Court Opinion

ID: 9374524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 16:00:45.905236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.460878
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2033    Document: 56    Page: 1   Filed: 02/23/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   DALE E. KRISTOF,
                       Petitioner

                            v.

         DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                       2021-2033
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CH-0752-20-0057-I-2.
                 ______________________

                Decided: February 23, 2023
                 ______________________

    JEFFREY M. SILVERSTEIN, Freking Myers & Reul LLC,
 Dayton, OH, for petitioner.

     LIRIDONA SINANI, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

  Before LOURIE, DYK, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
Case: 21-2033    Document: 56      Page: 2    Filed: 02/23/2023

 2                                       KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE

 PER CURIAM.
      Dale E. Kristof appeals a decision of the Merit System
 Protection Board. See Kristof v. Dep’t of the Air Force,
 No. CH-0752-20-0057-I-2, 2021 WL 847879 (M.S.P.B. Mar.
 5, 2021). The Board affirmed the decision of the Depart-
 ment of the Air Force to indefinitely suspend Mr. Kristof
 without pay, pending a final decision regarding his eligibil-
 ity for a security clearance. J.A. 1. We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Mr. Kristof was employed by the Air Force as a Sys-
 tems Integration Engineer. This position required access
 to classified information, which meant Mr. Kristof had to
 obtain and retain a security clearance as a condition of his
 employment.
     On February 20, 2015, Mr. Kristof’s access to classified
 information was suspended due to “alleged illegal distribu-
 tion of International Traffic in Arms Regulation infor-
 mation to a foreign national.” J.A. 150. Mr. Kristof was
 informed that after an investigation into the alleged inci-
 dent, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) Consolidated Ad-
 judications Facility (“CAF”) would make a final
 determination regarding his security clearance eligibility. 1
 Mr. Kristof was placed on administrative leave with pay,
 pending a final decision regarding his security clearance.
 Mr. Kristof remained in this status until 2019.

     1    DoD CAF has been renamed the Defense Counter-
 intelligence and Security Agency Consolidated Adjudica-
 tion Services.   See DCSA Consolidated Adjudication
 Services (CAS), Def. Counterintel. & Sec. Agency,
 https://www.dcsa.mil/mc/pv/dcsa_cas/ (last visited Feb. 7,
 2023).
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 KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE                                      3

      On July 22, 2019, Mr. Kristof received notice that the
 Air Force was proposing to suspend him indefinitely with-
 out pay, pursuant to Air Force Instruction (“AFI”) 36-704,
 Discipline and Adverse Actions of Civilian Employees (July
 3, 2018), because Mr. Kristof did not have access to classi-
 fied information, a requirement of his position. The indef-
 inite suspension would continue until Mr. Kristof was
 granted eligibility to maintain a security clearance. If DoD
 CAF, or another agency responsible for adjudicating secu-
 rity clearances for Air Force personnel, were to issue a final
 decision denying Mr. Kristof’s eligibility to maintain a se-
 curity clearance, his indefinite suspension would continue
 until the Air Force took further action, potentially includ-
 ing his removal.
     On October 24, 2019, the deciding officer issued a final
 written decision upholding Mr. Kristof’s indefinite suspen-
 sion. Mr. Kristof’s suspension became effective that same
 day.
     Mr. Kristof appealed to the Board. He subsequently
 sought to dismiss his appeal without prejudice to “explore
 his retirement and employment options with regard to his
 security status.” J.A. 218. The Board granted this request
 for a dismissal without prejudice on February 28, 2020.
 Mr. Kristof has now retired.
     On August 26, 2020, Mr. Kristof requested to reopen
 his appeal, “to establish that the Agency denied [him] his
 due process rights as set forth in [5] CFR §6329(b).” 2
 J.A. 237. In his close of record submission, Mr. Kristof

     2   Section 6329(b) of Title 5 of the Code of Federal
 Regulations does not exist. The administrative judge in-
 terpreted Mr. Kristof’s affirmative defense to be based on
 5 U.S.C. § 6329b, which includes provisions related to in-
 vestigative leave. See J.A. 266.
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 4                                       KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE

 challenged the delay in the conclusion of his security clear-
 ance investigation, arguing that he had not been afforded
 due process in challenging the revocation of his security
 clearance and that his decision to retire constituted a con-
 structive discharge. In this submission, Mr. Kristof relied
 particularly on AFI 31-501, Personnel Security Program
 Management (Jan. 27, 2005), which provided that “[t]he Air
 Force goal for processing personnel security investigation
 requests at base level is 14 duty days.”
      On March 5, 2021, the administrative judge issued an
 initial decision affirming the indefinite suspension. Mr.
 Kristof did not petition for Board review, so that decision
 became the final decision of the Board. This petition for
 review followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(9) and 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1).
      On December 7, 2022, we ordered the government to
 file a supplemental brief addressing whether the DoD had
 violated DoD Manual 5200.02: Procedures for the DoD Per-
 sonnel Security Program (PSP) § 9.4.i 3 and allowed
 Mr. Kristof to respond. Both parties filed supplemental
 briefs.
                         DISCUSSION
      We will affirm a decision by the Board unless it is:
 “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
 wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
 cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”

     3   Section 9.4.i provides: “Suspension cases must be
 resolved as quickly as circumstances permit. Suspensions
 exceeding 180 days must be closely monitored and man-
 aged by the adjudication facility concerned so as to expedi-
 tiously reach a new national security eligibility
 determination.” J.A. 171.
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 KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE                                     5

 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Hornseth v. Dep’t of the Navy, 916 F.3d
 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
      Certain adverse employment actions can be appealed
 to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d), which provides that
 “[a]n employee against whom an action is taken under this
 section is entitled to appeal to the [Board].” Section 7512
 defines the actions covered by § 7513(d) to include “a sus-
 pension for more than 14 days” but not the denial of a se-
 curity clearance. In Department of the Navy v. Egan, the
 Supreme Court held that “[a] denial of a security clearance
 is not such an ‘adverse action’ [defined in § 7512 and ap-
 pealable under § 7513(d)], and by its own force is not sub-
 ject to Board review.” 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). The Court
 explained “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Id.
 at 528. Following Egan, “[w]e consistently have held that
 a federal employee does not have a liberty or property in-
 terest in access to classified information, and therefore the
 revocation of a security clearance does not implicate consti-
 tutional procedural due process concerns.” Robinson v.
 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 498 F.3d 1361, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir.
 2007) (per curiam); see also Gargiulo v. Dep’t of Homeland
 Sec., 727 F.3d 1181, 1184–85 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Ryan v. Dep’t
 of Homeland Sec., 793 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
     In deciding an appeal from an adverse action related to
 the denial or revocation of a security clearance, “the Board
 may determine whether a security clearance was denied,
 whether the security clearance was a requirement of the
 appellant’s position, and whether the procedures set forth
 in [5 U.S.C. § 7513(b)] were followed, but the Board may
 not examine the underlying merits of the security
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 6                                       KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE

 clearance determination.” 4 Hesse v. Dep’t of State, 217 F.3d
 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
     In addition to claiming a violation of the procedural
 protections outlined in § 7513(b), which concern notice and
 opportunity to be heard, an employee may also challenge
 an agency decision to the Board if the employee can show
 “harmful error in the application of the agency’s procedures
 in arriving at such decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A). We
 have held that, under § 7701(c)(2)(A), an employee may
 challenge an agency’s failure to comply with the agency’s
 own regulations with respect to a security clearance deci-
 sion. Romero v. Dep’t of Defense, 527 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed.
 Cir. 2008) (“[W]e decline to interpret Egan as having pre-
 cluded such review [under § 7701(c)(2)(A)] . . . .”).
     Here, the Board correctly held that the procedural re-
 quirements of § 7513(b) relating to notice and opportunity
 to be heard had been satisfied, a conclusion which
 Mr. Kristof has not contested. Nor were the provisions of
 AFI 31-501 violated. AFI 31-501 § 5.6.1 only states that
 processing security clearance investigation requests within
 14 days is a “goal.”
     Mr. Kristof also raised an affirmative defense based on
 5 U.S.C. § 6329b, relating to investigative leave. Under
 § 6329b, an agency may place an employee under investi-
 gative leave, with pay, for a maximum of 130 days. 5

     4    Section 7513(b) requires: “(1) at least thirty days’
 advance written notice stating the reasons for the proposed
 action; (2) a reasonable time to answer orally and in writ-
 ing and the right to furnish affidavits and other documen-
 tary evidence in support of the answer; (3) the opportunity
 to be represented; and (4) a written decision and the rea-
 sons therefor.” Adams v. Dep’t of Def., 688 F.3d 1330, 1334
 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b).
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 KRISTOF   v. AIR FORCE                                     7

 U.S.C. § 6329b(b)(1)(A), (b)(3)(A), (c)(1)–(2). But the ad-
 ministrative judge determined that Mr. Kristof was never
 placed on investigative leave, and Mr. Kristof has not
 demonstrated this was erroneous.
     In the course of this review proceeding, we noted that
 Mr. Kristof cited DoD Manual 5200.02. Subsection 9.4.i of
 that manual requires: “Suspension cases must be resolved
 as quickly as circumstances permit. Suspensions exceed-
 ing 180 days must be closely monitored and managed by
 the adjudication facility concerned so as to expeditiously
 reach a new national security eligibility determination.”
 J.A. 171. This regulation was potentially violated by the
 delay in resolving Mr. Kristof’s security clearance investi-
 gation, which the government admits was “substantial.”
 Resp’t’s Br. 27. In the government’s supplemental brief, it
 argued that Mr. Kristof had not properly raised this issue;
 that subsection 9.4.i was not violated; and that this subsec-
 tion does not, in any event, confer enforceable rights. In
 his response to the government’s supplemental brief,
 Mr. Kristof clarified that, while he had mentioned DoD
 Manual 5200.02 in his brief, he “did not specifically raise
 the issue of the violation of DoD Manual 5200.02.” 5 Under
 these circumstances, we do not reach the question of
 whether the agency’s own procedures were violated.
    We have considered Mr. Kristof’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive.
                          AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
     No costs.

     5   Pet’r’s Resp. Agency Suppl. Br., Kristof v. Dep’t of
 the Air Force, No. 2021-2033, Docket No. 55, at 2 (Jan. 30,
 2023).