Court Opinion

ID: 9693471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:43:41.249147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:47.348569
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.,

dissenting:

Unemployment compensation was intended to be exactly what its name implies, insurance against the economic hardship and misfortune of unemployment. Contrary to popular belief, employees pay no part of the cost of operation of that system. It is the employers of this country who bear its full burden. Many small employers resent the substantial financial load they are obliged to carry without any of their employees ever having sought or needed unemployment insurance benefits. When striking individuals are paid from *531this Fund as in this situation, the financial burden of all employers is increased. Employers are in effect subsidizing strikes.
It is obvious to me that it was in the context of protection against unemployment by virtue of economic circumstances that this statute was enacted which makes an individual ineligible for benefits when the reason he is not working is his participation in a strike. A person who is not working because of a strike called by his union is not out of work because of economic conditions. His employer should not be expected to insure the worker against the worker’s going out on strike.
I note that the majority states:
"Even without the compelling weight of English and American precedents, we are convinced that the phrase 'stoppage of work’ in § 6 (e) refers to the curtailment of the employer’s operations. To interpret 'stoppage of work’ as cessation of work by the individual employee would make the phrase practically synonymous with 'unemployment’ as used in the same sentence. Unemployment always involves a 'stoppage of work’ by the employee. Only when 'stoppage of work’ is construed to refer to the curtailment of the employer’s operations does it acquire a meaning consonant with its usage in statutes similar to § 6 (e).”
I see nothing wrong with the language of § 6 (e) as I would interpret it. I believe it was enacted to make clear the legislative intent.
I do not believe, as the majority states, that "BFI’s argument would render the 'voluntarily leaving work’ provision of § 6 (a) superfluous.” There is a need for that provision to protect the Fund from claims of employees who leave their jobs of their own free will and accord but who are not out on strike.
I note that the weight of authority is contrary to the position I take. I am not obliged, however, to follow the weight *532of authority when I know it to be patently in error. If the weight of authority were that the sun rises in the west or that the outgoing tide of the Chesapeake Bay flows to the north, I certainly would not follow it. There is much to be said for comity, but it has no place when the majority view is plainly wrong as in this case. Moreover, I suspect that the employees involved here know in their hearts that the decision of the judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County holding them disqualified was absolutely right because they did not appeal despite the fact that they undoubtedly had counsel through their union available to them for such purpose. The appeal is brought through the action of the Attorney General of Maryland.
These people were no more unemployed in the common meaning of the term as the public understands it than am I. Hence, they should be denied benefits. I would affirm.