Court Opinion

ID: 9385705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 21:00:24.69931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.076016
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4002

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff − Appellee,

                     v.

        JEAN BUTEAU REMARQUE,

                            Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Stephanie A. Gallagher, District Judge. (8:19−cr−00039−SAG−1)

        Submitted: January 19, 2023                                       Decided: April 6, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Bernard V. Kleinman, LAW OFFICE OF BERNARD V. KLEINMAN
        PLLC, Somers, New York, for Appellant. Erek L. Barron, United States Attorney,
        Baltimore, Maryland, Timothy F. Hagan, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, John M.
        Blumenschein, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Jean Buteau Remarque appeals his conviction and sentence for two counts of receipt

        of child pornography and one count of possession of child pornography. Although he

        confessed his crimes to an investigating officer, Remarque went to trial, where a jury found

        him guilty on all counts.     The district court’s sentence varied downward from the

        Guidelines range. On appeal, Remarque argues that (1) his indictment was deficient, (2)

        he was denied a speedy trial, (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of receipt

        of child pornography, (4) the affidavit that led to the government’s search warrants was

        deficient, and (5) the district court’s sentence was substantively unreasonable. Finding no

        error, we affirm.

               Rather than reciting the full factual and procedural history here, we discuss the

        relevant aspects below as they relate to each of Remarque’s arguments on appeal.

                                                     I.

               First, Remarque argues that his possession charge is multiplicitous of his receipt

        charges because of a lack of factual allegations in the indictment. But the operative Third

        Superseding Indictment lists the date and time for Remarque’s two receipt charges, which

        are distinct from the date of the possession charge (the date the agents searched Remarque’s

        apartment and found child pornography). United States v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 373 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (possession and receipt charges “are not multiplicitous” when they “involve

        different conduct on different dates”). And as in Fall, there were many more files at issue

        in Remarque’s possession charge than in the two receipt charges, such that “any overlap

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        . . . is much too small to warrant a finding that the offense conduct charged in [the

        possession count] was in fact the same as that charged in the receipt counts.” Id. at 374.

        So the district court correctly held there was no multiplicity issue.

                 We also reject Remarque’s argument that his indictment doesn’t allege mens rea, as

        the Third Superseding Indictment states he “did knowingly” receive and possess child

        pornography.     J.A. 213, 214, 215 (emphasis added).        Remarque is correct that the

        knowledge requirement applies both to “the sexually explicit nature of the materials as well

        as . . . the involvement of minors in the materials’ production.” United States v. Miltier,

        882 F.3d 81, 86 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). But his indictment doesn’t have to spell that

        out in detail. Rather, indictments need only “allege each element of the offense, so that

        fair notice is provided.” United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471, 490 (4th Cir. 2003).

        Remarque doesn’t challenge the district court’s finding that he was sufficiently on notice

        of his charges. So this argument fails, too.

                                                       II.

                 Next, Remarque argues that his trial was illegally delayed. He raises only a

        constitutional challenge, appearing to concede that his trial accorded with the Speedy Trial

        Act. 1

                 That’s for good reason, because on all but 43 days between his initial appearance
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        and his trial, there was either at least one pending motion or an “ends of justice” exclusion
        because of COVID-19. On some days, both exceptions applied. Those 43 countable days
        are well within the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h).

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               Remarque doesn’t challenge the trial delays attributable to the COVID-19

        pandemic. Rather, he faults the government for taking too long (ten months) to respond to

        the motions to suppress he filed thirteen days after his initial appearance. This, he argues,

        pushed the trial into the pandemic, leading to unconstitutional delays that could have been

        avoided if the government had timely responded.

               But we agree with the district court that the government’s response was timely under

        the court’s routine scheduling practices. And guided by the factors laid out in Barker v.

        Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32 (1972)—the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the

        defendant’s responsibility to assert his right, and prejudice—we agree with the district

        court that Remarque did not suffer a constitutional speedy-trial violation. At bottom, most

        of the delay is not the fault of the government, but rather is attributable to Remarque’s own

        decision to change counsel repeatedly—and, we would add, to file dozens of pretrial

        motions—along with the COVID-19 pandemic, which neither party could foresee.

                                                    III.

               Despite his confession, Remarque challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

        underlying his two receipt convictions. He asserts there was insufficient evidence that he

        (1) actually received images, (2) received them in interstate commerce, (3) knew they were

        sexually explicit or involved minors, (4) received depictions of real children, or (5)

        received the images in Maryland. But the trial record forecloses his arguments. There was

        “substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support” his

        convictions. Fall, 955 F.3d at 375.

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               First, substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Remarque received the

        two images at issue. The jury heard a recorded confession in which Remarque admitted to

        Department of Homeland Security Special Agent Christine Carlson that he’d used his

        phone to view and save images of child pornography. The jury also heard from a forensic

        expert who testified that the two images at issue were screenshots taken on an Android

        phone from the internet and transferred to a USB drive that Remarque admitted was his.

               Second, substantial evidence likewise supported the federal nexus, interstate

        commerce. Using the internet satisfies this element. See Fall, 955 F.3d at 375. And the

        government “introduced evidence that, taken together, would allow a reasonable juror to

        conclude that the two files” came “from the internet.” Miltier, 882 F.3d at 88. Remarque

        confessed that he used his phone to access 4-Share, which he called both a “platform” and

        a “website.” See, e.g., J.A. 330–31; S.J.A. 25–28, 32–34. Forensic evidence backed this

        up, as several images showed partial web addresses.          And Agent Carlson testified

        specifically about the two images underlying the receipt charges, explaining that they were

        screenshots from a phone connected to Wi-Fi. One screenshot showed a partial URL. With

        this record, a reasonable juror could find that Remarque used the internet on his phone to

        access the two images and screenshot them.

               Third, substantial evidence supported a finding that Remarque acted knowingly with

        respect to both the images’ sexually explicit nature and the fact that they involved minors.

        The jury had Remarque’s confession to Agent Carlson, in which he even expressly

        acknowledged that he knew the images were illegal. S.J.A. 29 (“I know. I know.”); S.J.A.

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        37 (“Yeah, the act is illegal, yeah.”).    He also described being “addicted” to child

        pornography. S.J.A. 35.

               Fourth, Remarque’s argument that there was insufficient proof the images “depicted

        a real child,” Appellant’s Br. at 28, is similarly meritless. Agent Carlson provided

        unrebutted trial testimony that all images shown at the trial—including the two Remarque

        was charged with receiving—were database-verified images of identified children.

               Finally, Remarque’s argument that the government never proved venue in Maryland

        likewise fails. The search that produced the contraband, including the images in the receipt

        charges, took place in Remarque’s apartment in Greenbelt, Maryland. Remarque told

        Agent Carlson he lived there, and his laptop and USB drive were recovered there. At the

        very least, this is substantial circumstantial evidence that Remarque committed the

        “essential conduct” of receipt in Maryland. United States v. Sterling, 860 F.3d 233, 241

        (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that circumstantial evidence of venue, supported by the record as

        a whole, is sufficient).

                                                    IV.

               Next, Remarque challenges the search warrants that uncovered his offenses. We

        hold that Agent Carlson’s affidavit, attached to the warrant applications, established

        probable cause under a “totality-of-the-circumstances analysis,” consistent “with the

        practical, common-sense decision demanded of the magistrate.” Massachusetts v. Upton,

        466 U.S. 727, 732 (1984) (per curiam) (cleaned up).

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               The warrants were based on the personal knowledge of a named informant,

        Remarque’s then-wife, Wanna Remarque. Remarque challenges Wanna’s credibility, but

        she was a named informant—not an anonymous one—who described her personal

        knowledge of the facts. Cf. United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 462 (4th Cir. 2004)

        (“Unlike an anonymous tipster, an informant who meets face-to-face with an officer

        provides the officer with an opportunity to assess his credibility and demeanor and also

        exposes himself to accountability for making a false statement.” (cleaned up)). And Agent

        Carlson independently corroborated several facts she learned from Wanna, including

        Remarque’s address, the kind of car he drove, his current job and employment history, and

        even what his cell phone looked like. Wanna also described images she personally saw in

        Remarque’s possession, and her description left no room to doubt that those images were

        child pornography.

               At bottom, the affidavit supported probable cause. But even if the affidavit had

        fallen short of probable cause, the district court correctly denied suppression because good-

        faith reliance on the warrants was objectively reasonable. See Fall, 955 F.3d at 371.

                                                     V.

               Finally, Remarque challenges the factual basis for his sentence enhancements and

        argues that his below-Guidelines sentence was substantively unreasonable. We find both

        arguments to lack merit.

               The district court conducted its own review of the images at issue and rejected

        Remarque’s challenges to: (1) the number-of-images enhancement because the district

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        court counted them, (2) the use-of-computer enhancement because there was evidence

        linking Remarque’s phone, laptop, and USB drive, (3) the sadistic/masochistic

        enhancement because the court found depictions of children being bound, and (4) the

        prepubescent enhancement because the court found a pornographic image of a baby. Given

        these findings by the district court, which Remarque doesn’t and can’t meaningfully

        challenge, applying these enhancements wasn’t an abuse of discretion. Cf. Gall v. United

        States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–52 (2007) (“The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find

        facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”). Nor were the district

        court’s findings clearly erroneous. United States v. Barnett, 48 F.4th 216, 219 (4th Cir.

        2022).

                 Remarque’s argument that his below-Guidelines sentence is substantively

        unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) is also unfounded. While he argues his case

        involved a shorter time span and fewer images than more egregious child-pornography

        cases, the district court’s downward variance accounts for this. The record shows proper

        consideration of the parties’ positions and the factors relevant to the case, so we see no

        abuse of discretion with respect to the sentence’s substantive reasonableness. United States

        v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). 2

                Remarque raises other challenges to his conviction and sentence, but we find none
                 2

        to have merit.

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                                                    VI.

               We affirm the district court’s judgment. And we dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        Court and argument would not aid in our decision.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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