Court Opinion

ID: 9892879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 14:03:06.508175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:59.232530
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13717     Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 10/25/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13717
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        JOHN THOMAS SCHOOLCRAFT,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        WARDEN, G.S.P.,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00087-LGW-BWC
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13717

        Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                John Schoolcraft, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
        court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
        corpus. He asserts that the district court erred by concluding that
        the Georgia Court of Appeals didn’t unreasonably apply federal law
        in determining that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights
        under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before he made a
        self-incriminating statement to the police. He also contends that
        the Georgia Court of Appeals unreasonably applied federal law be-
        cause, he argues, it failed to consider whether the state trial court
        incorrectly determined that he was not in custody for Miranda pur-
        poses before the police read him his Miranda rights.
                                          I
               If a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, a fed-
        eral court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s decision
        (1) was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly es-
        tablished federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2)
        was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
        the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
        1996 imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-
        court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the
        benefit of the doubt. Sears v. Warden GDCP, 73 F.4th 1269, 1279
        (11th Cir. 2023).        This deference also applies to factual
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        22-13717                Opinion of the Court                          3

        determinations made by a state court; a factual determination
        made by a state court is presumed correct, and the petitioner has
        the burden of rebutting the presumption by clear and convincing
        evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e).
                Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings of the
        Supreme Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court
        decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). A state court
        unreasonably applies clearly established federal law if it identifies
        the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreason-
        ably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner’s case. Putman v.
        Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001). To be clear, though, an
        unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incor-
        rect application of federal law. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101. A state
        prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the state
        court’s ruling was “so lacking in justification” that its error was well
        understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possi-
        bility for reasonable disagreement. Id. at 103. In other words, a
        state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes fed-
        eral habeas relief so long as reasonable jurists could disagree about
        the correctness of the state court’s decision. Id. at 101.
               If the petitioner establishes that the state court unreasonably
        applied clearly established federal law, we still consider whether
        the state court’s error was harmless. Sears, 73 F.4th at 1280, 1292.
        An error is harmless unless “actual prejudice” results from it, mean-
        ing the error must have had a “substantial and injurious effect or
        influence” in determining the jury’s verdict. Id. at 1292. To assess
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13717

        the extent of any prejudicial effect, we examine the state court’s
        ruling in the context of the petitioner’s trial. Id. An error is not
        harmless if, after reviewing the record, we are left with a “grave
        doubt about the effect of the error.” Id.
                                         II
                In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the pros-
        ecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory on inculpa-
        tory, stemming from a defendant’s custodial interrogation unless it
        “demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure
        the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
        The Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated
        by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into cus-
        tody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
        cant way.” Id. Miranda requires that, prior to any questioning, the
        suspect "must be warned that he has the right to remain silent, that
        any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and
        that he has the right to an attorney. Id. The suspect may waive
        these rights, but only if the waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly,
        and intelligently.” Id. Of course, Miranda protects a right to have
        counsel present during any custodial interrogation; accordingly,
        absent such interrogation, no right arises, no infringement can oc-
        cur, and there is no need to determine whether a valid waiver oc-
        curred. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485–86 (1981).
               To invoke his rights under Miranda, a suspect must unequiv-
        ocally state that he wants to remain silent or that he does not want
        to talk to the officers or request that an attorney be present.
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        22-13717               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010). If the suspect
        makes a statement concerning the right to counsel that is ambigu-
        ous or equivocal or makes no statement, the police need not end
        the interrogation or ask questions to clarify whether the accused
        wants to invoke his Miranda rights. Id. at 381.
                Whether a suspect was in custody and entitled to Miranda
        warnings is a mixed question of fact and law. Thompson v. Keohane,
        516 U.S. 99, 102, 112–13 (1995). In determining whether an indi-
        vidual was in custody, a court must first examine the totality of the
        circumstances surrounding the interrogation—a factual inquiry.
        Id. at 112–13. The court then must consider whether, under those
        circumstances, there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
        movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest—the ulti-
        mate and legal inquiry. Id. The initial determination concerning
        custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interroga-
        tion, not on anyone’s subjective views; accordingly, the only rele-
        vant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s posi-
        tion would have felt that he was free to end the interrogation and
        leave. Id. The ultimate inquiry requires application of the control-
        ling legal standard to the historical facts. Id. Relevant factors in
        determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes
        include the location of the questioning, the duration of the ques-
        tioning, statements made during the interview, the presence or ab-
        sence of physical restraints during the interview, and whether the
        interviewee is released at the end of the interview. Howes v. Fields,
        565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13717

                In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Supreme Court considered
        whether the defendant, Alvarado, who was a minor at the time,
        had been in custody for Miranda purposes. 541 U.S. 652, 652–55
        (2004). The Court listed certain factors indicating that a reasonable
        person in Alvarado’s position would have felt free to end his inter-
        view at the police station and leave: (1) the police did not transport
        Alvarado to the police station or require him to appear at a certain
        time; (2) they did not threaten him or place him under arrest; (3)
        his parents remained in the lobby during the interview, suggesting
        it would be brief; (4) during the interview, the detective focused on
        Alvarado’s codefendant’s crimes, rather than Alvarado’s; (5) the de-
        tective appealed to Alvarado’s interest in telling the truth and being
        helpful, rather than threatening him; (6) the detective twice asked
        Alvarado if he wanted to take a break; and (7) Alvarado went home
        after the interview. Id. at 664–65. The Court also listed counter-
        vailing factors suggesting that a reasonable person would not have
        felt free to leave: (1) the interview lasted two hours; (2) the detec-
        tive did not tell Alvarado that he was free to leave; (3) Alvarado was
        brought to the police station by his legal guardian rather than by
        arriving on his own accord; and (4) Alvarado’s parents were not
        allowed to be present during the interview. Id. at 665.
               In Yarborough, which arose out of a habeas petition filed un-
        der § 2254, the Supreme Court held that though reasonable jurists
        could disagree over whether Alvarado was in custody, the state
        court’s application of clearly established federal law was reasona-
        ble. Id. at 664. The Court explained that the differing indications
        led it to hold that the state court’s application of the custody
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        22-13717               Opinion of the Court                        7

        standard was reasonable. Id. at 665. The Court further held that
        the more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching
        outcomes in case-by-case determinations, and considering that the
        custody test is general, the state court applied federal law that fit
        within the matrix of the Court’s prior decisions. Id. at 664–65. The
        Court held that it could not grant relief under § 2254 by conducting
        its own independent inquiry into whether the state court was cor-
        rect as a de novo matter. Id. at 665.
                Before the state may introduce a defendant’s uncounseled,
        self-incriminating statements made during a custodial interroga-
        tion, the state must show that the defendant knowingly and volun-
        tarily waived his Miranda rights, but the state need not show that
        the waiver was expressly given. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382, 384. The
        state needs to show that the waiver (1) “was the product of a free
        and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep-
        tion,” and (2) was “made with a full awareness of both the nature
        of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
        to abandon it.” Id. at 382–83. Only if the circumstances surround-
        ing the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the req-
        uisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that
        the Miranda rights have been waived. See id. at 383–85. Factors
        when considering the totality of the circumstances include the de-
        fendant’s lack of education or low intelligence, failure to appraise
        the defendant of his rights, the length of detention, the repeated
        and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use of physical
        punishment, including deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13717

        Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). No single factor is controlling.
        Id.
                                          III
               Here, the district court correctly concluded that the Georgia
        Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law in deter-
        mining that Schoolcraft knowingly and voluntarily waived his Mi-
        randa rights before making a self-incriminating statement to the po-
        lice. See § 2254(d); Sears, 73 F.4th at 1279; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
               As an initial matter, several objective factors support the
        conclusion that Schoolcraft was not in custody for Miranda pur-
        poses—(1) that Schoolcraft voluntarily went to the police station in
        his own car with his wife, who waited in the lobby during his inter-
        view, (2) that the police did not tell him that he was under arrest
        and made no allegations pre-Miranda regarding the sexual relation-
        ship between him and the victim, (3) that there was no evidence
        that he was threatened, handcuffed, or physically restrained during
        the interview, (4) that he was offered and given drinks, cigarettes,
        and restroom breaks, and (5) that he was told that he could leave.
        See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102, 112–13; Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; Yar-
        borough, 541 U.S. at 664–65.
               True, some factors might have supported a conclusion that
        Schoolcraft was in custody—(1) that he was interviewed in a se-
        cured room at the police station, and he got to that room by walk-
        ing through an automatically locked door and past several officers’
        cubicles, (2) that the pre-Miranda portion of the interview lasted
        about four hours, and the interview continued for about three
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        22-13717              Opinion of the Court                        9

        more hours post-Miranda, (3) that he was escorted to and from the
        restroom and to and from his smoke break, and (4) that he was ar-
        rested at the end of his interview. See Thompson, 516 U.S. at 102,
        112–13; Howes, 565 U.S. at 509; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664–65.
                Because the competing considerations could lead reasonable
        jurists to disagree over whether Schoolcraft was in custody, we
        cannot say that the Georgia Court of Appeals unreasonably applied
        federal law in concluding that he was not.
                Moreover, even if a reasonable jurist could have concluded
        that Schoolcraft was in custody for several hours, and even though
        his custody would be a relevant factor in determining whether he
        knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights after receiv-
        ing them, it did not, by itself, determine whether his waiver was
        coerced. See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382–84; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
        226. The evidence shows that, though Schoolcraft was hungry and
        unfed on the day of the interrogation, he was generally given access
        to relieve himself, given drinks and cigarettes, and was never phys-
        ically punished. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. There was also no
        evidence that he lacked education or that he had low intelligence.
        See id. After his Miranda rights were read to him, Schoolcraft con-
        firmed that he understood them, he continued to talk to the officers
        without asking for an attorney or asking to stop the interview, and
        he subsequently gave a confession. See id. Thus, the Georgia Court
        of Appeals reasonably applied federal law when it concluded that,
        under the totality of the circumstances, Schoolcraft voluntarily and
        knowingly waived his Miranda rights before he confessed that he
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13717

        engaged in sexual conduct with the victim. See Miranda, 384 U.S.
        at 444; Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 382–84; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226;
        Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101–03.
                Finally, to the extent that Schoolcraft argues that he was en-
        titled to Miranda warnings before he made statements about kiss-
        ing the victim and being in love with her because he considered
        them self-incriminating, the admission of these statements at trial
        was harmless because his post-Miranda confession that he engaged
        in sexual conduct with the victim—the acts that for which he was
        charged—was properly admitted at trial. See Sears, 73 F.4th at 1280,
        1292.
              For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err by
        denying Schoolcraft’s § 2254 petition.
              AFFIRMED.