Court Opinion

ID: 9759831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:28:59.464288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:05.076983
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Simply because a sentence is “well within the statutory limits” does not mean that it may not be “manifestly excessive.” In Pennsylvania we have adopted the principle of indeterminate sentencing. Under that principle, the sentencing judge is given broad discretion; but he must exercise that discretion after considering “the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 133, 351 A.2d 650, 658 (1976). Suppose a crime punishable by a maximum sentence of twenty years, for example, burglary. A sentence of two to five years would be “well within the statutory limits.” *40However, a consideration of the particular circumstances of the offense (empty building, nothing taken, no weapon used, no one threatened or endangered, no damage done) and of the character of the defendant (first offense, no attempt to flee, good job and work record, steady provider of his family) might nevertheless show that the sentence was “manifestly excessive.” Commonwealth v. Martin, supra (by implication); Commonwealth v. Kaminski, 244 Pa.Super. 388, 368 A.2d 776 (filed December 15, 1976) (Dissenting opinion by SPAETH, J.).
In my opinion, contrary to the majority’s, appellant here does assert that his sentence was manifestly excessive according to the Martin standards. The question, therefore, is whether we are able to decide whether appellant is right. In Commonwealth v. Riggins, 232 Pa.Super. 32, 46-48, 332 A.2d 521, 528-29 (1974), allocatur granted, I observed, in dissent, that to decide whether a sentencing judge has properly exercised his discretion, an appellate court must have at least a brief statement of the reasons for the sentence; I further observed that such a statement is required by Superior Court Rule 46.* Here no statement has been filed.
I would therefore remand for a statement.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.

 Immediately upon taking his appeal, appellant shall serve notice thereof on . . . the judge who entered the order, judgment or decree below . . If the appeal relates to any order, judgment or decree for which the reasons do not already appear of record, the judge below shall forthwith file of record a brief statement of the reasons therefor in the form of an opinion which shall be attached to the record and printed. .
Appeal was filed in the present case on March 5, 1976; Rule 46 therefore applies.
Under the new Rules of Appellate Procedure the requirement is even clearer. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925:

Opinion in Support of Order.

(a) General rule. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal the judge who entered the order appealed from, if the reasons for the order do not already appear of record, shall forthwith file of record at least a brief statement, in the form of an opinion, of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other matters complained of, or *41shall specify in writing the place in the record where such reasons may be found. (Emphasis supplied.)
“Order,” as used in the Rules, “[¡Includes judgment, decision, decree, sentence and adjudication.” Pa.R.A.P. 102 (emphasis supplied).