Court Opinion

ID: 9665052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:38:01.359135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.533845
License: Public Domain

John Mauzy Pittman, Chief Judge, dissenting. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was unreasonably withholding his consent to adoption. I would affirm. This is not a case in which termination of parental rights was based solely on the appellant’s incarceration. In determining that appellant was unreasonably withholding his consent, the trial judge noted that appellant was not married to the child’s mother and had lived with her and the child for only three days before he was incarcerated for aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. She also noted that, although he was only twenty-six years of age, appellant had been imprisoned twice, served over eight years in prison between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six, and was still imprisoned at the time of the hearing. Finally, she noted that appellee had cared for the six-year-old child since he was fifteen months of age. Appellant’s argument is premised on the sanctity of his parental rights. However, the parent-child relationship is not one-sided; a parent’s rights are based on his fulfillment of the correlative duties of parenthood. At a minimum, the obligations of parenthood require that a parent express love and affection for the child; express personal concern over the health, education and general welfare of the child; supply necessary food, clothing and medical care; educate the child; give social and religious guidance; and provide an adequate home. Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 580 S.W.2d 176 (1979). Although a parent’s imprisonment, standing alone, does not automatically require termination of parental rights, appellant in the present case has been repeatedly imprisoned since he was a teenager for highly antisocial behavior. Past actions over a meaningful period are good indicators of what the future may be expected to hold, In re Adoption of K.M.C., 62 Ark. App. 95, 969 S.W.2d 197 (1998), and the trial court has a duty to look at the entire picture of how the parent discharged his parental duties. Here the record shows that, although appellant has exerted himself somewhat to establish his parental rights, he has done nothing to discharge his parental duties. I respectfully dissent.