Court Opinion

ID: 9789317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:06.578931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:49.420375
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). {41} I respectfully dissent in regard to Issue One. I would reverse Defendant’s conviction. {42} The trial court has age-old powers of contempt and bond revocation and concurrent powers to issue bench arrest warrants and to order incarceration when a defendant fails to appear on time for arraignment, trial, or sentencing. The Legislature did not likely intend Section 31-3-9 to be used to convict as a felon a defendant who fails to appear on time for and thereby delays or disrupts his arraignment, trial, or sentence hearing without substantial evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to delay, disrupt, or thwart the proceeding. {43} That intent was not required in this case. The majority correctly notes that Section 31-3-9 does not expressly set out that specific intent. The majority also correctly notes that the trial court gave the general intent instruction. Further, the majority correctly cites Masters, 99 N.M. at 60, 653 P.2d at 891, a failure to appear case, which defined the Section 31-3-9 element, “willfully,” as denoting “the doing of an act without just cause or lawful excuse.” {44} But intent to delay, disrupt, or thwart ought to be required. It can and is to be found in an appropriate definition of “willfully fails to appear.” “Willfully” is not defined in Section 31-3-9. The Masters definition, while appropriate under the facts of that case, is too limiting and insufficient to apply to a case like the one before us now where a defendant may have carelessly failed to appear on time and disrupted a proceeding as a result. Unless “willfully” is defined in cases such as this to include an intent to delay, disrupt, or thwart, a defendant can be convicted for carelessness. BACKGROUND {45} The facts are important. Defendant was released from custody on bond. He had a job. Working with his attorney, he spent many hours assisting in the preparation of his own defense. Defendant’s wife Dorothy, a paralegal, together with his stepdaughter, participated also. {46} Dorothy testified that she and Defendant believed that trial began at 9 a.m. That morning, Defendant went to his father’s shop at 8 a.m. to set up the work assignments of the mechanics, to ensure that enough work was accomplished before his father’s return from California after Thanksgiving. Showered and dressed in a white button-down shirt, a black tie, black boots, and a black vest, Defendant’s appearance was much different than on a normal workday. Usually he went to work without showering in the morning and wore a blue coverall uniform, because he got very dirty at work. {47} Dorothy began to be concerned at about 8:40 a.m. that Defendant had not yet returned from the shop to go to trial. Just before 9 a.m., Deputy Sheriff Waybourn arrived. Dorothy told the deputy that Defendant had gone to court or gone by the shop on the way to court. {48} Deputy Waybourn called Judge Thrower at about 9:05 a.m. to say that Defendant was not at home and was presumably on his way to court. Then he sat in his car down the street to watch for Defendant’s arrival. At some point, Dorothy’s son warmed up their pickup truck so she could go to the nearest phone at Walmart, to cheek on Defendant, because their house had no telephone service. {49} In the meantime, Defendant drove up. He was dressed for court and, according to Deputy Waybourn, “seemed to be in a hurry, to make it to court.” Dorothy and her son joined Defendant in his car, calling out to the deputy as they left that they were on their way to court. The deputy followed them. On the way, he called Judge Thrower at 9:18 a.m. to say that Defendant was on his way to court. {50} Unfortunately for Defendant, although Judge Thrower had informed the jury at 8:45 a.m. that they could expect another 45 minutes of waiting, the judge released the jury at 9:17, and issued a bench warrant for Defendant’s arrest. Defendant and his family arrived at court between 9:18 and 9:26 a.m. As he was being arrested, Defendant told Deputy Waybourn that he thought the trial was set for 9 a.m. He knew he was a few minutes late, but “something came up.” Dorothy testified “it was never [Defendant’s] intention” to miss his day in court. {51} Defendant was held without bail. He spent the next eight months in jail until he again was released on bond pending trial on the charge of failure to appear. He was convicted at trial of felony failure to appear under Section 31-3-9 and given a suspended sentence of 18 months and a mandatory eight-year habitual offender sentence. At some point (the reasons are not in the record on appeal), the original felony charge was dismissed. DISCUSSION {52} No evidence was presented that Defendant was a flight risk. No evidence was presented that Defendant had a deliberate, conscious intent to be late to court in order to affect the court proceeding in any way. {53} Defendant may have intentionally placed his work obligation ahead of his punctuality. He may well have acted recklessly. In fact, the jury might have believed Defendant had a deliberate, conscious intent to be late and thereby affect the proceeding. But the defect here is that, under the jury instructions, the jury was allowed to convict Defendant if his tardiness was due simply to bad judgment or carelessness. {54} A trial court has unquestioned authority to command adherence by criminal defendants to its lawful orders through its contempt, bond revocation, and concomitant incarceration powers. The trial court has historically invoked those powers when a criminal defendant fails to appear on time for a scheduled arraignment, trial, or sentencing, particularly when the failure to appear on time disrupts the proceeding. The use of these powers is not conditioned upon a willful or even an intentionally defiant act; however, as a general proposition, the powers should not be invoked when a defendant can show “just cause” or a “lawful excuse” for the tardiness. {55} A felony attribution raises tardiness to a different level of “ ‘moral condemnation and social opprobrium [for which] the crime should ... reflect a mental state warranting such contempt.’ ” Magby, 1998-NMSC-042, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 361, 969 P.2d 965 (quoting Santillanes v. State, 115 N.M. 215, 222, 849 P.2d 358, 365 (1993)). I think the Legislature attached to Section 31-3-9 a much more significant role than to be a substitute for contempt or bond revocation. Section 31-3-9 requires a more serious level of behavior, a more specific level of intent. A.The Contempt Power {56} Defendant’s tardiness made him subject to contempt sanctions. See NMSA 1978, § 34-1-2 (1851); Rule 5-902 NMRA 2001. The contempt power derives from common law and is an inherent power of the court. See State v. Clark, 56 N.M. 123, 125, 241 P.2d 328, 329 (1952); Purpura v. Purpura, 115 N.M. 80, 82, 847 P.2d 314, 316 (Ct.App.1993). A court may impose a criminal contempt sanction for violation of a court order. State v. Wisniewski, 103 N.M. 430, 435, 708 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1985) (holding two district attorneys and two police officers in contempt for negligently failing^ to abide by discovery order in criminal case); State v. Klempt, 1996—NMCA-004, ¶ 1, 121 N.M. 250, 910 P.2d 326 (affirming criminal contempt against police officer for failure to comply with subpoena). The contempt power is “reserved to [the court] under N.M. Const, art. VI, Section 13,” and “[the] sanction is intended to preserve the authority of and respect for the courts.” Wisniewski, 103 N.M. at 434, 708 P.2d at 1035. Willfulness is not required. Id. A trial court can impose a jail term for contempt. Section 34-1-2. B. The Power to Revoke Bond {57} “A trial judge indisputably has broad powers to ensure the orderly and expeditious progress of a trial. For this purpose, he has the power to revoke bañ and to remit the defendant to custody.” Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16, 88 S.Ct. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 15 (1967). “The court on its own motion ... may at any time have the defendant arrested to review conditions of release.” Rule 5-403(A) NMRA 2001; Tijerina v. Baker, 78 N.M. 770, 773, 438 P.2d 514, 517 (1968) (“[T]he court has inherent power to revoke bail of a defendant during trial and pending final disposition of the criminal case in order to prevent interference with ... the proper administration of justice[.]”); accord State v. David, 102 N.M. 138, 142, 692 P.2d 524, 528 (Ct.App.1984) (“[B]ail decisions may be reviewed at any time and for a variety of reasons.”). Rule 5-403 gives broad latitude to the trial court to revoke and review the conditions of release of an accused “if circumstances arising after the initial release indicate the release should not be continued.” State v. Corneau, 109 N.M. 81, 91, 781 P.2d 1159, 1169 (Ct.App.1989); see, e.g., Crim. Form 9-212 NMRA 2001 (Bench Warrant); State v. Dean, 105 N.M. 5, 7, 727 P.2d 944, 946 (Ct.App.1986). {58} The court may issue a bench warrant for the arrest of a defendant who violates its order. Rule 5-209(B) NMRA 2001; see, e.g., Dean, 105 N.M. at 7, 727 P.2d at 946. Revocation is proper even when the defendant “has not been charged, arrested, indicted or bound over for any crime allegedly committed while he was released.” David 102 N.M. at 142, 692 P.2d at 528. C. “Willfully” Must Include the Element of a Specific Intent {59} Masters states that “ ‘willfully,’ as used in [Section 31-3-9] concerns [the] defendant’s state of mind.” Masters, 99 N.M. at 60, 653 P.2d at 891. Clearly, a defendant’s state of mind is material. Intent is a state of mind. The terms “just cause” and “lawful excuse” do not necessarily require a look into a person’s state of mind.1 That is why the definition in Masters is insufficient for a case such as that before us. That Defendant here had no just cause or lawful excuse for carelessly tending to his father’s shop while the clock was ticking toward 9 a.m., and no just cause or lawful excuse for mistakenly believing that trial was at 9 a.m. rather than 8 a.m., does not mean that he intended at the same time to delay, disrupt, or thwart the criminal trial by being late. {60} To say that this more specific intent is not an element to be proven is to read out of Masters the highly significant statement that “willfully ... concerns a defendant’s state of mind.” To disregard Defendant’s state of mind, and thereby make irrelevant an intent to delay, disrupt, or thwart the criminal process by his failure to appear, and to depend solely on the “just cause” and “lawful excuse” elements of the Masters definition, is to place at felony risk every defendant in every criminal case who is minutes late for an arraignment, or sentencing hearing, much less for a trial because the defendant used bad judgment or was careless in failing to appear on time. That cannot be what the Legislature intended in enacting Section 31-3-9. D. The General Intent Instruction Did not Fulfill the Missing Element of Specific Intent {61} The trial court gave the general intent instruction, UJI 14-141, over the State’s objection. This instruction requires only an intent to do an act, where the doing of the act ends up causing harm, even if there is no specific intent to cause harm. This causal connection does not necessarily involve an intent not to appear or even be late. The eausal connection need be simply being at work knowing that a certain time deadline is required. Here, Defendant’s decision to go to work, be at work, and return home before going to court caused Defendant not to be in court on time. The general intent instruction permitted the jury to convict on this basis. CONCLUSION {62} The instruction defining “willfully,” even with the general intent instruction, permitted the jury to convict Defendant for bad judgment or carelessness. These instructions would have permitted Defendant’s felony conviction under Section 31-3-9 if the proceeding for which he failed to timely appear had been an arraignment. The Legislature could not have intended such a result, or have intended the result here, without proof of an intent to delay, disrupt, or to thwart the criminal process. Section 31-3-9 ought to be strictly construed, “requiring that both the letter and the spirit of the statute must be violated to eliminate the spectre of criminal laws subjectively applied or unwittingly violated.” Abdulr-Musawwir, 483 N.E.2d at 466 (referring to the application of a failure to appear criminal statute by the Indiana Supreme Court where the defendant was not advised by the court of his duty to appear at a specified time and place.). {63} As stated in Masters, the state of mind of a defendant late for arraignment, trial, or sentencing is important. Willfully means more than doing an act without just cause or lawful excuse. For a felony failure to appear, willfully must also mean and require intent to delay, disrupt, or thwart the criminal process. That is when the conduct amounts to a felony. Being tardy due to carelessness or bad judgment should be punished, if at all, through the contempt sanction and revocation of bond. Defendant’s failure to appear felony conviction and Ms habitual criminal mandatory sentence should be reversed because the jury may have convicted Defendant for carelessness or bad judgment.  . Note NMSA 1978, § 30-6-1 (2001) and UJI 14-602 NMRA 2001, construed in Magby, 1998-NMSC-042, 126 N.M. 361, 969 P.2d 965. Section 30-6-l(D)(l) outlaws a person "knowingly, intentionally or negligently, and without justifiable cause, causing or permitting a child to be ... placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health.” The Legislature placed "intentionally” along side "without justifiable cause.” In the present case, the Masters definition of "without just cause or lawful excuse” should be placed aside "willfully,” or should be included within a fuller definition of "willfully,” rather than be substituted for or constitute a complete definition of "willfully.” “Willfully” should be construed as requiring a deliberate, conscious, and purposeful action to, at the very least, cause delay or disrupt the proceeding by not appearing on time.