Court Opinion

ID: 9647068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:22:31.67052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:45.195004
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, Bankruptcy Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority has totally missed the point of this appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 does not require the application of Florida law to determine the preclusion effect of a Florida default judgment in a dischargeability proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2), (4) and (6).'
I.

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COLLATERAL ESTOP-PEL EFFECT IN DISCHARGEABILITY PROCEEDINGS

Default judgments are not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in dischargeability proceedings because the issues were not “actually litigated.” In addition, it is clear that while 28 U.S.C. § 1738 generally requires federal courts to afford the same full faith and credit to a state court judgment, as would apply in that state, dischargeability proceedings provide an exception to the applicability of § 1738.
In In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.1983), the Court stated:
It is true that some types of judgments are not given collateral estoppel effect because the court did not get the benefit of deciding the issue in an adversarial context. In the case of a default judgment, for example, a party may decide that the amount at stake does not justify the expense and vexation of putting up a fight. The defaulting party will certainly lose that lawsuit, but the default judgment is not given collateral estoppel effect. Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Hale,
618 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir.1980); Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 (3d Cir.1978).
Gottheiner, 703 F.2d at 1140.
Indeed, four circuits, the Ninth in Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.1983), the Sixth in Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981), the Third in Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 292 (3rd Cir.1978), and the Fourth in In re Raynor, 922 F.2d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir.1991) have specifically held in the context of bankruptcy discharge-ability proceedings that default judgments are not entitled to collateral estoppel effect.1
To reduce the “actually litigated” requirement into a mere “opportunity to litigate,” as the majority of the Panel in this ease holds, is to turn the doctrine on its head. If a default judgment satisfies the “actually litigated” requirement, it is hard to imagine any case, under that standard, that is not actually litigated. Clearly, if a mere “opportunity to litigate” were sufficient, as is the case with res judicata, the elements of collateral estop-pel would not expressly require “actual litigation.” The words taken on their plain meaning cannot reasonably be construed to mean a “mere opportunity to litigate.”
In this case before us, no actual litigation on the merits took place. It is surprising that the majority concluded that the proceeding was “fully litigated.” If this is true, then an actual trial with the debtor represented would be “super” fully litigated. The debtor, Nourbakhsh purely defaulted. The facts are undisputed. Nourbakhsh resided in Southern California. The lawsuit was filed in Florida. Through an attorney, Nourbakhsh unsuccessfully attempted to contest personal jurisdiction of the Florida state court. At some point thereafter, Nourbakhsh’s attorney in Florida withdrew because Nour-bakhsh was unable to pay the fee demanded. No other work was performed on Nour-bakhsh’s case. Other than having submitted *848written answers to certain interrogatories without the assistance of counsel, Nour-bakhsh had no further involvement. Nour-bakhsh did not file an answer, conduct discovery or present evidence. He made no personal appearances in the Florida case. Nourbakhsh indicated, in his affidavit before the bankruptcy court, that he could not fly to Florida to defend himself or hire another attorney because he lacked the funds to do so. A default judgment was entered by the Florida court.2
It cannot realistically be said that this matter was actually litigated. The record before us regarding the Florida default judgment merely contained the original complaint and attached exhibits. The record contained no declarations. The majority erroneously believes that the Florida court’s findings of fact in the default judgment were actually decided. However, this appears to be no more than a classic default judgment, where it is not unusual to find the judgment prepared by the successful plaintiff. Collateral estoppel cannot rightfully be applied to this type of judgment.
What is surprising about the majority’s decision is that it entirely relies on several decisions of bankruptcy judges and totally ignores the unanimous contrary circuit court authority. Amazingly, the majority does not even bother to acknowledge that there is contrary authority. The majority ignores the clear majority of cases that hold that a default judgment is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in dischargeability proceedings, at least as to §§ 528(a)(2), (4) & (6), because the issues were not actually litigated. See Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 292 (3rd. Cir.1978); In re Raynor, 922 F.2d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir.1991); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir.1981); In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d at 1140; In re Joseph, 22 B.R. *849319, 321 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1982); In re Iannelli, 12 B.R. 561, 563 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981); In re Bishop, 55 B.R. 687, 689 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1985); In re Myers, 52 B.R. 901, 903, n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1985); In re Anderson, 49 B.R. 655, 656 (Bankr.W.D.Wis.1984); In re Anderson, 30 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1983); In re Morrison, 119 B.R. 135, 140 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1990); In re Louis, 49 B.R. 135, 138 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1985); In re Boyovich, 126 B.R. 348, 350 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1991); In re Dvorak, 118 B.R. 619, 624-25 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990); In re Sharp, 119 B.R. 779, 782 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990); In re Stiles, 118 B.R. 81, 85-86 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1990); In re Stowell, 113 B.R. 322, 329 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1990); In re Martinez, 110 B.R. 353, 355-56 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990); In re Hall, 95 B.R. 553, 558 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1989); In re Billings, 94 B.R. 803, 808 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1989); In re Durrance, 84 B.R. 238, 239 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1988); See B. Russell, Bankruptcy Evidence Manual, § 9 (1993 Ed.).
The leading and most often cited case dealing with the preclusive effect of prior default judgments in dischargeability proceedings is Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, which held that a prior state court default judgment was not “actually litigated” and therefore not entitled to collateral estoppel effect. The Third Circuit concluded:
In any case, we conclude that, because the bankrupts did not “actually litigate” the Ocean County case, not even facts which were necessary to that judgment can collaterally estop them from relitigating the same issues in the bankruptcy case. This holding is consistent both with general rules of collateral estoppel and with the federal policies in bankruptcy cases.
Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d at 292.
The Third Circuit further stated:
Clearly, adoption of the result urged upon us by the appellant — giving full collateral estoppel effect to all facts- necessarily determined by a prior default judgment would in bankruptcy court determinations under § 17a(2)—
“... necessarily defeat a major federal policy of granting exceptions to discharge only in certain circumstances specified by the [Bankruptcy Act.... The court also wishes to point out that creditors should not be encouraged to go into state courts prior to bankruptcy seeking default judgments based upon fraud. Such a circumstance would create an injustice greater than that which the 1970 amendments were intended to cure.” (quoting Opinion of the Bankruptcy Judge).
Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d at 293.
It is clear that the Third Circuit was well aware of § 1738.3 Judge Gibbons in his concurring opinion stated:
The issue in this case is whether a finance company holding the same type of debt can evade the congressional intent by securing a state court judgment against a delinquent borrower in anticipation of his bankruptcy. I think the answer should be no, and that we should admit an exception to the federal duty to recognized state court judgments imposed by § 1738. When Congress expressly identifies an abuse, when it has the constitutional power to correct it, and when as here it exercises that power, then the courts should give the congressional act its full effect. "While I agree with the majority’s analysis as far as it goes, I would prefer to rest the affir-mance on this more fundamental reason.
Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d at 294 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
The majority of the Panel relies heavily on In re Byard, 47 B.R. 700 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1985). Byard is clearly a minority position and is contrary to its own circuit’s opinion in Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d at 228 which held:
If the important issues were not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, as is the case with a default judgment, then collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation in the bankruptcy court. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d *850143, 146 (1st Cir.1980); Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 (3rd Cir.1978); [Matter of] Pigge, supra, 539 F.2d [369] at 373 [(4th Cir.1976)]; In re Cooney, 8 B.R. 96, 98-99 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1980); In re Richards, 7 B.R. 711, 714 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1980); In re Ashley, 5 B.R. 262, 264 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1980); In re McKenna, 4 B.R. 160, 162 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1980); Matter of Mallory, 1 B.R. 201, 202 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1979). (emphasis added).
In effect the Sixth Circuit, which includes the Byard court, agrees with McMillan and the majority does not agree. Given this clear mandate by the Sixth Circuit, it is not surprising that three Tennessee bankruptcy courts have specifically disagreed with Byard. In re Stiles, 118 B.R. 81 (Bankr.W.D.Tenn.1990); In re Morrison, 119 B.R. 135 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1990); and In re Hall, 95 B.R. 553 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1989).
Indeed, a judge from the same district as the Byard court clearly and correctly stated the law in In re Stiles, 118 B.R. at 85:
However, both before and after the Byard decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has discussed the effect to be given state court judgments in the bankruptcy context and in doing so has instructed that in order for collateral estoppel principles to apply, the issues which form a basis for a finding of nondischargeability must have been actually litigated and necessary to the judgment in the prior adjudication. Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615 (6th Cir.1986); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d at 228. In fact, in Spilman, the Court expressly stated:
If the important issues were not actually litigated in the prior proceeding, as is the case with a default' judgment, then collateral estoppel does not bar relit-igation in the bankruptcy court, (emphasis added).
******
Obviously, the Sixth Circuit has construed the “actually and necessarily decided” language of Brown v. Felsen to mean “actually litigated.” Contra, In re Byard, 47 B.R. at 704, n. 3. Consequently, this Court is compelled to follow the Sixth Circuit’s mandate that in order for collateral estop-pel to apply in this context, the issues must have been actually litigated and necessary to the prior adjudication. This same conclusion has been reached in recent decisions from Bankruptcy Courts for the Eastern District of Tennessee. See, In re Hall, 95 B.R. 553 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1989); In re Morrison, [119 B.R. 135 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1990)]; In re Gatlinburg Motel Enterp., Ltd., 106 B.R. 492 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1989).
In re Stiles, 118 B.R. at 85.
The court in In re Hall again specifically disagreed with the Byard decision:
As to Spilman v. Harley, the bankruptcy court in Byard took the view that, if the court of appeals were faced with the problem again, it would follow the later Supreme Court cases to the conclusion that state law controlled and gave collateral estoppel effect to the default judgment. However, after Byard was decided, the court of appeals applied the federal rules of collateral estoppel that it set out in Spilman v. Harley. The court of appeals did not look to state law to determine the collateral estoppel effect of an earlier state court judgment. Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir.1986). The court of appeals did not discuss the issue in detail and did not mention Byard, but its decision could be taken as disapproval of the result in Byard and reaffirmation of the federal rules of collateral estoppel that were set out in Spilman v. Harley.
In any event, this court disagrees with the decision in Byard that there is no federal justification for an exception to the rule that state law determines the preclusive effect of a state court judgment.
In re Hall, 95 B.R. at 555.
And finally, the court in Morrison in disagreeing with Byard concluded:
This court observes, however, as did Chief Bankruptcy Judge Ralph Kelley in Hall, 95 B.R. at 555, that after Byard was decided, the Sixth Circuit applied the identical rules of collateral estoppel enunciated in Spilman to the state court judgment before it in Laudani. The Sixth Circuit in Laudani did not mention Byard nor did it *851discuss the Supreme Court decisions relied upon by Judge Lundin. Instead, it reaffirmed the collateral estoppel rules enunciated in Spilman. This court will adhere to the principles enunciated by the Sixth Circuit in Spilman and Laudani.
In re Morrison, 119 B.R. at 141.
II.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT DISCHARGEABILITY PROCEEDINGS ARE AN EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICABILITY OF 28 U.S.C. § 17S8

A. BROWN v. FELSEN
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 132, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2210, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978), held that principles of res judicata did not prevent a creditor from offering evidence, in addition to the state court record, in dischargeability proceedings. In footnote 10, the Court left for another day whether collateral estoppel would apply in dischargeability proceedings. The Supreme Court decided this question in Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) where, in addition to holding that the proper burden of proof in dischargeability proceedings is the “preponderance of evidence,” the Supreme Court merely held that “[w]e now clarify that collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge exception proceedings pursuant to § 523(a).” Grogan, 498 U.S. at 285 n. 11, 111 S.Ct. at 658 n. 11. The Supreme Court did not hold that a default judgment qualified for collateral estoppel effect. The majority’s reliance on Grogan v. Garner is therefore misplaced.
The Supreme Court in Brown however did clearly state that dischargeability proceedings deal with very special federal interests to be decided by federal bankruptcy courts:
If a state court should expressly rule on § 17 [now § 523] questions, then giving finality to those rulings would undercut Congress’ intention to commit § 17 issues to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. The 1970 amendments eliminated post-bankruptcy state-court collection suits as a means of resolving certain § 17 discharge-ability questions. In those suits, creditors had taken advantage of debtors who were unable to retain counsel because bankruptcy had stripped them of their assets. Congress’ primary purpose was to stop that abuse. A secondary purpose, however, was to take these § 17 claims away from state courts that seldom dealt with the federal bankruptcy laws and to give those claims to the bankruptcy court so that it could develop expertise in handling them. By the express terms of the Constitution, bankruptcy law is federal law, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 4, and the Senate Report accompanying the amendment described the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over these § 17 claims as “exclusive.” S.Rep. No. 91-1173, p. 2 (1970). While Congress did not expressly confront the problem created by prebankruptcy state-court ádju-dieations, it would be inconsistent with the philosophy of the 1970 amendments to adopt a policy of res judicata which takes these § 17 questions away from bankruptcy courts and forces them back into state courts. See In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 (3rd Cir.1978); In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir.1978). (footnote omitted) (additional citations omitted).
Brown, 442 U.S. at 135-36, 99 S.Ct. at 2212.
It is significant that although the majority of the Panel disagrees with Matter of McMillan, the unanimous Supreme Court in Grogan, felt that it was significant in demonstrating the special nature of dischargeability proceedings in bankruptcy courts.
The Ninth Circuit has consistently made it clear that because of the special nature of dischargeability proceedings they should be decided by the bankruptcy court. In In re Houtman, 568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir.1978) (also cited by Brown v. Felsen) the Ninth Circuit held that:
The 1970 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act imposed upon the bankruptcy courts the exclusive jurisdiction to determine dis-chargeability. As we read those Amendments there is no room for the application of the technical doctrine of collateral estop-pel in determining the nondischargeability of debts described in section 17(a)(2), (4), *852and (8) of the Bankruptcy Act. (footnote omitted).
Houtman, 568 F.2d at 653.
The court further held:
To give collateral estoppel effect to prior state court factual findings would impair the exercise of the expertise of the bankruptcy court. The determination of non-dischargeability should remain an exclusive function of the bankruptcy court unimpeded by the refinements of collateral estoppel by state court judgments.
Houtman, 568 F.2d at 654, n. 2.
Although the Supreme Court in Grogan v. Garner held that collateral estoppel applied in dischargeability proceedings, Houtman still strongly supports the proposition that dischargeability proceedings are an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
The special federal concern in this case is the same as in Brown v. Felsen. Here the creditor, rather than the debtor, is asking the court to give preclusive effect to a pre-bank-ruptcy judgment, so as to require the debtor to litigate issues in state court before the bankruptcy, in order to preserve the issue of its dischargeability of the debt. Requiring either the debtor or creditors to litigate before bankruptcy in order to preserve the issue of dischargeability of debts is contrary to the policy behind the bankruptcy laws.
B. MARRESE v. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ORTHOPAEDIC SURGEONS
Marrese v. American Academy of Ortho. Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1984), reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1062, 105 S.Ct. 2127, 85 L.Ed.2d 491 (1985) concerned the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent lawsuit involving federal antitrust claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The Seventh Circuit held that as a matter of federal law, the prior state court judgment barred the federal antitrust suit under principles of res judicata. Because the lower courts did not consider the effect of state preclusion law, the case was reversed and remanded.
In remanding, the Supreme Court held, “[w]e are unwilling to create a special exception to § 1738 for federal antitrust claims that would give state court judgments greater preclusive effect than would the courts of the State rendering the judgment.” (emphasis added). Marrese, 470 U.S. at 384, 105 S.Ct. at 1334.
The Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue, before us, of whether an exception should apply to § 1738 to allow for lesser preclusive effect in a federal court than would the courts of the state rendering the judgment. Acknowledging that there might be such an exception for federal antitrust claims, in view of the remand, it left for another day the determination of this issue. The Court stated:
In this case the Court of Appeals should have first referred to Illinois law to determine the preclusive effect of the state judgment. Only if state law indicates" that a particular claim or issue would be barred, is it necessary to determine if an exception to § 1738 should apply. Although for purposes of this case, we need not decide if such an exception exists for federal antitrust claims, we observe that the more general question is whether the concerns underlying a particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction justify a finding of an implied partial repeal of § 1738. Resolution of this question will depend on the particular federal statute as well as the nature of the claim or issue involved in the subsequent federal action. Our previous decisions indicate that the primary consideration must be the intent of Congress. See Kremer, supra, at 470-76 (finding no congressional intent to depart from § 1738 for purposes of Title VII); cf. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 [99 S.Ct. 2205, 2212, 60 L.Ed.2d 767] (1979) (finding congressional intent that state judgment would not have claim preclusive effect on dischargeability issue in bankruptcy) (emphasis added).
Marrese, 470 U.S. at 386, 105 S.Ct. at 1335.
The Supreme Court’s specific reference to Brown v. Felsen, clearly indicates that congressional intent regarding dischargeability may support an exception to § 1738.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Felsen, cited one of the abuses which Congress *853sought to curb: “The 1970 amendments eliminated post-bankruptcy state collection suits as a means of resolving certain § 17 dis-chargeability questions. In those suits, creditors had taken advantage of debtors who were unable to retain counsel because bankruptcy had stripped them of their assets. Congress’ primary purpose was to stop that abuse.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. at 135-36, 99 S.Ct. at 2212. The majority in this appeal leave open a similar abuse. As in the case here, an individual debtor, who lacks the funds to defend a suit in a remote forum may be compelled to default. Where there is a complete default, as is the case here, a debt- or should not be bound by one-sided, unchallenged allegations which would summarily deny him the discharge of the debt. It furthers no congressionally intended purpose to find a debt nondischargeable based on a default judgment issued in a remote forum, all in the name of “full faith and credit.” To advance the congressional policy behind § 523 in securing a debtor’s chance at obtaining a discharge of debts, an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1738 is warranted. A default judgment in and of itself is an insufficient basis for determining a debt to be nondischargeable. Therefore, I would REVERSE.

. The Eleventh Circuit in In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672 (11th Cir.1993), in dictum noted that in a dischargeability proceeding that the collateral estoppel law of the state rendering the judgment must be applied. The entire discussion on this point is the following:
If the prior judgment was rendered by a state court, then the collateral estoppel law of that state must be applied to determine the judgment’s preclusive effect. In re Touchstone, 149 B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993).
In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d at 675-76.
The applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was clearly never an issue, probably because there was an actual trial in the state court and the remaining elements of collateral estoppel under the state law were the same as under federal law.

. I am not fully convinced that the majority is correct to conclude that the Florida law of collateral estoppel bars future litigation of issues raised in a default judgment. The majority cites cases which either do not provide binding interpretations of Florida law, or only offer dicta, not holdings, to support its view. For example, while it might be persuasive to a Florida state court, In re Seifert, 130 B.R. 607 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1991), does not bind a state court in matters of purely Florida law. See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Nor does Seifert rely on any Florida case law. The other case cited by the majority, In re Marsowicz, 120 B.R. 602 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1990), does rely on Florida cases, e.g., Perez v. Rodriguez, 349 So.2d 826 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); Baum v. Pines Realty, Inc., 164 So.2d 517 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1964), but those cases only support the majority's view in dicta. Perez, for example, held that an issue was not precluded from litigation in a subsequent lawsuit between the parties. Thus, the holding of Perez offers no direct support for the majority's conclusion. It is true that Perez, citing another Florida case, mentions in dicta that an earlier “default judgment conclusively establishes [in a subsequent action] ... the truth of all material allegations contained in the complaint in the [earlier default judgment] and eveiy fact necessary to uphold the [earlier] default judgment.” Perez, 349 So.2d at 827 (citing Baum, 164 So.2d at 522). But, like Perez, Baum is a case which held that collateral estoppel did not bar litigation of an issue between the parties in a subsequent lawsuit. Thus, neither Baum nor Perez directly hold for the majority’s view. Admittedly, these courts suggest, but do not hold, that were the issue before them, they would apply collateral estoppel to default judgments. But, given the variety of opinions non-Florida courts have about this question, compare, e.g., Matter of Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 812, 111 S.Ct. 48, 112 L.Ed.2d 24 (1990) and In re Dvorak, 118 B.R. 619 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1990) and In re Sharp, 119 B.R. 779 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) with In re Stowell, 102 B.R. 589 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989) and In re Bennett, 80 B.R. 800 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1988), I cannot assume, without more direct authority, that this debatable question is entirely settled. The closest a Florida court has come to squarely addressing this question is Mas-ciarelli v. Maco Supply Corp., 224 So.2d 329 (Fla.1969). Masciarelli purports to apply "estop-pel by judgment,” a synonym for collateral estop-pel, to a default judgment. However, the true basis for the court’s holding may have been res judicata. Masciarelli relies for its holding on Avant v. Hammond Jones Inc., 79 So.2d 423 (Fla.1955), a case which enunciates a collateral estoppel analysis, but defines collateral estoppel in terms of res judicata. For example, the Avant court applies the "opportunity to litigate” standard, the hallmark of res judicata, in order to arrive at its conclusion that a certain claim is barred. "We conclude that the appellant was estopped to maintain an action in trover [the claim raised in a later lawsuit] when he had had abundant opportunity to isolate for adjudication the claim he now makes....” Id. at 424. This res judicata case, belies the Court's stated application of "estoppel by judgment.” To the extent Avant is truly a res judicata case, it suggests that Masciarelli too is a res judicata case mislabeled as a case about collateral estoppel. If so, then there is no Florida authority directly on point about the collateral estoppel effect of default judgments.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 was enacted on June 25, 1948. Ch. 646. 62 Stat. 947. based on Title 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1940 ed.) (R.S. § 905).