Court Opinion

ID: 9467729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:55:01.029081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:29.546195
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
with whom Chief Judge SEITZ joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority’s affirmance of McElroy’s conviction for transporting forged checks in interstate commerce. I find, however, that I must part company with the majority when it reverses McEl-roy’s conviction under the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
Three elements comprise the offense of interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles, the offense embodied in the Dyer Act. The government must establish (1) that the vehicle was stolen; (2) that the defendant transported it in interstate commerce; and (3) that the defendant knew, at the time he transported it, that the vehicle had been stolen. See United States v. Gresham, 585 F.2d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1978). There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the government’s proof of the first and third elements. An automobile purchased with a worthless check is “stolen” for purposes of the Dyer Act, see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 416, 77 S.Ct. 397, 402, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957). Moreover, possession of the vehicle may be sufficient for the jury to draw the inference of guilty knowledge, see Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir. 1956). Because McElroy had possession of the automobile when he drove off with it from Don Allen Chevrolet, he *281may be presumed, in the absence of an exculpatory explanation, to have had knowledge that the car was stolen.
The only remaining issue is whether the jury might have inferred from the evidence in the record that McElroy injected the stolen automobile into the stream of interstate commerce. The majority acknowledges that the prosecution, in order to make out this component of the offense, need not show that the defendant was in control of the vehicle at the time it crossed a state boundary, or even that the car actually moved from one state into another. As long as the defendant inaugurated an intended interstate journey, he has violated the Act. Nonetheless, the majority apparently concludes that the evidence in the case at bar fails to demonstrate that McEl-roy’s automobile, stolen in Pennsylvania, was ever bound for Ohio.
Although the issue is not completely free from doubt, I would hold that the government proffered adequate evidence to support the jury’s verdict. When McElroy obtained the car from Don Allen Chevrolet in Pittsburgh, he advised the salesman that he lived in Ohio and that he intended to register the automobile in Ohio. McElroy paid for the car with checks stolen from a union office in Youngstown, Ohio. After his arrest, McElroy admitted to an FBI agent that, at the time of the alleged offense, he resided in East Liverpool, Ohio. In addition, the evidence at trial indicated that, after obtaining the Corvette, McElroy returned to Ohio and some time later ventured back into Pennsylvania to purchase a boat with another stolen check.
Admittedly, these items of evidence do not show conclusively that McElroy drove the stolen vehicle into Ohio. But a court reviewing a jury verdict must regard the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), and must accept as established all reasonable inferences that tend to support the jury’s determination, see United States v. Briddle, 430 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (8th Cir. 1970). I believe that the evidence of record provides a sufficient basis from which a jury might infer that, at the time McElroy departed from the Pittsburgh automobile dealer, he contemplated driving the stolen vehicle into the State of Ohio. Moreover, while it may be argued that the facts are consistent with a design on the part of McElroy to use the automobile exclusively in Pennsylvania, and perhaps to dispose of it there, the record is completely barren of any evidence to show that this was McElroy’s intent.
The majority correctly points out that the trial judge’s instructions may have led the jury to believe that, in order to convict, they would have to satisfy themselves that the stolen vehicle actually crossed the border between Pennsylvania and Ohio. Under the majority’s own interpretation of the Dyer Act, this instruction probably misconstrued § 2312 to the advantage of the defendant. But while the government’s failure to make timely objection might preclude it from taking exception to the instruction before this Court, I do not agree with the majority that the prosecutor’s silence should affect our disposition of McEl-roy’s claim to have been convicted on insufficient evidence. In light of the trial judge’s charge, the verdict manifests the jurors’ conclusion that McElroy transported the stolen car into Ohio. A fortiori, the verdict reflects the judgment, logically entailed from the crossing of state lines, that McElroy inaugurated an interstate journey. Because proof of this latter proposition suffices to establish the interstate transportation element of the Dyer Act, and because, in my opinion, the jury could properly infer from the evidence that McElroy embarked on an interstate venture, I would not disturb the jury’s conclusion that McElroy violated § 2312.
Accordingly, I dissent from Part II of the majority opinion.