Court Opinion

ID: 9420662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:55:36.483633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:26.503687
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Vinson,
with whom Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Minton join, dissenting.
I dissent because I would read Section 39 as it is written. That Section plainly forbids return of vested property to “any national” of Germany or Japan.1 Petitioner is a German citizen and the Court itself concedes *321that a German citizen is a German national. (Op. p. 320.) Yet the Court permits return of property to, petitioner, limiting the application of Section 39 to some nationals, namely those nationals who are also “enemies.” as the term is defined in Section . 2 (a) of the Trading with the ■ Enemy Act.
The term “national” has also been given legislative definition. “National” is defined as including “a subject, citizen or resident of a foreign country” in Executive Order No. 8389,2 a regulation “approved, ratified, and confirmed” by Congress in 1941.3 The Court applies Section 39 by reading out the term “national” and inserting the term “enemy” as defined in Section 2 (a). Since it is apparent on the face of the statute that Congress in no wise chose to assimilate these two clearly defined terms, the Court should no.
Just the other day, we held that “[w]e are not free, under the guise of construction, to amend [a] statute” by reading “carefully distinguished and separately defined ; terms to mean the same thing.” Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U. S. 197, 199-200 (1952). In departing from that standard in this case, the Court rewrites Section 39 so that the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, will conform more closely to its own notions of statutory symmetry. Condemning that Act as *322a “makeshift patchwork” does not justify a failure to reád the 1948 addition of Section 39 as it was written by Congress. Statutory revision by this Court is not consistent with our judicial function of enforcing statutory law as written by- the legislature.
In my view, this case should be decided on the basis of the legislatively defined language of Section 39. But the Court has broadened the inquiry. • Even on the Court’s own basis, the result in this case cannot be squared with the historyr of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the legislative background of Section 39 or the scope of Congress’ war power over enemy property.
At the outset, it should be clearly understood that when petitioner’s property was vested, he was an alien enemy ,in every ordinary sense of 'that term. So long as his citizenship was German, he became an enemy upon the declaration of war with Germany, wherever his-residence and whatever his personal sentiments. This Court has so held throughout its history.4 The Court today acknowledges that Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920), so held after an exhaustive review of the authorities. It should be added that this Court recently adopted the rationale of Techt v. Hughes, supra, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 771-773 (1950). Nor need we look only to judicial definition of petitioner’s status. Congress has defined “alien enemies” as including- “all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government.” 5 As we so recently said, the classification between friend and enemy based upon citi*323zenship, if ever “doctrinaire,” has now been “validated by the actualities of modern, total warfare.” Johnson v. Eisentrager, supra, at 772.
When, in 1917, Congress defined the term “enemy” solely “for the purposes of” the Trading with the Enemy Act, it was aware that such status was ordinarily deters mined by “nationality or allegiance of the individual” rather than by “domicile or residence.”6 However, at' that time, Congress chose to limit the definition of “enemy” to include only those persons “resident within” enemy territory — a definition which does not include petitioner on the pleadings in this case. ' Section 2 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. This represented a deliberate “relaxation” and “modification” of Congress’ power over enemy property.7 This policy of modification was followed throughout the World War I alien property program, culminating in the Settlement of War Claims Act of 1928 which authorized return of 80% of seized property to its former owners.8
World War II legislation over alien property Represented a complete reversal of the soft policy of World War I. In 1941, Congress extended the power of seizure and vesting to all property of “any foreign country or national thereof” in exercising its war power “to affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign property *324in a manner consistent with the interests of the United States.”9 In 1946, Congress added Section 32 to the Trading with the Enemy Act, authorizing administrative return of vested property subject to certain conditions, one of which prevented administrative return to a “citizen or subject of [an enemy] nation” who was “present . . . in the territory of such nation.”10 Finally, in the War Claims Act of 1948, Congress added Section 39 to the Trading with the Enemy Act; thereby expressing its “firm resolve not to permit the recurrence” of the World War I policy of returning enemy property.11 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in reporting favorably upon the bill, stated:
“The policy of nonreturn and noncompensation is a sound public policy which should be enacted into law. . It does not violate any concepts of international law or international morality. No essential difference exists between private property and public property in the case of Germany and Japan. For several years before World War II while Germany and Japan were preparing to make war upon the United States, property owned in the United States by the citizens of both of these countries was subject to rigid control of their respective governments. While the fiction of private ownership was1 retained, actually, property'.of German and Japanese nationals in the United States was widely used to accomplish the national objectives of those countries.
“The position of Germany and Japan (with respect to war claims against these countries) is somewhat *325analogous to that of a bankrupt against whom claims are apt to be filed in an amount greatly in excess of the bankrupt’s assets. The legitimate claims of the United States alone, on account of the expense incurred in fighting World War II, will most likely exceed many times the assets available for payment even over a considerable period of years. Under' these circumstances it is therefore not only expedient but just and fair for the United States to marshal all Japanese, and German assets which are available in this country.”12
Under this reversal of World War I policy, the property of German nationals, including petitioner’s, was to be retained to satisfy war claims arising out of German aggression. The policy of non-return of vested property to German nationals restricts the scope of Section 9 (a) as to . returns to German'nationals such as petitioner who are not “enemies” as defined in Section .2 (a). The primary purpose of Section 9 (a) — to provide for judicial return of property mistakenly seized from American citizens or nationals of friendly countries — is preserved.13 Such an interpretation of Section 39, reading the word “national” as meaning “national” and not “enemy,” is far more harmonious with the entire Act and particularly the World War II legislation on alien property14 than, the Court’s reading of the statute.
*326Looking to the legislative history of Section’ 39 itself, the Court notes that congressional attention was focused on the problem of compensating prisoners of war, internees and others injured by our World War II enemies. With the claims of the victims of aggression pressed upon it, it is not surprising that, when Congress balanced those claims against the rights of enemy nationals to property lawfully vested by the Alien Property Custodian, it prohibited return of property to enemy “nationals” and. not merely to “enemies” as restrictively defined in Section 2 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. It cannot be fairly suggested that congressional use of the term “national” was inadvertent. Objections to the restriction on recovery of property under Section 9 (a) resulting from the use of the term “national” instead of “enemy” in Section 39 were pressed upon Congress in a written statement and in oral testimony before a congressional committee.15 A witness offered a proposed amendment to Section 39 that would have limited its application to certain described enemy nationals.16 Even *327this amendment would not have saved petitioner’s claim. It would not have substituted the term “enemy” as narrowly defined in Section 2 (a) of the Act and hence would not have limited the operation of Section 39 as drastically as the Court does today.
The Court closes with the statement that its construction of Section 39 avoids a constitutional problem which, it says, “is not imaginary.” As discussed above, it is settled that petitioner is an alien enemy in every sense of the word but the purposely restrictive definition of Section 2 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act. “There is no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties.” United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U. S. 1, 11 (1926), and cases cited therein. The suggestion that the relaxed legislative definition of “enemy” in 1917 could limit the constitutional war power of Congress over enemy property finds no support in decisions of this Court.17
*328Petitioner, a German citizen present in Germany during the war, is certainly as much an enemy alien as was Ludecke, a German citizen lawfully- .resident in this country during the war. We found ho constitutional barrier to Ludecke’s summary removal without judicial scrutiny under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160 (1948). That opinion relied upon an excerpt from a paragraph by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 126 (1814), a case dealing with confiscation of property. 335 U. S. at 164. The full paragraph reads as follows:
“War' gives an equal right over persons and property: and if its declaration is not considered, as prescribing a law respecting the person 6f an enemy found in our country, neither does it prescribe a law for his property. The act concerning alien enemies, which confers on the president very great discretionary powers respecting their persons, affords a strong implication that he did not possess those powers by virtue of the declaration of war.”
Any doubts as to Congress’ “equal right over persons and property” of enemy, aliens should have vanished with the Ludecke decision. The Just Compensation Clause, like the Due Process Clause, is found in the Bill of Rights. As we said in our Ludecke decision, “it would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the statute offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights.” 335 U. S. at 171. In addition to what was said in Ludecke, the admonition of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. United States, supra, is appropriate in this case:
“Respecting the power of government no doubt is entertained. That war gives to the sovereign full right to take the persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found, is conceded. The mitigations of this rigid rule, which the humane and *329wise policy of modern times has introduced into practice, will more or less affect the exercise of this right, but cannot impair the right itself. That remains undiminished, and when the sovereign authority shall chuse to bring it into operation, the judicial department must give effect to its will. But until that will . shall be expressed, no power- of condemnation can exist in the Court.” 8 Cranch at 122-123.
The will of Congress'having been expressed in unmistakable terms in Section 39,1 would enforce, not frustrate, the legislative command.

 “No. property or interest therein of Germany, Japan, or any national of either such country vested in or transferred to any officer or agency of -the Government at any time after December 17, 1941, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be returned to former owners the.reof or their succéssors in interest, and the United States *321shall not pay compensation for any such property or interest therein. The net proceeds remaining upon the completion of administration, liquidation, and disposition pursuant to the provisions of this Act of any such property or interest therein shall be covered into the Treasury at the earliest practicable date. Nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal or otherwise' affect the operation of the provisions of section 32 of this Act or of the' Philippine Property Act of 1946.” (Emphasis supplied.) 62 Stat. 1240, 1246 (1948), 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 39.

 § 5 (E) (i), 6 Fed. Reg. 2897, 2898 (1941).

 55 Stat. 838, 840 (1941).

 The Rapid, 8 Cranch 155, 161 (1814); White v. Burnley, 20 How. 235, 249 (1858); The Venice, 2 Wall. 258, 274 (1865); The Benito Estenger, 176 U. S. 568, 571 (1900); Herrera v. United States, 222 U. S. 558, 569 (1912).

 Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 11 Stat. 577, now 50 U. S. C. § 21. A Similar definition of “alien enemies” had also been used in the naturalizatión laws. 2 Stat. 153, 154 (1802); R. S. § 2171. In World War I, *323Congress specifically exempted “alien enemies” from the .draft, a context in which the term “alien enemy” would be meaningless if it did not include nationals of enemy nations residing in this country. 40 Stat. 76-78, 885, 955 (1917-1918)

 H. R. Rep. No. 85, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1917).

 Ibid.; S. Rep. No. 111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1917); 55 Cong. Rec. 4842 (1917). See Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69, 76-77 (1942).

 45 Stat. 254, 270-274 (1928), 50 U. S. C. App. §§ 9 (b) (12)-(14) and (16), 9 (m). Returns of German property were postponed in 1934 when it appeared that Germany was in default in the payment of war claims. 48 Stat. 1267 (1934).

 55 Stat. 838, 839 (1941), 50 U. S. C. App. § 5 (b); S. Rep. No. 911, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941). See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., 332 U. S. 480 (1947).

 60 Stat. 50 (1946), 50 U. S. C. App. § 32 (a) (2) (D).

 H. R. Rep. No. 976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).

 Id., at 2-3.

 Section 9 (a) was originally designed to protect American citizens, S. Rep. No. 111, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1917), and apparently the bulk of the claims filed under § 9 (a) are those of American citizens. Hearings before Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4044, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1948).

 1946 patent legislation likewise conforms to this pattern. In 1921, Congress barred claims based upon World War I use of patent rights of an “alien enemy.” 41 Stat. 1313, 1314, 35 U. S. C. § 86. In 1946, Congress barred claims for patent infringement during World *326War II brought by a “national” of an enemy country. 60 Stat. 940, 944, 35 U. S. C. § 111. The failure to use the term “enemy” was deliberate. The next section of the 1946 Act refers to “rights of any enemy ... as defined by the Trading With the Enemy Act . . . .” 60 Stat. 940, 944, 35 U. S. C. § 112. And the bill as drafted in the House Committee on Patents, H. R. Rep. No. 1498, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), used the term “national” as used in proposed bill H. R. 2111 (§ 9), rejecting the term “alien enemy” as used in the 1921 legislation and in proposed bill H. R. 4079 (§ 10). This was done after the difference in meaning of the term was called to the attention of the Committee by the Office of Alien Property Custodian. Hearings before the House Committee on Patents on H. R. 2111 and H. R. 4079, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1945).

 Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 4044, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 197-198, 233-234 (1948). See also id., at 254-255, and 94 Cong. Rec. 551 (1948).

 Id., at 235.

 Ex parte Kawato, 317 U. S. 69 (1942), in holding that an enemy alien’s right of access to federal courts was not barred by common law or statute, did not touch upon the Constitutional power of Congress over enemy property. The extension of that power to include ' property of an American citizen resident in an enemy country, The Venus, 8 Cranch 253 (1814), hardly supports a restriction of that power in case .of petitioner, ah enemy citizen present in an enemy country.
In Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U. S. 469, 475 (1947), the Court stated:
“There is no doubt but that under the war power [Art. I, § 8, cl. 11], as heretofore interpreted by this Court,. the United States, acting under a statute, may vest in itself the property of a .national of an enemy nation. Unquestionably to wage war successfully, the United States’ may confiscate enemy property. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 11.” (Emphasis added.)
In’ discussing the requirement that just compensation be paid for seizure of property of “friendly aliens,” the Court had obvious reference to the nationals of friendly nations. 332 U. S. at 475-476, 479-480.