Court Opinion

ID: 9616353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:45:55.820405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:57.519706
License: Public Domain

Judge GREENE
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I disagree with the conclusion of the majority I) that there was insufficient evidence of the actual past expenditures of the children and II) that the trial court erred in its method of calculating the reasonable expenses of Joseph.
*235I
The defendant introduced into evidence affidavits reflecting the financial standings of the parties. The affidavit of the plaintiff dated August 1988 included a detailed listing of the expenses for the two children totalling $2,148.37. The plaintiff testified she determined these figures by estimating the actual expenses of the children. Also in evidence was plaintiffs affidavit of financial standing submitted in support of the first order dated October 1986. That affidavit revealed plaintiff’s expenses for the two children of $3,776 per month. The 1986 order, which was a consent order, set $3,333 per month as the defendant’s child support obligation to the plaintiff. This is sufficient evidence of past expenditures to support the trial court’s finding of plaintiff’s monthly expenses ($1,663) for the children and its subsequent determination of the reasonable monthly needs ($1,700) of the children. See Smith v. Smith, 89 N.C. App 232, 236, 365 S.E.2d 688, 691 (1988).
II
Furthermore, I see no error in the trial court’s calculation of the expenses for Joseph, the child who was a boarding school student in Virginia and was only in the plaintiff’s home some 71 days each year. The trial court did determine that plaintiff’s expenses for Joseph were less than the amount on plaintiff’s affidavit and that one of the reasons for such reduction was the fact that Joseph was in plaintiff’s home only 71 days a year. There is nothing in this record to support the conclusion of the majority that the trial court improperly allocated, by the use of some arbitrary formula, Joseph’s share of the fixed expenses in the plaintiff’s home. The order indicates the trial court accepted in full some of the plaintiff’s asserted expenses, i.e., mortgage payments, homeowners insurance and taxes, and accepted in part other asserted expenses, i.e., electricity, water, cablevision, automobile gasoline and household supplies. I do not find this procedure inconsistent with Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 257 S.E.2d 116 (1979). Gilmore held only that a trial court may not assume that the costs of maintaining remaining children are less simply because a sibling has left the household. Furthermore, the trial court is not bound to accept all the evidence presented to the court as true, and I see no justification for rejecting the findings of the trial court. The trial court obviously did not agree with the plaintiff’s allocation of certain expenses to Joseph.
*236III
Agreeing with the majority that the trial court correctly refused to find the defendant in contempt of court, I would affirm the trial court in every respect.