Court Opinion

ID: 9769151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:36:10.755967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:56.150593
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s judgment, and write separately to clarify my reasons for doing so.
The witness sought to be impeached in this case was a police officer with the Maverick County Sheriffs Department. In his capacity as a police officer, he recovered evidence in the case against appellant and testified in a pretrial hearing regarding the recovery of this evidence before he himself was indicted on unrelated federal charges of theft and conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances. Sometime after his own indictment, he was called to testify for the State at appellant’s jury trial on the merits.
Appellant argues that she should have been permitted to impeach the officer with evidence of his pending federal charges. However, there is nothing in the record to show how those federal charges could place the officer in a vulnerable relationship with the state prosecutors who called him as a witness against appellant. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record which would establish how the officer’s pending federal charges were relevant to his testimony at appellant’s trial for tampering with government documents. See Tex.R. Evid. 401 & 402 (formerly Tex.R.ÜRIM. Evid. 401 & 402) (defining “relevance” and stating that relevant evidence is generally admissible and irrelevant evidence inadmissible); Tex.R. Evid. 611(b) (formerly Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 610(b)) (a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility). Finally, although it is possible that the police officer could have possessed a knowledge of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and thus testified against appellant in hopes of a downward departure if sentenced in his federal cases,1 there is nothing in the record to show that he was aware of the guidelines or that he had any type of “deal” with the federal prosecutors in charge of his case. In fact, appellant never argued this point to the trial court or to this court. To the contrary, neither appellant’s offer of proof to the trial court nor her brief to this court establish anything other than the fact that federal charges were pending against the officer. Given all of this, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting appellant’s cross-examination of the witness. See Tex.R. Evid. 611(a) (formerly Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 610(a)) (courts shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence, in order to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, avoid needless consumption of time, and protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (trial courts retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination dealing with bias, based on concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues, witness safety, or repetitive or only marginally relevant interrogation); Hurd v. State, 725 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall). For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1998); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (1998).