Court Opinion

ID: 9448358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:33:00.887775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:23.866342
License: Public Domain

KNOCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I regretfully find myself in disagreement with Judges SCHNACKENBERG and SWYGERT in this matter.
The majority opinion notes that prior to the Warrior case, “most federal courts, including this court * * * held that management had a right to contract out work * * * unless [such right] is limited by the terms of the bargaining agreement.” The opinion also states that the Warrior case is not “authority for [plaintiff’s] contention that employers do not have a unilateral right to contract out work on company premises, in the absence of an express provision in the collective bargaining agreement.”
The majority then conclude that although “[t]here is no express prohibition of contracting out to be found in the agreement, * * * ” nevertheless the existence of the right to contract out is inconsistent with the provisions for a union shop. This conclusion is based on the theory that if the small group here involved “can be thus replaced, then other groups could meet the same fate, and eventually it would be possible to deplete a major part of the ‘protected’ union shop force.”
It seems to me that the majority have given consideration to an element which is concededly not an issue in the case before us: the good faith of management. There is no charge of dual unionism or unfair labor practice. The Union presumes that the action was based on economic reasons. The District Court’s opinion asserts that “no showing has been made that the subcontracting was done * * * to bring pressure on the Union or its members * * Had there been evidence to support a reasonable fear of the kind of threat which the majority apparently foresee, their conclusion would merit serious consideration.
The agreement between the Union and management was the result of collective bargaining. A long line of cases provided that management had the right to contract out work unless that right were expressly limited by the terms of the agreement. The majority hold that these cases have not been reversed by the ruling in Warrior. Yet the majority would give the Union the benefit of provisions which it may, or may not, have sought, but which, in any event, it did not secure. Management, on the other hand, reasonably relying on that same long line of eases, has been misled to its damage, through no fault of its own.
I do not subscribe to the erosion of the existing rights held by labor or management through the judicial process. Such changes should come about only through agreement, legislation, or voluntary surrender.
I must respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment below in its entirety.