Court Opinion

ID: 9567124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:49:09.183198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:52.099707
License: Public Domain

McInturff, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part)—I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority, for the trial court's refusal to resubmit the question of voluntariness of Mr. Moore's confession to the jury. The court invaded the province of the jury by withholding from them evidence upon which to judge the weight and credibility of the confession.
Mr. Moore has raised two principal assignments of error on appeal, the resolution of which I believe incorrect only as to the second. However, the majority has left important *14matters without comment in their resolution of the first issue.
Mr. Moore first argues the court erred in admitting into evidence his confession obtained during detention but after that time at which preliminary appearance before a magistrate first became practically possible. Because he was not taken before a magistrate at the first practical time, he seeks suppression of his confession as a sanction against such failure.
For ease of reference, I requote JCrR 2.03(a):
(1) Any person arrested for any offense, including capital cases and other felonies and not released shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a judge. The term "without unnecessary delay" means as soon as practically possible. In any event, delay beyond the close of business of the judicial day next following the day of arrest shall be deemed unnecessary. The court may, for good cause shown and recited in the order, enlarge the time prior to preliminary appearance.
(2) The judge shall inform the person of the crime for which he is arrested and of the rights of a person charged with a crime and shall provide for pretrial release pursuant to JCrR 2.09.
(Italics mine.) JCrR 2.03(a) does provide that a person arrested for any offense shall be taken before a magistrate at the first practical time, so that he may be informed of the charge against him and of his Miranda rights.1 As recognized by the rule, the first practical time may be the first regular judicial day after arrest, as in a weekend arrest. Beyond this point in time, police must justify their delay. But of necessity, the first practical time cannot be reduced to a mandatory hour limit. Practicality is a function of unique circumstances existing for the moment. Time limits of practical possibility are flexible, to be evaluated case by case. According to Holmes, "We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints."2
*15But JCrR 2.03(a), requiring preliminary appearance of the accused at the first practical time, has no application in this case, for sanctions against violation of that rule do not include suppression of a confession made prior to preliminary appearance.3 The exclusive standard for admissibility of a confession is voluntariness, and not the speed with which authorities present the accused for his preliminary appearance, as argued by Mr. Moore.4 The length of detention and questioning prior to confession are relevant considerations in determining whether the confession was extracted by overbearance, in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. But length of detention is only one circumstance which must be considered among a myriad of factors reflecting on voluntariness.5
On review, a finding by the trial court that a confession was voluntary and thus admissible will be affirmed when supported by substantial evidence of proof by a preponderance.6 In this case, the trial court did find the confession voluntary, which finding is supported by substantial evidence and will not be disturbed.
In his second assignment of error, Mr. Moore argues the trial court erred in sustaining the State's objection to cross-examination of a detective concerning reasons why Mr. Moore was not brought before a magistrate at the first practical time:
Q Do you know any reason why he wasn't taken from *16jail to justice court for a preliminary appearance on that day?
Mr. Kinney: I am going to object to that as immaterial.
The Court: Sustained.
It was error for the court to refuse such cross-examination.
Though it is the assigned office of the court to determine admissibility of a confession,7 the issue of voluntariness may be resubmitted by the accused to the jury as it reflects upon the weight and credibility of the confession.8 Evidence of extended detention and interrogation prior to confession is relevant to the issue of voluntariness, and could be properly pursued in questioning of the detective.9
The court's evidentiary ruling withheld from the jury's consideration substantial evidence reflecting upon the weight and credibility of Mr. Moore's confession. The record from a prior suppression hearing shows the accused to have been arrested near 12 a.m., Monday, June 2, 1975. After being given repeated Miranda warnings, he was interrogated by police detectives and later by a psychiatrist, was subjected to a polygraph examination, was reinterrogated, and finally confessed at 8:20 a.m., Tuesday, June 3, 1975. His confession was made after consistent denials of guilt, and without benefit of counsel.10 Mr. Moore was thus subjected to a 32-hour period of detention before his confession.
*17When objection to witness examination is sustained at trial, it becomes incumbent upon the examiner to fairly advise the court of evidence which he expects to develop from the witness and thus to afford the court an opportunity to correct possible error, in order to preserve that error on appeal.11 In this case, defense counsel did make an offer of proof:
I'll except to the ruling, your Honor. I think it is material; it goes to the voluntariness of the statement.
By advising the court of his desire to resubmit the issue of voluntariness to the jury, defense counsel did make an offer of proof sufficient to preserve the court's erroneous ruling for consideration by this court.
The critical question remains, whether the trial court's refusal to resubmit the issue of voluntariness to the jury constituted reversible error. Reversible error may be defined as one which affects or presumptively affects the final result of the trial.12
In addition to the confession, the jury heard other competent evidence, including a dying declaration in which the victim identified Mr. Moore as his assailant. Such evidence is persuasive of guilt and may have led the jury to such a conclusion, even in the absence of the confession. But I am unable to say that no other rational conclusion could be reached. I am unable to say from the record that Mr. Moore "would or would not have been convicted but for the error committed by the trial court. . . ."13 Therefore, the error may not be deemed harmless, and requires the guilty verdict be set aside and Mr. Moore be granted a new trial.14
*18I would reverse and remand for new trial.

 JCrR 2.03(a)(1) and (2).

 Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501, 75 L. Ed. 482, 51 S. Ct. 228 (1931).

 JCrR 2.03(c)(1); State v. Eastland, 77 Wn.2d 823, 824, 467 P.2d 300 (1970); State v. Winters, 39 Wn.2d 545, 549, 550, 236 P.2d 1038 (1951).

 State v. Sweet, 71 Wn.2d 172, 177, 426 P.2d 983 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 968; State v. Hoffman, 64 Wn.2d 445, 450, 392 P.2d 237 (1964); State v. Fallen, 7 Wn. App. 369, 384, 499 P.2d 893 (1972).

 See Annot. 22 L. Ed. 2d 871, 878 (1970).

 State v. Braun, 82 Wn.2d 157, 162, 509 P.2d 742 (1973); State v. Davis, 73 Wn.2d 271, 284, 438 P.2d 185 (1968).

 CrR 3.5(a); State v. Myers, 86 Wn.2d 419, 425, 545 P.2d 538 (1976).

 CrR 3.5(d)(4) states: "[I]f the defense raises the issue of voluntariness under subsection (1) above, the jury shall be instructed that they may give such weight and credibility to the confession in view of the surrounding circumstances, as they see fit." See also State v. Piche, 71 Wn.2d 583, 588, 430 P.2d 522 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 912; State v. Fullen, 7 Wn. App. 369, 385, 499 P.2d 893 (1972); State v. Smith, 72 Wn.2d 479, 485, 434 P.2d 5 (1967); State v. Cuzzetto, 76 Wn.2d 378, 387, 457 P.2d 204 (1969).

 See Annot. 22 L. Ed. 2d 871, 878 (1970).

 See CrR 3.1(c)(1) and (2).

 State v. Stambach, 76 Wn.2d 298, 302-03, 456 P.2d 362 (1969); State v. Danley, 9 Wn. App. 354, 357, 513 P.2d 96 (1973).

 State v. Mack, 80 Wn.2d 19, 21-22, 490 P.2d 1303 (1971); State v. Wanrow, 14 Wn. App. 115, 120, 538 P.2d 849 (1975).

 State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 627, 440 P.2d 429 (1968).

 Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340, 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 (1967).