Court Opinion

ID: 9659370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:43:02.48339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:07.356226
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Chafoulias is a limited purpose public figure but part company with its conclusion that ABC stands in a different position than Peterson on the issue. I conclude, as must the majority, that the factual record is sufficient to allow this court to reach the legal conclusion that Chafoulias is a limited purpose public figure. As to the issue of actual malice, I agree with the majority that summary judgment was appropriately granted as to ABC. Because I would conclude that Cha-foulias is a limited purpose public figure as to Peterson as well, I would also take the further step to conclude that Peterson is *661entitled to summary judgment. There are no facts before us that would clearly and convincingly support a finding that either ABC or Peterson acted with actual malice. Thus, I would affirm the court of appeals.
My disagreement with the majority begins at the first step of the limited purpose public figure analysis. While I agree with the majority that a public controversy existed at the time of the PrimeTime Live broadcast, the public controversy as framed by the majority is too narrow. As the majority presents it, the public controversy was “about whether the allegations were being sufficiently investigated by the women’s employers or Rochester law enforcement officials.” I would broaden the characterization of the public controversy.
The record shows that sexual harassment of Rochester women by male Arabs was a community issue. Area businesses considered harassment of women in Rochester by visiting Arabs a serious concern in the mid-1990s. The Mayo Clinic addressed the problem with “a lot of meetings and a lot of information” and held annual workshops on Arab culture. The Mayo Clinic also generated an internal security report, dated July 19, 1993, documenting the July 18, 1993, alleged sexual assault against Peterson’s client, S.M., by a physician associated with the Mayo Clinic that took place at the Radisson. Another local hotel put strict policies into place for dealing with complaints of guests harassing employees. These policies included utilizing interpreters when necessary.
The press reported the allegations of abuse, tolerance, and condonation. The Rochester Postr-Bulletin published at least seven articles in 1996 related to these concerns, representing the positions of the sexual harassment victims, the Arab community, and the hotel. KSTP launched into an independent investigation of the controversy and reported on incidents of harassment and abuse that took place at various locations in Rochester in its two-part series which focused on the lack of police investigation into the allegations of harassment and abuse and the problems with prosecuting the perpetrators. Some of these news reports mentioned that Arabs visiting Rochester made vital contributions to the local economy.
Therefore, I would conclude that the public controversy was a multi-faceted public controversy stemming from the community’s legitimate concern regarding possible condonation of sexual harassment and abuse against women. One facet of the debate was whether the women’s allegations were being sufficiently investigated by law enforcement officials. Another was concerned with the hotel’s and Chafoulias’ response to the women’s concern for their physical safety. Yet another aspect had to do with special treatment given to wealthy Arab visitors. In other words, the public questioned whether people in positions of leadership in the community, including Chafoulias, acknowledged and effectively addressed sexual harassment; whether employers, including Chafoulias, knew of employee harassment yet failed to report or investigate; and whether Rochester law enforcement and businesses, including the Radisson, prioritized business gain at the expense of Rochester women.
Not only does the majority characterize the public controversy too narrowly, but the majority also improperly considers Peterson’s role in publicizing the public controversy. If a controversy becomes a public controversy in substance — and the majority acknowledges that a public controversy exists here — how the controversy becomes a public controversy is unimportant. In other words, the essence of the public controversy issue is not just whether some private controversy has become public due to publicity. Instead, whether *662a controversy is a public controversy hinges on the nature or substance of the controversy, i.e., whether “ramifications [of the controversy] will be felt by persons who are not direct participants.” Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C.Cir.1980); accord Trotter v. Jack Anderson Enters., Inc., 818 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir.1987); Lundell Mfg. Co. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 98 F.3d 351, 363 (8th Cir.1996); see also Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 591 (1st Cir.1980) (requiring that the controversy exist at the time of the alleged defamation). The majority improperly focuses on whether Peterson publicized the controversy, which is irrelevant under our precedent.
Thus, I find Chafoulias’ argument that Peterson created the public controversy and therefore cannot invoke the public-figure defense to be unavailing. Exposing a controversy or piquing the press’s interest in publicizing a controversy — i.e., publicizing a private controversy — is different from creating a public controversy. Trotter, 818 F.2d at 434. Indeed, given the definition of “public controversy,” it would be impossible for an individual such as Peterson to be responsible for the existence of a public controversy. Moreover, to determine that by sharing news of the public controversy with the press Peterson created the public controversy and therefore conclude that, as to her, Chafoulias is a private figure is tantamount to muzzling those who would be sources for the press. I am quite sure that such a conclusion contradicts the United States Supreme Court’s admonition that debate on public issues be “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
Because Peterson’s alleged role in publicizing the public controversy is not germane to our analysis, whether Peterson contacted the press is irrelevant. I would conclude that whether Peterson initiated contact with the press is of no import to the determination of a public controversy.
Moving on to the second step in the limited purpose public figure inquiry, I agree with the majority that, at this point, the court must examine Chafoulias’ role in the public controversy. However, I disagree with the majority that “ABC stands in a different position than Peterson on this issue.” I am troubled by this proposition and find no authority to support it.
Gertz defined a limited purpose public figure as “an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). The United States Supreme Court noted that whether one is a limited purpose public figure turns on “the nature and extent of an individual’s participation in the particular [public] controversy giving rise to the defamation.” Id. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997. In other words, the determination of limited purpose public figure status hinges on the nature and extent of the plaintiffs role in the public controversy, not the defendants’. Id. Thus, if Chafoulias is determined to be a limited purpose public figure, he is a limited purpose public figure as to both Peterson and ABC, and I do not understand the majority’s remand for “specific findings of fact” in light of then-conclusion that, on this record, Chafoulias is a limited purpose public figure as to ABC. As the majority analysis as to ABC shows, the district court did make sufficient fact findings to make a remand inappropriate. Moreover, we give deference to the district court’s factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard of review. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“Findings of *663fact * * * shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses”).
Additionally, I find problematic the majority’s suggestion that fact-finding on the issue of limited purpose public figure may be submitted to the jury. This statement is dicta since the majority agrees that the district court may make findings of fact regarding this issue. Nevertheless, I am concerned with the inclusion of this dicta because the majority’s proposition — that contested material facts relevant to the limited public purpose inquiry may be put to the jury — contravenes the law.
Whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited purpose public figure is a matter of law for the court to decide. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A cmt. c (1977) (“The question of whether a plaintiff is a public official or a public figure * * * is one of law, not of fact, though the facts on which the determination is to be made may be in dispute and therefore subject to the determination of the fact finder.”). See generally 1 Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation, §§ 2:118, 2:120 (2d ed.2002) (explaining that treating the public figure question as a question of law is wise because of the risk of jury nullification and noting that “there is overwhelming precedent in support of the position that the status of the plaintiff * * * is an issue for the court and not for the jury”). The Rosenblatt court stated that “it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent to be a ‘public official.’ ” 383 U.S. at 88, 86 S.Ct. 669. The Court recognized that “[sjuch a course will both lessen the possibility that a jury will use the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopular ideas or speakers, and assure an appellate court the record and findings required for review of constitutional decisions.” Id. at 88 n. 15, 86 S.Ct. 669. Thus, both the plain language of Rosenblatt and the purpose behind the rule support my conclusion that the determination' of the status of a defamation plaintiff is to be decided by the court.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court applied the Rosenblatt rule to limited purpose public figure analyses — where there were contested issues of fact — in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979) (determining “[o]n this record” that Hutchinson was not a limited purpose public figure), and Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 167-69, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979) (concluding from the evidence that Wolston was not a limited purpose public figure). I therefore disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Rosenblatt is inapplicable to the instant case. Even if, as the majority concludes, Rosenblatt only applies to situations where material facts are not in dispute, Rosenblatt applies under the circumstances presented here because the district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the underlying facts before reaching the legal determination of Cha-foulias’ defamation plaintiff status.
In this case, the district court held a two-day evidentiary hearing on the public figure/private figure issue. Peterson was among those who testified. Chafoulias did not testify. The record before the court included some 500 exhibits. The court attached a memorandum of law, which included fact findings, to its order and noted that the memorandum was “incorporated herein and made a part of this Order.” See 2 David F. Herr & Roger S. Haydock, Minnesota Practice-Civil Rules Ann. § 52.1 (1998) (“The findings and conclusions may be made in a separate written *664document, may appear in an opinion or memorandum, or may be made orally and recorded in open court”). I conclude that these findings are sufficient for meaningful review. Rather than remand for “specific findings of fact” or additional hearings, I would look to the undisputed facts contained in the record and to the district court’s findings, using our clearly erroneous standard of review, to determine whether Chafoulias is a limited purpose public figure.
I would conclude, instead, that the second step of the limited purpose public figure analysis is met: Chafoulias did thrust himself into the public controversy so as to become a factor in its resolution. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997. I find Chafoulias’ claim — that he neither sought nor desired public attention and that he was “dragged unwillingly” into the limelight — disingenuous. Of course Cha-foulias did not desire “bad” publicity, but a defamation plaintiffs desire is not the appropriate measuring stick. Just as defamation defendants cannot create their own defense “by pointing to the attention they have themselves visited upon a plaintiff as evidence that the plaintiff is a public figure,”
the plaintiff is not permitted to avoid the [limited purpose public figure status] by protesting, “I didn’t want the attention.” The proper question is not whether the plaintiff volunteered for the publicity but whether the plaintiff volunteered for an activity out of which publicity would foreseeably arise.
Smolla, supra, at §§ 2:30, 2:32. In Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, for example, the court concluded that it was “of no moment that Marcone did not desire such status,” because the “purpose of the first amendment would be frustrated if those persons and activities that most require public scrutiny could wrap themselves in a veil of secrecy and thus remain beyond the reach of public knowledge.” 754 F.2d 1072, 1086 (3d Cir.1985).
Precedent would have us apply the Gertz factors to this record to determine whether Chafoulias thrust himself to the forefront of the public controversy so as to achieve a “special prominence” in the debate and become a factor in resolving the controversy. 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. In other words, I would look to the extent to which Chafoulias’ participation in the public controversy is voluntary, the extent to which Chafoulias has access to channels of effective communication to counteract false statements, and the prominence of the role Chafoulias played in the public controversy to decide whether Cha-foulias “voluntarily inject[ed] himself’ or was “drawn into” the public controversy at issue. Id.
The record here shows that Chafoulias had access to the media and used the media to promote his position in the dispute. See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 486 (Minn.1985) (noting effective media access is “a distinguishing feature” of public figures). In correspondence with KSTP, Chafoulias admitted that the hotel “and other area businesses” had been impacted “by the issues you intend to raise in your story” and admonished KSTP to share the hotel’s harassment policy with viewers. The Post-Bulletin published an article outlining the Radisson’s harassment policy two days after the Radisson issued a press release in response to the harassment charges. The two-part 1998 KTTC interview, though taking place after the alleged defamation, demonstrates that Chafoulias had broad media access allowing him to place media appearances strategically so that he could influence the ultimate outcome of the controversy surrounding the harassment allegations.
*665Additionally, Chafoulias has, by his own actions, “assumed [a] role[] of especial prominence in the affairs of society” that naturally “invite[s] attention and comment” from the public and the press. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1291-92. By seeking public and government support for his development projects that have a significant impact on Rochester, Chafoulias has assumed a position that invites attention and comment about the manner in which he conducts his business affairs.
Moreover, Chafoulias injected himself into the controversy by actively attempting to influence its outcome. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 164, 99 S.Ct. 2701. The record shows that Chafoulias voluntarily “added his voice to the chorus” discussing the controversy when he wrote the letter to KSTP dated April 26, 1996. Quantum Electronics Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 753, 764 (D.R.I.1995). As of this date, there had been no media reports of the lawsuits against Chafoulias or his hotel. Furthermore, Chafoulias’ suggestion to Page — before the airing of “The VIP Floor” — that the focus of ABC’s attention should be on Peterson’s allegedly unethical legal tactics demonstrates that Chafoulias played a purposeful role in this controversy.
Chafoulias is unlike the plaintiff in Jacobson v. Rochester Communications Corp., 410 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Minn.1987), who “took no other actions” besides defending himself in court and in an interview and who did not seek “any other notoriety.” Nor is Chafoulias like the plaintiff in Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Gt. 2701, who never discussed with the press his citation for contempt for failure to appear before a grand jury regarding spy charges against his aunt and uncle but “limited his involvement to that necessary to defend himself against the contempt charge.” Rather, Chafoulias communicated with the press and did so, not merely to defend himself, but in a way to influence the outcome of the controversy. Chafouli-as’ selective refusal of interviews is not credible evidence of his unwillingness to participate in this public controversy. See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1295 n. 21.
The district court found that Chafoulias “voluntarily took actions that made him a prominent person in this public controversy,” “purposefully used his status and resources to access the media in an attempt to get his position on the Radisson controversy (a part of the broader public controversy) out to the public,” and “ ‘injected himself into the vortex of the controversy’ in an attempt to influence its outcome.” These findings are substantiated by the record. I would conclude, therefore, that the court of appeals did not err by concluding as a matter of law that Chafoulias was a limited purpose public figure as to both ABC and Peterson.
As to the issue of actual malice, I agree with the majority that summary judgment was appropriately granted as to ABC. I add my analysis as to Peterson because the majority did not reach, whether summary judgment was appropriately granted as to her. I conclude that there are no facts before us that would clearly and convincingly support a finding that Peterson acted with actual malice.
For Chafoulias to prevail on this issue, a reasonable jury must be able to conclude that the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Peterson made her statement with actual malice — in other words, while knowing it was false or “with a high degree of awareness that it was probably false.” Hirman v. Rogers, 257 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn.1977). Chafoulias offers two justifications for his argument that Peterson acted with actual malice when she said “Chafoulias knew. Chafou-*666lias has known for years that these women were being attacked, harassed, raped.”
Chafoulias first claims that Peterson’s ill will toward him supports a finding of actual malice. Actual malice cannot be established “merely through a showing of ill will,” however. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). Ill will supports a finding of actual malice only where the plaintiff proves “an intent to cause harm through falsehood.” Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 263, 154 N.W.2d 409, 428 (1967); accord Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Minn.1980) (noting actual malice “focus[es] on the defendant’s attitude toward the truth of what he has said rather than on his attitude toward the plaintiff’). I would conclude that a reasonable jury could not conclude from the record in this case that Peterson intended to cause Cha-foulias harm by using information she knew to be false or thought was probably false.
Second, Chafoulias contends that Peterson acted with a reckless disregard for the truth by relying on a known unreliable source in making her allegedly defamatory statement. Specifically, Chafoulias argues that Peterson should have doubted the reliability of federal lawsuit plaintiff D.W. because on a number of occasions, D.W. failed to claim she had told Chafoulias of the attack. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (“[Rjecklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.”). I disagree. The record indicates that D.W. reported the same assault twice: once to her supervisor and manager, and later, to Chafouli-as. There is no discrepancy between her statements, and the record does not contain a claim by D.W. that she never told Chafoulias about the assault.
Thus, the record does not demonstrate that Peterson had obvious reasons to doubt D.W.’s veracity. Rather, the record here shows that Peterson conducted an extensive investigation into the allegations made by the hotel’s former employees before filing the federal suit. Peterson interviewed both employees and management and attempted to verify allegations. I concur with the district court that Peterson did not doubt the truth of her statement and that the record does not present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in Chafoulias’ favor. Accordingly, I would conclude that the court of appeals properly affirmed the district court’s grant of Peterson’s, as well as ABC’s, summary judgment motion on the actual malice issue.