Court Opinion

ID: 9626308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:08:00.437095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:25.280177
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice.
Appellants, the City of Roswell and its mayor, Jere Wood, appeal from the trial court’s order holding them in contempt of its November 18, 1999 injunction directing both the City and the Mayor to permit appellee, Eller Media Company, to “construct and operate” outdoor advertising signs within the city. Finding no error, we affirm.
The injunction at issue arose out of contentious litigation in which the City sought to preclude Eller Media Company’s predecessor in interest (hereinafter “Eller”) from constructing and operating advertising signs within the City of Roswell. Ultimately, the trial court ruled in favor of Eller and entered its order directing Mayor Wood and the City to “permit Eller to construct and operate each and every sign” involved in the action. The record demonstrates, however, that after the signs were constructed, the Mayor, using extensive City resources and personnel, contacted every business or organization that displayed a message or advertised on Eller’s signs in the City of Roswell and strongly discouraged them from advertising on such signs. On at least one occasion, the Mayor threatened to rebid a City contract with the advertiser unless the company canceled its advertising agreement with Eller. In response to the Mayor’s numerous threats and actions, several businesses canceled their contracts to advertise on Eller’s signs. Based on this evidence, the trial judge found that the Mayor engaged in a “course of conduct the clear intent of which was to undermine or prevent the operation of Eller’s signs in the City” and that the “Mayor knew or should have known that his attempts to impede the operation of Eller’s signs in the City violated the Court’s orders.”
1. A trial court has wide discretion in determining whether its orders have been violated and such determination will not be disturbed absent a gross abuse of discretion. See Blair v. Blair, 272 Ga. 94 (1) (527 SE2d 177) (2000); Wrightson v. Wrightson, 266 Ga. 493 (4) (467 SE2d 578) (1996). “ ‘If there is any evidence in the record to support a trial judge’s determination that a party either has or has not wilfully disobeyed the trial court’s order, the decision of the trial court will be affirmed on appeal. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” City of Camming v. Realty Development Corp., 268 Ga. 461, 462 (1) (491 SE2d 60) (1997).
Applying the appropriate standard of review, the record evidence *380amply supports the trial judge’s determination that the “Mayor has used the City’s resources, personnel, and power in an attempt to prevent the operation of Eller’s signs” in violation of its orders. The injunction directed the City and Mayor Wood to permit Eller to construct and operate each and every contested sign in the City of Roswell. Looking at the “four comers of the original decree,” Everett v. Everett, 256 Ga. 632, 633 (2) (352 SE2d 370) (1987), there is no question that the trial judge intended to broadly prohibit the City and its mayor from taking further steps to interfere with the construction and operation of the signs. It is further apparent from the record that the Mayor, using City resources and personnel, directly contravened the spirit and intent of the trial court’s order by contacting and threatening current and potential clients of Eller. See Smith v. Gwinnett County, 268 Ga. 179 (1) (486 SE2d 151) (1997) (“ ‘[i]t is the spirit more than the letter of the injunction to which obedience is required.’ [Cit.]”). Accordingly, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in holding that appellants wilfully refused to comply with his order.
2. We reject appellants’ argument that Eller failed to prove it has standing to file a motion for contempt as a successor in interest.1 Included in the record is the affidavit of the president of Eller, which includes a provision that “in April 2000, Eller entered an agreement with [the original plaintiffs], whereby Eller acquired all right, title, and interest” held by the original plaintiffs in the sign permits at issue. Moreover, appellants have acknowledged in previous filings in both this Court and the trial court that Eller acquired all property rights held by the original plaintiffs when it purchased the sign permits.
3. Appellants’ contention that the Mayor’s contemptuous conduct is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the corresponding rights in the Georgia Constitution is misplaced. The trial court found that appellants engaged in a “course of conduct,” including the use of threats, the clear intent of which was to interfere with and impede the operation of Eller’s signs. There is no constitutional protection for the Mayor’s acts not involving speech or for his use of explicit and implicit threats of official sanctions and economic reprisals against those who contracted with Eller. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 67 (83 SC 631, 9 LE2d 584) (1963); see generally Rattner v. Nethurn, 930 F2d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 1991). Cf. R.C. Maxwell Co. v. Borough of New Hope, 735 F2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1984).
*3814. Although the Mayor argues that the trial court erred in holding his conduct waived the court’s earlier finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity, the trial court assessed no damages against the Mayor and he has shown no harm from the ruling. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of this enumeration in this appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, C. J., Sears, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.

 The record reflects that the original plaintiffs in this matter sold their interests in the sign permits to Eller, which subsequently constructed and now operates the signs at issue.