Court Opinion

ID: 9914108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:02:54.33698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:19.264310
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                         Dec 29 2023, 8:44 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stacy R. Uliana                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Bargersville, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana

                                                          Daylon L. Welliver
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shawn Tyler Miller,                                       December 29, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-1793
        v.                                                Appeal from the Vanderburgh
                                                          Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Kelly E. Fink,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          82C01-2301-F6-35

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                              Judges Vaidik and Brown concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023                             Page 1 of 7
      Case Summary
[1]   The State charged Shawn Miller with an array of charges after which Miller

      requested a speedy trial. Three days before his scheduled trial date, the trial

      court entered a congestion order vacating the trial due to a trial in another case.

      At a subsequent hearing, the trial court assigned Miller another trial date

      outside the seventy-day window required after a defendant makes a speedy-trial

      request. As a result, Miller moved to discharge his case, arguing that the trial

      court had violated his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied Miller’s

      request and the case proceeded to trial, after which a jury found Miller guilty of

      all but one charge. Miller argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

      for discharge. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In December of 2022, Miller had a domestic dispute with his girlfriend, after

      which the State charged him with two counts of Level 6 felony criminal

      confinement of his girlfriend and her daughter; Level 6 felony strangulation;

      Level 6 felony intimidation; and Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. On

      January 25, 2023, Miller’s appointed counsel requested a speedy trial, which

      made the latest permissible trial date April 5, 2023, and the trial court scheduled

      trial for April 3, 2022.

[3]   On March 31, 2022, three days before Miller’s scheduled trial, the trial court

      entered a congestion order due to a trial in another case, State v. Woodard.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023       Page 2 of 7
      According to the trial court’s order, “both defendants [were] in custody;

      however, Defendant Woodard ha[d] been in custody longer than Defendant

      Miller[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 38. At a hearing on April 3, 2023, the

      trial court re-scheduled Miller’s jury trial for June 2, 2023—a date to which

      Miller’s counsel agreed. Miller, however, personally objected to “any and all

      continuances” that would place his trial outside the “70-day calendar day

      deadline.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. The trial court noted and overruled Miller’s

      objection.

[4]   In April and May of 2023, Miller filed pro-se motions for discharge and

      dismissal and asked to terminate counsel and proceed pro se. (Appellant’s App.

      Vol. II pp. 48, 54) At a hearing on June 1, 2023, the trial court granted Miller

      permission to proceed pro se and Miller filed another petition for discharge;

      however, after hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion, finding that

      the new trial date had been set within a reasonable time. At that same hearing,

      the parties disputed newly-discovered evidence and Miller requested a one-week

      continuance to review it. The trial court granted Miller’s request and set the

      trial date for June 9, 2023.

[5]   On June 9, 2023, Miller moved for discharge. In this motion, Miller claimed

      that his case had been pushed due to the trial court’s congestion because of

      Woodard, despite there being no early-trial request under Indiana Criminal Rule

      4(B) or imminent Criminal Rule 4(A) or (C) deadlines in that case. Woodard

      was in custody on a probation-revocation petition in cause number 82C01-

      2106-F6-3252 and not cause number 82C01-2207-F5-3929, which is the case

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023        Page 3 of 7
      that the trial court gave priority over Miller’s case. Woodard also continued his

      own trial from November 10, 2022, to April 3, 2023. Citing Clark v. State, 659

      N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind. 1995) and a Vanderburgh County local rule, Miller

      argued to the trial court that his case should have had priority over Woodard’s

      regardless of who had been in custody longer.

[6]   The trial court denied Miller’s motion, explaining that the Vanderburgh County

      Superior Court’s rule prioritizing Criminal Rule 4(B) cases does not apply to the

      circuit court. Thus, the case proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which a

      jury found Miller guilty of strangulation, intimidation, domestic battery, and

      one of the confinement charges, and not guilty of the other confinement charge.

      The trial court sentenced Miller to an aggregate 609-day sentence.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Miller argues that the trial court violated his Criminal Rule 4(B) right to a

      speedy trial by continuing his trial beyond the seventy-day deadline. “In

      reviewing Criminal Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo, and we

      review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.” State v. Harper,

      135 N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. When we consider a

      question of law based on uncontested facts, our standard of review is de novo.

      Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013).

[8]   Criminal Rule 4(B) aims “to provide functionality to a criminal defendant’s

      fundamental and constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial.” Austin, 997

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023       Page 4 of 7
       N.E.2d at 1037. The rule states that “[i]f any defendant held in jail on any

       indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if

       not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such

       motion.” Crim. R. 4(B)(1). There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule,

       including “where there was not sufficient time to try [the case] during such

       seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.” Id.

       The rule aims “to promote early trials, not to discharge defendants.” Finnegan

       v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation omitted), trans.

       denied. Notably, “[i]t is the defendant’s obligation to object at the earliest

       opportunity when his trial date is set beyond the time limits prescribed by

       Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B).” Talbott v. State, 204 N.E.3d 288, 297 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2023), trans. denied. Failure to object results in the waiver of any speedy-

       trial request. Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 488 (Ind. 2001).

[9]    The State argues that Miller has waived his request for a speedy trial by failing

       to object, and affirmatively acquiescing to a trial date outside the seventy-day

       window. For his part, Miller argues that the issue is not waived for two

       reasons: First, he argues that, because it was impossible to reschedule the trial

       within the Criminal Rule 4 deadline, no objection was necessary. See N.E.S. v.

       State, 708 N.E.2d 34, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Second, Miller claims that even

       if he had had a duty to object, he did so pro se despite his counsel failing to

       object. We agree with the State that this issue is waived.

[10]   First, Miller’s reliance on N.E.S. is misplaced. In that case, we acknowledged

       that “‘a defendant has no duty to object to the setting of a belated trial when the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023        Page 5 of 7
       setting of the date occurs after the time expires such that the court cannot reset the

       trial date within the time allotted by Crim. R. 4(C). All the defendant needs to

       do then is move for discharge.’” Id. at 36 (quoting Pearson v. State, 619 N.E.2d

       590, 592 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)) (emphasis added). Here, however, the trial court

       entered its congestion order on March 31, 2022, which was a few days before

       Miller’s speedy-trial deadline, and the parties scheduled a new trial date before

       the expiration of that deadline. Therefore, N.E.S. does not control.

[11]   Second, Miller’s objection should have come through his counsel. For

       example, in Flowers v. State, 154 N.E.3d 854, 860 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), the

       defendant, while represented by counsel, wrote multiple letters to the trial court

       requesting a speedy trial, which the chronological-case summary noted as

       “correspondence to/from Court” and which the trial court acknowledged it had

       received. We concluded that the trial court did not need to address the

       defendant’s requests because they did not come through his counsel. Id. at 867.

       In this case, although he had been represented by counsel at the time, Miller

       lodged a pro-se objection “to any and all continuances.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16.

       However, once counsel is appointed, a defendant speaks through his counsel

       and the trial court is not required to respond to the defendant’s pro-se requests or

       objections. Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000). “To require

       the trial court to respond to both Defendant and counsel would effectively

       create a hybrid representation to which Defendant is not entitled.” Id. at 831.

       While the trial court acknowledged and denied Miller’s objection, this does

       nothing to undermine Miller’s counsel of record’s agreement to continue the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023         Page 6 of 7
       trial date. Therefore, we conclude that, in the absence of an objection from

       Miller’s counsel, the issue is waived.

[12]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Brown, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1793| December 29, 2023    Page 7 of 7