Court Opinion

ID: 9907657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 19:13:07.258926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:34.784679
License: Public Domain

Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                                            Filed 11/06 23
                                                                                                          Chittenden nit

VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                              £9     £1.                       CIVIL DIVISION
Chittenden Unit                                                                    Case No. 23-CV-00998
175 Main Street, PO BOX 187
Burlington VT 05402
802-863-3467                                          Eﬁ
WWW.vermontjudiciary.org

                        Douglas Weston et a1 v. The City of Winooski

                           RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Title:          Motion to Dismiss (Motion: 1)
Filer:          Stephen D. Ellis, Esq.
Filed Date:     April 17, 2023

        Plaintiffs in this case challenge the constitutionality of an amendment to the City

of Winooski’s charter that permits lawful Winooski residents who are not citizens to

vote in municipal elections involving school boards and education budgets. A prior case

upheld a similar statute allowing noncitizen voting in local elections. See Ferry v. City of

Montpelier, 2023 VT 4. Plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable because school

budget votes, although local, have statewide impacts. The City of Winooski (“the City”)

has ﬁled a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) the institutional plaintiffs lack standing

and (2) the complaint is barred by res judicata.1 The court held oral argument on

September 13 and post-hearing memoranda were filed on October 4.

                                              Background

        In 2021, Douglas Weston, The Vermont Republican Party, The Republican

National Committee, and nine other individuals ﬁled a complaint against the City and

Carol Barrett, in her ofﬁcial capacity as the City Clerk for the City of Winooski

1”), challenging the constitutionality of the same amendment to the City’s charter that
1
 The State intervened as a defendant to defend the constitutionality of an act of the Leg’slature and ﬁled a
memorandum in support of the City’s motion to dismiss. See V.R.C.P. 24(d).
they challenge here, 24 App. V.S.A. ch. 19, § 202(b).2 On the same day that Weston I

was filed, a companion case was filed in Washington County by Charles Ferry and nine

other individuals, including Douglas Weston, against the City of Montpelier and John

Odum, in his ofﬁcial capacity as the City Clerk for the City of Montpelier (“Ferry”),

challenging a similar amendment to Montpelier’s charter, 24 App. V.S.A. ch. 5, §

1501(a).3 The Vermont Republican Party and The Republican National Committee were

also plaintiffs in Ferry.

          The basis of the plaintiffs’ arguments in both Weston I and Ferry were that the

Winooski and Montpelier amendments to the respective city’s charters violated the

voter-eligibility requirements set forth in Chapter II, § 42 of the Vermont Constitution.

The relevant portion of this section of the Vermont Constitution provides:

          Every person of the full age of eighteen years who is a citizen of the United
          States, having resided in this State for the period established by the
          General Assembly and who is of a quiet and peaceable behavior, and will
          take the following oath or affirmation, shall be entitled to all the privileges
          of a voter of this state:

          You solemnly swear (or affirm) that whenever you give your vote or
          suffrage, touching any matter that concerns the State of Vermont, you will
          do it so as in your conscience you shall judge will most conduce to the best
          good of the same, as established by the Constitution, without fear or favor
          of any person.

          The defendants in both Weston I and Ferry filed motions to dismiss the

complaints. The Superior Court in Ferry issued its ruling first, holding that (1) two

individual plaintiffs who were Montpelier voters had standing to challenge the

amendment and (2) the amendment did not violate the Vermont Constitution. Ferry v.

City of Montpelier, No. 21-CV-2963, 2022 WL 1242688 at *1–2, *5–7 (Vt. Super., Apr. 1,

2
    Weston I was docket number 21-CV-2965.

3
    The Montpelier case was docket number 21-CV-2963.

                                                  2
2022) (Mello, J.). The trial court in Weston I, relying on Judge Mello’s decision in

Ferry, held that it was “improbable” that any plaintiff other than Weston had standing to

challenge the amendment because he was the only one who resided in and voted in

Winooski. Weston I, No. 21-CV-2965, slip op. at 1 (Vt. Super., September 1, 2022)

(Hoar, J.). However, because one plaintiff’s standing was sufficient to consider the

constitutional question without determining the standing of the other plaintiffs

asserting the same claim, the court addressed the constitutional issue and held that the

Winooski charter amendment did not violate the Vermont Constitution, id. at 2. Judge

Hoar wrote:

       [T]he Vermont Supreme Court has made clear that Chapter II, § 42 of the
       Vermont Constitution does not apply to local elections. . . . As Plaintiffs’
       challenge rests entirely on the assertion that § 42 precludes the Legislature
       from extending the franchise to non-citizens, this observation is fatal to
       their claims.

Id. at 2.

       Plaintiffs in both Ferry and Weston I appealed the dismissal of their complaints

to the Vermont Supreme Court. The Supreme Court addressed Ferry first and affirmed

the dismissal. Ferry v. City of Montpelier, 2023 VT 4, ¶ 1. On the issue of standing, the

Court wrote:

       [A] plaintiff alleges an injury in fact and thus has standing to sue under
       Chapter II, § 42 bringing a facial challenge to a law when: that law on its
       face changes the qualifications for voters as defined in § 42 and the
       plaintiff is a voter within the voter pool for which those qualifications have
       been changed.

Id. ¶ 21 (footnote omitted). Because the complaint alleged facts establishing standing

for two Montpelier residents, the Court did not address whether the institutional

plaintiffs or other non-Montpelier residents also had standing. Id. ¶ 25.

                                             3
       Turning to the merits of the case, the Court noted that the plaintiffs were making

a facial constitutional challenge. “‘In a facial challenge, a litigant argues that no set of

circumstances exists under which a statute or regulation could be valid’ and requests the

court [to] ‘invalidate the contested law.’” Id. ¶ 26 (quoting In re Mountain Top Inn &

Resort, 2020 VT 57, ¶ 22, 212 Vt. 554). The Court reviewed the text of Chapter II, § 42

and how it has been amended from the time the Vermont Constitution was first adopted

in 1777 to the present day. Id. ¶¶ 28–31. The Court concluded that § 42 “does not apply

to municipal elections.” Id. ¶ 38.      The Court was not convinced by the plaintiffs’

argument that § 42 applied to “any election with an extra-municipal impact.” Id. ¶ 39.

The Court wrote: “[M]unicipalities generally remain entities that control local affairs,”

and “municipal officers today are still accountable to their local electorate” rather than

to all voters across the State. Id. ¶ 46 (citing Rowell v. Horton, 58 Vt. 1, 5 (1886)). The

Court continued:

       It is fundamentally different to act as a statewide officer compared to a
       municipal officer in terms of powers and accountability. Therefore, the
       structure of the Vermont Constitution and the Constitution’s treatment of
       municipalities in the scheme of statewide governance indicate that
       Chapter II’s requirements for statewide elections and representatives,
       including those in § 42, do not apply to municipal elections and officers.

Id.   Rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that a municipal vote with “extra-municipal

impact, no matter how tenuous, constitutes a statewide issue subject to the

requirements of § 42” as “untenable and not grounded in history,” id. ¶ 48, the Court

affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint. Id. ¶ 52.

       The plaintiffs in Weston I agreed to dismiss their appeal after the Supreme Court

issued its decision in Ferry. Weston v. City of Winooski, No. 22-AP-261, Entry Order (Vt.

February 9, 2023).

                                              4
                                                Discussion

        Michael Myers is the only plaintiff in this case who was not also a party in Weston

I. Myers is similarly situated to Weston, however, and the two individuals are described

identically in the complaint as “registered voter[s] in Winooski” who “intend[] to

participate in future elections, including those involving education matters.” Complaint,

¶¶ 3, 4. The City, which is the only defendant in this case, was also a defendant in

Weston I.

        The City argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by res judicata. Motion at 5–

8.4 Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, “‘bars the litigation of a claim or

defense if there exists a final judgment in former litigation in which the parties, subject

matter and causes of action are identical or substantially identical.’” Sutton v. Purzyki,

2022 VT 56, ¶ 21 (quoting Lamb v. Geovjian, 165 Vt. 375, 379 (1996) (quotation

omitted)). “By ‘preclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full

and fair opportunity to litigate,’” claim preclusion “protect[s] against ‘the expense and

vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[es] judicial resources, and foste[rs]

reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.’”

Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440

4
  Plaintiffs contend in a post-hearing memorandum that the City waived its res judicata claim at oral
argument. Supplemental Brief at 5. They are correct that such an argument is an affirmative defense that
is typically waived if not raised. In re Joyce, 2018 VT 90, ¶ 25, 208 Vt. 226. However, it was initially raised
in Defendant’s motion. The “waiver rule is premised on the necessity to provide notice to all parties
regarding the issues . . . , and, accordingly we have permitted exceptions to this general rule where ‘notice
considerations are not implicated.’” Id. (quoting Merrilees v. Treasurer, 159 Vt. 623, 623 (1992) (mem.)).
Even when not raised by the parties, if they are given the chance to brief the issue, a court may
“independently raise and decide whether res judicata barred the action[.]” Id.; see Merrilees, 159 Vt. at
623 (“[A]mple and persuasive precedent allows a court to raise res judicata on its own where the parties
have failed to raise it and consequently waived the right to do so.”); Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
412 (2000) (recognizing that courts may dismiss cases sua sponte, on preclusion grounds, to avoid
unnecessary judicial waste of resources). Because res judicata is a doctrine intended to protect broader
interests than those of the individual litigant, as discussed below, the court will proceed to consider the
argument.

                                                      5
U.S. 147, 153–54 (1979)); see also Sutton, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 21 (res judicata “‘advances the

efficient and fair administration of justice’ and ‘flows from the fundamental precept that

a final judgment on the merits puts an end to the cause of action, which cannot again be

brought into litigation between the parties upon any ground whatever’”) (quoting

Faulkner v. Caledonia Cnty. Fair Ass’n, 2004 VT 123, ¶¶ 8–9, 178 Vt. 51 (further

quotation and citation omitted)).

       Plaintiffs contend that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to preclude this

case because neither the parties nor the claims are identical, or substantially identical,

to those in Weston I. Opposition at 9–12. The only plaintiff here who was not a party to

the prior case is Myers. When determining whether a party who was not named in an

earlier action is barred from litigating their claim in a later action, the court considers

whether that party has privity with a party from the earlier action. See Lamb, 165 Vt. at

380 (“Identity of parties exists where the parties or their privies are involved in both

actions.”). “‘A privity relationship generally involves a party so identified in interest with

[another] party that they represent one single legal right.’” Bain v. Hofmann, 2010 VT

18, ¶ 10, 187 Vt. 605 (quoting Lamb, 165 Vt. at 380 (internal quotation omitted)); see

State ex rel. Barksdale v. Litscher, 685 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Wis. 2004) (“Privity compares

the interests of a party to a first action with a nonparty to determine whether the first

action protected the interests of the nonparty.”).         If the parties in two different

proceedings have “substantially the same interest” in the litigation, even though they are

not strictly identical, the parties have privity. Bain, 2010 VT 18, ¶ 10; accord First Wis.

Mortg. Trust v. Wyman’s, Inc., 139 Vt. 350, 358–59 (1981) (“The test for privity, for the

purposes of res judicata, is whether the parties have really and substantially the same

interest in the property in issue.”).

                                              6
       Plaintiffs do not argue that Myers has an interest that differs in any way from that

of Weston. Rather, they rely on the cases of Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008), and

Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Alabama, 517 U.S. 793 (1996), to argue that Myers should

not be bound by the outcome of a case to which he was not a party. Opposition at 9–11.

Taylor addressed the preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment under federal

common law. 533 U.S. at 891. The issue in that case was whether a case brought by one

private citizen seeking documents from a government agency (Herrick) should bar a

second action brought by a different private citizen against the government (Taylor),

when the relief sought by the individual plaintiffs was the same. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 885.

Herrick was the only plaintiff in the first action and did not represent anyone other than

himself. The United States Supreme Court addressed whether Taylor, the plaintiff in

the second action, was “virtually represented” by Herrick in the earlier case. Id. In

finding that Taylor should not be barred, the Court found that no established grounds

for nonparty preclusion applied to the facts of that case:

       There is no indication that Taylor agreed to be bound by Herrick’s
       litigation, that Taylor and Herrick have any legal relationship, that Taylor
       exercised any control over Herrick’s suit, or that this suit implicates any
       special statutory scheme limiting relitigation. Neither the FAA nor
       Fairchild contends otherwise.

       It is equally clear that preclusion cannot be justified on the theory that
       Taylor was adequately represented in Herrick’s suit. Nothing in the record
       indicates that Herrick understood himself to be suing on Taylor’s behalf,
       that Taylor even knew of Herrick’s suit, or that the Wyoming District
       Court took special care to protect Taylor’s interests. Under our
       pathmarking precedent, therefore, Herrick’s representation was not
       “adequate.” See Richards [v. Jefferson Cnty.], 517 U.S. 793, 801–802
       (1996).

Id. at 904–05. Stating that “the established grounds for nonparty preclusion described

in this opinion” apply to “[t]he preclusive effects of a judgment in a federal-question

                                             7
case decided by a federal court,” id. at 904, the Court contrasted the case with one in

which “a taxpayer challenges ‘an alleged misuse of public funds’ or ‘other public action,’”

id. at 902 (quoting Richards, 517 U.S. at 803). In that situation, “the suit ‘has only an

indirect impact on [the plaintiff’s] interests,’” and “‘the States have wide latitude to

establish procedures . . . to limit the number of judicial proceedings that may be

entertained.’” Id. (quoting Richards, 517 U.S. at 803).5

        In Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., Alabama, 517 U.S. 793 (1996), the plaintiffs were

representatives of a class of employees working in Jefferson County who were

challenging the validity of an occupation tax imposed by the county on the individual

employees. Richards, 517 U.S. at 795. An earlier case had been brought by the city of

Birmingham, and was consolidated for trial with a separate suit brought by three county

taxpayers. Id. The county argued that res judicata barred the second lawsuit because

the court had upheld the tax in the earlier action. On appeal, the United States Supreme

Court stated:

        [A] prior proceeding, to have binding effect on absent parties, would at
        least have to be “so devised and applied as to insure that those present are
        of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as
        to insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue.”

Richards, 517 U.S. at 801 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940)). The Court

concluded that the plaintiffs in the later case were not in privity with the plaintiffs from

the earlier case. It explained that there are two different types of actions taxpayers may

5 Some courts have interpreted Taylor to mean that its holding does not bind State courts when federal

questions are not at issue. See, e.g., Friends of Gualal River v. Gualala Redwood Timber, LLC, 552
F.Supp.3d 924, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (Taylor’s virtual representation theory of privity is limited to federal-
question cases decided by federal courts and does not alter California’s “community of interests” approach
to privity); State ex rel Schachter v. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 905 N.E.2d 1210, 1218 (Ohio 2009)
(Taylor’s holding on virtual representation to establish privity only applies to federal-question cases
decided by federal courts). The court does not find it necessary to reach that question today.

                                                     8
bring: (1) those in which the taxpayer complains about an alleged misuse of public

funds6 or other public action that only indirectly impacts his or her interests7 and (2)

those in which the taxpayer challenges, on federal constitutional grounds, a State’s

attempt to levy personal funds. Id. at 803. Concluding that the plaintiffs’ claim fell into

the second category, the Richards Court’s holding was based, in part, on the fact that the

plaintiffs’ “underlying rights [were] personal in nature.” Id. at 802 n.6. The Court noted

that “State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the

relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes.” Id. at 797.

        The Vermont Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider how the holdings

in Taylor or Richards would apply to a case such as this, where the plaintiffs’ interests

are shared among similarly situated voters and are not personal in nature. Other courts,

however, have addressed whether res judicata bars repeated actions by different voters

challenging the same issue. In Lilly v. Heard, 761 S.E.2d 46 (Ga. 2014), for example, the

plaintiff voters filed an action to remove the defendant from the local board of

education. The defendant moved to dismiss on res judicata grounds because another

voter (Cowart) had brought the same challenge and lost in an earlier lawsuit. Id. at 48.

6
  Richards cited Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), as an example of this type of case, which
stated that “[t]he administration of any statute, likely to produce additional taxation . . . upon a vast
number of taxpayers, . . . is essentially a matter of public and not of individual concern.” Mellon, 262 U.S.
at 487.
7
  Richards cited Stromberg v. Board of Education of Bratenahl, 413 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 1980), and Town of
Tallassee v. State, 89 So. 514, 517 (Ala. 1921), as examples of public actions that only indirectly impact a
plaintiff’s interests. 517 U.S. at 803. In Stromberg, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a taxpayer was
barred by res judicata from challenging the dissolution of a local school district after the board of
education lost the same challenge in an earlier case, following “extensive and protracted” litigation,
because the taxpayer’s interest was “shared in common with the public” and did not involve a “private
right.” Stromberg, 413 N.E.2d at 1185, 1186. “[A] judgment for or against a governmental body is binding
and conclusive as res judicata on all residents, citizens and taxpayers with respect to matters adjudicated
which are of general and public interest.” Id. In Town of Tallassee, the Supreme Court of Alabama barred
on res judicata grounds a challenge to the incorporation of a municipality when the same challenge had
been litigated by other plaintiffs in a prior case. Town of Tallassee, 89 So. at 171. The court reasoned that
neither case involved “the assertion or protection of any private right, but merely acts for and on behalf of
the public generally.” Id.

                                                     9
The Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the privity between the plaintiffs in the two

lawsuits:

        Here, Cowart and Appellants have an identity of interests. As residents
        and voters of Baker County, they have a common interest in having the
        public offices in their community held by legally qualified persons . . . . Not
        only do Appellants have a common interest with Cowart, that interest is a
        public concern, as opposed to a private right. . . . [A]lthough the general
        rule is that a judgment binds only the parties to the case, we conclude that
        this case falls within the exception to that rule for nonparties who are
        adequately represented by a party with the same interest.

Id. at 50–51 (quotations omitted) (citing Richards, 517 U.S. at 803 and other cases); see

also Nolles v. State Comm. for the Reorganization of School Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 904

(8th Cir. 2008) (applying Nebraska law, court found res judicata barred second set of

voters from raising same claim that another unrelated group of voters had raised in

earlier action because “due process concerns that limit the application of the res judicata

doctrine to nonparties are lessened when the rights asserted involve issues of public

concern rather than private rights”)8; Gustafson v. Johns, 434 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1257–58

(S.D. Ala. 2006) (holding res judicata barred successive lawsuits by different plaintiffs

challenging legislative redistricting plans: “[t]he remedy for any individual voter’s claim

of unequal weighting necessarily affects the rights of all other voters”; and “[a] state

should not face an endless stream of lawsuits after each redistricting.”); Matter of

Pearsall-Stipek, 961 P.2d 343, 346 (Wash. 1998) (en banc) (“Mr. Bennett’s interests in

judicial resolution of the sufficiency of a recall petition are no different from that of any

other citizen: proceeding to the signature gathering stage of the recall process. To hold

8
  Plaintiffs argue that Nolles is no longer good law because it relied on the “virtual representation” theory
later rejected in Taylor. However, despite using that term, the case did not apply the “all-things-
considered balancing approach” criticized in Taylor—553 U.S. at 901—but instead analyzed the question
in terms of the distinction between individual rights and issues of public concern.

                                                     10
otherwise would permit repeated litigation of the same charge based on the same facts

by merely substituting a different named party.”).

       Courts have also held that res judicata bars successive lawsuits where plaintiffs

were challenging the constitutionality of statutes or other official action that affected

members of the public similarly. See, e.g., Atwell v. City of Rohnert Park, 238 Cal. Rptr.

3d 248, 256–57 (2018) (private citizens were barred by res judicata from challenging

city council’s approval of retail store expansion because Sierra Club had made and lost

similar challenge; privity, for purposes of res judicata, “does not embrace relationships

between persons or entities, but rather it deals with a person’s relationship to the

subject matter of the litigation”); Nelson v. Chicago Park Dist., 945 N.E.2d 634, 643-45

(Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (barring on res judicata grounds second lawsuit challenging use of

public funds to construct soccer field because parties shared same legal interests);

Penner v. Cent. Puget Sound Reg’l Transit Auth., 525 P.3d 1010, 1015–19 and n.9 (Wash.

Ct. App. 2023) (applying res judicata to bar consecutive lawsuits challenging

constitutionality of excise tax because plaintiffs’ interests in both actions were public

and identical, distinguishable from Taylor v. Sturgell, where interest “was specific to

individuals and would not have inured to the benefit of the public”).

       The court finds the distinction in these cases between private rights and public

rights to be persuasive. If every taxpayer or voter could bring a lawsuit identical to ones

other taxpayers or voters have brought asserting rights common to every taxpayer or

voter, merely because they bear a different name, the legal system could grind to a halt.

Although Plaintiffs theorized at oral argument that a court could at some point start

sanctioning litigants for asserting frivolous claims, that is no answer: such litigation

                                            11
would require sanctions hearings in each case, tying up the same limited judicial

resources.

       Turning now to the facts here, the court considers (1) whether Myers’ interests

are the same as Weston’s were in Weston I, and (2) whether his interests were

adequately represented by Weston in the prior case. The complaint does not distinguish

between Myers and Weston in any respect: they are both described identically as

Winooski voters. Weston was similarly identified as a Winooski voter in Weston I. The

court concludes that Myers’ interest is the same as Weston’s was in Weston I. Weston’s

and Myers’ claims are not individualized, or personal in nature, as the plaintiffs’ claims

were in Taylor and Richards. Instead, their claims are more like the common public

interest claims at issue in Lilly v. Heard and the other cases discussed above. A

successful challenge to the Winooski charter amendment in Weston I would have

resulted in relief to Myers (and all other Winooski voters unhappy with the

amendment), not just Weston. Neither Weston nor Myers contends that Weston was

denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in Weston I, which would

implicate rights that are “fundamental in character.” See Richards, 517 U.S. at 797

(extreme applications of res judicata may be inconsistent with federal right

“fundamental in character”). For these reasons, and for the reasons the courts found res

judicata barred the lawsuits at issue in the cases cited above, the court concludes that

Myers is in privity with Weston for purposes of the res judicata analysis.

      The court next considers whether the subject matter and causes of action in

Weston I and this case are identical, or substantially identical. See Sutton, 2022 VT 56,

¶ 21. In Weston I, Plaintiffs brought a facial constitutional challenge to the Winooski

charter amendment, and here, they assert an “as-applied” constitutional challenge to the

                                            12
same charter amendment.9 When claims in two different actions are identical or

substantially identical, the doctrine of res judicata bars not only claims that were raised,

but also those that could have been raised, in the earlier litigation. Sutton, 2022 VT 56,

¶ 21; accord In re Burns 12 Weston Street NOV, 2022 VT 37, ¶ 13 (citing In re 15–17

Weston Street NOV, 2021 VT 85, ¶ 23, 216 Vt. 20). “[C]laim preclusion may apply even

though the second action relies on different evidence or legal theories, or seeks relief not

requested in the first action.” Sutton, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 23 (citing Faulkner, 2004 VT 123, ¶

14 and Restatement (Second) Judgments § 25 (1982)).

        “To determine whether two causes of action, including one not raised in an

earlier proceeding, are ‘sufficiently similar for claim preclusion purposes,’ [the court]

focus[es] on whether the claims arise ‘from all or any part of the [same] transaction, or

series of connected transactions.’” In re Burns 12 Weston Street NOV, 2022 VT 37, ¶ 14

(quoting Faulkner, 2004 VT 123, ¶¶ 11–12) (further quotation and citation omitted)).

The scope of a transaction is based on “‘such considerations as whether the facts are

related in time, space, origin, or motivation, [and] whether they form a convenient trial

unit[.]’” Sutton, 2022 VT 56, ¶ 23 (quoting Faulkner, 2004 VT 123, ¶ 13) (further

quotation and citation omitted).

        Plaintiffs here challenge the same charter amendment that was at issue in

Weston I. This clearly passes the transactional test Vermont uses to determine whether

claims raised in two different actions are sufficiently similar to be subject to the doctrine

of res judicata. Both claims certainly form a convenient trial unit. See Sutton, 2022 VT

9
 When making an as-applied challenge, “a party claims that a statute or regulation is invalid as applied to
the facts of a specific case,” and the remedy is narrower in scope than it is in a facial challenge. In re
Mountain Top Inn & Resort, 2020 VT 57, ¶ 22. Even if a court finds in favor of a party making an as-
applied challenge, this does not mean the challenged law is invalidated altogether, as it does if a party is
successful in making a facial challenge. In re Mountain Top Inn & Resort, 2020 VT 57, ¶ 12.

                                                    13
56, ¶ 23. Plaintiffs should have raised their as-applied challenge to the charter

amendment in Weston I. See In re LaBerge NOV, 2016 VT 99, ¶¶ 25–28, ¶ 25 n.2, 203

Vt. 98 (where it was not clear whether plaintiffs were making facial or as-applied

challenge to ordinance, court considered both). Their decision not to assert both types

of constitutional challenges in Weston I does not preclude the doctrine of res judicata

from barring this case.10 As the Eight Circuit noted in Nolles, “If preclusion is not proper

here and the Plaintiffs in this case are not successful, nothing will prevent the next

group of voters . . . from filing another suit. This entails a significant cost to the judicial

system and discourages the principles and policies the doctrine of res judicata was

designed to promote.” 524 F.3d at 904 (quotation and citation omitted).

                                                Conclusion

        The City’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint is granted.11

Electronically signed on November 6, 2023 pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).

10
  Plaintiffs cite Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. 582, 138 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), overruled on
other grounds by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), for the proposition that
an as-applied challenge may follow a failed facial challenge without being barred by res judicata.
Opposition at 12. The Court’s rationale in Hellerstedt, however, was that new facts that developed since
the first case might show that “constitutional harm, which seemed too remote or speculative to afford
relief at the time of an earlier suit, was in fact indisputable.” Hellerstedt, 138 S. Ct. at 2305. Plaintiffs do
not proffer any such changed facts.
11
   Given this ruling, the court need not address the City’s argument that the complaint should be
dismissed due to the institutional plaintiffs’ lack of standing. See Ferry, 2023 VT 4, ¶ 25.

                                                      14