Court Opinion

ID: 9782869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:26:33.475567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:15.369357
License: Public Domain

CRONE, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The State concedes that it failed to prove that Staten committed the class C traffic infraction with which he was charged, and I concur in the majority’s decision to vacate the trial court’s finding on that count. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusions that (1) the traffic stop was valid and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Staten’s conviction for class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated (“OWI”).

1. Validity of Traffic Stop

“The State has the burden of proving that the investigatory stop of an automobile was not violative of the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches] and seizures.” State v. Smith, 638 N.E.2d 1353, 1355 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). “A police officer may stop a vehicle when he observes a minor traffic violation. A stop is lawful if there is an objectively justifiable reason for it, and the stop may be justified on less than probable cause.” Ransom v. State, 741 N.E.2d 419, 421 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “Although a law enforcement officer’s good faith belief that a person has committed a violation will justify a traffic stop, an officer’s mistaken belief about what constitutes a violation does not amount to good faith. Such discretion is not constitutionally permissible.” Id. at 422 (citation omitted). See also Cash v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (“[Sjimple good faith on the part of the arresting officer, is not enough. If it were, ‘the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate.’”) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).
The State charged Staten with a class C infraction for violating Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-32, which says, “A person who drives a vehicle shall stop at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one (1) or more entrances to a through highway that are not a part of the through highway and proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles that are not required to stop.” Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-178 defines “through highway” as “a highway or portion of a highway at the entrance to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required by law to yield right-of-way to vehicles on the through highway in obedience to either a stop sign or a yield sign.” As Staten points out, Trooper Greer admitted at trial “that the access road where Staten was stopped is not a through highway and the stop sign that Greer observed Staten disregard did not control traffic at a through highway.” Appellant’s Br. at 7-8. The State properly acknowledges its complete failure of proof as to the “through highway” element of the infraction, and thus the infraction must be vacated.
Nevertheless, the State argues that Staten’s “actions did constitute a traffic infraction, therefore it does not matter for the validity of the traffic stop that [Trooper] Greer mistakenly charged [Staten] with the wrong infraction.” Appellee’s Br. at 4. (The State cites no authority that directly supports this “no-harm, no-foul” proposition.) The State first directs us to Indiana Code Section 9-21-4-11, which provides:
The Indiana department of transportation, with reference to state highways and highway routes through cities, and local authorities, with reference to other highways under their jurisdiction, may, *86upon an engineering and traffic investigation, designate:
(1) through highways and erect stop or yield signs at specified entrances to the highways; or
(2) an intersection as a stop or yield intersection and erect stop or yield signs at one (1) or more entrances to the intersection.
A person who drives a vehicle must obey the signs posted under Indiana Code Chapter 9-21-4. Ind.Code § 9-21-4-18. A failure to do so constitutes a class C infraction. Ind.Code § 9-21^4-19.
Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-84(a) defines “intersection” as the area embraced within:
(1) the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two (2) highways that join at, or approximately at, right angles; or
(2) the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.
And finally, Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-73 defines “highway” as “the entire width between the boundary lines of every publicly maintained way when any part of the way is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. The term includes an alley in a city or town.”
Based on a careful reading of the foregoing statutes, I believe that the State has failed to establish that Staten committed a traffic violation of any kind when he disregarded the stop sign on the access road. With respect to Indiana Code Section 9-21-4-11, the State ignores the fact that a stop sign erected pursuant to that statute must be erected by the Department of Transportation. The State presented no evidence in this regard at trial, and it is entirely possible that the school district erected the stop sign without any involvement by the DOT. As for whether the access road was a “highway” for purposes of Indiana Code Section 9-21-4-11, the State asserts that it was because it “was open to the public and was used for vehicular travel.” Appellee’s Br. at 5. Again, the State presented no specific evidence at trial on this point, although perhaps a reasonable inference to this effect could be drawn based on Staten’s presence there. The State further asserts that “the intersection is a three-way stop, which indicates that one road intersects another.” Id. The fatal flaw with this assertion is that an intersection must be a joining of two highways for purposes of Indiana Code Sections 9-21-4-11, and the State presented no evidence at trial that the roadway that joined the access road at the three-way stop was in fact a highway. So, even if one could infer from the evidence that the access road was a highway, there is no evidence that the roadway which led to the access road was a highway. Cf Dubois County Bank v. City of Vincennes, 517 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) (concluding as a matter of law that juncture of street and parking lot was not an intersection because “a parking lot does not qualify as a highway under the statutory definition of the term”), trans. denied.
These multiple failures of proof are likely a result of the State charging Staten under Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-32, in that neither side had an opportunity to prove or disprove a violation of any other statute. In my view, the majority opinion glosses over the various statutory elements and definitions in an attempt to backfill for a defective prosecution. The fact remains that Trooper Greer mistakenly believed that Staten had violated Indiana Code Section 9-21-8-32, and the State has failed to establish that Staten committed any other traffic violation. Thus, the traffic stop was invalid. Conse*87quently, I would hold that the trial court should have excluded the evidence regarding Staten’s intoxication that was obtained as a result of the invalid traffic stop and vacate his conviction for class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated. See Cash, 593 N.E.2d at 1270 (holding that traffic stop based on officer’s mistaken belief that defendant had committed a traffic violation was “constitutionally impermissible and the evidence obtained as a consequence of that stop should have been suppressed” and reversing defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession).
2. Sufficiency of Evidence for Class A Misdemeanor OWI
I would hold that Staten’s conviction for class A misdemeanor OWI should be vacated in any event because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “operate[d] [his] vehicle [while intoxicated] in a manner that endangered] a person” as required by Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-2(b). Staten does not dispute that he operated his vehicle while intoxicated, which is defined as being under the influence of alcohol “so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person’s faculties.” Ind.Code § 9-13-2-86.4 By definition, however, Indiana Code Section 9 — 30—5—2(b) “requires more than intoxication to prove endangerment.” Vanderlinden v. State, 918 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied (2010).
The majority cites Outlaw v. State for the proposition that “[t]o prove endangerment, the State must prove that the defendant was operating the vehicle in a condition or manner that could have endangered any person, including the public, the police, or the defendant.” Op. at 84 (citing Outlaw, 918 N.E.2d at 381). The majority further states that
the endangerment clause does not require that the State prove a person other than the defendant was actually in the path of the defendant’s vehicle or in the same area in order to obtain a conviction. [State v.] Krohn, 521 N.E.2d [374,] 377 [ (Ind.Ct.App.1988) ]. An officer does not have to wait until the defendant crosses the centerline and adds another victim to the statistics of those who have died in drunk driving accidents. Id. Thus, it is sufficient that the defendant’s condition renders driving unsafe. Id.
Id. at 84 (quoting Staley, 895 N.E.2d at 1251).
With all due respect to my colleagues and the public policy concerns expressed in cases like Outlaw, Krohn, and Staley, I believe that the plain language of the statute requires the State to prove that a defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that actually endangered a person. “The primary rule in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute, giving all words their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute.” Murray v. State, 798 N.E.2d 895, 902 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (citation omitted). “We must ... strictly construe penal statutes against the State to avoid enlarging them beyond the fair meaning of the language used.” Id. In interpreting a statute, we must consider not only what the statute says, but also what it does not say. State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d 746, 750 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied.
*88Simply put, Indiana Code Section 9-30-5 — 2(b) does not say that a person commits class A misdemeanor OWI if he operates his vehicle in a manner that could possibly endanger a person. See Ind.Code § 9-30-5-2(b) (stating that operating a vehicle while intoxicated “is a Class A misdemean- or if the person operates a vehicle in a manner that endangers a person.”). To obtain a conviction under this statute, I believe that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant operated his vehicle in a manner that actually endangered himself or others. Proof of actual endangerment need not be proof of actual harm, but it must be something more than merely proof of operating a vehicle while intoxicated. To conclude otherwise would be to effectively obliterate the distinction between class C misdemeanor OWI (which requires only proof of intoxication) and class A misdemeanor OWI (which requires proof of both intoxication and endangerment). Moreover, I believe that proof of actual endangerment must consist of something more than pri-ma facie evidence of unlawful driving. Otherwise, any intoxicated person who committed a traffic violation of any kind, no matter how minor, could be convicted of class A misdemeanor OWI, which strikes me as contrary to the intent of our legislature.
This is not to say that evidence regarding a person’s intoxication or evidence that a person committed a traffic infraction would be irrelevant in proving endangerment, but only that the determination of endangerment should be fact-sensitive and dependent upon all the relevant circumstances of a particular case. Here, Staten, who was admittedly intoxicated, ran a stop sign on an apparently deserted access road in a small town in the middle of the night.5 Although the manner in which Staten operated his vehicle could possibly have endangered himself or someone else, I believe that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually endangered himself or anyone else. Therefore, at a minimum, I would vacate his conviction for class A misdemeanor OWI due to insufficient evidence and remand with instructions to reinstate his conviction for class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a BAC of 0.15 or more. Because I believe that Staten’s traffic stop was invalid, however, I would vacate his conviction for class A misdemeanor OWI and not remand for reinstatement of either of the remaining convictions.

. Of course, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine would bar evidence regarding Staten’s intoxication that was directly obtained during the invalid traffic stop as well as such evidence that was derivatively gained as a result of information learned during that stop. Taylor v. State, 929 N.E.2d 912, 920 (Ind.Ct.App.2010), trans. denied.

. The majority states that Trooper Greer "saw Staten drive his vehicle left of center line and through a 3-way stop sign without stopping or slowing down." Op. at 84. It bears repeating that the State failed to prove that Staten committed the left-of-center infraction, which was subject to a less onerous preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) ("[Traffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, in nature and the State must prove the commission of the infraction by only a preponderance of the evidence.”), trans. denied.