Court Opinion

ID: 9556819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 18:04:42.307022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:22.271763
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23 In re H.R. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

In re H.R., a Person Coming                                  B318418
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                             Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                       Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP05023A
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

T.R.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
      Benjamin Ekenes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    _______________________
      Mother T.R. challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings and dispositional order removing her daughter H.R. from
her custody. During the pendency of her appeal, the juvenile
court terminated dependency jurisdiction over H.R. and released
her to mother. We decline to exercise our discretion to address
mother’s challenge to the jurisdictional findings and removal
order and dismiss the appeal.
                         BACKGROUND
      The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) alleged H.R., then four years old,
came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious
physical harm) and (b)(1) (failure to protect). (Further statutory
references are to that Code.) Both counts were based on a violent
altercation between mother and her male companion in H.R.’s
presence. The altercation involved mother throwing glass-
encased candles at the male companion; mother chasing the male
companion in her vehicle, with H.R. inside, at 90 miles per hour,
rear-ending his vehicle and repeatedly using her vehicle door to
bang on the male companion’s door; and more, resulting in her
arrest on several charges, including child endangerment.
      On January 26, 2022, the juvenile court found the
allegations true (with minor amendments); removed H.R. from
mother’s custody; and made various orders for visitation, anger
management and counseling programs for mother, and age
appropriate therapy for H.R. (H.R. was removed from the
father’s custody as well, but the father’s whereabouts were
unknown.)
      Mother filed a timely appeal.

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       In July 2023, the trial court found the conditions that
justified jurisdiction under section 300 no longer existed, and
terminated jurisdiction with sole legal and physical custody to
mother. (We take judicial notice, as mother requests, of the
juvenile court’s July 27, 2022 minute order finding mother’s
progress was partial and continued jurisdiction was necessary;
the January 3, 2023 minute order returning the child to mother’s
custody; and the July 6, 2023 juvenile custody order terminating
jurisdiction.)
       We sent a Government Code letter advising the parties we
intended to dismiss the appeal as moot unless they establish
dismissal is not proper. The Department does not oppose
dismissal of the appeal. Mother filed a letter brief contending we
should exercise our discretion and reach the merits of mother’s
challenge to the jurisdictional findings.
       Following the principles described in In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266 (D.P.), we conclude mother’s appeal is moot, and
we decline to exercise our discretion to decide the appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
       “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a specific legal or
practical consequence that will be averted upon reversal, the case
is not moot, and merits review is required. When a parent has
not made such a showing, the case is moot, but the court has
discretion to decide the merits nevertheless.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 283.)
       Here, mother’s jurisdictional challenge is moot, and mother
makes no serious contention otherwise. The juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction over H.R. with an order giving mother
full legal and physical custody. Therefore, the jurisdictional
findings have not formed the basis for any order that is now

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adversely affecting or curtailing mother’s rights. (See D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 277–278 [case is not moot where
jurisdictional finding affects custody rights, curtails contact with
child, or has resulted in dispositional orders that continue to
adversely affect a parent].) As in D.P., mother “has not
demonstrated a specific legal or practical consequence that would
be avoided upon reversal of the jurisdictional findings.” (Id. at
p. 273.)
        However, “[e]ven when a case is moot, courts may exercise
their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.”
(D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In D.P., the Supreme Court
discussed a nonexhaustive list of factors for assessing whether a
court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal. (Id.
at pp. 285–287.)
       First, a court may consider “whether the challenged
jurisdictional finding ‘could be prejudicial to the appellant or
could potentially impact the current or future dependency
proceedings,’ or ‘ “could have other consequences for [the
appellant], beyond jurisdiction.” ’ ” (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 285 [citing as examples instances where jurisdictional findings
influence the child protective agency’s decision to file a new
dependency petition or a juvenile court’s actions in a subsequent
dependency proceeding].)
       Second, the exercise of discretionary review “may also be
informed by whether the jurisdictional finding is based on
particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 285–286; id. at p. 286 [“[t]hough stigma alone
will not sustain an appeal, a court may consider the nature of the
allegations” when deciding whether discretionary review is

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proper; “[t]he more egregious the findings against the parent, the
greater the parent’s interest in challenging such findings”].)
       Third, a court may consider why the case became moot,
including whether the case became moot due to prompt
compliance by parents with their case plan. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [“It would perversely incentivize
noncompliance if mootness doctrine resulted in the availability of
appeals from jurisdictional findings only for parents who are less
compliant or for whom the court has issued additional orders.”].)
       Mother cites the first factor, arguing discretionary review is
appropriate because the jurisdictional findings “could impact
future family law proceedings, especially given [H.R.’s] young age
of six.” According to mother, the father—whose whereabouts
were unknown—could come forward in the future and seek
modification of the custody orders, and “arguably could
demonstrate a significant change of circumstances by the mere
fact that his whereabouts were known,” at which time mother
“could be saddled with improper jurisdictional findings” that
“potentially could curtail mother’s contact with [H.R.]” in future
family court custody determinations.
       While many things in life “could” happen, the scenario
mother poses concerning what a father whose whereabouts are
unknown might do if he were to come forward is pure
speculation. Mother has not identified, and we do not see, any
meaningful prejudice or potential consequences we would dispel
by reaching the merits of her moot appeal.
       Mother does not mention the second factor, and rightly so;
the conduct giving rise to jurisdiction was not particularly
pernicious, stigmatizing, or egregious. While dependency
jurisdiction necessarily involves conduct harmful to children, our

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assessment of severity or perniciousness is a relative analysis.
Here, mother’s one-time violent altercation with her male
companion in the child’s presence is certainly quite serious, but
we do not consider it so egregious as to merit review. (See D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; compare with In re M.W. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [exercising discretion to conduct merits
review because findings that the mother “exposed her children to
a substantial risk of physical and sexual abuse are pernicious”].)
       Mother also relies on the third factor, pointing out the case
became moot due to mother’s prompt compliance with her case
plan. (H.R. was removed from mother’s custody on January 26,
2022, and returned to her custody on January 3, 2023.) While
prompt compliance may favor discretionary review (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286), no single factor is dispositive (ibid.).
       D.P. instructs us to consider all relevant factors, the
totality of the evidence, and the overarching goal of the
dependency system to safeguard children, with a focus on
preserving the family and the child’s well-being. (D.P., supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Having examined and balanced the
pertinent considerations, we decline to exercise our discretion to
consider the merits of mother’s moot appeal.
                           DISPOSITION
       The appeal is dismissed.

                               GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

                  STRATTON, P. J.          VIRAMONTES, J.

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