Court Opinion

ID: 9954960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 15:00:55.207986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.820828
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2115     Document: 010111022640         Date Filed: 03/27/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             March 27, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  DANIELA BOWMAN,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 23-2115
                                                     (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-00675-JB-SCY)
  CORDELIA FRIEDMAN,                                              (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        After a state court dismissed Daniela Bowman’s lawsuit against the New

 Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department (the “Department”) and the dismissal was

 affirmed on appeal, she filed a pro se federal lawsuit against Cordelia Friedman, the

 lawyer who had represented the Department. Ms. Bowman alleged that in defending

 the Department, Ms. Friedman violated her Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment

        *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
 be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2115    Document: 010111022640        Date Filed: 03/27/2024      Page: 2

 rights. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal

 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and denied her motion for reconsideration.

 Ms. Bowman appeals. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                   I. BACKGROUND

                               A. State Court Proceedings

       Ms. Bowman sued the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department in state

 district court for recovery of gross receipt taxes she had paid in 2017. Cordelia

 Friedman, an attorney for the Department, was assigned to the case.

       Ms. Bowman alleged the issue to be determined was “whether [she] was an

 employee or independent contractor at the company [where] she worked in 2011, an

 employment issue not a tax issue.” ROA at 8. During discovery, the Department

 requested the production of Ms. Bowman’s federal income tax return to “review

 whether . . . [Ms. Bowman] took deductions on her Federal Return consistent with

 having business income rather than wage income.” Id. at 13 (emphasis and

 quotations omitted).

       Ms. Bowman, contending the tax return was irrelevant, refused to produce it.

 The Department moved to compel production. On July 19, 2018, the court held a

 hearing and ordered Ms. Bowman to produce the tax return or provide proof she had

 requested it from the IRS. When Ms. Bowman refused to sign an order reflecting the

 court’s ruling, the court held a second hearing and entered an order compelling the

 production of the tax return by July 31, 2018.

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        After Ms. Bowman failed to comply with the court’s order, the Department

 moved for dismissal of the lawsuit as a sanction. In response, Ms. Bowman asserted

 the tax return was privileged. After a third hearing, the court rejected that assertion

 and ordered Ms. Bowman to request a copy of her tax return from the IRS by October

 5, 2018. Ms. Bowman alleges now that she was not permitted to leave the courtroom

 until she completed the request.

        Ms. Bowman failed to submit the request by the deadline, so the Department

 renewed its motion. On November 1, 2018, the court held a fourth hearing,

 determined Ms. Bowman had not complied with the court’s discovery orders, and

 dismissed the case. Ms. Bowman appealed. The New Mexico Court of Appeals

 affirmed. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied Ms. Bowman’s petition for writ

 of certiorari.

                          B. Federal District Court Proceedings

        After the state litigation concluded, Ms. Bowman sued Ms. Friedman in

 federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Ms. Friedman had violated

 her rights under the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments during the state court

 proceedings.

        In support of her Fourteenth Amendment claim, she alleged that Ms. Friedman

 made false statements to the court concerning the relevancy of Ms. Bowman’s federal

 tax return, causing the district court to dismiss her lawsuit and thereby deprive her of

 a due process right to a decision on the merits.

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        Ms. Bowman claimed Ms. Friedman violated her Fourth Amendment rights

 because the discovery order Ms. Friedman obtained compelling the production of her

 tax return amounted to an unlawful “search and seizure.” ROA at 26 (quotations

 omitted). She also alleged that, because of Ms. Friedman’s arguments, the court

 detained her in the courtroom until she signed a tax return request form.

        Ms. Friedman moved to dismiss, arguing that Ms. Bowman (1) failed to state a

 claim for procedural due process because she received all the process she was due,

 and (2) failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim because no seizure occurred. The

 magistrate judge recommended granting the motion, and the district court adopted the

 recommendation over Ms. Bowman’s objections. Ms. Bowman then filed a motion

 for reconsideration. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, and the

 district court again adopted the recommendation over Ms. Bowman’s objections.

 This appeal followed.

                                     II. DISCUSSION

        We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Serna v. Denver Police Dep’t,

 58 F.4th 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2023). We accept as true all well-pleaded facts in

 Ms. Bowman’s complaint, view them in the light most favorable to her, and draw all

 reasonable inferences in her favor. See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d

 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021). We do not, however, assume the truth of conclusory

 allegations. See id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

 on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

                                              4
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 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Strain v. Regalado, 977 F.3d 984, 989

 (10th Cir. 2020).1

                            A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

       “We engage in a two-step inquiry in determining whether an individual’s

 procedural-due-process rights were violated: (1) Did the individual possess a

 protected property interest to which due process protection was applicable? (2) Was

 the individual afforded an appropriate level of process?” Camuglia v. City of

 Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006) (brackets and quotations

 omitted). The district court concluded the due process claim fails because, even

 assuming Ms. Bowman had a protected property interest, she received all the process

 she was due under the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree.

       “[O]rdinarily one who has a protected property interest is entitled to some sort

 of hearing before the government acts to impair that interest, although the hearing

 need not necessarily provide all, or even most, of the protections afforded by a trial.”

 Id. at 1220. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be

 heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,

 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotations omitted).

       The allegations in Ms. Bowman’s complaint show she was afforded a

 meaningful opportunity to be heard in state court. Over six months, she engaged in

       1
         Because Ms. Bowman proceeds pro se, we liberally construe her filings, but we
 do not assume the role of advocate. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir.
 2008).

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 discovery, filed multiple pleadings, and addressed the state district court judge in at

 least four hearings. She appealed and received a written decision from the New

 Mexico Court of Appeals. Ms. Bowman was afforded an appropriate level of

 process.2

        Citing a New Mexico Supreme Court case, Ms. Bowman argues that she was

 entitled to no fewer than seven procedural safeguards. Aplt. Opening Br. at 18 (quoting

 Bd. of Educ. v. Harrell, 882 P.2d 511, 519 (N.M. 1994)). The Harrell decision, however,

 merely quoted a passage of an administrative treatise, which listed “[t]he essential

 elements of the adversary process, some or all of which may be required.” 882 P.2d at

 519. The court observed that “[d]ue process considerations are flexible” and “the

 circumstances of the case determine the requirements.” Id. Harrell does not support

 Ms. Bowman’s assertion that she was entitled to every listed safeguard, particularly when

 she circumvented the usual process by disobeying the state court’s orders and was

 afforded the right to appeal the dismissal of her case to the New Mexico Court of

 Appeals.

        Ms. Bowman also argues she was entitled to a written decision in her state court

 litigation, citing a state statute setting forth the procedures for claiming a tax refund. See

 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-26 (West 2023). Under § 7-1-26(E), a person seeking a refund

        2
         Ms. Bowman additionally argues that she sufficiently pled a procedural due
 process claim because Ms. Friedman’s alleged perjury in the state district court tainted
 the court proceedings. Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. But the alleged perjury did not prevent
 Ms. Bowman from receiving a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

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 may pursue either an administrative protest or a civil action in state district court.

 In an administrative protest, the statute requires a written decision on the merits.

 See § 7-1B-8(I). Ms. Bowman insists, without citation to any authority, that the

 procedures for an administrative protest apply to taxpayers who pursue a civil action in

 state district court. Under this logic, one could commence a civil action under

 § 7-1-26(E), defy all of the court’s discovery orders, and still be entitled to a ruling on the

 merits. We reject this argument as lacking reason or merit. Having chosen a civil action,

 Ms. Bowman was subject to the procedural requirements set forth in the New Mexico

 Rules of Civil Procedure, including the discovery and sanctions provisions.3

        In sum, we discern no error in the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Bowman’s

 Fourteenth Amendment claim.

                                B. Fourth Amendment Claim

        “To state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, plaintiffs must show both that a

 seizure occurred and that the seizure was unreasonable.” Childress v. City of Arapaho,

 210 F.3d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted).4 Ms. Bowman maintains

 that, based on the discovery order, Ms. Friedman seized her “private papers.” Aplt.

        3
          Ms. Bowman alleges, without evidence, that no other New Mexico taxpayer has
 been denied a decision on the merits of their claim for a tax refund. She does not allege
 that any other New Mexico taxpayer has defied a state district court’s discovery order and
 was still afforded a decision on the merits.
        4
         The Fourth Amendment applies against state officials as incorporated through
 the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
 (1961).

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 Opening Br. at 31. The record shows, however, that Ms. Bowman never produced the tax

 return that was the subject of the discovery order.5 And although she asserts in her

 opening brief that Ms. Friedman seized the IRS form Ms. Bowman had filled out, her

 complaint contains no such allegation. We agree with the district court that Ms. Bowman

 failed to allege a seizure of any of her tax documents.

        Ms. Bowman also alleges she was arrested within the meaning of the Fourth

 Amendment. But she does not allege that Ms. Friedman detained her. Instead, she

 contends the state district court detained her as a result of Ms. Friedman’s legal

 arguments, which Ms. Bowman characterizes as “false statements.” ROA at 17.

 Ms. Bowman cites decisions finding a Fourth Amendment violation for a law

 enforcement officer to make false statements knowingly or recklessly in support of a

 search warrant if the statements were material to the finding of probable cause. See, e.g.,

 Briedenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1997). Such decisions, however,

 have no application to a discovery order alleged to have been fraudulently obtained in a

 civil lawsuit. And the state court’s instruction to Ms. Bowman to remain in the

 courtroom after the third hearing to sign a tax form request document in compliance with

 the court’s order was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Brigham City v.

 Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (stating “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth

        5
           Ms. Bowman argues at length that her claim for a tax refund in New Mexico
 district court did not place her tax return at issue and she therefore maintained an
 expectation of privacy in her tax return. But because she never produced the return, we
 need not address this argument.

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 Amendment is ‘reasonableness’”); In re Jade G., 30 P.3d 376, 382 (N.M. App. 2001)

 (“a court may exercise authority that is essential to the court’s fulfilling its judicial

 functions”).

        Because Ms. Bowman failed to adequately allege that any unlawful seizure

 occurred, we agree with the district court that Ms. Bowman failed to state a Fourth

 Amendment claim for which relief may be granted.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

        We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Ms. Bowman’s claims.

                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                                 Circuit Judge

                                                9