Court Opinion

ID: 9532780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:39.341909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:50.335133
License: Public Domain

Dell, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
While I am inclined to agree with Mr. Commissioner Magney that judgment should be entered for the defendants, nevertheless, I believe that a new trial should be granted in the furtherance of justice.
There was confusion in this case, but it did not come about because of the instruction relating to the presumption of due care as provided by Minn St. 602.04. It occurred because of the consolidation of cases *126which should not have been tried together. From at least the year 19181 until 1939, when the opinion of Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W. 557, was handed down, this court consistently held that it was proper to instruct the jury, in an action to recover damages for death by wrongful act, that the decedent was presumed to have been in the exercise of due care at the time of the accident causing his death. This presumption was based on the law of nature, the universal and insistent instinct of self-preservation. Contributory negligence remained a defense to be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The presumption in no way-changed this rule.2 In instructing the jury in death-by-wrongful-act cases the presumption was regularly given. In cases where the decedent was alone at the time of the accident and there was no direct evidence, “the presumption is recognized, and for very evident reasons.”3 While, in the Ryan case, the court for the first time held that the presumption was a “procedural device” rather than of an evidentiary nature, it was pointed out that the court did not mean to say that it would be error for a judge to give the instruction to the jury in a proper case. In attempting to reconcile the views of Mr. Morgan, who disagreed with the Thayer-Wigmore doctrine, the court stated (206 Minn. 568, 289 N. W. 560): “His [Morgan’s] conclusion is that there should be a general rule, by ‘uniform statute’ if need be, ‘that the sole effect of every presumption shall be to place upon the opponent the burden of persuading the trier of fact of the nonexistence of the presumed fact.’ ” It was, however, not until 1952, 13 years after the Ryan case was decided, that this court finally said in TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 493, 53 N. W. (2d) 468, 474:
“We now hold that, where the burden of proving contributory negligence rests on the party against whom a presumption of due care operates, it is error to instruct the jury that there is such presumption. The *127rule we adopted in the Ryan case does not permit the trial court to determine whether the presumption should or should not be given. Statements to the contrary in our opinions subsequent to the Ryan case are expressly overruled. The presumption, being a rule of law, under the view we have accepted, should be applied uniformly in all cases where it may be invoked at all.”
In the TePoel case this court reviewed the several cases decided after the Ryan case in which the presumption of due care had been given to the jury with approval in death cases and stated (236 Minn. 488, 53 N. W. [2d] 471): “The [Ryan] case has since had rather dubious treatment and subsequent cases have given cause for doubt as to whether we still follow the Ryan case or not.”
Only 5 years after the TePoel case was handed down, § 602.04 was enacted. Apparently in an effort to prevent this court from again taking from a decedent the right to have the presumption of due care given as an instruction in a death-by-wrongful-act action, the statute provided: “* * * The jury shall be instructed of the existence of such presumption, and shall determine whether the presumption is rebutted by the evidence in the action.” While from a practical standpoint it is entirely proper to instruct a jury as to the presumption of due care except in those cases where the presumption has been rebutted as a matter of law, from a theoretical standpoint it may be wrong to do so.
The author of the foregoing concurring opinion states: “But under § 602.04, even though the jury were convinced that Lambach [in the action to recover for his wrongful death] was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, it could still find in his favor on the theory that the presumption of due care had not been rebutted.” Obviously this is not a correct statement of the law since, if the jury was convinced that Lambach was guilty of contributory negligence, which proximately contributed to the accident, that ended the presumption of due care and the verdict would then go to the defendant.4
Section 602.04 was before us in Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. *128394, 95 N. W. (2d) 172. In construing this statute we unanimously said (254 Minn. 399, 95 N. W. [2d] 176):
“In order to understand the intent and purpose of this statute it is necessary to examine the law prior to its passage. Prior to Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W. 557, we held that the presumption was of an evidentiary nature. See, Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co. 169 Minn. 342, 211 N. W. 580. However, in the Ryan case we held that this presumption was merely a procedural device which shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence. While we had held that the giving of instructions relative to the performance of due care in wrongful death actions, although technically incorrect, did not result in reversible error (Lang v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. 208 Minn. 487, 295 N. W. 57), in TePoel v. Larson, 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. (2d) 468, it was declared to be error to instruct the jury with respect to such a presumption because it was only procedural in nature. In view of the foregoing it appears to be the intent of the legislature to restore the evidentiary conception of the presumption as it existed prior to the Ryan and TePoel decisions.”
We also pointed out in the Roeck case that in order to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional, as constituting a deprivation of judicial power granted by the constitution, it was the duty of the courts in appropriate cases to decide as a matter of law that the presumption of due care had been rebutted.5 It appears quite clearly that the legislature intended, in enacting § 602.04, to return to the procedure which was in force in this state for almost 35 years. I can see nothing wrong with this statute, if restraint is properly exercised to make sure that only cases that can be properly tried together are consolidated for trial.
These cases were consolidated for trial upon motion under Rule 42.01 of Rules of Civil Procedure. This should not have been done. As members of this court we know that the consolidation of some cases *129has resulted in more confusion, longer and more complicated trials, with perverse verdicts, than existed under the old practice.6
The Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated by this court on June 25, 1951, pursuant to authority vested in the court by L. 1947, c. 498. They became effective January 1, 1952. Their object was to secure the just and speedy disposition of cases, to relieve the courts and lawyers of work, and to further justice with less expense to the litigants.
It is a matter of common knowledge that some lawyers, and judges as well, claim that the rules have not accomplished the purpose for which they were promulgated. They also contend, and with some justification, that the consolidation of cases, discovery and pretrial procedure, as well as the use of other of the rules, have resulted in more confusion, more work for the courts and the lawyers, more expense to the litigants, and also delays and appeals, than existed under the prior statutory practice and procedure.
Sufficient time has now elapsed so that an investigation could be made, if the legislature .so desired, to determine whether the rules are bringing about the desired result. Should that be done it would seem that it could best be made by a legislative interim committee. L. 1947, c. 498, § 8, provides as follows:
“This act shall not abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify, or repeal any statute or modify or repeal any rule of the supreme court adopted pursuant thereto.”
Mr. Justice Otis took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 452, 168 N. W. 349, 352, L. R. A. 1918F, 154.

Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co. 169 Minn. 342, 211 N. W. 580.

Carson v. Turrish, 140 Minn. 445, 452, 168 N. W. 349, 352, L. R. A. 1918F, 154.

Aubin v. Duluth St. Ry. Co. 169 Minn. 342, 211 N. W. 580; see, Roeck v. Halvorson, 254 Minn. 394, 95 N. W. (2d) 172.

See, also, Kernan v. St. Paul City Ry. Co. 64 Minn. 312, 67 N. W. 71; Nelson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. 260 Minn. 61, 108 N. W. (2d) 720.

For example, in addition to this case, see Lott v. Davidson, 261 Minn. 130, 109 N. W. (2d) 336.