Court Opinion

ID: 9954017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 15:01:55.222368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:10:55.067633
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10905     Document: 61-1        Date Filed: 03/25/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                       In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 23-10905
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                          Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       EDDIE JOE OGLESBY, JR.,
       a.k.a. Gabriel Ethan Collins,
       a.k.a. Shadow,

                                                      Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10905

                     D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00076-JA-PRL-1
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Joe Oglesby, Jr., appeals his sentence of 960 months’ impris-
       onment and life term of supervised release for receiving child por-
       nography and enticing a minor to produce child pornography. He
       argues that the district court procedurally erred and deprived him
       of due process by failing to orally pronounce all the conditions of
       his supervised release that were included in his written judgment.
       He also argues that the district court erred by failing to make an
       individualized assessment as to whether the conditions of super-
       vised release were reasonably related to the sentencing factors and
       involved no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably neces-
       sary.
                                          I.
               Generally, when a defendant fails to object to the conditions
       of his supervised release at sentencing, we review his argument for
       plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5
       (11th Cir. 2023). But when a defendant is deprived of the oppor-
       tunity to object to his conditions of supervised release at sentenc-
       ing, we review a challenge to the imposition of those conditions de
       novo. Id. Under plain-error review, the defendant must show there
       was (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that aﬀects substantial rights; and
       (4) that seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
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       23-10905               Opinion of the Court                         3

       of judicial proceedings. United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349
       (11th Cir. 2003).
               “When the oral pronouncement of a sentence varies from
       the written judgment, the oral pronouncement governs.” United
       States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1316 (11th Cir. 2000). We ﬁrst deter-
       mine whether the oral and written conditions of supervised release
       “unambiguously conﬂict[].” See United States v. Bates, 213 F.3d 1336,
       1340 (11th Cir. 2000). If so, we must direct a limited remand with
       instructions for the district court to “enter an amended judgment
       that conforms to its oral pronouncement.” Chavez, 204 F.3d at
       1316. But when there is merely ambiguity, “as opposed to a conﬂict
       between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment,” the
       written judgment governs. United States v. Purcell, 715 F.2d 561, 563
       (11th Cir. 1983).
              Section 3583 imposes several mandatory conditions of su-
       pervised release and provides that the court may order further con-
       ditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The Guidelines allow the court to im-
       pose other discretionary conditions and provide 13 standard condi-
       tions that are generally recommended, as well as several special
       conditions. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)-(d).
               We recently held that a district court violated the defend-
       ant’s right to due process by failing to orally pronounce discretion-
       ary conditions of supervised release at sentencing which were in-
       cluded in the written judgment. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246-50. Dis-
       cretionary conditions include any condition other than the manda-
       tory conditions listed in § 3583(d). Id. at 1246. The district court
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-10905

       may satisfy this requirement by orally adopting the conditions of
       supervised release listed in the PSI or in a standing administrative
       order. Id. “By referencing at sentencing a written list, the court
       aﬀords any defendant who is unfamiliar with the conditions the op-
       portunity to inquire about and challenge them.” Id. “[T]he mere
       existence of an administrative order recommending certain condi-
       tions of supervised release, without in-court adoption of that list
       by the sentencing court,” is insuﬃcient to satisfy due process. Id.
       at 1249. In Rodriguez, the court only stated at sentencing that the
       defendant would serve a term of supervised release without mak-
       ing any reference to the discretionary conditions. See id. at 1240.
       We thus remanded in order to give the defendant an opportunity
       to be heard and for the court to reconsider whether to impose each
       of the discretionary conditions. Id. at 1249.
               Research does not reveal a standing order in the Middle Dis-
       trict of Florida concerning conditions of supervised release. See
       Standing         Orders/Plans/Procedures,           M.D.        Fla.,
       https://www.ﬂmd.uscourts.gov/standing-orders-plans-proce-
       dures. However, its website contains Form AO 245B, the standard
       template form used for a judgment in a criminal case, which lists
       the mandatory conditions—as well as 13 standard conditions—of
       supervised release. M.D. Fla., AO 245B, Judgment in a Criminal
       Case, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ao245b.pdf
       (“Form AO 245B”). The standard conditions in Form AO 245B
       mostly mirror those in § 5D1.3(c), but standard condition ten pro-
       hibits the defendant from possessing a ﬁrearm, which is not a
       standard condition found in § 5D1.3(c). Form AO 245B at 6; see
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       23-10905               Opinion of the Court                          5

       U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). The Probation Oﬃce in the Middle District of
       Florida maintains a webpage listing standard conditions of super-
       vision. Standard Conditions, United States Probation Middle Dis-
       trict of Florida, https://www.ﬂmp.uscourts.gov/standard-condi-
       tions (last accessed February 28, 2024) (“Probation Conditions”).
               As an initial matter, we review Oglesby’s claim for plain er-
       ror because he had the opportunity to object to the conditions of
       supervised release below and failed to do so. See Rodriguez, 75 F.4th
       at 1246 n.5. Unlike in Rodriguez, the district court’s pronounce-
       ment of “mandatory and standard conditions” adopted by the dis-
       trict court gave Oglesby an opportunity to raise questions regard-
       ing the standard conditions, but he failed to do so. See Rodriguez,
       75 F.4th at 1240, 1246, 1249.
               Here, the district court did not plainly err by failing to list
       the 13 discretionary, standard conditions of supervised release dur-
       ing the sentencing hearing because it explicitly incorporated the
       standard conditions adopted in the Middle District of Florida. See
       Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1246 n.5; Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. The facts
       here diﬀer from those in Rodriguez in an essential way because the
       district court orally pronounced at sentencing that Oglesby must
       comply with “the mandatory and standard conditions adopted by
       the [c]ourt in the Middle District of Florida.” Thus, the district
       court’s imposition of the standard conditions was suﬃcient to refer
       Oglesby to the standard conditions articulated on the district
       court’s probation oﬃce website and in the criminal judgment form
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10905

       available on the district court’s website, providing him an oppor-
       tunity to object. Thus, we aﬃrm the district court as to this issue.
                                        II.
              We review de novo a defendant’s challenges to the adequacy
       of a district court’s sentencing explanation under 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(c), even if the defendant did not object below. United States
       v. Hamilton, 66 F.4th 1267, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2023). “Because
       § 3553(c) applies to the entire sentence, and the term of supervised
       release is part of that sentence, § 3553(c) necessarily applies to the
       term of supervised release as part of the sentence imposed.” Id. at
       1275.
              The court may order any discretionary condition that: (1) is
       reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and
       circumstances of the oﬀense, history and characteristics of the de-
       fendant, the seriousness of the oﬀense, the need for adequate de-
       terrence, the need to protect the public, and the need to provide
       the defendant with corrective treatment; (2) involves no greater
       deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to accomplish
       the goals set forth in § 3553(a); and (3) is consistent with pertinent
       policy statements from the Sentencing Commission. United States
       v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2003); see also 18 U.S.C.
       § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. §5D1.3(b).
              The district court must “state in open court the reasons for
       its imposition of the particular sentence” that it selects. 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(c). The degree of explanation required for a sentencing de-
       cision varies based on the circumstances. Rita v. United States, 551
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       23-10905               Opinion of the Court                         7

       U.S. 338, 356 (2007). The district court must set forth a suﬃcient
       explanation to satisfy us that it has “considered the parties’ argu-
       ments and has a reasoned basis” for its sentencing decision. Id.
       While a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in deter-
       mining a sentence, it is not required to state in its explanation that
       it has evaluated each factor individually. United States v. Ortiz-Del-
       gado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th Cir. 2006). An acknowledgment by the
       district court that it has considered the § 3553(a) factors is suﬃ-
       cient. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
       Moreover, § 3553(c) does not require “two separate explanations—
       one for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of super-
       vised release,” so long as the explanation for the entire sentence is
       adequate. Hamilton, 66 F.4th at 1275.
               Here, the district court did not err in its explanation of the
       necessity of the conditions of supervised release because it noted
       Oglesby’s personal history and characteristics, the nature and cir-
       cumstances of his crimes, the purposes for sentencing, and the fac-
       tors from § 3553(a) in imposing his sentence. We do not require a
       district court to articulate how each condition of supervised release
       is reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors or involves no greater
       deprivation of liberty than is necessary, so long as the explanation
       for the entire sentence is adequate. Taylor, 338 F.3d at 1283; Hamil-
       ton, 66 F. 4th at 1275.
             AFFIRMED.