Court Opinion

ID: 9963019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:00:37.58863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.955391
License: Public Domain

22-6030
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                              Bither, IJ
                                                                           A205 585 885

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 24th day of April, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                      MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8                      EUNICE C. LEE,
 9                      SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   SUKHPREET SINGH,
14           Petitioner,
15
16                      v.                                       22-6030
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                      Heena Arora, Law Offices of Heena Arora,
24                                        P.C., Richmond Hill, NY.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
2                                        Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright,
3                                        Senior Litigation Counsel; Giovanni B. Di
4                                        Maggio, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
5                                        Litigation, United States Department of
6                                        Justice, Washington, DC.

 7         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Sukhpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

11   December 17, 2021 decision of the BIA denying his motion to terminate and

12   affirming an April 25, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his

13   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

14   Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Sukhpreet Singh, No. A 205 585 885 (B.I.A. Dec. 17,

15   2021), aff’g No. A 205 585 885 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Apr. 25, 2018). We assume the

16   parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified and supplemented by the

18   BIA. See Xue HongYang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan

19   Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual

20   findings for substantial evidence, and we review questions of law and the

21   application of law to fact de novo. Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d
                                             2
 1   Cir. 2018).    “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 2   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

 3   8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 4   I.    Agency Jurisdiction

 5         As a preliminary matter, Singh’s argument that the agency lacked

 6   jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because his notice to appear (“NTA”)

 7   did not include a hearing date and time is foreclosed by our case law. In Pereira

 8   v. Sessions, the Supreme Court held that an NTA that fails to specify a time or place

 9   of hearing as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) does not stop the accrual of

10   continuous presence required for cancellation of removal (a form of relief that

11   Singh has not sought) as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–

12   14 (2018). The Supreme Court clarified in Niz-Chavez v. Garland that a subsequent

13   hearing notice does not cure the defective NTA in that context. 141 S. Ct. 1474,

14   1486 (2021).    But Niz-Chavez and Pereira are limited to the stop-time rule for

15   cancellation of removal and are “not properly read to void jurisdiction in cases in

16   which an NTA omits a hearing time or place.” Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d

17   101, 110 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980, 987 (2d Cir. 2021)

18   (“Banegas Gomez remains good law even after the Supreme Court’s opinion in Niz-

                                              3
1    Chavez” because, “[a]s with Pereira, Niz-Chavez focused only on the stop-time rule

2    . . . and did not address the effect of a defective NTA on an IJ’s jurisdiction.”).

3    “[A]n NTA that omits information regarding the time and date of the initial

4    removal hearing is nevertheless adequate to vest jurisdiction . . . so long as a notice

5    of hearing specifying this information is later sent to the alien.” Banegas Gomez,

6    922 F.3d at 112. Here, although Singh’s NTA omitted the date and time of his

 7   hearing, he does not dispute that he received a subsequent hearing notice

 8   containing this information, and he appeared at his hearing.              The agency

 9   therefore had jurisdiction. See Chery, 16 F.4th at 986–87; Banegas Gomez, 922 F.3d

10   at 112.

11   II.   Credibility

12         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

13   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

14   the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or

15   not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements

16   were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, . . . and any

17   inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an

18   inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,

                                               4
1    or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an

2    IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is

 3   plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

 4   ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei

 5   Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.      Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility

 6   determination here.

 7         First, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent testimony about

 8   when he left India. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In his written statement and

 9   application, Singh alleged that members of an opposing political party assaulted

10   him in June 2012 and again in November 2012, and he went into hiding in Delhi

11   in late November 2012 before leaving India in January 2013. But at his hearing,

12   despite testifying that he was assaulted in June and November 2012, Singh

13   repeatedly stated that he left India in February 2012—even after his attorney

14   pointed out multiple times that this would mean he left before the assaults—before

15   changing his testimony to state that he first left in February 2013.

16         Singh argues that the agency erred in relying on this inconsistency because

17   it is trivial, he corrected his mistake, and he had difficulty understanding

18   questions. Under some circumstances, we have found that minor discrepancies

                                               5
1    in dates are not strongly probative of credibility. See, e.g., Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d

2    279, 288 (2d Cir. 2000) (observing that “minor and isolated” discrepancies “need

3    not be fatal to credibility”).     Still, the agency may consider even minor

4    inconsistencies in evaluating credibility, “as long as the ‘totality of the

5    circumstances’ establishes that [the] asylum applicant is not credible.” Xiu Xia

6    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The inconsistency here is not minor, because it rendered the

7    timeline of Singh’s account impossible, and a significant portion of his direct

8    examination focused on it.

9          The agency was not required to accept Singh’s explanation that he initially

10   misspoke because he repeated the error multiple times, and even after changing

11   his testimony to say he left in 2013, he reverted to the 2012 date. See Majidi v.

12   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a

13   plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

14   demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

15   testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). Given that repetition, Singh’s failure to

16   correct his testimony despite multiple opportunities to do so, and his attorney’s

17   efforts to point out the error, the IJ reasonably concluded that Singh was

18   attempting to follow a memorized script rather than testifying from his own

                                               6
 1   experiences. See id. at 81 n.1 (noting that a “fact-finder who assesses testimony

 2   together with witness demeanor is in the best position to discern . . . whether a

 3   witness . . . was . . . attempting truthfully to recount what he recalled of key events

 4   or struggling to remember the lines of a carefully crafted script” (quotation marks

 5   omitted)). Notably, Singh’s attorney pointed out the inconsistency six times

 6   before Singh corrected it. 1

 7          Second, the agency reasonably relied on Singh’s omissions of death threats

 8   from his credible fear interview and written statement. During the interview,

 9   Singh stated that opposing party members had threatened him, and when asked

10   about the contents of the threats, he said that they directed him to join their party

11   or they would beat him; he did not mention a death threat.                 Singh’s written

12   statement describes his assailants threatening to kill him during only the first

            1
              Singh’s argument that he had difficulty understanding questions and that he was
     “young and alone,” Petitioner’s Br. at 18, is supported by citations to his credible fear
     interview, not his merits hearing; the questions at the hearing were straightforward and
     his responses that he left India in 2012 were unequivocal. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
     Just., 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that the IJ is “in the best position to
     evaluate whether apparent problems in the . . . testimony suggest a lack of credibility or,
     rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause such as difficulty understanding the
     question” (quotation marks omitted)). And Singh was 24 years old and represented by
     counsel at his hearing.
                                                  7
1    assault.   But he testified that his assailants threatened to kill him during or

2    immediately after both assaults.

3          Singh argues that the IJ improperly treated these omissions as

4    “inconsistencies,” that the omissions were not probative of credibility, and that the

 5   agency erred in relying on the interview record. However, the IJ used the term

 6   “omission” in discussing this testimony, and the BIA explained that this evidence

 7   would support the adverse credibility determination even if viewed as an

 8   omission rather than an inconsistency because the omission was neither minor nor

 9   collateral to his claim. The agency is entitled to consider omissions in evaluating

10   credibility, although “[a] trivial . . . omission that has no tendency to suggest a

11   petitioner fabricated his or her claim will not support an adverse credibility

12   determination.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77. “[I]n assessing the probative value

13   of the omission of certain facts, an IJ should consider whether those facts are ones

14   that a credible petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose under

15   the relevant circumstances.” Id. at 78–79. Applying that standard, the omissions

16   here were not trivial. At the interview, Singh offered that the party members

17   made a less serious threat to beat him; therefore, it was reasonable to expect that

18   he would have disclosed the more severe threat to kill him. And his choice to

                                              8
 1   mention one death threat in his written statement suggests that he understood its

 2   significance, and thus it was reasonable to expect him to have disclosed that he

 3   was threatened with death a second time.

 4            The agency may consider statements made in a credible fear interview when

 5   assessing credibility so long as the “record of [the] credible fear interview displays

 6   the hallmarks of reliability.” Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir.

 7   2009). Here, the record was reliable because despite lacking a verbatim transcript

 8   of the interview, it includes a typewritten list of questions posed and Singh’s

 9   responses; the interview was conducted through an interpreter in Singh’s native

10   language; the record notes where Singh had difficulty understanding questions,

11   but there is no indication that Singh misunderstood the question at issue here; the

12   record reflects that the interviewer explained the purpose of the interview, the

13   importance of testifying accurately, and that Singh could request clarifications;

14   and the questioning was designed to elicit his claim, and included a specific

15   question about the contents of the threats. See id.

16            Finally, Singh’s argument that the agency should have found him credible

17   because his testimony was detailed and consistent in other respects is without

18   merit.     Even “a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the

                                               9
 1   petitioner)   infect   the   balance    of   the    [petitioner’s]   uncorroborated      or

 2   unauthenticated evidence.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007).

 3          In sum, given the inconsistency that undermined the entire timeline of

 4   events as well as the omissions, substantial evidence supports the adverse

 5   credibility determination. See Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

 6   (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

 7   was compelled to find him credible.”); Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 77–79; Xiu Xia Lin,

 8   534 F.3d at 167. As the BIA found and Singh does not dispute, the credibility

 9   determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

10   because the three forms of relief were premised on the same facts. 2 See Hong Fei

11   Gao, 891 F.3d at 76 (“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner's

            2
              Accordingly, we do not address the alternative grounds for denying CAT relief
     that Singh does not challenge here. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a
     general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision
     of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”); Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684
     (2d Cir. 2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an
     appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes
     abandonment.” (quotation marks omitted)). Singh’s challenges to the IJ’s alternative
     grounds for denying asylum and withholding of removal are misplaced because the BIA
     expressly declined to address that aspect of the IJ’s decision. See Xue Hong Yang, 426
     F.3d at 522 (reviewing the IJ’s decision “as modified by the BIA’s decision”). Finally, his
     challenges to a purported corroboration finding are premised on a mischaracterization of
     the record; the agency did not find him credible and denied asylum on the ground that
     he failed to present available corroborating evidence. See Petitioner’s Br. at 15–16.
                                                  10
1   claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, an

2   adverse credibility determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

3         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

4   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

5                                          FOR THE COURT:
6                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
7                                          Clerk of Court

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