Court Opinion

ID: 9610357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:40:04.958512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:58.582127
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s conclusion that appellant Dana Ricardo Weldon’s death sentence be reversed and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. It is at this point that my reasoning diverges from the majority’s and I respectfully dissent. The majority’s opinion fails to give proper weight to error committed during the trial, resulting in the affirmation of both appellants’ convictions and appellant Ronnie Howard’s (Howard) death sentence. I would reverse and remand these cases for a new trial.
I disagree with the majority that the appellant’s motion to quash the jury panel was properly denied. The issue before this Court is whether the state rebutted appellants’ prima facie showing of racial discrimination. The trial court qualified nine Black persons as prospective jurors. The state exercised peremptory challenges to strike eight of the nine Black persons. At the Batson hearing, the solicitor advanced the following reasons to justify the state’s exercise of peremptory challenges:
(1) The prospective jurors were too young — ages twenty and twenty-three;
(2) The prospective jurors exhibited wavering support for the death penalty; and
(3) A prospective juror had an erratic work history and an unemployed spouse.
See e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); State v. Jones, 293 S. C. 54, 358 S. E. (2d) 701 (1987).
The solicitor’s articulated criteria for striking prospective Black jurors because of their ages and wavering support of *475the death penalty were not applied to potential White jurors.1 The same is true of the solicitor’s peremptory challenges against Blacks predicated upon an unstable work history.2
Under the Equal Protection Clause, similarly situated persons are to be treated alike; and it prohibits prosecutors from striking potential jurors solely on account of race or on the assumption that Black jurors will not impartially consider the state’s case against a Black defendant. Batson v. Kentucky, supra. See also, People v. Hall, 35 Cal. (3d) 161, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P. (2d) 854 (1983); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. (3d) 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P. (2d) 748 (1978). It is evident in this case that the solicitor did not use his peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner in that he excused youthful or unemployed Blacks but did not excuse similarly situated — youthful or unemployed — Whites.3 Clearly, his actions violated the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is most unfortunate that the majority concludes that the solicitor rebutted appellant’s prima facie case in the face of a record which contradicts the state’s articulated position. The affirmation of this case effectively undermines appellants’ right to an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross section of the community. The majority’s willingness to allow the state to prevail upon such blatantly inconsistent standards for its peremptory challenges leaves Batson and Jones without substance. See e.g., State v. Martinez, 294 S.C. 72, 362 S. E. (2d) 641 (1987) (Ness, C.J., dissenting). A prosecutor is required to show that he challenged similarly situated members of the majority group on *476identical or comparable grounds as members of the minority group. Compliance with this requirement establishes consistency in Batson hearings and provides a systematic means of determining bona fide neutral reasons for peremptory challenges. See, Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N. E. (2d) 499 (1979). See also, State v. Gilmore, 103 N. J. 508, 511 A. (2d) 1150, 1168 (1986) (prosecutor’s failure to challenge White jurors who did not meet his asserted criteria is highly probative in determining whether the prima facie case had been rebutted). Such consistency in the record would significantly curtail appellate review of this issue and insure the preservation of an accused’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand these cases for a new trial.

 The record reflects that the solicitor did not exercise peremptory challenges against five White jurors in their twenties; Emily Bagwell, twenty-two years old; Debra Badley, twenty years old; Tasha Mathis, twenty-two years old; and William Miller, twenty-five years old. Furthermore, the solicitor did not use peremptory challenges against White jurors who exhibited wavering attitudes about the death penalty or who could only impose it in extreme cases. For example, Juror Rohn testified that he was “really not certain” whether he could vote for the death penalty.

 The solicitor did not strike four White prospective jurors who had unstable work histories. For instance, he accepted one White juror who was unemployed at the time of the trial and another who had been employed at numerous jobs in past years.

 See Notes 1 and 2, and accompanying text.