Court Opinion

ID: 9588343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:33:13.713499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.289430
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I agree that the Court of Appeals’ decision should be reversed, but I respectfully disagree with the majority’s rationale. In my opinion, breach of a “trust,” as that term is traditionally understood, is not essential to a conviction for breach of trust with fraudulent intent. Rather, the ’trust that must be breached for the crime to be complete is that confidence reposed by the victim in the recipient of the property.
Breach of trust with fraudulent intent “is nothing more or less than larceny. It might well be termed statutory larceny, as distinguished from larceny at common law. The main distinction between the two crimes is this: In common-law larceny, possession of the property stolen is obtained unlawfully, while in breach of trust, the possession is obtained lawfully.” State v. McCann, 167 S.C. 393, 397-98, 166 S.E. 411, 413 (1932) (emphasis in original). “[T]he object of [breach of trust with fraudulent intent] was simply to enlarge the field of larceny, removing what before might have been a defense for those who received property in trust and after-wards fraudulently appropriated it.” State v. Shirer, 20 S.C. 392, 408 (1884).
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the language from Shirer, “received in trust,” as meaning “received as a trustee.”2 In my opinion, the Shirer Court used the word “trust” in a lay sense, as in confidence in the integrity of another person. The Court was merely explaining the dichotomy between lawful and unlawful acquisitions in the context of larceny. A friend, an employee, or some other “trusted” person might receive property lawfully, but if he thereafter converts the property to his own use with animus furandi, then he is guilty of larceny through breach of trust with fraudulent intent.
*485In this case, that Parris lawfully received the Martins’ money is undisputed. The Martins trusted that Parris had title to the mobile home, and they tendered their money as consideration. Because there is evidence that Parris converted the Martins’ money for his own use, thus breaching their confidence, Parris was not entitled to a directed verdict.
If the State were in fact required to prove the existence of a trust, however, then the Court of Appeals’ decision should be affirmed. There is no evidence that the Martins intended to be the settlors of a trust. As the Court of Appeals noted, the Martins were not even aware that FNB financed and held title to Parris’s inventory. Had Parris owned title to the mobile home, as the Martins believed, then he would have used their money — their consideration under the sales contract — for his own benefit. He was not their trustee; there was no trust formed.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the result reached by the majority and join in the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

. Apparently, this interpretation was first made in State v. LeMaster, 231 S.C. 321, 98 S.E.2d 756 (1957).