Court Opinion

ID: 9553905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:37:12.863883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:32.933351
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. RCW 26.09.260 provides:
(1) The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at the time of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that the modification is necessary to serve the *202best interests of the child. In applying these standards the court shall retain the custodian established by the prior decree unless:
(c) The child's present environment is detrimental to his physical, mental, or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the advantage of a change to the child.
(Italics mine.) Custodial changes are viewed as highly disruptive to the child, Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wn. App. 366, 368, 541 P.2d 996 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976), and therefore there is a strong presumption in favor of custodial continuity and against modification. In re Marriage of Roorda, 25 Wn. App. 849, 851, 611 P.2d 794 (1980). A heavy burden is thus placed on the parent petitioning for the modification to present evidence supporting the statutory requirements. Roorda, at 851. These principles apply to joint custody situations. In re Marriage of Raugust, 29 Wn. App. 53, 54, 627 P.2d 558 (1981).
Here, the fitness of the parents has not changed since the dissolution decree was entered awarding these parents joint custody of their child. Following the hearing on the petition for modification, the court again found both parents to be fit. The only change found was the mother's remarriage and move to Portland, Oregon. There is absolutely no evidence in the record showing the child's "present environment", whether it be the environment of joint custody established by the dissolution decree or the environment precipitated by the mother's move, is detrimental to the child's "physical, mental, or emotional health". RCW 26.09.260(1)(c). The only evidence remotely showing a possibility of detriment is that the child indicated she missed her mother when she is with her father and had concern for the father while she is with the mother. This emotional reactión by the child is not unique to joint custody arrangements, but rather is directly related to the dissolution of the parents' marriage—almost all children from broken homes experience these emotions. Thus, the statutory requirements have not been met and I would find the court erred in modifying *203the joint custody provisions of the dissolution decree. However, the court could have changed the arrangements as to the primary custodian and when each parent would have physical custody.
The policy reasons underlying RCW 26.09.260 and the presumption in favor of custodial continuity and against modification are (1) to maximize finality of custody awards since children and their parents should not be subjected to repeated litigation of the custody issues determined in the original action; (2) to prevent "ping-pong" custody litigation since stability of the child's environment is of utmost concern; and (3) to preserve the basic policy of custodial continuity since custodial changes are viewed as highly disruptive to the child. In re Rankin, 76 Wn.2d 533, 458 P.2d 176 (1969); In re Marriage of Thompson, 32 Wn. App. 418, 421, 647 P.2d 1049 (1982).
It is true the mother's misconduct of moving with the child to Oregon without notifying the father in direct violation of the dissolution decree should not be used as a basis for modification. Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wn.2d 626, 630, 585 P.2d 130 (1978). However, it is in direct contravention of the policy behind RCW 26.09.260 that a parent who creates the change in circumstances can thereafter move for modification of custody based on the self-created situation and gain sole custody of the child when both parents are still found to be fit. One should not be allowed to benefit from his or her wrongdoing, nor should an innocent party lose custodial privileges because of a situation created solely by the other's wrongful acts. Thus, in my view, a custody provision in a dissolution decree should not be modified based on one parent's wrongful removal of the child from the state unless a material change in conditions is shown to be detrimental to the child's welfare. Christopher v. Christopher, 62 Wn.2d 82, 85, 381 P.2d 115 (1963). Here, there is no testimony or other evidence that a continuation of joint custody would be detrimental to the child or that a rearrangement of the times when the parents would have physical custody would not satisfy the distance *204aspects of custody. The proper procedure would have been for the mother to move for modification of custody prior to leaving the state. See Christopher v. Christopher, supra; In re Marriage of Osborn, 24 Wn. App. 862, 604 P.2d 954 (1979). Thus, joint custody should be reinstated with a modification of the physical custody provisions of the decree.
Finally, Mr. Swofford also assigned error to the court's consideration of his religious beliefs citing to his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Religious decisions and acts may be considered in the custody decision only to the extent they will jeopardize the temporal mental health or physical safety of the child and there must be shown a reasonable and substantial likelihood of immediate or future impairment. In re Marriage of Hadeen, 27 Wn. App. 566, 579, 619 P.2d 374 (1980), review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1009 (1981). Here, the court, in making its determination to award sole custody to the mother, stated in its memorandum decision Mr. Swofford's religion, while not the sole and determinative factor, was an appropriate one for the court to consider because the father's religion would interfere with the fostering of a good and enduring relationship with the mother. The court thereafter entered several findings regarding Mr. Swofford's religion and its possible effect on the child's relationship with her mother.
Since it is clear from the record and findings one of the determinative factors was the father's religious beliefs, and in the absence of a finding the father's religious beliefs posed a threat to the mental and physical welfare of the child, it was improper for the court to consider the father's religious involvement as an ingredient in its decision to modify custody. In re Marriage of Hadeen, supra at 581; see Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wn.2d 810, 813-14, 489 P.2d 1133 (1971); see also Annot., Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971 (1983). Additionally, there is no evidence in the record to support the court's findings Mr. Swofford's religious beliefs posed a threat to the child's mental and physical welfare or that he, *205based on his religious beliefs or otherwise, interfered with or deterred the relationship between the child and the mother either during the marriage or after the separation and divorce.
For these reasons I would hold the court's action in modifying custody from joint to sole custody in the mother is not supported by the record. In my view, joint custody should not have been disturbed. Instead, the court should have continued joint custody and then have developed an appropriate and workable arrangement of physical custody between the parents. For example, one parent could have physical custody during the school year and the other parent at other times during the year. See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 37 Wn.2d 159, 165, 222 P.2d 400 (1950); Earling v. Earling, 117 Wash. 584, 586, 201 P. 908 (1921). Prima facie error has been shown under Aquarian Found, v. KTVW, Inc., 11 Wn. App. 476, 523 P.2d 969 (1974).
Thus, I would reinstate the joint custody arrangement and remand for a further hearing to determine a workable arrangement for physical custody. Since considerable time has elapsed since the modification was made, present circumstances should be considered.