Court Opinion

ID: 9849045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:33:41.066667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:58.067707
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that the rebuttal testimony of K.P. was improper and that therefore Hernandez’ conviction must be reversed. However, in my view the prosecutor’s questioning of Hernandez on cross-examination was proper impeachment by contradiction of Hernandez’ testimony on direct examination.
The trial court ruled favorably on the defendant’s motion in limine to exclude K.P.’s testimony that Hernandez had kissed her on the mouth. The court found that the prejudicial effect of such testimony outweighed its probative value because kissing an eleven-year-old girl is not as overtly a sexual act as that with which the defendant was accused — manually rubbing the vagina and placing his penis between the legs of a seven-year-old girl. Therefore, the trial judge ruled that the prosecutor could not introduce in his case in chief as a similar act under MRE 404(b) K.P.’s testimony that Hernandez had kissed her.
While the prosecutor complied with this ruling in his case in chief, Hernandez testified as follows during direct examination:
*354Q. Mr. Hernandez, did you ever touch this child, [C.C.]?
A. No, I haven’t.
Q. Did you ever touch her in a sexual manner as she testified?
A. I never touched that child.
Q. Did you ever touch any child in the manner she testified?
A. I never touched any child.
Impeachment of a witness on cross-examination is proper to show that the witness lied in a specific portion of his testimony and that therefore his credibility concerning the rest of his testimony is questionable. See McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 47, p 100; 3 Weinstein’s Evidence, ¶ 607[05], p 607-62. Cross-examination on collateral matters to impeach credibility is appropriate, subject to the discretion of the trial court.1 MRE 611(b).
In the instant case, Hernandez’ testimony on direct examination was broad enough to imply that he had never touched a child in an improper way — that he is not the type of person to engage in such activities. He stated, "I never touched any child.” The prosecutor’s questioning of Hernandez on cross-examination was a proper effort to impeach Hernandez’ statement. Cf. United States v Gaertner, 705 F2d 210, 214-217 (CA 7, 1983) (cross-examination on prior drug convictions permissible to rebut defendant’s assertions that he was a "clean-liver” not involved with drugs).
The use of K.P.’s testimony to impeach Hernandez’ statements on direct and cross-examination is a more difficult question. The common-law rule that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove a collateral matter bars the admission of K.P.’s testi*355mony under the majority opinion. I question the viability of this doctrine in the context of impeachment by contradiction.
The policy concerns addressed by the collateral-matter doctrine include protection against undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, and waste of trial time which extrinsic proof on collateral matters could create. McCormick, supra, p 101. These same concerns are evidenced in MRE 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
In my view, the question of when contradiction by extrinsic evidence is permissible is better left to the discretion of the trial court under MRE 403 than in the automatic exclusion required by the collateral-matter doctrine. See Weinstein, supra, p 607-67.
Federal courts allow contradiction by extrinsic evidence where a defendant testifies to specific facts on direct examination. Walder v United States, 347 US 62; 74 S Ct 354; 98 L Ed 503 (1954); United States v Benedetto, 571 F2d 1246, 1250 (CA 2, 1978); Carson v Polley, 689 F2d 562, 574-575 (CA 5, 1982). When the testimony to be contradicted is elicited on cross-examination rather than on direct examination, some courts are less likely to allow contradiction by extrinsic evidence because that would allow prosecutors to subvert the policies limiting admissibility under Rules 404, 608, and 609 by making every statement elicited on cross-examination a credibility issue subject to impeachment by extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., United States *356v Pantone, 609 F2d 675 (CA 3, 1979). Weinstein, supra, pp 607-71 to 607-72, observes that "[prosecutors should not be permitted to escape the restrictions of Rules 404, 608, and 609 by framing questions which, although within the scope of direct examination, have as their objective trapping the defendant into opening the door to impeachment by contradiction.”
1 believe the better rule to be that statements made by a defendant on direct examination may be contradicted by extrinsic evidence that directly rebuts the assertions made on direct examination. The admissibility of such extrinsic evidence should lie within the discretion of the trial court subject to MRE 403 balancing. For statements elicited by the prosecution on cross-examination, the presumption should be against admitting rebuttal evidence which could have been admitted in the case in chief unless it is admissible on some other recognized evidentiary basis.2
Although the preferable rule is that where the defendant makes a statement on direct examination he can be contradicted by extrinsic evidence, in this instance I agree with the majority for two reasons. First, it is not clear that K.P.’s testimony directly contradicted Hernandez’ testimony on direct examination. People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 677 (1974). Second, K.P.’s testimony was clearly prejudicial. Therefore, the admission of K.P.’s testimony constitutes error requiring reversal.

 If requested, a cautionary instruction stating that any evidence obtained under this line of questioning is for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness’ credibility would be appropriate. MRE 105.

 The following cases cited in the majority opinion involved extrinsic evidence used to rebut statements elicited on cross-, rather than direct, examination: People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 677 (1974); People v Bennett, 393 Mich 445; 224 NW2d 840 (1975); People v Losey, 413 Mich 346; 320 NW2d 49 (1982).