Court Opinion

ID: 9709007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:37:50.282284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:45.331166
License: Public Domain

Lynch, J.
(concurring). I applaud the court’s conclusion that “[u]nlike a challenge to a regulation in which the court attributes any supporting rational basis for the regulation to the regulation’s author, (see Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass. 535, 553-554 [1985]), a challenge to a statutorily mandated determination of minimum rates cannot be rejected simply by imagining circumstances that would be supporting,” and that “{t]he commissioner’s . . . calculations and conclusions should not be upheld if they are illogical or irrational.” Ante at 58. I would, however, subject the commissioner’s action to the test of reasonableness rather than rationality. This court and the parties agree that the wage rates are, strictly speaking, neither a regulation nor an adjudication. When an administrative action is neither an adjudication nor the promulgation of a regulation but consists of rate setting, “our task is to determine ‘whether the commissioner has complied with the standards prescribed by the statute,’ although ‘we are not thereby authorized to substitute our judgment as to the reasonableness or adequacy of the [rates] for that of the commissioner. ’ ” Westland Hous. Corp. v. Commissioner of Ins., 352 Mass. 374, 384-385 (1967), quoting Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 329 Mass. 265, 273 (1952). In other rate setting contexts we determine whether the rates have reasonable support in the evidence, Westland Hous. Corp., supra at 385. I would, therefore, hold that the BHA may attempt to show that the wage rates established by the commissioner have no reasonable support. In applying this standard, I would be mindful of the deference due the commissioner’s specialized knowledge, technical competence, and experience regarding issues within the scope of his statutorily delegated authority. Workers’ Com*64pensation Rating & Inspection Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 391 Mass. 238, 246 (1984).
I am unsure if the reasonable support test I advocate would in this case compel a result any different from that adopted by the court. A test phrased in terms of reasonableness, however, would distinguish it from the traditional rational basis test which has been rejected in this case by the court and which I would abandon completely in the review of administrative decisions. See Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Cambridge, 395 Mass. 535, 557-563 (1985) (Lynch, L, dissenting). Although I see no real difference between the concepts of rational basis as the court now defines it, and reasonable support, reasonable support, unlike rational basis, is a term that has resulted in meaningful judicial review in other cases. I would reject any suggestion that the concept of rationality, as opposed to reasonableness, results in any greater deference to the administrative determination being considered. Since we have recently attempted to eliminate confusion by pointing out that there is no essential difference between a duty to look for reasonable support in the evidence and a duty to look for substantial evidence in the record, ante at note 13, the reasonable support test would, I believe, further that desirable purpose. The reasonable support test I suggest requires a familiar mode of judicial review. Any such test requires an examination of the basis for the administrative determination. I would follow the suggestion of the court, that a reviewing court may require that a record be made by the agency and that it explain its decision, or that a trial-type hearing be held in appropriate circumstances. Ante at 59. I would not eliminate the possibility, however, as the court has done, that some circumstances might exist that would make it appropriate for a court to develop the record upon which an administrative action is based. If, as in this case, there is no procedure mandated by statute for the development of a record justifying the rates, and if a reviewing court should be satisfied that the agency charged with the responsibility has either failed or refuses to develop such a record, it seems to me appropriate for the Superior Court to do so.