Court Opinion

ID: 9498716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:26:05.721705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:01.587798
License: Public Domain

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Our precedent precludes the majority from treating this petition as we would have had the BIA affirmed without opinion. The BIA’s error in failing to comply with its own regulations is not harmless and did cause prejudice. The most egregious prejudice is that when the BIA disregarded its regulations, choosing instead -to dispose of this petition through its summary affirmance procedures, Kumar was denied the .full review at the agency level to which he is entitled. This error should be remedied by a remand to the BIA for a determination whether, taking Kumar’s testimony as true, the Kumars established past persecution. Instead, the majority continues down the BIA’s misguided path by again denying Kumar the full review to which he is entitled.
The majority disregards governing case law that dictates the procedure we must follow when reviewing a BIA decision affirming the IJ without opinion. Where the BIA affirms the IJ without opinion, the panel is to review the IJ decision as the final agency decision. Singh v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 1117, 1121 n. 6 (9th Cir.2005); see also Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir.2003). The majority purports to undertake this review. What it actually does, however, is review the IJ’s ultimate rejection of the Kumars’ asylum claim while rejecting the IJ’s adverse credibility finding — an unprecedented process that flouts the rules governing BIA *526streamlining. The majority’s solution to the regulatory anomaly that the BIA created is to review both the IJ and BIA opinions, accepting the BIA’s credibility determination (presumably as supported by substantial evidence) and then reviewing the IJ’s opinion through that lens.
The majority further muddles the process required when an adverse credibility finding is rejected. Under INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002), if the panel rejects the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, which the majority does here, the proper course is to remand to the BIA for further proceedings, accepting the petitioner’s testimony as true. See, e.g., Ding v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir.2004); Singh v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1164, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004). Instead, the majority usurps the role of factfinder by “reviewing” the IJ decision, taking Kumar’s testimony as true, thus affirming the BIA’s decision instead of remanding.
Even setting aside the majority’s failure to follow the procedure for appellate review of streamlined cases, the BIA’s decision to streamline Kumar’s petition in the first place was prejudicial error. Affir-mance without opinion — the process under which a single Board member, rather than a three-member panel, reviews an IJ decision, and issues a standard three-sentence opinion (the language of which is mandated by statute), rather than one tailored to the petition — is appropriate if three requirements are met. The BIA member to whom the case is assigned must (1) affirm the result of the IJ’s decision; (2) determine that any errors in the IJ’s decision were “harmless or nonmaterial”; and (3) determine that (a) the issues on appeal are controlled by precedent and do not require application of precedent to a novel fact situation, or (b) the factual and legal issues on appeal are “not so substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i). Although the BIA indeed affirmed the result of the IJ’s decision, its footnote refusing to affirm the IJ’s credibility determination makes clear that the Board member reviewing the case determined that the IJ’s erroneous adverse credibility finding was not in fact “harmless or non-material,” as is required. If the adverse credibility finding was truly harmless or nonmaterial error, it would have been unnecessary to note disagreement with it.
Nor did this petition raise the kind of “not so substantial” factual and legal questions appropriate for review and disposition by a single member of the BIA. Rather, this petition presents “a decision by an immigration judge ... that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable precedents,” which makes it appropriate for review by a three-member panel of the Board. Id. § 1003.1(e)(6)(iii). Had it been given the greater consideration of a three-member panel, the BIA might have actually read the record and caught the misehar-acterization of Kumar’s testimony by the IJ contained within the so-called alternative ruling. Relegating this case to review by a single Board member, without the opportunity to explain the decision in an opinion, denied Kumar the right to the full and fair hearing required by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
The prejudice caused by the BIA is exacerbated in a petition such as Kumar’s, where the law and the facts are not clear. This is a very close case, both legally and factually. We have articulated varying legal standards on the degree of individualized persecution a petitioner must show to merit relief. Compare Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196(9th Cir.2000) (finding that “[f]or a sustainable showing of past persecution, a ‘[petitioner must establish that the mistreatment she suf*527fered ... was substantially more grievous in kind or degree than the general manifestation of hostility between ... competing ethnic and religious groups’ ”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.1998)), with Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that, in contrast to the proof required to show a well-founded fear of future persecution, “proof of particularized persecution is not- required to establish past persecution”).1
The cumulative effect of several incidents may constitute persecution, even if no single incident would itself rise to the level of persecution. In Chand v. INS, we stated, “When considering an asylum claim, we consider cumulatively the harm an applicant has- suffered. An applicant may suffer persecution because of the cumulative effect of several incidents, no one of which rises to the level of persecution.” 222 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir.2000) (finding persecution where Indo-Fijian was physically abused by Fijian soldiers, robbed multiple times, received no police assistance, and endured other crimes such as burglary); see also Narayan v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir.2004) (holding violence due to the 1987 military coup, the denial of medical treatment, repeated burglaries of the petitioner’s home, denial of police assistance, and other physical violence compelled a finding of persecution against an Indo-Fijian petitioner); Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614, 617 (9th Cir.1996) (finding persecution where Indo-Fijian member of the Labour Party was jailed twice for multiple days, beaten, and subjected to sadistic and degrading treatment); Surita v. INS, 95 F.3d 814, 819-21 (9th Cir.1996) (finding persecution where Indo-Fijian’s claims of being robbed ten to fifteen times by ethnic Fijians, who targeted her because she was Indo-Fijian, were supported by evidence that the government was unable or unwilling to control such crime).
On the other hand, given the deference afforded the IJ’s decision, we have at times strictly interpreted what “necessarily constitute^] persecution,” as the question is defined in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 479, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). See, e.g., Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that, in the case of an Indo-Fijian member of the Labor party who was forced from a vehicle at gunpoint, jailed, hit, kicked, and coercively questioned and threatened about political affiliations, a factfinder could have found persecution but was not compelled to do so); see also Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.2000) (finding assaults, burglarizing of the petitioner’s home, and other vandalism by ethnic Fijians constituted “isolated criminal ineident[s]” and did not compel a finding of persecution); Singh, 134 F.3d at 968-69(holding that an Indo-Fijian’s generalized claims of ethnic tension, burglarizing of petitioner’s home, governmental outlawing of Hindu religious gatherings, and refusal of police assistance did not compel a finding of persecution).
Because the precise standards for judging persecution have varied, the IJ’s credibility determination was all the more critical — and the record demonstrates that it must have tainted the IJ’s view of the facts as set forth in the “alternative” holding, understandable human behavior, for there is no explanation other than outright dissembling for the IJ’s deliberate mischarae-*528terization of Kumar’s testimony. For example, the IJ extrapolates from Kumar’s return to Fiji the factual finding that Ku-mar believed it would be “safe and appropriate” for him to return. In fact, Ku-mar’s testimony, which now must be deemed truthful, was that he returned because “[his] wife called[:] she said the situation was improving so — and decided that [he] didn’t have any relatives there so[he] was feeling lonely and depressed and [he] had to come back.” The IJ accepts as a fact that while Kumar was worshiping at temple, he was dragged out by two soldiers who told him (1) that he could not practice his religion in Fiji and (2) to get out of Fiji. This is plainly persecution, but the IJ concludes that because Kumar has worshiped at home since the time of that incident and now goes to temple only a few times a year, the religious persecution he suffered has somehow vanished. The IJ incorrectly finds that the Kumars believe worshiping at home is “comfortable, acceptable, and routine to them.” In fact, Kumar merely testified that it was acceptable in the Hindu religion to practice at home. He never testified that worshiping at home was an acceptable alternative to him; rather, he said his wife stopped him from going to temple. The obvious inference from this testimony is that Kumar wanted to go to temple, but his wife felt it was dangerous to practice his religion openly in Fiji. That the Kumars continue to practice at home, moreover, cannot be taken to mitigate the impact of the religious persecution they did suffer in Fiji. Indeed, Rina Kumar testified that the reason that they had attended temple more often in Fiji, prior to the incident, was that there was more activity as a result of the large Indian community there. Thus, as support for the “alternative” holding, the IJ misconstrued the Kumars’ less frequent attendance in the United States, explainable perhaps because the Indian or Hindu community is less active here, as evidence that the Kumars were not affected by the incident at the temple.
These and other errors the IJ made in allowing its disbelief of Kumar to infect her characterization of the Kumars’ testimony demonstrate the grave consequences flowing from the majority’s decision to pretend that the IJ’s holding on the merits was unaffected by its erroneous adverse credibility finding. When the IJ made her ruling on persecution, she could not help but do so from a perspective of skepticism and disbelief. The majority accepts the IJ’s misstatement of the facts and her unsupported inferences even though the record shows they are wrong. Given the complexities of our law on persecution, and the importance of particular facts to a decision on persecution, the majority’s decision to accept the IJ’s version of the facts is especially damaging.
We are, of course, not in the best position to now weigh the testimony presented, as it is not our responsibility to make factual determinations about petitioner’s allegations in the first instance. Where the IJ makes an erroneous adverse credibility determination, the IJ should be charged with reviewing Kumar’s claim, taking his testimony as true, and free of the taint of the adverse credibility finding that the record demonstrates influenced the IJ’s alternative ruling. Because we cannot treat this case as we would had the BIA simply affirmed without opinion, and because we should not place ourselves in the role of factfinder and inquire into the merits of the Kumars’ petition, rather than remand to the agency, the majority’s resolution is contrary to the holding of INS v. Ventura.
I am not quite as certain as the majority is that if this case were remanded, all that the BIA would do is delete the footnote refusing to affirm the adverse credibility *529finding and issue another summary affir-mance. It might just decide to follow its own regulation and give Kumar’s petition the full review it deserves, given the IJ’s errors. Especially considering the Attorney General’s recent statement that the conduct of some immigration judges “can aptly be described as intemperate or even abusive,” and his admonition to members of the BIA that each case must “be reviewed proficiently and that each alien be treated with courtesy and respect,” Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Jan. 9, 2006), I am inclined to believe that a remand would produce more meaningful review than the majority expects. And even if it did not, failure of the BIA to discharge its duty to review each case proficiently does not relieve us of our duty to follow correct procedure and our own precedent.
Because neither the BIA nor the majority followed the correct procedure and both thereby effectively deprived Kumar of the process to which he was entitled, I dissent.

. Mgoian v. INS also notes that "if the applicant is a member of a 'disfavored' group, but the group is not subject to systematic persecution, [we] will look to (1) the risk level of membership in ,the group (i.e., the extent and severity of persecution suffered by the group) and (2) the alien's individual risk level.” 184 F.3d 1029, 1035 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1999).