Court Opinion

ID: 9487634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:22:42.935574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:24.299281
License: Public Domain

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The public is entitled to know all of the relevant facts underlying this or any other prosecution and, as an inferior court, we have a solemn obligation to the Supreme Court of the United States to include all such facts in the opinions of this court. From time to time, of course, there will be a disagreement within the court over the relevance of certain facts and testimony to the issues addressed by the court, quite apart from any disagreement over the legal reasoning underlying the court’s ultimate decision to affirm or reverse the defendant’s convictions. WTien there is such a disagreement over the relevance of particular facts, we have an affirmative obligation to explain the basis for our respective conclusions as to their relevance, in order that the public and the Supreme Court be fully informed. The extent to which we insist upon a complete recitation of all potentially relevant facts has profound implications for further review by our Nation’s highest tribunal, for the lives of those whom our decisions touch, and for the public’s perception of the integrity of the court as an institution of government.
I.
In this case, Chief Judge Ervin and Judge Hamilton maintain that the government witness’ testimony that Hamrick’s bomb .was capable of detonating as constructed without any additional parts, is irrelevant to whether Hamrick’s bomb was a dangerous weapon, and that the court should include no reference to this testimony. See post at 890 n. 2 (Hamilton, J., concurring); post at 891-893 n. 1 (Ervin, Chief Judge, dissenting). Both of my colleagues refuse even to join Part III of *887the court’s opinion, which states in four innocuous sentences that Hamrick’s “destructive device” convictions are affirmed by an equally divided court, because two of these four sentences, in reciting the panel’s holding and reasoning on the “destructive device” convictions, allude to the testimony to which they object.
This testimony was not cited or discussed in the original panel’s unanimous opinion reversing Hamrick’s convictions, see 995 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir.1993); indeed, the testimony was incorrectly characterized in the single passage in the panel opinion that obliquely references it, see discussion infra. It is likewise not mentioned by Chief Judge Ervin in his dissent in this case. Thus, were we not to address this testimony, it would never be publicly known.
This testimony is not only highly relevant to the issues addressed by the court, but is the single most relevant evidence in the case. It is not only directly relevant to Hamrick’s Count VII conviction for assault of a federal officer with a dangerous weapon; it also confirms that Hamrick’s convictions on Counts I, II, III, VI, and VIII are unassailable under any plausible interpretation of the term “destructive device,” including that adopted by the original panel. I do not believe that any member of the court is foreclosed from discussing this testimony merely because other members of the court may disagree that it is relevant. I further believe, for the reasons set forth below, that we would disserve the public and the Supreme Court were we not to address this particular testimony.
A.
The testimony, which is briefly discussed in the court’s opinion, see ante at 881-882, is primarily that of Mr. Warren Parker, one of the government’s chief witnesses. The whole of the panel’s reference to Parker’s testimony appears in the following two sentences:
The final expert witness’s testimony was not certain on whether the bomb as constructed could have detonated. He testified, however, that with the substitution of readily available materials, the bomb could have exploded.
995 F.2d at 1270. In fact, Parker testified unequivocally that the bomb as constructed could have detonated, and that it may well have failed to detonate only because its parts had been disturbed during mailing.
Specifically, Parker testified that the wires, which ran from the batteries to the butane lighters, themselves could have become so hot as to detonate the bomb, without the addition of a single other part:
[M]erely ... weakening the walls [of the lighters] enough to allow that [butane] to vent would act as a mechanism for the function of this bomb. In this case, it is— it is possible that that wire could heat enough to do that, a spark or flame be generated by the heated wire sufficient to ignite the thing, producing the fire ball ... at least several feet in diameter ... [and] well over a thousand degrees.
J.A. at 207-08 (emphasis added). Even Hamrick’s counsel understood Parker to have so testified. See id. at 215 (statement by John Pizzuti) (“You testified ... that it was possible that the wire in this alleged bomb could heat enough to cause ignition to produce a fire ball.”).
In addition to his testimony that the bomb could have been detonated by the heat from the wires alone, Parker also testified that had the yellow sheets of legal paper in the letter bomb become inflamed, as intended, rather than simply been scorched, they, too, could have detonated the bomb:
Q: [Mr. Parker,] [h]ave you formed an opinion concerning the effect on the functioning of the device if the yellow legal pad papers had ignited?
A: Well, if any open flame would have been a source of ignition for the butane contained in the lighters.
Q: Would that include the yellow legal pad?
A: Including the yellow legal pad.
Id. at 212.
Parker went on to explain that, in his view, it may well have been that the bomb failed to detonate only because its parts were jostled in the mail. United States Attorney Horne *888asked Parker whether he had “formed an opinion as to the effect of mailing of the device on whether or not it would function.” Id. at 210. After observing that in his experience a “large portion” of letter bombs fail to detonate because parts become dislocated in the mails, Parker testified:
I believe that shipping [this particular device] through the mail and the handling it received could well have affected its functional ability and caused it to be dysfunctional.

Id.

Parker thereafter testified as to the “commonly available” materials that could have been substituted for the pink substance as fuses. The panel, characterizing this testimony, said that although Parker “was not certain on whether the bomb as constructed could have detonated,” he testified that it could have exploded “with the substitution of readily available materials.” 995 F.2d at 1270. However, Parker actually testified not that “the bomb could have exploded” only with the substitution of these materials, but rather that the substitution of these materials would have enhanced the likelihood that the bomb would detonate:
Q: [Mr. Parker,] [h]ave you formed an opinion as to whether modifications using commonly-available materials could have been made to increase the likelihood that the device would junction?
A: I would be reluctant to be a bomb instructor, but certainly many common materials that I would have available or that are available could have improved the possibility of that to dysfunction [sic] considerably.
Q: Have you formed an opinion whether commonly available materials might have been substituted for the pink substance to enhance the chances for it to function?
A: Well, the laboratory analysis established that the pink substance was not flammable. Had a flammable material been there, that would have greatly enhanced its probability of functioning.
Q: Have you formed an opinion whether or not hamburger grease could have served that function?
A: Hamburger grease would be one thing that would burn.
Q: Have you formed an opinion whether or not WD — 10 could have served that function?
A: Certainly it has a flammability characteristic.
Q: Have you formed an opinion whether or not match heads could have served that function?
A: Very easily match heads could cause that to happen.
Q: Have you formed an opinion whether or not toilet paper could have served that function?
A: Yes, any readily available ignitable material substituted for the apparently nonflammable material would have enhanced its ability to have worked.
Id. at 210-12 (emphases added).
In sum, Parker’s testimony, which was not cited, quoted or discussed by the panel, and which is not cited, quoted or discussed by the dissent or Judge Hamilton, exposes the error of the panel when it stated that Parker “was not certain on whether the bomb as constructed could have detonated,” and when it said that Parker testified that the device could only have exploded with the substitution of other materials. And it confirms the panel’s error when it concluded that,
[i]n the instant case, unlike [United States v.] Morningstar [456 F.2d 278 (4th Cir.1972)], Hamrick was not in possession of all of the parts needed to construct a destructive device within the meaning of the statute. Hamrick did not have all of the necessary parts in order for the dysfunctional bomb to qualify as a destructive device. As in Malone, a key component of the device was missing. The unidentified pink substance, serving as the ignitor, was dysfunctional. Moreover, an expert witness testified that the nine-volt battery could not have produced sufficient heat to ignite any number of readily available substitute fuses.... [T]he device is incapable of detonation. The bomb was incapable of detonating; therefore it cannot be a de*889structive device under section 5845(f) or its counterparts.
995 F.2d at 1271.
More importantly, Parker’s testimony exposes the error that would be worked were the court today to reverse either Hamrick’s Count VII conviction, as urged by the dissent, or his convictions under Counts I, II, III, VI, and VIII, as urged by the dissent and Judge Hamilton.
B.
Chief Judge Ervin and Judge Hamilton argue that no reference to Parker’s testimony should be made, even by the majority of the court that affirms Hamrick’s conviction for use of a “deadly or dangerous weapon,” on the ground that whether Hamrick’s device would explode is irrelevant to the question of the bomb’s dangerousness. See, e.g., post at 890-93 n. 1 (Ervin, Chief Judge, dissenting); post at 890 n. 2 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (referring to court’s “unnecessary and unfortunate reliance on” government expert’s testimony). Such an argument requires no response. It is self-evident that the fact that a bomb could explode is relevant to its dangerousness. One need look no further than to the fact that Parker’s testimony — that the device was fully capable of detonation — completely undermines Chief Judge Ervin’s own rationale for concluding that the bomb was not a dangerous weapon, namely, that the device “lacked at least one necessary element to make it work,” and therefore was incapable of inflicting injury or death, see post at 894.
Parker’s testimony speaks directly, as well, to the McLaughlin criteria, under which the dangerousness vel non of Hamrick’s device is assessed. It establishes that the first of these criteria — that the article be typically and characteristically dangerous and be manufactured for a dangerous use — is indisputably proven. For no one could maintain that a bomb capable of detonation is not typically dangerous and manufactured for a dangerous use. As Judge Hamilton observes, these are matters of “[p]ure common sense.” See post at 890 n. 2 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
Moreover, by proving beyond any question that the device was in fact capable of injuring or killing persons and destroying property, this testimony also eliminates the issue of putative dangerousness that gives rise to Judge Hamilton’s conclusion that he is “constrained” by Supreme Court precedent to affirm Hamrick’s Count VII conviction, see post at 890-91.
Apart from its obvious relevance to the dangerousness of Hamrick’s bomb, Parker’s testimony also provides more than enough basis for a reasonable juror to conclude, under any reasonable interpretation of the term “destructive device” — including the panel’s notion that all parts necessary for the device to detonate must be in the possession of the defendant — that Hamrick’s Counts I, II, III, VI, and VIII convictions should have been affirmed by the panel and must be affirmed here.
Given the testimony elicited by the government from Parker, among others, it is plain that all of Hamrick’s convictions must be affirmed under any reasonable interpretation of the terms “dangerous weapon” and “destructive device.” In this particular ease, this is little more than simple recognition by the law that Hamrick is a proven criminal with a demonstrated willingness to construct and mail bombs to any public official of whose actions he disapproves. That he is such is evident from his convictions and activities prior to those underlying this appeal, which the panel also nowhere mentioned and the dissent likewise contends are irrelevant. It is evident even from his activities since the time of his appeal, including the fact that it appears that only nine days after this case was argued before the court en banc, Ham-rick sent yet another bomb from Marion Federal Penitentiary to Special Assistant United States Attorney David J. Horne, who had represented the United States at Ham-rick’s trial in the district court and before the original and en banc panels of this court.
II.
Chief Judge Ervin does not share my understanding of our responsibility to the public and to the Supreme Court in a ease such as this. In his view, unless there is a majority of judges who join a single opinion for the *890court, we have no duty to the public, the parties or even to the Supreme Court, to address all of the facts that may bear on the resolution of the defendant’s legal claims. Thus, he believes that where, as here, a majority of the court agrees to dispose of the defendant’s claim in the same way, but only a plurality opinion emerges, there should be no discussion of those facts whose relevance the plurality and the dissent disagree over. Such discussion, in his judgment, amounts to nothing more than “provid[ing] fodder to the [Supreme] Court.” With respect, I simply cannot subscribe to this view. In my opinion, we have no higher obligation in any context than to set forth fully and faithfully the facts to which the law is to be applied. The parties are no less bound by a plurality opinion. With a plurality opinion, no less than with a majority opinion, the Supreme Court must decide on the facts presented whether the defendant has been constitution-ahy denied his life or liberty.
Chief Judge Ervin, because he fails to acknowledge the difference between the reasoning of a decision and the underlying facts of a case, suggests that the Supreme Court agrees with his view of our responsibility. It does not. Even putting to one side the obvious difference between a Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in terms of the unre-viewability of decisions, the Supreme Court always discusses both the relevant facts and the holding by the court from which the appeal is taken, where, as here, it disposes of a case by a plurality vote. It even discusses the facts and holding below when it affirms one of several issues by an equally divided court, as we do in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 108 S.Ct. 316, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987). Indeed, it is odd that Chief Judge Ervin cites Carpenter as an example of a case in which the Court provided none of the underlying facts or the holding below; the Court recited both. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 22-24, 108 S.Ct. at 318-20. The only context in which the Supreme Court does not recite the underlying facts and holdings is when an equally divided court decides the only issue before the Court. Of course, this is not the circumstance we face today.