Court Opinion

ID: 9951756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 21:17:06.10583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:20.319115
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                  No. 84809-7-I
                      Respondent,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
      v.
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 CARL ALEXANDER HARRIS,

                      Appellant.

       COBURN, J. — Carl Harris appeals several legal financial obligations (LFOs),

including a restitution order, imposed following his assault in the fourth degree domestic

violence conviction. The State agrees that it failed to meet its burden of proof at the

restitution hearing for medical expenses incurred after the offense date, but maintains

that it should be allowed to submit new evidence supporting restitution on remand. We

disagree. Harris specifically objected to certain expenses at the restitution hearing and

the State is not permitted to introduce new evidence on remand. State v. Dennis, 101

Wn. App. 223, 229, 6 P.3d 1173 (2000). We accept the State’s concession as to the

other challenged LFOs.

       We remand for the trial court to reduce the restitution amount to reflect only

expenses up through December 29, 2018, to strike the Victim Penalty Assessment

(VPA), the non-restitution LFO interest, and the costs of collecting LFOs. Because the

record suggests that the trial court imposed the Domestic Violence Penalty (DVP) after
No. 84809-7-I/2

the prosecutor inaccurately stated the penalty was mandatory, the court may reconsider

the DVP consistent with RCW 10.99.080. Because amended RCW 10.82.090 took

effect after sentencing, but while this case was on appeal, the court may also reconsider

its imposition of interest on restitution.

                                               FACTS 1

       After a jury convicted Harris of assault in the fourth degree domestic violence, the

trial court imposed various LFOs. At sentencing in October 2022, the court asked “I

don’t think there are any mandatory fines, are there?” The prosecution responded, “I

think there would be the $500 criminal assessment fee, along with the $100 domestic

violence fee.” The court then stated it “will impose those fees.” The judgment and

sentence reflect a $500 VPA and a $100 DVP. The pre-printed form included

boilerplate language that required Harris to pay the costs of services to collect unpaid

LFOs and interest on the imposed LFOs.

       Without objection, the court reserved restitution for 180 days. The court held a

restitution hearing on December 6, 2022. The State presented a lone ledger from the

Crime Victims Compensation Program (CVCP) which listed $3,163.94 for the funds paid

to the victim by the CVCP. The report, dated September 1, 2020, 2 identified at the top

of the report the victim’s name, the offender’s name, the date of incident, and a cause

number. The ledger was a list of procedures by shortened name only, dates, billed

amounts, and paid amounts. The State did not submit any additional evidence. Harris’s

counsel observed that items in the CVCP ledger included events beyond December

29th that were not related to or flowed from the assault four conviction. Harris objected

       1
           The facts underlying Harris’s conviction are not relevant to this opinion.
       2
           Harris was convicted on September 16, 2022.
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No. 84809-7-I/3

to restitution “for any of the visits occurring after the initial exam on December 29th.”

The State disagreed and argued that “all of these expenses are causally related to the

assault that Mr. Harris committed.”

         The trial court entered a restitution order for the full amount requested by State,

$3,163.94, which matched the total sum from the CVCP ledger. The restitution order

states that the defendant’s obligation “shall bear interest from the date of this order until

payment in full . . . . Only if the principal of the restitution is paid in full may the court

consider reducing or waiving the interest.”

         Harris appeals.

                                         DISCUSSION

                                              Restitution

         As to restitution, Harris appeals only those medical expenses for care after the

victim’s initial December 29 hospital visit. 3 Harris maintains that the State failed to meet

its burden of proof at the restitution hearing and that portion of the restitution should be

vacated.

         The trial court’s authority to order restitution is derived solely from statute. State

v. Hahn, 100 Wn. App. 391, 397-98, 996 P.2d 1125 (2000). The statutes authorizing

restitution for misdemeanors are RCW 9.95.210(2)(b) and RCW 9.92.060(2). State v.

Marks, 95 Wn. App. 537, 539-40, 977 P.2d 606 (1999). The imposition of restitution “is

generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Davison, 116 Wn.2d 917, 919, 809 P.2d 1374

(1991). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or

3
    The total amount challenged is $933.03.
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No. 84809-7-I/4

based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133

Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

       Only losses which have a causal connection to the crime may be awarded

restitution. State v. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P.3d 506 (2008). A summary of

medical treatment alone that “does not indicate why medical services were provided,

fails to establish the required causal connection between the victim’s medical expenses

and the crime committed.” State v. Bunner, 86 Wn. App. 158, 160, 936 P.2d 419

(1997). “Where a defendant disputes material facts for purposes of restitution, the

sentencing court must either not consider those facts or grant an evidentiary hearing

where the State must prove the restitution amount by a preponderance of the evidence.”

State v. Dedonado, 99 Wn. App. 251, 256, 991 P.2d 1216 (2000). When the State fails

to meet its burden of proof following a specific objection, this court must vacate the

restitution order. Dennis, 101 Wn. App. at 229.

       The State concedes “that no testimony discussed follow-up care, nor was

additional documentation submitted in support of the restitution sought for subsequent

care.” But the parties disagree as to the proper remedy. Harris asks that the portion of

the restitution order listing post-December 29 medical expenses be vacated. The State

asks us to permit the submission of additional evidence on remand.

       The State’s entire argument rests on the fact that the statutes governing

misdemeanor restitution do not impose any express time limit on when the restitution

hearing must be held. 4 See RCW 9.95.210(2) and RCW 9.92.060(2). This difference

from the felony restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753, the State argues, distinguishes the

       See Marks, 95 Wn. App. at 538-40 (holding that a trial court did not err in setting
       4

misdemeanor restitution hearing more than 180 days after sentencing).
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holding from Griffith where the Supreme Court held in a felony case that “[i]ntroducing

new evidence on remand would conflict with the statutory requirement that restitution be

set within 180 days after sentencing.” 164 Wn.2d at 968 fn. 6. But the issue in the

instant case is not whether the trial court is required to set a restitution hearing within

180 days for a non-felony conviction. The trial court, in fact, elected to reserve

restitution for 180 days and the hearing was set well within that timeframe. The issue is

whether the State is allowed a second bite at the apple.

       While it is true that restitution for felonies must be determined within 180 days of

sentencing unless the court extends this period for good cause, that is not the only

limitation on remanding for another restitution hearing. In Dennis, the trial court held the

restitution hearing and entered the restitution order within the 180-day limit as required

by RCW 9.94A.142, 5 but the State failed to establish the required causal connection

between the injuries and the assault after defendant objected at the restitution hearing.

101 Wn. App. at 229-30. This court vacated the restitution order because the State

failed to establish a causal connection between defendant’s actions and the damages

and “the State must not be given a further opportunity to carry its burden of proof after it

fails to do so following a specific objection.” Id. at 229. As an example, in Dennis we

cited State v. McCorkle, 137 Wn.2d 490, 496, 973 P.2d 461 (1999) (refusing to allow

the State to introduce new evidence on remand to prove defendant's prior out-of-state

convictions after the State failed to carry its burden of proof at sentencing). The State

cites to no authority supporting its assertion that it may be permitted to introduce new

evidence on remand at a restitution hearing after it failed to carry its burden at a hearing

       5
           Recodified as RCW 9.94A.753 effective July 1, 2001.
                                                5
No. 84809-7-I/6

that was properly set where the defendant specifically objected. “‘Where no authorities

are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities,

but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.’” State v. Logan,

102 Wn. App. 907, 911 fn. 1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000) (quoting DeHeer v. Seattle Post-

Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962)).

       Because Harris does not challenge the entire restitution order, instead of

vacating the order, the proper remedy is to remand and order that the trial court reduce

the amount of restitution to exclude the amount requested for services after December

29, 2018.

       Harris also asks us to direct the trial court to reconsider its order of interest on

restitution in light of recent legislative amendments. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 12. As

amended, RCW 10.82.090 permits the trial court to waive interest on restitution where

the defendant is indigent and the “victim’s input, if any” is considered by the trial court

“as it relates to any financial hardship caused to the victim if interest is not imposed.”

The parties agree that Harris is indigent.

       Though the amended statute went into effect after Harris’s sentencing, it still

applies to Harris because his matter is on direct appeal. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d

1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023) (citing State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d

714 (2018)). The State agrees that on remand, the trial court could consider Harris’

motion to waive interest on restitution consistent with the amended statute.

                                        Other LFOs

       As with other discretionary decisions, a trial court’s decision of whether to impose

LFOs is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Moreno, 14 Wn. App. 2d 143, 166,

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No. 84809-7-I/7

470 P.3d 507 (2020). “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Marriage of

Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at 46-47. Failure to exercise discretion is an abuse of discretion.

Kucera v. Dep’t of Transp., 140 Wn.2d 200, 224, 995 P.2d 63 (2000).

A. Victim Penalty Assessment

       The court imposed the $500 VPA under RCW 7.68.035, which was amended

during the pendency of this appeal. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 27. The amended statute

prohibits courts from imposing a penalty assessment “if the court finds that the

defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).”

RCW 7.68.035(4). The parties agree that the VPA should be stricken on remand. Ellis,

27 Wn. App. 2d at 16.

B. Domestic Violence Penalty

       Harris argues that the court mistakenly imposed the $100 discretionary domestic

violence penalty (DVP) fee after it had expressed an intent to waive any non-mandatory

fees. The State concedes that the prosecutor had erroneously advised the trial court

that the DVP, under RCW 10.99.080, was mandatory. But because the imposition of the

DVP does not rest on the defendant’s indigency, the State maintains, the matter should

be remanded for the trial court’s consideration. The DVP’s

       focus on hardship to the victim indicates that courts may decline to impose
       the assessment if doing so would hinder the defendant’s ability to meet
       financial obligations to the victim, such as restitution or child support. But
       if the assessment does not negatively impact the victim, then the penalty
       may be ordered without further concern for the defendant’s financial
       circumstances or ability to pay.

State v. Smith, 9 Wn. App. 2d 122, 128, 442 P.3d 265 (2019). To the extent that the

record suggests the court did not understand it had discretion to impose the DVP, we

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No. 84809-7-I/8

agree that remand for the court to exercise its discretion, consistent with RCW

10.99.080, is appropriate.

C. Discretionary costs

       We agree with the parties that it appears the trial court inadvertently imposed the

costs of collecting LFOs because of boilerplate language on the judgment and sentence

form. The trial court is not to order a defendant to pay discretionary costs when he is

indigent at the time of sentencing. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d at 738-39 (citing former RCW

10.01.160(3)). A “trial court commit[s] procedural error by imposing a discretionary fee

where it had otherwise agreed to waive such fees.” State v. Bowman, 198 Wn.2d 609,

629, 498 P.3d 478 (2021). A “scrivener's error” is a clerical mistake that, when

amended, would correctly convey the trial court's intention based on other evidence.

State v. Davis, 160 Wn. App. 471, 478, 248 P.3d 121 (2011). We remand for the trial

court to strike the discretionary LFO collection fees. State v. Ortega, 21 Wn. App. 2d

488, 499-500, 506 P.3d 1287 (2022).

D. Interest on non-restitution LFOs

       The judgment and sentence included the following preprinted language: “[t]he

financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the

judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to civil judgments.” However, RCW

10.82.090(1) provides: “As of June 7, 2018, no interest shall accrue on nonrestitution

legal financial obligations.” The trial court shall strike this provision from the judgment

and sentence on remand. State v. Spaulding, 15 Wn. App. 2d 526, 537, 476 P.3d 205

(2020).

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No. 84809-7-I/9

                                      CONCLUSION

       We vacate portions of the restitution order that includes payment for services

beyond December 29, 2018 and remand to the sentencing court to correct the amount

of restitution. See State v. Dedonado, 99 Wn. App. 251, 257-58, 991 P.2d 1216 (2016).

The trial court also shall strike the $500 VPA, the imposition of costs for collecting

LFOs, and non-restitution interest. On remand, the trial court may exercise its

discretion in reconsidering the $100 DVP consistent with RCW 10.99.080, as well as

imposition of interest on restitution consistent with RCW 10.82.090.

WE CONCUR:

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