Court Opinion

ID: 9700759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:48:21.664684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:27.758495
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(dissenting). I would reverse the order of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff’s action with prejudice and remand for a determination of the proper sanction considering the options available and considering the circumstances of this case. I therefore dissent.
Plaintiff filed this action in August 1988. Defendant filed his answer on October 5, 1988. The case was subsequently assigned to various judges. The record does not indicate that any pretrial scheduling order was issued. In July 1989, plaintiff moved to compel defendant’s answers to plaintiff’s interrogatories and request for document production. Defendant eventually answered plaintiff’s interrogatories in September 1989, and the motion to compel was dismissed. The case was mediated in February 1990, and a settlement conference was held on September 24, 1990. The settlement con*631ference worksheet contains notations, apparently written by the presiding judge, indicating the absence of a witness list and that plaintiffs counsel had stated that she was trying to prepare a final pretrial order but that defendant was not cooperating.
Plaintiff filed its witness list on November 6, 1990, and moved to admit the witness list on December 19, 1990. Plaintiff also prepared and filed a "joint” pretrial statement, apparently without the assistance of defendant. The circuit court denied plaintiffs motion to admit the belatedly filed witness list. Defendant then moved to dismiss the action with prejudice, arguing that plaintiff was unable to call any witnesses as a result of the circuit court’s order. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court held that the previous ruling disallowing plaintiff’s witness list barred plaintiff from calling any witnesses, including the parties. The circuit court then dismissed the action with prejudice, reasoning that the case had been pending since August 1988. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order of dismissal.
I agree with plaintiffs contention that in this case, the circuit court abused its discretion by barring plaintiff from calling the parties and dismissing the action. At the time of this litigation, MCR 2.301(A) provided that absent a scheduling order, discovery ended one year after the filing of the defendant’s answer.1 In addition, Wayne Cir*632cuit LCR 2.301 applies in this case and provides, in pertinent part:
Unless the court orders otherwise pursuant to a status conference or for good cause shown, counsel for all parties shall exchange lists of all witnesses to be called at the trial not later than two months before the date set for completion of discovery. This list shall include experts, who shall be so designated. An unlisted witness may not be called at trial, except as the court orders for good cause shown.
Generally, where a party fails to comply with discovery rules, the trial court has within its discretion the authority to dismiss the action. Houston v Southwest Detroit Hosp, 166 Mich App 623, 628; 420 NW2d 835 (1987). There is also some authority that an appropriate sanction for failure to name a defendant as a witness is precluding the plaintiff from calling the defendant, at least as an expert witness. Moy v Detroit Receiving Hosp, 169 Mich App 600, 607; 426 NW2d 722 (1988); Beattie v Firnschild, 152 Mich App 785, 793-794; 394 NW2d 107 (1986). Thus, the circuit court in this case had the authority to sanction plaintiff in the manner it did.
We review discovery sanctions to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in exercising this authority. Dean v Tucker, 182 Mich App 27, 32; 451 NW2d 571 (1990). Although it is within the authority of the trial court to bar a witness or dismiss an action as a sanction for failure to file timely a witness list, this action is discretionary rather than mandatory and, there*633fore, necessitates the trial court’s considering the circumstances of the case to determine the appropriate sanction. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 144; 486 NW2d 326 (1992); Dean, supra; see also Middleton v Margulis, 162 Mich App 218, 223; 412 NW2d 268 (1987). When determining an appropriate sanction, the factors for consideration by the trial court include (1) whether the violation was wilful or accidental, (2) that party’s history of refusing to comply with discovery requests or disclosure of witnesses, (3) prejudice to the defendant, (4) actual notice to the defendant and the length of that notice, (5) the party’s history of intentional delay, if any, (6) the party’s compliance with the orders of the court, (7) the party’s attempt to cure the defect, and (8) whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice. Dean, supra, 32-33.
In this case, the record reflects that the only factor considered by the trial court was that the case had been pending since August 1988. Reviewing the record, there is no evidence that plaintiffs delay was wilful, and plaintiff did attempt to cure the oversight by filing the witness list, albeit belatedly. By contrast, defendant apparently never provided plaintiff with a witness list. Further, there was no showing that defendant was prejudiced by plaintiffs late witness list, filed approximately two months before trial. These factors are considered valid reasons to not impose the severe sanction imposed in this case. See In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, supra. In addition, although this case was pending since August 1988, the causes for the delay bear consideration. The record reflects that defendant failed to respond timely to plaintiffs interrogatories, necessitating plaintiffs motion to compel. Defendant also apparently failed to cooperate with plaintiff in the preparation of the *634"joint” pretrial statement required by the circuit court. Thus, although we do not condone plaintiffs failure to file timely its witness list, the slow pace of the litigation cannot be attributed solely to this factor.
I would therefore hold that the circuit court inappropriately exercised its discretion when it imposed the sanction of barring plaintiff from calling the parties as witnesses and dismissing the case without first considering the relevant factors and without considering whether a less severe sanction would have been appropriate. I would further hold that after reviewing the record and considering the relevant factors, the sanction imposed was an abuse of the circuit court’s discretion. I would therefore reverse and remand.

 MCR 2.301 has since been amended, effective October 1, 1991. In addition, although not in effect at the time relevant to this case, MCR 2.401, amended effective October 1, 1991, now provides, in pertinent part:
(I) Witness Lists.
(1) No later than the time directed by the court under subrule (B)(2)(a), the parties shall file and serve witness lists.
*632(2) The court may order that any witness not listed in accordance with this rule will be prohibited from testifying at trial except upon good cause shown.