Court Opinion

ID: 9492739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:49:36.61048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:28.551787
License: Public Domain

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Since this is one of the very few instances, after this Court decided Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc), in which we have rejected a plaintiffs jury verdict in a Title VII case, I wish to add a few words of explanation. In Fisher, the in banc court considered the issue of whether a finding that the employer’s proffered reasons for an adverse employment action were false (“pretextual” in Title VII parlance) was sufficient to permit a fact-finder to infer discrimination. The majority ruled that a pretext finding does not necessarily permit the fact-finder to draw a reasonable inference of discrimination. See id., 114 F.3d at 1337-38. The dissenters substantially disagreed, believing that the fact-finder was entitled to infer discrimination from the proffer of a false explanation, except in the “rare” case where “the probative force of a pretext finding has been substantially diminished or even eliminated” by “evidence in the *168record.” Id. at 1368-74 (Newman, then C.J., with whom Winter, Kearse, and Cabranes, JJ., join, dissenting).
Fisher provided little illumination as to which circumstances would be legally insufficient to permit a fact-finder to infer discrimination from an employer’s proffer of a false explanation, because the in banc court, considering only broad principles concerning Title VII law, explicitly declined to make any ruling as to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in that case. See id. 114 F.3d at 1347. It was the panel decision that rejected the District Judge’s finding of discrimination, see Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1448 (2d Cir.1995), even though the panel left undisturbed the District Judge’s finding of pretext, see id. at 1437.
In the pending case, Judge Leval’s opinion makes clear that a pretext finding does not lack evidentiary significance. As with all evidence, the available inference from a finding of pretext will depend on the relevant circumstances. And, as he helpfully explains:
That an employer gives a pretextual reason for its , action may indeed give support to the inference of prohibited discrimination. Depending on the circumstances, an employer’s resort to pretext may give the plaintiff strong support.
202 F.3d at 166. Nevertheless, the Court rules that the particular aggregate of scant evidence in this case is legally insufficient, even with an available adverse inference from the employer’s proffer of false explanations.
For me, it is a very close question whether the minimal evidence in this case, considered in light of the in banc decision in Fisher, is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. I would much prefer to have upheld the jury’s verdict, applying literally what the Supreme Court said in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993):
[Rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and ... no additional proof is required.
Id. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (emphases in original) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and brackets omitted). But the in banc decision in Fisher concluded that in the context of the St. Mary’s opinion, the quoted sentence, “properly understood,” is not to be applied literally, see Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1343, and that decision precludes the literal reading I would have preferred. Bound by that decision, I therefore agree that this is one of those cases (I hope few in number) where a jury’s verdict in favor of a Title VII plaintiff must be set aside because the evidence is legally insufficient.1

. In the pending appeal, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is in one respect different and in another respect similar to the analytical framework of Fisher. The panel that rejected the District Judge's finding of discrimination in Fisher was entitled to do so upon concluding that this finding was “clearly erroneous,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), a standard met when the reviewing court is "left with the 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' ” Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). In the pending case, however, Seventh Amendment considerations permit us (and the District Court) to reject the jury’s verdict only if we conclude that “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury,” Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(a), to have found in favor of the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court has cautioned, "[T]he judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.... The *169judge's inquiry ... asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict....” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (equating standard for judgment as a matter of law with standard for summary judgment). The difference between being firmly convinced that a mistake has been made and concluding that a reasonable jury could not find for the plaintiff is probably easier to articulate than to implement, and I suspect that many appellate panels that reject a trial judge's finding as clearly erroneous would also reject the same finding if made by a jury. Nevertheless, it remains the law that a jury’s verdict is entitled to somewhat more deference than a trial judge's finding. See Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) ("[Rjeview under the 'clearly erroneous' standard is significantly deferential ... [a]nd application of a reasonableness standard is even more deferential than that... .”); United States v. Aluminum. Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir.1945) (appellate court "will hesitate less to reverse the finding of a judge than that of ... a jury”).
The Fisher case and the pending case are similar, however, in that in both cases, as in all civil cases, the plaintiff is not entitled to prevail if the evidence is legally insufficient to support a reasonable finding in the plaintiff's favor, i.e., insufficient to permit a fact-finder to consider the plaintiff's claim. In other words, if the evidence is legally insufficient, the plaintiff may not prevail whether the case is tried to the court or the jury. However, if the evidence satisfies the threshold of legal sufficiency, then a plaintiff's favorable jury verdict is immune from appellate rejection, but a plaintiff's favorable bench trial finding might still be rejected on appeal under the slightly less deferential standard of "a firm conviction” of a "mistake.”