Court Opinion

ID: 9902821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:24:04.536929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.332078
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

WILLIAM S. DUNSON, III,

            Appellant,

v.                                   Case No. 5D22-2607
                                     LT Case No. 2015-DR-000015

JESSICA DUNSON,

            Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed August 18, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Flagler County,
Christopher A. France, Judge.

Martin Pedata, of Law Office of Martin Pedata,
DeLand, for Appellant.

Steven J. Guardiano, of Guardiano Law P.A.,
Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

JAY, J.

      William Dunson (“Father”) raises five issues concerning the trial court’s

modification of the parties’ 2019 dissolution judgment and its order finding
Father in contempt. We agree that the court did not make all the findings

necessary to award attorney’s fees to Jessica Dunson (“Mother”). We also

agree that the court erred by using Father’s gross income to calculate his

monthly child support payment. As for the remaining three issues, we affirm

two without discussion and write to address Father’s claim that the court

made insufficient factual findings about the changes in circumstances that

warranted modification of the dissolution judgment.1

                                       I.

      The court ordered Father to pay $5,700 in attorney’s fees relating to

the contempt motion filed by Mother.2 The court made a finding about the

number of hours that Mother’s counsel spent on the contempt matter, which

was consistent with the billing records that the court incorporated in its order.

The court also made section 61.16 findings about Mother and Father’s

financial resources. See § 61.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2021); Rosen v. Rosen, 696

      1
        Mother moved to dismiss this appeal as moot because of subsequent
developments in another domestic case between the parties. That motion is
denied. See Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992); State Farm
Fla. Ins. Co. v. Bellamy, 302 So. 3d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
      2
        The court also ruled that Mother is entitled to a certain percentage of
attorney’s fees stemming from her modification petition, but it reserved
jurisdiction to award the precise dollar amount in a separate order after
receiving additional evidence. This ruling is not ripe for appellate review. See
Cummings v. Cummings, 868 So. 2d 1285, 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

                                       2
So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997).

     However, the court did not make              any findings about the

reasonableness of Mother’s counsel’s hourly rate. See Fla. Patient’s Comp.

Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150–51 (Fla. 1985) (setting forth factors,

such as counsel’s level of experience, that a court is to consider when

determining if counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable). This is an error apparent

on the face of the judgment. See Merriman v. Adler, 338 So. 3d 1084, 1085

(Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“[T]he absence of findings in the order to support the

amount of fees awarded is error on the face of the order that may be

addressed on appeal, even absent a transcript.”); Giovanini v. Giovanini, 89

So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (noting that the reasonableness of

counsel’s hourly rate is among the findings that a court must make when

awarding attorney’s fees under section 61.16). Indeed, even without a

transcript of the proceedings below, it is evident the court did not complete

the required hourly rate analysis since the judgment on appeal directs

Mother’s counsel—in aid of her still pending request for fees stemming from

the modification petition—to submit an affidavit detailing her number of years

in practice and experience in family law. See Horowitz v. Rossdale CLE, Inc.,

357 So. 3d 260, 261–62 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (reversing a fee award—in a

case where there was no transcript—because the four corners of the

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judgment showed that the court did not make the required findings and could

not have done so due to missing evidence). Thus, we must reverse the fee

award and remand for the court to make the required hourly rate

determination.

                                      II.

      The 2019 dissolution judgment required Father to pay $150 per month

in support of the parties’ child. In 2021, Mother asked the court to modify

Father’s child support payment based on his increased earnings. After

holding a trial,3 the court raised Father’s monthly payment to $677.65. The

court found that Father’s “total gross income” in 2021 was $43,302. However,

the child support worksheet that the court incorporated into its judgment lists

Father’s net monthly income as $3,608.50. This amount multiplied by twelve

months equals $43,302. Thus, as Father correctly alleges, the court based its

child support calculation on Father’s gross income instead of his net income.

This is error. See § 61.30(9), Fla. Stat. (2021); King v. King, 320 So. 3d 766,

768 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021); Marini v. Kellett, 279 So. 3d 248, 253–54 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2019).

      Mother maintains that Father effectively invited this error by stipulating

      3
       Again, because there is no transcript, our review is limited to errors
that appear on the face of the judgment. See Larocka v. Larocka, 43 So. 3d
911, 913 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

                                       4
to Mother’s evidence. The judgment shows that Father stipulated to the

exhibits listed on Mother’s amended exhibit list. While that exhibit list included

Father’s financial affidavits and income information from his employer, it did

not include a child support worksheet. Instead, the court wrote that it

“reviewed as a demonstrative aid, a guidelines child support calculation that

was prepared based upon the financial evidence of the parties.” Thus,

contrary to what Mother suggests, the judgment does not reflect that Father

stipulated to the accuracy of the child support worksheet.

       Mother also suggests that any missing income information is

attributable to Father’s noncompliance with discovery requests. The court

noted that Father displayed “contentiousness in refusing to provide accurate

income information and in failing to respond to discovery requests until

mandated to do so.” (emphasis added). However, the court did not find that

Father’s recalcitrance resulted in his net income being unavailable.

       Because the face of the judgment shows that the court used Father’s

gross income to determine his new child support payment, we reverse the

modified payment and remand for the court to recalculate the payment using

Father’s net monthly income. See § 61.30(9), Fla. Stat.; King, 320 So. 3d at

768.

                                        5
                                      III.

      Lastly, we write to address Father’s belief that the court did not make

findings of fact to support its legal conclusion that there were substantial and

material changes in circumstances that warranted modifying the 2019

dissolution judgment. Unlike the previous issue, here, the parties’ stipulation

is decisive.

      In his answer to Mother’s modification petition, Father agreed with

Mother’s allegation that “[b]etween November 15, 2019 and the present,

there have been substantial and material changes that have occurred with

respect to the Parenting Plan and in particular, with respect to matters

pertaining to the best interests of the minor child.” The judgment on appeal

states that at trial, the parties stipulated there were substantial and material

changes in circumstances that warranted modification to further their child’s

best interests. See Phillips v. Phillips, 1 So. 2d 186, 188 (Fla. 1941)

(recognizing that statements in a trial court’s judgment are presumed to be

accurate unless they are contradicted by other parts of the record). In

relevant part, the judgment on appeal reads:

               1. MODIFICATION: The parties, through a
               combination of their pleadings and a stipulation
               announced in open Court, each agreed that there
               have been substantial and material changes in the
               circumstances of both of the parties and the minor
               child since the Final Judgment was entered in this

                                       6
            matter and those substantial and material changes
            are such that it would be in the best interests of the
            minor child to make modifications in the parenting
            plan, child support[,] and issues bearing upon sole
            parental authority to make decisions as to some
            issues which will be enumerated below.

            2. SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL CHANGES:
            Because of the stipulations, the Court will not
            expound on the evidence, other than to state that it
            was fully and completely established that there is
            substantial, competent evidence before the Court
            sufficient to ratify and approve those stipulations and
            to modify the existing Final Judgment.

      In his reply brief, Father “agrees that the parties stipulated and

announced in court that there have been substantial and material changes

warranting the modification of the Final Judgment.” Nevertheless, he claims

that the court’s modification judgment cannot stand because it does not more

precisely identify the content of the parties’ stipulation. We reject this claim.

      Regardless of the underlying factual basis or strategic rationale for

doing so, there is no dispute that the parties stipulated there were substantial

and material changes that warranted modification of the 2019 judgment to

advance their child’s best interests. Furthermore, based on the evidence

before it, the court fully accepted that stipulation. Having stipulated to this

reality—both in his answer and at trial—Father cannot backtrack from it on

appeal. See Esch v. Forster, 168 So. 229, 231 (Fla. 1936) (“Courts look with

                                        7
favor upon stipulations designed to simplify, shorten, or settle litigation and

save costs to the parties, and such stipulations will be encouraged by the

courts, and enforced by them, unless good cause is shown to the contrary.”);

Gjokhila v. Seymour, 349 So. 3d 496, 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (favorably

quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 59–60 (2d Cir. 1986), which

provides that “[t]he legal consequences of a stipulation incorporated in a

court order may not be undone simply because, with the benefit of hindsight,

stipulating turns out to have been an unfortunate tactic”).

      To whatever extent the court’s judgment lacks findings of fact, the

parties induced that error by asking the court to accept their stipulation. See

Muina v. Canning, 717 So. 2d 550, 553 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (“Under the

invited error rule, a party cannot successfully complain about an error for

which he or she is responsible or of rulings that he or she invited the court to

make.”); see also Gjokhila, 349 So. 3d at 501–02 (“Mother contends that the

trial court erred when it ratified . . . an agreement that she asked the court to

approve. That is a bridge too far. The invited error doctrine precludes

appellate relief under these circumstances.”). In essence, Father’s position

is that even though the parties asked the court to find all the legal necessities

for modification, the court should have ignored this request so that it could

find more facts—facts which the parties’ stipulation made superfluous. Like

                                       8
the appellant’s position in Gjokhila, this is a bridge too far.

      Moreover, even without the stipulation, the judgment includes

numerous factual findings that support modification. For example, the court

found that since 2019, Father was earning more money and making

substantial purchases, Father refused to communicate with Mother about

parenting issues, Father interfered with “routine telephone communication”

between Mother and the child, Father and Mother were unable to

communicate civilly via text message and Facebook, the child had enrolled

in new extracurricular activities, and the Covid pandemic caused the closure

of Mother’s business. These findings were in addition to the court’s

overarching finding that there was “substantial, competent evidence before

the Court sufficient to ratify and approve [the parties’] stipulations and to

modify the existing Final Judgment.” On this record, Father cannot

demonstrate that the court’s judgment is legally insufficient.

                                       IV.

      In sum, we reverse Father’s modified child support payment and the

award of attorney’s fees stemming from Mother’s contempt motion. On

remand, the trial court must (1) recalculate Father’s child support payment

using his net monthly income and (2) determine whether Mother’s counsel’s

hourly rate is reasonable before awarding attorney’s fees related to Mother’s

                                        9
contempt motion. As to all other matters, we affirm.4

     AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED, with directions.

BOATWRIGHT and MACIVER, JJ., concur.

     4
        We also remand Mother’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees to the
trial court with directions to award those fees if Mother establishes her
entitlement to them under section 61.16. See Abouzaid v. Helmy, 326 So. 3d
209, 209–10 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021).

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