Court Opinion

ID: 9685526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:45:39.663569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:07.365532
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). I conclude that service of the Weisensels' petition for review satisfied sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats.1 I further conclude that by appearing in the special proceeding to review its decision, the department waived any objection to the circuit court's personal jurisdiction over it. I therefore dissent.
In Sunnyview Village, Inc. v. DOA, 104 Wis. 2d 396, 412, 311 N.W.2d 632, 640 (1981), the court said:
A person aggrieved by an administrative decision should not have to guess which governmental entity to name and serve as the respondent in proceedings for judicial review. We recommend that governmental entities adopt the practice of providing with their administrative decisions information on how to process proceedings for review, including which governmental entity is to be named and served as respondent.
*650I consider that Sunnyview is incorporated into sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats.
The department adopted the hearing examiner's decision. The decision states: "[An] appeal must be served on the Department of Health and Social Services, P.O. Box 7850, Madison, WI 53707-7850." I conclude that this direction does not satisfy Sun-nyview. First, the direction does not inform the Weisensels, as prospective appellants, how to process their petition for review. The use of the familiar term "appeal" did not warn the Weisensels that they had to begin a special proceeding to have the Bureau of Children, Youth and Families' adverse decision reviewed. See Tomah-Mauston Broadcasting Co. v. Eklund, 143 Wis. 2d 648, 655, 422 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Ct. App. 1988) (petition for review under sec. 227.53, Stats., is not a continuation of administrative proceedings, but commencement of special proceeding). "Appeal" does not have its ordinary meaning when it is used to describe the right of a losing litigant before a state agency to have the agency's decision reviewed by a court. An examination of sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats., does not give the appellant that information.
Second, the department's directive did not correctly inform the Weisensels how they could serve the department. The department's decision informed them that they "must" serve the department at "P.O. Box 7850, Madison, WI 53707-7850." Plainly, one cannot serve a post office box. Equally plainly, the department cannot rewrite sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats., to eliminate personal service as one way to serve the department.
It was reasonable for the Weisensels to look to the list of "Parties In Interest" for clarification as to how and where they could personally serve the department. They were aware that they must serve other parties in *651interest, if any, at the addresses listed. The department directed: "The appeal must also be served on the other Parties In Interest named in this decision." (Emphasis in original.) When they examined the list of Parties In Interest, they found that the only address which matched "P.O. Box 7850" was the "Office of Legal Counsel."2 They also noted that the full address of the office included "1 West Wilson St., Room 651." It was reasonable for the Weisensels to conclude that they would satisfy sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats., if they personally served the Office of Legal Counsel at that address. The envelope containing their petition for review caused their service to be suspect solely because of the internal administrative procedures adopted by the office for accepting service of process and routing that process.
Evelyn Russell, a program assistant with the Office of Legal Counsel for the department, averred that it is the practice and policy of the office to accept service of any pleading naming the department if personally served upon the secretary or the Office of Legal Counsel. This admission destroys the department's argument that the Weisensels were required to serve the secretary or some other official of the department.
*652Russell further averred that the policy and practice of the Office of Legal Counsel is to date stamp any pleading which is personally addressed to one of the attorneys in the office, and place it in the individual attorney's mail box. I suggest this is more efficient service on the Office of Legal Counsel than requiring attorneys or program assistants to sort through mail to determine which .pleadings or legal documents go to which attorney. Clearly the courts cannot allow agency internal administrative procedures to determine whether a person aggrieved by his or her government will be heard.
I further conclude that if the Weisensels' attempted service on the department did not strictly comply with sec. 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats., this case falls within the "unique" or "unusual" facts type of case where an alleged defect in service does not deprive the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction of a petition for review. See Hamilton v. DILHR, 56 Wis. 2d 673, 203 N.W.2d 7 (1973), explained in Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 84 Wis. 2d 504, 513-15, 267 N.W.2d 609, 615-16 (1978), and Cudahy v. DOR, 66 Wis. 2d 253, 260-61, 224 N.W.2d 570, 573-74 (1974). First, the Weisensels attempted to serve the department within the thirty-day statutory period. Cf. Cudahy, 66 Wis. 2d at 261, 224 N.W.2d at 574 ("In the instant case there was no attempt to serve the department until well after the thirty-day statutory period had expired."). Second, the department has not been misled nor has its right to participate been prejudiced in any way. Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, 84 Wis. 2d at 513, 267 N.W.2d at 615 (quoting Hamilton, 56 Wis. 2d at 687, 203 N.W.2d at 14). Finally, this is a case in which, except for the department's faulty information and internal administrative procedures, contrary to *653Sunnyview, strict compliance with the department's perception of sufficient service would have been accomplished. See Hamilton, 56 Wis. 2d at 688, 203 N.W.2d at 15.
This is not a case in which the insufficiency of service is self-evident. The director of the Office of Administrative Hearings informed the Attorney General that: "This office has been served with a Petition for Review in the above-entitled matter." (Emphasis added.) Attorney Durkin advised the director in a memo: "Contrary to the law, this copy of filing [the petition for review] was received by ordinary mail, rather than served personally or by certified mail. [Office of Legal Counsel] would like to raise the jurisdictional defense by way of a motion to dismiss." In fact, the petition was served personally on the office.
The department forwarded the record to the circuit court as required by sec. 227.55, Stats., before it moved to dismiss the Weisensels' petition, even though it was required to file the record only upon "service of the petition for review." I conclude that the department erred. It was required to move to dismiss the petition if it determined that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition or lacked personal jurisdiction over the department. Section 227.02, Stats., provides: "Compliance with this chapter does not eliminate the necessity of complying with a procedure required by another statute." Section 801.01(1), Stats., provides that: " 'Action1, as used in chs. 801 to 847, includes 'special proceeding' unless a specific provision of procedure in special proceedings exists." There is no specific provision in ch. 227, Stats., governing motions to dismiss petitions for review.
Section 802.06(2), Stats., enumerates defenses which shall be asserted in the responsive pleading "if *654one is requiredl," except that certain defenses, including insufficiency of service, may be made by motion. (Emphasis added.) The filing of the record under sec. 227.55, Stats., is not a responsive pleading. The proper way for the department to raise the issue of insufficiency of service was to move to dismiss the Weisensels' petition.
. I conclude that by filing the record with the circuit court instead of moving to dismiss the Weisensels' petition for review, the department waived its claim that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. In Hamilton, the court held that the department waived its objection to personal jurisdiction when it participated in a motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction, 56 Wis. 2d at 688, 203 N.W.2d at 14. While such an appearance would not have that effect under our rules of civil procedure adopted after Hamilton, Hamilton illustrates that an objection to personal jurisdiction may be waived. "[P]ersonal jurisdiction can be conferred by waiver or consent whereas subject matter jurisdiction cannot." Cudahy, 66 Wis. 2d at 260, 224 N.W.2d at 573.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 Section 227.53(l)(a)l, Stats., provides in part:
Proceedings for review shall be instituted by serving a petition therefor personally or by certified mail upon the agency or one of its officials, and filing the petition in the office of the clerk of the circuit court for the county where the judicial review proceedings are to be held....

 The entry for the department appeared as follows:
Wisconsin Dept, of Health & Social Services
Bureau for Children, Youth and Families
1 West Wilson Street
Madison, WI 53707
By: Atty. Therese Durkin
Office of Legal Counsel
1 West Wilson St., Room 651
P.O. Box 7850
Madison, WI 53707-7850
[Emphasis added.]