Court Opinion

ID: 9414649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 15:04:40.565936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.456169
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed August 2, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-2470
                        Lower Tribunal No. 16-4811
                           ________________

                   Rolando Orama Garcia, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                           Serge Myrtil, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Charles K.
Johnson, Judge.

     Davis, Giardino, Hrivnak, & Okon, PLLC, and Wayne T. Hrivnak (West
Palm Beach), for appellants.

      Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A., and Reginald J. Clyne, and
Michelle D. Cofiño, and Kimare S. Dyer, for appellee Mekka Miami Group
Corp.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and GORDO, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
          Appellants (Defendants below) Rolando Orama Garcia and Ali Isabel

Casanola appeal from an order dismissing their third-party Complaint against

Appellee Mekka Miami Group Corp. (the “Nightclub”). The underlying action

stems from a car accident caused by Garcia while he was driving under the

influence1. Over six years after the accident, Appellants filed a third-party

Complaint against the Nightclub for allegedly serving Garcia alcohol while he

was under the legal drinking age. The trial court concluded that Appellants’

third-party claims were beyond the four-year statute of limitations and subject

to dismissal.      Appellants argue their claims are for indemnification and

therefore do not accrue until a judgment is rendered against them. Because

Appellants fail to set forth a basis for imposing a duty on the Nightclub to

defend and indemnify them, we affirm.

     I.     BACKGROUND

          It is undisputed that early in the morning on February 1, 2015, Garcia

drove his vehicle at an excessive speed while above the legal blood alcohol

limit and crashed into the back of the vehicle Serge Myrtil was driving, which

was stopped at a red light. Myrtil sued Garcia and Casanola. Myrtil also

brought claims against the Nightclub pursuant to Florida’s Dram Shop Law,

§ 768.125, Florida Statutes, based on allegations that the Nightclub served

1
    Casanola is the owner of the vehicle Garcia was driving.

                                         2
alcohol to Garcia, who was under the legal drinking age. 2 After several years

of litigation, the case went to trial in September 2018, which ended in a

mistrial. A new trial date was set, but before a new trial occurred, Myrtil

settled with the Nightclub and voluntarily dismissed all claims against the

Nightclub with prejudice.

      A few days later, Appellants sought leave to file a third-party complaint

against the Nightclub. The complaint was filed on February 26, 2021, over

six years after the car accident. Appellants’ operative third-party Complaint

asserts five counts against the Nightclub. 3 Some counts appear to assert

2
 Florida’s Dram Shop Law generally prohibits liability against someone who
sells or furnishes alcohol to another unless that person willfully and
unlawfully provides alcohol to someone under the legal drinking age:

            A person who sells or furnishes alcoholic beverages
            to a person of lawful drinking age shall not thereby
            become liable for injury or damage caused by or
            resulting from the intoxication of such person, except
            that a person who willfully and unlawfully sells or
            furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not
            of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a
            person habitually addicted to the use of any or all
            alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or
            damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication
            of such minor or person.

§ 768.125, Fla. Stat. (2022).
3
 Appellants also brought claims against the Nightclub’s insurer. All claims
against the insurer were ultimately dismissed, and Appellants have not
challenged this on appeal.

                                      3
that the Nightclub is directly liable for damages caused by willfully and

unlawfully serving alcohol to Garcia. Other counts are based on a theory of

indemnification.    More specifically, Appellants allege that pursuant to

Florida’s Dram Shop Law, the Nightclub is obligated to defend and indemnify

them. However, the Complaint fails to explain how this alleged duty to

indemnify arises from the statute.

        The Nightclub moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellants’ causes of

action were barred by a four-year statute of limitations. The Nightclub also

argued that the third-party Complaint failed to state causes of action for

indemnification. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed that all claims

were barred by the four-year statute of limitations and therefore granted the

Nightclub’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. Appellants appealed.

  II.     ANALYSIS

        This Court reviews final orders of dismissal under the de novo

standard. See, e.g., Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Doe, 210 So. 3d 41, 43

(Fla. 2017). It is undisputed on appeal that to the extent Appellants’ third-

party Complaint alleges that the Nightclub is directly liable for damages

caused by willfully and unlawfully serving alcohol to a minor, those claims

                                     4
are barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in § 95.11(3),

Florida Statutes (2022).

      Appellants argue their claims survive because they are claims for

indemnification.      Appellants are correct that in general, a claim for

indemnification does not accrue until a judgment has been rendered against

an indemnitee. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Metro. Dade County, 436 So.

2d 976, 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“[It is a] well established principle that in

indemnification actions, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until

the indemnitee pays on an obligation.”). And indeed, nearly all of Appellants’

briefing and citation to authority is dedicated to arguing this point.

      Appellants, however, have not set forth a basis for imposing a duty on

the Nightclub to defend and indemnify them. The allegations in the operative

third-party Complaint simply assert that the Nightclub has a duty to defend

and indemnify the Appellants pursuant to § 768.125. The relevant plain

language permits liability against someone who willfully and unlawfully sells

alcohol to a minor for damage caused by or resulting from intoxication. But

nothing in the plain language imposes a duty to defend and indemnify other

tortfeasors:

               [A] person who willfully and unlawfully sells or
               furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person who is not
               of lawful drinking age or who knowingly serves a
               person habitually addicted to the use of any or all

                                        5
            alcoholic beverages may become liable for injury or
            damage caused by or resulting from the intoxication
            of such minor or person.

Id.

      Appellants have not cited any cases involving § 768.125. Neither have

they cited any authority for the proposition that § 768.125 gives rise to a duty

to indemnify. Rather, nearly all the cases Appellants cite involve contractual

indemnification and address the accrual of indemnification claims. 4

      In Allstate Insurance, a case Appellants rely on in support of their

accrual argument, this Court explained the general rule that indemnity shifts

the loss from one who is without fault to another based on some form of

special relationship:

            Indemnity, on the other hand, shifts the entire loss
            from one who, although without active negligence or
            fault, has been obligated to pay, because of some
            vicarious, constructive, derivative, or technical
            liability, to another who should bear the cost because
            it was the latter’s wrongdoing for which the former is
            held liable. Indemnification rights derive from the
            relationship between a party like the appellant and
            the party causing the injury. Given the requisite
            relationship, and assuming that the party seeking
            indemnification was not at all responsible for the
            injury, the injuring party becomes liable to the payor.

436 So. 2d at 978 (citation omitted).

4
  Appellants do not allege that their indemnification claims arise from a
contract.

                                        6
           Here, Appellants have pointed to no special relationship that would

give rise to a duty to indemnify. Moreover, it is undisputed that Garcia, the

intoxicated driver of the vehicle, was at fault. 5 See Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v.

Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 642 (Fla. 1999) (“For a party to prevail

on a claim of common law indemnity, the party must satisfy a two-prong test.

First, the party seeking indemnification must be without fault, and its liability

must be vicarious and solely for the wrong of another. Second,

indemnification can only come from a party who was at fault. Additionally,

Florida courts have required a special relationship between the parties in

order for common law indemnification to exist.” (citations omitted)).

    III.     CONCLUSION

           Given Appellants’ failure to set forth a basis in their third-party

Complaint for imposing a duty on the Nightclub to defend and indemnify them

and the lack of legal authority in support of this argument, we affirm the trial

court’s dismissal.

           Affirmed.

5
  In their third-party Complaint, Appellants admit that Garcia was speeding
and driving under the influence when he hit Myrtil, who was stopped at a red
light. Further, during the pendency of this appeal, a verdict was rendered,
and final judgment was entered against Appellants, finding them liable for
damages.

                                         7