Court Opinion

ID: 9684041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:25.850978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.511304
License: Public Domain

OPINION
W. C. DAVIS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for capital murder, wherein the punishment was assessed at déath. Appellant was convicted of acting with Paula Cantrell Derese to cause the death of Paul Cantrell for remuneration or the promise thereof, which was to be money from the proceeds of life insurance and the estate of Paul and Mary Cantrell.
In his fifteenth ground of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the murder was committed for remuneration or the promise thereof.
In the early morning hours of July 25, 1976, the bodies of the deceased, Paul and Mary Cantrell, were discovered in their home by their daughter, Paula Cantrell Derese. They were found lying on the floor of their den, and both had been strangled and had had their throats cut. Four days later, Paula, the only child of Paul and Mary, gave a statement in which she implicated herself and appellant in the murders. Paula, in testifying against appellant, stated that she had pled guilty to the murders of her parents, and that by her conduct, she had encouraged' the commission of the crime. She stated, that she admitted her part in the crime because she could not have taken her parents’ money and lived like she wanted to.
Paula first met appellant in 1970, when she lived in Beaumont and worked for Lamar University, where appellant was an assistant football coach. She later married Herbie Derese and had a son, Chad, in December of 1973. Her parents did not approve of Paula’s marriage to Herbie. In 1975, Paula and Herbie separated and Paula, with her son, moved into her parents’ home in Baytown. She lived there with her parents until their deaths in July of 1976. During this period of time, there was conflict between Paula and her parents, over Paula’s desire to reconcile with her husband. There was testimony that Paula’s father had threatened to wage a court battle for the legal custody of Chad if Paula reconciled with Herbie.
In January or February of 1976, appellant reestablished contact with Paula. Paula testified that at this time, she refused to go out with him. However, she talked to *511him several times on the telephone. A few weeks later, she had a serious argument with her parents about Herbie and was upset. She agreed to have lunch with appellant, and at this time discussed her problems with her parents with him. She testified that she told appellant that she would do anything to be free of her parents. Appellant responded that he knew of a way that that could be taken care of so that she would not have to worry about that again. Appellant also asked her about how much insurance Herbie had, and whether she wanted him killed. Paula responded that she did not want Herbie killed.
Sometime during February, appellant cosigned a $1,500 loan which Paula took out.
About two weeks after their first meeting, during which time Paula and appellant talked on the telephone several times, they met again for lunch. At this meeting, appellant told Paula that things had been taken care of so that she would not have to worry about it again. He told her that he knew some people who killed people for money, and that there had already been a payment made to have her parents killed. Paula testified that she was supposed to pay appellant out of the proceeds of her parents’ estate and life insurance; appellant told her that he wanted one-third. She testified that although she never expressly told him that she would pay him, she “let it slide.” She stated that at this time, she did not believe that he was serious.
In March of 1976, appellant and his business partner, Vernon Olney, came to Paula’s parents’ house to discuss a business matter, and Paula, with her mother, showed appellant through the house.
Paula and appellant maintained communication, and in April, Paula went to work for appellant as his secretary in his plywood brokerage business. She testified that at this time, she thought appellant was serious about having her parents murdered.
On Easter weekend, Paul and Mary had made plans to meet some friends in Austin to play golf. Prior to this weekend, appellant had a discussion with Paula about insurance double indemnity and “making something look like an accident.” Paula stated that she did not know what this meant. Appellant knew of the deceased’s plans Easter weekend, and Paula told him the motel in which they would be staying. Paula testified that when her parents left for their trip, she thought that something was going to happen to them that weekend. She thought that appellant was serious about murdering them. When questioned about whether she tried to warn them, she stated that she just could not tell them about the. situation. She admitted that this was when she started encouraging the murders of her parents. She testified that she turned her back on the situation. Still, she . called her parents several times that weekend, and they returned home safely.
In May, appellant discussed with Paula borrowing money from a credit union; this money was to be used to pay the person who was supposed to do the killings. He also told her that the “contact person” or “hit man” was sick in Ohio at that time.
During this time, Paula also became familiar with the name “Ben T.” and knew that he was somehow involved in the scheme to have her parents murdered.
During June, appellant was drinking heavily and was gone frequently from his business. Testimony showed that appellant was trying, but was not able to have the murders done soon. He told Paula that he should not have counted upon anyone else to do the killings, that he should have done them himself. He said that he would walk up to the deceased’s house and act like he was going to talk about business and kill them himself.
On Friday, July 23rd, Paula talked to appellant on the telephone from her house. She had observed him drive by her house that day. Appellant told her that “the man is in the area” and told her to leave the house. He had previously warned her not to be in the house when “the man” came. That evening, Paula went over to a friend’s house and returned home shortly before midnight.
*512Paula again talked to appellant on Saturday, July 24th, and told him that she had a date that evening; she further told him that her parents would be at home that night. That night, when she returned home from her date, she discovered the bodies of her parents in their den. Over the next few days, appellant visited Paula several times, and repeatedly told her to “keep her mouth shut and not to crack.” He then told her how the murders had occurred and that he had been present during them. According to his statements to Paula, appellant had rented a car from the Houston airport and had picked up two men. They then proceeded to the Cantrell house. All of them wore gloves. They had used a pipe to hit the victims in the head, and then had cut their throats. The three had started to ransack the house, but a car pulled up across the street, so they left. Appellant had also made a comment that if one hair was found on the bodies of the deceased, “he [appellant] was dead.”
In her written confession, Paula stated that during the months that she worked for appellant, “he always talked about it [the murders] ... He kept talking about it all the time until it happened.” On the day of the murders, appellant called and “told me that the man had called him Friday and said three is a crowd. I knew what he meant because he had told me in the past that it might not matter if I and Chad were there. He was afraid something would happen to me and he couldn’t get any insurance money.”
In her testimony at trial, Paula denied that she expressly told appellant that she would pay him, or that she ever expressly promised to pay him. She testified that, instead, he had told her that she was to pay him one-third of the proceeds of the estate. She testified that she had not thought through how she was to give him the money, because “the reality of it never really hit [her].”
Paula was examined extensively about her involvement in the murders, beyond her confession to the crime and entry of pleas of guilty to the murders. She was asked,
“Q. To you, then, knowledge [of the planned murders] is encouragement? In other words, knowing about it and you didn’t tell somebody?
“A. [Paula] That’s right.
“Q. Is this what you meant?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And so far as you are concerned, that is what has really brought you to this courtroom, is that you had knowledge but you never really encouraged . . . ?
“A. And by his saying that he got a third of the estate and me agreeing to that, that’s right.
“Q. Oh, you agreed to it?
“A. Well, I guess. I didn’t do anything about it.”
Ben Tabor, an acquaintance of appellant’s, testified that in March appellant had approached him about finding á professional killer or “hit man.” Appellant told Tabor that two people were to be killed, and that their daughter would be the beneficiary, and that he was to receive one-third of the estate. The recorder further reflects that appellant twice made payments of $6,000 each to Tabor to give to the “hit man” whom Tabor said he had procured for appellant.
Donna French, appellant’s girlfriend in June and July, testified that during these months, appellant had mentioned leaving town or vacationing somewhere. However, appellant told her that this would not be until around mid-August “because he was going to run into some money.”
Candy Campbell, a friend of Paula’s and an acquaintance of appellant’s, testified that she and Paula had planned a trip to California during June. Paula had received permission from appellant, her employer, to go. However, appellant changed his mind in June and would not let Paula leave. Campbell spoke to appellant about this, and appellant told her, “Well, if you all will just wait until late August [to go], I will pay for everything.”
*513Don Janowski, another acquaintance of appellant’s, testified that in February of 1976, appellant approached him and inquired about finding a “hit man.” Janow-ski testified that he believed appellant said that he was going to “hit” two people.
We hold that the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant committed murder “for remuneration or the promise of remuneration” as alleged in the indictment. See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 19.03(a)(3). The conduct proscribed by this section of the capital murder statute is the killing of' any person in order to receive, or for the purpose of receiving some benefit or compensation. Thus, the focus of the criminal culpability is upon the actor’s state of mind.
The record clearly reflects that appellant expected to share in the proceeds from the estate of the victims and that he acted out of an expectation that he would receive such remuneration. He made payments totaling $12,000 to hire a professional killer; he made statements to others that he was to receive a share of the victims’ estate upon their deaths, and he indicated to two people that he expected to “come into” some money in August.
Further, appellant could have inferred from Paula’s conduct that she agreed to and acquiesced in his request for one-third of the proceeds of the estate. Paula knew that appellant was serious about having her parents murdered, and, according to her own testimony, she listened to appellant discuss these plans frequently. She discussed her parents’ financial status with appellant, and gave him information concerning their activities, including their whereabouts at certain times. The record is clear that appellant perceived Paula’s conduct as an implicit promise of a benefit and that he acted upon that basis.
Upon review by this Court, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. Jones v. State, 582 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Seaton v. State, 564 S.W.2d 721 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Rogers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Clark v. State, 543 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). We find that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant committed the murders for remuneration or the anticipation thereof.
Appellant further contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction because there is no corroboration of the accomplice witness’ testimony. The jury was charged that Paula Derese was an accomplice witness as a matter of law. On the basis of Ben Tabor’s testimony that he had led appellant to believe that he had procured a “hit man” for appellant, but that he in fact had not done so, but rather had told appellant this to “con” him out of money, the jury was charged that they could find Tabor an accomplice witness as a matter of fact.
Article 38.14, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. provides:
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”
In Carrillo v. State, 566 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Cr.App.1978), we reiterated that:
“[t]he test as to the sufficiency of the corroboration [of the accomplice witness’ testimony] is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness and then to examine the evidence of other witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpatory evidence, that is evidence of incriminating character which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. If there is such evidence, the corroboration is sufficient; otherwise, it is not.”
See also Bentley v. State, 520 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1975);, Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). Further, the mere showing that an offense occurred is not sufficient corroboration. Carrillo v. State, supra; Windham v. State, 479 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). It is not necessary that the corroboration directly link the accused to the crime or be sufficient in itself to establish guilt, Carrillo v. *514State, supra; Attwood v. State, 509 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); it need only make the accomplice witness’ testimony more likely than not. Carrillo v. State, supra; Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Even if we assume that Tabor, as well as Paula, was an accomplice witness, appellant’s contention is without merit. The record reflects that two witnesses testified that appellant indicated to them that he expected to be “coming into” some money in August, the month after the murders. Don Janowski testified that in February 1976, appellant approached him and inquired about finding a “hit man” and indicated that he wanted two people killed. There was testimony that appellant rented a white Monte Carlo from the Houston airport on the afternoon before the murders and returned it the next morning. Two other witnesses, Ken Giles and Reid Hughes, both testified that they saw a car matching that description around the deceased’s neighborhood and house the afternoon of the murders. Further, Hughes identified appellant as the driver of that car. The record further reflects that appellant altered his physical appearance the day after the murders, and then fled the jurisdiction immediately prior to his trial setting. We hold that this other inculpatory evidence tends to connect appellant with the commission of the offense arid makes the accomplice testimony more probable than not. Thus, the testimony is sufficiently corroborated. See Carrillo v. State, supra; Bentley v. State, supra; Warren v. State, supra. Appellant’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction are overruled.
In his first ground of error, appellant contends that:
“[t]he Trial Court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion to quash the indictment in that it failed to apprise the Appellant as to the capacities in which he was alleged to have committed capital murder, to wit; whether he promised someone remuneration and whom did he promise or was he promised remuneration and by whom.”
Appellant filed his motion to quash the indictment on March 7, 1977. A hearing was held on that date, after which the trial court overruled the motion.
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 19.03 provides that:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and:
♦ * * * * *
“(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.” (Emphasis added)
The indictment charging appellant with capital murder alleged in part that appellant:
“. . . did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly, acting as a party with Paula Cantrell Derese and other persons to the Grand Jury unknown, cause the death of Paul Harvey Cantrell by choking and strangling him with a cord and cutting him with a knife; and said murder was committed for remuneration and the promise of remuneration, namely, money from the proceeds of life insurance and the estate of Paul Harvey Cantrell and Mary Bright Cantrell.”
Article 21.02, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. provides that in an indictment, the offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible words. Further, an indictment “shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in. such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged.” Article 21.11, Vernon’s Ann.C. C.P.
Appellant now contends that the indictment failed to apprise him of the charge against him with such particularity as to enable him to prepare his defense. This *515contention was raised prior to trial, and therefore the fundamental constitutional protections of adequate notice and due process are involved. Haecker v. State, 571 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). These fundamental protections require careful examination and consideration from the perspective of the accused. Haecker v. State, supra.
An indictment must allege facts sufficient to give the accused notice of the particular offense with which he is charged. Article 21.11, supra. As we stated in Haecker v. State, supra:
“[i]t is not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged; rather, we must inquire as to whether the face of the instrument sets forth in plain and intelligible language sufficient information to enable the accused to prepare his defense. Moore v. State, 532 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).”
In the instant case, the indictment clearly alleges that appellant did cause the death of Paul Cantrell, by choking and strangling him with a cord and cutting him with a knife, and that this murder was committed for remuneration and the promise thereof, which was to be the proceeds from the life insurance and estate of the deceased. Thus, the indictment clearly sets out the acts committed by appellant constituting the offense. The indictment is not susceptible to the interpretation, as appellant alleges, that appellant employed another to do the killing or that he promised another person compensation for doing it; it clearly alleges that appellant committed the murder and that he was promised compensation by another to do it.
Thus, the issue presented to this Court is whether the indictment failed to allege who promised appellant such remuneration for committing the murder, and whether this denied appellant adequate notice of the charge against him. We hold that there was no such failure to give appellant notice.
The indictment alleged that appellant committed the murder, “acting as a party with Paula Cantrell Derese and other persons to the Grand Jury unknown,” and that such murder was committed for remuneration. The clear import of this language is that the remuneration or the promise of remuneration was to be supplied by this named party to the offense or by a person or persons unknown. While no model, the indictment, when read as a whole, does, indeed, give appellant sufficient notice of who promised him or was to supply him the remuneration. While there is some evidence in this case that appellant attempted to and perhaps succeeded in hiring someone to do the killings with him, this is not the offense for which appellant was indicted and prosecuted. The gravamen of the capital murder offense charged in this indictment, of which appellant was given notice, was his having been promised compensation by Paula to kill the victims and on that basis, having killed them. Since the indictment sufficiently alleges facts to enable appellant to prepare his defense, the indictment was not subject to a motion to quash on this ground.
Appellant’s reliance upon Hobbs v. State, 548 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.Cr.App.1977) is misplaced. Therein, we held that the indictment for attempted capital murder was fundamentally defective for the failure to allege, as is necessary in charging an attempted offense, that acts were done “amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 15.01(a). Thus, the basis of that holding was the failure of the indictment to allege an element of the offense. This holding is completely inapplicable to the instant case. Appellant’s -first ground of error is overruled.
In his second ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a change of venue as a matter of law since his motion was uncontroverted by the State prior to jury selection.
*516Article 31.03, Vernon’s Ann.C. C.P., provides that a defendant in a criminal case may file in the trial court a motion for a change of venue, supported by affidavits. Article 31.04, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., allows the State to file controverting affidavits. The filing of such controverting affidavits raises an issue of fact to be tried and resolved by the trial court; thus, the trial court must then make a determination of this issue on its merits. Such decision on the merits is within the discretion of the court, and will only be reversed by this Court upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Adami v. State, 524 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
However, if no controverting affidavit is filed by the State, the defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law. Stapleton v. State, 565 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Burrough v. State, 562 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The reason that the defendant is entitled to this change as a .matter of law is because in the absence of controverting evidence, there is no issue of fact to be resolved. When there is no issue of fact to be determined by the trial court, and no place for its exercise of discretion, it must grant the defendant’s motion. Durrough v. State, supra. This is the reason it is stated that in this situation, a defendant is entitled to such change as a matter of law.
However, it is clear that a defendant may waive his per se right to a change of venue. If the State has filed no controverting affidavit, and the defendant proceeds to a hearing without objecting that there is no issue of fact to be tried and that he is thus entitled to the change as a matter of law, he waives his right to the per se change of venue. Puryear v. State, 510 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Lewis v. State, 505 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); see also Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (footnote #9). Where the defendant, without such objection, allows the trial court to hear the merits of the issue and to thus exercise its discretion in determining the issue of fact, he cannot thereafter argue that no issue of fact was raised and that he was entitled to the change as a matter of law.
In the instant case, the record reflects that appellant filed his motion for a change of venue on February 28, 1977, in compliance with Article 31.03, supra. The State did not file a controverting affidavit at this time. On March 7,1977, at a pre-trial hearing, appellant again requested a hearing on the motion. The trial court stated that it would not rule on the motion prior to the selection of the jury. On that same date, after the voir dire examination had begun, appellant again requested a hearing on the motion, which the trial court denied. Two days later, the record reflects that appellant understood and acquiesced in the court’s postponing the venue issue until after the voir dire was completed.1
*517On April 18, 1977, after the voir dire examination was completed, appellant again mentioned to the court the requested hearing on the motion. The next day, the State filed its controverting affidavit. On that date, a hearing was held pn appellant’s motion and evidence was received by the court, after which the motion was overruled. The record nowhere reflects that appellant objected to the hearing on the ground that, since his motion had theretofore been uncontroverted, there was no issue of fact to be tried, and that he was thus entitled to the change of venue as a matter of law. Further, the record does not reflect that appellant, after filing the motion, ever requested more than a hearing. He never urged the court to grant his motion as a matter of law; instead, he persisted in his request for a hearing on the motion.
Therefore, the issue is whether, by his failure to request the change as a matter of law and his failure to object to the trial court’s holding the hearing, appellant waived his right to the change of venue as a matter of law. Under the authority of Puryear v. State, supra, Lewis v. State, supra, and Von Byrd v. State, supra, we hold that appellant did waive this right. This ground of error is overruled.
Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying this motion for a change of venue after he presented “overwhelming evidence that appellant could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Harris County . . . ”
On April 19,1977, after a jury was selected, appellant was granted a hearing on his motion for a change of venue. Much evidence was presented from local newspapers and television stations regarding their coverage and publicity of this case. Numerous lawyers and a few judges testified on appellant’s behalf, and stated that appellant could not get a fair and impartial trial in Harris County. Testimony was also presented that appellant could not get a fair and impartial trial because of the publicity surrounding Paula’s confessions, and additional detailed reports on the case. On rebuttal, the State presented testimony from witnesses that the pre-trial publicity was not excessive and that appellant could get a fair and impartial trial in Harris County.
We are cognizant that the question of whether a change of venue should be granted because of prejudicial publicity is one of constitutional dimension and that the test to be applied by the court is whether outside influences affecting the community’s climate of opinion as to a defendant are so inherently suspect that the resulting probability of unfairness requires suitable procedural safeguards. See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417, 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); see also, Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962).
An examination of the exhibits introduced at the hearing indicates that all of the' information contained in the news reports was accurate and was apparently *518placed there for the purpose of informing the public of current évents. Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Adami v. State, 524 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Morris v. State, 488 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Taylor v. State, 420 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). Further, testimony that appellant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Harris County was contradicted by testimony presented by the State.
In the instant case, the trial court was presented with conflicting testimony with respect to whether appellant could obtain a fair trial in the local community because of pre-trial publicity. This issue was decided adversely to appellant’s contentions when the trial judgé, as the trier of facts, overruled the motion for change of venue. Bell v. State, supra; Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ransonnette v. State, 522 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion.
After overruling appellant’s motion, the court set the trial for April 25, 1977. On this date, appellant failed to appear and his bond was forfeited. Evidence showed that appellant fled the jurisdiction. After he was captured in Florida, and returned to Houston, counsel for appellant reurged his motion for a change of venue. On May 9,1977, the trial court held another hearing. Appellant introduced into evidence newspaper reports from April 25 to May 7, concerning appellant’s flight and apprehension. The parties stipulated that there was coverage of these events carried on radio and television. George Flynn, who previously testified that appellant could get a fair trial in Harris County, testified that since the subsequent publicity of appellant’s flight, he thought that it would be difficult for appellant to receive a fair trial there. George Pthick, a radio broadcaster, testified that he had interviewed one of the prosecutors in the case, who had stated that he thought the trial judge would have to move the trial out of Houston. The parties also stipulated that the witnesses who testified at the previous hearing on the motion for change of venue would testify to the same matters now as they had at that previous hearing. This included the testimony that appellant could receive a fair trial in Harris County. Thus, the record does not reflect that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion for a change of venue which was reurged prior to trial. See Bell v. State, supra; Adami v. State, supra; Morris v. State, supra. This ground of error is overruled.
In two grounds of error, appellant complains of the trial court’s imposing limitations on his voir dire examination of two prospective jurors. Particularly, he complains that he was not allowed to freely examine veniremen Benny Ballard and William Achgill concerning any “bias or prejudice resulting from pre-trial publicity.” We hold that appellant has failed to preserve error by failing to propound to the trial court specific questions which he claims he was denied the opportunity to ask the two prospective jurors. Further, even if error had been preserved, the record reflects that the trial court’s limitation of the voir dire examination was not unreasonable and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
We point out, as a preliminary matter, that the transcription of the voir dire examination alone in the instant case consisted of more than five thousand three hundred legal size pages. Discussions of the trial court’s ruling on the limitation of the voir dire examination ran throughout the proceedings. Appellant only directs our attention to certain portions of these discussions; thus, it has been necessary for us to independently examine much of the record in order to ascertain the exact nature of the court’s rulings and appellant’s particular objections thereto.
The record reflects that during the voir dire examination, the trial court adopted a procedure whereby it would first question each prospective juror about his or her attitude toward the death penalty and inquire about the pre-trial publicity with which each was familiar and its effect upon the prospective juror, in order to determine *519whether a bias against appellant existed. After the examination of several jurors by both parties, the State objected to the defense informing the venirepersons that Paula Derese had pled guilty to the murders of her parents. The basis of this objection was that to so inform prospective jurors, who held no conclusion or opinion as to appellant’s guilt, might tend to prejudice them against appellant, which would then allow the defense to challenge them for being biased. The defense contended that they were entitled under Article 35.16, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. to continue the inquiry concerning pre-trial publicity. Towards the end of the discussion, the State clearly delineated that its objection was only to the defense informing the jurors of the content of the pre-trial publicity in the course of examining them. The trial court did not rule at this time.
After examinations of a few more venire-persons, the defense asked for a clarification on this issue. The court stated that if, after its examination, the juror stated that he or she had no conclusion as to appellant’s guilt, then it would limit the inquiries as to pre-trial publicity. Appellant objected to the court’s ruling in that it denied him the opportunity to determine whether the prospective juror would be impartial. The next time the issue arose, the court restated that where any prospective juror indicated that he or she had formed any conclusion as to appellant’s guilt, then the defense could delve into the pre-trial publicity in depth. However, where the venireperson indicated that he or she had formed no conclusion, then the defense would not be permitted to do so.
The trial court first examined venireman Benny Ballard and determined that he had no opinion or conclusion from the pre-trial publicity as to appellant’s guilt. After the State had examined Ballard, the defense again objected to the trial court’s ruling “prohibiting [them] from, and again, going into the extent of the publicity and any bias or prejudice it may have had on this venireman.” This was overruled. After examining Ballard, the defense exercised a peremptory challenge to strike him from the panel. The record later reflects that after examining venireman William Achgill, the defense accepted him as a juror without any objection.
A discussion of the court’s ruling took place again after appellant exhausted his peremptory challenges. The defense again stated its objection to the limitation with regard to another prospective juror. The State responded:
“[PROSECUTOR]: . . . there has been no attempt by Mr. Vela [defense counsel] to explore that area, and that he was not denied exploring that area.
“THE COURT: I agree.
******
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL] I would like to inquire as to the Court’s ruling on whether or not we can inquire into pre-trial publicity.
“THE COURT: Counsel, I have never precluded you from going into pre-trial publicity except the manner in which you went into it at the first, that is, to take every news item and bring it up to the juror.
******
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL] ... we have always been prevented from going into publicity after the venireman has been turned over to us by the State. “THE COURT: That is not true.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL] . . .
[W]hen we have felt it so necessary to, we have felt that we have done it at our peril and could possibly be held in contempt of Court and this Court’s ruling. That has been our position all along.
“THE COURT: Counsel, you did in fact go into it on at least one juror after my ruling. No one objected. The Court did not object. You were not held in contempt. In fact, no comment was ever made about it . .”
We hold that appellant has failed to preserve error as to these two grounds. In both cases, appellant failed to propound to the trial court or to let the record reflect what questions concerning pre-trial publici*520ty he complains he was not allowed to ask. In Graham v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), we stated, “[although it is not necessary to show the answer that would be given in order to preserve error if a question for exercising peremptory challenges is disallowed, Burkett v. State, 516 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), the question should certainly appear in the record.” See also Rose v. State, 470 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Longs v. State, 429 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
The reason for such a rule is readily apparent in the instant case. In such a lengthy voir dire examination, as here, where the trial court has discretion to impose reasonable limits on the conduct thereof, some questions proposed by the parties regarding the pre-trial publicity might be proper and some would not be. In order for this Court to determine whether the parties’ questions were proper questions, they must appear in the record. In the instant case, certainly the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defense to tell a prospective juror of all the facts which were the subject -of the publicity, and then to object that he or she had formed a conclusion as to appellant’s guilt. The record simply does not reflect what other questions the defense wanted to ask. Without such a showing, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in disallowing certain inquiries into pre-trial publicity of this case.
Further, even if error had been preserved, it is apparent that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing some limitation on the conduct of the voir dire examination.
We recognize that the right to be represented by counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution, encompasses the right of counsel to question the members of the jury panel in order to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges. Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Florio v. State, 568 S.W.2d 132 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). However, the trial court, within its sound discretion, can and should control the voir dire examination of the venire.
We reiterate that the trial court may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of voir dire examination. Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); see Emanus v. State, 526 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Lewis v. State, 488 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); McCarter v. State, 478 S.W.2d 524 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Duplicitous questions may, within the court’s discretion, be limited to curb the prolixity of what can become the lengthiest part of a criminal proceeding. Bodde v. State, supra. In the instant case, the transcription of the voir dire examination was especially lengthy. The issue thus presented in such a situation is whether the trial court abused its discretion in the limitations which were imposed on voir dire examination.
In the instant case, the record reflects that the trial court did not err in limiting appellant’s voir dire examination of prospective juror Ballard. See Appendix A. Herein, the trial court questioned Ballard concerning the extent of pretrial publicity with which he was familiar. Further inquiry was made concerning whether the juror had formed any opinion or conclusion of appellant’s guilt. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the defense from again questioning the venireman about pre-trial publicity. Freeman v. State, 556 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
Neither did the court abuse its discretion in limiting appellant’s examination of prospective juror Achgill. See Appendix B. Again, the trial court examined this prospective juror at length concerning the pre-trial publicity with which he was familiar. The court carefully inquired whether Achgill had formed any conclusion as to appellant’s guilt or innocence. No abuse of discretion is shown in the court’s limitation of duplicitous questioning. Freeman v. State, supra.
*521Appellant also contends that the trial court’s limitation of his voir dire examination was in violation of Article 35.16, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. This statute provides, in part:
“Reasons for Challenge for Cause
“(a) A challenge for cause is an objection made to a particular juror, alleging some fact which renders him incapable or unfit to serve on the jury. A challenge for cause may be made by either the state or the defense for any one of the following reasons:
* * * * * *
9. That from hearsay, or otherwise, there is established in the mind of the juror such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as would influence him in his action in finding a verdict. To ascertain whether this cause of challenge exists, the juror shall first be asked whether, in his opinion, the conclusion so established will influence his verdict. If he answers in the affirmative, he shall be discharged without further interrogation by either party or the court. If he answers in the negative, he shall be further examined as to how his conclusion was formed, and the extent to which it will affect his action; and, if it appears to have been formed from reading newspaper accounts, communications, statements or reports or mere rumor or hearsay, and if the juror states that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, the court, if satisfied that he is impartial and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit him as competent to serve in such case . . .”
This statute deals with the disqualification of prospective jurors and challenges for cause. The procedure used to determine whether a juror is disqualified applies only when a prospective juror states that he or she has formed a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. If the juror states that he or she has formed no such conclusion, then, of course, there is no reason to ask whether the “conclusion so established” will influence the verdict. Thus, this statute does not, as appellant contends, give the defense absolute statutory authority to examine the jurors about each bit of information recounted in the media.
The record reflects that each of the two veniremen was qualified by the trial court under this statute. No error is shown. Grounds of error four and five are overruled.
In his sixth and seventh grounds of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting a challenge for cause after a juror had been sworn and impaneled.
On Friday, March 11, 1977, venireperson Richard Blanchard was examined by the court, the State and the defense, and was selected as the second juror in this case. He was sworn and impaneled. On the following Monday morning, the court notified the parties that Blanchard had contacted the trial judge that morning, indicating that he had some reservations concerning his service on the jury. •
After examining the juror concerning his reservations about the death penalty and his ability to serve on a capital jury, the court granted the State’s challenge for cause under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 12.31(b), and excused the juror from service. Appellant now contends that the court erred in excusing this juror after he was impaneled and sworn, and in refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial.2
*522We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s challenge for cause. Blanchard testified that he was not sure whether he could give the case fair and impartial consideration and that the mandatory penalty would affect his factual deliberations. The trial court determined that Blanchard was disqualified from serving, and appellant did not request to show otherwise. See Pittman v. State, 434 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) (on Motion for Rehearing). We are unable to determine how appellant was harmed by the court’s action. Blanchard was the second juror selected, and he was excused before any other venirepersons were examined. He heard no evidence in the case, and he was instructed by the court when he was selected not to discuss the case. We are also unable to discern how appellant was harmed by the court’s failure to discharge the other juror who had already been selected. See Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) and cases cited therein; cf. Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d 491 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). These grounds of error are overruled.
In a related ground of error, appellant complains of the trial court’s refusal to allow him to perfect a bill of exception as to the reasons why juror Blanchard had a “change of heart” with regard to the death penalty. After the trial court granted the State’s challenge for cause to Blanchard, appellant requested to examine him about his change in position, which the trial court denied. Appellant then perfected a bill of exception as to the questions he wanted to ask Blanchard. The bill reflects that appellant wanted to ask Blanchard (1) whether he had given false answers on Friday before he was selected or whether he had changed his mind about his position on the death penalty over the weekend; and (2) what brought about his change in position on the death penalty.
We hold that the trial court did not err in disallowing this inquiry. First, the testimony of Blanchard does contain information about why he approached the trial court with his reservations about the death penalty. The gist of his testimony is that after having been selected to sit in a capital case, he gave much thought to his previous position on capital punishment, and no longer felt sure that he believed in capital punishment. Second, to refuse to allow appellant to delve into the mental processes of the juror about why he had changed his mind did not constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court, once it became apparent that the juror was disqualified under the statute and that appellant did not object on that basis or request an opportunity to show that he was still a qualified juror. This gr.ound of error is overruled.
In his ninth ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not fully and adequately inquiring into the effects on the jurors of appellant’s flight from the jurisdiction. The record reflects that after a jury was selected, but before trial on the merits began, appellant forfeited his bond and left the jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, he was apprehended in Florida and was returned.
Before proceeding with the trial, the court, at appellant’s request, polled the jury individually to determine the effect, if any, of this publicity. Each juror individually stated that he or she had formed no conclusion as to appellant’s guilt or innocence, and stated that he or she would base his or her verdict entirely upon the evidence and the law given in the courtroom.
After the entire questioning was finished, appellant objected “on the grounds that the questioning has not been in compliance with Article 35.16 and the true determination of any pre-trial publicity has not been made.” This objection was overruled.
We hold that no error has been shown. Appellant had requested the court to poll the jury; this the court did. Appellant received exactly what he had requested; he never requested an opportunity to question the jurors himself, nor did he propose specific questions to the trial court to be asked of the jurors. His objection, which came *523too late and was too general, was insufficient to preserve any complaint he might have had. Further, the trial court’s actions were sufficient to adequately protect appellant’s rights. See Brown v. State, 516 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Klinedinst v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 510, 265 S.W.2d 593 (1953). This ground of error is overruled.
Appellant néxt contends that the trial court erred when it denied his request to impeach Reid Hughes, an identification witness, with a composite picture which he had helped prepare previously. At trial, Reid Hughes testified that he lived down the street from the Cantrells. On the day of the murders, he observed two men in a white Monte Carlo driving around his neighborhood. He had observed the driver of the car.
On the night of the murders, after the bodies of the deceased were discovered, Hughes related what he had seen to police officers. Based upon his descriptions, a composite picture was prepared in the early morning hours. Some ten days later, he identified appellant from another picture as the driver of the car.
At trial, appellant sought to introduce into evidence the composite drawing prepared shortly .after the murders were discovered, in order to impeach Hughes’ identification of appellant. The trial court refused to allow this composite drawing to be introduced, ruling that it was “immaterial.” We agree.
Hughes consistently testified that the composite picture which he helped prepare the night of the murders did not fairly and accurately represent the person he had seen driving the car. He further testified that it “wasn’t close at all.” The composite “was not close to the man [he] saw.” He “couldn’t put it all together for a composite drawing.” Thus, the composite did not show a prior inconsistent identification by the witness.
Since the witness testified that the composite picture was not even close to resembling the person he had observed driving the car, it was immaterial and not probative of his pre-trial identification. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defense to introduce the composite into evidence to impeach Hughes. See, Sherbert v. State, 531 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hoffman v. State, 514 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Harrison v. State, 495 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). This ground of error is overruled.
In his eleventh ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his request for the grand jury testimony of State’s witness Ben Tabor. During the cross-examination of Tabor, the witness stated that he had reviewed his grand jury testimony before testifying at trial. The trial court reviewed the witness’ grand jury testimony and ruled that appellant was not entitled to use it to cross-examine Tabor. The trial judge sealed the grand jury testimony and made it a part of the appellate record for this Court’s inspection.
The production of grand jury testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and the accused may be permitted to inspect such testimony where “some special reason” exists or where a “particularized need” is shown so as to outweigh the traditional policy of grand jury secrecy. Martin v. State, 577 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Mott v. State, 543 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Nelson v. State, 511 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Brown v. State, 475 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
In the instant case, we cannot conclude that appellant has shown a “particularized need” for the grand jury testimony so as to reflect that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order its production. See Mott v. State, supra; Brown v. State, supra; Martinez v. State, 507 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
Further, we have examined the sealed testimony, and conclude that such testimony was entirely consistent with the witness’ testimony at trial. Thus, we fail to see how appellant was harmed by the trial court’s refusing to make such testimony available for cross-examination. Mott v. State, supra; Brown v. State, supra; see also Hoff*524man v. State, 514 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Garcia v. State, 454 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). This ground of error is overruled.
In his twelfth ground of error appellant contends that the trial court denied him his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation in refusing to allow him to cross-examine Paula Derese concerning two letters she had written.
In cross-examining Paula, the defense produced a steno pad, identified as Paula’s, which contained two letters which she had written. After a hearing out of the presence of the jury, the trial court refused to allow the defense to impeach her testimony with these letters, sustaining the State’s objection that the letters were immaterial. We agree that the letters were immaterial.
Several times, Paula testified that she was in love with her estranged husband, Herbie, and that she desired to reconcile with him, which was a source of conflict between her and her parents. She also denied that she had ever participated in a conversation with anyone about a murder made to look like an accidental death.
The first letter, with which appellant sought to impeach.Paula, was written by Paula to Herbie, but was never mailed. In this letter, she expressed her intention to leave Herbie and her anger towards him. In the hearing out of the jury’s presence, it was developed that this letter was written several years ago, when Paula and Herbie separated for one day. We hold that the trial court’s ruling was correct; this old letter did not impeach her testimony that during the months before her parents were murdered, she desired to reconcile with Herbie. Thus, it was not probative of her credibility in this case, as appellant contends, and the trial court properly excluded it. It is well settled that a witness may not be impeached on immaterial and collateral matters. See Williams v. State, 542 S.W.2d 131 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Ellard v. State, 507 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Fisbeck v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 105, 311 S.W.2d 865 (1958).
The second letter in the steno pad was written by Paula to a previous boyfriend, Clay. In that letter, Paula made references, which she explained, to the fact that two of Herbie’s relatives had been involved in a murder in Port Arthur in 1973. There was also a reference, Paula explained, to the fact that one of the perpetrator’s wives turned them in, and an implication that the wife might be involved in some accident thereafter. Appellant sought to impeach her with this letter as being inconsistent with her testimony at trial that she never had knowledge of any murder that was made to look like an accidental death.
We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding this evidence. Paula testified at the hearing on this matter that she did not know when she wrote that letter. The testimony indicates it was written sometime between 1973 to 1975. Further, Paula testified that she was just recounting matters that Herbie had told her. Again, we do not find that this letter was material or probative as to any issue in the case; since a witness may not be impeached on immaterial and collateral matters, no error is shown. See Williams v. State, supra; Ellard v. State, supra; Fisbeck v. State, supra.
In a related ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not allowing him an opportunity to question Paula about the letters in the steno pad for the purposes of perfecting his bill of exception. The record reflects that this contention is without merit.
First, appellant, in a hearing out of the presence of the jury, was given ample opportunity to question Paula about the letters. Further, the record reflects that he did examine her about the contents of each. Still further, the questions which appellant proposed in his bill of exception were answered by Paula during the hearing out of the jury’s presence. Also, the record nowhere reflects that appellant requested to examine her further or that his examination of her was in any way limited by the trial court.
*525In his fourteenth ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to impeach Paula for bias and motive for testifying favorably to the State. Upon cross-examination by the defense, Paula testified that she entered pleas of guilty to the murders of her parents and agreed to testify against appellant, in exchange for the dismissal of the capital murder charges against her. The defense then inquired:
“Isn’t it true that you presently have held up hundreds of dollars of forged checks or hot checks with the District Attorney’s office in Jefferson County, Beaumont, being held up and no charges filed on the insistence or influence of these two gentlemen right here of the District Attorney’s Office of Harris County, isn’t that true?”
Paula denied that this was true. The defense then asked:
“You have never forged Herbie Derese’s name to any instrument, is that correct” The State’s objection to this question was sustained.
Appellant now contends that under the authority of Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) and Castro v. State, 562 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), he was denied the right of effective cross-examination and confrontation of this witness. We hold that no error is shown.
The record reflects that appellant failed to perfect a bill of exception concerning any charges pending against Paula in Beaumont. The defense asked Paula about the charges; she denied them. Appellant made no attempt to show that her answers were false. He did not perfect a bill of exception in order to let the record reflect that there were, indeed, other charges pending against Paula. Absent such a showing, no error is shown. Toler v. State, 546 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Garza v. State, 532 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
In Simmons v. State, 548 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), upon which appellant relies, the defendant was not permitted to develop a bill of exception concerning a witness’ prior charges in his attempt to show bias towards the State. This case is inapplicable to the instant case, since here, appellant made no attempt to perfect such a bill. Further, in Davis v. Alaska, supra, and Castro v. State, supra, both defendants preserved error by letting the record reflect the matters which were excluded by the trial courts. Thus, they do not control the disposition of this ground of error. Appellant’s contention is overruled.
In his sixteenth ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State’s witness Ben Tabor was an accomplice witness as a matter of law. Appellant has failed to preserve error on this ground. In his oral objections to the charge, appellant failed to raise this ground before the trial court. Further, his requested Charge No. 1, upon which he relies, did n.ot deal with the issue of whether Tabor was an accomplice witness as a matter of law. Rather, the requested charge dealt with the rule regarding corroboration of accomplice witness testimony.3 See Article 38.14, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Since appellant’s ground of error on appeal differs from his objections raised in the trial court, nothing is preserved for review. Sloan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Campbell v. State, 492 S.W.2d 956 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). *526We note that the trial court did submit a charge to the jury as to whether Tabor was an accomplice witness, and charged the jury on the accomplice witness corroboration rule. See Article 38.14, supra. We direct appellant’s attention to Lafoon v. State, 543 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Jackson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) and Mutscher v. State, 514 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This ground of error is overruled.
In his seventeenth and eighteenth grounds of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to testimony offered at the punishment phase of the trial. The record reflects that at the punishment phase, Joyce Sinclair, a former girlfriend of appellant’s, testified that in February of 1976, appellant had attempted to extort money from her and had threatened her. She also testified that appellant told her of his intent and plans to murder Don Sinclair, her husband. Don Sinclair testified that he had an encounter with appellant, whom he recognized even though appellant was disguised. Appellant later told Joyce that he had intended to kill Don during this encounter, but that he was prevented from doing so by the proximity of a police officer.
Appellant objected to the admissibility of this testimony. A hearing was held out of the presence of the jury, after which the trial court overruled appellant’s objections.
At the punishment phase of a capital murder trial, one of the issues which the jury must determine is “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Article 37.071(b)(2), Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Further, this statute provides that at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial, “evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence.” (Emphasis added)
In Jurek v. State, 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), we stated that the range and severity of a capital defendant’s prior criminal conduct was relevant evidence for a jury to consider in determining the likelihood that the defendant would be a continuing threat to society. In Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States emphasized that “[wjhat is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.”
In Garcia v. State, 581 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held that nothing in Article 37.071, supra, requires that there be a final conviction for an extraneous offense to be admissible at this stage of a capital trial. We stated in Garcia :
“Clearly, evidence of prior offenses falls within the range of ‘prior criminal conduct.’ Such ‘prior criminal conduct’ is clearly relevant to the jury’s deliberations on special issue number two . . .”
See also Hammett v. State, supra.
Since the trial court has wide discretion in admitting evidence at the punishment phase of a capital murder trial, see Gholson and Ross v. State, 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Livingston v. State, 542 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Robinson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Brown v. State, 554 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), we hold that this relevant evidence of appellant’s prior criminal conduct was admissible for the jury’s consideration. Garcia v. State, supra; Hammett v. State, supra; see also, Brooks v. State (60,521, delivered March 21, 1979); Earvin v. State, 582 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
These two grounds of error are overruled.
In his final ground of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to Joyce Sinclair’s testimony concerning a telephone conversation with an unidentified caller. Joyce testified that on January 6, 1976, appellant told her of his thwarted plans to kill her husband, Don. He also advised her that he had a “hit man” coming from Dallas, and then threatened her. About an hour and a *527half after this telephone conversation with appellant, Joyce received another call. She did not recognize the voice, nor did the caller identify himself. Over appellant’s objection, Joyce testified that the caller stated that he did not appreciate the way she was treating appellant, and said that if anything happened to appellant, he would return from Dallas and kill Joyce and her family. The caller then hung up. Shortly thereafter, appellant called Joyce and apologized for harassing her and her husband.
Appellant now contends that the court erred in allowing Joyce to testify about the conversation with the unidentified caller. Error, if there was any, in the admission of this testimony was clearly harmless in light of the substantial testimony concerning appellant’s repeated threats, expressed intent to do harm to, and criminal acts toward, Joyce and Don Sinclair. See Johnson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Dalton v. State, 516 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). This ground of error is overruled. Appellant’s pro se ground of error has already been overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.
APPENDIX A
In the course of examining Benny Ballard, the trial court inquired:
“Q. In the past I am sure you have probably heard, read or seen something about this case.
“A. [Ballard] No, not this one.
“Q. You do not recognize this case?
“A. I wouldn’t know a soul in here or anything about it?
“Q. All right. I believe that the evidence will show the additional fact that the offense, if any, happened in Baytown, Texas. And, again, I will repeat the names involved in the indictment — Vernon Eugene McMa-nus, Paula Cantrell Derese, Paul Harvey Cantrell and Mary Bright Cantrell.
“A. Now that you mention Baytown, there was a write-up in the newspaper. It was all over the newspaper. Couldn’t help but read it about this girl who was supposed to have hired somebody to murder her parents for the insurance money ... I don’t know if this is the case. I am bad on names. But I do remember that about Baytown.
‘Q. . did you read about it, did you follow it with avid interest or just follow it with passing interest?
‘A. No, I just read about it in the paper. I would go to work, and somebody would say: Did you hear about so and so.
* * * * * *
‘Q. So, you have read something about it and you have discussed it on occasion with fellow employees or family or friends. Is that a fair statement?
‘A. That would be fair.
‘Q. What is the last thing you recall reading about the case?
‘A. Just that they had the girl up on charges of hiring two people. That is all I remember.
‘Q. Do you have any recollection or any knowledge of the present status of the Derese case.
‘A. No, I don’t know what has happened to the girl.
‘Q. You have not read, seen or heard anything about that, then?
‘A. No.
‘Q. As a result of what you have read, seen or heard in the news media, or the result of any conversations you may have had in regard to the case with your fellow employees or anyone, have you formed any conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of this defendant, Vernon Eugene McManus?
‘A. No, I haven’t any conclusions at all.
‘Q. None whatsoever. In the event that you are selected as a juror in this case, and if, during the conduct of the trial, something comes up *528APPENDIX A — Continued that my [sic] trigger your memory as to something you have read, seen or heard, I think you will admit that is a possibility?
“A. It is a possibility. I know when you said Baytown awhile ago, it clicked in my mind.—
“Q. If such a thing should happen — if something you hear at the trial of the case triggers something in your mind about anything you have read, seen or heard discussed, could you and would you set that out of your mind and let your verdict rest entirely upon the sworn testimony of witnesses in the courtroom and any physical evidence that may be admitted?
“A. That's right. I would disregard everything because I know how wrong the papers are sometimes.”
The defense examined Ballard, and asked whether he had any bias or prejudice towards appellant, to which Ballard responded “I don’t even know the man.” Ballard also denied that there was any reason why he could not be a fair and impartial juror.
APPENDIX B
During the examination of juror Aehgill, the court inquired:
“[THE COURT] Now, have you seen, read, heard or discussed anything about this case, or do you recognize the case from the names?
“A. [Aehgill] From what you described in the indictment, I recognize I heard it on TV.
“Q. All right. The facts will show in this case that it also occurred in Baytown, if that is any help. But you say you have recognized some of the names and seen or heard it on TV?
“A. The part that I recognize is the insurance part of it.
“Q. That it was done for the proceeds—
“A. Yes, right.
“Q. What is the last thing you recall having seen, read or heard about the case?
‘A. Well, I was sitting at home last ' night talking to my son, the TV was on, and it was on Channel 2, and they started saying that this case— that they were trying to pick a jury for this case and two jurors had been chosen. At that point I turned the TV off.
‘Q. Thank you, sir. You are a juror that actually followed the Court’s instructions. I appreciate it, and I know counsel does. All right. Then, before that, what is the last thing you recall having read, seen or heard?
‘A. I couldn’t even recall when I heard about it.
‘Q. Does the name Paula Cantrell Derese ring a bell?
‘A. No, sir.
‘Q. Then I assume you don’t have any idea what has happened in her case?
‘A. No, sir.
‘Q. Do you recall ever seeing, reading or hearing anything about this case at its inception?
A. No, sir.
‘Q. Around the middle of last year?
‘A. No, sir.
'Q. All right. Well, based on what you have seen, read or heard or discussed with other people, have you formed any conclusion, however slight, as to the guilt or innocence of this defendant, Vernon Eugene McManus?
‘A. No, sir. The whole thing is just a vague recollection to me. I have not formed any opinion.
‘Q. Then, you have not formed any conclusion whatsoever, as to his guilt, or innocence at this moment?
‘A. No, sir.
‘Q. Nor have you in the past?
‘A. No, sir.
‘Q. All right. Would you answer this, then: In the event that you were on this jury and during the course of
*529APPENDIX B — Continued the trial something came up which might trigger your memory of something you have read, seen or heard, could you and would you set that aside, realizing it is the rankest hearsay, and base your verdict entirely upon the evidence and the testimony that you hear in. this courtroom?
“A. Yes, sir.”

. The record reflects that on March 9, 1977, during the voir dire examination, the following exchange occurred concerning the extent to which defense counsel was entitled to delve into pre-trial publicity with prospective jurors:
“MR. VELA: Your Honor, we are also pursuing this matter in light of a motion for change of venue, so it is not just for cause. We have urged this motion upon the Court. We need to be able to inquire as to the extent of the publicity, the extent of any prejudice, the extent of any discussions. And to restrict us, once again, would deny us two things. One, the determination of their qualifications to sit as jurors and, number two, and more importantly, or just as important, determination as to whether or not a change of venue is in order in this Court. We cannot make either one of those determinations without inquiry.
THE COURT: Counsel, we are right now trying to select a jury.
MR. VELA: I understand.
THE COURT: Now, if we select a jury and you want to hear your motion on a change of venue, we will hear it. I am not precluding you from your motion nor am I combining the jury selection and a motion for a change of venue.
MR. VELA: My understanding was that the Court was carrying it along and was going to wait—
THE COURT: Carrying it along, yes.
MR. VELA: And was going to wait and see—
THE COURT: This is not a motion hearing. This is for selection of the jury. If at the *517conclusion, either way, you know, if we are able to conclude by selecting a jury, you want your motion heard, it will be heard in full.
MR. VELA: I am not arguing with the Court. I want the record to reflect exactly what our agreement was so I will have it straight in my mind. My understanding of the agreement— •
THE COURT: First of all, I didn’t know it was an agreement.
MR. VELA: I am sorry, I misused the word. The order of the Court. I want to make sure I understand and the record re-fleets the order of the Court relative to the motion. My understanding was that the Court would see how the selection process progressed.
THE COURT: That is correct. Under the law of selecting a jury and not under any motion for change of venue.
MR. VELA: I understand. And then, in order to allow me to complete my sentence, that at the end of some period of time — I believe the Court instructed us that possibly a week — the Court would then determine whether or not, on its own motion, would grant a change of venue.”

. We note that appellant did not at trial, nor does he now, object to the court’s excusing Blanchard under the authority of Section 12.-31(b), supra. Further, he does not complain that the juror was excused in violation of With-erspoon v. Illinois, nor did he request any opportunity to determine whether the juror was still qualified under Witherspoon, nor is there any showing in the record that the juror was qualified under Witherspoon. His sole objection at trial and on appeal is the fact that a juror was excused after having been impaneled and sworn, and that a juror has an “absolute right” to change his opinions after being selected.

. “Defendant’s Requested Charge No. 1: Now if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense was committed as charged, and you further believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that the witness BEN MILTON TABOR is an accomplice; you are instructed that you cannot convict the Defendant upon the testimony of the said BEN MILTON TABOR, unless you first believe that the testimony of the said BEN MILTON TABOR, is true and it shows that the Defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment, and unless you further find and believe that there is other evidence in the case outside of the said testimony of the said BEN MILTON TABOR, tending to connect the Defendant with the commission of the offense charged against him, and from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment.”