Court Opinion

ID: 9573426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:54:59.369468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:54.115193
License: Public Domain

Justice Martin
dissenting.
In a criminal proceeding the “prosecutor may argue the evidence and any inferences to be drawn therefrom.” State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 357, 307 S.E.2d 304, 324 (1983). It is well settled, however, that “[t]he Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial argu*439ments.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 289 n.30 (1987). “Nonderogatory references to race are permissible ... if material to issues in the trial and sufficiently justified to warrant ‘the risks inevitably taken when racial matters are injected into any important decision-making.’ ” State v. Williams, 339 N.C. 1, 24, 452 S.E.2d 245, 259 (1994) (quoting McFarland v. Smith, 611 F.2d 414, 419 (2d Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 833, 133 L. Ed. 2d 61 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Warren, 347 N.C. 309, 320, 492 S.E.2d 609, 615 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1109, 140 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1998).
During closing argument the state argued to the jury: “If, and I hope that is the answer, if twelve people good and true, twelve [w]hite jurors . ...” It is an unremarkable proposition that the state’s reference to “twelve [w]hite jurors” was not relevant to any issue presented by the evidence or any reasonable inference arising therefrom. Indeed, it is difficult to envision a criminal trial in which the jurors’ race would constitute a proper matter for argument. Notably, the state acknowledges in brief that “the reference to race might have turned out to be unnecessary.”
The majority concludes the state’s reference to the jurors’ race does not constitute reversible error yet concedes the racially based line of argument may have been improper. In any event, the majority does not dispute that the trial judge properly sustained defendant’s objection to the state’s racial argument. Further, the majority notes that a curative instruction may have done more harm than good. In such circumstances, this Court cannot reasonably ascertain the extent to which the improper argument inflamed the jury with irrelevant racial considerations. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we should presume the state’s reference to the jurors’ race “so infected the trial with unfairness that it rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.” State v. Robinson, 346 N.C. 586, 607, 488 S.E.2d 174, 187 (1997).
I recognize that plain error analysis does not govern our review of jury arguments. See State v. Davis, 349 N.C. 1, 29, 506 S.E.2d 455, 470 (1998) (plain error review generally limited to jury instructions and evidentiary rulings), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1161, 144 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1999). Nonetheless, the rationale underlying the doctrine in criminal cases generally, correcting errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 80 L. Ed. 555, 557 (1936), applies with great force here. Public confidence in the administration of justice is *440seriously eroded when, as here, irrelevant information about the jurors’ race is introduced during the state’s closing argument.
The jurors’ race was wholly irrelevant to the jury’s consideration of the evidence in reaching a verdict at defendant’s trial. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.