Court Opinion

ID: 9890548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 15:10:20.830423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:27.236170
License: Public Domain

J-S22030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JENNIFER ANN MEDZIE                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1220 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 23, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
            Criminal Division at No: CP-17-CR-0000771-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                      FILED: October 13, 2023

      Appellant, Jennifer Ann Medzie, appeals from the September 23, 2022

order denying her petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts:

            On August 25, 2016, a criminal complaint was filed against
      [Appellant], which charged her with homicide, aggravated assault,
      endangering the welfare of children, simple assault, and recklessly
      endangering another person. The charges stem from an incident
      on November 15, 2013. At that time, [Appellant] resided with her
      boyfriend, Cody Lauder, and his 2-year-old daughter, S.H.
      (hereinafter “the Victim”). On November 15, 2013, [Appellant]
      was taking care of the Victim while Cody Lauder was at work, like
      she had done since moving in with them. About 7:30 that
      morning, the Victim woke up in her pack and play, and [Appellant]
      took her out to get the Victim dressed for the day. While
      [Appellant] was dressing the Victim, she went limp in [Appellant’s]
      arms. [Appellant] then called the Victim’s step-grandmother for
      help. Brandi Lauder, the step-grandmother, told [Appellant] that
      the victim had been sick the night before and she was probably
      just tired from being ill. Shortly after, [Appellant] called her
J-S22030-23

        friend, Krisandra Evans, to come over because something was
        wrong with the Victim. Evans arrived at [Appellant’s] house at
        approximately 8:00 a.m., and Evans called Brandi Lauder to tell
        her the Victim was not breathing normally. Then, Evans called
        911 at 8:44 a.m.

              EMS arrived and transported the Victim to Clearfield
        Hospital, but the Victim was ultimately flown to Pittsburgh
        Children’s Hospital for treatment. On November 16, 2013, Dr.
        Adelaide Eichman examined the Victim and found her injuries
        were caused by non-accidental shaking. Despite being treated,
        the Victim was pronounced dead on November 18, 2013. An
        autopsy was performed on November 20, 2013 by Dr. Kenneth
        Clark; Dr. Clark found that the injuries suffered by the Victim
        appeared to be caused by blunt force trauma. The manner of
        death was listed as ‘pending investigation.’ Later, Dr. Harry
        Kamerow reviewed the medical and autopsy reports and found
        that the cause of death was global hypoxic ischemic
        encephalopathy, the manner of death was homicide. Additionally,
        Dr. Kamerow found that the Victim would have been symptomatic
        almost immediately after the injury had occurred.

PCRA Court Opinion and Order, 9/28/22, at 1-2.

        On August 23, 2017, at the conclusion of a three-day trial, the jury

found    Appellant     guilty   of   third-degree   murder,   aggravated   assault,

endangering the welfare of children, and related offenses.1 The trial court

imposed an aggregate twenty to forty years of incarceration.           This Court

affirmed the judgment of sentence on October 9, 2019.            On November 9,

2020, Appellant filed this timely, counseled, first PCRA petition alleging the

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The PCRA court conducted a hearing on

April 18, 2022 and entered its order denying relief on September 28, 2022.

This timely appeal followed.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 2702, and 4304.

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       On appeal from an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must determine

whether the record supports the PCRA court’s findings of fact, and whether

the PCRA court committed an error of law. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183

A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018), aff’d, 226 A.3d 995 (Pa. 2020). The PCRA

court’s findings of fact, if supported by the record, are binding on this Court.

Id. We review the PCRA court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

       To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCRA

petitioner must plead and prove that (1) the underlying issue is of arguable

merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis in support of the disputed

action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice, such that there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the outcome of the

underlying proceeding would have been different.           Commonwealth v.

Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 880-81 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 125 A.3d

1201 (Pa. 2015). The failure to meet any of these prongs is fatal to the claim.

Id.

       Appellant’s written argument is divided in twelve sections addressing

separate allegations of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.2 Many of these sections

____________________________________________

2   This strategy rarely succeeds:

             Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through
       over-issue. The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive
       to the suggestion that a lower court committed an error. But
       receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors
       increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one ...
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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are underdeveloped and repetitive of one another. We will address each in

turn.

        First, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue

an alternate perpetrator claim. Appellant’s Brief at 11-13. In particular, she

argues that trial counsel should have introduced evidence that the Victim’s

father, Cody Lauder (“Cody”), had a history of violent and controlling

behavior. In a statement to police, the Victim’s biological mother said Cody

had anger issues and would have been capable of causing the Victim’s fatal

injury.    Appellant also notes that Cody was the last person other than

Appellant to be with the victim before the fatal injury occurred. The record

reflects that the Victim was hospitalized briefly on November 14, 2013, the

night before the incident in question, while she was in the custody of her

grandparents. The hospital records from that night note a yellow bruising on

the Victim’s forehead. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22, at 15-16. Thus, Appellant

claims that trial counsel should have used Cody’s propensity for violence and

the hospital records from the night before the incident to introduce an

alternate perpetrator defense.

____________________________________________

        [E]xperience on the bench convinces me that multiplying
        assignments of error will dilute and weaken a good case
        and will not save a bad one.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 864 A.2d 460, 480 (Pa. 2004) (quoting,
Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 Temple L.Q.
115, 119 (1951) (emphasis added in Robinson).

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       We believe this issue is of arguable merit. Appellant cannot, however,

make out the remining two prongs of her ineffective assistance claim.         As

noted above, the Commonwealth’s evidence was that the Victim died from

sudden, nonaccidental shaking, and that the onset of symptoms would have

started immediately when she sustained the injury. Appellant was the only

person with the Victim when her symptoms began.           Further, trial counsel

testified at the PCRA hearing that he was aware of the Victim’s hospitalization

on the night before her death, and that he tried and failed to find an expert

who would have testified that the Victim’s death could have resulted from a

preexisting illness or injury.3 N.T, PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22, at 29-30. Counsel

therefore concluded that an alternate perpetrator defense was not viable.

Instead, his trial strategy was to establish that Appellant lacked the specific

intent to kill and therefore avoid a conviction for first-degree murder.      He

succeeded. Given all of the foregoing circumstances, we conclude counsel’s

strategy was reasonable. Also, given the apparent lack of evidentiary support

for an alternate perpetrator defense, Appellant cannot establish prejudice.

Her first argument fails.

____________________________________________

3  The PCRA court found counsel’s testimony credible and relied on it in its
opinion. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/28/22, at 5. At the PCRA hearing, PCRA
counsel acknowledged that he was unable to procure an expert who would
have refuted the Commonwealth’s medical experts. PCRA counsel therefore
withdrew the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with
and procure a favorable expert witness. N.T, PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22, at 60-
61.

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      Appellant’s second argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to impeach Cody with pretrial statements he made to police.

Appellant’s Brief at 13-15.   In two of his interviews with police, Cody was

asked whether anyone used physical discipline on the Victim. Cody said that

he lightly smacked the victim “on the butt” and that Appellant did not use

physical discipline.   Also, Cody told police that he sometimes became

frustrated with the Victim and needed a break. Appellant claims trial counsel

should have examined Cody on these statements because “he was alone with

the victim just hours before she was rushed away to the hospital where the

injuries were noticed.” Appellant’s Brief at 15. As we explained just above,

the record reflects that Appellant was alone with the Victim at the onset of

symptoms, and the symptoms would have ensued immediately after the

injury. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the outcome of trial would

have been different if the jury knew that Cody sometimes became frustrated

with the Victim and spanked her on the butt.

      Appellant’s third argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to examine Cody about his statement that he did not believe Appellant would

intentionally hurt the Victim. Appellant’s Brief at 16. We believe this issue is

of arguable merit, and trial counsel acknowledged at the PCRA hearing that

he should have introduced Cody’s statement at trial.          Nonetheless, trial

counsel succeeded in convincing the jury that Appellant did not act with the

specific intent to kill the Victim. The jury acquitted her of first-degree murder.

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We therefore discern no prejudice to Appellant resulting from counsel’s

omission.

      Appellant’s fourth argument is that that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to question Cody about the paternal grandfather’s use of physical

discipline on the Victim.     Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.     During one of his

interviews with Police, Cody said that his father would sometimes ask the

Victim if he wanted Papa to “kick her big ass.” N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22,

at 14.     Paternal grandfather was watching the Victim on the evening of

November 14, 2013 when she needed to be taken to the hospital. Id. Thus,

Appellant believes that evidence of the paternal grandfather’s corporal

punishment would have raised an inference that paternal grandfather, not

Appellant, might have been responsible for the Victim’s injury. This is another

version of the alternate perpetrator defense. As we have already explained,

the evidence did not support that defense.

      Appellant’s fifth argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to impeach Cody regarding his statement that Appellant displayed little

emotion when the Victim passed away. Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Appellant

claims Cody had no knowledge of her reaction because Appellant was not at

the hospital when the Victim died. The pertinent exchange at trial went as

follows:

      Q.     Were you at the hospital when [the Victim passed away?]

      A.     In Pittsburgh?

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      Q.    Yes.

      A.    Yeah.

      Q.    How about [Appellant]? Was she there?

      A.    At the beginning, yeah.

      Q.    Did she have any reaction or emotion when [the Victim]
            passed?

      A.    Very little.

N.T. Trial, 8/21/17, at 48-49.

      Appellant fails to explain how counsel’s failure to object to this exchange

resulted in prejudice. If Appellant was not at the hospital when the Victim

died—and Cody testified that she was there only “at the beginning”—then she

would have been informed of the Victim’s death somewhere else at some other

point in time. Appellant’s argument rests on an unproven assumption that

Cody had no knowledge of Appellant’s initial reaction to the news of the

Victim’s death. Indeed, had defense counsel examined Cody on this point, he

might have simply clarified that the Victim displayed no emotion upon being

informed of the Victim’s death, wherever and whenever that occurred.

Because Appellant has offered no evidence to show that Cody had no

knowledge of Appellant’s initial reaction, this argument lacks merit. Further,

defense counsel remembered a state trooper saying that Appellant had little

reaction to the Victim’s death.    N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22, at 17.       Had

defense counsel pursued this line of inquiry with Cody, he risked opening the

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door for the Commonwealth to belabor a point that was not favorable to

Appellant.

      Appellant’s sixth argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to file a motion to suppress one of her pretrial statements to police.

Appellant’s Brief at 20-22. In her final interview with the police, Appellant

said the Victim bumped her head on a coffee table on the morning of

November 15, 2013. She had not mentioned that fact in her earlier police

interviews. Appellant claims that, prior to giving the statement in question,

she signed a waiver of rights and consent form only because police promised

her she would get to go home and see her family after her interview. She

claimed that this false promise from police provided grounds for a motion to

suppress. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that Appellant never

informed him of this alleged promise prior to trial.        N.T. PCRA Hearing,

4/18/22, at 22-23, 31. The PCRA court found counsel credible. Appellant has

failed to establish the factual predicate for this argument.

      Appellant’s seventh argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to the authenticity of a series of Facebook messages between

Appellant and her friend, Krisandra Evans. Appellant’s Brief at 22-24. In the

messages, Appellant revealed to Evans that she was frustrated with taking

care of the Victim, and that she might end up hurting the Victim. N.T. Trial,

8/21/17, at 98.

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       Electronic messages are subject to the same authenticity requirements

as any other document. Commonwealth v. Orr, 255 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa.

Super. 2021), appeal denied, 266 A.3d 2 (Pa. 2021).4 “[A]uthentication of

electronic communications, like documents, requires more than mere

confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular person.

Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender,

is required.” Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2011),

aff’d by an equally divided Court, 106 A.3d 705 (Pa. 2014). In Koch, this

Court held that the Commonwealth failed to authenticate text messages where

there was no testimony to establish that the defendant wrote all the drug-

related text messages retrieved from her cell phone. Id. There were “no

contextual clues in the drug-related text messages themselves tending to

reveal the identity of the sender.” Id. Indeed, the Commonwealth conceded

that the defendant was not the only person known to send text messages from

her phone. Id.

       In Orr, on the other hand, this Court held that the Commonwealth

produced sufficient circumstantial clues to identify the defendant as the author

of the disputed text messages.          Orr, 255 A.3d at 601.   In particular, the

content of the messages indicated that the defendant wrote them.              The

____________________________________________

4  Pa.R.E. 901(a) provides that the proponent of evidence must produce
sufficient evidence to support a finding that the item is what it appears to be.
Pa.R.E. 901(a).

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messages, from the defendant to the victim, commonly referenced their

ongoing custody dispute. Id. In context, they made clear that they were sent

from a “disgruntled lover who shared a daughter with the [recipient.]” Id.

      In Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa. Super. 2018), this

Court considered the admissibility of Facebook chat logs.       “Social media

evidence presents additional challenges because of the great ease with which

a social media account may be falsified, or a legitimate account may be

accessed by an imposter.” Id. at 1162. “Nevertheless, social media records

and communications can be properly authenticated within the existing

framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and Pennsylvania case law, similar to the manner

in which text messages and instant messages can be authenticated.”         Id.

Thus, there must be an adequate showing of relevance and authenticity, along

with direct or circumstantial evidence to identify the author. Id.

      In Mangel, a police officer testified that a search for the Facebook page

of the defendant’s name revealed a Facebook page with his name, identifying

his town of residence as Meadville, PA, and depicting pictures of him. Id. at

1156-57.    The Commonwealth failed, however, to offer any direct or

circumstantial evidence that the defendant was the author of the messages in

question.   The fact that the account reflected the defendant’s name,

hometown, and high school was not sufficient for that purpose, and there were

no contextual clues in the messages themselves that served that purpose. Id.

at 1164. Thus, the trial court did not err in excluding them. Id.

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      Instantly, Evans testified that she and Appellant communicated on

Facebook and in person.    N.T. Trial, 8/21/23, at 96.   She said she never

received a Facebook message from Appellant’s account that came from

someone other than Appellant.         Id. at 96-97.       Evans identified a

Commonwealth exhibit as a copy of an exchange of Facebook messages

between herself and Appellant. Id. at 97. Evans read the following portion

of Appellant’s message to her into the record:

            Ha, ha, ha, at least he got it. Yeah, after she sat on time-
      out and she sat there for like fifteen minutes, and I asked her if
      she wanted me to paint her nails, then I fed it to her. I’m stuck
      with her now while Cody sleeps. I’m pissed. I said, ‘is she going
      up there?’ And he said, ‘How often does she go up there anymore?’
      I said, ‘Never.’ And he just fell back to sleep. It’s not supposed
      to rain tomorrow. I checked on every news thing. Ha, ha. I’ll
      check again.     Seriously, Pee Wee, I’m sick and tired of
      watching her. I’m gonna end up hurting her or me, more
      than likely me. I’m not kidding. I’m tired of yelling at her
      for putting her finger in her mouth and teasing Jackson.
      The next time Jackson bites her, I’m just letting him. I
      don’t care. Someday next week maybe Soph is going to have to
      go with Brandi because my mom’s gonna make me a hair
      appointment. It’s just would you take me to Tracy’s to get it
      done?

Id. at 98. This post was dated October 11, 2013. Id. at 100.

      Evans testified that Jackson was the dog. Id. at 99. “Pee Wee” is Evans’

nickname. Id. Evans said that “her” in the bolded portion of the quote above

referred to the Victim. Id. Thus, Appellant stated in the Facebook message

that she would either hurt the Victim or herself. Id. at 100.

      In summary then, the recipient of Appellant’s message took the stand

and testified that she and Appellant communicated regularly on Facebook and

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that she had never received a message from Appellant’s account that was

authored by anyone other than Appellant.         Further, Appellant’s message

referenced the Victim by name, referenced the dog by name, and referred to

Evans by her nickname, “Pee Wee.”        Appellant’s message also referenced

Cody, with whom she lived at the time. These contextual clues are similar to

those present in Orr but missing in Koch and Mangel. The record therefore

contains more than sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence that the

Facebook message to Evans came from Appellant’s account and that Appellant

authored it.   An objection based on authenticity would have failed, and

counsel’s failure to lodge that objection was not prejudicial to Appellant.

      Next, in her eighth argument, Appellant claims trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to secure the testimony of Dr. Kenneth Clark, the coroner

who conducted the Victim’s autopsy and initially listed the cause of death as

undetermined. Appellant’s Brief at 24-26. To prevail on a claim that trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to call a witness, a PCRA petitioner must

establish:

              1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to
      testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known
      of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to
      testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of
      the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a
      fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 209 A.3d 992, 998 (Pa. Super. 2019). Appellant

did not call Dr. Clark at the PCRA hearing. Thus, there is no evidence that he

was willing to testify for the defense or of what his testimony would have

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been, and therefore nothing in the record to support a conclusion that the

absence of Dr. Clark’s testimony was prejudicial to Appellant. This argument

fails.

         Appellant’s ninth argument is that trial counsel failed to present

evidence of the Victim’s condition on the evening of November 14, 2013.

Appellant’s Brief at 26.       As noted above, the reports from the Victim’s

hospitalization that evening indicate that she had bruising on her head.

Appellant claims this evidence was critical to establishing that the Victim’s

fatal injuries were not sustained on the following morning when the Victim

was in Appellant’s sole care. This argument is another offshoot of Appellant’s

alternate perpetrator theory.       We have already explained that that theory

lacks merit because all of the evidence indicates that the Victim died from an

injury she sustained on the morning of November 15, 2013. Evidence that

the Victim had bruising on her forehead the previous evening would not have

altered the outcome of trial.

         Appellant’s tenth argument is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to address her presumption of innocence with the jury. Appellant’s Brief at

27. Appellant’s argument on this point is conclusionary and undeveloped. In

any event, the record reflects that the trial court instructed the jury that

Appellant was innocent until proven guilty.          N.T. Trial, 8/23/17, at 139.

Because the trial court explained the presumption of innocence to the jury,

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we discern no possible prejudice to Appellant resulting from trial counsel’s

failure to do so.

      Appellant’s eleventh argument is that counsel was ineffective for failing

to preserve her sentencing challenges on direct appeal. Appellant’s Brief at

27-29. On direct appeal, this Court concluded that Appellant’s challenges to

the discretionary aspects of her sentence either were not included in her post-

sentence motion, and therefore waived, or did not raise substantial questions.

The panel also noted, in dicta, that the issues were meritless even if properly

preserved. Commonwealth v. Medzie, 694 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. Oct. 9,

2019), unpublished memorandum, at 5-6.         The dicta from the prior panel

would not have precluded this panel from considering the merits of Appellant’s

sentencing arguments, but Appellant’s brief does not address the merits of

the waived sentencing issues. Thus, she does not explain how counsel’s error

prejudiced her. The failure to preserve an issue for direct appeal does not

result in presumed prejudice. Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119,

1128 (Pa. 2007).

      Appellant’s twelfth and final assertion of error is that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to impeach Krisandra Evans. Appellant’s Brief at 29-30.

Appellant asserts that, on September 11, 2017, Evans was charged with felony

and misdemeanor drug crimes. Appellant asserts these charges were pending

at the time of her August 2017 trial, but not disclosed by the Commonwealth

and not discovered by defense counsel. Appellant cites Brady v. Maryland,

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373 U.S. 83 (1963), but she does not develop any argument as to the

Commonwealth’s duty to disclose to Appellant that Evans was under

investigation as of Appellant’s trial. Trial counsel noted that the yet unfiled

charges against Evans would not have appeared on the criminal background

that he received for trial witnesses.   N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/18/22, at 25.

Appellant does not argue that defense counsel was aware or should have been

aware of the pending charges by any other means. Appellant baldly asserts

that impeachment of Evans with Evans’ pending criminal investigation would

have changed the outcome of trial, but she does not explain why this is so,

given all the evidence against her. For these reasons, Appellant cannot obtain

relief on her final argument.

      Because we have reviewed each of Appellant’s arguments and found

them lacking in merit, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

DATE: 10/13/2023

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