Court Opinion

ID: 9849575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:42:47.15107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.254942
License: Public Domain

Feomme, J.,
dissenting: As I view the majority opinion it holds that eligibility for unemployment compensation depends upon terms, such as “leave of absence”, used in a labor-management contract, at least that is the method used in the opinion to justify the decision reached. In the future this court will be asked to construe each labor-management contract applicable to -the period for which compensation is claimed to see if an employee is “laid-oif” or on a voluntary “leave of absence”. This will create an intolerable situation for the Employment Security Division as well as this court.
For instance the labor-management contract in the present case provided:
“(5) Employees who may have taken their vacations earlier in the year due to emergency or for exceptional valid reasons and employees who are ineligible for vacations during the shutdown periods will be considered on layoff if no work is made available to them.”
Under this paragraph the employer determines what vacations are taken earlier in the year due to emergency or for exceptional valid reasons and based upon the employer’s determination the vacation shutdown will entitle certain employees to be considered “on layoff”. The use of the term “layoff” under such circumstances cannot bind the employment compensation division to pay compensation unless the employees qualify under the act. The majority opinion indicates that if this portion of the contract is later changed at the bargaining table to read “leave of absence” that eligibility would then be denied. If we permit this, the company’s success at the bargaining table may in the future wholly exclude an employee from benefits under the act, and the union’s success at the bargaining table would have the opposite result. In such case the employee is left at the mercy of the union and management negotiations over which he has little control, except for one small vote.
The Employment Security Law is complete in itself. Compensation for unemployment provided by the act depends upon the specific provisions of the act. The labor-management contract should have no controlling effect upon payment of compensation. The majority opinion construes the use of the term “leave of absence” used in the contract and denies compensation to these *289claimants. The act itself provides that no agreement to waive, release or commute rights to benefits is valid. (K. S. A. 44-718)
This court should not permit the results reached by labor and management at the bargaining table to affect the statutory provisions of the employment security act. It is of no significance what terms the parties use at the bargaining table when they refer to the status of an employee during a plant shutdown. The terms “leave of absence” or “layoff” are not used in the employment security act and have no controlling effect upon eligibility for compensation.
An Ohio court, in reaching an opposite conclusion to what will now be the law of Kansas, expresses my reaction to the reasoning adopted by the majority. In Dahman v. Commercial Shearing & Stamping Co., 13 O. O. (2d) 368, 170 N. E. 2d 302, that court said:
“. . . Playing with phrases like ‘vacation without pay’ or “leave of absence’ stems from a want of better terms to avoid the words ‘laid-off’. . . .” (p. 369)
The majority opinion admits “in a literal sense” that the statutory conditions exist which render these employees unemployed. As to these employees the plant was shut down. There was no work available to them during these periods. They drew no wages and no vacation pay was attributable to them for these periods. They were unemployed as that word is defined by the act and by our previous case law.
The majority opinion turns on a finding that the unemployment resulted from a voluntary leave of absence because of the labor-management contract.
In the present case the union neither sought nor obtained the provision in the contract which permits the company to shut down the plant. The shutdown was for the company’s benefit in scheduling vacations. The company agrees that these employees were not required to schedule vacations during these particular periods and that vacation pay was not attributable to the employee during these periods. To say that these men were unavailable for work or that they were unemployed of their own volition overlooks the fact that there was no work available for them at the plant. (See Combustion Engineering, Inc., v. O’Connor, [Mo. App.] 395 S. W. 2d 528.)
The employment security act seeks to avert the hardships arising from a plant shutdown on those who have no work, no wages and *290no vacation pay fox- the shutdown period. These employees had their vacation pay tied to another period when they would not work and would draw no wages. If a vacation was deferred the vacation pay was likewise deferred.
Our employment security act specifies those periods of unemployment when an employee is disqualified for benefits. (K. S. A. 44-706) An employee is disqualified for benefits when the plant shutdown arises from a labor dispute. Various other specific disqualifications are built into the act. There is no disqualification for benefits during a plant shutdown because of vacations. Any change in the act should be left to the legislatxxre.
The courts are divided on the question we are deciding here. The modem trend of authorities, in my opinion, upholds eligibility when the shutdown is for the benefit of the employer and when vacation pay is not made attributable to the period of shutdown. (See Dudley, Admr., v. Morris, 10 Ohio St. 2d 235, 227 N. E. 2d 231; Combustion Engineering, Inc., v. O’Connor, supra; Texas Emp. Com. v. Huey, 161 Tex. 500, 342 S. W. 2d 544; Ungarean Unempl. Compensation Case., 207 Pa. Super. 506, 218 A. 2d 847.)
See also 30 A. L. R. 2d 366.
The Supreme Court of Texas in the Huey case collected decisions from other states on both sides of this question and then made this observation:
“In four of the states whose courts had held the claimants not entitled to benefits, the legislatures have amended their laws to make them eligible. That occurred in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Washington.” (161 Tex. 500, p. 508)
The majority opinion gives lip service to our rule that an eligible individual claiming benefits for unemployment under the employment security law is entitled to a liberal interpretation of the law, and the Pickman, Southwestern Bell and Erickson cases are cited. However, the rule was not applied.
In the past this court has consistently held the findings and conclusions of the board of review are conclusive in the absence of fraud if supported by substantial evidence, and the jurisdiction of this court is limited to questions of law. (Boeing Co. v. Kansas Employment Security Board of Review, 193 Kan. 287, 392 P. 2d 904.)
What question of law does the present reversal rest upon?
*291I find no case in which the findings and conclusions of the board of review have been overturned by this court.
In the present case this court has substituted its judgment for the judgment of the examiner, the referee, the board of review and the district court, and has done so by construing the term “leave of absence” as contained in the labor-management contract in such a way as to deny eligibility to the employee.
These employees were unemployed within the specific provisions of the act. The Employment Security Division has consistently interpreted the act to authorize eligibility in this situation since June 1963, when the contract first contained these vacation shutdown provisions.
The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.