Court Opinion

ID: 9662987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:25:19.835712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:21.899174
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in result).
I am compelled to concur in the results of this case due to the treatment by the majority opinion of the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.
As in State v. Tchida, 347 N.W.2d 338 (S.D.1984), defense counsel was young, inexperienced, and did not have the legal ability to effectively represent appellant. In the case at bar, defense counsel’s ineffective representation was not bottomed in trial strategy. It resulted from those factors I have set forth above and below which begot poor pretrial preparation and trial adversarial performance. Defense counsel made no attempts of discovery; failed to interview the State’s witnesses endorsed on the information; failed to investigate the circumstances of the crime; failed to interview a potential witness which the appellant specifically requested be obtained as a witness; failed to object to key, damaging testimony of the State when it was highly probable that the damaging evidence was inadmissible; failed to object to any of the proposed instructions of the State; failed to object to any of the court’s instructions; failed to propose any instructions on behalf of the appellant; failed to object to repeated leading questions throughout the trial; failed to actively participate in objecting to other questions during the trial asked by the State’s Attorney which appeared to be either immaterial or without foundation; and failed to affirmatively produce testimony to establish that appellant lacked the specific intent vital to establish intent to commit theft.
Finally, defense counsel permitted Instruction No. 16 to go before the jury which is an instruction dealing with the “natural, probable, and usual consequences” language which has been condemned generally in the United States and more specifically in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). Having written these words of indictment against the professional competency of this attorney, I conclude that her skills were not “the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” High Elk v. State, 344 N.W.2d 497, 500 (S.D.1984) (quoting United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir.1976)).
However, I am constrained to follow the dictates of the United States Supreme Court. In Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the highest Court of the land determined that it was not only necessary to show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, but also, except for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. In Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781, 784 (S.D.1984), writing for this Court, Retired Justice Francis Dunn wrote:
The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. To reverse a conviction on ineffective assistance grounds, a defendant must show: 1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The test for prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional *859errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Notwithstanding the serious flaws in the investigation, preparation, assistance, and trial conduct of court-appointed counsel, I cannot say that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Here, appellant was caught hiding in a dark room with a wrecking bar and chisel and a broken window near him. Simply put, he was a burglar caught red-handed in the act of burglary. Evidence reflected the shoe prints directly below the broken window matched the shoes worn by appellant when he was arrested.