Court Opinion

ID: 9430579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:07.03906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.029828
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
The Court acknowledges in its discussion in Part II concerning the scope of the Federal Aviation Act that “not only is there no indication that Congress wished to preclude state sales taxation of airline fuel, but, to the contrary, the Act expressly permits States to impose such taxes.” Ante, at 6. That being so I see no reason for the discussion in Part III.
While 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513(a) describes a number of state taxes which are prohibited, § 1513(b) expressly permits state “sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services.” The fuel tax challenged here is plainly a “sales or use ta[x] on the sale of goods” within the language of § 1513(b).
Remarkably, the Court nevertheless refuses to “rely on the existence of this section to answer the Commerce Clause issue raised here” because it believes it is “plausible that Congress never considered whether States should be permitted to impose sales taxes on foreign, as opposed to domestic, carriers.” Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court continues with an extended discussion of “the so-called dormant Commerce Clause,” which applies to cases involving *14areas where “the Federal Government has not affirmatively acted.” Ibid. The plain language of § 1513(b) demonstrates, however, that there is nothing “dormant” here.
The conclusion the Court reaches in Part II is illuminated by the Court’s curious failure to even mention any of the extensive legislative history or this Court’s recent precedent concerning the enactment of § 1513, which followed our decision in Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U. S. 707 (1972). In that case the Court upheld a $l-per-passenger “head tax” on all passengers boarding airplanes at the Evansville airport, after rejecting a Commerce Clause attack because the tax did not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce.
Congress reacted immediately to our decision by holding hearings on local taxation of air transportation. See Hearings on S. 2397 et al. before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 129-198 (1972) (hereafter Senate Hearings); Hearings on H. R. 2337 et al. before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (hereafter House Hearings). The result of these hearings was the enactment of §7(a) of the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973, see Pub. L. 93-44, §7(a), 87 Stat. 90, which added § 1113 to the Federal Aviation Act, and which is now codified, as amended, at 49 U. S. C. App. § 1513.
We subsequently addressed the scope of § 1513(a)’s prohibition when confronted with Hawaii’s state tax on the gross income of airlines operating within that State. See Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U. S. 7 (1983). Reviewing the legislative history, the Court pointed out that § 1513 was enacted out of congressional concern that “the proliferation of local taxes burdened interstate air transportation.” Id., at 9 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-12, pp. 17, 20-21 (1973), and H. R. Rep. No. 93-157, pp. 4-5 (1973)). We concluded unanimously that Hawaii’s tax was expressly pre*15empted by the plain language of § 1513(a), 464 U. S., at 11, emphasizing that
“when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, courts need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted.” Id., at 12 (footnote omitted).
In the course of our discussion of § 1513(a) we addressed the Hawaii Supreme Court’s “professed confusion over the ‘paradox’ between §1513(a)’s prohibition on certain state taxes on air transportation and §1513(b)’s reservation of the States’ primary sources of revenue, such as property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes.” Id., at 12, n. 6. Our resolution of this “paradox” is enlightening:
“We find no paradox between § 1513(a) and § 1513(b). Section 1513(a) pre-empts a limited number of state taxes, including gross receipts taxes imposed on the sale of air transportation or the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce. Section 1513(b) clarifies Congress’ view that the States are still free to impose on airlines and air carriers ‘taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a),’ such as property taxes, net income taxes, and franchise taxes. While neither the statute nor its legislative history explains exactly why Congress chose to distinguish between gross receipts taxes imposed on airlines and the taxes reserved in § 1513(b), the statute is quite clear that Congress chose to make the distinction, and the courts are obliged to honor this congressional choice.” Ibid.
Careful review of the legislative history indicates that it is not entirely silent as to why Congress chose to make this particular distinction. The Senate’s first proposal to *16limit state taxation would have prohibited any state tax— direct or indirect — on air transportation. S. 3611, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see also H. R. 2337, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (similar prohibition). The States, however, complained loudly at the hearings that this sweeping provision would prohibit even unobjectionable taxes such as landing fees, fuel taxes, and sales taxes on food provided to airline passengers. E. g., House Hearings, at 91 (statement of John A. Nammack, Executive Vice President, National Association of State Aviation Officials). This broad interpretation was supported by officials from the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Administration, who objected to any such broad prohibition because it would deprive local governments of funds necessary for maintenance of airports. Senate Hearings, at 138 (statement of Whitney Gillilland, Vice Chairman, CAB); id., at 140-141 (statement of Ronald W. Pulling, Acting Associate Administrator for Plans, FAA). In reply, Members of Congress assured these officials that the prohibition was intended to apply only to “head taxes” and the like, and that some clarification of the bill’s intent would be in order. E. g., id., at 138, 151, 157 (statements of Sen. Cannon). See also House Hearings, at 99 (statement of Rep. Dingell); id., at 101 (statement of Rep. Harvey). The final bill enacting.§ 1513 therefore appears to be a compromise following careful consideration by Congress as to the permissible scope of state taxation in the area of air commerce.
Most relevant to the issue before us in this case is the fact that nowhere in that legislative history is there any indication that Congress intended to limit the applicability of § 1513(b) to state taxation of interstate air commerce while prohibiting taxation oí foreign air commerce. To the contrary, Congress was fully aware that the bill would cover foreign air commerce, since both the State Department and the Senate’s own Legislative Council advised Congress that “air commerce” as employed in the proposed bill encompassed for*17eign and overseas air commerce. See Senate Hearings, at 136 (letter of David M. Abshire, Department of State); id., at 207 (memorandum of Peter W. LeRoux, Senior Counsel, Office of Legislative Council). Moreover, Congress discussed the effect of foreign “head taxes” if similar local taxes were barred. House Hearings, at 35-37.
The language of the Act bears this out. Section 1513(a)’s prohibition refers to certain taxes “on persons traveling in air commerce ... or on the sale of air transportation.” The Act defines “air commerce” as including “interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce.” 49 U. S. C. App. § 1301(4). Similarly, “air transportation” is defined as including “interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation.” § 1301(10). Under the plain language of § 1513, therefore, the Florida tax — even in the area of foreign air commerce — is expressly authorized by Congress.
Just as we need not look beyond the plain language “when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce,” Aloha Airlines, 464 U. S., at 12 (emphasis added), we need not look beyond the plain language of a federal statute which unambiguously authorizes the States to impose a particular kind of tax. Section 1513(b) authorizes state sales taxes on goods used in air commerce. While Congress has not explained exactly why it made the distinction between taxes prohibited under § 1513(a) and those permitted under § 1513(b), “Congress chose to make the distinction, and the courts are obliged to honor this congressional choice.” 464 U. S., at 12, n. 6.
By refusing to decide this case solely on the express language of § 1513(b) and instead entering the cloudy waters of this Court’s “dormant Commerce Clause” doctrine, the Court fails to honor the choice already pointedly made by Congress following its extensive consideration of the problem of state taxation in this area.