Court Opinion

ID: 9401548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 16:09:34.304502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.488409
License: Public Domain

J-S13001-23

                           2023 PA Super 108

 IN THE INTEREST OF: H.H.N., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 3024 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered November 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-AP-0000377-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.N., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 3025 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered November 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-AP-0000378-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: W.N., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER               :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 3026 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the Decree Entered November 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-AP-0000379-2022

 IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.N., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
J-S13001-23

                                               :
    APPEAL OF: D.B., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 3027 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered November 1, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-AP-0000380-2022

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:                                   FILED JUNE 13, 2023

        D.B. (Mother) appeals from the decrees entered November 1, 2022,

which granted the petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services

(DHS) and terminated her parental rights to her children, M.A.N. (born in May

of 2010), H.H.N. (born in October of 2013), M.M.N. (born in April of 2016),

and W.N. (born in March of 2018) (collectively, Children).1 We vacate the

decrees and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        Briefly, on July 9, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Children dependent.

The trial court held periodic permanency review hearings throughout the

pendency of these cases.           Initially, on March 28, 2019, the trial court

appointed the Defender Association of Philadelphia, Child Advocacy Unit to

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mother filed separate appeals from the trial court’s December 1, 2022 orders
changing Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption pursuant
to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. This Court docketed those appeals at 37 EDA 2023, 39
EDA 2023, 40 EDA 2023, and 41 EDA 2023 and addressed them in a separate
memorandum. See Interest of M.N., 2023 WL 3860327 (Pa. Super. filed
June 7, 2023) (unpublished mem.).

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serve as Children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and legal counsel. However, the

trial court appointed a separate attorney (Children’s TPR counsel) to serve as

Children’s legal counsel on January 31, 2022.

      On June 13, 2022, DHS filed goal change petitions for all four Children,

requesting that the trial court change Children’s permanency goals from

reunification to adoption. The following day, DHS filed petitions seeking the

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to all four

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

      The trial court held a combined termination of parental rights (TPR) and

goal change hearing on November 1, 2022. At the beginning of the hearing,

Children’s TPR counsel informed the trial court that he had not yet interviewed

Children due to scheduling problems. In response, the trial court chastised

Children’s TPR counsel for being unprepared and proceeded with the TPR

hearing as scheduled. N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 6-7. However, the trial court

indicated that it would take what evidence it could that day at the TPR hearing

and scheduled another hearing date concerning the goal change from

reunification to adoption. Id.

      DHS’s first witness was Community Umbrella Association (CUA) case

manager Larry Patrick. Id. at 8. During Mr. Patrick’s testimony, the trial

court interrupted and remarked:

      I just want to take a moment since it’s an appropriate break in the
      flow of the testimony occasioned by three outbursts from
      [Children’s TPR counsel’s] phone. And I observed [Children’s TPR
      counsel] all throughout the hearing and all he’s been doing is
      playing on his [phone] throughout the hearing, making no notes,

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      not paying attention to the testimony. The purpose of my doing
      this is now because I’m going to excuse [Children’s TPR counsel]
      from the hearing.

      We’re looking for a short date to bring everyone back because I
      have to entertain his report from [C]hildren, but I’m not going to
      belabor this hearing now with his presence.

Id. at 26.

      The trial court then announced it would hold an additional hearing on

December 1, 2022, concerning the goal change at which point Children’s TPR

counsel would be required to provide the trial court with a report regarding

his interviews with Children.    Id. at 26-28.     Thereafter, the trial court

dismissed Children’s TPR counsel from the hearing. Id. at 29. At that time,

Farrell Bernstein, Esq., Children’s GAL, expressed her concern about Children’s

TPR counsel’s absence, and stated that it was her understanding that

Children’s legal counsel must be present for the entire hearing. Id. The trial

court responded:

      They [i.e., Children’s legal counsel] don’t [have to be present for
      the TPR hearing]. The only purpose is to offer their report as
      to their conversation with [C]hildren. They don’t . . .
      represent any other party, and . . . they’re not attorneys of record
      for any other party. They’re TPR counsel for [C]hildren. And
      based upon the case law, the purpose for their appearance is
      to offer their report as to their conversations with
      [C]hildren. They do not have to be present.

Id. (emphases added). The trial court then proceeded with the TPR hearing

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in Children’s TPR counsel’s absence.2 Id.

        DHS also presented testimony from S.Y., the kinship caregiver for

M.A.N., H.H.N., and W.N.3 Mother also testified at the TPR hearing. Lastly

DHS called Jovanna Tagertt as a rebuttal witness. Ultimately, the trial court

concluded that termination of Mother’s parental rights was appropriate under

Section 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). Id. at 105-06. The trial

court then entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children.

        At the hearing on December 1, 2022, Children’s TPR counsel reported

that he had interviewed Children, that all of them were happy with their

current caregivers, and that the eldest child, M.A.N., said that he wanted S.Y.

to adopt him. N.T. Hr’g, 12/1/22, at 5, 7-8. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the trial court entered orders changing Children’s permanency goals from

reunification to adoption.

        Mother simultaneously filed timely notices of appeal and Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) statements at each trial court docket number with respect to

the TPR decrees.4 The trial court judge has since retired, and the records

were forwarded to this Court without a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Mr. Patrick also presented testimony regarding permanency
review and changing Children’s permanency goals during the November 1,
2022 TPR hearing. See N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 31-35, 48-52.

3   The kinship caregiver for M.M.N. did not testify at the TPR hearing.

4 On December 29, 2022, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513. Order, 12/29/22.

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       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the court below err in proceeding with the TPR hearing in
          the absence of legal counsel for Children?

       2. Did the court below err in finding that [DHS], had met its
          burden in proving grounds for termination of parental rights
          under 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?

       3. Did the court below err in finding that DHS had met its burden
          to prove that termination would be in [Children’s] best
          interests, under [23 Pa.C.S.] § 2511(b)?

       4. Did the court below err when it found that DHS by clear and
          convincing evidence had met its burden to change [Children’s]
          goal to adoption?

Mother’s Brief at 8 (some formatting altered).5

       In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial court erred by dismissing

Children’s TPR counsel from the TPR hearing. Id. at 16-23. Mother contends

that the trial court violated Children’s statutory right to counsel by directing

Children’s TPR counsel to leave the courtroom and conducting the TPR hearing

in Children’s TPR counsel’s absence. Id. at 16, 20-21 (citing, inter alia, 23

Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)). In support, Mother notes that this Court has recognized

that the role of a child’s legal counsel is “to engage in client-directed advocacy

on behalf of the child.” Id. at 20-21 (citing Interest of D.G., 241 A.3d 1230

(Pa. Super. 2020); Interest of D.N.G., 230 A.3d 361, 366 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

5 As previously noted, Mother separately appealed from the goal change
orders. Therefore, Mother’s fourth issue is not cognizable here. See, e.g.,
M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2018) (declining to review
the grandmother’s appeal from denial of her petition to intervene in
dependency case where the grandmother only filed a notice of appeal from
the order dismissing her complaint for custody).

                                           -6-
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2020)). Therefore, Mother concludes that because the trial court deprived

Children of their statutory right to legal counsel, the decrees terminating her

parental rights must be reversed.

       DHS and GAL respond that the trial court did not err in dismissing

Children’s TPR counsel from the TPR hearing because one attorney may

represent both Children’s best and legal interests, as long as those interests

do not conflict.6 GAL’s Brief at 27-29 (citing, inter alia, In re T.S., 192 A.3d

1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018)); DHS’s Brief at 18-19. GAL acknowledges that the

trial court’s reason for appointing Children’s TPR counsel does not appear in

the trial court’s appointment order. However, GAL contends that no party has

asserted that Children’s best and legal interests conflict. GAL’s Brief at 30.

GAL also argues that the record from the TPR hearing establishes that there

was no conflict between Children’s best and legal interests because Children

expressed their desire to remain with their current caretakers and for their

caretakers to adopt them. Id. at 30-33 (citing N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 23-25,

40, 48-52, 65-66). Additionally, GAL suggests this Court should consider the

declarations of Attorney Bernstein and Tosha Ferguson, one of GAL’s social

____________________________________________

6 We note that at the December 1, 2022 goal change hearing, the trial court
ordered that Children’s TPR counsel’s appointment as Children’s legal counsel
would be vacated within thirty-one days and the Defender Association would
serve in the dual capacity of GAL and Children’s legal counsel. See, e.g., Trial
Ct. Order, DP-1900-2012, 12/1/22, at 2; N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 11. However,
according to the trial court dockets, Children’s TPR counsel remains attorney
of record as Children’s legal counsel. Children’s TPR counsel did not file an
appellate brief.

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workers, stating that there was no conflict between Children’s best and legal

interests. Id. at 30, 33-34 (citing S.R.R. at 1b-9b); accord DHS’s Brief at

18-19 (citing, inter alia, S.R.R. at 3b).7 GAL further argues that a remand to

determine the existence of a conflict is not necessary because Children’s TPR

counsel presented evidence that Children desired to be adopted. GAL’s Brief

at 35-36 (citing N.T. Hr’g, 12/1/22, at 4-9). GAL contends that the facts of

D.G. and D.N.G. are distinguishable because in both of those cases the

children’s expressed preference was against adoption. Id. at 37-38 (citing

D.G., 241 A.3d at 1242; D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 367-68).

       Both GAL and DHS alternatively argue that if this Court concludes that

the record is unclear as to whether there is a conflict between Children’s best

and legal interests, then this Court should remand these matters to the trial

court for the limited purpose of determining whether there was a conflict

between Children’s best and legal interests. GAL’s Brief at 36-37; DHS’s Brief

at 19-20. GAL suggests that this Court order that, on remand, if the trial court

concludes that no conflict exists, the trial court shall vacate the order

appointing separate legal counsel for Children. GAL’s Brief at 38-39. DHS

recommends that this Court’s remand order should direct the trial court to

reinstate the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights if the trial court

____________________________________________

7 For reasons set forth below, we conclude that GAL’s supplemental
reproduced record does not contain any documents that are part of the
certified record.

                                           -8-
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concludes that Children’s best and legal interests were not in conflict. DHS’s

Brief at 20.

      We begin by stating our standard of review:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted and formatting

altered).

      Section 2313 of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part:

      (a) Child.—The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child
      in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is
      being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may
      appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who
      has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other
      proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of
      the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child
      and the adopting parent or parents.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).

      Our Supreme Court has explained that “Section 2313(a) requires the

appointment of counsel who serves the child’s legal interests in contested,

involuntary TPR proceedings.” In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 180

(Pa. 2017) (footnote omitted). Further, the L.B.M. Court held that “the failure

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to appoint counsel for a child involved in a contested, involuntary termination

of parental rights proceeding is a structural error and is not subject to

harmless error analysis.” Id. at 183. Further, the failure to appoint counsel

to represent a child’s legal interests pursuant to Section 2313(a) is a non-

waivable error. T.S., 192 A.3d at 1087. Subsequently, the Supreme Court

clarified that “trial courts are obligated by Section 2313(a) to appoint counsel

to serve the critical role of a child’s attorney, zealously advocating for the legal

interests of the child who otherwise would be denied a voice in the termination

of parental rights proceedings.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218,

1233-34 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted). In the context of TPR proceedings, the

child’s “legal interests” is synonymous with “the child’s preferred outcome[.]”

T.S., 192 A.3d at 1082 (footnote omitted); see also Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154, cmt.

      Further, “where a child’s legal and best interests do not diverge in a

termination proceeding, an attorney-GAL representing the child’s best

interests can also fulfill the role of the attorney appointed per Section 2313(a)

to represent the child’s legal interests.”     T.S., 192 A.3d at 1088 (citation

omitted). However, “where there is no conflict between a child’s legal and

best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best

interests can also represent the child’s legal interests. Id. at 1092; see also

K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235-36. As such, our Supreme Court has held that

before appointing an individual to serve as both guardian ad litem (GAL) and

legal counsel for a child, the trial court “must determine whether counsel can

represent the dual interests . . . .” K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1236. Further, where

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the trial court appoints one attorney “to represent both the child’s best

interests and legal interests, appellate courts should review sua sponte

whether the [trial] court made a determination that those interests did not

conflict.” Id. at 1235.

       This Court has concluded that where one attorney represents both the

child’s best and legal interests at a TPR hearing, but the trial court did not

place its determination that those interests did not conflict on the record, the

TPR decree should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the trial

court for further proceedings. Interest of A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d 563, 570-71

(Pa. Super. 2022). Upon remand, if the trial court “determines that no conflict

exists, it shall re-enter” the TPR decree, but if the trial court determines that

a conflict exists, it must appoint separate legal counsel for the child and hold

a new TPR hearing to “provide [child’s] counsel an opportunity to advocate on

behalf of [the child’s] legal interests.” Id. at 571.

       Regarding the role of child’s legal counsel, this Court has explicitly

rejected the notion that child’s legal counsel fulfills his or her obligations under

Section 2313(a) “by discerning [the child’s] preference and report[ing] it to

the court[.]” D.G., 241 A.3d at 1237; see also D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 366.8

       Indeed, this Court has stated that such a

       narrow characterization of legal counsel’s duties misstates [the
       child’s legal counsel’s] obligation to his client pursuant to §
____________________________________________

8D.G. and D.N.G. involved the same appellant, but different children. See
D.G., 241 A.3d at 1232 n.1.

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       2313(a). While legal representation in this context necessarily
       involves talking to the child client and reporting the child’s
       preferences to the court,[9] it is in no way limited to those two
       actions. To the contrary, pursuant to the majority of justices in
       In re Adoption of L.B.M., [161 A.3d] at 180 [the child’s legal
       counsel] was required to advocate on behalf of [the child] and
       provide zealous client-directed representation of [the child’s] legal
       interests.

D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 366 (citation omitted); see also In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d

955, 966 (Pa. 2021) (stating that “[g]enerally, an attorney acting as a child’s

legal counsel must, at a minimum, attempt to ascertain the child’s preference

and advocate on the child’s behalf” (emphasis added)).

       As noted previously, the parties rely on D.G. and D.N.G. in support of

their respective positions.          In those cases, the child’s legal counsel

communicated the children’s desire to return to their parent and their

opposition to adoption at the TPR hearings, but did not present any additional

evidence or examine any witnesses. D.G., 241 A.3d at 1238-39; D.N.G., 230

A.3d at 364, 366-67.        On appeal in both cases, this Court held that legal

____________________________________________

9 In K.M.G., our Supreme Court declined to adopt a requirement that child’s
legal counsel place the child’s preferred outcome on the record at a TPR
hearing because it could violate child’s legal counsel “duty of confidentiality to
their client, the child” and had the potential of “placing unconscionable stress
on a child by mandating that [his or] her feelings regarding [his or] her parents
and caretakers be made public and permanently enshrined in the record.”
K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1237-38; see also P.G.F., 247 A.3d at 966
(acknowledging that “[t]here may be circumstances surrounding a termination
proceeding that hamper determining a child’s clear preference. . . . While an
attorney must ascertain his client’s legal interest and advocate for it, in the
context of a minor client, we believe modulation is necessary, and achieving
a definitive understanding of the child’s preference may simply be too
disruptive and hurtful”).

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counsel’s failure to advocate for the children’s legal interests deprived the

children of their statutory right to counsel under Section 2313(a). D.G., 241

A.3d at 1239, 1242; D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 367-68.          Therefore, this Court

vacated the termination decrees and remanded for new TPR hearings.

Further, the D.G. Court declined to address DHS’s argument that “any

deficiency in [child’s] legal counsel’s performance would not have altered the

outcome of the termination proceeding.” D.G., 241 A.3d at 1239 (formatting

altered).

       Instantly, on this record, we conclude that the trial court committed an

error of law and abused its discretion by dismissing Children’s TPR counsel

from the November 1, 2022 hearing.10 See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. While

we understand the trial court’s frustration in maintaining order in the

courtroom with Children’s TPR counsel’s inattentiveness including his

cellphone disrupting the proceeding, the trial court mishandled the situation

by directing Children’s TPR counsel to leave the hearing, and stating that his

presence was not necessary because his role as Children’s legal counsel was
____________________________________________

10 We note that it is well-established that a judge has broad discretion to
maintain control of the courtroom. See, e.g., Behr v. Behr, 695 A.2d 776,
778-79 (Pa. 1997) (discussing a court’s discretion to use its contempt power
to maintain courtroom authority); In re Arrington, 214 A.3d 703, 707 (Pa.
Super. 2019) (affirming conviction for contempt of court where the defendant
used his cellphone in the courtroom in violation of the Allegheny County
Courthouse’s prohibition against using cellphones and defied the judge’s
directive to put his cellphone away).          However, we conclude that
notwithstanding the disruptions Children’s TPR counsel’s cellphone caused, the
trial court did not consider contempt, and abused its discretion by dismissing
Children’s TPR counsel from representing Children at the November 1, 2022
TPR hearing.

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simply to interview Children and report his findings to the court. See N.T.

Hr’g, 11/1/22, at 29. We note that at no time during the hearing did the trial

court find Children’s TPR counsel in contempt.      Further, we reiterate that

limiting child’s legal counsel’s advocacy to the mere reporting of the child’s

preferred outcome to the trial court at the TPR hearing, renders counsel’s

representation insufficient and deprives the child of his or her statutory right

to counsel under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). See D.G., 241 A.3d at 1239; D.N.G.,

230 A.3d at 367-68. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing Children’s

TPR counsel from the November 1, 2022 TPR hearing, notwithstanding

Children’s TPR counsel’s presence at the December 1, 2022 goal change

hearing, deprived Children of their statutory right to counsel. See D.G., 241

A.3d at 1237-39; D.N.G., 230 A.3d at 366-68.

       Further, because the deprivation of Children’s right to counsel in TPR

proceedings “is a structural error and is not subject to harmless error

analysis[,]” we decline to address DHS and GAL’s arguments that GAL was

permitted to represent Children’s legal interests at the November 1, 2022 TPR

hearing because there was no conflict between Children’s best and legal

interests.11    See L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183; D.G., 241 A.3d at 1239.
____________________________________________

11Although we do not reach the merits of GAL and DHS’s arguments that there
was no conflict between Children’s best and legal interests, we note that both
GAL and DHS cite to the verified declarations of Attorney Bernstein and Ms.
Ferguson. See GAL’s Brief at 30, 33-34 (citing S.R.R. at 1b-9b); DHS’s Brief
at 18-19 (citing S.R.R. at 3b). The trial court denied GAL’s request to
supplement the certified record with these declarations. See Trial Ct. Order,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Additionally, the facts of this case are very different from those of A.J.R.O.

In that case, the trial court appointed an attorney as the child’s GAL, and the

GAL was the only attorney to represent the child during the TPR hearing. See

A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d at 570. However, the trial court failed to determine on

the record that the child’s best and legal interests did not conflict. See id.

Therefore, the A.J.R.O. Court remanded for the limited purpose of

determining if a conflict existed. See id. at 571. The instant case presents a

very different and novel set of circumstances: the trial court appointed

Children’s TPR counsel as Children’s separate legal counsel for Children, but

dismissed Children’s TPR counsel from the TPR hearing. The trial court did

not vacate Children’s TPR counsel’s appointment as Children’s legal counsel

and did not appoint the GAL to serve in both capacities for the rest of the TPR

____________________________________________

3/23/23; see also Order, 3024 EDA 2022 et al., 3/24/23, at 2 (denying GAL’s
request to supplement the certified record as moot in light of the trial court’s
March 23, 2023 order). Nevertheless, GAL filed a supplemental reproduced
record containing these declarations. See S.R.R. at 1b-9b. Even if this Court
were to reach the merits of GAL and DHS’s arguments, we could not consider
these declarations because they are not part of the certified record. See
Rosselli v. Rosselli, 750 A.2d 355, 359 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that
“[t]his Court may review and consider only items which have been duly
certified in the record on appeal. . . . [A] document not filed of record does
not become part of the certified record by merely making a reproduction and
placing that reproduction in the reproduced record. For purposes of appellate
review, what is not of record does not exist” (citations omitted)).

Further, even if these declarations were part of the certified record, they are
not a substitute for the trial court’s fact-specific determination as to whether
a conflict exists between a child’s best and legal interests. See generally
K.M.G., 240 A.3d at 1235-36.

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hearing. Further, when the Court reconvened for the goal change hearing,

Children’s TPR counsel merely reported Children’s preferred outcome to the

trial court. For these reasons, the denial of Children’s right to counsel under

Section 2313(a) is structural error, therefore, a remand of these matters to

the trial court for the limited purpose of determining whether Children’s best

and legal interests conflict is not the appropriate remedy, instead we must

remand for a new TPR hearing. Compare L.B.M., 161 A.3d at 183 and D.G.,

241 A.3d at 1239 with A.J.R.O., 270 A.3d at 570-71.12
____________________________________________

12 We also note that if we were to reach the merits of Mother’s issues, the lack
of a Rule 1925(a) opinion would hamper this Court’s ability to conduct
meaningful appellate review of this matter. The trial court’s statements at the
TPR hearing reflect some of its reasoning but are inadequate for this Court to
conduct meaningful appellate review of this matter. See N.T. Hr’g, 11/1/22,
at 103-06. Further, our standards of review require deference to the trial
court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at
267. We understand the need to move this case forward expeditiously in order
to establish stability in the lives of Children, however, a meaningful application
of these standards requires more detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law from the trial court, which were simply not provided at the hearings or on
the record. While the trial court made some observations regarding the facts,
it did not discuss the requirements of each subsection of the Adoption Act, nor
did it apply the facts of the case to each subsection of the Adoption Act. In
such circumstances, this Court has remanded for the trial court to prepare a
supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion. See, e.g., Interest of E.G., Nos. 827
EDA 2022, 828 EDA 2022, 2022 WL 4090314, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 7,
2022) (unpublished mem); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that this
Court may cite to non-precedential decisions of this Court filed after May 1,
2019, for their persuasive value).

Instantly, a limited remand is not possible because the trial court judge who
presided at the TPR and goal change hearings has retired. Even if this Court
were to remand this matter for the limited purpose of determining whether
Children’s best and legal interests conflict, this Court could not conduct a
meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s
parental rights because of the current state of the record.

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J-S13001-23

      For these reasons, we are constrained to vacate the decrees granting

DHS’s petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Children and remand

for a new TPR hearing.

      Decrees vacated. Cases remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge Murray joins the opinion.

      P.J.E. Stevens concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2023

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