Court Opinion

ID: 9943586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:56.255114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:38.376291
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Gentry CA1/1
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                             DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
          Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A166735
 v.
 RYAN KEITH GENTRY,                                             (Contra Costa County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. 04-22-00089)
          Defendant and Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION1
           In April 2022, Ryan Keith Gentry tackled a man at the Pittsburg
  marina, punched him, and stabbed him in the cheek with a large hunting
  knife. Later that year, a jury convicted Gentry of assault with a deadly
  weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1); assault by means likely to produce
  great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2); and battery with serious
  bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count 3). It also found true several
  enhancement allegations, including that he personally inflicted great bodily
  injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of counts 1 and 2, and that

        1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion, reciting only those

facts necessary to resolve the disputed issue. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1;
People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) Undesignated statutory
references are to the Penal Code.

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 he personally used a deadly weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) in the
 commission of counts 2 and 3.
           In November 2022, the trial court sentenced Gentry to four years in
 prison, comprised of the three-year middle term on count 2, plus one year
 for the deadly weapon enhancement attached to that count. The court
 imposed concurrent terms on counts 1 and 3, and it struck the remaining
 enhancements.
      On appeal, the parties agree Gentry cannot be convicted of counts 1
and 2. They are correct. Assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1))
and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)) are “different ways of stating the same offense” and “a defendant
may not be convicted of both types of aggravated assault based on the same
act or course of conduct.” (People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974, 981, 996
(Aguayo); see also § 954.) Here, it is undisputed counts 1 and 2 arise from
Gentry’s single act of stabbing the victim in the face. Accordingly, Gentry
“may not be convicted of both types of aggravated assault.” (Aguayo, at
p. 996.)
      We now turn to the appropriate remedy. Before 2011, assault with a
deadly weapon and assault by means likely to cause great bodily were not
separate offenses; instead, they described alternative ways to violate former
section 245, subdivision (a)(1). (Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 986.) In
2011, the Legislature moved the offenses “into separate paragraphs” because
it recognized that assault with a deadly weapon is a “ ‘serious felony’ ” with
potential consequences under the “ ‘[T]hree Strikes’ law,” but assault by
means likely to cause great bodily injury is not. (Id. at pp. 986–987.) Our
high court reasoned that “a judgment showing the ‘true nature’ of a former
section [245, subdivision] (a)(1) conviction—by indicating whether it was

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pursuant to subparagraph (a)(1) or (a)(4)—would allow a prosecutor to settle
appropriate cases prior to a preliminary hearing and avoid ‘clogging the court
system.’ ” (Id. at p. 987, brackets in original.)
      The Attorney General persuasively argues the “ ‘true nature’ ” of
Gentry’s convictions is that he stabbed—and grievously injured—the victim
with a large hunting knife. (Aguayo, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 987.)
Consolidating the two forms of aggravated assault into a single conviction of
assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury preserves the jury’s findings. (People v. Coyle (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 209, 217 [remedy for multiple duplicative convictions is to order
“that multiple counts be consolidated into a single judgment”]; People v.
Craig (1941) 17 Cal.2d 453, 458–459 [consolidating convictions after
determining only one offense had occurred], overruled on another point in
People v. White (2017) 2 Cal.5th 349, 359.)
      Gentry’s reliance on People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632 does not
compel a different conclusion. There, the California Supreme Court
concluded that because larceny under section 484, subdivision (a) and
embezzlement under section 503 were “different statements of the same
offense of theft” (Vidana, at pp. 647–648), the defendant could not “be
convicted of both crimes.” (Id. at p. 635.) Vidana affirmed the lower court’s
judgment striking the defendant’s larceny conviction. (Id. at p. 651 & fn. 18.)
In doing so, however, Vidana noted the Attorney General had not requested a
different result; accordingly, the court expressed “no opinion” on whether
striking the larceny conviction or consolidating the two convictions was “the
proper remedy.” (Ibid.) “Cases are not authority for propositions not
considered.” (People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 330.)

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      We conclude the appropriate remedy is to consolidate the two forms of
aggravated assault into a single conviction of assault with a deadly weapon
and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Because
the deadly weapon enhancement in section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) is an
element of assault with a deadly weapon, however, “no deadly weapon use
enhancement can properly attach” to the consolidated conviction. (See People
v. Brunton (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1097, 1107; § 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Thus,
remand for resentencing is required. (Brunton, at p. 1108.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to (1)
consolidate Gentry’s separate convictions in counts 1 and 2 into a single
conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and assault by
means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), being
separate statements of the same offense; (2) strike the deadly weapon
enhancement (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); and (3) resentence Gentry consistent
with this opinion. In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
      “To the extent the parties desire a more expeditious remand, they may
stipulate to the immediate issuance of the remittitur.” (People v. Porter
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 652; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).)

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                                  LANGHORNE WILSON, J.

WE CONCUR

HUMES, P. J.

CASTRO, J.

A166735


 Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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