Court Opinion

ID: 9732111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:08:27.891315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:23.368358
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, J.:
¶ 1 Did the trial court err when it concluded that there were valid reasons to justify the delay in filing the criminal charges against Keith Snyder until they were filed and that the reasons for the delay in filing the charges were proper?
¶ 2 This case was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of making the above determination with the direction that a finding of the absence of valid reasons for the late filing of the charges would mandate vacation of the judgment of sentence and discharge of the appellant. The court, after an extensive hearing, found valid reasons for the delay and that the delay was proper and, of course subject to review, affirmed the judgment of sentence.
¶ 3 The core issue under scrutiny in the trial court and in the decision of the supreme court, which remanded for the hearing, is whether appellant Snyder had been deprived of his constitutional right to due process by reason of the pre-arrest delay of over eleven years from the time of the alleged offense.1. In the supreme court decision which remanded, the court equated the delay in prosecution issue under the Pennsylvania Constitution to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and placed reb-anee upon two cases decided in the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Accordingly, our supreme court in Snyder stated, “Thus, the Marion and Lovasco decisions stand for the proposition that to establish a due process violation for delay in prosecution, a defendant must show that the passing of time caused actual prejudice and that the prosecution lacked sufficient and proper reasons for postponing the prosecution”. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44, 713 A.2d 596 at 601 (1998). After a review of the evidence from the trial, the court then concluded that the delay in prosecution did result in actual prejudice to appellant. The court, again following the Marion/Lo-*586vasco analyses, concluded that the record was inadequate to determine if the second prong of the standard, whether the reasons for the delay were proper, was proven, and, thus, remanded.

Burden of Proof

¶4 At the outset, the parties are in disagreement as to the allocation of the burden of proof which governed the hearing on remand. Appellee Commonwealth cites language in Snyder “... to establish a due process violation... a defendant must show that...” Commonwealth v. Snyder, 713 A.2d at 601. Also cited is language from Commonwealth v. Clayton, 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987), “appellant must show” and “appellant has failed to produce”, 532 A.2d at 387-8 n. 2, and Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978), “appellant’s claim must fail because he has shown no actual prejudice”, 390 A.2d at 181. On the other hand, appellant argues, not unpersuasively, that if the burden were not on the Commonwealth, there would be no reason to remand for a further hearing. We conclude that it is not necessary to decide this issue in our disposition since, although the hearing court did not explicitly discuss the allocation of burden of proof, it is apparent that the matter was considered in the light of the burden being placed on the Commonwealth. It is certainly clear that the Commonwealth assumed the burden of going forward with the evidence. At the remand hearing conducted on August 6 and August 7, 1998, it was the Commonwealth which went forward and produced all the witnesses and, in fact, the defendant rested without offering any evidence. This was to be expected since on an issue of the propriety for a delay in prosecution, substantially all of the evidence is in the hands of the Commonwealth. Viewed in this context, the hearing court viewed its mandate as one of discovering whether there were valid reasons to justify the filing of charges after the extensive delay. In execution of this mandate, the court concluded that the reasons for the delay were valid and proper. From the court’s exhaustive discussion of the evidence, it is evident that it was found that the evidence preponderated in favor of the Commonwealth’s position.

The Prosecutor’s Duty

¶ 5 In remanding for a hearing, the supreme court was explicit. The trial court was charged to determine if the delay was proper or improper. The court concluded that appellant was actually prejudiced by the delay and sought a determination of whether there were valid reasons to justify the delay. In making such a determination, it is apparent that a court is somewhat confounded. The inquiry necessarily immerses the judicial branch of government in an assessment of the performance of the executive which, of course, has distinct constitutional obligations and variant calls for service by its constituency. The ready legal analogy is to the familiar line of cases which interpret the right to a speedy trial. The accused’s right to a speedy (prompt) trial is rooted in Amendment VI of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania. However, other than the commonality that they both implicate a burden on the judiciary to assay the performance of the executive prosecutor, there exist marked differences between an accused’s right to a prompt trial after an accusation has been lodged and a citizen’s right to be seasonably charged after a criminal episode. In the first instance, which finds its expression in Pa.R.Crim. P. 1100, the accused has already been subjected to public charges and has a right to a public trial to defend against the state, and demonstrate his innocence or, at least, the overstatement of the charges. In such instance, it is altogether reasonable that the law should require the prosecutor, having made a claim which brings a citizen into a position of obloquy and dishonor to proceed with promptitude with proof of his assertion. Appropriately, in such circumstances the prosecutor is burdened with an *587obligation to act with due diligence to prepare and proceed to trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(g).
¶ 6 Conversely, the citizen who may be a suspect, has certain rights — not to a prompt trial — but to be free from an extraordinary pre-arrest delay which may render charges constitutionally infirm. This infringement is based upon Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania as part of the “law of the land”. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, supra. In these circumstances, the law has not imposed a due diligence standard, but rather, as instantly, has sought to determine if there has been actual prejudice and if there has been valid or proper reason for delay. While recognizing that the law imposes a constitutional duty on the prosecutor, our courts have been careful not to invade the prerogatives of the prosecutor and to respect the quotidian decision making responsibility which attaches to that high office. Accordingly, the supreme court in Marion, supra, relied on the absence of evidence that there was intentional delay to gain a tactical advantage. In Lovasco, the court noted that no one’s interest is well served by compelling prosecution as soon as they have gathered evidence of probable cause. The court further recognized that charging decisions often involve policy considerations which should be free from interference. It also opined with approval that investigative delay until a prosecutor is “completely satisfied” that he should prosecute and be able to “promptly establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” is consistent with fair play and decency. Id., 431 U.S. at 793-95, 97 S.Ct. 2044.
¶ 7 In our own jurisdiction, our supreme court has specifically rejected the claim that courts should hold prosecutors to a duty to prosecute promptly when it appears that a probable case is demonstrable. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172, 180 (1978). In Commonwealth v. Clayton, Id., at 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385 (1987), the court rejected the unreasonable delay argument on the basis that there was a failure to show “that delay was a deliberate tactical move in bad faith by the Commonwealth”. 516 Pa. 263, 532 A.2d 385, 388. This court has rejected a delay in prosecution argument on the basis, inter alia, that there was no showing that the delay was “motivated by improper considerations” or was “deliberate or purposeful”. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 392 Pa.Super. 331, 572 A.2d 1258, 1263 (1990). In Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597, 526 A.2d 749 (1987), it was opined that even in the face of prejudice, delay is excusable if it is a derivation of reasonable investigation.

The Hearing on Remand

¶ 8 At the hearing before Judge Mundy, the Commonwealth assumed the responsibility of going forward with the evidence, as well as, implicitly, the burden of proof that the reasons for the delay were both valid and proper. In order to do so, it called as witnesses the decision and policy-makers who were in authority from the time of the fatal arson to the time of appellant’s arrest. The District Attorney of Luzerne County, at the time of the fatal fire, Robert J. Gillespie, Jr., established that the victims were appellant’s wife, Diane, and his 36 day-old son, Brian, and that Keith Snyder, appellant, was a suspect. Two aspects of the case which were problematic, were the burn time of the fire and the presence of the drug tuinal in Diane’s bloodstream. He opined that, while he felt there was sufficient evidence to arrest appellant, he was not satisfied that there was enough to achieve a conviction. Gillespie was in office from January 1982 to December 1985. In the fall of 1984, he was authorized to empanel what he described as the first investigating Grand Jury in his county’s history, to investigate several criminal matters, including the Snyder investigation. At the time of his departure from office, he felt that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a *588conviction. Bernard Podcasy succeeded Gillespie and served until January, 1988. He received a unanimous Grand Jury report in August of 1986 which recommended that, while there was unequivocal evidence of incendiary origin, the evidence to support an indictment was insufficient. The panel recommended vigorous pursuit of the investigation. Other than pursuit of a fruitless anonymous tip and being immersed in current business, there was no especial proactivity on the Snyder matter during the remainder of his term. Corr-éale Stevens served from January, 1988 to July, 1991. He was briefed on the case and had some key staff members review the matter, but determined thereafter that there was not enough to warrant an arrest. His overall view as to older unsolved cases was that they were primarily police matters. (The investigations were being pursued by the Wright Township Police and the Pennsylvania State Police).
¶ 9 Jerome Cohen served as District Attorney for five months and took no action. He, as did Stevens, stated that any inactivity was not for the purpose of achieving tactical advantage. Robert Martz was a regional chief for the Pennsylvania State Police. He reviewed the investigation file on six to eight occasions and consulted with his commander as well as District Attorney Stevens. Martz considered it an open investigation. Joseph A. Jacob, the Chief of Police of Wright Township, advised that he reviewed the evidence two times a year and did not repetitively re-interview the witnesses since to do so is often counterproductive; he had conferences with experts and other law enforcement persons on numerous occasions, maintained periodic contact on the case with the State Police, and maintained observation of the suspect. When, as a result of District Attorney Olszewski’s reappraisal of the case, renewed interviews were conducted he found that certain witnesses who had had an allegiance to the suspect were more forthcoming when a common employer closed its operation and they were no longer co-employees of appellant. The key to the eventual institution of criminal proceedings came after Peter Paul Olszewski, Jr., took office as District Attorney in 1992. Renewed action was occasioned by an approach from one of his county detectives, Jack Hlivia, who had been a state trooper and was familiar with the case. After conversation with Hlivia, he commissioned him to gather the investigative files from the agencies involved. After some time, Olszewski reviewed these files as well as the Grand Jury testimony. This led to interviews and discussions with a number of knowledgeable resources. Based on all of this, he was “absolutely not” of the judgment that Snyder should then be arrested. Nevertheless, he convened a meeting on April 5, 1993 with state and township law enforcement authorities and members of his own staff to address a number of questions and consider undertaking a rekindled investigation. The investigating team represented the three agencies. This involved relocating and re-interviewing witnesses; reviewing physical evidence and collecting it, as well as providing a chain of custody log. Consultations were had with FBI experts and insurance investigation records from the fire loss. There was consultation with federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms representatives and a forensic pathologist. There was an investigation into the theo-logic aspects of suicide which was the anticipated defense. As a result of information gathered, appellant was arrested. The new information, which led to the prosecutor’s decision to arrest Snyder, included; information from a witness who gave a lead to evidence from three other witnesses which clearly contradicted any suggestion that the wife victim was contemplating suicide. There was also elicited a crucial admission of a sexual relationship between a witness and appellant. This led to a new corroborating witness who confirmed this relationship and the existence of documentary support. Other evidence was developed to support a theory that the appellant likely aspired to end *589his marriage and continue the relationship. All of this served for the first time to provide a motive which, although not a necessary ingredient of the crime, was certainly crucial to a successful prosecution. The investigation also unveiled other evidence that appellant had engaged in several other, more casual, sexual relationships. Significantly, the interviews with the person who had developed a romantic relationship with Snyder uncovered the fact that he had furnished her with two recordings with titles suggesting dissatisfaction with his marital partner and a preference for his paramour. New evidence was gathered to support an argument that the wife decedent was not in a state of mental depression but, rather, that she was looking forward to future events; that appellant had expressed disdain for his infant child; and that the alcohol in the wife victim’s blood at midday was completely out of character for her. Supporting testimony was received with respect to the observation of a witness that on the morning of the fire, appellant was seen to exit his residence exhibiting a limp in his walk. A witness who became a trial witness furnished her opinion that when appellant came to a bank (after the fire was initiated) he appeared nervous and fidgety and in a hurry. Two witnesses were interviewed and testified at trial who supported a theory that a smoke detector had been rendered inoperative.
¶ 10 In sum, the reinvigorated Olszewski investigation interviewed some 80 persons on various expected issues who had not been previously sought out. The District Attorney ended his testimony by stating that he would not have proceeded to prosecute without this new information, having previously determined that an arrest was not appropriate. The initiative of District
Attorney Olszewski that the Snyder case was ripe for a very substantial commitment of public resources to a renewed investigation which ultimately bore fruit, does not depreciate the integrity of his predecessors’ election as to the proper ur-gencies during their occupancy of the office.
¶ 11 From our review of the precedents, many of which involve homicides for which there is no statute of limitations, it is clear that in assessing the performance of prosecutors as to delay in initiating charges, there is a distinct characteristic of hesitancy to critically evaluate the day-to-day decision making of the office of the prosecutor.2 This, undoubtedly, stems from a recognition that the prosecutor must face a stream of current cases which demand immediate attention and are subject to intense public scrutiny; that the office typically has limited resources which must react to legislative, judicial, media and public demands for priority in addressing an ever-changing array of social problems. However, the courts will not tolerate any purposeful shelving of a case to gain advantage. While it may not be expected that an older unsolved case may always receive the highest priority among competing demands, the prosecutor who exhibits studied recognition of his ongoing responsibilities to his constituency, should not be censured for a good faith election in the performance of his duty.
¶ 12 It should not offend constitutional standards even if it may be said that a given case has undergone a period of informed deferral or perhaps even benign neglect. So understood, we find that the hearing court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the reasons for the delay were valid and the delay was proper.
*590¶ 13 The evidence demonstrates that each prosecuting officer and law enforcement officer, who successively had responsibility for the Snyder case, gave consideration to the investigation and made evenhanded decisions as to the status of the case. It was not until the administration of District Attorney Olszewski that, inspired by the prompting of a veteran law enforcement officer, it was decided to devote substantial resources to reinvestigate the crime which uncovered substantial new evidence which changed a long standing assessment of sufficient to arrest, to the more responsible standard of sufficient to convict.

Commonwealth v. Scher

¶ 14 During the progress of this case on June 7, 1999, a panel of this court decided the matter of Commonwealth v. Scher, 732 A.2d 1278 (Pa.Super.1999). While Scher is factually dissimilar, it does directly involve the prosecutorial delay concept which is presently at issue. Our court adopted a standard based upon a decision by Senior Judge Barnes of the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.1977). We enunciated the following standard:
Therefore, where there has been an excessive and prejudicial pre-arrest delay, we will not only inquire as to whether there has been any intentional delay by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage over the accused, but we will also consider whether the prosecution has been negligent by failing to pursue a reasonably diligent criminal investigation.
Commonwealth v. Scher, 732 A.2d at 1284.
¶ 15 This standard, by its terms, implicates both a negligence and due diligence concept in the judicial evaluation of the prosecutor’s performance. Indeed, the conclusion of the opinion in setting aside a homicide conviction was that the court could not find a “diligently pursued” investigation and that the Commonwealth, by inactivity, was “grossly negligent”. We are mindful that Scher has now been argued on appeal to our supreme court. 561 Pa. 693, 751 A.2d 189 (2000). We have considered the instant case under what we consider to be -the standards called for in the Marion/Lovasco line of cases which have been embraced by our supreme court. The Scher decision was filed after the hearing and order on remand in the instant matter and we have elected not to follow the “due diligence” and negligence standards adopted therein. As a court en banc, we are not bound to follow a superior court panel opinion. See Neilson v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 738 A.2d 490 (Pa.Super.1999); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 444 Pa.Super. 170, 663 A.2d 728 (1995). As an intermediate appellate court, we have chosen to go forward with our decision so as not to contribute further delay to a case where the subject incident occurred in July of 1982.
¶ 16 Order affirmed.
¶ 17 Judge POPOVICH files a Dissenting Opinion in which Judge TODD and Justice MONTEMURO have joined.
¶ 18 Judges KELLY, JOHNSON, HUDOCK, FORD ELLIOTT, EAKIN have joined the majority.

. Commonwealth v. Snyder, 552 Pa. 44, 713 A.2d 596 (1998).

. Our courts have long recognized that the content and timing of charging decisions rests with the District Attorney. See Hearn v. Myers, 699 A.2d 1265 (Pa.Super.1997); Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 549 Pa. 634, 702 A.2d 1027 (1997); Commonwealth v. Slick, 432 Pa.Super. 563, 639 A.2d 482 (1994), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 669, 649 A.2d 671 (1994); Commonwealth v. Spells, 417 Pa.Super. 233, 612 A.2d 458 (1992), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 350, 643 A.2d 1078 (1994); Commonwealth v. McElroy, 445 Pa.Super. 336, 665 A.2d 813 (1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 610, 674 A.2d 1073 (1996).