Court Opinion

ID: 9640152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:59:01.462297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:51.878652
License: Public Domain

WATHEN, C.J.
[¶ 1] Sandra Libby appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Hjelm, J.) affirming the divorce judgment entered in the District Court (Lincoln, Stitham, J.) granting her a divorce from Patrick Libby, dividing marital property, and awarding child and spousal support through June 1, 1999. Sandra argues that the property division was unjust and that the court erred by terminating support payments after June 1, 1999. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] The underlying facts found by the District Court may be briefly summarized as follows: Sandra and Patrick Libby were married on August 3, 1985 and had two children together. Patrick has been a full-time truck driver for seventeen years. He hauls sawdust between Lincoln and Ash-land, Maine, and is paid $57.80 for each trip. Ordinarily, he makes two trips a day and earns anywhere from $28,000 to $35,000 a year. For the first ten years of the marriage, Sandra worked at various jobs for seven or eight dollars an hour. The couple felt that Sandra could realize greater employment opportunities if she attended nursing school at Husson College. Their plan was to have Sandra gain the education necessary for her to secure a good job and then for Patrick to do the same. In order for Sandra to attend college, Patrick had to increase his workload to three trips a day, at least fourteen hours of work, for five days a week. In addition, as Sandra became more involved in school, Patrick’s role as a homemaker necessarily increased.
[¶ 3] At the time of the divorce hearing, Sandra was in her fourth year and was about to graduate. . She did extremely well and earned many honors. Approximately half of her tuition expenses were paid through various grants and scholarships that she was awarded. Sandra borrowed $20,000 in student loans to cover the remainder. Eastern Maine Medical Center verbally promised her a job after graduation though the director of human resources at the hospital testified that they were currently doing “very limited” hiring. As an entry-level nurse at Eastern Maine Medical Center, she would earn approximately $16.60 an hour. From her own investigation, Sandra testified that she could earn about $14 an hour in Lincoln and $19 an hour in Bangor.
[¶ 4] Because of her education, Sandra now enjoys many opportunities for advancement in the nursing field. Patrick, on the other hand, enjoys no opportunities for advancement as a truck driver. Even though he has worked for the same company for seventeen years, he earns the same as an entry-level truck driver.
[¶ 5] On February 22, 1999, the District Court entered a divorce judgment wherein it awarded Sandra assets with a collective value of approximately $23,0001 and ordered her to pay the $20,000 student loan debt. It awarded Patrick assets, including the marital home, with a total value of roughly $105,000 and required him to pay debts totaling $70,360.12.2 In addition, the *775court ordered Patrick to continue paying child and spousal support through June 1, 1999. The court noted that Sandra would probably be employed by that date. After June 1st, the court ordered that any spousal support obligation be terminated and that the parties exchange child support affidavits to work out a new child support order. Sandra appealed the judgment to the Superior Court. On November 24, 2000, the court affirmed the divorce judgment.3 Sandra then appealed to this Court.
[¶ 6] A divorce court must “divide the marital property in proportions the court considers just after considering all relevant factors.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1) (1998). We review the divorce court’s disposition of marital property for an abuse of discretion and will overturn its decision only “if there is a violation of some positive rule of law or if the division results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Doucette v. Washburn, 2001 ME 38, ¶ 23, 766 A.2d 578 (quotations omitted).
[¶ 7] Contrary to Sandra’s contentions, the District Court’s property division was not a plain and unmistakable injustice. “A just distribution of property is not synonymous with an equal distribution.” Id. at ¶ 24. A divorce court is required to consider the “economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953(1)(C). For at least four years, Patrick made considerable sacrifice to help Sandra achieve her goal of obtaining a nursing degree. With her degree, Sandra can now find a well paid job in a field with many opportunities for advancement. Patrick’s sacrifice was to be reciprocated. Instead, he has been left with little opportunity for change and no chance for advancement in his job as a truck driver. The parties’ total net assets were meager. Under the circumstances, although there is a significant disparity in the value of the property awarded to each party, the division is not plainly and unmistakably unjust.
[¶ 8] Sandra also argues that the District Court erred by terminating child and spousal support on June 1, 1999 because, as of the date of the judgment, her future employment prospects were too speculative.4 We review a divorce court’s decision regarding spousal support for abuse of discretion and will overturn its determination only when it “violates a positive rule of law or results in a plain and unmistakable injustice, so apparent that it is instantly visible without argument.” Hedrich v. Hedrich, 1998 ME 248, ¶ 2, 720 A.2d 1157 (quotations omitted). Contrary to Sandra’s contentions, her future employment and economic prospects were sufficiently certain at the time of the divorce hearing for the court to award spousal support for a limited time. Sandra did extremely well in nursing school and earned many honors. She will enjoy many opportunities for advancement in the nursing field. She had been verbally promised a job at Eastern Maine Medical Center and would earn approximately $16.60 an hour. Under the circumstances, the court did not exceed the bounds of its *776discretion by terminating spousal support after June 1,1999.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.

. The collective value of the marital assets awarded to each party is based on valuations that Sandra provided and that Patrick has not challenged.

. According to the valuations provided by Sandra, Patrick is assigned $66,640 of the marital debt. In addition to marital debts, the District Court required Patrick to pay $3720.12 of Sandra's attorney fees and costs. Patrick’s total liability under the divorce judgment, therefore, is $70,360.12.

. The Superior Court entered its judgment on appeal more than twenty months after the District Court entered the divorce judgment. This inordinate delay is largely attributable to three requests that Sandra made for an extension of time to file her briefs in the Superior Court.

. Although the court did order that neither party receive spousal support after June 1, 1999, it did not order that child support payments be terminated. Rather, it ordered that both parties exchange child support affidavits and agree upon the details of a child support work sheet and proposed child support order after Sandra has secured employment.