Court Opinion

ID: 9789330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:34:42.421063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:21.801901
License: Public Domain

SCHUMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with everything in the majority’s opinion in this difficult case except the outcome. To be more specific: I agree that under Oregon statutory and case law as interpreted in light of Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054, 147 L Ed 2d 49 (2000), we must give significant weight to a fit biological parent’s fundamental right to determine the care, custody, and control of his or her children, and, as a consequence, the state may not award custody of a child to a non-parent instead of the child’s fit biological parent, contrary to the wishes of the fit biological parent, unless the nonparent has overcome a powerful presumption in favor of the fit biological parent. I also agree that a fit biological parent does not possess the fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child by virtue of biology alone; rather, he or she must have participated to some degree in the child’s rearing. I agree that the presumption in favor of the parent who has done so is rebutted only if the nonparent can demonstrate that the biological parent cannot or will not provide adequate love and care for the child or that giving custody of the child to the parent will cause the child undue physical or psychological harm. Finally, on the facts of this case, I agree that father has participated in the rearing of child to such a degree that he qualifies for the presumption in favor of a fit *555biological parent, that he is willing and able to provide adequate love and care for child, and that moving child to father’s custody will not cause child undue physical harm.
Thus, the majority and I part company only on the issue of psychological harm. Relying on the same record, I reach a contrary conclusion: I believe moving child from grandparents’ custody to father’s will cause undue psychological harm. Because this is necessarily a fact-specific determination and the particular facts of this case are unlikely to recur, it would serve no purpose to recite the reasons why I disagree with the majority. Further, such a recital could adversely affect the parties. Suffice it to say that I respectfully dissent.
Deits, C. J., and Brewer, J., join in this dissent.