevant pr e-Miranda statements were made in the least coercive of custodial environments, the pr e-Miranda statements in the instant case were made while the defendants were in handcuffs and sitting in the rear of a police car. Thus, while the majority comfortably concludes that the pre-Miranda questioning of Sangineto and Vargas “had *1523none of the earmarks of coercion,” I concur as to this issue solely on the ground that Sangineto has not raised the issue of coercion.
Concerning Part V of the majority opinion, I agree that the defendants have failed to set forth a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), but disagree with the majority’s proffered list of Batson “indicators.” In my view, this court should not now attempt to catalogue what may (or may not) be indicative of racially discriminatory jury selection, or to set forth a rigid test for making such determinations. At any rate, the majority’s suppositions in this regard are merely obiter dictum because they are unnecessary to the resolution of this case.