Court Opinion

ID: 9468754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:22:51.388256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:02.411910
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The agents in this case searched the Miller-Arrington store even though the warrant authorized them to search only Carl’s Carpet Mart. The majority overlooks this discrepancy because the defendants signed warrant returns in which they noted that the search was conducted at Carl’s Carpet Mart. I cannot attach this much importance to a layman’s signature upon the return of a search warrant, and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The physical layout of the two stores gives no reason to believe that they are one and the same.1 Although adjacent in a small shopping center, the stores are sepa*1121rated by a wall and have no interior access between them. (See appendix.) There is a sign on the roof directly over the larger store designating it as “Carl’s Carpet Mart.” The doors to the other store are clearly labelled, “Miller-Arrington.” The Miller-Arrington store is obviously a separate business, perhaps not a lively one at the time of the search, but certainly not part of the carpet store.
Further, the activities of the defendants gave no indication that the Miller-Arrington store was part of Carl’s Carpet Mart. During the two months in which FBI agents kept the defendants under surveillance, they never saw them enter or leave through any doors except those marked “Miller-Arrington.” Although armed with a warrant to search “Carl’s Carpet Mart,” the agents themselves did not begin their search at the carpet store, but proceeded directly through the Miller-Arrington doors and confined their search to that store.2
The majority virtually admits that the warrant was improper, but nevertheless would sanction the search because the defendants signed returns on the warrant in which they designated the searched premises as “Carl’s Carpet Mart.” My brethren unduly emphasize a document which is nothing more than an inventory sheet. In the confusion surrounding the search, it is entirely probable that the defendants had no idea of the significance of the description on the return.
In sum, this case arose as a result of the agents’ carelessness. These agents had two months to determine where they wanted to search. They should have obtained a warrant to search the Miller-Arrington store.3 Any attempt to justify this search is an exercise in post hoc rationalization.
I therefore would affirm the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence obtained in this search.
*1122APPENDIX

. The agents thought that the stores were connected because the telephones located in the Miller-Arrington store were listed in the name of “Carl’s Carpet Mart,” and because the defendants paid rent to Carl’s. The agents’ suspicions simply will not support this warrant. Common ownership and phone listings prove nothing. See, United States v. Kaye, 432 F.2d 647 (D.C.Cir.1970). The owner of Carl’s also owned the entire shopping center, so the de*1121fendants naturally would pay their rent at the carpet store. Further, Carl’s Carpet Mart could have had extension phones all over town, but a warrant to search “Carl’s Carpet Mart” would not permit agents to search each of those locations.

. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from the situation in United States v. Wright, 468 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), cited by the majority. In Wright, agents with a warrant to search “The New Plaza Lounge” searched the lounge first and then searched a sealed-up back room which, up until three weeks before the search, had been connected to the lounge by a door.

. The affidavit supporting the warrant (which was not attached to it or shown to the defendants at the time of the search) indicated that the agents did want to enter at the fourth set of doors which was the only entrance to the Miller-Arrington store.