Court Opinion

ID: 9662033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:57:44.137596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:34.946541
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims for damages and dissent from that portion of the judgment which remands the cause for hearing insofar as it pertains to injunctive relief against future flooding.
If the plaintiff has no enforceable claim for damages against the State for the taking or damaging of her lands, she has no right to injunctive relief. The majority opinion relies upon Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N. W. 2d 632, to support the dismissal of plaintiff’s causes of action for damages accruing from the floods of 1966 and 1969. Bordy holds that a suit against the State based on Article I, section 21, of the Constitution (prohibiting the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation), is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations of section 25-218, R. R. S. 1943. The Bordy case has never been overruled. Many other cases make it clear that passive acquiescence by an individual in the appropriation of his property, if continued for the statutory period of limitations, constitutes *528a waiver of his rights under Article I, section 21, of the Constitution. See, Kime v. Cass County, on rehearing, 71 Neb. 680, 101 N. W. 2; Bridge v. City of Lincoln, 138 Neb. 461, 293 N. W. 375; Armbruster v. Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 169 Neb. 594, 100 N. W. 2d 781.
The only real question here is: What is the applicable statute of limitations? If the 2-year limitation of section 25-218, R. R. S. 1943, does not apply, then the 10-year limitation of section 25-202, R. R. S. 1943, must apply. The latter section provides: “An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments * * * can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued * * The pleadings here show that all the construction and diking done by the State and now sought to be enjoined was completed in 1952 and 1953, and has been maintained since that time. Plaintiff’s pleadings allege and the majority opinion states that, “the channel cut altered the flow of the Loup River in such a manner that it causes and will continue to cause annual flooding of the plaintiff’s land.” (Emphasis ours.) If this be true, plaintiff’s cause of action for injunctive relief arose not later than 1954.
It should also be obvious that the State as well as other public bodies can acquire easement rights by prescription. See, Pierce v. Rabe, 177 Neb. 745, 131 N. W. 2d 183; State ex rel. Game, Forestation & Parks Commission v. Hull, 168 Neb. 805, 97 N. W. 2d 535; Dawson County Irrigation Co. v. Stuart, 142 Neb. 428, 6 N. W. 2d 602; Franz v. Nelson, 183 Neb. 137, 158 N. W. 2d 606; Hall v. City of Friend, 134 Neb. 652, 279 N. W. 346.
The State’s motion to dismiss specifically alleges that the statute of limitations has passed as to any and all the various causes of action mentioned in plaintiff’s petition. It also alleges that the facts pleaded in the petition affirmatively show that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for and that the plaintiff does not have the legal capacity to maintain the subject action.
*529The trial court’s determination and judgment was proper and should have been affirmed in all respects.
Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting in part.
I concur in Judge McCown’s opinion that the judgment of the District Court should have been affirmed in all respects.