Court Opinion

ID: 9756343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:24:45.733159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:44.565148
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Roberts :
I continue to dissent from the majority’s unwarranted, unreasonable, and unwise interpretation of Section 8(a) of the Act which not only awards “potential windfall [s] to the taxpayer who underassesses himself,” but actually encourages taxpayers to underassess themselves “in the hope that the settlement will not be made within a year.” Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 435 Pa. 525, 534, 257 A. 2d 530, 534 (1969) (Roberts, J., dissenting). Although my reasons for dissenting have been succinctly presented in two previous dissents on this identical issue, Commonwealth v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., supra; Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., 423 Pa. 101, 223 A. 2d 223 (1966) (Roberts, J., dissenting), the importance of this question compels me to briefly reiterate the bases for my conclusion.
*91First, the majority persists in misinterpreting the statute so as to completely deprive the phrase, “so far as possible”, of any meaning whatsoever. In Commonwealth v. Allied Bldg., Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 378, 123 A. 2d 686, 691 (1956), this Court interpreted this statutory phrase to mean “reasonable” or “within reason”. The Court there stated: “ ‘The inclusion of the phrase “so far as possible” indicates an intent on the part of the Legislature that the provision is not mandatory upon the Department of Revenue. It recognizes that the duty placed on the department to act within one year is not absolute and immutable, saying, in effect, there may be circumstances present which, if proven, would allow a settlement of the taxpayer’s account to be made after the one (1) year period has elapsed. What would constitute sufficient cause to allow a settlement to be made after the one (1) year period has expired is a question that would have to be determined in each case upon its own particular facts.’ ” Id.
However, the Court in Safe Harbor, supra, unnecessarily restricted the “operative effect of the language to only those delays created by the taxpayer.” Id. at 109, 223 A. 2d at 227-28 (Roberts, J., dissenting). This construction rendered the phrase in question a nullity “. . . since even without this phrase, a taxpayer could not successfully charge the Commonwealth with the failure of timely action because of his own delay in furnishing the taxing authorities with the required records. ...” Id. Clearly the Legislature did not intend to include a meaningless phrase in the statute. Therefore this Court should observe the express intent of the Legislature and abandon its unreasonably restrictive reading of the statute.
Secondly, I can conceive of no justification for absolving the taxpayer of his tax liability when he suffers absolutely no prejudice as a result of the delay in *92assessment. In fact, the taxpayer who is assessed as here, actually receives the windfall use of his money, interest-free, during the interim, period, and furthermore, pays no penalty for originally underassessing himself. The taxpayer now seeks “that in addition to having this advantage his debt to the Commonwealth should be forgiven.” Commonwealth v. Safe Harbor Water Power Corp., supra at 112 n.2, 223 A. 2d at 229 n.2. The majority advances no rational basis for permitting the corporate taxpayer to escape this lawfully imposed tax liability. Moreover, today’s decision arbitrarily places upon the Commonwealth the severe sanction of forfeiting lawfully accrued tax revenues. Such an unrealistic, unconventional and unsound result compels dissent.
Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Manderino join in this dissent.