Court Opinion

ID: 9753275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:06:03.797225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:33.026798
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that all of the issues raised in this appeal, with the exception of the questions concerning the inconsistent jury verdict, were properly dismissed by the trial court. I also agree with the majority’s holding that the jury’s verdict was irreconcilably inconsistent. My colleagues correctly state that “[u]nder such circumstances, where we could do no more than guess at the jury’s thinking, we would ordinarily order a new trial to determine these unanswered questions of responsibility.” Majority Opinion at 690.
*378I must dissent, however, from the majority’s ultimate conclusion that appellant Eastern Engineering & Elevator Company (“Eastern”) waived its claim for a new trial based on the inconsistent verdict. The majority relies upon a recent decision by our supreme court, City of Philadelphia v. Gray and Williams v. SEPTA, 534 Pa. 467, 633 A.2d 1090 (1993).
In Williams, the court confronted a similarly inconsistent verdict, yet denied a new trial because the appellant had waived her right to raise the issue:
The record reveals, however, that when the jury returned with the verdict, the court crier posed the [jury] interrogatories to the foreperson of the jury ... The trial court asked if either party wanted the jury polled. Each party declined. The verdict then was recorded. [Williams] did not object to the inconsistency of the jury’s answers to the interrogatories when the verdict was rendered. Instead, she raised this issue for the first time in her post trial motions. Because this issue was not preserved at trial, we must find it waived. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., [457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974) ].
Williams, 534 Pa. at 477, 633 A.2d at 1095.
The post-verdict events in Williams differ from those in this case. Significantly, after the jury foreperson read the answers to the special interrogatories, and the inconsistency was revealed, counsel for Eastern asked that the jury be polled. R. 983a. The verdict then was recorded, and the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: All right. Well, what does this all mean, folks? Sands?
MR. HEMSLEY [Counsel for Sands]: Well, Your Honor, I would move to mold the verdict because there is an inconsistency. The jury found the negligence of the Sands was not a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiffs and in , number seven they apportioned negligence at 30% and 70%, 30% for the Sands.- Given the finding number two, that apportionment cannot hold and the only finding there’s been against the defendants or I submit to you it’s inconsistent
*379and the 30% should be -withdrawn and based on the report of the jury it should be 100% on Eastern. They said there’s no causation.
THE COURT: Okay, I’m not going to make any rulings, I just want to get your initial reaction to all of this. Mr. Bell, do you have any comments?
MR. BELL [Counsel for Eastern]: No, your honor.
THE COURT: You don’t have to bind yourself, you can sit down, write memos and all of those things.
MR. BELL: There [sic] will be filing post-trial motions. R. 987a-988a. The trial court proceeded to ask the plaintiffs’ attorney what his reaction to the verdict was, and he responded that Eastern should be responsible for the whole award. The trial judge replied that he would “have to see that in writing.” The Sands’s attorney also stated that he “would like to look at that” and that “it will be in the motions.” Id.
When the entire post-verdict colloquy is considered, especially in light of the fact that the trial court did not intend to make any immediate rulings on the obviously inconsistent verdict, it is apparent that the waiver argument must fail. As the supreme court noted in Dilliplaine, supra, the purpose of an objection is to call the alleged error to the trial court’s attention, and to allow the trial court “the chance to hear argument on the issue and an opportunity to correct error.” 457 Pa. at 257, 322 A.2d at 116. In this case, the record shows that the trial court and the parties immediately recognized the problem with the verdict. The trial court expressly permitted the parties to save their arguments for the post trial motions, and specifically declined to “bind” the parties at that stage of the proceedings. Under the facts of this case, I do not see how the waiver argument can prevail. See James v. Nolan, 418 Pa.Super. 425, 614 A.2d 709, 711 n. 1 (1992) (a panel of this court considered appellant’s “waived” inconsistency argument out of “deference to the trial court,” who ordered the courtroom cleared after accepting the jury’s verdict).
*380I would remand for a new trial.1
ROWLEY, President Judge, and TAMILIA and HUDOCK, JJ., join.

. I realize that the grant of a new trial would not be the most judicially economical result. However, I believe that in this particular case, to find waiver and thus avoid á new trial where there is no question that the jury's verdict is inconsistent, would be to exalt form over substance.