Court Opinion

ID: 9730202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:05:05.448774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.858976
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). Our system of justice expects, and in fact must demand, that jurors put aside their prejudices during deliberations and judge a defendant’s innocence or guilt solely on the evidence and the law as presented to them at trial. That clearly did not happen in this case. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
This case involves a black man charged with soliciting prostitutes and keeping a place of prostitution. The state’s chief witness against the defendant was a white female who testified that she met the defendant when she was seventeen years old. Approximately five hours and 40 minutes into the jury deliberations, a juror said: “Let’s be logical; he’s a black, and he sees a seventeen year old white girl — I know the type.” Twenty minutes later, the jury returned with a guilty verdict.
The majority’s decision upholding the denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial is based, in part, on its *831interpretation of sec. 906.06(2), Stats. The majority concludes that the juror’s statement that was made during the deliberations is not competent evidence under the statute because it is neither “extraneous prejudicial information,” nor an “outside influence.” See pp. 794, 795. I disagree.
Section 906.06(2), Stats., allows a juror to testify “. . . on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention. . . (Emphasis supplied.) In interpreting this phrase this court has noted: “. . . a fundamental principle of our justice system is that the government has the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of evidence offered in the courtroom under the rules of evidence and under the supervision of the court.” State v. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d 510, 519, 343 N.W.2d 108 (1984). (Emphasis supplied.) This court has also stated that “sec. 906.06(2) ensures that juries will reach ver-, diets on the basis of information known to the parties and affords the party whose case is negatively affected by the information a chance to probe and rebut.” 116 Wis. 2d at 520. (Emphasis supplied.)
By making the statement in this case, the juror was clearly trying to persuade his fellow jurors by bringing “facts” outside the record to their attention. In effect what this juror said was: “Let’s be logical. Here’s a black man charged with soliciting prostitutes and keeping a place of prostitution. I know the way these things work. You should know it too. The fact is that the way black pimps work is to get young white girls working for them and that’s what happened here.”
The juror’s statement, in addition to evincing a personal prejudice, was of a type intended to persuade reluctant jurors that they should consider the “fact” that black pimps operate by utilizing young white women as prostitutes. This “fact” was not part of the evidence adduced at trial, and had it been offered, it could not have *832been received. This was both extraneous and prejudicial information, which the defendant had no opportunity to rebut.
The majority’s conclusion that the juror’s statement is not competent evidence under sec. 906.06(2), Stats., is also contrary to this court’s prior decision in After Hour Welding v. Laneil Management Co., 108 Wis. 2d 734, 324 N.W.2d 686 (1982). In After Hour, during jury deliberations jurors made certain remarks, including the comment that an officer of the defendant corporation was “a cheap Jew.” This court held that the jurors’ remarks were competent within the meaning of sec. 906.06(2). See 108 Wis .2d at 739-40. I fail to see how this court could conclude that the remarks in After Hour, which were made in a civil case and which concerned non-parties to the suit, were competent evidence, yet conclude that the juror’s statement in this criminal case, which concerned the defendant, is not competent within the meaning of the statute. If anything, this case presents a much more egregious case and therefore an easier case for concluding that the juror’s statement is competent evidence. The reference in After Hour to the corporate officer’s religion clearly evinced a subjective prejudice of the juror who made the remark. The juror’s statement in this case, however, not only evinced a subjective prejudice but was also an attempt to bring a prejudicial “fact” outside the record to the other jurors’ attention. The majority makes no attempt to distinguish After Hour and offers no explanation for the inconsistent holdings in After Hour and this case. Based on the language of sec. 906.06 (2) and the holding in After Hour, I conclude that the juror’s statement in this case is competent under sec. 906.06(2), and satisfies the first part of the test set forth in After Hour, and elaborated upon in Poh.
I also conclude that the second and third parts of the After Hour-Poh test were met in this case. The second *833part of the test concerns whether the evidence shows substantial grounds sufficient to set aside a verdict, as a matter of law. After Hour, 108 Wis. 2d at 740. As this court stated in PoK, the second part of the test requires that the trial court “. . . determine whether it is convinced by clear and satisfactory evidence that the alleged extraneous information reached the jury and could, bias the jury against the moving party.” Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 523. (Emphasis supplied.) The third part of the test requires a determination whether there is a reasonable possibility that the extraneous prejudicial information that was brought to the jury’s attention might have contributed to the conviction. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d 525-32.
In this case, the trial court determined that the statement was made during the jury deliberations. Further, the statement had the effect of placing before the jury a “fact” not in the record which the defendant had no opportunity to rebut, and it related directly to the crimes with which the defendant was charged. I therefore conclude as a matter of law that the jury could have become biased against the defendant after hearing this information. 1
Finally, in assessing the impact of the error that occurs when extraneous prejudicial information is brought to the jury’s attention, this court has held that trial and appellate courts should consider “. . . such factors as the nature of the extraneous information and the circumstances under which it was brought to the jury’s attention ; the nature of the state’s case; the defense presented at trial; and the connection between the extraneous in*834formation and a material issue in the case.” Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 530. Here, the statement had the effect of putting before the jury the “fact” that black men operate places of prostitution by using young white women as prostitutes. Because the defendant was charged with keeping a place of prostitution, it is logical to assume that the jury may have given more weight to the state’s case in light of this extraneous prejudicial information. However, not only did this statement attempt to persuade other jurors by putting forth a new fact for consideration, but it was made more than 5% hours into the jury deliberations, with the jury returning a guilty verdict approximately twenty minutes after the statement was made. I conclude that a reasonable possibility existed that this extraneous information might have contributed to the conviction. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.
I would also reverse and remand because I conclude that the majority’s holding denies the defendant his constitutional rights. As this court has acknowledged, extraneous information that arises during jury deliberations may impact upon three constitutional doctrines: a criminal defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury, the defendant’s right to be present during the proceedings, and the defendant’s right to be represented by an attorney. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 525-26. These rights are protected by both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. Id. These constitutional rights are implicated in this case. The majority’s interpretation of sec. 906.06 (2), Stats., as applied to this defendant, effectively denies the defendant these constitutional rights. Rather than interpreting sec. 906.06(2) in a manner that effectuates these rights, the majority elevates jury secrecy to the forefront of its consideration at the expense of the defendant’s constitutional rights.
*835In After Hour, this court recognized the importance of a defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by an impartial jury when it stated:
“Whenever it comes to a trial court’s attention that a jury verdict may have been the result of any form of prejudice based on race, religion, gender or national origin, judges should be especially sensitive to such allegations and conduct an investigation to ‘ferret out the truth’. Morgan v. United States, 399 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1025 (1969). For even if only one member of a jury harbors a material prejudice, the right to a trial by an impartial jury is impaired. United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1973).” After Hour, 108 Wis. 2d at 739-40.
This language of After Hour is in accord with two federal cases that discussed the question of racially prejudicial comments made by a juror. In Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D. N.Y. 1979), a juror stated that the issue of identification in the case was insignificant because “ ‘You can’t tell one black from another. They all look alike.’ ” Another juror stated that the jury should believe the testimony of two white victims as opposed to the black defendant. The court allowed this juror testimony to be heard under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the equivalent of sec. 906.06 (2), Stats., because the statements were “sufficient to raise a question as to whether the jury’s verdict was discolored by improper influences and that they are not merely matters of jury deliberations.” 468 F. Supp. at 1290.
The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Tobias from this case by stating: “The juror statement in Tobias is sufficiently different from the juror statement made here that the holding in Tobias is not useful precedent for this case.” Slip op. at 800. I do not find this persuasive. I conclude that the statements in Tobias are *836similar in nature to the juror’s statement in this case, and the rationale set forth in that case is equally applicable to the issue presented in this case.
In Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. N.Y. 1983), the court concluded that an evidentiary hearing into possible juror bias was not warranted because the possibly prejudicial comment involved was an isolated racial epithet spoken outside of jury deliberations. However, the court stated: “Certainly, if a criminal defendant could show that the jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could not be ignored without trampling the sixth amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial and an impartial jury.” 559 F. Supp. at 1151. The court also stated: “ ‘ [t] here may be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without violating the plainest principles of justice.’ ” Id., quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915). This is precisely the effect that the majority’s conclusion has in this case. Here, the juror uttered a statement during jury deliberations that reflects a prejudiced mind incapable of giving the defendant a fair trial. Furthermore, the juror attempted to persuade other jurors with this extraneous information. This clearly impacted on the defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury, his right to be present during the proceedings and rebut this information, and his right to be represented by an attorney.
The majority opinion recognizes the defendant’s constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, and defines that right as encompassing two separate rights: the right to be tried by a jury, and the right to be tried by a jury that is impartial. See p. 802. The majority’s focus on the need for secrecy of jury deliberations reflects its concern with the need to protect the right to be tried by a jury. What the majority opinion fails to recognize, however, is that the right to be tried by a jury is rendered meaningless if the jury is not impartial. *837In the abstract, the goal of preserving the right to a trikl by jury is laudatory; however, the protection of that right is of small consolation to a defendant in a particular case if the jury by which he or she has been tried was not impartial.
I dissent. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

 The concurring opinion cites to this conclusion but rejects it “. . . as a test under either the second or third phase of the After Hour test.” (Steinmetz, J., concurring op. at 818-819.) However, this is precisely the analysis that this court used in Poh to determine whether the second part of the test originally set forth in After Hour was satisfied. See Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 523-24.