Court Opinion

ID: 9521693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:09:59.210633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:06.532121
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, dissenting in part: I concur in the majority opinion except for that part of the decision remanding for resentencing. Where the record does not indicate that the circuit court was influenced by the vacated sentences in imposing sentences for the other offenses, a remand for resentencing is unnecessary. (People v. Payne (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 45, 57, 456 N.E.2d 44.) Here, in remarking on defense counsel’s argument advanced at the hearing to reconsider defendant’s sentence for armed violence that the jury found defendant not guilty of attempted murder, the circuit court merely responded that the jury did find defendant guilty of armed violence and other offenses. This one, isolated comment in the record does not suggest, in my opinion, that defendant’s sentence for armed violence was improperly affected by the convictions now vacated in this court. A reviewing court should not focus on a few words of the trial court, but should consider the entire record as a whole to determine if the sentence was improper. See People v. Ward (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526-27, 499 N.E.2d 422. From my reading of the record, the original sentence imposed for armed violence, which was reduced by the court at the hearing to modify the sentence, was based entirely on factors related to that offense and was not influenced by the number of convictions. (See People v. Burke (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 468, 474-75, 517 N.E.2d 1191.) There is simply no indication that the circuit court was influenced by the lesser convictions, briefly referred to in the hearing to modify, in imposing sentence for the more serious offense of armed violence. (See People v. Haybron (1987), 153 Ill. App. 3d 906, 909, 506 N.E.2d 369.) The 12-year sentence imposed for armed violence was substantially less than the maximum statutory sentence. Moreover, the majority sua sponte remands for resentencing the convictions for unlawful use of weapons and aggravated assault which had not been requested by the defendant in either the circuit court or this court. Remandment for resentencing on this record serves no useful purpose. Finally, I do not share the majority’s viewpoint that the Payne and Mitchell decisions of our supreme court are inconsistent. Payne clearly sets forth the rule that where the record does not indicate that the trial court was influenced by another conviction, subsequently vacated, in imposing sentences for other offenses, a remand for re-sentencing is unnecessary. (Payne, 98 Ill. 2d at 57, 456 N.E.2d at 50.) Mitchell, on the other hand, is an application of the exception to that rule where, in the circumstances of that case, convictions for the more serious offenses were reversed and the record indicated that the trial judge imposed maximum extended-term sentences for the less serious offenses based upon exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. (Mitchell, 105 Ill. 2d at 15-16, 473 N.E.2d at 1277.) The court apparently concluded from the record that the trial judge was influenced by the more serious convictions in imposing sentence for the less serious offenses. However, just because a more serious conviction is vacated, that alone, without an indication in the record of influence on the remaining convictions, will not require a remand for resentencing. See, e.g., Payne, 98 Ill. 2d at 57, 456 N.E.2d at 50 (where codefendant Bailey’s conviction for Class X offense of armed violence vacated and no remand for resentencing for same Class X offense of armed robbery and lesser Class 2 felony offense of burglary).