Court Opinion

ID: 9808962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:56:23.635213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:28.810925
License: Public Domain

CoNNOR, L,
dissenting: I concur in the opinion that the declarations of the defendant made to the prosecutrix were competent for the purpose of supporting or corroborating her testimony in regard to the promise of marriage. It was not competent to prove that, either at the time they were made or at the trial, the defendant was living in adultery with the “Davis girl.” The only controverted question in the case was whether, prior, and as an inducement to the prosecutrix to surrender her person to the defendant, he promised to marry her. This, if made at all, was some seven years before the trial, and several years before the alleged declaration. I concur with Mr. Justice Brown that “the record fails to disclose any testimony whatever as to the relations of the defendant with Lillian Davis, except the declarations of the defendant made to the prosecutrix.” This being true, I do not think that the counsel for the prosecution should have been permitted to argue to the jury “that he was then living in fornication and adultery with Lillian Davis,” after the defendant’s objection. After his Honor had correctly and clearly stated that the declaration was admitted for the sole purpose of corroboration, he was not called upon to introduce evidence to show that he was not living with Lillian Davis, *661except for the purpose of showing the improbability of his haying made the declaration. ■ Whether he was or was not so living was not relevant to the issue. He did, however, expressly deny that he had illicit relations with her, and it is well settled that, being collateral, his denial was conclusive. State v. Cagle, 144 N. C., 835. To permit the attorney for the State to use his declaration, admitted and competent for one purpose only, to persuade the jury that he was guilty of a separate and distinct crime, and draw therefrom prejudicial conclusions in regard to his guilt upon this issue, was error.
This is especially so after he had denied that he had such illicit relations with Lillian Davis. The testimony developed, on the part of the defendant ancl the prosecutrix, a course of lewd conduct well calculated to excite disgust and bring a jury to a verdict of guilty. It is in such case that the rules of procedure and of evidence, based upon experience and reflection, are in danger of being relaxed. The safety of the citizen, when charged with crime, depends upon at least a substantial enforcement of these rules. 'While the defendant may be guilty, he is entitled to be tried according to the “law of the land.” I think that there should be a new trial.
Walicee, J\, concurs in dissenting opinion.