Court Opinion

ID: 9444332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:56:48.722811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:49.136779
License: Public Domain

HARTIGAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The opinion of the court acknowledges that the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have held that one who seeks to recover under a state death statute for a tort occurring on the navigable waters of the state may do so only in accordance with the substantive law of the state in which the tort was committed. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has, likewise, so held in Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 4 Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 246 certiorari denied 1953, 345 U.S. 992. The court’s opinion indicates these cases are no longer of weight because of a statement, which is admittedly dictum, found in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 1953, 346 U.S. 406 on page 409, 74 S.Ct. 202. In the Pope & Talbot case the plaintiff, a carpenter employed by an independent contractor, was injured while working on a ship berthed on navigable waters in Pennsylvania. He brought a civil action for damages against the shipowner in a federal district court in Pennsylvania, alleging negligence and the ship’s unseaworthiness. A jury found that the ship was unseaworthy, that the shipowner was negligent, and that the plaintiff’s own negligence had contributed to his damages. The shipowner contended that the jury finding of contributory negligence should have been accepted as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s recovery because Pennsylvania law controls and under that state’s law any contributory negligence of an injured person is an insuperable bar to his recovery. In rejecting this contention the court stated in 346 U.S. on page 409, 74 S.Ct. on page 205: “But he was injured on navigable waters while working on a ship to enable it to complete its loading for safer transportation of its cargo by water. Consequently, the basis of Hawn’s action is a maritime tort, a type of action which the Constitution has placed under national power to control in ‘its substantive as well as its procedural features * * */ Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386, 44 S.Ct. 391, 393, 68 L.Ed. 748. And Hawn’s complaint asserted no claim created by or arising out of Pennsylvania law. His right of recovery for unseaworthiness and negligence is rooted in federal maritime law. Even if Hawn *714were seeking to enforce a state-created remedy for this right, federal maritime law would be controlling. * * * ”
It is obvious from this quotation that when the court states federal maritime law controls when the plaintiff seeks to enforce a state created remedy for “this right,” the “this right” refers to a right “rooted in federal maritime law.” In the Pope & Talbot case the court held that a claim for injuries suffered while working on a ship berthed on navigable waters because of the negligence of the shipowner and the unseaworthiness of the ship was a right rooted in federal maritime law. But in the instant case the plaintiff brought an action for a wrongful death. And it has long been well established that a right of action for a wrongful death is not rooted in federal maritime law. The federal maritime law allowed no recovery for a wrongful death. The Harrisburg, 1886, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 1921, 257 U.S. 233, 42 S.Ct. 89, 66 L.Ed. 210; Just v. Chambers, 1941, 312 U.S. 383, 61 S.Ct. 687, 85 L.Ed. 903; Levinson v. Deupree, 1953, 345 U.S. 648, 73 S.Ct. 914, 97 L.Ed. 1319.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated in numerous cases that in an action brought under a state wrongful death statute, the plaintiff's remedy and the defendant’s liability are to be determined by the application of the substantive law of the state. In The Harrisburg, supra, the widow and child of a deceased officer of a schooner brought a suit in rem in a federal district court against the Steamer Harrisburg to recover damages for the death of the deceased caused by the negligence of the steamer in colliding with the schooner. The court first held that no such action would lie in the courts of the United States under the general maritime law. The claimants also relied on the wrongful death statutes of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. The court, having found that the suit was brought after the period of limitations provided in the statutes had expired, ordered that the libel be dismissed and stated in 119 U.S. on page 214, 7 S.Ct. at page 147: “ * * * The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to be treated as limitations of the right. * * * ” (Italics ours.) See also Just v. Chambers, supra. In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 1942, 317 U.S. 239, 245, 63 S.Ct. 246, 251, 87 L.Ed. 239 the court said: “ * * * The constant objective of legislation and jurisprudence is to assure litigants full protection for all substantive rights intended to be afforded them by the jurisdiction in which the right itself originates. * * * And admiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights rooted in state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the substantive law of the State. * * * ” The court cites as authority for the latter statement Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra, a case in which the cause of action and defenses to a suit brought in the admiralty court were based on a state wrongful death statute. In Levinson v. Deupree, supra, a libel in person-am was brought in a federal district court in Kentucky by an administrator seeking damages under the Kentucky wrongful death statute. The court stated in 345 U.S. on pages 651, 652, 73 S.Ct. on page 916: “ * * * In the absence of congressional action, the court adopted and enforced the obligatio created by Kentucky as it would one originating in any foreign jurisdiction. La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95, 138, 28 S.Ct. 664, 679, 52 L.Ed. 973; The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 405, 28 S.Ct. 133, 134, 52 L.Ed. 264. And it was bound to enforce it as it found it, * * The court, however, ruled, that an admiralty court was not bound by the “procedural niceties” of Kentucky law.
Finally, in terms of incongruities, if, as the majority opinion suggests, general maritime law determines the liability and state law determines the remedy, then parties asserting rights under a state wrongful death statute arising from a maritime tort may obtain preferential treatment as compared with those asserting rights under the same statute *715because of a non-maritime tort. See Stevens, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and The Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 246, 266 (1950).
It is, therefore, my opinion that we must look to the Massachusetts’ decisions in order to determine the nature and extent of the defendant’s duty with respect to the plaintiff.
In Crimmins v. Booth, 1909, 202 Mass. 17, 21, 22, 88 N.E. 449, 451, 452, the court said: “* * * Apart from contract, the duty of the defendant shipowner toward a stevedore lawfully at work upon his vessel is the same as that of an employer respecting his apparatus and the permanent constructions with and upon which the laborer is expected to work, even though that laborer may be in the immediate employ of an independent contractor. * * * But even when the assumption of risk grows out of a contract, it has never been held to cover those unseen or obscure dangers, which cannot reasonably be discerned by an employe, and which the employer may be properly held to know about. Under such conditions a duty to warn exists on the part of owner or employer, who knows or ought to know the danger, toward the laborer, who does not know and cannot fairly be charged with knowledge of it. «• * * » And in Gray v. Boston, R. R. & L. R. Co., 1928, 261 Mass. 479, 482, 483, 159 N.E. 441, 442, the court said: “ •* * Apart from special contract, such owner would owe an employee the duty of exercising reasonable care to discover and remedy a defective condition in the premises which was not open and obvious to such employee. * * * ” See Cullen v. New England Fuel & Transportation Co., 1925, 253 Mass. 85, 148 N.E. 371. The employer, however, owes “ * * * no duty to inform his servant of conditions which are open and comprehensible to any reasonably careful man. The duty of the employer does not relieve the employee from using his eyes and his judgment in regard to things open to his observation. * * * ” Murphy v. Furness, Withy & Co., 1927, 259 Mass. 394, 396, 156 N.E. 836, 837.
The issue then is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to require the submission of the case to the jury of the defendant’s breach of a duty, as defined above by the Massachusetts courts, and if so, whether said breach caused O’Leary’s death. Since this question pertains to the substantive rights of the parties, then under the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, its resolution is determined by the decisions of the Massachusetts courts. Carter v. Kurn, 8 Cir., 1942, 127 F.2d 415; Waldron v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 3 Cir., 1944, 141 F.2d 230; Gutierrez v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 2 Cir., 1948, 168 F.2d 678; Compare Gorham v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass’n, 4 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 97, certiorari denied, 1941, 312 U.S. 688, 61 S.Ct. 615, 85 L.Ed. 1125; See Stoner v. New York Life Insurance Co., 1940, 311 U.S. 464, 61 S.Ct. 336, 85 L.Ed. 284.
In making a motion for a directed verdict, the defendant “ * * * admits the truth of all facts which the jury might find in favor of the plaintiff, whatever the nature of the evidence. He admits that if the evidence conflicts, that of the plaintiff is true so far as it conflicts with his own. * * * The court also will make any inference of fact in favor of the party offering the evidence which the evidence warrants and which the jury, with the least degree of propriety, might have inferred.” Shea v. American Hide & Leather Co., 1915, 221 Mass. 282, 283, 109 N.E. 158, 159; Horn v. Adamian, 1951, 327 Mass. 77, 97 N.E.2d 167.
In Navien v. Cohen, 1929, 268 Mass. 427, 431, 167 N.E. 666, 668, the court stated that the plaintiff was not “ * * * required to exclude all other possibilities as to the cause of the injury if by a preponderance of evidence he proved that it was caused by the defendant’s negligence. * * * ” The preponderance of the evidence was defined in Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 1940, 307 Mass. 246, 250, 29 N.E.2d 825, 827, as being the “ * * * power to *716convince the tribunal which has the determination of the fact, of the actual truth of the proposition to be proved. After the evidence has been weighed, that proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if it is made to appear more likely or .probable in the sense that actual belief in its truth, derived from the evidence, exists in the mind or minds of the tribunal notwithstanding any doubts that may still linger there. * * * ” See, e. g., Crisafi v. Sells Floto Circus, 1928, 262 Mass. 120, 159 N.E. 611; Marshall v. Carter, 1938, 301 Mass. 372, 17 N.E.2d 205; Rocha v. Alber, 1939, 302 Mass. 155, 18 N.E.2d 1018; Koczur v. Flanagan, 1940, 306 Mass. 121, 27 N.E.2d 483; Thomas v. Spinney, 1942, 310 Mass. 749, 39 N.E.2d 753. Cf. Bigwood v. Boston & N. St. Ry. Co., 1911, 209 Mass. 345, 95 N.E. 751, 35 L.R.A., N.S., 113.
In my opinion the application of the standards enunciated in the above decisions to the evidence in the record warrants the submission of the instant case to the jury
With respect to whether or not there is any evidence in the record upon which a jury might reasonably find a breach of duty by the defendant, the court’s opinion correctly states that the master stevedore was informed that the vessel arrived fitted to receive a cargo of grain in her No. 4 hold and the deep tanks thereunder. The court then declares: “This implied that the covers of those tanks had been removed, * * I find no justification for this implication in the record. The knowledge that the ship arrived fitted to receive grain in the No. 4 hold implied only that the covers were on, or that covers were off and the tanks guarded, or that the covers of the tanks that were to be immediately filled with grain were off and the tanks unguarded. O’Neil, one of the stevedores, testified as follows:
“Q. Well, will you tell us what portion of the ships come in with their tank covers on— A. I can clarify it easy enough. As far as I am concerned or as far as I know all deep tank covers should be on. Some ships come in without them.
“Q. I am not asking what they should be but how do they come in ? A. Covered.
******
“Q. Now, is there some practice and custom with respect to a provision for guards around the openings of the deep tanks, to your knowledge? A. Well, it has been done—
“The Court: No, no. Is there such a practice or custom; yes or no.
“The Witness: Yes, sir.
“Q. What is the custom and practice with respect to a provision for guards and what is that provision ? A. They have four pipes situated at four corners of the tanks and they have cables or chains running through the tops of them, about three foot high.”
Fennell, another stevedore, testified:
“The Court: Is there a usual condition with respect to a cargo ship?
“The Witness: Yes, sir.
“Q. What is that usual condition? A. The hatch covers are always on. At times they are not; I mean sometimes there is three on and one off; sometimes two and two.
“Q. What is the usual condition? A. Well, they are on.
“Q. And when you are referring to the hatch covers, what particular hatch covers are you referring to? A. You are speaking about the lower deep tanks.
“Q. Is there some usual provision for guarding a freighter that has deep tanks in the lower bottom? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What is the usual provision? A. Well, there is a railing put up around the four stanchions, and the chain is supposed to be made fast.”
The court correctly states that when the hatch was open it could be seen that *717the two forward deep tank covers were off. But the court then declares “ * * * since all four tanks were to be filled, it must have been obvious that in all probability the covers of the after tanks were also off.” There was evidence, however, that only the two forward tanks were to be loaded with grain during the night of August 31, 1950. O’Neil testified:
“X-Q. You tell me what they did tell you. A. Mr. Culleton told us to strip the forward end of the hatch, we were going to load grain in the two forward tanks.
“X-Q. That is all he told you?
A. That is right.”
And even if all four tanks were to be filled with grain during the night, nevertheless, it was not at all obvious that the covers of the after tanks would be off and the tanks unguarded. See Ford v. Allan Line S. S. Co., 1917, 227 Mass. 109, 116 N.E. 505. O’Neil testified:
“Q. When you remove the tank covers of a deep tank, how many covers do you remove at a time? A. When you are loading on the forward end, as we were, we would remove one at a time. But we would take two off.
“Q. And when you load grain, in how many tanks do you load at one time? A. One.”
Fennell testified:
“X-Q. I am talking now about the openings in tanks on vessels when you are running grain. Describe the guards, the last one you saw around the tanks. A. Well, there is four stanchions around the pipe where the chains are, but in the two tanks you would be working at the time there would be no guards, but the other two tanks would be guarded.”
Also, there is ample evidence in the record to warrant a jury finding that the defendant failed to provide the men with an adequate number of lights. O’Neil testified:
“Q. Will you tell us what the practice is in port with respect to cluster lights when work is to be done? A. The mate or the crew aboard ship put out cluster lights, one on each corner of the hatch.
“Q. Were there any at each corner of the hatch? A. There wasn’t any lights on.
“Q. There was none? A. No, sir.”
Fennell testified:
“Q. Can you tell us from your own observation what lights, if any, were provided at the corners- — A. There was no lights at the corners of the hatches. There was one light dropped down directly in the tank where the machine was to be placed.
* * * -X- -X- -X- *
“Q. Is there some usual manner for providing lights for working a freighter in the nighttime? A. Yes.
“Q. What is it? A. Well, usually there is a cluster in each corner, and the floodlights are on overhead.
“Q. And where are they usually provided. A. They are right at the deckhouse between the winches. That is where the outlets are.
“Q. And how many are usually provided? A. Four.”
Furthermore, I do not believe that the record supports the court’s statement that the boss stevedore, Hanlon, asked the ship’s mate for a light and that only after the accident he asked for more lights and received all the lights he wanted. Hanlon testified:
“Q. All right, tell us what you did when you went aboard the ship? A. Well, when I went aboard the ship, I told the officer to get the lights.
* * * * * * •»
“Q. What lights did you get? A. We got one light at that time.
-X- -X- -X- * -X- X- *
“X-Q. How many lights did you have up there, do you know? A. Well, I would think it was two. Two, I guess.
*718“X-Q. Did you at any time ask the mate for any additional light? A. I asked the mate to get the lights. The mate got a light for No. 4 and I told him we needed another one. We got that some time afterwards.
“X-Q. So he gave you all the lights you asked for during the evening? A. That night, yes.”
With respect to the issue of causation, the court states that: “It stretches our credulity to the breaking point to see how * * * ” O’Leary under the facts of the instant case could have jumped and pulled himself out of the deep tank. Under all the circumstances here, I do not believe that the court is sufficiently acquainted with the physical strength and ability of O’Leary to make such a ruling as a matter of law. It seems to me that the depth of the tank, the diameter and height of the vertical pipe in the tank and its location, and O’Leary’s weight and height, present a jury question as to whether or not he was able to get out of the tank, particularly in view of the following evidence:
1. When O’Leary was ordered to go below to the lower platform, his pants, T-shirt and shoes were very clean. When he returned to the main deck his clothes were covered with lime. The four deep tanks were spread with lime. O’Neil testified that the deep tanks were the only parts of the ship in which there was lime.
2. O’Leary’s cap was found in the after port deep tank.
3. Immediately following O’Leary’s return to the main deck, footprints were seen in the after port deep tank. No other footprints were seen in any of the deep tanks except those of O’Halloran in the forward starboard tank. There is no evidence tending to show that anybody other than O’Halloran and O’Leary were in the deep tanks between the time when the lime was placed in them and when the footprints and O’Leary’s cap were seen in the after port deep tank.
4. Handprints made with lime were seen on the coaming of the after port deep tank.
In addition to the above evidence, the close relationship between the evidence of the negligence of the defendant and O’Leary’s injuries strongly tends to show that O’Leary fell into the after port deep tank. See Johnson v. Griffiths S. S. Co., 9 Cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 224; Sad-ler v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 4 Cir., 1947, 159 F.2d 784. In Brooks v. Kinsley Iron & Machine Co., 1909, 202 Mass. 228, 232, 88 N.E. 771, 772, an employee brought an action against his employer for injuries caused by an explosion which occurred while the employee was pouring molten iron into a pig bed. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, holding that the jury might have found that the explosion was due to the negligent accumulation of rust or moisture in the pig bed. The defendant argued that since such an explosion might have been due to other causes than the negligence of the defendant, it was for the plaintiff to exclude the operation of those causes by a greater weight of the evidence. The court answered this objection in language which is particularly pertinent to the facts of the instant case when it said: “ * * * Where the jury have a right to find such actual negligence, followed by the existence of the very danger which might have been expected to arise therefrom, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff is bound to go further and to exclude the operation of other possible causes to which conceivably the danger might have been due, instead of having been due to the actual negligence which has been shown. * * * ”
In my opinion the judgment of the district court should be vacated and set aside and the case remanded to that court for a new trial.