Court Opinion

ID: 9662747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:17:06.364046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:42.002857
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The majority affirms a life sentence for a first offense involving a $20 sale of .238 grams of crack cocaine (3 rocks). This amounts to one strike and you’re out. I would affirm the conviction and remand for resentencing on grounds that the sentence was so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. As the majority opinion makes clear, that is one standard by which we gauge the propriety of sentences. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 498, 898 S.W.2d 38 (1995). The sentence prescribed by the General Assembly for the delivery of less than 28 grams of cocaine is “not less than ten (10) years nor more than forty (40) years, or life” plus a fine not exceeding $25,000. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-401(a)(l)(i) (Repl. 1993). The range for the jury to consider is very broad: 10 years to life imprisonment for a quantity of drugs up to 28 grams. Henderson contends that a life sentence for first-offense delivery of three rocks of crack cocaine constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. I agree. This is the first time that a life sentence has been affirmed in this State where the defendant’s crime was one offense and a first offense and where the quantity of drugs sold was such a minor amount. While I am extremely reluctant to reverse the jury in this case on grounds that it did not represent the moral sense of the community, I must conclude that it did not. The United States Supreme Court has held that under similar circumstances a reversal of the sentence is warranted. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, the Court affirmed reversal of a sentence of life without parole for writing a $100 “no account” check. The defendant had 6 prior felonies. The majority did so for proportionality reasons, finding that Solem was treated more harshly iri the state than were other criminals who committed more serious crimes. The Court affirmed reversal under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Subsequently, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), a splintered court in a plurality decision affirmed a first-offense sentence of life without parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Six members of the Court, however, still endorsed a proportionality review. According to Justice Kennedy, speaking for three members of the Court in a concurring opinion, a comparative analysis of a sentence with other sentences is “appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005. In the case before us, I conclude that an inference of gross disproportionality is evident when a first offense for a $20 sale of a minimal amount of crack cocaine garners a life sentence. A comparative analysis of convictions for drug sales which we have affirmed in recent years confirms that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime: • Affirmed a ten-year sentence for sale of cocaine. Elders v. State, 321 Ark. 60, 900 S.W.2d 170 (1995). • Affirmed a 75-year sentence for selling 1 rock of crack cocaine where the defendant had 7 prior felony convictions. Williams v. State, 320 Ark. 498, 898 S.W.2d 38 (1995). • Affirmed a 15-year sentence for first count of a sale of a controlled substance and life imprisonment for a second count for a drug sale occurring at a later date. Robinson v. State, 317 Ark. 407, 878 S.W.2d 405 (1994) (trial counsel failed to object to the jury’s sentence of life when the verdict form had provided 80 years as the maximum). • Affirmed a life sentence for possession with intent to deliver of 40 pounds of marijuana, in excess of 112 grams of cocaine, LSD, drug paraphernalia, and for possession by a felon of a firearm. Hendrickson v. State, 316 Ark. 182, 871 S.W.2d 362 (1994). • Affirmed a sentence of 32 years for possession of 4 bags of marijuana with intent to deliver and drag paraphernalia where the defendant was a habitual offender with 7 prior convictions. Hudson v. State, 316 Ark. 360, 872 S.W.2d 68 (1994). • Affirmed a sentence of 19 years for 4 offenses which included continuing criminal enterprise, public servant bribery, delivery of cocaine, and use of a communication facility to further a drug felony. Leavy v. State, 314 Ark. 231, 862 S.W.2d 832 (1993). • Affirmed 10 years in prison and fines for 4 counts of delivery of marijuana, mushrooms with a controlled substance, and 1/8 of an ounce of cocaine. Baker v. State, 310 Ark. 485, 837 S.W.2d 471 (1992). • Affirmed a life sentence for sale of 35 capsules of cocaine and possession of a firearm where the defendant was a habitual offender. Gomez v. State, 305 Ark. 496, 809 S.W.2d 809 (1991). • Affirmed a sentence of 35 years for sale of 1 rock of crack cocaine where defendant had one prior conviction and was charged as a habitual offender. Parker v. State, 302 Ark. 509, 790 S.W.2d 894 (1990). • Affirmed a conviction of 60 years for each of 2 counts of delivery of a controlled substance where defendant was a habitual offender. Williams v. State, 292 Ark. 616, 732 S.W.2d 135 (1987). • Affirmed life sentence for delivery of a “sack” of cocaine sold for $10,000. Hoback v. State, 286 Ark. 153, 689 S.W.2d 569 (1985). These cases highlight the uniqueness and the disproportionality of the sentence meted out in this case. There are two final points that need to be made. A case calling for a consideration of proportionality would be extremely rare. But our case law has contemplated such a review, to the extent of determining whether the sentence is wholly disproportionate to the crime charged, at least since 1941, and has reiterated the principle multiple times since then. See Williams v. State, supra; Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993); Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920 (1990); Parker v. State, supra; Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983); Chaviers v. State, 267 Ark. 6, 588 S.W.2d 434 (1979); Pridgeon v. State, 266 Ark. 651, 587 S.W.2d 225 (1979); Stout v. State, 263 Ark. 355, 565 S.W.2d 23 (1978); Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W.2d 106 (1977); Hinton v. State, 260 Ark. 42, 537 S.W.2d 800 (1976); Carter & Burkhead v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973); Davis v. State, 246 Ark. 838, 440 S.W.2d 244 (1969); Geurin v. City of Little Rock, 203 Ark. 103, 155 S.W.2d 719 (1941); see also Scott v. State, 27 Ark. App. 1, 764 S.W.2d 625 (1989). In addition, the General Assembly in its sentencing guidelines for guilty pleas and bench trials has recognized the need for proportionality in sentencing. Act 532 of 1993 seeks to ensure that the “sanctions imposed following conviction are proportional to the seriousness of the offense of conviction and the extent of the offender’s criminal history.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-801(b)(l) (Supp. 1993).1 In short, both this court and the General Assembly have endorsed proportionality review of the offense vis-avis the punishment in limited circumstances. Had Henderson been charged with witness tampering or obstruction of justice and convicted, or had he been charged and convicted of a second sale of crack cocaine, I would view this sentence differently. But the sole charge for which he was convicted and sentenced was the $20 sale of crack cocaine, which was his first offense. I would affirm the conviction but reverse the life sentence and remand for resentencing. Newbern and Roaf, JJ., join.   Following a guilty plea for Henderson’s offense or a bench trial resulting in conviction, a sentence of 3 1/2 years would have been presumed under the sentencing standards grid. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(a)(3) (Supp. 1993). Because this presumptive sentence is less than the minimum sentence prescribed by law, the minimum sentence of 10 years would apply. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-803(b)(3)(c) (Supp. 1993). Trial courts may deviate from the presumptive sentence when aggravating circumstances such as evidence tampering are involved. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-804(d)(2)(J) (Supp. 1993).