Court Opinion

ID: 989895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:13:40.673024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:38:22.477486
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 95-5219

HENRY LOFI SOLOMON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
M. J. Garbis, District Judge.
(CR-92-214-MJG)

Submitted: June 28, 1996

Decided: July 22, 1996

Before ERVIN, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

G. Godwin Oyewole, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Lynne A. Bat-
taglia, United States Attorney, Bonnie S. Greenberg, Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Henry Lofi Solomon entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to import
450 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 952(a), 960 (West 1981 & Supp.
1996). He received the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months.
In his plea agreement, Solomon agreed to waive his right to appeal
whatever sentence was imposed, reserving only the right to appeal
from an upward departure from the guideline range or a sentence in
excess of the statutory maximum. Solomon now seeks to appeal his
sentence, arguing that the district court erred in failing to sentence
him below the mandatory minimum under USSG § 5C1.2.1 We dis-
miss the appeal.

During the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, the government briefly
summarized the plea agreement, including the waiver provision. After
the summary, in response to questions from the district court, both
Solomon and his attorney agreed that the summary was accurate, and
Solomon stated that he wished to enter into the agreement. He stated
that no promises had been made to him apart from those in the plea
agreement. A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal his
sentence if the waiver is knowing and voluntary. United States v.
Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). For a waiver to be knowing
and voluntary, the district court should specifically question the
defendant about the waiver provision before accepting his plea. How-
ever, in the absence of such questioning, the record may otherwise
disclose that the defendant understood the significance of the waiver.
Id. Whether the waiver is effective is a legal question reviewed de
novo. Id.

In a pro se "Response to Government's Brief," Solomon asserts
that he did not voluntarily waive his appeal right. He states that he
objected to the waiver provision when his attorney discussed it with
him just before the plea hearing and that, after consultation with the
government, his attorney assured him that he could ignore the waiver
_________________________________________________________________
1 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1994). The criteria set out in the guideline are identical to those in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(f) (West Supp. 1996).

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because he would not lose his right to appeal his sentence. These rep-
resentations are at odds with Solomon's statements during the plea
hearing. After the waiver provision was read to him, Solomon, who
has a college degree and ran his own business in Nigeria, said he
wished to enter into the plea agreement. He said that he had been
promised nothing further and that he had no questions to ask the court
before the plea was accepted. On balance, we find that the waiver was
knowingly and voluntarily made.

We therefore dismiss the appeal.2 Solomon's motion for leave to
submit a pro se supplemental brief and response to the government's
brief is granted. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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2 Had we found that the waiver was ineffective, we would affirm the
sentence. Under United States v. Ivester, 75 F.3d 182, 185-86 (4th Cir.
1996), more than willingness to cooperate is required for compliance
with USSG § 5C1.2(5).

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