Court Opinion

ID: 9384443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 20:04:00.730178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.591279
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
           in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                      2023 IL App (3d) 220004-U

                                  Order filed April 3, 2023
     ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                   2023

     In re ESTATE OF ETHEL M. PRYOR,                )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
     Deceased                                       )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                    )       Peoria County, Illinois,
                                                    )
                                                    )       Appeal No. 3-22-0004
                                                    )       Circuit No. 13-P-54
                                                    )
                                                    )       Honorable
     (Kathy Ralph, Petitioner-Appellant, v.         )       David Brown,
     Michael Pryor, Respondent-Appellee).           )       Judge, Presiding.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

           JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices McDade and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
     ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                ORDER

¶1         Held: Section 4-4 of the Probate Act does not require republication of a will each time a
                 trust referenced therein is amended. However, summary judgment was improper
                 where genuine issues of material fact remained concerning whether the decedent
                 was under undue influence and/or lacked testamentary capacity when the
                 amendments to the trust were executed. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and
                 remanded.
¶2          Petitioner, Kathy Ralph (Ralph), moved for summary judgment on her declaratory

     judgment action,1 arguing that the second of four competing estate plans executed by the decedent,

     Ethel Marie Pryor, controlled, because it was the only plan that involved a contemporaneous

     execution of the will and the trust referenced therein. Respondent, Michael Pryor, urged that

     section 4-4 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2008)) does not require republication

     of a will each time a trust referenced therein is amended and, rather, expressly allows for wills to

     bequeath estate assets to a trust, even if that trust is amended after the execution of the will. In

     addition, Michael filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that the third estate plan,

     as the more recent plan, controlled over the second, and that the fourth estate plan was invalid due

     to Ethel’s lack of testamentary capacity at the time of its execution. Ralph responded, in part, that

     Ethel acted under Michael’s undue influence in executing the third estate plan and did not lack

     testamentary capacity in executing the fourth estate plan. The trial court denied Ralph’s motion

     for summary judgment and granted Michael’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Ralph appeals

     both rulings. We affirm the denial of Ralph’s motion for summary judgment based on our

     interpretation of section 4-4, and we reverse the granting of Michael’s cross-motion for summary

     judgment based on our determination that questions of fact remain concerning undue influence

     and testamentary capacity.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

            1
                Ralph’s motion did not specify the cause of action underlying her motion for summary

     judgment. However, following the 2017 appeal, her declaratory judgment action remained

     pending, and the parties clearly seek to have the court resolve which of four competing estate plans

     control.

                                                      2
¶4           Ethel Pryor, who never married or had children of her own, passed away at age 86 on

     September 3, 2012. Six months later, the trial court appointed Michael, who was Ethel’s nephew,

     to be the legal representative of her estate. The estate, partially distributed, remains pending in

     probate court. The estate’s primary asset is 7872 shares of Caterpillar stock, valued between $78

     and $210 per share during the relevant period. The will bequeathed the residue of the estate,

     including the Caterpillar stock, to the trust.

¶5           We have recounted key portions of the estate’s procedural history in our earlier order, In

     re Estate of Pryor, 2017 IL App (3d) 170023-U. Briefly, in February 2015, Ralph, who was Ethel’s

     great niece, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine which of Ethel’s four estate

     plans controlled. Id. ¶ 4. In December 2015, Ralph moved to appoint a special administrator of

     the estate, arguing in part that Michael—who was the trustee and, together with his son (Todd

     Pryor), the primary beneficiary under the third estate plan—should not be permitted to play a role

     in choosing which estate plan controlled. Id. ¶ 19. The trial court denied Ralph’s motion, citing

     to Estate of Hawley, 183 Ill. App. 3d 107, 109 (1989), which allows for some conflict of interest

     when the conflict is expressly contemplated by the estate documents. See Pryor, 2017 IL App

     (3d) 170023, ¶ 21.

¶6           This court’s majority affirmed the denial of Ralph’s motion, but on different grounds. Id.

     ¶ 12. The majority determined that Ralph had not cited the proper statutory section to obtain the

     relief sought. Id. The dissent disagreed, explaining that an oral exchange during the trial court

     proceedings had corrected that problem. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. The dissent addressed the merits of Ralph’s

     conflict-of-interest argument and agreed with her. Id. ¶ 24. The dissent recognized the importance

     of protecting a testator’s right to appoint executors and trustees of her own choosing, even if there

     is a conflict of interest. Id. ¶ 25. Still, the dissent continued, this right must be balanced against

                                                       3
     the rights of the trust beneficiaries to be able to demand that the trustee adhere to his fiduciary

     duty. Id. In the dissent’s view, “the facts and circumstances surrounding the trust create a potential

     for a conflict of interest that is not permissible because of the potential adverse effect on the

     interests of the other beneficiaries if Michael were to participate in any way in the determination

     of which trust amendment is the appropriate instrument to employ and to determine the distribution

     of the shares of the estate.” Id. ¶ 24. The dissent would have reversed and remanded the cause for

     the appointment of a special representative to replace Michael. Id. ¶ 25.

¶7          Following this court’s order, Ralph’s declaratory judgment action remained pending.

     Despite the majority’s disposition, the parties ultimately agreed that a special administrator should

     be appointed in helping to determine which of the four estate plans controlled.

¶8          The four estate plans were as follows: (1) the 2005 Rochford Estate Plan, which included

     the original revocable living trust, with no corresponding will, dated June 3, 2005, drafted by the

     Jim Rochford law firm, with Ethel as the trustee, her close friend, Deloris Nieukirk, as successor

     trustee, and Charles Dudley as a second successor trustee; (2) the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan,

     which included the first amendment to the revocable living trust, with corresponding will, dated

     February 13, 2009, drafted by the Rochford law firm, with Ethel as a trustee and Imogene Secretan

     and Jim Rochford as co-successor trustees; (3) the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan, which included the

     second amendment to the revocable living trust, without republication of the will, dated July 12,

     2012, drafted by the (Daniel) Harrod law firm, with Ethel as the trustee, Michael as successor

     trustee, and Michael’s son Todd as the second successor trustee; and (4) the 2012 Rochford Estate

     Plan, which included the third amendment to the revocable living trust, without republication of

     the will, dated August 13, 2012, drafted by the Rochford law firm, with Ethel as the trustee,

     Michael as the successor trustee, and Rochford as the second successor trustee.

                                                       4
¶9             The intended distribution of each estate plan was as follows. The 2005 Rochford Plan

       included only a revocable trust, not a will. After nominal bequests to friends and the church, the

       trust evenly distributed the residue of the estate to the members of Ethel’s original family of birth—

       her four brothers (or their families, if the brother predeceased her) 2, plus her close friend Nieukirk.

       Each group would receive a 1/5 share.

¶ 10           The 2009 Rochford Estate Plan included a 2009 will and a 2009 amended trust. The will

       contained an in terrorem provision that, in certain circumstances, prohibited interested parties from

       challenging it. It named Nieukirk and, next, Dudley as executors (the pair had previously been

       named successor trustees in the 2005 trust). It bequeathed the residue of the estate to the trust and

       provided that the bequeathed property would be distributed according to the terms of the trust,

       including any amendment to the trust made before Ethel’s death. After certain nominal bequests,

       the trust again evenly distributed the residue of the estate to Ethel’s four brothers (or their families,

       if the brother predeceased her), plus Nieukirk. Again, each group would receive a 1/5 share.

¶ 11           The 2012 Harrod Estate Plan departed from the two prior estate plans. There was no

       republication of the will. Instead, there was only the 2012 Harrod Amendment to the trust. The

       amended trust directed that the residue of the estate was to be split as follows: (1) Michael was to

       receive a 1/3 share, (2) Michael’s son, Todd Pryor, was to receive a 1/3 share, and (3) Nolan Pryor,

       Jr. and Allen Pryor, the sons of Ethel’s brother Nolan, were to split the final 1/3 share. Nieukirk,

       as well as the children of two of Ethel’s brothers and certain great nieces and nephews whose

               2
                   Ethel had a fifth brother who passed away in 1958, never married, and had no children.

       He is not accounted for in any of the estate plans.

                                                          5
       parents had passed, were excluded except for nominal bequests in the $1000 to $2000 range (with

       Ralph receiving a bequest of $10,000).

¶ 12          The 2012 Rochford Estate Plan represented a partial return to the original estate plan.

       Again, there was no republication of the will. Instead, there was only the 2012 Rochford

       Amendment to the trust. The amended trust directed that the residue of the estate was to be split

       as follows: (1) Michael was to receive a 1/3 share, and (2) the remaining 2/3 share was to be split

       in 1/4 shares for the families of each of Ethel’s four brothers. Michael was, therefore, in line to

       inherit both in his own right and, depending on the timing of his father’s death, as a child of Ethel’s

       brother. However, the children of two of Ethel’s brothers and certain great nieces and nephews

       whose parents had passed were no longer excluded. Nieukirk was to receive $1000.

¶ 13                                  A. Motions for Summary Judgment

¶ 14          On May 14, 2021, Ralph moved for summary judgment on her declaratory judgment

       action. She urged that the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan controlled, because it was the only plan that

       complied with section 4-4 of the Probate Act, which in her view, required contemporaneous

       publication or republication of the will each time a trust referenced therein was amended. Ralph

       also argued that Michael exerted undue influence in procuring the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan. As

       she would later clarify at hearing, this question should preclude the court from granting summary

       judgment in Michael’s favor.

¶ 15          On October 29, 2021, Michael filed the operative cross-motion for summary judgment. He

       argued that the will’s in terrorem provision operated to disinherit those, such as Ralph, who

       challenge the will. In the alternative, he argued in favor of the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan. According

       to Michael, the 2012 Harrod Plan, being the more recent plan, controlled over the 2009 Rochford

                                                         6
       Estate Plan and, further, the 2012 Rochford Estate plan, although the most recent plan, was invalid

       due to Ethel’s lack of testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

¶ 16            The parties attached various documents to their pleadings and responsive pleadings. Ralph

       attached, inter alia, attorney Rochford’s deposition transcripts. Michael attached, inter alia, the

       affidavits of Michael (himself), Sandy Pryor (Michael’s wife), and Barbara E. Daraban (Harrod’s

       legal secretary). The parties also referred to nursing home notes in the months preceding Ethel’s

       death.

¶ 17            Attorney Rochford testified in deposition that Ethel was referred to him by a mutual contact

       in the Kiwanis organization. Rochford testified to the estate plans drafted by his office. Rochford

       and his co-counsel, Cynthia Volk, helped Ethel to craft the 2005 and 2009 estate plans. Volk took

       the lead on drafting Ethel’s estate plan when, in 2009, Ethel named Rochford as a successor trustee.

       Through 2012, Rochford remained in contact with Ethel and he and his wife (and paralegal), Deb

       Rochford, visited her in the nursing home in April and May of 2012. Ethel informed them that

       Michael had played a more active role in her life as of late, whereas she had not seen several of

       her other intended beneficiaries in a while. Ethel informed Rochford that she wanted to leave a

       larger share of her estate to Michael, who Rochford also knew to be her power of attorney.

       Rochford believed that Ethel had the testamentary capacity to so provide. Rochford believed this

       even while acknowledging certain 2011 statements that Ethel had made against Michael’s father

       and, to a lesser degree, Michael (addressed below). Rochford’s firm drafted the 2012 Rochford

       Estate Plan consistent with his 2012 discussions with Ethel. However, Volk, not he, was present

       at the execution of the documents. Although Rochford was not present, he clarified that it was his

       firm’s practice to ask elderly clients questions aimed at discerning their testamentary capacity prior

       to signing and he had no reason to believe that Volk did not follow that practice.

                                                         7
¶ 18          Rochford also testified in deposition to the issue of Michael’s undue influence. In July

       2011, Rochford’s firm’s secretary wrote the following note to Rochford based on her phone

       conversation with Ethel: “Her nephew’s wife threatening her to be her POA or else—remove her

       from will. She’s very upset. Can you help?” Attached to that note was a post-it instructing “C.V.

       [Cynthia Volk], please call her[.]” Rochford further acknowledged that, in 2011, Ethel informed

       his law firm that she was “upset,” that Kenneth (Michael’s father) and Michael were going to take

       over her finances. Also, a firm document written in Volk’s handwriting provided: “Kenny and his

       son, on more than one occasion, told her to leave all of her assets to him and his son.” The date of

       that document is unclear from Rochford’s deposition testimony.

¶ 19          In contrast, Michael averred in an affidavit that he had a special relationship with Ethel,

       and, according to his parents, he was “the closest to her.” Michael’s son, Todd, also enjoyed a

       special relationship with Ethel. When Todd was a young man, he suffered a life-threatening head

       injury and Ethel’s visits and support made a difference to his recovery.

¶ 20          Michael recounted that Ethel was hospitalized in February 2012 and, in April 2012, she

       moved into a nursing home. While there, Michael and his wife continued their near-daily visits,

       running errands for Ethel: “She always wanted greeting cards to send to her many friends and

       nieces and nephews.” In April 2012, Ethel was offered, but refused, kidney dialysis treatment.

       She understood the consequences of her decision, explaining that she had lived a good life.

¶ 21          Michael further averred that, once in the nursing home, Ethel told Sandy and him that she

       wanted to change her will. Michael asked Ethel if he should contact Rochford, but Ethel

       responded, “No, I don’t trust that Rochford character.” In late April, Michael took Ethel to see

       attorney Harrod. In late June or early July 2012, Michael again took Ethel to see Harrod. Ethel

       spoke with Harrod while Michael remained in the waiting room. On July 11, 2012, Michael took

                                                        8
       Ethel to see Harrod for a third time to execute the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan. The appointment

       lasted 30 minutes. Michael remained in the waiting room.

¶ 22          According to Michael, on July 11, 2012, Ethel was well-dressed. She engaged in lively

       conversation with him and with Harrod’s secretary, Barbara Daraban. “[Ethel] exhibited no signs

       of any diminished mental capacity. She was clearly of sound mind on that day under no und[ue]

       influence, under no coercion.”

¶ 23          Also according to Michael, in late July or early August 2012, Ethel began showing signs

       of diminished mental capacity upon taking Ativan (an anti-anxiety medication). Michael averred:

       “[b]efore [Ethel] began taking Ativan, she was alert, well oriented and was making her own

       decisions including medical decisions. *** Once she began taking Ativan *** she deteriorated

       rather quickly. Her mental capacity became greatly diminished in August of 2012.” Also: “[I]n

       August 2012, the nurse at [the nursing home] asked if I would make decisions for [Ethel] because

       she became very mixed up and did not seem to have a grasp of things around her.” Finally: “My

       wife Sandy and I visited [Ethel] on almost a daily basis from August through the time of her death

       in September. In August 2012, she clearly suffered from memory loss, weakness, and drowsiness.

       *** [S]he had a very poor understanding of *** her medical situation and with everything in

       general.”

¶ 24          Sandy’s affidavit was consistent with Michael’s. In addition, Sandy averred that she was

       a registered nurse and, inter alia: “On August 3, 2012, [Ethel] began taking Ativan. Before that

       time, Ethel was alert, made sense while talking to her and was able to make her own medical

       decisions. However, on some of the last few days of July 2012, we noticed some issues with her,

       she was confused at times, she wanted to go back to her apartment and she was complaining of

       being tired all of the time.” Also, in “August 2012,” it was obvious to me that [Ethel’s] mental

                                                       9
       and physical condition was deteriorating at a concerning rate”; and “[Ethel] began suffering from

       confusion, memory loss, drowsiness, dizziness, and weakness with the medication of Ativan.”

¶ 25          Daraban, Harrod’s legal secretary, attested to her interactions with Ethel. Daraban had

       occasion to observe Ethel in late April 2012. Ethel was brought to the office by Michael, and “she

       clearly adored [him], as he did her.” Ethel was well-dressed, had excellent manners, and easily

       engaged in conversation. They discussed how nice she looked and the beautiful sunny day.

       Daraban’s impression was the same when Ethel came into the office a second and a third time.

       Ethel also engaged in conversation with the two witnesses to the amendment, Susan Karpraun (an

       office worker) and Don Pioletti (another client who was awaiting his meeting with Harrod).

       Daraban makes it a point to speak with the person whose documents she is notarizing or signing

       and, more than once in 18 years as a legal secretary, she witnessed clients that she did not believe

       had the mental capacity to understand the documents that they were signing. This was not one of

       those times. Rather, Daraban felt that Ethel was “in her right mind to make any changes she felt

       appropriate at the time.” Further, “I found [Ethel] to be of sound mind and not under or subject to

       duress, fraud or undue influence[.]”

¶ 26          The parties also referred to the nursing home notes. On June 11, 2012, one month prior to

       the Harrod Amendment, the notes state that “resident is 86 years old and confused.” On July 11,

       2012, the date of the Harrod Amendment, the notes state that “[r]es[ident] up with minimal assist.

       Alert and oriented.” On August 27, 2012, two weeks after the Rochford Amendment, the notes

       state that “[r]esident [is] in room for evening meal due to increased confusion and complaint of

       feeling sick to stomach and increased cough.” On August 28, 2012, the notes state that “[r]esident

       seems confused not understanding things she says. Will continue to monitor.”

                                                       10
¶ 27          At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the trial court and the parties clarified

       certain arguments. Relevant here, the court acknowledged that Michael had not presented a

       traditional cross-motion for summary judgment in the sense that he did not seek judgment on the

       same ground as Ralph. (Ralph sought judgment based on section 4-4 and Michael sought judgment

       based on the will’s in terrorem provision and the question of Ethel’s competence.)

¶ 28          Also relevant here, Ralph urged the trial court to distinguish between competence (or

       testamentary capacity) and undue influence:

                      “Mr. Harrod made the charge against me that I alleged that [Ethel] was

              incompetent. I never did, ever, say anything like that.

                      What I did say was there were legitimate legal arguments that should be

              investigated. Undue influence of someone who is a power of attorney has a conflict of

              interest; when he procures the document, the burden shifts to them to show us a valid

              document. I don’t think they’ve done that.

                      Especially, when they take the basic estate plan of the decedent and absolutely

              destroy it and just take it so that one-third goes to [Michael], one-third to his son, and the

              other third to two nephews in Iowa, and ten other people get nothing out of the [trust].”

¶ 29          Ralph also addressed Ethel’s testamentary capacity on August 13, 2012. Ralph argued

       that, even if the affidavits were uncontroverted that Ethel was competent in July 2012, “[h]ow did

       they know she’s not competent [four weeks later in August 2012]?” Also: “[T]here’s no statement

       by anyone of the competency of [Ethel] on the date she signed the Rochford Amendment, so I

       don’t know that the court can assume that she was competent or incompetent.”

¶ 30          The trial court recounted that this had been an interesting case. It referenced prior attempts

       at settlement that had not come to fruition. It also stated that, should it determine that an estate

                                                       11
       plan other than the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan—under which Michael had already distributed major

       assets—should control, the special administrator would be tasked with correcting for improper

       distributions. The special administrator, who was present at the hearing, did not say it could not

       be done.

¶ 31                                           B. The Trial Court’s Order

¶ 32           On December 3, 2021, the trial court issued a written order. Preliminarily, it rejected

       Michael’s argument that the will’s in terrorem clause precluded Ralph from seeking clarification

       on which estate plan controlled.

¶ 33           The trial court next rejected Ralph’s argument that the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan

       controlled as being the only plan that complied with section 4-4 of the Act:

                       “For the reasons more fully explained and stated on the record in open court ***,

               the court finds that [section 4-4 of the Act] does not require the republication (or other act)

               of a pour-over will every time a revocable living trust, which is referenced in the will, is

               amended. As a result, the court declines [Ralph’s] request that the court invalidate the

               [2012 Harrod Estate Plan] and the [2012 Rochford Estate Plan] based upon that theory.”

       The court had explained in open court: “[Section 4-4] contemplates a testator making changes to

       the trust. It doesn’t prohibit it. And there’s nothing in there that says if they make a change to the

       trust that they have to republish a will or the like.”

¶ 34           Returning to the written order, the trial court agreed with Michael’s argument that the 2012

       Harrod Estate Plan, being more recent, controlled over the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan. It

       determined that Ethel was “competent” when executing the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan:

               “[T]here are no material issues of fact relating to the execution of ‘Harrod Amendment’

               with regard to [Ethel’s] mental competency. The court finds that the affidavits [and/or

                                                         12
              depositions of Michael, Ralph, Daraban, and Rochford] adequately support the conclusion

              that [Ethel] was competent at the time she signed the Harrod amendment.”

       The court did not address Ralph’s argument that Ethel had acted under Michael’s undue influence

       in executing the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan.

¶ 35          Further, the trial court agreed with Michael’s argument that the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan,

       although the most recent, was invalid because Ethel was incompetent when executing it:

                      “The only admissible evidence regarding [Ethel’s] [competency] at the time of the

              execution of the Rochford Amendment are the affidavits of [Michael and Sandy Pryor].

              (The affidavit of Barbara Daraban only relates to the signing of the Harrod Amendment.)

              Those affidavits call into question [Ethel’s] competency at or about the time of the

              execution of the Rochford Amendment. No other evidence was submitted in that regard.

              The court has reviewed thoroughly the transcript of Mr. Rochford’s [deposition]. Mr.

              Rochford was not present at the signing of the Rochford Amendment and therefore had no

              personal knowledge of [Ethel’s] mental condition or state at that time. He did testify he

              met with [Ethel] earlier (prior to the signing of the Harrod Amendment). As such, his

              deposition does not contradict [Michael and Sandy’s] affidavits. Furthermore, no party has

              taken the position that the Rochford Amendment is valid and/or enforceable. As such, the

              court finds there are no material issues of fact regarding the Rochford Amendment and as

              a matter of law it is not valid or enforceable.”

¶ 36          The trial court concluded: “As a result of the rulings on the [motions for summary

       judgment], the court hereby directs the Special Administrator to administer the probate estate

       consistent with the court’s rulings and in compliance with the estate plan *** as set forth in the

       2009 pour-over will and the [2012] Harrod Amendment to the revocable living trust.” Thus,

                                                        13
       although it did not expressly state, the trial court denied Ralph’s motion for summary judgment

       and granted Michael’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Ralph now appeals those rulings.

       Michael does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the will’s in terrorem clause does

       not prohibit Ralph from seeking a determination of the appropriate estate plan.

¶ 37                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 38           Ralph appeals the trial court’s summary judgment rulings. A trial court may grant a motion

       for summary judgment only “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with

       the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

       party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). When

       appropriate, summary judgment procedure is encouraged as an aid to expeditiously resolve a given

       lawsuit. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1993). Nevertheless, summary judgment is

       a drastic remedy that should be granted only if the movant’s right is clear and free from doubt. Id.

       As such, in determining whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment, the court must

       construe the pleadings, depositions, exhibits, admissions, and affidavits on file strictly against the

       movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Id. at 410-11. A genuine issue of fact exists if there

       is a dispute as to material facts or if reasonable persons may draw different inferences from

       undisputed facts. Id. at 411. A motion for summary judgment is not to decide questions of fact,

       but to determine whether one exists. Aetna Casualty & Surety v. James J. Benes & Associates,

       229 Ill. App. 3d 413, 416 (1992). As such, motions for summary judgment present questions of

       law, which we review de novo. Direct Auto Insurance Co. v. Beltran, 2013 IL App (1st) 121128,

       ¶ 43.

¶ 39                          A. Ralph’s Motion for Summary Judgment: Section 4-4

                                                         14
¶ 40             We first address whether the trial court properly denied Ralph’s motion for summary

       judgment based on its interpretation of section 4-4 of the Probate Act. When interpreting a statute,

       the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re Estate of

       Lieberman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 882, 887 (2009). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language

       of the statute. Id. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the language will be

       given effect as written, without resort to other principles of statutory interpretation. In re Estate

       of Martin, 2020 IL App (2d) 190140, ¶ 58. We may not depart from the plain language of the

       statute “by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature.”

       In re Estate of Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d 45, 51 (2009). Like motions for summary judgment, statutory

       interpretation presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Lieberman, 391 Ill. App. 3d

       at 886.

¶ 41             Section 4-4 provides:

                         “Testamentary additions to trusts. By a will signed and attested as provided in this

                 Act a testator may bequeath or appoint real and personal estate to a trustee of a trust

                 evidenced by an instrument, including the will of another who predeceases the testator,

                 which is in existence when the testator’s will is made and which is identified in the

                 testator’s will, even though the trust is subject to amendment, modification, revocation or

                 termination. Unless the testator’s will provides otherwise, the estate so bequeathed or

                 appointed shall be governed by the terms and provisions of the instrument creating the

                 trust, including any amendments or modifications in writing made at any time before or

                 after the execution of the testator’s will and before, or after if the testator’s will so directs,

                 the death of the testator. ***.” (Emphases added.) 755 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2008).

                                                            15
¶ 42           The parties dispute whether section 4-4 requires republication of a will each time a

       revocable living trust, which is referenced in the will, is amended. If, as Ralph argues, section 4-

       4 requires republication, then only the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan is in compliance and we may

       end our analysis. If, as Michael argues, section 4-4 does not require republication, then the 2009

       Rochford Estate Plan, the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan, and the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan are all in

       compliance and we must proceed to address the questions of undue influence and testamentary

       capacity.

¶ 43           We determine that the plain language of section 4-4 resolves the dispute. Section 4-4

       plainly provides that the terms of the trust, including any amendments thereto, will govern the

       distribution of the bequeathed estate assets, even if the amendments to the terms of the trust were

       made after the will was made. Moreover, as the trial court stated, section 4-4 contains no

       requirement that the will be republished or amended contemporaneous to each amendment to the

       trust. See, e.g., Ellis, 236 Ill. 2d at 51 (we will not read additional requirements into a statute).

¶ 44           Indeed, as our case law has discussed, the legislature drafted section 4-4 precisely to avoid

       such a requirement. In In re Estate of Meskimen, 39 Ill. 2d 415, 418 (1968), our supreme court

       determined that a will’s language manifested an intent to give the residue of the estate to the trustee

       to be administered as part of the trust. In so concluding, the court referenced section 43a of the

       Probate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, chap. 3, par. 43a) [now section 4-4]. Id. at 420. The court noted:

       “The main purpose of this section was to validate transfers to [i]nter vivos trusts which were

       amenable or subject to modification, revocation, or termination, since there was a conflict in

       authority in other jurisdictions as to whether such bequests could be upheld if the trust had been

       amended or was even subject to an amendment.” Id. Thus, “it has been generally assumed” that

       the legislature enacted section 43a, now section 4-4, to clarify that a will’s bequest to a trustee

                                                         16
       remains valid even if the trust was later amended. Id. at 421; see also In re Estate of Phelan, 375

       Ill. App. 3d 875, 887 n.1 (2007).

¶ 45          We would further note that here, Ethel’s will itself contemplated that the bequeathed estate

       assets would be governed by a trust that was subject to amendment. Supra ¶ 10. Because we

       agree with the trial court’s interpretation of section 4-4, we affirm its denial of Ralph’s motion for

       summary judgment.

¶ 46                             B. Michael’s Motion for Summary Judgment:

                           Questions of Undue Influence and Testamentary Capacity

¶ 47          Turning to Michael’s motion for summary judgment, we consider the separate questions

       of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity. The question of undue influence arises as

       to the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan, because Michael, who stood in a fiduciary position, benefited from

       a plan which he helped to procure. The question of testamentary capacity arises as to the 2012

       Rochford Estate Plan, because Michael alleged in his motion for summary judgment with some

       supporting evidence that Ethel lacked testamentary capacity when she executed that plan. We

       address each question in turn.

¶ 48                    1. The Question of Undue Influence and the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan

¶ 49          We consider the question of Michael’s undue influence over Ethel in the execution of the

       July 11, 2012, Harrod Estate Plan. A presumption of undue influence arises when a person who

       stands in a fiduciary relationship to the testator/decedent participated in the preparation or

       procurement of the estate plan and receives a substantial benefit under its terms. In re Estate of

       Burren, 2013 IL App (1st) 120996, ¶ 20. Kindness and affection, real or feigned, are ordinarily

       insufficient to create the presumption of undue influence. Kelley v. First State Bank of Princeton,

       81 Ill. App. 3d 402 (1980). Rather, the testator’s free will must be overcome such that she is

                                                        17
       induced to do what she would not have done had she been left to act freely. DeHart v. DeHart,

       2013 IL 114137, ¶ 27. To invalidate an estate plan, the undue influence must be directly connected

       with the execution of the instrument and operate at the time it is made. Peters v. Catt, 15 Ill. 2d

       255, 263 (1958). Other factors that may support a finding of undue influence include old age and

       infirmity (id.) and a change in a long-established testamentary scheme (Kelley, 81 Ill. App. 3d at

       417).

¶ 50           Here, there is evidence to support each of the three elements composing the presumption

       of undue influence. First, it is undisputed that Michael stood in a fiduciary position to Ethel. He

       was her financial power of attorney. See DeHart, 2013 IL 114137, ¶ 31 (a power of attorney is a

       fiduciary relationship). In addition, he stood in a position of trust and influence as her nephew,

       visiting her at the nursing home nearly every day. Second, Michael participated in the procurement

       of the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan. Michael contacted the Harrod law firm, even though Ethel was

       then working with the Rochford law firm (with Jim Rochford, Deb Rochford, and Cynthia Volk

       each visiting Ethel in the nursing home during the same time). Michael transported Ethel to and

       from the Harrod law firm to change her estate plan. Third, Michael received a substantial benefit

       from the new estate plan. Under the previous plan, Michael would most likely receive a 1/10 share

       of the estate (if Michael’s father predeceased Ethel, a 1/5 share would be split between Michael

       and the family of his deceased sibling) and his son, Todd, would receive nothing. Under the 2012

       Harrod Estate plan, Michael was to receive an immediate 1/3 share (regardless of whether his

       father passed) and his son, Todd, was to receive a 1/3 share.

¶ 51           There is also evidence of other factors suggesting undue influence—old age and infirmity

       and a change in a long-established testamentary scheme. Catt, 15 Ill. 2d at 265; Kelley, 81 Ill.

       App. 3d at 417. As to old age and infirmity, Michael does not dispute that, in the spring of 2012,

                                                       18
       Ethel was taken to the hospital and, soon after, a nursing home. In the months that followed and

       until her death in September 2012, she would experience renal failure and intermittent confusion.

¶ 52          As to a change in a long-established testamentary scheme, not only were Michael and his

       son to benefit greatly under the new plan, but the descendants of some of Ethel’s brothers, as well

       as Ethel’s good friend, Nieukirk, were excluded except for nominal bequests. The 2012 Harrod

       Estate Plan upended the testamentary plan that Ethel had maintained for the previous seven years

       to bequeath equal shares to the families of each of her four brothers. We acknowledge that, in

       2012, Rochford believed that Ethel in fact wanted Michael to have a larger share of the estate

       (despite his firm’s 2011 concerns about Michael pressuring Ethel). Still, the 2012 Rochford Estate

       Plan, which we address in the next section, represents a swift return to the long-established plan

       to include the descendants of each of her brothers and, critical to this section of our analysis, is

       evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that Ethel was dissatisfied with, and never freely

       subscribed to, the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan that had excluded them.

¶ 53          All of this evidence, at a minimum, creates a question of fact as to undue influence at the

       time of the execution of the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan, precluding summary judgment in Michael’s

       favor that the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan controls as a matter of law.

¶ 54          Michael does not respond to Ralph’s undue influence argument. Like the trial court,

       Michael treats undue influence as synonymous with competence. In that regard, Michael argues

       in conclusory fashion that his, Sandy’s, and Daraban’s affidavits remain uncontradicted. However,

       undue influence may exist despite evidence of the testator’s mental competence. Hoover, 155 Ill.

       2d at 419. Michael’s supporting affidavits on the issue of undue influence are either conclusory

       (Baraban’s statement) or are not dispositive. They provide, for example, that Michael has always

       enjoyed a special relationship with Ethel and was her favorite, and that Ethel told Michael that she

                                                       19
       did not trust attorney Rochford. These assertions appear to challenge the presumptions against

       Michael that arise from his receipt of a disproportionate share of the estate and his procurement of

       Harrod’s law services. However, the assertions fall far short of establishing that the 2012 Harrod

       Estate Plan controls as a matter of law.

¶ 55               2. The Question of Testamentary Capacity and the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan

¶ 56          We next address the question of Ethel’s competence, or testamentary capacity, at the time

       she executed the August 13, 2012, Rochford Estate Plan. “The standard test of testamentary

       capacity, i.e., soundness of mind and memory, is that ‘the testator must be capable of knowing

       what his property is, who are the natural objects of his bounty, and also be able to understand the

       nature, consequence, and effect of the act of executing [an estate plan].’ ” DeHart, 2013 IL

       114137, ¶ 20 (quoting Dowie v. Sutton, 227 Ill. 183, 196 (1907)). “The law presumes that all

       individuals possess testamentary capacity until the contrary is proved.” In re Fordyce’s Estate,

       130 Ill. App. 2d 755, 757 (1971).

¶ 57          In Fordyce’s Estate, the trial court heard the petitioners’ complaint that, inter alia, the

       decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute a will. Id. The testator, a 76-year-old

       woman, was admitted to the hospital on October 21, met with an attorney on October 22, executed

       a will on October 23, and passed away on October 30, all in the same year. Id. at 757-58. The

       respondents presented several witnesses, including the testator’s doctor, attorney, the attorney’s

       legal secretary, and a funeral director, who testified that, in their opinion, at the time the testator

       executed her will, she was competent to do so. Id. at 758. The doctor testified, however, that,

       from October 24 to October 30, the testator’s health deteriorated quickly. Id. The petitioners

       presented several witnesses, including friends, relatives, and employees of the hospital, who

       testified to their observations “prior, during and subsequent” to the time the will was executed. Id.

                                                         20
       They testified that the testator “did not respond to them or appear to be aware of what was

       transpiring about her.” Id. The trial court found that the petitioners did not satisfy their burden of

       proving that the testator lacked testamentary capacity. Id. at 756. The appellate court affirmed,

       characterizing the petitioners’ evidence as “very indefinite.” 758.

¶ 58          Like the timing in Fordyce’s Estate, the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan was drafted and signed

       when Ethel was receiving in-patient care and soon to experience a rapid decline. However, this is

       not enough to establish, as a matter of law, that Ethel lacked testamentary capacity. See id. at 758.

¶ 59          Like the attorney in Fordyce’s Estate, Rochford met with Ethel in the medical facility.

       Rochford believed that Ethel had testamentary capacity when she informed him and his wife and

       paralegal, Deb, of her new plan. Deb and co-counsel Volk signed as witnesses that they believed

       Ethel had testamentary capacity at the time she executed the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan. Rochford

       testified in deposition that it was his firm’s practice to ask elderly clients questions aimed at

       evaluating capacity prior to execution and he had no reason to believe that Volk had not done so.

¶ 60          Also, in conjunction with Ethel’s own signing of the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan and the

       Notary Public’s certificate of acknowledgement of the same, Deb and Volk signed the following

       statement:

                      “I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of this state that the person who

              signed or acknowledged this document is personally known to me (or proved to me on the

              basis of convincing evidence) to be the person who signed or acknowledged this Document

              in my presence, and that the person appear[s] to be of sound mind and under no duress,

              fraud or undue influence.”

                                                        21
       Both Deb and Volk had known Ethel for years, had worked with her in drafting the 2005 and 2009

       Rochford Estate Plans, and had visited her in the nursing home prior to drafting the 2012 Rochford

       Estate Plan.

¶ 61          In contrast, like the petitioners in Fordyce’s Estate, Michael and Sandy’s affidavits do not

       provide definite markers of incapacity. See id. at 756-57 (it is the challenger’s burden to prove

       incapacity). The affidavits contained conclusory statements that Ethel’s mental acuity entered a

       state of decline when she began taking Ativan, an anti-anxiety medication, on August 3, 2012. See

       supra ¶¶ 23-24. The statements contained in Michael’s and Sandy’s affidavits do little more than

       generally provide that, sometime between August 3, 2012, when Ethel started taking Ativan, and

       September 3, 2012, when she passed away, her mental and physical state declined. Michael and

       Sandy make no assertions as to whether, on August 13, 2012, specifically, Ethel lacked

       testamentary capacity.    Sandy’s affidavit refers to a nurse note providing that Ethel was

       experiencing increased confusion in August 2012, but this note was not entered until August 27,

       2012. In fact, prior to August 27, 2012, the last nurse note pertaining to Ethel’s confusion had

       been entered on June 11, 2012. There were no nurse notes pertaining to Ethel’s confusion between

       June 11, 2012, and August 27, 2012, encompassing the dates of both the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan

       and the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan. Accordingly, we reject Michael’s argument that his affidavits

       were uncontradicted, competent, and dispositive evidence on the issue of Ethel’s testamentary

       capacity.

¶ 62          The trial court found that Michael and Sandy’s affidavits “call into question” Ethel’s

       competency on August 13, 2012. However, this is not the standard on summary judgment. To the

       contrary, if a material fact is in question, summary judgment should not be granted. See Aetna,

       229 Ill. App. 3d at 416. Similarly, that Ralph advocated for the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan over

                                                      22
       either of the 2012 plans is irrelevant to the question of whether Michael proved as a matter of law

       that Ethel in fact lacked testamentary capacity on August 13, 2012. For the reasons stated, he has

       not done so. Michael is not entitled to a summary judgment that the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan is

       invalid on the grounds that Ethel lacked testamentary capacity.

¶ 63          In sum, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Michael was a result of at least two

       errors. First, the trial court addressed Ethel’s competence (or testamentary capacity) but did not

       address the separate question of Michael’s undue influence.             Second, the trial court

       misappropriated the burden of proof applicable in summary judgment proceedings, granting

       summary judgment to one party, Michael, merely because the other party, Ralph, did not prove

       the validity of the 2012 Rochford Plan as a matter of law. It also appears that, after rejecting

       Ralph’s section 4-4 argument in support of the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan, the trial court believed

       that only the two 2012 plans remained viable. This is not so. Material questions of fact regarding

       Michael’s undue influence in the execution of the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan and Ethel’s

       testamentary capacity in the execution of the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan preclude a grant of

       summary judgment to Michael. Though we express no opinion in this regard, we note, for

       example, that if the trial court ultimately finds that Michael exerted undue influence in the

       execution of the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan and that Ethel lacked testamentary capacity in the

       execution of the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan, then the 2009 Rochford Estate Plan controls. These

       questions leave the 2012 Harrod Estate Plan, the 2012 Rochford Estate Plan, and the 2009

       Rochford Estate Plan available for further consideration.

¶ 64                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 65          The judgment of the trial court of Peoria County is affirmed in part and reversed in part

       and remanded.

                                                       23
¶ 66   Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

                                              24