Court Opinion

ID: 9685519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:45:35.708022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:07.346011
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. SDCL 53-9-6 provides in part that “[e]very provision in a contract restricting a party from enforcing his rights under it by usual legal proceedings in ordinary tribunals, or limiting his time to do so, is void.” Yet, under the terms of this bond and the majority opinion, these materialmen are prevented from enforcing them rights because they failed to provide written notice to St. Paul within ninety days of furnishing the last of the materials.
In Sheehan v. Morris Irrigation, this court found a contractual two-year limitation period void, stating that the “proper rule is that the law should set the limitation periods, not private contracts.” 410 N.W.2d at 570 (citing Phenix Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 19 S.D. 59, 101 N.W. 1110 (1905) (contractual provision shortening the limitations period is void); Vesey v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 18 S.D. 632, 101 N.W. 1074 (1904)). The majority opinion argues that while this is a correct recitation of the law, “[i]f the materialmen do not give the appropriate notice, they [still] have one year to sue but may be met with a defense of failure to give the required notice.” This argument is simply “form over substance” and nothing more. In substance, the ninety-day notice provision operated to restrict the materialmen from enforcing their rights and limited their time for bringing suit in violation of SDCL 53-9-6 and SDCL 5-21-6.*
*379The majority opinion is permitting St. Paul to do indirectly that which is directly prohibited by statutes and cases. And they are doing this simply because St. Paul was devious or resourceful enough to label its “limitation of action” provision as a “notice” provision. Although there are solid arguments why SDCL 53-9-6 should not be extended to a surety situation as done in Sheehan, see Sheehan, 410 N.W.2d 569, 571-72 (Sabers, J., dissenting), there are no contrary reasons when, as here, there is a statute expressly providing a one-year statute of limitations. See SDCL 5-21-6 set forth in footnote.
This contractual notice provision is void under SDCL 53-9-6, SDCL 5-21-6, Shee-han, Phenix, and Vesey. Therefore, the granting of summary judgment should be reversed.

 SDCL 5-21-6 provides:
If no suit should be brought by the public corporation within six months from the completion and final settlement of such contract, the person supplying the contractor with labor or material shall, upon application therefor and furnishing affidavit to the corporation that labor or material for the prosecution of such *379work has been supplied by him and payment for the same has not been made, be furnished with a certified copy of such contract and surety, upon which he shall have a right to action and shall be authorized to bring suit in the name of the public corporation in the circuit court for the county in which such contract was to be performed and not elsewhere, for his use and benefit, against such contractor and his surety, and to prosecute the same to final judgment; provided, that where suit is instituted by any such person on the surety of the contractor, it shall not be commenced until six months after the complete performance of such contract and final settlement thereof but must be commenced within one year thereafter; provided, further, that where suit is so instituted by any such person, only one action shall be brought, and any person may file his claim in such action and be made a party thereto within one year from the completion of the work under such contract, and not later; and provided, further, that costs shall not be taxed in such suit against the public corporation. (Emphasis added).