Court Opinion

ID: 9854204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:07.129539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:58.456229
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion states: “Clearly there was evidence supporting the finding by the trial court that the check was given for a present consideration.” I believe the record in this case contains no such evidence. Clearly, the check was given for an outstanding debt. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Although the majority opinion states that the “trier of fact... was authorized to infer from the state’s evidence that it was the defendant’s purpose to cheat and defraud the seller and then cause *693him to suffer loss resulting from his reliance on the defendant’s wrongful act as charged in the accusation by giving him a bad check as a ‘down payment on a boat,’ ” nowhere does it specify what assertedly constitutes “present consideration.” Perhaps this is because none exists.
“To constitute consideration, a performance or a returned promise must be bargained for. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Tent. Draft) 149, § 75. I believe this basic principal of contract law is no less applicable to a criminal prosecution under Code § 26-1704 than a contract dispute. The use of the term “present” consideration in Code § 26-1704 should make it abundantly clear that a bargained for exchange is an essential element of the offense of criminal issuance of a bad check.
There is not one shred of evidence in the record to support the view that the third check (upon which the instant prosecution is based) was issued in exchange for a promise or performance. Indeed, the evidence suggests the contrary. Shortly after the second check was returned, appellant voluntarily brought the boat back to the seller for minor repairs. The seller himself testified that he retained possession of the boat solely for the purpose of completing the requested repairs. His testimony suggests that he had an ongoing business relationship with appellant and that appellant was indebted to him on an open account.
The majority cites four cases in support of its conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. Two of these cases, Wiggins v. State, 139 Ga. App. 98 (227 SE2d 895) (1976) and Purvis v. State, 143 Ga. App. 447 (238 SE2d 575) (1977), concern convictions for criminal issuance of bad checks.
The principal question at issue in Wiggins was “whether the defendant knew the check would not be honored by the drawee bank at the time it was written.” Id at 99. Wiggins does not provide any guidance on the principal question in the instant case, i.e., whether appellant issued the third check “in exchange for a present consideration.”
In Purvis, this court found there was sufficient evidence of “present consideration” to support the verdict. However, unlike the case at bar, the evidence in Purvis “presented two conflicting theories, one that the check was given for payment of an overdue debt, and the other that the check was given for payment of the [merchandise] delivered i.e., a present consideration.” Id. at 448. This court found the latter theory supported by “some evidence” and affirmed the conviction.
The majority believes a similar problem exists in the instant case, that “the defendant had shown evidence which, if believed by *694the fact finder, would have authorized a finding to the contrary.” I do not believe such a credibility question is raised here. Both appellant and the state agree that the third check was issued as a “down payment on a boat” that appellant had previously “purchased.” The issue presented in this case, quite unlike the issue presented in Purvis, is whether the term “present consideration” encompasses payment for property that has previously been “purchased.” I believe not. See Brooks v. State, 146 Ga. App. 626 (247 SE2d 209) (1978). In my view, such payment constitutes payment on a debt.
I do not question the majority’s belief that appellant has acted wrongfully. Indeed, appellant may well have acted in violation of Code § 26-1704 when he issued the first check and thereby obtained possession of the boat. However, our function in this appeal is to determine whether the evidence supports the conviction for the offense charged. I believe the state has failed to prove that the third check was issued in exchange for a “present consideration.” I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Banke and Judge Sognier join in this dissent.