Court Opinion

ID: 9545701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:17:52.079673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:23.180247
License: Public Domain

Mallery, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The court instructed the jury as follows:
“In order to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in Count 1 of the Complaint, you must be satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the following elements:
“1. That on or about March 23, 1957, in the City of Seattle, Washington, the defendant was driving a motor vehicle, and was signaled to stop by a Seattle police officer in uniform;
“2. That the defendant, after having stopped, willfully set his vehicle in motion without permission of such officer, and without submitting himself to such questioning or other official action as such officer might desire to take.
“If you are not so satisfied, you should find the defendant not guilty as charged in Count 1.” (Italics mine.)
This is a correct statement of the law. The word “willful,” as used in the instruction, means “knowingly” (State *521v. Bixby, 27 Wn. (2d) 144, 177 P. (2d) 689) ánd “intentionally.” Lassiter v. Shell Oil Co., 188 Wash. 371, 62 P. (2d) 1096. The instruction, as given, authorized appellant’s counsel to argue to the jury his defense theory regarding the identity of the uniformed officer to the same extent as would have the requested instruction. The appellant does not assert that he, in fáct, did not do so.
I dissent.
Hill and Donworth, JJ., concur with Mallery, J.
October 5, 1959. Petition for rehearing denied.