Court Opinion

ID: 9639760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:47:04.009789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.509736
License: Public Domain

L. HAND, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Section 498, Title 39 U.S.C.A., gives power to a post office inspector to seize let*403ters which are being carried in violation of the postal monopoly and to take them to the nearest post office. I assume that when they reach such a post office, they are to be delivered to the “owner or sender” unless the Postmaster-General shall “otherwise direct.” § 258, Title 39 U.S.C.A. The section (§ 498) concludes by saying that, if the Postmaster-General or the Secretary of the Treasury so directs, the inspector “may * * * detain them until two months after the final determination of all suits and proceedings which may, at any time within six months after such seizure, be brought against any person for sending or carrying such letters.” The purpose pretty clearly is to allow the Post or the Treasury — each of which has an interest in such prosecutions — meanwhile to impound the letters as evidence. My brothers do not differ with me so far, but they say that, although six months is the limit of the period during which letters may be impounded, the district court may cut it down when justice requires. I cannot read the language so; the words to me mean that the letters may be “detained” for the whole six months, if the Postmaster-General or the Secretary decides that until then the proper time to sue has not arrived. I can see nothing to indicate that their decision may be reviewed by a court; and, if that had been intended, I should certainly have expected that it would not have been left to implication. It is true that a delay of six months may be unnecessary — I should think it generally would be — ; in the case at bar it seems to have been used to force the plaintiff to an “administrative proceeding” for which I can find as' little warrant in law as my brothers. Nevertheless, the fact that official powers may be abused is no answer; all powers may be, and it is ordinarily not the function of courts to correct the abuses when they arise.
In re Behrens, 2 Cir., 39 F.2d 561, was quite a different situation. The statute did not profess to fix a time within which the Treasury must decide to sue, and must prepare its case; the owner of the property had no recourse but to await the expiry of the statute of limitations. I agree that the district court has as absolute a jurisdiction over these letters as it had over that property: the last clause of § 499 of Title 39 U.S.C.A., incorporates § 747 of Title 28 U.S.C.A., by reference, and makes it immaterial whether the postal laws are revenue laws. But the fact that the letters are subject to the summary orders of the district court is also immaterial, if — as I believe — § 498, Title 39 U.S.C.A. gives the inspector power to detain them for six months. It does not follow that the “owner or sender” has no relief, if the property seized is not “letters.” Section 498 would not in that case confer power upon the inspector; and it may be that the district court could summarily direct their return. Whether it could in this way anticipate one of the issues of the trial of any prosecution for which the letters were being held I need not say; the plaintiff does not ask us to decide whether the documents here seized are “letters,” or to direct their return.
Finally, I can see no constitutional question in the offing which should make us hesitate. Prosecuting officers have in general power to impound documents, provided they have come by them lawfully. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950; Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 41 S.Ct. 574, 65 L.Ed. 1048, 13 A.L.R. 1159. The possibility that they may withhold them longer than is necessary does not seem to me one of those major grievances against which the Constitution protects the individual; not at least when the term of any possible abuse is limited so narrowly as it is here. Letters do not deteriorate with time; their contents can be learned, if it is not already known; copies are generally as serviceable as the originals. In the case at bar I assume that the cheques are being impounded along with the memoranda attached to them; but payment can be stopped and new cheques drawn and delivered. On the other hand, to exercise any such jurisdiction the district court must review the action of the Post; its reason for delaying the prosecution, which in turn must inevitably involve any contemplated prosecution and the time needed to prepare for it. That might seriously hamper the prosecution itself; at least it would duplicate much of the work. And for what? Only to insure the owner of the letters against delay for some part of six months in the institution of any prosecution against him. I cannot take seriously the suggestion that the solution, whatever it be, of such a conflict of interest, can raise a constitutional doubt.