Court Opinion

ID: 9403218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 18:03:44.792816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:05.526214
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/20/23 Onwuka v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 JAMES ONWUKA,                                                                D080375

            Plaintiff and Appellant,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1935462)

 DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
 AND REHABILITATION,

            Defendant and Respondent.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, David S. Cohn, Judge. Affirmed.
          Law Offices of Gloria Dredd Haney and Gloria Dredd Haney, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
          Joseph Macaluso, California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Office of Legal Affairs, for Defendant and Respondent.

          James Onwuka appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his
petition for a writ of mandate directing the California State Personnel Board
(the SPB) to set aside its order sustaining the decision of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to terminate his
employment as a psychiatric technician at the California Institute for Women
(CIW). We conclude that Onwuka’s appeal lacks merit, and we accordingly
affirm the judgment.
                                      I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Onwuka was hired as a psychiatric technician by CDCR in 2015 and
began working at CIW in March 2016. At CIW, he worked in the Special

Care Unit (SCU), which houses inmates with special needs.1 Onwuka’s
responsibilities included leading group therapy sessions, dispensing
medication, and crisis intervention. Onwuka’s supervisor was Kathy R.

      On May 2, 2018, one of the inmate-patients, B.M.,2 became agitated
and made loud accusations against Onwuka in the presence of Onwuka and
other employees. Among other things, B.M. stated that Onwuka was always
asking the inmate-patients personal questions, such as when they lost their

1     Specifically, as the administrative law judge (ALJ) found, “[t]he SCU at
CIW is an enhanced outpatient housing unit. It houses female inmate-
patients who require significant medication, and who are housed in SCU
because their mental stability makes them vulnerable to inmates in the
general population.”

2      The names of the relevant inmate-patients are redacted throughout the
administrative record. However, in setting forth the factual background we
rely on other documents in the record, including the pleadings, the parties’
briefing, and an unredacted version of the ALJ’s decision, all which identify
the inmate-patients by their full names. To preserve their privacy, we refer
to the inmate-patients by their initials.
                                      2
virginity. Onwuka documented the incident in the shift-report email he sent

to Kathy R. in a “Cerner note.”3
      Kathy R. spoke with B.M. on May 8, 2018, and documented B.M.’s
allegations against Onwuka. As Kathy R. later testified, B.M. said, among
other things, that Onwuka asked her and other inmate-patients “questions
about sex and the first time they’ve had sex.”
      On May 9, 2018, after Onwuka learned that he had been reassigned
from dispensing B.M.’s medication, Onwuka took the initiative to speak to
Kathy R. about the incident with B.M. Kathy R. wrote an email to her
supervisor on May 9, 2018, to document what Onwuka told her. As set forth
in the email, in addition to discussing B.M.’s May 2, 2018 outburst, Onwuka
brought to her attention an incident involving a different inmate-patient,

3     As the ALJ’s decision explained, “[a] Cerner note is where comments
regarding inmate-patient behavior are placed in an inmate-patient’s file.” On
appeal, Onwuka complains that the administrative record does not include
the Cerner note that he wrote on May 2, 2018, regarding his interaction with
B.M. However, that document does not appear in the administrative record
because Onwuka made no attempt to admit it into evidence at the
administrative hearing. Onwuka had access to that document, as the proof of
service on him of CDCR’s Notice of Adverse Action on January 30, 2019,
indicates that the Cerner note was provided to Onwuka as an attachment to
Kathy R.’s May 9, 2018 email, which itself was an exhibit to the Office of
Internal Affair’s investigative report. Moreover, we note that, when Onwuka
complained in the trial court about the absence of the Cerner note, CDCR
responded by stating that if Onwuka “has lost or misplaced” the Cerner note
“and wishes now to augment the Record, [CDCR] would be more than happy
to provide the document and stipulate to the augmentation of the Record[ ].”
We see no indication in the record that Onwuka acted on CDCR’s offer.
Finally, although Onwuka’s opening appellate brief makes much of the
missing Cerner note, Onwuka does not explain why that document is
material to the issues he raises on appeal. It is undisputed that the Cerner
note concerned the May 2, 2018 incident involving B.M., which was witnessed
by other employees, and about which there appears to be no material dispute.
                                       3
E.G. As Kathy R. described in her email, Onwuka told her that during a
group therapy session on May 2, 2018, E.G. asked Onwuka “if she could
journal about the first time she had sex.” Onwuka “responded back to the
inmates indicating [that] they can write about whatever they wanted.”
      In August 2018, the Office of Internal Affairs interviewed Onwuka.
Onwuka denied ever speaking to any inmate-patient, including E.G., about
losing her virginity. Onwuka also denied that he ever told Kathy R. about
any incident in which E.G. asked during a group therapy session whether she
could write in her journal about losing her virginity, and he denied that E.G.
ever made such a comment.
      In January 2019, CDCR sent Onwuka a notice of adverse action (the
Notice), which stated that Onwuka’s employment would be terminated
effective February 6, 2019. The Notice explained that the adverse action was
being taken based on inexcusable neglect of duty; dishonesty; and other
failure of good behavior. (Gov. Code, § 19572, subds. (d), (f), (t).) As the
factual basis for the adverse action, the Notice stated that on or about May 2,
2018, Onwuka led a group therapy session, immediately prior to which
inmate-patient E.G. asked what kinds of things were talked about in the
group. Onwuka told her that she could talk about “ ‘anything, like when you
lost your virginity and whether it was a bad experience or good experience,’ ”
or words to that effect. Onwuka then asked E.G. whether she was a virgin, to
which E.G. answered “ ‘no.’ ” Further, the Notice alleged that Onwuka gave
untruthful answers to the Office of Internal Affairs in August 2018 when it
was investigating the incident.
      Onwuka appealed to the State Personnel Board. An ALJ held a
hearing on June 3 and June 4, 2019.

                                        4
      E.G. testified at the hearing. E.G. stated that prior to a group therapy
session on “Emotions” in May 2018, she walked in when Onwuka was alone
and setting up for the session. As E.G. explained, when she asked Onwuka
what kinds of things they would talk about in the group session, “[h]e asked
if I was a virgin and I said no[,] and he said you can talk about if it was good
or bad . . . .” E.G. stated that on a different day that week, at a group therapy
session that included writing in a journal, she made a joke referencing
Onwuka’s earlier comments to her regarding virginity. Specifically,
according to E.G., “[Onwuka] said you can write about anything you want[,]

and I said like the first time when I lost my virginity.”4 E.G. testified that
Onwuka did not respond.
      According to E.G., after Onwuka made the comment to her about losing
her virginity, she told another inmate-patient about the comment. Because
B.M. was E.G.’s cellmate, B.M. overheard the discussion. E.G. believes that
B.M. adopted the story as if it happened to B.M. herself, not to E.G.
According to E.G., B.M. is a liar and makes up a lot of stories. E.G. also
testified that she did not report Onwuka’s virginity comment to the
authorities, and she never spoke with Kathy R. about it.
      Kathy R. testified at the hearing. She stated that when she spoke to
Onwuka on May 9, 2018, he was the one who brought up E.G. Specifically,
Kathy R. testified that Onwuka told her that during a group therapy session
E.G. asked whether she could write in her journal about the first time she

4     In his reply brief, citing a specific page of the administrative record,
Onwuka represents that during E.G.’s testimony, after explaining the joking
comment, E.G. “quickly changed her story, i.e.[,] she did not make any
virginity statement or joke during any group session.” Onwuka is incorrect.
The record shows that E.G. did not take back her story as to what she said
during the group therapy session.
                                        5
had sex. Kathy R. confirmed that she had never spoken with E.G. about any
comments involving Onwuka and virginity, and she was not aware of E.G.
complaining to anyone about Onwuka with respect to that issue.
      During his own testimony, Onwuka stated that other than B.M.’s
accusations during her outburst on May 2, 2018, there was never any
conversation between himself and E.G., or any other patient-inmate, about
losing her virginity. Onwuka also testified that he did not recall any
comment by E.G. during a group therapy session about losing her virginity.
Finally, Onwuka denied that he told Kathy R. about any such comment by
E.G. Instead, according to Onwuka, on May 9, 2018, it was Kathy R. who
raised the issue of E.G. by asking Onwuka whether he ever talked to E.G.
about anything inappropriate, such as her virginity. According to Onwuka,
he responded to Kathy R. by denying any such interaction.
      At the hearing, Onwuka called eight different witnesses who worked at
CIW to discuss instances that they characterized as showing that, as a
supervisor, Kathy R. made false allegations against them. Certain of
Onwuka’s witnesses also testified that, in general, they would credit Onwuka
over Kathy R., or that they had never witnessed Onwuka doing anything that
was inappropriate.
      On June 27, 2019, the ALJ issued a proposed decision sustaining
Onwuka’s dismissal. The proposed decision contained an extensive
discussion of the relevant testimony and evidence. As the ALJ explained,
because Onwuka’s testimony conflicted with that of E.G. and Kathy R., a
credibility determination was required. The ALJ expressly relied on the
demeanor of the relevant witnesses, as well as a detailed review of their
testimony and the other applicable evidence, to explain that he was crediting
the testimony of E.G. and Kathy R. over that of Onwuka. Having credited

                                       6
those witnesses, the ALJ decided that CDCR had established by a
preponderance of the evidence that Onwuka made inappropriate comments to
E.G. about losing her virginity, and that Onwuka lied to investigators from
the Office of Internal Affairs about that fact, as well as about what he said to
Kathy R. about E.G. on May 9, 2018.
      Further, the ALJ sustained the penalty of dismissal, explaining that
Onwuka’s “misconduct was very serious.” As the ALJ explained, “Asking an
inmate-patient an intimate and personal question about her first sexual
encounter without a legitimate business-related reason caused discredit to
CDCR and [Onwuka]. This kind of misconduct can discourage inmate-
patients from attending group therapy counseling, thereby impairing their
rehabilitation progress.” Further, due to Onwuka’s dishonest statements,
“[CDCR] can no longer trust that [Onwuka] can perform his duties in an
ethical and honest manner. And the public may now have a legitimate
concern that [psychiatric technicians] at CIW engage in inappropriate
personal conversations with inmate-patients, and that they will lie during
the course of an investigation to cover it up. Furthermore, dishonesty is not
an isolated act; it is more a continuing trait of character.” Finally,
“[Onwuka’s] refusal to accept responsibility for his misdeeds, and his
reflexive attempts to foist the blame on others, suggests a very high
likelihood of recurrence” and due to his “dishonest character, he is likely to
commit further dishonest acts.” The ALJ concluded that “[t]he significant
harm to the public service and high likelihood of recurrence, combined with
[Onwuka’s] dishonesty, counsel in favor of a harsh penalty,” supporting
Onwuka’s dismissal.
      On August 16, 2019, the SPB issued a resolution adopting the ALJ’s
proposed decision as its own.

                                        7
      Onwuka sought judicial review of the SPB’s decision by filing a petition
for writ of administrative mandate in the trial court pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5. The operative amended petition (the Petition)
named as respondents both the SPB and CDCR. The Petition alleged that
CDCR wrongfully terminated Onwuka’s employment because the charges
against him were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence and did not
constitute a legal basis for discipline. It further alleged that the penalty of
termination was not appropriate. Onwuka sought an order reinstating him
or remanding for a new hearing.
      After considering the briefing filed by Onwuka and CDCR, the trial

court issued a tentative ruling.5 In the tentative ruling, the trial court
explained: “[Onwuka’s] challenge to the administrative decision . . . is based
almost entirely on credibility issues. In short, [Onwuka] argues that his
testimony is simply more believable than the testimony of other percipient
witnesses. But that is not what the trier of fact found, and those findings are
not inherently incredible. . . . While [Onwuka’s] theory that his accusers
were simply ‘out to get him’ is plausible, and a reasonable trier of fact could
have believed [Onwuka’s] testimony rather than that of his accusers, it is at
least equally plausible that his accusers were telling the truth. It cannot be
said that substantial evidence does not support the findings.” With respect to
the penalty, the trial court’s tentative ruling stated, “[Onwuka] was a
Psychiatric Technician who worked with mentally ill prison inmates. His

5      Although the Petition named the SPB as a respondent, the SPB did not
participate in the briefing in the trial court and has not participated in this
appeal. In its answer to the Petition, the SPB explained that “[a]s an
impartial quasi-judicial tribunal, Respondent SPB does not anticipate taking
any advocacy position,” but it would “comply with the final judgment or order
in this matter to the extent that it is required to do so at the time specified by
law.”
                                        8
failure to act with integrity and honesty is not compatible with the public
trust. The [SPB] found [Onwuka] breached the public’s trust by making
sexually inappropriate comments to an inmate-patient. The [SPB] further
determined [Onwuka] was dishonest, both in a discussion with his supervisor
and during the investigation of his conduct. He failed to admit responsibility,
which evidences a strong likelihood of recurrence. There was no abuse of
discretion by imposing a penalty of dismissal.”
      At a hearing on August 13, 2021, the trial court adopted its tentative
ruling and denied the Petition. Judgment was subsequently entered against
Onwuka. Onwuka appeals from the judgment.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Legal Standards Governing Review of a Decision of the SPB
      Onwuka’s petition was based on Code of Civil Procedure

section 1094.5.6 Under that provision, the trial court inquires “whether the
respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; whether there
was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent has not proceeded in the
manner required by law, the order or decision is not supported by the
findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc,
§ 1094.5, subd. (b).)
      In many instances, when fundamental vested rights are at issue in an
administrative proceeding, a trial court is required to exercise its

6     Onwuka contends in his opening appellate brief that his “claims
alternatively . . . sound in ordinary mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085 in that the [SPB] has a mandatory duty to approve.”
However, Onwuka’s Petition did not assert a claim under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085.
                                        9
independent judgment in reviewing an agency’s adjudicative decision.
(Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d
28, 34.) However, that rule does not apply when a court reviews a decision by
the SPB because the SPB “derives its adjudicatory authority from the state
Constitution rather than from a legislative enactment.” (State Personnel Bd.
v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 512, 522 (State
Personnel).) “Because the SPB has been endowed with quasi-judicial powers,
the trial court may not exercise its independent judgment, but must uphold
the findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” (Furtado v. State
Personnel Bd. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 729, 742 (Furtado).) This is the case
even when a fundamental vested right is at issue. (Coleman v. Department of
Personnel Administration (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1102, 1125 (Coleman) [“Decisions
of the [SPB] . . . are reviewed only to determine whether substantial evidence

supports the determination, even when vested rights are involved.”].)7
      “In applying the substantial evidence test to [the SPB’s] decision, a
court must examine all relevant evidence in the entire record, considering
both the evidence that supports the [SPB’s] decision and the evidence against
it, in order to determine whether that decision is supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] This does not mean, however, that a court is to reweigh
the evidence. Rather, all presumptions are indulged and conflicts resolved in
favor of the [SPB’s] decision. [Citation.] [¶] These standards do not change
on appellate review from a trial court’s denial of a petition for writ of

7      In his appellate briefing, Onwuka identifies the general rule of
independent judgment review that applies when a fundamental vested right
is at issue, such as a petitioner’s status as a public employee. (Seibert v. City
of San Jose (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 [“interest in . . . public
employment status implicated a ‘fundamental vested right.’ ”].) However,
Onwuka fails to acknowledge that a different rule applies to a review of the
SPB’s decisions.
                                        10
mandate from a decision of the SPB; an appellate court independently
determines whether substantial evidence supports the SBP’s findings, not the
trial court’s conclusions. [Citations.] ‘We do not reweigh the evidence; we
indulge all presumptions and resolve all conflicts in favor of the [SPB’s]
decision.’ ” (Furtado, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.)
      With respect to the degree of penalty imposed by the SPB, “ ‘the
determination of the penalty by the administrative body will not be disturbed
unless there has been an abuse of its discretion.’ ” (Skelly v. State Personnel
Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 217 (Skelly).) “ ‘ “ ‘Neither an appellate court nor a
trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative
agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed.’ ” ’ ” (County of
Siskiyou v. State Personnel Bd. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1606, 1615.) “If
reasonable minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed, there
has been no abuse of discretion. [Citation.] It is only in the exceptional case,
when it is shown that reasonable minds cannot differ on the propriety of the
penalty, that an abuse of discretion is shown.” (Deegan v. City of Mountain
View (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 37, 46-47.) Indeed, “[t]he fact that reasonable
minds may differ as to the propriety of the penalty imposed fortifies the
conclusion that the administrative body acted within the area of its
discretion.” (Flowers v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 753, 761.)
On the issue of penalty, we review the SPB’s decision without regard to the
trial court. (Pollak v. State Personnel Bd. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1404.)
B.    Onwuka’s Arguments Lack Merit Because It Is Not Our Role to
      Reevaluate Credibility Determinations
      Although Onwuka’s arguments are presented in a somewhat
disorganized manner and often lack the required citations to the record, they

                                        11
are clearly targeted at attacking the credibility of the two witnesses upon

which the ALJ’s proposed decision relied: E.G. and Kathy R.8
      As to E.G., Onwuka argues that E.G.’s testimony lacked credibility for
two main reasons: (1) the End of Shift Report for the May 2, 2018 group

therapy session does not indicate that E.G. attended it;9 and (2) E.G.
admitted during her testimony that when interviewed by the Office of

8     In addition to attacking the credibility of E.G. and Kathy R.,
throughout his appellate briefing, Onwuka repeatedly asserts that CDCR’s
decision to terminate him, and the SPB’s affirmance of that decision was
based on accusations made by B.M. against Onwuka, even though B.M.’s
credibility was lacking. For example, Onwuka contends that even though
B.M.’s accusations were discredited, they “remained the basis for [Onwuka’s]
termination.” Onwuka contends that “CDCR adopted [B.M.’s] lies and ran
with them and continued to rely on [B.M.’s] statements to the point of
establishing [the Notice] . . . .” Onwuka states, “It is unfortunate that the
ALJ relied and continued to rely on the testimony of [B.M.] even though the
ALJ (like [Kathy R.]) subsequently found out that [B.M.] had fabricated the
entire matter.” These assertions are factually incorrect. It is clear from the
record that neither CDCR in the Notice, nor the SPB, based its decision on
B.M.’s accusations. Indeed, B.M. did not testify at the administrative
hearing. Instead, the decision to terminate Onwuka was based on the
information provided by E.G. and Kathy R. about what Onwuka said to them.

9      The End of Shift Report covering the May 2, 2018 group therapy
session, as it appears in the appellate record, contains redactions. However,
witnesses were asked at the administrative hearing to review that document,
and they testified that it did not identify E.G. as an attendee. As both the
ALJ and the trial court pointed out, however, the fact that E.G. is not listed
in the End of Shift Report is not dispositive because the evidence supports a
finding that Onwuka did not always require inmate-patients to sign in when
attending group therapy sessions. We also note that although the parties
identify May 2, 2018, as the date of a relevant group therapy session, E.G.
testified that she was not sure of the relevant dates. Although E.G. stated
that the date of the Emotions group therapy session would be May 2 if she
previously said so in her interview with the Office of Internal Affairs, that
interview is not in the record.
                                      12
Internal Affairs, she omitted the fact that another inmate-patient was
present when B.M. heard E.G. talk about Onwuka’s inappropriate

comments.10
      As to Kathy R., Onwuka points mainly to the testimony from the
various witnesses who recounted allegedly false accusations against them
made by Kathy R., or who testified that they would credit Onwuka over

Kathy R.11 Further, Onwuka contends that Kathy R.’s credibility is suspect
because of how she described to the Office of Internal Affairs a separate

incident involving Onwuka eating lunch at an improper time and place.12

10   Referring to the other inmate-patient, E.G. explained at the
administrative hearing, “I didn’t want to bring her into it.”

11     We note that Onwuka’s opening appellate brief misstates the facts as to
an incident involving one of the witnesses. That witness testified about an
incident in which Kathy R. stuck a clipboard in her face while wrongly
accusing her of not going to a meeting. Onwuka’s opening appellate brief
mistakenly states that the incident happened to Onwuka rather than to the
testifying witness.

12     Specifically, during Onwuka’s testimony, he described an incident in
February 2018, during which he was eating behind a partition in an area of
the clinic when it was not an assigned break time. Kathy R. wrote up the
incident for Onwuka’s personnel file. In that document, Kathy R. stated that
when she approached Onwuka and asked what he was doing, he “jumped up”
and “responded that [he was] ‘fixing [his] belt’ or words to that effect,” and he
said that he had been eating his lunch. Onwuka argues that Kathy R. should
not be viewed as credible because during her interview with the Office of
Internal Affairs, Kathy R. changed the description to add the details that
Onwuka “pulled up his pants” when she approached him, and was “in the
dark in that room with the lights off.” At the administrative hearing,
Onwuka presented witness testimony that the room was not dark, and he
testified himself that he was not pulling up his pants but was tightening his
belt after having loosened it to feel comfortable while eating.
                                       13
      We understand Onwuka’s arguments, but they are based on a
fundamental misunderstanding of the applicable standard of review. As we
have explained, courts apply a substantial evidence standard of review in a
petition for writ of mandate challenging a decision of the SPB. (State
Personnel, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 522; Coleman, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1125.)
“On substantial evidence review, we do not ‘weigh the evidence, consider the
credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do v. Regents of

University of California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1492.)13
      In sum, the ALJ was entitled to credit the testimony of E.G. and
Kathy R., and it is not our role to revisit the ALJ’s credibility determinations.
The testimony of E.G. and Kathy R., when credited, provides substantial
evidence for a finding that Onwuka (1) made inappropriate comments to
E.G.; and (2) was untruthful to the Office of Internal Affairs. Those findings
support the CDCR’s determination that Onwuka engaged in inexcusable

13    In contrast, “ ‘[w]hen applying the independent judgment test, the trial
court may reweigh the evidence and substitute its own findings for those of
the [agency], after first giving due respect to the [agency]’s findings.’
[Citation.] This includes examining the credibility of witnesses.” (Alberda v.
Board of Retirement of Fresno County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 426, 433.) We also note that, in any case, a court is required
to give “great weight” to an ALJ’s credibility determinations to the extent
they were, as here, expressly based on “specific evidence of the observed
demeanor, manner, or attitude of the witness.” (Gov. Code, § 11425.50,
subd. (b); see also California Youth Authority v. State Personnel Bd. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 575, 595 [discussing how Gov. Code, § 11425.50, subd. (b)
applies to a court’s review of a decision of the SPB where the SPB rejected the
ALJ’s credibility determinations].)
                                        14
neglect of duty; dishonesty; and other failure of good behavior. (Gov. Code,

§ 19572, subds. (d), (f), (t).)14
C.    Onwuka Sets Forth No Basis to Conclude the Penalty of Dismissal Was
      an Abuse of Discretion
      As we have explained, the SPB’s determination that dismissal is the
proper penalty to impose on Onwuka “ ‘will not be disturbed unless there has
been an abuse of its discretion.’ ” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 217.) In his
appellate briefing, Onwuka sets forth the legal standard for a court’s review
of the SPB’s penalty determination. However, Onwuka includes no
discussion applying those legal standards to the facts of his case to explain
why he believes that the SPB abused its discretion.
      “The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that a judgment is
presumed correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged in its
favor, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of affirmance.” (City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.) “In order to demonstrate
error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent
argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.” (Id. at
pp. 286-287.) “ ‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ”
(Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
199, 204.) “When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the

14    Onwuka develops no argument that the factual allegations against
him, if proven, would fail to satisfy the legal standards for inexcusable
neglect of duty; dishonesty; and other failure of good behavior. (Gov. Code,
§ 19572, subds. (d), (f), (t).) We accordingly limit our analysis to whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s factual findings.
                                       15
point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
1014, 1075.)
      Because Onwuka has failed to present any cogent legal argument
challenging the penalty of dismissal, the issue is forfeited, and we accordingly
do not address it.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                      IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      16