Court Opinion

ID: 8634773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:43:25.202368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:53.613075
License: Public Domain

HOPKINSON, J.
After having carefully
considered the arguments advanced, and the authorities cited in this cause, it appears to me unnecessary to pursue the whole tract of argument that hath been taken on this occasion. The decision of the cause rests solely on the nature of the contract between the owners of a ship and the captain they employ. And the terms or substance of such a contract is, in my opinion this, viz. If the master well and faithfully performs the duties of his station, the owners, on their part, are bound to pay the stipulated wages, and allow him all the customary privileges of his office. But it does not seem to be any part of the_ contract, that a master once engaged, shall be master for the voyage at all events. ' This might be extremely injurious to owners, on account of the very extensive powers a master hath over their property. And however hard it may appear that the master should be subject to the caprice of his owners in this respect, he must consider it as one of the unavoidable inconveniences of his occupation, and in cases of real injury apply to the laws of his country for redress. Much greater would the danger be to owners of vessels, and indeed to commerce in general, if the appointment of a master should be irrevocable for the voyage. Whatever good opinion an owner may have of the master, at the time of his appointment, he may find sufficient reason afterwards to change his mind, and yet not be able to produce legal proof of his defection or inability. Fidelity or infidelity before a service performed, is a matter of opinion only, and it would be an unreasonable hardship to compel an owner to continue wha.t was originally a voluntary trust in the hands of a person of whom he may have found subsequent- reasons • to believe that he may prove either-unfaithful or unskilful, although he may not be able to charge him with any positive offence: but 1 cannot see how this court can interfere to any effect. If the court should decree that the owners shall receive the libellant on board, as master for the voyage contracted for; have not the owners a power to sell their ship, to lay her up, or totally change the voyage, and so evade the decree? Or, If a master should refuse to go the voyage for which he engaged, can this court compel a specific performance of the. duties of his office? The remedy in both cases must be in damages for a breach of contract, to which the common law is most competent. Let the bill be dismissed. '
The libellant appealed from this judgment, and the cause was again fully argued before the judges of. the high court of errors and appeals; but the libel was finally dismissed. [1 Dali. (1 U. S.) 49.]