Court Opinion

ID: 9901471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 20:02:57.67987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:33.629032
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                         KEVIN MARTIN, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0140
                               FILED 11-21-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2020-105324-001
              The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael T. O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Aaron J. Moskowitz
Counsel for Appellant
                            STATE v. MARTIN
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1             Kevin Martin appeals his sentences for fraudulent schemes
and artifices, forgery, theft, and theft of means of transportation. He argues
that the trial court erred by considering his lack of remorse at sentencing.
We affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           In July 2019, Martin used fraudulent checks to purchase gold
coins from two separate gold sellers, X Brokerage and Y Brokerage,1 for
$29,300 and $29,240. When the checks did not clear, the sellers refused to
provide Martin with the coins. That same month, Martin used two
fraudulent checks to purchase gold coins from a third gold seller, Z
Brokerage, for a total of $93,600. Martin had already left with the coins
when the checks came back as fraudulent.

¶3            A Z Brokerage representative contacted the police, who set up
an undercover operation, asking Martin to come back and buy more gold
coins. Martin returned and attempted to purchase coins using another
fraudulent check for $47,580. After officers arrested Martin, they searched
his vehicle and home. Officers found journals, checkbooks, and documents
consistent with fraudulent activity. They never located the stolen coins.

¶4             After Martin had been arrested and released, he attempted to
purchase gold coins and bars from Y Brokerage in December 2019 using a
fraudulent check for $226,451. He later went to its store and left documents
stating his intent to buy additional coins, submitting another fraudulent
check for $230,000 to replace the initial check. Suspecting fraudulent
activity, a Y Brokerage representative declined Martin’s offer and contacted
police officers.

¶5           During the same period, Martin used a fraudulent check to
purchase a luxury vehicle from a dealership for $416,971.42. The dealership

1      We use pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the victims.

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                             STATE v. MARTIN
                            Decision of the Court

shipped the vehicle to Martin before processing the check. When the check
did not clear, a dealership representative contacted police and attempted to
retrieve the vehicle from Martin’s home. Martin refused to speak, and shut
the door. Later, officers observed Martin attempting to abandon the vehicle
a few blocks from his home. Officers recovered the vehicle and searched
Martin’s home, finding additional notes, checkbooks, and documents
consistent with fraudulent activity.

¶6             The State charged Martin with one count of fraudulent
schemes and artifices, a class 2 felony, seven counts of forgery, class 4
felonies, two counts of theft, class 2 felonies, and one count of theft of means
of transportation, a class 3 felony.2 The jury found Martin guilty of all
counts, and found aggravating factors applied. As relevant here, for one
count of theft and the count of theft of means of transportation, the jury
found Martin took property worth an amount sufficient to be an
aggravating factor and he committed the offenses for pecuniary gain. See
A.R.S. § 13–701(D)(3), (7). For the same count of theft, the jury also found
Martin’s conduct caused Z Brokerage to suffer harm. See A.R.S.
§ 13–701(D)(9).

¶7            Before sentencing, the probation department submitted a
presentence report that recommended “an extensive prison term,”
including consecutive sentences, based on Martin’s history of committing
financial crimes, multiple dates of offense, and the risk he poses to the
community. The report noted that a Z Brokerage representative
recommended consecutive sentences be imposed because Martin “thinks
he is above the law” and caused the business significant harm.

¶8           At sentencing, the trial court found that Martin’s prior felony
convictions, all of which involved fraud or forgery-related offenses,
exposed him to the category-two repetitive offender sentencing range. See
A.R.S. § 13–703(B). The State recommended the court impose presumptive
sentences with two counts run consecutively based on Martin’s criminal
history and the repetitive nature of the offenses. The State asked the court
to consider Martin’s demeanor, arguing that “[h]e has shown no remorse
for anything that has happened in this case.” Without objecting to the
State’s remarks, Martin argued his mental health issues constituted a
mitigating factor. He did not point to a specific diagnosis or present
documentation from a mental health provider. Martin added that he had
“some support” from a girlfriend and the offenses did not involve violent

2     The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss two additional
counts of forgery, class 4 felonies.

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                            STATE v. MARTIN
                           Decision of the Court

conduct. A Z Brokerage representative gave a victim impact statement,
characterizing Martin as a “professional con man” who “knew full well
what he was doing.” The representative asked that Martin be harshly
punished for the “devastating” harm he inflicted on the business.

¶9             In pronouncing sentence, the trial court stated that it
considered the aggravating factors the jury found. The court addressed
Martin’s proposed mitigation, declining to consider his mental health
issues as a mitigating factor. The court noted that Martin “may have mental
health issues, but his conduct is egregious” and he committed the offenses
“with knowledge of his behavior.” The court pointed to the “methodical”
and intentional nature of the offenses, finding that Martin still harmed the
community even though he did not engage in violent conduct. The court
noted that Martin’s prior felony convictions were “similar in nature in
terms of defrauding people or agenc[ies]. He knows exactly what he’s
doing. He intended to, and his behavior is unacceptable. He clearly has no
remorse.” After making this comment, the court clarified that Martin “had
every right to go to trial. He chose to do that. That’s perfectly fine. The
[c]ourt would never [hold] that against any defendant [for] a choice to go
to trial, but his behavior as evidenced through the trial, just shows his
willing intentional participation in this kind of conduct.”

¶10           The trial court found a “lengthy period” of imprisonment
appropriate based on Martin’s criminal history, the seriousness of the
offenses, and the harm to victims. The court imposed a term of
imprisonment slightly “greater than the presumptive” for one count of
theft, and presumptive terms of imprisonment for all remaining counts. The
court ordered the sentences in all counts to run concurrently except the
sentence for the count of theft of means of transportation, which the court
ran consecutively, for a total of 16.5 years’ imprisonment. Martin timely
appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶11           Martin argues that the trial court erred by considering his lack
of remorse at sentencing. In particular, he contends that the court
improperly used his lack of remorse to impose a “partially aggravated”
sentence for one count of theft and a consecutive sentence for the count of
theft of means of transportation. Relying on State v. Vermuele, Martin
concedes that he did not object at sentencing but argues the issue should be
reviewed de novo. 226 Ariz. 399 (App. 2011). We disagree. Unlike Vermuele,
in which the defendant had no “clear procedural opportunity” to challenge
his sentences below, Martin had the opportunity to object at any point after

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                             STATE v. MARTIN
                            Decision of the Court

the State commented on his lack of remorse in its sentencing
recommendation. Id. at 402 ¶ 9. He could have raised this objection before,
during, or after the court’s pronouncement of sentence. Because Martin
failed to raise this issue below, we review only for fundamental, prejudicial
error. See State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, 142 ¶¶ 12, 21 (2018); State v.
Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 317 ¶ 9 (App. 2011) (reviewing the court’s
unobjected-to consideration of lack of remorse at sentencing for
fundamental error).

¶12             Generally, a criminal defendant’s choice “not to publicly
admit guilt is irrelevant to a sentencing determination” because “it would
be irrational or disingenuous to expect or require one who maintains his
innocence to express contrition or remorse.” State v. Hardwick, 183 Ariz. 649,
656 (App. 1995). Absent the defendant’s admitting guilt and raising the
issue of remorse, the trial court must not consider lack of remorse as an
aggravating factor. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. at 317–18 ¶¶ 12–15. This court will not,
however, remand for resentencing when the record shows the “court would
have reached the same result even without consideration of the factor.” Id.
at 318 ¶ 13 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Mere
speculation that an improper factor may have affected the court’s
imposition of sentence is not enough to establish prejudice. State v.
Munninger, 213 Ariz. 393, 397 ¶ 14 (App. 2006). Moreover, the trial court is
allowed to “consider all evidence and information presented at all stages of
the trial,” including “the general moral character of the defendant,” for the
purpose of weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. State v. Suniga,
145 Ariz. 389, 395 (App. 1985).

¶13           The record does not show that the trial court used Martin’s
lack of remorse to impose consecutive or aggravated sentences. The court
addressed the aggravating factors found by the jury, all of which were
proper, before considering Martin’s proposed mitigation. The court
declined to view Martin’s mental health issues as a mitigating factor based
on evidence that he methodically defrauded others for his own financial
benefit. The court concluded that, given the complex and egregious nature
of the offenses, Martin’s potential mental health issues could not overcome
the significant aggravating factors in this case. The court mentioned
Martin’s lack of remorse within the context of this discussion. Immediately
after, the court clarified that this comment should not be interpreted as
punishing Martin for exercising his right to trial. The court then referred to
Martin’s criminal history, the seriousness of the offenses, victim harm, and
the risk he posed to the community, all of which were the focus of the
sentencing recommendations from the probation department, the State,
and a victim’s representative.

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                             STATE v. MARTIN
                            Decision of the Court

¶14           The trial court’s isolated comment did not become the focus
of sentencing. See Trujillo, 227 Ariz. at 316, 318 ¶¶ 6, 14 (finding error when
the court “repeatedly admonished” the defendant for his lack of remorse
and failure to admit responsibility). The brief reference to Martin’s lack of
remorse did not extend past the court’s rationale for rejecting the proposed
mitigation. The court properly considered Martin’s “general moral
character,” namely the gravity and frequency of his fraudulent activity, in
discounting his mental health issues as a mitigating factor. See Suniga, 145
Ariz. at 395. We find no support in the record to suggest that the court
would have imposed more lenient sentences absent the alleged error. See
Trujillo, 227 Ariz. at 318 ¶ 13. Martin has thus failed to establish
fundamental error requiring remand.

¶15           To the extent Martin asks that we overrule or disapprove of
the holding in State v. Dominguez, 236 Ariz. 226 (App. 2014), we decline to
do so here. That case involved the trial court’s express consideration of the
defendant’s lack of remorse under the catch-all provision of A.R.S.
§ 13–701(D)(27). Id. at 231 ¶ 16. Nothing about our decision in the current
case diverges from or conflicts with the holding in Dominguez.

¶16           Martin also argues that the State’s comment on his lack of
remorse constituted “prosecutorial misconduct.” This argument is not
meaningfully developed and is therefore waived. See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
31.10(a)(7)(A); State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 175 (1989) (“Failure to argue a
claim usually constitutes abandonment and waiver of that claim.”).

                               CONCLUSION

¶17           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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