Court Opinion

ID: 9965688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 12:02:22.518931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.992450
License: Public Domain

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                                        In re Wendy G.-R.

                                 IN RE WENDY G.-R.*
                                     (AC 46641)
                            Bright, C. J., and Suarez and Seeley, Js.

                                             Syllabus

         The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
             trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
             child, W. W was born in Guatemala and immigrated to New Haven in
             2018 with the respondent father. In 2019, following a sexual assault by
             a family member, W was adjudicated neglected and committed to the
             care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. From
             mid-2019 through December, 2021, the Department of Children and
             Families had limited and sporadic contact with the mother, who
             remained in Guatemala, and between December, 2021, and August, 2022,
             the mother did not respond to communications from the department.
             The mother immigrated to New Haven in July, 2022. The department
             was unaware of this until August, 2022, when the mother appeared,
             unannounced, at a supervised visit between W and the father. Thereafter,
             the department referred the mother to various services, with which she
             was reluctant to engage until early 2023. Trial on the termination of
             parental rights petition commenced in March, 2023. The petitioner ini-
             tially alleged that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (D)), no ongoing
             parent-child relationship existed between the mother and W. At the
             conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the petitioner’s counsel
             orally moved to amend the petition to add the adjudicatory ground of
             failure to rehabilitate as to the mother, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
             (i), ‘‘to conform to the proof elicited at trial.’’ In the absence of any
             objection or request for a continuation, the trial court granted the motion
             and, thereafter, terminated the respondents’ parental rights, determining,
             inter alia, that the petitioner proved that the mother had failed to rehabili-
             tate but not that an ongoing parent-child relationship between the mother
             and W did not exist. Held:
         1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that she was denied
             her due process right to the effective assistance of counsel during the
             termination of parental rights proceeding: contrary to the mother’s asser-
             tion, the fact that the petitioner sought to amend the petition at the
             close of evidence was not, in and of itself, a reasonable ground on which
             her counsel should have objected to the petitioner’s motion, as the

           * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
         (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
         appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
         for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
         order of the court.
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                                    In re Wendy G.-R.
           applicable rule of practice (§ 34a-1 (d)) permitted an amendment at any
           time prior to a final adjudication; moreover, the mother could not satisfy
           her burden of demonstrating that her counsel’s failure to object to the
           petitioner’s motion to amend the petition could not be explained by one
           or more possible strategic reasons that were objectively reasonable, as
           the record was bereft of any evidence of the actual strategy the mother’s
           counsel employed when she did not object to the petitioner’s motion,
           and, instead of developing a record of her counsel’s allegedly deficient
           performance or any resulting prejudice by filing a motion to open or a
           petition for a new trial, the mother merely claimed that the existing
           record amply demonstrated that her counsel acted deficiently and that
           her counsel’s lack of competency contributed to the termination of her
           parental rights; furthermore, the only legally viable ground on which
           the mother’s counsel could have objected to the petitioner’s motion to
           amend the petition, namely, that the amendment amounted to unfair
           surprise and that she needed additional time to respond adequately to
           the failure to rehabilitate ground, was not objectively reasonable because
           the record reflected that, at trial, the petitioner presented evidence
           related to the failure to rehabilitate ground without objection, including
           a copy of the specific steps ordered to facilitate the mother’s reunifica-
           tion with W, a permanency plan study that supported a finding that the
           mother had failed to satisfy her specific steps and, accordingly, had
           failed to rehabilitate, the testimony of a department social worker with
           respect to numerous issues that could interfere with the mother’s ability
           to safely assume a responsible position in W’s life, and the testimony
           of S, an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, that pertained to the
           mother’s failure to rehabilitate; additionally, throughout the trial, the
           mother’s counsel attempted to undermine such evidence through cross-
           examination and by presenting evidence of the mother’s rehabilitative
           efforts, and the mother did not assert that her counsel should have
           presented any additional evidence or that additional time was necessary
           to prepare stronger arguments to refute the failure to rehabilitate ground;
           accordingly, this court was not persuaded that the failure of the mother’s
           counsel to object to the petitioner’s motion to amend was objectively
           unreasonable under the circumstances, and, even if the mother could
           satisfy her burden of demonstrating that such failure was objectively
           unreasonable, she failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her
           counsel’s incompetency.
       2. The trial court properly determined that the respondent mother was
           unable or unwilling to benefit from efforts to reunify her with W, and,
           accordingly, it was unnecessary for this court to consider the merits of
           the mother’s claim that the department failed to make reasonable efforts
           to reunify her with W: the mother did not challenge any of the trial
           court’s specific subordinate findings as clearly erroneous and, instead,
           broadly challenged the court’s assessment of the degree to which she
           was receptive to and utilized the services offered as well as its ultimate
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                                      In re Wendy G.-R.
             determination that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the
             department’s services; moreover, in its findings, the trial court outlined
             the myriad efforts to reunify her with W that were made by the depart-
             ment despite the challenges posed by a global pandemic and the danger
             presented by the fact that the mother was residing in Guatemala until
             July, 2022, and those efforts were, on their face, not so lacking as to
             preclude a finding that the mother was unable or unwilling to benefit
             from such services; furthermore, the petitioner demonstrated by clear
             and convincing evidence that the mother had inconsistent communica-
             tion with the department when she was in Guatemala, that she failed
             to timely notify the department of her whereabouts prior to July, 2022,
             that she was reluctant to engage in services offered by the department
             prior to 2023, which detrimentally delayed her ability to gain critical
             and necessary knowledge of how W’s needs changed following her
             immigration to New Haven, and that, at the time of her evaluation by
             S, the mother still demonstrated a lack of insight into W’s traumatic
             experiences resulting from her relocation to the United States, particu-
             larly her sexual abuse, and what was required for the mother to provide
             W with a safe, nurturing, and supportive environment free from insecu-
             rity.

                Argued December 6, 2023—officially released May 2, 2024**

                                     Procedural History

            Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
         lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
         respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
         Court in the judicial district of New Haven, Juvenile
         Matters, and tried to the court, Conway, J.; judgment
         terminating the respondents’ parental rights, from
         which the respondent mother appealed to this court.
         Affirmed.
           Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
         lant (respondent mother).
           Evan O’Roark, assistant solicitor general, with whom
         were Kaelah M. Smith, assistant attorney general, and,
         on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, for the
         appellee (petitioner).
            ** May 2, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
         is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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                                    In re Wendy G.-R.

                                         Opinion

          SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Mirian R.,
       appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating
       her parental rights as to her biological daughter, Wendy
       G.-R., pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
       (i).1 The respondent claims that (1) she was denied her
       due process right to the effective assistance of counsel,
       (2) the court improperly determined that the Depart-
       ment of Children and Families (department) made rea-
       sonable efforts to reunify her with Wendy, and (3) the
       court improperly determined that she was unable or
       unwilling to benefit from reunification services. We
       affirm the judgment of the trial court.
          In its memorandum of decision, the court set forth
       the relevant facts and procedural history in this case:
       In January, 2014, ‘‘Wendy . . . was born in Guatemala
       to . . . [the respondent] and Santos G. [The respon-
       dent and Santos] speak only Spanish and understand
       little to no English. [Santos] attended three years of
       school in Guatemala and the [respondent attended] four
       years of school in Guatemala. [The respondent and San-
       tos] read and write very little Spanish. In the fall [of]
       2018, [Santos] and Wendy emigrated by bus from Guate-
       mala to the Mexico/Texas border. [The respondent and
       Santos] decided to have four year old Wendy accom-
       pany [Santos] because it is easier for an adult to success-
       fully cross the border if accompanied by a child. At the
       border, [Santos] surrendered himself and Wendy to the
       United States Immigration and Custom[s] Enforcement
       (ICE) authorities. [Santos and Wendy] were detained
       for two or three days and then released. [Santos] and
          1
            In the underlying action, the court terminated the parental rights of both
       the respondent and Wendy’s biological father, Santos G., as to Wendy. Santos
       has not appealed from that judgment. In this opinion, we refer to Mirian R.
       as the respondent. Unless necessary to our analysis of the claims raised by
       the respondent, in this opinion we need not and do not address the court’s
       findings and conclusions with respect to Santos.
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                                      In re Wendy G.-R.

         Wendy journeyed on by bus to New Haven, initially
         residing with relatives.
            ‘‘In January, 2019, [Santos] and his uncle engaged in
         a physical altercation in New Haven. Both men had
         been drinking alcohol prior to the altercation. Wendy
         sustained head contusions during the fight and bystand-
         ers observed five year old Wendy walking down the
         street covered in beer and bleeding through the nose.
         The petitioner, the Commissioner of . . . Children and
         Families . . . was contacted and referred [Santos] for
         a substance abuse evaluation. By June, 2019, [Santos]
         and Wendy had moved three times and were then shar-
         ing a room in a rooming house.
            ‘‘[Santos] sponsored2 his Guatemalan cousin’s entry
         into the United States and on or about June 19, [2019],
         [Santos] picked up his cousin, Juan Carlos G., from the
         airport. Juan Carlos took up occupancy in [Santos’] and
         Wendy’s room in the rooming house. [Santos] never
         came home the night of June 22, [2019], and, therefore,
         Wendy was left alone in the room with Juan Carlos. On
         the morning of June 23, [2019], Wendy told [Santos that]
         she was afraid of remaining in their room without him
         and asked if she could go with him to work. [Santos]
         declined Wendy’s request. Late on June 23, [2019], Wen-
         dy’s babysitter brought Wendy to the emergency room
         after Wendy disclosed she had been sexually assaulted
         by Juan Carlos.3
           ‘‘On June 24, [2019], [the petitioner] invoked an
         administrative, ninety-six hour hold and assumed tem-
         porary custody of Wendy. An order of temporary cus-
         tody . . . soon followed, and, on September 12, 2019,
           2
             ‘‘[Santos] defined sponsorship to mean that [he] was responsible for his
         cousin, Juan Carlos.’’
           3
             ‘‘A medical examination revealed a tear to Wendy’s hymen. In a forensic
         evaluation, Wendy disclosed [that Juan Carlos] had touched her vagina on
         two occasions with his hands and she reported other provocative statements
         by Juan Carlos. No arrests were ever made and [the respondent and Santos]
         report that Juan Carlos ‘left’ (presumably the New Haven area or the country)
         in August or November, 2022.’’
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       0 Conn. App. 1                                 ,0                            7
                                    In re Wendy G.-R.

       Wendy was adjudicated neglected4 and committed to
       the petitioner’s care. Wendy has remained continuously
       in [the petitioner’s] care since June 24, 2019.5

          ‘‘On March 9, 2021, the court approved a permanency
       plan of reunification with the respondent . . . in Gua-
       temala. In January, 2022, [the petitioner] sought and
       obtained approval to amend the permanency plan [for]
       termination of parental rights and adoption. On January
       11, 2022, given the change in permanency plans and
       [the respondent’s] Guatemalan residency, the court, sua
       sponte, appointed [the respondent] legal counsel. [The
       respondent’s] court-appointed attorney filed her
       appearance in the case on January 13, 2022. On March
       14, 2022, [the petitioner] filed [a petition to terminate
       the] parental rights . . . [of the respondent and San-
       tos] Both [the respondent and Santos] were properly
       served with the . . . [petition]6 and both were repre-
       sented by [appointed] counsel throughout the termina-
       tion proceedings.7
          4
            ‘‘[In the neglect proceeding, Santos] was defaulted for his nonappearance
       on September 12, [2019]. In September, 2019, [the petitioner] had yet to
       effectuate service on [the respondent] in Guatemala, and, therefore, the
       adjudication of neglect and commitment order entered without prejudice
       to the respondent . . . . [Santos] credibly testified that he timely informed
       [the respondent] of Wendy’s removal from his care.’’
          5
            ‘‘Wendy has lived with her current foster family for the majority of her
       stay in foster care, except for a brief period of time when, due to the foster
       parents’ medical concerns and the pandemic, Wendy was removed.’’
          6
            ‘‘[The respondent] was served via publication and [Santos] was abode
       served.’’
          7
            ‘‘The April 12, 2022 [termination of parental rights] plea hearing was a
       virtual proceeding and [the respondent] was defaulted for her nonappear-
       ance. However, given the [respondent’s] out-of-country status, the court
       appointed [the respondent’s] already assigned counsel to also represent [the
       respondent] for the purposes of the termination of parental rights petition.
       [The respondent] never appeared in court, in person or virtually, until the
       first day of the termination trial, March 8, 2023.
          ‘‘[Santos’] initial [termination of parental rights] plea date was continued
       due to a lack of a Spanish interpreter. On May 17, 2022, [Santos] appeared
       and was advised in Spanish of his rights.’’
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                                     In re Wendy G.-R.

            ‘‘On May 19, 2022, a competency evaluation of [San-
         tos] was ordered by the court, and on September 22,
         2022, [Santos] was found competent. In July, 2022, [the
         respondent] arrived in New Haven from Guatemala as
         an undocumented person. [The department] did not
         learn of [the respondent’s] local presence until late July
         or August, 2022. Trial on the [termination of parental
         rights petition] commenced on March 8, 2023, continued
         on March 15, [2023], and [resumed] again to conclusion
         on March 31, 2023. Both [the respondent and Santos]
         appeared in person for the multiday . . . trial and both
         were assisted by court interpreters throughout the . . .
         trial.8 The petitioner initially alleged that [Santos] had
         failed to [achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabil-
         itation] and that there exists no ongoing parent-child
         relationship between [the respondent] and Wendy. At
         the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the . . .
         trial, the petitioner orally moved to amend the [petition]
         to add the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate
         as to [the respondent]. Absent objection and any request
         for a continuation,9 the oral motion was granted, and,
         therefore, the adjudicatory date for purposes of the
         [termination of parental rights petition] is March 31,
         2023.10’’ (Footnotes altered; footnotes in original; foot-
         notes omitted.)
           Thereafter, the court set forth its findings and legal
         conclusions with respect to the petition to terminate
         the respondent’s parental rights as to Wendy. In the
         adjudicative phase of the proceeding, the court deter-
         mined that the department had made reasonable efforts
         to reunify the respondent and Wendy. Alternatively,
             ‘‘Just prior to the commencement of trial on March 8, 2023, the court
             8

         advised the [respondent and Santos] of their rights in accordance with In
         re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, [120 A.3d 1188] (2015).’’
           9
             ‘‘See Practice Book § 31a-1 (d).’’
           10
              ‘‘The termination [petition was] initially filed on March 14, 2022. A
         written motion to amend other aspects of the [petition] was granted on May
         17, 2022.’’
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                                    In re Wendy G.-R.

       the court determined that the respondent was either
       unwilling or unable to benefit from such reunification
       efforts. The court also determined that the petitioner
       proved that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate but
       that the petitioner had failed to prove that an ongoing
       parent-child relationship between the respondent and
       Wendy did not exist. In the dispositional phase of the
       proceeding, the court, guided by the considerations set
       forth in § 17a-112 (k), determined that it was in Wendy’s
       best interest to terminate the respondent’s parental
       rights as to her. Thereafter, the respondent appealed
       from the court’s judgment terminating her parental
       rights as to Wendy.11 We will set forth the court’s analy-
       sis in more detail as necessary in the context of the
       claims raised in this appeal.
                                             I
         First, the respondent claims that she was denied her
       due process right to the effective assistance of counsel
       during the termination proceeding.12 We are not per-
       suaded.
         The following additional facts are relevant to this
       claim. In the operative petition at the time of trial, the
         11
            We note that the attorney for the minor child filed a statement pursuant
       to Practice Book § 67-13 indicating that he adopts the brief submitted by
       the petitioner.
         12
            In her brief, the respondent states that she ‘‘does not believe that this
       case requires any further evidentiary findings in that both the deficient
       performance and prejudice are apparent upon an examination of the record
       as it exists.’’ Nonetheless, in what she labels a matter for further review,
       the respondent claims that our Supreme Court’s decision in In re Jonathan
       M., 255 Conn. 208, 764 A.2d 739 (2001), ‘‘should be reconsidered to the
       extent that it established the appropriate options available to a respondent
       seeking to supplement the record in order to raise an ineffective assistance
       of counsel claim [in a termination of parental rights proceeding].’’ The
       respondent correctly acknowledges, however, that this court is bound by
       the precedent of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., In re Kyreese L., 220 Conn.
       App. 705, 720 n.8, 299 A.3d 296 (this court is bound by Supreme Court
       precedent), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Thus, we
       merely note that the respondent has preserved this issue.
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                                       In re Wendy G.-R.

         petitioner alleged, as grounds for termination of the
         respondent’s parental rights, that there existed no ongo-
         ing parent-child relationship pursuant to § 17a-112 (j)
         (3) (D). On March 31, 2023, at the close of evidence,
         the court asked counsel: ‘‘[J]ust for clarity, what are
         the adjudicatory grounds that are alleged as to [the
         respondent]? ‘Cause I only have no ongoing parent-
         child relationship.’’ Counsel for the petitioner stated
         that she believed that the petition had been amended,
         but the court stated that it could not ‘‘find it.’’ Following
         a recess, the petitioner’s counsel made an oral motion
         to amend the petition by adding, with respect to the
         respondent, the ground of failure to rehabilitate pursu-
         ant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The petitioner’s counsel
         stated that the amendment was sought ‘‘to conform to
         the proof elicited at trial.’’ The court asked if anyone
         wanted to ‘‘be heard’’ with respect to the amendment,
         to which counsel for the respondent and counsel for the
         minor child each indicated that they had no objection.
         Following this acquiescence to the amendment to the
         termination of parental rights petition, counsel did not
         further discuss the matter. The court thereafter heard
         closing arguments. As stated previously in this opinion,
         in its memorandum of decision, the court explicitly
         stated that it had granted the petitioner’s motion to
         amend the termination of parental rights petition in the
         absence of an objection or any request for a continuance
         in the trial. The court also referred to Practice Book
         § 31a-1 (d).13
           For the first time on appeal, the respondent argues
         that her counsel acted deficiently by failing to object
           13
              Practice Book § 31a-1 (d) provides: ‘‘A petition or information may be
         amended at any time by the judicial authority on its own motion or in
         response to the motions of any party prior to any final adjudication. When
         an amendment has been so ordered, a continuance shall be granted whenever
         the judicial authority finds that the new allegations in the petition or changes
         in the information justify the need for additional time to permit the parties
         to respond adequately to the additional or changed facts and circumstances.’’
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                              In re Wendy G.-R.

       to the petitioner’s oral motion to amend the termination
       of parental rights petition with respect to the respon-
       dent at the close of evidence, after all the parties had
       rested, to add an ‘‘entirely separate ground for termina-
       tion,’’ namely, failure to rehabilitate pursuant to § 17a-
       112 (j) (3) (B) (i). The respondent argues that ‘‘no rea-
       sonable attorney would have failed to object to the
       [petitioner] orally amending its petition in such a funda-
       mental manner just prior to closing arguments.’’ In
       arguing that counsel’s conduct fell below the standard
       of reasonably effective assistance, the respondent con-
       tends that ‘‘there can be no argument that [her] counsel
       failed to object for some strategic reason that would
       insulate her deficient performance from scrutiny.’’

          The respondent also argues that there can be no
       dispute that she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
       performance because the court ultimately concluded
       that the petitioner had failed to prove the sole ground
       in the termination petition prior to the amendment—
       the lack of a parent-child relationship. The respondent
       argues that, ‘‘without the amendment to include the
       ground of failure to rehabilitate, the respondent’s paren-
       tal rights could not have been terminated.’’ The respon-
       dent asserts that a proper objection ‘‘would likely have
       been sustained’’ at trial and, for this reason, ‘‘the respon-
       dent is able to meet the burden that the failure to object
       contributed to the termination of her parental rights.’’
       The respondent further contends that her counsel
       should have objected because principles of due process
       weigh against permitting the petitioner to essentially
       engage in ‘‘a shell game’’ by alleging one or more
       grounds in a petition to terminate parental rights and
       then, at the close of a trial, seeking to amend a petition
       to conform to the evidence presented at trial. According
       to the respondent, if her counsel had properly objected
       to and argued against the motion to amend, due process
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                                      In re Wendy G.-R.

          considerations would have compelled the court to have
          sustained the objection.14
             We next set forth the principles that guide our review.
          ‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized that, ‘[i]n Connecti-
          cut, a parent who faces the termination of his or her
          parental rights is entitled, by statute, to the assistance
          of counsel. General Statutes § 45a-717 (b).’ In re Alex-
          ander V., 223 Conn. 557, 569, 613 A.2d 780 (1992). The
          Supreme Court further has held, consistent with that
          statutory right, that ‘a parent in a termination of parental
          rights hearing has the right not only to counsel but to
          the effective assistance of counsel.’ ’’ (Footnote omit-
          ted.) In re Danyellah S.-C., 167 Conn. App. 556, 567,
          143 A.3d 698, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 913, 150 A.3d
          228 (2016).
             ‘‘In State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 160, 425 A.2d
          939 (1979), our Supreme Court set forth the following
          standard for determining whether counsel has been
          ineffective in a termination proceeding: ‘The range of
          competence . . . requires not errorless counsel, and
          not counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but counsel
          whose performance is reasonably competent, or within
          the range of competence displayed by lawyers with
          ordinary training and skill in [that particular area of
          the] law. . . . The [respondent] must, moreover, dem-
          onstrate that the lack of competency contributed to
          the termination of parental rights.’ . . . ‘A showing of
          incompetency without a showing of resulting prejudice
          . . . does not amount to ineffective assistance of coun-
          sel.’ . . . In re Matthew S., 60 Conn. App. 127, 132,
          758 A.2d 459 (2000). ‘In making such a claim, it is the
          responsibility of the respondent to create an adequate
          record pointing to the alleged ineffectiveness and any
            14
               In her brief to this court, the respondent agrees with the petitioner,
          however, that the trial court properly granted the motion in the absence of
          any objection by her attorney.
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

       prejudice the respondent claims resulted from that inef-
       fectiveness.’ In re Christopher C., 129 Conn. App. 55,
       59, 20 A.3d 689 (2011). In the absence of findings by
       the trial court in this regard, we directly review the trial
       court record. See In re Dylan C., 126 Conn. App. 71,
       90–91, 10 A.3d 100 (2011).’’ In re Jah’za G., 141 Conn.
       App. 15, 35–36, 60 A.3d 392, cert. denied, 308 Conn. 926,
       64 A.3d 329 (2013); see also In re Alexander V., supra,
       223 Conn. 570 (in considering merits of unpreserved
       claim that counsel in termination of parental rights pro-
       ceeding rendered ineffective assistance, reviewing
       court undertook plenary review of trial court record).
          We are mindful that ‘‘[a] fair assessment of attorney
       performance requires that every effort be made to elimi-
       nate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct
       the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and
       to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at
       the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making
       the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presump-
       tion that [the] conduct [of trial counsel] falls within the
       wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
       is, [an appellant] must overcome the presumption that,
       under the circumstances, the challenged action might
       be considered sound trial strategy.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Love v. Commissioner of Correction,
       223 Conn. App. 658, 668, 308 A.3d 1040, cert. denied,
       348 Conn. 958, 310 A.3d 960 (2024).
          Although it is undisputed that the respondent did not
       raise the issue of ineffective assistance before the trial
       court, we note that, following the court’s judgment, the
       respondent had an opportunity to develop a factual
       record related to counsel’s allegedly deficient perfor-
       mance and any resulting prejudice. Our Supreme Court
       has explained ‘‘that General Statutes § 45a-719 provides
       a number of alternatives through which a parent may
       attempt to open the final judgment of termination and
       assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The
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          first option permits a motion to open the judgment in
          accordance with General Statutes § 52-212 or General
          Statutes § 52-212a. These provisions allow a four month
          window from the date of judgment within which such
          a motion may be brought.
             ‘‘Second, the principles governing the opening of
          judgments at common law may also provide an indigent
          parent a means of gaining a review of the adequacy of
          trial counsel at the termination proceeding. It is a well-
          established general rule that even a judgment rendered
          by the court . . . can subsequently be opened [after
          the four month limitation] . . . if it is shown that . . .
          the judgment . . . was obtained by fraud . . . or
          because of mutual mistake. . . . Thus, when a judg-
          ment of termination is predicated on fraud or mutual
          mistake and the indigent’s appointed counsel fails to
          address these issues, presumably rendering the assis-
          tance ineffective, the parent may have a remedy to open
          the judgment at common law.
             ‘‘Finally . . . a parent may file a petition for a new
          trial. See General Statutes § 52-582. Under this option,
          a parent whose rights have been terminated has three
          years within which to file a petition. General Statutes
          § 52-270 provides that the court may grant such a peti-
          tion for reasonable cause. Although we express no opin-
          ion as to whether a colorable claim of ineffective assis-
          tance of counsel always will require a court to grant a
          petition for a new trial under § 52-582, we note that this
          court has long recognized that [t]he causes for which
          new trials may be granted . . . are only such as show
          that the parties did not have a fair and full hearing at
          the first trial; and the words or for other reasonable
          cause, mean other causes of the same general character
          . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes omitted; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn.
          208, 236–39, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

          The respondent did not avail herself of any of the
       foregoing opportunities to develop a record of her coun-
       sel’s allegedly deficient performance or the prejudice,
       if any, that resulted from such performance. As stated
       previously in this opinion, however, she argues that the
       record amply demonstrates that counsel acted defi-
       ciently and that counsel’s lack of competency contrib-
       uted to the termination of her parental rights. See foot-
       note 12 of this opinion.
          Because the claim of ineffective assistance arises
       from trial counsel’s response to the petitioner’s motion
       to amend, we observe that amendments to petitions to
       terminate parental rights are permitted by our rules of
       practice. Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) provides: ‘‘A petition
       may be amended at any time by the judicial authority
       on its own motion or in response to a motion prior to
       any final adjudication. When an amendment has been
       so ordered, a continuance shall be granted whenever
       the judicial authority finds that the new allegations in
       the petition justify the need for additional time to permit
       the parties to respond adequately to the additional or
       changed facts and circumstances.’’ An appellate court
       reviews a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to
       amend for an abuse of discretion, and discretion is
       properly exercised when a court appropriately rules
       on any request made for additional time to respond
       adequately to new allegations. See, e.g., In re Carl O.,
       10 Conn. App. 428, 437–38, 523 A.2d 1339 (concluding
       that trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
       petitioner’s request to amend termination of parental
       rights petition when request was made on eve of trial
       and court had offered to grant respondents continu-
       ances for purpose of responding to amendment), cert.
       denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987), and cert.
       denied, 204 Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 964 (1987).
         For the reasons previously discussed herein, the
       record is bereft of any evidence of the actual strategy,
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                                In re Wendy G.-R.

          if any, that the respondent’s counsel employed when
          she did not object to the petitioner’s eleventh hour
          motion to amend the petition. In this circumstance, we,
          as a reviewing court, are mindful of the presumption
          that counsel acted reasonably, and we must contem-
          plate possible strategic reasons that might have sup-
          ported counsel’s challenged actions before considering
          whether those actions were objectionably reasonable.
          This is the proper analytical path that governs claims
          of ineffective assistance of counsel in habeas corpus
          proceedings in which the record does not contain evi-
          dence of the actual trial strategy, if any, underlying
          trial counsel’s challenged conduct. See, e.g., Jordan v.
          Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279, 290, 267
          A.3d 120 (2021) (‘‘when trial counsel is not available to
          testify . . . the court must contemplate the possible
          strategic reasons that might have supported the chal-
          lenged action and then consider whether those reasons
          were objectively reasonable’’); Roman v. Commis-
          sioner of Correction, 223 Conn. App. 111, 135, 307 A.3d
          934 (2023) (‘‘[A]lthough [appellate counsel] did not pres-
          ent arguments about the petitioner’s mental health and
          competence on direct appeal, the petitioner did not
          call [appellate counsel] to testify at the habeas trial to
          explain why, and the petitioner did not offer any other
          evidence of [appellate counsel’s] reasons for choosing
          which claims to raise on direct appeal. In the absence
          of such evidence, the petitioner did not otherwise meet
          his burden of overcoming the strong presumption that
          [appellate counsel] exercised reasonable professional
          judgment.’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 952, 308 A.3d 1039
          (2024); Godfrey-Hill v. Commissioner of Correction,
          221 Conn. App. 526, 543–44, 302 A.3d 923 (when trial
          counsel cannot recall trial strategy, court must ‘‘affirma-
          tively entertain the range of possible reasons [that]
          counsel may have had for proceeding as [he] did’’ (inter-
          nal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

       929, 304 A.3d 861 (2023); Crocker v. Commissioner
       of Correction, 220 Conn. App. 567, 585, 300 A.3d 607
       (‘‘although not automatically fatal to a petitioner’s
       claim, failure to elicit testimony from counsel about
       trial strategy renders it less likely that the petitioner
       can prevail with respect to his burden to demonstrate
       deficient performance’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 911,
       303 A.3d 10 (2023); Bush v. Commissioner of Correc-
       tion, 169 Conn. App. 540, 550, 151 A.3d 388 (2016)
       (‘‘There is a strong presumption that counsel has ren-
       dered adequate assistance and made all significant deci-
       sions in the exercise of reasonable professional judg-
       ment. . . . Just as the decision of trial counsel not to
       object to certain evidence is a matter of trial tactics, not
       evidence of incompetency . . . the tactical decision of
       appellate counsel not to raise a particular claim is ordi-
       narily a matter of appellate tactics, and not evidence of
       incompetency, in light of the presumption of reasonable
       professional judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.)), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 920, 157 A.3d 85
       (2017). We see no reason, and the respondent has not
       cited any relevant authority to the contrary, why this
       analytical path should not apply to the present claim
       of ineffective assistance of counsel.
          Contrary to the respondent’s arguments on appeal,
       because Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) permits amendments
       at any time prior to any final adjudication, the fact that
       the petitioner sought to amend the petition at the close
       of evidence was not, in and of itself, a reasonable ground
       on which to object to the petitioner’s motion. The
       respondent also strongly emphasizes that counsel
       should have advanced due process concerns as the
       grounds for objecting to the motion. As the respondent
       correctly observes, the fundamental pillars of due pro-
       cess encompass adequate notice of the grounds on
       which the petitioner relies so that the respondent has
       ‘‘a reasonable opportunity to prepare’’ and a right to
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          be heard. See In re P. T.-W., 223 Conn. App. 571, 584–85,
          309 A.3d 394 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is the settled rule of this
          jurisdiction, if indeed it may not be safely called an
          established principle of general jurisprudence, that no
          court will proceed to the adjudication of a matter involv-
          ing conflicting rights and interests, until all persons
          directly concerned in the event have been actually or
          constructively notified of the pendency of the proceed-
          ing, and given reasonable opportunity to appear and be
          heard’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neverthe-
          less, § 34a-1 (d) does not, as the respondent suggests,
          condone ‘‘a shell game . . . .’’ It permits the petitioner
          to amend the petition, thereby giving the respondent
          actual notice of the statutory grounds for termination
          of parental rights on which it intends to rely.15 It also
          provides a clear mechanism to protect the respondent’s
          right to prepare and be heard by requiring the court
          to afford the respondent additional time to respond
          adequately to the additional or changed facts and cir-
          cumstances.16 See Practice Book § 34a-1 (d).
             15
                In this regard, we note that Practice Book § 34a-1 (d) uses the word
          ‘‘shall,’’ thus triggering a mandatory duty on the part of the court to afford
          a respondent the time necessary to respond adequately to any amendments.
          See, e.g., In re Adrien C., 9 Conn. App. 506, 509, 519 A.2d 1241 (observing
          for purposes of statutory interpretation that ‘‘the word ‘shall’ is generally
          determined to be mandatory’’), cert. denied, 203 Conn. 802, 522 A.2d 292
          (1987).
             16
                As our Supreme Court has observed, ‘‘[i]t is well established that a
          person in jeopardy of having his or her parental rights terminated has
          a constitutional due process right to adequate notice of the grounds for
          termination. . . . Notice is not a mere perfunctory act in order to satisfy
          the technicalities of a statute, but has, as its basis, constitutional dimensions.
          An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceed-
          ing [that] is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under
          all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
          action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. . . .
          Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently
          in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that [a] reasonable opportunity
          to prepare will be afforded, and it must set forth the alleged misconduct
          with particularity. . . . [T]here is no violation of due process when a party
          in interest is given the opportunity at a meaningful time for a court hearing
          to litigate the question [at issue].’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
          marks omitted.) In re Gabriel S., 347 Conn. 223, 232–33, 296 A.3d 829 (2023).
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

          With respect to the present claim, the respondent, in
       order to satisfy her burden of proving that counsel
       rendered deficient representation, must do more than
       demonstrate that counsel failed to object to the motion
       to amend. Instead, she must demonstrate that counsel’s
       failure to object cannot be explained by one or more
       possible strategic reasons that are objectively reason-
       able. The respondent cannot satisfy that burden. It
       appears that the only legally viable ground on which
       the respondent’s counsel might have objected was, as
       the respondent suggests, on the ground that the amend-
       ment amounted to unfair surprise and that she needed
       additional time to respond adequately to the failure to
       rehabilitate ground. If counsel pursued such an objec-
       tion, however, the remedy to which the respondent
       would have been entitled was additional time.

          Such an objection does not appear to be objectively
       reasonable in the present case because, as the respon-
       dent acknowledges before this court, the record reflects
       that, prior to the motion, the petitioner presented evi-
       dence related to the failure to rehabilitate ground. We
       briefly observe that, at the time of the trial, although
       the petition set forth the sole ground of no ongoing
       parent-child relationship, the petitioner nonetheless
       presented a copy of the respondent’s court-ordered spe-
       cific steps to facilitate the respondent’s reunification
       with Wendy. The petitioner also presented a perma-
       nency plan study dated September 30, 2022, which sup-
       ported a finding that the respondent had failed to satisfy
       her specific steps and, thus, had failed to rehabilitate.
       In the absence of any objection, the petitioner presented
       testimony from a department social worker with
       respect to numerous unresolved issues that could inter-
       fere with the respondent being able to safely assume
       a responsible position in Wendy’s life. There was evi-
       dence that, in 2022, the respondent’s youngest child
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                                In re Wendy G.-R.

          was found outdoors, at night, in a city street. The peti-
          tioner also presented testimonial evidence from a
          department social worker that was relevant to the issue
          of the respondent’s failure to rehabilitate.
             Furthermore, the record reflects that the respon-
          dent’s counsel challenged the failure to rehabilitate
          ground through cross-examination and by presenting
          evidence of the respondent’s rehabilitative efforts. For
          example, during cross-examination of the social
          worker, the respondent’s counsel elicited testimony
          from the social worker that tended to demonstrate that
          the respondent’s residence was clean and that she had
          satisfied her specific step requiring her to consistently
          visit with Wendy. The respondent also testified with
          respect to the 2022 incident, in which she allegedly had
          failed to adequately supervise her youngest child. The
          respondent testified that, while she was cooking food,
          the child had wandered off briefly and was found at
          the edge of a city street.
             The petitioner presented testimony from Tina Schi-
          appa, an expert in clinical and forensic psychology who
          had evaluated the respondent. Several portions of Schi-
          appa’s examination pertained to the respondent’s fail-
          ure to rehabilitate. Schiappa testified that she had evalu-
          ated the respondent’s ‘‘ability to parent.’’ Without
          objection, counsel for the petitioner asked Schiappa
          whether she believed that the respondent ‘‘ha[d] reha-
          bilitated to the point where Wendy could be returned
          to her care today?’’ Schiappa replied in the negative.
          Counsel for the petitioner also asked Schiappa, ‘‘[G]iven
          the age and needs of Wendy, do you think [the respon-
          dent] should be given more time to achieve . . . that
          level of understanding that she could get through coun-
          seling and classes . . . in order for Wendy to be safely
          reunified with her?’’ Schiappa opined that it was not
          ‘‘fair’’ for Wendy to have to wait for that and that she
          did not believe that the respondent should be given
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

       additional time. Moreover, during the cross-examina-
       tion of Schiappa, the respondent’s counsel attempted
       to undermine these opinions in various ways. Counsel
       for the respondent also asked Schiappa questions that
       were relevant to the respondent’s alleged failure to reha-
       bilitate, such as whether she believed that the respon-
       dent should have been afforded ‘‘a little bit more time
       . . . once she got here to do services?’’
          An examination of the record reflects that, without
       objection at trial, the petitioner presented evidence that
       was relevant to the issue of whether the respondent
       had failed to rehabilitate. The respondent’s counsel
       attempted to undermine this evidence throughout the
       trial. Unless the respondent’s counsel had new evidence
       to present with respect to the failure to rehabilitate
       ground, believed that additional examination of the peti-
       tioner’s witnesses would be beneficial to dispute the
       new ground, or she simply needed additional time to
       prepare for closing argument, it would not have been
       a reasonable trial strategy to object to the motion to
       amend the petition for the purpose of seeking additional
       time. The respondent has failed to present any evidence
       as to what additional steps her counsel could or should
       have taken had she been given additional time in which
       to respond to the new ground. In fact, the respondent
       does not assert that her counsel should have presented
       any additional evidence or that additional time was
       necessary to prepare stronger arguments to refute the
       failure to rehabilitate ground. For these reasons, we
       are not persuaded that counsel’s failure to object to the
       petitioner’s motion to amend was objectively unreason-
       able under the circumstances of this case.
         Even if the respondent could satisfy her burden of
       demonstrating that it was objectively unreasonable for
       her counsel not to object to the motion to amend on
       the basis of the only ground on which she could object,
       namely, that she needed more time to defend against the
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          new adjudicative ground, she has failed to demonstrate
          that she suffered prejudice in that counsel’s incompe-
          tency contributed to the loss of her parental rights. In
          the present case, the respondent does not present us
          with a record to demonstrate what additional evidence
          or argument her counsel should have presented if she
          had asked for additional time to respond to the amend-
          ment. In fact, she does not even argue that there was
          anything that her counsel should have done differently
          to respond to the amendment.17 Instead, the respondent
          argues that prejudice is readily apparent in this case
          because the court ultimately relied on the failure to
          rehabilitate ground. For the reasons already discussed
          in this opinion, that argument is fundamentally flawed.
          The respondent’s argument overlooks the fact that our
          rules of practice permit the petitioner to amend a termi-
          nation of parental rights petition at any time prior to
          a final adjudication of the petition, provided that the
          respondent is afforded additional time as necessary to
          respond to the amendment. See Practice Book § 34a-1
          (d). As we have already concluded, the respondent has
          not demonstrated that it was objectively unreasonable
          for her counsel not to request additional time in light
          of the facts of this case.
            17
               With respect to this type of a claim, a respondent is unable to demon-
          strate that he or she suffered prejudice simply because the court subse-
          quently rendered an adverse judgment. See, e.g., In re Gabriel S., 347 Conn.
          223, 238, 296 A.3d 829 (2023) (‘‘[t]o the extent that the respondent claims
          that he did not receive adequate notice that his failure to rehabilitate would
          be one of the grounds for terminating his parental rights when the trial
          continued because it was possible that the petitioner would proceed under
          [§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)], any constitutional violation was harmless beyond
          a reasonable doubt because he makes no claim that there was additional
          evidence on that issue that he would have presented if he had received
          adequate notice’’); In re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 732 n.6, 271 A.3d 633
          (2022) (suggesting that, even if trial court improperly denied motion for
          continuance in termination of parental rights proceeding, denial was harm-
          less because ‘‘the respondent [mother never] explained how the testimony
          that she would have given if the trial court had granted her motion for a
          continuance would have affected the outcome of the termination proceed-
          ing’’).
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                                     In re Wendy G.-R.

         On the basis of the foregoing, we reject the respon-
       dent’s claim that her trial counsel rendered ineffective
       assistance at the termination of parental rights trial.
                                             II
          The respondent next raises two claims of error
       related to the court’s determinations made pursuant to
       § 17a-112 (j) (1). Specifically, the respondent claims
       that the court improperly determined that (1) the
       department made reasonable efforts to reunify her with
       Wendy, and (2) she was unable or unwilling to benefit
       from reunification efforts.18 We conclude that the court
       properly determined that the respondent was unable
       or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Given
       our resolution of this claim, it is unnecessary for us to
       consider the merits of her claim that the department
       failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the respon-
       dent and Wendy.19
          18
             General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: ‘‘The Superior
       Court, upon notice and hearing as provided in sections 45a-716 and 45a-
       717, may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear
       and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable
       efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in
       accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a-111b, unless the court finds
       in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
       reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required if the court
       has determined at a hearing pursuant to section 17a-111b, or determines at
       trial on the petition, that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is
       in the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child (i) has been
       found by the Superior Court . . . to have been neglected, abused or uncared
       for in a prior proceeding . . . and the parent of such child . . . has failed
       to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the
       belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the
       child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the
       child . . . .’’
          19
             Our Supreme Court has stated that, ‘‘[b]ecause the two clauses [of § 17a-
       112 (j) (1)] are separated by the word ‘unless,’ this statute plainly is written
       in the conjunctive. Accordingly, the department must prove either that it
       has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is
       unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. . . . [E]ither show-
       ing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
       In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 552–53, 979 A.2d 469 (2009).
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             We begin by setting forth additional findings of the
          court. Even though, as we have stated, we need not
          consider the merits of the respondent’s claim regarding
          the reasonableness of the efforts made by the depart-
          ment to reunify her with Wendy, we nevertheless set
          forth the court’s findings and conclusions concerning
          those efforts because those efforts are relevant to the
          claim that the court improperly determined that she was
          unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s
          rehabilitative efforts. ‘‘[The department] made reason-
          able efforts to locate [the respondent]. As noted above,
          [the respondent] (who was pregnant with Yeni20 at the
          time [Santos] and Wendy left Guatemala in 2018)
          remained behind in Guatemala. [Santos] provided [the
          department] with [the respondent’s] cell phone number
          in Guatemala and credible testimony revealed that vari-
          ous [department] social workers assigned to the case
          from mid-2019 to December, 2021, had contact, albeit
          limited and intermittent . . . with [the respondent], via
          cell phone or through the use of the WhatsApp app (a
          free virtual communication platform commonly used
          to video chat and/or text, particularly overseas).

             ‘‘[Santos] testified that [the respondent] always had
          access to a cell phone in Guatemala and he would
          video call [the respondent] during his weekly in-person
          supervised visitation sessions with Wendy so that [the
          respondent] and Wendy could visit with one another.
          [The respondent] also testified that [Santos] would
          video call her during his weekly visits with Wendy and
          Wendy and [the respondent] virtually connected with
          one another. [The respondent] also had some degree
          of cellular or video communication, independent from
          [the department], with Wendy and Wendy’s foster fam-
          ily.
            20
               The court found that Yeni is Wendy’s younger sister and that Yeni
          immigrated with the respondent to New Haven in July, 2022.
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                                   In re Wendy G.-R.

          ‘‘In July, 2019, Attorney Jennifer Avenia, the Director
       of Immigration Practice for [the department], was con-
       sulted for her expertise on how the [department] could
       best serve the family. [Avenia’s] recommendations in
       this case included (1) referrals for local services to
       assist [Santos] and Wendy, (2) securing Wendy special
       immigrant juvenile status,21 and (3) exploring the poten-
       tial reunification of Wendy with [the respondent] in
       Guatemala.
         ‘‘The potential reunification of [the respondent] and
       Wendy in Guatemala required pursuing a study of [the
       respondent] and the family’s Guatemalan home. [The
       department] reached out to International Social Ser-
       vices (ISS-USA) to conduct the out-of-country study. In
       December, 2019, ISS-USA shared a completed study
       with [the department], which recommended [that]
       Wendy be reunified with [the respondent] in Guatemala.
         ‘‘The family’s home22 is located in Jocotán, Guate-
       mala. Jocotán is a rural village or municipality in the
       Chiquimula department of Guatemala. [Avenia] credibly
       testified [that] Jocotán is not far from the Honduras
       border, Guatemala experiences a high homicide rate,
       and Chiquimula has the third highest homicide rate in all
       of Guatemala. Additionally, Guatemala’s rainy season
       spans from approximately May to October, and road-
       ways in and around Jocotán, Chiquimula are dirt roads
       which can wash out in the rainy season, thereby making
       road travel only possible with SUV-like vehicles. [The
       respondent] does not own a motor vehicle, and,
       according to the ISS-USA report (which was not placed
       in evidence nor shared with the court), [the respon-
       dent’s] available modes of transportation [are] by foot
       or horseback. Nonetheless, [the respondent] credibly
         21
            ‘‘Special juvenile immigration status potentially affords Wendy a path
       to United States citizenship.’’
         22
            ‘‘The family home in Guatemala is a single dirt floor room. The home
       has no indoor plumbing. Beds are rope woven entities.’’
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                                       In re Wendy G.-R.

          testified that a bus ride she undertook in 2019 from her
          Jocotán home to Guatemala City (the country’s capital)
          took twelve hours. An international airport is located
          just outside Guatemala City. [Avenia] testified that the
          United States State Department categorizes Guatemala
          as a country in which travelers from abroad should
          ‘reconsider travel.’23
             ‘‘Given ISS-USA’s December, 2019 recommendation
          of reunification, in early 2020, [the department]
          attempted to formulate a plan to safely return Wendy
          to [the respondent] in Guatemala. [Avenia] was told
          that Wendy’s passport was lost or stolen or taken at
          the Mexico/Texas border. In reality, Wendy was never
          issued a passport. In an attempt to arrange for Wendy’s
          legal entry back into Guatemala in 2020, [the depart-
          ment] reached out to the Guatemalan consulate seeking
          a passport for Wendy. However, the Guatemalan gov-
          ernment engaged in only minimal contact with [the
          department]. Ultimately, sometime between April and
          June, 2020, the Guatemalan government issued Wendy
          a one-way travel visa into Guatemala.24
            23
                ‘‘The court takes judicial notice of the United States Travel Advisory
          System, which is comprised of four levels. Level 1 recommends exercising
          normal precautions, Level 2 recommends exercising increased caution, Level
          3 recommends reconsidering travel, and Level 4 recommends do not travel.
          Guatemala is a Level 3 country.’’
             24
                ‘‘[The respondent] testified that, while pregnant with her daughter, Yeni
          (born [in] 2019), [the respondent] traveled by bus from her Jocotán home
          to Guatemala City to obtain a passport for Wendy. ([The respondent] was
          unsuccessful in procuring Wendy a passport.) The [respondent and Santos]
          sought to obtain a passport for Wendy in 2019 because they wanted Wendy
          to return to [the respondent’s] care in Guatemala (apparently with [Santos]
          remaining in the United States). [Santos] credibly testified that [he and
          the respondent] reconsidered that decision as Wendy began speaking and
          understanding more English than Spanish. [The respondent] expressed to
          [Santos] a concern that if Wendy were to return to her care in Guatemala,
          [the respondent] would not be able to understand what Wendy was saying
          in English.
             ‘‘The Guatemalan government’s meager responses to [the department’s]
          overtures and the Guatemalan consulate’s 2020 decision to only issue Wendy
          a one-way visa appears to have been driven, in whole or in part, by the
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                                     In re Wendy G.-R.

          ‘‘Thereafter, [the department] assessed the options of
       sending Wendy, accompanied by a [department] social
       [worker], to Guatemala and/or sending six year old
       Wendy unaccompanied to Guatemala. Formulating a
       plan to return Wendy to [the respondent] in Guatemala
       in mid-2020 included navigating the global challenges
       attendant to the COVID-19 pandemic. After carefully
       considering the profound health risks associated with
       traveling abroad in the pandemic, and the State Depart-
       ment’s travel advisory warning, and the homicide rate
       in Guatemala (and, particularly, in the department of
       Chiquimula), [the department] concluded any attempt
       to return Wendy to Guatemala in 2020 posed unaccept-
       able health and safety risks to Wendy and [depart-
       ment] staff.25
       COVID-19 pandemic. It is noteworthy that, had the [respondent and Santos]
       secured a passport for Wendy prior to the pandemic or prior to Wendy’s
       and [Santos’] 2018 departure from Guatemala, [the department] could have
       contemplated flying Wendy into Guatemala secure in knowing that if [the
       respondent] did not timely appear at the Guatemalan airport, Wendy could
       return to the United States and remain in [the petitioner’s] custody.’’
          25
             ‘‘A[n] extremely compelling concern for [the department] in 2020 was
       whether [the respondent] would/could actually timely appear at the Guate-
       malan airport to assume physical custody of Wendy. In 2020, [the respondent]
       was not maintaining reliable or consistent contact with [the department].
       Per [the respondent], it is a twelve hour bus ride from her home to Guatemala
       City and, as noted previously, the airport is located just outside of the capital
       city. [The department] was justified in its decision that it was not appropriate
       for [department] social workers to travel with Wendy from the Guatemalan
       airport to Jocotán, assuming road travel was even possible. As noted . . .
       the Guatemalan government’s one-way visa precluded Wendy from returning
       to the United States once she entered Guatemala. As discussed previously,
       [the department] had justified concerns about the safety and well-being of
       their [department] social workers staying indefinitely anywhere in Guate-
       mala, both due to the health risks posed by the pandemic in 2020 and the
       physical safety of travelers to Guatemala given the State Department’s rating.
       [The department] also vetted a contingency plan of turning Wendy over to
       Guatemalan child protection officials if [the respondent] did not appear.
       [The department] appropriately concluded [that] subjecting Wendy to Guate-
       mala’s less than robust foster care system, in the midst of a global pandemic,
       with a military that is known for seeking and obtaining bribes, was not in
       Wendy’s best interests.’’
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             ‘‘In early 2022, [Avenia] recommended the 2019 ISS-
          USA study be updated/repeated to determine if reunifi-
          cation with [the respondent] in Guatemala was a viable
          possibility in 2022.26 When ISS-USA attempted to make
          contact with [the respondent] in Guatemala in 2022,
          [the respondent] could not be contacted or located.
          Unbeknownst to ISS-USA and to [the department], [the
          respondent] left Guatemala with her younger daughter,
          Yeni, paying a ‘coyote’27 to secure her and Yeni’s passage
          to the Mexico/Texas border. Although [the respondent]
          and Yeni arrived in New Haven on or about July 10,
          2022, [the department’s] first 2022 contact with [the
          respondent] did not occur until [the respondent]
          appeared, unannounced, at an in-person supervised
          father-daughter visit in August, 2022. [The respondent]
          testified she did not reach out to [the department] prior
          to her August, 2022 appearance at the father-daughter
          supervised visit because she did not have a cell phone.28
            ‘‘In September, 2022, [the department] referred [the
          respondent] to [Integrated Refugee and Immigrant Ser-
          vices (IRIS)]. For an immigrant’s first two years in New
          Haven, IRIS will work with individuals requiring assis-
          tance. By November, 2022, [the respondent] had yet to
          engage with the IRIS worker. The IRIS worker therefore
          reached out to [the respondent’s] counsel. IRIS was
          able to finally convince [the respondent] to meet and
          IRIS conducted its first home visit with [the respondent]
            26
               ‘‘By 2022, the 2019 ISS-USA study had expired.’’
            27
               This court previously has observed that ‘‘coyote’’ is a slang word that
          refers to ‘‘a person paid to guide children . . . and other persons to and
          across the United States border.’’ In re Pedro J. C., 154 Conn. App. 517, 523
          n.4, 105 A.3d 943 (2014), overruled in part on other grounds by In re Henrry
          P. B.-P., 327 Conn. 312, 173 A.3d 928 (2017).
            28
               ‘‘Again, according to [Santos], [the respondent] ‘always’ had cellular and/
          or virtual platform communication accessibility in Guatemala. It is unknown
          what [the respondent’s] cell phone access was en route to the United States.
          However, what is known, is that upon arriving in New Haven in mid-July,
          2022, [the respondent] and her younger daughter, Yeni, resided with [Santos]
          and [Santos] had cell phone/virtual platform capability.’’
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                                     In re Wendy G.-R.

       in December, 2022. [The respondent] continued to be
       unwilling to share necessary background information
       with IRIS and [the respondent] would not engage with
       IRIS. It took [approximately five] months for the IRIS
       worker to establish a trusting, working relationship
       with [the respondent].29 Since February, 2023, IRIS has
       been assisting [the respondent] and [the respondent] is
       engaging with the IRIS worker.
          ‘‘In late August, 2022, New Haven police responded
       to a call that Wendy’s three year old sister, Yeni, had
       been found unsupervised standing/walking in the
       streets of New Haven. When [the respondent] appeared
       at the scene, [the respondent] appeared to be under
       the influence. She was arrested for risk of injury [to a
       child].30
          ‘‘After Yeni was found unsupervised in the street, [the
       department] referred [the respondent] for a substance
       abuse evaluation and there were no recommendations
       for follow-up treatment. [The department] also referred
       [the respondent] to [Intensive Family Preservation
       (IFP)], an in-home, parenting education and coaching
       service. The IFP worker continues to partner with IRIS
       to encourage [the respondent] to engage with IRIS and
       in obtaining community based social and legal services.
          ‘‘Since August, 2022, [the respondent] and Wendy
       have enjoyed weekly supervised visits facilitated by [the
       department] and/or a supervised visitation center. Both
       [the respondent and Santos] . . . participate in the
       family visits with Wendy. At times during the visits,
       the family requires the assistance of an interpreter.31
       [Santos] testified that Wendy speaks a lot more English
         29
            ‘‘The IRIS worker credibly testified that, in her experience, distrust and a
       reluctance to engage is not uncommon with the population she works with.’’
         30
            ‘‘The criminal case was eventually dismissed.’’
         31
            ‘‘[Department] social worker [Kelly] Tibault testified that, if a Spanish
       speak[ing] worker or interpreter is not present at the supervised visits, the
       Google Translate app is utilized.’’
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          than she does Spanish. According to [Santos], Wendy’s
          lack of fluency in Spanish played a part in [his and
          the respondent’s] reconsidering sending Wendy back
          to [the respondent’s] care in Guatemala. Reportedly,
          Wendy understands spoken Spanish more than she can
          speak it, and she requires a translator for some of her
          verbal exchanges with [Santos and the respondent]. To
          enhance communication between [Santos, the respon-
          dent] and Wendy, [the department] explored enrolling
          Wendy in Spanish language classes. Wendy declined
          Spanish language classes, claiming she learns better
          (Spanish) listening to her bilingual foster parents (and
          foster siblings) speak Spanish at home.
             ‘‘From July, 2022, to February, 2023, [the respondent]
          and Yeni primarily resided with [Santos] in a rooming
          house on Kimberly Avenue in New Haven. . . . [T]he
          rooming house’s common area was observed to have
          sticky floors, bugs, and cockroaches.32 [The depart-
          ment] attempted to screen the other rooming house
          tenants and view their individual rooms. Presumably
          because of the tenants’ undocumented status, some
          refused to interact with [the department] and [the
          department] could not adequately vet the other occu-
          pants or assess the physical structure of the rooming
          house (as to potential safety or hazardous issues appli-
          cable to a three year old). In mid-February, 2023, [the
          respondent] and Yeni began renting a room from an
          unrelated male acquaintance in another rooming house
          in New Haven, which [the department] assesses is
          appropriate for [the respondent] and Yeni.
           ‘‘[The respondent] works as an undocumented
          worker at a Mexican restaurant. [The respondent] and
            32
               ‘‘The house refrigerator contained mold and had a foul odor. Like [Santos
          and the respondent], [the department] surmised that the others in the room-
          ing house work in the food service-restaurant business and their dietary
          needs, in large part, are met with ‘take-out’ food, presumably from where
          they work.’’
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                                    In re Wendy G.-R.

       Yeni subsist in part on food from the restaurant and
       food donations from providers such as IRIS. One of the
       social/parenting issues IRIS and IFP were addressing
       with [the respondent] as recently as February and
       March, 2023, is the importance of securing safe and
       responsible child care for Yeni when [she is] not in [the
       respondent’s] care.33
         ‘‘Wendy was referred for mental health treatment to
       address the trauma and uncertainties she experienced
       in her young life, the journey to this country and ICE
       detention, the physical violence she witnessed and
       experienced while living with [Santos] in 2019, the sex-
       ual assault she endured by Juan Carlos . . . and [San-
       tos’] failure to keep her safe, her removal from [Santos’]
       care and entry into foster care, and the substantive loss
       of contact with [the respondent] from the latter part of
       2018 to August, 2022. Wendy last discharged success-
       fully from counseling in November, 2022. By all
       accounts, Wendy is an outgoing, resilient, and
       healthy child.
          ‘‘The testimony and evidence reflect that, from 2019
       through the end of 2021, [the respondent] had limited,
       sporadic contact with the various assigned [depart-
       ment] social workers and [the respondent] joined in
       virtually on [Santos’] and Wendy’s supervised visitation
       sessions. In December, 2021, through August, 2022,
       [department] social worker [Kelly] Tibault unsuccess-
       fully attempted contact with [the respondent], either
       directly ‘dialing’ the cell phone number provided by
       [Santos] or through the use of the WhatsApp messenger
       app. . . . Tibault routinely texted [the respondent]
       through the WhatsApp platform. [The respondent] did
       not respond.
         33
            ‘‘In January, 2023, [the petitioner] filed a neglect petition as to Yeni.
       Said neglect petition remain[ed] pending [at the time of the trial court’s
       judgment].’’
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             ‘‘[The department] was unaware of [the respondent’s]
          2022 emigration from Guatemala until after [the respon-
          dent’s] July, 2022 arrival to New Haven. It may be [that
          the respondent’s] lack of communication with [the
          department] in 2022 was tied to her decision to emigrate
          and the actual journey to Connecticut. Nonetheless,
          when ISS-USA attempted to connect with [the respon-
          dent] to complete an updated and/or second home study
          in 2022, [the respondent] could not be contacted or
          located. [The department] did not become aware of
          [the respondent’s] and Yeni’s July, 2022 arrival to New
          Haven until very late July/early August, 2022, and by
          late August, 2022, [the department] began attempting
          to engage with [the respondent] and to refer [the respon-
          dent] to IRIS, IFP, substance abuse evaluation, and
          weekly supervised visitation sessions with Wendy.34
            ‘‘Case law is clear [that] reasonable efforts is defined
          as doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.
          Clearly, the barriers to reunifying Wendy with [the
          respondent] in Guatemala could not be mitigated in
          2020. However, had [the respondent] responded to [the
          department’s] repeated attempts to communicate with
          her in 2022, and had [the respondent] made herself
          available for the second ISS-USA study in Guatemala,
          returning Wendy to Guatemala in 2022 (as the world
          emerged from the constraints of the pandemic) may
          have been possible (assuming a favorable and current
          ISS-USA study).
             ‘‘Since [the respondent’s] and Yeni’s August, 2022
          arrival to New Haven, [the department] has attempted
          to work with [the respondent], both in maintaining Yeni
          safely in [the respondent’s] care and in supporting/nur-
          turing [the respondent’s] relationship with Wendy. In
            34
              ‘‘It is of no moment to the court’s reasonable efforts analysis that [the
          department’s] efforts to engage with [the respondent] in August, 2022, were
          not isolated to just Wendy and [the respondent], but also included services
          and providers applicable to Yeni and [the respondent].’’
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                                    In re Wendy G.-R.

       addition to weekly supervised parent-child visitation,
       [the department] has connected [the respondent] to
       IRIS and to [IFP] services. [The department] has dili-
       gently remained cognitive of the significant language
       and cultural barriers attendant to the case and [the
       department] has consistently worked around and
       through both [Santos’ and the respondent’s] substantive
       illiteracy and language fluency challenges. Additionally,
       [the department] sought a court-ordered psychological
       evaluation and parent-child interactional. Accordingly,
       the court finds that [the department] made reasonable
       efforts to reunify [the respondent] and Wendy.’’
       (Emphasis in original; footnotes added; footnotes
       altered; footnotes in original; footnotes omitted.)
          With respect to whether the respondent was unable
       or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts
       made by the department, the court set forth the follow-
       ing findings and conclusions: ‘‘[T]he court finds that
       [the respondent] is unable to benefit from reunification
       efforts. As noted previously, [the respondent] communi-
       cated and/or virtually interacted with Wendy and [San-
       tos] and with the foster family at least from 2019 to
       the end of 2021.35 Although [the respondent’s] perhaps
       culturally derived distrust of others (as testified to by
       the IRIS worker) and her decision to attempt to immi-
       grate to the United States and her journey to Connecti-
       cut may have factored into [the respondent’s] 2022
       incommunicado stance with [the department], that real-
       ity rendered [the respondent] unable or unwilling to
       benefit from reunification efforts.
          ‘‘The court is not indifferent to the fact that [the
       respondent] and Yeni undertook an arduous and uncer-
       tain journey to reunify with Wendy and [Santos] in
         35
            ‘‘Although it is not clear, a careful review of [the testimony of the
       respondent and Santos] suggests [that the respondent] participated in virtual
       visits with Wendy during [Santos’] supervised visitation sessions beyond
       the end of 2021.’’
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          2022. Unfortunately, [the respondent’s] failure to timely
          inform [the department] of her presence in New Haven,
          and then her subsequent resistance to engage with pro-
          viders until just recently, detrimentally delayed [the
          respondent] in the opportunity [to] gain critical and
          necessary knowledge and insight as to what constitutes
          safe and nurturing parenting in an urban American
          city.36
             ‘‘Inexplicably, [the respondent] does not endorse or
          accept Wendy’s truth of being sexually assaulted by
          Juan Carlos while in [Santos’] care in 2019. At the Janu-
          ary, 2023 court-ordered parent-child interactional con-
          ducted by [Schiappa], [the respondent] asked then nine
          year old Wendy (a sexual assault victim) if she (Wendy)
          had a boyfriend. To be sure she understood [the respon-
          dent’s] question, Wendy asked [Schiappa] to translate
          [the respondent’s] question into English. [Schiappa]
          credibly testified [that] Wendy was shocked at [the
          respondent’s] sincerely and seriously asked question.
          [The respondent’s] boyfriend question is emblematic of
          [the respondent’s] lack of insight into and appreciation
          for Wendy’s past victimization. Until and unless [the
          respondent was] to exhibit an ability to validate Wen-
          dy’s traumas (physical abuse, sexual abuse, [Santos’]
          neglect and failure to protect, removal from [Santos’]
          care and entry into and protracted stay in foster care),
          continued reunification efforts are of limited, if any,
          value.
            ‘‘The court credits [Schiappa’s] testimony that, given
          that [the respondent] had been living in New Haven
          for only six months at the time of the January, 2023
          psychological evaluations, perhaps [the respondent]
          could benefit from additional time to gain insight and
          understanding as to why Wendy had come into foster
             36
                ‘‘To [the respondent’s] credit, she has recently start[ed] receiving posi-
          tive parenting reports from her IFP worker.’’
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

       care, and why Wendy remained in foster care, and the
       foreseeable challenges or issues for Wendy if she were
       to leave her long-term foster [care] family and [return]
       home to [the respondent’s] care. However, in the addi-
       tional months since [Schiappa’s] evaluation, [the
       respondent’s] lack [of] insight and understanding con-
       tinues unabated. For all of those reasons, the court
       finds that, in addition to [the department] having made
       reasonable efforts to reunify [the respondent] and
       Wendy, [the respondent] is unable or unwilling to bene-
       fit from reunification efforts.’’ (Footnotes altered; foot-
       note omitted.)
         The court later set forth additional findings concern-
       ing the respondent’s inability to benefit from the depart-
       ment’s reunification efforts: ‘‘When asked what [the
       respondent] needed to do for reunification to be possi-
       ble, [Schiappa] credibly testified [that the respondent]
       would need to (1) provide a sufficient and safe living
       space for her and her children, (2) demonstrate insight,
       knowledge and proficiency in safely caring for a nine
       year old while also caring for a three year old, (3)
       exhibit meaningful insight about how [the respondent’s]
       decisions and behaviors have impacted Wendy, (4) be
       accepting of Wendy’s truth regarding the sexual assault,
       [and] (5) acknowledge the other traumatic events
       Wendy has experienced and how said trauma(s) have
       impacted Wendy and may continue to impact Wendy
       in the future.’’
         With respect to the respondent’s claim that the court
       improperly determined, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1),
       that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the
       department’s efforts to reunify her and Wendy, we
       observe that she does not challenge any of the court’s
       specific subordinate findings as clearly erroneous.
       Instead, the respondent broadly challenges the court’s
       ultimate determination, which was based on those sub-
       ordinate findings, that she was unwilling or unable to
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          benefit from the department’s reunification efforts. She
          asserts, contrary to the court’s assessment of her con-
          duct, that the evidence demonstrated that, as of the
          time of the trial, she had ‘‘positively engaged’’ with
          the services that the department offered to her, which
          included IRIS, a psychological evaluation, a substance
          abuse evaluation, and parenting classes. The respon-
          dent argues that, ‘‘[b]ecause the department did not
          offer [her] necessary services toward reunification and
          . . . [she] actively and appropriately engaged in the
          services the department did offer her, the trial court
          erred in determining [that she] was unable or unwilling
          to benefit from services.’’
             This court has observed that, pursuant to § 17a-112
          (j) (1), ‘‘[t]he [petitioner] must prove [by clear and con-
          vincing evidence] either that [the department] has made
          reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the
          parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from the reunifi-
          cation efforts. Section 17a-112 (j) clearly provides that
          the [petitioner] is not required to prove both circum-
          stances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy
          this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
          quotation marks omitted.) In re Corey C., 198 Conn.
          App. 41, 66, 232 A.3d 1237, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 930,
          236 A.3d 217 (2020).
             ‘‘[A]lthough it is true that a finding that the depart-
          ment made reasonable reunification efforts is not a
          necessary predicate to a finding that a parent is unable
          to benefit from such efforts, this does not mean that a
          trial court could never view those two issues as interre-
          lated. . . . [T]he question of whether the [department]
          made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent with
          her child is inextricably linked to the question of
          whether the respondent can benefit from such efforts.
          . . . Depending on the case, a trial court might well
          conclude that the department’s reunification efforts
          were so lacking as to preclude both a finding that the
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

       department made reasonable reunification efforts and
       that a parent is unable to benefit from such efforts.
       . . . However, the department is only required to prove
       either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or,
       alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to
       benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j)
       clearly provides that the department is not required to
       prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is
       sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Citations
       omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) In re Cameron H., 219 Conn. App. 149, 161
       n.5, 294 A.3d 50, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 903, 296 A.3d
       171 (2023).
          We review a trial court’s reunification determinations
       for evidentiary sufficiency. See, e.g., In re Oreoluwa
       O., 321 Conn. 523, 533, 139 A.3d 674 (2016); In re Kyreese
       L., 220 Conn. App. 705, 716, 299 A.3d 296, cert. denied,
       348 Conn. 901, 300 A.3d 1166 (2023). Pursuant to that
       standard, ‘‘we consider whether the trial court could
       have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established
       and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that
       the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to
       justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying
       this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner
       most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial
       court. . . . We apply the identical standard of review
       to a trial court’s determination that a parent is unable
       to benefit from reunification services. . . . That is, we
       review the trial court’s ultimate determination that a
       respondent parent was unwilling or unable to benefit
       from reunification services for evidentiary sufficiency,
       and review the subordinate factual findings for clear
       error. . . . [An appellate court does] not examine the
       record to determine whether the trier of fact could have
       reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . .
       [Rather] every reasonable presumption is made in favor
       of the trial court’s ruling. . . .
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             ‘‘In our review of the record for evidentiary suffi-
          ciency, we are mindful that, as a reviewing court, [w]e
          cannot retry the facts or pass upon the credibility of
          the witnesses. . . . Rather, [i]t is within the province
          of the trial court, when sitting as the fact finder, to
          weigh the evidence presented and determine the credi-
          bility and effect to be given the evidence. . . . More-
          over, it is within the province of the trier of fact to
          accept or reject parts of the testimony of a single wit-
          ness.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) In re Gabriella A., 319 Conn. 775, 789–90, 127
          A.3d 948 (2015).
             The respondent does not challenge the correctness
          of any of the court’s subordinate factual findings con-
          cerning the conduct of the department or the respon-
          dent in the present case. Instead, the respondent chal-
          lenges the court’s assessment of the degree to which
          she was receptive to and utilized the services offered
          as well as its ultimate determination that she was unable
          or unwilling to benefit from the department’s services.
          Among the court’s relevant subordinate findings was
          that, although the respondent had access to a cell phone
          while she was living in Guatemala, from mid-2019 to
          December, 2021, she had only ‘‘limited and intermittent
          contact’’ with the department. From December, 2021,
          through August, 2022, the respondent did not respond
          to communications, whether in the form of telephone
          calls or texts, from the department. The respondent’s
          failure to let the department know of her whereabouts
          led to an inability of ISS-USA to conduct an updated
          home study in 2022. The respondent did not make the
          department aware of the fact that she intended to immi-
          grate to the United States and did not contact the depart-
          ment in a timely manner when she arrived in New Haven
          on or about July 10, 2022. Rather, the respondent
          appeared, unannounced, at a supervised visit between
          Wendy and Santos in August, 2022.
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                             In re Wendy G.-R.

         The court found that, for several months, the respon-
       dent was very reluctant to engage with the services
       the department offered through IRIS. This finding was
       supported by the evidence that, although the depart-
       ment referred the respondent to IRIS in September,
       2022, an agreed upon home visit did not occur until
       December, 2022. Moreover, the respondent did not fully
       share information about her living situation with IRIS,
       and it took until February, 2023, before IRIS workers
       could develop a working relationship with her.
          In August, 2022, the respondent participated in a sub-
       stance abuse evaluation as well as parenting services
       provided through IFP. The respondent also submitted
       to court-ordered psychological evaluation and a parent-
       child interactional study with Schiappa, a licensed psy-
       chologist, in January, 2023. The court relied on the
       detailed report prepared by Schiappa. Among her find-
       ings was that ‘‘[the respondent] did not appear to under-
       stand why Wendy couldn’t just be returned to her care
       now that she is living in the United States. She does
       not appear to understand the impact that her behaviors
       have on her ability to safely parent the children.’’ Schi-
       appa stated that the respondent did not come prepared
       to the parent-child interactional study, as she had
       brought her younger daughter, Yeni, but did not bring
       anything with which to entertain her. She was indiffer-
       ent to the fact that Yeni attempted to open a packet of
       medicine from her purse and that the evaluator ulti-
       mately had to intervene to prevent Yeni from ingesting
       the medicine. Schiappa opined that ‘‘[the respondent]
       does not appear to understand the differences in culture
       or recognize how her behaviors are impacting her ability
       to parent. [The respondent] minimizes any problems.
       She was cooperative to the evaluation process but has
       limited insight and judgment.’’ Schiappa also opined
       that the respondent lacks ‘‘a good understanding of
       Wendy’s needs or the capacity to meet them.’’ She stated
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          that termination of the respondent’s parental rights
          appears to be in Wendy’s best interest, that her biologi-
          cal parents are unable to provide her with a stable and
          safe home, and that, ‘‘[g]iven the amount of time that
          has passed, it does not appear within an appropriate
          time frame [that the respondent will be able] to provide
          stability and permanency for Wendy.’’ Schiappa
          observed that ‘‘[i]t would be impossible for [the respon-
          dent or Santos] to be [Wendy’s] psychological parents
          as neither of them have ever really provided the care
          for her that a parent would. In Guatemala, [Wendy’s]
          grandmother provided this care.’’
             In its detailed findings, the court outlined the myriad
          efforts to reunify that were made by the department
          in this case despite the challenges posed by a global
          pandemic and the danger presented by the fact that the
          respondent was residing in Guatemala until July, 2022.
          Mindful of the importance of reunification efforts made
          by the department,37 we conclude that the department’s
          reunification efforts were on their face not so lacking
          as to preclude a finding that the respondent was unable
          or unwilling to benefit from such services.38 The peti-
          tioner did not prove by clear and convincing evidence
              37
                 ‘‘The requirement of reunification efforts provides . . . substantive pro-
          tection for any parent who contests a termination action, and places a
          concomitant burden on the state to take appropriate measures designed to
          secure reunification of parent and child. . . . This requirement is based on
          the well settled notion that [t]he right of a parent to raise his or her children
          [is] recognized as a basic constitutional right.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572,
          584, 825 A.2d 127 (2003).
              38
                 Although it is unnecessary for us to reach the merits of the respondent’s
          claim that the court improperly determined that the department made rea-
          sonable efforts to reunify her with Wendy, we nonetheless observe that
          ‘‘[t]he reasonableness of the department’s efforts must be assessed in the
          context of each case. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the
          department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged,
          using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reason-
          able nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the
          federal act from which the requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonable
          efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible. . . .
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       that the respondent failed to engage with all of the
       department’s services, but such proof was not neces-
       sary. The petitioner demonstrated by clear and convinc-
       ing evidence, and the court found, that the respondent
       had inconsistent communication with the department
       when she was in Guatemala, she failed to timely notify
       the department of her whereabouts prior to July, 2022,
       and she was reluctant to engage in services offered by
       the department until early 2023, which supported its
       finding that the respondent was unwilling to benefit
       from services offered by the department.
          The respondent’s failure to timely engage in services
       offered by the department detrimentally delayed her
       ability to gain critical and necessary knowledge of how
       Wendy’s needs changed upon her immigration to an
       American city. The petitioner proved by clear and con-
       vincing evidence, and the court found, that, at the time
       of her evaluation by Schiappa, the respondent still dem-
       onstrated a lack of insight into Wendy’s traumatic expe-
       riences resulting from her relocation to the United
       States, particularly her sexual abuse, and what was
       required for her to provide Wendy a safe, nurturing, and
       supportive environment free from insecurity. Affecting
       her ability to benefit from services was the fact that
       the respondent, who did not speak English and was
       undocumented, required community based services to
       meet even basic needs for food and shelter for herself
       and Yeni. Her inability to converse in English with
       Wendy was an obvious barrier to her being able to meet
       Wendy’s psychological needs. The court also observed
       that the respondent struggled to parent Yeni, showing
       a lack of insight as to what was necessary to provide
       [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable
       efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circum-
       stances of each individual case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
       Omar I., 197 Conn. App. 499, 589, 231 A.3d 1196, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
       924, 233 A.3d 1091, cert. denied sub nom. Ammar I. v. Connecticut,
       U.S.     , 141 S. Ct. 956, 208 L. Ed. 2d 494 (2020).
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                                 In re Wendy G.-R.

          a safe environment for her, as well. The cumulative
          effect of these findings supported the court’s ultimate
          determination that the respondent, due in part to her
          lack of understanding of what was required of her to
          nurture Wendy and her struggles to have basic needs
          met for herself and Yeni, was unable to benefit from
          reunification efforts made by the department.
               The judgment is affirmed.
               In this opinion the other judges concurred.