Court Opinion

ID: 9430946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:59.160364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:26.431438
License: Public Domain

Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting in part.
The Court, in this case today, fails to apply the long-established “principle that the freedoms of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks.” Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 66 (1963). While I agree with the Court’s conclusion that appellee has standing, I do not agree that the designation “political propaganda,” imposed by the Department of Justice on three films from Canada about acid rain and nuclear war, pursuant to the Foreign *486Agents Registration Act (Act), 52 Stat. 631, as amended, 22 U. S. C. §§611-621, presents no obstacle to expression protected by the First Amendment.
HH
The Court s decision rests upon its conclusion that the term “political propaganda” is neutral and without negative connotation. It reaches this conclusion by limiting its examination to the statutory definition of the term and by ignoring the realities of public reaction to the designation. But even given that confined view of its inquiry, it is difficult to understand how a statutory categorization which includes communication that “instigates . . . civil riot... or the overthrow of . . . government... by any means involving the use of force or violence,” §611(j)(2), can be regarded as wholly neutral. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress fully intended to discourage communications by foreign agents.
The Act grew out of the investigations of the House Un-American Activities Committee, formed in 1934 to investigate Nazi propaganda activities in the United States and the dissemination of subversive propaganda controlled by foreign countries attacking the American form of government. See H. R. Res. 198, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), 78 Cong. Rec. 13-14 (1934).1 The Act mandated disclosure, not direct cen*487sorship, but the underlying goal was to control the spread of propaganda by foreign agents. This goal was stated unambiguously by the House Committee on the Judiciary: “We believe that the spotlight of pitiless publicity will serve as a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda.” H. R. Rep. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1937).
In 1942, Congress revised the Act, 56 Stat. 248, ch. 263, at the request of the Department of Justice in order to strengthen the Government’s “chief instrument... for controlling foreign agent activity in the theater of political propaganda.” Hearings on H. R. 6045 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 9, p. 24 (1941) (1941 Hearings) (statement of Lawrence M. C. Smith, Chief, Special Defense Unit, Department of Justice). The amendments included the definition of propaganda in addition to labeling and reporting requirements virtually identical to those imposed under the current version of the Act. The Department of Justice explained that it sought to counter secret propaganda efforts “[i]n view of the increased attempts by foreign agents at the systematic manipulation of mass attitudes on national and international questions, by adding requirements to keep our Government and people informed of the nature, source, and extent of political propaganda distributed in the United States. ” Id., at 25. And, as in the original Act, the amended version furthered Congress’ desire to disable certain types of speech by the use of disclosure requirements designed to bring about that result.2
The meaning of “political propaganda” has not changed in the 45 years since Congress selected those two words. While the Act is currently applied primarily to foreign policy *488advocacy, the designation it employs continues to reflect the original purposes of the Act and continues to carry its original connotations. For example, a Department of Justice representative recently recognized:
“[I]t is fair to say that the original act reflected a perceived close connection between political propaganda and subversion. It is this original focus . . . and therefore the pejorative connotations of the phrases ‘foreign agent’ and ‘political propaganda’ which has caused such misunderstanding over the years.” Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1983) (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice).
Even if Congress had enacted the “propaganda” designation at issue here with a completely neutral purpose, that would not be sufficient for the First Amendment inquiry, for the Court has “long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.” Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U. S. 575, 592 (1983). The Court today, however, fails to undertake this inquiry. It concludes that the statutory definition of “political propaganda” is a “neutral one,” ante, at 479, n. 14, and dismisses the District Court’s holding as resting on a “potential misunderstanding of [the statute’s] effect,” ante, at 478.
A definition chosen by Congress is controlling as to the scope of the statute, but the Court has never held that Congress’ choice of a definition precludes an independent determination of a statute’s constitutionality based upon its actual effect. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 255 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The fact that the statute’s practical effect may be to discourage protected speech is sufficient to characterize [it] as an infringement *489on First Amendment activities”). In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965), the “communist political propaganda” that was detained by the Postmaster and delivered only upon the addressee’s request was defined by reference to the same “neutral” definition of “political propaganda” in the Act that is at issue here. Id., at 302-303. Yet the Court examined the effects of the statutory requirements and had no trouble concluding that the need to request delivery of mail classified as “communist political propaganda” was “almost certain to have a deterrent effect” upon debate. Id., at 307. The reason was certainly the disapprobation conveyed by the classification:
“Public officials, like schoolteachers who have no tenure, might think they would invite disaster if they read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which federal officials have condemned as ‘communist political propaganda.’” Ibid.
I do not see why the analysis here should be any different, or why the statutory definition should be given any greater weight, in the case of the elected public official who wishes to exhibit films that the Federal Government has categorized as “political propaganda.”
I can conclude only that the Court has asked, and has answered, the wrong question. Appellee does not argue that his speech is deterred by the statutory definition of “propaganda.” He argues, instead, that his speech is deterred by the common perception that material so classified is unreliable and not to be trusted, bolstered by the added weight and authority accorded any classification made by the all-pervasive Federal Government. Even if the statutory definition is neutral, it is the common understanding of the Government’s action that determines the effect on discourse protected by the First Amendment.
*490We need not speculate as to the common reaction to the term “propaganda,” or rely only on the Court’s assessment in Lamont v. Postmaster General, swpra, of the negative connotations it raises. Appellee has submitted testimony of an expert in the study of propaganda, unrebutted by appellants. According to the declaration of Leonard W. Doob, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Psychology at Yale University: “[T]he designation ‘political propaganda’ of a film or book by the government is pejorative, denigrating to the material, and stigmatizing to those disseminating it. . . . [A]s the history of the last seventy years suggests, to call something propaganda is to assert that it communicates hidden or deceitful ideas; that concealed interests are involved; that unfair or insidious methods or [sic] being employed; that its dissemination is systematic and organized in some way.” App. 101. See also ante, at 474, n. 8. It simply strains credulity for the Court to assert that “propaganda” is a neutral classification.
II
Because the Court believes that the term “political propaganda” is neutral, it concludes that “the Act places no burden on protected expression.” Ante, at 480. The Court’s error on neutrality leads it to ignore the practical effects of the classification, which create an indirect burden on expression. As a result, the Court takes an unjustifiably narrow view of the sort of government action that can violate First Amendment protections. Because Congress did “not pose any obstacle to appellee’s access to the materials he wishes to exhibit” in that it “did not prohibit, edit, or restrain the distribution of advocacy materials,” ibid., the Court thinks that the propaganda classification does not burden speech. But there need not be a direct restriction of speech in order to have a First Amendment violation. The Court has recognized that indirect discouragements are fully capable of a coercive effect on speech, American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 402 (1950), and that the First *491Amendment protections extend beyond the blatant censorship the Court finds lacking here. “[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech . . . does not determine the free speech question.” Ibid.
In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 (1963), for example, the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute authorizing a commission to designate morally objectionable material. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the First Amendment was not violated because the Commission did not “regulate or suppress obscenity,” id., at 66, finding that through the use of informal sanctions, “the Commission deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications deemed ‘objectionable’ and succeeded in its aim,” id., at 67. There likewise was no overt restraint on speech in Lamont. The Postmaster General argued there that because an addressee had only to return a card in order to receive the publication, “only inconvenience and not an abridgment is involved.” 381 U. S., at 309 (concurring opinion). But, as was stated there, “inhibition as well as prohibition against the exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power denied to government.” Ibid.3
By ignoring the practical effect of the Act’s classification scheme, the Court unfortunately permits Congress to accomplish by indirect means what it could not impose directly — a restriction of appellee’s political speech. Political discourse is burdened by the Act because Congress’ classification scheme inhibits dissemination of classified films. In deciding whether or not to show a film, individuals and institutions are *492bound to calculate the risk of being associated with materials officially classified as propaganda. Many, such as appellee, reasonably will decline to assume the necessary risk. That risk is particularly high for those who are accountable to the public, among them librarians and elected officials, to cite obvious examples. In addition, the official designation taints the message of a classified film by lessening its credence with viewers. For the film to carry its full force and meaning an exhibitor must attempt to dispel skepticism flowing from the notion that the film is laced with lies and distortions. These burdens are too great and too real in practical terms to be ignored simply because they are imposed by way of public reaction rather than through a direct restriction on speech.
The Court perceives no burden on First Amendment rights, because “Congress simply required the disseminators of [propaganda] material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the propaganda.” Ante, at 480. Yet in its discussion of standing, the majority recognizes that the practical effect of the “disclosure” is to place a film exhibitor on the defensive, for this “disclosure” would require the exhibitor to take affirmative steps to avoid harm to his or her reputation. Ante, at 475. Moreover, disclosure requirements are not inherently consistent with the First Amendment and do not necessarily serve to advance discourse. The Court often has struck down disclosure requirements that threatened to have a “deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association.” Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U. S. 539, 557 (1963); see also, Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U. S. 87, 100 (1982) (names of campaign contributors and recipients of funds); Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960) (identification of names and addresses of authors of handbills); N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958) (membership lists).
*493The Court likens the injunction issued by the District Court to the state ban on advertising prices of prescription drugs struck down in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748 (1976). Ante, at 481-482. But there is a significant difference between the “paternalistic strategy of protecting the public from information,” ante, at 481, by way of a ban on information and a prohibition of the Government disparagement at issue in this case. A ban on advertising does indeed “en-forc[e] silence,” in the words of Justice Brandéis. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion). But the District Court’s holding here — that a derogatory classification impermissibly inhibits protected expression— did not impose a ban; it merely lifted a disclosure requirement, as in the other cases cited above. Under the District Court’s ruling, opponents of the viewpoint expressed by the National Film Board of Canada remained completely free to point out the foreign source of the films. The difference was that dialogue on the value of the films and the viewpoints they express could occur in an atmosphere free of the constraint imposed by Government condemnation. It is the Government’s classification of those films as “political propaganda” that is paternalistic. For that Government action does more than simply provide additional information. It places the power of the Federal Government, with its authority, presumed neutrality, and assumed access to all the facts, behind an appellation designed to reduce the effectiveness of the speech in the eyes of the public.
I — I f — H HH
Appellants have not even attempted to articulate any justification for saddling the expression of would-be film exhibitors with the classification “political propaganda.” Yet this Court has held consistently that a limitation on First Amendment freedoms can be justified only by a compelling governmental interest. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, *494Inc., 479 U. S., at 256; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963). The asserted purpose of the Act’s classification scheme is “so that the Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities.” 56 Stat. 249. But this goal has been rendered incapable of justifying even the slightest burden on speech, for appellants interpret the Act in a way that nullifies its effectiveness as a disclosure mechanism.
There are two ways in which the purpose of the Act to inform the public is fulfilled. First, the Act requires films transmitted by foreign agents to be “conspicuously marked” with the name and address of the agent and the foreign principal, and, second, the Act requires dissemination reports for the film and the agent’s registration statement to be placed on file with the Department of Justice, available for public inspection. §§ 614(a), (b), (c), and 616(a); see ante, at 470, and nn. 5 and 6.4 The public is able to learn of its opportunity to examine these files by reading the label affixed to the film. See ante, at 471.5
*495The purposes of the Act could be fulfilled by such a process without categorizing the films as “political propaganda.” But the importance of conveying any of this information to the public is belied by the Government’s position that the informative label can be removed by appellee. See Declaration of Joseph E. Clarkson, Chief, Registration Unit, Internal Security Section, Criminal Division, Department of Justice. App. 22. After the complaint in this case (which included a challenge to the labeling requirement) was filed in the District Court, the Department of Justice asserted that it “has never construed the Act to apply to a person in [appel-lee’s] position, and thus has not, does not, and will not require [appellee] to attach the neutral statutory disclaimer to, or exhibit the disclaimer on said films if he obtains them.” Ibid. The only reasonable interpretation of this statement is that any exhibitor would be “a person in [appellee’s] position” and thus exempt from the labeling requirements. But if the labeling requirements apply to the foreign agent only, and can be removed by recipients of the film, the information will never reach the public, its intended audience. This nullification of the primary purpose of the statute means that the classification of the films as “political propaganda” places a purely gratuitous burden on a would-be exhibitor and serves no governmental interest at all, let alone a compelling one.
Even if appellants could assert a compelling interest, the propaganda classification carries a derogatory meaning that is unnecessary to the asserted purpose of the Act. The Department of Justice admitted as much in a letter regarding proposed changes in the legislation:
“We believe Congress should . . . consider replacing the broad definition of ‘political propaganda,’ which currently defines materials that must be labelled, with a more concise definition, more narrowly focused on the United States political process. We would also support the use of a more neutral term like political ‘advocacy’ or ‘information’ to denominate information that must be *496labelled.” Letter, dated August 8, 1983, to the Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, of the House Committee on the Judiciary, from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice. App. 118.6
Given that position, the Court errs in tolerating even the slightest infringement of First Amendment rights by governmental use of a classification deemed unnecessary by those who enforce it. I respectfully dissent.

 One of the countermeasures the Committee recommended in light of the danger posed by foreign propaganda was that all propaganda agents who represented any foreign government or foreign political party be required to register with the Secretary of State. H. R. Rep. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1935). This requirement became the centerpiece of the Act, which was motivated by concern with the “many persons in the United States representing foreign governments or foreign political groups, who are supplied by such foreign agencies with funds and other materials to foster un-American activities, and to influence the external and internal policies of this country, thereby violating both the letter and the spirit of international law, as well as the democratic basis of our own American institutions of government.” H. R. Rep. No. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1937).

 See, e. g., 1941 Hearings 20 (statement of Lawrence M. C. Smith) (“And ... as Justice Holmes has said, champagne that is put in the light and left in the light goes flat, and that is the way we have found it to be, that these bad political organizations cannot survive in the pitiless light of publicity”).

 See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 59 (1965) (film censorship program unconstitutional in the absence of procedural safeguards because otherwise, as a practical matter, “it may prove too burdensome to seek review of the censor’s determination”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, 526 (1958) (state program placing burden on taxpayers to prove they did not advocate overthrow of United States declared unconstitutional because “[i]n practical operation . . . this procedural device must necessarily produce a result which the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes free”).

 The statutory requirement that a foreign agent submit two copies of the material it distributes, § 614(a), is relaxed for motion pictures. Two copies need not be filed so long as the agent files dissemination reports monthly and submits either a filmstrip showing the required labeling on the film or an affidavit “certifying that the required label has been made a part of the film.” 28 CFR § 6.400(c) (1986). Dissemination reports require a description of the propaganda material, the number of copies transmitted, the dates and means of transmission, and the number of each type of recipient: libraries, public officials, newspapers, etc. For films, the report must also list the “name of [the] station, organization, or theater using,” the dates it was shown, and the estimated audience. App. 17. A person who willfully violates the registration or filing requirements is subject to a fine of up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than five years. § 618(a)(2).

 Failure to comply with the labeling requirement is punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than six months. Ibid.

 The Justice Department also has favored altering the disclosure statement. In the same letter, Deputy Attorney General Schmults said: “We would . . . favor amending the Act to permit Use of simpler and more neutral language in the disclosure label, to avoid unnecessary negative connotations that may be inferred from the disclosure statement (as, for instance, from the current statement that the United States Government has not approved the contents of the message).”