Court Opinion

ID: 9916336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 19:03:35.651711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:00.315713
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/9/24 P. v. Sanabria CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D081649

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. SCN407906)

JORGE MARTINEZ SANABRIA,

          Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Carlos O. Armour, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
          Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

          In 2019, Jorge Martinez Sanabria was involved in a gang-related
shooting. Two years later, Sanabria pled guilty to aiding and abetting an
attempted murder and personally using a firearm in violation of Penal Code

section 12022.53, subdivision (b).1 After reforms to the state’s murder laws
were enacted, Sanabria petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6.
The trial court denied the petition, finding Sanabria had failed to state a
prima facie case for relief. On appeal from that order, Sanabria asserts that
because he could have been prosecuted under a natural and probable
consequence theory, the trial court erred by denying his petition at the prima
facie stage. For reasons we explain, we agree that denial at this early stage
was improper and reverse the trial court’s order.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Sanabria’s guilty plea stems from a gang altercation that ended with a

shooting.2 According to the probation officer’s report, on the night of May 26,
2019, Jorge Martinez Sanabria, and other individuals, confronted
Raymond S. about a debt Raymond owed to their gang. Sanabria and his
companions beat up Raymond, and Sanabria shot Raymond in the left arm,
chest, and back. A few days later, police found the gun used in the shooting
when they stopped a car owned by Sanabria. A shell casing and a loaded
magazine were also in the vehicle. DNA tests revealed that blood in the back
seat came from Raymond. On November 25, 2019, Sanabria was arrested.
      The San Diego County District Attorney filed a complaint charging
Sanabria and a co-defendant with willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (count 1; §§ 664/187, subd. (a).) The complaint also alleged
that Sanabria, but not his co-defendant, personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53,

1     Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2    Because the defendant pled guilty and there was no trial, the facts are
taken from the probation report and included solely for context.
                                       2
subd. (d)), and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Raymond
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
      On October 22, 2021, the District Attorney filed an amended complaint,
which added an allegation that Sanabria personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). The amended complaint also charged Sanabria’s co-
defendant with assault with a deadly weapon (count 2; § 245, subd. (a)(1))
and being an accessory after the fact (count 3; § 32).
      That same day, Sanabria pled guilty to attempted murder without
premeditation and deliberation as a lesser offense of count 1, and admitted
the firearm enhancement allegation under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).
Under the plea agreement, the prosecution agreed to dismiss the balance of
the charges brought against Sanabria and to a determinate sentence of 17
years in prison.
      In his change of plea form, Sanabria stated: “On May 26, 2019, I did
unlawfully aid and abet my co-defendant in an attempt to murder the victim
in violation of Penal Code section 664/187 and I personally and intentionally
used a firearm, to wit: a handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code
section 12022.53[, subdivision] (b).” The form also included a waiver
pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, stating that “[t]he
sentencing judge [could] consider [his] prior criminal history and the entire
factual background of the case, including any unfiled, dismissed or stricken
charges or allegations or cases when granting probation, ordering restitution
or imposing sentence.”
      At the change of plea hearing, the judge taking the plea asked
Sanabria, “Are you pleading guilty and admitting the allegation because on
May 26, 2019, you did unlawfully aid and abet your co-defendant in an
attempt to murder the victim in violating Penal Code 664/187, and you

                                       3
personally and intentionally used a firearm, to wit, a handgun, within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53 (b). Is that what happened, sir?”
Sanabria responded “Yes.” On November 22, 2021, the court sentenced
Sanabria to prison for the agreed-upon 17-year term.
      On June 8, 2022, Sanabria filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. In the petition, Sanabria alleged that: (1) a complaint,
information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution
to proceed under a theory of attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial
at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder pursuant to that
doctrine; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder
because of changes made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
After appointing counsel for Sanabria, receiving submissions from both
parties, and holding a prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause. Sanabria filed a timely notice of
appeal from the court’s order.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
                              Senate Bill No. 1437
      “The Legislature enacted Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to more equitably
sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b).) The Legislature recognized, ‘It is a bedrock
principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or
her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.’ (Id.,
§ 1(d).) With this purpose in mind, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person

                                        4
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) Outside of the
felony-murder rule, ‘a conviction for murder requires that a person act with
malice aforethought. A person’s culpability for murder must be premised
upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.’ (Id., § 1(g).)”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).)
      “Senate Bill [No.] 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in two
areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code.
Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death occurs is liable for
murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the
actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested,
or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
      “Second, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except
in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
(Ibid.) One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as
an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
([People v. ]Gentile [(2020)] 10 Cal.5th [830,] 846.) ‘[U]nder the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense

                                        5
he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any
other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the “natural and
probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the
nontarget offense). [Citation.] A nontarget offense is the natural and
probable consequence of a target offense “if, judged objectively, the
[nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable.” [Citation.] The accomplice
need not actually foresee the nontarget offense. “Rather, liability ‘ “is
measured by whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.” ’ ” ’ (Id. at pp. 843–
844.) Thus, under prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an intended
assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and
probable consequence of the intended assault. (Id. at p. 844.) The defendant
need not have intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the
natural and probable consequences of the intended crime. (Id. at pp. 843–
844.) Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ended this form of liability for murder.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
      “Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, which
created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief’
where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s
conviction.’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Two years later, by the
passage of Senate Bill No. 775 on October 5, 2021, the Legislature amended
the statute to expand the population of eligible offenders, including those
convicted of attempted murder under a theory of liability abrogated by
Senate Bill No. 1437; “codify certain aspects of [the Supreme Court’s] decision
in [People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis)]; and clarify the procedure

                                         6
and burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing stage of proceedings. (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 1.)” (Curiel, at p. 449.) Senate Bill No. 775 became effective
on January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) The following year, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 without

substantive change.3 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
      Under section 1172.6, “A person convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court
that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts ....” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
      The resentencing “process begins with the filing of a petition containing
a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6],
subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective date of Senate Bill
[No.] 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)).” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
708.) “When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary
declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the
petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.’ (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].) If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court
may dismiss the petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].)” (Strong, at
p. 708.) If the petitioner states a prima facie case for relief, the court must

3     We refer to the current statute throughout this opinion.
                                         7
issue an order to show cause and, in most cases, set an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the conviction, recall the sentence, and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(1).)
       “In determining whether the petitioner has carried the burden of
making the requisite prima facie showing he falls within the provisions of
section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the superior court properly examines
the record of conviction, ‘allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, ‘the prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,]
subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas
corpus proceedings, “ ‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true
and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would
be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the
court must issue an order to show cause.’ ” ... “However, if the record,
including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations
made in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Patton (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 649, 655–656, fn. omitted, review granted June 28, 2023,

S279670.4)
       “We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

4     The Supreme Court’s case summary in People v. Patton states, “This
case presents the following issue: Did the trial court engage in impermissible
judicial factfinding by relying on the preliminary hearing transcript to deny
defendant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage? (See
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952.)”
                                         8
                                        II
                                    Analysis
      Sanabria argues that the trial court erred by concluding he did not
establish a prima facie case for relief under the new law. Specifically, he
asserts that because a conviction for attempted murder based on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine was still possible under the state’s
murder laws at the time he entered his guilty plea, additional factfinding is
necessary to determine if he qualifies for relief. Sanabria also argues that
the record of conviction on which the trial court relied to reach its
determination lacks “assurance of the basis for the conviction” because he did
not admit any facts and there was no preliminary hearing, police report, or
other facts before the court showing he did not aid and abet a target offense
other then attempted murder. For instance, he contends, his “plea could
arguably have been an admission of aiding and abetting of an attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, with assault
with a firearm as the target crime.”
      As discussed, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.), which
became effective on January 1, 2022, amended section 1172.6 to make it
applicable to convictions of attempted murder based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) At the time of
Sanabria’s guilty plea several months earlier, the Supreme Court had
granted review to resolve a conflict in the lower courts over whether the
original statute applied to attempted murder convictions based on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. (People v. Lopez (Nov. 13, 2019)
S258175 [order granting review].) Thus, the state of the law at the time of
Sanabria’s guilty plea did not definitively preclude an attempted murder
conviction based on the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding

                                        9
and abetting. Because the law was unsettled, we reject the Attorney
General’s assertion that the Legislature’s passage of Senate Bill No. 775
before Sanabria’s change of plea hearing necessarily meant the parties
understood its effect.
      The Attorney General also asserts that Sanabria’s change of plea
establishes as a matter of law that he admitted guilt as a direct aider and
abettor, rather than on a natural and probable consequences theory. The
plea form stated: “On May 26, 2019, I did unlawfully aid and abet my co-
defendant in an attempt to murder the victim in violation of Penal Code
section 664/187 and I personally and intentionally used a firearm, to wit: a
handgun, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(b).” This
admission, however, shows only that Sanabria admitted that he aided and
abetted his co-defendant’s attempt to commit murder and that he used a
firearm. It does not identify the specific theory of aiding and abetting under
which he was admitting such guilt.
      Further, no other part of the limited record of conviction in this case
conclusively establishes that Sanabria admitted his guilt on a direct aiding
and abetting theory, rather than a natural and probable consequences theory.
For example, Sanabria’s generic admission that he “did unlawfully aid and
abet [his] co-defendant in an attempt to murder the victim” could have been
based on the theory that he knowingly aided and abetted his co-defendant’s
commission of a gang assault, and his co-defendant attempted to murder the
victim as a natural and probable consequence of the assault. (See, e.g.,
People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919–928 [sufficient evidence that
murder and attempted murder were natural and probable consequence of
gang assault].) “The plea consequently did not refute the defendant’s
allegation that he was eligible for relief.” (People v. Eynon (2021) 68

                                       10
Cal.App.5th 967, 977; see also People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987
(Flores) [petitioner’s guilty plea did not make him ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law because “[i]n entering his plea, petitioner did not
admit to or stipulate to any particular theory of murder”].)
      In a section 1172.6 case involving a guilty plea, the court may not rely
on the prosecution’s factual theory of the case unless the defendant stipulated
to it as part of the factual basis, “or otherwise admit[ted] the truth of the
facts recited by the prosecutor.” (People v. Das (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 954,
961–964 (Das) [court could not rely on prosecutor’s statement of factual basis
that defendant stabbed victim with a knife attempting to kill him because
defendant did not stipulate to or otherwise admit these facts].) “[A]llowing
inquiry into the historical facts that may appear in the court’s files but were
never admitted by the petitioner as the factual basis for a plea … would …
convert the prima facie inquiry into a factual contest.” (People v. Davenport
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [court could not consider preliminary hearing
testimony that defendant shot victim at close range because defendant never
stipulated or admitted to it as a factual basis for his guilty plea].) Here,
Sanabria made a prima facie showing because the complaint “allowed the
prosecution to proceed” against him under a “natural and probable
consequences theory” of aiding and abetting (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)) and
Sanabria’s guilty plea did not otherwise conclusively establish that he
admitted guilt under a still-valid theory of liability. (Das, at pp. 961–964.)
      Finally, contrary to the Attorney General’s arguments, Sanabria’s
admission to personal use of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision (b)
does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that he pleaded guilty to
attempted murder on a natural and probable consequences theory. “Personal
use of a firearm may be found where the defendant intentionally displayed a

                                       11
firearm in a menacing manner in order to facilitate the commission of an
underlying crime.” (People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059.)
Use does not require discharge of the weapon, or even that the weapon be
pointed at the victim. (See People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317,
322.) Sanabria’s admission that he personally used a firearm could mean
that he simply brandished a gun. This would be consistent with a theory that
Sanabria knowingly aided and abetted a gang assault, and his accomplice
committed an attempted murder as a natural and probable consequence of
the assault.
      Adjudicating a section 1172.6 petition involving a guilty plea poses
unique challenges. In contrast to a conviction after trial, “the record of
conviction involving a plea ‘will generally lack any comparable assurance of
the basis for the conviction.’ ” (Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 990
[quoting People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 237].) Given the “ ‘very
low’ ” bar at the prima facie stage and the prohibition against fact-finding
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972), courts may not read into a guilty plea
anything more than what the defendant actually admitted. The complaint
filed against Sanabria “did not specify that he was being charged with
attempted murder as the person who [shot] victim with the intent to kill, nor
did it limit the prosecution’s ability to proceed on a natural and probable
consequences theory at trial.” (Das, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 963.)
Because Sanabria did not admit or stipulate to this a factual basis that
showed his intent to kill, “we cannot conclude the record of conviction
conclusively refutes defendant’s entitlement to relief as a matter of law.”
(Ibid.)

                                       12
                                DISPOSITION
      The order denying Sanabria’s petition for resentencing is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to issue an order to
show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition.

                                                           McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                      13