Court Opinion

ID: 9645649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:31:09.60597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.054608
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, I would follow the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Hadnot v. State and hold that the evidence is sufficient for a rational jury to find that Bryant intended to place Raulston in fear of imminent serious bodily injury — based on the evidence of Bryant’s words, gestures, and conduct and on Raulston’s testimony. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Hadnot v. State, 884 S.W.2d 922, 924-26 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1994, no pet).
Raulston testified:
Q. When he got out of his ear and approached you, did you feel that you were going to be attacked at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So you were in fear of imminent serious bodily [in]jury?
*461A. Well, I’m 57 years old and he’s, I don’t know how old, but he’s a whole lot younger, whole lot bigger than I am.
The interpretation of this testimony was for the jury. See Hadnot, 884 S.W.2d at 925.
In addition, “[t]he requisite intent can be inferred from the acts, the words, and the conduct of an accused.” Id. We should not substitute our view of the evidence for that of the jury; we only assure the rationality of the fact finder. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App.1988).
Because I believe that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury, I dissent.