Court Opinion

ID: 9648251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:11:34.61342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:47.923775
License: Public Domain

SILVESTRI, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s recitation of the background of this case includes the fact that in June of 1986 Hoopes and Schaaf entered into an agreement with Pebble Hill Village for the purchase of approximately 48 acres of land, that the Township *407waived subdivision ordinance requirements in exchange for Hoopes and Schaafs agreement not to further subdivide the property, that Pebble Hill Village conveyed land to Teeling, and that Teeling subsequently requested Township approval of a further subdivision of the land contrary to the restriction prohibiting further subdivision. The majority then references the procedural posture of the case which is as follows.
On June 21, 1988, the Township withheld approval of Teeling’s proposed subdivision plan. From that denial, Teeling initiated a Land Use Appeal to the trial court which entered an order sustaining Teeling’s appeal. The Township appealed the order of the trial court to this court.
In an unreported opinion of this court, authored by Senior Judge Barbieri, we affirmed the order of the trial court on the basis of the Township’s noncompliance with Section 508 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (Code), 58 P.S. § 10508. Section 508 governs applications for approval of preliminary and final subdivision plans and requires a Township to specify the defects found in the application, describe the requirements which have not been met, and cite to provisions of the statute or ordinance relied upon when denying a subdivision plan. 53 P.S. § 10508(2). Failure of the Township to comply with these specific requirements for denial is deemed an approval of the subdivision plan. 53 P.S. § 10508(3).
The opinion determined that the Code clearly requires reference to provisions of a statute or ordinance and cited this court’s decision in Board of Commissioners of Lower Merion Township v. Haslett, 69 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 1, 450 A.2d 298 (1982) which provides that “Section 508(2) of the MPC (Code) clearly sets forth that a subdivision plan may be denied only for a violation of any applicable statute or ordinance and that the provision not complied with must be cited.” Concluding that the Township’s failure to comply with the Code deemed Teeling’s plan approved, we affirmed the determination of the trial court.
*408Now presented with the same determination, namely whether the condition restricting further subdivision is valid, the majority finds otherwise and now affirms the decision of the trial court in the equity action instituted by the Township and concludes that Teeling may not subdivide the land because the Township may enforce the condition attached to the subdivision plan prohibiting further subdivision.
Because I feel that the issue has already been dispositively decided, I would reverse, and thus, dissent.
It has previously been determined that, absent the most compelling circumstances, a judge should follow the decision of a colleague on the same court when based upon the same set of facts. Yudacufski v. Department of Transportation, 499 Pa. 605, 454 A.2d 923 (1982). I recognize that the prior determination is an unreported panel decision, however, I believe this court should be obligated to follow its own decisions until subsequently overruled or until compelling reasons persuade us otherwise. See Armstrong County v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Ross and Borough of Kittanning), 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 474, 473 A.2d 755 (1984).
It is for this reason that I respectfully dissent.1

. I also disagree with the majority’s determination that the restriction prohibiting further subdivision is a covenant running with the land. In construing the intent of the parties to determine whether a restrictive covenant runs with the land, it must appear from the terms of the grant, or from the situation of the parties and the surrounding circumstances, that it was the intention of the original grantor to create a servitude which would inure to the benefit of the land and be for the benefit of the party attempting to restrain its infringement. Leh v. Burke, 231 Pa.Superior Ct. 98, 331 A.2d 755 (1974).
A covenant is distinguished from a condition in that a condition is created by the mutual agreement of the parties and is binding on both, whereas a covenant is in the words, and is a promise or an agreement of the covenantor only. I view the prohibitive restriction on further subdivision as an agreement between the Township and Hoopes and Schaaf rather than a covenant running with the land which requires clear and explicit language to impose such a restriction. See Appeal of J.C. Grille, Inc., 181 Pa.Superior Ct. 456, 124 A.2d 659 (1956).