Court Opinion

ID: 9572385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:18.65095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:42.380985
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent as I believe the six-year statute of limitations on which the majority relies is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue in this case is not whether the eighteen-year statute of limitations should be given retroactive effect but whether the six-year statute of limitations on which Doese relies is valid. Although the issue of equal protection was not thoroughly briefed by Hove, Doese did allege a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; therefore, I do not believe the issue is waived under SDCL 15-26A-60(6). See Sharp v. Sharp, 422 N.W.2d 443, 445 (S.D.1988); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 86 (1984) (rule of procedure that constitutionality of statute may *372not be raised for first time on appeal may be disregarded when faced with a compelling case of considerable public importance).
The United States Supreme Court has struck down as unconstitutional every statute of limitations on an illegitimate’s right to establish paternity that has come before it. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982). To meet the heightened level of scrutiny applied to an equal protection challenge of a statute of limitations in an illegitimate child’s paternity suit, the statute must be substantially related to an important government interest. Mills states:
First, the period for obtaining support ... must be sufficiently long in duration to present a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in such children to assert claims on their behalf. Second, any time limitation placed on that opportunity must be substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Mills, 456 U.S. at 99-100, 102 S.Ct. at 1555, 71 L.Ed.2d at 778.
In Mills, the Court held a one-year statute of limitations to establish paternity failed both parts of the intermediate test. Mills, 456 U.S. at 100-01, 102 S.Ct. at 1555, 71 L.Ed.2d at 778-79. Paternity suits typically will be brought by the child’s mother, who might not act swiftly amidst the emotional and financial complications of the child’s first year. Id.
Moreover, this unrealistically short time limitation is not substantially related to the State’s interest in avoiding the prosecution of stale or fraudulent claims.... We can conceive of no evidence essential to paternity suits that invariably will be lost in only one year, nor is it evident that the passage of 12 months will appreciably increase the likelihood of fraudulent claims.

Id.

The very next term the Court struck down Tennessee’s two-year statute of limitations, holding it violated both prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test as it did not provide an illegitimate child with an adequate opportunity to obtain support, nor was it substantially related to state interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Pickett, 462 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372.
Five years later, a unanimous United States Supreme Court held Pennsylvania’s six-year statute of limitations was an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Clark, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465. The Pennsylvania Superior Court had previously determined that Pennsylvania’s 1985 enactment of an eighteen-year statute of limitations to establish paternity would not be applied retroactively. Clark v. Jeter, 358 Pa.Super. 550, 518 A.2d 276 (1986), cert. denied, 515 Pa. 572, 527 A.2d 533 (1987). When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Clark’s motion for appeal, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Clark v. Jeter, 484 U.S. 1003, 108 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed.2d 646 (1988). In its decision, the Supreme Court applied intermediate scrutiny and determined Pennsylvania’s 6-year statute of limitations violated at least the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny test:
Thus, it is questionable whether a State acts reasonably when it requires most paternity and support actions to be brought within six years of an illegitimate child’s birth.... We are, however, confident that the 6-year statute of limitations is not substantially related to Pennsylvania’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Clark, 486 U.S. at 464, 108 S.Ct. at 1915-16, 100 L.Ed.2d at 473.
In the case before us, Doese denied paternity in August of 1984 and claimed SDCL 25-8-9 barred action against him because more than six years had passed since M.A.W.’s birth. In 1984, SDCL 25-8-9 provided:
Proceedings to enforce the obligation of the father may not be brought after the lapse of more than six years from the *373birth of the child, unless paternity has been judicially established, or has been acknowledged by the father in writing or by the furnishing of support.
When the second prong of the equal protection test is applied to South Dakota’s six-year statute, it is clear the statute is not substantially related to South Dakota’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Under South Dakota law in 1984, paternity could be established after six years in a number of situations. First, like Pennsylvania, under SDCL 25-8-9 South Dakota set no time limit as to the father’s right to establish paternity. “[N]o statute of limitations applies to a father's action to establish paternity.” Clark, 486 U.S. at 464, 108 S.Ct. at 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d at 474. Second, an acknowledged illegitimate person could inherit from his father under SDCL 29-1-15. In re Kessler’s Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956); see also Matter of Erbe, 457 N.W.2d 867, 871 (S.D.1990) (Wuest, C.J., dissenting) (statute which prevents unacknowledged illegitimate child from inheriting from father without provision for proving paternity is unconstitutional); cf. Clark, 486 U.S. at 464, 108 S.Ct. at 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d at 474 (Pennsylvania law allows illegitimate to establish paternity for purposes of intestacy by clear and convincing evidence). As evidence that South Dakota had little interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims, SDCL 15-2-22 tolled statutes of limitations for most civil causes of action accruing to a minor until one year after reaching majority. “Recently, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted a statute that tolls most other civil actions during a child’s minority.” Clark, 486 U.S. at 464, 108 S.Ct. at 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d at 474; Pickett, 462 U.S. at 15-16, 103 S.Ct. at 2208, 76 L.Ed.2d at 384; Mills, 456 U.S. at 104-105, 102 S.Ct. at 1557-58, 71 L.Ed.2d at 781 (O’Connor, J. concurring). Further, South Dakota’s subsequent amendments to SDCL 25-8-9 indicate the legislature did not consider problems with proof of paternity insurmountable.1 “A more recent indication that Pennsylvania does not consider proof problems insurmountable is the enactment by the Pennsylvania Legislature in 1985 of an eighteen-year statute of limitations for paternity and support actions.” Clark, 486 U.S. at 465, 108 S.Ct. at 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d at 474. In short, I believe South Dakota’s six-year statute of limitations fails the intermediate scrutiny test and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
An unconstitutional statute offers no protection to Doese. An unconstitutional statute is void from the time of its enactment — it constrains no one, protects no one, and its effect is as if it had never existed. “An unconstitutional Act is not a law; it binds no one, and protects no one.” Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U.S. 97, 101-02, 7 S.Ct. 469, 471, 30 L.Ed. 588, 590 (1887); accord State v. Piekkola, 90 S.D. 335, 241 N.W.2d 563 (1976); State v. Dove, 75 S.D. 460, 67 N.W.2d 917 (1955) (a conviction under an unconstitutional statute is a nullity). Unconstitutional legislation is void and is to be treated as if it never existed. State v. Clark, 367 N.W.2d 168 *374(N.D.1985). An unconstitutional statute is just as inoperative as if it had never been enacted. McGuire v. C & L Restaurant Inc., 346 N.W.2d 605 (Minn.1984). An unconstitutional statutory provision is from the beginning no law at all; its invalidity dates from the time of enactment rather than the time of decision branding it as unconstitutional, and it is at no time effective for any purpose. Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Canon Foundry, 379 Mich. 160, 150 N.W.2d 752 (1967). I believe the unconstitutional statute of limitations is void and offers no protection to Doese.2
The argument concerning the retroactive application of the current eighteen-year statute of limitations misses the mark. As the six-year statute of limitations is void, unless the eighteen-year limit is applicable, there exists no valid statute of limitations applicable to paternity claims in South Dakota. See Bowser v. Zachary, 375 Pa.Super. 481, 544 A.2d 1022, 1024 (1988) (if eighteen-year statute of limitations for paternity claim is not applied retroactively there would be no statute of limitations in place for cases formerly covered by the unconstitutional statute); see also Opinion of the Justices, 131 N.H. 573, 558 A.2d 454, 456 (1989) (if prior statutes of limitations had run and there was no final judgment, retroactive application of eighteen-year statute of limitations did not violate New Hampshire’s constitutional provision against retroactive laws where prior statutes of limitations were void under federal constitution). Whether the eighteen-year statute of limitations is applied retroactively or not, no valid statute of limitations has run on Hove’s paternity claim against Doese.

. In order to qualify for federal funds under Title IV, Aid to Families With Dependent Children, South Dakota's statute of limitations in paternity claims has been required to comply with the Federal Child Support Enforcement Act since 1984. In fiscal year 1991, the South Dakota Department of Social Services received $180,627,149 in federal funding, including funds under Title IV. State of South Dakota Governor’s Budget Fiscal Year 1993, 08-1. Receipt of Title IV funds is conditioned upon complying with 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. which authorizes federal appropriations for states under Title IV.
The Federal Child Support Enforcement Act provides, in part:
(a) In order to satisfy section 454(20)(A) [42 U.S.C. § 654(20)(A) [State plans must include these requirements to be approved] ], each State must have in effect laws requiring the use of the following procedures, consistent with this section and with regulations of the Secretary, to increase the effectiveness of the program which the State administers under this part [42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq.]:
(5)(A)(i) Procedures which permit the establishment of the paternity of any child at any time prior to such child’s eighteenth birthday, (ii) As of August 16, 1984, the requirement of clause (i) shall also apply to any child for whom paternity has not yet been established and any child for whom a paternity action was brought but dismissed because a statute of limitations of less than 18 years was then in effect in the State.
42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (emphasis added).

. Doese denied paternity in 1984 and asserted the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Neither Minnesota, Hove or Doese took any further action until this action commenced in 1991. The record does not indicate Doese obtained a prior judgment dismissing the claim for untimeliness.