Court Opinion

ID: 9401919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 17:03:42.789816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.012854
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/14/23 Felix v. Dept. of State Hospitals Coalinga CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 SCOTT EMERSON FELIX,
                                                                                             F081766
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 14CECG01707)
                    v.

 DEPARTMENT OF STATE HOSPITALS                                                            OPINION
 COALINGA et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. D. Tyler
Tharpe, Judge.
         Scott Emerson Felix, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General,
Gregory D. Brown and Kevin L. Quade, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and
Respondents.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Scott Emerson Felix, a self-represented civil detainee, appeals from a judgment of
dismissal entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, a demurrer to his
amended petition for writ of mandate. In his amended petition against the People of the
State of California (the People) and the Department of State Hospitals-Coalinga (DSH-
Coalinga), Felix sought immediate release from his assertedly unlawful detention at the
California State Hospital in Coalinga where he is being held as a sexually violent
predator (SVP), pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), Welfare and
Institutions Code section 6600 et seq.
       The trial court sustained the demurrer as to the claims against the People1 based on
Felix’s failure to bring the matter to trial within five years, as required by Code of Civil
Procedure section 583.3102; and as to the claims against DSH-Coalinga because Felix
was requesting relief beyond the court’s ability to grant. The trial court did not reach
DSH-Coalinga’s arguments that Felix’s claims were barred by his previous litigation of
writ petitions in various courts or that the petition was not properly brought in mandamus
because Felix could assert his claims in a habeas petition. Without approving or
disapproving the trial court’s stated reasoning, we affirm the judgment because Felix has
not shown that other remedies at law were inadequate or unavailable to him.
                                     BACKGROUND
       A.     The SVPA
       “The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil commitment of certain offenders,
following the completion of their prison terms, who are found to be sexually violent
predators because they have previously been convicted of sexually violent crimes and
currently suffer diagnosed mental disorders that make them dangerous because they are

1     Other than joining DSH-Coalinga’s motion to change venue, the People have not
appeared in the action or in this appeal.
2      Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                              2.
likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior.” (Turner v. Superior
Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1054.) The SVPA sets forth detailed administrative
and judicial procedures for civilly committing an individual as an SVP. (Walker v.
Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, 190 [outlining the procedures].) As relevant to
Felix’s petition, the SVPA requires the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) to screen any potential SVP at least six months before their release date and
refer qualifying inmates to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for a “full
evaluation.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subds. (a), (b).) If the DSH evaluation results
in a request for commitment, “a petition for commitment shall be filed in the superior
court of the county in which the person was convicted of the offense” for which they
were imprisoned. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6601, subd. (i).) If the court determines that
probable cause supports the state’s petition, the court orders a trial at which the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person meets the statutory
definition of an SVP. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6600, subd. (a)(1), 6602, 6604; see Turner,
at pp. 1054–1055.) While the petition for SVP commitment may be filed by the district
attorney, commitment proceedings under the SVPA are civil and nonpunitive in nature.
(People v. Talhelm (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 400, 404.)
       The SVPA originally authorized only two-year terms of commitment, which could
be extended on the state’s petition. (Welf. & Inst. Code, former § 6604.) But
amendments effective September 2006 made commitment terms indeterminate, that is,
indefinite. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6604, subd. (a), 6604.1, subd. (a); Sen. Bill No. 1128
(2005–2006 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2006, ch. 337, §§ 55–56).) At least once a year, DSH
must conduct an examination of an SVP’s mental condition and file with the committing
court a report of that examination (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.9); and an SVP may
periodically petition for conditional release or unconditional discharge (Welf. & Inst.
Code, §§ 6608, 6604.9, subd. (d)). (See People v. Smith (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 332, 337
[describing pathways for release].)

                                              3.
          B.     Facts
          “In 1982, [Felix] suffered convictions in San Francisco for forcible rape, forcible
oral copulation, and assault with intent to commit rape. [Citations.] He served a prison
sentence and, when paroled, committed additional criminal offenses. In 1996, the court
revoked his parole and committed him to [Atascadero State Hospital] as an SVP. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, §§ 6600, 6601 & 6604.) His commitment was extended more than once
based on a continuing risk of reoffending. (People v. Felix (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 607,
611.).” (People v. Felix (Nov. 21, 2011, No. B223500) [nonpub. opn.] [2011
Cal.App.Unpub. LEXIS 8921, p. *2].)3 While committed at Atascadero State Hospital,
Felix “had regular behavior problems and, in April 2005, he assaulted a fellow patient.”
(Ibid.) The San Luis Obispo District Attorney charged Felix with assault (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and eventually in March 2010 he was convicted and sentenced to
prison.
          In the meantime, in October 2006, a jury trial was held on consolidated petitions
by the San Francisco County District Attorney to extend Felix’s SVP commitment.
(People v. Felix (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 607, 613.) The jury found Felix was an SVP as
defined in the SVPA, and on October 20, 2006, the San Francisco County Superior Court
ordered Felix committed for an indeterminate term—pursuant to the newly effective
SVPA amendments. (Ibid.) The First District Court of Appeal affirmed Felix’s SVP
commitment (People v. Felix, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 607), and he was confined at
Atascadero State Hospital while his criminal case in San Luis Obispo moved forward.

3       We quote from this unpublished opinion, in which Division Six of the Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed Felix’s latest criminal conviction, solely to provide
context for the issues in this appeal. (See In re W.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 284, 286,
fn. 2 [“Citation of our prior unpublished opinion is permitted by California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1) ‘to explain the factual background of the case and not as legal
authority.’ [Citations.]”].)

                                                4.
       After his criminal assault conviction in San Luis Obispo, Felix was transferred to
CDCR custody and began his prison sentence at Wasco State Prison. In April 2010,
respondent DSH-Coalinga sent a “Notice of Detainer” to CDCR-Wasco, advising that
Felix was not to be released at the end of his prison term, due to the standing SVP
commitment order of the San Francisco County Superior Court. As a result of this
detainer—which Felix’s present petition challenges as unlawful—when Felix reached the
end of his prison term in December 2013, he was transferred to Coalinga State Hospital
to continue his indeterminate SVP commitment instead of being released on parole. He
was transferred without any CDCR screening, DSH evaluation, or renewed SVP
commitment petition—which Felix likewise claims was contrary to the SVPA and state
and federal due process protections.
       Since February 2014, Felix has been filing writ petitions, including the present
one, seeking immediate release from his SVP commitment based on his contention that it
was improper to transfer him to Coalinga State Hospital upon completing his prison
sentence, without a pre-release SVP evaluation and renewed SVP commitment
proceedings in San Luis Obispo County (the county where he was most recently
criminally convicted). In 2014, he filed multiple petitions for writs of mandate in San
Francisco County Superior Court (which ordered his SVP commitments), San Luis
Obispo County Superior Court (where his assault conviction occurred), and Fresno
County Superior Court (based on his confinement at Coalinga State Hospital, in Fresno
County); as well as appeals and original writ petitions in their respective Courts of
Appeal and in the California Supreme Court. In 2019, Felix filed two habeas petitions in
San Francisco Superior Court contesting other aspects of his SVP commitment
proceedings. And in 2022, through counsel appointed in his ongoing San Francisco SVP
commitment case, Felix filed two habeas petitions with the First District Court of Appeal,

                                             5.
invoking its original jurisdiction.4 The petition attached to Felix’s reply brief also
references a previous habeas petition (not in the record or attached as an exhibit) filed in
San Francisco County Superior Court in September 2020 and denied on October 26,
2021. The outcome of certain of these cases is discussed below, but none have been
successful.
       C.     Proceedings
       In June 2014, Felix (then representing himself) filed the instant petition for writ of
mandate in Fresno County Superior Court, naming the People as the sole respondent.
The trial court set the matter for hearing on September 2, 2014, and mailed a notice to
Felix at the Coalinga State Hospital post office box listed on the petition. However, the

4       Felix attaches a copy of one of the 2022 habeas petitions as exhibit 5 to his reply
brief, which is improper because this document is not part of the record on appeal. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d) [“A party filing a brief may attach copies of exhibits or
other materials in the appellate record or copies of relevant local, state, or federal
regulations or rules, out-of-state statutes, or other similar citable materials that are not
readily accessible.”], italics added.) However, we grant Felix’s implied request for
judicial notice of the habeas petition and accompanying memorandum to the First District
Court of Appeal, dated July 20, 2022, attached to Felix’s reply brief as exhibit 5. (See
Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
        Although the attached petition bears no proof of its filing, it is dated July 20, 2022,
which matches the filing date shown on the First District Court of Appeal’s public docket
for In re Scott Emerson Felix on Habeas Corpus, case No. A165648, in which Felix was
represented by the same attorney who signed the petition.

                                              6.
minute order for the September 2, 2014 hearing reflects that no one appeared for either
party.5
          The register of actions for this case shows no entries for the next four years. On
October 23, 2018, the trial court issued a notice of hearing on an order to show cause why
the petition should not be dismissed. Felix appeared at the November 2018 hearing,
where the court dismissed its order to show cause; and by January 2019 Felix obtained
counsel to represent him. At a February 2019 status conference where only Felix and his
counsel appeared, the court set a trial setting conference for March 28, 2019.
          A few days before the trial setting conference, the Attorney General’s office made
a special appearance on behalf of DSH-Coalinga to submit a joint request to continue the
trial setting conference so that Felix could file an amended petition naming DSH-
Coalinga and the Deputy Attorney General could then accept service on the hospital’s
behalf. The court approved the parties’ proposed order continuing the conference to
May 23, 2019, and setting a deadline for Felix’s amended petition.

5       The proof of service attached to the petition stated Felix served the petition by
mail on the clerk of the superior court and the office of the district attorney of Fresno
County. These are the same two entities Felix served with his other two petitions for writ
of mandate against the People, filed in the Fresno County Superior Court a few months
earlier in February 2014. We affirmed the orders dismissing each of those petitions
because Felix had not shown proper service on the People. (Felix v. People of California
(Jun. 8, 2021, case No. F080255) [nonpub. opn.] [affirming order dismissing writ petition
for failure to appear telephonically at a hearing, based on lack of prejudicial error given
Felix’s failure to effect proper service within three years after the action was
commenced]; Felix v. People of California (Jun. 18, 2020, case No. F078523) [nonpub.
opn.] [affirming order dismissing writ petition for failing to effect proper service within
three years after the action was commenced].) The same fate might have befallen the
present case, had the Attorney General’s office not voluntarily appeared on behalf of
DSH-Coalinga and agreed to accept service after the three-year period provided in
section 583.210. There is no indication, however, that the People were ever properly
served; and they have not appeared in this appeal or in the trial court except to join in a
motion to change venue.

                                               7.
The Operative Pleading
       On April 26, 2019, Felix (through counsel) filed his amended petition for writ of
mandate naming both the People and DSH-Coalinga as respondents. The amended
petition added no new factual allegations, instead incorporating by reference the claims in
the original petition. As incorporated in the amended petition, Felix alleges that DSH-
Coalinga’s April 2010 detainer was unlawful because the SVPA does not specifically
authorize such detainers to be issued on a civil detainee who has been “lawfully
discharged” (italics and underscoring omitted) from DSH to CDCR. He further alleges
that, upon conviction for a new criminal offense, “the prior indeterminate Civil
Commitment put into effect by the San Francisco County Superior Court, became null
and void, and the new committing county [San Luis Obispo County] was required to
initiate the SVPA commitment process anew” before Felix could be transferred to DSH-
Coalinga. The petition concludes that the failure to initiate new SVP commitment
proceedings before Felix’s prison term expired means he “is being detained unlawfully”;
and it requests that the trial court issue a writ of mandate “directing that [his] civil
commitment be vacated and that [Felix] be immediately released so that he may be
continued on State Parole.”
Responsive Motions
       On May 13, 2019, the Attorney General entered a general appearance on behalf of
DSH-Coalinga, and the parties on May 21, 2019, stipulated to vacate the upcoming trial
setting conference in anticipation of DSH-Coalinga filing a motion to change venue to
San Francisco County. On June 11, 2019, DSH-Coalinga filed the contemplated motion
to change venue, a motion in which the People joined. Respondents argued that, because
Felix was challenging the lawfulness of his detention ordered by the San Francisco
County Superior Court in 2006, San Francisco County—not Fresno County—was the
proper venue. The court denied the motion on August 27, 2019, because respondents
failed to show that venue was improper, as Felix was residing in Fresno County. The

                                               8.
court ordered a response to the amended petition within 35 court days, increased at DSH-
Coalinga’s request from the initial 10 court days reflected in the court’s tentative ruling.
       With the benefit of an automatic 30-day extension, DSH-Coalinga complied by
filing a demurrer on November 18, 2019. As relevant here, DSH-Coalinga sought
dismissal on the grounds that (1) Felix’s claims were barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel based on the denials of his previous writ petitions; (2) the petition was time-
barred both for failure to commence the action within four years of its accrual (§ 343) and
for failure to bring the action to trial within five years of its commencement (§ 583.310);
(3) the court lacked jurisdiction to order the relief requested, which would entail ordering
another superior court to vacate Felix’s indeterminate civil commitment; and (4) the
petition was not properly brought in mandamus because Felix had an adequate remedy in
the form of a habeas petition.
Trial Court’s Ruling
       On January 29, 2020, the trial court issued a tentative ruling that would sustain the
demurrer as to the claims against the People based on Felix’s failure to bring the matter to
trial within five years, as required by section 583.310; and as to the claims against DSH-
Coalinga because Felix was requesting relief beyond the court’s jurisdiction. The
tentative ruling declined to reach the other arguments for dismissal, but the court noted
they did “indicate that these establish additional reasons for the demurrer to be
sustained.” Finding the noted defects incurable, the tentative ruling would sustain the
demurrer without leave to amend.
       Oral argument on the demurrer was continued several times due to the outbreak of
COVID-19. During the continuances, Felix attempted to rebut the court’s tentative
finding that the claims against the People were subject to mandatory dismissal for
violating section 583.310’s five-year rule. Felix argued that the court’s four-year delay in
issuing the order to show cause and DSH-Coalinga’s litigation tactics amounting to
nearly six months of delay made it “impossible, impracticable, or futile” (§ 583.340,

                                              9.
subd. (c)) to bring the action to trial. These arguments were unavailing, and after oral
argument on July 16, 2020, the court adopted the tentative ruling as its final ruling.
Judgment and Appeal
       In August 2020, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the case. Felix filed a
timely notice of appeal challenging the judgment and the underlying order sustaining the
demurrer.
       Because we granted multiple extensions of time for Felix to designate the record
on appeal and for the parties to file conforming briefs, the briefing of this appeal was not
completed until January 2023. During the pendency of the appeal, we denied Felix’s
multiple requests for appointment of counsel. However, we actively monitored the
briefing to protect Felix’s meaningful access to court. After receiving Felix’s opening
brief, we issued a letter affording the parties the opportunity to present their views on
certain issues not addressed in the trial court’s dismissal order; and after receiving DSH-
Coalinga’s responsive brief, we issued an order in which we summarized DSH-
Coalinga’s arguments to be addressed in Felix’s reply brief.
                                      DISCUSSION
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
       On appeal from a judgment of dismissal sustaining a demurrer, we independently
review the record—without deference to the trial court’s ruling or its reasoning—to
determine the legal question of whether the facts alleged state a claim for relief. (See
Bichai v. Dignity Health (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 869, 876 (Bichai); Visalia Unified School
Dist. v. Superior Court (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 563, 568 [describing de novo review].)
We accept as true all of the pleading’s material factual allegations, unless contrary to law
or judicially noticed fact. (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859,
865; SLPR, L.L.C. v. San Diego Unified Port District (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 284, 317.)

                                             10.
       As the appellant, Felix has the burden to show any error by the trial court in
sustaining the demurrer, and the judgment of dismissal will be affirmed if it is correct on
any ground asserted in the demurrer, independent of the trial court’s stated reasons.
(Bichai, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 877; see Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992)
2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
II. ANALYSIS
       Felix argues the trial court erred by dismissing the claims against the People under
section 583.310 because the court was responsible for the four-year silence that followed
the parties’ nonappearance at the September 2014 hearing. He further argues that his
petition is meritorious, and this court should order his immediate release or, in the
alternative, direct the trial court to appoint counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing on the
lawfulness of his detention.
       DSH-Coalinga counters that the petition’s legal claims lack merit, but primarily
urges affirmance because (A) the trial court correctly determined Felix failed to bring his
claims against the People to trial within five years, pursuant to section 583.310, even
when considering applicable tolling provisions; (B) Felix’s claims against DSH-Coalinga
were barred by any applicable statute of limitation; and (C) the entire action was
improperly brought in mandamus when Felix had an available alternative remedy of
bringing a habeas corpus petition, which is the preferred vehicle for seeking release from
confinement.
       We agree with respondent on at least the last point. Rather than undergo a
complicated analysis of the accrual and potential tolling of the statutory time limits, we
affirm for the simple reason that Felix could pursue, did pursue, and still can pursue other
remedies for the present claims. (See Bichai, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 877 [we may
affirm on any ground asserted in the demurrer, independent of the trial court’s stated
reasons for dismissal].)

                                             11.
       A.     Principles Governing Writs of Mandate
       Section 1085, subdivision (a) provides that a writ of ordinary mandate “may be
issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the
performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station .…” Section 1086 provides that a writ of mandate is to be issued in cases
“where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.”
Although the statute does not expressly forbid the issuance of the writ if an adequate
alternative remedy exists, “it has long been established as a general rule that the writ will
not be issued if another such remedy was available to the petitioner.” (Phelan v. Superior
Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 366; see Villery v. Department of Corrections &
Rehabilitation (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 407, 410 (Villery); Menefield v. Foreman (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 211, 216–217.) It is the petitioner’s burden to show that he did not have
an alternative remedy. (Phelan, at p. 366.)
       Whether an alternative remedy is “plain, speedy, and adequate,” within the
meaning of section 1086, is “a question of fact that requires an evaluation of the
circumstances of each particular case.” (Villery, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 414.)
Whether a potential alternative remedy is available “in the ordinary course of law”
(§ 1086) is a legal question which “involves an examination of (1) the legal foundation
for that remedy and (2) how the remedy relates to the relief sought by the plaintiff”
(Villery, supra, at p. 415).
       B.     Availability of Alternative Remedy
       The relief Felix sought through his amended petition was his immediate release
from civil confinement at DSH-Coalinga and the vacatur of his SVP commitment. This
mandamus petition is a poor vehicle for obtaining this relief because it is not clear how
the named respondents—the state hospital and the People—have the capacity, much less
a duty, to “vacate” the San Francisco Superior Court’s indeterminate commitment order
or to release Felix in the face of that order. (See § 1085, subd. (a) [authorizing writ of

                                              12.
mandate “to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a
duty”]; Villery, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 413 [§ 1085, subd. (a) requires, among other
things, “a clear, present … duty upon the part of the respondent”].) Moreover, writs of
mandate in general are not the way for those in custody to challenge the legality of their
confinement. Rather, a writ of habeas corpus, addressed by Penal Code section 1473,
subdivision (a), is specifically made available to any “person unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty, under any pretense.” For those in actual or constructive
custody, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the preferred method by which to
challenge the constitutionality of their confinement. (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48
Cal.4th 330, 339.)
       Habeas relief is available to challenge one’s civil confinement as an SVP, both as
a general matter and as expressly provided in the SVPA. (See Pen. Code, § 1473,
subd. (a) [authorizing habeas petition for any “person unlawfully … restrained of their
liberty, under any pretense”]; People v. Smith, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 344 [citing
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7250]; People v Johnson (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 80, 88 [same]; cf.
People v. Talhelm, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 404 [deeming Pen. Code, § 1473 broad
enough in scope to encompass SVPA commitment proceedings].) Success on a habeas
petition raising the present claims in the San Francisco County Superior Court, or its
controlling appellate court (the First District Court of Appeal), would afford Felix the full
relief he seeks.6 Thus, a habeas remedy is available for Felix’s claims in the ordinary
course of law. (See § 1086; Villery, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 415.)
       The habeas remedy is also “plain, speedy, and adequate.” (§ 1086.) As just
discussed, a habeas petition would be adequate to obtain the full relief requested. Felix
offers no persuasive reasons to think this remedy is not also plain and speedy. He first

6     We express no opinion on Felix’s likelihood of success on the merits in such a
habeas petition.

                                             13.
argues that no courts other than the Fresno County Superior Court have “jurisdiction” any
longer because of his time in CDCR custody, and “to seek a hearing in a juri[s]diction
that lost jurisdiction would be a waste of the court[’s] time.” However, this jurisdictional
conclusion is not Felix’s to make. The San Francisco County Superior Court is still the
court overseeing his civil SVP commitment—and receiving ongoing annual reports. (See
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6604.9.) It is the court that ordered Felix’s indeterminate
commitment, and it is the court to which Felix should direct and has directed (in parallel
proceedings) his present claims for release.
       Second, Felix argues that Fresno County Superior Court became the “proper
jurisdiction” once it held the February 2019 “hearing,” and he was no longer required to
pursue alternative remedies. First, the minute order describes the February 14, 2019
hearing type as a “Status Conference,” and in any event a court’s holding of a hearing
does not necessarily establish its jurisdiction. It certainly does not preclude us from
considering the availability of other alternatives to the present mandamus petition.
       Finally, Felix argues that he was unable to file a habeas petition because he was
represented by court-appointed attorneys in San Luis Obispo and San Francisco. As
established by the cases Felix cites, it is true a represented party may not file submissions
to the court except through their attorney of record in the case. (See In re Barnett (2003)
31 Cal.4th 466, 471; People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554–555.) But the fact
that a litigant has counsel in one case does not bar them from bringing and litigating a
separate case on their own behalf.
       Felix’s ability to file habeas petitions, either on his own behalf or through
appointed counsel, is apparent from the petitions he filed both in San Luis Obispo County

                                               14.
Superior Court in 2014 and in San Francisco County Superior Court in 2020—followed
by further habeas petitions in the First District Court of Appeal just last year.7
       The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court denied Felix’s in propria persona writ
of mandate petition filed in February 2014 in which he sought release from custody due
to the failure to recommence his SVP commitment process after his prison term. In its
March 4, 2014 order, the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court construed the petition
as a habeas petition and denied it for failure to state a prima facie claim for relief. In
rejecting Felix’s claims, the court concluded that Felix’s 2010 criminal conviction “has
no bearing” on his status as an SVP; and that if the detainer issued by DSH-Coalinga was
unlawful, “it had nothing to do with the actions or proceedings taken by the San Luis
Obispo County Superior Court.”
       In his habeas petition filed through counsel in the First District Court of Appeal in
July 2022, Felix again asserted that the government’s failure to evaluate him before his
2013 release from prison “divested the [San Francisco County Superior Court] of
jurisdiction over any civil commitment proceedings after Felix served his prison

7       On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the March 4, 2014, order of the San
Luis Obispo County Superior Court in case No. F383966, which was presented for
judicial notice in this case without any record of the trial court acting on that request. We
also take judicial notice of the public dockets of the First District Court of Appeal in In re
Scott Emerson Felix on Habeas Corpus, case No. A165648 (filed July 20, 2022), and In
re Scott Felix on Habeas Corpus, case No. A166969 (filed Jan. 17, 2022), available at
. These documents are the
proper subject of judicial notice and are not of substantial consequence to our
determination of this appeal. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (d) & (h) [records of any
state court and facts not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of immediate and
accurate determination], 459, subd. (d) [parties shall be afforded the opportunity to
challenge judicial notice if matter is not in the record and is of substantial consequence to
the determination of the appeal].)
       Nevertheless, because Felix is confined at an institution where he has little or no
internet access, we append to this opinion printouts of the First District Court of Appeal’s
online dockets in these cases.

                                              15.
sentence.” The First District denied the petition on July 22, 2022, for failure to exhaust
all claims in the superior court (referencing an October 26, 2021 denial of Felix’s
previous habeas petition in the San Francisco County Superior Court), failure to show
why Felix did not possess other remedies such as a motion in the SVPA proceeding, and
failure to provide an adequate record for review. The order instructs: “To avoid
piecemeal review of petitioner’s claims, all arguments related to the Grounds for relief
asserted in this court … shall be initially exhausted in the superior court.” And it
concludes with an admonition that any refiled petition in the Court of Appeal would need
to explain how it cured these deficiencies. On February 9, 2023, the First District
summarily denied Felix’s other recent habeas petition by referring back to the July 22,
2022 order.
       As shown by Felix’s ability to bring petitions sounding in habeas and raising the
same claims asserted in the instant writ of mandate petition, the habeas remedy has been
available to him all along. In these parallel proceedings, Felix has regularly been
informed that the San Francisco County Superior Court is the proper jurisdiction in which
to challenge his continued confinement based on his theory that his intervening prison
term nullified his indeterminate SVP commitment.8 Concurrently with the prosecution of
this appeal, he was in fact pursuing a habeas remedy in that court, and subsequently in the
First District Court of Appeal. Felix’s lack of success in his writ proceedings to date
does not convince us that a habeas remedy is unavailable or inadequate in this case. It
appears that compliance with the governing rules and procedures would enable his habeas

8      We acknowledge that a habeas petition seeking release based on an alleged
improvement in mental condition would properly be brought in Fresno County Superior
Court. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 7250 [authorizing habeas petition to “the judge of the
superior court of the county in which the hospital is located” and requiring consideration
of the person’s medical history and mental condition].)

                                            16.
petition to be heard on the merits in the San Francisco County Superior Court which has
been handling his SVP proceedings for over 20 years.9
       Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Felix’s petition for writ of mandate
because he has not shown why a habeas petition was not an adequate alternative remedy.
(See Phelan v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 366 [petitioner’s burden]; Polanski
v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 507, 552–555 [accepting the availability of
habeas relief as an alternative remedy that defeats a petition for writ of mandate to
dismiss criminal charges].)
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall each bear their own costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

                                                                   FRANSON, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

9       As the ostensible October 26, 2021 order of the San Francisco County Superior
Court denying Felix’s September 2020 habeas petition is not part of the record and is not
publicly available, it is not clear whether these claims already have been denied on their
merits.

                                            17.
APPENDIX

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