Court Opinion

ID: 9852302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:28:08.52284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:25.240790
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The General Assembly in crafting the State Tort Claims Act clearly, unambiguously, and plainly stated: “[n]o action against the state under this article shall be commenced and the courts shall have no jurisdiction thereof unless and until a written notice of claim has been timely presented to the state as provided in this subsection.” Ga. L. 1992, p. 1883, § 1; Ga. L. 1994, p. 1717, § 12; Ga. L. 1998, p. 128, § 50; OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (3); Williams v. Dept. of Human Resources, 272 Ga. 624 (532 SE2d 401) (2000); Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., 267 Ga. 90 (475 SE2d 614) (1996); Kim v. Dept. of Transp., 235 Ga. App. 480, 482 (510 SE2d 50) (1998); Bradley v. Ga. Institute of Technology, 228 Ga. App. 216, 219 (1) (c) (491 SE2d 453) (1997); Howard v. State of Ga., 226 Ga. App. 543, 544-545 (1) (487 SE2d 112) (1997). Such plain language limits the subject matter jurisdiction not only of the trial court but also of the appellate courts where the notice has not been given as a condition precedent to suit to have jurisdiction limited to deal only with the issue of its own subject matter jurisdiction; thus, the trial court has limited subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction only. OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1); Kim v. Dept. of Transp., supra at 482; Bradley v. Ga. Institute of Technology, supra at 219; Howard v. State of Ga., supra at 543-544. Such express limitation of subject matter jurisdiction of the courts is a procedural matter that does not reach the merits. See generally Henderson v. Dept. of Transp., supra at 90.
Summary judgment constitutes an adjudication on the merits and is not the appropriate procedural vehicle to deal with pleas of abatement, a dilatory plea, i.e., lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction of the person, venue, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, lack of indispensable party, which are dilatory defenses that do not cause an adjudication on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice. See State Bar of Ga. v. Beazley, 256 Ga. 561, 563 (1) (350 SE2d 422) (1986); Nat. Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, 244 Ga. 240, 242-243 (260 SE2d 1) (1979); McPherson v. McPherson, 238 Ga. 271, 272 (1) (232 SE2d 552) (1977); Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, 232 Ga. 614, 615 (208 SE2d 459) (1974); Larwin Mtg. Investors v. Delta Equities, 129 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) (201 SE2d 187) (1973); Hemphill v. Con-Chem, 128 Ga. App. 590, 591-593 (197 SE2d 457) (1973). Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment instead of dismissal without prejudice because: (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the case; and (2) summary judgment is not *451the appropriate procedure to deal with lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the judgment should be reversed and vacated.
Decided July 6, 2001
Ronny E. Jones, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Allyson G. Krause, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
As a practical matter in this case, since the 12 months are long past and notice cannot now be given, the requirement to give notice as a condition precedent to suit has the effect of a statute of limitation, because the window of opportunity to sue the State has now closed. However, in cases of minors, incompetents, or others under a disability or where the dismissal comes within the 12-month window of opportunity, the plaintiff could now give the proper statutory notice to the State and satisfy the condition precedent. See Howard v. Dept. of Transp., supra at 544-545.