Court Opinion

ID: 9850766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:46.834661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.074608
License: Public Domain

*297Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
This Court in Division 8 approves a jury instruction on the sentence of life without parole because it “is a part of the statutory language” of OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d). The fact that a jury instruction is taken directly from a statute does not automatically qualify it as an appropriate jury instruction.2 Because part of the statutory language is both misleading and unnecessary as a jury instruction, it should not be charged to the jury.
The trial judge instructed the jury prior to voir dire concerning the three possible punishments — death, imprisonment for life without parole, or life imprisonment. On the second option, the trial court stated:
The second punishment, life without parole, means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and shall not be eligible for parole unless he is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he was sentenced.
This instruction is taken directly from OCGA § 17-10-31.1 (d) (1), which grants authority to the trial court to give the instruction during the sentencing phase of trial.
Although the statute is good law, the phrase “unless he is subsequently adjudicated to be innocent of the offense for which he was sentenced” causes problems when used in a jury instruction. This phrase misleads the jury by suggesting that a person sentenced to life without parole may be eligible for parole. If, however, a court or the State Board of Pardons and Paroles determines that a person is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, then the proper procedure would be to vacate the sentence or grant a pardon. Moreover, the phrase is not necessary to inform the jury about the meaning of life without parole. Life without parole, as the first part of the statute states, “means that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life and shall not be eligible for parole.” No more explanation is needed; none should be given.
Because the majority opinion blindly adheres to the rule that any statute, no matter how confusing, is a valid basis for a jury charge, I concur specially to Division 8. Although trial courts should not give the offending phrase in the future as part of their jury *298instruction, I conclude that there was no reversible error based on the charge in this case. In addition, I concur in judgment only to Division 6 of the majority opinion.
Decided July 16, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1997.
Brian G. Combs, Reginald L. Bellury, for appellant.
Fredric D. Bright, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Wesley S. Homey, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 See Ford. v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 267 Ga. 226 (476 SE2d 565) (1996) (concluding that trial court should not have given jury instruction based on 75 percent allocation rule in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e)); cf. Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196 (486 SE2d 819) (1997) (Carley, J., dissenting) (discussing why language taken directly from appellate court opinions is inappropriate as a jury instruction).