Court Opinion

ID: 9712480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:54:55.373253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.499637
License: Public Domain

*365Liacos, J.
(dissenting, with whom O’Connor, J., joins). The court concludes today that the admission in evidence of a composite picture, shaped in significant part by the efforts of a witness whose absence at trial is unexplained, does not constitute reversible error. The court so concludes, even though the same witness, in the only fair identification procedure in which she participated (the lineup) chose someone else as the alleged assailant. The court also concludes that the admission of identification evidence obtained through use of a clearly suggestive photographic array merely requires remand for reconsideration of the propriety of admitting such evidence. I cannot agree with either conclusion and, therefore, dissent.
1. The composite picture. The danger inherent in all identification evidence is well known and need not be fully restated. Suffice it to say that the United States Supreme Court has summed up the problem by stating that pretrial identification procedures arranged by the police are “peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). The danger inherent in these procedures is that unreliable or mistaken identifications may result. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). We have been concerned with this danger and have insisted on an adequate showing of reliability. See Commonwealth v. Venios, 378 Mass. 24 (1979); Commonwealth v. Botelho, 369 Mass. 860, 865-868 (1976).
Of all the identification procedures devised, the least reliable is that which utilizes the so-called Identikit, as was done in this case. Again, there is no need to elaborate on the inherent suggestiveness of the Identikit procedure, as Justice O’Connor and I have set forth an extensive analysis of the problem in Commonwealth v. Blaney, 387 Mass. 628, 640, 642-643 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting), and Commonwealth v. Weichell, 390 Mass. 62, 79, 81, 84 (1983) (Liacos, J., dissenting). The essential point remains that, although the court in Weichell did not accept those views fully, it did limit carefully the use of composite pictures to those resulting from the effort of a single eyewitness who was present in court to testify and *366be cross-examined. The court stated: “The statements of the witness that form the basis for the composite drawing here would not be inadmissible under our more recent decisions since they are statements of an out-of-court identification (‘his eyebrows, nose, and hair looked like that’) by a witness who has made an in-court identification and is available for cross-examination. Since the statements of the witness that led to the creation of the composite are admissible, the composite which is prepared from the statements similarly ought to be admissible either because the composite retains the character of the statements that led to its creation or because the composite is not a statement within the meaning of the hearsay rule.” (Emphasis added.) Commonwealth v. Weichell, supra at 72.
Here, the majority gloss over the unexplained absence of the composite witness Floyd and the loss of the right to examine her as to the reliability of the process. I doubt that the other composite witness’s (McCarthy’s) presence at trial would satisfy the majority as to the lack of confrontation of Floyd if McCarthy had been asked to relate — for purposes of identifying the defendant — whether Floyd had orally identified the defendant extrajudicially. Also, while we have recognized that the procedure of having witnesses choose jointly from a photographic array may not invalidate an identification, we have stated that it would be “highly preferable” for two witnesses to make their selections independently. Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468, 476 (1978) (describing resulting weakness in photographic identification as “close question”). Id. at All. Clearly, the more suggestive Identikit procedure engaged in jointly by two witnesses and a police officer should present not only a “close question” but a clear answer: that a composite created by two witnesses interacting with the police officer should be inadmissible — at least, where one of the witnesses later misidentifies a person in a fair lineup and then is unavailable for trial examination.
2. The photographic array. The trial judge found that, in separate sessions, a photographic array of thirteen photographs was presented to the victim (Davis) and the composite witnesses, McCarthy and Floyd. All thirteen persons depicted were *367white males. Only one, the defendant, was shown with eyeglasses. All three witnesses went for the eyeglasses. The witness" McCarthy testified at trial:
Defense counsel: “Didn’t you think that, at least, the wearing of the glasses was a distinctive feature?”
The witness: “I would notice somebody’s glasses, sir, what kind they had, more than anybody else who doesn’t wear glasses.”
Defense counsel: “I see. Did you take particular notice of, and at least, was the one thing that stood out in your mind as distinctive the fact that the person that night had glasses on?” The witness: “That was one of them.”
Defense counsel: “In fact, mention was made underneath that composite that the person wears glasses; isn’t that right?” The witness: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “So that was something that you had in mind when you went to look at the pictures, didn’t you?” The witness: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “So you saw a group of pictures and you knew you were looking for someone with glasses, weren’t you?”
The witness: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “And there is one in there with glasses, isn’t there?”
The witness: “Yes.”
McCarthy had testified similarly at the suppression hearing:
Defense counsel: “And that description indicated that the man wore glasses; is that right?
The witness: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “And that was something you remembered as fairly distinctive; isn’t that correct?”
The witness: “Yes, because I, myself, also wear glasses.”
The judge ruled: “1.1 find and rule that there was no suggestiveness on the part of the police to the identifying witnesses in the preparation of the identi-kit sketch of the defendant on July 30, 1982, and that said sketch closely resembles the defendant, even to the glasses. 2. I find and rule that the photo *368array, shown to the identifying witnesses on November 12, 1982, was only suggestive in that the defendant had glasses on. Otherwise, there was no suggestiveness.” (Emphasis supplied.)
With all due respect, if the composite was supposedly reliable “even to the glasses,” it is hard to fathom how “there was no suggestiveness” as to the array. To say that the array “was only suggestive in that the defendant had glasses on” strikes me as pure sophistry. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 369 Mass. 892, 896 (1976), does not help the Commonwealth because there the singular feature (ski cap) was stated by the identifying witness not to be the basis of the identification. Here, the witness admitted that he relied on the eyeglasses.
The court concludes there was “an element of suggestiveness in the photographic array.” I agree with this understated position. Why then a remand? The photographic array was erroneously admitted; the evidence of the Identikit identification was also erroneously admitted. The errors were prejudicial.1 The case should go back for a new trial. I dissent.

 In light of the position I take, I need not consider whether the lineup and courtroom identifications were so tainted as also to be inadmissible.