Court Opinion

ID: 9514747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:27.894056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.482903
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
concurring in result and delivering the opinion as to the rationale of the decision of the Court.
[¶ 24.] I agree with the trial court that under the circumstances of purchasing credit life insurance, the policy language was not ambiguous. As stated, Craig’s medical condition was not a minor ailment, but a life threatening condition. He was at “high risk of sudden death” and under the language of the policy, should have disclosed his condition.
[¶ 25.] Therefore, I concur in result.
[¶ 26.] If this court were to conclude that the language was ambiguous, then it would be reversible error to refuse to give the proposed jury instructions on ambiguity. See Buxcel v. First Fidelity Bank, 1999 SD 126, ¶ 13, 601 N.W.2d 593, 596 (stating “[fjailure to give a requested instruction that correctly sets forth the law is prejudicial error.” (citations omitted)); Delzer Construction Co. v. SD State Bd. of Transportation, 275 N.W.2d 352, 355 (SD 1979) (providing that “when there is an ambiguous contract, evidence must be introduced to determine ... the intentions of the parties ... and ... such evidence creates a question of fact, which must be resolved by the jury.”). See also Clements v. Gabriel, 472 N.W.2d 480, 482-83 (S.D.1991) (holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to construe an ambiguous contract against the draftsman); Delzer, 275 N.W.2d at 356-57 (providing that the instruction given, implicitly construing an ambiguous contract against the draftsman, was accurate).
[¶ 27.] KONENKAMP, Justice, joins this concurrence in result.