Court Opinion

ID: 9597050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:55:11.720669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:36.614294
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, A.C.J.
(concurring)—On the particular facts of this case, I agree that the trial court's failure to instruct on the necessity for unanimous jury agreement on the act relied upon to convict was harmless error.
I point out, however, that the majority opinion states a test for harmless error which, in my view, is incorrect. The opinion states that "[s]uch error is harmless only if a *411rational trier of fact could have found each incident proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Majority opinion, at 409. It is the use of the word "could" that makes the test incorrect as stated. To say that the error is harmless if the jury could have found each incident proved beyond a reasonable doubt is meaningless because it requires nothing more than that there be sufficient evidence to get the issue before the jury in the first place. It is the fact that the jury could find each incident to constitute a crime that creates the need for the unanimity instruction.
In a case involving several acts, each of which could be found to constitute the commission of a crime, the test for harmless error is that the error is not harmless if a rational trier of fact could have a reasonable doubt as to whether each incident established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury could not have a reasonable doubt about any of the incidents, then it would be immaterial that the jury may not have agreed unanimously on a single incident relied upon for conviction. The correct test is applied in State v. Gitchel, 41 Wn. App. 820, 823, 706 P.2d 1091 (1985) and State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wn. App. 652, 656, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985). In both cases, the failure to instruct was prejudicial because "a rational trier of fact could have entertained a reasonable doubt as to one or more of the incidents of abuse." Fitzgerald, at 656.
The majority opinion cites State v. Petrich, 101 Wn.2d 566, 573, 683 P.2d 173 (1984) as authority for its statement of the test. The statement in Petrich, however, is dicta, that is, unnecessary to the decision of the court in that case. Petrich cited as authority State v. Franco, 96 Wn.2d 816, 639 P.2d 1320 (1982), where the test is stated on page 823. Franco, however, involved alternative means of committing a single offense. In alternative means cases, unanimity as to the means is not required. State v. Arndt, 87 Wn.2d 374, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976). The statement of the test for harmless error cited in the majority opinion is the correct test in cases involving alternative means of committing a single offense. It has no application or relevancy to a case *412involving several acts, each of which could be found to be the commission of a crime. I concur, however, in the result reached by the majority opinion, and except for the foregoing, I concur in the reasoning leading to that result.
Review denied by Supreme Court February 21, 1986.