Court Opinion

ID: 9867884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 17:11:18.902849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:42.290870
License: Public Domain

J-S24038-23

                                  2023 PA Super 182

  IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.K., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: D.J.K., A MINOR                   :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1751 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered November 7, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Juvenile Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-JV-0000183-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

       D.J.K., a juvenile, appeals from the November 7, 2022 dispositional

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, following an

adjudication of delinquency on charges of sexual assault and indecent

assault.1 Following our careful review, we affirm the dispositional order in this

clear case of credibility issues.

       The juvenile court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows:

              [S.S.], an autistic female who was seventeen years
              old at the time of this incident, and [Appellant] were
              friends having met at school. [S.S.] lived with her
              mother and spent weekends with her father. During
              the early morning hours of July 16, 2020, while
              staying with her father, [S.S.] texted [Appellant]
              stating she was bored and wanted someone to hang
              out with.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.1 and 3126(a)(1), respectively.
J-S24038-23

          [S.S.] suggested that the two of them go to Juvenile’s
          house although neither of them had previously visited
          each other’s home and Juvenile agreed to meet with
          her. [S.S.’s] father did not object to this visit and
          Juvenile picked her up between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m.
          [Appellant] took [S.S.] to his brother’s house where
          [he] was living. When they arrived they went to
          [Appellant’s] bedroom on the third floor of the house
          where they vaped and [S.S.] drank three cans of
          White Claw, an alcoholic beverage.

          At [Appellant’s] suggestion, the two of them walked
          next door to a spare bedroom. [S.S.] laid down on a
          bed in the room and then fell from the bed, landing in
          a prone position. [Appellant] then removed [S.S.’s]
          shorts and underwear. While pushing her face down
          onto the floor, [Appellant] engaged in vaginal
          intercourse from behind. [S.S.] was not able to
          escape and while crying, told [Appellant] to stop but
          he continued to assault her for several minutes. When
          he completed his assault, [Appellant] left the [S.S.] in
          the spare bedroom, and he returned to his bedroom.

          [S.S.] remained in the spare bedroom and sent
          several text messages throughout the night to
          [Appellant]. Some these texts were friendly and at
          one point she asked [Appellant] if she could stay at
          his home. [S.S.] testified she sent this text because
          “she was not in her right mind.” [S.S.] also noticed
          blood on the floor of the spare bedroom as well as on
          her clothing and took photos of the blood stains with
          her cell phone. [S.S.] said she took the photographs
          and sent the text messages to [Appellant] because
          she was “sad and scared.” [S.S.] also sent text
          messages to her stepsister, two friends, her cousin,
          and a friend she knew from kindergarten telling them
          that she had been raped or attacked. [S.S.] then fell
          asleep and awoke at approximately 8:00 a.m. She
          then observed that [Appellant] was still asleep and
          called her father who arrived and picked her up.

          At approximately 9:15 p.m. that evening, [S.S.] told

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            her father that she had been raped by [Appellant].
            [S.S.] then called her mother and later texted her
            telling her that she had been drinking, blacked out and
            [Appellant] had turned her around backwards and
            raped her.       Mother called the Fleetwood Police
            Department on July 17, 2020 and reported her
            daughter had been raped. [S.S.] and her mother met
            with officer Angel Arndt of the Fleetwood Police
            Department later that day. Officer Arndt conducted a
            minimal facts interview and following [S.S.’s]
            directions drove [S.S.] and her mother and step-
            father past [Appellant’s] residence. Officer Arndt
            referred [S.S.] to the Children’s Alliance Center for an
            interview which took place on August 3, 2020. During
            the interview, [S.S.] told an Alliance representative
            that [Appellant] had placed his penis in her “no-no
            area.”

            The Alliance referred [S.S.] to Dr. Renee Riddle, a
            pediatrician, [and] an expert in the area of child abuse
            examinations for an evaluation. Dr. Riddle examined
            [S.S.] on August 18, 2020. It was Dr. Riddle’s
            understanding from her discussion with [S.S.] that the
            latter had experienced vaginal penetration. Dr.
            Riddle’s examination revealed that [S.S.] had a
            healed hymenal transection. The doctor opined that
            this observation was evidence that supported a
            vaginal penetration. The doctor said that the healed
            injury would explain [S.S.’s] observations of bleeding
            after the assault.

            On August 13, 2020, the Fleetwood Police Department
            conducted a search of juvenile’s house pursuant to a
            warrant but uncovered no evidence. County Detective
            Kyle Rentschler processed the bedroom where [S.S.]
            had been assaulted for blood stains but failed to detect
            any blood. For reasons that remain unclear, the
            Fleetwood Police Department did not forward this case
            to the Berks County District Attorney’s office until
            February 16, 2021.

Juvenile court opinion, 2/14/23 at 1-4 (citations omitted).

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     On September 27, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a petition alleging

Appellant was delinquent of rape by forcible compulsion, sexual assault, and

two counts of indecent assault. On October 26, 2022, the Commonwealth

filed a motion in limine which sought to bar the admission of evidence that

S.S. had made a complaint to police that an unrelated individual had sexually

assaulted her in June and October 2021. Hearings were held on these matters

on October 27 and November 7, 2022. The juvenile court ultimately found

that S.S.’s unrelated claim of sexual assault was barred under the Rape Shield

Statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104, and granted the Commonwealth’s motion in

limine.

     As noted, on November 7, 2022, the juvenile court adjudicated

Appellant delinquent of one count each of sexual assault and indecent assault.

Appellant was placed on formal probation and ordered not to have any contact

with the victim. Notes of testimony, 11/7/22 at 219-223. On November 14,

2022, Appellant filed a timely post-dispositional motion alleging that the

juvenile court erred in granting the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and

that the adjudication was against the weight of the evidence. The juvenile

court denied this motion on November 17, 2022. This timely appeal followed

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on December 9, 2022.2 Appellant and the juvenile court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              I.     Whether the juvenile court erred by granting the
                     Commonwealth's Motion in Limine to exclude
                     Appellant’s proffer of admissible, relevant
                     evidence based upon the Rape Shield Law[?]

              II.    Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion
                     in ruling that the adjudication of delinquency
                     was not against the weight of the evidence
                     despite the testimony of S.S. being contradicted
                     by multiple other witnesses’ testimony and the
                     lack of evidence to support a conclusion that the
                     Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with
                     S.S. without her consent[?]

Appellant’s brief at 5.

I.     Exclusion of S.S.’s Unrelated Complaint of Sexual Assault

       Appellant first argues that the juvenile court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine to exclude evidence that S.S. had made a

complaint to police that an unrelated individual had sexually assaulted her in

____________________________________________

2 Appellant purports to appeal “from the adjudication of delinquency entered

on this matter November 7, 2022, and the subsequent denial of the Post-
Dispositional Motion Nunc Pro Tunc entered on this matter November 17,
2022.” However, in a juvenile action, an appeal properly lies from the
dispositional order. See In the Interest of J.D., 798 A.2d 210, 211 n.1
(Pa.Super. 2002) (stating, “the appealable order is not the adjudication of
delinquency (the equivalent of a finding of guilt in criminal matters), but rather
is the dispositional order (the equivalent of the judgment of sentence in
criminal matters).”).

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June and October 2021, in accordance with the Rape Shield Statute.

Appellant’s brief at 24.

            A motion in limine is used before trial to obtain a
            ruling on the admissibility of evidence. It gives the
            trial judge the opportunity to weigh potentially
            prejudicial and harmful evidence before the trial
            occurs, thus preventing the evidence from ever
            reaching the jury. A motion in limine differs from a
            suppression motion in that a suppression motion is
            designed to preclude evidence that was obtained in
            violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, while a
            motion in limine precludes evidence that was
            constitutionally obtained but which is prejudicial to the
            moving party.

Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 715 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation

omitted).

      Generally, “[q]uestions concerning the admissibility of evidence lie

within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not

reverse the court’s decision on such a question absent a clear abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 768 (Pa.Super.

2018) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 195 A.3d 166 (Pa. 2018).         This

Court has emphasized that a juvenile court’s ruling on the admissibility of a

sexual abuse victim’s prior sexual conduct will be reversed only where there

has been a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. K.S.F., 102 A.3d

480, 483 (Pa.Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely

because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but

requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,

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or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Crosley, 180

A.3d at 768.

        The Rape Shield Statute restricts the introduction of evidence of a

victim’s prior sexual conduct and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

             Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s
             past sexual conduct, past sexual victimization,
             allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion
             evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct,
             and reputation evidence of the alleged victim’s past
             sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions
             of any offense listed in subsection (c) except evidence
             of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct with the
             defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at
             issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible
             pursuant to the rules of evidence.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(a). The purpose of the Rape Shield Statute “is intended

to exclude irrelevant and abusive inquiries regarding prior sexual conduct of

sexual assault complainants.” Commonwealth v. Burns, 988 A.2d 684, 689

(Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 8 A.3d 341 (Pa. 2010).

        This Court has recognized several exceptions to the general prohibition

against the admission of evidence of victim’s prior sexual conduct, in an effort

“to reconcile the effect of the statute in excluding evidence with the accused’s

sixth    amendment      right   to   confrontation   and    cross-examination.”

Commonwealth v. Largaespada, 184 A.3d 1002, 1007 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 197 A.3d 223 (Pa. 2018).

             Established exceptions include evidence that negates
             directly the act of intercourse with which a defendant
             is charged, evidence demonstrating a witness’ bias, or
             evidence that attacks credibility. Notably, evidence

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               tending to directly exculpate the accused by showing
               that the alleged victim is biased and thus has a motive
               to lie, fabricate, or seek retribution is admissible at
               trial.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

      A defendant wishing to introduce evidence of a victim’s prior sexual

conduct that falls within an exception to the Rape Shield Statute must make

a specific, written proffer to the court. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3104(b). Once a

defendant meets this threshold requirement, the court is then required to hold

an in camera hearing to determine whether the evidence is “relevant to

exculpate the accused, more probative than prejudicial, and non-cumulative

in nature.” Id.; Largaespada, 184 A.3d at 1007 (citation omitted).

      Instantly, the juvenile court conducted a hearings on this matter, at the

conclusion of which it barred the admission of evidence that S.S. had made a

complaint to police that an unrelated individual had sexually assaulted her in

June and October 2021.         The juvenile court found that S.S.’s allegations

against an unrelated individual were not exculpatory in nature but rather

“separate incidences of sexual victimization” barred by the Rape Shield

Statute. Juvenile court opinion, 2/14/23 at 9. The juvenile court further found

that these allegations were irrelevant and did not directly bear on S.S.’s

credibility:

               [T]hese incidents occurred eleven and fifteen months
               respectively after the assault in the instant case, there
               was no connection between [Appellant] and the
               alleged assailant [S.S.] encountered in 2021, and
               these latter incidents do not show bias or hostility to

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              [Appellant] nor a pattern of behavior that would
              impugn [S.S.’s] credibility[.]       Also, [Appellant]
              possessed alternative means of challenging the
              credibility of [S.S.] such as [her] text messages to
              [Appellant], the testimony of the fiancée of
              [Appellant’s] brother, and the boy who roomed with
              [Appellant] on the night of [S.S.’s] assault.

Id. at 8-9.

      Following our careful review, we agree with these conclusions. S.S.’s

allegations of sexual assault against an unrelated individual in no way

exculpates Appellant for his crimes, nor does it provide a basis to infer that

S.S. had a bias or motive to fabricate allegations against Appellant in the

instant matter.       As a panel of this Court recently emphasized in

Commonwealth v. Allen, 284 A.3d 958 (Pa.Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied, 293 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2023), “[t]he fact that a

sexual assault complainant has been a victim of sexual assaults by persons

other than the defendant creates no logical inference that she has a motive to

fabricate accusations against the defendant and has no probative value with

respect to her credibility or the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”     Id. at *5

(citations omitted). Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s contention that the

juvenile court abused its discretion in barring S.S.’s unrelated complaint of

sexual assault must fail.

II.   Weight of the Evidence

      Appellant next argues that his adjudication of delinquency for sexual

assault and indecent assault were against the weight of the evidence because

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S.S’s testimony regarding details of the assault was contradicted by multiple

other witnesses. Appellant’s brief at 30.

      Our standard of review of a challenge to the weight of the evidence is

well settled.   “An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the

evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth

v. Galvin, 985 A.2d 783, 793 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied,

559 U.S. 1051 (2010). “[A] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes

that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which

evidence is to be believed.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 643

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa.

2018).

            [W]here the trial court has ruled on the weight claim
            below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the
            underlying question of whether the verdict is against
            the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate review
            is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused
            its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 40 A.3d 1250, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

            Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to
            hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate
            court will give the gravest consideration to the
            findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
            reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
            is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
            assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial
            is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or
            was not against the weight of the evidence and that a
            new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.

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            This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by
            the trial court in granting or denying a motion for a
            new trial based on a challenge to the weight of the
            evidence is unfettered. In describing the limits of a
            trial court’s discretion, we have explained[,] [t]he
            term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
            wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate
            conclusion within the framework of the law, and is not
            exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of
            the judge. Discretion must be exercised on the
            foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
            personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.
            Discretion is abused where the course pursued
            represents not merely an error of judgment, but
            where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or
            where the law is not applied or where the record
            shows that the action is a result of partiality,
            prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations and

emphasis omitted).

      In sum, the juvenile court should reverse an adjudication of delinquency

when it is “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and

the award of a new [hearing] is imperative so that right may be given another

opportunity to prevail.” In re J.B., 106 A.3d 76, 95 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

      Upon review, we find that the juvenile court properly exercised its

discretion in concluding that the adjudication of delinquency was not against

the weight of the evidence.      “[T]he trier of fact while passing upon the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to

believe all, part or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz,

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911 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 926

A.2d 972 (Pa. 2007).

      Here, the juvenile court, sitting as factfinder, found that the testimony

of S.S. credible and elected not to believe Appellant’s version of the events.

Juvenile court opinion, 2/14/23 at 15. The juvenile court held that “[S.S.]

convincingly testified that she had been sexually assaulted by [Appellant]” and

it “took into account [S.S.’s] age, the traumatic nature of her experience, as

well as her diagnosis of autism[]” in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 15, 17.

The court further emphasized that “[t]he evidence in this case was not so one-

sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that [an adjudication of delinquency]

shocks one’s sense of justice.” Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Appellant essentially asks us to reassess the juvenile court’s credibility

determinations.    We are precluded from reweighing the evidence and

substituting our judgment for that of the factfinder. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055.

Accordingly, Appellant’s weight claim must fail.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the November 7, 2022

dispositional order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/26/2023

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