Court Opinion

ID: 9563863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:48:37.756204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:06.127610
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent.
At the outset it is deemed of utmost importance to note that we are here concerned with contractual rights and obligations, not an alimony and support order, or, as urged by counsel for the executor, something “in the nature” of an alimony and support order. See International Trust Company, Executor v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P. (2d) 264. Accordingly we are not concerned with the general rule that an alimony and support order in favor of the wife abates with the death of the husband. Rather we are concerned with a contract and the law presumes that parties to the contract intend to bind not only themselves, but their personal representatives as well, in the absence of any clearly expressed intent to the contrary. This presumption is well stated in United States v. Chain, 300 U.S. 31, 57 Sup. Ct. 394, where it was stated:
*210“It is a presumption of law that the parties to a contract bind not only themselves but their personal representatives. Executors therefore are held to be liable on all contracts of the testator which are broken in his lifetime, and with the exception of contracts in which personal skill or taste is required, on all contracts broken after death.”
In paragraph 5 of their agreement the husband in so many words promised to pay a certain sum to the wife “so long as the wife may live and remain unmarried.” (Emphasis supplied.) In paragraph 18 it is provided that “all of the covenants, stipulations, provisions, agreement and promises herein contained shall, so far as appropriate, apply to, bind and be obligatory upon the heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns of the parties or either of them, and whether so expressed or not.”
This language strikes me as being singularly clear and unequivocal and easily understood. To me, at least, it means that the expressed intent of the parties is that the husband’s promise to pay a monthly sum to his wife so long as she “may live and remain unmarried” is to be binding on his executor and, of necessity therefore, must survive his death. The majority opinion, as I read it, concedes this much, but then proceeds with the comment “that the intent of a document may_ not be determined from an isolated statement contained therein, particularly when, as here, other provisions cast serious doubt upon the meaning of an isolated statement.”
The net effect of the majority opinion is to hold that paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 12, admittedly not by any express language but by necessary implication, negate the clear and express terms contained in paragraphs 5 and 18. This construction I believe is completely unwarranted and unjustified, and therefore I dissent.