Court Opinion

ID: 9813010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:53:38.980713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:36.813674
License: Public Domain

Connor, J.,
dissenting. The plaintiff alleges that while he was in the employment of the Gibson Manufacturing Company, the defendant “unlawfully, willfully and maliciously, for the purpose of injuring the said plaintiff * * * did contrive, conspire and procure the discharge of the said plaintiff from the employment of the said Gibson Manufacturing Company, by certain false and fraudulent representations to the said Gibson Manufacturing Company.” The only evidence tending to sustain the allegation is that of the plaintiff, in which he says that Stafford, the boss of the weave-room of the Gibson Company, told him that the defendant manufacturing company objected to his working there, and that he had a letter from the defendant company to discharge him. Passing by the objection that this was simply hearsay, there is not the slightest suggestion as to what officer, agent or employee of the defendant company wrote, or was *398authorized to write, the alleged letter. There is not a scintilla of evidence tending to show that any letter was ever written by any officer or agent of the defendant company. On the contrary Stafford and Price, the employees of the Gibson Company, denied that they or either of them had seen such a letter, or that they ever said to the plaintiff that such letter had been written or received by them. E. 0. Earnhardt, who was the assistant manager of the defendant company and of the Gibson Manufacturing Company, testified that he had the plaintiff discharged from the Gibson Company as the assistant manager of. that company, and not of the defendant company; that he had him discharged of his own motion, without any suggestion from any officer or agent of the defendant company; that there was no letter about discharging him. There was not the slightest contradiction of this testimony.
Although the allegation made by the plaintiff is that the defendant unlawfully and maliciously procured his discharge, the issue submitted is confined to the “wrongful and unlawful” discharge of the plaintiff. Notwithstanding this form of the issue, the Judge below said to the jury: “You can also, if the charge was malicious, that is, intentional and willful, and without cause, and for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of his job or service, award what are called puni-tory or exemplary damages for the wanton conduct of the defendant in bringing about the discharge, if by its servants and agents it did so.” The objection to this instruction is found in the fact, first, that no issue was submitted to the jury in regard to the malicious conduct of the defendant, and next, because there was no evidence tending to show malice. It may well be that the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully procured the discharge of the plaintiff, without having done so maliciously or wantonly.
“The primary purpose of an action for damages is to *399recover compensation for the actual loss or injury sustained. The liability for punitive or exemplary damages, however, being for the purpose of punishment, or as an example, rests primarily upon the question of motive. And the jury are not at liberty to go beyond the allowance of a compensation, unless it be shown that the act was done willfully, maliciously or wantonly, or was the result of a reckless indifference to the rights of others, which is equivalent to an intentional injury; and when there is no proof that the injury was so inflicted, exemplary damages should not be allowed.” Joyce on Damages, section 119; Wood v. Bank (Va.), 40 S. E., Rep., 931; Gilreath v. Allen, 32 N. C., 67. The wrongful'injury gives the right of action for compensation. The malicious, wicked motive gives the right to punitive damages. Holmes v. Railroad, 94 N. C., 319.
It is manifest that the jury awarded the plaintiff punitive damages because, on his own evidence, he was discharged about the 8th of August and got a regular job on the 14th of September. He testified that he earned $7.50 a week.
Eor the reasons pointed out, and others apparent upon the record, I am unable to concur in the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court. I think that, in any point of view, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Walkeb, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.