Court Opinion

ID: 8208221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-21 20:02:37.62992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:30.518487
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                         No. 1D21-2323
                 _____________________________

CHARLES L. SPANN, father,

    Appellant,

    v.

SHELLI D. PAYNE, mother In Re:
A.J.S., a minor child,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Linda L. Nobles, Judge.

                      September 21, 2022

PER CURIAM.

    AFFIRMED.

RAY and NORDBY, JJ., concur; LONG, J., concurs with opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________
LONG, J., concurring.

     I concur in affirming the trial court’s custody-modification
order. I write to express my view that, contrary to one of
Appellant’s arguments on appeal, the trial court did award
sufficient make-up timesharing even though it was not explicit in
its order.

    Section 61.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), states:

    [w]hen a parent refuses to honor the time-sharing
    schedule in the parenting plan without proper cause, the
    court:

         1. Shall, after calculating the amount of time-
    sharing improperly denied, award the parent denied time
    a sufficient amount of extra time-sharing to compensate
    for the time-sharing missed, and such time-sharing shall
    be ordered as expeditiously as possible in a manner
    consistent with the best interests of the child and
    scheduled in a manner that is convenient for the parent
    deprived of time-sharing. In ordering any makeup time-
    sharing, the court shall schedule such time-sharing in a
    manner that is consistent with the best interests of the
    child or children and that is convenient for the
    nonoffending parent and at the expense of the
    noncompliant parent.

The trial court cited Appellee’s “persistent refusal to honor
[Appellant’s] timesharing” as the basis for modifying the parties’
timesharing schedule. § 61.13(4)(c)(6), Fla. Stat. (stating the trial
court “[m]ay, upon the request of the parent who did not violate
the time-sharing schedule, modify the parenting plan if
modification is in the best interests of the child”). But it also found
“it would not be in the Child’s best interest for [Appellee] to have
no timesharing.”

    It is clear from the text and context of the trial court’s order
that when it awarded Appellant the majority of overnights each
year, make-up timesharing was a part of that award. Section
61.13(4)(c)(1) does not demand that every day missed be awarded
in make-up—it demands “a sufficient amount of extra time-
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sharing” be awarded “in a manner consistent with the best
interests of the child.” § 61.13(4)(c)(1), Fla. Stat. The trial court’s
custody order complied with this mandate.

                  _____________________________

Charles L. Spann, pro se, Appellant.

No appearance for Appellee.

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