Court Opinion

ID: 9749461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:45:36.142795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:12.543937
License: Public Domain

KELLEHER, Justice,
with whom BEVI-LACQUA, Chief Justice,
joins, dissenting.
With apologies to the late Justice Cardozo, the truly crucial issue before us can be framed in terms of a question that asks whether a mentally disturbed patient “shall go free” because the Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals “has blundered.”4 The answer, I submit, is yes because the General Assembly, by its employment of clear, concise, and explicit language, has mandated such a result. Taking a cue from my brother Weisberger, I too present for consideration a page of history, this time as chronicled by the Providence Journal.
In the Journal’s March 27,1974 edition at page A-5, one of the statehouse reporters informed the reader that on the previous day a bill that sought a “broad revision of the state’s mental health laws” had been introduced in the Rhode Island Senate. It was noted that the proposed legislation had been drafted by a committee of state officials and “private experts” and had attempted to satisfy patients’-rights requirements as “dictated by recent court decisions as well as current medical thinking in favor of greater community — rather than institutional — care.” In a message accompanying' the bill’s introduction, then-Govemor Philip W. Noel claimed that the act’s passage would place Rhode Island among the leaders of states whose legislation represented an updated view of what was going on in the mental-health area.
On March 28, the Journal, in its lead editorial, urged speedy approval of the committee’s efforts and emphasized that the proposed legislation had been the subject of a “most careful review.” In urging a legislative O.K., the editorial characterized the approval as “handing the state Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals a carefully prepared program for modernization of mental health treatment * * ” and as “guaranteeing the mentally ill a bill of rights too long lacking and sadly needed.” I respectfully suggest that the majority, in construing § 40.1-5-11(3), have judicially amended the Mental Health Law of 1974 in such a manner that the guarantees alluded to in the 1974 editorial have been destroyed or substantially diminished.
In construing a statute, the judiciary cannot question the wisdom of its enactment. Words used in a statute are to be accorded their plain and usual meaning unless a contrary intent appears on the face of the statute. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Rhode Island Commission For Human Rights, R.I., 416 A.2d 673, 674 (1980); Little v. Conflict Of Interest Commission, R.I., 397 A.2d 884, *718887 (1979). If there is no ambiguity to the language chosen by the Legislature, there is no need to look elsewhere for intent. A statute that declares itself needs no construction. Citizens For Preservation Of Waterman Lake v. Davis, R.I., 420 A.2d 53, 57 (1980); Beaudoin v. Petit, R.I., 409 A.2d 536, 539 (1979); State v. Angell, R.I., 405 A.2d 10, 15 (1979); Vaudreuil v. Nelson Engineering And Construction Co., R.I., 399 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1979).
I submit that the legislative language that the majority concedes is “carefully crafted” amply demonstrates the deliberate choice made by the General Assembly when, in adopting § 40.1-5-11(3), it specifically declared that a patient involuntarily committed to a treatment facility for mental illness “shall be unconditionally released” unless a recertification petition has been filed by the official in charge of that facility within the first fifteen days of the final thirty days of the six-month period for which a prior certification has been obtained. It is obvious that in 1974 the committee that drafted the initial legislation and the General Assembly took the route espoused by those some of whom are referred to by my brother Weisberger as “civil rights advocates.”
Evidence of the genuine legislative concern for the civil rights of the involuntarily committed can be seen by an examination of the bill proposed by the committee and the bill as it finally passed both branches of the Legislature. As drafted, the bill permitted the initial commitment and the subsequent recertification of an individual’s need for continued treatment to be authorized by a simple showing of a fair preponderance of the evidence. Immediately after its introduction in the Rhode Island Senate on March 26, 1974, the bill was referred to the Committee on Health, Education, and Welfare. Later, on April 30,1974, the committee made two significant amendments to the bill. It changed the burden of proof so that an initial commitment order could be obtained only on “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” of the subject’s need for treatment, and all subsequent recertification orders would be issued only on a presentation of proof by “clear and convincing evidence” of the patient’s need for continued treatment.
I shall not guess what Draco would have done in 621 B.C. about the plight of the mentally ill in Athens, but I have no doubt that in 1974 the committee that drew up the legislation was well aware of the avalanche of mental-health litigation which had enveloped many states including Alabama, where a Federal District Court judge, in recognizing the involuntarily committed’s right to treatment, described a Tuscaloosa mental-health facility as a hospital that had been converted into a penitentiary. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F.Supp. 781, 784 (M.D.Ala.1971); see also Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala.1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D.Ala.1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F.Supp. 1341 (M.D.Ala.1971).5
Unquestionably, Mad Ludwig’s fate was a fait accompli in 1974. Nevertheless, in that year the General Assembly, by its use of simple, direct language calling for the unconditional release of an involuntarily committed patient and for a recertification hearing that “must be held” prior to the expiration of the current six-month period, demonstrated that individuals such as Ludwig or Rhode Island’s John Doe and Joseph Roe had a right to immediate discharge once the statutory fifteen-day period prescribed in § 40.1-5-11(3) had expired with*719out any attempt having been made to initiate the recertification process.
The observations expressed by my brother Weisberger as he describes his efforts as the Superior Court’s presiding justice to implement the judicial provisos found in the 1974 legislation are quite interesting. The events he witnessed could justify a change in the act, but the change, if it is to come, must come by legislative action rather than by judicial fiat.
Having had my say concerning the reach of § 40.1-5-11(3), I turn to the appeals now before us. I would sustain all the appeals. Since there was no compliance with the time constraints specified in the recertification portion of the Mental Health Law, the District Court judge should have granted the mental-health advocate’s motions to dismiss the recertification petitions relating to John and Joseph.
Nancy’s appeal raises a unique question. An involuntary-commitment petition was filed two days after the ten-day emergency-commitment period prescribed in § 40.1-5-7 had expired. Nancy was present when the two-day overlap was disclosed to the Family Court justice. She indicated her willingness to remain at the IMH adolescent unit on a voluntary basis. The Family Court justice observed that the ten-day statute “must be strictly construed” but that since Nancy was a volunteer, the ten-day limitation would not be enforced. However, he then held a hearing and ruled that Nancy should be detained at the IMH for the ensuing six months. In taking this approach, the Family Court justice misconceived the nature of a voluntary admission.
The essence of voluntary commitment is the patient’s right to leave the treatment facility at the end of the business day following the presentation of a written notice by the patient to a responsible official of his or her intent to leave the facility. Section 40.1-5-6(3). By certifying Nancy for six months, the Family Court justice effectively destroyed her status as a volunteer. If an individual is to be involuntarily committed to a treatment facility, such a commitment must take place within the legislative provisos found in § 40.1-5-8. Thus, if the officials at the IMH decided to have Nancy involuntarily committed, they were obliged to file a proper petition and to present evidence of the need of commitment by proof beyond reasonable doubt rather than by the clear-and-convincing standard employed by the Family Court justice.
As noted by the majority, neither the Chief Justice nor I have any objection to Richard’s emergency certification. In fact, this legislative mechanism provides a vehicle whereby a responsible official may rectify any oversight of the strict deadline delineated in the 1974 legislation. But, as my brother Weisberger points out, the trial judge in the District Court, as did his counterpart in the Family Court, employed the wrong standard of proof, and, of course, Richard is entitled to a rehearing.

. Noting dissatisfaction with the effects of the exclusionary rule in the context of criminal cases, Justice Cardozo answered the question, should the criminal “go free because the constable has blundered?,” in the negative. People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).

. This court in In re John Doe, R.I., 390 A.2d 390, 393 (1978), alluded to the Wyatt cases and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ belief that the civilly committed mental patient had a constitutional right to such individual treatment as would aid each either to be cured or to have his mental condition improved. On review, the Supreme Court of the United States took a different view in avoiding the constitutional question of whether such a patient is constitutionally entitled to treatment, and ruled that a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely outside a mental-health facility either on his own or with the help of family or friends. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975).