Court Opinion

ID: 9965097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:09:57.65242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.022151
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40743

PHILLIP TRUJILLO and SALVADOR
GONZALEZ,

      Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROGER FOSTER; PATRICK SEGURA;
TIMOTHY MENCHEGO; GREG AGUINO;
BONADELLE CANDELARIA, in their
individual capacities,

      Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY
James A. Noel, District Court Judge

Law Office of George Geran
George T. Geran
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellants

Rothstein Donatelli LLP
Richard W. Hughes
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellees

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

WRAY, Judge.

{1}    Plaintiffs Phillip Trujillo and Salvador Gonzalez were terminated from their
positions with the Pueblo of Santa Ana’s (the Pueblo) Police Department (the
Department) and sued Defendants Roger Foster, Patrick Segura, Timothy Menchego,
Greg Aguino, and Bonadelle Candelaria, each in their individual capacity. The district
court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss and (1) declined to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction because to do so “would undermine the authority of tribal courts over Pueblo
affairs, and thus would infringe on the right of the Pueblo’s sovereign authority to govern
itself”; and (2) determined that Defendants would be entitled to sovereign immunity if the
state court had jurisdiction. Plaintiffs appeal, and we affirm.

DISCUSSION

{2}     Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the district court’s order granting
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.1 In its order, the district court determined that (1)
“application of New Mexico law . . . would infringe on the right of the Pueblo’s sovereign
authority to govern itself”; and (2) the Pueblo was the real party in interest and
“Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are barred by sovereign immunity.” This Court reviews “an
appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction” de
novo. Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe, 2017-NMSC-007, ¶ 17, 388 P.3d 977. In
motion to dismiss briefing, the parties provided additional “facts upon which subject
matter jurisdiction depend[ed],” and the district court could therefore consider evidence
beyond the allegations in the complaint to make factual determinations to resolve the
jurisdictional dispute. See South v. Lujan, 2014-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 8-9, 336 P.3d 1000
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Normally, we would review the district
court’s factual determinations under a substantial evidence standard. See Ponder v.
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2000-NMSC-033, ¶ 7, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960. But
because on appeal, Plaintiffs concede the district court’s factual determinations, we only
review the application of law to those facts. See id.

{3}    Plaintiffs primarily challenge the dismissal by arguing that Lewis v. Clarke, 581
U.S. 155 (2017), created a new test for tribal sovereign immunity and implicitly
overruled Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), as well as the application of what New
Mexico courts have referred to as “tribal sovereign authority.” See Haamatsa, Inc.,
2017-NMSC-007, ¶ 26 (distinguishing tribal sovereign immunity and “tribal sovereign
authority”). Plaintiffs contend that under this new test “actions against tribal individuals
do not implicate sovereign immunity, or involve the relevant tribe directly enough to
make the tribe a real party in interest,” and because in this case, Defendants were
named in their individual capacities in the complaint, tribal sovereign immunity does not
apply. We first address Plaintiffs’ overarching argument that Lewis overruled Williams
and the concept of improper infringement on tribal sovereign authority adopted by
Williams to limit state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over matters occurring on Indian
lands. Then, we review the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss based on
(1) improper infringement, and (2) tribal sovereign immunity.

1Plaintiffs additionally request that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying their motion to
reconsider but fail to make any arguments on appeal related to this order. We therefore only consider
Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding the motion to dismiss. See Battishill v. Ingram, 2024-NMCA-001, ¶ 2 n.1,
539 P.3d 1203.
I.      The Lewis Court Did Not Overrule the Williams Infringement Test

{4}     Plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal rely on their contention that Lewis implicitly
overruled Williams and therefore, the jurisdictional analysis that arose from Williams has
been “subsumed” into a simplified version of tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs assert
that the new test for whether tribal sovereign immunity applies under Lewis only
requires courts to examine the caption of a complaint, and if the defendants are listed in
their individual capacities, the suit can go forward without further inquiry. As we explain,
we reject Plaintiffs’ view of tribal sovereign immunity and conclude that while Lewis has
amended the tribal sovereign immunity analysis with respect to individual-capacity
defendants, Williams still applies to determine whether a state court may exercise
subject matter jurisdiction in certain circumstances based on concerns about
infringement of tribal sovereign authority—a concept that is distinguishable from
sovereign immunity. See Hamaatsa, Inc., 2017-NMSC-007, ¶ 26.

{5}     In Lewis, a tribal employee who acted within the scope of employment with a
tribal gaming authority was involved in a car accident on a state highway. 581 U.S. at
159-60. The petitioners in that case filed suit in state court against the respondent, who
was a tribal employee. Id. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of tribal
sovereign immunity. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted that the “identity of the
real party in interest dictates what immunities may be available,” and that “[the
d]efendants in an official-capacity action may assert sovereign immunity.” Id. at 163. In
making a determination between official and individual capacity suits, “courts may not
simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the complaint, but rather must
determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly against the
sovereign.” Id. at 162. The Lewis Court ultimately held that the suit was not against the
respondent in his official capacity, but was “simply a suit against [the respondent] to
recover for [their] personal actions, which will not require action by the sovereign or
disturb the sovereign’s property.” Id. at 163 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

{6}    In Williams, a non-Indian2 business owner that operated a general store on a
reservation sued two Indian patrons in state court “to collect for goods sold them there
on credit.” Williams, 358 U.S. at 217-18. The question in Williams was not whether tribal
sovereign immunity applied, but whether the state or tribal court had jurisdiction over the
action. Id. at 218. In deciding whether the state court had jurisdiction, the United States
Supreme Court explained that “the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.” Id. at 220. The Williams Court held that the

        exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the
        tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right
        of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not

2We use the term “Indian” in this opinion to mirror the language used in Williams and subsequent
controlling authority interpreting that case.
       an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian
       took place there.

Id. at 223. The holding that the state court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over the action did not relate to whether the defendants were immune from suit.
Conversely, Lewis did not address whether the state court could properly exercise
jurisdiction over the tort action arising from a car accident that occurred outside of tribal
lands, only whether the tribal employee was shielded from suit by sovereign immunity.

{7}     In analyzing sovereign immunity for individual-capacity claims the Lewis Court
had no occasion to overrule the analysis implemented by Williams regarding the state
court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over incidents between tribal members and
nonmembers. Our Supreme Court in Hamaatsa, Inc. explained the difference and
described tribal sovereign immunity as “the plenary right to be free from having to
answer a suit,” and “tribal sovereign authority” as “the extent to which a tribe may
exercise jurisdictional authority over lands the tribe owns to the exclusion of state
jurisdiction.” Hamaatsa, Inc., 2017-NMSC-007, ¶ 26. In this way, Lewis coexists with
Williams because each case addresses a different doctrine—Lewis, who can be sued,
and Williams, which court can exercise jurisdiction over the suit. We have neither the
authority nor the inclination to hold differently. See State v. Lea, 2023-NMCA-061, ¶ 15,
535 P.3d 754 (observing that this Court is “governed by the decisions of the New
Mexico Supreme Court” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{8}     Having declined Plaintiffs’ invitation to revisit the limitation of state courts to
exercise jurisdiction that would infringe on tribal sovereign authority or acknowledge any
implicit overruling of Williams by Lewis, we consider (1) whether the district court
properly refused to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims;
and (2) alternatively, whether Plaintiffs’ claims would additionally be barred by tribal
sovereign immunity.

II.    The District Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Suit Would
       Infringe on the Tribal Sovereign Authority of the Tribe

{9}    The district court determined that Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Defendants
“would undermine the authority of tribal courts over Pueblo affairs, and thus would
infringe on the right of the Pueblo’s sovereign authority to govern itself.” As we have
noted, to determine “whether a state court has jurisdiction over causes of action
involving Indian matters,” New Mexico courts adhere to the Williams’ infringement test
and assess whether an action infringes on a tribe’s sovereign authority. Found. Rsrv.
Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 1987-NMSC-024, ¶ 6, 105 N.M. 514, 734 P.2d 754. To apply that
test, we consider the following in turn: “(1) whether the parties are Indians or non-
Indians; (2) whether the cause of action arose within the Indian reservation; and (3) the
nature of the interest to be protected.” South, 2014-NMCA-109, ¶ 15 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
{10} Plaintiffs in this case are not tribal members, but three of the five Defendants in
this case are tribal members. Because not all Defendants are tribal members, this factor
is not determinative and so we continue and evaluate the remaining factors. See State
ex rel. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Jojola, 1983-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 99 N.M. 500, 660 P.2d 590
(noting that the infringement test is particularly important “in situations involving a non-
Indian party,” because the test was “designed to resolve [a jurisdictional] conflict by
providing that a state could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-
government would be affected”).

{11} The cause of action arose on Pueblo lands and the nature of the interest to be
protected implicates Defendants’ and the Pueblo’s rights to be heard in tribal court and
be ruled by tribal law. See Found. Rsrv. Ins. Co, 1987-NMSC-024, ¶ 9. Plaintiffs do not
dispute the district court’s findings that (1) Plaintiffs’ claims arose “from their
employment as . . . Pueblo police officers”; (2) the “Pueblo police department is located
on Pueblo lands”; and (3) Defendants’ actions related to the suit were taken “within the
exterior boundaries of the Pueblo.” As we have already explained, these undisputed
facts further suggest that state court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims would infringe on
the Pueblo’s right to govern its own affairs, which include employment with the Pueblo
and operation of the Department. See Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 2003-
NMSC-019, ¶ 13, 134 N.M. 133, 74 P.3d 67 (“Indian nations . . . possess a broad
measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-Indians on Indian reservation lands
in which the tribes have a significant interest.”). Plaintiffs state that the case “arose
during the period of Plaintiffs’. . . employment at the Pueblo” and that the claims contest
Plaintiffs’ termination from the Department. The complaint directly challenges the
policies and operations of the Department, and as we discuss below, the Pueblo is the
real party in interest. See South, 2014-NMCA-109, ¶ 18 (noting that whether the tribe is
the real party in interest is relevant “to the third prong of the infringement test”).
Therefore, the Pueblo has the right to have Pueblo employment disputes heard in tribal
court. See Hartley v. Baca, 1981-NMCA-080, ¶¶ 10-11, 97 N.M. 441, 640 P.2d 941
(identifying “the nature of the interest to be protected [as] the right of [the defendant] to
be heard in . . . [t]ribal [c]ourt under its tribal laws”).

{12} The application of the infringement test using undisputed facts supports the
district court’s determination that allowing “the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of tribal courts over Pueblo affairs, and thus would infringe on
the right of the Pueblo’s sovereign authority to govern itself.” Though not every
Defendant is a Pueblo member, this is an employment dispute that occurred on Pueblo
land and that challenges Pueblo policies. As a result, this employment matter demands
the exercise of the Pueblo’s responsibility for self-government.

III.   Plaintiffs’ Suit is Also Barred by Tribal Sovereign Immunity

{13} Even were we to apply Lewis to the exclusion of Williams, as Plaintiff contends
we should, we must reject Plaintiffs’ sovereign immunity analysis. Plaintiffs argue that
under Lewis, “tribal sovereign immunity has no bearing on claims brought against tribal
employees in their individual capacities,” and because Defendants were named in their
individual capacities in the complaint, tribal sovereign immunity does not apply. But
Lewis does not instruct courts to stop an immunity inquiry at the caption of the
complaint, and in fact, instructs the opposite. 581 U.S. at 161-62. The Supreme Court in
Lewis stated that courts must determine “whether the sovereign is the real party in
interest,” by assessing “whether the remedy sought is truly against the sovereign.” Id.
To determine whether the Pueblo in this case is the real party in interest, we consider
whether the alleged bad “conduct was within the scope of employment, whether the
damages requested implicate the Pueblo, and whether a judgment would have an
impact on Pueblo governance.” See South, 2014-NMCA-109, ¶ 18; see also Lewis, 581
U.S. at 163.

{14} Regarding scope of employment, the district court determined, and Plaintiffs do
not dispute, that the “Pueblo operates its own police department” and that any actions
Defendants took with respect to Plaintiffs’ termination from the Department arose
directly from Defendants’ official positions—except for Defendant Segura who “did not
have the authority to terminate employees of the Pueblo’s police department and was
not present when those decisions were made.” Instead of challenging these findings,
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants did not act in the scope of their employment because
they engaged in “a conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiffs” for discovering illegal
activity within the Department, which is evidence of Defendants’ individualized
motivation to terminate Plaintiffs’ employment. Plaintiffs, however, do not explain how
these factual allegations relating to a conspiracy—Plaintiffs did not plead a claim for civil
conspiracy—overcome the district court’s factual findings that all Defendants acted
within the scope of their employment. We therefore do not consider this argument
further.

{15} The damages Plaintiffs requested for these claims and the impact the claims
would have on the Pueblo government also implicate the Pueblo as a real party in
interest. In the prayer for relief, Plaintiffs requested back pay, loss of fringe benefits, and
“loss of future earnings and future lost benefits, like loss of pension benefits.” All of
these damages are directly related to Plaintiffs’ employment with the Pueblo. Plaintiffs
do not provide any reason why Defendants would be individually responsible for
damages directly related to Plaintiffs’ wrongful termination from the Department. For the
same reason, Plaintiffs’ claims infringe on the Pueblo’s self-governance. Plaintiffs
pleaded claims for discrimination, contrary to the New Mexico Human Rights Act, NMSA
1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -14 (1969, as amended through 2023), wrongful termination,
retaliatory discharge, and tortious interference with contractual relations. Plaintiffs’
allegations supporting these claims rely on the Pueblo’s policies and procedures for
running the Department and on the employment contract between Plaintiffs and the
Department, all of which implicate the Pueblo’s self-governance. Based on these
allegations and state law claims, we agree with the district court that any judgment
would likely “infringe[] upon the Pueblo’s governance of its own police force.”

{16} Based on the above, we agree with the district court’s finding that Defendants’
actions that form the basis for the complaint were taken in their official capacities with
the Department, and official capacity actions implicate the sovereign as the real party in
interest. See Lewis, 581 U.S. at 162 (“[L]awsuits brought against employees in their
official capacity represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent and they may also be barred by sovereign immunity.”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Plaintiffs have not pointed to any waiver
of sovereign immunity or congressional authorization that would justify bringing suit
against the Pueblo. See Hamaatsa, Inc., 2017-NMSC-007, ¶ 22. We therefore conclude
that the district court properly determined that the Pueblo is the real party in interest and
that in the absence of waiver or congressional authorization, the action is barred by
tribal sovereign immunity.

CONCLUSION

{17} On the basis of both tribal sovereign immunity and infringement on tribal
sovereign authority, we affirm.

{18}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge