Court Opinion

ID: 9947500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:18:25.540399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.885160
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
 of:                                                No. 85914-5-I

                                                    DIVISION ONE
 KEVIN LEE FORLER,
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                       Petitioner.

      MANN, J. — In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Kevin Forler challenges his

2017 convictions for attempted first degree rape of a child and attempted commercial

sexual abuse of a minor. Less than a year after his direct appeal mandated, Forler filed

this PRP. Forler asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

defense counsel did not raise an entrapment defense. Forler made the same assertion

in his direct appeal. Forler also challenges a community custody condition.

      We remand for the trial court to remove the community custody condition but

otherwise deny Forler’s PRP.

                                              I

      The facts of this case are fully set forth in this court’s decision in Forler’s direct

appeal, State v. Forler, No. 79079-0-I, slip op. at 2-7 (Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2019)
No. 85914-5-I/2

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/790790.pdf. We repeat only

those facts necessary to Forler’s petition here.

       As part of a sting operation by the Kitsap Missing and Exploited Children’s Task

Force, Washington State Patrol Detective Carlos Rodriguez posted an ad on a

Craigslist Casual Encounters forum posing as “Shannon Pearsen,” a mother of two

young daughters. Forler, slip op. at 2. Forler responded by e-mail and began

communicating with Detective Rodriguez, first via e-mail and then via text. Forler, slip

op. at 2-3. Forler then spoke by telephone with an undercover detective who went over

the rules of the encounter with “Shannon’s” children. Forler, slip op. at 5. Forler texted

that he could be at “Shannon’s” apartment in about an hour and Detective Rodriguez

gave Forler the address to a Burger King in Bremerton to stop at before receiving the

address of “Shannon’s” apartment. Forler, slip op. at 5. After receiving the address,

Forler proceeded to the apartment and was arrested upon arrival. Forler, slip op. at 6.

       Forler was charged with attempted rape of a child and attempted commercial

abuse of a child. Forler, slip op. at 6.

       At trial, Forler testified that he only continued conversations with
       “Shannon” and went to the apartment complex to find out if “real children”
       were involved. Forler testified that he did not intend to commit rape of a
       child, or commercial abuse of a child. Forler explained that he continued
       engaging “Shannon” by saying he was “excited at the possibilities”
       because if he did not use the “right words” when talking about the
       Craigslist ad, “[m]ost of the time—boom—you never hear from [the
       Craigslist poster] again” and he was trying to “make it sound like [he] was
       interested” so he could determine if children were at risk.

       Forler also indicated that he always had condoms in his car, but that he
       left them in the car when he arrived at the apartment complex because he
       had no intention of using them. When asked why Forler did not call law
       enforcement if he was worried children were at risk, he stated, “[l]ike with
       so many things, it would just fall in between the cracks and nobody would

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No. 85914-5-I/3

       ever investigate it.” Forler also testified to his belief that he was as well
       suited as law enforcement to investigate whether children were at risk.

Forler, slip op. at 6-7.

       After a jury trial, Forler was convicted of attempted rape of a child and attempted

commercial abuse of a child. Forler, slip op. at 7. In his direct appeal to this court,

Forler raised several challenges including that his defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to request a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. Forler, slip op. at 1.

In that unpublished opinion, we affirmed Forler’s conviction but reversed and remanded

to modify the community custody conditions. Forler, slip op. at 1.

       The mandate was issued on January 13, 2020. Forler timely filed this PRP.

                                              II

                                              A

       Relief by way of a collateral challenge through a PRP is extraordinary; the

petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an otherwise settled

judgment. In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011).

To obtain relief in a PRP, a petitioner must demonstrate either a constitutional error

resulting in actual and substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that is a

fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint

of Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d 801, 807, 383 P.3d 454 (2016). If the petitioner fails to

demonstrate actual and substantial prejudice or a fundamental defect, we deny the

PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of Schreiber, 189 Wn. App. 110, 113, 357 P.3d 668 (2015).

       A petitioner may not renew a ground for relief that was raised and rejected on

direct appeal unless the interests of justice require reconsideration of that ground. In re

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No. 85914-5-I/4

Pers. Restraint of Knight, 196 Wn.2d 330, 341, 473 P.3d 663 (2020); In re Pers.

Restraint of Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872 (2013). A ground for relief was

“raised and rejected on direct appeal” if the same ground presented in the petition was

determined adversely to the petitioner on appeal and the prior determination was on the

merits. In re Pers. Restraint of Taylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, 687, 717 P.2d 755 (1986). A

“ground” is a distinct legal basis for granting relief. Taylor, 105 Wn. 2d at 688. If there

is doubt about whether two grounds are different or the same, the doubt should be

resolved in the petitioner’s favor. Taylor, 105 Wn. 2d at 688.

       The interests of justice are served by reconsidering a ground for relief if there has

been an intervening material change in the law or some other justification for having

failed to raise a crucial point or argument on appeal. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 17; In re

Pers. Restraint of Gentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 388, 972 P.2d 1250 (1999). This is a narrow

exception to the general rule against relitigation, and any change in the law must be

clearly established. See Knight, 196 Wn.2d at 342 (Court of Appeals decision on

double jeopardy claims was not an intervening change of law).

       A “new” ground for relief is not created merely by supporting a previous ground

with different factual allegations or different legal arguments, or by couching the claim in

different language. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 17; In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d

296, 329, 868 P.2d 835 (1994). For example, a petitioner generally may not renew a

previously determined issue simply by recasting it as a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 906, 952 P.2d 116 (1998). But

if a petitioner made a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the

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No. 85914-5-I/5

petitioner may assert ineffective assistance on a different basis on collateral review. In

re Pers. Restraint of Khan, 184 Wn.2d 679, 688-89, 363 P.3d 577 (2015).

                                                   B

       Forler argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because the

State argued the incorrect standard for entrapment, defense counsel did not object and

did not otherwise propose an entrapment defense. 1 We disagree.

       To be entitled to collateral relief in a PRP raising an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the petitioner must show both that (1) defense counsel’s representation

was deficient and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial. In re Pers. Restraint

of Crace, 174 Wn.2d 835, 840, 846-47, 280 P.3d 1102 (2012) (citing Strickland v.

Wash., 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). Representation is

deficient if, after considering all the circumstances, it falls below an objective standard of

reasonableness. State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). A petitioner

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome a strong presumption that

counsel’s performance was reasonable. Grier, 171 Wn.2d at 33. “When counsel’s

conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not

deficient.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 863, 215 P.3d 177 (2009). A petitioner

establishes actual and substantial prejudice if the petitioner meets the standard of

       1 RCW 9A.16.070, Washington’s entrapment statute provides that:

       (1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:
       (a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any person
       acting under their direction, and
       (b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise
       intended to commit.
       (2) The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing only that law enforcement
       officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime.

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No. 85914-5-I/6

prejudice applicable on direct appeal: that but for counsel’s deficient performance there

is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different. In re Pers. Restraint

of Lui, 188 Wn.2d 525, 538, 397 P.3d 90 (2017). If one prong of the test fails, this court

need not address the remaining prong. State v. Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 507, 438

P.3d 541 (2019).

       Forler impermissibly revives the very argument that was “raised and rejected” on

direct appeal. Taylor, 105 Wn.2d at 687. Forler specifically argued that defense

counsel was ineffective for failing to request an instruction on the defense of

entrapment. Forler, slip op. at 12. This court held, “[e]ven if Forler can show that he

was entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment, Forler cannot show that

his defense counsel lacked a legitimate trial strategy for not requesting the instruction.”

Forler, slip op. at 12.

       The court explained:

       Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction
       on the defense of entrapment because Forler cannot show the absence of
       a legitimate trial strategy for not requesting the instruction. Forler’s theory
       at trial was to challenge the mens rea element of attempted rape of a child
       and attempted commercial abuse of a child. He testified that he did not go
       to the apartment with the specific intent to commit those crimes, rather he
       was trying to discern whether children were at risk. If, at the same time,
       Forler argued that he was entrapped by law enforcement, he would have
       to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that law enforcement induced
       him to commit a crime he was not predisposed to commit.

Forler, slip op. at 13.

       “Forler’s actions, and subsequently, the defense’s legal theory, were inconsistent

with showing the required elements of entrapment—inducement and lack of

predisposition.” Forler, slip op. at 14.

                                           -6-
No. 85914-5-I/7

       Forler attempts to reframe his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in terms of

the State’s pretrial motion to prohibit Forler from arguing entrapment. In support, Forler

cites State v. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356, 506 P.3d 1238 (2022). Such a reframing is

only permissible if Arbogast announced an intervening change in the law that Forler

could not have raised previously. In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 750,

101 P.3d 1 (2004).

       In Arbogast, our Supreme Court held, “generally, affirmative defense instructions

are permitted upon a prima facie showing of some evidence in support of the defense.”

199 Wn.2d at 368. The Arbogast court acknowledged that “[a] handful of cases

describe the burden differently” for instance, by stating “that defendants are entitled to

an instruction if it is supported by substantial evidence.” 199 Wn.2d at 369. In light of

these differences, the court was taking “the opportunity to clarify that regardless of the

terms used, the quantum of proof justifying an instruction on a party’s theory of the case

is some evidence supporting the proposition.” Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d at 370. However,

the Arbogast court was careful to articulate that this was a clarification of a point of

confusion in the law, not a change in the law overturning existing precedent. 199 Wn.2d

at 370.

       Tellingly, Forler does not attempt to argue that Arbogast was a material change

in law. As a matter of law, Arbogast did not announce a new rule. See 199 Wn.2d at

370; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Racus, 26 Wn. App. 2d 447, 455, 527 P.3d 833

(2023) (holding Arbogast did not change the law, it merely clarified the existing law).

       Forler seeks retroactive application of our Supreme Court’s clarification of

existing law, which is not grounds for collateral review. Rather, new points of fact and

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No. 85914-5-I/8

law should be raised that were not or could not have been raised in the principal action.

We again note that Forler unsuccessfully argued ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to raise an entrapment defense in his direct appeal. See Forler, slip op. at 13. 2

Simply revising a previously rejected legal argument neither creates a new claim nor

constitutes good cause to reconsider the original claim. Yates, 177 Wn.2d at 17.

                                                   III

       Finally, Forler challenges a community custody condition that he obtain a

substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any and all recommended

treatment.

       A person subject to community custody conditions may raise a challenge to the

conditions through a PRP, where they must show they are restrained and that the

restraint is unlawful. RAP 16.4(a)-(c); In re Pers. Restraint of Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d

881, 883-84, 232 P.3d 1091 (2010). A court may, in its discretion impose “any crime-

related prohibitions” that “directly relates to the circumstances of the crime for which the

offender has been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f); RCW 9.94A.030(10). There must

be a sufficient connection between the prohibition and the crime. State v. Nguyen, 191

Wn.2d 671, 685, 425 P.3d 847 (2018).

       Forler argues that this condition was improper as his crime did not involve drugs

or alcohol. The State concedes that the condition should be stricken. We accept the

State’s concession.

       2 Further, this court correctly explained the burden of proof required for an entrapment defense.

Forler, slip op. at 13; Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d at 366 (“Defendants must prove entrapment by a
preponderance of the evidence.”).

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No. 85914-5-I/9

      We remand for the trial court to remove the community custody condition but

otherwise deny Forler’s PRP.

WE CONCUR:

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