Court Opinion

ID: 9571422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:41.940209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:26.247189
License: Public Domain

Carley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-plaintiff. However, my analysis of the instant case differs somewhat from that advanced by the majority. Accordingly, I must concur specially.
OCGA § 44-14-161 (a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “When any real estate is sold on foreclosure, without legal process, and under powers contained in security deeds . . . and at the sale the real estate does not bring the amount of the debt secured by the deed ... , no action may be taken to obtain a deficiency judgment *739unless the person instituting the foreclosure proceedings shall, within 30 days after the sale, report the sale ... for confirmation and approval and shall obtain an order of confirmation and approval thereon.” (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, unless the “debt” which was secured by the second security deed was somehow included or includable in the “debt” which was secured by the first security deed, appellee’s failure to obtain confirmation of the foreclosure sale under the first security deed would not provide appellant-defendants with a defense to appellee’s instant action on the note evidencing the “debt” secured by the second security deed. “The confirmation statute does not bar a subsequent action ‘to recover on an independent, separate, unsecured obligation. It is not within the ambit of the statute requiring confirmation.’ [Cit.]” Kennedy v. Trust Co. Bank of Gwinnett County, 160 Ga. App. 733, 734-735 (288 SE2d 87) (1981).
As the majority notes, in C. K. C., Inc. v. Free, 196 Ga. App. 280 (395 SE2d 666) (1990), there was but one purchase money debt, evidenced by two separate notes and secured by one security deed. Under those circumstances, it is clear that foreclosure under the one security deed would encompass the one debt, notwithstanding that that debt had been evidenced by two separate notes.
As the majority also notes, in the instant case, however, there are two separate debts, evidenced by two separate notes and secured by two separate security deeds. Appellee was owed not only the debt secured by the second security deed, but, by assignment, was also owed the debt secured by the first security deed. By virtue of this assignment, the two debts owed to appellee did not merge. See Williams v. Joel, 89 Ga. App. 329 (3) (79 SE2d 401) (1953). In the instant case, the first security deed did contain an “open-end” dragnet clause. However, that clause would not operate to merge the debt secured by the second security deed into the debt secured by the first security deed. Pursuant to OCGA § 44-14-1, the operation of that clause is limited to debts arising between the “original parties” to the first security deed and appellee was not an original party thereto, but held that first security deed by assignment. See Citizens Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Andrews, 114 Ga. App. 94, 96 (1) (150 SE2d 301) (1966).
Since appellants were in default on both notes, appellee, as the holder of both the first and second security deeds, was entitled to institute foreclosure under either the first security deed, the second security deed, or both. Pindar, Ga. Real Estate Law, § 21-74 (3d ed. 1986). Appellee instituted foreclosure only under the first security deed. By foreclosing under the first security deed and failing to confirm, appellee is now barred from seeking a deficiency judgment as to the debt which had been secured by that first security deed. Foreclosure under the first security deed would also serve to extinguish the second security deed and to render the debt which had been secured *740thereunder an unsecured obligation, but foreclosure under the first security deed would not serve to extinguish the debt which had been secured by that second security deed. Failure to confirm foreclosure under the first security deed would not bar appellee from suing appellants on that independent, separate, unsecured obligation which had formally been secured under the second security deed.
Decided December 4, 1992 —
Reconsideration denied December 16, 1992
Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, David Flint, Alexander J. Simmons, Jr., for appellants.
Tomlinson & Dennison, Jeffrey R. Joyce, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson joins in this special concurrence.