Court Opinion

ID: 9547466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:47:48.618199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:47.022421
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — The majority holds that a state court's authority to divide military retired pay is not limited to cases in which the marriage has lasted for more than 10 years during the service member's military career. Although policy considerations may favor this holding, it *479requires an interpretation of the applicable statute which totally disregards the rules of statutory construction established by this court. Discretionary application of the rules of statutory construction destroys their value and leads to unnecessary judicial tampering. For this reason I dissent.
Petitioner contends that the award of his military retired pay was improper under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA). He interprets the USFSPA to allow state courts to award a portion of military retired pay as part of a property division only if the parties' marriage has lasted for more than 10 years during the service member's military career.
Petitioner relies on language in 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2) of the USFSPA which provides:
If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or retainer pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable retired or retainer pay of the member as property of the member or property of the member and his spouse.
(Italics mine.) Petitioner contends that the 10-year requirement of subsection (d)(2) is made applicable to the entire section 1408 by the language "under this section". Therefore, he argues no division is proper under section 1408 unless the couple was married during at least 10 years of service.
The majority summarily concludes that an ambiguity exists as to whether section 1408(d)(2) applies to subsection (d) alone or to the entire section 1408. In this way the majority introduces the legislative history which becomes the basis for its analysis. The majority does not identify or discuss the ambiguity in subsection (d). Indeed, it cannot, because no ambiguity exists.
The intent of the Legislature must be determined pri*480marily from the language of the statute itself, and where the language is plain and free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction, because the meaning will be discovered from the wording of the statute itself. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 68 L. Ed. 2d 744, 101 S. Ct. 2239 (1981), on remand sub nom. Cenance v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 666 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1982); People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 101 Wn.2d 425, 679 P.2d 922 (1984); Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wn.2d 748, 675 P.2d 592 (1984). Accordingly, when a term used in a statute is not defined therein, it should be given its ordinary meaning. State ex rel. Graham v. Northshore Sch. Dist. 417, 99 Wn.2d 232, 662 P.2d 38 (1983). This is so even if the court, as draftsman, might have used or preferred a different choice of language than that employed by the Legislature. Guinness v. State, 40 Wn.2d 677, 246 P.2d 433 (1952).
In the present case, the language of subsection (d), paragraph (2) is plain and free from ambiguity. The 10-year requirement set forth here is clearly made applicable to the entire section 1408 by the language "under this section". The majority's assertion that it could apply either to the entire section 1408 or only to subsection (d) is simply not supportable under this language. "Section" is defined as a distinct part or portion of a writing as a subdivision of a chapter. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2052 (1961). Section 1408 is within chapter 71 and is a subdivision of this chapter. Subsection (d) is a further division of section 1408; subsection (d) is not properly termed a " section".
An examination of the statute itself is conclusive proof that the word "section" encompasses every part of section 1408(a) through (h). The introductory language states:
Sec. 1002. (a) Chapter 71 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
96 Stat. 730, Pub. L. No. 97-252 (1982). Thereafter there follows in quotation marks all of section 1408(a) through *481(h). In other words, the introductory language itself defines "section" by stating that there is added a new section. What is contained within that section is indicated by the quotation marks in front of "§ 1408" through the last word in (h). The entire section 1408 is the new section. Because the phrase "under this section" can only apply to the entire section 1408, no ambiguity exists and therefore statutory construction is improper.
The Legislature's use of the words "section" and "subsection" in the entirety of section 1408 supports the contention that the 10-year requirement of subsection (d)(2) applies to the entire section 1408. When construing a statute, courts must read the act as a whole and not piecemeal. State v. Parker, 97 Wn.2d 737, 649 P.2d 637 (1982); Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wn.2d 321, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977). Throughout section 1408 the Legislature used the term "section" to refer to the entire act. For example, the codification index of chapter 71 of Title 10 lists the sections of the chapter. Section 1408 is listed under the heading "sections". We can therefore presume it knew to what that term correctly referred.
In addition, specific subsections are referred to. In section 1408(b)(1)(A) and in section 1408(f)(1) and (2) the term "subsection" is used to refer to subsection (h). In section 1408(d)(2) itself subsection (c) is referred to. In section 1408(d)(5) the division of paragraph is referred to, supporting further distinction between sections, subsections, and paragraphs. And most importantly, the subsection in question, subsection (d), is correctly referred to as "subsection" in section 1408(e)(1). It is obvious that the Legislature knew the difference between "section" and "subsection" and had it wanted to limit the 10-year requirement to subsection (d) it would have used the proper term.
If the majority is correct in its conclusion that the limitation in section 1408(d)(2) is limited only to direct payments made under section 1408(d)(1), then the whole act is rendered a shambles. For example, section 1408(a)(1) *482through (6) provides the definitions of the words "court", "court order", "final decree", "disposable retired or retainer pay", "member" and "spouse or former spouse". Under the majority's analysis these terms would apply only to section 1408(a). Thus, the definitions therein provided would stand alone and section 1408(a) would be meaningless. Likewise, section 1408(b) which determines when service of a court order is effective and when it is regular on its face would apply only to itself and would stand as a meaningless collection of words, applicable to nothing.
In addition, section 1408(h) is utterly meaningless under the majority's analysis. In its entirety it provides: "[t]he Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section." The majority's holding would limit such regulations to the administration of section 1408(h) which only authorizes the issuances of regulations.
Obviously, each subsection cannot refer solely to itself. The language "under this section" must refer to the entire section 1408 or the act is rendered useless. For example, the trial court disposed of the military pension by court order. The court order must fulfill the requirements of subsection (a)(2) before the military retired payments may be divided. The court order in this case is the very type of order section 1408 is designed to deal with. Then subsection (c) comes into play by announcing that such division is possible. And finally subsection (d) limits the division in various ways. The subsections are meant to work together and each is designed to apply to the entire section 1408.
It may well be that the conference report, cited by the majority, is what the members of the conference committee intended. However, that is not what the drafter of the bill itself put into the document ultimately passed.
The interpretation which applies the 10-year requirement of subsection (d)(2) to the entire statute is reconcilable with the intent apparent in the remainder of the statute. The idea that the Legislature wanted to limit state courts' authority to divide military retired pay to cases *483where the marriages lasted a reasonable period of time fits into the general scheme of offering some protection to the retiring spouse. Section 1408(c)(3) similarly protects this spouse by not giving courts the authority to order the service member spouse to retire or apply for retirement so as to effectuate payment under section 1408. Subsection (d) provides for various limitations which protect the retiring spouse to an extent. Subsection (d), paragraph (1) requires a court order before benefits can be paid directly to the spouse or former spouse. Subsection (d), paragraph (3) provides that a court may not order payments to be made more often than cice each month. Any payment, direct or other, would occur most beneficially for both spouses at a time when money was available, after the government's monthly payment. Subsection (d), paragraph (4) limits payment under section 1408 to the time when the retired or retiring spouse is still alive. Subsection (d), paragraph (5) sets forth the procedure for garnishment of the military retired pay. Each of these paragraphs of subsection (d) refer to the "section" and each is reconcilable to the interpretation that they limit the entire section 1408. Contrary to the holding in In re Marriage of Wood, 66 Or. App. 941, 676 P.2d 338 (1984), the limitation in (d)(1), requiring a court order before benefits are paid directly to the spouse or former spouse, is not necessarily applicable to the entire subsection (d). Each of the paragraphs are separate limitations on section 1408.
Because there is no ambiguity in subsection (d) and the ordinary meaning applied to the questioned term is reconcilable with the remainder of the statute, I would hold that the 10-year requirement of subsection (d)(2) applies to the entire act. Therefore, I would reverse and remand.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Brachtenbach, J.
Reconsideration denied February 15, 1985.