Court Opinion

ID: 9756438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:28:57.861071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:22.622607
License: Public Domain

Roberts, C. J.,
dissenting. Reluctantly I am compelled to disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority in this case. As I read the pertinent statute, I am persuaded that the medical expenses and hospital expenses, as well as the compensation paid the injured workman in this case, did not become recoverable when the decree of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarding such compensation was reversed by this court.
In the first place it is clear from both our statutes and decisions that bills for medical and hospital services are to be treated as part of the compensation paid an injured employee. It is provided in G. L. 1956, §28-33-5: “The employer shall, subject to the choice of the employee as provided in §28-33-8, promptly provide for an injured employee such reasonable medical, surgical, dental, optical or other attendance or treatment * * * for such period as *97is necessary, in order to cure, rehabilitate or relieve the employee from the effects of his injury * * In construing this statute in Atlantic Rayon Corp. v. Macedo, 73 R. I. 157, 159, 53 A.2d 756, 757, we stated: “There is no question but that reasonable bills for medical and hospital services are to be treated as a part of compensation.”
Since payments made to cover medical expenses are classified as compensation within the context of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, they then of necessity draw other characteristics and qualities from such legislation. In §28-35-33 provision is made for the finality of decrees entered by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. It is expressly stated in the pertinent section: “The decree entered by the workmen’s compensation commission acting within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be final, and any appeal shall not stay the effect of said decree * * * if compensation payments have been ordered by the workmen’s compensation commission, such payments shall be made and continued until reversal * * We held in Girard v. United States Rubber Co., 84 R. I. 230, 122 A.2d 747, that this is a clear and unambiguous statute and as such requires no statutory construction. We have further held in Weimar v. Newman, 78 R. I. 221, 226, 80 A.2d 887, 890: “It is fundamental that if the language of a statute is free from ambiguity and expresses a definite and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the one which the legislature intended to convey. In such circumstances the statute must be interpreted literally.”
The statute enunciates quite clearly that all payments made under a decree of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are final. It makes no provision for the recovery of sums paid out as compensation, nor does it provide for the creation of an actual or constructive trust for such sums pending final adjudication. In enacting *98this statute the Legislature took into account one retroactive situation that provides for payments of funds from the date of injury where a decree of the commission denying payments is reversed by the Supreme Court, “* * and if payments have not been ordered and the decree is reversed, retroactive payments shall be made from the date provided for in the decision of the supreme court.” In the light of the Legislature’s expressed provision for this retroactive situation and its obvious omission of the other retroactive possibility and in the light of the use of the word “final” in the statute describing payments made, we see no ground for holding that implied in this statute is a possibility of recovery under any theory of law or equity.
The statute in its clear and unambiguous language also clearly shows the purpose for which this legislation was enacted. The purpose is to allow the recipient of payments to use those payments to alleviate the distress that accompanies unemployment and to obtain necessary medical treatment immediately without the necessity of holding the funds in escrow until a final determination in the appellate proceedings. To allow recovery after payment would defeat such a purpose and nullify the statute.
It is my conclusion, contrary to that of the majority, that the payments once made — and this includes payments for medical and hospital expenses — are final and may not be recovered. With respect to the validity of §28-35-33, I again refer to Girard v. United States Rubber Co., supra, where at 233, 122 A.2d at 748, we said: “We conclude that the legislature, in enacting secs. 4 and 7 of article III [now §§28-35-33 and 28-35-34] of the workmen’s compensation act, was acting with respect to an appropriate subject matter and within its constitutional powers * *