Court Opinion

ID: 9733078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:52:51.438673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.247110
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting.
This court has held that evidence which tends to impeach a witness for the State in a criminal prosecution is ordinarily admissible to discredit the witness and the weight to be given to his testimony. State v. Matejka, 186 Neb. 454, 183 N.W.2d 917 (1971).
The U.S. Supreme Court, after holding that to be denied the right to effective cross-examination is “ ‘constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of *465prejudice would cure it,’ ” Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1966), backed away from that position 2 decades later and held that
[a] constitutionally improper denial of [an accused’s] opportunity to impeach a witness for bias [is not grounds for automatic reversal of a conviction but] is subject to ... harmless-error analysis. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986).
While Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1989) does provide, inter alia, that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for confusion of the issues or for misleading the jury, the fact that a jury may be confused by presented evidence does not, in and of itself, justify exclusion of the evidence — and certainly not when presented by way of cross-examination of witnesses on the issue of defendant identification and the compromise in perceptual accuracy which may have resulted from an intervening traumatic event.
Evidence exists to support the notion that the subsequent robbery was a traumatic event, and the effect on previous memory was a relevant and crucial inquiry. When .the issue before the trial court is whether to allow the' defense to cross-examine on issues of identification and perceptual abilities, the court should be encouraged to allow such examination rather than unduly restrict it.
I cannot agree with the majority position that the exclusion of the testimony concerning the subsequent robbery was harmless error. I believe that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to allow the defense to cross-examine the witness on the second robbery and its impact on the witness’ perceptions, and thus would hold that reversal and remand of the cause would be the appropriate remedy. I respectfully dissent.
. Caporale, J., joins in this dissent.