Court Opinion

ID: 9382028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 16:06:40.297756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.586556
License: Public Domain

J-S30024-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHRISTOPHER AARON                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2424 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 27, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-23-CR-0000433-2021

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                            FILED MARCH 24, 2023

        Christopher Aaron (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas after his non-jury

convictions of simple assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct (engages in

fighting).1 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each

of his convictions. We affirm.

        On December 29, 2020, Appellant physically assaulted Shakeema Taylor

(Victim), his then girlfriend, outside a train station in Delaware County,
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), 5503(a)(1). Appellant’s disorderly
conduct conviction was graded as a third-degree misdemeanor under
Subsection (b) of the statute. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b) (“An offense under
this section is a misdemeanor of the third degree if the intent of the actor is
to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, or if he persists in
disorderly conduct after reasonable warning or request to desist. Otherwise
disorderly conduct is a summary offense.”).
J-S30024-22

Pennsylvania. N.T., 10/27/21, at 7-9. Immediately following the incident,

Appellant was arrested and charged with the above-mentioned crimes. See

id at 11, 31.

      The matter proceeded to a bench trial on October 27, 2021. The trial

court summarized the testimony as follows:

      [Victim] testified that on December 29, 2020, she was in an
      ongoing relationship with . . . Appellant. On that evening, as
      [Victim] was about to exit the train in Crum Lynne, Delaware
      County, Appellant stepped on the train, snatched her cell phone
      from her, and pulled her off the train by her arm. As [Victim] was
      stepping off the train, a can was thrown in her face, making
      contact with and splashing her in the face.

             [Victim described Appellant as “harassing” her when she]
      tried to separate herself from [him] and [she] began walking
      towards the steps to exit the train platform. Appellant kept telling
      [Victim] to walk with him while he was going through her cell
      phone. As [Victim] and Appellant approached the steps, Appellant
      grabbed her by the hood of her coat and slammed the back of her
      head into a metal pole. She did not feel pain to her head right
      away, but explained she felt pain later. [Victim] made it to the
      bottom of the steps, ran across the street, and fell as Appellant
      was coming after her. [Victim noted that a bystander must have
      called the police because they “came right away[.”] Victim [then]
      gave a statement [to police indicating that she] sustained some
      injuries including a cut on her knee, ripped jeans, knee pain, and
      pain to the back of her head.

Trial Ct. Op. 1/20/22, at 1-2 (record citations omitted & paragraph break

added).

      Ridley Park Police Corporal Detective John Morris also testified at the

trial, stating he was responsible for Appellant’s October 28, 2020, video

arraignment and bail interview the morning after his arrest.        N.T. at 31.

Corporal Morris stated that during the video proceeding, Appellant had an

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“outburst” and told the magistrate district judge that he “did not assault

anybody, he just threw a Diet Coke at [Victim.]” Id. at 36. Appellant then

stated that if he “assaulted [Victim], she would know it and . . . would have

definite injuries.” Id. Corporal Morris also recounted “[t]here was at least

one call to 911” related to this incident. Id. at 33.

       At the conclusion of trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of simple

assault, harassment, and disorderly conduct as a third-degree misdemeanor.

Upon Appellant’s request, the matter immediately proceeded to sentencing.

N.T. at 51. The court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of four and

one-half to 12 months’ incarceration, followed by one year of probation.2

       Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion but did file this timely

appeal.3

       Appellant raises the following claims:

       1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
          support the conviction for simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §
          2701(a)(1), where the evidence at trial failed to establish that
          Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily
          injury?

       2. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
          support the conviction for harassment under 18 Pa.C.S. §
____________________________________________

2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to four and one-half years’ incarceration
for simple assault, followed by one year of probation for harassment, and one
year of probation for disorderly conduct. The terms of probation were ordered
to run concurrently.

3 Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court
issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on January 20, 2022.

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        2709(a)(1), where the evidence at trial failed to establish that
        Appellant, with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,
        struck, shoved, kicked, or otherwise subjected another person
        to physical contact?

     3. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
        support the conviction for disorderly conduct — engage in
        fighting under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1), where the evidence at
        trial failed to establish that Appellant, with intent to cause
        public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
        creating a risk thereof, engaged in fighting or threatening, or
        in violent or tumultuous behavior?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some extra spacing omitted).

     Each of Appellant’s claims challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

We note the relevant standard of review:

     The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
     is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
     most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
     to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
     a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
     the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
     addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
     the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
     innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
     resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
     inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
     drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
     may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
     beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
     evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
     must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
     considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
     credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
     is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

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        In his first claim, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to

sustain a conviction for simple assault because the Commonwealth did not

prove that Appellant intended or attempted to cause bodily injury to Victim,

nor did it show that she sustained bodily injury. See Appellant’s Brief at 9.

Specifically, he contends, “Even when viewed in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the evidence does not establish that [Appellant] acted

with the requisite mens rea. [Victim] did not sustain any bodily injury and the

evidence failed to show an attempt to cause bodily injury because his conduct

was negligent at best, and without the use of any deadly weapon.” Id. He

also maintains that he “did not leave any marks” on Victim, and that she “did

not need medical attention.” Id. at 10. Appellant further insists that there

was “no photographic evidence,” no testimony from police, and no testimony

from “any possible onlooker” to suggest Victim sustained any injuries. Id.

        A person commits simple assault if they “attempt[ ] to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[ ] bodily injury to another[.]”4 18

____________________________________________

4   Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly are defined as follows:

        (1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element
        of an offense when:

           (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a
           result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
           of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.”        18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.   A person attempts to

commit a crime when they, “with the intent to commit a specific crime,

[perform] any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission

of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). We also note that “intent may be inferred

from the circumstances surrounding the incident if a specific intent to cause

bodily injury may reasonably be inferred therefrom.” In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d

767, 770 (Pa. Super. 2017) (concluding testimony from eyewitnesses

provided circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s intent to attempt to cause

____________________________________________

          (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he
          is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he
          believes or hopes that they exist.

       (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
       an offense when:

          (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
          attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of
          that nature or that such circumstances exist; and

          (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
          aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause
          such a result.

       (3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of
       an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
       unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
       from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
       that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
       the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
       deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
       would observe in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1)-(3).

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bodily harm), citing Commonwealth v. Polston, 616 A.2d 669, 679 (Pa.

Super. 1992).

      Here, the trial court determined there was sufficient evidence to support

Appellant’s conviction for simple assault, opining:

      [Victim] testified credibly that Appellant grabbed her arm and
      pulled her[ off the train before throwing] a soda can at [her],
      making contact with her face[. Appellant] then proceeded to
      follow her and push her head into a metal pole. [Victim] did not
      needlessly embellish her injuries, but instead explained to the
      court that her head did not hurt right away from the impact, but
      did so later on.

Trial Ct. Op. at 4. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion.

      The Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant: (1) pulled

Victim off a train; (2) threw a can of soda at her face — which he admitted to

doing during his arraignment; (3) slammed her head into a pole; and (4)

caused her to experience pain because of those actions. See N.T. at 8-11,

36.   Despite Appellant’s claims that Victim did not sustain bodily injury

because he “did not leave any marks[,]” and the Commonwealth did not

present photos or third-party testimony about her injuries, Victim testified

that she experienced pain as a result of Appellant’s attack. N.T. at 11, 23.

The trial court, sitting as fact-finder, found her testimony credible. See Trial

Ct. Op. at 4. One can reasonably infer that Appellant’s actions demonstrated

a specific intent to cause bodily injury to Victim. See In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d

at 770.

      Further, Appellant does not provide any authority to support his

contention that the Commonwealth was required to show evidence other than

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Victim’s credible testimony. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, it was reasonable for the court, as

factfinder, to infer from the attendant circumstances — throwing an object at

Victim’s face, then slamming her head into a pole — that Appellant either

attempted or intended to cause her bodily harm. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at

756; see also In re C.E.H., 167 A.3d at 770. No relief is due.

      In his second claim, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to

support his harassment conviction. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. He alleges

he did not intend to harass, annoy, or alarm Victim. Id. He further contends

Victim’s own testimony “established[ ] she was not harassed by [Appellant.]”

Id. at 12. He avers that, instead, he and Victim were a couple who “were

walking together” while having a “heated discussion[.]”              Id.   Appellant

concludes there was no evidence to support a finding that he had the requisite

intent for this conviction. Id.

      Keeping the sufficiency standard of review in mind, “[a] person commits

the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,

the person[, in relevant part,] strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the

other person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same[.]”

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1). Thus, Section 2709(a)(1) contains two elements:

(1) subjecting another person to physical contact; and (2) with the intent to

harass, annoy, or alarm. Further, it is well established that “[a]n intent to

harass   may    be   inferred     from   the   totality   of   the   circumstances.”

Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 2013).

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      Notably, Appellant only challenges the Commonwealth’s evidence

pertaining to the intent element. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. The trial court

rejected this contention, concluding it could reasonably infer Appellant’s intent

to harass Victim from his actions:

      Appellant grabbed [Victim’s] arm; he pulled her off the train;
      threw a soda can at her face; and took her phone. [Appellant]
      then began going through [Victim’s] phone while following her as
      she attempted to separate herself from him. This establishes that
      [Victim] was clearly annoyed or alarmed by Appellant’s actions;
      the required mens rea for [h]arassment. It also establishes the
      second element of [h]arassment, subjecting another to physical
      contact. As such, the evidence was sufficient to support [his]
      conviction[.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 5.

      We agree with the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s intent was

reasonably inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Victim testified

that she was attempting to get away from Appellant and he was following her.

The trial court found her testimony credible, and inferred that Victim was

“annoyed or alarmed” by his behavior, which it was permitted to do. See

Cox, 72 A.3d at 721; Trial Ct. Op. at 5.         Moreover, other than a bald

statement, Appellant does not elaborate how Victim’s testimony “established”

that he was not harassing her. See Appellant’s Brief at 12. He merely states

they were a couple who were having a “heated discussion.” Id. A review of

Victim’s testimony contradicts Appellant’s allegations. In fact, Victim explicitly

described Appellant’s conduct as “harassing” as she attempted to “separate”

herself from him. N.T. at 10. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

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to the verdict winner, it established that Appellant initiated physical contact

with Victim for the purpose of annoying or alarming her. See 18 Pa.C.S. §

2709(a)(1); see also Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756; Cox, 72 A.3d at 721. No

relief is due.

      In his final claim, Appellant argues his conviction for disorderly conduct

was not supported by sufficient evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 13. He

contends that the testimony “clearly demonstrated that he did not engage in

fighting or tumultuous behavior[.]” Id. at 14. Instead, Appellant avers that

while he and Victim were engaged in a “heated discussion” and he “put his

hands on [Victim,]” he “never intended” to cause “any public disruption or

annoyance” that would justify his misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 12, 14.

      A person is guilty of disorderly conduct, in pertinent part, if “with intent

to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a

risk thereof, he . . . engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or

tumultuous behavior[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1). Relevant to our analysis,

“public” is defined in the statute as “affecting or likely to affect persons in a

place to which the public or a substantial group has access; among the places

included . . . transport facilities . . . or any premises which are open to the

public.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c). Disorderly conduct is graded as a third-degree

misdemeanor when “the intent of the actor is to cause substantial harm or

serious inconvenience[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b). The Pennsylvania Supreme

Court has explained that the statute does not require that an offender’s

conduct

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      be directed at a certain number of persons that could qualify as
      “the public.” Therefore, when an offender engages in fighting or
      threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior in a public arena,
      even when that conduct is directed at only one other
      person, the offender may be subject to conviction for disorderly
      conduct.”

Commonwealth v. Fedorek, 946 A.2d 93, 100 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted;

emphasis added). When imposing this higher grading, we focus on

      the offender’s behavior, not directly upon the public impact of that
      behavior. Thus, when the Commonwealth proves that an offender
      intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
      recklessly created a risk thereof, by, for example, engaging in
      fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior, the
      next level of inquiry, under Section 5503(b), is the degree of the
      offender’s behavior. If the offender acted with intent to cause
      substantial harm or serious inconvenience (and by so doing
      potentially increased the threat to the public peace and safety),
      the offense is graded as a third-degree misdemeanor.

Id. at 101. Further, we note that “intent is a subjective frame of mind, [and]

can be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from

acts or conduct or from the attendant circumstances.” Commonwealth v.

Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations & some quotation

marks omitted).

      Here, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to

sustain Appellant’s conviction. Specifically, it stated:

      Appellant in the instant matter engaged in fighting with [Victim]
      in a public forum; in this instance, a train station during the
      evening commute. Appellant grabbed her, threw a can at her,
      and pushed her up against a pole, then continued to follow her.
      [Victim] did not call the police, but someone else did; a member
      of the public who witnessed the event a[nd] was inconvenienced
      or alarmed enough to have called 911. This establishes that

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      Appellant’s actions in fighting with [Victim] caused a public
      inconvenience.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6. We agree.

      The record supports the trial court’s inferences pertaining to Appellant’s

intent. It is beyond reason for Appellant to contend that attacking Victim on

a public train platform, throwing a can at her face, and slamming her head

into a pole is not “violent or tumultuous behavior[.]”           See 18 Pa.C.S.

5503(a)(1). Further, Appellant initiated this attack while others were present,

which reasonably would “cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or

recklessly create[e] a risk thereof[.]” See id. As pointed out by the trial

court, his actions were alarming enough that a third party sought police

intervention. Corporal Morris confirmed there was “at least” one phone call

reporting the incident and it was not Victim. See N.T. at 11, 33.

      Lastly, the trial court did not err in grading the offense as a third-degree

misdemeanor where the totality of the circumstances of the attack permit a

reasonable inference that Appellant intended to cause substantial harm or

serious inconvenience. See 18 Pa.C.S. 5503(b); Fedorek, 946 A.2d at 101;

Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1119. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence that

Appellant engaged in disorderly conduct as defined by the statute and did so

with the requisite intent.    See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5503(a)(1), (b); see also

Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 756. No relief is due.

      Because Appellant failed to demonstrate any error on the part of the

trial court, we do not disturb the court’s findings on appeal.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/24/2023

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