Court Opinion

ID: 9829966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:45:30.373957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:23.524214
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
From a further analysis of the record on motions for rehearing, we have concluded that the respective interests of the appellants were not correctly disposed of. At the time of the divorce decree -in October, 1922, there was due on the purchase vendor’s lien notes executed by Rufus the sum of $475, with interest from March 17, 1920, all of which Rufus paid by May, 1924, out of his earnings after the divorce. Arah testified that she had not paid or offered to pay any part of these notes or the taxes. She did not tender any part of this sum in the *1134trial or offer to do so in any of her pleadings'. She had not been on the land sincé shortly after the divorce. She testified she first moved to Henderson, then to Chicago, and was then living in Fort Worth. In October, 1932, ten years after the divorce decree, she executed the power of attorney heréinbefore mentioned, then asserting an interest in this land. This history of her conduct and attitude towards-this land is in keeping with the testimony of Rufus when he testified. that after Arah came back to the farm shortly after the divorce to get her boy and the household furniture, she told him. she did not want possession of the land, that it was not paid for and she was not going to pay a nickel on it, and she did not want the land; that he relied upon these statements and went ahead and paid. out the land. Upon this phase of the case the jury, in answer to special issues, found that shortly after the divorce Arah stated to Rufus in substance and effect' that she was not interested in the land, and that she would not pay anything on the "unpaid vendor’s lien notes; and that' whén Rufus paid off these notes he relied .upon the statements made by Arah to him. These findings were not attacked in the trial'court by Arah or the royalty owners holding under her.
After the entry' of the divorce decree which did not adjudicate the title, Rufus and Arah became tenants in commdnj subject to all the rules and regulations of strangers bearing to each other that relation. Kirkwood v. Domnau, 80 Tex. 645, 16 S.W. 428, 26 Am.St.Rep. 770; Power v. City of Breckenridge, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 872; Freeman v. Pierce, Tex.Civ.App., 250 S.W. 778. If it be conceded that such interest as' Rufus arid Arah had in the land was community, it' is evidént that they had nothing more than a small equity, an executory contract under the- terms of the deed under which they might have acquired the' outstanding title only by paying the. purchase price notes, two of which were then past due. In Dikes v. Miller, 24 Tex. 417, it is said: “Legal rights, when once vested, must be divested according to law, but equitable rights may be abandoned.” See, also, Hill v. Preston, 119 Tex. 522, 34 S.W.2d 780; 66 Cor.Jur. p. 730; 1 Cor.Jur. p. 10, § 14; 11 Texjur. p. 469.
And, as stated by Justice Greenwood of the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Smith, 115 Tex. 193, 280 S.W. 158, 160:
“Elymas Johnson being without title but holding a mere contract for a title conditioned on payment of the notes, and being unable to pay, could agree by parol for others to have the benefit of his contract. Mead v. Randolph, 8 Tex. [191] 196; Secrest v. Jones, 21 Tex. [121] 132. But for the payments procured by means of Elymas Johnson’s promise to hold for plaintiffs in error, there would have been no divestiture of title out of Sherrod. Elymas Johnson was not contracting away title existing in himself.”
From Arah’s .own testimony she knew there were purchase vendor’s lien notes outstanding and it was incumbent upon her in order to protect her alleged equitable interest to pay or offer to pay at some seasonable time ½ of this indebtedness. She declared she would not pay anything on the land, as found by the jury, in keeping with her statement, did not make a move to assert her alleged claim for ten years, and not then until after this land had greatly enhanced in value. Under the doctrine of estoppel it would be wholly inequitable now for Arah to step in at this late day and recover an interest in this land. Upon this phase of the case, planting the issue upon equitable grounds or that of estoppel and very pertinent to the facts here, we quote from 54 A.L.R. 880, 910:
“In other words, equity does not deny to a cotenant the right to purchase an out7 standing or adverse claim on the common property, although it will not permit him to acquire such title solely for his own benefit, or'to the absolute exclusion of the others. fi.t the same time it exacts from the others the exercise of reasonable diligence in making their election to participate in the benefit of the new acquisition, and will not permit them to equivocate or trifle with the possession thus afforded him, or make it the means of speculation for themselves, by delaying, until a rise in the price of the land, or some other event, shall determine their course. They must make their election to participate within a reasonable time, and contribute or offer to contribute their ratio of the consideration actually paid, or will be deemed to have repudiated the transaction and abandoned the benefits.”
See, also, Magruder v. Johnston, Tex.Civ.App., 233 S.W. 665; Niday v. Cochran, 42 Tex.Civ.App. 292, 93 S.W. 1027; Becker v. Becker, 254 Mo. 668, 163 S.W. 865; Johnston v. Johnston, Tex.Civ.App., 204 S.W. 469; Thompson v. Robinson, 93 Tex. *1135165, 54 S.W. 243, 77 Am.St.Rep. 843; Glenn v. Lowther, 219 Ky. 383, 293 S.W. 947; Williams v. Cook, Tex.Civ.App., 272 SW. 809.
The trial court upon request of appellees (leaseholders) submitted special issue No. 9, reading:
“Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that there was a dispute concerning the title to the land in controversy in this lawsuit on September 11, 1933?”
Jury answer: “No.”
In our original opinion we concluded that said issue presented a question of law. Appellants (Daugherty associates) in their very able and exhaustive brief on motion for rehearing attack this conclusion. They assert that appellees requested the submission of this issue; failed to object to its submission; did not file a motion to enter, a judgment non obstante veredicto to set aside the jury’s finding on this special issue No. 9; and did not in their motions for new trial allege there was no evidence to raise the issue. It can not be said that the record does not reflect this condition as asserted by appellees. However, we are still of the opinion that Issue No. -.9 submitted a question of law to the jury. The recordation of the two powers of attorney and assignment of interest in the Deed Records of Rusk County was constructive notice that the two claims were then being asserted. Both claims were of a serious nature and were largely the basis of this suit. We entertain no sympathy or respect for the clause in reference “to a dispute by any other person,” but are without power to make a new contract in this court.
Our former judgment did not dispose of the interest in the oil already produced nor clearly provide for the disposition of production 'in the future or include the rights under the reverter' clause in the oil and gas lease. In keeping with our former'opinion together with such, modification as contained herein, the final disposition of this appeal is as follows:
The judgment of the trial court as to the respective awards of the several leasehold estates is affirmed.
The judgment which decrees to appellees Thetford, Bradley, a-nd Sun Oil Company their respective interests in the royalty in the entire tract is affirmed-. - - - -
The judgment which decrees to Opal .Givens or her successors in title- to the extent of the surface fee title to the 4-acre tract and of 1¾68 interest in the royalty in the entire tract -is affirmed.
The judgment is reversed, and here rendered that Webb Kennedy, Emma Montgomery, Major Kennedy, Savannah Butts, and Arthur Kennedy each recover a ¾40 interest; and G. W. Morgan recover ½8 interest, respectively, in the surface fee title and the royalty under the entire tract.
That part of the judgment which denied Rufus Jones an interest, in the surface or royalty, and that part which awarded Arah Crenshaw and. those holding .under her a<n interest in the royalty, is- reversed, and judgment is here rendered in favor of Rufus Jones for % 'of the surface fee 'title to the land in'suit, less' the four acres'partitioned to the Givens, and for an undivided %s interest in the minerals in the entire tract including a like interest in the royalty subject to the oil and gas lease in-favor 5f Laird, and subject to’ the partition contract between Rufus Jones and the Givens.'
That part of the judgment which denied Daugherty associates a recovery is reversed, and here rendered that Glenn Myers recover a ½6 interest, Home Corporation, Limited, a ½4 interest, Black Arrow Oil Company a ½2 interest, and Royal Petroleum Company a ½6 interest, respectively, in and to all of the minerals in, under and that may be produced 'from the land in suit] subject to the terms and provisions of lease executed in favor of Laird together with an undivided interest in the same ratio in royalty düe to be paid under said lease and in the possibility of a' reverter.
As the value of the oil produced prior to November 1, 1935, is without dispute, judgment is here rendered that Glenn Myers, Home Corporation, Limited, Black Arrow Oil Company, and Royal Petroleum Company, collectively, recover of Sinclair-Prairie Oil Marketing Company, J. Beren and P. A..Wiley, jointly and severally, the sum of $442.01; and likewise of and from Fred Birdsong the sum of $144:17, and likewise of and from the Overton Refining Company the sum of $463.70.
And, further, that Rufus Jones recover of and from the Sinclair-Prairie Oil-Marketing •Company and J. Beren and P. A. Wiley, jointly and severally,, the sum of $155.79, and likewise of and-from Fred Birdsong the sum- of $103, and likewise of and .-from Overton Refining Company the sum of $331.25.