Court Opinion

ID: 9771375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:40:12.577549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.787462
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In preparing the original opinion herein we followed and quoted from an opinion by our Supreme Court wherein that court, in reversing our court held, without any exceptions or limitations, that the denial of a summary judgment is interlocutory in nature and thus unappealable. Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670. In tracing the case just cited *249in Shephard’s Citator we did not find, nor do we now find any record of that case having been overruled. At the time of our original opinion we also were familiar with the Supreme Court’s holding in Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Company, Tex., 302 S.W.2d 938, an appeal from our court where both sides had made motions for summary judgment and wherein the Supreme Court held that no appeal lay from the order of the trial court refusing summary judgment.
Appellant, in its motion for rehearing, has called our attention to the case of Tobin v. Garcia, Tex., 316 S.W.2d 396, 400, wherein the Supreme Court has since held that their opinion in the Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co. case is overruled, yet made no mention of Wright v. Wright, supra, and held that “ * * * when, as in this case, both parties filed motions for summary judgment and one such motion is granted, then the trial court’s judgment becomes final and appealable, and on appeal the Court of Civil Appeals should determine all questions presented.” This latter holding makes that part of our original holding erroneous wherein we held that appellants, having been denied a motion for summary judgment, could not appeal therefrom and necessitates our considering appellant’s appeal from a denial of its motion for summary judgment.
Appellee by sworn allegations pleaded that he was induced to sign the notes in controversy by the fraudulent representations of H. B. Yates to the effect that his signature was desired on the notes purely as a character recommendation for Frances H. Thomas and that he would not be liable for the payment thereof and that if he had not relied thereon and believed such representations to be true he would not have signed said notes.
The 1932 note in controversy has lines designating the capacity in which Frances H. Thomas and her husband Jack E. Thomas signed, the former as “maker” and the latter as “co-maker.” There was no designation on the line with appellee’s signature. On the 1954 note Mrs. Thomas signed on the line designated “maker” and appellee signed on the line designated “comaker.” On the instrument designated “application for loan” the line on the designation “names of co-makers” is blank and Dr. J. Shirley Sweeney’s name appears below upon the line designated “security.” With respect to the first note the instrument designated “application for loan” has the name of Dr. J. Shirley Sweeney following the language “names of co-makers.”
Our Commission of Appeals in an opinion approved by our Supreme Court, has held “It is well recognized or established that there are exceptions to the general rule which exclude parol evidence to explain written instruments, and they apply to negotiable paper as well as to other contracts. When the issue of fraud, surety, ambiguity, or want of consideration is raised, as between the original parties * * * parol testimony is admissible to show the true facts.” McFarland v. Shaw, Tex.Com.App., 45 S.W.2d 193, 195. See also Scott v. Walden, 140 Tex. 31, 165 S.W.2d 449, 452, 154 A.L.R. 1; Guardian Trust Co. v. Bauereisen, 132 Tex. 396, 121 S.W.2d 579, 583; Hansen v. Holland, Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 510 (writ refused); Lone Star Olds Cadillac Co. v. Vinson, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W.2d 673 (writ refused).
When the rules of law in the authorities just cited are applied to the facts of this case, we believe parol evidence is admissible to explain the conditions under which Dr. Sweeney signed the notes and that appellant did not discharge the burden of showing there is no genuine issue of any material fact.
As stated in our original opinion the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits.