Court Opinion

ID: 9747487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:17:59.580899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.096836
License: Public Domain

BIGELOW, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The current petition for writ of mandate is limited to the discoverability of the nonparty objectors’ private information. The objectors are, as the trial court noted, “7,700 [out of 47,000 notified who] ... do not ask for, or want, any part of this lawsuit. They merely want to be left alone.”
It is not disputed that the objectors have a legally protected privacy interest in the categories of information sought. Moreover, the invasion into private information sought here is from persons who are not plaintiffs in the lawsuit which must be given appropriate consideration. In this context, the California Supreme Court has noted that nonlitigants should be afforded more protection than litigants from discovery of private information. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 858-859 [143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766] (Britt).) In Britt, the California Supreme Court determined that a discovery order requiring extensive disclosure about persons’ activities in political associations was overbroad. The court indicated that insofar as the challenged order “directly impinge[d] on the constitutional rights of numerous individuals who have taken no action whatsoever with respect to the underlying lawsuit,” it was “unquestionably overbroad as it applied to such nonlitigants.” (Id. at p. 858.) *1441Where the actual plaintiffs were concerned, on the other hand, the court determined there was an implicit partial waiver of constitutional associational privacy such that the party seeking disclosure must make a showing that the evidence sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution” of the lawsuit “to assure maximum protection of the constitutional interests at stake.” (Id. at p. 859, italics omitted.)
While the court fell short of announcing a more stringent test for discovery from nonlitigants, it certainly signaled there was a heightened concern in the constitutional protection afforded them. The point is even more important here because the nonlitigants have here specifically cried foul with respect to the release of their personal information. But even setting aside this issue, I believe the trial court ruled appropriately here.
The trial court is vested with discretion in determining whether confidential information may be divulged. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 150 P.3d 198].) As such, the ruling must be upheld in the “ ‘absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition or whimsical thinking.’ ” (In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 85 [98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819].) Abuse of discretion is not shown by simply arguing a different ruling would have been better. Discretion is abused only when, “ ‘in its exercise,’ ” the trial court “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566 [86 Cal.Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) “Under this standard, the superior court’s determination will be set aside only when it has been demonstrated that there was no legal justification for the order denying the discovery requested.” (Ochoa v. Fordel, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 898, 912 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 277]; see Tien v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 528, 535 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 121].) In my view, exclusion of the 7,700 objectors from the statistical analysis pool of 47,000 was not an abuse of discretion.
Petitioners did not demonstrate that the information from the 7,700 objectors was essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit; the trial court found the remaining persons who do not object to release of the information form a sufficient pool to proceed with a statistical analysis.1 Petitioner’s own expert, Janice Fanning Madden, declared only that there is a potential for “selection *1442bias” if the objectors are removed from the analysis.2 She stated that “[t]he potential for selection bias as a result of excluding the objecting writers is difficult to evaluate empirically. . . .” (Italics added.) Madden concluded that “omission of data from those who object (a) would definitely lead to fewer observations and decisions in the data set, leading to less accurate and precise results; and (b) may lead to selection bias and erroneous results. In addition, any effort to determine whether exclusion of the data on objectors would lead to selection bias would be expensive, time-consuming, and involve the same types of analyses as required for the analyses of hiring and other employment outcomes.” (Italics added.) In other words, because there will be a smaller number of writers to use in the statistical analysis, one might speculate inaccuracies will result, but in Madden’s view it is simply too difficult and expensive to determine if the speculation is correct. Given Madden’s speculative assertions, it was not an abuse of discretion to find petitioners did not demonstrate a compelling need for discovery from the objectors.
I also disagree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in its application of the balancing test. The trial court specifically found that “the objector’s privacy rights outweigh the public interest in pursuing this litigation.” It found that “[w]hen weighing the articulated privacy concerns against the possibility that the information could be useful, the decision is clear.” In so stating, the court articulated the appropriate balancing test to determine whether the information should be disclosed. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633].)
The factors to be considered in the balance include, “ ‘the purpose of the information sought, the effect that disclosure will have on the parties and on the trial, the nature of the objections urged by the party resisting disclosure, and the ability of the court to make an alternative order which may grant partial disclosure, disclosure in another form, or disclosure only in the event that the party seeking the information undertakes certain specified burdens which appear just under the circumstances.’ (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 382 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266].) Where it is possible to do so, ‘. . . the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery.’ (Id., at p. 383.)” (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 658 [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977].) Discovery is not to be ordered if the information is available from other sources or by less intrusive means. (Allen v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 453 [198 Cal.Rptr. 737].) Review of this ruling is also *1443subject to the abuse of discretion test. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 371.)
The trial court’s typewritten, three-page ruling set forth a number of factors underlying its conclusion, including: that the objectors are not a part of the lawsuit and do not want to be; that there were other avenues available to plaintiffs to get this information; that the categories of information sought would identify the objectors by name, date of birth, address and Social Security number, raising concerns of identity theft; that although there was a strong protective order in place plaintiffs’ attorneys admitted they cannot ensure that the information would remain outside the public domain; that followup investigation into the information could result in third parties appearing to align themselves with plaintiffs; and that release of the information could affect the objectors’ viability in the media marketplace. The ruling represents a reasoned analysis of those factors.3
Requiring partial disclosure of certain categories of data sought, as does the majority, is an alternative to be considered in the balancing test. (Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 658.) But it was not necessary here, where the information was not required to be turned over in the first instance in the absence of a compelling need and where the information was available to them from the remaining pool who does not object to disclosure. There is no question there is a significant state interest in preventing invidious discrimination, as the majority states. But under these facts, and in light of the information available to plaintiffs from the nonobjectors, the trial court could reasonably conclude the right to privacy asserted by the 7,700 nonparty objectors outweighs plaintiffs’ need for their confidential *1444information. I find nothing arbitrary or capricious about the trial court’s ruling. I would deny the writ petition.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 15, 2008, and the petitions of real parties in interest for review by the Supreme Court were denied October 28, 2008, S166929. George, C. J., and Corrigan, J., did not participate therein. Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The trial court specifically ruled, “[The writers] still have other avenues of proof open to them without information from [the] objectors. In fact, in their brief, plaintiffs have stated that they may still be able to put together a meaningful statistical study based upon information from non-objectors.”

 She defines selections bias as “the errors introduced into a statistical study due to the way that the data are collected.” She states selection bias might produce an “unrepresentative sample,” which could lead to an erroneous conclusion.

 The trial court did not change this ruling after reconsideration was requested. I point this out only because the majority believes the focus of our review should be on a more limited subset of information than that requested in the original motion to modify the protective order. I believe our focus should not be changed to what was before the trial court on the subsequent motion for reconsideration or the further limited subset of confidential information petitioners request us to consider for the first time now. When the order to show cause was issued by this court on February 19, 2008, it directed the court to either “vacate [its] order of September 19, 2007 [the date of the ruling on the original motion to modify the protective order], . . . and to thereafter enter a new and different order granting the motion in whole or in part, ... or show cause before this court why a peremptory writ of mandate should not be issued.” Our order made reference to the trial court’s initial denial of the motion to modify only. The motion for clarification and/or reconsideration was not ruled on until November 16, 2007, and the order to show cause made no reference to it.
In California-Hawaii Development, Inc. v. Superior Court (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 293, 300 [162 Cal.Rptr. 365], the court refused to address the merits of a motion for summary judgment because the alternative writ issued by the court was limited to a review of an expungement order. I would not address what happened after the issuance of the order to show cause, as I believe our jurisdiction is fixed by file alternative writ.