Court Opinion

ID: 9751310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:20:41.871682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:42.413347
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Cer-cone, J.:
Upon consideration of the court’s charge in full, and in light of the facts and circumstances of this case, I do not believe that the lower court’s reference to “assured-clear-distance-ahead” constituted a charge thereon. On the other hand, I do agree that the court’s refusal to charge on reckless driving was error. Therefore, for the reasons which follow, I would affirm the judgments entered in favor of the passengers against the drivers of the two vehicles in question, Terry Lake and Charles Smith. However, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the question of the liability of Terry Lake and Charles Smith, inter se.
Appellant Lake’s first contention is that the lower court erred in charging the jury on the assured-clear-*171distance-ahead rule because, Lake says, he was not bound to anticipate, when he entered Gay Street, that someone would be negligently approaching him in the wrong lane of travel. See Schofield v. Druschel, 359 Pa. 630 (1948) ,1 In particular, Lake rests his argument upon Fleischman v. Reading, 388 Pa. 183 (1957). In that case, in dealing with a situation involving a head-on collision in which one of the vehicles was traveling in the wrong lane of traffic, the Court through Justice Musmanno, stated: “The defendant interprets ‘assured clear distance ahead’ to mean more than what is within the purport of its language. ‘Assured clear distance ahead’ means only what it says: a clear distance that is assured, that is, one that can reasonably be depended on. The rule does not mean that the motorist must carry in his mind every possible series of combinations which could conspire against him, and that he must transport ready-made solutions to overcome all fortuitous hazards which suddenly face him. Assured does not mean guaranteed. When a driver approaches the crest of a hill, there comes a moment when, because of the convexity of the highway, he has practically no guaranteed clear distance ahead, but he can reasonably be assured that no one will be insane enough to approach the crest of the road from the other side of the summit, using the contrary lane of travel. If such a predicament should develop and a collision result, the motorist on his own side of the thoroughfare cannot be declared guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law on the theory that he did not have an assured clear distance ahead.” Id. at 185-86. [Emphasis added.]
First, the posture of that case as it stood before the Supreme Court was materially dissimilar from the case *172currently at bar. Mr. Fleischman, the plaintiff in that case, never got his case to the jury, for the trial court therein granted defendant’s motion for a non-suit based upon a strict reading of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule.2 In Fleischman the court did not permit the jury to consider whether the plaintiff exercised that measure of due care which the circumstances required. Had the trial court in the instant case applied the standard which was rejected by the Supreme Court in Fleischman, there is *173little doubt that appellant Lake, in his cause of action against Mr. Smith, would have been non-suited. Indeed, herein, the court expressly refused to instruct the jury that appellant was negligent as a matter of law. Instead, the trial court in the instant case instructed the jury to examine appellant’s conduct in light of the circumstances and the requirements of due care, so that appellant’s inability to see over the crest of the hill was only one circumstance affecting his duty of care.
Therefore, my disagreement with the majority opinion lies in its conclusion that the trial court did, in fact, instruct the jury on applying the assured clear distance ahead rule to appellant Lake’s driving in cresting the hill at Gay Street. The relevant portion of the court’s charge was thus:
“[Lake] says that when he came around this curve and entered Gay Street that by reason of the contour of the highway itself, it was impossible for him to see down Gay Street and impossible then for him to see the Smith vehicle. But you have to ask yourselves then whether or not since he had travelled this highway before and since he was familiar with that and knew that there was a blind spot there, was it negligence on his part to come around the curve and to enter Gay Street in such a way that he would not be able to stop his vehicle in the event it came upon an obstruction in the highway, particularly in the area where this blind spot occurred?
“You must determine, ladies and gentlemen, from this testimony whether if he were going 35 m.p.h. or even if he were going less than 35 m.p.h., whatever speed you decide he was going when he entered Gay Street, whether he was going at a speed that would enable him to have his vehicle under such control that would justify him to enter a spot where he knew that there was an inability to see what was in the highway *174in front of him. And if you find that he was operating at a speed that was not sufficient to enable him to have the vehicle under control within what has been referred to in the vehicle code as the assured clear distance ahead, then you would certainly be justified to find him guilty of negligence. If his failure to have his automobile under such control at that point was a proximate cause of the accident, then certainly you would be justified to conclude that his negligence was such that would render him responsible to the plaintiffs in this action, the other plaintiffs.” [Emphasis added.]
Of course, the court referred to the assured distance ahead rule in its charge, but not because it was statutorily applicable to this case. Indeed, no reference was made to The Vehicle Code in connection with assured clear distance ahead, although the Code’s proscription against driving on the wrong side of the highway was so referenced. Rather, the context of its use indicates that the principle should have been considered as a factor affecting Lake’s duty of due care. To wit: At what speed would an actor be justified in traveling when he knew it was impossible for him to see the road ahead? The court asked the jury, “was it negligence on [Lake’s] part to come around the curve and enter Gay Street in such a way that he would not be able to stop his vehicle in the event it came upon an obstruction in the highway... Since Lake admitted that he could not see anything on the road immediately beyond the hillcrest, if the assured clear distance ahead rule were deemed applicable, the question would not have survived its statement.
Taken in context with the court’s admittedly correct charge on the duty of care in negligence cases, and the admission of evidence concerning posted speed limits, I do not think its reference to assured clear distance ahead constituted a charge thereon under the statute.
However, I do find merit in appellant Lake’s second allegation of error that he was entitled to have the jury *175instructed on reckless driving, so that if the jury found Smith’s conduct to be reckless, appellant’s contributory negligence would not constitute a defense for Smith.
Our Supreme Court has strenuously condemned the misuse of the left lane of a two lane highway. In Polando v. Blue Ridge Trans. Co., 374 Pa. 485 (1953), the Court stated: “In America, travelling on the left side of the road is fundamentally improper. The State permits the occasional use of that lane because of the exigencies of travel but authorizes it only with the understanding that one will enter that hazardous territory with his eyes on the road, his mind on the job, and his hands and feet prompt to execute a safe maneuver over a course already formulated. Anything less than such conduct is blameworthy.” Id. at 489.
While it is true that proof that a motorist was driving in the left lane when an accident occurred is merely prima facie evidence of negligence, that is so only because under particular circumstances one is entitled to drive in the left lane. 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law & Practice §101.64 (1965). Hence, if a defendant can demonstrate that he was properly in the left lane when an accident occurred, he will not be held to be negligent therefor. In the absence of explanation or justification, however, such misuse of the left lane may be ruled to be negligence per se. See 75 P.S. §1004 (1971). And, under certain circumstances, a defendant’s misuse of the left lane may be so egregious that a jury could properly find that his conduct amounted to “carelessly disregarding the rights or safety of others....” 75 P.S. §1001(1) (1971). Thus, in the Potando Case, supra, the Court gratuitously stated that a jury could well find the bus driver’s conduct to be “gross negligence.” Similarly, cases in other jurisdictions have determined that misuse of the left lane may constitute recklessness. Thus, in Forston v. Hester, 39 So. 2d 649 (Ala. 1949), the¡(SAlabama Supreme Court held that a milk truck driver drove recklessly, causing him to strike *176a paper boy on a bicycle, when he drove his truck through a heavy fog, in the left lane, at six o’clock in the morning. A truck driver was also found to be driving recklessly when he allowed his truck to remain in the left lane while negotiating an “S” curve. Trotter v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 645 (W.D. La. 1951).
While it is true that in the instant case the evidence tended to indicate that Mr. Smith was ascending the grade slowly, in first gear, I do not find that the evidence, as a matter of law, bars a jury from finding his conduct to be reckless. The evidence also indicated that he pulled into the left lane deliberately, despite the fact that he knew he was “blindly” approaching the crest of Gay Street at the intersection with Route 624. Especially in light of the Court’s strong language in the Fleisehman Case (one can reasonably be assured that no one will be insane enough to approach the crest of the road from the other side of the summit, using the contrary lane of travel), the court erred in not instructing the jury on reckless driving.
This is not to say that Mr. Smith was not also entitled to such an instruction. The evidence fairly indicated that Lake was going so fast when he crossed the hilltop that he literally became airborne. He admittedly used the road frequently and knew of the blind spot, yet did not approach it with any appreciable degree of added caution. Any number of foreseeable obstacles may have awaited him and his passengers on the other side; and, given the speed at which he was traveling, he certainly could not have avoided them.3
*177For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial only with respect to the verdict in favor of Charles Smith against appellant Lake.

. Since the filing of briefs and arguments on the instant appeal, this court has determined that the assured clear distance ahead rule should not be applied to situations involving vehicles proceeding in the wrong lane of travel. See Unangst v. Whitehouse, 236 Pa. Superior Ct. 458 (1975).

. In this regard, the law in Pennsylvania has been in a state of confusion, and perhaps contradiction, for more than a decade. Compare Fleischman v. Reading, supra; Francis v. Henry, 399 Pa. 369 (1960); and McElroy v. Rozzi, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 (1960) ; with Haines v. Dulaney, 424 Pa. 608 (1967) ; Rich v. Petersen Truck Lines, Inc., 357 Pa. 318 (1947) ; and Hollern v. Verhovsek, 220 Pa. Superior Ct. 343 (1971). Other decisions, in favoring a strict application of the rule, have found it to be “fixed and unchangeable”: Stark v. Fullerton Trucking Co., 318 Pa. 541, 544 (1935); and “inflexible”: Gaber v. Weinberg, 324 Pa. 385, 387 (1936).
Professor Prosser appears to be in favor of the broader liberalization of the rule suggested by the Fleischman and Francis cases. In W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 189-90 (4th ed. 1971), he states:
“A similar fate is overtaking the rule which many courts have stated, that it is always negligence to drive at such a speed that it is impossible to stop within the range of vision. Again the principle is sound enough; but universal application becomes quite impossible. The rule has proved to be much too stringent when the visibility is obscured by fog or rain, when the driver is suddenly blinded by the lights of an approaching car, or when unanticipated defects or obstacles suddenly appear on an apparently safe highway. The reaction from the rule has been so marked that some courts have gone to the other extreme, of saying that such speed is never more than evidence of negligence for the jury.
“Such rules may be useful to fix a standard for the usual, normal case, but they are a hindrance to any just decision in the large number of unusual situations presenting new factors which may affect the standard. A standard which requires only conduct proportionate to the circumstances and the risk seldom, if ever, can be made a matter of absolute rule.”

. Appellant Lake also argued that his conduct did not proximately cause the accident because the accident could not have been avoided no matter what speed he had been traveling. In the first place, one is ordinarily not entitled to an instruction on “unavoidable accidents” in situations where the evidence indicates that his conduct was negligent. 2 Blashfield, Automobile Law & Practice §101.13 (1965). In any event, the jury was fully instructed *177on proximate cause, and may well have determined that if Lake had been traveling at a speed appropriate under the circumstances, the collision or the injuries resulting therefrom may not have occurred.