Court Opinion

ID: 9532722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:18.156295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:49.625911
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe the appellant must be discharged. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 mandates trial within 180 days, and it is now well-settled that an extension of time for commencement of trial may only be granted upon a showing by the Commonwealth that despite its own due diligence trial could not be had within that time limit. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976). The Commonwealth has the burden of proving its due diligence. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977). When the delay is caused by scheduling difficulties or judicial delay, the reasons must appear on the record and the case must be listed as soon as possible consistent with the court’s business. Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 364 A.2d 1345 (1976).
The Commonwealth’s case, presented at the hearing of August 23, 1977 on its motion to extend, and appellant’s motion to dismiss, is set forth below in its entirety:
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, this is in the case of John E. Lewis, Case No. 148-77. This is a matter of a pre-trial application. The first would be the Rule 1100 application. And in that regard—
THE COURT: Excuse me. This is your application to extend?
MR. JOYNER: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Wait until I get that. This is your application filed July 7th, is that correct?
MR. JOYNER: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Now I notice here Mrs. Haltrecht July 20th filed a petition and a rule was granted on that. Apparently that had only to do with the hearing date on the Commonwealth’s application, is that correct?
MRS. HALTRECHT: Yes, sir. We filed an application for dismissal. But, in any event, the hearing date as *69originally scheduled was for a time when I was to be on vacation. Rather than reassign it, because it is one of those cases with testimony and argument, all that sort of thing, I had asked to have it moved ahead. That corrected rule was merely to change it.
THE COURT: All right. Now you have attached to it an application for dismissal, so apparently that is before us also.
MRS. HALTRECHT: Yes.
MR. JOYNER: That’s correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now is John E. Lewis in the Courtroom?
MRS. HALTRECHT: He certainly is. He is right in the front row.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Joyner?
MR. JOYNER: Your Honor, pursuant to that application, myself and the attorney for the Defendant John E. Lewis have entered into a stipulation. And that stipulation basically would be that the original complaint was filed on January 13, 1977, and that 180 days expired approximately 7/12/77.
THE COURT: 7/12/77?
MR. JOYNER: That is correct, Your Honor. And that a preliminary hearing was had on this matter on January the 24th, 1977, and that the Defendant was arraigned and waived that arraignment on March the 11th, 1977, and this matter was listed for trial during the May criminal term as number ten and that case was passed on the request of the Commonwealth due to the fact that Mr. Gavin was in a murder trial and we requested of Judge Pitt to pass this case until he was available so that we could try both Defendants together at that time. That case was passed and never called. The Criminal Trial List went past number ten, and at one point in time I believe Mr. Gavin and Mrs. Haltrecht were available but it was never called by the Court Administrator or Judge Pitt.
And, Mrs. Haltrecht has a copy of the transcript of that request at the call of the list.
*70THE COURT: All right.
MR. JOYNER: It was again listed during the June criminal trial term, and on that trial term it was not reached.
THE COURT: Do you know the number there?
MR. JOYNER: I don’t have that. I believe it was further in the list, somewhere in the neighborhood of—
MRS. HALTRECHT: No. 61.
MR. JOYNER: Sixty-one, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. JOYNER: And the case is listed on the August trial term.
THE COURT: All right. Anything further by way of stipulation?
MR. JOYNER: No, Your Honor. And that is basically the Commonwealth’s case.
The above simply does not establish due diligence by any known measure of proof, and certainly does not meet the standard of the burden placed upon the Commonwealth. Since the Commonwealth is no longer permitted a “second bite”, I would vacate the judgment of sentence and order appellant discharged.