Court Opinion

ID: 9781843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:33:30.77318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.428455
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
[125] While I agree that the Dispositional Order should be reversed and remanded, I do so for reasons different than the majority. The Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Predispositional Study also should be reversed. Accordingly, I must dissent from the majority opinion.
[126] This case is an excellent example of how a relatively simple case can become an extremely important case in terms of judicial process and statutory interpretation and the tension between the legislative and judicial departments and their respective powers. With regard to the Dispositional Order, WJH questions the authority and the discretion of the juvenile court to impose certain sanctions. The majority opinion concludes that the juvenile court has full authority to impose any sanction on any juvenile adjudicated delinquent. Essentially, the majority opinion construes isolated language of the Juvenile Justice Act in such a manner that the Act becomes advisory only and is not binding upon the juvenile court. I cannot agree with this construction of the Juvenile Justice Act. The legislature specifically adopted a pro*1156gressive sanction structure, and the structure must be adhered to if the juvenile court is to impose sanctions.
[127] This Court has traditionally used a process for interpreting specific language within a statute that requires specific language to be read in the context of the statute as a whole. By placing specific language in the context of the statute as a whole, it is more likely that the interpretation will accurately reflect the legislative intent:
[T]he statute reader may fruitfully draw on the entirety of the statute, studying the whole rather than the solitary part (or parts) put before the court by the specific case at hand. Answers may emerge from a study of the whole that might not be suggested by a narrowly focused parsing of a solitary provision in a complex statute.
Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 703, 708 (1988). This Court has stated that, in interpreting statutory language, the Court reviews the entire statutory scheme "in order to see the forest and not just the trees." Mondt v. Cheyenne Police Dept., 924 P.2d 70, 16 (Wyo.1996).
[128] The forest in this case is the Juvenile Justice Act, and particularly the progressive sanction structure of the Juvenile Justice Act. The progressive sanction structure is set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 through § 252 (Lexis 1999). In section 245(2)(i), the legislature stated one purpose for progressive sanctions is to "ensure that juvenile offenders face uniform and consistent consequences and punishments that correspond to the seriousness of each offender's current offense." To this end, the legislature developed sanction levels defined by the nature of the juvenile's conduct. Once a sanction level is imposed, sanctions are expressly delineated that may be imposed for each sanction level. The juvenile court maintains the flexibility to choose any sanction level and apply sanctions from the numerous sanctions delineated in the statute. Viewing see-tions 245 through 252 as a whole, it is clear that the intent of the legislature is to promote dispositional uniformity through the imposition of sanction levels based upon the specific conduct of the juvenile and then the imposition of appropriate, defined 'sanctions.
[129] The majority opinion ignores this context. The basic flaw of the majority opinion is that it chooses to focus on single trees in the forest. The majority opinion focuses on isolated, specific language contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-246. Specifically, the construction arrived at by the majority relies upon an individual word, "may," in subsection 246(a) and one particular sentence in subsection 246(d). The majority then interprets this one word and this one sentence without regard even to the language of seetion 246 as a whole, let alone within the context of the progressive sanction structure developed by the legislature. By taking the statutory language at issue out of context, the majority opinion renders the progressive sanction structure meaningless. It is difficult to imagine that the legislature enacted the progressive sanction structure as a recommendation only. Interpreting the language in context, it is possible to give effect to all the language employed by the legislature.
[130] The Juvenile Justice Act must be read as a whole in order to effectively interpret the progressive sanction structure. The Act itself must be read in the context of the juvenile court system in general. Juvenile courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article 5, section 29 of the Wyoming Constitution delegates authority to the legislature to provide for juvenile delinquency courts that "shall have such jurisdiction as the legislature may by law provide." Thus, juvenile courts are the creation of the legislature and have powers only as expressly conferred by the legislature. See In Re C.N., 816 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Wyo.1991) (limiting jurisdictional authority of the juvenile court to authority expressly authorized in statute; general provision cannot override specific provision to expand authority); In Re Maricopa County, JSuvemile Action No. J-74275, 117 Ariz. 317, 572 P.2d 451, 452 (Ct.App.1977) ("the power of a juvenile court to make a particular disposition of a delinquent child is limited in that it must be expressly granted by legislative act"). Therefore, the dispositional terms im*1157posed upon WJH must be expressly authorized under the Juvenile Justice Act.
[131] Turning to the Juvenile Justice Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229 authorizes the specific terms of disposition available to a juvenile court and therefore is key to the overall analysis. Section 229 is entitled "Decree where child adjudicated delinquent; dispositions; terms and conditions; legal custody." Subsection 229(d) authorizes the juvenile court to impose sanctions. Specifically, subsection 229(d) states: "If a child is found to be delinquent the court may impose any sanction authorized by W.S. § 14-6-245 through § 14-6-252." No other provision in section 229 authorizes any other sanctions for disposition. The juvenile court therefore is limited to imposing only those sanctions authorized in subsection 229(d).
[132] Because the majority opinion places so much emphasis on the term "may" as found in subsection 246(a), it is instructive to analyze the term "may" as used in subsection 229(d). The majority correctly characterizes "may" as a permissive word, but this does not answer the question of what authority is granted by a sentence that includes the term "may." Subsection 229(d) authorizes the juvenile court to impose the sanctions as found in sections 245 through 252. The term "may" does not modify the sanctions available for disposition, it modifies the verb "impose." By utilizing "may" before the verb "impose," the legislature made it clear that the juvenile court is not required to impose any sanction on a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. This allows the juvenile court to maintain flexibility to make individually tailored dispositions. The sanctions available for disposition, however, are not affected by the use of the term "may." The sanctions available for disposition are only those sanctions as found in sections 245 through 252. Any other interpretation would stretch the definition of the term "may" beyond its ordinary and obvious usage and meaning.
[133] If a juvenile court is to impose sanctions, then, pursuant to section 229, the juvenile court is only authorized to impose those sanctions as found in sections 245 through 252. Moving to sections 245 through 252, we find the statutory structure for progressive sanctions. Sections 245 and 246 provide the purposes and certain terms and conditions applicable to the sanctions. Sections 247 through 252 delineate specific sanctions. It is important to note that seetion 229 refers the juvenile court not just to those sections delineating sanctions, but rather to all the sections defining the progressive sanction structure.
[134] Looking more closely at the progressive sanction structure established by the legislature, the statutory scheme begins with section 245. Section 245 contains the legislative purposes for the progressive sanction guidelines.1 The statutory language of sections 246 through 252 must be interpreted to affect these purposes. The purposes include not only allowing the juvenile court flexibility but also ensuring uniformity and consistency in disposition based upon a juvenile's conduct. Generally, it is noteworthy that the legislature does not state within the purposes that the progressive sanction structure is a recommendation only and need not be followed by the juvenile court.
[185] Section 246 is the section receiving the focus of the majority opinion. Section 246 is entitled "Sanction levels" and its content is true to its title. Section 246 defines how a juvenile court should choose a sanction level based upon a juvenile's conduct. Subsection 246(a) states in pertinent part that the juvenile court "may, in a disposition hearing, assign the child one (1) of the following sanction levels." The use of the term "may" in this subsection is identical to the use of the same term in subsection 229(d). The juvenile court is not required to assign a sanction level just as the juvenile court is not required to impose a sanction on juveniles adjudicated delinquent.
[136] The majority opinion of the Court correctly construes this "may" as making the assignment of a sanction level permissive. The majority opinion then jumps to the erroneous assumption that the alternative option for the juvenile court is to impose sanctions without determining a sanction level. This construction not only does not comport with *1158the ordinary and obvious usage and meaning of the term "may" as discussed above, but it also cannot stand when analyzed in light of the statutory language read as a whole.
[137] Many provisions within the Juvenile Justice Act become meaningless if no sanction level is imposed. Going back to the purposes of the progressive sanctions in § 14-6-245, the purposes include promoting uniform and consistent consequences for delinquent behavior throughout the state and to "Llmprove juvenile justice planning and resource allocation by ensuring uniform and consistent reporting of disposition decisions at all levels." These purposes cannot be achieved if juvenile courts are free to ignore the sanction levels.
[138] Further, because, pursuant to seetion 229, available sanctions are limited to those expressly authorized in sections 245 through 252, the juvenile court would have no sanctions available if no sanction level is imposed. The specific sanctions expressly authorized are found in sections 247 through 252. Section 247 lists "Sanctions common to all levels." The section starts with "[flor a child at any sanction level, the juvenile court may ..." and then sets forth certain sanctions. By its express terms the sanctions only apply to a child "at any sanction level." Sections 248 through 252 define the sanctions directly applicable to each sanction level. All these delineated sanctions are inapplicable if no sanction level is imposed. The statutory scheme is thus erystal clear that, if the juvenile court is going to impose sanctions, it must first impose a sanction level.2
[489] Onee a sanction level is imposed, the juvenile court can impose appropriate sanctions. The legislature delineated authorized sanctions in sections 247 through 252. The majority opinion of this Court holds that the juvenile court may impose any sanction whether or not expressly authorized by the legislature in sections 247 through 252 because of language found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-246(d).3 Subsection 246(d) states: "If the juvenile court deviates from the guidelines under this section it shall state in writing its reasons for the deviation and enter the statement into the record. Nothing in Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 14-6-245 through § 14-6-252 prohibits the imposition of appropriate sanctions that are different from those provided at any sanction level." In the majority opinion of the Court, the second sentence has been termed a "catchall" and interpreted as allowing the juvenile court to impose any imaginable sanction.
[¥40] Subsection 246(d) allows the juvenile court flexibility, but not the flexibility contended by the majority opinion. The majority opinion creates uncertainty regarding the use of the term "sanction." 4 The majority opinion reads extra language into the statute and interprets "appropriate sanction" to mean "any imaginable appropriate sanction." This Court may not read into a statute authority that the legislature did not expressly grant.
The omission of words from a statute must be considered intentional on the part of the legislature. Words may not be supplied in a statute where the statute is intelligible without the addition of the alleged omission. Words may not be inserted in a statutory provision under the guise of interpretation. The Supreme Court will not read into laws what is not there. This court will not supply omissions in a statute and redress is with the legislature. We are alerted by all this to the result that it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.
In Re Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo.1976) (citations omitted). Available sanctions are expressly defined by the legislature in see-tions 247 through 252. The term "sanction" in section 246(d) should be limited to refer*1159ence only those sanctions expressly defined by the legislature.
[141] This interpretation becomes imperative when interpreting the language within its context. Section 246 defines sanction levels-specifically how to choose the appropriate sanction level. The location of this section within the statutory scheme is important. The supposed "catchall" provision does not exist in any section that defines available sanctions or other available terms of disposition. If the Wyoming legislature had intended to include a dispositional "catchall," one would expect to find it in section 229 where the specific terms of disposition are defined.5 A narrower sanction "catchall" logically could be in § 14-6-247 "Sanctions common to all levels." Neither section contains any "catchall" language.
[142] The Wyoming legislature did not include express broad authority for the juvenile court to impose any imaginable sanction in the section authorizing available orders of disposition or in any of the sections authorizing specific sanctions available upon disposition of a juvenile adjudicated delinquent. Therefore we must infer reasonably that the Wyoming legislature did not intend the juvenile court to have such power. Certainly it is not the province of this Court to judicially create such broad authority where the legislature has not done so by express language.
[T48] Subsection 246(d) allows the juvenile court the flexibility to impose any combination of the expressly delineated sanctions at any sanction level. It does not expand the authority of the juvenile court to impose any sanction other than those specifically delineated in sections 247 through 252.
[144] In sum, the Juvenile Justice Act requires that, if the juvenile court is going to impose sanctions, it must choose a sanction level. The "may" references in the statute logically only give the juvenile court the option to not impose sanctions. Once a sanction level is chosen, the sanction options available to the juvenile court include any combination of those sanctions expressly defined by the legislature in sections 247 through 252. This interpretation is supported both by the express language of the applicable statutory sections and the statutory scheme as a whole.
[T 45] The disposition imposed upon WJH does not comply with the mandates of the Juvenile Justice Act. WJH was not assigned a sanction level, Because no sanction level was imposed, no sanctions were available to the juvenile court to impose. Thus, in imposing sanctions, the juvenile court exceeded its authority. The Dispositional Order is thus void.
[146] Turning now to the Order Adjudicating Child Delinquent and Requiring Pre-dispositional Study, WJH admitted to certain delinquent acts and an adjudication of WJH as a delinquent child is appropriate. The problem with the Order, however, is that the Order simply states that WJH "is found and adjudicated to be a delinquent child." Since sanction levels and sanctions are to be based upon the specific conduct of the juvenile that led to his adjudication, this broad language does not allow the juvenile court to properly impose any sanction.
[147] Should the juvenile court refer to its findings of fact, the findings are just as vague. The findings state "[the child ... admitted the allegations contained in the Petition filed herein." Certainly, as pointed out in the facts set forth in the majority opinion, WJH did not admit to all the allegations contained in the Petition. There is no indication in the Order as to exactly what WJH admitted nor what delinquent acts the juvenile court found WJH to have committed based upon his admissions. The Order is thus facially insufficient and should be reversed on that ground.6
[148] While I could end the discussion here, the Dispositional Order presents anoth*1160er troubling issue. Although this issue is not briefed or argued, this Court has authority on its own to raise and decide issues involving fundamental rights. As this Court explained on another occasion:
We are not a bit concerned that the matter ... was not raised in the lower court or argued by either of the parties. This court has general superintending control over all the courts of the state and the Wyoming judicial system in general. It is our duty to protect its integrity and prohibit dealing lightly with its proceedings. We are at liberty to decide a case upon any point which in our opinion the ends of justice require, particularly on a point so fundamental that we must take cognizance of it.
Allen v. Allen, 550 P.2d 1137, 1142 (Wyo.1976) (footnotes omitted); see also In re HC, 983 P.2d 1205, 1209, (Wyo.1999) ("[nleither party addresses this issue; however, this Court may review issues directly involving an appellant's fundamental rights"); Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverton, 70 Wyo. 84, 127, 247 P.2d 660, 663 (Wyo.1952) ("were we to limit our decisions strictly and literally to the arguments advanced by counsel in a case, the law in this jurisdiction would be in a sorry state" (Blume, C. J.)).
[1 49] The issue of concern is the appointment and use of the muiltidisciplinary team (MDT). The Dispositional Order, for the first time, appoints a MDT.7 The language of the Order gives the MDT the mandate of preparing "recommendations for the Court's consideration in making an informed disposition of this case." Obviously such mandate is moot when given in the Dispositional Order. The language regarding the juvenile court making an informed disposition, however, is very appropriate. The entire statutory scheme is premised upon the juvenile court making an informed disposition, which the juvenile court cannot accomplish if it fails to appoint the MDT until after disposition.
[1 50] Under the Juvenile Justice Act, the juvenile court is required to appoint a MDT pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 entitled "Predisposition studies and reports." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227(b) states "[alfter a petition is filed alleging a child is delinquent, the court shall appoint a multidisciplinary team." This requirement is mandatory on the juvenile court. In this case, the question concerns the timing of the appointment. Although the section does not expressly specify a time, it is clear under the statute that the multidisciplinary team must be appointed before disposition.
[¥51] Returning to our original premise of statutory interpretation, a statute must be construed in context. Reading § 14-6-227 in context, there is no uncertainty regarding when the juvenile court must appoint the MDT. The topic of section 227, as suggested by its heading, is predisposition reports. Subsection (a) requires the juvenile court to order the Department of Family Services (DFS) to prepare a predisposition study and report. Subsection (b) requires the juvenile court to appoint a MDT. Subsection (e) provides a mandate for the MDT-the MDT "shall review the child's personal and family history, school, mental health and department of family services records and any other pertinent information, for the purpose of making sanction recommendations." The only logical interpretation of the statutory language, read as a whole, is that the MDT must be appointed in time for the MDT to prepare sanction recommendations for the Juvenile court to use in determining a disposition.8
[152] This interpretation is supported by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-229(a) (Lexis 1999), which states in pertinent part:
In determining the disposition to be made under this act in regard to any child:
*1161(i) The court shall place on the record the predisposition report and the recommendations, if any, of the multidisciplinary team;
(i) If the court does not place the child in accordance with the recommendations of the predisposition report or multidisciplinary team, the court shall enter on the record specific findings of fact relied upon to support its decision to deviate from the recommended disposition.
It might be argued that the "if any" language regarding recommendations from the MDT in Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 14-6-229(a)(i) negates the requirement for the juvenile court to appoint a MDT. This construction contradicts the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 requiring the appointment of the MDT and establishing the statutory duty of the MDT to gather information "for the purpose of making sanction recommendations."
[153] The more statutorily consistent interpretation is that the MDT is not required to propose any sanction recommendations, solely at the MDT"s discretion. The juvenile court is required, however, to appoint the MDT and place whatever recommendations the MDT may formulate on the record prior to disposition. Appointing the MDT after disposition has occurred, or as part of the disposition, does not comply with the mandates of the statute.
[154] Practically, the appointment of the MDT after disposition creates serious jurisdictional and due process issues. In this case, the juvenile court, as part of its order of disposition, appointed a MDT. The juvenile court then ordered the juvenile and his parents to cooperate with and comply with the members of the MDT. Because the MDT is not given an appropriate express mandate in the dispositional order, I am left to guess at the authority of the MDT. Presumably the MDT is to develop actions for the juvenile and his parents to follow. Should WJH or his parents not abide by the dictates of the MDT, the parents could be held in contempt of court and WJH could have his probation revoked and receive a harsher disposition for violating the terms of his probation.
[T 55] The juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting such authority to the MDT. It is the responsibility of the juvenile court to order the terms of disposition. The authority of the MDT is defined clearly by statute. Nowhere in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-227 does it state or even imply that the MDT may formulate recommendations that will become immediately effective upon the juvenile and his parents. The MDT recommendations are to be submitted to the juvenile court. The juvenile court determines the ultimate terms of disposition. The juvenile court cannot abdicate this responsibility to the MDT post-disposition.
[156] The entire dispositional phase of the underlying juvenile case is troubling. While juvenile courts certainly have flexibility, they still must exercise such flexibility within the confines of their statutorily defined jurisdiction. While juvenile courts have a great deal of flexibility in order to fulfill their objectives of serving as parens patrige, "the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).
[157] The Juvenile Justice Act provides a dispositional process that promotes collaboration among multiple professionals to help determine the individual needs and requirements of juveniles coming before the juvenile court. Disposition is supposed to be based upon the predisposition report of the DFS and recommendations from the MDT plus any additional information submitted at the dispositional hearing. The juvenile court thus is aided in determining an appropriate disposition by information from a variety of professionals, including counselors and educators, as well as from people who know the child such as relatives and friends.
[158] The requirement that the juvenile court put in the record any reasons for deviating from the recommendations of the MDT and the DFS predisposition report confirms that the legislature truly wants dispositional decisions to be made on the basis of a team effort. This case does not reveal such a professional collaboration during the disposi-tional phase of the proceedings. This is especially troubling given the juvenile court's *1162failure to impose a sanction level or clearly state the reasons for the terms of disposition.
[4159] In reading the Juvenile Justice Act, it is clear that the purposes of many provisions of the Act are to ensure a uniform dispositional process and a disposition for juveniles that at least follows certain guidelines. Neither has been achieved in this case. The will of the legislature, a coordinate branch of government, should not be so obviously ignored.
[160] I would hold that both the letter and the spirit of the Juvenile Justice Act have been violated in this case in regard to both the specific disposition and the process used in achieving the disposition. The juvenile court did not look to the progressive sanction structure of the Juvenile Justice Act in reaching its disposition. Sanctions were imposed without first imposing a sanction level, The disposition was not reached as the result of a team effort of professionals investigating WJH's specific cireumstances. The resulting disposition of WJH is exeep-tionally harsh given his admitted (not alleged and unproven) conduct.9
[161] The case should be reversed and remanded for a new disposition. The specific acts of delinquency to which WJH admitted should be defined so that the sanction level guidelines can be applied. The juvenile court, after receiving and considering dispo-sitional recommendations from a MDT, should then impose a sanction level and appropriate sanctions as expressly defined by the legislature in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 through § 252, should sanctions still be appropriate.

. The full language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-245 is quoted in 112 of the majority opinion.

. While I fully agree with the majority opinion that, pursuant to § 246(d), a deviation from the sanction level guidelines mandates a written explanation on the record from the juvenile court, I cannot agree that omitting the assignment of a sanction level is a deviation. Failure to assign a sanction level is a complete abrogation of the guidelines, not a deviation.

. This holding is especially curious because even the State, in its brief, concedes that the juvenile court is limited to those sanctions expressly delineated in sections 247 through 252.

. The term "sanction" is not defined in the Juvenile Justice Act.

. The Ohio statute referred to in the majority opinion authorizing the juvenile court to "[mlake any further disposition that the court finds proper" is found in the Ohio section authorizing available terms of disposition, Ohio's equivalent to Wyoming's section 229. The context and the express language of the Ohio statute make it an obvious catchall. It is not analogous to the language in Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 14-6-246(d).

. I also agree with the majority opinion that the Order contains other language that is at best misleading and must be corrected.

. Pursuant to the language of the order, the MDT was appointed pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 14-6-427 which is part of the Children in Need of Supervision Act, not the Juvenile Justice Act.

. In fact, in order to avoid any potential delays that might be occasioned by the work of both the DFS and a MDT in gathering information and formulating predispositional recommendations, best practices would indicate that both the DFS and a MDT should be judicially appointed and authorized to proceed with their work when a petition alleging a juvenile delinquent is filed, or at least as soon thereafter as is practical.

. While not reaching the abuse of discretion arguments posed by WJH, the sanctions imposed do not seem to meet the legislative purpose of imposing the most serious sanctions for the most serious conduct.