Court Opinion

ID: 9851341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:10:59.458197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.923663
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice:
This appeal arises out of an unsuccessful products liability action trial.
*261Plaintiffs, W. Rivers Claytor and his wife, Frances Claytor, brought separate actions (tried together) to recover damages sustained when the motor vehicle in which they were riding was struck by an oncoming Oldsmobile alleged to be defective. The trial judge granted a directed verdict to defendant General Motors Corporation (GM); the trial proceeded to a verdict by which the remaining defendants, Coastal Buick-Oldsmobile Company (Local Dealership) and Gary M. Meyer and Marcia Meyer, owners and operators of the offending vehicle, were exonerated of liability by a jury. The Claytors appeal alleging error in the granting of a verdict in favor of GM.
In March of 1976, the Claytors were proceeding northerly on a secondary road near Beaufort when the Meyers’ southbound Oldsmobile went out of control, crossed into the northbound land and struck the Claytors’ vehicle. There was evidence to the effect that immediately prior to the collision, a wheel had separated from the 1975 Oldsmobile manufactured by GM. Further evidence showed that the wheels on the Meyers’ Oldsmobile had ben rotated by the Local Dealership in October, 1975, and that the Oldsmobile vehicle had been driven about 9,000 miles since the rotation.
The Claytors’ actions against GM alleged separate causes of action for (1) negligence, (2) breach of warranty, and (3) strict tort liability.
An expert testified that lug bolts connecting the wheel to the vehicle had been cracked by overtightening the lug nuts; that the cracks enlarged under normal driving stress; that the lug bolts eventually broke completely and caused the wheel to separate from the vehicle; and that the separated wheel resulted in loss of control of the vehicle and, in turn, the collision. The Claytors alleged GM failed to design a sufficiently strong bolt and/or failed to warn that overtightening the bolt could cause it to crack and even to break.
On appeal from an order granting a directed verdict, this Court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable *262to the party against whom the directed verdict was granted. If the evidence as a whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue is created and the motion should be denied.
Using this standard we now proceed to analyze the questions raised on this appeal. The Claytors submit that the evidence was sufficient to create two jury issues concerning GM: (1) was the design of the lug bolts faulty? and (2) was there insufficient warning relative to the effect of overtightening the lug nuts.
The plaintiffs depend largely upon an expert, Mr. Aseph, who had nineteen years of experience in metallurgy. They endeavored to use his testimony to make a jury issue as to whether the lug bolts and lugs were defective, relying especially on his testimony that if the lug bolts were made larger they might not have broken. Strict liability in tort for defective products is recognized under § 15-73-10, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). It reads in pertinent part as follows:
Liability of seller for defective product.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
# # * # *
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all posible care in the preparation and sale of his product . . .
# * # #
The basic question before the lower court and before us is whether the evidence is susceptible of the inference that the lugs and lug bolts were defective. The test of whether a product is or is not defective is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user given the conditions and circumstances that foreseeably attend use of the product. Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co., *263Inc., 271 S. C. 171, 246 S. E. (2d) 176 (1978). While it is normally true that any product if made larger would be less likely to break or wear out, that fact alone does not create liability under § 15-73-10. In deciding whether or not GM should be granted a directed verdict, it was the duty of the trial judge to consider the whole of the evidence. On cross examination, Mr. Aseph testified that the metal in both pieces (the lug and the bolt) were of "... a strong and tough material.” He further responded at various times on cross examination as follows:
Q. All right, sir. How did these that you found with this tire and wheel assembly compare with what is generally sold in the trade?
A. These are comparable to what we call high strength bolts. *****
Q. —certainly you don’t indicate that the bolt size here had anything to do with your conclusions or action, do you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Certainly there is nothing about the bolts, as you saw and examined them,_anything . . good enginering or safety practices in the automotive industry, did you, sir?
A. Nothing I could find.
* * * * *
Q. Is it your opinion that they were adequate and safe so far as the material used?
A. Yes, sir. The material used appeared to be quite adequate.
Mr. Aseph’s conclusion is set forth as follows:
Q. Mr. Aseph, can you tell us with scientific certainty the cause of the failure of these lug nuts?
A. Yes, sir. Based on my observations and lab tests.
Q. Would you state that cause?
A. Yes, sir. The most probable cause of the failure was due to over-torqueing the lug nuts, causing small cracks to occur in the lug bolt, and as a result of the normal fatigue that you get, then these bolts were broken off.
*264Section 15-73-30 of our Code incorporates by reference the comments in 402A of the Restatement of Torts, 2nd. Comment (g) reads as follows:
g. Defective condition. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller’s hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the testimony is that the product complained of was not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when it left GM’s plant. The defective condition, the cracks in and subsequent breakdowns of the lug bolts, were caused by subsequent mishandling of the product.
It would appear at first blush that warnings are not necessary where the product is properly manufactured, but this is not necessarily true. A product may, by reason of its nature and use, be unreasonably dangerous unless proper instructions and warnings are supplied for its intended use. Many products cannot be made completely safe for use. However, such products may be useful and desirable. If they are properly prepared, manufactured, packaged and accompanied with adequate warnings and instructions, they cannot be said to be defective. To hold otherwise would discourage the marketing of many products because some danger attends their use.
In Marchant v. Mitchell Distributing Co., 270 S. C. 29, 240 S. E. (2d) 511 (1977) this Court said:
Most any product can be made more safe. Automobiles would be more safe with disc brakes and steel-belted radial tires than with ordinary brakes and ordinary tires, but this *265does not mean that an automobile dealer would be held to have sold a defective product merely because the most safe equipment is not installed. By a like token, a bicycle is more safe if equipped with lights and a bell, but the fact that one is not so equipped does not create the inference that tihe bicycle is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Academically, it may be argued that all products are defective because they can be made more safe. However, it does not automatically follow that tihe products are deemed “unreasonably dangerous.” In the final analysis, we have another of the law’s balancing acts and numerous factors must be considered, including the usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger.
The manual supplied by GM suggested that lug nuts should be tightened with a pressure of approximately 85 pounds. Plaintiffs submit that GM should have warned that continued pressure would strip the threads on the nut and/or bolt or crack tihe bolt. It is common knowledge that if one applies excessive force to a nut, this result will occur. Certainly, a mechanic for an Oldsmobile dealer knows the result of applying too much torque to a nut. Under tihe circumstances, we think the warning simply was not required. We hold that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence is that the real, efficient, and proximate cause of the damage to the lug bolts, and, in turn, the collision causing the injury, was the mechanic’s improper application of torque. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the jury was not inclined to so find.
Since the evidence was insufficient to sustain the action for strict tort liability, it naturally follows that tihe actions based on implied warranty and negligence must likewise fail under the facts of this case. A common element to each of these separate causes of action is proof that the product was not reasonably fit or safe for its intended use. Thus, without sufficient evidence on this element, a directed verdict was properly granted as to each cause of action.
*266We accordingly hold that the order for directed verdict to GM should be and is hereby
Affirmed.
Littlejohn and Ness, JJ., concur.
Lewis, C. J. and Harwell, J., dissent.