Court Opinion

ID: 9427205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:01.415688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:05.453986
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
In joining the Court’s opinion I write separately only to emphasize the significance of Montana’s special interest in its elk population and to point out the limits of the Court’s holding.
The doctrine that a State “owns” the wildlife within its borders as trustee for its citizens, see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896), is admittedly a legal anachronism of sorts. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U. S. 265, 284 (1977). A State does not “own” wild birds and animals in the same way that it may own other natural resources such as land, oil, or timber. But, as noted in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 386, and contrary to the implications of the dissent, the doctrine is not completely obsolete. It manifests the State’s special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the benefit of its citizens. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra, at 284, 287. Whether we describe this interest as ■ proprietary or otherwise is not significant.
We recognized in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 401-402 (1948), that the doctrine does not apply to migratory shrimp located in the three-mile belt of the marginal sea. But the elk involved in this case are found within Montana and remain primarily within the State. As such they are natural resources of the State, and Montana citizens have a legitimate interest in preserving their access to them. The Court acknowledges this interest when it points out that the Montana elk supply “has been entrusted to the care of the State by the people of Montana,” ante, at 388, and asserts the continued vitality of *393the doctrine upon which the court relied in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3,230) (CC ED Pa. 1825); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391 (1877); and Geer v. Connecticut, supra. See ante, at 386.
McCready v. Virginia, supra, made it clear that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prevent a State from preferring its own citizens in granting public access to natural resources in which they have a special interest. Thus Montana does not offend the Privileges and Immunities Clause by granting residents preferred access to natural resources that do not belong to private owners. And Montana may give its residents preferred access to Montana elk without offending the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
It is not necessary to challenge the cases cited by the dissent, post, at 405, which make clear that a State does not have absolute freedom to regulate the taking of wildlife within its borders or over its airspace. A State may not regulate the killing of migratory game birds in a way that frustrates a valid treaty of the United States entered into pursuant to the Art. II, § 2, treaty power, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434 (1920); it may not regulate wild animals found on federal lands in a way that conflicts with federal statutes enacted under the Property Clause, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, 546 (1976); nor may it allocate access to its wildlife in a manner that offends the Fourteenth Amendment. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U. S. 410 (1948). Once wildlife becomes involved in interstate commerce, a State may not restrict the use of or access to that wildlife in a way that burdens interstate commerce. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., supra, at 281-282; Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928). None of those cases hold that the Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents a State from preferring its own citizens in allocating access to wildlife within that State.
It is the special interest of Montana citizens in its elk that *394permits Montana to charge nonresident hunters higher license fees without offending the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court does not hold that the Clause permits a State to give its residents preferred access to recreational activities offered for sale by private parties. Indeed it acknowledges that the Clause requires equality with respect to privileges "bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.” Ante, at 383. It seems clear that those basic privileges include “all the privileges of trade and commerce” which were protected in the fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U. S. 656, 660-661, and n. 6 (1975). The Clause assures noncitizens the opportunity to purchase goods and services on the same basis as citizens; it confers the same protection upon the buyer of luxury goods and services as upon the buyer of bread.