Court Opinion

ID: 9845630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:25:27.58288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.685446
License: Public Domain

Reed, J.
(dissenting)—The majority has determined that the dispositive inquiry in this case is not whether a sufficient affidavit has been filed in support of publication of service but whether, under a postjudgment (CR 60(b)) analysis of the search underlying the affidavit, the judgment rendered is void. I disagree.
The majority holds that Brennan's affidavit in support of publication was insufficient to warrant publication, and I agree. They do not, however, find that infirmity fatal to service or to jurisdiction, because they have based their analysis of the validity of the judgment on a review of the postjudgment record. They state that their analysis would be different if jurisdiction had been attacked before the entry of judgment and conclude that, in such a case, the trial court would have been required to dismiss.4
Although a presumption of jurisdiction arises from a recital in a default judgment that valid service was made, Longview Fibre Co. v. Stokes, 52 Wn. App. 241, 244, 758 P.2d 1006 (1988); Burns v. Stolze, 111 Wash. 392, 191 P. 642 (1920), that presumption is overcome in a case of service by publication alone, by showing that publication was based on a defective affidavit. Burns v. Stolze, supra. As recognized in Stolze, the plaintiff may yet prevail by a postjudgment showing that service was effected by some other method. That was not the case in Stolze, however, and it was not the case here. The majority incorrectly permits the Brennans to validate the judgment by proof offered to "fortify the adequacy of the original search." (Italics mine.) Majority, at 318.
*321Again I would emphasize that the Stolze court looked at the postjudgment record and determined that no other means of service not of searching, was employed, stating that "the petition [to vacate] and the answer thereto read together show conclusively that the only attempt to bring the petitioner into court in the original case was by virtue of the published summons, based upon the defective affidavit." Stolze, 111 Wash, at 397.
Gould v. White, 54 Wash. 394,103 P. 460 (1909) did not, as the majority seems to believe, permit a tardy showing that "a proper basis for substitute service in fact existed." Majority, at 319. Rather, the Gould court would have permitted the plaintiff to show that valid publication of process had in fact taken place. Gould did not address the sufficiency of an affidavit underlying publication.
This court has long held that in order for jurisdiction to attach when a summons is served by publication, there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements. Longview Fibre Co. v. Stokes, 52 Wn. App. 244, 758 P.2d 1006 (1988); Kent v. Lee, 52 Wn. App. 576, 579, 762 P.2d 24 (1988). As stated in Painter v. Olney, 37 Wn. App. 424, 427, 680 P.2d 1066, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1002 (1984):
First and basic to any litigation is jurisdiction. First and basic to jurisdiction is service of process. Statutes authorizing service by means other than personal service, i.e., constructive and substituted service, require strict compliance.
A sufficient affidavit for publication is as essential to obtaining jurisdiction as the publication of the summons itself. If it does not contain statutorily required statements, it is not sufficient to authorize publication as a means of conferring jurisdiction. Burns v. Stolze, at 395 (citing Felsinger v. Quinn, 62 Wash. 183, 113 P. 275 (1911)). Felsinger further held at page 185:
An attempted affidavit for service by publication which entirely omits allegations expressly required by the statute is without vitality or force, and when filed leaves the party, on whose behalf it is made, in no better position than if no affidavit had been filed.
*322Brennan's five affidavits filed after the fact were more extensive in setting out his efforts to locate the defendants and might have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the superior court, had they been filed in addition to or instead of the brief affidavit originally filed. Without them, however, that affidavit did not strictly comply with statutory requirements and was facially defective. As such, it was sufficient to overcome the jurisdictional presumption recited in the judgment.
Citing Brenner v. Port of Bellingham, 53 Wn. App. 182, 765 P.2d 1333 (1989), the majority goes on to state that the inquiry on a CR 60(b) motion is: what in fact did the plaintiff do before seeking service by publication. Again, I submit that is not the inquiry. What the plaintiff in fact did is a question of diligence that is unrelated to the sufficiency of the affidavit for publication, because it is a question of the truth of that affidavit and arises only after sufficiency has been established. It does not itself establish statutory sufficiency. To that extent, the Brenner analysis also is wrong. There, the court stated that, once a defendant overcomes the presumption of jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff "to produce evidence that a reasonable search was made." Brenner, 53 Wn. App. at 187. As I hope I have made clear, that is not the burden that shifts. As noted above, the burden that shifts is that which requires a plaintiff to show that some other valid process was used to bring the defendant into court. In other words, that some other method of service was made. Stolze, 111 Wash, at 397.
While I am not inclined to burden a plaintiff with the vacation of a judgment entered on its behalf when due diligence in fact has been exercised, we must adhere to the jurisdictional requirements upon which a judgment must be founded. My analysis is not based upon an overnice technical disputation as to the sufficiency of the original affidavit. The very question of the validity of jurisdiction itself underlies this dissent, for jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine. In re Estate of Brown, 7 Wn.2d 717, 723, *323110 P.2d 867 (1941). Either a court has jurisdiction, or it does not. "If it does not have jurisdiction, any judgment entered is void ab initio and is, in legal effect, no judgment at all." Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wn.2d 90, 93-94, 346 P.2d 658 (1959).
The law is there to be read. As I read it, the Superior Court was without jurisdiction to authorize service by publication. Service not having been accomplished by any other method, the judgment premised upon publication was void and should have been vacated. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Review denied at 116 Wn.2d 1002 (1991).

The majority leaves unanswered the question of how a party who has never received notice that a lawsuit has been commenced against him or her could possibly attack jurisdiction prior to the entry of a default judgment.