Court Opinion

ID: 9701244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:12:53.355018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:21.504526
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I cannot conclude as the majority has that Appellant’s counsel was effective in light of the majority’s proper analysis that Appellant was denied his constitutional rights in violation of Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I agree with the majoritys analysis that trial counsel acted improperly when he failed to request a “no-adverse inference” jury instruction and that no reasonable basis existed for trial counsel’s course of conduct. My dis*103agreement with the majority arises from their conclusion that Appellant failed to establish prejudice and their independent review of the record likewise failed to discern any prejudice.
The burden placed on the Appellant by the majority in this instance is both impossible and absurd and highlights the unfairness of the prejudice element of the Pierce standard.1 The only way Appellant could possibly establish prejudice here would be to re-empanel his jury and depose each member as to the effect Appellant’s failure to take the witness stand in his defense had on his/her verdict. If the Appellant’s failure to testify was a critical factor in only one juror’s mind, then under Pierce, the Appellant would have established the required “adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings” necessary to prove “prejudice.” Short of that testimony, Appellant cannot sustain his ineffectiveness claim.
As can be seen by this scenario, Appellant could never establish the required prejudice. As such, I would adhere to my reasoning set forth in my dissent in Commonwealth v. Pierce, supra, that if there is no reasonable basis to support trial counsel’s action, his action a fortiori was prejudicial to his client. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987), Zappala, J., dissenting.

. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987).