Court Opinion

ID: 9406394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 20:04:08.421479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:30.542982
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/30/23 In re Israel M. CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 In re ISRAEL M., a Person                                      B325834
 Coming Under Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                           (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 18LJJP00585)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 M.W.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Donald A. Buddle, Judge. Affirmed.
      William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       M.W. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to her son, Israel M., on the basis that the
Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
and the juvenile court did not satisfy their duties of inquiry and
further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901–1963, and related California statutes (collectively,
ICWA). We need not decide whether any such error occurred
because, even assuming either DCFS or the court failed to
sufficiently execute their duties of inquiry and/or further inquiry,
on the current record, any such error was not prejudicial.

            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
      A.    Family’s Prior Dependency Proceedings and
            Related ICWA Inquiry1
       Israel was first adjudicated to be a dependent of the
juvenile court in 2016 in Kern County, along with several
maternal half siblings.2 The Kern County Department of Human
Services (the Kern DHS) investigated Israel’s possible Native
American heritage and whether ICWA applied to Israel as part
of the dependency proceedings that followed. We have taken

      1Because the only issue Mother raises on appeal is
compliance with ICWA, we do not attempt to summarize
Mother’s child welfare history, the basis for the prior or instant
dependency proceedings, or the basis for the termination of
her parental rights to Israel. We discuss other dependency
proceedings only to the extent they are relevant to our ICWA
analysis.
      2Mother has been involved in numerous dependency
proceedings in Los Angeles County and Kern County over the
past 20 years, and has had her parental rights to four of Israel’s
maternal half siblings terminated in connection therewith.

                                 2
judicial notice of documents reflecting that,3 in October 2016, the
Kern DHS sent ICWA inquiries regarding Israel to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA), Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, Colorado River
Indian Tribes, Ramah Navajo School Board, and Navajo Nation
in 2016, and received the following in response: a November
2016 letter from the Navajo Nation indicating the tribe could not
determine, based on the ancestry information provided, whether
Israel was eligible for membership in the tribe; a December
2016 letter from the Ramah Navajo School Board likewise so
indicating; and a December 2017 letter from the Blackfeet tribe
indicating Israel is not on the Blackfeet tribal rolls, nor is he
an Indian child under ICWA based on affiliation with the tribe.
      The Kern County court terminated jurisdiction over Israel
in 2017 with a family law order granting joint legal custody of
Israel to Mother and Israel’s father, I.M. (Father), not a party
this appeal, and granting sole physical custody of Israel to
Father.

      3  These were among the documents of which DCFS has
requested we take judicial notice. We hereby grant DCFS’s
request and take judicial notice of various records from
dependency proceedings in Kern County regarding Israel, his
siblings, and/or his half siblings. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)
[“[j]udicial notice may be taken of . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) [r]ecords of (1)
any court of this state”].)

                                     3
      B.    Instant Proceedings and Initial ICWA Inquiry
            Therein
       On September 1, 2018, DCFS detained Israel from Father.
On September 6, 2018, it filed the Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3004 petition on behalf of Israel leading to the instant
dependency proceedings.
       Prior to the hearing on the September 2018 petition, Father
informed DCFS that he was part Navajo, but that neither he nor
Israel was registered with the tribe. Father filed Judicial Council
form ICWA-020 (ICWA-020 form), on which he checked the box
for “I may have Indian ancestry,” crossed out the word “may,”
and wrote, “Navajo.” He further wrote, “[the] Kern County Court
determined that I am not eligible for membership in the tribe.”
       Mother filed an ICWA-020 form on which she checked
the box stating, “I may have Indian ancestry” and wrote,
“Blackfoot.”
       At the detention hearing on September 6, 2018, the
juvenile court asked Father about his reported Navajo heritage.
Father confirmed the information he had provided in writing.
Father further told the court that the only family member
with additional information about Father’s heritage was Israel’s
paternal grandfather, who was deceased. “In an abundance of
caution,” the court “order[ed] [DCFS] to make further inquiries
as to [Father’s] American Indian heritage.”
       The court also inquired of Mother about her claimed
Blackfeet heritage. Mother identified the website “Ancestry.com”
and “[her] grandma—[her] great[-]grandma” as sources of
additional information about her Native American heritage.

      4Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                4
Mother stated her great-grandmother had a tribal membership
number, and that the maternal grandfather would have a way to
contact her. The court ordered DCFS to conduct further ICWA
inquiry as to Mother.

     C.     Further ICWA Inquiry in the Instant
            Proceedings
     DCFS interviewed Father again on September 18, 2018
regarding his possible Native American heritage. Father offered
the same information he had in the past, adding that his paternal
grandmother (the paternal great-grandmother) had told him
they were Navajo. DCFS asked Father if he could identify
any family members who were registered with a tribe or would
have additional information about the family’s heritage. Father
responded that the only relatives with such information—the
paternal grandfather and paternal great-grandfather—were both
deceased. Father repeatedly told DCFS he did not want to delay
proceedings for further ICWA inquiry, because he “ ‘kn[e]w’ ” his
ancestry “is not recognized[,]” he had “already [gone] through this
with Kern [C]ounty[,]”and the Kern County court had already
determined ICWA does not apply.
     DCFS interviewed Mother on September 13, 2018 regarding
possible Native American heritage. Mother stated her great-
grandmother (the maternal great-great-grandmother) had
told Mother she belonged to a tribe, “ ‘but she passed away
and [Mother] [did not] remember right now.’ ” DCFS requested
contact information for Mother’s family members who might
have additional information, and Mother said she would ask
the maternal grandfather if Mother could provide his contact
information to DCFS.

                                5
      When DCFS interviewed Mother again a week later, Mother
stated she did not know which tribe her family was affiliated
with, and she planned to investigate her heritage through
the website Ancestry.com. DCFS explained to Mother the need
to collect as much information about Mother’s family as possible
in order to research possible tribal affiliation, and requested the
names and contact information of Mother’s relatives. Mother
provided the maternal grandmother’s name, but did not have
any further information about the maternal grandmother.
She provided the maternal grandfather’s name, birthplace,
and birthdate, but indicated his address was “confidential.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Mother had no information for the
maternal great-grandparents on her mother’s side. She provided
the names of the maternal great-grandparents on her father’s
side, both of whom were deceased. She told DCFS she had
provided all the family information she had.
      On November 15, 2018, DCFS mailed “ICWA notice[s]” to
the Navajo Nation, Ramah Navajo School Board Inc., Colorado
River Indian Tribes, Secretary of the Interior, and Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). The Ramah Navajo School Board responded
that it had no record of the family. It identified other sources of
information about possible tribal membership, to both of which
DCFS had already mailed ICWA inquiries (the BIA and Navajo
Nation).

      D.    ICWA Finding and Termination of
            Reunification Services
      At the disposition hearing on February 25, 2019, the
juvenile court found ICWA did not apply to Israel and ordered
the parents to keep the court and DCFS informed of any new
information relevant to ICWA.

                                6
      On November 16, 2020, after an extended trial, the juvenile
court terminated reunification services for both parents and
scheduled a permanency planning hearing. The hearing was
repeatedly continued.

     E.    ICWA Inquiry Efforts in Concurrent Kern
           County Dependency Proceedings Regarding
           Israel’s Full Siblings
       Meanwhile, on February 8, 2022, a Kern County juvenile
court found Israel’s three full siblings to be dependents of the
court, and new dependency proceedings began in Kern County
regarding those three children.
       Soon thereafter, Mother reported to the Kern DHS that
she had Blackfeet ancestry, and Father reported having Navajo
ancestry. The Kern DHS searched its records from previous
dependency proceedings, and located the 2016-2017 responses
the Kern DHS had received from the Blackfeet tribe, Navajo
tribe, and the BIA “stating that the children’s sibling [Israel]
was not eligible for membership in the [i]nquired [t]ribes.”
       The Kern County court inquired of Mother and Father
and found reason to believe the siblings may be Indian children.
The Kern DHS therefore conducted additional investigation
under ICWA.
       During a March 11, 2022 phone interview, a Kern DHS
social worker asked Mother about possible Native American
heritage and reminded her she had previously told the
authorities her family was affiliated with the Blackfeet tribe
and/or a small tribe in Mississippi. In response, Mother said
she did not know, and ended the call. A social worker spoke
again with Mother on March 15, 2022, and Mother stated she
has Pueblo heritage, and that her family lived on a reservation

                                7
in Mississippi. When the social worker asked how Mother had
determined that her heritage was with the Pueblo tribe, rather
than the Blackfeet tribe, Mother indicated she had “googled it.”
After the social worker noted that the Pueblo tribe was located
in New Mexico and attempted to inquire further, Mother
disconnected the call. The Kern DHS also spoke with Father,
and Father provided the same information he had provided to
DCFS in connection with the instant dependency proceedings.
       In March 2022, the Kern DHS attempted to contact several
extended relatives without success. Specifically, a Kern DHS
social worker called the maternal grandmother (L.R.) and the
maternal grandfather (D.W.), and in both instances, left a
message requesting a return call. The social worker sent an
ICWA letter, questionnaire, family tree and return envelope to
L.R. as well. The social worker attempted to contact the paternal
grandmother (S.D.) via phone and left a message requesting a
call back with a woman who indicated she was S.D.’s colleague.
Finally, the social worker attempted to contact the paternal
grandfather via phone and left a message requesting a return
call.
       The Kern DHS was able to reach some extended family
members as a result of its efforts in March 2022. First, a Kern
DHS social worker spoke with maternal aunt C.J., who denied
any information about Native American heritage and suggested
the social worker contact the paternal grandfather (whom the
social worker subsequently attempted to contact again, without
success). Second, the social worker spoke with the maternal
great-uncle (E.D.), the maternal grandfather’s brother. E.D.
said that “his great[-]grandmother was Cherokee . . . and [his]
mother, [M.G.], was born in Missouri and is Cherokee [and], the

                                8
great[-]grandmother, [A.S.], unknown date of birth or middle
name, was Cherokee and born on a reservation but [he] did not
know which one.” He denied that the family had any Blackfeet or
Pueblo heritage to his knowledge. The Kern DHS was ultimately
able to make contact with the paternal grandmother, who denied
any Native American heritage. The Kern DHS also spoke with
maternal aunt S.J., who denied any Native American heritage.
      Following up on these discussions with the extended
family, the Kern DHS sent ICWA inquiries to the Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians, the United Keetoowah Bank of Cherokee
Indians, the Cherokee Nation, and the BIA. These inquiries
provided the names of both parents, the children, and the names
Mother and Father had provided for several extended family
members (specifically the maternal grandparents, the paternal
grandfather, the paternal great-grandmother, and the maternal
great-grandmother), as well as the birth dates the Kern DHS
had been able to obtain for some of these family members. The
inquiry sent to the BIA specifically identified the potentially
implicated tribes as “[p]ossibly Blackfeet” and “Navajo.” The
Cherokee tribes responded in April 2022 that the children—
Israel’s full siblings—were neither members of nor eligible for
membership in those tribes. The BIA responded that it had
insufficient information to determine tribal membership.

     F.    ICWA Finding and Termination of Parental
           Rights to Israel
       On October 31, 2022, counsel for DCFS asked the court
to find ICWA did not apply “based on the updated investigation
that has occurred in the sibling[s’] case [in Kern County].” The
court found no reason to know ICWA applied through Mother or
Father.

                                9
       On December 2, 2022, the court terminated parental rights
as to Israel. Mother appealed.

                         DISCUSSION
       Mother argues on appeal that we must conditionally
reverse the order terminating her parental rights to Israel,
because DCFS and the juvenile court did not fulfill their duties
of initial inquiry and further inquiry under ICWA by failing to
sufficiently inquire of extended family members. Even assuming
DCFS and/or the court did not sufficiently inquire of extended
family members to the extent ICWA requires,5 any such error
would not be prejudicial on the current record, and thus would
not warrant relief.
       Under ICWA, DCFS and the juvenile court “have
an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” into whether
a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (a).) An “Indian child” to whom ICWA applies is defined
as an unmarried child who “is either (a) a member of an Indian
tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C.
§ 1903(4); § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b).) ICWA requires, under
certain circumstances, that DCFS seek information about the

      5 We thus need not determine whether the duty to inquire
of extended family members applies as part of the initial duty
of inquiry, an issue recently addressed by In re Robert F. (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500, petition for review filed May 22, 2023,
S279743. (See ibid. [because child was not taken “into temporary
custody under section 306” but rather pursuant to “a protective
custody warrant under section 340[,] . . . [t]he inquiry obligation
prescribed by subdivision (b) of section 224.2 [to inquire of
extended family members] was not triggered”].)

                                10
child’s heritage from extended family members as part of its
initial inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).)
       DCFS must also conduct further inquiry when there
is reason to believe that a child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e).) There is reason to believe this when there is
“information suggesting that either the parent of the child or
the child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe,” including “information that indicates, but does not
establish,” the grounds for reason to know. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
Further inquiry includes gathering biographical information from
the parents and relatives, contacting the BIA, and contacting the
tribes potentially involved. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)
       A failure to sufficiently inquire of extended family members
in connection with ICWA duty of inquiry is prejudicial and
requires conditionally reversing a judgment terminating parental
rights only where “the record indicates that there was readily
obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully
upon whether the child is an Indian child.” (In re Benjamin M.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 (Benjamin M.); see also In re
Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, 509 [applying test for
prejudice from Benjamin M.]; In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
1009, 1017 [assessing whether there was “readily obtainable
information that was likely to bear meaningfully on whether [the
child] was an Indian child”].) While the instant proceedings were
pending in Los Angeles County, the Kern DHS engaged in efforts
to contact the only living extended family members anyone had
identified—either in the Kern County proceedings regarding
Israel’s full siblings that began in 2022 or the instant proceedings
regarding Israel—as possibly having information relevant to
whether ICWA applies to Israel and his siblings. In response

                                11
to these efforts, the Kern DHS either did not receive a response,
or received a response denying Native American heritage. In
addition, the Kern DHS efforts to contact potentially relevant
tribal organizations as recently as 2022 also did not suggest
Israel is an Indian child under ICWA. Thus, the record does not
indicate that conditionally reversing so that DCFS may again
attempt to contact these same relatives and/or again reach out
to these same tribal organizations is “likely to bear meaningfully
upon whether [Israel] is an Indian child.” (Benjamin M., supra,
at p. 744.)
       Indeed, the Kern DHS contacted or attempted to contact
all but one of the extended family members Mother specifically
identifies as readily available for DCFS to contact in this case,
were we to conditionally reverse. The one relative Mother notes
neither the Kern DHS nor DCFS inquired of regarding possible
Native American heritage is paternal aunt T.M. However,
considering the record as a whole—specifically, recent responses
from several paternal relatives indicating that the family had no
recognized Native American heritage, 2022 responses from tribal
organizations that did not find Native American heritage on the
paternal side, and 2016 responses from tribal associations to this
same effect—this is not sufficient to establish prejudice. Put
differently, given this additional information, T.M. is no longer a
person reasonably likely to have information suggesting Native
American heritage on the paternal side of the family. (See In
re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 (D.S.) [although great-
grandmother was potentially a “ ‘person that may reasonably be
expected to have information regarding the child’s membership,
citizenship status, or eligibility [under ICWA,]’ ” “the [a]gency
reasonably could conclude (based on its further communications

                                12
with [the] [a]unt) that no further inquiry was needed because
there was no further information of value to obtain from [great-
grandmother]”].)
       We conclude there can be no prejudice from the error
Mother argues occurred, because the Kern DHS recently
conducted the very inquiries Mother contends DCFS should have
conducted—and that Mother argues a conditional reversal would
allow DCFS to conduct. Indeed, the Kern DHS did so while the
instant dependency proceedings were pending—thus, at the very
time Mother argues DCFS should have been doing so. Mother
identifies no reason why DCFS repeating the same investigative
actions the Kern DHS recently completed and did not yield any
indication that Israel is an Indian child as defined under ICWA
would yield additional or different information, were DCFS to
repeat them.6
       To support her argument that the Kern DHS efforts are
insufficient, Mother cites the general proposition that the duty
of a court and DCFS to inquire under ICWA is an ongoing one.
The ongoing nature of that duty does not require, however, that

     6  In opposing DCFS’s request that we take judicial notice
of the documents reflecting the Kern DHS’s efforts, Mother
argues that they were not before the juvenile court and that
the more appropriate procedure, rather than taking judicial
notice of and relying on these documents on appeal, would be
to remand with the instruction that the juvenile court consider
them. This would be highly inefficient and would delay
permanency for Israel. (See In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th
664, 676 [permitting consideration of postappeal evidence under
certain circumstances when doing so would “ ‘expedit[e] the
proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the juvenile court[’]s
orders and judgment’ ”].)

                               13
the same investigative efforts be repeated when there is no
indication that they will yield different results. (See In re A.M.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323 (A.M.) [“[t]here is no need
for further inquiry . . . where parents ‘fail[ ] to provide any
information requiring follow[-]up’ [citations], or if the persons
who might have additional information are deceased [citation],
or refuse to talk to [the agency]”].)
       Mother also argues that “it is unreasonable to infer from
[the Kern DHS’s] unfruitful efforts—in relation to child Israel’s
siblings in a neighboring county—that [DCFS’s] initial and
further inquiries would be equally unfruitful in this case.”
(Italics omitted.) But Mother does not explain why this is
unreasonable, when the additional inquiry she is claiming the
court and DCFS should have undertaken is the same as what the
Kern DHS undertook; namely, reaching out to the same relatives
about the same two families.
       Mother further argues that, in assessing ICWA error
and prejudice therefrom, we cannot rely on the responses to
inquiries DCFS and the Kern DHS received from the BIA
and tribal associations, because the inquiries did not include
additional identifying information that DCFS might learn,
were it to conduct further inquiry of extended family members.
But again, Mother offers no basis for the assumption that
reaching out to the same family members the Kern DHS
contacted or attempted to contact would yield any more
information than the Kern DHS received in response to its
efforts. ICWA does not require DCFS to endlessly “cast about”
for investigative leads (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1053;
A.M., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 323), and “DCFS’s inquiry

                                14
obligation is ‘not an absolute duty to ascertain or refute Native
American ancestry.’ ” (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 570.)
       Finally, although Mother is correct that the Kern DHS only
contacted a few of the hundreds of tribes in the United States,
the duty of inquiry does not require reaching out to all Native
American tribes, or reaching out to a particular tribe without
some indication that the child might be affiliated therewith.
The record contains no basis for concluding Israel may have a
connection with any specifically identified Native America tribe
other than those of which the Kern DHS already inquired.
       In sum, even assuming there was insufficient inquiry
of extended family members, this error was not prejudicial in
light of the Kern DHS conducting—in 2022 and while the instant
dependency proceedings were ongoing—the very inquiries Mother
argues we must facilitate by conditionally reversing in the
instant matter.

                               15
                        DISPOSITION
      The court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights is
affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 BENDIX, J.

                 WEINGART, J.

                               16