Court Opinion

ID: 9707012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:58:37.60529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.891893
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
Whether Jefferson’s admission be termed tacit or equivocal is completely irrelevant.1 The essence of the “tacit” admission rule was that an individual accused of crime will naturally deny the accusation and that a failure to deny this accusation would permit an inference of guilt. Any action short of a denial made the accusation admissible. Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 421, 32 A. 2d 889, 890 (1943) leaves no doubt that this failure to deny was the basis for evidentiary use of a confederate’s inculpatory statement: “The rule of evidence is well established that, when a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to demy it are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the truth of the charges thus made. The justification of this rule is to be sought in the age-long experience of mankind that ordinarily an innocent person will spontaneously repel false accusations against him, and that a failure to do so is therefore some indication of guilt.” (Emphasis supplied.) See Developments in the Law—Confessions, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 1036-44 (1966); Note, Tacit Criminal Admissions, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 210 (1963). That Jefferson said something short of admitting the truth of his alleged conspirator’s declarations rather than nothing is immaterial for, so long as he did not deny the accusations, the tacit admission rule applied. What Mr. Justice *539Musmanno has said is that Jefferson would have been better off had he remained silent. Why this should be true when the basis for admitting Hughes’ statement was Jefferson’s failure to deny it, not his failure to remain silent, is nowhere explained. I conclude that Jefferson’s admission is as tacit as that found in any of our other tacit admission cases.
Mr. Justice Musmanno next distorts the views expressed by a majority of this Court in Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A. 2d 904 (1967). Mr. Justice Eagen’s concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justice Jones, Mr. Justice Cohen and Mr. Justice O’Brien joined, states that a reversal is required in all cases employing a tacit admission “wherein the judgment was not finalized as of the date Miranda was announced.” Id. at 595, 227 A. 2d at 911. I am at a loss to determine how this judgment of conviction can be deemed final as of the date of Miranda. This appeal is a direct appeal not a collateral attack. The very heart of the grant of relief under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963) is a determination that the state by reason of the accused’s indigency has denied him the right to appeal.2 When this right is restored, the appellate court examines all alleged errors in a posture identical to that employed for any other direct appeal. For example, claims such as the sufficiency of the evidence are cognizable.
Even the most cursory reading of Dravecs indicates that this Court chose zto adopt the Linkletter w. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965) rule to restrict the retroactivity of its decision. As articulated by the Supreme Court, the concept of finality employed in Dink-letter and adopted by Drawees compels the conclusion that Jefferson’s conviction is not final: “By final we *540mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio.” 381 U.S. at 622 n.5, 85 S. Ct. at 1734 n.5. (Emphasis supplied.) That the availability of appeal for Jefferson has not been exhausted is amply demonstrated by the fact that the present proceeding is a direct appeal. If the Supreme Court (and this Court, by adopting the Supreme Court’s test) intended to exclude Douglas claims (Douglas, decided in 1963, was well prior to Linhletter) it could have insisted that the relevant inquiry was whether the time for appeal not its availability had expired.3
Yet Mr. Justice Musmanno concludes that this appeal is final for purposes of Dravecz because it is a nunc pro tunc appeal. What he fails to appreciate is that the availability of various constitutional challenges turns not on the nature of the appeal but rather the operative event which determines the prospectivity of the right asserted. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965) teaches us that the protections afforded by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961) are applicable to all defendants whose convictions were not finalized at the time Mapp was decided; Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S. Ct. 1772 (1966) that individuals whose trials commenced after the dates of decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964) may avail themselves of these new principles; and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967) that all line*541ups conducted after tlxe decision in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967) not in conformity with the Wade rules are invalid. Simply, the Supreme Court of the United States has used at least three distinct events to anchor the prospectivity of its decisions: (1) whether the litigation is final (Link-letter); (2) the date of the commencement of trial (Johnson) ; and (3) the date upon which the alleged constitutional violation occurred (Stovall). At least two of these three alternatives were available to this Court when Dravecz was decided.4 Had we chosen the Johnson rule, Jefferson would not be able to assert the rights established in Dravecz for his trial commenced well before Miranda5 We did not. Instead, this Court employed the Linhletter finality concept and, under Linhletter, this judgment is not final.
Assuming arguendo that Jefferson cannot find shelter under Dravecz, Mr. Justice Musmanno ignores two cases recently decided by this Court giving limited retroactivity to the proscription against use of tacit admissions. In both Commonwealth v. Stevens, 429 Pa. 593, 240 A. 2d 536 (1968) and Commonwealth ex rel. Berkery v. Myers, 429 Pa. 378, 239 A. 2d 805 (1968) we held that where the use of a tacit admission results in a fundamentally unfair trial that use can be collaterally attacked, i.e., the conviction is retroactively invalid. Given the fact that the bartender allegedly robbed by Jefferson could not identify him at trial and that the Commonwealth’s case rested almost completely*5426 upon Jefferson’s tacit admission, I believe that use of this admission might well be characterized as fundamentally unfair.7 However, in view of the fact that I am convinced that Mr. Justice Musmanno has misinterpreted Draveem, I find it unnecessary to express my views as to the applicability of Stevens and Berbery.8 Furthermore, despite the intimation contained in Mr. Justice Musmanno’S opinion to the contrary, the withdrawal by Jefferson’s trial counsel of his objection to evidentiary use of his client’s tacit admission would not constitute a waiver of the contention presently made9 for the simple reason that neither counsel nor client can be required to anticipate Draveem, Stevens or Berbery, decisions rendered well after the date of Jefferson’s trial. See O’Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 87 S. Ct. 252 (1966); Commonwealth v. Stevens, supra *543at 598-600, 240 A. 2d at 539-40; Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A. 2d 765 (1967).
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Cohen and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this dissenting opinion.

 It seems clear that Jefferson’s reply cannot be classified as an adoptive admission such as the one found in Commonwealth v. Cheeks, 429 Pa. 89, 239 A. 2d 793 (1968).

 The Commonwealth does not challenge the propriety of the determination below that Jefferson was denied his Douglas rights.

 Although nowhere suggested in his opinion, it is possible that Mr. Justice Musmanno is sub silentio attempting .to overrule Draveez. If such is the case, I would still be compelled to dissent on the basis of the views I expressed in my opinion in Commonwealth ex rel. Shadd v. Myers, 423 Pa. 82, 91-93, 223 A. 2d 296, 301-02 (1966) (dissenting opinion).

 In a different context, the third alternative (the Stovall rule) was also suggested to this Court prior to Dravecz. See Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 423 Pa. 432, 442-445, 224 A. 2d 625, 630-32 (1966) (dissenting opinion).

 Since Dravecz was termed an outgrowth of Miranda, such a choice was available to this Court. Had we opted for the Stovall rule, Jefferson again would be unable to employ Dravecz for his tacit admission was made before Miranda was announced.

 The only other evidence presented by the Commonwealth of any probative value was testimony by one police officer that the allegedly robbed bartender had identified Jefferson’s picture. However, the bartender denied that he had done so.

 It is possible that the Btevens-Berlcery rule was foreshadowed by a line of our cases stating that a tacit admission may not be employed unless there is other evidence of guilt. The import of these cases is that a tacit admission alone is insufficient to support a verdict. See Commonwealth v. Karmendi, 328 Pa. 321, 335-36, 195 Atl. 62, 68 (1937); Commonwealth v. Manuszak, 155 Pa. Superior Ct. 309, 313, 38 A. 2d 355, 357 (1944); Commonwealth v. Wiand, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 444, 447, 30 A. 2d 635, 637 (1943); Commonwealth v. Weigand, 134 Pa. Superior Ct. 603, 606, 5 A. 2d 385, 386 (1939). Unless the testimony of the police officer that Jefferson was identified by photograph, see footnote 6, supra, is sufficient other evidence, then Jefferson’s conviction may well be supported by insufficient evidence. He makes just such a contention and, of course, can succeed on this ground for we deal with a direct appeal.

 Since Mr. Justice Musmanno affirms this conviction, it would appear incumbent upon him to discuss why Stevens and Berlcery do not apply.

 See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A. 2d 530 (1967).