Court Opinion

ID: 9518358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:50:59.984434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:41.523434
License: Public Domain

Todd, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in that part of the majority opinion which holds that a refusal to receive into evidence medical records of complainant on the basis of an invocation of the statutory privilege effectively *131denies defendant his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under the rule enunciated in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. ed. 2d 347 (1974).
However, since this court, in State v. Fontana, 277 Minn. 286, 152 N. W. 2d 503 (1967), has precisely interpreted Minn. St. 595.02 to preclude disclosure by a physician of any medical information or opinion derived from attending a patient in a professional capacity without the patient’s consent, I would expressly overrule Fontana. A comparison of the subsequent interpretation of the constitutional right of confrontation with our decision in Fontana necessitates the conclusion that the two theories are irreconcilable. By overruling Fontana, it would be possible to maintain the personal medical privilege created by the statute but read with and subject to constitutional limitations now applicable.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the defense of good motive constitutes reversible error.
Minn. St. 609.255 provides:
“Whoever, knowing he has no lawful authority to do so, intentionally confines or restrains a child not his own under the age of 18 years without his parent’s or legal custodian’s consent, or any other person without his consent, is guilty of false imprisonment and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both.”
The majority opinion relies upon the cases of Commonwealth v. Trunk, 311 Pa. 555, 167 A. 333 (1933), and Henderson v. State, 95 Ga. App. 830, 99 S. E. 2d 270 (1957), to support its conclusion that the motives or good faith of the defendant are proper matters of defense to be considered by the jury on the trial of a criminal charge for false imprisonment. These cases may be *132distinguished factually in that in both situations defendants were police officers executing their duties and acting within what they believed was their legal authority. There is no such claim here.
In Trunk, the court relied upon the fact that defendants “were police officers investigating crime. Their motive, their reason for arresting and holding [the complainant] .was a most important part of their defense, because it tended to justify the original act of taking into custody and his detention at least for a certain time.” 311 Pa. 568, 167 A. 338.
The Henderson case similarly involved prosecution of a state patrolman for. arresting, without a warrant, a driver for drunkenness on a public highway. The officer’s asserted defense was his good-faith belief that he had probable cause to conclude that an offense was being committed in his presence. The court reasoned that where this is the sole defense relied upon, it is error to fail to instruct the jury as to its elements. The applicable statute was quoted as follows:
“ ‘False imprisonment is a violation of the personal liberty of a person and consists in confinement or detention of such person without sufficient legal authority.’ Code § 26-1501.
“ ‘Any person who shall arrest, confine, or detain a person without process, warrant, or legal authority to justify it, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.’ Code § 26-1502.
“ ‘An arrest for a crime may be made by an officer * * * without a warrant if the offense is committed in his presence * * *.’ Code § 27-207.” 95 Ga. App. 832, 99 S. E. 2d 272.
The court concluded that motive and good faith are legitimate matters of defense to be considered by the jury in passing upon false imprisonment indictments because they “negative the idea of criminality.” It would appear that statutory construction would allow this interpretation. Ga. Code § 26-1502, supra, indicates that there is an implied allowance for the belief that there was legal authority to confine; i.e., a belief by defendant officer that he had probable cause to arrest.
*133However, since Minn. St. 609.255, unlike the interdependent statutes considered in Henderson, seemingly focuses only upon an intent to confine, the suggested defense would appear to be germane only to the knowledge of legal authority to confine or to a belief that consent had been given.
Practically speaking, there are situations which may arise in which an alleged defense of good motive would be wholly proper in a prosecution for false imprisonment. The trial court may then, after receiving and reviewing the evidence, within its discretion determine whether the jury should be so instructed. Such was apparently the procedure here, with the court determining that the evidence did not establish that this was a proper consideration for the jury.
As discussed fully in the majority opinion, the record indicates a rather substantial dispute in the focal evidence upon which defendant relies in asserting the defense of good motive to the criminal charge of false imprisonment. Despite repeated claims by defendant that his actions were directed at preventing a suicide attempt by complainant, there is evidence that as the police officers approached the automobile in which complainant was confined, defendant did not immediately release her. Further, complainant testified that defendant told her, “Now be quiet * * * [a] nd stop' crying, there’s a police car right next to us.”
With this evidence before the court, a discretionary determination was made that an instruction regarding good faith or motives was not proper. I would, therefore, allow this determination to stand.
Mr. Justice Scott took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.