Court Opinion

ID: 9579732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:04.876476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:43.803558
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
In the instant case it is undisputed that appellant knew in advance what treatment would be undertaken. Appellant has offered no competent evidence that appellees, or either of them, made wilful misrepresentations as to the risks or dangers attendant upon the procedure. The testimony of the physicians who appeared in appellant’s behalf was, at best, equivocal on this point.
Moreover, since under Georgia law the physician has no affirmative duty to disclose the risks of treatment, silence as to the mere remote possibility of perforation does not constitute fraud. See Padgett v. Ferrier, 172 Ga. App. 335 (323 SE2d 166) (1984). Thus there exists in the instant case no fraud which would vitiate the validity of appellant’s consent to the procedure, or which would activate the provisions of such Code sections as §§ 51-6-1, 51-6-2 (a), 51-6-4 (a), or 51-11-2.
The interpretation given to OCGA § 31-9-6 in Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737 (222 SE2d 113) (1975), has been consistently followed by the courts of this state on the principle of stare decisis. See Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga. App. 344 (306 SE2d 404) (1983); see also Butler v. Brown, 162 Ga. App. 376 (290 SE2d 293) (1982); Blount v. Moore, 159 Ga. App. 80 (282 SE2d 720) (1981).
In deliberating on the case sub judice, we are constrained to reiterate the considerations set forth in Simpson v. Dickson, supra, and to conclude that the judgment below should be affirmed. I therefore respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier and Judge Benham join in this dissent.