Court Opinion

ID: 9550371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:33.804033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:27.496946
License: Public Domain

*737ROONEY, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur with the majority of the court, but I express concern over the character of the broad language used in the first sentence of the fourth paragraph from the end of the majority opinion in which it is stated that “[t]he purpose of a warranty is to protect innocent purchasers and hold builders accountable for their work.” This may be, and is, one of the purposes of an implied warranty of fitness and it may be one of the purposes of express warranties. But, if such were the sole purpose of a warranty, as is here implied, the contractual aspect of the warranty is dulled. For example, the ability for a disclaimer is negated. A warranty provides protection for purchasers other than “innocent” ones. One of the purposes of a warranty is to induce a purchase. Denna v. Chrysler Corp., 1 Ohio App.2d 582, 206 N.E.2d 221 (1964); Nielson v. Hermansen, 109 Utah 180, 166 P.2d 536 (1946); Canon v. Chapman, D.C.Okl., 161 F.Supp. 104 (1958). Inasmuch as a cause of action ex contractu or a tortious action premised on negligence, or both, are available to a contractee in construction contracts where negligence on the part of the contractor results in a breach of the implied warranty that the work will be performed in a skillful, careful, diligent and workmanlike manner, Cline v. Sawyer, Wyo., 600 P.2d 725 (1979), and inasmuch as the Wyoming comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977, provides for apportionment of damages in some instances in negligence cases, it is particularly important that the various purposes, elements, and results of the causes of action upon which the complaint is based be properly designated and considered.