Court Opinion

ID: 9469537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:43:17.564116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:26.543816
License: Public Domain

SILER, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion on the merits but disagree with it on procedural grounds, that is, I believe the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata should not be applied here.
Where the history of the cases shows that in Stauffer I, as designated in the majority opinion, the Wyoming district court opinion in favor of the EPA was rendered on June 23, 1980, there was legal authority for the action of the EPA at the time it obtained a warrant and Went to inspect the Tennessee plant on August 7,1980. Then, the district court in this case held its hearing on August 29, 1980, while the district court opinion from Wyoming was the only available court decision on the subject.
Next, the district court in Tennessee below rendered its decision on April 17, 1981, not precluded at all from deciding the case by res judicata or collateral estoppel. Then, on May 8, 1981, the opinion from Wyoming was affirmed in Stauffer Chemical Co. v. E. P. A., 647 F.2d 1075 (10th Cir. 1981). Apparently no further appeal was attempted in that case, although a rehearing was denied on June 16, 1981. Finally, before the case at bar was argued, the decision in Bunker Hill Co. Lead & Zinc Smelter v. United States E. P. A., 658 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1981), was decided on October 13, 1981.
Res judicata is not applicable here, as a cause of action different from that in Stauffer I was involved, but collateral estoppel would be applicable. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715, 92 L.Ed. 898 (1948); Hart v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 270 F.Supp. 296 (M.D.Tenn.1966) (Miller, J.), aff’d, 379 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 924, 88 S.Ct. 849,19 L.Ed.2d 983 (1968); see generally Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1967).
However, as stated in Western Oil & Gas v. United States E. P. A., 633 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1980), federal appellate courts “traditionally have permitted federal agencies to relitigate substantially identical legal issues raised by different transactions or events, after adverse decisions elsewhere.” That court went on to say at 809:
Collateral estoppel is not to be applied mechanically. In proper circumstances, it can prevent the waste of judicial resources and shield litigants from duplica-tive and often vexatious law suits. As the Supreme Court has recently recognized, however, countervailing policies may justify a refusal to apply principles of estoppel.
This doctrine was followed in Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1982), where the Court stated:
We do not hold that the application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel is mandatory in every case. They are an expression of the policy of federal courts preferring finality, i.e., that litigation at some time must become final. In the face of more important federal policies, however, the preference for finality might be outweighed by more compelling considerations.
Id. at 536. Accord, Restatement of Judgment § 70 (1942) (collateral estoppel not to be invoked if injustice would result).
Here, injustice would result if EPA were precluded from entering with private contractors at Stauffer’s plant in Tennessee, but were using private contractors in entering competitor’s plants in the same area. Likewise, where several different cases involving the same issues are being litigated simultaneously in separate circuits, collateral estoppel should not be invoked. Thus, collateral estoppel, although legally applicable, is not appropriate here.
Nevertheless, I concur with the majority opinion on the merits of the issue. Where the federal government has embarked upon a policy so radically divergent from its stan*1193dard policy, that is, having only government officers or employees executing search warrants and inspecting plants, it seems that authority for such conduct should be clear from the Act itself or from legislative history. As the authority to allow the private contractors to be used under the circumstances of this case is not at all clear, EPA should not be allowed to use these private contractors for such inspections until Congress amends its legislation. Cf. Bread Political Action Committee v. Federal Election Commission, -U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1235, 71 L.Ed.2d 432 (1982).
In concurring with the majority opinion to reverse the district court I am not suggesting that the lower court “missed the signs on a well marked trial,” Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971, 975 (6th Cir. 1977), for when it rendered its decision below, it had no benefit of an appellate court decision directly on point.
ORDER
No active judge of this court having requested that a vote be taken on the suggestion of the appellee that its petition for rehearing be heard en banc, said petition for rehearing was therefore referred to the panel for consideration and determination.
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, we are of the view that the issues in this appeal were adequately dealt with in our slip opinion and that the petition lacks merit. The appellee has not demonstrated that EPA in conducting a pollution inspection and search of private commercial property of Stauffer Chemical Company needs the services not only of its own employees as well as the employees of the State of Tennessee, but in addition thereto requires the services of a private contractor who is a competitor of Stauffer with conflicting interests who may have an axe to grind and may be interested in obtaining trade secrets of Stauffer.
The petition for rehearing is denied.