Court Opinion

ID: 2965016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:34:13.500646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:04.669343
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1285

                         CARLOS J. NIEVES-VILLANUEVA, et al.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                      JOSE R. SOTO-RIVERA, Individually and as 
                   Mayor of the Municipality of Canovanas, et al.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Stahl, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________
                                 ____________________

               Carlos A. del Valle Cruz for appellants.
               ________________________

               Miguel  Pagan, with  whom Pagan  & Pagan  was on  brief, for
               _____________             ______________
          appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 22, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.    Plaintiffs are  fifty-one
                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.
                              _____________

            former  "transitory"   or  non-permanent  employees   of  the

            municipality of Canovanas, Puerto Rico.  A jury found against

            their  claims that the  incoming New Progressive  Party (NPP)

            administration  failed to renew their contracts of employment

            in various municipal jobs because they were supporters of the

            prior Popular  Democratic Party  (PDP) administration  and so

            violated their rights under the First Amendment.1

                      The  important  question  raised  by this  case  is

            whether the district  court committed error in  admitting the

            testimony of an expert witness.   The witness testified as to

            what the law required and that her examination of plaintiffs'

            personnel records led  to the conclusion that  plaintiffs had

            been   improperly  hired  or  renewed  in  the  first  place.

            Defendants did not testify this  was their reason at the time

            of  their  decision  not  to   renew  plaintiffs'  contracts.

            Although   such  expert  testimony   should  not   have  been

            permitted,  we  consider any  alleged error  in light  of the

                                
            ____________________

            1.  This  court has  reviewed  numerous  claims of  political
            firings or demotions from Puerto  Rico.  In November of 1984,
            the  PDP won  the  gubernatorial  election  in  Puerto  Rico.
            Before that,  the governor's office  was held by a  member of
            the NPP.  A first wave of cases involved outright dismissals;
            the second wave  involved adverse actions less  than outright
            dismissals.   That history is  recited in Agosto-de-Feliciano
                                                      ___________________
            v. Aponte-Roque,  889 F.2d  1209 (1st Cir.  1989).   In 1992,
               ____________
            control   of  the  governor's   office  and  of   some  local
            governments switched, and  the NPP came back to  power.  Now,
            this  court  is faced  with  another wave  of  litigation (we
            hesitate to count  which wave this is), brought  this time by
            PDP members.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            evidence as a whole, and particularly in light of the judge's

            instructions to the jury.  In the circumstances of this case,

            we consider  the alleged errors harmless and  affirm the jury

            verdicts.

                                          I.
                                          I

                      Plaintiffs  sued,  inter alios,2  Jose  Soto-Rivera

            ("Soto") and the Municipality of Canovanas under  42 U.S.C.  

            1983, alleging  that they  had been  dismissed  due to  their

            political  beliefs  and  in violation  of  their  due process

            rights.    The  complaint  sought  reinstatement,  injunctive

            relief,  compensatory and  punitive  damages, and  attorney's

            fees.

                      On  defendants' motion  for  summary judgment,  the

            district court  dismissed  plaintiffs'  due  process  claims,

            noting  that, under First  Circuit precedent and  Puerto Rico

            law,  transitory employees generally  do not have  a property

            interest in continued employment beyond their yearly terms of

            appointment.  See Caro v.  Aponte-Roque, 878 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st
                          ___ ____     ____________

            Cir.  1989); see  also Mel ndez  v.  Municipio de  Arroyo, 96
                         _________ ________      ____________________

            J.T.S. Case No. 68, at p.  1077 (P.R. Sup. Ct. May 15,  1996)

            (reaffirming that, as a matter of Puerto Rico law, transitory

            employees  generally have  no "legitimate  expectation" to  a

                                
            ____________________

            2.  The district  court dismissed plaintiffs'  claims against
            the other municipal defendants prior to trial.

                                         -3-
                                          3

            renewal  of   their  contracts);  Departamento   de  Recursos
                                              ___________________________

            Naturales v. Correa, 118 D.P.R. 689, 697 (1987) (same).3
            _________    ______

                      Before trial,  defendants retained  Blanca Santiago

            as an expert in governmental personnel matters to examine the

            plaintiffs' personnel  records.  Santiago's  report concluded

            that  plaintiffs' initial  appointments and,  in  some cases,

            renewal appointments  were contrary to Puerto  Rico municipal

            law,  and that  the previous  administration  had employed  a

            "subterfuge"  to  renew the  plaintiffs' appointments  and to

            evade  a prohibition on making personnel decisions within two

            months of  a general election.   The report also  opined that

            plaintiffs  did  not   have  "a  legitimate   expectation  of

            retaining employment."  Finally,  the report concluded  that,

            under the law of Puerto Rico, "the Municipality  of Canovanas

            could not continue extending said transitory appointments."

                      Upon receiving Santiago's report, plaintiffs made a

            motion   in   limine   to   exclude   Santiago's   testimony.

            Plaintiffs' principal objection was that the expert witness's

            opinion concerning the  propriety of plaintiffs' appointments

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Defendants also moved  for summary judgment on the claims
            for  damages on  qualified immunity grounds.     The district
            court  denied defendants'  motion,  holding  that before  the
            events in  1993, the  First Circuit  had clearly  established
            that First  Amendment protection  extended to  political non-
            renewals of employment.  See  Caro, 878 F.2d at 2-4; Figueroa
                                     ___  ____                   ________
            v.  Aponte-Roque, 864  F.2d 947,  951 (1st  Cir. 1989).   The
                ____________
            district  court determined that there existed a genuine issue
            of material fact concerning defendants' motives  in declining
            to renew plaintiffs' transitory appointments.  

                                         -4-
                                          4

            was not relevant  to liability.  Defendants did  not maintain

            that  Soto  did  not renew  plaintiffs'  appointments  due to

            irregularities  in how  they were  appointed.   The  district

            court denied plaintiffs' motion.

                                         II.
                                         II

                      We state  the facts  as the  jury could have  found

            them,  in  the context  of  the  evidence  as a  whole,  with

            particular  emphasis on  the evidence  allegedly admitted  in

            error.

                      Plaintiffs said they were affiliated with  the PDP,

            one of Puerto Rico's major  political parties.  In 1992, Soto

            was elected Mayor  of Canovanas as the candidate  of the NPP,

            the main rival of the PDP.  Soto was the first  NPP candidate

            elected as Mayor of Canovanas in several decades.

                      Plaintiffs  had been  appointed  by  the prior  PDP

            mayor, Esteban Melendez-Rivera, to various  municipal jobs as

            transitory  employees.  Those  jobs included manual  labor in

            the  Public Works  Department,  janitorial work  in municipal

            offices,  clerical  work,  and other  lower  level  jobs with

            minimal   salaries.      Under   Puerto   Rico's   Autonomous

            Municipalities Act, 21 L.P.R.A.    4554, transitory employees

            may be appointed for a  limited term, generally not to exceed

            one year.   Although plaintiffs, unlike other  civil servants

            in Puerto Rico, had no  formal tenure in their jobs following

            the  expiration of their contracts, many had been reappointed

                                         -5-
                                          5

            for  several one-year  terms as  a matter  of course.   Other

            plaintiffs were in their first annual term of employment.

                      On January 15, 1993, three days after taking office

            as Mayor of  Canovanas, Soto informed most  of the plaintiffs

            that  their positions as transitory employees had expired and

            that he would  not renew their  appointments.  The  remaining

            plaintiffs'  appointments  were   temporarily  extended,  but

            eventually their appointments expired as well.

                      Plaintiffs  testified  that   they  campaigned  for

            Esteban   Melendez-Rivera,  the PDP  candidate,  in the  1992

            mayoral election.  Plaintiffs testified that they had engaged

            in  various PDP political  activities on behalf  of Melendez,

            including  attending political meetings or taking part in the

            campaign  rallies known  as caravanas  ("caravans") that  are
                                        _________

            typical of mayoral campaigning in  Puerto Rico.  Many of them

            testified that Soto  solicited their support, and,  when they

            said they would support the incumbent PDP mayor instead, Soto

            threatened  to  leave  them  without  employment  after   the

            election.  Many plaintiffs also testified that they observed,

            after their non-renewals, NPP  members performing the  duties

            of the jobs they had performed as transitory employees.

                      In  support   of  their  First   Amendment  claims,

            plaintiffs  put  in evidence  their personnel  files, arguing

            that  there  was nothing  in  them that  would  indicate poor

            performance.   Plaintiffs also presented an expert witness in

                                         -6-
                                          6

            personnel administration to bolster their claims of political

            discrimination.4

                      Defendants'  position   was  that   Soto  had   not

            considered plaintiffs' political  affiliation in his decision

            to allow  their contracts to  expire.   They presented  three

            witnesses:  Mayor  Soto,  Vice-Mayor  Miguel  Jimenez-Carrion

            ("Jimenez"),  and Blanca  Santiago, their  expert witness  on

            government  personnel  administration.    Soto  categorically

            denied  the  plaintiffs' allegations  that he  had threatened

            their jobs if they supported the incumbent.  He noted that he

            had  retained or  hired PDP  members to  municipal jobs.   He

            testified that he had allowed plaintiffs' contracts to expire

            because their services  were no longer needed.   Jimenez gave

            essentially  the same version  of events.   Neither testified

            that they had  not renewed the contracts  because plaintiffs'

            appointments had been irregular.

            Defendants' Expert
            __________________

                      Defendants'   expert   witness,   Blanca  Santiago,

            testified that the plaintiffs' personnel records demonstrated

            that,  in many  cases, their  appointments  were contrary  to

            Puerto Rico law.  In particular, Santiago testified that many

            employees  had been  on the  payroll in  excess of  one year,

                                
            ____________________

            4.   The  plaintiffs did  not  order the  transcript of  that
            portion of  the trial  that included  their expert  witness's
            testimony.   That omission  complicates our  analysis, as  we
            explain below.

                                         -7-
                                          7

            sometimes  without any  documented reappointment,  and opined

            that this violated  the Autonomous Municipalities Act,  which

            provides  that  the  appointment  of "[t]ransitory  employees

            shall not  exceed  one  (1) year  . . .  ."   21  L.P.R.A.   

            4554(c).  Santiago also testified that many of the plaintiffs

            had  been illegally appointed within  two months of a general

            election,  in  violation  of a  prophylactic  prohibition  on

            government  personnel   decisions  commonly   known  as   the

            "electoral ban."  See 21 L.P.R.A.   4564; 3 L.P.R.A.    1337.
                              ___

            Santiago testified further that, in some cases, the personnel

            records had been manipulated in  order to make it appear that

            plaintiffs'  appointments were  not within the  electoral ban

            period.

                      Defense counsel then questioned Santiago to  elicit

            testimony to the effect that courts have held that transitory

            employees  do  not have  a  right  to  the renewal  of  their

            contracts.   Defense counsel  accomplished this  objective by

            reading passages from court decisions holding that transitory

            employees in  Puerto Rico  have no  reasonable or  legitimate

            expectation  of  continued  renewal of  their  contracts that

            would entitle them to  administrative due process protections

            before  allowing their contracts  to expire, and  then asking

            Santiago to comment.  This  was done although the due process

            claims had been dismissed.

                                         -8-
                                          8

                      Santiago  testified  that, under  court  decisions,

            "[o]nce  [a  transitory  employee's]  appointment  ends   the

            transitory employee . . . doesn't have any . . . other right,

            regardless of the fact that his appointment has been extended

            for a  period of time  that we may call  'excessively long.'"

            Plaintiffs'  counsel objected to this testimony on the ground

            that it misstated the law.  That objection was overruled.

                      Soon   afterwards,   defense    counsel   continued

            questioning  Santiago  on  the  legal  status  of  transitory

            employees:

                      Q. I am going to review . . . the case of
                      Fermin  Orta  et   al.  versus  Pedro  A.
                      _________________________________________
                      Padilla, Municipality of  Trujillio Alto,
                      _________________________________________
                      et al. .  . . .  I'm going to read to you
                      ______
                      from  the  translation  of  that  opinion
                      . . . .

            At this  point, plaintiffs  again objected,  noting that  the

            case   concerned  the   due  process  rights   of  transitory

            employees, and  that the  sole claim on  trial was  the First

            Amendment  claim.    Again,   the  district  court  overruled

            plaintiffs' objection.   Defendants  resumed questioning  the

            witness about the  law articulated in that case.5  Plaintiffs

                                
            ____________________

            5.   Defense  Counsel:   "[I]t  says, the  opinion:   After a
            careful examination of the service and  appointment contracts
            of  these 23  appellees,  we  find  that  the  only  contract
            terminated before the expiration date was that of Juana Cruz.
            The other 22 employees were notified that the contracts would
            be terminated at the expiration  date of the same.  In  light
            of  the  prevailing  principles, we  must  conclude  that the
            termination  of the contract of those 22 transitory employees
            was valid  at law  because the municipality  did not  have to
            provide them with the  regulatory guarantees mentioned above.

                                         -9-
                                          9

            objected  again,  noting,  "She's testifying  [to]  what  are

            basically jury  instructions." The  district court  initially

            sustained plaintiffs' objection,  but then permitted  defense

            counsel to continue  questioning the witness in  this manner.

            Defense counsel proceeded  to read excerpts from  the Supreme

            Court  of Puerto  Rico's decision  in Correa,  and  from this
                                                  ______

            court's decision in  Cheveras-Pacheco v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 809
                                 ________________    _______________

            F.2d  125, 129  (1st  Cir.  1987)  (holding  that  transitory

            employees  do not  have  a  property  interest  in  continued

            employment).   Plaintiffs'  counsel again  protested,  and  a

            conference  was  held  outside  the  presence  of  the  jury.

            Plaintiffs'  counsel  asked the  judge  to strike  Santiago's

            testimony or  give a curative instruction, stating explicitly

            that it is against the law for a  municipal government to let

            a transitory employee's contract expire if the primary reason

            is  the employee's political affiliation.  The district court

            refused, saying plaintiffs had opened the door with their own

                                
            ____________________

            The trial  court erred  in  ruling that  the termination  was
            unlawful."
                Santiago:  "The interesting thing about that case is that
            there  were --  there  were  22  transitory  employees  whose
            appointments  were to  end,  and there  was another  group of
            employees  in  which  --  in  which  case  the  decision  was
            different,  and the  matter of  discrimination  was approved.
            But in the case of the transitory ones their appointments had
            ended."

                                         -10-
                                          10

            expert  witness and that they could cross-examine Santiago on

            the illegality of firing employees for political reasons.6

                      On  cross-examination,  Santiago  stated  that  the

            legal opinions she provided on direct examination  concerning

            the  status   of  transitory   employees   and  the   alleged

            illegalities in plaintiffs' original  appointments were based

            solely on Commonwealth law, not federal law.  When questioned

            about  the case  law  of this  court which  has  held that  a

            decision  not to renew  a transitory employees'  contract may

            not be  primarily based  on political  affiliation under  the

            First  Amendment,  the  witness was  evasive.    Although she

            agreed  that transitory employees could not be discharged for

            political reasons, she insisted that  this did not apply when

                                
            ____________________

            6.  The  Court:  "Counsel, the  problem with you is  that you
            don't   make  a  distinction  between  the  --  the  witness'
            credibility  and  what  is  admissible.    She --  Mr.  Pagan
            [defense  counsel]  read  to her  certain  passages  of cases
            saying  that -- concerning transitory employees.  I'm certain
            you're  going  to  read  her a  part  saying  if  you  take a
            transitory employee  and discharge him for  political reasons
            it's illegal, and she has to  agree with that.  See?   That's
            the way you neutralize that.  I'm not going to teach  you how
            to practice  law."   (At oral  argument, plaintiff's  counsel
            argued that this last sentence  was particularly prejudicial.
            However, as this admonition did  not occur in the presence of
            the jury, we examine only  the impact of the district court's
            ruling itself.)  
                 The judge continued,  "[T]he Orta case was  brought [in]
                                              ____
            by  your  [expert]  witness, and  that  opened  the door  for
            [defense counsel] to bring [in] the Orta case. . . . Once you
                                                ____
            open  the door then you can't complain. . . . I will instruct
            the jury on  the law  at the  proper time, and  they have  to
            follow the law as I tell them, not as what counsel tells them
            the law is."

                                         -11-
                                          11

            a  contract expired because,  she said, such  an employee was

            not discharged.

            Closing Arguments
            _________________

                      In  closing arguments,  plaintiffs' counsel  argued

            that the  witnesses' testimony, principally  the plaintiffs',

            established that the incoming NPP administration's motive for

            refusing  to renew  plaintiffs'  contracts  was reprisal  for

            their  support of  the previous  PDP mayor.   Defense counsel

            strongly contested  the plaintiffs'  credibility, and  argued

            that Soto never  considered plaintiffs' political affiliation

            in his decision not to renew plaintiffs' contracts.

                      Defense counsel also  made reference to  Santiago's

            testimony,  arguing that  the employees  were  transitory and

            that their appointments had been in violation of  Puerto Rico

            municipal law.    Defense counsel also argued  that the Mayor

            would have  been in violation of  that law if he  had renewed

            their  appointments.    Defense  counsel  made  reference  to

            Santiago's  testimony that transitory employees do not have a

            reasonable  expectation of  retaining their jobs  after their

            contracts  expire,   arguing  that  plaintiffs'   expert  had

            distorted the law  in suggesting otherwise.   Defense counsel

            asked  rhetorically, "[A]fter  the appointment  expired . . .

            what are  their [sic]  rights of those  employees?   And that
                             ___

            Your Honor is  going to tell you, see,  in the instructions."

            Defense  counsel   noted  that,  unlike   plaintiffs'  expert

                                         -12-
                                          12

            witness,   "She  never  . . .  tell  [sic]  us  whether  [the
                                                  ___

            plaintiffs]   were    dismissed   or   not    for   political

            discriminatory reasons.  That is for you to decide."  Defense

            counsel did not  argue that the reasons  for the non-renewals

            were that plaintiffs' appointments were irregular.

            Instructions
            ____________

                      The judge instructed the jury that its duty was "to

            follow the law as I shall state it to you" and that it should

            not "base  [its] verdict upon any view  of the law other than

            that given in  the instructions of the Court."  The court did

            not otherwise specifically instruct the jury to disregard the

            expert witnesses' opinions concerning the applicable law, but

            rather  said expert  testimony  should  be  treated  just  as

            testimony from any other witness.

                      Significantly,  however, the  judge instructed  the

            jury  that  any  irregularities in  the  appointments  of the

            plaintiffs could not be used as a pretext for violating their

            First Amendment rights:

                           Now, conduct purportedly  engaged in
                      consonance   with    the   Puerto    Rico
                      personnel's law and regulation [sic] does
                                                      ___
                      not control a  claim alleging a violation
                      of the  employees' First  Amendment right
                      of political affiliation.
                           A new administration  cannot use the
                      doctrine of compliance with  state law or
                      nullity under state  law as  a cover  for
                      discharges, transfers  and discrimination
                      based solely on political affiliation.
                           Similarly,   a  new   administration
                      cannot use the  fact that plaintiffs were
                      hired  during  the  electoral prohibition

                                     13  -13-

                      period  or   "veda"  as  a   pretext  for
                                    ____
                      political discrimination.   In  the final
                      analysis, the question of motivation is a
                      question of fact.

            The court also instructed:

                           If   you   find   that   plaintiffs'
                      political affiliation was  the motivating
                      factor  for  the   non-renewal  of  their
                      appointments, then you  may find for  the
                      plaintiffs.

            The court also gave this instruction:

                           However,    if    you    find   that
                      plaintiffs' appointments were not renewed
                      because they  had been  appointed by  the
                      former administration in violation of the
                      personnel  and  electoral  laws  and  not
                      because    of    plaintiffs'    political
                      affiliation,  then you  may find  for the
                      defendants.

            The  judge  further   instructed  that,  although  transitory

            employees  do not have tenure in  their jobs, their contracts

            may   not  be  allowed  to  expire  for  political  reasons.7
            Finally,  in response to  a request from  plaintiffs' counsel

                                
            ____________________

            7.  The  Court: "Transitory -- the plaintiffs  in this action
            were  transitory employees of  the Municipality of Canovanas.
            Puerto  Rico   law  permits  the  employment   of  transitory
            employees appointed for  a fixed term.  The  duration of this
            designation  shall correspond  to the  period  for which  the
            position was created.
                      "The  law   provides   that   once   a   transitory
            appointment expires,  defendant may terminate  the transitory
            employee . . . for any reason  except if that reason is based
            on political affiliation.   Defendant . . .  asserts that the
            reason for not renewing plaintiffs' appointments or contracts
            was that plaintiffs' contracts had expired and that they were
            not   renewed  for   valid  reasons  wholly   independent  of
            plaintiffs' political affiliation.
                      "Plaintiffs  claims  [sic] that  their  position as
                                            ___
            transitory  employees  were  not  renewed  because  of  their
            political affiliation.  So that is the issue."

                                         -14-
                                          14

            for a  curative instruction,  the judge  instructed that  the

            jury was  to consider  only evidence  that they  believed was

            known to the decisionmakers at the time plaintiffs' contracts

            were not renewed.8

            Verdict
            _______

                      The  verdict  form   asked,  as  to  each   of  the

            plaintiffs, "Do you find by  a preponderance of the  evidence

            that the motivating  factor for not renewing  the appointment

            of [plaintiff] was [his or her]  political affiliation?"  The

            jury answered no in each case.

                                         III.
                                         III

                      We review the district court's decision to admit or

            exclude  evidence for  abuse  of  discretion.    See  General
                                                             ___  _______

            Electric Co. v. Joiner, 1997 WL 764563, at  *3 (U.S. Dec. 15,
            ____________    ______

            1997); Knowlton v. Deseret Med.  Inc., 930 F.2d 116, 124 (1st
                   ________    __________________

            Cir. 1991).

            Legal Principles
            ________________

                      Because  the  parties exhibit  some  confusion over

            long-established legal  principles in  this  area, we  repeat

            them.   In  Elrod v. Burns,  427 U.S.  347 (1976),  a divided
                        _____    _____

                                
            ____________________

            8.   The  Court:  "In   determining  whether  the  defendants
            discriminated or not, you  are not to consider any  testimony
            or  evidence that you believe was not  present at the time of
            [sic]  the  decision  not  to  renew  plaintiffs'  transitory
             ___
            appointment  was taken, for if the irregularity or misconduct
            was  not discovered until  after the employee's  contract was
            not renewed, the  employer could not  have been motivated  by
            knowledge of it, and he  cannot now claim that the employee's
            contract was not renewed for that reason."

                                         -15-
                                          15

            Supreme  Court granted  some  First  Amendment protection  to

            employees terminated  because of their  political affiliation

            where political affiliation was not a  reasonably appropriate

            requirement for the job.  See id. at 359 (plurality opinion).
                                      ___ ___

            As  Justice Stewart,  concurring,  said, a  "nonpolicymaking,

            nonconfidential government employee [cannot] be discharged or

            threatened   with   discharge   from  a   job   that   he  is

            satisfactorily  performing  upon  the   sole  ground  of  his

            political beliefs."  Id.  at 375 (Stewart, J.,  concurring in
                                 ___

            judgment).   In Branti  v. Finkel, 445  U.S. 507  (1980), the
                            ______     ______

            Supreme  Court reaffirmed Elrod, and explained that the First
                                      _____

            Amendment prohibits termination  of public employees  because

            of their political affiliation  unless "the hiring  authority

            can  demonstrate that  party  affiliation  is an  appropriate

            requirement  for  the  effective performance  of  the  public

            office involved."  Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.9
                               ______

                      This court has held that the  Elrod-Branti doctrine
                                                    _____ ______

            applies to a local government's decision whether to renew the

            contract of a  transitory employee.  See  Cheveras-Pacheco v.
                                                 ___  ________________

            Rivera-Gonzalez,  809   F.2d  125   (1st  Cir.   1987).     A
            _______________

            municipality may not allow transitory employees' contracts to

            expire  if the  primary motive  is to  punish them  for their

            political  affiliation.   See id.  at 127-29.   This  is true
                                      ___ ___

                                
            ____________________

            9.  Defendants have  never  suggested  that  political  party
            affiliation was  an appropriate  requirement for  any of  the
            jobs that were held by the plaintiffs.

                                         -16-
                                          16

            regardless  of whether the  employees have been  renewed on a

            regular basis prior to their dismissal or, as is true of some

            of plaintiffs here, have served  only one term.  See Figueroa
                                                             ___ ________

            v. Aponte-Roque,  864 F.2d 947,  951 (1st Cir. 1989).   Thus,
               ____________

            the  fact  that  a  transitory  employee  does  not   have  a

            reasonable  expectation of renewal  in his or  her employment

            that would require due process protections does  not defeat a

            First Amendment claim.

                      In Rutan v. Republican  Party of Ill., 497  U.S. 62
                         _____    _________________________

            (1990),   the  Supreme  Court   held  that  the  Elrod-Branti
                                                             _____ ______

            prohibition  against  political   affiliation  discrimination

            applied  not  only  to discharges,  but  also  to significant

            personnel  decisions such  as whether  to hire  or promote  a

            public employee.   See Rutan, 487 U.S. at 79.  Hence, even if
                               ___ _____

            the  decision  not  to renew  a  transitory  appointment10 is

            considered a hiring decision rather than a  discharge,  Rutan
                                                                    _____

            reinforces our rule announced in Cheveras-Pacheco.  
                                             ________________

                                
            ____________________

            10.   As a practical  matter, given the Commonwealth's merit-
            based  system  for  hiring  and   discharging  civil  service
            employees, the risk is greater that transitory employees, who
            may be more  easily hired and fired, may  suffer from the use
            of unlawful patronage practices.  See 21 L.P.R.A.   4554.  It
                                              ___
            has   been    said   that   "invidious    political   [party]
            discrimination  is  mainly  directed  against  humble  public
            employees  or [those]  with scarce  resources."   Casiano  v.
                                                              _______
            Departamento de Educacion,  97 J.T.S. Case No. 33,  at p. 718
            _________________________
            (P.R.  Sup.  Ct.  March  19,  1997)  (Fuster-Berlingeri,  J.,
            dissenting from denial of certiorari).

                                         -17-
                                          17

                      And  the  Elrod-Branti-Rutan   principle  has  been
                                _____ ______ _____

            reinforced recently by the Supreme Court.  In Board of County
                                                          _______________

            Comm'rs v.  Umbehr, 116 S.  Ct. 2342 (1996) and  O'Hare Truck
            _______     ______                               ____________

            Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996), the
            ___________    _________________

            Supreme  Court  held   that  the  First   Amendment  provides

            protection  to  independent  contractors   similar  to  those

            afforded  government employees.   See Umbehr,  116 S.  Ct. at
                                              ___ ______

            2345-46   (termination  of   a  contract   in  reprisal   for

            contractor's criticism of county government);  O'Hare, 116 S.
                                                           ______

            Ct. at 2355-56  (removal of an independent contractor  from a

            list of towing  services employed by the  city in retaliation

            for supporting opposing political party).  

            Expert Testimony on the Law
            ___________________________

                      Aspects of Santiago's testimony are very troubling.

            Certain parts  of her  testimony --  for example,  concerning

            actual personnel practices, the various  categories of public

            employees and  the like -- are unobjectionable.  But Santiago

            also testified as to the  holdings of various opinions of the

            Supreme Court of Puerto Rico  and by reference, of this court

            (over  objection), and  to the  legal  conclusion that  these

            appointments were  in violation  of law  (without objection).

            To  exacerbate  matters,  her  testimony  may  be  charitably

            described  as  misleading  at  best  as  to  the   rights  of

            transitory employees as a matter of federal law.

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      It  is black-letter  law  that  "[i]t  is  not  for

            witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable principles of

            law, but for the judge."  United States v. Newman, 49 F.3d 1,
                                      _____________    ______

            7  (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc.,
                                        __________    __________________

            550 F.2d  505, 512 (2d Cir.  1977)).  At least  seven circuit

            courts have held  that the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit

            such testimony,  and we now join them as to the general rule.

            See Burkhart  v. Washington  Metro. Area  Transit Auth.,  112
            ___ ________     ______________________________________

            F.3d  1207, 1212-14  (D.C. Cir.  1997)  (reversible error  to

            allow an  expert  in police  practices  to opine  on  whether

            police  officers'  efforts  in  communicating  with  a   deaf

            plaintiff   were   enough  to   satisfy   federal  disability

            statutes);  Snap-Drape, Inc.  v. Commissioner,  98  F.3d 194,
                        ________________     ____________

            197-98  (5th  Cir.  1996)   (trial  court  properly  excluded

            taxpayer's  expert reports  as containing  nothing more  than

            legal  arguments  concerning  the  tax treatment  of  certain

            dividends); Berry v. City  of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342,  1353-54
                        _____    ________________

            (6th  Cir. 1994)  (finding inadmissible  the  comments of  an

            expert in police  practices on the meaning of  the legal term

            "deliberate indifference" in a civil rights case); Aguilar v.
                                                               _______

            International Longshoreman's Union, Local  #10, 966 F.2d 443,
            ______________________________________________

            447  (9th  Cir.  1992) (testimony  of  purported  expert that

            workers reasonably  and  foreseeably  relied  on  defendants'

            promises  addressed   "matters   of  law   for  the   court's

            determination" that  were "inappropriate subjects  for expert

                                         -19-
                                          19

            testimony");  Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988)
                          ______    ______

            (en banc)  (reversible error to  allow an expert  witness who

            was an attorney to give his opinions on  what was required to

            make consent to a search  effective); Adalman v. Baker, Watts
                                                  _______    ____________

            &  Co.,   807  F.2d  359,   366  (4th  Cir.   1986)  (finding
            ______

            inadmissible  proffered  expert opinion  concerning  whether,

            under  securities laws, disclosure  of a particular  fact was

            required in  the course of negotiating a transaction); Marx &
                                                                   ______

            Co.  v. Diners'  Club,  Inc.,  550 F.2d  505  (2d Cir.  1977)
            ___     ____________________

            (securities lawyer, called as an expert, could not testify to

            the legal  obligations created under  a contract).   To state

            the general  rule is not  to decide the far  more complicated

            and measured question of when there is a transgression of the

            rule.   We outline some  of the  considerations and  conclude

            that the rule has been transgressed here.  We leave to future

            cases  the defining of  the contours  of application  of this

            rule.

                      In  our legal  system,  purely legal  questions and

            instructions to  the jury  on the  law to  be applied  to the

            resolution  of the  dispute before  them  is exclusively  the

            domain of  the judge.  Accordingly, expert  testimony on such

            purely  legal issues  is rarely  admissible.   As the  Second

            Circuit has  noted, "The  danger is that  the jury  may think

            that the 'expert'  in the particular branch of  the law knows

                                         -20-
                                          20

            more than the judge   -- surely an impermissible inference in

            our system of law."  Marx & Co., 550 F.2d at 512.
                                 __________

                      The one well-recognized exception  is for questions

            of  foreign law, where the judge may be aided by the expert's

            assistance.   See Adalman, 807 F.2d  at 366; Marx &  Co., 550
                          ___ _______                    ___________

            F.2d at 510;  1 McCormick on  Evidence   12,  at 50 (John  W.
                            ______________________

            Strong,  ed., 4th  ed. 1992);  7 Wigmore  on Evidence    1953
                                             ____________________

            (Chadbourne rev.  1978).   Even in the  case of  foreign law,

            under modern practice the testimony is generally given to the

            judge, outside of the presence of  the jury, and is meant  to

            assist the judge in determining the appropriate instructions.

            See Adalman, 807 F.2d  at 366; 9  Wigmore on Evidence    2558
            ___ _______                       ___________________

            (Chadbourne rev. 1978).  Here,  the testimony was plainly not

            offered to assist the judge,  who has presided over many such

            political discharge cases, and was presented to the jury.

                      Because  the  jury   does  not  decide  such   pure

            questions of law,  such testimony is not helpful  to the jury

            and so  does not  fall within  the literal terms  of Fed.  R.

            Evid.  702, which  allows expert testimony  "[i]f scientific,

            technical  or  other  specialized knowledge  will  assist the

            trier of  fact to understand  the evidence or to  determine a

            fact in  issue . . . ."   As the D.C. Circuit  noted, "Expert

            testimony that consists of legal  conclusions cannot properly

            assist the trier of fact in either respect . . . ." Burkhart,
                                                                ________

            112 F.3d at 1212; see  also Aguilar, 966 F.2d at 447  (expert
                              ___  ____ _______

                                         -21-
                                          21

            legal opinion does not assist the factfinder under Rule 702).

            This is because the judge's expert knowledge of the law makes

            any   such  assistance  at  best  cumulative,  and  at  worst

            prejudicial.  See Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1213 ("Each courtroom
                          ___ ________

            comes equipped with a 'legal  expert,' called a judge, and it

            is his  or her province  alone to  instruct the  jury on  the

            relevant legal  standards."); 7  Wigmore on  Evidence    1952
                                             ____________________

            (Chadbourne rev.  1978) ("It is  not the common  knowledge of

            the  jury which renders the witness' opinion unnecessary, but

            the special legal knowledge of the judge.")

                      Similarly, Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), which removes  the

            common-law  bar  on  "otherwise  admissible"  testimony  that

            "embraces an  ultimate issue  to be decided  by the  trier of

            fact," does  not vitiate the  rule against expert  opinion on

            questions of  law.  The  common law did  not allow an  expert

            witness to inform  the jury of his or  her factual conclusion

            concerning the "ultimate issue" in the case, because this was

            thought to invade the province of the jury.  The abolition in

            Rule 704(a) of  this "ultimate issue" rule allows  the expert

            witness to  offer his or  her factual conclusion in  order to

            aid the jury,  which properly can choose to  accept or reject

            it.  However, questions of law are not "to be decided  by the

            trier of fact";  rather it is for the  judge, not the lawyers

            or the witnesses, to inform the jury of the law applicable in

                                         -22-
                                          22

            the case and  to decide any purely legal  issue.11  Recently,

            this court  has cautioned that  the abolition of the  "bar on

            'ultimate issue' opinions  . . . is not  a carte blanche  for

            experts." Dincov. Dylex,Ltd.,111 F.3d964,973 (1stCir.1997).12
                      _____   __________

                      While  the testimony  by  Santiago described  above

            clearly transgressed the general rule, we acknowledge that it

            is  often  difficult  to  draw  the  line  between  what  are

            questions of  law, what are  questions of fact, and  what are

            mixed questions.  See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie,
                              _________  ________________________________

            Scotland on December  21, 1998, 37 F.3d 804,  826-27 (2d Cir.
            ______________________________

            1994) (regarding  expert's testimony that  defendants engaged

            in "fraud"  and "deceit"  admissible because  the terms  were

            used  in layman's  sense, while  finding  expert's conclusion

                                
            ____________________

            11.   For similar  reasons, the question  of whether  a legal
            rule  has  been clearly  established,  in  the  context of  a
            qualified immunity defense to a    1983 action, is a question
            decided by the  court, not the jury.  See St. Hilaire v. City
                                                  ___ ___________    ____
            of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1995).  Thus, the Eighth
            __________
            Circuit  found  reversible  error in  allowing  a  witness to
            espouse views concerning the  reasonableness of an  officer's
            conduct in light of prevailing "Fourth  Amendment standards."
            Peterson  v. City  of Plymouth,  60 F.3d  469, 475  (8th Cir.
            ________     _________________
            1995).   The jury's role  was only to  decide what facts were
            known to the  officer at the time of the arrest, not whether,
            in light of those facts, the officer's conduct was reasonable
            under the applicable  legal standard and therefore  protected
            by qualified immunity.  See id.  
                                    ___ ___

            12.  Santiago  was  competent  to  testify  that  plaintiffs'
            appointments were  irregular in the  sense that they  did not
            conform  to   normal  personnel   practice,  but   her  legal
            conclusion that the appointments were in violation of the law
            was improper.    Because  there  was  no  objection  to  such
            conclusions,   our  review  is  for  plain  error,  a  burden
            plaintiffs  cannot  sustain  in  light  of  our  harmlessness
            analysis.

                                         -23-
                                          23

            that  defendants  violated   FAA  regulations  inadmissible);

            Specht,  853  F.2d  805,  809 (discussing  the  distinction).
            ______

            Indeed, the definition of what is law and what is application

            or  practice may  be difficult  to  ascertain.   This may  be

            particularly so   when the issues involve not  only a statute

            and formally  promulgated regulations,  but also  guidelines,

            handbooks, advisory rulings,  interpretive bulletins, general

            counsel's letter opinions, informational notices and  similar

            accoutrements  of  the modern  bureaucratic state.   Further,

            there   may  be  particular  areas  of  law,  such  as  legal

            malpractice,  where  expert  testimony  on  legal  matters is

            admissible where it would normally  be excluded.  We can also

            hypothesize instances in rare,  highly complex and  technical

            matters where a trial judge, utilizing limited and controlled

            mechanisms, and as a matter of trial management, permits some

            testimony seemingly at variance with the general rule.13  But

            none of  those instances  are before us.   The  issues raised

            here  are  routinely  before  the  federal  courts,  are  not

            complex, and the use of such testimony was egregious.

            Testimony Re After-Acquired Evidence
            ____________________________________

                                
            ____________________

            13.   Such  an instance  may be  patent litigation,  in which
            technical experts  are generally  allowed to  comment on  the
            scope  of a patent's  coverage and give  their conclusions on
            the issue  of infringement.   See Snellman v. Rioch  Co., 862
                                          ___ ________    __________
            F.2d 283, 287 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Stearns Co. v. United States,
                                            ___________    _____________
            324 Fed. Cl. 264, 268-69 (1995).  

                                         -24-
                                          24

                      There  is   a  second   reason  the   admission  of

            Santiago's testimony is very troubling.   That has to do with

            application  of the after-acquired  evidence doctrine.14   In

            McKennon  v. Nashville  Banner  Publ'g Co.,  115  S. Ct.  879
            ________     _____________________________

            (1995),  the Supreme  Court considered whether  an employee's

            wrongdoing, discovered after  the termination of  employment,

            which would have been sufficient to justify the decision, but

            which  was not  known  to the  employer at  the  time of  the

            decision  and so  could  not  have  motivated  the  decision,

            foreclosed a  claim of age  discrimination.  See id.  at 882.
                                                         ___ __

            The Supreme Court held that such evidence was not relevant to
                                                          ___

            the employer's liability for age discrimination, but would be

            relevant in determining what remedy was appropriate.  See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            at  885.  If  the evidence would  have led  to the employee's

            discharge  at some later date,  that would affect the measure

                                
            ____________________

            14.    A question  may  be  raised  whether the  evidence  of
            irregularities that Santiago  described meets the  definition
            of after-acquired evidence under McKennon v. Nashville Banner
                                             ________    ________________
            Publ'g  Co.,  116 S.  Ct.  879  (1995).   McKennon  concerned
            ___________                               ________
            employee wrongdoing that would  normally cause termination of
            employment.  We do not  know if the irregularities alleged in
            this case would in fact  normally lead to termination or non-
            renewal of  employment.    In  addition,  McKennon  expressly
                                                      ________
            considered  the  equitable  doctrine  of   unclean  hands  in
            determining  that "the  employee's wrongdoing  must  be taken
            into account,  lest  the employer's  legitimate  concerns  be
            ignored."   Id. at 360.  Here, as the evidence was presented,
                        ___
            it  was   apparently  the  former   administration,  not  the
            employees, who made the appointments allegedly against normal
            procedures.   If  the  employees were  blameless,  it may  be
            difficult to import  wholesale the McKennon doctrine.   Given
                                               ________
            the desultory treatment  of this aspect of the McKennon issue
                                                           ________
            by the parties and our disposition  of the case, we think  it
            wiser to address the issue in some future case.

                                         -25-
                                          25

            of  damages  and  the  appropriateness  of  reinstatement  as

            equitable relief.  See id. at 885-86.  In Umbehr, the Supreme
                               ___ ___                ______

            Court adopted the McKennon approach in First Amendment claims
                              ________

            brought by public employees or  contractors.  See Umbehr, 116
                                                          ___ ______

            S. Ct.  at 2352  ("[I]f [plaintiff]  prevails, evidence  that

            [defendants] discovered  facts after  termination that  would

            have  led  to  a  later  termination  anyway . . .  would  be

            relevant in assessing what remedy is appropriate.").

                      Thus,  such  after-acquired  evidence  is  normally

            admissible  only as  to remedy,  and not  on liability.   Yet

            here,  it was seemingly offered, over objection, as pertinent

            to  liability.   Those  portions  of    Santiago's  testimony

            concerning  the  irregularities in  plaintiffs'  appointments

            which  did not  consist of  legal  conclusions were  arguably

            relevant  to damages,  but normally,  not to  liability.   On

            appeal, plaintiffs only argue the issue of admissibility, and

            the evidence was arguably admissible on damages.15

                      To   prevail,   plaintiffs  must   show   abuse  of

            discretion  in  admission of  the  evidence.    Any abuse  of

            discretion  analysis is  complicated by  the  actions of  the

                                
            ____________________

            15.  The trial  court erred in  failing to instruct the  jury
            that  Santiago's testimony  was not  relevant in  determining
            liability.  Although  the judge properly instructed  the jury
            that it should not consider  evidence that it did not believe
            was before  the decision maker  at the time of  the decision,
            the risk  of prejudice  was such that  the judge  should have
            stated  explicitly   that  Santiago's   testimony  concerning
            irregularities was  not to  be considered in  any way  on the
            question of liability.

                                         -26-
                                          26

            parties  here.    While much  of  Santiago's  testimony would

            normally  be   inadmissible,  plaintiffs  may   have  invited

            defendants to respond in kind.  It was apparently  plaintiffs

            who first  introduced the  topic of  legal conclusions  to be

            drawn  from review of plaintiffs' personnel  files and of the

            law about rights of public employees.  Plaintiffs argued that

            the files showed no disciplinary warnings or other actions by

            the employers which  provided cause for termination  of their

            employment,   and   their   expert   may  have   engaged   in

            inappropriate legal commentary. Defendants apparently did not

            object, perhaps because they wanted to respond in kind.

                      The trial judge evidently felt that this opened the

            door to  the defendants'  expert.  "Opening  the door"  is an

            evidentiary concept  which requires  careful weighing  of the

            unfairness of allowing one  party's objectionable evidence to

            remain  unanswered  against  the  danger of  compounding  the

            problem with further inadmissible and potentially prejudicial

            testimony.  See 1 McCormack on Evidence   57 (John W. Strong,
                        ___   _____________________

            ed.,  4th ed.  1992).   The  judge may  well  have felt  that

            plaintiffs created the problem about which they now complain.

            As plaintiffs did not provide this court with a transcript of

            their own expert's testimony, we do not reach the question of

            whether  the  judge   abused  his   discretion  in   allowing

            Santiago's problematic testimony under an "opening  the door"

            theory.

                                         -27-
                                          27

                      To overcome the jury  verdict, plaintiffs must show

            not only that there were errors under the abuse of discretion

            standard,  but also  that the  district  court's errors  were

            harmful.  "Only  if we answer both questions  in the positive

            will [plaintiffs']  argument on  appeal prevail."   Ahern  v.
                                                                _____

            Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 786 (1st Cir. 1996).
            ______

            Harmless Error
            ______________

                      In  a civil case,  the party asserting  error bears

            the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful, i.e.,

            that it affected  that party's substantial rights.   See Fed.
                                                                 ___

            R. Civ. P.  61; Fed. R. Evid.  103; Federico v. Order  of St.
                                                ________    _____________

            Benedict  in R.I., 64  F.3d 1, 3  (1st Cir. 1995)  (burden of
            _________________

            showing harmful error  in a civil case is  on party asserting

            error); Hygh v.  Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364-65  (2d Cir. 1992)
                    ____     ______

            (holding  that objecting party had  not met burden of showing

            that  admission  of  improper  legal  opinion  testimony  had

            prejudicial  effect).    "In  determining  whether  an  error

            affected a party's substantial right[s], the central question

            is whether this court can  say with fair assurance . . . that

            the  judgment was  not substantially  swayed  by the  error."

            Ahern,  85 F.3d at  786 (citations, internal  quotation marks
            _____

            and original alterations omitted).

                      Factors  considered in  determining the  likelihood

            that  the  jury's  verdict was  substantially  swayed  by the

            evidentiary error include both the centrality of the evidence

                                         -28-
                                          28

            and the  prejudicial effect  of its  inclusion or  exclusion.

            See id.   "We weigh these  factors in the context of the case
            ___ ___

            as  gleaned from the  record as a whole."   Id. (citation and
                                                        ___

            internal quotation marks omitted).   Ultimately, if we are in

            "grave doubt"  concerning the likely  effect of the  error on

            the verdict,  we treat the  error as if  it had  affected the

            verdict.  See id.
                      ___ ___

                      Although normally  testimony such as  Santiago's as

            to legal conclusions is  clearly wrong and such  testimony as

            was proper  is limited,  at best, to  damages, we  cannot say

            that the  testimony affected  the outcome  of the  trial, and

            therefore, we consider it harmless.16 

                      The  district court's  instructions here  reinforce

            the  conclusion that Santiago's testimony was not central nor

            did it  actually prejudice  the jury's  decision.  The  judge

            properly  instructed  that  "once  a  transitory  appointment

            expires, defendant  may  terminate  the  transitory  employee

            . . .  for any  reason  except  if that  reason  is based  on
                                    ______  __ ____  ______  __ _____  __

            political   affiliation."  (emphasis   added)     The   judge
            _________   ___________

            instructed,  not once  but several  times,  that the  central

            issue  for the  jury to  decide  was whether  the motive  for

                                
            ____________________

            16.  That plaintiffs  apparently  opened  the  door  to  such
            testimony also bears  on the  harmless error  analysis.   The
            jury may have had two  "experts" each opining on the law  and
            may have disregarded  both experts as not helpful  on the key
            question of motive.  In this case, the question of motive was
            a straightforward  question of  whom the  jury believed,  the
            Mayor or the plaintiffs.

                                         -29-
                                          29

            plaintiffs'  non-renewals  was their  political  affiliation.

            Finally, the verdict form itself  posed the question, "Do you

            find by  a preponderance of the evidence  that the motivating

            factor  for not renewing  the appointment of  [plaintiff] was

            [his or her] political affiliation?"

                      The judge did  expressly caution the jury  that the

            municipal  defendants could not use compliance with state law

            as  a pretext  for political  discrimination.   The  district

            court instructed the jury that  they were not to consider any

            facts that were not known  to the relevant decision makers at

            the  time plaintiffs'  contracts were  allowed  to expire  in

            deciding  whether  Soto's  administration  let plaintiffs  go

            because  of their political  affiliation.17  As  the district

            court explained, "if  the irregularity or misconduct  was not

            discovered  until  after  the  employee's  contract  was  not

            renewed,  the employer  could  not  have  been  motivated  by

            knowledge of it, and he  cannot now claim that the employee's

            contract was not renewed for that reason."

                      Thus,  we do not find it likely, despite Santiago's

            testimony, that  the jury  was confused  about the  rights of

                                
            ____________________

            17.   In  finding  any  error harmless,  we  need not  decide
            whether the  admission of the  evidence was erroneous  in the
            first  instance.   Plaintiffs  themselves represented  to the
            court that Soto's knowledge of the  illegalities was a viable
            factual  issue  for  the  jury.    Plaintiffs  asked for  and
            received  an instruction, which they said "would be curative"
            of  the McKennon problem, that  the jury should disregard the
                    ________
            illegality evidence "if they believed that [the illegalities]
            were discovered after the fact."  

                                         -30-
                                          30

            transitory  employees under the First Amendment.  As in Caro,
                                                                    ____

            the  issue in  this  case  was "the  factual  matter of  [the

            municipality's]  reason for dismissing  the plaintiffs.   Was

            [its]  motive political?"   Caro,  878 F.2d at  2.   The jury
                                        ____

            answered that question.   As we harbor no  "grave doubt," the

            judgment  of  the district  court  is  affirmed.    Costs  to
                                                   ________

            appellees.

                                         -31-
                                          31