Court Opinion

ID: 9488649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:51:21.361781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:00.703190
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In my view, Taylor has failed to present any evidence that would support a finding that Warden Foltz acted with deliberate indifference, and I would AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Taylor argues that Foltz, as the prison warden, had actual knowledge of his vulnerability to sexual assault from his inmate file, and that Foltz acted with deliberate indifference in ordering his transfer to the barracks-type prison. Taylor’s file contained a description of his physical characteristics, including his size, a mild mental retardation, *85and that he has a seizure disorder and an adjustment disorder.1 In addition, Taylor’s file contained psychological reports that had been prepared as part of his presentence report as was described in the majority opinion. The report warned that “[tjhis offender’s mental limitations are certainly factors in his past behavior and will affect his future adjustment.”
Foltz, however, denies any knowledge about Taylor’s allegedly particular vulnerabilities to sexual assault. During the period in dispute, Warden Foltz was responsible for overseeing three prison complexes. He claims that he delegated responsibility for transfer decisions between same-level prisons to his deputy wardens at each of the prison complexes for which he was responsible. Thus, although his signature appears on Taylor’s transfer orders, it was placed there by a deputy warden who also placed his initials on the transfer.
Although the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons ... neither does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citations omitted). Not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another [however] translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 1977. To bring a successful claim in these prison conditions eases, the inmate must show that the prison officials acted (or failed to act) with “deliberate indifference” to his safety or welfare. Id.
To meet the deliberate indifference standard, the inmate must show the prison official had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Setter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991) (importing a subjective standard into the “deliberate indifference” test). Recently, in Farmer, the Supreme Court has held that the test is a subjective one. As pointed out by the majority, the Court stated that a “prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added). Simply failing to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not is insufficient to ground liability. Id.
To survive a summary judgment motion, therefore, Taylor must present some evidence that Warden Foltz failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of harm. Taylor presents two possible theories on which to ground direct liability. First, Taylor argues that a jury could infer from the evidence in his inmate file that Foltz knew of Taylor’s vulnerabilities to sexual assault, but chose to disregard these factors when ordering the transfer. Alternatively, Taylor argues that Warden Foltz knew generally that small, youthful looking prisoners were more likely to be subject to prison assault but was indifferent to these risks and failed to draft policies that protected these inmates from transfers to unsafe prisons.
As to Taylor’s first argument, he has failed to present enough evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude Warden Foltz knew of Taylor’s particular vulnerabilities to sexual assault. Although Foltz had access to Taylor’s file, Foltz presented an affidavit that claimed he had delegated responsibility for same-level transfers to the deputy wardens at each of the prison complexes for which he was responsible. Taylor has not presented any information to rebut this claim. On the contrary, prisoner official Bogan actually caused Taylor’s transfer as a “Camp volunteer” to Camp Pugsley.2 J/A at 268, Exh. 1. *86The effect of the majority’s holding is to expose Foltz to potential liability by way of respondeat superior for the alleged misconduct of Bogan whom Taylor did not properly serve with process in this suit.3 The theory of respondeat superior may not be used to establish liability under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Serv. of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Additionally, as in Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir.1992), plaintiff has not made a showing that Foltz acted out of “[o]b-duracy or wantonness,” as is required in an Eighth Amendment context. “Lack of due care for a prisoner’s safety by prison officials is insufficient.” Gibson, 963 F.2d at 853. Gibson makes it clear that to hold Foltz potentially liable as warden, he must have “knowledge” and thus have intended harm to the prisoner. Id. What has allegedly occurred, though indeed unfortunate and distressing, insofar as Foltz was concerned, did “not rise to the level of a wanton infliction of pain” or injury by him. Id. at 854. Again, there is no evidence, no allegation even, that Foltz “knew that [Taylor] was in danger,” even though he may have had ultimate responsibility “to monitor the conditions at the prison.” Id. at 854 (emphasis added). There was no evidence that Foltz personally was aware that Taylor was likely to be a homosexual attack victim at Camp Pugsley or that he was “aware that subordinates had failed to carry out prison policies.”4 Id.
Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2992, 125 L.Ed.2d 687 (1993), cited by the majority as authority for its decision, does not support the extension of supervisory liability under § 1983 under the facts of this case. Hill addresses the nursing supervisor’s “actual knowledge ” in the departmental malfunction, and notes that the supervisor “personally ” failed to do his job. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added). In addition, Hill was able to offer strong proof of a pervasive pattern of indifference to the inmates’ medical needs generally. Id. Morris did not do his job— “responding to inmates’ complaints about medical needs” — and thus was held liable. Id. That situation is a far cry from Foltz’s non-personal involvement in this case.
Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2395, 124 L.Ed.2d 297 (1993), also cited by the majority, again involved allegations of the deliberate indifference of the warden of that facility, with accompanying proof of a pervasive pattern of rapes in a particular prison. An almost evenly divided en banc court allowed a one dollar damages award against the warden. I likewise find Butler not to be persuasive under the facts of this case.
But even if we were to assume that Foltz had personally reviewed Taylor’s file and, *87thus, had actual knowledge of the information contained therein, that information does not raise a red flag that Taylor was particularly vulnerable to sexual assault. Although the file gives Taylor’s physical characteristics and age, it does not mention other characteristics (such as feminine mannerisms or homosexual orientation) that would make him more likely to be a victim of prison rape. Cf. Farmer v. Brennan, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (pre-operation transsexual with feminine mannerisms). Second, the psychological reports contained within the file do not necessarily lead one to conclude that Taylor is especially vulnerable to rape. These reports describe Taylor as a “peculiar individual” and warns that he will have a difficult time adjusting to prison life. No concern is expressed in these reports about the likelihood that Taylor will be subject to sexual pressure in prison. Thus, Foltz’s knowledge of the information in Taylor’s file does not support the conclusion that Foltz actually knew that this defendant was particularly vulnerable to sexual assault.
Taylor’s second theory of liability also must fail. He argues that Foltz knew that the category of smaller, youthful prisoners are subject to sexual pressure, but acted with “deliberate indifference” in failing to adopt transfer procedures that would prevent them from being transferred to unsafe prisons.
Indeed, Foltz had previously testified about general vulnerability of small, youthful prisoners. People v. Harmon, 53 Mich.App. 482, 220 N.W.2d 212 (1974), aff'd, 394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975). There was also evidence that a barracks-styled prison would give sexual predators more opportunities to attack these vulnerable inmates than would a single-cell facility.
But the existence of that evidence does not mean summary judgment is inappropriate in this case. As Farmer states, the deliberate indifference standard describes “a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 1978. Although the inmate does not have to show that the prison official actually intended for the harm to occur, he must show that the official knew of and disregarded the excessive risk to the inmate’s health or safety. Id. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.
The Court’s use of the term “disregard” in Farmer requires that the prison official (or the state) be able feasibly to alleviate the risk to the inmate.5 I cannot agree that we should declare barracks-style prison camps unconstitutional for minimum-security prisoners or youthful, slight prisoners, or that a jury could so find. If Foltz failed to develop special procedures that would have screened small, youthful inmates to try to protect against prospective rapes, I would deem that failure to be negligent, not deliberate indifference.
What type requirements would we impose upon the warden? The factors on which Taylor bases his claim (e.g., “young-looking,” “small”) are far too subjective on which to predicate liability. Unlike the characteristics of the pre-operative transsexual in Farmer, I cannot agree that Foltz was either aware of, or acquiesced in, approving a transfer, knowing that this would place Taylor in imminent danger. It is simply unreasonable to hold a warden liable for the transfer by a subordinate of a young, slight, mentally troubled prisoner to a prison camp.6 Even if the characteristics Taylor bases his claim upon are objectively identifiable, the relevancy of this information would also depend on the characteristics of the other inmates already located at the barracks-styled facility. Even this information alone would not be conclusive; a proper analysis of an inmate’s ability to protect himself, an evaluation of the inmate’s muscle strength, aggressiveness, ability to make allies with other inmates, together with a variety of other unknown factors, would be required.
I would not hold the warden potentially liable as a matter of law under all the circumstances. No reasonable jury could find that Foltz was deliberately indifferent in failing to *88adopt procedures to accomplish a practical and realistic impossibility taking into account the numbers of prisoners and different prison settings in Michigan.
In my view, the majority is taking a real step towards establishing strict liability against the warden in ease of the rape of a youthful, troubled prisoner. It also risks imposing respondeat superior liability against Foltz. There was nothing to prevent Taylor’s properly pursuing the deputy warden or resident unit manager responsible for the actual assignment to Camp Pugsley.
Accordingly, I would AFFIRM the district court’s decision.

. It is not apparent from his inmate file that Taylor has youthful looking features, thus allegedly more susceptible to sexual assault.

. The majority concedes that Foltz did not personally authorize the transfer to Camp Pugsley. It concludes, however, that a jury could find Foltz knew of Taylor's particular vulnerabilities to sexual assault because he had personally reviewed the file the previous year when transferring Taylor from a medium-security facility to a minimum security facility.
I find that proposition unconvincing. Foltz was responsible for supervising three prison complexes that house approximately 5,000 inmates. No reasonable jury could conclude that *86after seeing Taylor's name on a list of inmates to be transferred, Foltz was able to recall the information he had read about Taylor the previous year and deduce that Taylor was at risk at a barracks-styled prison. Although we are required to draw every possible inference in favor of the non-moving party, we are not allowed to stack inference upon inference to preserve an issue for die jury.

. Whether the alleged misconduct of Bogan was misconduct at all, negligent conduct, or deliberate indifference, we do not decide.

. In another recent case, we described the law in this circuit in a case of this type:
At issue here is whether the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment is violated where prison officials fail to segregate an inmate who has received death threats, threats of assault and arguments with another inmate in the same room. Cf. Danese [v. Asman], 875 F.2d [1239] at 1243-44 [(6th Cir.1989)]. As of 1985, this court had decided only one case dealing with eighth amendment liability for failure to protect an inmate from assault by another inmate. In Stewart v. Love, 696 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.1982), an inmate, fearing for his own safety due to rumored threats of harm against him, requested and received a temporary transfer, and upon return to his original unit, informed prison administration of renewed threats, hut was beaten so severely as to require hospitalization. Nonetheless, this court found mere negligence.
Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056, 1067 (6th Cir.1991) (footnote omitted). The unpublished decision in Roland v. Johnson, No. 90-1343, 1991 WL 84346 (6th Cir. May 22, 1991), cannot, of course, counter the authority of Marsh and Gibson. "[W]e have held that 'deliberate indifference' of constitutional magnitude may occur when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another.” Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). We have not held a warden similarly liable previously.

. The deliberate indifference standard doses not impose strict liability on prison officials. Farmer, — U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 1977 (not every injury translates into constitutional liability).

. There is no allegation or showing of any unusual incidence of rape in the Michigan prisons supervised by Foltz. Note the Johnson report, included in the joint appendix at 270-275.