Court Opinion

ID: 9943588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:57.149275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:38.032404
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Castro CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                B319220

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Los Angeles County
                                                                            Super. Ct. No. BA432941)
           v.

 CHRISTIAN OSBELI CASTRO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Melissa Widdifield, Judge. Affirmed.
      Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Steven Matthews and Rama Maline, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       A jury found Christian Osbeli Castro guilty of five counts of
lewd acts against his wife’s niece, minor Lisa C., which occurred
when she was 13 and 15 years old. On appeal, Castro challenges
only one of the convictions for committing a lewd act upon a child
under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)).1 He contends the
trial court erred in admitting an investigating police officer’s
testimony recounting Lisa C.’s preliminary hearing testimony.
He also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the
conviction. We affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Castro is married to Lisa C.’s paternal aunt. In November
2013, Lisa C. and her family traveled to Los Angeles to stay with
the paternal aunt, Castro, and their family, for 15 days. Lisa C.
was 13 years old at the time.
       Lisa C. testified that during the visit, Castro kissed her on
four occasions. During at least some of the kissing, Castro
inserted his tongue into Lisa C.’s mouth.2 The first time, Castro
found Lisa C. sitting alone and kissed her. The second time, she
was in the kitchen washing dishes. The third time, she was in
the bathroom. The fourth time, Lisa C. was in an area she
described as both the dining room and the living room. Lisa C.

1       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

2     As described more fully below, Lisa C.’s testimony on the
details of Castro’s use of his tongue during the kissing was
inconsistent and, ultimately, forms the basis of Castro’s
arguments on appeal.

                                  2
testified she was alone in the dining room with Castro when he
kissed her.
       Castro also touched Lisa C. in other ways. Once, when
Lisa C.’s parents were away and she and Castro were “playing,”
Castro put his hand on Lisa C.’s shoulder. He moved his hand
down “little by little” towards her breast, eventually grazing it,
and then he apologized. At other times, while they were eating,
Castro would put his hand on top of Lisa C.’s, out of sight of
Castro’s daughter and Lisa C.’s siblings. Castro and Lisa C.
would also touch their feet together under the table. Lisa C.
thought that “maybe [she] loved” Castro, and she felt for him the
way that a “girl would like a boy.” On the last day of her visit,
Lisa C. gave Castro a letter telling him she would be back the
next year.
       In late 2014 and early 2015, Lisa C.’s family visited
Castro’s home a second time. Lisa C. was 15 years old. At one
point during the visit, Lisa C.’s parents left for a few days to visit
San Francisco. While they were gone, Castro and Lisa C.
engaged in sexual contact on several occasions. Castro kissed
Lisa C.’s breasts, they engaged in oral sex, and they attempted to
have sexual intercourse.
       One night after Lisa C.’s parents had returned, Castro told
Lisa C. to wait for him in the bathroom at 4:00 a.m. Following
his instructions, Lisa C. met Castro in the bathroom in the early
morning hours of January 15, 2015. While they were engaging in
sexual activity, Lisa C.’s mother, Ivon C., knocked on the door
after noticing that neither Lisa C. nor Castro was in bed. Lisa C.
did not open the door right away. Ivon C. could hear movement
inside the bathroom. Castro left through the bathroom’s back
door. After Lisa C. opened the bathroom door, Ivon C. entered,

                                  3
looking for Castro. Ivon C. found Castro standing naked next to
the bathroom’s back door. Lisa C.’s father called the police.
        During a recorded interview later that day with Los
Angeles Police Department Sergeant Jackeline Orellana and a
detective, Castro admitted he had kissed Lisa C. during her first
visit in 2013. Castro said Lisa C. asked him to kiss her. He
explained, “I knew the consequences of that . . . but she was going
. . . back to Guatemala afterward anyway. And I said, I’m a man,
what could I lose with a kiss? I gave it to her.” Castro also told
the officers that during the first visit, he and Lisa C. would touch
“skin” at the table, and “sometimes when nobody was around . . .
we’d kiss or we’d hold hands.”
        Castro said that in 2013, he had only “a nice feeling” for
Lisa C., but he also admitted he was attracted to her “in some
way.” He explained: “I was starting to feel something . . . . I’ve
had problems with my wife . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . we’re always
fighting. We don’t have intimacy.” Castro admitted that in 2013,
he would “look at [Lisa C.]” and “say how is it possible that she’s
thirteen years old,” because she looked very developed and had
breasts and buttocks larger than she did two years later. He
denied touching her breasts in 2013 but said he noticed them
because she wore tight blouses. When asked if he was tempted
back then to touch her breasts, Castro answered “Who wouldn’t.
Not only touch her but—” He later admitted that he “started to
like” Lisa C. in 2013, and she looked at him “differently,” and
“like she liked [him],” a look he was familiar with from going to a
co-ed school. He explained: “I was familiar with those looks,
when a girl looks at, at a man like that . . . at a guy like that.
Well you stare.”

                                 4
        Castro further described kissing Lisa C. in 2013: “I
remember that I touched her face and I was about to kiss her . . .
like this, basically very close to each other—No, you know I don’t
believe her. I told her, ‘No,’ I said, ‘no.’ ‘Why?’ she said to me.
‘No.’ . . . We kissed . . . I don’t remember if it was that day at
night or the next day but afterwards we did kiss each other. And
she also hugged me around my neck . . . and well I kissed her.”
The police interviewer asked, “And didn’t you think that maybe
that wasn’t appropriate?” Castro answered, “Of course.” Castro
additionally admitted that in 2013, on the way to the airport, he
touched Lisa C.’s chest. He said he could not remember whether
Lisa C. put his hand on her chest, or he grabbed her, but his
hand started on her chest and ended on one of her breasts.
        Castro also admitted having extensive sexual contact with
Lisa C. during her second visit, including sexual touching, oral
sex, and attempts at penetrative intercourse.
        A sexual assault exam on January 15, 2015, revealed
semen on Lisa C.’s face and buttocks. DNA found on her face,
neck, hand, and buttocks was later linked to Castro.
        The People charged Castro by information with three
counts of committing a lewd act upon a child under 14 (§ 288,
subd. (a)), corresponding to conduct during the November 2013
visit.3 The People further charged Castro with four counts of

3     At trial, the prosecutor told the jury that counts 1 and 2
covered the “incidents described where there was kissing on the
mouth . . . that occurred in November of 2013.” The prosecutor
identified count 3 as involving “the touching of the victim’s
breasts that she described.” The court instructed the jury on
unanimity as to counts 1 and 2, informing the jurors: “The People
have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the

                                 5
committing a lewd act upon a child who was 15 years old (§ 288,
subd. (c)(1)), corresponding to conduct during the second visit.
      A jury found Castro guilty of one count of lewd act upon a
child under 14 (count 1) and not guilty on the two other counts
alleging the same crime (counts 2 and 3). The jury further found
Castro guilty of four counts of lewd act upon a child who was 15
years old (counts 4, 5, 6, and 7). The court sentenced Castro to an
aggregate sentence of three years and eight months in state
prison.
      Castro timely appealed. On appeal, he challenges only the
conviction on count 1.
                            DISCUSSION
I.    The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in
      Admitting Evidence of Lisa C.’s Prior Testimony
      Castro contends the trial court committed prejudicial error
when it allowed Orellana to testify at trial regarding Lisa C.’s
preliminary hearing testimony. He asserts the admission of this
evidence violated state hearsay rules and his federal
constitutional rights. We conclude that the trial court properly
admitted the testimony as prior inconsistent statements. We
further conclude that, even if the testimony was erroneously
admitted, the error was harmless.
      A.     Background
      At trial, the prosecutor asked Lisa C. on direct examination
if Castro touched “any part of [her] body” during her 2013 visit.

defendant committed these offenses. You must not find the
defendant guilty unless you all agree that the People have proved
that the defendant committed at least one of these acts for each
of the charged counts and you all agree on which act [he]
committed.”

                                6
Lisa C. said no. Yet, when the prosecutor explicitly questioned
Lisa C. about Castro’s kisses in November 2013, she admitted
they happened. Lisa C. testified that the first time Castro kissed
her, it was on her mouth. She also testified that she was sitting
on a chair when the first kiss happened and no one was around,
but she did not indicate where she was in the house. The
prosecutor asked about the kiss in the kitchen. Lisa C. initially
testified Castro kissed her on the mouth but did not use his
tongue.
       The prosecutor then asked, “Did [Castro] ever place his
tongue inside your mouth during your first stay here in the
United States?” Lisa C. said she did not remember. The
prosecutor responded, “Do you remember testifying during the
preliminary hearing and you indicated to the court that the
defendant did insert his tongue inside your mouth?” Lisa C.
replied, “Kind of,” and, “I don’t remember.” She then admitted
she did not want to be in the courtroom testifying and it was
“uncomfortable” for her.
       The prosecutor read Lisa C. some of her testimony from the
preliminary hearing, including her statements that Castro used
his tongue during the kitchen and dining room kisses. Lisa C.
said she did not remember giving that testimony.
       The prosecutor also asked if Lisa C. remembered speaking
to the prosecutor and a detective earlier that week and telling
them Castro inserted his tongue into her mouth three times
during her 2013 visit. She said yes. She then changed her prior
testimony and said one of those kisses took place in the kitchen.
       On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Lisa C.
about her preliminary hearing testimony. Lisa C. stated she
remembered the kisses in the kitchen and dining room but did

                                7
not recall the details. She again changed her testimony
regarding the kiss in the kitchen, testifying she did not remember
whether Castro used his tongue during that kiss.
       On re-direct, Lisa C. testified she remembered Castro
kissing her with his tongue in the kitchen. However, she could
not remember the location of the other tongue-kissing incidents,
recalling only: “I do remember it was more than once.” She
testified the kisses in the living room and bathroom were “a
peck.”
       Orellana subsequently testified over a defense objection
that during the preliminary hearing, Lisa C. stated Castro kissed
her three times during her 2013 visit. Lisa C. had also testified
that Castro used his tongue twice, during the kitchen and living
room kisses.
       B.     The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
              admitting Orellana’s testimony as to Lisa C.’s
              prior inconsistent statements
       “A trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence,
including ‘on the hearsay nature of the evidence in question,’ is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Holmes, McClain
and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 766.)
       “ ‘A statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his or
her trial testimony is admissible to establish the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement under the conditions set forth
in Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 462 (Cowan).) Under Evidence
Code section 1235, “a statement made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent
with [the witness’s] testimony at the hearing and is offered in
compliance with [Evidence Code] [s]ection 770.” Under Evidence

                                8
Code section 770, “extrinsic evidence of a statement made by a
witness that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the
hearing shall be excluded unless: [¶] (a) The witness was so
examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to
explain or to deny the statement; or [¶] (b) The witness has not
been excused from giving further testimony in the action.” “ ‘The
“fundamental requirement” of section 1235 is that the statement
in fact be inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony.’
[Citation.] ‘ “Inconsistency in effect, rather than contradiction in
express terms, is the test for admitting a witness’[s] prior
statement . . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at
p. 462.)
       Castro argues the Evidence Code section 1235 exception did
not apply because, at most, Lisa C. could not recall the details of
the kisses at trial. He thus contends Orellana’s testimony
recounting Lisa C.’s prior preliminary hearing testimony did not
provide evidence of statements inconsistent with her trial
testimony. We disagree.
       A witness’s claimed memory loss may constitute
evasiveness that amounts to inconsistency under Evidence Code
section 1235. (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 463.) The trial
court could reasonably conclude that was the case here. At trial,
Lisa C. changed her testimony regarding whether Castro kissed
her with his tongue, first saying he had not touched her at all,
then admitting she previously said he kissed her with his tongue
three times, and finally stating she could not remember how
many times he kissed her with his tongue, but that it was more
than once. Her testimony was also contradictory as to whether
Castro kissed her with his tongue in the kitchen. When
confronted with her preliminary hearing testimony in which she

                                 9
described Castro inserting his tongue into her mouth, she
claimed she did not remember giving that testimony. Lisa C. also
testified that she did not want to get Castro in trouble and was
uncomfortable testifying.
       “The trial court had the opportunity to view [Lisa C.’s]
demeanor and therefore was in the best position to assess the
credibility of her claimed nonrecollection.” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 78 (Coffman and Marlow).) The
court could reasonably conclude Lisa C. was being deliberately
evasive when she claimed to not remember where or how many
times Castro kissed her with his tongue. (People v. Homick
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 859, citing People v. Ledesma (2006) 39
Cal.4th 641, 711 [evasiveness may be implied from the trial
court’s ruling].)4 The court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in admitting Orellana’s testimony relating to Lisa C.’s prior
testimony summarizing the details of the kisses.
       We similarly reject Castro’s constitutional claims.
(Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 78.) As an initial
matter, at trial, defense counsel made only a hearsay objection to
Orellana’s challenged testimony. Generally, constitutional
claims are forfeited if no objection is made in the trial court.
(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 436; People v. Carter

4     Although the parties do not discuss Evidence Code
section 770, we additionally note that the provision’s
requirements were met here. The prosecutor specifically
examined Lisa C. about her prior inconsistent statements. The
prosecutor asked if she recalled her preliminary hearing
testimony, allowing her to explain the discrepancy. (People v.
Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 908; People v. Brown (1995) 35
Cal.App.4th 1585, 1596–1597 (Brown).)

                                10
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1196, fn. 6.) However, even assuming
these claims were preserved for our review, we would reject them.
       There is no Sixth Amendment violation under the
confrontation clause because Lisa C., the declarant of the out-of-
court statements, appeared at trial for cross-examination.
(People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 404; Brown, supra, 35
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1596–1597.) The admission of the testimony
likewise did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The
evidence was properly admitted under state law, Castro was free
to confront it, and it was only a small part of the prosecution’s
case. (Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 463–464.)
       C.    Any error was harmless
       Moreover, even if the trial court erred in admitting
Orellana’s testimony, we would find any error was harmless. It
is not reasonably probable that the admission of Orellana’s
challenged testimony affected the verdict. (People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)5
       Orellana testified that Lisa C. said Castro kissed her twice
with his tongue in 2013, once in the kitchen, and once in the
dining room. However, before Orellana’s testimony was offered,
Lisa C. had already testified and admitted she had previously

5     Contrary to Castro’s assertion that the federal harmless
error test under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 should
apply, our high court has repeatedly applied the Watson standard
in reviewing error in the admission of a prior inconsistent
statement under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770. (People v.
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 153 (Arias); People v. Johnson (1992)
3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220 (Johnson).) “This routine application of
state evidentiary law does not implicate defendant’s
constitutional rights.” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518,
545; Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 76.)

                                11
said Castro kissed her three times with his tongue during the
2013 visit. She had also already testified on redirect that Castro
kissed her with his tongue in the kitchen. Accordingly, after
Lisa C.’s first denial, she admitted that Castro put his tongue in
her mouth more than once, and, after changing her testimony
several times, finally testified that one of those times was in the
kitchen.
       In addition, the prosecutor confronted Lisa C. directly with
her preliminary hearing testimony and the defense did not object.
Thus, even without Orellana’s testimony, there was evidence that
Castro kissed Lisa C. with his tongue more than once. Even if
erroneously admitted, Orellana’s testimony was a minor part of
the prosecution’s case that was merely cumulative of Lisa C.’s
testimony. (Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 153; Johnson, supra, 3
Cal.4th at p. 1220.) And, as discussed more fully below, there
was overwhelming evidence of Castro’s sexual intent in kissing
Lisa C., irrespective of whether he used his tongue.
    The admission of Orellana’s testimony was not prejudicial
error.
II.    Substantial Evidence Supported the Conviction for
       Lewd Act on a Child Under 14 Years Old as Charged
       in Count 1
       Castro also argues that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for count 1. We disagree.
       To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
criminal conviction, “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9

                                12
Cal.5th 793, 820.) We presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence, and we accept logical inferences the jury might have
drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v. Baker (2021) 10
Cal.5th 1044, 1103.) We do not reverse unless it appears
“ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.) We resolve
conflicting inferences and credibility findings in favor of the
verdict. (People v. Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 344.)
         A violation of section 288, subdivision (a) “requires proof of
the following elements: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully touched any
part of a child’s body . . . ; [¶] 2. The defendant committed the act
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of himself or the child; and [¶] 3. The
child was younger than 14 years old at the time of the act.”
(People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1160 (Valenti).)
         In People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434 (Martinez), our
Supreme Court explained section 288 is “violated by ‘any
touching’ of an underage child committed with the intent to
sexually arouse either the defendant or the child.” (Id. at p. 442.)
In determining that any type of touching was sufficient if
sexually motivated, the court reasoned that “the statute was
intended to include sexually motivated conduct not made
criminal elsewhere in the scheme.” (Id. at p. 443.) Thus, “a lewd
or lascivious act” under section 288 “can involve ‘any part’ of the
victim’s body.” (Id. at p. 444.) However, because children are
“routinely cuddled, disrobed, stroked, examined, and groomed as
part of a normal and healthy upbringing,” and “any of these
intimate acts may also be undertaken for the purpose of sexual

                                  13
arousal,” whether the act falls under section 288 “depend[s] upon
the actor’s motivation,” which is “inferred from all the
circumstances.” (Id. at p. 450.) Relevant circumstances include
“the charged act,” the defendant’s “extrajudicial statements,”
“other acts of lewd conduct admitted or charged in the case,” the
“relationship of the parties,” and any “coercion, bribery, or deceit
used to obtain the victim’s cooperation or to avoid detection.” (Id.
at p. 445.) “[S]exual gratification must be presently intended at
the time” the touching occurs. (Id. at p. 444.)
       Substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings based on
Castro kissing Lisa C. in November 2013. Lisa C. testified that
Castro kissed her with his tongue. Castro admitted that he
kissed her. Both also stated that they engaged in other romantic
or sexually motivated activities, including holding hands and
touching feet under the table. During his recorded police
interview, Castro said the kisses and handholding took place
when others were not around. The jury could infer that the
deliberately clandestine nature of these displays of affection
betrayed Castro’s improper, sexual intent. (In re Randy S. (1999)
76 Cal.App.4th 400, 407 [touching in a “clandestine manner” to
“keep nature of his activities hidden” is evidence of sexual
intent].)
       Castro also admitted he was attracted to Lisa C. in 2013.
He looked at her breasts and buttocks and described his disbelief
that she was only 13, given her appearance. Lisa C. testified she
“maybe . . . loved him” and felt for him the way a girl would feel
for a boy. Castro also explained he felt Lisa C. looked at him as if
she “liked” him, the way a “girl looks at . . . a man.” Castro’s
statements acknowledged his awareness of Lisa C.’s romantic
feelings for him. He said Lisa C. asked him to kiss her and,

                                14
although he “knew the consequences” of kissing her, he did it
anyway since she was returning to Guatemala. He admitted
being tempted to not only touch Lisa C.’s breasts but to do more.
Indeed, he connected his feelings about Lisa C. and his actions to
his lack of intimacy with his wife. Castro further acknowledged
the inappropriate and unchaste nature of what had occurred.
Substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Castro
kissed Lisa C. with “the intent to sexually arouse [himself] or the
child.” (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 442, 450 [intent
inferred from all circumstances, including defendant’s
extrajudicial statements and admission of other acts of
touching].)
       Castro argues the evidence was insufficient because, at
trial, Lisa C. testified that the 2013 kisses were a “peck” on the
mouth, Castro’s statements were “consistent with” Lisa C.’s
testimony, and there was no evidence that Castro “attempted to
open [Lisa C.’s] mouth or that the kisses were of significant
duration.” He also argues that he “never touched Lisa’s breasts
and buttocks in 2013. All they did was kiss, without using his
tongue, play footsy under the table, and touch hands. He does
remember that she grabbed his hand and put it on her chest.”
       This argument ignores the evidence that, even though
Lisa C.’s testimony varied about the details of the kissing, she
testified without objection that Castro inserted his tongue into
her mouth on more than one occasion. The jury was free to
accept Lisa C.’s testimony and to reject Castro’s denial of any
tongue kissing. (In re R.C. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 741, 750–751
[“[T]here can be no innocent or lovingly affectionate tongue
kissing of a child by an adult”].)

                                15
       Further, irrespective of whether Castro used his tongue,
the other evidence was overwhelming that Castro’s intent in
kissing Lisa C. was sexual during at least one of the kisses.
“ ‘Any touching of a child under the age of 14 violates this section,
even if the touching is outwardly innocuous and inoffensive, if it
is accompanied by the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desires of either the perpetrator or the victim.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Shockley (2013) 58 Cal.4th 400, 404.) Castro’s
assertion on appeal that the kisses were like those between close
friends or family members of “nonsexual affection” are belied by
his admission of sexual or romantic feelings for Lisa C., his other
sexually motivated touching of Lisa C. in 2013, and his
acknowledgment that at least one kiss he described was
inappropriate. (Martinez, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 445 [intent may
be determined from defendant’s statements and “other acts of
lewd conduct admitted”]; Valenti, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1161 [jury could infer that hugs were given with sexual intent
based on defendant’s other conduct with the victims and
defendant’s pattern of “courtship” conduct].)
       Substantial evidence supported Castro’s conviction.

                                 16
                       DISPOSITION
    The trial court judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                              ADAMS, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             EGERTON, J.

                        17