Court Opinion

ID: 9850934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:39.562182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.888814
License: Public Domain

Gordon, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion. I will limit my comments to that portion of the majority opinion which holds that there is no basis in the record for an award for future pain and suffering.
Mr. Rivera testified that he had continuing pains; Dr. Zupnik supported that claim with testimony that Mr. *316Rivera would “continue to have some pain for an indefinite period of time.” At another point, the medical doctor stated: “I don’t think one could actually set a period. I felt it was indefinite . . . .”
I believe that this satisfies the legal requirement of Diemel v. Weirich (1953), 264 Wis. 265, 58 N. W. (2d) 651, as recently examined by this court in Huss v. Vande Hey (1965), 29 Wis. (2d) 34, 138 N. W. (2d) 192. In my view, this is true even though Dr. Zupnik’s testimony related to a physical examination that was held about a year earlier. The date of the doctor's examination might very well affect the weight to be given to his opinion, but it would not render the evaluation incompetent. Indeed, no claim is made that the opinion was inadmissible. The majority opinion does not declare that Dr. Zupnik’s opinion was inadmissible, but, nevertheless, the doctor’s opinion is ruled to be insufficient as a matter of law. As I read the record there was sufficient evidence to have enabled the jury to conclude that there would in fact be future pain and suffering; this conclusion was approved by the trial court.
Dr. Zupnik’s testimony was relevant and competent; it was not so remote as to bar it from being received as evidence. Since the doctor’s testimony was admissible, its import was for the trier of fact — not for this court. We violate the “any credible evidence” rule to which we are so firmly dedicated when we usurp the jury’s function of weighing the evidence. A multitude of cases could be cited to support this proposition. The rule is forcefully summarized by Mr. Justice Wilkie’s opinion in Bleyer v. Gross (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 305, 307, 120 N. W. (2d) 156:
“The rule is well established that a verdict or a finding of a jury will not be set aside or disturbed, ‘if there is any credible evidence which under any reasonable view fairly admits of an inference that supports the jury’s finding.’ Van Galder v. Snyder (1948), 254 Wis. 120, *317123, 35 N. W. (2d) 187. ‘The familiar rule, often declared by this court, that where there is credible evidence to support a finding of a jury we may not disturb it, needs no citation of authorities.’ Mossak v. Pfost (1950), 258 Wis. 73, 75, 44 N. W. (2d) 922. It should be further pointed out, ‘on review this court must accept the credible evidence most favorable to sustain the verdict.’ ”
As I see it, there is nothing inherently inadequate in a medical doctor’s testimony that his patient’s pain will continue for an indefinite period. Even though the doctor’s appraisal were based on an examination which was a year old, the jury, nevertheless, could accept such opinion. It was the defendants’ responsibility to challenge the doctor’s opinion by cross-examination or by conflicting medical testimony. Then, the trier of fact was to decide which view was the more tenable.