Court Opinion

ID: 9536888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:08:47.00739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:28.301733
License: Public Domain

Price, C. J.,
dissenting:
The allegedly obscured stop sign is the focal point of this case. I think the opinion of the court is based upon a completely erroneous premise in that it refers to this stop sign as being “on the side of a state highway.” Conceding that its location was encompassed within the “corporate limits” of the right-of-way of the state highway — the plain fact of the matter is that it was located on the side or shoulder of the county road and its only purpose was to control traffic on the county road. A warning sign may absolve the state highway commission from liability for a dangerous condition (defect) in a state highway — but the absence of a warning sign is not the defect. The defect, if any — must already have been in objective existence. Other than the circumstances in connection with this stop sign which was on the side or shoulder of the county road and back from the state highway, as such — there is not the slightest suggestion in this case that there was any “defect” in the state highway at or near the intersection in question.
This case is unlike Grantham v. City of Topeka, 196 Kan. 393, 411 P. 2d 634, in which liability was predicated upon the negligent failure of the city to keep its streets reasonably safe for public use. Here, liability is statutory — and results only for injury sustained because of a defect in a state highway.
Some point also is made of the fact this stop sign was only about five feet high instead of seven feet. Under the evidence, however, it is fair to say that the small trees, brush and weeds were such as to obscure a view of the sign even had it been the required seven *19feet high. Violation of a statute, ordinance, rule or regulation— although negligence per se — is actionable only when it is the proximate cause.
This tragedy occurred in the latter part of June — a period of rank weeds and sunflowers in Kansas. Undoubtedly there are thousands of county, township, country road — state highway intersections in this state. Does each of them — under facts and circumstances like those here — constitute a defect in a state highway? I think not.
Much more could be said, but, due to circumstances beyond the court’s control — disposition of this case already has been delayed and it should be disposed of.
In my opinion the condition and circumstances shown here simply do not — as a matter of law — constitute a “defect in a state highway” within the meaning of K. S. A. 68-419. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Fromme, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.