Court Opinion

ID: 9898235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:20.131923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:58.854697
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 In the Matter of the Detention of                  No. 84834-8-I

 E.M.R.R.,
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                              Appellant.

       BOWMAN, J. — E.M.R.R. appeals a 14-day involuntary commitment order.

She argues the court erred by not entering an order authorizing her detention

until nearly a week after the 120-hour time limit expired. We agree. Because

E.M.R.R. was held without lawful authority, we reverse and remand to vacate the

14-day involuntary commitment order and dismiss the petition.

                                       FACTS

       At about 4:30 a.m. on Monday, December 5, 2022, police transported

E.M.R.R. to the emergency department at University of Washington Medical

Center Montlake after she had smashed her own car windows because

“ ‘demons’ ” had trapped her inside. At 5:00 a.m., an emergency department

social worker filed a “Petition for Initial Detention” under the involuntary treatment

act (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW. The hospital later relocated E.M.R.R. to Valley

Cities Recovery Place in Kent.

       On Thursday, December 8, 2022, Valley Cities petitioned for a 14-day

involuntary treatment hold. A superior court judge held a probable cause hearing

on the petition the next day, December 9. All the witnesses testified, but the
No. 84834-8-I/2

court could not hear closing arguments by the end of the day. So, the court

orally continued the matter to Monday, December 12.

       For reasons that are unclear from the record, nothing occurred on

Monday, December 12. The court did not resume the hearing until Friday,

December 16, four days after the statutory time limit to involuntarily detain a

person had expired. After closing arguments, the court granted Valley Cities’

petition, finding that E.M.R.R. was gravely disabled. The court found that

treatment in a less restrictive alternative setting was not in her best interests and

ordered Valley Cities to detain E.M.R.R. for up to 14 days. The court backdated

the 14-day period of commitment to begin on December 9, 2022.

       E.M.R.R. appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       E.M.R.R. asserts we should reverse the 14-day order of commitment for

involuntary treatment because the court did not enter the order within 120 hours

of her initial detention as required by due process and the ITA. The State argues

that this issue is not properly before us because E.M.R.R. did not raise it below.

Alternatively, the State asserts that dismissal is not an appropriate remedy for the

alleged error. In light of recent Washington Supreme Court decisions, we agree

with E.M.R.R.1

RAP 2.5(a)(3)

       The State asserts we should not review E.M.R.R.’s challenge to her

       1
         Although E.M.R.R.’s appeal is technically moot because the 14-day hold has
ended, her issue on appeal is one of continuing and substantial public interest, so we
accept review. See In re Det. of H.N., 188 Wn. App. 744, 749-50, 355 P.3d 294 (2015).

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No. 84834-8-I/3

involuntary hold because she did not raise the issue below and the error is not

manifest. We disagree.

       As a general rule, we will not review an issue raised for the first time on

appeal. RAP 2.5(a). But a party may raise for the first time manifest error

affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3). In order to show manifest

constitutional error, the appellant must make a plausible showing that the

asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences in the

proceedings. State v. A.M., 194 Wn.2d 33, 38, 448 P.3d 35 (2019).

       Here, E.M.R.R. alleged the court erred by not entering the 14-day

involuntary commitment order until well after the statutory time limit to hold her

had expired. There is no dispute that the error affects E.M.R.R.’s constitutional

rights. Indeed, “[i]nvoluntary commitment for mental disorders constitutes a

significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protections.” In re Det.

of C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 277, 53 P.3d 979 (2002) (citing Addington v. Texas,

441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979)). The error was also

manifest. The trial court’s order detaining E.M.R.R. had practical and identifiable

consequences in the proceedings.2 We decline the State’s request to dismiss

E.M.R.R.’s appeal on procedural grounds.

       2
          The State asserts that E.M.R.R. suffered no actual prejudice as a result of the
delay, so the claimed error is subject to a harmless error analysis. The State
misconstrues the relevant standard of inquiry. “The requirements under RAP 2.5(a)(3)
should not be confused with the requirements for establishing an actual violation of a
constitutional right or for establishing lack of prejudice under a harmless error analysis if
a violation of a constitutional right has occurred.” State v. Lamar, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583,
327 P.3d 46 (2014).

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No. 84834-8-I/4

ITA Violation

         E.M.R.R. argues that the trial court erred by entering the 14-day

involuntary commitment order more than 120 hours after her initial detention. We

agree.

         Our legislature ensures due process protection for those living with

“behavioral health disorders” through the ITA. See RCW 71.05.010.

Interpretation of the ITA is a question of law we review de novo. In re Det. of

D.H., No. 100716-7, slip op. at 11 (Wash. July 27, 2023), https://www.courts.

wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1007167.pdf. We look to the plain meaning of a statute as

an expression of legislative intent. See C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 272.

         Given the liberty interests at stake, courts must strictly construe the ITA.

In re Det. of D.W., 181 Wn.2d 201, 207, 332 P.3d 423 (2014) (citing In re Det. of

G.V., 124 Wn.2d 288, 296, 877 P.2d 680 (1994)). Further, our legislature has

decreed that “[w]hen construing the requirements of [the ITA] the court must

focus on the merits of the petition, except where requirements have been totally

disregarded.” RCW 71.05.010(2).

         The ITA permits a treatment facility to petition for up to 14 days of

involuntary commitment for any person with a behavioral health disorder. See

RCW 71.05.240. The court must hold a probable cause hearing on the petition

where the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that “as the

result of a behavioral health disorder,” the person detained “presents a likelihood

of serious harm, or is gravely disabled,” and for whom less restrictive treatment

would not be in their best interest. RCW 71.05.240(1), (4)(a). Excluding

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No. 84834-8-I/5

Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, the court must hold the probable cause

hearing within 120 hours, or five days, of the initial detention. RCW 71.05.180,

.240(1).

       After E.M.R.R. filed her appeal, our Supreme Court issued its decisions in

D.H. and In re Detention of A.C., No. 100668-3 (Wash. July 28, 2023),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1006683.pdf. In both cases, the court

held that under due process requirements and RCW 71.05.010(2), “the State

may not totally disregard the requirements of the ITA when involuntarily detaining

a person,” and if it does, “dismissal is required.” A.C., slip op. at 13; see also

D.H., slip op. at 15 (“When the State totally disregards the [requirements of] the

ITA, the remedy is dismissal.”). The court also held that “the requirements of the

ITA have been totally disregarded when a person is involuntarily detained without

legal authority under the act.” A.C., slip op. at 14.

       In her statement of additional authorities, E.M.R.R. likens her case to D.H.

That case concerned a patient involuntarily held at a hospital on a 72-hour hold.3

D.H., slip op. at 3. Believing that D.H. would agree to voluntary inpatient

treatment, the evaluator did not petition for a 14-day hold. Id. at 3-4. But D.H.

did not agree to treatment, and the hospital did not release him at the expiration

of the 72 hours. Id. at 4-5. Instead, it filed a second notice of 72-hour

emergency detention under a new cause number and petitioned for a 14-day

       3
          An earlier version of the ITA permitted a facility to involuntarily hold a patient
without a court order for up to 72 hours. See, e.g., former RCW 71.05.180 (2020). The
legislature amended the ITA in 2020 to extend the initial holding period to 120 hours.
LAWS of 2020, ch. 302.

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No. 84834-8-I/6

hold. Id. at 5. D.H. moved to dismiss, which the court did not hear until 20 days

after his initial detention. Id.

       Former RCW 71.05.210(1)(b) (2019), the statute in effect at the time of

D.H.’s detention, stated:

       A person who has been detained for [72] hours shall no later than
       the end of such period be released, unless referred for further care
       on a voluntary basis, or detained pursuant to court order for further
       treatment as provided in this chapter.

Our Supreme Court concluded that because D.H. did not voluntarily agree to

further care and the hospital did not obtain a court order authorizing further

treatment, the “only option” was release. D.H., slip op. at 15-16. The court held

that the hospital’s failure to release D.H. constituted “a total disregard of the ITA”

and required dismissal of the 14-day involuntary treatment petition. Id. at 16-17.

       The State likens this case to In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wn.2d 21,

804 P.2d 1 (1990). In that case, the court scheduled an involuntary treatment

probable cause hearing within the statutory 72-hour emergency detention period.

Id. at 23. The court began its calendar within the 72-hour time limit but did not

actually begin Swanson’s hearing until about 74 hours after detention. Id. Our

Supreme Court held that “in the civil commitment context, a hearing begins when

the court calendar begins and the parties’ attorneys are ready to proceed.” Id. at

31. So, Swanson’s hearing had “begun” within the statutory time limit, and

dismissal was not warranted. Id. at 28, 31. The court noted that “if the intent of

the statute is to be fulfilled and absurd results are to be avoided, dismissal

cannot turn on the vagaries of scheduling, especially in these unpredictable and

sensitive proceedings.” Id. at 31.

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No. 84834-8-I/7

        Here, the hospital detained E.M.R.R. on Monday, December 5, 2022. The

court began a probable cause hearing within the statutory time frame on

December 9. But it did not conclude the hearing and issue an order of detention

until December 16—four days after the statutory time limit expired. So, like D.H.,

no court order authorized the detention of E.M.R.R. beyond the statutory time

frame, and Valley Cities held E.M.R.R. without authority of law for at least four

days.

        We recognize that a court may continue an involuntary commitment

probable cause hearing “for a reasonable time” beyond the 120-hour time limit if

“[t]he respondent expressly consents to a continuance or delay and there is a

showing of good cause,” or “[s]uch continuance is required in the proper

administration of justice and the respondent will not be substantially prejudiced in

the presentation of [their] case.”4 RCW 71.05.236(1). But if the court continues

the involuntary commitment hearing, it “shall state in any order of continuance or

postponement the grounds for the continuance or postponement and whether

detention will be extended.” RCW 71.05.236(4). And here, there is no written or

oral order in the record explaining why the court continued E.M.R.R.’s hearing to

December 16. Under D.H., the only option on December 16 was to dismiss

Valley Cities’ petition for 14 days of involuntary treatment. D.H., slip op. at 15.

        4
         The ITA no longer has a time limit on how long the court may continue a
hearing on a petition for involuntary commitment. Compare LAWS OF 2020, ch. 302, § 37
(adding new section RCW 71.05.236), with LAWS OF 2020, ch. 302, § 38 (striking
language from former RCW 71.05.240(1) (2019) that stated the court may postpone the
probable cause hearing “for a period not to exceed [48] hours” if requested by the
petitioner or “subject to the petitioner’s showing of good cause for a period not to exceed
[24] hours”).

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No. 84834-8-I/8

       The State asserts that even if E.M.R.R.’s hearing occurred outside the

120-hour time frame, dismissal is unwarranted because the delay in finalizing

E.M.R.R.’s hearing was largely because of E.M.R.R.’s counsel. We disagree.

       On Friday, December 9, 2022, E.M.R.R.’s counsel notified the court that

because of medical reasons, she would be unavailable on Tuesday, Wednesday,

and possibly Thursday, December 13 through 15. But counsel was available on

Monday, December 12, and asked the court to finish the hearing “first thing

Monday” due to her scheduling conflict. The record does not show that

E.M.R.R.’s counsel caused the delay.

       By continuing E.M.R.R.’s hearing to December 16 without an oral or

written order explaining its reasons for doing so, the court totally disregarded the

requirements of the ITA. Because dismissal of the 14-day involuntary treatment

petition was the only appropriate remedy for this violation, we reverse and

remand for the trial court to vacate the 14-day involuntary commitment order and

dismiss the petition.

WE CONCUR:

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