Court Opinion

ID: 9852182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:17.535016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.854656
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, P.J.
We agree with Judge Cynar’s disposition of all claims raised on appeal, except the amount of remitted damages Robert Kolosowski should have been awarded.
As a general rule, awards for personal injury rest within the sound judgment of the trier of fact. If the amount awarded falls reasonably within the range of evidence and within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation for the injury sustained, the verdict should not be disturbed. Precopio v Detroit, 415 Mich 457; 330 NW2d 802 (1982). However, where a jury’s award is greater than the highest amount the evidence will support, remittitur is proper. See Palenkas v Beaumont Hospital, 432 Mich 527; 443 NW2d 354 (1989). This Court may only disturb a grant of remittitur if an abuse of discretion is shown. Palenkas, supra.
In this case, the trial court remitted the jury’s $5,000,000 award to $106,696.01. As Judge Cynar’s opinion details, the trial court in reaching this remitted amount committed a number of legal and factual errors. While we are cognizant of our duty to afford due deference to the decision of the trial judge, Palenkas, supra, in light of these errors we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion *733in its grant of remittitur. Based upon an objective review of the evidence, Palenkas, supra, we are of the opinion that the proofs reasonably support a remitted total award of $1,265,843.84.
As Precopio, supra, and Judge Cynar’s opinion indicate, damages in personal injury cases may compensate the plaintiff for both economic losses (such as lost wages and expenses associated with the plaintiff’s injury) and for noneconomic losses (including pain, disability, and lost enjoyment).
We agree with Judge Cynar’s opinion that the remitted award for Robert Kolosowski’s economic losses constituted an abuse of discretion. For the reasons stated in Judge Cynar’s opinion, we are satisfied that the evidence in this case warranted an award to Robert Kolosowski of $315,843.84 for his future economic losses.
We also conclude that the trial court’s remitted award to plaintiff for his noneconomic losses constituted an abuse of discretion. In assessing the appropriateness of an award for noneconomic losses, analogous cases provide a sense of a reasonable range of awards. Precopio, supra, pp 471-472. The awards in the analogous cases must be adjusted for the difference between purchasing power in the year of those judgments and the year of the judgment under consideration. Precopio, supra, p 474, n 26. The judgment in this case was rendered in 1985. Cases involving injuries analogous to those suffered by Robert Kolosowski demonstrate a range of awards from approximately $182,000 to approximately $1,111,500 in 1985 dollars.1 Only where the brain damage sustained by the plaintiff *734resulted in profound retardation,2 or was accompanied by disfigurement and emotional disorders,3 have courts exceeded the above range.4
In Sewar v Gagliardi Bros Service, 69 AD2d 281; 418 NYS2d 704 (1979), a twelve-year-old struck by a bus suffered a fractured skull, brain damage, restricted sight and hearing, and some spasticity. The plaintiff’s iq was measured at between fifty-seven and sixty-three, and she was deemed educable to the third-grade level, with an extremely limited social and occupational future. Remitted damages were $750,000 (approximately $1,111,500 in 1985 dollars) for pain and suffering and permanent disability. The remittitur was affirmed.
In Herman v Milwaukee Children’s Hospital, 121 Wisc 2d 531; 361 NW2d 297 (1984), a ten-year-old suffered a reduced iq of eighty-five (dull normal range) as a result of medical malpractice. A jury awarded the plaintiff over $2,000,000 for past and future pain, suffering, and disability. On appeal, the award was reduced to $925,000 (approximately $958,300 in 1985 dollars), as that was the highest amount plaintiff’s attorney requested the jury to award.
In Coastal States Gas Producing Co v Locker, *735436 SW2d 592 (Tex Civ App, 1968), a five-year-old suffered permanent brain damage in an automobile accident. The boy was left with an iq of seventy-eight and he exhibited behavioral problems. A jury awarded him $400,000 for mental impairment, anguish, and lost earning capacity. On appeal, the court determined that this award should have been remitted to $300,000 (approximately $927,600 in 1985 dollars), including an award for lost earning capacity.
In Stanley v Ford Motor Co, 49 AD2d 979; 374 NYS2d 370 (1975), the plaintiff suffered permanent brain damage impairing his physical and mental coordination. Evidence established that his educational ability was severely limited and future employment would be confined to menial tasks. Additionally, there was a likelihood the plaintiff would develop seizure and emotional disorders. An award of $315,000 (approximately $687,000 in 1985 dollars), which included the present value of lost future earnings, was upheld as not excessive.
In Stanley v Wiley, 325 So 2d 661 (La App, 1975), the thirteen-year-old plaintiff suffered head injuries in a truck accident, resulting in intellectual impairment to the dull-normal range, physical impairment of skilled movement, impaired judgment, and impaired memory. Noting that the plaintiff’s changed appearance would diminish her social life and that her vocational prospects were poor, the court upheld a general award of $275,000 (approximately $550,000 in 1985 dollars).
In Masters v Alexander, 424 Pa 65; 225 A2d 905 (1967), a twelve-year-old child was awarded $100,000 (approximately $359,600 in 1985 dollars) for disfigurement, permanent lessening of earning capacity, physical and mental pain and discomfort, and personality change. His injuries included a fractured skull, eye damage, and permanent brain *736damage leaving him unable to do or carry through anything but the most menial form of work. Additionally, the plaintiff sustained scarring of the face and head with a deformity and depression of the forehead.
In Watts v Town of Homer, 301 So 2d 729 (La App, 1974), a seventeen-month-old child was struck on the head with a metal pole, resulting in a fractured skull, swollen brain, and frequent convulsions. The child was unconscious for eight days, and holes had to be drilled in her skull. At the time of trial, left side paralysis was diminishing but affected her gait, her IQ was approximately fifty, and she was unable to attend school due to problems associated with convulsions. Because she required constant supervision and continual medication, she was deemed unable to work. The court remitted her general damages to $150,000 (approximately $327,000 in 1985 dollars).
Finally, in Smolinski v Taulli, 285 So 2d 577 (La App, 1973), a nineteen-month-old child fell, suffering a skull fracture. The child became hyperkinetic, exhibited slow motor development and slow toilet training, had difficulty with speech, and was in the dull or below normal intelligence range. A general award of $75,000 (approximately $182,000 in 1985 dollars) was held not excessive.
Based upon a review of the proofs and the above survey of analogous cases, we are persuaded that the highest award which can be justified for Robert Kolosowski’s past and future noneconomic losses is $950,000. Plaintiffs neurological expert testified that Robert was mildly retarded. There is little likelihood that Robert will ever progress past the fourth grade level in school and his vocational opportunities will be limited. Children his age tease him, and he exhibits difficulties with speech. Robert will always require guidance and support, *737and his chances of engaging in "normal” social interactions and relationships are significantly reduced. Nevertheless, although intellectually impaired, Robert is far from being profoundly retarded. At the time of trial, he was attending school, was fully ambulatory, played with younger children, rode a tricycle, and enjoyed watching television and going places with his mother. There was no evidence of seizure disorders, hearing or visual problems, or disfigurement as in some of the analogous cases. Plaintiffs neurological expert found Robert’s physical size and appearance, coordination, balance, posture, movement, and strength all totally normal. His physical pain and suffering seems to have been minimal, involving headaches approximately every three months which were controlled by baby aspirin. Plaintiffs neurological expert testified that Robert could live independently. Taking a view of Robert Kolosowski’s loss most favorable to him, an award of $950,000 for noneconomic losses is both within the range of the proofs and the awards made in analogous cases.5
On the basis of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that the evidence in this case warranted a total award to Robert Kolosowski of $1,265,843.84, plus statutory interest, for his economic and noneconomic losses. Because the trial court abused its discretion in remitting the verdict to $106,696.01, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and order the judgment remitted to $1,265,843.84 plus statutory interest. Plaintiff will have twenty-eight days from the date of this opinion to file an acceptance of this judgment with the trial court. *738Otherwise, this matter will be reversed for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
M.E. Kobza, J., concurred.

 To adjust analogous judgments to 1985 dollars, we have used the following formula based on the Consumer Price Index (cpi):
(Average cpi 1985) — (Average cpi year of analogous judgment) ^ Average cpi year of analogous judgment
This formula yields the percentage by which the analogous judgment must be increased to reflect 1985 purchasing power.

 See, e.g., Tinnerholm v Parke-Davis & Co, 411 F2d 48 (CA 2, 1969), and Northern Trust Co v Cook County, 135 Ill App 3d 329; 90 Ill Dec 157; 481 NE2d 957 (1985).

 See, e.g., Frankel v United States, 321 F Supp 1331 (ED Pa, 1970).

 Indeed, in instances where the plaintiff suffered profound retardation and could never master basic body functions or be trained in simple skills, courts have approved awards within the above range. See, e.g., Davis v Royal-Globe Ins Cos, 223 So 2d 912 (La App, 1969) (award of approximately $337,000 in 1985 dollars), Schnebly v Baker, 217 NW2d 708 (Ia, 1974) (award of approximately $654,300 in 1985 dollars), and Shaw v United States, 741 F2d 1202 (CA 9, 1984) (award of approximately $1,036,000 in 1985 dollars).

 Under the analysis suggested by Precopio, no further calculation reducing plaintiffs future noneconomic losses to present value is required, the assumption apparently being that the triers of fact in the analogous cases already did so.