Court Opinion

ID: 2964116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:50.215048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.127245
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2308

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   CRAIG J. CLARK,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                   [Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

               Kevin E. Buchholz, with whom Bianco, P.A., was on brief, for
               _________________            ____________
          appellant.

               Peter E. Papps, First Assistant United States Attorney, with
               ______________
          whom  Paul M. Gagnon, United  States Attorney, was  on brief, for
                ______________
          the United States.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 30, 1996
                                 ____________________

                  LYNCH, Circuit  Judge.  The  kidnapping at  knife point
                         ______________

            of a young New  Hampshire woman by defendant Craig  Clark and

            others resulted  in Clark  ultimately pleading guilty  to two

            federal  charges:     conspiracy   to   interfere  with   and

            interference with interstate commerce by threats of violence,

            both  in  violation of  18 U.S.C.    1951.   This  is Clark's

            second trip to this court on his sentence.  He was successful

            before,  and now finds, to his chagrin, that his new sentence

            is  higher  than the  one that  was  overturned in  his first

            appeal.

                  In United States v.  Clark, 55 F.3d 9 (1st  Cir. 1995),
                     _____________     _____

            this court  vacated Clark's  original 188 month  sentence and

            remanded for resentencing before a new judge on grounds  that

            the  government had not kept  its end of  the plea agreement.

            Clark  now appeals  from  the 223  month sentence  imposed on

            resentencing by the second sentencing judge after remand.

                  Relying  on  the  Supreme  Court's  decision  in  North
                                                                    _____

            Carolina v.  Pearce, 395 U.S.  711 (1969), Clark  argues that
            ________     ______

            the  district   court's  imposition  of  a   prison  term  on

            resentencing that  was more severe than  the sentence vacated

            on appeal  effectively punishes him for  exercising his right

            to  appeal and violates his right to  due process of law.  He

            also contends that the district  court erred in enhancing his

            sentence  based on  a  determination that  he had  obstructed

            justice by  suborning perjury and making  false statements to

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            his probation officer.   The decisions  of the Supreme  Court

            and  this  court  interpreting  the holding  of  Pearce  doom
                                                             ______

            Clark's  first attack.  His second attack is without merit on

            the law and the facts.  We affirm.

                                          I

                  In  Pearce,  the  Supreme  Court   held  that  a  court
                      ______

            violates the  Due Process  Clause when  it imposes  a heavier

            sentence  upon a  reconvicted  defendant for  the purpose  of

            penalizing the  defendant  for having  successfully  appealed

            from his  original conviction.   See  id. at  723-24.   As  a
                                             ___  ___

            prophylactic measure, the  Court created  a "'presumption  of

            vindictiveness'  . . . which is  triggered whenever  the same

            judge imposes a more  severe sentence upon a defendant  after

            retrial."  Johnson v. Vose,  927 F.2d 10, 11 (1st Cir.  1991)
                       _______    ____

            (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982)).
                     _____________    _______

            However, the  "presumption of vindictiveness" does  not arise

            in  every  case  in  which  a  defendant  receives  a greater

            sentence the  second time around.   Texas v.  McCullough, 475
                                                _____     __________

            U.S.  134,  138 (1986).   As  the  Court said  in McCullough,
                                                              __________

            "vindictiveness  of a sentencing judge  is the evil the Court

            sought to prevent rather than simply enlarged sentences after

            a new trial."   Id.  Thus, the presumption  of vindictiveness
                            ___

            created by Pearce  arises only when  "there is a  'reasonable
                       ______

            likelihood'  . . .  that  the  increase in  sentence  is  the

            product  of   actual  vindictiveness  on  the   part  of  the

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            sentencing authority."  Alabama  v. Smith, 490 U.S.  794, 799
                                    _______     _____

            (1989) (citation omitted).

                  The Pearce presumption does not arise where  "different
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            sentencers  assessed the  varying sentences  that [defendant]

            received."  McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140; see also Hurlburt v.
                        __________                   ________ ________

            Cunningham,  996 F.2d  1273,  1275 n.2  (1st Cir.  1993) (per
            __________

            curiam)  ("Our  research  indicates  that  decisions  by  the

            circuit  courts  of appeals  after McCullough  have uniformly
                                               __________

            held that the Pearce  presumption does not apply to  the two-
                          ______

            sentencer situation.").  In this case, the defendant's second

            sentence  was  imposed  by  a  different  judge.    Thus,  no

            presumption  of  vindictiveness  arises.     Absent  such   a

            presumption, the defendant cannot  prevail on his due process

            claim   unless   he  demonstrates   "actual  vindictiveness."

            Johnson, 927 F.2d at 11.
            _______

                  Clark falls far  short.  He argues  that vindictiveness

            should be inferred because the New Hampshire federal district

            court  has only four  judges and is  a small court.   Neither

            logic nor  experience warrants any such  inference.  Further,

            he says,  an increased  sentence may not  be imposed  without

            additional findings to support  the increase.  Pearce implies
                                                           ______

            no such requirement.  The second trial judge heard all of the

            sentencing  evidence  anew  and  made  findings  adequate  to

            support  the sentence  imposed,  which was  within the  range

            prescribed  by  the Guidelines.    The length  of  a sentence

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            vacated on appeal does not automatically function as a cap on

            the term of imprisonment that can be imposed on resentencing.

            One of the risks of appealing  a sentence is that a different

            judge, on remand, may take a different view of the  facts (or

            the law) relevant to the required Guidelines findings, a view

            less favorable to the defendant.  We note that Clark makes no

            argument  that the  second  sentencing  judge misapplied  the

            Guidelines (aside  from  his assertion  of  error as  to  the

            obstruction-of-justice enhancement, which  we reject  below).

            There   is  no  basis  in   the  record  for   a  finding  of

            vindictiveness.    Cf.  McCullough,   475  U.S.  at  140  (no
                               ___  __________

            vindictiveness  where "second  sentencer provides  an on-the-

            record,   wholly  logical,   nonvindictive  reason   for  the

            sentence").

                                          II

                  Under   3C1.1  of the Guidelines, the  sentencing judge

            is  directed to increase the  offense level by  two "[i]f the

            defendant willfully obstructed  or impeded,  or attempted  to

            obstruct or impede, the  administration of justice during the

            investigation,  prosecution, or  sentencing  of  the  instant

            offense."  U.S.S.G.   3C1.1 (Nov. 1993).1   Clark argues that

            the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence based on

            this provision.  A brief description  of the facts underlying

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The district court apparently applied the 1993 version of
            the Guidelines.  The current version of   3C1.1 is the same.

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            the district court's obstruction  of justice finding sets the

            stage for resolution of Clark's claim.

                  After his  arrest and prior  to his  arraignment, Clark

            apparently  hatched the  thought that  if the  district court

            could be persuaded that the  victim herself had been involved

            in  the scheme  to  kidnap  and  hold  her  for  ransom,  the

            defendants  would either  receive more  lenient sentences  or

            "all walk away scott [sic] free."  In order to make the story

            -- which  had no basis in  fact -- stick, he  had to convince

            his  co-defendants  to  keep  to  the story  line  when  they

            testified.   That is exactly what he tried to do while in the

            U.S.  Marshal's  lockup.    Clark's  co-defendants,  however,

            refused  to  go  along  with  his  fabrication  and  told the

            probation officer of Clark's efforts to induce them to lie to

            the  court.  When the probation officer asked Clark about the

            scheme, he denied  it and claimed that his co-defendants must

            have misunderstood him or were lying.   The probation officer

            included  this  information in  the  Pre-Sentence Report  and

            recommended  that Clark's  conduct  be  found  to  constitute

            obstruction of justice and  that he be denied any  credit for

            acceptance of responsibility.

                  After hearing  testimony from Clark's two co-defendants

            that Clark  had tried to induce them to lie to the court, the

            district court increased Clark's offense level from 34  to 36

            pursuant  to  U.S.S.G.    3C1.1.   This  enhancement  had the

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            effect  of  increasing his  Guidelines sentencing  range from

            151-188  months to 188-235  months.  Clark  contends that the

            district court committed three  errors: that the court should

            not have applied  the preponderance-of-the-evidence  standard

            with respect  to its  finding that Clark  obstructed justice;

            that the court failed to view his testimony in the light most

            favorable to him; and that (in light of the first two points)

            the court's finding of obstruction was clearly erroneous.

                  On the first point,  Clark appears to argue that  if he

            had  been  separately charged  with  the  crime of  suborning

            perjury  and been  convicted of  that crime  (as well  as the
                               _________

            crimes  of which he was actually convicted) by proof beyond a

            reasonable doubt,  he would  have received a  lesser sentence

            than  he received as a  result of the  obstruction of justice

            being considered at sentencing.  From this, he  contends that

            due  process  required  the  government to  prove  the  facts

            underlying the   3C1.1 enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.

            The  argument is  doubly flawed.   First, Clark's  premise is

            presented without any effort to elaborate its basis under the

            Guidelines and is far from obviously true.  Second, precedent

            disposes of  his argument that anything  but a preponderance-

            of-the-evidence   standard   governs  the   district  court's

            factfinding  at  sentencing.   See,  e.g.,  United States  v.
                                           ___   ____   _____________

            Lombard,  72 F.3d 170, 175-76 (1st  Cir. 1995); United States
            _______                                         _____________

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            v. Gonzalez-Vazquez, 34 F.3d  19, 25 (1st Cir.  1994); United
               ________________                                    ______

            States v. Mocciola, 891 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1989).
            ______    ________

                  Clark's  second  argument  rests  on  his  reading   of

            application note1 to   3C1.1.  Thatapplication note provides:

                  In  applying  [  3C1.1]  in  respect  to  alleged
                  false testimony or statements  by the  defendant,
                  such testimony or statements  should be evaluated
                  in a light most favorable to the defendant.

            U.S.S.G.    3C1.1, comment.  (n.1).   Clark argues  that this

            instruction  required the  district court  to  credit Clark's

            version of the  events (that his co-defendants  were lying or

            misunderstood him) over the testimony of the co-defendants as

            described in the PSR and given at the sentencing hearing.

                  But   the  application  note   cannot  mean,  as  Clark

            apparently  would have  it, that  the court must  resolve all

            factual or  testimonial disputes  in favor of  the defendant.

            Nor does it  require the district court, in  deciding whether

            an obstruction  of justice occurred, to  accept a defendant's

            self-serving denials over the testimony of other witnesses it

            finds more credible.   See  United States v.  Tracy, 36  F.3d
                                   ___  _____________     _____

            199,  203-04 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 609 (1994);
                                     _____ ______

            see also United  States v.  Akitoye, 923 F.2d  221, 228  (1st
            ________ ______________     _______

            Cir. 1991) ("Were that so, the safeguard [of application note

            1]  would swallow the rule in a single gulp."); United States
                                                            _____________

            v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d  797, 801 (5th Cir. 1989)  (such a
               _____________

            reading "would effectively enable  every defendant to nullify

            its application by self-serving testimony").

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                                          8

                  Indeed, the plain  language of the application  note is

            not nearly so broad as to permit Clark's reading.  The note's

            instruction  is specifically  limited  to the  application of

              3C1.1 "in respect to  alleged false testimony or statements
                     _____________

            by the defendant"  and provides that only  "such testimony or
                                                        _________________

            statements"  should  receive  the  benefit  of  a  defendant-
            __________

            favorable light.  U.S.S.G.    3C1.1, comment. (n.1) (emphases

            added).2  We  understand this  language to mean  that if  the

            defendant is alleged to  have obstructed justice by means  of

            false  testimony  or statements,  and  if  such testimony  or

            statements  encompass  genuine  ambiguities   that  plausibly

            suggest  that the  testimony or  statements were  innocent as

            opposed to obstructive, then those ambiguities may have to be

            resolved in favor  of the  innocent reading.   See Tracy,  36
                                                           ___ _____

            F.3d at 204 (quoting  United States v. Crousore, 1  F.3d 382,
                                  _____________    ________

            385 (6th Cir. 1993)).  As this court has recently said:

                  [The]   interpretive  principle   [contained   in
                  application   note   1]  only   applies   to  the
                  construction  of allegedly  perjurious  language,
                  not  the  determination  of  credibility of  fact
                  witnesses.     . . .     Furthermore,    lenitive
                  interpretations only  apply 'to  the extent  that
                  an innocent reading may be plausible.'

                                
            ____________________

            2.  We find  it significant  that an  earlier version  of the
            application  note  provided,  more  expansively,   that  "the
            defendant's testimony and statements should be evaluated in a
            light most  favorable to  the defendant."   U.S.S.G.   3C1.1,
            comment. (n.1) (Nov. 1990).  In amending the application note
            to  read  as it  currently  does,  the Sentencing  Commission
            explained that  "[t]his amendment  more precisely  states the
            meaning of  this commentary."   U.S.S.G. App.  C, amend.  415
            (Nov. 1991).

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            United States v.  Kelley, 76  F.3d 436, 441  (1st Cir.  1996)
            _____________     ______

            (quoting Tracy,  36 F.3d at 204).  In sum, application note 1
                     _____

            requires at  most that  the district court  indulge "lenitive

            interpretations"  of  the  defendant's allegedly  obstructive

            statements  to  the  extent  plausible,  and  only  if  those

            statements are ambiguous.   See Tracy,  36 F.3d  at 204.   It
                                        ___ _____

            does not require  the district  court to avoid  a finding  of

            obstruction by contriving doubt as to the defendant's conduct

            where  the evidence  is otherwise  clear, merely  because the

            defendant denies he  did anything  obstructive.   See id.  at
                                                              ___ ___

            203-04; United States v. Rojo-Alvarez, 944 F.2d 959, 969 (1st
                    _____________    ____________

            Cir. 1991).

                  Here, there  were two aspects  of Clark's  conduct that

            the  court  found  constituted obstruction  of  justice:  his

            attempts to induce his co-defendants to lie to the court, and

            his  statements to  the  probation officer  denying any  such

            attempts.  See U.S.S.G.   3C1.1,  comment. (n. 3(b) &  3(h)).
                       ___

            We  review the  district court's factual  findings underlying

            the   3C1.1 enhancement only  for clear error.   See Akitoye,
                                                             ___ _______

            923 F.2d at 229.

                  As to Clark's  attempt to suborn perjury,  the lenitive

            interpretive principle of  application note 1 is  inapposite,

            as that conduct  did not  strictly consist of  the making  of

            false statements.   The  district court explicitly  found the

            testimony  of Clark's co-defendants regarding Clark's conduct

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                                          10

            to be credible, notwithstanding  Clark's denials.3  We cannot

            say that the court's finding was clearly erroneous.

                  As  for  Clark's  allegedly  false  statements  to  the

            probation  officer, there  was nothing ambiguous  about them.

            There is no dispute  that Clark made those statements.   Once

            the  district court found that Clark had in fact attempted to

            induce his  co-defendants to  perjure themselves,  it clearly

            did  not err in finding that Clark's denials to the probation

            officer  constituted obstruction of  justice for  purposes of

              3C1.1.

                  Affirmed.
                  _________

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The  fact  that  the  co-defendants did  not  recall  the
            precise  language Clark used  in his entreaties  to them does
            not undercut that finding.

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