Court Opinion

ID: 2964453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:50.483421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:58.930032
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1073

                         CURTIS CLEVELAND and JUDY CLEVELAND,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                    HASBRO, INC.,
                          d/b/a MILTON BRADLEY TOY COMPANY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Morris E. Lasker, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                           Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
                                             ______________

                           and McAuliffe,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Bruce  A.  Bierhans with  whom  Andrew  D.  Nebenzahl, Kenneth  B.
            ___________________             _____________________  ___________
        Walton and Bierhans & Nebenzahl were on briefs for appellants.
        ______     ____________________
            John  P.  Graceffa with  whom Kathryn  M.  Anbinder and  Morrison,
            __________________            _____________________      _________
        Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellee.
        ________________

                                 ____________________

                                   November 6, 1996
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

        *Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.  In this  diversity case, Curtis
                         ______________

            and  Judy Cleveland appeal from the district court's grant of

            summary judgment  in favor  of Hasbro,  Inc.   The Clevelands

            sued Hasbro for negligence and loss of consortium based  upon

            an injury  that Curtis Cleveland suffered  while loading toys

            onto  his  truck  at   Hasbro's  plant  in  East  Longmeadow,

            Massachusetts.  The district court ruled, as a matter of law,

            that Hasbro had  never assumed  a duty of  care owing to  the

            Clevelands.     Our  review  is  plenary,  and  we  take  the

            allegations  of  facts in  the  light most  favorable  to the

            Clevelands.  See  Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d  3, 4
                         ___  _____________    ___________

            (1st Cir. 1994).

                 In September 1991, Curtis was a truck driver employed by

            V.K. Putnam  Trucking, Inc. ("Putnam") of  Belgrade, Montana.

            All  of the loads that Putnam contracted to haul were "driver

            assist" loads, meaning  that the truck driver rather than the

            shipper was  responsible for  loading cargo.   Putnam drivers

            were  provided  with  a stipend  for  the  purpose  of hiring

            "lumpers"  to assist  in this  process.   At his  option, the

            driver could load himself and pocket the stipend.

                 In early September, Curtis was offered the Hasbro job by

            the  Putnam dispatcher  and  told  that  it would  be  driver

            assist.   On September 6, Curtis and Judy arrived at Hasbro's

            East  Longmeadow  plant to  pick up  a  shipment of  toys for

            delivery  to a purchaser in Oregon.  Curtis claims that prior

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            to  arriving at Hasbro, he  spoke by telephone  with a Hasbro

            employee  who  assured him  that  the  company would  provide

            "lumpers"  or other  personnel  to load  the  cargo into  his

            truck.   Curtis says that without this assurance he would not

            have accepted the job.

                 When the  Clevelands arrived at  Hasbro to  pick up  the

            load, they were  told that no Hasbro employees were available

            to assist in loading  the truck.  Curtis then decided to load

            the truck himself with help from his wife.  Hasbro provided a

            manual pallet jack to  the Clevelands for use in  loading the

            cargo  pallets onto the truck, but declined to make available

            a more expensive electric jack that was also on the premises.

                 After several  hours of  loading, Curtis  had difficulty

            moving an  especially heavy pallet  up an inclined  ramp into

            his truck.  Starting with the pallet-laden jack at a distance

            from the truck, Curtis gave the jack a long running push from

            inside  the warehouse toward the  interior of his  truck.  He

            got the load into the truck;  but he then lost control of the

            jack, and  as it slid back  out, he jumped aboard  it and was

            ultimately  thrown  between  two  other  pallets,  sustaining

            injuries.   The Clevelands  then completed loading  the truck

            and drove the truck back to Oregon.

                 The  Clevelands brought  suit in  the district  court in

            August  1994,  alleging that  Hasbro  had  been negligent  in

            failing  to provide personnel to  load the truck  and that it

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            was  also  negligent in  other respects,  such as  failing to

            permit the Clevelands to use the electric jack and failing to

            provide medical assistance to Cleveland following his injury.

            After  discovery,  in  June  1995 Hasbro  moved  for  summary

            judgment.   The district  court granted Hasbro's  motion (and

            denied the  Clevelands' cross-motion)  on November  29, 1995.

            The Clevelands now appeal.

                 On  appeal,  the Clevelands  advance  three  theories of

            liability: first,  that  Hasbro, by  its  employee's  alleged

            statement, assumed  a duty to provide  assistance in loading;

            second,  that Hasbro had breached its general duty of care as

            a landowner; and third, that the employee's alleged statement

            constituted  negligent misrepresentation  under Massachusetts

            law.   Hasbro  says that  this third  theory has  been waived

            because not pressed in  the district court, but it  turns out

            to make no difference.

                 The Clevelands'  first negligence claim  rests upon  the

            premise   that  the  statement  allegedly  made  by  Hasbro's

            employee  gave rise to a duty of  care on Hasbro's part; they

            then  argue  that  the  failure  of  Hasbro  to  provide  the

            assistance was a breach of this duty and a proximate cause of

            Curtis'  injuries.    The   district  court  found  that  the

            statement  by  Hasbro's  agent,  assuming it  was  made,  was

            insufficient  to   give  rise  to   a  duty  of   care  under

            Massachusetts law.

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                 It is by  no means  clear that  Massachusetts law  would

            impose on Hasbro a general duty of care based on the isolated

            statement of the Hasbro employee.   Most of the Massachusetts

            cases,  some recognizing  and others rejecting  a voluntarily

            assumed duty of care, concern activities that the "volunteer"

            undertook  and  then  performed  in  an  allegedly  negligent

            manner.1 Here, when  Curtis arrived at the plant, Hasbro made

            quite  clear that it was  not going to  provide assistance at

            all,  although it did  allow Curtis  to make  use of  an idle

            jack.

                 Nor  are  the  Clevelands'  other   theories  especially

            promising.    A landowner  does have  a  duty of  care toward

            invitees  (e.g.,  to  furnish  a safe  premise),  Mounsey  v.
                       ____                                   _______

            Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707  (1973), but the Clevelands' claim
            ______

            to  assistance in loading a truck,  customarily loaded by the

            driver,  probably stretches this  duty beyond  its accustomed

            bounds.  As for negligent misrepresentation, see, e.g., Danca
                                                         ___  ____  _____

            v.  Taunton Savings  Bank, 385  Mass. 1,  8 (1982),  there is
                _____________________

            little  proof  that the  employee  was negligent  as  well as

            mistaken.

                 But we  think that the  duty of care  issue need not  be

            resolved in order to  affirm the district court.   Rather, we

                                
            ____________________

                 1See, e.g., Somerset Savings  Bank v. Chicago Title Ins.
                  _________  ______________________    __________________
            Co., 420 Mass. 422 (1995) (alleged failure of title insurance
            ___
            company to exercise due care in search of plaintiff's title);
            Mullins v. Pine  Manor College, 389 Mass. 47  (1983) (failure
            _______    ___________________
            of college to provide adequate campus security).

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            will assume that on occasion a mere representation of intent-

            -although  neither negligent nor  couched as a promise--might

            lead  a victim to alter his position in reliance or otherwise

            give  rise to duties that  would not otherwise  exist.  There

            exist  a brace  of  theories that  respond  to such  problems

            including,  in  addition   to  negligent   misrepresentation,

            invoked by Cleveland, various forms of estoppel.  

                 Nevertheless, we think that  this case must be affirmed,

            because, in  light of Curtis' own  carelessness, a reasonable

            jury  could not  under  Massachusetts law  properly return  a

            verdict for the Clevelands in this  case.  We are entitled to

            affirm  on any  dispositive ground,  Levy v.  Federal Deposit
                                                 ____     _______________

            Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 1054,  1056 (1st Cir. 1993), since  it makes
            ________

            no  sense to  send a  case back  to district  court when  the

            result is foreordained.   Two different doctrines converge on

            our result.

                 Under Massachusetts  law, as elsewhere,  a defendant  is

            liable only if the wrongdoing was the "proximate"--as well as

            the "but  for" cause  of the  harm in  question.  Peckham  v.
                                                              _______

            Continental  Casualty Ins. Co.,  895 F.2d 830,  836 (1st Cir.
            ______________________________

            1990) (applying  Massachusetts law).   The rubric is  used to

            draw a legal  line somewhere, along  the chain of  causation,

            between the more immediate  and foreseeable consequences of a

            wrong  and those that are more remote, unlikely or partly the

            product of  intervening forces.  Young  v. Atlantic Richfield
                                             _____     __________________

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            Co.,  400  Mass. 837,  842  (1987);  Restatement (Second)  of
            ___                                  ________________________

            Torts,    440, 442 (1965).
            _____

                 Assuming that  a Hasbro  employee made the  statement to

            Curtis,  it might  be  reasonable to  anticipate that  Curtis

            could find himself  at the  plant unable to  load the  truck,

            resulting in delay and  additional expense (e.g., charges for
                                                        ____

            delayed  delivery,  inability  to   carry  out  other  jobs).

            Perhaps it might be reasonable to assume that, in the absence

            of  expected help,  Curtis would  incur added expense  to get

            labor or would even attempt to load the truck himself.

                 But to describe the  injury itself as proximately caused

            by the  Hasbro statement or  resulting lack of  help requires

            more.   It  requires that it  be reasonably  foreseeable that

            Curtis  would  then attempt  to load  the  truck in  a highly

            negligent  manner.     By his  own  admission, Curtis  ran an
                                                                   ___

            extremely  heavy load  resting on  a jacked-up  pallet  up an

            inclined ramp into  his truck.   He  knew that  the load  was

            unusually heavy and difficult to maneuver slowly; that is why

            he attempted the  running start.   It is  hard to explain  so

            risky a course in the face of a known hazard.

                 But even if we  assume dubitante that Curtis' negligence
                                        _________

            was  foreseeable  enough  to  satisfy   the  requirements  of

            proximate cause,  compare Restatement, supra,    443, cmt. c,
                              _______ ___________  _____

            the Clevelands are still barred from recovery.  Massachusetts

            has  eliminated  contributory negligence  as  a defense  but,

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            under  its  comparative  negligence  doctrine,  it  does  bar

            recovery where  the victim's  negligence exceeds that  of the

            wrongdoer.  Mass. Gen.  L. ch. 231,   85.  That is plainly so

            in this case.

                 It is  doubtful that  the Clevelands have  proffered any

            substantial proof of negligence by Hasbro.  The  statement of

            its employee, if made  at all, was  mistaken but there is  no

            indication of fault.  For all we know, Hasbro does often have

            lumpers available and the employee's prediction may have been

            perfectly  reasonable.   Plaintiffs,  although they  claim to

            have  charged "negligent misrepresentation,"  have pointed to

            no evidence at all of negligence on the part of the employee.

                 But assuming  arguendo that a rational  jury might still
                               ________

            be  entitled to infer some measure of fault, there is nothing

            whatever  to suggest that Hasbro's fault  comes even close to

            that of Curtis.   Curtis' negligence  is patent, serious  and

            beyond reasonable dispute; Hasbro has  at most made a  garden

            variety  administrative error,  weakly inferable at  best and

            (by any  test of  foreseeability) only remotely  connected to

            Curtis' own injury.  Bluntly put, Curtis injured himself.

                 Matters of proximate cause and comparative fault are, as

            a  general rule, for the  jury; but the  settled exception to

            the general rule  applies when a reasonable  jury could reach

            only one result.  This is such a case and, without suggesting

            that the  district  court  was wrong  in  its  broader  legal

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            holding,  we  think  that   our  own  ruling  on  comparative

            negligence offers a firm and narrow basis for the result.

                 Affirmed.
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