Court Opinion

ID: 9919238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:22.112215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.801840
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Bates CA2/4
         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

     IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B327277

      Plaintiff and                                          (Los Angeles County
 Respondent,                                                 Super. Ct. No. BA450278)

           v.

 PRENTISS BATES,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.
     Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION
       Prentiss Bates appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate
counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th
216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental brief. We
review the contentions appellant raises in his supplemental brief
and affirm the order.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       The underlying facts presented at appellant’s trial are
discussed in detail in this court’s prior nonpublished opinion,
People v. Brown (Nov. 26, 2019, B287726). We briefly discuss
them here to provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We
otherwise do not rely on this factual background in resolving the
issues presented in this appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
appellant, along with four co-defendants, with the first degree
murder of Trevon Lark (§ 187, subd. (a); count one), conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count two), and shooting at
an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count three). The information
also included firearm enhancement allegations (§ 12022.53;
counts one and two) and gang enhancement allegations (§ 186.22,
subds. (b)(1)(B) & (C); count three). The information further
alleged prior serious felony and strike convictions for appellant
under section 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)-(j), respectively.
       The prosecution presented evidence at trial that appellant,
his co-defendants, and the victim were all members of the Hoover
gang. In the early hours of August 29, 2015, the group attended
a party at a marijuana dispensary in Los Angeles. Two of the co-

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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defendants left the party, returned with guns, and then the group
got into three cars and left with a plan to kill rival gang
members. Appellant drove one car, occupied by two armed co-
defendants. At one point, those co-defendants opened fire on the
car containing the victim, who was shot and died a short time
later.
       In September 2017, the jury found appellant guilty as
charged and found true all enhancement allegations. The court
found that appellant had suffered a prior conviction qualifying as
both a strike and a prior serious felony. The court sentenced
appellant to a total of 80 years to life in prison. A different panel
of this court affirmed appellant’s conviction, but struck certain
enhancements and remanded the matter to allow the trial court
to exercise its discretion whether to strike the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements as to appellant and Brown. (People v.
Brown, supra, B287726).
       In July 2021, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.2
The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed
the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because the jury was not instructed on the theories
of natural and probable consequences or felony murder. The
People asserted that instead, the sole theory pursued at trial was
that appellant “was an aider and abettor to a gang murder as
well as a participant to a conspiracy to commit murder,” and that
the jury was instructed only as to direct aiding and abetting. The
People further argued that appellant’s conviction for conspiracy

2     Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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to commit murder precluded relief. The People attached as
exhibits the jury instructions and verdict forms from the trial,
this court’s opinion from appellant’s direct appeal, and the
transcript from appellant’s sentencing hearing. Appellant filed a
reply brief, arguing that he was not the actual killer or a major
participant, the trial court should not rely on the prior appellate
opinion to make factual findings, and appellant had established a
prima facie case.
       The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that
appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to relief.
At the hearing on the petition, the court noted that in addition to
the submitted materials, it had reviewed the transcript of closing
arguments from the trial. The court summarily denied relief on
the basis that no jury instructions were given regarding natural
and probable consequences or felony murder. The court also
found support from “the fact that I was the trial judge in this
matter, . . . did read the closing argument last night . . . and I
determined that all the People did was pursue a malice murder
theory in this case.” The court also stated it had considered that
appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, “which
had the implications that the jury found, that he had specific
intent.” The court thus concluded that appellant failed to make
the requisite prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.
       Appellant timely appealed.

                           DISCUSSION
       Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no
issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to
Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of
his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14

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Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the
arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232
[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written
opinion”].)
       Appellant’s supplemental brief does not raise any
arguments relevant to his section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. Instead, he asserts his innocence and argues that
there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. He also
raises issues of jury instruction error and ineffective assistance of
counsel. None of these arguments establish any error with
respect to the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage. We therefore affirm.
                              DISPOSITION
       The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

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