Court Opinion

ID: 9672326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:52:47.050327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.407001
License: Public Domain

Connor T. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). This writer respectfully dissents from the decision of the majority of the court.
Ch. 305, Laws of 1973, creates ch. 499 of the Wisconsin statutes. This legislation purports to create an entity identified as a “public body corporate and politic” (sec. 499.02 (1), Stats.) to be known as the “Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority.”
The act proclaims that recycling from “solid waste is necessary to protect the public health and quality of the natural environment.” Such is a laudable objective; nevertheless, the Authority is primarily a manufacturing operation. There is no precedent for such an activity in the annals of Wisconsin history. It will manufacture solid wastes into recycled materials for sale, presumably *500to private industry. Sec. 499.03 (4), Stats., provides that the Authority utilize private industry to the maximum extent “feasible.” However, sec. 499.16, for all practical purposes, permits the Authority to extend its operation into both private and local municipal sectors upon a legislative type determination of public interest.
The Authority is composed of seven members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate. Sec. 499.02, Stats. Basically, it is the intent of the act that the operation of the Authority be financed by the issuance of its bonds. The board of engineering consultants appointed to assist in the development of the legislation estimated that total capital cost of instituting a statewide regional recycling system would be approximately $120,000,000, in terms of 1973 dollars.
The act also provides for a “capital reserve fund requirement.” It establishes a procedure involving the governor and the joint committee on finance of the legislature, whereby it can go to the legislature in future years to replenish the fund if needed. Sec. 499.32, Stats.
Sec. 499.10, Stats., contemplates that the Authority will ultimately divide the entire state into regions. However, to further implement the Authority and without setting forth any reason or justification whatever, the act first creates three regions. They are:
(a) Fond du Lac, Outagamie and Winnebago counties;
(b) Lincoln, Marathon, Portage and Wood counties; and
(c) Milwaukee, Ozaukee, Washington and Waukesha counties.
After a determination of “best public interest,” the Authority can require such municipalities as it chooses within the boundaries of a region to use its facilities. The municipalities which the Authority so decides must use its facilities shall pay the Authority a reasonable sum, to be determined by the Authority for bringing its solid wastes to the place designated by the Authority. *501After a nonjudicial-type hearing the Authority can make a determination of “best public interest” based upon any one of several findings, including the following:
“(d) Required use is necessary to achieve operational volumes necessary to make the authority financially self-supporting to the greatest extent possible.” Sec. 499.16 (2) (d), Stats.
The act gives the Authority complete charge of serving such parts of the state or even regions, when it chooses and how it chooses.
Sec. 499.02 (4), Stats., provides that no law terminating the existence of the Authority shall take effect while it has obligations outstanding. Under sec. 499.25, the Authority may issue notes and bonds as it deems expedient. Thus, any subsequent legislature is precluded from terminating the existence of the Authority. It can, by its own action, perpetuate itself to infinity. This must be the intention of the act because it provides absolutely no method for either voluntary or legislative liquidation of the manufacturing facilities.1 In fact, the act by its very terms creates a situation whereby the legislature could not terminate its existence if the Authority elected to perpetuate itself by the continued creation of outstanding obligations.
In my opinion, no legislation closely comparable to ch. 499, Stats., has ever been declared constitutional. While one’s sensitivities and judgment recognize the abiding concern to protect our environment and properly husband our natural resources, such fundamental beliefs do not justify the approval of what I believe to be unconstitutional legislation.
Admittedly, the legislative statement of purpose of the act is relevant:
*502“Nevertheless, when legislation is challenged, the justices of this court deem it their unavoidable burden under the constitution to examine such legislation and to assess its realistic operation. Although the legislative declarations are entitled to great weight, we may not blindly accept at full value even the most elaborate prefatory expressions concerning community need, economic impact, or public purpose. . . .” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. Bowman v. Barczak (1967), 34 Wis. 2d 57, 65, 66, 148 N. W. 2d 683.
In arriving at its ultimate conclusions as to the constitutionality of the act, the majority appears to place considerable emphasis and weight upon abstract general statements of law in State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N. W. 2d 780, without regard to their particular applicability to the factual situation to which they are applied. Nusbaum found constitutional an act creating the “Wisconsin housing finance authority.” In essence, the Wisconsin housing finance authority was created to assist in the financing of certain declared needed housing facilities through existing channels of the commerce and construction industry. It did not authorize construction, selling and leasing of housing facilities by the Authority. Had the act purported to give the Wisconsin housing finance authority such authority this writer would have been compelled to find the act unconstitutional. As contrasted to the Wisconsin housing finance authority, the instant act purports to give the Authority the right to develop manufacturing facilities to produce recycled solid waste for sale.
In my opinion, such activity by the Authority consists of a clear act of internal improvement in violation of art. VIII, sec. 10, Wisconsin Constitution.
I am unable to dismiss the internal improvement argument as does the majority. Without establishing any definitive nature of the Authority as an entity, the majority decides what is not.
*503“There is no doubt here that the Solid Waste Recycling Authority is an independent authority from the state, that it is neither an arm nor an agent of the state, and that its activities are to be undertaken as an independent entity . . . .”
This conclusion is supported by citation of two authorities from Alabama, which I find to be unpersuasive.
An examination of the history of the internal improvement clause and its application leads to the inescapable conclusion that the only way the state can provide the financial assistance necessary for the building and operating of these facilities by an entity of its own creation is through the avenue of a constitutional amendment.
The birth of the internal improvement clause was not an easy one. In fact it was a significant contributing factor to the need for two state constitutional conventions.2 It became a part of the constitution as a result of the “plunge into the gulf of internal improvements which had swallowed up the credit and prosperity of so many states.” State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, supra, page 83.
The creation of this Authority is not designed to provide limited financial assistance for various municipalities to carry on works of internal improvements by governmental subdivisions as in all previously decided cases. Rather it is a plan to do it for them through some kind of an entity created by the legislature. I cannot subscribe to the idea that the issuance of bonds, not to exceed $16,000,000 to build these plants in but three areas of the state, and incurring expenses not to exceed $600,000 annually in administrative costs, is incidental *504to the dominant purpose of the act. The reality of the situation is that the intent and purpose of the act cannot be implemented unless the state provides a financial means for building' the recycling plants by the “public body corporate and politic” of its own creation.
In my opinion, the history of the amendments to our constitution support the conclusions that the establishment of this Authority to accomplish this end is an internal improvement.
Since the adoption of the constitution it has been found necessary to amend it to permit the state to carry on the following internal improvements: 1908-highway construction; 1945-airport and other aeronautical projects; 1948-veterans’ housing; 1960-port facilities; 1968-development of forests; and, most recently, mass transit.
To follow the rationale of the majority to what, to me, is its logical conclusion, would mean that none of these constitutional amendments were necessary if the legislature had chosen to delegate its authority to an entity, “public body corporate and politic” with an appropriate declaration of public purpose. If such is the conclusion of the present majority of the court, I cannot subscribe to it.
In my opinion, the Wisconsin cases cited lend little support to the conclusion of the majority. Glendale Development v. Board of Regents (1960), 12 Wis. 2d 120, 106 N. W. 2d 430, stands for the proposition that friends of the university could organize a nonprofit corporation to carry on internal improvements for the university. Redevelopment Authority v. Canepa (1959), 7 Wis. 2d 643, 97 N. W. 2d 695, recognized the well-established exception that governmental subdivisions are not subject to the prohibition. Nusbaum, supra, is also readily distinguishable on its facts. The construction of no facility of any kind was involved.
State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1954), 267 Wis. 331, 65 N. W. 2d 529, involved a private corporation and the *505construction of a state office building, which itself is not a work of internal improvement. State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1955), 271 Wis. 15, 72 N. W. 2d 577, found that a structure used by the state university for educational purposes was excluded from being a work of internal improvement.
State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 96, 153 N. W. 2d 49, related to a nonprofit corporation organized to sell bonds for highway purposes. State ex rel. La Follette v. Reuter (1967), 33 Wis. 2d 384, 147 N. W. 2d 304, provided funds to municipalities to assist in construction of water pollution abatement facilities. State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 201, 170 N. W. 2d 790, appropriated state funds to Marquette School of Medicine for operating expenses for research and educational activities.
Appeal of Van Dyke (1935), 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700, provided funds through the industrial commission to reimburse counties for a percentage of funds expended by them to provide employment for the unemployed. State ex rel. Wisconsin Development Authority v. Dammann (1938), 228 Wis. 147, 277 N. W. 278, 280 N. W. 698, relates to encouraging others to form municipal power districts and did not involve the state or a legislatively created entity in the construction of power plants.
None of these cited cases even closely resemble the factual situation presented and the ultimate decision in each is irrelevant to this case.
The fact that private capital may not readily fulfill the need identified by the act does not necessitate fulfilling the needs in this manner. Other procedures or methods are available which would not contravene the internal improvement prohibition. Aid could be provided to governmental subdivisions as approved in prior cases or by constitutional amendment as used in certain instances.
Art. IY, sec. 1, Wisconsin Constitution, restricts the delegation of power by the legislature. It is my belief *506that the power given this Authority is violative of this constitutional provision. Once again the majority relies on language abstracted from Nusbaum, supra, and once again it is pointed out that the type of authority validated in Nusbaum is entirely different than that under consideration in the instant case.
Nusbaum, supra, made clear, at page 395, that:
“The act contemplates that the Authority will issue notes and bonds, presumably at a lower rate of interest because of their contemplated tax-exempt status. The Authority, in turn, will make money available to the housing industry at reduced rates. The developers will then be able to sell or rent housing to low and moderate income families, thereby tending to eliminate substandard housing conditions in the state and accomplish other objectives set forth in the enabling legislation.”
In contrast, the recycling authority is invested with power to govern the people of the state in certain aspects. It is in complete charge of building and maintaining a solid waste recycling system serving such parts of the state as it chooses.
One particularly significant power of government given the Authority is that set forth in sec. 499.16, Stats. It can require such municipalities, private corporations, and even individuals to use its manufacturing facilities when it chooses if the Authority “finds such use to be in the best public interest.” As previously stated, such “best public interest” can exist on no finding other than that the use is necessary to help the Authority become financially self-supporting. Sec. 499.16 (2) (d).
We are not here concerned with whether the state has the power or authority to so govern the lives of the people. What we are concerned with is whether the state can delegate such great power and authority to an entity which both the legislature and the majority have gone to considerable length to disavow is an agency or arm of the state. So far as I can ascertain, such an attempted *507delegation of power to govern the people of the state has never before been validated by this court. I would not be one to put a stamp of approval on the establishment of such a governmental process.
Clintonville Transfer Line v. Public Service Comm. (1945), 248 Wis. 59, 21 N. W. 2d 5, and Robertson Transportation Co. v. Public Service Comm. (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 653, 159 N. W. 2d 636, are inapposite. Both of those cases go directly to the question of appropriate legislative guidelines for a state agency to implement the law.
Art. XI, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution is frequently referred to as the “reserved, power clause.” I respectfully submit that the response of the majority to the argument that ch. 499, Stats., contravenes this clause, begs the question.
Sec. 499.02 (4), Stats., provides that no law terminating the authority shall take effect while the Authority has outstanding obligations. Sec. 499.07 authorizes the Authority to incur obligations in a wide variety of ways, including, but not limited to, contracts, notes and bonds. To me, this language of the act is explicit and unambiguous. Is the effect of these provisions any different than that of an enactment boldly stating that this law can never be repealed if the Authority elects to continue in operation ? I think not.
The nonimpairment of contract clauses in both state and federal constitutions, in my opinion, add no support to the position advanced by the majority in disposing of the issue on the reserved power clause. The act clearly gives the Authority absolute authority to incur continuing obligations and forecloses any possible termination by the legislature so long as these obligations exist. Absent these nontermination provisions of the act, any future legislature could, in its wisdom, terminate the existence of the Authority by appropriate arrangements to recognize the then outstanding obligations of the Authority. *508Hence the provisions of the nonimpairment of contract clauses would be fully accommodated. But this act by its very terms prohibits the termination of the Authority by any future legislature if the Authority chose to extend its existence.
I believe there are other provisions of ch. 499, Stats., which are subject to challenge and arguable merit. However, having expressed my opinion on certain provisions of the act, little will be added by the discussion of additional issues.
It is my conclusion that ch.. 499', Stats., should be declared unconstitutional. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hanley and Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen concur in this conclusion.

 Sec. 499.36, Stats., relates to procedures required in the event the Authority defaults in its obligations.

 State ex rel. Jones v. Froehlich (1902), 116 Wis. 32, 91 N. W. 115; State ex rel. Owen v. Donald (1915), 160 Wis. 21, 151 N. W. 331; State ex rel. Martin v. Giessel (1948), 252 Wis. 363, 371, 31 N. W. 2d 626.