Court Opinion

ID: 9634108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:30:50.931576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:50.704752
License: Public Domain

BOGGS, Chief Judge,
dissenting in part.
I am in general agreement with most of what is written in the well-reasoned opinion for the court in this case. Unfortunately, I cannot agree that the actions of the state here met the requirement of AEDPA that a state does not waive the requirement of exhaustion “unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).
From the point of view of judicial economy and efficiency, to say of nothing of good practice, returning to state court at this point is probably not the best course. On the other hand, the balance of state and federal interests in the processing of habeas petitions from state court convictions is one for Congress to set, and Congress has done so through AEDPA. Thus, we must determine, based strictly on the language of AEDPA, whether the state’s actions here constitute an “express” waiver. I simply cannot find that the state’s silence, even in the face of the district court’s stating that it was “without concern that Respondent will subsequently move to dismiss the Petition for failure to exhaust the amended claim” can be an express action. It may be “tacit,” it may be “implicit,” it may even be somewhat deceitful, but the warden’s silence, in my opinion, cannot be “express.” The court’s opinion is quite correct that no “magic words” are needed, but it seems to me that some words, sign, signal, or indication other than silence is necessary for a waiver to be “express.”
I would also note that the potential for gamesmanship exists on both sides here. It is true that the warden can be seen, knowingly or unwittingly, to have “hidden in the weeds” by neither raising nor waiving exhaustion, and then raising it on appeal. On the other hand, counsel for the petitioner, undoubtedly aware of the AED-PA requirement, also refrained from bringing the matter to a head. Petitioner could have demanded that the waiver be made “express” and thus nail the matter down in the district court. Of course, this would have run the risk that the warden might then have declined to waive and the court would then have been required to rule explicitly on the point, with the possible result that the federal proceedings would have been derailed awaiting such actual exhaustion. Thus, the weeds involved in this case may well have contained counsel for both Petitioner and Respondent.
In any event, I do not feel at liberty to deviate from what I consider the correct interpretation of the term “expressly waives,” and I therefore respectfully dissent on this point.