Court Opinion

ID: 9654473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:22:31.848904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:09.716305
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. Like the members of our court who vote to affirm appellant’s conviction for raping his five-year-old daughter, I consider that crime reprehensible. Yet, I am convinced that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress appellant’s confession after a police officer knowingly, purposely, and deliberately lied by telling appellant that probation was possible for the crime he was accused of committing, and then purported to guarantee that appellant’s sentence would be lowered if he cooperated with the police. Therefore, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and sentence and remand his case for a new trial. It is undisputed that Officer Joyce Wyatt lied to appellant during interrogation when she told him that by confessing to raping his daughter he could “end up gettin’ lesser time an’ get on probation or somethin’.” Wyatt testified at the suppression hearing that she knew probation is not possible for a Class Y felony such as rape. The State argues that her comment was not a false promise of reward or false statement meant to deceive appellant so as to procure an untrue statement from him, and that appellant was not misled or deceived. It is well settled law in Arkansas that statements made while in police custody are presumed to be involuntary, and place the State under the burden to show that they were made voluntarily, freely, and understanding^, without hope of reward or fear of punishment. In determining whether a statement is voluntary, we must make an independent review of the totality of the circumstances, and will not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. However, all doubts are resolved in favor of individual rights and safeguards. Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 81, 941 S.W.2d 411 (1997). It is equally beyond question that the prospect of probation is attractive for most persons charged with breaking the law, whether they are charged with speeding, rape, or murder. It. should come as no surprise to anyone, therefore, that .the notion of probation is very attractive for someone facing prosecution for raping a five-year-old. There is absolutely no basis in this record for concluding that appellant had any objective reason to doubt Wyatt’s assertion that he might be placed on probation if he cooperated, nor is there any reason to doubt that the fear of punishment for rape, if not the hope of reward through probation, was a strong factor influencing appellant’s decision to confess to the crime. The State’s claim — that Wyatt’s false statement about the possibility of appellant being.placed on probation was not meant to deceive appellant — is unpersuasive. By definition, lies are untruths designed to be believed; otherwise there is no point in lying. When a pohce officer knows that there is no possibility for probation in a rape case, yet tells a rape suspect the lie that probation might be possible if the suspect cooperates with the investigating effort, the officer certainly hopes the suspect will believe the fie and waive the right against self-incrimination at the very-least, if not the right to counsel and other rights that protect persons accused of criminal conduct. After ah, the pohce know the difficulties involved in prosecuting rape charges, especially when the accused and victim belong to the same family. The pohce know that conviction can only occur after the prosecution carries the heavy burden of proving the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The pohce know that a confession greatly eases the difficulties faced by the prosecution, while simultaneously raising the chances of obtaining a conviction or guilty plea. Therefore, judges should not believe that the pohce do not mean to deceive a rape suspect when they tell him that cooperating with their investigation may enable him to be placed on probation. In the same conversation when she lied to appellant and told him that probation might be possible for his rape charge, Wyatt also told appellant “the more cooperative you are, the less your sentence gonna be. An’ I guarantee you that.” Wyatt had no power to dictate or influence any sentence that appellant would have received in any event. The record contains nothing to show that she, or the police department generally, had any role in sentencing. We are conditioned to expect lies from people accused of committing crimes. We should not be surprised that the police are, understandably, eager to bring lawbreakers to justice. But we should not expect the public to trust a criminal justice process that essentially gives police what I have termed a “free-lie zone” during criminal interrogations when they try to out-lie the people they accuse of breaking the law. I stated my concerns on this subject in my concurring opinion in Williams v. State, 56 Ark. App. 156, 940 S.W.2d 500 (1997). We should call a legal system just if it works to find the truth while respecting and protecting the constitutional rights of those accused of committing crimes, not if it merely works to manufacture the most cunning He that will support a popular result. It is hard enough to find the truth; we do not need the police to help hide it.