Court Opinion

ID: 9847804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:07:45.578716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:35.153357
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring specially.
During jury selection, the prosecution used all its peremptory strikes to remove black jurors. Although the trial court, relying on Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75 (365 SE2d 111) (1988), ruled that appellant did not make a prima facie case of racially-motivated peremptory strikes, the prosecuting attorney stated on the record the reasons for the strikes. The trial court did not evaluate those reasons. In my view, two errors were committed: the trial court’s holding, in reliance on Aldridge, that appellant did not make a prima facie case of racially-motivated peremptory strikes, and the trial court’s failure to scrutinize and reject the reasons given by the prosecuting attorney.
1. In my special concurrence in Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 447 (405 SE2d 660) (1991), I suggested that this court should take that opportunity to disavow the mathematical approach taken in Aldridge. This case shows even more clearly the imperative necessity for abandoning the mechanistic approach to addressing issues of racial dis*104crimination in the judicial process: the State used 100 percent of its peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the jury, but the trial court held that no prima facie case of discrimination was made because the percentage of blacks on the petit jury was greater than the percentage of blacks on the venire. It is now evident that Aldridge has bred disrespect for the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), and will continue to impede our efforts to remove racial considerations from jury service. Aldridge is not only leading the courts to error as to the establishment of a prima facie case, it is confusing the trial courts and the prosecutors who appear before them as to what Batson requires in the exercise of peremptory strikes.
In Hayes, supra, the trial court made the same holding the trial court in this case made with regard to the failure of the defense to make a prima facie case undér Batson, but the trial court in that case went on to hear the reasons for the strikes and to rule on their validity. The trial court in the present case, though it made the reasons a part of the record, declined to assess the reasons because of the mathematical application of Aldridge. We need no clearer indications that Aldridge has passed its time of utility and has become destructive to the ends of justice: it is time for this court to overrule Aldridge and to put in its place the policy suggested in my concurrence in Hayes, supra:
Rather than deciding on a case by case basis whether a party is entitled to a hearing based upon a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination, the better course to follow would be to hold a Batson hearing on any party’s request whenever the other party exercises peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable racial group from the venire. This bright line test would ensure consistency by removing any doubt about when a Batson hearing should be conducted. Further, this procedure would ensure a complete record for appellate review. [Id. at 449.]
In the context of that policy, conducting a Batson hearing would include the trial court’s evaluation of the reasons given by the prosecution.
2. Because the trial judge in the present case did not evaluate the reasons given by the prosecution for its peremptory challenges, this case should be remanded for consideration of those strikes under the standards this court has established. In Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325 (357 SE2d 792) (1987), this court issued the following caution:
“ ‘[R]ubber stamp’ approval of all nonracial explanations, no *105matter how whimsical or fanciful, would cripple Batson's commitment to ‘ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.’ Batson, 106 SC at 1723.” [Gamble, supra at 327, quoting from State v. Butler, 731 SW2d 265 (Mo. App. 1987).]
In Tharpe v. State, 262 Ga. 110, 112 (6) (416 SE2d 78) (1992), we noted as follows:
It can be argued that explanations by the state as to the striking of black jurors — who allegedly make minor mistakes on the jury questionnaire; or show signs of immaturity; or demonstrate certain aspects of eye contact — reflect certain stereotypical attitudes as to particular groups. Any such explanations should be given additional scrutiny by the trial court before they are found acceptable.
Finally, as I noted in my concurrence in Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 635 (409 SE2d 839) (1991), in considering those reasons,
I find instructive the suggestion in Horton v. Zant, _ F2d _ (11th Cir. 1991) (Case No. 90-8522, decided September 3, 1991, slip op. p. 22) that in evaluating [the] rebuttal it is appropriate to keep in mind that “testimony from the alleged discriminators should be viewed with a great deal of judicial scrutiny.” [Cit.]
After applying the appropriate scrutiny, with appropriate awareness of racial stereotypes, to the reasons given in this case for using all ten peremptory challenges to remove black jurors, the trial court should enter an order either accepting the reasons, in which case this appeal would be reinstated if appellant desired, or rejecting the prosecuting attorney’s explanations, in which case appellant would be entitled to a new trial.