Court Opinion

ID: 9950429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 22:10:18.294425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:08.971106
License: Public Domain

03/13/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT NASHVILLE
                        Assigned on Briefs February 28, 2024

     EDWARD RONNY ARNOLD v. DEBORAH MALCHOW, ET AL.

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
             No. 19C3007, 20C2199 Amanda Jane McClendon, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                         No. M2024-00314-COA-T10B-CV
                      ___________________________________

Appellant filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal under Rule 10B of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee. Because the trial court has not entered an order on
Appellant’s motion for recusal, there is no order for this Court to review. Appeal
dismissed.

           Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal; Appeal Dismissed

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Edward Ronny Arnold, Nashville, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Jordan K. Gibson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Deborah Malchow.

Cyrus L. Booker, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Allstate Insurance Company.

                                       OPINION

       On October 23, 2019, Appellant Edward Ronny Arnold and Appellee Deborah
Malchow (“Appellee Malchow”) were involved in a motor vehicle accident. Following
the accident, Appellant filed multiple lawsuits, which have given rise to three appellate
decisions: (1) Arnold v. Malchow, No. M2021-00695-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 774925
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2022) (“Arnold I”); (2) Arnold v. Malchow, No. M2022-00907-
COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5097179 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2023) (“Arnold II”); and (3)
Arnold v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. M2023-00536-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 95577 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Jan. 9, 2024) (“Arnold III”). In this fourth appeal, we borrow from our previous
opinions and, in the interest of judicial economy, discuss only the facts and procedural
history necessary to address this appeal.

       On December 27, 2019, Appellant filed a complaint for damages in the Davidson
County Circuit Court (“trial court”) against, inter alia, Appellee Malchow. Arnold I, 2022
WL 774925, at *1. “The complaint alleged that [Appellee] Malchow had injured Appellant
through the negligent operation of a motor vehicle[.]” Id. The case was assigned docket
number 19C-3007 (“Case No. 19C-3007”). Id. “On October 5, 2020, Appellant initiated
a second lawsuit [in the trial court] involving the car accident at issue in Case No. 19C-
3007.” Id. Appellant named his underinsured/uninsured motorist carrier, Appellee
Allstate Insurance Company (“Appellee Allstate”), as the sole defendant. Id. As discussed
in Arnold I,

      Appellant set out as his “first cause of action” “negligent operation of a motor
      vehicle by uninsured motorist.” Appellant then set forth four “cause[es] of
      action against insurance company,” including breach of contract, breach of
      the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, and two claims of tortious
      breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. This complaint
      against [Appellee] Allstate was assigned docket number 20C-2199. (“Case
      No. 20C-2199”).

Id. On October 22, 2020, the trial court consolidated Case Nos. 19C-3007 and 20C-2199.
Id.

      On June 23, 2021, Appellant filed his first appeal to this Court, i.e., Arnold I. On
March 15, 2022, this Court dismissed Arnold I for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and
remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at *4.

        On remand, Appellee Malchow filed a motion for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted by order entered June 30, 2022. See Arnold II, 2023 WL 5097179, at
*3. Thereafter, Appellee Allstate filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted
by order entered September 16, 2022. Id. at *4. Appellant filed a timely appeal, i.e.,
Arnold II. In Arnold II, this Court addressed, inter alia, the trial court’s grant of the
foregoing motions. Relevant here, the Arnold II Court concluded that genuine issues of
material fact existed and that the trial court erred in granting Appellee Malchow’s motion
for summary judgment. Id. at *12-13. Concerning Appellee Allstate’s motion to dismiss,
the Arnold II Court vacated the trial court’s grant of same. Id. at *16. Aside from the
foregoing, this Court also addressed several other issues related to protective orders and
various other rulings of the trial court, and we affirmed the trial court’s decisions
concerning these matters. Id. at *16-22. This Court filed its opinion in Arnold II on
August 9, 2023. On September 5, 2023, Appellant filed a Rule 11 application seeking to

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appeal the Arnold II decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court.1 This application remains
pending with the Tennessee Supreme Court.

       The issue in this appeal concerns consolidated cases 19C-3007 and 20C-2199, i.e.,
the underlying case at issue in Arnold I and Arnold II. Relevant to the issue before us, on
February 7, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge, and he set this
motion for a hearing on February 23, 2024.2 On February 15, 2024, Appellant filed a
document titled “Issue of Movement to Remove Jury Demand from Civil Action Edward
Ronny Arnold v. Allstate Insurance Company 20-C2199.” In this filing, Appellant appears
to present more arguments concerning his request for recusal. Also, in this filing, Appellant
notes that issues concerning this cause of action are currently pending before the Tennessee
Supreme Court under case number M2022-00907-SC-R11-CV, as a result of his appeal of
Arnold II.

        On February 21, 2024, the trial court entered an order stating:

        It appears to the [c]ourt that there is an unresolved issue pending in this
        matter at the Appellate Court level. Accordingly, the [c]ourt continues
        indefinitely all hearings and case management conferences at the Trial Court
        level until the issue pending at the Appellate level is resolved.

That same day, Appellant filed a response to the trial court’s order, arguing that the trial
court had no authority to cancel or continue the February 23, 2024 hearing on Appellant’s
motion to recuse. On February 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order addressing
Appellant’s contention. Therein, the trial court reiterated that there “is an unresolved issue
pending in this matter at the Appellate Court level.” Thus, the trial court “affirm[ed] its
decision and . . . continue[d] indefinitely all hearings and case management conferences at
the Trial Court level until the issue pending at the Appellate Court level is resolved.”
Accordingly, the trial court has yet to enter an order directly addressing Appellant’s motion
for recusal. On February 26, 2024, Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal.

       While we are cognizant of the fact that Appellant is representing himself in this
appeal, it is well-settled that “pro se litigants are held to the same procedural and
substantive standards to which lawyers must adhere.” Brown v. Christian Bros. Univ.,

1
  For completeness, we note that, on October 17, 2022, while Arnold II was pending in this Court, Appellant
filed another action in the trial court against Appellee Allstate, which included substantially the same
allegations as contained in Appellant’s first complaint. The case was assigned docket number 22C-2097
(“Case No. 22C-2097”). Case No. 22C-2097 was the underlying trial court case at issue in Arnold III. For
reasons we need not address here, in Arnold III, this Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court
dismissing Case No. 22C-2097.
2
  We note that many of the filings Appellant included in his petition for recusal appeal are not file stamped
by the trial court. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.03 (“The petition shall be accompanied by a copy of the
motion and all supporting documents filed in the trial court . . . .”).
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428 S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). This Court has held that “[p]arties who choose
to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal treatment by the courts.” Hodges v.
Tenn. Att’y Gen., 43 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Paehler v. Union
Planters Nat’l Bank, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997)). Nevertheless,
“courts must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and
procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe.” Young v. Barrow, 130
S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Edmundson v. Pratt, 945 S.W.2d 754, 755
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 733 n.4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)).

      Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, the only order this Court may review
on an appeal is the trial court’s order denying a motion to recuse. Duke v. Duke, 398
S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“Pursuant to [Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10B], we may not review the correctness or merits of the trial court’s other rulings[.]”).
Accordingly, the sole issue on appeal in 10B appeals is whether the trial court erred in
denying an appellant’s motion for recusal. Williams by & through Rezba v. HealthSouth
Rehab. Hosp. N., No. W2015-00639-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 2258172, at *5 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 8, 2015). As discussed supra, having indefinitely continued all hearings until
the appeals process is exhausted, the trial court has not entered an order denying
Appellant’s motion for recusal. Accordingly, there is nothing for this Court to review
under Rule 10B. See Burkhart v. Burkhart, No. M2023-01390-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL
6818637, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2023) (“In the absence of an effective written order
denying [the appellant’s] final two recusal motions, we have no jurisdiction under Rule
10B to review . . . those motions.”).

       For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal. Costs of the appeal are assessed
to the Appellant, Edward Ronny Arnold, for all of which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                    s/ Kenny Armstrong
                                                 KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

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