Court Opinion

ID: 9845934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:31:27.416424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:29.121631
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent primarily on the basis of my dissent in Horton v. Brown, 117 Ga. App. 47 (159 SE2d 489) (1967). First, in my opinion the wrongful death statutes are intended to create a new cause of action for the recovery of damages suffered by the survivors, and such right of action does not rest upon any rights derivative from their ancestor, the decedent. The Code section (105-1306) clearly provides that the right to bring suit is vested in "those surviving at the time the action” is brought. If the right of action was derived solely from the deceased, those *719surviving at the time of the death of the deceased or their representatives would be entitled to bring the action. Thus, this Code section created a new cause of action in those surviving at the time the action is brought and is not related to or dependent upon whether or not the deceased could have sued the wrongdoer for damages had the decedent lived.
Secondly, this is a suit against a stepfather, as was the situation in Horton, supra. The Harrell opinion clearly indicated that the intent of the General Assembly was to authorize an action under this statute only against third persons other than the father (mother). Since the defendant here, the stepfather, is not the father of the plaintiffs, he can only be a "third person” as contemplated by the language in Harrell. He is a blood stranger to the plaintiffs with no relationship sufficient to bar an action against him under the doctrine of intra-family immunity.
"Both this court and the Supreme Court have said that the word 'parent’ used in the statutes means the lawful father or mother, and that a child cannot recover for the homicide of his stepfather even though he stood in loco parentis to the child. Marshall v. Macon &c. Lumber Co., 103 Ga. 725 (30 SE 571, 41 LRA 211, 68 ASR 140); Weems v. Saul, 52 Ga. App. 470 (183 SE 661). A stepfather is simply not within the circle; is one 'other than a member of the class designated’ and as such is subject to suit for the wrongful death of a member of the circle.” Dissenting opinion, Horton v. Brown, supra, p. 57.
If a child cannot recover for the wrongful death of his stepfather, why should the law protect the stepfather from suit by the child for the wrongful death of his mother?
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hill joins in this dissent.