Court Opinion

ID: 9664974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:35:45.290517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:03.905196
License: Public Domain

W. J. Giovan, J.
(concurring). I concur in the majority opinion, including that portion which holds that defendant waived the CJI 3:1:16 instruction labeled "Specific Intent”. I write separately, however, to add my view that a complete disposition of the defendant’s claim of error requires the further observation that, because it is argumentative, the defendant would not have been entitled to the instruction even if it had been requested._
*454At the time of trial in this case, CJI 3:1:16 provided:1
"(1) When a certain intent is a necessary element in a crime, the crime cannot have been committed when the intent did not exist.
"(2) Intent is a decision of the mind to knowingly do an act with a conscious [fully formed] objective of accomplishing a certain [specific] result.
"(3) There can be no crime of- under our law where there is no intent to -, and the burden rests upon the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at the time of doing the alleged act had that wrongful intent.
"(4) The intent with which a person does an act is known by the way in which he expresses it to others or indicates it by his conduct. The intent with which a person does an act can sometimes be determined from the manner in which it is done, the method used and all other facts and circumstances, but only if that intent is established by the evidence.
"[At this point read instructions relative to defenses which have been raised which would negate intent, i.e., intoxication, claim of right, etc.]
"(5) If you find that the defendant, for any reason whatsoever, did not consciously and knowingly act with the intent to _, the crime cannot have been committed and you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of__
"(6) If from all of the evidence you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant knowingly and consciously acted with the intent to -, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the crime of__”
The first, third, fifth and sixth paragraphs are restatements in partisan form of instructions that the trial judge did give: that the described specific intent is an element of the crime charged and that a finding of guilt requires proof of each element *455beyond a reasonable doubt. Once these propositions are clearly established by jury instruction, to go on to give CJI 3:1:16 is to imply that the issue of specific intent has some special significance in the case or that there is some infirmity of proof regarding that element. If either proposition is to be advanced, the argument should be made by counsel rather than by the implication of instructions from the court.
While it hardly requires citation of authority to say that jury instructions should not be argumentative, it is relevant to observe that long ago Justice Cooley disparaged requests to charge which were similar in effect to the specified paragraphs of CJI 3:1:16:
"The defence is not entitled of right to put an argument into the instructions; that must be left to counsel. Neither is he entitled of right to have from the judge any comment upon the evidence, or any pointing out of the weak points in the case of the State, so far as they involve questions of fact and not of law. All that can be demanded is, correct instructions on the legal points and no incorrect or unfair comments upon or presentation of the evidence.” People v Crawford, 48 Mich 498, 501; 12 NW 673 (1882).
In similar circumstances the Court has already said that the failure to give CJI 3:1:16 is not a failure to instruct on an element of an offense. People v Yarborough, 131 Mich App 579; 345 NW2d 650 (1983).2 I would make explicit that the defendant would not have been entitled to the instruction even if it had been requested because it is argumentative._

A revised form of CJI 3:1:16 appears in the December, 1984, supplement to the Standard Criminal Jury Instructions.

 Although the appellant has not relied on People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 571; 339 NW2d 461 (1983), it will be noted that the Court reproduced CJI 3:1:16 in footnote 1. The Court did not approve or disapprove the language of the instruction, the holding of the case being that the offense of endangering the lives of persons traveling on a railroad is a specific intent crime and that the trial court erred in not instructing on the specific intent element.