Court Opinion

ID: 9958121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 08:11:36.82454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:51.837925
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00044-CR
     ___________________________

   JOHN PHILLIP HUGHS, Appellant

                     V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 235th District Court
          Cooke County, Texas
      Trial Court No. CR22-00242

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Wallach, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       John Phillip Hughs appeals his conviction for possession of one to four grams

of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1 and sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment.

We will affirm.

                                    I. Introduction

       The facts of the offense have no bearing on our analysis. We will summarize

only the pertinent facts.

       Appellant Hughs was charged by indictment with possession of one to four

grams of a controlled substance in Penalty Group 1. See Tex. Health & Safety Code

Ann. § 481.115(c). The indictment contained two enhancement paragraphs alleging

that Hughs had twice before been convicted of the offense of possession of a

controlled substance. 1 Hughs pled guilty to the offense and true to both enhancement

paragraphs. After he had entered his pleas and the jury had been excused for the day,

the trial court stated its intent to revoke his bond. However, the trial court changed its

mind when Hughs’s trial counsel threatened to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial

court then warned Hughs:

       The worst thing you can do is not show up tomorrow because the trial
       will go -- the trial will go on whether you’re here or not. The indictment
       has been read. You’ve entered a plea. And it’s not going to look too
       good to this jury if you don’t show up.

       The enhancements increased the statutory ranges of punishment for Hughs’s
       1

offense to “life, or . . . any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years.” See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d).

                                            2
His trial counsel assured the trial court, “He’ll be here, Your Honor.” The trial court

told the parties to be in court “at 8:30 to start promptly at 9:00.”

       Hughs did not appear for trial the following day. He had not been in contact

with his trial counsel that morning, and his trial counsel had not been able to get in

contact with him. Police searched Hughs’s residence and did not find him. The bailiff

called Hughs’s name three times in the hall, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 22.02;

Green v. State, 670 S.W.3d 633, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023), and received no

answer. The trial court then revoked Hughs’s bond, set a new bond, and announced

that the trial could continue. At Hughs’s trial counsel’s suggestion, 2 the trial court

informed the jury:

       Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you will note the absence of the
       Defendant. The Defendant was ordered to return to the Court at 9:00
       o’clock this morning. The Defendant has failed to appear. The jury has
       been sworn, the Defendant has entered his plea; therefore, the trial will
       continue in the absence of the Defendant.

       The trial court also told the jury that the hall had been sounded and that Hughs

had failed to answer. Two witnesses testified at the trial, and both sides rested and

closed that same day.

       During its closing argument, the State argued to the jury that Hughs “fled . . . .

He has no regard for the law. He has no regard for [the trial court,] and he has no

regard for you.” Later on in its argument, the State repeated that Hughs had “fled”

      Up until this point, the jury had not been present in the courtroom that
       2

morning.

                                            3
and that he “showed no regard for anyone other than himself.” The State asked for a

life sentence. The jury assessed Hughs’s punishment at 40 years’ confinement. Hughs

was apprehended within a week and brought back to court the next month.3 The trial

court sentenced Hughs in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

      Hughs argues in his sole point on appeal that he was denied effective assistance

of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object to the State’s argument regarding

Hughs’s failure to appear at trial. Because the record is insufficient to support Hughs’s

argument, we affirm.

                                      II. Analysis

      The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance

of counsel. Ex parte Scott, 541 S.W.3d 104, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); see U.S. Const.

amend. VI. To establish ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a

preponderance of the evidence both that his counsel’s representation was deficient

and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Nava v. State, 415 S.W.3d 289, 307 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); see Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We need not

address both parts of the Strickland test if the appellant makes an insufficient showing

of one component. 466 U.S. at 697, 014 S. Ct. at 2069.

      3
       When the trial court asked Hughs when he was re-arrested, Hughs answered,
“Five days later. Five, six days later.”

                                           4
      Furthermore, the record must affirmatively demonstrate that the ineffective-

assistance claim has merit. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999). Isolated instances of a failure to object to inadmissible argument do not

necessarily render counsel ineffective. Hill v. State, 303 S.W.3d 863, 879 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d). An appellate court may not infer ineffective assistance

simply from an unclear record or a record that does not show why counsel failed to do

something. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Mata v.

State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Trial counsel “should ordinarily be

afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.”

Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593. If trial counsel did not have that opportunity, then we

should not conclude that counsel performed deficiently unless the challenged conduct

was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Nava, 415

S.W.3d at 308. Direct appeal is usually inadequate for raising an ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claim because the record generally does not show counsel’s reasons for any

alleged deficient performance. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592–93; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d

at 813–14.

      “The instant case presents an example of the inadequacies inherent in

evaluating ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal.” Patterson v. State, 46 S.W.3d

294, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). Hughs did not file a motion for new

trial or otherwise try to make a record and give his trial counsel an opportunity to

explain himself and show whether his failure to object was grounded in sound trial

                                           5
strategy. See Hill, 303 S.W.3d at 879 (“Because there was no motion for new trial

addressing these alleged failures, there is only speculation that different conduct by

trial counsel would have been beneficial to Hill.”). The record does not reflect

counsel’s mental processes, including his thoughts at the moment the State made the

argument of which Hughs now complains. “In such situations, the issues are better

presented within the framework of a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus under

article 11.07 of the code of criminal procedure.” Patterson, 46 S.W.3d at 306; see Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07; see also Hill, 303 S.W.3d at 879.

      As an appellate court, we may not “reverse a conviction on ineffective

assistance of counsel grounds when counsel’s actions or omissions may have been

based upon tactical decisions, but the record contains no specific explanation for

counsel’s decisions.” Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When

direct evidence of a deficiency in counsel’s performance is not available, “we will

assume that counsel had a strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation can be

imagined.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

      In this case, we deem the record inadequate to make a fair evaluation of

Hughs’s claim. See Hill, 303 S.W.3d at 879. Because “the record is silent as to why trial

counsel made the decision that he made,” Hughs has failed to rebut the presumption

that “the actions of counsel were the result of a strategic or reasonable decision . . .”

Id.

                                            6
      Because, on this record, we conclude that Hughs has failed to establish

deficient representation by a preponderance of the evidence, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813, we do not reach Strickland’s

prejudice prong, and we overrule his sole point.

                                   III. Conclusion

      Having overruled Hughs’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Mike Wallach
                                                      Mike Wallach
                                                      Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 4, 2024

                                           7