Court Opinion

ID: 9582782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:18.043228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:26.519259
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
Plaintiff alleged one injury and four specifications of negligence that may have caused that injury. One of those specifications was that defendants failed to obtain plaintiffs informed consent to the procedure that caused his injury. The majority concludes that plaintiffs cause of action based on that “specification” is time-barred, because plaintiff knew that he had not been warned of the risk of losing the function of his arm before agreeing to having the procedure performed. However, it then concludes that that does not necessarily mean that plaintiffs remaining specifications of negligence are also time-barred. Because that conclusion conflicts with our precedents, I dissent.
To support its conclusion that, when one specification of negligence is time-barred as a matter of law, other specifications of negligence relating to the same injury are not necessarily time-barred, the majority relies on Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or App 658, 639 P2d 1284 (1982). It reads that case as holding that
“the trial court correctly left it to the jury to determine whether the statute of limitations had run as to two of plaintiffs specifications of negligence despite the fact that plaintiffs failure to warn specification was time barred as a matter of law.” 117 Or App at 560.
*562The majority misunderstands that case.
In Rockey, the plaintiff sued for medical malpractice, alleging that the defendant had failed to warn him of the risks of the procedure and had failed to perform the procedure properly. At the end of the plaintiffs case, the defendant moved for a directed verdict, claiming that the action was time-barred as a matter of law. The court struck the failure to warn specification on that basis but allowed the others to be considered by the jury.
At the close of the case, the plaintiff requested a jury instruction on the discovery rule, which the court refused to give. The jury found for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, assigning as error the court’s failure to give his requested instruction and the striking of the allegations of negligence. We held that the court properly allowed the motion for directed verdict, as far as it went. However, because the defendant did not make a cross-assignment of error relating to the court’s denial of its motion to strike the remaining specifications of negligence, we did not, and could not, decide whether the court erred in not granting the motion for directed verdict on those specifications. Because those two specifications were still before the jury, we evaluated the court’s ruling on the jury instruction issue and concluded that the court erred in not giving the requested instruction.
Obviously, Rockey does not stand for the proposition that the majority reads it to support. To the contrary, the issue we address here was never raised or analyzed in that case. Perhaps recognizing that weakness, the majority also relies on Little v. Wimmer, 303 Or 580, 739 P2d 564 (1987), where the Court held that, when one specification of negligence is barred by a statute of repose, that does not necessarily mean that the alternative specifications of negligence are also barred. 303 Or at 583. That case is inapposite.
Statutes of repose are intended to prevent a cause of action based on a particular act or acts from accruing. Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or 387, 393, 788 P2d 435 (1990). In Wimmer, one of the allegedly negligent acts had occurred at a time beyond the statute of repose. Consequently, the action based on that act had accrued, and its timeliness could not be *563affected by the lack of viability of the plaintiffs alternative allegations.
At best, we can read Wimmer to mean that a claim that is based on an act or acts that occurred at a different time than a claim that is time-barred is not barred merely because it is brought as part of the same action. However, that rule does not help plaintiff, because we have already held that, if a cause of action on one specification of negligence accrues, the statute of limitations runs as to all alternative specifications arising from the same injurious incident. Mann v. Dept. of Transportation, 114 Or App 562, 566, 836 P2d 1353 (1992).
In Mann, the plaintiffs spouse was killed in a highway accident that occurred three years before he filed a wrongful death action. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently failed to provide a warning, install a center divider and sand the roadway. Because the plaintiff was aware of the facts concerning the first two specifications immediately after the accident, the negligence action accrued at that time and was, therefore, not timely filed. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that, because he had not discovered that the road had not been sanded until two years later, his action based on that allegation was not time-barred. We disagreed:
“A limitation is not tolled in order to allow a plaintiff ‘to develop facts to support or identify a theory of recovery or * * * to learn “all of the facts which they might ultimately be able to advance to support their claim.” ’ * * * On December 2,1986, plaintiff had sufficient information to raise an issue of fact on each element of his wrongful death claim. Accordingly, his cause of action accrued on that date.” 114 Or at 565. (Citations and footnote omitted.)
More than two years before this action was filed, plaintiff knew he had been injured and that defendants had negligently failed to obtain his informed consent. The majority concedes that an action based on that specification of negligence is time-barred. Although some negligence accrued before and some simultaneously with the injury, plaintiff sustained only one injury. His cause of action for that injury accrued no later than the daté when he knew or should have *564known he had any cause of action. Because all of the specifications of negligence are based on the same injury, the claim is time-barred.
I dissent.