Court Opinion

ID: 9914034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:09:00.466757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:53.853498
License: Public Domain

J-S35004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ERIC WILLIAM DIAZ                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1016 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0003178-2017

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Eric William Diaz appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his guilty plea to six counts of child pornography. Diaz’s counsel,

Kristen L. Weisenberger, Esquire, has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and an application to withdraw as counsel.

After careful review, we affirm, and grant Attorney Weisenberger leave to

withdraw.

       Since the initiation of Diaz’s charges in 2017, the procedural history in

this case has been lengthy. In 2011, Diaz pled guilty to possession of child

pornography and received an aggregate negotiated sentence of five years’

probation. The trial court revoked Diaz’s probation in 2012, and resentenced

him to five years’ intermediate punishment, with six months’ imprisonment.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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In 2014, Diaz was convicted of a new sexual offense in Maryland, leading the

trial court in this case to revoke his sentence of intermediate punishment. In

2016, the trial court re-sentenced Diaz to five years’ intermediate punishment,

with one year served in prison, to be followed by five years’ probation.

      In 2017, Diaz was serving his sentence of intermediate punishment, but

on work release subject to sex offender conditions, including a prohibition on

possessing a wireless phone. Diaz was found to be in possession of a wireless

phone, the phone was seized and searched by probation and child

pornography was found on the phone.

      Diaz was originally represented by Attorneys Vincent Monfredo and

Roger Laguna of the law firm Laguna Reyes Maloney, LLP, who filed pretrial

motions and litigated a motion to suppress. After many continuances for plea

negotiations, Diaz filed a pro se notice of appeal to this Court on April 15,

2019, purporting to appeal from the January 31, 2018 order granting

reconsideration of Diaz’s pretrial motion for suppression and scheduling a

suppression hearing. This Court quashed that appeal as untimely and

interlocutory. See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 622 MDA 2019 (Pa. Super. filed

May 23, 2019) (unpublished order).

      Diaz continued litigating pretrial motions through his counsel in the trial

court, while sending pro se notices of appeal to the trial court clerk. Notably,

the Judge who had re-sentenced Diaz in 2016, the Honorable Deborah

Curcillo, presided over an initial suppression hearing. At the close of the

hearing, Judge Curcillo granted Diaz’s motion to present additional evidence

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at a later date. While waiting for a supplemental hearing, Diaz filed a motion

seeking to have Judge Curcillo recuse herself. However, due to scheduling

conflicts, the supplemental hearing was transferred to the Honorable President

Judge Richard Lewis, who subsequently denied suppression. See Order,

12/10/2019.

       Diaz, through counsel, filed a motion to certify the interlocutory order

for appeal to this Court. The motion to certify was denied, however, and in

the interim Diaz filed another pro se appeal in this Court which was quashed

as interlocutory. See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 164 MDA 2020 (Pa. Super.

filed July 6, 2020) (unpublished order).

       Diaz pleaded guilty before Senior Judge Robert Eby on June 3, 2021. On

August 31, 2021, Diaz filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and

have Attorney Weisenberger appointed. A hearing was held, at which point

Diaz   withdrew   his   guilty   plea   and   Attorney   Laguna   withdrew   from

representation. See N.T. 12/1/2021, at 14-15. Diaz then proceeded pro se,

until the trial court ultimately appointed the public defender to represent him.

See Order, 3/17/22.

       Diaz again chose to enter a guilty plea. When he pleaded guilty, Diaz

admitted that, while a resident of the county’s work release program, he was

in possession of a wireless phone in violation of the rules of the program and,

when it was seized and searched, it was found to contain child pornography

which was downloaded and stored on six separate dates. See N.T. 5/13/22 at

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15-16. That same day, Diaz was sentenced to an aggregate of six to twelve

years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation. See id. at 19-21.

        On May 16, 2022, and May 20, 2022, pro se motions were docketed,

both dated May 11, 2022 with the note, “The ‘Prisoner Mailbox Rule’ applies

to this instant filing”. On May 23, 2022, counsel from the public defender’s

office withdrew their appearance. On May 25, 2022, a pro se post-sentence

motion to vacate and modify the sentence was docketed, dated May 23, 2022,

with the same notation regarding the prisoner mailbox rule. The same day,

another pro se post-sentence motion was docketed, this time requesting to

withdraw the guilty plea and request new counsel, also dated May 23, 2022.

        The trial court issued an opinion disposing of Diaz’s numerous pro se

motions. See Order and Opinion, 7/6/2022. Diaz then filed a pro se notice of

appeal to this Court on July 14, 2022. Attorney Weisenberger was appointed

for the appeal and counsel and the trial court both complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Before we reach the merits of Diaz’s appeal, we must address its

timeliness. Timely appeals must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the

order on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Post-sentence motions must be filed

within ten days of the sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (A)(1). Timely post-

sentence motions toll the appeal period until an order is entered deciding the

motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (A)(2). Untimely post-sentence motions do not

toll the appeal period. See Commonwealth v. Capaldi, 112 A.3d 1242, 1244

(Pa. Super. 2015).

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      Here, Diaz was sentenced on May 13, 2022. His pro se post-sentence

motions were docketed on May 25, 2022. As these filings were more than 10

days after his sentence, they were facially untimely. However, an incarcerated

pro se litigant’s filing is considered filed on the day it is delivered to the prison

for mailing. See Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. Super.

2011). Therefore, Diaz’s post-sentence motion is deemed timely filed on May

23, 2022, and the instant appeal is timely.

      On appeal, Attorney Weisenberger has filed an Anders brief and an

application to withdraw as counsel. Diaz filed a pro se brief in response to the

Anders brief.

      Before reviewing the underlying merits of the appeal, we must

determine    whether     Attorney    Weisenberger      has   complied     with   the

requirements of Anders in her attempt to withdraw from representation. See

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc). Anders requires direct appeal counsel to file a petition evincing their

review of the record and their determination that an appeal is frivolous, file a

brief laying out issues that could arguably support an appeal and provide a

copy of said petition and brief to their client, advising them of their right to

retain new appellate counsel, proceed pro se on appeal or raise additional

issues. See Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Super.

2015). A proper Anders brief contains a factual and procedural summary of

the case, citing the record, references to points in the record that arguably

support the appeal, counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, and

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counsel’s reasons for reaching that conclusion including relevant authority.

See id.

      Here, Attorney Weisenberger has complied with the requirements set

forth in Anders by indicating that she examined the record and determined

that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, Attorney Weisenberger’s Anders

brief sets forth her conclusion that Diaz’s claim that the trial court erred by

not allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea a second time is frivolous. Finally,

Attorney Weisenberger provided a letter to Diaz, informing him of her

intention to withdraw as counsel, and advising Diaz of his rights to retain new

counsel, proceed pro se, and file additional claims. Because Attorney

Weisenberger has satisfied the technical requirements for withdrawing from

representation, we will independently review the record to determine whether

Diaz’s appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1248.

      Attorney Weisenberger identifies a single argument that Diaz wishes to

present to this Court: that it was error to deny his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea which was induced by the threat of a mandatory minimum that

does not apply to Diaz. See Anders Brief, at 8. Turning to the merits of this

claim we easily confirm Attorney Weisenberger’s conclusion that the claim is

wholly frivolous.

      Diaz argues that he was coerced into his guilty plea through the threat

of a 25-year mandatory minimum sentence as a repeat offender. As all parties

concede, Diaz was in fact subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 25

years’ incarceration for this conviction, based on his prior conviction for child

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pornography, if the Commonwealth sought its imposition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9718.2(a)(1); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(b)(9). However, in exchange for his

guilty plea, the Commonwealth waived the imposition of the mandatory

minimum sentence and Diaz instead received the negotiated sentence of six

to twelve years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation. See N.T.

5/13/2022, at 4.

      The law does not require that Diaz be pleased with the outcome of his

decision to enter a plea of guilty, rather, all that is required is that Diaz’s

decision to plead guilty is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 913 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). If the

mandatory minimum sentence that the prosecutor threatened to seek at trial

were, in fact, an illegal sentence, Diaz would possibly be entitled to relief. See

Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789 A.2d 764, 767 (Pa. Super. 2002).

      Diaz contends the mandatory minimum sentence would have been

illegal because he was still serving his sentence for the conviction that

triggered the applicability of the mandatory minimum sentence. See Anders

Brief, at 12-13. The mandatory minimum sentence identified by the

Commonwealth applies “if, at the time of the commission of the current

offense [Diaz] had previously been convicted” of a crime listed under 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9718.2(1). As noted, Diaz does not

contest that he had previously been convicted of such a crime. Rather, Diaz

contends that section 9718.2(1) does not apply unless he had finished serving

his sentence for that crime. This argument is wholly frivolous, as the statute

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explicitly requires only a prior conviction; there is no requirement, either

explicit or implied, that Diaz’s sentence be concluded.

      Next, Attorney Weisenberger notes that Diaz claims his plea was not

knowing and intelligent because he had no prior notice of his hearing in

violation of his due process rights. See Anders Brief, at 13. A guilty plea

colloquy must include the nature of the charges, facts of the offense,

defendant’s right to a jury trial and presumption of innocence and the

guidelines for sentencing as well as the trial court’s power to deviate from a

recommendation. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa.

Super. 2015). Here, the record reflects a thorough guilty plea colloquy and

explanation of the negotiated sentence, belying Diaz’s claim that his plea was

unknowing and unintelligent. See N.T. 5/13/22, at 5-14. Diaz entirely fails to

explain how any alleged lack of notice of the hearing undermines this

conclusion.

      Further, in his pro se response to the Anders brief, Diaz raises a

multitude of claims that he has made many times before throughout this case.

Specifically, he asserts that Attorney Weisenberger was ineffective generally

and for failing to incorporate and address the claims he originally raised in his

pro se notice of appeal: that a manifest injustice justified the withdrawal of

his guilty plea; that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on motions

which allegedly corrupted the plea process; that the trial court should have

recused itself; that the trial court should have granted his post-sentence

motion for new counsel; that the trial court should have granted his post-

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sentence motion to modify the conditions of parole and probation; and that

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.14(d) of Subchapter H is unconstitutional and he is due

a hearing on the matter of the unconstitutionality of his lifetime registration

under SORNA. See Pro Se Response to Anders Brief at 4-5; Exhibit 1, 4-5.

      Initially, to the extent that Diaz is claiming that Attorney Weisenberger

was ineffective in filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement that did not identify all of

the issues Diaz wished to argue, we note that in a case where counsel has

filed an Anders brief, this Court must perform an independent review of the

record to determine whether there are any meritorious issues not raised by

counsel. As such, the counseled Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement does not prevent

this Court from considering those issues highlighted by Diaz in his pro se

response. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      Turning to those issues identified by Diaz, he first contends that the trial

court ignored a manifest injustice in denying his request to withdraw his guilty

plea. This contention is based on Diaz’s belief that he was not subject to the

mandatory minimum sentence since he was still serving the sentence imposed

for the triggering conviction. As we have already determined that this claim is

wholly frivolous, Diaz is due no relief on this issue.

      Next, Diaz argues that Judge Curcillo should have recused herself. Diaz

does not identify where he first sought Judge Curcillo’s recusal, but our review

of the record indicates this was first done after the suppression hearing on

January 31, 2018. While Judge Curcillo did not explicitly rule on this request,

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it is notable that she had no further involvement in this matter. It is arguable

that Diaz waived this issue by pleading guilty. See Commonwealth v.

Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. 2013) (observing that “by entering a

guilty plea, the defendant waives his right to challenge on direct appeal all

nonjurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of

the plea.” (citation omitted)). It is further arguable that Diaz waived his

recusal request by failing to raise it “at the earliest possible moment[.]”

Lomas v. Kravitz, 170 A.3d 380, 390 (Pa. 2017). But we need not even reach

these conclusions, as we conclude that Diaz has waived the issue by failing to

identify how any alleged impropriety on the part of Judge Curcillo affected his

ultimate guilty plea. To reiterate, it was Judge Lewis who denied Diaz’s motion

to suppress, and Senior Judge Eby who presided over Diaz’s guilty plea and

sentencing. While Diaz forcefully asserts a right to relief, his arguments are

mere boilerplate allegations that Judge Curcillo’s alleged improprieties tainted

the proceedings before other judges. Accordingly, this issue is waived and

therefore wholly frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829, 838

(Pa. 2014).

      Next, Diaz contends that Senior Judge Eby erred by denying Diaz’s

numerous pre- and post-sentence motions requesting the appointment of

conflict counsel. As we have already concluded that Diaz knowingly and

intelligently entered his negotiated guilty plea, and received the negotiated

sentence, we further conclude that Diaz has waived this issue. See Lincoln,

72 A.3d at 609.

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      Diaz also argues that the trial court did not impose any conditions on

his probation or parole, and he therefore objects to the special conditions for

sex offenders sent to him by Dauphin County Probation Services. These

conditions are not in the certified record and are only before this Court as

exhibits attached to Diaz’s pro se response to the Anders brief. As such, this

issue is technically waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d 122,

126 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Even if we were to reach this issue, we would conclude it has no merit.

While Diaz argues that the probation office imposed these conditions without

direct authority from the sentencing court, the record clearly belies this

assertion. In its written sentencing order, the court checked the box titled

“Standard Conditions of Probation/Parole – Sex Offender[.]” Sentencing

Sheet, 5/13/22. As such, the sentencing court clearly imposed the special

conditions for sex offenders. See Commonwealth v. Kremer, 206 A.3d 543,

548 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“Stated another way, the signed, written sentencing

order controls, where the sentencing transcript is ambiguous[.]”).

      Finally, Diaz argues that he is entitled to a hearing on the

constitutionality of SORNA subchapter H pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020). We disagree. Diaz has not presented any

evidence to overcome the presumption of Subchapter H’s constitutionality; he

therefore is not entitled to any relief on appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Manzano, 237 A.3d 1175, 1182 (Pa. Super. 2020).

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      In sum, Diaz knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into his

guilty plea. None of his claims to the contrary hold any merit, and his guilty

plea waives several of the claims raised in his pro se response. Additionally,

we have discovered no other, non-frivolous issues that merit our review. We

therefore grant counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm Diaz’s judgment of

sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2023

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