Court Opinion

ID: 9776581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:28.06855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:15.242531
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the circuit court and the Court of Appeals were correct in determin*140ing that the provision of the separation agreement was merely an agreement to agree and therefore unenforceable pursuant to Walker v. Keith, Ky., 382 S.W.2d 198 (1964).
The pertinent part of the agreement relating to the college education of the daughter is as follows:
however, the amount and nature thereof shall hereafter be mutually agreed upon by the Husband and Elizabeth (emphasis added.)
There could be no clearer statement of only an agreement to mutually agree.
The wife argues that it is difficult to draft a specific contract provision relating to post secondary education when the scholastic aptitude of the child as well as future tuition costs are unknown at the time of the divorce. Although this may be true, there are ways of drafting such agreements to make them binding which was not done in this case. A large number of cases on all aspects of the college education question are compiled in Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parents to Pay for or Contribute to, Costs of Child’s College Education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322.
This agreement merely states the “father’s intention” to pay for college upon the mutual agreement of the father and the daughter at a later time. The circuit court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding this to be an unenforceable agreement to agree.
Walker, supra, dealt with a lease renewal option but the Court specifically determined that such an option stands on the same footing as any other contractual right. To be enforceable and valid, a contract to enter into a future covenant must specify all material and essential terms and leave nothing to be agreed upon as a result of future negotiations. Johnson v. Lowery, Ky., 270 S.W.2d 943 (1954); also see National Bank of Kentucky v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.1933).
Belknap v. Belknap, 265 Ky. 411, 96 S.W.2d 1012 (1936), is not applicable to this case because it held that a Court could exercise continuing jurisdiction in terms of regulating child custody. Clearly parents are obliged to provide for support and well being of minor children. No such legal duty exists for college education. A court should not impose such terms and conditions because there is no authority for such a duty on the part of the parents. The Indiana decision of Rohn v. Thuma, Ind. App., 408 N.E.2d 578 (1980) is not similar to this case because there the father did agree to provide a college education for his children. In this case, no such agreement existed.
In the absence of contract language to the contrary, the court should not impose a different burden than Miller v. Miller, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 81 (1970) requires. Miller, supra, held that a father could not be required to pay for private, elementary or secondary schools in the absence of a showing that the county’s public schools were inadequate. It should be noted that the 1988 amendments to K.R.S. 403.210, which lists relevant factors in setting child support payments, the educational needs of the child, including the need of a child who has attained the age of 18 years or older relates to a student enrolled on a full-time basis in high school. Clearly the legislature has recently considered the obligation of a parent to provide an education to a child over 18 and has limited that obligation to high school. The 1988 amendment leaves no doubt that the obligation to pay for college education is contractual only.
Obviously, there is a great potential for mischief in this opinion because the interpretation of separation agreements which requires the husband to pay for four-year college, obligates the father to pay tuition for a possibly expensive private school selected by the child rather than a state university or college located near the home. The economic impact is of considerable importance in determining the fairness of the separation agreement or property settlement.
There is no reason to depart from the well settled law in this state which requires that any contract, including those involving support and separation, be specific as to all material and essential terms, and leaves *141nothing to be agreed upon as the result of future negotiations.
I would affirm the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.
GANT, J., joins in this dissent.