Court Opinion

ID: 9467778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:56:30.895002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:31.471765
License: Public Domain

WEICK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Joseph Peraino and Plymouth Distributors, Inc. contend principally that the district court did not have venue jurisdiction over them since they had joined the conspiracy some eight months after the obscene film Deep Throat had been shown in Memphis. They argue that if each district where the film previously had been distributed had jurisdiction that this would subject them to varying community standards the details of which they had no knowledge and in violation of their constitutional rights. They offered no proof, however, of different community standards except self-serving statements and opinions from their own past employees. Here the conspiracy in which these defendants joined was of national scope even though they later restricted the territory in which they operated. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887,41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); United States v. Sandy, 605 F.2d 210 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. den., 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 412 (1979). These defendants never withdrew from the conspiracy.
Their contentions conflict with the fundamental law of conspiracy. A conspirator need not join a conspiracy at its inception, in order to become liable as a conspirator. When he joins the conspiracy, he is bound by the prior acts and statements of other conspirators made in furtherance of the common objective which, in this case, was the distribution of an obscene movie Deep Throat in interstate commerce. United States v. Cimini, 427 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 151 reh. den., 400 U.S. 984, 91 S.Ct. 364, 27 L.Ed.2d 396 (1971). These defendants as the jury found had full knowledge of the details of the obscene film and of community standards. The government, however, was not required to prove that each conspirator was familiar with each and every detail of the conspiracy. United States v. Mishkin, 317 F.2d 634 (2nd Cir. 1963), cert. den., 375 U.S. 827, 84 S.Ct. 71, 11 L.Ed.2d 60 (1963). From the time that the agreement is entered into, the crime of conspiracy is a continuing crime from its inception to its conclusion. Prosecutions for conspiracy may be made either where the conspiracy was formed or where any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed. United States v. Downing, 51 F.2d 1030 (2nd Cir. 1931). Even an overt act not pleaded in the indictment may be used. Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 32 S.Ct. 812, 56 L.Ed. 1136 (1912); United States v. Downing, 51 F.2d 1030 (2nd Cir. 1931). Only slight evidence is necessary to connect a defendant with a conspiracy. United States v. Chambers, 382 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1967).
The stipulation entered into by all of the parties clearly established venue in the Western District of Tennessee. These defendants are bound by their stipulation.
Joseph Peraino was no novice. As the majority concedes, Peraino took over the distribution of the film in December 1974 and moved the distribution center from Florida to New Jersey. He organized *555Plymouth Distributors, Inc. for the purpose of distributing the film in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey and Maine. The jury was fully justified in finding these defendants knowledgeable in every particular. I find no basis for carving out an exception to the well established rule of conspiracy which would exempt these defendants from the consequences of their knowledgeable acts. I would affirm these convictions.