Court Opinion

ID: 9404532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 13:07:28.243747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.064622
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ackman v. Mercy Health West Hosp., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-2075.]

                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                      HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 JENNIFER ACKMAN, Personal                            :     APPEAL NO. C-220507
 Representative and                                         TRIAL NO. A-2000845
 Administrator of the Estate                          :
 of Janet M. Sollmann,
 deceased,                                            :

           Plaintiff-Appellant,                       :            O P I N I O N.

     vs.                                              :

 MERCY HEALTH WEST HOSPITAL,                          :
 LLC, et al.,
                                                      :
           Defendants,
                                                      :
     and
                                                      :
 MUHAMMAD RIAZ AHMAD, M.D.,
                                                      :
     and
                                                      :
 HOSPITALIST MEDICINE PHYSICIANS
 OF OHIO P.C.,                                        :

           Defendants-Appellees.                      :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 23, 2023

Colleen M. Hegge, F. Joseph Shiavone Co., LPA, and Frank Schiavone III, for
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Calderhead, Lockemeyer & Peschke Law Office, and Joshua F. DeBra, for
Defendants-Appellees Muhammad Riaz Ahmad, M.D., and Hospitalist Medicine
Physicians of Ohio, P.C.,
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant Jennifer Ackman, the personal representative and

administrator of the estate of Janet M. Sollmann, appeals the trial court’s entry of

summary judgment dismissing defendants-appellees Muhammad Riaz Ahmad, M.D.,

(“Ahmad”) and Hospitalist Medicine Physicians of Ohio, P.C., (“Hospitalist”) for lack

of proper service. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   In February 2020, Ackman filed medical-malpractice and wrongful-

death claims against several defendants, including Ahmad and Hospitalist. According

to the complaint, Ahmad is an employee of Hospitalist and provided care for Janet

Sollmann in April 2019 at Mercy Health West Hospital. Ackman tried to serve Ahmad

through certified mail at a business address for Mercy Hospital on Kipling Avenue in

Cincinnati, Ohio. But service failed because that hospital was demolished in 2015.

       {¶3}   In March 2020, Ahmad and Hospitalist answered Ackman’s complaint,

raising several defenses, including insufficient process and insufficient service of

process under Civ.R. 12(B)(4) and (5). Weeks later, the certified mail envelope

addressed to Ahmad was returned to the Hamilton County Clerk’s office marked

“RETURN TO SENDER, VACANT, UNABLE TO FORWARD, RETURN TO SENDER.”

       {¶4}   After some participation in the case, Ahmad and Hospitalist moved for

summary judgment in June 2022, requesting that the court dismiss Ahmad and

Hospitalist based on Ackman’s failed service. The trial court granted summary

judgment to Ahmad, finding no genuine issue of material fact. Specifically, the trial

court ruled that Ahmad properly preserved his insufficient-process and insufficient-

service-of-process defenses despite his active participation in the case. Because the

case was never commenced against Ahmad within the statute of limitations and the
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

claims against defendant Hospitalist were premised on vicarious liability, the trial

court dismissed defendants Ahmad and Hospitalist from the case.

                               II. Law and Analysis

       {¶5}   Ackman challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a

single assignment of error. First, Ackman maintains that Ahmad’s active participation

in the case waived his service-based affirmative defenses. Second, Ackman contends

that summary judgment is improper when an issue of fact exists involving the clerk of

court’s alleged failure to comply with Civ.R. 4.1(A)(2). Third, Ackman argues that

Ahmad had reasonable notice of the lawsuit through his employer, Hospitalist. Fourth,

Ackman asserts that the trial court erred when it dismissed defendant Hospitalist.

       {¶6}   We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Wright

v. Mirza, 2017-Ohio-7183, 95 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 5 (1st Dist.), citing Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C),

“[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material

fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) the

evidence, when viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.” Id.

                  Ahmad Did Not Waive Service-Related Defenses

       {¶7}   Under Civ.R. 3(A), service of a complaint upon a named defendant

commences a civil action. Civ.R. 12(H)(1) governs the waiver of affirmative defenses

relevant to this case—insufficient process or insufficient service of process. Under that

rule, service-based affirmative defenses are waived “if a motion is made raising other

Civ.R. 12(B) defenses and [they are] not included in that motion or, if there is no such

motion, if [they are] not raised by separate motion or included in the responsive

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

pleading.” Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-

Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 9.

        {¶8}    In Gliozzo, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “when the affirmative

defense of insufficiency of service of process is properly raised and properly preserved,

a party’s active participation in litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that

defense.” Id. at ¶ 11. And we are, of course, compelled to apply binding precedent from

the Ohio Supreme Court. See State v. Hernandez, 2020-Ohio-5496, 163 N.E.3d 1175,

¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

        {¶9}    Although a party may waive insufficiency of process, “[t]he only way in

which a party can voluntarily submit to a court’s jurisdiction, however, is by failing to

raise the defense of insufficiency of service of process in a responsive pleading or by

filing certain motions before any pleading.” Gliozzo at ¶ 13; see Pioneer Automotive v.

Village Gate, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210205, 2022-Ohio-1247, ¶ 10. In Gliozzo, the

defendants “properly raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of

process by including it in their answer” and were therefore “free to seek dismissal of

the case for insufficiency of service, even though they had also mounted a vigorous

defense upon the merits.” Gliozzo at ¶ 12.

        {¶10} The parties agree that Ahmad was never served. And the record makes

clear that Ahmad and Hospitalist answered Ackman’s complaint, raising both

insufficient process and insufficient service of process under Civ.R. 12(B)(4) and (5).

Yet, Ackman contends that Ahmad’s involvement in the case waived his insufficient-

process and insufficient-service-of-process defenses. Ackman points to Ahmad’s

participation in case-scheduling orders in May 2020 and a joint motion to amend the

scheduling order filed in February 2021 to assert that Ahmad voluntarily submitted to

the jurisdiction of the court.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶11} But these arguments run counter to Gliozzo. And the facts in Gliozzo are

nearly identical to the facts in this case. Ahmad raised his insufficient-service and

insufficient-service-of-process defenses in his answer, participated in the litigation,

and moved for summary judgment based on those defenses. We cannot distinguish

the facts of this case from Gliozzo, which is binding precedent and dispositive of

Ackman’s arguments.

            An Attorney Carries The Ultimate Duty Of Verifying Service

       {¶12} Next, Ackman argues that the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts failed

to notify her counsel that service to Ahmad at the Kipling Avenue address failed. Civ.R.

4.1(A)(2) instructs the clerk of courts to “notify the attorney of record” when service

fails, in addition to entering that fact and the method of notification on the docket. On

April 13, 2020, the clerk of courts recorded on the docket that the service failed and

was returned because the property was vacant. It appears the notice of that failed

delivery never found its way to Ackman’s attorney.

       {¶13} But the civil rules “place[] responsibility on attorneys for verifying

service.” Brookville Ents. v. Clarence J. Kessler Estate HCF Mgt., 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29314, 2022-Ohio-1420, ¶ 30. Under Civ.R. 4.6(E), “the attorney of

record or the serving party shall be responsible for determining if service has been

made and shall timely file written instructions with the clerk regarding completion of

service notwithstanding the provisions in Civ.R. 4.1 through 4.6 which instruct a clerk

to notify the attorney of record or the serving party of failure of service of process.” In

the end, Ackman’s attorney failed to determine if service had been completed.

 Service Was Not Reasonably Calculated To Provide Ahmad Notice Of The Claims

       {¶14} Ackman emphasizes the fact that she successfully served Hospitalist,

through an agent, to argue that Ahmad had reasonable notice of the claims.
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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} We recognize that the civil rules and due process do not “ ‘require actual

service upon the party receiving notice.’ ” Akron-Canton Regional Airport Auth. v.

Swinehart, 62 Ohio St.2d 403, 405, 406 N.E.2d 811 (1980), quoting Castellano v.

Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 107, 111, 326 N.E.2d 686 (1975). Indeed, the Ohio Supreme

Court has held that “service is effective when the notice is delivered and properly

receipted for by an appropriate person.” Castellano at 111. And the court has held that

service “to a business address can comport with due process if the circumstances are

such that successful notification could be reasonably anticipated.” Swinehart at 406.

In other words, due process requires, at a minimum, that parties must be served in a

manner reasonably calculated to “ ‘apprise interested parties of the pendency of the

action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” Id., quoting

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94

L.Ed. 865 (1950). In Swinehart, service was not reasonably calculated to apprise the

defendant who “did not maintain an office on the premises of the business” where

service was attempted, “[h]is principal place of business was in fact in another city,”

and he “only sporadically visited the business where service was attempted[] usually

two or three times per month.” Id. at 406-407.

       {¶16} So too here. Ahmad acknowledged in his pleading and affidavit that

Hospitalist is his employer. But like the defendant in Swinehart, Ahmad does not

maintain an office at Hospitalist’s business address. Instead, he works at “multiple

Mercy facilities” in the Cincinnati area. Further, Hospitalist was served in Columbus,

Ohio. And significantly, Ahmad was not identified on the certified mail envelope

delivered to Hospitalist. Therefore, we conclude that serving Hospitalist was not done

in a manner reasonably calculated to provide Ahmad notice of the claims.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                 Hospitalist’s Liability Was Premised On Ahmad’s Liability

       {¶17} The final issue raised by Ackman concerns the trial court’s dismissal of

Hospitalist. After the trial court granted summary judgment to Ahmad because the

suit against him had never commenced, the trial court granted summary judgment for

Hospitalist because the claims against Hospitalist “sound only in vicarious liability.”

The court dismissed Ahmad and Hospitalist from the case. Ackman takes issue with

the court’s dismissal of Hospitalist, advancing two arguments.

       {¶18} First, Ackman argues that Hospitalist failed to substantively present a

vicarious-liability argument in its summary-judgment motion. We disagree. “ ‘It is

reversible error to award summary judgment on grounds not specified in the motion

for summary judgment.’ ” State ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas, 121 Ohio

St.3d 507, 2009-Ohio-1523, 905 N.E.2d 1192, ¶ 27, quoting Patterson v. Ahmed, 176

Ohio App.3d 596, 2008-Ohio-362, 893 N.E.2d 198, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). But Hospitalist

maintained in its summary-judgment motion that all claims against it were premised

vicariously on the liability of Ahmad. Hospitalist sufficiently raised the issue and

Ahmad’s affidavit supported its argument. See Civ.R. 56(B).

       {¶19} Second, Ackman contends that her negligence claims were not premised

on vicarious liability. Rather, she emphasizes her alleged negligence claim against

Hospitalist individually. In response, Hospitalist argues that it cannot be held liable

without a suit against one of its agents.

       {¶20} But Ackman’s claim was a medical claim. Ackman titled her first claim

“NEGLIGENCE” and maintained that Hospitalist failed to “exercise reasonable care

and skill” when assessing, diagnosing, and treating Sollmann. While Ackman argues

that she is raising ordinary negligence claims, “ ‘[m]alpractice by any other name still

constitutes malpractice.’ ” Amadasu v. O’Neal, 176 Ohio App.3d 217, 2008-Ohio-1730,
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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

891 N.E.2d 802, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), quoting Steinmetz v. Francis J. Lowry, D.D.S. & Assoc.,

17 Ohio App.3d 116, 118, 477 N.E.2d 671 (1st Dist.1984), quoting Muir v. Hadler Real

Estate Mgt. Co., 4 Ohio App.3d 89, 90, 446 N.E.2d 820 (10th Dist.1982). Indeed, “[i]t

makes no difference whether the professional misconduct is founded in tort or

contract, it still constitutes malpractice.” Steinmetz at 118, quoting Muir at 90, quoting

Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 372, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964).

       {¶21} The nature of Ackman’s claim is significant because this court and

others have held that “only individuals can be held directly liable for medical

malpractice.” Henry v. Mandell-Brown, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090752, 2010-Ohio-

3832, ¶ 13. And “ ‘a hospital does not practice medicine and is incapable of committing

malpractice.’ ” Natl. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wuerth, 122 Ohio St.3d 594, 2009-Ohio-

3601, 913 N.E.2d 939, ¶ 14, quoting Browning v. Burt, 66 Ohio St.3d 544, 556, 613

N.E.2d 993 (1993). Ackman alleged in her complaint that Hospitalist, along with

Ahmad, failed to administer appropriate treatment and failed to conduct necessary

scans of Sollmann. And Ackman identified Hospitalist as “a Professional Corporation

* * * doing business in Hamilton County providing medical services.” But Hospitalist

cannot be held directly liable to Ackman and she must proceed under a theory of

vicarious liability.

       {¶22} But, as the trial court concluded, Ackman cannot prevail against

Hospitalist under a theory of vicarious liability. When a medical claim premises the

liability of an employer “solely on vicarious liability, the imputed liability hinges on

the tortfeasor’s relationship to the entity.” McQuade v. Mayfield Clinic, Inc., 2022-

Ohio-785, 186 N.E.3d 278, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), citing Dinges v. St. Luke’s Hosp., 2012-Ohio-

2422, 971 N.E.2d 1045, ¶ 45 (6th Dist.) (Yarbrough, J., concurring). Further “ ‘an

entity may be vicariously liable for malpractice only when one or more of its principals
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

or associates are liable’ ” for malpractice. Id. at ¶ 11, quoting Wuerth at ¶ 26. In other

words, vicarious-liability claims against a physician’s employer are precluded when

direct-liability claims against the physician are barred. Clawson v. Hts. Chiropractic

Physicians, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4154, ¶ 29.

       {¶23} Consider Mandell-Brown, a medical-malpractice case where the

patient’s claims against the surgeon were dismissed as untimely under the statute of

limitations. Mandell-Brown at ¶ 1. This court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the

surgery center as a defendant because “only individuals can be held directly liable for

medical malpractice” and therefore “the respondeat superior claim against the surgery

center could not survive the dismissal of the claims against Mandell-Brown.” Id. at ¶

13-14. And following Mandell-Brown, we explained that there is “no room for

vicarious liability for medical malpractice where a doctor cannot be found to be liable

for malpractice.” Rush v. Univ. of Cincinnati Physicians, Inc., 2016-Ohio-947, 62

N.E.3d 583, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).

       {¶24} In the end, Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d

141, 2007-Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 714 (2007) requires us to hold that Ahmad’s active

participation in this case did not waive any service-based defenses. And Ackman’s

vicarious-liability claims against Hospitalist could not survive the dismissal of Ahmad.

We overrule her assignment of error.

                                   III. Conclusion

       {¶25} We overrule Ackman’s single assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                                    Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER, J., concurs.
BERGERON, P.J., concurs separately.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, P.J., concurring separately.

       {¶26} For those who would complain about our civil justice system as being

too slow, too expensive, and too reliant on technicalities, this case is Exhibit A. While

I agree with the majority’s conclusion as correct under Gliozzo v. Univ. Urologists of

Cleveland, Inc., 114 Ohio St.3d 141, 2007-Ohio-3762, 870 N.E.2d 714, I write

separately to urge the Supreme Court of Ohio to revisit its holding in Gliozzo, or failing

that, I would encourage the Rules Committee to remedy the matter. We should not

allow rule interpretations such as that espoused by Gliozzo to turn Civ.R. 1’s mandate

that the Civil Rules must be interpreted “to effect just results by eliminating delay,

unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration of

justice” on its head. Civ.R. 1(B). As I see it, the Gliozzo rule accomplishes the hat trick

of exactly what Civ.R. 1 sought to avoid.

       {¶27} In 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court in Gliozzo held, “When the affirmative

defense of insufficiency of process is properly raised and properly preserved [by

including it in their answer, pursuant to Civ.R. 12], a party’s active participation in

litigation of a case does not constitute waiver of that defense.” Gliozzo at ¶ 11. In other

words, a party can sit back and wait for the clock to run out, all the while engaging in

active litigation.

       {¶28} The origins of this holding trace back to 1984, when the Ohio Supreme

Court issued its decision in First Bank of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St.3d 317, 466

N.E.2d 567 (1984). In Cline, defendants properly raised the defense of insufficient

service of process in the first responsive pleading, but the case proceeded to trial. Only

after all the evidence had been presented did the defense move to dismiss for

insufficiency of service of process. The court held that failure to request a pretrial

hearing on the issue did not constitute a waiver of the defense. Id. at 318. In making
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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

this decision, the court relied on the language of Civ.R. 12(D), ultimately concluding

that “[t]he rule does not require a party to request a preliminary hearing on the

specified motions, nor does it mandate a waiver of such defenses for failure to do so.”

Id.

        {¶29} It doesn’t have to be this way. Consider the federal example. Nearly

identical to Ohio’s rule, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h) provides: “A party waives any defense listed

in Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) [including insufficient service of process] by: (A) omitting it from

a motion in the circumstances described in Rule 12(g)(2); or (B) failing to either: (i)

make it by motion under this rule; or (ii) include it in a responsive pleading or in an

amendment * * *.” Just like in Ohio, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) obliges a party to raise the

defense of insufficient service of process either by answer or by motion made before

the answer. If a party fails to raise the defense by either of those means, Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(h)(1) provides that it is waived. Unlike in Ohio, however, even if the defense is

preserved in the answer, many federal courts have held the defenses identified in

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(1) to be waived if the party participates in litigation without actively

pursuing the defenses. This is referred to as “waiver by conduct.” See Boulger v.

Woods, 917 F.3d 471, 477 (6th Cir.2019) (explaining that, even where a defendant

preserves a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) defense in an answer, he may forfeit the right to seek a

ruling on the defense at a later point through his conduct in the litigation); see also

King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 658 (6th Cir.2012), citing Hamilton v. Atlas Turner,

Inc., 197 F.3d 58, 60 (2d Cir.1999) (“Even where a defendant properly preserves [a

defense of insufficient service of process] by including it in an answer, he may forfeit

the right to seek a ruling on the defense at a later juncture through his conduct during

the litigation.”).

                                            11
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶30} In King, the defendant included an insufficient service defense in his

answer but then remained silent on the issue for nearly a year. King at 660. During

that year, the defendant participated in the litigation in various ways, including

meeting with plaintiffs’ counsel, participating in discovery on the merits, moving to

extend discovery deadlines, and attending a status conference. Id. While the district

court ruled that the defendant had not waived his Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) defense, the

Sixth Circuit reversed, holding, “Such voluntary, active, and extensive participation in

the litigation indisputably gave plaintiffs a ‘reasonable expectation that [defendant

would] defend the suit on the merits.’ ” Id., quoting Gerber v. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514,

519 (6th Cir.2011).

       {¶31} The court emphasized: “In finding forfeiture here, we do not imply that

a defendant who believes he has been improperly served and insists upon proper

service must raise the issue in a motion at the earliest possible moment upon pain of

forfeiture. * * * [Defendant], however, waited until well after the 120-day period [to

serve a defendant] expired to press his service defense in a motion and, in the

meantime, took substantial steps to defend the case on the merits. Doing so forfeited

his defense.” Id. at 661. Moreover, federal case law explains that “ ‘[d]etermining what

constitutes waiver by conduct is more [an] art than a science * * * and there is no bright

line rule.’ ” Boulger at 477, quoting State Auto Ins. Co. v. Thomas Landscaping &

Constr., Inc., S.D. Ohio No. 2:09-cv-735, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88176 (Aug. 9, 2011),

and Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 616 F.Supp.2d 210, 216 (D.R.I.2009).

A court “must consider all of the relevant circumstances in determining whether

waiver by conduct has occurred.” Boulger at 477.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶32} The federal standard strikes me as a sensible way of addressing a party’s

failure to litigate affirmative defenses like insufficiency of service. We should not

encourage litigation charades, with parties lying in wait to run out the clock on statutes

of limitations or repose, all the while pretending to litigate with gusto. That inflicts real

harm on the adverse party and the court system as well. Since the primary purpose of

service is to ensure that the party has notice of the suit, obligating that party to press

an objection to service is not an onerous requirement. For these reasons, I encourage

the Supreme Court to reconsider the Gliozzo rule and adopt the federal waiver by

conduct approach as applied by the Sixth Circuit.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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