Court Opinion

ID: 9896022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 15:07:10.29965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.548819
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 9, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-1044-MR

ASIEL IRAOLA-LOVACO                                                  APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 16-CR-00202

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2015, Appellant, Asiel Iraola-Lovaco, struck three

individuals with his vehicle and then drove away from the scene. Two of the

victims lost a leg and all required extensive medical treatment. He entered a guilty

plea to one count of leaving the scene of an accident. A Fayette County jury found

him guilty of three counts of second-degree assault, and one count of driving under

the influence of alcohol. The jury recommended a sentence of 30 years’
imprisonment. He was ultimately sentenced to serve 20 years.1 His conviction

was unanimously affirmed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See Iraola-Lovaco v.

Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 241 (Ky. 2019). Appellant subsequently filed a

motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to RCr2 11.42. He was initially

represented by an attorney with the Department of Public Advocacy (DPA). His

counsel reviewed the case pursuant to KRS 31.110(2)(c) and concluded that this

was “not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be

willing to bring at his or her own expense.” As a result, counsel filed a Motion to

Allow the DPA to Withdraw as Counsel and to Allow Movant to Fully Pursue His

Claims Pro Se. The motion to withdraw was granted. Thereafter, the court

scheduled a RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing. The circuit court ultimately denied

Appellant’s motion for post-conviction relief. Appellant now appeals to this Court

as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                Appellant specifically claims that his trial counsel failed to: 1)

present a defense of extreme emotional distress; 2) object to the prosecutor crying

during the Commonwealth’s closing argument; 3) make an opening statement

during the penalty phase of trial; and 4) call more than one defense witness during

1
  Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080 and KRS 532.110 the cap on Class C
and D felonies is twenty (20) years.
2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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the penalty phase of trial. He also argues that defense counsel was deficient due to

his statement during closing argument that Appellant should receive “more time.”

As to the latter claim, trial counsel did not ask the jury to consider the minimum

sentence. Instead, he requested that they assess an increased term of years, but to

be served concurrently.

             A successful motion for relief under RCr 11.42 for ineffective

assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance” and

“prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). As to the

second Strickland prong, the defendant has the duty to “affirmatively prove

prejudice.” Id. at 693. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is that he was erroneously

denied counsel during the underlying evidentiary hearing. RCr 11.42(5) provides

in relevant part as follows:

             If the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be
             determined on the face of the record the court shall grant
             a prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of
             record and if financially unable to employ counsel, shall
             upon specific written request by the movant appoint
             counsel to represent the movant in the proceeding,
             including appeal.

Appellant correctly cites that “[i]f an evidentiary hearing is required, counsel must

be appointed to represent the movant if he/she is indigent and specifically requests

such appointment in writing.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Ky.

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2001) (citation omitted). The Commonwealth does not contest Appellant’s

indigency, or that he requested counsel. In fact, on the same day he filed his RCr

11.42 petition, Appellant also filed a pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis

and for appointment of counsel. This satisfies the writing requirement. However,

the Commonwealth correctly cites that the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that

when the evidentiary hearing is an exercise in futility, any error in failing to

appoint counsel for the RCr 11.42 motion, is harmless. Commonwealth v. Stamps,

672 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Ky. 1984). See also Fraser, 59 S.W.3d at 455 (citing

Stamps, 672 S.W.2d at 337-39).

             We have reviewed the underlying hearing. Therein, the

Commonwealth, the trial judge, and Appellant, all questioned Appellant’s trial

counsel regarding the claims raised in the RCr 11.42 motion. The court denied

Appellant’s motion in a well-reasoned eleven-page order. Any error that occurred

here due to the absence of counsel was harmless. Therefore, we affirm.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 J. Ryan Chailland                          Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Courtney Hightower
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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