Court Opinion

ID: 9373746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:05.377371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:43.074415
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JOSEPH FERRANTE,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-15-0372-I-2

                  v.

     ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION                        DATE: April 25, 2022
       AGENCY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence Berger, Esquire, Glen Cove, New York, for the appellant.

           Alexandra Meighan and Merrick D. Cosey, Washington, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, whi ch
     reversed the appellant’s constructive suspension of more than 14 days .
     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to clarify the improper agency action that rendered the
     appellant’s leave of absence involuntary and to modify the constructive
     suspension period, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant is employed as a Criminal Investigator, GS-1811-13, with the
     agency in Edison, New Jersey.      Ferrante v. Environmental Protection Agency,
     MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-15-0372-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 16, Refiled
     Initial Decision (RID) at 2.    The appellant is subject to medical examination
     whenever there is a question as to his continued ability to meet the medical
     standards or physical requirements of his law enforcement position. RID at 2;
     Ferrante v. Environmental Protection Agency, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-15-
     0372-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 25 at 131-56.
¶3         On February 13, 2015, the appellant suffered a nonwork-related head injury
     that resulted in a facial fracture and cognitive impairment and that required
     emergency surgery and physical therapy. RID at 2; IAF, Tab 25 at 11, 72, 85,
     305. On February 17, 2015, the appellant informed his supervisor of his injury
     and began a period of voluntary sick leave.      IAF, Tab 25 at 20.     The agency
                                                                                      3

     continued to approve his sick leave from February to April 2015, but requested
     that he provide sufficient documentation detailing, among other things, how his
     medical condition affected his ability to perform his duties. IAF, Tab 6 at 20, 22,
     Tab 25 at 20-22. The appellant provided additional medical documentation. IAF,
     Tab 25 at 20-21, 25-32, 54, 275-84. The agency found it insufficient to make a
     determination as to his fitness for duty and on March 17, 2015, ordered him to
     submit to a Federal Occupational Health (FOH) medical examination. Id. at 22.
     Instead, on March 19, 2015, the appellant provided a note from his treating
     certified registered nurse practitioner (CRNP) stating that he was unable to work
     “[d]ue to impaired delayed recall and fatigue” and indicated that he may not use a
     firearm, among other restrictions. Id. at 82, 85. But, on April 13, 2015, after
     receiving clearance from his CRNP, the appellant requested to return to partial
     duty on April 15, 2015. Id. at 32, 83. The agency declined his request and again
     ordered him to undergo an FOH exam. Id. at 80, 82.
¶4        The appellant scheduled his FOH exam and reported for testing and
     examination on April 29 and May 12, 2015. RID at 3. On May 28, 2015, the
     appellant’s CRNP cleared him for return to full duty.        IAF, Tab 25 at 54.
     Nonetheless, as indicated in her June 15, 2015 report, the FOH medical review
     officer (MRO) deferred making a final determination on the appellant’s clearance
     until he provided a report from a board-certified neurologist detailing 14 specific
     pieces of medical information, including the “Results of a CURRENT
     neurological and mental status evaluation.” IAF, Tab 25 at 11-12, 14-15, 74-75.
     The appellant did not receive the FOH report until July 9, 2015. RID at 4; IAF,
     Tab 25 at 302-03.     On July 17, 2015, the appellant’s treating practitioners
     forwarded his extant clinical documentation because they believed it to be fully
     responsive to the FOH request. RID at 4; IAF, Tab 25 at 286, 305. The FOH
     MRO, however, clarified that the records were only 1 of the 14 items needed and
     reissued the request for the remaining information. IAF, Tab 25 at 304-06. The
     appellant then scheduled an appointment with a board-certified neurologist and
                                                                                      4

     obtained the remaining documentation. RID at 4; IAF, Tab 25 at 213, 307-10.
     The appellant submitted this information to the agency on or about October 2,
     2015; FOH cleared him for duty, effective October 14, 2015; the agency informed
     him of his clearance on Friday, October 16, 2015, and returned him to duty the
     following Monday, on October 19, 2015. RID at 4-5.
¶5        While the appellant’s medical clearance decision was pending, he filed this
     Board appeal, claiming that the agency’s refusal to return him to duty and
     placement on “[e]nforced [l]eave” constituted a constructive suspension and
     disability discrimination. IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 23 at 3. The agency asserted that
     the appellant was not returned to duty because there was a legitimate, outstand ing
     question as to his fitness for duty. IAF, Tab 6 at 7-10. The administrative judge
     initially dismissed the appeal without prejudice, but automatically refiled the
     appeal on February 3, 2016.     I-2 AF, Tabs 1-2; IAF, Tab 27, Initial Decision
     at 1-3. After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative j udge
     issued an initial decision finding that the agency constructively suspended the
     appellant from May 13, 2015, the day after his last FOH exam, to October 16,
     2015, the last day of his absence before returning to duty; reversing the
     constructive suspension because it was effected without minimum due process;
     and finding unproven the appellant’s disability discrimination claim of failure to
     provide a reasonable accommodation. RID at 5, 13, 16.
¶6        The agency has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tabs 1-2. The appellant has filed a response, to which the agency has replied.
     PFR File, Tabs 4-5.      On petition for review, neither party challenges the
     administrative judge’s findings on the appellant’s failure to provide a reasonable
     accommodation claim.     PFR File, Tabs 1-2, 4-5.     Accordingly, we focus our
     discussion on the appellant’s constructive suspension claim.
                                                                                         5

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         Although various fact patterns may give rise to an appealable constructive
     suspension, all constructive suspension claims are premised on the proposition
     that an apparently voluntary absence actually is not.          Rosario-Fabregas v.
     Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 8 (2015), aff’d, 833 F.3d 1342
     (2016). To demonstrate that the absence was not voluntary and is an actionable
     constructive suspension, an appellant must prove that he lacked a meaningful
     choice in the matter and that the agency’s wrongful actions deprived him of that
     choice. Id. Assuming the jurisdictional requirements of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 are
     otherwise met, proof of these two things is sufficient to establish Board
     jurisdiction. Id. This analysis extends to situations when, as here, the agency
     prevents the appellant’s return to work after an initial voluntary absence. Id. Our
     reviewing court has specifically held that the jurisdictional analysis set forth
     above is appropriate in such cases.           Rosario-Fabregas v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 833 F.3d 1342, 1346-48 (2016); Thomas v. Department of the
     Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 628, ¶ 9 (2016).
¶8         On petition for review, the agency does not dispute that the appellant’s
     absence from April 15 until October 16, 2015, was involuntary. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 7, Tab 4 at 10. Nevertheless, it argues that the administrative judge erred in
     finding that the appellant met his burden of proof as to the sec ond prong, i.e., that
     its wrongful actions deprived the appellant of a meaningful choice . PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 7. We find that the agency constructively suspended the appellant for
     the reasons set forth below.

     The agency was authorized to order the appellant to report for a FOH exam
     before returning him to duty.
¶9         Under 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(b)(3) (2015), an agency has the authority to
     require an employee who occupies a position with physical and medical standards
     to report for a medical exam whenever there is a direct question about his
                                                                                            6

      continued capacity to meet the physical or medical requirements of his position. 2
      Here, the administrative judge correctly found that, while the agency must
      consider the appellant’s provided medical documentation, it need not rely on that
      information exclusive of an opinion from its own physician. RID at 6-8.
¶10         We further find that the agency’s exam order was appropriate because the
      appellant’s medical documentation did not sufficiently resolve the question of his
      fitness for duty. The appellant’s clearances from his treating practitioners did not
      explain how his medical condition affected his duties, or the reasons and bases
      for finding that his medical condition had improved since their recommendations
      that the appellant be excused from his duties.        IAF, Tab 25 at 26-32, 54, 85,
      256-57; see Archerda v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶¶ 19, 34-35
      (2014) (finding that the agency was authorized to order the appellant to report fo r
      a fitness-for-duty exam because the provided medical documentation did not
      adequately explain his Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) medications,
      provide a history of his medical condition, include a prognosis or diagnosis, or
      indicate how his PTSD affected his ability to perform his Firefighter position
      duties); Calicott v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A01169, 2003 WL
      21634364, at *2 (July 2, 2003) (finding that the agency had a sufficient basis for
      ordering a fitness-for-duty exam when the employee’s medical documentation
      lacked relevant facts and information regarding his current medical status). We
      therefore discern no error in the agency’s decision to order the appellant to

      2
        The Office of Personnel Management amended 5 C.F.R. part 339, effective March 21,
      2017, after the issuance of the March 10, 2017 initial decision. RID at 1; 82 Fed.
      Reg. 10959-01, 10959 (Feb. 17, 2017). For the purposes of this nonprecedential final
      order, we apply the 2015 version of the regulations in effect at the time of the
      appellant’s alleged constructive suspension. See Zajac v. Department of Agriculture,
      112 M.S.P.R. 160, ¶ 5 n.2 (2009). Nonetheless, we would reach the same outcome
      under either version because the amended regulations do not absolve the agency its
      obligation to designate an appropriate practitioner and to pay for exams that it orders.
      Compare 5 C.F.R. part 339 (2015), with 5 C.F.R. part 339 (2017).
                                                                                         7

      submit to a FOH exam, under 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(b)(3) (2015), to determine his
      fitness for duty.

      The agency failed to fully discharge its obligations under 5 C.F.R. part 339 in
      effecting the ordered FOH examination.
¶11         The agency argues that, contrary to the administrative j udge’s findings, it
      acted appropriately and reasonably in requiring the appellant to submit acceptable
      medical documentation before permitting him to return to work, given the
      severity of his injury and the demanding nature of his position. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4, 7-14. While we agree with the administrative judge that the agency acted
      improperly when it ordered the appellant to obtain and provide a neurological
      evaluation after the agency had conducted the medical examination, we
      additionally find that the wrongful action included the agency’s requirement that
      the appellant pay for that evaluation.
¶12         The agency-ordered FOH exam did not include the neurological evaluation
      at issue. RID at 11-12; IAF, Tab 25 at 259-64. However, early documentation
      from the appellant’s treating practitioners raised a question as to his cognition,
      which, among other things, affected his ability to operate a firearm. IAF, Tab 25
      at 276-84. Thus, given the extent of the appellant’s head injuries and the nature
      of his position, the FOH exam likely should have included that evaluation or
      referred him for further testing. I-2 AF, Tab 12, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD)
      at 1:38:10-1:38:45 (testimony of FOH MRO explaining that FOH medical
      examiner is responsible for conducting appropriate medical exams); IAF, Tab 25
      at 264 (exam notes from the FOH examining physician recognizing that the
      appellant had suffered head trauma, but declining to refer him for further testing );
      Archerda, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 21 (stating that an exam ordered pursuant to
      5 C.F.R. § 339.301 must be done in conformance with the Equal Employment
      Opportunity Commission Americans with Disabilities Act regulations , consistent
      with business necessity, and tailored to its specific concerns regarding the
      appellant’s ability to perform).
                                                                                           8

¶13         Recognizing the deficiency, the FOH MRO directed the appellant to submit
      a “CURRENT” neurological and mental status evaluation by a board-certified
      neurologist. IAF, Tab 25 at 11, 305. The neurological evaluation was a required
      component of the clearance determination. Id. at 11-12, 74-76, 305-06. Rather
      than merely provide already-obtained medical information describing his
      diagnosis or prognosis, the appellant was forced to undergo a new exam to fulfill
      the FOH directive. Id. at 307-10. Also, unlike Rosario-Fabregas, 122 M.S.P.R.
      468, ¶¶ 2-5, 13, wherein, in furtherance of the interactive process, the agency
      requested additional medical information from the appellant because the
      supporting information he offered was insufficient to make a determination on his
      reasonable accommodation request, the FOH MRO’s directive was in conjunction
      with an agency-ordered medical exam and evaluation to determine whether it
      would permit the appellant to resume his duties in a position with medical
      standards and physical requirements. We therefore find that , under these facts,
      the agency effectively ordered the appellant to undergo a med ical exam from a
      private board-certified neurologist. 3
¶14         Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency did not
      comply with 5 C.F.R. § 339.303(b), which required it to “designate[] the
      examining physician,” and that this wrongful action deprived the appellant of a
      meaningful choice. RID at 12. Although the agency contends that it complied
      with the designation requirement by directing the appellant to “have a
      board-certified neurologist” complete a “CURRENT neurological and mental
      status evaluation,” PFR File, Tab 1 at 15; IAF, Tab 25 at 11, 305, we disagree.
      Section 339.303(b) does not indicate that an agency may “designate” an
      employee’s yet unidentified personal physician as the examining physician;

      3
       The agency argues that under 5 C.F.R. § 339.302, it has the option of offering an exam
      under certain conditions. However, even if this is a circumstance in which the agency
      had the authority to offer (or refrain from offering) an exam under that provision, it
      nonetheless elected to utilize its authority under 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(b)(3) (2015) to
      order a medical exam.
                                                                                            9

      rather, it provides that the agency must merely “offer” the employee an
      opportunity to submit medical documentation from the personal physician.
¶15         Moreover, when an agency orders or offers a medical exam, the agency
      shall pay for the exam. 5 C.F.R. § 339.304 (2015). The evidence in the record
      does not reflect that the agency made any effort to pay for the new neurological
      exam. 4   Consequently, we find that the agency also did not comply with the
      requirements set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 339.304 (2015), and that wrongful action,
      along with its failure to comply with 5 C.F.R. § 339.303 (2015), deprived the
      appellant of a meaningful choice.
¶16         As a result, the delay in medically clearing the appellant was attributable to
      the agency’s failure to conduct a sufficient exam and to comply with its
      obligations under 5 C.F.R. part 339 in ordering and paying for a neurological
      exam, and not due to the appellant’s delay in providing the neurological report.
      Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 339.102(c) (2015) (explaining that “[a]n employee’s refusal to be
      examined in accordance with a proper agency order authorized under [5 C.F.R.
      part 339] is grounds for appropriate disciplinary or adverse action”) (emphasis
      added).     We therefore find that the appellant proved that the agency
      constructively suspended him from June 15, 2015, when the FOH MRO
      completed her report, to October 16, 2015, the appellant’s last day of absence
      before returning to duty, and that the Board has jurisdiction, under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7512(2), over that constructive suspension.

      4
        Moreover, on review, the appellant’s representative asserts under penalty of perjury
      that the agency required the appellant to obtain the neurological evaluation “at his own
      cost and expense.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 3, 12. We consider this new evidence because it
      implicates the Board’s jurisdiction. See Lovoy v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 30 (2003) (considering new arguments raised on review
      because the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time). Also, the agency does not
      dispute this evidence. PFR File, Tabs 1, 5; see Woodall v. Federal Energy Regulatory
      Commission, 30 M.S.P.R. 271, 273 (1986) (finding that a declaration subscribed as true
      under penalty of perjury, if uncontested, proves the facts it asserts).
                                                                                         10

      The administrative judge erred in including the appellant’s involuntary absence
      before June 15, 2015, in the constructive suspension period.
¶17         The agency argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that the
      delay between the appellant’s last FOH appointment on May 13, 2015, and the
      appellant’s receipt of the June 15, 2015 MRO report on J uly 9, 2015, was
      unreasonable. We agree with the agency in part and modify the administrative
      judge’s finding as to when the constructive suspension period began .
¶18         The administrative judge relied on Sherrod v. Department of the Navy,
      90 M.S.P.R. 347, ¶ 24 (2001), in finding that the delay was unreasonably long.
      RID at 11-12. We find Sherrod distinguishable from the instant case. There, the
      agency failed to provide any explanation for its nearly 3-month delay between
      receiving the appellant’s request to return to duty and medical information from
      his private physician and issuing its request for more information.          Sherrod,
      90 M.S.P.R. 347, ¶ 24.       Here, in contrast, the agency submitted evidence
      explaining the medical review process and the FOH MRO’s actions taken to
      complete her review, which included reviewing medical documentation from the
      appellant’s private practitioners and the FOH exam information.                 HCD
      at 1:37-1:39:20, 1:48:25-1:48:40 (testimony of FOH MRO); IAF, Tab 25 at 11-12,
      74-75.
¶19         We also find the remaining cases relied on by the administrative judge on
      this issue inapposite.   In Caballero v. U.S. Postal Service, 34 M.S.P.R. 263,
      266-67 (1987), the Board did not base its finding on the appellant’s constructive
      suspension claim on the length of the agency’s delay in rendering a
      fitness-for-duty determination. In Baker v. U.S. Postal Service, 84 M.S.P.R. 119,
      ¶¶ 10, 13 (1999), the Board found that the agency constructively suspended the
      appellant because it failed to comply with its obligations to search for a light -duty
      assignment within the appellant’s restrictions and within the 72-hour time frame
      mandated by the collective bargaining agreement. There is no similar provision
      requiring the agency to return the appellant to work within a specific timeframe in
                                                                                      11

      this case; thus, the Board’s unreasonably long delay finding in Baker is not
      applicable. Finally, the administrative judge relied upon Justice v. Department of
      the Navy, 89 M.S.P.R. 379, ¶ 13 (2001), in finding that, although a “brief delay”
      between a medical examination and a medical clearance determination would not
      be improper, the Board declines to speculate in these types of cases as to how
      long a reasonable delay might last. RID at 12 n.10. Justice, however, was issued
      before the Board decided in Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397
      (2013), that a finding of wrongful agency action is required for an involuntary
      absence to constitute a constructive suspension, and therefore, merely held that
      the appellant’s constructive suspension began on the day the agency refused to
      allow him to return to work when he reported for duty that day.        See Justice,
      89 M.S.P.R. 379, ¶ 13.
¶20           The FOH MRO completed her review of the appellant’s medical
      information 1 month after his last FOH exam. RID at 3; IAF, Tab 25 at 12. We
      find that this is not an unreasonably long time to conduct such a review and that
      such a delay does not constitute a wrongful action sufficient to trigger a
      constructive suspension. See Campbell v. U.S. Postal Service, 94 M.S.P.R. 646,
      ¶¶ 20-21 (2003) (finding no wrongdoing in the agency’s nearly 1 -month delay
      between receiving the appellant’s clearance from his private physician and
      issuing its request for medical documentation). Therefore, the appellant has not
      shown any wrongdoing in the agency’s actions from April 15 to June 14, 2015.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant was constructively suspended only from
      June 15, 2015, when the FOH MRO deferred a medical determination pending
      further documentation, including a neurological and mental status evaluation,
      until October 16, 2015, the last day of the appellant’s absence until his return to
      duty.
                                                                                            12

      The agency constructively suspended the appellant from June 15 to October 16,
      2015, without due process.
¶21         As explained by the administrative judge, RID at 13, minimum due process
      for depriving a tenured public employee of his property right in his emp loyment
      entails prior notice and an opportunity to respond.              Cleveland Board of
      Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).           An adverse action taken
      without due process must be reversed. Stephen v. Department of the Air Force,
      47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991). Here, the appellant’s constructive suspension of
      more than 14 days must be reversed because the agency failed to provide him
      with any process before taking that adverse action.             See Mc Lain v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 82 M.S.P.R. 526, ¶ 10 (1999) (reversing the appellant’s
      constructive suspension of more than 14 days because it was effected without the
      procedural protections of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b), in violation of his constitutional
      right to minimum due process).
¶22         Accordingly, we find that the agency violated the appellant’s constitutional
      rights by constructively suspending him from June 15 to Octo ber 16, 2015,
      without minimum due process. We therefore affirm the initial decision’s reversal
      of the appellant’s constructive suspension, as modified. 5

                                             ORDER
¶23         We ORDER the agency to cancel the appellant’s constructive suspension
      from June 15 to October 16, 2015. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts,
      726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no later
      than 20 days after the date of this decision.

      5
        The agency also asserted its belief that the administrative judge did not order interim
      relief. PFR File, Tab 2 at 4-5. As argued, the administrative judge was correct in
      declining to order interim relief. See Zygas v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 397,
      ¶ 14 (2011) (finding an interim relief award inappropriate in co nstructive suspension
      cases when at the time the initial decision is issued, the agency has returned the
      appellant to paid duty status at the same grade and step occupied prior to his absence).
                                                                                        13

¶24         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶25         We further ORDER the agency to compensate the appellant for the cost of
      the neurological examination and evaluation from his private physician that he
      obtained on or about October 2, 2015.
¶26         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶27         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶28         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
                                                                                     14

Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, t he Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      15

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                  16

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases   involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, yo u may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).            If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or o ther security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     17

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via comm ercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                18

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsite s.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as
ordered by the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump
Sum Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.