Court Opinion

ID: 9582883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:32:25.099945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:42.522716
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Judge RULAND.
Claimant, David L. O’Gorman, petitioned this court for review of an order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel. This order remanded his claim to the Administrative Law Judge (ALT) for additional findings. Citing Natkin & Co. v. Eubanks, 775 P.2d 88 (Colo.App.1989), the Panel moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that its order was not final for purposes of appellate review. In response to the motion, claimant asserted that the Panel lacked jurisdiction to enter its remand order because only two Panel members signed it. This court then ordered the parties to submit briefs on the jurisdictional issue. Having considered those briefs, we conclude that the Panel had jurisdiction, and therefore, we dismiss the petition without prejudice.
Prior to the enactment of legislation creating the Panel, administrative review of workers’ compensation and unemployment compensation claims was conducted by a three-member Industrial Commission. Section 8-1-102(1), C.R.S. The General Assembly authorized a majority of the members to address each review. Section 8-1-102(2), C.R.S.
When legislation was initially adopted creating the Panel for review of workers’ compensation and unemployment compensation claims, appointment of three members was authorized. See § 8-1-102, C.R.S. (1986 RepLVol. 3B). The statute was silent as to the number of members required to reach a decision in each case. *392However, when two members of the Panel agreed upon disposition of any particular case, the order was signed by those Panel members only.
In 1989, the statute establishing the Panel was amended to provide:
“There is hereby created in the office of the executive director of the department of labor and employment the industrial claim appeals office, which may consist of five industrial claim appeals examiners, who shall be appointed to serve on the industrial claim appeals panel by the executive director.... Each industrial claim appeals examiner shall exercise his powers and perform his duties and functions in the industrial claim appeals office within the office of the executive director of the department as if transferred thereto by a type 2 transfer as such transfer is defined in the ‘Administrative Organization Act of 1968’, article 1 of title 24, C.R.S.” Section 8-1-102(1), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp). (emphasis added)
However, only one additional member was appointed; thus, the Panel currently consists of four members.
The 1989 amendment also included an addition to the Unemployment Compensation Act which authorized two Panel members to resolve the issues in each case. If those members could not agree, a third member was required to review and resolve the case. See § 8-74-110, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.). However, the amendment was silent as to the number of members required to resolve workers’ compensation cases.
Relying upon § 2-4-110, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB), claimant contends that at least three members of the Panel must address the issues in each workers’ compensation case before a valid order may be entered. That statute provides:
“A grant of authority to three or more persons as a public body confers the authority upon a majority of the number of members fixed by statute.”
On the other hand, the Panel and respondent, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., both contend that only one member is required to enter a valid order. Therefore, an order signed by two members is also valid. We conclude that the statute is ambiguous because it fails to specify the number of members required to reach a decision in workers’ compensation cases. In resolving that ambiguity, we hold that an order signed by two members is valid.
In construing a statute, our task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In conducting that analysis, we must assume that the General Assembly was cognizant of the existing procedure adopted by an administrative agency in fulfilling its delegated duties. We must also read and consider the statutory scheme as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts.
If, as here, a statute is ambiguous, we may determine the intention of the General Assembly by considering the statute’s legislative history, the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment, the problem addressed by the legislation, and the statutory remedy created to cure the problem. See § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB); Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665 (Colo.1988).
A primary and important resource for determining legislative intent is the discussion which takes place in hearings before House and Senate Committees concerning the amendment. See City of Aspen v. Meserole, 803 P.2d 950 (Colo.1990).
Here, the legislative hearings on the 1989 amendment demonstrate that it was intended to address the heavy caseload and the delay in resolving unemployment compensation cases that then existed. Specifically, because prior legislation mandated a decision from the Panel in workers’ compensation cases within 60 days, § 8-43-301(8) & (11), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.), resolution of unemployment cases was increasingly delayed.
The legislative history evidenced by evaluation of the financial impact of the amendment further confirms that the addition of Panel members was for the purpose of *393addressing the unemployment cases. Indeed, because the objective was prompt resolution of unemployment claims, the sponsoring legislators contemplated that federal funding would be available to finance a significant part of the cost for the additional Panel members.
With reference to how the 1989 amendment would modify the existing procedure, Representative Masson explained in Committee hearings that the bill simply increased the number of Panel members. Moreover, it was stated that the Panel would operate in the same manner as before. She further advised the Committee that two members would decide each case in order to avoid an arbitrary decision by only one member. See Tape Recording of Testimony before House Agriculture, Livestock and Natural Resources Committee concerning H.B. 1313 (February 8, 1989, 57th General Assembly) (discussion between Representative Masson and Representative Fish).
In that same hearing, the executive director of the Department of Labor and Employment explained that the purpose of the amendment was to address unemployment cases. He stated that two members were required to address workers’ compensation cases because of the 60-day time limitation. See Tape Recording of Testimony before House Agriculture, Livestock and Natural Resources Committee concerning H.B. 1313 (February 8, 1989, 57th General Assembly) (testimony of John Donlon, Executive Director of Department of Labor and Employment).
In the hearing before the Senate Committee on Business Affairs and Labor, Senator Traylor presented the amendment to the Committee and confirmed that its purpose was to address the delay in resolving unemployment cases, that a decision by only two members was required, and that, unless those two members disagreed, it would be unnecessary for a third member to review the case. See Tape Recording of Testimony before Senate Business Affairs and Labor Committee concerning H.B. 1313 (March 6, 1989, 57th General Assembly) (testimony of Senator Traylor).
Accordingly, we conclude that the legislative intent in adopting the 1989 amendment is clear. No change to existing procedure for handling workers’ compensation by two Panel members was contemplated. Also, the appointment of an additional Panel member or members was authorized only to address the unemployment case backlog. Further, to ensure that decisions in those cases were not arbitrary, two Panel members were directed to review each case and, unless they disagreed, review by a third member was not required.
With this legislative intent before us, we return to claimant’s contention predicated upon § 2-4-110 and the requirement that a “majority” of the members of a “public body” are required to reach a decision. Even if we assume that § 2-4-110 may be construed to apply to state agencies, we conclude that it does not govern resolution of the issue before us.
In § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Vol. IB), we are instructed that, in construing ambiguous statutes, we must consider the consequences of any particular interpretation of a statute as well as the administrative construction thereof. With reference to statutes generally, the General Assembly has stated that an unreasonable result is never intended. Section 2-4-201(l)(c), C.R.S. (1980 RepLVol. IB). And if, as here, the statute is silent as to the issue before us, precedent dictates that our decision is to be governed by legislative intent. See Williams v. White Mountain Construction Co., 749 P.2d 423 (Colo.1988).
Adherence to claimant’s contention in this case would violate each of these canons of statutory construction. Specifically, a requirement that three members of the Panel address each workers’ compensation case would frustrate the purpose of the 1989 amendment. The time and effort of the third member would be diverted from the specific objective of the legislation to reduce the unemployment case backlog. We would also ignore the interpretation of the amendment by the Panel which is charged with the duty of carrying out the intent of the statute. See Lucero v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d 642 (Colo.*3941987). Finally, and most important, the interpretation urged by claimant would call into question the validity of all the Panel orders entered by two members in workers’ compensation cases following enactment of the amendment. We are confident that this result was not contemplated or intended by the General Assembly in its effort to reduce the unemployment case backlog.
Hence, we conclude that, insofar as the 1989 amendment increased the number of Panel members, it was not intended and did not in fact modify the procedure for addressing review of workers’ compensation cases. Therefore, orders in those cases signed by two members are authorized and valid.
Accordingly, since the Panel’s order was not final for purposes of appellate review, claimant's petition for review is dismissed without prejudice. See Natkin & Co. v. Eubanks, supra.
METZGER, J., concurs.
CRISWELL, J., dissents.