Court Opinion

ID: 9585433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:25.452395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:18.755593
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that the fourth amendment governs probation searches. I agree with the majority that probationers have an expectation of privacy but that their expectation is not the same as that of other citizens who are not on probation. I agree with the majority that the probation officer must have latitude in *65observing the probationer and the probationer's home if the probation officer is to exercise his or her supervisory responsibilities.
This case does not, however, involve a probation officer making a home visit, which is generally regarded as an important part of the supervision. This case involves a probation officer making a search of the probationer's home. This kind of supervision is not usual. As the Department of Health and Social Services has stated, "it is preferable to have searches and seizure conducted by law enforcement authorities, [but] that may not always be feasible or advisable." Appendix, sec. HSS 328.21, Wis. Adm. Code (Reg., April 1986, No. 364, p. 243.)
I agree with the majority that a full search of the probationer's home is permissible without the usual quantum of probable cause. I depart from the majority because I would require that the evidence be suppressed in a criminal case unless the search was conducted by the probation officer with a warrant unless the case falls within one of the traditional exceptions to the warrant rule, e.g., exigent circumstances. The rule under the constitution is that there should be a warrant. That requirement should not be easily cast aside.
I would allow the probation officer to search a probationer's home if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the probationer is violating or is in imminent danger of violating a condition of probation and that the officer has reasonable cause to believe that evidence of the violation will be found in the home to be searched. Evidentiary support for the reasonable cause standard need not meet the standards of Gates, or Aguilar-Spinelli. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); *66Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1969); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). As Judge Hufstedtler explained, the standard should be "sufficiently flexible to accommodate the [probation] officer's supervisory obligations, but not so loose as to offer the [probationer] and his family no protection from arbitrary intrusions by the [probation] officer or from searches that are unjustifiably broad." Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257 (9th Cir. 1975) (Hufstedtler, J. dissenting).
In deciding whether to issue the warrant and in defining its terms, the judge would take into account the strength of the showing of reasonable cause and such additional factors as the nature of the probation violation suspected, the extent to which persons other than the probationer would have their privacy invaded by the search, and the existence of means less intrusive than the search to meet the probations officer's supervisory responsibilities. The issuance of a warrant on this kind of showing is not an undue burden on the probation officer and provides the protection for the probationer guaranteed by the constitutions. Requiring an officer to articulate reasons for the search is a deterrent to impulsive or arbitrary governmental conduct— and that is what the fourth amendment is about. Upholding the warrant requirements for searches of the probationer's home does not impede the dual goals of probation, protecting the public and rehabilitation. Latta, supra 521 F.2d at 257.
Professor LaFave characterizes Judge Huf-stedtler's dissent in the Latta case as "cogently reasoned." Search and Seizure, sec. 10.10, p. 441 (1978). I am persuaded by her dissent and the similar reasoning in United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982).
*67Because there was a search of this probationer's home without a warrant and there is no claim that the case falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, I would suppress the evidence.
Even if I were to agree with the majority that no warrant was needed, I would have to dissent because the facts in this case do not satisfy the tests set forth by the majority and the Department of Health and Social Services.