Court Opinion

ID: 9931379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 21:00:51.637758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:32.873595
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4301

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        GREGORY WARREN DANIELS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00355-D-1)

        Submitted: January 30, 2024                                       Decided: February 7, 2024

        Before GREGORY and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Christopher S. Edwards, WARD & SMITH, PA, Wilmington, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Gregory Warren Daniels appeals his convictions and 264-month sentence imposed

        following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

        280 grams or more of crack cocaine and five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of

        21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and distribution of a quantity of crack cocaine, in

        violation of § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to

        Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds

        for appeal but questioning whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

        Daniels’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his pro se supplemental brief, Daniels

        contends that his first attorney provided ineffective assistance and that a federal agent told

        him that the agent would speak to the prosecutor about getting him a lower sentence or

        dropping charges. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal as barred by the appeal

        waiver in Daniels’ plea agreement but concedes that the challenge to the denial of the

        motion to withdraw falls outside the scope of the valid appeal waiver. We affirm in part,

        dismiss in part, and remand with instructions to correct the criminal judgment.

               To the extent Daniels challenges in his pro se brief the validity of his guilty plea,

        his appeal waiver does not bar that claim. See United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 364

        (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that an appeal that “goes to the propriety of the guilty plea itself . . .

        is not barred by [an appeal] waiver” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Before accepting

        a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the

        defendant of, and determines he understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading

        guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the maximum and mandatory minimum

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        penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The court also must ensure that the plea is

        voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea

        agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.

        R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). A guilty plea is valid if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and

        intelligently pled guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

        consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               Daniels’ claim regarding the federal agent’s alleged statement is belied by the

        record. Moreover, at the plea hearing, the magistrate judge * fully complied with Fed. R.

        Crim. P. 11 in accepting Daniels’ plea and ensured that the plea was knowing and voluntary

        and supported by a sufficient factual basis. We therefore conclude that the plea is valid.

               Next, we review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw a

        guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir.

        2012); see id. at 384 (discussing factors courts consider in evaluating a motion to withdraw

        a guilty plea). A defendant may withdraw a plea accepted by the court before the

        imposition of sentence if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the

        withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw

        a guilty plea,” United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 377 n.1 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal

        quotation marks omitted), and “bears the burden of demonstrating that withdrawal should

        be granted,” United States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal

               *
                   Daniels consented to proceed before a magistrate judge at the plea hearing.

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        quotation marks omitted). “[A] properly conducted Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy leaves a

        defendant with a very limited basis upon which to have his plea withdrawn,” Nicholson,

        676 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record on appeal

        convinces us that Daniels did not meet his burden and that the district court did not abuse

        its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea—a motion that was filed

        14 months after the entry of his plea.

               Daniels also raises several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the

        appeal waiver in the plea agreement permits Daniels to assert those claims on appeal, they

        generally are not cognizable on direct appeal unless counsel’s ineffectiveness conclusively

        appears on the record. United States v. Freeman, 24 F.4th 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2022) (en

        banc). Instead, ineffective assistance claims should be raised, if at all, in a motion brought

        pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, United States v. Jordan, 952 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir.

        2020), to permit sufficient development of the record, United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d

        214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). We conclude that ineffective assistance does not conclusively

        appear on the present record.

               Our review of the record pursuant to Anders did, however, uncover one issue with

        Daniels’ supervised release conditions. In imposing Daniels’ supervised release conditions

        at sentencing, the district court ordered Daniels to support his children, while the written

        judgment requires Daniels to support his dependents. A district court must announce all

        nonmandatory conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing. United States v.

        Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296-99 (4th Cir. 2020). And we have explained that inconsistency

        between the descriptions of a supervised release condition announced at sentencing and in

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        the written judgment may constitute reversible Rogers error where the government fails to

        explain the alleged inconsistency. United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193-94 (4th Cir.

        2022). However, in the context of this record, which reflects no dependents other than

        Daniels’ children, it is clear that the district court’s intention was to require Daniels to

        support his children. In these circumstances, “[t]he proper remedy is for the [d]istrict

        [c]ourt to correct the written judgment so that it conforms with the sentencing court’s oral

        pronouncements.” United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 29 n.1 (4th Cir. 1965).

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no other meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore grant the Government’s

        motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as to any nonfrivolous issues that fall within the

        scope of the valid appeal waiver. We also affirm the denial of Daniels’ motion to withdraw

        his guilty plea and remand to the district court for the limited purpose of correcting the

        written judgment to conform with the court’s oral pronouncement that Daniels support his

        children, leaving the judgment—including the sentence and remaining conditions of

        supervised release—undisturbed.

               This court requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of the right to petition

        the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Daniels requests that a

        petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

        may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

        state that a copy thereof was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because

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        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                              DISMISSED IN PART,
                                                                              AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                                 AND REMANDED

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