Court Opinion

ID: 9738234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:46:19.660859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.755637
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, specially concurring: I specially concur because I wish to emphasize a few points that are contained in the majority disposition. I also have a minor disagreement with a comment made by the majority. The trial court dismissed sundry counts, based upon the following findings: “[T]he trial court stated that, under the doctrine of associational standing adopted in International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 148 v. Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37 (2005), WCCCG did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its members, because a majority of the members did not have standing to sue individually. The trial court further found that the La Salle claim in count II must be dismissed because an analysis of this claim would not involve pure questions of law and thus would require the participation of individual members in the suit. As to count I, the trial court stated that it was following the special concurrence of Justices Thomas and Garman in International Union, and it therefore found that WCCCG did not have standing to bring suit under the Administrative Review Law, because it had not been a party to the administrative proceedings being challenged.” 383 Ill. App. 3d at 739. I wish to emphasize the following points: first, a majority or minority of an associational membership that has standing is not the benchmark by which associational standing is determined; second, pure questions of law are not the only questions that entitle an entity to qualify for associational standing; third, the mere existence of issues of fact neither constitutes nor requires the “participation” of individual members in the suit; fourth, and finally, associational standing does not require the entity to have been in existence, let alone present, during the administrative proceedings — it requires only that a member of the association was a party to the administrative proceedings. The majority has opined that, “If later developments make it clear that significant individual participation will be required to establish WCCCG’s right to the relief it seeks, the trial court is free to revisit this issue.” 383 Ill. App. 3d at 747.1 submit that, as long as the pleadings remain unchanged, there is no need to revisit the issue, and the trial court is not free to revisit the issue. In Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343, 362, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2212 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that, “so long as the nature of the claim and the relief sought does not make individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court’s jurisdiction” (emphasis added). Thus, according to Warth, it is the plaintiffs pleadings that determine the claim, the relief sought, and the level of “participation.” We have determined that presently the pleadings do not establish that the “participation” of individual members is necessary to grant the relief sought by the plaintiff. Until such time as the plaintiffs complaint is altered to expand the relief sought, there will not be a point in the proceedings that requires revisitation as the majority has stated. 383 Ill. App. 3d at 747. I submit that the parameters of “participation” are determined by the proofs required. The proofs required are determined by the relief sought. The relief sought is determined by the claim, and the claim is determined by the pleadings. Thus, if there is no amendment to the plaintiffs complaint, there will be no need to revisit the issue of “participation” and no need to revisit standing.