Court Opinion

ID: 9836785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:02.83042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.883970
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent, because of the majority’s misguided view of the law-of-the-case. In my opinion, the judge did not abuse his discretion in finding Ms. Earls’ testimony necessary, due to the tactics employed by the defense counsel.
RESIDUAL HEARSAY
Mil.R.Evid. 803(24),1 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.), provides for the admission of a statement not specifically covered by any of the other hearsay *360exceptions when that statement has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.”
Our Court has previously explored the parameters of the residual hearsay exception and application of the rule. See United States v. Powell, 22 MJ 141 (CMA 1986); United States v. Giambra, 33 MJ 331 (CMA 1991); United States v. Kelley, 45 MJ 275 (1996). Any hearsay statement admitted under Mil.R.Evid. 803(24) must be material, necessary, and trustworthy (reliable).
Most litigation in the residual hearsay arena involves whether the statement has the necessary indicia of reliability/guarantees of trustworthiness. See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); United States v. Johnson, 49 MJ 467 (1998). This case presents us with the question of necessity. Mil.R.Evid. 803(24)(B). Furthermore, this is one of those rare cases involving “necessity” where the victim is present, has testified, and has been cross-examined. There is no issue about the materiality or trustworthiness of EB’s statement to her teacher, Ms. Earls.2
LAW OF THE CASE
The issues in this case center around the discussion by the Court of Criminal Appeals concerning the necessity for Ms. Earls’, the counselor’s, testimony. While the judge found some of EB’s testimony vague and unclear, the court below found “that EB was particularly definite, clear, and unequivocal in her direct testimony.” 50 MJ at 662. Thus, the court then found that Ms. Earls’ testimony was not more probative as to the offenses than the victim’s testimony herself.
Now, however, the majority finds EB’s testimony leaves “grave doubts” concerning the conviction. Yet, despite the Government actively contesting the lower court’s conclusion that the trial judge erred, and despite appellate counsel being on notice, the majority refuses to relook at the admissibility of Ms. Earls’ testimony, hiding behind “the law-*361of-the-case doctrine.” If EB’s testimony is so unclear as to give the majority “grave doubts,” such a conclusion logically and ineluctably demonstrates that the trial judge did not err by allowing Ms. Earls’ testimony. For the majority to say that the victim’s testimony was weak, but it was improper to supplement that testimony with otherwise admissible hearsay, binds and gags the trial counsel in a manner that prevents him from representing the interests of the Government.
The law-of-the-case doctrine, as interpreted by the majority, does not allow this Court to oversee the military justice system by pointing out when a lower court is erroneously applying the law. Such a view negates the very purpose for which this Court was created. A higher court is not bound by the decisions of a subordinate court or judge on legal issues. As we said in United States v. Williams, 41 MJ 134, 135 n. 2 (CMA 1994):
The law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude this Court, once the case has been properly granted for review, from considering an erroneous conclusion of law made by the Court of Military Review. See Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 ... (1988).
Conversely, when a case is remanded, the trial court is bound by the decisions of the higher court if there has been no change in the underlying facts. Jones v. Cassens Transport, 982 F.2d 983, 987 (6th Cir.1993); Shore v. Warden, Stateville Prison, 942 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir.1991).
The majority’s erroneous view of the law-of-the-case doctrine further complicates our “charter” to oversee the lower courts by requiring that the respective judge advocates general certify an issue to this Court before we can determine whether the lower court erroneously applied the law. We need not speculate why judge advocates general do not certify more cases. While various judge advocates general have certified cases on behalf of the defense, see United States v. Diaz, 40 MJ 335 (CMA 1994), most certifications have involved unfavorable rulings from the Courts of Criminal Appeals against the government position. See, e.g., United States v. Mayfield, 45 MJ 176 (1996). For the judge advocates general to certify all of these cases would create an appearance of an unfair advantage. Nonetheless, a certification by a judge advocate general is not required for this Court to examine a legal ruling from below. Once a case has been accepted for review by this Court, and the Government Appellate Division attacks the lower court ruling, that issue is placed squarely before us.
In the past, we have been inconsistent as to whether or not we are limited by the lower court’s conclusions, with which we may sometimes disagree, that error has occurred. Compare Williams, 41 MJ 134 with United States v. Grooters, 39 MJ 269 (CMA 1994); see also United States v. Townsend, 49 MJ 175 (1998); United States v. Taylor, 47 MJ 322, 328 n. 1 (1997). Accordingly, I do not feel bound by the majority’s view of law-of-the-case.
DEFENSE THEORY
One of the keys to being an effective counsel is choosing the right theory of the case. In this ease, the defense did not choose any of the affirmative defenses, for example, accident or alibi. Instead, the approach was to attack the 7-year-old victim’s veracity. Starting with voir dire and ending with closing arguments, the defense theory of the case was EB’s lack of credibility. Their theory was that you cannot tell when children are lying. During closing, the defense argued that “time frame wise [EB’s testimony] didn’t make sense,” and “the Government can’t ... follow-up as to the specific details,” including clothing and who was present.
The civilian counsel who represented appellant in state court on charges involving the same incident zealously represented him at trial. A large percentage of the court-martial record is devoted to a pretrial motion to suppress the victim’s statements to .a police officer and her statements to the school counselor, Ms. Earls. The judge exercised his discretion to exclude these statements in the first instance, but left the door open to admit them later.
*362Defense counsel’s cross-examination of EB at trial was short. No questions were asked about EB’s encounter with appellant in the bedroom. Defense counsel did ask the victim about the timing of the incident and whether or not appellant’s stepdaughter, KL, had a friend named Jessica.
Since the door was left ajar by the judge, the defense counsel’s strategy was to do a perfunctory, innuendo-laced cross-examination, attack the victim’s testimony during closing argument, and ask the finder of fact to draw a series of negative inferences based on omissions from the testimony of a 7-year-old victim. This tactic would not allow the Government a chance to reply by reopening the case and offering additional evidence. Cf. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S.Ct. 1119, 146 L.Ed.2d 47 (2000).
DISCUSSION
The starting point for analysis of any evidentiary issue is the abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Powell, 22 MJ at 145, which states:
Our review of the authorities convinces us that the facts of individual cases will frequently defy the application of hard-and-fast rules. Rather, what must generally occur is the balancing of a variety of circumstances unique to a particular case.
When young children, more than other victims, complain of abuse, there is a greater need for evidence that either corroborates or negates the victim’s version of the abuse. Child victims are easily attacked and often easily confused with peripheral details.3 Evidence which shows state of mind is important.
Prior to the admission of Ms. Earls’ testimony, there was no evidence of an early detailed report (complaint) given to an adult. EB had previously told her friend KL immediately after the indecent assault what had happened, but EB got no support from that complaint. Without evidence of a report being made, the court members could conclude through negative inference that the failure to introduce such a report showed the crime did not occur. Accordingly, the Government had the right to introduce the fact that a report was made even, if the substance of that report was excluded.
Although this Court has never directly embraced the modern rule that in cases of young children witnesses, “the administration of justice is served by the admission of statements made in a more relaxed environment without the possible harm of traumatic courtroom encounter,” United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir.1987), we have recognized the importance of such a rule in United States v. Kelley, supra. The necessity rule should not be interpreted as a rule of preference, that is, if the declarant is available, the hearsay is not admissible and vice versa.
The following factors establish the need for Ms. Earls’ testimony: (1) the victim was under 10 years of age; (2) the lack of physical evidence of sexual activity; (3) the lapse of time in reporting the activity to an adult; and (4) the reluctance of appellant’s family to testify.
This rule is crucial because of what impacts on the ability of a witness to observe, remember, and recall. Certainly, memory does not exist without observation, and there can be no meaningful perception and narration without memory. What young victims lack, like in this ease, is education, experience, and the ability to verbalize. Additionally, memory goes stale with time, especially with young children, justifying the need for the earlier statements by the victim to adults.
The cost of excluding all three statements is clear, while the possibility that the hearsay will mislead the jury is problematic. The statements taken by Ms. Earls were taken by an individual with a Master’s degree in guidance and counseling and 5 years’ experi*363enee as a counselor. She was careful not to be suggestive in taking the statement. Her testimony rebuts the negative inference that the victim took little action to report the crime.
Other statements made by the victim are essential when there are questions raised concerning the lack of details, as stressed by the defense in this ease. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 610 (8th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Haner, 49 MJ 72 (1998) (wife’s statement to the Office of Special Investigations was found to be admissible); Kelley, 45 MJ at 280-82; United States v. Grant, 42 MJ 340 (1995).
If the factors mentioned in the argument which focused on the lack of specific details were raised during cross-examination, the federal courts would allow Ms. Earls’ statements to be admissible. Cf. United States v. Juvenile NB, 59 F.3d 771, 776 n. 6 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (8th Cir.1988).
The defense did not set forth the negative inferences in their cross-examination, knowing they could be countered based on the judge’s rulings. Thus, in the case of a child victim, the other statements are admissible as positive evidence as to what happened, and as evidence to counter any negative inferences arising from the failure to produce other reports made by the victim. Certainly, there are negative inferences in criminal cases, and the defendant is entitled to an instruction not to draw a negative inference from the defendant’s failure to testify. See, e.g., Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S.Ct. 1091, 55 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). In this case, the evidence is also relevant to show even after an immediate report was made to KL, which was disregarded, the victim still followed through with other reports.
The victim could not even confirm that she talked to the police officer. It was only Ms. Earls’ testimony that corroborated the report made to the police officer, but not the substance of the report. This evidence is necessary when there is a 7-year-old victim whose initial report is denied by a party with interest, and the defense seeks to rely on negative inferences.
Because the majority holds that the necessity prong was not met in this case, I believe it is incumbent upon Congress or the President, as many states have done,4 to adopt a child hearsay exception. 2 John E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases § 753 at 354-66 (3rd ed.1997).5

. Currently Mil.R.Evid. 807 (effective 1 June 99).

. In support of his ruling, the military judge made the following findings of fact:
The testimony of Mrs. Earls is reliable as to [EB’s] statements, the statements are reliable under a totality of the circumstances for the following reasons. Mrs. Earls was a person who [EB] knew and had trusted; she was involved in counseling with her previously; [EB] was not afraid of her.
Second, although Mrs. Earls brought [EB] into her office and initiated the conversation with her, she did not elicit responses from [EB] concerning the alleged incident with Sergeant Pablo. She did not question her initially about the incidents with Sergeant Pablo. None of the essential details of these statements were suggested to [EB] by Mrs. Earls. Mrs. Earls' questions to [EB] were open-ended rather than conclusionary or leading questions. [EB's] statements to Mrs. Earls were under the circumstances spontaneous, voluntary, uncontrived, and unconstrained. Only a short time transpired between the alleged incident and the interview with Mrs. Earls.
At the time of the alleged incident [EB] was 7 years old. The statements made by [EB] contain personal sexual matters that a 7-year-old child would not be expected to discuss with an adult or anyone else. The statements to Mrs. Earls involve an unusual and exciting event that a 7-year-old would not be expected to experience or discuss with an adult or anyone else.
The language used by [EB] in describing the instance was language that one would expect of a 7-year-old child, that is she described a weiner or a pee-pee as opposed to a penis. The statement was not a response to any questions concerning the incident.
Although statements to Mrs. Earls do not qualify as an excited utterance, the nature of the statements to Mrs. Earls were similar to an excited utterance in that the statements were unsolicited and involved an unusual and exciting event.
[EB] demonstrated no animosity toward Sergeant Pablo and had no reason to lie about the incident, she had no reason to fabricate. [EB] has been consistent with her description of what occurred prior to the statements made to Mrs. Earls and several subsequent statements made since the statements to Mrs. Earls. [EB] has not recanted.
See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); United States v. Hughes, 52 MJ 278, 279 (2000); United States v. Grant, 42 MJ 340 (1995), for factors to consider when evaluating the trustworthiness of a child’s statement on the topic of sexual abuse.

. If the defense counsel attacks a child victim’s credibility in his or her opening statement, rehabilitating the victim’s credibility during the Government’s case in chief would not constitute improper bolstering. Rehabilitation testimony is properly admitted as soon as any attack on a child victim is mounted. See John E.B. Myers, et ah, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb.L.Rev. 1, 92 (1989).

. Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9A.44.120 provides:
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, describing any attempted act of sexual contact with or on the child by another, or describing any act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.04.110, not otherwise admissible by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in dependency proceedings under Title 13 RCW and criminal proceedings, including juvenile offense adjudications, in the courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) is unavailable as a witness: PROVIDED, That when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. A statement may not be admitted under this
section unless the proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse party his or her intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide the adverse party with a fair 'opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.

. In fact, Colorado, the state where the incident occurred, has a child hearsay exception. People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo.1990).