Court Opinion

ID: 9774210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:11:34.354161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.416125
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted in a bench trial of possession of cocaine upon his plea of not guilty before the court. His punishment was assessed by the court at three years’ imprisonment.
The record shows that following a hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress evidence the appellant waived trial by jury and entered his plea of not guilty. The evidence was “stipulated” and the appellant was found guilty. The judgment of conviction was entered.
On appeal the sole point (nee ground) of error was that the “evidence is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance recovered from the appellant was in fact cocaine, as alleged in the indictment.”
The argument in support of the appellant’s contention was that the State had failed to offer a chemist’s testimony that *697the substance was cocaine or even a laboratory report reflecting that the substance submitted to the chemist tested as cocaine.
The Court of Appeals observed in its unpublished opinion that the stipulated evidence before the trial court in the form of an offense report showed that appellant, at the time of his arrest, told the arresting officers that the camera case or bag he had with him contained a pistol and cocaine. Approximately 20 grams of white powder was recovered from the bag. The tests were performed on the suspected narcotics with positive results. These tests included the cocaine found in the bag. The Court of Appeals found that the field tests were not sufficient in themselves to establish the nature of the substance, but the positive results of such tests tended to confirm the direct evidence in the form of appellant’s admission that the substance was cocaine. Citing Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), the Court of Appeals, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found all essentials of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the question of sufficiency is determined by the combined weight of all incriminating evidence. Messer v. State (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] March 8, 1984 — unpublished).
In appellant’s petition for discretionary review the sole ground of review was that the Court of Appeals erred because there was “insufficient evidence of probative value in the record to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance recovered from the appellant was in fact cocaine, as alleged in the indictment.”
Under his reasons for review, appellant urges that in absence of a chemical analysis or laboratory report the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction, citing Wagoner v. State, 557 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). In addition, for the first time appellant urges a matter not presented to the Court of Appeals. He contends the stipulated evidence was not in compliance with the mandatory requirements of Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., which requires that the stipulation before the court is not a proper method of proof “until the trial judge places his signature on it.”
We granted appellant’s petition to determine the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in light of appellant’s argument.
On original submission this Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding that the stipulated evidence did not meet the requirements of Article 1.15, supra, and ordered an acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978).
We granted the State’s motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing in which the State urged that our opinion on original submission was in irreconcilable conflict with Ex parte Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), holding that the failure to comply with Article 1.15, supra, was trial error rather than failure to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction so as to bar a retrial because of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Burks, supra; Greene, supra. The State also urged that our opinion on original submission erroneously indicated that the trial judge’s signature must appear on the stipulation itself as approval thereof, when Article 1.15, supra, requires the trial judge to sign and approve the “waiver of rights and consent to stipulate” form, not sign the stipulation of evidence itself which could in fact under the statute be oral.
Article 1.15, supra, provides:
“No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly rendered and recorded, unless in felony cases less than capital, the defendant, upon entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing in accordance with Articles 1.13 and 1.14; provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to *698support the same. The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of the cause.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing statute is mandatory and must be followed for a stipulation to be considered as evidence where the plea is before the court. See Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Valdez v. State, 555 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Duran v. State, 552 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and cases there cited. See also Green v. State, 666 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984). And it is quite true that the statute has always had application to a plea of not guilty entered before the court where a jury trial has been waived. Rodriguez v. State, 442 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Further, as the State correctly argues, it is not the stipulation itself that must be approved in writing by the trial court but the defendant’s waiver of his rights and consent to stipulate. Only recently in Landers v. State, 720 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), this Court wrote:
“What appellant overlooks is that Article 1.15 requires that before stipulated evidence may be permitted in any plea before the court in a felony case the written waiver by the defendant of appearance, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and his consent to stipulation of evidence must be approved by the trial court, not the stipulation itself. A stipulation may be oral under Article 1.15, supra. An oral stipulation cannot be signed and approved by the trial court. The trial court is not required to examine each piece of stipulated evidence, oral or written, sign and approve it before introduction. The statute only requires that the defendant’s waiver and consent to stipulate evidence be signed and approved by the trial court.”1
The scenario in the instant case is all too familiar to appellate courts, particularly in the appeals from Harris County. There is a brief hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, which motion is subsequently overruled. The defendant then immediately waives trial by jury and enters a plea of not guilty before the court and the evidence is stipulated in forms of an exhibit or exhibits. No “live” testimony is offered. The defendant is promptly found guilty. On appeal it is urged that there was a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Article 1.15, supra, to which too little attention at trial is given.
In the instant case there was a printed form entitled somewhat misleadingly “Stipulation of Evidence.” (State’s Exhibit No. 2) In said form the appellant waived the appearance, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and consented to the oral and written stipulation of evidence. The appellant further agreed that if the State called witnesses they would testify as set forth in the offense report (State’s Exhibit No. 1) and that he was the one and same person described in State’s Exhibit No. 1 to be admitted. The form was signed and sworn to by the appellant. It was also approved in writing by his counsel and the assistant district attorney. The space in the form for the trial judge’s approval was left blank. It was not signed.
At the trial after the not guilty plea the State informed the court the evidence *699would be stipulated, and asked if the appellant was agreeable to being questioned. His attorney stated, “No objection.” After being sworn, the appellant was simply asked to identify his signature on State’s Exhibit No. 2 and asked if he understood the stipulation procedure and had agreed to have “that done.” Upon receiving an affirmative answer2 State's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2 were offered into evidence. Appellant’s counsel offered no objection except to observe that all rights to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress were being reserved. The exhibits were expressly admitted by the trial judge into evidence. Both sides then rested and closed.
,Stipulations, oral or written, in criminal cases where the plea of not guilty is entered before the jury do not have to comply with Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. The stipulations entered in the instant case where the plea was not guilty to the indictment were entered before the court met all the requirements of Article 1.15, supra, except the approval in writing by the court of the appellant’s waiver of his rights and his consent to the stipulation of evidence. Appellant does not contend, even now, that he did not waive his rights or consent to stipulate the evidence, or that the trial judge did not orally accept and admit into evidence the stipulations and exhibits. He complains now, only belatedly, before this court that the trial judge’s signature is missing.
The history of Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P., as originally enacted in 1965, was traced in the original dissenting opinion in Rodriguez v. State, supra, 442 S.W.2d at pp. 379-383. One of the sources of Article 1.15, supra, was former Article 12, V.A.C. C.P. (1925), as amended (Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43, § 8), which permitted for the first time a plea of guilty before the court in a non-capital felony case. Until 1931 all felony cases were tried before a jury regardless of the plea.
The procedure required by Article 1.15, supra, is perhaps unique to Texas. Although originally designed for applications to pleas of guilty and nolo contendere before the court in non-capital felony cases, the statute by its very terms also applies to pleas of not guilty before the court in such cases. Rodriguez v. State, supra. The wisdom of the continuation of such requirements, at least as to not guilty pleas, is for the Legislature and not this Court.
The question before this Court is whether the absence of the trial judge’s signature approving the waiver and consent calls for an acquittal under Burks, supra, and Greene, supra. What then, are the double jeopardy implications of a reversal by an appellate court of a conviction that was supported only by inadmissible evidence (in this case stipulations orally admitted into evidence by the judge without his written approval of the appellant’s duly executed waiver of the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses and his written consent to stipulate evidence and the introduction of written statements)?
Ex parte Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), involved a plea of guilty before the court where the evidence was stipulated without the defendant having executed a written waiver of his rights and consent to stipulate the evidence.
In Ex parte Duran, supra, at p. 684, the Court wrote:
“Burks held that ‘the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, [and] the only “just” remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.’ 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. The Supreme Court was careful to distinguish reversals caused by trial error from those resulting from evidentiary insufficiency.
“ ‘In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a *700defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.’ 437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149.
Therefore, reversal for trial error does not preclude another trial.3
* * * * * *
“This situation is different from that presented in Burks, in which the trial court’s error was in failing to grant a motion for new trial which was based on insufficiency of the evidence. In the applicant’s case, the basic error was not failure to recognize, after the State had rested, that the evidence was insufficient; it was error in admitting evidence. We think that this basic error, upon which our earlier reversal rested, was therefore trial error. Properly construed, our holding was not that the State had failed to prove its case, but that it had been permitted erroneously to prove its case through incorrect receipt of evidence. Cf. Burks, 437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, quoted above. A reversal for such trial error as was committed in this case is not tantamount to a holding by this Court that a directed judgment of acquittal should have been entered. It was a holding that the applicant should have a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error. For this reason, our earlier reversal was not one that would bar a re-trial because of the application of the double jeopardy clause in Burks and Greene.” See also Clark v. State, 657 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
In the instant case we conclude that the basic error was not proceeding to enter a judgment of conviction because of eviden-tiary insufficiency but error in admitting the stipulation without the written approval of the trial judge as to the appellant’s waiver of rights and consent to stipulate evidence. This was trial error and does not call for an acquittal. Although Ex parte Duran, supra, involved a plea of guilty and the instant case involved a plea of not guilty before the court, we adhere to the holding in Duran.
In view of the trial error, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court.4

. Regrettably, loose language indicating that it is the stipulation itself which must be signed and approved has crept into the courtroom language, appellate briefs and even into appellate court opinions. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 708 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Clark v. State, 657 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Young v. State, 648 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Terry v. State, 681 S.W.2d 136 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984); Green v. State, 666 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984). See footnote #3, Landers v. State, supra, at p. 540.

. The appellant was not further interrogated by the prosecutor or his own counsel.

. Greene held that the Burks standard applies to state criminal proceedings.

. It is this writer’s thought that the instant case is somewhat inconsistent with Humason v. State, 729 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). There the search and seizure question was written on by the majority while ignoring the fact that the stipulations did not comply with Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. Here we write on the Article 1.15 question.