Court Opinion

ID: 9857300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:28:55.840602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:26.469027
License: Public Domain

Vanderbilt, C. J.
(dissenting). I am in accord with the principles and conclusions expressed in Parts I and II of the majority opinion holding that the State may not take by escheat the property possessed by the defendant when the statute of limitations has barred the owner’s right to recover, *311and that the State may take by escheat that property which the defendant holds in trust, including its stock and unpaid dividends thereon, but not with that portion of Part III of the opinion dealing with the adequacy of the notice prescribed by the Escheat Act and the status of the defendant to resist the escheat. I am therefore constrained to dissent. To my mind the Escheat Act, B. 8. 2:53-15 et seq., is fatally defective for lack of the procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy the constitutional requirement of “due process.^
The validity of the statute and the proceedings thereunder depend upon the adequacy of the notice prescribed by the statute and not by the notice that may in fact have been given in the particular instance, Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 72 L. Ed. 446, 45 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928); Weiner v. Wittman, 129 N. J. L. 35 (Sup. Ct. 1942). The notice to be given to the owners of the property of which escheat is sought is provided by B. 8. 2:53-21. It does not require that the names and addresses of the last known owners be given, nor that the character of the property be specified, nor that the basis of escheat be set forth. This notice, moreover, need only be published once a week for three successive weeks in a single newspaper, and the owner to whom it is supposedly directed must file his claim five days before the time fixed for the hearing. Such notice is wholly inadequate when it is borne in mind that the very purpose of the act is to extinguish the rights of persons whose names or whereabouts are unknown. Neither the information contained in the notice, nor the publication of it, nor the time allowed to file a claim are reasonably calculated to inform the owners of the property of the impending proceedings and to give them an opportunity to appear and protect their interests. The notice required by the statute is, in effect, no notice at all to anyone.
Nor do I consider the inadequacy of the notice required by the statute any less important because of the fact that the owners of the escheated property may apply to reopen the proceedings at any time within two years and “upon proof that they were without actual knowledge of such escheat pro*312ceedings, and of proof of ownership of such property or the right to possession thereof, the court may in its discretion reopen the decree” and order the State Treasurer to repay the moneys received by the State, less expenses and costs, R. S. 2 :53-31. Not only does the judgment in the escheat proceeding start the running of the two-year period after which the right of the owner of the property is automatically and forever barred, but the right to recover during the two-year period is not absolute, but within the discretion of the court. In the majority opinion it is stated that the court must enter judgment for the claimant if “the statutory criteria of ownership or right of possession and a failure of actual notice of the escheat proceeding” are proven; that the statute contemplates a “mere legal discretion.” With this interpretation I do not agree. If the claimant to the escheated property is entitled to recover upon proof of these two conditions, then the court is not exercising its discretion but following the legislative mandate. In that event the words of the statute “may in its discretion” are of no meaning or effect, and it is not to be considered that the Legislature employed them fruitlessly.
I would reverse the judgment below in its entirety.
Mr. Justice Case has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent.
For modification—Justices Heher, Oliphant, Waoheneeld and Burling—i.
For reversal—Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justice Case—2.