Court Opinion

ID: 9625609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:45:47.575012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:05.090345
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons I dissent.
The issue central to this lawsuit is: “Was the escape of the prisoner the result of a tort on the part of the State?” The trial court dismissed the action without finding out, and the opinion does not mention the issue.
Whether we have work release programs, or not, is a basic policy decision, and discretionary with the State, insofar as they are constitutionally permissible. No question is raised against that proposition. But, it does not follow that the escape of the prisoner from the work release program is also discretionary with the State. When we commend the work release program we commend a discretionary act taken at the planning level, the basic policy-making level. Here we are not concerned with decisions made on that level, we are concerned with circumstances occurring and decisions made on the operational level. This court has clearly made that distinction in Carroll v. State Road Commission,1
Plaintiffs’ allegations pertinent to the central issue are:
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4. On or about the 10th day of October, 1974, Michael Hart was an inmate in the Utah State Penitentiary under the control and custody of the warden of that penitentiary and his subordinate officers.
5. Michael Hart was incarcerated as a result of a crime involving moral turpitude, to-wit: arson, and by reason of the fact that he had a long history of violent criminal conduct, was known to the defendant, or should have been known to the defendant as being violent, malicious, incorrigible and a sexual deviate.
6. The criminal and dangerous propensities of the prisoner, Hart, were known to the defendant or, with the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known to the defendant and not withstanding this fact, the defendant, acting by and through its agents, officers and employees, allowed the prisoner to be released from custody without an order of the Court, without having served his sentence, and without having been rehabilitated; and in doing so, the defendant failed to exercise ordinary prudent control over the prisoner, thereby exposing the general public to the danger and risk attendant to such exposure.
7. The care of prisoner Hart by the defendant was so flagrantly negligent that those charged with his custody and supervision allowed him to purchase alcoholic beverages, to drink them while in custody and to regulate the terms and conditions of his own incarceration to suit his (Hart’s) convenience.
8. On or about the 10th day of October, 1974, prisoner Hart failed to return to the prison and this fact was known to the defendant, its officers, agents, and employees as of 9:30 p. m. on that date.
9. It was known to the defendant, its officers, agents and employees that the prisoner was acquainted with one, Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell, the mother of the plaintiffs, and the defendant knew or should have known that the prisoner was a former resident of Orem and that in light of his acquaintance with Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell and her husband, he was likely to seek out and find Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell and her husband, and notwithstanding the knowledge known to the defendant, its officers, agents and employees, the defendant failed and neglected to inform Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell or her husband or relatives, or the Orem Police Department, of such escape and the defendant failed to exercise prudent, diligent and prompt efforts to apprehend the said prisoner after he had escaped and knowing the facts of the prisoner’s propensities and his likely objectives and destinations, the defendant, nevertheless, did not act in a reason*246able manner to apprehend the said prisoner.
10. The prisoner Hart, on or about the 10th day of October, 1974, did batter, rape and murder Cynthia Hanegan Mitchell, the mother of the plaintiffs.
Now, unless we want to hold that escapes (under any circumstances), are an intrinsic part of the work release program, and as such discretionary, then we must reach further, into the operational level, to determine if decisions and circumstances culminating in the escape were tortious. Such can only be a matter of evidence, and not summary dismissal.
Another matter of grave concern is whether the actions of the State are legal on any level. Article XVI, Section 3, Constitution of Utah, states:
The Legislature shall prohibit:
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(3) The labor of convicts outside prison grounds, except in public works under the direct control of the State.
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Are the actions of the State constitutionally impermissible? An evidential determination is necessary.
With reference to the “arises out of the incarceration of any person . . .” exception in our Governmental Immunity Act,2 I submit that a careful reading of the statute, and a consideration of the policy reasons behind enacting such a statute conclusively show that the statute’s purpose is to prevent incarcerated persons from disrupting the orderly administration of governmental institutions where legal confinement, for crime or offense, is proper; by rendering nugatory frivolous lawsuits ' y incarcerated persons, against supervisory personnel.3 It has nothing whatever to do with a third party not even remotely connected with the incarceration.
This view, I believe, is strengthened by our Constitution.4 The phrase “arising out of the incarceration” was enacted, and must be read in the light of the constitutional provision which prohibits the labor of convicts outside the prison grounds, except in public works under the direct control of the State. Thus, it would seem the phrase could only mean injuries arising while the incarcerated person was in the prison, or under the direct control of the State, while laboring on a public work. By a logical extension it would embrace those incarcerated elsewhere.
The interpretation placed on the incarceration exception is, in my view, far too broad. What other remote and tenuous connections to incarceration would be countenanced under such interpretation ? Such an interpretation does not comport with the fact, viz., that, if anything, the claim arose out of the prisoner’s lack of incarceration. Thus, we return to the central point: How did that lack of incarceration occur? I would reverse and remand for trial.
TUCKETT, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J.

. 27 Utah 2d 384, 389, 496 P.2d 888 (1972).

. 63-39-10(10), U.C.A.1953.

. Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968).

.Article XVI, Section 3: The Legislature shall prohibit: The labor of convicts outside prison grounds, except in public works under the direct control of the State.