Court Opinion

ID: 9868574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:42:05.180873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:51.225477
License: Public Domain

ON Petition to Rehear.
Petition to rehear has been filed in which it is sought to reargue the case: “A rehearing will he refused where no new argument is made, and no new authority adduced, and no material fact is pointed out as over-looked.” Rules of Supreme Court, rule 32, 173 Tenn. 887; Holmes v. Eason, 76 Tenn. 754, 763; Hume v. Bank, 78 Tenn. 1, 7, 43 Am. Rep. 290; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. *100United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 125 Tenn. 658, 691, 693, 148 S. W. 671.
While not insisting that the Court overlooked any facts, petitioner insists that the Conrt overlooked certain legal authorities. The first of these is Potter v. Golden Rule Grocery, 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S. W. (2d) 364. In that case section 241 of the Restatement of the Law of Agency was under consideration and the entire section was set out in the opinion 169 Tenn. at page 246, 84 S. W. (2d) at page 366. Petitioner lifts subsection (c) from its context and quotes in his petition the following: “Liability only where transfer is negligent. Under the rule stated in this section, in the absence of authority in the servant to delegate to another control over the instrumentality, the master is liable only if the servant, at the time he surrenders custody, has reason to believe that the change of custody is likely to result in harm to others. Such likelihood may exist because of the known incompetence or recklessness of the person to whom custody is given, or, in the case of an instrumentality likely to do harm if not carefully managed, because a servant does not know of the qualities of such person. Likewise, it may be negligent to surrender custody to one likely to abandon the instrumentality in a dangerous situation or to surrender its custody to an inexperienced person.”
By quoting only that part of the pertinent section of the Restatement of the Law of Agency which is favorable to himself, Petitioner seeks to make this authority serve his ends. The full quotation makes the Potter case, not an authority for Petitioner, but additional authority for the rule stated and applied in our original opinion: “A master who has entrusted a servant with an instrumentality is subject to liability for harm caused by its negligent *101management by one to whom tbe servant entrusts its custody to serve the purposes of the master, if tbe servant should realize that there is an undue risk that such person will harm others by its management.” (Our italics.) Restatement of the Law of Agency, Vol. 1, sec. 241.
Since the subject matter of (c) is a “pertinent comment” (Potter case 169 Tenn. at page 246, 84 S. W. (2d) at page 366) on the rule of Section 241, the language, “to serve the purposes of the master” is necessarily implied in (c).
Petitioner next complains that we did hot cite Harrison v. Carroll, 4 Cir., 139 F. (2d) 427. That case has no application to the question presented on this appeal, since the question there was one of the liability of the minor, and it appears from the present record that in the minor’s ease a nonsuit had been taken in the Trial Court before we heard the appeal.
Finally, it is complained that we did not consider Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, 177 Tenn. 440, 150 S. W. (2d) 1069. That case has no application to the facts here because the loan there was made by the owner himself, and not by an agent.
Petition denied.
All concur.