Court Opinion

ID: 9589908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:50:10.361303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:55.050810
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
In this appeal we are once again called upon to grapple with questions regarding the regulation of nude dancing. Although the majority implies in Division 10 that, because of the appellants’ substantial expenditures in their businesses, they would have acquired vested rights if the City of Marietta had chosen to regulate adult entertainment by way of a zoning ordinance, the majority holds that the appellants acquired no right to continue their businesses since the city chose to regulate adult entertainment pursuant to a licensing scheme. I disagree with this holding and therefore dissent.
The majority relies largely on Division 1 (a) of Cobb County v. Peavy12 for its holding. I find, however, that that division of Peavy is inapposite to this case. The contention addressed in Division 1 (a) of Peavy was whether the issuance of a business license in and of itself, without regard to the property owner’s investment in the business, was sufficient to create a vested right. Here, of course, the issue is whether the appellants have acquired a vested right to operate their businesses because they obtained the appropriate licenses pursuant to the adult entertainment ordinance and because they made substantial expenditures to put the businesses into operation. Furthermore, although we held in Peavy that the fact that the appellant had obtained a business license was not enough, by itself, to give her a vested right, we did not hold that this factor was dispositive of the appeal. Instead, we addressed whether Peavy had a vested right in *700her lawful, pre-existing use based upon the expenditures she had made.13 Peavy thus implicitly stands for the proposition that a person operating a business can obtain a vested right based upon expenditures even if that person cannot acquire vested rights based upon the business license.
Decided March 17, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1997.
O. Jackson Cook, Groover & Childs, Denmark Groover, Jr., for appellants (case no. S96A1494).
Steven M. Youngelson, for appellants (case no. S96A1496).
Moreover, I find no rational reason to treat an adult entertainment ordinance like the one in this case any differently from a zoning ordinance for purposes of determining vested rights. First, Peavy itself acknowledged that “the general aim of both zoning and licensing regulations is the promotion of the general welfare.” Second, zoning regulations, like licensing regulations, are subject to change at any time if the local government believes that the change will promote the general welfare of the community. Third, the adult entertainment ordinance in this case is in fact a combination zoning-licensing scheme, containing numerous traditional zoning features. Finally, here, unlike many licensing regulations, including the one at issue in the Colorado case on which the majority relies,14 the adult entertainment ordinance was amended so as to entirely preclude the businesses that the appellants had been operating — lounges featuring nude dancing.
Because the adult entertainment ordinance at issue is a combination zoning-licensing scheme, because the ordinance’s amendment precludes a pre-existing use of the property, and because zoning and licensing schemes share a common goal of furthering the general welfare of the public, I would apply to this case the well-established principle that the termination of a pre-existing use of property that does not constitute a nuisance and has not been abandoned generally is confiscatory unless there is a reasonable amortization period in which to bring the use to a close.15 Under that test, I believe that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the appellees. I therefore dissent.
*701Alan I. Begner, Cory G. Begner, for appellants (case no. S96A1497).
Haynie & Litchfield, Douglas R. Haynie, Emilie K. Petrovich, Barnhart, O’Quinn & Williams, Michael A. O’Quinn, Robert K. Haderlein, for appellees.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Daniel M. Formby, Deputy Attorney General, John B. Ballard, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General, W. Wright Banks, Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae.

 248 Ga. 870, 872 (1) (a) (286 SE2d 732) (1982).

 Peavy, 248 Ga. at 872.

 See Ficarra v. Dept. of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P2d 6 (Colo. 1993).

 4 Ziegler, Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 51.01[2][a] (4th ed.); 2 Ziegler at 17B.02 [3] [I]; 4 Ziegler at 51B.05 [1]; Ebel v. City of Corona, 767 F2d 635, 639 (3) (9th Cir. 1985) (60-day amortization period for adult bookstore was found not to be satisfactory in view of length of lease and financial investment in bookstore).