Court Opinion

ID: 9841290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 20:02:44.562557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:44:37.034285
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEVEN EDWARDS,

     PLAINTIFF,

V.                                  Civ. Action No. 19-3614
                                    (EGS/RMM)
CHARLES SCHWAB CORPORATION,

     DEFENDANT.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Mr. Edwards, proceeding pro se, brings this action against

Charles Schwab Corporation (“Charles Schwab”), alleging damages

as a result of Charles Schwab’s alleged “fraudulent association

with the assignment of a loan with [Mr. Edwards] to PHH Mortgage

(“PHH”) that resulted in the foreclosure of his property.”

Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3, 25.

     On October 11, 2022, the Court referred this case to

Magistrate Judge Meriweather for full case management up to but

excluding trial, including, with respect to any dispositive

motions, the preparation of a report and recommendation pursuant

to Local Civil Rule 72.3. On September 8, 2023, Magistrate Judge

Meriweather issued a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”)

recommending that the Court dismiss the case with prejudice and

deny without prejudice the then-pending motions. See R. & R.,

ECF No. 66.

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       Pending before the Court are Mr. Edwards’ objections to the

R. & R. See Pl.’s Obj., ECF No. 67. Upon careful consideration

of the R. & R., the objections, the applicable law, and the

entire record herein, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R. & R., ECF

No. 66.

  I.      Legal Standard

       Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A

district court “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended

disposition.” Id. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)

(“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.”).

       A district court “must determine de novo any part of the

magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected

to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). “If, however, the party makes

only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his

original arguments, the Court reviews the [R. & R.] only for

clear error.” Houlahan v. Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C.

2013) (citation omitted). “Under the clearly erroneous standard,

the magistrate judge’s decision is entitled to great deference”

and “is clearly erroneous only if on the entire evidence the

court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

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mistake has been committed.” Buie v. Dist. of Columbia, No. CV

16-1920 (CKK), 2019 WL 4345712, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2019)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

     Objections must “specifically identify the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). “[O]bjections

which merely rehash an argument presented and considered by the

magistrate judge are not properly objected to and are therefore

not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff v. EPA, 991 F. Supp.

2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

  II.   Discussion

  On April 19, 2023, Magistrate Judge Meriweather issued an

Order to Show Cause, stating as follows:

            Plaintiff Stephen S. Edwards (“Mr. Edwards”)
            brought    suit    against   Charles    Schwab
            Corporation (“Schwab”) for damages resulting
            from Schwab’s allegedly fraudulent behavior
            related to the mortgage of a home that Mr.
            Edwards owned. See generally Compl., ECF No.
            1. Although the Complaint does not identify
            the address of the home at issue, Defendant
            asserts that Mr. Edwards’s allegations pertain
            to a property located at 1765 N. Lemon Street
            in Mesa, Arizona. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.
            for Entry of Default at 1, ECF No. 47. It
            appears that Mr. Edwards has brought numerous
            lawsuits in other federal courts based on the
            same facts. See Super Trust Fund u/t/d
            06/15/01 v. Charles Schwab Bank, et al., No.
            2:13-cv-735 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. Charles
            Schwab Bank et al., No. 2:14-cv-66 (D. Ariz);
            Stephen S. Edwards Inc. v. PHH Mortgage Corp.

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et al., No. 2:15-cv-919 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v.
Experian Info. Solutions Inc. et al., 2:15-
cv-2640 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. PPH Corp. et
al., 2:16-cv-1842 (D. Ariz.); Edwards v. PHH
Mortgage Corp. et al., 2:18-cv-4040 (D.
Ariz.); Edwards v. PHH Mortgage Corp. et al.,
1:22-cv-3926 (D. N.J.).

In Mr. Edwards’s most recent lawsuit in the
District of Arizona, the court found that Mr.
Edwards’s claims were barred by res judicata,
dismissed his claims with prejudice, declared
him a vexatious litigant, and ordered that Mr.
Edwards must obtain permission before bringing
any further litigation related to same facts.
See Edwards, 2:18-cv-4040 (D. Ariz.), ECF Nos.
99, 100. Specifically, that Court ordered that
Mr. Edwards and entities he wholly owned “must
obtain this Court’s approval before seeking to
commence any new action against Defendant PHH
Mortgage Corporation or any of its affiliates,
including officers, directors, employees,
agents, attorneys, predecessors, successors,
insurers,    affiliates,     subsidiaries   or
parents, or arising out of the purchase,
mortgage, financing or refinancing of the
property located at 1765 N. Lemon Street,
Mesa, Arizona.” Edwards, 2:18-cv-4040 (D.
Ariz.), ECF No. 100 at 10. Mr. Edwards then
brought related litigation in the District of
New Jersey, and that court, finding that Mr.
Edwards had not presented any evidence that he
received permission from the District of
Arizona court to bring the lawsuit, ordered
Mr. Edwards to show cause as to why the court
should   not   dismiss   his   complaint  with
prejudice. Edwards, 1:22-cv-3926 (D. N.J.),
ECF No. 20. After Mr. Edwards responded to the
order to show cause, the court dismissed the
case with prejudice. Edwards, 1:22-cv-3926 (D.
N.J.), ECF Nos. 22, 23.

Given that this lawsuit appears to be within
the scope of the District of Arizona’s
vexatious litigant order, and Mr. Edwards has
not presented any evidence that he received
permission from that court to bring the

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          present lawsuit, it is hereby ORDERED that Mr.
          Edwards shall SHOW CAUSE no later than May 10,
          2023 as to why the Court should not dismiss
          his complaint with prejudice in accordance
          with the District of Arizona court’s orders.
          The Court further advises Mr. Edwards that if
          he fails to timely respond to this Order the
          Court may dismiss this case with prejudice.

Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 60.

     On May 12, 2023, Mr. Edwards responded to the Order to Show

Cause on by filing a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that

the orders from the District of Arizona pertain only to

litigation in Arizona. See generally Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No.

62. Magistrate Judge Meriweather explained that she was

unpersuaded by his argument because “[t]he portion of the

District of Arizona order that requires Mr. Edwards to obtain

permission before bringing a new action is not limited that

jurisdiction.” R. & R., ECF No. 66 at 3 (citing Edwards, 2:18-

cv-4040 (D. Ariz.), ECF No. 100 at 10). Magistrate Judge

Meriweather further explained that

          The only portion of the order that expressly
          limits itself to matters “pending or closed in
          the District of Arizona” concerns Mr. Edwards’
          obligation to obtain permission before filing
          “further motion or pleadings” in those cases.
          See id. The subject of the present litigation—
          the Property at 1765 N. Lemon St.—is squarely
          within the scope of the District of Arizona’s
          order. See id. As noted, the order encompasses
          “any new action . . . arising out of the
          purchase, mortgage, financing or refinancing
          of the property located at 1765 N. Lemon
          Street, Mesa, Arizona.” Id. This case concerns

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          alleged fraudulent behavior regarding     the
          mortgage for that property. See Compl.

R. &. R., ECF No. 66 at 3-4. Magistrate Judge Meriweather

recommends dismissing the instant case because Mr. Edwards did

not receive permission from the District of Arizona to bring the

litigation. Id. at 4.

     Mr. Edwards’ objections fail to address Magistrate Judge

Meriweather’s determination that the instant case should be

dismissed because Mr. Edwards did not receive permission from

the District of Arizona to bring the litigation. See generally

Pl.’s Obj., ECF No. 67. Rather, Mr. Edwards casts aspersions on

Magistrate Judge Meriweather and others and claims that the

Arizona Order is frivolous because the case should not have been

removed from state to federal court. See generally id.

     “A court has the discretion to dismiss a complaint with

prejudice when a plaintiff fails to prosecute the complaint,

fails to follow the federal rules, or fails to follow court

orders.” O-J-R v. Ashcroft, 216 F.R.D. 150, 151 (D.D.C. 2003)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); LCvR 83.23). “It is well settled

that a court may dismiss a complaint filed by a vexatious

litigant that violates an injunctive order entered by another

court.” Justice v. Koskinen, 109 F. Supp. 3d 142, 147

(D.D.C. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As Magistrate Judge Meriweather stated, “Mr. Edwards has not

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received permission from the District of Arizona to bring this

litigation and is thus in violation of that court’s orders.” R.

&. R., ECF No. 66 at 4. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this

action.

  III. Conclusion

  For the reasons explained above, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate

Judge Meriweather’s R. &. R., see ECF No. 66; DISMISSES this

action with prejudice; and DENIES without prejudice Mr. Edwards’

pending Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 44; Motion for

Default Judgment, ECF No. 55; Motion to Strike, ECF No.

55; Motion for Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 59; and Motion for

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 62. An appropriate Order accompanies

this Memorandum Opinion.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          September 21, 2023

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