Court Opinion

ID: 9809357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:10:08.955565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:18.570017
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
The General Assembly has provided that the county board of education upon consolidating two or more school districts into one shall be authorized and empowered to make provision for- the transportation of pupils in the consolidated district who reside too far from the schoolhouse to attend without transportation; also that the expense of transportation, when included in the budget and duly approved, shall be paid out of funds provided by the board of county commissioners. *3823 C. S., 5489. Pursuant to these provisions the board of education in Gates County provided for the transportation of pupils within the boundaries of the consolidated district who reside more than two miles and a half from the school building. The plaintiffs allege that they live not quite this distance from the schoolhouse, but that Ruth and Lois Hayes, despite this fact, have the legal right to be conveyed in the bus to and from the school, and that they are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the enforcement of their alleged right.
Mandamus is an action or proceeding of a civil nature extraordinary in the sense that it can be maintained only when there is no other adequate remedy and designed to enforce clear legal rights or the performance of ministerial duties which are enjoined by law; but the writ will not be issued to enforce an alleged right which is in doubt. Not only must the plaintiff show that he has a clear legal right; he must show that the opposing party is under legal obligation to perform the act or to grant the relief for the performance or enforcement of which the action is prosecuted. 38 C. J., 541; Johnston v. Board of Elections, 172 N. C., 162; Britt v. Board of Canvassers, ibid., 797; Person v. Watts, 184 N. C., 499, 505; Person v. Doughton, 186 N. C., 723; Umstead v. Board of Elections, 192 N. C., 139; Lewis, Treasurer, v. Comrs., ibid., 456.
It is important to note that the action was not brought to compel the defendants to exercise their jurisdiction or discretion, or to perform a duty which is merely ministerial; it was instituted for the purpose of compelling the defendants to abrogate or to disregard, a rule which the board of education had established by express authority of law. 2 C. S., 5412, School Code, secs. 29, 30; 3 C. S., 5489; School Code, sec. 81. It is, therefore, evident that the plaintiffs’ allegations, if admitted, are not sufficient to establish a clear legal right to have the writ issued. The Legislature, in authorizing the county board of education to provide for the transportation of pupils, gave it power in the exercise of its sound discretion to fix and designate the geographic line between those who do and those who do not reside too far from the schoolhouse to attend without transportation. The line thus established is the final determination of the boundary beyond which the use of the bus is necessary; and in the absence of abuse the discretion exercised by the board in fixing the dividing line cannot be set aside or controlled by the courts. In Newton v. School Committee, 158 N. C., 187, it is said: “In numerous and repeated decisions the principle has been announced and sustained that courts may not interfere with discretionary powers conferred on these local administrative boards for the public welfare unless their action is so clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive *383and manifest abuse of discretion. Jeffress v. Greenville, 154 N. C., 499; Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 150 N. C., 116; Rosenthal v. Goldsboro, 149 N. C., 128; Ward v. Comrs., 146 N. C., 534; Small v. Edenton, 146 N. C., 527; Tate v. Greensboro, 114 N. C., 392; Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244.”
It is necessary to bear in mind tbe reason assigned for dismissing tbe children from school — their persistent violation of the rule made by the board for the transportation of pupils. They were denied transportation only because they resided within- two and one-half miles from the schoolhouse. The principal of the school said that he regretted the necessity, but was compelled to dismiss 'them for this cause. They did not base their alleged right to transportation on the ground that Ruth Hayes is afflicted; they insisted upon the unconditional transportation of both children. There is no evidence that they have ever requested the board of education to modify the rule by providing for the transportation of afflicted pupils who reside within the prescribed boundary. In the complaint there is an intimation that the principal and the school committee favor the change, “provided such affliction renders said child unable to walk the distance and is so adjudged by a competent physician”; but it is not alleged that a certificate has been secured, possibly because, as suggested in the argument, Ruth Hayes has heretofore “demonstrated her ability to walk to school.” The plaintiffs do not contend that the action of the defendants was corrupt or arbitrary. In its ultimate analysis their appeal presents one question: Shall pupils within the prescribed boundary make use of the bus to the exclusion of those who, under the rule made by the county board of education, admittedly reside too far from the schoolhouse to attend unless transported? To this question there can be only one answer. The writ of mandamus must be denied because the plaintiffs have failed to show a clear legal right to the relief demanded, in that the rule made by the county board of education was authorized by law and the discretion of the board in determining the line of separation is not subject to the control of the courts. The judgment is
Affirmed.