Court Opinion

ID: 2964369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:40.527119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:54.868164
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

           
                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2339

                                   SUSAN G. ISLES,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                 WHC JR./COC, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Susan G. Isles on brief pro se.
            ______________
            Francis D. Dibble, Jr., Ellen M. Randle, Carol E. Kamm and
            ______________________  _______________  _____________
        Bulkley, Richardson and Gelinas on brief for appellees.
        _______________________________

                                 ____________________

                                   October 17, 1996
                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.   Three months after  being hired, plaintiff
                 __________

            Susan Isles  was discharged from her  position as housekeeper

            at the residence  of William and Camille Cosby  in Shelburne,

            Massachusetts.  She responded by filing the instant action in

            which   she  claimed,   inter  alia,  that   her  termination
                                    ___________

            constituted:  (1) sex  discrimination in  violation  of Title

            VII,  42 U.S.C.   2000e-2(a); (2)  retaliation for the filing

            of a worker's  compensation claim, in violation of Mass. Gen.

            L.  ch. 152,    75B(2);  and (3)  breach of  contract.   Upon

            completion of discovery, the  district court rejected each of

            these   contentions  and   granted   summary   judgment   for

            defendants.   Having reviewed  the record in  full, we affirm

            substantially for the reasons recited by the district court. 

                 We have little to  add to Judge Freedman's comprehensive

            analysis.  As to the Title VII claim, we agree that plaintiff

            has  failed  to  adduce  sufficient  evidence  from  which  a

            reasonable jury could  conclude that defendants'  articulated

            reasons for the firing were a pretext for sex discrimination.

            See,  e.g., Udo  v. Tomes,  54  F.3d 9,  13 (1st  Cir. 1995).
            ___   ____  ___     _____

            Defendants explained, on the basis of abundant evidence, that

            plaintiff was fired primarily because of an overly aggressive

            attitude and  a tendency  to criticize  the work  of others--

            traits that  proved disruptive to staff  cohesion and morale.

            Such  concerns constitute a  justifiable basis for discharge.

            See, e.g.,  Johnson v. Allyn &  Bacon, Inc., 731  F.2d 64, 73
            ___  ____   _______    ____________________

            (1st Cir.), cert.  denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).  Plaintiff's
                        _____________

                                         -2-

            principal  evidence  to the  contrary--a vague  denial voiced

            during  her  deposition--proves  insufficient  to   create  a

            genuine dispute as to whether defendants' articulated reasons

            were  pretextual.    See,  e.g., Kaiser  v.  Armstrong  World
                                 ___   ____  ______      ________________

            Indus., Inc., 872  F.2d 512, 518 (1st  Cir. 1989) ("[s]ummary
            ____________

            judgment  is  appropriate even  in  the  face of  conflicting

            evidence  if the  latter is  insufficient to  support  a jury

            verdict in the nonmovant's  favor").  Indeed, plaintiff's own

            written  words (in the form  of letters mailed  to the Cosbys

            and to an earlier employer) only lend further credence to the

            concerns cited by defendants. 

                 Plaintiff's evidence, in any  event, fails to support an

            inference of  discriminatory animus.   As the  district court

            explained, the  specific factors on  which she relies  are of

            minimal probative value.  For example, the male employees who

            allegedly  received  more lenient  treatment  in disciplinary

            matters were not similarly situated to plaintiff.  See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Smith  v. Stratus Computers, Inc.,  40 F.3d 11,  17 (1st Cir.
            _____     _______________________

            1994), cert. denied,  115 S.  Ct. 1958 (1995).   The  alleged
                   ____________

            division  of  labor  in   the  household  staff  entailed  no

            disadvantage to her with respect to conditions of employment.

            And the alleged "breadwinner" remark was properly disregarded

            as hearsay.   Moreover, it  is undisputed that  plaintiff was

            fired  by a  female, that she  was replaced by  a female, and

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            that  the  only other  household employee  ever to  have been

            discharged was a male.

                 As to  plaintiff's claim of retaliation,  what we stated

            in  Byrd  v. Bonayne,  61 F.3d  1026,  1033 (1st  Cir. 1995),
                ____     _______

            applies as  well here:  "For the  most part,  her retaliatory

            discharge claim rests on  the identical inferences of pretext

            found  wanting above."  Id.  at 1033; accord,  e.g., Grant v.
                                    ___           ______   ____  _____

            News Group Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
            _______________________

            that showing  of pretext is essential  to retaliation claim).

            In  any  event,  we  agree  with   the  district  court  that

            plaintiff's evidence fails to support the inference that Mrs.

            Cosby even knew of plaintiff's alleged head injury, much less

            that  she  harbored  a  retaliatory  motive  in  deciding  to

            discharge  her.   See,  e.g., Medina-Munoz  v. R.J.  Reynolds
                              ___   ____  ____________     ______________

            Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting  that non-
            ___________

            moving  party's  reliance  on  "conclusory  allegations"  and

            "improbable inferences"  is  insufficient to  defeat  summary

            judgment,  even "where  elusive  concepts such  as motive  or

            intent  are  at  issue") (quoted  in  Fennell  v. First  Step
                                                  _______     ___________

            Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir. 1996)).
            _____________

                 Finally, plaintiff's claim that she enjoyed a "lifetime"

            contract, terminable only  for cause, is equally  unavailing.

            As  the district  court  explained, nothing  in the  comments

            voiced by  Mrs.  Adams  or  Mrs. Cosby  could  be  reasonably

            construed  under  the  circumstances  as  creating  any  such

                                         -4-

            arrangement.  See, e.g., O'Brien v.  Analog Devices, Inc., 34
                          ___  ____  _______     ____________________

            Mass. App.  Ct. 905, 906-07 (1993)  (requiring "strong proof"

            and   "particularly  explicit   expressions  of   intent"  to

            establish lifetime  contract); accord,  e.g.,  Smith v.  F.W.
                                           ______   ____   _____     ____

            Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413, 427 (1st Cir. 1996).  Nor did
            _________________

            Mrs. Adams have the authority to commit  the Cosbys to such a

            permanent contract.   See, e.g., Simonelli  v. Boston Housing
                                  ___  ____  _________     ______________

            Auth., 334 Mass. 438, 440-41 (1956). 
            _____

                 Plaintiff also advances a trio of  procedural challenges

            on  appeal, each of which we reject.  First, she complains of

            a  discovery   ruling   restricting  access   to   employment

            information concerning defendants'  past and present workers.

            This  court will intervene in such matters "only upon a clear

            showing  of  manifest injustice,  that  is,  where the  lower

            court's  discovery order  was plainly  wrong and  resulted in

            substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party."  Mack v. Great
                                                            ____    _____

            Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989)
            __________________________

            (quoted in Ayala-Gerena v. Bristol Myers-Squibb Co., ___ F.3d
                       ____________    ________________________

            ___, 1996 WL 494221, at *2 (1st Cir. 1996)).  No such showing

            has been made.   Far from being plainly wrong,  the discovery

            order  strikes  us  as  balanced and  fair.    And  plaintiff

            suffered minimal prejudice.   Indeed, we  note that seven  of

            the nine excluded employees ended  up being deposed, and that

            the payroll  information sought as to  such individuals would

            have been of negligible relevance.

                                         -5-

                 Second, plaintiff challenges the court's award of costs.

            Her  contention  that  the  costs of  depositions  cannot  be

            taxable when a case is resolved at the summary judgment stage

            is  misplaced.   See, e.g., Merrick  v. Northern  Natural Gas
                             ___  ____  _______     _____________________

            Co.,  911  F.2d 426,  434-35  (10th  Cir. 1990);  10  Charles
            ___

            Wright,  Arthur  Miller &  Mary  Kane,  Federal Practice  and
                                                    _____________________

            Procedure    2676,  at 341  &  n.17 (1983  & '96  Supp.); see
            _________                                                 ___

            generally Templeman v. Chris Craft  Corp., 770 F.2d 245,  249
            _________ _________    __________________

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985).  The district
                        ____________

            court acted within its  discretion in taxing costs  only with

            respect to those depositions on which it had relied in ruling

            on the summary judgment motion. 

                 Finally,  plaintiff  complains   of  the   circumstances

            surrounding the  district court's  allowance of  her original

            attorney's motion to withdraw.   As with its handling  of all

            other  aspects of the case,  we think the  court resolved the

            matter  in  an  equitable  and  conscientious  fashion.    No

            discussion  is required,  however, inasmuch as  plaintiff has

            not identified (and we do not discern) any legally cognizable

            prejudice stemming therefrom.

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

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