Court Opinion

ID: 9775879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:11:46.922477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:31.796029
License: Public Domain

SPAIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the Majority’s Opinion and Order vacating the order of Jefferson Circuit Judge Corey. I can find no rule or statute prohibiting the procedure outlined by Judge Corey and also believe it to be within the inherent power of the trial judge. In my view, it is an ingenious device permitting exploration of every avenue toward resolution of at least a part of this serious criminal case. While not guaranteeing that a protracted jury trial will not be necessary, it substantially reduces the odds against it, which certainly is in the best interest of the public.
I take issue with the statement in the Majority Opinion that, under the proposed procedure, “the court shall establish the terms subject to the approval of the defendant and without any participation by the Commonwealth.” Without any doubt, after the Alford pleas were taken under the proposed procedure, the trial court would order a complete presentence investigation followed by a report and an open-court hearing, all as provided for in KRS 532.025. At such a hearing and before the trial judge made his decision as to the appropriate punishment due each defendant, the Commonwealth would be given full opportunity to “participate” by introducing any evidence in aggravation of punishment and by offering argument regarding the punishment to be imposed. Thus the duly elected prosecutor would be afforded the input regarding the punishment which our adversary system contemplates. This is the extent of his participation in any case; he does not have the responsibility to actually set punishment or to sentence a defendant under our law — this burden is properly on the trial judge.
I would further emphasize that, under Judge Corey’s proposed procedure, the trial judge would make no determination in advance of the presentence hearing as to *324what punishment will be appropriate in a given case. Upon his making and announcing such final decision, the matter would be concluded or the defendant would elect whether to accede to the sentencing decision or to withdraw his Alford guilty plea and to stand trial. If this alternative were chosen, then the parties once again would be restored to their status quo as if the plea had never been entered. In either event, I see no prejudice to the Commonwealth.
COMBS and LEIBSON, JJ., concur in this dissent.