Court Opinion

ID: 9917410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 15:01:45.209309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:38.820687
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                               ________________________

                                      SC-2023-0278
                                _________________________

                Ex parte Richard Mullen and Cheryl Mullen

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                            (In re: Karl Leo and Fay Leo

                                                  v.

                  Richard L. Mullen and Cheryl C. Mullen)

                    (Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-22-902788)

BRYAN, Justice.

       Richard Mullen and Cheryl Mullen petition this Court for a writ of

mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer this action to
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the Walker Circuit Court. For the reasons explained below, we grant the

Mullens' petition and issue the writ.

                              Background

     In 2018, the Mullens purchased a parcel of real property located in

Walker County ("the property") and, thereafter, constructed a residence

on the property. In 2021, the Mullens sold the property to Karl Leo and

Fay Leo for $2.25 million.

     In September 2022, the Leos commenced this action against the

Mullens and fictitiously named defendants in the Jefferson Circuit Court

by filing a verified complaint; the Mullens resided in Jefferson County at

that time. In summary, the Leos averred that the Mullens were not

licensed homebuilders and that, within months of purchasing the

property, the Leos had discovered several latent defects in the residence,

including an inadequate and improperly installed climate-control

system, improper construction of a retaining wall and chimney, and

insufficient drainage. The Leos averred that they had asked the Mullens

to cure the alleged defects but that the Mullens had declined to do so.

The Leos asserted the following claims: breach of contract, breach of the

implied warranty of habitability, fraud, negligence, and fraudulent

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suppression. In their "demand for relief," the Leos requested awards of

compensatory and punitive damages and "such other and further relief

to which they may be entitled in law or in equity."

     The Mullens filed a motion to dismiss the Leos' complaint or,

alternatively, to transfer the action to the Walker Circuit Court. The

Mullens asserted that Walker County is the proper venue for this action

because the property is located there and, alternatively, that Walker

County is a significantly more convenient forum. On March 13, 2023, the

Jefferson Circuit Court denied the Mullens' motion, determining that

venue is proper in Jefferson County.      The Mullens then filed their

mandamus petition.

                          Standard of Review

           "Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be
     issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the
     petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
     respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
     the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
     jurisdiction of the court."

Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995).

     " 'A trial court's denial of a motion to transfer based on
     improper venue is reviewable by a petition for writ of
     mandamus, and "such a petition is due to be granted if the
     petitioner makes a clear showing of error on the part of the

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     trial court." Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 922
     (Ala. 1994).' "

Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So. 3d 940, 942 (Ala.

2011)(quoting Ex parte Burr & Forman, LLP, 5 So. 3d 557, 565 (Ala.

2008)).

                                 Analysis

     The Mullens assert two arguments in their petition. First, they

argue that the only proper venue for this action is Walker County because

that is where the property is located and because the Leos have requested

equitable relief in their complaint. Alternatively, the Mullens argue that,

even if Jefferson County is a proper venue, the action should nevertheless

be transferred to Walker County pursuant to the doctrine of forum non

conveniens.   For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the

Mullens' first argument is dispositive; therefore, we express no opinion

regarding their second argument.

     As noted, the Mullens first argue that the only proper venue for this

action is Walker County because that is where the property is situated

and because, in the "demand for relief," the Leos' complaint requested

awards of compensatory and punitive damages and "such other and

further relief to which they may be entitled in law or in equity."
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(Emphasis added.) The Mullens cite § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, and Rule

82(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Section 6-3-2 provides:

           "(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against individuals:

                "(1) All actions for the recovery of land, of the
           possession thereof, or for a trespass thereto must
           be commenced in the county where the land or a
           material part thereof lies.

                 "(2) All actions on contracts, except as may
           be otherwise provided, must be commenced in the
           county in which the defendant or one of the
           defendants resides if such defendant has within
           the state a permanent residence.

                 "(3) All other personal actions, if the
           defendant or one of the defendants has within the
           state a permanent residence, may be commenced
           in the county of such residence or in the county in
           which the act or omission complained of may have
           been done or may have occurred.

           "(b) In proceedings of an equitable nature against
     individuals:

                "(1) All actions where real estate is the
           subject matter of the action, whether it is the
           exclusive subject matter of the action or not, must
           be commenced in the county where the same or a
           material portion thereof is situated.

                "(2) If the action is to enjoin proceedings on
           judgments in other courts, it may be commenced
           in the county in which such proceedings are
           pending or judgment entered.

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                 "(3) Except as may be otherwise provided,
           actions must be commenced in the county in which
           the defendant or a material defendant resides.

                 "(4) In the case of nonresidents, actions must
           be commenced in the county where the subject of
           the action or any portion of the same was when the
           claim arose or the act on which the action is
           founded was to be performed."

     Section 6-1-1(b), Ala. Code 1975, states: "The adoption of the 1975

Code of Alabama shall not repeal, alter, amend, or modify any rule

governing civil procedure heretofore promulgated by the Supreme Court

of Alabama." Section 6-1-2, Ala. Code 1975, states: "Any provisions of

this title regulating procedure shall apply only if the procedure is not

governed by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, the Alabama Rules of

Appellate Procedure, or any other rule of practice and procedure as may

be adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama."

     The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure became effective in 1973.

See Rule 86, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Phillips v. D. & J. Enters., 292 Ala. 31, 288

So. 2d 137 (1973). Rule 82(b) provides, in pertinent part:

           "(b) Venue of Actions. Venue of actions shall not be
     affected by these rules except as the statute for venue for
     actions against individuals at law (§ 6-3-2(a)) and the statute
     for venue for actions against individuals in equity (§ 6-3-2(b))
     are inconsistent. Such inconsistencies are resolved as follows:

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                "(1) Against Resident Individuals. Actions
           against an individual or individuals having a
           permanent residence in this state:

                       "(A) Must be brought in the
                 county where the defendant or any
                 material defendant resides at the
                 commencement of the action, except
                 that if the action is a personal action
                 other than an action on a contract, it
                 may be brought either in the county
                 where the act or omission complained
                 of occurred, or in the county of the
                 permanent residence of the defendant
                 or one of them;

                       "(B) Must, if the subject matter of
                 the action is real estate, whether or not
                 exclusively, or if it is for recovery or the
                 possession thereof or trespass thereto,
                 be brought in the county where the real
                 estate or a material portion thereof is
                 situated."

     The Committee Comments on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 82 state,

in pertinent part:

           "Subdivision (b).     It is not possible to preserve
     unchanged existing Alabama law as to venue. The general
     venue statute dealing with actions at law, Code 1940, Tit. 7, §
     54[, now codified at § 6-3-2(a)], differs from the venue statute
     covering suits in equity, Code 1940, Tit. 7, § 294[, now codified
     at § 6-3-2(b)]. Since law and equity are merged by these rules,
     it is necessary to provide one rule as to venue which will
     resolve such differences. This subdivision is intended to have
     that effect. The two statutes have been reconciled, and the
     more liberal provision as to venue in any particular situation
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     has been incorporated into this rule. Of course, this Rule
     82(b) applies only to individuals, not corporations or other
     entities unless multiple claims against parties are involved.
     See Rule 82(c).

           "….

          "Clause (B) incorporates provisions of both venue
     statutes as they apply to specific actions involving land."

     Frequently, in determining whether the location of real property

dictates the venue of a particular action, this Court has discussed § 6-3-

2(b)(1) and considered both whether the proceeding at issue was of an

equitable nature and whether the subject matter of the action was the

real estate involved. See, e.g., Ex parte Pratt, 514 So. 2d 947 (Ala. 1987);

Ex parte Cannon, 508 So. 2d 222 (Ala. 1987); Ex party Clardy, 460 So. 2d

1273 (Ala. 1984); and Ex parte Lamb, 400 So. 2d 386 (Ala. 1981).

     However, in Ex parte Travis, 573 So. 2d 281 (Ala. 1990), the Court

considered § 6-3-2 and Rule 82(b)(1)(B) together. After quoting from § 6-

3-2(b)(1), the Court stated that "Rule 82 broadens this principle by doing

away, for venue purposes, with the distinction between legal and

equitable actions concerning real estate …." 573 So. 2d at 282 (emphasis

added). Somewhat confusingly, however, the Court's decision in Ex parte

Travis still pointed out that the action at issue there sought equitable

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relief. 573 So. 2d at 282 n.1. To further add to this confusion, cases that

the Court decided in the subsequent two years also continued to consider

both whether the subject matter of the action at issue was real estate and

whether the action involved equitable relief when applying § 6-3-2 and

Rule 82(b)(1)(B). See Ex parte Diamond, 596 So. 2d 423 (Ala. 1992); and

Ex parte Taylor, 583 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991).

     Later, in Ex parte Ambrose, 813 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 2001), the Court

again considered § 6-3-2(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(1)(B) together. In so doing,

the Court stated: "Rule 82, Ala. R. Civ. P., … governs venue of actions

only when the application of § 6-3-2(a) and § 6-3-2(b) to claims for legal

and equitable relief produces inconsistent venues." 813 So. 2d at 809

(emphasis added).       This statement was in accord with prior

pronouncements of the Court. See Ex parte Lashley, 596 So. 2d 890, 892

(Ala. 1992)("Although there are cases that appear to apply provisions of

Rule 82 as if Rule 82 were an independent statement of venue, Rule 82

applies only when there is an inconsistency between the legal and

equitable provisions of the venue statute. Rule 82(b), Ala. R. Civ. P."

(footnotes omitted)).

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     In light of the foregoing history, we take this opportunity to clarify

the proper standard for evaluating whether the location of particular real

property dictates the venue of an action involving that property asserted

against resident individuals.    Pursuant to §§ 6-1-1(b) and 6-1-2, we

conclude that Rule 82(b)(1)(B) governs that issue.       As the Committee

Comments on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 82 make clear, Rule 82(b)(1)(B)

was intended to incorporate the pertinent provisions of the predecessor

statutes to § 6-3-2(a) and § 6-3-2(b) to provide a uniform rule to govern

venue for "specific actions involving land."        As noted above, Rule

82(b)(1)(B) provides, in relevant part:

           "(1) Against Resident Individuals. Actions against an
     individual or individuals having a permanent residence in
     this state:

                 "….

                 "(B) Must, if the subject matter of the action
           is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or if it is
           for recovery or the possession thereof or trespass
           thereto, be brought in the county where the real
           estate or a material portion thereof is situated."

     Under the clear language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B), application of that

rule does not depend on whether the action at issue involves legal or

equitable claims. Instead, venue is dictated by Rule 82(b)(1)(B) "if the

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subject matter of the action is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or

if it is for recovery or the possession thereof or trespass thereto." It is

undisputed that the Leos' action does not involve a request for recovery

or possession of the property, nor does the action involve trespass to the

property. Thus, the remaining question is whether "the subject matter

of the action is real estate, whether or not exclusively." See id.

     As explained above, the pertinent language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is

derived from the predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2. The phrase "subject

matter" first appeared in one such statute in § 3760 of the Alabama Code

of 1876. This Court has explained that " '[w]ords used in a statute must

be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood

meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret

that language to mean exactly what it says.' " Blue Cross & Blue Shield

of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala. 1998)(quoting IMED

Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992)).

     The first edition of Black's Law Dictionary was published in 1891.

At that time, Black's Law Dictionary defined "subject matter" as: "The

thing in controversy, or the matter spoken or written about." Black's Law

Dictionary 1130 (1st ed. 1891). At the time Rule 82(b)(1)(B) was adopted

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in 1973, Black's Law Dictionary defined "subject matter" as: "The subject,

or matter presented for consideration; the thing in dispute; the right

which one party claims as against another .… Nature of cause of action,

and of relief sought." Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).

The current edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines "subject matter"

as: "The issue presented for consideration; the thing in which a right or

duty has been asserted; the thing in dispute." Black's Law Dictionary

1723 (11th ed. 2019).

     The parties cite several of this Court's decisions considering

whether the subject matter of particular actions was real property. The

Mullens rely primarily on this Court's decision in Ex parte Taylor, supra.

For their part, the Leos cite Ex parte Nichols, 757 So. 2d 374, 377 (Ala.

1999), and Ex parte AU Hotel, Ltd., 677 So. 2d 1160 (Ala. 1996). We

consider each decision in turn.

     In Ex parte Taylor, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had

committed breach of contract, fraud, and breach of warranty in the sale

of two condominium units located in Baldwin County. "They further

alleged that there were numerous defects in, and problems with, the

units." 583 So. 2d at 1302. The plaintiffs sought "to recover money

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damages for mental anguish and emotional distress and to have the

contract for the sale of the two condominium units rescinded." Id.

     In considering whether the Baldwin County property was the

subject matter of the action, the Court reasoned as follows:

            "The [plaintiffs] argue that the subject matter of their
     action is not real estate because they are not seeking the
     recovery of, or the possession of, land, or damages for a
     trespass on land. This action, they argue, is merely an action
     based on fraud and breach of contract. However, the mere
     fact that the [plaintiffs] do not seek recovery or possession of
     land or damages for trespass is not solely determinative of the
     subject matter of their suit. The subject matter of an action
     'relates to the nature of the cause of action and the relief
     sought.' Ex parte Pratt, 514 So. 2d 947, 949 (Ala. 1987). In
     this case, it is clear from a reading of the complaint that the
     subject matter of the [plaintiffs]' claims, while not exclusively,
     is, in fact, the Baldwin County real estate. The [plaintiffs] are
     seeking to have the contract for the sale of the real estate
     rescinded. Moreover, the [plaintiffs]' allegations of fraud and
     breach of contract relate to the advertisement, sale, and
     condition of the premises of the Baldwin County
     condominium. Therefore, we conclude that the subject matter
     of the [plaintiffs]' complaint is real estate, and, therefore,
     according to Rule 82(b)(1)(B), that venue is proper only in
     Baldwin County, where the real estate is situated."

583 So. 2d at 1303.

     In Ex parte AU Hotel, the plaintiffs, AU Hotel, Ltd., and one of its

partners, operated a hotel located on Auburn University's campus in Lee

County under a sublease agreement with the City of Auburn. Under a

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sublease with AU Hotel, Ltd., Auburn University operated a conference

center in the same location. The sublease agreement between AU Hotel,

Ltd., and Auburn University "required Auburn University to 'use its best

efforts to publicize the availability of the services provided by the hotel'

in connection with its 'publicizing events to be conducted at the

conference center.' " 677 So. 2d at 1161. A dispute arose implicating the

foregoing provision, and the plaintiffs sued Auburn University and its

former president in the Covington Circuit Court seeking " 'rescission of

the agreements entered into between the parties' and a judgment

requiring Auburn University specifically to perform the agreement to

'use its best efforts to publicize the availability of the services provided

by the hotel.' " Id. The Covington Circuit Court transferred the action to

the Lee Circuit Court.

     This Court concluded that venue was not proper in Lee County. In

so doing, the Court decided that the hotel and conference center were not

the subject matter of action. The Court reasoned as follows:

         " 'A "transitory" action is one [that] could have arisen
     anywhere.' Ex parte City of Birmingham, 507 So. 2d 471, 473

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     (Ala. 1987).[1] By contrast, an action having real estate as its
     'subject matter' is an example of a 'local action,' that is, one
     that 'could only have arisen in the particular locality where it
     did arise.' Id. …

          " … '[C]ontract actions are generally considered
     transitory even where damage to real property is involved.'
     Ex parte Teledyne Exploration, 436 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala.
     1983)(emphasis added)."

677 So. 2d at 1162.

     In Ex parte Nichols, the plaintiff corporation had purchased a

funeral business from the defendants and subsequently sued the

defendants in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The defendants then sued the

plaintiff in the Winston Circuit Court and moved to have the plaintiff's

action transferred there. In relevant part, this Court analyzed the venue

issue as follows:

     "The [defendants] argue that the subject matter of [the
     plaintiff]'s action is real estate because the action seeks
     enforcement of a contract that involved the sale of real estate.
     …

           "[The plaintiff]'s complaint does not allege any damage
     or harm to real estate, nor does it seek to affect title to any
     real estate. … [The plaintiff] asserts that the 'real property'
     it says the [defendants] failed to deliver in 'good working
     order' is a lease. This Court has held that a lease is not to be

     1"At common law a defendant could be sued in a transitory action

anywhere he could be served …." Ex parte City of Birmingham, 507 So.
2d 471, 473 (Ala. 1987).
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     considered 'real estate' for purposes of applying venue rules.
     See AU Hotel, Ltd., 677 So. 2d at 1162. [The plaintiff]'s
     complaint seeks injunctive relief and damages. It does not,
     however, seek to affect title to any real estate. Thus, even
     though [the plaintiff]'s claims arise from transactions that
     involved the transfer of real estate, we must conclude that
     real estate is not the 'subject matter' of the action. Venue in
     Jefferson County is not, therefore, improper under Rule
     82(b)(1)(B)."

757 So. 2d at 377.

     After considering the foregoing precedent, we agree with the

Mullens that the circumstances of the present action are more like those

of Ex parte Taylor than those of Ex parte Nichols or Ex parte AU Hotel,

and we conclude that the property at issue in this case is the "subject

matter" of the Leos' action within the meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B).

Although the Leos do not appear to seek rescission of the contract for the

sale of the property at issue in this case like the plaintiffs did in Ex parte

Taylor, the gravamen of the Leos' complaint is that the Mullens

improperly designed and constructed the residence located on the

property and sold it to the Leos in an uninhabitable condition by making

false advertisements and representations concerning the condition of the

residence. In both respects, the Leos' action is similar to the action at

issue in Ex parte Taylor, in which the plaintiffs' "allegations of fraud and

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breach of contract relate[d] to the advertisement, sale, and condition of

the premises of the … condominium." 583 So. 2d at 1303.

     In particular, we note that the Leos averred that the Mullens "had

a duty to exercise reasonable care by properly designing and constructing

the [Leos]' home in a good and workmanlike manner free from defects.

[The Mullens] breached their duty to exercise reasonable care by

[im]properly designing and constructing the [Leos]' home." The Leos also

averred that, "[i]n entering into the contract for the purchase of the

[p]roperty, [the Mullens] made certain materially false representations

to the [Leos], including but not limited to advertisements and

representations that the home was new as well as representations that

the home was free from known and latent defects."

     Thus, "[t]he thing[s] in controversy" in this case are the condition

of the residence located on the property and the Mullens' representations

regarding that condition. See Black's Law Dictionary 1130 (1st ed. 1891).

Moreover, the condition of the residence and the Mullens' related conduct

are the "matter[s] presented for consideration [and] the thing[s] in

dispute." See Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The

rights asserted by the Leos against the Mullens are reasonable care in

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the design and construction of the residence and true representations

concerning the condition of the residence. See id. Correspondingly, the

residence is "the thing in which a … duty has been asserted," considering

that the Leos averred that the Mullens had "a duty to exercise reasonable

care by properly designing and constructing the [Leos]' home in a good

and workmanlike manner free from defects." See Black's Law Dictionary

1723 (11th ed. 2019). Therefore, we conclude that, in also considering the

historical plain meaning of the phrase "subject matter," as used in the

context of Rule 82(b)(1)(B), the property is the subject matter of the Leos'

action against the Mullens.

     Ex parte AU Hotel and Ex parte Nichols are materially

distinguishable. Each of those cases involved a dispute over a lease

agreement. The present action does not involve a lease agreement. We

acknowledge the Ex parte AU Hotel Court's statement that " '[c]ontract

actions are generally considered transitory even where damage to real

property is involved.' " 677 So. 2d at 1162 (citation omitted). As noted

above, the Leos' complaint includes a breach-of-contract claim, averring

that the Mullens had agreed to sell the Leos "a new-build residence that

was habitable and constructed in a good and workmanlike manner free

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from defects." Assuming, without deciding, that the principle from Ex

parte AU Hotel quoted above would be applicable to the Leos' breach-of-

contract claim and that venue for that claim would be proper in Jefferson

County under that principle, Rule 82(b)(1)(B) clearly requires that

actions "[m]ust, if the subject matter of the action is real estate, whether

or not exclusively, … be brought in the county where the real estate or a

material portion thereof is situated." (Emphasis added.)

     In considering § 6-3-2(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(1)(B), the Court stated

the following in Ex parte Travis:

           "The language of both the rule and the statute is
     mandatory. A judge's failure to follow their mandate would
     be an abuse of discretion. This Court is aware of what might
     appear to be an inconsistency between the mandatory
     language of § 6-3-2(b)(1) and Rule 82(b)(1)(B), on the one
     hand, and the 'liberal joinder' provision of Rule 82(c),[2] on the
     other.    However, both the statute and the rule are
     unambiguous. Actions concerning real estate must be
     brought in the county where the real estate, or a material
     portion thereof, is located, 'whether it is the exclusive subject
     matter of the action or not.' Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-2(b)(1)."

573 So. 2d at 282.

     2In  relevant part, Rule 82(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "Where
several claims or parties have been joined, the suit may be brought in
any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been
brought."
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     As detailed above, the subject matter of the Leos' complaint is

clearly the property. Therefore, even assuming, without deciding, that

Jefferson County would be a proper venue for the Leos' breach-of-contract

claim if that claim were asserted alone, the inclusion of that claim within

the Leos' complaint does not affect the requirement of Rule 82(b)(1)(B)

that this action be brought in the Walker Circuit Court.

                               Conclusion

     The Mullens have demonstrated that the property they sold the

Leos in Walker County is the "subject matter" of this action within the

meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B). Consequently, the Jefferson Circuit Court

clearly exceeded its discretion by denying the Mullens' motion to transfer

this action to the Walker Circuit Court. Therefore, the Mullens' petition

for the writ of mandamus is granted, and the Jefferson Circuit Court is

hereby directed to vacate its order denying the Mullens' motion to

transfer the action and to enter an order transferring the action to the

Walker Circuit Court.

     PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart,

Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.

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