Court Opinion

ID: 9909909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-14 16:05:47.130411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:47.396044
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                             RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2023
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0336-MR

ALLEN WAYNE HATCHER                                                   APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                         NO. 2022-CA-0435
                EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 03-CR-0118

HONORABLE PHILLIP PATTON, SPECIAL                                      APPELLEE
JUDGE, EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT

AND

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                  REAL PARTY IN INTEREST/APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals’ decision denying a writ of

prohibition sought by Allen W. Hatcher to reverse and vacate his conviction for

intentional murder. Hatcher argues this conviction violated his right against

double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. We affirm.

                       I.    Facts and Procedural Posture

      The underlying facts of Hatcher’s crimes are irrelevant here. It suffices to

note that he was convicted of murder and several other crimes in 2005 for

which he received a sentence of thirty years in prison. Those convictions were

affirmed on direct appeal. Hatcher v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-0623-MR,
2006 WL 2456354, at *1 (Ky. Aug. 24, 2006). In 2010, upon an RCr 1 11.42

motion for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court of Appeals vacated his

conviction for murder and remanded for a new trial solely on that charge and

lesser included offenses. Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Ky.

App. 2010). In that collateral attack, Hatcher had argued that the instruction

for murder upon which he was convicted was a combination jury instruction

that failed to distinguish between intentional murder and wanton murder. Id.

at 698. 2 The Court of Appeals held that argument was without merit. Id.

      In 2015, Hatcher was retried for murder, again convicted, and sentenced

to life in prison. We again affirmed. Hatcher v. Commonwealth, No. 2015-SC-

000258-MR, 2016 WL 3370999, at *3 (Ky. June 16, 2016). In 2018, Hatcher

filed separately an RCr 11.42 motion and a CR 3 60.02 motion to collaterally

      1 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
      2 Jury Instruction No. 5, the instruction for murder, read as follows:

      You will find the Defendant, Allen Hatcher, guilty of Murder under this
      instruction, if and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
      doubt all of the following:
             A. That in this county on or about November 6, 2003, and before the
             finding of the Indictment herein, he killed Edward Tankersley by
             shooting him;
      AND
             B. That in so doing;
             (1) He caused the death of Edward Tankersly [sic] intentionally and not
             while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance;
      OR
             (2) He was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of
             Death to Edward Tankersly [sic] under circumstances manifesting an
             extreme indifference to human life.
      AND
             C. That in so doing he was not privileged to act in self-protection.

Id.
      3 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure

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attack this second conviction. Both were denied by the trial court, and the

Court of Appeals ordered the two cases consolidated. In the CR 60.02(e)

motion, Hatcher specifically argued that based on the jury instructions in his

second trial, his right against double jeopardy was violated. As the Court of

Appeals summarized,

      The basis for this motion is the combined instruction for
      intentional and wanton murder used in the first trial in 2005 and
      the second trial in 2015. Hatcher argued that his murder
      conviction in the second trial constituted a double jeopardy
      violation,

            because the jury's return of a guilty verdict under a
            combined jury instruction at the first trial brough [sic]
            about the very situation here where the jury's verdict
            finding Hatcher guilty of both intentional and wanton
            murder, jeopardy attached as a matter of law to both
            intentional and wanton murder barring Hatcher's
            conviction for intentional murder at the second trial.

             He argued that, because the jury verdict at the first trial
      could not be determined to be under the intentional murder or
      wanton murder part of the murder instruction, it had to be
      considered under both pursuant to the applicable caselaw. He
      argued that if he had been found guilty of either intentional or
      wanton murder in the first trial, there was an implied acquittal on
      the other charge, which would implicate a double jeopardy
      violation on retrial.

Hatcher v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-001537-MR, 2020 WL 1490759, at *5

(Ky. App. Mar. 27, 2020). The jury instruction given in the second trial read,

                                INSTRUCTION NO. 5
                                      MURDER
      You will find the Defendant guilty of Murder under this Instruction if,
      and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all
      of the following:
      A. That in this county on or about November 6, 2003 and before the
      finding of the Indictment herein, he killed Edward Tankersly Jr., by
      shooting him in the head with a 45 cal. Handgun;
      AND
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      B. That in so doing:
            (1) He caused the death of Edward Tankersly Jr., intentionally and
            not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional
            disturbance;
      OR
            (2) He was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave
            risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of Edward
            Tankersly, Jr., under circumstances manifesting an extreme
            indifference to human life.
      AND
      C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection.

Id. at *8. The Court of Appeals noted that the difference between the first trial

and second trial was in the verdict forms: “[t]he verdict form [in the second

trial] permitted the jury to find Hatcher guilty of intentional murder under form

‘A,’ guilty of murder under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference

to human life under form ‘B,’ or not guilty under form ‘C.’” Id. In the first trial,

the verdict form “permitted the jury to find Hatcher guilty of murder under

form ‘A’ or not guilty under form ‘B.’” Id. The Court of Appeals noted that

      Hatcher asserts that, because it was impossible to determine
      whether the jury convicted him of intentional murder or wanton
      murder in the first trial, it was equally impossible to determine
      which offense he was acquitted of. Therefore, he argues that
      jeopardy attached to both the intentional and wanton murder
      charges on retrial.

Id. at *9. But the lower court denied his claim for CR 60.02 relief because

“Hatcher's double jeopardy argument should and could have been raised on

direct appeal, although we do not believe Hatcher would have been successful

had he raised this issue in the appropriate forum.” Id.

                                          4
      On April 14, 2022, Hatcher filed his petition for writ of prohibition

making the same arguments regarding double jeopardy as in his CR 60.02

action. The Court of Appeals denied the writ, ruling Hatcher

      is not entitled to relief by means of a writ. First, the Edmonson
      Circuit Court is not acting and is not about to act. Although a
      claim of double jeopardy can be considered in an application for a
      writ of prohibition, the purpose is to consider whether a pending
      trial is appropriate. Petitioner’s trial has been concluded and his
      conviction became final years ago.

             Second, Kentucky law provided Petitioner with more
      adequate remedies by appeal and otherwise. Petitioner could have
      and should have raised any potential double jeopardy claim in his
      direct appeal. Also, Petitioner did raise the issue in his CR 60.02
      motion and in the appeal thereof.

We now consider the merits of the appeal.

                                   II.    Analysis

      We decline to address the specific arguments regarding double jeopardy

advanced by Hatcher. This case raises a question of whether a writ of

prohibition can ever lie, as a matter of law, to vacate a final judgment of a trial

court. The Court of Appeals implicitly addressed this question when it ruled the

writ would not lie because the Edmonson Circuit Court was not taking or

about to take an action erroneously within its jurisdiction. We agree and

reaffirm that neither a writ of prohibition nor mandamus can lie to vacate a

final judgment.

      In Hoskins v. Miracle, we set out the two categories of writs of prohibition

and their requirements, as follows,

      A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the
      lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its
      jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an
                                         5
      intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about
      to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there
      exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great
      injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not
      granted.

150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). In Dunn v. Maze, we held “there is not an

adequate remedy by appeal where a defendant contends that double jeopardy

would bar a second trial following either an acquittal or conviction.” 485

S.W.3d 735, 742 (Ky. 2016). As such, Hatcher could have petitioned for the

writ once it was clear the Commonwealth intended to re-try him for murder,

although, we do not imply such action would have been meritorious.

      As stated clearly in Hoskins, a writ under either class may be granted if it

can be shown the trial court is “proceeding or is about to proceed” without

jurisdiction or “acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its

jurisdiction.” Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. The language is active, and presumes

an action is being or is about to be taken by the trial court. We therefore agree

with what the Supreme Court of the United States said over 150 years ago,

      The writ of prohibition, as its name imports, is one which
      commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something
      which . . . the court is informed he is about to do. If the thing be
      already done, it is manifest the writ of prohibition cannot undo it,
      for that would require an affirmative act; and the only effect of a
      writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any
      further proceeding in the prohibited direction.

United States v. Hoffman, 71 U.S. 158, 161-62 (1866). As such, a writ of

prohibition cannot direct the trial court to take an affirmative act. It only

requires an action being taken or about to be taken, not be taken. Our

predecessor Court has previously echoed this understanding when it held

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      the principal function and character of a prohibitory writ is
      preventive rather than corrective and issues to prevent the
      threatened commission of a future act rather than to undo an act
      which, as here, has already been performed. It will not be granted
      when the act sought to be prevented is already done.

Garner v. Shouse, 168 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Ky. 1943). Shouse is in fact on point. In

that case, a man had been charged with and pled guilty to driving while

intoxicated. He sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge of the police

court from signing and entering the final judgment. Id. at 45. The petitioner

alleged irregularities with procedure that denied him his right to a fair trial. Id.

But because proof showed the final judgment had been duly signed and

entered prior to the seeking of the writ, the Court held the petition “must needs

be overruled” because “after entering the judgment of conviction and fine and

therein stating same had been paid and satisfied in full . . . [the judge] duly

signed the said judgment, when same became a completed act.” Id. at 47.

Therefore, the writ was improper because its purpose was “forbidding the doing

of something which has thus been already done . . . .” Id.

      Properly speaking, what Hatcher is seeking is a writ of mandamus—an

order compelling the trial court to vacate his judgment. But the standards for

both the writs of mandamus and prohibition are the same.

      To prevail on the Petition for Writ of Mandamus, it is incumbent
      upon appellant to establish that the lower court is proceeding or
      about to proceed without jurisdiction, and there is no adequate
      remedy by law, or to establish that the lower court, although acting
      with jurisdiction, is about to act incorrectly and there is no
      adequate remedy by appeal and great injustice or irreparable
      injury would result.

                                         7
Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Ky. 1990). The difference between the two is

that a writ of prohibition restricts an action, while a writ of mandamus is “to

compel a public officer to perform a ministerial duty, and . . . a petitioner must

name a public officer and seek to compel that officer to perform a ministerial

act.” Hamblen ex. rel. Byars v. Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Fam. Servs.,

322 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Ky. App. 2010). “While mandamus will lie to set a court

in motion, it cannot be used to control the result.” Kaufman v. Humphrey, 329

S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky 1959) (quoting Hargis v. Swope, 114 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Ky.

1938)). And “[w]hen the circuit court has entered a final judgment, mandamus

will not lie.” Childers v. Stephenson, 320 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Ky. 1959). As has

been the rule since the very beginnings of the Commonwealth, “[m]andamus is

a proper remedy to compel an inferior Court to adjudicate upon a subject

within their jurisdiction, where they neglect or refuse to do so; but where they

have adjudicated, the mandamus will not lie for the purpose of revising or

correcting their decision.” Mahoney v. McDonald-Burkman, 320 S.W.3d 75, 79

(Ky. 2010) (quoting Warren County Court v. Daniel, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 573, 1812 WL

628 (1812)).

      In the case before us, Hatcher seeks a writ of prohibition but, as the

Court of Appeals correctly noted, there is no erroneous action alleged by

Hatcher that the trial court is taking or about to be taking. There is no action

of the circuit court at all. The judgment was entered in 2015, and the direct

appeal affirming was completed in 2016. His collateral attacks were considered

in March 2020; thus, his conviction became final later that same year. There is

                                        8
nothing to prohibit. Insofar as Hatcher is substantively seeking a writ of

mandamus to compel the vacatur of his conviction, he asked the Court of

Appeals to direct a specific result regarding a final judgment. That is contrary

to law. In other words, Hatcher seeks a writ to circumvent the regular appellate

procedure, but the law is clear writs are “not to be used as a substitute for the

appellate process.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Caudill, 136 S.W.3d 781,

782 (Ky. App. 2003).

                                  III.   Conclusion

      “A writ of mandamus or prohibition serves only to prevent injury, not to

remedy it.” Mahoney, 320 S.W.3d at 78. Because Hatcher seeks to vacate a

final judgment duly entered by a Circuit Court whose jurisdiction to do that act

is not doubted, the action he seeks is remedial, not preventative, and is

improper. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

      All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., sitting. All concur. Thompson, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Allen Wayne Hatcher, pro se

APPELLEE:

Hon. Phillip Patton, Special Judge
Edmonson Circuit Court

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN INTEREST:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General
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