Court Opinion

ID: 9829692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:32:20.683828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.317740
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing and to Certify.
The only error assigned in the imotion for rehearing is the ruling that Pauline E. Mitchell, wife of one of the sons of the deceased, was a competent witness in this proceeding. It is asserted she was incompetent to testify, under article 3716, R. S., because she was an interested witness. Appellant moves to certify the question at issue to the Supreme Court because of conflict with cases herein mentioned. There is no doubt that Article 3716, R. S., applied to this proceeding. Gamble v. Butchee, 87 Tex. 643, 30 S. W. 861; Leahy v. Timon, 110 Tex. 73, 215 S. W. 951.
In Gamble v. Butchee, one of the questions presented was whether the wife of a legatee was competent as a subscribing witness to testify to the execution of the will in a proceeding to probate such will. After holding the statute applied to the proceeding, Justice Brown said:
“If it be admitted that the wives of the legatees are interested, this would not disqualify them as witnesses, because interest does not disqualify in such case. The legatees themselves are not disqualified by interest to testify to the execution of the will, in cases where they are not witnesses to its execution, and they could prove its execution as could any other witnesses. Martin v. McAdams [87 Tex. 225] 27 S. W. 255. The wives are not disqualified to testify as witnesses in the matter because their husbands are parties to the proceeding, for the reason that the property to be received by the husband would be their separate property, and the-case does not come within the doctrine of Simpson v. Brotherton, 62 Tex. 170. Under the statute a wife may testify in'favor of her hus-, band, who is a party, she not being a party, to-matters which transpired between him and a deceased person whose heirs or legal representatives are parties.”
It is asserted the ruling of this court is-in conflict with Leahy v. Timon, supra, and decisions by other courts of Civil Appeals in Tannehill v. Tannehill, 171 S. W. 1050, Skeeters v. Hodges, 270 S. W. 907, Pellum v. Fleming, 283 S. W. 531, and Shelton v. Shelton, 281 S. W. 331.
There is no conflict with Leahy v. Timón,, for in that case the witness was held incompetent,-not because of interest but because he-was a party to the suit.
In Simpson v. Brotherton, 62 Tex. 170, cited in Gamble v. Butchee, the witness, a wife of one of the'litigants, had a community interest in the subject-matter of the litigation. Chief Justice Willie said the husband was representing her community interest, and she was-to all intents and purposes a party to the litigation as if formally joined and should be-treated as such, and, therefore, incompetent to testify. In other words, she was a party by representation.
A-variation of .the statute as it affects parties was applied in Heirs of Reddin v. Smith, 65 Tex. 26, where the husband of a litigant from whom he was separated, but not divorced, was held to be an incompetent witness-because he was a proper party plaintiff.
The decisions by Courts of Civil Appeals, with which it is asserted the ruling of this-court is in conflict, broadly assert that the-wife of a litigant is an incompetent witness under the statute because of interest. In some of the cases this statement was not necessary to the decision, for the witness was incompetent because she was either a party in. fact or by representation through -the husband, under the doctrine of Simpson v. Brotherton.
However this may be, the question is-controlled by Gamble v. Butchee. We are not required to certify a question which has already been decided by the Supreme Court.. The duty to certify arose in the cases cited by appellant announcing a rule contrary to the-decision of the Supreme Court. It is not imposed upon this court when its decision follows that of the Supreme Court. Yoacham v.. McCurdy, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 183, 65 S. W. 213; Lock v. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 165 S. W. 536; Village Mills Co. v. Houston Oil Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 186 S. W. 785; Stark v. J. M. Guffey, etc. (Tex. Civ. App.) 80 S. W. 1080; and Id., 98 Tex. 542, 86 S. W. 1, 4 Ann. Cas. 1057.
The motions for rehearing and to certify " are overruled.