Court Opinion

ID: 9439972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 07:03:38.929286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:52.477505
License: Public Domain

STAHL, Circuit Judge.
Following the 1996 presidential election, Maine’s Secretary of State informed plaintiff-appellant Maine Green Party that it was disqualified from official party status because its presidential nominee, Ralph Nader, had failed to receive at least 5% of the Maine presidential vote. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 301(1)(C) (1992) (requiring, inter alia, previously-qualified parties1 to receive at least 5% of the presidential vote in presidential election years and at least 5% of the gubernatorial vote in gubernatorial election years to retain official party *2status). Plaintiff subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action claiming, insofar as is here relevant, that § 301(l)(C)’s presidential vote requirement violates plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it effectively prohibits the formation of new political parties that lack national organizations. In due course, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
As developed in its summary judgment papers, plaintiffs argument was a tripartite syllogism: (1) “the backing of a nationally known and reasonably capable national party is essential for a presidential candidate of a state party if he or she is to have credibility with the voters in that state,” Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for Summary Judgment with Incorporated Memorandum of Law at 7; (2) Maine’s presidential vote requirement has the practical effect of “prohibiting] the formation of third parties from within the State of Maine that have no national organization[s],” id. at 10, and (3) the presidential vote requirement thus forecloses the development of new political parties in Maine, as new parties will almost inevitably lack national organizations, see id. In presenting this argument, plaintiff also asserted that it had had no intention of fielding a candidate for the 1996 presidential election; it had only done so after learning that it faced disqualification and in the hope that Mr. Nader would receive enough of the vote to obviate the need for this litigation.
The district court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Cohen for a report and recommendation. Magistrate Judge Cohen recommended that summary judgment be entered for the State and against plaintiff. He initially questioned the foundational premise of plaintiffs argument, reasoning that “it is possible that Maine voters who care enough about the official status of a new political party would be willing to vote for that party’s presidential candidate even if that candidate cannot win because he or she lacks a national organization or presence.” Maine Green Party v. Secretary of State, Civil No. 96-261-B-C, Recommended Decision on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 12 (D. Me. filed Dec. 24, 1997). In any event, he concluded that the presidential vote requirement was insufficiently burdensome to warrant strict scrutiny, see id. at 12-14 (applying Supreme Court and First Circuit case law), suggesting that “the restriction at issue here in no ’ way regulates the organization and development of political parties,” id. at 14-15. In declining to apply strict scrutiny, Magistrate Judge Cohen contrasted § 301(1)(C) with statutes prohibiting the governing bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in their parties’ primaries, see Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S. 214, 222-33, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (striking down such a statute), and with statutes prohibiting political parties from allowing independent voters to participate in then- primaries, see Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 213-25, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (similar). Applying the more lenient rational basis review, Magistrate Judge Cohen concluded that § 301(1)(C) passed constitutional muster with room to spare. See Maine Green Party, Recommended Decision at 14-16.
Apparently after having secured new counsel, plaintiff objected to the report and recommendation.2 But its objection set forth an additional argument not urged in the summary judgment papers: that it would be unconstitutional to apply § 301(1)(C) to a party, like itself, which *3chooses to organize solely on the state and local level. We pause here to emphasize this shift in plaintiffs position. Prior to filing its objection to the report and recommendation, the thrust of plaintiffs argument, as we have said, was that it would be unconstitutional to apply § 301(l)(C)’s presidential vote requirement to a new party, like itself, that lacked the resources to support a national organization. In contrast, plaintiffs objection for the first time suggested that plaintiffs lack of a national organization was instead an outgrowth of the party’s philosophical commitment to operate only on the state and local level. The district court, facing time constraints related to the then-upcoming 1998 primary elections, accepted the magistrate judge’s recommended disposition without commenting upon the new twist put on plaintiffs argument by plaintiffs new counsel, or even indicating whether it had given the argument plenary consideration.3
On appeal, plaintiff has effectively elected to develop and press only the argument that application to it of § 301(l)(C)’s presidential vote requirement unconstitutionally interferes with one of its associational first principles: to remain a solely local party. By way of elaborating this position, plaintiff further asserts before us that it has “a constitutional right to choose not to run candidates for president at all.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. The State, though apparently perceiving plaintiffs argumentative shift, has not presented us with a developed responsive argument; it has merely sought to distinguish Eu and Task-jian, and it has made little mention of plaintiffs asserted right not to run presidential candidates.
The distinction between the position taken by plaintiff at the summary judgment stage and the position taken by plaintiff on appeal strikes us as potentially crucial. If, on the one hand, plaintiff was unable to field a viable presidential candidate because it was new and therefore lacked the support and resources to implement a national organization, we could, at the very least, rest assured that § 301(1)(C) was operating within contemplated circumstances. The statute plainly was intended to assure that official parties be sufficiently supported. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (“[Tjhere is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization’s candidate on the ballot.”); see also Libertarian Party of Maine v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365, 371-72 (1st Cir.1993) (state may properly require a political party to demonstrate continued “substantial support” among the electorate as a condition of official party status). Use of the presidential vote requirement to exclude from the ballot a party formed on a more traditional model (i.e., one that intends, at least at some point in time, to nominate candidates for all elective offices voted on within a state) but insufficiently developed at the present time to nominate a minimally viable presidential candidate would seem consonant with the statute’s purpose.
If, on the other hand, plaintiffs lack of a national organization (and concomitant decision not to nominate presidential candidates) stemmed from a philosophical commitment to devote itself solely to issues with direct bearing on Maine or to nominate only candidates who could be elected to office by the Maine electorate, matters might be different. Forcing such a party to field a presidential candidate might well be regarded as a direct infringement of the party’s core protected activity — an infringement that is, under relevant precedent, to be skeptically scrutinized. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 230, 109 S.Ct. 1013 (treating as core protected activity political party’s “discretion in how to organize itself, *4conduct its affairs, and select its leaders”); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224, 107 S.Ct. 544 (Constitution protects a party’s “determination ... of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political goals”).
We come, then, to our fundamental problem: the argument plaintiff presses on appeal was not timely asserted in the district court, see Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (“The district court is under no obligation to discover or articulate new legal theories for a party challenging a report and recommendation issued by a magistrate judge.”); Paterson-Leitch Co., Inc. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990 (1st Cir.1988) (similar); Borden v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (“Appellant was entitled to a de novo review by the district court of the [magistrate judge’s] recommendations to which he objected, however he was not entitled to a de novo review of an argument never raised.”) (citation omitted)4, yet the argument made to the magistrate judge is not here renewed, at least not in a developed fashion.5
Under the circumstances, we think the prudent course is to affirm the judgment of the district court without passing on the merits of plaintiffs appellate argument. Although the district court’s boilerplate af-firmance of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation does not explicitly indicate that it rejected plaintiffs “new” argument on grounds of waiver (as it would have been within its rights to do, see Santiago, 138 F.3d at 4; Paterson-Leitch, 840 F.2d at 990-91; Borden, 836 F.2d at 6), we think it doubtful that the court gave the argument plenary consideration, given its silence on the matter and plaintiffs utter lack of explanation for (indeed, acknowledgment of) not having advanced the argument earlier. Moreover, we have considerable doubt as to whether the summary judgment record even supports plaintiffs new position; despite a number of affidavits which stated that plaintiff was formed to participate in state and local political activities, plaintiff also filed an affidavit making clear that, during the 1996-97 time frame, a number of plaintiffs founding members were taking steps towards forming a national Green party. See Declara*5tion of Nancy Allen at ¶¶ 8-9. We thus believe that a remand for purposes of clarification would be an exercise in empty formalism.
Moreover, a number of the minimalist principles underlying our waiver rules support avoidance of a merits ruling in this case. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term — Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L.Rev. 4, 6-8 (1996) (summarizing the jurisprudential underpinnings of the presumption towards decisional minimalism) (hereafter “Sun-stein”). Our resolution not only avoids an unnecessary constitutional decision, see, e.g., Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984), but it leaves undecided the constitutionality of an application of a state statute in circumstances that may well be beyond the statute’s contemplation and ivhere we are not even certain that the State would apply it. With respect to whether these circumstances are within the statute’s contemplation, we note that the statute appears to proceed from the assumption that political parties will wish to nominate presidential candidates; we have before us no evidence of a legislative intent to keep off the ballot well-supported parties that are philosophically opposed to participating in presidential politics. Cf. Sunstein, 110 Harv. L.Rev. at 7 (noting a presumption against deciding and implementing a statute’s hypothetical purposes). And with respect to whether the State would even apply the statute to a solely local party, we note an absence of evidence that plaintiff ever informed the State prior to its objection to the report and recommendation that it was committed to being a solely local party, or that its local character implied a commitment to abstain from nominating presidential candidates. Cf. id. (courts should strive to avoid rulings in areas not “ripe” for decision or where their decisions may well be advisory in fact).
In addition, our resolution avoids a merits ruling where there has been no real adverse argumentation of the point in question. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Sound judicial decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense’ of the issues in dispute ... and a constitutional rule announced sua sponte is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.”) (citation omitted). And it does so where the costs of an erroneous ruling (a strong possibility given the lack of adverse argumentation and relevant record development) could be very high for states and for developing political parties. See Sunstein, 110 Harv. L.Rev. at 18-19.
Before concluding, we respond to one other point made in Judge Campbell’s opinion concurring in the judgment. Although we already have explained our disagreement with Judge Campbell that the argument made in the summary judgment papers and the argument made on appeal are essentially the same, and/or that the argument made on appeal was subsumed within the argument made at summary judgment, see supra at 6-7, we think it important to emphasize that this is a qualitatively different situation from one where a claim made below — for example, a claim that a search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — is amplified by appellate counsel with, for example, novel policy arguments never presented to the district court. The present situation involves a material shift in a factual position taken by plaintiff as to why it had no national organization in 1996; it is tantamount to a plaintiff arguing “I was fired because my boss didn’t like me” below and then arguing “I was fired because my boss doesn’t like elderly workers such as me” on appeal. We think it clear that our waiver rules ought to preclude such a shift.
Affirmed. No costs.

. Under 21-A M.R.S.A. § 302(1), a party can qualify to appear on the ballot by forming around a non-party candidate for governor or president who was nominated by petition and who received 5% of the total vote in the preceding gubernatorial or presidential election, provided the candidate consents to the formation of the party around him or her. In 1994, Jonathan Carter, a registered Maine voter not enrolled in any party and nominated by petition, received 6.4% of the 1994 Maine gubernatorial vote. Subsequently, Mr. Carter consented to plaintiff qualifying as an official party "on his coattails” pursuant to § 302(1).

. Paul Manetti, Esq., filed the complaint and wrote plaintiff's summary judgment papers. Gary Sinawski, Esq., plaintiff’s appellate counsel, authored the objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. The docket reflects, however, that neither Mr. Sinawksi nor his local counsel, Toby Hollander, Esq., entered an appearance in the lower court.

. The order affirming the recommended decision of the magistrate judge merely stated that the court had made “a de novo determination of all matters adjudicated by the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision.”

. As Judge Campbell suggests, there is a citation to Eu and Tashjian in the summary judgment papers which, when read out of context and back through the lens of plaintiff's appellate argument, might be taken to have hinted at, or at least presaged, the appellate argument. Yet our careful review of the record has persuaded us that plaintiff's appellate argument was only sufficiently developed in plaintiff's objection to the report and recommendation. In so ruling, we point out that plaintiff never sought to notify the magistrate judge that the State had misunderstood its position, even though the State’s summary judgment motion and opposition to plaintiff’s summary judgment motion quite clearly understood plaintiff only to be arguing that its lack of a national organization was a result of its newness as a party. Nor did plaintiff either file a motion for reconsideration informing the magistrate judge that he had misunderstood its position (the magistrate judge clearly shared the State’s understanding of plaintiff's position) or suggest to the district court in the objection to the report and recommendation that the magistrate judge had misunderstood its position.

. Again, although a few sentences of plaintiff's appellate brief track points made by plaintiff in its summary judgment papers, plaintiff has presented us with neither a developed account of how the statute undermines the constitutional rights of new parties formed on the traditional model nor an explicit assessment of where the magistrate judge went wrong. Moreover, in summarizing and then introducing its appellate argument, plaintiff advertises itself as arguing only that § 301(l)(C)’s presidential vote requirement, when applied to a party, like itself, that has chosen to remain solely local, runs afoul of the Constitution. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-13 (emphasizing that plaintiff is not claiming "that Maine’s election law is inhospitable to minor parties by itself,” but only that § 301(l)(C)'s presidential vote requirement is unconstitutional "as applied to plaintiff,” which has "a constitutional right to organize itself solely on the local level”); see also Appellant's Reply Brief at 1 (asserting that plaintiff's appellate "argument” (plaintiff uses the singular) was not addressed by the State in its brief).