Court Opinion

ID: 9516541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:44:52.680649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:32.070408
License: Public Domain

THURMAN, Bankruptcy Judge,
specially concurring.
When the issue in this appeal came before me as a member of this panel, I was hesitant to endorse the concept of allowing Chapter 13 debtors an ownership deduction for vehicles that they own free and clear. My instincts tell me that the vehicle ownership deduction is supposed to cover debtors’ monthly payments on vehicles that are subject to either secured debt or a lease. Allowing this deduction when a debtor actually has no such obligation appears to be a fiction, or rather, a “phantom deduction.” Nonetheless, my reading of the commentary and the many cases on both sides of this issue has persuaded me that a fair reading of § 1325(b)(3), together with § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), compels the conclusion that, in determining the return to unsecured creditors, deduction of a vehicle expense under these circumstances is allowed.
However, I cannot conclude that these statutes are either “plain” or “clear,” but I acknowledge that they are clear enough to support this decision. For that reason alone, I find the labels used to reference the various decisions on this issue, both by this decision and others, to be problematic. Characterizing decisions that differ in outcome from the present ruling as either “incorrect” or as falling outside of the “Plain Language View” is inappropriate.1 The “IRM View” is supported by a host of thoughtful and considered decisions, all of which conclude that the proper interpretation of the statutory language is that such a deduction is specifically disallowed.2 I *715prefer to label the two competing views as the “Numbers View” and the “Manual View,” or to at least adopt some title other than the currently used “Plain Language View.” In my opinion, these statutes simply do not evince “Plain Language.” This becomes even more apparent upon review of the cases, in which the terms “standards,” “interpretations,” and “manual” are frequently used interchangeably when referring to IRS publications. By my reading, “standards” are the actual numbers that debtors may use on Form B22C pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, whereas the “manual” supplies the IRS’s interpretations of those numbers within a different context, which were not adopted by the Bankruptcy Code.
In any event, in reaching my conclusion in this case I determined that, as a matter of fairness, it makes little sense to deny an ownership deduction to a frugal debtor who, although he has fully paid for his used car, finds himself in need of bankruptcy relief, while allowing the deduction to a more “aggressive” debtor who has acquired a late model car by incurring a large secured debt. I was also persuaded by Judge Rhodes’s excellent reasoning in In re Kimbro,3 to the effect that “the expenses of vehicle ownership are the fixed expenses that an owner incurs,” including “depreciation, insurance, licensing fees and taxes,” and that “every vehicle owner incurs ownership expenses, and that is so regardless of debt or lease payments.” 4
Despite this case’s outcome, I am not persuaded that the bankruptcy courts are without some flexibility in determining the amount and applicability of income deductions. Thus, I do not believe that today’s decision in any way undermines the concept that bankruptcy courts have both the power and the obligation to deviate from the numbers derived on Form B22C under certain circumstances, as I have ruled on prior occasions. Thus, I am keenly aware of, and still fully support, the holdings in Martin, that deviation from Form B22C may be justified by a debtor’s lack of compliance with the good faith requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), and in Jass and Lanning, that such deviation may be justified by significant changes in circumstances that render the numbers so derived either unrealistic or unfair.5 These cases in fact support today’s outcome, in that they stand for the proposition that bankruptcy courts should exercise some discretion based on the individual cases before them, and are not and cannot be, bound by the generalized discretionary determinations made by other branches of government.
Finally, as the majority points out, “Congress did not incorporate the entire IRS Manual into the means test.” In fact, as noted in Kimbro, a previous reference to the IRS’s “financial analysis for expenses” was removed from § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) when it was enacted in *7162005.6 This suggests that Congress intended to adopt only the dollar amounts set forth in the IRS Standards, without necessarily adopting the interpretations of those numbers in the Manual. In this respect, I note that the additional $200 “older car” operating expense given to the debtors in this case is derived from the Manual rather than the Standards.7 Accordingly, such a deduction should not be given under the view we have adopted in this case.8 However, because the Trustee did not appeal that award in this case, we do not disturb it here.
Accordingly, although not entirely persuaded that the statutory language before us is in fact “plain,” I concur with the result reached by the majority.

. See Majority op. at 713, fn. 4.

. See Majority op. at 712, fn. 3.

. In re Kimbro, 389 B.R. 518 (6th Cir. BAP 2008).

. Id. at 530-31.

. See, e.g., In re Martin, 373 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr.D.Utah 2007) (court must find both that debtors have complied with Form B22C and that plan is proposed in good faith); In re loss, 340 B.R. 411, 418 (Bankr.D.Utah 2006) (entries on Form B22C may be altered based on significant changes in circumstances that render them inaccurate or unfair); In re Lanning, 380 B.R. 17 (10th Cir. BAP 2007) (Form B22C’s disposable income is a "starting point” for determining debtor’s projected disposable income). The holdings in Jass and Lanning have been challenged elsewhere, but until our circuit rules otherwise, I believe they should be followed.

. In re Kimbro, 389 B.R. at 525-26.

. I.R.M. 5.8.5.5.2(3).

. See, e.g., In re Herbord, 2008 WL 149972 (Bankr.S.D.Ill.2008).