Court Opinion

ID: 9720426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:30:14.405227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.039468
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Regarding the proposed circumstantial evidence jury instruction by Fast Horse, I concur outright with the majority opinion.
Concerning the instruction to the jury on flight, I specially concur. South Dakota’s *503jury instruction on flight is sick and it needs a doctor.
Here, Fast Horse told the victim of the crime that he was leaving for California. Is this “flight?” * Is this “fleeing from justice?” Secondly, State’s Information did not fix a date certain for Fast Horse’s commission of the offense, but rather, charged the commission “during the month of December, 1990, through January, 1991.” In essence, State took the position that this was a continuing crime.
Is it not the jury’s function to determine if, indeed, a crime has been committed? Obviously. Why, then, in this state, do we continue to bless an instruction, such as the one given here, that “Flight by the defendant, after the crime has been committed, does not create a presumption of guilt.” (Emphasis supplied mine). In effect, the assumption is made that (a) a crime has been committed (2) the defendant committed the crime and (3) defendant fled from the crime. Then, in effect, it tells the jury you do not have to consider those three assumptions. It is instructional baloney. Frankly, in my opinion, this South Dakota Criminal Pattern Instruction 1-14-9 is inherently skewed against every defendant where the instruction is given. In State v. Menard, 424 N.W.2d 382 (S.D.1988) we admonished the trial courts in this state to use this instruction on flight “sparingly” and “only when the special circumstances and evidence require.” We went on in Menard to express, “To that extent we would suggest modifying the comment which accompanies Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 1-14-9.” Could not the trial courts say, as a modifier, “after the alleged commission of the offense?” This would be a beginning. However, we need a complete overhaul.
An instruction, used in this case, was error. However, our review does not end there. SDCL 23A-44-14 reflects: “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” In each case, to determine if it is prejudicial error, the facts and circumstances of the case govern. State v. Branch, 298 N.W.2d 173 (S.D.1980). When instructing a jury, to warrant a reversal, based upon an error, it is vital to establish, if the conviction is to be reversed, that prejudicial error be established. Stare deci-sis on erroneous instructions is set forth in State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193 (S.D.1985). Furthermore, in said case, we held that an appellant must establish that, under the evidence, the jury might and probably would have returned a different verdict but for the error in the instructions.
Here, Fast Horse bought a one way airplane ticket to California. He took the camcorder with him. He also offered to sell the camcorder to one Joann Thunder-hawk. Fast Horse also told Dale, the victim, that the camcorder was still on the reservation. But he brought the camcorder to his girlfriend’s apartment in Rapid City, before going to California. His story of where he had it, what he did with it, what he intended to do with it, is rife with prevarication. My point is: There is overwhelming evidence of his embezzlement. And there is error, but no prejudicial error by decisional law in South Dakota, in giving what I believe to be a lousy instruction (per se) in law. Notwithstanding this instruction, the jury might and probably would not have returned a different verdict. See also, State v. Stapelton, 387 N.W.2d 28 (S.D.1986). A fundamental determination of embezzlement by the jury was sound. Ramees, 815 P.2d at 1207.
Our committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in this state needs to review and improve a “flight” instruction for our Bench and Bar.

 Evidence of flight can be attributed to causes other than consciouness of guilt. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 483, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, 452-53, n. 10 (1963).