Court Opinion

ID: 9547730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:51:14.666747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:01.375214
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, J.,
concurring.
Although I concur in the result, I disagree with the analysis in part 3 of the court’s opinion.
Scafidi and Tedesco, as agents for Bulkcarriers, conducted transactions in Oregon and Louisiana to effect the charter. Tedesco is now deceased. The plaintiffs complaint in this suit alleged multiple theories of recovery. One of the theories of recovery against the defendant Scafidi was that Scafidi, “by reason of [his] actions and handling *357of the affairs of Pyramid Bulkcarriers, Inc., [is] also responsible for the judgment [against Bulkcarriers]. * * *” Although the trial judge considered that this was an appropriate theory of recovery, he found against the plaintiff on the merits.
The majority states that the question is whether contacts “with this state during charter contracting may be relied upon to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction * * * in this creditor’s bill.” 293 Or at 353. The majority answers the query in the negative, saying:
“* * * Thus, although it may be said as a matter of causation that this suit had its genesis in the contract entered into in 1970 in this state, Bulkcarriers’ contacts with this state, relevant as they may have been to a breach of contract action here, are simply not relevant to this creditor’s bill suit seeking to obtain satisfaction of a foreign judgment.”
ORS 14.025(1) subjected persons to the jurisdiction of Oregon courts “as to any cause of action or suit or proceeding arising from * * * the transaction of any business within this state * * *.” Under the statute, the determining factor is the relationship between the cause of action, suit or proceeding and the transaction of business. If the claim arises from the transaction of business, personal jurisdiction exists over the person transacting business. ORS 14.035(1), (4).
Creditors’ bills, even though independent actions in form, are usually ancillary in the sense that they are brought to collect a judgment obtained in another proceeding. The proceedings are equitable, and are usually in rem rather than in personam, being a continuation in effect of the judgment upon which they are founded in order to achieve a satisfaction thereof. Pierce v. United States, 255 US 398, 41 S Ct 365, 65 L Ed 697 (1920).
An effort to collect a judgment which arises from the transaction of business is as much a consequence of the transaction of business as the cause of action underlying the judgment. Because creditors’ bills are, in a sense, ancillary to the underlying proceeding, I believe that the creditors’ bill claim against Scafidi has a sufficiently close nexus to his transaction of business in Oregon to support the conclusion that the claim asserted against Scafidi in *358this case can be said to arise from the transaction of business within Oregon. As noted in footnote 1 of the majority opinion, this court has held that ORS 14.035 is to be construed to permit exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the limits allowed by the Due Process Clause. State ex rel Western Seed v. Campbell, 250 Or 262, 271, 442 P2d 215 (1968). Compare ORCP 4L. Although some of the elements of the creditors’ bill claim may involve post-breach events unrelated to the contract, the fact that the underlying claim arose from the transaction of business in Oregon creates the necessary causal relationship for the exercise of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff cites Creditors Protective Ass’n. v. Balcom, 248 Or 38, 432 P2d 319 (1967), for the proposition that a judgment creditor can proceed by way of a creditors’ bill to obtain a judgment against one who, although not a party to the underlying judgment, actively participated in a fraudulent scheme to hinder the creditors’ collection of the judgment.1 The defendants, in their brief, concede that “* * * when an individual causes cash or other tangible property to be withheld or transferred without consideration that to that extent the individual is liable. * * *” The trial court assumed that this theory of recovery was available to the plaintiff against the individual defendants, including Scafidi, but found against the plaintiff under the evidence.2 I concur with the trial court’s analysis of the evidence and with its finding, and would therefore affirm the trial court in denying recovery to the plaintiff on the plaintiffs claim against Scafidi, but not for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion or in the majority opinion.
Linde, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 Creditors Protective Ass’n. v. Balcom, 248 Or 38, 432 P2d 319 (1967), was a creditors’ bill suit against a third person who, although not a judgment debtor of the plaintiff, hindered collection of the judgment. I quote from the opinion:
“* * * Here the holder of the debtors’ property, Shirley Roberts, in concert with the debtors, wrongfully paid over, or allowed to be paid over, amounts due to debtor in order to prevent the plaintiff from reaching the property. We hold that one who actively participates with the debtor in a fraudulent scheme to hinder the creditor’s enforcement of his judgment, and, pursuant to that scheme, withholds amounts due on garnishment, is personally liable for the amount that garnishment would have realized. * * *” 248 Or at 45.

 The plaintiff cross-appealed from the trial court’s denial of relief against Scafidi.