Court Opinion

ID: 9882499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:45.003551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:02.551942
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Rentschler, 2023-Ohio-3009.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 9-22-50

        v.

SHANE ALLEN RENTSCHLER,                                   OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                           Trial Court No. 20-CR-151

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: August 28, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Dustin M. Blake for Appellant

        Martha Schultes for Appellee
Case No. 9-22-50

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Shane Allen Rentschler (“Rentschler”), appeals

the August 31, 2022 judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in the

Marion County Court of Common Pleas, following a jury trial in which Rentschler

was found guilty of Possession of Fentanyl. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                                 Procedural History

       {¶2} This case originated on May 20, 2020, when the Marion County Grand

Jury returned a single-count indictment charging Renstchler with Trafficking in

Heroin, a second-degree felony. On May 26, 2020, an arraignment was held and

Rentschler entered an initial plea of not guilty.

       {¶3} On June 10, 2020, a two-count superseding indictment was filed,

charging Rentschler in Count 1 with Trafficking in Heroin, a second-degree felony,

and in Count 2 with Possession of Heroin, also a second-degree felony. An

arraignment on that indictment was held on June 15, 2020, and Rentschler again

pled not guilty.

       {¶4} On August 5, 2020, a second superseding indictment was filed,

charging Rentschler in Count 1 with Trafficking in Fentanyl, a first-degree felony

in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(9), and in Count 2 with Possession of

Fentanyl, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(11). On

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August 10, 2020, Rentschler was arraigned on the second superseding indictment

and a not guilty plea was entered.

       {¶5} On August 16, 2022, a jury trial commenced as to the charges in the

August 5, 2020 second superseding indictment. On August 18, 2022, the jury

returned verdicts finding Rentschler not guilty on Count 1 but guilty on Count 2.

       {¶6} On August 31, 2022, a sentencing hearing was held. Rentschler was

sentenced to a minimum prison term of eleven years, with a potential maximum

prison term of sixteen and a half years, to be served consecutively to a prison term

to which Rentschler was sentenced in a prior Marion County case.

       {¶7} On September 29, 2022, Rentschler filed the instant appeal, in which he

raises seven assignments of error for our review.

                            First Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s conviction must be vacated because the State engaged
       in prosecutorial misconduct during the trial which violated
       Appellant’s right to a fair trial memorialized under the Fifth,
       Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
       Constitution and Article I, Sections 1, 10, and 16 of the Ohio
       Constitution.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred when it admitted irrelevant, prejudicial and
       highly inflammatory evidence during Appellant’s jury trial. The
       admission of the same undermined Appellant’s right to a fair trial
       memorialized under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
       Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 10,
       and 16 of the Ohio Constitution, and further violated Ohio
       Evid.R. 401, 402, 403, and 404.

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                          Third Assignment of Error

      Appellant’s first trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
      when he failed to communicate the State’s offer to resolve this
      case by allowing the Defendant to plead guilty to a reduced charge
      of a felony of the second degree as a lesser-included offense of one
      of the counts in the indictment. This violated Appellant’s right to
      the assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
      Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I,
      Sections 1, 10, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

                         Fourth Assignment of Error

      The court’s unlawful jury instructions undermined Appellant’s
      right to a fair trial and his right to a unanimous jury verdict under
      the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
      Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 10, and 16 of the Ohio
      Constitution, R.C. 2945.10(G), Crim.R. 30, and Crim.R. 31(A).

                          Fifth Assignment of Error

      The trial court plainly erred when it sentenced Appellant on count
      two to an indeterminate prison term imposed pursuant to the
      statutory scheme set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a), R.C.
      2929.144(B)(1), R.C. 2967.271(C), and R.C. 2967.271(D)
      (“Reagan Tokes Act”) which violates: Appellant’s right to a jury
      trial under Section 10, Article I, Ohio Constitution and the Sixth
      and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; the
      separation of powers principles in violation of Section 1, Article
      IV, Ohio Constitution; Appellant’s right to due process of law
      under the federal and Ohio constitutions because it fails to notify
      him with adequate notice and a fair hearing.

                          Sixth Assignment of Error

      Appellant’s conviction for possession of fentanyl is not supported
      by the sufficiency of the evidence.

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Case No. 9-22-50

                           Seventh Assignment of Error

       The cumulative effect of the errors advanced in this brief resulted
       in a violation of Appellant’s right to a fair trial under the Fifth,
       Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and
       Article I, Sections 1, 10, and 16 of the Ohio Constitution and thus
       entitles him to a new trial.

       {¶8} For ease of discussion, we elect to address the assignments of error out

of the order in which they were raised.

                              Sixth Assignment of Error

       {¶9} In the sixth assignment of error, Rentschler argues that his conviction

for possessing fentanyl is not based on sufficient evidence.

       {¶10} “‘“[S]ufficiency” is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is

applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is

legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary

1433 (6th Ed.1990). See, also, Crim.R. 29. Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of

adequacy rather than of credibility or weight of the evidence. Thompkins, at 386-

387.

       {¶11} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

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St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. Consequently,

“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

       {¶12} Here, Rentschler was convicted of possession in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A), which provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or

use a controlled substance ***.” The indictment on which Rentschler was tried in

this case further specified that the fentanyl-related compound at issue weighed equal

to or more than 20 grams but less than 50 grams, pursuant to R.C.

2925.11(C)(11)(e).

       {¶13} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or

substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance

through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance

is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “The issue of whether a person charged with drug

possession knowingly possessed a controlled substance ‘is to be determined from

all the attendant facts and circumstances available.’” State v. Brooks, 3d Dist.

Hancock No. 5-11-11, 2012-Ohio-5235, ¶ 45, quoting State v. Teamer, 82 Ohio

St.3d 490, 492, 696 N.E.2d 1049 (1998).

       {¶14} “Possession of drugs can be either actual or constructive.” State v.

Bustamante, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-12-26, 13-13-04, 2013-Ohio-4975, ¶ 25. “A

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Case No. 9-22-50

person has ‘constructive possession’ if he is able to exercise dominion and control

over an item, even if the individual does not have immediate physical possession of

it.” Id., citing State v. Hankerson, 70 Ohio St.2d 87, 434 N.E.2d 1362 (1982),

syllabus. “For constructive possession to exist, ‘[i]t must also be shown that the

person was conscious of the presence of the object.’” Id., quoting Hankerson at 91.

       {¶15} In the instant case, the prosecution presented the testimony of five

witnesses at trial, in addition to admitting several exhibits.

       {¶16} The prosecution’s first witness was James Peterson, a parole officer

for the State of Ohio. Peterson testified that he knew Rentschler from having

supervised him. Peterson identified the defendant in the courtroom as being Shane

Rentschler. On May 14, 2020, Peterson received a tip from the MARMET Drug

Task Force that related to Rentschler and his documented address of 1178 Fairwood

Avenue in Marion, Ohio. As a result, Peterson and his partner, Officer Chase Bass,

went to 1178 Fairwood Avenue. After Rentschler answered the officers’ knock at

the door, he was then secured outside in handcuffs, for officers’ safety. The officers

then entered the house, where they found that Rentschler’s wife was present, as well

as two or three young children. Peterson and Bass began a search of the home,

starting in the master bedroom. Upon noticing a few items in the bedroom, they

requested that police officers from MARMET respond to assist with the search.

Peterson went back outside and asked Rentschler about a bag of suspected

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Case No. 9-22-50

marijuana found in the bedroom in a duffle bag, and Rentschler confirmed it was

his, saying it was for personal use.

         {¶17} The state’s second witness was Chris Adkins, a major with the Marion

Police Department and the supervising officer in charge of the MARMET task force.

On May 14, 2020, Adkins went to 1178 Fairwood Avenue to assist the parole

officers. When Adkins arrived, Detectives Baldridge and Marburger, two officers

assigned to the task force, were already present and were standing outside with

Rentschler. Adkins went inside and began assisting in the search of the residence.

Adkins was then alerted by Parole Officer Bass that Bass had located a digital scale

in a closet where the furnace and hot water tank were located. Adkins then decided

to pull out the furnace filter because it is common to locate narcotics inside furnaces.

As he began pulling out the filter, he noticed a small plastic bag containing

suspected heroin or fentanyl (State’s Exhibit 7) that was located right in front of him

on one of the furnace pipes. Once the suspected narcotics were found, Major Adkins

decided that a search warrant should be obtained in order to search the rest of the

house.

         {¶18} Detective Matt Baldridge of the Marion Police Department testified

that he was assigned to the MARMET Drug Task Force, which is a county-wide

task force focused on investigating drug crimes in Marion County. On May 14,

2020, Baldridge and his task force colleague, Detective Marburger, went to 1178

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Case No. 9-22-50

Fairwood Avenue in Marion to assist the parole officers who were there. Upon

arriving, Baldridge stood outside with Rentschler, who had been handcuffed while

the parole officers searched the home. Detective Baldridge subsequently went

inside the house, where he was shown a plastic bag of suspected fentanyl that had

been found. Baldridge testified that he then spoke to Rentschler about the suspected

fentanyl that was found in the house, and Rentschler admitted that the drugs were

his, telling Baldridge that the substance was heroin. Detective Baldridge also

testified that the street value of fentanyl is approximately one hundred dollars per

gram.

        {¶19} Detective Aaron Marburger of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office

testified that in May of 2020, he was assigned to the MARMET Drug Task Force.

On May 14, 2020, he and Detective Baldridge were called to 1178 Fairwood

Avenue, in Marion County, in order to assist parole officers with a search of a

residence. Upon arriving, Marburger and Baldridge waited outside the house while

the other officers were inside. Marburger and Baldridge were subsequently made

aware that Major Adkins had found something in the residence, which Detective

Baldridge then walked inside to look at. When Detective Baldridge came back

outside, he Mirandized Rentschler and then asked Rentschler a couple questions

about what had been found. Baldridge asked Rentschler if he was aware of the bag

and the scales that had been found, and Rentschler first stated that he knew nothing

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Case No. 9-22-50

about the items.     Detective Baldridge then showed Rentschler a photo on

Baldridge’s phone and Rentschler admitted that the drugs were his.

       {¶20} The state’s final witness was Kelsey Degen, a forensic scientist at the

Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation lab in Bowling Green. Degen, an expert in

the field of scientific analysis of controlled substances, testified that she had

weighed and analyzed the substance in State’s Exhibit 7. Degen determined that

the substance weighed 37.52 grams, plus or minus .04 grams, and through the

laboratory analysis that she performed, Degen identified the substance in State’s

Exhibit 7 as fentanyl.

       {¶21} Reviewing that evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

we conclude the jury could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that

Rentschler constructively possessed the fentanyl at issue, and that the substance

weighed over 20 grams as alleged in the indictment. This is particularly true given

the evidence that Rentschler admitted the drugs were his.

       {¶22} The sixth assignment of error is overruled.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶23} In the first assignment of error, Rentschler asserts that his conviction

must be reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Rentschler argues

that prosecutorial misconduct occurred through eliciting unlawful opinion

testimony in the direct-examination of two witnesses; by failing to comply with the

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Case No. 9-22-50

discovery requirements of Crim.R. 16(K) with regard to those two witnesses; and

through statements made in closing argument concerning evidence of the “tip”

received by law enforcement that led to the search of Rentschler’s home.

       {¶24} “The conduct of a prosecuting attorney during trial cannot be made a

ground of error unless the conduct deprives defendant of a fair trial.” State v.

Apanovitch, 33 Ohio St.3d 19, 24, 514 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1987). Prosecutorial

misconduct constitutes reversible error only in rare instances. State v. Keenan, 66

Ohio St. 3d 402, 405, 613 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1993). If established, misconduct on

the part of the prosecution may violate a defendant’s due process rights; therefore,

the “touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor.’” State v. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 162,

quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

The effect of any misconduct must be considered in light of the whole trial. State v.

Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 94, 568 N.E.2d 674 (1991).

       {¶25} In the instant case, Rentschler first argues that the prosecution engaged

in misconduct during the direct examinations of Major Chris Adkins and Detective

Matt Baldridge.

       {¶26} As to the claims regarding the direct-exam testimony of Major Adkins,

Rentschler takes issue with the following portion of Adkins’ testimony:

       Q    Where was your search area?

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Case No. 9-22-50

       A I believe I started in the hallway, the bedroom area there and I
       was alerted by P.O. Bass that he had located an item in the furnace
       area, the closet.

       Q    And that particular item was what?

       A    A digital scale.

       Q In your experience working with MARMET Drug Task Force
       for nine years plus now?

       A    Yes.

       Q    What is a digital scale used for?

       A Obviously, it can be used for food. But given the location where
       it was at, not in the kitchen, we commonly find those associated with
       narcotics.

       Q    And then I’m sorry, where did you say that this was found?

       A It was in the closet just off the bedroom near the bathroom where
       the furnace and hot water tank were located. So if you can call it a
       closet or – or a room.

       Q    Based on having been alerted to that, what did you do?

       A Moved the door. Start to pull the furnace filter out cause it’s
       common for us to locate narcotics inside furnaces and different areas.
       And as I started to pull the furnace filter out, basically right in front
       of me was a small plastic bag on the pipe in for the furnace.

(8/16/22 Tr., 278).

       {¶27} As to the claims regarding the direct-exam testimony of Detective

Baldridge, Rentschler takes issue with the following portion of Baldridge’s

testimony regarding the fentanyl found in Rentschler’s home:

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Case No. 9-22-50

      Q     Do you recall what the weight of those suspected drugs was?

      A     I think it was approximately 33 grams.

      Q Based on your training and experience, what would be the street
      value of roughly 33 grams of fentanyl?

      A It’d be about – give or take about a hundred dollars a gram, so
      around 3300 dollars.

      Q Based on your training and experience, would someone that only
      uses drugs purchase 33 grams of anything?

      A     No, ma’am.

      Q Based on your training and experience, when have you seen a
      person have 33 grams of drugs?

      A     When they’re trafficking.

      Q Would a person that solely uses drugs have, let’s say, 33 grams
      of fentanyl?

      A     No.

      Q Would a person that solely uses drugs leave behind 33 grams of
      fentanyl?

            MR. BLAKE [defense counsel]:         Objection, Your Honor.
            Speculation.

            THE COURT: Sustained.

      Q Based on your training and experience, have you ever seen a user
      leave behind 33 grams of fentanyl?

      A     No.

(8/16/22 Tr., 322-323).

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Case No. 9-22-50

       {¶28} Rentschler argues on appeal that the above-quoted testimony of Major

Adkins and Detective Baldridge constituted “unlawful profile opinion testimony.”

       {¶29} In analyzing this claim, we first note that there was no objection at trial

to any portion of Adkins’ testimony with which Rentschler takes issue on appeal,

and just a single objection to one question during Baldridge’s testimony, an

objection that was sustained. Thus, as to the testimony at issue, Rentschler’s failure

to object forfeited all but plain error. See, e.g., State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359,

2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 171. To establish plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), the party

asserting error must demonstrate that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and

that the error affected his substantial rights. State v. Bond, 170 Ohio St.3d 316, 2022-

Ohio-4150, ¶ 17.

       {¶30} Upon review of the testimony at issue in the context of the overall

record, we find that the testimony – and therefore the conduct of the prosecution in

eliciting the testimony – falls well short of plain error.

       {¶31} Evid.R. 701 governs the admissibility of opinion testimony from lay

witnesses, and provides:

       If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in
       the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
       inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the
       witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’
       testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

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Case No. 9-22-50

       {¶32} It is well established that police officers may offer lay opinion

testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 701 if the testimony is based on the officers’

perceptions through experience. State v. Duncan, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-75, 2020-

Ohio-3916, ¶ 9. Additionally, appellate courts throughout Ohio have repeatedly

held that drug trafficking may be proven by circumstantial evidence, including

evidence of items such as plastic baggies, digital scales, large sums of money, and

the street value of the drugs at issue. See, e.g., State v. Lopez-Olmedo, 9th Dist.

Lorain No. 21CA011745, 2022-Ohio-2817, ¶ 33, appeal not allowed, 168 Ohio

St.3d 1458, 2022-Ohio-4201.

       {¶33} In this case, we conclude that the testimony of Major Adkins and

Detective Baldridge was properly admitted lay opinion testimony pursuant to

Evid.R. 701, particularly as Rentschler was on trial for both trafficking in fentanyl

and possession of fentanyl. Rentschler has failed to establish the existence of plain

error with regard to his claims, particularly as he was ultimately acquitted of the

trafficking charge to which the testimony related.

       {¶34} Rentschler next asserts that prosecutorial misconduct occurred

because the state failed to provide the defense with “expert witness reports” relating

to the complained-of testimony given by Major Adkins and Detective Baldridge, in

alleged non-compliance with Crim.R. 16(K).

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Case No. 9-22-50

       {¶35} Crim.R. 16(K) governs the discovery of expert witness reports, and

provides:

       An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report
       summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis,
       conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a summary of the expert’s
       qualifications. The written report and summary of qualifications shall
       be subject to disclosure under this rule no later than twenty-one days
       prior to trial, which period may be modified by the court for good
       cause shown, which does not prejudice any other party. Failure to
       disclose the written report to opposing counsel shall preclude the
       expert’s testimony at trial.

       {¶36} The record here reflects that the prosecution never requested that the

trial court qualify either Adkins or Baldridge as an expert witness. As this part of

Rentschler’s prosecutorial misconduct claim relates to expert witness requirements

and Adkins and Baldridge did not testify as experts, Rentschler’s assertion that there

was non-compliance with Crim.R. 16(K) lacks merit. See State v. Morris, 3d Dist.

Henry No. 7-21-05, 2022-Ohio-3608, ¶ 20, appeal allowed on other grounds, 169

Ohio St.3d 1140, 2023-Ohio-381.

       {¶37} Finally, Rentschler argues that the state engaged in misconduct during

closing argument when the prosecutor referenced the “tip” received by law

enforcement that led to the search of Rentschler’s home.

       {¶38} “A prosecutor is entitled *** to ‘wide latitude in summation as to what

the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may be drawn therefrom.’”

State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 274, quoting State v.

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Case No. 9-22-50

Stephens, 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 82, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970). “The test regarding

prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments is whether the remarks were

improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the

defendant.” State v. Manley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-04, 2011-Ohio-5082, ¶ 14.

       {¶39} “In making this determination, an appellate court should consider

several factors: (1) the nature of the remarks, (2) whether an objection was made by

counsel, (3) whether corrective instructions were given by the court, and (4) the

strength of the evidence against the defendant.” State v. Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d

28, 41, 656 N.E.2d 970 (1995). “We evaluate the allegedly improper statements in

the context of the entire trial.” State v. Klein, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-12-09, 2013-

Ohio-2387, ¶ 60, citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 464, 739 N.E.2d 749

(2001).

       {¶40} As noted above, the first witness called at trial was parole officer

James Peterson. After Peterson took the stand and identified Rentschler, the

following direct examination occurred:

       Q I want to turn your attention back to May 14th of 2020.
       Remember that date?

       A    Yes.

       Q Okay. Did you have reason to go to an address of 1178 Fairwood
       Avenue here in Marion County, Ohio?

       A    Yes, I did.

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Case No. 9-22-50

      Q And generally speaking, what was the reason for going to that
      address?

      A   I received a tip from MARMET Drug Task Force –

          MR. BLAKE [defense counsel]:         Objection, Your Honor.
          Hearsay.

          THE COURT: As to – as to receiving a tip and who it was from,
          overruled. The content of the tip is different. But he hasn’t
          testified as to that. So, overruled.

      A I received a tip from MARMET Drug – Drug Task Force that
      Mr. Rentschler –

          MR. BLAKE: Objection, Your Honor.

      A   --was –

          MR. BLAKE: He’s going there.

          THE COURT: Yeah. You want to clarify your question,
          counsel? I’m going to sustain that objection as to the –

          MR. SCOTT: Okay.

          THE COURT: Unless you want to make an argument as to why
          it’s not hearsay.

          MR. SCOTT: Your Honor, I would – I would suggest that it’s
          not hearsay because it’s not meant for the truth of the matter
          asserted but more what he does next based on that information.

          THE COURT: Well, I think there’s a way to – to get to that
          without – without the specific content of what the tip was.

          MR. SCOTT: Okay.

          THE COURT: So I’m going to sustain the objection.

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Case No. 9-22-50

(8/16/22 Tr., 262-264).

       {¶41} Immediately following that exchange on the record, the prosecutor

then elicited from the witness the fact that Peterson “received some information

from the MARMET Drug Task Force” relating to Rentschler and his residence at

1178 Fairwood and that, as a result, Peterson and his partner went to that location.

(8/16/22 Tr., 264-265).

       {¶42} Subsequently, during closing argument, defense counsel made the

following statements to the jury:

       There’s no prior investigation into Shane. Whatsoever. Several
       officers got up here and said they had a tip. And I should just talk
       about this for a moment. They get a tip. What’s the tip? Who’s it
       from? Who came in here and told you what that tip was about?

(8/18/22 Tr., 30).

       {¶43} Defense counsel then almost immediately went on to again argue that

the police failed to do any investigation or surveillance of Rentschler before going

to search his house. (8/18/22 Tr., 31).

       {¶44} Then, in rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor made the following

statements:

       [The defense] also talks about the things that [the police] could have
       done. Now, they’re responding to a tip. It’s not hard for you to infer
       that that tip was that there’s drugs in that house. That is not a –
       (inaudible) – because of what they go and what they look for. It’s
       pretty clear what they were looking for when they got there.

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Case No. 9-22-50

       So the fact that they didn’t do trash pulls on a tip that they had just
       received, or the fact that they didn’t do surveillance, or CI buys, or
       wiretaps is not a big deal. Because if you do all of that there’s a
       possibility that what you’ve been tipped to have been there is gone by
       the time that you go searching for it. So you act on it when the tip is
       ripe.

(8/18/22 Tr., 42-43).

       {¶45} On appeal, Rentschler argues that the above-quoted comments of the

prosecutor in final closing argument amount to prejudicial misconduct because the

comments touched upon the specific content of the tip, which the trial court had

ruled was inadmissible in evidence. Rentschler also claims that the state’s argument

was impermissible in that the state was asserting that the tip was substantive proof

of Rentschler’s guilt. Upon consideration, we find that Rentschler’s claims lack

merit for several reasons.

       {¶46} First of all, we note that no objection at trial was made to the portion

of the prosecutor’s closing argument with which Rentschler now assigns error.

Accordingly, we review the prosecution’s statements only for plain error. State v.

Lane, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-21-33, 2022-Ohio-3775, ¶ 59. Under the plain error

standard, the appellant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for the error at issue, the outcome of the proceeding would have been otherwise.

State v. West, 168 Ohio St.3d 605, 2022-Ohio-1556, ¶¶ 35-36.

       {¶47} While Rentschler asserts that the prosecution impermissibly argued

that the tip was substantive proof of Rentschler’s guilt, we disagree. When the

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prosecutor’s statements are reviewed in context, the record reflects that the

prosecutor’s argument regarding the tip was properly proffered as rebuttal to the

defense argument concerning the lack of an actual investigation prior to law

enforcement searching Rentschler’s house.

       {¶48} Moreover, to the extent that there was anything arguably improper in

the prosecutor’s comments, the record reflects that the defense opened the door to

the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument regarding the tip and the reason for the lack of

investigation on the part of law enforcement. We also note that the trial court twice

instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel were not evidence.

       {¶49} After examining the prosecutor’s statements under the four factors set

forth above, we do not find that the statements constituted plain error. Rentschler

has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments affected Rentschler’s

substantial rights or that, but for the statements, the jury would have found

Rentschler not guilty. As detailed in our discussion of Rentschler’s sixth assignment

of error, supra, the prosecution presented more than ample other evidence at trial

upon which the jury could find Rentschler guilty of possessing fentanyl, including

but not limited to Rentschler’s admission that the fentanyl was his.

       {¶50} Thus, for all of those reasons, Rentschler has failed to demonstrate

reversible prosecutorial misconduct with regard to closing arguments.

       {¶51} The first assignment of error is overruled.

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                            Second Assignment of Error

       {¶52} In the second assignment of error, Rentschler asserts that the trial court

erred in admitting evidence that was irrelevant, prejudicial, and highly

inflammatory, and which Rentschler claims was admitted in violation of Evid.R.

404(B).

       {¶53} Evid.R. 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.”

       {¶54} While relevant evidence is generally admissible pursuant to Evid.R.

402, Evid.R. 403 mandates exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the

issues, or of misleading the jury.”

       {¶55} Pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B), evidence of any other crime, wrong, or

act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that the person

acted in accordance with that character, however such evidence may be admissible

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.           “‘The list of

acceptable reasons for admitting testimony of prior bad acts into evidence is non-

exhaustive.’” State v. Bagley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-31, 2014-Ohio-1787, ¶ 56,

                                         -22-
Case No. 9-22-50

quoting State v. Persohn, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 11 CO 37, 2012-Ohio-6091, ¶

23.

       {¶56} In this assignment of error, Rentschler first argues that a reference by

a prosecution witness to the fact Rentschler was on parole constituted inadmissible

and highly prejudicial evidence in violation of Evid.R. 404(B).

       {¶57} As previously noted, the state’s first witness at trial was James

Peterson. Upon taking the stand, Peterson testified that he was a parole officer with

the State of Ohio, having been in that position for about five years. Peterson was

then asked, “[d]o you know a person by the name of Shane Rentschler?”, and

Peterson answered that he did. (8/16/22 Tr., 261). Peterson was then asked how he

knew Rentschler, and he answered “I have supervised Shane Rentschler.” (Id.).

Defense counsel lodged an objection, which was overruled. Peterson then identified

the defendant in the courtroom as being Shane Rentschler, and the direct

examination moved on to questioning about the events of May 14, 2020 and the

search of Rentschler’s home.

       {¶58} Contrary to Rentschler’s claims on appeal, the parole officer’s

testimony that he knew Rentschler from having supervised him was not evidence of

a specific prior crime, wrong, or act that falls under the dictates of Evid. R. 404(B).

The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that Evid.R. 404(B) “prohibits the use of

evidence related to other acts of the defendant to show his character or propensity

                                         -23-
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to commit crimes ***.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-

Ohio-4441, ¶ 3. Here, Peterson’s testimony that he had “supervised” Rentschler,

with no elaboration, is not “other acts” evidence as envisioned by Evid.R. 404(B).

Peterson’s testimony did not detail any specific prior criminal activity on

Rentschler’s part as prohibited under the rule. See State v. Fairley, 3d Dist. Hancock

No. 5-03-41, 2004-Ohio-2616, ¶ 31. Rather, the passing reference to Rentschler’s

supervision was offered only to establish the basis of Peterson’s knowledge of the

defendant and to then also explain why Peterson and his partner went to Rentschler’s

home that day. Thus, there was no evidence presented of an “act” by Rentschler, or

any details about that act, that would have implicated Evid.R. 404(B).

       {¶59} Nonetheless, the trial court also gave a limiting instruction advising

that evidence of the commission of wrong acts other than the offenses with which

the defendant was charged was not to be considered to prove the character of the

defendant in order to show that he acted in conformity with that character. The jury

was further instructed that it does not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he

committed the particular crimes charged in the instant case. This court presumes

that the jury followed those instructions. State v. Gardner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59,

656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).

       {¶60} Ultimately, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Peterson’s

testimony that he “supervised” Rentschler served to confuse, mislead, or inflame

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Case No. 9-22-50

the jury, particularly in light of the testimony’s very limited nature, the extremely

neutral phrasing used by the witness in explaining how he knew Rentschler, the

cautionary instructions given by the trial court, and the ample evidence of

Rentschler’s guilt. As such, Rentschler has failed to establish that any material,

unfair prejudice resulted from the admission of Peterson’s testimony and therefore

Rentschler’s claim lacks merit.

       {¶61} Rentschler also argues in the second assignment of error that the trial

court erred in admitting the opinion testimony of Major Chris Adkins and Detective

Matt Baldridge, which is the same testimony Rentschler challenged as prosecutorial

misconduct in the first assignment of error. Again, as explained in our analysis of

that assignment of error, supra, the testimony given by Adkins and Baldridge was

properly admitted as lay opinion testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 701. Additional

review reflects that there is no merit to Rentschler’s claim that the testimony was

irrelevant or inflammatory.

       {¶62} The second assignment of error is overruled.

                              Third Assignment of Error

       {¶63} In his third assignment of error, Rentschler argues that he was denied

the effective assistance of counsel because his initial trial counsel failed to

communicate to Rentschler a plea offer made by the State of Ohio.

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       {¶64} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State

v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prove ineffective

assistance of counsel, one must establish that: (1) counsel’s performance was

deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Counsel’s

performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonable

representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989),

paragraph two of the syllabus. Prejudice exists if there is “a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been

different.” State v. Sowell, 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138.

       {¶65} In Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379

(2012), the United States Supreme Court held that trial counsel may be ineffective

if they fail to communicate the terms of a plea offer to a defendant. Pursuant to

Frye, a criminal defense attorney has a duty to inform the defendant of formal

prosecution offers that may be favorable to the defendant. Id., at 135. To show

prejudice where a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s failure

to communicate the same, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability

both that they would have accepted the more favorable plea offer had they been

afforded effective assistance of counsel and that the negotiated plea would have

                                        -26-
Case No. 9-22-50

been entered without the prosecution’s revoking it or the trial court’s refusing to

accept it. Id.

       {¶66} In support of the instant assignment of error, Rentschler relies solely

upon a comment made by his trial counsel at the sentencing hearing as counsel was

arguing on Rentschler’s behalf in mitigation of sentence. At that time, pursuant to

suggesting that Rentschler should receive a prison sentence in the range of seven or

eight years, counsel stated:

       But in every occasion that I talked with him I talked with [the
       prosecutor] Mr. Scott and I understand sometimes, I’ve been doing
       this for a minute, and the Court knows as well, and you get involved
       in a case and it’s old, there are things that are kind of set in place and
       I work pretty hard with Mr. Scott to try to resolve matters. And Mr.
       Scott had indicated to me that there was some sort of an offer with
       regard to pleading to the F2 that that – if the motion hearing was had,
       that would go away. My client did –didn’t seem to be aware of that.
       I came to a pretrial and indicated that my discussions with Mr.
       Rentschler he would agree to that, and at a final pretrial they’d agree
       to resolving for an F2.

(8/31/22 Tr., 9-10).

       {¶67} Upon review, we cannot find that counsel’s vague reference at

sentencing to “some sort of an offer” sufficiently establishes that a formal plea offer

to a lesser included offense was made by the prosecution and that the offer then

lapsed or was rejected under circumstances that render Missouri v. Frye, supra,

applicable here. Moreover, even assuming that Rentschler’s prior trial counsel

engaged in deficient performance by not communicating a plea offer to his client,

                                         -27-
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the record lacks evidence of a reasonable probability that Rentschler would have

accepted the plea offer and that the negotiated plea would have been ultimately

accepted by the trial court. Any evidence necessary to establish those prongs of the

Missouri v. Frye standard would be evidence outside the record and therefore

Rentschler’s claim fails on direct appeal. See State v. Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d

226, 228, 448 N.E.2d 452 (1983).

       {¶68} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                             Fourth Assignment of Error

       {¶69} In the fourth assignment of error, Rentschler asserts that the trial court

erred in several ways with respect to jury instructions.

       {¶70} “[T]he trial judge is in the best position to gauge the evidence before

the jury and is provided the discretion to determine whether the evidence adduced

at trial was sufficient to require an instruction.” State v. Fulmer, 117 Ohio St.3d 319,

2008-Ohio-936, 883, ¶ 72. Thus, we generally review alleged errors in jury

instructions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Blanton, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 9-15-

07, 2015-Ohio-4620, ¶ 55, citing State v. Guster, 66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271, 421

N.E.2d 157 (1981). An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d

144 (1980). We note also that “the rule regarding appellate review of jury

instructions is that a sole instruction must be viewed within context of the whole set

                                         -28-
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rather than in isolation.” State v. Moore, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-06-18, 2007-Ohio-

5905, ¶ 26.

       {¶71} Here, Rentschler argues first that the trial court erred by including an

instruction on complicity in the charge to the jury. Rentschler asserts that there was

no evidence presented at trial that supported the trial court’s decision to instruct the

jury as to complicity.

       {¶72} Under the principle of complicity or accomplice liability, an individual

may be found guilty if he solicits, aids, abets or conspires with another individual

to commit an offense and shares the criminal intent of an individual who commits

the principal offense. R.C. 2923.03. It is well settled law that a defendant charged

with an offense may be convicted of that offense upon proof that he was complicit

in committing the crime, even though the indictment is stated in terms of the

principal offense and does not mention complicity. State v. Herring, 94 Ohio St.3d

246, 251, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002). See, also, R.C. 2923.03(F). Additionally, in order

to convict a defendant as an accomplice, the prosecution need not prove who the

principal offender was but only that there was a principal offender. State v. Lamarr,

3d Dist. Logan No. 8-04-39, 2005-Ohio-6030, ¶ 8, citing State v. Perryman, 49 Ohio

St.2d 14, 358 N.E.2d 1040 (1976). Where the state presents evidence that the

defendant acted in concert with another person to commit a crime, a jury instruction

                                         -29-
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on complicity is proper. State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170358, 2018-

Ohio-4754, ¶ 43.

       {¶73} In this case, the record reflects that, after all the evidence was in, the

trial court informed counsel of the court’s intention to give a complicity instruction.

Defense counsel objected on the basis that “[t]here’s not been any evidence of that

and it would serve to confuse the jury.” (8/18/22 Tr., 3). The trial court responded

by saying:

       The Court’s view in this case is that there was testimony elicited that
       the officers had a second suspect that they – some might say
       threatened to arrest in this case. Namely, the defendant’s wife. And
       that the defendant, in essence, confessed to this crime because he
       didn’t want to see his wife arrested. But I think from that testimony
       the jury could also find that they were acting together because they
       both lived in the house. And so the Court feels that the aider and
       abettor instruction is appropriate given these facts. ***

(8/18/22 Tr., 4).

       {¶74} The trial court then ultimately gave the following instruction to the

jury as part of the overall charge:

       The defendant may be convicted as an aider and abettor or a
       complicitor.

       A complicitor is one who knowingly solicits or procures another to
       commit the offense.

       Solicit means to ask, to in – influence, to invite, to tempt, to lead on,
       to bring the pressure to bear.

       Procure means to obtain, induce, bring about, motivate.

                                         -30-
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       An aider and abettor is one who aids, assists, or encourages another to
       commit a crime and participates in the commission of the offense by
       some act, word, or gesture. Aid means to help, assist, or strengthen.

       The knowledge that a crime is being committed and the mere presence
       of an accused at the scene of a crime is not sufficient to prove in and
       of itself that the accused was an aider and an abettor. The defendant’s
       mere association with the principal offender is not enough to prove
       the defendant is an aider and abettor. Before you can find the
       defendant guilty of complicity by aiding and abetting, you must find
       beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant supported, assisted,
       encouraged, cooperated with, advised or incited the principal offender
       in the commission of the offense and if the defendant shared in the
       criminal intent of the principal offender. Such intent may be inferred
       from the circumstances surrounding the offense including but not
       limited to – to presence, companionship, and conduct before and after
       the offense was committed. The mere presence at the scene of the
       offense is not sufficient to prove in and of itself that the defendant was
       [sic] aider and abettor.

(8/18/22 Tr., 51-52).

       {¶75} Upon review, the record reflects that the state tried this case on the

theory that Rentschler was the principal offender and not on a complicity theory.

However, the circumstantial evidence of potential complicity between Rentschler

and his wife was not so remote as to render the inclusion of the complicity

instruction prejudicial error, particularly as both adults appeared to be living in the

home, both were present at the time the drugs were discovered, the drugs were found

in a location that was not specific to just one of the spouses, and – as the trial court

noted – there were references in evidence to the fact that Rentschler’s wife could

have also been charged with the same crime. Thus, while the complicity instruction

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may not have been strictly warranted, we cannot say that its inclusion in the general

charge was an abuse of discretion.

       {¶76} Rentschler next argues that the trial court erred in the giving of the

complicity instruction by failing to include information in the instruction about the

culpable mental state required for complicity.

       {¶77} In analyzing this claim, we note first that while Rentschler objected at

trial to the applicability of the complicity instruction generally, no objection was

lodged as to the form or substance of the complicity instruction itself. Accordingly,

we find that Rentschler’s failure to object to the form of the instruction waives all

but plain error as to this claim. Even in the context of jury instructions, “[p]lain

error ‘should be applied with utmost caution and should be invoked only to prevent

a clear miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-

6391, ¶ 52, quoting State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983),

syllabus. “Plain error exists only where it is clear that the verdict would have been

otherwise but for the error.” Skatzes, supra, at ¶ 52, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio

St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). See, also, Crim.R. 30.

       {¶78} R.C. 2923.03 governs complicity and provides, in relevant part, that

“[n]o person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the

offense” shall solicit or procure another to commit an offense or aid or abet another

in committing the offense. (Emphasis added). Thus, in order to convict an offender

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Case No. 9-22-50

of possession of drugs under a complicity theory, R.C. 2923.03 requires that the

state establish that the accused acted “knowingly.” See R.C. 2925.11.

       {¶79} In the instant case, Rentschler argues that the complicity instruction

was erroneous because it did not include a specific instruction as to the requisite

culpability of “knowingly”. However, a review of the complicity instruction as

given reflects that the jury was told that finding the defendant guilty of complicity

requires, among other things, a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that “the

defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal offender.” (8/18/22 Tr., 52).

The record reflects that the jury instructions elsewhere contained a thorough and

complete explanation of the requirement that the crime of drug possession be

committed “knowingly”, with that requisite degree of culpability having been

accurately defined for the jury. Finally, there was ample evidence presented at trial

to establish that Rentschler had the requisite criminal intent for the possession

offense of which he was found guilty.

       {¶80} For all of those reasons, Rentschler is not able to demonstrate the

necessary prejudice from the trial court’s complicity instruction under the plain error

standard and we find that the trial court’s failure to redefine “knowingly” when

instructing the jury on complicity does not constitute plain error in this instance.

       {¶81} Next, Rentschler argues that the trial court erred in giving the

“multiple counts” instruction to the jury.       The record reflects that, because

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Rentschler was charged with two counts in the indictment, the trial court utilized

the “multiple counts” jury instruction set forth in 2 CR Ohio Jury Instructions

425.07, which provides in relevant part:

       The charges set forth in each count in the indictment (information)
       constitute a separate and distinct matter. You must consider each
       count and the evidence applicable to each count separately and you
       must state your finding as to each count uninfluenced by your verdict
       as to (the other) (any other) count. The defendant(s) may be found
       guilty or not guilty of any one or all the offenses charged.

       {¶82} However, assuming there is no error in the transcription, the trial court

here gave that instruction in the following way:

       The charge [sic] set [sic] in each count in the indictment constitute a
       separate and distinct matter. You must consider each count and the
       evidence applicable to each count separately from each other count.
       You must state your finding as to each count influenced [sic] by your
       verdict as to any other count. The defendant may be found guilty or
       not guilty or [sic] any one or all of the offenses charged.

(6/18/22 Tr., 52-53).

       {¶83} Rentschler asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred by saying

“influenced” instead of “uninfluenced” in giving that instruction. We disagree.

       {¶84} In State v. Wegmann, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-06-98, 2008-Ohio-622, this

Court addressed an extremely similar issue, where a trial court used the term

“unlawful act” instead of “lawful act” in giving an instruction on “accident” in a

murder case. In analyzing the issue in that case, we noted as follows:

       It is well settled that a criminal defendant is entitled to a complete and
       accurate jury instruction on all issues raised by the evidence. State v.

                                         -34-
Case No. 9-22-50

      Williford (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 251. However, the precise
      language of a jury instruction is within the trial court’s discretion and
      will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Bailey, 8th
      Dist. No. 81498, 2003–Ohio–1834, ¶ 51, citing State v. Guster (1981),
      66 Ohio St.2d 266, 271.

      When reviewing the trial court’s charge, a “single instruction to a jury
      may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the
      context of the overall charge.” State v. Price (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d
      136, 141, citing Cupp v. Naughten (1973), 414 U.S. 141, 146–47; see,
      also, State v. Thompson (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 13. Viewing the
      instructions in their totality, if the law is clearly and fairly expressed,
      a reviewing court should not reverse a judgment based upon an error
      in a portion of a charge. Margroff v. Cornwell Quality Tools, Inc.
      (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 174, 177; Yeager v. Riverside Methodist
      Hosp. (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 54, 55. Furthermore, there is a strong
      presumption in favor of the adequacy of jury instructions. Instructions
      which, in their totality, are sufficiently clear to permit the jury to
      understand the relevant law shall not be the cause of a reversal upon
      appeal. Schade v. Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210.

      ***

      Wegmann first argues that the trial court misled the jury by using
      “unlawful” instead of “lawful” when verbally instructing the jury on
      the accident defense. The trial court used the definition of accident
      provided in Ohio Jury Instructions (OJI) which states, in pertinent
      part, that an accident “is a mere physical happening or event, out of
      the usual order of things and not reasonably (anticipated) (foreseen)
      as a natural or probable result of a lawful act.” 4 OJI 411.01(2)
      (emphasis added). The trial court apparently misspoke and said
      “unlawful act” instead of “lawful act.” However, Wegmann failed to
      object to the trial court's misstatement, thereby waiving all but plain
      error. State v. Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003–Ohio–1325, at ¶ 75,
      citing State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, paragraphs one and two
      of the syllabus, and Crim.R. 30(A). Plain error is to be used “with the
      utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent
      a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21,
      27, 2002–Ohio–68.

                                         -35-
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       Plain error exists only in the event that it can be said that “but for the
       error, the outcome of the trial would clearly have been otherwise.”
       State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 431, 1997–Ohio–204; see, also,
       State v. Johnson, 3d Dist. No. 2–98–39, 1999–Ohio–825, and Crim.R.
       52(B). Moreover, “[t]he general tendency of reviewing courts is to
       disregard mere ‘technical errors or verbal slips,’ when, from the
       context, it appears that comprehensive and correct instructions have
       been given and substantial justice has been done.” Washington v.
       Niemeyer (1997), 11th Dist. No. 97–P–0002, 1997 WL 586095,
       quoting Fairchild v. Lake Shore Elec. Ry. Co. (1920), 101 Ohio St.
       261, 268.

       Looking at the context of the overall charge on accident, we cannot
       say that the trial court’s use of “unlawful” instead of “lawful” during
       the verbal instruction rises to the level of plain error. ***

State v. Wegmann, supra, at ¶¶ 103-108.

       {¶85} In the instant case, we apply the legal principles set forth in Wegmann

and begin our analysis by noting that Rentschler failed to object to the trial court’s

misstatement in the “multiple counts” instruction. Thus, we review this claim solely

for plain error. Upon examining the trial court’s apparent slip of the tongue in the

context of the overall charge on multiple counts, we cannot say that the same rises

to plain error. This is particularly so given that, notwithstanding the verbal slip, the

trial court quite plainly instructed the jury that (1) each count in the indictment

constituted a separate and distinct matter; (2) each count and the evidence applicable

to each count must be considered separately; and (3) the defendant may be found

guilty or not guilty as to any one or all of the offenses charged. We therefore find

that the instruction, in its totality, was sufficiently clear to permit the jury to

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understand the law with regard to considering the counts separately and, because

Rentschler was actually acquitted on the trafficking charge in Count 1 and convicted

only on the possession charge in Count 2, any misstatement by the trial court in

giving the “multiple counts” instruction was ultimately not prejudicial. For all of

those reasons, Rentchler has failed to demonstrate plain error.

       {¶86} Next, Rentschler argues that the “other acts” evidence instruction

given by the trial court was incomplete, although Rentschler did not object at trial

to the same and has again waived all but plain error.

       {¶87} In this case, as a result of the testimony by parole officer James

Peterson that he knew Rentschler from having “supervised” him, the trial court

opted to give the jury a cautionary instruction about “other acts” evidence as part of

the overall charge. However, as we determined in the second assignment of error,

supra, Peterson’s reference to having supervised Rentschler did not amount to

“other acts” evidence as contemplated by Evid.R. 404(B), and therefore the

cautionary instruction given on the same was not specifically necessary.

       {¶88} Nonetheless, a review of the cautionary instruction given by the trial

court reflects that the instruction accurately forbade the jury from considering any

evidence of prior wrongdoing as proof of Rentschler’s character or as evidence that

he acted in conformity with that character. The jury was also correctly told that “[i]t

does not follow from the defendant’s past acts that he committed the particular

                                         -37-
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crimes charged in this case.” (8/18/22 Tr., 51). Accordingly, plain error in the

giving of that instruction has not been demonstrated.

       {¶89} Finally, Rentschler argues that the trial court erred in failing to make

the written jury instructions part of the record, contrary to the dictates of R.C.

2945.10(G) and Crim.R. 30(A).

       {¶90} R.C. 2945.10(G) provides:

       The court, after the [closing] argument is concluded and before
       proceeding with other business, shall forthwith charge the jury. Such
       charge shall be reduced to writing by the court if either party requests
       it before the argument to the jury is commenced. Such charge, or other
       charge or instruction provided for in this section, when so written and
       given, shall not be orally qualified, modified, or explained to the jury
       by the court. Written charges and instructions shall be taken by the
       jury in their retirement and returned with their verdict into court and
       remain on file with the papers of the case. (Emphasis added.)

       Similarly, Crim.R. 30(A) provides, in relevant part:

       *** The court shall reduce its final instructions to writing or make an
       audio, electronic, or other recording of those instructions, provide at
       least one written copy or recording of those instructions to the jury for
       use during deliberations, and preserve those instructions for the
       record.

       {¶91} In State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, the Supreme

Court of Ohio held that the failure of a trial court to maintain written jury

instructions with the “papers of the case” in violation of R.C. 2945.10(G) is not a

structural error requiring automatic reversal. Id., at syllabus. In the absence of a

defense objection to the trial court’s failure to preserve the written jury instructions

                                         -38-
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as required, the trial court’s failure to do so is reviewed for plain error under Crim.R.

52(B). Perry, at ¶¶ 16, 26. Under Crim.R. 52(B), a finding of plain error requires

that there be a deviation from a legal rule, the error be an “obvious” defect in the

trial proceedings, and the error must have affected a defendant’s substantial rights.

State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).

       {¶92} In the instant case, Rentschler lodged no objection to the trial court’s

noncompliance with R.C. 2945.10(G) and Crim.R. 30(A), thus we review the

noncompliance for plain error. While the error complained of in this instance was

certainly a “deviation from a legal rule” and arguably was also “obvious”, we cannot

find that the trial court’s failure to preserve the written jury instructions affected the

outcome of the trial or otherwise impacted Rentschler’s substantial rights. Thus, we

find no plain error. See, also, City of Columbus v. Mullins, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

03AP-623, 2004-Ohio-1059 (failure of trial court to maintain written jury

instructions with the papers of the case was not reversible error), State v. Johnson,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90450, 2008-Ohio-5869 (no manifest miscarriage of justice

resulted from trial court’s noncompliance with R.C. 2945.10(G)).

       {¶93} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

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Case No. 9-22-50

                             Fifth Assignment of Error

       {¶94} In the fifth assignment of error, Rentschler contends that the trial court

erred in imposing an indefinite prison term pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act, with

Rentschler arguing that the Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutional.

       {¶95} Rentschler did not challenge the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes

Law in the trial court, so we therefore apply the plain-error standard of review in

this case. State v. Ball, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-21-16, 2022-Ohio-1549, ¶ 57. “An error

qualifies as ‘plain error’ only if it is obvious and but for the error, the outcome of

the proceeding clearly would have been otherwise.” State v. Barnhart, 3d Dist.

Putnam No. 12-20-08, 2021-Ohio-2874, ¶ 8, citing State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio

St.3d 227, 245, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 32.

       {¶96} As this Court noted in Ball, supra, challenges to the Reagan Tokes

Law do not present a matter of first impression in this Court. Ball at ¶ 59. “Since

the indefinite sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law went into effect in

March 2019, we have repeatedly been asked to address the constitutionality of these

provisions. We have invariably concluded that the indefinite sentencing provisions

of the Reagan Tokes Law do not facially violate the separation-of-powers doctrine

or infringe on defendants’ due process rights.” Id. citing e.g., State v. Crawford, 3d

Dist. Henry No. 7-20-05, 2021-Ohio-547, ¶ 10-11; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan

No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048, ¶ 22; State v. Wolfe, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-21-16,

                                         -40-
Case No. 9-22-50

2022-Ohio-96, ¶ 21. We have also rejected constitutional challenges related to the

jury trial issue. See Ball at ¶ 61-63.

       {¶97} Additionally, in State v. Hacker, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2023-Ohio-

2535, the Supreme Court of Ohio recently reviewed the Reagan Tokes Law and held

that indefinite sentencing pursuant to that law was constitutional.

       {¶98} Thus, on the basis of Hacker and all the prior precedent of this Court,

we find no merit to Rentschler’s challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law.

       {¶99} The fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                             Seventh Assignment of Error

       {¶100} In the seventh assignment of error, Rentschler argues that the

cumulative effect of errors in the trial court denied him a fair trial. Specifically,

Rentschler asserts that the cumulative effect of the errors that he alleged in his first

six assignments of error amounted to reversible error.

       {¶101} “Under [the] doctrine of cumulative error, a conviction will be

reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair

trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Spencer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-

13-50, 2015-Ohio-52, ¶ 83, citing State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-

2577, ¶¶ 222-224 and State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 656 N.E.2d 623 (1995).

                                         -41-
Case No. 9-22-50

       {¶102} “‘To find cumulative error, a court must first find multiple errors

committed at trial and determine that there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome below would have been different but for the combination of the harmless

errors.’” State v. Stober, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-13, 2014-Ohio-5629, ¶ 15,

quoting In re J.M., 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-11-06, 2012-Ohio-1467, ¶ 36.

       {¶103} Because we did not find multiple errors as alleged by Rentschler in

the first six assignments of error, and because there is no reasonable probability that

the trial outcome would have been different but for the matters Rentschler has raised

on appeal, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. State v. Bertuzzi, 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9-13-12, 2014-Ohio-5093, ¶ 110.

       {¶104} The seventh assignment of error is overruled.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶105} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant in the

particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                 Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

                                         -42-