Court Opinion

ID: 9597469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:59:03.542427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:03.757399
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the conviction in all respects for the following reasons.
I. Double Jeopardy
In this situation there are two separate crimes charged, manufacturing in violation of KRS 218A.1432 and possession of anhydrous ammonia not in a proper container in violation of KRS 250.489. These are distinct crimes, each containing an element that the other does not. It should be remembered that KRS 250.489 describes the crime of knowingly possessing anhydrous ammonia in a container other than *336an approved container as a class D offense and it may be enhanced to possibly a class A felony by virtue of KRS 250.991. Here, the prosecution proved that Parks possessed the unlawfully contained material with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Consequently, the enhancement provision of KRS 250.991 was proper.
Anhydrous ammonia is used for purposes other than manufacturing methamphetamine. It is of its own virtue a regulated substance because it is highly hazardous. See, e.g., 29 CFR 1910.119. Accordingly, KRS 250.489 punishes such careless possession because it endangers public safety to improperly store and transport such a highly hazardous material. See, generally, KRS 205.482, et seq. Moreover, KRS 250.489 is a separate offense to KRS 218A.1432 because possessing anhydrous ammonia in an approved container does not cause a violation of KRS 250.489. Accordingly, one can violate KRS 218A.1432 by manufacturing methamphetamine but not incur violation of KRS 250.489 if the container in which the anhydrous ammonia is kept is approved.
KRS 250.489 contains an element which KRS 218A.1432 does not, that is, possession of anhydrous ammonia in a container other than an approved container. There is no such element of proof within the description of manufacturing methamphetamine. KRS 218A.1432 contains an intent element not present among the elements in KRS 250.489. Accordingly, there is no double jeopardy prohibition for prosecuting a criminal defendant for both crimes. See Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky.1996), which follows the double jeopardy analysis of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). This Court found no double jeopardy bar in regard to similar arguments in Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky.2003), cert. denied, Kotila v. Kentucky, 540 U.S. 1198, 124 S.Ct. 1456, 158 L.Ed.2d 114 (2004).
II. Search
At the time the police stopped the vehicle being driven by Parks, he was on probation and had signed a waiver of rights subjecting him to any and all searches. When the police stopped the vehicle driven by Parks, a warrant had been issued for the search of the residence of his two companions, Blakeman and Morris. It authorized a search of the trailer and all vehicles located on the premises. Although the warrant had not yet been served, the vehicle was seen leaving the residence and was followed by police. The two men for whom the warrant authorized the search were inside of the automobile.
The waiver in question stated in pertinent part:
I, the undersigned, have been informed by my attorney, Phillip Smith, of my Fourth Amendment Right not to have a search of, or seizure of my property owned by me or in my care, custody and control without a valid search warrant ....
That for and in consideration at least in part, of receiving probation, I hereby willingly give my permission to any properly identified law enforcement officer to conduct a complete search of me, my residence and my premises!,] including vehicles, buildings, and containers, under my care, custody and control. Additionally, I willingly consent for these officers to seize anything they desire as evidence for criminal prosecution.
The waiver also indicated that Parks had consulted with his attorney before signing the waiver. It also provided that Parks would willingly agree to remain drug-free while on probation and not asso*337ciate with other drug users or sellers. The trial judge determined that the waiver began at the time probation began in January 2001, and continued for the five-year period of probation, which meant it was in effect when the stop occurred in 2002, as well as when he was tried in 2003.
The stop of the vehicle was reasonable as an investigatory stop pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Taylor v. Commonwealth, 987 S.W.2d 302 (Ky.1998), because there was a reasonable suspicion that a subject is involved or about to become involved in some criminal activity. Parks had signed a waiver in exchange for probation. The authorities cited by Parks are unconvincing and not applicable, particularly in view of the bargain and informed waiver. Cf. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), which deals with a similar but not identical issue. Here, police had a reasonable, independent basis for suspicion in which to make the investigatory stop.
III. Police Testimony
Parks argues that the trial judge committed prejudicial error by allowing evidence to be introduced against him through the testimony of Elizabethtown police sergeant Edwards. Parks claims that the officer was never offered as an expert, but was allowed to testify as if he were an expert for approximately three minutes without any objection from the defense. The officer’s qualifications were subject to direct examination and disclosed that he had 16 years experience in narcotics investigation field; was specifically trained in methods of methamphetamine manufacture; originally took courses in this area in 1987; trained under the federal Drug Enforcement Agency as to clandestine labs, and later took an advanced course in the same subject. He testified that he had been involved in the investigation of hundreds of labs since 1987, and that he was certified to investigate clandestine labs and that such certification was required because of the hazardous material involved. He described anhydrous ammonia as one such material.
Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 801 (Ky.1991), permitted a police witness who is qualified by training and experience to testify in such a situation. See also United States v. Bender, 265 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Quinn, 230 F.3d 862 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676 (6th Cir.1996). These cases support the principle that a police officer, by virtue of his job, training and experience, can in certain instances assist a jury to understand aspects of the drug trade that the average lay juror would not be able to comprehend. It should be understood that the first mention of the process of manufacture was introduced by the defense cross-examination of a prior police witness.
Parks also complains of prejudicial testimony presented by codefendant Morris who Parks claims was “allowed to impeach his own testimony.” The prosecution had uncovered certain facts about prior statements by Morris to police and was attempting to ensure that the trial testimony was consistent and accurate. Originally, the trial judge in chambers had warned the witness not to he and the trial judge repeated that warning during the open-court testimony of the witness. There is no evidence of any kind of cohusion by either the prosecutor or the trial judge that even suggests a conspiracy to intimidate the witness or to prejudice Parks. The witness testified under oath with subject cross-examination and was not impeached.
*338IV. Limitation on Cross-Examination
Parks alleges a denial of his right to cross-examine a police officer concerning a search warrant as a Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) violation. At trial, defense counsel asked Officer Willen on cross-examination why he stopped Parks’ car. The Commonwealth objected and a bench conference followed. Defense counsel told the trial judge that he wanted to show that the police were looking for two men but not for Parks. The judge sustained the objection but permitted the defense to enter the questioned testimony by means of an avowal. During the in-chambers testimony, the officer stated that he stopped the vehicle because it had just left the premises for which the search warrant had been issued. Two individuals other than Parks were named in the search warrant. The trial judge ruled that the testimony was not relevant because he had already determined that the stop and search of a probationer was lawful. The judge reasoned that opening this line of questions could lead to redirect examination about the affidavit supporting the warrant which indicated that two codefendants were waiting at the premises for a third person who would supply them with the illegal ingredients. The judge reasoned that this would lead to a prejudicial inference going to the jury that the third party must have been Parks because it was his vehicle. Defense counsel did not pursue any future questioning following the explanation given by the trial judge.
The requirements of Davis v. Alaska were not compromised. In this case, Parks sought to explore a relatively extraneous matter concerning the search warrant. The warrant did not apply to Parks directly. He had every opportunity to cross-examine the two codefendants and did not choose to do so. The trial judge correctly exercised judicial discretion in preventing the defense from going into extraneous material. Cf. Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718 (1997); KRE 611.
V. Sentencing Information
Parks argues that the jury was given legally and factually inaccurate information regarding the potential sentencing range available during the penalty phase, and thus a new penalty phase should be conducted. It is admitted that this sentence was not properly preserved for appellate review by contemporaneous objection, but that it should be considered pursuant to RCr 10.26. The trial judge combined the penalty phase instructions on one jury form and the instructions did allow the jury to consider a non-enhanced sentence of between ten and twenty years. The combined instructions stated:
A. If you find the Defendant NOT GUILTY of being a Persistent Felony Offender, based on the evidence you heard throughout this trial you shall now fix his punishment for the offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine at confinement in the Penitentiary for a period of not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years, in your discretion.
B. If you find the Defendant guilty of being a Persistent Felony Offender, Second Degree you shall so state in your verdict and fix his punishment for the offense of Manufacturing Methamphetamine at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of not less than twenty (20) years, nor more than Life, in your discretion.
Parks complains that the jury was not permitted to fix any punishment on the underlying offenses before proceeding to whether or not he was proved to have a persistent felony offender status.
*339Although the instructions consolidated the PFO and non-PFO offenses, the jury was properly instructed to consider each one separately. They were first instructed to assess a non-enhanced sentence if PFO did not apply. The result was to achieve a verdict that properly reflected that they found the defendant guilty of each charge, had found him guilty of a PFO second degree, and then they imposed a sentence.
There was never a contemporaneous objection. In fact the prosecutor asked the trial judge as to whether the penalty phase should be trifurcated and the defense counsel stated that it was no longer necessary. Certainly the alleged error was un-preserved, waived and also harmless.
Considering the instructions as a whole, it is clear that the jury decided upon a sentence of twenty years, or the upper limit for each of the two non-enhanced counts and then, after enhancement, left the sentence at twenty years or the minimum sentence after enhancement was considered.
It is true that the verdict sheet expressly stating non-enhanced sentence was not issued. However, we consider this error, if any, to be procedural, and in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, it can be determined to be harmless. See Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 718 (Ky.1991). As such there was no violation of the substantial rights of the defendant.
The failure of the trial judge to follow the precise language of KRS 532.110(l)(c), in the sentencing instruction is based on speculation. The question of whether the aggregate consecutive terms would exceed 70 years is not met in this case. Parks can only speculate that if the jury had been specifically instructed on the 70 year rule, it would have recommended concurrent sentences. The better way to determine sentencing error under a palpable error review is to test for prejudice. In this matter, there was none. The sentence was 30 years below the 70 year cap and the sentence for each of the two crimes was the minimum. Thus, there was no prejudice and the failure to specify the 70 year cap is harmless if error at all.
VI. Sufficiency of Evidence
This case was prosecuted for a violation of KRS 218A.1432(l)(b). In this matter no specific foundation regarding the materials required to make methamphetamine was made at trial. The issue raised on appeal differs from the issue raised at trial and is not properly preserved for appellate review.
At trial, the two codefendants testified that each one of the three individuals knew that the items were intended to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial judge correctly overruled the motion for directed verdict. In this appeal, Parks argues that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that either all of the chemicals or all of the equipment used for the production of methamphetamine were found in his possession. This is a different approach than was used in the trial and is expressly condemned as such a practice in Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466 (Ky.1999), which follows Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.2d 219 (Ky.1976). After much judicial debate involving a variety of cases beginning with Kotila v. Commonwealth, supra, followed by Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363 (Ky.2004), and Varble v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 246 (Ky.2004), this Court has effectively overruled the Kotila decision in Matheney v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599 (Ky.2006).
In any event in this case complicity liability removes this matter from any Kotila requirement. Kotila in that case was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine himself, not counseling, aiding or *340assisting someone else as required by complicity liability. Here, the conduct of Parks satisfies the complicity to commit the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine. Every item enumerated by the statute is in evidence with the possible exception of glassware or jar. Varble, supra, upheld a conviction under KRS 128A.1432(l)(b), where all the chemicals except anhydrous ammonia and all the equipment except for a filter were present. Despite the missing materials, there was sufficient evidence to satisfy even Kotila. In any event, Matheney, supra, disposes of the Kotila analysis.
VII. Instructions
There was no error in instructing the jury in this case because of the complicity aspect which would satisfy the completion of a crime. Complicity does not require the proof of each element of the underlying offense. The only similarity between this case and Kotila is the presence of many ingredients required in the manufacturing process. Here, there was no need for speculation by a jury as to what the ingredients were intended to be used for. Both codefendants had entered guilty pleas to complicity to manufacture and both testified against Parks that he was driving them and these ingredients to a person who would take the ingredients and manufacture the substance and give the three suppliers the processed product.
As noted in Matheney, the language of KRS 218A.1432(l)(b) states “the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine means that one must possess two or more chemicals or items of equipment with the intent to manufacture.” Such a construction is based on the common sense approach which gives the proper recognition to the conduct that is denounced by the statute.
In this case, all that is necessary is that the instructions make out a complicity case under the statute and not a Kotila case. See Commonwealth v. Sutiles, 80 S.W.3d 424 (Ky.2002). Reliance on Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky.2002) and Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878 (Ky.2000), is misplaced.
I would affirm the conviction in all respects.
SCOTT, J. joins.