Court Opinion

ID: 9706914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:55:10.900157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:25.904477
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge:
Michale J. Anderson was tried by jury and was found guilty of first degree murder and theft in connection with the strangulation and stabbing death of seventeen year old Karen Hurwitz and the taking of an automobile belonging to her father. Post-trial motions were denied, and Anderson was sentenced to serve a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder, as well as a consecutive term of imprisonment for not less than three and one-half (3V2) years nor more than seven (7) years for theft. On direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, Anderson argues that the trial court improperly charged the jury that the first two elements of first degree murder had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby *526directing a verdict as to those elements. He additionally contends that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to present the testimony of a psychiatric expert in support of the diminished capacity defense which he utilized at trial.
“In reviewing jury instructions to determine whether reversible error has been committed by a trial court, we consider the charge as a whole. Error will not be predicated on isolated excerpts. Rather, it is the general effect of the charge that controls.” Commonwealth v. Myers, 376 Pa.Super. 41, 50, 545 A.2d 309, 314 (1988). See also: Commonwealth v. Ohle, 503 Pa. 566, 582, 470 A.2d 61, 70 (1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1083, 106 S.Ct. 854, 88 L.Ed.2d 894 (1986); Commonwealth v. Bowers, 400 Pa.Super. 377, 392, 583 A.2d 1165, 1172 (1990). “Jury instructions will be upheld if they adequately and accurately reflect the law and are sufficient to guide the jury properly in its deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa.Super. 427, 430, 534 A.2d 511, 512 (1987). See also: Commonwealth v. Person, 345 Pa.Super. 341, 345, 498 A.2d 432, 434 (1985); Commonwealth v. Cimorose, 330 Pa.Super. 1, 10, 478 A.2d 1318, 1323 (1984).
The portion of the jury charge at issue in the instant case is as follows:
First degree murder is a murder in which the killer has the specific intent to kill.
You may find a defendant guilty of first degree murder if you are satisfied that the following three elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the Commonwealth. First, that the victim Karen Hurwitz is dead. Secondly, that the defendant killed her. And thirdly, that the defendant did so with the specific intent to kill with malice.
Obviously, ladies and gentlemen, the first two have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, I’m sure. There’s no question about those. The one that you really have to consider here is the third element, that the *527defendant did so, did this killing, with the specific intent to kill and with malice.
Appellant argues that, by instructing the jury that the first two elements of first degree murder had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court usurped the jury’s fact finding role and, in effect, directed a verdict with respect to those elements. We disagree.
At trial, it was conceded by the defense that appellant had killed the victim. In both his opening and closing statements, defense counsel told the jury that it was undisputed that appellant had killed the victim. Counsel argued, however, that appellant had lacked the specific intent to kill which was necessary for a finding of first degree murder. Such a diminished capacity defense concedes general criminal liability, but argues that the defendant was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 70 n. 4, 595 A.2d 28, 35 n. 4 (1991); Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 221, 360 A.2d 914, 919-920 (1976).
Because appellant admitted the killing and contested only the degree of guilt, the trial court did not err when it told the jury that the victim was dead and that appellant had killed her. See: Commonwealth v. Schultz, 170 Pa.Super. 504, 511-512, 87 A.2d 69, 72 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 868, 73 S.Ct. 111, 97 L.Ed. 673 (1952) (in prosecution for burglary, larceny and receiving stolen goods, where fact that crime occurred was undisputed and only issue being contested was defendant’s connection with crime, trial court did not err by charging jury that identity of property, its location and fact it was stolen were fairly well proven). Moreover, by instructing the jury that it should focus on whether appellant had acted with malice and with the specific intent to kill, the court fulfilled its principal duty of “clarifying] the issues so that the jury [might] understand the questions to be resolved.” Commonwealth v. Newman, 323 Pa.Super. 394, 402, 470 A.2d 976, 980 (1984). See also: Commonwealth v. Beach, 438 Pa. 37, 40, 264 A.2d *528712, 714 (1970); Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 401 Pa.Super. 560, 573, 585 A.2d 1069, 1075 (1991) (en banc).
In Commonwealth v. Walker, 459 Pa. 12, 326 A.2d 311 (1974), the defendant was charged with murder in connection with the shooting of a man inside a Philadelphia bar. The owner of the bar, who knew the defendant well, identified him as the perpetrator. The defendant, however, claimed to have been at home, asleep, at the time of the shooting. In its charge to the jury, the trial court stated that there was no question about identification. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the court had usurped the jury’s fact finding function by removing from its consideration the issue of identification. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning as follows:
The challenged statement was merely an attempt to narrow the issues for the jury’s consideration. In view of the length of time that appellant was alleged to have been in the bar and subject to observation by Mr. Jones, who by virtue of their prior relationship would have no difficulty in recognizing the appellant, the question of mistaken identity was clearly not in the case. As the trial judge properly pointed out, the case essentially turned upon the credibility of irreconcilably conflicting testimony. In such a situation, it was clearly proper for the trial judge to exercise his right to clarify the issues for jury.
Commonwealth v. Walker, supra, 459 Pa. at 16, 326 A.2d at 313 (citations omitted). So too in the instant case, the trial court will not be faulted for identifying for the jury the central issue to be decided.
Moreover and in any event, a review of the trial court’s jury instructions in their entirety is persuasive that no part of the jury’s function was usurped by the court, which left it to the jury to determine whether all elements of the crime of murder had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The court told the jury that appellant was presumed to be innocent, that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and that it was *529solely the jury’s function to decide all issues of fact. Finally, the court told the jury that it could find the defendant not guilty or guilty of the several degrees of homicide. We conclude, therefore, that there is nothing in the court’s jury instructions that would entitle appellant to a new trial.
In evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we employ an analysis as set forth by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Durst, 522 Pa. 2, 559 A.2d 504 (1989) as follows:
The threshold inquiry in such claims is whether the issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit; for counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985). If this threshold is met, it must next be established that the particular course chosen by counsel had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests. Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Finally, we require that the defendant establish how counsel’s commission or omission prejudiced him. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).
Id., 522 Pa. at 4-5, 559 A.2d at 505. See also: Commonwealth v. Rollins, 525 Pa. 335, 344, 580 A.2d 744, 748 (1990); Commonwealth v. Davis, 518 Pa. 77, 83, 541 A.2d 315, 318 (1988). Additionally, “[bjecause the law presumes that counsel is effective, the burden of establishing ineffectiveness rests with appellant.” Commonwealth v. House, 371 Pa.Super. 23, 28, 537 A.2d 361, 363 (1988). See also: Commonwealth v. Floyd, 506 Pa. 85, 90, 484 A.2d 365, 367 (1984); Commonwealth v. McKendrick, 356 Pa.Super. 64, 71, 514 A.2d 144, 148 (1986).
In the instant case, appellant’s only defense at trial was that, because of mental illness, he had been acting under a diminished capacity which prevented him from forming a specific intent to kill. However, trial counsel presented no expert testimony in support of this defense. *530Appellant contends that this failure rendered counsel ineffective.
The law is clear that counsel’s failure “to interview witnesses whose testimony could prove beneficial and exculpatory to the defendant’s case can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if no reasonable basis otherwise exists for counsel’s failure.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 501 Pa. 275, 287, 461 A.2d 208, 214 (1983). See also: Commonwealth v. Mabie, 467 Pa. 464, 359 A.2d 369 (1976); Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). Moreover, “[w]hen the only issue is appellant’s state of mind, trial counsel’s decision not to present relevant psychiatric and psychological testimony which may be determinative of the issue can be as damaging to the truthfinding process as the failure in other contexts to present the testimony of an available eyewitness, alibi witness, or other key witness.” Commonwealth v. Potts, 486 Pa. 509, 513, 406 A.2d 1007, 1009 (1979) (plurality opinion). See also: Commonwealth v. Stewart, 304 Pa.Super. 382, 388-389, 450 A.2d 732, 735 (1982); Commonwealth v. Sirianni, 286 Pa.Super. 176, 185-186, 428 A.2d 629, 634 (1981).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has consistently held that expert psychiatric testimony is admissible to negate the specific intent to kill which is essential to first degree murder. See: Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 521 A.2d 398 (1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3198, 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 505 Pa. 304, 479 A.2d 473 (1984); Commonwealth v. Walzack, supra. In this regard, the Supreme Court has said:
[P]sychiatric testimony relevant to the cognitive functions of deliberation and premeditation is competent on the issue of specific intent to kill. Thus psychiatric testimony is competent in Pennsylvania on the issue of specific intent to kill if it speaks to mental disorders affecting the cognitive functions necessary to formulate a specific intent.
*531Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. 106, 114, 451 A.2d 1344, 1347 (1982). See also: Commonwealth v. Terry, supra, 513 Pa. at 394, 521 A.2d at 404.
In support of his claim of ineffectiveness, appellant has affixed to his brief affidavits from two psychiatrists. The affidavit of Dr. Robert Wettstein states, inter alia, that:
6. I would have been available and willing to examine Michael J. Anderson and to testify as an expert at his trial if requested.
7. Based upon my recent examination of Michael J. Anderson, I conclude with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that he suffers from manic depressive illness which can affect cognitive functioning as well as his ability to premeditate and deliberate the offense in question.
I have diagnosed Michael J. Anderson as suffering from a bipolar disorder with episodes of mania and depression---- His past episodes of mania were characterized by euphoria, excessive activity, lack of sleep, inappropriate spending, increased sexual activity, increased grandiosity, perceptual distortions such as hallucinations (auditory, visual, and tactile), racing thoughts, impaired attention and concentration, increased speech, reduced appetite, chaotic lifestyle, and inability to function at school. His depressed episodes were characterized by periods of predominantly and persistently depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness, and suicide ideation with a previous suicide attempt with a handgun in 1988. According to the history provided, there is also evidence that at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant was experiencing cognitive impairment consisting of impaired concentration and thinking, perceptual disturbances (tactile, visual, and auditory), hyperalertness, and irrational and disorganized behavior. Earlier in the day there was evidence of a manic episode with symptoms noted above.
*532The affidavit of Dr. Gary Vallano in pertinent part is as follows:
5. During my assessment of Michael Anderson, I diagnosed him as suffering from bipolar disorder and the symptoms reflecting this illness are filed in the Health Services Progress Notes at Shuman Center. I based this diagnosis on the history presented to me b[y] Michael Anderson and his mother. This history includes a report by Michael of depressive symptoms including sleep difficulties, suicide ideation, decreased energy, depressed mood, and a suicide attempt. During at least one of these episodes Michael experienced psychotic symptoms including derealization, depersonalization, and visual and auditory hallucinations. These resulted in a suicide attempt and hospitalization at St. Francis Hospital according to Michael. Additionally, Michael reports episodes of decreased need for sleep, grandiosity, irritability, mood lability, increased speed of thoughts, and feelings that things are not real.
6. His mother reported a similar history of mood lability and fluctuations in Michael. She also reports a strong family history of bipolar disorder in Michael’s twin sister, his maternal grandfather, and at the time of the discussion with her she was being assessed for similar difficulties in mood fluctuation. This information and my observations of Michael Anderson at Shuman Center provide the basis for my diagnosis.
7. Had I been subpoenaed to Michael Anderson’s trial, I would have honored the subpoena and would have testified if requested to do so that he suffered from bipolar disorder with psychotic features. This disorder could [a]ffect his cognitive functioning during acute episodes. The psychiatric evidence appearing in the affidavits of
Dr. Wettstein and Dr. Vallano would have been relevant if offered at appellant’s trial. It was of a nature which, if believed, would have tended to reduce the degree of appellant’s crime. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that there is arguable merit in appellant’s contention that *533trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present psychiatric testimony in support of a diminished capacity defense. However, because there has not yet been an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel had a reasonable basis for failing to present psychiatric testimony regarding appellant’s mental illness, we cannot determine on the present state of the record whether appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel. “When an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has been made, and there has been no evidentiary hearing in the [trial court] to permit the defendant to develop evidence on the record to support the claim, and to provide the Commonwealth an opportunity to rebut the claim, [the Superior] Court will remand for such a hearing.” Commonwealth v. Petras, 368 Pa.Super. 372, 377, 534 A.2d 483, 485 (1987). See also: Commonwealth v. McBride, 391 Pa.Super. 113, 121, 570 A.2d 539, 543 (1990); Commonwealth v. Copeland, 381 Pa.Super. 382, 397, 554 A.2d 54, 61 (1988).
The judgment of sentence is vacated, at least for the time being, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if a reasonable basis existed for trial counsel’s failure to present expert psychiatric evidence for the purpose of reducing the degree of appellant’s guilt. If counsel is found to have been ineffective, a new trial must be granted. If counsel was not ineffective, however, the judgment of sentence may be reimposed. Jurisdiction is not retained meanwhile.
POPOVICH, J., files a dissenting opinion.