Court Opinion

ID: 9374209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:03:46.315183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.540745
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 22-1470
                               Filed February 22, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF J.R.,
Minor Child,

K.R., Mother,
       Appellant,
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal    from    the    Iowa    District   Court   for   Osceola   County,

Shawna L. Ditsworth, District Associate Judge.

       A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

       Tobias A. Cosgrove, Sibley, for appellant mother.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

       Alexandria Celli Smith of Sandy Law Firm, Spirit Lake, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

       Considered by Bower, C.J, and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

         The mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights. She

challenges placement of the child after termination and urges that a permissive

exception should have precluded termination. We affirm.

         I.    Background Facts and Proceedings

         Before the birth of the child at issue in this appeal, the Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services (HHS) found the mother repeatedly used

methamphetamine while caring for other children. The mother’s rights to those

children were terminated in 2014 and 2015.

         When the child at issue in this appeal was born in 2019, the child’s

meconium tested positive for methamphetamine, leading to reports to Nebraska’s

and North Dakota’s child-welfare agencies. In 2020, HHS became aware that the

mother was using methamphetamine while caring for the child, then eight months

old. There were also reports that the mother was abusing prescription medication

and that the mother and child were staying in homes where illegal drugs were

used. The child’s fictive father also had a history of methamphetamine use.

Neither the mother nor fictive father cooperated with HHS efforts, and the child

was placed with the fictive paternal grandfather pursuant to an ex parte removal

order.

         When first assessed, the mother admitted to substance abuse and seemed

amenable to inpatient treatment. The mother also admitted to her history of

involvement with various states’ child-welfare agencies and to spending time in

both jail and prison. The fictive father remained uncooperative and refused drug

testing, as he believed he would test positive for marijuana. The fictive father
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admitted that he and the mother had abused controlled substances, including

methamphetamine, for a long time.

       In June 2020, the mother, fictive father, and child all tested positive for

amphetamines and methamphetamine on a hair test. HHS made a founded child-

abuse assessment against the mother and fictive father on that basis. And the

child was adjudicated as a child in need of assistance (CINA). The child was

placed with the mother on the condition that the mother participate in and complete

inpatient treatment. A caveat of the placement was that, if the mother left or

unsuccessfully discharged the treatment program, placement and custody would

automatically revert to HHS.

       In July 2020, the mother left the treatment center against medical advice

and moved in with the fictive grandfather. The mother briefly returned to the

treatment center, but she left again without successfully completing the program

and moved in with the fictive father.        The child was placed with the fictive

grandfather while remaining in HHS custody.

       For the later months of 2020, the mother appeared to maintain sobriety and

used services. The CINA adjudication continued, and the mother was ordered to

comply with drug testing. The child continued to reside with the fictive grandfather.

       In February 2021, the mother disclosed to HHS that she was pregnant.

There was conflict between the fictive father and the mother, and they temporarily

separated.

       In May 2021, the mother caused a car accident with the child in the car.

The mother apparently fell asleep at the wheel, failed to yield at a stop sign, and

crashed into another vehicle. The child did not suffer any injuries in the crash. The
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mother was taken to the hospital, where she gave birth to the child’s youngest

sibling (not at issue in this appeal). Once again, the mother and newborn child

tested positive for both amphetamines and methamphetamine.           The mother

admitted to using methamphetamine three days before the crash, while pregnant.

Around the same time, the fictive father’s hair also tested positive for

methamphetamine. HHS once again made founded child-abuse assessments

against both the mother and fictive father.

       At a June 2021 permanency hearing, the parties agreed to continue

reunification efforts for the mother over the next six months, so long as she

addressed    her    substance-abuse     problems   and    followed   case   plan

recommendations. Custody of the child remained with HHS.

       At some point between February and June 2021, the mother and fictive

father got back together. The sheriff’s office responded to a call from a hotel

manager, describing a woman (later identified as the mother) who stumbled into

the lobby and needed an ambulance. The mother reported that the fictive father

grabbed her and caused her to fall, which aggravated her concussion from the May

car accident. The mother and fictive father started residing together again some

time after that. In September 2021, both the mother and fictive father once again

tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine.          The fictive father

blamed his exposure on the mother, but his November sweat patch confirmed

ongoing methamphetamine usage. The mother admitted that she and the fictive

father used marijuana and methamphetamine “one or two nights” each week.

       The mother and fictive father have had some degree of on-again/off-again

relationship since then.   The mother was also romantically linked to another
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methamphetamine user, and she tested positive for amphetamine again in

February 2022. Both the mother and fictive father refused an HHS-requested drug

test in May 2022.

       At the time of the termination hearing, the child was placed in a pre-adoptive

home and was generally progressing. The State and guardian ad litem both

recommended termination of parental rights and adoption. The mother requested

guardianship placement with the fictive grandfather. The fictive grandfather, as an

intervenor, requested placement with the fictive father or himself. The fictive

father, also as an intervenor, requested placement with himself.

       The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights and placed

custody with HHS for adoption. Notices of appeal were filed by the mother, fictive

father, and fictive grandfather.    The fictive father’s and fictive grandfather’s

intervenor–appeals were dismissed by the supreme court when they failed to file

petitions on appeal or other appellate papers, leaving only the mother’s petition for

resolution by our court.

       II.     Discussion

       The mother raises two issues on appeal. First, she asserts that the juvenile

court should have placed the child with the fictive father or fictive grandfather.

Second, she asserts her bond with the child warrants application of a permissive

exception to termination. Neither claim warrants reversal.

       “We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489,

492 (Iowa 2000). “The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best

interests of the child.” Id.
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       As to the first issue, the mother’s complaint that the fictive father or fictive

grandfather were better placements, we agree with the State that the mother lacks

standing to bring this claim. See In re K.A., 516 N.W.2d 35, 38 (Iowa Ct. App.

1994) (holding that a parent whose rights were terminated had no right to

participate in a placement hearing because “termination of [the mother’s] rights

concerning these three children divest[ed] her of all privileges, duties, and powers

with respect to the children”); In re D.B., 483 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992)

(refusing to consider claim about placement, made by parent whose rights were

terminated, because termination divested the parent of “any legally recognizable

interest she would have concerning the guardianship or custody of” the child). This

lack of standing ends the analysis, given the supreme court’s dismissal of the

intervenors’ appeals. To the extent the mother makes policy arguments in her

petition about what the guardianship provision of the statute should say, rather

than what it does, that is for the General Assembly to decide—not the courts. In

re Guardianship of Radda, 955 N.W.2d 203, 214 (Iowa 2021) (“Policy arguments

to amend the statue should be directed to the legislature.” (quoting In re Est. of

Whalen, 827 N.W.2d 184, 194 (Iowa 2013))).

       We note the mother’s challenge on appeal appears limited to asserting the

juvenile court erred under Iowa Code section 232.117(3) (2022), involving

placement of the child after termination; she does not argue the court should have

ordered a guardianship in lieu of termination pursuant to section 232.104(2)(d)(2).

In any event, even if the mother had requested a guardianship placement,

termination would still be warranted given her ongoing struggle with substance

abuse and involvement with other substance abusers. See In re B.T., 894 N.W.2d
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29, 32 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (“[A] guardianship is not a legally preferable alternative

to termination.”).

       Second, it is debatable whether the mother preserved error as to the

permissive bond exception. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012)

(“[T]he general rule that appellate arguments must first be raised in the trial court

applies to CINA and termination of parental rights cases.”). As the State correctly

points out, the juvenile court did not seem to think the mother adequately raised

the issue, writing: “Although [the mother] loves [the child], the Court does not

believe there is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be

detrimental to [the child] due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship, nor

was this even asserted at the hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Assuming without

deciding this issue is properly before us, we affirm the juvenile court. The mother

bore the burden to prove this permissive exception by clear and convincing

evidence. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). A parent’s love is not

enough to prevent termination, nor is the mere existence of a bond. See In re A.B.,

956 N.W.2d 162, 169–70 (Iowa 2021); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa

2010). Any connection the child may still have with the mother, despite being

removed from her for two years at the time of the termination hearing, does not

nearly outweigh the need to give this child permanency in light of the mother’s

failure to provide a safe, stable, and drug-free home.

       Finally, we note the State concludes its response to the petition on appeal

with a procedural argument about combined permanency and termination

hearings, in the event we found scattered references in the mother’s brief sufficient

to present the issue. We understand the State’s concern as appellee in letting
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sprinkled mentions of an issue go unchallenged, given the potentially dire

consequences if we were to find the State failed to respond to an issue. We re-

affirm that “random mention of [an] issue, without elaboration or supportive

authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for our consideration,” and therefore

confine our review to the issues properly presented by the mother. See Soo Line

R.R. Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994).

      AFFIRMED.