Court Opinion

ID: 9848648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:24:21.202882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:33.722337
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority opinion to the extent that I am convinced from the record that the claimant was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of SDCL 9-24-3 because of his incapacity during the major portion of the sixty days during which the statute of limitations under SDCL 9-24-2 was running and I agree that the case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether the notice of November 4, 1974 was given within a reasonable time after the expiration of the period of disability. To arrive at this decision the trial judge will have to keep in mind that the legislature by its enactment determined that sixty days was a reasonable period of time where no incapacity occurred. It would seem to me that an extension of sixty days from the date when the plaintiff’s incapacity concluded would be reasonable.
As to the balance of the opinion however, with respect to the adequacy of the purported notice, the case of Inlagen v. Town of Gary, 1914, 34 S.D. 198, 147 N.W. 965, and Hagberg v. City of Sioux Falls, 1968, D.C.S.D., 281 F.Supp. 460, cited by the plaintiff and mentioned by the majority in their opinion are not authority for the point contended, that is, that actual knowledge would prevent the city from utilizing SDCL 9-24-2. In Inlagen the city had notice by letter from the plaintiff’s attorney which that court held adequate to meet the requirements of the statute which provides for notice from the claimant or his attorney. In Hagberg, claimant had filed a petition for leave to give late notice and the court had entered an order granting him leave.
*690The majority opinion points out the haphazard and fragmentary manner in which the city or any of its various departments or employees had received any kind of notice whatever of the occurrence. It is inconceivable to me that, by any stretch of the imagination, this could begin to comply with the legislative requirements. In fact this is a good example of the reason for the requirements. The citations of statements by counsel for the city conceding that the city had actual notice of the occurrence points out to me that at most they had knowledge of the fact that a swing had broken or become disconnected. As I read the record the plaintiff himself didn’t know within twenty-four hours that he had a potential claim because he didn’t know he was injured.
Going back to the Inlagen case the court there pointed out that the purpose of the notice, as required by statute, is to apprise the municipality of the fact that an accident from which a claim could arise had occurred (emphasis added) so that the officers of such city or town may have an opportunity to investigate the cause of such accident, if any, while the conditions which resulted from such accident are, as nearly as may be, the same as when the accident occurred.
I would further point out that the insurance claims made as mentioned in the majority opinion were for hospitalization insurance coverage which plaintiff carried under the city and for accident insurance coverage which he likewise carried under the city, but nowhere in the record does it show that any claim was made to the city’s liability insurance carrier.
This is not to intimate that I would consider such claim to be in compliance with the statutory requirement. The requirements for notice are entirely within the prerogative of the legislature and so long as the legislature’s scheme meets constitutional requirements it is not up to this court to amend them.