Court Opinion

ID: 9488031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:34:15.413633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.685273
License: Public Domain

VAZQUEZ,5 with SEYMOUR, Chief Judge,
concurring.
Defendant argues that the district court incorrectly applied U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) to enhance his sentence. We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 487-88 (10th Cir.1994).
The issue presented is whether Defendant’s conduct falls within the scope of § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A). In interpreting the guidelines, we follow the clear, unambiguous language of the guidelines unless there is a *1112manifestation of contrary intent. United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir.1990). Moreover, commentary in the guidelines that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline. Stinson v. United States, — U.S. -, —, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). With these principles in mind, we now examine the plain language of the guideline and the adjoining commentary.
Section 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) provides that a defendant’s base offense level may be increased by two levels “if the offense involved ... a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization, or a government agency.” Application note 4 to the commentary adjoining § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) is both explanatory and interpretative of the guideline. It explicates several examples of conduct to which the guideline is intended to apply. Such conduct “would include a group of defendants who solicit contributions to a non-existent famine relief organization by mail, a defendant who diverts donations for a religiously affiliated school by telephone solicitations to church members in which the defendant falsely claims to be a fund-raiser for the school, or a defendant who poses as a federal collection agent in order to collect a delinquent student loan.” U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment, n. 4. Paragraph 4 of the background note to the commentary emphasizes the underlying purposes of sentence enhancement for such conduct. It explains that “[u]se of false pretenses involving charitable causes and government agencies enhances the sentences of defendants who take advantage of victims’ trust in government of law enforcement agencies or their generosity and charitable motives.” It further explains that “defendants who exploit victims’ charitable impulses or trust in government create particular social harm.”
Turning first to the language of the guideline, we note that the plain language requires that the defendant misrepresent that he was acting on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization or a government agency. Misrepresent means “to represent incorrectly, improperly, or falsely” and “[it] usually involves a deliberate intention to deceive, either for profit or advantage.” Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1230 (2d ed. 1993). The phrase “on behalf of’ means: (1) as a representative of; or (2) in the interest or aid of. Id. at 188. Thus, the plain, language of § 2F1.1(3)(A) requires that a defendant represent incorrectly, improperly or falsely that he is either acting “as a representative of’ or “in the interest or aid of’ a charitable, educational, religious or political organization or a government agency. Pursuant to this literal interpretation of the guideline, a defendant may be subject to enhanced punishment if he either falsely claims to be a representative of the organization, i.e., falsely claims that he has the capacity to act as an agent or employee of the organization, or if he falsely claims to act “in the interest or aid of’ the organization. However, in accordance with the well-established canon of statutory construction we must look beyond the literal language of the guideline if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute. Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2025-26, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); see United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir.1990) (the guidelines should be interpreted as if they were a statute or court rule). Furthermore, we are bound by the adjoining interpretative and explanatory commentary to the guideline, unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline. Stinson, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1915. The hypothetical clearly do not violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Moreover, they are not “inconsistent with” or a “plainly erroneous reading” of the guideline. Far from being inconsistent with the guideline, the hypothetical clarify the context in which the guideline was intended to apply. They define the parameters of conduct intended to fall within the purview of the guideline. In so doing, they demonstrate the Sentencing Commission’s intent that the guideline apply where a defendant misrepresents his authority to act on behalf of a charitable organization or government agen*1113cy, such as a defendant who claims he works on behalf of a non-existent charitable organization, or a defendant who falsely claims to be a fundraiser for a charitable organization, or a defendant who poses as a federal collection agent. See United States v. Echevarria, 33 F.3d 175 (2d Cir.1994) (U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) applicable where defendant misrepresented that he was a “state doctor” and could thereby approve applications for benefits); United States v. Hall, 996 F.2d 284 (11th Cir.1993) (U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) applicable where defendant collected phony taxes, falsely implying that he worked for the IRS); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 1319, 113. L.Ed.2d 252 (1990) (U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) applicable where defendant falsely told victim he was employed by United States State Department and Department of Defense). Cf. United States v. Starr, 986 F.2d 281, 282-83 (8th Cir.1993) (U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) inapplicable where the government failed to demonstrate that the defendant lacked authority to act on behalf of the charitable organization at the time of the offense).
Each of the hypothetieals clearly involves conduct that induces the victim to contribute funds because the defendant has falsely led the victim to believe that he has the capacity to act as an agent or employee for the charitable, educational, or political organization or government agency. In this way, the hypo-thetieals demonstrate that the purview of the guideline is narrower than that which may be discerned from a literal reading of the guideline. This narrower interpretation of the guideline is further supported by paragraph 4 of the background note to the commentary.
The commentary background note emphasizes the underlying rationale for enhancing the sentence of a defendant who engages in conduct within the purview of the guideline, as envisioned by the Sentencing Commission. It characterizes § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A) as applying to a defendant who engages in “false pretenses” and who by engaging in such conduct exploits the generosity and charitable motives of the victim or the victim’s trust in government. Thus, when coupled with the hypothetieals, the background note demonstrates that the conduct intended to fall within the scope of the guideline is exploitative conduct which induces victims to act upon their charitable or trusting impulses due to the defendant’s misrepresentation that he has authority to act on behalf of a charitable, educational, religious or political organization or a government agency.
In this case, it is undisputed that Defendant was president and chairman of the board of NIBC d/b/a UTSC, a non-profit corporation, which was funded by the United States Department of Labor to provide employment and training opportunities for American and Alaskan Indians through the DOL grant program. In his position as president and chairman of the board, Defendant was authorized to act on behalf of UTSC — an “educational organization” for purposes of the guideline. Thus, at no time during commission of the offense did Defendant appeal to the generosity and charitable or trusting impulses of his victim by falsely declaring that he had authority to act on behalf of an educational organization. Unlike the examples in the commentary, this case does not involve conduct whereby the defendant exploits his victim by claiming to have authority which in fact does not exist. Rather, Defendant as chairman and president of an educational organization used funds to which that organization was entitled for unauthorized purposes.6
The government relies upon United States v. Marcum, 16 F.3d 599 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 137, 130 L.Ed.2d 79 (1994), to support its contention that the district court correctly applied § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) to enhance Defendant’s sentence. In Marcum, the defendant was a corporal in a sheriffs department and president of a charitable organization that conducted bingo games. As president of the charitable organization, the defendant was in charge of administering the bingo games, which were held on a twice-weekly basis. *1114Over a period of approximately eighteen months, the defendant skimmed 10% of the charitable proceeds for himself and his fellow deputies. During this time, the illegal skim-mings accumulated to approximately $25,000. The Fourth Circuit held that because the defendant misrepresented to the public that he was conducting the bingo games wholly on behalf of the charitable organization, when, in fact, he was acting in part for himself and his fellow deputies, the guideline applied. See id. at 603.
We decline the Government’s invitation to follow Marcum. The Fourth Circuit in Mar-cum applied the guideline to conduct which did not involve a false representation of the defendant’s authority to act on behalf of the charitable organization. Indeed, the defendant, as president of the organization, had full authority to act on it’s behalf. In light of the clear manifestation of the Sentencing Commission’s intent as illustrated by the hypothetical and the background note, we believe that the Fourth Circuit expanded the scope of the guideline beyond that which was contemplated by the Sentencing Commission.7
Furthermore, even if the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the guideline in Marcum, it would not mandate application in this case because Marcum is distinguishable. In Marcum, the defendant exploited the generosity and charitable impulses of his victims— members of the public — by conducting the bingo games ostensibly for the entire benefit of a charitable organization, when, in fact, the defendant diverted 10% of the proceeds to himself and to his fellow deputies. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 comment, backg’d. para. 4. In this way, Marcum affirmatively solicited charitable contributions from the public, thereby inducing the public to act upon their “generosity” and “charitable motives.”8
By contrast, here the Defendant did not affirmatively solicit contributions from the public, but rather as president and chairman of the board of an educational organization misapplied DOL grant funds to which the organization was entitled. Thus, he did not exploit the “generosity” and “charitable motives” of his victim, the DOL, in order to receive the funds, but instead misapplied DOL funds which had been previously allocated to his organization. The fact that he made a false statement certifying that the funds had been used for an authorized purpose does not, in any way, implicate the guideline.
Moreover, unlike the defendant in Mar-cum, Defendant did not solicit funds the purpose of which was, at least in part, to serve his own personal interest. Defendant did not gain personally from his misapplication of the DOL funds. The funds were used to purchase computers and computer equipment for the educational organization and to pay Ms. Elizabeth David, who was to provide the computer training. The purchase of the computers and computer equipment was unauthorized because Defendant was required to receive approval of the purchase of computers or computer equipment beyond $500, which he failed to do, and in this case the computers and computer equipment cost $8,206.64. The payment of Ms. David — of $1,793.36 — was unauthorized because, Ms. David never, in fact, performed the training. Thus, this case is completely devoid of the kind of aggravating circumstances present in Marcum.
In conclusion, Defendant’s conduct is simply too removed from that envisioned by the sentencing commission in fashioning § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A). His conduct is drastically different from any of the conduct explicated in the hypotheticals. Moreover, the “particular social harm” which the Sentencing Com*1115mission perceived as justifying an enhanced sentence of one who falsely represents one’s authority — the exploitation of victims’ generosity and charitable motives — is completely lacking here. It was precisely this exploitation, coupled with a misrepresentation of one’s authority, which augmented the culpability of a defendant and rendered him subject to greater punishment than required by the base offense level. The kind of aggravating circumstances contemplated by § 2Fl.l(b)(3)(A), justifying a two level increase in the base offense level, are simply not present in this case. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s sentence of Defendant and remand for resentencing.
V.
In its cross-appeal, the government argues the district court erred in granting defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. We review the district court’s grant of a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal under the same standard applied by the district court when it considers the motion. United States v. White, 673 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir.1982).
We must view the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in-the light most favorable to the government, and without weighing conflicting evidence or considering the credibility of witnesses, determine whether that evidence, if believed, would establish each element of the crime. If the government has met that standard, we, as well as the trial court, must defer to the jury’s verdict of guilty. This standard reflects a deep respect for the fact-finding function of the jury.
Id. at 301-02. (citations omitted).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the government is required to prove that the defendant:
[I]n any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry....
18 U.S.C. § 1001.
In the instant case, Defendant argues the government did not prove an essential element of § 1001 — ie., that Defendant actually submitted his false statement.9 In other words, Defendant contends § 1001 requires as an element the defendant to physically deliver or send his false statement to some person or entity. The district court was persuaded by this argument and stated “I think that there was no evidence to show that the specific documents set forth in Count 3 of the indictment, namely invoices and cover letters, were presented to the Department of labor or caused to be presented by this Defendant.” Aplee.Supp.App. at 21.
Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, § 1001 does not require a defendant to physically submit his false statement to some person or entity. Section 1001 requires among other things that the defendant knowingly make a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of a United States department or agency. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001. “An agency has jurisdiction under section 1001 “when it has the power to exercise authority in a particular situation.’ ” United States v. Wright, 988 F.2d 1036, 1038 (10th Cir.1993). Applying § 1001 to the instant case, the government introduced evidence showing Defendant knowingly made false statements in invoices and cover letters and directed these documents be filed in UTSC files. Defendant’s purpose in filing the documents was to create false documentation to deceive persons looking at the files that computer training had been provided for the grant money paid. The DOL had power to exercise authority over the files in that the files were subject to audit by the DOL. Thus, the government introduced evidence that Defen*1116dant knowingly made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the DOL. The jury convicted Defendant of violating § 1001 based on this evidence. We conclude the court erred in granting Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
In sum, we REVERSE the court’s grant of Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count III of the indictment. We also REVERSE the court’s application of § 2F1.1(b)(3)(A) to Defendant. We REMAND for the court to reinstate the jury verdict on Count III and to resentence Defendant in accordance with this opinion. On all other issues, we AFFIRM.

. The Honorable Martha Vazquez, United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation.

. UTSC was entitled to over $10,000 of grant funds annually. This was an element of the misapplication charge for which Defendant was convicted.

. At least one other circuit has defined the scope of § 2F 1.1 (b)(3)(A) to require that the defendant falsely represent that he has authority to act on behalf of the charitable, educational, religious or political organization or a government agency. See United States v. Starr, 986 F.2d 281, 282-83 (8th Cir.1993).

. Although application of the guideline to such exploitative conduct superficially appears to serve the purpose of the guideline as elucidated in the background note of the commentary, the conduct in Marcum does not fall within the purview of the guideline. This is so, because the exploitation was not achieved by means of a misrepresentation of the defendant's authority to act on behalf of a charitable organization, but rather by virtue of the defendant's de facto position as an agent of the organization.

. Defendant also argues that the statements made by Defendant were not "material” under § 1001. Defendant did not make this argument to the district court in his motion for judgment of acquittal. We decline to consider his argument because it is raised for the first time in this appeal. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1485 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1552, 128 L.Ed.2d 201 (1994).