Court Opinion

ID: 9673340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:10:21.052453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:21.682074
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
I concur in the result reached by *219Justice Riley on the issue in these cases regarding settlement setoff computations. There is no requirement that a jury determine a plaintiffs negligence by comparing the plaintiffs actions to all possible tortfeasors. A jury is not and should not be permitted to adjust a plaintiffs fault upward or downward on the basis of the fault of an absent defendant. The jury is to determine the plaintiffs fault in bringing about the injuries, expressed as a percentage of damages. The remainder is attributed to the universe of factors that caused damages, as to which the defendant at trial is responsible if the defendant’s action was "a” proximate cause of the injury. Moreover, in these cases, the plaintiffs’ conduct which contributed to the damages is exactly the same irrespective of the presence or absence of any defendants. Stated otherwise, if the settling defendants had been present at trial in these cases, and if our system permitted determination of relative fault among the defendants, the factfinder could not permissibly conclude that the plaintiffs’ conduct was comparatively less or greater vis-á-vis one defendant or another. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs conduct is a constant, is relevant to the injuries, and is not based on the relative fault of all the potential tortfeasors. The majority has thus created a rule of compensation on the basis of an assumption which, on these facts, is not legally permissible. The result of today’s decision may do harm to the societal objective of full compensation for tort victims. Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). Therefore, I dissent.
*220I concur with Justice Riley’s opinion on the prejudgment interest issue in Rittenhouse v Erhart.