Court Opinion

ID: 9649132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:43:07.807398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:08.056673
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant must be granted a new trial on the charges of criminal conspiracy and criminal homicide, because in the course of appellant’s jury trial on both charges, the trial court committed reversible error by clearing the courtroom of all members of the public except for media representatives. Thus, I dissent.
On Monday, March 5,1979, the court and counsel discussed preliminary matters before commencement of jury selection. After review of proposed questions for voir dire, both defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney addressed their respective concerns regarding trial scheduling. The prosecuting attorney informed the Court:
“The only problem I would have, your Honor, is because of security reasons, the Commonwealth’s chief witness, Thomas Colvin, is not in this county. The problem I would have is, and I want the court to know about it, in the event that when a jury is finally selected, if Mr. Colvin is the first witness, I may need about an hour or an hour and a half to get the witness here.”
*474Jury selection was not completed until Wednesday morning, March 7, and the case was not ready for trial until that afternoon. The Commonwealth chose not to present Colvin until the following day.
Despite the “security” problems regarding Colvin, there is nothing on the record to indicate that the court called for any precautions regarding spectators at trial. Indeed, the record indicates that, on Thursday morning, March 8, the second day of testimony, there were as many as fifty persons observing trial, including members of a high school class and at least thirty prospective jurors not yet assigned to a trial.
That Thursday morning, before chief Commonwealth witness Colvin testified, the prosecuting attorney informed the court that he was “quite sure [Colvin] will be on the stand for quite a length of time ...” and suggested that, “we let the jury recess....” Record at 196a. The court agreed to a recess.
During the recess suggested by thé prosecuting attorney, the court, in chambers, put the following on the record:
“I have been informed by the Commanding Officer of the Pennsylvania State Police that they have information that there is going to be an attempt on the life of the next witness [(Colvin)], and it has come from three different sources, and I was informed of this at recess.”
Rather than considering less prejudicial alternatives, the court, over defense objection, ordered the courtroom cleared of “all spectators with the exception of a couple members of the newspaper and radio ...” and resumed trial immediately, one-half hour after the recess had begun. With only media representatives present, and the public excluded, Colvin testified to his own involvement in the alleged homicide as well as to the involvement of appellant.
Colvin’s testimony covered the remainder of that Thursday. The next day, Friday, eight additional Commonwealth witnesses testified. After a weekend recess, the defense presented its testimony on Monday, March 12, and Tuesday the 13th. On these three days, so far as the record indicates, *475no limitations on public access were imposed. Late Tuesday afternoon, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of murder of the first degree and conspiracy.
The prejudicial impact upon the jury of the court’s order clearing the courtroom of all spectators during the presentation of the Commonwealth’s chief witness must be obvious. Surely, the abrupt exclusion of members of the public when the most damaging testimony against the accused is presented would set the stage for a wide range of speculation by the jury, including the possibility that the witness’s safety is in jeopardy. The court’s exclusion of the public from this jury trial, the attending circumstances, and the range of speculation all would inevitably cause the jury to focus upon the defense and prejudice appellant’s cause.
Such courtroom-closing affects more than the jury. It denies appellant his constitutional right to a public trial, and adversely impairs the integrity of the truth-seeking process. As Mr. Chief Justice Burger observed in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980),
“the historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open. This is no quirk of history; rather, it has long been recognized as an indispensible attribute of an Anglo-American trial. Both Hale in the 17th Century and Blackstone in the 18th saw the importance of openness to the proper functioning of a trial; it gave assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned, and it discouraged perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or partiality.”
448 U.S. at 569, 100 S.Ct. at 2823 (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court). Mr. Justice Brennan, quoting Blackstone, also wrote: “ ‘open examination of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth ....’” Id., 448 U.S. at 584-585, 100 S.Ct. at 2830. See also United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1969) (Jackson v. Denno *476hearing, conducted after jury empanelment, may not be closed to public over defense objection).
Here, where the chief Commonwealth witness testified before only a few media representatives in the non-public portion of a trial otherwise fully open, it must be concluded that the trial court’s order closing the courtroom was prejudicial and that a new trial should be granted.*

 I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. The testimony of chief Commonwealth witness Colvin, who testified while the court’s prejudicial order was in effect, directly linked appellant to a plan to kill the victim as well as to the killing itself. As to appellant’s claim that he must be discharged because of a “jurisdictional” defect in the information, the majority also correctly denies relief. I do not, however, share the majority’s apparent belief that a defective signature of a district attorney or authorized staff member would provide a basis for relief. At the same time, I would not condone the “rubber stamp” process employed here by the district attorney’s office.