Court Opinion

ID: 9786958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:06:38.640948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:50.599846
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
¶ 59 I concur with the majority’s analysis in Part I but respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached in Part II.
¶ 60 The dispositive question before the court is whether Utah Code section 63-98-102 is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to prohibit the University, absent “specific[ ] authorization]” from the legislature, from “establishing] or enforcing] any ... policy pertaining to firearms that in any way inhibits or restricts the possession or use of firearms on either public or private property.” Utah Code Ann. § 63-98-102(5) (2004). The answer to this question rests on whether article X, section 4 of the Utah Constitution vests the University with the autonomous power to restrict firearm possession among its students and employees. If article X, section 4 grants such authority to the University, then the legislature is foreclosed from infringing upon this authority by a statutory enactment such as section 63-98-102.
¶ 61 Article X, section 4 states:
The general control and supervision of the higher education system shall be provided for by statute. All rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments originally established or recognized by the constitution for any public university or college are confirmed.
The University rests its claim of autonomy on the second sentence of this section. Essentially, it argues that the constitutional language perpetuating “[a]ll rights, immunities, franchises and endowments originally established or recognized” reserves to the University the power to take whatever action it deems necessary to carry out its mission of providing higher education to the people of the state. I therefore examine the meaning of this second sentence more closely.
¶ 62 The use of the phrase “originally established or recognized by the constitution” in the second sentence of article X, section 4 requires an examination of the original version of this constitutional provision as it existed prior to its 1987 amendment. The original provision confirmed “[t]he location and establishment by existing laws of the University of Utah” and, in turn, “perpetuated unto said University” “all the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred.” Utah Const, art. X, § 4 (amended 1987). As the Attorney General and the legislature argue, the terms “rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments” are terms commonly used to refer to the powers of corporate entities. It seems clear that they so refer here since, as mentioned, the University is a corporate entity. The question is, therefore, what rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments were granted to the University as a corporate entity prior to the Utah Constitution’s ratification in 1896?
¶ 63 This court faced the same question previously when the University sought a declaration that it was not subject to state legislative enactments “requiring preaudit of bills, submission of work programs and deposit of funds into the State Treasury.” Univ. of Utah v. Bd. of Exam’rs, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 350 (1956). The court denied the University’s claim, relying primarily on an 1892 territorial enactment that declared the University “ ‘a public corporation [that shall] be subject to the laws of Utah, from time to time enacted, relating to its purposes and government.’ ” Id. at 352 (quoting 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 8). The Attorney General *1123argues that Board of Examiners decided the issue now before us because it affirmed the continuing applicability of this provision in the 1892 act.
¶ 64 Although I agree that Board of Examiners rejected the University’s claim of absolute autonomy, I disagree that the court in that decision conclusively subjected the University to legislative control on all matters. As quoted above, the 1892 Act designated the University a “public corporation.” One treatise has explained:
A public corporation that is not municipal is one created by the state solely as its own device and agency.... A state university ... constitute^], if incorporated, [an] illustration[ ] of this class. Because the independent powers of such corporations are frequently nominal, or small ... these organizations are sometimes described ... as public quasi corporations.
1 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 2.03.20 (3d ed. rev.1999). It does not necessarily follow, however, that all incorporated state universities have only nominal independent power, particularly where the university in question is provided for in the state constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Black v. State Bd. of Educ., 33 Idaho 415, 196 P. 201, 205 (1921) (recognizing the University of Idaho as “a constitutional corporation with granted powers”); Sterling v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253, 257 (1896) (interpreting the extensive powers granted to the University of Michigan by Michigan’s constitution); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951, 952-54 (1928) (discussing the constitutional corporate status of the University of Minnesota). Although the language in our state’s constitution varies from the language in the constitutions of Idaho, Minnesota, and Michigan,1 our constitution nevertheless recognizes the University’s corporate powers. Article X, section 4 explicitly perpetuated these corporate powers in 1896 and thereafter confirmed them in 1987.2 In my view, this constitutional recognition of corporate powers raises the status of the University above that of most public corporations.
¶ 65 Significantly, the University was the only corporate entity, public or private, whose corporate powers the framers of the original 1896 constitution sought to insulate from subsequent legislative control. Elsewhere, the constitution specifically states that “[n]o law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or immunity.” Utah Const, art. I, § 23. This provi*1124sion made clear that all corporate charters granted after the constitution’s adoption would be subject to legislative amendment. The 1896 article governing corporations directed that “[c]orporations ... shall not be created by special acts” and that “[a]U laws relating to corporations may be altered, amended or repealed by the Legislature.” Utah Const, art. XII, § 1 (amended 1993). Again, this provision allowed the legislature to amend the general laws under which private corporations would be chartered. In regard to municipal corporations, the 1896 constitution similarly provided that “[t]he Legislature, by general laws, shall provide for the incorporation ... of cities and towns ...; which laws may be altered, amended or repealed.” Utah Const, art. XI, § 5 (amended 1933 & 2001). The proceedings of the constitutional convention indicate that the framers of the 1896 constitution were concerned with the United States Supreme Court case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat) 518, 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819), which had held that a legislature may not amend a corporate charter, once granted, unless the legislature expressly retains the right to do so in the original grant. See 1 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 366 (1898) (statement of Mr. Evans) (citing Dartmouth College when urging passage of article I, section 23); id. at 1467 (statement of Mr. Hart) (citing Dartmouth College when urging passage of article XII, section 1, recognizing that, “when the legislature once granted a corporate privilege, under the decision of that case the state itself no longer had any power over the corporation”). The fact that the framers of the Utah Constitution were careful to preserve the legislature’s power to amend the charters of all corporations, private or municipal, except for the University’s strongly suggests an intent to preserve the University’s corporate powers independent of legislative control and supports my plain language interpretation of article X, section 4. See also State ex rel. Univ. of Minn., 220 N.W. at 954 (interpreting the Minnesota Constitution’s perpetuation of “[a]ll the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted” to its state university as having “a definite legal import; the terms are those of confirmation in perpetuity of a prior grant of corporate rights”).
¶ 66 Also in line with this interpretation, the two justices who concurred in the Board of Examiners’ lead opinion qualified their concurrence by acknowledging that the University was a “constitutional corporation” in that “its corporate status and existence” were “beyond the power of legislative control.” 295 P.2d at 371 (Crockett, J., concurring); see also Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Utah 1982) (recognizing that “the University of Utah ... enjoys a degree of constitutionally rooted independence” distinct from “an executive department agency”). The concurrence thus recognized that “[i]t would undoubtedly require a change in the Constitution to abolish the University or to change substantially its nature or function” and noted that the case before it did not involve “any question of interference with the corporate existence or the operation of the institution in any manner that would substantially alter its function as a university.” Bd. of Exam’rs, 295 P.2d at 371 (Crockett, J., concurring). Here, in contrast, according to the University, the question of its authority to prohibit students and employees from carrying firearms is directly tied to its ability to carry out its academic function.
¶ 67 Based on my examination of the early history of Utah’s higher education system, as related in Board of Examiners, I agree with the concurrence in that case that “[t]he importance and desirability of a high degree of independence of [the University’s] internal function, and of [its] academic freedom, was unquestionably recognized by the founders” of our constitution. Id. (Crockett, J., concurring). Significantly, the 1892 Act relied on in Board of Examiners clearly distinguishes between the state’s general control over the University’s purposes and government and the University’s internal regulation of its academic affairs. In regard to the former, both the territorial legislature and the framers of our constitution were concerned with the relationship between the University and other institutions of public education. By retaining control over the University’s purposes and government, the legislature intended to en*1125sure the efficiency and effectiveness of the state’s system of higher education as a whole. At the same time, the legislature defined the University’s mission as the system’s flagship academic institution. Both of these intentions are evidenced in the 1892 Act, which states:
“The University shall be the highest branch of the public system of education in Utah, and, as far as practicable its courses and methods of instruction shall be arranged to supplement and continue the instruction in other branches of the public system, and with a view to afford and complete a thorough education to students of both sexes in arts[,] science and literature, and in such professional branches as may be included in its courses of instruction.”
Bd. of Exam’rs, 295 P.2d at 352 (quoting 1892 Laws of Utah eh. IX, § 2). The 1892 act directed that the University include a department that would engage in “practice in teaching and instruction in pedagogy,” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 5, a “school for deaf mutes,” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 6, a “military department,” at least until June 1894, 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 7, and a preparatory program, 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 8.
¶ 68 At the same time that the 1892 Act identified the University’s role as the highest educational institution in the state and designated particular fields of instruction, the Act provided for the University’s relative independence in regard to its internal academic affairs. The Act vested in the board of regents, the corporate officers of the University3 (now the board of trustees), the authority to “adopt by-laws” governing its own organization and conduct and to “employ or provide for the employment of all instructors and employees.” 1892 Laws of Utah ch. IX, § 11. The board was further authorized to
provide for the organization of a faculty of the instructors of which the President shall be the chairman and executive officer, and ... [to] commit to the faculty the general management and control of instruction, and the exercise of such powers regarding the examination, admission, classification and instruction of students as the regents may deem proper.
Id. This provision of the 1892 Act indicates that the University itself, as a corporate entity, was given control over internal academic matters regarding the hiring of faculty and the admission and instruction of students.
¶ 69 The framers of the 1896 Utah Constitution did nothing to controvert this authority. Rather, they were concerned with the distribution of educational purposes between the two institutions of higher education that then existed — the University and the Agricultural College (now Utah State University) — and with maintaining the unique function of each. While some delegates “supported consolidation [of the two institutions] on the ground of efficiency and economy,” others “argued that agricultural subjects would be overshadowed by classical subjects if the schools were united.” Bd. of Exam’rs, 295 P.2d at 368. By establishing the two institutions in their separate locations, the framers decided against consolidation. Id. In 1905, the legislature deter*1126mined that, in the absence of constitutional revision, it lacked the authority to reconsider this decision despite any duplication in the work in which the two institutions engaged. Id. at 369. It did, however, take other steps designed to limit duplication, “prohibit[ing] [the University] from including in its courses agriculture, horticulture, animal industry, veterinary science, domestic science and art.” Id. at 364.
¶70 When presenting the 1896 constitution to the people for adoption, Utah’s constitutional convention declared that “[t]he article on the proposed Educational System has absorbed the best thoughts and efforts of the Convention, and draws around the Public Schools such protection and defense as will secure for them, it is believed, the steady upward progress which is the enthusiastic desire of this people.” 2 Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention 1847 (1898). I believe that the analysis above shows that the framers intended to secure the University’s “protection and defense” by perpetuating its autonomous control over internal academic affairs, as originally granted in the 1892 Act. By retaining control over the University’s purposes and the structure of its governing board, the 1892 territorial legislature ensured the government’s ability to distribute various specialized educational endeavors among different public educational institutions and to regulate the entire higher education system with maximum efficiency. E.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 29 Utah 2d 110, 505 P.2d 1193, 1196 (1973) (plurality opinion) (upholding the legislature’s establishment of the Board of Higher Education, now the Board of Regents, to exercise general control, management, and supervision over the state’s system of higher education); Spence v. Utah State Agric. Coll., 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18, 22 (1950) (holding the legislature could increase the number of trustees for the Agricultural College). Control over University budgetary matters, as recognized in Board of Examiners, similarly ensured that the state government would retain ultimate authority over the state’s financial affairs. See 295 P.2d at 370 (“To hold that [the University] has free and uncontrolled ... use of its property and funds, while making the State guarantee said funds against loss or diversion is inconceivable.”). At the same time, the University was granted autonomy over academic matters — matters which it was uniquely competent to control and which were intrinsic to its function as an institution of higher education. This type of internal autonomy is consistent with the powers that a private university would enjoy by virtue of its corporate status. See 6 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 2545 (“An educational institution ... may exercise those powers expressly conferred by law and its charter as well as those powers necessary to carry out its educational purposes. It generally has the power ... to charge reasonable fees to students; to grant degrees and issue diplomas; to provide specialized training and instruction for the trades and professions; and to regulate student conduct and activities.” (footnotes omitted)).
¶ 71 I therefore conclude that, aside from the selection of general fields of study,4 the power to control academic affairs on its campus is among those corporate rights and privileges perpetuated by the 1896 constitution and confirmed by its 1987 revision of article X, section 4. The majority disagrees, arguing that the University does not have academic autonomy. It bases its conclusion, in part, on the first clause in article X, section 4, which provides that “[t]he general control and supervision of the higher education system shall be provided for by statute.” To determine the meaning of this phrase, the majority turns to the “general control and supervision” language contained in article X, section 3 of the Utah Constitution, as construed in Utah School Boards Ass’n v. Utah State Board of Education, 2001 UT 2, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1125. Supra ¶¶ 46-47. In Utah School Boards Ass’n, this court held that article X, section 3’s clause vesting “[t]he general control and supervision” of the *1127public education system in the State Board of Education meant the Board of Education had “the authority to direct and manage all aspects of the public education system in accordance with the laws made by the legislature.” 2001 UT 2, ¶ 22, 17 P.3d 1125. According to the majority, the same construction applies to the “general control and supervision” language contained in article X, section 4, thus giving the legislature the same authority with respect to the University as the State Board of Education has with respect to the public schools. Supra ¶ 48. I disagree. The second sentence of article X, section 4, which confirms the University’s original “rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments,” acts as a limitation on the legislature’s authority to provide for the “general control and supervision of the higher education system.” Utah Const. art. X, § 4. No such limiting language exists in article X, section 3.5 Thus, the two provisions cannot be said to have the same meaning, and the first clause of article X, section 4 does not grant the legislature “the authority to direct and manage all aspects” of the University’s academic affairs. Based on this conclusion, I do not believe the legislature may enact a statute interfering with internal academic matters at the University. The remaining question, therefore, is whether, as the University argues, the provisions of the University’s personnel and student conduct policies that prohibit employees and students from carrying firearms on campus fall within the scope of the University’s academic autonomy.
¶ 72 As indicated above, the academic powers originally vested in the University relate to matters, such as faculty hiring and student instruction, that directly involve the unique institutional competence of a university. The Attorney General argues that the University’s firearms policies are an attempt “to create policy contrary to legislative enactments.” The Attorney General thus implies that the University’s policies simply reflect a different view of the underlying social and political controversy over the potential benefits and harms involved in carrying firearms. I agree that the University has no particular expertise that would put it in a better position than the legislature to decide the state’s policy in regard to these controversial issues, nor would I argue that the University has any authority to do so. That is a matter squarely within the legislature’s authority to decide.6 However, I do not regard the University’s policies as reflecting a social or political judgment on whether, for example, more people carrying firearms generally leads to more or less crime. Applying, as they do, only to University employees and students, and only while these individuals are on the University campus, these policies merely reflect the University’s judgment on an issue that is within the scope of its academic expertise — namely, the appropriate means by which to maintain an educational environment in its classrooms and on its campus.7
¶ 73 It is significant that, even outside the context of federal “academic freedom” analy*1128sis, a number of courts have explicitly recognized that a university’s academic role extends beyond the classroom itself to the maintenance of an educational atmosphere on its campus. See, e.g., Esteban v. Cent. Mo. State Coll., 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir.1969) (characterizing “college regulations relating to conduct” as “codes of general conduct which those qualified and experienced in the field have characterized ... as part of the educational process itself’ and recognizing that “a school has inherent authority to maintain order and to discipline students”); Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F.Supp. 725, 729 (M.D.Ala.1968) (recognizing Troy State University’s “affirmative obligation to promulgate and to enforce reasonable regulations designed ... to promote an environment consistent with the educational process” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal.App.2d 867, 57 Cal.Rptr. 463, 472 (1967) (holding that a university’s function of “imparting] learning and ... advancing] the boundaries of knowledge ... carries with it the administrative responsibility to control and regulate that conduct and behavior of the students which tends to impede, obstruct or threaten the achievements of its educational goals”); State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (holding that because “[s]tudents attending a university require and are entitled to an atmosphere that is conducive to educational pursuits,” Utah State University had a “contractual duty” to maintain such an atmosphere in its student dormitories (emphasis added)); Nzuve v. Castleton State Coll., 133 Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321, 325 (1975) (“Educational institutions have both a need and a right to formulate their own standards [for academic discipline] and to enforce them.”). This recognition reflects the fact that a university, by its nature, is more than the sum of its classes. Its educational endeavor extends to unorganized activities and discussion among its students and faculty in its offices, hallways, cafeterias, libraries, and open spaces on its campus. The maintenance of an appropriate atmosphere within which such activity may occur is directly related to a university’s academic mission. Thus, if the University’s policies are reasonably connected with its academic mission and the campus environment necessary to that mission, those policies are within its autonomous authority over academic affairs. The record in this case contains extensive evidence that practitioners and experts in higher education are convinced that a no weapons on campus policy is necessary to the educational enterprise; that evidence is un-controverted. I therefore conclude that the University’s policies governing students, faculty, and staff are within its authority to govern academic affairs.
¶ 74 My conclusion on this point says nothing about whether the policies at issue are reasonable exercises of the University’s authority. As I perceive it, the issue before us today is which governmental entity — the University or the legislature — has the authority to make such policies, not whether the policies themselves are advisable or constitutionally sound. The University’s aca.demic interests must be weighed against individual constitutional rights where these rights are properly invoked. A policy that prohibited students and employees from openly brandishing firearms in classrooms would clearly be legitimate. Although I express no ultimate opinion on the matter, it is less immediately clear whether the current policies, which prohibit firearms that are hidden in a student’s purse or an employee’s desk, would survive an individual’s constitutional challenge.
¶ 75 The majority fails to recognize the University’s authority to establish any policy whatsoever relating to on-campus firearm possession by its students and employees. Under its analysis, the University may not subject a student to academic discipline for flashing his pistol to a professor in class. Because I believe the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with the authority that the state constitution grants the University as a corporate entity, I respectfully dissent.

. Like the majority and the Board of Examiners court, we recognize the Idaho and Michigan constitutions contain language that is somewhat different from the language used in our constitution. For example, article IX, section 10 of the Idaho Constitution provides, in part:
All the rights, immunities, franchises, and endowments, heretofore granted thereto by the territory of Idaho are hereby perpetuated unto the [University of Idaho]. The regents shall have the general supervision of the university, and the control and direction of all the funds of, and appropriations to, the university, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
Likewise, article VIII, section 5 of the Michigan constitution designates each board of regents of the University of Michigan, Michigan State University, and Wayne State University as a separate "body corporate” and provides that "[e]ach board shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds.”
The current provision in Minnesota's constitution is more closely aligned to article X, section 4 of the Utah Constitution, providing only that "[a]ll the rights, immunities, franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred upon the University of Minnesota are perpetuated unto the university.” However, the constitutional provision in existence at the time of State ex rel. University of Minnesota v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951, 952-54 (1928), also provided that “all lands which may be granted hereafter by Congress, or other donations for said university purposes, shall vest in the institution referred to in this section.'' Id. at 953-54 (citing Minn. Const. art. 8, § 4 (1858)). In University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 356 (1956), this court relied heavily on the latter clause in distinguishing the language of the Minnesota constitution from the language in our constitution.

. The 1896 constitution's perpetuation of the University’s rights in specific corporate language distinguishes it from at least one earlier draft of the constitution that never went into effect. The 1882 draft stated that "[t]he University of [Utah] shall be the University of this State, and be under the control of the legislature, and constitute a public trust.” Constitution of the State of Utah, art. XI, § 4 (1882). The fact that the framers of the 1896 constitution removed this language and instead explicitly perpetuated the University’s corporate powers lends further support to my interpretation.

. The original act establishing the University provided that the corporate powers of the University were vested in the board of regents and included the powers
"to sue and be sued; to act as Trustees of the University, to transact, or cause to be transacted, all business needful to the prosperity of the University in advancing all useful and fine arts and sciences; to select and procure lands; erect and purchase buildings; solicit donations; send agents abroad; receive subscriptions; purchase books, maps, charts, and all apparatus necessary for the most liberal endowment of any library, and scientific institution; employ professors and teachers; make by-laws, establish branches of the University throughout the State; and do all other things that fathers and guardians of the Institution ought to do."
Bd. of Exam’rs, 295 P.2d at 350 (quoting § 4, State of Deseret Ordinance of Feb. 28, 1850). This list includes many of the powers generally considered to inhere in a corporate entity simply by virtue of its corporate status. See 6 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations § 2485 (listing among a corporation's "inherent attributes" "the power of perpetual succession and duration, the power to sue and be sued in the corporate name, the power to purchase, hold, and transfer real and personal property, the power to have a corporate seal, the power to make and amend bylaws, the power to lend and invest money, the power to make contracts and guarantees" (footnotes omitted)).

. In 1969, the legislature established a state agency, later named the Board of Regents, for the purpose of allocating educational functions among the various institutions in the state's system of higher education. Higher Education Act of 1969, ch. 138, § 4, 1969 Utah Laws 582, 583 (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 53B-1-101 (2000)).

. The full text of article X, section 3 provides:
The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in the State Board of Education. The membership of the board shall be established and elected as provided by statute. The State Board of Education shall appoint a State Superintendent of Public Instruction who shall be the executive officer of the board.

. I therefore do not wish to imply that I believe the University to be immune from all state supervision, even in regard to its personnel policies. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218, 223 (1973) (holding that "[pjroblems concerning the disputes between employees and public employers ... [are] a matter of public policy” and that the University of Michigan was therefore not exempt from the state public employees relations act).

. The University points out that, in the past thirty-two years, only twenty crimes involving firearms have occurred on its campus, six of which were suicides and four of which involved armed robbery of credit unions. I recognize, of course, that those who wish to carry firearms for their personal protection are concerned with defending themselves not only against attackers who wield firearms but also against those who may otherwise be able to succeed in an assault without using a firearm. However, as there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that attacks by strangers (with or without firearms) against employees or students on campus are common, and as the University's policies do allow students and employees to receive authorization to carry a firearm on an individual basis, I remain unable to conclude that the policies implicate legislative concerns regarding the best way to prevent crime. Students and employees may well have their own concerns regarding the burden University policies place on their consti*1128tutional right to bear arms. Such concerns are properly raised by individual students and employees in a claim against the University under article I, section 6.