Court Opinion

ID: 9825722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:00:50.859028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:18.541845
License: Public Domain

Smith, J., (on rehearing). Upon further consideration of this case we reaffirm the original opinion except in the particular hereinafter stated. The cases cited in the original opinion make a distinction which now appears to he unsound. These cases hold that where lands have been forfeited to the state an improvement district may not sue to enforce its taxes until the land has been redeemed or purchased from the state, and thus returned to private ownership, at which time — and not before — the improvement district may proceed to enforce payment of its delinquent taxes. But these cases hold that this limitation upon the right of the improvement district to enforce, by suit, the payment of taxes due it applies only where the sale to the state was a valid sale, and does not apply if, for any reason, the sale to the state was invalid. In the latter case the improvement district postpones the suit at its peril, and will be barred of its remedy to enforce its taxes if the applicable statute of limitations has run while the title was apparently in the state. There appears no valid reason for this distinction. This rule requires the improvement district, in each instance, at its peril, to determine the validity of the forfeiture to the state. If the suit is brought and the sale is valid the improvement district is cast in its suit for costs and is denied relief. However, if the sale to the state is invalid, and the suit is not brought before the bar of the statute of limitations has fallen, the right to sue is barred, and the improvement district will lose its taxes, and other property owners in the improvement district who have paid the taxes extended and assessed against their lands will be required to make good the loss of revenue or of having their future taxes increased, sub-. ject only to the limitation that they shall not be required to pay anything in excess of their total assessment of benefits. Arkansas-Louisiana Highway Imp. Dist. v. Pickens, 169 Ark. 603, 276 S. W. 355; Chicago Mill & Lbr. Co. v. Drainage Dist. No. 17, 172 Ark. 1059, 291 S. W. 810; Jefferson Bank of St. Louis v. Little Red River Levee Dist., 186 Ark. 1048, 57 S. W. (2d) 805; Watson v. Barnett, 191 Ark. 990, 88 S. W. (2d) 811. There does not appear to be any valid or just and proper reason for making this distinction. It is an elementary principle in the law of limitations upon causes of action that the statute does not begin to run until the right to sue has accrued. Now we have held, in the cases cited, which the original opinion in this case reaffirms, that an improvement district may not sue where the sale to the state was good. These cases relate to and are based upon the opinion in the case of Turley v. St. Francis Road Imp. Dist. No. 4, 171 Ark. 939, 287 S. W. 196. That case did not, however, distinguish between good and invalid sales, this distinction being made in later cases. The right to sue was denied because the state’s lien for its taxes is the paramount lien,, and suit could not be brought against the state to determine whether the sale to it was good or bad, for, even in the case of invalid sales, the title is apparently in the state, its taxes have not been paid, and its lien subsists and remains paramount and would not be divested or discharged by the suit of an improvement district to enforce payment of taxes due it. Upon these considerations our former opinions are modified to the extent of now holding that the right to sue is suspended where lands or town lots have been sold to the state, and that this suspension is not dependent upon the validity or invalidity of the sale to the state. The right is suspended in either case, as the state cannot be divested of its paramount lien for its taxes, whether the sale was good or bad. It must also follow from this holding that the right of the improvement district to sue is not barred by the statute of limitations through failure to sue while the actual or apparent title is in the state. Mr. Justice Mehaeey dissents.