Court Opinion

ID: 9639304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:11:54.39653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:11.980869
License: Public Domain

STONE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the majority that the indictment is sufficient. I am compelled to dissent from that portion of the opinion reversing the ease because of- the admission of evidence procured through thé seareh and seizure. Without expressing any opinion as to the lawfulness of the search and seizure, I think there was no reversible error (if error), because this record convinces me that no prejudice could possibly have resulted from reception of the evidence gained by the seareh and seizure.
Not only has it long been the judicial appellate practice to regard nonprejudicial errors as insufficient for reversal (Lancaster v. Collins, 115 U. S. 222, 227, 6 S. Ct. 33, 29 L. Ed. 373), but all federal appellate courts are under the statutory injunction to disregard errors, in criminal as well ás civil cases, where an examination of the entire record shows they “do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” 28 USCA § 391. “The rule that harmless error is not reversible error is upheld as well in criminal eases * * * though, doubtless, the question of prejudice in such ease must be resolved in conformity with the strict principles of the criminal law.” Brown v. U. S., 142 F. 1, 4, Seventh Circuit. “In reviewing a judgment in an appellate court, the burden is on the plaintiff in error to show that error in the ad'mission of testimony was prejudicial” [Marron v. U. S., 18 F.(2d) 218, 219, Ninth Circuit; Simpson v. U. S., 289 F. 188, 191, Ninth Circuit; and to the same effect, Trope v. U. S., 276 F. 348, 351, this court; Rich v. U. S., 271 F. 566, 570, this court; Haywood v. U. S., 268 F. 795, 798, Seventh Circuit]. “Whether prejudice results from the erroneous admission of evidence at a trial is a question that should not be considered abstractly or by way of detachment. The question is one of practical effect, when the trial as a whole and all the circumstances of the proofs are regarded.” Williams v. U. S., 265 F. 625, this court. In determining this .“practical effect” of challenged evidence, some situations have arisen sufficiently often to give rise to certain rules of application, One such rule is that where the facts covered by the challenged evidence are, elsewhere in the trial, admitted by the defendant, testified to by him or his witness, or clearly estab-*335hshed by other evidence, there is no prejudice. This rule has been repeatedly announced and applied in the Supreme Court (Holt v. U. S., 218 U. S. 245, 251, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138), in this court1 and in other circuits.2 This rule is accurately applicable to all of the evidence secured through the- search and seizure in the present case, as will now he shown.
This indictment and conviction was for the transportation, in an Oldsmobile coupé, of “moonshine whiskey” from a highway “to the farm known ás the Peter Kroska farm.” The main evidence for the government was by two prohibition agents. While driving along a highway which ran past the Kroska farm, these agents observed an Oldsmobile coupe turn into that farm about 287 feet from the Kroska house. At the time they saw the ear it was about three or four city blocks in front of them. The car passed out of their sight behind a bend in the farm roadway. They proceeded directly in to the farmyard after the ear, and found it parked in front of the farm house. They stopped their car behind the Oldsmobile. The rear deck of the Oldsmobile was raised several inches, revealing two kegs. The agents detected the odor of moonshine whisky, which they ascertained was leaking from one of the kegs. One of the agents guarded the ear while the other entered the house and found appellant, whom he arrested and brought out to where the car was. Appellant admitted owning the car, but denied having driven it in. Confronted with the fact that the motor of the car was still hot, he admitted he had driven the car in about two minutes before with the *336whisky in it, and said he had bought the whisky from an unnamed person and was going to deliver it to some “soft drink” places. The agents filled a bottle with whis-ky from one of the kegs and destroyed the remainder of the liquor. The preceding is the main evidence of the government’s ease in chief. There was extended cross-examination of the agents upon all of the above facts. Thereafter, appellant took the stand and also introduced several other witnesses, including his uncle, brother, and mother, who were at the place while the agents were there. Appellant testified as follows:
“After dinner, when we were ready for work, a Ford sedan drove in the yard, about one o’clock. I went outside, and I spoke to the fellow, a man that owed me money for some tires; his name was Jack Paulson. I spoke to him; he said he did not have no money, but he brought the liquor in, in place of the money. He brought two ten-gallon kegs. I told him I did not need the whisky, but as long as he brought it — well, I will take it off of his hands, if he did not have the money. It was placed in the Oldsmobile; it was in the back; the two kegs were across this way (indicating) towards the street; about that far from the rear (indicating). I smelt it; it was like whiskey, moonshine.
“By the Court:
“Q. What did he tell you it was; what did he say it was? A. Well, when I smelt of it, it was like moonshine. After these two kegs were placed in the rear of this ear I closed the cover clean down shut, and I turned the knob, so that it was closed.^ * * *
“And then he [one of the agents] asked me if the Oldsmobile coupe was mine, and I told him 'Yes.’ And then he asked me where did I get the liquor. I told him a man brought it out with a Ford sedan at one o’clock. He asked me what. I was going to do with it. I told him I was going to take it by the bam, towards evening.”
His uncle and his brother testified to seeing the kegs of whisky in the car at the time the officers were there. Appellant denied telling the officers that he had driven the car in shortly before, and said the car had not been driven since the night before. His other witnesses testified that the car had not been driven that day.
From the above outline of the evidence, several matters are clear. One is that there was no disputed issue of fact as to the two kegs of moonshine whisky being in the Oldsmobile car parked in front of the house, nor that the car and the whisky belonged to appellant. Appellant directly admitted that the car and whisky were his and that the whisky was in the ear. Another is that the sole disputed issue of fact for the jury to decide was whether appellant had transported the whisky in the car. He denied that the ear had been used that day. The agents testified they had closely followed it into the farmyard that afternoon.
In this state of the evidence, what prejudice was suffered by appellant through evidence based on information obtained by the search and seizure? The evidence so obtained was that the ear contained two kegs of moonshine whisky. Appellant and his witnesses voluntarily testified to those facts. There was never any dispute in the evidence about that. An examination of the numerous cases cited in the preceding footnotes will not reveal a single one stronger than the facts of this case, and most of them are not so strong. Aside from this unbroken line of authorities dealing with similar situations, it is impossible for me to conceive any prejudice from proof of an admitted and entirely undisputed fact.
But the majority opinion sets forth another piece of evidence. That is, that the agents testified to having examined the motor of the Oldsmobile and found it to be hot. I seriously question whether this information is -within the protection of the amendment but, solely for the purposes of argument, if it be conceded that it is, yet there remains the question of prejudicial or nonprejudiciai effect thereof. The only bearing of this evidence was upon the recent use of the car— the transportation. This evidence came solely from the two agents. The testimony of appellant and his witnesses was in direct denial, because they contended the ear had not been used since the night before. Therefore, whether the motor was hot or not depended solely upon the credibility of the two sets of witnesses. These same agents swore positively that they had seen this car turn into the farm roadway about three or four city blocks ahead of them; that they were traveling toward it at the time; that they followed, without stopping their own ear, into the farmyard and found this car, which they had just seen, parked in front of the house, which was about 287 feet from where it had turned off of the road into the farm. The entire evidence of the agents shows that the only reason they turned into the Kroska farm was to follow this car which was only a few hundred *337feet ahead of them. The other evidence of transportation is that of the agents to the effect that appellant admitted he had just driven the car in. In short, the entire evidence that this car was recently driven into the farmyard consisted of three pieces, as follows : The agents seeing it driven in and following it; the admission of appellant that he had driven it in; the evidence that the motor was still hot. All of this evidence was given by the two agents. The jury must have approved their credibility and believed them, or there was no way possibly to reach a verdict of guilty. In this situation, how can it be said that there was the slightest prejudice from the evidence as to the hot motor? Could the evidence of the agents that the motor was still hot add to their positive evidence that they had seen and closely followed this car a few hundred feet to where it was parked ? Could such evidence add to the testimony of the agents that appellant had admitted having just driven the ear in? The fact clearly is that this evidence came into the ease, not at all as proof of the ear being driven in, but it came in connection with the admission of appellant. There was never any doubt in the minds or the evidence of the agents that they had just seen this car driven into the farmyard, but when appellant denied to them that he had driven it in they faced him with this contradicting physical fact and, thereupon, he made the admission that he had driven it in. Viewing this entire situation, it is impossible for me to see how there could have been any prejudice from the admission of this piece of evidence.
But it seems to be the view of the majority that, because some of the above evidence was secured by what is deemed an unlawful search and seizure, the vice of admitting such evidence cannot be cured even though the appellant himself, or other testimony entirely nullifies the effect of such testimony. This upon the theory that the appellant cannot be said to have given his nullifying testimony voluntarily, but under the compulsion of a situation created by the erroneous action of the court. I think this view is directly contrary to authority and is dangerous to the administration of criminal justice. This court [Rossini v. U. S., 6 F.(2d) 350, 353] has held directly the contrary in a case where appellant objected to evidence of the presence of intoxicants claimed to have been found in an illegal search and seizure, saying:
“The third reason is that there was other evidence which conclusively established the presence of intoxicants. Rossini testified, without objection, that he had the liquor, but that it was for his own use. One bottle, he said, was alcohol for body rubbing purposes and that the beer was ‘near beer,’ or was bought by him for ‘near beer,’ and he had no knowledge that it was intoxicating or contained an illegal excess of alcohol. As this plaintiff in error voluntarily admitted all that the officers found under the search warrant, he could not have been substantially injured by the admission of such evidence. Without substantial prejudice therefrom, he cannot urge reversal therefor.”
Other cases to the same effect are White v. U. S., 16 F.(2d) 870, 872 (C. C. A. 9); Bilodeau v. U. S., 14 F.(2d) 582, 585 (C. C. A. 9); McFarland v. U. S., 11 F.(2d) 140, 141 (C. C. A. 9); Libera v. U. S., 299 F. 300, 301 (C. C. A. 9); Temperani v. U. S., 299 F. 365, 367 (C. C. A. 9); Malacrauis v. U. S., 299 F. 253, 255 (C. C. A. 4); Jones v. U. S., 296 F. 632 (C. C. A. 4); Savage v. U. S., 295 F. 686 (C. C. A. 4); Honeycutt v. U. S., 277 F. 941, 944 (C. C. A. 4).
I am convinced that this evidence was in no possible way prejudicial, and to so hold will have the practical effect of releasing a criminal, which the entire evidence proves clearly is guilty of the offense charged, and for which he was properly convicted.

 In this court some of the cases are the following: Norwood v. U. S., 45 F.(2d) 495, 496, where a telephone directory was improperly admitted to show partnership because no sufficient foundation laid, but the error held nonprejudicial because appellant and other testimony showed partnership; Lipscomb v. U. S., 33 F.(2d) 33, 36, where evidence of unlawful sale of liquor in a trial for perjury held nonprejudicial because the indictment charged this sale as being the basis of the suit wherein the perjury was committed; Porter v. U. S., 31 F.(2d) 544, 545, where incompetent evidence of the true name and address of appellant held nonprejudicial because appellant gave the same evidence; Sloan v. U. S., 31 F.(2d) 902, 905, where evidence as to other transactions held nonprejudicial because later appellant testified thereto; Beach v. U. S., 19 F.(2d) 739, 743, where introduction of affidavits held nonprejudicial because affiants testified to substantially the facts in the affidavits; Anderson v. U. S., 18 F.(2d) 404, 405, where evidence of alcohol found in search a short time after illegal sales, held nonprejudicial where appellant admitted the presence thereof; Havener v. U. S., 15 F.(2d) 503, 506, where parole evidence of conviction of principal offender, in the trial of an abettor, held nonprejudicial by admission of such conviction by counsel for appellant; Cooper v. U. S., 9 F.(2d) 216, 223, where testimony as to signatures of appellants on tax returns, held nonprejudicial because sufficiently established by other testimony; Ingram v. U. S., 5 F.(2d) 940, 941, where parole testimony of contents of official records, held nonprejudicial because same facts shown in testimony of appellant and one of his witnesses; Bergera v. U. S., 297 F. 102, 115, where evidence was held nonprejudicial because same facts shown by other evidence; Lucas v. U. S., 275 F. 405, 407, where a confession, introduced without proper showing that it was voluntary was held nonprejudicial because cross-examination of appellant showed it was voluntary; Kreuzer v. U. S., 254 F. 34, 38 (certiorari denied 249 U. S. 603, 39 S. Ct. 260, 63 L. Ed. 798), where testimony by a participant in a raid as to what another participant said about a barricade, held nonprejudicial where the witness testified as to what he himself saw and heard the appellant do; De Moss v. U. S., 250 F. 87, 88, where parole testimony as to a check given for liquor, held nonprejudicial because other undisputed testimony that check was given by appellant; Garanflo v. U. S., 246 F. 910, 914, where incompetent evidence held nonprejudicial because appellant testified to same matter ; Blackwell v. U. S., 236 F. 912, 913, where testimony that business of defendant on certain day was hauling whisky held nonprejudicial because admitted by appellant.

 In other circuits some of the cases are as follows: First Circuit, Thompson v. U. S., 144 F. 14, 19-20, 7 Ann. Cas. 62; Second Circuit, Becher v. U. S., 5 F.(2d) 45, 52; Third Circuit, Sibona v. U. S., 294 F. 272, 274, where admission of sample of win© from barrels found at appellant’s place held nonprejudicial because testimony by government that appellant admitted, at time of seizure, that barrels contained wine; Stern v. U. S., 193 F. 888, 896; Cook v. U. S., 159 F. 919, 922, certiorari denied 209 U. S. 551, 28 S. Ct. 761, 52 L. Ed. 922; Fourth Circuit, Malacrauis v. U. S., 299 F. 253, 255; Jones v. U. S., 296 F. 632, 634; Savage v. U. S., 295 F. 686; Bullard v. U. S., 245 F. 837, 839; Sneierson v. U. S., 264 F. 268, 275; Fifth Circuit, Williams v. U. S., 46 F.(2d) 731, 732; Benese v. U. S., 25 F.(2d) 231, 232; McLendon v. U. S., 14 F.(2d) 12, 15; Sharp v. U. S., 280 F. 86, 88, where evidence as to presence of liquor held nonprejudicial since appellant admitted its presence; Brown v. U. S., 257 F. 46, 51; Gregorat v. U. S., 249 F. 470, 472; Dean v. U. S., 246 F. 568, 574; Sixth Circuit, McDaniel v. U. S., 294 F. 769, 770 (certiorari denied 264 U. S. 593, 44 S. Ct. 453, 68 L. Ed. 866); Tucker v. U. S., 224 F. 833, 840; Seventh Circuit, Kriebel v. U. S., 8 F.(2d) 692, 696; Michael v. U. S., 7 F.(2d) 865, 866; Arnold v. U. S., 7 F.(2d) 867, 870; Brown v. U. S., 142 F. 1, 3; Ninth Circuit, Mitchell v. U. S., 23 F.(2d) 260, 263; Marron v. U. S., 18 F.(2d) 218, 219; White v. U. S., 16 F.(2d) 870, 872, where introduction of narcotics claimed to have been unlawfully seized held nonprejudicial because possession thereof admitted by accused; Bilodeau v. U. S., 14 F.(2d) 582, 585, where introduction of documents illegally seized held nonprejudicial because same facts shown by uncontradicted evidence; McFarland v. U. S., 11 F.(2d) 140, 141, where evidence gained in unlawful search held nonprejudicial because same facts admitted by counsel for accused; Dawson v. U. S., 10 F.(2d) 106, 108, where improper 'evidence of possession and sale of liquor held nonprejudicial because proven by other evidence; Libera v. U. S., 299 F. 300, 301, where evidence of liquor and still gained by unlawful search held nonprejudicial because accused admitted such possession ; Temperani v. U. S., 299 F. 365, 367, where introduction of liquor, eta, obtained in unlawful search held nonprejudicial because accused admitted same facts; Wells v. U. S., 257 F. 605, 615; Stewart v. U. S., 211 F. 41, 45; Reagan v. U. S., 202 F. 488, 491, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 583; Barnard v. U. S., 162 F. 618, 626 ; Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, Harrod v. U. S., 58 App. D. C. 254, 29 F.(2d) 454, 455; Harris v. U. S., 50 App. D. C. 139, 269 F. 481, 482.