Court Opinion

ID: 9759506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:18:43.186737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.456784
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The majority opinion quotes Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), to the effect that Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), “makes it plain that the question of a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy is an issue going to the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim.” That being true, the judge of the trial court erroneously laid down as a precondition for hearing the motion to suppress that appellant “sa-tisfie[s] me he has standing to complain.”
The colloquy that followed demonstrates that matters such as a pretrial motion to suppress evidence are not susceptible to “hearing” by colloquy. Having been rebuffed by the statement that “the Court will not consider the motion to suppress,” appellant was free to object appropriately at trial when fruits of the alleged invalid search warrant were offered in evidence, and demand hearing outside the presence of the jury. A denial at that point would strain his right to procedural due process.
Essentially, then, I agree with the Court of Appeals that “evidence or testimony to support his position should have developed and presented the same to us for review.” Calloway v. State, 707 S.W.2d 720, at 724 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1986).
On that basis I join the judgment of the Court.