Court Opinion

ID: 9709650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:52:38.92715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.709235
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
dissenting.
In its opinion, the majority concludes that Veiman was under custodial arrest at the time Officer Craig transported him to the hospital, and thus, “[t]here is no excuse for Craig’s failure to issue Miranda warnings, nor is there any remedy except suppression of Veiman’s statements.” The majority characterizes the record as stating that Craig instructed and “ordered” Veiman into his police cruiser. However, this characterization is not supported by the record, which reflects that Veiman entered the cruiser voluntarily to be taken to the nearest hospital.
*887The majority correctly states our standard of review is that unless clearly wrong, this court will not overturn findings of fact made by a trial court on a motion to suppress. State v. Dake, 247 Neb. 579, 529 N.W.2d 46 (1995). In determining whether a trial court’s findings on a motion to suppress are clearly erroneous, this court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence, but, rather, recognizes the trial court as the finder of fact and takes into consideration that it observed the witnesses. State v. Grimes, 246 Neb. 473, 519 N.W.2d 507 (1994); State v. Dyer, 245 Neb. 385, 513 N.W.2d 316 (1994).
After observing the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the trial court denied Veiman’s motion to suppress. I cannot go along with the majority’s conclusion that this determination was clearly erroneous. I would therefore affirm.
Wright and Gerrard, JJ., join in this dissent.