Court Opinion

ID: 9498679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:25:01.900637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:00.316966
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority correctly points out that it is very plausible a fellow inmate in D Gallery took the opportunity to enter Fender’s open cell during the time the inmates were released for regular breakfast and that Officer Bull had no involvement in the attack. In reaching its conclusion, however, the majority fails to address several facts that, when viewed under the proper summary judgment standard, require our court to leave this question for a jury to resolve. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
Fender described his attacker as wearing a stocking cap pulled down over his face with eye holes cut out and a prison-issued sweatshirt. He claimed the attacker was not one of the inmates housed within D Gallery because he failed to recognize his voice. Therefore, Fender theorizes that Bull must have let his attacker into the unit and allowed him to access Fender’s cell. In support of this argument, Fender asserts that the inmates were not released for regular breakfast until 7:15 a.m. on July 3, 2001, and therefore there was no reason for Fender’s cell door to be open at the time of the attack. Considering the evidence before us in the light most favorable to Fender’s claim, I can only conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the time the inmates were released for regular breakfast on the morning of the attack.
The housing units eat in a certain order each month. The eating schedule rotates each month, but within any given month the inmates in a certain gallery will generally be eating at approximately the same time. While Bull’s officer’s log for July 3 shows that he released the inmates for breakfast at 6:40 a.m., none of the other officer’s logs for July that are in the record show the prisoners being released that early. The breakfast times in the record indicate that, during the month of July, inmates in D Gallery were released for breakfast between 6:57 a.m. and 7:13 a.m. The earlier breakfast time in the July 3 log is especially troublesome because the officer’s log sheets for July 1 through July 10 have now been lost by the penitentiary, with the exception of the July 3 log sheet. Moreover, Bull initially stated that the inmates were released for breakfast on July 3 at 7:15 a.m. Bull repudiated that statement after he reviewed the July 3 officer’s log and stated that the 6:40 a.m. release time listed there was correct.
The majority accepts Bull’s explanation as reasonable and rejects Fender’s allegations as lacking support. I cannot agree that a plaintiffs failure to provide the court with all the evidence it desires means that the court may ignore the evidence that is actually contained in the record. In my opinion, Fender has presented evidence that calls into question the time the inmates in D Gallery were released for regular breakfast. The resolution of this factual question is not for the courts to decide by determining the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legiti*875mate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge .... ”).
Fender also provided the affidavit of a fellow inmate, David Lee Atkinson, who reported Fender’s injuries to Bull. Atkinson claims to have seen an individual, dressed as Fender reported, brush past him and exit D Gallery as Atkinson returned from early breakfast sometime between 6:50 and 6:55 a.m. Fender relies upon Atkinson’s statement to assert that, no matter what time breakfast occurred on July 3, an inmate exited D Gallery between 6:50 and 6:55 a.m., a time when D Gallery was supposed to be under lock-down. Once again, the majority rejects Fender’s evidence by making factual determinations and weighing the evidence. In my opinion, Fender’s assertion that he failed to recognize his attacker’s voice and Atkinson’s claim that he saw the attacker exit D Gallery when it was under lockdown provides additional evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the unknown attacker was not a resident of D Gallery and entered and exited with the aid of Officer Bull.
The majority defends its weighing of the evidence by emphasizing the lack of context for Bull’s involvement in the attack. It is undisputed that there is no evidence of animus between Fender and Bull. Fender’s alleged attacker is unknown and Fender provided only circumstantial evidence suggesting Bull’s involvement in the attack. However, it is important to note that in section 1983 actions brought by inmates, the only evidence of a conflict or involvement by a guard is often based solely upon the assertions of the injured inmate. See, e.g., Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 52-53, 56-59 (2d Cir.1997) (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs claim where the plaintiff was assaulted in his cell by six inmates who could not have entered had a guard not opened the cell door, the plaintiff claimed a defendant threatened him while he was in the hospital, and the plaintiff claimed one of his attackers made a statement during the attack that suggested the defendant’s involvement). Direct evidence of involvement or motive provided by an inmate is not necessarily any more credible than the circumstantial evidence provided by Fender in this case, and the lack thereof does not justify the majority improperly drawing inferences and weighing evidence in this case. “Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has emphasized, on various occasions, that the question of subjective intent is not an issue in the analysis of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
I will not pretend to profess that this is a perfect plaintiffs case. I merely wish to emphasize that at the summary judgment stage, we are bound to interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. With this obligation in mind, I believe that Fender is entitled to a trial where a jury will properly weigh the evidence he presents. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.