Court Opinion

ID: 9711153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:25:21.212452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.547026
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE VAN DEUSEN, dissenting: For an employee to be acting v/ithin the scope of his employment, he must be acting in his employer’s interest. (Rosenberg v. Packerland Packing Co. (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 959, 963, and cases cited therein.) However, if he is acting in the furtherance of his employer’s interest, he cannot be held personally liable for tortious interference with a co-employee’s contract with a common employer. Worrick v. Flora (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 755, 759. As a result of the majority opinion in this case, we permit plaintiff to recover in count I of the complaint against Marshall Field under the doctrine of respondeat superior on the ground that Greenwald was acting within the scope of his employment; at the same time we permit plaintiff to recover against Greenwald in count II on the ground that he maliciously interfered with the plaintiff’s employment contract with Marshall Field, which, as the majority opinion states, negatives any contention that Greenwald was acting in the. best interest of Marshall Field. Such a result is irreconcilable and cannot stand. Nor can we determine from the record which verdict should be sustained. The answers the jury gave to the special interrogatories are inconsistent. The jury found that the defendant Greenwald was acting within the scope of his employment (in the furtherance of his employer’s interest) and that he was acting with actual malice (against his employer’s interest). The majority finds that the special interrogatory on the scope of employment was improperly submitted to the jury and reasons that, since the defendants had not denied that Greenwald was in the scope of his employment, the question of scope of employment is not an issue in this case. Ordinarily, this would be true, but such is not the case where the plaintiff chooses to submit his case to the jury on the basis of two inconsistent theories as set forth in counts I and II of the complaint. By so doing, it becomes necessary that both of these issues be submitted for determination by the jury. Plaintiff cannot have it both ways at the same time. In light of the conflicting answers which the jury gave to these special interrogatories, it is obvious that the jury was confused. The verdicts based upon these inconsistent answers cannot stand. I would reverse the jury verdicts and the judgments entered thereon against Greenwald and Marshall Field and remand the matter to the trial court for a new trial.