Court Opinion

ID: 9788864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:21:07.343639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.887445
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
dissenting.
The majority refuses to intervene in this case to prevent a juvenile court from proceeding without jurisdiction after a jury determination failing to find that A.H. was dependent and neglected. The basis of the majority’s refusal to intervene, that G.H. did not pursue an adequate legal remedy and can ask for custody in the pending case, misses the point. Regardless of whether G.H. failed to appeal or can request custody in the pending case, because the juvenile court is proceeding without jurisdiction, that ease will now continue futilely, with the court entering orders concerning the care and control of A.H. that ultimately have no effect. Because jurisdiction can be raised at any time, when the issue is eventually revisited or reviewed — and correctly decided — those orders will be vacated and the dependency and neglect proceedings dismissed. In my view, we properly issued a rule to show cause in this case and should make that rule absolute after explaining that, in light of the jury determination failing to find by a preponderance of the evidence that A.H. was dependent and neglected, A.P.’s no-fault admission is not a proper basis for adjudication in this case. *586Because A.P.’s no-fault admission is not a proper basis for adjudication, the juvenile court’s continued exercise of jurisdiction over this matter is improper. ' Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Because the majority disregards the adjudicatory proceedings in the juvenile court, choosing instead to borrow liberally from representations about the facts of this case that were not determined by the juvenile court in the adjudicatory proceedings, I begin by describing the status of the proceeding in the juvenile court. ’
El Paso County’s Department of Human Services (“DHS”) initiated this dependency and neglect proceeding on behalf of A.H., filing a petition alleging violations of several provisions of section 19-3-102, C.R.S. (2008). A.P. only admitted the legal allegation that “[t]he child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent ... through no-fault of such parent,” a violation of section 19 — 3—102(l)(e). A.P. made factual admissions of an inability to provide a safe and stable environment for A.H.1 to support the legal, “no-fault,” admission. A.P. did not admit the petition’s other allegations, and those allegations were subsequently dismissed.
Unlike A.P., G.H. did not admit any of the allegations in the petition. Instead, G.H. exercised his right to a jury trial. § 19-3-202, C.R.S. (2008). At trial, the jury determined the allegations of dependency and neglect were not proven as to three of four allegations. It found G.H. had not subjected A.H. to mistreatment or abuse; A.H. did not lack proper parental care due to G.H.’s actions or omissions; and G.H. had not failed or refused to provide proper or necessary subsistence, medical care, or any other care necessary to A.H.’s health, guidance, or well-being. Because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the fourth allegation, a second trial was held. At the second trial, the jury failed to find that A.H. was dependent and neglected as to the fourth allegation, finding A.H. was not subjected to an injurious environment. Thus, the jury failed to find that A.H. was dependent and neglected.
After the filing of a dependency and neglect petition, but prior to adjudication, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to enter temporary orders. § 19 — 1—104(l)(b), C.R.S. (2008). However, jurisdiction does not continue if the allegations of dependency and neglect are not proven, and the juvenile court is without both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the respondents and the minor child. Id.; § 19-3-403, C.R.S. (2008).
Because A.P. made a no-fault admission and two jury verdicts failed to find that A.H. was dependent and neglected in G.H.’s care, on July 17, 2008, the juvenile court questioned whether A.P.’s admission alone could support its continuing jurisdiction over this case, citing In re T.R.W., 759 P.2d 768 (Colo. App.1988) (holding child was not dependent and neglected where non-custodial parent made a no-fault admission and child was found not dependent and neglected in custodial parent’s care). Accordingly, it entered an order to show cause why it should not “return custody to Respondent father.”
In the ensuing show cause hearing, the juvenile court reversed course. The court ruled that, because G.H. did not have “legal custody” of A.H. at the time DHS initiated this dependency and neglect proceeding, T.R.W. did not apply. Thus, the court concluded that because A.P. alone had “legal custody” of A.H. when DHS initiated this proceeding, A.P.’s no-fault admission was enough for it to adjudicate A.H. dependent and neglected and retain jurisdiction over the case. The court then dismissed G.H. from the proceeding. G.H. filed a petition with this court for relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21, claiming the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction *587to sustain the petition, and as a result must dismiss the ease.2
The juvenile court’s distinction between the present case and T.R.W. is important because the court based its continuing jurisdiction over the case on distinguishing T.R.W. The juvenile court’s analysis that T.R.W. is inapplicable because G.H. did not have legal custody of A.H. is incorrect. Legal custody is “the right to the care, custody, and control of a child and the duty to provide” ordinary medical care, food, clothing and shelter. § 19-l~103(73)(a), C.R.S. (2008). Parents start their legal parent-child relationship with legal custody of their children and maintain legal custody unless and until a court adjudication deprives them of this right. § 1 EM-102, C.R.S. (2008); 19-1-103(73)(a). No court has deprived G.H., or A.P., of legal custody; therefore, both parents still have legal custody of A.H. and T.R.W. is not distinguishable on that basis.
Separate and apart from the juvenile court’s focus on the “legal custody” of A.H., the juvenile court misconstrued T.R.W. In T.R.W., the father of two minor children who had primary care and control of the children was accused of physical abuse. 759 P.2d at 769. The mother made a no-fault admission to the allegations contained in the petition for dependency and neglect. Id. The father made no admission, and a jury trial was held at which the jury returned a verdict finding that none of the allegations had been proven. Id. However, the juvenile court entered an order adjudicating the children dependent and neglected despite the jury’s verdict on the basis of the mother’s no-fault admission. Id.
On appeal, the court of appeals held that “although strict application of § 19 — 1— 103(20)(e) [C.R.S. (1986) ] would permit an adjudication of dependency and neglect on the basis of a noncustodial parent’s admission that a child is not domiciled with her through no-fault of her own, to allow such an adjudication where the finder of fact has determined that the child is not dependent and neglected ... would produce an absurd re-suit and contravene the purposes of the Children’s Code.” Id. at 771. Because the jury found that allegations in the petition were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s adjudication of dependency and neglect. Id. The court of appeals has reached similar holdings in other cases. See In re AM, 786 P.2d 476 (Colo.App.l989)(a no-fault admission made by one parent, while binding upon that party, is legally insufficient to establish the allegations in a dependency and neglect proceeding in the face of the other parent’s denial); In re P.D.S., 669 P.2d 627, 627-28 (Colo.App.1983). (a no-fault stipulation to dependency and neglect by one parent is insufficient to support adjudication of dependency and neglect).
Accordingly, the court of appeals has consistently and repeatedly determined that a no-fault admission is insufficient to support an adjudication of dependency and neglect. In a dependency and neglect proceeding, it is the child’s status that is at issue and determines whether a court has jurisdiction. P.D.S., 669 P.2d at 627. Dependency and neglect adjudications do not determine whether a child is dependent and neglected “as to” each parent. Id. at 627-28. Instead, adjudications determine whether the child is dependent and neglected at all. Id. Because a child is not adjudicated dependent and neglected “as to” each parent, and instead the focus is on the status of the child, a no-fault admission alone is not sufficient to support a finding of dependency and neglect, particularly where a jury has failed to find that the child is dependent and neglected. Therefore, once a jury has failed to find dependency and neglect, notwithstanding a no-fault admission, the juvenile court has no continuing jurisdiction over the matter. See § 19-l-104(l)(b).
An admission to the no-fault provision is consistent with the underlying goals of section 19-3-102 and its provisions when it is properly understood as meaning a parent denies responsibility for the welfare of a child while the child is dependent and ne-*588gleeted in the other parent’s care. Accordingly, an admission to the provision is generally used to gain dispositional authority over a parent who agrees the child is dependent and neglected, but denies knowledge or responsibility for that status because the child resides with the other parent. T.R.W., 759 P.2d at 769; A.M., 786 P.2d at 476-77.
A.P.’s no-fault admission cannot sustain A.H.’s adjudication. The effect of A.P.’s admission only concerned A.H.’s status while A.H. was in G.H.’s care, and a jury subsequently returned a verdict failing to find that A.H. was dependent and neglected in G.H.’s care. See A.M., 786 P.2d at 479 (holding the children were not dependent and neglected where the mother made a no-fault admission and the father denied the petition’s allegations); T.R.W., 759 P.2d at 771; compare People ex rel. U.S., 121 P.3d 326 (Colo.App.2005).(recognizing child was dependent and neglected where father admitted to several of the petition’s allegations, even though child was found not dependent and neglected in mother’s care). Because jury verdicts failed to find A.H. dependent and neglected in G.H.’s care, contrary to A.P.’s admission, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over this case.
In my view, our C.A.R. 21 review is appropriate in this case on the basis that the juvenile court is without jurisdiction, a sufficient and persuasive reason to intervene regardless of the expedited proceedings in C.A.R. 3.4 and whether G.H. failed to appeal. This court has often granted C.A.R. 21 relief when courts have acted wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of their jurisdiction. See, e.g., People v. Juvenile Court, City and County of Denver, 915 P.2d 1274 (Colo.1996); Peña v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.1984).
Here, because a jury determined that allegations of dependency and neglect were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the juvenile court is wholly without jurisdiction to continue to enter orders concerning A.H. and her parents. In my view, the most important reason for this court to grant C.A.R. 21 relief is when a court acts with absolutely no jurisdiction, and especially when that court is directing the care and control of a child and the custodial rights of the parents. Absent our intervention, the juvenile court will continue to enter orders concerning the custody and care of A.H. without any jurisdiction to do so. Because lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time, these orders will always be subject to being declared void.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Bender and Justice Coats join in the dissent.

. Neither the petition nor the disposition order mentions A.P.’s homelessness. The disposition order states A.P. admitted to the petition’s paragraphs 1 (general information regarding the child), 2 (general information regarding the parents and other interested parties), 3(e) (the legal no-fault allegation), and 4(a) (a factual allegation). Paragraph 4(a) states only "[t]hat it has been reported the Respondent, [A.P.], is unable to provide a safe and stable environment for the subject child, [A.H.], placing the welfare of the subject child at risk....” Thus, A.P. admitted only that A.H. was homeless through "no fault” of A.P.’s.

. In addition, G.H. made arguments the majority addresses after ignoring the pivotal question of whether the juvenile court was without jurisdiction regarding the legal and physical custody of A.H.