Court Opinion

ID: 9846889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:04.76671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:56.686426
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court erroneously “rejected the city’s all-residential zoning of TAP’s property!, b]ecause we conclude that the developer has not met its burden of proving that the city’s zoning presents a significant loss that is unjustified by any public benefit. . . .” However, I submit that the trial court was authorized to find that TAP proved that the existing zoning of its property is unjustifiably confiscatory. Therefore, I dissent.
A zoning ordinance is presumptively valid, but, since Tuggle v. Manning, 224 Ga. 29, 33 (159 SE2d 703) (1968), this Court has recognized that
[z]oning laws and regulations must meet the demands of the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and restrictions which are arbitrary or unreasonable or lacking in any *686substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare come within the constitutional inhibition. . . .
To prove that the existing zoning was such a “taking,” TAP, as the property owner, had the burden of rebutting the presumption of the constitutionality of the all-residential classification by clear and convincing evidence. Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs. of Richmond County, 256 Ga. 469, 471 (349 SE2d 707) (1986). The trial court concluded that TAP successfully proved its constitutional claim by clear and convincing evidence. Although this Court does not defer to the trial court on the applicable law, we must accept its factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Moon v. Cobb County, 256 Ga. 539 (350 SE2d 461) (1986).
In reversing the finding that the existing all-residential zoning is significantly detrimental to TAP, the majority holds that “[n]one of the trial court’s factual findings concerning the entire tract’s lack of economic feasibility deal separately with the 2.08-acre tract designated for single-family residential housing.” (Emphasis supplied.) However, the entire 9.35-acre tract is zoned residential, and the only distinction is that the 2.08 acre parcel is zoned for a lower density than the remaining 7.27 acres. TAP contends that the tract is, in its entirety, economically unfeasible for exclusive residential development of any density. Compare Pennington v. Rockdale County, 244 Ga. 743 (262 SE2d 59) (1979). Because the dispute between the City and the landowner involves the zoning applicable to the entire tract, it is clear that the evidence and the trial court’s findings address that question.
Without citing any supporting authority, however, the majority focuses instead on whether TAP “showed only a diminution in the value of a part of [its] property by reason of the zoning classification . . . . [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Pennington v. Rockdale County, supra at 744. The relevant legal issue is not whether the portion of the tract zoned for single-family residences has a separate and distinct value for that purpose. The proper inquiry is whether TAP suffers a significant hardship resulting from the residential classification covering its entire tract and, in making that determination, the fact that the lower and higher densities are adjoining uses cannot simply be ignored. “Property is said to take its character from the uses which surround it, and an analysis of the adjacent uses in relation to the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance lies at the heart of most of the zoning decisions.” 1 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning (4th ed.), § 3.30, p. 184 (1995). Obviously, if the 7.27 acres are not economically viable for high- or very high-density residential development exclusively, that would have a potentially adverse effect on *687the economic viability of the adjoining 2.08 acres for single-family housing. “[A] zoning ordinance restricting an area to residential use is void as to property located in the area but so situated in relation to a commercial zone as to be peculiarly unattractive, if at all salable, for residential uses. [Cit.]” Barrett v. Hamby, 235 Ga. 262, 265 (219 SE2d 399) (1975). Here, the trial court specifically held that
[T]he height-plane restrictions imposed by the City’s zoning ordinance would severely limit the height at which residential towers could be built on the [remaining 7.27 acres]. As a result of lower building heights, an all-residential development would have diminished view corridors and magnified traffic and noise problems, which would further reduce its marketability and viability.
Therefore, even if the smaller parcel could be developed for single-family residences, it would negatively impact the development of the larger portion for residential purposes. I believe that the trial court properly addressed the issue from the perspective of the residential classification of the whole tract, and that it would have been error for it to do otherwise. Pennington v. Rockdale County, supra. Because the single-family classification should not be addressed separately, the majority applies an erroneous legal analysis in its review of the trial court’s order.
“[I]t is not necessary that the property be totally useless for the purposes classified. [Cit.]” Barrett v. Hamby, supra at 266.
Where a property owner adduces evidence that establishes a down turn in viability of a property under its current zoning and a decrease in land value if the property remains under its current zoning classification, a trial court does not clearly err by concluding the property owner has carried its burden of proving a significant detriment. [Cits.]
City of McDonough v. Tusk Partners, 268 Ga. 693, 695-696 (492 SE2d 206) (1997). The majority does not dispute that, in accordance with this applicable standard, TAP submitted clear and convincing evidence that the entire 9.35 acres was not economically feasible for an exclusively residential development of any density. According to the trial court’s comprehensive order:
The subject property is not suitable for residential uses only. It borders a busy intersection and is bounded by commercial and office development across Phipps Boulevard and the Buckhead Loop. A multi-level parking deck behind the Parisian department store in Phipps Plaza is located directly *688across Phipps Boulevard, and the property adjacent to the parking deck recently has been rezoned from high-rise residential to a use that allows a 28-story office building and a multi-story parking deck. Directly south, across the Buck-head Loop, is property that also has been rezoned and approved for mixed use development, including three highrise office buildings and a 250-unit high-rise residential building.
A review of the record shows ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the entire 9.35-acre tract in question is not economically suitable for exclusive residential development and that TAP therefore suffers a significant detriment from the existing classification which limits its property to that use. That being the case, this Court should “not re-weigh the evidence before the trial court in order to support the opposite conclusion.” City of McDonough v. Tusk Partners, supra at 696. By predicating its reversal of the trial court’s order on the erroneous legal theory that the relevant issue is density of development on separate portions of the tract, rather than the residential classification applicable to the entire parcel, the majority, in effect, engages in an unauthorized reweighing of the evidence. Applying the proper legal analysis, we should be compelled to affirm the trial court’s factual finding that the existing all-residential zoning constitutes a substantial detriment to TAP, because that finding is not clearly erroneous.
Turning to the other element of the constitutional claim, the 1 majority concludes that, because the existing all-residential classifi-1 cation “is justified by the public’s valid interest in protecting! Atlanta’s neighborhoods, the trial court erred in finding that TAP 1 met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on the public 9 benefit issue.” However, the parties do not dispute the general princi- 9 pie that maintaining and developing stable residential neighbor-1 hoods is a desirable goal for any municipality. The proper inquiry is 9 whether or not that civic objective is substantially promoted by the i existing all-residential classification of the developer’s property. Gradous v. Bd. of Commrs., supra at 471. The focus of that relevant S determination is on whether the commendable aim of protecting! neighborhoods, “‘when applied to [this] particular piece of property! and [this] particular set of facts and circumstances [, is] so arbitrary! and unreasonable as to result in a confiscation of the property.’ ” Tuggle v. Manning, supra at 33. Thus, the benefit to be derived from zon-9 ing in general does not control when the landowner shows that the ! existing classification of his specific property does not promote that! goal.
Contrary to the majority opinion, the trial court’s order contains 9 *689extensive findings which address the relationship between the City’s aim of fostering residential neighborhoods and the current zoning of TAP’s property. To give but one example, the trial court cited expert testimony to the effect that
maintaining the Buckhead Loop as a firm boundary between residential and non-residential uses is an outdated policy that no longer makes sense given the changes that have occurred and are anticipated in the surrounding area, all of which have taken place since the City first articulated its “line in the sand” policy in the late 1980[’]s. These changes include the construction of the Buckhead Loop, Georgia 400, the Buckhead MARTA station and Phipps Boulevard, the expansion of Phipps Plaza and extensive commercial development across from the subject property along the Buckhead Loop and Phipps Boulevard. . . . [Moreover, the] decision ... in 1993 to continue to maintain the Buckhead Loop as a firm boundary was not a planning decision but rather a political compromise incident to completing the Buckhead Transit Station Area Development Study (“Buckhead TSADS”). Unable to reach a consensus about the appropriate zoning classification for the subject property, [the former Commissioner of Planning and Development for the City] agreed to maintain the status quo in order to complete the study. . . .
This expert testimony, coupled with additional clear and convincing evidence specifically cited in the order, authorized the trial court to find that TAP proved that, under the present circumstances, there is no substantial relationship between the City’s promotion of residential neighborhoods and the existing all-residential zoning of the tract. The facts, as found by the trial court, place this case squarely within the holding that,
“[w]here property is situated at the intersection of two heavily traveled thoroughfares, in the midst of commercial establishments, and has little suitability for residential use, but rather is a prime business site, the zoning thereof for residential uses only has no tendency to promote the public health, safety, morals, convenience, or general welfare, and bears no reasonable relation thereto and, as applied to such property, is arbitrary, unreasonable, and beyond the zoning power.”
Tuggle v. Manning, supra at 33. Where, as here, the evidence authorizes a finding that the municipality does not derive any benefit from *690maintaining the existing zoning, “the trial court does not clearly err by concluding the property owner has carried its burden of proving the zoning is unsubstantially related to the public health, safety and welfare. [Cit.]” City of McDonough v. Tusk Partners, supra at 696. Because the majority merely cites evidence supporting, but not demanding, a contrary finding and then engages in an unauthorized reweighing of the evidence to reach the opposite conclusion, I dissent.
Decided March 21, 2001
Reconsideration denied April 12, 2001.
Susan P. Langford, David D. Blum, Lemuel H. Ward, for appellants.
Kilpatrick Stockton, Wyckliffe A. Knox, Jr., Michael E. Brooks, for appellee.
Maddox, Nix, Bowman & Zoeckler, Robert L. Zoeckler, Thomas A. Bowman, John A. Nix, Susan M. Pruett, amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.