Court Opinion

ID: 9477196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:16:54.243278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:45.063509
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the setoff issue. Were I writing for the majority, however, I would not have reached that issue. I would have held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the wrongful death suit because appellee failed to comply with *1163the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982).1
Compliance with section 2675(a)’s administrative filing requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 646 (11th Cir.1984). In the present case, no one disputes that appellee failed to comply with that requirement prior to filing his wrongful death suit in the district court. Nevertheless, the majority concludes that he was excused from doing so because the decedent had made an administrative filing before his death in connection with his own personal injury claim. The majority reasons that the decedent’s personal injury claim gave the VA sufficient notice of ap-pellee’s wrongful death claim, and that section 2675(a) requires no more.
To support this reasoning, the majority cites cases holding that an individual claimant may sue on a theory of recovery not set forth in his administrative claim, provided that the filing was otherwise proper and it “fairly apprise[d] the government of the facts leading to the [claimant’s] injury.” Bush v. United States, 703 F.2d 491, 494 (11th Cir.1983) (citation omitted). These cases, I submit, have little to do with the issue the court decides today. This case does not involve an individual claimant who has suffered a single injury and is seeking to pursue a particular theory of recovery that he neglected to include in his properly filed administrative claim. Rather, it involves a claimant who never filed an administrative claim in the first place and is seeking to rely on the filing of another claimant who suffered a wholly distinct injury. I submit that the majority’s willingness to permit appellee to rely on another person’s administrative filing is at odds with the congressional purposes behind section 2675(a).
One of the primary purposes of the procedure for administrative exhaustion established by section 2675(a) is to “mak[e] it possible for the government to expedite the fair settlement of tort claims asserted against the United States.” S.Rep. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2515, 2516. See also Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1442 (9th Cir.1983) (“The primary goal of the procedures established by the FTCA is to facilitate satisfactory administrative settlements.”). Consistent with that purpose, courts have held that section 2675(a) “clearly presupposes the existence of an identifiable claimant or claimants with whom the government can negotiate a settlement.” Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 225 (8th Cir.1977). Thus, for example, courts have held that a wrongful death claimant may not rely on an administrative filing in which he is not named as a claimant even though the filing involves the very wrongful death for which he seeks damages. See Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808 (D.C.Cir.1984); Estate of Santos v. United States, 525 F.Supp. 982 (D.P.R.1981). Courts have also held that unnamed members of a plaintiff class ordinarily cannot rely on the administrative filing of the named members. See Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.1977); Caidin v. United States, 564 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.1977); Commonwealth v. National Ass’n of Flood Ins., 520 F.2d 11 (3rd Cir.1975). Finally, several courts have held that a personal injury plaintiff cannot rely on the administrative filing of a third party even though the third party’s filing arguably puts the government on notice of the plaintiff’s injury. See Rucker v. United States, 798 F.2d 891 (6th Cir.1986); Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.1983); Moody v. United States, 585 F.Supp. 286 (E.D.Tenn.1984), aff'd, 774 *1164F.2d 150 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 65, 93 L.Ed.2d 24 (1986); Susanin v. United States, 570 F.Supp. 25 (W.D.Pa.1983); Fol v. United States, 548 F.Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Ryan v. United States, 457 F.Supp. 400 (W.D.Pa.1978); Walker v. United States, 471 F.Supp. 38 (M.D.Fla.1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 770 (11th Cir.1979); Stewart v. United States, 458 F.Supp. 871 (S.D.Ohio 1978); Green v. United States, 385 F.Supp. 641 (S.D.Calif.1974).
The rationale underlying these cases is straightforward enough: the government simply cannot be expected to assess the settlement value of the claim of an unnamed claimant. The government has no way of knowing the amount of damages that will be sought or the theory under which those damages will be claimed. Thus, if plaintiffs seeking to sue in federal court were permitted to rely on administrative filings in which they were not named as claimants, a primary purpose of section 2675(a)’s exhaustion requirement — the facilitation of settlements — would be defeated.
These concerns are particularly strong where, as here, a wrongful death claimant seeks to rely on a personal injury filing made by the decedent before his death. The measure of damages available to a wrongful death claimant is substantially different from the measure of damages that would be available to the decedent had he survived.2 A proper evaluation of the settlement value of a wrongful death claim requires information chat the government agency would not have had any reason to seek out when investigating the settlement value of the personal injury claim. For example, in evaluating loss of support, “the survivor’s relationship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent’s probable net income available for distribution to the particular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent’s services to the survivor may be considered.” Fla.Stat. § 768.21(1) (1985). Given the difference between the compensable injuries involved, I find it difficult to conclude that the VA would not, in cases such as this one, want to conduct a second investigation so that it could reassess its settlement position.3
By excusing the wrongful death claimant from following the procedures established by section 2675(a), the majority in effect denies the government the opportunity it is granted under the law to evaluate the settlement value of the claim. This result forces the government into one of two positions. Either it forces the government in many cases to forgo any attempt to settle, or it requires the government, each time it is presented with a personal injury claim, to evaluate the settlement value of any number of hypothetical wrongful death suits so that it can be ready with a settlement offer in the event a death does occur and a wrongful death suit is instituted. I do not believe that Congress, in enacting a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement intended to facilitate settlements, meant to impose such a burden on the government. Accordingly, I would hold that a wrongful death claimant must follow fully the exhaustion procedures established by section 2675(a).4 Because appellee did not follow those procedures, I would hold that the *1165district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his suit.

. Section 2675(a) provides in pertinent part:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.

. By statute, Florida law provides that the decedent's survivors may recover damages for lost support and services, lost companionship, and pain and suffering. Additionally, the decedent’s estate may recover lost earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the date of death, as well as medical and funeral expenses. Fla.Stat. § 768.21 (1985).

. The majority contends that the decedent’s administrative filing suffices because the wrongful death claim is based on the same injuries that gave rise to the personal injury claim. Of course the wrongful death claim is, in a sense, based on the same negligent act that injured the decedent; otherwise, the death would not be "wrongful." The important point, and the point that the majority does not address, is that the injury compensated in a wrongful death suit is entirely different from the injury compensated in a personal injury suit.

.Two district courts have reached the same conclusion. See Shemansky v. United States, No. 77-1152 (M.D.Pa. May 17, 1983); Raymond v. United States, 445 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.Mich.1978). One district court has reached the contrary conclusion. See Nelson v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 816 (M.D.N.C.1982).