Court Opinion

ID: 9794173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:46.433866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:39.114332
License: Public Domain

Dollxver, J.
(dissenting) — The majority correctly states the law of this case: where a legislative action directly conflicts with a court rulé in an area of inherent judicial authority, the legislative action must fall as a violation of separation of powers. The issue of this case, however, is not the accuracy of that rule. Rather, the issue presented is whether such a conflict exists on the facts of the case: does chapter 297 of the Laws of 1994 (the Amendment), amending the Public Employees’ Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) (RCW 41.56.020), directly conflict with General Rule (GR) 12(b)-(16)? I would hold no such conflict exists.
I
Guiding the court’s consideration of an alleged conflict between statutory provision and judicial rule is the principle that "[a]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized, and both given effect if possible.” Nearing v. Golden State Foods Corp., 114 Wn.2d 817, 821, 792 P.2d 500 (1990). Applying this principle, we have consistently avoided striking down such a statute. Instead, the court has construed the statute so that no conflict existed, In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d 561, 566, 488 P.2d 259 (1971); In re Levy, 23 Wn.2d 607, 617, 161 P.2d 651, 162 A.L.R. 805 (1945), or acquiesced to the conflicting action of the competing branch while retaining ultimate authority to negate future intrusions, State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass’n, 80 Wn.2d 266, 271, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972).
*911The majority decides the legislative and judicial acts here cannot be harmonized because GR 12(b)(16) permits collective bargaining at the Bar Association’s "discretion”, while the Amendment makes it "mandatory”. I would interpret both the scope of the Bar Association’s "discretion” and the impact of PECBA’s "mandatory” collective bargaining differently than the majority has. Because this reasonable interpretation of the conflicting actions permits harmonization, I would so hold.
The discretion granted in GR 12(b)(16) simply acknowledges that the Bar Association, not the court, will act as the employer in collective bargaining decisionmaking. This discretion, however, does not grant the Bar Association unfettered freedom over employment practices. The Bar Association is already subject to various state employment statutes administered by executive agencies, including the state workers’ compensation act, RCW 51.12, wage and hour laws, RCW 49.46, the Employment Security Act, RCW 50.04, and the state Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60. Likewise, the Bar Association is treated as a public employer for the purposes of state employment programs, such as the Public Employees’ Retirement System, WAC 415-02, and the Washington State Health Care Authority administered health insurance plans, WAC 182-08.
The majority unjustifiably fears the term "mandatory” without investigating the true impact of mandatory collective bargaining: PECBA actually imposes very little. The statute would guide the Bar Association’s employment practices through three points: the initial representation election, RCW 41.56.070; certification of the collective bargaining representative, RCW 41.56.060, .080; and, if necessary, adjudication of unfair labor complaints, RCW 41.56.160, RCW 41.58.020. The Bar Association agreed prior to the initiation of this case to hold an election and to the composition of the bargaining unit for certification. Thus, the Amendment merely designates the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) as the supervisor of this process. RCW 41.56.070. The court retains *912authority to review PERC’s nonadjudicatory decisions as applied. See International Ass’n of Fire Fighters, Local 1052 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm’n, 29 Wn. App. 599, 602, 630 P.2d 470, review denied, 96 Wn.2d 1004 (1981).
If the Bar Association employees elect a bargaining representative, by no means a certainty 4 years after the original employees expressed interest in unionizing, the certified representative and the Bar Association will negotiate a collective bargaining agreement completely independent of PECBA. The Bar Association retains full discretion over the contours of any agreement; PERC has no authority to compel contract terms, including whether to appoint PERC as grievance arbitrator. Indeed, PECBA would have no other application to the Bar Association’s activities unless an unfair labor dispute arose. Even in that case, PERC’s authority is primarily procedural, confined to factfinding and applying PECBA. RCW 41.58.020. The agency lacks prosecuto-rial or independent investigatory authority, and only a court may enforce a PERC order. RCW 41.56.160(3).
Thus, PECBA would set the rules of collective bargaining and appoint the referee, but would not compel an outcome. It is evident the Bar Association would retain full discretion over the substantive aspects of collective bargaining. The only "mandatory” effect of PECBA is its requirement to engage in the process, a process to which the Bar Association has agreed.
H
Not only are the statute and judicial rule reconcilable, PECBA does not constitute an impermissible intrusion into judicial function by either the legislative or executive branch.
The court has asserted a constitutional framework where "complete separation was never intended and overlapping functions were created deliberately.” In re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232, 242, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). Rather, separation of powers must be viewed concurrently with the system of checks and balances, creating a plan of overlapping functions that permits even some direct control by one branch *913over another. Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d at 242-43; see also Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 506, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Moran v. State, 88 Wn.2d 867, 873, 568 P.2d 758 (1977). Thus, we have sought to balance the constitutional value of autonomy with the competing value of reciprocity. Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d at 248.
Harmonious cooperation among the three branches is fundamental to our system of government. Only if this cooperation breaks down is it necessary for the judiciary to exercise inherent power to sustain its separate integrity. . . . The question to be asked is not whether two branches of government engage in coinciding activities, but rather whether the activity of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another. . . .
Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743, 750, 539 P.2d 823 (1975).
A review of our previous decisions reveals three determinative factors in a separation of powers challenge to a legislative intrusion into the judicial sphere. First, the court has been willing to go a long distance to avoid declaring a separation of powers violation. The court will, as we should here, attempt to reconcile any apparent conflicts. See Schwab, 80 Wn.2d at 271; Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d at 566; Levy, 23 Wn.2d at 617.
Second is the centrality of the judicial function: the court is more willing to permit legislative oversight of ancillary administrative functions. See Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443, 453, 635 P.2d 730 (1981); In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 479, 172 P. 1152 (1918). Moreover, the court has permitted a broad range of legislative intrusions into matters of inherent judicial authority over the bar, including matters more central to the judicial functions of the bar than employment practices, such as the establishment of a board of bar examiners, Bruen, 102 Wash. at 477, minimum requirements for bar membership, Levy, 23 Wn.2d at 614, and recommendations for procedures for bar regulation, Graham v. State Bar Ass’n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 633, 548 P.2d 310 (1976); Schwab, 80 Wn.2d at 271.
Finally, the court will avoid invalidating legislation on its face. See Zylstra, 85 Wn.2d at 748-49; Schwab, 80 Wn.2d at *914271; Levy, 23 Wn.2d at 617. To this end, the court has permitted legislative regulation as long as the court retains final authority. See Graham, 86 Wn.2d at 633; Bruen, 102 Wash. at 477. Indeed, the only case holding a legislative action impermissibly usurped judicial authority occurred in In re Bruen, supra, where the court invalidated that portion of the State Bar Act delegating to the board of bar examiners the authority to issue final admission orders. Bruen, 102 Wash. at 479. Under PECBA the court retains both constitutional and statutory authority to protect itself from any undue executive encroachment by PERC. Public Empl. Relations Comm’n v. Kennewick, 99 Wn.2d 832, 840, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983); Zylstra, 85 Wn.2d at 748-49; RCW 41.56.165. As we have previously underscored, the facial constitutionality of PERC jurisdiction does not preclude a subsequent as applied challenge.
[A] legislatively created bargaining scheme does not and cannot interfere with the ultimate power of the judiciary to administer its own affairs. Until and unless such a scheme interferes with the court’s functioning, no separation-of-powers problem exists. . . .
Zylstra, 85 Wn.2d at 749.
Ill
Beyond the constitutional arguments, the majority decision departs from this court’s historically strong protection of collective bargaining rights. We have particularly emphasized effective protection of collective bargaining rights includes access to PERC jurisdiction:
PERC jurisdiction is essential for enforcement of the labor laws, since neither the NLRB nor any other agency has jurisdiction. . . . While some labor law provisions are enforceable, others are essentially administrative tasks, such as supervising union elections and selecting bargaining units. Some administrative agency must have discretion to administer the applicable law.
PUD 1 v. Public Empl. Relations Comm’n, 110 Wn.2d 114, 119, 750 P.2d 1240 (1988) (quoting Nucleonics Alliance, Local Union 1-369 v. WPPSS, 101 Wn.2d 24, 35-36, 677 P.2d 108 (1984) (Utter, J., dissenting)). Denying Bar Association em*915ployees PECBA protection leaves them in the very position we have denounced in prior cases, where
employee-employer disputes [are relegated] to whatever resolution method the employer is willing to agree to or else to a lawsuit, rather than to PERC with its expertise and ability to carry out the Act’s mandate of uniform application of labor relations principles throughout public employment.
PUD 1, 110 Wn.2d at 120; see also Kennewick, 99 Wn.2d at 842.
IV
It is true the court must "jealously” guard its sphere of authority to maintain our constitutional structure of separation of powers. See Short v. Demopolis, 103 Wn.2d 52, 65, 691 P.2d 163 (1984). But we must pick our fights well. We should not take such quick offense from this legislative action when reconciliation is possible and results in stronger protection of collective bargaining rights.
Smith and Madsen, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.