Court Opinion

ID: 9737287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:20:45.050626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.834279
License: Public Domain

BOWES, J.,
Dissenting.:
¶ 1 As I believe that the majority’s disposition in this case is inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s pronouncements in Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999), Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232 (2001), and Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 A.2d 838 (2002), as well as our recent panel decision in Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 2002 PA Super 290, 809 A.2d 396, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 The facts of this case undoubtedly are egregious. Appellant’s counsel falsely told him that a direct appeal had been filed. Subsequently, Appellant’s two PCRA counsel both abandoned representation. Nonetheless, I do not believe that we have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
¶ 3 At the onset, one must be mindful that there is no constitutional right to post-conviction relief. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987). Therefore, Appellant’s right to such review is purely a matter of legislative grace. Our legislature has permitted such review through enactment of the Post-conviction Relief Act, (“PCRA”) 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et. seq., which is the means of obtaining collateral relief, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Our legislature’s enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 limits our jurisdiction to consider the merits of a collateral attack and provides that a petition for post-conviction review must be filed within one year of when a judgment of sentence becomes final. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 561 Pa. 214, 749 A.2d 911 (2000) (timeliness requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b) are jurisdictional in nature, and the courts lack jurisdiction to grant PCRA relief unless a petition is timely under that section). It is beyond dispute that this fourth PCRA petition was not timely filed.
¶ 4 Our Supreme Court has made clear that vindication of the constitutional right to direct review granted in the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. CONST, art. V, § 9, cannot be obtained outside the parameters of the PCRA, stating that the “PCRA provides the exclusive remedy for post-conviction claims seeking restoration of appellate rights due to counsel’s failure to perfect a direct appeal.... ” Lantzy, supra at 223, 736 A.2d at 570.
¶ 5 In the present case, Appellant sought restoration of his appellate rights, and his entitlement to relief must be examined within the confines of the PCRA. He sought restoration of his rights in an untimely-filed PCRA petition. I believe that under the Supreme Court’s directives in Hall and Eller, we may not consider this fourth petition an “extension” of Appellant’s timely-filed first petition. Hall holds that a petition seeking a direct appeal nunc pro tunc based on an allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to *1269file a direct appeal has to be brought within the one-year time limitations of the PCRA. Further expanding this holding in Eller, supra, our Supreme Court found that a petition seeking reinstatement of appellate rights must be dismissed if untimely, even when the defendant asked his attorney to file an appeal and his attorney refused to do so. The Court stated, “The PCRA confers no authority upon this Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” Id, at 634, 807 A.2d at 845.
¶ 6 It must be remembered that Hall and Eller merely reinforce the consistent pronouncements from our Supreme Court that any allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, no matter how framed, will not save an untimely filed PCRA petition under any circumstances. E.g., Commonwealth v. Howard, 567 Pa. 481, 788 A.2d 351 (2002); Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 753 A.2d 780 (2000); Commonwealth v. Pursell, supra; Commonwealth v. Beasley, 559 Pa. 604, 741 A.2d 1258 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999).
¶ 7 The instant case involves ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to Appellant’s first, second, and third PCRA counsel, who did not perform their professional duty to file a direct appeal.1 However, there is no authority for the proposition that this type of failure to act is such that the filing requirement can be ignored.
¶ 8 Perhaps our Supreme Court will make a crucial distinction between ineffective assistance of counsel and a wholesale dereliction of duty in the face of a defendant’s request for action, as is presented in this case, so that we may “relate back” subsequent petitions. However, in light of the Court’s unequivocal position that ineffective assistance under any guise does not fall within any exceptions, we are without jurisdiction to entertain this petition.
¶ 9 Clearly, this Court in Fairiror, supra, recognized the impact of Hall on “relation back” cases.
¶ 10 Whether Lantzy, Hall, and Eller are cases with which this Court agrees, we must abide by the Supreme Court’s dictates in this regard. Vindication of the constitutional right to direct review is not allowed outside the parameters of the PCRA. In this case, prior PCRA counsels’ dereliction of duty, as unconscionable as it is, ultimately must be viewed in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, we do not have the authority to fashion an equitable remedy by relating back untimely petitions to timely petitions when counsel’s representation is deficient. Since the fifing requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 are not met, we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this PCRA petition, regardless of how much we prefer to do so in light of the obvious injustice presented.
¶ 11 Our legislature and Supreme Court have spoken and have deprived us of jurisdiction to act, even in these compelling circumstances. We, as an intermediate appellate court, are without authority to ignore them. See Commonwealth v. Kirkner, 569 Pa. 499, 805 A.2d 514 (2002) (a legislative enactment may not be modified by judicial discretion, even when the judiciary has good intentions). However, this case presents the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to find that certain types of ineffective assistance of counsel shock the conscience of the court such that the defendant’s constitutional right to direct appeal must be vindicated. Until that *1270day, however, I believe we must follow its dictates and find this petition to be untimely. Accordingly, I would affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of this petition as untimely filed.

. I believe that these PCRA counsel, who engage in the wholesale abandonment of their client resulting in their client’s loss of important constitutional guarantees, should be sanctioned.