Court Opinion

ID: 9401096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 00:01:19.67498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.599613
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50600        Document: 00516781098             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                     ____________                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                                            FILED
                                      No. 22-50600                                       June 9, 2023
                                     ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk
   Diann H. Angus,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
   Security,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CV-242
                     ______________________________

   Before Smith, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:*
         Between 2012 and 2017, Plaintiff-Appellant Diann Angus applied to
   three job openings posted by Immigration and Customs Enforcement
   (“ICE”), an agency within the Defendant-Appellee Department of
   Homeland Security (“DHS”). Angus was not selected for any of these
   positions. According to Angus, these non-selections were the result of

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                          No. 22-50600

   various forms of discrimination and retaliation. Eventually, after attempting
   to pursue an administrative remedy, Angus filed suit. The district court
   dismissed fourteen of her fifteen claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6), and later granted summary judgment in favor of DHS on
   the surviving retaliation claim, Angus timely appealed, and we now
   AFFIRM.
                                                 I.
           This case arises out of Plaintiff-Appellant’s so-far unsuccessful
   pursuit of her ultimate career goal—working as an intelligence research
   specialist for the federal government. As alleged in her complaint, Angus
   thrice applied for positions related to intelligence research at ICE and was
   rejected each time.1
           First, in 2012, she applied for both the Intelligence Research Specialist
   and Intelligence Assistant positions at ICE. When she applied for these
   positions, Angus requested to be placed on the “Schedule A” certificate.2
   Under the “Schedule A” hiring authority, “[a]n agency may [non-
   competitively] appoint, on a permanent . . . basis, a person with an
           _____________________
           1
             Because Angus appeals both the dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and a
   grant of summary judgment in favor of DHS, we divide this background section between
   the allegations in the complaint and the facts produced at summary judgment.
           2
               A certificate is a list of all candidates who are minimally eligible for a given
   position under a specific hiring authority. So, for example, as in this case, there may be one
   certificate listing all eligible “competitive merit selection” candidates and one containing
   a list of all eligible “Schedule A” candidates. These certificates are compiled through the
   following process. First, each USAJOBS (the hiring platform for federal positions)
   applicant is asked a series of questions related to federal employment, experience, and
   education. Based on the applicant’s answers, USA Staffing—a hiring platform for ICE—
   automatically generates selection certificates for each designated hiring authority. A
   Human Resources specialist will then review these certificates and verify that each
   applicant is eligible under the hiring authority and qualifies for the position before
   forwarding the selection certificate to the selecting official.

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   intellectual disability, a severe physical disability, or a psychiatric
   disability.”3 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u)(1); see id. § 213.3101. As Angus
   acknowledges, the Schedule A hiring authority is meant to allow agencies to
   proactively recruit and hire certain individuals, including those with
   disabilities.
           However, although Angus qualified for the Schedule A certificate, she
   was also eligible for inclusion on the competitive service certificate for these
   positions. Pursuant to ICE policy, her applications were therefore forwarded
   to the selecting official, Special Agent in Charge for San Antonio Homeland
   Security Investigations Jerry Robinette, under the competitive service
   certificate. In other words, the selecting official was not informed that she
   was a Schedule A candidate with a targeted disability.
           On October 16, 2012, Angus was informed that she was not selected
   for the Intelligence Research Specialist position, and on November 9, 2012,
   was similarly notified that she was not selected for the Intelligence Assistant
   position. Angus contacted an EEO counselor as to both non-selections on
   December 4, 2012. Then, on March 19, 2013, Angus filed a formal complaint
   with the ICE Equal Opportunity Office (“EEO”), alleging that her non-
   selections were the result of discrimination based on sex, age, and disability,
   as well as for retaliation for prior EEO activity.4 On January 30, 2019, DHS
   issued a Final Agency Decision, later affirmed by the EEOC, concluding that

           _____________________
           3
             An individual may also be eligible under Schedule A hiring authority if they satisfy
   other criteria, none of which is applicable to Angus. See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102.
           4
             According to the complaint, Angus had filed an earlier EEO complaint related to
   her non-selection for an ICE position in 2010. This prior complaint formed the basis of her
   retaliation claim.

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   Angus’s claims were untimely and that, in any event, ICE did not
   discriminate or retaliate against her.5
          In 2016 or 2017, Angus again applied for the position of an
   Investigative Research Specialist at ICE. On January 24, 2017, Angus was
   once more informed that she was not selected for the position. Angus reached
   out to an EEO counselor on May 4, 2017, and soon after, on June 16, 2017,
   filed another formal complaint with the ICE EEO related to this non-
   selection. This time, Angus alleged sex and age discrimination (but not
   disability discrimination) as well as a retaliation claim. In February 2020,
   DHS resolved the complaint by issuing a Final Agency Decision affirming the
   dismissal of her case based on her intent to file a federal action.
          Soon after, in March 2020, Angus filed a 49-page pro se complaint in
   federal court. The complaint contained fifteen overlapping “counts” against
   DHS, alleging various claims for disability, sex, and age discrimination, as
   well as for improper processing of her EEO complaints and for retaliation.
   DHS moved to dismiss all the claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The district
   court, adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge,
   granted the dismissal as to fourteen claims but denied the motion as to
   Angus’s retaliation claim.
          Following discovery, both DHS and Angus moved for summary
   judgment on the remaining retaliation claim. In connection with these
   motions, both parties produced more evidence as to the circumstances
   surrounding each of Angus’s non-selections. We address each in turn,
   beginning with Angus’s 2012 applications.

          _____________________
          5
               Although Angus initially requested a hearing before the Equal Employment
   Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), she later asked that her case be remanded to DHS
   for a final agency decision.

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           First, as to the position of Intelligence Research Specialist, Robinette
   received over one hundred applications for four positions. Although
   Robinette was the selecting officer, he delegated the task of screening
   resumes, conducting interviews, and making a final recommendation to two
   other officials, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Sammy Ashurst and
   Supervisory Intelligence Officer David Salazar. Neither Ashurst nor Salazar
   was aware of Angus’s prior EEO activity.
           When she applied to the 2012 positions, Angus, who had an
   associate’s degree in liberal arts from Louisiana Tech University, was at GS-
   8 with sixteen years of federal experience.6 Much of her experience was
   administrative and primarily included preparing, updating, and maintaining
   files.7 Although Angus self-classified her work in these positions as
   “intelligence work” because she was privy to nonpublic information, she
   admitted that her work was not as “in depth” or “fully involved” as
   intelligence work. Additionally, there were numerous punctuation and
   grammatical errors in the resume attached to her application.
           The four selected candidates were J.W., A.K., R.K., and N.R.
   According to Ashurst, the position was “very competitive,” and Angus was
   not interviewed because “other candidates were more qualified than her.”
   Salazar also stated that, “[t]o the best of [his] recollection[,] Ms. Angus did

           _____________________
           6
            The General Schedule (“GS”) classification system is a 15-grade scale which
   governs the qualifications, pay structure, and other human resources policies for federal
   employees, with GS-1 being the lowest grade and GS-15 being the highest.
           7
             Angus held the following positions: Mail and File Clerk at the Immigration and
   Naturalization Service (“INS”) (1996-1997); Immigration Records Technician at INS
   (1997-1998); Investigations Clerk at ICE (1998-2006); Investigative Assistant at ICE
   (2006-2010); Office Assistant at the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) (2010-2011);
   and Investigative Support Assistant at the U.S. Secret Service (Angus’s position at the time
   of her 2012 applications).

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   not have the qualifications sought after” for the position because she lacked
   an intelligence background.
          J.W. was the only selected candidate who was employed by ICE when
   he applied. In his role as a mission support specialist at ICE, J.W. had
   received positive feedback from colleagues and supervisors. He had a military
   background, having earned an associate’s degree in instruction of technology
   and military science and served in the United States Air Force for six years.
          A.K. had a comparable background. She held a bachelor’s degree in
   business administration and two associate’s of applied science degrees (one
   in Instructor of Technology and Military Science, the other in
   Communication Applications Technology). She had also spent time (ten
   years) in the military. Additionally, A.K. had thirteen years of experience in
   the intelligence field, and had, in her prior position as a criminal investigative
   analyst with the Texas Air National Guard, worked with ICE.
          Similarly, R.K. had a military and intelligence background.
   Specifically, R.K. had served in the United States Marine Corps as an Arabic
   linguist, and reconnaissance expert. Moreover, R.K. had had previously
   worked with ICE Intelligence Research Specialists as an analyst consultant
   with a private contractor. At the time of his application, R.K. was finishing
   his bachelor’s degree and was an analyst consultant with a private company.
           Finally, and as with the other selected candidates, both N.R.’s
   educational and work experience related to the military and intelligence
   fields. Specifically, N.R. had a Bachelor of Science degree from the United
   States Air Force Academy, had served as a United States Army Military
   intelligence officer, and had worked as a military intelligence company
   commander in Iraq.
          As to the Intelligence Assistant position, Robinette received over 60
   applications for one opening. Ultimately, Robinette offered the job to J.C.,

                                               6
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   who held both a bachelor’s and master’s degree. J.C. had twenty-eight years
   of federal service and was currently employed as an Administrative Officer
   in the Houston office at a GS-14. J.C. was highly recommended by her
   current supervisor, who told Robinette that J.C. was willing to apply to a
   lower level because she was relocating to the Austin area. Robinette also
   believed that J.C.’s prior experience as an Administrative Officer would be
   an asset to the Austin office, which often needed additional administrative
   support.
          As noted, Angus filed an EEO complaint after she was not selected for
   either position. During the resulting investigation, an EEO investigator
   contacted Robinette, who had since retired. Robinette responded by email,
   stating that “[I] can assure you my selection of candidates were [sic] based
   on who [was] the best candidate for the overall job and position.” He then
   noted that “[his] recollection [was] that this employee [Angus] use[d] to
   work for one of [his] offices” and “ha[d] been applying for multiple vacancies
   and when not selected she file[d] a discrimination allegation.” Robinette then
   reiterated that he stood behind the selections and did not discriminate or
   retaliate against Angus.
          Over 70 candidates applied for the one open Intelligence Research
   Specialist in 2016/2017. Three individuals were involved in the selection.
   First, Ashurst and Group Supervisor Todd West reviewed the submitted
   resumes and selected the top five candidates. Then, Ashurst, West, and
   Assistant Special Agent in Charge Monica Mapel conducted the interviews.
   The panel selected T.H., who was described as “far exceed[ing] the
   qualifications” required, to fill the position.
          As with the candidates selected for the Intelligence Research
   Specialist position in 2012, T.H. had prior military and intelligence
   experience. His experience included time spent as an intelligence research

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   specialist for the U.S. Coast Guard, an open-source intelligence analyst with
   the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command, and an all-source
   intelligence analyst at the U.S. Northern Command. He had also held
   positions in Signals Intelligence (“SIGINT”), was fluent in both Spanish and
   Portuguese, and held a bachelor’s degree.
            After considering the record and both parties’ arguments, the
   magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment in favor of DHS
   and dismissing Angus’s motion for summary judgment as moot.8 The district
   court again adopted the report and recommendation in full and entered a final
   judgment in favor of DHS. Angus timely appealed.
                                             II.
            We first address the claims dismissed by the district court before
   turning to the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the remaining
   claim.
                                             A.
            We review a grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.
   Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 2021). In so doing,
   we “accept[] all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and viewed in the
   light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322,
   329-30 (5th Cir. 2013). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
   contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

            _____________________
            8
              Specifically, the magistrate judge found that Angus failed to exhaust her
   retaliation claims as to her 2012 non-selection for the Intelligence Research Specialist
   position and 2016/2017 non-selection for the Investigative Research Specialist position,
   and concluded that Angus’s retaliation claim as to her 2012 non-selection for the
   Intelligence Assistant position failed on the merits.

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   that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
   (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
                                             i.
          We begin with Angus’s claims for disability discrimination, which can
   be broadly sorted into two groups. First, Angus asserted claims for disparate
   treatment, all related to her own non-selections and all stemming from ICE’s
   failure to forward her applications to the selecting officer under the Schedule
   A certificate. Second, and similarly, Angus asserted claims for disparate
   impact, alleging that ICE’s policy of not placing candidates who qualify for
   both the Schedule A certificate and the competitive service certificate on
   both certificates, but rather only forwarding the candidate’s application
   under the competitive service certificate, disparately impacted Schedule A
   applicants with disabilities.
          First, we must address the threshold issue of exhaustion. A plaintiff
   must exhaust her administrative remedies by timely filing a charge of
   discrimination with the EEOC before filing an ADA claim in federal court.
   Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017). When
   determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted a claim, we consider not only
   those claims contained in the administrative charge, but also those that could
   have reasonably grown out of the charge. Pacheo v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 789
   (5th Cir. 2006).9
          The ADA recognizes claims for both disparate treatment and
   disparate impact. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 53 (2003).
   Disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims address “two largely

          _____________________
          9
           Although Pacheo addresses the exhaustion requirement for Title VII claims, the
   ADA incorporates by reference Title VII’s administrative procedures. Dao v. Auchan
   Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

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   separate theories of discrimination.” Pacheo, 448 F.3d at 787 (citing Int’l
   Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)). A
   disparate-treatment claim, “the most easily understood type of
   discrimination,” Int’l Brotherhood, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, arises where a
   plaintiff alleges that an employer treated individuals less favorably than
   others on account of their protected class (here, disability). Raytheon, 540
   U.S. at 52 (citing Int’l Brotherhood, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15)). That is, “[l]iability
   in a disparate-treatment case ‘depends on whether the protected
   trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s decision.’” Id. (alteration in
   original) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)). “By
   contrast, disparate-impact claims ‘involve employment practices that are
   facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
   harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
   necessity.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Brotherhood, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15).
           Here, Angus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to any
   disparate-impact claims. Her 2013 EEO complaint referenced only her own
   non-selections, with no mention of any facially neutral policy or practice
   affecting other candidates with disabilities.10 Accordingly, the ICE Office of
   Diversity and Civil Rights limited the scope of its inquiry to “[w]hether
   complainant . . . was subjected to discrimination . . . when the agency did not
   select her,” and DHS’s Final Agency Decision expressly referred to her
   claims regarding her non-selections as “disparate treatment claims.”
   Because we do not find that a disparate-impact claim could “reasonably have
   been expected to grow” from this administrative charge, see, e.g., Pacheo, 48

           _____________________
           10
              Angus’s 2017 EEO complaint did not mention disability discrimination and
   instead asserted only claims for sex and age discrimination, as well as for retaliation.

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   F.3d at 792, we find that the district court correctly found that Angus did not
   exhaust her disparate-impact claims.
          Turning to the merits of Angus’s remaining disability discrimination
   claims, Angus failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
   Angus’s disability discrimination claims were all rooted in ICE’s alleged
   policy of declining to place job applicants (including her) on the Schedule A
   certificate when they otherwise qualify for placement on another certificate
   (in her case, the competitive service certificate). On appeal, Angus reiterates
   this argument, essentially contending that an agency engages in disability
   discrimination when it fails to proactively prioritize applicants with a
   disability.
          Schedule A is a hiring authority that allows agencies to non-
   competitively fill certain positions. See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3102(u). As other
   courts have recognized, Schedule A authority is permissive, not mandatory.
   See Ward-Johnson v. Glin, No. 19-CV-00534, 2020 WL 2770018, at *9
   (D.D.C. May 28, 2020) (“But the regulation’s language is permissive; there
   is no obligation to hire a disabled applicant.”); see also Hylton v. Calabria, No.
   17-2023, 2020 WL 6134673, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2020). Put another way,
   although Schedule A gives agencies a “means to avoid competitive
   placement,” it “does not impose an obligation to use this authority in any
   specific case.” MacDonald v. Cohen, 233 F.3d 648, 653 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing
   Van Wersch v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 197 F.3d 1144, 1146 (Fed. Cir.
   1999)). Thus, contrary to Angus’s contention, the regulation does not confer
   a “civil right” to be on the Schedule A certificate such that the failure to
   utilize the Schedule A hiring authority can, on its own, sustain a cause of

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   action for discrimination.11 Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed
   her disparate-treatment claims for failure to state a claim.12
           For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of
   Angus’s claims for disability discrimination.
                                               ii.
           Next, Angus brought several claims challenging ICE’s actions in
   processing and investigating her EEO complaints. Specifically, Angus alleged
   that ICE’s EEO office (the Office of Diversity and Civil Rights) failed to
   timely process her complaints, properly document aspects of its
   investigation, cooperate in discovery, and follow the EEOC’s administrative
   judge’s orders. She further alleged that the EEO investigators were
   improperly biased. As the district court accurately noted, however, neither
   Title VII nor any of the statutes or regulations upon which Angus relies
   confers a right of action for improper investigation or processing of a federal
   administrative employment discrimination complaint. Gibson v. Mo. Pac. R.R.
   Co., 579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VII does not confer
   a right of action against the EEOC for improper investigation or processing
   of an employment complaint); see also Daniels v. Caldera, 237 F.3d 631, 2000
   WL 1701699, at *3 (5th Cir. 2000) (“There is no compelling justification to
   confer upon federal employee plaintiffs an ‘improper complaint processing’

           _____________________
           11
             In her briefing, Angus appears to believe that, had she been considered for the
   open positions under the Schedule A certificate, she would have been hired. She does not,
   however, otherwise plead that her (or others’) non-selection was because of her disability—
   in other words, her only evidence of discrimination is ICE’s alleged failure to use its
   Schedule A hiring authority.
           12
             We note that Angus’s disparate-impact claims are similarly premised upon ICE’s
   failure to place qualified candidates with disabilities on the Schedule A certificate in
   addition to the competitive service certificate. Accordingly, these claims, even if they had
   been properly exhausted, would fail for the same reasons as her disparate-treatment claims.

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   cause of action under Title VII . . . .”). We therefore AFFIRM the district
   court’s dismissal of these claims.
                                                iii.
           Angus’s complaint also contained a single count of sex discrimination.
   Title VII prohibits discrimination in hiring on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C.
   § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where there is no direct evidence of intentional
   discrimination, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of sex
   discrimination by showing “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
   was qualified for the position she sought; (3) she suffered an adverse
   employment action; and (4) others similarly situated but outside the
   protected class were treated more favorably.”13 Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492
   F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007).
           Although Angus satisfactorily alleged the first three requirements of a
   prima facie claim for sex discrimination, she failed to allege that comparators
   outside her protected class were treated more favorably in the selection
   process. While Angus did allege that the selected candidates were outside of

           _____________________
           13
              Although, at the pleading stage, “an employment discrimination plaintiff need
   not plead a prima facie case of discrimination,” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
   515 (2002), we have nonetheless found it “helpful to refer to McDonnell Douglas to
   understand whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded an adverse employment action taken
   “because of” [her] protected status.” Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 600 (5th
   Cir. 2021); see also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex.at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016)
   (“Although Chhim did not have to submit evidence to establish a prima facie case of
   discrimination at this stage, he had to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements
   of a disparate treatment claim to make his case plausible. In that inquiry, it can be helpful
   to reference the McDonnell Douglas framework, on which Chhim would continue to rely if
   he based his claim on circumstantial evidence[.]”). As in Olivarez and Chhim, we similarly
   refer to the prima facie elements of a discrimination claim to guide our analysis as to whether
   Angus has pleaded sufficient facts to support a plausible claim for discrimination.

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   her protected class,14 she failed to allege any other facts as to the candidates’
   experience, qualifications, or other relevant attributes. See Saketkoo v. Adm’rs
   of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 998 (5th Cir. 2022) (explaining that
   courts look to a variety of factors, including past performance, job
   responsibility, experience, and qualifications to determine whether
   individuals are similarly situated). Nor did Angus otherwise plead that her
   non-selection was on account of discriminatory animus against her on
   account of her sex.15 We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of her
   sex-discrimination claim.
                                               iv.
           Similarly, Angus alleged that her non-selection for the 2012
   Intelligence Research Specialist position was the result of age discrimination.
   Pursuant to the public-sector provisions of the Age Discrimination in
   Employment Act (“ADEA”), “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees
   or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . . shall be
   made free from any discrimination based on age.” 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). As
   with a claim for sex discrimination, in the absence of direct evidence of
   discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was within the protected
   class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse
   employment decision (here, non-selection for a position); and (4) she was
   replaced by someone younger or treated less favorably than similarly situated

           _____________________
           14
             Angus alleged that three of the four selected candidates for the 2012 Intelligence
   Research Specialist position were men (the chosen candidate for the 2012 Intelligence
   Assistant position was a woman), and that ICE hired a man for the 2016/2017 Investigative
   Research Specialist position.
           15
              In her complaint, Angus cited reports indicating that women are
   underrepresented compared to men at ICE. Yet the existence of a gender gap in
   employment at the agency does not suffice to show that a given employment decision was
   motivated by discriminatory animus.

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   younger employees to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.16
   Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 196 (5th Cir. 2003). As with her claim
   for sex discrimination, although Angus alleged that each of the four selected
   candidates were “approximately 20 or more years younger than” her, she
   failed to allege that these candidates were similarly situated to her.
   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the dismissal of her age-discrimination claim.
                                         B.
          As with a grant of a motion to dismiss, we review a district court’s
   grant of summary judgment de novo. Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561
   (5th Cir. 2020). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that
   there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
   to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A
   genuine issue of material fact exists when there is evidence sufficient for a
   rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Perez v. Region 20
   Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Matsushita Elec.
   Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). When
   reviewing an appeal from summary judgment, we view the facts and evidence
   in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable
   inferences in her favor. Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2017).
   We may affirm the district court on any ground supported by the record, even
   if different from the one relied upon by the district court. Bluebonnet Hotel
   Ventures, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 754 F.3d 272, 276 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (citations omitted).
          Only Angus’s claim for retaliation under Title VII proceeded to
   summary judgment. We evaluate a claim for retaliation based on
   circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence under the burden-shifting
          _____________________
          16
               See supra note 13.

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   framework first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
   792, 802-05 (1973). Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th
   Cir. 2000). First, Angus must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
   showing that “(1) [she] participated in an activity protected by Title VII;
   (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action against [her] [here,
   the failure to hire]; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected
   activity and the adverse employment action.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport,
   492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007). If she makes this showing, the burden
   shifts to DHS to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory
   reason for its failure to hire Angus. Id. at 557. Should DHS satisfy this burden,
   Angus “bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered
   reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real. . . retaliatory purpose.”
   Id.
           Here, assuming Angus established a prima facie case of retaliation,
   DHS provided legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons as to its hiring decisions
   for each of the three positions to which Angus applied—each of the selected
   candidates possessed qualifications superior to Angus’s.17 For both the 2012
   Intelligence Research Specialist position and 2016/2017 Investigative
   Research Specialist position, each of the five selected candidates either had
   prior substantive intelligence experience, military experience, or both. In
   contrast, Angus, who at the time of her application was not working for ICE,
   self-admittedly had neither substantive intelligence experience (at best, she
   had provided investigative assistance and support) nor military experience.
   Additionally, each candidate had attained greater or more relevant academic
           _____________________
           17
              Because we can dispose of Angus’s retaliation claims on the merits, we need not
   address the alternative argument that she failed to exhaust any retaliation claims related to
   her 2012 and 2016/2017 non-selections. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846
   (2019) (holding that prerequisites to suit such as Title VII’s charge-filing precondition are
   not jurisdictional in nature).

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                                         No. 22-50600

   achievement than Angus, who had an associate’s degree in liberal arts.
   Similarly, the candidate selected for the 2012 Investigative Assistant position
   had attained a higher GS level than Angus, had more years of federal service
   than Angus, and had obtained both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree. Put
   plainly, this gap in qualifications is more than enough to demonstrate that
   DHS had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for selecting other candidates
   over Angus.
           Therefore, Angus bore the burden of rebutting DHS’s proffered
   explanation and showing that the reason given was “merely pretextual.”
   Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 969 F.3d 571, 578 (5th Cir. 2020).
   “Pretext can be proven by any evidence that casts doubt on the credence of
   the employer’s proffered justification for the adverse employment action.”
   Id. None of the evidence to which Angus points, however, creates an issue of
   fact as to whether ICE’s stated reasons were pretextual.
           First, Angus refers to ICE’s failure to forward her application under
   the Schedule A certificate and seemingly implies that this failure was
   somehow nefarious. These arguments, however, speak not to pretext, but to
   her already-dismissed claims for disability discrimination.18
           Next, Angus points to the email from Robinette, written after he had
   retired from DHS and in response to the EEO investigation, in which he
   recalled that Angus “ha[d] been applying for multiple vacancies and when
   not selected she files a discrimination allegation.” As a preliminary matter,
   because Robinette was not involved in the selection process for the

           _____________________
           18
            To the extent that Angus is implying that the failure to place her application on
   the Schedule A certificate was retaliation for her prior EEO activity, we note that this
   argument conflicts with her own disparate-impact claims, which assert that her non-
   placement on the Schedule A certificate was the result of a general policy at ICE.

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                                    No. 22-50600

   2016/2017 position, this email only speaks to the existence of pretext as to
   the 2012 non-selections.
          More importantly, considered in light of the record as a whole, this
   statement does not constitute evidence of pretext. To begin, it is factually
   true—at the time Robinette responded to the email, Angus had applied for
   multiple positions and had filed discrimination allegations as to those non-
   selections. Additionally, Robinette provided a written declaration stating
   that, at the time of selection, he had not been aware that Angus was on the
   list of eligible applicants for the Intelligence Research Specialist position,19
   and that he had never considered any candidate beyond J.C. for the
   Intelligence Assistant position. An email written more than a year after that
   decision does not cast doubt upon these statements, nor does it reflect
   Robinette’s state of mind when making the hiring decision.
          Finally, Angus appears to argue that some of the selected candidates
   (specifically, J.W. and J.C.) were not actually qualified for the job. To the
   extent that Angus contends that she was more qualified than these
   candidates, as already discussed above, the evidence shows the contrary is
   true. See EEOC v. La. Off. of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (“A fact finder can infer pretext if it finds that the employee was ‘clearly
   better qualified’ (as opposed to merely better or as qualified) than the
   employees who are selected.”). And, insofar as Angus argues that other
   candidates misrepresented their qualifications on their own applications, she

          _____________________
          19
            Indeed, Robinette did not even conduct the interview screening for the
   position—he had delegated that task to Ashurst and Salazar.

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                                         No. 22-50600

   fails to explain how such misstatements demonstrate that ICE’s stated
   reasons for not selecting her were pretextual.20
          In conclusion, even assuming that Angus’s claims have been properly
   exhausted and that she can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, she has
   failed to show that the proffered reasons for her non-selection were
   pretextual. We therefore find that the district court properly granted
   summary judgment in favor of DHS and AFFIRM.
                                     *        *         *
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          20
             Indeed, Angus concedes that ICE would not have been aware of J.C.’s alleged
   misrepresentations until December 2012, after the positions had been filled.

                                                  19