Court Opinion

ID: 9849131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:08.491664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:01.931259
License: Public Domain

RAMIL, Justice,
dissenting.
During fiscal year 1994, 43,921 workers’ compensation claims were processed m Hawaii, according to the State of Hawaii Department of Labor and Industrial Relations’ annual report. Because of this court’s decision today, similar to the Wyoming experience, we can expect an “abundance of co-employee litigation.” See Stephame Materi, Worker’s Compensation — The Dilemma of Co-Employee Immunity and the Confusion in the Aftermath of Mills II. Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo.1992), 28 Land & Water L.Rev. 271 (1993). Indeed, tMs “excessive furniture” in the workplace case, in my view, signals the erosion of our workers’ compensation’s exclusive remedy provision. Because I disagree with the majority’s premises that: (1) the plain meaning of the words used in the term “wilful and wanton misconduct” includes reckless conduct; (2) the concept of deterrence is consistent with the workers’ compensation scheme; and (3) suits between co-employees based on reckless conduct does not contravene or undermine the purpose of co-employee immumty and the purposes underlying workers’ compensation in general, I must disagree with its conclusion that “wilful and wanton misconduct” is an exception to full co-employee immumty. I respectfully dissent.
I. The Purpose of Hawaii’s Workers’ Compensation System is to Eliminate Costly Court Involvement
We explained in Coates v. Pacific Engineering, 71 Haw. 358, 364, 791 P.2d 1257, 1260-61 (1990) (quoting Costa Minors v. Flintkote Co., 42 Haw. 518, 530 (1958)), that:
the purpose of the Workers’] Compensation Law is to charge against industry the peeumary loss arising from disabling or fatal personal injury, regardless of negligence by the employee or lack of negligence by the employer; that it is designed to obtain for an injured work[er] or his [or her] dependents an assured, certain and prompt compensation to replace the doubtful right accorded by common law, and to secure for the employer freedom from vexatious, delaying and uncertain litigation with its possibilities of heavy penalties by way of verdicts and Mgh costs; that it is based on the obligation of industry to recognize accidental injury and death arising out of employment as one of the costs of production.
(Emphasis and brackets added).
Moreover, in Kepa v. Hawai‘i Welding Co., Ltd., 56 Haw. 544, 545 P.2d 687 (1976), we described the purpose of Hawaii’s workers’ compensation laws as follows:
Workers’] compensation laws were enacted as a humamtarian measure, to create legal liability without relation to fault. (Citation omitted.) They represent a socially enforced bargain: the employee giving up Ms right to recover common law damages (in tort) from the employer in exchange for *22the certainty of a statutory award for all work-connected injuries.
Id. at 549, 545 P.2d at 691 (brackets added). See also Lantz v. Nat’l Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 (Utah App.1989); Bryan v. Utah Int’l, 533 P.2d 892, 893-94 (Utah 1975).
To further ensure the separateness of a workers’ compensation claim from costly court involvement, workers’ compensation laws provide a “presumption” “[t]hat the claim is for a covered work injury.” See HRS § 386-85 (1993).
Most significant, we said:
The exclusiveness of remedy is the “keystone” of our Workers’ Compensation plan and “anything that tends to erode the exclusiveness of either the liability or the recovery strikes at the very foundation of statutory schemes of this kind, now universally accepted and acknowledged.”
Coates, 71 Haw. at 365, 791 P.2d at 1261 (citing Costa Minors, 42 Haw. at 531 (quoting Smither & Co., Inc. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914, 77 S.Ct. 1299, 1 L.Ed.2d 1429 (1957))).
Accordingly, the three keystone principles of workers’ compensation designed to eliminate court involvement are: (1) legal liability without relation to fault; (2) the presumption under HRS § 386-85 that the claim is for a covered work injury; and (3) the exclusiveness of remedy under HRS § 386-5.
As will be explained below, in my view, the majority’s opinion today will do grave damage to these principles of workers’ compensation.
II. The Co-Employee Immunity
I begin my discussion by noting the general proposition that a tortfeasor co-employee enjoys the same full immunity provided to his or her employer.1 Majority opinion at 7, 919 P.2d at 269-270.
Given the no-fault principle of workers’ compensation, we must start with the clear understanding that this “socially-enforced bargain” involves and extends to a tortfeasor co-employee. The majority recognized this workers’ compensation principle when it quoted Professor Larson:
The reason for the employer’s immunity is the quid pro quo by which the employer gives up his [or her] normal defenses and assumes automatic liability, while the employee gives up his [or her] right to common-law verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the tortfeasor co[-]employee; he [or she], too, is involved in this compromise of rights. Perhaps, so the argument runs, one of the things he [or she] is entitled to expect in return for what he [or she] has given up [i.e., “normal defenses”] is freedom from common-law suits based on industrial accidents in which he [or she] is at fault.
2A Larson, supra, § 72.22, at 14-15 (emphasis and brackets added).
Accordingly, all parties involved in the workplace gave up something in return for immunity and certainty of an award. Thus, whether the injury is caused by the unintentional act of the employer, a co-employee, or by the injured employee’s own unintentional conduct, see HRS § 386-3, this socially-enforced bargain provides a wall of separation where a claim for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment is exclusively in the workers’ compensation arena. The majority’s opinion today, however, seeks to introduce a “reckless” fault standard to a no-fault scheme, undermining this “wall of separation” principle. Cf. Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai'i 14, 897 P.2d 941 (1995) (Ramil, J., dissenting).
III. The No-fault Principle and the Deterrence Concept
In an attempt to justify less than full immunity to co-employees, the majority claims, relying on the “punitive damages” principle, “that reckless conduct is capable of being deterred.” See majority opinion at 8, 919 P.2d at 270. However, because workers’ *23compensation is a no-fault system, it is not designed to “punish the wrongdoer.” The majority fails to recognize that deterrence and no-fault are concepts that are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Thus, the majority’s premise that the deterrence concept supports lawsuits between co-employees is simply wrong.
Rather, “punishing the wrongdoer” is accomplished within the internal disciplinary procedures of the employer. In this sense, an employer’s disciplinary function plays a vital role in workers’ compensation. Cf Wharton v. Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., 80 Hawai'i 120, 906 P.2d 127 (1995) (holding that employee’s stress injury solely due to disciplinary proceedings was not compensable under workers’ compensation).
In addition, because our workers’ compensation system is based on the no-fa,ult principle, workplace safety is addressed by a separate statute. Employees like Iddings, concerned about workplace safety, can invoke the remedies available to them under HRS chapter 396. See, note 4, infra.
Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on the concept of deterrence as the reason to allow lawsuits between co-employees is contrary to the no-fault principle of our workers’ compensation system.
IV. The Plain Meaning Argument
The majority, relying solely on cases decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa beginning with Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 1981), holds its opinion together by the conclusion that the single term “wanton” includes reckless conduct.2
I believe that the majority’s reliance on Thompson, supra, and its three-part test is misplaced. The court in Thompson interpreted Iowa Code § 85.20 (1977), the language of which is significantly different from the relevant language of HRS § 386-8. As discussed in part III.B.3 of the majority opinion, Iowa Code § 85.20 provides that workers’ compensation constitutes the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by a co-employee, except where the injury is “caused by the other employee’s gross negligence amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another.” (Emphases added.) HRS § 386-8, on the other hand, provides in relevant part that “[ajnother employee of the same émployer shall not be relieved of his liability as a third party, if the personal injury is caused by his wilful and wanton misconduct.” (Emphasis and brackets added.)
The Wyoming Supreme Court discussed these differences in Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1987):
Although degrees of negligence are not considered in comparative negligence, it must be remembered that the traditional concept of gross negligence visualized less culpable conduct than willful and wanton conduct. Gross negligence has been defined as:
Indifference to present legal duty and to utter forgetfulness of legal obligations so far as other persons may be affected. It is a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others. The element of culpability which characterizes all negligence is in gross negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with that present in ordinary negligence. Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amounts of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence. But it is something less than the willful, wanton and reckless conduct.
Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505, 506 (1919).
*24Wilful and wanton misconduct is the intentional doing of an act, or an intentional failure to do an act, in reckless disregard of the consequences and under circumstances and conditions that a reasonable person would know, or have reason to know that such conduct would, in a high degree of probability, result in harm to another. Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369-70 (1986) (citing Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo.1979)).
Mayflower Restaurant v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106, 1115 (Wyo.1987) (emphases added).
Because the Thompson court interpreted “wanton neglect” in relation to the “gross negligence” standard of the Iowa statute, in my view, the majority’s reliance on Thompson to support the “plain meaning” argument is misplaced.
Moreover, the majority opinion, in invoking the “plain meaning” rule, stated that: (1) “our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself’; (2) “our only duty is to give effect to the statute’s plain and obvious meaning”; and (3) “in interpreting a statute, we give the words their common meaning, unless there is something in the statute requiring a different interpretation.” Majority opinion at 7, 919 P.2d at 269.
Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990), it defined “wanton” as “[rjeckless, heedless, malicious; characterized by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness; recklessly disregardful of the rights or safety of others or of consequences.” Majority opinion at 7, 919 P.2d at 269. The opinion then proclaimed that the plain meaning of the term “wilful and wanton misconduct” encompasses reckless conduct. Id. I disagree.
First, the term “wanton” does not have a plain, obvious or common meaning. Indeed, the authority cited by the majority, i.e., Black’s Law Dictionary, contains at least six variations of the definition of “wanton.” For example, the same dictionary defined, in pertinent part, “wanton injury” as an “[ijnjury produced by conscious and intentional wrongful act, or omission of known duty with reckless indifference to consequences.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1582 (6th ed.1990) (citing Rainey v. State, 31 Ala.App. 271, 17 So.2d 683, 686 (1943)) (emphasis added). See also Mayflower Restaurant, supra, (defining “wilful and wanton misconduct” as an intentional act).
Second, the majority’s definition of “wanton” came from a 1937 bankruptcy court decision involving the interpretation of “oper-at[ing][an] automobile upon [a] public highway in a wanton and reckless manner and with an utter disregard for the safety of others ..., and under circumstances likely to cause great bodily injury” applied to “Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.” In re Wegner, 88 F.2d 899, 900 (7th Cir.1937). This 1937 decision noted that “[t]he word ‘reckless’ has a wide range of meaning.” Id. at 902. Thus, in my view, it is inappropriate to invoke the “plain meaning” rule to the term “wanton” when what it is supposed to mean, i.e., “reckless,” is also vague and ambiguous.
By interpreting the word “wanton” to include reckless conduct, which, in turn, arguably includes allowing “excessive furniture” in the work place, the majority fails to take into account the purpose of workers’ compensation and the entire statutory scheme as discussed in part I, supra.
Under HRS § 386-8, a tortfeasor co-employee enjoys the same immunity as his or her employer if he or she is acting in the course of his or her employment. However, if the co-employee acts “as a third party” and “the personal injury is caused by his [or her] wilful and wanton misconduct,” the co-employee is not immune from suit. The construction of HRS § 386-8 is consistent with the definition of “wanton injury” which requires: (1) a conscious and intentional wrongful act, or (2) an intentional failure to do an act, with reckless indifference to consequences. In other words, an employee’s intentional wrongful act or an omission of a known duty that is further characterized with the willingness to injure others will be considered as actions of a “third party.”3
*25In the present case, the first question is whether Dr. Mee-Lee committed a conscious and intentional wrongful act. In other words, in the workers’ compensation context, whether his actions deviated from the normal duties of his employment. If so, the second question is whether the character of his actions displayed a willingness to injure others.
Here, Iddings filed her complaint against Dr. Mee-Lee in his capacity as “the Director of Psychiatry at [CMC].” The basis for the suit is “that excessive furniture within the Intensive Care Module posed a safety hazard.” And, the allegations that Dr. Mee-Lee as the director “had the ability to control the patient population,” and he failed “to take steps to provide for the safety” of employees like Iddings, are duties within the scope of his employment. Dr. Mee-Lee did not intentionally commit a wrongful act.4 Because the work-related injury to Iddings provided immunity to CMC, Dr. Mee-Lee, because he is being sued in his capacity as Iddings’ supervisor, should also enjoy the same immunity.
Y. The Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof
For reasons similar to those discussed in part IV, supra, I do not believe that the adoption of the clear and convincing standard of proof would alleviate our concerns of an increased abundance of co-employee litigation and the potential for stigmatic effects on a co-employee defendant’s reputation. Because the term “wanton” itself, having at least six variations in its definition, is vague and ambiguous, see part IV, supra, I cannot fathom how the application of the clear and convincing standard of proof would “endow a factfinder’s determination that a suit is based on wilful and wanton misconduct with a greater degree of certainty.” See majority opinion at 13, 919 P.2d at 275.
Furthermore, I do not believe that such a standard would discourage injured employees from challenging their cases before the courts, in light of the legal community’s, as well as the general public’s, uncertainty with the definition of “wanton.” In its opinion, the majority set forth numerous instances in which Hawaii’s appellate courts have implemented the clear and convincing standard of proof. However, the rules and definitions in which the courts have applied in each of the cases cited by the majority were plain, obvious, and/or unambiguous.5 The term “wan*26ton” in HRS § 386-8, on the other hand, is not; I therefore must disagree with the court’s use of the clear and convincing standard of proof.
VI. The “Arising Out Of And In The Course Of Employment” Principle
Furthermore, consistent with the above-entitled principles, the structure of workers’ compensation laws makes clear that co-employees are accorded full immunity by providing in their statutes, for example, the following similar language: “acting in the course of his [or her] employment,” see HRS § 386-8, or “employees acting within the scope of their employment,” see Wyo.Stat. § 27-14-104(a) (1991).6
First, I note that Professor Larson has identified only ten states (Hawaii not one of *27the ten) with “exceptions” that would allow co-employees to sue one another.7 2A Larson, supra, § 72.11 n.13.2. An example of a statute allowing an “exception” to full immunity can be found in Wyoming’s workers’ compensation law. The Wyoming statute, prior to the 1991 amendment that established full immunity to co-employees, provided in pertinent part: “The rights and remedies provided in this act ... are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer ... or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are grossly negligent,....” 1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 149 § 1 (amended 1977). Thus, by the plain language, i.e., “unless,” and the construction of the phrase, Wyoming allowed suits against “grossly negligent” co-employees while they were acting within the scope of their employment.
As noted above, Professor Larson can only identify ten states that permit less than full immunity to co-employees. Although a majority of states have clarified that certain conducts are deemed to be outside the scope of employment, see, e.g., Ariz. Const., art. 18, § 8 (“if the injury is the result of an act done by the employer or a person employed by the employer knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring another, and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employeesL]”); Cal. Labor Codes § 3601(a) (1971) (“wilful and unprovoked physical act[s] of aggression by another employee”); and W. Va.Code. Ann. § 23-2-6a (1973) (“deliberate intention,” defined in section 23-4-2(e)(2)(i) as a “consciously, subjectively and deliberately formed intention to produce the specific result of injury or death to an employee”), these clarifications are not regarded as exceptions to full immunity. Furthermore, in my view, an intentional conduct to injure a co-employee, or an intent to injure one’s employee, constitutes conduct outside the scope of employment.8 See majority opinion at 19-20, 919 P.2d at 281-282.
HawaiTs workers’ compensation law, specifically the “Liability of third person” provision of HRS § 386-8, as found by Professor Larson, is consistent with the majority of states that provide full immunity to co-employees, i.e., it provides immunity to employees “acting in the course of [their] employment.” Also, similar to the majority of the states’ laws, HRS § 386-8 clarifies that employees committing “wilful and wanton misconduct” are acting “as a third party.” Unlike the Wyoming example above, Hawaii’s co-employee immunity provision does not indicate an exception by words such as “unless” or “except” or by its construction.
VII. Dr. Mee-Lee in His Capacity as a Supervisory Employee
As discussed above, a regular employee is part of the “socially enforced bargain,” and workers’ compensation laws make clear that full immunity extends to co-employees if they are “acting in the course of [their] employment.” In the present case, Dr. Mee-Lee is being sued because of his duties and responsibilities as the director of CMC. Given the obvious distinction between a regular employee and a supervisory employee,9 Simmons First Nat’l Bank v. Thompson, 285 Ark. 275, 686 S.W.2d 415 (1985), provides us guidance on a supervisor’s immunity from liability.
1.
In Simmons, a tort action was brought by injured employees and the personal representatives of two employees who died. Id. 686 S.W.2d at 416. The four defendants were supervisory employees of the company: *28the mill manager, the pulp mill superintendent, the superintendent of engineering, and the supervisor of safety. Id. The complaint alleged that each defendant failed to discharge his or her responsibility to make the premises safe and thus wrongfully allowed chemicals to enter an open grate sewer covering that resulted in the creation of poisonous gas. Id. The supervisory employees moved for summary judgment. Id. The circuit court sustained the motion. Id. On appeal, appellants argued that, on the facts of this case, the supervisory employees should not be immune from liability for their own wrongdoing. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas disagreed and cited A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 1.20 (1984), for support:
The right to compensation benefits depends on one simple test: Was there a work-connected injury? Negligence, and for the most part, fault, are not in issue and cannot affect the result. Let the employer’s conduct be flawless in its perfection, and let the employee’s be abysmal in its clumsiness, rashness and ineptitude: if the accident arises out of and in the course of the employment, the employee receives his award. Reverse the positions, with a careless and stupid employer and a wholly innocent employee: the same award issues.
Thus, the test is not the relation of an individual’s personal quality (fault) to an event, but the relationship of an event to an employment. The essence of applying the test is not a matter of assessing blame, but of marking out boundaries.
Simmons, 686 S.W.2d at 417 (emphasis added). In harmony with Larson’s conclusions, the Simmons court explained:
As we all know, the purpose of workers’ compensation statutes was to change the common law by shifting the burden of all work-related injuries from individual employers and employees to the consuming public. In that effort the matter of fault, as Larson points out, is ordinarily immaterial. Employers were compelled to give up the common-law defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servant,10 and assumption of risk. Employees were compelled to give up the chance of recovering unlimited damages in fault-related eases in return for a certain recovery in all work-related cases. The plaintiffs here are attempting to return to the common-law system based on fault, when it is to their advantage to do so, but at the same time to retain the assured benefits of workers’ compensation regardless of fault.
Id. 686 S.W.2d at 417-18 (emphasis in original).
The Missouri Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Badami v. Gaertner, 630 S.W.2d 175 (Mo.App.1982), gave a persuasive practical justification for this view:
Under present day industrial operations, to impose upon executive officers or supervisory personnel personal liability for an accident arising from a condition at a place of employment which a jury may find to be unsafe would almost mandate that the employer provide indemnity to such employees.11 That would effectively destroy the *29immunity provisions of the workmen’s compensation law.
Simmons, 686 S.W.2d at 417 (quoting Gaertner, 680 S.W.2d 175).
For the reasons above, the Simmons court held that because the employer, International Paper Company, was immune under the statutes from a failure to provide employees with a safe place to work, the same immunity protected the supervisory employees when their general duties involved the overseeing and discharging of that same responsibility. Id. (citing Vaughn v. Jernigan, 144 Ga.App. 745, 242 S.E.2d 482 (1978); Kerrigan v. Errett, 256 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa 1977); Athas v. Hill, 54 Md.App. 293, 458 A.2d 859 (1983); Greco v. Farago, 477 A.2d 98 (R.I.1984); and Laffin v. Chemical Supply Co., 77 Wis.2d 358, 253 N.W.2d 51 (1977)). See also Parker v. St. Louis County Water Co., 668 S.W.2d 182 (Mo.App.1984).
In the present case, at the time of Iddings’ injury, Dr. Mee-Lee served as Director of Psychiatry at CMC and was in charge of the Human Services Unit. Being in charge of the Human Services Unit in which Iddings served as a nurse, Dr. Mee-Lee served as Iddings’ supervisor. Thus, similar to Simmons, the present case involved a tort action brought by an injured employee against a supervisory employee for failing to discharge his responsibility to make the premises safe. Because CMC, the employer in the present case, is immune under HRS § 386-5 from an unintentional failure to provide employees with a safe place to work, the same immunity protects Dr. Mee-Lee who had the responsibility of overseeing and discharging that same responsibility.
2.
Moreover, the duty to provide a safe working environment is CMC’s “nondelegable duty.”
Raulerson v. Roehr, 511 So.2d 1027 (Fla.2d DCA 1987), dealt with circumstances similar to that in the present case. In Rauler-son, a machine shop employee was seriously injured when he was working with his supervisors to repair a “tracked vehicle.” Id. at 1029. The jury rendered a verdict against the supervisors. Id. at 1028. However, the trial court granted the supervisors’ motion for directed verdict notwithstanding a jury verdict on the ground that workers’ compensation was the injured employee’s exclusive remedy. Id.
The appellate court affirmed the directed verdicts in the supervisors’ favor and held that an injured employee was not entitled to pursue a civil action against his supervisors where there was no evidence that the supervisors were guilty of any misconduct beyond a mere failure to ensure that the employer’s “nondelegable duty” to provide a safe working environment was discharged. Id. at 1030. It held that a corporate officer is subject to personal liability when he or she commits an affirmative act of negligence that goes beyond the scope of the nondelegable duty of the employer to provide his employees with a safe place to work. Id. at 1029 (citing West v. Jessop, 339 So.2d 1136 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). The court explained:
The rule ... was derived from a rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Kruse v. Schieve, 61 Wis.2d 421, 213 N.W.2d 64 (1973). In commenting on a supervisor’s liability to an employee, the Wisconsin court said:
Under what circumstances can a duty be owed to a fellow employee additional to and different from the duty of proper supervision that is owed to the employer by a corporate officer or supervisor/employee? Clearly something extra is needed over and beyond the duty owed the employer.12
Id. [213 N.W.2d] at 67 (emphasis supplied).
We emphasized this language in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Scofi 366 So.2d 1193 (Fla.2d DCA 1979), which involved the death of an employee working in a trench when a cave-in occurred. Damages were sought from the supervisor employed by the same company which employed the deceased worker. The supervisor was in charge at the job site. We found that there was nothing in the record of that *30case to indicate that the supervisor committed any affirmative act of negligence which went beyond the scope of his employer’s duty to provide a safe place to work. We said “simply stated, the ‘something extra’ as required by Kruse was missing in the instant case.”
Similarly, we find the “something extra” missing in the case now before us. We believe the trial judge was correct in ruling that the evidence presented at trial simply does not sustain a finding that the individual appellees were guilty of affirmative acts of negligence which went beyond the failure to perform the nondelegable duty of [the employer] to provide [the employee] with a safe place to work.
Raulerson, 511 So.2d at 1080.
In the present ease, Iddings’ complaint alleged, inter alia, that:
10. Prior to October 12, 1991, Defendant MEE-LEE had been advised that excessive furniture within the Intensive Care Module posed a safety hazard, but Defendant MEE-LEE took no steps to remove the furniture or to reduce the patient population within the Intensive Care Module.
11. Defendant had the ability to control the patient population, as was evidenced by the fact that he caused said population to be reduced to within authorized numbers in anticipation of a hospital accreditation inspection, and, again, in anticipation of an inspection by the State Department of Health.
12. The actions of Defendant MEE-LEE in. failing to take steps to provide for the safety of plaintiff IDDINGS and other staff members who were required to work within the Intensive Care Module with individuals who often were hostile and/or violent constituted negligence and/or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of Defendant MEE-LEE.
(Emphases added). Dr. Mee-Lee’s “taking no steps” or “failing” to provide for the safety of plaintiff Iddings by removing excessive furniture within the Intensive Care Module does not go “beyond the scope of the nondel-egable duty of the employer to provide his employees with a safe place to work” merely because he, as the Director of Psychiatry in charge of the Human Services Unit, “had the ability to control the patient population.” Because safety in the workplace is a nondele-gable duty of CMC, Dr. Mee-Lee did not commit “something extra” that is outside the “course of his employment.” See HRS § 386-8. Indeed, Iddings’ suit is premised on Dr. Mee-Lee’s responsibility as the Director of Psychiatry in charge of the Human Services Unit and accordingly, within the course of his employment.
VIII. The Impact of this Decision
Iddings contends that making it easier for injured employees to sue their co-employees will help in reducing the costs incurred by employers to pinchase workers’ compensation insurance. In my view, Iddings’ contention is meritless. See note 11, supra. Furthermore, Iddings as well as the majority fail to consider the social costs of allowing the exclusive remedy provision to be easily circumvented by simply claiming that a supervising employee allowed an employee to work in an unsafe environment. In other words, employers in our state will now have to pay double, i.e., (1) workers’ compensation premiums and (2) liability insurance for their supervisors and employees, in exchange for their “immunity.”
If we follow the majority’s position, almost any claim for an on-the-job injury may be framed as a claim under HRS § 386-8 against a supervising employee for “wantonly” allowing the employee to work in an unsafe environment, e.g., in this case, “excessive furniture” within the workplace. If it is not necessary to prove that the alleged wilful and wanton misconduct included an actual intent to cause injury, any time an employee is injured on work premises, the exclusive remedy provision can be easily circumvented.
It would seem ironic that a “reckless” 1937 bankruptcy ruling could have drastic consequences for Hawaii. I note the concerns of the Alabama Legislature.13 Wyoming, at *31least its state legislature, also learned the bitter and costly lesson that a fault standard cannot co-exist within a no-fault system:
The court’s decision also undermines the purpose of Worke[rs’] Compensation. Worker[s’] Compensation statutes were enacted not only to benefit employees, but also to insure employers against large judgments that might be awarded if employees were allowed to sue. However, with the elimination of co-employee immunity, employers are once again facing the possibility of paying out large sums of money to protect their workers. Many employees will now demand their employers to provide them with liability insurance as a condition of employment. The employer will be paying double for the immunity it supposedly received from worker[s’] compensation statutes. In addition, employers may be required to indemnify or defend their negligent employees. These increased demands will greatly increase costs to Wyoming employers. If employers refuse these demands, then the cost to Wyoming employees will be severe. Every time an employee makes a mistake on the job, he will be vulnerable to a costly lawsuit.
The court’s decision will also have serious, non-legal, ramifications. Currently, only ten states, including Wyoming, permit co-employees to sue one another. When a business is deciding whether or not to locate in Wyoming, co-employee liability will be one of the factors taken into consideration. The added cost of insurance for its employees will encourage businesses to look at surrounding states such as Colorado, Nebraska, Utah, Idaho and Montana which provided immunity for businesses and their employees. Employer could achieve substantial savings by relocating in a state that provides them and their employees more protection from lawsuits. It could have a disastrous impact on Wyoming’s already fragile economy if employers begin relocating.
While Justice Urbigkit sought to “open the courthouse doors” to. injured employees, the court has effectively opened a floodgate of litigation that will end up costing employers, employees, and the judicial system a lot of time and money. This, in turn, injures everyone through crowded court dockets, higher costs to employers, and higher prices for the consumer.
Materi, supra, at 287-88 (brackets added).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the circuit court’s order granting Dr. Mee-Lee’s motion for summary judgment.

. Given the no-fault principle of workers’ compensation and that negligent and reckless conduct could arguably mean the same thing, I submit that the majority's analysis is flawed. In order for the workers’ compensation system to work, it must be dictated by a fairly clear standard. "Gross negligence” or a reckless conduct standard, by its nature, are vague terms. Consequently, it will invite lawsuits, as Wyoming discovered.

. Referring to Black’s Law Dictionary, 1142-43 (6th ed.1990), the term "reckless” is defined in pertinent part as "careless, heedless, inattentive .... According to circumstances, it may mean desperately heedless, wanton or willful, or it may mean only careless, inattentive or negligent.” On the other hand, the same dictionary defines "reckless misconduct” in relevant part as follows: "a person is guilty of reckless misconduct When he intentionally does an act, or fails to do an act in violation of his duty, with knowledge of serious danger to others involved in it or of facts which would disclose such danger to a reasonable man.”
As noted above, the term “reckless,” depending on the circumstances, could have a different meaning. Thus, it does not have a "plain meaning.”

. Such intent is not limited to consequences that are desired. See Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064(1992).
*25If an actor knows that an injury is substantially certain to result from his act and he nevertheless completes the act, he is treated by the law as if he in fact desired to produce the injury. To constitute an intentional tort, the tortfeasor must have known that his conduct was substantially certain to result in injury.
[T]he mere knowledge and appreciation of a risk — something short of substantial certainty — is not intent. The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong. In such cases the distinction between intent and negligence obviously is a matter of degree. The line has been drawn by the courts at the point where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the actor a substantial certainty.
Id. 614 A.2d at 1067 (citations omitted and emphases added).

. With respect to Iddings’ allegation of unsafe working conditions at CMC, I note Hawaii’s Occupational Safety and Health Law affords Id-dings a remedy. Under HRS § 396 — 8(b) (1993), entitled Employee Responsibility and Rights, an employee such as Iddings may file a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations "and where reasonable grounds exist for the department to believe there may be a hazard, there shall be an inspection in response to the complaint.” Furthermore, under HRS § 396-8(e), "[d]ischarge or discrimination against employees for exercising any right under this chapter is prohibited." This prohibition allows employees like Iddings to refuse to engage in unsafe practices. HRS § 396 — 8(e)(1)(B). In her affidavit, she alleges that she knew that an "unsafe physical environment existed within the Human Services Unit as a result of overcrowding.” Indeed, "[f]or more than one year prior to [her] accident," Iddings knew of the alleged unsafe condition at her work. Yet, Iddings continued to work assuming the risk of her overcrowded work place. Accordingly, it is difficult to conclude that Dr. Mee Lee's action, or, more appropriately, his inaction, created a condition of obvious danger to his employees that it can be characterized as "wanton" or a willingness to injure his employees.

. See, e.g., Carr v. Strode, 79 Hawai'i 475, 904 P.2d 489 (1995) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome presumption of paternity); State v. Miller, 79 Hawai'i 194, 900 P.2d 770 (1995) (requiring clear and convincing evidence *26that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released); State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai'i 433, 896 P.2d 889 (1995) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that any evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7, would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means before such evidence may be admitted); Cresencia v. Kim, 10 Haw.App. 461, 878 P.2d 725 (1994) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that the representations were false and that the defendant misrepresented and/or failed to inform the petitioner of the agreement status); Maria v. Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 832 P.2d 259 (1992) (holding that a constructive trust will be imposed where the evidence is clear and convincing that one party will be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the entire property); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rapp, 70 Haw. 539, 777 P.2d 710 (1989) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of intentional violations, neglect, and an effort to mislead Disciplinary Counsel); Chan v. Chan, 7 Haw.App. 122, 748 P.2d 807 (1987) (requiring clear and convincing proof that the defendant had power to comply with order and failed to do so); Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 66 Haw. 133, 658 P.2d 312 (1983) (requiring clear and convincing proof of defamation); Woodruff v. Keale, 64 Haw. 85, 637 P.2d 760 (1981) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that the severance of the natural parent-child tie be in the child’s best interest); Tanuvasa v. City and County of Honolulu, 2 Haw.App. 102, 626 P.2d 1175 (1981) (instructing the jury that malice must be shown by clear and convincing evidence); Boteil-ho v. Boteilho, 58 Haw. 40, 564 P.2d 144 (1977) (holding that if part performance is relied upon to remove the oral agreement from the operation of the statute of frauds, clear and convincing proof of performance in pursuance of the alleged agreement must be adduced by the party seeking to enforce it).
The other case cited by the majority, i.e., Calleon v. Miyagi, 76 Hawaii 310, 876 P.2d 1278 (1994), does not even address the implementation of the clear and convincing standard in its opinion. Given the disposition of Calleon, the court held that the defendant’s argument, i.e., the punitive damages awarded by the jury were not supported by clear and convincing evidence, was simply moot, and therefore the, instant punitive damages award was vacated and remanded.

. The [Wyoming] legislature soon realized that the "culpable” standard had failed to curb the abundance of co-employee litigation. In 1986, the legislature further amended article 10, section 4 to extend coverage of worker[s’] compensation, at the election of the employer, to all employment. That same year, the legislature codified this provision and further extended the employer’s immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of their employment. The legislature had reestablished full co-employee immunity under Wyoming law.
Maten, supra, at 278-79 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
Despite the legislature’s extension of the employer’s immunity to co-employees acting within the scope of their employment, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo.1992), held that § 27-14-104(a) was unconstitutional for two reasons.
First, [the legislature] has taken the entire group of individuals who have suffered or who will suffer from the .tortious conduct of others and carved out an exception, without express constitutional authority, for co-employees. Second, it has created a class of employees. Under the Act, employees who were involved in extrahazardous employments were automatically within the purview of the Act_ Employees who were not involved in extra-hazardous employment could have been subject to the provisions of the Act if their employers had elected to participate.... Given that only some employees were automatically covered by the Act and that the determination of whether employees not involved in extra-hazardous employment were covered by the Act was made by employers, we cannot concur that:
Because every worker in Wyoming now may receive an equal benefit under the act with respect to the protection afforded the co-employee, there seems no prospect of supporting the claim of a deprivation of equal protection.
Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d [383,] 397 [ (Wyo.1991)] (emphasis added). The Act created classifications which treat similarly situated people differently.
Mills, 837 P.2d at 51 (brackets added). Cf. Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992) (holding that the co-employee immunity provision in workers’ compensation law was constitutional).

. Those states that permit co-employees to sue one another include Alabama, Arkansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.

. Accordingly, a person, whether a co-employee or the employer, who "orders the excavation of a large portion of the floor immediately outside a co-employee's office door on the second floor of a building, leaving a gaping hole to the floor below” and "orders the hole covered with paper-thin balsa wood” and severely injures an employee is guilty of an intentional act and should be criminally prosecuted.

.For example, a foreman or foreperson is defined as a "[pjerson designated by employer-management to direct work of employees; superintendent; overseer.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 648 (6th ed. 1990).

. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer generally is liable for injuries caused by the negligent acts of his employees. Significantly, pursuant to the fellow servant rule, an employer need not redress such injuries when the person harmed also is one of his employees. The import of this rule, which has been criticized as unjust by courts and commentators, has been diminished by workers’ compensation and employers' liability laws.
Matthew J. McMahon, The Survey of New York Practice, 56 St. John’s L.Rev. 371, 389-90 (1982) (footnotes omitted).

. In my view, the result would be another layer of insurance coverage for supervisory employees on top of workers’ compensation paid for by employers and, ultimately, the consuming public. Furthermore, it would be absurd to have the employer provide benefits to the injured employee through workers’ compensation, and, at the same time, indemnity coverage to the supervisory employee. A typical situation where this absurd result would occur is the following: (1) the injured employee would seek workers’ compensation, in addition to damages from the supervisory employee; (2) the supervisor would thereby seek indemnity from the employer; and, finally, (3) the employer would then seek reimbursement from the injured employee. As pointed out by the Gaertner court, this would effectively destroy the immunity provisions of the workers’ compensation law.

. Under HRS § 386-8, “another employee of the employer acting in the course of his [or her] employment” is immune from suit as a third parly.

. I do not claim to understand fully Alabama's exclusive remedy provision because it "provides complete immunity to employers and limited immunity to officers, directors, agents servants or *31employees of the same employer ... from civil liability for all causes of action except those based on willful conduct and such immunity is an essential aspect of the workers’ compensation scheme.” However, the legislative findings and intent as to actions filed by an injured employee against a co-employee is also worth noting:
The legislature finds that actions filed on behalf of injured employees against officer, directors, agents, servants or employees of the same employer seeking to recover damages in excess of amounts received or receivable from the employer under the workers' compensation statutes of this state and predicated upon claimed negligent or wanton conduct resulting in injuries arising out of and in the course of employment are contrary to the intent of the legislature in adopting a comprehensive workers’ compensation scheme and are producing a debilitating and adverse effect upon efforts to retain existing, and to attract new industry to this state. Specifically, the existence of such causes of action places this state at a serious disadvantage in comparison to the existing laws of other states with whom this state competes in seeking to attract and retain industrial operations which would provide better job opportunities and increased employment for people in this state. The existence of such causes of action, and the consequent litigation resulting therefrom, results in substantial cost and expenses to employers which, as a practical matter, must either procure additional liability insurance coverage for supervisory and management employees or fund the costs of defense, judgment or settlement from their own resources in order to retain competent and reliable personnel. The existence of such causes of action has a disruptive effect upon the relationship among employees and supervisory and management personnel. There is a total absence of any reliable evidence that the availability of such causes of action has resulted in any reduction of the number or severity of on-the-job accidents or of any substantial improvement on providing safe working conditions and work practices.
Ala.Code § 25-5-14 (1992).