Court Opinion

ID: 9485908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:33:43.73962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:26.506394
License: Public Domain

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority’s holding today permits a judgment of conviction to stand where “the most damaging evidence” against the defendant was presented through the testimony of an expert witness who was not sworn to testify truthfully and was not reminded of the penalty for perjury. Because I believe that a conviction based on the unsworn testimony of a key witness violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to meaningful confrontation, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority concludes that “there was no error, and certainly no plain error” in the court’s failure to administer a specific witness oath to Ms. Ahrens. Maj. opinion at —1235. I disagree. As the majority correctly notes, there is no constitutional or statutorily required form of oath. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.1992). We have stated that “any statement indicating that the [witness] is impressed with the duty to tell the truth and understands that he or she can be prosecuted for perjury for failure to do so satisfies the requirement for an oath or affirmation_” Gordon v. Idaho, 778 F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir.1985). The oath formulated by the district court and administered to Ms. Ahrens,, however, satisfied neither of these requirements. The district court merely asked Ms. Ahrens: “Do you swear that you have translated the tape that is in issue here today from Spanish to English to the best of your ability so help you God?” (emphasis added). The court did not remind Ms. Ahrens of her duty to tell the truth while on the stand, nor did it inform her that she would face imprisonment if she testified falsely.
The majority reasons that it was unnecessary to administer the standard witness oath to Ms. Ahrens because “[h]er testimony and the direct and cross examination that followed merely tested the accuracy and validity of her translation, not her credibility or veracity as a witness.” Maj. opinion at 1235. The record, however, belies this conclusion. The trial transcript contains over thirty pages of extensive cross-examination of Ms. Ahrens during which defense counsel attempted to impeach the veracity of her testimony concerning her translation of the taped conversations. Because none of the jurors understood Spanish, Ms. Ahrens’ credibility and the veracity of her testimony were clearly critical factors for the jury to consider in determining Armijo’s culpability.
The majority further relies on Ms. Ahrens’ testimony that, as an interpreter, she is subject to a standing oath “so it doesn’t have to be done every time [she] appearfs] in Court,” .to support its conclusion that Ms. Ahrens was properly sworn as a witness.- Id. at 1235. The text of this standing interpreter’s oath, however, is not set forth in the record. Accordingly, we have no way of determining whether the standing oath she received reminded her of her duty to tell the truth while testifying as a witness,,and whether it apprised her of the punishment for testifying falsely.1 Moreover, we have held that the *1237standing interpreters’ oath is inapplicable where the translator takes the stand to testify as a witness. See United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 532 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (translator who testifies as a witnesis subject to standard witness oath, not the interpreter’s oath). Because the district court failed to administer a standard witness oath to Ms. Ahrens, as required by the law of this circuit as explained in Taren-Palma, I cannot join my brethren in their conclusion that the trial court did not err.
II.
We have not previously considered the question whether the failure to swear a witness in a criminal case violates a defendant’s constitutional rights. Other circuits have-labeled the failure to administer the standard witness oath an “irregularity” that is waived on appeal if not promptly objected to in the trial court. United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 114 (4th Cir.1984) (“It is well settled that the swearing of a witness is waived by failure to raise the point during the witness’ testimony, thus denying the trial court an opportunity to correct what has been characterized as an ‘irregularity.’ ”); see also United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 273 (5th Cir.1981) (“It has long been the general rule that even a failure to swear a witness may be waived.”); Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.) (By failing to bring the lack of an oath to the attention of the court at the time the witness testified, the defendant waived the right to seek a new trial on that ground), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 943, 76 S.Ct. 834, 100 L.Ed. 1469 (1956); Beausoliel v. United States, 107 F.2d 292, 294 (D.C.Cir.1939) (“[W]e are of the opinion that the irregular administration of the oath to a witness, or the taking of testimony without an oath at all, must, if known to the adverse party, be objected to at the time. [A defendant] may not, with knowledge of the irregularity, permit the trial to proceed, and raise the question after the verdict.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In my view, the failure to impress upon an essential witness his or her duty to testify truthfully or face a penalty for perjury cannot be passed off as a mere “irregularity.” The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 842, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3162, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). The right to confrontation includes not .only the right to cross-examine witnesses, but also insures “that the witness will give his statements under oath — thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the he by the possibility of a penalty for perjury.” Id. at 845, 110 S.Ct. at 3163 (quoting United States v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). To label the failure to swear an essential witness against a defendant in a criminal case an “irregularity,” as was done in eases decided prior to Maryland v. Craig, is to ignore the teaching of the Court that the failure to administer an oath reminding the witness that he or she must testify truthfully or face the penalty of imprisonment denies a criminal defendant his right to meaningful confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.
Having established that the failure to administer an oath to a witness that sufficiently reminds him or her of the duty to testify truthfully and the consequences of perjury violates the Constitution, I now address the type of constitutional error that occurs in these circumstances. The Supreme Court has identified two kinds of constitutional error in a criminal proceeding — structural error and trial error. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,—, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Structural errors are “defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards.” Id. Examples of structural error include the denial of an impartial tribunal, the denial of counsel, id., and the failure to give a reasonable doubt instruction to the jury. Sullivan v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2083, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). These errors are structural because “[without these basic protections, a criminal trial *1238cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3105-06, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986)). Trial errors, in contrast, impact a defendant’s constitutional rights without destroying the trial’s basic structure. Standen v. Whitley, 994 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 1264-65). The erroneous admission of evidence is a classic example of trial error. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 1265.
The failure to swear witnesses is not simply an error in the admission of evidence. Rather, such a defect undermines the basic truth-seeking function of the entire criminal trial. Our 'adversary system of justice has embraced the belief that the best mechanism to elicit the truth is to impress witnesses with the duty to testify truthfully and admonish them of the penalty for perjury. See VI John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, § 1817 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976) (“By ... laying hold of the conscience of the witness and appealing to his sense of accountability,- the law best insures the utterance of truth.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1977) (“[TJhose who have been impressed with the moral, religious or legal significance of formally undertaking to tell the truth are more likely to do so than those who-have not made such an undertaking or been so impressed.”). Without the administration of the oath, a witness could feel free to lie with impunity without any fear of punishment for testifying falsely. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (crime of perjury is dependent on whether the testimony was given under oath or affirmation). Thus, I question whether a criminal trial in which a defendant has been deprived of the basic protection that the prosecution’s witnesses will be subject to imprisonment if they testify falsely, has reliably served “its function as a vehicle for [the] determination of guilt or innocence.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 1265 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
I do not suggest that the failure to swear every kind of witness should automatically compel reversal. The situation presented in this case differs sharply from circumstances where a witness merely provides ministerial evidence. For example, the failure to swear a witness called to establish the chain of custody, a custodian of records, or any other person whose testimony provides no percipient evidence tending to prove guilt, probably should not compel reversal. Where the court fails to swear a witness whose testimony is critical to establishing the defendant’s culpability, however, the judgment of conviction should not be permitted to stand.
Because I speak only for myself, I cannot enter a judgment holding that the failure to swear an essential witness constitutes structural error requiring automatic reversal. Under existing law, however, I am compelled to conclude that reversal is mandated in this case even under the more liberal standard of plain error. See United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.1991) (In the absence of a timely objection, we review allegations of a Confrontation Clause violations under the plain error doctrine because a failure to comply with the Confrontation Clause infringes on substantial rights), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 107, 121 L.Ed.2d 65 (1992). We will reverse for plain error in. those circumstances where it “appears necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.” United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 398 (9th Cir.1987).
The majority concludes that the “most damaging evidence” against Armijo were the tape recorded conversations. Maj. opinion at 1234. The majority then attempts to diminish the importance of Ms. Ahrens’ testimony by reasoning that the “jury was instructed that the tape, rather than the transcript, was the evidence.” Maj. opinion at 1234. I agree that- Ms. Ahrens’ translation of the' tape recorded' conversations contained the most damaging evidence against Armijo. The record, however, reflects that the jury did not understand Spanish. Because the tape recorded conversations were in Spanish, *1239the jury could not compare Ms. Ahrens’ translation with the tapes to determine what was said. Thus, Ms. Ahrens’ testimony concerning the accuracy of her translation was critical to establishing Armijo’s- culpability. Because I believe that a conviction based on the unsworn testimony of a key witness against the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause, constitutes a miscarriage of justice even in the absence of a timely objection, and is a classic example of a defect in the truth-seeking mechanism of the judicial process, I would reverse.