Court Opinion

ID: 9859536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:58:14.556153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:08.879467
License: Public Domain

DeBruler, C. J.
On February 28, 1969, Noble Pearcy, Prosecutor of Marion County, Indiana, sought and obtained a mass indictment of thirteen girls and ten boys, students of Shortridge High School, Indianapolis, Indiana, from the grand jury convened by the Criminal Court of Marion County, for the crime of disorderly conduct. Twenty-one of those indicted are the relators herein, and are juveniles at least fifteen years of age. Two of those indicted and transferred to the juvenile court were under fifteen years of age and are not parties to this action. The prosecutor and the grand jury knew these children, the relators herein, were under eighteen years of age because the ages were typed on the face of the indictment. This mass indictment was filed on February 28, 1969, in the Criminal Court of Marion County. That same day the judge of Division I of that court received the indictments and immediately ordered them transferred to the Marion County Juvenile Court. On March 5,1969, the Juvenile Court noted the transfer made along with the indictment, and ordered a case filed against each relator and a cause number assigned to each such case. On March 7, 1969, the prosecutor of Marion County filed in the Juvenile Court a Petition for Waiver of Jurisdiction in each case and the respondent ordered a hearing as to each relator on the petition. The relators seek a writ of prohibition to prevent respondent from acting on the Petition for Waiver of Jurisdiction on the grounds that respondent has no jurisdiction to act in these cases.
We agree with the relators.
*239*238The grand jury is an arm of the Marion County Criminal *239Court and under Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-824, it has a duty to inquire into
“. . . violations of the criminal laws of this state generally, of which the court has jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.)
Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. 9-3103 states in part:
“The juvenile courts created by this act . . . shall have original exclusive jurisdiction, except when specifically waived by the court, in such cases as provided by law, in all cases of delinquent . . . children . . .” (Emphasis added.)
Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3204 states in part:
“The words ‘delinquent child’ shall include any boy under the full age of 18 years and any girl under the full age of 18 years who ... (1) commits an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment....”
It is conceded that disorderly conduct is not punishable by death or life imprisonment, that relators are under eighteen years of age, and that the grand jury knew this when it returned the indictment. Therefore, the relators were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Marion County Criminal Court. The grand jury’s power to indict is limited to the jurisdiction of the court of which it is an extension, so the grand jury was without jurisdiction to return the indictment in this case.
Secondly, Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3215 states in part:
“No adjudication upon the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the court shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a conviction, nor shall any child be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court, except as provided in section 1U [waiver by juvenile court to criminal court] and section 23 [contempt of juvenile court] . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
*240*239This is a specific statutory prohibition against knowingly *240charging either by affidavit or indictment any person under eighteen years of age with a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment in any court, except after waiver from the juvenile court or for contempt of the juvenile court.
This conclusion is further supported by several other statutes. Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-807 sets out the oath required of grand jurors and reads in part:
“You, and each of you, do solemnly swear or affirm that you will diligently inquire, and true presentment make, of all felonies and misdemeanors, committed or triable within this county....”
It has long been the rule in this State that juvenile matters are considered to be civil in nature. State ex rel. McClintock v. Hamilton Circuit Court (1968), 249 Ind. 333, 232 N. E. 2d 356; State ex rel. Johnson v. White Circuit Court (1948), 225 Ind. 602, 77 N. E. 2d 298. Since the grand jury knew the relators were under eighteen years of age, they knew they could make no presentment against them. The grand jury is free to investigate events similar to the one which precipitated the charges in this case in order to determine whether any violations of law have been committed over which the convening court has jurisdiction. They might even need to call persons under eighteen years of age as witnesses. However, the prosecuting attorney and the grand jury, being aware of the fact that relators were under eighteen years of age, were precluded by law from returning a valid indictment charging relators with a criminal offense, unless the case is within the statutory exceptions.
Of course, the situation would be completely different if the prosecutor and the grand jury had not known that the relators were under eighteen years of age. There are two provisions in the statute for just that contingency. Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3213 says in part:
“If a complaint or charge of a criminal or quasi-crim*241inal nature is made or pending against any person in any other court, and, it shall be ascertained that said person was under the age of 18 years at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed, it shall be the duty of such court to transfer such case immediately, together with all the papers, documents and testimony connected therewith, to the juvenile court____”
Bums’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3207 provides in part:
“. . . A person subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under this act may be brought before it by either of the following means and no other:
(a) By petition praying that the person be adjudged delinquent or dependent or neglected;
(b) Certification and transfer from any other court before which any such person is brought charged with the commission of a crime....”
Admittedly, these statutes do not state explicitly they are to be used only when a person under eighteen years of age is inadvertently brought before the criminal court. Neither is there any statutory warrant for the prosecutor’s position that these statutes clearly anticipate that a juvenile may be charged in a criminal court, at the discretion of the prosecutor, even though it is known that he is under eighteen years of age.
We believe the whole spirit and purpose of the juvenile act is violated by the procedure followed in this case. Burns’ Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3202 states:
“This act [§§ 9-3201 — 9-3225] shall be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes herein sought.”
Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3201 states:
“The purpose of this act [§§ 9-3201 — 9-3225] is to secure for each child within its provisions such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will serve the child’s welfare and the best interests of the state; and when such child is removed from his own family, to secure *242■for him custody, care and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents.
“The principle is hereby recognized that children under the jurisdiction of the court are subject to the discipline and entitled to the protection of the state, which may intervene to safeguard them from neglect or injury and to enforce the legal obligations due to them and from them.”
To sanction the action of the prosecutor and grand jury in the case at bar is to permit a prosecutor to seek an indictment which he knows is not triable in the court which convened the grand jury; to cause the grand jurors to ignore their oath; to usurp the discretion placed by statute in the judge of the juvenile court, namely, to determine when the names arrest, records of delinquent children should be made public. When the prosecutor files an affidavit or obtains an indictment it becomes a public record, unless in the case of an indictment,. the person has not yet been taken into custody or given bail. Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 9-904, 9-906. Therefore, the juvenile may be arrested on a warrant long after the act, fingerprinted and processed at the jail, and placed in the jail as if he were an adult offender. This does not seem to us to “serve the child’s welfare and best interests of the state.” It would further permit the police and the prosecutor to ignore the plain mandate in Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. § 9-3208, which states in part:
“Any person may and any peace officer shall give to the court information in his possession that there is within the county or residing within the county, a . . . delinquent child” ... (emphasis added).
That is the course which should be followed by a prosecutor when dealing with a juvenile, known to be such.
We, therefore, hold that a prosecutor cannot seek, nor the grand jury return, an indictment, nor may the prosecutor file an affidavit in a court of criminal jurisdiction against any person known to be under eighteen years of age unless the case is within the statutory excep*243tions. Such an indictment or affidavit is a nullity and gives the criminal court no jurisdiction of the persons named therein or of the cause. In this case the Marion County Criminal Court lacked jurisdiction even to transfer this cause to the respondent and the respondent did not obtain jurisdiction to act in any manner with regard to such an indictment.
Relators by a motion to dismiss, which is overruled, have advised this Court that the respondent judge of the juvenile court has anticipated the holding of this Court and dismissed the cases against relators for lack of jurisdiction. We hereby approve that action, but proceed to issue this opinion due to the weighty issues involved.
While the writ prayed for is no longer needed to provide the relief sought the same is hereby granted.
Jackson, J., concurs; Hunter, J., concurs with opinion; Givan, J., dissents with opinion in which Arterburn, J., concurs.