Court Opinion

ID: 9366060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 19:07:42.853934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:49.485586
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Estate of Haynes v. Gaines, 2023-Ohio-208.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LUCAS COUNTY

The Estate of Oscar Haynes,                              Court of Appeals No. L-22-1093
Gwendalyn Haynes Burel,
Administrator                                            Trial Court No. CI0202003123

        Appellee

v.

Sharon Gaines                                            DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                        Decided: January 25, 2023

                                                  *****

        James Schuller, for appellee.

        Lafe Tolliver, for appellant.

                                                  *****
        ZMUDA, J.

                                             I.    Introduction

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Sharon Gaines, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court

of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Gwendalyn Haynes

Burel, as administrator of the estate of Oscar Haynes, thereby imposing a constructive
trust on appellant’s bank account and ordering appellant to pay $83,096.80, plus interest,

to appellee. Finding no error in the trial court’s judgment, we affirm.

                         A.       Facts and Procedural Background

         {¶ 2} On February 28, 2018, Oscar and his wife, Leona, opened a money market

checking account at Huntington Bank (the “MMA Account”). According to the personal

signature card associated with the MMA Account, the owners of the account are Oscar,

Leola, and appellant. The signature card identifies the MMA Account as a “Joint

Account with Rights of Survivorship.”

         {¶ 3} Approximately 19 months later, on September 30, 2019, appellant withdrew

$72,096.08 from the MMA Account and deposited the funds into her personal account.

Six months after that, on March 25, 2020, appellant withdrew another $11,000 from the

MMA Account and deposited the funds into her personal account.

         {¶ 4} On September 22, 2020, after learning of the foregoing withdrawals from the

MMA Account, Oscar filed his complaint with the trial court, alleging that appellant

breached her fiduciary duty and wrongfully converted his property when she withdrew

the funds from the MMA Account.1 In the complaint, Oscar acknowledged that he and

Leona made Gaines a co-owner of the MMA Account, but insisted that it was “for the

sole purpose of assisting the aged couple in handling their finances and paying Leona’s

medical bills.” Further, Oscar alleged that appellant’s fiduciary relationship arose out of

1
    Leona died on July 5, 2020.

2.
the authority he and Leona granted appellant when they made her a co-owner of the

MMA Account.

       {¶ 5} In his complaint, Oscar sought an order from the trial court imposing a

constructive trust on the funds appellant removed from the MMA Account, as well as an

award of damages for appellant’s alleged breach of her fiduciary duties “in an amount

equal to the amount wrongfully removed from Plaintiff’s MMA account.” Additionally,

Oscar requested damages in excess of $25,000 for appellant’s alleged conversion of the

funds from the MMA Account, plus punitive damages and attorney fees.

       {¶ 6} Appellant filed her answer on November 17, 2020, in which she denied any

wrongdoing in her withdrawal of the funds from the MMA Account because she “was

also the owner of the account with all rights thereto.” Further, appellant denied that her

status as a co-owner of the MMA Account resulted in the creation of any fiduciary

relationship with Oscar and Leona.

       {¶ 7} Thereafter, the matter proceeded through pretrial motion practice and

discovery. On November 9, 2021, Oscar filed a motion for summary judgment. In the

motion, Oscar asserted that appellant’s withdrawal of $83,096.08 from the MMA

Account shortly before Leona died was done without his knowledge or consent and

without the knowledge and consent of Leona. According to Oscar, appellant did not use

any of the withdrawn funds to provide care to himself or Leona.

       {¶ 8} Several pieces of evidence were attached to Oscar’s motion for summary

judgment, including appellant’s answers to interrogatories and requests for production,

3.
Oscar’s affidavit, and supporting bank statements evidencing the withdrawal activity. In

his affidavit, Oscar stated that he and Leona appointed Gaines as an additional named

joint owner of the MMA Account in February 2018 to enable her to assist them in the

handling of their bills and medical expenses. According to Oscar, “[n]o survivorship

provision was ever added to the account and none was ever intended. The addition of

Sharon to the account was never intended as a gift upon the death of either Leola or

myself.”

       {¶ 9} In response to Oscar’s motion, appellant filed a memorandum in opposition

to summary judgment on November 29, 2021. Therein, appellant argued that she

possessed the right to exert control over the funds deposited into the MMA Account since

she was a co-owner on the account. Appellant noted the absence of any evidence of

fraud, duress, or undue influence as to the opening of the MMA Account or her

identification as an additional owner on the account.

       {¶ 10} On December 1, 2021, Oscar filed his reply, in which he asserted that the

Ohio Supreme Court case relied upon by appellant to support her argument, Wright v.

Bloom, 69 Ohio St.3d 596, 635 N.E.2d 31 (1994), was not controlling in this case

because the transfers at issue took place during the lifetimes of all the owners of the

MMA Account. As such, Oscar argued that this case was subject to language in the Ohio

Supreme Court’s decision in In re Thompson’s Estate, 66 Ohio St.2d 433, 423 N.E.2d 90

(1981), addressing proportional ownership interests among co-owners of joint bank

accounts.

4.
       {¶ 11} On December 28, 2021, while his motion for summary judgment was still

pending before the trial court, Oscar died. As a consequence of Oscar’s death, appellee,

acting as administrator of Oscar’s estate, was substituted as the named plaintiff.

       {¶ 12} Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments related to Oscar’s motion, the

trial court issued its order and judgment entry granting summary judgment to appellee on

March 21, 2022. In its decision, the court found that Thompson was controlling as to the

issue of how much money appellant was entitled to withdraw from the MMA Account

since all three co-owners of the account were alive when appellant withdrew the funds at

issue. Following Thompson, the trial court found that appellant was not entitled to

withdraw any funds because she did not contribute any funds to the account.

       {¶ 13} The trial court rejected Oscar’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and

conversion. The trial court found that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether

appellant had a fiduciary relationship with Oscar and Leona at the time of the

withdrawals. Further, the trial court found that the evidence in the record did not support

a claim for conversion because such evidence established only that appellant “simply

withdrew funds based on an understanding that [she was] entitled to unfettered rights of

the Huntington MMA joint account with survivorship rights.”

       {¶ 14} Notwithstanding its rejection of the breach of fiduciary and conversion

claims, the trial court deemed it equitable to impose a constructive trust on the bank

account into which appellant deposited the wrongfully withdrawn funds. Further, the

5.
court ordered appellant to pay appellee the amount of $83,096.80, the total amount of the

funds withdrawn from the MMA Account.

       {¶ 15} Thereafter, on April 18, 2022, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

                               B.     Assignment of Error

       {¶ 16} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:

       The trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the contract rights of

       the owners of bank funds to exercise their rightful control over the

       deposited assets.

                                       II.   Analysis

       {¶ 17} In her sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment to appellee should be reversed because it was based upon the

erroneous conclusion that she wrongfully withdrew funds from the MMA Account

despite the fact that she was an unrestricted co-owner of the account.

       {¶ 18} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,

applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61

Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77

Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is

appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that

6.
conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,

54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).

         {¶ 19} Here, appellant argues that she is plainly an unrestricted co-owner on the

MMA Account, as evidenced by the personal signature card associated with that account,

and was thus entitled to withdraw the funds from the account at her discretion. In support

of her contention, appellant cites Bloom and insists that it is “controlling and dispositive”

in this case.

         {¶ 20} In response, appellee argues Thompson, not Bloom, governs this case.

According to appellee, Bloom did not disturb the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in

Thompson as to who owns funds deposited into a joint and survivorship bank account

during the account holders’ lifetimes. Because it is undisputed that appellant withdrew

the funds in question from the MMA Account before Leona and Oscar died, appellee

states that “there should be no question that the Thompson rule should be applied. We

agree.

         {¶ 21} Our resolution of the parties’ arguments in this case involves two issues.

First, we must determine whether appellant was entitled to withdraw the contested funds

from the MMA Account. The proportional lifetime ownership of funds held by several

co-owners of a joint and survivorship account was addressed by the Ohio Supreme Court

in Thompson. That case involved two accounts held jointly, with survivorship rights, by

Richard Thompson and his wife, Carma Lee. Prompted by marital problems, Richard

closed the accounts and transferred the funds into two new accounts held in his name

7.
only. Thereafter, Richard was served with divorce papers and Carma Lee filed a motion

seeking a restraining order to prevent Richard from withdrawing any funds from the two

joint and survivorship accounts.

       {¶ 22} Approximately four months later, Carma Lee died. Carma Lee’s daughter,

as the executrix of Carma Lee’s estate, filed a probate inventory that included two

unliquidated claims against Richard as constructive trustee for one-half of the amounts

that were in the joint and survivorship accounts prior to Richard’s withdrawal of the

funds. At a hearing on the matter, Richard testified that the two joint and survivorship

accounts consisted primarily of his contributions, that he told Carma Lee not to take

money out of these accounts, and that he maintained possession and control over the

accounts.

       {¶ 23} Following the hearing, the probate court found that Richard had improperly

withdrawn the funds from the parties’ joint and survivorship accounts, and thereby

breached a fiduciary relationship he had with Carma Lee as a co-owner of the funds. The

court of appeals reversed, and the matter was accepted by the Ohio Supreme Court.

       {¶ 24} Upon its review, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Richard was entitled to

withdraw from the joint and survivorship accounts whatever funds he contributed to those

accounts. Thompson, 66 Ohio St.2d at 440, 423 N.E.2d 90. The court further found that

“[a] constructive trust [could] be imposed over any amounts withdrawn which exceeded

those amounts attributable to [Richard’s] contributions.” Id. Consequently, the court

8.
remanded the matter to the probate court so that it could determine what proportion of the

net contributions to the accounts were attributable to Carma Lee. Id.

       {¶ 25} In summarizing its decision in Thompson, the court provided the following

two-part holding:

              1. A joint and survivorship account belongs, during the lifetime of

       all parties, to the parties in proportion to the net contributions by each to the

       sums on deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a

       different intent.

              2. Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint and

       survivorship account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the

       estate of the decedent unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a

       different intention at the time the account is created. If there are two or

       more surviving parties, their respective ownerships during their lifetimes

       shall be in proportion to their previous ownership interests augmented by

       an equal share for each survivor of any interest the decedent may have

       owned in the account immediately before his death; and the right of

       survivorship continues between the surviving parties.

Id. at paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.

       {¶ 26} Approximately 13 years after Thompson was decided, the Ohio Supreme

Court issued its decision in Bloom. In that case, relied upon by appellant in the present

appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court established a conclusive presumption that “[t]he opening

9.
of a joint and survivorship account in the absence of fraud, duress, undue influence or

lack of capacity on the part of the decedent is conclusive evidence of his or her intention

to transfer to the surviving party or parties a survivorship interest in the balance

remaining in the account at his or her death.” Bloom, 69 Ohio St.3d 596, 635 N.E.2d 31,

at paragraph two of the syllabus. In so holding, the court overruled the second paragraph

of the syllabus in Thompson. Id. The court in Bloom was careful to note that its decision

“does not change the ownership-during-lifetime presumption set forth in Thompson,

supra, at paragraph one of the syllabus, utilized in determining the rights of the parties

and others to joint and survivorship funds in controversies arising during the parties’

lifetimes.” Id. at 607.

       {¶ 27} Based upon the plain language in Bloom, we find that the first paragraph of

the syllabus in Thompson is still controlling law in Ohio regarding the relative ownership

of funds deposited into a joint and survivorship account held by several living co-owners.

At the time of appellant’s withdrawal of funds from the MMA Account in this case, both

Leona and Oscar were still living. Therefore, Thompson, not Bloom, controls our

disposition of the first issue in this case.

       {¶ 28} The parties do not dispute that the funds deposited into the MMA Account

were contributed entirely by Oscar and Leona.2 Indeed, appellant does not assert that she

2
 The record in this case does not establish whether Leona made any contributions to the
MMA Account prior to her death. However, this is a moot point since the funds were
withdrawn prior to Leona’s death and thus the wrongful conduct Oscar sought to remedy

10.
contributed any funds whatsoever into the MMA Account. Accordingly, the trial court

properly found that appellant was not the owner of any of the funds in the MMA

Account. Since she did not own the funds, appellant was not entitled to withdraw the

funds from the MMA Account and deposit them into her personal bank account.

       {¶ 29} Having found that appellant was not entitled to withdraw the contested

funds from the MMA Account, we now must examine the second issue in this case,

which has to do with the appropriate remedy. As already noted, the Thompson court

expressly sanctioned the imposition of a constructive trust to ensure the return of funds

that are wrongfully withdrawn from a joint and survivorship account by one who does not

own those funds. Thompson at 440.

       {¶ 30} A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that protects against unjust

enrichment. Estate of Cowling v. Estate of Cowling, 109 Ohio St.3d 276, 2006-Ohio-

2418, 847 N.E.2d 405, ¶ 19. It is usually invoked when property has been obtained by

fraud, but “‘may also be imposed where it is against the principles of equity that the

property be retained by a certain person even though the property was acquired without

fraud.’” Id., quoting Ferguson v. Owens, 9 Ohio St.3d 223, 226, 459 N.E.2d 1293 (1984).

“In applying the theories of constructive trusts, courts also apply the well known

with his complaint occurred when all three co-owners were still living. Further, appellant
does not argue that she is entitled to a share of the MMA Account funds as a beneficiary
of Leona’s estate, presumably because all of Leona’s estate passed to Oscar, her
surviving husband, upon her death.

11.
equitable maxim, ‘equity regards [as] done that which ought to be done.’” Ferguson at

226.

       {¶ 31} Here, the trial court fashioned an appropriate remedy to ensure that what

ought to be done, namely the return of Oscar’s funds to Oscar (or his estate). In order to

effectuate this result, the trial court imposed a constructive trust on the personal bank

account into which appellant deposited the contested funds. We find no error on the part

of the trial court in fashioning such a remedy, particularly since it comports with the Ohio

Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson.

       {¶ 32} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that appellant was not entitled to

withdraw the contested funds from the MMA Account. Further, we find that the trial

court properly imposed a constructive trust in order to effectuate the return of the funds to

appellee. Accordingly, appellant’s sole assignment of error not well-taken.

                                     III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 33} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant under

App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

12.
                                                             The Estate of Oscar Haynes,
                                                              Gwendalyn Haynes Burel,
                                                           Administrator v. Sharon Gaines
                                                                     C.A. No. L-22-1093

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                         ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                               ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                  JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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