Court Opinion

ID: 9955144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 19:02:11.933565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.497890
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/27/24 Stebbins v. Cal. Public Utilities Commission CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 ALICE STEBBINS,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                        A167141
 v.
 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES                                            (San Francisco County
 COMMISSION,                                                            Super. Ct. No. CGC20588148)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Alice Stebbins was the executive director of the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) from early 2018 until she was terminated from
her position in September 2020. She filed suit against the CPUC, alleging
she was terminated in retaliation for whistleblowing. After a trial lasting
several weeks, the jury rejected her claims and awarded her no damages.
The only issues on appeal concern two jury instructions: one that the trial
court gave, which stated that the CPUC and the State Personnel Board are
separate legal entities, and one that the trial court did not give, CACI No.
204, concerning the intentional destruction of evidence.1 Because Stebbins
has shown no prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment.

         1 CACI No. 204, “Willful Suppression of Evidence,” states:
                                                                “You may
consider whether one party intentionally concealed or destroyed evidence. If

                                                               1
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    Stebbins’s Role at the CPUC
      Stebbins was hired as the executive director of the CPUC in February
2018. She reported to the five CPUC commissioners, including the CPUC
president, all of whom are appointed by the Governor. There was testimony
at trial that when Stebbins was hired, the commissioners recognized the
CPUC needed a strong administrator and manager to improve the agency’s
policies, procedures, and processes, and they hired Stebbins because of her
administrative skills and experience.
B.    Investigations into Stebbins’s Hiring Practices
      In late March 2019, Candace Hyatt, then the human resources director
at the CPUC, had concerns that Stebbins was inappropriately involved in
personnel matters. Hyatt had heard from her staff that some recent CPUC
hires had previous relationships with Stebbins and her staff; that some
recent hires were being awarded higher-than-appropriate salaries; and that
job candidates with higher qualifications were being passed over for less
competitive candidates. Hyatt told the CPUC’s chief internal auditor,
Virginia Veneracion-Alunan, of her concerns. The chief internal auditor then
began investigating the matter with her subordinate, Daniel Washburn.
      In July 2019, Marybel Batjer was appointed president of the CPUC.
Before she was sworn into office, she spoke with Hyatt, who by then was no
longer working at the CPUC. Batjer testified that Hyatt told her Stebbins
had asked Hyatt to do things she thought were wrong, and that Hyatt
implied that people were being hired at the CPUC in violation of state hiring
rules. Batjer testified that, as a result of her conversation with Hyatt, she

you decide that a party did so, you may decide that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to that party.”

                                        2
contacted the executive officer of the State Personnel Board (SPB), Suzanne
Ambrose. The SPB is the state agency that enforces the state’s civil service
statutes. (Cal. Const., art. VII, §§ 1, 2, 3.2) Batjer told Ambrose that she was
concerned people were being hired into the CPUC outside the hiring rules.
That conversation led to the SPB opening an investigation, which was
conducted by an SPB employee named Lori Gillihan.
      The SPB directed Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn (from the CPUC)
to provide the SPB with the information they had gathered during their
internal investigation, which they did. As the SPB’s investigation continued,
Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn continued to provide information as
requested, and they reviewed and commented on drafts of the SPB’s report,
at the request of the SPB.
C.    SPB Report
      The SPB prepared a draft investigation report dated June 12, 2020,3
which included findings about Stebbins’s involvement in the hiring of five
CPUC employees. The draft report stated that Stebbins pre-selected a
candidate for a high-level CPUC position even though he was less qualified
than several other candidates, and then increased his salary 49 percent just
four months after he was hired. The report also stated that Stebbins hired
four other people into positions for which they were not the most qualified
candidates, and that those four employees were not doing work that rose to
the level at which they were hired. The draft report was sent to the CPUC
for response.

      2 The SPB consists of five members who are appointed by the Governor

and who themselves appoint an executive officer to administer the civil
service statutes. (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 2, subds. (a), (c); § 3, subd. (b).)
      3 Subsequent dates are in 2020 unless otherwise stated.

                                          3
      The CPUC commissioners directed the CPUC’s human resources
department to assess the report’s findings and draft the CPUC’s written
response, and also asked Stebbins to review the draft report and provide a
written response.
      On July 24, after Stebbins had submitted her response to the draft
report, CPUC Commissioner Liane Randolph asked Stebbins to resign,
saying that the commissioners had lost faith in her because of the SPB
report. Stebbins did not agree to resign. On July 30, CPUC President Batjer
asked Stebbins to resign, and again Stebbins refused. On August 4, Stebbins
was placed on administrative leave.
      On August 10, CPUC President Batjer sent an email to CPUC
employees, stating that on that day the SPB had issued a special
investigation report about the CPUC’s hiring practices, and including a link
to the final report, which included the CPUC’s response. The report stated
that the SPB had reviewed information “to determine whether the actions of
CPUC officials and employees violated the California Constitution’s
requirement that appointment and promotion shall be made under a general
system based on merit ascertained by competitive examination,” and that
“the scope of SPB review includes appointments of certain employees made
between June 2018 and March 2019 to determine whether Civil Service rules
were violated, and, if so, by whom.” Batjer’s August 10 email stated that the
commissioners shared the “SPB’s commitment to protecting the merit system
as required by the California Constitution to ensure appointments and
promotions are made under a system based on merit through competitive
examination.”
      On September 2, Stebbins received a letter informing her that her
employment at the CPUC would end on September 4.

                                      4
D.    Stebbins Files Suit
      In December Stebbins filed a 17-page complaint against the CPUC in
San Francisco Superior Court alleging four causes of action. She alleged that
in her role as executive director of the CPUC she directed her staff to prepare
various audits and reports that focused on fiscal accountability at the CPUC
and the CPUC’s oversight of utilities. She further alleged that the work
underlying those audits and reports revealed serious problems with the
CPUC’s accounting processes, as well as financial mismanagement and
operational deficiencies. Stebbins alleged that starting in December 2019,
she made efforts to engage CPUC President Batjer and other CPUC
commissioners on these issues, but was met with indifference.
      Stebbins alleged that the SPB report was a pretext for her termination,
and was intended to cover up the fact that she was terminated because of her
efforts to address serious problems at the CPUC, including its failure to
pursue the recovery of about $200 million from regulated utilities. She
alleged that she was terminated in retaliation for refusing to close down
investigations and for insisting on completing reports of the CPUC’s problems
and failures.
E.    Trial and Verdict
      By the time of trial, Stebbins was proceeding on only two causes of
action against the CPUC: one for whistleblower retaliation in violation of
Labor Code section 1102.5, and one for whistleblower retaliation in violation
of the California Whistleblower Protection Act (Gov. Code, § 8547 et seq.).
The trial proceedings ran for 26 days.
      After just one day of deliberation, the jury returned its verdict in favor
of the CPUC. The jury specifically found that there was no retaliation:

                                         5
Stebbins’s disclosure of information to the CPUC was not a contributing
factor in the CPUC’s decision to fire her.4
      Judgment was entered in favor of the CPUC, and this appeal followed.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Principles of Appellate Review
      A judgment challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct, and it is
the appellant’s burden to affirmatively show that the trial court erred
(Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham)) and to
provide legal argument showing how the error was prejudicial. (Century
Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 (Century Surety).)
      An appellant’s opening brief must include “a summary of the
significant facts limited to matters in the record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(C)) and must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by
a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.” (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).)
      An appellant must “present each point separately in the opening brief
under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the question to be
presented and the point to be made; otherwise the point will be forfeited.”
(Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656, citing Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) In addition, an appellant must “support claims of error
with meaningful argument and citation to authority. [Citations.] When legal

      4 The jury was given a special verdict form with a series of questions for

each of the two causes of action. Although for each cause of action the jury
found that Stebbins had made legally protected disclosures to the CPUC
about information that she believed was “a violation of or non-compliance
with a federal or state statute, rule, or regulation” or “a violation of law or
government waste,” no disclosure was a “contributing factor in [the CPUC’s]
decision to discharge her.” Thus the jury never reached the question of
damages. Neither Stebbins nor the CPUC asked to poll the jury.

                                        6
argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we
may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration.” Allen v.
City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) We are “not required to
examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Ibid.)
      Further, an appellant’s arguments must be supported by appropriate
reference to the appellate record. (Air Couriers International v. Employment
Development Dept. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 923, 928 (Air Couriers).) We are
not required to search the record for evidence, and we may disregard
unsupported factual assertions. (Ibid.; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C) & (a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening brief must include a summary
of significant facts limited to matters in the record, with any reference to a
matter in the record supported by a citation to the volume and page number
of the record].)
      Stebbins was represented by counsel in the trial court but represented
herself on appeal until after her opening brief was filed. The rules that
govern appellate review and practice apply to self-represented litigants as
well as to those represented by counsel. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122
Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 [self-represented party “ ‘is entitled to the same,
but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys’ ”].)
Stebbins’s opening brief is deficient in several respects. The brief does not
contain a coherent statement of facts: the facts are not presented
chronologically or thematically. Many of the assertions in the statement are
not supported by any citation to the record, while some apparently simple
factual statements are followed by string cites containing up to 35 separate
citations to the trial transcript, with no indication of whether the citations
are to argument or testimony, or whose testimony is being cited, or how those
citations support Stebbins’s claims of error. This is not “appropriate

                                        7
reference to the appellate record” (Air Couriers, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p.
928), particularly in a case like this one where the reporter’s transcript of the
multi-week trial is nearly 5,000 pages long. Moreover, none of the assertions
in the argument section of the brief are supported by citations to the record or
by citations to legal authority.
      Nevertheless, we discern two issues on appeal: first, that the court
erred in instructing the jury that the SPB and CPUC were separate entities
because, as argued by Stebbins on appeal, the agencies did not conduct
themselves as independent agencies in their investigations, and second, that
the court erred in refusing to give CACI No. 204, because, as argued by
Stebbins on appeal, there was evidence that both the SPB investigator and
CPUC employees destroyed or suppressed evidence. We address those issues
to the extent we can in light of the limitations of Stebbins’s briefing.
B.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      A party has the “right to have the jury instructed as to the law
applicable to all their theories of the case which were supported by the
pleadings and the evidence, whether or not that evidence was considered
persuasive by the trial court.” (Fish v. Los Angeles Dodgers Baseball Club
(1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 620, 633.)
      We apply the de novo standard of review to claims that a court erred in
giving or refusing a jury instruction. (Ted Jacob Engineering Group, Inc. v.
The Ratcliff Architects (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 945, 961 (Ted Jacob
Engineering).) Instructional error in a civil case is prejudicial “if it is
reasonably probable the error affected the verdict.” (Id. at p. 962.) Although
our review is de novo, the fundamental principles of appellate review apply:
it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate both error (Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d
at p. 564) and prejudice (Century Surety, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 963),

                                         8
and our review is limited to the issues that are adequately raised and
supported in appellant’s opening brief. (See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [“[i]ssues not raised in an appellant’s brief are
deemed waived or abandoned”].) We do not consider issues raised for the
first time in a reply brief. (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754,
764.)
C.      Additional Background on Jury Instructions
        At trial, Lori Gillihan, who conducted the SPB’s investigation, testified
in response to questions from Stebbins’s attorney that she did not save all the
drafts of her investigation report, and that she sometimes wrote a new draft
over an old one. Gillihan also testified that although she recorded interviews
with certain witnesses, she retained only some of the recordings. She did not
retain interviews that she considered “meaningless.” During a break in
Gillihan’s testimony, and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
judge stated that he was considering giving CACI No. 204, pending hearing
from the CPUC about why the SPB’s decisions about retaining documents
should not be used against the CPUC. Upon subsequent questioning by
counsel for the CPUC, Gillihan testified that she alone made the decisions
about what materials to retain; that neither her supervisor at the SPB nor
anyone at the CPUC asked her to delete any recordings or documents, and
that she did not tell her supervisor or anyone at the CPUC that she was
going to delete material or that she had done so.
        After Gillihan’s testimony was concluded, the court stated in a
conference with counsel that it had raised the question of the “relationship
between the State Personnel Board and the CPUC and the connection with

                                         9
CACI No. 204, and I’m looking forward to getting briefing on that issue.”5
The court also stated that, because Stebbins had asked for CACI No. 204, and
the CPUC opposed that request, there would be “a full hearing on that.”
      As the trial drew to a close, the court conducted several conferences
with counsel to discuss jury instructions. At one such conference, the court
acknowledged the parties’ disagreement as to whether CACI No. 204 should
be given. The court stated that “there will be a further hearing as to whether
or not there is evidence to support—that the CPUC or an employee of the
CPUC in some respects [a]ffected evidence such that it should be given with
regard to the CPUC, and no one is requesting that it be given with regard to
any actions of the State Personnel Board, and so that will be an issue we’ll
resolve later today. [¶] So there I’d be looking to the Plaintiff to identify the
witness and/or the employee of the CPUC who you believed destroyed
evidence or took other actions which would justify giving [CACI No.] 204 to
the CPUC.” (Italics added.) Stebbins’s counsel confirmed that she would be
prepared to address the issue of CACI No. 204. She did not dispute that no
one requested that CACI No. 204 be given with regard to actions of the SPB.
At the conclusion of that conference, in keeping with its practice throughout
the proceedings, the court asked both parties whether they wanted to put
anything on the record before the jury was admitted to hear further
testimony. Both sides said no.
      At another jury instruction conference outside the presence of the jury
later that day, there was discussion of the CPUC’s request for a special

      5 Stebbins did not include any briefing on that matter, or any other, in

the record on appeal. (See Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349,
1362 [appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record for review; we
indulge “ ‘ “ ‘[a]ll intendments and presumptions . . . to support [trial court
orders] on matters as to which the record is silent’ ” ’ ”].)

                                        10
instruction that the “[CPUC] is a separate and distinct legal entity from the
[SPB].” Stebbins’s counsel’s only response to that instruction was that she
would not object to it being given as long as the court also gave CACI No. 204.
Counsel for the CPUC argued that the instruction should not be contingent
on CACI No. 204 “based on everything that the jury has heard to date about
some of the decisions made by Lori Gillihan. [¶] So we think it’s important
that the jury understand that we are a separate and distinct legal entity from
the State Personnel Board.”
      At conferences held the next day, the court heard extensive argument
on whether to give CACI No. 204. Stebbins’s counsel made two arguments
for giving the instruction. The first, which Stebbins’s counsel characterized
as “overt destruction of evidence,” was that Veneracion-Alunan and
Washburn, who conducted the CPUC’s internal investigation, had both
testified that they took handwritten notes of interviews they conducted, typed
those notes into memoranda, and then destroyed the handwritten notes.6
Stebbins’s counsel argued that the “best evidence” of what occurred in the
interviews would have been the handwritten notes. The second argument,
which Stebbins’s counsel characterized as “circumstantial evidence of
destruction,” was that Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn had testified in
deposition that there were “no writings” about findings they made concerning
certain questionable employee travel expenses, but had testified at trial that
there was a draft memorandum. Yet no such draft was ever produced in

      6 Veneracion-Alunan and Washburn testified at trial that the

handwritten notes were typed into interview summaries, which were
reviewed to make sure they included everything in the handwritten notes,
and that the handwritten notes were then discarded.

                                      11
discovery. Stebbins’s counsel argued that the “document appears not to exist,
[which] is circumstantial evidence that it was destroyed.”
      After hearing further argument from counsel, the trial court concluded
that in view of Washburn’s testimony that the handwritten interview notes
were “transcribed” into typed summaries, the failure to retain the notes did
not justify giving CACI No. 204. With respect to the document about travel
expenses, the trial court stated that it understood Stebbins to be arguing that
a document related to the investigation into travel expenses should have been
produced in discovery but was not. The parties disagreed as to whether a
discovery request had ever been made that would have called for such a
document. The court stated that it would have CACI No. 204 in hand to read
to the jury the next day, but would not give it unless Stebbins’s counsel
provided evidence that a request for production had been made that was
“broad enough to have included that memorandum if it existed.” The court
explained, “If it was never requested, then it wasn’t concealed [and] there’s
no basis for giving [CACI No.] 204.” Stebbins’s counsel said she would find
the discovery request.
      Later during the same jury instruction conference, the court stated that
whether or not it gave CACI No. 204, it would give the requested special
instruction that the SPB and CPUC were separate entities, explaining, “I
think it’s very important in this case that the difference between the two
entities, the separation and distinct legal identity of each, be emphasized by
the Court with an instruction. [¶] I think it’s certainly warranted under the
circumstances of this case, and it will be given.”
      The record contains no further discussion of the special instruction or
CACI No. 204. The next day the court instructed the jury, including the
special instruction, and the parties gave their closing arguments. Counsel

                                       12
never mentioned CACI No. 204 again; Stebbins’s attorneys never provided
evidence that the document about travel expenses had been requested in
discovery, as they had promised they would the night before; and the court
did not give CACI No. 204.
D.    Stebbins’s Arguments on Appeal
      Stebbins’s arguments are not clearly presented. Notably, however,
Stebbins does not present any legal argument in her opening brief that CACI
No. 204 should have been given to the jury on account of the destruction of
Veneracion-Alunan’s and Washburn’s handwritten interview notes or on
account of the failure to produce a memorandum about the investigation of
travel expenses, which were the issues raised by her counsel in arguing for
the instruction at trial. She does not even mention those issues.
      We understand Stebbins’s primary argument on appeal to be as follows:
Lori Gillihan, the SPB investigator, destroyed the recording of an interview
she conducted with CPUC employee Ellen Moratti, as well as notes Gillihan
took during that interview; because the CPUC and SPB were working
together on the SPB investigation, the destruction of that material was
effectively destruction by the CPUC; and if the jury had been given CACI No.
204, it would have understood that the Moratti interview notes tied the fiscal
issues that Stebbins was investigating with the SPB investigation, therefore
the jury would have “been able to say yes” as to whether Stebbins’s reporting
on alleged fiscal malfeasance at the CPUC was a contributing factor in the
CPUC’s decision to discharge her.
      The problem with this argument is that it was never made to the trial
court in connection with the instruction of the jury, and therefore it has been
forfeited. As a general matter, we will not consider issues that are raised for
the first time on appeal when those issues could have been but were not

                                      13
presented to the trial court. (Newton v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11
(Newton).) Further, the argument fails because Stebbins does not provide
any citations to evidence that would suggest Moratti spoke with Gillihan
about fiscal malfeasance at the CPUC. It is noteworthy that, although there
was testimony at trial about Moratti, including testimony from Gillihan
about her interview with Moratti, Moratti did not testify at trial, nor was she
mentioned by either party in closing argument.
      Stebbins also argues that the trial court should have given CACI No.
204 because there was evidence that investigators at the CPUC and SPB
used their personal email accounts, instead of the state email system, in
communicating about the investigations, and that they did so, allegedly, in
order to avoid producing evidence. This argument has been forfeited for two
reasons. First, it is not supported by any citations to the record, and we
disregard unsupported factual assertions. (Air Couriers, supra, 150
Cal.App.4th at p. 928.) Second, Stebbins’s counsel never argued in the trial
court that the use of personal email accounts was a reason to give CACI No.
204. (Newton, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) Because Stebbins has
forfeited her claim that the trial court erred by not giving CACI No. 204, we
do not discuss that issue further.
      With respect to the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury that the
SPB and CPUC are separate entities, Stebbins concedes—as she must—that
the SPB and CPUC are legally distinct. She argues only that they acted
together improperly in investigating her. Even if the special instruction was
given in error (and Stebbins has not demonstrated that it was), Stebbins fails
to show how she was prejudiced by it, because she does not show how it is
reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict if it
had not been given the instruction. (Ted Jacob Engineering, supra, 187

                                       14
Cal.App.4th at p. 962.) Nothing about that jury instruction precluded
Stebbins’s counsel from arguing in their closing arguments that the CPUC
had been improperly involved in the SPB’s investigation, which counsel
argued at length. Stebbins’s counsel also argued in closing that Gillihan had
destroyed documents to prevent Stebbins from “ever being able to shine the
light on what a rotten, biased house of lies this investigation really was,” that
the investigation was a pretext for firing Stebbins, and that the SPB
investigation “was a secret retaliation to basically give a report to the
[c]ommissioners.” Yet notwithstanding all the evidence adduced over weeks
of trial, the jury found that Stebbins’s disclosure of information about
assertedly improper fiscal activities at the CPUC was not a contributing
factor in the CPUC’s decision to discharge her. Stebbins fails to show on
appeal how it is reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a
different verdict if it had not been instructed that the SPB and CPUC were
separate legal entities.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover any costs on
appeal.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P. J.

_________________________
Mayfield, J.*

A167141, Stebbins v. California Public Utilities Commission

      * Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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