Court Opinion

ID: 9928931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:02:29.965221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:55.899215
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                    DAVE ALLEN LAPORTE, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0257
                               FILED 2-1-2024

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County
                        No. S0100CR201900388
               The Honorable Michael D. Latham, Judge

    AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED FOR
                      RESENTENCING

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Eric Knobloch
Counsel for Appellee

Hamblin Law Office, PLC, Eagar
By Bryce M. Hamblin
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. LAPORTE
                           Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

G A S S, Chief Judge:

¶1            Dave Allen LaPorte appeals his convictions and sentences for
three crimes: second-degree murder, abandonment or concealment of a
dead body, and tampering with physical evidence. LaPorte challenges his
convictions based on the admission of evidence of other acts. We affirm his
convictions. We requested supplemental briefing on sentencing issues. We
vacate the sentences on all three convictions and remand for resentencing.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            This court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to
sustaining the jury verdicts, resolving all reasonable inferences against
LaPorte. See State v. Felix, 237 Ariz. 280, 283 ¶ 2 (App. 2015).

I.    The jury convicted LaPorte of three felonies, including second-
      degree murder.

¶3            On October 29, 2019, LaPorte was in a bad mood after his son
rolled a vehicle LaPorte had recently rebuilt specially for him. Through the
afternoon and evening LaPorte argued with his wife. During their
argument, LaPorte’s wife left the house and sat in her truck for nearly an
hour. While she was in her truck, LaPorte stepped outside briefly with a
handgun in his pants pocket and looked around before going back inside.
He came out again, appearing intoxicated, and threw chunks of concrete
toward a casita on the property where he thought his wife might be. Shortly
after LaPorte went back inside, his wife went back into the house.

¶4             About 30 minutes later, LaPorte came outside a third time,
again with the handgun in his pants pocket. He made obscene gestures
toward the sky and walked back and forth outside the house, at times
removing the gun from his pocket and carrying it in his hand. At 7:50 p.m.,
he left in his truck, returning not ten minutes later after damaging it in a
location on the way to where he would discard his wife’s body. LaPorte and
his wife were the only two at the house.

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                           STATE v. LAPORTE
                           Decision of the Court

¶5            Sometime between 7:15 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., neighbors heard
a gunshot nearby. The shot was fired by the handgun LaPorte had been
holding earlier. The gun went off in the living room where he and his wife
were close to each other. The bullet entered LaPorte’s wife’s head in front
of her right ear, continued downward, and came to rest inside her neck,
killing her instantly. At 8:13 p.m., LaPorte’s wife’s phone received a text
from LaPorte’s phone. The text read, “I found your phone, B/N Hello?”

¶6            LaPorte hid the handgun under a sandbag in the backyard
and the used shell casing under nearby artificial turf. He tried to clean the
bloodied living-room carpet but finally cut out the soiled piece, replaced it
with a patch of new carpet, and rearranged a rug and furniture to try to
conceal the remaining blood. He hid the bloodied carpet and padding
under the artificial turf along with the shell casing. He used a moving
blanket to drag his wife’s body into her truck and drove the body to where
he dumped it in a ditch by the side of a road.

¶7             The next day, LaPorte approached his neighbor, a police
officer, for help to find his “missing” wife. The officer started an
investigation after seeing what he suspected was blood on LaPorte’s and
his wife’s trucks and the damage to LaPorte’s truck. LaPorte eventually told
officers where to find his wife’s body and admitted to replacing the carpet
and hiding the evidence, though he maintained the shooting had been an
accident or suicide.

¶8            Over LaPorte’s objection, the superior court allowed the State
to present evidence of two of LaPorte’s earlier acts. First, in 2004 LaPorte
repeatedly disconnected the home phones to prevent his daughter from
calling her mother. Second, in 2006 LaPorte took his ex-girlfriend’s cell
phone and pulled the landline out of the wall so she could not call the
police. The 2004 incident led to a conviction, but the 2006 incident did not.

¶9           After a ten-day trial, the jury returned three guilty verdicts.
Though the State charged LaPorte with first-degree murder, the jury
convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. It
also returned guilty verdicts for abandonment or concealment of a dead
body and tampering with physical evidence.

II.   The superior court relied on an alleged historical prior felony and
      considered other aggravating factors and mitigating factors to
      decide LaPorte’s sentences.

¶10           At the sentencing hearing, the State alleged LaPorte had a
prior felony conviction for aggravated driving under the influence (DUI).

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                           STATE v. LAPORTE
                           Decision of the Court

LaPorte did not object. Though the alleged aggravated DUI conviction was
more than 10 years old, the State asserted it could be used to sentence
LaPorte as a category-two repetitive offender for the abandonment or
concealment of a dead body and tampering with physical evidence
convictions. These felony convictions are often called “forever priors”
because they can be used to enhance sentencing even for acts committed
more than 10 years later. See A.R.S. § 13-703. Again, LaPorte did not object.

¶11           The State submitted, and the superior court admitted, a
certified copy of the conviction during the sentencing hearing. Even so, the
copy inadvertently was not entered into the record. At our request, the
parties supplemented the record on appeal with a copy of the conviction.
As it turned out, the conviction was for attempted aggravated DUI, not
aggravated DUI, and was an undesignated felony.

¶12           The jury neither was asked to find nor found any aggravating
circumstances. And LaPorte did not plead to any aggravating
circumstances. Even so, the superior court said, “[T]he trier of fact as well
as the State have established aggravating factors,” specifically “the use of a
deadly weapon.”

¶13           The superior court then found additional statutory
aggravating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence: use of a
deadly weapon, the especially heinous nature of the crime, and the
emotional and financial harm to the victim’s immediate family. See A.R.S.
§ 13-701.D.2, 5, 9. The superior court also found non-statutory aggravating
circumstances: LaPorte’s propensity for violence toward women and his
lack of remorse.

¶14           Based on all those aggravating circumstances and some
mitigating factors, the superior court sentenced LaPorte to “the maximum
amount of time . . . under the law” for all three convictions.

¶15             This court has jurisdiction over LaPorte’s timely appeal under
article VI, section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1,
13-4031, and 13-4033.A.1.

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Any error in admitting the other-acts evidence was harmless.

¶16          At trial, the State argued LaPorte’s other acts involving his
daughter and ex-girlfriend related to his taking his wife’s phone “so she
[could not] call 911.” On appeal, LaPorte argues the superior court erred

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                             STATE v. LAPORTE
                             Decision of the Court

when, over his objection, it allowed the State to present evidence of the two
other phone-related acts of domestic violence. The State argues the superior
court did not err by admitting the other-act evidence and argues any error
was harmless because overwhelming evidence of guilt existed and because
the other acts were less egregious than the charged crime of murder.

¶17            When a criminal defendant raises an issue on which the
superior court allegedly ruled erroneously, “this court reviews for harmless
error.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 588 (1993). Error is harmless if this court
can say beyond a reasonable doubt the error “did not contribute to or affect
the verdict.” Id. The question is whether the guilty verdict was “surely
unattributable” to the error. Id. (citation omitted). “Under harmless error
review, the State bears the burden of proof.” State v. Arias, 248 Ariz. 546, 555
¶ 31 (App. 2020).

¶18           The superior court admitted evidence of LaPorte’s other acts
under Rule 404(b)’s modus operandi exception. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
Evidence of a defendant’s other acts is not admissible at trial to show
conformity with that person’s character. Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see State v.
Garcia, 96 Ariz. 203, 205 (1964). But a party may seek to admit other-act
evidence for permitted purposes, such as proving “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).

¶19           For the superior court to admit other act evidence: (1) the
evidence must be “factually or conditionally” relevant, (2) the State must
prove the defendant committed the act by clear and convincing evidence,
(3) the State must offer the evidence for a proper purpose, and (4) the
probative value of the evidence must outweigh the potential for unfair
prejudice. State v. Vigil, 195 Ariz. 189, 191 ¶ 14 (App. 1999); State v.
Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 60 (1995).

¶20           When the superior court admits evidence of other acts, the
objecting party must have a chance to request a limiting instruction. See
Ariz. R. Evid. 105; see also Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. at 60. The superior court
gave a limiting instruction, telling the jury to consider the other acts only if
the State proved by clear and convincing evidence LaPorte committed
them. The court instructed the jury to consider the other acts only “to
establish the defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident.” It also instructed the
jury not to consider the other acts “to determine the defendant’s character
or character trait, or to determine that the defendant acted in conformity

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                            STATE v. LAPORTE
                            Decision of the Court

with the defendant’s character or character trait, and therefore committed
the charged offense.”

¶21             Still, LaPorte argues the unfair prejudice of introducing
evidence of his other acts substantially outweighed the evidence’s
probative value. “Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis . . . such as emotion, sympathy or horror.”
State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52 (1993) (citation omitted). “Rule 403 weighing
is best left to the trial court and, absent an abuse of discretion, will not be
disturbed on appeal.” State v. Spencer, 176 Ariz. 36, 41 (1993). When the
other-act evidence is less egregious than the charged acts, the other-act
evidence is less likely to be unfairly prejudicial. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403; State
v. Vega, 228 Ariz. 24, 29–30 ¶ 21–24 (App. 2011).

¶22             Assuming, without deciding, the superior court erred by
admitting evidence of LaPorte’s other acts, any error was harmless because
other overwhelming evidence pointed to his guilt. See State v. Copeland, 253
Ariz. 104, 116 ¶ 27 (App. 2022) (noting admission of evidence can be
harmless when other “overwhelming” evidence points to the defendant’s
guilt). Surveillance video showed LaPorte with the handgun that fired the
fatal shot in his possession when he was alone with his wife at home.
LaPorte admitted to hiding the evidence, disposing of his wife’s body, and
at first lying to police. He maintained the killing was an accident or suicide,
but his shifting explanations for his wife’s death contradicted the evidence.

¶23           And the superior court’s admission of evidence of the other
acts was not prejudicial because that evidence did not cause the jury to
render a guilty verdict based on “emotion, sympathy or horror.” See State
v. Herrera, 232 Ariz. 536, 548 ¶ 32 (App. 2013) (citation omitted). The State
charged LaPorte with first-degree murder, but the jury found LaPorte
guilty of the lesser charge of second-degree murder. The jury finding
LaPorte guilty of a lesser offense suggests the evidence of his other acts did
not prejudice the jury’s verdict because the jury did not convict on all
charges, including the most serious. See id.

¶24            The less egregious nature of LaPorte’s evidenced other acts as
compared to the charged act—murder—also suggests the other-act
evidence did not prejudice the verdict. See Herrera, 232 Ariz. at 548–49 ¶ 30;
Vega, 228 Ariz. at 29–30 ¶ 21–24 (noting lower risk of unfair prejudice when
other acts were “far less egregious” than the charged acts). This court
cannot attribute the jury’s verdict to the admission of evidence of LaPorte’s
other acts because his taking other victims’ phones to prevent them from
calling for help does not compel the conclusion LaPorte shot his wife.

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                            STATE v. LAPORTE
                            Decision of the Court

¶25           Any error by admission of other-act evidence was harmless.

II.    LaPorte’s sentences for all three convictions exceeded the length
       allowed by law.

¶26            The superior court must impose a sentence “solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”
State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 582 ¶ 12 (2005) (quoting Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)) (emphasis omitted). The only
exception is for prior felonies, which “the court shall determine.” A.R.S.
§ 13-701.D.11 (providing court determines previous felony convictions
within ten years before the charged offense).

¶27           At sentencing, LaPorte did not object when the superior court
used the prior felony as the foundation for imposing the maximum
sentence for the second-degree murder conviction and enhanced category-
2 sentences for the abandonment of a dead body and evidence tampering
convictions. And LaPorte did not raise these sentencing issues on appeal.

¶28            A defendant who does not object to a perceived error at trial
waives review of the issue other than for fundamental error. State v.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19 (2005). Though LaPorte did not timely
raise the issue, Arizona’s appellate courts consistently review a defendant’s
sentence for fundamental error. See State v. Smith, 219 Ariz. 132, 136 ¶ 20
(2008). And when a sentencing procedure deprives a defendant of the right
to have a jury find certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt, that deprivation
goes to the foundation of the case and constitutes fundamental error.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 25. Because an illegal sentence is inherently
prejudicial, “[a]n illegal sentence constitutes fundamental error.” State v.
Forde, 233 Ariz. 543, 574 ¶ 137 (2014).

       A.     LaPorte’s attempted aggravated DUI conviction cannot be
              used to aggravate or to enhance his sentences.

¶29          The State concedes it was error to use LaPorte’s attempted
aggravated DUI conviction to impose the maximum sentence for the
second-degree murder conviction and to sentence LaPorte as a category-2
offender for the abandonment of a dead body and evidence tampering
convictions.

¶30           The superior court could not sentence LaPorte to the
maximum sentence for the second-degree murder conviction unless the
trier of fact—the jury—found the State had proved beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating circumstance or unless the court determined

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                            STATE v. LAPORTE
                            Decision of the Court

LaPorte had a prior felony conviction less than 10 years old. A.R.S.
§ 13-701.C, D.11. Because the prior conviction was more than 10 years old,
it could not be used as an aggravating circumstance to impose a maximum
sentence for the second-degree murder conviction. See A.R.S. § 13-701.D.11.

¶31            The superior court also could not sentence LaPorte as a
category-2 repetitive offender for the abandonment of a dead body and
evidence tampering convictions unless the court found LaPorte had a
historical prior felony conviction. See A.R.S. § 13-703. If he had a historical
prior felony conviction, the superior court could then sentence him to an
aggravated sentence as a category-2 offender for those two convictions only
if the record supported at least two statutory aggravating circumstances.
A.R.S. § 13-701.D; State v. Allen, 248 Ariz. 352, 369 ¶¶ 68–69 (2020) (vacating
the defendant’s aggravated sentence because the jury found only one
aggravating circumstance). A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
have a jury find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 25 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
490 (2000)).

¶32           True enough, aggravated DUI is a historical prior felony
conviction. A.R.S. § 13-105.22(a)(iv) (2015). But attempted aggravated DUI
is not. A historical prior felony conviction for DUI under the statute
applicable to LaPorte’s sentencing required a conviction for a crime
involving “driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.”
A.R.S. § 13-105.22(a)(iv) (2015). But attempted aggravated DUI requires,
among the other elements, a defendant only take “any step beyond mere
preparation and toward driving or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle.” See State v. Wing, 190 Ariz. 203, 206 (App. 1997) (emphasis
added). The elements for attempted aggravated DUI, thus, are different
from those supporting a historical prior felony conviction involving DUI.
Cf. State v. Cleere, 213 Ariz. 54, 57 ¶ 6 (App. 2006) (“inflicting or even
threatening serious physical injury” was not an element of the crime of
attempted murder).

¶33           LaPorte’s prior attempted aggravated DUI conviction, thus, is
not a historical prior felony conviction (or “forever prior”). The conviction,
thus, could not be used to enhance LaPorte’s sentence by moving him from
being a category-1 to a category-2 repetitive offender. See A.R.S. § 13-703.A–
B. On remand, the superior court must sentence LaPorte as a category-1
repetitive offender for the abandonment or concealment of a dead body
conviction and the tampering with physical evidence conviction. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-703.A; A.R.S. § 13-701.D.

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                           STATE v. LAPORTE
                           Decision of the Court

       B.     Because the jury found no aggravating factors, LaPorte’s
              sentence cannot exceed the presumptive sentence for any of
              the three convictions.

¶34             The State also concedes it was error to find aggravating
circumstances not found by the jury and to consider LaPorte’s lack of
remorse as an aggravating factor. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 568 ¶ 25; State
v. Trujillo, 227 Ariz. 314, 317–18 ¶ 12 (App. 2011). These were errors because
a reasonable jury could have found differently from the superior court on
the aggravating circumstances and because the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination precludes consideration of lack of remorse as a
sentencing aggravator. See Henderson, 210 Ariz. 569 ¶ 27 (jury could have
found differently); Trujillo, 227 Ariz. at 317–18 ¶ 12 (remorse irrelevant to
sentencing).

¶35           Based on the conceded errors, the State asks this court to
vacate and remand all three sentences. Because the court could not use the
prior conviction as a sentence enhancer or an aggravating circumstance and
the jury did not make findings of any other aggravating circumstances, the
superior court’s discretion on remand is limited to imposing a sentence
either at or below the presumptive for all three convictions. See A.R.S.
§§ 13-701.C, -702.D, -703.H; Allen, 248 Ariz. at 368 ¶ 62.

                              CONCLUSION

¶36         We affirm the three convictions but vacate all three sentences
and remand for resentencing.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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