Court Opinion

ID: 9409653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 22:00:35.522238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.418288
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUL 18 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOVEPREET SINGH,                                No. 22-1013
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A208-319-760
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted July 14, 2023**
                            San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Lovepreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) which

dismissed Petitioner’s appeal from the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”)

who denied Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and ordered that

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Petitioner be removed from the United States to India. The parties are familiar

with the facts and procedural history, so we do not repeat them here. For the

reasons stated below, we deny Petitioner’s petition for review.

1.     Petitioner’s opening brief first argues that the IJ erred when the IJ

concluded that Petitioner had voluntarily returned to India after his voyage had

ended in Singapore. However, “[w]hen the BIA conducts its own review of the

evidence and law rather than adopting the IJ’s decision, our review ‘is limited to

the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly

adopted.’” Singh v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Shrestha

v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010)), overruled in part on other

grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The BIA

expressly declined to adopt the IJ’s analysis on this point. Thus, any error by the

IJ pertaining to this analysis is irrelevant.

2.     Petitioner next argues that the BIA’s internal relocation analysis is not

supported by substantial evidence. We review the BIA’s internal relocation

analysis for substantial evidence. Singh v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.

2014). “Under that standard, the BIA’s determination must be upheld if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence from the record.” Id.

(quoting Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006)). The BIA’s

factual findings can be overturned by this court only if the evidence compels the

opposite conclusion. Id. at 1162.

                                           2                                22-1013
      Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Petitioner could

relocate to Mumbai or Kolkata because Petitioner lived in Mumbai and Kolkata

without persecution for significant periods of time. Petitioner argues that the

January 15, 2015, attack by BJP supporters in Mumbai constituted past

persecution, but the evidence demonstrates that the attack was an isolated

encounter that fails to compel a finding of past persecution. See Singh v. Garland,

57 F.4th 643, 655 (9th Cir. 2022). Petitioner argues that Kolkata is unsafe

because Petitioner’s classmates in Kolkata teased him for being a Sikh, because

a classmate tried to start a fight with him, because he was discriminated against

in Kolkata, because he was harassed in Kolkata, and because he received

threatening phone calls from his persecutors in Punjab. These incidents do not

compel a finding of past persecution in Kolkata. See Singh v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d

1353, 1359 (9th Cir. 1996).

      Because the government demonstrated that Petitioner could reasonably

relocate, the government rebutted the presumption of future persecution, and the

BIA was correct to deny asylum and withholding of removal.

3.    Last, Petitioner argues that the past attacks upon him compel a finding that

Petitioner is likely to be tortured upon his return to India. However, substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the past attacks on Petitioner do not

rise to the level of torture. Past beatings, even if they rise to the level of past

persecution, do not compel the conclusion that Petitioner is likely to be tortured

in the future. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2019). The violence

                                        3                                   22-1013
which Petitioner faced in India did not rise to the level of torture, and thus

Petitioner failed to carry his burden to prove that he is likely to be tortured upon

his return to India.

      Because the past attacks against Petitioner do not rise to the level of torture,

the BIA was correct to deny CAT relief.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         4                                     22-1013