Court Opinion

ID: 9664897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:33:22.585033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.562105
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing, appellant contends that appellees’ defensive plea that Mrs. Pope was not an eligible debtor to have a credit life insurance policy issued to her because she was not gainfully employed was waived or abandoned in the trial court. As the basis for this contention, he relies upon certain statements which he says were made by counsel for both appellant and appellees in their oral arguments to this Court; also that appellant and appellees in their Briefs and oral arguments to the trial court limited all points and issues to the construction of Section 5, Article 3.53 of the Insurance Code of Texas. As a further basis for his contention, he says that his original Brief on file with this Court contains the unchallenged statement that: “The only defense raised by the appellees in the Trial Court which was found adverse to Appellant herein was that the issuance of the policy violated the provisions of Article 3, Section 5 of the Insurance Code * * From the record, it is apparent that appellant was referring to Article 3.53 of the Insurance Code rather than Article 3. Appellant relies on Rule 419, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, for legal support of his contention. This contention is without merit because (1) this rule does not apply to statements made in oral arguments in appellate courts, nor to statements made in the Briefs or oral arguments of the parties in the trial court, and (2) the appeal presents only questions of law. Refugio Lumber Com*381pany v. Bailey, 172 S.W.2d 133, (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1943, writ ref.); Stracener v. Steele, 240 S.W.2d 507, (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1951, n. w. h.). Moreover, during the oral argument of appellees’ attorney, the Honorable Murph Wilson, in response to questions from the writer of this opinion, he stated that it was stipulated that Mrs. Pope was not gainfully employed and that the policy of insurance required that she be gainfully employed. No one at that time made any contention to this Court that this defense had been waived or abandoned.
 As to what defenses were raised in the trial court for its determination, we must look to the pleadings and evidence. At the time the case was presented to the trial court and at the time of the rendition of the judgment, there was before the court appellees’ defensive plea that Mrs. Pope was not an eligible debtor to have a credit life insurance policy issued to her because she was not gainfully employed. Also, in the stipulations of fact by and between the parties, it was stipulated that she was not so employed. After rendition of the judgment, pursuant to appellant’s request, the court made and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law wherein the court found as a fact that Mrs. Pope was not gainfully employed, which finding is supported by the pleadings and evidence. Appellant did not except to the findings of fact filed by the trial court nor request any additional findings. Therefore, the finding that Mrs. Pope was not gainfully employed is binding upon the parties and must be accepted by this Court. Curtis v. National Cash Register Company, 429 S.W.2d 909, (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1968, writ ref., n. r. e.); Beck v. South, 423 S.W.2d 188, (Tex.Civ.App., Ft. Worth, 1967, writ ref., n. r. e.); Hines v. First Guaranty State Bank of Aubrey, 243 S.W. 972 (Tex.Com.App., 1922, judg. adopted). Appellant does attack the conclusions of law made by the trial court; hov/ever, as the findings are sufficient to support the judgment, it will be upheld even if the trial Judge did err in his conclusions of law, which we do not decide. Mercedes Dusting Service, Inc. v. Evans, 353 S.W.2d 894, (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1962, n. w. h.).
We have carefully searched the record and do not find where this defense was ever waived or abandoned in the trial court. To the contrary, we find that this defense was before the trial court up to the time the findings of fact and conclusions of law were made and filed by the court which was the last act performed by the court in regard to this case.
We are aware that the trial court’s only conclusion of law is that the facts establish a renewal and re-financing of the indebtedness to G.M.A.C. and therefore was in violation of Section 5, Article 3.53 of the Insurance Code of Texas. However, in determining whether the judgment should be affirmed, this does not limit or confine this court solely to the consideration of whether the facts show the loan by the bank to the Popes to be a renewal or re-financing in view of the facts in this case.
It is a well settled rule of law in this State that an appellate court will affirm the judgment of a trial court on any theory of law applicable to the case, regardless of whether the trial court gives the correct legal reason for the judgment it enters, or whether he gives any reason at all. Gulf Land Company v. Atlantic Refining Company, 134 Tex. 59, 131 S.W.2d 73, 84 (Tex.Sup., 1939); Foran v. Smith, 228 S.W.2d 251, (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1950, n. w. h.); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77, 80, (Tex.Civ.App., Ft. Worth, 1960, n. w. h.).
The pleadings, the evidence and the court’s findings of fact support the judgment rendered and entered by the trial court. Furthermore, the stipulations themselves, without looking to the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, furnish an adequate basis to support the trial court’s judgment. Ruby v. Cambridge *382Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 358 S.W.2d 943, 946, (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1962, n. w. h.).
Remaining convinced from the record before us that this case was correctly disposed of in our original opinion, we respectfully overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.
MOORE, J., not participating.