Court Opinion

ID: 9730985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:50.113058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.900158
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
Although I believe, as once did the Supreme Court of Indiana, that appellate courts should not weigh the evidence to find that a trial court error is harmless,1 I never*686theless agree with the majority that later cases,' such as Harvey v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 473, 269 N.E.2d 759, require us to do so. The majority also correctly attributes to Harvey the holding that the admission of hearsay evidence which tends only to prove a fact which is clearly proved by other legitimate evidence is harmless error and that whether the hearsay is harmless depends on the status of the evidence it corroborates. But the majority errs in the application of those principles to the evidence in this case.
The evidence corroborated is the testimony of Officer Rothenbusch that he saw Burhannon pass something from his right hand to his left hand and then drop a bindle of heroin when requested to open his left hand. This incident occurred after Burhannon had fought with police for five minutes, had been subdued with Mace, had had his hands handcuffed behind his back, had been ordered into an automobile, had been transported to another location, and finally had been ordered from the automobile for questioning. Having weighed that evidence as best I can from the cold typewritten page, I find it amazing that a man could have hung onto this “small tinfoil item containing a white powdery substance” through all that he had experienced from the time the police stopped him until- he allegedly dropped it. Of course I have no reason to believe the officer is not subjectively sincere in his testimony nor any means of explaining his testimony in terms of an honest mistake. Furthermore, I know nothing whatsoever of his demeanor as a witness. But in spite of all these handicaps I must weigh his testimony. And when I do I cannot say that it is “overwhelming” or that it clearly proves Burhannon was in possession of the white powdery substance known as heroin. I cannot, therefore, say that the corroborating hearsay was not without influence on the minds of the jurors in convincing them that Burhannon was guilty as *687charged. Certainly I cannot say that the error in admitting the hearsay was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 apparently requires before an error of constitutional dimensions can be deemed harmless. (Burhannon had both a state and a federal constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face. Ind. Const., Art 1, § 13; Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution.)
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
Note. — Reported at 361 N.E.2d 928.

. Ind. Ann. Stat. §35-1-47-9 (Burns Code Ed., 1975), provides: “In consideration of the questions which are presented upon an appeal [in a criminal case] the court shall not regard technical errors or defects, or exceptions to any decision or action of the trial court, which did not, in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken, prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.” (Originally Acts of 1905, Ch. 169, § 334, p. 584.) In Beneks v. State (1935), 208 Ind. 317, 329, 196 N.E. 73, the court said: “This statute must be construed as having reference only to matters of practice and procedure, and to questions which do not go to the merits of the case. It was not intended to authorize this court to weigh the evidence and determine therefrom whether the jury *686would have reached the same verdict under proper instruction.” (My emphasis.) Accord: Hedrick v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 381, 390, 98 N.E.2d 906; Todd v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 664, 671, 101 N.E.2d 45; Madison v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 517, 527, 130 N.E.2d 35.