Court Opinion

ID: 9542065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:59.184958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:16.879468
License: Public Domain

McCLINTOCK, J.,
concurring, with whom GUTHRIE, Chief Justice,
joins.
I concur with the majority opinion and offer these further remarks:
I agree that both the evidence as to possible intoxication and the instruction concerning the same were erroneous. Ordinarily, I think that such a conclusion would necessarily result in a reversal and requirement for new trial. However, I also agree with the court’s further conclusion that the errors were not prejudicial upon the facts of this case and that there is no necessity of a new trial. As I view the case, and considering the evidence as to intoxication completely incompetent, there still remained in the case unrefuted evidence that the defendant Boone was on the wrong side of the road, without explanation or justification therefor, and this fact as a matter of law required a verdict for the plaintiff on the question of negligence.
Before amplifying my reasons for agreeing with what I consider is for this jurisdiction a new application of an old principle of law, I should like to say, with reference to my Brother Thomas’s dissent, that I do not believe Beardall’s location near or at the center of the road, or his possible responsibility to contribute to any damages paid by the other defendants, was an issue before this court. I find nothing in the briefs claiming error in that respect and I feel that it is well settled law in this state that this court should not and will not consider points that are not raised in the brief. Roberts Construction Co. v. Vondriska, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171, 1178 (1976); Booth v. Hackney, Wyo., 516 P.2d 180, 185 (1973).
As to the possible dispute concerning where the accident occurred, I can add nothing to what has been said by Justice Rose and agree that there is no legitimate question of fact but that it occurred in the east lane of traffic as Boone was proceeding south. The defense has come up with no explanation or justification whatsoever for his presence on this side of the road so we have a situation where under applicable law a prima facie case of negligence has been made and remains unrefuted unless we engage in speculation or conjecture as to how he got on the wrong side. Where a prima facie case of negligence has been made, unrefuted in any way, I am convinced that the direction of a verdict for the plaintiff on the question of negligence is proper. I quote from Newing v. Cheatham, 15 Cal .3d 351, 124 Cal.Rptr. 193, 198, 540 *1052P.2d 33, 38 (1975), in turn quoting from the earlier ease of Walters v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass’n, 9 Cal.2d 46, 69 P.2d 839, 840 (1937):
“ * * * ‘The trial court, in a proper case, may direct a verdict in favor of a party upon whom rests the burden of proof, in this case the plaintiff. Substantially the same rules apply to directed verdicts in favor of plaintiffs as apply to such verdicts in favor of defendants. [Citations] A directed verdict may be granted, when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the verdict is directed, it can be said that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of such party, if such a verdict has been rendered. * *
In Nelson v. Brames, 253 F.2d 381, 383 (10 Cir. 1958), a wrong-side-of-the-road case, where defendant had given an explanation found by the district and appellate courts to have been sufficient to raise a factual question with the jury, the court said:
“Whether judged by the Wyoming or Federal rule, a peremptory instruction directing a verdict is proper only when but one inference or conclusion can be drawn from the evidence. * * * When fair minded persons may form different conclusions and inferences from facts, the question of negligence is for the jury.”
By holding in this case that plaintiff was entitled to a verdict on the question of negligence, I do not think that we establish any absolute liability, or commit ourselves to a theory of negligence per se that imposes absolute liability upon one who violates a rule of the road, whether decisional or statutory. I do not think that that is the law of Wyoming. Such presence on the wrong side of the road may result without fault on the part of the driver in technical violation. Wallis v. Nauman, 61 Wyo. 231, 243, 157 P.2d 285, 288 (1944), cites but does not seem to rely upon the then applicable meeting statute, § 72-204, W.S.1931. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of negligence and affirmed the decision of the trial judge, sitting without a jury, to that effect. However, the court cites various authorities to the effect that absolute liability does not exist merely because one is on the wrong side of the road, and I find nothing in the opinion that indicates that being upon the wrong side of the road is to be considered as negligence per se. This statement from Nelson v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256, 257 (10 Cir. 1957) I think succinctly summarizes the Wyoming law:
“ * * * [TJhere is no actionable negligence where without fault on the part of the driver an automobile skids across the center line of the highway to the left side thereof and collides with another motor vehicle, but that the burden rests upon such driver to show that he was there without any act of commission or omission which constituted fault on his part. Wallis v. Nauman, 61 Wyo. 231, 157 P.2d 285.”
1 have found few cases holding that a directed verdict was properly directed in favor of plaintiffs on the question of negligence. Nor do I find many indicating on appeal that direction of such a verdict would have been proper. However, the principle seems clear to me that if the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, thereby thrusting the burden of going forward with the evidence upon the defendant, two courses logically follow: First, if the defendant makes a showing factually strong enough to rebut the case made by the plaintiff, the question is for the jury; secondly, if no case at all is presented by the defendant, then the judgment must be in favor of the plaintiff because as a matter of law the defendant has failed to meet his burden.
In Sughero v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 37 I11.2d 240, 226 N.E.2d 28 (1967) reh. denied, the driver of the offending truck testified he had been following three other vehicles proceeding in the same direction but he was the only one to have trouble at an intersection when the leading car made a sudden turn to the left, and his truck invaded the left side of the road. The trial court found *1053his explanation insufficient and directed a verdict that he was negligent which was affirmed by the appellate court, 66 Ill. App.2d 358, 214 N.E.2d 512 (1966). The sole question before the supreme court was said to be “whether the trial court properly directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the question of liability.” In affirming, the court said, 226 N.E.2d at 29:
“ * * * As the appellate court noted, however, the fact that the two automobiles in front of him and the truck behind him were under sufficient control to stop safely within their lane of traffic indicates that he did not have his vehicle under proper control. We think the appellate court’s conclusion was correct on this issue.”
Here an explanation was given which the court found unacceptable as a matter of law. If an attempted justification can be ruled improper as a matter of law, then in my opinion it necessarily follows that failure to give any explanation whatsoever properly results in a verdict against the party having the burden. The Supreme Court of Missouri does not seem to have agreed with this view. In Friederich v. Chamberlain, Mo., 458 S.W.2d 360, 366, after setting forth certain rules pertaining to wrong-side-of-the-road accidents, and the inferences that are to be drawn therefrom, the court conceded that an inference of negligence was created by the offending party’s presence on the wrong side of the road. This inference of negligence operated to establish a prima facie case and shifted to the offending driver the burden to “excuse the presence of his vehicle on the wrong side of the road.” But strangely, it seems to me, the court continued that if “no evidence of justification is presented, the question of negligence is for the jury.” I find this conclusion that no evidence is more probative than a possible explanation unacceptable.
The Kentucky court, in Norton v. Hughes, Ky., 408 S.W.2d 197 (1966), reh. denied, refers to earlier decisions of that court and appears to me to hold that location upon the wrong side of the road permits an inference of negligence “ ‘unless other circumstances (and fair inferences to be drawn from them) so clearly support or overcome the inference of negligence that reasonable minds could not differ about the ultimate conclusion.’ ” In Stark’s Adm’x v. Herndon’s Adm’r, 292 Ky. 469, 166 S.W.2d 828, 830 (1942), reh. denied, a wrong-side case, the appellate court, faced with a situation in which there was no explanation by the offending driver and the cause had been submitted to the jury, concluded that “the nature of the evidence and its prima facie character were sufficient to submit the issue to the jury.” The court was not there faced with the question whether a directed verdict was required since the jury had found in favor of the person on her own side of the road. However, in the earlier case of Thronton v. Phillips, 262 Ky. 346, 90 S.W.2d 347 (1936), the same court had recognized the necessity of an explanation by the driver of the offending car, and pointed out that this driver had denied all knowledge of the presence of the other car on the highway and his collision therewith (in other words, essentially the same situation where one does not testify at all). The court said, 90 S.W.2d at 349:
“ * * * The evidence establishing that Thronton’s truck was to the left of the center of the highway in which it was traveling at the time it collided with the Phillips car is uncontradicted. It is in like manner established that the driving it to the left of the center of the highway was the proximate cause of the accident. * * * In these circumstances Mrs. Phillips was, in reality, entitled to a peremptory instruction as to the negligence of the driver of the Thronton truck.”
I find nothing in later cases abrogating this principle and think that it is most pertinent to the case at bar.
I accept the Sughero and Thronton cases as reaching the logical and proper result and therefore conclude that in this case, absent an explanation of Boone’s presence on the wrong side of the road, it must be found as a matter of law that he was guilty of negligence. This negligence was sufficient as a matter of law to require a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.