Court Opinion

ID: 9955146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 19:02:12.993483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.704923
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 P. v. Tate CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081982

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. SWF1807246)
ELVIS EUGENE TATE,

      Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Walter H. Kubelun, Judge. Affirmed.
         Mark D. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Jennifer B. Truong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      Elvis Eugene Tate appeals from a judgment following convictions on

one count of murder in violation of Penal Code1 section 187, subdivision (a),
and one count of driving under the influence of alcohol and a drug, causing
bodily injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (g). He
contends the convictions should be reversed because the trial court
prejudicially erred in not instructing the jury on gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated. The Attorney General disagrees, and so do
we. Hence we affirm the conviction.
                                   I.
                   Factual and Procedural Background
A.    Evidence at Trial
      The evidence adduced at trial is largely undisputed.
      One evening in 2018, a car driven by Tate was observed weaving,
swerving, cutting off other vehicles, and traveling at high rates of speed, first
on the 76 freeway and then on Winchester Road in Riverside County.
Noticing the erratic manner of the car’s progress, the driver of another car
traveling in the same direction telephoned 911 and used her cell phone to
film Tate’s car in transit. Drivers of other cars resorted to evasive maneuvers
to avoid being struck by Tate’s car. After running several red lights, Tate’s
car finally came to rest when it forcefully collided with another car—igniting
a fire, killing the other car’s driver, and injuring its passenger.
      A civilian rendering assistance at the scene detected a strong smell of
alcohol on Tate. A CHP officer detected the odor of alcohol on Tate’s breath
and the odor of marijuana on his person. Based on these observations and
Tate’s slurred speech, bloodshot/red watery eyes, and nystagmus, this officer
determined Tate had been impaired at the time of the collision.

1     All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                         2
      A second CHP officer interviewed Tate at the hospital later that
evening. Tate gave this officer conflicting accounts as to whether he had
consumed alcohol and marijuana that day. Tate also told this officer that he
was familiar with the consequences of drinking and driving because that
topic had been addressed in coursework he had recently completed toward
applying for a class B (commercial) driver’s license, as well as in discussions
with his wife (a nurse) and in classes he had taken after receiving a DUI
conviction years earlier.
      Asked specifically about what he had learned in the commercial driving
classes he had recently completed, Tate responded:
         “Tate: If somebody [is] killed while I’m driving the car, I’m
         gonna [go to] jail for the rest, I’m gonna [go to] jail, ain’t no
         ifs, ands or buts about it.
         “[¶ . . . ¶]
         “Officer: Do you know why . . . you’d go away for the rest of
         your life?
         “[¶ . . . ¶]
         “Tate: You[’re] supposed to know better and ain’t no such
         thing, even if I was drinking, I should knew better, I should
         know, uh, to watch the, I, I, I[’m] supposed to know better,
         ain’t no excuses.
         “Officer: Did they explain to you that if you’re driving
         under the influence that you could possibly be charged with
         murder?
         “Tate: Yes, yes, they told me.
         “[¶ . . . ¶]
         TATE: [T]hey tell you that you’re not supposed to drive
         with any alcohol in your system. If you drive with alcohol
         in your system, you can be charged with . . . vehicular
         homicide.
         “[¶ . . . ¶]

                                         3
         “Tate: That’s the class I took. . . . That’s what I read.”
      The foregoing events were presented to the jury via witness testimony
and an audio recording of the second officer’s interview with Tate. Also
presented to the jury was a misdemeanor DUI plea agreement from a case in
which Tate had pleaded guilty, and been convicted, seven years before the
2018 collision. In this document, Tate’s signature appears just below the

statement “My blood alcohol reading was .12;”2 and his initials appear beside
this statement:
         “I understand [that] . . . [b]eing under the influence of
         alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs my ability to safely
         operate a motor vehicle, and it is extremely dangerous to
         human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or
         drugs, or both. If I continue to drive while under the
         influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result of my
         driving, someone is killed, I can be charged with murder
         (VC § 23593).”
      The jury also received evidence through a toxicologist, who testified
that a blood sample drawn from Tate approximately two and one-half hours
after the collision revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.113 percent and that
this would have corresponded to a blood alcohol content at the time of the
collision of between 0.138 and 0.163 percent. The toxicologist further
testified that Tate’s blood sample also revealed the presence of marijuana
and that this indicated both a likelihood that Tate had used marijuana
within several hours before the blood draw and a likelihood that Tate was
experiencing the psychoactive effects of the drug at the time of the collision.
According to the toxicologist, the alcohol content alone demonstrated Tate

2     “It is unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle.” (Veh. Code §23152(b).)

                                        4
was too impaired to safely operate a motor vehicle, and Tate’s consumption of
marijuana so close in time to driving would have amplified that impairment.
B.    Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentence
      In preparation for the giving of jury instructions, the prosecution and
defense agreed the jury should be instructed on murder with implied malice
under sections 187, subdivision (a), and 188. But they disagreed as to
whether the jury should also be instructed on gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated under section 191.5, subdivision (a). The trial court
resolved this disagreement in favor of the prosecution and thus instructed the
jury on murder but not gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.
      The jury convicted Tate on both counts charged—murder in violation of
section 187, subdivision (a), and driving under the combined influence of
alcohol and a drug, causing bodily injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section
23153, subdivision (g)—and found, in connection with the latter count, that
Tate had “personally inflicted great bodily injury . . . within the meaning of
12022.7(a) of the Penal Code.” The trial court then sentenced Tate, and he
timely appealed.
                                      II.
                                  Discussion
      Tate’s principal contention on appeal is that the convictions should be
reversed because the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on gross

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated was error.3 In support of this
contention, Tate argues that such an instruction should be given whenever “a

3      In addition to contending the trial court erred by not instructing the
jury on gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, Tate also contends
this instructional error caused him prejudice. Inasmuch as we find no
instructional error (see post), we need not address the contention that Tate
suffered prejudice.

                                        5
defendant is charged with second degree murder, the evidence indicates the
charge is based on a vehicular homicide while intoxicated, and the evidence
shows the only real issue in dispute is the element of implied malice.” We
review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Fiore (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584.)
A.    The Mens Rea Required for Gross Vehicular Manslaughter While
      Intoxicated Versus for Watson Murder
      Tate’s argument is based on his assertion that “[t]he only issue in
dispute in this case [i]s whether the defendant acted with implied malice or
with a less culpable state of mind.” Thus we begin our examination with a
focus on the distinction between the mens rea element of implied malice
murder and the mens rea element of gross vehicular manslaughter while

intoxicated.4

4     “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187(a).) Such “malice may be express or implied.”
(§ 188(a).)
      “Gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice aforethought, in the driving of a vehicle,
where the driving was in violation of Section 23140, 23152, or 23153 of the
Vehicle Code, and the killing was either the proximate result of the
commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, and with gross
negligence, or the proximate result of the commission of a lawful act that
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence.”
(§ 191.5(a).)
      Vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence without intoxication
(§ 192(c)(1)), vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence while
intoxicated (§ 191.5(b)), vehicular manslaughter with ordinary negligence
without intoxication (§ 192(c)(2)), and injury to someone while driving under
the influence of alcohol or drugs (Veh. Code § 23153) are lesser included
offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. But none of these
offenses is a lesser included offense of murder. (Cf. post.)

                                       6
      Each of these offenses includes among its elements the “unlawful
killing of a human being.” (See §§ 187(a), 191.5(a).) But, whereas such a
killing must be “with malice aforethought” (§ 188(a)(2)) to support implied
malice murder, it must be “without malice aforethought” (§ 191.5(a), italics
added) to support gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. Our high
court expounded on the difference between these two states of mind in its
opinion in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296–297 (Watson). It did so
by distinguishing in that case between malice, which “may be implied when a
person, knowing that his conduct endangers the life of another, nonetheless
acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life” and “gross negligence . . . ,
which has been defined as the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise

a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences.”5 (Id. at p. 296
[“[i]mplied malice contemplates a subjective awareness of a higher degree of
risk than does gross negligence, and involves an element of wantonness
which is absent in gross negligence”].)
      With the distinction between conscious disregard for life and conscious
indifference to consequences squarely in mind, the Court held in Watson that
“ ‘[o]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication,
knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining

5      As our colleagues at the First District have pointed out: “The
distinction between ‘conscious disregard for life’ and ‘conscious indifference to
the consequences’ is subtle but nevertheless logical.” (People v. Olivas (1985)
172 Cal.App.3d 984, 987.) “Phrased in everyday language, the state of mind
of a person who acts with conscious disregard for life is, ‘I know my conduct is
dangerous to others, but I don’t care if someone is hurt or killed.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 987–988.) “The state of mind of the person who acts with conscious
indifferences to the consequences is simply, ‘I don't care what happens.’ ” (Id.
at p. 988.) “It makes sense to hold the former more culpable than the latter,
since only the former is actually aware of the risk created.” (Ibid.)

                                          7
sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of
great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious
disregard of the safety of others.’ ” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301.)
Thereafter, “[i]mplied malice murder involving drunk driving [came to be]
‘colloquially known as a Watson murder.’ ” (People v. Alvarez (2019)

32 Cal.App.5th 781, 785, fn. 2 (Alvarez).)6
B.      Supreme Court Case Law Controlling the Circumstances in
        which a Defendant Charged with Watson Murder Is Entitled to a
        Gross-Vehicular-Manslaughter-While-Intoxicated Instruction
        After Watson, the Supreme Court decided three other cases that go to
the core of Tate’s arguments on appeal. We address each of these cases in
turn.
        1.   People v. Breverman and the Sua Sponte Instructional
             Rule that Governs Lesser Included Offenses
        In cases too numerous to list here, the Supreme Court over the years
has articulated what since 1998 has been commonly referred to as the sua
sponte instructional rule. Pursuant to this rule, “a trial court must instruct
on an uncharged offense that is less serious than, and included in, a charged
greater offense, even in the absence of a request, whenever there is
substantial evidence raising a question as to whether all of the elements of

6     Some years after Watson was decided, a legislative overhaul of drunk-
driving legislation led to modification and re-codification of the gross
vehicular manslaughter provision (former § 192(3)(a)) at issue in Watson.
But the new legislation emphasized that a new provision intended to address
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated must not be interpreted as
supplanting Watson. (See § 191.5(e) [“This section shall not be construed as
prohibiting or precluding a charge of murder under Section 188 upon facts
exhibiting wantonness and a conscious disregard for life to support a finding
of implied malice, or upon facts showing malice consistent with the holding of
the California Supreme Court in People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290.”].)

                                       8
the charged greater offense are present.” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38
Cal.4th 175, 215.)
       Among the judicial opinions most closely associated with the rule is the
case—People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 (Breverman)—in which our
Supreme Court first coined the phrase by which the rule has come to be
known. As Justice Baxter explained in the majority opinion in that case:
          “[T]he sua sponte instructional rule . . . prevents the
          ‘strategy, ignorance, or mistakes’ of either party from
          presenting the jury with an ‘unwarranted all-or-nothing
          choice,’ encourages ‘a verdict . . . no harsher or more lenient
          than the evidence merits’ [citation] and thus protects the
          jury’s ‘truth-ascertainment function’ [citation].
          “[T]he rule seeks the most accurate possible judgment by
          ‘ensur[ing] that the jury will consider the full range of
          possible verdicts’ included in the charge, regardless of the
          parties’ wishes or tactics. [Citation.] The inference is that
          every lesser included offense, or theory thereof, which is
          supported by the evidence must be presented to the jury.”
(Breverman, at p. 155, italics deleted; see also People v. Hicks (2017)
4 Cal.5th 203, 210 (Hicks) [noting “that an all-or-nothing choice encourages a
high-risk, high-reward gambler’s approach to criminal justice” and “that
‘ “[o]ur courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of
truth” ’ ”].)

                                         9
      2.    People v. Birks and the Rule Governing Instructions on
            Lesser Related Offenses
      Breverman held the sua sponte instruction rule must be applied to

lesser included offenses. But what of lesser related offenses?7 Might a trial
court have a sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser related uncharged offense
if the jury has been presented with substantial evidence to support it?

Breverman did not address this question.8 But another opinion that issued
the same day as Breverman did. That case was People v. Birks (1998) 19
Cal.4th 108 (Birks).
      In Birks, the high court revisited its holding in People v. Geiger (1984)
35 Cal.3d 510 (Geiger)—a case in which it had concluded that decision-
making authority as to whether a jury must be instructed on a lesser related
offense is to be vested, not with the trial court, but with the defense. (Birks,

7      “If a lesser offense shares some common elements with the greater
offense, or if it arises out of the same criminal course of conduct as the
greater offense, but it has one or more elements that are not elements of the
greater offense as alleged, then it is a lesser related offense, not a necessarily
included offense.” (Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 209.)
8      Justice Mosk touched on the topic in a dissent in Breverman in which
he argued that “manslaughter, as currently understood, is a lesser offense
related to the greater charged offense of murder” (Breverman, supra, 19
Cal.4th at pp. 182–184 (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)), rather than a lesser included
offense of murder. But the majority rejected this argument as irrelevant (id.
at p. 154, fn. 5 (maj. opn.)) and held instead “that manslaughter qualifies as a
lesser included offense of murder, and thus a trial court has a sua sponte
duty to instruct on heat of passion and imperfect self-defense when the
evidence raises a question as to those issues.” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15
Cal.5th 237, 255–256 [citing Breverman, at pp. 153–155]; cf. People v.
Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 990 (Sanchez) [describing as “well-
established” “the settled practice of treating manslaughter as an offense
necessarily included within murder”].)

                                       10
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 112 [“Geiger concluded that instructions on lesser
merely ‘related’ offenses can be given only upon the defendant’s request.”].)
      After engaging in an extensive analysis of precedents and policy
considerations, the Court in Birks concluded that Geiger, decided just 14
years earlier, had been “wrong to hold that a criminal defendant has a
unilateral entitlement to instructions on lesser offenses which are not
necessarily included in the charge.” (Birks, 19 Cal.4th at p. 136.) So holding,
the Court held that “Geiger is therefore overruled.” (Ibid.; see also
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 168, fn. 16 [“in [our] companion decision
[in Birks, we] abrogate the California rule entitling the defendant to demand
instructions on lesser merely related offenses supported by the evidence”].)
As a consequence of this holding, “[a] defendant has no right to instructions
on lesser related offenses, even if he or she requests the instruction and it
would have been supported by substantial evidence, because California law
does not permit a court to instruct concerning an uncharged lesser related
crime unless agreed to by both parties.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th
616, 668.)
      3.     People v. Sanchez and Whether Gross Vehicular
             Manslaughter While Intoxicated is a Lesser Included, or
             Just a Lesser Related, Offense of Murder
      Three years after its rulings in Breverman and Birks, the Supreme
Court considered whether gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is
a lesser included, or just a lesser related, offense of murder. (People v.
Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983 (Sanchez).) Specifically, in Sanchez, the court
decided that, notwithstanding the presence of the word “manslaughter” in its
name, the offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated “is not”
(Sanchez, at p. 985), and “should not be treated as” (id. at p. 992, italics

                                        11
added), a lesser included offense of murder. Instead, it is—and should be

treated as—a lesser related offense of murder.9
      The holding in Sanchez was not without its critics. Justice Kennard in
particular noted that, “[w]hen an intoxicated driver becomes involved in a
fatal accident, a prosecutor may elect to charge the driver only with murder,
without also charging any form of vehicular manslaughter” and that, “under
the majority’s holding, trial courts may not instruct on vehicular
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.” In such circumstances,
she pointed out, “juries will face the difficult and troubling all-or-nothing
choice between a murder conviction and an acquittal” and will be
“den[ied] . . . ‘the opportunity to consider the full range of criminal offenses
established by the evidence.’ ” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1001 (dis.
opn. of Kennard, J.) [citing Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 127 and quoting
other authority].)
C.    Tate’s Argument
      Channeling the concern that Justice Kennard expressed in Sanchez,
and invoking the policy considerations discussed in Breverman, Tate argues
in this case that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated left Tate’s jury with precisely the kind of
stark binary choice against which Justice Kennard had warned:
         “A juror not instructed on vehicular manslaughter while
         intoxicated as a lesser offense to second degree murder
         based on a vehicular homicide faces an all-or-nothing

9     As the court explained in Sanchez, “gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated” is not a lesser included offense of murder because it “requires
proof of elements that need not be proved when the charge is murder,
namely, use of a vehicle and intoxication.” (Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at
p. 989.)

                                        12
         choice: convict the defendant of murder or acquit him
         entirely. This is particularly problematic in cases where it
         is clear the defendant caused the death of an innocent
         person in a vehicle collision. Jurors are required to either
         acquit a defendant they know committed homicide, or
         convict them of murder, even if they believe vehicular
         manslaughter while intoxicated is a more accurate
         reflection of the defendant’s criminal culpability.
         “[¶ . . . ¶]
         “Even if the issue of malice is in doubt, if it is clear the
         defendant caused the death of another person through
         gross negligence[, then] the jurors are likely to resolve
         doubts in favor of conviction even if they should find the
         defendant not guilty.”
Invoking this reasoning, Tate argues that reducing his case to an all-or-
nothing choice between a murder conviction or acquittal without offering a
middle ground—such as a vehicular manslaughter instruction would have
afforded—worked an injustice amounting to error.
      But Tate’s argument runs headlong into the binding precedents of
Birks and Sanchez because, as discussed ante, gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated is a lesser related offense (Sanchez) that was not charged in
this case, and a trial court is forbidden to instruct on an uncharged lesser
related offense unless the prosecution agrees (Birks). These cases are not
just a hurdle in Tate’s path. They are a barrier.
      Recognizing as much, Tate concedes this court “is bound by the holding
of Sanchez” and “by the analysis in Birks.” But, he continues, we are “only
bound . . . not gagged” (italics added). Thus he contends we should urge the
Supreme Court to reconsider its holdings in Sanchez and Birks.
      We decline the invitation.
      As a threshold matter, we are of course required to follow precedent.
(See People v. Lagunas (2024) 97 Cal.App.5th 996, 1008 (Lagunas)

                                       13
[“California courts are required to follow precedent.”]; Auto Equity Sales, Inc.
v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
      Moreover, the Supreme Court already has reconsidered the

instructional rule for lesser related offenses in comparatively recent years10
(see ante), it has emphasized that this reconsideration was thorough (see
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 156 [debate over abrogation of rule was
“vigorously advanced” and “received complete and focused briefing” in Birks];
Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 112 [the rule’s abrogation was a matter of
“careful reflection” by the court]), and it has made abundantly clear that all
seven justices were of the view that Geiger’s “extension of the right to
instructions on lesser offenses” was “unwarranted,” “ill-considered,” and/or

“wrong.”11 As for the Supreme Court’s decision that gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of murder,
Justice Kennard’s dissent in Sanchez (see ante) reveals that the Court

10    Although Tate says he is seeking reconsideration, the fact that the
issues at hand were considered in Geiger and then reconsidered in Birks
reveals that what Tate really is seeking is re-reconsideration.

11     (See Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 112, 136 (maj. opn.) [“[o]n careful
reflection we now agree that Geiger represents an unwarranted extension of
the right to instruction on lesser offenses;” “Geiger was wrong to hold that a
criminal defendant has a unilateral entitlement to instructions on lesser
offenses which are not necessarily included in the charge”]; see also id. at
pp. 139–141 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.) [Geiger was “unworkable;” its
abrogation was “long overdue”]; id. at pp. 138–139 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.)
[Geiger “unworkable” and “ineffectual”]; id. at p. 139 (conc. opn. of Werdegar,
J.); Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 156, fn. 6 [“in Birks we today overturn
the ill-considered rule allowing defendants to demand instructions on lesser
related offenses”].)

                                       14
understood the majority’s decision would yield results of precisely the sort
that Tate has experienced in this case.
      Further, it is evident from the Court’s opinion in a more recent
vehicular homicide case that the Court remains of a mind that “the goal of
enabling a jury to return the most accurate verdict that the evidence supports
does not require that every possible crime a defendant may have committed
be presented to the jury as an alternative” and that “a jury need only be
instructed on offenses that the prosecution actually charged either explicitly
or implicitly (because they were necessarily included within explicitly
charged offenses.)” (Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 211; cf. Alvarez, supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 789 [adding emphasis to language just quoted].)
      As our colleagues stated in another Watson murder appeal that this
court decided in recent years:
         “[G]ross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated is a
         lesser related offense but not a lesser included offense of
         Watson murder. ‘[I]nstruction on a lesser related offense is
         proper only upon the mutual assent of the parties.’ (People
         v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 622 . . . [citing and
         declining to reconsider Birks].) ‘Here, because the
         prosecutor objected to the instruction on the crime of [gross
         vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated], the trial court
         correctly denied defendant's request.’ ”
(Alvarez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 790; cf. Lagunas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th
at 1011 [“we hold the trial court did not commit error by failing to instruct
the jury on its own motion on the lesser related offense of gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated”].)
                                      III.
                                  Disposition
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                    KELETY, J.

                                       15
WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                   16