Court Opinion

ID: 9516576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:45:41.401775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:38.116987
License: Public Domain

KERN, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
The pertinent law regarding juror misconduct as applied to the particular facts of this case constrains me from joining the majority’s opinion.1 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority correctly points out, this court follows Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), for the principle that “[wjhere a claim of juror partiality is made, ‘the remedy ... is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.’ ” Harris v. United States, 606 A.2d 763, 765 (D.C.1992) (quoting Shannon & Luchs Management Co. v. Roberts, 447 A.2d 37, 41 (D.C.1982)). While the preservation of the defendant’s opportunity to prove bias is a guarantee of his right to an impartial jury,
due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable. The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.
Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946.
The trial judge has broad discretion in this area, and the exercise of such discretion will not be reversed “unless the juror’s partiality is manifest.” Harris, supra, 606 A.2d at 764 (quoting Wilburn v. United States, 340 A.2d 810, 812 (D.C.1975)). • In determining whether a particular juror can be impartial, “the trial judge must consider all circumstances and not merely accept the juror’s belief as controlling.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
The trial judge in the instant case conducted a hearing; he extensively questioned the juror in the presence of the prosecutor and the defense counsel about his visit to the scene, and whether the visit had influenced him to such an extent that it became impossible for him to render a fair verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.2 The trial court was per*687suaded by the juror’s candor and also his remorse about visiting the scene,3 and concluded, “[cjonsidering the total circumstances ... in this case ... without regard to what he saw last night, I believe ... that the outcome of this trial will not be tainted by the juror’s indiscretion in visiting the scene.”
While some courts have doubted the reliability of a juror’s declaration of his or her ability to render an unbiased verdict, “the Supreme Court has settled that such testimony is not ‘inherently suspect,’ for a juror ‘is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a certain matter.’ ” United States v. Butler, 262 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 134-35, 822 F.2d 1191, 1196-97 (1987) (quoting Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217 n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 946 n. 7)).
Additionally, the trial court in acknowledging the importance of the lighting conditions at the time of the' offense, found several other factors which the jury could consider in weighing the identification testimony, such as the length of the encounter and the testimony of both prosecution and defense witnesses. In particular, two of the defense witnesses testified that the conditions of visibility on the scene were “light” at night due to the illumination of the street lights. One defense witness, in particular, stated that given the lighting conditions “I could read a license plate.” Moreover, the evidence against appellant was strong: (1) the undercover officer testified to appellant’s presence in the drug transaction; (2) the undercover officer provided an immediate description of appellant; (3) an immediate arrest was made; and (4) the marked funds were found on appellant’s confederate.
The trial court was better positioned to determine the juror’s credibility than is this court upon the cold record. I am unable to conclude, based on the record, that the juror’s response, i.e., that he could decide the case on the evidence presented at trial without considering his own observations, was so inherently incredible under the circumstances as to warrant a rejection of the trial court’s finding based on its observation of the juror and its evaluation of credibility made during the voir dire. As the majority noted, “[o]ur review is deferential because the question of prejudice turns substantially on the judge’s appraisal of the juror’s demeanor, ... and is therefore one about which the trial judge is ‘especially qualified to render a sound opinion.’ ” Leeper v. United States, 579 A.2d 695, 698 (D.C.1990) (quoting Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 805 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 901, 100 S.Ct. 1824, 64 L.Ed.2d 253 (1980)); see also Harris, supra, 606 A.2d at 763 (no abuse of discretion by trial judge’s refusal to strike juror for cause in an action for armed robbery where the trial judge had opportunity to evaluate the juror’s demeanor and concluded that she could be impartial when juror previously was a victim of an armed robbery but claimed that while the incident was traumatizing, “the juror described herself as an ‘analytical person’ who could ‘deal with the facts’ ”).
Based on the facts of this particular case, I disagree with the majority that the trial court’s decision represents an “extreme situation! ] threatening a miscarriage of justice,” Beale v. United States, 465 A.2d 796, 799 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1293, 79 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), if not reversed. I defer to the trial court’s conclusion based on its opportunity to evaluate the juror’s demeanor during the extensive voir dire it properly conducted, see Harris, supra, 606 A.2d at 765, and *688therefore would affirm its decision that the outcome of the trial was not tainted as to warrant another trial.

. In essence, the prosecution’s case consisted of testimony (1) by an undercover officer that he was standing at approximately arms-length from appellant and his two compatriots and then purchased cocaine from them; and (2) by the arresting officer that, within a minute or two of receiving descriptions of a radio call by the purchasing officer of the race, gender, and dothing of the cocaine sellers, he arrested appellant and two others because they matched these descriptions. Upon arrest the police discovered that one of appellant’s confederates had on his person the marked bill the first officer had used to pay for the drugs.

. The majority expressed concern about the juror’s communication to the other jurors with *687respect to his visit to the area reasoning that "the fact of disclosure to the other jurors ... is a factor that must be given weight in our assessment of prejudice.” See Part III. However, in response to the trial court’s question to the juror about the content of his communication to the other jurors concerning his visit to the scene, the juror stated, "[ajctually, I didn’t get into it. All I said is — I stood up and opened up the chart and I said, ‘I went to the area last night.’” Thus, the weight of “the disclosure” is clearly de minimis.

. At the voir dire, the juror admitted that “I just drove through Wiley Street. I didn’t stop anywhere in particular." He apologized:
None of us was told not to go in the area, so I had — I did not know. And I am sorry if I inconvenienced anyone or done anything wrong.