Court Opinion

ID: 9855924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:34:26.16004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:17.780603
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I concur with the majority in holding that the plaintiffs should recover a judgment as a result of Twin Lakes’ breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, but I disagree with that portion of the opinion approving the trial court’s finding that plaintiffs’ mobile home had no value on the date of acceptance.
The evidence established that the plaintiffs have lived in the mobile home continuously since August, 1975. It has passed inspection by county building officials. While it is apparent that the home contains numerous and serious defects, I find the witness Gleaton’s testimony that the home has no value to be utterly incredible.
Gleaton’s testimony, when examined in context, is nothing more than an expression of the value of the mobile home to him. When *476asked if he had determined the value of the mobile home, Gleaton responded:
Well, being able to obtain other mobile homes at dealer cost if somebody had said, Gleaton, I’ll give you this home if you’ll move it out of here, I would have refused it. I put no value on it at all because it’s too slipshod ....
Gleaton’s opinion was not couched in terms of “fair market” value. He failed to employ any of the recognized methods for appraising property, such as comparable sales, the income approach, etc. Instead, he based his opinion on the value of the home to him, a mobile home dealer.
Holz v. Motor Company, 206 Va. 894, 147 S.E.2d 152 (1966), is strikingly similar to the present case. In Holz, the plaintiff testified that a defective automobile which he had driven between 8,000 and 9,000 miles was worthless to him, and we held that this statement did not support a finding that the automobile had no value. “Obviously the automobile had some value, since it had been driven between 8,000 and 9,000 miles during a period of twelve months.” Id. at 897-98, 147 S.E.2d at 155.
A fact finder, whether court or jury, is not bound by the opinions of experts, and where, as here, the opinion is both incredible and based on the wrong legal standard, it should be rejected.
HARRISON and COCHRAN, JJ., join in dissenting and concurring opinion.