Court Opinion

ID: 9461414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:14:07.553227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:03.253705
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge
(dissenting in part):
On this record and at this point in time I do not differ with the Court’s holding no Eighth Amendment violation occurred, because I am not sure an isolated incident such as this — in violation of established prison regulations — should come within that Amendment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Nosser, 5 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 835, 842 (Simpson, J., concurring specially), incorporationg by reference Roberts v. Williams, 5 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 819, 834 (Simpson, J., specially concurring).
Instead, my dissent is focused on the Court’s erroneous assertion the Eighth Amendment is the only issue before this Court. Completely forgotten was the due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleged a Civil Rights Action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The plaintiff sought recovery for the action of the prison guards under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Eighth Amendment. And in this Court appellant continues to urge the Fourteenth Amendment as an alternate ground for relief — citing Johnson v. Glick, 2 Cir., 1973, 481 F.2d 1028.
Two distinctive operational facts are presented. The first, on which the Court focuses, is the decision to use tear gas to allay a possible riot. The second, is whether suitable steps were taken to overcome the harmful effects of the gas once order was in hand. Just from reading the Court’s account of the officers’ “justifications” a trial court facing up to this issue might well find that the guards were consciously taking no action out of retaliatory or retributive motives. They must be charged with actual notice of the regulation 1 Greggs was suspended *1341for violating. Further, at least 40%— four out of nine or ten — of those occupying the area required medical attention. On Due Process the issue is not whether it is enough to find justification for the initial teargassing, but whether there was any justification for failing to vent the area during the ensuing 30 minutes.
“Section 1979 [now 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983]' should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Monroe v. Pape, 1961, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 484, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 505. Of course, the right of action, as a Congressional expression of policy, should not be read to include merely technical torts, such as inoffensive— though unprivileged — touchings. Nevertheless, several of our Sister Circuits have recognized Civil Rights Actions under the Due Process clause in cases similar to this, without relying on any more specific constitutional provision (such as the Eighth Amendment). Draeger v. Grand Central, Inc., 10 Cir., 1974, 504 F.2d 142; Gregory v. Thompson, 9 Cir., 1974, 500 F.2d 59; Curtis v. Everette, 3 Cir., 1973, 489 F.2d 516, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774; Johnson v. Glick, 2 Cir., 481 F.2d 1028,2 cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 1973, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324.
Our own Circuit has indicated acceptance of this rule, and in' my view the Court errs today by falling away from it. Anderson v. Nosser, 5 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 835 (en banc); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 5 Cir., 1975, 506 F.2d 904; Tolbert v. Bragan, 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 1020; cf. Rodriguez v. Jones, 5 Cir., 1973, 473 F.2d 599, cert. denied, 1973, 412 U.S. 953, 93 S.Ct. 3023, 37 L.Ed.2d 1007.
What — and all — I am saying at this juncture is that the District Judge did not pass upon the due process claim. The plaintiff has not had a trial on a vital part of his case. He is entitled to that even though the Judge might conclude that there was no denial of due process. My dissent does not forecast what that decision should be or what I would do with it if it came back to me on appeal. Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 5 Cir., 1971, 451 F.2d 505; Barber v. Motor Vessel “Blue' Cat”, 5 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 626.

. FROM: Walter T. Capps, Warden
TO: Atmore & Holman Lieutenants & Sergeants
IN RE: MACE & TEAR GAS
This is to advise that it has been brought to my attention that some of the Officers have used Mace and Tear Gas on occasions when it may not have been necessary.
*1341In the future, Mace and Tear Gas will be used only in case of an emergency. Such as when an 'inmate is destroying State property, endangering the life of another inmate or Correctional Officer.
Mace and Tear Gas have been placed in the Central Control Station at the Holman Unit and in the Main Cubical [sic] at Atmore Prison Farm for the purpose of an emergency.
Any time that a Correctional Officer is forced to use Mace or Tear Gas, he is to write a report on the details and send it to me.
You are not to use Mace or Tear Gas unless it is absolutely necessary.
Your cooperation in this matter is expected. Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 4.

. In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
481 F.2d at 1033.
Assuming (without deciding in this dissenting opinion) Judge Friendly’s analysis is correct, a trial court, facing up to the issue as framed by pleadings and the evidence, F.R. Civ.P. 15(b), might have held the line to have been crossed in this case. On this approach, not only was Greggs suspended for violating a regulation he had to know about, but at least 40% of the prisoners subjected to the gas needed medical attention. Balanced against these injuries, which were substantial, was the fact that from the standpoint of prison security at that stage the guards conceded that they were in no physical danger because of the double-lock system in the cellblock.