Court Opinion

ID: 9405740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 07:09:25.457524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:24.250472
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                 EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      EL PASO, TEXAS

 THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                §               No. 08-22-00174-CR

                                Appellant,          §                  Appeal from the

 v.                                                 §            210th Judicial District Court

 CLEVY MUCHETTE NELSON,                             §             of El Paso County, Texas

                                Appellee.           §                (TC# 20210D02380)

                                    DISSENTING OPINION

       I write separately because I disagree with the second part of the Court’s analysis whereby

it reverses the trial court’s suppression ruling. After reviewing the transcript of the suppression

hearing, and viewing as well, the digital recording of Nelson’s audio and video statement, and

doing so in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, I would conclude the trial court

properly suppressed the challenged evidence based on a violation of Nelson’s constitutional rights.

Because the majority concludes otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

       A. Fifth Amendment right to interrogation counsel

       The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from

compelling a criminal suspect to bear witness against herself. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person

. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against [herself]. . . .”). In Pecina v.
State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals described the procedural safeguards protecting such

right against self-incrimination. 361 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). First, the Court

described that the United States Supreme Court “crafted safeguards to protect this ‘privilege

against self-incrimination’ in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogations.”

Pecina, 361 S.W.3d at 75 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 (1966)). As relevant

here, “[b]efore questioning a suspect who is in custody, police must give that person Miranda

warnings.” Id. “Only if the person voluntarily and intelligently waives [her] Miranda rights,

including the right to have an attorney present during questioning, may [her] statement be

introduced into evidence against [her] at trial.” Id. Second, “once a person invokes [her] right to

have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be

established by merely showing that the suspect responded to police-initiated interrogation after

being advised of [her] rights again.” Id. (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)).

Pecina explained: “[t]he purpose of the Edwards rule is to ‘prevent police from badgering a

defendant into waiving [her] previously asserted Miranda rights.’” Id. (quoting Michigan v.

Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)). “That prophylactic rule protects the suspect—who has made

the decision not to speak to law-enforcement officers without [her] lawyer and clearly

communicated that decision to the police—from further police badgering.” Id. Based on these

safeguards, we are instructed that a trial court commits a constitutional violation by admitting

evidence that Miranda and its progeny proscribes. Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 582

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (providing that Miranda operates as an exclusionary rule when law

enforcement fails to honor an invocation of rights and no exception applies).

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       B. Nelson’s invocation of her right to counsel

       The majority initially decides the record established that law enforcement officers created

a situation that would lead a reasonable person in Nelson’s position to believe their freedom of

movement had been significantly restricted. Thus, the Court concludes the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it impliedly found Nelson was in custody when she was questioned by law

enforcement. On that preliminary point, I fully agree. It follows, then, that police were obligated

to give Miranda warnings including the right to counsel during questioning. No party disputes that

Miranda warnings were given prior to the start of questioning. Rather, in dispute is whether the

officers honored Nelson’s request for counsel, which followed such reading of rights.

       First, in looking at Nelson’s initial invocation of her right to have counsel present to advise

her prior to or during questioning, a court must determine whether the officers honored her request.

When a suspect asks for a lawyer, interrogation must cease until counsel has been provided

or the suspect herself initiates further communication. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85). To trigger law enforcement’s duty

to terminate the interrogation, the suspect’s request must be clear. Id. Moreover, “[i]f the accused’s

invocation of the right to counsel is clear, [her] responses to further questioning may not be used

to cast doubt retrospectively on the clarity of [her] initial request.” Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 (citing

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984)).

       At the start of the interview, Detective Garcia properly warned Nelson that before he could

ask her any questions, he needed to advise her of her rights. After he reads the Miranda warnings,

he then turns to Nelson requesting that she confirm her knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver

of rights he had just read. Nelson responds saying, “I’d like to speak to my attorney.” Garcia

replies: “You want to speak to your attorney?” Nelson seemingly mumbles or nods her head.

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Garcia next says: “So, we can’t ask you nothing then. We’re going to have to terminate the

interview. Okay. We don’t know what happened. That was the whole reason why. Okay. So, we-

- the only way we can know what happened is if we talk to you. But if you request an attorney the

interview will be terminated.”

       Nelson responds, “Can he just come here?” Detective Garcia says, “Can who come here?”

She clarifies, “My attorney.” He responds: “I don’t know who your attorney is.” Nelson replies:

“It’s the military, Chief of Justice.” Garcia replies: “I don’t. I mean. Again, I’m assuming you’re

military then, correct? You’re active? I don’t know how that works. I don’t -- we don’t deal with

them. Okay. Like I said our whole purpose here was to find out what happened this morning ‘cause

we don’t know what happened. Okay. But before we can ask you any questions, we have to advise

you of your rights. Okay. If you’re requesting an attorney, then we have to terminate the interview

and we can’t ask you anything. Okay.” Nelson next says: “Is it a lot of questions?” He responds:

“Well we’re going to ask you what happened this morning because we don’t know what happened

this morning. That’s the main question. And we were just going to hear you.”

       After a slight pause, Nelson says: “I have strep throat. But I can answer the questions.”

Detective Garcia says: “So, then you’re saying that you change your mind, and you will talk to us.

So, you do understand your rights and you hereby knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive

these rights then and you’ll speak to us.” After a slight pause, Nelson says: “Yes.” Garcia then

reconfirms her willingness to waive her rights. Throughout this exchange, neither Detective Garcia

nor his partner ever moved from their seated position in chairs they had positioned directly across

from Nelson. She herself sat in a chair across from them while dressed in a hospital gown.

       At the motion hearing and on appeal, the State readily conceded that Nelson immediately

invoked her right to counsel by stating she wanted to talk to her attorney before confirming whether

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she intended to waive any of her Miranda rights. Indeed, the recorded interview plainly shows that

when Detective Garcia asked whether she knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights, she

immediately requested an opportunity to speak with her attorney. Rather than cease the interview,

Detective Garcia plowed forward casting doubt on her request. He asked questions clarifying

whether she actually wanted an attorney, told her he did not know who her attorney was, and

repeated multiple times that they were simply trying to find out what happened. For our purposes,

however, statements made after an unequivocal request “may not be used to cast retrospective

doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself.” See State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 893

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984)) (holding an

unequivocal invocation of a right to counsel was not honored by officers when a suspect

immediately invoked his rights stating, “I don’t want to give up any right, though if I don’t got no

lawyer”).

       In my view, Nelson’s initial invocation was unambiguous and unequivocal. She repeated

it at least twice, before asking a third time whether her attorney could “just come here.” However,

Detective Garcia continued with a series of statements, without interruption or pausing, persuading

her to let them know what had happened regarding events of the early morning. Ignoring her

plainly stated request for counsel during questioning, Detective Garcia mentioned that “if” she

requested an attorney “the interview will be terminated.” Characterizing his own conduct at the

suppression hearing, Garcia testified that he immediately terminated the interview. That is, as he

viewed the totality of the circumstances, he believed Nelson understood he had terminated the

interview. Because the trial court granted the motion to suppress, there is an implied finding that

it disbelieved Detective Garcia and concluded otherwise. Unlike the majority, I would conclude

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the record supports the trial court’s determination that Nelson’s exercise of her right to counsel

was not honored by an immediate termination of her interrogation by police.

       C. No bursting of the Edwards bubble by Nelson

       Even assuming Detective Garcia terminated the interview midstream, I further disagree

with the majority’s conclusion that Nelson herself reinitiated conversation or communication about

the case. Law enforcement must wait for counsel to be available to a suspect, unless the suspect

herself “initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards,

451 U.S. at 484–85. Under the two-step analysis, we determine, first, whether there is proof that

the suspect, and not law enforcement, reinitiates communication after invoking the right to

counsel. Cross v. State, 144 S.W.3d 521, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A suspect’s desire to

reinitiate can be shown by “a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the

investigation[.]” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045–46 (1983). Second, we determine

whether there is proof that after the suspect reinitiates communication, the suspect validly waives

the right to counsel. Cross, 144 S.W.3d at 527.

       First, the majority concludes that Detective Garcia’s statements to Nelson after her

invocation of her right to counsel did not rise to a level of continuing his questioning or

interrogation. Distinguishing between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, the Court

holds that once a suspect invokes her right to counsel, only interrogation-type questions must

cease. It views Detective Garcia’s statements as non-interrogational because they were not

reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Again, I disagree. As discussed above, the

record supports an implied finding that Detective Garcia did not honor her invocation of her right

to counsel because he never terminated the interview, but instead, he attempted to retrospectively

cast doubt on her invocation. See Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 893.

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       The majority further concludes that after Nelson invoked her right to interrogation counsel,

she “almost immediately reinitiated the interview after clearly being told it would terminate.”

Without describing a basis for its reasoning, the majority concludes the record shows Nelson

expressed a “willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.” I

disagree. From my view, the record does not support that Nelson expressed her willingness and

desire to talk without her counsel’s presence by simply asking how many questions would be

asked. Nelson so inquired only after Detective Garcia ignored her clearly stated request for

counsel, repeated that he did not know anything about how counsel could be obtained, and told

her he was simply trying to understand what had occurred earlier that morning.

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has described that when a defendant invokes a right to

counsel, that invocation creates a protective Edwards bubble, “insulating [her] from any further

police-initiated questioning.” Cross, 144 S.W.3d at 529. “Only the suspect [herself] can burst that

bubble by both initiating communications with police and expressly waiving [her] right to

counsel.” Id. “Once that bubble is burst, however, Edwards disappears, and the police are free to

reinitiate any future communications and obtain any further statements as long as each statement

is voluntarily made after the waiver of Miranda rights.” Id.

       Following that principle, this Court has held that a defendant reinitiated further

communication with detectives when he expressed a desire to tell his story. Engleton v. State,

No. 08-13-00077-CR, 2015 WL 1285202, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 20, 2015, no pet.) (not

designated for publication). In that case, the defendant was placed under arrest and read his

Miranda rights. Id. at *2. The defendant stated he did not want to talk and wanted to get

representation. Id. The detectives immediately terminated the interview, asked him nothing further,

and placed him in a holding cell. Id. Minutes later, however, he flagged a detective down, stated

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he wanted to speak to the detectives he had met with before, and expressed a desire to tell his side

of the story. Id.

        Contrasted with Engleton, there are no similar details in this case. There was no termination

of the interview once Nelson invoked the protective Edwards bubble. And it was Detective Garcia

who continued expressing his own desire to speak with her without delay as he otherwise did not

know what had happened that morning. He expressed ignorance in how she might be able to access

an attorney, describing he did not know how that worked. Only then did Nelson ask the number of

questions he wanted her to answer. The State argues that “Detective Garcia reasonably could have

interpreted her question as relating generally to the investigation, and the fact that he reaffirmed

that Nelson wanted to waive her rights before commencing with the interview shows that he

interpreted her question in this manner.” In my view, however, neither the record nor the trial

court’s implied finding supports that supposed inference. The trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress will be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory

of law applicable to the case. Ramos v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Standing apart from the majority, I would conclude the record here supports the trial court’s

implied finding that neither Miranda nor Edwards were satisfied. Thus, I would affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                                GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

June 28, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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