Court Opinion

ID: 9722745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:48:40.647166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.622277
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE WEBBER, specially concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but not in the reasoning for it. I am further of the opinion that the trial court reached the proper result but only because of fortuitous circumstances. Section 402 of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act clearly expresses a preference for legal separation in lieu of dissolution. Its language is mandatory: “shall.” The only way in which a trial court could determine whether grounds for legal separation exist is to try that issue first. If such grounds are not made out, the petition for legal separation should then be dismissed and the court should then proceed to the petition for dissolution. The latter procedure may not even be necessary in most cases since the matter will always be contested when there are petition and counterpetition before the court. Evidence supporting the dissolution would normally be introduced in cross-examination of the party seeking legal separation. The majority’s suggestion that both petitions be tried together only confuses the record and leads to argument over such matters as burden of proof and burden of going forward. Both the trial and appellate courts will have an easier time of it if they are able to determine clearly what evidence is offered by whom in support of what, rather than try to sort out an olio of evidence. In the instant case, the respondent-counterpetitioner was denied all opportunity to present what evidence she had in support of her counter-petition, either by way of testimony in chief or by cross-examination of the petitioner-counterrespondent. This smacks of a serious lack of due process, even though it was apparent that her motive in seeking separation was not really to preserve the marriage. The court today sets a dangerous precedent. The next case with a welter of charges and countercharges not present in this one may be considerably less easy of solution. Section 402 nowhere dictates, as the majority suggests, that a spouse at fault may forfend a dissolution by the simple expedient of filing a counterpetition for separation. All it requires is that the trial court first determine whether there are grounds for separation. If not, the statutory mandate is satisfied.