Court Opinion

ID: 9414626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 14:06:51.439002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.308815
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-581

                            LUCIUS HILL & another 1

                                       vs.

                   CONSERVATION COMMISSION OF FALMOUTH.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The plaintiffs, Lucius and Wendy Hill, appeal from the

 judgment of a Superior Court judge upholding the decision of the

 conservation commission of Falmouth (commission) denying an

 application for an order of conditions for construction of a new

 walkway leading to an existing dock in West Falmouth harbor.                 We

 affirm.

        In addition to the Wetlands Protection Act, G. L. c. 131,

 § 40 (WPA), the town of Falmouth regulates wetlands through a

 local wetlands protection bylaw, chapter 235 of the town's code

 (wetlands bylaw), and the commission's Falmouth wetland

 regulations (FWR).       The plaintiffs submitted a notice of intent

 under the WPA, wetlands bylaw, and the FWR, seeking permission

 1   Wendy Hill.
to construct an elevated walkway to reach their existing

licensed concrete ramp and float. 2   Section 10.16 (h) of the FWR

provides "general requirements" and "prohibitions" applicable to

all docks and piers.   Section 10.16 (h) (1) provides that:

     "No new docks or piers or extension of an existing dock or
     pier may be constructed in any portion of [a] FEMA
     designated velocity zone (V-Zone) unless the applicant
     demonstrates that there will be public benefit from the
     project. The Commission shall weigh the potential
     likelihood of damage and harm that any such dock or pier
     would cause during a storm event with the public benefit
     demonstrated by the applicant in determining whether the
     project should be allowed."

While the record does not reveal a specific finding, the

commission and the parties have all treated the location of the

proposed walkway as being in a velocity zone, and the plaintiffs

do not suggest otherwise on appeal.

     After providing proper notice, the commission conducted a

public hearing over several days.     At one of the first hearing

dates, some of the members inquired about revegetating the

existing walking path after the elevated walkway is installed.

The plaintiffs responded with a letter from a landscape design

company recommending the planting of 200 salt marsh plugs to

facilitate restoration.   At the next hearing, the plaintiffs'

representative informed the commission that the plaintiffs would

2 According to the commission's meeting minutes, currently there
is a grass path leading to a solid stone and concrete dock,
which is surrounded by knee-high water at times.

                                 2
install salt marsh material as recommended by the landscape

design company.    Before the commission voted, it was noted that

the plan proposed an expansion of a dock in a velocity zone and

that planting plugs was recommended to enhance the salt marsh

after construction of the walkway.    Indeed, one of the members

of the commission noted prior to the vote that "[i]t will be a

better environment because the salt marsh will fill in.      It's

better for Falmouth to have the project than not to have it."

Another member commented, however, that "[t]here is value of the

salt marsh and the value of the velocity zone.    The structure

should be prohibited because of the damage that will be done

when the structure is ripped out in a storm and does harm to the

resources."

     On February 24, 2021, a motion was made to grant the order

of conditions.    The commission voted, but the vote failed to

carry a majority of the commission, and therefore, the

application was considered denied.    On February 26, 2021, the

commission issued a written decision signed by a majority

explaining its reasons for denying the application.    The

decision set forth the commission's finding that the proposed

walkway is an "extension" of the existing dock and explained

that no extension of a dock is allowed in the velocity zone

unless the applicant demonstrates a public benefit, and the

                                  3
plaintiffs did not demonstrate how there will be a public

benefit from the proposed project.

     The plaintiffs filed a certiorari appeal pursuant to G. L.

c. 249, § 4, in the Superior Court.     On cross motions for

judgment on the pleadings, the judge granted the commission's

motion, affirming the commission's decision and dismissing the

appeal.    This appeal followed.

     Discussion.   "In a review under certiorari, the court is

limited to correcting 'substantial errors of law apparent on the

record adversely affecting material rights'" (citation omitted).

FIC Homes of Blackstone, Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of

Blackstone, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 681, 684 (1996).     We review a

decision allowing a motion for judgment on the pleadings de

novo.   Delapa v. Conservation Comm'n of Falmouth, 93 Mass. App.

Ct. 729, 733 (2018).    "In an action in the nature of certiorari

challenging a wetlands permit decision made by a conservation

commission pursuant to a local by-law, our review is limited at

most to whether the commission's decision is supported by

substantial evidence in the administrative record, whether the

commission's action was arbitrary and capricious, and whether

the commission committed an abuse of discretion or other error

of law."    Id. at 733-734.   With these principles in mind, we

address the plaintiffs' arguments.

                                   4
     1.   Sufficiency of the vote.   The plaintiffs first argue

that when the commission's vote to grant the order of conditions

did not pass, the commission erred in treating it as a vote to

deny the order of conditions, and that the proper procedure

would have been to conduct a second vote specifically on the

question whether to deny the order of conditions.    They point to

several sections of the wetlands bylaw and the FWR, none of

which require two votes in the circumstances presented.    Cf.

McElderry v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 431 Mass. 722, 722, 727

(2000) (in absence of affirmative vote by majority of quorum,

plan disapproved).

     First, the plaintiffs point to § 10.05 (9) (b) of the FWR,

which discusses "substantive denials" and provides that the

commission "may deny permission for any activity within areas

under its jurisdiction if, in its judgment, such denial is

necessary to protect the Resource area values identified in the

Bylaw."   It further provides that "[t]he written decision will

include the reasons for the denial, citing Resource area values

protected, and relevant regulations.    The written decision will

be signed by a majority of the Commission."    Contrary to the

plaintiffs' contention, all of these requirements were met, as

reflected in the written decision.

     In addition, the plaintiffs point to § 235-7 (B) of the

wetlands bylaw, which requires that in denying a request for a

                                 5
permit, "[d]ue consideration shall be given to any demonstrated

hardship on the applicant by reason of denial, as presented at

the public hearing," and argue that because there was no second

vote, the commission did not consider any "hardship" that the

plaintiffs would suffer if their application were denied.    The

FWR defines "hardship" specifically:

     "Hardship means the application of Chapter 235 of the Code
     of Falmouth to a particular piece of property, evaluated in
     its totality, owing to the unique characteristics of the
     property, that is unduly oppressive, arbitrary or
     confiscatory and would involve substantial economic loss to
     the Applicant because of the literal enforcement of the
     Bylaw provided that the Conditions and characteristics of
     the property are not the result of the actions of the
     Applicant, or owner, or their agents, predecessors,
     successors or assignees."

Nothing in the record suggests that the plaintiffs presented

evidence at the hearing of a hardship within the foregoing

definition.   And, in their brief, they point only to their need

to wade through water to reach their existing dock -- which

evidence was before the commission when it voted.   The

commission cannot be faulted for failing to explicitly weigh the

hardship on the plaintiffs when the plaintiffs presented no

evidence of harm that would meet the definition of "hardship,"

or any evidence that they would suffer from a "substantial

economic loss" because of the application of the wetlands bylaw.

     The plaintiffs also argue that § 10.05 (2) of the FWR was

violated because the decision was drafted after the vote and the

                                 6
commission did not vote on the specific reasons for denial while

they were at the meeting.    Section 10.05 (2) requires only that

any action taken by the commission pursuant to "Chapter 235 of

the Code of Falmouth" "is to be taken by more than half the

members present at a meeting of at least a quorum."    It does not

require that the drafting of a written decision occur during the

meeting.    Where the written decision was signed by more than

half of the members that were present at the public meeting on

the plaintiffs' proposal, the regulation was satisfied.

     Finally, the plaintiffs argue that a second vote was

required because it may not have passed and then the commission

might have failed to act on the application within twenty-one

days of the application and lost its jurisdiction to enforce the

local bylaw and regulations.    See Oyster Creek Preservation,

Inc. v. Conservation Comm'n of Harwich, 449 Mass. 859, 866

(2007).    That outcome, however, is belied by the written

decision denying the application that was signed by a majority

of the commission.    In short, the requirement of a written order

explaining the reasons for the denial eliminates the scenario

the plaintiffs have contemplated.

     2.    Walkway is an extension of the existing dock.   The

plaintiffs next contend that the commission's conclusion that

the proposed walkway is an "extension" of the existing dock is

based on an erroneous interpretation of the regulations.     As

                                  7
noted above, § 10.16 (h) prohibits new structures in the

velocity zone (in the absence of a public benefit) and applies

to "new docks or piers or extension[s] of an existing dock or

pier."     A "dock" is defined in § 10.04 as "the entire structure

of any Pier, wharf, walkway, bulkhead or float, and any part

thereof including pilings, ramps, walkways, float and/or tie-off

pilings."

     The plaintiffs speculate that the prohibition on extensions

of existing docks is only for "seaward extensions," not to the

addition of a walkway landward of an existing dock.     Velocity

zones are defined in the FWR as "those portions of land subject

to coastal storm flowage which are coastal high hazard areas or

areas of special flood hazard extending from the inland limit

within the one-hundred-year floodplain seaward supporting waves

greater than three feet in height."     By its very definition,

velocity zones include property that may be inland from the

dock.     The distinction offered by the plaintiffs is not made in

the bylaw and we decline to add language to it.     Where the

plaintiffs do not suggest that the proposed walkway will not be

in a velocity zone, we discern no reason to conclude that

§ 10.16 (h) does not apply to it.

     3.    Public benefit.   The commission concluded that the

plaintiffs did not demonstrate how there would be a public

benefit from the proposed project.     On appeal, the plaintiffs

                                   8
contend that there will be a public benefit because the project

will restore some salt marsh.   They contend that salt marsh

provides public benefits and assists in controlling storm

damage, and that the commission should have weighed these

benefits with the risks of harm from the walkway.

     The meeting minutes reveals that the commission considered

the planned wetlands restoration and, indeed, reveals that the

commission members disagreed as to whether the restoration

offset the potential harm from the elevated walkway.   It was the

commission's job to determine whether a public benefit would

arise, and the majority concluded that there was no public

benefit.   We cannot substitute our judgment on this issue.    See

Croteau v. Planning Bd. of Hopkinton, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 922, 924

(1996) ("The determination of public benefit involves a

'considerable area of discretion' and it is 'the board's

evaluation . . ., not the judges, which is controlling'"

[citation omitted]).   Cf. Wine v. Planning Bd. of Newburyport,

74 Mass. App. Ct. 521, 527 (2009) (burden of showing board erred

in denying waiver because denial was not in public interest

"nearly insupportable" [citation omitted]).   Where the

commission concluded that there was no public benefit, the

plaintiffs' argument that the commission did not weigh the

public benefit against the likelihood of harm is unavailing.

                                 9
       Discerning no abuse of discretion or other error of law, we

affirm the judgment.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Sullivan,
                                        Desmond & Singh, JJ. 3),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    August 2, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                 10