Court Opinion

ID: 9655100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:00:16.520622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.437437
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority’s holdings that the trial court did not err in refusing to hold a Miranda/Goodchild hearing in this case and that the rule governing civil appeals as set out in Marsh v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 2d 44, 310 N.W.2d 615 (1981), does not govern criminal appeals. I dissent from the majority’s holding that the cases in which an illegal arrest will deprive the trial court of personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant are only those cases in which the arrest’s illegality resulted from a defect in the warrant.
This holding unnecessarily complicates the law in Wisconsin and undermines the basis of the rule followed in Walberg v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 448, 243 N.W.2d 190 (1976). Like the United States Supreme Court1 and *153unlike the majority here, I find no meaningful way to distinguish cases involving illegal arrests on the basis of the underlying causes of the illegality. In making the underlying cause of the illegality the distinguishing feature in this case, the majority injects uncertainty into what was previously a clear rule in Wisconsin. Since the majority gives no practical or theoretical reasons to distinguish between practices that taint arrests and practices that do not, I would either affirm the decision of the court of appeals which relies on Walberg, or I would, as the state has urged us to do on numerous occasions,2 reverse Walberg and adopt the rule followed in the majority of the states and the federal courts.
The following memorandum was filed on December 16, 1982.
PER CURIAM
(on motion for reconsideration). In his motion for reconsideration the defendant argues that Rule 809.30(1) (f) has eliminated the necessity for post-conviction motions. The Rule reads: “The defendant shall file a notice of appeal or motion seeking postcon-viction relief within 30 days of the service of transcript.” (Emphasis added.) The defendant reads the “or” as making postconviction motions optional. As authority he refers us to the Judicial Council Committee Note to Rule 809.30. That note reads in part:
*153a“. . . Under the former procedure counsel, . . . was required to . . . present to the trial court by a post-trial motion any issues which the defendant desired to raise on appeal even if the issues had been presented to and decided by the court during the trial. . . .
“The procedures in this section are designed to . . . eliminat[e] the necessity of each issue being presented twice to the trial court.”
The Judicial Council is an advisory body (sec. 758.13 (2) (a), Stats. 1979-80) and its interpretations are not binding. It is only under sec. 974.02(2), Stats. 1979-801 that authorization is given to take an appeal without a postconviction motion first being made. It is this section to which the “or” in sec. 809.30 (1) (f) refers. We construe this rule as being consistent with prior case law and hold that for issues on appeal to be considered as a matter of right, postconviction motions must be made except in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence under sec. 974.02 (2).
This clarification shall be enforced as to all judgments entered on and after March 1,1983.
Motion for reconsideration is denied without costs.

 The federal rule is derived from a case where the police kidnapped the defendant in Peru and took him to Illinois to stand trial. The supreme court held that this kidnapping did not constitute grounds for depriving the trial court of personal jurisdic*153tion over the defendant. Rather than confining the holding to the facts of the case, the court stated that “mere irregularities in the manner in which [the defendant] may be brought into the custody of the law” would not defeat personal jurisdiction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886). The Supreme Court followed Ker v. Illinois, in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (illegal extradition), and in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1975) (illegality in the arrest arising from Florida’s defective procedure for obtaining arrest warrants).

 See State v. Cheers, 102 Wis. 2d 367, 417, 306 N.W.2d 676 (1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).

 Sec. 974.02(2) reads: “A motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is not necessary to raise on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence.”