Court Opinion

ID: 9716401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:38:06.990381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:45.330064
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and must part ways with the majority's decision to reverse the denial of Holder's motion to suppress. In my view, Officer Bruner's initial entry onto the premises was lawful, as was the warrantless entry into the house in light of the exigent cireumstances that existed here.
I would note that the touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is whether an individual has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy." Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). At least one commentator has observed that "when the police come onto private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations . made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.3(f), at 506-08 (3d ed. 1996). Moreover, what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984).
A well-known exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to enter a home when it is believed that evidence may be destroyed or removed before a warrant is obtained. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 598, 600 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The officers must have a reasonable belief that there are people within the *371premises who are destroying or about to destroy the evidence. Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ind.1994). In such a case, the nature of the evidence must be evanescent, and the officers must fear its imminent destruction. Id. Yet another exception to the warrant requirement arises when the risk of bodily harm or death is present, or when it is necessary to come to the aid of an individual who is in need. VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trams. denied. Put another way, "tlhe need to preserve or protect life justifies what would otherwise be illegal if exigency or emergency did not exist." Vango v. State, 7388 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
In light of the above, it is apparent to me that Officer Bruner's decision to enter the premises and conduct the "smell test" at the basement window was simply incident to the strong odor of ether that was drifting through the vicinity. And Holder had already exposed his illegal activity to the public, as evidenced by the odor of ether in the air and cracked window from which he permitted it to escape. Tr. p. 13. Additionally, the record shows that Officer Bruner already sensed the strong odor outside Holder's residence while armed with the knowledge that ether is a precursor in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Tr. p. 7-9, 38. Put another way, it is without dispute that Officer Bruner detected the odor of ether before he 'approached Holder's window and before coming in extreme proximity to the residence.
That said, I believe it was reasonable for Officer Bruner to suspect that methamphetamine was being manufactured and to make an initial entry onto Holder's land to investigate. Hence, I must disagree with the majority's determination that Officer Bruner's "smell test" at the basement window was overly intrusive of Holder's priva-ey rights to the extent that his protections as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment were violated. >
I would also note that sufficient exigent circumstances existed here that justified the officers' entry into the residence without a warrant. During a conversation with the officers at the residence, Holder told them that he had pending criminal charges for the manufacture of methamphetamine. Tr. p. 14. Holder went on to admit that his three-year-old granddaughter was in the house, along with two other adults. Tr. p. 18. To me, all the cireumstances here-the strong smell of explosive ether, the adults in the home that could have been destroying evidence, the endangered child, and Holder's pending charges for manufacturing methamphetamine-justified the warrantless entry into Holder's residence. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the trial court's judgment in denying Holder's motion to suppress.
ORDER
On January 26, 2005, the Court handed down its opinion in this appeal marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication. The Appellant, by counsel, has filed a Motion to Publish Memorandum Decision.
Having considered the matter, the Court FINDS AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Appellant's Motion to Publish Memorandum Decision is GRANTED and this Court's opinion heretofore handed down in this cause on January 26, 2005, marked Memorandum Decision, Not for Publication is now ORDERED PUBLISHED.