Court Opinion

ID: 9741078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:49:15.36826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.189674
License: Public Domain

McGregor, P. J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff’s cause of action arose on April 6, 1970, and the only suit presently before us on appeal was commenced on February 19, 1974 — the intervening period being 3 years, 10 months and 12 days.
In Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 481; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), our Supreme Court stated that:
"It is only when the action is not commenced within *557the statutory period — as determined by consulting the date of claim, the date of filing the complaint and the calendar — it is only when a prima facie bar of the statute appears, that tolling comes into play.”
As plaintiffs action herein was subject to a three-year statute of limitations,1 it therefore becomes necessary to determine whether or not the statute of limitations was tolled and, if so, for how long.
Plaintiff claims that MCLA 600.5856; MSA 27A.58562 is applicable to the facts of the instant case. Its tolling provisions, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Buscaino, supra, apply only to prior lawsuits between the parties which were not adjudicated on the merits. However, even if the plaintiff was allowed every conceivable extension possible under this section, the statute of limitations would only be tolled approximately 7-1/2 months.3
As the tolling provisions of MCLA 600.5856, supra, are inadequate to offset the full 10 months and 12 days, the plaintiff further argues that the *558tolling provisions of MCLA 600.5853; MSA 27A.5853 more than make up for any deficiency. Here, his basic contention is that the statute of limitations should be tolled whenever á plaintiff experiences difficulties in locating an óut-of-state defendant.
I find Hammel v Bettison, 362 Mich 396; 107 NW2d 887 (1961), Bush v Watson, 3 Mich App 94; 141 NW2d 707 (1966), and Melville v Kelleher, 22 Mich App 251, 254-255; 177 NW2d 238 (1970), dispositive of this issue. In Melville, it was stated:
"In Bush v Watson, [supra]* * * this Court stated:
" 'There is no provision in any statute for tolling of the statute of limitations in the event the plaintiff is unable to locate a nonresident motorist defendant notwithstanding the fact that he has made diligent effort to do so. The only method for tolling the statute is that contained in the statutes themselves. Vega v Briggs Manufacturing Co, 341 Mich 218 [67 NW2d 81] (1954). The remedy, if any, under these circumstances, is for legislative action.’ (Emphasis added.)
"Thus, we must look to the statutes as to whether the statute of limitations was in fact tolled. CLS 1961, § 600.5853 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5853) states:
" 'If any person is outside of this state at the time any claim accrues against him the period of limitations shall only begin to run when he enters this state unless a means of service of process sufficient to vest the jurisdiction of a Michigan court over him was available to the plaintiff. If after any claim accrues the person against whom the claim accrued is absent from this state, any and all periods of absence in excess of 2 months at a time shall not be counted as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action unless while he was outside of this state a means for service of process sufficient to vest the jurisdiction of a Michigan court over him was available to the plaintiff.’ (Emphasis in original.)
"MCLA 1969 Cum Supp § 257.403 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2103) supplies to the plaintiff a means of service of *559process sufficient to vest jurisdiction of a Michigan court. Consequently, there is no tolling of the statute because defendant Kelleher resided in the State of Ohio.”
Plaintiff argues that since these cases were decided under the nonresident motorist statute, they are therefore distinguishable from the present case. I disagree.
The interpretation given to MCLA 600.5853 in the above quotation would be the same regardless of whether the action was brought under the nonresident motorist statute or MCLA 600.705(2); MSA 27A.705(2). In either case there is a means of service of process sufficient to vest jurisdiction and, consequently, there would be no tolling of the statute of limitations.
The majority relies on Goniwicha v Harkai, 393 Mich 255; 224 NW2d 284 (1974), and Krontz v Estoves, 49 Mich App 30; 211 NW2d 213 (1973), in arriving at their decision.
In regard to Goniwicha, the majority states that "Defendant’s absence from the state in Goniwicha was ruled to effectively toll the running of the statute of limitations.” I submit that Goniwicha did not so hold. All Goniwicha held was that GCR 1963, 102.5 "is not self-executing and until the clerk in fact dismisses the complaint, the complaint is not dismissed”. The fact that the defendant in Goniwicha happened to be absent from the state had no bearing whatsoever on the issues decided in that case.
As to Krontz, it need only be pointed out that the Supreme Court in Goniwicha completely rejected the reasoning of our Court in that case in regard to the tolling of statutes of limitations.
Plaintiff finally argues that the end result of affirming the trial court would be that defendants *560who cannot be located, even after diligent search, will be able to completely escape all liability for their wrongdoing. The relief for this complaint is GCR 1963, 105.8.4 As stated in the author’s comments to this rule in 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 112:
"Nevertheless, given the vagaries of human behaviour where service is intentionally avoided, and the increased mobility and complexity of society, individual cases may arise in which none of the specifically provided means of service will reach a defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of Michigan courts. Under this Rule, the court, in its discretion, may provide for some different method of service adapted to the particular situation, so long as it is reasonably calculated to reach the defendant and give him an opportunity to be heard.”
I would affirm the trial court.

 MCLA 600.5805(7); MSA 27A.5805(7).

 "The statutes of limitations are tolled when (1) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant, or when (2) jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired, or when (3) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith, are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute shall not be tolled longer than 90 days thereafter.”

 This is allowing 90 days under sub-section (3) for delivery of the summons and complaint to the Kalamazoo County Sheriffs Office for service on the defendant in the first suit; allowing an additional 90 days for delivery of summons and complaint to the Ingham County Sheriffs Office for service on the Secretary of State, also in the first suit; and allowing another 42 days for the period of time between personal service on the defendant in the first suit, on August 7, 1973, and the dismissal of that suit on September 19, 1973. See Stewart v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 39 Mich App 360; 197 NW2d 465 (1972). The second suit instituted by the plaintiff could not toll the statute of limitations, as the defendant was never served in that action, nor was the process placed in the hands of an officer.

 "The court in which an action has been commenced may, in its discretion, allow service of process to be made upon a defendant in any other manner which is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, if an order permitting such service is entered before service of process is made upon showing to the court that service of process cannot reasonably be made in the manner provided for under other rules.”