Court Opinion

ID: 9950959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 14:00:39.14776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:35.563524
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10527    Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 03/15/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10527
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       TAMAR LEE,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00017-ELR-CMS-2
                           ____________________
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       2                           Opinion of the Court                   22-10527

       Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tamar Lee, proceeding with counsel, appeals her conviction
       for conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 371,
       on the grounds that the district court failed to conduct a meaning-
       ful Faretta 1 hearing before allowing her to proceed pro se at trial,
       and therefore failed to ensure that she knowingly and voluntarily
       waived her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
               Whether a defendant’s waiver of her Sixth Amendment
       right to counsel was knowing and voluntary is a mixed question of
       law and fact that we review de novo. United States v. Hakim, 30 F.4th
       1310, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 776 (2023). On
       appeal, it is the government’s burden to show the validity of the
       waiver. United States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088 (11th Cir. 1995)
       (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-36). Therefore, we “must indulge in
       every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Hakim, 30 F.4th at
       1326 (quotation marks omitted). If the government cannot meet
       its burden, the defendant need not show prejudice to obtain a re-
       versal. Id. at 1327 (emphasis omitted, alteration adopted).
               Under the Sixth Amendment, all criminal defendants are en-
       titled to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The
       right to self-representation is closely tied to the right to representa-
       tion by counsel. United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (11th

       1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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       22-10527                Opinion of the Court                            3

       Cir. 2008). Accordingly, those who have a right to counsel also
       have the right to waive counsel. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d
       633, 649 (11th Cir. 2014). The assertion of one, however, requires
       the waiver of the other, so it is critical that trial courts create a rec-
       ord that ensures that the defendant’s decision to proceed pro se was
       made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. United States v.
       Fant, 890 F.2d 408, 410 (11th Cir. 1989). “The importance of this
       approach is underscored by the fact that a violation of either right
       is not subject to harmless error analysis.” Id. (citations omitted).
       Accordingly, this Court will not inquire as to whether a different
       outcome would have resulted had a defendant been represented by
       counsel at trial. Cash, 47 F.3d at 1090 n.5.
               To waive the right to counsel, the defendant “must clearly
       and unequivocally assert the right of self-representation,” and this
       waiver must be “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” United
       States v. Owen, 963 F.3d 1040, 1048 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation
       marks omitted). This Court’s task, accordingly, is to review the
       “district court’s conclusion that a defendant’s waiver is valid—that
       it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” United States v. Kimball,
       291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the defendant’s
       waiver must be knowing and voluntary at the time pro se represen-
       tation is first granted. Stanley, 739 F.3d at 646. The fact that the
       defendant later becomes aware of the consequences of her decision
       to proceed pro se may not cure a waiver that was initially made un-
       knowingly. Id.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10527

              Although a defendant does not need to have the skill and
       experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose self-
       representation, “he should be made aware of the dangers and dis-
       advantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish
       that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes
       open.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quotation marks omitted). When
       a defendant asks to represent herself, the district court should ide-
       ally hold a Faretta hearing to ensure that the defendant understands
       the consequences of waiving her right to counsel. Kimball, 291 F.3d
       at 730. At this hearing, the court should inform the defendant of
       the charges against her, the possible punishments, basic trial proce-
       dure, and the hazards of self-representation. Id. This Court has
       held that a court merely warning a defendant of the dangers of pro-
       ceeding pro se and recommending against doing so is not enough.
       Fant, 890 F.2d at 409. The test does not turn on the trial court’s
       advice, but the defendant’s understanding. Id. The absence of a
       Faretta hearing “will not give rise to a violation of the Sixth Amend-
       ment right to counsel in the rare cases where the record may sup-
       port a waiver.” Cash, 47 F.3d at 1088 (quotation marks omitted,
       alteration adopted); see also Owen, 963 F.3d at 1049 (“As long as the
       record establishes that the defendant understood the risks of self-
       representation and freely chose to face them, the waiver may be
       valid.”) (quotation marks omitted).
             Eight factors are considered in determining whether the de-
       fendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary:
              (1) the defendant’s age, educational background, and
              physical and mental health; (2) the extent of
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       22-10527               Opinion of the Court                         5

             defendant’s contact with lawyers prior to trial; (3) the
             defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the charges,
             possible defenses, and penalties; (4) the defendant’s
             understanding of rules of procedure, evidence, and
             courtroom decorum; (5) the defendant’s experience
             in criminal trials; (6) whether standby counsel was ap-
             pointed and the extent to which that counsel aided
             the defendant; (7) any mistreatment or coercion of
             defendant; and (8) whether the defendant was trying
             to manipulate the events of the trial.
       Cash, 47 F.3d at 1088-89 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F.2d
       1057, 1065-67 (11th Cir. 1986)).
              Here, the trial court never made any conclusion that Lee’s
       waiver of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowing and
       voluntary and thus failed to ensure that her waiver of such was
       valid. See Kimball, 291 F.3d at 730. The court did not inquire as to
       any of the Fitzpatrick factors at the June 2020 ex parte hearing at
       which she was granted pro se representation. Our precedent re-
       quires that there must have been a valid waiver at the time pro se
       representation was granted. See Stanley, 739 F.3d at 646 (“A defend-
       ant's waiver must be knowing and voluntary at the time pro se rep-
       resentation is first permitted: the fact that a defendant later became
       aware of the consequences of his decision may not cure a waiver
       that was initially unknowing.”). At most, at that hearing, the court
       warned her of the dangers of proceeding pro se and advised her
       against it, which is not enough to ensure a valid waiver. See Fant,
       890 F.2d at 409. With respect to the Fitzpatrick factors, the record
       clearly indicates that Lee did not have an adequate understanding
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10527

       of the charges against her, possible penalties, or the applicable rules
       of procedure or evidence.
               Thus, Lee represented herself for 16 months until the pre-
       trial conference in October 2021, when additional discussion was
       had concerning Lee’s self-representation. Although this 16-month
       unknowing self-representation is probably a Faretta violation by it-
       self, the district court’s interactions with Lee in October 2021 do
       not establish that Lee’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. While
       Lee had standby counsel at trial, her attorney did very little at trial,
       at the instruction of Lee. The record also reveals no evidence that
       Lee was trying to manipulate the events of trial, only that she was
       woefully underprepared for it. See Cash, 47 F.3d at 1088-89 (citing
       Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065-67). We therefore vacate and remand
       to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
       this opinion. We decline to address the other issues that Lee raises
       on appeal.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.