Court Opinion

ID: 9385672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 19:02:41.236636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.803450
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 In re Derek M. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re DEREK M. et al., Persons                                         B320496
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP06928A-C)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
           v.
 JOHNNY M. and CHRISTOPHER C.,
           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Philip L. Soto, Judge. Affirmed in part and
conditionally reversed in part with directions.
      Jacques Alexander Love, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Johnny M.
      Michelle Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Christopher C.
      Dawyn Harrison, Interim County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              _________________________________

       Johnny M., the father of Derek M., and Christopher C., the
father of Aliyah C. and Alyssa C., appeal from the juvenile court’s
orders terminating parental rights under Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 366.26. Johnny also appeals the
juvenile court’s denial of his section 388 petition. The mother of
all three children is not a party to the appeal.
       Johnny contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
denying the section 388 petition. He challenges the denial on the
grounds that he presented new evidence showing a change of
circumstances, and therefore established it is in Derek’s best
interests to have another chance to reunify and enjoy
unmonitored visits with his father. Johnny also argues for
reversal of the order terminating his parental rights based on the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception under section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). He contends that because he
maintained regular visitation and contact with Derek, Derek had
a substantial and positive emotional relationship with his father,
thereby establishing that termination of Johnny’s parental rights
would be detrimental to Derek.
       Johnny and Christopher both contend the juvenile court’s
finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) (ICWA) did not apply was erroneous because it was

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
predicated upon a defective ICWA inquiry by the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).2
DCFS does not oppose a remand for further inquiry in accordance
with ICWA.
       We disagree with Johnny’s assertions regarding the
juvenile court’s findings and orders denying his section 388
petition and terminating parental rights under section 366.26.
However, we agree that further ICWA inquiry is warranted in
this case, and therefore conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s
orders terminating Johnny’s and Christopher’s parental rights
and remand the matter for the limited purpose of ensuring
compliance with the requirements of ICWA and related state law.
If, based on the completed ICWA inquiry, the juvenile court finds
no reason to believe Derek, Aliyah or Alyssa is an Indian child, or
if no tribe or agency determines any of the children is an Indian
child, the orders terminating parental rights shall be reinstated
as the orders of the juvenile court.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       1. Initial detention, adjudication and disposition
       Derek was born in April 2010.
       In July 2017 DCFS received a referral alleging a domestic
violence incident between Mother and Johnny during which both
parents grabbed Derek. DCFS substantiated the allegations,
referred Mother to counseling, and closed the referral. Mother

      2 Christopher’s sole contention on appeal is that the
juvenile court and respondent failed to comply with the duty of
inquiry pursuant to ICWA and related California statutes,
requiring a conditional reversal and remand.

                                 3
obtained a permanent restraining order against Johnny
protecting herself and Derek.
       Aliyah was born in March 2018.
       In September 2018, DCFS received a new referral alleging
general neglect of Derek and Aliyah by Mother. At that time,
Mother, Derek and Aliyah were living with Christopher, and
Johnny’s whereabouts were unknown. On October 26, 2018,
DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Derek and Aliyah
alleging the children were at risk due to the previously reported
domestic violence between Johnny and Mother, Mother’s
substance abuse (methamphetamine and amphetamine), and
Christopher’s substance abuse (alcohol).
       The juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition and at
the disposition hearing on December 13, 2018, ordered the
children removed from parental custody with reunification
services and monitored visitation. The court ordered Johnny to
participate in a 26-week DCFS/court-approved domestic violence
program for perpetrators, a parenting class, and individual
counseling with a licensed DCFS-approved therapist to address
child protection, conflict resolution, and anger management.
       2. Reunification: December 2018 to June 2020
       Between December 2018 and May 2019, Johnny had
weekly monitored visits with Derek. Derek reported that he
loved his visits with both his mother and his father, and he
wanted to live with both of them.
       Alyssa was born in May 2019, and DCFS filed a section 300
petition as to her on May 31, 2019. The juvenile court sustained
the petition and ordered Alyssa to remain in Mother’s custody.
Mother began overnight visits with Derek and Aliyah on June 1,
2019. At the six-month review hearing on June 13, 2019, the

                                 4
juvenile court returned Derek and Aliyah to Mother’s custody
with family maintenance services. The court granted Johnny
unmonitored visits, once a week for four hours.
       Johnny completed his parenting program (16 classes) in
June 2019, and his domestic violence program (26 sessions) in
August 2019.
       Derek reported that he enjoyed spending time with his
father and asked to have overnight visits with him. On
November 1, 2019, DCFS granted Johnny overnight weekend
visits with Derek, which continued until the COVID-19 pandemic
hit in March 2020. Thereafter, Derek and Johnny’s visits took
place over video chat.
       3. Re-detention and adjudication: May to August
          2020
       In May 2020, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine
and Christopher also relapsed. On May 20, 2020, Derek was
moved to Johnny’s home. But the next day DCFS received an
anonymous text message that Johnny was using
methamphetamine. On May 22, 2020, Johnny tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine. Derek was returned to his
mother’s care on June 3, 2020.
       On June 12, 2020, DCFS detained Derek, Aliyah, and
Alyssa and placed them in foster care. Derek said he felt good
about being placed in foster care because he only felt safe in
foster care or with Johnny. The foster parents reported that
Derek, Aliyah, and Alyssa were comforted by each other’s
presence and wanted to be together.
       On August 12, 2020 the juvenile court ordered the children
removed from the parents with reunification services. The court
ordered Johnny to participate in a full drug/alcohol program for a

                                5
minimum of six months, random or on-demand drug testing,
parenting classes, and individual therapy.
      In an interview with DCFS on July 10, 2020, Johnny
admitted that he used methamphetamine with Mother on a
regular basis for about two years starting when Derek was three
or four years old. But he claimed he had been sober until two
weeks before Derek was placed in his care, and his last drug use
was the day of his positive test in May. He told DCFS he
intended to remain sober and comply with all programs to get
Derek back, but he tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine again that day.3 DCFS found Johnny’s statement
that he had refrained from drug use prior to May 2020 was not
credible.
      4. Reunification: August 2020 to December 2021
      Between August and October 2020, Johnny attended an
eight-week outpatient program through Kaiser, and in November
he enrolled in an outpatient program through MFI Recovery
Center. But he tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamine on December 8, 2020, and between August 5, 2020,
and January 7, 2021, all 15 of his other scheduled drug tests were
“no-shows.”
      On January 22, 2021, all three children were placed with
their maternal great uncle Alejandro and his wife Diana, who
stated they were open to adopting the children in the event
reunification with the parents failed. Derek reported being
happy to be with his relatives.

      3Johnny also tested positive for methamphetamine on July
27, 2020, and was a “no-show” for drug tests on June 29, July 13,
and July 22, 2020.

                                6
       Johnny continued with the MFI program until March 31,
2021, when he was discharged for lack of attendance. In January
and March he had two negative drug tests with MFI, but on
February 25, 2021, he tested positive for methamphetamine and
amphetamines. Johnny missed two DCFS-scheduled drug tests
in January and February. In the meantime, however, Johnny’s
weekly two-hour visits with Derek were going well.
       At the six-month review hearing on March 25, 2021, the
juvenile court ordered continued reunification services. The court
ordered Johnny to continue drug testing, but specified that a
missed test would be considered a positive test. Thereafter,
Johnny missed the next five drug tests scheduled by DCFS in
April, May, and June 2021.
       Johnny re-enrolled at MFI on July 22, 2021. MFI reported
Johnny had started a medication to help with addiction. In
August and September, 2021, he missed two tests and had three
negative drug tests with MFI. During the same period he missed
three DCFS drug tests.
       Johnny attended the majority of his weekly monitored
visits with Derek, but started missing visits over the summer.
When he missed visits, Johnny did not call ahead to cancel, nor
did he call afterwards to check on Derek. Derek continued to
state that he would like to return to his father’s care, but if that
did not happen he wanted to remain with Alejandro and Diana.
       By September 2021, Derek was showing major
improvements in his behavior in his placement with Alejandro
and Diana. He was attentive and helpful at home, and had made
great progress with his schoolwork. Derek was affectionate
toward his caregivers, and the three children always appeared

                                 7
happy in the home. Alejandro and Diana wanted to adopt the
children.
        In the meantime, the parents had not consistently made
themselves available to meet with DCFS, they had not
demonstrated any change in conduct, and none of them had
fulfilled drug testing requirements or otherwise had fully
complied with their case plans. At the 12-month review hearing
on September 30, 2021, the juvenile court continued reunification
services against DCFS’s recommendation.
        Derek continued weekly monitored visits with Johnny, but
Johnny was consistently late and always ended the visits a half
hour early. Johnny missed the October 16, 2021 visit altogether
and did not call; Derek cried. Asked about his visits with Johnny,
Derek expressed frustration, saying, “ ‘My dad keeps on being
late all the time. When we get to the park, he keeps getting late!
Late! Late! Late!’ ”
        In a progress report dated November 1, 2021, MFI reported
Johnny had not attended any sessions in person since
September 22, 2021, and had stopped drug testing with MFI after
that date. Between August 2 and September 22, three out of
seven of Johnny’s MFI drug tests were negative, two were
positive, and he had twice refused to test. He missed his DCFS-
scheduled drug tests on September 16, October 1, and
November 2, 2021.
        Alejandro and his wife continued to express interest in
adopting the children.
        The juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification
services at the 18-month review hearing on December 14, 2021,
and set a section 366.26 hearing for April 12, 2022 (later
continued to May 12, 2022).

                                8
       5. Permanent Planning Period: December 2021 to
          May 2022
       Johnny visited Derek for the last time on December 25,
2021. He called Derek on January 15, 2022, but Derek hung up
the phone, crying. A visit scheduled for January 22, 2022, did not
take place. Johnny had no other contact with Derek that month.
Alejandro reported that even before January 2022, Johnny had
missed many of his scheduled visits, which greatly affected
Derek. Johnny told Alejandro he was living in Modesto with his
father and was having difficulty getting to Los Angeles to visit
Derek, but he did not accept Alejandro’s offer to meet Johnny
halfway for visits.
       Johnny called Derek twice in February, but did not visit
him. On February 23, 2022, when asked about visits with his
father, Derek said, “ ‘I haven’t even seen him for 6 weeks. He
says that he loses his car. He always says no meeting no meeting
it’s been six weeks, six weeks since I’ve seen him.’ ” With regard
to being adopted, Derek said, “ ‘It’s been a year now and I’ve been
waiting to be adopted.’ ” Nevertheless, Derek continued to
express a desire to return to his father’s care or remain with
Alejandro and his wife.
       DCFS reported that all three children always appeared
happy, responsive, and very connected to their caregivers. Derek
was openly affectionate with Alejandro, and his sisters
“constantly” wanted to be picked up and held.
              a. The section 388 petition
       Johnny filed a section 388 petition on April 11, 2022,
requesting that Derek be returned to his care or that
reunification services be reinstated with unmonitored overnight
and weekend visitation. In support of the petition Johnny stated

                                9
he had completed a 26-week domestic violence program and
parenting classes and he had participated in individual
counseling.4 He declared that Derek continued to be interested
in visiting Johnny and would benefit from having his father in
his life. Johnny stated that he loved and wanted to support
Derek. But he did not acknowledge his limited contacts and
failure to visit Derek after December 2021, nor did he provide
any evidence in support of his section 388 petition from the
period after termination of reunification services.
       On April 12, 2022, the juvenile court set a May 12, 2022
hearing date for the petition.
              b. Further DCFS reports
       In its report in response to the section 388 petition, DCFS
noted a new vandalism charge against Johnny on December 17,
2021. DCFS also stated it had previously documented Johnny’s
completion of the 26-week domestic violence program and
parenting classes in its June 11, 2020 status review report. As
for individual counseling, DCFS reported it had been unable to
verify Johnny’s participation or progress in therapy since his
claimed enrollment in December 2019. Subsequently, Johnny
had tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine,
and on August 12, 2020, the juvenile court made new orders that
Johnny complete a full six-month substance abuse program with
aftercare, random drug testing, parenting classes, and individual
counseling with a DCFS-approved therapist. Thereafter, Johnny
continued to struggle with his substance abuse, he consistently

      4Documents submitted with the petition showed Johnny
had completed these programs by August 2019.

                                10
failed to submit to random testing, and there was no indication
he had completed any drug treatment program.
       In April 2022, Derek said he had not seen Johnny in five
months, since Christmas Day 2021. He expressed anger that his
father did not visit, call or text, even on Derek’s birthday. He did
not believe Johnny would ever change, and he spoke positively
about being adopted by Alejandro and Diana. Derek said he was
happy in his caregivers’ home and wanted to continue living with
them. He added, “ ‘I don’t know how I would feel about seeing my
dad. I would feel sad if I saw him because it’s been 5 months;
5 months’ (the child became upset and yelling)! . . . ‘I’m happy
here and I want to live here.’ ”
       Alejandro reported no improvement in the parents’
attitudes or conduct toward their children, nor did they
demonstrate that the children were a priority in their lives.
Although Alejandro and his wife remained committed to adopting
the children, they were unwilling to proceed if visits with the
parents were required as part of the adoption.
       6. Section 388 hearing on May 12, 2022
       On the morning of the hearing, Johnny’s counsel filed two
exhibits. The first was a letter dated May 2, 2022, from New
Hope Recovery in Modesto. The letter stated that Johnny had
enrolled in an outpatient program on January 10, 2022, and
completed the program on May 2, 2022. He had attended 12
individual sessions, 24 group sessions, and had 16 negative drug
tests. The second exhibit was a letter from MFI dated May 11,
2022. It stated Johnny “was under MFI Recovery Center’s
medical care since Aug. 5, 2021. [He] was also enrolled at MFI’s
Medicated Assisted Treatment Program and has received
2 monthly Vivitrol injections.”

                                11
       The court denied the section 388 petition, noting there were
no recent drug tests through DCFS, and there was no evidence
the tests through the outpatient program met DCFS standards.
Johnny had shown changing circumstances, but not enough to
show a likelihood he would be drug-free going forward. As for the
best interests of the child, the court found it was not in Derek’s
best interest to continue with this relationship based on Johnny’s
history of missing scheduled visits and failing to maintain
regular contact with his son. The court expressed great
disappointment over Johnny’s failure even to show up for the
child’s birthday. The court added that Derek’s own statements
showed that the relationship between Derek and Johnny was
broken as a result of Johnny’s conduct, and the court had no
confidence the relationship could be repaired in six months or at
any time before Derek becomes an adult. It was therefore not in
Derek’s best interest to grant the petition.
       7. Section 366.26 hearing on May 12, 2022
       At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court stated it
was inclined to terminate parental rights. Johnny offered no
additional evidence, but argued that he had visited regularly and
consistently, the visits had gone well, and Derek had expressed
interest in continuing to see his father. Based on the bond that
existed between Derek and his father, Johnny argued that the
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception applied, and
Derek would benefit from a continued relationship with him.
       The court found that Johnny was not showing up to visits,
and the evidence showed none of the parents had maintained a
beneficial bond with the children. The court terminated parental
rights as to all three children.

                                12
                           DISCUSSION
    I. The Juvenile Court Properly Denied Johnny’s
       Section 388 Petition
       Johnny contends the juvenile court erred in denying the
section 388 petition because he made a sufficient showing to
require the court to vacate the section 366.26 hearing and return
Derek to his care or reinstate reunification services with
unmonitored visitation. We disagree.
       A. Governing law and standard of review
       Pursuant to section 388, subdivision (a), a parent may
petition the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside any
previous order of the court when the parent presents new
evidence or a change of circumstances and demonstrates that
modification of the previous order is in the child’s best interests.
(§ 388; In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063, 1079–1080; In
re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525 (J.C.).) The parent seeking
modification of the prior order has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) a change of circumstances
or new evidence warrants the proposed modification, and (2) the
proposed change is in the child’s best interests. (In re L.S. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194; In re Michael B. (1992) 8
Cal.App.4th 1698, 1703.)
       Reunification services are limited to reduce “the length of
time a child has to wait for a parent to become adequate.” (In re
Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308 (Marilyn H.).) For a child
three years of age or older when first removed from a parent’s
physical custody, the parent and child shall receive 12 months of
reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(A); Michael G. v.
Superior Court (Apr. 6, 2023, S271809) __ Cal.5th __ [pp. 1, 8–9].)

                                13
Services may be extended up to 18 months (361.5, subd.
(a)(3)(A)), but generally, if the child is not returned to the
parent’s physical custody at the 18-month mark, the juvenile
court must terminate services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
(Michael G., supra, __ Cal.5th __ [at pp. 1, 8–9]; § 366.22,
subd. (a)(3).)
       “After the termination of reunification services, the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this point ‘the focus
shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’ ”
(Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317; J.C., supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at p. 526.) Indeed, “there is a rebuttable
presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of
the child.” (Stephanie M., at p. 317; Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th
at p. 302; Amber G. v. Superior Court (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 465,
489.) And where “the permanent plan is adoption, that
presumption is even more difficult to overcome.” (In re
Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 448–449; see also In re
Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1235 [parent’s burden of
“showing that changed circumstances demonstrate a return to
parental custody is in the child’s best interests . . . may be
especially difficult to sustain for a parent who failed to continue
with substance abuse treatment during the reunification
period”].)
       Thus, “[n]ot every change in circumstance can justify
modification of a prior order.” (In re S.R. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th
864, 870.) To warrant changing or setting aside an order
terminating reunification services, the change in circumstances
or new evidence must be substantial, such that “ ‘the undoing of
the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re

                                 14
Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615; Stephanie M., supra,
7 Cal.4th at p. 317; In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.)
“ ‘A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and
would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a
child to see if a parent . . . might be able to reunify at some future
point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s best
interests.’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 206; In re
Mickel O., at p. 615.)
       Determination of a section 388 petition is committed to the
sound discretion of the juvenile court. (Stephanie M., supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 318; J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) A
reviewing court will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision
“ ‘ “unless the [juvenile] court has exceeded the limits of legal
discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.] . . . ‘ “The appropriate
test for abuse of discretion is whether the [juvenile] court
exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no
authority to substitute its decision for that of the [juvenile]
court.” ’ ” (Stephanie M., at pp. 318–319.)
       B. Johnny failed to show changed circumstances in
           support of his section 388 petition
       Johnny’s section 388 petition, filed on April 11, 2022,
presented no new evidence or changed circumstances whatsoever.
In support of the petition, Johnny attached two documents: one
showing he had completed a 26-week domestic violence program
on August 16, 2019, and the other showing that by June 19, 2019,
he had completed a parenting program. But DCFS had already
reported Johnny’s completion of both programs in its
December 12, 2019 status review report. The information in

                                 15
these documents was before the juvenile court when it
terminated reunification services and did not show changed
circumstances.
       Moreover, on August 12, 2020, the juvenile court sustained
a new count against Johnny based on his methamphetamine and
amphetamine abuse and ordered him to complete a new case
plan. The new case plan required Johnny to complete a six-
month full drug and alcohol program with aftercare, submit to
random or on-demand drug testing, complete parenting classes,
and undertake individual counseling. Johnny’s petition
contained no evidence of his participation in any substance abuse
program, classes, or counseling services after August 2019.
       Notwithstanding the facial deficiency of the petition, the
juvenile court granted a hearing, and ordered Johnny to present
any documentation to DCFS as soon as possible to enable DCFS
to verify and make its assessment before the May 12, 2022
hearing. But Johnny declined to make a statement to DCFS and
did not send DCFS any documentation about enrollment or
completion of any programs in accordance with the case plan.
       Johnny did not testify at the hearing, and the two letters he
filed that morning were not authenticated. DCFS had no
opportunity to verify the information in the letter from New Hope
Recovery or seek further information or clarification about the
four-month outpatient treatment program Johnny had
completed. Although the letter from MFI was dated May 11,

                                16
2022, the information it contained had been reported to the
juvenile court before reunification services were terminated.5
       The juvenile court noted there were no recent drug tests
from DCFS, and there was no information about what procedures
and controls were in place to ensure the validity of the drug tests
conducted through the outpatient program. In the two years
since Derek was placed in foster care due to Johnny’s
methamphetamine abuse, Johnny attended substance abuse
treatment for several months at a time, but then would relapse
and resume his drug abuse.
       Despite being ordered in August 2020 to participate in
substance abuse treatment for a minimum of six months, by the
time of the hearing on his section 388 petition in May 2022,
Johnny had only managed to complete a four-month outpatient
program. Thus, even taking the exhibits submitted on the day of
the hearing at face value, the juvenile court was justified in
concluding that while Johnny had made progress against his
drug addiction, he had not yet “beaten these demons,” and had
failed to show materially changed circumstances. (See In re N.F.
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 121 [“In the context of a substance
abuse problem that has repeatedly resisted treatment in the past,

      5 In his opening brief, Johnny claims the MFI letter showed
he was “still connected with MFI by receiving twice monthly
Vivitrol injections to assist in his sobriety.” However, the letter
referred to Johnny’s association with MFI in the past tense and
contained no indication that his participation in the program was
ongoing. Moreover, given that Johnny’s last drug test with MFI
was on September 22, 2021, and he had not been to the office
since then, his interpretation of the MFI letter appears
disingenuous at best.

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a showing of materially changed circumstances requires more
than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet
another program”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415,
423 [seven months of sobriety insufficient to show changed
circumstances given parent’s history].)
       Derek was eight years old when he was first placed in
foster care and Johnny started receiving reunification services.
He was 11 by the time the court terminated reunification
services, and 12 on the date of the section 388 hearing.
“Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.”
(Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.) Johnny’s showing of
changing circumstances was not sufficient to establish that a
substantial change of circumstances or new evidence warranted
the modification Johnny sought in his section 388 petition.
       C. Johnny also failed to show the proposed change
           was in Derek’s best interest
       It was Johnny’s burden to prove that the change in his
circumstances and Derek’s current circumstances were such that
it was in Derek’s best interest to be placed in Johnny’s custody or
to begin a new period of reunification services. In light of
Johnny’s history of inconsistent visitation and his failure to
maintain regular contact with his son over the five months
preceding the section 388 hearing, the juvenile court was entirely
justified in finding that Johnny had failed to show that the
modification proposed in the section 388 petition was in Derek’s
best interest.
       In the past, Derek had enjoyed a positive visiting
relationship with Johnny and had expressed a desire to live with
him. In the section 388 petition, Johnny cited Derek’s continued
interest in visiting his father (which was noted in the DCFS’s

                                18
April 12, 2022 section 366.26 report) as evidence that it was in
the child’s best interest to reunify with Johnny. But by the time
of the hearing on May 12, 2022, Derek’s interest in visiting
Johnny had changed. Johnny’s last visit with Derek had been on
December 25, 2021; he did not visit Derek at all in the next four
and a half months. During that time, Johnny did not even
maintain regular telephone contact with his son.
       Before, when Johnny had become inconsistent about
attending scheduled visits, it upset Derek. It hurt Derek deeply
when he no longer had any contact at all. Derek expressed anger
and frustration about Johnny’s failure to contact him, even on
Derek’s birthday.
       However, Derek learned over time to process his feelings
and had come to accept the absence of his father in his life. By
the end of April 2022, Derek no longer wanted to live with
Johnny, but wanted to remain in his “safe house” with Alejandro
and Diana who took good care of him. Derek said he was happy
living with his caregivers and wanted to be adopted by them. At
the same time he expressed ambivalence about whether he would
even want to visit Johnny anymore.
       Although Johnny’s move to Modesto had made in-person
visits more difficult, nothing prevented him from maintaining
telephone or video contact with Derek in the five months before
the May 12, 2022 hearing. Yet, inexplicably, Johnny made no
effort to stay in touch with his son. Johnny’s choices had already
caused chaos in Derek’s young life, and there was no reason to
believe any change would result if the juvenile court granted
additional reunification services.
       Although reunification is favored at the beginning of the
dependency process, the opposite is true at the end of the process,

                                19
when the child deserves a stable, permanent home. (In re
Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 420.) Indeed, “after a child has
spent a substantial period in foster care and attempts at
reunification have proved fruitless, the child’s interest in stability
outweighs the parent’s interest in asserting the right to the
custody and companionship of the child.” (Id. at pp. 419–420.)
After three and a half years of upheaval, Derek deserved the
permanence and stability that adoption would provide.
        The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding
the best interests of the child dictated denial of Johnny’s petition
under section 388 for custody of Derek or further reunification
services.
    II. The Juvenile Court Properly Determined that the
        Exception to Termination of Parental Rights Under
        Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) Did Not Apply
        Johnny contends the juvenile court erred when it found the
beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of
parental rights under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) did
not apply and terminated Johnny’s parental rights. We conclude
there was no error.
        A. Applicable law
        After the juvenile court terminates a parent’s reunification
services, “ ‘the focus [of the proceedings] shifts to the needs of the
child for permanency and stability.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 45, 52 (Celine R.); see Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 304 [“the sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select
and implement one of the listed permanent plans”].) At this
point, adoption becomes the preferred permanent plan for the
child, and if the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, section 366.26,

                                 20
subdivision (c)(1) requires the court to “choose that option—and
as a result terminate the natural parents’ parental rights.”
(Celine R., at p. 49; In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630
(Caden C.).) However, “the parent may avoid termination of
parental rights in certain circumstances defined by statute. One
of these is the parental-benefit exception. What it requires a
parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, is that
the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that
terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child.”
(Caden C., at pp. 629, 631 [to establish the exception the parent
must prove each of the three elements]; § 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(i).)
       As our Supreme Court has explained, the beneficial
parental relationship exception is limited in scope. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) The exception applies only where
the juvenile court “ ‘finds a compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child.’ ” (Ibid.) And
“in assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the
[juvenile] court must decide whether the harm from severing the
child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the
child of placement in a new adoptive home. [Citation.] By
making this decision, the [juvenile] court determines whether
terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests.” (Id.
at p. 632.)
       The court clarified in Caden C. that a parent’s ongoing
struggles with the issues preventing reunification, while
relevant, do not constitute a categorical bar to establishing the
exception. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637–638.) The
critical question is whether the child’s relationship with his or

                                21
her parent is so significant that it outweighs the benefits of
adoption, not whether the parent has satisfactorily addressed the
issues that led to dependency proceedings. (Id. at pp. 635–636.)
       When the parent has established the application of the
parental-benefit exception by showing it would not be in the best
interest of the child to terminate parental rights, the court should
select a permanent plan other than adoption. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).)
       B. Standard of review
       An appellate court reviews the juvenile court’s findings on
the first two elements—regular visitation and whether the child
would benefit from continuing the relationship—for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) As for
the juvenile court’s findings on the third element⎯the ultimate
question of whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the parent-child relationship⎯the
appellate court reviews the juvenile court’s weighing of the
relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for
abuse of discretion. (Caden C., at p. 640; In re Katherine J.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 318.) In accordance with that
standard, we will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision unless
the court “ ‘ “has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making
an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination
[citations].” ’ ” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318; In re
Katherine J., at p. 318.)
       Where, as in this case, the juvenile court found the parent
did not meet his or her burden of proof, the appellate court must
determine whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of that
parent as a matter of law. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th
1517, 1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of

                                22
O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) “Specifically, the question
becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted
and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to
leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient
to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., at p. 1528.)
       C. Analysis
       The juvenile court properly found that Johnny did not
prove the three elements of the beneficial parental relationship
exception under Caden C.
          1. The first element⎯regular visitation and contact
       As our Supreme Court has explained, the first element
required to establish the exception is straightforward. “The
question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into
account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’ ” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) As the juvenile court found, Johnny
did not establish that he had maintained regular visitation and
contact with his son.
       Johnny did not visit Derek at all after December 25, 2021.
Between December 25, 2021, and May 12, 2022, Johnny called
Derek once in January and twice in February. But even before
January 2022, Johnny’s visits were inconsistent. He started
missing scheduled visits in summer 2021, he was consistently
late to those he attended, and he always ended the visits a half
hour early.
       Johnny argues that he maintained consistent visitation at
an earlier point in time, but the juvenile court was not required
to discount Johnny’s complete lack of visitation in the four and a
half months before the section 366.26 hearing and his
inconsistency in the six months before that.

                                23
          2. The second element⎯a beneficial relationship
       Even if Johnny could establish he had maintained regular
visitation and contact, he has not demonstrated the second
element required to establish the exception, that is, the existence
of “a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the
child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) In this regard,
Caden C. instructs “the focus is the child. And the relationship
may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child,
the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the
“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and
child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.] . . . [C]ourts
often consider how children feel about, interact with, look to, or
talk about their parents. [Citations.] Doing so properly focuses
the inquiry on the child, even as courts must remain mindful that
rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely
consistent pattern.’ ” (Id. at p. 632.)
       Johnny contends that guardianship, rather than adoption,
would have been the better permanent plan for Derek because of
“Derek’s substantial, positive emotional attachment with his
Father.” However, “[a] positive attachment between parent and
child is necessarily one that is not detrimental to the child but is
nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and
stability.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) While
Derek had a more positive attachment to Johnny earlier in the
case, by April 2022 Derek said it made him “angry and sad” to
talk about Johnny, and he expressed ambivalence about whether
he would even want to see Johnny again. And from fall 2021
through spring 2022, Derek repeatedly voiced frustration and
disappointment over Johnny’s failure to prioritize his
relationship with Derek. The hope and expectation that Johnny

                                24
would visit or call but chose not to⎯even on Derek’s
birthday⎯caused emotional turmoil for Derek, not security or
stability.
           3. The third element⎯termination of parental rights
              would be detrimental to the child
       Johnny has also failed to establish the third element: that
due to the benefits to Derek of maintaining the relationship with
his father, termination of Johnny’s parental rights would be
detrimental to Derek. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631.) To
make this determination, the court must ask “what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) The juvenile court must then decide
“whether losing the relationship with the parent would harm the
child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a
new, adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 634.)
       Here, the question of what Derek’s life would be like in an
adoptive home without Johnny in his life was not hypothetical;
the severing of the relationship with Johnny had already taken
place in Derek’s life over several months preceding the section
366.26 hearing. Over time, Derek had processed his feelings
about Johnny and his absence from Derek’s life. The stability of
Derek’s relationship with his caregivers and the support they
gave him had already helped Derek overcome the loss of the
relationship with Johnny. Derek felt safe in Alejandro and
Diana’s care, he loved them, and he wanted to continue living
with them; he was waiting to be adopted by them.
       On the other hand, Derek was not even sure he wanted to
see Johnny again. And there is no reason to expect Johnny’s
long-established pattern of inconsistent visitation and contact
would change. Johnny failed to show that whatever benefit

                                25
Derek would gain from a continued relationship with Johnny
outweighed the benefits Derek would receive from adoption.
        Accordingly, we conclude Johnny has not met his burden of
demonstrating that severing his relationship with Derek would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment
to Johnny, such that even considering the benefits of a new
adoptive home, termination of Johnny’s parental rights would
harm Derek. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) The
juvenile court did not err in rejecting the beneficial parental
relationship exception and terminating parental rights.
   III. ICWA
        A. ICWA-related facts
        The record in this case contains no information to suggest
that any of the children might be an American Indian child as
defined by ICWA. Mother, Johnny, and Christopher repeatedly
denied any known Native American heritage. Alejandro, the
children’s maternal great uncle, also denied American Indian
ancestry. However, there is also no indication that DCFS
contacted any other relatives about possible Native American
ancestry. DCFS had the children’s maternal grandmother’s
name and contact information, and a social worker spoke with
her in October 2018. But it does not appear that any information
was sought from the maternal grandmother about American
Indian ancestry. Nevertheless, based on the parents’ denials of
Indian ancestry, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply to
Derek, Aliyah, or Alyssa.
        B. Applicable law
        “ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal

                                26
standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881; 25 U.S.C. § 1902.)
Under the ICWA as well as California’s statutory scheme (Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.), an “ ‘Indian child’ ” is defined as an
unmarried person under the age of 18 who “is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a)
[adopting the federal definition].)
       Section 224.2, subdivision (a) imposes on DCFS and the
juvenile court in every dependency proceeding “an affirmative
and continuing duty” to determine whether ICWA applies.
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048
(D.S.).) The duty of inquiry includes asking, among others, the
child, parents, extended family members, and others who have an
interest in the child whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Inquiry must be made at the
commencement of the dependency proceeding, and further
inquiry is required where there is any reason to believe the child
is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (c), (e); D.S., at p. 1052.)
Further inquiry includes contacting the tribes as well as
gathering information from the parents and relatives. (§ 224.2,
subd. (e); D.S., at pp. 1052–1053.) Finally, if there is reason to
know that the child is an Indian child, notice to the tribe in
accordance with section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5) is required.
(§ 224.2, subd. (f).)
       We review the juvenile court’s factual findings regarding
ICWA compliance for substantial evidence, “[b]ut where the facts
are undisputed, we independently determine whether ICWA’s

                                27
requirements have been satisfied.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1051.)
       C. The juvenile court and DCFS failed to make the
          requisite ICWA inquiries to extended family
          members
       We agree with the parties that the inquiry into the
children’s possible Native American heritage in this case was
inadequate. Appellants contend the ICWA violation requires
reversal of the termination orders and remand to enable DCFS
and the juvenile court to comply with ICWA’s inquiry
requirements. Citing this court’s decision in In re Dezi C.,6
respondent asserts the error was harmless, but “[i]n the interest
of minimizing delay to the children’s permanency,” does not
oppose conditional affirmance of the orders with remand for
ICWA compliance.
       We accept the parties’ agreement that remand is
appropriate here, but our disposition is a conditional reversal of
the termination orders.
       Although respondent requests a conditional affirmance, we
believe that a conditional reversal is appropriate for the limited
purpose of allowing DCFS to satisfy its duty of initial inquiry
under ICWA and thereby to eliminate the ICWA error in this
case. We recognize that the Courts of Appeal are deeply split on
whether to conditionally affirm or conditionally reverse in cases
where there is no stipulation (compare, e.g., In re J.K. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 498, 507, 511 [conditionally affirming] and In re
Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 326–327 [same] with, e.g., In

      6
      In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted
September 21, 2022, S275578.

                                28
re D.B. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 239, 245, 249 [conditionally
reversing] and In re E.V. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 691, 694, 701
[same]), but conclude that the functional effect of what we are
doing should control in cases where the parties are stipulating to
a limited remand following an order terminating parental rights.
(In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 131–132 [accepting
stipulation, but issuing disposition as conditional reversal]; In re
Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 187.)
       Our Legislature has defined for us when an appellate court
may properly accede to the parties’ request to “reverse or vacate a
duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the
parties”; specifically, we may do so only if we find (1) “[t]here is
no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the
public will be adversely affected by the reversal,” and (2) “[t]he
reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the
erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a
judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal
will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement.” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).)
       Under these standards, conditional reversal with a limited
remand to comply with ICWA is appropriate in this case. The
reason for the remand request is a practical one: It is not clear at
this time what the test is for assessing “prejudice” in cases where
the DCFS has not complied with its ICWA duty of initial inquiry;
the error in this case would be prejudicial under some tests and
not prejudicial under others; the California Supreme Court is not
likely to resolve this issue for months, if not years; there is the
possibility that a ruling by this court affirming the termination of
parental rights (due to the absence of “prejudice” from the ICWA
error under the Dezi C. test) might be undone months, if not

                                29
years, from now when the Supreme Court defines the proper test
for “prejudice”; it is undisputed that, in dependency proceedings
“involv[ing] the well-being of children,” “considerations such as
permanency and stability are of paramount importance” (In re
S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293); and these considerations of
permanency and stability are better served by a remand to
eliminate any ICWA error now (and thereby to ensure that the
order terminating parental rights can be final sooner rather than
later) rather than rejecting remand and affirming (which leaves
open the possibility that the ICWA issue—and, depending on the
outcome of that issue, the entire case—will be re-opened months,
if not years, down the line).
       Given these considerations, there is “no reasonable
possibility” that the interests of the nonparties (namely, the
prospective adoptive parents and the Indian tribes) “will be
adversely affected by the reversal” because those nonparties will
benefit from the stability imparted by resolving the ICWA issue
now instead of at some point in the future. And the permanency
and stability imparted by a remand to resolve the ICWA issue
now also “outweigh[s] the erosion of public trust” that arises from
conditionally reversing the order terminating parental rights.
Indeed, the remand in this case enhances the public trust by
ensuring compliance with ICWA.
                            DISPOSITION
       The order denying Johnny’s section 388 petition is
affirmed. The orders terminating Johnny’s and Christopher’s
parental rights are conditionally reversed. The matter is
remanded with the following directions:

                                30
       1. DCFS shall make reasonable efforts to ask all known
and available extended family members whether Derek, Aliyah
or Alyssa is or may be an Indian child.
       2. DCFS shall document its efforts to interview all known
and available extended family members as to whether Derek,
Aliyah or Alyssa is or may be an Indian child, and shall provide a
report with said documentation and the results of its interviews
to the juvenile court.
       3. At a noticed hearing, with counsel for the parties
reappointed, the juvenile court shall make a finding regarding
the ICWA’s applicability, determine whether DCFS has
interviewed all known and available extended family members,
and proceed in accordance with Welfare and Institutions Code
sections 224.2 and 224.3, including, if required, ordering DCFS to
send notices with the above information to the appropriate tribes
in accordance with the ICWA.
       4. If, based on the completed inquiry, the juvenile court
finds there is no reason to believe Derek, Aliyah or Alyssa is an
Indian child, or if no tribe or agency determines Derek, Aliyah or
Alyssa is an Indian child after notice has been provided pursuant
to the ICWA, the orders terminating Johnny’s and Christopher’s
parental rights shall be reinstated as the orders of the juvenile
court. If notices are sent and the juvenile court receives
responses from the noticed tribes, the juvenile court shall proceed
in accordance with the ICWA if any tribe determines Derek,
Aliyah or Alyssa is an Indian child.
       5. At the conclusion of the proceedings and addressing
compliance with federal and state law related to the ICWA, and

                                31
upon the juvenile court’s findings and orders, the parties have the
right to appeal from the renewed ICWA findings.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          LUI, P. J.
I concur:

      HOFFSTADT, J.

                                32
In re Derek M., B320496
ASHMANN-GERST, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

       I agree with the majority that the juvenile court did not err
in denying Johnny M.’s (Johnny) petition pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 388 1 and in terminating his
parental rights pursuant to section 366.26. However, I would not
conditionally reverse the orders terminating Johnny and
Christopher C.’s (Christopher) parental rights. Any alleged error
pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq.) (ICWA) was harmless.
       As the majority accurately summarizes: “The record in this
case contains no information to suggest that any of the children
might be an American Indian child as defined by ICWA. Mother,
Johnny, and Christopher repeatedly denied any known Native
American heritage. Alejandro, the children’s maternal great
uncle, also denied American Indian ancestry. However, there is
also no indication that [the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS)] contacted any other relatives about possible
Native American ancestry. DCFS had the children’s maternal
grandmother’s name and contact information, and a social
worker spoke with her in October 2018. But it does not appear
that any information was sought from the maternal grandmother
about American Indian ancestry.” (Maj. Opn., at p. 26.)
       Based upon the foregoing, the parties assert that the
inquiry into the children’s possible Native American heritage in

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
this case was inadequate. (Maj. Opn., at p. 28.) Although DCFS
contends that any error was harmless, it does not oppose a
“conditional affirmance” for ICWA compliance. (Maj. Opn., at
p. 28.)
       The majority accepts the parties’ agreement and
conditionally reverses the judgment. I would not conditionally
reverse the judgment because doing so effectively disregards our
holding in In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769 (Dezi C.),
review granted September 21, 2022, S275578.
       In Dezi C., we adopted the following rule: “[A]n agency’s
failure to conduct a proper initial inquiry into a dependent child’s
American Indian heritage is harmless unless the record contains
information suggesting a reason to believe that the child may be
an ‘Indian child’ within the meaning of ICWA, such that the
absence of further inquiry was prejudicial to the juvenile court’s
ICWA finding. For this purpose, the ‘record’ includes both the
record of proceedings in the juvenile court and any proffer the
appealing parent makes on appeal.” (Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.)
       Here, the juvenile court may have erred (as DCFS seems to
concede) by not asking the children’s maternal grandmother
about any possible Native American heritage. But, applying the
“‘reason to believe’ rule” that we adopted in Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at page 779, I conclude that the juvenile court
and DCFS’s failure to make inquiries of this one extended family
member was harmless because the record does not suggest a
reason to believe that the children are Indian children within the
meaning of ICWA. (In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984,
1014 [“where an appeal is taken from an order terminating

                                 2
parental rights, ICWA inquiry error should require reversal only
if prejudicial”].)
       Mother and both fathers reported that they had no known
Indian ancestry, and nothing in the record suggests that any
parent was adopted such that “their self-reporting of ‘no heritage’
may not be fully informed [citation].” (Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779; contra, In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th
542, 554 [a mother’s denial of Indian heritage was unreliable
because she was adopted at a young age and had no contact with
her biological parents].) Neither father makes any proffer on
appeal that either one of them or mother has any Indian
heritage. (See Dezi C., supra, at pp. 779, fn. 4, 786.)
       My analysis is underscored by ICWA itself, which narrowly
defines “Indian child” to include only a child who is himself or
whose parent is a current member of a federally recognized
Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subd. (b).) I doubt that the children’s
maternal grandmother, if asked, would have been able to provide
any different information about whether the children or their
mother were current tribal members—particularly in the absence
of any contrary suggestion from Johnny or Christopher, either
before the juvenile court or on appeal. (See In re A.C. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1023 (conc. & dis. opn. of Crandall, J.)
[“Because such basic information is often known or easily
discoverable by each respective parent, there is limited utility in
remanding such matters for ‘extended family member’ inquiry”].)
       As the majority implicitly concedes, Dezi C. remains good
law during the pendency of review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1105(e)). Because Johnny and Christopher’s argument does not
satisfy the test for prejudice that we established in Dezi C., I see
no reason to reverse.

                                 3
      In reaching this conclusion, I am well-aware that the
“overriding purpose of the hearings in dependency cases is to
advance the best interest of the child.” (In re Z.C. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1279.) And, “time is of the essence” in a
dependency proceeding (In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402,
1409); the children’s best interests are most likely to be well-
served by moving quickly to permanence (Tonya M. v. Superior
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 846–847). But there is no evidence
or argument set forth in the appellate record that the agreed-
upon remand will promote the children’s best interests by quickly
moving them to a permanent placement.2 (See In re Ezequiel G.,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 995 [“These reversals unquestionably
delay permanency for some of the most vulnerable children in our
juvenile court system”].) As noted in July 2022, “In just the last
12 months, [the approach of automatic reversal without any
showing of prejudice] to asserted ICWA error has resulted in, by
our count, appellate courts returning more than 100 dependency
cases to the juvenile courts with directions to conduct further
ICWA inquiries after parental rights were terminated. At best,
these reversals significantly delay entry of final judgments
releasing children for adoption; at worst, they may result in

2     The delay could be even worse if a parent attempts
successive or serial appeals challenging ICWA notice. While the
court in In re X.V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 804 held that
successive appeals challenging ICWA notice were impermissible,
our Supreme Court has not yet decided “whether a parent would
be precluded from raising an ICWA notice violation in a second or
successive appeal.” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14; see
also In re Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1007–1008.)

                                4
potential adoptive parents deciding not to adopt.” (In re
Ezequiel G., supra, at p. 1001.)
       Furthermore, as set forth in our California Constitution, we
only reverse trial court judgments for prejudicial error.3 (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13.) It follows that we do not reverse
dependency cases for harmless error; “‘the error must be
prejudicial under the proper standard before reversal is
appropriate.’” (In re J.R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 526, 531.) There
is good reason for this rule, particularly in dependency matters.
“It is beyond dispute that ordering a child services agency to try
to run down suggestions of possible Indian heritage has real costs
to the agency’s core mission of keeping children healthy and
safe—there are only so many hours in a day and only so many
child services agency employees on the payroll.” (In re H.V.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 441 (dis. opn. of Baker, Acting P. J.).)
       Moreover, it is undisputed that we are not required to
accept the parties’ agreement to remand the matter for ICWA
compliance. (See California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau
v. Superior Court (1990) 50 Cal.3d 658, 664 [court in a civil case
may reject a stipulation that is contrary to public policy or
incorporates an erroneous rule of law; court cannot surrender its
duty and act as a puppet of the parties]; People v. Segura (2008)
44 Cal.4th 921, 931 [same is true with plea bargains in criminal
cases]; In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 637
[rejecting the parties’ joint stipulation for remand because it did
not seek affirmance or reversal of the juvenile court’s order and

3     Thus, my conclusion might be different if DCFS had
conceded prejudicial error. (See Maj. Opn., at p. 28 [DCFS
asserts that the alleged ICWA error was harmless].)

                                5
only sought a remand with directions to order ICWA compliance];
In re A.C. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 130, 142 (dis. opn. Baker, J.).)
        Thus, in deciding whether to accept the parties’ request to
conditionally reverse the judgment, we must consider the
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision
(a)(8). (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 379; see also
Hardisty v. Hinton & Alfert (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005
[presumption against stipulated reversals].) The statute
provides, in pertinent part: “Every court shall have the power
. . . [¶] . . . (8) To amend and control its process and orders so as
to make them conform to law and justice. An appellate court
shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an
agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds
both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable possibility
that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely
affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for
requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may
result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the
availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for
pretrial settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).)
        I am concerned that conditionally reversing the judgment
here will adversely affect the public and erode confidence in the
courts. “Public trust in the judiciary is uniquely at stake when
the basis for termination of parental rights is called into
question.” (In re B.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 803, 820 [“Left
vague [was] any reference to the legal basis for reversing, other

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than the parties[’] desire that we do so”].)4 Countless ICWA
appeals akin to this one are currently pending in the courts of
appeal. Unfortunately, DCFS is not taking a consistent
position—sometimes it is agreeing to a remand and other times it
is arguing in favor of an outright affirmance—often leading to
inconsistent results in the appellate courts, even in this Division.
Issuing an opinion that simultaneously holds that Dezi C.
remains good law while also reversing and remanding the matter
for further ICWA proceedings based upon harmless error only
adds to the unsettled state of the law.
       I would affirm the orders terminating Johnny and
Christopher’s parental rights.

                        __________________________, J.
                        ASHMANN-GERST

4      The Second District does not have a local rule like rule 10
of the First District’s local rules. Rule 10 provides that a motion
for stipulated reversal of judgment must be accompanied by “a
joint declaration by the parties” that, in part, (1) describes the
factual and legal issues, and (2) indicates whether the judgment
involves important public issues or otherwise affects a significant
number of people who are not parties to the litigation.

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