Court Opinion

ID: 9940777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 15:07:11.808463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:45.613663
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0310-22

C.D.V.D.,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

B.K.T.,

  Defendant-Respondent.
______________________

                   Submitted January 18, 2024 – Decided February 15, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County,
                   Docket No. FM-03-1185-20.

                   C.D.V.D., appellant pro se.

                   Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC,
                   attorneys for respondent (Rachel Elena Partyka and
                   Wayne G. Perry, on the brief).

1
   We utilize the initials of the parties involved in this matter to protect their
privacy and their child. R. 1:38-3(d)(3) and (13).
PER CURIAM

      In this custody and parenting time dispute, plaintiff C.D.V.D. appeals

from the Family Part's May 16, 2022 dual final judgment of divorce (FJOD)

awarding the parties joint legal and physical custody of their son H.J., born in

February 2018, designating defendant B.K.T. as the parent of primary residence

(PPR), and designating plaintiff as the parent of alternate residence (PAR). The

judge found plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal with the parties' son was

not in the child's best interest. Plaintiff also appeals the provisions of the FJOD

ordering her to pay $189 per week in child support to defendant and the counsel

fee award of $50,000 entered against plaintiff in favor of defendant. In addition,

plaintiff appeals from the August 29, 2022 post-judgment order denying her

motion for reconsideration of these issues.

      For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision designating defendant

as PPR, denying plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal, and establishing the

child support amount. However, we reverse and remand the award of counsel

fees because the judge did not address the factors required by Rules 5:3-5(c),

4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a).

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                                       I.

                             Factual Background

      We summarize the facts developed in the record. The parties married in

2015. Plaintiff was born in Portugal. Because plaintiff's father was a diplomat,

she and her family moved every few years. At the age of eight, she moved to

Maryland, then later to Brussels, and she returned to Portugal at the age of

sixteen for two years. In 2003, plaintiff moved to the United Kingdom where

she attended college, earned a master's degree, and began her career. Plaintiff

maintains dual citizenship in Portugal and the United States. Defendant was

born in Pennsylvania and moved to New Jersey when he was eight years old.

He does not have dual citizenship.

      In 2010, the parties met in London, where they were both living and

working at the time. On May 25, 2015, the parties entered into a pre-nuptial

agreement and were married in a civil ceremony in Lisbon, Portugal three days

later. 2 The pre-nuptial agreement does not address where the parties would live

after they got married, but plaintiff contends that prior to their marriage, the

parties agreed to move to the United States for a period of ten years before

2
  The parties had a second religious wedding ceremony in May 2016, also in
Portugal.
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                                       3
returning to Portugal where the couple would reside. Following the marriage,

the parties moved to New Jersey and resided with defendant's parents while he

was seeking employment. In January 2016, the parties moved to Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, where they resided until early 2018. They moved to Mount Laurel

six months later after their son was born. H.J. is a dual citizen of the United

States and Portugal and has lived his entire life in New Jersey.

      After moving to the United States, plaintiff was unemployed for a year

but claims she ultimately secured employment that paid less money than she

earned in London. The parties agreed plaintiff would resign from her position

after she became pregnant with H.J. After their son was born, defendant worked

from home every day, and plaintiff cared for their infant. In June 2018, H.J.

traveled to Portugal with the parties and stayed with his maternal grandparents

for several weeks.

      In April 2019, H.J. entered daycare. The following month, defendant

changed jobs and began working for Iridium Technology, which provides

business intelligence services for legal services providers. He works remotely,

with ten to twenty days of travel per year. In June 2019, plaintiff co-founded

Canopy Group, a virtual personal assistance firm, which provides clients with

in-person and remote professional and executive assistant services. During the

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COVID-19 pandemic, H.J.'s daycare shut down and defendant's business travel

ended. Defendant's parents assisted with childcare when daycare was closed.

When travel resumed post-pandemic, plaintiff and H.J. went to Portugal for

three weeks in the summer of 2020, and H.J. has spent time there during the

summer with plaintiff in subsequent years.

       On May 12, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of

irreconcilable differences. Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim and later

filed an amended counterclaim, which is not germane to this appeal.

       On October 2, 2020, plaintiff contended defendant was using drugs and

that drug residue was left on one of H.J.'s playroom items. A week later, plaintiff

filed an order to show cause (OTSC) seeking to compel defendant to submit to

a hair follicle drug screen, require defendant to have supervised parenting time

with H.J., and award her sole custody if defendant's drug screen was positive.

The OTSC was denied without prejudice as non-emergent and not meeting the

standard for preliminary injunctive relief.

       Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the same relief, which was returnable on

December 11, 2020. Defendant countered that plaintiff planned to kidnap H.J.

The judge ordered defendant to submit to a TASC 3 evaluation.           Plaintiff's

3
    Treatment Assessment Services for the Courts.
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                                        5
application to restrict defendant to supervised parenting time was denied without

prejudice, pending the results of the TASC evaluation. The TASC evaluation

revealed defendant did not exhibit symptoms of a substance abuse disorder and

treatment was not recommended.

      On January 19, 2022, the parties entered into a marital settlement

agreement (MSA), which resolved the majority of their equitable distribution

and financial issues. On February 3, 2022, they entered into a custody and

temporary parenting time agreement, which provided they "shall enjoy shared

legal custody of the minor child born of the marriage" and "[t]here shall be no

residential custody determination at this juncture, other than to memorialize that

the parties continue to reside in the same home together with [H.J.] and neither

has been designated as [H.J.'s] primary custodial parent. This determination is

pending the [c]ourt's decision."

                                     The Trial

      The judge conducted a non-consecutive seven-day trial in January and

February 2022 via Zoom limited to the following issues: (1) custody and

parenting time; (2) plaintiff's request to relocate with H.J. to Portugal; (3) child

support; and (4) counsel fees.

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      Eight lay witnesses and two experts testified during the trial. The judge

determined both parties were "very fit, competent and capable parents" but noted

they "are unwilling or unable to agree and cooperate in matters relating to the

child, and therefore are unable to resolve conflicts." When plaintiff testified at

trial, she reaffirmed that she wanted to relocate to Portugal with H.J., but she

intended to relocate to Portugal even if she was not granted custody of the child.

In fact, plaintiff relocated to Portugal on June 26, 2022, and has remained living

there. H.J. spent the summer of 2022 with plaintiff in Portugal. Plaintiff travels

back and forth from Portugal to New Jersey to exercise parenting time with H.J.

She speaks to H.J. exclusively in Portuguese and extolled the benefits of a

Portuguese education, explaining the linguistic and cultural benefits.

      Plaintiff asserted she needed to relocate to Portugal, in part, to be in a

better time zone to service the European market after her company, Canopy

Group, was unsuccessful in the United States, and her business partner and

financial backer, S.C., "would not be inclined to invest in the business any

further" if its financial condition did not improve.

      Canopy Group is based in the United Kingdom.             S.C. testified the

company's growth "has been much slower than anticipated," and the company

was just "breaking even." Based on these circumstances, S.C. testified that

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Canopy Group has been attempting to "develop[] its clientele in the European

market," and may try to "re-establish itself in the U.S. at some point in the

future." S.C. testified plaintiff could better service and develop clients if she

relocated to Portugal, where she could "more effectively leverage her business

and family's contacts." According to S.C., Canopy Group had three to six

months of "runway" left, referring to his willingness to continue to finance the

business for that period of time.

      Plaintiff's custody expert, Harry Green, Psy.D., prepared an evaluation,

interviewed the parties, administered psychological testing, observed each party

interact with H.J., and conducted collateral interviews. At trial, Dr. Green

assumed defendant would not move to Portugal and opined that it would be in

H.J.'s best interest to remain in the United States with plaintiff designated as

PPR. However, Dr. Green also testified that if plaintiff moved to Portugal and

defendant remained in New Jersey, H.J.'s best interests would be served by

relocating to Portugal because plaintiff is the child's "primary attachment

figure," she has a better job opportunity in Portugal, it is more feasible for

defendant to interact with H.J. in Portugal because of his remote work and prior

employment history in Europe than for plaintiff to interact with H.J. in New

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Jersey, and Portugal offers better access to both Portuguese and American

culture and language than New Jersey.

      Dr. Green opined the parties' "relationship was strained," and that they

were "inflexible and unwilling to compromise" their parenting styles. Dr. Green

testified that defendant resisted allowing H.J. to visit plaintiff's extended family

in Portugal. Dr. Green stated, "any prior drug use on defendant's part has not

impeded his ability to function" and that "he is capable of safe and effective

parenting." Dr. Green testified he did not think it was necessary to subject

defendant to drug screening. After observing H.J.'s interaction with both parties,

Dr. Green opined that H.J. "was more interactive" with plaintiff but was

"comfortable with both parents" and was "bonded" with both of them.

      Plaintiff's younger sister, M.D., testified she lives in Lisbon and explained

what the city has to offer in terms of culture, sports, and nearby beaches. M.D.

stated plaintiff's family lives nearby, including H.J.'s maternal grandparents.

M.D. testified both parties are good parents, but her sister "is a bit better" with

being hands-on with H.J.       On cross-examination, M.C. indicated she has

FaceTime calls with H.J. daily.

      Plaintiff's father, A.D., testified he resides in Portugal. He speaks to H.J.

in Portuguese. A.D. stated the only way he can maintain a relationship with H.J.

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                                         9
is on FaceTime. Plaintiff also presented testimony from M.F., a family law

attorney in Portugal, who testified about the status of Portuguese law, plaintiff's

parental rights in Portugal, and Hague Convention concerns.

      Defendant testified that he purchased a home in Moorestown, a short

distance from the parties' former marital residence and close to H.J.'s daycare,

paternal grandparents, and friends. Defendant is employed full-time in New

Jersey, which gives him sufficient flexibility to serve as H.J.'s PPR. T.J.,

Iridium Technology's Chief Executive Officer and defendant's supervisor,

testified defendant's job security was predicated on his remaining in the United

States. Defendant testified he cannot relocate to Portugal.

      Defendant's custody expert, Gregory W. Joseph, Psy.D., also prepared an

evaluation, interviewed the parties, administered psychological testimony,

observed each party interact with H.J., and conducted collateral interviews. Dr.

Joseph opined he opposed H.J.'s relocation to Portugal because H.J. would

experience difficulties adjusting because of his young age, "late language

development," and "some emotional dysregulation," such as tantrums and

difficulty soothing himself, when frustrated. Dr. Joseph testified that relocation

would not provide the stability and consistency H.J. needs in anticipation of

starting kindergarten in September 2022.

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                                       10
      Dr. Joseph described plaintiff's parenting style as "democratic" and

"emphasizing high nurturance, communication, and expectations, with moderate

control" and noted she only speaks to H.J. in Portuguese. In contrast, Dr. Joseph

described defendant's parenting style as "authoritative . . . with high nurturance,

expectations and control and moderate communication," and noted he only

speaks to H.J. in English. Dr. Joseph recommended H.J. be evaluated for his

delayed language development and "over-reliance on gestures" through the

school district or a facility, such as the Children's Hospital of Pennsylvania, to

ensure he is prepared to enter elementary school.

      M.F., defendant's mother, testified she is a retired schoolteacher. M.F.

and her husband live fifteen minutes away from the parties. She testified that

H.J. has a bedroom at her house. M.F. stated she picked up and dropped off H.J.

at daycare and that she cared for him during the pandemic.

                              The Judge's Decision

      The judge rendered a thirty-three-page written opinion, which was

incorporated into the FJOD, denying plaintiff's request to relocate to Portugal

with H.J. The judge emphasized plaintiff's proposed relocation would "result in

some positive developments for [H.J.], [but] that any such benefits do not come

close to outweighing the substantial and irreparable harm that would result to

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                                       11
his relationship with [defendant] as a consequence of his relocating to a country

over 3,000 miles away." The judge identified steps that could be taken to expose

H.J. to a Portuguese community in the United States and stated, "[t]he ability to

be immersed in Portuguese language and culture does not take precedence over

[H.J.'s] relationship with [defendant,] . . . ."

      In addition, the judge noted "such a relocation would also likely be

detrimental to [H.J.]'s relationship with [defendant], due to the extended

absences that any proposed parenting time schedule would involve." The judge

highlighted that as H.J. grows older, the proposed international shared parenting

time schedule "would only grow more complicated and result in further conflict

as he matures and becomes a teenager with his own interests, activities, and

scheduling obligations." The judge reasoned that plaintiff "had not explored

potential employment opportunities in the U.S.," and her testimony,

corroborated by S.C., that Canopy Group's prospects for success would improve

if plaintiff relocated to Portugal "were largely speculative" and not based on

evidence.

      In support of this conclusion, the judge considered the statutory factors

identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), namely:

             the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
             cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents'

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                                         12
            willingness to accept custody and any history of
            unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on
            substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of
            the child with its parents and siblings; the history of
            domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the
            safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other
            parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient
            age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
            decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the
            home environment offered; the quality and continuity
            of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the
            geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the
            extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
            to or subsequent to the separation; the parents'
            employment responsibilities; and the age and number
            of the children.

            [Ibid.]

      The judge rejected plaintiff's contention that the parties reached an

agreement regarding relocation and found her allegation was not supported by

the parties' pre-nuptial agreement. Plaintiff testified the parties were supposed

to live in the United States for ten years and then relocate to Portugal. The judge

noted "even by her own understanding of the alleged agreement" plaintiff's

request to locate "is [five] years premature." The judge awarded PPR status to

defendant, entered a parenting time schedule, ordered H.J. to be evaluated for

language development and emotional functioning, and directed that H.J. begin

receiving any recommended services. The judge also ordered defendant to

submit to quarterly urine drug tests.

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                                        13
      The judge calculated the child support guidelines using a sole parenting

worksheet, a weekly gross income of $1,058 for plaintiff, and $3,173 for

defendant, and utilizing the parties' financial information provided at the time

of trial. Although the judge awarded plaintiff up to two non-consecutive weeks

of parenting time each month when she was within twenty-five miles of

defendant, eight weeks of parenting time in the summer months in Portugal, and

other parenting time, the judge found she should be allotted 16.16% of the

overnights since the judge determined she would not exercise the parenting time

of two non-consecutive weeks per month while residing in Portugal. The judge

determined that plaintiff should pay $189 per week in child support directly to

defendant.

      As for the parties' counsel fee requests, the judge noted "[t]he results

obtained in this case would strongly support [defendant's] request for a fee

award" and found the positions plaintiff advanced were not brought in bad faith.

After reciting the factors in Rules 4:42-9(a) and 5:3-5, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, and

RPC 1.5(a), the judge made a "partial counsel fee award" in favor of defendant

in the amount of $50,000.

      In her reconsideration motion, plaintiff argued the judge erred in denying

her request to relocate to Portugal with H.J., and not designating her as PPR; the

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judge erred in calculating the child support amount because he did not utilize

the shared parenting worksheet, did not give her proper credits for overnight

visitation, and did not impute income to defendant on the approximately

$450,000 he received in exempt funds from his former employer. Plaintiff also

requested that the judge reconsider and clarify plaintiff's parenting time, specify

parameters for defendant's drug testing, and require H.J. to be evaluated by a

mutually agreed upon expert for behavioral and emotional problems quarterly.

      The judge denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and issued an

eleven-page written decision. Regarding plaintiff's request to impute "interest

income at a reasonable rate of return to [d]efendant on the approximately

$450,000 in exempt funds issued to him," the judge denied the request without

prejudice as the transaction took place during or after the trial, and the record

contained no evidence supporting plaintiff's allegations. Both parties' requests

for an award of counsel fees incurred relative to the reconsideration motion was

denied. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the judge erred:

            (1) in denying her request to relocate with H.J. to
            Portugal;

            (2) in calculating the child support amount; and

            (3) in awarding counsel fees to defendant.

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                                       15
                                        II.

      Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at

412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)).

      The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are

entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v.

DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan,

51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the

special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish,

412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will

only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are 'so wholly

insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269

N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84).

      An appellate court, in consequence, will only reverse the family court's

conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'"

that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family

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                                        16
Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).

      "Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to

discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci,

448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547

(2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "rested on

an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to

consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or

unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434

(App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Challenges

to legal conclusions, as well as the trial court's interpretation of the law, are

subject to de novo review. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis,

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

      Under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2, a parent who seeks to remove a child from this state

when the other parent does not consent must demonstrate "cause" for the

removal. The legislative intent of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 was "'to preserve the rights of

the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial

relationship.'" Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 323 (2017) (quoting Holder v.

Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 350 (1988)).

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      In Bisbing, the Court interpreted "cause" under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 as requiring

the petitioning parent to satisfy the "best interests analysis . . . set forth in

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), supplemented by other factors as appropriate." 230 N.J. at

338 (citing N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)). The Bisbing Court specifically overruled the

two-part removal test in Baures v. Lewis, 167 N.J. 91 (2001), and replaced it

with the best-interest standard embodied in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. 230 N.J. at 312-13.

      Further, the Bisbing Court instructed that in making "the sensitive

determination of cause[, a court] must weigh the custodial parent's interest in

freedom of movement as qualified by his or her custodial obligation, the State's

interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and the competing interests

of the noncustodial parent."     Id. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Holder, 111 N.J. at 350).

      Here, it is readily apparent the trial judge considered the principles

enunciated in Bisbing and was cognizant of his charge to review the fourteen

statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) when assessing plaintiff's application.

The judge highlighted that both experts' hypothetical ideal scenario—for both

parties to be actively involved with H.J. on a daily basis—was impossible

because plaintiff intended to move to Portugal with or without H.J., and

defendant was unwilling to relocate to Portugal. The judge noted defendant did

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not have a visa or dual citizenship in Portugal, and his job and work travel were

based in the United States.

      Moreover, the judge identified steps which could be taken to expose H.J.

to a Portuguese community and immerse him in his cultural heritage in the

United States. The judge stressed "[w]hile opportunities for [H.J.] to be exposed

to Portuguese language and culture are greater in Portugal than in the [United

States], there are means" to accomplish these goals and "[t]he ability for [H.J.]

to be immersed in Portuguese language and culture do not take priority over the

relationship with his [f]ather," however.

      Referring to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), the judge observed both custody experts

indicated the parties "failed to demonstrate an ability to parent [H.J.] jointly,"

and "they are unable to resolve conflicts." Based on these findings, the judge

found the statutory factor involving the parties' ability to agree, communicate,

and cooperate was in equipoise.

      Regarding the parties' unwillingness to accept custody and any history of

unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse, the

judge concluded both parties have shown a willingness to accept custody and

both of them "have some examples of being unwilling to allow parenting time

for the other not based on substantiated abuse." The judge highlighted that

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defendant's prior denials of plaintiff's requests to take H.J. to Portugal to see his

extended family "were focused on the safety concerns relating to the COVID-

19 pandemic."

      The judge also determined the next factor, the interaction and relationship

of the child with his parents and any siblings, was supported by the experts'

testimony that H.J. is bonded with both of his parents, but has a stronger

attachment to plaintiff. The judge noted during Dr. Joseph's observation period,

H.J. "was resistant to instructions" from both parents.

      The judge found the factors regarding domestic violence and the safety of

the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent

were of no significance because there was no evidence either parent posed a

threat to H.J. Further, because H.J. was only four years old when the hearing

concluded, the judge determined he was unable to express a parental preference.

      Turning to H.J.'s needs, the judge recognized both experts agreed that

"maintaining frequent, consistent, if not daily contact with both parents is in

[H.J.'s] best interest." The judge also noted both experts agreed it was not in

H.J.'s best interest "for one parent to be living in the U.S. and the other in

Portugal." The judge emphasized H.J. "is fortunate to have a good relationship

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                                        20
with both parties' extended families, and it is in his best interest to foster those

relationships as well."

      As to the stability of the home environment offered, and the geographic

proximity of the parties' homes factors, the judge stated the parties resided

together with H.J. during the pendency of the litigation. Based upon the parties'

testimony, the judge determined both parties would be able to provide a stable

home environment for H.J. if they separated and resided in different locations.

The judge indicated plaintiff introduced evidence of a lease she entered into in

Lisbon and that defendant was relocating to a new home in Moorestown, a short

distance from the parties' existing residence.

      Referencing the quality and continuity of H.J.'s education, the judge noted

H.J. was transitioning from pre-school and daycare to kindergarten. The judge

acknowledged plaintiff's "fears" that "the American educational system will not

enable [H.J.] to develop his Portuguese language skills" and that defendant

intended to enroll H.J. in the Moorestown school district. As to the fitness of

the parents, this factor weighed equally in favor of both parents.

      When assessing the extent and quality of time H.J. spent with his parents

prior to and subsequent to the parties' separation, the judge found "both have

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                                        21
been actively involved in caregiving" and "[b]oth experts agreed that [H.J.] is

closely bonded with both parents."

      As to the statutory factory regarding the parents' employment

responsibilities, the judge found plaintiff is self-employed and co-founded

Canopy Group with S.C. in 2018 or 2019. The judge considered S.C.'s testimony

that if plaintiff did not relocate to Portugal, it was unlikely the business would

remain viable largely because the time difference between the United States and

Europe made it difficult for her to service clients. Absent any changes, the judge

noted S.C. testified that "he would not be inclined to invest in the business any

further."

      The judge stated plaintiff was previously employed by LexisNexis in

London as a marketing coordinator and held other positions. She subsequently

obtained employment in the Fintech—financial technology industry—which

involves the use of technology to enhance financial services for businesses. The

judge found plaintiff resigned from her position when she became pregnant with

H.J., and looked for employment after he entered daycare, but ultimately co-

founded Canopy Group with S.C.

      The judge highlighted that defendant's employment provides him with

"sufficient flexibility" that would enable him to be designated PPR. Although

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defendant is expected to work in excess of fifty hours per week, the judge

observed he could reschedule his business travel "in a way that is consistent with

his child care responsibilities." Regarding the age and number of children

factor, H.J. is an only child.

      Here, the judge performed the required best interests analysis under

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), and addressed all of the factors.      Contrary to plaintiff's

contention, the judge did not make an erroneous decision in denying her request

to relocate to Portugal with H.J. The judge aptly concluded, based upon the

substantial credible evidence in the record, it would be in the best interest of

H.J. to have defendant designated as PPR so he could continue to reside in New

Jersey. The record supports the judge's findings and conclusions, and we discern

no basis to disturb the judge's decision on custody and parenting time.

                                       III.

      Plaintiff next argues the child support calculation was incorrect because

the judge made factual errors in the gross annual income of both parties and

awarding the number of overnights that the parties would exercise. She claims

the judge accepted defendant's earned income was $165,000 but failed to include

an additional $450,000 approximate amount he received in January 2022 from

his former employer's payout and erred in using an inflated amount of $55,000

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as her income.     Plaintiff contends the judge awarded her eight weeks of

parenting time each summer plus two weeks per calendar month outside the

summer months, which equals 196 overnight each year, but only credited her

with fifty-nine overnights per year without justification. We disagree.

      The child support guidelines are presumptive absent a showing of good

cause. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,

Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 2, www.gannlaw.com (2024). The guidelines

recognize "child support is a continuous duty of both parents . . . [and] children

are entitled to share in the current income of both parents . . . ." Id. at ¶ 1.

             For the purpose of these guidelines, gross income, is all
             earned and unearned income that is recurring or will
             increase the income available to the recipient over an
             extended period of time. When determining whether an
             income source should be included in the child support
             guidelines calculation, the court should consider if it
             would have been available to pay expenses related to
             the child if the family would have remained intact . . .
             and how long that source would have been available to
             pay those expenses.

             [Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero,
             Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-B to R. 5:6A
             (2024).]

      "In determining the amount of income to be imputed [for child support

purposes], the court must take into consideration the specific circumstances of

the parent for whom income imputation is being considered, to the extent known,

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including but not limited to . . . assets [and] residence . . . ." Child Support

Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to

R. 5:6A, ¶ 12, www.gannlaw.com (2024).

      "The trial court has substantial discretion in making a child support

award." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001) (citing

Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 594 (1995)). "If consistent with the law, such

an award will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or

clearly contrary to reason or to other evidence, or the result of whim or caprice."

Id. at 315-16 (quoting Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 605 (App. Div.

1999)) (internal quotations omitted).

      Plaintiff argues the judge failed to substantiate his decision not to deviate

from the child support guidelines. This argument lacks merit and is flawed

because the guidelines establish a rebuttable presumption of support.           "A

rebuttable presumption means that an award based on the guidelines is assumed

to be the correct amount of child support unless a party proves to the court that

circumstances exist that make a guidelines-based award inappropriate in a

specific case." Ordukaya v. Brown, 357 N.J. Super. 231, 239 (App. Div. 2003)

(quoting Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶ 2).

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        There must be a showing of good cause to deviate from the guidelines.

Rule 5:6A sets forth the elements of good cause:

              Good cause shall consist of (a) the considerations set
              forth in Appendix IX-A, or the presence of other
              relevant factors which may make the guidelines
              inapplicable or subject to modification, and (b) the fact
              that any injustice would result from the application of
              the guidelines. In all cases, the determination of good
              cause shall be within the sound discretion of the court.

              [Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero,
              Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶
              2, www.gannlaw.com (2024).]

Here, plaintiff offered nothing to rebut the presumption to follow the guidelines.

        The record shows the judge used the correct annual income for each party

based upon the evidence and financial information presented at trial. Because

there was no showing of good cause to deviate from the guidelines, the judge

did not abuse his discretion and complied with the mandate required by Rule

5:6A.

        Moreover, the judge in his reconsideration decision denied plaintiff's

motion to recalculate the child support amount to include the company payout

defendant received without prejudice. Plaintiff can make an application to

modify the child support award with this subsequently obtained information.

We discern no reversible error.

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                                        IV.

      "[O]ur 'standard of review on a motion for reconsideration is deferential.'"

Castano v. Augustine, 475 N.J. Super. 71, 78 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Hoover

v. Wetzler, 472 N.J. Super. 230, 235 (App. Div. 2022)). Reconsideration is only

appropriate in "that narrow corridor in which either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed

its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is

obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the

significance of probative, competent evidence." Triffin v. SHS Group, LLC,

466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)).

      We consider whether the court acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, or

unreasonable manner," which "is the least demanding form of judicial review."

D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990); see, e.g., State v.

Steele, 92 N.J. Super. 498, 507 (App. Div. 1966) ("If the trial judge

misconceives the applicable law or misapplies it to the factual complex, in total

effect the exercise of legal discretion lacks a foundation and becomes an

arbitrary act;" finding that the appellate court does not need to give the usual

deference where the trial court's decision is arbitrary).

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      "Alternatively, if a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information

to the [c]ourt's attention which it could not have provided on the first

application, the [c]ourt should, in the interest of justice (and in the exercise of

sound discretion), consider the evidence." Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384

(quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at 401 (cautioning against "repetitive bites at

the apple")).

      The judge reviewed the arguments plaintiff presented on reconsideration.

In his careful analysis, the judge considered plaintiff's arguments and denied

relief, noting reconsideration is not "a vehicle to bring to the court's attention

evidence that was available but not presented in connection with initial

argument," citing Fusco v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 349 N.J. Super. 455, 462

(App. Div. 2002). The judge did not err or fail to appreciate the evidence.

Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384. And, plaintiff may file a post-judgment

motion to recalculate child support as stated.

                                        V.

      Finally, plaintiff argues the judge erred in awarding partial counsel fees

to defendant. She asserts the judge paid short shrift to Rules 5:3-5(c), 4:42-9.

and RPC 1.5(a). The judge acknowledged defendant was the breadwinner with

his income being $165,000 annually and plaintiff's income being $55,000

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annually. The judge found plaintiff did not proceed in bad faith. In his decision,

the judge noted that plaintiff incurred $148,068.50 in attorney's fees in pursuing

this action and defendant incurred $158,669.50 in legal fees and costs opposing

her claim.

      Counsel fee determinations, "rest[] within the sound discretion of the trial

judge." Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 314-15 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting

Loro v. Colliano, 354 N.J. Super. 212, 227 (App. Div. 2002)). "We will disturb

a trial court's determination on counsel fees only on the 'rarest occasion,' and

then only because of clear abuse of discretion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J.

Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292,

317 (1995)).

      Generally, "the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need

and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if those

two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must have acted

in good faith in the litigation." J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 493 (App.

Div. 2012) (citing Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 545 (App. Div.

1992)). When both parties have a "sufficient ability to satisfy [their] attorney's

fee obligation, and neither . . . proceeded in bad faith," the court may justifiably

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deny the award of counsel fees. Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 586. The court also

considers the following factors:

            (1) the financial circumstances of the parties;

            (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to
            contribute to the fees of the other party;

            (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions
            advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial;

            (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties;

            (5) any fees previously awarded;

            (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by
            each party;

            (7) the results obtained;

            (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce
            existing orders or to compel discovery; and

            (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.

            [R. 5:3-5(c).]

      A trial court's failure to consider the appropriate factors, make the

required findings, and state its conclusions of law, constitutes a clear abuse of

discretion. See Saffos v. Avaya, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 244, 271 (App. Div.

2011). Ordinarily, the purpose of a counsel fee award in a matrimonial action

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is to equalize the relative financial resources of the parties. J.E.V., 426 N.J.

Super. at 493 (citing Kelly v. Kelly, 262 N.J. Super. 303, 307 (Ch. Div. 1992)).

      "Simple omnibus references to the rules without sufficient findings to

justify a counsel fee award makes meaningful review of such an award

impossible . . . ." Loro, 354 N.J. Super. at 228. If the court performs its

obligation under the statute and rules, and "there is satisfactory evidentiary

support for the trial court's findings, 'its task is complete and [a reviewing court]

should not disturb the result, even though it . . . might have reached a different

conclusion were it the trial tribunal.'" Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568 (quoting

Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981)). Conversely, a remand is appropriate if

the trial court fails to adequately explain an award or denial of counsel fees. See

Giarusso v. Giarusso, 455 N.J. Super. 42, 54 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Loro, 354

N.J. Super. at 227-28).

      Here, the judge awarded counsel fees without considering all relevant

factors. In its written statement of reasons, the judge simply stated, "[t]he results

obtained in this case would strongly support [defendant's] request for a fee

award" and noted the discrepancies in the parties' incomes. The judge did not

make detailed findings under the Rules 5:3-5(c), 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a). Thus,

we are constrained to reverse and remand for the judge to consider the requisite

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                                        31
factors and conduct the appropriate analysis.       We have no opinion on the

outcome of the counsel fee decision.

      Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part for proceedings consistent

with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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