Court Opinion

ID: 9466171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:07:15.544169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:34.992554
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I have great difficulty with the majority’s application of Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), to this case. That case, in addition to holding proper a morning warrantless reentry by fire officials and a police detective “to investigate the cause of the fire” in a “continuation” of the original entry, id. at 510-11, 98 S.Ct. at 1951, also held that additional entries thereafter must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches, id. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. 1942. In the instant case Detective Cassidy was not called to investigate the cause of the fire, he was called for a drug investigation. True, he found “exigent circumstances” requiring use of the bomb squad, but his entry was not made with those circumstances in view. I would not reach this question, however, for I think the case may properly be disposed of on other grounds.
Under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), “the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment” are defined in terms of “whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” I note that the occupants fled — evidently never to return — from the house which contained exceedingly limited personal property to begin with, most of which was drug-making equipment. For all that appears, the house was uninhabited except as appellant and his codefendants used it as an illegal drug manufacturing laboratory. I also note that, so far as the record on appeal indicates, appellant never returned to the house. To claim their drug-related property, they would obviously not be likely to return at least if the police were anywhere about. Even after three days when Detective Cassidy came back with owner Mercurio’s consent they obviously had not returned.
Thus it appears to all intents and purposes that appellant abandoned the house and the property in it. Cf. United States v. Haddad, 558 F.2d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 1977) (abandonment of hotel room and belongings in it).1 This issue is relevant because “[tjhere can be nothing unlawful in the Government’s appropriation of such abandoned property.” Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); see United States v. Smith, 527 F.2d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883, 92 S.Ct. 218, 30 L.Ed.2d 165 (1971). As the Third Circuit has stated, “[o]ne who abandons personal *566property may not contest the constitutionality of its subsequent acquisition by the police.” United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1066 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927, 92 S.Ct. 978, 30 L.Ed.2d 800 (1972).
In connection with the Government’s challenge to appellant’s standing, which with the majority I deem under Rakas to be addressed to the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue, the Government calls to our attention the limited nature of appellant’s property interest in the house. But the absence of “a recognized property interest at common law” controls neither the issue of the applicability of the Fourth Amendment, Rakas, supra, 439 U.S. at 143—44 & n.12, 99 S.Ct. at 430, nor the issue of abandonment. Rather, “[t]he proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.” United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 176, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973); see United States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 933, 98 S.Ct. 1509, 55 L.Ed.2d 531 (1978); see also United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). I note, of course, that under Rakas this test is now the relevant inquiry in all Fourth Amendment cases; and I am reinforced in the conclusion that, because the facts of this case present the issue of abandonment, resolution of the case should properly address this issue initially and not treat the legality of Cassidy’s entry under Michigan v. Tyler, supra.
Abandonment is a question of fact based upon intent, United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266, 1283 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Akin, supra; United States v. Colbert, supra; United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1968); and the question “depends upon all relevant circumstances existing at the time.” United States v. Manning, 440 F.2d 1105, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 125, 30 L.Ed.2d 69 (1971). Accordingly, I would vacate the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress and remand to the district court for a hearing on the issue of abandonment; for the district court must make the findings of fact on the issue in the first instance. I would point out, however, that it is not material to a finding of abandonment that Cassidy did not know at the time that he entered the house whether appellant would return; it is sufficient that subsequent events show that appellant had already formulated the intent to abandon the house and the personal property inside. See Parman v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 192-94, 399 F.2d 559, 563-65 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858, 89 S.Ct. 109, 21 L.Ed.2d 126 (1968); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 248—50 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872, 83 S.Ct. 123, 9 L.Ed.2d 110 (1962); cf. United States v. Cowan, supra. The district court should determine whether and when appellant formulated an intent to abandon because there was “no unlawful invasion of the premises prior to the discovery” of the incriminating matter; and if appellant had abandoned the property “the seizure . . . after discovery required no warrant.” United States v. Wilson, supra, 472 F.2d at 903.

. Haddad like some of the other abandonment cases, see, e. g., United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 1975), discusses the Fourth Amendment issue in terms of a defendant’s standing to raise the issue. Under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Court views the discussion as going to the merits of the claim of a Fourth Amendment violation, confident that “no decided cases would have come out differently” if the standing requirement is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.