Court Opinion

ID: 9439930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:59:59.133524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:48.403418
License: Public Domain

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I write separately because I am concerned that we have significantly expanded a prior precedent, United States v. Estrella, 104 F.3d 3 (1st Cir.1997), without giving serious consideration to the difference between Es-trella and the circumstances attending the present ease.
The defendant in Estrella appealed his conviction under the federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), arguing that a prior Massachusetts felony conviction could not serve as a predicate felony under the federal statute because his civil rights had been restored by operation of Massachusetts law. This court held that, notwithstanding the retention of a felon’s right to vote and the restoration of his rights to hold public office and to -serve on a jury, the restrictions Massachusetts imposes on a convicted felon’s right to own firearms trigger the “unless” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which nullifies the ordinary rule that a civil rights restoration will remove the conviction from consideration as a predicate offense for purposes of the federal felon-in-possession statute. See Estrella, 104 F.3d at 8. Estrella’s holding went no further than the context of that case: it merely permitted such a prior conviction to serve as a predicate felony to support a federal conviction under the felon-in-possession statute. Id.
In the present case, the majority applies this conclusion to an entirely different context: to enhance Blodgett’s sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). As the opinion notes, Blodgett maintains that “[tjhere are reasons why this Court might choose to interpret Massachusetts law as preserving the federal ban on handgun possession by a felon, and yet not interpret Massachusetts law as allowing a severe enhancement of defendant’s sentence where defendant’s civil rights have been restored.” Ante, at 3. Even if Massachusetts’ restrictions on the right of an individual, previously convicted of a Massachusetts felony, to own firearms should have a bearing on the question of whether to criminalize federally an individual’s possession of a firearm, it is not at all clear that Massachusetts’ restrictions have any effect upon the very different question of whether that individual’s Massachusetts conviction should result in an enhanced sentence upon conviction of a later federal offense. Accordingly, before we expand the Estrella holding from one context to the other, I think we should carefully consider whether such expansion is appropriate, and we should discuss our reasoning if we decide to go ahead with the expansion.
I do not think we did this in Alston. The Alston decision focused almost exclusively on a completely different issue (whether the prosecution’s significant alteration of a gun should have precluded its being received in evidence). Alston’s expansive reading of Es-trella was offered in response to the last of several also-ran arguments that the court dealt with only very briefly. We conclusorily applied Estrella, noting simply that:
In Estrella, we found these limited [Massachusetts] restrictions trigger the above-quoted ‘unless’ exception to the provision relied upon by Alston as restoring his civil rights. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Estrella was decided after Alston’s sentence and the original briefing [in this court], but his reply brief has no effective answer to that decision.
Alston, 112 F.3d at 38. Thus, far from “reject[ing] the precise argument Blodgett *5makes in this appeal,” as the majority asserts ante at 3, Alston never addressed that argument. The court in Alston did not even acknowledge that it was applying the Estrel-la conclusion to a different context — which is Blodgett’s argument here — much less provide any reasoning for such an expansion. Nor did the defendant in Alston brief the question of whether Estrella should be applied in the sentence enhancement context.
In the present case, in contrast, as the majority acknowledges, Blodgett does at least raise the issue that Estrella on its face does not address the present context. I do not think we should assert that Estrella’s holding has been significantly enlarged to the sentencing context merely by referring to Alston’s conclusion (without further analysis) and stating that we will not “deviate from Alston ” here. If we are going to enshrine this expansion into solid precedent, we should discuss its consistency with the plain language (first) and the context and legislative history (if the plain language is not clear) of the relevant provisions of the enhanced sentencing statute (ACCA).
Nevertheless, as the majority notes, although Blodgett does direct our attention to the implicit expansion that would inhere in our application of Estrella to the enhanced sentencing context, he has not provided us with developed argumentation explaining why such expansion would be inconsistent with legislative intent or otherwise violative of law. It is a “settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” are deemed waived. Continental Cas. Co. v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 370, 375 (1st Cir.1991). For this reason, I concur in the majority’s judgment affirming the district court’s sentence.