Court Opinion

ID: 9364915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 17:08:17.819484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.277806
License: Public Domain

J-A23040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    DELMAR O. ULSH AND CRYSTAL                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ULSH                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MARLIN TROY ULSH AND STUART                :
    LEE ULSH                                   :   No. 1515 MDA 2021
                                               :
                       Appellant               :

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2018-00299

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: JANUARY 20, 2023

        Appellants, Marlin Troy Ulsh and Stuart Lee Ulsh, file this interlocutory

appeal by right from the portion of the October 14, 2021, order entered by

the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County that determined the parties’

respective shares in a family partnership, granted the Plaintiffs/Appellees’

request to dissolve the partnership, and ordered the partition of the

partnership asset known as the “Front Farm” real estate accordingly.          We

affirm the order in these respects and remand to the trial court to resume

further proceedings consistent with this decision.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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       The present matter arises from a Complaint filed by Plaintiffs/Appellees

Delmar and Crystal Ulsh on December 19, 2018, in which they alleged that

the “Ulsh Farm Partnership”, whose business it is to run the Ulsh Family Farm,

comprised four equal partners—adult siblings Delmar, Crystal, Marlin, and

Stuart.    The Complaint further alleged that the Ulsh Family Farm itself

consisted of various personal property and two farm properties on which the

Partnership’s farming takes place, the “Front Farm” and the “Rear Farm.”

       Delmar and Crystal’s Complaint sought dissociation from and dissolution

of the Partnership,1 partition of the “Front Farm” among the four owner-

siblings equally, and partition of the “Rear Farm” between co-owners Delmar

and Stuart.2 With respect to the first of the farm properties, the “Front Farm”,

which is the main working farm on the property, the Complaint alleged that it

was owned equally by the four siblings despite Crystal’s conveyance of her

share by Deed to Stuart and Delmar at Stuart’s insistence to shield the

____________________________________________

1 Once one dissociates from a partnership, one has no standing to seek
dissolution of the partnership, as only an existing partner may dissolve a
partnership. See Official Comment to 15 Pa.C.S. 8481(a)(1) (a partner who
has already been dissociated lacks the power to dissolve the partnership.)

Here, the trial court perceived that Plaintiffs/Appellees Delmar and Crystal
sought primarily to dissolve the Partnership in question, and it granted that
request. Accordingly, the trial court declared the dissociation request moot.

2 The Complaint provides, however, “that if the property cannot be divided
without prejudice to or spoiling the whole, such proper and necessary sale or
sales of the same may be made by such person(s) and in such manner as the
Court may direct. Complaint ¶ 37 B.

                                           -2-
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property from her then-pending divorce and equitable distribution matter. 3,   4

The second of the farm properties, the “Rear Farm”, accessible only by a 25-

foot wide right of way across the Front Farm, is owned equally by Delmar and

Marlin as tenants-in-common.

       Defendants/Appellants Stuart and Marlin filed their Answer and New

Matter and Counterclaims seeking dissociation of Delmar from the Partnership

and partition of the Rear Farm and asserting against Delmar and Crystal both

____________________________________________

3 The parties acknowledged during the present litigation that they initially
misapprehended the applicable law regarding Crystal’s share in the
partnership, as it was not subject to equitable distribution because it was a
gift from their father.

4 Upon Crystal’s 2009 conveyance, therefore, the Front Farm was owned
equally by Delmar, Marlin, and Stuart as joint tenants. Notably, the brothers
had not prorated Crystal’s 1/3 share amongst themselves in accordance with
their preexisting 1/6, 1/3, and 1/6 shares but had chosen, instead, to become
equal partners.

Delmar and Crystal’s Complaint alleged that the parties intended the
conveyance to be a temporary measure, as reflected by the facts that no
consideration for the conveyance of Crystal’s share was paid and Crystal
continued to work the Front Farm in the ensuing years to the Partnership’s
benefit. Complaint, ¶ 23. The Complaint thus averred that “all parties have
agreed that Crystal Ulsh is [sic] also holds an equal one-fourth share in the
Partnership[,]” Complaint, ¶ 13, and it further avers that Crystal has been
working on the farm and received a partial distribution of the farm income in
2017 (the year prior to the Complaint); is not paid a salary for her farm work
but performs the work as an equal member of the Partnership; has reasonably
relied on the representations of Marlin and Stuart that she would continue to
be treated as an equal partner; and that the Partnership has received the
benefit of Crystal’s work for years, with the understanding that she was
entitled to the full benefits of Partnership. Complaint, at ¶¶ 14-17.

                                           -3-
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a conversion claim with respect to Partnership assets and a breach of fiduciary

duty claim for alleged mismanagement of such assets.

      The matter proceeded first to an evidentiary hearing on January 29,

2020. The trial court determined afterward, in its Opinion of February 13,

2020, that Crystal was a partner in the Ulsh Farm Partnership, finding that the

evidence belied Defendants’/Appellants’ claim that she intended to dissociate

from the partnership and thereby permanently surrender her partnership

interest with her conveyance. Instead, the temporary transfer of title was in

the nature of a constructive trust in her favor, the trial court ruled, as she

trusted the representations of her siblings that title would be returned to her

in the future.

      The trial court thus ordered that Crystal possessed an equal, one-

quarter interest in the Partnership with her siblings despite title as indicated

on the deed, and, therefore, that she would share equally with her three

sibling Partners the value of the Front Farm—which was deemed a partnership

asset-upon dissolution of the partnership. Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/20, at 3-

4.

      On June 22, 2021, the present matter proceeded to a non-jury trial on

the remaining issues, which included formal partition of the Front Farm,

partition of the Rear Farm, dissociation from the Partnership, dissolution from

the Partnership, and Marlin’s and Stuart’s counterclaims. At trial, the parties

agreed the Partnership’s purpose was to conduct the business of farming on

the Front Farm. N.T., 6/22/21, at 6. Marlin and Stuart testified that they

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have not assisted with the farming operations for at least five years, N.T. at

77, 115, and all parties agreed that they can no longer remain in business

together. N.T. at 7, 33, 58, 84, 137, 141. In this regard, the parties have

been unable to work together and have disagreed on many things related to

the Partnership.

       Appellants testified, however, that they had the financial wherewithal to

hire a third party to help with the farming if necessary, and had done so in

the past, N.T. at 35-36, 101-102, 141-42, and they wished to continue the

Partnership operations only with one another. N.T. at 84, 141-42. Appellees

countered by reference to Marlin’s testimony that he lives almost 150 miles

away from the farm and is a long-distance truck driver, and Stuart’s testimony

that he runs a business, farms on his personal property, and is a local

commissioner, leaving little time to tend to the Front Farm. N.T. at 18-19,

115.

       As a result, Plaintiffs/Appellees Delmar and Crystal testified that since

2014 or 2015 they have been forced to perform all the work on the farm—

which takes anywhere from 35 to 40 hours per week during the “busiest

weeks” of the year and from 10-15 hours per week during the “slowest weeks”

of the year—and have used the income earned from commercial sale of the

crops primarily to pay for the property taxes and insurance. N.T. at 6-7, 52-

53, 115. Citing this hardship, they testified that they no longer wished to

share in the remaining profits with two non-participating partners, so they

                                      -5-
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brought the present action and leased the Front Farm to a third party for the

past few years pending resolution of this litigation. N.T. at 7, 17.

      Testimony further established that in 2020, Defendants/Appellants

Marlin and Stuart demanded that the tenant pay each party an equal one-

fourth share of the rent rather than pay the rent to the Partnership bank

account.   When they presented this demand to the tenant, the tenant

withdrew from the lease for fear that Marlin or Stuart would destroy his crops.

N.T. at 132.

      Delmar and Crystal testified that they wished the Front Farm to be

partitioned equally among the four partners so that they could continue

farming and keep their own profits. Stuart and Marlin testified that they would

prefer to buy out Delmar’s and Crystal’s share of the farm, though it was

unclear whether they intended to farm it, lease it, or sell it.

      By the trial court’s Order of October 6, 2021 (filed on October 14, 2021),

the trial court dissolved the parties’ Partnership and declared, inter alia, that

the Front Farm, as a Partnership asset owned equally by the Partners, shall

be subject to a “winding up” conference regarding the manner by which

Partnership assets would be sold, divided, or managed.            With this order,

therefore, the trial court effectively granted Delmar and Crystal’s request for

equal partition of the Front Farm among the four partners.

      Marlin and Stuart filed post-trial motions, but before the trial court

addressed the motions, they filed the instant appeal under Pa.R.A.P.

                                      -6-
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311(a)(7), infra. The trial court more specifically summarizes this aspect of

the procedural history:

     Following trial, [the trial court] entered [its Order of October 6,
     2021 (docketed on October 14, 2021)] that is the subject of the
     current appeal. The Order granted the partition of the “Rear
     Farm” and set forth the names of all co-tenants and the extent of
     their interest in the property (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1557).

           Fn. The [trial court] recognizes that such an order is
           subject to immediate interlocutory appeal under
           Pa.R.Civ.P. 311(a)(7). See Kapcsos v. Benshoff,
           194 A.3d 139, 142 (Pa. Super. 2018). Nevertheless,
           in their Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on
           Appeal, Appellants do not challenge [the trial court’s]
           Order of partition of the “Rear Farm.” Indeed, the
           Order of partition grants relief requested in Count IV
           of Appellants’ Answer with New Matter and
           Counterclaim.       As such, [the trial court’s]
           unchallenged partition Order is not a basis to trigger
           appellate review of the remaining interlocutory issues.

     Additionally, a preliminary conference was scheduled pursuant to
     Pa.R.Civ.P. 1558(a)(1), (3), and (b) to determine whether the
     parties could agree upon “a plan of partition or sale” and to
     consider whether the partition process should be referred to a
     master. In addition, the challenged Order granted dissolution of
     the partnership pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S.A. § 8481(a)(1) and
     (a)(4)(iii) and scheduled a conference to discuss the winding up
     of the partnership business, including the manner of sale of the
     partnership’s personal property and real property and
     identification of outstanding obligations and liabilities. The Order
     further dismissed the dissociation action as moot and entered
     judgment on the various actions raised by Appellants in their
     Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim.

     On October 25, 2021, Appellants timely filed Post-Trial Motions
     challenging a number of the [trial court’s] findings.[ ] By Order
     dated October 29, 2021, [the trial court] continued the previously

                                    -7-
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      scheduled conferences and set a briefing schedule to address
      Appellants’ Post-Trial Motions.

      On November 10, 2021, Appellants filed the current Notice of
      Appeal, thereby depriving [the trial court] of further jurisdiction.
      Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a); Thomas v. Elash, 781 A.2d 170, 175 (Pa.
      Super. 2001) (trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider post-trial
      motions following filing of appeal).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/22, at 2-3.

      Appellants present the following issues for our consideration:

      1. Did the [trial court] err when it granted dissolution of the Ulsh
         Farms Partnership (the “Partnership”) where Plaintiffs failed to
         establish grounds for dissociation of the Partnership, it is
         reasonably practicable to carry on the Partnership as a
         prosperous business, certain assets of the Partnership are
         restricted from sale making dissolution impracticable, and
         where the Plaintiffs did not establish more than mere
         disagreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants as to the
         Partnership business?

      2. Did the [trial court] err in determining the ownership and value
         of Partnership assets where it disregarded jointly submitted
         evidence regarding ownership, failed to rule upon disputed
         items, failed to assign any value to certain undisputed
         Partnership assets (including real estate and personality [sic]),
         and improperly allowed valuation testimony from an admittedly
         unqualified appraiser?

      3. Did the [trial court] err when it reassigned the Partnership
         interests of the Parties in contravention of the Parties’
         agreements?

Brief of Appellants, at 4.

                                     -8-
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        Initially, we deem the trial court’s order filed on October 14, 2021, an

immediately appealable order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7), 5 as it explicitly

ordered      partition    of    the    Rear    Farm   and   necessarily   granted

Plaintiffs/Appellants Delmar’s and Crystal’s request for partition of the Front

Farm by ordering dissolution of the Partnership, affirming that the Front Farm

is owned equally by the four Partners, and directing that a conference take

place where the parties wind up Partnership business regarding, inter alia, the

Partnership’s real property consisting of the Front Farm.

        In Friday v. McShane, 268 A.3d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum),6 this Court acknowledged the immediate

appealability of a such an order:

____________________________________________

5   Rule 311. Interlocutory Appeals as of Right, provides, in relevant part:

     (a)   General rule.--An appeal may be taken as of right and without
           reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from:

           ...

           (7) Partition.--An order directing partition.

....

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(7).

6 While Friday is not controlling because it is a non-published memorandum,
it nevertheless provides persuasive authority to this Court as it was filed after
May 1, 2019.         See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished
nonprecedential memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May
1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

                                           -9-
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          Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1551-1574 split
          a partition action into two, distinct, chronological
          parts. Rules 1551-1557 govern Part [I], and Rules
          1558-1574 govern Part [II]. Each part, by rule, must
          produce its own, distinct, appealable order.

          The first order, under [Rule] 1557, directs partition of
          the    parties'   legal   interests   into   severalty.
          See Johnson v. Gaul, [ ] 77 A. 399, 400 ([Pa.] 1910)
          ([stating that,] “partition is a possessory action; its
          purpose and effect being to give to each of a number
          of joint owners his or her share in severalty”).

          The second order, under [Rule] 1570, does one of
          three things. A Rule 1570 order may (1) divide the
          partitioned property among the parties, (2) force one
          or more of the parties to sell their interest in the land
          to one or more of the parties, or (3) sell the land to
          the general public and distribute the proceeds among
          the parties.

          In Part [I], the [trial] court must determine whether
          the property is partitionable under law. In other
          words, Part [I] is to ascertain:

                [1.] Do the parties jointly own the real
                estate in question?

                [2.] If so, what fractional legal interests in
                the property does each party hold?

          The answers to these questions may be admitted in
          the pleadings, or, if they are not, a hearing or jury
          trial may be needed. If the trial court answers both
          questions and finds that the plaintiff has established a
          right to partition, Rule 1557 dictates:

                the [trial] court shall enter an order
                directing partition which shall set forth the
                names of all the co-tenants and the
                nature and extent of their interests in the
                property. No exceptions may be filed to
                an order directing partition.

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            [Pa.R.Civ.P.   1557.]    Critically,    any    party
            may immediately appeal        that   order     under
            Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
            311(a)(7)     (permitting     some     interlocutory
            appeals as of right). After a Part [I] order of
            partition becomes final (either because no [party]
            appeals or an appellate court affirms it), only then
            may parties proceed to Part [II], where the actual
            division, award, or sale of the partitioned property
            occurs.

      Kapcsos, 194 A.3d at 141-142 (ellipsis and original brackets
      omitted). “Part [II] is purely an equitable proceeding where the
      trial [court] balances the equities to decide what form the
      partitioning will take. If the property were a pie, the trial court
      must decide how best to serve it to the parties.” Id. at 142-143.

Friday, 268 A.3d 425 at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (emphasis added).

      Here, the trial court’s Order filed on October 14, 2021, marked the end

of the Part I phase described in Friday, as it declared that the Front Farm was

a Partnership asset, the Partners each owned a 25 percent Partnership interest

in the Front Farm, and the Partnership was dissolved so as to require a Part

II, winding up conference to determine the manner of division or sale of the

property. Accordingly, the trial court’s order in this respect was immediately

appealable under Rule 311(a)(7).

      In Defendants/Appellants Marlin and Stuart’s first issue, they contest

the trial court’s order of dissolution, as they maintain Delmar and Crystal failed

to carry their burden to establish that dissolving the Partnership and, in turn,

the consequential partitioning of the Front Farm was appropriate. Without a

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governing partnership agreement to the contrary,7 the trial court reviewed the

evidence and awarded dissolution in light of Sections 8481(a)(1) and

8481(a)(4)(iii) of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Partnership Act. Marlin and Stuart

argue, however, that neither Section 8481(a)(1) nor Section 8481(a)(4)(iii)

are applicable under the facts of the case. We disagree.

        Pursuant to the Act’s Section 8481(a)(1), a partnership at will is

dissolved when “the partnership knows or has notice of a person’s express will

to withdraw as a partner.”           15 Pa.C.S. § 8481(a)(1).8       Even where a

partnership agreement exists, an at-will dissolution does not violate the

agreement “[w]here no definite term or particular undertaking is specified in

the partnership agreement[.]” Stainton v. Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. 1051

(E.D.    Pa.   1986)    (applying    Pennsylvania   law;   decided   under   former

____________________________________________

7   See N.T., 1/29/20, at 17.

8   § 8481. Events causing dissolution

        (a) General rule.--A partnership is dissolved, and its business
        shall be wound up, upon the occurrence of any of the following:

        (1) In a partnership at will, the partnership knows or has notice
        of a person's express will to withdraw as a partner, other than a
        partner that has dissociated under section 8461(2), (3), (4), (5),
        (6), (7), (8), (9) or (10) (relating to events causing dissociation),
        except that, if the person has specified a withdrawal date later
        than the date the partnership knew or had notice, on the later
        date.

15 Pa.C.S. § 8481.

                                          - 12 -
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law); Girard Bank v. Haley, 332 A.2d 443 (Pa. 1975) (decided under former

law); Canter's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Elizabeth Associates, 578 A.2d 1326

(Pa. Super. 1990) (decided under former law). See also 13 Summ. Pa. Jur.

2d Business Relationships § 17:38 (2d ed.) (noting, “A partnership is

dissolved, and its business must be wound up, in a partnership at will, if the

partnership knows or has notice of a person's express will to withdraw as a

partner, [barring an exception inapplicable to the present case].”) (collecting

cases).

      This provision recognizes the power of any partner in a partnership at

will to dissolve the partnership at any time "by express will." Official Comment

to 18 Pa.C.S. § 8481(a)(1). Partners cannot be coerced into remaining in a

partnership against their wishes, and a partner has the power to terminate the

relationship the partner has with the partners, which is an agency relationship,

even if terminating the relationship breaks a contract. Girard Bank, supra.

      Here, Appellants Marlin and Stuart argue that Crystal, for example,

failed to satisfy the notice element of Section 8481, and they suggest that her

testimony at the January 29, 2020, evidentiary hearing supports their claim.

Specifically, in their appellate brief, they rely solely on the following excerpt

from Crystal’s testimony during her direct examination:

      Counsel for Delmar and Crystal: Did you ever send a formal
      notice that you wanted to withdraw from the partnership?

      Crystal:    No.

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N.T., 1/29/20, at 32.

      Offered in isolation, the excerpt is, at best, misleading, as the reader is

not given the context in which the testimony was offered. The larger excerpt

below clarifies that Crystal was referring not to the present matter regarding

Delmar’s and her Complaint to dissolve the Partnership but, instead, to the

separate issue of whether she had intended to retain a Partnership interest in

the Ulsh Farms when she had voluntarily and temporarily conveyed her

Partnership share to her siblings with the understanding that she was not

permanently relinquishing her partnership interest.

      Counsel:    Just to be clear, did they pay you anything for your
                  share?

      Crystal:    No . . . .

      Q:          When did Stuart first tell you that he wasn’t going to
                  voluntarily put you back on the deed?

      A:          I discovered this back in --     I discovered that
                  whenever – like 2016, ’17 when I read the papers
                  from this ongoing process, what we’re going through
                  right now.

      Q:          Would you have ever singed the deed over to Stuart
                  and Delmar if you had known that Stuart would refuse
                  to put you back on?

      A:          No, I would not have, no.

      Q:          When was the first time that either Stuart or [Marlin]
                  told you that they don’t consider you to be a partner
                  in the partnership?

      A:          I never heard that from anyone, no.

      Q:          You’re aware they contend that now though?

      A:          Yes. I’m aware of that now.

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       Q:            Were you ever a part of a vote to have yourself
                     removed as a partner from the partnership?

       A:            No, I was never removed never with any votes.

       Q:            Did you ever send a formal notice that you wanted to
                     withdraw from the partnership?

       A:            No.

N.T., 1/29/20, at 31-32.

       Viewed in context, therefore, Crystal’s testimony cited by Appellants is

irrelevant to the present question of whether she and Delmar gave statutory

notice of their express will to withdraw as Partners.     By the unambiguous

language of Section 8481(a)(1), the filing and service of their Complaint in

dissolution supplied sufficient notice. See also Tarantino, 637 F. Supp. at

1056 (filing of complaint in dissolution is sufficient notice).9 On this ground,

alone, the trial court’s order granting Delmar’s and Crystal’s request to

dissolve the Partnership was proper.

       In Defendants/Appellants Marlin and Stuart’s second issue, they argue

that the trial court erroneously disregarded “jointly submitted evidence”

regarding ownership and otherwise engaged in improper valuation methods

in valuing certain Partnership assets, including the valuation of the farms. In

response, the trial court observes that the valuation issues raised in the

present interlocutory appeal had been raised first in their post-trial motions

____________________________________________

9Although not binding on us, we may cite federal authority for its persuasive
value. Bochetto v. Piper Aircraft Co., 94 A.3d 1044, 1050 (Pa. Super.
2014).

                                          - 15 -
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and were slated for trial court review pending completion of court-ordered

briefs. In this regard, the trial court opines:

      Importantly, the prematurity of the current appeal has precluded
      the efficient conclusion of this litigation. At least one issue raised
      in the Post-Trial Motion, and subsequently on appeal, challenges
      [the trial court’s] lack of ruling on requests for relief not apparent
      in the pleadings [referencing, e.g., items of Partnership personal
      property that were not mentioned in the pleadings]. As the lack
      of ruling is directly the result of the parties’ failure to properly
      identify the issue before the Court, the first opportunity to fully
      address the issue presented itself in post-trial motions.
      Unfortunately, the filing of appeal ended that opportunity. Thus,
      Appellants have effectively denied [the trial court] the opportunity
      to correct omissions on salient issues prior to final judgment and
      thereby avert the need for appellate review.

      ...

      [The trial court] has yet to enter an order relating to the
      disposition of partnership assets to be sold, but Appellants
      inexplicably claim [the trial court] erred “when ordering that the
      partnership must be wound up and its assets sold.” Paragraph C,
      Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal. Similarly,
      Appellants challenge the entry of an order that they claim requires
      the sale of the “Front Farm” to third parties in violation of deed
      restrictions affecting the property. Id. No such order exists.
      Rather, Appellants’ . . . appeal has denied [the trial court] the
      opportunity to consider the impact of deed restrictions on real
      property owned by the partnership in winding up partnership
      affairs.

      In similar fashion, Appellants challenge [the trial court’s] failure
      to assign any value to the “Front Farm” and [the trial court’s]
      allegedly improper decision to admit the testimony of Appellees’
      witness regarding the value of the “Front Farm.” Once again,
      however, the [trial court] did not rule on the issue of value or
      consider the testimony of Appellees’ witness concerning the same,
      as the Order currently subject to appeal sets those issues for
      discussion and possible resolution at a subsequent conference,
      which Appellants precluded from occurring by the current appeal.
      In effect, Appellants currently complain of [the trial court’s] failure

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      to enter findings that their actions prevented [the trial court from
      making.

      ....

Trial Court Opinion at 4-6.

      After careful review of the record and consideration of the trial court’s

pertinent observations, we conclude that the matters raised in Appellants’

second issue are in the nature of the “Part II” partition inquiry outlined above

in Friday and, therefore, properly and best addressed at the trial court level

on remand.

      In Marlin’s and Stuart’s final issue, they assert the trial court erroneously

determined that the Partners were equal owners in the Partnership, with each

owning a 25% interest in the Front Farm. They maintain that the documentary

basis for their assertion—mainly their father’s will—established that Delmar

and Stuart each owned a 1/6 interest while Marlin and Crystal each owned a

1/3 interest in the Front Farm prior to Crystal’s temporary conveyance to

Stuart.

      After her conveyance, however, tax records showed Marlin, Stuart, and

Delmar represented themselves as equal, 1/3 owners in the Partnership.

While Marlin and Stuart posit that there was no historical basis for the trial

court’s finding of fact that the four siblings were equal partners, it is apparent

from the record that the trial court made this finding, at least in part, by

relying on the three-owner Partnership’s previous, equities-driven decision to

                                      - 17 -
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apply Crystal’s tendered share amongst themselves in such a way as to

become equal partners rather than to prorate her share to maintain the

original model of dominant and lesser partners.10

       We discern no manifest abuse of discretion, no misapplication of law, or

nothing palpably erroneous with respect to the trial court’s decision to

continue this equitable model upon recognizing Crystal, above Appellants’

objections, as an equal partner in the four-owner Partnership. Indeed, it is

beyond dispute that Crystal held one of the two larger ownership interests

prior to making her sacrificial conveyance out of a sense of duty to the

Partnership, and the record otherwise shows her to have been one of the more

active contributors to maintaining the Front Farm.

       As such, we find inapposite the decisions of Hess v. Gebhard & Co.,

808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002) (holding where there are no reasonable grounds

for the court’s decision, the decision will be reversed) and Viener v Jacobs,

834 A.2d 546, 554 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding a decision in equity will be

reversed where the trial court was “palpably erroneous, misapplied the law or

committed a manifest abuse of discretion.”) (internal citations and quotation

omitted) relied upon by Appellants to challenge the trial court’s exercise of
____________________________________________

10 Appellees Delmar and Crystal seek further to undermine Appellant’s
opposition to the trial court’s equal share model with the interesting point that
a return to the original 1/6, 1/6, 1/3, 1/3 share model would result in the
same 50/50 split between Appellants and Appellees as currently exists and,
ostensibly, would offer Appellants no collective benefit.            We merely
acknowledge this critique without adopting it for our present purposes.

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J-A23040-22

equitable discretion in determining that Stuart, Marlin, Delmar, and Crystal

each owns a one quarter interest in the Partnership. Accordingly, this claim

affords Defendant/Appellants Marlin and Stuart no relief.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order entered below to the

extent it declares that the four Partners possess equal fractional interests in

the Partnership, that the dissolution of the Partnership requires the partition

of, inter alia, the Partnership asset known as the “Front Farm” real estate, and

that said partition shall accord with the Partners’ fractional interests.

      Order affirmed. Case remanded to the trial court, which shall conduct

further for proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/20/2023

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