Court Opinion

ID: 9953222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 17:01:07.011248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:46.855011
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                ______________

                                       No. 22-3186
                                     ______________

                                   SHERRY NORRIS,
                                               Appellant

                                             v.

                            NLMK PENNSYLVANIA LLC;
                              SHARON COATING LLC
                                 ______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                             (D.C. Civil No. 2-21-cv-00291)
                     Magistrate Judge: Honorable Patricia L. Dodge
                                    ______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on October 27, 2023

    Before: HARDIMAN, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

                             (Opinion filed: March 21, 2024)
                                    ______________

                                        OPINION ∗
                                     ______________

∗
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

       Sherry Norris appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment on

hostile-workplace, sex-discrimination, and retaliation claims that she brought under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17 (“Title VII”),

and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 951–63

(the “PHRA”). The District Court properly held that the handful of offensive remarks

and other conduct that Norris identified—while troubling and inappropriate—did not

constitute severe or pervasive discrimination given the high bar that controlling precedent

sets for hostile-workplace claims. 1 And Norris has failed to adduce evidence that

Appellees relied on pretext to justify her termination considering that joint committees

formed by Norris’s union and her employer concluded that Norris engaged in harassing

behavior toward two co-workers, Norris attempted to interfere with an internal

investigation into her own misconduct, and Norris violated other company rules. Thus,

we will affirm.

I.     BACKGROUND

       Because Norris challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, the

following recitation of the facts resolves all disputed facts and draws all reasonable

1
 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

                                             2
inferences in her favor. See, e.g., Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340,

345 (3d Cir. 2022).

       A.     Norris Is Harassed 2

       Norris worked in the shipping department for Sharon Coating, LLC (“Sharon

Coating”), an entity that operated a steel mill. She was the only woman who worked in

her department.

       In 2014, Mike Confer, a male co-worker, began harassing Norris on the basis of

her sex. Among other things, Confer called Norris “derogatory terms while at work, such

as ‘bitch,’ ‘cunt,’ and ‘whore.’” App. 1277. Confer posted similar remarks on Facebook.

       Norris reported the behavior to management, which investigated the complaint and

confirmed that Confer violated the company’s anti-harassment rule. This misconduct

was grounds for termination. But rather than terminate Confer, Sharon Coating

2
 Some of the most troubling facts alleged by Norris were neither pleaded in her
complaint nor disclosed in discovery. Instead, they first surfaced in a declaration that
Norris filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment filed by Sharon Coating and
NLMK Pennsylvania, LLC (collectively, “Appellees”). Appellees filed a motion to strike
Norris’s declaration under the sham-affidavit doctrine, arguing that parts of the
declaration conflicted with her prior sworn testimony (including several facts we list here
and in our analysis). The District Court ultimately found the motion moot because
Norris’s claim failed even with her declaration.

                                            3
suspended him for five days, transferred him to a different part of the facility for about

five months, and required that he sign a last-chance agreement. 3

       B.     The 2017 Joint Committee Cannot Substantiate Norris’s Allegations
              that Confer Is Continuing to Harass Her

       After completing a five-month tour in a different part of the facility, Confer

returned to his regular post in the area where Norris worked. What happened next is

hotly contested. But for purposes of summary judgment, Norris adduced evidence that

(1) co-workers, other than Confer, used sex-based slurs to refer to Norris on a handful of

occasions, (2) Confer and another co-worker smashed a coffee cup and plastic chairs that

belonged to Norris and threw away her coat or jacket, 4 and (3) someone posted “graphic

pornography of a woman . . . directly next to [Norris’s] locker,” App. 1279. 5 See

generally Norris v. NLMK Pa., LLC, No. 2:21-cv-291, 2022 WL 11264627, at *1–10

(W.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2022).

       Norris complained to management that Confer “ha[d] an agenda to get her fired,”

App. 1012, intentionally made mistakes to make her work more difficult, discouraged

3
 The last-chance agreement provided that Confer “w[ould] be terminated immediately”
“[s]hould it be established that [he] is involved in another charge of harassment or treats
others inappropriately including any form of retaliation.” App. 1034.
4
  Norris also noticed that her phone charger repeatedly went missing after Confer worked
a shift but had no evidence that Confer “actually took” it. App. 298.
5
  Norris also claims to have noticed “persistent errors in the staging of coils in [her] area
. . . when on [a] shift with or following a shift when . . . Confer worked.” App. 1279.
But she did not know whether Confer made similar errors for other employees and
admitted that it was common for employees to make mistakes at the steel mill.

                                              4
other co-workers from helping her, and used slurs to refer to her. In 2017, Sharon

Coating and the United Steelworkers Local 1016-15 (the “Union”) formed a joint

committee to investigate Norris’s complaint (the “2017 Joint Committee”). 6 After

interviewing Norris, Confer, and 27 other witnesses, the 2017 Joint Committee

unanimously concluded that it could not validate Norris’s allegations against Confer. To

the contrary, the 2017 Joint Committee unanimously concluded that “there are

harassment type behaviors coming from [Norris] regarding . . . Confer resulting in the

other employees feeling like a victim from the situation as schedules are monitored and

the work environment is tense.” 7

         After the 2017 Joint Committee finished its investigation, a group of managers—

including Thomas Taborek, then-corporate director of human resources and labor

relations for NLMK Pennsylvania, LLC—met with Norris. “[T]he goal of the meeting

was to help [Norris] understand the issues and to help everyone move on from [the]

6
    The Union represented Norris, Confer, and other employees at the steel mill.
7
  App. 1014. For example, Norris alleged that Confer had an agenda to get her fired.
There is no dispute, however, that this allegation “was not confirmed by anyone [the
2017 Joint Committee] interviewed. . . . On the contrary, several [witnesses] indicated
that [Norris] had made the comment about wanting to get [Confer] fired” when she said
things like, “I don’t care if I lose my job as long as he does too,” “[I am] not going to be
happy until [Confer] [is] fired,” and “[I] will not stop this until he or both of [us] are
fired.” Id.

Similarly, Norris alleged that Confer intentionally made mistakes to interfere with her
work. But again, there is no dispute that the 2017 Joint Committee unanimously found
that this allegation was unsubstantiated. Indeed, on one occasion, a co-worker told Norris
that he had made a mistake that Norris wrongly attributed to Confer. Norris “would not
believe [the co-worker],” however, “and still insisted” that Confer made the mistake. Id.

                                              5
situation.” App. 176. Among other things, Taborek told Norris that she needed to “let go

of this twisted perception of reality that doesn’t seem to be true,” stop “nit-picking . . .

everybody else,” and “go do [her] job.” App. 667.

       C.     Norris Accuses Steiner of Fighting

       In 2018, a supervisor ordered Norris to move some coils. When Norris left her

pulpit to do so, David Steiner, a co-worker who drove trucks at the steel mill, “began

screaming at [Norris] asking why [she] was moving the coils.” App. 1280. Steiner and

Norris were “on good terms and had a collegial working relationship.” App. 1279. But

this occasion caused their working relationship to sour and they “never spoke again.”

App. 1280.

       After this event, Norris was hostile to Steiner. For example, Norris started

directing Steiner to go to the wrong places while he was working, which caused other

shippers to get angry with Steiner. And a joint committee later determined that Norris

did not properly communicate with Steiner at work.

       Norris also falsely reported Steiner for fighting on two occasions. 8 On the first

occasion, Norris told a foreman that Steiner was fighting with Larry Merchant, a co-

8
  Norris offers explanations for why she thought that these reports were justified. But
there is no dispute that these reports were false because Steiner did not get into a fight
with the relevant co-worker or customer.

                                               6
worker in the shipping department. Norris’s report was false. Steiner and Merchant did

not fight or have a disagreement.

       On the second occasion, Norris reported that Steiner was fighting with an outside

driver, effectively a customer of Sharon Coating. After hearing about the purported fight,

the head of safety at Sharon Coating came “‘flying up’ in a golf cart.” App. 186. The

driver and Steiner both confirmed that they had not gotten into a fight and that Steiner

had simply approached the driver to discuss the timing of pulling a truck.

       D.     Appellees Terminate Norris

       On April 27, 2018, Steiner told a manager that Norris was harassing him. Among

other things, Steiner said that Norris was interfering with his work and falsely accusing

him of misconduct. Steiner explained that he did not want to file a formal complaint but

“just wanted this info documented in case something is said regarding any of these issues

in the future.” App. 1121. The manager referred Steiner to the human resources

department. Steiner discussed his concerns with management on a few more occasions in

the following weeks and months. But he waited until August 7, 2018, to formally accuse

Norris of harassment.

       Sharon Coating and the Union formed another joint committee to investigate

Steiner’s formal complaint (the “2018 Joint Committee”). After interviewing Steiner,

Norris, and 13 other witnesses, the 2018 Joint Committee unanimously concluded that

“[m]ost of what . . . Steiner provided as examples of how [Norris] [was] acting towards

                                             7
him could be validated in testimony from others” and “referred [the matter] to

management for resolution.” 9

       Sharon Coating suspended Norris while it decided how to resolve the matter.

Three days later, on September 24, managers in the human resources department

exchanged an email outlining occasions when Norris may have violated company rules.

The managers did not limit their review to Norris’s treatment of Steiner and considered

several other issues, such as an occasion when Norris allegedly failed to timely report a

work-related injury. The managers also accused Norris of “coercion” because she tried to

“change people’s minds and get them to be on her side” while the 2018 Joint

Committee’s investigation was ongoing even though Taborek forbade Norris from

discussing the investigation with co-workers. App. 204.

       On September 26, Sharon Coating held a discharge meeting with Norris and her

union representative. During that meeting, Norris had an opportunity to respond to the

9
  App. 1000. The Union could not “agree to any form of discipline because [it]
represents the party being disciplined.” App. 199.

                                             8
allegations against her. Management considered all available options but decided that

termination was appropriate.

       Two days later, on September 28, Sharon Coating terminated Norris. In a letter,

Sharon Coating stated that Norris was being terminated for cause because she created a

hostile work environment and broke other company rules.

       E.     The District Court Grants Summary Judgment

       After exhausting her administrative remedies, Norris filed the operative complaint

in the District Court. The complaint alleged that Appellees violated Title VII and the

PHRA by (1) subjecting Norris to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex,

(2) terminating Norris for misconduct that would not have resulted in termination for a

male comparator, and (3) terminating Norris to retaliate against her for reporting sex

discrimination.

       The District Court granted Appellees summary judgment on all counts. Among

other things, the Court held that Norris failed to adduce evidence of severe or pervasive

harassment or that Appellees relied on pretext to justify her termination. Norris appealed.

                                             9
II.    DISCUSSION 10

       Norris argues that the District Court erred by granting summary judgment on her

hostile-workplace, sex-discrimination, and retaliation claims. We address each claim

below. 11

       A.    The Hostile-Workplace Claim

       Title VII prohibits “[s]exual harassment that creates a hostile workplace.” Starnes

v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 971 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Meritor

Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). To establish a hostile-workplace

claim Norris must show, among other things, that she experienced “severe or pervasive”

“discrimination.” Nitkin, 67 F.4th at 570 (quoting Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp.,

10
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a). This Court
has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Samuel Grossi &
Sons, 49 F.4th at 345 (citing Cranbury Brick Yard, LLC v. United States, 943 F.3d 701,
708 (3d Cir. 2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and [Appellees] [are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(quoting Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020), amended by, 979
F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2020)). When making that determination, “we view the facts in the
light most favorable to [Norris] and draw all reasonable inferences in [her] favor.” Id.
(cleaned up) (quoting Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. St. Sys. of Higher Ed., 470
F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). “We may affirm on any basis supported by the record,
even if it departs from the District Court’s rationale.” TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d
259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089
& n.10 (3d Cir. 1988)).
11
  “Claims under the [PHRA] [generally] are interpreted coextensively with Title VII
claims.” Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67 F.4th 565, 569 n.1 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting
Atkinson v. LaFayette Coll., 460 F.3d 447, 454 n.6 (3d Cir. 2006)). For simplicity, and
because there are no relevant differences between federal and state law, the following
discussion focuses on Norris’s Title VII claims.

                                            10
706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013)). Discrimination is severe or pervasive only if it is so

“extreme” that it “amount[s] to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (collecting cases). As such,

“[t]he mere utterance of an epithet, joke, or inappropriate taunt that may cause offense

does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII liability.”

Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Schwapp v. Town of

Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997)).

       Norris relies on the following incidents—which occurred during a roughly five-

year period from 2014 to 2018—to show severe or pervasive discrimination: (1) on about

ten occasions, co-workers used a sex-based slur to refer to Norris; (2) co-workers

smashed a coffee cup and chairs that belonged to Norris and threw away her coat or

jacket; and (3) on one occasion, someone posted pornography next to Norris’s locker.

       This Court’s opinion in Nitkin held that similar allegations were insufficient, as a

matter of law, to establish severe or pervasive discrimination. In that case, a female nurse

practitioner identified seven specific instances over three-and-a-half years when a male

lead doctor made inappropriate sexual comments about women generally, and the

plaintiff in particular. See 67 F.4th at 568. Among other things, the plaintiff adduced

evidence that:

          • “[T]he Lead Doctor would complain about his prostatitis, which he
            claimed ‘was due to having sex with loose women,’ and that ‘his
            wife was a loose woman,’ and that ‘he had sex with loose women’”;

          • “[D]uring a meeting where a coworker disclosed trauma that she
            experienced as a young girl, the Lead Doctor told a story about how
            he ‘had a date with a woman, and she took all her clothes off and

                                             11
              wanted to act like a tiger’ but then later stated that the incident
              occurred ‘while he was baby-sitting’ a young girl”;

          • “[T]he Lead Doctor said that a hospital visitor had ‘big fake tits,’
            and that ‘women who have big tits either show them off or hide
            them’”;

          • On an “early morning,” the Lead Doctor “entered [the plaintiff’s]
            office ‘looking terrible’” and told the plaintiff “that he was up all
            night the night before struggling with his sex addiction and
            masturbation addiction, and that he was watching pornography all
            night.” “[O]ut of fear for her personal safety,” the plaintiff “locked
            herself in her office bathroom for several minutes until other
            coworkers arrived”; and

          • “[T]he Lead Doctor told [the plaintiff] that a male patient ‘would
            like to be alone with her. The patient would probably really like
            that.’ [The plaintiff] interpreted this comment as the Lead Doctor
            ‘talking about a patient who basically want[ed] [her] alone because
            the Lead Doctor[] [was] thinking about having sexual relations with
            [her].’”

Id. at 568 (cleaned up).

       The Court held that these comments—while “obnoxious, unprofessional, and

inappropriate”—were insufficient as a matter of law to establish severe or pervasive

discrimination. Id. at 571–73. To arrive at that conclusion, the Court focused on “the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct” and “the nature and severity of the misconduct,

including whether it involved ‘physically threatening or humiliating [acts], or . . . mere

offensive utterance[s].’” Id. 571–72 (alterations in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Applying those factors, the Court held that “[t]he

relative infrequency of the [male doctor’s] remarks—reflecting one or two statements in a

given six-month period—indicate[d] that his actions were not severe or pervasive

harassment.” Id. at 571 (citing Ali v. Woodbridge Twp. Sch. Dist., 957 F.3d 174, 182 (3d

                                              12
Cir. 2020)). The Court also held that “[t]he misconduct in this case [was] . . . a far cry

from that we have previously deemed ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive’” because, “although the

[male doctor’s] remarks were obnoxious, unprofessional, and inappropriate, he never

threatened [the plaintiff], touched her, or propositioned her for a date or sex.” Id. at 572

(collecting cases). 12

       Nitkin compels the conclusion that Norris has failed to adduce evidence of severe

or pervasive discrimination. The harassing conduct Norris identified occurred with

“relative infrequency,” see id. at 571, as she recounted, over a roughly five-year period,

about ten occasions when co-workers used sex-based slurs, two or three occasions when

someone destroyed her property, and one occasion when someone posted pornography

near her locker. Moreover, this alleged conduct—while troubling and inappropriate—did

not involve “touching, threats, [or] propositions of sex,” see id. at 572 n.4, and generally

was not directed at Norris while she was present. 13 Of course, a plaintiff need not be

12
  Nitkin clarified that “touching, threats, propositions of sex, or requests for dates[] are
[not] necessary to demonstrate a hostile work environment; other verbal comments can
suffice where they are sufficiently severe or pervasive,” such as conduct that is
“physically threatening or humiliating.” Id. at 572 n.4 (collecting cases). That direction
does not change our analysis because Norris failed to adduce evidence of physically
threatening or humiliating verbal comments for the reasons provided below.
13
  Norris asserts that “the physical destruction of [her] personal items . . . amount[ed] to
physically threatening and obviously work-disrupting behavior.” Opening Br. 32. But
she neither explains why it would be reasonable to infer that this conduct was threatening
nor cites any evidence or legal authorities to support that assertion in the argument
section of her opening brief.

                                             13
present for conduct to be harassing. 14 And conduct can make a workplace hostile even if

it was not directed at the plaintiff. 15 But the fact that nearly all of this alleged conduct

was not directed at Norris while she was present suggests that it was neither severe nor

pervasive. Norris also conceded that employees at the steel mill “were always ‘stirring

the pot . . .’ and ‘picking on’ each other,’” and that male “co-workers all called each other

names and made comments to each other that were not directed at [Norris].” App. 154–

55. This context suggests that co-workers were not singling out Norris in particular when

they used slurs to refer to her. 16

       Accordingly, the District Court correctly held that the handful of specific alleged

instances of harassment that Norris identified—while offensive and discriminatory—

were insufficient, alone or in the aggregate, to establish severe or pervasive

14
  See, e.g., Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The mere fact
that [the plaintiff] was not present when a racially derogatory comment was made will
not render that comment irrelevant to his hostile work environment claim.”).
15
  See, e.g., Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A]
plaintiff may show that, while she was not personally subjected to harassing conduct, her
working conditions were nevertheless altered as a result of witnessing a defendant’s
hostility towards other women at the workplace.” (citing Lehman v. Toys R Us, Inc., 626
A.2d 445, 457 (N.J. 1993))).
16
  Norris argues that Nitkin is not on point because “it involved much less egregious
behavior that described the personal circumstances of the alleged harasser, rather than
describing the alleged victim in derogatory terms.” Reply Br. 7 n.1. But at least one of
the male doctor’s comments in Nitkin implicitly described the plaintiff in sexual terms.
See 67 F.4th at 568. Thus, the fact that Norris has identified comments that referred to
her specifically, as opposed to women generally, does not provide a basis to distinguish
this case from Nitkin.

                                              14
discrimination under controlling precedent. 17 Thus, Appellees are entitled to summary

judgment on Norris’s hostile-workplace claim.

       B.     The Sex-Discrimination Claim

       “Title VII forbids employers ‘to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Jones v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,

796 F.3d 323, 325 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)).

       Sex-discrimination claims are analyzed under the three-step McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. See generally Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425–27

(3d Cir. 2013). Under the first step, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. Id. at 426. If a “plaintiff makes out her prima facie case, ‘the burden of

production [then] shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate non-discriminatory

[justification] for the adverse employment action.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 2009)) (citing Simpson v. Kay

Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998)). If the employer

provides a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, “the burden of production”

“shifts . . . back to the plaintiff to provide evidence from which a factfinder could

17
  Norris asserts that the District Court erred by “considering each” instance of
harassment “in isolation.” Opening Br. 25. That critique cannot be squared with the
District Court’s opinion, which explained that the conduct Norris identified was not
“sufficiently severe or pervasive” “in the aggregate” to establish a hostile-workplace
claim. See, e.g., Norris, 2022 WL 11264627, at *15 (emphasis added).

                                             15
reasonably infer that the employer’s proffered justification is merely a pretext for

discrimination.” Id. (collecting cases).

       Norris claims that Appellees engaged in sex discrimination because they would

not have terminated a similarly situated male employee for engaging in the same

misconduct. The parties dispute whether Norris can establish a prima facie claim of sex

discrimination. We need not resolve that issue, however, because Appellees have carried

their burden of production under step two of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework to offer a nondiscriminatory justification for terminating Norris. And Norris

has failed to rebut that showing with evidence of pretext. See generally Burton, 707 F.3d

at 426–27 (collecting cases).

       To establish pretext, Norris must show that Appellees’ “proffered non-

discriminatory reasons” for her termination were “either a post hoc fabrication or

otherwise did not actually motivate [that] employment action.” Kautz v. Met-Pro Corp.,

412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.

1994)) (citing Logue v. Int’l Rehab. Assocs., Inc., 837 F.2d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Norris argues that she has adduced evidence of pretext for three reasons. First, Appellees

purportedly “subjected Norris, the only woman in her work area, to discipline for acts

[that they] permitted other, male, employees to do.” Opening Br. 44. Second, “the 2018

Joint Committee [purportedly] was conducted in a peculiar manner that gives rise to a

suspicion that its outcome was orchestrated to further Appellees’ pretext.” Id. Third,

Appellees purportedly “had to search for a rationale to justify Norris’s termination after

                                             16
already having disciplined her by placing her on a five-day suspension.” Id. But none of

these points show pretext.

       Regarding the first point, Norris’s assertion that male employees were not

disciplined for engaging in similar conduct is false. Appellees disciplined Confer for

breaking the company’s anti-harassment rule by suspending him, temporarily reassigning

him to a different part of the facility, and requiring that he sign a last-chance agreement.

       Perhaps Norris means that Appellees disciplined her more harshly than male

comparators because Appellees allowed Confer to keep his job “after being deemed

guilty of harassing [Norris].” Opening Br. 26. This selective-discipline argument is

unavailing, however, because Norris failed to adduce evidence that Confer was deemed

to have violated multiple company rules and, thus, was a proper comparator. See In re

Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that comparators must

be “similarly[] situated in all respects” and have “engaged in the same conduct” as the

plaintiff (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th

Cir. 1992))). In her opening brief, Norris asserts that Confer was a proper comparator

because he “worked in the same department,” was “employed in [a] substantially similar

position[],” and also was “accused” of violating the company’s anti-harassment rule.

Opening Br. 41. None of the points address how Confer can be a proper comparator

considering that Norris was deemed to have violated multiple plant rules, including by

allegedly engaging in harassing behavior regarding two co-workers, while Confer’s only

                                             17
documented misconduct charge was his violation of the company’s anti-harassment rule

with respect to Norris.

       On reply, Norris suggests that the Court should disregard her other alleged rule

violations because they were the product of “one-sided rhetoric from the very group of

people harassing and discriminating against [her].” Opening Br. 19. Again, this

argument does not address how Confer could be “similarly situated in all respects” to

Norris despite the lack of evidence that he was deemed to have broken multiple company

rules. See In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d at 403. And—notwithstanding Norris’s

assertion to the contrary—there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Norris was

deemed to have violated multiple company rules, in addition to her alleged harassing

behavior regarding Steiner, when Norris allegedly (1) engaged in harassing behavior

regarding Confer, (2) tried to get people to take her side while the 2018 Joint

Committee’s investigation was ongoing, despite being ordered not to discuss the

investigation with co-workers, and (3) falsely reported Steiner for fighting with a

customer.

       Thus, Norris has failed to show that she adduced evidence capable of supporting a

reasonable inference that Confer was a proper comparator. And, as such, there is no

                                             18
reason to infer that Appellees’ decision to offer Confer a last-chance agreement, but not

Norris, can show pretext. 18

       Norris’s second point is that the 2018 Joint Committee’s formation was “peculiar”

because Appellees waited more than 100 days after receiving Steiner’s informal

complaint to launch a joint committee. Opening Br. 44. Appellees offered a

nondiscriminatory explanation for this delay: Steiner did not wish to file a formal

complaint when he first reported Norris’s harassment in April 2018. And Sharon Coating

formed the 2018 Joint Committee after Steiner changed his mind and decided to formally

accuse Norris of harassment. The District Court made this point below when analyzing

identical arguments related to Norris’s retaliation claim. Norris, 2022 WL 11264627, at

*20. Norris offers no substantive response to these points on appeal and fails to cite any

evidence indicating that the 2018 Joint Committee’s formation deviated from past

18
  Norris also suggests that Steiner is a proper comparator because he allegedly spoke to
co-workers about the 2018 Joint Committee’s investigation while it was ongoing, but was
not disciplined. Norris cites no evidence that Steiner was found to have harassed co-
workers or engaged in other serious misconduct. Thus, Steiner is not a proper
comparator because his alleged misconduct was materially different—in type and
degree—from Norris’s alleged harassing behavior regarding Confer and Steiner. See
generally In re Tribune, 902 F.3d at 403.

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practices. 19 Thus, we see no reason to conclude that Appellees’ delay in forming the

2018 Joint Committee can show pretext.

       Norris’s third, and final, point is that Appellees purportedly “did not have a

legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to terminate” her when they suspended her, so they

had to “search[] for additional violations . . . to buttress their already-made decision.”

Opening Br. 45. But Appellees did not need to search for a new rationale to terminate

Norris. The 2018 Joint Committee already did that work by uncovering Norris’s

treatment of Steiner, which Appellees cited as the primary reason for her termination.

Moreover, Norris fails to explain why she could not have been suspended and terminated

for the same misconduct. Appellees’ “typical procedure [was] to have a meeting” with

an employee and their union representative “[w]hen an employee is facing potential

termination.” App. 200. Thus, there is no reason to infer anything nefarious from the

fact that Norris was suspended pending termination for engaging in the same core

misconduct.

       Finally, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Norris was found to have

engaged in nearly all of the alleged conduct that led to her termination, including falsely

accusing Steiner of fighting with a customer and trying to get people to take her side

19
  For example, Norris stresses that Sharon Coating did not launch a joint committee in
April 2018 even though Steiner informally reported the same harassing behavior that
purportedly led to Norris’s suspension and dismissal. But Norris cites no evidence that
Appellees have investigated other instances of misconduct when an employee does not
wish to file a formal complaint. And Norris offers no evidence that Steiner’s complaint
was not genuine or that Appellees exaggerated their concern about Steiner’s allegations
to disguise discriminatory animus.

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while the 2018 Joint Committee’s investigation was ongoing. Norris tries to explain why

these actions were justified or did not warrant termination. But the pretext inquiry is

about “whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer,” not whether “the

employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765 (collecting cases).

And Norris neither casts “substantial doubt” on the reasons that Appellees provided for

her termination nor offers evidence that her sex factored into that decision. Cf. id. at 764

n.7 (emphasis added). Thus, the District Court did not err by granting summary

judgment on the sex-discrimination claim because Norris failed to adduce evidence of

pretext.

       C.     The Retaliation Claim

       Norris’s final claim is that Appellees violated Title VII by terminating her because

she reported sexual harassment. The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework

applies to retaliation claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531,

536 n.3 (3d Cir. 2021). Norris relies on the same arguments that she made with respect to

the sex-discrimination claim to establish pretext for her retaliation claim. Those

arguments are unpersuasive for the reasons provided above. Thus, Appellees are entitled

to summary judgment on the retaliation claim for the same reasons that they are entitled

to summary judgment on the sex-discrimination claim.

III.   CONCLUSION

       For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting

Appellees summary judgment.

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