Court Opinion

ID: 9917457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:07:00.005294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:05.095429
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
01/12/2024 09:06 AM CST

                                                           - 679 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        315 Nebraska Reports
                                        PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                                                  Cite as 315 Neb. 679

                    Janet Palmtag, appellant and cross-appellee, v. The
                        Republican Party of Nebraska, also known
                            as The Nebraska Republican Party,
                               appellee and cross-appellant.
                                                      ___ N.W.2d ___

                                           Filed January 12, 2024.   No. S-22-967.

                 1. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews
                    the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
                    record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing
                    all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
                 2. Libel and Slander: Negligence. A claim of defamation requires (1) a
                    false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2) an unprivi-
                    leged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting to at least neg-
                    ligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either actionability of the
                    statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm
                    caused by the publication.
                 3. Libel and Slander: Words and Phrases. Libel is defamation where the
                    defamatory words are written or printed; slander is defamation where
                    the defamatory words are spoken.
                 4. Constitutional Law: Libel and Slander. When the plaintiff is a public
                    official or public figure and the speech is a matter of public concern, the
                    First Amendment requires the plaintiff to surmount certain higher barri-
                    ers than those raised by common-law libel.
                 5. ____: ____. There is no constitutional right to espouse false assertions
                    of facts, even against a public figure in the course of public discourse.
                 6. Libel and Slander: Negligence. The principal higher barrier a public
                    libel plaintiff must surpass is that actual malice, not simple negligence,
                    is part of the scienter element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
                 7. Libel and Slander: Proof. The plaintiff in a public libel action must
                    establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
                 8. Summary Judgment: Libel and Slander. The same general summary
                    judgment standards applicable to any action apply to a public libel
                                      - 680 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      315 Nebraska Reports
                 PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                           Cite as 315 Neb. 679

      action; however, the existence of a genuine issue of material fact is
      dependent upon the particular elements and standards of proof of the
      underlying action.
 9.   Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the
      pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the
      record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or
      as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that
      the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
10.   Actions: Proof. Successful suits are not limited to those cases in which
      there is direct proof by a party’s admission of the ultimate fact.
11.   Libel and Slander: Words and Phrases. Actual malice means knowl-
      edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
12.   Libel and Slander: Proof. Mere proof of failure to investigate, without
      more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth in a defama-
      tion claim.
13.   ____: ____. Standing alone, proof of a defendant’s ill will toward a
      public figure plaintiff is insufficient to establish knowledge of falsity or
      reckless disregard for the truth for purposes of a defamation claim.
14.   Libel and Slander: Evidence. Motive and negligence, including a fail-
      ure to investigate, are factors in the totality of the evidence that may be
      considered in making reasonable inferences as to the defendant’s state of
      mind in a public libel action.
15.   Libel and Slander: Evidence: Proof. A plaintiff in a public libel action
      is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstan-
      tial evidence.
16.   Libel and Slander. Relevant to actual malice is the ambiguity of any
      source material consulted by the defendant and the reasonableness or
      lack thereof in interpreting that material in a way that led to the false
      statement forming the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.
17.   Libel and Slander: Words and Phrases. A “critical issue” is whether
      a source relied upon in making the false and defamatory statement was
      reasonably susceptible of the interpretation given it by the defendant.
18.   Libel and Slander. An inference of actual malice can be drawn when a
      defendant publishes a defamatory statement that contradicts information
      known to him or her, even though the defendant testifies that he or she
      believed that the statement was not defamatory and was consistent with
      the facts within the defendant’s knowledge.
19.   ____. A publisher cannot feign ignorance or profess good faith when
      there are clear indications present which bring into question the truth or
      falsity of defamatory statements.
20.   Corporations. Generally, a corporation is viewed as a complete and
      separate entity from its shareholders and officers.
                                    - 681 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 679

21. Corporations: Fraud. A court will disregard a corporation’s identity
    only where the corporation has been used to commit fraud, violate a
    legal duty, or perpetrate a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of the
    rights of another.
22. Libel and Slander: Damages. In general, the damages under common
    law that may be recovered for defamation are (1) general damages for
    harm to reputation; (2) special damages; (3) damages for mental suffer-
    ing; and (4) if none of these are proved, nominal damages.
23. Damages. Special damages is a subset of actual harm, as actual harm
    is supported by evidence of injury, but the injury need not be pecuni-
    ary loss.
24. Constitutional Law: Libel and Slander: Pleadings: Proof: Damages.
    Pleading and proving special damages is not one of the higher barriers
    the U.S. Supreme Court has held the public libel plaintiff must surmount
    to protect the First Amendment right to public debate.
25. Libel and Slander: Pleadings: Proof: Damages. A plaintiff in a per se
    public libel action is not required to plead and prove special damages to
    state a claim.

   Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County:
Andrew R. Jacobsen, Judge. Reversed and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.
  David A. Domina, of Domina Law Group, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellant.
  Kamron T.M. Hasan and Sydney L. Hayes, of Husch
Blackwell, L.L.P., for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Papik,
and Freudenberg, JJ., and Moore, Judge.
   Freudenberg, J.
                     I. INTRODUCTION
   A general candidate for the Nebraska Legislature sued The
Republican Party of Nebraska (the Party) for public libel
stemming from political mailers stating that the candidate,
a real estate agent, had been disciplined by the Iowa Real
Estate Commission (Commission) for breaking the law and
had lost her Iowa real estate license. The candidate appeals
                              - 682 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

from a summary judgment against her, in which the court
found a genuine issue that the statements were false but no
genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. The
Party cross-appeals the district court’s conclusion that because
the candidate stated a per se defamation action, she did not
have to plead and prove special damages and she had, in any
event, proved special damages. We reverse the order of sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that when the facts presented
by the candidate are viewed in a light most favorable to the
candidate, as the nonmoving party, those facts are sufficient
that a jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the
Party acted with actual malice. We find no merit to the Party’s
cross-appeal.
                        II. BACKGROUND
   Janet Palmtag has active real estate licenses in Nebraska and
Missouri and an inactive license in Iowa. Her license in Iowa
became inactive in January 2020. She testified that she chose
to make her license inactive because she was not doing much
business there.
   Palmtag owns 100 percent of the common voting stock of
J. J. Palmtag, Inc. (J.J.), a real estate brokerage firm orga-
nized and registered as a corporation. J.J. has three employees,
including Palmtag, and has 15 independent contractor agents,
including Palmtag. Palmtag receives a salary from J.J. rather
than receiving income directly through her commissions.
   J.J., as a corporate entity, has brokerage licenses in Nebraska
and Missouri and previously had a license in Iowa. Palmtag’s
individual brokerage license is the managing license for J.J.
                      1. Consent Order
   In August 2018, J.J. entered into a “Combined Statement of
Charges, Informal Settlement Agreement, and Consent Order
in a Disciplinary Case” (consent order) with the Commission.
It was captioned as “IN RE: J.J. Palmtag, Inc. Firm . . .
RESPONDENT” and referred to a case number (disciplin-
ary case).
                             - 683 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

   Palmtag is referred to in the consent order “both as the
designated broker in charge and a licensed real estate broker
officer for the Respondent real estate brokerage firm.”
   The consent order describes the “STATEMENT OF
CHARGES” against J.J.:
      Respondent is charged with engaging in improper trust
      account procedures in violation of Iowa Code sections
      543B.29(l)(k), 543B.34(1), 543B.46 (2017) by disburs-
      ing earnest money funds from an Iowa real estate trust
      account prior to closing and without the informed writ-
      ten consent of all the parties to a transaction. See 193E
      Iowa Administrative Code sections 13.1, 13.1(1), 13.1(7),
      18.14(5)(f)(2).
   Under “CIRCUMSTANCES,” the consent order states in
part:
      In a random sampling of transaction files, the auditor
      discovered one (1) real estate transaction for a property
      located in Fremont County, Iowa where the Respondent
      transferred trust funds from J.J. Palmtag Inc. Iowa Trust
      Account to Nebraska Title Trust Account without the
      informed written consent of all the parties to this respec-
      tive transaction.
   Under “SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT,” the consent
order provides that “[w]ithout admission of wrongdoing or
guilt, the Respondent does not contest the violations alleged in
the above-stated Statement of Charges” and that “[t]his Order
constitutes discipline against the Respondent, and is the final
agency order in this contested case pursuant to Iowa Code sec-
tion 17A.10 and 193 Iowa Administrative Code 7.4.”
   Under “CIVIL PENALTY,” the consent order states, “The
Respondent shall pay a civil penalty to the Commission in the
amount of five hundred dollars . . . .” There is no reference in
the order to the loss or suspension of any real estate license.
   Immediately before the signature of “Janet A. Palmtag,
Broker Officer,” the consent order provided, “FOR THE
                             - 684 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

RESPONDENT: Voluntarily agreed to and accepted by J.J.
Palmtag . . . .”
   Palmtag testified that she signed the consent order in
her capacity as a corporate representative. Palmtag was not
involved in the underlying transaction and denied being aware
of it until the State of Iowa audited J.J. Palmtag testified
in her deposition that the consent decree stemmed from the
actions of an agent working for J.J., who was ill at the time
and who is now deceased. She testified that, as owner, she
takes responsibility for J.J.’s actions.
                   2. Licensing Bureau Status
   The license status for J.J. and Palmtag are listed on the
Iowa Professional Licensing Bureau (Bureau) online. It pro-
vides that Palmtag’s license is “[i]nactive,” effective January
2, 2020. It provides that the license of “J.J. Palmtag, Inc.”
is “[c]anceled.”
   The Bureau website states with respect to Palmtag that there
have been “No Discipline or Board Actions.”
   Like her personal license, Palmtag testified she canceled
J.J.’s license in Iowa because she was not doing much business
there. According to Palmtag, this decision was not related to
the consent order.
                      3. Political Mailers
   In 2020, Palmtag was a general candidate for the Nebraska
Legislature. It was undisputed that, because of this, Palmtag
was a public figure. Although Palmtag was a registered
Republican voter, the Party backed Palmtag’s opponent in the
legislative primary race. On approximately October 6, 2020,
the Party mailed two mailers to approximately 3,200 house-
holds of registered voters.
   The mailers were attached to Palmtag’s complaint. The mail-
ers cite the disciplinary case as the source of the information.
Palmtag made an official demand for corrections on October
19, 2020. No corrections were made.
                             - 685 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

   Palmtag highlighted in her complaint two statements in the
mailers. The first statement was that “Janet Palmtag Broke
The Law & Lost Her Real Estate License.” The second state-
ment was that “Janet Palmtag was charged with and fined for
engaging in improper trust account procedures by disbursing
funds . . . without the informed written consent of all the par-
ties.” These statements were also the two specific statements
that Palmtag had officially demanded the Party correct.
   In her response to the Party’s statement of undisputed facts
and a brief submitted to the trial court, Palmtag clarified she
also alleged she was defamed by the statement that her real
estate license had been “revoked,” which was reflected in the
attachments to the complaint. The mailers depicted a yard
sign reading “Licensed Agent,” with a red stamp over it read-
ing “REVOKED.” The mailers also described that Palmtag
was “TOO IRRESPONSIBLE TO KEEP HER LICENSE.”

                    4. Party’s Investigation
   Before distributing the mailers, Ryan Hamilton, the Party’s
executive director, submitted them to the Party’s chairman for
approval, in accordance with the chairman’s policy that no
mailers be sent unless they are first approved by him. Hamilton
testified in his deposition that he had read the consent order
and J.J.’s license status on the Commission website, which
stated J.J.’s license was “canceled.” Hamilton did not know
how many real estate agents J.J. had or which individual
was involved in the underlying transaction. Hamilton did not
review the webpage for Palmtag’s Iowa license.
   Hamilton testified he believed Palmtag was “responsible”
for the violations described in the consent order. This was
based on Palmtag’s signature on the order and his assump-
tion that she was the person responsible because she owned
J.J. and was the designated broker in charge and licensed real
estate broker officer for J.J. Although Hamilton acknowl-
edged that J.J., the corporate entity, was the only respondent
in the consent order, Hamilton said that “it seems to be a
                               - 686 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
              PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 679

difference without a distinction to me.” Hamilton informed
the chairman that he had researched the issue and reviewed
the consent order and that the mailers were accurate.
   The chairman testified in his deposition that he had informed
Hamilton the mailers must be accurate and was assured by
Hamilton that they were. He testified that he believed the state-
ments had been sufficiently vetted. He did not entertain serious
doubts about their truth.
   Palmtag disputed the veracity of the chairman’s and
Hamilton’s testimony as “self-serving.” There was evidence
admitted that, in a text message thread between Hamilton and a
vendor involving a copy of the consent order, the vendor said,
“Ok that’s not real” and “[y]our call boss.”

                        5. Lost Earnings
   Both J.J.’s gross income and net income increased from
2019 to 2020 and from 2020 to 2021. Also, the evidence dem-
onstrated that Palmtag’s personal listings were approximately
the same before and after the alleged defamation. Palmtag
testified that it was “impossible to identify clients lost because
listings have not been signed and persons have not approached
the firm.” Put differently, Palmtag testified that the identities of
potential persons were not known because lost opportunities,
by definition, do not present themselves.
   However, Palmtag, in her deposition testimony, identified
approximately $100,000 per year in lost income. She identi-
fied that her personal listings had declined. While from 2015
to 2019, her personal listings averaged 20 per year, she had 7
personal listings in 2020 and 12 in 2021.

                  6. Complaint and Answer
   Palmtag alleged in her complaint that the Party made inten-
tional, reckless, and false statements in the mailers and that
each statement exhibited actual malice, knowledge of falsity, or
reckless disregard for the truth.
                             - 687 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

    Palmtag alleged that the statements were defamation per
se because they falsely accused her of committing a crime
involving moral turpitude and of unfitness to perform the
duties of a public office and because, in her employment as a
real estate professional, they prejudiced her in her profession
and trade. Palmtag alleged that pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-840.01 (Reissue 2016), she was not limited to special
damages because the Party declined to correct the defamatory
statements after timely demand.
    Palmtag alleged both general and special damages. For
special damages, she alleged lost earnings, loss of equity in
her business, expenses to mitigate lost earnings, and expenses
for medical and psychological care. For general damages,
Palmtag alleged physical illness, emotional distress, sleep
disturbance, and a variety of other quality-of-life and mental
health effects.
    In its answer, the Party asserted Palmtag could not estab-
lish special damages and, as a result, her defamation claim
was barred. In its statement of undisputed material facts, the
Party quoted the definition of special damages in § 25-840.01,
which states they include only damages suffered in respect to
property, business, trade, profession, or occupation. In other
filings before the hearing on the motion for summary judg-
ment, the Party asserted that reputational harm and medical
expenses are not special damages. It also asserted that all
public libel cases, regardless of whether they are defamation
per se, must plead and prove special damages as an essential
element of the public libel claim.

             7. Motion for Summary Judgment
   The Party moved for summary judgment, generally alleg-
ing there was no genuine issue that the statements were
substantially true, it did not act with actual malice, and there
were no special damages. In its statements of undisputed
material fact and at the hearing, the Party elaborated as to
special damages that Palmtag could not prove lost business
                                - 688 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
              PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 679

proximately caused by the mailers. It relied on a statement in
Moats v. Republican Party of Neb. 1 that “[t]he plaintiff in a
‘public-libel’ action must establish that the alleged statement
is false by clear and convincing evidence and establish spe-
cial damages.”
    In her brief in opposition to summary judgment, Palmtag
stated, “Though whether the Consent Order constitutes ‘disci-
pline’ is a complex question under Iowa’s statutes and regula-
tions, it is clear the Consent Order did not suspend or revoke
. . . Palmtag’s license.” In fact, “no real estate license was
ever suspended, revoked, or lost as a result of any proceeding
involving . . . Palmtag or J.J.”
    Palmtag also noted that the Commission website “discloses
no license revocations nor violations of the law by . . .
Palmtag.”
    According to Palmtag, the false statements at issue were not
supported by any reasonable reading of the material Hamilton
said he consulted. Furthermore, discovery of the falsity of
the statements in the mailers could have been easily made
through a phone call or by looking at the Bureau website.
Neither Hamilton nor the chairman made any real investiga-
tion because they were told by a “‘big donor’” to “‘[g]o hard
on [Palmtag].’”
    Palmtag cited to our statement in McKinney v. Okoye 2 that
“[s]tate of mind is difficult to prove, and rarely will the plain-
tiff be able to provide a ‘“smoking gun.”’ Thus, . . . cases
where the underlying issue is one of motive or intent are
particularly inappropriate for summary judgment.” She argued
that the evidence was sufficient in combination for a rational
finder of fact to conclude by clear and convincing evidence
that the Party acted with actual malice and that its statements
to the contrary were not credible.
1
  Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., 281 Neb. 411, 422, 796 N.W.2d 584,
  594 (2011).
2
  McKinney v. Okoye, 287 Neb. 261, 275, 842 N.W.2d 581, 594 (2014).
                              - 689 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

  Palmtag denied that she had to prove special damages.
Nonetheless, she asserted that she had presented evidence
supporting a genuine issue of whether special damages could
be shown.
          8. Order Granting Summary Judgment
   The district court granted the Party’s motion for summary
judgment. The court stated that Palmtag alleged only that the
two statements set forth in her demand to correct and in her
complaint were defamatory, but the parties disputed to what
extent the court should consider other statements in the mail-
ers. The court said that it must consider the full content of the
mailers for context.
                            (a) Falsity
   The court found that although it was substantially true that
J.J. broke the law and was fined for improper trust account
procedures, the substance of the statement was that Palmtag,
as an individual, had broken the law and was fined. The court
relied on cases considering whether corporate representatives
had personal knowledge or involvement in the matters that
were the subject of the defamatory statements. The court con-
cluded there was a genuine issue of whether the statements
that Palmtag broke the law and was charged and fined for
improper trust account procedures were substantially true. It
noted evidence that Palmtag was “not involved at all in the
underlying transaction and was not even aware of it until the
State of Iowa audited the [c]orporation.”
   The court also found a genuine issue as to whether it was
substantially true that Palmtag had “‘lost’” her license. It noted
that J.J. and Palmtag had separate licenses. The court observed
that the Commission never told Palmtag to stop selling real
estate in Iowa or to stop holding herself out as licensed to
sell real estate and that Palmtag had voluntarily changed her
license status to inactive because she was not doing business
there and did not want to pay the renewal fees.
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            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 679

                       (b) Special Damages
   The district court rejected the Party’s argument that in all
public libel cases the plaintiff must prove special damages.
The district court explained that our reasoning in Moats was
inconsistent with our broad statement therein that a plaintiff
in a public libel action must establish special damages regard-
less of whether the underlying statement constituted libel per
se. The district court observed that we discussed in Moats that
in a per se libel action, special damages are not required and
concluded that because the statements were not defamation
per se, the plaintiff had to plead special damages. The district
court found no other support for the proposition that a per se
public libel action requires special damages. The court found
Palmtag had stated a claim for libel per se because the state-
ments implied she was unfit to work as a real estate broker.
In the alternative, the court found a genuine issue of whether
Palmtag suffered special damages.
                         (c) Actual Malice
   The district court explained that the usual rules for sum-
mary judgment apply to actual malice. It said that the clear
and convincing evidence standard applies at the summary
judgment stage inasmuch as the inquiry is whether a trier of
fact could find actual malice by clear and convincing evi-
dence, but questions of motive and intent are particularly
inappropriate for summary judgment.
   However, citing to Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S.,
Inc., 3 the district court also said that whether the evidence in
the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a find-
ing of actual malice is a threshold question of law that the
Constitution requires judges to make before entry of a judg-
ment against the defendant.
3
    Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct.
    1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984). See, also, Harte-Hanks Communications v.
    Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989).
                             - 691 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
             PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 679

   The district court observed that Palmtag had produced no
evidence directly contradicting Hamilton’s testimony that he
subjectively believed Palmtag herself had broken the law and
that the Commission had charged and fined her for improper
trust account procedures. The court also found no evidence
of purposeful avoidance of the truth. The court noted state-
ments by the U.S. Supreme Court that the failure to fur-
ther investigate is insufficient to demonstrate malice. Also,
the district court questioned how the Party reasonably could
have conducted a further investigation. Citing to the “Iowa
Code §§ 272C.1(6)(d) [and] 272C.6(4)(a),” as well as to the
“Iowa Admin. Code r. 193E-18.8,” the district court said the
Commission’s investigative information is generally privileged.
It did not directly address if the Bureau website information
about Palmtag having “No Discipline or Board Actions” was
available to the Party. It also did not address whether the Party
could have discovered Palmtag’s license was listed as “[i]nac-
tive,” effective January 2, 2020.
   The district court implicitly concluded that the Party oper-
ated under a reasonable misunderstanding of ambiguous
sources: (1) the consent order and (2) the Bureau website’s
licensing status for J.J. The district court found, in relation
to the Bureau’s website showing the license status for J.J.,
that the Party could have rationally interpreted the phrase
“[c]anceled” as consistent with “‘lost.’” The court did not
directly address whether the Party could have rationally read
the Bureau information for J.J.’s license status as indicat-
ing that Palmtag’s, as opposed to J.J.’s, license had been
“[c]anceled.” The district court suggested the consent order
was likewise ambiguous. However, the court did not elaborate
on what aspects of the consent order were ambiguous and
what rational interpretations of it the Party had made.
   Despite acknowledging that Palmtag was arguing the con-
sent order on its face showed J.J., and not Palmtag, was the
disciplined party and having found a genuine issue of whether
                                   - 692 -
            Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                     315 Nebraska Reports
                PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 679

the statements were false because they implicated Palmtag
individually rather than only J.J., the court did not explicitly
address if the Party’s sources were ambiguous as to whether
Palmtag, as an individual, broke the law, was disciplined, and
lost her license. Nor did the district court explicitly address
the reasonableness of the Party’s stated subjective belief that
Palmtag, as an individual, broke the law, was disciplined, and
lost her real estate license.

               III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Palmtag assigns, summarized, that the district court erred in
sustaining the motion for summary judgment by finding insuf-
ficient evidence of actual malice as a matter of law and failing
to give Palmtag the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
   The Party cross-appeals, assigning that the district court
erred by determining that Palmtag (1) was not required to pre­
sent a genuine issue of material fact that she incurred special
damages and (2) had presented a genuine issue of material fact
that she incurred special damages.

                IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
  [1] An appellate court reviews the district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, viewing the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all reason-
able inferences in that party’s favor. 4

                          V. ANALYSIS
                   1. Overview of Elements
   [2,3] In the ordinary case, a claim of defamation requires (1)
a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, (2)
an unprivileged publication to a third party, (3) fault amounting
to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and (4) either
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm
4
    Brown v. State, ante p. 336, 996 N.W.2d 56 (2023).
                                   - 693 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    315 Nebraska Reports
                PALMTAG V. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF NEB.
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 679

or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. 5
Libel is defamation where the defamatory words are written
or printed; slander is defamation where the defamatory words
are spoken. 6
   [4] When the plaintiff is a public official or public fig-
ure 7 and the speech is a matter of public concern, the First
Amendment requires the plaintiff to surmount certain higher
barriers than those raised by common-law libel. 8 This is
because erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate and
must be protected. 9 Furthermore, a rule compelling a critic of
official conduct to guarantee the truth of all factual assertions,
on pain of libel judgments, would lead to self-censorship. 10
Finally, it has been observed that public officials and public
figures, due to greater access to channels of effective commu-
nication, have a greater opportunity than private individuals to
counteract false statements and minimize its adverse impact on
reputation, 11 and they have normally assumed roles for which
they must accept certain necessary consequences. 12
   [5] Nevertheless, the First Amendment’s protections of pub-
lic debate are not absolute. 13 It is well settled that there is no
constitutional right to espouse false assertions of facts, even
against a public figure in the course of public discourse. 14
5
   Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., supra note 1.
6
   50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 6 (2017).
 7
   See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 18 L. Ed.
   2d 1094 (1967).
 8
   See Hoch v. Prokop, 244 Neb. 443, 507 N.W.2d 626 (1993).
 9
   See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed.
   2d 686 (1964).
10
   See id.
11
   Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d
   789 (1974).
12
   Id.
13
   See Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., supra note 1.
14
   Id.
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   [6] The principal higher barrier a public libel plaintiff must
surpass is that actual malice, not simple negligence, is part of
the scienter element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case. 15
   Another barrier particular to a public libel action is that,
to be constitutionally sufficient “to support a finding that the
statements referred to” the plaintiff, there must be evidence,
other than general assumptions attaching praise or criticism to
the official in control of the body, connecting the plaintiff to
the statements at issue. 16 The statements must be “specifically
made of and concerning” 17 the plaintiff to be actionable.
   [7] Finally, there is a heightened “clear and convincing”
burden of proof for certain elements of a public libel action,
instead of the preponderance of the evidence standard that
would normally apply because it is a civil action. Most nota-
bly, the plaintiff in a public libel action must establish actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence. 18 But we have also
held that the plaintiff in a public libel action bears the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence the element of
falsity of the published statements. 19 Further, we have indi-
cated that it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the statements are “of and concerning
the plaintiff.” 20
              2. Summary Judgment Standard
                  for Public Libel Actions
  [8] Palmtag suggests that the district court utilized an inap-
propriately high summary judgment standard in determining
15
   See Hoch v. Prokop, supra note 8.
16
   New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 9, 376 U.S. at 292.
17
   Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80, 86 S. Ct. 669, 15 L. Ed. 2d 597
   (1966). See, also, Deaver v. Hinel, 223 Neb. 529, 391 N.W.2d 128 (1986).
18
   Hoch v. Prokop, supra note 8. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note
   11.
19
   See Deaver v. Hinel, supra note 17. See, also, Firestone v. Time, Inc., 460
   F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972).
20
   Deaver v. Hinel, supra note 17, 223 Neb. at 539, 391 N.W.2d at 135.
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whether there was a genuine issue pertaining to the elements of
Palmtag’s public libel action. We agree that the same general
summary judgment standards applicable to any action apply to
a public libel action; however, the existence of a genuine issue
of material fact is dependent upon the particular elements and
standards of proof of the underlying action.
   [9] In general, summary judgment is proper only when the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affida-
vits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be
drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 21 The party moving for summary
judgment must make a prima facie case by producing enough
evidence to show the movant would be entitled to judgment
if the evidence were uncontroverted at trial. 22 If the burden of
proof at trial would be on the nonmoving party, then the party
moving for summary judgment may satisfy its prima facie
burden either by citing to materials in the record that affirma-
tively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party’s
claim or by citing to materials in the record demonstrating
that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to estab-
lish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim. 23 If
the moving party makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the nonmovant to produce evidence showing the existence
of a material issue of fact that prevents judgment as a matter
of law. 24
   In its order granting the Party’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the court stated the usual rules of summary judgment
applied. However, it also cited to the independent appellate
21
   407 N 117 Street v. Harper, 314 Neb. 843, 993 N.W.2d 462 (2023).
22
   Clark v. Scheels All Sports, 314 Neb. 49, 989 N.W.2d 39 (2023).
23
   Id.
24
   Id.
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review doctrine established by Bose Corp. 25 We clarify that this
is not a standard applicable to summary judgment.
   In Bose Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ques-
tion of whether the evidence in the record is of the convinc-
ing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment
protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. 26
Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently
decide whether the evidence is sufficient to cross the consti-
tutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is
not supported by clear and convincing proof of actual mal-
ice. 27 The Court elaborated that in determining whether the
constitutional standard of liability has been satisfied in cases
of defamation of a public figure, there is a requirement of
independent appellate review to decide whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to “cross the constitutional threshold
that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by
clear and convincing proof of ‘actual malice.’” 28 The Court
said that although credibility determinations are reviewed
under the clearly erroneous standard, because the trier of
fact has had the “opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses,” 29 the reviewing court must “examine for [itself]
the statements in issue and the circumstances under which
they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character
which the principles of the First Amendment . . . protect.” 30
   There is a difference between independently reviewing
on appeal the entirety of the evidence at trial to determine
if the statements are of a character that the principles of the
First Amendment protect and conducting such an examination
25
   Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., supra note 3.
26
   Id.
27
   Id.
28
   Id., 466 U.S. at 511.
29
   Id., 466 U.S. at 499-500.
30
   Id., 466 U.S. at 508 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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upon the more limited evidence presented at a summary
judgment hearing and without the benefit of a trier of fact’s
credibility determinations. At the summary judgment stage,
the primary issue remains whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact.
   Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed the
proper summary judgment standard for a public defamation
case in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 31 The Court said that
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact for purposes
of summary judgment necessarily implicates the substantive
evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial
on the merits. 32 Thus, whether any dispute about actual mal-
ice is genuine involves a determination of whether there is
enough probative evidence from which reasonably minded
jurors could find that actual malice has been proved by clear
and convincing evidence. 33 “[T]here is no genuine issue if the
evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient
caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.” 34
   The Court acknowledged it may be unlikely that the higher
standard of proof at trial would produce different results at
the summary judgment stage, 35 but said it did not follow that
it could never make a difference. The Court elaborated that
merely asserting the jury might disbelieve the defendant’s
testimony as to an innocent state of mind is insufficient, in
itself, to overcome a motion for summary judgment in a public
libel action. 36 The Court held that the movant must set forth
31
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed.
   2d 202 (1986).
32
   Id.
33
   See id.
34
   Id., 477 U.S. at 254.
35
   Id.
36
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra note 31.
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specific facts showing a genuine issue and may not rest only
upon mere allegations or denials. 37
   Still, the Court in Anderson reiterated that a higher under-
lying burden of proof at trial does not change the fact that
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are
jury functions, not those of a judge . . . .” 38 Furthermore,
“[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 39
   [10] The Court emphasized in Anderson that its “holding
that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be
taken into account in ruling on summary judgment motions
does not denigrate the role of the jury.” 40 The Court reiterated
that, as always, trial courts should act with caution in granting
summary judgment. The Court emphasized that where a result
turns upon a choice of permissible inferences from undisputed
evidence, summary judgment may not properly be granted. 41
Finally, the Court in Anderson explained that successful suits
are not limited to those cases in which there is direct proof
by a party’s admission of the ultimate fact. 42 This is consist­
ent with the Court’s statement in St. Amant v. Thompson 43
that “[t]he defendant in a defamation action brought by a
public [figure] cannot . . . automatically insure a favorable
[judgment] by testifying that he published with a belief that
the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine
whether the publication was indeed made in good faith.”
37
   Id.
38
   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra note 31, 477 U.S. at 255.
39
   Id.
40
   Id.
41
   See Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. App. 1979).
42
   See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969).
43
   St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S. Ct. 1323, 20 L. Ed. 2d
   262 (1968).
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   To the extent the district court incorrectly relied on Bose in
deciding if there was a genuine issue of material fact, it is of
no consequence, because we review the district court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo. We will apply the standards
set forth in Anderson to the parties’ dispute as to whether there
were genuine issues that (1) the Party acted with actual malice
and (2) Palmtag suffered actionable harm. We note that the
Party does not assign as error the district court’s finding that
there was a genuine issue that the statements were false and
defamatory, because there was evidence that Palmtag lacked
personal knowledge or involvement in the underlying actions
leading to the consent judgment. And there appears to be no
dispute that the statements at issue were made “of and concern-
ing” Palmtag. 44

                        3. Actual Malice
   [11] We first address whether there was a genuine issue
of actual malice. Actual malice means knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth. 45 This is analogous to the
scienter necessary to negate the privilege for statements by
public officials. 46
   The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged the concept of
“‘[r]eckless disregard’” “cannot be fully encompassed in one
infallible definition.” 47 It has said the defendant must have
made the false publication with a “high degree of awareness
of . . . probable falsity,” 48 “entertained serious doubts as to the
44
   See Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra note 17, 383 U.S. at 80. See, also, Deaver v.
   Hinel, supra note 17.
45
   Hoch v. Prokop, supra note 8.
46
   See, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 11; New York Times Co. v.
   Sullivan, supra note 9.
47
   St. Amant v. Thompson, supra note 43, 390 U.S. at 730.
48
   Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S. Ct. 209, 13 L. Ed. 2d 125
   (1964).
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truth of his publication,” 49 had a necessary awareness of prob-
able falsehood, 50 or “obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of
the informant or the accuracy of his reports.” 51
   Palmtag relies on several aspects of the evidence admit-
ted at the summary judgment hearing as being sufficient for
a reasonably minded jury to find actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence. She argues the statements in the mail-
ers were directly contrary to the plain language of the con-
sent order and the Bureau’s website for J.J.’s licensing status
and not a reasonable reading of ambiguous sources. She also
points to the lack of proper investigation, political motives
behind the mailers, and the text thread as evidence supporting
a genuine issue of actual malice.
   The Party, for its part, argues that the consent order and
license status were ambiguous and that its statements consti-
tuted reasonable interpretations of the source materials. It then
asserts that this reasonable misunderstanding of ambiguous
documents is insufficient as a matter of law to support a find-
ing of actual malice—even if combined with its ill will toward
Palmtag and a failure to further investigate. It argues that any
reliance on the text thread stating “that’s not real” is being
raised for the first time on appeal and does not show actual
malice because it is unclear what the texts refer to and would
not give the Party reason to doubt its understanding of the
Bureau website and the consent order.
   [12,13] In making these arguments, the Party relies on
precedent by the U.S. Supreme Court holding that mere proof
of failure to investigate, without more, cannot establish reck-
less disregard for the truth. 52 Likewise, standing alone, proof
of a defendant’s ill will toward a public figure plaintiff
is insufficient to establish knowledge of falsity or reckless
49
   St. Amant v. Thompson, supra note 43, 390 U.S. at 731.
50
   Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S. Ct. 1635, 60 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1979).
51
   St. Amant v. Thompson, supra note 43, 390 U.S. at 732.
52
   Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 11.
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disregard for the truth for purposes of a defamation claim. 53
But it does not follow that ill will and investigatory deficien-
cies are irrelevant and cannot be considered by a trier of fact
together or in conjunction with other evidence. 54
   [14,15] To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court has
made clear that motive and negligence, including a failure
to investigate, are factors in the totality of the evidence
that may be considered in making reasonable inferences as
to the defendant’s state of mind in a public libel action. 55
The U.S. Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks Communications
v. Connaughton 56 held that a plaintiff in a public libel action
“is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through
circumstantial evidence.” 57 Further, “it cannot be said that
evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation
to the actual malice inquiry.” 58
   [16,17] As the Party points out, also relevant to actual
malice is the ambiguity of any source material consulted by
the defendant and the reasonableness or lack thereof in inter-
preting that material in a way that led to the false statement
forming the basis of the plaintiff’s claim. A “critical issue” is
whether a source relied upon in making the false and defama-
tory statement was “reasonably susceptible of the interpreta-
tion” given it by the defendant. 59
53
   Jackson v. Hartig, 274 Va. 219, 645 S.E.2d 303 (2007).
54
   See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, supra note 3;
   Goldwater v. Ginzburg, supra note 42.
55
   See id.
56
   Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, supra note 3, 491 U.S. at
   668.
57
   See, Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S. Ct. 197, 19
   L. Ed. 2d 248 (1967); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S. Ct. 992, 13 L.
   Ed. 2d 892 (1965).
58
   Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, supra note 3, 491 U.S. at
   668.
59
   Nader v. de Toledano, supra note 41, 408 A.2d at 53.
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   Thus, in Time, Inc. v. Pape, 60 the Court held that the adop-
tion of one of several possible rational interpretations of an
“extravagantly ambiguous” document was not enough to create
a jury issue of actual malice. In an article, a news magazine
attempted to summarize a lengthy government document, a
report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, describing
“‘chilling text about police brutality’” and that “the report
cites Chicago police treatment of Negro James Monroe and
his family.” 61 The article went on to quote the summary of the
filed civil rights complaint found in the Commission’s report.
At issue in the public libel action was the fact that the news
article failed to specify these were charges by the complainant
rather than independent findings by the Commission.
   The U.S. Supreme Court explained that the commission’s
report was ambiguous as to whether it had independently
determined the truth of the incident alleged in the civil rights
complaints it set forth. This was because the facts of the civil
rights complaints were contained within a report that repeat-
edly asserted it was “dealing with a problem of unquestionable
reality and seriousness.” 62 Furthermore, the civil rights com-
plaints were described under a heading entitled “‘UNLAW­
FUL POLICE VIOLENCE,’” and the Commission said it
was of the opinion that “‘the allegations appeared substantial
enough to justify discussion in this study.’” 63
   Given the ambiguities of the source and the testimony
by the author of the article that they believed that the com-
mission believed the incident had occurred as described, the
Court in Pape reversed the lower appellate court’s reversal
of a directed verdict in favor of the publisher. There was no
other evidence presented supporting an inference of actual
60
   Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 287, 91 S. Ct. 633, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45
   (1971).
61
   Id., 401 U.S. at 281, 282.
62
   Id., 401 U.S. at 286.
63
   Id., 401 U.S. at 287.
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malice. The U.S. Supreme Court held there was insufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the publisher acted
with the requisite reckless disregard for truth or falsity that
constitutes actual malice.
   Likewise, in Bose Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
a choice of one of several possible rational interpretations of
an ambiguous event does not place the speech beyond First
Amendment protections. 64 Therein, the defendant published
an article in its magazine evaluating loudspeaker systems.
The article described the sound of the plaintiff’s system as
tending to “‘wander about the room.’” 65 This was found to
be false because the sound actually tended to wander back
and forth “‘along the wall’” 66 between the two speakers of
the system.
   In Bose Corp., the original report and the article were
written by the same engineer. The original report described
the movement of sound around the room rather than along
the wall. Only upon cross-examination at trial did it become
apparent that the sound moved back and forth along the wall
between the speakers. The engineer could not explain the
choice of words he used in his report and in the article, but
testified he believed they described what was observed.
   The U.S. Supreme Court in Bose Corp. reversed a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff for product disparagement, holding
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of
actual malice. The Court observed that “the only evidence
of actual malice on which the District Court relied was the
fact that the statement was an inaccurate description of what
[the engineer] actually perceived.” 67 There was no evidence
presented that the engineer had a motive to disparage the
64
   Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., supra note 3.
65
   Id., 466 U.S. at 488.
66
   Id., 466 U.S. at 490.
67
   Id., 466 U.S. at 512.
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plaintiff or had failed to investigate. The Court held that the
language chosen by the engineer was one of a number of pos-
sible rational interpretations of an event that “‘bristled with
ambiguities’” and “descriptive challenges for the writer.” 68
The Court indicated that an individual who uses a malaprop-
ism and “did not realize his folly at the time” is not liable
simply because an intelligent speaker would know the term
was inaccurate in context. 69
   In contrast to such reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
sources or events or the wrong choice of words when faced
with “descriptive challenges,” “a publisher . . . who deliber-
ately distorts [the] statements [of others] to launch a personal
attack of his own on a public figure, cannot rely on a [First
Amendment] privilege . . . . In such instances he assumes
responsibility for the underlying accusations.” 70
   [18] “[A]n inference of actual malice can be drawn when
a defendant publishes a defamatory statement that contradicts
information known to him, even [though] the defendant testi-
fies that he believed that the statement was not defamatory and
was consistent with the facts within his knowledge.” 71 This is
“not simply a failure to investigate, but a failure to consider
contradictory evidence already in his possession.” 72
   [19] “[A] publisher cannot feign ignorance or profess good
faith when there are clear indications present which bring
into question the truth or falsity of defamatory statements.” 73
68
   Id.
69
   Id., 466 U.S. at 513.
70
   Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.
   1977).
71
   Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, 720 F.2d 631, 645 (11th Cir. 1983).
72
   Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 250 (D.D.C. 1987).
73
   Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 538 (7th Cir. 1982). See, also,
   Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, supra note 71; Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Intern., Ltd.,
   691 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Also, the deliberate omission of important information that
would have substantially modified, qualified, or eliminated the
defamatory meaning can support a finding of actual malice. 74
   Accordingly, in Harte-Hanks Communications, the U.S.
Supreme Court held there was sufficient evidence of actual
malice relating to what the jury found were false and defama-
tory statements by a newspaper reporting that a challenger
candidate in an election had offered jobs and a trip to two
sisters in exchange for helping an investigation that led to the
arrest of the incumbent. 75 There was evidence of motive by
the newspaper to purposefully avoid the truth that the sister
who reached out to them with the allegations of bribery was
lying. And although the newspaper interviewed all other wit-
nesses to the conversation in which the challenger allegedly
bribed the sisters, the newspaper chose not to interview the
other sister or listen to a recording of the conversation in
their possession in which the alleged bribery of the sisters
took place.
   The U.S. Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks Communications
found this evidence sufficient to support the jury’s implicit
rejection of the credibility of the newspaper’s innocent expla-
nations as to why it did not verify the allegations by inter-
viewing the sister or by listening to the tape. It followed
from the jury’s assessment of credibility that the newspaper’s
inaction “was a product of a deliberate decision not to acquire
knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity”
of the charges, amounting to “the purposeful avoidance of the
truth.” 76 This, explained the Court, demonstrated a reckless
disregard for the truth amounting to actual malice.
74
   See David A. Elder, Defamation: A Lawyer’s Guide § 7:13 (Oct. 2023
   update).
75
   Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, supra note 3.
76
   Id. 491 U.S. at 692.
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   A similar conclusion was reached by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Young v. Gannett Satellite Information Network 77
in affirming a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a public libel
action. A newspaper editor wrote that a police sergeant had
been terminated for forcing sex on a coworker and stated that
the sergeant “‘had sex with a woman while on the job.’” 78 The
sergeant had in fact initially been fired for sexual assault, but
the termination was overturned by an arbitrator who stated, in
a report consulted by the editor, that the allegations had not
been proved.
   In Young, the arbitrator noted in the report that the DNA
sample from the scene did not match the DNA of the sergeant
and that the accuser had a history of behavior that undermined
her credibility. On the other hand, the arbitrator also found
that the sergeant was not credible in his claim that he had
never engaged in sexual conduct with the woman. The arbi-
trator conceded the truth was probably “‘somewhere in the
middle.’” 79 The arbitrator ultimately ordered a suspension for
inappropriate sexual remarks at work about the woman.
   On appeal, the court in Young held there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to have decided that the source arbi-
trator’s report was not an ambiguous document or that the
editor’s interpretation of the report was not rational. The court
also noted that the editor failed to conduct any investigation
beyond the records of the original case. The jury could have
concluded the editor had a reckless disregard of the truth with
the motive to fit the editor’s desired storyline. Thus, there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of actual mal-
ice by clear and convincing evidence.
77
   Young v. Gannett Satellite Information Network, 734 F.3d 544 (6th Cir.
   2013).
78
   Id. at 545.
79
   Id. at 548.
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    Similarly, in Nader v. de Toledano, 80 the D.C. Court of
Appeals found summary judgment was not appropriate where,
despite the source material being lengthy, it was not reason-
ably susceptible to the interpretation given it by the journalist
defendant. The journalist had stated in a newspaper column
that a U.S. Senate subcommittee report showed that the plain-
tiff, a public interest advocate, had falsified and distorted
evidence to make his case that an automobile model was
unsafe. The lengthy subcommittee report largely consisted of a
point-by-point refutation of the advocate’s charges of unsafety.
Nevertheless, the report concluded unambiguously: “‘[W]e
believe [the charges] were made in good faith based on the
information available to him.’” 81
    The court in Nader stated that the subcommittee’s report was
not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation of it advanced
by the journalist. Thus, the journalist was not immune from
liability on that ground. Instead, the unambiguous “good faith”
conclusion set forth in the report afforded a sufficient eviden-
tiary basis from which a reasonable inference of actual malice
could be drawn. And “[w]here a result turns upon a choice of
permissible inferences from undisputed evidence, summary
judgment may not properly be granted.” 82
    We determine, for purposes of our summary judgment
review, that the sources relied upon by the Party were not
ambiguous as to whether they pertained to J.J., the corporate
entity, as opposed to Palmtag, in her personal capacity. And,
as the district court observed, the substance of the Party’s
statements in the mailers was that Palmtag, as an individual,
had broken the law, was fined, and had lost her license as a
result—not that J.J., the corporation, had done so. Attributing
these acts and consequences to Palmtag personally rather
80
   Nader v. de Toledano, supra note 41.
81
   Id. at 37.
82
   Id. at 54.
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than to J.J., the corporation, was not a case of descriptive chal-
lenges or a malapropism and was not a reasonable interpreta-
tion of ambiguous source materials.
   The Party does not even attempt to explain how the
Bureau’s website information was ambiguous as to whether
J.J.’s or Palmtag’s license had been “[c]anceled.” The web-
site’s information plainly referred to the license status of
“J.J. Palmtag, Inc.” being canceled. It nowhere referred to
“Janet Palmtag.”
   As for the consent order, the Party claims it was ambiguous
as to whether the violation described therein was committed by
Palmtag individually, because she signed it. However, the con-
sent order plainly refers to “J.J. Palmtag Inc. Firm” as the only
respondent. The order goes on to state that “the Respondent
does not contest the violations alleged,” “[t]his Order consti-
tutes discipline against the Respondent,” and “[t]he Respondent
shall pay a civil penalty to the Commission in the amount of
five hundred dollars.” (Emphasis supplied.)
   Nowhere does the consent order describe that Palmtag
personally committed these violations or was fined in her
personal capacity. That the consent order referred to Palmtag
as the designated broker in charge and a licensed real estate
broker officer “for the Respondent real estate brokerage firm”
does not imply that Palmtag was subject to the order in her
personal capacity. Furthermore, it is not a reasonable interpre-
tation of the consent order that Palmtag personally committed
the violation or was legally liable in her personal capacity
for the violation because her signature line describes she was
signing as “Janet A. Palmtag, Broker Officer.” That signature
line was preceded by the clear language that she was sign-
ing “FOR THE RESPONDENT: Voluntarily agreed to and
accepted by J.J. Palmtag . . . .”
   [20] The Party was aware that J.J. is a corporate entity,
which, in any event, was plainly reflected in the source mate-
rials. Generally, a corporation is viewed as a complete and
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separate entity from its shareholders and officers. 83 Organizing
a corporation to avoid personal liability is a legitimate goal
and is one of the primary advantages of doing business in the
corporate form. 84
   [21] A court will disregard a corporation’s identity only
where the corporation has been used to commit fraud, violate
a legal duty, or perpetrate a dishonest or unjust act in contra-
vention of the rights of another. 85 But there was no evidence
that the Party had reason to believe Palmtag personally used
J.J.’s identity to commit fraud, violate a legal duty, or perpe-
trate a dishonest or unjust act in contravention of the rights
of another.
   Instead, Hamilton testified he subjectively believed Palmtag
was “responsible” for the violations because she owned J.J.,
was the designated broker in charge for J.J., and a licensed
real estate broker officer for J.J. He considered the fact that the
consent order was plainly against J.J. “a difference without a
distinction to me.” Hamilton’s alleged misunderstanding of the
law does not mean that the source materials were ambiguous
as to whether Palmtag in her personal capacity had committed
any violation for which she was fined or that Palmtag’s per-
sonal brokerage license had been “[c]anceled.”
   We also find that it was not a reasonable interpretation
of the source materials that the cancellation of J.J.’s license,
reflected on the Bureau’s website, was because of the violation
described in the consent decree. The substance of the state-
ment in the political mailer that “Palmtag Broke The Law &
Lost Her Real Estate License” was that she lost her license
because of breaking the law. However, the consent decree spe-
cifically and plainly stated that the consequence of the viola-
tion set forth therein was a fine, and it nowhere indicated that
83
   Christian v. Smith, 276 Neb. 867, 759 N.W.2d 447 (2008).
84
   Axtmann v. Chillemi, 740 N.W.2d 838 (N.D. 2007).
85
   Christian v. Smith, supra note 83.
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a license revocation would result from the violation or that
any person’s or entity’s brokerage license would in any way
be affected by the violation. Similarly, the Bureau information
for J.J.’s license status nowhere referenced the consent decree
or any law violation. The implication of “lost” was not that
Palmtag had somehow misplaced her real estate license but
that it was forfeited by breaking the law. Even if “canceled”
could be considered ambiguous to the extent that “lost” is
a reasonable interpretation of that term, there is nothing in
the source materials tying the cancellation to the violation
described in the consent decree.
   Because the consent decree and the license status are not
ambiguous as to whether Palmtag, as opposed to J.J., com-
mitted the violation described in the consent decree or as to
whether Palmtag or J.J. lost a brokerage license because of
the violation, the Party cannot rely on case law holding that
publishing a rational interpretation of an ambiguous report is
insufficient to demonstrate actual malice. The lack of ambi-
guity in the Party’s only two sources raises the question of
whether, by accusing Palmtag personally of breaking the
law and losing her license as a result, the Party deliberately
distorted unambiguous sources to launch a personal attack,
which would support actual malice. It is the function of a
jury to determine Hamilton’s credibility concerning his dis-
regard of J.J.’s separate corporate identity and his rationale
for assuming the cancellation of J.J.’s license was because of
the violation.
   Moreover, the Party’s statements that were not reason-
able interpretations of the source materials were not the only
evidence presented at the summary judgment hearing that
could support actual malice. Most apparent, there was a fail-
ure to investigate beyond the two sources that plainly impli-
cated only J.J. and plainly did not tie the violation described
in the consent decree to Palmtag or to the cancellation of
J.J.’s license. Leaving aside whether some information pertain-
ing to the allegations may have been confidential, the Party
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presents no argument as to why it could not have investigated
Palmtag’s license status on the Bureau’s website just as it did
J.J.’s. The Party also could have requested more information
from Palmtag. Thus, a jury could find the Party chose not to
investigate further in a purposeful avoidance of the truth.
   Palmtag also presented evidence of possible ill will in the
form of political motivation to discredit her to the voting
public. Furthermore, there was a text thread telling Hamilton,
“Ok that’s not real.” We disagree with the Party’s argument
that the text thread cannot be considered on appeal in combi-
nation with other evidence in determining whether there was
a genuine issue that the Party acted with actual malice. The
Party argues that the meaning of the texts is not clear and
that Palmtag is specifically articulating an argument based on
the texts for the first time on appeal. Any lack of clarity is a
matter for the trier of fact and could have been the subject of
an objection to the text thread. But the record reflects that the
exhibit was admitted into evidence without objection. While
an appellate court will not consider an argument or theory
raised for the first time on appeal, 86 the argument made by
Palmtag below was that the evidence presented at the sum-
mary judgment hearing demonstrated a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact. The effect of the text thread was before the trial court
even though it may not have been pointed out with particular-
ity. Viewing the texts in a light most favorable to Palmtag as
the nonmoving party, a jury could determine it evidenced the
Party’s awareness that its statements were not true.
   Palmtag did not simply rest on allegations and denials but
provided several specific facts from which a jury could find
by clear and convincing evidence of actual malice in falsely
stating that Palmtag had broken the law, been fined, and lost
her license because of the law violation. A reasonable fact
finder could find the Party’s attestations of innocence disin-
genuous. It could instead find that the false and defamatory
86
     Elbert v. Young, 312 Neb. 58, 977 N.W.2d 892 (2022).
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statements were made with a “high degree of awareness of
. . . probable falsity,” 87 that the Party “entertained serious
doubts as to the truth” of the statements, 88 or that the Party
had a necessary awareness of the probable falsehood 89 of the
statements. Or a reasonable fact finder might reject all of
those interpretations. There was sufficient evidence to present
a genuine issue of whether the Party acted with actual malice.
The court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds
that no reasonable juror could find by clear and convincing
evidence that the Party acted with actual malice.

                           4. Damages
   We turn to the question of whether there was a genuine issue
that Palmtag suffered actionable harm because of the libelous
statements. In its cross-appeal, the Party argues the district
court erred by determining that Palmtag was not required to
present a genuine issue that she incurred special damages to
state a claim, which the Party argues is contrary to our deci-
sion in Moats. The Party does not assign as error the court’s
conclusion that Palmtag’s action involves defamation per se.
The Party also asserts the district court erred in its alternative
finding of a genuine issue of whether special damages had
been incurred as a proximate result of the allegedly defama-
tory statements.
   We agree with the district court that because Palmtag’s
action involves defamation per se, she was not required
to prove special damages. We therefore do not address the
district court’s alternative determination that there was suf-
ficient evidence for a jury to find that Palmtag incurred spe-
cial damages.
   [22] In general, the damages under common law that may
be recovered for defamation are (1) general damages for
87
   See Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 48, 379 U.S. at 74.
88
   See St. Amant v. Thompson, supra note 43, 390 U.S. at 731.
89
   See Herbert v. Lando, supra note 50.
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harm to reputation; (2) special damages; (3) damages for
mental suffering; and (4) if none of these are proved, nominal
damages. 90
   However, we have said that words that are actionable “per
quod” do not constitute a basis for recovery of damages in the
absence of a specific allegation of special damages. 91 This is
in contrast to words that are actionable “per se,” for which we
have held that no proof of any actual harm to reputation or any
other damage is necessary for recovery of either nominal or
substantial damages. 92
   By statute, § 25-840.01(1) provides that the plaintiff’s
recovery in a libel action is limited to special damages unless
the plaintiff requested a correction and the defendant failed
to publish one within the time and in the manner specified
by the statute. Section 25-840.01(2) provides, “This section
shall not apply if it is alleged and proved that the publication
was prompted by actual malice, and actual malice shall not be
inferred or presumed from the publication.” Because Palmtag
requested a correction, the limitation of § 25-840.01(1) is not
applicable to her action.
   We have said defamation is per se if the words are action-
able in themselves because they (1) falsely impute the com-
mission of a crime involving moral turpitude, (2) an infectious
disease, or (3) unfitness to perform the duties of an office or
employment, or if they prejudice one in his or her profession
or trade or tend to disinherit one. 93 We have also said that
“any language the nature and obvious meaning of which is to
90
   See McCune v. Neitzel, 235 Neb. 754, 457 N.W.2d 803 (1990).
91
   See Hruby v. Kalina, 228 Neb. 713, 424 N.W.2d 130 (1988).
92
   See, McCune v. Neitzel, supra note 90; Williams v. Fuller, 68 Neb. 354, 94
   N.W. 118 (1903).
93
   See, e.g., Matheson v. Stork, 239 Neb. 547, 477 N.W.2d 156 (1991).
   See, also, Rodney A. Smolla, Rights and Liabilities in Media Content:
   Internet, Broadcast, and Print § 6:34 (2d ed. Nov. 2023 update); 4 Barry A.
   Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 35:20 (2d ed. 2023).
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impute to a person the commission of a crime, or to subject
him to public ridicule, ignominy, or disgrace, is actionable of
itself” 94 and “[a]ny false and malicious writing published of
another is libelous per se, when its tendency is to render him
contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him
to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from
associating with him.” 95
   In contrast, we have indicated words are defamation per
quod if innuendo or explanation is necessary to make a state-
ment clear and understandable or where a communication is
ambiguous or meaningless unless explained, or prima facie
innocent, but capable of defamatory meaning. 96
   The theory animating the distinction in the treatment of
damages in per se versus per quod defamation is that words
classified as defamatory per se are so obviously harmful that
no proof of damage ought to be required. 97 The common law
of defamation allows recovery of purportedly compensatory
damages without any evidence whatsoever of actual loss, if the
defamation is deemed per se. 98
   [23] When the defamation is deemed to be per quod,
though, the special damages requirement imposes a much
higher threshold than showing actual loss. Special dam-
ages are those capable of accurate determination by some
means other than the opinion of the judge or jury. 99 Section
94
   World Publishing Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126, 131-32, 61 N.W. 108, 109
   (1894). See, also, K Corporation v. Stewart, 247 Neb. 290, 526 N.W.2d
   429 (1995).
95
   Williams v. Fuller, supra note 92, 68 Neb. at 357, 94 N.W. at 119.
   See, also, K Corporation v. Stewart, supra note 94; Heckes v. Fremont
   Newspapers, Inc., 144 Neb. 267, 13 N.W.2d 110 (1944).
96
   Matheson v. Stork, supra note 93.
97
   See Smolla, supra note 93, § 6:34.
98
   See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 11.
99
   See Hatcher v. McShane, 12 Neb. App. 239, 670 N.W.2d 638 (2003). See,
   also, Southwell v. DeBoer, 163 Neb. 646, 80 N.W.2d 877 (1957).
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25-840.01(1) states in part, “The term special damages, as
used in this section, shall include only such damages as
plaintiff alleges and proves were suffered in respect to his or
her property, business, trade, profession, or occupation as the
direct and proximate result of the defendant’s publication.”
Special damages is a subset of actual harm, as actual harm
is supported by evidence of injury, but the injury need not be
pecuniary loss. 100 “[T]he only function of the special dam-
ages requirement is to protect a defendant from being caught
by surprise, in cases in which the defendant could not have
predicted that some readers would have a diminished view of
the plaintiff’s reputation from the face of the publication.” 101
When a plaintiff is able to plausibly plead and prove special
damages, the various “‘per se’” rules do not matter, because
the pleading and proving of special damages will render the
statement actionable. 102
   It has been criticized that the traditional per se versus per
quod requirements respecting damages
      put the plaintiff in a sort of all or nothing game with regard
      to proof of injury: Either special harm was required, in
      which case the plaintiff was faced with the harsh task of
      demonstrating pecuniary loss, or damages were presumed,
      in which case the plaintiff had no burden whatsoever
      regarding evidence of injury. 103
The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that
the distinction between per se and per quod actions is no
longer tenable, and all libel is actionable “irrespective of spe-
cial harm.” 104
   [24] We did not decide in Moats to go in the opposite
direction of the Restatement and hold that special damages
100
    See Rodney A. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 9:35 (2d ed. 2022).
101
    Id., § 7:23 at 7-52 to 7-53.
102
    Id., § 7:5 at 7-9.
103
    See Smolla, supra note 93, § 6:34.
104
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569 at 182 (1977).
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are required to state a claim for all defamation actions, even
those that are per se. 105 And we find support for the premise
that pleading and proving special damages is not an additional
hurdle that a plaintiff in a public libel action must over-
come. The U.S. Supreme Court has been clear as to what the
Constitution requires to balance the plaintiff’s rights against
the First Amendment’s protections of public debate. Pleading
and proving special damages is not one of the higher barriers
the Court has held the public libel plaintiff must surmount.
   The Party admits that Moats is the only authority it could
find to support its argument that Palmtag was required to plead
and prove special damages in her per se public libel action.
The district court was correct that Moats contains a misstate-
ment. We did not explicitly say in Moats that a plaintiff in a
public defamation case must always plead special damages
regardless of the per se versus per quod nature of the state-
ments. Nevertheless, we made the overly broad statement that
“[t]he plaintiff in a ‘public-libel’ action must . . . establish
special damages.” 106
   The breadth of that statement had little connection to the
analysis and holding of the case. The appeal involved a per
quod public libel action. We concluded that “[b]ecause the
publications at issue were not defamatory per se, it was nec-
essary for [the plaintiff] to plead the defamatory nature of
the words and special damages to properly plead his defama-
tion per quod claims.” 107 Furthermore, the cases we cited in
Moats for the broad statement at issue in no way suggest the
per se/per quod distinction has been eradicated such that spe-
cial damages are always required to state a claim in any kind
of public libel action.
105
    See Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., supra note 1.
106
    Id. at 422, 796 N.W.2d at 594.
107
    Id. at 423, 796 N.W.2d at 594 (emphasis supplied).
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   We find no merit to the Party’s argument that even for
defamation per se, the plaintiff in a public libel action must
plead and prove special damages. To the extent Moats sug-
gested otherwise, we disapprove of it. We do not at this time
consider the Restatement’s suggestion that the special dam-
ages requirement should be eradicated altogether, as we are
not presented with a per quod action.
   [25] A plaintiff in a per se public libel action is not required
to plead and prove special damages to state a claim. As
Palmtag’s action was per se, the court did not err in determin-
ing that to overcome the Party’s motion for summary judg-
ment, Palmtag was not required to present a genuine issue that
she incurred special damages.
                      VI. CONCLUSION
   Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Palmtag
as the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences
in her favor, we determine Palmtag presented sufficient evi-
dence upon which a jury could find by clear and convincing
evidence that the elements of public figure defamation were
met. But a jury might also find that Palmtag’s evidence did
not reach the level of clear and convincing evidence. Because
this presents a genuine issue of material fact, we reverse the
judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in
favor of the Party. We remand the cause for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
                               Reversed and remanded for
                               further proceedings.
   Funke, J., not participating.