Court Opinion

ID: 9663345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:45.44858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.191567
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
The Nebraska Constitution’s clearly expressed content concerning compulsory educational institutions contradicts any conclusion that Kearney State College, or any state college, must exist or continue to exist after legislative establishment in accordance with the Constitution. Yet, through invocation of principles for construing an ambiguous document, notwithstanding the clarity of the Nebraska Constitution regarding state colleges, this court’s majority has judicially fashioned a provision for mandatory existence of Kearney State College from Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, which provides: “The general government of the state colleges as now existing.. . shall be vested [in the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges].”
*401Recognizing that judicial interpretation or construction of a document may be warranted to reach the meaning of an instrument, we have stated: “Ambiguity exists in an instrument when a word, phrase, or provision in the instrument has, or is susceptible of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.” Knox v. Cook, 233 Neb. 387, 391, 446 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1989). See, also, Dammann v. Litty, 234 Neb. 664, 452 N.W.2d 522 (1990); Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., 229 Neb. 160, 425 N.W.2d 872 (1988); American Sec. Servs. v. Vodra, 222 Neb. 480, 385 N.W.2d 73 (1986).
As will be demonstrated, rather than recourse to principles pertaining to resolution of ambiguity in a document, the majority should have been guided by several fundamental considerations in determining whether a statute withstands a challenge based on the allegation that the Legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority for legislation.
It is axiomatic that the Legislature of this state has vast authority and is limited only by the Nebraska and U.S. Constitutions. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 217 Neb. 682, 353 N.W.2d 267 (1984); Lenstrom v. Thone, 209 Neb. 783, 311 N.W.2d 884 (1981). The Nebraska Constitution is, generally, a limitation on legislative power, not a grant of power to the Legislature. State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, supra. Thus, “the Legislature may legislate upon any subject not inhibited by the Constitution.” Lenstrom v. Thone, supra at 789, 311 N.W.2d at 888. See, also, State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, supra at 688, 353 N.W.2d at 271: “ ‘Implied restrictions on the legislative power are not to be inferred unless the restriction is one that is clearly implied.’ ” Hence, a court may declare a statute unconstitutional only when the statute is genuinely repugnant to a controlling constitutional provision.
The Nebraska Constitution does not expressly prohibit the Legislature from enacting a law which changes a state educational institution’s classification from a college to a university. Nevertheless, the majority apparently finds that such restriction on legislative power is implicit in Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, because Kearney State College, formerly a normal school, was one of the educational institutions “now *402existing” when the citizens of Nebraska adopted the amendment to Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, in 1920. While the educational institution at Kearney is unquestionably a state college within Neb. Const. art VII, § 13, the conclusion that a state college must exist until abolition by future constitutional amendment is a quantum leap from mere mention about governance of state colleges in article VII, § 13, of this state’s Constitution. To illustrate, suppose the Legislature passed legislation to establish a fifth state college, that is, a new state college in addition to the four current state colleges. The fifth state college would be governed by the Board of Trustees because the new state college is included within the constitutional language “the state colleges as now existing, and such other state colleges as may be established by law ...” However, according to the majority, the illustrative new or fifth state college, as a product of legitimate legislative power, would be endowed with constitutionally required and protected existence because the college had been “established by law.” As a constitutionally questionable consequence of the majority’s view of existence for a state college, the Legislature may properly give, but never take away.
All hypotheticals aside, it is obvious that existence of any state educational institution in Nebraska, with the exception of elementary and secondary schools, is not constitutionally mandated, an inescapable conclusion drawn from Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1:
The Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of this state of all persons between the ages of five and twenty-one years. The Legislature may provide for the education of other persons in educational institutions owned and controlled by the state or a political subdivision thereof.
By the word “shall” in Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1, the Legislature is required to establish common schools. A common school is “a free public school now usu. including primary and secondary grades.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 459 (1981). Cf. State, ex rel. Baldwin, v. Dorsey, 108 Neb. 134, 187 N.W. 879 (1922). The word “may” in Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1, allows, but does *403not compel, the Legislature to establish other educational institutions beyond the common schools, such as colleges and universities. The Legislature’s discretionary power to create necessarily and correspondingly includes the discretionary power to amend, repeal, or abolish. As expressed in Schumacher v. Rausch, 190 Kan. 239, 244, 372 P.2d 1005, 1010 (1962): “Generally speaking, that which is purely a creature of the legislature is subject not only to the legislative power to create, but also to the legislative power to modify, dissolve or abolish.” See, also, Miller v. Jones, 658 S.W.2d 888 (Ky. App. 1983); Wencke v. City of Indianapolis, 429 N.E.2d 295 (Ind. App. 1981); Martin v. State Liq. Auth., 43 Misc. 2d 682, 252 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1964); State ex rel. Bergin v. Washburn, 224 Minn. 269, 28 N.W.2d 652 (1947). Cf. State v. Houston, 94 Neb. 445, 452, 143 N.W. 796, 799 (1913): “[A]n office created by the legislature may be abolished by that body.” Thus, it is clear that the Nebraska Constitution does not mandate existence of Kearney State College, although existence of a state college may result from a discretionary exercise of legislative power. Pursuant to Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, governance of the state colleges, whatever those institutions may be legislatively designated or denominated, must repose in the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges. However, L.B. 247 does not alter any aspect of the general governance of the state colleges. Nevertheless, without any explicit constitutional basis and, more importantly, contrary to Neb. Const. art. VII, § 1, this court’s majority has decided that the Nebraska Constitution, in its present form, demands existence of state colleges.
Although judicial decisions in other jurisdictions usually supply little assistance to ascertain the meaning of a particular provision in the Nebraska Constitution, Kanaly v. State By and Through Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819 (S.D. 1985), is instructive in view of the substantial similarity of facts and provisions in the South Dakota Constitution. In Kanaly, South Dakota’s Legislature enacted legislation which authorized closing the University of South Dakota at Springfield (USD/S), transferring control of the school’s facilities to the Board of Charities and Corrections, and establishing a minimum security *404prison at Springfield in place of the previous educational facility. The plaintiffs, who were South Dakota taxpayers, argued that Senate Bill 221 “violated Article XIV, § 3, of the South Dakota Constitution by transferring control of USD/S from the Board of Regents to the Board of Charities and Corrections.” 368 N.W.2d at 822. South Dakota’s Constitution, article XIV, § 3, which established the governing board for certain educational institutions in South Dakota, provided:
The state university, the agricultural college, the school of mines and technology, the normal schools, a school for the deaf, a school for the blind, and all other educational institutions that may be sustained either wholly or in part by the state shall be under the control of a board of five members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the senate under such rules and restrictions as the Legislature shall provide. The Legislature may increase the number of members to nine.
Thus, S.D. Const. art. XIV, § 3, is similar to Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, in two important respects: (1) both state constitutions allowed the legislature to determine the duties and powers of the governing board of a state educational institution, and (2) although both constitutional provisions for governance refer to a number of educational institutions, neither provision expressly states that a particular institution must exist.
In response to the plaintiffs’ contention in Kanaly, the Supreme Court of South Dakota stated:
This Court has interpreted [S.D. Const. art. XIV, § 3] as creating a constitutional “administrative body charged with the control of all institutions of higher learning ....” ... It does not, however, “establish the Regents as a fourth branch of government independent of any legislative policies.” . . . The Regents’ control is subject to constitutionally authorized legislative “rules and restrictions.” ... These legislative “rules and restrictions,” however, “must stop short of removing all power.” ...
Although the Board of Regents’ control over some aspects of South Dakota educational institutions has been described as “vast and subject to little, if any, control” ... *405the Regents’ control does not include the power of the purse . . . does not include the power to change the character of the institutions ... does not include the power to create or establish schools .. . and does not include the power to determine the educational policy of this state ... . The legislature has the power to create schools, to fund them as it has the power of the purse, and to establish state educational policy and this necessarily includes the power to close a school if efficiency and economy so direct. It is a legislative rule or restriction of the Regents’ control and does not go so far as to remove all power because the Regents maintain their right of basic control over all other educational institutions. As stated above, an institution of higher education is not required by the constitution ... to exist in Springfield.
(Citations omitted.) 368 N.W.2d at 825-26.
Board of Reg., Okl. A.&M. Col. v. Oklahoma State Reg., 497 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1972), supplies additional guidance for a decision in the present case. The Oklahoma Legislature enacted legislation which changed Murray State College of Agriculture and Applied Science, formerly governed by the Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, to Murray State College of Technology, which, pursuant to the questioned legislation, was governed by a newly established Board of Regents of Murray State College of Technology. The plaintiff contended that the legislation contravened Okla. Const. art. VI, § 31a, which established a “Board of Regents for the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College and all Agricultural and Mechanical Schools and Colleges maintained in whole or in part by the State” and argued that
the above Constitutional provision requires that Murray State College be governed by [the Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges]; that the College has always been and continues to be an Agricultural and Mechanical College within the meaning of the Constitution, notwithstanding Senate Bill 214; and that the Legislature does not have the Constitutional authority to create a new governing board for the College.
497 P.2d at 1065. The plaintiff’s argument in Board of Reg. is *406nearly identical to the Attorney General’s argument in the present case before this court, except in the present case the new governing board for the educational institution at Kearney already exists, whereas the governing board in the Oklahoma case was created by the questioned legislation. In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma stated:
There is no language in § 31a, expressing an intent that all Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges which were under the management and control of the State Board of Agriculture when § 31a was adopted, shall be under and must continue to be under the management and control of the Board of Regents for the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges. . . . We agree with plaintiff that the Legislature may not constitutionally remove the management and control of a School or College that comes within the meaning of § 31a, from the Board of Regents named therein and place its management and control in another Board. However, if the intent of § 31a, was to “freeze-in” such Schools and Colleges to be under the Board of Regents created therein, although such Schools and Colleges at some future date may not fall within the meaning of an Agricultural and Mechanical School or College, language would have been employed expressing such an intent.
497 P.2d at 1066-67. Similarly, if Kearney State exists as a state college, then the Board of Trustees of the Nebraska State Colleges must govern the college. However, there is no language in Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, that requires that Kearney State shall remain a state college or that the school must exist in any particular form at all.
Consistent with the analysis of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma are this court’s expressions that “[c]ourts must apply and must enforce the Constitution as it is written ... and constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course” and that “[b]efore construing a constitutional provision, it must be demonstrated that its meaning is not clear and that construction is necessary.” State ex rel. Spire v. Public Emp. Ret. Bd., 226 Neb. 176, 178, 410 N.W.2d 463,465 (1987).
As parts of a plán for state education, Neb. Const. art. VII, *407§ 1, pertaining to common schools which must exist in response to the state Constitution’s mandate, is unequivocally compatible with Neb. Const. art. VII, § 13, regarding governance of a state college which, by appropriate legislative choice, may exist or not exist. Consequently, the Nebraska Constitution clearly does not require the existence of a state college at Kearney and, as unambiguously expressed in Neb. Const: art. VII, § 1, leaves existence of all educational institutions beyond common schools to the Legislature’s discretion. For that reason, it is both unnecessary and improper to explore the framers’ intent in the Nebraska Constitution. Regarding the case now before this court, the language used by the framers of the Constitution speaks for itself: If a state college exists, general government of the state college lies with the constitutionally designated Board of Trustees, but the Nebraska Constitution requires only the existence of common schools and does not require existence of any educational institution beyond common schools. See Neb. Const. art. VII, §§ 1 and 13.
In the absence of a constitutional obligation imposed by the people of Nebraska, requiring the Legislature to continue existence of a state college as an educational institution, the very same people of Nebraska, through their elected representatives exercising legitimately unrestricted legislative power, may appropriately terminate an educational institution which has heretofore existed solely at the discretion of the Legislature. Hence, §§ 6 to 11 of L.B. 247 are constitutional as a proper exercise of legislative power in the State of Nebraska.
White, J., joins in this dissent.