Court Opinion

ID: 9739615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:18:30.372054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.160579
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: The defendant raises a number of contentions in this post-conviction appeal, but the majority considers only two matters, which concern allegations that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence at trial. The post-conviction judge rejected these claims after an evidentiary hearing, and those determinations should be upheld on review unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). On the record before us, I do not believe that the defendant has met this standard, and therefore I would affirm the denial of relief under these portions of the defendant’s post-conviction petition. The defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the State’s contention that he had a preference for the brand of boots whose prints were discovered at the crime scene. The trial evidence showed that the footprints were made by a particular brand, called the “Texas Steer,” sold at K mart stores. The defendant, at the time of his arrest in Montana, was in possession of a pair of Texas Steer boots. Although the latter pair of boots did not make the prints found at the crime scene, the prosecution argued that the defendant’s subsequent ownership of a pair of Texas Steer boots evinced his preference for the brand. The defendant argues, and the majority agrees, that trial counsel should have presented evidence to show that the defendant was wearing boots of a different style and brand around the time of the commission of these offenses. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that counsel’s failure to present the proposed evidence was prejudicial to the defendant under the standard expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A defendant complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Establishing prejudice requires a defendant to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel was deficient in this regard, I do not believe that the defendant has established that he was prejudiced by the asserted error. The relative insignificance of the footprint evidence is apparent from the brief notice it received in this court’s opinion on direct appeal. The court’s opinion mentioned the footprint evidence only once, during a summary of the testimony presented at trial. According to the opinion, the evidence showed that footprints were found on the victim’s back and on the ground nearby, and that the two sets of prints were “similar in design.” People v. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1992). Notably, in summarizing the trial evidence the opinion did not also mention the defendant’s subsequent possession of boots of the same brand that made the prints, or the prosecution’s theory that the defendant had a preference for boots of that brand. At no other time did the opinion refer to the footprint evidence, and even omitted it from later discussions of the strength of the evidence of guilt in this case. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d at 17-18, 25. At trial the State presented strong evidence, apart from that involving the footprints, connecting the defendant to the present offenses. As this court noted on direct review, two pubic hairs removed from the victim’s rectum were consistent in all respects with those from the defendant, but were dissimilar to those of the victim’s family members and 24 other suspects. Gold-colored fibers found on various articles of the victim’s clothing were consistent in all respects with the carpeting in the defendant’s vehicle, but were dissimilar to the carpet samples from the child’s environment. Also, a foreign fiber found in the victim’s shirt was consistent in every respect with fibers from the seat of the defendant’s car, but was dissimilar to sample fibers from the child’s environment. Other evidence showed that fibers found on the front passenger side of the defendant’s vehicle were consistent with fibers from the victim’s shirt and shorts. Dog hairs found on the victim’s clothing were consistent in all characteristics with a standard from the defendant’s dog, and other evidence showed that dog hairs could be found throughout the defendant’s car. Finally, tire impressions found at the crime scene could have been made by the defendant’s car. Sutherland, 155 Ill. 2d at 17-18. The absence from this court’s prior opinion of any discussion of the footprint evidence, beyond an abbreviated reference to the matching prints found at the crime scene, illustrates well its relative lack of importance to the prosecution’s case at trial. Here, the evidence showed only that footprints found at the scene could have been made by a Texas Steer brand boot, and that the defendant was later found to be in possession of a pair of boots of that particular brand. Relying on this evidence, the prosecutor argued that the defendant had a preference for the brand and could have been wearing them when he committed the present offenses. Although there existed evidence that defense counsel could have presented to counter the State’s theory regarding the defendant’s preference for Texas Steer boots, I do not believe that counsel’s failure to introduce this testimony was prejudicial. Because the footprint evidence played only a minor role in the defendant’s trial, and because the remaining evidence provided strong proof of the defendant’s guilt, I would conclude that the defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to challenge more vigorously the State’s theory about his preferred footwear. In a separate contention, the defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present certain evidence about the tires on his car. At trial, the State introduced testimony showing that tire impressions found at the crime scene were made by either a Cooper “Falls Persuader” or a Cooper “Dean Polaris” tire, and that the tire found on the right front wheel of the defendant’s car at the time of the defendant’s arrest several months later was a Cooper Falls Persuader tire. Investigators were not able to determine whether the defendant’s particular tire had made the impressions. In the present appeal, the majority agrees with the defendant that trial counsel was ineffective for fading to introduce evidence that the defendant changed the tires on his automobile perhaps once, and possibly twice, in the period between the commission of the present offenses and the defendant’s subsequent apprehension in Montana. The evidence presented by the defendant at the post-conviction hearing was contradicted in several important respects, however, and I do not believe that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and introduce the testimony the defendant now urges. The evidence in question was introduced at the post-conviction hearing through the testimony of Ronald Lawrence, a friend of the defendant. Lawrence testified that he changed a number of tires on the defendant’s car during the period after the commission of the offenses involved here and before the defendant left Illinois for Montana. Lawrence also stated that he had conveyed this same information to defense counsel and to the police some time before trial. In the original proceedings in this case, Lawrence had testified in behalf of the defendant only at the capital sentencing hearing. Officer David Leigh of the Illinois State Police testified that he questioned Ronald Lawrence in October 1987, four months after the present offenses were committed. At that time, Lawrence did not mention changing any tires for the defendant. Leigh questioned Lawrence a number of years later, in 1996, after Lawrence had provided an affidavit stating that he had changed the defendant’s tires. On this occasion, Lawrence said that he had mentioned the changing of the tires to defense counsel, a defense investigator, and a captain with the Jefferson County sheriff’s department. Leigh believed that Lawrence was being prompted by his wife during the interview. The defendant’s trial lawyer, James Henson, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had one note suggesting that defendant might have purchased tires from someone. Henson denied having any specific evidence to support this, however. A defense investigator, Sherry Gutzler, testified that she did not recall that Lawrence had ever told her that he had changed tires for the defendant. She stated that if he had, she would have attempted to follow up on that lead, regarding it as important. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction judge rejected the defendant’s claims that counsel was ineffective, including the allegation that counsel should have introduced evidence — specifically, Lawrence’s testimony — to show that the defendant had his tires changed at some point after the commission of the present crimes and before his departure for Montana. Lawrence’s testimony did not go unchallenged, and, on this basis, the post-conviction judge could well have concluded that there was reason to doubt the utility of the witness’s testimony at the guilt stage of the proceedings. In addition, there remained strong evidence of the defendant’s guilt. As noted earlier, a post-conviction judge’s determinations made after an evidentiary hearing will be reversed only if they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998). I do not see any reason to disturb the post-conviction court’s decision on this issue. Rather than grant the defendant relief on the two questions discussed by the majority, I would uphold those portions of the post-conviction court’s judgment and would consider in this appeal the remaining contentions raised by the defendant but not discussed in the present opinion.