Court Opinion

ID: 9918823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 17:21:09.733618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:05.166484
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Humphreys,* Beales and Lorish
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Richmond, Virginia

            LUCINDA WALKER
                                                                                OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 1265-22-2                                     JUDGE LISA M. LORISH
                                                                              JANUARY 16, 2024
            VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS—
             GREENSVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER

                        FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

                           Brody H. Reid (ReidGoodwin, PLC, on brief), for appellant.

                           Emily O. Sealy, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General; Steven G. Popps, Deputy Attorney General;
                           Jacqueline C. Hedblom, Section Chief; Scott John Fitzgerald, Unit
                           Manager, on brief), for appellee.

                   Lucinda Walker injured her ankle while working for the Virginia Department of

            Corrections. The Department and Walker agreed that the Department would pay for medical

            benefits connected to her injury, and the Workers’ Compensation Commission entered an award

            agreement formalizing the same. Two years and twelve days later, Walker filed a claim for

            temporary total disability based on a change in condition. Such a claim is timely under Code

            § 65.2-708(A) if filed within 24 months from the last date compensation was paid pursuant to an

            award of compensation. The Commission found Walker’s claim was barred by the statute of

            limitations because the Commission’s award was not an “order of compensation” but “medical

            only.” Because we conclude Code § 65.2-708(C) defines the voluntary payment of equal wages for

                   *
                     Judge Humphreys participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the
            effective date of his retirement on December 31, 2023.
light-duty work to be “compensation paid pursuant to an award of compensation,” and Walker’s

claim was filed within two years of the last day she received qualifying wages, we disagree and find

her claim was timely.

                                           BACKGROUND

        The facts are undisputed. Walker injured her ankle on June 24, 2019, while working for the

Department. Within a month, she filed a claim with the Commission seeking an award for medical

benefits in connection with her injury. The Department agreed to pay for medical benefits related to

Walker’s injury, so the parties executed an award agreement. In August 2019, the Commission

entered a “Medical Only Award Order” adopting that agreement.

        Due to her ankle injury, Walker was restricted to light-duty work from June 24, 2019 to

August 1, 2019, from October 17, 2020 to December 17, 2020, and again from May 26, 2021 to

July 22, 2021. During these time periods, the Department paid Walker full wages for her light-duty

work.

        On July 6, 2021, Walker filed a claim requesting a retroactive, continuing award of

temporary total disability wage loss benefits starting from the first day she was restricted to light-

duty work.1 Walker subsequently filed a letter with the Commission explaining that she was still

experiencing pain after being treated by two approved doctors and going to multiple appointments

with them over a 23-month period. She explained that these doctors had misdiagnosed her injuries

and that she was finally referred to an orthopedic specialist. That specialist took multiple X-rays

and determined that the “tendon in [her] left foot [was] torn” and needed surgical correction.

Walker clarified that she sought “lost time benefits for the amount of time [she would] be out of

work for surgery and recovery.” Walker completed her surgery, and amended her claim to include

        1
       Walker also requested an award of temporary partial disability benefits but later
abandoned that claim.
                                           -2-
an additional request of temporary total disability benefits from the date of surgery, July 23, 2021,

through October 4, 2021.

        The case proceeded to a hearing before a deputy commissioner, during which the parties

stipulated that their sole dispute was whether Walker’s claim for temporary total disability benefits

was barred by the statute of limitations.2 At the parties’ request, the deputy commissioner directed

the parties to brief the issue. The Department argued that Walker’s claim, filed two years and

twelve days after her injury, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth under Code

§ 65.2-601. Walker contended, however, that Code § 65.2-708(C) tolled the statute of limitations

and that she could file a claim based on a change in condition up to two years after the Department

last paid her full wages for light-duty work, or until July 22, 2023.

        The deputy commissioner issued an opinion agreeing with the Department that Walker’s

claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Walker appealed the deputy commissioner’s decision

to the full Commission, which affirmed the same. Walker now appeals the full Commission’s

decision.

                                             ANALYSIS

        The only question for review is whether Walker’s claim was barred by the statute of

limitations set out in the Workers’ Compensation Act. “An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure

question of law which we review de novo.” Ford Motor Co. v. Gordon, 281 Va. 543, 549 (2011).

“When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that

language.” Id. (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007)).

Thus, “we must give effect to the legislature’s intention as expressed by the language used unless a

literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity.” Id. Where a “statute is

        2
         The Department agreed to cover the cost of surgery on July 23, 2021, and also conceded
that Walker was totally disabled from July 23, 2021, to October 4, 2021, while recovering from
the surgery.
                                               -3-
subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the

legislative intent behind the statute.” Id. Because the Act is “remedial legislation[,]” it must be

“liberally construed in favor of the injured employee.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.

Eggleston, 264 Va. 13, 17 (2002).

        In general, “[a]n employee must assert against his employer ‘any claim that he might have

for any injury growing out of the accident’ within the two-year statute of limitations period found in

Code § 65.2-601.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Mease, 62 Va. App. 190, 198 (2013) (quoting

Shawley v. Shea-Ball Constr. Co., 216 Va. 442, 446 (1975)). An employee may receive

compensation for qualifying injuries. See Code §§ 65.2-500 to -531. Because injuries may change

over time, the Act allows an employee to seek review from the Commission based on changed

circumstances. See Code § 65.2-708(A).

        In 2013, the legislature amended the part of the Act dealing with changes in condition. It

remains the case that Code § 65.2-708(A) (“subsection A”) authorizes further review based on a

“change in condition,” but the italicized qualifying language was added:

                  Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest,
                  on the ground of a change in condition, the Commission may review
                  any award of compensation and on such review may make an award
                  ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously
                  awarded . . . . No such review shall be made after 24 months from
                  the last day for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award
                  under this title . . . . 3

The legislature also amended Code § 65.2-708(C) (“subsection C”) of the same “change in

condition” statute, adding the following italicized language:

                  All wages paid, for a period not exceeding 24 consecutive months, to
                  an employee (i) who is physically unable to return to his pre-injury
                  work due to a compensable injury and (ii) who is provided work
                  within his capacity at a wage equal to or greater than his pre-injury
                  wage shall be considered compensation paid pursuant to an award of
                  compensation but shall not result in a reduction of the maximum

        3
            Code § 65.2-708(A) identifies exceptions that are not applicable to this case.
                                                 -4-
               number of weeks of compensation benefits as described in
               §§ 65.2-500 and 65.2-518.

       These amendments followed decades of caselaw interpreting an ever-evolving Act. “[P]rior

to 1932, no time limit was imposed upon the filing of an application for review based upon a

change of condition.” Buenson Div., Aeronca, Inc. v. McCauley, 221 Va. 430, 432 (1980). After

instituting a limitations period, the General Assembly later added the provision now codified as

subsection C “to prevent possible abuse by employers of the two-year limitation period” that

otherwise applies under subsection A. Scott v. Scott, 16 Va. App. 815, 819 (1993). More precisely,

the General Assembly enacted subsection C “to prevent employers from lulling partially disabled

workers into a false sense of security during this two-year period by providing employees light duty

work at their pre-injury wage for two years and then terminating the employee without liability for

future disability benefits.” Id. An employer may not pay the injured employee his pre-injury wage

for two years, “only to have the employer later use a medical-only award to allege that a change-in-

condition claim for compensation filed more than two years after the date of the accident is barred

by the statute of limitations.” Prince William Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Rahim, 58 Va. App. 493, 507

(2011) (en banc) (quoting Scott, 16 Va. App. at 819), aff’d, 284 Va. 316 (2012). Thus, subsection

C protected the change-in-condition claims of disabled workers who receive pre-injury wages for

light-duty work.

       In Ford Motor Company, the Supreme Court explained that subsection C applies even when

the award itself makes no mention of such wages. There, the “last direct payment of compensation

under [any express] award” occurred more than two years before the employee sought more

compensation based on a change in condition. Ford Motor Co., 281 Va. at 549. Even so, the

two-year statute of limitations was tolled by subsection C because the employee had later worked

in a “light-duty position and earned wages at or above his pre-injury wage.” Id. at 546, 552.

                                                -5-
       The Supreme Court reasoned that when equal wages were paid for light-duty work under

subsection C, those wages were “compensation,” and that “compensation” tolled subsection A’s

limitation of review to the 24-month period after “the last day for which compensation was paid,

pursuant to an award under this title.” Id. at 551 (emphasis added). In effect, subsection C

“expand[ed] the definition of ‘compensation’ under subsection A to include wages which meet

certain conditions.” Id. at 550. Since the payment of qualifying wages was defined as

“compensation,” it had the effect of tolling, or extending, the “last day for which compensation

was paid” under subsection A. Id. Thus, the prior version of subsection C was “not a stand-

alone provision,” but one that “provide[d] a definition for the tolling mechanism applied to

subsection A, where a claimant has received wages (rather than compensation) as provided in

subsection C.” Id. at 551.

       Noting that the statute did not “limit[]” the Commission’s authority based on “the nature

or type of award previously awarded,” our Court then naturally applied the same reasoning

where the original award was “medical only” and did not include any compensation. Rahim, 58

Va. App. at 505. So long as the employer had paid equal wages for light-duty work, qualifying

under subsection C, those wages were “compensation” and tolled the operation of subsection A’s

limitation of review “after 24 months from the last day for which compensation was paid,

pursuant to an award under this title.” Code § 65.2-708(A) (emphasis added); see Rahim, 58

Va. App. at 508. Thus, even though the original award did not include any compensation, Rahim

still found wages qualifying under subsection C to be compensation “paid, pursuant to an award

under this title” for purposes of subsection A.

       In both cases, Ford Motor Company and Rahim, there was no mention in the

Commission’s order of compensation in the form of equal wages for light-duty work. Yet the

fact that the original formal award did not require the payment of equal wages for light-duty

                                                  -6-
work did not impede the Commission’s ability to review the compensation arrangement under

subsection A given the alleged change in condition.4

       The General Assembly amended subsection A in 2013 to narrow the Commission’s

authority to review awards after an alleged change of condition. Before, subsection A allowed

review of “any award” upon a change of condition of the employee, as long as a request for

review was made within “24 months of the last day for which compensation was paid, pursuant

to an award under this title.” Now, subsection A allows review only of “any award of

compensation.”

       But the General Assembly also simultaneously amended subsection C to state that when

an employer pays full wages for light-duty employment, those payments are “considered

compensation paid pursuant to an award of compensation.”

       Putting the provisions together, as amended, the Commission retains the same authority

to consider a request based on a change in condition if it was submitted within two years of the

last day an employer pays full wages for light-duty work.5 The earlier version of the statute gave

the Commission broad authority to review a change in condition within two years of “any order,”

tolling that period if the employer paid equal wages for light-duty work during the two years. As

explained above, we found the statute implicitly identified such qualifying wages paid as

“pursuant to an award of compensation” without any express language stating the same. Now,

subsection C has been amended to expressly recognize what we long held by implication. When

       4
         We affirmed the same in Roske v. Culbertson Co., 62 Va. App. 512 (2013), in a
decision issued after the 2013 amendments, but without analyzing the amendments which took
effect only after the Commission considered the worker’s claim in that case.
       5
         Subsection C cuts off tolling after an employee receives 24 consecutive months of
qualifying wages.
                                                 -7-
an employer pays equal wages for light-duty employment it is a statutory award of compensation

under Subsection C. That statutory award6 is then reviewable under subsection A.

       That the General Assembly also narrowed the authority of the Commission in subsection A

from reviewing “any award” to “any award of compensation” does not change the analysis in the

face of subsection C’s explicit definition of equal wages for light-duty work as an “award of

compensation.” Instead, the General Assembly’s modification to subsection A merely clarified that

not all “medical only” awards can be reopened under the “any award” analysis in Rahim. The

Commission only has such authority when a “medical only” award is followed by an employer

paying wages that are expressly defined to constitute “compensation pursuant to an award for

compensation.”

       Applying the statute here, the Commission may review the wages the Department of

Corrections paid to Walker following her ankle injury, and “may make an award ending,

diminishing or increasing [this] compensation previously awarded” because those wages are a

statutory award of compensation. Code § 65.2-708(A). Walker petitioned on July 6, 2021,

alleging a change in condition two years and twelve days after she injured her ankle. After she first

received a “medical only” award from the Commission, Walker was paid full wages while she was

restricted to light-duty work, most recently from May 26, 2021, to July 22, 2021. These wages are

“compensation paid pursuant to an award of compensation.” Code § 65.2-708(C). The

       6
          We have long recognized the creation of awards other than those formally entered by
the Commission. For example, for more than 35 years, we have recognized that “de facto”
awards may be created by the conduct of the employer and employee. See, e.g., Tyco Elecs. v.
Vanpelt, 62 Va. App. 160, 177 (2013). “In contrast to an actual award, a de facto award is ‘a
legal fiction crafted by the courts, “a creature of case law not statutory law.”’” Roske, 62
Va. App. at 520 (quoting Lysable Transp., Inc. v. Patton, 57 Va. App. 408, 414 (2010)). In
contrast to a de facto award, the statute now affirmatively creates an award of compensation that
the Commission may then review. The effect of recognizing payments in these circumstances as
a statutory award merely extends the two-year statute of limitations that would otherwise prevent
an employee—or employer—from ending, diminishing, or increasing compensation due to a
change in condition.
                                                  -8-
Commission may review this “award of compensation” for up to 24 months from the last date

compensation was paid. Code § 65.2-708(A). Because Walker petitioned within two years of the

last day for which she was paid full wages for light-duty work, her petition is not barred by the

statute of limitations.

        The Department argues that a claimant cannot invoke subsection C unless the

Commission previously made an award of compensation. In other words, the Department claims

that when the General Assembly narrowed the language in subsection A to only permit review of

“any award of compensation,” the General Assembly abrogated our prior decision in Rahim

allowing the review of “medical only” awards. While we agree with the Department that there

must have been an award of compensation, we disagree that the award must have been entered

by the Commission. Instead, the award here is a creature of statute. The Department’s

interpretation cuts off the statute after the phrase “award of compensation” in subsection A and

assigns no meaning to the amended subsection C, which now specifically defines equal wages

for light-duty work as an “award of compensation.” As a result, the Department robs subsection

C of its force—and plain meaning.

        The plain meaning of the text is clear. Even absent such clarity, our interpretation

appropriately resolves any ambiguity “in favor of the injured employee.” Eggleston, 264 Va. at

17. And it aligns with the legislature’s long-standing intent to “prevent[] an employer from ‘lulling

[a] partially disabled worker [ ] into a false sense of security.” Rahim, 58 Va. App. at 507 (quoting

Scott, 16 Va. App. at 819).

                                                 -9-
                                          CONCLUSION

       We hold that the Commission erred in finding that Walker’s claim for temporary total

disability benefits was barred by the statute of limitations under Code § 65.2-601 and reverse and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                           Reversed and remanded.

                                               - 10 -