Court Opinion

ID: 9644728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:03:03.037015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:17.151134
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. It is unfortunate that the majority has passed up an opportunity to alleviate the uncertainty left in the wake of Bailey v. State, 287 Ark. 183, 697 S.W.2d 110 (1985), of which it has been said, “The court’s reasoning and decision in Bailey are flawed in two significant respects and represent a marked departure from its prior holdings.” 8 UALR Law Journal 746, 752 (1985). Without specifying the offending words, the majority lists five excerpts from the remarks of the prosecutor during closing argument. Two of them (No.’s 3 and 4 in the numerical order of listing) can be readily disposed of as immaterial, if not entirely appropriate to the proof and admitted implicitly by the defense. A forensic serologist testified to multiple testing procedures reflecting the presence of motile sperm in the victim’s vaginal canal. In fact, the defensive strategy throughout was based on the victim’s age, sixteen, and that intercourse was consensual. As to the remaining three excerpts, the majority does not specify what the prosecutor said that should not have been said. But the sum and substance, as readers can judge for themselves, is that the evidence or testimony that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse is “not disputed” or is “unrefuted.” The rationale for the holding in this case is built on Bailey v. State, supra, and Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536, 566 S. W.2d 387 (1978), on which the Bailey majority “heavily relied” (see the majority opinion). Oddly enough, Adams tells us it is perfectly permissible for the prosecutor to say “there has been absolutely no testimony to contradict that” and the prosecuting attorney “had every right to call to the jury’s attention that there existed no contradictions in the state’s case. We cannot visualize any valid objection to a remark of this nature when it cannot be construed as calculated to call a jury’s attention to the fact that a defendant has failed to take the witness stand.” The offending words in Adams were, “How many witnesses did the defense put on for your consideration?” Of course, nothing in that vein was said in this case. The majority sees that as comparable to what was said in Bailey, i.e., “The only thing we’ve heard today about what happened in that room is from the prosecuting witness.” Again, where is the comparable language in this case? The Aaron majority does attempt to give some degree of guidance to the bench and bar by adopting the formula approved in United States v. DiCaro, 852 F.2d 259, 263 (7th Cir. 1988) to the effect that when a defendant elects not to testify and when he is the only person able to dispute the testimony of the state, the prosecutor may not focus the jury’s attention on the defendant’s failure to testify.1  The DiCaro formula may be useful in some cases, but it will hardly serve in all cases, as the comments must be viewed in context of the entire case. See 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 23.4 n.32.1 (Supp. 1991). So it is in the case before us, where the defensive strategy, though calling no witnesses, was aimed at creating an inference that the victim consented. In opening statement counsel for the appellant twice told the jury that inasmuch as the victim was sixteen years old, no crime occurred if she consented to sexual intercourse. The clear and focused aim of counsel’s cross examination was to emphasize that the victim and her two friends were on a lark, drinking Vodka, suggesting the victim wanted to leave her companions, while urging the appellant to take her to Louisiana to get married. The prosecutor’s remarks in closing were made in direct response to that strategy: Mr. Davis had said that if Karol Whitecotton consented to sexual intercourse no crime occurred. That’s an issue. Again that applies to the offense of rape. Judge has instructed you that in deciding the issues you should consider the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence. Ladies and gentlemen, there’s not been one exhibit and there’s not been one word of testimony that this young lady ever agreed or consented to have sex with that defendant. In accord, United States v. Kubitsky, 469 F.2d 1253 (1st Cir. 1972), where the court found the prosecutor’s comments proper and stated: “ Since the prosecutor found himself in a situation where there are no defense witnesses at all, it was difficult to comment upon the case without at least indirectly touching upon that fact.” In short, I doubt that this decision provides any clearer standard than did Bailey, or that it is possible to formulate an objective guide for what constitutes a “veiled reference,” as this case and many others demonstrate. As the majority is searching elsewhere for guidance, it should look at the case of People v. Hunter, 464 N.E.2d 659 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1984) which is in line with the comments in Adams and our previous cases: The prosecution may, however, refer to the fact that the testimony of the State’s witnesses is uncontradicted even though the defendant would be the only person who could have contradicted it (citations), for this involves no more than an accurate summary of the evidence. It is only when the “thrust [of the argument] is the defendant’s nonappearance rather than the strength of the State’s case” that commentary on the uncontradicted nature of the evidence is deemed improper. . . .or where the evidence in fact was not uncontradicted, but the prosecutor stated that ‘‘there was no defense in this case” (e.g., People v. Escobar). [My emphasis.] I suggest that is a considerably better standard than we are left with since Bailey and I commend it to the majority in lieu of what is now offered. Corbin, J., joins in this dissent.   1 The Bailey majority gave lip service to that same formula yet disregarded the fact that the victim testified that Bailey’s brother, Willie Foreman, was in the motel room during the time she was held against her will.