Court Opinion

ID: 9737146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:17:10.788137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.726182
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(concurring specially).
Code section 321.210, gives department of public safety authority, “ * * * to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee: * * *
“7. Has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws of this state.”
Upon issuance of a suspension order notice the alleged offender is granted permissive hearing before the commissioner or his agent. Section 321.211, Code, 1966.
Then Code section 321.215 permits an appeal, except where cancellation or revocation is mandatory. Incidentally, we are not here dealing with a chapter 321B proceeding.
If the licensee elects to appeal it shall be to a court of record in the county in which the person resides. In that regard section 321.215 provides, inter alia, “ * * * the court shall hear and determine the matter as an original proceeding upon a transcript of all the proceedings before the commissioner, and upon additional evidence and other pleadings as the court may require. The decision of the court shall be final.” (Emphasis supplied)
As to construction of this statutory provision, rule 344(f) (13), R.C.P., states: “In construing statutes the courts search for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said.” In this connection the word “determine”, as here used, means to bring a question or controversy to a final conclusion. People v. Kuduk, 388 Ill. 248, 57 N.E.2d 755. More specifically, “to determine” is to decide, adjudge, adjudicate an issue presented, come to a decision, perform a judicial act, settle by judicial sentence. People v. Escobar, 122 Cal.App.2d 15, 264 P.2d 571, 573, and Wood v. Department of Public Safety, Tex.Civ.App., 311 S.W.2d 274, 276.
It thus appears the commissioner has full and complete primary authority to act, and a licensee is allowed permissive hearing, yet the district court, in appellate proceedings, may completely ignore the reasoning upon which the administrative officer acted, or his conclusion.
II. Although the foregoing may serve to create something of an incongruous situation, it appears to be unavoidable in light of the statutory language employed in Code section 321.215, supra.
In other words, appellate determination under that statute, as above construed, negates entirely the effectiveness of administrative action, and is contrary to accepted standards in administrative proceedings, leaving ultimate determination not only to district courts on appeal, but also this court on certiorari.
In effect, that construction serves to subvert normal administrative processes. As stated in 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, section 612, pages 452-453: “The cases are legion which stress the fact that the function of the court, or judicial review of the action of administrative agencies, is limited in scope and the range of issues open to review is narrow, being limited to judicial questions, even though the statute provides for review on the law and the facts or a trial de novo, or for a suit to test the validity of rules, regulations, or orders. The scope of review is not the same as upon review by an appellate court of a judgment of a lower court. The boundaries of judicial review, however, are stated in vary*288ing standards which themselves are subject to variation in particular situations.
“Judicial review is ordinarily limited or confined to the record of the proceedings before the agency and to the consideration of questions of law or to questions of law and the sufficiency of the evidence, or to determining whether the action of the agency is legal or in accordance with the law or whether errors of law have been committed.”
And Davis, Administrative Law Text, Hornbook Series, section 29.07, page 531, says: “When an administrative record has been made, taking testimony from the same witnesses a second time is wasteful, and even when statutes explicitly provide for de novo review, courts strive to prevent a duplication of the evidence-taking process. Although over the last few decades the movement away from use of juries on judicial review is perceptible, jury review is still common in some states. A test which is between the substantial-evidence test and substitution of judgment is the test of whether the finding is ‘against the manifest weight of the evidence.’
“Scope of review in state courts varies not only from state to state but often from agency to agency within the same state. Although the scope of review of the multifarious state and local agencies remains exceedingly diverse, the federal system is providing an effective leadership which the states are increasingly following.”
However, for reasons previously set forth, this appears to be a matter resting entirely in the hands of the legislature. See Kruck v. Needles, Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 296, 300; Town of Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Board, 253 Iowa 517, 529, 111 N.W.2d 317; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 380, page 391.
I find no alternative but to concur in the result reached by the majority.