Court Opinion

ID: 9719983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:11:53.874608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.008257
License: Public Domain

WALLIN, J.,
Dissenting. —I would reverse and remand for a Franks (Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674]) hearing on the veracity of Nunez’ statements regarding his independent observations of Sandlin and Tustison. The “substantial showing” required by Franks requires only an offer of proof to directly controvert the affiant’s statements. That offer must include affidavits or statements of reliable witnesses, or explanations for their absence. Here the two defendants submitted declarations, signed under penalty of perjury, directly controverting the affidavit. The declarations carried with them the clear implication that the allegedly false statements were made “ ‘knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth.’ ” (People v. Luttenberger (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1, 10 [265 Cal.Rptr. 690, 784 P.2d 633].)
In U.S. v. Johns (9th Cir. 1988) 851 F.2d 1131, the defendants’ allegations that they did not do what was alleged in the affidavit merited an evidentiary hearing when those allegations were supplemented with affidavits of experts. (Id. at p. 1134.) Here the only conceivable supporting proof for Sandlin or Tustison would have been a declaration from either an alibi or other percipient witness. I do not believe this kind of proof is required to obtain a Franks hearing. If either had been fortunate enough to have Mother Theresa by their side on the day in question and she too submitted a declaration stating the defendants did not engage in the alleged activities, without a doubt the trial court would have granted a Franks hearing. But the majority holds that in this case it is not enough that only the defendants submit declarations. In other words, it is presupposed that a criminal defendant, by virtue of having been accused, is unworthy of belief.
People v. Duval (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1105 [271 Cal.Rptr. 240] rejected the defendant’s claim that he had made a Franks “substantial showing.” In Duval the police officer’s affidavit in support of the search warrant alleged *1320he had received information from a confidential informant regarding the defendant’s participation in the selling of cocaine, and another officer told him he obtained similar information from a citizen informant. The affiant conducted surveillance at the defendant’s apartment and observed suspicious activities. After the defendant’s arrest, the affiant police officer died. The defendant then requested a Franks hearing to challenge the affidavit. His offer of proof was his testimony that the facts stated by the affiant were untrue and that no such informant existed. The court affirmed the denial of his motion, concluding the defendant had provided only a general denial of the affiant’s allegations and that the offer of proof was nothing more than the creation of an inference that the affiant lied. (Id. at p. 1113.) The court went on to state, “[W]e do not hold that the sole testimony of a defendant would, in every case, be insufficient to meet the preliminary showing required by Franks. Each case necessarily must be determined on its own facts and circumstances.” (Ibid.) In Duval, because the affiant was dead the only proof would have been the defendant’s testimony that the acts alleged in the affidavit never occurred. Here the court could have held the Franks hearing and weighed the credibility of the defendants and the affiant. Furthermore, in Duval, the sole defendant was challenging the observations of an informant, not the affiant. (See United States v. Kiser (9th Cir. 1983) 716 F.2d 1268, 1271.) Here the two defendants each directly challenged the observations of the affiant. This was an adequate offer of proof entitling them to an evidentiary hearing. The concern that allowing a Franks hearing on the basis of such an offer of proof has the practical effect of allowing two trials in every search warrant case is not well founded. The only purpose of the Franks hearing is to test the veracity of the affidavit. Once the court has concluded it contains sufficient probable cause, it is no longer an issue at trial. I would remand this case to the trial court for the limited evidentiary hearing required under Franks.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 24, 1991. Wallin, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 22, 1991. Mosk, J., Broussard, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.