Court Opinion

ID: 999352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:24:33.193024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:37.713932
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                   No. 98-4264

MICHAEL JEFFERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Marvin J. Garbis, District Judge.
(CR-95-491-MJG)

Submitted: June 22, 1999

Decided: August 6, 1999

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Roland Walker, WALKER, VAN BAVEL, AMARAL & MEAD,
P.A., Baltimore, Maryland; Lisa J. Sansone, LAW OFFICE OF LISA
J. SANSONE, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Bat-
taglia, United States Attorney, Martin J. Clarke, Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Jefferson appeals his jury convictions and sentence for
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West Supp. 1999), and aiding
and abetting such crime, and possession of a firearm by a felon in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Jefferson was
sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment and one year supervised
release for violating § 924(c) and 232 months' imprisonment and
three years of supervised release for violation of§ 922(g)(1) and
ordered to pay a special assessment of $200. (Id.)

On appeal, Jefferson contends that: (1) the district court abused its
discretion in admitting testimony concerning the contents of a hand-
written note; (2) the court erred in admitting police testimony con-
cerning findings of a latent fingerprint examiner whose report was
admitted into evidence without objection; (3) the court abused its dis-
cretion in admitting testimony concerning the identification of a pos-
sible suspect given to police by anonymous sources; (4) the court
erred in ruling that a suggestive pretrial photographic identification
was nonetheless reliable; and (5) there was insufficient evidence to
support Jefferson's jury convictions. We affirm.

We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
testimony concerning contents of a handwritten note from a probation
officer. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(a), (c); United States v. Lis, 120 F.3d
28, 30-31 (4th Cir. 1997). We also find no abuse of discretion in the
admission of Officer McGee's testimony as to his knowledge of fin-
gerprint analysis. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. Moreover, any possible error
that resulted from McGee's testimony concerning the latent finger-
print report was harmless because the report was admitted into evi-
dence without objection.

                    2
Furthermore, we find that McGee's testimony concerning the anon-
ymous tip was offered for the limited purpose of explaining the police
investigation of the perpetrator's identity, and thus the testimony was
not hearsay. See United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir.
1985). Nor do we find that the probative value of McGee's testimony
was outweighed by undue prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We also
conclude that the court's findings as to the reliability of Officer Stam-
baugh's identification of Jefferson were not clearly erroneous, and
thus both the photographic identification and the in-court identifica-
tion of Jefferson were properly admitted. See Neil v. Biggers, 409
U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972). Finally, when construed in the light most
favorable to the Government, we find the evidence sufficient to sup-
port Jefferson's convictions. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942).

Accordingly, we affirm Jefferson's convictions and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                     3