Court Opinion

ID: 9620461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:42:33.080446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:50.766047
License: Public Domain

Justice Frye
dissenting in part.
The majority concludes that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstand*754ing the verdict as to plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim, holding that probable cause existed as a matter of law for plaintiff’s arrest on the charges of trespass and larceny. I believe that the evidence in this case, viewed properly, presented a question of fact for the jury as to the existence of probable cause and, therefore, I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which takes this issue away from the jury.
In ruling on a motion for directed verdict or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, “the trial court must examine all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the nonmoving party must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Abels v. Renfro Corp., 335 N.C. 209, 214-15, 436 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1993). Furthermore, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the nonmoving party’s favor. United Laboratories, Inc. v. Kuykendall, 322 N.C. 643, 661, 370 S.E.2d 375, 387 (1988). The question presented by a motion for directed verdict is whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle the nonmovant to have the jury decide the issue in question. Id. It is for the jury to determine whether to believe all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony.
Without unnecessary duplication, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmoving party, shows that plaintiff drove into the Faculty Club driveway to turn around and was in the driveway less than a minute. Plaintiff informed the officers who stopped him that he was taking the furniture in his automobile to a friend’s house. In addition, plaintiff told Officer Russell he was welcome to look inside his automobile and opened the automobile door for him; however, Officer Russell appeared not to want to look and plaintiff closed the door. Russell told plaintiff that he recognized him as a Duke University Medical Center employee.
Russell looked “quite a few times” at the furniture in plaintiff’s automobile, shining his flashlight through the windows of the automobile. He was checking the furniture for a Duke University identification sticker because he believed there would be a Duke sticker on the table had it belonged to the Faculty Club. Officer Russell found no Duke University sticker on the furniture. During the course of the stop, neither Officer Russell nor any of the other officers removed the furniture from the automobile to look at it. Officer Russell sent an officer to the Faculty Club, and when the officer reported that he saw *755nothing unusual at the Club and no furniture appeared to be missing, Russell allowed plaintiff to leave.
When Officer Russell returned to work the next evening, he learned that John LeBar of the Faculty Club had called in a larceny report that morning indicating that “two tables, seven chairs, all gray in color” had been taken from the Faculty Club the previous night. Without contacting John LeBar to verify the report, Russell obtained warrants charging plaintiff with larceny of the furniture and trespass upon the premises of Duke University Faculty Club. Furthermore, Russell obtained these warrants without contacting plaintiff to hear his explanation and without inquiry as to the present location of the table and three chairs he had seen earlier in plaintiffs automobile. In addition, Russell did not go to the Faculty Club at any time between the stop and arrest of plaintiff.
The question before the Court on defendant’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of lack of probable cause is not whether the evidence would support a finding of probable cause, but whether the evidence compels such a finding as a matter of law. After considering the evidence in this case, and weighing the credibility of the plaintiff and the officers, twelve jurors found that defendant instituted criminal charges against the plaintiff with malice and without probable cause. While there is much evidence that would support a contrary finding by a jury, it does not compel such a finding. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict, allowing the issue of lack of probable cause to go to the jury, and denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on this issue.
Chief Justice Exum and Justice Mitchell join in this dissenting opinion.