Court Opinion

ID: 5135801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-12-17 08:15:33.868729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:23:51.509457
License: Public Domain

In The

                                  Court of Appeals

                       Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                 __________________

                                 NO. 09-21-00187-CV
                                 __________________

                   IN THE INTEREST OF G.F.L.L. AND L.M.L.

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the County Court of Law
                       Orange County, Texas
                     Trial Cause No. C190681-D
__________________________________________________________________

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In a parental-right termination case, Mother appeals from a final order

terminating her rights to her children, G.F.L.L. and L.M.L. 1 As the plaintiff in the

trial court, the Department of Family and Protective Services had to prove two things

to prevail on its claim to terminate Mother’s parental rights: (1) Mother engaged in

conduct that violated at least one of the twenty-one subsections the Legislature

      1
          The order also terminated Father’s rights, but Father did not appeal.
                                           1
established to justify terminating a parent’s relationship with his or her child; and

(2) terminating the relationship is in each child’s best interest. 2

       When before the trial court, the parties tried the case to the bench. In the end,

the trial court found Mother engaged in conduct that supports the Department’s

allegations to terminate Mother’s rights under sections 161.001(1)(D), (E), (L), (N),

and (O) of the Family Code.3 Along with those findings, the trial court found that

terminating the parent-child relationships between Mother and her children,

G.F.L.L. and L.M.L., is in their best interest. 4 After rendering judgment, Mother

appealed.

       On appeal, Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed a brief, which argues there

are no arguable grounds available for an argument claiming the trial court made an

error that would require the judgment to be reversed. 5 After reviewing the briefs the

parties filed, we agree the brief filed by Mother’s attorney represents a professional

evaluation of the record. The record also shows Mother’s attorney sent Mother a

copy of the brief that the attorney filed on Mother’s behalf in her appeal. Upon the

filing of the brief, the Clerk notified Mother she had the right to file a pro se response.

However, Mother did not do so.

       See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)-(2).
       2

       See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L), (N), (O).
       3
     4
       See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
     5
       See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In the Interest of L.D.T., 161
S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.).
                                          2
      Based on our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we agree with the

suggestion of Mother’s attorney that the appeal is frivolous. Thus, we need not

appoint another attorney to represent Mother in the appeal.6 For the reasons

explained above, the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parent-child

relationships with G.F.L.L. and L.M.L. is

      AFFIRMED.

                                                     _________________________
                                                          HOLLIS HORTON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on September 16, 2021
Opinion Delivered December 16, 2021

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

      6
          Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
                                            3