Court Opinion

ID: 9885145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:32:52.281979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:44.592388
License: Public Domain

GAUT, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s opinion on all of the issues raised with the exception of its conclusion there was sufficient evidence to support the Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) enhancement alleging defendant was personally armed with a firearm during the commission of the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine.
Defendant was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing analogs with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and possessing *1576methamphetamine for sale. He was also found guilty of being personally armed with a firearm in connection with manufacturing methamphetamine. (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (c).) It is this latter conclusion with which I disagree.
The evidence to support the personally armed allegation in connection with the manufacture of a controlled substance, in this case methamphetamine, was based upon the sheriff’s office search of defendant’s bedroom where it found two handguns located in the headboard of defendant’s bed and a shotgun in his bedroom closet. During that search the sheriff’s officer also found $40,000 in cash, electronic scales, some methamphetamine, and pseudoephedrine pills in a car parked in the front of defendant’s house. There was no evidence defendant had ever been to the Norman Road methamphetamine lab or had personally participated in the actual manufacture of methamphetamine.
The majority relies exclusively on People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391] to support its position. Bland simply does not apply. In Bland, the California Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine in his house with an enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(2) for possessing an assault weapon in the house, even though the gun was unloaded and even though defendant was in a police car outside his home when the drugs and weapon were found. The court concluded the firearm must be “available to the defendant to use in furtherance of the underlying felony.” (10 Cal.4th at p. 998.)
The Bland court found that Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a) was violated when the defendant could resort to use of a firearm to further the felony drug possession; it was immaterial that defendant was not present when the police seized his assault rifle as long as it was “available for use in furtherance of the drug offense at any time during his possession of the drugs.” (People v. Bland, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1000.) The court concluded that “contemporaneous possession of illegal drugs and a firearm will satisfy the statutory requirement of being ‘armed with a firearm in the commission’ of felony drug possession only if the evidence shows a nexus or link between the firearm and the drugs.” (Id. at p. 1002.)
The Bland court found that keeping the illegal drugs with a firearm in close proximity created a risk of injury or death if used to protect against theft of the drugs. That conclusion has no applicability to the case here. There is no evidence that the defendant’s guns were available to further the manufacture of methamphetamine or that there was any nexus between the firearms and the manufacture of methamphetamine. The guns may well have been available to preclude the theft of the methamphetamine or money defendant *1577possessed in his house, but there is no evidence of a nexus between the guns and the manufacture of methamphetamine.
The majority relies upon the contention that the “manufacture” of methamphetamine is a continuing crime unlimited by a discrete event or location. Hence the availability of firearms at defendant’s house could be available at any time during the manufacturing process. Following that line of reasoning the manufacturing could occur in Chicago and a firearm located in Southern California would satisfy Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) so long as the Southern California defendant periodically sent money to Chicago to be used to further the manufacturing process.
In this case the People have not established defendant was ever at the lab or that he was at the lab with the guns and thus they have therefore not satisfied the “underlying intent of the Legislature ... to deter persons from creating a potential for death or injury resulting from the very presence of a firearm at the scene of the crime.” (People v. Garcia (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 335, 350 [228 Cal.Rptr. 87] (italics in original).) The purpose of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) is to require “proof the defendant personally had a firearm ‘at the ready.’ ” (People v. Gonzales (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1663 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 267]).
In People v. Jackson (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 411, 421 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 214], the defendant’s gun was in a car a substantial distance away from where the defendant committed various sexual offenses. The court concluded: “Evidence a gun was in a car two blocks away from where the crimes occurred is insufficient evidence of the presence of a firearm ‘at the scene of the crime’ ([People v.] Reaves [(1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 852 [117 Cal.Rptr. 163]]). Nor from this distance of two blocks was the gun ‘available for use’ as that phrase is defined where he could not reach it or have ‘ready access’ to the gun ([People v.] Mendival [(1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 562 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 566]]).”
The Jackson court explained that “the purpose behind the sentence enhancement provisions for crimes where firearms are involved is to ‘deter persons from creating the potential for death or injury resulting from the very presence of a firearm at the scene of the crime.’ (People v. Reaves, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 856). However, this threat is appreciably diminished, if not removed, where access to a firearm is only a theoretical possibility. For this reason, as the foregoing authorities point out, to warrant the increased punishment for being armed with a firearm there must be some evidence the presence of the gun at the scene of the crime created an increased risk because it was within reach, handy or accessible to the defendant.” (People v. Jackson, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 422.)
*1578The People argue there was sufficient evidence to infer that defendant was at the methamphetamine lab at some point and that, while there, he was carrying a gun or his gun was readily accessible. The People’s argument is pure speculation. When defendant was detained, he was transporting methamphetamine manufacturing equipment in his truck but the guns were not in his possession or nearby. They were at home, a substantial distance from the arrest and apparently even farther from the situs of the lab. There is no evidence tying the guns to the methamphetamine manufacturing offense: the guns were not readily available at the methamphetamine lab or at the time defendant was stopped while transporting drug manufacturing equipment.
The arming enhancement under Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) attaching to defendant’s conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine was not justified by the evidence and should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 18, 2006. Chin, J., did not participate therein.