Court Opinion

ID: 9940581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:13:04.532781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:02.637550
License: Public Domain

J-S03011-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JOHN HOLLIS REYNOLDS 4TH                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 566 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 16, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-01-CR-0000056-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2024

       Appellant, John Hollis Reynolds, IV, appeals from the February 16, 2023

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County,

following his non-jury trial conviction for several driving under the influence

(“DUI”) offenses and two motor vehicle summary offenses, as more fully

discussed herein.         Counsel for Appellant, Jamison Entwistle, Esquire

(“Attorney Entwistle”) filed an Anders brief1 and a petition to withdraw as

counsel.    We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant the petition to

withdraw.

____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also Commonwealth v.

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434
A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981).
J-S03011-24

      The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this

case as follows:

      [Immediately] before [the start of Appellant’s] bench trial on July
      26, 2022, Appellant petitioned the [trial] court to discharge his
      [trial] counsel. Appellant did not like the advice [trial] counsel
      had given him concerning his plea or his desire to testify.
      Additionally, Appellant claimed that [trial] counsel had not
      requested evidence Appellant thought important for his defense.
      Specifically, Appellant wanted to subpoena [a motor vehicle
      recording (“MVR”)] that he thought would show [that a] police
      [officer returned] Appellant [to his vehicle] after he had been
      taken to the hospital [for a blood draw]. However, the only MVR
      of the incident ended at the hospital and did not show anything
      that happened afterwards. [Trial] counsel explained that the
      issues Appellant wanted to raise were without merit or were not
      relevant.    Appellant stated, "I'm not comfortable with [trial
      counsel]. I do not believe he has my best interest at heart." The
      [trial] court explained to Appellant that he could either proceed
      pro se or with [current trial] counsel, but new counsel would not
      be provided for trial. After Appellant stated that he did not know
      enough to represent himself, the [trial] court told Appellant that
      [current trial] counsel would continue to represent him.

      At the bench trial, the following facts were revealed. On October
      5, 2021, Appellant was in Adams County, [Pennsylvania,] driving
      southbound on [United States] Route 15 at approximately
      12:46 p.m. when Pennsylvania State Trooper Matthew Duncan
      [(“Trooper Duncan”)] observed that [the] passenger [side] brake
      light [on Appellant’s vehicle] was inoperable[,] and Appellant was
      exceeding the posted speed of 65 miles per hour (“mph”).
      Trooper Duncan paced Appellant's [vehicle] for three-tenths of a
      mile. Trooper Duncan was driving [his police cruiser at] 80 [mph],
      and Appellant was gaining distance in front of [the police cruiser].
      At that time, Trooper Duncan activated his [police cruiser] lights
      and pulled Appellant over.

      Trooper Duncan had undergone standardized training to detect
      individuals who were under the influence of controlled substances
      and Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement
      ("ARIDE")[] training which teaches officers to detect impairment
      from [controlled substances] rather than just alcohol.

                                     -2-
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     When Trooper Duncan spoke with Appellant, he noticed loose
     green particles of leaf marijuana, [i.e.,] marijuana shake, on
     Appellant's lap and chest. He also detected an odor of burnt
     marijuana. Trooper Duncan [] observed that Appellant had
     bloodshot eyes. Based on these observations, Trooper Duncan
     asked Appellant whether he [] recently ingested or was currently
     ingesting marijuana. Appellant responded that he [] ingested
     marijuana prior to driving. Appellant also gave Trooper Duncan a
     clear ziploc bag of leaf marijuana when Trooper Duncan asked
     whether there was any marijuana in [Appellant’s vehicle].

     Trooper Duncan then asked Appellant to exit the vehicle to
     perform standard field sobriety tests. Appellant was initially
     unable to maintain his balance. He also did not take the right
     number of steps during the walk-and-turn [test] before he turned.
     During the one-leg test, where a person stands on one leg,
     Appellant used his arms for balance and swayed. During the
     modified Romberg test, a person should be able to follow a
     stimulus with their eyes, but Appellant could not follow the
     stimulus equally with both eyes. Additionally, Trooper Duncan
     noticed Appellant's eyes involuntarily jerked when Appellant had
     his eyes closed, which happens when a stimulant or narcotic
     impairs the nervous system.

     After the field [sobriety] tests were conducted, Trooper Duncan
     did not think Appellant could safely operate a vehicle and believed
     that Appellant was under the influence of a controlled substance
     that impaired his ability to drive safely. Trooper Duncan then
     placed Appellant under arrest and took him to [a hospital], where
     Appellant submitted to a blood [draw]. Appellant's blood [sample]
     was then sealed and packed for transport and sent to [a
     laboratory] for forensic testing.

     Dr. Stephanie Marco works at [the laboratory] and analyzed
     Appellant's blood [sample]. Appellant's blood [sample contained
     the presence of] marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance,
     active metabolites of marijuana, and a metabolite of cocaine, a
     Schedule II controlled substance.

     [At trial,] the [trial] court explained to Appellant that he had the
     right to remain silent and that if he chose not to testify [at trial,]
     no negative inferences could be drawn about his guilt or
     innocence. Appellant had the opportunity to speak with [trial]
     counsel regarding the decision to testify. Appellant chose to
     [testify].

                                     -3-
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      Appellant was asked what he would like to share with the [trial]
      court about the incident in question. Appellant disclosed that he
      is an everyday marijuana user and used it to self-medicate,
      despite having no official prescription. Appellant admitted that he
      did not know exactly what substance he [] purchased in [the state
      of] New York and [] smoked the night before he was arrested.
      Appellant testified that he was not aware that under Pennsylvania
      law metabolites in the blood were sufficient to prove [DUI] and[,]
      if he had known[,] he would not have consented to a blood draw.

      During cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked Appellant
      when he last used cocaine. [Trial] counsel objected that the
      question was outside the scope of Appellant's testimony on direct
      and advised Appellant not to answer the question. However, the
      Commonwealth's expert [] already testified to the presence of
      cocaine metabolites in Appellant's blood and the laboratory test
      results confirming the presence of cocaine metabolites in his blood
      had been admitted. The Commonwealth argued that the question
      went toward an element of the crime charged[,] and Appellant
      had already spoken about his marijuana use. As [Appellant] was
      subject to cross[-]examination, the Commonwealth could fairly
      question [Appellant] about his marijuana use and other
      substances in his blood. The [trial] court overruled the objection.
      Appellant then testified that the night before, in New York, he had
      been in a room with people who were smoking cocaine. Although
      Appellant said that he did not personally partake [in smoking
      cocaine], he theorized that the [blood] test results showing [the
      presence of] cocaine were based on his second-hand inhalation of
      the smoke. Appellant also admitted to using marijuana the night
      before he was arrested.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/23, at 1-4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

      At the conclusion of the non-jury trial, the trial court convicted Appellant

of   DUI – Schedule    I   controlled    substance   (marijuana)    (Count    1);

DUI – metabolite of Schedule I controlled substance (marijuana) (Count 3);

DUI – under the influence of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which

impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive (Count 4); maximum speed

                                        -4-
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limits – 65 mph, a summary offense (Count 6); and general lighting

requirements – rear lighting, a summary offense (Count 7).2

       On February 16, 2023, Appellant was sentenced as follows: On Count 1,

Appellant was sentenced to time-served to 6 months’ incarceration with credit

given for the periods of February 24, 2022, to February 28, 2022, and January

18, 2023, to February 16, 2023.3 The trial court ordered Appellant be released

on parole upon approval of a house plan.         Appellant was also ordered to

undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with any recommended

treatment, complete alcohol safe driving school, pay a fine of $1,000.00, and

pay the costs of prosecution in the amount of $2,558.21. On Count 6, the

trial court ordered Appellant to pay a fine of $72.50 and the costs of

prosecution. On Count 7, the trial court ordered Appellant to pay a fine of

$25.00 and the costs of prosecution. See Sentencing Order, 2/16/23.

       On March 27, 2023, the trial court granted trial counsel’s motion to

withdraw from his representation of Appellant. That same day, Appellant filed

pro se a petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

____________________________________________

2 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(iii), 3802(d)(2), 3362(a)(1.1),
and 4303(b), respectively.

Appellant was also charged with DUI – Schedule II controlled substance
(cocaine) (Count 2), and possession of a small amount of marijuana for
personal use. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(ii) and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i),
respectively. Prior to the start of trial, the Commonwealth withdrew Counts 2
and 5. N.T., 7/26/22, at 6, 9

3 For the purpose of sentencing, Counts 3 and 4 merged with Count 1.

                                           -5-
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Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.4          Appellant also filed pro se a motion for the

appointment of new counsel for the purpose of pursuing a direct appeal on

March 27, 2023.5

       On March 30, 2023, the trial court reinstated Appellant’s right to file a

direct appeal and appointed Attorney Entwistle to represent Appellant. Trial

Court Order, 3/30/23. On April 10, 2023, Appellant filed a counseled notice

of appeal with this Court. On April 19, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant

to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).           Trial Court Order,

4/19/23.

       In pro se correspondence directed to the trial court on May 8, 2023,

Appellant requested the appointment of new counsel. Pro Se Letter, 5/8/23.

____________________________________________

4 Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition was timestamped as having been received

by the PCRA court on March 29, 2023. The envelope that Appellant used to
mail his petition does not reveal a postage cancellation stamp. A review of
Appellant’s petition, however, reveals that Appellant included a proposed trial
court order that was dated March 27, 2023. Pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox
rule,” we deem Appellant’s PCRA petition as filed on March 27, 2023. See
Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa. 1997) (explaining that,
pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” a document is deemed filed on the
date an inmate deposits the mailing with prison authorities or placed it in the
prison mailbox).

5 Appellant’s motion for the appointment of new counsel was timestamped as

having been received by the trial court on March 29, 2023. The envelope that
Appellant used to mail his motion, however, bears a postage cancellation
stamp dated March 27, 2023. Pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” we
deem Appellant’s motion for the appointment of new counsel as filed on March
27, 2023. See Jones, 700 A.2d at 426.

                                           -6-
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Appellant asserted that Attorney Entwistle maintained a conflict of interest

due to his law firm’s “partnership” with the public defender’s office for Adams

County. Id. Appellant further claimed that Attorney Entwistle was ineffective

in advising Appellant on his now-simultaneous pursuit of both a direct appeal

and a petition seeking collateral relief.        Id.   Appellant explained that he

instructed Attorney Entwistle to pursue the PCRA petition. Id. at ¶3.

       That same day, May 8, 2023, the trial court denied Appellant’s request

for the appointment of new counsel. Trial Court Order, 5/8/23. In its order,

the trial court explained that “[Appellant] legally may not pursue both a direct

appeal from his conviction and PCRA actions simultaneously.                 Given

[Appellant’s] previous pro se filings of both a direct appeal and a PCRA

matter[, Attorney Entwistle’s] advice that [Appellant] must [choose] which

course of action he wishe[d] to pursue at this time [was] entirely correct.”

Id.

       On May 10, 2023, Attorney Entwistle filed a motion, with this Court, to

withdraw from representation of Appellant. Motion to Withdraw, 5/10/23. In

a May 12, 2023 per curiam order, this Court remanded the case to the trial

court for a Grazier hearing6 to determine whether Appellant wished to

proceed pro se or continue to be represented by current counsel.7 Per Curiam
____________________________________________

6 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

7 Meanwhile, pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” (see Jones, supra), on

May 11, 2023, Appellant filed pro se with this Court (1) a motion for an

                                           -7-
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Order, 5/12/23. In the interim, the trial court, on May 10, 2023, scheduled a

hearing on Attorney Entwistle’s motion to withdraw for May 18, 2023. Trial

Court Order, 5/10/23. On May 23, 2023, the trial court, having conducted a

hearing on May 18, 2023, granted Appellant’s request to withdraw his pro se

PCRA petition and to proceed solely with his direct appeal.8 Trial Court Order,

5/23/23. Thereafter, Appellant’s counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement, and

the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on June 19, 2023.

       Preliminarily, we must address Attorney Entwistle’s petition to withdraw

and the accompanying Anders brief, both alleging this appeal is without

merit. Anders Brief at 26. “When presented with an Anders brief, this Court

may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on

____________________________________________

extension of time to resolve the matter of the pending PCRA petition and the
direct appeal; (2) a motion for the appointment of new counsel; and (3) a
motion to withdraw his direct appeal without prejudice to allow him to pursue
his petition for collateral relief. In a July 26, 2023 per curiam order, this Court
directed the prothonotary of this Court to forward copies of Appellant’s
aforementioned motions to Appellant’s counsel of record. Per Curiam Order,
7/26/23.

8 In its May 23, 2023 order, the trial court stated,

       As indicated, both a direct appeal from his sentence imposed [on]
       February 16, 2023[,] and a pro se PCRA petition are pending. As
       the PCRA petition is untimely due to the pending direct appeal,
       after consultation with appointed counsel and following a lengthy
       on-the-record colloquy, [Appellant] moved to withdraw the PCRA
       petition. That request is granted. The PCRA petition is withdrawn.
       [Appellant] may proceed with his direct appeal.

Trial Court Order, 5/23/23.

                                           -8-
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the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593

(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).     In order to withdraw pursuant to

Anders, “counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established

by our Supreme Court in [Santiago, supra].” Commonwealth v. Harden,

103 A.3d 107, 110 (Pa. Super. 2014) (parallel citation omitted). Specifically,

counsel’s Anders brief must comply with the following requisites:

      (1)   provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
            citations to the record;

      (2)   refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
            arguably supports the appeal;

      (3)   set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
            and

      (4)   state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
            frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
            record, controlling case law, [and] statutes on point that
            have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id. (citation omitted).

      Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super.

2005), and its progeny, “[c]ounsel also must provide a copy of the Anders

brief to his [or her] client.” Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880

(Pa. Super. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The brief

must be accompanied by a letter that advises the client of the option to “(1)

retain new counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3)

raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention in

addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”      Id.    “Once

counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this Court’s duty to

                                    -9-
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conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and render an

independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous.”

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       Instantly, Attorney Entwistle satisfied the technical requirements of

Anders and Santiago. In his Anders brief, counsel identified the pertinent

factual and procedural history and made citation to the record. Counsel raises

three issues challenging Appellant’s judgment of sentence that could arguably

support an appeal, but ultimately, counsel concludes the appeal is wholly

frivolous. See Anders Brief at 26. Counsel also attached to his petition a

letter to Appellant that fulfills the notice requirements of Millisock. Appellant

has not filed a response to counsel’s letter, the Anders brief, or the petition

to withdraw.9 Accordingly, we proceed to conduct an independent review of

the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.
____________________________________________

9  Pursuant to the “prisoner mailbox rule,” (see Jones, supra), on January
27, 2024, Appellant filed pro se with this Court a letter in which he states that
Attorney Entwistle “was never authorized or directed to” file a notice of direct
appeal but, rather, was “repeatedly directed to file” a PCRA petition. Pro Se
Letter, 1/27/24. In his correspondence, Appellant requests this Court permit
Appellant to withdraw his direct appeal without prejudice in order that he may
first pursue collateral relief. Id. Upon review, we do not find Appellant’s
correspondence to be a response to Attorney Entwistle’s letter, the Anders
brief, or the petition to withdraw.

Once Appellant has exhausted his direct appeal rights and his judgment of
sentence becomes final, Appellant will have one year from the date his
judgment of sentence becomes final to present a timely PCRA petition. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). As such, we will take no further action on

                                          - 10 -
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         In the Anders brief, counsel raises the following issues for our review:

         [1.]   [Whether] the trial court abused its discretion or committed
                an error of law in refusing [Appellant’s] oral motion prior to
                trial for the appointment of alternative counsel when
                [Appellant] cited a breakdown in the attorney-client
                relationship to such a degree that trial counsel could not
                effectively represent [Appellant?]

         [2.]   [Whether] the trial court abused its discretion or committed
                an error of law in overruling [trial] counsel's objection to
                testimony which was beyond the scope of [Appellant’s]
                direct examination resulting in incriminating testimony (see
                [N.T., 7/26/22, at] 56-57)[?]

         [3.]   [Whether] the trial court abused its discretion or committed
                an error of law when it found [Appellant] guilty of [DUI]
                pursuant     to     75    Pa.C.S.A.     [§§ ]3802(d)[(1)](i),
                [3082](d)[(1)](iii), and (d)(2) [on the grounds] the verdict
                was against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence[?]

Anders Brief at 15-16 (extraneous capitalization omitted).10

         The first issue presented in the Anders brief challenges the trial court’s

denial of Appellant’s oral request, prior to the start of trial, for the appointment

of new counsel on the ground that there was a breakdown in the

attorney-client relationship.       Anders Brief at 34-38.     Counsel asserts, on

behalf of Appellant, that arguably, the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

request for the appointment of new counsel but, ultimately, counsel concludes

____________________________________________

Appellant’s pro se correspondence other than to direct the prothonotary of his
Court to forward a copy of the correspondence to Appellant’s counsel of
record.

10 For ease of review, we have reorganized the issues presented in the Anders

brief.

                                          - 11 -
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that this issue is frivolous. Id. As counsel explains, Appellant sought new

trial counsel because his then-current trial counsel refused to obtain

exculpatory evidence, namely MVR evidence or dispatch/global positioning

system records for Trooper Duncan’s police cruiser from the evening of the

incident, that Appellant maintained would demonstrate Trooper Duncan

returned Appellant to his vehicle after the blood draw at the hospital. Id. at

36-37. Counsel stated that if such evidence did exist, and was presented at

trial, it would have arguably demonstrated “some merit related to whether or

not [Trooper Duncan] believed Appellant was impaired to a degree he could

not safely operate a motor vehicle.” Id. at 37.

      It is well-established that “[a]lthough the right to counsel is absolute,

there is no absolute right to a particular counsel.” Commonwealth v. Tyler,

360 A.2d 617, 619 (Pa. 1976) (stating, “an indigent [defendant] is entitled to

[appointed (free)] counsel but not entitled to [appointed] counsel of his[, or

her,] choice” (emphasis in original)). We review the denial of a request for

the appointment of new counsel for an abuse of discretion, as the decision

whether to deny, or grant, such a request rests within the sound discretion of

the trial court. Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 617 (Pa. 2009).

      Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 122(C), “[a]

motion for change of counsel by a defendant for whom counsel has been

appointed shall not be granted except for substantial reasons.” Pa.R.Crim.P.

122(C).   Case law has established that      “substantial reasons” require the

defendant to demonstrate that he or she has an “irreconcilable difference”

                                    - 12 -
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with counsel that precludes counsel from representing the defendant. See

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 134 (Pa. 2008); see also Tyler,

360 A.2d at 619; Commonwealth v. Spotz, 756 A.2d 1139, 1150 (Pa.

2000); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 287 A.3d 869, 2022 WL 9663426, at

*7 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 17, 2022) (unpublished memorandum), appeal

denied, 296 A.3d 561 (Pa. 2023).

      In denying Appellant’s request for the appointment of new counsel, the

trial court stated,

      In this case, Appellant did not like the advice appointed [trial]
      counsel gave him regarding whether he should plead guilty or
      testify. Appellant also did not think that [trial] counsel was
      gathering evidence that Appellant wanted to present. Specifically,
      Appellant wanted to show MVR evidence that Trooper Duncan
      [returned] him [to] his [vehicle] after Appellant was taken to the
      hospital. However, the MVR ends at the hospital where Appellant
      was waiting to get his blood drawn and there is no MVR of what
      happened after the hospital. [Trial] counsel also explained to
      Appellant that several issues Appellant wanted to raise were
      irrelevant, and Appellant did not agree with that assessment.
      Appellant stated, "I'm not comfortable with him. I do not believe
      he has my best interest at heart."

      Although Appellant was clearly dissatisfied with appointed [trial]
      counsel, his words do not show that he had "irreconcilable
      differences" with counsel. Rather, they only convey a "mere
      dissatisfaction." Appellant had a different, albeit futile, trial
      strategy where he wanted to pursue evidence that either did not
      exist or was not relevant. He lacked confidence in [trial] counsel's
      ability, but that is not sufficient to rise to the level of
      "irreconcilable differences." In [the trial] court's experience,
      [trial] counsel is experienced and thorough.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/23, at 10 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

                                     - 13 -
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      A review of the record demonstrates the following exchange prior to the

start of Appellant’s trial,

      [Trial Court:]      All right. [Appellant], what is the issue with the
                          representation here?

      [Appellant:]        Borderline having an anxiety attack.

      [Trial Court:]      Pardon me?

      [Appellant:]        I’m just starting[ - ]just having a borderline
                          anxiety attack.

      [Trial Court:]      So you want to discharge your attorney[?]

      [Appellant:]        Yes. I do[,] on the grounds that I have been
                          speaking to [trial counsel] for two months about
                          evidence that I would like to subpoena for
                          myself on my behalf for my defense[,] and I
                          have not had any opportunities to [do so]. I've
                          got [electronic mail (“e-mail”)] after e-mail after
                          e-mail. [Trial counsel] will not articulate a
                          defense for me. He told me to plea[d] guilty or
                          testify. Neither of which I talked [about with
                          him]. He did not help me to prepare for [my]
                          defense at all.

      [Trial Court:]      This is a first offense DUI on a bench trial. You
                          said you wish to subpoena witnesses on your
                          behalf?

      [Appellant:]        No, evidence from the same incident. I was
                          dropped back off at [my] vehicle with my keys.
                          There was questionable - [a] list of issues I can
                          give you the e-mails to -

      [Trial Court:]      That can all be presented at trial if it's relevant
                          to -

      [Appellant:]        Yes, that's -

      [Trial Court:]      - the elements of the offense.

      [Appellant:]        That's what I’m seeking, yes, and I have not
                          been allowed to have any assistance or, what's

                                          - 14 -
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                        the word, cooperation from my attorney with
                        this.

     [Trial Court:      Trial counsel], do you know any of these issues
                        with regard to subpoenaing evidence?

     [Trial Counsel:]   Yes, Your Honor.       [Appellant] brought up
                        several issues with me over the last several
                        months. I have vetted these issues with him.
                        They are without merit. I have not moved
                        forward on those issues, as the [trial] court []
                        indicated, based on the lack of relevance to the
                        issues involved today.

                        I have been trying to work with [Appellant] to
                        prepare for today. I’ve inquired about whether
                        he intends to testify. He's refused to answer
                        those questions and [to] work with me on those
                        issues because we seemed to have reached a
                        middle ground where we just can’t resolve our
                        issues when he's bringing forward issues that I
                        can't bring forward to the [trial] court because
                        of the relevance.

     [Trial Court:]     All right.

     [Appellant:]       I have something to say to that if I have an
                        opportunity.

     [Trial Court:]     Pardon me?

     [Appellant:]       I have something to say to that if I have an
                        opportunity.

     [Trial Court:]     Go ahead.

     [Appellant:]       I think the credibility of the witness’s report is
                        very relevant. I also think the grounds of the
                        blood draw are very relevant and there's
                        much - there's - I was dropped back off at [my
                        vehicle] with the keys and allowed to drive
                        home.      I was clearly not suspected of
                        intoxication if I was allowed to do that.

                        Just several things that [have] happened in the
                        case which kind of show that this case was put
                        together with an instruction to come around to

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                      fit the charge, the possession of marijuana
                      charge and the possession of a small amount [of
                      marijuana charge.]

     ...

     [Trial Court:]   Again, those are all issues that I can[,] well[,]
                      entertain at trial through evidentiary testimony,
                      whether it's you or it's cross-examination of
                      other witnesses, but I don't see any grounds
                      based on that to [do] what you're suggesting
                      right now[,] to discharge counsel, especially if
                      we're ready for trial right now.

     [Appellant:]     Well, my grounds are as that you even as the
                      Judge found irrelevant to be examined during
                      trial[,] and I have had no time to prepare with
                      my attorney to -

     [Trial Court:]   You've had adequate time. This case was - you
                      were transported - there was a transport order
                      back in February [2023, a] bench warrant
                      [issued on] February 28[, 2023,] arraignment
                      [was on] March 21[, 2023,] a plea day [was set
                      for] May 16[, 2023, and now we're here on July
                      26[, 2023,] for a bench trial and there's been
                      more than enough time. So, again, I'm going
                      to deny your motion to discharge the attorney.

     [Appellant:]     I'm not being represented by this attorney. I
                      fire him. I'm not going to be represented -

     [Trial Court:]   You want to represent yourself in this case?

     [Appellant:]     I'm not prepared.

     [Trial Court:]   Well, you have those two choices. You have
                      [trial counsel] represent you and he's prepared
                      and he's well-experienced. He appears in court
                      all the time on these types of cases[,] or you
                      can represent yourself, but it's today. You've
                      had more than enough time. We have a roomful
                      of witnesses and parties here to proceed to trial.
                      Today's your trial.

     [Appellant:]     If there was more evidence that I was trying to
                      subpoena on my behalf and I have not been -

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     [Trial Court:]   I have yet to hear about any evidence that you
                      think you need to subpoena.

     [Appellant:]     There's a video of [Trooper Duncan] pulling me
                      off to the side of the highway and getting my
                      keys in my [vehicle] to leave after the blood
                      draw.

     [Trial Court:]   Again, that's testamentary. I don't know if
                      there's an MVR in the case or not.

     [Appellant:]     There's not. There's not a video of that and
                      wasn't provided. That's what I'm seeking. I
                      have a date and a time. I just need the -

     [Trial Court:    Appellant], if there's not a video, it's not going
                      to be provided to you then, is it?

     [Appellant:]     I can subpoena one, because -

     [Trial Court:]   No, you can't if it doesn't exist, sir.

     [Appellant:]     I have a date and a time I'm requesting.

     [Trial Court:]   You want to represent yourself today and you
                      think you know enough to do so?

     [Appellant:]     I don't think I know enough to do so.

     [Trial Court:    Trial counsel] is representing you. We're going
                      to have a trial. You can have a seat, sir.

     [Appellant:]     I decline to be represented by him.

     [Trial Court:]   You don't have that choice.

     [Appellant:]     Then –

     [Trial Court:]   You just stated you do not know enough to
                      represent yourself so, therefore, I cannot legally
                      allow you to proceed pro se as your own
                      attorney.

     [Appellant:]     I'm firing [trial counsel]. I'm not comfortable
                      with him. I do not believe he has my best
                      interest at heart. I'm not gonna testify.

     [Trial Court:]   You don't have to testify.      That's your right.
                      Have a seat, sir.

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                            First witness.

N.T., 7/26/22, at 3-9.

       In the case sub judice, trial counsel was appointed to represent

Appellant and, while Appellant has the right to counsel, he does not have the

right to “fire” court-appointed counsel and secure new representation without

substantial reasons. In seeking court approval for the appointment of new

counsel,    Appellant     failed    to    demonstrate        “substantial   reasons”    or

“irreconcilable differences” that precluded trial counsel from representing him.

Rather, Appellant displayed mere dissatisfaction with trial counsel because,

according to Appellant, trial counsel failed to obtain certain MVR evidence that

Appellant believed existed and would exonerate him. Trial counsel, fully aware

of Appellant’s belief that such evidence existed and his desire to obtain such

evidence, did not believe that the evidence, in fact, existed and did not feel,

even if it did exist, that it was relevant to the issues at hand. At the time of

Appellant’s request for new counsel, trial counsel was prepared to proceed to

trial. Moreover, at trial, trial counsel elicited testimony from Appellant that he

was returned to his vehicle after the blood draw and that he recovered his

vehicle    keys   from    Trooper        Duncan,    which,    according     to   Appellant,

demonstrated that Trooper Duncan did not believe Appellant to be impaired

at that time such that he could not operate his vehicle.11 See N.T., 7/26/23,
____________________________________________

11 In response to trial counsel’s inquiry, Appellant stated,

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____________________________________________

       The fact that I would like to present and have looked at is that
       after the traffic stop, after the blood draw, I was dropped [] off at
       my vehicle and handed the keys by [Trooper Duncan] out of [the]
       passenger side window [of the police cruiser]. The date and time
       will be recoverable when I called the [Adams County] police
       department and asked them where my keys were as [Trooper
       Duncan] was pulling up that minute. So the date and time that I
       placed a call to the Adams County police [department] inquiring
       about my keys to my vehicle will be where there will be evidence
       of my keys being returned to me and me being allowed to drive,
       which I think contradicts [Trooper Duncan’s] testimony of his
       alleged accusation he believed I was impaired.

N.T., 7/26/22, at 53 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

We further note that on cross-examination, the Commonwealth asked
Appellant, “Was it [Trooper Duncan] that dropped you off at your car and gave
you your keys?” Id. at 55. In response, Appellant stated,

       He dropped me off on an overpass a quarter mile away and told
       me I could walk to my vehicle, which I did, and he did not drop
       me off at the hospital as [he] alleged he did, or not the hospital,
       the hotel where a gas station where he claimed he would be
       dropping me off, if the tapes are viewed[.]

Id. at 55-56.

Trooper Duncan testified that after the blood draw concluded at the hospital,
he drove Appellant to a near-by hotel and released him pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 519(B)(1). Id. at 59-60; see also
Pa.R.Crim.P. 519(B)(1) (permitting an arresting officer to release a defendant
from custody in a DUI related incident where the arresting officer believes the
defendant will appear as required and does not pose a threat of immediate
physical harm to self or others). At the time Trooper Duncan released
Appellant from police custody at the hotel, Trooper Duncan believed Appellant
had his wallet, cellular telephone, and vehicle keys in his possession. N.T.,
7/26/22, at 60-61. Trooper Duncan further stated that upon releasing
Appellant at the hotel, he had no further interaction with Appellant. Id.

                                          - 19 -
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at 53. Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial

of Appellant’s request, made prior to the start of trial, for the appointment of

new counsel.

      The second issue presented in the Anders brief challenges the trial

court’s decision to allow certain testimony provided by Appellant on

cross-examination regarding when he last used cocaine.            Anders Brief at

38-39.     While   Appellant   contends   that   his   required   testimony   was

self-incriminating, counsel points out that the Commonwealth had already

established, without objection, the presence of cocaine in Appellant’s

bloodstream on the evening of the incident through the introduction of expert

testimony and the toxicology reports depicting the blood-draw results. Id. at

39.

      It is well-settled that “[t]he admission of evidence is a matter vested

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be

reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an

error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or

the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias,

prejudice, ill-will[,] or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.”

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 749 (citation omitted).          “In determining whether

evidence should be admitted, the trial court must weigh the relevant and

                                     - 20 -
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probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial impact of the

evidence.” Id.

      Regarding the scope of cross-examination, Pennsylvania Rule of

Evidence 611(b) states that “[c]ross-examination of a witness other than a

party in a civil case should be limited to the subject matter of the direct

examination and matters affecting credibility, however, the [trial] court may,

in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on

direct examination.” Pa.R.E. 611(b); see also McManamon v. Washko, 906

A.2d 1259, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating, Rule 611(b) permits the trial

court, “in its discretion, to allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct

examination”), appeal denied, 921 A.2d 497 (Pa. 2007). “In criminal cases,

the right of cross-examination extends not only to the matters testified to on

direct examination, but also to any facts tending to refute inferences or

deductions arising from those matters.” Commonwealth v. Karnebauer,

715 A.2d 1086, 1095 (Pa. 1998); see also Commonwealth v. Begley, 780

A.2d 605, 628 (Pa. 2001) (permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine a

witness about facts already testified to during direct).

      The    record    demonstrates      that,   on    cross-examination,      the

Commonwealth asked Appellant, “When was the last time you used cocaine

before you were stopped by [Trooper Duncan].” N.T., 7/26/22, at 56. Trial

counsel objected on the ground the question was outside the scope of [direct]

testimony. Id. Appellant, however, responded, “I can answer it. I can answer

it. Can I?” Id. To which, trial counsel advised Appellant not to answer the

                                      - 21 -
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question. Id. The Commonwealth argued that the question was permitted

because it related to an element of the crime. Id. The trial court, ultimately,

overruled the objection and permitted Appellant to answer the question. Id.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained,

       Appellant [] already admitted on direct that he was not surprised
       marijuana metabolites were in his system since he smokes
       marijuana every day. Appellant attempted to explain or mitigate
       the presence of marijuana in his blood[stream], apparently
       thinking it would somehow absolve him of criminal culpability, but
       he conveniently avoided discussion about the cocaine found in the
       laboratory testing. The Commonwealth then wanted to ask about
       his cocaine use since cocaine metabolites were also found in his
       [blood] system.        The subject was clearly ripe for
       cross[-]examination.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/23, at 11-12.

       At trial, the Commonwealth’s expert in forensic toxicology testified that

the   results    of   the   testing   performed    on   Appellant’s   blood   sample,

demonstrated, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the presence of

active metabolites of marijuana (11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC), active ingredients

of marijuana (Delta-9 THC), inactive metabolites of marijuana (Delta-9

Carboxy THC), and metabolites of cocaine (benzoylecgonine). N.T., 7/26/22,

at 39-40.       Furthermore, Commonwealth Exhibit 4, the toxicology report

admitted at trial, reported the presence of the same controlled substances in

Appellant’s blood sample.12 Id.; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 4.
____________________________________________

12 The toxicology report defined 11-Hydroxy Delta-9 THC as “an active
intermediate metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) the active component

                                          - 22 -
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       Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the

trial court’s decision to overrule the objection to the Commonwealth’s question

on cross-examination regarding Appellant’s use of cocaine.       The fact that

Appellant’s blood sample contained the presence of inactive metabolites of

cocaine was already disclosed, without defense objection, during the

testimony of the Commonwealth’s forensic toxicology expert, as well as

through the admission into evidence of the toxicology report (Commonwealth

Exhibit 4). Because the presence of an inactive metabolite of cocaine, which

results from the breakdown of cocaine, was already established through this

Commonwealth evidence (and since the presence of cocaine or cocaine

metabolites bore some relevance to the charges at Count 4), the

Commonwealth was permitted to inquire further from Appellant about his use,

prior to operating his vehicle, of cocaine, which, ultimately, resulted in the

presence of the inactive metabolite of cocaine being present in his blood

sample.

       The final issue presented in the Anders Brief challenges the sufficiency

and weight of the evidence to support the trial court’s conviction of Appellant

____________________________________________

of marijuana.” Delta-9 THC was defined as “the principle psychoactive
ingredient of marijuana (cannabis, hashish).” Delta-9 Carboxy THC was
defined as “the inactive metabolite of THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) the major
active component of marijuana and cannabis.” Benzoylecgonine was defined
as “an inactive metabolite and chemical breakdown product of cocaine.” See
Commonwealth Exhibit 4, at 2 (unpaginated).

                                          - 23 -
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under Sections 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(1)(iii), and 3802(d)(2). Anders Brief

at 28-34.

      Our standard and scope of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence is well-settled.

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the [fact-finder] while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Section 3802 of the Crimes Code states, in pertinent part, that

      An individual may not drive, operate[,] or be in actual physical
      control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following
      circumstances:

         (1) There is in the individual's blood any amount of a:

            (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the
            act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),1 known as
            The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
            Act;

            ...

                                    - 24 -
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             (iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph
             (i)[.]

         (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
         combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
         individual's ability to safely drive, operate[,] or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), and (d)(2).

      In order to prove a conviction under Section 3802(d)(1)(i) or

3802(d)(1)(iii), the Commonwealth must establish the operation of a vehicle

by a driver who has any amount of a Schedule I controlled substance or a

metabolite of a Schedule I controlled substance in his or her blood, regardless

of impairment.      Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1174

(Pa. Super. 2007), aff’d, 943 A.2d 262 (Pa. 2008).        “[A] conviction under

Section 3802(d)(1) does not require that a driver be impaired[.]” Etchison,

916 A.2d at 1174.

      In order to convict a defendant under Section 3802(d)(2), the

Commonwealth must demonstrate “that [the defendant] was under the

influence of a drug[, or combination of drugs,] to a degree that impairs his or

her ability to safely drive or operate a vehicle.”          Commonwealth v.

Williamson, 962 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and original

quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 608 (Pa. 2009). Section

3802(d)(2) “does not require proof of a specific amount of a drug in the

driver's system. It requires only proof that the driver was under the influence

of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that the ability to drive is

impaired.”    Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 341, 345 (Pa. Super.

                                     - 25 -
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2012), citing Williamson, 962 A.2d at 1204 and Commonwealth v.

Griffith, 32 A.2d 1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011). “[E]xpert testimony is not necessary

to establish impairment [due to a controlled substance] under [Section]

3802(d)(2) where there exists other independent evidence of impairment.”

Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 173 A.3d 267 (Pa. 2017). A “lay witnesses may testify to someone's

readily observable physical condition or appearance that does not require

medical training.” Gause, 164 A.3d at 538 (citation omitted).

       Here, the Commonwealth provided the testimony of a forensic

toxicology expert and the toxicology report depicting the results of tests

performed on Appellant’s blood sample taken after the incident.        Both the

expert, as well as the report, showed that Appellant’s blood sample contained

the presence of marijuana (a Schedule I controlled substance) and active

metabolites of marijuana. As such, in viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, there was sufficient

evidence upon which the trial court, as trier-of-fact, could convict Appellant of

DUI under Sections 3802(d)(1)(i) and 3802(d)(1)(iii).13

____________________________________________

13 A conviction under either Section 3802(d)(1) or Section 3802(d)(2) requires

the Commonwealth to establish that a defendant was driving, operating, or in
actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3802. In the case sub judice, Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence in support of this element. Moreover, there is sufficient
evidence to establish that Appellant was driving, operating, or in physical
control of the movement of his vehicle at the time Trooper Duncan stopped
Appellant.

                                          - 26 -
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       To the extent that Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

of impairment necessary to support his conviction of Section 3802(d)(2),

Trooper Duncan testified that upon learning, inter alia, that Appellant ingested

marijuana prior to operating his vehicle, he asked Appellant to exit his vehicle

to perform several field sobriety tests. N.T., 7/26/22, at 17-18. Appellant

failed to properly perform the field sobriety tests, which included, inter alia,

the walk-and-turn test, the one-leg stand test, and the Romberg test. Id. at

20-22. Based upon his observations of Appellant and Appellant’s performance

during the field sobriety tests, Trooper Duncan concluded Appellant was

impaired due to the use of a controlled substance (marijuana) such that he

was not able to safely operate his vehicle. Id. at 23. In viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, Trooper

Duncan, as a lay witness trained in the administration of field sobriety tests

and the detection of the use of, and impairment by, controlled substances,

offered sufficient evidence of Appellant’s impairment upon which the trial court

could convict Appellant under Section 3802(d)(2).14 Therefore, we find no

merit to Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim.
____________________________________________

14 To the extent that Appellant offered testimony that his vehicle keys were

returned to him after being released from police custody, we find this assertion
to be of no avail. The crucial time for the detection of, and determination of,
impairment by Trooper Duncan was at the conclusion of the field sobriety tests
and prior to Appellant’s arrest and transportation to the hospital for a blood
draw. The events following the release of Appellant from police custody do
not establish the lack of impairment at the time of his arrest, as Appellant
contends. Moreover, Trooper Duncan testified that when Appellant was

                                          - 27 -
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       Counsel also sets forth a claim that the verdict is against the weight of

the evidence but contends that this issue is waived because Appellant failed

to raise the claim orally or in a written motion prior to sentencing or in a

post-sentence motion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

607.15 Anders Brief at 34. Generally a weight of the evidence claim is waived

on appeal when not properly preserved pursuant to Rule 607. When the issue

is raised within the context of an Anders brief, however, an appellate court

will consider the issue to determine its merit.           Commonwealth v.

Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding that, Anders

requires the review of issues otherwise waived on appeal).

       Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
       discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict
       is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial [court]
____________________________________________

released from police custody, Appellant was in possession of his vehicle keys.
The trial court, as fact-finder, is free to believe, all, some, or none of the
testimony offered and assign credibility to the witnesses. An appellate court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, which
was the Commonwealth in the case sub judice.

15 Rule 607 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

       A claim that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
       shall be raised with the trial [court] in a motion for a new trial:

       (1) orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing;

       (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or

       (3) in a post-sentence motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1-3).

                                          - 28 -
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      had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an
      appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings
      and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when reviewing a trial
      court’s determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the
      weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for
      granting or denying a new trial is the [trial] court’s conviction that
      the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and
      that a new trial should be granted[, or denied,] in the interest of
      justice.

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). A trial court abuses

its discretion “where the course pursued represents not merely an error of

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the

law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of

partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Horne, 89 A.3d at 285-286 (citation

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)

(stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,]

and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial

court]”). For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, “the

evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks

the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d

795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

appeal denied, 833 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2003).

      When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on
      the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's
      decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so
      unreliable [or] contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon

                                      - 29 -
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      pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on
      appellate review.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal

denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013).

      In addressing Appellant’s weight claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the

trial court stated,

      Here, there was little evidence that weighed in favor of acquittal.
      Appellant admitted to smoking marijuana every day, including the
      night before he was pulled over. [Appellant] told Trooper Duncan
      that the [z]iploc bag he gave him contained marijuana. Appellant
      only argued that he did not know that driving while having
      metabolites of a controlled substance in his blood was considered
      [DUI] and that[,] if he had known[,] he would not have consented
      to a blood draw. Ignorance of the law is no defense. See 18
      Pa.C.S.[A. § ]304 (official comment) ([stating,] "[g]enerally
      speaking, ignorance[,] or mistake of law is no defense["]); [see
      also] Commonwealth v. Robertson, 186 A.3d 440, 446
      ([Pa. Super.] 2018). [Appellant] did not contest that he was
      indeed driving with such metabolites in his blood. Therefore, the
      evidence was not so one-sided toward acquittal that a guilty
      verdict shocks one's sense of justice.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/19/23, at 8-9.

      As discussed supra, Trooper Duncan determined that, upon Appellant’s

failed performance of the field sobriety tests, and his own observations,

Appellant was impaired to the extent that he could not safely operate his

vehicle due to his admitted use of marijuana prior to travel.       Moreover,

Appellant testified that he used marijuana daily and that he used the

controlled substance prior to the operating of his vehicle.    The toxicology

report, as well as the Commonwealth’s expert, confirmed that a test of

Appellant’s blood drawn shortly after his arrest revealed the presence of

                                    - 30 -
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marijuana, metabolites of marijuana, and metabolites of cocaine.         Finally,

Trooper Duncan testified that he first observed Appellant’s vehicle traveling

with a non-functioning rear light.      Trooper Duncan proceeded to follow

Appellant’s vehicle, which traveled at a rate in excess of 65 mph, facts that

Appellant did not contest at trial. To the extent that Appellant’s claim calls

upon this Court to reassess the credibility of the witnesses and reweigh the

evidence in an attempt to have us reach a result different than the one reached

by the trial court, as fact-finder, such is not the role and function of an

appellate court in this situation. Rather, the trial court, as fact-finder, while

passing on the credibility of the witnesses and weight of the evidence, was

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.        Commonwealth v.

Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 631 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa.

2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022). Based upon our review of the

record, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in Appellant’s

convictions based on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of

the evidence. Consequently, Appellant’s claim is without merit.

      Upon a review of the record, we conclude that it supports Attorney

Entwistle’s assessment that Appellant’s appeal is wholly frivolous. Moreover,

our independent review of the record reveals no additional, non-frivolous

claims.   Therefore, we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

                                     - 31 -
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     Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2024

                                 - 32 -