Court Opinion

ID: 9568474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:04:07.181445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:52:37.653580
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/21/23
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION FOUR

 JOSE R. INZUNZA et al.,             B318956
       Defendants and Appellants,    (Los Angeles County
       v.                            Super. Ct. No.
                                     BC678942)
 MARIA NARANJO et al.,

       Plaintiffs and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mel Red Recana, Judge. Reversed in part and
remanded with directions.
      Locke Lord, Susan A. Kidwell; Clark Hill and Pamela A.
Palmer for Defendant and Appellant CR GTS, Inc.
      Clark Hill, Dean Olson, Pamela Palmer; Greines, Martin,
Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson and Laura G. Lim for
Defendant and Appellant Jose R. Inzunza.
      California Truck Injury Law and Katherine Harvey-Lee for
Plaintiffs and Respondents.
                        INTRODUCTION

       Jose I.V. Naranjo died after his pick-up truck collided with
a tractor-trailer driven by Jose R. Inzunza (Inzunza) for CR GTS,
Inc. (CRGTS), an interstate motor carrier. Jose’s surviving spouse
(Maria ), their four adult children (Griselda, Araceli, Jose Jr., and
Oscar), and Jose’s two adult stepchildren (Carla and Luis)
(collectively, plaintiffs) 1 brought this wrongful death action
against defendants and appellants Inzunza and CRGTS
(collectively, defendants).
       The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. CRGTS
appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the trial court
prejudicially erred by precluding it from contesting liability and
comparative fault and, instead, imputing Inzunza’s deemed
admissions to CRGTS to establish its liability; and (2) the
verdicts in favor of the stepchildren must be vacated because no
substantial evidence supports a finding that they were financially
dependent on the decedent at the time of his death – an essential
element of standing to bring a wrongful death claim under Code
of Civil Procedure section 377.60, subdivision (b)(1). 2 Inzunza
separately appeals from the judgment, contending: (1) the jury’s
award of noneconomic damages to Maria was excessive as a
matter of law (CRGTS joins this argument); and (2) in addition to
the lack of evidence to support the stepchildren’s standing, the
trial court also improperly instructed the jury regarding the
necessary elements for stepchild standing in a wrongful death
action.
       For the reasons discussed below, we agree with CRGTS’s
first contention and conclude the trial court prejudicially erred by

1     Because the decedent and some of the plaintiffs share a
surname, we use their first names when referring to them
individually to avoid confusion.
2    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
                               2
precluding CRGTS from presenting evidence contesting liability
and of comparative fault. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
against CRGTS and remand the action for a new trial against
CRGTS. The judgment against Inzunza is set aside pending the
outcome of the new trial. We address defendants’ additional
contentions only to the extent they regard issues likely to arise on
retrial.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 3

       In December 2015, Jose was involved in a fatal car accident
involving a tractor trailer driven by Inzunza and owned by
CRGTS. According to eyewitnesses, a portion of the tractor trailer
was partially blocking the left lane of a divided highway when
Jose’s vehicle collided with it.
       Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against Inzunza and
CRGTS, alleging a single cause of action for negligence. 4 They
alleged defendants were negligent and proximately caused Jose’s
fatal injuries. They further alleged Inzunza was driving the
tractor trailer while working for CRGTS in the course and scope
of his employment.
       Plaintiffs later propounded requests for admission on
Inzunza. The requests sought the following admissions, among
others: Inzunza was negligent, Inzunza’s negligence caused the
accident, no negligence on the part of the decedent caused or
contributed to the fatal injuries he sustained, and Inzunza’s
negligence proximately caused the fatal injuries to decedent.
Despite receiving multiple extensions of time to respond, Inzunza
failed to serve any responses to the requests. Thus, plaintiffs filed

3     Except for background facts included for context, we limit
our recitation of the facts to those relevant to the issues we are
deciding.
4     Plaintiffs also sued Kershaw Fruit & Cold Storage, Inc.,
and later added Carlos Gonzalez as a defendant. Neither party
remained in the case at the time of trial.
                                 3
a motion for an order that the truth of each matter specified in
the requests for admission propounded on Inzunza be deemed
admitted under section 2033.280, subdivision (b). 5 In opposition
to the motion, Inzunza’s counsel explained they lost contact with
Inzunza despite multiple attempts to reach him, including by
hiring two private investigators. The court found that “[w]hile
[Inzunza’s] counsel demonstrates that they made reasonable
efforts to locate and contact [Inzunza], [Inzunza’s] counsel does
not show [Inzunza] is not attempting to evade the lawsuit or
discovery demand.” On that basis, the court granted plaintiffs’
motion, and “deem[ed] admitted the truth of the matters set forth
in Requests for Admission, Set One, to defendant Jose R.
Inzunza.”
       Plaintiffs also propounded requests for admission on
CRGTS. Several of the requests were the same as those
propounded on Inzunza, including: admit that Inzunza caused or
contributed to the accident, admit Inzunza was negligent, admit
the negligence of Inzunza was the cause of the fatal injuries to
Jose, and admit no negligence on the part of Jose caused or
contributed to the fatal injuries he sustained. CRGTS provided
verified responses denying these requests. 6

5      Section 2033.280, subdivision (b) states, in relevant part: If
a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve
a timely response, the “requesting party may move for an order
that . . . the truth of any matters specified in the requests be
deemed admitted . . . .”
6     CRGTS originally provided unverified responses to the
requests for admission, and plaintiffs obtained an order from the
court deeming the requests admitted based on the “incomplete,”
“evasive,” and unverified responses. It is undisputed, however,
that the parties entered into a stipulation under which the order
deeming the requests admitted was withdrawn, and CRGTS
ultimately served verified responses to the requests for
admission.
                                  4
       Before trial, plaintiffs filed a motion in limine to preclude
defendants “from offering evidence, expert opinion, exhibits,
writings, testimony, reference or argument contrary to the
Requests for Admissions propounded to [Inzunza] which were
deemed admitted by court order . . . .” Plaintiffs argued the
admissions by Inzunza conclusively established that Inzunza
caused the accident and Jose bore no comparative fault. Thus,
according to plaintiffs, “the court must exclude any opinion
testimony by . . . experts, or indeed any other evidence or
argument that conflicts or casts doubt on the admitted liability of
[Inzunza].” CRGTS filed its own motion in limine for “an order
permitting evidence regarding liability . . . as to . . . CRGTS . . . .”
After hearing argument, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion
and denied CRGTS’s motion on the ground it was moot. The trial
court explained that CRGTS could present evidence that Inzunza
was acting beyond the scope of his employment, and therefore,
CRGTS is not vicariously liable. The court ruled CRGTS could
not, however, present evidence of comparative fault.
       Just before the start of trial, the court heard argument on
how to implement its decision to grant plaintiffs’ motion in limine
to preclude evidence contrary to Inzunza’s deemed admissions.
CRGTS’s counsel explained: “[W]e had three eyewitnesses . . .
who had been deposed . . . . We were prepared to provide their
testimony that it appeared that the decedent was not paying
attention; he never put his brakes on, they saw the vehicle but
somehow the decedent didn’t see or react to the vehicle.” In
response, plaintiffs’ counsel argued Inzunza’s deemed admissions
“precluded any evidence coming in that would contradict those
deemed admissions,” and that meant that “not CRGTS, not
[p]laintiffs, not anybody [sic] can bring in evidence contrary [to]
or contesting deemed admissions.” The trial court agreed with
plaintiffs.
       At trial, plaintiffs read Inzunza’s deemed admissions to the
jury. Plaintiffs also called two of Jose’s grandchildren, his two

                                   5
stepchildren, his four children, his surviving spouse, and a
damages expert to testify. Unable to contest that Inzunza was
entirely at fault for the accident, defendants called only a
damages expert to testify about the value of Jose’s household
services.
      The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs. The jury
determined Inzunza was negligent and his negligence was a
substantial factor in causing harm to Jose and plaintiffs. The jury
also determined Inzunza was the agent of CRGTS and was acting
within the scope of his agency when he harmed Jose and
plaintiffs. The jury awarded a total of $7,619,000 to plaintiffs,
including Jose’s two adult stepchildren. The court entered
judgment on the verdict, holding CRGTS and Inzunza jointly and
severally liable.
      Defendants moved for a new trial and for partial judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The court denied both motions.
CRGTS and Inzunza each appealed from the final judgment.

                          DISCUSSION

1.    Inzunza’s Deemed Admissions Do Not Preclude
      CRGTS From Introducing Evidence Contrary to
      Those Admissions

       A. Governing Principles and Standard of Review
       When a party to whom requests for admission are directed
fails to serve a timely response, “[t]he requesting party may move
for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth
of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted . . . .”
(§ 2033.280, subd. (b).) The court “shall make this order,” unless
it finds the party to whom requests for admission have been
directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed
response that substantially complies with the discovery statutes.
(§ 2033.280, subd. (c).) “[A] deemed admitted order establishes, by
judicial fiat, that a nonresponding party has responded to the
requests by admitting the truth of all matters contained therein.”
                                 6
(Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 979.) Any matter
deemed to have been admitted “is conclusively established
against the party making the admission” but “is binding only on
th[e] party” that made the admission. (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) &
(b).)
       “‘Generally, a trial court’s ruling on an in limine motion is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (Appel v. Superior Court (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 329, 336.) Here, however, the trial court’s order
was predicated on its interpretation of section 2033.410. We
therefore exercise de novo review. (Ibid [“‘Statutory construction
is a question of law we decide de novo’”].)

       B. Analysis
       Plaintiffs acknowledge, as they must, that deemed
admissions are conclusively established only against the party
making the admission. (§ 2033.410, subds. (a) & (b).) Plaintiffs
nevertheless contend the trial court correctly ruled CRGTS was
also precluded from introducing evidence on the issues of liability
and comparative fault because that evidence would directly
contradict Inzunza’s deemed admissions, and CRGTS’s liability is
merely derivative of Inzunza’s based on the doctrine of vicarious
liability. CRGTS counters that precluding it from introducing
evidence contrary to Inzunza’s deemed admissions effectively
makes Inzunza’s admissions binding on CRGTS. CRGTS explains
that because it is vicariously liable for Inzunza’s tortious conduct,
prohibiting it from introducing evidence of liability and
comparative fault imputes Inzunza’s failure to respond to
requests for admission to CRGTS in violation of section 2033.410,
subdivisions (a) and (b). For the reasons discussed below, we
agree with CRGTS.
       We begin with the plain language of the statute. (Estate of
Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 911 [“If the terms of the statute
are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant what they
said, and the plain meaning of the language governs”].) As noted
above, section 2033.410 provides, in relevant part, that any
                                  7
matter deemed admitted “is conclusively established against the
party making the admission” and is “binding only on that party.”
(§ 2033.410, subds. (a) and (b), italics added.) It is undisputed
that Inzunza failed to respond to plaintiffs’ requests for
admission propounded on him, and the trial court correctly
deemed the matters in the requests admitted by Inzunza. It is
also undisputed, however, that CRGTS timely responded to
plaintiffs’ requests for admission, and denied some of the same
requests as those deemed admitted by Inzunza (i.e., that Inzunza
negligently caused the accident and that Jose was not
comparatively at fault). The basis of plaintiffs’ action against
CRGTS is vicarious liability arising from the acts of Inzunza.
Vicarious liability of an employer is wholly derivative of the
employee’s fault. If the employee is not at fault, the employer is
not vicariously liable. (See Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners
Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426 [“[v]icarious
liability of an employer is not based on fault and is wholly
derivative”].) Thus, by precluding CRGTS from introducing
evidence contesting liability, the trial court saddled it with
Inzunza’s deemed admissions—making his admissions of fault
binding not only on Inzunza, but also CRGTS, in violation of
section 2033.410.
       Despite the clear language of the statute, plaintiffs argue
“[u]nanimous authorities preclude any party from introducing
evidence to contest deemed admissions being held against the
party who made them.” (Italics added.) There are two problems
with this argument. First, plaintiffs appear to rely on Murillo v.
Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730 (Murillo) and People
v. $2,709 United States Currency (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1278
($2709 United States Currency) for the proposition that section
2033.410 prevents all parties from introducing evidence contrary
to deemed admissions. The courts in those cases stated the
“general rule [that] an admission is conclusive in the action as to
the party making it” and “no contradictory evidence may be

                                 8
introduced.” (Murillo, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 736; $2709
United States Currency, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 1286.)
Neither case, however, involved multiple defendants. Thus, the
courts in Murillo and $2709 United States Currency had no
occasion to address the issue here, i.e., whether a defendant may
introduce evidence contrary to a codefendant’s deemed
admissions to demonstrate the party’s (as opposed to
codefendant’s) non-liability. (See Rosen v. State Farm General
Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1076 [“‘It is a well-established
rule that an opinion is only authority for those issues actually
considered or decided’”].)
       Second, contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, Inzunza’s deemed
admissions were, in practical effect, used against a party that
denied the very same requests. As discussed above, CRGTS is
vicariously liable for its agent’s negligence if the agent was acting
within the scope of his agency. (See Presbyterian Camp &
Conference Centers, Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 493,
502.) But Izunza was not acting as CRGTS’s agent when he failed
to timely deny the requests for admissions addressed to him.
Thus, while it is fair to hold CRGTS liable for Inzunza’s actual
actions and inactions during the course and scope of his
employment as its agent, it is unfair to hold CRGTS liable for
deemed admissions of fault resulting from Inzunza’s failure to
timely respond to the requests for admissions.
       We likewise reject plaintiffs’ argument that the jury
instructions preclude any party from introducing evidence
contrary to the deemed admissions of one defendant. The
instruction given to the jury on requests for admission, California
Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 210, provides: “Before trial,
each party has the right to ask another party to admit in writing
that certain matters are true. If the other party admits those
matters, you must accept them as true. No further evidence is
required to prove them.” But nothing in the jury instruction

                                  9
states the jury must accept those matters as true as against a
party who denied the same requests. 7
       The parties have not directed us to, and we have not
located, a case directly addressing the issue presented, i.e.,
whether the deemed admissions of an agent preclude the
principal from introducing evidence of liability and comparative
fault. In an analogous context involving defaulting defendants,
however, courts have held that admissions implied from the
default of one defendant are not binding on a codefendant who
answered, and expressly denied, the allegations in the complaint.
       For example, in Taylor v. Socony Mobil Oil Co. (1966) 242
Cal.App.2d 832, 833 (Taylor), the plaintiff sued Socony Mobil and
its employee for malicious prosecution. The employee failed to
answer the complaint and his default was entered, but Socony
Mobil answered, “denying all material allegations of the
complaint.” (Ibid.) The action went to trial against Socony Mobil
and at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted
Socony Mobil’s motion for nonsuit. (Ibid.) On appeal, the plaintiff
did “not seriously argue that he presented testimony constituting
a prima facie showing of lack of probable cause or of malice” but
argued “proof of these issues is supplied by the pleadings”
because the employee admitted the allegations in the pleadings
by failing to answer the complaint. (Id. at pp. 833-834.) The
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, explaining: “The validity
of plaintiff’s argument rests upon his major premise that an
admission implied from the default of one defendant is binding

7     We note that, in brackets, CACI No. 210 states: “However,
these matters must be considered true only as they apply to the
party who admitted they were true.” And, in the directions for
use of the instruction, it states: “The bracketed phrase should be
given if there are multiple parties.” It appears on the record
before us that neither party requested this sentence be included
in the instruction. On retrial, in accordance with the directions
for use of the instruction, the bracketed sentence should be
included.
                                   10
upon an answering codefendant who has denied the relevant
allegations of the complaint. His position is untenable.” (Id. at p.
834.) Rather, “the correct rule . . . [is] ‘ . . . that admissions
implied from the default of one defendant ordinarily are not
binding upon a codefendant who, by answering, expressly denies
and places in issue the truth of the allegations thus admitted by
the absent party.’” (Ibid.)
       Similarly, in Western Heritage Insurance Co. v. Superior
Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1199-1200 (Western
Heritage), the court held an intervening insurer was permitted to
litigate the issue of liability notwithstanding its insured’s default.
The court explained: “A party’s default does not bind
nondefaulting codefendants, even when the basis for the action
against the codefendants is vicarious liability arising from the
acts of the defaulting defendant.” (Id. at p. 1211.)
       Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish these cases is unavailing.
First, plaintiffs claim Taylor and Western Heritage involved
“default[ing] parties with wildly different procedural postures
and fact patterns.” They point to the fact that in Taylor, the
defaulting employee never answered the complaint or appeared
in the case, and in Western Heritage, the employee’s answer had
been stricken at the plaintiff’s request. We fail to understand the
significance of these distinctions. Whether the defendant fails to
answer the complaint, or to respond to requests for admission,
facts are established by his or her failure to respond. Thus, the
principles expressed in Taylor and Western Heritage should
equally apply here (or perhaps with even greater force in the
deemed admissions context) because the controlling statute
explicitly states admissions by one party are “binding only on
that party[.]” (§ 2033.410, subd. (b).)
       Next, plaintiffs contend CRGTS “misapplies another
holding in Taylor.” We disagree. In Taylor, as an additional
reason in support of its holding, the court explained that, “under
the rules of evidence[,]” declarations of an agent are admissible

                                 11
only when made during the course of his agency and at the time
the event occurred. (Taylor, supra, 242 Cal.App.2d at p. 834.) The
admissions in Taylor, the court explained, were made not only
after the event occurred, but also after his employment had
terminated. (Ibid.) Thus, the employee’s admissions implied from
his default could not bind his employer. (Ibid.) So too, here.
Inzunza’s admissions were deemed to have been made long after
the accident in 2015. This additional point in Taylor, therefore,
lends further support to CRGTS’s argument that the principles in
Taylor should apply here.
       In sum, we conclude an agent’s deemed admissions do not
bind the principal codefendant, even when the basis for the action
against the principal codefendant is vicarious liability arising
from the acts of the agent. 8 To hold otherwise would directly
contradict the plain language of section 2033.410. The trial court
therefore erred by precluding CRGTS from introducing evidence
of non-liability and comparative fault. This error clearly was
prejudicial. We therefore reverse the judgment against CRGTS
and remand for a new trial. The judgment against Inzunza must
be set aside pending the outcome of that trial. (See Adams Mfg. &
Engineering Co. v. Coast Centerless Grinding Co. (1960) 184
Cal.App.2d 649, 655 [“[W]here there are two or more defendants
and the liability of one is dependent upon that of the other, the

8      We note other jurisdictions have reached the same
conclusion. (See, e.g., Riberglass, Inc. v. Techni-Glass Industries,
Inc. (11th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 565, 566-567 [Even where the
liability of a guarantor depends on the liability of a co-party,
deemed admissions of the latter that it is indebted to the creditor
do not justify the entry of judgment against the guarantor who
has responded sufficiently to requests for admissions]; see also
Alipour v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (N.D. Ga. 1990) 131 F.R.D.
213, 215-216, fn. 3 [even in cases involving defendants whose
rights or liabilities are derivative of the party who failed to
respond to material admissions, the deemed admissions of one
defendant are not binding on the codefendant].)
                                   12
default of one of them does not preclude his having the benefit of
his codefendants establishing, after a contested hearing, the
nonexistence of the controlling fact; in such case the defaulting
defendant is entitled to have judgment in his favor along with the
successful contesting defendant”]; see also Western Heritage,
supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210, fn. 18 [“[I]f the action is still
pending against a party which may be jointly liable with the
defaulting insured, it is improper to enter judgment against the
defaulting defendant while the action remains pending against
the other defendant”].)

2.    Additional Contentions of Error at Trial

        In light of our conclusion that the case must be remanded
for a new trial, we need not address defendants’ other contentions
(i.e., no substantial evidence that the stepchildren were
financially dependent on the decedent at the time of his death,
and the noneconomic damages awarded to Maria were excessive
as a matter of law). To assist the parties and the trial court,
however, we address Inzunza’s instructional error contention
because it is likely to arise on retrial.
        Inzunza contends the trial court’s instruction on stepchild
standing contained the wrong standard. Under section 377.60,
subdivision (b)(1), stepchildren of the decedent may bring a
wrongful death action “if they were dependent on the decedent[.]”
For purposes of this subdivision, dependence refers to financial
support at the time of decedent’s death, or at most, two years
before the decedent’s death. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Carpenter (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445, 1447-1148.)
        The trial court gave the following instruction, proposed by
plaintiffs: “Under California law, a stepchild is permitted to bring
a claim for wrongful death if they are dependent, to some extent,
upon the decedent for the necessaries of life. No strict formula
can be applied to determine this. If a stepchild received financial
support from their parent which helped them in obtaining the

                                13
things which one cannot and should not do without, then that
stepchild is dependent upon their parent and is qualified to bring
a wrongful death claim. Such things may include, but are not
limited to, shelter, clothing, food, utilities, car payments, medical
treatment, and other customary living expenses.” Inzunza asserts
the instruction “erroneously implied that dependence could occur
at any point in the stepchild’s life” rather than “present
dependence.” (Original italics.) He argues defendants’ proposed
instruction included the necessary temporal restriction. Their
proposed instruction provided, in part: “[I]n order for you to
award damages to either [Carla or Luis], you must find that
either stepchild was dependent on the decedent. Dependence is
defined as financial support, ‘actually dependent, to some extent,
upon the decedent for necessaires of life . . . which aids them in
obtaining the things, such as shelter, clothing, food and medical
treatment which one cannot and should not do without.’”
        We are unpersuaded. Indeed, we find defendants’ proposed
instruction is not any clearer on the temporal issue than the
instruction given. We therefore conclude the trial court did not
err by giving plaintiffs’ proposed instruction, which correctly used
present tense in the introductory sentence: “[A] stepchild is
permitted to bring a claim for wrongful death if they are
dependent, to some extent, upon the decedent for the necessaries
of life.” (Italics added.)

                                 14
                         DISPOSITION

       The judgment against CRGTS is reversed and the matter is
remanded for a new trial against CRGTS. The judgment against
Inzunza is set aside pending the outcome of that trial. In the
event plaintiffs decide not to retry the action, the trial court is
instructed to enter a new judgment against Inzunza only.
Assuming that happens, this opinion does not prejudice Inzunza’s
right to appeal from the new judgment, and renew his arguments
raised in this appeal that we have not decided (i.e., the
noneconomic damages awarded to Maria were excessive as a
matter of law and the stepchildren lacked standing to bring a
wrongful death claim) on the ground those arguments may be
moot depending on whether plaintiffs retry the case. CRGTS is
awarded its costs on appeal.

              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                   CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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