Court Opinion

ID: 9927228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:05:40.741766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:11.205961
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                             No. 126,247

                  In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of MICHAEL SIMS.

                                  SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
        K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) requires a claimant to show two elements:
(a) a court's reversal or vacating of a felony conviction; and (b) either the dismissal of
charges or a finding of not guilty following a new trial.

2.
        The phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B)
clearly and unambiguously means both terminating the criminal accusation presented in
court and relieving the defendant of that accusation's criminal liability.

        Appeal from Saline District Court; JACOB E. PETERSON, judge. Submitted without oral argument
December 15, 2023. Opinion filed January 26, 2024. Affirmed.

        Larry G. Michel, of Kennedy Berkley, of Salina, was on the brief for appellant.

        Kurtis K. Wiard, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were on the
brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

        BILES, J.: In this civil proceeding for wrongful conviction and imprisonment,
Michael David Sims seeks monetary damages after the Court of Appeals reversed his
felony conviction for interference with law enforcement and he was resentenced to time

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served on a misdemeanor charge for the same crime. The issue is whether that felony
interference charge can be considered "dismissed" as required by K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
5004(c)(1)(B). The district court held it was not dismissed and denied the claim. We
affirm.

                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          In 2016, a domestic dispute between Sims and his wife led to a 911 call. When the
police arrived, Sims physically resisted. A jury convicted him of criminal restraint,
battery, assault of a law enforcement officer, criminal damage to property, and felony
interference with law enforcement. See generally State v. Sims, No. 120,449, 2021 WL
1228113 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion).

          On appeal, Sims raised an issue with the conviction for felony interference with
law enforcement. Both parties advised the Court of Appeals panel they believed the
evidence was insufficient and asked that the conviction be reversed, the sentence vacated,
and the case remanded for resentencing on a misdemeanor interference offense. The
panel agreed without analyzing how Sims could be convicted of misdemeanor
interference when he was charged and convicted only of the felony crime. Sims, 2021
WL 1228113, at *2.

          On remand, the lower court resentenced Sims, ordered the misdemeanor
conviction to run concurrent with all other counts, and found he satisfied his sentence
with the time served.

          Sims then brought this wrongful conviction lawsuit alleging he spent nearly a year
in prison because of an invalid felony conviction. The State answered and moved for
judgment on the pleadings. It primarily argued Sims could not prove his interference

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charge was dismissed or that he was found not guilty on retrial. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
60-5004(c)(1)(B). In opposing the motion, Sims urged the court to liberally construe this
remedial civil statute to accomplish its purpose. He claimed his "felony charge" was
"actually or effectively dismissed" when the Court of Appeals reversed the felony
conviction.

       In its 16-page decision, the district court agreed with the State that Sims'
interference charge was not dismissed as envisioned by the statute. In so ruling, it treated
the State's pleading as a motion for summary judgment because the State attached the
criminal case's Court of Appeals judgment and the original journal entry of judgment.
See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-212(d) ("If, on a motion [for judgment on the pleadings],
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under K.S.A. 60-256 . . . . All parties must
be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the
motion."). It also took judicial notice of the criminal case's record.

       The district court's factual findings are undisputed:

                "1. On or about August 31, 2018, Mr. Sims was convicted of felony interference
       with a law enforcement officer and related misdemeanors under K.S.A. 21-5904(a)(3)
       and (b)(5)(A). . . .

                "2. Mr. Sims appealed his conviction to the Kansas Court of Appeals.

                "3. On appeal he argued and the State conceded that the evidence presented at
       trial was insufficient to convict him of felony interference. . . .

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                  "4. The Court of Appeals 'reverse[d] [Mr. Sims'] felony conviction, vacate[d]
       Sims' sentence, and remand[ed] . . . for resentencing consistent with a conviction for the
       lesser included offense of misdemeanor interference with a law enforcement officer.'

                  "5. On remand, the district court sentenced Mr. Sims to '12 months in the Saline
       County Jail on Count 5 [i.e., the interference count] to run concurrent with all remaining
       counts.'

                  "6. The Court further ordered 'that all time served to date is sufficient to fulfill
       sentence [sic].'"

       The court held the only question was whether Sims had a viable claim under the
wrongful conviction statute. It dismissed the lawsuit based on K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
5004's plain language and this court's interpretation of the wrongful conviction statute in
In re M.M., 312 Kan. 872, 482 P.3d 583 (2021) (interpreting "conviction") to dismiss
Sims' lawsuit.

       He directly appeals to this court. Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
5004(l) (district court's decisions in civil cases to recover damages for wrongful
convictions "may be appealed directly to" Supreme Court).

                                                   ANALYSIS

       Eligibility for damages under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(B) requires the
claimant prove the charge was "dismissed or on retrial the claimant was found to be not
guilty." (Emphasis added.). Sims primarily contends he did not commit felony
interference, for which he was convicted and imprisoned. He argues he was wrongfully
incarcerated because the Court of Appeals effectively dismissed his felony conviction
upon reversal. The State responds the interference charge was never dismissed because

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the case was remanded and Sims was convicted of misdemeanor interference—as he
specifically requested in the Court of Appeals.

Standard of review

       Because the district court dismissed this case on summary judgment and Sims
does not allege any genuine issue of any material fact, this appeal presents only a
question of law. Roe v. Phillips County Hospital, 317 Kan. 1, 5, 522 P.3d 277 (2023)
("When the parties agree that the facts are undisputed, an appellate court reviews a
district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo."). Likewise, the lower
court's interpretation of K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004 is reviewed de novo. In re Wrongful
Conviction of Bell, 317 Kan. 334, 337, 529 P.3d 153 (2023).

Discussion

       We consider first whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reverse and
vacate Sims' felony interference conviction and remand for sentencing on the
misdemeanor. This helps contextualize the legal question presented here. K.S.A. 2015
Supp. 21-5904(a), under which Sims was convicted, provides various alternative means
for committing interference with law enforcement. See K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-
5904(a)(1)(A) (falsely reporting a particular person committed a crime); (a)(1)(B) (falsely
reporting a law enforcement officer committed a crime); (a)(1)(C) (falsely reporting any
information intending to influence officer's duty); (a)(1)(D) (falsely reporting any
information about the death or disappearance of child under 13); (a)(2) (concealing,
destroying, or altering evidence); (a)(3) (knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing law
enforcement officers). Subsection (b) provides the appropriate classification and severity
level for each type of interference with law enforcement outlined in subsection (a).

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The State charged Sims with felony interference. The complaint stated:

                                         "COUNT 5

        "That on or about the 6th day of April, 2016, in Saline County, Kansas, Michael
David Sims, then and there being present did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
obstruct, resist or oppose Carlos Londono and Edward Addo persons he knew or should
have known to be law enforcement officers, to wit: Carlos Londono and Edward Addo,
and such law enforcement officers are authorized by law to perform an official duty, and
further that such act of Michael David Sims, to wit: resist and oppose, substantially
hindered or increased the burden of Carlos Londono and Edward Addo in the
performance of the officer's official duty, and that such act was committed in the case of
a felony, or resulting from parole or an authorized disposition for a felony.

        "Interference with Law Enforcement - Obstruction of Official Duty - In violation
of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) & (b)(5)(A), a severity level 9 nonperson felony
(Penalty: from a minimum of 5 months to a maximum of 17 months in prison and a fine
of up to $100,000; Postrelease supervision term of 12 months)." (Emphases added.)

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3) provides:

        "(a) Interference with law enforcement is:

        ....

        (3) knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to
serve process in the service or execution or in the attempt to serve or execute any writ,
warrant, process or order of a court, or in the discharge of any official duty.

        "(b) Interference with law enforcement as defined in:

        ....
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               (5) subsection (a)(3) is a:

               (A) Severity level 9, nonperson felony in the case of a felony, or resulting from
       parole or any authorized disposition for a felony; and

               (B) class A nonperson misdemeanor in the case of a misdemeanor, or resulting
       from any authorized disposition for a misdemeanor, or a civil case." K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
       21-5904.

       As shown, both felony and misdemeanor obstruction share the same criminal
elements outlined in subsection (a)(3), but their classification diverges depending on the
case's circumstances, as described in subsection (b).

       State v. Hudson, 261 Kan. 535, 931 P.2d 679 (1997), is instructive. There, the
defendant faced a felony charge of obstructing official duty, which the district court later
reduced to a misdemeanor. The Hudson court upheld the reduction, reasoning the
classification depends on what the officer believed their duty to be during the incident,
not the defendant's actual status. It noted the record showed the officer was performing
duties related to a misdemeanor by trying to stop the defendant for a traffic violation,
even though he later learned the defendant had outstanding felony warrants. See 261 Kan.
at 538-39 ("We conclude that 'official duty' under K.S.A. 21-3808 [currently K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-5904] is to be defined in terms of the officer's authority, knowledge, and
intent."). But see 261 Kan. at 539-40 (Davis, J., dissenting) (contending classification
should be based on the actual status of the accused at the time of obstruction, not the
officer's knowledge and intent).

       In Sims' case, the jury instruction only provided the criminal elements under
subsection (a)(3):

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              "To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved:

              "1. Carlos Londono was discharging an official duty, namely investigating the
      report of a crime.

              "2. The defendant knowingly resisted or opposed Carlos Londono in discharging
      that official duty.

              "3. The act of the defendant substantially hindered or increased the burden of the
      officer in the performance of the officer's official duty.

              "4. At the time the defendant knew or should have known that Carlos Londono
      was a law enforcement officer." (Emphasis added.)

      No element addressed Officer Londono's knowledge or intent. The instruction
merely stated the officer was discharging his official duty—"namely investigating the
report of a crime" without reference to whether the case was a felony or misdemeanor.
And the jury simply found Sims "guilty of Interference with Law Enforcement by
Obstructing Official Duty as charged in Count Five." The record remained silent on
whether Londono believed he was discharging his official duty "in the case of a felony,
or resulting from parole or any authorized disposition for a felony." K.S.A. 2015 Supp.
21-5904(b)(5)(A) (felony obstruction). This explains why the parties jointly agreed the
Court of Appeals should reverse the felony conviction and remand for resentencing on
misdemeanor obstruction.

      The panel in Sims' criminal case appropriately adjusted the classification, just as
the district court in Hudson properly reduced the charge. Felony and misdemeanor
interference's identical elements mean Sims' felony conviction necessarily establishes the

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misdemeanor's elements, so retrying Sims' case was unnecessary. And the record
supported a conviction of misdemeanor obstruction. No party disputed this.

       Next, we interpret the wrongful conviction and imprisonment statute, beginning
with its text. A court "must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the
statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings." H.B. v. M.J.,
315 Kan. 310, 320, 508 P.3d 368 (2022).

       K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1) lists the conditions a claimant must establish by
a preponderance of evidence to bring a wrongful conviction claim within the statutory
framework. Our focus is subsection (c)(1)(B).

               "(c)(1) The claimant shall establish the following by a preponderance of
       evidence:

               (A) The claimant was convicted of a felony crime and subsequently imprisoned;

               (B) the claimant's judgment of conviction was reversed or vacated and either the
       charges were dismissed or on retrial the claimant was found to be not guilty;

               (C) the claimant did not commit the crime or crimes for which the claimant was
       convicted and was not an accessory or accomplice to the acts that were the basis of the
       conviction and resulted in a reversal or vacation of the judgment of conviction, dismissal
       of the charges or finding of not guilty on retrial; and

               (D) the claimant did not commit or suborn perjury, fabricate evidence, or by the
       claimant's own conduct cause or bring about the conviction. Neither a confession nor
       admission later found to be false or a guilty plea shall constitute committing or suborning
       perjury, fabricating evidence or causing or bringing about the conviction under this
       subsection." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-5004.

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       Breaking it down, subsection (c)(1)(B) requires a claimant to show: (1) A court's
reversal or vacating of a felony conviction, and (2) either the dismissal of charges or a
finding of not guilty following a new trial. The district court and the parties agreed the
Court of Appeals reversed the felony conviction, which settles the first element. What is
contested is whether the Court of Appeals' reversal dismissed the charge.

       The wrongful conviction statute does not define the phrase "the charges were
dismissed," and neither do any provisions within the Code of Civil Procedure, K.S.A. 60-
101 et seq. But the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure, K.S.A. 22-2101 et seq., defines
"charge"—"a written statement presented to a court accusing a person of the commission
of a crime and includes a complaint, information or indictment." (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-2202(h). It does not explicitly define "dismiss" or "dismissal."

       In the civil context, the terms' meaning and effect vary depending on the type of
dismissal involved, rendering a meaning less straightforward in Sims' case. See generally
K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-241 (dismissal of actions; outlining different scenarios such as
voluntary dismissal, which is dismissed without prejudice, dismissal by court order,
which is dismissed without prejudice unless a court determines specific terms,
involuntary dismissal, which generally operates as an adjudication on the merits, and so
forth). But Black's Law Dictionary defines "dismissal" as "[t]ermination of an action,
claim, or charge without further hearing, esp. before a trial; esp., a judge's decision to
stop a court case through the entry of an order or judgment that imposes no civil or
criminal liability on the defendant with respect to that case." (Emphases added.) Black's
Law Dictionary 589 (11th ed. 2019).

       In this context, the phrase "the charges were dismissed" in K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-
5004(c)(1)(B) is clear and unambiguous. The phrase signifies both terminating the
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criminal accusation presented in court and relieving the defendant of that accusation's
criminal liability. The district court similarly defined the phrase as: a "termination[]
of . . . legal proceedings without the 'not guilty' factual determination associated with an
acquittal." And with this understanding, it becomes evident the district court correctly
found Sims failed to prove subsection (c)(1)(B). His interference charge was never
dismissed because he was convicted of that same charge on remand—even if only the
reduced classification, i.e., misdemeanor.

       In short, while the panel reversed Sims' felony conviction, the interference
accusation in count five remained effective, leading the district court to sentence him
based on his criminal liability. Although "[t]he touchstone for the classification of the
offense is the reason for the officer's approaching the defendant," it is not a criminal
element itself. Hudson, 261 Kan. at 538; see also K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904(a)(3)
("knowingly obstructing, resisting or opposing any person authorized by law to serve
process in the service or execution or in the attempt to serve or execute any writ, warrant,
process or order of a court, or in the discharge of any official duty"). Sims' argument the
felony conviction's reversal equated to dismissal misses the point and does not align with
the legal principles at play.

       As the State correctly claims, "if the Court of Appeals had effectively dismissed
the charge, there would have been no charge upon which the misdemeanor conviction
could rest. The reversal could not have been a dismissal." In addition, though the
complaint specifically charged Sims with the felony by citing K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5904
(b)(5)(A), he can still be convicted of the misdemeanor version, given that both versions
share identical criminal elements. Construing this reversal as a dismissal of the charge
would collapse subsection (c)(1)(B)'s second element into the first, rendering it
meaningless. See State v. Moler, 316 Kan. 565, 573, 519 P.3d 794 (2022) ("Courts
'presume the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.'").
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       Sims also asks that the statute's purpose be considered, proposing its construction
in his favor due to its remedial nature. But we have already rejected a similar claim in In
re M.M., a case in which the court was asked to "disregard the Legislature's intent as
expressed through the plain language of the statute and instead construe K.S.A. 2019
Supp. 60-5004 as broadly as possible because it is a remedial statute." 312 Kan. at 874.
The M.M. court explained:

       "[W]e held that 'a tort statute may be construed liberally in order to give effect to its
       remedial purpose.' (Emphasis added.) Unlike tort law—derived from common law—
       K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 was promulgated by the Kansas Legislature. As a result, we
       are bound to interpret and apply the provisions of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 as the
       Legislature intended—not to extend the statute's application when the court sees fit.

               "We reject M.M.'s claim that K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-5004 applies to juvenile
       adjudications because the plain language of the statute unambiguously states otherwise.
       [Citations omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) 312 Kan. at 874-75.

       We hold the district court properly granted the State's motion for summary
judgment.

       Judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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