Court Opinion

ID: 9681657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:53:58.690288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:35.171203
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion herein. I would hold that the trial court erroneously dismissed defendant’s counterclaim and would remand the case for trial thereon.
The Authority’s petition in condemnation herein was filed on April 21, 1966. On May 26, 1966, Heffner filed an answer and counterclaim. The Authority then filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim and on June 23, 1966, the court sustained that motion and dismissed the counterclaim. Subsequently, the commissioners filed their report and in April, 1968, the case was tried on exceptions to that report.
The counterclaim having been dismissed by the court, the case was tried solely on the issue of the value of the property taken in condemnation, and in that connection the court instructed the jury that it should award Heffner “such sum as you believe was the fair market value of defendant’s property immediately before the taking on October 24, 1966.”
Heffner does not attack or appeal from the judgment entered on the petition in condemnation. He does not seek to change the rule fixing the valuation date as the time when the amount of the commissioners’ award is paid into the registry of the court. Instead, he asserts that the Authority in connection with its ultimate condemnation of his property began to and did exercise dominion over his property from and after September 17, 1964, thereby damaging and depreciating his property in direct violation of both Missouri and federal constitutional provisions unless he is compensated therefor.
The first question presented is whether it is permissible in Missouri to have a counterclaim for damage done to the property by condemnor prior to the date of taking as of which the condemnation award is determined. This question is posed but not reached or answered in the principal opinion because it concludes that the counterclaim was properly dismissed as not stating facts justifying a finding of a taking by the Authority prior to the date of payment of *201the commissioners’ award into the of the court. registry
In my view, such a counterclaim is permissible. A recent decision by the St. Louis Court of Appeals will illustrate. In Harris v. L. P. and H. Construction Co., Mo.App., 441 S.W.2d 377, defendant telephone company, through its contractor, erected telephone lines across plaintiff’s land without first condemning an easement therefor. Plaintiff brought suit for trespass and for cutting of trees on the property. The telephone company, in what it called an affirmative defense but which the court treated as a counterclaim, sought by “inverse condemnation” to acquire an easement over the property. The trial court permitted the telephone company to condemn as of the date it first trespassed and entered judgment for the condemnation award of $800. The Court of Appeals held, that it was error to permit condemnation on a retroactive basis, saying, 441 S.W.2d 1. c. 384: “No authority exists under the condemnation statutes for the assessment of past damage resulting from defendants’ trespass. In short, the proceeding by way of condemnation cannot relieve defendants from liability for the damages resulting to the plaintiffs from the prior trespassing. The trial here proceeded on the basis that the jury therein was assessing in a condemnation action all damages sustained by plaintiffs as a result of all the conduct of the Telephone Company or its agents. This was beyond the scope of a condemnation proceeding and requires reversal of the judgment.”
The judgment was reversed so as to permit plaintiff to try his petition for damages which accrued prior to the condemnation. It is apparent that while the parties in this inverse condemnation situation were reversed from the usual order, actually the counterclaim there corresponds to the petition in condemnation and the petition for damages which was remanded for trial corresponds to a counterclaim for antecedent damages such as Heffner seeks to maintain.
I do not consider that State ex rel. City of St. Louis v. Beck, 333 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814, or St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes, Mo., 375 S.W.2d 144, hold that a counterclaim is not permissible. The question of whether a counterclaim could be asserted was not involved. Beck was an original prohibition proceeding to prohibit the trial judge from including in his instructions to the commissioners an authorization to hear evidence as to whether damage had been sustained by reason of the long delay in which an original proceeding was abandoned and a new one instituted or because the new suit sought only part of the property described in the original suit. The court held, 63 S.W.2d 1. c. 817:
“We do not undertake to decide if the realty company is entitled to any damages on account of the pendency or delay of the condemnation proceeding itself, and if there is any damage on account of such proceedings, it is of a personal character, as distinguished from any damage to the property itself, and is not an element to be considered by the commissioners in assessing benefits and damages in this proceeding. Petition of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 392, 90 A. 329, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 262.
“We, therefore, believe that the respondent would be acting in excess of his jurisdiction in giving an instruction to the commissioners to consider such damages as are set forth in the realty company’s motion.”
Barnes was a condemnation suit by the Housing Authority, but no counterclaim for damages to the property from the date of taking was involved. Instead, the owner sought to have the court instruct the jury that in assessing damages (making the condemnation award) they could “take into consideration any damages caused to defendant’s property as a result of the institution of the condemnation proceedings, either by the actual filing of the condemnation petition or by the announcement of plans for condemnation and the effect of such announcement on the value of such property if you find that such announce*202ment, if any, caused the property to change in value.”
Relying on Beck, supra, this court in Barnes held that such damages could not be recovered as an element of damage for the taking. Neither case held that the owner could not recover for damages preceding the taking, if shown. In the determination of the condemnation award in this suit Heffner did not seek to include damages caused by the Authority prior to the commissioners’ award. Instead, he sought to recover therefor in the counterclaim which he filed. These damages allegedly accrued as a result of actions of the Authority which preceded but led up to its ultimate condemnation of the property. Admittedly, the award in condemnation did not take into account or compensate for depreciation in value (here acknowledged) which occurred after the Authority announced its plan on September 17, 1964, and before the commissioners’ award was filed on October 24, 1966. Unless the landowner is permitted in some action to allege and prove that the Authority did damage and depreciate the value of his property by acts prior to the commissioners’ award in condemnation, then he is forced to bear that loss himself and the provision in Article 1, Section 26 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, saying “That private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation” (emphasis supplied) becomes an empty constitutional guarantee in his situation. In my view, he should be given the opportunity to prove that his property was damaged by acts of the Authority. The determination of such issues relates to the same subject matter as those in the petition in condemnation and should be litigated in a counterclaim in that action.1 This is the sort of situation which the compulsory counterclaim rule (S.Ct. Rule 55.45, V.A.M.R.) contemplates. It actually is comparable to the procedure approved by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Harris v. L. P. and H. Construction Co., supra.
The second question presented is whether Heffner’s counterclaim alleges sufficient facts to state a claim. It alleges that on September 17, 1964, the plaintiff placed on file a proposed plan for redevelopment of the area in which Heffner’s two 22-room, four-family brick buildings were located and proposed to acquire such property. The two buildings are alleged to have been worth $45,000 and $48,000, respectively, on September 17, 1964. It also is alleged that notices of a public hearing thereon were published in late October and early November, 1964, and that such public hearing was held November 19, 1964, at which the Authority’s intention to acquire land including Heffner’s tracts was clearly set forth. The counterclaim alleges that the Authority enticed all the tenants in both buildings to move, knowing that if the property was vacant it would be vandalized and would depreciate in value. It also alleges that filing of the condemnation suit was delayed until April 29, 1966, although the plaintiff had exercised dominion over the property from and after September 17, 1964. The counterclaim states that the actions of plaintiff in exercising dominion over the property without compensation to the owner and prior to condemnation thereof violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 10 of the 1945 Constitution of Missouri. It seeks recovery of the difference in value between the sums of $45,000 and $48,000 and the amounts awarded in condemnation for the taking as of October 24, 1966. These allegations, in my view, are sufficient to allege that the *203Authority by its actions damaged the landowner’s property without compensation therefor, contrary to the applicable constitutional provisions.
As previously noted, this counterclaim was stricken on motion and was not tried. During the course of the presentation of evidence on the trial of exceptions to the commissioners’ award, Heffner sought and was denied permission to refile his counterclaim. Following the court’s ruling, counsel for Heffner then made an offer of proof which was rejected.
In ruling on the sufficiency of the counterclaim to state a claim, the principal opinion considers the offer of proof made by Heffner. In my view, this is not permissible. The counterclaim had been dismissed and there was no issue before the court relative to damage to the property preceding the date of filing of the commissioners’ award. This was recognized by counsel for the Authority when he objected to the offer of proof and in so doing stated:
“Your Honor, rather than take up the Court’s time, of course, it is entirely up to the discretion of the Judge, but since the counterclaim is not accepted by the Court and there is no issue in this proceeding about making an offer of proof, we don’t accomplish anything. The question is a question of law. If on appeal Mr. Sleater is able to try his counterclaim, he will have to adduce his entire facts as to the counterclaim. The facts which he is going to show the Court today, really, will just take up the Court’s time, because it is not in issue. It has been dismissed.”
Heffner should not be denied a trial on his counterclaim on the basis that his offer of proof made after the court refused refiling of his counterclaim was deficient in some respect.
The principal opinion also takes into consideration allegations in the petition in condemnation in determining whether the counterclaim states a claim. It observes that according to the petition the Authority had to follow certain prescribed procedure which included seeking passage of an ordinance, entering into a contract with the city, seeking federal financial assistance, declaring the heed to acquire the property in the project, and filing the petition in condemnation. The principal opinion concludes that these mere allegations are sufficient to refute the assertion in the counterclaim that the Authority stalled and delayed the filing of the condemnation petition and presumably cause the allegations of the counterclaim to fail to state a claim. The opinion further concludes that since § 99.420(11), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., provides for the Authority to furnish assistance in relocating families displaced by the project, it was not improper conduct for the Authority to contact families in order to assist them in relocating. It further notes that whereas the counterclaim states that the Authority enticed tenants to move, the offer of proof only said that the Authority had contacted five tenants and encouraged them to move, and did not recite when this occurred or when the tenants moved.
In my view, this reliance on allegations in the condemnation petition and on asserted insufficiency in the landowner’s offer of proof does not provide a valid basis for holding that the counterclaim failed to state a claim. The fact that the Authority followed statutory procedure does not mean that the landowner’s property was not damaged without compensation therefor by the Authority’s actions, in violation of Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945.2 If Heffner should prove in a trial of his counterclaim that the Authority did exercise dominion over his property prior to condemnation and did contact ten*204ants and arrange to move them elsewhere, and that by its actions the property was damaged prior to the time when the commissioners’ award in condemnation was filed, he would be entitled under the constitutional provision to be compensated for that damage. Whether Heffner could and would make the necessary proof should be determined in a normal trial on the counterclaim, not by an offer of proof made in a case in which the counterclaim is not a pleading and not by what the petition in condemnation alleges was the statutory procedure which the Authority was to follow. There is logic in a statutory provision providing for other places to live for-those to be displaced, but if as a result the property is damaged, those losses should rest on the condemning Authority, not on the landowner whose land is being condemned.
I am impressed by the reasoning in the cases cited in the principal opinion which arose in Michigan, Ohio and New York. Some are by state courts and some by federal courts sitting in those states. They apply both state and federal constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Without lengthening this dissent by a review and analysis of those cases, I note merely that they conclude that where the condemning authority by its actions causes depreciation in value of the property prior to a taking in the usual sense, the landowner is entitled to compensation therefor.
The principal opinion refers to these cases, particularly Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F.Supp. 655, and City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52, 5 A.L.R.3d 891, as extreme cases and states that if such cases arise in Missouri, they will be dealt with on their facts. I cannot see any basis for concluding that these cases were extreme but that Heffner’s case is not. The Detroit and Cleveland cases were tried and the court had the full facts. The landowner had a chance to develop fully what the city had done and how his property was damaged. Heffner has not had his day in court on this same issue. Even so, what is before us indicates that Heffner had eight tenants in his two four-apartment buildings when this plan was announced and filed. Each unit rented for $75.00 per month. The Authority filed its plan, conducted hearings, contacted the tenants about moving, and told Heffner they would be acquiring the buildings shortly and not to make improvements. The tenants began to move out and within approximately a year all the tenants were gone and no one else moved in. Annual rentals dropped from $7,200 to zero. The vacant buildings were vandalized. Their value dropped, just as occurred in the Detroit and Cleveland cases. This loss in value is recognized in the principal opinion when it states: “On this appeal, a major matter of contention is the bearing upon this case of the admitted depreciation in the condition of the property following the filing of the plan of renewal on September 17, 1964, and the payment of the commissioners’ award, October 24, 1966.” As a result of that depreciation, the Authority’s witnesses valued the property as vacant lots, considering the buildings to be beyond economical repair. These facts, even without the elaboration which a trial would make possible, disclose a situation comparable in many respects to the cases which the principal opinion calls extreme and which it says “present situations in which the traditional rules of valuation fail to meet the constitutional requirements.”
I would hold that the counterclaim does allege sufficient facts to entitle Heffner to a trial thereon and would reverse and remand for that purpose.

. The other alternatives would be to permit recovery therefor in the actual condemnation award by moving back the date of taking and to instruct the jury accordingly as directed in City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896, or to permit a separate suit therefor. If the landowner is to be denied the opportunity to prove his claim in this counterclaim, the principal opinion ought to indicate the vehicle and means by which he will have his day in court on his constitutional guarantee.

. For example, in City of St. Louis v. International Harvester Co., Mo., 350 S.W.2d 782 [3], the city had followed the provision of its Charter, but this court held Section 26 of Article I of the Constitution of Missouri, 1945, governed, and in that case the. Charter provision was held unconstitutional.