Court Opinion

ID: 9403722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:08:16.960406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.954896
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Spangler, 2023-Ohio-2003.]

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  ATHENS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                 :   Case No. 21CA17
                                               :
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :
                                               :
        v.                                     :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                               :   ENTRY
DALTON RAY SPANGLER,                           :
                                               :
        Defendant-Appellant.                   :   RELEASED: 06/09/2023

                                        APPEARANCES:

L. Scott Petroff, Athens, Ohio, Attorney for Appellant.

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and Merry M.
Saunders, Athens County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio, for
Appellee.

Wilkin, J.

        {¶1} Appellant, Dalton Ray Spangler (“Spangler”), appeals an Athens

County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry of conviction that accepted his

guilty plea to engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C.

2923.32(A)(1). That entry also sentenced Spangler to an indefinite 8 to 12 years

in prison for that offense and 3 years in prison for his violations of judicial release

and community control from three prior cases, 15CR464, 16CA132, and

20CR264. The trial court ordered Spangler’s judicial release and community

control violations to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to his sentence

for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity for an aggregate prison term of 11 to

15 years.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                                2

         {¶2} Spangler argues that the record does not support the imposition of

consecutive sentences, and that he was not advised of the maximum sentence

that he could receive because he was unaware that the sentences could run

consecutively. In response, the state maintains that the trial court did not err in

imposing consecutive sentences, and that it was not required to advise Spangler

of a maximum sentence he could receive for his violations of community control

and judicial release in his two prior criminal cases and for his new criminal

indictment.

         {¶3} After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable

law, we overrule Spangler’s two assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment entry.

                                   BACKGROUND

         {¶4} On February 10, 2021, a grand jury indicted Spangler in case

21CR34 for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of R.C.

2923.32(A)(1), a second-degree felony. Spangler initially pleaded not guilty.

         {¶5} On September 23, 2021, the court held a hearing to consider a guilty

plea by Spangler in case 21CR34, and to accept his admission to violating

judicial release and community control in cases 15CR464, 16CA132, and

20CR264. These violations were caused by Spangler’s offense in case 21CR34,

as well as his violations of various conditions imposed in those cases. The state

revealed to the court that prior to his judicial release in cases 15CR464 and

16CA132, Spangler had been sentenced to an aggregate prison term of three

years.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                                              3

        {¶6} The parties recommended the following sentences: (1) for the offense

of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in case 21CR34, a prison term of six to

nine years, and (2) for violating his judicial release and community control

sanction in prior cases: 15CR464, 16CR132, and 20CR264 that his “community

control be revoked and his underlying prison sentence of two years be imposed,

and that run concurrent to [his prison term of six to nine years for the offense of

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity]” for an aggregate prison term of six to

nine years. (Emphasis added.)

        {¶7} The court began by reviewing Spangler’s violations of judicial release

and community control in his prior cases, which included: (1) failed to report to

The Landing1, (2) failed to complete the detox program, (3) was terminated on

October 31, 2020 from The Landing, (4) failed to maintain contact with his

supervising officer since November 3, 2020, (5) was arrested for identity fraud

and theft, to which he admitted, and (6) committing the offense of engaging in a

pattern of corrupt activity in case 21CR34. The court then engaged in a colloquy

regarding the violations, which included asking Spangler if he understood that

admitting to these violations would mean that he could have his judicial release

“revoked and all underlying time imposed?” Spangler responded affirmatively.

The court accepted Spangler’s admission to the violations of his community

control.

1
 “The Landing” is likely a rehabilitation center. See State v. Fischer, 4th Dist. 2019-Ohio-2420,
which discusses “The Landing at Cedar Ridge,” which is a rehab center.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              4

       {¶8} The court then addressed Spangler’s proposed guilty plea in case

21CR34 to the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity by having a

colloquy with Spangler that discussed his constitutional and non-constitutional

rights. Among other issues, the court informed Spangler that he could be subject

to a prison term of 8 to a maximum of 12 years in case 21CR34, and it was not

required to accept the sentence that the parties recommended. Pursuant to

Spangler’s responses, the court found Spangler’s guilty plea to the charge in

case 21CR34 was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. More specifically the court

found that Spangler had “been informed of his constitutional rights and that he

understands the nature of the charge, the effect of the guilty plea, as well as

possible penalties.” Thus, the court accepted his guilty plea. The court then

proceeded on “two separate [sentencing] tracks.”

       {¶9} For Spangler’s violations in cases 15CR464, 16CR132, and

20CR264, the court first revoked his judicial release and community control in all

three cases. It then imposed the following prison terms: (1) case 15CR464 (a

prison term of three years), (2) case 16CR132 (a prison term of 12 months), and

(3) case 20CR264 (a prison term of 12 months) with these three sentences to be

served concurrently for an aggregate prison term of three years.

       {¶10} Next the trial court sentenced Spangler in case 21CR34 and

“considering the recidivism and seriousness factors[,]” the court found that

Spangler’s corrupt activity was “the very worst possible form of the offense, short

of perhaps an elected official violating a public trust.” The court further found that

Spangler’s chance of recidivism was high because he committed this offense
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                                5

while on judicial release and community control in three other cases, had a

pattern of illicit drug use, and showed no remorse. Therefore, the court rejected

the parties’ agreed sentence, and imposed an indefinite sentence of 8 to 12

years in prison with post-release control.

       {¶11} Finally, the court ordered the indefinite prison term of 8 to 12 years

in case 21CR34 to be served consecutive to the aggregate prison term of three

years in cases 15CR464,16CR132 and 20CR264, effectively increasing

Spangler’s minimum prison term to 11 years, and his maximum possible prison

term to 15 years.

       {¶12} After the hearing, the court issued two judgment entries reflecting

the sentences it imposed. One addressed cases 15CR464, 16CR132, and

20CR264 that accepted Spangler’s admission of violating his community control

and judicial release. The entry also revoked his community control and judicial

release in those cases, and imposed prison in each of those cases that resulted

in an aggregate prison term of three years.

       {¶13} The other entry addressed case 21CR34 and accepted Spangler’s

guilty plea to engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity and imposed an indefinite

prison term of 8 to 12 years. It also ordered that sentence to run consecutive to

his aggregate three-year prison term imposed in the first entry. It is this judgment

entry that Spangler appeals.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       {¶14} Spangler alleges that the court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences is not supported by the record. He claims that “[c]onsecutive
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                               6

sentences are not necessary to protect the public nor punish [him] and are

disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to the danger he poses.”

Contrary to the court’s finding, Spangler claims that he showed remorse by

pleading guilty in case 21CR34. Spangler makes broad claims that there was no

evidence to support that the type of property he stole would make his offense a

felony, and the losses associated with his actions were not significant. These

claims along with the fact that he made these thefts to support his drug habit

showed that his offense was not “ ‘the very worst possible form of the offense.’ ”

Therefore, he claims that the record does not support that his actions warranted

consecutive sentences.

       {¶15} In response, the state cites the number of victims (more than 200),

who had checks, credit cards, passports, and other documents stolen over a long

period of time, supports consecutive sentences. The state further cites the trial

court’s recognition that Spangler was previously on judicial release and

community control for prior offenses at the time that he committed the offense of

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. Therefore, the state argues that the trial

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is supported by the record.

                                        LAW

                              1. Standard of Review

       {¶16} “When reviewing felony sentences appellate courts must apply the

standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Johnson, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 19CA1082, 2019-Ohio-3479, ¶ 7, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio

St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1, 7. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) states
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                                   7

        that an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate
        and remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and
        convincingly finds either:
        (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
        findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
        (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
        2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
        (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. (Emphasis
        added.)

State v. Jordan, 4th Dist. Adams No. 19CA1105, 2020-Ohio-3928, ¶ 7,
quoting R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

       {¶17} “Clear and convincing evidence is ‘that measure or degree of proof

which * * * will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction

as to the facts sought to be established.’ ” State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123

Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 18, quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. It is important to note that

        ‘[R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)] does not say that the trial judge must have
        clear and convincing evidence to support its findings. Instead, it is
        the court of appeals that must clearly and convincingly find that
        the record does not support the court's findings. In other words,
        the restriction is on the appellate court, not the trial judge. This is
        an extremely deferential standard of review.’

State v. Pierce, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 18CA4, 2018-Ohio-4458, ¶ 8, quoting
State v. Venes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d
453, ¶ 20-21.

                            2. Consecutive Sentences

       {¶18} There is a statutory presumption in favor of concurrent sentences

pursuant to R.C. 2929.41(A). “In order to impose consecutive terms of

imprisonment, a trial court must make the findings mandated by R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              8

sentencing entry, but the court has no obligation to state reasons to support its

findings.” State v. Blair, 4th Dist. Athens No. 18CA24, 2019-Ohio-2768, ¶ 52,

citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659,

syllabus.

              “Under the tripartite procedure set forth in R.C.
        2929.14(C)(4), prior to imposing consecutive sentences a trial
        court must find that: (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to
        protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2)
        consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
        seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the
        offender poses to the public; and (3) that one of three
        circumstances specified in the statute applies.”

State v. Cottrill, 4th Dist. Ross No. 20CA3704, 2020-Ohio-7033, ¶ 14, quoting
State v. Baker, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA18, 2014-Ohio-1967, ¶ 35-36.

               The three circumstances are: (a) The offender committed
        one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was
        awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
        pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised
        Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense. (b) At
        least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
        or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
        of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that
        no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of
        any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness
        of the offender's conduct. (c) The offender's history of criminal
        conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary
        to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

Id., quoting R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c).

Any findings required by applicable statutory sentencing provisions and made by

the sentencing court, such as R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), must still be supported by

the record. State v. Gray, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 18CA3857, 2019-Ohio-5317, ¶ 21.

                                    ANALYSIS
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                               9

       {¶19} There is no dispute that the trial court made the findings required for

it to order Spangler to serve consecutive sentences. Specifically, the court found

that consecutive sentences were required to punish the offender, protect the

public from future crime, and is not disproportionate to the seriousness of his

conduct or any danger posed by the defendant. Finally, the court cited

Spangler’s criminal history, and that “[his actions were] part of an on-going

course of conduct with the harm caused so great and unusual that a single prison

term would demean the seriousness of the offense” were both “circumstances”

that supported consecutive sentences.

       {¶20} Spangler, however, contends that the record does not support these

findings. He focuses on specific facts in support of minimizing his offense of

engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity. For example, he claims that the amount

of some of the thefts were minimal, that the state was seeking only $288 in

restitution as part of his plea. He claims that there were no allegations that

Spangler stole any property that would make his predicate offense a felony.

       {¶21} The mere fact that individually the amount of some of his thefts were

not large sums of money, or that as part of this plea the state was seeking only

$288 of restitution, is not indicative of the extent of injury that he caused. For

instance, the record shows that the financial injury was greater than the $288

sought in restitution by the fact that one victim had checks stolen in amount of

$1,237.10. Spangler stole other items as well, including credit cards, passports,

prescriptions, a fishing license, and a book of checks, causing victims not only

financial injury but other types of injury as well, e.g., travel disruption. And
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              10

Spangler’s alleged use of the money to support his illegal drug habit does not

mitigate the damage he inflicted. But perhaps most notable was the scope of

Spangler’s conduct was quite broad with thefts occurring in Athens County from

Lockbourne to Sugar Grove, causing injury to 201 victims.

       {¶22} Finally, we find that the record shows that Spangler was on judicial

release and community control in cases 15CR464, 16CR132, and 20CR264

when he committed engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in case 21CR34,

which is a “circumstance” that supports consecutive sentences.

       {¶23} Therefore, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record

does not support the trial court's findings it made pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)

that are required for consecutive sentences. Accordingly, we overrule Spangler’s

first assignment or error.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       {¶24} In his second assignment of error, Spangler maintains that “[a]

defendant cannot knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty

when the defendant is not informed of the possibility of consecutive sentences.”

Spangler maintains that during the plea hearing the trial court informed him of the

maximum penalty “only as it relates to 21cr0034.” But, he claims that the court

never informed him that his sentence in case 21CR34 could run consecutive to

his sentences in cases 15CR464, 16CR132, and 20CR264. Thus, Spangler

claims he did not understand that he could face a prison term of 11 to15 years by

being subject to consecutive sentences for his three prior cases. In support,

Spangler cites State v. Fikes, 1st Hamilton No. C-200221, 2021-Ohio-2597.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                             11

       {¶25} Spangler also cites the fact that the parties reached an “agreed

sentence” of no more than nine years in prison. Spangler claims that his failure

to be informed of the maximum sentence of 11 to15 years caused him prejudice

because his expectation was that he would be sentenced to the agreed upon 6

years in prison and had he known of the maximum sentence, he would have

rejected the plea.

       {¶26} Spangler alleges that he has a viable defense against engaging in a

pattern of corrupt activity claiming that a single actor cannot be convicted of this

offense, citing State v. Halka, 2021-Ohio-149, 166 N.E.3d 707 (6th Dist.).

       {¶27} In response, the state argues that the court was not required to

inform Spangler of the maximum sentence from both his post-conviction release

cases and his conviction for engaging in a pattern of corruption. Because

Spangler waived his right to a hearing on his community-control violations, the

trial court “[was] not required to comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11,

which governs pleas.” State v. Norman, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2017-CA-40, 2017-

CA-41, 2018-Ohio-993, ¶ 19, citing State v. Cunningham, 2d Dist. Clark Nos.

2014-CA-99 and 2014-CA-100, 2015-Ohio-2554, ¶ 14. The state maintains that a

trial court need not comply with the requirements of Crim.R. 11, which governs

pleas, in accepting an offender's admission to community control violations. See,

e.g., State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-04, 2015-Ohio-468, ¶ 15; State v.

Lucas, 6th Dist. Ottawa Nos. OT-13-025, OT-13-026, 2014-Ohio-3857, ¶ 7.

                                       LAW

                              1. Standard of Review
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              12

       {¶28} “In determining whether a guilty or no contest plea is knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary, an appellate court must examine the totality of the

circumstances through a de novo review of the record to ensure that the trial

court complied with constitutional and procedural safeguards.” State v. Meade,

4th Dist. Scioto No. 17CA3816, 2018-Ohio-3544, ¶ 6, citing State v. Billiter, 4th

Dist. Scioto No. 15CA3720, 2018-Ohio-733, ¶ 15.

                            2. Maximum Sentence

       {¶29} “ ‘When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must

  be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of those points

  renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the United States

  Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.’ ” State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,

  2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 7; quoting State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d

  525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996). “To achieve that goal, ‘the trial court should

  engage in a dialogue with the defendant as described in Crim.R. 11(C).’ ” State

  v. Cremeans, 4th Dist. Ross No. 21CA3744 2022-Ohio-4832, ¶ 9, quoting

  State v. Ruby, 4th Dist. Adams No. 3CA780, 2004-Ohio-3708, ¶ 8, citing

  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). In part, “Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) [requires a trial court] to

  inform the defendant of the maximum penalty involved for each offense.” State

  v. Duty, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 16CA6, 2017-Ohio-451, ¶ 27 (Harsha, J.,

  concurring in judgment). However, “[f]ailure to inform a defendant who pleads

  guilty to more than one offense that the court may order him to serve any

  sentences imposed consecutively, rather than concurrently, is not a violation of
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                             13

  Crim.R. 11(C)(2), and does not render the plea involuntary.” State v. Johnson,

  40 Ohio St. 3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), syllabus.

                                    ANALYSIS

1. A Trial Court’s Failure to Inform A Defendant of the Possibility of Consecutive
             Sentences Does Not Render A Plea Involuntary

       {¶30} At the September 23, 2021 plea hearing, the court advised Spangler

that it could impose a maximum term of 12 years in prison as part of an indefinite

prison term of 8 to 12 years for the offense of engaging in a pattern of corrupt

activity in case 21CR34. The also court asked Spangler if he understood that by

admitting to the violations at issue his judicial release and community control

could be revoked and “all underlying time imposed[,]” which was an aggregate

prison term of three years. Spangler responded affirmatively.

       {¶31} However, Spangler maintains that the court was also obligated to

inform him that it could order those sentences to be served consecutively, and

that failing to do so caused his plea to be less than knowing, voluntary or

intelligent. We disagree. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson,

there was no obligation for the court to advise Spangler that it could have

ordered those prison terms to run consecutively. 40 Ohio St. 3d 130, 532 N.E.2d

1295 (1988), syllabus. The trial court’s advisement to Spangler during the plea

hearing that it could impose a maximum term of 12 years in prison in case

21CR34, and three years for his violations of judicial release and community

control was sufficient under Johnson for his plea to be knowing, voluntary and

intelligent.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              14

           2. Courts Are Not Obligated to Impose Agreed Sentences

       {¶32} The fact that the parties submitted an agreed or recommended

sentence to the court for Spangler regarding his prison term for engaging in a

pattern of corrupt activity and for violating his judicial release also offers no

support to Spangler’s appeal. It is well settled that sentencing courts are under

no obligation to accept agreed/recommended sentences. State v. Underwood,

124 Ohio St. 3d 365, 2010-Ohio-1, 922 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 28, citing State ex rel.

Duran v. Kelsey, 106 Ohio St.3d 58, 2005-Ohio-3674, 831 N.E.2d 430, ¶ 6. As

we found in analyzing Spangler’s first assignment of error, the trial court informed

Spangler that it was not obligated to accept a recommended sentence and

justifiably rejected concurrent service of those two sentences after making

findings in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), which we found were supported by the record.

                        3. Fikes is Not Applicable

       {¶33} Spangler maintains that the First District Court of Appeal’s decision

in Fikes supports his argument. 1st Hamilton No. C-200221, 2021-Ohio-2597.

We disagree.

       {¶34} In Fikes, during the plea colloquy, the trial court erroneously relied

on the sentencing statutes prior to the Reagan-Tokes Amendment that now

require indefinite sentences when it advised the defendant of the maximum

sentence that he could face if he pleaded guilty. However, after the court

accepted the defendant’s plea, it sentenced him to an indefinite prison term

under the sentencing statutes as required by the Reagan-Tokes Amendment.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                              15

The court of appeals reversed the defendant’s plea finding it was not knowing,

voluntary, or intelligent.

       {¶35} Fikes addresses the trial court’s error of relying on one version of

the sentencing statutes during its colloquy, but on a different version at

sentencing. No such error occurred in our case.

       {¶36} In sum, we find that Fikes is not helpful in resolving Spangler’s

second assignment of error in his favor.

       {¶37} Therefore, based on our de novo review of the record we find under

the totality of the circumstances Spangler’s plea was knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. Accordingly, we overrule Spangler’s second assignment of error.

                                      CONCLUSION

       {¶38} Having overruled both of Spangler’s assignments of error, we affirm

the trial court’s sentencing entry.

                                                          JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Athens App. No. 21CA17                                                               16

                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

P.J., Smith and J., Hess: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                                 For the Court,

                                            BY: ________________________
                                                Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

                               NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.