Court Opinion

ID: 9727151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:21:44.449915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:34.164411
License: Public Domain

VERNIERO, J.,
concurring.
In its careful analysis, the Court correctly concludes that a death action and a malpractice action are independent claims. Thus, plaintiff filed this lawsuit within the limitations period contained in the wrongful death statute. I write separately to emphasize that nothing in the language of that statute prevents the trial court from applying principles of causation and other tenets to this or any similar case.
“Proximate or legal causation is that combination of ‘logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent’ that fixes a point in a chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond which the law will bar recovery.” People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 264, 495 A.2d 107 (1985) (citation and internal quotation omitted). “[T]he limit of proximate cause is, ultimately, an issue of law and ... entails a consideration of public policy and fairness.” Williamson v. Waldman, 150 N.J. 232, 245, 696 A.2d 14 (1997). Ordinarily, issues of proximate cause are considered jury questions. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 161 N.J. 1, 27, 734 A.2d 1245 (1999). On occasion, however, a court may resolve that issue itself. Ibid. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that courts may resolve for themselves the question of *388legal or proximate causation if they believe that a reasonable jury could not find such causation on the facts presented. “The actor’s conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor’s negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2) (1965).
There is ample precedent in New Jersey authorizing courts to resolve the issue of proximate cause in any case in which reasonable minds could not differ on whether that element of the plaintiffs case has been established. See, e.g.; Caputzal v. The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 78-79, 222 A.2d 513 (1966) (discussing case law and other authority in support of rule). In a recent case, Vega by Muniz v. Piedilato, 154 N.J. 496, 713 A.2d 442 (1998), this Court invoked that authority in dismissing the plaintiffs case on causation grounds. In Vega, a fourteen-year-old boy trespassed on the roof of the defendant’s apartment building and fell into an air shaft, suffering tragic injuries. Id. at 499-500, 713 A.2d 442. The plaintiff advanced numerous allegations of negligence, including the defendant’s failure to prevent access to the roof for security purposes. Id. at 509, 713 A.2d 442.
In upholding the summary dismissal of the plaintiffs claim, the Court explained:
We do not believe that a fair-minded jury could find that the lack of security measures was the cause of the fall. The cause of the accident and injuries was the plaintiffs unsuccessful effort to leap this divide. Even when parties have a special relationship to others requiring them to act to prevent foreseeable harm, the issue of proximate cause is always present. See Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 545 A.2d 159 (1988) (holding that causation would be issue in case of incompetent patient leaping from hospital window).

[Ibid.]

In the present case, Mrs. Miller died on March 30, 1996. Dr. Sperling’s alleged tortious conduct occurred twenty years prior to decedent’s death. According to the undisputed pharmacy logs, Ovulen 28, the drug in question, was prescribed by Dr. Sperling in 1974 and last renewed in 1976, some twenty years before decedent’s death. Other than those logs, which merely confirm the *389prescription dates, there are no available charts, journals, physician notes, or medical records of any kind to support plaintiffs claim. Moreover, both the doctor and his patient have never been deposed and are now deceased, making it impossible to consider testimonial evidence from the central fact witnesses. Against that backdrop, the question for the motion court will be whether a reasonable jury could find that the doctor’s alleged conduct caused the complained-of injury.
I do not diminish the distress and sense of sadness that inevitably occur whenever a person loses a spouse or loved one. This may be a rare case in which, given the lack of medical records and unavailability of witnesses, there is no issue capable of legitimate resolution. In a different context, the Appellate Division has observed that “the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.” DeDisto v. Linden, 80 N.J.Super. 398, 406, 193 A.2d 870 (App.Div.1963) (quoting 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 1(b)(1) n. 19 (1948)). “Once memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is lost, courts no longer possess the capacity to distinguish valid claims from those which are frivolous or vexatious.” Galligan v. Westfield, Ctr. Serv., Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192, 412 A.2d 122 (1980).
In sum, I agree with the Court that plaintiff filed this action within the limitations period contained in the wrongful death statute. That holding does not, in this or any future ease, preclude a court from determining the legal viability of a plaintiffs claim by applying principles of causation or other traditional tenets.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 7.
Opposed — None.