Court Opinion

ID: 9735194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:04:55.527072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.947906
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s determination that it was reasonable for the police officers to stop defendant based on the appearance of a red dot of light traveling across their field of vision. Officers must have a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person . . . has committed or is about to commit a crime” to make a limited investigatory seizure under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See State v. Hollister, 165 Vt. 553, 553, 679 A.2d 883, 884 (1996) (mem.). In evaluating whether officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion, we look at “the totality of the circumstances.” See State v. Crandall, 162 Vt. 66, 70, 644 A.2d 320, 323 (1994). Taking the totality of circumstances into account here, I cannot find that the officers’ suspicion that defendant’s passenger was intentionally pointing a laser-sighted firearm at them was reasonable.
The officers were stopped at a red light, and defendant drove his car across the intersection under a green fight. Officer Blake testified that a small red fight flashed across the windshield and the officer’s face. Blake mentioned it to Officer Dumas, who said he had seen the same thing. While they had this discussion, defendant’s car continued across the intersection and down the road, away from the officers’ car. The officers then decided to follow the car, turned the corner after it, and activated their fights. They pulled the car over about a quarter-mile past the intersection. The State suggests that the officers could have suspected a number of crimes, including 13 V.S.A. § 4011 (aiming gun at another), or 13 V.S.A. § 1025 (recklessly endangering another person) (presumption of recklessness and danger exists *301where a person “knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another”). Both of these crimes require an element of intent implausible in these circumstances.
In making this stop, the officers leapt to a number of conclusions. First, they assumed that the red light was a laser-sight on a firearm, despite the fact that Officer Blake admitted being aware that laser pointers are widely available and used as everything from a business accessory to a toy. Next, they assumed that the chance encounter at the intersection somehow prompted defendant intentionally to aim a firearm at their car. Then, they must have assumed that the red light that flashed over their car was aimed precisely at their bodies, inside the darkened car (since the crimes alleged to have been suspected require the intentional direction of- a firearm or other threat at a person). And despite the fact that the car continued down the road and away from them, the officers must have assumed that the occupants of that car had intentionally aimed a gun at them and then immediately grown disinterested and drove away.
While it might be reasonable to assume a small red light could be a laser-sight on a firearm, all the other circumstances of the incident fail to support such an assumption. The car was operated normally; it was a momentary, chance encounter at an intersection; and the occupants, which these officers thought posed such a threat to their safety, drove through the intersection and away from the police car, evidencing no interest in it at all. The State relies on State V. Santacruz-Betancourt, 969 P.2d 1040 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 987 P.2d 513 (Or. 1999). There, the defendant aimed a laser beam inside a house, first at the forehead of an elderly man and then at the forehead of an elderly woman. The defendant’s car was seen outside the house at the time by a person in the kitchen with the elderly couple. The trial court suppressed the stop and the appellate court reversed. According to the appellate court, the suspicion was reasonable under those circumstances. See id. at 1043.
This case is unlike Santacruz-Betancourt for two reasons, as the district court noted. First, the beam in this case was never pointed at a person, let alone a person’s head and second, the fact that the vehicle moved through the light and was proceeding down the road, away from the police, is wholly inconsistent with the actions of a person attempting to point a firearm at someone else. In this situation, I think it was unreasonable for the officers to stop the car and, therefore, the court’s ruling should be affirmed. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins in this dissent.