Court Opinion

ID: 9772606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:23:47.374063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.205287
License: Public Domain

Read, J. (dissenting).
I would uphold the conviction because the complained-of error was harmless. The majority rejects this option on the ground that the Legislature’s amendment of CPL 310.20 in 1996 “left intact” our precedents holding “that harmless error analysis cannot be applied where a verdict sheet exceeds the limitations that section 310.20 (2) imposes” (majority op at 708). On the contrary, the 1996 amendment was specifically intended to countermand these and other precedents thought to create “hyper-technical rules . . . bestow[ing] new trials on fairly convicted criminals” (Governor’s Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 630, at 9, reprinted in 1996 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1909), such as the defendant in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In 1996, the Governor submitted a Program Bill to the Legislature that, as he explained in his Approval Memorandum, was meant to prevent “the needless reversal of dozens of fairly obtained criminal convictions . . . occasioned by the Court of Appeals’ decisions in People v. Page, 72 N.Y.2d 69 (1988), and People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993)” (Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 630, at 7, 1996 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1907). The Governor’s proposed bill was introduced in the Senate “at the request of the Governor” on July 11, 1996 as Senate Bill S7929 (Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 310.20, at 350 [2002 ed]). The Governor issued a message of necessity to the Senate, which passed the bill that same day. Senate Bill S7929 was then delivered to the Assembly, where it was substituted for Assembly Bill A11155-A; the Governor likewise issued a message of necessity to the Assembly, which also passed the bill on July 11, 1996. Senate Bill S7929 was then returned to the Senate, which delivered it to the Governor on September 3, 1996. The Governor signed the bill on September 4, 1996, which thereby became chapter 630 of the Laws of 1996. He simultaneously issued a detailed Approval Memorandum.
Section 1 of chapter 630 amended CPL 270.35 to create a bright-line rule that essentially circumvented Page’s strictures on the discharge of sworn jurors and their replacement with alternates (see People v Jeanty, 94 NY2d 507, 513-516 [2000] [discussing legislative history of section 1 of the Laws of 1996, chapter 630]). Section 2 amended CPL 310.20 by granting trial judges express authority to place certain kinds of explanatory *711information on verdict sheets. As the Governor explained, section 2 was intended to prevent the problems created
“[u]nder a line of cases culminating in People v. Spivey, [whereby] trial judges no longer [had] the authority they long enjoyed to enhance the ability of deliberating juries to distinguish between seemingly identical or substantially similar counts by annotating verdict sheets with distinguishing, explanatory phrases . . .
“For decades, until the Court of Appeals issued a series of decisions culminating in People v. Spivey, trial judges helped juries by putting brief explanatory notations on verdict sheets to distinguish otherwise identical counts.
“Because of the absence of express statutory authority for such notations, the Spivey line of cases holds that trial judges cannot put them on verdict sheets, and that harmless error analysis cannot be used to save convictions obtained in cases in which the verdict sheet contained such innocuous but helpful notations. As a result, many fairly tried and convicted defendants have had their convictions reversed on appeal.
“The amendments made by the bill to subdivision 2 of section 310.20 of the [CPL] will restore trial judges’ authority to annotate verdict sheets, facilitate an orderly and intelligent deliberative process and prevent needless reversals of convictions. To be sure, trial judges from time to time may place on verdict sheets distinguishing notations that do not fit within the technical terms of the bill. However, any such errors will no[t] be subject to the onerous automatic reversal rule of Spivey, for that rule is predicated on the complete absence of statutory authority for any verdict sheet annotations. See e.g., People v. Owens, 69 N.Y.2d 585, 591-92 (1987). As a result of the bill, there will be such authority and thus any erroneous verdict sheet notations will be subject to harmless error analysis, consistent with subdivision 1 of section 470.05 of the [CPL]” (Governor’s Approval Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch 630, at 7, 8-9, 1996 McKinney’s Session Laws of NY, at 1908-1909 [emphasis added]).
*712The majority dismisses the Approval Memorandum’s reasoning as “too attenuated to justify rejecting” the holdings of Spivey and People v Damiano (87 NY2d 477 [1996]) “on the harmless error issue” (majority op at 709), as though the Governor’s statements were some species of post-enactment “spin” or propaganda. But the Governor was explaining his bill, drafted by his lawyers at his direction to carry out his policy. And the Legislature agreed with him: both houses enacted the Governor’s Program Bill, without amendment, pursuant to messages of necessity, the same day it was introduced. Under these circumstances, the Governor’s view of section 2, which is perfectly consonant with the amendment’s language, should be dispositive.
The majority also comments that the Legislature might have used language similar to “the language that it adopted in another context, to overrule our holding in People v Ranghelle (69 NY2d 56, 63 [1986])” by saying that “a failure to deliver Rosario material to defense counsel . . . does not justify reversal ‘in the absence of a showing . . . that there is a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure materially contributed to the result’ ” (majority op at 709, quoting CPL 240.75). Indeed the Legislature might have done this, but only if it wanted a rule other than CPL 470.05, the general rule for harmless error analysis, to govern annotation errors on verdict sheets.
Here, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, a conclusion with which I doubt the majority disagrees. Defendant was indicted for murder and other, lesser charges for the shootings of his estranged girlfriend and her ex-boyfriend, the father of her child, as they sat in a car parked outside her home. She died as a consequence, while her ex-boyfriend sustained serious injuries. He testified that defendant, whom he knew, was the shooter, and his account was corroborated by a neighbor who saw and heard the shooting (although she could not identify defendant). In the days following the crime, defendant made many incriminating statements to his friends and family. And while the absence of expert testimony was not fatal to his defense of extreme emotional disturbance, defendant did not testify either. As a result, there was essentially no proof that he suffered from a mental infirmity manifested by a loss of self-control. In other words, it was, to say the least, generous of the trial judge to allow the jury to consider the defense on these facts in the first place. As to intent, defendant fired multiple shots into the occupied car at point-blank range.
*713In sum, the evidence to support extreme emotional disturbance or a finding that defendant merely intended to seriously injure his victims was so weak that the verdict sheet annotations—which, in fact, supplied the jury with correct statements of the law—cannot have affected the outcome. A decision to set aside a conviction under such circumstances is exactly the kind of ‘‘hyper-technical” result that the Legislature sought to foreclose when it enacted chapter 630 of the Laws of 1996.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo and Jones concur with Judge Smith; Judge Read dissents in a separate opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Order affirmed.