Court Opinion

ID: 9691066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:06:47.85408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:09.834379
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in affirmance). The cause of action each corporate plaintiff possesses against Iiidey arose from a succession of torts committed by ITidey, and it has passed to, such plaintiff by assignment. The cause of action individual plaintiff Michael possesses against Hidey arose in his favor and is of the same order. The question is whether 17 parties, separately possessed of such causes against a common wrongdoer — causes not joint within meaning of CL 1948, § 608.1 (Stat Ann § 27.591),— may unite in suit by single declaration and thus, by the mere act and, fact of agreed confederation and without consent of court, compel the wrongdoer (and the latter’s surety) to answer all such causes in a trial of issues presented by 1 set of pleadings.
Since the plaintiff parties have not sought relief in equity, there is no occasion,for resort to authorities dealing with equity’s distinctive and flexible *517jurisdiction over -multivarious rights of action. By the same token, Federal rules of practice are quite irrelevant, since they have largly abolished distinctions between proceedings at law and equity and actually authorize what our rules, statutory and court made, do not. See Rule 20(a) (1938), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 USCA, p 61.* The controlling authority here is Bajorek v. Kurtz, 335 Mich 58, and I suggest that- we either follow or overrule its gleanable holding “that the plaintiffs were not entitled to combine in 1 action their individual claims against the defendant's” (p 65 of report).
1 agree with Mr. Justice Carr that the causes these plaintiffs seek to join are not joint within meaning of said section 608.1; that each plaintiff so far as the face of this declaration discloses is possessed of a single cause separately maintainable by him; that the claim of each plaintiff — referring again to the face of the declaration — sounds in tort; that the respective causes are quite akin to such as would have accrued had Hidey’s blasting operations action-ably injured 17 persons, and that the occasion for determining whether such causes or any group or groups thereof should be tried together will not arise unless and until they or certain of them have been separately commenced and brought to issue.
It is said that affirmance of this order of dismissal would require separate trials of 17 or more separate lawsuits, thus overburdening the courts and creating unnecessary expense. I disagree and respect*518fully suggest that Bajorek’s requirement, of separate suits brought by separate declarations, in no manner infringes authority of the trial court to consider need and provide group trials of suits that have come to issue. Too, Bajorek shows that the administration of justice would be served better by letting the trial court rather than agreeable plaintiffs decide whether selected suits at law should or should not he declared and tried together.
For example: Let us picture the instance of an intoxicated motorist, driving at excessive speed and losing control with result that he runs down 17 pedestrians both in the street and on the sidewalk. Some are minors, some are grievously injured yet survive, some are killed and are survived by numerous and uncertainly identifiable dependents, some-linger and die later with and without dependency, and some are subject to the issue of contributory negligence. Assuming the lawyer or lawyers in charge of such causes partake of sufficient ingenuity to declare all in 1 instrument, and his or their clients agree that such bo done, is the court (with whose clerk the “declaration” is filed) obliged on account of such agreement to convene a jury and proceed to trial of issues made by the filed instrument? I think not, in the name of common sense and proper interpretation of the statute. And it will not do to say that the court in such instance might and probably would order separate or group trials. The court could not do so for want of a declaration and answer in each case unless, of course, the judge chose to undertake separation of the causes by use of scissors and pastepot. Even then, he would be hard put. It would not be easy, I swear, to make 17 declarations out of 1 on file.
This case should not pass into our reports without reference to and treatment of certain confusing language appearing in Higdon v. Kelley, 339 Mich; *519209.* The statute (said section 608.1) does not provide “that causes of action may he joined by plaintiffs where that result would promote the convenient administration of justice,” and we should say so considering- the erroneous dicta shown on pages 220 and 221 of Higdon’s report. The statute does not prevent what was done in Higdon, that is, consolidation for trial of separately pending suits at law when such consolidation will, in judicial view, promote the administration of justice. This means that it is for the court to say whether such consolidation for trial shall take place, and that parties plaintiff by agreeing to declare together — upon nonjoint causes — cannot usurp the judicial function.†
The' ultimate and altogether final conclusion made hy the declaration in this case is that each plaintiff is exclusively possessed of a right ex delicto against Hidey and that the contractual instruments attached to such declaration (between the defendants and the city of Detroit) grant no right of pleaded joinder thereof, at law, with like causes possessed by the others. It follows that such declaration should be dismissed as to the defendant party moving for such dismissal, there being no request for dropping of 16 parties plaintiff.
For stated reasons I vote to affirm the circuit court’s order dismissing as to Hidey’s surety (defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company) . Whether the suit remains alive as to defendant Hidey is not before us.
Smith, J., concurred with Black,^J.
Voelkbb, J., took no part in the decision of this case. _

 A comparison of Bajorek with Federal rules appears, as my Brother notes, in 51 Mich L Bev 1068. Bajorek's reviewer, critical of Bajorek, correctly concludes that “By holding that individual property owners could not join in 1 aetion at law for damages from the same wrongful conduct of the defendants, the court has, in effect, said that each plaintiff in such a situation must institute a separate action against the same defendants.” He concludes that BajoreVs holding will require “several separate trials in which different juries will be presented with evidence of the same wrongful conduct of the same defendants, and of similar types of injuries to real property.” This is quite erroneous, as will presently appear.

 Strangely enough this ease of Higdon is neither cited nor considered in the briefs. It holds — quite properly — that the trial court was lawfully empowered to consolidate for trial 6 separately pending damage suits (arising out of the same facts pertaining to liability).

 See, in support, 9 Detroit L Rev 74.