Court Opinion

ID: 9763342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:42:00.604233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:41.417655
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I join in Justice Dudley’s dissent but write to highlight the public policy behind the ten-day wait that must occur after the natural mother consents to adoption and before the hearing on the adoption petition can take place. Our statutes require that ten-day period: (b) (1) A consent to adopt may be withdrawn within ten (10) calendar days after it is signed or the child is born, whichever is later, by filing an affidavit with the clerk of the probate court in the county designated by the consent as the county in which the adoption, petition will be filed.... Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-209(b)(l) (1987). (a) Before any hearing on a petition, the period in which the relinquishment may be withdrawn under § 9-9-220 or in which consent may be withdrawn under § 9-9-209, whichever is applicable, must have expired. . . . Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-212 (1987). (c) If at the conclusion of the hearing the court determines that the required consents have been obtained or excused and the required period for the withdrawal of consent and withdrawal of relinquishment have passed and that the adoption is in the best interest of the individual to be adopted, it may (1) issue a final decree of adoption; or (2) issue an interlocutory decree of adoption .... (d) If the requirements for a decree under subsection (c) have not been met, the court shall dismiss the petition and the child shall be returned to the person or entity having custody of the child prior to the filing of the petition. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-214(c) & (d) (1987). An essential plank of the Adoption Code is the ten-day period during which time the natural mother can change her mind and renege on the adoption of her child. The obvious justification for the wait is that the decision is one of monumental importance that must be made coolly and deliberately. To rush pell mell into a hearing before a probate judge with all the inherent pressure and finality that the hearing suggests on the same day of the consent undermines and erodes this policy considerably. In sum, the mother must have an unobstructed period before the adoption hearing to reconsider her decision, and that did not occur in this instance. We strictly construe and apply our adoption statutes. Swaffar v. Swaffar, 309 Ark. 73, 827 S.W.2d 140 (1992); Norris v. Dunn, 184 Ark. 511, 43 S.W.2d 77 (1931). I accordingly dissent. Newbern, J., joins. ■