Court Opinion

ID: 9834218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:24:11.269559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.843405
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The earnestness with which appellant’s counsel argue in their motion for a rehearing that we have committed error in affirming the judgment of the trial court herein, induces us to add the following to our opinion in this cause: It is well settled that limitations in a shipping contract have no application in case of conversion. 10 C. J. 167, 168.
Appellant contends that appellee’s petition alleges a breach of contract of shipment, and not a conversion. The petition alleges that appellant converted the trip spear to its own use. But, says the appellant, this is but a conclusion of the pleader; no facts are alleged to show a conversion, but the allegations do show a breach of the shipping contract. The allegations as to the contract are merely matters of inducement, which show how the trip spear came into the possession of appellant. Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Grain Co., 52 Tex. Civ. App. 156, 114 S. W. 441; Elder, Dempster & Co. v. Railway Co., 105 Tex. 628, 640, 641, 650, 154 S. W. 975.
Failure to deliver necessarily shows a breach of the shipping contract, but the charge of conversion involves more. It is not required that the plaintiff in such case should allege the manner of the conversion. This ordinarily would be peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier, and unknown to the shipper. All that he would ordinarily know would be that the goods were received by the carrier and never delivered to the consignee. Such failure to transport and deliver within a reasonable time would constitute a prima facie-case of conversion. Railway Co. v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 195-201, 17 S. W. 608, 27 Am. St. Rep. 861; Railway Co. v. Clemons, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 452, 47 S. W. 732; Williamson v. Railway Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 138 S. W. 807-809. It is true that Williamson v. Railway Co., supra, was reversed by the Supreme Court (106 Tex. 294, 166 S. W. 693); but the reversal was on the issue of pleading, and did not affect the issue here under consideration.
It is contended by appellant that the allegations of the petition do not show a conversion, because it is not alleged that the consignee demanded the delivery of the-goods. The petition alleges that appellant “failed and refused” to transport and deliver the trip spear to the consignee. A refusal implies a demand. But a demand was not necessary. It devolves upon the carrier to show that it was ready, willing, and able to make delivery, or to account for its inability to do so. In Railway v. Heidenheimer, 82 Tex. 201, 17 S. W. 610, 27 Am. St. Rep. 861, po demand was shown. The court said:-
“Such a demand was in our opinion immaterial. It is the duty of the carrier in discharge of his undertaking to deliver the goods to the consignee or his assigns.”
We take judicial cognizance of thefact that it is customary for express companies to deliver the shipment when the-consignee is known, and, if not, to mail him a notice of the arrival of the goods.
“The general rule is that the liability of an express company as a common carrier does not end until it has made or tendered a personal delivery of the goods to the consignee or owner, or to some person authorized by him to receive them.” 10 C. J. 234.
The appellant, having failed to discharge-its duty as a common carrier, cannot claim, the benefit of its contract as such. In Express *274Co. v. Windham, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 267, 21 S. W. 402, cited by appellant, the plaintiff was denied a recovery on account of having failed to make demand for the shipment. That was not a suit for conversion, but for damage to fruit trees, by reason of failure to promptly deliver. The trees were shipped to the care of the railroad agent, and arrived on time. The consignee did not live at the point of destination. The express company published notices in a newspaper that the trees had been received. The owner saw these notices, but delayed in calling for or demanding the trees. It was held that he could not recover. In Railway Co. v. Tyler Coffin Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. 826, the goods were tendered but were refused on account of alleged failure to arrive in time. Appellant also cites Express Co. v. Duncan (Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 412. The issue in that ease was whether the express company’s liability was that of a common carrier or a warehouseman. The goods were promptly carried to the point of destination, but the owner to whom they were shipped did not arrive until about a week later. They were destroyed by fire the next day after he had notice that the goods had arrived. In that ease the court said:
“The obligation of the carrier includes the obligation of a safe delivery to the consignee, and its responsibility as a carrier continues until it has' made actual delivery or done that 'which may be considered an equivalent to or the substitute for such delivery.” 193 S. W. 412.
We have examined the cases from other states cited by appellant, and we do not regard them as sustaining appellant’s contention.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.