Court Opinion

ID: 9366681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 18:02:30.447102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.331696
License: Public Domain

NOTICE
       The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the
       Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal
       errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts:
                           303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
                                    Fax: (907) 264-0878
                             E-mail: corrections @ akcourts.gov

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

MIKE STEELY MORGAN,
                                                      Court of Appeals No. A-13512
                            Appellant,              Trial Court No. 3AN-18-12600 CR

                     v.
                                                               OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                            Appellee.                  No. 2739 — January 27, 2023

              Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
              Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge.

              Appearances: Bradly A. Carlson, Law Office of Bradly A.
              Carlson, LLC, under contract with the Public Defender Agency,
              and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
              Appellant. Seneca Theno Freitag, Assistant Attorney General,
              Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor,
              Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

              Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.

              Judge HARBISON.

              Under AS 11.41.230(a)(1), a person who recklessly causes physical injury
to another person commits the crime of fourth-degree assault. This offense is generally
classified as a class A misdemeanor, but under AS 11.41.220(a)(5), the offense is
elevated to third-degree assault, a class C felony, if the defendant has at least two prior
convictions, within the previous ten years, for certain enumerated offenses or for an
offense of this or another jurisdiction with “elements similar” to those of an enumerated
offense.
             In the present case, Mike Steely Morgan was convicted in 2019, following
a jury trial, of third-degree assault under the repeat-offender provision of
AS 11.41.220(a)(5).1 To meet its burden under this provision, the State presented
evidence of Morgan’s 2017 conviction for assault under Anchorage Municipal Code
(AMC) 08.10.010(B)(1) and his 2016 conviction for assault on a police officer under
AMC 08.10.010(D). The State argued that both of these offenses had “elements similar”
to the elements of fourth-degree assault under AS 11.41.230(a)(1) — an offense that is
specifically enumerated in the repeat-offender provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5).
             Morgan then moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that, as a matter
of law, his 2016 conviction for assault on a police officer under AMC 08.10.010(D) was
not a qualifying prior conviction under the repeat-offender provision of
AS 11.41.220(a)(5).     (Morgan conceded that his 2017 assault conviction was a
qualifying prior conviction.) The superior court denied Morgan’s motion.
             Morgan challenges this ruling on appeal. He contends, and the State agrees,
that to be guilty of assaulting a police officer under AMC 08.10.010(D), a defendant
must also violate subsection (B), which enumerates the four ways one can commit an
assault under the ordinance.
             But only two of the four offenses specified in AMC 08.10.010(B) are
qualifying prior offenses for purposes of the recidivist third-degree assault statute. And
the documents that we are authorized to consult to determine the statutory subsection

   1
       Morgan was also charged with resisting arrest, under AS 11.56.700(a)(1), but he was
acquitted of this offense at trial.

                                          –2–                                        2739
under which Morgan was convicted are unclear as to the basis for his 2016 conviction.
Accordingly, the record does not establish that Morgan has two prior qualifying
convictions for purposes of the recidivist third-degree assault statute.
              We therefore reverse Morgan’s conviction for third-degree assault (but we
remand this case to the superior court with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction
for the lesser included offense of fourth-degree assault).

       Procedural background
              Morgan was indicted for third-degree assault under AS 11.41.220(a)(5),
and his case proceeded to a jury trial in May 2019. In order to establish that Morgan had
been convicted of at least two qualifying offenses as required by the repeat-offender
provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5), the State presented evidence of Morgan’s 2017
conviction for recklessly causing physical injury to another person under
AMC 08.10.010(B)(1) and his 2016 conviction for assault on a police officer under
AMC 08.10.010(D).
              After the evidence was presented, but before the case was submitted to the
jury for deliberations, Morgan moved for a judgment of acquittal under Alaska Criminal
Rule 29(b). He argued that his 2016 conviction for assault on a police officer under
AMC 08.10.010(D) was not a qualifying prior conviction under AS 11.41.220(a)(5).
Morgan pointed out that AS 11.41.220(a)(5) includes only the “physical injury”
provisions of AS 11.41.230(a) — i.e., subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) — as qualifying prior
offenses, but it excludes the “fear” assault provision — subsection (a)(3).2 He noted that

   2
       Both AS 11.41.230(a)(1) and AS 11.41.230(a)(2) include, as an element, that the
defendant caused physical injury to another person; these offenses accordingly are commonly
referred to as “physical assaults.” By contrast, AS 11.41.230(a)(3), criminalizes recklessly
                                                                                (continued...)

                                            –3–                                          2739
his 2016 conviction was for violating an Anchorage municipal ordinance that proscribes
both physical injury assaults and fear assaults.
              This ordinance, AMC 08.10.010, provides, in relevant part:
              A. It is unlawful for any person to commit an assault.
              B. A person commits an assault if:
                     1. That person recklessly causes physical injury
                     to another person;
                     2. With criminal negligence that person causes
                     physical injury to another person by means of a
                     dangerous instrument;
                     3. By words or other conduct that person
                     recklessly places another person in fear of
                     imminent physical injury; or
                     4. That person recklessly uses words or other
                     conduct which places a family member in
                     reasonable fear of imminent physical injury or
                     death to that family member or another person,
                     provided however, this subsection does not
                     prohibit lawful discipline of a minor by a parent
                     or another person with lawful physical custody
                     or control of a minor.
                     ....
              D. It is unlawful when an assault is committed against the
              person of a police officer, firefighter, paramedic or animal
              control officer and the person committing the offense knows
              or reasonably should know that such victim is a police
              officer, firefighter, paramedic or animal control officer
              engaged in the performance of official duties.

   2
       (...continued)
placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury and does not have, as an element,
the requirement that the defendant actually caused injury.

                                           –4–                                         2739
Morgan argued that his conviction for violating this ordinance did not satisfy the repeat-
offender provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5) because his judgment of conviction did not
specify the subsection under which he was convicted and because the Anchorage
ordinance includes fear assaults — which are not similar to any offense enumerated in
AS 11.41.220(a)(5).
              The State opposed this motion. Relevant to this appeal, the prosecutor
asserted that the probable cause portion of the complaint charging Morgan with the 2016
assault alleged that Morgan “grabbed the officer’s genitals and squeezed, causing
significant pain.” The prosecutor argued that this confirmed that Morgan’s prior offense
was a “physical injury” assault — and thus similar to AS 11.41.230(a)(1) — rather than
a “fear” assault.
              The court took the matter under advisement, and after the jury found
Morgan guilty of third-degree assault, the court resumed its consideration of Morgan’s
motion. The court ultimately denied the motion in a written order. In its order, the court
focused on the text of AMC 08.10.010(D), which criminalizes an assault “against the
person” of a police officer. The court found that the “against the person” language in this
ordinance was intended to reference “physical injury” assaults and to exclude “fear”
assaults. After construing AMC 08.10.010(D) in this manner, the court found that the
elements of Morgan’s 2016 statute of conviction were “similar” to the elements of
AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
              This appeal followed.

                                           –5–                                        2739
       Why we conclude that Morgan’s conviction for assault under
       AMC 08.10.010(D) does not satisfy the repeat-offender provision of
       AS 11.41.220(a)(5)
              The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the superior court
erred when it determined that Morgan’s 2016 conviction for assault on a police officer
under AMC 08.10.010(D) satisfied the repeat-offender provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5)
— i.e., when it determined that Morgan’s prior conviction was for an offense having
“elements similar” to the elements of AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
              In other contexts, when determining whether another jurisdiction’s offense
had “elements similar” to an offense under Alaska law, both the Alaska Supreme Court
and this Court have applied a categorical approach, comparing the elements of the two
relevant statutes rather than examining the facts of the defendant’s prior offense. For
example, in determining whether an out-of-state conviction qualified as an offense
subject to sex offender registration in Alaska, the supreme court compared “the elements
of the [other jurisdiction’s] statute of conviction to the elements of the allegedly similar
Alaska statute,” without reference to the underlying facts.3 This Court has likewise
conducted a categorical analysis when determining whether another jurisdiction’s
offense was similar to a felony in Alaska for purposes of presumptive sentencing.4
              We similarly conclude that the statutory language of AS 11.41.220(a)(5)
— referring to prior offenses from another jurisdiction with “elements similar” to one of
the enumerated offenses — requires us to compare the elements of Morgan’s prior 2016
municipal conviction with the elements of a physical injury fourth-degree assault under
AS 11.41.230(a)(1) or (2).

   3
       State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 425 P.3d 115, 120 (Alaska 2018).
   4
       Borja v. State, 886 P.2d 1311, 1312, 1314 (Alaska App. 1994).

                                           –6–                                         2739
              Morgan’s prior judgment specifies that he was convicted under
AMC 08.10.010(D) — i.e., committing “an assault . . . against the person of a police
officer.” But the actual parameters of this offense are set out in subsection (B), which
establishes four separate assault offenses in its four subsections. The text of two of these
subsections — AMC 08.10.010(B)(1) and (2) — is nearly identical to the text of
AS 11.41.230(a)(1) and (2), which are the “physical injury” assaults that are specifically
enumerated under AS 11.41.220(a)(5). Thus, if a person is convicted of committing an
assault under either of these two subsections of AMC 08.10.010(B), the person
necessarily will have committed a crime with elements that are similar to an enumerated
offense under AS 11.41.220(a)(5).
              But the other two provisions of AMC 08.10.010(B) — subsections (3) and
(4) — do not include, as an element, a requirement that the defendant cause physical
injury to another person. Instead, these offenses criminalize conduct that places another
person in fear of physical injury. In fact, the language of subsection (B)(3) is identical
to the language of AS 11.41.230(a)(3) (the “fear assault” provision of the Alaska
misdemeanor assault statute), which is not included in the list of qualifying offenses
under AS 11.41.220(a)(5).
              As a result, convictions under subsection (B)(1) or (B)(2) of
AMC 08.10.010(B) are qualifying convictions for purposes of the repeat-offender
provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5), but convictions under subsection (B)(3) or (B)(4) are
not qualifying convictions.
              In this case, the superior court concluded that the “against the person”
language found in AMC 08.10.010(D) limits the offense to “physical injury” assaults and
excludes “fear” assaults. But on appeal, the parties agree that this ruling was incorrect.
In particular, the parties agree that the specific subsection of AMC 08.10.010 under
which Morgan was convicted — assault on a police officer under subsection (D) — must

                                           –7–                                         2739
be for conduct that is proscribed by one of the four subsections of AMC 08.10.010(B).
In other words, a defendant may be convicted of assault “against the person of a police
officer” under subsection (D) if they engage in conduct against a police officer that is a
“physical injury” assault under subsections (B)(1) or (2) or a “fear” assault under
subsections (B)(3) or (4).
              We agree with the parties that the superior court misconstrued
AMC 08.10.010(D).5 In fact, our review of the legislative history of this ordinance
provides additional support for the parties’ position.
              The text of AMC 08.10.010, including the “against the person” language
that the superior court relied on in issuing its decision, was based on the California Penal
Code.6 Under California law, when a defendant actually causes physical injury to
another person, the defendant has committed the crime of “battery” rather than
“assault.”7 Thus, under the California Penal Code, an assault “against the person” does
not refer to a “physical assault.” (Indeed, California law includes the “against the
person” language in all of its assault provisions.) Accordingly, the phrase “against the
person” in AMC 08.10.010(D) does not necessarily equate to a “physical injury” assault.
Rather, the provisions set out in AMC 08.10.010(B) establish whether a particular assault
under (D) was a fear assault or a physical injury assault.

   5
       See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (appellate courts must
independently assess whether a concession of error is supported by the record on appeal and
has legal foundation).
   6
      See Anchorage Ordinance (AO) No. 85-209, § 1 (Nov. 26, 1985) (enacting former
AMC 08.05.030 (1985), an earlier version of AMC 08.10.010, and noting that the language
was “[a]dapted from CPC [Cal. Penal Code] [§] 240-243[.]”).
   7
       Compare Cal. Penal Code § 240, with Cal. Penal Code § 242.

                                           –8–                                         2739
               Because the superior court erred when it determined, as a matter of law, that
any conviction under AMC 08.10.010(D) was a qualifying prior “physical injury”
assault, we must examine whether the record nonetheless establishes that Morgan’s
conviction was for a physical injury assault under AMC 08.10.010(B)(1) or (2). While
we cannot look to the underlying facts of Morgan’s prior conviction to determine
whether it has “elements similar” to a physical injury assault, we can look to certain
record documents to attempt to determine under which subsection Morgan was
previously convicted. This “modified” categorical approach applies to divisible statutes,
which have “multiple, alternative elements,” effectively creating several different ways
of committing a crime.8
               Under the modified categorical approach, if the statute of conviction is
divisible into alternative sets of elements, a court may consider certain court records for
the limited purpose of determining the statutory subsection under which the defendant
was previously convicted. But the court may only consider particular “extra-statutory
materials,” such as the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy, to
determine what offense, with what elements, the defendant was actually convicted of
committing.9
               The State acknowledges that Morgan’s 2016 judgment shows only that he
was convicted of violating AMC 08.10.010(D), and it does not specify whether Morgan
committed a physical injury assault under subsection (B)(1) or (2), or a fear assault under
subsection (B)(3) or (4). The State nevertheless contends that the application of a
modified categorical approach to AMC 08.10.010 reveals that Morgan’s 2016 conviction

   8
       Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 264 (2013); see Doe, 425 P.3d at 123
(adopting the modified categorical approach with respect to the determination of whether a
person with a prior out-of-state conviction must register as a sex offender in Alaska).
   9
       Descamps, 570 U.S. at 262-63; Doe, 425 P.3d at 123 n.34.

                                            –9–                                        2739
was for a physical assault. According to the State, the complaint charging Morgan with
the 2016 assault on a police officer contains a probable cause statement which alleged
that Morgan squeezed the police officer’s genitals, causing him pain. The State argues
that the complaint thus establishes that Morgan’s prior offense was “similar” to a
physical assault under AS 11.41.230(a)(1).
              But the Alaska Supreme Court has cautioned that only “facts found by a
court of law or conceded by [the defendant]” may be considered when applying a
modified categorical approach to determining statutory similarity.10 Here, Morgan’s
2016 conviction was based on his plea of no contest to the charge that he violated
AMC 08.10.010(D), an ordinance that proscribes both fear and physical injury assaults.
There was no evidence that Morgan conceded, as part of his plea agreement, that he
caused physical injury. Rather, the probable cause statement was simply an allegation
that Morgan caused physical injury to a police officer, and the State cannot rely upon
such “non-elemental facts” to establish that Morgan committed a physical assault.11
              Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that the modified
categorical approach is not to be “repurposed” as a technique for discovering whether
a defendant’s prior conviction for violating a divisible statute rested on facts that could
have satisfied the elements of a specifically enumerated qualifying offense.12 Because

   10
        Doe, 425 P.3d at 123.
   11
       Jones v. State, 215 P.3d 1091, 1100 (Alaska App. 2009) (noting “a plea of no contest
is an admission of every essential element of the offense well-pleaded in the charging
document. . . . A no contest plea is not a concession of other, non-essential assertions of fact
contained in the affidavit supporting the complaint.” (citations, modifications, and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
   12
        Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 513-14 (2016).

                                            – 10 –                                         2739
the extra-statutory materials “will not in every case speak plainly,”13 “any lingering
ambiguity about them can mean the government will fail to carry its burden of proof in
a criminal case.”14
               Here, the application of a modified categorical approach does not clearly
reveal which of the four subsections of AMC 08.10.010(B) formed the basis of Morgan’s
2016 conviction. This lingering ambiguity means that the State has failed to carry its
burden of establishing that Morgan’s 2016 conviction was for an offense that has
elements that are similar to the elements of AS 11.41.230(a)(1).15
               For these reasons, we reverse Morgan’s conviction for third-degree assault
under the repeat-offender provision of AS 11.41.220(a)(5). However, because the jury
found, as an element of this offense, that Morgan committed the crime of fourth-degree
assault under AS 11.41.230(a)(1), we instruct the superior court on remand to enter a
judgment of conviction for this lesser included offense and to resentence Morgan
accordingly.

        Conclusion
               The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED.             This case is
REMANDED to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

   13
        Id. at 519.
   14
        Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S.Ct. 754, 765 (2021).
   15
       Cf. id. at 762-66 (holding that, in civil immigration context, application of the
modified categorical approach did not clearly reveal which of the four subsections of the
relevant statute formed the basis of the individual’s prior conviction).

                                          – 11 –                                    2739