Court Opinion

ID: 9409783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:05:13.030463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.378793
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                         THE BLIND MONK, LLC,
                               Appellant,

                                      v.

   USO NORGE WHITNEY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company,
       and 410 EVERNIA STREET PARTNERS, LLC, a Florida
                   limited liability company,
                           Appellees.

                               No. 4D22-569

                              [July 19, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Richard L. Oftedal, Senior Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2018-
CA-001997-XXXX-MB.

   Jack Scarola of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., West
Palm Beach, and Kara Rockenbach Link and Daniel M. Schwarz of Link &
Rockenbach, PA, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Peter M. Armold of Gary Dtyrych & Ryan, P.A., North Palm Beach, for
appellee 410 Evernia Street Partners, LLC.

WARNER, J.

    Appellant, a commercial condominium tenant (Tenant), sued its
Landlord and the Purchaser of Tenant’s condominium unit over the failure
of the Landlord to abide by a right of first refusal (ROFR) in Tenant’s lease.
As to Landlord, Tenant claimed that it was entitled to specific performance
of its ROFR.      As to Purchaser, Tenant sought rescission of the
condominium sale, because the sale was in derogation of the ROFR.
Landlord and Purchaser moved for summary judgment, contending that
Tenant had not shown that it was ready, willing, and able to complete the
purchase price. The trial court agreed with Landlord and Purchaser and
granted summary judgment.          We reverse, as neither Landlord nor
Purchaser provided Tenant with the purchase price and terms of their sale
of the unit. Thus, Tenant was not required to prove itself ready, willing,
and able to comply with an undisclosed purchase agreement.
   Tenant leases Unit 107 of the Whitney Condominium where it operates
a wine and tapas bar. Its lease from Landlord commenced in March 2010
and contained a ROFR, which provided:

     RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL: The premises is not currently
     being offered to sale but Landlord and Tenant recognize the
     possibility that it may be offered for sale at some later date.
     Tenant may desire to purchase the property if and when it is
     offered for sale. In consideration of the premises and of the
     payment of the rent by Tenant, Landlord grants to Tenant, a
     right of first refusal with respect to the above-described
     property as follows:

     1. If Landlord desires to sell the above-described property and
     receives from a third party a bona fide offer for the purchase
     thereof, Landlord agrees to disclose the terms of such offer to
     Tenant, in writing, with seven (7) days following receipt of the
     offer.

     2. Tenant shall have thirty (30) days after receiving notice of
     the terms of the offer within which to elect to purchase the
     property on terms identical to those offered by the third party.
     Such election shall be made by written notice to Landlord at
     address set forth herein, accompanied by a check for ten
     percent (10%) of the purchase price, to be applied to the
     purchase price at closing. Within five (5) days thereafter, the
     parties shall enter into a formal contract of sale expressly
     including all terms of the original bona fide offer made to
     Landlord, except as the parties may mutually agree. If the
     contract is rescinded for any reason as set forth therein, all
     amounts paid by Tenant to Landlord shall be returned.

     3. If Tenant fails to give the notice and to tender the payment
     as provided in Paragraph 2, Landlord shall be relieved of all
     liability to Tenant hereunder and may dispose of the property
     as Landlord sees fit.

   In October 2016, a realtor representing Landlord notified Tenant’s
president that Landlord was offering the Whitney units for sale to the
current tenants. The realtor asked Tenant’s president if he would be
interested in purchasing Unit 107. Tenant’s president replied that he
would be interested in the purchase and would look into financing.
Tenant’s president requested any information about outstanding offers on
Unit 107, citing his ROFR.

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    About a week later, the realtor advised Tenant’s president that Unit 107
was appraised at $250,000 and Landlord had an offer on the unit.
However, the realtor did not disclose the specific terms of the outstanding
offer. Tenant’s president replied that he would follow up later that week.
However, the next day, the realtor notified Tenant’s president that
Landlord was moving to a bulk sale of the entire Whitney building and was
suspending all retail sales in the building “to keep inventory straight[.]”

    Landlord moved forward with the bulk sale of 139 Whitney
condominium units to Purchaser. The sale agreement notified and made
available to Purchaser the leases for the condominium units prior to
closing. The agreement provided that Purchaser had the obligation to
review all materials submitted. Landlord did not disclose to Tenant any
offer to purchase before closing on the sale. Tenant learned of the bulk
sale when Tenant received notice to send future rent checks to Purchaser.

   After the sale, Tenant filed a complaint against both Landlord and
Purchaser, bringing a claim for rescission of the contract and cancellation
of the deed against both defendants, as well as claims for specific
performance and breach of contract against Landlord and a claim for
tortious interference with a contract against Purchaser. Tenant sought
rescission of the deed to allow it to exercise its ROFR under its lease. The
specific performance count against Landlord demanded that Landlord
comply with the ROFR by informing Tenant of the purchase price Landlord
had negotiated with Purchaser for Unit 107 and providing Tenant with the
opportunity to purchase the unit under the same terms. Alternatively,
Tenant sued Landlord for breach of the ROFR and requested damages.

   Purchaser filed a motion to dismiss Tenant’s rescission and tortious
interference claims. Purchaser argued that Tenant could not receive
rescission and specific performance because Tenant was a stranger to the
purchase contract, and Tenant had not alleged it was financially ready,
willing, and able to purchase Unit 107. Tenant filed a response, arguing
that the facts pled were sufficient to excuse it from the usual “ready, willing
and able” test, because Tenant had not been provided Unit 107’s purchase
price and therefore could not prove its ability to match that price. After a
hearing, the trial court denied Purchaser’s motion to dismiss.

   Purchaser answered Tenant’s complaint, denying notice of Tenant’s
ROFR and raising the affirmative defenses that Tenant had not pled it was
ready, willing and able to purchase Unit 107. It also alleged that Tenant’s
ROFR was not triggered, because purchase of Unit 107 would not be

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identical to Purchaser’s purchase by bulk sale of the 139 units in the
Whitney.

   After some discovery, Purchaser moved for summary judgment against
Tenant’s claims for rescission and tortious interference, but only the
rescission claim is pertinent to this appeal. Purchaser argued that Tenant
had not shown that it was ready, willing and able to purchase the
condominium unit because the “commitments” which Tenant had secured
from its president’s parents were not exchanged for consideration, and
therefore were not legally binding.

   Tenant filed a response, arguing it was unable to obtain a more
traditional financial commitment because the purchase price and terms
were undisclosed. Tenant argued that without a purchase price for the
unit, all Tenant could obtain was its president’s parents’ commitments,
which Tenant argued were binding.

   At the hearing on the summary judgment, Tenant repeated these
arguments. Counsel noted that neither Landlord nor Purchaser provided
Tenant with the terms of any purchase, asking “[h]ow can [Tenant] go to
any lender and say I want to borrow the funds necessary to meet this third-
party offer and exercise my right of first refusal if he’s never told what it is
he needs to match?”

   The trial court issued an order granting Purchaser’s motion for
summary judgment on the rescission count. The trial court found that
both commitments were gifts rather than binding contracts to loan. In
addition, the trial court noted that rescinding the entire bulk sale would
serve no purpose if Tenant was not entitled to specific performance.

   Tenant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court
misunderstood Tenant’s objectives because Tenant did not seek to rescind
the entire bulk sale but only to exempt Unit 107 from the purchase.
Tenant also moved for rehearing, again arguing the “practical
impossibility” of proving its ability to match an offer which was not
disclosed. The trial court denied the motion.

   Tenant now appeals the summary judgment as to Purchaser only, as
the summary judgment as to Landlord is not a final order while other
claims against Landlord remain pending.

   Appellate courts review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de
novo. United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, 350 So. 3d 754,
756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate where the

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movant shows no genuine disputes as to any material facts remain and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a).

   Tenant argues that summary judgment was improper on its rescission
claim because Purchaser’s contention that Tenant had no proof that it was
ready, willing and able to close on the sale of Unit 107 could not be decided
before Landlord had complied with the ROFR by submitting the offer of
purchase to Tenant. Genuine issues of material fact remained regarding
the purchase price for Unit 107. Without the tender of the purchase price
and terms of offer, Tenant could not exercise its ROFR. Thus, Tenant
contends that Unit 107’s purchase price should have been determined
before evaluating whether Tenant had the ability to complete the sale and
before ruling on Tenant’s rescission count against Purchaser.

   While Purchaser concedes that Unit 107’s purchase price was not
determined below, Purchaser argues that the specific purchase price is not
necessary to resolve whether the commitments were enforceable, which is
dispositive as to whether Tenant was “ready, willing and able” to perform.
Tenant replies that the trial court could not perform the “ready, willing and
able” analysis without the specific purchase price, and the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment on this ground. 1 We agree with Tenant.

   Although Landlord and Purchaser entered into a bulk sale of the
remaining condominium units in the Whitney, this does not preclude
either rescission or cancellation of the deed to Unit 107, or specific
performance of the ROFR. In Denco, Inc. v. Belk, 97 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1957)
(Denco I), a lease agreement contained a ROFR, yet the landlord sold the
property to a third party as part of a sale of the leased property and other
properties. Id. at 262. The tenant filed suit, claiming its right to exercise
the ROFR. Id. at 262–63. As relief, it requested cancellation of the deed
to the purchaser of the leased property and for the landlord to notify the
tenant of the purchase price of the property so that the tenant could
purchase the property. Id. at 263. The trial court denied a motion to
dismiss the cause of action, and a petition for certiorari was taken to the

1 Purchaser claims that Tenant made strategic decisions not to seek the
determination of a purchase price. But our review of the record shows that
Tenant through discovery and pleadings raised the issue continually throughout
the litigation, thus preserving the argument made on appeal. The complaint itself
demanded specific performance by the Landlord offering Tenant Unit 107 at the
price Purchaser offered to pay. In addition, through discovery, Tenant sought to
determine what that purchase price was, but Landlord objected to all requests
for production of documents revealing the unit pricing in the sales contract.

                                       5
Florida Supreme Court, which held that the trial court’s denial of dismissal
was proper:

      The real and basic issue in this case, however, is simply
      whether the purchaser of this land, not only charged with
      knowledge of the rights of the lessee as a matter of law but
      placed on direct notice by the very provisions of the deed he
      accepted, may defeat the substantial rights of the lessee under
      the terms of this lease. Denco is not a bona fide purchaser.
      Denco, Inc. comes within the rule that persons dealing with
      an owner of land for purposes of sale or purchase who have
      knowledge of possession by a lessee, are placed on inquiry as
      to the full terms and conditions of the lease, including a
      provision granting a right of first refusal of purchase to the
      lessee if the lessor decides to sell the property during the term
      of the lease. We think the law and every concept of equity and
      good conscience requires Denco, Inc. to recognize the rights of
      the lessee under all of the provisions of the lease under which
      he holds possession of the property, not the least of these being
      the option above alluded to.

Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 2

    On remand from Denco I, the trial court determined the optioned
parcel’s value by allocating a portion of the bulk purchase, which the
Second District approved on appeal, finding “no error inherent in the
chancellor’s method of allocating a proportionate part of the total price to
the property covered by appellee’s option.” Denco, Inc. v. Belk, 109 So. 2d
201, 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959) (Denco II). In approving the trial court’s
method, the Second District wrote that any of the purchaser’s objections
“relating to the uncertainty of the price allocable to the property leased by
appellee, and the chancellor’s method of determination, are occasioned by
[the purchaser’s] own act, i.e., purchasing the property in question,
together with other properties, for a lump sum payment, with knowledge
of appellee’s first refusal option.” Id.

   Denco I and Denco II make clear that where a bulk sale of property
occurs, some of which is the subject of a ROFR, an owner is not excused
from its obligation to offer the property to the ROFR’s holder. To provide

2 In this case, Purchaser had at least constructive knowledge of the Tenant’s
ROFR, because the active leases were among the due diligence materials which
Purchaser had the obligation to review and approve, and it was provided all of
the leases on the Whitney condominium units.

                                      6
the holder with its contractual right, a trial court must enforce the ROFR
and determine what portion of the bulk sale purchase price should be
allocated to the ROFR property.

    Similarly, in Whyhopen v. Via, 404 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), the
landlord refused to permit the tenant to exercise a right of first refusal
where the landlord sold the leased property in a bulk sale with other
properties. Id. at 852. The tenant filed suit against the landlord and the
purchaser for cancellation of the deed, specific performance, damages, and
tortious interference. Id. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss,
because the tenant had not sought to exercise an option to purchase all
the properties. Id. The appellate court rejected that holding, relying on
Denco I to hold that the tenant was not required to purchase the entire
properties of the bulk sale in order to exercise its option. Id. at 852–53
(citing Denco I, 97 So. 2d 261). The court also noted that:

      Once the landlord evidenced an intention to sell the property,
      tenants’ right of first refusal was converted into an irrevocable
      option to purchase. Vorpe v. Key Island, Inc., 374 So. 2d 1035
      (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The third-party purchaser is subject to
      this right.

Id. at 853.

   Applying these holdings, once the Landlord decided to sell the unit, the
Landlord had to comply with the ROFR. The ROFR required the Landlord
to disclose the purchase price and terms to Tenant to allow Tenant to
decide whether to exercise the ROFR to purchase. The Landlord failed to
do that, and Tenant filed suit to obtain both specific performance and
cancellation of the deed to Purchaser of Unit 107. Based upon Denco I,
Denco II, and Whyhopen, not only did Tenant state a cause of action, but
the trial court also had a duty to determine the purchase price and terms
so that Tenant could obtain the benefit of its ROFR.

   Instead of following Denco I and Denco II, Purchaser contended that, as
the party seeking specific performance of a real estate contract, Tenant
had to prove that it was ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase
in order to exercise its ROFR. Purchaser relied on Hollywood Mall, Inc. v.
Capozzi, 545 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). However, Capozzi is
inapplicable under the circumstances of this case.

   In Capozzi, the buyer sought specific performance of an executed real
estate contract between itself and the seller where all terms of the contract
were established, and the purchase price was known. Id. at 919–20. The

                                     7
trial court had granted specific performance, but we reversed, holding that
the corporation which sought to purchase the property had not proven
that it was ready, willing, and able to purchase. Id. at 920. In the opinion,
we listed three non-exclusive methods by which a purchaser could prove
it was ready, willing, and able to close on the transaction. Id. at 920–21.

   As noted by Tenant in its brief, Capozzi has never been applied to a
case involving an option to purchase or a ROFR. Thus, Capozzi does not
provide guidance for specific performance where a purchase price is
unknown.

   In this case, pursuant to the ROFR, Landlord was contractually
obligated to convey a firm purchase offer, including the price and terms,
to Tenant. Tenant then would have a period of time to determine whether
to accept the offer. Upon acceptance, a binding purchase contract would
be formed. Only if Landlord failed to sell to Tenant in accordance with
those terms would Tenant have to show that it was ready, willing, and able
to complete the purchase in accordance with those terms in any suit for
specific performance. Landlord and Purchaser cannot preemptively
determine that Tenant has no ability to comply with the ROFR or demand
that Tenant show its ability to close without extending to Tenant a
purchase offer. Moreover, as Tenant’s counsel stated, how could a party
obtain a binding financial commitment without the third-party knowing
what amount of money would be needed to close the transaction?

    We liken this case to Jarvis v. Peltier, 400 S.W. 3d 644 (Tex. App. 2013).
There, the party holding an option on property discovered that the property
had been sold and deeded to a third-party. Id. at 648. The optionor sought
to exercise his option and demanded to know the price paid by the
purchaser, which the seller refused to disclose. Id. at 649. The optionor
filed suit against both the seller and the purchaser. Id. The trial court
granted the purchaser’s motion for summary judgment, partially on the
ground that the optionor had not complied with the option’s terms. Id.
On appeal, the court reversed, noting that the optionor must be excused
from failing to comply with the option’s terms, because the purchase price
was never disclosed to him.

      [W]hen the rightholder [option holder] learns of a sale in
      violation of his right, he again has the opportunity to elect to
      purchase or decline to purchase within the time frame
      specified in the contract creating the right of first refusal. The
      rightholder does not have a duty to act in order to exercise his
      preferential purchase right unless and until he receives a
      reasonable disclosure of the terms of the sale. The new

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      property owner has a duty to make reasonable disclosure of
      the terms of the purchase to the rightholder.

Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Here, both Landlord and
Purchaser failed to provide Tenant with the purchase price and terms of
the sale of Unit 107. Until they provided this information, Tenant had no
“duty to act.” As Tenant had no duty to act, Tenant also had no duty to
show that it was ready, willing, and able to meet some undisclosed
purchase price.

    We thus reverse the summary judgment and remand for further
proceedings. Pursuant to Denco I, Denco II and Whyhopen, the court must
first determine the purchase price and terms of the sale of Unit 107 in
accordance with the agreement between Landlord and Purchaser.
Discovery may reveal that the parties assigned a specific value to the unit
in the sales contract, or the court may be required to determine the sale
price. 3 Once the purchase price and terms are determined, then according
to the ROFR, Tenant will have thirty days in which to elect whether to
purchase the property. In order to prevent useless judicial labor, the court
may wish to defer consideration of Tenant’s rescission claim until Tenant
decides whether or not to exercise its ROFR.

   Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

MAY and GERBER, JJ., concur.

                              *         *          *

    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

3 In Denco I, the supreme court cited with approval Brenner v. Duncan, 27 N.W.2d
320 (Mich. 1947). Denco I, 97 So. 2d at 265. Brenner dealt with a sale of lands,
which, under similar circumstances to the case here, involved an option to
purchase without establishment of a price. The court held that “it is competent
for the court to fix the option price, afford the optionee an opportunity to accept
and thereupon specifically enforce the resulting contract.” Brenner, 27 N.W.2d
at 322.

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