Court Opinion

ID: 9890912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 19:08:33.063176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:22.895515
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Amin, 2023-Ohio-3761.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 GEAUGA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                 CASE NO. 2023-G-0009

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                               Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                 Court of Common Pleas

KALRAV T. AMIN,
                                               Trial Court No. 2021 C 000188
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                           OPINION

                                    Decided: October 16, 2023
                                Judgment: Reversed and remanded

James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecutor, and Alexandria R. Scheid, Assistant
Prosecutor, Courthouse Annex, 231 Main Street, Suite 3A, Chardon, OH 44024 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

Joseph C. Patituce and Catherine A. Purdum, Patituce & Associates, LLC, 16855 Foltz
Industrial Parkway, Strongsville, OH 44149 (For Defendant-Appellant).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Kalrav T. Amin, appeals her conviction and sentence

for Attempted Aggravated Arson. For the following reasons, we reverse and vacate

Amin’s plea and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

        {¶2}     On November 23, 2021, the Geauga County Grand Jury indicted Amin for

Aggravated Arson, a felony of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(3).

        {¶3}     On January 24, 2023, Amin pled guilty to an amended charge of Attempted

Aggravated Arson, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C. 2909.02(A)(3) and
R.C. 2923.02(A). As stated in the Plea Agreement, Amin was subject to the following

potential penalties: “Prison: 2-8 years”; “Subject to Regan Tokes: Yes, indefinite prison

term maximum up to 12 years”; “Post release control: Mandatory up to 3 years but not

less than 18 months”; and “Maximum fine up to $15,000.00.”

       {¶4}   On March 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced Amin to a prison term of 2 years,

up to 3 years but not less than 18 months of post-release control, and a fine of $5,000.00.

       {¶5}   On appeal, Amin raises the following assignments of error:

              [1.] Appellant did not enter a knowing, intelligent, or voluntary plea
              when the trial court failed to personally review the potential penalties
              involved, the imposition of post-release control, and failed to correct
              the State’s improper recitation of the potential penalty.

              [2.] Appellant’s sentence is contrary to law because the trial court
              failed to give required notice under SB 201 and 2929.19(B)(2)(c).

       {¶6}   Under the first assignment of error, Amin argues that the trial court failed to

properly advise her of the maximum penalty involved when accepting her plea thus

rendering the plea invalid.

       {¶7}   “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660

N.E.2d 450 (1996). “Failure on any one of those points renders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Id.;

State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 10. “Ohio’s

Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow when accepting pleas” to

“‘ensur[e] an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally inform

the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is

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Case No. 2023-G-0009
understandingly and voluntarily made.’” (Citation omitted.) Dangler at ¶ 11; State v. Nero,

56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).

       {¶8}   Relevant for the present appeal is Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) which provides: “In

felony cases the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without first addressing

the defendant personally * * * and * * * [d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea

voluntarily, with understanding * * * of the maximum penalty involved.” The duty to ensure

that   a   defendant    understands     the   maximum      penalty    is   considered    to   be

“nonconstitutional” in nature. State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820

N.E.2d 355, ¶ 29.

       {¶9}   “When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on

appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the trial-court

proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13. Thus, “when a

trial court fails to fully cover [the] ‘nonconstitutional’ aspects of the plea colloquy,” such as

the maximum penalty involved, “a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to

invalidate a plea.” Id. at ¶ 14. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has “made a limited

exception to the prejudice component of that rule in the criminal-plea context.” Id. “[A]

trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the

defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 15. For example, in State v. Sarkozy,

117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 N.E.2d 1224, the Supreme Court “held that the

trial court had completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that it

explain the maximum penalty when the court made no mention of postrelease control in

the plea colloquy, despite the fact the defendant was subject to a mandatory five years of

postrelease control.” Id.

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       {¶10} At the plea colloquy, the following advisements were given with respect to

the potential penalties:

              Prosecutor: The parties acknowledge that the defendant is subject
              to the following potential penalties: Count 1, Attempted Aggravated
              Arson, second degree felony. Prison. Definite prison between 2 and
              8 years. There is a presumption for prison. There is no mandatory
              prison. Post-release control would be mandatory up to 3 years but
              not less than 18 months. This sentence would be subject to the
              Reagan Tokes law, so potential for indefinite prison term maximum
              up to 12 years. There is an arson registration requirement. And the
              financial sanctions are mandatory reimbursement of investigative
              costs of arson but the State is not aware of any costs seeking to be
              recovered by the sheriff’s department at this time. And a maximum
              fine of up to $15,000. Thank you.

              ***

              The Court: All right. So normally I would advise you of the
              maximum penalties but they’ve been set forth in the plea agreement
              itself. I’m going to ask Mr. Burling [the prosecutor] do you have an
              opinion whether that’s sufficient to be able to not repeat them all.

              Prosecutor: Well, your Honor, I think if you ask the defense if they
              understand-- if she understands and is satisfied with that
              explanation.

              The Court: All right. That’s what I’m gonna do. So in your [Amin’s]
              plea agreement all those maximum penalties were set out in it. Are
              you comfortable that you understand them, what the maximum
              penalties are?

              Amin:         Yes, your Honor.

              The Court: Okay. And you are-- you don’t need me to repeat them
              for you as we speak?

              Amin:         No, your Honor.

              The Court: Okay. All right. Well, let me also advise you, you are
              advised that there is a mandatory post-release control but let me
              advise you that if you violate-- so post-release control is a period of
              time after release from incarceration, if you are sent to prison. So if
              you-- sometimes they impose post-release control sanctions and if
              you violate a post-release control sanction all of the following apply:
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Case No. 2023-G-0009
              First, the adult parole authority could impose a more restrictive post-
              release control sanction. Secondly, the parole board may increase
              the duration of the post-release control. Third, the parole board may
              impose an additional prison term of up to one-half of the original
              sentence not to exceed nine months for each violation. And lastly, if
              the violation of a post-release control sanction is also a felony, you
              could be sentenced for the new felony and the court may impose an
              additional prison term of either 12 months or the time remaining on
              post-release control whichever is greater which must run
              consecutively.

       {¶11} Amin maintains that the trial court completely failed to strictly comply with

the maximum penalty requirement of Crim.R. 11(C) so that she did not need to show

prejudice. Specifically, she notes the following purported defects in the colloquy: “The

court does not correct the appellee’s incorrect assertion that this offense is subject to a

definite term of incarceration, nor does the court explain the indefinite sentencing scheme

of Reagan Tokes required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), R.C. 2929.144(C) and R.C.

2929.271 [sic]. Further, the court mentions the mandatory post-release control sanction

for this offense and what could occur if there is a violation, but fails to identify what post-

release control is. Furthermore, the court fails to notify Appellant of her eligibility for

Judicial Release by entering this plea. Lastly, the court fails to address the limitations a

guilty plea has on Appellant’s appellate rights.” Appellate Brief of Defendant-Appellant at

6.

       {¶12} We find that the trial court’s advisement regarding the maximum penalty

was wholly deficient inasmuch as it communicated contradictory information to Amin

without any effort to explain the significance of definite and indefinite sentencing under

the Reagan Tokes law.

       {¶13} It is well-established that, when conducting the plea colloquy, “the trial judge

must convey accurate information to the defendant so that the defendant can understand
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Case No. 2023-G-0009
the consequences of his or her decision and enter a valid plea.” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio

St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 26. Here, the trial court conveyed no

information to Amin regarding the maximum penalty involved. Rather, the court relied on

the prosecutor’s deficient statement of the maximum penalty. State v. Gonzalez, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 29018, 2019-Ohio-4882, ¶ 9 (“statements from the prosecutor and defense

counsel are not an adequate substitute for the trial judge’s obligation to address the

defendant ‘personally’ to ensure that he understands the maximum penalty he is facing”).

      {¶14} The prosecutor advised Amin that she faced a “definite” prison sentence of

between 2 and 8 years. Then, after advising her that there was a presumption for prison

but that prison would not be mandatory, the prosecutor stated that, under the Reagan

Tokes law, she faced a “potential for indefinite prison term maximum” of up to 12 years.

No explanation was given Amin as to how a definite prison sentence of up to 8 years was

consistent with an indefinite prison sentence of up to 12 years or what was the legal

significance of being “under the Reagan Tokes law.” Amin responded to the court that

she understood the prosecutor’s advisement as to what the maximum penalty was but it

is not at all clear that her “understanding” properly reflected the operation of the Reagan

Tokes law. The law provides for a “stated minimum term” and a “maximum prison term”

and these terms were not employed by the prosecutor or explained by the court. See

R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) and R.C. 2929.144(B)(1). Stated otherwise, we cannot presume

that Amin’s understanding of the maximum penalty was more accurate than the

prosecutor’s statement of the maximum penalty. State v. Tutt, 2015-Ohio-5145, 54

N.E.3d 619, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (“[i]f a defendant receives ‘proper information,’ it can be

assumed that he or she understood it”).

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Case No. 2023-G-0009
       {¶15} In this respect, Amin’s reliance on State v. Mullins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

111291, 2023-Ohio-803, is instructive. In Mullins, the defendant was not fully informed

regarding the nature of the charges and misinformed about the maximum sentence. Id.

at ¶ 18.   The court of appeals held that “[t]hese omissions and the misinformation

demonstrate a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) and eliminate [the

defendant’s] burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s error.” Id.

at ¶ 21. Although the nature of the deficiencies in the plea colloquy differs from the

present case, the effect on the validity of the plea is the same. “Because of the substantial

misinformation * * * provided to [the defendant], it cannot be said that Mullins knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea.” Id. at ¶ 20.

       {¶16} The first assignment of error is with merit.

       {¶17} Under the second assignment of error, Amin argues the trial court erred at

sentencing by failing to provide the required notices regarding indefinite sentencing and

her appellate rights.

       {¶18} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), a trial court imposing a non-life felony

indefinite prison term must, at the sentencing hearing and before imposing sentence,

provide the offender with certain statutory notifications regarding the consequences of an

indefinite sentence. The court in the present case failed to give the required notifications

and the State concedes the error. When the court fails to give the indefinite sentence

notifications, it has been the practice of this and other courts to remand the case for

resentencing. State v. Fenderson, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-22-034, 2023-Ohio-2903, ¶ 77

(“Ohio courts agree that a trial court errs where it fails to make these mandatory

advisements at the sentencing hearing” so the matter must be remanded “‘for the limited

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Case No. 2023-G-0009
purpose of permitting the sentencing court to provide the mandatory notifications’”)

(citation omitted); State v. Baker, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 22 CO 0033, 2023-Ohio-2747,

¶ 16; State v. Miles, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2020-P-0032, 2020-Ohio-6921, ¶ 27-29.

        {¶19} Given that Amin’s plea has been found invalid and must be vacated under

the first assignment of error, however, any error with respect to sentencing is rendered

moot.

        {¶20} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Geauga County Court of

Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent

with this Opinion. Costs to be taxed against the appellee.

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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