Court Opinion

ID: 9411049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:26:15.067039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.452526
License: Public Domain

J-A09031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KASHAWN DIVINE FLOWERS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :    No. 190 MDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 21, 2021,
                in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001962-2019.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: JULY 25, 2023

       Appellant, Kashawn Divine Flowers appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder.1       We

affirm.

       On February 4, 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with

criminal homicide and possession of firearm prohibited following the shooting

death of Hezekiah Walker on August 18, 2014. Eventually, the case was set

for trial on one count each of first-degree and third-degree murder.

       On February 6, 2020, the Commonwealth moved in limine to admit

testimony from two cooperating witnesses about Appellant’s gang affiliation

and related gang activity. It stated that Appellant associated with the South

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
J-A09031-23

Side gang in York City, which had a dispute with the West Side gang after the

2013 killing of Joseph “Plaga” Gomez.       The Commonwealth outlined its

witnesses’ expected testimony that on August 17, 2014, Dysheem Jones gave

Appellant a handgun that Jones used earlier that day, and then Appellant went

to the West Side “lurking” for the “opposition”—looking to kill an opponent.

The witnesses would describe that Appellant told them that he saw Walker,

asked where he was from, and shot him in the head. The witnesses would

also state how their group would dispose of handguns by putting them in safes

or burying them.

      Appellant responded on February 28, 2020, objecting to (a) testimony

that he was “in a gang,” (b) references to the South Side or West Side, (c)

testimony about “lurking” or “opposition,” and (d) testimony about the killing

of Joseph Gomez in 2013. Response, 2/28/20, at 3. At argument before the

trial court on May 27, 2021, Appellant further emphasized his position that

the term “gang” was unnecessary and prejudicial.

      The trial court indicated its concern that the Commonwealth witnesses

would testify as to general actions of other gang members in disposing of

guns. N.T., 5/27/21, at 5–6. However, the trial court ruled that the term

“gang” was not overly prejudicial and granted the Commonwealth’s first

motion in limine in full. Id.

      On October 1, 2021, the Commonwealth filed its second motion in

limine, seeking to admit expert testimony about gangs.       Appellant filed a

                                    -2-
J-A09031-23

response in opposition on October 12, 2021.         The trial court granted the

motion the same day.

      The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 18–21, 2021. The trial

court detailed the pertinent facts at trial as follows:

            On August 18, 2014, at 6:00 A.M. Officer Derrick Millhouse
      responded to the 300 block of West King Street [in York City] for
      reports of a possible shooting and a man down. When Officer
      Millhouse arrived at the scene, he observed the victim with an
      obvious gunshot wound to the head [lying] on the sidewalk with
      a large pool of blood around his head. Officers secured the scene
      and found spent shell casings, bullet fragments, and damage to
      one of the nearby houses. There were no eyewitnesses of the
      shooting, no gun was found, and no DNA evidence was recovered
      from the scene. On August 18, 2014, Brenda McCleary was living
      [nearby] and heard three gunshots around 2:30 a.m. outside of
      her home. Additionally, Edward Daniels who lives [nearby] heard
      gunshots from his home on the date of the incident between 2:40
      a.m. and 3:00 a.m.

            The victim was identified as Hezekiah Walker, and Dr.
      Samuel Land of Forensic Pathology Associates, an expert in
      forensic pathology, performed an autopsy on Hezekiah Walker and
      determined the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.
      Additionally, the autopsy report indicated that Hezekiah Walker
      sustained a perforating gunshot wound to his right leg. Dr. Land
      ruled Hezekiah Walker’s manner of death a homicide.

            Detective Anthony Fetrow of the York City Police
      Department was assigned as the lead detective to investigate the
      death of Hezekiah Walker. Detective Fetrow determined Hezekiah
      Walker’s last known location was 600 West College Avenue, a
      corner house on West Street and College Avenue. 600 West
      College was the home of Zach Williams, Hezekiah Walker’s friend,
      which was next to a large business. Detective Fetrow obtained
      the large business[’] surveillance video from August 18, 2014 to
      determine Hezekiah Walker’s whereabouts between the time he
      left Zach William[s’] home and when the shooting occurred.
      Hezekiah Walker was seen in camera view for approximately three
      minutes from 2:20 to 2:23 a.m. Next, Detective Fetrow obtained
      footage from St. Paul’s Evangelical Congregational Church at 450

                                      -3-
J-A09031-23

     West King Street in York which showed Hezekiah Walker walking
     on the south sidewalk toward Penn Street [at 2:35 a.m.]
     Additionally, Detective Fetrow obtained surveillance video from
     Elite Property Management on the corner of Penn and King
     Street[s] which showed Hezekiah Walker at 2:37 a.m. on August
     18, 2014. None of the video surveillance obtained showed
     Hezekiah Walker having contact with any other individuals.

             Hezekiah Walker’s cell phone was found at the crime scene
     and [o]fficers conducted a forensic analysis to review any
     communication that Hezekiah had in the hours leading up to his
     death. Hezekiah Walker exchanged text messages with two ex-
     girlfriends between 2:33 a.m. and 2:39 a.m. Based on the
     surveillance video and text message communications, [Detective]
     Fetrow was able to determine the shooting occurred sometime
     around 2:37 a.m. An analysis of Appellant’s cell phone records
     indicated that he was near the crime scene between 2:27 a.m.
     and 2:46 a.m. on August 18, 2014, the day the shooting occurred.

            Through an investigation, Detective Wesley Kahley, an
     expert on gang culture and gang affiliation, determined that
     Appellant represented himself as a member of the [S]outh [S]ide
     criminal street gang in York.        Detective Kahley reviewed
     Appellant’s social media posts and conversation during his
     investigation.    Appellant made various posts claiming his
     association with the [S]outh [S]ide criminal street gang including:
     (1) “[Ots] be my squad,” short for “only the south be my squad,”
     (2) “ClaimGangLife,” and (3) “#600K,” indicating disrespect to
     opposition as “600” refers to the [W]est [S]ide and “K” is short for
     “kill.” Additionally, Appellant has a “F-O-E” tattoo meaning
     “family over everything,” indicative of Appellant’s involvement in
     gang culture.

           Acquaintances of Appellant, Marcos Martinez and Raymond
     Bruno Carrasquillo, testified that Appellant and other individuals
     from the South Side used the term or phrase “1017” to refer to
     their friend, Joseph Gomez, also known as Plaga Two Times
     (“Plaga”), who passed away in April of 2013, during a shootout
     with Flair Griggs, an individual who hung out in the “West End.”
     [Martinez and Carrasquillo] testified that … “beef” and “ops,” were
     two terms used to describe the opposition between the “South
     Side” and “West Side” “groups” of York. Plaga’s death caused beef
     between the South Side and West Side because it made a lot of
     people angry, including Appellant. Appellant had two tattoos in
     memory of Plaga’s death, one that stated, “RIP Plaga,” and

                                    -4-
J-A09031-23

      another “1017.” [Martinez] went on to testify that Appellant
      “wanted to get revenge” for Plaga’s death, and [Carrasquillo]
      testified that Appellant was “revengeful” of Plaga’s death.

             Additionally, [Martinez] testified that he and other
      individuals from the South Side were involved in a shootout on
      August 17, 2014, with individuals he believed to be from the West
      End. On the same day of this shootout, Appellant came to
      [Martinez’s] home around 12:00 in the afternoon and retrieved a
      gun, specifically a Colt .45, which was used in the earlier shootout.
      Later that night, Appellant returned to [Martinez’s] home and
      explained that he drove out West looking for “ops” and shot
      someone in the head after the individual told Appellant that he
      was from out West. [Firearm toolmark analysis revealed that the
      cartridge casings from the shooting on August 18 were discharged
      from one of the same guns as the earlier shootout on August 17.]

             [Martinez] observed Appellant to be “hype[d],” “excited,”
      and “happy” when informing [Martinez] and other South Side
      individuals that he shot someone from the West End. While
      incarcerated, Appellant was bragging to [Carrasquillo] that he had
      a “head shot,” meaning he shot someone in the head and killed
      them, on King Street. Appellant proceeded to tell [Carrasquillo]
      that on August 18, 2014, he was very emotional and decided that
      he would shoot whoever he saw walking on the West Side.
      [Carrasquillo] said Appellant appeared happy and excited about
      the shooting.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/22, at 1–5 (record citations omitted).

      The jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder. On December

21, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life in prison without the

possibility of parole. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the

trial court denied without opinion on January 3, 2022.         Appellant timely

appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule

of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      Appellant raises five issues on appeal:

                                      -5-
J-A09031-23

     A. Was the evidence insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
        doubt, that [Appellant] committed First Degree Murder where:
        (a) there was no eyewitness to the shooting (b) there was no
        forensic evidence attributable to [Appellant], e.g., fingerprints
        or DNA, found either on the victim or even in the vicinity of the
        offense; (c) testimony from two individuals purportedly
        implicating [Appellant] in the offense was so corrupt, polluted
        and contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon
        unreliable and pure conjecture, and (d) the cell triangulation
        testimony was, at best, speculative, thus requiring the
        conviction be reversed and vacated?

     B. Alternatively, was the verdict against the weight of the
        evidence and so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
        sense of justice, thus requiring that the conviction be reversed,
        and a new trial granted?

     C. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, err and infringe on
        [Appellant’s] right to due process of law as guaranteed by the
        [federal and state constitutions] by granting the prosecution’s
        motion in limine to admit at trial certain testimony pursuant to
        Rule 404(b) where: (a) the testimony was not relevant, as it
        did not make any material fact at issue more of less probable;
        (b) the testimony was rank propensity evidence which sought
        to establish [Appellant] as a member of a “criminal street gang”
        who had the propensity to engage in violent acts and who may
        have been involved in other uncharged crimes; (c) none of the
        “permitted uses” set forth in Rule 404(b)(2) which would
        permit this propensity evidence applied; and (d) even if some
        permitted use of the bad character evidence existed, the
        probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its potential
        for unfair prejudice, thus requiring that the conviction be
        reversed and a new trial granted?

     D. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, err and infringe on
        [Appellant’s] right to due process of law as guaranteed by the
        [federal and state constitutions] by allowing the prosecution to
        present expert testimony concerning gang activities and
        [Appellant’s] alleged gang affiliation where: (a) to the extent
        that any evidence concerning [Appellant’s] involvement with a
        gang was relevant, such type of evidence is not beyond the
        knowledge of an average layperson, and expert testimony was
        not needed to help the jury understand the evidence or
        determine a fact in issue; and (b) the expert testimony only
        emphasized and bolstered the general nature and

                                    -6-
J-A09031-23

         dangerousness of gang activity and the propensity of gang
         members to engage in criminal conduct, thus requiring that the
         conviction be reversed and a new trial granted?

      E. Did the trial court abuse its discretion, err and infringe on
         [Appellant’s] right to due process of law as guaranteed by the
         [federal and state constitutions] by denying [Appellant’s]
         motion for a mistrial where the prosecution’s expert on gang
         activities and [Appellant’s] alleged gang affiliation testified that
         gangs are involved in criminal activity, specifically referencing
         drug activity, an offense with which [Appellant] was not
         charged, thus requiring that [Appellant’s] conviction be
         reversed and a new trial granted?

Appellant’s Brief at 7–8 (excess capitalization omitted).

                         A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Appellant’s first claim is that the evidence was insufficient to establish

his identity as the person who killed Walker. He emphasizes the unreliability

of the evidence against him. Appellant notes that Martinez and Carrasquillo

had motive to testify favorably for the Commonwealth and gave inconsistent

accounts of what Appellant told them. He further challenges the accuracy of

the cell site location information that placed him in the vicinity of the shooting.

Appellant concludes that in this case, the jury’s verdict could only be the result

of conjecture and must be overturned.

      A sufficiency challenge “presents a question of law and is subject to our

plenary review under a de novo standard.” Commonwealth v. Moore, 263

A.3d 1193, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 234

A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020)). We determine “whether viewing all the evidence

admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime

                                       -7-
J-A09031-23

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565,

578 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790

(Pa. Super. 2014)). A jury is generally “free to believe some, all, or none of

the Commonwealth’s evidence” and to resolve inconsistencies in favor of

either party. Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1078 (Pa. 2017)

(citing Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 607 (Pa. 2011)).

Identity, like any element of a crime, can be established by evidence that is

circumstantial and which “need not be positive and certain.”         Id. at 579

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 954 A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super.

2008)).

      However, our Supreme Court has recognized “atypical situations” in

which “the entire body of evidence introduced at trial which furnished the basis

for an appellant’s conviction is so deficient that it does not reasonably support

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law.” In the

Interest of J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 409 (Pa. 2018) (citing Commonwealth v.

Jackson, 66 A.2d 841, 843 (Pa. 1949)). In such a case, the reviewing court

must reject the conjectural findings of fact and find the evidence insufficient.

Id. (citations omitted).

      Here, Martinez and Carrasquillo testified that Appellant told them that

he shot and killed someone on the west side of York, which is consistent with

Walker’s death.     Their testimony, if believed, was sufficient to identify

Appellant as the shooter. We hold that this testimony is not so inherently

unreliable that it is insufficient as a matter of law. Notably, both witnesses

                                      -8-
J-A09031-23

stated that they had abandoned their gang lifestyles and acknowledged any

expectation of favorable treatment. Further, their testimony was corroborated

by common elements between what Appellant told them, as well as the

identification of the casings down the street from where Walker was shot

coming from the same gun used in the shootout the day before.

      The inconsistencies in testimony were up to the jury to resolve, rather

than removing the case from consideration. Jacoby, supra. As to Martinez

and Carrasquillo’s testimony that the shooting occurred around 11 p.m., not

2:30 a.m., this reflects Appellant’s own misperception of the time he told them

that he shot Walker. And while McCleary and Daniels did not recall hearing

any exchange of words before the early morning gunfire, this is logical given

the time of the shooting and relative volume; a voice, even one shouting down

the block, may not be heard the same way as a .45-caliber gunshot. The

totality of the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, was therefore sufficient to identify Appellant as the person

who killed Walker. Appellant’s first claim fails.

                           B. Weight of the Evidence

      Appellant’s second claim concerns the denial of his post-sentence

motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence. He argues that

the trial court abused its discretion by not assessing whether the verdict

shocked its sense of justice, instead merely deferring to the jury’s findings.

Had the trial court appropriately reviewed the evidence, Appellant contends,

                                      -9-
J-A09031-23

it would have found that the jury’s verdict was so contrary to the weight of

the evidence as to shock the trial court’s sense of justice.

      Our Supreme Court has explained the standard to be applied by a trial

court in ruling on a weight-of-the-evidence challenge as follows:

             An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
      Commonwealth v. Brown, 648 A.2d 1177 (Pa. 1994). A new
      trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the
      testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
      arrived at a different conclusion. Thompson v. City of Phila.,
      493 A.2d 669, 672 (Pa. 1985). A trial judge must do more than
      reassess the credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would
      not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges,
      in reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the
      evidence do not sit as the thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the
      trial judge is to determine that “notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.”
      Id. at 674.

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751–52 (Pa. 2000) (citation

format altered). Under this standard, a trial court awards relief upon a finding

that “the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to shock

one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right

may be given another opportunity to prevail.”      Jacoby, 170 A.3d at 1080

(quoting Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)). This

stands in contrast to an assessment of evidentiary sufficiency, which draws

reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth and accepts that jurors

are free to believe any evidence. Id. at 1078.

                                     - 10 -
J-A09031-23

      An appellate court, in turn, reviews whether the trial court abused its

discretion in ruling on the weight claim, not whether the verdict itself was

against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 259 A.3d

539, 541 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d

698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error

of judgment, but is rather [1] the overriding or misapplication of the law, [2]

the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or [3] the result of

bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

(quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

It is a misapplication of the law, and thus an abuse of discretion, for a trial

court to deny a weight challenge based only on evidentiary sufficiency.

Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806–07 (Pa. Super. 2003). This

Court’s role is then to remand for the trial court to apply the proper standard.

Id. at 807 n.12 (citing Widmer, 744 A.2d at 752).

      In reviewing this issue, the trial court set forth the proper legal standard

to be followed in assessing a weight of the evidence claim. Trial Court Opinion,

4/18/22, at 9.    (“A true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that

sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence

is to be believed. Exclusively, the finder of fact is to determine the weight of

the evidence and is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to

determine the credibility of the witnesses. … When reviewing a challenge to

the weight of the evidence, the verdict may be reversed only if it is so contrary

                                     - 11 -
J-A09031-23

to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” (footnotes, citations and

quotation marks omitted)). In applying this correct standard to the case sub

judice, the trial court found as follows:

       The elements and supporting evidence for the charge[] of [f]irst-
       [d]egree [m]urder are listed in section I [of the trial court’s
       1925(a) opinion].[2] The jury, sitting as the finder of fact for the
       charges, was free to determine the credibility of all witnesses and
       to make inferences based on all the evidence presented at trial.
       Appellant states that “the cell phone triangulation evidence was,
       at best, speculative,” but fails to support this statement with any
       facts or argument; however, the jury was free to determine the
       credibility of the testimony related to Appellant’s cell phone
       records. Further Appellant alleges that “the testimony of [Marcos]
       Martinez and [Raymond] Bruno-Carrasquillo was so corrupt,
       polluted and incredible that no reliable jury verdict could be
       premised on this testimony;” however, the jury, as factfinder was
       free to determine the credibility of each witness, and likely found
       both Martinez and Bruno-Carrasquillo to be credible witnesses,
       and thus found that Appellant informed both Martinez and Bruno-
       Carrasquillo that he has a “headshot” on the [W]est [S]ide on the
       same date that Hezekiah Walker was killed by a gunshot wound
       to the head on the [W]est [S]ide.
____________________________________________

2 In ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence challenge raised by    Appellant,
the trial court stated as follows:

       [T]he evidence established that Appellant wanted revenge against
       the [W]est [S]ide for the death of his friend, [Joseph Gomez, also
       known as Plaga Two Times], and he told at least two individuals
       that he shot someone on the [W]est [S]ide the same day that
       Hezekiah Walker was shot and killed by a gun shot wound to the
       head on the [W]est [S]ide. Appellant outwardly represented
       himself as being associated with the [S]outh [S]ide criminal street
       gang in York and publicly displayed his affiliation with the [S]outh
       [S]ide by posting about killing individuals on the [W]est [S]ide,
       the [S]outh [S]ide’s opposition []. Additionally the cell phone
       analyst testimony and evidence placed Appellant in the vicinity of
       the crime scene on the date and time of the shooting.”

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/22, at 8 (footnotes omitted).

                                          - 12 -
J-A09031-23

Id. at 9-10.       Although the trial court did not expressly state that,

notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that

to ignore them or give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice,

or that the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence as to

shock one’s sense of justice, it is clear that the trial court applied the correct

legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s weight

of the evidence claim. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

                   C. Evidence that Appellant Was in a Gang

      Appellant’s third claim is that the trial court erred in admitting testimony

about his gang affiliation. He submits that this evidence should have been

excluded under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404 because it showed only

that he had a propensity for violence and was not relevant for any permissible

purpose. Further, Appellant argues that the potential for unfair prejudice from

evidence that he was in a violent “criminal street gang” outweighed any

probative value.      He posits that the evidence was so pervasive and

inflammatory that it stripped him of the presumption of innocence and denied

his right to a fair trial, despite the trial court’s limiting instruction.

      The Commonwealth responds that the trial court properly admitted

evidence that Appellant was affiliated with a gang.            It explains that the

evidence was relevant to prove Appellant’s motive and to show the sequence

of events leading up to the shooting. The Commonwealth also argues that

                                        - 13 -
J-A09031-23

the trial court made no error in finding that the probative value of the evidence

outweighed the potential that it would unfairly prejudice Appellant.

      This Court reviews pre-trial evidentiary rulings to determine whether the

trial court abused its discretion. Frazer v. McEntire, 265 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa.

Super. 2021) (citing In re Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2016)).

      In general, evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. Pa.R.E. 402.

“Evidence is relevant if it tends to make a material fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275

A.3d 513, 519 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Christine, 125

A.3d 394, 398 (Pa. 2015)); see Pa.R.E. 401. In a criminal case, evidence of

motive is always relevant. Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 442 A.2d 236, 241

(Pa. 1982) (citing Commonwealth v. Faison, 264 A.2d 394 (Pa. 1970)).

      Rule 404 provides for the exclusion of certain evidence that otherwise

meets the test for relevance:

      (a) Character Evidence.

      (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character
      trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the
      person acted in accordance with the character or trait.

                                 *     *      *

      (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

      (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act
      is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show
      that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
      the character.

      (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another
      purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
      plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

                                     - 14 -
J-A09031-23

       In a criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the probative
       value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.

Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2). Under this rule, the Commonwealth may not

introduce evidence solely to show that the defendant has a “propensity for

committing criminal acts.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 665

(Pa. 2014) (citing Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) and Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d

491 (Pa. 1988). However, subject to the balancing test of Rule 404(b)(2),

evidence of a defendant’s other acts can be admitted if it is relevant for

another purpose, including motive and the “res gestae exception.” Id. A jury

is presumed to follow instructions to consider evidence of a defendant’s “other

act” only for one of these limited purposes.           E.g., Commonwealth v.

Arrington, 86 A.3d 831, 845 n.11 (Pa. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v.

Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 971 (Pa. 2001)).

       Pennsylvania courts have previously addressed admissibility of the

“other act” of being a gang member. Gang membership is relevant to prove

motive to kill, such as killing a member of a rival gang. Commonwealth v.

Gwaltney, 442 A.2d 236, 241 (Pa. 1982)3 (citing Commonwealth v.

Faison, 264 A.2d 394 (Pa. 1970)); Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 363 A.2d

1316, 1317 (Pa. Super. 1976).            However, such evidence of motive is not

limited to cases where the victim was in a rival gang. For example, when a

non-gang victim stole drugs from a prospective gang member, a defendant’s

____________________________________________

3 We cite cases from before the adoption of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence

mindful that the Rules were not intended to change existing law.              See
Commonwealth v. Minich, 4 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super. 2010).

                                          - 15 -
J-A09031-23

gang membership was relevant evidence of his motive for killing the victim as

a gang enforcer. Commonwealth v. Reid, 642 A.2d 453, 461 (Pa. 1994).

As another example, a defendant’s gang membership was relevant to explain

his participation in shooting at a non-gang member who had sold fake drugs

to a gang member’s girlfriend. Commonwealth v. Wilson, No. 1470 EDA

2019, 2020 WL 2315616, at *5–7 (Pa. Super. May 11, 2020) (unpublished

memorandum).4 Notably, the relevance of gang membership is not limited to

proof of a criminal conspiracy, which is a separate purpose than proof of

motive to kill. See Gwaltney, 442 A.2d at 241 (describing these purposes

as two reasons evidence of gang membership was properly admitted at trial).

       Here, Appellant’s gang membership was relevant as evidence of his

motive for killing Walker.        The Commonwealth’s theory at trial was that

Appellant went to the West Side territory and shot the first person he saw

there. That Appellant was in the South Side gang makes this more likely and

helps explain his motive in doing so—revenge over the death of Plaga the

previous year at the hands of a West Side gang member.

       Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the

probative value and potential for unfair prejudice stemming from evidence

that Appellant was in the South Side gang. N.T., 5/27/21, at 5–6. The court

addressed concerns about the breadth of the Commonwealth’s evidence and

____________________________________________

4 This Court may cite non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019 for

their persuasive value. Superior Court Operating Procedures § 65.37.

                                          - 16 -
J-A09031-23

found that using the word “gang” would not be overly prejudicial.5 Moreover,

the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence of

Appellant’s gang involvement only as proof of motive. N.T., 10/20/21, at 394.

We presume that the jury was able to follow this instruction and thus conclude

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the Rule 404(b)(2)

balancing test. Arrington, supra.

       Appellant’s third claim fails.

                           D. Expert Testimony on Gangs

       Appellant’s fourth claim is that the trial court erred in allowing testimony

from Detective Kahley, who was qualified as an expert in gang membership

affiliation and identification in York City, and who concluded that Appellant

____________________________________________

5 The only witness who used the word “gang” was Detective Kahley, who
identified the South Side group as a “criminal street gang.” E.g., N.T.,
10/20/21, at 338 (emphasis added). We note that “criminal street gang” is a
well-defined term in federal law and several state statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 521;
see United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a
challenge to the federal definition); see, e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann.
§ 11.81.900(b)(13); Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(f); Md. Crim. Law § 9-804
(amended 2020 to replace “criminal gang” with “criminal organization”); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-29. By contrast, Pennsylvania law only defines a “criminal
gang” in an offense that was not charged here. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5131(e); see
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9720.4 (sentencing enhancement).

      Appellant did not object to Detective Kahley’s use of the phrase “criminal
street gang” at trial or in his post-sentence motion. He first challenged the
admissibility of this phrase in his Rule 1925(b) statement. This was too late
for the trial court to remedy any heightened prejudice caused by the
detective’s use of this legal term of art. Therefore, Appellant waived any
challenge to the phrase “criminal street gang.” See Commonwealth v.
Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 639 & n.47 (Pa. 2015) (finding waiver where a
defendant first raised a claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement).

                                          - 17 -
J-A09031-23

was in the “South Side Criminal Street Gang.” See N.T., 10/20/21, 320–338.

Appellant contends that Detective Kahley’s testimony was not necessary or

helpful for the jury to understand any fact in issue. Given the testimony from

Martinez, Carrasquillo, and Detective Fetrow, Appellant submits that allowing

Detective Kahley’s inflammatory, prejudicial testimony was reversible error.

      The Commonwealth responds that Detective Kahley’s expertise went

beyond that of a layperson and that it was needed to prove Appellant’s gang

affiliation. It adds that the trial court properly instructed the jury to minimize

any prejudice stemming from the evidence that Detective Kahley used to

identify Appellant as a member of the South Side gang.

      As with other evidence, we review the admission of expert testimony to

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v.

Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 965 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v.

Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. 2008)). Pennsylvania law permits

expert testimony where:

      (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
      knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average layperson;

      (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
      knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
      to determine a fact in issue; and

      (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
      field.

Pa.R.E. 702. Testimony from an appropriately qualified expert “is permitted

only as an aid to the jury when the subject matter is distinctly related to a

science, skill, or occupation beyond the knowledge or experience of the

                                     - 18 -
J-A09031-23

average layman.”       Commonwealth v. Williams, 274 A.3d 722, 729 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Duffey, 548 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa.

1988)).

       Here, Appellant’s gang affiliation was relevant as evidence of his motive

for shooting Walker, the first person he encountered when he went to the

West Side in revenge for the death of Plaga.       Gwaltney, supra.      It was

therefore a fact in issue in determining Appellant’s guilt.       Furthermore,

Detective Kahley possessed specialized knowledge beyond that of an average

layperson that he used to identify Appellant as a member of the South Side

gang. The detective explained that to identify gang members, he used the

FBI’s process that includes consideration of numerous criteria.            N.T.,

10/20/21, at 328. Based on his review of these criteria, he concluded that

Appellant represented himself as a “member of the South Side Criminal Street

Gang in York.” Id. at 328–338 (describing factors).6

       While other witnesses provided information about the affiliated groups

in York City and the background of Plaga’s death, Detective Kahley’s expertise
____________________________________________

6 In his reply brief, Appellant notes that Detective Kahley opined that certain

hashtags meant “criminal activity related to the gang life,” when they were
really titles of mix tapes by a rapper. Appellant did not challenge this aspect
of the detective’s testimony at trial. He did not cross-examine Detective
Kahley at all. We note that the trial court instructed the jury that another one
of Appellant’s posts was just song lyrics by the same rapper, which was “not
to suggest that Appellant in any way has done anything other than pirated the
lyrics of a rap song relative to an incident that occurred in York City.” N.T.,
10/20/21, at 314. Cf. Commonwealth v. Williams, 245 A.3d 710, 722 &
n.17 (Pa. Super. 2021) (finding a cautionary instruction mitigated any unfair
prejudice stemming from a jail letter and rap song lyrics used to establish the
defendant’s identity as the shooter).

                                          - 19 -
J-A09031-23

filled in the gap of concluding that Appellant was a member of the South Side

gang. Because this was proper expert testimony, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to admit it.

      Appellant’s fourth claim fails.

                                    E. Mistrial

      Appellant’s fifth claim is that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for mistrial after Detective Kahley mentioned drugs. The relevant excerpt of

testimony is as follows:

      [Assistant District Attorney Lombardo:] I would like to draw your
      attention to 2014 and 2013 in York City. Were there gangs in York
      City at that time?

      [Detective Kahley:] Yes. Throughout my career, there have been
      gangs in York City.

      Q. What kind of gangs have there been?

      A. Our biggest problems come from local criminal street gangs,
      which you also see the national gangs, such as Bloods, Crips, Latin
      Kings. Those forms of group[s] that come to our area. We really
      saw a rise in the mid-’90s of our local street gangs that were kind
      of banding together because of members of the United Blood
      Nation coming into York taking over the drug selling areas.

N.T., 10/20/21, at 324 (emphasis added).

      Appellant moved for a mistrial based on the reference to drug dealing.

The trial court denied the motion and provided a cautionary instruction:

      THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, in the answer of Detective
      Kahley, there was reference made to gangs who engage in drug
      dealing. This case is not about drug dealing. It never has been.
      They have been instructed that they will—this will not occur. I so
      instruct the detective. Don’t take it as any indication that this is
      a trial about that. It’s clearly not. Thank you.

                                        - 20 -
J-A09031-23

Id. at 326.

      Appellant now argues that the instruction was flawed because it did not

tell the jury to disregard the testimony and avoid attributing it to Appellant’s

guilt. Even if the instruction had been proper, Appellant submits that it would

have been inadequate to cure the error in light of Detective Kahley’s other

testimony that Appellant was a member of a criminal street gang.                 He

concludes that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

mistrial.

      The Commonwealth responds that Detective Kahley’s remark was not

intentionally elicited, was not exploited, and was cured of taint by the trial

court’s instruction. Commonwealth’s Brief at 49 (citing Commonwealth v.

Manley, 985 A.2d 256, 266–67 (Pa. Super. 2009)).                   Therefore, the

Commonwealth argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

denying Appellant’s motion.

      A ruling on a motion for mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court.

As such:

      “It is well-settled that the review of a trial court’s denial of a
      motion for a mistrial is limited to determining whether the trial
      court abused its discretion.” . . . “A trial court may grant a mistrial
      only where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such
      a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of
      a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a
      true verdict.” It is also settled that a mistrial is not necessary
      where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any
      potential prejudice. The law presumes that a jury will follow the
      trial court’s instructions.

                                      - 21 -
J-A09031-23

Commonwealth v. Dula, 262 A.3d 609, 633 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 274–75 (Pa. Super. 2021)).

      Here, we discern no abuse of discretion. Detective Kahley’s reference

to selling drugs arose while he was providing background information about

the history of gangs in York City. Notably, the detective did not state that

Appellant had any involvement with drug sales, nor that this homicide case

was motivated by drugs. Moreover, the trial court promptly instructed the

jury that the case was not about drug dealing. Absent any indication that the

jury disregarded this instruction, we conclude that the trial court’s instruction

was sufficient to cure any prejudice from Detective Kahley’s solitary remark

about drug sales. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial, and Appellant’s fifth claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      President Judge Panella joins.

      Judge Kunselman files a Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 07/25/2023

                                       - 22 -