Court Opinion

ID: 9386464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 16:06:37.96333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.575065
License: Public Domain

J-S04013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TYRONE WROTEN                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 83 EDA 2021

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 17, 2020
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0004610-2019

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED APRIL 12, 2023

        Tyrone Wroten (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of indecent assault without consent

and simple assault.1 We affirm.

        The trial court recounted the facts presented at trial as follows:

              On June 7, 2019, at approximately 11:28 p.m., police
        arrived at an apartment located at 1350 N. 10th Street in response
        to a 911 call from [A.C. (the Victim)]. … When police arrived,
        Appellant was in the hallway outside of the apartment. (N.T.
        1/24/19 at 45:8-11.) A responding officer had a taser out and
        told Appellant to get on the ground. (Id. at 107:7-16.) During a
        search incident to arrest, police recovered various narcotics and
        paraphernalia from Appellant. (Id.)

              After[] police placed Appellant into custody they interviewed
        the [Victim]. (Id. at 82:12-17.) The [Victim] told police how she
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) and 2791(a).
J-S04013-23

      saw Appellant [with whom the Victim was acquainted] at a vigil
      down the street and went with him to see his [new] apartment.
      (Id. at 15:15-23,16:7-9,17:11-15, and 19:2-10.) The [Victim]
      testified that, when they got to the apartment, Appellant put some
      items away and went into the bathroom. (Id. at 23:18-24:20.)
      Appellant came out of the bathroom without a shirt on looking
      “really weird” and “sweating real[ly] bad.” (Id. at 25:16-21 and
      27:14-28:2.) Then Appellant attacked the [Victim]. (Id. at
      45:19-25.)

             Appellant started choking the [Victim] with one hand,
      squeezing so tightly it was hard for her to breathe. (Id. at 30:4-
      11 and 31:12-32:3.) The [Victim] testified that Appellant used
      his other hand to pull her pants down and digitally penetrated her
      anus and vagina. (Id. at 30:13-18.) However, in the body worn
      camera footage [taken by the police], the [Victim] is heard telling
      police that Appellant “tried” to digitally penetrate her. (Id. at
      139:17141:8 and 165:3-6.)         Regardless, the [Victim] kept
      tightening up her legs to try and stop Appellant. (Id. at 70:18-
      24.) Appellant also sucked on the Victim’s breast. (Id. at 110:18-
      19.) Appellant told the [Victim], who was trying to scream, to:
      “shut the eff up” and that he was going to make her perform
      fellatio on him. (Id. at 31:22-32:2 and 36:5-10.) At one-point,
      Appellant punched the [Victim] in her mouth and gave her a
      “busted lip.” (Id. at 48:9-14.)

            The [Victim] testified that she did not consent to any of the
      physical contact. (Id. at 49:11-18.) During the attack, the
      [Victim] tried to shove Appellant off her, and eventually bit
      Appellant on his bare chest. (Id. at 30:13-18.) Appellant jumped
      up and started looking all around, grabbed his shirt and attempted
      to leave the apartment. (Id. at 36:23-37:7.)

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/22, at 3-4.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant at docket MC-51-CR-0015243-

2019 (sexual assault prosecution) with offenses related to the sexual assault.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant at docket MC-51-CR-0015244-2019

(drug prosecution) with offenses related to the drugs found incident to

                                       -2-
J-S04013-23

Appellant’s arrest, as well as disorderly conduct.2 The trial court summarized

the ensuing procedural history:

              After [a] June 27, 2019, preliminary hearing, the
        Philadelphia Municipal Court held the sexual assault [prosecution]
        for court. …

              [On] July 11, 2019, [the] Municipal Court trial date for the
        drug [prosecution], the Commonwealth requested a continuance.
        The case was listed for trial on September 4, 2019. On that day,
        the Commonwealth offered Appellant a [n]egotiated [g]uilty
        [p]lea to [d]isorderly [c]onduct with no further penalty. In
        exchange the Commonwealth withdrew the charges of
        [p]ossession of a [c]ontrolled [s]ubstance and [p]araphernalia.
        Appellant accepted the Commonwealth’s offer.

               In this case [related to the sexual assault], on September
        25, 2019, Appellant filed a [m]otion to [d]ismiss pursuant to [18
        Pa.C.S.A. §] 110. On October 2, 2019, the Commonwealth filed
        its [r]esponse. On October 25, 2019, the [trial c]ourt heard
        arguments on the [m]otion and held it under advisement. On
        October 31, 2019[,] the [trial c]ourt denied the [m]otion.

Id. at 2.

        The trial court held a bench trial on January 24, 2020, and thereafter

convicted Appellant of indecent assault without consent and simple assault.3

On September 17, 2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

9 - 23 months of incarceration with immediate parole. Appellant filed post-

____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4).

3 The trial court found Appellant not guilty of attempted rape, aggravated
indecent assault without consent, terroristic threats, and strangulation.

                                           -3-
J-S04013-23

sentence motions which the trial court denied on December 20, 2020. This

timely appeal followed.4

        Appellant presents three issues for review:

        1. Did the trial court err when it denied [Appellant’s m]otion to
           [d]ismiss under the [c]ompulsory [j]oinder [c]lause?

        2. Did the trial court err when it sustained [an objection to]
           defense counsel’s question regarding the         [Victim’s]
           [i]ntimidation of a [w]itness conviction?

        3. Did the trial court err by not granting a new trial where the
           weight of the evidence should have resulted in an acquittal?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

        In his first issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss charges pursuant to the compulsory joinder clause.

Appellant’s Brief at 10-15. Appellant maintains his cases at separate dockets

        arose from the same criminal episode. The acts giving rise to the
        [drug prosecution] occurred during the arrest for the [sexual
        assault prosecution], the witnesses were the same, there were
        overlapping issues of witness credibility relevant in both cases,
        and the actions [in the drug prosecution] were relevant [to] a
        guilty state of mind in the [sexual assault prosecution].

Id. at 9.

        The Commonwealth counters that Appellant “failed to demonstrate at

the [trial] court hearing that his [guilty plea in the drug prosecution] was

based on facts that were from the same criminal episode as those in the

____________________________________________

4   Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                           -4-
J-S04013-23

[sexual assault] prosecution.” Commonwealth Brief at 11 (quotation marks

omitted).

     Appellant’s claim that the trial court incorrectly declined to dismiss his

charges under the compulsory-joinder rule presents a question of law.

“Consequently, our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is

de novo.” Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 207 A.3d 812, 821 (Pa. 2019).

     The purpose of the compulsory joinder statute is twofold: (1) to
     protect a defendant from the governmental harassment of being
     subjected to successive trials for offenses stemming from the
     same criminal episode; and (2) to ensure finality without unduly
     burdening the judicial process by repetitious litigation.

Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 75-76 (Pa. 2008) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

     The compulsory joinder statute provides in relevant part:

     Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of
     the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different
     facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
     circumstances:

        (1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
        conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to
        when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
        same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

                                     ***

            (ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising
            from the same criminal episode, if such offense was
            known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the
            time of the commencement of the first trial and
            occurred within the same judicial district as the former
            prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial
            of the charge of such offense[.]

                                     -5-
J-S04013-23

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii).

      Section 110(1)(ii) contains the following four requirements which, if

met, preclude a subsequent prosecution due to a former prosecution for a

different offense:

      (1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an acquittal or
      conviction;

      (2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal
      conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the former
      prosecution;

      (3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before the
      commencement of the trial on the former charges; and

      (4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial district
      as the former prosecution.

Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72 (citations omitted).

      Instantly, the parties dispute the applicability of the second prong. See

Appellant’s Brief at 11; Commonwealth Brief at 11. To determine whether the

current prosecution is based on the same criminal conduct or arose from the

same criminal episode, the court must look at the temporal and logical

relationship between the charges:

      Generally, charges against a defendant are clearly related in time
      and require little analysis to determine that a single criminal
      episode exists. However, in defining what acts constitute a single
      criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence of events
      important, but also the logical relationship between the
      acts must be considered.

Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted,

emphasis added).

                                     -6-
J-S04013-23

      In determining whether offenses are logically related, courts should

“inquire as to whether there is a substantial duplication of factual[ ] and/or

legal issues presented by the offenses.” Id. (citation omitted). If duplication

exists, “then the offenses are logically related and must be prosecuted at one

trial.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “a mere de minimis duplication of

factual and legal issues is insufficient to establish a logical relationship

between offenses. Rather[,] what is required is a substantial duplication of

issues of law and fact.” Id. at 582-83 (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court explained:

      In Commonwealth v. Stewart, [] 473 A.2d 161 ([Pa. Super.]
      1984), the Superior Court held that Section 110 was not a bar to
      a subsequent prosecution for drug related charges based upon
      evidence that had been discovered at the same time and place as
      evidence that supported prior theft[-]related charges. There, the
      [C]ourt found that “[t]here is no logical relationship between the
      crimes of theft by receiving stolen property and possession of a
      controlled substance. They are defined by separate statutes and
      are intended to prevent different evils. There is no similarity of
      issues involved in proving these distinct offenses.” Id. at [] 164.

            Here, as in Stewart, there is a temporal relationship but
      not a logical one. There is no substantial duplication of factual,
      and/or legal issues presented by the offenses. Appellant was
      charged in the first prosecution with [s]imple [p]ossession of
      [d]rugs, [u]se of [d]rug [p]araphernalia, and [d]isorderly
      [c]onduct. Different facts from different witnesses are required to
      prove the charges in this case where Appellant is charged with
      [assault and sexual offenses]. These offenses are defined by
      separate statutes and are intended to prevent different evils.
      “There is no similarity of issues involved in proving these distinct
      offenses.”[FN] Id. at [] 164.

            [FN] Although it may appear that the [d]isorderly
            [c]onduct charge upon which Appellant was convicted
            in the [drug] prosecution could factually relate to the

                                     -7-
J-S04013-23

              charges here, it does not. There is nothing on the
              record to indicate that the disorderly conduct charge
              required the [Victim’s] testimony. Moreover, the
              [d]isorderly [c]onduct conviction could not be
              premised upon acts against the [Victim] that occurred
              inside Appellant’s apartment. See Commonwealth
              v. Lawson, 759 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa. Super 2000).

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/22, at 7-8 (footnote in original).

       The trial court did not err. There is nothing in the record to support

Appellant’s claim that his disorderly conduct charge in the drug prosecution

arose from the same events in the sexual assault prosecution, or that it

involved the same witnesses.5 Appellant acknowledged at the hearing on his

motion to dismiss that the events which gave rise to the drug prosecution

occurred when Appellant “was arrested in the hallway” and the Victim

“appeared to be back in [Appellant’s] abode.”       N.T., 10/25/19, at 3.     The

Commonwealth noted:

       We have one officer who did a [report] for that sexual assault. …
       He was not involved in the narcotics charges. In fact[,] that was
       a different [report] and … it went to a different police detective
       division. The drugs … went to Central Detectives. The [sexual
       assault prosecution] went to Special Victims.

Id. at 13.

       In sum, there is no “substantial duplication of factual and/or legal issues

presented by the offenses,” and no logical relationship between the

____________________________________________

5Appellant did not attach any documentation from the drug prosecution to his
Amended Motion to Dismiss and did not enter any exhibits at the hearing.
See Amended Motion to Dismiss, 9/25/19, at 1-5; N.T., 10/25/19, at 1-14.

                                           -8-
J-S04013-23

prosecutions. Reid, 77 A.3d at 582. Appellant’s first issue does not merit

relief.

          In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred when it

sustained the Commonwealth’s objection to defense counsel’s questioning of

the Victim about her conviction for witness intimidation. Appellant’s Brief at

16-18. Appellant specifically claims that the trial court erred in finding that

intimidation of a witness is not crimen falsi. Id.

          The Commonwealth observes that there is no Pennsylvania caselaw

“addressing the question of whether intimidation of a witness is a crimen falsi

offense.”      Commonwealth’s Brief at 17 n.4.      However, the Commonwealth

argues that even if Appellant is correct about witness intimidation being a

crimen falsi offense, any error would be harmless. Id. at 14. We agree.

          Our standard of review regarding the admissibility of evidence is
          an abuse of discretion. The admissibility of evidence is a matter
          addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and ... an
          appellate court may only reverse upon a showing that the trial
          court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not a mere
          error in judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality,
          prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or misapplication of law.

Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251–52 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations omitted).

          With respect to a witness’s criminal history, this Court has explained:

          Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609, evidence that a
          witness has been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty
          or false statement must be admitted if the conviction or
          release from confinement occurred within the last ten years.
          When a defendant is impeached through introduction of prior
          convictions, the witness’s opponent may only introduce the name,

                                         -9-
J-S04013-23

     time, and place of the crime and the punishment received. We
     have applied this limitation to all witnesses, not merely to
     defendants, and we employ this limitation to minimize the
     potential prejudice and distraction of issues already inherent in
     the mention of prior offenses.

     In prior cases, we have precluded a party seeking to impeach a
     witness from using the facts underlying a prior conviction, in
     circumstances where such facts would increase the risk of
     prejudice to a party or confusion of the issues.

Commonwealth v. Creary, 201 A.3d 749, 754 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted, emphasis added).

     The harmless error doctrine “reflects the reality that the accused is

entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84

A.3d 657, 671 (Pa. 2014). Further:

     Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either: (1) the
     error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de
     minimis; or (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
     cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially
     similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
     admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
     overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
     insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
     contributed to the verdict.

Id. at 671–72.

     Here, defense counsel questioned the Victim as follows:

     Q. You said you [have] never been [] through anything like this?

     A. No, I haven’t.

     Q. All right. Well, isn’t it true, ma’am, that you’re currently under
     parole for — on parole for a burglary?

     A. I’m on parole. Yes, I am.

                                    - 10 -
J-S04013-23

     Q. And you got sentenced to 11 and a half to 23 months, plus
     five years[’] probation on that?

     A. Correct.

           [THE COMMONWEALTH]: I’m going to object, Your Honor.
           We can stipulate to that. When she said she had never been
           [] through anything like that, she was clearly referring to a
           sexual assault.

           THE COURT: Counsel, I don’t need you to testify. You can
           ask her what she meant by that. You can clarify.

           [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah.

     Q. You were sentenced to 11 and a half to 23 months, plus five
     years[’] probation for a burglary, right?

     A. Correct.

     Q. You pled guilty, right?

     A. Correct.

     Q. So you were out there robbing people’s houses, right?

     A. No I didn’t—

           THE COURT: Counsel, that’s sustained.

     Q. Did you have to give a statement in that burglary case? Did
     the detectives try to talk to you about what happened?

     A. No. The detectives didn’t talk to me about what happened
     during the situation.

     Q. Okay.

                                     ***

     Q. All right. So I just asked you about the burglary.

     A. Correct.

                                   - 11 -
J-S04013-23

      Q. I’m going to ask you another question. Are you on parole for
      intimidating a witness, also?

      A. All that is that one case.

      Q. Okay. So that was all out of the burglary?

      A. Correct.

      Q. And you also pled guilty to intimidating a witness and you’re
      on parole for that, too, right?

      A. That’s all one case.

            [THE COMMONWEALTH]:          I’m going to object to the
            relevance. That’s not a crimen [falsi] offense.

            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think it is a crimen [falsi] offense.

            THE COURT: Sustained. I don’t know that it is.

N.T., 1/24/20, at 128-30, 132-33 (emphasis added, some paragraphs

altered).

      The trial court subsequently explained:

             Here, the [c]ourt considered the [Victim’s] … testimony
      regarding the attack. The [c]ourt also heard the recording of her
      911 call to police. (N.T. 1/24/20 at 37:15-38:8.) Furthermore,
      the [c]ourt watched the body worn camera footage from the
      arresting officer. (Id. at 139:17-141:8.) The [c]ourt listened to
      the Appellant’s testimony. (Id. at 143:10-161:9) And[] the
      [c]ourt considered [the Victim’s] prior crimen falsi conviction
      based upon a burglary charge, which related to the intimidation of
      witness conviction.      (Id. 128:20-129:5.)       Considering the
      overwhelming evidence against Appellant upon which the [c]ourt
      based its judgment[, and] after giving consideration to the
      [Victim’s] crimen falsi conviction, the [c]ourt’s decision to sustain
      the Commonwealth’s objection to the admission of another crimen
      falsi charge that was part of the burglary conviction did not result
      in any prejudice to Appellant.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/22, at 14.

                                      - 12 -
J-S04013-23

      Upon review, we agree that any error would be harmless. The testimony

was   cumulative,   and   Appellant     has    not    shown    prejudice.      See

Commonwealth v. Sattazahn,             763     A.2d   359,    364-65   (Pa.   2000)

(concluding trial court did not commit reversible error by limiting defense

counsel’s impeachment of a witness where evidence was cumulative of other

impeachment evidence and appellant failed to show prejudice). Appellant’s

second issue does not merit relief.

      In his third and final issue, Appellant argues his conviction was against

the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 18-20. Appellant asserts “the

verdict in this case rested solely upon the testimony of [the Victim, which]

“was inconsistent, incredible, and contrary to the evidence[.]” Id. at 18.

      “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient

to sustain the verdict but seeks a new trial on the grounds that the evidence

was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict

shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re A.G.C., 142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa. Super.

2016) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of

the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth. v. Widmer,

744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

                                      - 13 -
J-S04013-23

Id. (citation omitted). This standard applies even when the trial judge sat as

the finder of fact. See Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1022

(Pa. Super. 2016) (reviewing trail court’s exercise of discretion in a weight

claim on appeal from a non-jury verdict).

      Here, the trial court summarized the Victim’s testimony in explaining its

rejection of Appellant’s weight issue. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/6/22, at 9-

10. It is evident the trial court found the Victim to be credible. Id. The trial

court, as factfinder, “while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the

evidence.”   Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa. Super.

2016). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the

verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence. Appellant’s final issue

does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023

                                     - 14 -