Court Opinion

ID: 9693673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:56:32.576844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.655065
License: Public Domain

OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Justice NEWMAN.
Freeman May (May) appeals from an Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County (PCRA court) denying his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA). For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of
*190the PCRA court. Because we conclude that the trial court erred during the 1995 re-sentencing hearing, we vacate the Judgment of Sentence and remand the matter for a new penalty phase.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts and procedural history herein recapitulated are taken in large part from our Opinions in this case on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237, 656 A.2d 1335 (1995) (May I), and Commonwealth v. May, 551 Pa. 286, 710 A.2d 44 (1998) (May II), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1078, 119 S.Ct. 818, 142 L.Ed.2d 676 (1999). In 1988, in a remote wooded location in Lebanon County, a man discovered human skeletal remains buried under logs, brush, and leaves. Dr. Neil A. Hoffman (Dr. Hoffman), a forensic pathologist, determined that the remains were those of Kathy Lynn Fair (Fair), whose sister had reported her missing on September 4, 1982, when Fair did not show up for an outing. Dr. Hoffman concluded that the cause of death was multiple stab wounds inflicted by a short, single-edged weapon, most likely a knife.
The police arrested May in 1990, and the Commonwealth charged him with the murder of Fair. At trial, Detective Michael F. Wahmann (Detective Wahmann) testified that, at the time the remains of Fair were discovered, he remembered an incident that occurred in December of 1982. In that series of events, two girls, G.S. and S.S., who had accepted rides from May, were stabbed with a short, folding single-edged knife and left for dead not far from the place where Fair’s remains were ultimately discovered; both G.S. and S.S. survived the attack. In addition, one of the young women had been raped. The Commonwealth had charged May with two counts each of attempted murder,2 aggravated assault,3 and reckless endangerment of another person,4 and one count of *191rape.5 A jury convicted May of all crimes charged in connection with the December 1982 assaults.
Stanley May (Stanley), May’s brother, testified that May came to his house on December 17, 1982, and confessed to him that he had stabbed a girl and buried her in the brush several months prior, and had done it again the night before. Stanley also stated that May always carried a folding buck knife, which is a short, sturdy, single-edged knife. Denise DeHaven (DeHaven), May’s wife, stated at trial that when she visited him in jail in connection with the 1982 rape and assaults, May told her that he had hurt another girl and buried her under leaves and bushes in the woods. Subsequently, May wrote letters to DeHaven reiterating the same story. Thomas W. Fryberger (Fryberger), an acquaintance of May, testified that May had taken him and two girls up to a wooded location; Fryberger later took a state police trooper to that location, which is where Fair’s remains were eventually found. Charles W. Neidig (Neidig), an inmate at the prison where May was incarcerated, testified that he had a conversation with May in the prison yard when May returned from a hearing held in connection with the rape and assault convictions. May indicated to Neidig that the hearing did not go very well because the police were going to be able to “put a body on him” and that he “did it.”
Following trial, a jury convicted May of first-degree murder6 in connection with the stabbing death of Fair. After a separate penalty hearing, the jury found the existence of one aggravating circumstance, that the killing was committed while May was perpetrating a felony,7 namely rape, and one mitigating circumstance, that he had no significant history of prior criminal convictions.8 The jury determined that the aggravating circumstance it found unanimously outweighed the mitigating circumstance and, consequently, the trial court *192sentenced May to death. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, but reversed the sentence, concluding that the jury could not properly consider whether May committed murder while in the perpetration of a rape because the court never instructed the jury on the elements of rape. May I, 656 A.2d at 1344-45. Accordingly, we remanded the matter for a new penalty phase. Mr. Justice Castille filed a dissenting opinion, in which he opined that, despite the jury’s statement that the predicate felony was rape, the predicate felony was in fact attempted rape, a crime on which the court did charge the jury.
The trial court conducted the second penalty hearing on December 4, 1995, at which time the new jury found one aggravating circumstance, a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person,9 and no mitigating circumstances. The trial court imposed a sentence of death pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), which requires a death sentence if the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. On September 19, 1996, the trial court denied post-trial motions, prompting a direct appeal to this Court. We affirmed the Judgment of Sentence, concluding, inter alia, that May was not entitled to an instruction that life means life without the possibility of parole because May’s future dangerousness was not at issue. See May II, 710 A.2d at 46-47 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994)). Then-Chief Justice Zappala and Mr. Justice Nigro filed concurring opinions, both reiterating their views that the jury should be provided with a “life means life” instruction in every death penalty case. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 710 A.2d 31, 43-44 (1998) (Zappala, C.J.E., concurring; Nigro, J., concurring).
On February 18, 1999, Petitioner initiated PCRA proceedings by filing a pro se form Petition and motions for stay of execution and appointment of counsel. Pro bono counsel subsequently filed an amended PCRA Petition, raising more than a dozen substantive issues. By Order dated April 12, *1932001, the PCRA court denied relief on all of May’s issues, except for his contention that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence of May’s allegedly traumatic childhood, on which the court granted an evidentiary hearing. Initial Brief of Appellant, Appendix 2 at 1-3. Following the evidentiary hearing, by Order dated March 26, 2003, the PCRA court denied relief on the sole remaining issue and dismissed the PCRA Petition. May has appealed the denial of PCRA relief to this Court.

DISCUSSION

May raises numerous contentions, some stemming from his 1991 trial and direct appeal therefrom, and others arising from the 1995 re-sentencing. For clarity of discussion, we have renumbered, reordered, and regrouped the arguments, dealing first with the 1991 guilt phase and then with the 1995 penalty phase. Because we ultimately grant May relief in the form of a new penalty phase, many of his allegations of error from that proceeding are rendered moot and, therefore, unreviewable.
Issue 1 — Testimony of Detective Hogan and Barbara Turner
May first contends that his appellate counsel10 were ineffective for failing to appeal the decision of the trial court to disallow his attempt to present the Investigative Report of Lancaster County Police Detective Charles Hogan (Detective Hogan). To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, one must show that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her *194action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999) (using the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001).
Following Fair’s disappearance in 1982, the Lancaster County Police assigned Detective Hogan to investigate the missing persons report. For more than two years, Detective Hogan compiled a report containing several statements from persons who claimed that they had seen Fair after December 19,1982, the date on which May was arrested and incarcerated for the rape and attempted murder of G.S. and S.S. See, e.g., Initial Brief of Appellant, Appendix 4 at 14 (report of interview with David James Cunningham (Cunningham), who stated that he had known Fair for eight or nine years and had observed her driving by him in September or October of 1983); id. at 17 (report of interview with Samuel Witherspoon (Witherspoon), who stated that he knew Fair and that she attended a party at his house in November of 1983).
During the 1991 guilt phase, trial counsel sought to introduce the Investigative Report in an attempt to demonstrate that Fair was still alive after May had been sent to jail, rendering it impossible for May to have killed her. The trial court permitted Detective Hogan to testify about the preparation of the report, but refused to allow testimony regarding the contents of the report, concluding that the individual statements contained therein were inadmissible hearsay. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), March 8, 1991, at 892-93. May assigns error to this decision, asserting that the Investigative Report is a business record and, therefore, should have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Pennsyl*195vania Rule of Evidence 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless a specific exception applies. Pa.R.E. 802. May points to the “business record” exception, which provides as follows:
(b) General Rule. — A record of an act, condition or event shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the tribunal, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
(c) Definition. — As used in this section “business” includes every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions whether carried on for profit or not.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6108.11 May is correct in asserting that the Investigative Report is a business record and, as such, is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.12 May fails to realize, however, that the admission of the Investigative Report does not automatically render the statements included therein admissible. Whether or not the Investigative Report is admissible, the statements themselves are also hearsay. Thus, the individual statements taken by Detective Hogan are “double hearsay,” which are “permissible [only] if there is a [separate] hearsay exception for each statement in the chain.” *196Commonwealth v. Ogrod, 576 Pa. 412, 839 A.2d 294, 327 n. 23 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 558 Pa. 478, 738 A.2d 406, 417 (1999)). May does not articulate any exception into which the statements could fall, and our review likewise reveals none. During the 1991 trial, May could have attempted to call the individuals who claimed that they saw Fair alive after December of 1982, but he did not, and he does not now contend that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to call those witnesses to testify. The presentation of direct testimony from Cunningham and Witherspoon, among others, would have alleviated the hearsay problem and would have provided the Commonwealth a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Because May has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in ruling the statements contained -within the Investigative Report inadmissible, appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to appeal this ruling. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001).
In the same vein, May claims that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to appeal the decision of the trial court to deny his attempt to present the testimony of Barbara Turner (Turner), Fair’s mother-in-law, who, allegedly, would have testified that Fair left her one-year old son, Ricky Hamm (Ricky), with Turner for periods of time without telling Turner where she was going or when she would return. Trial counsel wished to call Turner to show that Fair’s lifestyle was such that “she would party on weekends and she would like to go out and have a good time” without caring for or accepting responsibility for her child. N.T., March 8, 1991, at 903-06. The Commonwealth objected, asserting that the only purpose for this testimony would be to smear Fair’s name. The trial court agreed and refused to allow Turner to testify in this regard, concluding that the evidence was irrelevant as “it’s just as illegal to kill the devil as it is to kill a saint” and “[i]t’s not legal to kill irresponsible people.” Id. at 904, 906.
In the present PCRA filings, the Defender Association attempts to recast the proffered testimony of Turner as *197relevant to rebut testimony presented by the Commonwealth that Fair had a close relationship with her son and would not leave him for long periods of time. However, a full and fair review of the record makes it clear that trial counsel sought to introduce the testimony of Turner only to disparage Fair. As aptly articulated by the trial court, the allegedly irresponsible character of the victim is not relevant to exculpate May. Accordingly, appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to appeal the decision of the trial court to estop the questioning of Turner as it related to Fair’s character. See Tilley, supra (holding that counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim).
Issue 2 — Victim Impact Testimony
May next contends that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to alleged victim impact statements that the prosecutor made and elicited during the guilt phase of his 1991 trial.13 Specifically, May alleges four instances of improper victim impact argument and testimony during the trial.
First, May asserts that the prosecutor presented impermissible victim impact argument when he stated:
[the charge of homicide] require[s] that you hear some evidence about a young lady from Lancaster who when she was twenty-two years of age had her life suddenly taken from her, and you are going to hear some testimony about her young son who hasn’t been with his mother since that date, and that kind of testimony is never easy to hear.
N.T., March 6, 1991, at 491.
Generally, a prosecutor’s arguments to the jury are not a basis for the granting of a new trial unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility towards the accused which would prevent them from properly weighing the evidence and rendering a true verdict.
*198Commonwealth v. Jones, 546 Pa. 161, 683 A.2d 1181, 1199 (1996). A prosecutor must have “reasonable latitude in fairly presenting a case to the jury and must be free to present his or her arguments with logical force and vigor.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 551 Pa. 465, 711 A.2d 444, 454 (1998). “The prosecutor is also permitted to respond to defense arguments. Finally, in order to evaluate whether the comments were improper, we do not look at the comments in a vacuum; rather we must look at them in the context in which they were made.” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 565 Pa. 504, 776 A.2d 958, 968 (2001).
We determined in Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155, 159 (1978), that evidence introduced to result in sympathy for the victim’s family, while having no direct relationship to the facts and circumstances of the crime, is impermissible during the guilt phase of trial. In this case, the age of Ricky has no correlation to the determination of whether May committed the murder. Thus, the prosecutor’s statements, whether intentionally designed to elicit sympathy or not, were improper. Nevertheless, the comment was a fleeting reference and clearly did not substantially affect the outcome of the trial, as required to demonstrate the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. “Absent a demonstration of prejudice, [a PCRA petitioner] cannot prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and no further inquiry into the claim is warranted.” Commonwealth v. Pierce, 567 Pa. 186, 786 A.2d 203, 221 (2001) (citing Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000)).
May further avers that the prosecutor acted improperly when he stated, “[n]o one ever saw her again, including her small son, and you are going to hear evidence that she was not the type of mother who would just ignore her son and go off places for long periods of time.” N.T., March 6, 1991, at 499. The above quote fails to provide the context of the prosecutor’s remarks. When read in its totality, the argument of the prosecutor was simply that it was reasonable for the police to .assume that Fair was kidnapped and/or killed, rather than *199voluntarily missing, because she did not usually leave her son for extended periods of time. Therefore, the statement was both relevant and probative, and this claim has no arguable merit.
May also argues that the prosecutor elicited inappropriate victim impact statements from Lisa Stern (Stern), Fair’s sister, when he: (1) asked her the ages of Fair and Ricky; and (2) asked if, to her knowledge, Ricky had seen his mother since her September 4, 1982 disappearance. Id. at 660, 666. The initial comment of Stern was a simple statement indicating Ricky’s age, not how the death of Fair affected him. Stern made the second statement not to result in empathy, but to illustrate the disappearance of Fair. While the comment may have been inapt, it was fleeting when viewed in the context of a trial that consisted of more than one-thousand pages of testimony. Even if the statement satisfies the definition of victim impact evidence, the remark was not so severe as to prejudice the jury to the point that it could not render a true and fair verdict.
May proposes that the testimony of Stern, indicating that Fair was a wonderful sister, and that she had a very close relationship with Fair, was designed solely to inflame the jury. See id. at 660. Stern’s testimony provided her opinion of Fair’s personal qualities. May fails to cite any law indicating that it is impermissible to comment on the qualities of the victim. Moreover, while we do not condone the remarks of the prosecutor, we cannot say that the brief reference to Fair’s loving relationship with her sister was so pervasive as to unfairly prejudice the jury to the point that they could not fairly weigh the evidence presented.
Finally, May suggests that these occurrences of ineffective assistance of counsel were compounded by his inability to rebut the accuracy of Turner’s testimony describing Fair’s propensity for leaving her child with a babysitter for long periods of time. However, as discussed above, the proposed testimony of Turner would not have shown that Fair left Ricky for extended periods of time such that it was unreason*200able for the police to believe that, when she became missing, she would not have voluntarily disappeared. Therefore, May’s claim concerning Turner is devoid of arguable merit, and he fails to demonstrate entitlement to relief on any of his victim impact issues.
Issue 3 — Alleged Bolstering of Commonwealth Witnesses
May alleges that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of Detective Wahmann insofar as Detective Wahmann commented on the qualifications of Dr. Hoffman, the Commonwealth’s expert forensic pathologist. May also avers that trial counsel impermissibly failed to object to the prosecutor’s questioning of Dr. Hoffman about a report prepared by Dr. Isadore Mihalakis (Dr. Mihalakis), a forensic pathologist hired by the defense, despite the fact that the defense never called Dr. Mihalakis at trial.
At trial, the following exchange between the prosecutor and Detective Wahmann took place:
Q: Why did you take [the body] to the West Reading Hospital and Medical Center?
A: To have an autopsy conducted and an examination conducted by a forensic pathologist.
Q: And who was that?
A: Dr. Neil Hoffman.
Q: Why Dr. Hoffman?
A: I am familiar with Dr. Hoffman. I have worked with Dr. Hoffman in the past and am aware of his credentials and know that he is eminently qualified and one of the foremost forensic pathologists in the Commonwealth.
N.T., March 6, 1991, at 581. May contends that the questioning of Detective Wahmann constituted impermissible bolstering of a Commonwealth witness because Detective Wahmann’s testimony encroached on the jury’s province to determine the credibility of Dr. Hoffman.
“It is well settled that as long as a prosecutor does not assert his personal opinions, he or she may, within reasonable limits, comment on the credibility of a Commonwealth *201witness. This is especially true when the credibility of the witness has been previously attacked by the defense.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 572 Pa. 623, 819 A.2d 504, 516 (2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 541 Pa. 211, 662 A.2d 621, 639 (1995)). Expert testimony cannot be used by the Commonwealth to encroach on the jury’s right to determine the credibility of witnesses. Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 519 Pa. 291, 547 A.2d 355, 357 (1988). In the matter at hand, the prosecutor did not assert his personal opinion regarding Dr. Hoffman’s credibility, nor did Detective Wahmann vouch for the credibility of the physician. The detective merely indicated that he brought the body to Dr. Hoffman because Dr. Hoffman was a well-qualified forensic pathologist. Therefore, May has failed to demonstrate arguable merit to support his ineffectiveness claim.
As to the testimony of Dr. Hoffman, referencing the report of Dr. Mihalakis, which had been prepared for the defense and provided to the prosecution during discovery, May fails to articulate how the prosecutor’s questioning of Dr. Hoffman regarding the similarities in the two reports constitutes improper bolstering of Dr. Hoffman. The Commonwealth was free to question its expert about the report, and the defense was free to cross-examine Dr. Hoffman about it and any areas in which Dr. Mihalakis’ conclusions differed from his own. Accordingly, May cannot establish that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this regard.
Issue I — Impeachment of Jailhouse Informant
May asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue on appeal that the trial court erroneously restricted defense counsels’ cross examination of jailhouse informant Neidig. As indicated above, while both were incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) Huntingdon, May indicated to Neidig that the police were going to be able to “put a body on him” and that he “did it.” N.T., March 7, 1991, at 850-51. Counsel for May sought to impeach Neidig’s credibility by introducing a 1971 armed robbery conviction. The trial court *202forbid such impeachment, determining that robbery was not crimen falsi. Id. at 693-96.
The applicable rule of evidence provides as follows:
(a) General Rule. — For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime ... shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.
(b) Time limit. — Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date[.]14
Pa.R.E. 609. The trial court erred in concluding that robbery is not a crimen falsi offense. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 519 Pa. 571, 549 A.2d 513, 521 (1988). However, no evidence of this crime could be used in the cross-examination of Neidig because Neidig had been released from prison for the armed robbery more than ten years prior to the trial of May.15 Accordingly, this argument is without merit. Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001).
Having concluded that none of May’s guilt-phase issues necessitates a grant of relief, we turn to his penalty phase claims. We first address those claims that, if proven, would have entitled May to an automatic sentence of life imprison*203ment. Because neither of these claims have merit, we then turn to the claim on which we ultimately grant relief in the form of a new penalty phase.
Issue 5 — Double Jeopardy
May next argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to argue that the jury’s determination, in his first sentencing proceeding, that he had no significant history of criminal convictions, estopped the Commonwealth from proving that aggravating circumstance during the second sentencing hearing. Specifically, May asserts that because the 1991 sentencing jury rejected the significant history aggravating circumstance, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9), and specifically found that he had no significant history of prior criminal convictions, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(1), the 1995 re-sentencing jury should have been estopped from finding the significant history aggravator and rejecting the no significant history mitigator.
In Poland, v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that a capital sentencer’s refusal to find a particular aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution always constitutes an “acquittal” of that aggravating circumstance for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 155, 106 S.Ct. 1749. The Court explained that it was not prepared to view the capital sentencing hearing as a set of mini-trials. Id. at 156, 106 S.Ct. 1749. Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are “standards to guide the making of [the] choice” between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981). This Court has followed the reasoning of Poland, noting that:
it is not the finding of the presence or absence of an aggravating circumstance that is dispositive of whether the defendant will receive the death penalty, but rather it is the ultimate conclusion reached after the factfinder weighs all the factors found, both aggravating and mitigating... . When a jury has imposed a death penalty in a first trial, double jeopardy does not attach no matter what aggravating *204circumstances were found by the jury in the first trial or what aggravating circumstances are presented to the jury in the second trial.
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 533 Pa. 539, 626 A.2d 133, 136-37 (1993).
May avers that his case is distinguishable from Gibbs because the 1991 sentencing jury specifically found that he had no prior history of criminal convictions. Brief for Appellant at 64 n. 54. Yet, his position ignores the reasoning of Gibbs and Poland that double jeopardy does not attach in such situations, regardless of what mitigator and/or aggravators were or were not found in the first and second sentencing proceedings.
Although not raised by either May or the Commonwealth, it is worth noting that the United States Supreme Court stated, albeit in dicta, that “if [a] petitioner’s first sentencing jury had unanimously concluded that Pennsylvania failed to prove any aggravating circumstances, that conclusion would operate as an ‘acquittal’ of the greater offense ... bar[ring] Pennsylvania from ... [re-]seeking the death penalty.” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003). While this language may initially appear to provide some support for May’s claim of entitlement to relief, Sattazahn is inapposite to the instant matter. Sattazahn speaks to the situation where the original jury did not find any aggravating circumstances, and, thus, the sentence of life imprisonment was statutorily mandated. In May’s 1991 sentencing hearing, while the jury did not unanimously find the (d)(9) aggravating circumstance, nevertheless, it did find the (d)(6) aggravating circumstance, that May committed the murder while in the perpetration of another felony.16
*205Moreover, sentencing juries in this Commonwealth do not reject aggravating circumstances unanimously; rather, unless the jury finds an aggravator unanimously, it is discarded. Thus, no sentencing proceeding in Pennsylvania can ensure a unanimous decision against any specific aggravator, let alone all aggravators presented by the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the Commonwealth could pursue the “significant history of felony convictions using the threat of violence” aggravating circumstance. Because the trial court correctly decided this issue, appellate counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise it on appeal.
Issue 6 — Constitutionality of (d)(9)

Aggravating Circumstance

May next claims that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9)17 is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied, because the term “significant history,” as used in this aggravating circumstance, is not defined under Pennsylvania law. Because counsel for his trial, sentencing hearings, and direct appeals never raised the claim, May alleges ineffective assistance. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have addressed the substance of the claim, finding it meritless. The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed a vagueness claim against a portion of the death penalty statute of the State of California, which states, “in determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into consideration ... the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involves the use or *206attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.” Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 969, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994); Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 190.3(b). In upholding the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
[This aggravating circumstance] is phrased in conventional and understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact.... Both a backward-looking and forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process ... and the States have considerable latitude in determining how to guide the senteneer’s decision in this respect. Here, [the challenged aggravator] is not vague.
Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976-77, 114 S.Ct. 2630.18
It is noteworthy that the statutory language upheld in Tuilaepa is less restrictive than the language in the Pennsylvania statute. Specifically, the California statute stated that the “presence” of “criminal activity” could constitute an aggravating circumstance. The Pennsylvania statute requires more than a mere presence of such activity; rather, it requires a “significant history.” Similarly, the California statute allows any “criminal activity” to trigger the aggravating factor; the Pennsylvania law demands “felony convictions.” It is clear to this Court that where the less demanding standard of the California statute is constitutional, the same must be true of the statute in the case subjudice. Because May has failed to demonstrate how the Pennsylvania statute is unconstitutionally vague, we find his contention wholly without merit.
In asserting that the (d)(9) aggravator is unconstitutionally vague as applied, May does nothing more than present that bald statement. His argument only attacks the statute as a whole, without indicating how it might be unconstitutionally applied to him while constitutionally applied to others. Be*207cause May’s argument that this portion of the sentencing statute is unconstitutional is wholly unsupported, he fails to demonstrate arguable merit, and, therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001).
Issue 7 — Evidence of Early Childhood Abuse
May posits that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the decision of the trial court during the 1995 re-sentencing proceeding that the mitigation evidence May wished to present regarding the abuse perpetrated on him by his father was irrelevant and inadmissible. Specifically, May wanted to present evidence that his father physically and sexually abused him, and forced him to watch as his father physically and sexually abused his sisters and mother. In fact, the Commonwealth conceded before the PCRA court that May had been “physically struck or threatened with physical harm” by his father and that his father “was a cruel and abusive man who controlled his family by keeping them isolated and by keeping them at his mercy financially.” Commonwealth’s Response to Appellant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-2 (Original Record No. 273). May wished to present this evidence regarding his father pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) (subsection (e)(8)), which includes as a mitigating circumstance “any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.” This mitigating circumstance is often called the “catchall” mitigator.
The Commonwealth asserted that the use of a conjunctive by the legislature in subsection (e)(8)19 limited the admissible mitigation evidence to that which addressed both character and record. The Commonwealth believed that this interpretation rendered May’s proffered evidence irrelevant and objected to its admission. The trial court doubted whether the proposed evidence lit into one of the mitigating factors set *208forth in the statute, and sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to admission of any such evidence. N.T., Dec. 1, 1995, at 30-31. We disagree with the ruling of the trial court. Not only is such evidence relevant, its presence is a necessary component of a fair and complete sentencing proceeding. We hold that the failure of trial counsel to object to such an egregious mistake by the trial court constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel from which May suffered prejudice.
As discussed, supra, at 193-94, 898 A.2d at 564, in order to prove counsel ineffectiveness, a defendant must establish that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his choice; and (3) but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). In order to analyze properly May’s ineffectiveness claim, however, we must first review the history of mental and physical abuse as a mitigating factor.
The United States Supreme Court has long held that ensuring justice involves the presentation of evidence detailing the childhood of a defendant as a mitigating factor in the process of determining whether to impose the death penalty. Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) (“justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts ... [it also necessitates] tak[ing] into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the defendant”). In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the United States Supreme Court explained that the entity charged with sentencing the defendant should not be precluded from considering, in mitigation, evidence of a defendant’s childhood, upbringing, and emotional disturbances. See id. at 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869. “Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation.” Id. at 115, 102 S.Ct. 869; accord McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 187-188, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). While the Court recognized that in certain circumstances, “such evidence properly may be given *209little weight,” specifically dependent upon the age of the defendant at the time of the offense,20 nevertheless “evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance” is relevant. Id. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death”).
Further, a unanimous court stuck down a death sentence where the jury was precluded from considering mitigation evidence that did not fall within the elements of mitigation specifically set forth in the state statute at issue. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). In Hitchcock, the defense presented evidence of the defendant’s inhalation of gas fumes, the poverty of his family, and unfortunate circumstances of his upbringing. Id. at 397, 107 S.Ct. 1821. The trial court, however, limited the evidence available to the jury for consideration to the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances, which did not include this type of evidence. The United States Supreme Court ruled that this functional exclusion of evidence did not comport with the requirement of Eddings.
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-37, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), adds further support to this line of cases. In Wiggins, the United States Supreme Court held that inadequate investigation of the history of the defendant for the purposes of developing mitigation evidence for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial prejudiced the defendant; had counsel done his research, he would have uncovered that the defendant experienced “severe privation and abuse” in the early years of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother, and had suffered physical torment, sexual *210molestation, and repeated rape during years of foster care. C.f. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
This Court has also long recognized that it is of paramount importance that juries have knowledge of a defendant’s childhood when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959). Not only have we focused on the availability of such mitigation evidence to the jury, we have also held that the breadth of such evidence is almost unlimited. Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833, 856 (1985) (ruling that “our statute steers a course between the rock of draconian imposition and the whirlpool of discrimination by requiring death for narrowly defined aggravating circumstances, but allowing an almost unlimited presentation and consideration of mitigation circumstances ... ”).
These series of federal and state cases make abundantly clear that mitigation evidence is not merely admissible, but rather is vital to a fair sentencing procedure. Further, state and federal case law demonstrate that the scope of such evidence is not limited to those examples detailed within the relevant statute. In the case before us, May had a right as a matter of both state and federal law to present the evidence of his abusive and traumatic childhood as mitigation at his sentencing hearing.21 Therefore, his underlying claim has arguable merit.
We now look at the second prong, in which we decide if counsel’s decision to forego bringing this claim was reasonable. May contends that trial counsel’s strategy not to raise “too many issues” was unreasonable. May notes that trial counsel stated at the PCRA hearing that he would raise as many as five issues that had merit, but that in the end he deemed only two issues worthy of appeal. N.T. April 9, 2002, *211at 25. Thus, as a matter of strategy, trial counsel did not choose to forego some claims that he believed had merit. Instead, May avers, trial counsel’s failure to raise this issue is evidence that his representation of May was incompetent.
According to a plurality of this Court, “appellate counsel is not constitutionally obliged to raise every conceivable claim for relief. Counsel may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor of claims which, in the exercise of counsel’s objectively reasonable professional judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 815 A.2d 598, 613 (2002) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court per Castille, J., joined by Eakin, J.). Others have expressed a belief that counsel can never be effective in failing to raise a meritorious claim:
When appellate counsel fails to advance an issue that would, if raised, have entitled his or her client to a new trial, or a new sentencing hearing in a capital case, I simply cannot see how this strategy would ever be reasonable. Although I realize that trial lawyers, in arguing a case to a jury, often forego meritorious objections for a variety of strategic reasons (for example, not wishing to confuse the jury on a technical issue, the possibility of defense theories appearing to conflict, credibility with the jury, etc.), appellate litigation presents entirely different considerations.
* * *
In brief, if the underlying claim of error is of such an important magnitude that it would have entitled a defendant to relief had it been raised on appeal, there can be no justification for the failure of appellate counsel to pursue the claim that would ever qualify as a reasonable professional judgment.
Id. at 619 (Newman, J., concurring). However, because the majority of our Court has not accepted either position, we continue to analyze this claim for the reasonableness of counsel’s decision to forego raising this claim.22
*212As May correctly observes, trial counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing demonstrates that his failure to present evidence of May’s childhood abuse was either a failure to identify the trial court’s error or a failure to recognize the merit in objecting to the trial court’s determination. There was no strategy involved. As trial counsel himself admitted, he had no strategy regarding this issue. N.T. April 9, 2002, at 25. We are therefore constrained to reason that a complete lack of strategy cannot constitute a reasonable basis for a decision not to raise a claim. Thus, we conclude that May has established the second component of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Turning to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, the defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Pierce, supra. This Court has previously held that the failure to present a history of abuse is prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 570 Pa. 378, 809 A.2d 325, 334 (2002) (holding that defendant was prejudiced by failure to present history of abuse and mental illness); Commonwealth v. Perry, 537 Pa. 385, 644 A.2d 705, 709 (1994) (failure to present evidence in mitigation prejudiced defendant). C.f Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527.23
*213In the case sub judice, it is this Court’s judgment that May suffered prejudice. The jury in May’s second sentencing hearing found only one aggravating circumstance — a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The jury was bound to impose the death penalty because it found no mitigating circumstances.24 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). Had May established this “catch all” mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury would have been free to award a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. Had trial counsel presented evidence of mitigation, the jury would have weighed the contested aggravating factor against the strong evidence of abuse suffered by May. Keeping in mind the recent instances where this Court has found prejudice in similar cases, we are satisfied that the likelihood of a different outcome is reasonable, and that May therefore suffered prejudice where trial counsel failed to object when the trial court would not admit such evidence. Accordingly, May has established that his counsel was ineffective. He is therefore entitled to relief on this claim.
Issue 8 — Cumulative Error
The final argument of May is that the cumulative effect of the errors alleged herein denied him a fair trial. As we are remanding this case for a new penalty phase, we will address this contention only as it relates to the guilt phase. We have held that “no number of failed claims may collectively attain merit if they could not do so individually.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 615 A.2d 716, 722 (1992). Because we have determined that there were no guilt phase errors warranting relief, May’s allegation fails.

*214
CONCLUSION

We affirm the decision of the PCRA court as it relates to May’s claims arising from the guilt phase of his original trial. However, because we have determined that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to appeal the decision of the trial court, during the 1995 re-sentencing, that evidence of May’s childhood abuse could not be admitted pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8), we vacate the Judgment of Sentence and remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County for re-sentencing.
Justice BAER and Justice BALDWIN join the opinion.
Justice CASTILLE files a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice CAPPY and Justice EAKIN join.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq.

. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901,2502.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121.

. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6).

. 42 Pa.C.S.§ 9711(e)(1).

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9).

. Joseph Farrell, Esquire, and Timothy Sheffey, Esquire, represented May at his 1991 trial and sentencing, his direct appeal from that conviction and death sentence, his 1995 re-sentencing after remand, as well as his direct appeal from the second death sentence. The terms "appellate counsel" and "trial counsel” are used interchangeably throughout this Opinion. The Defender Association of Philadelphia (Defender Association) represented May before the PCRA court and continues its representation in this proceeding. Accordingly, no layering of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is required. C.f.Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014 (2003).

. See also Pa.R.E. 803(6).

. In Commonwealth v. Graver, 461 Pa. 131, 334 A.2d 667 (1975), this Court held that a log of police reports was a business record for the purpose of the exception to the hearsay rule. Further, police reports are exempt from hearsay disqualification pursuant to the Public Records Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6104. Justice Saylor expresses concern that any documents prepared in anticipation of litigation should not be considered a business record. Concurring Opinion of Justice Saylor at 1. Although I agree with Justice Saylor's theoretical concern, I fail to identify any cause for concern in the instant case. In Pompa v. Hojancki, 445 Pa. 42, 281 A.2d 886 (1971), this Court held that an expert's report, prepared specifically for litigation, was not admissible pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Unlike the facts of Pompa, in the instant case the preparation of the police repon appears to be routine, rather than purposefully prepared for the sole purpose of litigation. I therefore conclude that the instant matter is substantially dissimilar from Pompa.

. Victim impact evidence is defined in the capital sentencing statute as "evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim....” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2).

. The Court recognizes that Pa.R.E. 609(b) requires that courts utilize a balancing test to determine whether the interests of justice demand the admissibility of convictions falling outside of the ten-year period. However, because May’s argument in this case invokes only the per se rule of admissibility, we will not engage in this balancing test. See Brief of Appellant at 95-7.

. While the criminal records of Neidig were not entered into evidence during trial and, therefore, we do not have access to them, the trial court and the prosecution both stated on the record that Neidig had been out of prison on this charge for more than ten years, and defense counsel did not quarrel with this finding. See N.T., March 7, 1991, at 693-97. • Moreover, in his PCRA Petition and instant appeal, May does not allege that Neidig had not been out of prison for more than ten years on the armed robbery conviction as of March 7, 1991.

. In overturning the original death sentence on direct appeal, this Court concluded that the jury could not have found the predicate felony of rape alleged by the Commonwealth because the court never instructed the jury on the elements of rape. Anticipating the potentiality of the circumstance presently before us, and the effect of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(4), which provides a mandatory life sentence if none of the aggravating circumstances found are supported by sufficient evidence, our Court stated as follows:
*205We wish to state clearly that in reaching this conclusion, our decision should not be interpreted as a finding that the aggravating circumstance (the killing was committed during the commission of a felony) is not supported by sufficient evidence. Rather, we emphasize that our conclusion is based on the rationale that the jury erred in considering the wrong felony to support its finding that the killing was committed during the commission of a felony. In fact, we cannot ‘review' the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of rape since the Commonwealth never attempted to present such evidence or prove the crime of rape.
May I, 656 A.2d at 1345.

. This section of the sentencing statute states that "[ajggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: [t]he defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9).

. On many occasions, this Court has followed the reasoning expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 557 Pa. 207, 732 A.2d 1167 (1999); Commonwealth v. Fahy, 512 Pa. 298, 516 A.2d 689, 698 (1986).

. “any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense ...” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) (emphasis added).

. May was twenty-four years old at the time of the offense, while Eddings was sixteen.

. Nowhere does this Opinion state, as Justice Castille's concurrence claims, that counsel "is obliged” to present such evidence. Instead, we noted the important role such evidence plays in sentencing and allowed *211for its consideration. See Concurring Opinion at 219, 898 A.2d at 580 (Castille, J.).

. Justice Castille, in his Concurring Opinion, gives the impression that the view I expressed while concurring in Jones renders any appellate *212counsel per se ineffective, without a consideration of reasonableness, when he foregoes raising a meritorious claim. His representation of my position in Jones is skewed. That opinion does not fail to consider counsel's reasonableness; rather, it simply concludes that in any scenario where counsel fails to raise a meritorious claim should be viewed as presumptively unreasonable if it would have entitled a defendant to relief had it been raised on appeal. Justice Castille’s misconstruction of my position creates an inaccurate understanding of the views delineated in my concurring opinion.

. We are mindful of the fact that a plurality of this Court have has indicated that "[i]t may be that upon hearing evidence of [a defendant’s] appalling background, jurors might decide that [he or] she is incapable of rehabilitation, and deserving of the harshest punishment available." Commonwealth v. Rivers, 567 Pa. 239, 786 A.2d 923, 930 n. 5 (2001) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, per Flaherty, J.). However, in the present case, May specifically sought to introduce this evidence and was effectively precluded from doing so by the ruling of the trial court. Therefore, May had chosen to risk exposing the jury to this evidence.

. As noted supra, at 192, 898 A.2d at 563, this Court determined that the jury could not properly consider whether May committed murder while in the perpetration of a rape because the court never instructed tfie jury on the elements of rape. May I, 656 A.2d at 1344-1345. Therefore, during his second sentencing hearing, the aggravating factor for committing a killing while perpetrating a felony, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(6), was not available.