Court Opinion

ID: 9391907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 17:01:01.709358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.406112
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 3 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GURWINDER SINGH                                 No.    22-171

                Petitioners,                    Agency No. A209-156-704

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                       Argued and Submitted April 20, 2023
                            San Francisco, California

Before: SCHROEDER, CALLAHAN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

      Gurwinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal of an

Immigration Judge’s denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review the agency’s

factual findings for substantial evidence and review questions of law de novo.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1241 (9th Cir. 2020); see Plancarte Sauceda

v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (we must uphold the agency’s

determination unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion).          We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

      1. The BIA assumed without deciding that Singh had established past

persecution but found that the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) had

rebutted this assumption by showing that Singh could safely and reasonably relocate

within India. DHS may rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution

by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the applicant no longer has

a well-founded fear of persecution in the country of their nationality or (2) that he

can safely and reasonably internally relocate. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659

(9th Cir. 2019). Although the IJ decided Singh’s case in 2018 before we decided

Singh v. Whitaker, the BIA applied that precedent in its 2022 decision and conducted

an adequate individualized assessment of Singh’s circumstances.            The BIA

considered whether Singh would be targeted for his continued support of the Mann

Party outside of Punjab.

      First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Singh can safely

relocate in India. Singh argues that he cannot safely relocate because he is a member

of the Mann Party and faces threats by both the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”) and

Akali Dal Badal Party (“Badal Party”). The record supports the conclusion that

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Singh is a low-level member of the Mann Party, and the central authorities controlled

by the BJP target “high-profile militants.”       Singh is also unlikely to suffer

persecution by Badal Party outside of Punjab since different political parties control

other states. Singh, 914 F.3d at 659 (“there must be an area of the country where

[the applicant] has no well-founded fear of persecution” for the applicant to safely

relocate internally).1

      Second, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that it would be

reasonable for Singh to internally relocate. See Plancarte Sauceda, 23 F.4th at 831.

Singh argues that he only speaks Punjabi fluently and that “he has never lived or

worked outside of Punjab.” But no legal restrictions prevent Singh from relocating,

and he is a high school graduate with work experience and financial support from

his family. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214

(9th Cir. 2004) (courts determine the reasonableness of internal relocation by

considering the applicant’s age, health, education, and economic status). This record

does not compel a different conclusion than the BIA reached.

      Because the issue of internal relocation within India is dispositive, we decline

to reach whether the change in political power in Punjab constituted a change in

      1
       At argument, Singh argued for the first time that the BIA failed to distinguish
between persecution by the political parties and that done by party supporters. This
argument was not made in Singh’s opening brief, and so is deemed waived. Smith
v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

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circumstances. INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25-26 (1976) (courts are not

required to decide issues unnecessary to their results).

      2. Because “[a] failure to satisfy the lower standard of proof required to

establish eligibility for asylum therefore necessarily results in a failure to

demonstrate eligibility for withholding of deportation,” Singh’s withholding claim

fails. Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).

      3. Singh did not contest the IJ’s denial of his petition for CAT relief before

the BIA. Since we consider only the grounds relied upon by the BIA, this claim falls

outside the scope of our review. Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.

2004).

      PETITION DENIED.

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