Court Opinion

ID: 9766576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:53:46.229635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.812857
License: Public Domain

NORTHCUTT, Justice.
This is an action upon a promissory' note and for real estate commission. Appellee sued appellant upon a promissory note for principal, interest and attorney’s fees and, in the same cause of action, alleged that appellant, by letter to appellee, admitted commission liability of ■ $10,250 of which $5,000 was evidenced by a promissory note sued upon herein. Further pleading that appellant thereupon, in writing, acknowledged his obligations to pay the appellee the sum of $5,250 in addition to the note obligation. Appellant, by sworn answer, pleaded that the note in question was given to appellee purely as an accommodation • note in that appellee claimed he was in dire need of some money and, for the purpose of assist*614ing appellee to secure a loan, the appellant gave the note to appellee to place as additional security in helping appellee to secure the money that appellee needed and that appellee agreed to return the note to the appellant after the use of it for collateral terminated; that, on numerous occasions, the appellee informed the appellant that he would return the note as well as the letter sued upon by appellee but he had refused to return them to appellant. Appellant further pleaded that appellee along with George L. Aycock and a Mr. Alexander, acting together, attempted to negotiate a ranch transaction with one B. R. Sheffield wherein the appellant was to transfer title to certain New Mexico ranch land to B. R. Sheffield on or about March 17, 1953 wherein appellant was to transfer title to certain New Mexico ranch land to B. R. Sheffield; that on June 29, 1953, the appellant agreed to pay $10,250 to appellee and his associates subject to completion of said deal; the transfer of said ranch was made to B. K. Construction Company instead of to B. R. Sheffield; that during the transaction ap-pellee, acting for B. R. Sheffield and Roy Jones, agreed to have transferred certain Federal and State grazing leases adjacent to and connected with the fee land of said ranch but the appellee failed to have delivered the leases as he agreed which resulted in a lawsuit by Sheffield against this appellant for cancellation and, as a result thereof, the ranch was delivered back to appellant and appellee paid back to Sheffield certain commissions received by appellee from Sheffield and that, because of the non-completion of the sale, the letter under date of June 29, 1953 was of no force and effect. Appellant further pleaded that no contract was ever entered into as provided by statute between appellant and- appellee for a commission. Appellant also pleaded a complete settlement of all claims between appellant and appellee. Appellant then seeks to recover commission advanced to appellee that appellant contends was paid to appellee but the trade was never closed and commission was never earned by appellee. The case was tried-to the court, without a jury and judgment was rendered in" favor of appellee upon the note for the principal, interest and attorney’s fees and also commission in the sum of $5,250 together with interest. But the judgment does not dispose of appellant’s claims for the commission he claimed was advanced because the sale was never closed. From this judgment, appellant has perfected this appeal.
Appellant’s third assignment of error is as follows:
“Since plaintiff Jackson admitted that George Aycock and H. M. Alexander, deceased, had an interest in the subject matter of this lawsuit the Trial Court erred in going to judgment in this case without the Aycock and Alexander estates, heirs or legatees being-made parties herein.”
It is true as contended by appellant that appellee pleaded that the note was given for part of the commission but the letter relied upon does not so state but appellee testified that the commission was $7,500 and the $5,000 as represented by the note was money loaned by the appellee to appellant. The pleadings and the testimony are not in accord but appellee testified that Mr. Alexander was dead and that Mr. Alexander owned 25% of the note and the commission and that Mr. Aycock owned 37i^% of the note and commission and that appellee owned the other 37i/£%. Neither Mr. Ay-cock nor the Alexander Estate was a party to the suit but judgment was granted in favor of appellee for the total amount of the note and $5,250 commission together with interest. The letters offered as plaintiff’s Exhibits Nos. 10 and 11 which, it is contended, would have been introduced but for appellant’s exceptions were signed by Oliver S. Tyler and there is nothing in this record to show he had any authority to sign Aycock’s name — appellee testified Aycock owned 37}4% while these letters show Tyler was claiming Aycock’s part of the note and commission. There were no pleadings on the part of appellee other than he alone was entitled to recover upon the note and also the commission. During the trial of the case, it developed that other parties *615than appellee, plaintiff in the trial court, owned a greater interest in the note and commission, if any amount was due, than the plaintiff and consequently were necessary parties to the suit. The trial court could not render judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the note and commission sued for when the undisputed record shows that he brought the suit as the owner of the note and also the commission and then testified that other parties owned more of the note and commission than he did and also pleaded the note was a part of the commission but testified the $5,000 note was a loan made by him to appellant. If it is a loan made by him, it is not a part of the commission and the two contentions are in direct conflict. And there are no pleadings to substantiate the holding that he was recovering for himself and Mr. Aycock and the Alexander Estate and neither does the judgment so speak.
In order that a valid judgment may be rendered, all necessary and essential parties must be before the court and that those who are such persons as have a claim or claim a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit and whose interests will necessarily be affected by any judgment that may be rendered.
We think the correct rule was stated in the case of Ball v. Cundiff, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 502, 504, which opinion was approved by the Supreme Court, where it is stated:
“(7) The following statement in 22 Tex.Jur., par. 67, p. 105, is sustained by numerous decisions cited: ‘When in the development of the case it is found that additional parties are necessary in order properly to adjust equities and prevent multiplicity of suits, the court of its own motion may and will stay proceedings until such parties are brought in. Indeed it has been decided that the court commits fundamental error in proceeding to a final judgment without the presence of the essential parties. But this duty of the court does not, of course, arise where the absent persons are not necessary parties.’ See, also, par. 88, p. 128 of- the same volume.
“In Adams v. Bankers’ Life Co., 36 S.W.2d 182, 185, in opinion by the Commission of Appeals, expressly approved by the Supreme Court, this is said:
“ ‘The nonjoinder of a party necessary to the main issue is fundamental, and requires either a dismissal of the suit oí a stay of proceedings until such party t_an be brought in. This is the rule, no matter when or how the absence of such party may become apparent. De La Vega v. League, 64 Tex. 205; Buffalo Bayou Ship Channel Co. v. Bruly, 45 Tex. (6) 8.
“ ‘The objection of nonjoinder of such a party may be made by plea in abatement, general demurrer, special exception, motion for new trial, suggestion of fundamental error on appeal, , or otherwise; whenever it comes to the knowledge of the court, the result must be the same — either the dismissal or stay of the case. Townes Texas Pleading (2d Ed.) p. 288; 1 Tex.Jur. p. 144.’
“The lack of necessary parties to the suit being fundamental, the decisions stressed by appellant in his brief relating to waiver of right by defendant to an abatement of a suit, by failing to file his plea in abatement in the due order or pleadings or failing to have a ruling thereon at the proper time, are not in point here, because in such cases grounds urged for abatement involved matters of personal privilege of the defendant, and not fundamental error of the character noted in the foregoing authorities.”
When it developed, in the trial, there were other necessary parties, appellant requested the case be dismissed. The additional parties could not be made parties to this suit without notice and could not be made necessary parties by trial amendment. Appellant’s third point of error is sustained.
*616Since we are of the opinion that this case must he reversed to make the necessary parties, we will not discuss the other points of error as they may not arise on another trial.
Judgment of the trial court reversed and remanded.