Court Opinion

ID: 9826550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:05:52.900309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:46.328417
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    STATE OF DELAWARE,                     )
                                           )
              v.                           )     ID No. 1709011232
                                           )
    ROBERT POTTS,                          )
    a.k.a. TAHLAL WAL-IKRAM                )
                                           )
                    Defendant.             )

                              Submitted: June 5, 2023
                             Decided: August 31, 2023

            ORDER DENYING POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
         AND GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW

       Upon consideration of the Defendant Robert Potts a.k.a Tahlal Wal-Ikram’s1

(“Mr. Wal-Ikram” or the “Defendant”) Motion for Postconviction Relief2 (the

“Motion”), his several supplements and amendment thereto,3 the State’s Response,4

1
  Robert Potts legally changed his name to Tahlal Wal-Ikram, however, his Superior
Court records do not reflect this change. There is no dispute that Robert Potts and
Tahlal Wal-Ikram are one in the same. Hereinafter, Tahlal Wal-Ikram will be
referred to as “Mr. Wal-Ikram” or the “Defendant.”
2
  Docket Item (D.I.) 63.
3
  D.I. 99, 110, 113. In addition, Defendant has docketed an application entitled: “A
Rule (33)” (D.I. 84). The Court has reviewed Defendant’s Rule 33 filing and
determined that his claims and arguments overlap with the instant Motion. See
Wilson v. State, 2006 WL 1291369, at *1 n.3 (Del. May 9, 2006) (determining that
a court examining such filings must ignore the label an inmate attaches to his claim,
and instead, consider the true substance of the claim). Accordingly, this decision
also resolves D.I. 84.
4
  D.I. 107.
the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel,5 the affidavits of both trial counsel,6 Superior

Court Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 61 (“Rule 61”), and the record in this

matter, it appears to the Court that:

I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       1.     On September 16, 2017, the Defendant was pulled over by Detective

Matthew Rosaio of the Wilmington Police Department for a defective registration

light above the license plate.7 During the course of the traffic stop, while the

Defendant was reaching into an opaque duffle bag, Detective Rosaio asked the

Defendant if any weapons were in the car. The Defendant replied in the affirmative.8

Detective Rosaio ultimately seized the Defendant’s weapon as well as a large quantity

of illegal drugs from the vehicle.9

       2.     Subsequently, the Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for (1)

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited; (2) Possession of Ammunition by a

Person Prohibited; (3) Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon; (4) Drug Dealing; (5)

5
  D.I. 95. When a document or transcript has been included in the Appendix to the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, (D.I. 96) the page references to that appendix are
included as “A__”.”
6
  D.I. 105 and 106.
7
  D.I. 62 ¶ 2.
8
  Id. ¶ 3; D.I. 21 at 59:18-20.
9
  Id.
                                          2
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony; (6) Illegal Possession

of a Controlled Substance; and (7) Resisting Arrest.10

       3.     On December 15, 2017, the Defendant’s initial trial counsel, Elliot M.

Margules, Esquire, filed a motion to suppress arguing Detective Rosaio’s question

regarding the presence of firearms in the car exceeded the scope of the traffic stop.11

The Motion to Suppress was denied by this Court on February 2, 2018.12

       4.     Approximately, one month later, Jonathan Layton, Esquire, entered his

appearance as trial counsel13 and filed a supplemental motion to suppress14 which was

withdrawn on May 2, 2018.15

       5.     The Defendant was reindicted on June 4, 2018 to amend the Drug

Dealing Count to Drug Dealing Cocaine and/or Heroin as opposed to Drug Dealing

Heroin.16 Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the Defendant was previously

convicted of two felonies – the first on June 8, 2007, and the second on October 16,

2008.17

10
   D.I. 3.
11
   D.I. 9; A015-025.
12
   D.I. 12; D.I. 21 at 54:9-62:2.
13
   D.I. 16.
14
   D.I. 22.
15
   D.I. 23.
16
   D.I. 29.
17
   D.I. 30.
                                           3
       6.     The case proceeded to trial, and during trial, the Court granted

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the resisting arrest charge. 18 On the third day of trial,

the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all the remaining Counts of the indictment.19

Subsequently, the Defendant was sentenced to a total of 12 years of Level 5 time

followed by varying levels of probation.20

       7.     The Defendant timely appealed, and the Delaware Supreme Court

affirmed the Defendant’s convictions.21

II.    DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCOVICTION RELIEF

       8.     The Defendant timely filed, pro se, the instant Motion22 and Motion for

Appointment of Counsel.23 Defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel

claims against Messrs. Margules and Layton.24 In addition, Defendant identifies one

additional ground for relief: prosecutorial misconduct against Timothy Maguire,

Esquire.25 The Court granted Defendant’s application for counsel26 and Natalie S.

Woloshin, Esquire, was appointed to represent Defendant in his postconviction

18
   D.I. 33. The State entered a nolle prosequi on Count 6 and the Court granted a
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Count 7 at the close of State’s evidence.
19
   Id.
20
   D.I. 39.
21
   Potts v. State, 2019 WL 7369199 (Del. Dec. 30, 2019).
22
   D.I. 63.
23
   D.I. 64.
24
   D.I. 61.
25
   Id.
26
   D.I. 70.
                                             4
proceedings. Ms. Woloshin filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.27 In her motion,

Ms. Woloshin reports that, after careful review of Defendant’s case, Defendant’s

claims are so lacking in merit that she cannot ethically advocate for them; and further,

that she is not aware of any other substantial grounds for relief.28

       9.     Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7):

       If counsel considers the movant’s claim to be so lacking in merit that
       counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any
       other substantial ground for relief available to the movant, counsel may
       move to withdraw. The motion shall explain the factual and legal basis
       for counsel’s opinion and shall give notice that the movant may file a
       response to the motion within 30 days of service of the motion upon the
       movant.29

       10.    Ms. Woloshin provided Defendant with a copy of her withdrawal

motion and advised Defendant of his ability under Rule 61(e)(7) to file a response

thereto.30 Defendant contested Ms. Woloshin’s motion.31 Defendant’s trial counsel,

Messrs. Margules and Layton, filed affidavits addressing Defendant’s Motion.32 The

27
   D.I. 95.
28
   Id. at 1, 22-23.
29
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
30
   D.I. 94.
31
   D.I. 99. Mr. Wal-Ikram’s response reiterated his bases for the Motion and claims
Ms. Woloshin should have withdrawn earlier. D.I. 99 at 1. However, Ms. Woloshin
explained in her timely requests for continuances that she needed additional time to
investigate the record and Mr. Wal-Ikram’s additional claims pursuant to her
obligation as post-conviction counsel. See e.g., D.I. 79, 83, and 93.
32
   D.I. 105 and 106.
                                           5
State opposed Defendant’s Motion.33 Defendant, replied to the State’s opposition34

and subsequently filed an amended motion for postconviction relief.35

III.   RULE 61 PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

       11.    Postconviction relief is a “collateral remedy which provides an avenue

for upsetting judgments that have otherwise become final.”36 Before addressing the

merits of Defendant’s Motion, the Court must consider procedural requirements for

relief set forth in Rule 61(i).37 If a procedural bar exists, the Court will not consider

the merits of the postconviction claim.38

       12.    Rule 61(i)(1) bars a motion for postconviction relief if the motion is

filed more than one year from the final judgment of conviction;39 this bar is

inapplicable as Defendant’s Motion was timely. Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive

motions for postconviction relief;40 this bar is inapplicable as this is Defendant’s first

postconviction motion. Rule 61(i)(3) bars relief if the postconviction motion includes

claims that were not asserted in prior proceedings leading to the final judgment,

unless the movant shows cause for relief from the procedural bars and prejudice from

33
   D.I. 107.
34
   D.I. 110.
35
   D.I. 113. Defendant’s amendment does not raise new claims, the amendment does
however, supplement Defendant’s previous arguments.
36
   Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 745 (Del. 1990).
37
   Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
38
   Id.
39
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
40
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
                                            6
a violation of the movant’s rights.41 Moreover, Rule 61(i)(4) bars relief if the

postconviction motion includes grounds for relief formerly adjudicated in any

proceeding leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, or in a postconviction

proceeding.42 Rule 61(i)(3) and (i)(4) are inapplicable to allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel that, in all but the rarest of circumstances, could not have been

raised on direct appeal.43 Defendant failed to raise his prosecutorial misconduct

complaints on direct appeal, as required by the rules of this Court. To the extent

Defendant has shown cause for his failure to raise this claim before alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court assesses this claim through that lens.

Accordingly, the Court will address Defendant’s Motion on the merits.

IV.    DISCUSSION
       A.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       13.    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed under the two-

part Strickland test.44 A claimant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate that: (i) his defense counsel’s representation fell below an objective

41
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
42
   Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
43
   State v. Coverdale, 2018 WL 259775, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2018).
44
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984); Neal v. State, 80 A.3d
935, 946 (Del. 2013).
                                           7
standard of reasonableness, and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s error(s), the result of his proceedings would have been different.45

       14.    For the first prong – deficient performance – the burden is on the

claimant to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness, “i.e., that no reasonable lawyer would have conducted the defense as

his lawyer did.”46 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was

reasonable,47 and “[i]t is not this Court’s function to second-guess reasonable [ ]

tactics” engaged by trial counsel.48 Indeed, an attorneys strategic or tactical choices

made after thorough investigation of the relevant law and facts are virtually

unchallengeable.49

       15.    In addition, one claiming ineffective assistance “must make specific

allegations of how defense counsel’s conduct actually prejudiced the proceedings,

rather than mere allegations of ineffectiveness.”50 This second prong requires the

45
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94; see also Alston v. State, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3
(Del. Sept. 4, 2015).
46
   Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174 (Del. 2020) (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776, 791 (1987)).
47
   Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).
48
   State v. Drummond, 2002 WL 524283, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2002).
49
   Green, 238 A.3d at 174.
50
   Alston, 2015 WL 5297709, at *3 (citing Wright, 671 A.2d at 1356); Monroe v.
State, 2015 WL 1407856, at *5 (Del. Mar. 25, 2015) (citing Dawson v. State, 673
A.2d 1186, 1196 (Del. 1996)); Zebroski v. State, 822 A.2d 1038, 1043 (Del. 2003).

                                           8
claimant to show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional error(s), the result of the proceeding would have been different.”51

       16.    Again, to summarize, a defendant must prove both deficient attorney

performance and resulting prejudice to succeed in making an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. Failure to prove either will doom his claim, and the Court need not

address the other.52

       17.    There are a few situations that the United States Supreme Court has

recognized to be so egregious that an ineffectiveness claimant need not prove the

prejudice prong of the traditional Strickland test. In United States v. Cronic, the

Court set out three “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the

cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”53 These are: (i) where

there was complete denial of counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding;54 (ii) where

“counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial

51
   Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694).
52
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 825 (Del. 2013)
(“Strickland is a two-pronged test, and there is no need to examine whether an
attorney performed deficiently if the deficiency did not prejudice the defendant”);
State v. Hamby, 2005 WL 914462, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005).
53
   United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
54
   Id. at 659.
                                             9
testing”;55 and, (iii) where “counsel is called upon to render assistance under

circumstances where competent counsel very likely could have not . . .”56

       18.    Generally, Defendant seeks to invoke the Cronic standard, claiming

that he was denied counsel altogether “when both attorneys failed to do a complete

investigation of all facts of the [Defendant’s] case and did not come up with a proper

defense at trial.”57 Before the Court will presume prejudice under Cronic, “there

must be a complete failure of counsel.”58 And, as set out below, there was nothing

even close to a “complete failure of counsel.” Indeed, Defendant’s contentions

exhibit more of either his complete disagreement with or complete misunderstanding

of the professional decisions both attorneys made, and the professional acts counsel

took—acts taken with, at least, some favorable results—in Defendant’s defense.

Thus, Defendant’s claims will all be subject to the traditional Strickland analysis.

              1.    Pretrial Claims

       19.    In Defendant’s Motion, supplements, and amendment, he raises

ineffective assistance of counsel claims against pretrial counsel, Mr. Margules.

Specifically, Defendant alleges, Mr. Margules, was ineffective in relation to the

55
   Id.
56
   Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 (2002).
57
   D.I. 63 at 3.
58
   Jackson v. Carroll, 161 F. App’x. 190, 193, 2005 WL 3477556, at *2 (3d Cir.
Dec. 20, 2005); State v. Jackson, 2008 WL 5048424, at *18 n.134 (Del. Super. Ct.
Nov. 25, 2008).
                                          10
motion to suppress by failing to: (1) attack Detective Rosaio’s credibility and

motives; (2) bring up that the Defendant had provided his license to Detective Rosaio;

(3) ask Detective Rosaio whether the Defendant was under arrest; and (4) emphasize

(i) the validity of the stop, and (ii) that a citation was introduced.59 In order to prevail

on this claim, Defendant must prove, (1) deficient performance, and (2) resulting

prejudice.60 He fails to do so.

       20.    First, Defendant’s claims are belied by the record. With respect to

attacking Detective Rosaio’s credibility and motives, Mr. Margules questioned the

Detective regarding why he felt the need to conduct an additional investigation into

the registration light after Defendant had already been arrested.61 Further, Mr.

Margules called the Defendant to the stand and elicited testimony from him that the

light was functioning properly62 and admitted documents from a DMV inspection

into evidence that indicated the light was functioning properly.63

       21.    Defendant next claims Mr. Margules was ineffective for not bringing

up that the Defendant had provided his driver’s license to Detective Rosaio. The

Defendant, however, himself took the stand and testified that he provided his driver’s

59
   D.I. 63, Mot. at 2; D.I. 110 at 1-3; D.I. 113 at 2.
60
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94.
61
   D.I. 21 at 22:1-24:3.
62
   Id. at 32:5-9.
63
   Id. at 29:22-30:23.
                                             11
license to Detective Rosaio as soon as he came to the driver side window. 64 The

Court did not find the Defendant’s testimony credible and credited Detective

Rosaio’s version of events instead.65

       22.    The Defendant next claims Mr. Margules was ineffective for failing to

ask the Detective if the Defendant was ever under arrest. Mr. Margules declares he

likely did not ask the question because an officer’s subjective belief on whether the

Defendant was under arrest was irrelevant to the grounds for the suppression

motion.66

       23.    Lastly, the Defendant alleges Mr. Margules was ineffective for failing

to emphasize the validity of the stop and to check if a traffic citation was issued to

the Defendant. Mr. Margules elicited testimony and presented evidence that there

was no basis for the traffic stop because the license plate light was operable. In

addition, Mr. Margules, in his affidavit, attests he likely did not ask Detective Rosaio

if the Defendant was issued a traffic citation because it was never alleged he had

issued one, and whether a traffic citation was issued or not did not impact the

reasonableness of the underlying stop.67 A traffic citation was not required to arrest

and prosecute the Defendant for the charges he was indicted on.

64
   Id. at 34:18-35:15.
65
   Id. at 58:20-59:14.
66
   D. I. 105 ¶ 3.
67
   D. I. 105 ¶ 4.
                                           12
       24.     Second, a criminal defense attorney is given wide latitude in making

strategic trial decisions; this extends to the conduct of cross-examination.68 The

questions to be asked and how a given cross-examination is conducted are tactical

decisions.69   When challenging those decisions, the movant has the burden of

supplying precisely what information would have been obtained had counsel

conducted the cross as the complaining inmate desired and just how this information

would have changed the result of his trial.70

       25.     To the extent Defendant now disagrees with the manner the testimony

was conducted, Mr. Margules has explained the information elicited and that he

avoided asking certain questions was because of their lack of strategic value.

       26.     Additionally, “[w]hen a defendant is represented by counsel, the

authority to manage the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney.”

An attorney’s informed decision as to what evidence to admit and whom to call is a

tactical decision that deserves great weight and deference. Indeed, “the United States

Supreme Court [has] held that the attorney possesses the right to decide certain

strategic and tactical decisions, including what witnesses to call, whether and how to

conduct cross-examination, what trial motions should be made, and what evidence

68
   State v. Powell, 2016 WL 3023740, at *25 (Del. Super. Ct. May 24, 2016).
69
   Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547, 557 (Del. 1998) (“Whether to call a witness, and
how to cross-examine those who are called are tactical decisions.”).
70
   See Outten, 720 A.2d at 557 (quoting U.S. v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1449 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
                                          13
should be introduced.” Defendant has thus failed to overcome the strong presumption

that his counsel acted reasonably and on that basis alone his ineffectiveness claim

against Mr. Margules must fail.

                  2.    Trial Claims

         27.      The Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims against Mr.

Layton arise from Mr. Layton’s: (1) withdrawal of a supplemental motion to

suppress; (2) failure to file a motion for acquittal after the Court granted the motion

for acquittal related to Defendant’s resisting arrest charge; and (3) failure to object

for a number of reasons, including (i) the admission of a prior conviction, (ii)

testimony regarding the lab report, and (iii) point out that there was no citation and

Defendant was never under arrest.71 Again, in order to prevail on this claim,

Defendant must prove, (1) deficient performance, and (2) resulting prejudice.72 He

fails to do so.

         28.      With respect to Mr. Layton’s withdrawal of a supplemental suppression

motion, both Mr. Layton and the Defendant’s Postconviction counsel concur that Mr.

Layton’s professional responsibilities prevented him from pressing the motion. Trial

counsel has a duty not to make frivolous arguments to the Court, and it is Mr.

Layton’s belief that the arguments set forth in the supplemental motion had already

71
     D.I. 63, Mot at 4; D.I. 110 at 3-8; D.I. 113 at 1-3.
72
     Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-94.
                                             14
been considered by the Court.73 Next, Defendant claims Mr. Layton was ineffective

for failing to file a motion for judgment of acquittal, after the judgment of acquittal

on the resisting arrest charge was granted.74 As to the other charges, Mr. Layton

asserts it is his belief there was no basis in law or fact to advance any motions for

acquittal on any other counts.75

       29.    The decision whether to file a given motion is a strategic decision and

a matter of professional judgment. Such a decision will be upheld if it is reasonable.76

A defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice by defense counsel’s withdrawal of or

failure to file any motion if that motion were likely to fail.77 Defendant has failed to

overcome the strong presumption that Mr. Layton acted reasonably78 and therefore,

Defendant’s ineffective assistance claims related to the supplemental motion to

suppress and motion for judgment of acquittal must fail.79 Furthermore, Defendant

73
   D.I. 106 ¶ 20.
74
   D.I. 60 at 60:5-17.
75
   D.I. 106 ¶ 23.
76
   See Pennewell v. State, 2005 WL 578444, at *1 (Del. Jan. 26, 2005).
77
   See Poteat v. State, 2007 WL 2309983, at *1 (Del. Aug. 14, 2007); Bratcher v.
State, 2008 WL 2475741, at *1 (Del. June 20, 2008).
78
   Burns, 76 A.3d at 788 (“Under Strickland, the strategic decisions made by counsel
are entitled to a strong presumption of reasonableness.”).
79
   See State v. McGlotten, 2011 WL 987534, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2011),
aff’d, 2011 WL 3074790 (Del. July 25, 2011) (“To restate the requirements of
Strickland, a defendant must establish two things, not just one: that trial counsel’s
performance was deficient and that but for that deficiency, the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different. If a defendant cannot establish both prongs,
then the ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.”) (emphasis in original).
                                           15
failed to address the other Strickland showing – that, but for Mr. Layton’s conduct,

the outcome of the trial would have been different (i.e., that Defendant would have

been acquitted of the charges of which he was convicted).80             Accordingly,

Defendant’s claims alleging ineffectiveness assistance of counsel fail for this reason

too.

       30.   In Defendant’s final claim, he asserts Mr. Layton was ineffective for

failing to object at various moments during trial.      Specifically, the Defendant

contends Mr. Layton was ineffective for failing to object: (1) when the nature of his

prior conviction came into evidence; (2) during Detective Rosaio’s testimony and

pointing out that no citation was ever issued to the Defendant and that the Defendant

was not under arrest; and (3) to testimony regarding heroin.81

       31.   Turning first to the Defendant’s claim that Mr. Layton was ineffective

for failing to object when the nature of Defendant’s prior convictions came into

evidence. Though the Court finds that counsel was not ineffective, some explanation

is in order. The Defendant was previously convicted of two felonies, the first of

which made him a person prohibited from possessing a firearm. The State and

Defense entered into a stipulation that the Defendant was a person prohibited, as a

80
   Wright, 671 A.2d at 11356 (“Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice.
A defendant must make specific allegations of actual prejudice to substantiate
them.”).
81
   D.I. 63 at 4.
                                          16
result, his status could be presented to the jury without the name or type of felony.

During the defense examination of the Defendant, however, Mr. Layton asked the

Defendant whether he had ever sold drugs. The Defendant answered no. Whereupon

a sidebar ensued, and the prosecution informed the Court the Defendant was

previously convicted of drug dealing. Mr. Layton indicated it was his intent to limit

the question to the last 48 hours, however, the Court ruled that since the question

posed no time limitation and Defendant denied selling drugs, the State would be

permitted to question the Defendant about the conviction for drug dealing.82

         32.   Thus, Mr. Layton could not in good faith object to the State’s

introduction of his prior felony conviction of drug dealing since Mr. Layton’s own

questioning opened the door to the introduction of it. Moreover, Mr. Layton in his

affidavit indicated the question was posed as part of a broader trial strategy to show

the Defendant as a reformed man, and he did not expect the Defendant to perjure

himself.83 Thus, the Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that Mr.

Layton’s representation was reasonable under the circumstances.

         33.   To the extent such a question constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel, this Court finds the Defendant suffered no prejudice. The Court issued a

82
     D.I. 21 at 126:6-11.
83
     D.I. 106 ¶ 11.
                                          17
jury instruction that indicated the Defendant’s prior felony conviction was only to be

considered in judging the credibility of the witness.84

       34.    The Defendant next appears to suggest that Mr. Layton should have

reargued the legality of the stop at trial. Specifically, Defendant argues that Mr.

Layton was ineffective for failing to object during Detective Rosaio’s testimony; and

point out no citation was issued, and that the Defendant was not under arrest. This

Court, in denying the Defendant’s motion to suppress, had already ruled the stop was

legal, and therefore, Mr. Layton had no good faith basis for objecting to or rearguing

these issues. Accordingly, the Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption

that Mr. Layton’s representation was reasonable in this respect.

       35.    Finally, the Defendant claims Mr. Layton was ineffective for failing to

object to the testimony that heroin was found in one of the bags. The Court does not

understand the nature of the Defendant’s claims in this respect. The State’s witness,

Forensic Analytical Chemist from the Division of Forensic Science, testified that

while most of the substances seized and tested in this case were identified as cocaine,

one sample contained a mixture of cocaine and heroin.85 This testimony was

consistent with the Laboratory Report provided during discovery.86 Accordingly,

there was no basis for Mr. Layton to object.

84
   D.1.61 at 27:9-18.
85
   D.I. 59 at 192:13-23.
86
   See D.I. 96 at A236-37.
                                          18
       36.   In sum, the Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that Mr.

Layton’s representation was reasonable.

B.     Prosecutorial Misconduct

       37.   Lastly, the Defendant claims the prosecutor, Mr. Maguire, engaged in

prosecutorial misconduct by introducing the nature of the Defendant’s felony

conviction to the jury and by allegedly mischaracterizing the narcotics found in the

bags.87 With respect to the first claim, as discussed above, the nature of the

Defendant’s previous felony conviction was admitted with permission of the Court

and only after the Defendant denied ever having sold drugs. No misconduct occurred.

With respect to his second claim, any reference to heroin was permissible given the

language in the reindictment88 and the evidence contained in the Laboratory Report.

Again, no misconduct occurred.

87
  D.I. 63 at 4-5.
88
  The indictment alleged the Defendant, “did knowingly possess with intent to
deliver any morphine, opium, salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer thereof, including
heroin as described in 16 Del. C. § 4714, or any mixture containing any such
controlled substance and/or cocaine, or any mixture containing cocaine.” D.I. 96 at
A093-95.
                                          19
V.     RULE 61 COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW

       38.   After reviewing the record to determine if there were any meritorious

grounds for relief and concluding no such grounds existed, Ms. Woloshin filed a

motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Rule 61(e)(7). The Court must also

conduct its own review of the record to determine whether Defendant’s Motion is

devoid of any, at least, arguable postconviction claims.89

       39.   To evaluate Defendant’s postconviction claims, and to determine

whether Ms. Woloshin’s motion to withdraw as counsel should be granted, the Court

should be satisfied that Ms. Woloshin conducted a truly conscientious examination

of the record and the law for claims that could arguably support Defendant’s Rule 61

motion. Ms. Woloshin has stated that she undertook a thorough analysis of the record

to evaluate Mr. Wal-Ikram’s claims and determined that the claims do not have merit

to be ethically advocated. Ms. Woloshin also reviewed the record to determine if any

other meritorious grounds for relief exist and found none. Finally, the Court has

reviewed Mr. Wal-Ikram’s Motion and had found no meritorious grounds for relief.

       40.   After careful review of the record, the Court concludes that Mr. Wal-

Ikram’s claims are without merit, and no other substantial grounds for relief exist.

He has not met the heavy burden under Strickland of demonstrating that his attorneys’

89
  State v. Caulk, 2021 WL 2662250, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 29, 2021), aff’d,
2022 WL 320575 (Del. Feb. 2, 2022).
                                          20
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for

their alleged errors, the outcome of his case would have been any different.

Accordingly, Mr. Wal-Ikram’s Motion is DENIED and Ms. Woloshin’s Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel is GRANTED.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                   /s/ Patricia A. Winston
                                                   Judge Patricia A. Winston

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