Court Opinion

ID: 9908510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 22:07:54.909372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.946607
License: Public Domain

12/08/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                         AT NASHVILLE
                                 August 15, 2023 Session

              STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEIRDRE MARIE RICH

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dickson County
                     No. 2017-CR-214 Larry J. Wallace, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. M2022-00435-CCA-R3-CD
                        ___________________________________

Defendant, Deirdre Marie Rich, appeals from her conviction for first degree premediated
murder, for which she received a sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant contends that:
(1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting entries from
the victim’s ex-wife’s journal in violation of Defendant’s right to confrontation. Following
a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.
WEDEMEYER and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

Michael J. Flanagan (on appeal and at trial) and Tim Wills (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee,
for the appellant, Deirdre Marie Rich.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; and W. Ray Crouch, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State
of Tennessee.

                                          OPINION

                         I. Factual and Procedural Background

        This appeal concerns the death of the victim, Kevin Rich, who was shot and killed
by his then-wife, Defendant, on March 20, 2017. The Dickson County Grand Jury initially
indicted Defendant on a charge of second degree murder but later issued a superseding
indictment charging Defendant with second degree murder in Count One and first degree
premeditated murder in Count Two. The case proceeded to trial in March 2021.

       Christopher Woodard, a dispatcher for Dickson County Emergency 9-1-1, testified
that, on March 20, 2017, he answered two 9-1-1 calls in connection with this case. He
explained that the first call was made by the victim’s father at 8:02 p.m. and that the second
call was made by the victim’s mother at 8:08 p.m.

       Ann Rich, the victim’s mother, testified that she lived on approximately forty-two
acres of land off Log Wall Road in Dickson County. She explained that the victim was her
only son and was born in 1970. She said that she and her husband built two houses on their
property with the family living in the first house for seven years before building and
moving into the second one. She stated that the victim married a woman named Patricia
Evans when he was nineteen years old; they lived together in the first house built on the
property during the duration of their twenty-five-year marriage, but they eventually
divorced.

        The victim’s mother testified that, on the evening of March 20, 2017, the victim,
who worked as an HVAC technician, drove his work van to her house to work on her water
heater. When it began to storm, the victim said that he was going to go home but that he
would return the following afternoon to check the thermostat on the water heater. The
victim’s mother testified that the victim left her house around 6:45 or 6:50 p.m. and that
this was the last time she saw the victim alive. She stated that she received a phone call
from the victim’s wife, Defendant, at 7:54 p.m. She testified, “I answered the phone on
the first ring because I was standing right by it, and I got a dial tone. I h[u]ng the phone
up and I dial[ed] right back. I g[o]t a busy signal.” She received a second phone call from
Defendant at 8:00 p.m. Regarding this call, the victim’s mother testified:

       [Defendant] said, “you need to come over.” She said, “[The victim] needs
       you. Come quick. Come directly.” Then she said, “he’s been shot.” And I
       didn’t ask where or anything.

       ....

       I just said, . . . “I’ll be right there.”

       ....

       And I told my husband, I said, “call 9-1-1.” I said, “something is wrong with
       [the victim].”

                                                   -2-
       The victim’s mother drove over to the victim’s home where Defendant directed her
to the den at the back of the residence. She saw the victim lying on the floor “flat on his
back with his hands down to his side”; the victim was “motionless, with . . . all his blood
out on the floor and him in it.” The victim’s mother testified that the victim appeared to
have “been placed there” on the floor. She said that Defendant was on her knees beside
the victim with her hand placed on a wound to the victim’s neck, “but there was no blood
coming out.” The victim’s mother testified that, when she asked Defendant what
happened, Defendant said that she and the victim “got into it.” Defendant said, “I got the
gun out of the safe, and he shot himself.”

        The victim’s mother recalled that Defendant was dressed in a shirt with a white
background. Defendant was holding a cell phone in her hand, and she gave it to the
victim’s mother and told her to call 9-1-1. The victim’s mother testified that the cell phone
was a “smart phone,” that she did not know how to operate it, and that Defendant had to
tell her which screen to view and which icon to use to make the phone call. While on the
phone with the 9-1-1 operator, the victim’s mother told the dispatcher that “[Defendant]
got the gun out of the safe.”

       The victim’s mother said that she returned to her house and told the victim’s father
the victim had been shot. She then drove down their driveway to unlock the gate for first
responders and lead them up to the victim’s house. The victim’s mother testified that, after
officers arrived, she saw Defendant on the porch and that Defendant was wearing a solid
black dress. She commented to the victim’s father that she could not believe law
enforcement allowed Defendant to change clothes.

       Regarding the shotgun Defendant used to shoot the victim, the victim’s mother
recalled, “It was his first gun that we had gotten him for Christmas when he became old
enough to get the Hunter’s Safety Course.” She said that she visited the victim’s house
regularly and had a key to the front door. She said that she never saw the shotgun out
around the house. She testified that the victim was meticulous about keeping his firearms
locked up in a gun safe, which was in the den where he was killed. She said that she did
not have a key to the victim’s gun safe and did not know the combination to unlock it. She
noted that the victim always “pulled his shoes off at the front door” and that, when his
boots were wet, “[h]e would . . . put them on that boot dryer in the laundry room.” She
said that she saw the victim’s boots on the boot dryer when she went inside the victim’s
home that night.

      The victim’s mother provided a written statement to law enforcement that night, in
which she said that Defendant had previously threatened the victim. She said:

                                            -3-
       I talked to [Defendant] when I was over there that day and she told me, she
       said, “[W]e got into it.” And . . . she said, “I kneed him in the groin. But if
       we had had the combination to the safe, I would have shot him.”

              Me being his mother had trouble believing someone would say that to
       me. And I said, “[D]on’t shoot him.” [Defendant] said, “I’ll tie him to the
       bed, call you the next day to come and turn him loose, or . . . I’ll tie him to
       the bed and beat him with a belt.”

              And like I say, I had trouble believing anybody would say that and be
       serious saying it to someone’s mother.

       Eric Stewart, a paramedic with Dickson County Emergency Services, testified that
he responded to the victim’s residence on March 20, 2017. Mr. Stewart said that the initial
report was of a gunshot wound to the neck and that it was “believed to be a self-inflicted
possible suicide type of injury.” Mr. Stewart arrived at the victim’s house at 8:19 p.m. He
found the victim in a den at the back of the residence, which he described as “a small . . .
den/study type area.” The victim was lying flat on his back on the floor. Mr. Stewart
checked the victim for vital signs but found none. Mr. Stewart explained that the victim
had a “penetrating injury to the base of his neck” and had lost a substantial amount of
blood. Mr. Stewart noted in his report that Defendant admitted to shooting the victim.

        Sergeant James Gardner with the Dickson County Sheriff’s Office (DCSO) testified
that he was dispatched to the scene of the shooting at 8:08 p.m. Sergeant Gardner explained
that he wore a body camera that night and that he turned it on before entering the victim’s
house. The gate to the property was open when he arrived, and the victim’s mother led
him down the driveway. When he entered the house, Sergeant Gardner saw the victim’s
body in the den at the back of the house. He took Defendant, who was still inside the
residence, into a different room to preserve the scene. Defendant began telling Sergeant
Gardner what had happened but then stopped to ask him to turn off the stove where she
had a white liquid cooking in a saucepan on a burner.

        Defendant told Sergeant Gardner that the victim returned from his parents’ house
around 6:30 p.m. She said that they began arguing about a ringback tone on her cell phone,
and that the victim got upset and slapped her on the chest. Defendant said that she sat down
in the front room with her Bible but that the victim then “chased her around the house” and
cornered her in a bathroom. Defendant told Sergeant Gardner that she was tired of getting
slapped and beaten, and she said that the victim would get “pissy” after visiting his parents
and “take it out on [her].” She said that she told the victim she would not take any further
abuse from him. Defendant said that she then tried to call her brother and a friend, Bobby

                                            -4-
Larrison, but received no answer. She said that she then called the victim’s parents but that
the victim ended the call.

        Defendant recounted that, around 8:00 p.m., she went to the bathroom to take a
shower and that the victim followed her and continued arguing with her. She claimed that
she told the victim she was not his “punching bag” and that she “rebuked” him and told
him to leave the house. She said that the victim ran outside but returned to the house and
began calling her names and telling her that he hated her. Defendant recounted, “[The
victim] says ‘I’m tired of you.’ He goes, ‘You’re leaving tonight in a body bag.’ Whatever.
I said, ‘Bring it on. I don’t care.’”

       Defendant told Sergeant Gardner that the victim then went to the den and retrieved
the shotgun from between the desk and the wall but that he could not find any shells.
Defendant recounted, “[H]e says, ‘I’m going to shoot you.’ Go ahead. He couldn’t find
the shells.” She said that the victim put the gun back by the desk and returned to the kitchen
where he screamed at her and shoved her. Defendant said that she went to the den to
retrieve her car title, intending to leave the residence. She claimed that the victim stood in
the doorway of the den and told her that she was not going anywhere. Defendant said that
she told the victim she was leaving but that the victim told her she would leave the house
that night in a body bag, to which Defendant replied, “Whatever. I’ll pull the gun myself.
I’m tired of fighting with you. I can’t do this anymore.”

        Defendant recounted that the victim said she “didn’t have the balls” to shoot him.
Defendant then retrieved the shotgun from behind the desk, got two shells out of a red
basket, and put one of the shells in the gun. Defendant said that she cocked the hammer of
the shotgun, that the victim charged her, that she pulled the gun up to shoot the ceiling but
that “he was there” and she shot him. She reported that the shot lifted the victim off his
feet, and he fell onto the floor and said, “[Y]ou’re a bitch.” Defendant stated that she put
her fingers in the hole created by the shot and gave the victim “mouth to mouth,” and then
he died. She said that, after shooting the victim, she called the victim’s mother instead of
9-1-1.

       Defendant told Sergeant Gardner that the victim had abused her before. She said
that the victim hit her in the chest in September 2016, but that she did not call the police
because she lived too far from the main road and because the victim said he could bury her
without anyone knowing. She claimed that, during an argument in November 2016, the
victim pushed her and that, on New Years Eve, the victim chased her around the house and
sat on her chest, causing bruises. When asked why she had not called police after she “was
safe and out in the public,” Defendant said that she had told the victim’s parents about the
abuse and that the victim’s father had told her, “If you ever hurt my son, [if] you ever hurt
a hair on his head, I will kill you, I will put you in a body bag, and I will bury you and
                                            -5-
nobody will find you.” Defendant then commented, “I figured I could take a beatin’ but I
can’t take a gun.” She also claimed that the victim had slapped his ex-wife several times
as well.

      When asked if he observed any injuries to Defendant, Sergeant Gardner said,
“Nothing was visible. I think twice I shined the flashlight on her face and chest area. She
had blood, but it was transferred blood[.]” He noted that, inside the residence, he saw a
wedding band on the kitchen counter. Defendant told Sergeant Gardner that the wedding
band had belonged to the victim and that he had taken it off that night because he had been
mad at her.

       Detective Sarah McCartney with the DCSO testified that she assisted the lead
detective, Detective Jeff Lovell, after responding to the crime scene. Detective McCartney
said that she arrived around 8:30 p.m. and saw Defendant sitting in a small chair in the
kitchen talking with Sergeant Gardner. Detective McCartney noted that Defendant was
wearing a black dress and had blood on her hands. Sergeant Gardner had already read
Defendant her Miranda rights, but Detective McCartney reviewed those rights with her
again before asking what happened. Detective McCartney transcribed Defendant’s
statement as Defendant spoke. At the end of the interview, she reviewed the statement
with Defendant “line-by-line,” and then Defendant signed the statement.

        In her statement to Detective McCartney, Defendant recounted that the victim had
returned from his parents’ home around 6:30 p.m. and that they had begun arguing about
ringback tones on Defendant’s cell phone. She stated that, during the argument, the victim
tried to take her phone but that she “rebuked him,” and he ran outside. Defendant said that,
when the victim came back inside, she was going to make the victim a plate of food, but
he called her names, and the argument resumed. She said that, at 7:35 p.m., the victim took
his ring off and placed it on the kitchen counter. Defendant then retrieved her phone and
Bible and went to the bathroom to take a shower with the victim following her into the
bathroom. She said that she turned on the water for her shower. She stated that she and
the victim argued for ten to fifteen minutes inside the bathroom, explaining that they called
each other names and that the victim shoved her in the chest.

       Defendant told Detective McCartney that she then went into the living room where
she accidentally called her brother, the victim’s parents, and Mr. Larrison. She said that
the victim took her phone and shoved her into a chair. She said that she then went to the
den, sat down, and grabbed the shotgun, which was sitting between the desk and the wall.
Defendant said that she put a shell in the shotgun and “clicked” the gun shut. She said that
the victim was standing by the door to the laundry room, which was attached to the den;
he took two steps forward and began laughing and grinning. She said that the victim asked
her, “What are you gonna do? Shoot me?” Defendant said she then told the victim, “[I]f
                                            -6-
you come any closer to hurt me I’m going to either shoot you or shoot me. One of us is
going out in a body bag tonight.” According to Defendant, the victim said she “didn’t have
the balls,” and she stood up and said, “I’m not playing, get away from me.” Defendant
said that the victim came towards her, that she raised the gun up toward the ceiling, and
that she “got him instead.” Defendant stated, “I was going to shoot the ceiling, but he
rushed me. I was going to scare him.”

       Detective McCartney testified that the sheriff’s office later conducted a “data dump”
on Defendant’s cell phone, showing Defendant’s incoming and outgoing calls for that
night. Detective McCartney stated that the earliest outgoing call from Defendant’s phone
was a call to the victim’s mother at 7:54 p.m. The next outgoing call was made to
Defendant’s brother at 7:57 p.m., and the next outgoing call was placed to Mr. Larrison a
few seconds later. The last outgoing call from Defendant’s cell phone was to the victim’s
mother at 8:00 p.m.

        Detective McCartney stated that, during her interview with Defendant, Defendant
told her that she turned on the water in the bathroom for a shower but that she did not take
one. Defendant mentioned that she turned on the water and turned it off and said that she
was “very sure” she had done so. However, Detective McCartney testified that, when she
photographed the bathroom, there was no water in the bathtub. Additionally, she said that
she did not see any signs of a disturbance or struggle in the house. She said that she looked
closely at Defendant’s chest but did not see any injuries to Defendant. She explained that
Defendant remained at the scene for several hours and was then taken to the sheriff’s office
for further questioning.

       Detective McCartney testified that she and Detective Lovell also conducted an
interview with Defendant at the sheriff’s office. During this interview, Defendant again
said that she and the victim had argued leading up to the shooting, explaining that they had
yelled at each other, spat on one another, and called each other names. She said that they
argued about ringback tones on her cell phone and that the victim pushed her. Defendant
said that she tried to call her brother but got no answer; she then accidentally called Mr.
Larrison. Defendant said that, during her argument with the victim, the victim compared
her to his ex-wife and called her names.

         Defendant recounted that she went to take a shower but that the victim followed her
into the bathroom where they continued to argue for ten to fifteen minutes, and then the
victim shoved her in the chest. Defendant stated that she invoked the Bible and
commanded the victim to leave the house. She said that the victim ran outside in the rain
but eventually came back inside the house yelling at her. She stated that he had water and
dirt all over his shirt. Defendant told the detectives that she put milk and water in a pot on
the stove to make mashed potatoes. She claimed that the victim continued to scream at her
                                            -7-
and call her names and that she told him to go away. Defendant said that she walked over
to a chair where the victim called her more names and shoved her in the chest, causing her
to fall into the chair. She said that the victim told her not to get up, to which she responded,
“Who died and made you my momma? My momma’s in Ohio. I’m not listening to you.
Get the f*** away from me.”

       Defendant reported that she went back into the kitchen and saw on the microwave
clock that it was 7:35 p.m. She said that the victim called her another name and that she
responded, “If you don’t get away from me tonight, one of us is gonna be carried out in a
body bag.” Defendant stated that the victim responded, “Yeah, one of us will be. And it’s
not going to be me.” Defendant then told the victim, “Get the f***ing gun and shoot me.
I’m tired of listening to you.” Defendant stated, however, that the victim did not get the
gun. Instead, he continued calling her names. The victim then told Defendant to pack her
things, and he took off his wedding ring and set it on the kitchen counter. Defendant told
the victim she would leave the next day, but when the victim said there was “only one way
for [her] to leave,” she told him she would not leave because it was her house too.
According to Defendant, the victim then commented, “What the f*** are you going to do
about it? You think you’re all Miss Billy Badass.” Defendant replied, “Either I’m going
to shoot you or you’re going to take this gun and you’re going to shoot me. One of us is
going to die tonight. I’m tired of listening to this. I’m not going to be your punching bag.”
Defendant said, however, that the victim did not retrieve the gun.

       Defendant recounted that she went to the den, grabbed the gun, and pointed it at the
victim. The victim, who had been in the kitchen, asked Defendant if she was going to shoot
him, and he asked her where the shotgun shells were. When the victim again asked
Defendant what she was going to do, Defendant said, “You know what. I’ve had it with
you,” and she put a shell into the shotgun and “clicked” the gun shut. Defendant said that
the victim watched as she loaded the gun. She said that he took two steps towards her so
that he was standing next to the gun safe in the den. Defendant stated that she told the
victim she was either going to shoot the victim or herself. She claimed that she stood up
and started to turn the gun toward herself and that the victim rushed toward her. She also
said that she started to raise the shotgun toward the ceiling but “got him instead.”

        When questioned further about details of her statement, Defendant denied turning
on the water to the shower that night. She stated that she accidentally called her brother
and Mr. Larrison but that the phone call to the victim’s parents was intentional. She said
that the phone calls occurred after the argument in the bathroom and that she, not the victim,
hung up on the victim’s parents.

       Defendant said that she had the gun pointed at the victim’s navel but that, when she
raised it to shoot herself or the ceiling, the victim “was there.” Defendant claimed she did
                                             -8-
not want the victim to corner her, asserting that he liked to do so and that he cornered her
in the laundry room and beat her head on the wall on another occasion. According to
Defendant, the victim also previously put his knees on her chest on two occasions and
slammed her into a cupboard on another occasion. Defendant also contended that the
victim “slammed” his ex-wife a few times.

        Detective McCartney said that, during both of her interviews with Defendant,
Defendant referred to pictures of bruises she had taken with her cell phone; however,
Defendant could not explain why those photographs were no longer on her phone.
Detective McCartney said that Defendant was allowed to clean herself up at the sheriff’s
office. Detective McCartney saw no bruising, marks, or scratches on Defendant, even
when Defendant pulled down her shirt to show where on her chest the victim had allegedly
slapped and shoved her. Detective McCartney said that Defendant reported putting milk,
water, and butter in a pan on the stove to boil before 7:35 p.m. Detective McCartney
testified that, although the stove burner was on, the liquid in the pan was not boiling by the
time Defendant asked Sergeant Gardner to turn off the stove.

        Forensic pathologist, Dr. Randy Tashjian, testified that he performed the victim’s
autopsy and determined that the victim’s cause of death was a shotgun wound to the chest
and that the manner of death was homicide. Dr. Tashjian said that there was a large
entrance wound to the right side of the victim’s chest. He noted soot marks around parts
of the entrance wound, which indicated that “the barrel or the muzzle of the firearm was in
relatively close proximity” to the victim when it was fired. Dr. Tashjian said that he
collected shotgun pellets from inside the victim’s body and a plastic shot shell wad. He
testified that locating the wad inside the body again indicated that “the range was relatively
close.”

        Dr. Tashjian took an x-ray of the victim’s body and found that, in the right side of
the body, there were several small pellet-like foreign bodies, which corresponded to
birdshot pellets that were collected from the body. From the x-ray, Dr. Tashjian determined
that the shotgun pellets entered the chest cavity and perforated the upper lobe of the right
lung. He said that some of the pellets completely severed the right subclavian artery and
right subclavian vein, which he explained were “major vessels that come off the heart and
supply the arm and drain the arm” of blood. Dr. Tashjian testified that additional shotgun
pellets went through the lungs and fractured the first, second, and third rib on the victim’s
right side. Regarding the direction of the shot, Dr. Tashjian stated that the pellets traveled
“from top to bottom[,] . . . from front to back[,] . . . [and] [f]rom right to left.” Dr. Tashjian
testified that the victim was five feet ten inches tall. He said that he did not find any
defensive wounds to the victim.

                                              -9-
       According to Dr. Tashjian, a toxicology report showed that the victim had a .175
blood alcohol level at the time of his death. The victim also had temazepam in his system,
which Dr. Tashjian explained was a type of sedative “often used . . . for the purposes of
calming nerves[.]” When asked what effect depressants like alcohol and temazepam have
on a human body, Dr. Tashjian responded, “Generally, they would cause an individual to
be sleepy. You know, their respiratory drive, their breathing rate would slow down. These
are especially if taken in higher quantities. You know . . . their coordination would be
impaired, those kinds of things.”

        Detective Jeff Lovell of the DCSO testified that he arrived at the crime scene at 8:30
p.m. While Detective McCartney spoke with Defendant at the scene, Detective Lovell
photographed the scene and collected evidence. In the kitchen, he recovered a live shotgun
shell on the floor next to the refrigerator. He said that, in her interview, Defendant said she
had two shotgun shells and held the second shell in her hand when she fired the shot that
killed the victim. Defendant claimed that she fired the shotgun standing “on the back wall”
of the den next to the desk, facing toward the laundry room. Defendant said that, after
firing the shotgun, she immediately dropped the gun on the floor and attempted to aid the
victim. Detective Lovell said that he found the victim’s wedding ring on the kitchen
counter. He said that, in searching the residence, he saw no evidence to suggest there had
been “any type of fighting, shoving, hitting, pushing, [or] destruction of property going
on[.]”

       During Defendant’s interview at the sheriff’s office, she told Detective Lovell that
she was going to take a shower in the downstairs bathroom prior to the shooting. Detective
Lovell testified:

              There’s . . . two different versions. At one point, she said she turned
       the water on to take a shower and that [the victim] was mad because she
       turned on the heater because the floor gets cold, the tub gets cold.

              And then at another point, she said she never turned the water on.

Detective Lovell said that he documented the bathtub in the downstairs bathroom and that
he did not see “a single drop of water in the tub.”

       Detective Lovell said that he documented the laundry room, which contained the
victim’s boots on top of a boot dryer. Contrary to Defendant’s story, the victim’s boots
were not muddy or dirty. Detective Lovell explained, “[Defendant] rebuked [the victim].
He ran outside. And when he came back in, he was wet and covered in dirt and mud[.]”
Detective Lovell testified, however, that he did not see any evidence of the victim’s

                                            - 10 -
tracking mud into the house, describing the house as “immaculate.” Further, he did not see
any indication of mud or dirt on the victim’s body.

       Detective Lovell identified a photograph of a recliner in the den that was in a
“partially reclined” position. Detective Lovell explained that there was also a couch in the
den with a large pool of blood on the floor beside it. The victim was lying on the floor in
the large pool of blood next to the couch, and there were blood droplets “going down
toward his feet[.]” Detective Lovell also documented blood droplets on the floor in front
of the gun safe located in the den.

       Detective Lovell said that he photographed a red basket sitting on top of a file
cabinet in the den, which was where Defendant claimed the shotgun shells had been
located. Detective Lovell said that there were no additional shells in the basket. While
processing the scene, Detective Lovell found handwritten notes made by Defendant in a
calendar and organizer on the desk in the den. He said that the notes contained Bible verses
and that the last verse read, “Leviticus 20:10, ‘[I]f a man commits adultery with another
man’s wife shall surely be put to death.” Detective Lovell stated that he discovered blood
droplets going back towards the desk and some on the calendar.

        Detective Lovell recovered the weapon used by Defendant, which he described as a
20-gauge single-shot shotgun. He also collected the spent shell casing and the live round
from the kitchen floor. He towed Defendant’s car and took an inventory of it. He said that,
in the trunk, he found a trash bag that contained eye and hearing protection. He agreed that
he participated in the Defendant’s interview at the sheriff’s office. Detective Lovell
testified:

               One of the things that did stand out to me . . . was that during our
       interview at the sheriff’s office, at no point did [Defendant] say she was in
       fear or was in any imminent threat when she went back there and actually got
       the gun and introduced it into the situation.

       Detective Lovell identified a photograph of the victim’s gun safe taken in February
2021 after it was opened by the victim’s ex-wife at his request. He noted that it contained
a black box with assorted “shells and boxes of ammunition[.]” He said that the safe door
was not open when police arrived at the scene the night of the shooting.

       On cross-examination, Detective Lovell agreed that Defendant had described the
fighting with the victim that night as involving a “shove, a slap, and screaming and yelling.”

       Special Agent Alex Brodhag testified that he worked at the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (TBI) crime laboratory in Nashville as a firearms examiner. Agent Brodhag
                                            - 11 -
said that he examined a 20-gauge Harrington and Richardson shotgun in connection with
this case. He said that, initially, he examined the shotgun and determined that it was
working as intended. He checked the shotgun’s safety devices and ensured that they were
also functioning properly. Agent Brodhag explained that the particular model of the
shotgun contained an internal safety called a “transfer bar.” He stated that it was “not
something that the user turns on and off. It’s just part of the design of a weapon.” He
continued:

               And . . . what that transfer bar does is when the trigger is pulled, the
       hammer will go forward. And as the trigger is pulled, it lifts up the transfer
       bar and the handler hits the transfer bar and then the transfer bar hits the firing
       pin. But in order to do that, the trigger has to be pulled. If the trigger were
       to be let go, that transfer bar there in the center will retract down so that the
       hammer cannot come in contact with the firing pin.

He agreed that, without pulling the trigger, the shotgun would not fire. Agent Brodhag
then demonstrated for the jury how the shotgun worked, explaining:

              First thing that’s necessary to do is break it. There’s a lever here that
       will release it so the barrel will pivot up. You then put a shot shell in the
       chamber and close it. And then if you want to fire it, you need to bring the
       hammer back and then pull the trigger.

        Agent Brodhag stated that he test-fired the shotgun using shells similar to those
submitted as evidence; he then compared the test-fired shot shells with the shot shell
submitted as evidence. He concluded that the shot shell submitted as evidence had been
fired in the same shotgun. Agent Brodhag further testified that he conducted a “muzzle to
garment distance determination” test and concluded, based upon the shot pellet pattern on
the victim’s clothing, that the shotgun was fired two to nine feet from the victim.

       Patricia Rich, the victim’s ex-wife, testified that she was married to the victim for
twenty-eight years before they divorced in May 2016. During their marriage, they lived in
the residence on Log Wall Road on the victim’s parents’ property. She denied that the
victim was ever violent towards her. When asked if their divorce was “attributed to any
type of violent outbursts or violence or intimidation or assault or abuse in any way[,]” the
victim’s ex-wife responded, “Absolutely not.” She said that she attributed the divorce to a
“mid-life crisis” on the victim’s part after he suffered an injury and was unable to work.
She said that she had never seen the victim be violent toward anyone.

       The victim’s ex-wife stated that because she and the victim had two young children,
they purchased a gun safe for storing their firearms. They installed the gun safe inside the
                                             - 12 -
house in 1997 or 1998. She said that, when she lived in the residence with the victim,
neither she nor the victim would leave firearms “loose about the house[.]” She said that
the firearms and ammunition were “always kept in the safe[.]” She stated that the safe
could only be opened by a combination or by key. She said that, in 2015, both she and the
victim had a key to the safe and that, when she moved out in 2016, she kept her key.
Regarding the operation of the safe, she testified:

              The way this safe works is you can have the key and you turn it so far
       and then you’re able to open the door. But if you have spun the combination,
       you cannot open the safe with just the key. You have to have the combination
       to open it. So it’s a dual lock.

        The victim’s ex-wife said that they had the combination to the safe “locked up in
another small safe box[.]” She said that, after she moved out of the house, the victim could
access the gun safe using his key. She explained, however, that at some point “the
combination spun . . . [s]o he was unable to open the safe.” She learned that the victim
could not access the gun safe after he mentioned to their youngest son, Austin, how much
money it was going to cost to get someone to bore the lock open. The victim’s ex-wife
explained, “So because I was mad at [the victim] and Austin was trying to purchase a
vehicle, I told [the victim] . . . give Austin some money and I will send Austin over with .
. . the combination to the safe.” The victim’s ex-wife said that she then wrote the
combination to the gun safe on a piece of paper, which Austin gave to the victim. She
testified that, in February 2021, she opened the safe for detectives to photograph inside.

      The victim’s ex-wife testified that, as part of their divorce agreement, the victim
was ordered to pay her alimony on the 5th of every month but that she did not receive a
check by the 5th of January 2017. She explained:

       So I was in communication with [the victim]. And he kept telling me it had
       been mailed over a week ago, you know, blamed it on the post office,
       whatever. He asked me one more time to go to my post office box to check
       and see if it was there.

               I do remember it was snowy and icy that day. I wasn’t real happy
       about having to go up there, but I did. And I got to work and I called him
       and I told him, I said, “[L]ook, the check is not there.” So he told me,
       “[D]on’t worry about it. I’ve got my checkbook. When I get off from work,
       I will stop by your office and just write you another check.”

       ....

                                           - 13 -
             Well, then the next thing I know, one of the other ladies in the office
       came to get me and she said . . . somebody is out front. And it was
       [D]efendant.

She said that Defendant handed her an envelope and told her that the post office put it in
the wrong post office box and that it “ended up back in their box[.]

       The victim’s ex-wife stated that she and the victim began talking again at the end of
December 2016 and that she began keeping a journal regarding their interactions. The
following exchange then occurred:

       Q. Okay. Did his death . . . in March of 2017, looking back now at your -- some of
your journal entries, does it surprise you?

       A. No.

       Q. Why is that?

       A. He had called me a few times and --

        At this point in the testimony, Defendant raised a hearsay objection, and the trial
court held a jury-out hearing. During the hearing, the victim’s ex-wife testified that she
kept a journal detailing the interactions and conversations she had with the victim leading
up to his death. She read a series of those journal entries at the State’s request. She testified
that she was unable to remember the exact content of the entries without referring to the
journal and said that it would be easier for her to read directly from the journal. She agreed
that the journal entries were accurately dated and reflected the dates upon which she wrote
them.

       Defendant objected to the admission of the journal entries, arguing “[w]e’ve got two
hearsay problems here. One, what [the victim] is saying is hearsay and the entire journal
is hearsay[.]” The State responded that the entries fell under Tennessee Rule of Evidence
803(3), as then existing mental, emotional, or physical conditions, and that the journal was
admissible under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(5), as a recorded recollection.
Defendant acknowledged that the hearsay exception in Rule 803(3) might apply “in one or
two circumstances” but asserted that “most of these times, it’s [the victim] coming to her
talking about what happened the previous day or what was happening behind the scenes at
the house. It’s not something where he’s saying, ‘[S]he just hit me,’ or something like
that.”

                                             - 14 -
        During a recess, the trial court reviewed “each page . . . and each date” of journal
entries and then announced the portions of the journal that were admissible. In making its
ruling, the trial court stated:

               So under [Rule] 803(3), that rule states “then existing mental,
       emotional, and physical condition. The following are not excluded by the
       hearsay rule: A statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind,
       emotional, sensation, or physical condition such as intent, plan, motive,
       design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health, but not including a statement
       of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates
       to the execution, et cetera, of a will.”

               And then you go on down to the beginning. Cohen’s Sixth Edition,
       803(3), Section 2. It says, “State of Mind Hearsay Exception. Although
       803(3) is commonly referred to as the state of mind hearsay rule, it extends
       to a number of mental processes that stretch the concept of the state of mind.
       Thus, by its own terms, Rule 803(3) reaches emotions, sensations, and
       physical condition. As illustrations of these processes, the rule cites seven
       examples: Intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily
       health. It should be obvious that these examples reflect an intent that this
       hearsay exception be read broadly to embrace virtually all mental processes
       that the declarant can describe.”

              And then it goes onto say, “as described in the next section, statements
       falling under 803(3) can be used to prove mental condition, conduct, and
       physical condition.”

              Under section 4 here, 8.08 section 4 in the book . . . it says, “[T]his
       principle can be illustrated by the statement ‘on Monday, I love Karen.’ If
       the issue is whether the declarant loved Karen on that day, the statement is
       hearsay but admissible under rule 803(3), a state of mind. If the issue is
       whether the declarant loved Karen on Sunday, the day before the statement
       was made, the statement is also admissible. The declarant’s statement is
       admissible under 803(3) expressing a then-existing state of mind because it
       asserted his feelings at the time the statement was made,” in parentheses
       Monday.

              “Using the rules of logic inherent in 401’s test of relevance, the
       declarant’s feelings towards Karen on Monday are some evidence of the
       declarant’s feelings toward her the day before. By a parity of reasoning, the
       declarant’s feelings towards Karen on Monday may also be used to prove the
                                           - 15 -
       declarant’s feelings toward her on Tuesday. Logically, a declarant’s feelings
       for a person on one day are at least some evidence of the declarant’s feelings
       toward that person the next day. At some point, however, mental state on
       one day may become irrelevant or only slightly helpful in assessing mental
       state far in the future or past.”

               And, of course, basically what we have here is the days it looks like
       what they’re trying to admit here . . . is from December 30th pretty much up
       until the time of death, pretty close, the day before I believe, and so that’s
       less than three months anyway -- if my math is right, less than three months,
       less than 90 days there is this journal entry. So the [c]ourt, you know, does
       find it relevant.

       The trial court also ruled that the victim’s ex-wife could read the journal entries into
the record because the journal fell under the recorded recollection exception of Tennessee
Rule of Evidence 803(5), after finding that the witness’s recollection was insufficient to
allow her to testify fully and accurately and that the journal entries were created when the
matters were fresh in her memory. The court further found that, under Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 401, the journal entries were relevant. The court stated that it considered whether
the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice under Rule 403 and concluded that “most of it [was] not.” The court ordered
redacted the portions of the journal entries that it found to be unfairly prejudicial.

       Following the jury-out hearing, the victim’s ex-wife testified that she began keeping
a journal after her separation from the victim and that, in the journal, she recorded things
that the victim had said to her and her thoughts about those things. She said that the first
journal entry was dated December 30, 2016, and that her last journal entry was dated March
19, 2017, one day before the victim’s death. She then read the following from her journal
entries:

      • December 30, 2016: “[The victim] [s]aid he woke up thinking about what today
was and said, ‘[S]trange, it’s sad ol’ Kevo effed up again. What a fool am I.’”

       • January 6, 2017: “So been going back and forth with [the victim] about where my
alimony check was. Claimed it was mailed a week ago. Kept telling me to check the box.
Well, of course, it snowed and there’s ice on the roads, but I went to the post office. Still
no check. So I told him. He said he’d take care of it and just bring me another check.”

                                            - 16 -
       • January 7, 2017: “At least he called me today. Almost was like old times. First
he called me at work. Then again on my cell. It’s probably the”1

       • January 8, 2017: “I’m beyond worried. [The victim] called me twice last night.
Both times he was crying. [The victim] hardly ever cries, so I knew it was bad. He asked
me to listen and not talk, so I did. He said he was sorry and he didn’t know how to get out
of his mess. He kept telling me how mean and controlling she is. Said when she gets mad,
she spits in his face and hits him. The second time he called, I told him to just leave. He
said he had nowhere to go, but I told him he could come stay with me. He said he was too
scared, that she said she would shoot him if he ever left her. He promised his guns were
locked up.”

        • January 9, 2017: “Friday [the victim] had text[ed] me from his work number. So
I text[ed] him on that number to check on him. He said he was okay but had not received
my text on his other phone.”

      • January 10, 2017: “Asked [the victim] if we could ever be friends again. He said
yes. That would be golden. He said he would stop one night at State Farm and see me.”

       • January 11, 2017: “[The victim’s] birthday. I couldn’t resist. I sent him a smiley
bunch of flowers. He loved them. Talked and text[ed] him for a long time today. He
thinks it[’]s funny to call my work phone from different numbers. Says he loves me not
knowing who’s calling.”

       • January 19, 2017: “Called and talked to [the victim] for a while. He told me about
a dream he had back in June. Said he was in the back of the truck asleep by himself and
he had a horrible nightmare. Said it woke him up and he rolled over to grab me. He
remembers thinking, ‘Dob, you aren’t going to believe this nightmare I had.’ Then he fully
woke up and said he realized I wasn’t there and that the nightmare was actually his life.
He was crying again and asking me how to get out of his mess. I told him again that he
could come stay with me, but again he said he couldn’t leave. Not only has she threatened
him, but also his --”

       • January 28, 2017: “Well, after [the victim] kept not showing up at State Farm at
night, when he text[ed] me yesterday to say he would stop by Chase on his way to Saint
Thomas, I tried not to get my hopes up. He showed up. I couldn’t get over how much
weight he’s gained, but it felt so good to get a hug. His eyes were so sad. He kept hugging
me saying how sorry he was.”

      1
          This portion of the sentence was cut off in the copy of the journal.
                                                   - 17 -
        • February 3, 2017: “Been talking and texting [the victim] some more. He keeps
telling me we need to get together and talk. With our work schedules, it’s going to be hard,
but hopefully we can. The other day he called and left me a message saying there was an
issue with the fridge and wanted to know if I wanted some food.”

       • February 5, 2017: “Well, well, well, that was interesting. [The victim] called me
at work and elaborated on the fridge ordeal. It didn’t go out. It seems that she left the door
open to the freezer all day. Said she blew a gasket over it. And when he told her he called
me and offered some food to me and the boys, she got the garbage can and threw it all out.
Said over and over again she would never let him give any of that food to me.”

       • February 7, 2017: “I sent [the victim] some pictures of Bubba when he was first
born. I had to call and tell him the funny. We both bought him the exact same card. Can’t
deny how well we know each other still yet. Some things you can’t change. We had too
many years together. We were both pretty emotional over it. Sure was a different
conversation than the one we had last year. As much as he’s devastated me[.]”

       • February 26, 2017: “I’m really getting worried about things he’s telling me. He’s
not in a good situation. I don’t understand it. He’s always been such a man. And he tells
me that if she doesn’t like something he says or does, that she pounces on him. He said
she gets him down and will slap him around.”

       • February 28, 2017: “Things are getting really bad for [the victim]. He said he’s
scared. The goofball must have mentioned me because she informed him that she’d snap
me like a twig. Ha. Like to see her try that one. She stole what is mine and I will get him
back. He’s always been my best friend. I need him just like he needs me.”

      • March 3, 2017: “Asked [the victim] if he could come by and fix my drain issue.
He said yes. Just give him a couple of weeks and he’d stop by.”

        • March 13, 2017: “Talked to [the victim] a few times today. He’s trying to get
Bubba a job in Nashville. I just remembered something he asked me to do. He said since
she still takes his phones and goes through them every so often, I need to send a crappy
text to him.”

       • March 14, 2017: “Talked to [the victim] again. Said he has what he needs to snake
out the drain and he will be over next week. He sounds so sad.”

       • March 18, 2017: “[The victim] stopped by the office for a hug. Said things were
really bad at home. Told me for the last two or three months she keeps saying if he wants
out, she won’t let him. I asked him why, for a millionth time. He did say when they met,
                                            - 18 -
she was giving him kinky sex. That kills me to write. And it got out of control. By the
time he straightened out, it was too late. He had destroyed his family and she was abusing
him. He said he was so ashamed to admit that a woman was doing that to him.”

       • March 19, 2017: “[The victim] text[ed] me that he could get me a newer fridge.”

       On cross-examination, the victim’s ex-wife testified that, while married to the
victim, she and the victim argued but that they never physically fought with one another.
She said that, prior to his death, the victim told her that he wanted to “get back together”
with her but acknowledged that her journal entries did not reflect this.

        During a charge conference, defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct
the jury on self-defense, asserting that the issue of self-defense had been raised by the
proof. Defense counsel argued, “I think that’s the standard that it’s been raised by the
proof. Not what the defense may have been arguing or what the defense may argue. It’s
separate from that.” The State objected to the instruction, arguing that Defendant “never
asserted she acted in self-defense . . . through all of her statements that were recorded and
played for the [c]ourt. She introduced the shotgun, she loaded it. If anybody [was] entitled
to assert self-defense in this case, it would have been [the victim].” When asked by the
trial court what proof raised the issue of self-defense, defense counsel responded, “Well, .
. . [Defendant], in her statements, expressed fear. She was afraid she was being attacked.
I don’t think the fact that her intent to shoot the ceiling excludes self-defense. That’s part
of defending herself.”

       The trial court stated that, in determining whether to instruct self-defense, the court
looked to the Tennessee Supreme Court case of State v. Cole-Pugh, 588 S.W.3d 254, 260
(Tenn. 2019). The trial court quoted from the opinion, stating that:

              [t]he quantum or proof necessary to fairly raise a general defense is
       less than that required to establish a proposition by a preponderance of the
       evidence. To determine whether a general defense has been fairly raised by
       the proof, a court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to
       the defendant and draw all reasonable inferences in the defendant’s favor.

Id. (quoting State v. Perrier, 536 S.W.3d 388, 403 (Tenn. 2017) (internal citation omitted)).
The trial court found “that the proof to raise the instruction for self-defense ha[d] been
insufficient for the [c]ourt to do so, and there’s not enough there for the [c]ourt to believe
it’s necessary to do the instruction to the jury on self-defense.”

                                            - 19 -
        At the close of proof, the State announced that it would submit only Count Two,
first degree premeditated murder, for the jury’s consideration. Following deliberations, the
jury convicted Defendant of that charge, and the trial court imposed a life sentence.

       Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial. Following a hearing, the trial court
entered a written order denying relief. This timely appeal follows.

                                         II. Analysis

                                Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for
first degree premeditated murder, arguing that the State failed to establish that she acted
intentionally and with premeditation. She asserts that the evidence is “uncontroverted,”
based upon her statement to police, that it was her “intent to shoot into the ceiling as an act
of self-defense” and that “no evidence exists to contradict this mind set[.]” The State
responds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for first degree
premeditated murder. We agree with the State.

       Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also Tenn. R.
App. P. 13(e). Questions of fact, the credibility of witnesses, and weight of the evidence
are resolved by the fact finder. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). This
court will not reweigh the evidence. Id. Our standard of review “is the same whether the
conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d
370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009))
(internal quotation marks omitted).

       A guilty verdict removes the presumption of innocence, replacing it with a
presumption of guilt. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914
(Tenn. 1982). The defendant bears the burden of proving why the evidence was
insufficient to support the conviction. Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659; Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at
914. On appeal, the “State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence
and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d
514, 521 (Tenn. 2007).

      First degree murder is the premeditated and intentional killing of another person.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2017). A person acts intentionally “when it is the
person’s conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” Tenn.
                                            - 20 -
Code Ann. § 39-11-302(a) (2017). Premeditation “is an act done after the exercise of
reflection and judgment. ‘Premeditation’ means that the intent to kill must have been
formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the
mind of the accused for any definite period of time.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d)
(2017). Additionally, “[t]he mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly
decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was
sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.” Id.

        Premeditation “may be established by proof of the circumstances surrounding the
killing.” State v. Suttles, 30 S.W.3d 252, 261 (Tenn. 2000). These circumstances include,
but are not limited to:

       the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim; the particular cruelty of
       a killing; the defendant’s threats or declarations of intent to kill; the
       defendant’s procurement of a weapon; any preparations to conceal the crime
       undertaken before the crime is committed; destruction or secretion of
       evidence of the killing; and a defendant’s calmness immediately after a
       killing.

State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 615 (Tenn. 2003) (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660;
State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 914-15 (Tenn. 1998)). This court has also noted that the
jury may infer premeditation from any planning activity by the defendant before the killing,
evidence concerning the defendant’s motive, and the nature of the killing. State v. Bordis,
905 S.W.2d 214, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (citation omitted). In addition, a jury may
infer premeditation from a lack of provocation by the victim and the defendant’s failure to
render aid to the victim. State v. Lewis, 36 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000).
Whether premeditation is present in a given case is a question of fact to be determined by
the jury from all of the circumstances surrounding the killing. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d at
614 (citing Suttles, 30 S.W.3d at 261; Pike, 978 S.W.2d at 914).

        Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence at trial established that
Defendant shot the victim in the chest with a 20-gauge shotgun from a distance close
enough to leave soot marks on the victim. Although Defendant initially told the victim’s
mother that the victim shot himself, she later admitted to shooting him but claimed that she
did it accidently as she was raising the shotgun either to shoot the ceiling or herself.
Despite Defendant’s claim that she was raising the gun when she shot the victim, Dr.
Tashjian testified that the autopsy showed the shotgun pellets entered the victim’s chest in
a downward trajectory. Agent Brodhag testified that he examined the shotgun and found
that it was in proper working order. He explained that, in order for the weapon to fire a
shot, Defendant had to “break it[,]” “put a shot shell in the chamber and close it[,]” “bring
the hammer back and then pull the trigger.” As noted by the State, the jury heard
                                            - 21 -
Defendant’s claim that the shooting was accidental, weighed that claim in relation to the
other evidence presented at trial, and reconciled the evidence in the State’s favor. A
rational jury could find from the proof presented that Defendant acted intentionally when
she shot and killed the victim.

       A rational jury could also find that Defendant acted with premeditation based upon
Defendant’s procurement of the weapon, use of the deadly weapon on an unarmed victim,
and the nature of the killing. See Davidson, 121 S.W.3d at 615; Bordis, 905 S.W.2d at 222.
Based upon the evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant retrieved the
shotgun and ammunition from the gun safe sometime after the victim’s son provided the
victim with the combination to unlock the safe. On the night of the offense, she used the
20-gauge shotgun to shoot the victim in the chest from relatively close range, causing
catastrophic injuries to the victim and his death. Following the shooting, Defendant told
multiple, inconsistent stories to the victim’s mother, responding officers, and detectives—
many details of which were not supported by physical evidence at the scene.

        The jury could also infer premeditation based upon Defendant’s previous threats
and declarations of her intent to kill the victim. See Davidson, 121 S.W.3d at 615. She
previously told the victim’s mother that, if she had known the combination to the gun safe,
she would have shot the victim during an argument. A little over a month before the
murder, the victim told his ex-wife that Defendant had threatened to shoot him if he ever
left her. Defendant also admitted that, on the evening of the shooting, she was holding the
shotgun when she told the victim, “[E]ither I’m going to shoot you or you’re going to take
this gun and you’re going to shoot me. One of us is going to die tonight.” She also admitted
that, before she loaded the shotgun, she told the victim, “I’ve had it with you.” Detectives
also found a Bible quote written by Defendant at the scene of the shooting that stated, “Man
committeth adultery with another man’s wife—shall surely be put to death.”

        Finally, the jury could infer that Defendant acted with premeditation because the
State presented evidence of Defendant’s motive to kill the victim. See Bordis, 905 S.W.2d
at 222. The evidence showed that the victim and Defendant had a troubled marriage and
that the victim, who had come to regret divorcing his ex-wife, had resumed
communications with his ex-wife in the months leading up to the shooting. Defendant
reported that, on the evening of his death, the victim removed his wedding ring and told
Defendant to leave their house; Defendant previously told the victim that, if he ever left
her, she would shoot him. Accordingly, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to
support Defendant’s conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Defendant is not
entitled to relief.

                                           - 22 -
                               Self-defense Jury Instruction

        Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
self-defense, asserting that the defense was “more than fairly raised by the proof.” She
avers that, taken in the light most favorable to the defense, the evidence showed “a volatile
relationship” between Defendant and the victim and “contain[ed] examples of activity that
. . . would necessitate a jury instruction on self-defense.” The State responds that the trial
court properly determined that a jury instruction on self-defense was not warranted. We
agree with the State.

       “It is well-established in Tennessee that the trial court has the duty of giving a
correct and complete charge of the law applicable to the facts of the case and that the
defendant has the right to have every issue of fact raised by the evidence and material to
the defense submitted to the jury upon proper instructions by the trial court.” State v.
Green, 995 S.W.2d 591, 604-05 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (citations omitted). “In
determining whether a defense instruction is raised by the evidence, the court must examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant to determine whether there is
evidence that reasonable minds could accept as to that defense.” State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d
1, 9 (Tenn. 2001). Whether jury instructions are sufficient is a question of law, which we
review de novo with no presumption of correctness. State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 295
(Tenn. 2014). “The omission of an essential element from the jury charge is subject to
harmless error analysis.” State v. Majors, 318 S.W.3d 850, 864 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State
v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 434 (Tenn. 2000)). “‘An instruction should be considered
prejudicially erroneous only if the jury charge, when read as a whole, fails to fairly submit
the legal issues or misleads the jury as to the applicable law.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. 2005)).

       “Once a general defense is fairly raised, it is incumbent upon the State to negate,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the application of a general defense.” State v. Cole-Pugh, 588
S.W.3d 254, 264 (Tenn. 2019). As noted by the State, when a jury instruction issue
involves a “fundamental defense” like self-defense, this court may exercise plenary review
notwithstanding the lack of a written request. State v. Ethan Alexander Self, No. E2014-
02466-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 4542412, at *58 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2016). As a
result, we will exercise plenary review of the self-defense issue notwithstanding
Defendant’s failure to make a written request in this case.

       Tennessee’s self-defense statute provides, in relevant part:

       (b)(1) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in
       conduct that would constitute a felony or Class A misdemeanor and is in a
       place where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before
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      threatening or using force against another person when and to the degree the
      person reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect
      against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.

      (2) Notwithstanding § 39-17-1322, a person who is not engaged in conduct
      that would constitute a felony or Class A misdemeanor and is in a place
      where the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat before threatening or
      using force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, if:

             (A) The person has a reasonable belief that there is an
             imminent danger of death, serious bodily injury, or grave
             sexual abuse;

             (B) The danger creating the belief of imminent death, serious
             bodily injury, or grave sexual abuse is real, or honestly
             believed to be real at the time; and

             (C) The belief of danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-611(b)(1)-(2) (2022). Acts committed in self-defense are
justified, and self-defense is a complete defense to crimes of violence. See Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-11-601 (2022); State v. Ivy, 868 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

      In Perrier, 536 S.W.3d at 402-03, our supreme court stated the following:

             As this Court explained in State v. Hawkins, [406 S.W.3d 121
             (Tenn. 2013),] self-defense is a general defense and as such it
             need not be submitted to the jury unless it is “fairly raised by
             the proof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-203(c) [2018]. The
             quantum of proof necessary to fairly raise a general defense is
             less than that required to establish a proposition by a
             preponderance of the evidence. To determine whether a
             general defense has been fairly raised by the proof, a court must
             consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
             defendant and draw all reasonable inferences in the
             defendant’s favor. Whenever admissible evidence fairly raises
             a general defense, the trial court is required to submit the
             general defense to the jury. From that point, the burden shifts
             to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
             defense does not apply.

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       Hawkins, 406 S.W.3d at 129 (citation omitted).

              Within this structure, the trial court makes the threshold determination
       whether to charge the jury with self-defense, and we conclude that the trial
       court, as part of that threshold determination, should decide whether to
       charge the jury that a defendant did not have a duty to retreat.

Id. at 403.

        In this case, the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on self-defense
because it was not fairly raised by the proof. Viewed in the light most favorable to
Defendant, no evidence suggested that Defendant believed she was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury when she shot the victim. Defendant gave three separate
statements to law enforcement, with the statement given to Sergeant Gardner being
arguably the most favorable to Defendant’s claim. In that statement, Defendant told
Sergeant Gardner that she and the victim had argued that evening when the victim returned
home, that the victim had slapped her in the chest and shoved her during the argument, and
that, when she told the victim she would not take any further abuse from him, he threatened
that she was “leaving tonight in a body bag.” However, as noted by the State, a slap and a
shove do not constitute serious bodily injuries within the meaning of the self-defense
statute, and detectives saw no injuries to Defendant. Moreover, Defendant’s statements to
police suggest that she did not truly believe the victim’s verbal threats. She told Sergeant
Gardner that she responded to his comment about a “body bag” by saying, “Whatever . . .
[b]ring it on. I don’t care.” Defendant claimed that the victim then went to the den and
retrieved the shotgun from between the desk and the wall but that he could not find any
shells. Defendant recounted that the victim threatened to shoot her, to which she replied,
“Go ahead.” She admitted that the victim never loaded the gun and that he returned the
unloaded gun to its location beside the desk.

        Defendant acknowledged that she reintroduced the shotgun into the argument and
that the victim was unarmed when she shot him. She said that the victim was standing in
the kitchen when she went to the den to retrieve the gun. She recounted that the victim
stood next to the gun safe in the den and watched her load the shotgun and that he rushed
toward her as she raised the gun. Defendant never claimed she shot the victim in self-
defense, nor would such a claim be reasonable under these circumstances. Instead,
Defendant consistently maintained that she shot the victim by accident, despite asserting
that the victim had been abusive in the past and that he had slapped her and threatened her
on the evening of the shooting. Because Defendant denied intentionally firing the shotgun
at Defendant and claimed that she shot the victim by accident, Defendant cannot also claim
that she shot the victim in self-defense. See e.g., State v. Blackwood, No. W1999-01221-
CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1672343, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2000) (holding, in a
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case in which “the defendant claimed that he only fired his own gun in the air after he was
attacked,” that “notwithstanding the improbability of the defendant’s testimony, he was not
entitled to a self-defense instruction, because even according to his own testimony, he did
not intentionally fire at anyone”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 21, 2001). The evidence
at trial did not fairly raise a claim of self-defense; therefore, the trial court properly refused
the instruction.

        Furthermore, we conclude that, even if the trial court did err in failing to provide a
self-defense instruction, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no
reasonable jury would have concluded that Defendant acted in self-defense. See Perrier,
536 S.W.3d at 404-05 (concluding that the trial court’s error in instructing the jury
regarding self-defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “because no reasonable
jury would have accepted the defendant’s self-defense theory”). Defendant is not entitled
to relief on this claim.

                                    Right to Confrontation

       Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the
victim’s ex-wife to testify concerning statements the victim made, which the victim’s ex-
wife recorded in a journal. Defendant asserts that the trial court’s “extensive analysis of
the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, 803 and 805, [was] misdirected” and that the “paramount
issue [was] whether allowing the evidence violated . . . Defendant’s constitutional right to
confrontation.” The State responds that Defendant has waived her claim that the trial court
erred by admitting testimony from the victim’s ex-wife about her diary entries in violation
of the Confrontation Clause. We agree with the State.

        During the testimony of the victim’s ex-wife, Defendant raised a hearsay objection
to her journal entries. Defendant’s objection was not based upon a claimed violation of
her right to confrontation. Moreover, Defendant did not raise the issue under the
Confrontation Clause in her motion for new trial. A defendant may not object to the
introduction of evidence, such as testimony, on one ground at trial but rely on a different
ground on appeal. See State v. Alder, 71 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (“It is
well-settled that an appellant is bound by the evidentiary theory set forth at trial, and may
not change theories on appeal”). Additionally, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e)
provides that “no issue presented for review shall be predicated upon error in the admission
or exclusion of evidence . . . unless the same was specifically stated in a motion for a new
trial; otherwise such issues will be treated as waived.” We conclude, therefore, that
Defendant has waived the claim of a Confrontation Clause violation by failing to raise the
claim at trial and in her motion for new trial. Although this court may consider an otherwise
waived issue for plain error, Defendant has not requested plain error review, much less

                                              - 26 -
established that she would be entitled to relief on that basis. See State v. Bledsoe, 226
S.W.3d 349, 354-55 (Tenn. 2007).

       In one sentence under this section in her brief, Defendant claims that the trial court
“erred in determining the prejudicial effect of this evidence did not outweigh any probative
value.” Defendant did not raise this issue in her motion for new trial. See Tenn. R. App.
P. 3(e). Moreover, an appellate brief must contain an argument “setting forth the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefore,
including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the
authorities and appropriate references to the record.” Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)(A). “Issues
which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate references to
the record will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. 10(b); see also
State v. Sanders, 842 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Defendant has not cited
any authority related to prejudice or offered an argument as to why the testimony from the
victim’s ex-wife was more prejudicial than probative. Thus, to the extent Defendant was
intending to raise a standalone claim under Rule 403 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence,
the claim is waived. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                      III. Conclusion

       Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JUDGE

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