Court Opinion

ID: 9654824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:52:11.672081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.883606
License: Public Domain

DWYER, Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this cause.
I predicate my dissent on one premise alone. In all other particulars pertaining to the treatment of the assignments of error, I concur with the majority opinion. My dissent with my fellow judges is bottomed on the statement of Mitchell obtained by the interviewing officer which was introduced into evidence over objection of counsel. This statement was highly inculpatory and damaging to the defendant. To bring into focus my dissent it will be necessary to digress on the back-ground of how the statement or confession was taken.
The investigating officer in this case, a member of the Morristown Police Department, testified that he interviewed Mitchell in the City Jail of Morristown on August 19, 1968, at 10:50 A.M. He was interviewing Mitchell on a separate charge than the one in the instant case. He at that time fully and completely advised Mitchell as per the Miranda holdings. The defendant signed and executed a waiver form at that time which is found in this record and marked as an exhibit to his testimony. It does not appear in this record that he did or did not give any confession or statement pertaining to that charge. The next day, August 20, 1968, the officer testi*163fied that he interviewed Mitchell again in the City Jail and this time in relation to the offense for which he stands convicted. The pertinent part of the record reflects the following pertaining to this interrogation transpired:
“Q Did you again advise the defendant, Jerry Dean Mitchell, of his rights that you had advised him the day before?
“A I advised him that his rights had already been explained to him, and asked him if he was involved in this particular case, and he said—
“Mr. Myers: May it please the Court, we object to any testimony at this time. I think it’s a matter that might need to be taken up outside the presence of the Jury.
“The Court: Alright. Mr. Officer, take the Jury to the Jury room. You will not discuss any phase of this case, gentlemen.”
At that time defense counsel urged that the statement not be admitted because the officer did not advise Mitchell as per the Miranda holdings. The court permitted defense counsel to cross examine the officer out of the presence of the jury with the record reflecting the following:
“CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. MYERS:
“Q Mr. Franklin, is it correct that you did state you did not again read these rights as set out in Exhibit No. 1?
“A I did not read them.
*164“Q All you said was ‘You understand your rights’, or words to that effect?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q That’s all, in the absence of the Jury.”
The trial court overruled the objection and allowed the statement to be introduced. I believe the action of the trial court in allowing the oral confession into evidence was prejudicial and violative of the Miranda holdings. There is a complete absence of the Miranda warning given at the time of obtaining the damaging statement. The fact of the matter is that the officer testified he did not advise Mitchell again of his rights. The officer made a presumption that Mitchell waived his rights. There is an absence of any intelligent, knowing waiver of his rights in this record.
In Martin v. State, Tenn., 440 S.W.2d 624, 628, the following is found:
“* * * this warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right.
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“An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact *165eventually obtained. A statement we made in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962), is applicable here:
‘Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.’ ”
I feel that the Miranda warning must be given as an “absolute prerequisite” before any statement may be introduced into evidence. In absence of this warning the statement is made inadmissible. In the Miranda case the Supreme Court of the United States said in substance that it is the letter of the law and not the spirit that must be obeyed. For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment entered in this case and remand the cause for a new trial.