Court Opinion

ID: 9763945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:03:34.553003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:51.680741
License: Public Domain

D. Franklin Arey, III, Judge. The Workers’ Compensation Commission determined that appellant Frankie Sapp failed to prove entitlement to additional permanent partial disability benefits over and above a 5% physical impairment rating to his lumbar spine. On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.  When reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the fight most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Oak Grove Lumber Co. v. Highfill, 62 Ark. App. 42, 968 S.W.2d 637 (1998). In cases where a claim is denied because a claimant failed to show entitlement to compensation by a preponderance of the evidence, the substantial evidence standard of review requires that we affirm if a substantial basis for the denial of relief is displayed by the Commission’s opinion. Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Service Chevrolet v. Atwood, 61 Ark. App. 190, 966 S.W.2d 909 (1998). The question is not whether the evidence would have supported findings contrary to those made by the Commission; there may be substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. University of Ark. Med. Sciences v. Hart, 60 Ark. App. 13, 958 S.W.2d 546 (1997).  We recognize that it is the function of the Commission to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Service Chevrolet, supra. It is the responsibility of the Commission to draw inferences when the testimony is open to more than a single interpretation, whether controverted or uncontroverted; and when it does so, its findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. Oak Grove Lumber Co., supra. Appellant sustained a compensable injury on November 17, 1993, when he was struck by a tree during the course of his employment as a logger. Appellant was initially treated by Dr. D’Orsay Bryant, an orthopedist, who diagnosed a cervical and lumbosacral strain with possible disc disease. Dr. Bryant referred appellant to Dr. Richard Pillsbury, an otolaryngologist, for appellant’s complaint of loss of hearing in his right ear. Dr. Pillsbury did not detect any permanent hearing problems, but referred appellant to Dr. Shailesh Vora, a neurologist. Dr. Vora treated appellant for complaints of headaches, anxiety, depression, and memory loss. Appellant gave Dr. Vora a history of being rendered unconscious by his compensable injury. Although appellant’s tests were normal, Dr. Vora assigned him a 25% impairment rating for epilepsy, and a 5% physical impairment rating for the lumbar disc. Appellant did attempt to go back to work. He drove a log skidder for another logger, but was eventually laid off. Appellant then drew unemployment compensation. He testified that he did not know of any other job that he could do, because he had only worked in the logging woods, and that he had not really tried to find another job. On January 15, 1996, an independent medical evaluation was performed by Dr. Reginald Rutherford, a neurologist. Dr. Rutherford reported that appellant’s neurological investigations proved normal, with the history provided by appellant and a review of the medical documentation failing to substantiate the allegation of cerebral concussion. Dr. Rutherford did not believe that appellant would benefit from further attempted medical or psychological intervention. He opined that there was no objective evidence to substantiate the diagnosis of epilepsy. Appellant received temporary total disability benefits, medical benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits for a 5% impairment rating to his spine. He sought an additional 25% impairment rating for posttraumatic epileptic seizures, and additional permanent partial disability benefits for loss of earning capacity. In its opinion denying additional benefits, the Commission noted that the objective medical evidence of record did not substantiate a finding that appellant sustained some type of epileptic or seizure disorder as a result of his compensable injury. It observed that there were no objective medical findings to substantiate Dr. Vora’s rating, and that Dr. Rutherford testified in his deposition that there were no objective findings for the alleged epilepsy diagnosis. Therefore, the Commission believed the only physical impairment rating was a 5% rating to appellant’s lumbar spine, which had been accepted as compensable and paid in full.  It is well settled that the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinion and the authority to determine its medical soundness and probative force. Oak Grove Lumber Co., supra. This medical evidence constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Commission’s decision denying appellant an additional 25% impairment rating for posttraumatic epileptic seizures. Regarding additional wage loss disability, the Commission found that appellant was not a credible witness and that he failed to present credible testimony that he was entitled to any additional benefits beyond the 5% impairment rating previously paid. The Commission noted that, although appellant testified that he was unable to work, the record indicated that he worked for at least six months after being released by Dr. Vora once his workers’ compensation benefits ceased. He then drove a log skidder until he was laid off by his employer. Appellant testified that he was capable of working as a skidder driver and implied that he would have continued to do so had he not been laid off. The Commission also noted that appellant drew unemployment benefits after being laid off, which implied that appellant held himself out as being physically capable of working. The Commission concluded, due to appellant’s ability to return to work for a six month period, his negative attitude in seeking or searching for further employment after being laid off, and his relatively minor physical impairment rating for his injury, that appellant failed to prove that he suffered from a decrease in his ability to earn wages.  Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-522(b)(1) (Supp. 1997) provides: In considering claims for permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the employee’s percentage of permanent physical impairment, the commission may take into account, in addition to the percentage of permanent physical impairment, such factors as the employee’s age, education, work experience, and other matters reasonably expected to affect his future earning capacity. The wage-loss factor is the extent to which a compensable injury has affected the claimant’s ability to earn a livelihood. Bradley v. Alumax, 50 Ark. App. 13, 899 S.W.2d 850 (1995). In making this determination, the Commission may consider factors such as a claimant’s lack of motivation to return to work or failure to attempt to seek work. See id.  In this instance, the Commission’s determination turned on its view of the appellant’s credibility and the weight to be given the evidence. The Commission specifically noted that appellant failed to present any credible testimony that he was entitled to any additional benefits over and above the 5% physical impairment rating previously paid. We believe the Commission’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Affirmed. Pittman, Bird, and Griffen, JJ., agree. Neal and Roaf, JJ., dissent.