Court Opinion

ID: 9389081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 17:00:34.176098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.165790
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ____________

                                       No. 22-2507
                                       ___________

                                   ROBERT COMRIE,
                                            Appellant

                                             v.

DENISE WOOD; RANDALL N. SEARS, Deputy Chief Counsel for the Department of
Corrections; VINCENT MAZESKI, Assistant Counsel for the Pennsylvania Department
                              of Corrections
                              ____________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                                (D.C. No. 3-17-cv-00027)
                           District Judge: Hon. Keith A. Pesto
                                      ____________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                   (April 18, 2023)

             Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges

                                  (Filed: April 24, 2023)

                                      ____________

                                        OPINION *
                                      ____________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

       Robert Comrie appeals the District Court’s summary judgment for three

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials whom Comrie sued for their

alleged deliberate indifference to his wrongful imprisonment. We will affirm, essentially

for the reasons stated by the District Court.

                                                I

       In 2004, Comrie was given a two-to-four-year sentence by the Clearfield County

Court of Common Pleas and was incarcerated by the DOC. The sentencing judge credited

Comrie with nearly three years’ time served. Almost ten years later, however—while

Comrie was on parole after serving other state and federal sentences—his sentencing

credit was erroneously erased in one of his post-conviction challenges. DOC officials

discovered the incorrect commitment form, called a DC-300B, and sought a bench

warrant from Comrie’s sentencing judge. Though the DOC officials caught the error, they

thought themselves duty-bound to implement the mistaken form. At an ex parte hearing

on the petition for a bench warrant, DOC counsel alerted the judge to the error—but the

judge, apparently piqued by Comrie’s convictions or litigiousness, declined to remedy it.

The bench warrant issued, Comrie was arrested, and he returned to custody. Comrie was

released the next year after his habeas petition was granted. But there’s no dispute that he

had served considerably more than his maximum sentence.

       Comrie sued Denise Wood, Randall Sears, and Vincent Mazeski—DOC officials

involved in the decision to seek a bench warrant—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they

violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment through their

                                                2
deliberate indifference to state law and the court’s failure to credit Comrie for time he

had served. Following discovery, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The

magistrate judge, who was presiding by consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),

denied Comrie’s motion and granted the officials summary judgment. Comrie timely

appeals.

                                             II1

       This case arises under the Eighth Amendment. Yet Comrie cites no Eighth

Amendment cases in either his motion for summary judgment or his opening brief.

Instead, his argument is based on obviousness: because Comrie was incarcerated for what

he says was over 1,000 days beyond his maximum sentence, his Eighth Amendment right

was violated. Comrie’s argument presupposes that the DOC officials caused the

excessive incarceration. But as the District Court held, the facts and the law prove

otherwise.

       Pennsylvania law requires officials from the county in which a sentencing court

sits to give the DOC the form DC-300B when transferring an inmate or after altering his

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)

(discussing 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 9764(a)). Here, following a Superior Court decision

nearly ten years after Comrie’s sentencing, county officials gave the DOC two DC-300B

forms that erroneously erased the sentence credit awarded Comrie in 2004. That erasure

rendered his parole premature, which prompted the DOC to respond.

1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
                                              3
       Comrie insists that the Superior Court never vacated his previous credit; the

Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court said otherwise. See Comrie v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

142 A.3d 995, 1001 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (it is “clear” that the Superior Court decision

“specifically voided” Comrie’s 2004 credit). But that quarrel is immaterial. DOC officials

must faithfully apply sentences imposed by court order. They can’t credit time served

unless a court directs them to, and they can’t sua sponte alter sentencing conditions.

McCray v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 872 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 2005). Though form DC-300B

is not, itself, a sentencing order, Commonwealth v. Pierre, 2018 WL 847646, at *1 (Pa.

Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2018), the DOC officials’ reliance on the forms was routine—and

reasonable. See 42 Pa. Const. Stat. § 9764(c.1)(3). Defendants even brought the 2012

DC-300Bs’ credit error to the sentencing court’s attention and requested its correction.

Defendants took “affirmative steps” to fix the problem within the legal constraints they

faced and their conduct was not “so inept or ineffectual” as to signal deliberate

indifference. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 687 (3d Cir. 1993).

                                            III

       Even if we agreed that Defendants were deliberately indifferent, they would

receive qualified immunity. See TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 276 n.9 (3d Cir.

2019) (permitting affirmance on any non-waived ground the record supports). Comrie

fails to cite a single precedent, and we know of none, placing “beyond debate” the

unconstitutionality of Defendants’ actions. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per

curiam) (cleaned up). So we cannot say that every reasonable official would have known

that enforcing an apparently mistaken commitment order while flagging the mistake to

                                             4
the court and asking the court to correct it was unconstitutional.

                                      *       *      *

       No one should be incarcerated a day beyond the time fixed by the court. So

Comrie is right to complain about what happened to him. But a Pennsylvania judge’s

refusal to fix an error regarding time served does not make the Department of Corrections

or its officials liable for the harm caused by circumstances beyond their control. In a

more perfect world, Comrie would have filed an immediate petition for writ of

mandamus and the state appellate court could have cured the problem. That the correction

came much later through federal habeas relief does not make the DOC officials liable.

We will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment.

                                              5