Court Opinion

ID: 9636474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:30:22.16284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:54.839204
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). The ease is one in which it was competent for the court below to grant the relief which was sought, and the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversy. The bill of complaint, while framed for equitable relief, contained all the necessary averments of a complaint in an action at law to recover judgment for money had and received, and judgment was rendered for the recovery of an amount of money shown by the stipulation of the parties to be due and owing to the United States from the appellant. For the reason that the appellee had an adequate remedy at law, it is proposed to reverse the judgment and remand the ease in order that it may be placed on the law calendar of the court below for a new trial. To my mind the ease is clearly one for the affirmance of the judgment so far as it concerns the recovery of the money adjudged to be due the appellee and for the reversal of that portion thereof which awards to the appellee a lien upon the property which had been assessed for taxes.
The rule is well settled that where, as here, it is competent for the court to grant the relief sought, and it has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and where, as here,- the fendant in a suit in equity submits to the jurisdiction in equity, it is too late thereafter to object that the plaintiff had a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law. The objection is one that “should be taken at the earliest opportunity.” This is the rule as stated in Daniels, Chancery Practice, which is quoted and approved in Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530, 535, 10 S. Ct. 604, 33 L. Ed. 1021. In Kilboum *195v. Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 9 S. Ct. 594. 32 L. Ed. 1005, the court said that the “objection should be taken at the earliest opportunity,” and in Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 381, 14 S. Ct. 127, 129 (37 L. Ed. 1113), it was said: “It was a defense and objection which must be made in limine, and does not of itself oust the court of jurisdiction.” It is a rule which has been consistently followed in this circuit. Southern Pac. R. Co, v. United States (C. C. A.) 133 P. 651, affirmed, 200 U. S. 354, 26 S. Ct. 298, 50 L. Ed. 512; McCloskey v. Pacific Coast Co. (C. C. A.) 160 F. 794, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 673; Original Consol. Mining Co. v. Abbott (C. C.) 167 F. 681, 683; Pacific Coal & Transportation Co. v. Pioneer M. Co. (C. C. A.) 205 P. 577, 582; Thomas v. South Butte Mining Co. (C. C. A.) 230 P. 968, 970; Muck v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. (C. C. A.) 273 P. 469, 473. And the same is true of the decision in other circuits, among which may be cited Cincinnati Equipment Co. v. Degnan (C. C. A.) 184 P. 834; Peale v. Marian Coal Co. (C. C.) 190 P. 376, 389; Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co. (C. C. A.) 142 P. 919, 922; Barrett Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co. (C. C. A.) 24 F.(2d) 329, 332.
The appellant filed a demurrer to the bill specifying various grounds of objection, but not including objection on the ground of the existence of an adequate remedy at law. After the demurrer was submitted and overruled, the appellant took leave to answer, and answered the bill on the merits, denying the material allegations thereof, and setting up affirmative defenses thereto, and praying for affirmative relief, in that the appellee be adjudged to have no lien against any property of the estate of Henry A. Pratt, deceased. However, in the body of the answer, it was alleged on information and belief that the plaintiff had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, but this allegation was not at any time brought to the attention of the trial court, nor did the appellant move under Equity Rule 22 to transfer the cause to the law side of the court. Evidence was taken on "behalf of the appellee without objection from the appellant, and the parties joined in a stipulation as to the material facts in the case. After the appellee had rested, the appellant made a motion to dismiss on various grounds, one of which was that the appellee had an adequate remedy at law. I submit that the appellant had waived that objection by failing to include it in her demurrer and by answering to the merits and asking affirmative relief and proceeding with the trial as above indicated without bringing the objection to the attention of the trial court. I am unable to discover any reason why the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, nor can I see that any benefit therefrom will accrue to either party. The facts are stipulated, and they are all shown by the record; the appellant raises no new issue as to any of them, and there is no additional defense which she can make by virtue of a transfer to the law side of the court, and there is nothing that she can gain by a new trial of the cause.