Court Opinion

ID: 9966130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-05 14:08:53.336026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:23.028720
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                            ══════════
                             No. 22-0889
                            ══════════

                   Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc.,
                               Petitioner,

                                    v.

Theodis Bruce, Maria Bruce, Virginia Cordova, Sergio Cordova,
 Victor Corral, Jose Dominguez, Magdalena Juarez, Bernarda
Lopez, Elisa Negrete, Maria Reyes, Luis Velazquez, Jose Valdez,
       Antonio Salgado, Maria Salgado, and Iris Jordan,
                              Respondents

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                      Argued February 1, 2024

      JUSTICE BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

      Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 41.003 permits a
judgment for exemplary damages only if “the jury was unanimous” in
deciding “the amount of exemplary damages.”1 In this construction
dispute, the jury rendered its verdict on the agreement of ten of the

      1 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.003(d).
twelve jurors. The jury was not unanimous. A poll of the jury confirmed
this vote, with two jurors indicating their disagreement with the verdict.
Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment omitting exemplary
damages.
      The court of appeals reversed, holding that unanimity as to
exemplary damages could be implied despite a verdict certificate
demonstrating a divided verdict. In the court’s view, the juror
disagreement reflected in the verdict form could have stemmed from an
extraneous answer not involving exemplary damages, so the verdict
certificate was not definitive in demonstrating a divided verdict. The
court further held that it was the defendant’s burden to confirm the
divided verdict and that the defendant’s objection to a judgment
awarding exemplary damages was untimely and insufficiently
preserved the issue.
      We reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial
court’s judgment. Under Section 41.003, a court may not imply a
unanimous jury finding in imposing exemplary damages. The burden to
secure a unanimous verdict is on the plaintiff and “may not be shifted.”2
                                    I
      The City of El Paso developed a stormwater project that included
a drainage pipeline from Interstate 10 to the Rio Grande. The City
engaged Petitioner Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc., to build the pipeline.
As constructed, the pipeline passes through the San Marcial
neighborhood. During construction, several San Marcial homeowners

      2 Id. § 41.003(b).

                                    2
experienced noise, strong vibrations, and shifting soil. As a result, their
homes sustained damage. The homeowners sued Renda Contracting for
negligence and gross negligence, alleging that its misuse of heavy
equipment and faulty construction techniques caused the damage. The
homeowners sought actual damages to restore their properties and
exemplary damages based on gross negligence.
      The trial court charged the jury with these questions intended to
support exemplary damages:
          •   Question 1 asked: “Did the negligence, if any, of Oscar
              Renda Contracting proximately cause the injury in
              question?”
          •   Question 7 asked: “Do you find by clear and convincing
              evidence that the harm to Plaintiffs resulted from gross
              negligence?” This question further instructed the jury that
              it must be unanimous to answer “Yes.” It also instructed
              the jury not to answer the question unless it was
              unanimous in finding Renda Contracting negligent in
              Question 1.
          •   Question 8 asked: “What sum of money, if any, should be
              assessed against Oscar Renda Contracting and awarded to
              Plaintiffs as exemplary damages for the conduct found in
              response to Question 1?”
Question 8 omitted instructions that (1) exemplary damages must be
based on clear and convincing evidence and (2) the amount of exemplary
damages must be based on a unanimous vote.3 Absent these critical

      3 See id. § 41.003(b), (d), (e); Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a; see also Comm. on

Pattern Jury Charges of the State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges:
General Negligence, Intentional Personal Torts & Workers’ Compensation PJC
4.2, 28.7 (2020). Both the statute and Rule 226a provide special instructions
for exemplary damages, including one on unanimity: “You are instructed that
you must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary

                                     3
instructions, the jury was left with general instructions that exemplary
damages could be based on a preponderance of the evidence (instead of
clear and convincing evidence) and by a 10–2 vote (instead of a
unanimous one).4 Neither party objected to the omission of a unanimity
instruction for Question 8.
       In addition, Rule of Civil Procedure 226a requires a special
verdict form for exemplary damages.5 The special verdict form confirms
that the jury was unanimous as to all questions imposing liability,
damages, and the amount of exemplary damages. The trial court did not
submit a special verdict form; neither party objected to its absence.
       The jury found Renda Contracting negligent and grossly
negligent and awarded $75,000 per home—totaling $825,000—in
exemplary damages. The jury certified: “Our verdict is not unanimous.
Ten of us have agreed to each and every answer and have signed the
certificate below.” A jury poll confirmed that two jurors did not agree
with the verdict. Neither party asked for clarification of the verdict, and
the trial court discharged the jury.

damages.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a note (“Jury Instructions Prescribed by Order
Under Rule 226a”).
       4 The charge generally instructed the jurors that a “‘yes’ answer must

be based on a preponderance of the evidence” unless they were “told otherwise.”
Regarding unanimity, the instructions said: “Unless otherwise instructed, the
answers to the questions must be based on the decision of at least 10 of the 12
jurors. The same 10 to 12 jurors must agree on every answer.”
       5 This additional certificate must be patterned as follows: “I certify that

the jury was unanimous in answering the following questions. All 12 [6] of us
agreed to each of the answers. The presiding juror has signed the certificate
for all 12 [6] of us.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a note.

                                        4
      The homeowners proposed a judgment that included exemplary
damages. Renda Contracting objected. Because the jury verdict was not
unanimous, it argued, the verdict did not support a judgment for
exemplary damages. Agreeing with Renda Contracting, the trial court
rendered judgment excluding exemplary damages, and the homeowners
appealed.
      A divided court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court
erred in excluding exemplary damages from the judgment.6 The court of
appeals acknowledged that such an award requires a unanimous
verdict, but it concluded that Renda Contracting had waived any
complaint to the imposition of exemplary damages. First, it found Renda
Contracting’s objection to the judgment formally deficient. Because a
“trial court cannot disregard a material jury finding on its own
initiative—it can do so only on a written motion,” the court of appeals
held that Renda Contracting should have filed a motion to disregard the
verdict under Rule 301, not an objection to the homeowners’ proposed
judgment.7 Absent such a motion, it held, the trial court “lacked
authority to disregard jury findings on exemplary damages.”8 Second,
the court of appeals concluded that Renda Contracting bore the burden
to clarify that the jury was not unanimous. Thus, Renda Contracting
“was required to lodge an objection pursuant to rule 295 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure before the jury was discharged.”9

      6 657 S.W.3d 453, 468 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022).

      7 Id. at 461 (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 301).

      8 Id. at 462.

      9 Id. at 463.

                                        5
       Finally, the court postulated that the jury could have been
unanimous in awarding exemplary damages but divided in answering
questions about other claims not essential to a finding of exemplary
damages; thus, the jury’s certification of its divided verdict was
insufficient to preclude the court from deeming unanimity as to
exemplary damages.10
       The dissenting justice would have held that the burden to secure
a unanimous verdict was on the homeowners as the parties seeking to
impose exemplary damages.11 We granted Renda Contracting’s petition
for review.
                                         II
       The parties disagree about who bears the burden to demonstrate
a verdict’s unanimity. Renda Contracting contends it is the plaintiff’s
burden under governing law. Even if Renda Contracting had that
burden, it further contends, the jury certified in this case that the verdict
was not unanimous, and a demonstrably divided verdict shows that the
jury was not unanimous in reaching its verdict. The homeowners
respond that the burden to prove unanimity falls upon a defendant
dissatisfied with the verdict and that Renda Contracting failed to timely
and properly object to the charge, which did not require unanimity, by
waiting until the homeowners moved for a judgment including
exemplary damages.

       10 Id. at 464.

       11 Id. at 468 (Alley, J., dissenting).

                                         6
      We review de novo the statutory standards of recovery for
exemplary damages and the legal effect of a jury’s verdict.12 First, we
examine the standards governing recovery of exemplary damages under
Section 41.003 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Applying those
standards, we conclude that a party seeking exemplary damages bears
the burden of securing a unanimous verdict. Second, we determine
whether Renda Contracting appropriately raised the unanimity
requirement in the trial court. We conclude that it did.
                                     A
      Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 41 governs damages
in civil cases. Section 41.001(5) defines “[e]xemplary damages” as “any
damages awarded as a penalty or by way of punishment but not for
compensatory purposes. Exemplary damages are neither economic nor
noneconomic     damages.     ‘Exemplary    damages’     includes   punitive
damages.”13
      Section 41.003, in turn, governs the “Standards for Recovery of
Exemplary Damages.”14 Two of these standards decide the outcome of
this case. First, “[e]xemplary damages may be awarded only if the jury
was unanimous in regard to finding liability for and the amount of
exemplary damages.”15 Second, “[t]he claimant must prove by clear and

      12 See Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018); Zorrilla v.

Aypco Constr. II, LLC, 469 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex. 2015) (“The scope of a
procedural rule is a question of law, which we review de novo by applying the
same canons of construction applicable to statutes.”).
      13 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.001(5).

      14 Id. § 41.003.

      15 Id. § 41.003(d).

                                     7
convincing evidence the elements of exemplary damages as provided by
this section. This burden of proof may not be shifted to the defendant or
satisfied by evidence of ordinary negligence, bad faith, or a deceptive
trade practice.”16 To further emphasize that a unanimous verdict is
required, Section 41.003(e) mandates a unanimity charge instruction:
“You are instructed that, in order for you to find exemplary damages,
your answer to the question regarding the amount of such damages
must be unanimous.”17
       Section 41.003 answers who bears the burden of securing a
unanimous verdict. It is the claimant, the party seeking exemplary
damages, who must secure proof of the elements of exemplary damages
“as provided by this section.”18 While a unanimous verdict is not an
element of a claim to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, it is a
“standard[] for recovery” that the statute provides must be met; thus,
the burden of establishing it “may not be shifted to the defendant.”19
       We reached a similar conclusion in Zorrilla v. Aypco Construction
II, LLC.20 In that case, we held that a defendant had no burden to plead

       16 Id. § 41.003(b).

       17 Id. § 41.003(e). Rule 226a patterns this unanimity instruction for
findings of (1) negligence; (2) gross negligence; and (3) the amount of
exemplary damages awarded. Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a (requiring compliance with
jury instructions prescribed by the Texas Supreme Court). Rule 226a further
requires a separate verdict certification attesting that the jury was unanimous
in each of its answers required to support exemplary damages. Id. at 226a note
(documenting the jury instructions required by the Supreme Court).
       18 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.003(b).

       19 Id.

       20 469 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2015).

                                        8
or prove as an affirmative defense that the exemplary damages awarded
exceeded the statutory cap and thus must be reduced as part of the
judgment.21 We stressed that “the defendant bears no burden of
establishing the cap’s applicability; it either applies or it does not.” 22
Just as exemplary damages “may not exceed” the statutory limit,23 a
judgment may not award such damages without unanimous jury
findings as to “liability for and the amount of exemplary damages.”24
                                      B
       In concluding that Renda Contracting had the obligation to
demonstrate that the verdict was not unanimous, the court of appeals
improperly shifted the burden. The burden was instead on the
homeowners to demonstrate that the verdict was unanimous.
       Renda Contracting’s objection to the motion for a judgment
requesting exemplary damages was sufficient to raise the issue. Renda
Contracting filed a written pleading objecting to a proposed judgment
for exemplary damages, specifically identifying the jury’s lack of
unanimity. The issue was thus properly before the trial court—and, in
fact, Renda Contracting prevailed on this issue.25

       21 Id. at 157–58.

       22 Id. at 157.

       23 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.008(b).

       24 Id. § 41.003(d).

       25 See Zorrilla, 469 S.W.3d at 158 (holding that the defendant properly

raised application of the statutory cap limiting exemplary damages in a motion
for new trial).

                                      9
       The court of appeals was incorrect to require a motion to
disregard the jury’s verdict under Rule of Civil Procedure 301.26 First,
our Court has consistently held that we examine the substance of a
motion or pleading rather than requiring the formality of a title or
reference to a specific rule to determine whether an issue was properly
before the trial court.27 Second, Renda Contracting did not seek to
disregard the verdict as a Rule 301 motion contemplates; instead, Renda
Contracting relied on the verdict to show that the jury was not
unanimous as Section 41.003 requires.
       A divided verdict does not support unanimity. It supports the
opposite conclusion. Because the plaintiff bears the burden to secure
unanimity, it is the plaintiff who must seek clarification to the extent
that it asserts that the divided verdict inaccurately reflects the jury’s
vote as to a particular question. The court of appeals erred in concluding

       26 Rule 301 provides:

       The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the
       nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so
       framed as to give the party all the relief to which he may be
       entitled either in law or equity. Provided, that upon motion and
       reasonable notice the court may render judgment non obstante
       veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and
       provided further that the court may, upon like motion and
       notice, disregard any jury finding on a question that has no
       support in the evidence.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 301.
       27 Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d

424, 441 (Tex. 2023); see also In re J.Z.P., 484 S.W.3d 924, 925 (Tex. 2016) (“We
have stressed that ‘courts should acknowledge the substance of the relief
sought despite the formal styling of the pleading.’” (quoting Ryland Enter., Inc.
v. Weatherspoon, 355 S.W.3d 664, 666 (Tex. 2011))); Tex. R. Civ. P. 71.

                                       10
that it was Renda Contracting’s burden to seek further clarification of
the divided verdict under Rule of Civil Procedure 295.28
       The homeowners further contend that errors in the court’s charge
required the trial court to deem the verdict unanimous as to exemplary
damages despite the divided verdict. Deemed findings may be
appropriate when the evidence supports an omitted element of a claim
on which the plaintiff has prevailed.29 However, deemed-finding
principles, which look to the evidence for support, do not apply to
determining the strength of the jury’s verdict—unanimous or divided.
Nor do deemed findings apply in situations in which a jury finding
indicates the opposite of the element sought to be deemed. 30 The jury

       28 “If the purported verdict is defective, the court may direct it to be

reformed.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 295. Rule 295 permits a trial court to inform the jury
of a defect, incompleteness, or inconsistency in the verdict and “retire the jury
for further deliberations” to cure the issue. Id.
        The homeowners argue that Renda Contracting, as the party
dissatisfied with the verdict, had the burden to obtain clarification about the
jury’s unanimity. See Lewis v. Tex. Emps.’ Ins. Ass’n, 246 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex.
1952). While the jury awarded exemplary damages, only a unanimous jury
could do so successfully. Without a unanimous finding, the trial court could not
award exemplary damages. The homeowners thus are the party dissatisfied
with the divided verdict.
       29 Tex. R. Civ. P. 279; see, e.g., Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 667,

668 (Tex. 1990). An element of a claim that is omitted from a jury charge must
be deemed in favor of the judgment if (1) no objection is made to its absence
and (2) some evidence supports the omitted element. Id.
       30 Rule 279 explains that omitted elements may be deemed found only

when “one or more of such elements necessary to sustain such ground of
recovery or defense, and necessarily referable thereto, are submitted to and
found by the jury.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 279 (emphasis added); see also Longview
Energy Co. v. Huff Energy Fund LP, 533 S.W.3d 866, 875 (Tex. 2017) (listing
the jury’s finding of other elements of the claim as a requirement to reach a
deemed elemental finding). A court cannot assume an outcome that is the

                                       11
certified that it was divided. And a divided jury verdict does not support
exemplary damages.
       The homeowners similarly misplace their reliance on Osterberg v.
Peca.31 That case is often cited for the rule that “it is the court’s charge,
not some other unidentified law, that measures the sufficiency of the
evidence when the opposing party fails to object to the charge.”32 The
homeowners argue that a divided verdict suffices in this case because
the charge failed to instruct the jury that it had to render a unanimous
verdict, and Renda Contracting did not object to the omission. According
to the homeowners, the jury properly awarded damages based upon a
10–2 vote because the jury charge permitted a 10–2 vote for exemplary
damages and Renda Contracting did not object.
       The Osterberg line of authority evaluates the legal sufficiency of
the evidence according to the law given in the charge when no objection
is raised.33 But a reviewing court does not measure unanimity by

opposite of the jury’s findings; the same is true when the evidence conclusively
establishes that the element is not met. See Sw. Energy Prod. v. Berry-Helfand,
491 S.W.3d 699, 713 (Tex. 2016) (explaining that evidence is legally insufficient
when “evidence of a vital fact is completely absent” or “the evidence establishes
conclusively the opposite of the vital fact”); see also Gulf States Utils. Co. v.
Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 564 (Tex. 2002) (“The court of appeals misapplied Rule
279 to deem a finding, not to support the trial court’s judgment, but to render
a new judgment for actual damages in an amount nearly fifteen times the trial
court’s award.”).
       31 12 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2000).

       32 Id. at 55.

       33 Other cases the homeowners rely upon are similarly inapposite. In

Fitzerman v. Classic Americana, LLC, the trial court confirmed unanimity. No.
05-15-00528-CV, 2016 WL 1450165, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2016,
no pet.) (“[I]n any event, the record reflects that when the jury returned its

                                       12
examining the evidence presented—a jury is either divided in its verdict
or it is not. For this reason, the homeowners are mistaken in contending
that Renda Contracting’s failure to object to the omission of the
unanimity instruction in the charge “waives any complaint concerning
the absence of unanimity in Question 8.”34 Unanimity cannot be a
deemed finding in the face of a non-unanimous verdict. Because the
statutory burden to obtain unanimous findings belongs to the party
seeking exemplary damages, that party must ensure that the charge
asks questions that satisfy this requirement. It would shift the burden,
not satisfy it, if a failure to object to a charge that does not satisfy the
statute eliminated the unanimity requirement.
       Though the jury was not properly instructed that any amount of
exemplary damages awarded must be unanimously found, nothing in
the charge precluded a unanimous verdict. Jury verdicts are often
unanimous even when they need not be. The standard verdict
certificate, given in this case, contemplates as much in requiring only
the foreperson to certify to a unanimous jury.35 The charge as given did
not disallow a unanimous verdict—it merely increased the likelihood

verdict, the trial court inquired whether the verdict was unanimous, and the
jury answered in the affirmative.”). In Murphy v. American Rice, Inc., the law
at the time did not require unanimous jury findings to award exemplary
damages. No. 01-03-01357-CV, 2007 WL 766016, at *21 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Mar. 9, 2007, no pet.) (“[T]he exemplary-damages statute that
applied to this case did not require unanimity for such damages to be
assessed.”).
       34 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 272, 274.

       35 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 226a note (providing that “only the presiding juror

signs the verdict” when the verdict is unanimous).

                                          13
that the jury would render a verdict that would not support a claim for
exemplary damages.
                             *     *      *
      The trial court correctly declined to award exemplary damages in
its judgment because the jury rendered a divided verdict. Under
Section 41.003, the plaintiff bears the burden to obtain the findings
necessary to impose exemplary damages, including that the jury is
unanimous as to any amount of exemplary damages awarded. It is the
plaintiff who must challenge a divided verdict as infirm or in need of
clarification. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

                                       Jane N. Bland
                                       Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: May 3, 2024

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