Court Opinion

ID: 9961172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 07:12:59.997197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:22.167823
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                       EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                            EL PASO, TEXAS

    ELIJAH COVINGTON,

                                         Appellant,             §                No. 08-23-00176-CR

                             v.                                                     Appeal from the
                                                                §
                                                                             384th Judicial District Court
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                                §             Of El Paso County, Texas
                                         Appellee.
                                                                                 (TC# 20210D02752)

                                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

         A jury found Appellant Elijah Covington guilty of one count of murder in the shooting

death of Jamaal Jones-Aguilar and sentenced him to 29 years in prison. Appellant contends the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and urges that his sentence be reformed to

reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent manslaughter. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 1

1
  We note that the trial court has certified Appellant’s right to appeal in this case, but the certification does not bear
Appellant’s signature as required by Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules
of Appellant Procedure, the Court ORDERS Appellant's attorney to send Appellant a copy of this opinion and this
Court’s judgment to notify Appellant of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review and inform Appellant
of the applicable deadlines. See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4, 68. The Court further ORDERS Appellant’s attorney to comply
with all Rule 48.4 requirements.

                                                            1
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        A. The shooting

        On September 1, 2019, Appellant was at the “Dirty Sanchez” club, also known as Gourmet

Hot Dogs, in El Paso with several friends, including Melek Decquir (Melek) and Jonathan Jackson

(Rico). At some point that day, Appellant, Melek and Rico, who had been drinking since early

afternoon, were ejected from the club by security staff after they were found smoking cigars in the

club’s patio area. 2

        Appellant and Rico thereafter went to Appellant’s vehicle, which was parked in the rear of

the club’s parking lot, where they remained for several hours, vomiting and suffering the effects

of excessive alcohol consumption. Melek, however, reentered the club and became embroiled in

an argument with a group of males, including the victim, Jamaal Jones-Aguilar. While inside the

club, Melek called Rico on his cell phone, asking for assistance, as he was in fear for his safety,

thinking the men were going to “jump him.” At approximately 11:00 p.m., the security staff in the

club removed both Melek and the group of males from the club. The confrontation between them

continued in the club’s parking lot with a security guard, Eduardo Vasquez (Vasquez), present.

During this time, Appellant answered Melek’s call for help and drove with Rico to the front of the

parking lot where the confrontation was ongoing.

        Vasquez testified that during the confrontation in the parking lot, he observed Melek and

Jones-Aguilar punch—or attempt to punch—each other at various times. Vasquez was able to

separate them, but the confrontation continued with the various individuals “talking shit to each

2
  Rico testified at trial that they were smoking marijuana, but Appellant and Melek testified that they were smoking
cigars.

                                                         2
other.” Vasquez observed Appellant pull up to the scene in a black Jeep and exit the vehicle holding

an AR-15 rifle. Vasquez recalled Melek turning and saying something to Appellant, but he did not

testify as to what he heard, if anything. Jones-Aguilar took a step toward Melek and punched him

in the head. According to Vasquez, Appellant then fired one round from the AR-15, which struck

Jones-Aguilar, who fell to the ground. Appellant thereafter shot up to seven rounds into the air,

with several individuals nearby, causing them to run for safety. Appellant later explained to the

police that shooting Jones-Aguilar was an accident and that his intent was to de-escalate the

situation.

        Vasquez and others attempted to assist Jones-Aguilar, but he passed away at the scene from

a fatal gunshot wound to his head. Immediately after the shooting, Appellant and Rico fled from

the scene, going to an apartment they shared.

        During its case in chief, the State played for the jury a very short video of the confrontation

and shooting, which a bystander recorded on his cell phone. 3 The recording demonstrated that

Appellant was holding an AR-15 and standing next to Melek and Rico in a crowd of people, when

an unidentified male confronted Melek. Appellant shouted at the man and then pushed him,

prompting Vasquez to intervene by standing between them. At that point, Jones-Aguilar

approached and struck Melek in the head with his fist. As Melek swung back, Appellant pointed

the gun at Jones-Aguilar and fired one bullet into his head. Appellant fired three to four shots into

the air before the video abruptly ended.

3
 Vasquez acknowledged that certain events he described involving the parking lot confrontation during did not appear
on the video.

                                                         3
         B. Appellant’s arrest and police interview

         After the police learned that the vehicle involved in the shooting was registered to

Appellant, a warrant was issued for his arrest, and he was brought in for questioning two days

later, on September 3, 2019. The State played the video of Appellant’s interview for the jury.

         During the interview, Appellant initially denied that he was at the Dirty Sanchez the day

of the shooting but later admitted he had been there and consumed a large amount of alcohol. 4 He

recalled that after being ejected from the club, he went to his vehicle in the back of the club’s

parking lot and was trying to sober up. After receiving the call, he drove to the front where he

observed a confrontation in the parking lot. He informed the officers that he believed his cousin

was involved, and his intent was to assist his cousin. However, when he arrived there, he panicked

and shot his AR-15 into the air, as a means of trying to diffuse the situation. 5 Appellant claimed

he did not realize at the time that he had shot anyone and that he blacked out before driving away.

Appellant informed police that he learned from the news the next day that Jones-Aguilar had been

shot during the confrontation. However, he repeatedly claimed he did not intend to shoot Jones-

Aguilar, and the shooting was an accident; he only intended to use the rifle de-escalate the situation

by shooting in the air.

         Appellant admitted to police that the day after the accident, he took his license plates off

his vehicle and drove to Las Cruces where he left the vehicle. He further told police that he gave

his rifle to “some random Mexicans” at a park in Northeast El Paso the following day to “get rid

4
  At trial, Appellant explained that he initially failed to tell the police the truth regarding what occurred on the night
of the shooting because he was scared.
5
  Appellant testified that he had purchased the AR-15 in July of 2019 after the Wal-Mart shooting, out of fear for his
safety as he frequented the same Wal-Mart where the shooting occurred.

                                                            4
of it.” And finally, he told police that he used Rico’s credit card the day after the shooting to

purchase a bus ticket to San Antonio to leave “as soon as possible.”

       C. The indictment

       Appellant was indicted on one count of murder and one count of deadly conduct, but the

State later dismissed the deadly conduct charge. The indictment alleged three alternative manner

and means by which Appellant committed the murder: (1) he intentionally and knowingly caused

the death of Jamaal Jones-Aguilar by shooting him with a firearm; (2) he acted with the intent to

cause bodily injury to Jones-Aguilar, by committing an act clearly dangerous to human life that

caused serious bodily injury resulting in the death of Jones-Aguilar by shooting him with a firearm;

and (3) he caused Jones-Agular’s death in the course of intentionally and knowingly committing

the felony offense of deadly conduct by holding a firearm with his finger on the trigger and

discharging the firearm into a crowd of individuals.

       D. Appellant’s defense

       At trial, Appellant acknowledged that he shot Jones-Aguilar but claimed he did not do so

intentionally or knowingly, and instead the shooting was an accident. According to Appellant,

prior to the shooting, he had been in his vehicle with Rico after being ejected from the Dirty

Sanchez, when he answered a call from Melek on Rico’s phone. In the call, Melek asked him to

“come now,” sounding “panicked,” saying that someone was “trying to get [him].” Appellant

recalled driving to the front of the parking lot where he saw a large group of people involved in a

confrontation. According to Appellant, he left his vehicle carrying his AR-15 with the intent to

“de-escalate everything” and to “scare everybody off.” Although he could not recall the details of

what occurred next due to being “highly intoxicated,” he acknowledged that he was holding the

                                                 5
rifle when it discharged and that a bullet from the rifle struck Jones-Aguilar. Appellant further

acknowledged that because he was holding the rifle, he must have been the one who pulled the

trigger—even though he did not specifically recall having his fingers on the trigger at the time. He

also admitted to subsequently firing six or seven rounds into the air despite knowing other people

were standing around him, again explaining he was trying to “scare everyone away.” Appellant

testified that he felt remorseful the next day when he found out Jones-Aguilar had died, and he

gave his rifle to a friend the next day, telling his friend he “didn’t want to have anything to do with

it.”

       At trial, Melek testified to much of the same version of events as Appellant, recalling that

he phoned Rico on his cell phone seeking assistance during the confrontation but claiming he did

not ask Appellant to bring a firearm or provide any instructions to shoot Jones-Aguilar. Melek

further testified that he did not observe Appellant aim the rifle at Jones-Aguilar, but he

acknowledged that the shooting happened so quickly, he did not recall even seeing the rifle. Rico

also testified to much of the same chain of events as Appellant and Melek did, also testifying that

he did not hear Melek direct Appellant to shoot anyone at the scene, and he did not believe the

shooting was planned.

       D. The jury’s verdict

       Following the State’s presentation of evidence, and again at the close of Appellant’s case,

defense counsel moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support a

finding that he had the requisite mental state to commit murder. The trial court denied Appellant’s

motion on both occasions.

                                                  6
       The jury charge provided an instruction on the elements of murder and instructed the jury

that if it found the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of

murder, it could consider whether the evidence established that Appellant was guilty of the lesser-

included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent manslaughter. The jury returned its

verdict finding Appellant guilty of murder as alleged in the indictment and sentenced him to 29

years in prison. Appellant then filed a motion for new trial, arguing the jury’s verdict was “contrary

to the law and evidence.” After the motion was denied by operation of law, Appellant appealed

from his judgment of conviction.

                                       ISSUES ON APPEAL

       Appellant raises two related issues on appeal: (1) there was legally insufficient evidence to

support an inference that he acted with the requisite mens rea to support a murder conviction, and

the trial court therefore erred by denying his motions for a directed verdict; and alternatively, (2)

we should reform his judgment to reflect a conviction for the lesser-included offense of criminally

negligent homicide.

                              SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       A. Standard of review

       Under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the State is required to prove every

element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

318–19 (1979). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we apply the

legal sufficiency standard as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. State. See Brooks

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d

166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Under that standard, we view the evidence “in the light most

                                                  7
favorable to the verdict” and recognize that because the jury is the “sole judge of the witnesses’

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony,” we must defer to the jury’s credibility and

weight determinations. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899–900 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). We

therefore may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment

for that of the fact-finder. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also

Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (holding that a reviewing court

should not act as a “thirteenth juror” by overturning a jury’s credibility and weight determinations).

       In addition, it is firmly within the jury’s province to resolve conflicts in testimony, and we

must therefore presume the jury resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict. Dobbs,

434 S.W.3d at 170 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “This standard gives full play to the

responsibility of the factfinder to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244,

262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). A jury’s verdict will therefore be

upheld if any rational juror could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

       It is also well-established that in assessing whether the State presented sufficient evidence

to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, circumstantial evidence is considered

equally probative as direct evidence. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004);

see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Accordingly, a defendant’s

guilt may be established by circumstantial evidence alone. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49;

Clayton 235 S.W.3d at 778. Further, “[e]ach fact need not point directly and independently to guilt

if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”

                                                  8
Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 262. And the evidence need not negate every conceivable alternative to a

defendant’s guilt to be sufficient. David v. State, 663 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

       We apply the same standard of legal sufficiency in determining whether a trial court erred

in denying a motion for directed verdict, as such a motion is effectively a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence. See Canales v. State, 98 S.W.3d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 307). We will therefore affirm a trial court’s decision to deny a

directed-verdict motion “if any rational trier of fact could have found [the] element[s] of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt” under the Jackson standard. Id.

       B. Analysis

       A person commits the offense of murder if the person: “(1) intentionally or knowingly

causes the death of an individual; (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act

clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; [or] (3) commits or attempts

to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the

commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, the person commits

or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an

individual.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02(b). As set forth above, the State alleged all three statutory

means by which Appellant committed Jones-Aguilar’s murder, and the jury was properly

instructed that it could convict Appellant of murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant committed murder by any of those three alternative means. See Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d

738, 746, n. 27(Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc) (recognizing that the gravamen of the offense of

murder, on which the jury must be unanimous, is causing the death of a person, but that the jury

need not be unanimous on the “manner and means” by which the murder occurred); see also

                                                  9
Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 583–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing that in homicide

cases, the State may allege “alternate methods” of committing the same offense) (citing Kitchens

v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)).

       And when as here, the jury returns a general verdict finding a defendant guilty of murder,

a reviewing court may uphold the defendant’s conviction if “the evidence is sufficient to support

a finding under any of the paragraphs submitted.” Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 642

(Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en banc) (the jury’s “verdict will be applied to the paragraph finding

support in the facts”) (citing Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also

Cardenas v. State, No. 08-18-00083-CR, 2021 WL 3629990, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 17,

2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (recognizing same). In our analysis, we focus on

the third means alleged in the indictment, i.e., that Appellant committed felony murder by causing

Jones-Agular’s death “in the course of intentionally and knowingly committing a felony, namely

Deadly Conduct” by “holding a firearm with [his] finger on the trigger and discharge[ing] that

firearm into a crowd of individuals.”

       A person commits felony murder if he “commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than

manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in

immediate flight from the commission or attempt, the person commits or attempts to commit an

act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann.

§ 19.02(b)(3). As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained, felony murder is, “an

unintentional murder committed in the course of committing a felony.” Rodriguez v. State, 454

S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999)). The state must prove the elements of the underlying felony, including the culpable

                                               10
mental state for that felony, but no culpable mental state is required for the murder committed.

Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302, 306–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In other words, “it is the

underlying felony itself, and not the felony-murder statute, that determines whether the underlying

felony requires a culpable mental state.” Id. at 307.

       Here, the underlying felony alleged in the indictment is “deadly conduct,” which is

committed when a person “knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of . . . one or more

individuals.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.05(b)(1); see also Yandell v. State, 46 S.W.3d 357, 361–

62 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that the felony offense of deadly conduct

may serve as the underlying felony for proof of felony-murder); Washington v. State, 417 S.W.3d

713, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (recognizing same). Thus, the

culpable mental state needed to support Appellant’s conviction under a felony-murder theory was

that he acted “knowingly” in discharging the firearm into a crowd of individuals, as alleged in the

indictment. See Freeland v. State, No. 05-02-01746-CR, 2003 WL 22456353, at *2

(Tex. App.— Dallas Oct. 30, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (to prove deadly

conduct, the State must show that the actor knowingly discharged a firearm). Texas Penal Code

§ 6.03 provides that “[a] person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of

his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his

conduct or that the circumstances exist.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03 (b). Thus, a person’s

awareness that he is discharging a firearm in the direction of an individual or crowd of individuals

is sufficient to support an inference that he acted with the requisite mental state to support a

conviction for deadly conduct. See Wheaton v. State, 129 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2004, no pet.) (where evidence supported an inference that defendant fired his

                                                 11
gun in the direction of his wife following an argument, defendant was properly convicted of deadly

conduct); Miles v. State, No. 14-10-00882-CR, 2012 WL 2356478, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] June 21, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem op., not designated for publication) (evidence

supported an inference that defendant acted knowingly in discharging his firearm, where,

following an argument with various individuals, he knocked on their apartment door and opened

fire, killing the complainant).

       1. Appellant’s claim that the shooting was an “accident”

       Appellant contends the State failed to prove that he knowingly discharged the firearm,

claiming the evidence supported an inference that the shooting was an “accident.” Appellant

testified repeatedly that the shooting was an accident, that he was not aware his fingers were on

the trigger when the rifle discharged and struck Jones-Aguilar, and that he did not have “the

mindset” or “intent” to pull the trigger at that time. Appellant calls the video of the shooting

“anything but dispositive” of the intent question.

       As a preliminary matter, “the defense of accident is no longer present in the penal code,”

but a defendant may claim his actions were not the result of “voluntary conduct.” See Brown v.

State, 955 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) (citing Tex. Pen. Code Ann.

§ 6.01(a) (“a person commits an offense only if he engages in voluntary conduct, including an act,

an omission, or possession”). And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has long recognized, a

“homicide that is not the result of voluntary conduct is not to be criminally punished.” Brown, 955

S.W.2d at 280 (citing Alford v. State, 866 S.W.2d 619, 622–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)

and the cases cited therein)). But the court also recognizes, the “issue of the voluntariness of one’s

conduct, or bodily movements, is separate from the issue of one’s mental state.” Id. (citing

                                                 12
Adanandus        v.    State,     866     S.W.2d       210,     230      (Tex.     Crim.      App.      1993);      see

also Soria v. State, No. 08-20-00074-CR, 2022 WL 2965979, at *11 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 27,

2022, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (recognizing same).

         In general, “[v]oluntariness is a low threshold,” and “[e]ven accidental or unintentional

movements and actions are voluntary.” Rodriguez v. State, 629 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). “Only if an outside force directly causes the movement, or if the movement is the result of

truly nonvolitional action, such as a muscle spasm, will an action be deemed involuntary.” Id.

(finding no evidence that defendant involuntarily discharged the firearm causing the victim’s

death); see also McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc),

abrogated on other grounds, by Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc)

(finding no evidence that appellant’s conduct in discharging a firearm was not voluntary). Here,

despite his blurry memory, Appellant acknowledged that he must have pulled the trigger when it

discharged the fatal bullet, as he was admittedly holding the rifle at the time. He presented no

evidence to support an inference that an outside force caused him to pull the trigger involuntarily. 6

         2. Appellant’s claim that he did not act “knowingly” in discharging the rifle

         Appellant correctly notes that the record lacks direct evidence of his mental state during

the shooting. But the record contains sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could

6
  At trial, Appellant testified he was “highly intoxicated” on the day of the shooting. But as the jury was properly
instructed, voluntary intoxication does not serve as a defense to the commission of a crime, nor does it serve to negate
the “mens rea elements of intent or knowledge.” See Jimenez v. State, 507 S.W.3d 438, 440 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, no pet.) (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04(a) (“Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to the
commission of [a]crime.”); Hawkins v. State, 605 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)); see also
Craig v. State, 594 S.W.2d 91, 96 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (holding that defendant’s voluntary intoxication
did not constitute a defense to the commission of aggravated assault). Accordingly, it would not be a valid defense to
claim he “accidentally” pulled the trigger due to his voluntary intoxication.

                                                          13
have found that he acted “knowingly” when he discharged the rifle into the crowd. Nisbett, 552

S.W.3d at 267 (reinforcing that the State is not required to produce direct evidence of a defendant’s

mental state to support a murder conviction). Instead, by its very nature, a defendant’s “culpable

mental state must generally be inferred from the circumstances,” as neither the jury nor a reviewing

court can “read an accused’s mind.” Id. Therefore, absent a confession, a defendant’s mental state

must be inferred “from his acts, words, and conduct.” Id. at 267 (quoting Hernandez v. State, 819

S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc)); see also Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 35

(Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (recognizing same). This is because “[o]ne’s acts are generally reliable

circumstantial evidence of one’s intent.” Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App.

2009). As we have previously recognized, both “[i]ntent and knowledge are fact questions for the

jury and are almost always proven through the circumstances surrounding the crime.” Collins v.

State, No. 08-15-00103-CR, 2017 WL 192913, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 18, 2017, pet. ref’d)

(not designated for publication) (citing Manrique, 994 S.W.2d at 649); see also Brown v. State,

122 S.W.3d 794, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (recognizing that “in homicide prosecutions, the

defendant’s state of mind is a question of fact that must be determined by the jury”).

       Here, the jury was presented with multiple circumstances from which it could have inferred

that Appellant acted “knowingly” in discharging his AR-15 into the crowd. Miles, 2012 WL

2356478, at *2 ; Wheaton, 129 S.W.3d at 124. Appellant acknowledged bringing a rifle to the

confrontation where the crowd was gathered with the intent of de-escalating the situation. He

acknowledged he was holding the rifle when it discharged into the crowd and struck Jones-Aguilar.

He acknowledged subsequently shooting the rifle into the air to “scare everyone away.” To

determine whether Appellant acted with the requisite intent, we look at all “events occurring

                                                 14
before, during and after the commission of the offense,” and we “may rely on [the] actions of the

defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.” Guevara,

152 S.W.3d at 49. Given Appellant’s admittedly intentional conduct both before and after the fatal

shooting, the jury could have inferred that his action in firing the fatal shot was done knowingly—

if not intentionally. See Wheaton, 129 S.W.3d at 274 (recognizing that a fact-finder may consider

the “circumstances surrounding the act” in considering whether a defendant acted knowingly in

discharging a firearm); see also Miles, 2012 WL 2356478, at *1 (affirming deadly conduct

conviction despite Appellant’s account that, in response to three men confronting him, “[h]e

retrieved a loaded firearm from his waist band to scare and ward [them] off” but when trying to

escape, “he stumbled and hit his hand on a corner of the building. The firearm accidentally

discharged, and he fled the scene.”).

       Immediately after the shooting, Appellant fled the scene and purchased a bus ticket the

next day to get out of town as “as soon as possible.” “Evidence of flight is indicative of a

consciousness of guilt and it is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn.”

In re J.A.B., 440 S.W.3d 818, 823 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Clay v. State, 240

S.W.3d 895, 905 n. 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see also Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883

(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“Evidence of flight or escape is admissible as a circumstance from which

an inference of guilt may be drawn.”).

       Additionally, Appellant attempted to conceal evidence by removing the license plates from

the vehicle he was driving and attempting to hide it in Las Cruces. “Attempts to conceal

incriminating evidence” are “probative of wrongful conduct and are also circumstances of guilt.”

                                                15
Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50 (citing Graham v. State, 566 S.W. 2d 941, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978);

United States v. Cano–Guel, 167 F. 3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1999)).

           Finally, Appellant initially lied to police regarding his whereabouts on the day in question

and made statements inconsistent with his trial testimony—such as the manner in which he

disposed of the rifle. See Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 50 (recognizing that a defendant’s false or

inconsistent statements may support an inference of guilt); see also Padilla v. State, 326 S.W.3d

195, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (holding that a rational fact-finder can consider a defendant’s

untruthful statements as evidence of the defendant’s guilt); Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 747

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (recognizing same).

           We therefore conclude there was legally sufficient evidence from which a rational juror

could infer that Appellant acted knowingly in discharging his firearm into a crowd of individuals—

an act clearly dangerous to human life—which caused the death of Jones-Aguilar. Thereby

supporting his conviction under a felony-murder theory of guilt. 7

           Appellant’s Issue One is overruled.

                                 CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

           Appellant next argues in the alternative that we should reform the trial court’s judgment to

reflect a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide.

That lesser-included offense does not require a finding that the defendant acted intentionally or

knowingly in causing his victim’s death. 8 Appellant asserts that when an appellate court

7
  Given our conclusion that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict under a felony-murder
theory of guilt, we do not consider whether Appellant had the requisite intent to either kill or cause serious bodily
injury to Jones-Aguilar under the first two paragraphs in the indictment.
8
    The Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of criminally negligent homicide if he “causes the death

                                                          16
determines insufficient evidence supports a finding of guilt for the convicted offense, rather than

rendering an “outright acquittal,” the court may reform the judgment to reflect a conviction for a

lesser-included offense when the evidence supports the elements of that offense. This is true. See

Thornton, 425 S.W.3d at 299–300.

         However, it is only appropriate to reform a judgment of conviction to a lesser-included

offense when legally insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt for the greater

offense. See Langs v. State, 664 S.W.3d 155, 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (recognizing that a court

must first determine there is legally insufficient evidence to support a conviction for a greater

offense before conducting a reformation analysis); see also Liller v. State, No. 08-16-00309-CR,

2018 WL 3583877, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 26, 2018, pet. ref’d) (not designated for

publication) (declining to enter a judgment of acquittal or reform the defendant’s murder

conviction to a lesser-included offense of manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide where

legally sufficient evidence supported the culpable-mental-state element of murder); Edward v.

State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (finding court of appeals erred in reforming

defendant’s conviction for greater offense of assault family violence to the lesser-included offense

of an individual by criminal negligence.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.05(a). And in turn, the Code provides that a
“person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his
conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Id. § 6.03 (d). As set forth above, the trial court instructed the
jury that if it did not find that the State proved Appellant committed the offense of murder beyond a reasonable doubt,
it could consider whether he was guilty of the lesser offense of criminal negligence homicide. However, the jury
rejected that option when it found Appellant guilty of the greater offense of murder.

                                                           17
of misdemeanor assault where the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for

the greater offense).

       Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction for the

greater offense of murder, reformation is inappropriate. Appellant’s Issue Two is overruled.

                                         CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                             LISA J. SOTO, Justice

April 12, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

                                                 18