Court Opinion

ID: 9942323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 20:10:35.697579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:57.770996
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 14-23-27
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

KAREN MORGAN,                                             OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 14-23-28
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

KAREN MORGAN,                                             OPINION

         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeals from Union County Common Pleas Court
                  Trial Court Nos. 23-CR-0052 and 23-CR-0006

                                     Judgments Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: February 20, 2024

APPEARANCES:

         Alison Boggs for Appellant

         Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee
Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Karen S. Morgan (“Morgan”) appeals the

judgments of the Union County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the trial court

erred in the process of imposing a sentence in these cases and that she was denied

her right to the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the

judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} Morgan appeals two cases.           In Case No. 23-CR-06, Morgan was

indicted on one count of criminal trespass in violation of R.C. 2911.21(A)(3), a

fourth-degree misdemeanor; one count of burglary in violation of R.C.

2911.12(A)(1), a first-degree felony; and one count of petty theft in violation of

R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor. On May 12, 2023, Morgan pled

guilty to the three charges against her. The trial court then imposed an aggregate,

indefinite prison term of two to three years.

       {¶3} In Case No. 23-CR-52, Morgan was indicted on one count of trafficking

in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a first-degree felony, and one count

of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), a fourth-degree felony.

On May 18, 2023, Morgan pled guilty to both of the charges against her. The trial

court imposed an aggregate, indefinite prison term of six to nine years to be served

consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case No. 23-CR-06.

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

       {¶4} Morgan filed her notices of appeal on July 13, 2023 and July 19, 2023.

On appeal, she raises the following two assignments of error:

                             First Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred when it imposed a greater than minimum
       sentence in the trafficking in cocaine case after finding the factors
       in support of a minimum sentence in the burglary case, then
       ordering the trafficking sentence to be served consecutive to the
       sentence in the burglary case.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Appellant was deprived [of] effective assistance of counsel.

                              First Assignment of Error

       {¶5} Morgan asserts that the trial court erred (1) by not imposing the

minimum prison term in Case No. 23-CR-52 and (2) by ordering her sentence in

Case No. 23-CR-52 to be served consecutively to her sentence in Case No. 23-CR-

06.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶6} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) establishes the scope of appellate review for felony

sentences. State v. Passmore, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-22-39, 2023-Ohio-3209, ¶

64. Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may reverse or modify a sentence

only if there is clear and convincing evidence (1) that the trial court’s findings under

R.C. 2929.13(B), R.C. 2929.13(D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e), R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) or

R.C. 2929.20(I) are not supported by the record or (2) that the sentence is otherwise

contrary to law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

1231, ¶ 1. “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof * * *

which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to

the facts sought to be established.” State v. Taflinger, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-17-20,

2018-Ohio-456, ¶ 12, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118

(1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶7} “Trial courts have full discretion to impose any sentence within the

statutory range.” State v. Stansberry, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-22-25, 2023-Ohio-

3212, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225,

¶ 9. But in the process of fashioning a sentence, trial courts are still required to

consider the principles and purposes of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 in

addition to the seriousness and recidivism factors listed in R.C. 2929.12. State v.

Slife, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-20-17, 2021-Ohio-644, ¶ 11-12.

       {¶8} However, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) “does not provide a basis for an appellate

court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence is not

supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio

St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. Thus, “[a] sentence imposed

within the statutory range is not contrary to law as long as the trial court considered

the purposes and principles of felony sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11 and the

sentencing factors contained in R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Johnson, 2021-Ohio-1768,

173 N.E.3d 94, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.).

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

      {¶9} Further, prison terms for multiple offenses are generally served

concurrently. State v. Schmidt, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-23-01, 2023-Ohio-3845, ¶

32, citing R.C. 2929.41(A).     However, the trial court may impose sentences

consecutively if it makes the findings that are set forth as follows in R.C.

2929.14(C)(4):

      (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions
      of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
      prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
      service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
      punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
      disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
      the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds
      any of the following:

      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
      the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
      imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
      Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
      one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
      of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
      single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
      the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
      offender’s conduct.

      (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crime by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Thus, pursuant to this provision,

      the trial court must find (1) that consecutive sentences are necessary
      to protect the public or punish the offender (‘the necessity finding’);
      (2) that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

         seriousness of the offense (‘the proportionality finding’); and (3) that
         one of the three factors listed in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a-c) is applicable.

State v. Dendinger, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-23-11, 2023-Ohio-4255, ¶ 18. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(a) expressly authorizes an appellate court to reverse or modify a

sentence if the findings made under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) are clearly and

convincingly unsupported by the record. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209,

2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 28.

                                             Legal Analysis

         {¶10} In her first argument, Morgan asserts that the trial court should have

imposed the minimum prison term in Case No. 23-CR-52. Specifically, she argues

that her criminal history supports the imposition of a shorter sentence for the drug

trafficking offenses she committed. Morgan also notes that the trial court imposed

the minimum prison sentence in Case No. 23-CR-06.                               However, the record

establishes that the trial court expressly considered R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12

in the process of imposing a sentence in Case No. 23-CR-52.                                  Further, the

challenged prison terms fall within the authorized range. Thus, these arguments do

not establish that the prison terms imposed in Case No. 23-CR-52 are clearly and

convincingly contrary to law.

         {¶11} In her second argument, Morgan asserts that the prison terms from

these two cases should not have been imposed consecutively.1 During sentencing,

1
 Many of Morgan’s arguments are based upon the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gwynne, ---
Ohio St.3d ---, 2022-Ohio-4607, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 12. However, after she had filed her brief, the Ohio Supreme

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

the trial court expressly made the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and

incorporated these findings into its judgment entry.                      Further, the presentence

investigation indicates that Morgan has a criminal record that went back to 1993.

She also committed the offenses in Case No. 23-CR-52 in February of 2023. Thus,

these offenses occurred in the same month that she had been released on her own

recognizance in Case No. 23-CR-06. The State also noted that the drug offense was

committed in the presence of a child and involved a substantial amount of drugs.

Having reviewed the relevant materials, we do not conclude that the trial court’s

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings are unsupported by the record. Thus, Morgan’s second

argument does not establish that her sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary

to law. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

                                   Second Assignment of Error

        {¶12} Morgan asserts that her conviction for burglary should be reversed

because defense counsel’s representation was ineffective.

                                           Legal Standard

        {¶13} Ohio law presumes that a licensed attorney’s representation was

competent. State v. Bruce, 2023-Ohio-3298, 224 N.E.3d 715, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In

order to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry

the burden of establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient

Court vacated this decision on reconsideration. See State v. Gwynne, --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2023-Ohio-3851, --
- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 26. We will examine this assignment of error in light of the prevailing law.

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay,

3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-42, 2018-Ohio-3618, ¶ 24, quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

       {¶14} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate

that trial “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Howton, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-16-35, 2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 35, quoting Strickland at 687. To

establish prejudice, “the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v.

Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, 78 N.E.3d 343, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶15} Case No. 23-CR-06 arose from a situation in which Morgan took

$566.00 worth of goods out of a Walmart without tendering payment. While

investigating this incident, law enforcement discovered that Morgan had previously

received a conviction for stealing from a Walmart in Marion County, Ohio. As the

result of this earlier case, she was ordered not to enter Walmart stores. This prior

order resulted in Morgan being charged with burglary for the incident that gave rise

to Case No. 23-CR-06.

       {¶16} On appeal, Morgan argues that defense counsel’s performance was

deficient “because a certified copy of the [Marion County judgment] entry was

never entered into evidence to prove that the language in the entry was clear and

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Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

unequivocal * * *.” (Appellant’s Brief, 11). Morgan asserts that she may have been

charged with an offense that was less serious than burglary if the wording of the

order was ambiguous or vague. In response, the State points out that the Defense

received a copy of the “Walmart Trespass Notice” during discovery. (Doc. 13).

       {¶17} This Court has held that, “where proof outside the record is required

to support a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the claim is ‘purely

speculative and * * * “it is not appropriate for consideration on direct appeal.”’”

State v. Nichols, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-22-08, 2023-Ohio-4364, ¶ 21, quoting State

v. Anders, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-16-27, 2017-Ohio-2589, ¶ 66, quoting State v.

Zupancic, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0065, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶ 4. This assignment

of error rests on the wording of a document that is not in the record. Her brief

reveals the speculative nature of her argument when she asserts that the outcome of

this proceeding may have been different “if the language [in the order] was vague

and not pointed.” (Emphasis added.) (Appellant’s Brief, 11).

       {¶18} In conclusion, Morgan’s speculative argument cannot establish the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Thus, she has failed to carry the burden of

establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this appeal. Accordingly,

the second assignment of error is overruled.

                                        -9-
Case No. 14-23-27 and 14-23-28

                                   Conclusion

       {¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgments of the Union County Court of Common Pleas

are affirmed.

                                                             Judgments Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.

/hls

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