Court Opinion

ID: 9566906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:43.146092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:04.492470
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the majority unnecessarily expands the use of evidence of drug transactions in proving a conspiracy. I readily agree that evidence of the *296amount of drugs involved in various transactions can be used to prove a conspiracy; however, I disagree that the identical evidence serves the purpose of establishing the elements of the crime of conspiracy to traffic.
Initially, it must be remembered that the appellants were indicted for conspiracy to traffic, not trafficking by conspiracy. Therefore the use at trial of evidence of substantive offenses never should have had the intended purpose of proving the “crime of trafficking by conspiracy.” The majority’s erroneous analysis is compounded by my belief that the trafficking statute did not create a new substantive offense, but simply established different levels of punishment depending on the amount of drugs involved.
According to the majority, the evidence of separate substantive offenses may also be admitted for the express purpose of aggregating sums of drugs for purposes of punishment. Certainly such evidence may be admitted, but the majority ignores the thrust of the appellants’ argument: whether the evidence of small individual transactions can be aggregated and admitted to prove that the agreement was to conspire in a large amount; and whether the trial judge erred in not granting appellants’ request for a special interrogatory.
Again, there is a wide range of evidence that may be admitted to establish the existence and scope of the conspiracy, and under appropriate situations aggregating the amount of drugs presented by the evidence is proper. However, in my view, the jury must be aware that evidence which sufficiently proves that a drug conspiracy existed, is not necessarily the same evidence which determines the statutorily mandated level for trafficking. For example, three witnesses could testify that, pursuant to an agreement between the defendant and a third party, 1) defendant purchased 10 pounds of marijuana, 2) defendant sold 10 pounds of marijuana, and 3) defendant possessed 10 pounds of marijuana. While this evidence establishes a conspiracy between the parties, it does not establish that an agreement existed to traffic in 30 pounds of marijuana. Under the majority’s analysis this situation could exist and be allowed to continue unfettered. While the jury has the latitude to judge and construct the evidence presented in any fashion they wish, they should not be allowed to float aimlessly. The special interrogatory moved for by appellants *297would have provided a much needed rudder and greatly discouraged confusion by not permitting the jury to lose its focus on the agreement; the heart of any conspiracy.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in not granting appellants’ motion for a special interrogatory, and that appellants’ conviction and sentences on Counts One and Two should be reversed and remanded.