Court Opinion

ID: 9662818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:18:53.705113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:42.796458
License: Public Domain

DOGGETT, Justice,
dissenting.
What is the teaching of this case? Legal scholars and practitioners who ponder this question, recognizing that the court reaffirms but then fails to' follow El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1987), will ultimately conclude that it stands solely for the proposition: “here, the cab company wins!” Under the facts presented, the result-oriented nature of the opinion is somewhat understandable. With taxi operators daily exposed to the dangers of Houston’s ever rising crime, I personally empathize with Yellow Cab. It is perhaps only natural that the drivers would take steps to protect themselves and that the company would believe that there is little it should do to foreclose this method of self-help. Had I been selected as a juror I could well have cast my personal vote for the defendant.
However, the people of Texas elected me to be more than a juror in one case. As a judge, I must interpret the established law fairly and recognize that a holding set forth in one context may well control many less compelling and totally different factual situations.
The court of appeals judiciously respected precedent and correctly noted that “the duty of care arises from the probability of injury to one who may reasonably be foreseen as likely to be subject to such injury.” 783 S.W.2d at 263. Today’s opinion recites this same basic principle that liability should be imposed when “sufficient evidence indicates] that the defendant knew or should have known that harm would eventually befall the victim.” Maj.Op. at 526. Thereafter, it unfortunately ignores evidence presented to the only properly constituted jury regarding Yellow Cab’s pre-incident awareness that drivers carried guns in their cabs and that many traffic accidents resulted in violence.1 Despite this knowledge, the company’s president made a “conscious decision” to avoid discussion of the subjects of weapons and alternative methods of self-protection in its operator training course or otherwise. Clearly, this constitutes some evidence to support a reasonable jury’s determination that, by failing to take some action to avoid injury to third persons, “the cab company was itself negligent.” 783 S.W.2d at 263.
The conclusion that “the law recognizes that there is no duty to inform others of the requirements of the law” both misstates prior holdings2 and evades the real issue. Maj.Op. at n. 3. If an actor contributes to create a situation posing harm to others, there is a legal duty to prevent it without regard to whether a violation of a *528penal statute is involved. Driving while intoxicated is illegal, but the dangers arising from it were the focus of El Chico. Yellow Cab’s “duty” was to take some action to prevent foreseeable injury to third persons from conduct over which it could exercise some control.
Once again ignoring evidence that the jury had for consideration, the court implies that all Yellow Cab could have done about traffic shootings was to “admonish” drivers regarding weapons. Maj.Op. at 526. Far more was possible. Yellow Cab could have added to its existing training curriculum on post-accident procedures instructions on dealing with the known risks of traffic incident violence. Random inspections and driver suspensions for firearm possession could have been initiated.3 The court’s only apparent attempt to distinguish El Chico is by noting that there the licensee “created a foreseeable and dangerous situation for other drivers by serving alcohol to an intoxicated person who would be driving.” Maj.Op. at 526. This is an illusory distinction. Here, Yellow Cab was aware that it was placing vehicles with armed drivers into the public stream of commerce — not unlike the characterization described in El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 311, of “setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall.” Evidence established that the “common knowledge of the effects” of traffic incidents involving weapons and “the direct nature of the defendant’s activity” in supplying the cabs and training the drivers, made it a “certainty that injuries [would] result[ ] from such activity.” Maj.Op. at 526. How this case differs legally from El Chico remains a mystery about which the court offers no real hints.
Under the rubric of “no duty,” the court essentially concludes that Yellow Cab has no legal responsibility to act in a reasonable and prudent manner with reference to the situation in question. On another day we may learn how many more shootings are required before a jury can be permitted to evaluate the reasonableness of this company’s decision. A dozen people killed or maimed? Perhaps not; under its narrow holding, today’s opinion may itself be sufficient additional notice for a court to impose a duty on the company to avert injury to third persons. I would not wait for more violence, more shootings, injuries and deaths to occur before permitting a cross section of the people of Harris County, convened as a jury, to demand preventive action. It would be better to tell cab companies today that they risk being held accountable by their neighbors tomorrow to encourage prevention and thereby decrease litigation. I dissent from this opinion which can only be interpreted as an aberration.
RAY and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissent.

. Violence associated with traffic accidents in Houston has become so common that it is referred to by the police with the shorthand term "traffic rig rag.” (S.F. vol. VI, at 165). Testimony from Ken Suprenant, claims manager for Yellow Cab, also revealed:
Q: And, sir, as a corporate representative of Yellow Cab, do you think it’s an appropriate area of concern for the company to be worried about third parties being shot by cabdrivers?
A: Yes.
******
Q: Don’t you know, sir, there’s a liability risk in a situation where you got that kind of contact between a cabdriver and a third party in a collision and unhappiness that there is a high risk of someone being shot if one of the parties has a gun?
A: I would say there is a risk, yes.
******
Q: What are you doing about the risk of third parties being shot by cabdrivers in that situation?
A: What am I doing.
Q: What is the company doing that you’re aware of? What is the company doing?
A: I’m not aware of anything.
Q: Of anything?
A: No.
(S.F. vol. XIV, at 76-78).

. The alleged supporting authorities cited thereafter in the text of the court’s opinion stand only for the more limited proposition that all persons are presumed to know the law.

. At least one claims manager for Yellow Cab testified that he had previously found a gun in a taxi. (S.F. vol. XII, at 93).