Court Opinion

ID: 9577277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:36.292227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:17.765568
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
Neither the motion for rehearing nor the dissenting opinion present anything that was overlooked by the majority members of the court who joined in the original opinion.
The vice of the dissenting opinion is that it substitutes the  views of the author for those of the jury as to the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The jury was warranted in finding from the evidence that plaintiff’s drinking did not contribute to his injuries and was warranted in finding that the absence of the lights on his car at the time of the impact was not the proximate cause of his injuries.
On the other hand the jury was justified from the evidence in finding that defendant Soren Jacobsen’s negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. There was evidence that the road contained some spots of ice. There was not sufficient ice to prevent control of a ear.
Plaintiff’s ear came to a stop by coasting. On that point plaintiff testified: “Q. Did you coast to a stop, or did you apply your brakes? A. I coasted to a stop.”
Likewise after the impact defendant had no difficulty in stopping his car. He stopped it within 150 feet of where the im*365pact took place. The jury was warranted in finding it was negligence on the part of Soren Jacobsen not to take some means of slowing up the speed of the car he was driving before running into plaintiff.
He testified that he did not apply the brakes and as far as the record shows he did nothing to slow down his speed. He gave no warning to plaintiff of his approach. Plaintiff was dragged or thrown about 35 or 40 feet from the place of impact.
It should be said too, that the lights on plaintiff’s ear were on until plaintiff got ready to hook the trouble light on the battery and then they were turned off.
One witness for plaintiff testified that only about 15 seconds elapsed after they were turned off until plaintiff was struck. Obviously defendant Soren Jacobsen should have observed the stalled car long before he did had he used proper care. From the brow of the hill to the parked car was shown to be 700 feet.
It is true that the evidence shows that lights on the defendant’s car would not be focused on the parked car until it was within 150 feet from it. But while the lights on plaintiff’s car were on defendant should have seen the car when within 700 feet from it, — that being the visible distance between the parked car and the top of the hill as shown by measurements.
The evidence was such that it was a matter for the jury to determine whose negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. The learned trial judge heard all the evidence and observed the witnesses and he did not see fit to disturb the verdict of the jury and neither are we justified in substituting our opinion for that of the jury.
The dissenting opinion takes the view that the court erred also in not limiting the liability of defendant Ingolf Jacobsen to $500. The dissenting opinion fails to point out where there is anything in the record to indicate that there was deposited any place or any time proof of financial responsibility in respect to the operation of the car by defendant Soren Jacobsen as provided *366in paragraph (c) of sec. 31-131 and hence subdivision 1 of see. 53-402, R. C. M. 1947, has no application.
The motion for rehearing is denied.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES FREEBOURN and ANDERSON, concur.