Court Opinion

ID: 9383314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 14:03:08.145333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:44.903278
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

GEORGE ACREE,             :
                          :
                          :             C.A. No. K21C-02-029-JJC
              Plaintiff,  :
                          :
      v.                  :
                          :
BAYHEALTH MEDICAL CENTER, :
INC., WEATHERBY LOCUMS,   :
INC., AND PREMIER         :
ORTHOPEDIC BONE AND JOINT :
CARE, LLC,                :
                          :
              Defendants. :

                        Submitted: December 19, 2022
                        Decided: March 29, 2023
                 MEMORDANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

     Upon Defendant Weatherby Locums, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment –
                                  DENIED
Ronald G. Poliquin, Esquire, THE POLIQUIN FIRM LLC., Dover, Delaware, Attorney
for Plaintiff.

James E. Drnec, Esquire, and Phillip M. Casale, Esquire, WHARTON LEVIN
EHRMANTRAUT & KLEIN, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant
Bayhealth Medical Center, Inc.

John A. Elzufon, Esquire, and Matthew Donelson, Esquire, ELZUFON, AUSTIN &
MONDELL, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware,         Attorneys for Defendant Premier
Orthopedic Bone and Joint Care, LLC.

Maria R. Granaudo Gesty, Esquire, BURNS WHITE LLC., Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorney for Defendant Weatherby Locum, Inc.

Clark, R. J.
      Defendant Weatherby Locums, Inc. (“Weatherby”) is a national staffing agency
that recruits and places physicians with hospitals around the country. Here, Weatherby
placed Dr. Thomas Anderson, an orthopedic surgeon, with Defendant Bayhealth
Medical Center, Inc. (“Bayhealth”) at its Kent General site in Dover.
      Dr. Anderson then operated arthroscopically on Mr. Acree’s knee at Kent General
and Mr. Acree alleges that he did so negligently. Mr. Acree, however, did not sue Dr.
Anderson individually. Rather, he sues Weatherby vicariously to recover for Dr.
Anderson’s alleged negligence.
       This opinion addresses Weatherby’s motion for summary judgment.                   In
Weatherby’s motion, it contends that it cannot be held liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior because Dr. Anderson performed the surgery as an independent
contractor as a matter of law.         Mr. Acree counters that Dr. Anderson’s status for
purposes of respondeat superior should remain a factual issue for the jury.
      For the reasons discussed below, there are sufficient facts in the summary
judgment record to preclude summary judgment.              As a result, Dr. Anderson’s
master/servant versus independent contractor status will remain an issue for the jury.

                                  I.       BACKGROUND
      Dr. Thomas Anderson performed a right knee arthroscopy on Mr. Acree at
Bayhealth’s Kent General site.      After the surgery, Mr. Acree suffered complications
and a post-operative infection that he alleges, in turn, will require him to undergo a total
knee replacement.
      Mr. Acree elected not to sue Dr. Anderson or any other alleged individual
tortfeasors. Rather, he sues Bayhealth, Weatherby, and Premier Orthopedic Bone and
Joint Care, LLC, and alleges they are vicariously liable for the harm that their employees
caused him. Weatherby counters by contending that Dr. Anderson provided medical
care to Mr. Acree as an independent contractor.
                                              2
       Weatherby placed Dr. Anderson with Bayhealth as a locum tenens physician. It
selected this Latin phrase to describe the role of the doctors that it places – it means “ to
hold the place of” or to substitute for.1 Since 2012, Weatherby has provided Bayhealth
with multiple locum tenens physicians to help staff its facilities.2
       Weatherby first moved for summary judgment early in the case before the parties
completed discovery.3 At that point, it relied primarily on the terms of two contracts:
a written agreement between it and Dr. Anderson, and a separate written agreement
between it and Bayhealth.4 In Mr. Acree’s initial opposition, he relied on (1) the general
rule that issues of agency status are generally ones of fact, and (2) that he had not yet
completed discovery on the issue.5
       The Court then deferred its decision on the motion and provided the parties time
to conduct limited discovery regarding Dr. Anderson’s status. At that point, the Court
left it to the parties to determine whether targeted discovery on the issue or broader
discovery (to avoid potential duplication of efforts and costs) would be appropriate.
The parties elected targeted discovery that they believed would conclude within two
months. By stipulation, the parties later requested the Court to extend the discovery
and briefing deadlines, which the Court approved.
       When the parties filed their supplemental briefing, neither addressed the
Restatement (Second) of Agency §220 (hereafter “Section 220”) factors. In Fisher v.
Townsend,6 the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that respondeat superior questions in
Delaware turn on the application of these factors. Accordingly, at oral argument, the
Court requested the parties to provide additional written argument (1) to address the

1
  Locum Tenens, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
2
  Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C at 7 [hereinafter Bayhealth Service Agreement].
3
  Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.
4
  Id. ¶ 21–24.
5
  Pl.’s Resp. Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 34.
6
  695 A.2d 53 (Del. 1997).
                                                 3
Section 220 factors, and (2) to provide mandatory or persuasive authority that examined
the status of a professional placed in a facility or business by a professional staffing
agency. The parties then filed supplemental arguments on December 19, 2022.

                                   II.    FACTS OF RECORD
       The summary judgment record includes three deposition transcripts and two
contracts. The contracts include one between Weatherby and Bayhealth, and a separate
contract between Weatherby and Dr. Anderson. The facts below are drawn from these
sources and are viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Acree.
       Weatherby operates a medical staffing agency located in Florida. It recruits and
then places medical professionals at health care facilities nationally.7 Weatherby’s
business practice is to contract separately with the doctors it places and the “client”
health care facilities where it places them.8
       In February 2012, Weatherby contracted with Bayhealth (“Bayhealth Service
Agreement”) to fill multiple physician vacancies at Bayhealth’s facilities in Delaware.9
The Bayhealth Service Agreement permits Bayhealth to specify the disciplines and
durations of service that it needs Weatherby to fill.10               After receiving Bayhealth’s
request, Weatherby locates and then matches a physician with the facility. Weatherby
then agrees to furnish the physician to Bayhealth for the requested time,11 and agrees to
pay the physician’s travel and housing costs for the duration of the arrangement.12 The
Bayhealth Service Agreement further requires Weatherby to pay doctors such as Dr.
Anderson directly.13         In addition, it characterizes the doctors as independent

7
  Def.’s Suppl. Arg., Ex. B at 8–9 [hereinafter Dr. Anderson Dep.].
8
  Def.’s Suppl. Arg., Ex. C at 20 [hereinafter Gregory Prine Dep.].
9
  Bayhealth Service Agreement at 7.
10
   Id. at 1.
11
   Id.
12
   Id. at 2.
13
   Id. at 1.
                                                  4
contractors.14       The agreement further recites Weatherby’s refusal to assume
responsibility for the doctors’ clinical decisions during the placement,15 while
confirming Bayhealth’s obligation to set the doctors’ work schedules and provide the
doctors’ the equipment and supplies needed to practice medicine.16 Throughout the
placements, Weatherby nevertheless retains the exclusive right to alter the doctors’
work location with Bayhealth.17         In other words, Bayhealth may not unilaterally move
the doctors from one of its facilities to another.              Finally, the agreement requires
Weatherby to provide the physicians’ medical malpractice insurance.18
        The second contract, the November 2016 agreement between Weatherby and Dr.
Anderson (“Dr. Anderson’s Contract”), contains terms and obligations that, when
viewed individually, provide additional relevant facts.19 As in the Bayhealth Service
Agreement, Dr. Anderson’s Contract characterizes Dr. Anderson as Weatherby’s
independent contractor.20 To this end, Weatherby labels its role as one that arranges
medical coverage by Dr. Anderson without maintaining an interest in his medical
services.21 Dr. Anderson’s Contract further provided that Dr. Anderson had a one-year,
uninterrupted placement with Bayhealth.22              It also precluded Dr. Anderson from
competing with Bayhealth or from accepting a position with Bayhealth during the term,
or for two years thereafter.23 Dr. Anderson’s contract also gave Weatherby the right to
immediately cancel the contract, without notice, for several reasons,24 such as Dr.

14
   Id.
15
   Bayhealth Service Agreement at 1.
16
   Id. at 2.
17
   Id.
18
   Id. at 1.
19
   Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 1 [hereinafter Dr. Anderson’s Contract].
20
   Id. at 1.
21
   Id. at 2.
22
   Id. at 3.
23
   Id.
24
   Id.
                                                  5
Anderson’s failure to meet the “highest professional and ethical standards” when
performing services for Bayhealth.25 Separately, Weatherby agreed to provide Dr.
Anderson with professional liability insurance and Dr. Anderson agreed to cooperate
with any necessary defense efforts.26
       Furthermore, Dr. Anderson’s Contract imposed the following additional duties
and obligations on Dr. Anderson: (1) to maintain a current medical license;27 (2) to
render faithful and diligent medical services pursuant to the highest professional and
ethical standards as well as accepted standards of care;28 (3) to preserve patient records;29
(4) to advise Weatherby of any disciplinary or quality assurance proceedings that
involved him;30 and (5) to submit to both a drug screening and background check.31
Weatherby, and only Weatherby, reserved the right to terminate Dr. Anderson if he
breached any duty or obligation owed under the contract.32
       The remainder of the summary judgment record comes from three depositions.
In the first deposition, Dr. Anderson first described his relationship with Bayhealth. He
explained that he performed one continuous and exclusive assignment at Bayhealth after
his arrival.33 For his part, he considered Bayhealth’s Chief of Staff to be his supervisor
at the facility.34 Dr. Anderson also described his relationship with Weatherby. Namely,
throughout his placement, he worked with a Weatherby contact person who acted as his
intermediary with Bayhealth.35 He explained that if Bayhealth had problems with the

25
   Dr. Anderson’s Contract at 1.
26
   Id. at 2
27
   Id. at 1.
28
   Id.
29
   Id.
30
   Dr. Anderson’s Contract at 3.
31
   Id.
32
   Id.
33
   Dr. Anderson Dep. at 10.
34
   Id. at 13.
35
   See Dr. Anderson Dep. at 14 (describing his relationship with his contact person at Weatherby).
                                                  6
quality of his work, it would raise those issues with Weatherby, who in turn would notify
him.36 On average, Dr. Anderson spoke with his contact person at Weatherby every
other week while at Bayhealth.37 He further testified that although Weatherby had no
control over how he performed surgeries,38 Weatherby paid him directly after he
recorded his hours in Weatherby’s time portal.39
       Second, Gregory Prine testified as Weatherby's Rule 30(b)(6) designee and
described Weatherby’s business model.40 According to Mr. Prine, Weatherby balanced
the preference of its physicians for placement against the medical facilities’ needs. He
further explained how Weatherby conducts a background check on a potential physician
and confirm licensure status at the beginning of the process.41 Once Weatherby places
a physician under contract, it discusses available locations and positions with the
doctor.42      At that point, the doctor picks a desired location from the options.43
Weatherby then informs the medical facility of the potential match and schedules an
interview between the doctor and the facility. If there is a match, Weatherby then
arranges the details of the physician’s assignment.
       Furthermore, according to Mr. Prine, once a physician arrives at the job,
Weatherby maintains contact with the physician about quality of life issues only, such
as living arrangements and the acceptability of the commute.44       He maintained that
Weatherby employees do not discuss or become involved in the substance of a

36
   Id. at 16.
37
   Id. at 14.
38
   Id. at 27.
39
   Id. at 16.
40
   Gregory Prine Dep. at 8.
41
   Id. at 16–17.
42
   Id. at 9.
43
   Id.
44
   Id. at 19.
                                           7
physician’s work.45        Mr. Prine further confirmed that Weatherby considered the
physicians to be independent contractors.46 On balance, Weatherby considered itself a
staffing agency, not a medical facility, and intends to provide no oversight regarding the
quality of care that its locum tenens physicians provide.47
       Bayhealth’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee, Dennis Hallock, also provided deposition
testimony. Contrary to Mr. Prine, Mr. Hallock testified that Weatherby remained
involved in the tripartite relationship from the beginning of the physician’s placement to
the end.48 Mr. Hallock confirmed that Bayhealth would communicate directly with
Weatherby, rather than the physician, to discipline or address bad conduct of a doctor,
unless it were an emergency issue.49           In such non-emergency cases, Bayhealth would
contact Weatherby's assigned "handler," and the "handler" would address the matter with
the physician.50 From Bayhealth’s perspective, Weatherby supervised Dr. Anderson and
only Weatherby could terminate the doctor, if need be.51

                            III.    THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
       Weatherby contends that Dr. Anderson was an independent contractor as a matter
of law. It focuses narrowly on its lack of control over Dr. Anderson’s clinical decision
making and surgical actions.52 On one hand, Weatherby acknowledges that it exercised

45
   Notably, for purposes of summary judgment, Mr. Prine’s and Mr. Hallock’s deposition testimony
conflict regarding Weatherby’s degree of involvement in the physician’s day-to-day operations at the
facility. See id. (providing Weatherby merely conducts quality checks once the physician at the
facility); c.f., Def.’s Suppl. Arg., Ex. D at 14 [hereinafter Dennis Hallock Dep.] (stating that Weatherby
is involved from beginning to end and maintains consistent contact with Bayhealth and the physician
regarding a range of issues).
46
   Gregory Prine Dep. at 8.
47
   Id. at 9.
48
   Dennis Hallock Dep. at 14.
49
   Id. at 27.
50
   Id. at 14.
51
   Id. at 24, 28.
52
   Def.’s Suppl. Br.’g. at 1, 4, 5.
                                                    8
some control over non-clinical aspects of Dr. Anderson’s work by paying him, retaining
the right to hire or fire him, and coordinating the location of his work. On the other
hand, Weatherby emphasizes that it did not control Dr. Anderson’s independent
judgment when he treated patients. Accordingly, it contends that it cannot be held
vicariously liable for his alleged negligence.
          Mr. Acree counters that the question of Dr. Anderson’s status is a factual issue
that a jury must decide because such questions are almost entirely issues of fact.53 He
further urges the Court to examine and apply the Section 220 factors because they
require a broader inquiry than merely focusing on the right to control the granular
delivery of medical services. While Mr. Acree concedes that Weatherby did not control
Dr. Anderson’s clinical actions, he maintains that Weatherby retained significant control
over the time, manner, and method of his work. In support, he relies on the following
facts of record: (1) Weatherby paid Dr. Anderson directly, by the time; (2) it provided
him with medical malpractice insurance; (3) it handled his necessary travel and housing
arrangements; (4) it contractually required him to maintain and perform his medical care
in conformity with national medical standards; and (5) it prohibited him from providing
medical services in any manner outside of his work for Weatherby by virtue of a non-
compete clause. Those facts, he submits, preclude summary judgment.

                                          IV.     STANDARD
          Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.54 When considering a summary
judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

53
     Pl.’s Suppl. Br.’g. at 2.
54
     Super. Ct. R. 56(c); Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979).
                                                   9
non-moving party.55 The moving party bears the initial burden of proof.56 However, if
the movant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
demonstrate the existence of material issues of fact.57 When the non-moving party
responds, he or she must identify a material fact in dispute that is sufficient to withstand
a motion for judgment as a matter of law and can further support the verdict of a rational
jury.58

                                         V. ANALYSIS
          The Court’s summary judgment decision turns on whether Weatherby’s lack of
control over Dr. Anderson’s clinical decisions makes Dr. Anderson an independent
contractor as a matter of law. For the reasons discussed below, it does not because (1)
the issue of agency status is predominantly one of fact, and (2) Delaware law does not
narrowly limit the analysis to one of granular control.

                          A. Respondeat Superior Law in Delaware
          Mr. Acree raises a vicarious liability claim against Weatherby. Ultimately, if
Weatherby and Dr. Anderson had a master/servant relationship, Weatherby will become
vicariously liable for any harm that Dr. Anderson negligently caused Mr. Acree. On the
other hand, if Dr. Anderson provided the medical care as an independent contractor,
Weatherby will not face potential liability.
          In Delaware agency law, the vicarious liability of a principal depends, in large
part, upon the extent of the principal’s right of control over the other.59 A master/servant
relationship exists if the principal assumes the right to control the time, manner and

55
   Brzoska v. Olson, 688 A.2d 1355, 1364 (Del. 1995).
56
   Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e); Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 680.
57
   Sizemore, 405 A.2d at 681 (citing Hurtt v. Goleburn, 330 A.2d 134 (Del. 1974)).
58
   Lum v. Anderson, 2004 WL 772074, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 10, 2004).
59
   Fisher v. Townsends, Inc., 695 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1997).
                                                 10
method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right to require only certain
results in conformity with the contract.60
       Typically, whether an individual is a servant or an independent contractor depends
on the unique facts of each case.61 The label by which the parties designate themselves
is relevant, but it is not dispositive under circumstances where the status potentially
impacts a third-party’s rights.62          In other words, even though two parties may
contractually define one as an independent contractor, the question of status remains
almost entirely one of fact.63        Accordingly, no single rule governs whether a given
relationship should be considered a master/servant or independent contractor
relationship.64
       The Delaware Supreme Court expressly adopted the Section 220 factors as the
test for determining this status.65 Section 220 requires the Court, when considering a
motion for summary judgment, and the trier of fact if appropriate, to consider the
following:
       (a) the extent of control, which, by the agreement, the master may exercise
       over the details of the work; (b) whether or not the one employed is engaged
       in a distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of occupation, with
       reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the
       direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision; (d) the skill
       required in the particular occupation; (e) whether the employer or the
       workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the
       person doing the work; (f) the length of time for which the person is
       employed; (g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
       (h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
       (i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
       and servant; and (j) whether the principal is or is not in business.66

60
   Id. (citing Gooden v. Mitchell, 21 A.2d 197, 200–01 (Del. Super. 1941)).
61
   Fisher, 695 A.2d at 59.
62
   Id. at 60.
63
   Id. at 61 (quotation omitted).
64
   Id.
65
   Id. at 59.
66
   Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (1958).
                                                 11
       Here, the three relevant parties testified, either individually or through Rule
30(b)(6) designees, that they considered Dr. Anderson to be Weatherby’s independent
contractor. Furthermore, the evidence points fairly to only one relevant conclusion –
that Weatherby had no right to control Dr. Anderson’s granular delivery of medical
services. Nevertheless, as explained in the Fisher decision, the parties’ labels and the
right to control are only two components in a list of factors that must be balanced.67
Accordingly, the right to such granular control is not dispositive.68
       In addition to master/servant liability, the Fisher decision explained that an
independent contractor can still be liable under respondeat superior if he or she acts as
an agent-independent contractor.69 In this alternative analysis, the Court must focus on
the principal’s control or direction of the other and determine if it dominates the manner
or means of the work performed.70 If so, the principal is vicariously liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of an independent contractor.71
       In this case, the alternative analysis for imposing vicarious liability is not at issue.
Rather, it applies only in circumstances where the principal retains control over the
delivery of the particular service at issue.72          On this record, no facts could support a
reasonable jury’s finding that Weatherby controlled how Dr. Anderson performed his
surgery. Accordingly, the Court will not further address agent-independent contractor
status.73

67
   Fisher, 695 A.2d at 60.
68
   Id. at 59.
69
   Id. at 60.
70
   Id. at 61.
71
   Id.
72
   See id. (explaining that if the principal’s control or direction dominates the work performed, then the
independent contractor may become an agent that subjects the principal to vicarious liability).
73
   The parties’ arguments address this alternative analysis only in passing. Accordingly, the Court does
not couch its decision as one granting partial summary judgment in Weatherby’s favor on this
alternative means of imputing vicarious liability. The effect of this decision, nevertheless, will be to
remove such issue from the case since the motion fairly encompassed it.
                                                   12
                           B. Application of the Section 220 Factors
       The Section 220 factors generally leave the issue of agency status as one of fact.74
Namely, the comments to Section 220 recognize the general inappropriateness of
deciding the issue on summary judgment.75 They further recognize that “although . . .
the right to control the physical conduct of the person giving service is important and in
many situations is determinative, the [degree of control] needed to establish the relation
of master and servant may be very attenuated.”76 Weatherby narrowly focuses only on
what has been termed the “right to control test.” The Fisher decision, however, rejected
such a narrow focus.
       When examining the record in its entirety, four of the Section 220 factors weigh
strongly in favor of independent contractor status. Two fall more neutrally. Three weigh
strongly in favor of master/servant status.
       The first factor, extent of control, weighs in favor of independent contractor
status.77 Weatherby maintained significant general control over Dr. Anderson, through
competition restriction provisions, and the right to hire and fire; nevertheless, it retained
no control over the “details of the work.”78 While a jury should be able to weigh the
degree of both general and granular control when making its decision, the first factor
focuses primarily on the granular type – the actual delivery of services.79 Here, Mr.
Acree’s claims against Weatherby involved Dr. Anderson’s surgical actions and clinical

74
   Id.
75
   See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. c (explaining when the inference regarding the
parties’ relationship is unclear, the jury must determine status).
76
   Id. § 220 cmt. d.
77
   Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(a).
78
   Section 220 comment i provides the helpful illustration of a full-time cook that takes no input from
the principal regarding recipes or preparation. In such a circumstance, based on the other Restatement
220 factors, the cook may be considered a servant even though the employer has absolutely no control
over his or her cooking. Id. § 220 cmt. i.
79
   Id. § 220 cmt. d.
                                                  13
decision-making. Accordingly, the evidence of record tilts this factor significantly in
favor of independent contractor status.
       The second factor asks whether Dr. Anderson was engaged in a distinct
occupation or business.80 This factor weighs neutrally. On one hand, Weatherby
delivers no medical services directly to a patient. On the other hand, Weatherby is in
the sole business of delivering medical professionals, who in turn, deliver medical
services to patients. Furthermore, Dr. Anderson’s covenant not to compete against
Bayhealth, and in part against Weatherby, supports a master/servant relationship. 81 A
jury should be able to consider the nuances presented in this record before making its
findings.
       The third and fourth factors examine the kind of occupation and skill involved.82
Here, the actions and omissions at issue were those of an orthopedic surgeon who
provided a highly skilled service.            Accordingly, both factors weigh in favor of
independent contractor status.
       The fifth factor asks who provides the instrumentalities of the work.83                     On
balance, the evidence cuts neutrally on this factor because Dr. Anderson, Weatherby,
and Bayhealth were in a tripartite relationship. In that relationship, Bayhealth provided
the place of work and the tools for Dr. Anderson to perform surgery and follow-up care.
Nevertheless, Bayhealth provided those tools and instrumentalities pursuant to the
Bayhealth Service Agreement with Weatherby.84 In other words, Weatherby contracted
for Bayhealth to provide Dr. Anderson’s tools and practice site. Separately, Weatherby

80
   Id. § 220(2)(b).
81
    See Keller v. Missouri Baptist Hosp. of Sullivan, 800 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Miss. Ct. App. 1990)
(recognizing that a partial covenant not to compete in a contract between a physician and a hospital
staffing corporation strongly supported the second factor). More aptly, such employment restrictions
supported that the physician was not engaged in his own independent or distinct occupation or business.
Id.
82
   Id. § 220(2)(c) & (d).
83
   Id. § 220(2)(e).
84
   Bayhealth Service Agreement at 2.
                                                  14
procured malpractice insurance for Dr. Anderson which the jury may also find to be an
instrumentality of his job. Given such evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find that
the fifth factor weighs against a master/servant relationship because Weatherby did not
own the facility and Weatherby did not provide surgical tools directly to Dr. Anderson.
On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find in favor of a master/servant relationship
because Weatherby contracted with Bayhealth to provide him tools and a work location.
For these reasons, the fifth factor cuts neutrally.
       The sixth factor, the length of time of employment, cuts strongly in favor of a
master/servant relationship.85 As the comments reflect, the length of employment is
important and when the employment is short, the worker is less apt to subject himself or
herself to control. Here, Dr. Anderson and Weatherby entered a one-year relationship
where Dr. Anderson provided services for the same facility.86              Moreover, Dr.
Anderson’s Contract (1) restricted his ability to compete against Bayhealth, and (2)
barred him from independently accepting a relationship with Bayhealth for an additional
two years after the one-year term.87         Such an exclusive and long-term agreement,
combined with an even longer restriction regarding future employment opportunities,
cuts heavily in favor of master/servant status.
       The seventh factor also cuts in favor of a master/servant relationship.88 Namely,
Weatherby paid Dr. Anderson, by time, for the hours he inputted into Weatherby’s
portal.89 Even though Dr. Anderson was a highly skilled worker, Weatherby’s payment
of him by time makes it more likely that he was Weatherby’s servant.
       The eighth factor asks whether the work is part of the employer’s regular business
and in this case weighs in favor of master/servant status. Weatherby places only medical

85
   Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(f).
86
   Dr. Anderson’s Contract at 4.
87
   Id. at 3.
88
   Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2)(g).
89
   Dr. Anderson Dep. at 16.
                                                 15
professionals with medical facilities. The alleged negligence centers on the actions and
omissions of a medical provider. Accordingly, Weatherby’s role is different from that
of a general temporary staffing agency that is in the business of placing workers in
multiple businesses types and specialties.            The summary judgment record includes
sufficient facts for this factor to weigh in favor of finding a master/servant relationship.
       The ninth factor weighs in favor of independent contractor status.90 Namely, the
two most relevant parties, Dr. Anderson and Weatherby, considered Dr. Anderson an
independent contractor.91 While the parties’ description of their relationship does not
control,92 it is nevertheless a relevant factor that weighs in favor of independent
contractor status. In the end, this factor, when considered with the other evidence, may
carry the day with the trier of fact – or it may not.
       The tenth and final factor asks whether the principal is in business,93 and the
evidence balances in favor of master/servant status. As explained above, Weatherby is
in the business of placing medical professionals such as Dr. Anderson for a fee. That
Weatherby is “in business” provides an additional fact that the jury may consider. For
summary judgment purposes, this factor favors master/servant status.
       On balance, Weatherby’s right to hire and fire Dr. Anderson, its payment of him
by time, and a long-term exclusive employment relationship (with a two-year restriction
on employment beyond that) could support a reasonable jury’s finding that Dr. Anderson
was Weatherby’s servant.           Furthermore,       Bayhealth’s Rule 30(b)(6) designee’s
testimony supports findings that (1) Weatherby makes employment and discipline-
related corrections on its locum tenens physicians through a “handler,” and (2)
Weatherby contractually required Dr. Anderson to maintain medical records, cooperate

90
   Id. at § 220(2)(i).
91
   Dr. Anderson Dep. at 9; Gregory Prine Dep. at 8.
92
   Fisher, 695 A.2d at 60.
93
   Id. at § 220(2)(j).
                                                 16
in any medical malpractice defense, and maintain high professional standards.      The
totality of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Acree, makes
summary judgment inappropriate.

                                    VI.   CONCLUSION
      For the reasons discussed above, Defendant Weatherby’s Motion for Summary
Judgement is DENIED.            The question regarding whether Dr. Anderson provided
medical care while working as either Weatherby’s servant or independent contractor will
remain an issue for the jury.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Jeffrey J Clark
                                                       Resident Judge

Via File & Serve Express

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