Court Opinion

ID: 9731436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:45:48.998569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.113770
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent.
During the voir dire process, after the trial court had completed its questioning of the venire, the petitioner requested it further to inquire of the panel, whether any member or a close friend or relative, is or has been, a member of the law enforcement community. This question was necessary, he asserted, because, inter alia 1 the omnibus questions, which pertained only to the venirepersons’ perception of their ability to serve as impartial jurors, and not to any specific area or issue potentially productive of bias, were wholly insufficient; they did not identify any area of potential bias, or any other potential cause for disqualification. The trial court declined the petitioner’s invitation to further question the venire. The majority holds, citing judicial efficiency, and, in particular, *56raising the specter of greatly expanded and time consuming voir dire proceedings in criminal cases, see majority opinion at 49-51, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. I do not agree.
I agree completely with the petitioner, “where ‘the sole issue ..is the credibility of [one] police officer as [o]pposed to [the defendant] a voir dire question concerning law enforcement employment or association may well lead to the disqualification for cause of one or more of the prospective jurors.’ ”2 Such an inquiry need not be extensive and, indeed, in this case, the inquiry sought to be made by the petitioner can not fairly be characterized as “extensive and unfocus[ed] questioning.” I also agree that the trial court’s refusal to make the requested inquiry denied the petitioner “the ability to challenge jurors for cause, [and left] the trial judge without *57meaningful information concerning juror bias [and prejudices] on which to act, and [shifted] to the prospective jurors themselves the responsibility for making the ultimate decision as to their ability to serve on the jury.” The Petitioner’s brief at II, citing Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991).
The majority correctly identifies the predominating purpose of the voir dire process: the discovery of whether cause for disqualification, which may involve uncovering bias and/or partiality, exists as to any venireperson. Majority opinion at 4-5. This purpose is, of course, served when “examination of a prospective juror ... is conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of a juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him.” Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 671, 566 A.2d 111, 117 (1989), quoting Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 564, 45 A.2d 340, 343 (1946). The majority and I part company only on the question of whether the inquiry sought to be made in this case was for the purpose of ascertaining “the existence of cause for disqualification and for no other purpose.” McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959), quoting Adams v. State, 200 Md. 133, 140, 88 A.2d 556, 559 (1952).
Unlike the majority, I do not construe Maryland law as requiring that the voir dire inquiry directly establish cause for disqualification. Stated differently, a question on the voir dire may be proper even though an affirmative answer is not automatically disqualifying. That is true whenever the question identifies an area of inquiry, exploration of which reasonably may result in ultimate disqualification. Nor do I read Maryland law to mean that the decision whether disqualifying cause exists is a matter to be determined by the venireperson him or herself, rather than the trial court.
In Bedford, we reviewed the nature of the voir dire examination. 317 Md. at 670, 566 A.2d at 116. We noted the source of the defendant’s right in that regard: Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which guarantees the defendant the right to examine prospective jurors to determine whether cause for disqualification exists. See also Grogg v. State, 231 *58Md. 530, 532, 191 A.2d 435, 436 (1962). We also pointed out that the mechanism by which that right is to be exercised is the voir dire process. Id., quoting Corens, 185 Md. at 564, 45 A.2d at 343. We reiterated the broad rule underlying the voir dire process, that “any circumstances which may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfit for jury service may be made the subject of questions and a challenge for cause.” Bedford 317 Md. at 671, 566 A.2d at 117, quoting Corens, 185 Md. at 564, 45 A.2d at 343. Just how broad and important we perceived the right of inquiry to be was made clear when we quoted from Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 35, 150 A.2d 895, 897-98 (1958 (quoting State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A.2d 152 (1956)):
If there is any likelihood that some prejudices in the jurors’ mind which will even subconsciously affect his decision of the case, the party who may be adversely affected should be permitted questions designed to uncover that prejudice. This is particularly true with reference to the defendant in a criminal case. Otherwise, the right of trial by an impartial jury guaranteed to him ... might well be impaired ...
Thus, it is clear that the defendant may benefit from the benevolent purpose of the voir dire only if the voir dire process permits the development of information relevant to cause for disqualification — only if the defendant is permitted to propound questions to the venire designed to unearth “any circumstances which may reasonably be regarded as rendering a person unfit for jury service.” Corens, 185 Md. at 564, 45 A.2d at 343. A voir dire procedure which depends on the confession of the venirepersons as to their inability impartially to serve is an empty procedure which might well impair the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. Moreover, because the burden is placed on the defendant to demonstrate that a venireperson is biased or partial, the right guaranteed the defendant by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to examine prospective jurors for cause for disqualification is rendered almost, if not entirely, meaningless by such a procedure.
*59Under Maryland law it is clear that the focal point of voir dire is the trial judge. It is the trial judge that has responsibility for regulating and conducting voir dire. It is the trial judge that controls the process; he or she determines: what questions to ask on voir dire; whether, and when, to allow counsel to ask follow-up questions; and whether, and when, a prospective juror is dismissed for cause. It follows, therefore, that it is the trial judge that must decide whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists as to any particular venireperson. Neither the venire nor the individual venirepersons occupies such an important position. The position taken by the majority would imbue the venire with much greater power in the determination of the jury composition than the trial judge. Only if a venireperson were to respond in such a fashion as to make obvious that he or she could not serve impartially and fairly could the trial judge, under the majority’s view, dismiss that juror for cause, and only under those circumstances could the defendant challenge that venireperson for cause. This renders the defendant’s right to challenge for cause unworkable and essentially meaningless.
To be sure, the nature and extent of the voir dire process lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Langley v. State, 281 Md. 337, 341, 378 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1977), quoting McGee v. State, 219 Md. 53, 58-59, 146 A.2d 194, 196 (1959). That discretion is not, however, unlimited. See Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 217 Md. 595, 605, 143 A.2d 627, 631 (1958). Indeed, the majority recognizes that this is so. See majority opinion at 44. Thus, when it is, or potentially is, in the case, the venire must be questioned as to possible racial bias, Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 15, 595 A.2d 448, 455 (1991), religious bias, Casey, 217 Md. at 606-07, 143 A.2d at 632, how the venire would weigh the credibility of a police officer’s testimony versus that of the defendant or another witness, Langley, 281 Md. at 349, 378 A.2d at 1344, and juror attitudes concerning the death penalty, Bowie, 324 Md. at 5, 595 A.2d at 450. These are not the only circumstances, however, in which the failure of the trial court to further inquire may constitute an abuse of discretion. See e.g., Alexander v. R.D. Grier & *60Sons Co. Inc., 181 Md. 415, 419, 30 A.2d 757, 758 (1943). In that case, the trial court’s refusal to ask “whether or not [jurors] or any of their immediate family [were assessables] in the Keystone Indemnity Exchange,” where the issue was the enforcement of an assessment against a subscriber by Keystone, was held to be an abuse of discretion. This Court noted that the question was directed at determining whether any juror was biased or prejudiced: the juror’s financial interest “would theoretically incline him in favor of recovery of a verdict for the liquidator.” Id. at 419, 30 A.2d at 758. See also Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258, 70 S.Ct. 586, 94 L.Ed. 815 (1950) (where panel from which the jury was selected consisted of almost entirely government employees, refusal to allow questions pertaining to possible influence of the federal loyalty oath was error); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 170-172, 70 S.Ct. 519, 523, 94 L.Ed. 734 (1950). Similar reasoning unlay Casey. Explaining why the trial court’s failure to inquire whether anyone in the venire had a religious bias, this Court said
[I]f the religious affiliation of a juror might reasonably prevent him from arriving at a fair and impartial verdict in a particular case because of the nature of the case the parties are entitled to ferret it out, or preferably have the court discover for them, the existence of bias or prejudice resulting from such affiliation. In other words, a party is entitled to a jury free from all disqualifying bias or prejudice without exception, and not merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of a general or abstract nature.”
217 Md. at 607, 143 A.2d at 632.
It is necessary that we focus more critically on the trial court’s exercise of discretion. As we have seen, and the majority does not dispute, it is the trial court that is entrusted with making the decision whether cause for disqualification exists. It is that decision to which the court’s exercise of discretion is directed and which an appellate court must review. The majority recognizes that in attempting to empanel a fair and impartial jury, the critical inquiry is directed *61toward determining the prospective jurors’ state of mind, i.e., whether they are biased or prejudiced. Whether a prospective juror has that mindset may be informed by the vocational or professional or social status of the prospective juror.
While professional, vocational, or social status is not dispositive of a venireperson’s qualification to serve, it does tend to prove bias; that a venireperson has been, or is, a member of the group to which the principal witness for the State belongs is relevant to the determination of that person’s partiality or bias. Thus, the prospective juror’s mindset should not be inquired into in a vacuum; instead, because it is the correlation between the juror’s status and his or her state of mind that is dispositive, as the majority also recognizes, see majority opinion at 46, when the venireperson’s status is relevant to his or her bias, the question whether the venireperson can be fair and impartial should be linked with that venireperson’s status. Therefore, while “[t]he fact that a prospective juror is employed as, related to, or associated with a law enforcement officer[, for example,] does not establish that the prospective juror has any undue bias or prejudice that will prevent that person from fairly and impartially determining the matter before them,”-majority opinion at 45, whether, in a particular case, that venireperson should be discharged as biased necessarily will depend upon the circumstances, including, in addition to the venireperson’s bottom line conclusion in that regard, as reflected in the answers he or she gives, the character and duration of the position, the venireperson’s demeanor, and any and all other relevant circumstances. In short, the trial court, being the proper authority for doing so, will determine from all of the circumstances whether “a demonstrably strong correlation [exists] between the status in question and a mental state that gives rise to cause for disqualification.” Majority Opinion at 45.
It was to allow that correlation to be explored that the petitioner proposed further voir dire. It is because the trial *62court chose not to do so that the trial court erred.3
Obviously prospective jurors may be struck for cause whenever they confess, for whatever reason, an inability to be fair and impartial. Indeed, disqualification ordinarily is automatic when that occurs. But surely that is not the only basis on which venirepersons could be stricken. In a proper case, where there is information from which the contrary could be found, a trial court could, on motion, strike for cause a venireperson who professes to be able to decide the case fairly and impartially. Thus, whatever the prospective juror’s response to the ultimate voir dire question, a prospective juror may, and should be, subject to challenge for cause. See *63Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 855, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 855 (1985), in which the Supreme Court discussed the nature of the trial court’s decision-making when it determines whether to exclude a venireperson for cause. It stated, “[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be discerned from an appellate record.” Although Witt was a capital sentencing case, the Court noted explicitly that “excluding prospective capital sentencing jurors because of their opposition to capital punishment is no different from excluding jurors for innumerable other reasons which result in bias____” Id.
Thus, the strike for cause process encompasses the situation where the motion to strike is made on the basis of information developed during the voir dire process, not simply where the prospective juror admits an inability to be fair and impartial. In point of fact, I maintain that the voir dire process is meaningful only when it is expansive enough to allow a party — be it the State or the defense — to elicit factual information which could form the predicate for a challenge for cause. Unless the voir dire process is interpreted as requiring the trial judge to ask questions that will produce such factual information as may be relevant to the venireperson’s bias, the voir dire process will be rendered all but entirely useless. When the inquiries that constitute proper voir dire are restrictively interpreted, so that the voir dire process does not produce any information other than that which is automatically disqualifying, the defendant may be deprived of the right to a fair and impartial jury; he or she is completely at the mercy of the good faith, objectivity, and astuteness of the individual venirepersons. I believe that it is an abuse of discretion for the court to so restrict the voir dire process.
Under the rationale underlying the majority’s view of voir dire, taken to its logical conclusion, all that would be necessary to empanel a legally sufficient jury is that the trial court ask the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial. Only those jurors who confessed that they could not *64would, or could, be challenged for cause. Because the voir dire has not produced any other information, the others would be absolutely insulated from challenge. The majority’s recognition that, by virtue of our prior holdings and the Supreme Court’s insistence, more than one omnibus question must be asked is not particularly comforting. By requiring that the connection between the cause for disqualification and the answer to the voir dire inquiry be direct, the majority greatly reduces the value of even those required inquiries and, indeed, all but nullifies their value in obtaining information useful as a basis for challenging venirepersons for cause.
The jury selection process in capital cases is instructive. In Bowie, we considered the adequacy of a voir dire examination into juror attitudes concerning the death penalty. The entire voir dire examination on that issue consisted of the following:
Ladies and gentlemen, the State of Maryland has filed a request before the court that if found guilty, Mr. Damon Bowie will be put to death. Is there any member of the prospective jury panel who has any feeling whatsoever about such a request, and I don’t care which way you feel about it, that it would interfere with your ability to fairly and truly judge this matter based only on the evidence before the court?
Said another way, is there anybody in this room who has such feelings about the death penalty one way or the other way that it would affect you emotionally or to the extent that it would override your ability to judge this matter based only on the evidence brought out in the courtroom and the instructions of the court to you and the application of that evidence to the law? If you have a positive response, please stand in place.
324 Md. at 16, 595 A.2d at 455. Jurors who responded affirmatively were excused for cause. Id. The court overruled defendant’s objection to that procedure.
This Court reversed. After reviewing the decisions in Witt, supra; Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, cert. *65denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); and Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990), we explained:
What occurred in the instant case is in no way similar to what occurred in Witt or in our cases applying Witt. In those cases, the basis for the juror’s conclusion and, therefore, for the court’s ruling was apparent in the record. All we have in this case is a trial judge’s propounding of a question designed to elicit from prospective jurors their bottom line conclusion as to their ability to serve on a capital sentencing jury. Once the prospective juror answered that question, i.e., indicated that, because of an inclination for or against the death penalty, they could not impartially apply the law in accordance with the court’s instruction, they were excluded without further inquiry, not even that requested by appellant, because it would have allowed the parties to “argue them out of their responses that they cannot fairly and accurately try this case.”
It is significant that the question asked was extremely broad; not only did it address both sides of the death penalty issue, but the answer to it did not provide any clue as to what caused, or causes, the prospective juror’s predisposition. Moreover, the answer to the question did not reveal whether the attitude thus expressed would, or should, result in automatic disqualification. In other words, the mere answer to the question does not provide the trial judge with any meaningful information concerning juror bias on which to act, nor does it conclusively establish juror disqualification; here, the question gives no clue and, hence, does not make apparent the nature of the juror’s apprehension or bias or indicate that automatic disqualification would be appropriate. Were we to endorse the procedure followed in this case, we would be ratifying a trial court’s shifting to the prospective jurors, themselves, the responsibility to make the ultimate decision as to their ability to serve on a capital sentencing jury, thus, allowing the court to avoid the exercise of discretion.
*66Bowie, 324 Md. at 22-23, 595 A.2d at 459.4
In Bowie, the jurors’ attitude for or against the death penalty was not automatically disqualifying, See Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52; Hunt v. State, 321 Md. at 415, 583 A.2d at 231, just as the questions as to the venire’s status are not disqualifying. Disqualification could occur only after further inquiry into whether that juror’s attitude, whether for or against the death penalty, impaired his or her ability impartially and fairly to decide the case. It is significant that we required a more specific inquiry than that made by the trial court. Implicit in the Borne decision is that, whether for or against the death penalty, the juror’s attitude in that regard is an important factor to be considered by the court when ruling on a motion to strike a death penalty juror for cause.
The voir dire actually conducted in this case is also informative. The trial court asked six questions on voir dire. Of the six, an affirmative answer to only one, namely,
“4) ... whether any of the jurors is “likely to give more or less weight to the testimony of a police officer merely because that person is a police officer,”
Davis v. State, 93 Md.App. 89, 92, 611 A.2d 1008, 1009 (1992), which' directed, and focused, the venire’s attention to a specific, relevant issue in the case, was automatically disqualifying. As to the other five questions, i.e.,
1) ... whether any of the prospective jurors had any knowledge or information about this particular case[;]
*672) ... whether any of the jurors knew a) the [defendant], b) defense counsel, c) the assistant state’s attorney, d) Officer Andrew Bratcher, the chief police investigator and only State’s witness; or e) Mary Easlay, a witness for the . defense[;]
3) ... whether any of the jurors “has been or ... has a close relative who has either been the victim of or has been charged with or convicted of a drug related crime[;]”
5) ... whether any of the jurors “knows of anything that would keep him or her from giving a fair and impartial verdict in this case[;]”
6) ... whether any of the jurors “knows of any reason why he or she should not sit on a jury in this ease[,]”
Davis v. State, 93 Md.App. at 92, 611 A.2d at 1009, an affirmative answer would not be automatically disqualifying. Each merely opened up an area of inquiry which could, but did not have to, disclose disqualifying bias. A prospective juror who' has knowledge of the case on trial, knows either the counsel or the witnesses; is, has been, or is related to a person who has been, the victim of a crime, or knows of anything that would prevent him or her from rendering a fair and impartial verdict, or a reason why he or she should not sit in the case, is not automatically disqualified from serving on the jury. The venireperson’s answer triggers, as occurred in connection with questions 2) and 3), a further inquiry into whether that knowledge would prejudice or bias him or her. To be meaningful the inquiry must, at the very least, identify, as to each prospective juror, the nature and source of the knowledge and its effect on his or her ability to be fair and impartial. The fact that, upon the completion of the inquiry, a prospective juror does not admit bias does not insulate him or her from being discharged for cause; a successful motion nevertheless could be made based on the prospective juror’s responses and demeanor.
Questions 5) and 6) are somewhat different. Initially, it is to be hoped that a Court would not, without further inquiry, excuse a prospective juror who answers these questions in the *68affirmative; follow-up questioning is clearly necessary to establish the bona fides of the reasons the prospective jurors may proffer, a decision entrusted to the court. More to the point, however, those questions are quite general and uninformative insofar as what kinds of considerations could impact a response; they are no more than “broad questions calling for the jurors’ bottom line conclusions, which do not in themselves reveal automatically disqualifying biases as to their ability fairly and accurately to decide the case, and, indeed, which do not elucidate the bases for those conclusions.” Bowie, 324 Md. at 23-24, 595 A.2d at 459. It is improper to assume that the venirepersons could, and, therefore, simply to rely on them to, answer such questions objectively and accurately.
Although not identical, in the case sub judice, a prospective juror’s belief as to whether, given his or her law enforcement background or connection, he or she cannot fairly and impartially decide the case is not conclusive as to that juror’s qualification to serve. While it may be that the defendant will challenge, and the court will order, the discharge of all those prospective jurors who say that they cannot be impartial, the defendant is also entitled to explore whether those with a law enforcement connection or background, who, by their silence, purport to be able to be fair and impartial, ought, nevertheless, be disqualified by reason of bias. So, it is to allow the defendant to challenge for cause prospective jurors who do not admit partiality or bias that prompts a defendant to request that questions pertaining to the jurors’ status be asked.
I do not advocate unlimited voir dire of the kind against which the majority makes such a compelling case. My position simply is that a prospective juror’s status or attitude must be the subject of the voir dire examination when a critical witness in the case occupies that status or has that attitude. In that event, the purpose of the voir dire examination is to identify the prospective jurors with that status or attitude. This may be accomplished by expanding the scope of the voir dire somewhat; rather than the six questions the trial judge asked in this case, it may be necessary to ask an additional *69two or three. Certainly, that is not too high a price to pay to give meaning to a right guaranteed by our Constitution.
I would reverse and remand for new trial.5
ELDRIDGE, J. joins in the views expressed herein.

. The petitioner also argued that expanded voir dire would assist him in the exercise of his peremptories, a purpose he urges this Court now to recognize as legitimate. Maryland law, of course, as the majority points out, is to the contrary. See Whittemore v. State, 151 Md. 309, 134 A. 322 (1926); Handy v. State, 101 Md. 39, 60 A. 452 (1905). In both cases, the issue squarely presented was whether a defendant "may enlighten [himself] as to the propriety of exercising the right of peremptory challenge.” Handy, 101 Md. at 40, 60 A. at 453. See Whittemore, 151 Md. at 313, 134 A. at 323. I do not propose that we revisit this well considered and legitimate policy decision. I note, however, that, to the extent that proper voir dire requires exploration of an area of potential bias, but does not conclusively establish its existence — the court denies the defendant's motion to strike — a fall-out effect of the expanded inquiry is to inform the use of peremptories, not only by a defendant, but by the State, as well. Moreover, that is not necessarily to be frowned upon. Given the disfavor into which the unbridled use of peremptory challenges has fallen, the incidental availability of information which could form the basis for the exercise of peremptory challenges would make more likely that jurors are not stricken for legally impermissible reasons.

. The question at issue in this case is quite different from those sought to be asked in Handy and Whittemore, both of which I believe were correctly decided. In Handy, the defense wanted to know “whether a juror was married,” id., 101 Md. at 44, 60 A. at 454. Quite appropriately, the court held the question to be “clearly immaterial,” given the issue to be decided — whether the victim’s flirting with other men was sufficient to provoke her murder at the hands of her husband, the defendant. We explained:
"[N]either in law nor in common sense can it be supposed that competency to judge of the effect of such provocation is found exclusively in married men, and if we indulge in speculation as to the reason behind this question, imagination can suggest none moré substantial than we have hazarded.”

Id.

In Whittemore, the question concerned the prospective juror's age and former business. In affirming the trial court's refusal to ask that question, the Court said:
The appellant here suggests, by way of illustrating the need of freedom to ask questions as to a juryman’s former occupation, that, in this instance, conceivably, he too may have been a former penitentiary guard, and because of that fact unfitted to render an impartial verdict on a charge of murder of a guard by a prisoner. But the answer to that suggestion is that if such ground for doubting a juryman’s fitness should be known, or feared, a question directed to that ground specifically would not only be proper, but in this case would probably have been asked; and if facts showed reason to doubt the juror’s fitness to sit in judgment, a challenge for cause might have been allowed.
151 Md. at 314 — 15, 134 A. at 323-324 (emphasis supplied).

. It may be that a motion to strike for cause may be appropriate even when the only available information is that the venireperson is, or is related to, a police officer. See Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665 (1952) (constitutional guarantee that law enforcement personnel are not qualified to sit as jurors precluded a special deputy sheriff from appearing as a witness at the defendant’s trial for the murder of her former husband, it being presumed that deputy would clearly show allegiance to his superior who was the sheriff and the prosecutor); Gaff v. State, 155 Ind. 277, 58 N.E. 74 (1900) (deputy sheriff constitutionally cannot serve on a jury); State v. Butts, 349 Mo. 213, 159 S.W.2d 790 (1942) (it was error for the trial judge to overrule defendant’s challenge for cause against a police officer who had investigated the crime and subsequently arrested the defendant. The court said “It seems incompatible with justice that a defendant who has been apprehended by the police, and against whom the police officers were going to testify should be tried by a jury made up of police officers.”) State v. Golubski, 45 S.W.2d 873 (Mo.1932) (State statute exempting deputy sheriff's from jury service is legislative recognition of the impropriety of officers acting as jurors in cases wherein they might be called upon to perform other and inconsistent duties); State v. Langley, 342 Mo. 447, 116 S.W.2d 38 (Mo.1938) (defendant’s statutory rape conviction was reversed where the State constitution guaranteed the defendant the right to an impartial jury thereby disqualifying a law enforcement officer from sitting on the jury panel); Thompson v. State, 541 P.2d 1328 (Okla.1975) (law enforcement personnel cannot sit as jurors where statutes specifically disqualify them from jury service); State v. West, 157 W.Va. 209, 200 S.E.2d 859 (1973) (a defendant’s challenge for cause should be sustained when he can demonstrate even a tenuous relationship between the prospective juror and any law enforcement or prosecutorial arm of State government). In this case, because the court did not ask the proffered question, the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to move to strike for cause any prospective juror with a connection to law enforcement.

. We said in Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 24, n. 10, 595 A.2d 448, 459 n. 10 (1991), that a different situation applies in non-capital cases. That may be true when the prospective juror’s attention is focused by . reference to a specific disqualifying cause, i.e., as when the inquiry is whether a juror would give more or less weight to a police officer simply because of his or her status. On the other hand, the question whether the “juror” knows of any reason why he or she should not sit on the jury in this case and whether he or she "knows of anything that would keep him or her from giving a fair and impartial verdict in this case” are not proper bottom line conclusion questions inasmuch as they, like the question at issue in Bowie, leaves to the juror, and only the juror, the decision whether he or she is disqualified.

. By stressing that it would not have been error had the court asked the subject question, like Judge McAuliffe, the majority seems to be sending a message to trial judges that they should not curtail voir dire too strictly, thus muting the impact of its ruling. Implicitly therefore, the majority recognizes that the inquiry is not totally irrelevant to the exercise of the right to challenge for cause. In any event, this same message has been delivered to trial judges in the past. In fact, in both Handy and Whittemore, the Court noted the trial court's discretion to have asked the excluded question. See Handy, 101 Md. at 42-43, 60 A. at 454; Whittemore, 151 Md. at 313, 134 A. at 323. Nevertheless, voir dire continues to be limited more and more. There is no reason to suppose that "the message” will have any greater effect this time in causing trial judges to exercise their discretion more expansively than it has had in the past.