Court Opinion

ID: 9931343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:09:41.288058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:18.621944
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Marchbanks v. Ice House Ventures, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-417.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[Jack Marchbanks], Director of the Ohio               :
Department of Transportation,
                                                      :
                Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                      :                      No. 21AP-24
v.                                                                      (C.P.C. No. 16CV-7726)
                                                      :
Ice House Ventures, LLC et al.,                                      (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                                                      :
                Defendants-Appellees.
                                                      :

                                          D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on February 6, 2024

                On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, William J. Cole, L.
                Martin Cordero, and Gregory S. Severance, for appellant.

                On brief: Vorys Sater Seymour & Pease LLP, Joseph R.
                Miller, John M. Kuhl, and Daniel E. Shuey, for appellees.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.

        {¶ 1} This case is before the court pursuant to a remand from the Supreme Court
of Ohio. See Marchbanks v. Ice House Ventures, LLC, 171 Ohio St.3d 637, 2023-Ohio-1866
(“Ice House III”).1 The Supreme Court reversed our judgment in Wray v. Ice House
Ventures, LLC, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-24, 2021-Ohio-4195 (“Ice House II”) and remanded the
case to this court to address the three assignments of error that were rendered moot by our
prior decision in Ice House II. Before doing so, we will set forth the factual and procedural
background of the case.

1 The current director of ODOT, Jack Marchbanks, was substituted as a party for the former director of ODOT,

Jerry Wray, who was the director when this action commenced, pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B) and Civ.R.
25(D)(1).
No. 21AP-24                                                                       2

I. Facts and Procedural History
      {¶ 2} Our prior decision in Ice House II sets forth the following factual and
procedural background:

              ODOT is reconfiguring and improving Interstates 70 and 71
              through downtown Columbus, Ohio. (See generally August 17,
              2016 Petition to Appropriate Property and to Fix
              Compensation (“Petition”).) As part of the project, ODOT
              needed to appropriate a portion of IHV’s real property located
              in the area known as the Brewery District (“the Property”). (Id.,
              Ex.1.) Thus, on August 17, 2016, ODOT filed an appropriation
              action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and
              deposited $343,280 with the Clerk of Courts. (See id.)

              Subsequently, each of the parties obtained its own appraisal
              reflecting the compensation due IHV as a result of ODOT’s
              appropriation. ODOT’s appraiser, Brian Barnes, opined the
              total compensation due IHV was $370,000, including
              $168,064 for land taken and $201,936 in damages to the
              residue. (Barnes appraisal.) IHV’s appraiser, Debi Wilcox,
              opined the total compensation due IHV was $2,509,777,
              consisting of $149,190 for land taken and $2,200,810 in
              damages to the residue. (Wilcox appraisal.) Both appraisers
              considered the loss of parking spaces to be a significant
              component of the respective determinations of damages to the
              Property’s residue.

              Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement prior to trial. The
              terms of the settlement were memorialized via an Agreed
              Judgment Entry and Transfer of Property and Order for
              Distribution. (Oct. 11, 2018 Agreed Jgmt. Entry, hereinafter
              “Agreed Entry.”) The Agreed Entry provided that IHV would
              receive $900,000 from ODOT “as partial consideration for the
              appropriation of IHV's property.” (Agreed Entry at 1.) The
              Agreed Entry further provided that "as additional material
              consideration for the appropriation of property from IHV,
              ODOT shall provide IHV with marketable fee simple title to the
              real property” delineated as the “Parking Mitigation Property.”
              (Id. at 1-2.) The Parking Mitigation Property was described “as
              a parking lot sufficient to hold twelve (12) parking spaces” as
              depicted in an attachment incorporated within the Agreed
              Entry. (Id. at 2.) The Agreed Entry stipulated that, amongst
              other obligations, if ODOT failed to convey marketable fee
              simple title to the Parking Mitigation Property within one year
              of the date of the Agreed Entry, “then the Court shall retain
              jurisdiction to determine the damages due to IHV for the
No. 21AP-24                                                                                               3

                failure of ODOT to deliver this portion of the consideration for
                ODOT’s appropriation of IHV’s property.” (Id. at 5-6.)

                At some point in early 2019, ODOT advised the trial court that
                it would be unable to convey marketable fee simple title to the
                Parking Mitigation Property to IHV because the current holder
                of the title to the property—the City of Columbus (the “City”)—
                was unwilling to convey the parcel to ODOT. (June 18, 2019
                Order and Entry Granting Defendant’s Motion to Enforce
                Agreed Judgment Entry on Settlement, hereinafter “Order and
                Entry,” at 2.) It is apparent from the record that although
                ODOT believed that the City would be willing to convey the
                Parking Mitigation Property to ODOT for subsequent
                conveyance of the property to IHV, ODOT entered into the
                Agreed Judgment Entry without firm assurance from, or an
                agreement with, the City that this was actually the case. (See
                June 3-4, 2019 Tr. at 8-9; 349-350.) On April 29, 2019, IHV
                filed a Motion to Enforce Agreed Judgment Entry (hereinafter
                “Motion to Enforce”). After full briefing by the parties, the trial
                court held a hearing on the Motion to Enforce commencing on
                June 3, 2019.

                On June 18, 2019, the trial court issued its Order and Entry
                which granted IHV’s Motion to Enforce. The trial court
                specifically determined that ODOT breached the parties’
                settlement as memorialized in the Agreed Entry; that IHV was
                entitled to $900,000 as damages for ODOT’s failure to convey
                title to the Parking Mitigation Property; and that IHV was
                entitled to attorney fees and costs ensuing from ODOT’s
                breach, in an amount to be determined at a later hearing.

Ice House II at ¶ 2, quoting Ice House I, 2020-Ohio-6935, ¶ 2-6.2
        {¶ 3} Our decision in Ice House II further set forth the following relevant
procedural history:

                On July 19, 2019, 2020, ODOT filed its notice of appeal from
                the June 18, 2019 order and entry. In a decision issued on
                December 29, 2020, this court dismissed the appeal as
                premature. See Ice House I, 2020-Ohio-6935. Specifically, we
                found that because the order and entry reserved the issue of the
                amount of attorney fees and costs for a later hearing and did
                not include Civ.R. 54(B) language indicating “there is no just

2 As noted in paragraph three of the herein decision, Ice House I was dismissed as being a premature appeal.
No. 21AP-24                                                                              4

              reason for delay,” the trial court’s order was not final and
              appealable. Id. at ¶ 14-16.

              Subsequently, on January 8, 2021, the parties filed a joint
              motion to certify interlocutory appeal. On January 12, 2021,
              the trial court granted the motion and issued an order and
              entry which is identical to the court's previous June 18, 2019
              order and entry with the exception that it includes the following
              additional language: “* * * The Court finds, pursuant to Ohio
              Civil Rule 54(B) and Revised Code Section 2505.02, that any
              delay would affect the substantial rights of both parties, and
              that there is no just reason for delay.” (Jan. 12, 2021 Order &
              Entry at 17.)

Ice House II at ¶ 3-4.

       {¶ 4} A timely appeal of the trial court’s January 12, 2021 Order and Entry
followed. Ice House II at ¶ 5. Ultimately, we determined that the trial court erred in
enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement because there was no meeting of the minds on
a material term of settlement, to wit: what the parties meant by the term “damages.” See
Ice House II at ¶ 14-17. Accordingly, we sustained ODOT’s first assignment of error. Id. at
¶ 18. We further found the remaining three assignments of error moot. Id. at ¶ 19.
       {¶ 5} On appeal by ODOT to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court found that the
parties did not make a material mistake about a basic assumption on which their settlement
agreement was made, and thus the agreement was enforceable. More specifically, the court
stated as follows:
              [T]he purported “mistake” here does not concern the basis of
              the parties’ agreement. Specifically, the parties’ performances
              under the agreement—ODOT’s compensation to IHV for the
              appropriation of IHV’s land and IHV’s release of claims for
              further compensation relating to the appropriation—did not
              depend on a particular calculation or amount of damages. And
              the parties did not contract for a particular type or amount of
              damages, despite being sophisticated parties negotiating in
              good faith with the advice of legal counsel. For example, the
              parties could have included a liquidated-damages clause or
              some specific description of the type of damages to be awarded
              if that were appropriate under and material to the agreement.
              However, the agreement is clear that the parties left the
              question of damages to the trial court, if the question were to
              arise. The agreed judgment entry on the settlement plainly
              states: “[T]he Court shall retain jurisdiction to determine the
No. 21AP-24                                                                                 5

              damages due to IHV for the failure of ODOT to deliver this
              portion of the consideration[, i.e., the Parking Mitigation
              Property,] for ODOT’s appropriation of IHV’s property.”

              Moreover, had the terms of the contract been fully performed,
              the question of damages never would have arisen. In other
              words, even assuming that each party understood the term
              “damages” to mean something different, that mistake would
              not frustrate the obligations of the parties or the intent of the
              agreement, because the parties’ performances of the terms
              existed independently of the type or amount of damages that
              might become due if a breach occurred. Any uncertainty
              regarding the meaning that each party assigned to the term
              “damages” in the agreement is irrelevant, because the essential
              elements of the parties’ agreement were clear. See, e.g.,
              Coldwell, 2014-Ohio-5323, 22 N.E.3d 1097, at ¶ 22
              (“Regardless of the meaning the [buyers] attached to the term
              ‘minerals’ or what they believed they already owned, the record
              is clear that they intended to buy all of the mineral rights to
              those parcels from the [sellers]” [emphasis sic]). Thus, even if
              we were to determine that the parties understood the meaning
              of the term “damages” in the agreement differently, that is not
              a mistake that is material to the agreement.

(Emphasis sic.) Ice House III at ¶ 17-18. The Supreme Court concluded that ODOT “has
not shown by clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to rescission of the settlement
agreement or that any lack of understanding about the term ‘damages’ in the agreement
renders it unenforceable.” Id. at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 6} Based on the court’s determination, and as noted previously, the Supreme
Court reversed our judgment in Ice House II and remanded the matter with instructions to
consider the three assignments of error we had previously found moot. Id. at ¶ 21. We now
proceed with such consideration.
II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 7} The assignments of error remanded to this court for consideration are set
forth as follows:
              [2.] The Trial Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
              award contract damages against ODOT.

              [3.] The Trial Court erred in finding that ODOT breached the
              settlement.
No. 21AP-24                                                                               6

              [4.] The Trial Court erred in finding ODOT liable for [IHV’s]
              attorney fees.

III. Law and Analysis

       A. Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 8} In its second assignment of error, ODOT asserts the trial court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to award contract damages against it. We disagree.
       {¶ 9} We begin our discussion by setting forth a potent observation made by the
Supreme Court regarding the posture of the within matter. On this point, the court declared
as follows:
               At the outset, we note that the posture of this case is different
              from that in a contract dispute in which one side files a
              complaint seeking to enforce contractual terms and the other
              side asserts defenses. Here, the proceeding in the trial court
              that led to this appeal was a damages hearing conducted
              pursuant to the parties’ settlement agreement, which stated
              that the trial court “shall retain jurisdiction” to determine
              damages. The arguments at that hearing centered on the
              proper nature and amount of damages and not on whether the
              agreement was valid or any alleged lack of clarity about the
              parties’ performances or obligations under the agreement.
              Although ODOT argued in the trial court that it should
              interpret the meaning of the term “damages” in the agreement
              as meaning “damages to the residue,” ODOT also presented
              evidence of what it asserted to be the proper calculation of
              expectation damages, if the court were to determine that
              expectation damages were what IHV should be awarded.

Ice House III at ¶ 9. Thus, as aptly assessed by the Supreme Court, this is not a typical
breach of contract action initiated by a private plaintiff against the state of Ohio as a
defendant. Rather, it began as—and remains—an eminent domain action initiated in a
court of common pleas by the state itself, with the settlement agreement at the heart of the
instant matter arising out of that eminent domain action.
       {¶ 10} The Court of Claims has “exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions
against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the
Revised Code.” R.C. 2743.03(A)(1). Nevertheless, “not all suits against the state are
channeled to the Court of Claims by the act. To the extent that the state consented to be
sued before the enactment of R.C. Chapter 2743, the chapter has no applicability.” Cirino
No. 21AP-24                                                                                 7

v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 153 Ohio St.3d 333, 338, 2018-Ohio-2665, ¶ 19, citing
R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). Thus, contrary to ODOT’s contention, the court of claims is not the sole
arbiter over all disputes seeking money damages against the state.
       {¶ 11} Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Ice House III and discussed
above, this case is not a “civil action against the state” as that term is used in R.C
2743.03(A)(1) in the first place. Rather, it is an eminent domain action. And, as the
Supreme Court has previously explained,
              [w]hen a court has the constitutional or statutory power to
              adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has
              subject-matter jurisdiction. Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio
              St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, 181 N.E.3d 1162, ¶ 36, citing Corder
              v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166
              N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14. Common pleas courts “have such original
              jurisdiction over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided
              by law.” Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 4(B). And the
              Eminent Domain Act provides jurisdiction in
              appropriation cases to the court of common pleas in
              the “county in which the property sought to be
              appropriated is located.” R.C. 163.01(D) and 163.05.

(Emphasis added.) Schlegel v. Sweeney, 171 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 12. Thus,
because the within matter is an appropriations proceeding, the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas has subject jurisdiction over the entire matter, including jurisdiction over
the parties’ settlement agreement and the issue of damages should that issue become
necessary to decide.
       {¶ 12} In support of its position that the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction in
this case is limited to determining the amount of compensation and damages to the residue
to which the property owner is entitled, ODOT directs this court to two cases: Thormyer v.
Irvin, 170 Ohio St. 276 (1960), and Proctor v. Thieken, 4th Dist. No. 03CA33, 2004-Ohio-
7281 (Lawrence Cty.). These cases are not apposite. Neither case involved the issue of
damages for breach of a settlement agreement entered into in order to avoid a jury trial to
determine damages in the context of an appropriations proceeding. In Thormyer, the
Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Court of Appeals for Muskingum County which
held that the question of the necessity and the extent of the appropriation of land is not
determinable in a proceeding in which the state is exercising its power of eminent domain.
No. 21AP-24                                                                               8

The Supreme Court held that the question of necessity may be determined in a separate
action to enjoin the proceeding, but once the proceeding had gone forward the jurisdiction
of the trial court was “limited to a determination of the amount of compensation and
damages to which the landowner is entitled.” Thormyer at paragraph one of the syllabus.
And in Proctor, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District, following Thormyer, held that
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to determine if an additional taking beyond that
which was delineated in the complaint had occurred. Proctor at ¶ 29. Thus, ODOT has
cited no authority that supports its proposition that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to award IHV its expectation damages as a result of ODOT’s breach of the
parties’ settlement agreement for its failure to convey the Parking Mitigation Property.
Neither has our own research revealed any such authority.
       {¶ 13} Furthermore, it is beyond dispute the parties agreed that the trial court
retained jurisdiction over the matter of damages. We reiterate the Supreme Court’s
statement on this point in Ice House III:
              the parties’ performances under the agreement—ODOT’s
              compensation to IHV for the appropriation of IHV’s land and
              IHV’s release of claims for further compensation relating to the
              appropriation—did not depend on a particular calculation or
              amount of damages. And the parties did not contract for a
              particular type or amount of damages, despite being
              sophisticated parties negotiating in good faith with the advice
              of legal counsel. For example, the parties could have included
              a liquidated-damages clause or some specific description of the
              type of damages to be awarded if that were appropriate under
              and material to the agreement. However, the agreement is
              clear that the parties left the question of damages to the trial
              court, if the question were to arise. The agreed judgment entry
              on the settlement plainly states: “[T]he Court shall retain
              jurisdiction to determine the damages due to IHV for the
              failure of ODOT to deliver this portion of the consideration
              [, i.e., the Parking Mitigation Property,] for ODOT’s
              appropriation of IHV’s property.”

(Emphasis added.) Ice House III at ¶ 17. Therefore, having identified no authority
supporting the proposition that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to
award contract damages for ODOT’s breach of the parties’ settlement agreement, and
having found the parties’ agreement is clear that the issue of damages was left to the trial
No. 21AP-24                                                                                9

court should the issue arise, we conclude the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to
award contract damages against ODOT for its breach of the parties’ agreement.
       {¶ 14} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, appellant’s second assignment of error
is overruled.
       B. Appellant’s Third Assignment of Error

       {¶ 15} In its third assignment of error, ODOT asserts the trial court erred in finding
that ODOT breached the parties’ settlement agreement. We disagree.
       {¶ 16} We begin by observing that ODOT did not argue in the trial court that it was
not in breach of the parties’ settlement agreement. Indeed, the record is clear that not only
did ODOT not argue it was not in breach of the parties’ settlement agreement, ODOT
conceded this point. The transcript from the June 3, 2019 damages hearing in the trial
court evinces the following colloquy on this issue:
                THE COURT: Okay. I guess at this point is the State of Ohio,
                is the Department of Transportation stipulating that it cannot
                comply with the terms of the agreed judgment entry?

                [COUNSEL FOR ODOT]: Yes, Your Honor. We can’t transfer
                that property. The City of Columbus will not transfer the
                property to ODOT, yes.

                THE COURT: Okay. Based on the stipulation then, the Court
                will find that the State of Ohio is in breach of the agreed
                settlement order that was filed on October 11, 2018.

(Emphasis added.) (June 3, 2019 Tr. at 9.) The above exchange makes it abundantly clear
that ODOT did, in fact, stipulate that it could not comply with the terms of the parties’
settlement agreement, and ODOT’s characterization of this exchange as not being one of
concession to a breach, but rather a mere inability to deliver the Parking Mitigation
Property amounts to nothing more than a distinction without a difference. Under the clear
and unambiguous terms of the parties’ settlement agreement, ODOT’s failure to deliver the
Parking Mitigation Property for ODOT’s appropriation of IHV’s property is a breach of that
agreement.
       {¶ 17} Furthermore, the transcript is devoid of any indication that ODOT disagreed
with the court’s finding of a breach of the parties’ settlement agreement. ODOT did not
object to the finding, nor make any other kind of protestation of the finding on the record.
No. 21AP-24                                                                               10

In short, ODOT failed to make any kind of argument in the trial court that it was not in
breach of the agreement. It is well-settled that “[u]nder Ohio law, ‘arguments raised for the
first time on appeal are improper.’ ” Tucker v. Leadership Academy for Math, 10th Dist.
No. 14AP-100, 2014-Ohio-3307, ¶ 20, quoting Marysville Newspapers, Inc. v. Delaware
Gazette Co., Inc., 3d Dist. No. 14-06-34, 2007-Ohio-4365, ¶ 23. “Parties cannot raise any
new issues for the first time on appeal, and the failure to raise an issue at the trial level
waives it on appeal.” Bell v. Teasley, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-850, 2011-Ohio-2744, ¶ 15, citing
Gangale v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1406, 2002-Ohio-2936, ¶ 13.
Indeed, even a de novo standard of review “does not supersede [the] settled practice of not
addressing issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Tucker at ¶ 20, quoting Henson v.
Cleveland Steel Container Corp., 11th Dist. No. 2008-P-0053, 2009-Ohio-180, ¶ 77.
Therefore, we decline to further address this new argument raised for the first time on
appeal.
       {¶ 18} Accordingly, based on the foregoing, appellant’s third assignment of error is
overruled.
       C. Appellant’s Fourth Assignment of Error

       {¶ 19} In appellant’s fourth assignment of error, ODOT contends that the trial court
erred in finding ODOT liable for IHV’s attorney fees. We disagree.
       {¶ 20} Ohio law is clear that where a party breaches a settlement agreement entered
into to resolve litigation and the breach causes the other party to incur attorney fees in
continuing the litigation, such fees are properly awarded by a court as compensatory
damages, and both this court and other courts have consistently followed this principle of
law. Rohrer Corp. v. Dane Elec. Corp. USA, 482 Fed.Appx. 113, 115-17 (6th Cir.2012);
Brown v. Spitzer Chevrolet Co., 5th Dist. No. 2012 CA 00105, 2012-Ohio-5623, ¶ 20-21;
Berry v. Lupica, 196 Ohio App.3d 687, 2011-Ohio-5381, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.); Raymond J.
Schaefer, Inc. v. Pytlik, 6th Dist. No. OT-09-026, 2010-Ohio-4714, ¶ 33-34; State ex rel.
Ohio Atty. Gen. v. Tabacalera Nacional, S.A.A., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-606, 2013-Ohio-2070;
Tejada-Hercules v. State Auto Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-150, 2008-Ohio-5066, ¶ 7-23;
Shanker v. Columbus Warehouse Ltd. Partnership, 10th Dist. No. 99AP-772, 2000 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2391 (June 6, 2000). In Shanker, we acknowledged that Ohio adheres to the
“American Rule,” which generally prevents a prevailing party from recovering attorney fees
No. 21AP-24                                                                                                11

as part of the costs of litigation. Shanker at *12. We found the American Rule inapplicable,
however, because the defendant did not claim attorney fees as costs of the action. Rather,
the defendant sought attorney fees as compensatory damages flowing from the plaintiffs’
breach of the settlement agreement. Id. Accordingly, because IHV’s attorney fees are
attributable to and were incurred as the result of ODOT’s breach of the parties’ settlement
agreement, IHV is entitled to recover those fees in order to compensate and make whole
IHV for losses caused by ODOT’s breach.
        {¶ 21} ODOT recognizes the foregoing authority but asserts that a more recent
opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Ohio controls here and unequivocally forecloses
any award of attorney fees to IHV in this matter. Specifically, ODOT cites to State ex rel.
New Wen, Inc. v. Marchbanks, 163 Ohio St.3d 14, 2020-Ohio-4865, wherein the court
found, in a per curiam opinion, that attorney fees were not recoverable in a mandamus
action brought to compel an appropriation proceeding. The Supreme Court came to this
conclusion after noting that the Ohio Revised Code contained no provision authorizing an
award of attorney fees in an inverse-condemnation proceeding.3 New Wen, Inc. at ¶ 8-10.
        {¶ 22} We find New Wen, Inc. wholly distinguishable from the instant case. First,
as noted above, New Wen, Inc. was an original action in mandamus brought by a property
owner to compel the state to file a proper appropriation proceeding when the state had
already taken the owner’s property—it was not itself an appropriation proceeding. Second,
the property owner in New Wen, Inc. was not seeking its attorney fees as part of its
compensatory damages flowing from the state’s breach of any settlement agreement
entered into to end the litigation; rather, the property owner was seeking its attorney fees
incurred in having to bring the action in mandamus in the first instance. The circumstances
in the instant matter are not analogous to those in New Wen, Inc., and contrary to ODOT’s
assertion it does not control in this case.
        {¶ 23} Finally, ODOT argues in its reply brief that even if ODOT could be liable for
IHV’s attorney fees as a result of ODOT’s breach of the parties’ settlement agreement, the

3 Notably, in a concurring opinion, Justice Fischer opined that while he agreed there was no current statutory

authorization for an award of attorney fees in an inverse condemnation proceeding, he “believe[d] that
legislators should specifically at least consider whether Ohioans, or any Americans for that matter, who have
had property improperly taken by any government—and who must go to court to correct that problem caused
by the government—should be entitled to their attorney fees, which they incurred to uphold their
constitutionally protected property rights.” New Wen, Inc. at ¶ 18.
No. 21AP-24                                                                                  12

trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award such fees. We note that ODOT did
not present this argument in its opening brief. An appellant may use a reply brief to
respond to the brief of appellee, not to raise new issues for the first time. Hadden Co., L.P.A.
v. Zweier, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-210, 2016-Ohio-2733, ¶ 15, citing State v. Mitchell, 10th Dist.
No. 10AP-756, 2011-Ohio-3818, ¶ 47. See also App.R. 16(C). We will generally not address
a new argument raised for the first time in a reply brief. Hadden Co., L.P.A. at ¶ 15, citing
State v. Shedwick, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-709, 2012-Ohio-2270, ¶ 50. Accordingly, this new
argument could rightly be disregarded. Even if it were not disregarded, however, this
argument lacks merit for the same reasons as those discussed under ODOT’s second
assignment of error above.
       {¶ 24} Therefore, based on the forgoing discussion, we find the trial court did not
err when it determined that IHV was entitled to an award of attorney fees incurred as a
result of ODOT’s breach of the parties’ settlement agreement. Accordingly, appellant’s
fourth assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Disposition
       {¶ 25} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule ODOT’s second, third, and fourth
assignments of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas.
                                                                          Judgment affirmed.
                         MENTEL, P.J., and DORRIAN, J., concur.