Court Opinion

ID: 9585268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:58:28.249577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:33.442269
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the majority’s ruling that the acceleration provision at issue in this case must be considered an unenforceable penalty due to the fact that it purports to authorize the recovery of eight years’ worth of future rental payments, totalling almost $80,000 without reduction to present value. However, I do not believe it is possible to reach this result without overruling Hughes Motor Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 136 Ga. App. 295 (3) (220 SE2d 782) (1975), and Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dowdy, 159 Ga. App. 666 (284 SE2d 679) (1981). In both those cases, this court rejected the same argument advanced by the appellant in the present case, based on the stated assumption that a lease provision authorizing the acceleration of unearned rental payments must always be considered enforceable. I do not believe it is appropriate for us to attempt to disavow the language which we used in those cases by reciting facts which are not included in the opinions but are derived from re-examination of the case records. Surely, it is unreasonable to expect the bench and bar to secure the record in each case we decide in order to determine whether we meant what we said.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Shulman, Judge Carley and Judge Pope join in this special concurrence.