Court Opinion

ID: 9675286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:48:11.867044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:10.745302
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
It is difficult from appellants’ motion for rehearing to tell if they are urging error in our opinion announced on May 13, 1968, because the summary judgment record does not negative their right to a hearing on the merits of their allegations of administrative negligence of the hospital defendants, i. e., selecting and retaining the employee alleged to have been guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of Mrs. Williams’ injuries.
We did not write on that question in our original opinion because we do not consider the record raised the question. Their third point urged error in granting summary judgment because appellees are not as a matter of law exempt from liability for negligence of their managers, officers and vice-principals. Their fourth point asserted reversible error in granting summary judgment because appellees are not as a matter of law exempt from liability for negligence of their agents, servants and employees. Neither point, in our opinion, raises the question of negligence of appel-lees in selecting and retaining the alleged negligent employee. The same may be said for the motion for rehearing.
Southern Methodist v. Clayton, supra, held “ * * * it is * * * well settled that it is not liable for injuries to beneficiaries of the charity, provided it is not negligent in hiring or keeping the agent whose negligence proximately caused the injuries.” In Sullivan v. Sisters of St. Francis of Texas, 374 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio, 1963, n. w. h.) the intermediate appellate court held its charitable immunity doctrine does not protect appellee from liability for injuries caused by administrative negligence on the part of appellee as to nondelegable duties. In Medical and Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Civ. App.-El Paso, 1949, n. r. e.) the El Paso Intermediate Appellate Court quoted with approval from another authority as follows:
“ ‘The law is well settled in this State that a charitable institution is not liable to a beneficiary for the torts of its servants, unless it was negligent in the selection and retention of the employees and the instrumentalities used by it in carrying on and furthering its benevolent purposes.’ ”
Even if it could be said that the brief and motion for rehearing technically raise the question of administrative negligence in the selection and retention of the alleged negligent employee, the summary judgment record- does not. This is understandable because the thrust of the brief is to convince this court that we should overthrow the doctrine of charitable immunity. For the reasons stated in our original opinion, we believe to do so in the instant case would be contrary to the latest expression of our Supreme Court on the subject in Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, supra.
Plaintiffs properly alleged administrative negligence in their trial pleading. Defendant’s affidavits and Quenna Cox’s deposition negative such allegations. Plaintiffs’ depositions do not show negligence in this regard. In fact, no employee *380of the hospital was ever identified as the one guilty of the alleged negligence and no summary judgment proof was offered to show the unidentified individual was employed by the hospital, when she was employed, under what circumstances or for what period. We thus have an unsworn petition signed by appellants’ counsel as against defendant’s summary judgment components above mentioned. “When facts entitling the moving party to prevail have been established by affidavits, deposition testimony or admissions, the motion for summary judgment will not be denied merely because the opposite party has alleged matters which, if proved, would require that a different judgment be rendered.” Kuper v. Schmidt, 161 Tex. 189 338 S.W.2d 948 (1960).
The Motion for Rehearing is overruled.