Court Opinion

ID: 9851476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:13:34.156931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.520095
License: Public Domain

Taylor, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I regret that I find myself in disagreement with that portion of the Opinion in this case which construes Section 72 —356, 1952 Code of Laws for S. C. The pertinent portion of which is:
“ * * * In case of an appeal from the decision of the Commission on questions of law, such appeal shall operate as a supersedeas for thirty days only and thereafter the employer shall be required to make payment of the award involved in the appeal or certification until the questions at issue therein shall have been fully determined in accordance with the provisions of this Title.”
The foregoing Opinion holds, in effect, that where an appeal by the employer and its carrier has been prosecuted with due diligence and the matter not disposed of within the 30 day period through no fault of appellants, they would be relieved of the burden of such payments.as had been ordered by the Commission and quotes from Greenville Baseball, Inc. v. Bearden, Sheriff, 200 S. C. 363, 20 S. E. (2d) 813, for the proposition that the Courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute but the real purpose and intention of the lawmakers will prevail.
This is one of those “hard cases which tend to make hard law.” It is true that where such payments are made and, as in this case, where the award later was reversed, the employer and its carrier would have made payments which possibly could not be thereafter recovered. However, on the other hand should this Court hold that appellants may be *336excused from making such payments on the grounds that the delay beyond the thirty day period was brought about through no fault of theirs, this Court will be faced, in practically every such case, with the impossible task of determining which party, if either, was responsible for the delay beyond the thirty day period and therein open the door to an abuse which the legislature intended to prevent when it wrote that section of the act in such clear and unambiguous language.
Fault in causing a delay is often a difficult and close question. If the Circuit Court must stop in the midst of an appeal and try such issue, it can only result in further delay. If fault of delay is an issue upon which payment must be made or denied, certainly the parties should be given an opportunity to submit testimony relative thereto and be heard in argument. Furthermore, the lower Court should determine the fault of delay which has not been done here. If the Circuit Court may try the issue of “whose fault caused the delay,” then of course either party should be allowed to appeal the ruling on that issue before any compensation is paid. To complicate matters the fault issue would normally involve solely testimony of the attorneys if factual issues arise.
Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, both the employer and the employee surrender benefits enjoyed under the common law in exchange for other benefits gained under the act. The employer assumes the obligations imposed by the act as written, and this Court may not add to nor subtract therefrom under the guise of interpreting a provision of the act already declared by this Court to be unambiguous.
The language found in the case of McDonald v. Palmetto Theaters, 196 S. C. 38, 11 S. E. (2d) 444, 446, is equally applicable here:
“And there can be no doubt whatever, under the plain and explicit language of Section 60, that the claimant was entitled after the lapse of thirty days to have the award paid which had been made to him on July 7, 1938, of a weekly *337sum extending back to September 2, 1937, notwithstanding the appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.”
Also see Bannister v. Shepherd, 191 S. C. 165, 4 S. E. (2d) 7, 11, wherein it is stated:
“The Legislature has in clear and convincing language provided that an appeal shall only act as a supersedeas for a period of thirty days, whether or not this was a wise decision on the part of the General Assembly, it is not the province of this Court to say. This Court can only carry out the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the Act. * * * so it is apparent that the legislative purpose was to allow a supersedeas for only thirty days, which was neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional, * * *. * * * It must also be borne in mind that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a form of social legislation passed primarily for the benefit of the employee, and to prevent the burden of injured employees becoming charges upon society.”
Quoting further from Bannister v. Shepherd, supra, we find the precise question now before us disposed of in the following language:
“The defendant takes the position that if it be required to make the payments provided for in the award and the Supreme Court should ultimately reverse the Order and judgment of this Court and set aside the award that it would have no way of recovering the payments finally determined not to be due and owing by it, and therefore if Section 60, supra, be so construed as to require the payments of such award during the pendency of its appeal that said Section would deprive it of the equal protection of law and would therefore be unconstitutional. * * *
“Upon consideration of Defendant’s first ground of objection, at first glance it does seem unfair to require the payment of the award during the pendency of an appeal, especially so, when there is no way prescribed for its recovery in the event the award should be set aside.”
*338The legislature could have allowed no supersedeas at all, or permitted one until all questions were concluded and could of course have permitted no appeal whatsoever. The subject was not overlooked; the legislature did not qualify the time limit as it might have done and it is not within the province of this Court to add this or other qualifications.
The legislative intent and language being clear and unambiguous, there is nothing for this Court to construe, 82 C. J. S., Statutes, § 311, p. 526. Once an award of the Industrial Commission is issued in favor of the claimant, thirty days thereafter the employee becomes a privileged suiter and occupies a position similar to that of a wife suing for alimony. See Jeffords v. Jeffords, 216 S. C. 451, 58 S. E. (2d) 731, and long line of decisions adopting the same reasoning. A wife may receive temporary alimony and attorney fees even though she may eventually lose the case for permanent alimony and attorney fees on the trial of the case on its merits. In like fashion, one may receive temporary benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act even though he may eventually lose his case on the merits. And so it is not without precedent even under the common law, for one to receive temporary benefits and later lose the case on its merits; certainly this Court should not in effect nullify a clear and plain mandate of the statute which makes a provision similar in effect to one heretofore adopted by the Court of its own volition under the common law.
After thirty days from the time of the Commission’s award the claimant was entitled to have the temporary total disability payments brought down to date. It should not have been necessary to rule the employer and the insurance carrier to show cause, for one of the purposes of the act is to avoid litigation rather than to encourage it.
The principle set forth in the leading Opinion would encourage “justifiable delay” in hopes of making restitution convenient to the employer. In Workmen’s Compensation cases, this Court has not declared whether restitution is a *339matter of right, a matter of discretion, or entirely unavailable to the employer and this question has not been raised in the appeal now before us; however, if it be a matter of discretion, then no discretion has been exercised by the Commission or by the lower Court. This Court should declare the law only and should not inject it§ own discretion here.
More persuasive still is the fact that even the respondent makes no reference in his brief to restitution, does not proceed on that theory, and does not bottom his claim on the law of restitution. Obviously the appellant has not been permitted to be heard on the issue and learns of the theory as applicable to this case first from this Court.
It may at first seem alarming that one who finally loses a case on the merits, may receive benefits during the course of the litigation but the administration of the law for the great mass of cases occurring annually should not be complicated and made difficult in order to bring about a desirable result injdiis one particular case. Doubtlessly the thirty day provision is a signal from the legislature to the litigants, to the Industrial Commission, and to the lower Court, to proceed with dispatch in order that the employee may receive prompt compensation and be not a charge on the public.
While under the ruling I would adopt, occasionally as here an employee might draw comparatively small amounts of compensation to which he is later adjudged not entitled, such would be more than offset by the fact that adherence to the rule as written would assure prompt hearings and prompt payments in the great multitude of cases wherein the claims are just.
This case is difficult because ordering temporary disability compensation at this time comes after the case is lost on its' merits. That which makes it difficult is the fact that the employer and insurance carrier did not pay according to the law when the compensation was due under the act.
This case cannot be distinguished from the Bannister case by the fact that in that case the employee won the decision *340in the Circuit Court, whereas here the employee lost in the Circuit Court. The Opinion overlooks the fact that under the statute the employee here was entitled to be paid before the Circuit Court ruled upon the appeal. If the payment of temporary disability compensation must await the result of the appeal, then the statute is entirely nullified. If the cases are to be decided on the basis of who won the appeal in the Circuit Court, then every employee must wait until the appeal is decided.
The number of cases appealed to the Circuit Court and not heard within thirty days must be infinitesimally small; experience will show that of such cases most are affirmed. The benefits (of the rule to which I would adhere) to the great mass of injured employees obscures the meager possibility that in an extremely extraordinary situation some employee might gain small benefits as a result of a ruling later made by the Circuit Court reversing the Commission. If the payments are not made in compliance with the statute, the worker will suffer and, if made and the award later%reversed, the employer and its carrier will suffer; therefore, there is no perfect solution but it can be reasonably assumed that the insurance carrier took under consideration this provision of the act at the time of determining the employer’s premium rate and that the legislature was cognizant of the import of the words used in the act.
I would affirm that portion of the Order reversing the award of the Industrial Commission but would hold that the employee was entitled to be paid after the thirty-day supersedeas provided by the statute and that the Circuit Judge should have ordered the same.
Baker, C. J., concurs.