Court Opinion

ID: 9685188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:25:43.72965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.119725
License: Public Domain

WINTER, Circuit Judge (concurring) :
I readily concur in the judgment of the court and I agree with much of what is said in its opinion. The differences, if any there be, between my views and those of the majority, lie in the articulation of the precise basis on which the judgment rests. Because I would prefer to make sharper definitions than those made by the majority, I proceed to state my separate views:
Notwithstanding that Sugarman1 and Carter2 contain suggestions to the contrary, I agree with the majority that the outcome of this case should depend upon whether a compelling state interest justifies the requirement that the selection of jurors be confined to persons who are citizens, because alienage is a suspect classification. Defendants assert that resident aliens, as a class, lack three general characteristics that are prerequisites to minimally proficient jury service: (1) familiarity with language; (2) familiarity with the laws and customs of the jurisdiction served by the jury panel; and (3) commitment to the laws which it is the juror’s obligation to apply. Because it may reasonably be assumed, so the argument runs, that individual members of the class will lack one or more of these characteristics, the government (federal and' state) has a compelling interest in excluding all of the members of the class from jury service. I will examine these various characteristics and the reasonable necessity for exclusion of jurors on the grounds of each, seriatim.
With regard to the first two asserted characteristics, certainly native born citizens as a class are more likely to be familiar with our language, customs and laws than resident aliens as a class.3 The only basis for the assertion that *140naturalized citizens have a greater familiarity with such subjects than resident aliens is the fact that successful completion of the naturalization process requires that the naturalized citizen pass certain examinations designed to demonstrate that he has an adequate familiarity with such subjects. Defendants contend that they are entitled to rely upon the tests administered by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to separate the class of persons who are not citizens by birth into those who are qualified for effective jury service (those who have been naturalized) and those who are not (those who have not yet been naturalized). I do not think that such reliance survives close judicial scrutiny. There is obviously a less drastic means of ensuring that a prospective resident alien juror is sufficiently proficient in English and sufficiently familiar with our laws and customs to serve effectively. Albeit, with some administrative inconvenience and burden, defendants could condition the eligibility of resident aliens for jury service upon their successful completion of examinations comparable to those administered by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. By that means a resident alien could establish that he has sufficient knowledge to serve effectively as a juror, without being required to abandon the legal relationship he enjoys with his present sovereign. It should be noted, however, that any examination, whether for naturalization or solely to establish jury eligibility, could only demonstrate knowledge of American language, customs and laws; it could not measure sympathy with or willingness to be governed by American customs and laws or to apply them. Were this not a case of a suspect classification requiring close judicial scrutiny, I would be persuaded that the administrative convenience of relying upon the naturalization process would justify imposing this additional burden on the class discriminated against. However, since defendants could create an examination system which would ensure that resident aliens applying for jury service possess adequate familiarity with our language, customs and laws,4 I would rest the judgment upon adoption of the third justification relied upon by the defendants.
Defendants contend that effective jurors should have, in addition to minimal knowledge of language, laws and customs, a commitment to uphold the laws of the United States and the several states, both by observance and application. I agree. The desirability of such a commitment is particularly compelling in the case of grand jurors who are-charged with the responsibility of determining whether the prosecution of alleged violations of the criminal law shall go forward. A grand juror who cares little whether the laws of the United States are vindicated could undermine substantially the government’s effort to obtain even-handed enforcement of the criminal laws. As the majority points out, it is no less desirable that petit jurors have a commitment to uphold the laws of the United States and the several states. Although petit juries are instructed as to their obligation to apply the law, it cannot be denied that, at least in criminal cases, petit juries have an unreviewable power to nullify the law by acquitting a criminal defendant against whom a case has been clearly proved. In both civil and criminal cases the unassailability of a jury’s resolution of disputed questions of fact is well established, and this is an additional reason why those facts should be resolved in accordance with the mores of the community in which the case arose. The state and federal governments thus have a substantial interest in ensuring that the power exercised by grand and petit jurors is entrusted to persons who can be expected to have a substantial commitment to the just enforcement of *141the law in accordance with the mores and fabric of American life.
Although resident aliens are liable for federal and state taxation and, in general, benefit from the protection of our civil and criminal laws, their continued allegiance to a foreign sovereign may cast substantial doubt upon their inclination to apply the laws of this country in the spirit and with the enthusiasm that the government and litigants have a right to expect. The relationship of a citizen of the United States, either native born or naturalized, to this country, when compared to that of an alien to the government of the territory in which he resides, contains several elements likely to lead the citizen to feel a stronger commitment to the enforcement of the laws of the United States. Some of these were identified- by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent in Sugar-man, 413 U.S. at 661-662, 93 S.Ct. at 2867:
Native-born citizens can be expected to be familiar with the social and political institutions of our society; with the society and political mores that affect how we react and interact with other citizens. Naturalized citizens have also demonstrated their willingness to adjust to our patterns of living and attitudes, and have demonstrated a basic understanding of our institutions, system of government, history, and traditions. It is not irrational to assume that aliens as a class are not familiar with how we as individuals treat others and how we expect “government” to treat us. An alien who grew up in a country in which political mores do not reject bribery or self-dealing to the same extent that our culture does; in which an imperious bureaucracy historically adopted a complacent or contemptuous attitude toward those it was supposed to serve; in which fewer if any cheeks existed on administrative abuses; in which “low-level” civil servants serve at the will of their superiors — could rationally be thought not to be able to deal with the public and with citizen civil servants with the same rapport that one familiar with our political and social mores would, or to approach his duties with the attitude that such positions exist for service, not personal sinecures of either the civil servant or his or her superior.
Citizens, as a rule, harbor positive feelings toward their sovereign and possess a sense of identity with their fellow citizens. I think it not unreasonable to believe that resident aliens may be likely to permit their positive feelings toward their foreign sovereigns and their sense of identity to their fellow-countrymen to impair their commitment to the enforcement and application of American law in those situations where our law resolves a question of public policy in a manner different from the law of the alien’s sovereign, or where American law defining interpersonal relationships differs from the law of the alien’s sovereign. Unlike the governments of many other nations, American government, national, state and local, is a participatory democracy. United States citizens, both native born and naturalized, are entitled to participate in the formulation of the laws of the United States and the several states through exercise of the franchise and eligibility for public office. To me, it is not unreasonable to expect that jurors who have, at least theoretically, some influence upon the content of the laws they must apply and enforce will have a greater commitment to their proper application and enforcement than those lacking such influence.
Of course, some resident aliens could be so individually constituted that their continued commitment to a foreign sovereign would not stand in the way of enthusiastic commitment to the proper enforcement and application of the laws of the United States and the several states; but this is an unidentifiable group. Unlike knowledge of a language, law or custom, personal commitment is not susceptible of objective measurement. Even if knowledge is established, an oath to serve as a juror in accordance with such knowledge is virtually unenforceable. An actual demonstration of personal commitment is necessary, and I *142can conceive of no other form of demonstrated commitment short of naturalization, where an alien formally renounces allegiance to his previous sovereign and freely and willingly assumes allegiance to the United States, that is likely to serve the state and federal government’s interest in ensuring that jurors have the proper attitude toward the enforcement of our laws.
In short, I conclude that the state and federal governments have a substantial interest in restricting eligibility for jury service to persons likely to have a personal commitment to the proper application and enforcement of the laws of the United States and the several states. The determination that resident aliens are so likely to retain ties to their fatherland that may undermine such a commitment has a sufficient basis in fact to survive the “close scrutiny” test. Therefore, I agree that the exclusion of resident aliens from service on grand and petit juries is justified by a “compelling” interest in ensuring that persons who serve as jurors are personally committed to the proper application and enforcement of the laws of the United States and the several states.

. In Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648, 92 S.Ct. 2842, 37 L.Ed.2d 853 (1973), Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the court, stated that while state action in regard to voter qualifications is not immune from scrutiny under the equal protection clause, that scrutiny will not be “so demanding” where the state action is within the state’s constitutional prerogatives. Examples given were the state’s right to require citizenship as a prerequisite to holding public office and to voting. The analogy to jury service is manifest.

. In Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 332, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970), there is the flat statement that the states may “confine the selection [of jurors] to citizens.” The statement, however, is only dictum.

. There are of course, exceptions in each category. There is a clearly definable minority of native born citizens who speak, write and understand only a language other than English. The United States is sufficiently large and diverse that regional differences in the usage and meaning of some aspects of English exist. Similarly, there are regional differences in the mores affecting interpersonal relationships. These differences become operative as the mobility of citizens within the United States increases. Many aliens, and undoubtedly plaintiff is one, speak and understand a purer form of English than many Americans, and undoubtedly many aliens adhere to political and personal mores not dissimilar to those possessed by American citizens. I believe, however, that these are the exceptions rather than the rule.

. There has been no insuperable administrative problem in identifying and excluding from jury service those persons, otherwise eligible, who lack a sufficient knowledge of English or who are so deficient in cognitive skills and understanding as to render them inefficient jurors.