Court Opinion

ID: 9486064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:09.888954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:30.896642
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The majority states that district courts have the discretion under the current Sentencing Guidelines to consider a defendant’s challenges to prior convictions. I agree with that proposition and the majority’s determination that defendant McGlocklin’s prior convictions are valid. However, I write separately to address two matters of concern regarding the majority opinion. First, I believe the majority should have considered this Court’s decision in United States v. Hoffman, 982 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.1992), in reaching its decision. Second, I disagree with the limitations the majority imposes on a district court’s ability to exercise its discretion in considering challenges to prior convictions.
I.
In Hoffman, a panel of this Court addressed the question of how district courts should handle challenges to prior convictions under the current Sentencing Guidelines. The Hoffman Court held that the November 1990 amended versions of Application Note 6 and the Background Note to § 4A1.2 of the Guidelines give district courts the discretion to determine whether a defendant may collaterally attack the use of prior convictions at sentencing in instances where the defendant has not previously challenged the prior convictions. The Hoffman Court stated:
This Circuit has not previously decided the effect of the amended versions of Application Note 6 and the Background Note to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 as they apply to collateral attacks to prior convictions. However, we adopt the view of the Second, Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits that it is within a district court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant may collaterally attack the use of prior convictions at sentencing where the defendant has not previously challenged the convictions.
982 F.2d at 190 (footnote omitted). In Hoffman, we quoted with approval United States v. Cornog, 945 F.2d 1504, 1511 (11th Cir.1991), where the Eleventh Circuit wrote:
A 1990 amendment to application note 6 ... clarifies that a district court may never count convictions previously held invalid in sentencing a defendant, but that it has discretion to conduct a collateral inquiry to determine whether challenged convictions, which the defendant has not previously contested, are invalid and, hence, must be ignored.
982 F.2d at 190.
Prior to the instant decision, Hoffman was the only published decision in this Circuit that addressed the issue of a district court’s discretion to consider challenges to prior convictions under the 1990 amended version of the Guidelines. I read the majority’s opinion in McGlocklin as being generally consistent with Hoffman on this issue.
*1049II.
I disagree and am concerned with the majority’s attempt to provide guidance to district courts regarding the breadth of their discretion to consider challenges to prior convictions. In adopting a brightline test to aid trial judges’ exercise of discretion, the majority states: “district courts are obliged to hear constitutional challenges to predicate state convictions in federal sentencing procedures only when prejudice can be presumed from the alleged constitutional violation, regardless of the facts of the particular case; and when the right asserted is so fundamental that its violation would undercut confidence in the guilt of the defendant.” (Majority Opinion at page 1045).
The majority requires that defendants “state specifically the grounds claimed for the prior conviction’s invalidity in his initial objection and the ‘anticipated means by which proof of invalidity will be attempted— whether by documentary evidence, including state court records, testimonial evidence, or combination — with an estimate of the process and the time needed to obtain the required evidence.’ ” (Majority Opinion at page 1045) (citations omitted). Thus, the majority provides at least one mandatory factor which the trial judge must consider. Additionally, the majority writes that district courts “should consider whether the defendant has available an alternative method of attacking the prior conviction either through state post-eonvietion remedies or federal habeas relief.” (Id. at 1045). The majority further notes this factor “should not be solely dispositive” but “should play a significant role” in the court’s exercise of its discretion. (Id.). Finally, the majority furnishes an example of a challenge a district court should entertain as an “unchallenged felony conviction where the defendant was not represented by counsel, counsel was not validly waived, and court records or transcripts are available to document the facts.” (Majority Opinion at page 1045).
Anticipating precise facts and circumstances under which a defendant may seek to challenge the validity of prior convictions is nearly impossible and is a matter which should rest entirely within the discretion of the trial judge. In the instant case, the majority illegitimately attempts to define the parameters of a district court’s discretion to hear such challenges.1 By mandating factors and furnishing an example of an “appropriate” challenge for consideration, the majority undermines the very discretion it concludes rests with district courts, diluting trial judge inclination into obscurity. The majority’s arrogant usurpation of the trial judge’s inherent and historic authority is objectionable, unacceptable, and reflects a lack of trust and deference to our colleagues on the district court. Indisputably, trial judges are best positioned to exercise discretion to entertain challenges to prior convictions.

. District court rulings on whether to hear challenges to prior convictions at sentencing are, in essence, evidentiary rulings subject to review by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1195 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2824, 115 L.Ed.2d 995 (1991).