Court Opinion

ID: 9480637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:54:15.159124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:48.987537
License: Public Domain

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Since I disagree with the majority that the district court’s competency determination denied Purnett his right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, I respectfully dissent.
The result reached by the majority, which is neither statutorily nor constitutionally required, does no more than penalize the government and the district court for their thoroughness. The record demonstrates that Purnett was almost certainly competent at the time Judge Bartels raised the issue. The comprehensive psychiatric report, undertaken at the behest of Judge Bartels and the government, demonstrated that Purnett was in fact competent. Pur-nett’s standby counsel, Allen Lashley, Esq., also believed that Purnett was able to stand trial. Moreover, Purnett does not seriously challenge on appeal the finding that he was competent. Thus, the majority has attempted to fashion a rule that forces a defendant in a criminal case to accept counsel when the word “incompetency” is even breathed in court.
I recognize that when the defendant’s competency is legitimately in question, absence of counsel at a competency determination would render the proceedings, whether formal or informal, void under the Sixth Amendment. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Contrary to the majority, however, I see no need to turn that princi-*57pie on its head and blindfold the judge from responding to the circumstances at hand.
This case is a striking illustration of such a blindfold. Judge Bartels was placed in a classic “Catch-22”, On the one hand, if he forced Purnett to accept appointed counsel, he risked violating Purnett’s right to proceed pro se pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). On the other hand, if he did not force Purnett to accept counsel, he risked the instant challenge. Since, by any reasonable observation, Pur-nett was competent, Judge Bartels chose the latter course. His judgment was sound and should have been upheld by our Court. It is likely that the majority’s refusal to do so will force district judges in our Circuit to be baffled by the same dilemma countless times in the future.
It should be remembered, furthermore, that “Judge Bartels is generally regarded as one of the most conscientious and experienced federal trial judges in the United States.” United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 38 n. 2 (2 Cir.1978).
We have held that the determination whether or not to hold a competency hearing when a question of competency is raised rests in the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2 Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987). The district court is able to assess the condition of the defendant. We are not. While Vamos does not govern directly the instant appeal, its logic is in point. Judge Bartels gave careful consideration to the question of Purnett’s competency — probably more than was merited — before ruling him competent. On the facts of this case, I do not believe that Purnett was constitutionally entitled to more.
If the majority opinion were to establish a “bright line” rule that would provide clear guidelines for resolutions of dilemmas of this type in the future, I would join the majority. Unfortunately, in my view, the opinion does no such thing. It merely compounds confusion. The reasons for this are several. The case arises from a muddied record. In all probability, Purnett’s competence was not the real problem; rather, it was his obstinance and uncooperativeness. Such factors will be enhanced at a retrial which surely will result in an inevitable conviction in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
All in all, I am satisfied that Judge Bar-tels exercised commendable discretion. “[C]all this particular ... judgment what one will, it does substantial justice and we [should] not disturb it.” Achilles v. New England Tree Expert Co., 369 F.2d 72, 74 (2 Cir.1966) (Medina, J.). From the majority’s ill-advised insistence upon doing so, I respectfully but emphatically dissent.
* * * * * *
And if there is to be a new trial, the majority appears to have overlooked warning counsel that when a defendant is convicted of two charges, one of which is a lesser included offense, the lesser included offense is merged into the more serious charge. Grimes v. United States, 607 F.2d 6, 11-15 (2 Cir.1979). Purnett was convicted of armed bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1988) and also of simple bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988), a lesser included offense. If the new trial should result in the same pattern of convictions, his conviction pursuant to § 2113(a) would be deemed merged into his conviction pursuant to § 2113(d), and the judgment should be drawn accordingly.