Court Opinion

ID: 9955054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 16:05:00.624606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.412271
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Mar 27 2024, 8:54 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                    Wade A. Hummer and Lindsay A. Hummer,
                                         Appellant-Plaintiffs

                                                    v.

              Allen D. Donathan, Carolyn S. Beckley, and Mary H.
                                 Thornburgh,
                                         Appellee-Defendants

                                           March 27, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-MI-1925
                            Appeal from the Blackford Circuit Court
                              The Honorable Brian W. Bade, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                      05C01-2008-MI-000141

                                 Opinion by Judge Felix
                      Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bradford concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024                    Page 1 of 17
      Felix, Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   Norma Donathan died testate in 2020 and was survived by her four children.

      Norma’s will, which she executed in 2016 and amended by codicil in 2018,

      disinherited one of her children—Kathy Hummer. After Norma’s death, Kathy

      sued her three siblings, contesting Norma’s will. However, Kathy died in 2021,

      so her children Wade and Lyndsay Hummer (collectively, the “Hummers”)

      were substituted as plaintiffs in the will contest. Kathy’s siblings subsequently

      filed a motion for summary judgment on all the Hummers’ claims, which the

      trial court ultimately granted. The Hummers now appeal and raise two issues

      for our review that we revise and restate as the following single issue: Whether

      the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Kathy’s siblings.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Norma and Fred Donathan had four children: Kathy, Allen Dewayne

      Donathan (“Wayne”), Carolyn Beckley, and Mary Thornburgh. Beginning in

      approximately 2012, Wayne, Carolyn, and Mary “put [their] lives on hold for

      the care of [their] parents.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 65, 69, 73. On March

      23, 2014, Fred died while in assisted living at Albany Health & Rehabilitation

      Center (“Albany Health”). In September 2014, Norma suffered a stroke. By

      January 2016, Norma had been diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. On

      January 5, 2016, Norma was admitted to IU Health Ball Memorial Hospital

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024       Page 2 of 17
      (“Ball Hospital”) with complaints of “generalized weakness and not feeling

      well.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 160. The nurse practitioner who examined

      Norma for 60 minutes upon her arrival at Ball Hospital noted Norma was

      “awake, alert, and oriented to person, place, time, and situation.” Id. at 162.

      Four days later, a physical exam again revealed that Norma was “alert and

      oriented,” and she was discharged from Ball Hospital. Id. at 165. Following

      her hospitalization, Norma spent approximately five weeks at Albany Health

      for rehabilitation. Norma’s Albany Health progress notes from January 10, 11,

      and 12, 2016, all indicated that Norma was “alert and oriented.” Id. at 170.

      Additionally, the progress note from January 10 stated that Norma was “able to

      recall some staff names from when [her] husband was here.” Id.

[4]   Sometime in late 2015 or early 2016, Wayne contacted attorney James Forcum

      about revising Norma’s estate plan “so that Kathy . . . would receive nothing

      from [Norma’s] estate.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 179. Forcum had

      previously revised Norma’s estate plan in 2013. On January 13, 2016, Forcum

      and his longtime legal assistant Elizabeth Thomas visited Norma at Albany

      Health. When Forcum and Thomas arrived, Wayne and Carolyn were with

      Norma; Forcum requested Wayne and Carolyn leave Norma’s room, and they

      did. Forcum then proceeded to have a closed-door conversation with Norma

      about her estate plan, for which Thomas was also present. During this

      conversation, Forcum examined Norma as to her estate planning goals, the

      assets to be included in her estate plan, her desired beneficiaries, her

      “competency to understand her estate plan, and that she was “voluntarily

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024         Page 3 of 17
      executing the documents and not under any sort of duress or compulsion to do

      so.” Id. at 178–79, 182–83. Forcum also explained the effect of Norma’s estate

      plan to her and confirmed that she intended to execute her will. Forcum

      determined that “Norma knew where she was, who she was, and exactly what

      she was doing.” Id. at 179, 183. Norma “confirmed her intent that Kathy

      receive nothing from estate,” explaining that Wayne, Carolyn, and Mary “all

      had taken care of her for several years and that it was not fair to them that

      Kathy did nothing to help and did not even call or come to visit her.” Id. at

      179–80, 183. Further, Norma told Forcum and Thomas that “she loved Kathy,

      but changing her will was what needed to be done.” Id. at 183.

[5]   Once Forcum was satisfied that “Norma was competent, understood what she

      was doing, and was doing so voluntarily,” Norma, Thomas, and Forcum

      executed Norma’s last will and testament. Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 180, 183.

      The will was three pages in length, and Norma signed all three pages. Norma’s

      will appointed Wayne, Carolyn, and Mary as the personal representatives of

      her estate. The will further provided, “It is my intention that my daughter,

      KATHY A. HUMMER, shall receive nothing from my estate.” Id. at 173. On

      the third page of Norma’s will, Norma, Forcum, and Thomas all declared

      under the penalties for perjury that, among other things, Norma “executed the

      Will as her free and voluntary act” and Norma “was of sound mind.” Id. at

      174. Wayne and Carolyn did not reenter Norma’s room until after this process

      was complete.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024        Page 4 of 17
[6]   Following her discharge from Albany Health in February 2016 until the time of

      her death in 2020, Wayne, Carolyn, and Mary provided around-the-clock care

      for Norma at Norma’s home. Wayne took care of Norma in the morning,

      Carolyn took care of Norma in the afternoon, and Mary took care of Norma in

      the evenings. Wayne paid bills, grocery shopped, and transported Norma to

      appointments; Carolyn acted as Norma’s beautician; and both Carolyn and

      Mary did laundry, cleaned, and dispensed medication for Norma. Wayne gave

      up two jobs to help care for Norma, and Carolyn retired early to do the same.

      From 2012 forward, the only time Wayne did not help care for Norma was for

      a three-month period in 2018 when he was battling cancer; during that time,

      Carolyn and Mary cared for Norma without assistance from Kathy.

[7]   Sometime after Norma executed her will, Wayne contacted Forcum again

      about revising Norma’s estate plan, this time to add Wayne’s wife as a

      beneficiary should Wayne predecease Norma. On January 31, 2018, Wayne

      took Norma to Forcum’s office. Forcum again examined Norma as described

      above. “Norma knew where she was, who she was, and exactly what she was

      doing.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 180, 184. Norma “confirmed her intent to

      leave Wayne’s share to [his wife] in the event Wayne predeceased her” because

      Wayne’s wife “had spent considerable time and effort taking care of [Norma].”

      Id. at 180, 184. Norma also “confirmed . . . that Kathy shall still receive

      nothing from her estate.” Id. at 180, 184. “After it was clear Norma was

      competent, understood what she was doing, and was doing so voluntarily,”

      Norma, Thomas, and Forcum executed the codicil. Id. at 180, 184. On the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024       Page 5 of 17
       final page of Norma’s codicil, Norma, Forcum, and Thomas again declared

       under the penalties for perjury that, among other things, Norma “executed the

       Will as her free and voluntary act” and Norma “was of sound mind.” Id. at

       176.

[8]    On June 14, 2020, Norma died. Two days later, Norma’s will and codicil were

       admitted to probate. On August 3, 2020, Kathy sued Wayne, Carolyn, and

       Mary (collectively, the “Personal Representatives”), alleging that Norma’s will

       and codicil were invalid for two reasons: (1) “the unsoundness of mind of the

       testator” and (2) they were “executed under duress or . . . obtained by fraud.”

       Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 26.

[9]    On December 14, 2020, the Personal Representatives deposed Kathy. After

       reviewing the reports from Norma’s 2016 stays at Ball Hospital and Albany

       Health, Kathy testified that she had no reason to believe those reports were

       inaccurate or reflected anything other than what the medical professionals

       observed. Likewise, Kathy did not believe Forcum and Thomas committed

       perjury when they executed Norma’s will. On August 2, 2021, Kathy died.

       Subsequently, the Hummers filed a motion to be substituted as plaintiffs in the

       will contest, which the trial court granted.

[10]   On February 2, 2022, the Personal Representatives filed a motion for summary

       judgment as to all claims in the Hummers’ complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 56.

       Simultaneously with their motion, the Personal Representatives also filed a

       brief and designation of evidence in support thereof. The designated evidence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024      Page 6 of 17
       included portions of Kathy’s deposition and excerpts of affidavits from the

       Personal Representatives, Forcum, and Thomas.

[11]   The Hummers’ original deadline to respond to the motion was March 4, 2022,

       but the trial court granted the Hummers’ motion for an extension of time,

       pushing their deadline to respond to April 4, 2022. However, the Hummers

       never filed anything in response to the summary judgment motion on or before

       April 4, 2022. Instead, on April 11, 2022, the Hummers filed motions

       requesting an extension of time to respond to the motion and to reschedule the

       April 16, 2022, hearing on said motion. The Personal Representatives did not

       object to continuing the hearing but did object to the Hummers receiving more

       time to respond to their summary judgment motion. On May 16, 2022, the trial

       court set the matter for a telephonic hearing, which was held on May 19, 2022.

       The trial court never entered an order either granting or denying the Hummers’

       motions, but the summary judgment hearing was reset for June 30, 2022.

       Thereafter, on May 22, 2022, the Hummers filed their response to the Personal

       Representatives’ motion for summary judgment.

[12]   On July 27, 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the

       Personal Representatives. This appeal ensued.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024     Page 7 of 17
       Discussion and Decision
       The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Summary Judgment in Favor
       of the Personal Representatives

[13]   As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained, we review summary judgment

       decisions de novo, which means we apply the same standard as the trial court.

       Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 644 (Ind. 2023) (quoting 624 Broadway, LLC v.

       Gary Hous. Auth., 193 N.E.3d 381, 384 (Ind. 2022)). Summary judgment is

       proper only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine

       issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

       as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C) (emphasis added). “A fact is

       ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is

       ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of

       the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable

       inferences.” City of Marion v. London Witte Grp., LLC, 169 N.E.3d 382, 390 (Ind.

       2021) (quoting Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009)).

[14]   We consider only those portions of the pleadings, depositions, and any other

       matters specifically designated to the trial court by the parties for purposes of

       the summary judgment motion. T.R. 56(C), (H). That is, a party may not

       designate such matters in their entirety but instead must specify which parts

       thereof on which it relies to support or oppose the motion. See id.; Filip v. Block,

       879 N.E.2d 1076, 1081 (Ind. 2008). We resolve “all factual inferences and all

       doubts as to the existence of a material issue” in favor of the nonmovant.

       Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024) (internal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024           Page 8 of 17
       quotation marks omitted) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind.

       2012)). In so doing, “we give careful scrutiny to make sure the non-movant’s

       day in court is not improperly denied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)

       (quoting Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 51 N.E.3d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 2016)).

[15]   The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima

       facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is

       entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp. Co., 205

       N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194

       N.E.3d 84, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)), reh’g denied (Apr. 5, 2023), trans. denied,

       211 N.E.3d 1007 (Ind. 2023). Only if the moving party meets this prima facie

       burden does the burden then shift to the nonmoving party to show the existence

       of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (citing Serbon, 194 N.E.3d at 91).

[16]   As a preliminary matter, the Personal Representatives claim that we cannot

       consider the Hummers’ response to the summary judgment motion because it

       was filed after April 4, 2022—the trial court-imposed deadline for the Hummers

       to respond. We have a bright line rule for dealing with late responses to

       summary judgment motions: when the nonmovant fails to respond to a motion

       for summary judgment either within 30 days or by the trial court-imposed

       deadline, “the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that

       party subsequent to” the relevant deadline. Andry v. Thorbecke, 218 N.E.3d 600,

       603–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell v. 10th & The

       Bypass, LLC, 3 N.E.3d 967, 972 (Ind. 2014)), trans. not sought. Based on our

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024         Page 9 of 17
       bright line rule, we agree with the Personal Representatives’ argument, so we

       will not consider the Hummers’ late response to the Trial Rule 56 motion.

[17]   Next, in their brief on appeal, the Hummers cite to parts of the Personal

       Representatives’ designated evidence that were not relied upon by the Personal

       Representatives in their Trial Rule 56 motion and supporting brief. Because we

       cannot consider the Hummers’ belated response to the motion, we also cannot

       consider any portions of the designated evidence not cited by the Personal

       Representatives in their Trial Rule 56 motion and supporting brief. See T.R.

       56(C), (H); Filip, 879 N.E.2d at 1081.

[18]   We now turn to the merits of the Personal Representatives’ summary judgment

       motion regarding the Hummers’ claims that Norma’s will and codicil are

       invalid. Any interested person may contest the validity of a will based on “(1)

       the unsoundness of mind of the testator; (2) the undue execution of the will; (3)

       that the will was executed under duress or was obtained by fraud; or (4) any

       other valid objection to the will’s validity or the probate of the will.” Ind. Code

       § 29-1-7-17. In their complaint and on appeal, the Hummers assert that

       Norma’s will and codicil are invalid because at the time she executed them, she

       was (1) of unsound mind and (2) subject to undue influence.1

       1
        In their complaint, the Hummers also alleged that Norma’s execution of her will and codicil was obtained
       by fraud. However, the Hummers do not make this argument on appeal or otherwise challenge the trial
       court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Personal Representatives on this ground, so it is waived.
       See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024                             Page 10 of 17
       1. Unsound Mind

[19]   First, the Hummers contend that Norma was of unsound mind when she

       executed both the will and the codicil. As another panel of this court has

       explained:

               Every person is presumed to be of sound mind to execute a will.
               Gast v. Hall, 858 N.E.2d 154, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing
               Hays v. Harmon, 809 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
               denied), reh’g denied, trans. denied. To rebut this presumption, a
               party must show that the testator, at the time of executing his
               will, lacks the mental capacity to know: “(1) the extent and value
               of [her] property; (2) those who are the natural objects of [her]
               bounty; and (3) their deserts, with respect to their treatment of
               and conduct towards [her].” Id. It is the testator’s mental
               capacity or soundness of mind at the time she executes the
               document at issue that is controlling. Id. However, evidence of
               the testator’s mental condition before the date of execution is
               admissible as it relates to the testator’s mental state at the time
               she executed the document at issue. Id.

       In re Rhoades, 993 N.E.2d 291, 299 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (alterations in original).

[20]   Considering the specifically designated evidence in the light most favorable to

       the Hummers reveals that Norma intended to disinherit Kathy when she

       executed her will and reaffirmed that intent two years later when she executed

       her codicil. Several medical professionals determined Norma was alert and

       oriented as to time, place, people, and circumstances in the days leading up to

       the execution of her will. Kathy did not dispute the accuracy of these reports.

       At the time Norma executed her will and codicil, both Forcum and Thomas

       believed Norma knew where she was, who she was, and what she was doing;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024       Page 11 of 17
       understood her estate plan and its effect; and executed those documents freely

       and voluntarily. Kathy did not contend that Forcum and Thomas committed

       perjury by attesting to the soundness of Norma’s mind and the free and

       voluntary nature of her execution of her will. Based on these undisputed facts,

       the Personal Representatives have met their prima facie burden of showing that

       Norma was of sound mind when she executed the will and codicil. Because the

       Hummers failed to file a timely response, they have not carried their burden of

       demonstrating a genuine dispute of material fact exists concerning Norma’s

       soundness of mind. Therefore, the Personal Representatives are entitled to

       summary judgment in their favor concerning the Hummers’ claim that Norma’s

       will and codicil are invalid on this basis.

       2. Undue Influence

[21]   Second, the Hummers argue that Norma executed her will and codicil while

       subject to undue influence. “Undue influence” is “the exercise of sufficient

       control over the person, the validity of whose act is brought into question, to

       destroy his free agency and constrain him to do what he would not have done if

       such control had not been exercised.” Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 629

       (Ind. Ct. App.) (quoting In re Estate of Compton, 919 N.E.2d 1181, 1185-86 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied), trans. denied, 159 N.E.3d 566 (Ind. 2020). To

       affect a will,

               undue influence must subjugate the mind of a testator to the
               wishes of the person exerting the influence. It must be such as to
               control the mental operations of the testator in the making
               thereof, overcome his power of resistance and oblige him to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024      Page 12 of 17
               make a disposition of his property which he would not have
               made if left freely to act according to his own wishes and
               pleasures.

       Id. (quoting Lindinger v. Lindinger, 126 Ind. App. 463, 466, 130 N.E.2d 75, 77

       (1955)). “When considering whether a will is invalid because it is a product of

       undue influence,” the court considers several factors, including the testator’s

       mental state. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 630 (citing Nichols v. Est. of Tyler, 910

       N.E.2d 221, 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). The party contesting the will need not

       show “[c]omplete unsoundness of mind . . . ; rather, weakness of mind when

       combined with other factors is sufficient.” Id. (quoting Nichols, 910 N.E.2d at

       229).

[22]   Undue influence “may flow from the abuse of a confidential relationship in

       which ‘confidence is reposed by one party in another with resulting superiority

       and influence exercised by the other.’” Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 629–30

       (quoting Carlson v. Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). “[A]

       confidential relationship sufficient to support an undue influence claim may

       arise either as a matter of law or may arise under the particular facts of a case.”

       Id. at 629 n.7 (quoting Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2011)). “Confidential relationships as a matter of law include relationships

       such as . . . attorney-in-fact and the one granting the power of attorney,

       guardian and ward, principal and agent, . . . and parent and child.” Id. (quoting

       Scribner, 953 N.E.2d at 484). “A confidential relationship as a matter of law

       creates a presumption of undue influence.” Id. (citing Scribner, 953 N.E.2d at

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024        Page 13 of 17
       484). Here, the designated evidence demonstrates that a confidential

       relationship as a matter of law did not exist between the Personal

       Representatives and Norma.

[23]   As another panel of this court has explained:

               Where there is no confidential relationship as a matter of law, the
               evidence in a given case may show a relationship of trust and
               confidence that would have justified one in relying upon that
               relationship. Instead of creating a rebuttable presumption of
               undue influence, the plaintiff in such a case bears the burden of
               establishing not only the existence of a confidential relationship
               in fact between the parties but also to prove that the parties to the
               challenged transaction did not deal on terms of equality. The
               plaintiff must prove either the dominant party dealt with superior
               knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relationship, or
               dealt from a position of overpowering influence as to the
               subordinate party.

       Scribner, 953 N.E.2d at 484 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

       “On occasion, we have held that the traditional parent-child relationship may

       be reversed, placing the child in the dominant position, if there is evidence that

       the child has become the parent’s ‘caretaker.’” Id. at 485 (citing Meyer v. Wright,

       854 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[24]   Here, considering the specifically designated evidence in the light most

       favorable to the Hummers, that evidence shows that Wayne, Carolyn, and

       Mary began caring for Norma in approximately 2012, but they did not begin

       caring for her around-the-clock until February 2016, after she had already

       disinherited Kathy. At most, the designated evidence shows the Personal

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024         Page 14 of 17
       Representatives helped one another provide part-time care for Norma prior to

       January 13, 2016. The designated evidence also shows that Wayne and

       Carolyn were not in the room when Forcum and Thomas discussed the will

       with Norma or when the will was executed.

[25]   After Norma executed her will but before she executed her codicil, the Personal

       Representatives began providing around-the-clock care for her. That is, Norma

       spent a third of every day with each of the Personal Representatives. Mary was

       responsible for Norma’s laundry, cleaning, and dispensing her medications.

       Carolyn was responsible for Norma’s beautician needs, laundry, cleaning, and

       dispensing her medications. Wayne was responsible for paying Norma’s bills,

       grocery shopping, and transporting her to appointments, including medical and

       legal appointments; he also contacted Forcum on Norma’s behalf to initiate the

       preparation and execution of the codicil.

[26]   These undisputed facts demonstrate that Norma did not solely rely on her

       relationship with any one of the Personal Representatives either at the time she

       executed or at the time she executed her codicil. Based on the foregoing, the

       Personal Representatives have shown that none of them had a confidential

       relationship as a matter of fact with Norma.

[27]   As discussed above, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the

       Hummers, the specifically designated evidence demonstrates that Norma was of

       sound mind when she executed her will and codicil, and Norma, Forcum, and

       Thomas all averred that Norma executed those documents freely and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024     Page 15 of 17
       voluntarily. The designated evidence here does not support the idea that

       Norma disinherited Kathy for any reason other than her desire to fairly

       distribute her estate based on the care, or lack thereof, provided to her by her

       children. That is, the designated evidence shows that Norma was not

       susceptible to undue influence, let alone that any of the Personal

       Representatives successfully exercised undue influence over her. The Personal

       Representatives have carried their prima facie burden of showing that Norma

       was not subject to undue influence. Because the Hummers failed to file a

       timely response, they have not carried their burden of demonstrating a genuine

       issue of material facts exists concerning any alleged exercise of undue influence.

       Therefore, the Personal Representatives are entitled to summary judgment in

       their favor concerning the Hummers’ claim that Norma’s will and codicil are

       invalid on this basis.

       Conclusion
[28]   In sum, when viewing the specifically designated evidence in the light most

       favorable to the Hummers, we cannot say that there is a genuine issue of

       material fact regarding Norma’s soundness of mind or susceptibility to undue

       influence. The record reflects that Norma was not of unsound mind when she

       executed the will and codicil, nor was she unduly influenced to do so. Thus,

       Norma’s will and codicil are not invalid on these grounds, and the Personal

       Representatives are entitled to judgment as a matter of law in their favor on the

       Hummers’ claims to the contrary. We therefore affirm the trial court on all

       issues raised.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024       Page 16 of 17
[29]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Chris M. Teagle
       Anderson, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Matthew L. Kelsey
       DeFur Voran LLP
       Muncie, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1925 | March 27, 2024   Page 17 of 17