Court Opinion

ID: 2963544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:11:42.898771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:24.410587
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2311

                            DONALD A. RUBINOVITZ, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                GRACE ROGATO, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Edward F. Lawson with whom Denise  M. Leydon and Weston,  Patrick,
            ________________           _________________     _________________
        Willard & Redding were on brief for appellants.
        _________________
            Thomas  A. Reed  with  whom  J. Owen  Todd, Todd  & Weld,  John P.
            _______________              _____________  ____________   _______
        Fitzgerald and Cogavin & Waystack, were on brief for appellees.
        __________     __________________

                                 ____________________

                                    August 1, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.   Plaintiffs Donald  A. and
                      STAHL,  Circuit  Judge.
                              ______________

            Linda L. Rubinovitz ("the Rubinovitzes") brought  this action

            under 42 U.S.C.    1983 and 1985 against various officials of

            the    City    of    Lynn,    Massachusetts    (collectively,

            "defendants"),1 claiming  a violation  of their civil  rights

            by the  apparent revocation  of a previously  granted zoning-

            variance  application and  by  the  commencement of  numerous

            code-enforcement actions against  them.   The district  court

            granted  defendants'  motion  for  summary  judgment.   After

            careful  review of the record, we conclude that, as to two of

            the   defendants,  summary  judgment  should  not  have  been

            granted.  

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                      The  facts  leading to  this  appeal  center around

            property  owned by  the  Rubinovitzes that  includes an  out-

            building containing an apartment  over a one-car garage ("the

            property").   On January 1, 1989, the Rubinovitzes leased the

            apartment  to Laurie  A.  Lussier.   On  the same  day,  they

            received  a check for $500  from defendant Grace  Rogato -- a

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The defendants are city purchasing director Grace Rogato,
            health inspector  Robert M.  Barrett, gas inspector  Henry P.
            Baron,  Board  of Appeals  chairman John  J. Burke,  Jr., and
            Board  of Appeals  members Dennis  Tobin and  John Volo.   In
            February  1993, Rogato died and her estate was substituted as
            a party in the action.  

                                         -2-
                                          2

            friend of  Lussier -- to  cover the first month's  rent and a

            $100 installment toward a $300 security deposit.  

                      Two  days  later,  on  January  3,  1989, defendant

            Robert M.  Barrett, a code inspector for  the Lynn Department

            of  Public Health,  notified the  Rubinovitzes that  the city

            required a certificate of occupancy before the dwelling could

            be legally  inhabited.    Three days  later,  upon  a  visual

            inspection of the apartment, Barrett advised the Rubinovitzes

            that  city  health regulations  required  a  second means  of

            egress before the city would issue the occupancy permit.  The

            city building department then advised the Rubinovitzes that a

            zoning  variance  was required  before  they  could obtain  a

            building permit for the second means of egress.

                      Several   months   later,   in   April   1989,  the

            Rubinovitzes  discovered  that  Lussier  had  a  cat  in  the

            apartment,  in  violation of  the  lease.    Acting  on  that

            violation,  on  April  10,  1989,  the  Rubinovitzes notified

            Lussier that  her tenancy  would terminate effective  May 31,

            1989.  On  April 20,  1989, Rogato went  to Mr.  Rubinovitz's

            business,  an   office  supply   store,  and   asked  whether

            Rubinovitz intended  to give Lussier  a "hard time."   Rogato

            further asked whether the  security deposit would be returned

            to her.

                      On May  2, 1989, the  Rubinovitzes' application for

            the zoning variance came  before a hearing of the  Lynn Board

                                         -3-
                                          3

            of  Appeals ("the  Board").   By  a  vote of  4-1, the  Board

            approved the variance.  Two or three days later, Rogato spoke

            with  Nancy Amenta, the clerk  for the Board,  and asked what

            had transpired as to the property at the May 2 hearing.  

                      At  some   point,   after  Lussier   occupied   the

            apartment,  defendant  Barrett  apparently   reinspected  the

            property.   On May  4, 1989, Barrett  at a  meeting with  Mr.

            Rubinovitz,  presented  him with  an  order  to make  various

            repairs within seven days.  Barrett also told Rubinovitz that

            Rogato had been calling the health  department "every hour on

            the  hour"  regarding the  property  and  was pressuring  the

            department to bring enforcement actions.

                      Later that day, the  Rubinovitzes wrote a letter to

            the director of public health, Gerald M. Carpinella (the "May

            4 letter"), in which they requested a hearing on the order to

            repair.  The letter also stated:

                      [We] request that the type  of harassment
                      that  [we] have  been subjected  to cease
                      immediately, as  [we] are well  aware and
                      have  been informed that  this stems from
                      cronyism  and blatant misuse of power and
                      authority  brought  on by  the Purchasing
                      Director, Grace Rogato.

                      Carpinella  discussed  the   letter  with   Rogato.

            Subsequent to  the May  2 variance hearing,  the Rubinovitzes

            received two  post cards from  the Board notifying  them that

            the  Board  had approved  their request.    On May  11, 1989,

            however, the  Rubinovitzes received  a letter from  the Board

                                         -4-
                                          4

            notifying  them  that  the  May  2 hearing  (at  which  their

            variance request had been  approved) had been continued until

            May  16, 1989.   At  the continued  hearing, defendant  Board

            chairman  John J. Burke, Jr.,  moved to reconsider  the May 2

            vote, and Burke and defendant  Board member Dennis Tobin then

            reversed  their  earlier  votes to  grant  the  Rubinovitzes'

            petition.     Thus,  on  reconsideration,  the  Rubinovitzes'

            petition failed by a 3-2 vote.

                      On June 2, 1989, defendant Henry P. Baron, the city

            gas  inspector, wrote  to  public health  director Carpinella

            advising  that gas  service  to the  Rubinovitz apartment  be

            discontinued because  of alleged safety problems.   Five days

            later, Carpinella wrote to  the Rubinovitzes advising them of

            numerous violations of state plumbing and gas codes.  On July

            12, 1989, the city plumbing inspector, Gerald Capano, ordered

            the  Rubinovitzes   to   disconnect  the   water  and   sewer

            connections to  the apartment because  they lacked  requisite

            permits.   On  July 14,  1989, Baron  ordered the  Boston Gas

            Company  to  disconnect the  gas  service  to the  Rubinovitz

            apartment because of the lack of a permit.  Later, Baron told

            a  contractor hired  by the  Rubinovitzes to  stay away  from

            them,  characterizing  the Rubinovitzes  as "bad  people" and

            calling Mrs. Rubinovitz "a bitch."

                      Meanwhile,  the  Rubinovitzes   had  appealed   the

            Board's variance order  to the Massachusetts  Superior Court.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            On January 10, 1991,  the Superior Court vacated  the Board's

            reconsideration vote, thereby  reinstating the  Rubinovitzes'

            variance.

                      The  Rubinovitzes filed the present action under 42

            U.S.C.   1983 against  defendants alleging violation of their

            equal  protection rights,  their rights  to free  speech, and

            their  property   rights.    The  Rubinovitzes   also  allege

            violation  of  42  U.S.C.      1985.    Following  discovery,

            defendants moved  to dismiss.  The district court treated the

            motion as one for summary judgment  and, following a hearing,

            ruled from  the bench  that the Rubinovitzes'  claims, though

            styled   under   different    theories,   amounted   to   one

            constitutional claim:  that they were denied equal protection

            under  the law  by being  singled out  by Lynn  officials for

            exercising their property  rights (in  evicting Lussier)  and

            for exercising their  rights to free  speech (in sending  the

            May  4  letter).    The  district  court  determined  that  a

            landlord's right  to evict  a tenant  is  "a matter  uniquely

            grounded  in  state  property  law  and  does  not  implicate

            constitutional rights triggering the  protections of   1983."

            As to  free speech,  the district  court determined  that the

            Rubinovitzes "failed to  show any  causal connection  between

            the  May 4  letter and  Miss Rogato's  alleged conspiratorial

            campaign against  them."  In  fact, the district  court said,

            Rogato's  motivation  appeared   to  be  malice   toward  the

                                         -6-
                                          6

            Rubinovitzes  because of  their eviction  proceedings against

            Lussier rather  than retaliation for their  exercise of their

            free speech rights.   Accordingly, the district court granted

            summary judgment as to all counts.  This appeal followed.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

            A.  Standard of Review
            ______________________

                      We  review  a  district  court's grant  of  summary

            judgment  de novo,  considering the  facts in the  light most
                      __ ____

            favorable to the nonmoving  party.  See, e.g., Udo  v. Tomes,
                                                ___  ____  ___     _____

            54 F.3d  9, 12 (1st  Cir. 1995).   We resolve  all reasonable

            inferences in  that party's  favor, but  "we need  not credit

            purely conclusory allegations,  indulge in rank  speculation,

            or draw improbable inferences."  National Amusements, Inc. v.
                                             _________________________

            Town  of Dedham, 43 F.3d  731, 736 (1st  Cir.), cert. denied,
            _______________                                 _____ ______

            115 S. Ct. 2247  (1995).  Summary judgment should  be granted

            when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

            and  admissions on  file, together  with affidavits,  if any,

            show  that there is no genuine issue  as to any material fact

            and  that the moving  party is  entitled to  a judgment  as a

            matter of law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  

            B.  Equal Protection
            ____________________

                      We first  set out the analytical  framework for our

            decision.   The Rubinovitzes charge  defendants with improper

            selective enforcement  of  lawful  local  regulations.    See
                                                                      ___

                                         -7-
                                          7

            LeClair  v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 608 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
            _______     ________                                    _____

            denied, 450 U.S. 959  (1981).  Specifically, the Rubinovitzes
            ______

            argue  that   the  Board's  about-face   on  their   variance

            application as well as the litany of code-enforcement actions

            were  retaliatory   and  singled   them  out  for   disparate

            treatment.  As we have stated before:

                      Liability  in the  instant type  of equal
                      protection  case  should depend  on proof
                      that (1) the person, compared with others
                      similarly   situated,   was   selectively
                      treated;  and  (2)  that  such  selective
                      treatment  was   based  on  impermissible
                      considerations  such  as race,  religion,
                      intent to inhibit  or punish the exercise
                      of constitutional rights, or malicious or
                      bad faith intent to injure a person.

            Yerardi's  Moody St. Restaurant  & Lounge,  Inc. v.  Board of
            ________________________________________________     ________

            Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16,  21 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing  LeClair,
            _________                                            _______

            627 F.2d at 609-610).  The  Rubinovitzes argue that liability

            arises because:   first, defendants treated them selectively;

            second, the  selective treatment was based  upon the exercise

            of  their  property  and   free  speech  rights;  and  third,

            defendants'  actions  constituted  "malicious  or  bad  faith

            intent to injure." 

                      To facilitate the analysis  of this case, we divide

            the  events described above  into two broad  categories:  the

            zoning-variance approval revocation and  the code-enforcement

            actions.    Turning  first to  the  zoning-variance  approval

            issue, we conclude  that the Rubinovitzes have not  offered a

            sufficient  basis   for  us   to  conclude  that   they  were

                                         -8-
                                          8

            selectively treated.  Plaintiffs claiming an equal protection

            violation must first "identify and relate  specific instances

            where persons  situated similarly `in  all relevant  aspects'

            were treated differently,  instances which have  the capacity

            to  demonstrate that [plaintiffs] were `singled . . . out for

            unlawful  oppression.'"     Dartmouth  Review   v.  Dartmouth
                                        _________________       _________

            College, 889 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
            _______

            The Rubinovitzes neither  identify others who were  similarly

            situated,  nor do  they identify  any instances  of disparate

            treatment.     In   opposition   to  summary   judgment,  Mr.

            Rubinovitz's affidavit states: "there are at least [thirteen]

            properties in  the neighborhood  in which  I live  which have

            structures to the rear of the main dwelling which are used as

            dwelling  units .  . .  . All  of the  properties are  within

            approximately two  blocks of my  property."  Appended  to the

            affidavit were pictures of  the property and thirteen similar

            structures.     From   this  submission,   the   Rubinovitzes

            apparently  ask us  to infer  that the Board  readily granted

            their neighbors variance requests.  However, the Rubinovitzes

            fail to present any evidence that any of their neighbors were

            either  required to seek a  variance or actually  made such a

            request of the Board.  Thus, there is no basis  in the record

            by  which  we  can   determine  that  the  Rubinovitzes  were

            "`singled  . . . out for  unlawful oppression,'" id. (quoting
                                                             ___

            (Burt  v. City of New York, 156  F.2d 791, 791 (2d Cir. 1946)
             ____     ________________

                                         -9-
                                          9

            (L. Hand, J.)), or that they "suffered what others in general

            have escaped," Burt, 156 F.2d at 791.
                           ____

                      The  Rubinovitzes'  complaint  of  selective  code-

            enforcement  actions  stands  on  far  firmer  ground.    For

            example,  the Rubinovitzes  point  to the  affidavit of  city

            plumbing inspector Capano, in which he states that (1) he had

            encountered other  instances where there was  plumbing but no

            permits and (2) he did  not order the plumbing  disconnected,

            as  he had with the Rubinovitzes.  As to code-enforcement, we

            think the  record contains sufficient  evidence of  selective

            treatment  to forestall  summary judgment.   Accordingly, the

            balance  of our  analysis  focuses on  the defendants'  code-

            enforcement efforts against the Rubinovitzes.  

                      The second prong of the Yerardi's analysis requires
                                              _________

            us   to   determine  whether   defendants  singled   out  the

            Rubinovitzes for  an improper  purpose.  The  Rubinovitzes do

            not  allege  that  the  disparate treatment  flowed  from  an

            invidious classification involving race or religion.  Rather,

            the Rubinovitzes argue that  defendants sought to punish them

            for  the  exercise  of  fundamental   constitutional  rights.

            First, although not entirely clear from their arguments below

            and  to this  court, the Rubinovitzes  appear to  allege that

            defendants  punished  them  for  exercising  their "right  to

            evict"  Lussier.   The  Rubinovitzes  rely  on language  from

            Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez,  903 F.2d 49,  53 (1st
            _______________    __________________

                                         -10-
                                          10

            Cir. 1990) (quoting Board  of Regents v. Roth, 408  U.S. 564,
                                _________________    ____

            577  (1972)), holding  that, in  a deprivation-of-due-process

            analysis,  protected   property  interests  "`stem   from  an

            independent source such as state law.'"  Even assuming that a

            right  to  evict  a  tenant would  be  a  protected  property

            interest under Roth for  purposes of a due process  claim, it
                           ____

            does not follow that  there is a fundamental right  to evict,

            the  exercise of which  is protected by  the Equal Protection

            Clause.    In  fact,  the Constitution  establishes  no  such

            fundamental right.

                      The Rubinovitzes mount another argument grounded in

            fundamental constitutional rights.  Specifically, they allege

            that defendants' code-enforcement actions  were an attempt to

            punish  the Rubinovitzes for the May 4 letter.  This argument

            also falls short, but for a different reason.  Free speech is

            a  fundamental right  but, to  survive summary  judgment, the

            Rubinovitzes must offer some proof that defendants' allegedly

            retaliatory actions were  motivated by the  protected speech.

            See,  e.g., Cloutier v. Town  of Epping, 714  F.2d 1184, 1192
            ___   ____  ________    _______________

            (1st Cir. 1983); Packish  v. McMurtrie, 697 F.2d 23,  26 (1st
                             _______     _________

            Cir.  1983).  The Rubinovitzes  point to ten  facts that they

            contend constitute  evidence of  retaliatory motive.   We are

            unconvinced.   The  Rubinovitzes adduce  no  direct  evidence

            establishing retaliatory motive.  Instead, they rely entirely

            on circumstantial  evidence:   that  is, enforcement  actions

                                         -11-
                                          11

            followed the  May 4 letter.   Indeed, the facts  to which the

            Rubinovitzes point  do nothing  more than lay  out the  basic

            rubric of the case:  e.g., the Board approved the variance on
                                 ____

            May  2; Rogato  contacted  the Board  regarding the  variance

            after  May  2;  the May  4  letter  was  sent to  Carpinella;

            Carpinella  discussed  the  May  4 letter  with  Rogato;  the

            Rubinovitzes  received  notice  that the  variance  had  been

            approved; on May 16,  the Board reversed its decision  on the

            variance  and  various  code  enforcement  actions  had  been

            commenced against the property beginning in January 1989.

                      This  recitation  is  insufficient  to  support  an

            inference of improper motive.  As the Rubinovitzes themselves

            point out, the city's code-enforcement activity had been well

            underway for four months prior to the May 4 letter.  In fact,

            the Rubinovitzes wrote the May 4 letter immediately following

            Barrett's  meeting with Mr.  Rubinovitz during  which Barrett

            both presented an order to  repair and related Rogato's  pre-

            May  4 pressure to bring code-enforcement actions.  The May 4

            letter  itself complained  about the  "harassment"  from city

            officials.    Although  the  Rubinovitzes  contend  that  the

            "principal  wrongful  actions" took  place  after  the May  4

            letter, they offer  no basis upon  which to distinguish  pre-

            and post-May 4  harassment.  Of course,  on summary judgment,

            we must  draw  all  reasonable  inferences in  favor  of  the

            nonmoving  party.    However,  those  inferences  "must  flow

                                         -12-
                                          12

            rationally from  the underlying  facts; that is,  a suggested

            inference  must  ascend  to   what  common  sense  and  human

            experience indicates is an acceptable level of  probability."

            National  Amusements, 43  F.3d at 743.   The  record suggests
            ____________________

            that  although the  city  had focused  its  attention on  the

            property  prior  to  the  Lussier  eviction,  the  heightened

            attention began after  the eviction notice but before the May

            4  letter.    We  think   the  inference  suggested  by   the

            Rubinovitzes rests on a "`tenuous insinuation,'" id. (quoting
                                                             ___

            Mesnick v. General  Elec. Co.,  950 F.2d 816,  820 (1st  Cir.
            _______    __________________

            1991), cert.  denied, 504  U.S. 985 (1992)),  rather than  an
                   _____  ______

            acceptable level  of probability.   Accordingly, we  conclude

            that  the record  fails  to  support  an inference  that  the

            officials' post-May 4 conduct was  in retaliation for the May

            4 letter.  

                      Finally,   as  noted  above,   in  the  absence  of

            invidious discrimination or the abuse of a fundamental right,

            a  party may  establish  an equal  protection violation  with

            evidence  of  bad  faith   or  malicious  intent  to  injure.

            Yerardi's, 878  F.2d  at 21;  see  also Yerardi's  Moody  St.
            _________                     _________ _____________________

            Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. Board of Selectmen, 932 F.2d 89,
            _________________________    __________________

            94 (1st  Cir. 1991) (hereinafter, "Yerardi's II").   We start
                                               ____________

            with   two  related  observations.     First,   bad-faith  or

            malicious-intent-to-injure cases are  infrequent.   Yerardi's
                                                                _________

            II,  932  F.2d at  94 (citing  PFZ  Properties, Inc.  v. Rene
            __                             _____________________     ____

                                         -13-
                                          13

            Alberto Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting in
            _________________

            the zoning context that "[e]very appeal . . . from an adverse

            ruling . . .  necessarily involves some claim that  the board

            exceeded,  abused or  distorted its  legal authority  in some

            manner") (quotations and citations omitted), cert. dismissed,
                                                         _____ _________

            503  U.S.  257  (1992)).    Second,  "`the  malice/bad  faith

            standard  should be  scrupulously met.'"   Yerardi's  II, 932
                                                       _____________

            F.2d at 94 (quoting LeClair, 627 F.2d at 611).
                                _______

                      Indeed, despite the  general language of Yerardi's,
                                                               _________

            at least one  member of  this panel  believes that  something

            substantially  more than  a single  act of  malice underlying

            some routine administrative action is necessary to make out a

            constitutional  claim.   Cf. Esmail v.  Macrane, 53  F.3d 176
                                     ___ ______     _______

            (7th Cir.  1995) (campaign of severe  harassment orchestrated

            by mayor).  But we need  not resolve such issues in this case

            beyond  cautioning that routine  claims that  some individual

            action was malicious are  likely to have rough sailing.   For

            here  we think  there  is enough  indication  of a  malicious

            orchestrated campaign causing  substantial harm--though  only

            barely enough  evidence--that the case cannot  be resolved on

            summary judgment.

                      Although Rogato had  no official  authority in  the

            matter, there  is certainly evidence that  she was personally

            hostile  to   the  Rubinovitzes  based   on  her   resentment

            concerning   Lussier's  eviction,  that  she  had  sought  to

                                         -14-
                                          14

            intervene  with  the  Rubinovitzes  personally  on  Lussier's

            behalf,   that  she  had   repeatedly  pressured  the  health

            department to  bring enforcement  actions, that she  had kept

            track  of  the Board  proceedings, and  that  in May  she had

            conferred with  Carpinella, the  public health director,  not

            long  before the cut-off orders.   Rogato was  an official of

            the  city  and, in  a  relatively small  unit  of government,

            almost certainly had access and  influence beyond that of  an

            ordinary outsider.

                      Putting  aside  the  Board's reconsideration  vote,

            these  actions by Rogato  were followed by  Baron's advice to

            Carpinella   that  gas   service  to   the   Rubinovitzes  be

            discontinued   (June   2),   Carpinella's   notice   to   the

            Rubinovitzes advising  them of numerous violations  (June 7),

            Capano's order to disconnect water and sewer hook-ups  to the

            apartment  (July  12), and  Baron's  order to  Boston  Gas to

            disconnect gas service (July 14).  Baron thereafter sought to

            interfere  with  the Rubinovitzes'  hiring  of a  contractor,

            using language about them ("bad people," "bitch") redolent of

            malice.    In  the case  of  both  cut-offs,  there was  some
                                         ____

            evidence  that other  residents  similarly  situated did  not

            suffer the same penalty.

                      Under  these circumstances, we  think that although

            the  case  might be  a difficult  one  for the  plaintiffs, a

            reasonable jury might well be able to conclude that there was

                                         -15-
                                          15

            an orchestrated conspiracy  involving a number of  officials,

            selective enforcement,  malice,  and substantial  harm.    Of

            course, the full presentation of evidence on both sides might

            alter this judgment  and show that  the plaintiffs fell  just

            short and would be subject to a directed verdict.  But at the

            summary  judgment  stage, with  the  obligation  to draw  all

            reasonable inferences in favor  of the party opposing summary

            judgment, we  think  that this  case could  not be  dismissed

            against all defendants.

                      We think  that Barrett, also named  as a defendant,

            was  properly granted summary judgment; his own investigation

            of   code   violations   began  well   before   the  eviction

            controversy, and  --while his report of  Rogato's pressure is

            highly pertinent evidence--there is  no evidence that Barrett

            was himself involved in either of the cut-off directives.  As

            for  Carpinella  and Capano,  there  is no  need  to consider

            whether  the evidence might  be sufficient as  to them, since

            they  were not named as defendants and it is almost certainly

            too  late  in  the day  to  consider  any  expansion of  this

            lawsuit.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                      For the  foregoing  reasons, the  judgment  of  the

            district  court is vacated as to  defendants Rogato and Baron
                               _______

            and  the case remanded as  to them for proceedings consistent
                          ________

                                         -16-
                                          16

            with  this opinion.  As to all other defendants, the decision

            of the district court is affirmed.
                                     ________

                                         -17-
                                          17