Court Opinion

ID: 9951625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 16:01:02.952088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:50.220136
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1395    Document: 010111017234    Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 1
                                                                FILED
                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                           FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         March 18, 2024
                       _________________________________
                                                                      Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                          Clerk of Court
  JOHN PATRICK FLETCHER,

           Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                     No. 23-1395
                                             (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02345-LTB-SBP)
  JASON LENGERICH,                                        (D. Colo.)

           Respondent - Appellee.
                      _________________________________

           ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                  _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       John Patrick Fletcher, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a

 certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28

 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. He also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on

 appeal. For the reasons explained below, we deny Fletcher a COA and IFP

 status.

                                     BACKGROUND

       Fletcher is serving a life sentence in Colorado for a murder that he

 committed in 1992. In 2017, he filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in

       *
         This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
 the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1395   Document: 010111017234      Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 2

 which he challenged the validity of his conviction and sentence. Fletcher v.

 Lengerich, No. 17-CV-01022, 2017 WL 7241021, at *1 (D. Colo. July 14,

 2017). The district court denied his petition because it was barred under the

 one-year statute of limitations. See id. at *2–4. We affirmed. See Fletcher v.

 Lengerich, 702 F. App’x 795, 796 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished).

       In 2023, Fletcher filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In this petition,

 he contends that his conviction was unlawful because his arrest was a “state-

 sponsored kidnapping.” R. at 16. A magistrate judge reviewed Fletcher’s

 petition and noted that it was “really a § 2254 application in § 2241 clothing.”

 R. at 50. And because Fletcher had not received authorization to file a second

 or successive § 2254 petition, the magistrate recommended that it be dismissed

 without prejudice. Fletcher objected to the magistrate’s recommendation,

 arguing that § 2241 is the proper avenue to obtain relief from his alleged illegal

 kidnapping. The district court rejected Fletcher’s arguments, adopted the

 magistrate’s recommendation, and denied his petition for lack of jurisdiction.

 Fletcher timely appealed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Fletcher must obtain a COA before we can address the merits of his

 habeas petition, as it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review. See Montez

 v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867–69 (10th Cir. 2000). To do so, Fletcher must

 show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable” (1) “whether the petition

 states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and (2) “whether the

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Appellate Case: 23-1395   Document: 010111017234       Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 3

 district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

 473, 484 (2000).

                                    DISCUSSION

       A petition is properly brought under § 2241 when a prisoner seeks to

 challenge “the execution of a sentence,” whereas § 2254 “is the proper avenue

 for attacking the validity of a conviction and sentence.” Yellowbear v. Wyoming

 Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008). Before a state prisoner may file

 a “second or successive” § 2254 petition, “he must successfully apply to this

 court for an order authorizing the district court to consider the petition.”

 Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). Without an order

 authorizing a second § 2254 petition, the district court lacks jurisdiction to

 address the merits of the petition. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir.

 2008). If a prisoner files an unauthorized § 2254 petition, then the district court

 “may transfer the matter to this court if it determines it is in the interest of

 justice.” Id. at 1252. Otherwise, the district court should dismiss the “petition

 for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d

 Cir. 2002)).

       The district court properly construed Fletcher’s petition as a second

 § 2254 petition. Though labeled under § 2241, his petition alleges that the state

 court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because his arrest was really an illegal

 kidnapping. This is a challenge to the “validity of [his] conviction and

 sentence.” See Yellowbear, 525 F.3d at 924. Because Fletcher had filed a

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Appellate Case: 23-1395   Document: 010111017234       Date Filed: 03/18/2024     Page: 4

 § 2254 petition in 2017, Fletcher’s current petition is his second under § 2254.

 But Fletcher never received authorization from us to file his second petition. So

 the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider

 Fletcher’s petition on the merits. See Cline, 531 F.3d at 1251.

       The district court likewise acted within its discretion by dismissing his

 petition rather than transferring it. A district court may transfer a petition to us

 when “it is in the interest of justice to do so.” Id. at 1252. This standard

 requires courts to consider, among other factors, whether “the claims alleged

 are likely to have merit.” Id. at 1251. But to have merit, the prisoner must seek

 to advance a claim based on (1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made

 retroactive to cases on collateral review, that was previously unavailable” or

 (2) newly discovered evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B) (establishing

 requirements for second habeas petition). Fletcher’s petition does neither: he

 simply alleges that his conviction violated federal law because he was

 kidnapped. Thus, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s ruling.

       Fletcher also requests to proceed IFP on appeal. We grant IFP motions

 when appellants show (1) “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees”

 and (2) “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and

 facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d

 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Because Fletcher’s arguments are

 frivolous, we deny his IFP motion.

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                                 CONCLUSION

       For all these reasons, we deny Fletcher a COA, deny his motion to

 proceed IFP, and dismiss this matter.

                                         Entered for the Court

                                         Gregory A. Phillips
                                         Circuit Judge

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