Court Opinion

ID: 9406798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-03 19:03:26.723473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.306854
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/3/23 Marriage of Mona and Schmelzer CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re Marriage of STEPHANIE                                      B317609
MONA and TROY SCHMELZER.
________________________________                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. BD626890)
STEPHANIE MONA,

         Appellant,

         v.

TROY SCHMELZER,

         Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Wendy L. Wilcox, Judge. Affirmed.

         Appellant, in pro. per.

         No appearance by Respondent.

                                    _________________________
                       INTRODUCTION
      This is an appeal from a post-judgment order modifying
child and spousal support and determining arrearages payable by
Troy Schmelzer to ex-wife Stephanie Mona.1 The family court
ordered Troy to pay down the arrearages he owes for child
support, spousal support, and unreimbursed medical expenses by
$100 each, or a combined $300, per month.
      Stephanie appealed. She argues the trial court’s order
amounts to an abuse of discretion, as it “would take 254 years
and 7 months [for Troy] to [pay the balance due]” to Stephanie.
Troy has not made any appearance on appeal.
      We find no error and affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
     We piece together the following from the scanty record we
were provided.
I.    Background Information
      Troy and Stephanie married on February 17, 2001. They
separated on July 13, 2015. They have two minor children, ages
12 and 14, and one adult child, age 20.
      On September 10, 2015, Stephanie filed a petition for
dissolution of her marriage to Troy.
      On October 17, 2016, the judgment of dissolution
(judgment) was filed and entered by the court. We were not
provided a copy of the parties’ judgment. We glean some of the
judgment’s terms from pleadings filed four and a half years later.
The judgment ordered Troy to pay Stephanie $10,114 in child

1     We refer to the parties by their first names.

                                 2
 support per month. The judgment also ordered Troy to pay
 Stephanie spousal support of $6,852 per month.
II.    Post-Judgment Motion to Modify Child and Spousal
       Support
        On April 9, 2021, Troy filed a request for order (RFO) to
 modify visitation, child support, spousal support, and for the
 “[r]elease of [Troy’s] California Law License”; he also filed an
 Income and Expense (I&E) declaration (which was not provided
 to us). He sought to modify the judgment’s child support order to
 guideline amount and to modify and/or terminate spousal
 support.
        Troy stated there has been “a substantial and material
 change of circumstances since entry of [the judgment]” in that his
 employment as a partner at Baker Hostetler was “involuntarily
 terminated” on February 28, 2019. The judgment’s support
 terms were based on his then income of $707,136 per year. He
 has “since been unable to find comparable employment.”
        After months passed with “no success in finding a position
 in a law firm,” Troy started his own practice, Schmelzer IP. As
 he was undertaking this effort, he was notified in October 2019 of
 the “imminent suspension of [his] California law license due to
 falling behind on child support payments in the preceding
 months in which [he] had no income.” This “disqualifie[d] [him]
 from providing services or earning income as an attorney in
 California.” He thus relocated his law practice to Arizona where
 he also has a law license. However, the global COVID-19
 pandemic then began and “added to [Troy’s] difficulties in finding
 employment.”
        “Although [his] Arizona law license remains active for now,
 the suspension of [his] California license is very public and

                                 3
prominent and has had the consequence of making it virtually
impossible to find employment as an attorney, even in Arizona.”
Until his child support obligation is “reduced to a level
commensurate with [his] substantially changed circumstances, so
that [he] can be in compliance going forward and obtain release of
[his] law license, [he] will continue to be unable to find
substantial employment in [his] field.” Troy requested that the
court “order the California Department of Child Support Services
to issue a release of his California law license no. 211460 to the
State Bar of California.”
       Troy further alleged that on March 30, 2020, Stephanie
“petitioned the State Bar of Arizona to revoke [his] Arizona law
license.” He alleged: Stephanie sought “to deprive [him] of his
ability to generate income by her petition with the State Bar of
Arizona for his permanent disbarment, based on false allegations
including that [he] had quit his job to ‘find himself. . . . [T]his is
simply not true. [¶] If [Stephanie] truly has a continued need for
spousal support from [him], she would not petition his licensing
authority to revoke his law license at all, much less make such a
petition based on false and damaging allegations. . . . It would not
be just or equitable for this court to continue ordering spousal
support to a party that is actively seeking to strip the supporting
party of his ability to earn income.”
       Troy next alleged he “currently is unable to support himself
and has no ability to pay spousal support.” He “completely
tapped all financial resources, and at this point [was] living on
the basis of loans from [his] mother and the goodwill of a friend.”
He alleged that Stephanie “has been living comfortably in the
home of the boyfriend with whom she cohabits for the last two
years, with the children having rooms and attending high quality

                                  4
schools. She has a higher monthly income (unemployment
compensation) than [him].” He provided, as an exhibit, a copy of
Stephanie’s resume as an “Event Design and Production
Manager” where she describes herself as a “[r]esults-oriented
professional with over 15 years of experience.” She previously
attended law school and also has experience working as a legal
secretary prior to event planning.
      On May 21, 2021, Stephanie filed her responsive
declaration opposing Troy’s RFO. She alleged that Troy “stopped
paying child support & spousal support in April 2019, and
currently owes $275,000 child support arrearages and $206,000
in spousal support arrearages.” She and the children are
“surviving by living with her boyfriend in Van Nuys, borrowing
money from her parents, and receiving government assistance in
the form of Cal-fresh (food stamps) & Medi-Cal (health
insurance).” Due to Troy’s “continued non-payment, she was
forced to file for bankruptcy in August 2019, and had both of her
vehicles repossessed in December 2019.”
      That same date, Stephanie filed an I&E declaration, a copy
of which was not included in the record before us.
      On May 25, 2021, Los Angeles County’s Department of
Child Support Services (DCSS) filed a responsive declaration that
the “current order for child support should remain in full force
and effect unless there is a change in circumstances, then
guideline child support should be ordered.” (Italics added.)
      On May 26, 2021, Troy filed an updated I&E declaration—
again not included in the appellate record.
      At the hearing held July 30, 2021, the court found there
has been a material change in circumstances warranting a
modification of child and spousal support. We were not provided

                               5
  a reporter’s transcript of this hearing. The minute order provides
  the court “note[d] that child support and spousal support shall be
  based on the parties’ current Income and Expense
  Declaration[s].” The minute order further provides that hearing
  “is continued to October 29, 2021” and that the parties are
  ordered “to submit proposed DissoMasters based on the current
  Income and Expense Declarations by the parties.”
III.    Post-Judgment Motion to Determine Arrears Owed
        On September 1, 2021, Stephanie filed an RFO for a
  determination of arrearages owed for child support, spousal
  support, and unreimbursed medical expenses. She alleged Troy
  informed her in January 2019 that “he would be quitting his job
  as a patent attorney” and “taking some time off ‘to find himself.’ ”
  She initiated a case against Troy with DCSS on April 15, 2019.
  She “was forced to file for bankruptcy, which was granted in
  August 2019.” She was then informed by Troy that he “would be
  starting his own law firm, and that it would be months before he
  would be able to pay any form of support again.”
        She also filed a declaration of payment history, stating that
  Troy owes her $287,924.75 in child support arrearages, $85,980
  in spousal support arrearages, and $3,685 in unreimbursed
  medical expenses; the sums include interest.
        On September 30, 2021, Stephanie filed another RFO re
  modification of child custody because she was moving to
  Maryland with the children. A hearing was set for November 19,
  2021.
        On October 5, 2021, Troy filed an updated I&E declaration.
  On October 6, 2021, Stephanie filed her I&E declaration. On
  October 8, 2021, Troy filed another I&E declaration. The record

                                   6
provided to us did not include any of the parties’ I&E
declarations.
      Based on the parties’ current and updated I&E
declarations, Troy argued in his October 5, 2021 brief to the court
that child support should be $323 per month and spousal support
should be $106 per month. He also notified the court that his
California law license “is currently on administrative suspension
due to his inability to be current on child support payments, and
his Arizona law license is on probation status as a result of
[Stephanie’s] complaint to the Arizona State Bar asking that he
be permanently disbarred.” He explained that for him to “obtain
reinstatement of his California law license, and to avoid
suspension of his Arizona law license, he must come into
compliance with child support payments going forward, and
arrange a repayment plan for child support arrears.” He
suggested $100 per month for the repayment of arrears.
      In her brief filed October 6, 2021, Stephanie informed the
court that she has not had a job since 1999 when she was a legal
secretary and has no marketable skills. However, she stated in
the spousal support declaration attachment (Judicial Council
form FL-157) that she recently “[got] her real estate license in
California” but has since moved with the children to Maryland to
live with her mother. Stephanie calculated child support for all
three children, despite the fact that the eldest child was no longer
a minor.
IV.   Hearing and Ruling
      On October 21, 2021, the court heard Stephanie’s RFO re
arrearages owed. We were not provided a reporter’s transcript of
this hearing, which severely restricts our review. The minute
order provides the “matter with respect to the child support and

                                 7
spousal support arrearages is heard” and the “matter with
respect to the unreimbursed medical expenses is heard.” The
court ordered Stephanie to prepare an updated declaration of
payment history through March 30, 2021. The court ordered
Troy to pay Stephanie the unreimbursed medical expenses
pursuant to the judgment. The court further ordered Troy to pay
Stephanie $100 each towards child support arrearages, spousal
support arrearages, and unreimbursed medical expenses every
month, commencing November 1, 2021, making it a combined
$300 monthly due on the first of every month.
       The hearing continued on October 29, 2021. We were
provided a reporter’s transcript of this hearing. The court noted
“it found a material change of circumstance at the previous
hearing.” The court ordered Troy to pay Stephanie $296 per
month as and for child support commencing November 1, 2021.
       Stephanie informed the court that she “redetermined [the
arrearages] going back retroactive to April, and it came out to . . .
[$]243,000 in child support arrearages. You said a hundred
dollars a month. That would make it 202 years for him to pay it
back.”
       The court explained that the October 21st order “is based
on where we are today.” Troy “has to get his licenses in order” so
that he may “go get a job [so that he] can pay you more . . . . It’s
what he raised last time, and which is my concern, is that who’s
going to hire him if, in fact, he has issues with the state bar in
California and the state bar in Arizona? He’s trying to clear
those up, and so he can go and get a job that’s actually going to
pay him something that is going to pay you back faster. That’s
why I said, this is what we’re working with today. But I expect
that to change once he gets his licenses in order. Because there

                                  8
are jobs out there that he can get that are going to pay him a lot
more than what he’s trying to do himself.”
        The following exchange took place between the court and
Troy:
        Troy stated, “The status of my legal licenses is depending
on me getting current with child support.” He requested that the
court order “a temporary child support amount . . . based on all
the numbers we have right now, so that [he] can at least get
current and get [his] licenses in good order.”
        The court: “[C]orrect me if I’m wrong, but you said you
would go and get a job from somewhere—from a firm, rather than
what you’re doing today, once you get your licenses cleared;
correct?”
        Troy: “My earning capacity will certainly be greater . . . if I
had my law licenses.”
        The court: “[I]f [Troy’s] license is cleared up, then [he] can
go and find a job working for a firm. [He] worked for great firms
previously. [He] can work for a firm, which will make a lot more
money than [what] you’re making a month by yourself. Right?”
        Troy: “Yes. Yes.”
        The court: “[T]hat’s what you said last time we were
together, so that you can go and do that. So you can make a lot
more money and you can get caught up and pay [Stephanie] back.
[¶] . . . [¶] And that’s why I said that this is where we are today.
But I expect it to be different once we get this order in line, so he
can clear up the [state bar] license issues.”
        “[I]n order to determine what the amount of support is, we
need . . . to understand what the custody and visitation schedule
[is]. I can’t get to what that schedule is until we go through your
RFO in November regarding the move-away, because A) I have to

                                  9
address the LaMusga[2] factors, and B) for a move-away, . . . the
court orders the parenting plan assessment II. “I think what I
need to do is at least—I need to have [Troy’s] request for order
trail the custody and visitation request for order, because the
only way that I can determine what the numbers are . . . based
on.” The court “continue[d]” Troy’s RFO and “ha[d] it trail
[Stephanie’s] RFO”; it reserved all other issues for later
determination.
       This appeal followed.
                          DISCUSSION
      Stephanie contends the trial court’s order on the child and
spousal support arrearages amounts to an abuse of discretion,
and requests that we reverse.
      Finding no error, we affirm.

I.      Applicable Law
       A motion for the determination of arrearages is a “species
of declaratory judgment or accounting unconnected with any
specific enforcement of the support obligation.” (County of Shasta
v. Smith (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 329, 334; see In re Marriage of
Sabine & Toshio M. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1214 [a family
court has the authority “to determine whether any arrearages
exist and, if so, the amount due”]; In re Marriage of Robinson
(1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 93, 98 [a determination of arrearages
“ ‘rests upon an existing order rendered in a family law action’ ”].)
The determination of arrearages is “treated as a money
judgment” enforceable under Family Code section 290. (County

2       Referring to In re Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1072.

                                 10
of Shasta, at p. 334; see In re Marriage of Lackey (1983)
143 Cal.App.3d 698, 702–203.)
       The Family Code permits a trial court to modify or
terminate a child support order “at any time as the court
determines to be necessary.” (Fam. Code, § 3651, subd. (a).)
A party seeking modification of a child support order must
“ ‘introduce admissible evidence of changed circumstances.’ ” (In
re Marriage of Williams (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234.)
“The party seeking the modification bears the burden of showing
that circumstances have changed such that modification is
warranted.” (In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th
1039, 1054.)
       Modification of spousal support, even if the prior amount is
established by agreement, requires a material change of
circumstances since the last order. (In re Marriage of Dietz
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 387, 396.) Change of circumstances
means a reduction or increase in the supporting spouse’s ability
to pay and/or an increase or decrease in the supported spouse’s
needs. (Ibid.) It includes all factors affecting need and the
ability to pay. (Ibid.) A party moving to modify or terminate
spousal support usually has the burden to show a material
change in circumstances since the time of the last support order.
(In re Marriage of West (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 240, 246.) A trial
court considering whether to modify a spousal support order
considers the same criteria set forth in Family Code section 4320
as it considered in making the initial order. (Dietz, at p. 396.)
       A change of circumstances may include, for example, an
“ ‘increase or decrease in either party’s income available to pay
child support.’ ” (In re Marriage of Leonard (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 546, 556.) Regarding child support modification,

                                11
 “ ‘[s]o long as the statewide statutory formula support
 requirements are met (Fam. [Code,] § 4050 et seq.), the
 determination is made on a case-by-case basis and may properly
 rest on fluctuations in need or ability to pay.’ ” (Ibid.)

II.    Standard of Review
        We review the family court’s order granting or denying a
 request for a modification of child support and spousal support
 for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Usher (2016)
 6 Cal.App.5th 347, 357 (Usher) [child support]; In re Marriage of
 Berman (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 914, 919 [spousal support].)
 “Discretion is abused when its exercise is arbitrary, whimsical, or
 capricious.” (In re Marriage of Battenburg (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th
 1338, 1343.) We reverse “ ‘ “only if prejudicial error is found after
 examining the record of the proceedings below.” ’ ” (In re
 Marriage of Lusby (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 459, 472.) “When
 conducting an abuse of discretion review, appellate courts
 consider (1) whether the trial court’s factual findings are
 supported by substantial evidence, (2) whether the trial court
 followed applicable legal principles, and (3) whether the trial
 court reasonably exercised its discretionary authority—that is,
 whether any judge reasonably could have made such an order.”
 (In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529.)
        It is well established that courts will not modify child
 support “unless there has been a material change of
 circumstances following the previous determination.” (Usher,
 supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 357; accord In re Marriage of
 Brinkman (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1292 [“party seeking a
 modification must present evidence that establishes a change of
 circumstances”]; In re Marriage of Laudeman (2001)
 92 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1016 [stipulated agreement to pay support

                                  12
above guideline formula cannot be modified downward unless
moving party “presents admissible evidence of changed financial
circumstances”].)
       “The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to
modify a spousal support order based upon changed
circumstances.” (In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
830, 836 (Swain).) In exercising its discretion, the trial court
considers the same criteria set forth in Family Code section 4320
as it was obligated to consider in making the initial support
order. (In re Marriage of Shaughnessy (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th
1225, 1235.) “These factors include the ability of the supporting
party to pay; the needs of each party based on the standard of
living established during the marriage; the obligations and assets
of each party; and the balance of hardships to each party.” (In re
Marriage of Terry (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) A supported
spouse’s receipt of additional income in the form of retirement
benefits may constitute a change in circumstances. (In re
Marriage of Shimkus (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1274–1276.)
       In exercising its discretion, a trial court must follow
established legal principles and base its findings on substantial
evidence. (Swain, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 836.) If the trial
court conforms to these requirements, its order will be upheld
whether or not the appellate court agrees with it or would make
the same order if it were a trial court. (Ibid; In re Marriage of
Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 47, fn. omitted.) However, a
court abuses its discretion if its findings are wholly unsupported,
because a consideration of the evidence is essential to a proper
exercise of judicial discretion. (Swain, at pp. 836–837.)

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III.    Analysis
        Stephanie contends the trial court erred in ordering Troy to
  pay $100 per month towards the $305,635.95 child and spousal
  support arrearage balance owed to Stephanie. She argues that
  “would take [Troy] 254 years and 7 months to [complete payment
  of arrearages owed]” which “essentially wiped the $305,635.95
  debt clean” as Stephanie will “not be alive for the next 254 years
  and 7 months [and] [t]his order denies her of this legal right” to
  obtain child and spousal support arrearages. She contends this
  amounts to an abuse of discretion and asks that we reverse and
  “order a new hearing so that a reasonable re-payment plan of
  these arrearages be made, and/or so that [Stephanie] may file a
  motion to obtain a judgment for the amount owed.”
        Our task here is to determine whether the court abused its
  discretion in concluding that Troy demonstrated a material
  change in his circumstances. Stephanie, however, does not argue
  that the trial court erred in reducing Troy’s monthly spousal
  support obligation because there had been no material change in
  circumstances since the October 17, 2016 judgment to warrant
  such a reduction. In fact, the extreme change in Troy’s income
  and finances is not even discussed by Stephanie on appeal.
  Instead she focuses on the fact that repayment of the arrearages
  at a rate of $100 per month would take 254 years to fulfill,
  amounting to an abuse of discretion.
        We find Stephanie’s argument on appeal is not well taken.
        First, the trial court did not order $100 monthly payments
  by Troy towards the arrears. The court ordered $100 monthly
  payment towards the arrears for child support, spousal support,
  and unreimbursed medical expenses each, totaling $300 per

                                 14
month towards arrears. This is in addition to the child support of
$296 per month.
       Second, the trial court made clear multiple times during
the hearing that this was an interim order. At the hearing held
October 29, 2021, the court explained that its October 21, 2021
order “is based on where we are today” and that Troy is “trying to
clear [his law license issue] up, . . . so he can go and get a job
that’s actually going to pay him something that is going to pay
you back faster. That’s why I said, this is what we’re working
with today. But I expect that to change once he gets his licenses
in order.” (Italics added.) The trial court indicated to the parties
that this issue shall be revisited when Troy’s issue with the
California State Bar and Arizona State Bar is resolved, so that
Troy “can make a lot more money” and “can get caught up and
pay [Stephanie] back.” The court indicated to Stephanie that it
“expect[s] [the payment amount] to be different once we get this
order in line, so he can clear up the [state bar] license issues” and
reserved this issue for later determination. Thus, Stephanie is
empowered to file a motion to redetermine payment on
arrearages owed based upon the trial court’s ruling and
statements made on the record.
       Third, we are precluded from making a determination as to
whether the trial court erred by setting the arrearages payment
amount to $300 a month, because Stephanie did not include a
single I&E declaration filed by her or Troy, nor the reporter’s
transcript of the October 21, 2021 when the court made its
determination. The court noted as early as July 30, 2021 that
“child support and spousal support shall be based on the parties’
current Income and Expense Declaration[s].” Stephanie’s failure
to include the I&E declarations in the appellate record is fatal to

                                 15
her appeal. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to
be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the
trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
“ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics added.) It is appellant’s burden on
appeal to produce a record “ ‘which overcomes the presumption of
validity favoring [the] judgment.’ ” (Webman v. Little Co. of Mary
Hospital (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 592, 595.) Failure to provide an
adequate record requires that the issue be resolved against
Stephanie. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296;
see Oliveira v. Kiesler (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1349, 1362.)
        On this record, we cannot say the court abused its
discretion.
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm. No costs are awarded.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.             VIRAMONTES, J.

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