Court Opinion

ID: 9682327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:30.490785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.774607
License: Public Domain

RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The time has come to partially eliminate the artificial distinction between sales and services in implied warranty cases. The reasoning defect in the sales/service distinction is clearly illuminated by the facts of this cause. To hold that a psychiatrist does not impliedly warrant to his patients that he will comply with the ethical commandments of his calling defies logic.
In Jacob E. Decker and Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942), this court recognized a theory of recovery, based on public policy, for a breach of implied warranty. In Nobility Homes of Texas Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.1977), this court considered “whether section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) or the implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code allow a consumer to recover his economic loss against a manufacturer with whom the consumer is not in privity.” 557 S.W.2d at 78. In deciding that issue, we concluded that the manufacturer of mobile homes was a seller of goods and that the post-Decker adoptions in Texas of section 402A and the implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code adequately provided remedies for the users of defective goods. Based on these factors, we abandoned the public policy implied warranty formulated by Decker. With the statutory implied warranties available to the consumer in Nobility Homes, it made sense to reject the implied warranty based on public policy in that case. However, that logic does not extend to the present cause. Since we are now faced with a pure service situation, and not a sale of goods, the statutory implied warranty is not available. Thus, to the extent that the language in Nobility Homes can be read to eliminate the public policy implied warranty in a non-sale-of-goods situation, I would overrule that case.
While I realize that courts have been reluctant to impose liability for a breach of an implied warranty by a pure service provider, I fail to understand the rationale behind this reluctance. In Texas, the attempts by our courts in dealing with hybrid sales/service situations lack a comprehensive approach and demonstrate an ad hoc decision making process. See Powers, Distinguishing between Products and Services in Strict Liability, 62 N.C.L.Rev. 415, 415-16 n. 4 (1984). Also, several comipen-tators conclude that it is not logical to deprive consumers in service transactions *97the protection afforded to the same consumers in other transactions. See Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions — Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 Utah L.Rev. 661; Comment, Guidelines for Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 365 (1976); Note, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State: The Extension of Enterprise Liability to Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 401 (1974); Note, The Application of Implied Warranties to Predominently “Service” Transactions, 31 Ohio S.L.Rev. 580 (1970). I do not go as far as some of these commentators in advocating a rule that a professional service provider always impliedly warrants favorable results, even though situations do exist where favorable results by the service provider are impliedly warranted. See Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So.2d 767, 772 (1963) (per curiam). Instead, I am of the opinion that a professional service provider, at a minimum, impliedly warrants that he will not breach the ethical commandments of his calling in providing his service.
The facts of this cause clearly demonstrate the appropriateness for such a rule. Here, Dr. Allison violated basic ethical principles of the medical profession by brutally raping and beating his emotionally disturbed and vulnerable patient. At a minimum, Ms. Dennis had a right to expect that Dr. Allison would not breach his profession’s ethical commandments in the treatment he provided. I am not disturbed that the recognition of a public policy implied warranty in this cause would impose strict liability on professional service providers for breaches of their profession’s ethics. I believe that Ms. Dennis is entitled to the same legal benefits that are available to the victim of a defective product. If Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.1968) can be read to disallow an action for a professional’s breach of the implied warranty to abide by the ethical commandments of his profession, then that case should be overruled.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “it is not necessary to impose an implied warranty as a matter of public policy because [Ms. Dennis] has adequate remedies to redress [the] wrongs committed [by Dr. Allison].” In my opinion, Ms. Dennis is entitled to be the architect of her lawsuit. If the facts give rise to a particular theory of recovery, then a party has the right to assert that theory, regardless of the applicability of other available theories. When the assertion of more than one theory poses the danger of a cumulative recovery, a party can be put to an election. Even so, this danger is non-existent in this cause because Ms. Dennis based her action entirely on an implied warranty theory.
In conclusion, I would allow Ms. Dennis the right to proceed against Dr. Allison for his breach of the implied warranty to abide by the ethical commandments of the medical profession. Accordingly, I would give effect to the jury findings and render judgment for Ms. Dennis.
SPEARS and KILGARLIN, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.