Court Opinion

ID: 9962951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 09:17:56.349319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:43.627711
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00223-CR

         ANTHONY DEVON BYRD, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 71st District Court
                Harrison County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 23-0140X

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
      Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

           A Harrison County jury convicted Anthony Devon Byrd of possession of a controlled

substance in penalty group 1 (methamphetamine) in an amount of 400 grams or more1 and

assessed a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment.              The trial court entered its judgment of

conviction in accordance with the jury’s verdict. Byrd’s sole issue on appeal asserts that the

evidence is legally insufficient to show he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. Because

we find the jury’s verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I.         Standard of Review

           “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010)). “Our rigorous review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id.

(citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency

under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury

‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)).

1
    See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(f) (Supp.).
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       “In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of

the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common

design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not required

that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.’”

Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are

equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by

circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the evidence

admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Id. (quoting Fowler v. State,

517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d in part by 544 S.W.3d 844 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018)).

       The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”

Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is based

upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008)).

       “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

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out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

II.         The Evidence at Trial

            The evidence at trial showed that the Joint Harrison County Violent Crime and Narcotics

Task Force used a CI2 to make four controlled purchases of methamphetamine and hydrocodone

from Byrd. Based on those purchases, the task force obtained a search and arrest warrant to

search 2626 West Loop 390, Apartment 223, in Marshall, the residence where the last purchase

was made, and to arrest Byrd, who was accused of delivery of a controlled substance in penalty

group 1.

            When the warrant was executed, Byrd was in the master bedroom and was the only

occupant of the house.3 Byrd was taken into custody, and suspected marihuana and some money

were found on his person. The money found on Byrd consisted of three twenty-dollar bills and

one ten-dollar bill with serial numbers that matched the serial numbers of the bills provided to

the CI to purchase narcotics from Byrd.

            When they searched the apartment, the task force found approximately 501 grams of

suspected Adderall, roughly twelve grams of methamphetamine, six grams of oxycodone, eight

grams of hydrocodone, eight grams of marihuana, other controlled substances, and drug

paraphernalia. Upon analysis by the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory in

2
    Confidential informant or cooperating individual.
3
 The apartment had two bedrooms, but only the master bedroom had a bed that was set up. The other bedroom only
contained a bedframe leaning against a wall and other miscellaneous items.
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Tyler, the suspected Adderall was determined to be 469.57 grams of methamphetamine. The

methamphetamine was contained in 1,976 orange pills imprinted “AD/30,” packaged in ten

plastic bags, and located in a box in the closet of the bedroom where Byrd was found.

            The task force also found a debit card on the kitchen counter of the apartment with the

name “Thony Byrd.” Also, after Byrd was arrested, he was taken to the Harrison County Jail.

On his book-in sheet, Byrd gave his address as 2626 West Loop 390, Apartment 223, in

Marshall.

            Caleb Caldwell, a detective with the Marshall Police Department assigned to the task

force, acknowledged that he did not know whose name was on the lease to the apartment. He

also testified that narcotics are sometimes sold out of “trap houses,”4 which are often not owned

by the person selling the drugs.

            Yesenia Martinez, the mother of Byrd’s child, testified that she had asked Byrd to leave

her house about four days before he was arrested. Martinez maintained that Byrd did not have a

job or money to rent the apartment but that he told her he had found a place to stay for a few

weeks. He brought her to the apartment, and she saw items there that belonged to someone other

than Byrd.

III.        Analysis

            Under the statute and the indictment, in order to convict Byrd, the State was required to

show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Byrd (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) possessed

(3) methamphetamine (4) in an amount of 400 grams or more. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY

4
    A “trap house” is a house used to sell narcotics.
                                                        5
CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (f) (Supp.). Byrd only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

showing that he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine. He argues that, since he was only

staying at the apartment temporarily and was not the sole occupant of the apartment, the State

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of affirmative links connecting him with

the methamphetamine. We disagree.

       “To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove that:

(1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the accused

knew the matter possessed was contraband.” Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 173 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2015). This may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, but “it must

establish . . . that the accused’s connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous.” Id. at

406 (quoting Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).

       Mere presence of the defendant in the place where the drugs are found is insufficient to

establish possession. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). “Presence or

proximity to drugs, however, when combined with other direct or circumstantial evidence, may

be sufficient to establish control, management, custody, or care provided the proof amounts to

more than a strong suspicion.” Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2014, no pet.) (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

       If the defendant was not in exclusive possession of the place where the contraband was

found, “additional independent facts and circumstances which affirmatively link the accused to

the contraband” must be presented to establish his possession of the contraband. Deshong v.

                                                6
State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). The Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals has recognized fourteen non-exclusive factors that may affirmatively link a defendant to

the contraband:

       (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
       contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
       accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of
       narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or
       narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements
       when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the
       defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband;
       (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether
       the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were
       found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed;
       (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and
       (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In our analysis, “[i]t is . . .

not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence,

direct and circumstantial.” Id. at 162.

       Here, the logical force of the evidence strongly links Byrd to the methamphetamine.

Before the search, a CI had purchased methamphetamine and hydrocodone from Byrd, the last of

which was purchased at the apartment where Byrd was searched and arrested. The search and

arrest warrant authorized the search of the apartment for controlled substances and the arrest of

Byrd, who was accused of delivery of a controlled substance in penalty group 1. When the

search was conducted, Byrd was the only person present in the apartment, and he was found in

the bedroom where the methamphetamine was discovered. Also, other contraband, including

hydrocodone, was discovered in the apartment and on Byrd’s person.             Byrd was also in

possession of the three twenty-dollar bills and the ten-dollar bill that were used by the CI in his
                                                7
prior purchases of methamphetamine and hydrocodone. Further, both Byrd, on his book-in

sheet, and Martinez, by testimony, affirmed that Byrd was residing in the apartment at the time

of the search.

        Based on our review, we find that the evidence supports the jury’s finding that Byrd

knowingly possessed the methamphetamine as alleged in the indictment. As a result, we find

that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We overrule Byrd’s

sole issue.

IV.     Conclusion

        For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      Scott E. Stevens
                                                      Chief Justice

Date Submitted:        April 9, 2024
Date Decided:          April 19, 2024

Do Not Publish

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