Court Opinion

ID: 9808584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:43:13.790245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:37.655877
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
dissenting. By the use of the words, “I give and bequeath to my daughter, Parthenia Leathers, during her natural life, and after her death to the begotten heirs or heiresses of her body, one-half of three tracts of land,” &c., I think it manifest that it was not only the paramount intent, but the only intent of the testator to give the land to his daughter for life, with remainder to her children, sons and daughters, but under the rule in Shelley’s case, that would not in the least alter the construction to be placed upon his will, if he used the words “the begotten heirs or heiresses of her body,” as meaning simply heirs in the tech*168nical sense of that word, for I believe it will be conceded that the rule often, and in cases of wills written, by unprofessional persons, oftener than otherwise, defeats the intent, and the single and only intent of the testator; yet whatever may have been his intent, if he used the word heirs simply, without super-added words to limit or explain its meaning, the technical meaning would follow. From the whole clause of the testator’s will it seems 10 me quite clear that he used the word, not in any technical sense (for the language shows that with him there could have been none) but as descriptio personarum, and his one intent, and only intent was to give the land to his daughter for life, remainder to her children. The rule in Shelley’s case is based upon the idea that there is in the mind of the maker of the instrument, that comes under its operation two intents, one a paramount or general, or legal intent as it is called, and the other a particular or prescribed intent, and if both intents cannot have effect, the latter must yield to the former. See the question discussed by Pearson, J., in Ward v. Jones, 5 Ired. Eq., 400. See the authorities cited in the case in 96 N. C., 548.
It is a rule of construction, that when technical words or phrases are used, nothing else appearing, they must be taken in their technical sense, and when the word “heirs,” or “ heirs of the body ” are used alone, without anything to show that they were not so intended, the technical meaning must prevail, because, standing alone, there can be no other certain meaning given to them, but it has been held and is settled in this State, that super-added words, “ equally to be divided,” and like qualifying words which show that they were not used in a technical sense, will prevent the operation of the rule in Shelley’s case. Mills v. Thorne, 95 N. C., 362, and authorities there cited; Chambers v. Payne, 6 Jones’ Eq., 276. Such words are not treated as surplusage, but as 'aids to show the true meaning of the testator. Suppose the testator in the case before us had added, by way of explana*169tion, by “ heirs and heiresses,” “ I mean sons and daughters,” it would clearly have shown that he did not use them in any technical sense, and I apprehend that in that case the rule in Shelley’s case would not be insisted on, and yet, it seems to me that is clearly what he meant, and I cannot conceive of their use by him in a technical sense, unless'you treat the word “ heiresses ” as surplusage, and if that word, in connection with other parts of his will, tend to show his meaning, I do not see why we should reject it.
I think we have no right to reject, as surplusage, any word or words used by the testator, that may tend to show or aid in showing what he meant. It is his will that must prevail, and if it is apparent that he uses a technical word, not in a technical sense, the meaning attached to it by him should govern in the construction of his will.
If it be said that by “heirs or heiresses’’ is meant nothing more than heirs, I think the answer is that it shows none the less conclusively that the words were not used by the testator in the technical sense, importing the class of persons who take indefinitely as heirs.
Whatever in the past may have been the value of the rule in Shelley’ case, I think it should be strictly construed when otherwise it would defeat the manifest intention of the. testator. I think the tendency of modern decisions in America is to limit its operation to cases that come strictly and technically within the rule, and in many of the States it has been abolished by statute. It is a rule by which the meaning of the testator is construed, and when this meaning is 'clear I do not see why it should be defeated by a too liberal construction of a rule of construction.
As much as the memory of Coke is to-be venerated for his great legal learning, I think, with all his faults, if not crimes, while Attorney General, his services in behalf of popular rights and civil liberty in resisting the encroachments and tyranny of the house of Stuart, entitle him to far more last*170ing fame than did bis services in the legal war carried on by the bench and the bar between the “Shelleyites” and the “ anti-Shelleyites.”
The record show's that the merits are with the defendant, who purchased for value, and I regret the more for that reason that I cannot concur in the opinion of my brethren in reversing the former decision, and am glad that in this case, at least, a strict adherence to the rule is in the interest of justice.