Court Opinion

ID: 9644778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:04:45.065515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:18.236969
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the proposition that a defective complaint has no effect on the validity of an information. We recently held:
... our state constitution assigns the law making function to the Legislature while assigning the law interpreting function to the Judiciary.
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (emphasis in original). Because Texas Constitution art. 5, § 12 and Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.14 do not address complaints, I dissent to the legislative efforts of the majority.
I.
The facts are not in dispute. A complaint was filed charging appellant with driving while intoxicated. . The complaint, executed on January 16, 1988, alleged the defendant committed this offense “on or about the 5th day of March, A.D.1988.” 1 Prior to today, such a defect was fatal and rendered the information void. In Davis v. State, 503 S.W.2d 241 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), we stated:
The date on or about which the offense was alleged to have been committed being subsequent to the date the complaint was sworn to renders the complaint fatally defective.
An information is void which is based upon a fatally defective complaint.
Id. [citations omitted]. See also, Thomas v. State, 474 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Hall v. State, 373 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Cr.App.1963); Mitchell v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 255, 340 S.W.2d 301 (App.1960); and Bradshaw v. State, 156 Tex.Crim. 441, 243 S.W.2d 586 (App.1951). Based upon this authority, the Court of Appeals held the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear appellant’s case. Agui*322lar v. State, 810 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1991). See, Davis, 503 S.W.2d at 241.
II.
With its blinders firmly in place, the majority bases its opinion solely upon the 1985 amendment to art. 5, § 12(b) and, in so doing, ignores the precedent cited above as well as Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.14, and other relevant portions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 5, § 12(b) provides:
(b) An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense. An information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense. The practice and procedures relating to the use of indictments and informations, including their contents, amendment, sufficiency, and requisites, are as provided by law. The presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.
Texas Constitution, art. 5, § 12.
Art. 1.14, as amended in 1985, became the enabling legislation for art. 5 § 12. Art. 1.14(b) provides:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding. Nothing in this article prohibits a trial court from requiring that an objection to an indictment or information be made at an earlier time in compliance with Article 28.01 of this Code.
In Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 273 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), we interpreted art. 1.14 and art. 5, § 12 and held a defect in a charging instrument is waived if the defendant fails to raise the issue in the trial court. Our prior case law was overruled so far as it held a defect in a charging instrument deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. Id.
III.
The majority fails to discuss the enabling legislation to avoid the policy of statutory interpretation we adopted in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). In Boykin we stated:
When attempting to discern the collective legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. We do this because the text of the statute is the law in the sense that it is the only thing actually adopted by the legislators, probably through compromise, and submitted to the Governor for her signature. We focus on the literal text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute was enacted into law.
* * * J¡S * *
... Yet a third reason for focussing on the literal text is that the Legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect that the Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.
* * * * * *
If the plain language of a statute would lead to absurd results, or if the language is not plain but rather ambiguous, then and only then, out of absolute necessity, is it constitutionally permissible for a court to consider, in arriving at a sensible interpretation, such extra textual factors as executive or administrative interpretations of the statute or legislative history.
* He * * # *
[footnote 4, pg. 786] Although Section 311.023 of the Texas Government Code invites, but does not require, courts to consider extratextual factors when the statutes in question are not ambiguous, such an invitation should be declined for *323the reasons stated in the body of this opinion. [Citations omitted.]
Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785-786 (emphasis in original).
Art. 1.14 is clear and unambiguous; only indictments and informations are addressed. Complaints are not included within art. 1.14. As previously noted, an information is “a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense.” Art. 5, § 12. Additionally, Tex.Code Crim.Proe.Ann. art. 21.20 defines an information as
... a written statement filed and presented in behalf of the State by the district or county attorney, charging the defendant with an offense which may by law be so prosecuted.
Art. 21.22, entitled “Information Based Upon Complaint,” provides:
No information shall be presented until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense. The affidavit shall be filed with the information. It may be sworn to before the district or county attorney who, for that purpose, shall have power to administer the oath, or it may be made before any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 21.22. Furthermore, Tex.Code Crim.Proe.Ann. art. 15.04, provides “[t]he affidavit made before the magistrate or district or county attorney is called a ‘complaint’ if it charges the commission of an offense.” Clearly, complaints and informations are separate and distinct instruments.
As Art. 5, § 12 and art. 1.14 do not address defective complaints, the case law concerning defective complaints was not overruled by art. 5, § 12, art 1.14(b) or Studer. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly relied upon that authority.
By including complaints within the ambit of art. 5, § 12 and art. 1.14, the majority has violated the policy of statutory interpretation established in Boykin, supra. See also, Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (“With rare exceptions, courts must apply penal statutes exactly as they read.”); Smith v. State, 789 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (“... When a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court will not strain that plain meaning of the wording in order to give the statute a ‘desirable’ reading.”); and, Faulk v. State, 608 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (“The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent in enacting a statute. Such intent and a determination of the meaning of a statute is to be based upon the language of the statute itself. [Citations omitted.]”).
IV.
By definition, an information cannot be filed unless a complaint has been made. Art. 21.22. Therefore, an information based upon a defective complaint is void. See, Davis, supra. Yet the majority confers jurisdiction in the trial court simply because an information was filed, wholly ignoring the requirement of a complaint. The Court of Appeals correctly held:
... The 1985 amendments and the analysis in Studer do not stand for the proposition that defects in the process by which a charging instrument must be generated are waived in the absence of timely trial court objection.
Aguilar, 810 S.W.2d at 232.
Under the majority’s opinion, the State is now free to decide whether the filing of a complaint has become too burdensome. Unless the defendant objects, a complaint is no longer required. This is not what the Legislature contemplated in the passage of the proposed amendment (or enabling legislation) and not what was intended by the voters when they ratified the proposed amendment.2 To the contrary, the Legisla: *324ture was concerned that these constitutional and statutory changes were going to encourage prosecutors to be “lazy.” Today the majority strains to protect “lazy prosecutors” in areas never contemplated by the Legislature or the voters of this State.3
Today, the majority by abandoning the policy of statutory interpretation announced in Boykin expands the scope of art. 5, § 12 and art. 1.14 and implicitly overrules art. 21.22 (which requires an information to be based upon a complaint). Because the majority has undertaken such a legislative effort, rather than hand down this opinion, it should be sent to the Governor for her signature or veto.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis herein is supplied by the author.

. The amendment to Art. 5, § 12 was proposed Amendment 11 on the ballot for the general election held November 5, 1985. The "Voters Guide” distributed to the public by the League of Women Voters of Texas described the amendment as follows:
Presently, the constitution guarantees anyone accused of a crime the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation and to have a copy of the accusation. The same article also says that no person may be tried for a felony offense unless indicted by a *324grand jury. Article 5, section 12 presently provides that all prosecutions must be carried out "in the name and by the authority of the State of Texas" and must conclude with the words "Against the peace and dignity of the State."
Passage of the amendment would eliminate the specific words in Article 5, section 12 and add subsection (b) which defines an indictment as a criminal charge presented by a grand jury and an information as a criminal charge brought by a prosecutor. The practice and procedures relating to such charging instruments would be provided by law. (The legislature provides the law.) Presenting an indictment or information invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.
(Emphasis in original.)

. At the Senate Criminal Justice Committee hearing on Senate Bill 169, March 5, 1985, Senator Glasgow made the following comments:
Let me be real candid with you counsel, I'm for this bill and I’m for doing this, and I don't know that this is the way to do it but to do it, because we’re interrupting the criminal law process. I was a prosecutor for eight years and I know the biggest problem caused by this is lazy prosecutors that are not doing indictments the way they ought to be done. Now those indictments are not that hard to draw and prosecutors are just drawing bad indictments, sometimes by incompetence, sometimes by a mistake. If all district attorneys would draw those things the way they should be drawn in the first place, it wouldn't be a problem. But we can’t legislate wisdom in this committee and so I’m for your bill trying to solve some of these problems that get us where we need to go. But I do want you to recognize, and they’re all my good friends, that the majority of these problems is because of the prosecutors....
At the House Criminal Jurisprudence Subcommittee meeting on House Bill 12 and House Bill 366 on March 6, 1985, the following occurred:
Rep. Evans: Well, shouldn't the prosecutor, since he knows what he’s doing, have the obligation and the duty and the responsibility to write the indictment right from the beginning? Shouldn’t that be the case? Rep. Morales: Absolutely-