Court Opinion

ID: 9688466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:48:38.834997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:39.158280
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent:
I agree plaintiff failed to establish title on the theory of adverse possession, but am unable to agree he is entitled to recover as an occupying claimant under chapter 560 of the Code. Hence, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The only interest Sarah Jane Canutt ever had in the two lots was the one-third (dower) interest which she took upon the death of her first husband and which she subsequently conveyed to defendant John W. Canutt. It is not contended this conveyance did not include all of her undivided interest in the property. Nor did plaintiff attempt to prove he did not know of the conveyance. He pleaded, but again offered no evidence, that it was without consideration and pursuant to an understanding that Sarah would “retain ownership and possession of said property.”
Plaintiff’s petition alleged his wife, Sarah Jane, remained in possession of the property under claim of ownership from 1924 until her death in 1943. It alleged also that since 1930 plaintiff himself was in hostile and exclusive possession under claim of right and color of title. These allegations are obviously repugnant. If Sarah Jane remained in possession until 1943 plaintiff could not have been in exclusive possession since 1930. His holding was not adverse to her. Keas v. Burns, 23 Iowa 235. His evidence tended to show only that upon his marriage to Sarah Jane Canutt he moved into the home with her, paid taxes, made the improvements here in question in 1930, then moved into the improved property, lived there with Sarah Jane, and after her death rented it to others. With reference to the improvements *702he testified, “nobody objected to it and thought he was doing all right.”
He testified also' he never acquired title to the real estate by deed and never claimed he bought it at any time: “It was already mine after we were married, partly. I didn’t need to buy it. Q. Then it is your contention, is it Mr. Hollinberger, that because you married Mrs. Canutt that that property became your property? A. Partly. Q. That is what you claim. You don’t claim that you ever bought it from anybody, or that you ever acquired a deed for it from anybody, do- you ? A. No.” He testified he paid the taxes, “Why, because I was living there and making it my home. The taxes was due and I paid them. It was on my property.” Plaintiff testified he did not know who was the record titleholder and that the tax receipts were in the names of John Canutt and Ashbel Canutt.
To entitle an occupant of real estate to the benefits of the Occupying Claimants chapter, Code section 560.1 requires, among other things: (1) That he have color of title thereto, and (2) that he has made valuable improvements in good faith.
Section 560.2 provides, in part, persons who occupy premises for five years or who occupy premises for less than five years and pay taxes which are not repaid or tendered within two years “shall be deemed to have color of title within the meaning of this chapter.”
The trial court found:
“The plaintiff has not shown that he has in good faith, as good faith is considered under this chapter, made valuable improvements on the premises. He has not shown that he intended in 1930, at the time of making the improvements, to claim any interest in the real estate. His testimony shows that at the time he made the improvements he thought his wife was the owner of the .property, or at least she had some interest therein.”
Snell v. Mechan, 80 Iowa 53, 54, 45 N.W. 398, points out that good faith requires that the improvements be made under the belief claimant has such a right to or interest in the land as authorizes him to make them, and reasonable grounds for such belief must exist. The mere hope or expectation of securing the prop*703erty at some time in the future does not constitute such good faith.
Lindt v. Uihlein, 116 Iowa 48, 54, 89 N.W. 214, 216, states:
“The doctrine of honest belief * * * is subject to well-defined limitations. The claimant must not only entertain an honest belief in the validity of his title, but he must have some reasonable ground upon which to base such confidence.”
Plaintiff believed Sarah Jane owned the property or had an interest in it. His testimony that it became his property, partly, when he married her, if taken literally, is unrealistic. It does not furnish reasonable grounds for an honest belief that the marriage gave him anything more than an expectation of inheriting the property or receiving a spouse’s share or rights in it in case of her death during his life.
With reference to good faith, 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession, section 170, page 743, states:
“In some jurisdictions good faith means merely the absence of an intent to deceive, mislead, or defraud in the acquisition of color of title # * #. In other jurisdictions good faith in the claim of right, title, or possession has been construed to require, on the part of claimant, an honest belief, based on reasonable grounds, that when he obtained his deed relied on as color of title he acquired a valid legal title * * citing and quoting from McFerrin v. Wiltse, 210 Iowa 627, 231 N.W. 438, “Something must exist upon which he may in good faith base such a claim.”
A headnote in 42 C. J. S., Improvements, section 7b(2), page 433, thus states the general rule as to occupying claimants: “Good faith on the part of an occupant of land claiming compensation for improvements requires his honest and reasonable belief in his title and ownership.”
16 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, Second Ed., Improvements, section 4b, pages 85, 86, states:
“By good faith is meant an honest belief on the part of the occupant that he has secured a good title to the property in question and is the rightful owner thereof. And for this belief there must be some reasonable grounds such as would lead a man of ordinary prudence to entertain it.”
*704The text in 27 Am. Jur., Improvements, section 14, page 270, states, in the absence of a statutory definition of good faith the authorities are not in harmony: “The good faith which will entitle [him] to compensation for improvements has been defined to mean simply a reasonable and honest belief of the occupant in his right or title * *
The author of the annotation in 104 A. L. R. 577 states at page 584:
“Upon any view, there is.no right to recover for improvements mistakenly made on the land of another, where the improver’s belief in his ownership of the premises was so utterly without foundation as to be little more than an idle guess, assumption, or hope.”
A definition approved by the majority in the case at bar is; “The term is used in its popular sense, as the actual, existing state of mind, whether so from ignorance, sophistry or delusion, without regard to what it should be from given legal standards.” Although several decisions subscribe to that rule it is contrary to the great weight of authority and to the rule heretofore existing in this jurisdiction.
The majority states: “Payment of taxes is evidence of good faith. * * * So is the mere fact plaintiff improved the land at his own expense.” It is questionable whether the decision cited by the majority supports either statement. In any event, neither is sound as a general statement. Payment of taxes is an element in proof of color of title and would not be substantial evidence of good faith. Nor may one show improvements were made in good faith by showing merely he made such improvements.
This case falls within the class referred to in the annotation in 148 A. L. R. 335: “Expectation by one who improved real property of acquiring title or interest in property from a third person who in fact had neither title nor enforceable interest as supporting claim for compensation against the true owner.” Some of these cases involve improvements made to the family home by one spouse on the theory it belonged to the other and are factually similar to the case at bar.
Whitehead v. Barker, 288 Mich. 19, 23, 284 N.W. 629, 630, was an action to establish a lien for improvements upon the fam*705ily home made by a husband under the mistaken belief it belonged to his deceased wife, who had previously conveyed it to defendant. Holding the husband was not entitled to compensation and pointing out that if he had an expectancy of title it would not have been sufficient to give him a right of compensation unless defendant was estopped to deny it, the court stated: “Improvements by the husband upon the lands of the wife will in general be presumed to be intended by him for her benefit, and he is consequently not entitled to compensation for the same. * *
Kelly v. Kelly, 293 Ky. 42, 48, 168 S.W.2d 339, 341, 342, 148 A. L. R. 331, 334, which was submitted on demurrer to plaintiff’s pleadings, held a wife’s expectation of inheriting or taking a widow’s interest in her husband’s property did not entitle her to recover from his grantee for improvements on property which she believed her husband owned but which he had conveyed before or after the improvements were made. The court stated:
“Such expectancy is, however, generally held insufficient to constitute or support a claim made in good faith under color o£ title, such as would entitle her to recover the expenditures made in improving the property. «* # *
“We are thus of the opinion that the allegations of the petition and petition as amended were insufficient to show that plaintiff was herself a claimant of the property under color of title or in good faith, where she did not claim under any instrument or deed, as vesting her with color of title.”
Bryan v. Councilman, 106 Md. 380, 67 A. 279, 282, 14 Ann Cas. 1175, holds, to entitle one to recover even in equity for improvements made upon another’s property, he must have acted in good faith, that is, in honest belief, founded upon reasonable grounds, that he had secured good title to the property and was the owner; and hence, where a wife improved land in which her husband had inherited an interest, to serve herself, supposing it would be a home for herself and children, knowing the land did not belong to her, or having no reasonable grounds for believing it did, she could not recover the money expended.
Rainsbarger v. Rainsbarger, 208 Iowa 764, 224 N.W. 45, cited in the majority opinion is not in point. In that case the legal *706title to the real estate upon which the wife placed the improvements was in her husband and she believed he owned it and did not know plaintiff (her husband’s brother) had paid for the property. She pleaded and proved an estoppel based upon plaintiff’s knowledge of and consent to the improvements.
The majority opinion places considerable emphasis upon the rule that oceupying-claimant statutes will be construed liberally. I agree with that rule. Were the rule otherwise it is questionable whether this action, as brought, could have been maintained.
The majority opinion also quotes with approval part of a statement from Lindt v. Uihlein, 116 Iowa 48, 56, 89 N.W. 214, 217, that “The many cases * * * where courts have exercised great liberality, if not ingenuity, in extending the presumption of good faith for the relief of persons claiming compensation for improvements on land, will be found to* have been cases of hardship * * Of course, that does not mean the law will favor the claimant because he happens to be aged or because his wife was a blind pensioner, as pointed out by the majority. Nor does the statement include cases of the type of this case. If it did, the majority opinion would doubtless have cited decisions in which a court, exercising liberality or ingenuity would have allowed a spouse to recover as an occupying claimant in a situation comparable to that at bar. The authorities to the contrary cited above appear to be directly in point.
Wennerstrum, G.J., and Smith and Mttlroney, JJ., join in this dissent.