Court Opinion

ID: 9551301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:59.661274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:29.967308
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting)—We have before us a situation in which a minor’s cause of action has been severely damaged by erroneous, or at best ambiguous, jury instructions.
The last paragraph of instruction No. 1 advises the jury that:
In like manner, the use of the singular of a word may be taken equally to mean the plural.
The jury from that point forward was instructed to consider the word “plaintiff” to mean each of the plaintiffs including plaintiff Kelly Jefferson.
Instruction No. 2 advises the jury of the respective burdens of the plaintiffs and defendants. In pertinent part, it states the defendant has the burden of proving two propositions:
First, that the plaintiff acted, or failed to act, in one of the ways claimed by the defendant and that in so acting, or failing to act, the plaintiff was negligent;
Second, that the negligence of the plaintiff was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s own injuries and was therefore contributory negligence.
In the final paragraph of instruction No. 2, the court instructs the jury that:
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the plaintiff has sustained plaintiff’s burden of proof, and that the defendant has also sustained defendant’s burden of proof, your verdict should be for the defendant. If the plaintiff has not sustained plaintiff’s burden of proof, your verdict should be for the defendant as to that plaintiff.
Instruction No. 3 defined contributory negligence for the jury as follows:
Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a *728person claiming injury or damage which is a proximate cause of the injury or damage complained of. Contributory negligence bars recovery on the part of a person suffering injury or damage, even though the opposing party is negligent.
Instruction No. 5, adding to the prejudicial effect, instructs the jury that:
Every person has the right to assume that other persons will use ordinary care, and he has a right to proceed on such assumption until he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care should know, to the contrary.
At the time of his injury, Kelly Jefferson was 7 months old. As a matter of law, a child of that age cannot be found to be contributorially negligent. Carraway v. Johnson, 63 Wn.2d 212, 386 P.2d 420 (1963); Cox v. Hugo, 52 Wn.2d 815, 329 P.2d 467 (1958), and cases cited therein. No such instruction was given, none was requested, no exception was taken. To members of the bar, it may be clear that the instructions intended to convey to the jury that the child would be entitled to recover if the existence of a duty on the part of the landlord was established, if the landlord breached that duty, and if the child had been injured as a result of that breach. However, in the context of the previous instruction on contributory negligence and the definition of “plaintiff” as “all parties plaintiff to this suit” the jury could have concluded that the conduct of Kelly Jefferson which contributed to his own injury would bar his recovery. (At the time of the injury, RCW 4.22.010, the comparative negligence statute, had not been enacted.) Such a result is wrong as a matter of law and constitutes a manifest injustice.
Kelly Jefferson has been scarred, disfigured, and disabled for his entire life. His lips will never function properly, and his speech will be affected as a result of his burns. As a minor, he was dependent upon his mother and guardian, Mattie Ball, for her choice of counsel and upon the counsel chosen to represent him competently and upon the court to protect any of the rights he may have had.
*729The general rule is that the appellate court will not review the appropriateness of instructions on appeal unless exception was taken to the instructions at the time of trial. However, there are long-standing exceptions to this rule. We previously have held that there are exceptions to the general rule in civil cases (see Maynard Inv. Co. v. McCann, 77 Wn.2d 616, 465 P.2d 657 (1970); Morrill v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 94 Wash. 258, 162 P. 360, 163 P. 733 (1917); Holzer v. Rhodes, 24 Wn.2d 184, 163 P.2d 811, 172 A.L.R. 1173 (1945); Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 260, 67 P.2d 868 (1937); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wn.2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972)), as well as in criminal cases. See State v. Peterson, 73 Wn.2d 303, 438 P.2d 183 (1968); State v. Case, 49 Wn.2d 66, 298 P.2d 500 (1956).
In Siegler v. Kuhlman, supra, an action was brought by the administratrix of the estate of a 17-year-old girl who was burned to death when her car encountered a large pool of gasoline. The case was argued only on the theories of negligence and res ipsa loquitur. A defense verdict was entered. Strict liability was not raised before the trial court, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, yet this court held that strict liability was applicable in this case and remanded only on the issue of damages. In Siegler, as in this case, there was plain error by counsel requiring judicial intervention in order to prevent an injustice.
In Maynard Inv. Co. v. McCann, supra at 623, we considered the application of a statute to the case even though the issue was not raised in the trial court. We stated:
The exception to the rule is a salutary one. Courts are created to ascertain the facts in a controversy and to determine the rights of the parties according to justice. Courts should not be confined by the issues framed or theories advanced by the parties if the parties ignore the mandate of a statute or an established precedent. A case brought before this court should be governed by the applicable law even though the attorneys representing the parties are unable or unwilling to argue it.
(Italics mine).
This court has held in the past that the trial court erred *730in submitting the question of a minor’s capacity and his contributory negligence to the jury. We held that the superior court should have determined, as a matter of law, that a child under six was incapable of contributory negligence. Von Saxe v. Barnett, 125 Wash. 639, 217 P. 62 (1923). Von Saxe does not reveal whether or not an exception was taken- to the submission of the question of contributory negligence to the jury. However, even if a timely exception was made, such gamesmanship should not be the deciding factor in determining whether or not a child recovers for his personal injury.
In In re Ivarsson, 60 Wn.2d 733, 737, 375 P.2d 509 (1962), we adopted the rationale of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Haden v. Eaves, 55 N.M. 40, 47, 226 P.2d 457 (1950):
“. . . we fully approve the doctrine that courts of equity should not sit idly by and see guardians lose the estates of their wards through mistakes in judgment or neglect of their duties. We also approve the rule that a minor who has a case in court is represented not only by his guardian ad litem, but by the court itself. A guardian ad litem is an arm of the court whose function is to protect the ward, and a court must not permit its arm to strangle him.
“Here we have a case where the interests of the minor and his father [who was the guardian ad litem] are separable; both have appealed and we see what we believe to be a serious error made in the case against the interests of the minor. We cannot in good conscience sit with folded hands, adopt the attitude of umpires in a contest between adults, apply our ordinary rules of civil procedure and say that because of a mistake of the guardian ad litem in trying the case on an erroneous theory the minor must lose all. . . .”
The majority has distinguished this case from In re Ivarsson, supra; Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wn.2d 234, 254 P.2d 732 (1953); and In re Deming, 192 Wash. 190, 73 P.2d 764 (1937), by finding that in this case there is no property right at stake or a showing of manifest error. I disagree on both points. Kelly Jefferson had a chose *731in action, a form of property which has long been recognized. Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Ry., 3 Wash. 592, 28 P. 1021 (1892). “Property” is a term of the widest significance and should not receive a literal or technical interpretation. Labberton v. General Cas. Co. of America, 53 Wn.2d 180, 332 P.2d 250 (1958); C.J.S. Property § 1 (1951). The distinction between this loss of property and the wrongful dissipation of a minor’s estate is insignificant in the present context. In re Ivarsson, supra; In re Deming, supra. Additionally, I find that a conflict of interest between the guardian and ward (In re Ivarsson, supra; In re Deming, supra) or a showing of fraud or collusion (see Burke v. Northern Pac. Ry., 86 Wash. 37, 149 P. 335 (1915) as relied upon by the majority), to be an unnecessary prerequisite to our intervention. This court has both the power and the responsibility to act when to do otherwise would result in a gross injustice to a minor child.
I dissent.
Hunter, Utter, and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Petition for rehearing denied January 13, 1977.