Court Opinion

ID: 9891977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 05:07:24.947586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:16:41.672218
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

TW, JR., by Next Friend, SCHKELLIA WALKER,                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                 October 19, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                No. 362803
                                                                 Genesee Circuit Court
AMBER QUINN, MICHIGAN ASSIGNED                                   LC No. 20-113971-NI
CLAIMS PLAN, and MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE PLACEMENT FACILITY,

              Defendants,
and

CAROLYN QUINN,

              Defendant-Appellee,
and

INTEGON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
MEMBERSELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, and
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY,

              Defendants/Cross-Defendants-
              Appellees,
and

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE,

              Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

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       In this negligence action, plaintiff, TW, Jr. (“TW”), by next friend, Schkellia Walker,
appeals of right the order granting summary disposition to defendant, Amber Quinn, under MCR
2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of fact). We affirm.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On July 10, 2019, Amber was driving northbound on Tuxedo Avenue in Flint, Michigan.
At the same time, thirteen-year-old TW was riding his bicycle in the street on Barrie Avenue
towards Tuxedo Avenue. Amber, who did not have a stop sign, proceeded through the intersection
and struck TW, seriously injuring him. TW filed a negligence complaint against Amber. Amber
moved for summary disposition under a theory of comparative negligence, which the trial court
granted.

                              II. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

        On appeal, TW argues the trial court erred by granting Amber’s motion for summary
disposition because Amber’s negligence so outweighed any negligence on behalf of TW. We
disagree.

                                 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court “reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition.”
Zarzyski v Nigrelli, 337 Mich App 735, 740; 976 NW2d 916 (2021). “A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109,
120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The facts should be viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and “[w]here the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding
any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Under the
burden-shifting framework of this rule:

       [T]he moving party has the initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits,
       depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. The burden then shifts to
       the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists. Where
       the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party, the
       nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must
       go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of
       material fact exists. If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence
       establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly
       granted. [Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362-363; 547 NW2d 314
       (1996) (citations omitted).]

                                   B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        “Generally, to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish (1) a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) that the damages were caused by the defendant’s breach of duty.”
Composto v Albrecht, 328 Mich App 496, 499; 938 NW2d 755 (2019). “Duty is the legal
obligation to conform one’s conduct to a particular standard to avoid subjecting others to an
unreasonable risk of harm.” Id. “The duty a defendant typically owes to a plaintiff often is

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described as an ordinary-negligence standard of care. Under ordinary-negligence principles, a
defendant owes a plaintiff a duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.” Id. at 499-
500. But, even when a party breaches their standard of care, the comparative negligence doctrine
holds that “a party who is more than 50% at fault” may not recover damages. MCL
500.3135(2)(b). A trial court may grant summary disposition if no reasonable juror could find the
defendant was more at fault than the plaintiff. Huggins v Scripter, 469 Mich 898, 898; 669 NW2d
813 (2003).

        Amber moved for summary disposition under a theory of comparative negligence,
asserting that the evidence established that “[o]ne hundred percent (100%) of the [l]iability rests
on [TW] in this accident . . . .” To succeed on her motion for summary disposition, Amber needed
to demonstrate no genuine question of fact whether TW was more than 50% at fault for the
accident. Amber attached several exhibits supporting her theory of comparative negligence. These
exhibits emphasized the testimonies of the responding police officer and an eyewitness, who each
opined TW caused the accident because he failed to stop at the stop sign on Barrie Avenue. Thus,
Amber satisfied her burden of demonstrating that there was no genuine question of fact that TW
was more than 50% at fault for the accident.

        The burden then shifted to TW to show a question of fact as to this issue. Quinto, 451
Mich at 362-363. TW’s response to the motion for summary disposition included his deposition
testimony stating he remembered stopping at the stop sign. He also attached Amber’s deposition
testimony in which she reported receiving several text messages during her drive. Taken together,
these two things could create a question of fact as to whether TW was comparatively negligent.
And a court should normally deny summary disposition on this basis because courts should view
the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Maiden, 461 Mich at 120. However, in Michigan, a
bicyclist traveling on a roadway is required to not only stop at a stop sign, but also yield to
oncoming traffic.1 Thus, it does not matter whether TW stopped at the stop sign because TW was
statutorily required to yield to oncoming traffic, which he plainly did not do. Because TW failed
to yield to the oncoming traffic, there was no genuine question of fact that the comparative
negligence rested with TW and, therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary
disposition.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                               /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                               /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

1
  “Each person riding a bicycle . . . upon a roadway has all of the rights and is subject to all of the
duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle . . . .” MCL 257.657. “The driver of a vehicle
approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle that has entered the intersection
from a different highway.” MCL 257.649(1). Furthermore, “[t]he operator of a vehicle or bicycle
upon a highway, before stopping or turning from a direct line, shall first determine that the stopping
or turning can be made in safety . . . .” MCL 257.648(1).

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