Court Opinion

ID: 9769188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:37:21.971195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:57.321661
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER
By motion for rehearing, or alternatively to transfer, the Union again vociferously argues that there is a compelling need to resolve the question of whether § 105.510, RSMo 1986, permits or precludes agency shop provisions as a lawful issue in public sector labor negotiations. This court agrees that resolution of that issue would be beneficial to public sector labor organizations and employers in the public sector. However, because the issue is important, and because meaningful guidance on the question is necessary, resolution thereof should be deferred until the issue has been squarely placed before an appellate court in a case where there is sufficient record made, and presented to the appellate court, to indicate that deciding such an important issue is essential to the resolution of the case. That is not the situation presented by this record. For example, the “joint statements of intent” for the “office unit” and “physical unit” employees were the writings upon which the Union based its cause of action in Count I and Count II;1 yet, those statements of intent were not a part of the record presented to the trial court nor to this court.2 The joint statements of intent were not attached by the Union to its petition, nor to the motion for summary judgment, n’or to the affidavits and other documents filed in support of its motion for summary judgment, nor were they attached to the instruments filed in opposition to the respondent’s motion for summary judgment. With the evidence so limited, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the respondents and against the Union.3 Significantly, the judgment in this case contained no declaration of the rights of the parties and did not include declarations in its judgment as is required if the pleadings state a cause of action for a declaratory judgment. Zaiser v. Miller, 656 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Mo.App.1983). In its brief filed with this court, the Union completely ignored the declaratory judgment count. For example, in its brief, the Union said:
Subsequent to the enactment of these provisions [“joint statements of intent”], certain bargaining unit employees ... stopped paying the service charges (hereafter referred to as agency fees) required by the respective joint statements and Local 753 brought a collection suit against them_ The Respondents defended on four grounds: that § 105.510, R.S.Mo, prohibits agency fees; that the joint statements of intent were not binding and enforceable with respect to the Respondents; that the agency fee agree*549ments violated the Respondents’ rights under the United States Constitution; and that the agency fee requirements of the joint statements of intent did not apply to certain of the Respondents.
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Although the Circuit Court is not required to issue a detailed analysis, the absence of any findings of fact and conclusions of law makes [sic] this case extremely difficult to brief. For example, while we find it hard to believe, we must assume that the Circuit Court ruled in Respondents’ favor on all four points which Respondents raised in their motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we must address them all in this brief. (Emphasis added).
There was sufficient substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment based upon the office unit’s defense that the joint statements of intent did not apply to them because they were hired before November 1982. The other issues did not have to be addressed in order to affirm the trial court’s judgment. With regard to Count II, the record is barren of any objection, by the Union, directed to the trial court about the failure of the trial court to make a declaration of the rights of the parties and include such declarations in its judgment. Certainly no issue was presented or briefed by the Union on this appeal concerning the failure of the trial court to make findings and declarations in response to the request in Count II for a declaratory judgment. To the contrary, the Union said, on appeal, that it had brought a “collection suit” against respondents and that the trial court was not “required to issue a detailed analysis.” Such pronouncements directly contradict any claim by the Union of a viable issue presented to this court concerning the declaratory judgment count. Accordingly, this court could only assume that the parties and the trial court treated the issues in the declaratory judgment count as abandoned, or that the trial court’s judgment amounted to a determination that Count II did not state a cause of action for declaratory judgment and the Union thereafter totally abandoned that issue. Casper v. Hetlage, 359 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Mo.1962).
Whatever the reason might be for the trial court’s failure to make a declaration of the parties’ rights, the Union did not present that failure as alleged error to the trial court. It is a fundamental rule that contentions not put before the trial court will not be considered by the appellate court; an appellate court will not convict a trial court of error on an issue which was not put before it to decide. Casper v. Hetlage, supra, at 783; Estate of Huskey v. Monroe, 674 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Mo.App.1984). Where a declaratory judgment action is filed, if the pleadings state a cause of action, the trial court must make a declaration of the rights of the parties and include such declarations in its judgment. Zaiser v. Miller, supra, at 315. On appeal, the Union did not brief, or otherwise present, a complaint of error in the failure of the trial court to make a declaration of the rights of the parties. Accordingly, this court concludes, and remains convinced, that the Union’s appeal on the declaratory judgment count was abandoned. Estate of Huskey v. Monroe, supra, at 208; Komanetsky v. Missouri State Medical Association, 516 S.W.2d 545, 549 (Mo.App.1974). “An appellant has a duty to furnish an adequate record by which allegations of error can be reviewed with some degree of confidence.” Daniels v. Griffin, 769 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Mo.App.1989).4
*550Appellate review presupposes a record and evidence from which the appellate court can perform the review with some degree of confidence in the reasonableness, fairness and accuracy of the final decision. Zaiser v. Miller, supra, at 318. The record and evidence in this case was not sufficient to convince this court that it should decide the important issue of the lawfulness of agency fee provisions in public sector labor relations when the issues, as presented by the record, could be resolved without reaching such issue.
The following additional contention found in the motion for rehearing or transfer should be addressed for clarification:
... [T]hat portion of the Court’s opinion dismissing Appellant’s appeal as to Joseph Hahn is erroneous for the reason that Appellants have never abandoned their claim against Mr. Hahn_ Mr. Hahn’s name plainly appears on the caption of the First Amended Petition and plainly appears throughout the pleadings in Case No. CV186-401CC1. Moreover, Count II of Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition clearly seeks relief with regard to “all present regular, non-probationary employees ... who are not union members, but who work in a bargaining unit represented by said unions ...” Defendant Hahn is clearly addressed by this pleading, and Appellants’ appeal with regard to him, and hence the physical unit, should not be abandoned for the reason that it is important for all units to be considered in the Court’s Opinion for the reasons cited above.
Clearly, whether the Union intended to do so or not, it omitted any claim against Joseph Hahn in Count I. As contained in the legal file furnished this court, Hahn’s name does not “appear[] throughout the pleadings in Case No. CV186-401CC1.”5 A copy of Count I of the first amended petition is attached as an appendix hereto.6
This court never considered Count II to apply to Hahn, and properly so. The Union clearly abandoned Count II as it related to Hahn and Cepowski.7 Count II of the Union’s petition is attached as a part of the appendix. The pleading recites:
Come now the plaintiffs, as and for Count II of their cause of action against defendants Rebecca G. James, Patsy Northcutt, Nancy Fox, Rose Gambon, Barbara Johnson, Sharon Sue Truitt and Fran Albright, and state to the court as follows: (Emphasis added.)
There then follows a paragraph incorporating the allegations of paragraphs 1-17 of Count I of the first amended petition (all of which relate to the employees of the office unit). Hahn was omitted as a party to Count II and by incorporating Count I into Count II without additional pleadings, only the “office unit” employees and the office unit “joint statement of intent” were included in Count II.
*551The motions of the Union for rehearing or in the alternative for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court are denied.
APPENDIX
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY, MISSOURI DIVISION 4
RUSSELL STRUNK and DEAN MOORE,
Individually and as Officers, Agents, and Representatives of a Class Consisting of the Membership of the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFI^CIO, LOCAL UNION NO. 753, Plaintiffs,
vs.
PAT C. CEPOWSKI and JOSEPH L. HAHN, Defendants.
and
RUSSELL STRUNK and DEAN MOORE,
Individually and as Officers, Agents, and Representatives of a Class Consisting of the Membership of the
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL UNION NO. 753, Plaintiffs,
vs.
REBECCA G. JAMES, PATSY NORTH-CUTT, NANCY FOX, ROSE GAM-BON, BARBARA JOHNSON, SHARON SUE TRUITT and FRAN AL-BRIGHT, Defendants.
Case Nos. CV186-401-CC1, CV186-750-CC2
May 11, 1987.
FIRST AMENDED PETITION
COUNT I — PETITION
Come now the plaintiffs, and for Count I of their First Amended Petition against defendants state to the court as follows:
1.Plaintiffs Russell Strunk and Dean Moore are officers and agents of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 753, and are residents of Greene County, Missouri.
2. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 753 (hereinafter “the Union”) is an unincorporated labor organization with its headquarters located at 2902 East Division, Springfield, Greene County, Missouri, and is the certified bargaining representative of all employees of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, employed in the “Office Unit” of said utility.
3. That the full membership of said class of said Union is numerous, and the names of each member, agent, and representative of said class cannot, without great delay and difficulty, be added as plaintiffs in this action, but that this action is brought by plaintiffs Strunk and Moore with the consent of the membership of said class, and for the benefit of said class, and that plaintiffs Strunk and Moore adequately represent all of the members of said class.
4. That all defendants herein are residents of Greene County, Missouri.
5. That the legal document upon which this petition is based was entered into in Greene County, Missouri.
6. That, at all times mentioned herein, Local Union No. 753, “the Union,” and the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, were signatory to a Joint Statement of Intent, which was entered into with the express intent of defining the respective rights, duties, and obligations concerning wages, hours, rules, and other conditions of employment, for certain employees of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, employed in the unit of employees hereinafter referred to as the “Office Unit,” including defendants James, Northcutt, Fox, Gam-bon, Johnson, Truitt, and Albright.
7. That the aforesaid Joint Statement of Intent was in full force and effect at all times mentioned herein, and with respect to the Union, the utility, and all defendants herein, it does define their respective rights, duties, and obligations concerning wages, hours, rules, and other conditions of employment.
*5528. That with concern to the issues of wages, hours, rules, and other conditions of employment, defendants James, Northcutt, Fox, Gambon, Johnson, Truitt, and Al-bright do benefit from the aforesaid Joint Statement of Intent and as such, are third party beneficiaries of such statement.
9. That, regardless of whether or not these defendants are current members of “the Union” they benefit equally from the representation of “the Union” for collective bargaining purposes, and, pursuant to Article VII, Section A, of the Joint Statement of Intent, they are required to pay to the Union either Union dues or a service fee equal to the regular monthly dues of Union members (not including initiation fees, fines, assessments, or any other charges uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership).
10. That defendants James, Northcutt, Fox, Gambon, Johnson, Truitt, and Al- ■ bright are members of the appropriate bargaining unit of employees (the “Office Unit”) to which “the Union” is the certified bargaining representative.
11. Pursuant to the terms of the Joint Statement of Intent, all bargaining unit employees, including these defendants, as a condition of their continued employment with the utility, are compelled to pay to “the Union” each month, either regular Union dues or a service charge equal to the regular monthly dues of Union members.
12. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant James to “the Union” is Three Hundred Eighty-one and 04/ioo Dollars ($381.04).
13. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Northcutt to “the Union” is Three Hundred Six and 40/ioo Dollars ($306.40).
14. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Fox to “the Union” is Two Hundred Fifty-one and 04Aoo Dollars ($251.04).
15. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Gambon to “the Union” is One Hundred Twenty-one and 24/ioo Dollars ($121.24).
16. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Johnson to “the Union” is Three Hundred Two and 43/ioo Dollars ($302.43).
17. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Truitt to “the Union” is Twenty and 81/ioo Dollars ($20.81) per month from March, 1987, forward until settled.
18. That the monthly service charge owed by defendant Albright is Twenty-one and 46/ioo Dollars ($21.45) per month from March, 1987, forward until settled.
19. That although “the Union” has repeatedly requested of defendants James, Northcutt, Fox, Gambon, Johnson, Truitt, and Albright that they pay the aforesaid arrearages, they have failed and refused to do so.
WHEREFORE, in this Count I of plaintiff’s petition, plaintiffs respectfully request judgment against defendant Rebecca G. James in the amount of Three Hundred Eighty-one and 04/ioo Dollars ($381.04); and against defendant Patsy Northcutt in the amount of Three Hundred Six and 40/ioo Dollars ($306.40); and against Defendant Nancy Fox in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty-one and 04/ioo Dollars ($251.04); and against defendant Rose Gambon in the amount of One Hundred Twenty-one and 24/ioo Dollars ($121.24); and against Defendant Barbara Johnson in the amount of Three Hundred Two and 43/ioo Dollars ($302.43); and against Sharon Sue Truitt in the amount of Twenty and 81/ioo Dollars ($20.81) per month from March, 1987, forward until settled; and against Fran Al-bright in the amount of Twenty-one and 45/ioo Dollars ($21.45) per month from March, 1987, forward until settled; and for such other amounts and arrearages as may come due in the future, as alleged in Count I of this First Amended Petition; for a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of this action; and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate under the circumstances.
COUNT II — DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Come now the plaintiffs, as and for Count II of their cause of action against *553defendants Rebecca G. James, Patsy Northcutt, Nancy Fox, Rose Gambon, Barbara Johnson, Sharon Sue Truitt, and Fran Albright, and state to the Court as follows:
1. That plaintiffs restate and reallege and incorporate herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 17 of Count I of their First Amended Petition as if realleged herein in haec verba.
2. That plaintiffs Moore and Strunk, as officers and agents of “the Union,” as aforesaid, have fiduciary and good faith duty to fairly represent all of the members of the Local Union No. 753, and all of the employees of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, employed in appropriate bargaining units represented by Local Union No. 753, and, as such, must insist on strict compliance of all terms, duties, and obligations contained in the Joint Statement of Intent referred to in Count I of plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition.
3. The plaintiffs further allege that, by reason of the above and foregoing, it is necessary for the protection of the class consisting of the membership of “the Union” and of the appropriate bargaining unit employees of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, that plaintiffs secure a declaratory judgment as to the existence or non-existence of the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the parties hereto, upon the facts alleged herein, and of the existence or non-existence of the facts upon which such rights, powers, privileges, and immunities now exist or will arise in the future.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs respectfully request that a declaratory judgment be issued by this Court ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that all present regular, non-probationary employees of the City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri, who are not Union members, but who work in a bargaining unit represented by said Union, shall, as a condition of their continued employment, pay to the said Union each month, a service charge equal to the regular monthly dues (not including initiation fees, fines, assessments, or other charges uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining a membership) paid to the Union by an employee in the same bargaining unit who is a Union member; for reasonable attorney fees and costs and expenses of this litigation; and for such other and further declaratory judgment, order, or relief as may be just and proper.
/s/Douglas W. Greene, III Douglas W. Greene, III
DOUGLAS W. GREENE, III
Missouri Bar No. 24373
805 Woodruff Building
PO Box 1322
Springfield, Missouri 65805
Attorney for Plaintiffs

. Count I was a collection effort relying upon the “office unit" statement of intent. Count II sought a declaration of the rights of all non-union Board of Utility employees who worked in a bargaining unit represented by the Union.

. The joint statement of intent for the office unit for the period July 16, 1987, through July 16, 1990, was attached to affidavits of certain respondents in support of their defense that the office unit statement of intent did not apply to them because they were hired before November 2, 1982; but that was the ONLY statement of intent contained in the record presented to the trial court as that record was revealed to this court by the legal file.

. The trial court’s order, in pertinent portion, read: “The Court has heard arguments on the motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs and defendants in these two cases which have been consolidated. Having duly considered all of the pleadings and affidavits, depositions and exhibits, the Court has found that the summary judgment motion filed by defendants should be sustained and the summary judgment motion filed by plaintiffs should be overruled.... NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND RULED AS FOLLOWS: 1. Pursuant to Rule 74.04(b), the motions by defendants for summary judgment dismissing the petitions herein, is hereby sustained. Pursuant to Rule 74.01(b), the Court further finds that there is no just reason for delaying the finality of said judgment and therefore said judgment shall be ... appealable-”

. This court clearly recognizes that when, as here, a declaratory judgment is sought and a trial court fails to make a declaration settling the rights (as when it dismisses a petition without a declaration), a reviewing court may make a declaration. Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, 762 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Mo.banc 1989). However, exercise of appellate court discretion to go forward with a declaration of rights in such case is normally confined to those instances where there are no disputed facts and the record clearly indicates the issue is purely a legal one. Nicolai v. City of St. Louis, supra, at 426; Magenheim v. Board of Education, 347 S.W.2d 409 (Mo.App.1961). This court does not believe the record presented in this case is such that it should exercise its discretion to declare the rights of the parties. Deciding an issue as important as what the parties here perceive this issue to be, should be left to a case where the record clearly reflects that deciding the issue was necessary. In such instance, the decision is *550not open to being distinguished or criticized and can be clearly relied upon.

. The only pleadings presented to this court were the Union's first amended petition, answer to first amended petition with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, motion of Union for summary judgment with affidavits. None of those pleadings refer to Hahn (other than in the caption). Affidavits filed in support and in opposition of the motions for summary judgment, which mentioned other defendants, never mentioned Hahn or offered facts regarding Hahn.

. Hahn and Cepowski were not named as parties to the counterclaim filed by the defendants against the Union, whereas all the employees in the "Office Unit" (those against whom relief was sought in Count I) did file counterclaims against the plaintiff.

. In the suggestions filed in support of the motion for rehearing or to transfer, the Union says:
"During the passage of time during which this litigation has been pending, several of the affected employees have decided to pay their monthly service charges as requested by the Union, and, therefore, by stipulation, the lawsuit against these employees was dismissed and the issues with regard to them became moot.” Later in that memorandum, the Union says, "Although ... Cepowski later recanted and decided to pay his monthly fees, Hahn remains a viable party to this lawsuit....” The record presented to this court simply does not support the Union's assertions. Nowhere in the docket sheets contained in the legal file is there an indication that any employee was dismissed from the lawsuit. Rather, the parties simply continued to carry the names Hahn and Cepowski on the caption of the pleadings but ceased making allegations in the body of the pleadings as against those two individuals.