Court Opinion

ID: 9910282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 14:07:39.088169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:59.372236
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re Y.H., 2023-Ohio-4554.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: Y.H. AND B.H.                       :    APPEAL NO. C-230472
                                                 TRIAL NO. F10-231Z
                                            :
                                                      O P I N I O N.
                                            :

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 15, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Patsy Bradbury,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and
Family Services,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Megan E. Busam,
Assistant Public Defender, Guardian Ad Litem for the Minor Children,

Christopher Kapsal, for Appellant Father.
                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

         {¶1}    Defendant-appellant B.H., Sr., (“Father”) appeals the judgment of the

Hamilton County Juvenile Court granting permanent custody of his children, Y.H. and

B.H., to the Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”).

Father asserts that the juvenile court erred and abused its discretion in finding that

the grant of permanent custody to HCJFS was in the best interest of the children.

Father further argues that the grant of permanent custody was not supported by

sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. After a careful

review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile

court.

                                         Procedural Posture

         {¶2}   This case comes before the court for the second time. In Father’s first

appeal, we held that the juvenile court abused its discretion in awarding permanent

custody of the children to HCJFS without conducting an independent review under

Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(d). We remanded the matter to the juvenile court to independently

review and consider the transcripts before issuing a decision. See In re Y.H., 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-230132, 2023-Ohio-2272.                   In this appeal, Father once again

challenges the juvenile court’s grant of permanent custody, raising new arguments not

previously pursued in his first appeal.1

                                        Factual Background

         {¶3}   We summarized the relevant facts regarding Father, Y.H., and B.H. in

Father’s first appeal. Id. at ¶ 3-28. We do so again here.

1 Mother was not a party to the previous appeal and is not a party to this appeal.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           Y.H.

       {¶4}    Father is the parent of both Y.H. and B.H. Y.H. is the older of the two

children and was born in May 2020, prematurely. Two days before Y.H.’s birth, T.W.

(“Mother”) tested positive for cocaine. Y.H. did not test positive for any chemical

substances when she was born, but there were concerns about her exposure to cocaine

due to Mother’s test results. Y.H. spent the first three months of her life in the neonatal

intensive care unit (“NICU”) and has significant medical needs.

       {¶5}    From the start, there were concerns about both parents’ ability to parent

Y.H. For example, when asked to consent to a nasal gastronomy tube (“g-tube”) for

Y.H., both parents initially declined, believing that Y.H. would learn to eat on her own.

However, from birth, Y.H. had consistently experienced difficulty feeding arising from

her complex medical issues, and the parents’ refusal to accept a g-tube was contrary

to the advice of the medical professionals. This created doubts that both parents truly

appreciated Y.H.’s medical needs.         In time, however, both parents ultimately

consented to Y.H. receiving a g-tube.

       {¶6}    Father also visited Y.H. while she was in the NICU. But there were

concerns, because Father arrived at the hospital smelling of marijuana during his visits

and he visited Y.H. at strange hours during the night.

       {¶7}    On September 1, 2020, when Y.H. was ready to be discharged from the

hospital, HCJFS filed a motion for an interim order of temporary custody with an

accompanying complaint for permanent custody. The complaint alleged the following

regarding Father:

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       Hospital staff noticed a heavy smell of marijuana on [Father] when he

       visited Y.H. in the hospital. The HCJFS has not had consistent contact

       with him since the birth of the child. He has a warrant for a pending

       Aggravated Menacing charge (20/CRB/8383).           An altercation with

       [Mother] in 2019 led to an Assault charge (19/CRB/18353) that was

       eventually dismissed for want of prosecution.

       {¶8}   Interim temporary custody was granted to HCJFS that same day, and

Y.H. was ultimately placed in foster care after being released from the hospital. In the

order granting interim temporary custody, the magistrate noted:

       HCJFS does not believe that father is appropriate to care for this child,

       at this time. Father has not made himself available to HCJFS for the

       purpose of assessment, despite multiple attempts by the agency. Father

       has two open criminal warrants. HCJFS suspects that father uses

       marijuana. In 2019, father was charged with an offense of violence

       against mother.

       {¶9}    At the time, HCJFS had also sought to obtain permanent custody of

Mother’s older child, S.L. Father is not S.L.’s parent and therefore was not a party to

S.L.’s case. In addition, Mother’s parental rights had been terminated regarding her

oldest child, D.W., who is also not Father’s child. As a result of D.W.’s proceeding,

HCJFS filed a motion for a determination that it need not pursue reasonable efforts at

reunification of Y.H. with Mother.

       {¶10} On October 2, 2020, HCJFS also filed a case plan with the court. The

case plan was originally created for S.L. and, as such, Father was not a party to it.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Nevertheless, HCJFS removed S.L. from the case plan and added Y.H. and Father as

parties.

       {¶11} The case plan required Father to participate in a diagnostic assessment

of functioning (“DAF”), participate in a domestic-violence assessment, regularly visit

Y.H. in a supervised setting, submit to toxicology screens, and provide proof of income.

       {¶12} On November 25, 2020, HCJFS dismissed and refiled the above

paperwork for interim temporary custody and permanent custody due to the

dispositional hearing not being held within the required 90-day period after the initial

filing. That same day, the magistrate granted the refiled motion for interim temporary

custody and the motion for no reasonable efforts regarding Mother. The parties

waived the 90-day requirement for future proceedings.

       {¶13} On January 6, 2021, the juvenile court adjudicated Y.H. dependent and

abused. Regarding Father, the magistrate found that:

       Father is not appropriate to care for [Y.H.]. Father has not bonded with

       [Y.H.], and has not demonstrated an ability to care for [Y.H.]. Father

       has not made himself available to HCJFS for assessment of his fitness

       to care for this child. Father does not have stable housing. And, father

       has a concerning criminal history.

                                     B.H.

       {¶14} B.H., Father’s younger child, was born in September 2021 while Mother

was incarcerated on a domestic-violence charge against Father. B.H. was also born

with serious medical issues that require intensive care.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} After his birth, HCJFS filed for interim temporary custody of B.H. with

an accompanying complaint for permanent custody. In its request for permanent

custody, HCJFS alleged that Father:

       has an extensive criminal history. The agency has ongoing concerns

       about father’s substance use. Father tested positive for cocaine on a drug

       screen in March 2021. Father failed to appear for nine drug screens. * *

       * Father admitted to regular use of marijuana. The agency has been

       unable to assess father’s mental health or substance use because he has

       not participated in a diagnostic assessment despite multiple referrals.

       Father was previously charged with aggravated menacing against a

       previous paramour. Father does not have stable housing or income.

       {¶16} The juvenile court granted interim custody to HCJFS, and B.H. was

placed in the same foster home as Y.H. B.H. was then adjudicated dependent on

January 18, 2022. B.H. was added to the case plan filed on June 1, 2022. The case

plan provided Father with reunification requirements nearly identical to that of Y.H.

Dispositional Hearing

       {¶17} The permanent-custody hearings for both children were combined and

began on April 19, 2022. On that day, three witnesses testified: (1) Mariah Delaney,

(2) Y.H. and B.H.’s foster mother, and (3) Father.

       {¶18} Mariah Delaney was a visitation facilitator for the Family Nurturing

Center, the facility where the parents’ supervised visits with the children took place.

Delaney testified that there had been some issues with visitation, but that most of the

issues involved Mother. She testified that Mother would be combative and would yell

at Father. Delaney described incidents in which Mother kicked Father, Mother cursed

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

in front of the children, and Mother lunged at her. Regarding Father, Delaney testified

that Father would try to calm Mother when her behavior escalated. She also testified

that Father was receptive to coaching but was not making a lot of progress. However,

Delaney also testified that Father was affectionate, attentive, and appropriate with the

children during his visits. She explained that Father handled both children well when

they would “fuss,” but that Father still needed support and occasional intervention.

       {¶19} In addition, Delaney testified that both parents had been inconsistent

with visitation, had missed several visits, and had been placed on “call-ahead” status

due to the number of missed visits. Due to both parents missing three or more

consecutive visits, both parents had been removed from the visitation schedule twice.

Delaney also testified that Father’s need for support and intervention, and his refusal

to separate visits from Mother caused his visits to stay at the highest level of

supervision.

       {¶20} The foster mother of Y.H. and B.H. testified that the siblings had begun

bonding. She explained that Y.H. had made great improvements since her brother’s

arrival. The foster mother testified that Y.H. was in physical therapy, occupational

therapy, speech therapy, and had a g-tube. She explained Y.H. had multiple medical

appointments and that her g-tube required special training. She also testified that

Y.H. had torticollis. Regarding B.H., the foster mother testified that he also suffers

from serious medical issues requiring numerous appointments. B.H. attended

physical therapy due to concerns about cerebral palsy and torticollis. B.H. was also

born with a facial droop, which is monitored. Ultimately, the foster mother testified

that she wanted to adopt the children if permitted to do so.

                                               7
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶21} Father testified that he had obtained stable, subsidized housing and

began living with Mother in February 2022, although they had lived together on and

off during the pendency of the case. Father further testified that he was receiving

social security, but that HCJFS had not confirmed his job as a mechanic although he

maintained he worked as one. Father indicated that he completed a drug screen in

March 2021, and that even though his results showed he was positive for marijuana

and cocaine, he never used cocaine. Father explained that he only tested positive for

cocaine because he was around Mother when she used it. However, Father admitted

to using marijuana regularly. Regarding the multiple missed drug screens, Father

testified that he missed these screenings due to work and transportation issues.

Regarding visits, Father testified that he missed visits due to transportation issues,

work, and medical issues, which resulted in him having surgery. Father further

testified that he missed his children and wanted them home with him.

       {¶22} The dispositional hearing was continued to July 19, 2022. At the second

hearing, Crystal Claggett and Mother testified.

       {¶23} Crystal Claggett was a supervisor with HCJFS at the time of the hearing

but had been a caseworker at the time she became involved in the case. Claggett

initially met Mother in 2019 regarding S.L. She testified that Mother had a long

history of drug abuse, specifically with cocaine. She testified that Mother’s parental

rights had been involuntarily terminated twice.

       {¶24} Regarding Father, Claggett testified that he admitted to using marijuana

consistently. She testified that Father had not participated in any services and had not

completed either of the two assessments to which she had referred him. She testified

that because there were no completed assessments, HCJFS could not assess Father’s

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

mental health or substance use. Regarding the drug screens, she explained that she

sent Father for more than ten drug screens, which he never attended except for the

one in March 2021. When asked why HCJFS was requesting permanent custody

regarding Father, Claggett stated:

       We do have concerns about his ability to care for the children and their

       basic needs, just based upon his job instability or lack of proof of

       income. We also have concerns about substance use due to one positive

       screen that he did have and the self-reporting of marijuana use. We also

       have concerns about his lack of bonding with the children because of the

       inconsistent visitation. And then also there is no DAF, so we don’t really

       know if there’s a mental health diagnosis. If there is, its currently going

       unaddressed, so we would have those concerns about his ability to care

       for children.

       {¶25} Mother testified to a range of issues not relevant to this appeal, given

that she is not a party.

                           Disposition, Objections, and Appeal

       {¶26} On November 14, 2022, the magistrate issued an order granting

permanent custody to HCJFS. Regarding Father, the magistrate found that: (1) Father

made negligible progress in his case plan; (2) Father did not use the rehabilitative

services provided to help rectify any concerns and assume parental duties; (3) each

parent went periods of 90 days without seeing the children; (4) the parents have a

violent relationship; (5) Father admitted to using marijuana consistently; (6) both

parents have not resolved the issues that caused the children to be removed; and (7)

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Father had unaddressed substance-abuse issues.          In the entry, the magistrate

approved and adopted the various case plans that had been filed throughout the case.

       {¶27} Father timely filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision, and Mother

filed a late objection. On March 9, 2023, the juvenile court denied both objections and

entered judgment in favor of HCJFS. However, in In re Y.H., this court reversed and

remanded the case for the juvenile court to properly consider transcripts submitted by

Father in support of his objection.

       {¶28} The juvenile court issued a new order on September 6, 2023, upholding

the decision of the magistrate to award permanent custody to HCJFS. In this regard,

the juvenile court found that Father had made insignificant progress in his case plan

by failing to complete diagnostic assessments, failing to complete drug screens, and

inconsistently visiting the children. The juvenile court further found that there was

clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to Father

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E). To support this finding, the juvenile court found that

Father did not complete the case plan, tested positive in a drug screen, admitted to

using marijuana frequently, and refused to separate his visits from Mother even

though he acknowledged it placed the children at risk. The court noted that, in its

observation, “Father lacks the capacity to protect his children from the harm that could

result from Mother’s behavior.”

       {¶29} Pursuant to the R.C. 2151.414(D) best-interest factors, the juvenile court

found that the parents went periods of time exceeding 90 days without seeing the

children; the children had been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent in 2021

and 2022; and the children could not be placed with the parents within a reasonable

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

time.   The juvenile court accordingly found that an award of permanent custody to

HCJFS was in Y.H.’s and B.H.’s best interest.

        {¶30} Father timely appealed.

                  Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

        {¶31} Father raises one assignment of error: that the juvenile court erred and

abused its discretion in granting permanent custody to HCJFS, which he argues was

not supported by sufficient evidence, was against the manifest weight of the evidence,

and was not in the children’s best interest. In support of this alleged error, Father

emphasizes two subarguments. First, Father asserts that the various case plans

submitted for Y.H. and B.H. had not been approved and journalized by the juvenile

court before permanent custody was granted. Therefore, he argues that the juvenile

court erred in finding the children eligible for permanent custody under R.C.

2151.414(E)(1), which focuses on a parent’s compliance with services to remedy the

conditions that caused a child to be placed outside the home. Second, Father asserts

that the children were never in the temporary custody of HCJFS, because the

magistrate only placed them in “interim temporary custody.” Thus, Father contends

that the juvenile court erred in considering periods of interim custody in analyzing one

of the best-interest factors, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), which references “temporary

custody.”

        {¶32} Our review of the juvenile court’s decision involving the termination of

parental rights focuses on whether the court’s decision was supported by clear and

convincing evidence. In re S & W, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-230110 and C-230122,

2023-Ohio-2210, ¶ 11.      “Clear and convincing evidence is evidence sufficient to

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

to be established.” Id. Where competent and credible evidence exists to support the

juvenile court’s judgment, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile

court. Id.

       {¶33} Sufficiency and weight of the evidence are reviewed under slightly

different standards.

       When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we look to the

       adequacy of the evidence and determine whether some evidence exists

       on each element. When examining the weight of the evidence, we look

       to the inclination of the evidence and determine whether the greater

       amount of credible evidence supports one side rather than the other. In

       doing so, we must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,

       consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether—in

       resolving the conflicts in the evidence—the juvenile court clearly lost its

       way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

       judgment must be reversed. We must also be mindful of the

       presumption in favor of the finder of fact.

(Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 12.

                 Case Plan and R.C. 2151.414(E) Placement Factors

       {¶34} We first address Father’s claim that the lack of a journalized case plan

is fatal to the juvenile court’s award of permanent custody.

       {¶35} HCJFS sought permanent custody as an original disposition for both

Y.H. and B.H. To support such an outcome, the juvenile court must determine “(1)

that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should

not be placed with the parent, using the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E), and (2)

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                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child based on the factors set forth

in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).” (Internal citations omitted.) In re L Children, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-220601, 2023-Ohio-1346, ¶ 12. R.C. 2151.414(E) contains 11 different

factors for the juvenile court to assess to determine whether a child cannot or should

not be placed with a parent. The juvenile court need only find that one factor

disqualifies a parent as a placement to justify its permanent-custody determination

under R.C. 2151.414(E). Id at ¶ 16.

       {¶36} Here, the juvenile court found that Y.H. and B.H. could not and should

not be placed with Father on the basis of four separate factors contained in R.C.

2151.414(E): (1) (E)(1), which looks at whether the parent has failed to substantially

remedy the conditions that caused the child to be placed outside the home through

case planning and services; (2) (E)(2), which considers, among other conditions, a

parent’s chronic chemical dependency that is so severe that it precludes a parent from

providing a suitable home for the child now or within one year into the future; (3)

(E)(4), which takes into account a parent’s lack of commitment to a child; and (4)

(E)(10), in which a parent has abandoned a child.

       {¶37} Father argues that the juvenile court erred in applying (E)(1) and (E)(2)

to him, because those factors rely upon case plans, and the case plans here were not

properly journalized.

       {¶38} We acknowledge that, as a matter of due process, when it comes to case

plans, “[j]ournalization is key.” In re D.M., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200043, 2020-

Ohio-3273, ¶ 32. Nevertheless, the issue of whether the juvenile court erred with

regard to its reliance upon the (E)(1) and (E)(2) factors or whether the case plans were

                                               13
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

properly journalized below is immaterial, because the juvenile court need only find

one factor under R.C. 2151.414(E) to support an award of permanent custody.

       {¶39} We hold that the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) is

adequate to support an award of permanent custody in this case. To that end, the

juvenile court found that Father visited the children inconsistently throughout the

case. The juvenile court also found that Father lacked the capacity to protect the

children from Mother’s harmful behavior and also failed to understand the potential

safety risk Mother’s conduct posed to the children.

       {¶40} On appeal, Father asserts that, in making this determination, the

juvenile court failed to address language in R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) regarding whether he

was “able to” visit Y.H. and B.H. Father contends that his missed visits with the

children were due to transportation and work issues and that, outside of those life

events, he visited “when able to so.” See R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) (“The parent has

demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support,

visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so * * *.”). We view this argument

as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

       {¶41} Our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to support the

juvenile court’s determination that Father demonstrated a lack of commitment to Y.H.

and B.H. See In re S & W, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-230110 and C-230122, 2023-

Ohio-2210, at ¶ 12. While we do not doubt Father’s love for his children and desire to

be present for them, the record shows that Father missed more visits than he attended.

While Father testified to having transportation and work issues, those conflicts do not

explain all of the missed visits.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶42} Moreover, Y.H. and B.H. both have significant medical needs that

require the full attention and support of their caregivers.         Father had ample

opportunity to show that he would be willing to do what is necessary to support the

children and their medical needs, and the record falls short of establishing that

commitment. This, again, is not to cast doubt on Father’s sincere love for his children.

Genuine intention sometimes does not translate into actual action.

       {¶43} R.C. 2151.414 (E)(4) also focuses on a parent’s “other actions [that]

show[] an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child[.]”

Here, too, we find ample evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding. In this

regard, the record demonstrates that Father lacked an adequate permanent home for

Y.H. and B.H. For most of the time that the case was pending, HCJFS could not verify

where Father was living. It was not until shortly before the dispositional hearing that

Father secured housing. With regard to his proposed living situation, Father also had

trouble understanding that Mother’s turbulent behavior posed a safety risk to the

children. Father testified that he wanted Mother, Father, Y.H., and B.H. to live

together. But part of providing an “adequate permanent home” is ensuring a safe place

for the children to reside, and this point seemed lost on Father as the case progressed.

       {¶44} Given Father’s spotty visitation history, inattention to Y.H.’s and B.H.’s

medical needs, and inability to provide a safe permanent home for the children, the

juvenile court’s finding that permanent custody was appropriate under R.C.

2151.414(E)(4) was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Because only one factor is needed under R.C. 2151.414(E) to

justify an original disposition of permanent custody, we need not consider Father’s

arguments as to the case plan under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (E)(2) or as to the validity

                                              15
                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

of the juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10).2 We uphold the juvenile

court’s determination that Y.H. and B.H. were eligible for an original disposition of

permanent custody as to Father under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4).

                  Temporary Custody vs. Interim Temporary Custody

        {¶45} Next, we consider Father’s argument that the children were never in the

“temporary custody” of HCJFS, because the magistrate’s orders throughout the case

continuously placed them in “interim temporary custody.” Father argues that this

difference in terminology matters because one of the best-interest factors under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) focuses exclusively on periods of “temporary custody” rather than

“interim temporary custody.” However, Father points to a distinction without a

difference, as an examination of the statutes under which Y.H. and B.H. were placed

in the care of HCJFS during the pendency of this case reveals that they were actually

in temporary custody, regardless of the terminology used by the magistrate.

        {¶46} Relevant to permanent-custody cases, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides

that “a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency

on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the

Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from home.”

        {¶47} Regarding Y.H., HCJFS filed for and was granted interim temporary

custody on September 1, 2020. Sixty days from that date is October 31, 2020. Y.H.

was subsequently adjudicated abused and dependent on January 6, 2021. Thus,

2 We acknowledge that the juvenile court’s order is somewhat contradictory as to its determination

that permanent custody was warranted under R.C. 2151.414(E)(10). In determining whether Y.H.
and B.H. could not and should not be placed with Father, the juvenile court found that Father
abandoned the children under (E)(10) because he had gone more than 90 days without seeing them.
On the other hand, in analyzing the best-interest factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the juvenile
court explicitly held that the (E)(7) to (E)(11) factors were inapplicable. Because we uphold the
juvenile court’s finding under (E)(4), however, we need not resolve the contradiction below as to
the applicability of the (E)(10) factor.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

applying R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), Y.H. was in temporary custody as of October 31, 2020,

or, at the very least, on January 6, 2021.

       {¶48} Regarding B.H., HCJFS filed for and was granted interim temporary

custody on October 1, 2021. Sixty days from that date is November 30, 2021. B.H.

was subsequently adjudicated dependent on January 18, 2022. Again applying R.C.

2151.414(B)(1), B.H. was in the temporary custody of HCJFS on November 30, 2021,

at the earliest or January 18, 2022, at the latest.

       {¶49} We agree with Father that it would have been preferable for the

magistrate to utilize the precise statutory terminology in granting temporary custody

to HCJFS. This would have alleviated confusion as to the precise status of the children,

which is important given that both eligibility for permanent custody and the best-

interest   factors   consider   a   child’s   temporary-custody   status.    See   R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d) and (D)(1)(C). Nonetheless, because the children were in temporary

custody under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), we reject Father’s argument that the juvenile court

erred in considering the periods of “interim temporary custody” in determining their

best interest.

       {¶50} Since the children were adjudicated dependent, R.C. 2151.353(A)(4)

applies. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), once a child is adjudicated abused,

neglected, or dependent, a child can be placed in the permanent custody of an agency

“if the court determines in accordance with division (E) of section 2151.414 of the

Revised Code that the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and determines in

accordance with division (D)(1) of section 2151.414 of the Revised Code that the

permanent commitment is in the best interest of the child.”

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                 Best-Interest Factors

       {¶51} Father’s final argument is that the best-interest findings of the juvenile

court are not supported by the record. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides that when making

a best-interest determination, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including:

       (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s

       parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers,

       and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

       (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through

       the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the

       child;

       (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has

       been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

       agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of

       a consecutive twenty-two-month period, * * *;

       (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and

       whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of

       permanent custody to the agency; and

       (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of [R.C.

       2151.414] apply in relation to the parents and child.

       {¶52} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the juvenile court found that the children

had been in foster placement since birth. The juvenile court also found that the

parents have shown that they clearly love their children. The juvenile court also found

that both parents had gone 90 days or more without seeing the children, a reality that

Father admitted. It is also undisputed that the children had never been in the home

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

or custody of Father. Having reviewed the record, and given Father’s admission as to

his absence from the children’s lives, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in reaching this finding.

       {¶53} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the juvenile court found that the children

were too young to express their wishes. Father does not dispute this determination.

       {¶54} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c), the juvenile court found that the children

had been in the temporary custody of HCJFS. As to Y.H., the juvenile court found that

she had been in temporary custody since her adjudication date. As to B.H., the juvenile

court noted he had been in interim custody since October 1, 2021, and was adjudicated

on January 18, 2022. As we have discussed, we do not view the magistrate’s use of

different terminology to undermine the fact that the children were consistently placed

outside of Father’s care while this case was pending. The juvenile court did not abuse

its discretion in considering that fact in taking the children’s best interest into account.

       {¶55} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), the juvenile court found that the children

should not and could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time,

implying that neither parent offered Y.H. and B.H. a legally secure placement. On

appeal, Father argues this was an abuse of discretion because he had stable housing at

the time of the dispositional hearing.        However, “[a] legally secure permanent

placement is more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally encompasses a

stable environment where a child will live in safety with one or more dependable adults

who will provide for the child’s needs.” In re M.B., 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19,

2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56. Given the evidence presented below, we cannot say that the

juvenile court abused its discretion in weighing this factor in favor of permanent

custody.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶56} Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the juvenile court found that none of the

(E)(7) to (E)(11) factors applied. Thus, there is nothing for us to review in this regard.

       {¶57} Considering the juvenile court’s best-interest findings as a whole, and

reviewing the record in light of Father’s sufficiency and manifest-weight challenges,

we cannot say that the juvenile court lost its way or created a manifest injustice in

finding that permanent custody was in Y.H.’s and B.H.’s best interest.

                                          Conclusion

       {¶58} After reviewing the record in this case, we hold that the juvenile court’s

judgment was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. The juvenile court’s findings awarding permanent custody of

Y.H. and B.H. to HCJFS under R.C. 2151.414(D) and (E) are clearly and convincingly

supported by the record. We accordingly overrule Father’s sole assignment of error

and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and WRINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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