Court Opinion

ID: 9707570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:15:53.217177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.259097
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. The majority criticizes the trial court for holding that defendant was seized “when the officer approached him and asked him questions.” 165 Vt. at 553, 679 A.2d at 884. Although I agree that the United States Supreme Court has held that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure,” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991), I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the trial court’s decision. The court stated:
There is no question in The Court’s mind that at least at the point when Officer Doucette asked the defendant and his companion if they had been drinking and if they had anything they shouldn’t have had, that there was a seizure [and that] a reasonable person in the defendant’s position at that time would not believe that they were free to leave.
The court thus held that the seizure began not when the officer first questioned defendant and his companion about their presence at the closed library, but when the officer questioned the pair about illegal activity and sought their consent to a search.
I believe that the trial court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bostick. The Bostick Court reaffirmed that the “crucial test” for determining whether a seizure has occurred is “whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would ‘have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.’” Id. at 437 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569 (1988)). The question, then, is whether a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt free to ignore the officer’s questions and simply walk away. Id. at 434.
The trial court applied this test and reached the correct result. Several aspects of the encounter would have made a reasonable person feel coerced and restrained. The uniformed officer approached the two young men as they walked down a ramp and stood in their path. The officer then immediately started with accusatory and incriminating questions, asking the two men why they were at the closed library, and whether they had been drinking. The officer was persistent, first asking to search defendant’s knapsack, and then continuing to question defendant when that search revealed no contraband. See State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 363 (Hawaii 1992) (holding *555that defendant was “seized” where officer initiated encounter, asked intrusive and insinuating questions, and then continued questioning after search of defendant’s carry-on bag revealed nothing).
Although an encounter with the police does not become a seizure merely because an officer asks incriminating questions, some police questioning techniques are coercive. I agree with the dissenting judges in United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994), that “[djireet, focused, or prolonged accusatory questioning in a commanding tone of voice is likely to make a reasonable innocent person feel coerced and unable to terminate a police encounter.” Id. at 1512 (Logan, J., dissenting). In this case, the officer’s prolonged, accusatory questioning is especially disturbing given defendant’s youth. Cf. United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 759 (10th Cir. 1993) (“such attributes as the age, gender, education, and intelligence of the accused” may be relevant in determining voluntariness of encounter).
I am also concerned that the officer never informed defendant that he was free to leave and did not have to answer any questions. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432 (“particularly worth noting” that police informed Bostick that he had right to refuse consent); Little, 18 F.3d at 1510 (Logan, J., dissenting) (agent’s failure to inform defendant that she had right to refuse consent should be important factor in determining whether seizure occurred). Again, this fact does not automatically transform the encounter into a seizure. Nonetheless, in light of defendant’s age and the other coercive aspects of the encounter, the omission is telling. By informing defendant that he did not have to respond or cooperate, the officer could have mitigated his show of authority (with the greater risk, of course, that defendant would not cooperate).
The majority skips over the threshold question of whether a seizure occurred, instead holding that even if defendant was seized, the seizure was justified. Specifically, the majority states that the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant had been and was continuing to commit the crime of possession of alcoholic beverages by a minor, 7 MS.A. § 657(a). I agree that, after smelling alcohol on defendant’s breath, the officer had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant was in possession of alcohol. Based on that suspicion, the officer asked to search defendant’s knapsack. That search revealed no alcohol or other contraband.* Reading the officer’s testimony at the hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, however, I can see no connection between the officer’s suspicion that defendant was in possession of alcoholic beverages, and the search of defendant’s pockets.
The officer testified that after defendant admitted that he had been drinking, the officer asked to look through defendant’s knapsack. Defendant agreed, and an inspection of the bag revealed no alcohol or contraband of any kind. Only then did the officer ask defendant and his companion about the contents of their pockets. Defense counsel questioned the officer about the basis for the second request:
Q: [Hjaving failed to discover any alcohol in his bag, you then proceeded to ask him did he have anything in his pocket which he shouldn’t have, is that right?
A: Yes.
*556Q: Now, at that point when you asked him that, was there any question in your mind that he had committed an illegal act? What was he doing that made an illegal act at the library? Why did you think it was illegal? What was he doing?
A: Based on the fact that we’ve had numerous vandalism complaints, just the Bennington Free Library is like a haven for the kids to go and hang out and be destructive and so on and so forth and based on the fact that it was I believe a Sunday night and the library was closed and they are coming down the handicapped access ramp which leads directly to the library, there was some concern that I had that they may have been involved in something illegal.
Q: Okay, but you didn’t articulate what the illegality was in your affidavit, did you? What specifically were they doing that you thought was illegal?
A: I didn’t know what they were doing, that’s the reason why I stopped them.
Q: Okay, you didn’t know what they were doing, but is it your statement or your testimony today that you suspected they were doing something illegal?
A: They may have been.
The officer’s justification for his continued questioning and his search of defendant’s pockets was not that he was still looking for alcohol; rather, he could point to only a vague, generalized concern of some possible illegality. In fact, the majority’s reasoning ignores the officer’s further testimony that after the fruitless search of the knapsack, he no longer suspected that defendant possessed any alcohol:
Q: But other than the fact that they were at a location that you considered a known location for use of controlled substances and drinking, you had no other information by which, upon which to even have some questions in the first place, did you?
A: Other than the fact of conversing with Mr. Hollister and he admitted the fact that he had been consuming alcohol and he was not 21.
Q: But after he said that and you looked into his bag, were you satisfied that he was telling you the truth?
A: That they didn’t have any alcohol, yes.
As the officer was already satisfied that defendant did not possess any alcohol, his request to search defendant’s pockets could not have been related to his suspicion of criminal activity. In fact, as the officer had determined that his original suspicion was unfounded, without more, the officer was not justified in continuing the limited investigatory seizure of defendant. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (where seizure permitted on less than probable cause because of legitimate law enforcement interests, scope of detention must be carefully tailored to underlying justification). The illegality of the continued seizure taints defendant’s consent to the search of his pockets, if indeed he consented at all. See id. at 502-03 (where police action exceeded bounds of permissible Terry stop, defendant’s consent to search of his luggage was tainted by illegality).
The majority characterizes this argument as “hair-splitting.” 165 Vt. at 554 n*, *557679 A.2d at 884 n*. Although a colorful response, it does not explain why the majority glosses over the second part of the Terry inquiry. After determining that an investigatory stop was based on reasonable suspicion, “the next inquiry is whether its scope and duration are reasonable. The investigation must be as minimally intrusive as possible, bearing in mind the circumstances that gave rise to the suspicion.” United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995). The officer’s continued questioning and search of defendant’s pockets after he determined that his suspicion was unfounded fails this test. The majority’s statement that “the officer could request to search for evidence of any related illegal activity,” 165 Vt. at 554 n*, 679 A.2d at 884 n*, ignores the settled principle that a limited investigatory stop must be “carefully tailored,” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500, and as “minimally intrusive as possible.” Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58.
Finally, even if I accepted the majority’s conclusion that the officer’s seizure of defendant was premised on reasonable suspicion, I can see no reason to remand the case to determine whether or not the search of defendant’s pockets was consensual. All of the coercive aspects of this encounter that made it a seizure lead as well to the conclusion that defendant did not consent to the search. Again, the officer did not tell defendant that he could refuse to consent. Moreover, when defendant at first pulled his pocket out only part of the way, the officer “asked him a second time what was in his pocket because there was still a bulge there in the pocket.” Only after the officer continued to pressure him did defendant produce the marijuana. Under these circumstances, it is clear that defendant felt he had no choice but to comply
I would affirm the trial court’s decision suppressing the marijuana and pipe.

 Although the issue was not raised here, some commentators have argued that the Terry rule permitting investigatory stops based only on reasonable suspicion should be limited to investigations of serious offenses. See 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(c), at 28-32 (3d ed. 1996); Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (“I have the gravest hesitancy in extending Terry to crimes like the possession of narcotics . . . .”) (Friendly, J., dissenting), aff’d, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).