Court Opinion

ID: 9472918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:14:46.258937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:13.690802
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the majority. I write separately, however, to point out that in Check, heavily relied upon by the majority, the prosecution had incorporated no fewer than seventeen otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements into the witness’ testimony. 582 F.2d at 678. As we noted in Check, the witness there acted as a “transparent conduit for the introduction of inadmissible hearsay.” Id. Herein, by contrast, the challenged testimony appears to have been admissible as a verbal act, serving to explain the circumstances of Vazquez’ arrest on the street and appellant Figueroa’s subsequent arrest in Room 638. Even if this were not the case, however, I am unpersuaded that the testimony itself had more than a very slight effect on the jury. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Moreover, the majority’s assertion that the testimony was the only evidence directly implicating Figueroa, see supra, 924, overlooks the evidence to the effect that Agent Caprio spoke on the telephone about a narcotics deal with a person whom he addressed as “Leo.” That person did not object to being called Leo, and his voice matched an arresting detective’s description of appellant Figueroa’s voice. See supra, 911.
The prosecutor, however, relied heavily in summation upon the veracity of the challenged testimony, despite the fact that it had been admitted as only a verbal act. In spite of my reservations, because of this wholly inappropriate argument to the jury, I concur in the reversal and remand of the case for a new trial.