Court Opinion

ID: 5435045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-08 17:52:18.126478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:47.314764
License: Public Domain

Cope, J. delivered the opinion of the Court
Field, C. J. and Norton, J. concurring.
Covillaud and Eye purchased of one Burlingame a lot with the improvements thereon in the city of Marysville, and as a part of the consideration assumed the payment of a mortgage upon the property, in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of §6,000. Eye conveyed his interest in the property to Covillaud, and the latter arranged with the plaintiff for a release of his mortgage, agreeing to pay him the sum of §8,000, in two installments of §4,000 each, and to secure the payment by a mortgage on the same property. This arrangement was carried out by the execution of the notes and mortgage as agreed on, and the release of the original mortgage, but as the debt and interest due from Burlingame amounted to more than the sum for which the notes were given, the note of Burlingame was retained by the plaintiff. The amount of the Covillaud notes was credited upon it, and a suit brought against Burlingame for the balance, and a judgment recovered, and the present action is against Covillaud and Eye upon their agreement to pay off the original mortgage. The action is based upon that agreement, and upon a written assignment frofn Burlingame to the plaintiff of his cause of action against Covillaud and Eye, including his lien as vendor, and the plaintiff asks a judgment for the amount claimed, and a decree enforcing the lien. The case comes up on appeal from an order refusing a new trial, and from a judgment granting the relief asked, and various objections are urged as grounds of reversal.
*189It is objected that the agreement sued on does not bind Covillaud and Rye for the payment of the mortgage debt, and that it only amounted to an undertaking on their part to obtain a discharge of the mortgage as a lien upon the property. The intention obviously was to assume the payment of the debt, and any other construction would be inconsistent with the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into, and could not be maintained even upon the strictest interpretation of the language used. It would be absurd to hold, that an agreement to pay a mortgage is complied with by procuring a discharge of the mortgage, leaving the debt unsatisfied; and particularly where the person agreeing to pay receives the amount of the mortgage debt as the consideration for the agreement. It is clear that the objection taken cannot be sustained, and that Covillaud and Rye in assuming the payment of the mortgage, retaining for that purpose the amount of the mortgage debt, assumed and intended to assume the payment of the debt.
It is objected further, that the plaintiff cannot sue upon the agreement for want of privity, and the case of McLaren v. Hutchinson (18 Cal. 80) is relied upon in support of the objection. In that case the suit was upon an agreement made by the defendant with a third person to pay a debt owing by the latter to the plaintiff, and we held that as the plaintiff was not a party to the agreement the action could not be maintained. The decision was placed upon the ground that there was no privity, but since the case was decided the matter has frequently been called to our attention, and we are by no means satisfied with the rule laid down. The agreement was founded upon a sufficient consideration, and the modern doctrine in such cases seems to be in favor of the maintenance of the action, and we are inclined to hold the question open for further investigation. It is unnecessary to pass upon it in this case, as the assignment of the cause of action enables the plaintiff to sue as the assignee of Burlingame, and in any event the point raised is untenable. It is claimed with reference to the lien, however, that it was not assignable, being a mere personal equity in the vendor, and not transferable by him to another. This point is covered by the decision just rendered in the case of Baum v. Grigsby, and under the rule there laid down the objection is well taken.
*190The more important question in the case arises upon the arrangement between Covillaud and the plaintiff, this arrangement being pleaded in discharge and satisfaction of the original debt. The question, of course, is one of intention, and being purely a question of fact, we cannot interfere with the decision of the Court below, unless there is a want of evidence to sustain it, and the conclusion drawn is legally erroneous. The Court finds that the parties did not intend by the arrangement to extinguish the debt, and concludes that the effect was to release the mortgage and to pay the debt to the extent of $8,000. If the finding is correct, the conclusion can hardly be complained of, and to sustain the finding the plaintiff relies upon the fact that the note was not surrendered with the mortgage, and upon the language used in discharging the latter as a lien. The words are, “ satisfied by being released,” and it is claimed that these words imply the existence of a debt, and show that the intention was to discharge the lien, and hold the debt as a personal obligation. There is some plausibility in this view, and taking the circumstances together, we are of opinion that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding, or at least to render interference on our part improper. We cannot consider the matter as an original question, for to do so would be to throw off our distinctive character as an appellate Court, and assume powers which the Constitution and laws have vested elsewhere. It is possible that upon the weight of evidence we should have arrived at a conclusion different from that of the Court below, but the question for us is, whether the finding is so plainly contrary to the evidence as to raise necessarily the inference of error. So far as mere opinion is concerned the finding is conclusive, and it is clear that upon the evidence before us we cannot interfere without overstepping the bounds of our legitimate authoriiy. There are undoubtedly some embarrassing circumstances in the case, and it may be that due weight and proper consideration Avere not given to these circumstances, and that the finding is not in accordance vnth the intention of the parties. If so, it is unfortunate that relief cannot be administered, but it is one of those misfortunes for which no remedy seems to exist, for we cannot set aside the decision of the Court below upon a difference of opinion as to the Aveight of evidence. *191The rule is well settled that where the evidence is conflicting, or where the conclusion drawn from it is not necessarily erroneous in point of law, the decision cannot be disturbed.
Our conclusion is, that as to the lien the judgment should be reversed, but that in other respects it should be affirmed.
Ordered accordingly.