Court Opinion

ID: 9640360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:04:26.216002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.252351
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although Appellant’s speech was reprehensible, I agree with the principal opinion that Appellant has standing to challenge section 566.095 on its face as an unconstitutional infringement on the right of free speech.
The majority opinion does not address the pitfalls of a limiting construction described by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). The Osborne Court expressed serious doubt that Osborne had been provided due process. Id. 122-126, 110 S.Ct. 1691. The Osborne Court reversed the conviction and remanded “for a new trial in order to *70ensure that Osborne’s conviction stemmed from a finding that the State had proved each of the elements” of the newly constructed statute. Id. at 125-126, 110 S.Ct. 1691. As in Osborne, the majority opinion in this case has construed a statute as substantially different from its plain language. For example, it is not clear that Appellant was tried for a crime that includes the element of a solicitation or request that results in “real emotional turmoil.” Even if section 566.095 is subject to a limiting construction, Appellant should be retried to ensure that the State proves each of the elements of a reformed section 566.095.
Moreover, it is inappropriate to subject section 566.095 to a limiting construction. Section 566.095 should be analyzed under the stringent scrutiny of overbreadth analysis. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (content-based restriction on speech is to be accorded the most stringent review); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) (restraint of speech on the basis of its content presumptively violates the First Amendment).
The majority opinion’s analysis relies on two cases (State v. Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. banc 1987); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)), both of which declined to apply such narrowing constructions.1 A review of both cases raises, rather than reheves, doubts concerning the propriety of such a redraft of section 566.095.
In State v. Carpenter, this Court held that a disturbing the peace statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. The crime was defined as follows:
1. A person commits the crime of peace disturbance if:
(1) He unreasonably and knowingly disturbs or alarms another person or persons by:
(c) Threatening to commit a crime against any persons; ...
The Carpenter Court noted that:
Although, a limiting construction would avoid imposition of the facial over-breadth conclusion, there is no indication that such a construction would be consistent with the intent of the legislature. In fact, the plain language of the statute would indicate to the contrary. We thus refrain from any attempt to redraft the statute.
Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d at 408 n. 1 (citations omitted). In the context of a First Amendment challenge, the standard for application of a limiting construction to a Missouri statute is the extent to which its language is “plain.” Id. The majority opinion in this case does not analyze whether the language of section 566.095 is similarly “plain,” but seeks to elevate the opinion of dissenting Judge Blaekmar that no such standard applies. Id.
The Carpenter Court’s refusal to apply a limiting construction to the peace disturbance statute should guide the decision here. The language of section 566.095 is similar to the language of the statute at issue in Carpenter, and it is no less plain.
The second case cited by the principal opinion for the proposition that this statute should be redrafted is City of Houston, *71482 U.S. at 459, 107 S.Ct. 2502. In City of Houston, the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance that prohibited verbal interruptions of police officers. Id. at 461, 107 S.Ct. 2502. The ordinance made it unlawful for any person “to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty.” Id. at 455, 107 S.Ct. 2502. The City of Houston urged the Court to apply limiting constructions that would eliminate the ordinance’s overbreadth. Id. at 467, 107 S.Ct. 2502. The Court declined, holding that a statute is not susceptible to a limiting construction if “its language is plain and its meaning unambiguous. Its constitutionality cannot ‘turn upon a choice between one or several alternate meanings.’ ” Id. at 468, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (citations omitted).
As with the statutes at issue in Carpenter and City of Houston, the language of section 566.095 is plain, and its meaning is unambiguous. The elements of the crime are a mere 28 words. The words “solicits,” “requests,” “affront,” and “alarm,” are just as plain and unambiguous as the words “threatening,” “disturbs,” and “alarms” at issue in Carpenter and the words “molest,” “abuse” and “interrupt” at issue in City of Houston.
The majority opinion has presented no reason to overturn the holding of Carpenter. Because section 566.095 is plain and unambiguous, it should be scrutinized on its face for overbreadth.
Section 566.095 is content-dependent regulation of speech. Such regulation presumptively violates the First Amendment. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). It does not fall within any recognized exceptions. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973) (regulation of obscenity must regulate speech that is patently offensive in light of community standards); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (prohibition of fighting words must address speech that, by its very utterance, inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace); Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 54-55, 106 S.Ct. 925 (time, place or manner restrictions upon sexually-explicit speech must be content-neutral and designed to serve a substantial governmental interest, such as zoning). Therefore, section 566.095 is an unconstitutionally over-broad prohibition of speech protected by the First Amendment. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

. The majority opinion also refers to a law journal article, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L.J. 853, 886-887 (1991). The section of the law journal article cited by the majority opinion addresses in an inconclusive manner the public policy concerns of both narrowing constructions and overbreadth rulings. Professor Fallon’s discourse is well-reasoned and well-written, but it cannot stand as authority.