Court Opinion

ID: 9632777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:25:00.646896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:22.604349
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
Because an accurate understanding of John Fautenberry’s current mental state is essential to a determination of whether he is entitled to clemency, I believe that retention of a neuropsychologist is reasonably necessary for Fautenberry’s representation during his clemency proceedings. Fautenberry has a history of head trauma and suffers from significant brain impairment, part of which was identified by a neuropsychological evaluation performed in 1996. Now, thirteen years later, it is important that the Parole Board and the Governor have a complete picture of Fautenberry’s current mental state, including whether he still suffers from brain impairment. A stale evaluation performed in 1996 does not serve this purpose. Even *272without evidence of specific changes, which, in any event, could be discovered only through a current evaluation, it is obvious that Fautenberry’s mental state would have changed in the past thirteen years he has spent on death row.
The Supreme Court recently made clear “that [18 U.S.C.] § 3599 authorizes federally appointed counsel to represent their clients in state clemency proceedings and entitles them to compensation for that representation.” Harbison v. Bell, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 1491, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009); see 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e). As part of this representation, “the court may authorize the defendant’s attorneys to obtain” expert services “[u]pon a finding that [such] services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant.” § 3599(f). Because a current picture of Fautenberry’s mental state clearly is important to determining whether he should be executed, an updated neuropsychological evaluation is reasonably necessary for his representation. The majority is correct, however, that Fautenberry did not present this argument to the district court. I therefore cannot say that the district judge abused his discretion based on the record before him. Although I would not foreclose Fautenberry from presenting new arguments to the district court, I am constrained, based on this record and our standard of review, to concur in the judgment.