Court Opinion

ID: 9946285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:00:51.820899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.559584
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-2149     Document: 010111007401      Date Filed: 02/29/2024   Page: 1
                                                            FILED
                                                United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS     Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                    February 29, 2024
                          _______________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

            Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                           No. 22-2149
     v.                                          (D.C. No. 1:22-CR-00636-PJK-1)
                                                            (D. N.M.)
     FERMIN SAAVEDRA,

            Defendant - Appellant.
                      ___________________________________________

                            ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                        _________________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________

          In this appeal, we address the tension from judges’ dual ethical

 obligations. Judges must recuse when the public can reasonably question

 their impartiality and otherwise must sit on the case. See 28 U.S.C.

 § 455(a) (duty to recuse); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir.

 1995) (duty to sit). The tension arose here when a judge was assigned a

 *
       The parties haven’t requested oral argument, and it would not help us
 decide the appeal. So we have decided the appeal based on the record and
 the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-2149   Document: 010111007401   Date Filed: 02/29/2024   Page: 2

 criminal matter where he had a professional relationship with the victims’

 employer. The judge declined to recuse, and we see no error.

       The crime involved an assault on two probation officers working in

 the probation office for the District of New Mexico. See 18 U.S.C.

 § 111(a)(1). The chief judge drew the case, but recused and issued an order

 stating that “all judicial officers for the District of New Mexico” must

 recuse. R. vol. 1, at 9. The chief judge then immediately transferred the

 case to Judge Paul Kelly.

       Judge Kelly is a senior judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

 Tenth Circuit. To assist the district, Judge Kelly volunteers his time to

 preside over cases in the District of New Mexico.

       When the chief judge transferred the case to Judge Kelly, the

 defendant (Mr. Fermin Saavedra) asked Judge Kelly to reconsider the

 transfer order. Mr. Saavedra argued that Judge Kelly was subject to the

 same concerns that had driven the chief judge’s recusal order. Judge Kelly

 declined to reconsider the transfer order and sentenced Mr. Saavedra to the

 top of the guideline range (33 months). Mr. Saavedra appeals, arguing that

 Judge Kelly

             failed to provide an explanation for declining to recuse and

             should have recused to prevent the appearance of bias.

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       The government argues that an appeal waiver applies. We can assume

 for the sake of argument that the appeal waiver doesn’t apply because

 Mr. Saavedra’s appellate arguments would fail on the merits.

       Mr. Saavedra points out that Judge Kelly didn’t provide a reason to

 deny the motion to reconsider. Judges must ordinarily explain their denial

 of a motion to recuse. See United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1007

 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “the judge must document the reasons for his

 or her decision” on recusal). When the judge doesn’t provide an

 explanation, we conduct de novo review. See Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v.

 Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162, 1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that “because the

 judge in this case did not create a record or document her decision not to

 recuse, we review the denial de novo”). 1

       Conducting de novo review, we must consider whether “the

 reasonable person, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor

 doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Mobley, 971 F.3d

 1187, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020). Under this standard, we conclude that Judge

 Kelly didn’t err in declining to recuse.

       Mr. Saavedra asked Judge Kelly to recuse only on the ground that he

 was subject to the chief judge’s order recusing all judicial officers of or for

 1
      Mr. Saavedra agrees that we apply de novo review in light of Judge
 Kelly’s lack of explanation. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1 n.1.

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 the district. But the chief judge obviously didn’t agree: He transferred the

 case to Judge Kelly soon after entry of the order recusing all the judicial

 officers for the district.

       Mr. Saavedra argues that the reasoning behind the chief judge’s

 recusal order would also have applied to Judge Kelly. But the chief judge

 said only that his recusal order was “consistent with District wide

 practices.” R. vol. 1, at 9. We have no way of knowing what those

 practices were or why they might have applied to Judge Kelly.

       Without an explanation for the recusal order, we infer that the chief

 judge didn’t intend for it to cover Judge Kelly. After all, why would the

 chief judge have transferred the case to Judge Kelly if he would have been

 subject to the same concerns underlying the recusal of all the district

 judges?

       Mr. Saavedra argues that Judge Kelly is a “judicial officer” for the

 District of New Mexico and has often used probation officers in criminal

 cases. For this argument, Mr. Saavedra points out for the first time on

 appeal that Judge Kelly has sentenced at least 25 criminal defendants in

 the District of New Mexico. But regardless of those ties to New Mexico,

 the chief judge transferred the case to Judge Kelly right after announcing

 the recusal of all judicial officers for the District of New Mexico. Given

 the timing of the transfer order, the chief judge didn’t appear to regard

 Judge Kelly as a judicial officer for the District of New Mexico.

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       Mr. Saavedra points out that Judge Kelly was designated to the

 district and often held court there. But this designation did not make

 Judge Kelly a “judicial officer” for the District of New Mexico. See, e.g.,

 18 U.S.C. § 3141(b) (distinguishing between a “judicial officer of a court

 of original jurisdiction over an offense” and a “judicial officer of a Federal

 appellate court”). And Judge Kelly’s contribution to the district court’s

 work did not make him a “judicial officer” for the District of New

 Mexico. 2 Though Judge Kelly helped the district court, he is not subject to

 the same rules as the district judges recused by the chief judge’s order. So

 Judge Kelly was not subject to the chief judge’s recusal order. 3

       Mr. Saavedra also argues that even without the chief judge’s recusal

 order, Judge Kelly should have recused based on his professional

 relationship with the probation office.

 2
       Mr. Saavedra says that an objective observer would interpret the district
 court’s website to say that Judge Kelly is a judicial officer for the District of
 New Mexico. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 7 n.3. But the appellate record contains
 no information from the website. See, e.g., Anthony v. United States, 667 F.2d
 870, 875 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that judicial review is limited to evidence in
 the record).
 3
       Mr. Saavedra says that Judge Kelly arbitrarily revisited the chief
 judge’s recusal order that disqualified him. Because Judge Kelly revisited
 the order, Mr. Saavedra says that he was entitled to notice and an
 opportunity to be heard on the new ruling. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 11–
 12. We disagree: Judge Kelly didn’t revisit the chief judge’s recusal order,
 and no one needed to tell Mr. Saavedra in advance that Judge Kelly would
 get the case.

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       The appearance of impartiality may be affected by a judge’s

 relationships with participants in the case. The participants include not

 only parties and counsel, but also individuals who may be affected by the

 outcome (like the victim in a criminal case) or who assist the judge (like

 clerks, probation officials, or federal marshals). When these relationships

 are involved, the court engages in a fact-intensive inquiry into the

 appearance to a reasonable observer. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351

 (10th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (stating that recusal decisions under [28

 U.S.C.] § 455(a) “are extremely fact driven”).

       Here we address a judge’s professional relationship with the victim

 of a crime. Courts don’t ordinarily require “disqualification of a single

 judge . . . simply because of a professional relationship with a victim.”

 Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1180

 (9th Cir. 2005); see United Stats v. Angelus, 258 F. App’x 840, 843 (6th

 Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (stating that disqualification isn’t required just

 because the judge has a working professional relationship with the victim);

 see also Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal &

 Disqualification of Judges § 25.7, at 418 (3d ed. 2017) (“Disqualification

 is . . . unlikely to be deemed to be warranted merely because a crime

 victim is or was related to another judge; or to a member of the judge’s

 staff, another court officer, or other courthouse personnel.”). After all,

 “[j]udges interact with many different parties in a professional capacity,

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 such as the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Public Defender’s

 Office, local sheriff offices, and various court personnel.” Angelus, 258 F.

 App’x at 843. We don’t typically expect judges to recuse themselves

 whenever they preside over cases involving someone from these

 organizations. Id.

       The same is true in criminal cases when representatives of these

 organizations are victims of the underlying crime. For example, four

 circuit courts have held that recusal is unnecessary even when the victim is

 a deputy marshal who was responsible for protecting the sentencing judge.

 United States v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh,

 J.); United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1211 (8th Cir. 1984); United

 States v. Jacobs, 311 F. App’x 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2008) (unpublished);

 United States v. Angelus, 258 F. App’x 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2007)

 (unpublished). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a judge was

 “entirely correct” to decline to recuse when the charge involved a threat to

 kill three fellow judges. Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of

 Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). And the

 Seventh Circuit has held that a judge didn’t need to recuse when the

 criminal charge involved the filing of a fraudulent lien against the chief

 judge of the district. United States v. Swallers, 897 F.3d 875, 788–78 (7th

 Cir. 2018). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has held that a judge didn’t need

 to recuse when the victims were security guards stationed in the

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 courthouse. United States v. Ramsey, 871 F.2d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1989).

 To our knowledge, no circuit court has held that a judge must recuse just

 because the victim works for a related agency like the probation office or

 the marshals service.

       Granted, sentencing judges typically get reports prepared by

 probation officers. So Judge Kelly presumably obtained a probation

 officer’s report in each of his criminal cases. We must consider the

 significance of these reports on Judge Kelly’s impartiality.

       Probation officers act as an arm of the court. United States v. Davis,

 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998). So when Judge Kelly sat as a

 sentencing judge, he could visit ex parte with the probation officer before

 sentencing. Id. Mr. Saavedra says that the nature of this relationship

 rendered probation officers the “advisors” or “agents” of Judge Kelly.

 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 16. But we lack evidence involving Judge

 Kelly’s interaction with any of the probation officers. 4

       In our view, Mr. Saavedra bases his concerns on conjecture about

 Judge Kelly’s relationship with the probation office. In Mr. Saavedra’s

 view, the possibilities could stir questions about Judge Kelly’s

 impartiality.

 4
       Although probation officers are appointed and removed by the
 district court, Judge Kelly had no role in the appointment or removal
 because he is not a judge on the district court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3602(a).

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       In suggesting public concern, Mr. Saavedra points to four opinions

 where we or other Courts of Appeals said that an objective observer might

 question the judge’s impartiality. But there, the judge or his clerk had

 blatant ties to a witness, a party, or an attorney representing one of the

 parties. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1989) (witness);

 Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1983) (party and its

 attorney); Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.

 1980) (attorney for a party); United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th

 Cir. 1976) (attorney for a party). The circumstances here don’t rise to a

 similar level of blatant ties.

       In Kelly, for example, the judge’s wife was a close friend of a

 witness’s wife. 888 F.2d at 738. And during the trial, the judge met

 privately in chambers with the witness’s wife. Id. When the wife explained

 that her husband was planning to testify, the judge blamed the defendant

 for creating a dilemma. Id. at 738, 746. The judge’s remarks led the Court

 of Appeals to conclude that he should have recused. Id. at 745–46. Indeed,

 the Court of Appeals explained that the judge had apparently stayed on the

 case only because he worried that recusal might bar a retrial. Id. at 746.

       Hall involved the need for a judge to recuse based on the conduct of

 his law clerk. The case involved a class action against the Small Business

 Administration for gender discrimination. 695 F.2d at 177. The judge’s law

 clerk was a member of the class who had worked at the Small Business

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  Administration, and she had lodged her own complaint against the agency

  for gender discrimination. Id. The clerk also developed ties with the

  plaintiffs’ law firm, agreeing to work there when her clerkship ended. Id.

  at 178. The Court of Appeals concluded that the law clerk’s continued

  involvement in the case, after accepting a job with the plaintiffs’ law firm,

  had created the appearance of bias. Id. at 179.

        The circumstances in Potashnick were just as blatant. There the

  plaintiff’s chief trial counsel had done business with the judge and

  represented him in a lawsuit by the time of the trial. 609 F.2d at 1107. And

  the judge’s father was a senior partner in the law firm representing the

  plaintiff, receiving 1% of the firm’s profit. Id. Together, the judge’s ties to

  the plaintiff’s attorney and law firm created an appearance of bias. Id. at

  1110–11.

        Finally, in Ritter, one of the attorneys was the state bar president.

  540 F.2d at 460. While the trial was pending, the attorney presided over

  resolutions lodged against the judge. Id. Given those circumstances, we

  concluded that the judge should have recused to avoid the appearance of

  bias. Id. at 464.

        Together, Kelly, Hall, Potashnick, and Ritter show that a judge’s

  personal tie to a party or its attorney can create an appearance of bias. The

  public can reasonably suspect bias when a judge meets privately with a

  witness who’s married to the judge’s close friend, when the judge presides

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  over litigation involving the judge’s own law clerk as a class member,

  when the judge’s father is receiving a percentage of the profit earned by a

  law firm appearing before the judge, or when one of the attorneys

  contemporaneously presides over a state bar resolution against the judge.

  But none of these cases involve potential recusal based on a judge’s

  interaction with an agency performing services for the court (like a

  probation office or marshals service).

        To assess the line between a judge’s duty to sit and to recuse, we

  must consider the circumstances. As discussed earlier, circuit courts have

  generally concluded that judges need not recuse based on professional

  relationships with offices in which someone is victimized by a crime. Here

  there is nothing else to suggest a need to recuse.

                                      * * *

        In roughly 20 years, Judge Kelly has received presentence reports in

  about 25 cases from someone in the probation office for the District of

  New Mexico. But there is no evidence of a personal relationship between

  Judge Kelly and these probation officers. In these circumstances, the

  public had little reason to question Judge Kelly’s decision not to recuse.

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  We therefore affirm his denial of Mr. Saavedra’s motion to reconsider the

  chief judge’s transfer order.

                                      Entered for the Court

                                      Robert E. Bacharach
                                      Circuit Judge

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  No. 22-2149, United States v. Saavedra
  BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

        I concur in the result, but would affirm the judgment of the district court on the

  grounds that Saavedra’s appeal is barred by the waiver of appellate rights provision

  contained in his plea agreement.

        We review de novo the question of whether an appellate waiver contained in a

  plea agreement is enforceable. United States v. Ibarra-Coronel, 517 F.3d 1218, 1221

  (10th Cir. 2008). In answering this question, we follow a three-step process,

  determining: “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of

  appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his

  appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of

  justice as we define herein.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir.

  2004). Notably, the defendant “bears the burden of establishing these requirements.”

  United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2014).

               1. Does Saavedra’s appeal fall within the scope of the waiver?

        The plea agreement in this case contained the following appellate waiver

  provision:

        The Defendant is aware that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742 afford
        a defendant the right to appeal a conviction and the sentence imposed.
        Acknowledging that, the Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal the
        Defendant’s conviction(s) and any sentence, including any fine, at or under
        the maximum statutory penalty authorized by law, as well as any sentence
        imposed below or within the Guideline range upon a revocation of supervised
        release in this cause number.

  Supp. R. at 18.
Appellate Case: 22-2149       Document: 010111007401          Date Filed: 02/29/2024       Page: 14

         Even strictly construing this language, I have little trouble concluding that

  Saavedra’s appeal falls within the scope of the waiver. Although Saavedra’s appeal

  focuses on the question of whether Judge Kelly should have recused himself from the

  case, Judge Kelly’s only involvement in this case was his sentencing of Saavedra. In

  other words, if Saavedra were successful in his appeal, the remedy would be to remand

  the case to the district court for resentencing before a different judge. In fact, that is the

  very remedy he seeks in his opening brief. Aplt. Br. at 1, 23, 27. Thus, there is no

  question that the appeal concerns Saavedra’s sentence. As a result, the appeal squarely

  falls within the scope of the appellate waiver provision.

             2. Knowing and Voluntary

         In determining whether a defendant entered into a plea agreement knowingly and

  voluntarily, we first look to see “whether the language of the plea agreement states that

  the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily”; if so, we then look “for

  an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.

  Here, the appellate waiver provision of the parties’ written plea agreement expressly

  states that “Defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal [his] conviction(s) and any

  sentence.” Supp. R. at 18. The plea agreement also states that Saavedra’s “plea of guilty

  is freely and voluntarily made and is not the result of force, threats, or promises.” Id. at

  19. In turn, the district court, in accepting the plea, specifically addressed the appellate

  waiver including asking Saavedra if he understood the appellate rights he was giving up

  and whether he was willing to give up those rights. Following the questioning of

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  Saavedra, the district court expressly found that Saavedra’s “plea [wa]s knowing and

  voluntary and supported by sufficient facts.” R., Vol. III at 26. In sum, the record firmly

  establishes that the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary.

            3. Miscarriage of Justice

         “[E]nforcement of an appellate waiver does not result in a miscarriage of justice

  unless enforcement would result in one of the four situations enumerated in [United

  States v.] Elliott.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (citing United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171,

  1173 (10th Cir. 2001)). Those four situations are “(1) where the district court relied on

  an impermissible factor such as race, (2) where ineffective assistance of counsel in

  connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, (3) where the

  sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or (4) where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.”

  Id.

         There is no question that the first three situations are inapplicable here. That

  leaves only the possibility that the appellate waiver provision in Saavedra’s plea

  agreement “is otherwise unlawful.”

         To satisfy the “otherwise unlawful” exception, the error “must seriously affect the

  fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up). In

  addition, we have held that the fourth exception “looks to whether ‘the waiver is

  otherwise unlawful,’ not to whether another aspect of the [sentencing] proceeding may

  have involved legal error.’” United States v. Holzer, 32 F.4th 875, 887 (10th Cir. 2022)

  (quoting United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)).

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         In attempting to satisfy this standard, Saavedra argues that enforcement of the

  appellate waiver would implicate “the public’s acceptance of judicial decisionmaking,”

  would “fail to ‘satisfy the appearance of justice,’” would “undermin[e] the public’s

  confidence in the judicial process,” and would create doubts about impartiality and the

  appearance of impropriety. Aplt. Reply Br. at 26–27. But these arguments really focus

  on the merits of the legal error that he seeks to raise, and do not, in my view, implicate

  the lawfulness of the appellate waiver. I therefore conclude that Saavedra has failed to

  establish that the appellate waiver contained in his plea agreement is “otherwise

  unlawful.”

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