Court Opinion

ID: 9883358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:40:46.814898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:22.844339
License: Public Domain

GIBSON, J.
(dissenting). I concur in the affirmance of the judgment against the Ohio Oil Company, but cannot agree with the majority opinion in affirming the judgment against Franklin Drilling Company.
The basis of the latter affirmance is declared to be that the positive duty imposed by Tit. 52 O. S. 1941 §296, upon the operator is also imposed upon the drilling company. Such imposition is said to arise because the drilling company was in charge of drilling the well out of which the escape of oil, etc., arose.
The reasoning upon which the conclusion is reached is thus stated:
“Clearly the owner of an oil and gas lease who contracts for and procures the drilling of a well is thereby no less bound to prevent oil, gas or salt water from escaping from the well to other premises. It is equally apparent that when a contractor has charge of the operations of a well and substances therefrom escape to other premises the statute is no less violated. Under the statute and as affects a third party such contractor has an equal duty with the owner of the well of preventing gas, oil or salt water from escaping from the premises.”
The reason the operator of the lease is not absolved from the duty imposed by said section 296 is, as recognized in the opinion, because the duty so imposed is nondelegable. 27 Am. Jur. 526, §49; Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (R. E.) vol. 1, p. 412, sec. 176; Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Haviland, 55 Okla. 43, 155 P. 217 (also cases cited in the opinion). Since such duty of the operator cannot by contract be imposed upon a drilling company, such duty of the latter to prevent the escape, regardless of any want of care or power to prevent it, must arise by force of the statute. It is held to so arise because the drilling company was in charge of the drilling of the well.
No authority is cited that lends support to the idea that the absolute duty imposed under the aforesaid section applies to the drilling company as well as to the Ohio Company. The statute does not so declare, and we see no reason for so holding. We have repeatedly held that the duty imposed thereby upon the operating company is mandatory, nondelegable, and that the fact of the escape of oil gave rise to the liability independently of the fact of actual negligence. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ford, 183 Okla. 14, 79 P. 2d 588. We have never had occasion to consider whether the section is applicable to a servant or to an independent contractor of the operating company engaged in creating the condition out of which the escape of the oil or salt water arose. However, we have tacitly recognized that the section has no such mandatory application to such servants of the operating company by affirming the judgments of trial courts wherein it was held that such servants, who were not guilty of any actual negligence, were not liable under the statute. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. et al. v. Graham et al., 174 Okla. 438, 50 P. 2d 720; Texas Co. v. Taylor, 178 Okla. 21, 61 P. 2d 574; Texas Co. v. ALred, 167 Okla. 128, 28 P. 2d 556. The oil company is liable in event of the escape without proof of negligence because the obligation of the statute is impressed upon the right to produce and is justified in law because the exercise of the right entails an invasion of the rights of others when the escape occurs.
*692The contractor is not so liable because to so hold is to credit the statute with imposing the liability as a condition upon the execution of a lawful contract in a lawful manner. The mere fact of the contractor’s control, which can relate only to the method of the execution of the contract, can have no bearing upon such liability where the method itself is not material thereto. It is that control which is an incident to the right to produce, and-not that of others, whether they be contractors or servants whose control goes merely to the method of performance of the work done in furtherance of the right of the producer, that bespeaks the responsibility. To place the responsibility on any control short of that would make possible the liability of all persons engaged in the work, for each one acting must exercise some control and a single act may be the efficient or a contributing cause. If negligent, the one ■ so acting is liable for the violation of his duty. In the absence of negligence, the privilege of working for another does not in law entail responsibility for the other’s liabilities.
A sufficient basis for the imposition of liability independently of negligence upon the operator is that he has the right to elect whether to drill or not and it is he who will enjoy the fruits of the enterprise. In other words, the liability is made a condition upon the exercise of the right and the mere fact of the escape is made an act of negligence to afford a basis for recovery. The drilling company as a contractor is exercising no right within the purview of the statute. To undertake to establish his wrong on the theory that the mandatory duty of the statute is applicable to him, under the circumstances, is to predicate the obligation upon what, in effect, would be a legislative fiat because it would impose a liability upon one without fault for the benefit of another without justifiable reason therefor. (11 Am. Jur. 1204, §375).
The imposition of such liability, without sufficient reason, is no less a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution than would be the taking of property without due process.
LUTTRELL and JOHNSON, JJ., concur in these views.