Court Opinion

ID: 9675042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:40:21.445141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.191648
License: Public Domain

Grant, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority reversing the action of the District Court in this case. I feel a more detailed statement is necessary.
The county attorney of Greeley County, in his *553third amended petition, alleged that the three children named in the petition were in the sole custody of their mother, appellant Beverly J. Hochstetler, until May 8, 1981; that after such date the children were, by court order, in the custody of the Nebraska Department of Public Welfare; that the father of such children had been determined in a Hall County District Court adjudication, and that the father had abandoned the children; that said minor children are minors as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-202(1), (2)(b), (c), and (e) (Reissue 1978); that appellant was mentally ill and as a result, but through no fault of appellant, the said children were without proper support and should be placed in the custody of the state Department of Public Welfare; that appellant, by reason of her fault, has neglected or refused to provide proper and necessary subsistence and other care necessary for the well-being of the children; and “that she has caused the children to be placed in a situation which is injurious to the health or morals of such children in that the children are deprived of heat in the winter and on occasion food, they are traumatized by stories and threats of the mother and they are deprived of a stable home environment . . . .”
The county attorney prayed that the children be declared to be children as defined in § 43-202(1), (2)(b), (c), and (e); that the children be placed in the custody of the state Department of Public Welfare; that the parental rights of both appellant and the children’s father be terminated; and for such other relief as was in the best interests of the children.
Appellant’s answer to this petition was a general denial.
The county court thereafter held hearings on July 28, August 12, September 29 and 30, October 1, and November 3, 1981. Pursuant to appellant’s motion in limine, all evidence before December 3, 1979 (the date of dismissal of a prior juvenile court case in Merrick County) was excluded. Eight hundred *554forty-five pages of testimony were taken and 40 exhibits were submitted.
The county court by journal entry of adjudication hearing on September 29, 1981, found: “By a preponderance of the evidence that [the children] . . . are each within the meaning of 43-202(2)(b) who lack proper parental care by reason of the fault of Beverly J. Hochstetler, (c) whose parent, Beverly J. Hochstetler, neglects and refuses to provide proper or necessary care for the mental health, morals, and well-being of said children, and (e) who are in a situation injurious to the mental health and morals of said children.”
The county court further found that the State had failed to prove that appellant was a mentally ill or mentally deficient parent.
The . court ordered a home study of appellant’s home and ordered appellant to meet with Michael O’Neill, Ph.D., a psychologist and director of the Family/Child Center in Grand Island; ordered Dr. O’Neill to develop a treatment program “structured and designed with the goal of reuniting Beverly J. Hochstetler with her children”; and set a dispositional hearing for November 3, 1981.
The dispositional order placed temporary custody of the children with the state Department of Public Welfare in a designated foster home, and with detailed directions as to the conduct of the children and appellant, until further review set for June 4, 1982; or such earlier date as might be requested.
It is from this order that the appellant appealed to the District Court, where the county court order was affirmed on March 1, 1983.
It should be noted, as to appellant, that there was no termination of parental rights and no permanent deprivation of custody. The parental rights of the father were terminated earlier,- in the county court proceeding, and no appeal was taken from that order.
I agree that the findings of fact of the juvenile *555court should be accorded great weight by this court, as set out in the majority opinion. I further agree that the physical needs of the children were being met by appellant, i.e., that the children were fed and housed adequately. I do not think that is the issue decided by the juvenile court.
That court specifically held that appellant “refuse [d] to provide proper or necessary care for-the mental health, morals, and well-being of said children, and [that said children] are in a situation injurious to the mental health and morals of said children.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I feel there is overwhelming evidence to support those findings. This particular case began when appellant was arrested in May of 1981 for exercising control over property owned by another. At that time the children, of necessity, were placed in the custody of state officials for a period of some 20 days while appellant was jailed. Appellant’s conviction of that crime, after jury trial, was affirmed in this court in State v. Hochstetler, 214 Neb. 482, 334 N.W.2d 455 (1983). The facts in that case showed that appellant had sold property owned by her landlord, valued at well in excess of $1,000, to another person for $140. It is of interest to note that among the conditions of probation enforced on appellant in that case was one requiring that appellant “ ‘refrain totally from acting as her own lawyer, and . . . from representing herself as an attorney or a proctor.’ ” Id. at 483, 334 N.W.2d at 456.
Typical of appellant’s testimony throughout this case is the following example from the hearing on July 28, 1981: “Q. [By the court] Your husband’s name or X-husband’s [sic] name— A. I’m a widow. My husband’s name was Jonathan Lester Hochstetler. Q. When did he pass away? A. Jan-, uary 4, 1972. Q. And at the time he passed away you were married to him? A. Yes. Q. And is he the father of the three children? A. Yes. Q. John Hochstetler? A. Yes. Q. Now who are you re*556ceiving child support from? A. As I tried to explain earlier, the only setup that they had in the district court in Grand Island for any payments of any kind is through — is under either alimony or child support. Mr. Moses asked me which one I wanted it to come under and I said neither one because neither one applies so it’s alimony. This man had done a great injury to my husband and he was suppose [sic] to pay money to him monthly. Q. But John— This man whp’s paying this alimony or whatever you call' it; was he ever married to you? A. No. Q. And he is not the father of your three children? A. No. Their father is dead.” Later examination by the children’s guardian ad litem shows: ‘‘Q. (by Mr. Wheeler) You stated that John Hochstetler is the father of these children, is that right? A. John Lester Hochstetler. Q. Lester? And you’re his widow? A. Yes. Q. He died January 4, 1972? A. He was killed in Viet Nam.”
Certified copies of pleadings and orders from the Hall County District Court were then introduced in evidence. These pleadings show that appellant herself filed a sworn complaint naming as the father of the children the same .man whose parental rights were terminated in this case. Appellant’s petition, resulted in a court determination as to the father of the children, and a. child support order.
After the documentary , proof of the adjudication of paternity and order for child support were marked as exhibits, appellant, still under oath, explained that, the support payments were really just payment to her by a man who ‘‘had injured both my husband and myself,” and that because of that injury appellant was required to go through the support payment procedure to get paid, and that Judge Weaver had told her she might say it was child support. It seems to be clear that appellant does not always function in the world of reality. It should be noted that appellant’s confusion between fantasy and *557reality is one of the very matters that concerned the examining psychologist.
Later in the trial, Lester Hochstetler testified that he had been married to appellant from September 28, 1956, until their divorce on March 31, 1964, and that he had never been in Vietnam. His appearance indicated he was not dead. Other documentary evidence proved, beyond any doubt, that he was not the father of the children.
Other evidence shows, as recited in the majority opinion, that appellant had told her children that Lester Hochstetler was their father, but admitted otherwise when the children discovered the facts -in 1975 or 1976. Such statements were direct lies to her children concerning their parentage and are, in my judgment, deplorable. But when they are repeated, under oath, some 5 or 6 years later, to a judge faced with difficult decisions as to those very children, then such statements attain the rank of patent perjury — and indicate either that appellant is perfectly willing to play fast and loose with the virtue of truth or is so calloused mentally that she does not know the difference between boldfaced lies under oath and the plain truth.
Further examples of similarly untruthful or perjured testimony are scattered throughout appellant’s testimony and in exhibits received. As examples, appellant told the landlord where she had arranged to rent a home for these children, during the course of these proceedings, that she was an attorney working on several cases and had recently received a $6000 court settlement. This conduct, of course, is the type of conduct that the court was trying to restrain in defendant’s probation in State v. Hochstetler, 214 Neb. 482, 334 N.W.2d 455 (1983).
Other examples of appellant’s bizarre conduct are set out in the majority opinion. Such conduct, both in court and out, goes far beyond excusable eccentricity and, in my judgment, constitutes suffi*558cient evidence in itself to make a court wary of entrusting these children to her.
Other evidence supports the findings of the juvenile court to an even greater extent. A physician who cared for the oldest child testified that, in his opinion, the ulcer that the child had was stress-related and flared up over visits with appellant. This same physician testified that, in his medical opinion, “From the information that I have and from the examinations of the children, I feel it would not be in their best interests to be returned to the home environment of their mother.” This physician also testified that it would be detrimental to the children emotionally as well as physically to be placed back with their mother.
Other testimony from the clinical psychologist, Dr. O’Neill, who evaluated the children on three occasions, and who evaluated appellant, concluded that “it would be destructive for all concerned for them to try to be together at this point.” This psychologist recommended treatment for all concerned and later review in 6 months or longer. It should be noted that this same witness thought it would be harmful to the children to terminate appellant’s parental rights.
The testimony of the children need not be set out, but it may be said fairly that the children do have some love for their mother but that they dislike the life she requires them to live, and that, as a result, at least the two older children have expressed their desire that they not be required to live with their mother. I believe that the trial court gave appropriate weight to that love. And, of course, it would be perfectly appropriate to love Don Quixote, and yet not be willing to let him rear his own children — at least until he got through his windmill phase.
In summary, I believe that, giving proper weight to the findings of the juvenile court, this court should affirm the findings and order of that court. I think that court and ail people involved with appellant *559have done a commendable job in dealing with a most difficult problem, in spite of the efforts of appellant to enjoy herself at the expense of all who come in contact with her.
I would hold that § 43-202 -(and the statutes that have supplanted it) concerns both mental and physical health and that there can be at least as great mental abuse of a child as physical abuse. Children should be protected against mental abuse as well as physical.
I would state that the result I reach is in no way dependent on the circumstance that appellant is unfortunately not a rich person. I restate that the record does establish that appellant has cared for the-physical needs of the children in at least a minimal way.
I would affirm the order of the District Court which affirmed the order of the juvenile court.
Boslaugh and Hastings, JJ., join in this dissent.