Court Opinion

ID: 9407587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:09:18.885085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.020658
License: Public Domain

J-S14020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RYAN MARTIN BURGESON                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1350 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 10, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-17-CR-0001205-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: July 7, 2023

        Appellant, Ryan Martin Burgeson, appeals from the judgment of

sentence of 48 hours’ to 6 months’ incarceration, as well as fines and costs of

prosecution, imposed after he was found guilty, following a non-jury trial, of

driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(2), and

careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). Herein, Appellant challenges the trial

court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, arguing that there was no

probable cause to support his warrantless arrest. After careful review, we

affirm.

        On August 4, 2021, Pennsylvania State Troopers, including Trooper

Tyler Blaniar, responded to a report that a man, later identified as Appellant,

was intoxicated and sitting in his disabled truck in the parking lot of a Pilot

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Travel Center in Dubois, Pennsylvania. See Trial Court Opinion and Order

(TCOO), 5/24/22, at 1. When Trooper Blaniar arrived at the scene, Appellant

told him he had struck a guard rail and damaged his tire as he was traveling

home from a wedding reception.       Id.    The Trooper noticed that Appellant

smelled of alcohol and had watery, bloodshot eyes. Id. Appellant admitted

he had consumed alcohol prior to driving. He also displayed indications of

impairment during several field sobriety tests. Id. Trooper Blaniar arrested

Appellant and he subsequently consented to a blood draw, which showed that

his blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.159%.

      Based on these facts, Appellant was charged with several counts of DUI

and multiple summary traffic offenses.       On February 22, 2022, he filed a

pretrial motion to suppress, arguing that Trooper Blaniar did not have

probable cause to arrest him and, therefore, the evidence of his BAC should

be suppressed. A hearing was conducted on April 14, 2022. On May 24,

2022, the trial court issued an Opinion and Order denying Appellant’s motion

to suppress. He proceeded to a non-jury trial on August 18, 2022, at the

conclusion of which the court convicted him of the DUI and careless driving

offenses set forth, supra. On October 10, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant

to the term of incarceration stated above. He filed a timely, post-sentence

motion, which the court denied. He then filed a timely notice of appeal, and

he complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court subsequently

filed a letter stating that it would not be filing any additional opinion in this

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case, as the issue set forth in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was

addressed in the court’s Opinion and Order denying his motion to suppress.

       Herein, Appellant states one issue for our review: “Whether the [trial]

court erred in denying … Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress his arrest as

being illegal because the arresting officer lacked the requisite probable cause

to suspect that Appellant was driving under the influence of alcohol?”

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       To begin, we recognize:
       An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a challenge
       to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
       whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
       the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
       facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
       the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
       Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
       remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
       a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
       supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by those
       findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
       erroneous.     Where the appeal of the determination of the
       suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
       suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
       appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
       court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
       of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned

up).

       Instantly, Appellant contends that the totality of the circumstances

surrounding his interaction with Trooper Blaniar was insufficient to provide the

Trooper with probable cause to conduct his warrantless arrest. Specifically,

Appellant notes that the video from Trooper Blaniar’s police vehicle, which was

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entered into evidence at the suppression hearing, shows that he was “not

swaying, unsure of his footing[,] or otherwise displaying any of the common

characteristics of a person impaired by alcohol.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He

also stresses that, although he showed a few signs of intoxication during the

field sobriety tests, he also was able to successfully complete many aspects

of those tests with no indication of intoxication.         See id. at 14-16.

Furthermore, Appellant points out that there were no witnesses to his manner

of driving prior to, or at the time of, the single-vehicle accident in which he

was involved, and he followed all the instructions given by Trooper Blaniar

without issue.   Id. at 17, 18.   Appellant also minimizes his admission to

drinking alcohol prior to driving, stressing that it was not known when he had

consumed his last drink, and “[a]ny number of things can cause a person to

have bloodshot, watery eyes.” Id. at 19. Thus, Appellant concludes that the

totality of the circumstances was insufficient to provide Trooper Blaniar with

probable cause to arrest him without a warrant.

      We disagree. In the trial court’s opinion accompanying its order denying

suppression, it explained:

      “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances
      within the police officer’s knowledge and of which the officer has
      reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to
      warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an
      offense has been committed by the person to be arrested.
      Probable cause justifying a warrantless arrest is determined by
      the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Salter,
      121 A.3d 987, 996-97 (Pa. Super. 2015) [(citation omitted)].
      Thus, for [Appellant’s] warrantless arrest to be valid, the Troopers
      must have had enough personal knowledge that a reasonable

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     person would believe [Appellant] was driving or operating his
     truck “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that [he
     was] rendered incapable of safely driving….” 75 Pa.C.S. §
     3802(a)(1).

     During the hearing on [Appellant’s pre-trial m]otion, the
     Commonwealth presented the testimony of Trooper Blaniar.
     Trooper Blaniar testified that when he approached [Appellant’s]
     truck, he noticed that the front tire was off and the inspection was
     expired. He also noticed that the truck’s engine was running, the
     lights were on, and [Appellant] was in the driver’s seat, alone in
     the vehicle. While speaking with the Trooper[], [Appellant]
     reported that he had hit a guardrail and drove into the parking lot
     without the tire to wait for assistance. [Appellant] also showed
     the Trooper[] a large scratch on the pavement that was caused
     by driving his truck on the rim, without the tire.

     Trooper Blaniar testified that [Appellant] had watery and
     bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol. Additionally, [Appellant]
     disclosed that he had been returning from a wedding, where he
     had consumed alcohol. Upon request, [Appellant] agreed to
     complete field sobriety tests. Trooper Blaniar testified that during
     the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, Vertical Gaze Nystagmus
     test, and the Walk and Turn test, [Appellant] displayed signs of
     impairment. However, [Appellant] did not show any signs of
     impairment during the One Leg Stand test.            Based on his
     observations and [Appellant’s] statements, Trooper Blaniar
     determined he had probable cause to arrest [Appellant] for
     suspicion of [DUI] and requested [Appellant] to submit to a blood
     draw.

     [Appellant] argued that because his speech was not slurred, he
     successfully completed the One Leg Stand Test, and he was not
     witnessed driving, the Trooper[] did not have probable cause to
     arrest him.      However, this argument cannot stand.         “The
     applicable standard for determining probable cause calls for a
     totality of circumstances analysis, not a mechanical consideration
     of specific factors….      ‘[P]robable cause does not involve
     certainties, but rather the factual and practical considerations of
     everyday life on which reasonable and prudent [persons] act.’”
     Salter, 121 A.3d at 995 (internal citations omitted). Even though
     [Appellant] did not have slurred speech, he showed multiple signs
     of impairment, including watery, bloodshot eyes, an inability to
     successfully complete all … the field sobriety tests, and, most
     importantly, involvement in a single vehicle accident. Despite the

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      fact that [Appellant] did not show signs of impairment during the
      One Leg Stand test, the Appellate Courts have held that the failure
      of all field sobriety tests is not necessary to establish probable
      cause. See Commonwealth v. Slonaker, 795 A.2d 397, 402
      (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding “the law is well settled that reasonable
      grounds to arrest does not require the failure of field sobriety
      tests[]“) [(citation omitted)].

TCOO at 2-3.

      We agree with the trial court that Trooper Blaniar had probable cause to

arrest Appellant based on the totality of the circumstances. Namely, while no

one observed Appellant’s driving, he admitted that he drove his car into the

guard rail, and that he had consumed alcohol prior to driving. Trooper Blaniar

noticed that Appellant “had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage emanating

from his breath” and “watery, bloodshot eyes.” N.T. Suppression Hearing,

4/14/22, at 10.    Appellant also showed signs of impairment during field

sobriety tests. The fact that Appellant also completed certain aspects of those

tests without issue does not negate that Trooper Blaniar observed signs

indicating to him, based on his training and experience, that Appellant was

intoxicated.   Taken together, these facts provided Trooper Blaniar with

probable cause to arrest.     Therefore, the court did not err in denying

Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2023

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