Court Opinion

ID: 9782768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:13:42.870217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:11.341872
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because I believe that the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion to suppress. The “ ‘essential purpose’ of the fourth amendment is to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officers to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions.” People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 266 (2010) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)). Here, it is undisputed that the home address that defendant provided was about four blocks away from the location of the stop. Officer Hucker presumably could have verified the address through the license check that led to defendant’s arrest. As in Young, I believe that Hucker should have asked the teenager, whom Hucker admitted could have been 16 to 19 years old, whether she was a licensed driver. If so, the reasonable course of action would have been to allow the teenager to go to the home and retrieve proof of insurance, which would have led to both the teenager driving the vehicle away and the elimination of the statutory basis for impounding the vehicle. Although the majority states that it would be unreasonable and unduly burdensome for an officer to have to wait an “indeterminate period” for this series of events (409 Ill. App. 3d at 355), the officer could have easily provided a specific amount of time to retrieve the insurance card. Even otherwise, I believe the vehicle’s impoundment under the circumstances of this case violated defendant’s fourth amendment rights. I recognize that the impoundment complied with section 6 — 303(e) of the Vehicle Code, but a seizure may comply with state law while still being unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 61 (1968). I agree with the majority that an impoundment must either be supported by probable cause or be consistent with the police role as “caretaker” of the streets. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 347. In the caretaker scenario, it follows that “[a]n officer cannot reasonably order an impoundment in situations where the location of the vehicle does not create any need for the police to protect the vehicle or to avoid a hazard to other drivers.” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2005). Further, as the majority recognizes, the fact that a car would be left unattended does not justify impoundment unless the car would be parked illegally. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 348. Here, defendant’s car was parked in a residential area four blocks from her home and was not blocking traffic or a driveway. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 349. The majority states that, because defendant did not have proof of insurance, her car was tantamount to a disabled vehicle because it could not be operated until proof of insurance was shown. 409 Ill. App. 3d at 349. However, it does not logically follow that the car could not remain legally parked without proof of insurance. In other words, the legally parked car was not in any sense jeopardizing public safety or impeding the efficient movement of traffic, so its impoundment cannot be justified as a street caretaking function. Accordingly, I would hold that the vehicle’s impoundment was unreasonable, and I would affirm the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress.