Court Opinion

ID: 9764456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:23:41.319875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.086997
License: Public Domain

DON BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I reluctantly dissent. My dissent is reluctant because it is clear the trial judge approached the matter with great care and fashioned what he believed to be a just result. The majority places some emphasis on the language of Tex. Prop.Code Ann. § 202.003(a) (Vernon 1995). However, two cases have determined there is no meaningful distinction between the statute and the rule announced in Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 657 (Tex.1987) that “[a]ll doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it.” See Ashcreek Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Smith, 902 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Crispin v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 78, 81 n. 1 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
The majority and the trial court are quite correct in holding that the covenant in question does not prohibit the renting of the residences. Furthermore, a residential use restriction generally does not prohibit the use of property for duplexes, apartments or condominiums. See MacDonald v. Painter, 441 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex.1969); Stephenson v. Perlitz, 532 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.1976).
While the majority is technically correct when they state the trial court had no definitive case law covering this particular situation, Munson v. Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied) is somewhat similar. In that case the use of a residence for transient housing was deemed to be prohibited by the restrictive covenants only because those covenants specifically declared that “[m]otel, tourist courts, and trailer parks shall be deemed to be a business use” and the restrictive covenants allowed only residential use. The court read the provisions together in determining the intent of the covenants.
Here there is no additional covenant to discern the intent of the drafter. Therefore, I believe the still viable rule that allows for the free and unrestricted use of property should control. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment and render in favor of appellants.