Court Opinion

ID: 9618918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:19:18.551855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:26.992907
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, J.,
dissenting.
I do not agree that plaintiff’s employer, the city of Beaverton, was engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise, or in the accomplishment of the same or related purposes with Savaria-Smith, the firm which was constructing the building.
*547I cannot believe that the legislature intended that a city building inspector, whose only duty is to make certain the construction complies with the local budding code, and a contractor building an apartment house are engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise or the accomplishment of the same or related purposes. One is engaged in a commercial enterprise for profit, and the other is engaged in the governmental activity of inspection to determine whether the construction complies with the budding code and presumably to require the contractor to make such changes as are necessary to comply with the code.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time this court has extended its interpretation of the phrase to include in the definition one engaged in a governmental activity and one engaged in a commercial project. In other cases the employers were engaged in the furtherance of a commercial purpose. See e.g., Fisher v. Rudie Wilhelm Warehouse Co., 224 Or 26, 355 P2d 242 (1960); Brown v. Underwood Lumber Co., 172 Or 261, 141 P2d 527 (1943); Inwall v. Transpacific Lumber Co., 165 Or 560, 108 P2d 522 (1941).
In another case which involved a municipality, Hensler v. City of Portland, 212 Or 28, 318 P2d 313 (1957), the plaintiff was an employee of a boat budder who had contracted with the city of Portland through the Department of Public Docks for the delivery of a boat. Plaintiff’s duties were to make the boat shipshape. Wlide the boat was being unloaded, a crane broke and injured plaintiff. This court held that plaintiff’s employer and the city of Portland were not engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise or in the accomplishment of the same or related purposes.
The majority relies on the case of Plummer v. Donald M. Drake, 212 Or 430, 320 P2d 245 (1957), *548wherein an employee of a firm of architects hired to inspect the construction of a school was injured by the negligence of the general contractor who was constructing the building. The case is not applicable. In Plummer the primary question was the constitutionality of ORS 656.154. A secondary issue was whether defendant’s supplemental answer alleged sufficient facts to constitute a defense. Generally, the answer alleged that plaintiff and the contractor were on premises over which plaintiff’s employer and the defendant contractor had joint supervision and control and were engaged in the furtherance of a common enterprise and the accomplishment of the same or related purposes within the meaning of the statute. This court decided that the answer alleged sufficient facts to constitute a defense and that the demurrer was properly overruled. However, the opinion added the additional comment that if plaintiff should, on trial, establish the facts alleged, “he would without doubt also establish that he is barred from maintaining this action by ORS 656.154.” Obviously, the court was dealing with a question of pleading, and the specific issue was not squarely before the court.
More importantly, however, Plummer did not involve one party being' engaged in a governmental activity of inspection. Presumably the architect was engaged by the school district, which contracted with the defendant to construct the school building. In the instant case, plaintiff was employed by the city of Beaverton, which had no interest in the construction other than to see that it complied with the building code.
Our statute, ORS 656.154, was adopted from the Minnesota Compensation Law. Plummer v. Donald M. Drake Co., supra. The interpretation given the *549statutes by the Minnesota courts is persuasive. In fact, in Johnson v. Timber Structures Inc., 203 Or 670, 281 P2d 723 (1955), the specially concurring opinion of Justice Tooze (the opinion was actually the majority opinion as three other justices joined) stated that we should have “no hesitancy in adopting” the rule announced by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn 499, 8 NW2d 808 (1943). There, the Minnesota court stated that the terms “common enterprise” and “accomplishment of the same or related purposes” meant that the employers were, at the time and place of injury, engaged on the same project and their employees were exposed to the same or similar hazards created by such engagement.①
A more recent case is Crawford v. Woodrich Const. Co., 239 Minn 12, 57 NW2d 648 (1953). There, a highway inspector employed by the highway department was injured by a truck whose driver was employed by either an independent contractor or an employee of the company doing the highway construction. The question presented was whether plaintiff’s employer, the state of Minnesota, and the contractor were “engaged in the due course of business (a) in the furtherance of a common enterprise, or (b) in the accomplishment of the same or related purposes” within the meaning of the Minnesota statutes so as to bar plaintiff from an action against the contractor. The court stated:
“* * * Here the state, plaintiff’s employer, and the company clearly were not engaged in the same project. The state was not engaged in the *550project of budding or repairing a road; its only connection with the project was that it had contracted for the road-building services of the company. It cannot be said that the state — or any other employer — which merely carries on a systematic inspection to insure that it is getting the quality of services for which it has obligated itself to pay under a construction contract is engaged in the same project as the contractor who performs the work. Furthermore, the plaintiff as an inspector herein was not engaged in the performance of the project. When he found a defect, he performed no services to correct such defect. Correction work was left entirely to employes of the company. Obviously plaintiff is not barred from prosecuting a common-law action against the company.” (Footnote omitted.) 57 NW 2d at 654.
The same reasoning applies to the ease at bar. The city was not engaged with the defendants in the common enterprise of building an apartment house. The city’s only interest was in seeing that the construction of the apartment house complied with the building code. Any correction work would be done by the contractor, and the plaintiff was in no manner engaged in the performance of the project.
I would reverse.
O’Connell, C. J., concurs in this dissent.

The Minnesota court also stated that “[b]usiness is related when the parties are mutually or reciprocally interested in a commercial way; or where the business of one has a necessary relation toward or in conjunction with the other.” (Emphasis supplied.) 8 NW2d at 810.