Court Opinion

ID: 9846095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:34:34.12552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.279568
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the ruling in Division 1 of the majority opinion on the authority of Whiddon v. Hall, 155 Ga. 570 (6, 7) (118 SE 347). That case involved the question of the delivery of a deed. Headnotes 6 and 7 read as follows: “Presumptions in favor of the delivery of a deed arising from its possession by the grantee, its due recordation, its attestation by an officer, and the possession of the premises conveyed under the deed, are evidence of delivery; and, while these presumptions are rebuttable ones, the evidence of an unimpeached witness that the deed was not delivered raises a conflict between such presumptive evidence of delivery and such direct evidence of nondelivery, which can only be decided by the jury, as it can not be said, as a matter of law, that the jury is bound to accept evidence as true, although not contradicted by direct evidence. The court erred in directing a verdict for the claimant, under the evidence.” Page 577 of the opinion reads as follows in referring to the presumptions and the so-called uncontradicted testimony: “Again, this deed was recorded. From this, a presumption arises that it had been duly delivered to the grantee. Parrott v. Baker, 82 Ga. 364 (9 SE 1068). The record of a deed is proof of delivery. Fletcher v. Horne, 75 Ga. 134. The fact that a deed was attested by a proper officer and purported on its face to have been delivered raises a presumption of delivery. Bourquin v. Bourquin, 110 Ga. 440 (35 SE 710). Possession of a deed by a grantee is presumptive evidence of its delivery. Rushin v. Shields, 11 Ga. 636 (56 AD 436); Black v. Thornton, 39 Ga. 361. The delivery of a deed may be inferred from possession of the land conveyed. Jordan v. Pollock, 14 Ga. 145. Here were four presumptions in favor of the delivery of this instrument. From any one of them the inference could be *865drawn that it had been delivered. They were substantive evidence of its delivery; but it is insisted that they were rebuttable presumptions, which were fully rebutted by the uncontradicted testimony of the attorney, who drew the deed, that it had been left with him in escrow, and that its possession had been fraudulently obtained from him by the agent of the vendee, by means of the promise hereinbefore set out. It is urged that the unimpeached testimony of the attorney can not be arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded by court or jury. Where a disinterested witness, who is in no way discredited by other evidence or his own, testifies from his own knowledge to a fact which is not in itself improbable or in conflict with other evidence, the witness is to be believed, and the fact testified to is to be accepted as legally established. In re Miller, 49 Ore. 452 (90 P 1002, 124 ASR 1051). It can not be said, as a matter of law, that the jury is bound to accept evidence as true, although not contradicted by direct evidence. Cobe v. Coughlin Hardware Co., 83 Kan. 522 (112 P 115, 31 LRA (NS) 1126); Yonkus v. McKay, 186 Mich. 203 (152 NW 1031, AC 1917E, 458); Elwood v. W. U. Tel. Co., 45 N. Y. 549 (6 AR 140). The credit of this witness was for the jury. There were circumstances which the jury could weigh in determining the weight to be given his testimony. The transaction culminating in the execution of this deed took place in 1896. The witness was testifying in 1020. The witness admitted delivering to the agent of the vendee this deed in violation of the agreement by which it was lodged with him in escrow, although under circumstances relieving him from intentional wrong-doing. He further testified that the. agent of the vendee had performed the most onerous terms and conditions, the performance of which would entitle him to the possession of the deed. The witness took no steps to recover the deed from the vendee. The claimant took no action to recover the deed or possession of the premises from her vendee, who went into possession under the deed, and remained in possession for five or six years and up to her death. The jury could consider these and other circumstances appearing in the evidence, *866in determining the weight they would give to the testimony of this witness.”
In my opinion, this case stands for authority that the presumption or inference itself in the present case is a part of the evidence and is never, as a matter of law, overcome by the other “uncontradicted” testimony. The inference is drawn in the present case where the facts authorizing it appear and, where these facts alone appear, the inference is demanded as a matter of law. Where counter evidence is offered, the inference is still there and may be considered by the jury in arriving at its verdict. The thing that disappears is the demanded inference which will authorize the direction of a verdict based thereon. See my dissent in Blount v. Sutton, 114 Ga. App. 767 (152 SE2d 777).
“Presumptions are either of law or of fact. The former are conclusions and inferences which the law draws from given facts. The latter are exclusively questions for the jury, to be decided by the ordinary test of human experience.” Code § 38-113. The inference, such as that in the present case, is similar to the inference against suicide, and as was said in Templeton v. Kennesaw Life &c. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. 770, 773 (119 SE2d 549): “In a case such as we are dealing with here, the only place the presumption vanishes is in the jury room, and the time it vanishes is when the jury, in consideration of all the facts and circumstances, determines that the preponderance of the evidence is against” the presumption; “and where that decision is arrived at, the presumption . . . like all other circumstances and inferences in favor of accident, vanishes.”