Court Opinion

ID: 9744302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:59:41.758784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.327516
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GROMETER, dissenting: As the majority notes, in Lee v. Calfa, 174 Ill. App. 3d 101, 113 (1988), this court stated that “[j]ury verdicts are not lightly set aside, but where a case is close on its facts *** and the jury might have decided either way, errors made at trial which might have had a significant effect on the outcome of the case require reversal.” 357 Ill. App. 3d at 844. The trial court here acknowledged that the case was close on its facts when it ruled on Glen Oaks’ motion for a directed verdict. In Lee, we also stated that “[w]hile any one of the complaints set forth *** would not alone require reversal, when taken together *** the complaints establish a pattern of conduct intended to thwart the orderly administration of justice.” Lee, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 112. I am mindful that some of Glen Oaks’ allegations of improper conduct by plaintiffs counsel, Attorney Geraci, have been waived. Yet, as the majority concedes, “many of [Glen Oaks’] contentions point to valid sources of error.” 357 Ill. App. 3d at 844. Even so, the majority ultimately concludes that, when considered cumulatively, Glen Oaks’ complaints of Attorney Geraci’s conduct at trial did not constitute reversible error. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 844. I respectfully dissent because, unlike the majority, I find that Attorney Geraci engaged in a pattern of conduct intended to thwart the orderly administration of justice. The record is replete with examples of Attorney Geraci’s misconduct. With regard to the questioning of Mahlmeister, plaintiffs expert witness, I find that Attorney Geraci’s tactic in posing leading questions to Mahlmeister, only to later withdraw the questions upon Glen Oaks’ objections, created the misleading impression that the witness held opinions critical of the nursing staff on several matters that were never disclosed in discovery. The majority concluded that this conduct did not amount to prejudicial error. 357 Ill. App. 3d at 836-37. I submit, however, that the frequency with which Attorney Geraci engaged in this maneuver, when coupled with a multitude of other instances of unprofessional behavior, denied Glen Oaks a fair and impartial trial. While by no means a complete catalog of Attorney Geraci’s misconduct, other examples of his improper behavior include: (1) violating the trial court’s in limine order barring him from suggesting that any of the medical records had been changed, altered, destroyed, or otherwise modified; (2) posing questions regarding Benjamin’s father’s salary as a machinist, his loss of pay from missing work to take Benjamin to see a doctor, and his inability to pay doctor’s fees; (3) asking Sharon Driessen why she needed a lawyer to prepare for her deposition if she was not a defendant, whether she was amused by what she saw in Benjamin’s mother’s room when she arrived, and how Dr. Brewer could remain so calm when everyone else had their “adrenaline going”; (4) cross-examining Glen Oaks’ life-care planning expert, Harry Brennan, in an argumentative, sarcastic manner; and (5) seizing an exhibit from Brennan. The trial court recognized the impropriety of many of Attorney Geraci’s actions and statements. For instance, the court warned Attorney Geraci that he was being “very argumentative” and “extremely inappropriate” and that he needed to “lower the tone.” Indeed, the court went as far as suggesting that Attorney Geraci’s conduct was intentional and cautioning Attorney Geraci that “the histrionics in front of the jury does create a cumulative effect that may ultimately be damaging.” I commend the trial court for gallantly trying to maintain courtroom decorum despite the unprofessional nature of Attorney Geraci’s behavior. I also note that the trial court attempted to safeguard the trial process by sustaining defense counsel objections and instructing the jury to disregard improper statements. Nevertheless, where a party repeatedly engages in unprofessional behavior, the defendant may be prejudiced despite the existence of curative measures. See People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723, 732 (2001). In my opinion, the record demonstrates that Attorney Geraci engaged in a repeated, systematic, and intentional pattern of misconduct, the cumulative effect of which severely prejudiced Glen Oaks and requires a new trial. I believe that allowing such pervasive, unprofessional misconduct to go unchecked not only encourages such behavior to continue but impedes the orderly administration of justice. See People v. Libberton, 346 Ill. App. 3d 912, 927 (2003) (Hutchinson, RJ., dissenting (in the context of prosecutorial misconduct)); West Chicago Street R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 69 Ill. App. 147 (1897). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.