Court Opinion

ID: 9791789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:17:54.068407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.504637
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent. I would reverse the judgment for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shepard, and concurred in by Mr. Presiding Justice Griffin and Mr. Justice Coughlin, in the opinion prepared for the District Court of Appeal in Wollam v. City of Palm Springs (Cal.App.) 24 Cal.Rptr. 142.
The principal question here involved is the constitutionality of section 4430.3 of article 443 of Ordinance No. 395 enacted by the City Council of Palm Springs. A majority of this court holds that the above mentioned section is unconstitutional because it abridges the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 4430.3 of the ordinance provides that sound amplifying equipment shall not be operated unless the truck upon *289which it is mounted is operated at a speed of at least ten miles an hour except when the truck is stopped because of traffic conditions.
As set forth in the majority opinion, the ordinance was based upon a model recommended by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers. That body, in its report, stated that the reason for the regulation was to prevent the operator of a sound truck from blaring forth a message from one spot because continuous noise was more likely to result in injury to nerves, health, disturbances and nuisances, as well as to cause traffic congestion with resulting injuries and fatalities.
It is obvious from the wording of the report that traffic control was not the only reason for the model ordinance. A stationary truck blaring forth its message is very much of a traffic hazard because of the natural inclination of motorists to look for the source of the sound and away from preceding or oncoming traffic. It is also a problem insofar as pedestrians are concerned because of the natural .curiosity of idle persons to gather and obstruct public sidewalks and streets.
In considering the constitutional validity of the ordinance, I agree with the rule set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Gibson, speaking for a majority of this court in In re Petersen, 51 Cal.2d 177, 182 [7] [331 P.2d 24], that “Ordinances are presumed to be valid, and no provision of the challenged ordinance may be condemned as an improper exercise of the police power if any rational ground exists for its enactment. (Hart v. City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal.2d 343, 348 [79 P.2d 1080] ; Parker v. Colburn, 196 Cal. 169,178 [236 P. 921].) ” (Italics added.) (Corning Hospital Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 496 [9] [20 Cal.Rptr. 621, 370 P.2d 325] ; Dittus v. Cranston, 53 Cal.2d 284, 286 [1] [1 Cal.Rptr. 327, 347 P.2d 671] ; Johnson v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 693, 696 [1], 699 [7] [329 P.2d 5]; Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal.2d 644, 652 [10] [298 P.2d 1] ; Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 636 [1] [91 P.2d 577].)
Cities and counties everywhere are seeking a solution to the difficult problem of regulating sound trucks so as not to unreasonably interfere with freedom of speech and at the same time safeguard others in the enjoyment of their private property and the public highways.
Our court, in upholding a county antinoise ordinance in Haggerty v. Associated Farmers of Cal., 44 Cal.2d 60, 70 [2] [279 P.2d 734], said: “The county, in the exercise of the *290police power of the state, has a legitimate interest in the preservation of the safety and tranquility of its citizens. It cannot be said that the present ordinance is not reasonably directed to that end. ’ ’
The leading United States Supreme Court cases are Saia v. New York (1948) 334 U.S. 558 [68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574], and Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608], In Saia, the court held unconstitutional a city ordinance which forbade the use of loud speakers in public places without first obtaining a permit from the chief of police. The ordinance was held to abridge the guarantee of freedom of speech, not because it forbade oral expression of views via loud speaker, but because it established a prior restraint, without any standards prescribed for the exercise of discretion by the chief of police. Such prior restraint, the court held, might have passed the tests of constitutionality had the ordinance been “narrowly drawn to regulate the hours and places of use of loud-speakers, or the volume of sound (the decibels) to which they must be adjusted.” (P. 560.)
In Eovacs, an ordinance which forbade the use or operation on the public streets of a sound truck, or of any instrument emitting loud and raucous noises attached to a vehicle, on public streets was held not to infringe the right of free speech. Mr. Justice Reed, who announced the judgment of the court, said: “The use of sound trucks and other peripatetic or stationary broadcasting devices for advertising, for religious exercises and for discussion of issues or controversies has brought forth numerous municipal ordinances. The avowed and obvious purpose of these ordinances is to prohibit or minimize such sounds on or near the streets since some citizens find the noise objectionable and to some degree an interference with the business or social activities in which they are engaged or the quiet that they would like to enjoy. A satisfactory adjustment of the conflicting interests is difficult as those who desire to broadcast can hardly acquiesce in a requirement to modulate their sounds to a pitch that would not rise above other street noises nor would they deem a restriction to sparsely used localities or to hours after work and before sleep—say 6 to 9 p.m.—sufficient for the exercise of their claimed privilege. . . . Unrestrained use throughout a municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be intolerable.” (336 U.S. at p. 81.) (Italics added.)
The opinion continued, at page 87: “City streets are rec*291ognized as a normal place for the exchange of ideas by speech or paper. But this does not mean the freedom is beyond all control. We think it is a permissible exercise of legislative discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interest, amplified to a loud and raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities. On the business streets of cities . . . such distractions would be dangerous to traffic at all hours useful for the dissemination of information, and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city dwellers would likewise be at the mercy of advocates of particular religious, social or political persuasions. We cannot believe that rights of free speech compel a muncipality to allow such mechanical voice amplification on any of its streets.”
Further, the court said in Kovacs: “All regulatory enactments are prohibitory so far as their restrictions are concerned, and the prohibition of this ordinance as to a use of streets is merely regulatory. Sound trucks may be utilized in places such as parks or other open spaces off the streets. The constitutionality of the challenged ordinance as violative of appellant’s right of free speech does not depend upon so narrow an issue as to whether its provisions are cast in the words of prohibition or regulation. The question is whether or not there is a real abridgment of the rights of free speech.
“Of course, even the fundamental rights of the Bill of Rights are not absolute. The Seda case recognized that in this field by stating ‘The hours and place of public discussion can be controlled.’ ” (Pp. 85-86.)
The use of the two words “hours” and “places” implies that there may be an absolute prohibition at certain hours and at certain places. It does not mean that there must be permissible hours at every place.
The Palm Springs ordinance follows precisely the guide set forth in the Saia case. It is narrowly drawn to regulate the hours of use, the volume of sound, and the places of use. It does not permit any official, or official body, to control the use of loud speaking equipment in his, or its, uncontrolled discretion, and, therefore, it avoids the infirmity of the ordinance involved in the Saia case which, according to Mr. Justice Douglas, because it was not so narrowly drawn, sanctioned a “device for suppression of free communication of ideas.”
In Commonwealth v. Geuss, 168 Pa. Super. 22 [76 A.2d 500], affirmed 368 Pa. 290 [81 A.2d 553], an ordinance was upheld that entirely prohibited the use of sound amplifying *292devices on the busiest streets of Allentown, Pennyslvania. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question (342 U.S. 912), citing Kovacs v. Cooper, supra.
The Pennsylvania court, in addition to pointing out that the ordinance was valid as a safety measure, stated: ‘ ‘ There is no absolute right of free speech with sound trucks or other amplifying devices on city streets, as urged upon us by appellants. The right is subject to curtailment on ‘busy streets in the business area. ’
“If we were to uphold the contention of appellants it would be tantamount to ruling that a sound truck or other amplifying device may be added to each individual’s right of freedom of speech. The result would indeed be intolerable. It is daily becoming more difficult for a person to concentrate on his work in a downtown office building because of the noises apparently necessary and incidental to the conduct of affairs in the life of a modern city. And if the councilmanie bodies of the municipalities are not to be permitted to prohibit the operation of sound trucks and the blare of this ultramodern means of communication on certain streets or in certain .areas, then there will no longer be any authority lodged anywhere to safeguard . . . ‘the steadily narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection’; and we may add ‘the steadily narrowing opportunities’ to keep the streets open and available for safe movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which streets are dedicated. [Citation.] ” (76 A.2d at pp. 503-504.)
The Pennsylvania court then quoted the New Jersey Supreme Court when the Kovacs case was before it: “ ‘The freedom to express one’s opinions and to invite others to assemble to hear those opinions does not contain the right to compel others to listen. The means of expression through a sound amplifier is tantamount to compulsion. The booming voice of a speaker in crowded thoroughfares of the city forcibly attracts the attention of almost all within a wide area. That alleged right was never intended to be guaranteed by either [United States or New Jersey] Constitution,’ nor, may we add, by the Constitution of Pennsylvania.’’ (76 A.2d at p. 504.)
The majority of our court states that the city’s requirement to keep sound trucks moving is unnecessary as a safety measure because another section of the ordinance provides that the police department shall not issue a license if it finds that the *293sound truck would be a detriment to traffic safety, but, as has been pointed out above, traffic safety is not the only area in which police power may be exercised. In Kovacs, the United States Supreme Court said: “The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.” (336 U.S. at p. 83.)
The majority concludes that “the vice of the present ordinance lies in its practical prohibition of the conveyance of a message to the public, ’ ’ and “. . . the ordinance sweeps within its broad ambit the constitutional right to tell a whole story by means of this method of communication.”
Mr. Justice Peters, in a recent unanimous opinion of this court, American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education, ante, pp. 203, 220 [28 Cal.Rptr. 700, 378 P.2d 980] said: “In the final analysis, the determination that a particular statute is or is not too broad in the constitutional sense turns not so much on its language as upon its effect. A statute may be phrased in words that are ‘broad,’ in that they convey general rather than specific concepts, and yet be the means of stating a regulation that is narrow and limited in its application. (See for example the two ordinances involved in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 [68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574], and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608].)”
The effect of the ordinance may be to prohibit plaintiff from conveying a sustained message, but the ordinance is not the sole cause thereof. The same effect may occur in a variety of ways, e.g., a motorist or pedestrian passing a stationary truck would also receive an incomplete message; and even a willing listener cannot be compelled to hear a message from beginning to end. Furthermore, the mere belief as to the precise way in which plaintiff’s speech will bring about the best results does not justify invalidating the ordinance. “Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the advocates are involved.” (Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 [71 S.Ct. 920, 95 L.Ed. 1233, 35 A.L.R.2d 335].)
The effect sought by plaintiff, i.e., a guarantee that a complete message be conveyed, can only be achieved if it is granted an exclusive permit. If others are permitted the same freedom at the same time and place, each sound truck *294will necessarily interfere with the other so that none of the messages will be coherent, and the clamor from several megaphones will be unbearable.
The majority of this court overlooks the crucial fact that when plaintiff asserts a right to remain parked at the curb at the site of the trade dispute, it is not claiming or making a public use of the street in common with all other members of the public, but is claiming an absolute and exclusionary right to appropriate a particular segment of the street for its private and exclusive use.
It is fundamental that the basic right of free speech guaranteed by the Constitution belongs equally to everyone, and the effect, if the majority opinion is followed to its logical conclusion, is that confusion and disorder would prevail on the streets of Palm Springs. The striking employees could park their sound truck in front of their employer’s place of business and proceed to blast forth their message in loud tones, while the employer could park a sound truck of his own in front of his place of business and blast forth his message in equally loud tones, with the result that a chaotic condition would be created which the innocent citizens and peace officers would be powerless to alleviate. Such a condition in a civilized state would be intolerable.
That such a situation was never intended to be sanctioned by the guarantee of free speech was pronounced in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R 1352]: “When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or punish is obvious. ’ ’
Since the ordinance in the present ease bears a substantial relation to the health, safety and general welfare of the public as a whole and is not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, thus constituting a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the city, and it does not unreasonably interfere with plaintiff’s right of free speech. Freedom of speech on the public streets is not prohibited; it is only the amplification of such speech by the means of stationary sound trucks at which the ordinance is aimed.
As Mr. Justice Shepard said in his opinion for the District Court of Appeal: “The exercise of any human right or privilege always recognizes the reasonable protection of the exercise of the same right in others and the welfare, health *295and happiness of all. ... We would be naive indeed if we ignored the common knowledge that loud speakers of sound trucks used on public streets have as their primary purpose the overriding of all ordinary traffic noise and sidewalk conversation so that the sound truck message will, by force of sound volume, demand attention.” (Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, supra (Cal.App.) 24 Cal.Rptr. 142, 144-145.)
For each and all the reasons enunciated above, I would sustain the ordinance in its entirety.
Sehauer, J., concurred.