Court Opinion

ID: 9945745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:09:41.892018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.058829
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2331-22

C.P.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.S.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted February 14, 2024 – Decided February 28, 2024

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Walcott-Henderson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
                   Docket No. FV-04-2005-23.

                   Hark & Hark, attorneys for appellant (Michael Joseph
                   Collis, on the brief).

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

1
  We use initials to identify the parties because the names of victims and alleged
victims of domestic violence are not subject to public disclosure under Rule
1:38-3(d)(10).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant J.S. appeals from a final domestic violence restraining order

(FRO) entered against her in favor of plaintiff C.P. under the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Based on our review

of the record submitted in support of the appeal, defendant's arguments, and the

applicable legal principles, we reverse the FRO and remand for further

proceedings.

      Plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint alleging he and defendant

had a prior dating relationship and defendant committed a predicate act of

domestic violence under the PDVA that plaintiff characterized as "cyber-

harassment" under "N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(a)."2 More particularly, plaintiff alleged

2
    A violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1, which defines the offense of cyber-
harassment, constitutes a predicate act of domestic violence under the PDVA.
See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(19) (providing a cyber-harassment offense under
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1 is a predicate act of domestic violence under the PDVA). A
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9(a), which in part defines the offense of invasion
of privacy, is cited in plaintiff's complaint but does not constitute a predicate act
of domestic violence under the PDVA. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(1) to (19)
(listing the predicate acts of domestic violence under the PDVA). For purposes
of our disposition of the issues raised on appeal, it is unnecessary to address
whether plaintiff intended to allege defendant committed the offense of cyber-
harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1, supporting a finding there was a predicate
act of domestic violence under the PDVA, or the offense of invasion of privacy
under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-9, which is not a predicate act of domestic violence under
the PDVA. On remand, the court shall address the ambiguity in plaintiff's

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defendant had posted a nude image of him on a fake social media account

without his consent.    In response to the complaint, on January 2, 2023, a

municipal court judge issued a temporary domestic violence restraining order

(TRO) against defendant.

      A month later, defendant filed a domestic violence complaint against

plaintiff alleging that following the parties' break-up around Thanksgiving of

2022, plaintiff had posted a nude photograph of the parties on social media with

a caption "ALL MINE" that was available to defendant's contacts and was sent

to her place of employment, the school her son planned to attend, and her friends

and family. Defendant's complaint included allegations of prior acts of domestic

violence by plaintiff. The complaint listed cyber-harassment as the alleged

predicate act of domestic violence under the PDVA. A Family Part judge issued

a TRO against plaintiff based on the allegations in defendant's complaint.

      The court conducted a joint trial on plaintiff's and defendant's separate

complaints. Plaintiff and defendant appeared as self-represented litigants and

each testified at trial. Following presentation of the evidence, the court rendered

a bench opinion finding defendant's testimony was not credible, her claims were

complaint at the outset so the parties and the court can proceed based on an
accurate understanding of the claim asserted in the complaint.
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baseless, and she did not prove plaintiff either committed a predicate act of

domestic violence under the PDVA or that she required an FRO to protect

against future acts of domestic violence. See generally Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.

Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006) (explaining the standard for issuance of an

FRO under the PDVA).

      In contrast, the court found plaintiff's testimony credible, determined

defendant had posted a nude photograph of plaintiff on a fake social media

account bearing plaintiff's name, and concluded defendant knowingly posted the

photograph to cause plaintiff humiliation and embarrassment. The court found

plaintiff proved defendant had committed the predicate act of "cyber[-

]harassment" under the PDVA and plaintiff required an FRO to prevent future

acts of domestic violence.

      The court entered an FRO against defendant. Defendant appealed from

the FRO.3

      Our scope of review is limited when considering an FRO issued by the

Family Part. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013). We

3
   The record on appeal does not include an order dismissing defendant's
complaint seeking an FRO against plaintiff. The record also does not include
any indication defendant appealed from the dismissal of her complaint against
plaintiff.
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"grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal

conclusions based upon those findings." Ibid. (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411-12 (1998)). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are

binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence."

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65

N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Our deference to the Family Part's findings of fact is

particularly appropriate where the evidence is largely testimonial and hinges

upon a court's ability to make assessments of credibility. Id. at 412. We review

de novo the court's conclusions of law. S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 430

(App. Div. 2010) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

      To support entry of an FRO under the PDVA, a trial court must make

findings in accordance with the two-pronged analysis explained by the court in

Silver. 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. The court must first "determine whether the

[person seeking the FRO] has proven, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)

has occurred." Id. at 125. The court should make that determination "in light

of the previous history of violence between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare,

154 N.J. at 402). Second, the court must determine "whether a restraining order

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is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to

prevent further abuse."4 Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).

        Defendant challenges the court's factual findings. She argues the court

failed to properly consider the evidence presented and erred in its evidentiary

rulings. Defendant further contends the court erroneously concluded an FRO is

necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence.          Last,

defendant claims the FRO should be reversed because the court failed to advise

her that she had a right to counsel at trial.

        We are not persuaded by defendant's vaguely asserted claims the court's

factual findings are not supported by the evidence and the court improperly

4
    The six factors a court should consider under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) are:

              (1) The previous history of domestic violence between
              [the parties], including threats, harassment and physical
              violence;
              (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
              property;
              (3) The financial circumstances of the [parties];
              (4) The best interests of the victim and any child;
              (5) In determining custody and parenting time the
              protection of the victim's safety; and
              (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
              from another jurisdiction.

              [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6).]
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failed to consider evidence she presented. We discern no error in the court's

factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence the court found

credible. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12. We reject defendant's claim the court

erred by failing to consider evidence she contends supported her request for the

FRO, including her testimony about various text messages, because the

argument ignores that the court found her testimony wholly incredible. Thus,

because the court found defendant's testimony not credible, and explained its

basis for doing so, the court did not commit error by failing to otherwise cite or

detail defendant's testimony in its decision. The court's finding defendant's

testimony was wholly incredible was sufficient.

      We also reject defendant's claim the court erred by relying on evidence—

her testimony—she presented in support of her complaint as a basis for its

determinations she committed the predicate act of cyber-harassment and an FRO

is necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. The court

ordered a joint trial on the parties' respective cross-complaints, defendant did

not object, and defendant does not argue on appeal the court erred by ordering

the joint trial. The evidence concerning the parties' history and alleged actions

overlapped, and the court did not err by considering all the evidence admitted

by both parties—including defendant's testimony—in its determinations

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concerning the validity of the claims asserted in the separate complaints. See,

e.g., Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-28 (assessing cross-complaints for FROs

under the PDVA based on evidence presented by both parties during a joint trial

on the complaints). Defendant's claims to the contrary are bereft of merit.

      We agree with defendant's contention the court did not make adequate

findings supporting its determination under Silver's second prong that an FRO

is required "to protect . . . [plaintiff] from an immediate danger or to prevent

further abuse." 387 N.J. Super. at 127. In its determination plaintiff satisfied

the second prong of the Silver standard, the court did not address or make

findings as to each of the requisite factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6),

including whether there is a prior history of domestic violence between the

parties, "and how that impacts, if at all, on the issue of whether a restraining

order should issue." Id. at 128.

      If the court's failure to make adequate findings supporting its

determination under Silver's second prong was its only error, we would be

inclined to vacate the FRO and remand for the court to make the requisite

findings. However, we are required to reverse the FRO and remand for a new

trial because the court did not advise defendant prior to the commencement of

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trial that she had the right to retain legal counsel. As a result, the record lacks

evidence establishing defendant knowingly waived her right to seek counsel.

      As we explained in A.A.R. v. J.R.C., "[t]he right to seek counsel is an

important due process right that affords defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to

defend against a complaint in domestic violence matters[.]'" 471 N.J. Super.

584, 588 (App. Div. 2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting D.N., 429

N.J. Super. at 606). Defendants are not entitled to appointed counsel, but their

due process right "to a meaningful opportunity to defend against a complaint,"

D.N., 429 N.J. Super. at 606, requires that they understand their "right to retain

legal counsel" and "receive[] a reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney,"

A.A.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 588. Thus, due process "require[s] that a defendant

understands that he or she has the right to retain legal counsel and receives a

reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney." Ibid. Where, as here, "defendant

was not advised in advance of trial that [s]he had the right to retain legal

counsel," reversal of an FRO entered following trial is "require[d]." Id. at 589.

      Accordingly, we reverse the FRO and remand for a new trial on plaintiff's

complaint consistent with the requirements and guidance set forth in A.A.R. See

id. at 588-89.   We reinstate the TRO pending the outcome of the remand

proceedings. Because we have ordered a new trial and the judge who presided

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                                        9
over the initial trial made credibility determinations, the retrial on remand shall

be assigned to a different judge. See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125,

133 (App. Div. 2005) (determining "[i]n an abundance of caution" that a

remanded matter should be assigned to "a different judge for the plenary hearing

to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice based on the judge's prior

involvement with the matter and his expressions" of doubt as to defendant's

credibility). Our decision to reverse the FRO and remand for a new hearing

shall not be interpreted as expressing an opinion on the merits of plaintiff's

claims or any defenses that may be asserted by defendant.

      Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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