Court Opinion

ID: 9630977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:26:11.482435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:49.315104
License: Public Domain

*328POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant Odell McDuffie, appealing from a conviction of murder of the second degree, contends that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to strike certain testimony given on cross-examination by a prosecution witness. The majority agrees, reverses the judgment and remands for a new trial. I respectfully dissent.
The allegedly damaging testimony appears at the end of the following portion of the cross-examination by the defense of one Alvin Jordan, called as a witness for the Commonwealth:
By Miss Nichols [Attorney for the defense]:
Q Now, aside from Mr. McDuffie’s problem. — and you have already acknowledged that you have an interest in truth and justice prevailing.
Aside from that, sir, what did you discuss with the District Attorney, as concerns your own particular problems, which also necessitate truth and justice?
MR. STRAUSS [Assistant District Attorney]: I’m going to object, your Honor, unless counsel is more specific to which time. There’s two interviews.
THE COURT: I thought we had that straightened out. Will you give him a chance to answer and try to keep your questions to the point?
MISS NICHOLS: OK, Fine.
By Miss Nichols:
Q We will start with the first contact you had with a member of the District Attorney’s office. On that occasion, aside from discussing the shooting and killing of George Rodgers, what did you discuss, with reference to your problem?
A I didn’t discuss nothing as far as my robberies are concerned. As far as Odell is concerned, yes, I discussed it. My lawyer told me — I told him what happened and after Odell told me that the boy died, you know, and being as *329though Odell beat — or got a probation of a homicide later on, I feel as though he can’t handle this one.
MISS NICHOLS: I request to have that stricken, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
BY MISS NICHOLS:
Q Now, will you try to be responsive?
THE COURT: You asked for the conversation. You may not like the answers but he’s trying to answer you.
The general rule, as the Court acknowledges, is that a party is not entitled to have stricken incompetent testimony which that party elicits. The Court then concludes that the instant case is not within the proscription of the rule because the witness Jordan’s testimony was unresponsive, was not elicited by defense counsel and was “well beyond the scope of defense counsel’s question.” Opinion of the Court, ante, at 326.
The view of the trial judge, in contrast, was that the witness was responsive and was, in the face of frequent interruption by defense counsel, attempting to answer questions put to him which were hardly “clear.” * After reviewing the record, I am obliged to agree, and cannot accept the sweeping statement of the majority opinion that Jordan’s testimony was “well beyond” the scope of the questioning. Rather, the witness’ answer was arguably elicited by the defense questions and the defendant should not now be heard to complain. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325 (1971). I find no reason to make exceptions to the normal rule that incompetent testimony elicited here by defense counsel will not be sanctioned.
*330In addition, the record does not support the Court’s paraphrase of Jordan’s testimony as being “to the effect that appellant had previously been convicted of another homicide.” (At p. 323; my emphasis). What Jordan said was that appellant “beat or got a probation of a homicide later on.” It is not semantic quibbling to emphasize that the import and seriousness of the two versions are not the same. At best, the admitted remark indicates that appellant had not been convicted of a previous homicide; at worst, that appellant had received probation, presumably pursuant to the acceptance of some sort of guilty plea.
It should be noted furthermore that at no time did defense counsel request cautionary instructions or renew her motion to strike the answer upon which the Court today reverses. While I concede that a better response on the part of the trial judge would have been to strike the testimony and give cautionary instructions concerning it, I cannot agree that the degree of prejudice to appellant is so severe as to warrant reversal. Viewing the record as a whole, I find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Stanton Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155.
As I am in agreement with the majority that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder of the second degree, I would affirm the conviction.
EAGEN, C. J., and LARSEN, J., join in this opinion.

 The cross-examination of the witness Jordan, up through the point of the challenged exchange, occupies a scant twelve pages [N.T. to ] out of a trial transcript of some 739 pages reflecting four days of trial. In those twelve pages of cross-examination, the record shows, the trial judge three times requested that defense counsel keep her questions “to the point” and cease interrupting the answers of the witness. Furthermore, the trial judge also three times stated his belief that the witness was, in fact, attempting to answer counsel’s questions.