Court Opinion

ID: 9774299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:14:17.378128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:30.292869
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
ALLEN, J.:
I respectfully dissent. In this products liability action, Appellant Sterling Lewis, plaintiff below, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of defendant-manufacturer, CRC Industries, Inc (“CRC”). Appellant alleged that CRC manufactured a defective aerosol spray, PE Precision Cleaner (“Precision Cleaner”). Appellant used Precision Cleaner to clean electrical switches that were located at the top of a utility pole, and he was electrocuted. Following trial, a jury found that Precision Cleaner was not defective in its design.
Upon review of the record and applicable case law, I conclude that Appellant’s issues on appeal lack merit. To support my position, I rely upon the thorough and detailed analysis of the learned trial judge, the Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro, in her Pa.R.A.P, 1925(a) opinion. Below, I summarize the major points contained in Judge Alejandro’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, adding only brief commentary to supplement her analysis.
*851First, the trial judge did not err in allowing CRC to introduce evidence of Appellant’s conduct to establish that Appellant’s unreasonable behavior was the sole, proximate cause of his injury.
Here, CRC introduced evidence that: (1) Appellant read the warnings on the Precision Cleaner can and knew that the spray conducted electricity and should not be applied to equipment that was energized; (2) Appellant broke his insulation protection when he climbed the step inside the protective bucket and exposed parts of his body that would otherwise be protected by the bucket; (3) Appellant knowingly sprayed Precision Cleaner on a charged electrical switch; (4) Appellant removed his protective work gear, which was required by his employer and would have prevented his injuries; and (5) a co-worker of Appellant warned Appellant to reposition himself into a more safe place shortly before Appellant cleaned the energized switch. Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 12/24/09, at 19-20; 3, 12-13, 17. I agree with the trial judge that this evidence was relevant and admissible to prove that Appellant’s unreasonable use of Precision Cleaner was the sole, proximate cause of his injuries. See Johansen v. Makita USA, Inc., 128 N.J. 86, 607 A.2d 637, 646 (1992) (“Such evidence could have been considered ... in determining whether the specific manner in which plaintiff had operated the saw had been the sole cause of the accident.”).
Second, Appellant claims that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the legal principles of comparative negligence and superseding cause. Brief for Appellant at 42-48, 51-54. Even if the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on comparative negligence and superseding cause, the error(s) were harmless because the jury found that Precision Cleaner was not defective in its design. As such, the jury never reached the issues of comparative negligence and superseding cause, and any error with regard to these charges would not have affected the verdict. Harkins v. Calumet Realty Co., 418 Pa.Super. 405, 614 A.2d 699, 707 (1992) (“Appellant’s fourth argument is that the trial court erred in charging the jury on superceding cause. Appellant is entitled to no relief, however, because the jury never reached the issue of superceding cause. The jury found that the product was not defective.”); Robinson v. Philadelphia, 329 Pa.Super. 139, 478 A.2d 1, 5 (1984) (finding harmless error where the defendant improper admitted evidence concerning causation and plaintiffs contributory negligence where the jury never decided these issues because it found that the defendant was not negligent).
Third, Appellant complains that the trial judge erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction to the jury informing them that they may not consider his negligent conduct when assessing factors 5 and 6 of the risk utility test. Brief for Appellant at 30-31. I find this issue waived due to Appellant’s failure to affirmatively request a limiting instruction during trial.
Here, prior to the trial court’s charge to the jury, Appellant did not submit a proposed limiting instruction informing the jury that they may not consider Appellant’s negligence when determining liability. Although Appellant generally took exception to the trial court’s instruction on comparative negligence immediately after the jury was charged and before it deliberated, Appellant never affirmatively requested that the trial court issue an independent instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of Appellant’s conduct.1 As *852such, Appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction is waived, because Appellant did not specifically submit or request a proposed limiting instruction during the proceedings below. Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa.Super. 36, 532 A.2d 441 (1987) (“An assignment of error that the trial court failed to give a specific instruction will not be considered unless it affirmatively appears from the record that a request for such an instruction was made [and] that it was denied by the trial court[.]”).2
Fourth, the trial judge did not err in failing to instruct the jury on Appellant’s claim that Precision Cleaner contained a manufacturing defect. Quite simply, Appellant failed to adduce any competent evidence that would permit the jury to draw an inference that Precision Cleaner deviated from its original design. T.C.O., 12/24/09, at 21-24. I note that CRC’s representations regarding Precision Cleaner’s performance capabilities do not amount to evidence of Precision Cleaner’s actual, scientific design. See Brief for Appellant at 19-20.
Fifth, the trial judge did not err in failing to provide a more elaborate charge on the third element of the risk-utility test. Brief for Appellant at 26-29. Indeed, the alleged omission would be redundant of the charge that the trial judge provided; even with the alleged omission, the charge clearly and accurately conveyed the law to the jury, instructing them to consider whether the alternative design submitted by Appellant was feasible and practical. T.C.O., 12/24/09, at 32-33. Consequently, I discern no reversible error on the part of the trial judge.
For these reasons, and relying upon Judge Alejandro’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment entered in favor of CRC.

. Indeed, an examination of Appellant's motion in limine, the trial court's charging con*852ference, and Appellant's exceptions to the charges indicate that Appellant merely requested that the comparative negligence charge be used only to explain the concept of sole, proximate causation and not proportional fault or general liability. R.R. at 323-34; 2169; 2171-72; 2302. At no time did Appellant specifically request that the trial court issue a limiting instruction with regard to his negligent conduct and whether Precision Cleaner was defective.

. I note that New Jersey, unlike Pennsylvania, invokes the plain error doctrine to review issues on appeal that were not properly objected to at the time of trial. In re Stern, 11 N.J. 584, 95 A.2d 593 (1953). Although the trial court was obligated to apply the substantive law of New Jersey, the parties must abide by Pennsylvania’s procedural rules, which include the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence and Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wilson v. Transp. Ins. Co., 889 A.2d 563, 571 (Pa.Super.2005). Therefore, this Court is compelled to apply Pennsylvania’s rules regarding waiver and our standard of review for addressing appellate issues.