Court Opinion

ID: 9702884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:28:56.624963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:42.588598
License: Public Domain

*514Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:
If a deputy commissioner. of public property of Philadelphia and a city architect are entitled to absolute privilege — and in Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A. 2d 100, this Court held that they were entitled to absolute privilege — I believe that. a Councilman of the City Council of Philadelphia, who is a higher and more important. public official, is. entitled to absolute privilege. However and in. any event the majority has in my judgment confused the scope of absolute or unlimited privilege with the tests for conditional or limited privilege. See: Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892; and Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra.
In Matson v. Margiotti, supra,, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania sent a letter to the District Attorney of Allegheny County concerning Mrs. Matson, who was an Assistant District Attorney of Allegheny County. The letter accused her of being a Communist, a statement which was libelous per se.* The Court in its opinion pertinently said (pages 193, 194, 198, 202, 203-204,205):
“The defendant would nevertheless have two possible defenses: (a) Truth: [Citing cases] and (b) Privilege. ...
“Privilege has been divided into two.kinds, (1) absolute .or unlimited, and (2) conditional or limited.
“Defendant contends he is entitled to 'absolute privilege’ and hence absolute immunity from civil suit. Absolute privilege, as its name implies, is unlimited, and exempts a high public official from all civil suits for damages arising out of false defamatory statements and even from statements or actions motivated by malice, provided the statements are made or the actions are taken in the course of the official’s duties or powers *515and within the scope of his authority, or as it [is] sometimes expressed, within his jurisdiction: [Citing numerous authorities].” (We note parenthetically that this definition of absolute privilege was reiterated and quoted with approval in Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa., supra, pages 182-183.)
. . If the Attorney General was entitled to absolute privilege, his personal or political motives are immaterial as is the presence of malice or want of reasonable and probable cause :* Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483.
“. . . We specifically hold that this official letter, being written by a public official in the course and within the scope of his powers, was ‘absolutely privileged’ ; and that even if the allegations were erroneous and false, and were maliciously made, this privilege was absolute and constituted a complete defense to Mrs. Matson’s action of libel.
“One other point has given us grave concern: Was the immediate delivery to the press by the Attorney General of a copy of his letter, prior to its delivery * to the District Attorney — a regrettable practice pursued by high ranking officials whose victims first learn their fate by radio or press — incidental to and hence entitled to the same absolute privilege as the letter, or was it outside the scope of the Attorney General’s official duties or powers and therefore entitled only to a conditional privilege? Here once again we have competing rights: the right of the individual to be protected in her property and reputation, and the right of the public to be kept informed of the official actions of their public officials.
*516“. . . We therefore hold that under the facts in this ca'se the delivery to the public press of the letter of the Attorney General to the District Attorney of Allegheny County dated January 5, 1951, was within the protection of the absolute privilege accorded in this case to the Attorney General.”
In Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra, the Court said* (page 183) : “Whereas qualified privilege could be successful only after a full trial, thus placing a government official at the whims and mercy of a jury, the purpose of absolute immunity is to foreclose the possibility of suit. l. . . [A] bsolute immunity is designed to protect the official from the suit itself, from the expense, publicity, and danger of defending the good faith of his public actions before a jury. And yet, beyond this lies a deeper purpose, the protection of society’s interest in the unfettered discharge of public business and in full public knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business. Absolute immunity is thus a means of removing any inhibition which might deprive the public of the best service of its officers and agencies.’ Note, 20 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 677, 679 (1953).”
Furthermore, if privilege is absolute, malice is immaterial, as is mailing or publicizing of an official letter after it was sent but before it was delivered to the addressee. (Cases, supra).
It is very difficult if not impossible to tell from plaintiff’s complaint whether defendant abused and thus lost his right to absolute privilege, or if his privilege was conditional whether he violated his conditional privilege.
*517I therefore concur in the majority’s action in remanding the case to the lower Court for further proceedings, but I would require plaintiff to file a more specific complaint setting forth with particularity all the important essential facts.*

 We note that a Committee of the Allegheny County Bar cleared Mrs. Matson of any charge of .Communism,

 Italics, ours.

 The majority’s quotation, from the Court’s opinion in the Montgomery case, which was in turn taken from Dempsky v. Double, 386 Pa. 542, 126 A. 2d 915, and from Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255, 69 A. 2d 520, concerned and involved only conditional privilege.

 If, as appears from plaintiff’s amended, pleadings (which, inter alia, omitted one or more essential facts which appeared in his original complaint), plaintiff has purposely omitted vital facts, ■he is deserving of censure for such reprehensible conduct; defendant, in my judgment, pursued a regrettable practice if he had the letter to the Mayor published before its delivery to the Mayor.