Court Opinion

ID: 9533822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:50.127487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:11.501171
License: Public Domain

HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The decision by the court in this case is somewhat unusual for two reasons. First, the trial judge is reversed for making the correct ruling on the motion which counsel filed; second, this court begins the practice of making advisory rulings.
The motion filed by counsel asked the trial court pursuant to Rule 60(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., to clarify the minute entry dated October 22, 1981, and to rule nunc pro tunc that the final judgment was filed October 24, 1981.
The trial judge ruled that he had no jurisdiction to enter a nunc pro tunc order indicating that the order was signed the 24th when in fact the judgment was signed the 22nd. The majority agrees that the trial judge and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that there is no authority to enter a nunc pro tunc order in a situation where the record correctly reflects what the court had actually done. Slip opinion, p. 7. Once the majority agreed that the trial court’s ruling was correct, I would have thought that the matter was resolved, but the court proceeds to write a new motion for counsel and decide the case on the new motion.
The case has now turned on determining whether the trial judge correctly ruled on this court’s motion.
Taking the motion as construed by this court, I agree with the Court of Appeals, and what is implicit in the trial court’s ruling, that the minute entry is not ambiguous, and any confusion suffered by counsel could have been remedied by a minimum of effort such as a phone call to the clerk’s office.
Departing from our previous practice of not making advisory rulings, the majority offers their view that “the record shows *334counsel’s diligent attention to business, and consistent, careful attempt to comply with the rules in a prompt and efficient manner.” Slip opinion, p. 17. If counsel was as diligent as the majority indicates, this case would never be in the situation that it is.
As a parting note the majority nobly defers to whatever decision the trial judge makes on remand, but the majority would find “the mistake excusable, counsel diligent, the Rodgers and Park standards satisfied, and relief appropriate.” Slip opinion, p. 18.
I dissent from the decision of the majority, especially the attempt to turn negligence and poor practice into diligence and efficiency.