Court Opinion

ID: 9828996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:54:45.144527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:56.258881
License: Public Domain

On Motion 'for Rehearing.
Where consistent with the welfare of the child, it should be given into the custody of a parent rather than to any one else, even though a dose relative. As we endeavored to state in clear and forcible language, when a parent is contending for the custody of a child, regardless of financial advantages to be derived for the child by taking it from the custody of the parent, natural ties should prevail, and the mother or father should have the custody of the child, when the character of either is such that the probabilities are that the mother or father is such a character as will impress the child with a love for morality, with respect for law, and a reverence for God and religion. This is the extent of the decision in this case, and, had this court deemed the appellee to be the best person to have charge of the destiny of a girl nine years old, it would unhesitatingly have given her, not a divided authority over the .child, but exclusive possession. The recitation in a clause following the judgment of the trial court, and really no part of it, endeavors to justify the divided authority by the unsolicited finding “that it is not true as alleged that the mother of said child, Mrs. Terry Greenlaw,' is not a proper person to have the custody, and that it is not true that it would not be. to the best interests of said child to award the custody of said child to said mother.” If those negative recitals were true, the custody of the child should have been given to the mother regardless of the fact that Mrs. Greenlaw was not living permanently in Texas, and of the fact that the parents of the child are divorced, and of the fact that the child was attending a school in Gonzales. The best interests of the child should have been consulted, and not a residence in Texas, a divorce of the parents, and a school in Gonzales.
No one testified to the fitness of the mother to rear the child, and, on the other hand, the evidence was overwhelming to the effect that she was not a proper person to have the custody and rearing of the child. This court refrained from entering into details of the evidence, out of a desire to not increase and .spread the charges, and even now, in spite of the intemperate assertions in the motion for a rehearing that the evidence does' not support the conclusions of the court, we will not spread the unsavory details of the evidence upon the records of this court. We merely adhere to our conclusion from all the evidence that the aunt of the child, who is aided and assisted by the father, is the proper person to rear the girl to useful womanhood.
 The conclusions as to appellee not being unfit to have custody of the child can have no controlling influence .on this court, because they are -not such conclusions of *335fact as are permitted by article 2208, Rev. Civ. Stats, of 1925. City of Houston v. Kapner, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 507, 95 S. W. 1103; Sewall v. Colby (Tex. Civ. App.) 163 S. W. 694. The fact that sucb conclusions are placed in tbe judgment adds no sanctity to them, especially when sucb conclusions are inconsistent with tbe judgment rendered.
While tbe character of tbe appellee was assailed by several witnesses, no witnesses to sustain her character and reputation were selected out of her large acquaintance in San Antonio to meet tbe attacks made upon her by witnesses and through letters filled with erotic protestations, and revealing that they were constantly replied to in the same spirit, at a time when the marital relation existed between her and Elliott Jones.
The high character of the father, who is assisting in placing his child with his sister, as well as the character of the sister, Mrs. Dilworth, was sustained by such strong evidence that the court was willing to intrust the custody to her a larger part of the time, up to September 15,1927, after which time no provisions are made for the custody of the child.
We amend the judgment so as to permit appellee to see the child at least once a month at such time and place as may be agreed upon, and at such other times as may be agreed upon by Mrs. Greenlaw and Mrs. Dilworth
The motion for rehearing is overruled.