Court Opinion

ID: 9560397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:34.686714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.409719
License: Public Domain

Justice ERICKSON
dissenting:
Certiorari was granted to review the drug-testing program employed to test intercollegiate student athletes at the University of Colorado, Boulder (CU). We agreed to answer two specific questions:
In the context of the University’s drug-testing program, whether suspicionless drug testing is constitutionally reasonable?
Whether student athletes can give valid consent to the University’s drug-testing *958program if their consent is a condition of participation in intercollegiate athletics at the University?
These two questions address the same issue — whether drug testing of student athletes at CU, conducted without either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, is nevertheless “reasonable” and therefore constitutionally permissible.
If a student athlete voluntarily consents to a drug-testing program before entering the intercollegiate athletic program, the answer is obvious. Such a warrantless search based on voluntary consent is constitutionally permissible even absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See infra part II. If there is no valid consent, however, the answer is more difficult and requires a balancing of CU's asserted interests against a student athlete’s privacy expectations to determine whether the war-rantless search is reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible. See infra part I. Because I answer the two questions on which we granted certiorari in the affirmative, I dissent.
I
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution establish the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Peple v. McKinstrey, 852 P.2d 467, 470 (Colo.1993); see also People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Colo.1992). I agree with the majority that CU’s drug-testing program for intercollegiate student athletes must satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution because the collection and testing of urine is a “search.” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1413, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 257-59, 557 P.2d 399, 405-07 (1976); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.3, at 189 (1993 Supp.).1 The first question on which we granted certiorari concerns whether suspicionless drug testing of student athletes in the context of CU’s drug-testing program is an unreasonable search. In my view, it is reasonable and therefore constitutionally permissible.
A
In issuing the permanent injunction, the trial court concluded that any drug-testing program of student athletes administered by CU must be premised on probable cause to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.2 The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court and stated that reasonable suspicion has been approved as a basis to validate warrantless searches in certain circumstances. Derdeyn v. University of Colorado, 832 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Colo.App.1992). The court of appeals therefore reversed that portion of the trial court’s order prohibiting all drug testing of student athletes not premised on probable cause. Id. at 1035-36. While the majority expresses no opinion on the conclusion of the court of appeals, maj. op. *959950 n. 37, neither party claims that the court of appeals erred in this respect.
We granted certiorari, however, to consider the broader question addressed by the trial court, but left unanswered by the court of appeals — whether the drug-testing program in this context, premised on neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, is nevertheless constitutionally reasonable. The majority concludes that sus-picionless drug testing of student athletes at CU is unreasonable.3 I disagree.
B
The question of whether a suspicionless drug-testing program is constitutionally permissible absent probable cause or reasonable suspicion is not a question of fact, but is a question of law that is subject to de novo review on appeal. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Department of Transp., 932 F.2d 1292, 1298 (9th Cir.1991). Applying settled principles of constitutional adjudication to the case before us, I conclude that within the context of CU’s drug-testing program for student athletes, suspi-cionless drug testing satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
As a genera] matter, a search must be supported by a warrant issued upon probable cause to satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1390, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). It is well-settled, however, that “neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance.” Id. Accordingly, where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, as in this case, “it is necessary to balance the individual’s privacy expectations against the Government’s interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.” Id. at 665-66, 109 S.Ct. at 1390-91; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417; see also O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1498, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).
The balancing test is used to determine whether a search must be supported by probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or possibly neither, in order to be reasonable. Where the balancing test precludes insistence on a showing of probable cause, the Supreme Court has “usually required some quantum of individualized suspicion before concluding that a search is reasonable.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417. The showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, however, below which a search must be presumed unconstitutional. Id.
In fact, the Supreme Court on two occasions has employed the balancing test to uphold drug testing as reasonable, despite the absence of any individualized suspicion. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679, 109 S.Ct. at 1397; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417; see also Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2487, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoint conducted without any individualized suspicion based on the balancing test). In these “limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417.4
*960The question in this ease is whether CU’s particular drug-testing program directed at intercollegiate student athletes falls within the circumstances where a warrantless search can be upheld as reasonable, despite the absence of any individualized suspicion. To answer this question, it is necessary to engage in a balancing of the interests asserted by CU and the student athletes’ expectations of privacy.
1

Asserted Governmental Interests

The majority’s analysis of the asserted interests offered by CU to support its sus-picionless drug-testing program for student athletes is limited to the observation that CU asserts no significant public safety interests, maj. op. at 945, and the questioning of whether some of the interests asserted by CU are even significant for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. I disagree with this analysis and conclude that CU’s implementation of its suspicionless drug-testing program for Student athletes serves important and valid public interests, including protecting the health and safety of intercollegiate student athletes and preventing drug use by other students who look to student athletes as role models.
Drug usage involves considerable risks to the health and safety of student athletes, whether or not the student athlete is impaired during practice or competition. These dangers are particularly evident with respect to anabolic steroids, which pose a serious risk to the health and safety of athletes. Protecting the health and safety of student athletes unquestionably constitutes an important interest. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1321 (7th Cir.1988); O’Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F.Supp. 997, 1002, 1006-07 (W.D.Wash.), rev’d on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir.1988); see also Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 682-83 (7th Cir.1991) (en banc).
Preventing drug use by other students who look to student athletes as role models also constitutes an important interest. As noted in Schaill:
Because of their high visibility and leadership roles, it is not unreasonable to single out athletes and cheerleaders for special attention with respect to drug usage. This court may take judicial notice of the fact that in the society at large drug usage by athletes is highly publicized and is a matter of great concern. Drug usage by this widely admired group is likely to affect the behavior of others and school authorities are within their discretion in conducting a program specifically directed at athletes.
Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320-21. As the majority concedes, the desire to prevent drug use by other students is a significant public safety interest. Maj. op. at 945 n. 30.
The asserted governmental interests need not rise to the level of a compelling interest. See supra note 4. Nor must the asserted interests be related to issues of public safety or national security to be valid. As such, I conclude that the interests asserted by CU are not just commendable, but are valid, significant, and important. Against these valid interests, it is necessary to weigh the interference with student athletes privacy expectations that results from requiring student athletes to undergo a urine test. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. at 1393.
2

Expectations of Privacy

The interference with individual privacy that results from the collection of urine for subsequent analysis varies depending on the circumstances. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. at 1393; Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 682. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of individuals have diminished expectations of privacy even with respect to such personal searches. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. at 1393.
*961In this case, I conclude that the student athletes who are subject to CU’s drug-testing program have similarly diminished privacy expectations with respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. The following factors all militate in favor of my conclusion: (1) student athletes are subject to regular and routine physical examinations; (2) student athletes voluntarily submit to extensive regulation of their personal behavior; and (3) a communal locker room atmosphere is commonplace in intercollegiate athletics. I examine each consideration separately.
Because the physical condition of a student athlete is a primary focus of intercollegiate athletics, student athletes are routinely physically examined to determine fitness to compete. See Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 682 (recognizing that athletes must submit to frequent medical examinations); Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318 (stating that physical examinations are integral to athletic programs). Unlike most private citizens or other students, student athletes reasonably expect routine inquiry into their fitness. Cf. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671, 109 S.Ct. at 1433. As part of their annual medical examinations, student athletes provide urine samples under circumstances similar to those used in CU’s drug-testing program. Throughout the year, student athletes also undergo close physical contact with both trainers and medical personnel in the course of being examined, diagnosed, and treated for injuries or potential injuries. See O’Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1005 (recognizing that in the context of athletic examinations, viewing and touching is tolerated among relative strangers that would be firmly rejected in other contexts). Based on this continuing physical examination and close physical contact with trainers and medical personnel, student athletes have diminished expectations of privacy with respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test. See Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 682 (stating that the affront to privacy that is caused by the giving of a urine sample is slight for people who are subject to frequent examinations).
The extensive regulation of behavior that student athletes voluntarily submit to further reduces their privacy expectations. Student athletes are regulated by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the Big 8 Conference, CU, and their individual athletic programs. Among others, the regulations include maintenance of required levels of academic performance, monitoring of course selection, training rules, practice schedules, weight and diet restrictions, curfews, and prohibitions on drug use. Significantly, student athletes at CU are already subject to the NCAA drug-testing program which mandates suspicionless urine testing of student athletes. In my view, the expectation of privacy of student athletes with respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test are greatly diminished based on their voluntary participation in the highly regulated area of intercollegiate athletics. Cf. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627, 109 S.Ct. at 1418 (stating that “expectations of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of covered employees”); International Bhd. of Teamsters, 932 F.2d at 1300 (concluding that the privacy expectations of commercial truck drivers are diminished because they voluntarily choose to enter a highly regulated profession); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1142 (3d Cir.) (recognizing that privacy expectations of jockeys are diminished because of the regulated nature of the sport), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986, 107 S.Ct. 577, 93 L.Ed.2d 580 (1986).
The privacy expectations of student athletes with respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test are also diminished because of the communal atmosphere of locker rooms that is commonplace in intercollegiate athletics. By its very nature, a locker room setting consists of communal undress, showering, and urination. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318; O’Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1005. In this context, it is difficult to conclude that student athletes do not have reduced privacy expectations in *962being required to submit a urine sample for testing purposes.
These considerations all make it clear that participation in intercollegiate athletics is quite distinguishable from almost any other activity. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318. The distinctive circumstances that diminish student athletes’ expectations of privacy, however, do not extend beyond the limited identifiable group of intercollegiate student athletes to other groups, including collegiate students as a whole. No other group is subject to routine physical examinations, submits to extensive regulation of their behavior, and encounters a communal locker room atmosphere on a routine basis. Based on a combination of these factors, it is implausible to conclude that student athletes have strong expectations of privacy with respect to submitting urine samples for testing purposes. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319; O’Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1005.
In addition, CU has designed its drug-testing program for student athletes to significantly minimize the impact on their privacy interests. CU has attempted to reduce the intrusiveness of the collection process in a number of ways.5 In my view, the procedures prescribed by CU for the collection and analysis of the urine samples do not carry the grave potential for arbitrary and oppressive interference with an individual’s privacy interests that the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394 n. 2.
3

Outcome of the Balancing Test

It is clear that CU has asserted important interests to justify its drug-testing program for student athletes and that student athletes, as a group, have diminished privacy expectations based on their unique circumstances. Based on the interests CU has asserted, it designed a drug-testing program for student athletes to minimize the impact on their privacy interests by reducing the intrusiveness of the collection process. Because the drug testing contemplated in this limited context does not constitute an undue infringement on the student athletes’ expectations of privacy, I conclude that CU’s asserted interests outweigh the privacy concerns.
The examination of the asserted governmental interests and the privacy expectations is only the initial step under the test delineated by the Supreme Court. The purpose of balancing these factors is to determine whether it is impractical to require the government to obtain a warrant or establish some level of individualized suspicion before it is permitted to conduct the search. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66,109 S.Ct. at 1390-91; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20, 109 S.Ct. at 1414-15; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1313.
In this case, the student athletes do not contend that either a warrant or probable cause is required by the balance of privacy and governmental interests. Nor does it appear that such an assertion could withstand scrutiny. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-68, 109 S.Ct. at 1391-92; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1417; cf Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987) (stating that the probable-cause standard “is peculiarly limited to criminal investigations”); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097 n. 5, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (same). Rather, the student athletes assert that CU must, at a minimum, prem*963ise its drug-testing program for student athletes on reasonable suspicion. I disagree.
In my view, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes in this limited context is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. To achieve the important interests asserted by CU, it is necessary to accurately detect drug use among the student athletes. As the trial court suggested, however, it is nearly impossible to ever establish reasonable suspicion of drug use among student athletes. Cf. O’Halloran, 679 F.Supp. at 1006. The important interests asserted by CU therefore would be placed in jeopardy, and CU’s efforts to achieve these goals significantly hampered, if it were required to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion before testing a student athlete. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 109 S.Ct. at 1392; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624, 631, 633, 109 S.Ct. at 1417, 1420, 1421; see also Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 685; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1322; cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (noting that requiring particularized suspicion before routine stops on major highways near the U.S.-Mexico border would be impractical). These facts, combined with the diminished privacy interests implicated by the drug testing of intercollegiate student athletes, lead me to conclude that the suspicionless drug testing of student athletes in this limited context is a reasonable search.
Because suspicionless drug testing of intercollegiate student athletes in this context is reasonable, CU’s drug testing program is constitutionally permissible. Even were I to agree, however, that a drug-testing program based on no individualized suspicion was unreasonable in this context, such a search nevertheless could be constitutionally permissible based on the valid consent of the student athletes.6 It is therefore necessary to examine the question of the student athletes’ consent in this case.
II
Based on its reading of the trial court order, the majority affirms what it characterizes as the trial court’s “finding of fact” that the individual student athletes within the certified class did not voluntarily consent to CU’s drug-testing program for student athletes. Maj. op. at 947.7 As a result, the majority does not reach the second issue on which we granted certiorari. See maj. op. at 935.
Because I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the trial court order, and instead would find that the trial court concluded as a matter of law that no student athlete could validly consent to the drug testing program, I am compelled to address the second question on which we granted certiorari. I would conclude that CU may validly condition a student ath*964lete’s participation in intercollegiate athletics on a student athlete’s knowing and voluntary consent to a drug-testing program.
A
I agree with the majority that as an appellate court, “we must defer to the trial court’s findings on the. factual issue of voluntariness unless its findings are clearly erroneous or not supported by the record.” Maj. op. at 946 (citations omitted). This rule of deference, however, is limited to factual findings contained in a trial court’s order and not to the trial court’s legal conclusions, which we review de novo.
In my view, the majority avoids answering the question on which we granted cer-tiorari by erroneously characterizing the trial court’s legal conclusions on the question of consent as findings of fact. Maj. op. at 947. It is clear from a plain reading of the trial court's order that it made no findings of fact regarding the validity of consent given by any individual member of the class. Instead, the trial court relied on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to conclude as a matter of law that no student athlete could validly consent to a drug-testing program.
The sole factual finding made by the trial court with regard to the consent issue related to all student athletes, and nowhere in the trial court’s order is there a factual determination that any individual class member failed to give voluntary consent or was in any way influenced by duress or coercion.8 The factual findings relating to consent that the majority defers to actually appear within the trial court’s order as “conclusions of law.”9 This is not surprising, because the broad injunctive relief granted by the trial court is appropriate only if the trial court decided the voluntary consent issue based on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.10
*965The foregoing considerations all suggest that the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the consents given by CU student-athletes were not voluntary and did not exempt CU from the constitutional requirements of the United States and Colorado Constitutions. Accordingly, I disagree with the majority’s unnecessary deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions and would reach the unconstitutional conditions issue squarely presented by both the trial court’s order and the issue on which we granted certiorari.11
B
An unreasonable search is nevertheless constitutionally permissible when it is conducted based on voluntary consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The question presented on appeal is not whether certain individual student athletes voluntarily consented to the drug-testing program of student athletes, but whether all student athletes at CU cannot voluntarily consent, as a matter of law, if their consent is a condition of their participation in intercollegiate athletics. The student athletes contend, and the trial court concluded, that representing CU in intercollegiate athletics cannot be conditioned on their giving consent to a random drug-testing program. I disagree.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine relied on by the trial court in reaching its legal conclusion derives from Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Perry stated:
Even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes on his constitutionally protected interests — especially his interest in freedom of speech.
Id. at 597, 92 S.Ct. at 2697. The determination of whether the unconstitutional conditions doctrine precludes consent from ever being voluntary involves a balancing of the governmental interests involved and the benefit that will be lost if consent is not given.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that governmental benefits far more significant than participation in intercollegiate athletics can be conditioned on waiving the exercise of a constitutional right. See, e.g., *966Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 763, 62 L.Ed.2d 704 (1980) (employment with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) can be conditioned on an employee’s consent to pre-publication review and censorship of any publication concerning the CIA); United States Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (government employment can be conditioned on the prohibition of partisan political activity by employees); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324, 91 S.Ct. 381, 389, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (receipt of welfare benefits can be conditioned on recipient’s consent to inspection of home); cf. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632 (1984) (post-graduate financial aid can be conditioned on draft registration without violating the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).12
Wyman v. James is instructive on the issue of whether conditioning participation of student athletes in intercollegiate athletics on consent to a random drug-testing program is an unconstitutional condition. The case involved a Fourth Amendment challenge to an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) requirement that denied AFDC benefits to any program recipient who refused to consent to a caseworker “visitation” of their home. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 311-12, 91 S.Ct. at 382-83. Government representatives informed Mrs. James, a recipient of AFDC benefits, that she would lose her benefits if she refused to consent to the visitation. Id. at 313-14, 91 S.Ct. at 383-84. She brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that conditioning her AFDC benefits on the requirement that she consent to the visitation violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches.
In rejecting Mrs. James’s Fourth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court stated:
the visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and [ ] the beneficiary’s denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be. There is no entry of the home and there is no search.
Id. at 317-18, 91 S.Ct. at 385-86. The Supreme Court also added that “what Mrs. James appears to want from the agency that provides her and her infant son with the necessities for life is the right to receive those necessities upon her own informational terms, to utilize the Fourth Amendment as a wedge for imposing those terms and to avoid questions of any kind.” Id. at 321-22, 91 S.Ct. at 387-88.
The factual situations presented in Wy-man and the present case are analogous. The home visitation in Wyman and the drug testing in this case are not designed to gather evidence for use in a subsequent criminal prosecution, but ensure compliance with the requirements of the respective programs.13 However, the benefit involved in this case, participation in intercollegiate athletics, is certainly less of a recognized interest than the benefit at stake in Wyman, the loss of State provided “nec*967essities for life.” 14 Moreover, the privacy-interest in this case is certainly lower than in Wyman. See supra part I.B.2.
The consent to random drug testing is not per se invalid for all student athletes at CU simply because it is a condition of representing the school in intercollegiate athletics. Student athletes remain free to withhold their consent to the drug-testing programs or to individually challenge the voluntariness of their own consent. Alternatively, student athletes may decide to participate in intercollegiate athletics at colleges or universities with drug-testing programs more suitable to their individualized expectations of privacy. “The choice is entirely [theirs], and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.” Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324, 91 S.Ct. at 389.
Ill
I would answer both of the questions on which we granted certiorari affirmatively. In the limited context before us, I conclude that suspicionless drug testing of intercollegiate student athletes is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. I would also conclude that CU may validly condition student athletes’ participation in intercollegiate athletics on a knowing and voluntary consent to the drug-testing program. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
Chief Justice ROVIRA joins in this dissent.

. In determining whether an intrusion is a search under article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, this court has occasionally diverged from the United States Supreme Court. E.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811 (Colo.1985). On these occasions, this court has determined that article II, section 7 provides more protection than does the similarly worded Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution based on an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. In this case, however, CU does not dispute on appeal that the drug-testing program is a search for constitutional purposes.
Accordingly, while my discussion of the reasonableness of the search at issue in this case is limited to Fourth Amendment decisions, the logic applies with equal force to article II, section 7. In this case, there is no basis for applying a different standard to test the reasonableness of the search under article II, section 7 than the standard applied to a search under the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483, 490 (Colo.1990) (concluding that Fourth Amendment balancing test used to determine whether checkpoint stops were reasonable also applied to article II, section 7); see also Exotic Coins, Inc. v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 943 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S.Ct. 214, 88 L.Ed.2d 214 (1985).

. The trial court concluded that drug testing based on reasonable suspicion was no more sustainable than suspicionless drug testing.

. Specifically, the majority holds that “for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution, CU’s intercollegiate student athletes do not voluntarily consent to being searched pursuant to the drug-test program.” Maj. op. at 949-950.

. Under the limitations set forth by the Supreme Court, the governmental interest need not be compelling. Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189, 1195 n. 8 (7th Cir.1989); see also Dimeo v. Griffin, 943 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir.1991) (en banc). Instead, where an individual’s privacy interests are weaker, the government need only make a lower showing of countervailing harms, *960and a valid or substantial interest may be sufficient to justify the conclusion that a suspicion-less search is reasonable. Dimeo, 943 F.2d at 681; Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Willner v. Barr, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 669, 116 L.Ed.2d 760 (1991); Taylor, 888 F.2d at 1195 n. 8.

. Under CU’s drug-testing program, the intrusion on privacy is reduced because there is no direct observation of the act of urination. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394-95 n. 2; Willner, 928 F.2d at 1189; Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318. The notice provided by the consent forms also significantly diminishes the subjective intrusiveness of the urine testing by reducing to a minimum any "unsettled show of authority" that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672-73 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394-95 n. 2; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1398, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320. The drug-testing program is also designed to assure that the student athletes’ expectations of privacy are not subject to the discretion of the officials in charge of the program. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1321. Finally, the urine samples may be examined only for specified drugs, and the use of samples to test for other purposes is not authorized. The combination of these procedures reduces the intrusiveness on the student athletes’ expectations of privacy.

. A warrantless search is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment if an individual student athlete has voluntarily consented to it, regardless of whether the search is conducted based on probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or'no suspicion at all. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); see generally 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (1987 & 1993 Supp.). The majority’s conclusion that the consent at issue in this case was not voluntary as a factual matter does not negate the elementary proposition that a warrantless search based on voluntary consent would be constitutionally permissible even absent reasonable suspicion.

. The class certified pursuant to C.R.C.P. 23 consists of:
Those present and prospective undergraduate student athletes who are or will be subject to the University of Colorado intercollegiate athletic department’s drug education program as a condition of participation in the University of Colorado intercollegiate athletic program limited as follows: Those present undergraduate student athletes who have never tested positive or have been subject to discipline or sanction as a result of a positive test result; and those present student athletes, who, although having executed waivers, consents or agreements to participate in the University of Colorado’s drug education program, object to the program as being an unconstitutional condition of participation; and lastly, those prospective undergraduate student athletes who will execute waivers, consents or agreements to participate in the University of Colorado’s drug education program, but who object to the program as being an unconstitutional condition of participation.

. In its only factual finding regarding the consent issue, the trial court stated:
In all phases of the program the student athletes have been required to sign a "consent" form in order to participate in intercollegiate athletics. If a student does not sign the form the student may not participate in intercollegiate athletics at the University.

. In reaching the determination that the trial court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, the majority fails to acknowledge that the language it cites from the trial court's order is contained in the section labeled conclusions of law and relate entirely to the trial court’s legal determination that CU may not constitutionally condition an athlete’s participation in athletics on the signing of a consent form. The trial court concluded that:
The evidence produced during this trial failed to establish that the consents given by the University's student-athletes are voluntary. It is quite clear that they are "coerced" for constitutional purposes by the fact that there can be no participation in athletics without a signed consent. As in the cases cited, the "consent” obtained by the University is not voluntary. ...

. The trial court permanently enjoined CU from requiring any urine samples from student athletes for the purposes of drug testing. In other words, the order struck down all drug-testing programs as they relate to all student athletes and not just class members. Thus, even if CU could demonstrate that any of its present or future student athletes voluntarily consented to the drug-testing program, CU would still be enjoined from conducting any drug-testing program.
Such a broad-based injunction would be warranted if the student athletes’ unconstitutional conditions claim was valid. In such a case, the conditioning of the right to represent CU on the signing of the consent form would preclude any student athlete from voluntarily consenting to the drug-testing program. On the other hand, such a broad injunction would be inappropriate if the trial court believed that the class representatives, and therefore the class, did not voluntarily consent as a matter of fact to the drug-testing program. In such a case, the drug-testing program would have been enjoined as to the class, but not as to all student athletes.
Moreover, it is implausible to contend that the trial court could have entered the injunction as to the group of "prospective undergraduate student athletes" without relying on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. It would have been impossible for the trial court to conclude as a matter of fact that this group did not voluntarily consent to the drug-testing program insofar as no representative of the group appeared before the trial court. Simply stated, there are no factual findings for the majority to defer to on the question of whether prospective student athletes consented to an unspecified future random drug-testing program.
The effect of the majority opinion is to uphold the trial court’s legal determination that this group of individuals who, even though they have not yet considered whether they wish to attend CU to participate in athletics or whether they wish to consent to a random drug-testing *965program, are incapable of voluntarily consenting to any random drug-testing program. Only with the assistance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine could the trial court have declared that all student athletes, including the as yet undetermined group of prospective student athletes, were incapable of giving consent as a matter of law.

. We denied certiorari on the issue of whether we should decertify this case as a class action. Specifically, that issue was:
Did the court of appeals err in sustaining a class action judgment on grounds that apply only to a few members of the class.
In my view, our denial of certiorari on the decertification of class issue was justified at that time because we granted certiorari to resolve the voluntariness of consent issue on the basis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The majority, by refusing to decide the unconstitutional conditions issue, calls into doubt the legal underpinnings of the original class certification because the record contains no support for the majority’s deference to the trial court’s "factual determinations” as representative or typical of all of the members of the class. For
example, it is unclear to me how permanent injunctive relief could be granted in this case to an entire group of individuals, such as prospective student athletes, if no member of that group appeared before the trial court or testified about their individual experiences regarding the vol-untariness of consent that would be obtained from them át some time in the future. See supra note 10.
Fundamental fairness should dictate that CU should not be permanently enjoined from conducting a random drug-testing program in the future, nor should student athletes be precluded from participating in such a program, so long as it can be established that the student-athletes voluntarily consent to participate. If we are going to purposefully avoid application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this case, we should address the question of whether the representatives who appeared and testified before the trial court are typical of all members of the certified class. See C.R.C.P. 23(a)(3) (stating that one or more members of a class may sue as representative parties on behalf of all "only if the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”).

. Commentators view this line of Supreme Court precedent as determinative of the question of whether conditioning participation in intercollegiate athletics on the signing of a consent form for drug-testing programs is constitutionally permissible. E.g., Alex M. Johnson & James F. Ritter, The Legality of Testing Student-Athletes for Drugs and the Unique Issue of Consent, 66 Or.L.Rev. 895 (1987). These commentators conclude that there is presently no constitutional bar to conditioning participation in this manner. See id. at 921-22 (stating that "the Court has approved 'coerced consent, under circumstances closely analogous to the drug-testing procedures adopted by [various Universities] and the NCAA.... Short of the Court overruling itself on the consent issue, no other fourth amendment issues need be raised").

. Wyman stated:
The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and ... is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. If the visitation serves to discourage misrepresentation or fraud, such a byproduct of that visit does not impress upon the visit itself a dominant criminal investigative aspect.
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323, 91 S.Ct. at 389.

. Courts repeatedly have held that, unlike certain expectations like continued employment and attending college, participation in athletics is not a constitutionally protected interest because there is no legitimate expectation of continued participation. See Bailey v. Truby, 174 W.Va. 8, 321 S.E.2d 302, 314-15 (1984) and cases collected therein.