Court Opinion

ID: 6739654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:20:57.621751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:54.675484
License: Public Domain

Grace, J.
(dissenting). This action is one to recover on a life insurance policy. The trial was to the court upon stipulated facts. On the 6th day of April, 1918, the defendant, a fraternal benefit association, issued its policy, in the sum of $1,000 on the life of the insured, payable at death to his father, the plaintiff. Insured was 21 years of age and unmarried.
We are of the opinion, the judgment should be affirmed, and 'this principally for three reasons:
Firstly. The following provision in the certificate, relied on by the defendant to avoid liability, is void, as being against puttie policy, and as tending in some degree to deter enlistments in military service in time of war. The provision is as follows:
“This beneficiary certificate is issued and accepted upon the express consent of the member that in the event he engage in military, naval, submarine, or aerial service in time of war, without first obtaining a permit signed by the Grand Master Workman and Grand Recorder, and availing himself of one of the options adopted by the advisory board of said Grand Lodge at its meeting held on September 1, 1917, (No. 1, 2 or 3), the amount payable.upon this beneficiary certificate in the event of his death during such service shall be the reserve actually maintained by the Grand Lodge in respect to this beneficiary certificate.”
If, for example, one of military age possess a beneficiary certificate for $2,000 at the time war was declared by the United States against Germany, and he at that time understood that, if he enlisted in military service without the consent of the insurance company, the certificate would become void, or largely so, it can hardly be doubted that he would in some degree be deterred from enlisting; or, even after the passage of the Selective Service Act, he might for the same reason hesitate to comply with its requirements, knowing, in the circumstances, that his act might, avoid the certificate.
If such, in some degree, should be the effect, it cannot well be denied *292that such provision is void. It would perhaps be otherwise if the certificate provided that, in the event of his entrance into military service, or in any of the various branches of it mentioned in the provision, a stated sum, over and above the regular assessment, would be charged as additional premium for extra hazard incurred during each year he was in military service, and that such sum should be and remain a charge against the amount named in the policy; or if there were a provision contained in the certificate that, if this extra premium were not paid within a reasonable time after the termination of the military service, then, in that event, the certificate would be void; or even if it provided that the certificate would be void after service of notice by the defendant on the insured and his beneficiary that, if the extra premiums demanded were not paid within a reasonable time after they became due, as, for instance, within six months, the policy would be of no further effect; but such is not the tenor of the provision we are here considering. Furthermore, it is unreasonable, in that it seeks to make the status of military service, regardless of the increase of hazard, the sole cause for limiting or avoiding liability on*its certificate.
In other words, if the insured should enlist in the military service, in the defense of his country, whether there was any increase in hazard or not, by his so doing his certificate of insurance is absolutely void, unless he first gets permission from the insurance company, and pays the extra premium, etc.
Assume, for instance, that in a real estate mortgage there was a provision that, if the mortgagor, a person of military age, should engage in military service in time of war, such act would constitute a default, and be sufficient authority for the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage. Can any one believe, or reasonably contend, that such a provision would not be against public policy, and for that reason void. We think not. And so we might further illustrate by numberless contracts of different nature, but it would seem unnecessary to do so.
An insurance certificate or policy is nothing but just an ordinary contract. There is no reason why such a provision should be regarded any more favorably in an insurance contract than if it occurred in any other form of contract. The entire contract is to be construed to determine its purpose and effect, and, when so construed in the light of what has above been said, the defendant cannot, on account of the provision above mentioned, avoid its liability.
*293Secondly. The death of the insured being caused by influenza and not by any increased hazard because of military service, the prohibition contained in the provision is not effective to relieve the defendant of liability.
In the case of Myli v. American Life Ins. Co., 175 N. W. 632, 11 A. L. R. 1097, which was an action to recover on an insurance policy, where the insured died while in military service, not, however, from any extra hazard occasioned thereby, but from the disease of influenza, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Birdzell, construed the following provision contained in the policy:
“If, within five years from the date hereof, the death of the insured shall occur while engaged in military or naval service in time of war without previously having obtained from the company a permit therefor, the company’s liability shall be limited to the cash premiums paid hereon for the three years from date of issuance and thereafter to the legal reserve on this policy.”
The identity of meaning between that provision and the one presented for our consideration in the present case is indeed exceedingly marked.
Of the provision under consideration in the Myli case, w'e said:
“The argument is that the above provisions reduce liability to a return of the premium in this case by reason of the fact that the insured was at the time of his death an enlisted man in the naval service. It is contended that the effect of the provision is to automatically cancel the life insurance stipulated in the policy the moment the policy holder becomes enlisted or inducted into the military or naval service without having previously obtained a permit therefor, and without complying with whatever provisions (not named in the policy) the company might wish to require concerning additional premiums. As against this contention the respondent asserts that it is the evident purpose of the stipulation to provide only against the consequences of extra hazard incident to actual service in connection with hostilities.
“Before the harsh construction in the direction of forfeiture can be supported it must be found to result necessarily from the provisions of the policy. The policy must be read in the light of the obvious purpose of the particular provision, and it must be found that the exemption falls clearly and directly within its terms. It seems clear to us, upon a view of the whole policy and the evident purpose underlying the particular *294stipulation, that the circumstances of this case do not bring the defendant within the exemption contracted for. * * *
“Reading the whole policy, we deem the intention of its various provisions with regard to the restrictions concerning military or naval service to be clear. The express intention does, in reality, conform tO' the purpose of the provision as stated in the deposition of an officer, of the company, namely, to except the policy from applying where the insured has come to his death from a hazard connected with military or naval service. In short, the status of the insured is not made the test, but the character of the service. The important words in the clause relied upon and those which signify its correlation with the other provisions hereinbefore referred to are ‘while engaged in military or naval service/' These words are descriptive of two forms of hazardous service that are not intended to be covered, and it is only while the insured is engaged in such service that the exemption is applicable. It is idle to say that because one’s status is such that he must respond to orders from military or naval authority, he is in military or naval service within such a provision, when in fact there is nothing about his daily activities that suggests, the least physical danger that would enhance an insurance risk.”
That language and reasoning is directly applicable to the case now before us. It is idle to say that, because the insured here died in the hospital, from influenza, his death was caused by military service.
Thirdly. The defendant had notice and knew that the insured was in military service, and thereafter it received payment of assessments and lodge dues, with full knowledge of this fact. Hence it waived any defense, if any it had, with reference to the insured entering the prohibited occupation of military service, unless under conditions specified in the foregoing provision. It is therefore estopped to assert that defense.
For the foregoing reasons, the court did not err in refusing to render judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $200 as requested by the defendant and appellant, and did not err in ordering judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $1145.90.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.