Court Opinion

ID: 9602770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:59:46.102113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:06.869094
License: Public Domain

Lovins, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached in this action. As stated in the Court’s opinion, the public policy of this state does not permit one spouse to sue another for the recovery of damages for a tort. The cases of Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604; Staats v. Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S. E. 2d 916; Wright v. Davis, 132 W. Va. 722, 53 S. E. 2d 335; indubitably establish and define that policy. Further, as stated, the gravamen of the plea in abatement considered in this case is the admitted fact that the sole beneficiary of a recovery, if any be had, is the wife of the defendant.
The decision herein ignores realities and gives undue weight to form, rather than substance. It seems specious to me to say that this action is not in reality one by a wife against a husband. The cause of the action is in fact that of the wife. She does not have the right to bring this action, but the fact the statute gives the right of action to the personal representative of Algie M. Simons and not to the beneficiary, should be disregarded.
If we adhere to the public policy adverted to in the Courts’ opinion with reference to the unity of husband and wife, we certainly cannot, with logic and due respect *551to reality, say that a wife who is the sole beneficiary of a recovery in an action, brought by the personal representative of the wife’s father against her husband, is not actually an action against her husband.
The dissenting opinion in Albrecht v. Potthoff, 257 N. W. (Minn.), 377, is sound in reason and comports with the public policy of this state. The doctrine laid down in Davenport v. Patrick, (N. C.), 44 S. E. 2d 203, states the true rule to be applied in cases of this kind. The 9th headnote in Davenport v. Patrick, supra, reads as follows: “The administrator of childless deceased wife’s estate, not being entitled to recover damages from her surviving husband for her wrongful death as result of husband’s negligence, has no cause of action against husband for amount of wife’s burial expenses.” Davenport v. Patrick, supra, also holds that, “Courts will look beyond nominal party, whose name appears on record as plaintiff in death action, and consider legal questions raised as affecting real party in interest.”
This court likewise looks beyond nominal parties to the party in interest. An action for wrongful death of an infant,-illegally employed, is barred by the contributory negligence of a minor’s father who is the sole beneficiary of recovery. Hendricks v. Public Service Co., 111 W. Va. 576, 163 S. E. 411; Irvine v. Tanning Co., 97 W. Va. 388, 125 S. E. 110; Wills v. Coal Co., 97 W. Va. 476, 125 S. E. 367; Swope v. Coal & Coke Co., 78 W. Va. 517, 89 S. E. 284; Hendricks v. Public Service Co., supra; Dickinson v. Stuart Colliery Co., 71 W. Va. 325, 76 S. E. 654. The first and second points of the syllabus in the Swope case read as follows: “1. For the death of a boy under fourteen years old, in consequence of his employment in a coal mine, in violation of the statute, Code, 1913, ch. 15H, sec. 26, ser. sec. 485, Barnes’ Code, ch. 15H, sec. 24, with the consent of the father, express or implied, there is no right of recovery by the administrator for the benefit of the father.” “2. A father’s abandonment of his wife and children, sufferance of the procurement of a decree of divorce, alimony and custody of the children by the wife and *552avoidance of payment of the alimony by flight from the state, constitute the wife his agent for the care and custody of the children, and her exposure of one of them to danger resulting in his death, is the negligence of the father and precludes right of recovery of damages for his benefit.” Nor can the brothers and sisters of the deceased be substituted for the negligent parent of the deceased. Swope v. Coal & Coke Co., supra.
Moreover, a settlement with the distributee of decedent bars the action. Fetty v. Carroll, 118 W. Va. 401, 190 S. E. 683. “A valid settlement with the sole distributees of a decedent for his wrongful death may be introduced in defense of the decedent’s administrator to recover damages for such death.” Somewhat related to the principle stated in Fetty v. Carroll, supra, recovery by a beneficiary because of a connection with the death of the decedent, will be found in the line of cases which deny a recovery of beneficiary of an insurance policy where the beneficiary has murdered the insured. Wickline v. Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743; Johnston v. Insurance Company, 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865.
Prunty v. Traction Co., 90 W. Va. 194, 110 S. E. 618, permitted a recovery for the benefit of an infant who survived his injury and does not present the same question as that involved in the instant case.
I do not mean to say that the principle denying the recovery to a negligent parent of a decedent is exactly parallel to the situation presented here, since the sole beneficiary of the recovery in this case has done no wrong, nor, insofar as the record discloses did she contribute in any way to the injury and death of her father. But, cases above cited stand for the equitable principle inherent in an action, under Code, 55-7-5, as amended. Such principle interposes a bar against the recovery by a personal representative, if a beneficiary is barred.
Under modern conditions, practically all owners of motor vehicles carry insurance protecting them from liability for death or injury of other persons occurring *553by reason of the operation of such vehicle. With this situation in mind, it is a fair inference that the decision in this case will open the door of temptation for persons standing in a domestic relation to bring and prosecute collusive actions.
To permit a recovery by the personal representative under the statute, Code, 55-7-5, as amended, who will be required to turn over the entire recovery to the wife of the defendant, is to ignore the public policy of this state, as well as the reasons upon which it was founded. I would therefore hold that the plea in abatement presents a bar to the maintenance of this action.