Court Opinion

ID: 9583348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:37:54.638277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:58.440931
License: Public Domain

PARKER, J.,
concurring in result.
The policy requirements as to giving notice of accident, and action against the company are set forth in the Court’s opinion. The policy requires that the notice shall be given “as soon as practicable,” and that “no action shall lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with all the terms of this policy.”
All the evidence shows these facts: One. The accident in which plaintiff was injured occurred on 24 October 1954. Two. The insured Arvie L. Crosby gave defendant notice in June 1955 — more than seven months after the accident occurred.
Plaintiff has no allegation in her complaint that the insurer has by waiver or estoppel lost its right to defeat a recovery under the liability policy because of the insured’s failure to comply with the policy provision that the giving of notice as soon as practicable by the insured is an express condition precedent to liability under the policy.
The insured has offered no excuse or extenuating circumstances for his delay in giving the insurer notice of the accident. The policy requires that notice of the accident shall be given by the insured to the insurer “as soon as practicable.” That means to give such notice within a reasonable time, for the word “practicable” means “capable of being put into practice, done, or accomplished; feasible.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed.; Unverzagt v. Prestera, 339 Pa. 141, 13 A. 2d 46; Callaway v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 107 F. 2d 761; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafer, 35 F. Supp. 647; American Lumbermen’s Mutual Casualty Co. v. Klein, 63 F. Supp. 701; Young v. Travelers Ins. Co., 119 F. 2d 877; Anno. 18 A.L.R. 2d p. 462, §14.
*83What is a reasonable time, when the facts are not in dispute, as here, is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Depot Cafe v. Century Indemnity Co., 321 Mass. 220, 72 N.E. 2d 533; Unverzagt v. Prestera, supra.
In Houran v. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. of New York, 109 Vt. 258, 195 A. 253, the Supreme Court of Vermont said: “The rule established by the weight of authority is that where, by the terms of the insurance contract, a specified notice of accident, given by or on behalf of the insured to the insurer, is made a condition precedent to liability on the part of the latter, the failure to do so will release the insurer from the obligations imposed by the contract, although no prejudice may have resulted. Among the cases so holding are Meyer v. Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 240 Ill. App. 431, 436; Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S.W. 128, 130; Lee v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 S.C. 475, 186 S.E. 376, 381; Jefferson Realty Co. v. Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp., 149 Ky. 741, 149 S.W. 1011, 1014; Sherwood Ice Co. v. U. S. Casualty Co., 40 R.I. 268, 100 A. 572, 576; Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp., v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181 A. 436, 442; St. Louis Architectural Iron Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (C.C.A.), 40 F. (2d) 344, 347, certiorari denied 282 U.S. 882, 51 S. Ct. 86, 75 L. Ed. 778. Other decisions might be cited, but instead reference may be had to those mentioned in the opinions in the foregoing cases, and in annotation, 76 A.L.R. 182 if.
“Indeed, much of the conflict of authority upon this question is more apparent than real. Many of the cases which hold that a showing of prejudice is necessary turn upon a construction of the language of the policy, while recognizing, tacitly at least, the rule stated above. In Southern Surety Co. v. MacMillan Co. (C.C.A.), 58 F. (2d) 541, 546, 549, certiorari denied 287 U.S. 617, 53 S. Ct. 18, 77 L. Ed. 536, it was held that, where the giving of notice is a condition precedent, the failure to give it relieves the insurer from liability, but that in the particular case the language of the contract could not be said to be unambiguous and to impose a condition, and so, no prejudice to the insurer being shown, recovery was allowed. A very similar ease is Caldwell v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 38 Ga. App. 589, 144 S.E. 678, Sokoloff v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 288 Pa. 211, 135 A. 746, 747, is to the same effect.”
See supplemental annotations, 123 A.L.R. 981, and 18 A.L.R. 2d 452, where additional later cases are collected. In 18 A.L.R. 2d 452, it is said: “It appears to be well settled that if a liability policy *84expressly, makes the insured’s failure to give timely notice a ground of forfeiture, or compliance a condition precedent to liability, no recovery can be had where timely notice has not been given. The following later cases support this general rule either expressly or by necessary implication.” The later cases are cited.
See the scholarly and exhaustive opinion in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, 66 Nev. 227, 216 P. 2d 606, 18 A.L.R. 2d 431, where numerous cases are cited and discussed, and in which the Court closes its opinion with these words: “By reason of the overwhelming weight of authority of the courts of last resort within the United States, we are compelled to hold that on account of the respondent’s failure to perform the condition precedent, stipulated in the policy as such, of giving notice of the suit and forwarding summons and complaint within a -reasonable time, no action on his part lay against the company. Lack of prejudice, under the terms of the policy, was immaterial.” To the same effect see also: Standard Acci. Ins. Co. v. Turgeon, 140 F. 2d 94; Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 172 Va. 61, 200 S.E. 616; Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 130 N.J.L. 576, 33 A. 2d 866; Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 148 F. 2d 761; Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, 338 Pa. 211, 12 A. 2d 569.
• The policy here has no express forfeiture clause. Peeler v. Casualty Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261, was a case involving automobile accident insurance, and the insurer was given no written notice of the accident. In that case this Court said: “The provision requiring written notice is a condition precedent to the assured’s right to recover damages, although it contains no express forfeiture clause.” In closing its opinion the Court said: “It would be extravagant to hold that the plaintiff in this action, who is not a party to the contract between the defendant and Graham, acquired rights under the policy which are superior to Graham’s and that the defendant is liable to him although it is not liable to the party with whom the contract was made. One who seeks to take advantage of a contract made for his benefit ■— if in any view the contract of insurance can be construed as made for the plaintiff’s benefit — must take it subject to all legal defenses, such as the nonperformance of conditions. 13 C.J., 699, sec. 799. As the assured failed to comply with the contract, and as the plaintiff has no rights superior to those of the assured, the plaintiff cannot maintain his action. The motion for non-suit should have been allowed.”
The liability policy made requirement as to notice an express condition precedent to any liability. It is obvious that this express con-*85dátion precedent is of the essence of the contract in insurance of this kind. In insurance of this character it is a matter of the first importance to the insurer, to be informed as soon as practicable of the time, place and circumstances of the accident, and of the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses. In a very little time the facts may in a great measure fade out of memory, or become distorted, witnesses may go beyond reach, physical conditions may change, and more perilous than all, fraud and cupidity may have had. opportunity to perfect their work.
In the following cases where the policy required the insured to give the insurer notice of the accident “as soon as practicable” or a similar provision, and the insured offered no excuse or extenuating circumstances for the delay, these delays in giving notice were held fatal: 28 days in Vanderbilt v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. A., 265 App. Div. 495, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 808; 46 days in Depot Cafe v. Century Indemnity Co., supra; 66 days in Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Miller, 29 F. Supp. 993; 2% months in Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp., supra; 94 days in Weller v. Atlantic Casualty Ins. Co., 128 N.J.L. 414, 26 A. 2d. 503; 7 months in Standard Acci. Ins. Co. v. Turgeon, supra; 7 months in Dworkin v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 194 Misc. 501, 87 N.Y.S. 2d 77; 16 months in Star Transfer Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London, 323 Ill. App. 90, 55 N.E. 2d 109; 2½ years in Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra; 29 days in Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow Co., 39 F. Supp. 100, affirmed 125 F. 2d 462; 6 weeks in Preferred Acci. Ins. Co. v. Castellano, supra; 4½ months in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cassinelli, supra; 5 months in Brown Materials Co. v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 760, 127 P. 2d 51; 8 months in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grimmer, 47 F. Supp. 458; 11 months in Arthur v. London Guarantee & Acci. Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 198, 177 P. 2d 625. For numerous other cases holding as a matter of law that an unexcused delay in giving notice for varying lengths of time was fatal, see Anno. 76 A.L.R. 66 et seq.; 123 A.L.R. 962.
The statement in the Court’s opinion to the effect, that plaintiff has the burden of showing that Crosby, the insured, has complied with the express condition of giving notice to the insurer of the accident “as soon as practicable” precedent to liability under the policy, is supported by the overwhelming weight of authority in the Courts of last resort in the United States, and meets with my entire approval. The statement in MacClure v. Casualty Co., 229 N.C. 305, 49 S.E. 2d 742, to the effect, that the failure of insured in a policy similar to the one here to comply with an express condition precedent to *86liability under the policy is an affirmative defense which the insurer has the burden of proving, is, in my opinion, erroneous and should be disapproved or overruled by the Court.
The law cannot make a better contract for the insured Crosby than he chose to make for himself. Whittle v. Associated Indemnity Corp., supra. “One who seeks to take advantage of a contract made for his benefit — if indeed the contract of insurance can be so construed — must take it subject to all its terms and conditions.” Sears v. Casualty Co., 220 N.C. 9, 16 S.E. 2d 419.
The delay of the insured Crosby in giving notice to the defendant insurer was unreasonable, and is fatal to plaintiff’s action. The court below erred in overruling defendant’s motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit, and I agree with the Court’s opinion that its judgment should be reversed.