Court Opinion

ID: 9672810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:00:36.929394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:18.470101
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with the conclusion of the majority only as it relates to immunity for legislative aides under art. IV, sec. 16. Dean Wigmore has stated the following proposition concerning privileges from testifying:
“For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a right to every man’s evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exemption, we start with the primary *148assumption that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2191 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
The Supreme Court has cited this maxim with approval. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
The reasons behind this maxim are well-founded. Dean Wigmore has characterized the duty as a contribution which must be made by the individual to society in order that the execution of justice is ensured. He has also stated that this demand for the individual’s contribution is made by the community as a whole, to protect the continuance of the judicial process and ultimately to achieve a state of law and order which civilized society requires. Therefore, any privileges of exemption from the duty to testify must be treated as exceptional and should be approached with caution. “They should be recognized only within the narrowest limits required by principle. Every step beyond these limits helps to provide, without any real necessity, an obstacle to the administration of justice.” 8 Wigmore, Evidence sec. 2192. One must always bear in mind that the very foundation of the legal system is the doctrine of full disclosure.
This court has striven to abide by this maxim, stating in a recent case that the duty to testify extends to all citizens, including the President of the United States, and that the courts will only excuse persons from the duty in the most extreme situations, such as when a young child’s emotional well-being is threatened should she be compelled to testify. State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 504-08, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982).
In this decision, however, the majority seemingly has brushed over this maxim. The majority states that art. IV, sec. 16 may be utilized to protect a legislative aide from being compelled to testify after a member of the *149legislature has approved the aide’s assertion of the privilege. The aide may assert the privilege even though the disputed statement imparted information which would have been outside the realm of information normally communicated by an aide on behalf of the legislator.1 This is also notwithstanding the fact that the plain language of sec. 16 provides that “\_n~\o member of the legislature shall be liable” and does not contain any references to persons other than members of the legislature.
I do not take issue with the majority’s general reasoning concerning the legislator’s increased dependence on the aide because of the complexities of the modern legislative process. However, I do take issue with the majority’s interpretation of sec. 16 in order to extend the privilege to the aide, especially when one considers the fact that the statement did not relate to the aide’s duties for the legislator. Clearly, this is stepping beyond the narrowest limits which privileges must be accorded. Also, it opens the door to future claims that a person who is protected by an express statutory, common law, or constitutional privilege requires another’s assistance in order to carry out that person’s duties in society. The court has created an entirely new class of persons exempt from the duty to testify, and there is no clear limit to the potential parameters of this class.
*150I believe that a maxim rooted in three hundred years of judicial evolution should not be brushed aside in order to make the legislator’s duties more convenient. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Nixon, “Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”2 Accordingly, I dissent.

 The record indicates that Attorney Sarah Crandall attended a statutorily required conciliation conference in a sex discrimination action filed by Walter Ward’s former secretary against Walter Ward and the entire Wisconsin Assembly. Attorney Cran-dall represented Ward’s secretary. Richard White was present as Ed Jackamonis’ Administrative Assistant, who, as Speaker of the Assembly, was involved in the lawsuit. Attorney Crandall testified that Richard White made statements concerning her client’s claim, stating that it had come to his attention that Del Beño, a witness in the case, was about to be indicted on tax fraud. White stated that he, therefore, felt that Del Beno would not be a credible witness.

 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).