Court Opinion

ID: 9722743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:48:40.379864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:39.620207
License: Public Domain

Quinn, P. J.
(dissenting). Because of facts and procedures hereinafter noted, contained in the record but not mentioned in the majority opinion, I dissent.
Defendant was arrested on the premises where the larceny occurred April 23, 1966. Questioned that same day, defendant made certain oral statements to the police, including a statement that defendant “got out of Jackson prison April 22, 1966”. The oral statements were reduced to writing by the officer to whom they were made in his police report dated April 23, 1966. June 24, 1966, the prosecution served notice that it intended to use such statements at trial.1 July 8, 1966, defendant filed demand for copies of the statements and motion to determine the use or suppression of them,2 together with a motion to dismiss. The latter was denied by order of July 15, 1966, but the record fails to disclose an order with respect to defendant’s demand for copies of the statements and motion to determine their use or suppression. Prom the facts that defendant was furnished with a copy of the statements on day of trial and that they were received in evidence at trial as exhibit 1, I infer that the trial court ruled on the demand and motion to determine use or suppression from the bench.
Prior to taking any proofs and in the absence of the jury, a Walker type3 hearing was had on the *224voluntariness of the statements. During this proceeding, the officer who interrogated defendant, on being asked to relate the contents of the oral statement, testified as follows: “He. (defendant) stated that he had.got out of Jackson prison on the 20th —that would be April 22, 1966”. In the same proceeding and on cross-examination by defendant, the officer repeated this statement.
At trial before the jury, the same officer was asked:
“Q. All right. Then do you recall the conversation that you had after you advised him of his rights ¶
“A. Yes, sir. I asked him his name and address and such, and then he stated that he had got out of Jackson prison — .”
Defendant immediately requested that the jury be excused, and when this was accomplished, moved for a mistrial because of the reference to defendant’s release from prison. During argument on this motion, defendant conceded that the above statement was not interjected intentionally. The motion was denied. No motion to strike and no request for a corrective instruction were made, nor was the matter mentioned again in the presence of the jury. Defendant did not testify at trial.
The propriety of the rule that it is prejudicial error to bring out a defendant’s past prison record except in those instances where his character or credibility are in issue, or under the provisions of CL 1948, § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050) is not in issue here. The issue is whether the rule applies and a mistrial must be granted even though the prejudicial information is elicited unintentionally and inadvertently, as here, where it came out in an unresponsive and volunteered manner which defendant conceded was unintentional. No author*225ity lias been cited, and independent research has disclosed none, requiring an affirmative answer on this issue. People v. Greenway (1962), 365 Mich 547, is not such authority because the Supreme Court found that the prejudicial answer was “clearly anticipated or hoped for” by the prosecution.
I believe the record before us is stronger than the record on the same point in People v. Fleish (1948), 321 Mich 443, 462, 463, where the Supreme Court said:
“We think the record does not justify the conclusion that this improper testimony was deliberately injected into the case by the prosecutor. * * * Inadvertent irregularities of this character are bound to occur in the course of prolonged, hotly-contested trials, and when, as in the instant case, the objectionable testimony is purged from the record by the trial court, the irregularity should not be held to constitute reversible error in the absence of a persuasive showing of prejudice.”
Absent a showing that the trial court refused to correct the situation by denying a motion to strike or refusing to give requested corrective instructions, I am not persuaded that this record presents grounds for reversal. CL 1948, § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1096); GCR1963, 529.
I would affirm.

 Then required by GCB 1963, 785.5 (see 376 Mich xlv, xlvi).

 GCB 1963, 785.5 (see 376 Mich xlv, xlvi).

 People v. Walker (On BRehearing, 1965), 374 Mich 331.