Court Opinion

ID: 9897470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:14:32.183902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:28.881913
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion   35
                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                 KELLY WAYNE PATTERSON,                                    No. 86108
                 Petitioner,
                 vs.
                 LAS VEGAS MUNICIPAL COURT; AND
                 THE HONORABLE CEDRIC A. KERNS,                            FILED
                 Respondents,
                   and                                                      SEP 21 2023
                 CITY OF LAS VEGAS,                                     ELI
                                                                                                RT
                                                                      CLER
                 Real Party in Interest.                              BY
                                                                             IEF DEPUTY CLERK

                           Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a
                municipal court order denying a motion for attorney fees and litigation
                expenses under NRS 41.0393.
                           Petition denied.

                Stephen P. Stubbs, Henderson,
                for Petitioner.

                Bryan K. Scott, City Attorney, and Bobby Anderlik, Deputy City Attorney,
                Las Vegas,
                for Real Party in Interest City of Las Vegas.

                American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Nevada and Christopher M.
                Peterson, Las Vegas,
                for Amicus Curiae ACLU of Nevada.

                Randolph M. Fiedler, Las Vegas,
                for Arnicus Curiae Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

                BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., and LEE and BELL,
                JJ.
SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA                                                                   23 - 3 117 4 (
c.0) I947A
                                                 OPINION

                By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.
                            NRS 41.0393 permits the award of attorney fees and litigation
                expenses to a criminal defendant, as the prevailing party, in limited
                circumstances. Petitioner Kelly Patterson faced criminal charges in Las
                Vegas Municipal Court. After the charges were dismissed and withdrawn,
                Patterson sought attorney fees and litigation expenses as the prevailing
                party under NRS 41.0393.       The municipal court denied that request,

                concluding that it lacked authority to award such fees and expenses.
                Because NRS 41.0393(8) specifically defines the courts that may award such
                fees and expenses as district courts and justice courts, we agree with the
                municipal court that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and
                litigation expenses.    Accordingly, we deny Patterson's writ petition
                challenging the municipal court's decision.'
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                            Patterson runs a website that posts videos of Las Vegas police
                officers performing their duties. While filming a police officer, Patterson
                was arrested and charged with obstructing a police officer and a traffic
                violation. Patterson successfully moved to dismiss the obstruction charge,
                and thereafter, real party in interest City of Las Vegas withdrew the traffic
                violation charge.
                            Patterson then filed an application for attorney fees and

                litigation expenses under NRS 41.0393, which the• City opposed.         The

                      'Patterson additionally brought this petition against the Las Vegas
                Metropolitan Police Department. We previously denied the petition as to
                that party.
SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA

                                                     2
(01 1947A
                municipal court denied Patterson's request, concluding that municipal
                courts lack authority to award fees and expenses under NRS 41.0393.
                Patterson appealed the decision to the district court, which agreed with the
                municipal court and denied Patterson's appeal.              Patterson filed the

                immediate writ petition, and the City filed an answer in opposition.2
                Additionally, the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada and Nevada
                Attorneys for Criminal Justice were permitted to brief the issue as amici
                curiae, and we considered that briefing in resolving this matter except to
                the extent that amici raised issues •that were not raised in Patterson's writ
                petition.
                                                 DISCUSSION
                We exercise our discretion to entertain the writ petition
                            "This court    has    original jurisdiction     to issue writs of

                mandamus." Gardner v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 133 Nev. 730, 732,
                405 P.3d 651, 653 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). A writ of
                mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law
                requires or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Int'l
                Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d
                556, 558 (2008); NRS 34:160. "Writ relief is an extraordinary remedy that
                is only available if a petitioner does not have a plain, speedy and adequate
                remedy in th.e ordinary course of law." In re WilliarnJ. Raggio Family Tr.,

                      2 Patterson's petition for a writ of mandamus also a ddre.sses a
                vindictive-prosecution claim that he raised in district court. Given that the
                Criminal case against him has been dismissed, we conclude that no further
                remedy is available to Patterson as to the vindictive-prosecution claim. See
                People v. Kun Lee, 954 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) ("A finding of
                prosecutorial vindictiveness is remedied through dismissal of the criminal.
                charges brought against a clefenda.nt.").
SUPREME COURT
         OF
      NEVADA

                                                      3
( 0) 194 7A
                136 Nev. 172, 175, 460 .P.3d 969, 972 (2020) (internal quotation marks
                omitted); see also NRS 34.170. "This court has considered writ petitions
                when doing so will clarify a substantial issue of public policy or precedential
                value, and where the petition presents a matter of first impression and
                considerations of judicial economy support its review." Washoe Cty. Human
                Servs. Agency v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 87, 521
                P.3d 1199, 1203 (2022) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
                            Patterson availed himself of an available alternative remedy—
                an appeal to the district court. In similar circumstances, we generally have
                declined to entertain a writ petition so as not to undermine the district
                court's appellate jurisdiction.   See State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court

                (Hedland), 116 Nev. 127, 134, 994 P.2d 692, 696 (2000). Nevertheless, we
                have considered such petitions in limited circumstances, particularly when
                a significant issue otherwise will evade this court's review. See Bildt v.
                Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 137 Nev. 121, 123, 483 P.3d 526, 529 (2021).
                We conclude that the issue of first impression raised by Patterson's
                petition—whether municipal courts can award fees and expenses under
                NRS 41.0393—presents such a circumstance and, thus, judicial economy
                supports our consideration of this petition.
                Municipal courts cannot award fees and expenses under NRS 41.0393
                            When interpreting a statute, we first look to its plain language.
                Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 72, 481 P.3d 1222, 1230 (2021). "Mt is
                well settled that where the language of a statue is plain and unambiguous
                and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction."
                Local Gov't Ernp.-Mgmt. Relations Bd. v. Educ. Support Emps. Ass'n, 134
                Nev. 716, 721, 429 P.3d 658, 662-63 (2018) (internal quotation marks
                omitted).

SUPREME COURT
        OF
     NEVADA

                                                      4
(0) 1947A
                            The plain language of NRS 41.0393 is clear and unmistakable.
                NRS 41.0393(1) provides that "[a] court may, in a criminal action, award to
                a prevailing party, other than the State, reasonable attorney's fees and
                litigation expenses incurred by the party in the criminal action if the court
                finds that the position of the State was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith."
                NRS 41.0393(8) further provides that, as used in this statute, "`[c]ourt'
                means a district court or justice court."      Accordingly, under the plain

                language of NRS 41.0393, the authority to award attorney fees and
                litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action is specifically
                limited to district courts and justice courts. As a result, we need not look
                past the plain language of the statute to the legislative history or public
                policy in our interpretation of NRS 41.0393, as Patterson requests. See, e.g.,
                McGrath v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 123 Nev. 120, 123-24, 159 P.3d 239,
                241 (2007) (explaining that this court need only consider legislative intent
                and public policy in interpreting a statute if the statute is ambiguous).
                            Further, we are not persuaded by Patterson's argument that
                other statutes compel a different result. In particular, Patterson points to
                NRS 5.073 and NRS 266.550. NRS 5.073(1) provides that "[t]he practice
                and proceedings in the municipal court must conform, as nearly as
                practicable, to the practice and proceedings of justice courts in similar
                cases. .. . The municipal court must be treated and considered as a justice
                court whenever the proceedings thereof are called into question."         NRS

                266.550(1) provides that "[t]he municipal court shall have such powers and
                jurisdiction in the city as are now provided by law for justice cOurts . . . ."
                These two statutes generally treat the municipal courts the same as justice
                courts and address the powers of municipal courts in general, but they do
                not control whether municipal courts have authority to award attorney fees

SUPREME COURT
          OF
       NEVADA

                                                      5
(o)   1947A
                        and costs to the prevailing party in a criminal action because the more
                        specific statute, NRS 41.0393, governs this issue. See State, Tax Comm'n,
                        ex rel. Nev. Dep't of Taxation v. Am. Home Shield of Nev., Inc., 127 Nev. 382,
                        388, 254 P.3d 601, 605 (2011) ("A specific statute controls over a general
                        statute."). Thus, we cannot look past the plain language of NRS 41.0393 to
                        either NRS 5.073 or NRS 266.550 for a different result.
                                                      CONCLUSION
                                      The plain language of NRS 41.0393 limits the courts that may
                        award attorney fees and litigation expenses in a criminal action to district
                        courts and justice courts.   Municipal courts were not included in NRS
                        41.0393(8)'s definition of the term "court."       Thus, we conclude that
                        municipal courts lack authority under NRS 41.0393 to award attorney fees
                        and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action.
                        Therefore, the municipal court correctly denied Patterson's request for fees
                        and expenses, and the district court properly denied Patterson's appea1.3
                        Accordingly, we deny Patterson's petition for a writ of mandamus.

                                                                                         , C.J.
                                                            Stiglich

                                                       J.

                              3This  opinion does not foreclose any other remedies that may be
                        available to Patterson, as it impacts only the relief he sought under NRS
                        41.0393.
SUPREME COURT
        OF
    NEVADA

01 1947A                                                      6
      NIA4 .    4gri.