Court Opinion

ID: 9539257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:01:06.931841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:39.478608
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
MADDOX, Justice.
On application for rehearing appellee says that we have substituted our findings for those of the trial court. We do not so read our original opinion. We noted many inconsistent statements in the depositions .of the parties, as appellee pointed out initially and on application for rehearing, but our reversal and remandment was not made on the trial court’s findings of fact, with the exception of the finding that there was fraud, but solely upon the ground that there was insufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude the existence of fraud in the transaction, especially in view of the rule that fraud will not be presumed if the circumstances in evidence may be consonant with honesty in the parties to the transaction.
As we pointed out in the original opinion, fraud can be shown by circumstances surrounding a particular transaction, but is never presumed. L. W. & P. Armstrong v. Miller, 238 Ala. 17, 189 So. 74 (1939). Our reversal and remandment does not foreclose the appellee from showing, if it can, whether Salter and Muscogee were solvent at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer, or other facts, such as circumstances surrounding the making of the loan with the bank. We cannot possibly know whether circumstances did exist which would show that fraud was present. But facts sufficient to show fraud are not in the record before us, and we have carefully reviewed it again on application for rehearing.
Appellee suggests that in our original opinion we held that the appellee was required to prove that the transaction was made with the specific intent to hinder, delay and defraud Peoples Bank. While we do not see how our original opinion could be so interpreted, we here restate the rule which we think is applicable. If there is sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, of actual fraud on the part of the debtor, directed toward existing creditors, contemplated creditors, or both, such transaction is void as to such creditors. We are still of the opinion, however, that the evidence in this record is insufficient to show fraud, and the evidence is certainly not of the quantity and cogency of the evidence we held to be sufficient in L. W. & P. Armstrong v. Miller, supra, strongly relied upon by the appellee. The application for rehearing is due to be denied.
Opinion extended and rehearing denied.
LAWSON, MERRILL, PIARWOOD and McCALL, JJ., concur.