Court Opinion

ID: 9956293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 19:00:33.75996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:48.378842
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          APR 1 2024

                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                         No. 23-1110
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00005-JCM-LRL-1
    v.
                                                  MEMORANDUM*
MICHAEL LAMAR RIVERS,
                  Defendant-Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Nevada
                       James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
                         Argued and Submitted March 5, 2024
                                 Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: M. SMITH, BENNETT, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.
         Defendant Michael Rivers appeals the district court’s denial of his motion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) for early termination of supervised release. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing the district court’s decision for

abuse of discretion, United States v. Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2022),

we affirm.

         Under § 3583(e)(1), a district court “may, after considering the factors set

forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and

(a)(7),” “terminate a term of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”

Rivers contends that, in denying his motion, the district court applied the wrong

legal standard because it quoted language from a case that stated, inter alia, that a

defendant must “show something ‘of an unusual or extraordinary nature’” to justify

early termination. Rivers is correct that, under our caselaw, a motion for early

termination under § 3583(e)(1) does not require a showing of extraordinary

circumstances. Ponce, 22 F.4th at 1047. Despite this stray erroneous statement in

the district court’s order, we conclude that reversal is not warranted because it is

clear that the district court “ultimately applied the correct legal standard” in

denying Rivers’ motion. United States v. Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d

1093, 1103 n.9 (9th Cir. 2000).

      The order denying Rivers’ motion explained that, in the court’s view, Rivers

had “provided nothing more than compliance” with the conditions of his

supervised release to support his motion, and the court held that such compliance

“standing alone” was insufficient to justify early termination. That reasoning was

proper under the plain language of § 3583(e)(1), which states that early termination

may be granted only if it is “warranted by the conduct of the defendant released

and the interest of justice” (emphasis added). If compliance with the conditions of

supervised release—i.e., the “conduct of the defendant released”—were enough for

a district court to grant early termination, the requirement that early termination

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also be warranted by the “interest of justice” would be superfluous. See Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (describing the well-settled canon that a statute

should ordinarily be construed so as to avoid rendering any part of it superfluous).

      Moreover, the district court’s order makes clear that the court weighed the

appropriate considerations and acted within its discretion in concluding that the

overall circumstances did not “warrant” termination. The court “applaud[ed]”

Rivers’ post-release “progress,” thus addressing Rivers’ central argument for early

termination. But the court concluded that this consideration, which it permissibly

viewed as the sole factor weighing in favor of early termination, was outweighed

by several countervailing factors, including Rivers’ status as a “career offender”

and the fact that, in the underlying offense, he had recruited a 12-year-old child to

commit an armed bank robbery. These are appropriate factors under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(1), which directs the court to consider, inter alia, “the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”

id. § 3553(a)(1), and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate

deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to protect the public from further crimes of

the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C). The district court adequately explained its

decision here, and it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that early

termination was not warranted in the interest of justice.

      AFFIRMED.

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