Court Opinion

ID: 9671373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:35:20.414728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:09.581601
License: Public Domain

Lesinski, C. J.
(dissenting). Inasmuch as it is my opinion that the instant case is controlled by People v. Lemmons (1970), 384 Mich 1, I herewith respectfully dissent from the view of the majority. The facts of Lemmons and the case at bar are strikingly similar: both are armed robberies; in both an alibi defense is presented; in both, the jury was in*239formed that it was not to consider lesser included offenses as possible verdicts. While in Lemmons the jury was instructed that there were no lesser crimes, the jury in the present case learned that no lesser crimes were to be considered by an on-the-record discussion between court and defense counsel. Whether the jury is instructed that possible verdicts do not include lesser offenses or whether the jury overhears a discussion along this line, the effect is exactly the same: the jury will not regard included crimes in rendering its verdict. The circumstances of this case amount to such an affirmative exclusion as to come within the interdiction of Lemmons.1
See, also, my dissent in People v. Membres (1971), 34 Mich App 224.
I would reverse and remand to the trial court.

A jury is charged to follow the law as enunciated by the court. People v. Gardner (1906), 143 Mich 104, 116. I fail to distinguish how in reality a lay jury is any less prohibited from bringing in a finding of guilt upon a lesser included offense when they are simply not told of lesser included offenses. If the rationale for the rule of People v. Lemmons (1970), 384 Mich 1, is sound, it should be extended to cases where the trial judge is silent on included offenses without express limitation of possible verdicts. The entire area of included offenses is in great need of being revisited and restated. The rule found in People v. Stevens (1968), 9 Mich App 531, that a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser offense only when evidence of sueh lesser offense is presented at trial does not square with Lemmons. It would appear that Lemmons must be founded on the concept that in the event a jury disbelieves a defendant’s alibi it still can find that the prosecution failed to prove every element of the crime charged and find the elements of a lesser included offense even when the only proof presented is that of the crime charged. This must be the case as 3 Comp Laws 1929, § 17325, now MCLA § 768.32 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1055), is not limited to cases in which the defense of alibi is interposed. I fail to see why a case invoking the defense of alibi should be more favorably regarded as to jury instructions than one in which the defendant simply defends on the basis that he is not guilty or where he interposes some other defense. If Lemmons is correct, then it should apply to a case sueh as where the charge is robbery armed, the only testimony is that the victim was robbed at gunpoint and the defendant puts in no defense.