Court Opinion

ID: 9554897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 15:04:52.175531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:33.661765
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 23-CO-0233

                          RALSTON PEYTON, APPELLANT,

                                         v.

                            UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

                          Appeal from the Superior Court
                           of the District of Columbia
                              (2021-CMD-007290)

                     (Hon. Peter A. Krauthamer, Trial Judge)

(Argued June 21, 2023                                     Decided August 10, 2023)

      Daniel Gonen, Public Defender Service, with whom Samia Fam, Jaclyn S.
Frankfurt, and Kelsey Townsend, Public Defender Service, were on the filings, for
appellant.

      Michael E. McGovern, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Matthew
M. Graves, United States Attorney, and Chrisellen R. Kolb, Saifuddin Kalolwala,
and Jennifer C. Mika, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the filings, for
appellee.

       Holly M. Johnson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L.
Schwalb, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile,
Solicitor General, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, were
on the brief, for the District of Columbia as amicus curiae supporting appellee.

      Before BECKWITH, EASTERLY, and MCLEESE, Associate Judges.

      Opinion of the court per curiam.
                                           2

       Opinion by Associate Judge MCLEESE, dissenting in part and concurring in
the judgment, at page 12.

      PER CURIAM: Appellant Ralston Peyton was charged with the misdemeanor

offense of unlawful entry onto private property, but he was subsequently found to

be incompetent to proceed in the criminal case and unlikely to regain competence.

See D.C. Code § 24-531.01(1) (defining “competence” as “present ability to consult

with [defendant’s] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and

“rational, as well as . . . factual, understanding of the proceedings”).

      The criminal court ordered Mr. Peyton to remain in inpatient treatment for up

to 30 days pending the filing of a civil-commitment petition. See D.C. Code

§ 24-531.06(c)(4). After the District of Columbia filed a civil-commitment petition,

the criminal court further ordered that Mr. Peyton remain in the inpatient mental-

health facility until the entry of a final order in the civil-commitment case. See D.C.

Code § 24-531.07(a)(2) (“If a petition for civil commitment has been filed, the court

may either order that treatment be continued until the entry of a final order in the

civil commitment case or release the defendant from treatment.”).

      Mr. Peyton appealed and filed an emergency motion for summary reversal.

The United States filed a cross-motion for summary affirmance, supported by the
                                          3

District of Columbia as amicus curiae. After the emergency filings were completed,

the court set the case for oral argument as soon as was practical.

      Relying on principles of substantive due process, procedural due process, and

equal protection, Mr. Peyton argues that § 24-531.07(a)(2) is both facially

unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. The United States and the

District of Columbia argue that § 24-531.07(a)(2) is not facially unconstitutional and

the United States argues that § 24-531.07(a)(2) was not unconstitutionally applied

to Mr. Peyton.

      During the pendency of this emergency appeal, the family court issued a final

order in Mr. Peyton’s civil-commitment matter. In that order, to which the parties

consented, the family court determined by clear and convincing evidence that Mr.

Peyton was mentally ill; that he was likely to injure himself or others if not

committed; and that outpatient treatment was the least-restrictive treatment

alternative. The family court therefore ordered Mr. Peyton committed for a one-year

period of outpatient treatment. The issuance of that final commitment order means

that the order currently under review, which provided for inpatient treatment only

until issuance of a final commitment order, is no longer in effect.
                                          4

      The parties dispute whether the appeal is therefore moot or whether the order

instead might have adverse collateral consequences. We need not decide that issue.

Even assuming that the case is moot, we would decline to dismiss the case outright.

This court was established under Article I of the United States Constitution and

therefore is not strictly governed by the mootness principles that govern courts

established under Article III of the United States Constitution. E.g., In re Bright

Ideas Co., 284 A.3d 1037, 1042 n.4 (D.C. 2022). Rather, we have discretionary

authority, which we exercise “careful[ly,] . . . to reach the merits of a seemingly

moot controversy.” Atchison v. District of Columbia, 585 A.2d 150, 153 (D.C.

1991). For example, we have exercised that authority in cases that “present[] an

important and recurring issue . . . [that] would otherwise tend to evade review.” In

re Macklin, 286 A.3d 547, 551 (D.C. 2022).

      The defendant in In re Macklin was found incompetent and unlikely to regain

competence. 286 A.3d at 550. Unlike in the present case, the criminal court in In

re Macklin ultimately released the defendant in the criminal case and did not order

the defendant into inpatient treatment pending the outcome of the ongoing civil-

commitment proceeding. Id. at 550-51. The District of Columbia appealed, arguing

that the statutory provisions at issue required that the defendant remain in inpatient

treatment pending the outcome of the civil-commitment proceeding. Id. at 551.
                                          5

While the appeal was pending, however, the civil-commitment proceeding was

completed and the defendant was committed for a one-year period of outpatient

treatment. Id. Nonetheless, this court exercised its discretion to decide the case on

the merits. Id.

      For reasons similar to those in In re Macklin, we exercise our discretion to

consider certain of the issues raised in this emergency appeal rather than dismissing

the appeal outright. We note, however, that the parties and the amicus raise

numerous constitutional and statutory issues, some of which are complex and

unsuited to disposition under the standards the court generally applies when

considering whether to decide issues through summary procedures. See generally,

e.g., Carl v. Tirado, 945 A.2d 1208, 1209 (D.C. 2008) (per curiam) (“The standard

for summary disposition is well-established: the movant must show that the basic

facts are both uncomplicated and undisputed, and that the lower court’s ruling rests

on a narrow and clear-cut issue of law.”). In theory, the court could devote

substantial additional resources to the case, by directing full briefing, holding a

second oral argument after that full briefing, and fully resolving all contested issues

on the merits. We are mindful, however, that our discretion to decide seemingly

moot cases should be exercised carefully. Atchison, 585 A.2d at 153. Rather than

either dismissing the case outright or fully resolving all of the issues presented by
                                            6

the parties and the amicus, we take an intermediate approach. In the course of this

appeal, the United States has acknowledged that important minimum requirements

must be met before a defendant who has been found incompetent and unlikely to

regain competence could constitutionally be ordered pursuant to D.C. Code

§ 24-531.07(a)(2) to remain in inpatient treatment in the criminal case awaiting final

resolution of a pending civil-commitment petition. We agree, and we therefore issue

this opinion recognizing those minimum requirements.

       Most broadly, Mr. Peyton argues that § 24-531.07(a)(2) is facially

unconstitutional, because it purports to grant the criminal court standardless

discretion to order continued inpatient treatment of defendants who have been found

incompetent and unlikely to regain competence, until the final resolution of a

pending civil-commitment petition. In our view, Mr. Peyton’s facial challenge to

§ 24-531.07(a)(2) presents a difficult issue not suitable for resolution through

summary procedures. Compare, e.g., Conley v. United States, 79 A.3d 270, 277

(D.C. 2013) (to demonstrate statute is facially invalid, “[a]ppellant must demonstrate

that the terms of the statute, measured against the relevant constitutional doctrine,

and independent of the constitutionality of particular applications, contain a

constitutional infirmity that invalidates the statute in its entirety” (cleaned up)), with,

e.g., Sharps v. United States, 246 A.3d 1141, 1154 (D.C. 2021) (stating that
                                           7

defendant asserting facial unconstitutionality of statute “can only succeed by

establishing that no set of circumstances exist under which the statute would be

valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications” (cleaned up)).

We recognize the desirability of providing guidance to the trial court on the question

whether § 24-531.07(a)(2) is facially unconstitutional, but for the reasons we have

explained we do not on balance view it as appropriate to resolve that issue in the

circumstances of the present case.

      More narrowly, Mr. Peyton argues that a defendant who has been found

incompetent and unlikely to regain competence could lawfully be ordered by the

criminal court to remain in inpatient treatment while awaiting final resolution of a

pending civil-commitment petition only if certain procedural and substantive

requirements were met. The United States and the District of Columbia take

differing positions on some of the issues raised by Mr. Peyton’s narrower argument,

and the positions of both the United States and the District of Columbia also appear

to have evolved to a degree during this appeal. As noted above, however, we

understand the United States—the prosecuting entity in this case—to have

acknowledged at oral argument that, to constitutionally order inpatient treatment

under § 24-531.07(a)(2), the criminal court must comply with certain procedural and

substantive requirements. Specifically, we understand the United States to have
                                           8

acknowledged that a defendant who has been found incompetent and unlikely to

regain competence may not constitutionally be ordered to remain in inpatient

treatment in the criminal case, pursuant to § 24-531.07(a)(2), in the absence of (1) a

finding that the defendant has a mental illness; (2) a finding that, because of that

mental illness, the defendant would be a danger to self or others if not immediately

detained; (3) a finding that inpatient treatment is the least restrictive means of

addressing dangerousness; and (4) the right to an evidentiary hearing unless the

defendant concedes those issues. We also understand the District, as amicus, to

agree that these findings and a hearing (if requested) are required, though the United

States is more pointed in acknowledging that the Constitution—rather than a silent

statute—requires these measures. 1 We agree with the United States that a criminal

court’s constitutional exercise of authority to order inpatient treatment under

§ 24-531.07(a)(2) would at a minimum require compliance with those procedural

and substantive requirements.

      1
         Because the text of D.C. Code § 24-531.07(a)(2)—“If a petition for civil
commitment has been filed, the court may either order that treatment be continued
until the entry of a final order in the civil commitment case or release the defendant
from treatment”—is silent on these questions, we do not see a way in which these
requirements could be imposed without reference to constitutional principles. But
see post at 14. And we do not understand the District to be advocating otherwise.
Instead it took the position at oral argument that we could “read[] [the statute] so it
would be constitutionally valid. Whether you want to call it fixing the statute,
changing the statue, or just interpreting it in a way that’s valid, that is what we know
the court is required to do.”
                                         9

      Specifically, we are confident that the Fifth Amendment’s substantive and

procedural protections 2 in combination support requiring the criminal court to make

the findings described above regarding mental illness, dangerousness, and least

restrictive alternative. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (observing

that “[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment

bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is

committed”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (holding that, to

comport with due process, a court must make dangerousness and least-restrictive-

alternative findings in a civil-commitment proceeding because “a State cannot

constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of

surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible

family members or friends”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78-80, 83 (1992)

(holding that, to comport with due process, a current mental illness and

dangerousness finding was required for continued detention of individuals acquitted

by reason of insanity); Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979)

(observing that “[d]iscretion without a criteria for its exercise is authorization of

arbitrariness” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383

U.S. 107, 114 (1966) (rejecting as unconstitutional the “wholly arbitrary” statutory

      2
         The principles embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment likewise define the
protections that apply to the District under the Fifth Amendment. See Dean v. United
States, 938 A.2d 751, 759 n.10 (D.C. 2007).
                                          10

provision of lesser procedures to one group of individuals civilly committed); cf.

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (reaffirming that “[f]reedom from

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical

restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects” and

that outside of a criminal case, detention violates that Clause absent “certain special

and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification, such as harm-

threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected

interest in avoiding physical restraint” (cleaned up)). We likewise have no doubt

that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful

time and in a meaningful manner” necessitates an evidentiary hearing unless all of

these substantive criteria are conceded. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488

(1980) (requiring “opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing” regarding

prisoner transfer to a mental hospital to comport with due process); cf. Zadvydas,

533 U.S. at 691 (noting that the Court has “upheld preventive detention based on

dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to

strong procedural protections”). We therefore hold that the Constitution requires

these substantive and procedural protections.
                                         11

      As previously noted, we express no view on Mr. Peyton’s claim that

§ 24-531.07(a)(2) is facially unconstitutional. We also express no views as to a

number of other issues that arose during briefing and argument in this case. Many

of those issues have not been fully briefed and many in any event do not appear to

be suitable for summary decision.      For example, we express no views as to

(1) whether the required findings should be made under a probable-cause standard

or a higher standard; (2) what level of scrutiny applies under substantive-due-

process principles to determine the constitutionality of the temporary detention of

defendants who have been found incompetent and unlikely to regain competence;

(3) the constitutionality of D.C. Code § 24-531.06(c)(4), which authorizes a criminal

court to order up to 30 days of inpatient treatment for defendants who have been

found incompetent and unlikely to regain competence, during which time a civil-

commitment petition may be filed; (4) the constitutionality of the procedure,

discussed in In re Macklin, wherein a defendant who has been found incompetent

and unlikely to regain competence is “released from treatment” in the criminal case

and then remanded to the inpatient treatment facility, D.C. Code § 24-531.07(a)(2),

(c)(1); In re Macklin, 286 A.3d at 553-60; and (5) the proper procedure to be

followed if the criminal court declines to order inpatient treatment under D.C. Code

§ 24-531.07(a)(2) because the criminal court finds that the defendant has not been
                                          12

shown to be dangerous, and the criminal court then releases the defendant from

treatment.

      Finally, we vacate the criminal court’s order that Mr. Peyton remain in an

inpatient mental-health facility until the entry of a final order in the civil-

commitment case. On the assumption that the appeal is moot, vacating the trial

court’s order serves to “protect [Mr. Peyton] from the collateral effects” of the

criminal court’s order. Bryan v. United States, 836 A.2d 581, 583 (D.C. 2003). On

the assumption that the appeal is not moot, we think it clear that the proceedings in

the criminal court in this case did not fully comply with the procedural and

substantive requirements that the United States and the District of Columbia now

acknowledge. The order of the Superior Court is therefore vacated.

                                                                          So ordered.

      MCLEESE, J., Associate Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in the

judgment: In my view, this appeal is moot. The order at issue directed that Mr.

Peyton remain in an inpatient mental-health facility until the entry of a final order in

the civil-commitment case. A final order has now been entered in the civil-

commitment case, so the prior order is no longer operative. Mr. Peyton argues that
                                          13

the prior order might have collateral consequences, but I am not persuaded that is

the case. To avoid the possibility of such consequences, however, I agree that the

order of the trial court should be vacated. See, e.g., Lewis v. Hotel & Rest. Emps.

Union, Local 25, 727 A.2d 297, 299-300 (D.C. 1999) (when case becomes moot on

appeal, trial-court judgment should ordinarily be vacated, “thereby preserving the

rights of all parties”). I therefore concur in the judgment.

      I respectfully disagree with the court’s decision to resolve this case on the

merits.   Mr. Peyton’s broadest argument is that § 24-531.07(a)(2) is facially

unconstitutional. The court appropriately declines to decide that issue, for three

stated reasons: (1) the issue has been briefed and argued in this case through

expedited and summary procedures; (2) the issue is difficult and not suitable to

resolution through summary procedures; and (3) we should carefully exercise our

discretion to decide seemingly moot cases. Supra at 5-6. Declining to reach Mr.

Peyton’s claim of facial unconstitutionality is appropriate for a fourth reason that is

of fundamental importance but that the court does not mention: the principle that we

should avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues. See generally, e.g., In re

Bright Ideas Co., 284 A.3d 1037, 1049 (D.C. 2022) (“[C]onstitutional adjudication

is a matter of great gravity and delicacy, so our practice is to avoid ruling on

constitutional questions unless we have no other choice.”) (internal quotation marks
                                          14

omitted); Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 81 (D.C. 1988) (“The

practice of avoiding constitutional issues if it is reasonably possible to do so is

predicated on a fundamental rule of judicial restraint, which is perhaps more deeply

rooted than any other doctrine of constitutional adjudication.”).

      Mr. Peyton argues more narrowly that a defendant who has been found

incompetent and unlikely to regain competence may not constitutionally be ordered

to remain in inpatient treatment in the criminal case, pursuant to D.C. Code

§ 24-531.07(a)(2), unless certain procedural requirements are met. The United

States and the District of Columbia concede that the procedural protections noted

above are legally required, but they disagree as to whether those protections are

compelled by the Constitution or instead should be imposed as a matter of statutory

interpretation. In my view, the court in this case need not and should not decide

those issues on the merits. Resolving those issues will have no effect on Mr. Peyton.

Moreover, given the concessions of the United States and the District of Columbia,

it does not appear that resolving those issues in this case is necessary to protect the

interests of defendants who are found to be incompetent and unlikely to regain

competence. Finally, resolving those issues in this case is unwarranted for the same

four reasons that it is appropriate to decline to decide whether § 24-531.07(a)(2) is

facially unconstitutional: (1) the relevant constitutional and statutory issues have
                                           15

been briefed and argued in this case through expedited and summary procedures;

(2) the issues are difficult and not suitable to resolution through summary

procedures; (3) we should carefully exercise our discretion to decide seemingly

moot cases; and (4) we should avoid unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues.

      The court’s choice to announce a constitutional ruling in this case is of

particular concern, in my view, for two additional reasons. First, the court’s

constitutional ruling appears to raise a significant question about the constitutionality

of a federal statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a) (filing of civil-commitment certificate

with respect to defendant found incompetent and unlikely to regain competence

“stay[s] the release of the person pending completion” of civil-commitment

proceedings). Second, although the court announces a constitutional holding, it does

not provide any substantial independent analysis to support that holding. Rather, the

court’s analysis consists of (1) a brief footnote suggesting, without citation to

authority, that § 24-531.07(a)(2) cannot properly be construed to provide the

procedural protections at issue, supra at 8 n.1; and (2) a string cite of cases that

address various substantive-due-process and procedural-due-process issues but that

do not clearly resolve the constitutional issue the court chooses to resolve, supra at

9-10. The court does not address the contrary authority and arguments presented by

the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, 406 U.S. 715, 725
                                          16

(1972) (temporary, rather than indefinite, detention of defendant found incompetent

and unlikely to regain competence “might well be a different case”); Thomas v.

United States, 418 A.2d 122, 126 (D.C. 1980) (“The Supreme Court in Jackson did

not require additional temporary measures to justify continued confinement pending

disposition of the civil commitment procedures . . . and we, too, see no need for such

additional measures here.”). In my view, the court’s brief discussion does not

support a conclusion that the constitutional issue the court unnecessarily decides is

so clear as to be appropriate for summary resolution in this moot appeal. See

generally, e.g., D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police/Metro. Police

Dep’t Lab. Comm., 997 A.2d 65, 70 (D.C. 2010) (“[S]ummary treatment is reserved

for cases where the trial court’s ruling rests on a narrow and clear-cut issue of law.”)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

      For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent in part and concur only in the

judgment.