Court Opinion

ID: 9724792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:14:11.248016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:06.103997
License: Public Domain

ASHBY, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the $1,500 damage award should be doubled. However, I would affirm the order which denies plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees.
The usual rule is that prevailing civil litigants are not entitled to collect their attorney’s fees from the opposing party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021; Olson v. Arnett (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 59, 67 [169 Cal.Rptr. 629].) Here we construe Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.9, a legislative exception to the general rule. The majority improperly expands this exception by giving the language a literal interpretation while ignoring the usual and ordinary sense of the words. In allowing attorney’s fees for actions resulting from trespass on “lands either under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock” the Legislature invoked language relating to land use. The usual and ordinary import of the words “lands either under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock” is lands in the agricultural industry.1
Because the Legislature has used words relating to land use, it is appropriate to consider the local zoning ordinances regulating land use.
The parties live in an unincorporated area of Los Angeles County known as Pellissier Village near Whittier, California. The village is designated an equestrian district by chapter 22.44 of the Los Angeles County Planning and Zoning Code. (Tit. 22, L. A. County Code.) The purpose of such designation is stated in former section 22.44.120 (now tit., 22 L.A. County Code, § 22.44.150) as follows: “The equestrian district is established as a supplemental district in order to recognize particular areas where the keeping or *1374maintaining of horses and other large domestic animals for the personal use of members of the family residing on the premises has become or is intended to become an integral part of the character of the area. The application of this district permits the keeping of horses and other large domestic animals for personal use as accessory to residential use subject to standards and conditions which are intended to insure compatibility with surrounding areas and within the district itself while also taking the individual characteristics of the particular area under consideration.” (Italics added.)
Permitted uses in such zone are stated in tit. 22, L.A. County Code, former section 22.44.150 (now tit. 22, L.A. County Code, § 22.44.165) as follows: “Property in the equestrian district may be used for any use permitted in the basic zone to which this district is added, subject to the same limitations and conditions as such basic zone, except that the provisions for such equestrian district shall supersede the regulations provided in Part 6 of Chapter 22.56 relative to the keeping and maintaining of horses and other equine, cattle, sheep and goats as pets or for the personal use of family residing on the premises.”
The land in this case is residential land. The zoning law allows the “keeping” or “maintenance” of horses “for the personal use of members of the family residing on the premises,” as an “accessory” to the basic residential use. This is not land used or intended for the raising of livestock in the ordinary and usual sense of that phrase.2
The fact that Piper was literally “raised” on this land because Piper was born and kept there is irrelevant. Literal construction should not be followed if opposed to the intention of the Legislature apparent in the statute. (Webster v. Superior Court (1988) 46 Cal.3d 338, 344 [250 Cal.Rptr. 268, 758 P.2d 596].) We must construe the words in their ordinary and usual sense to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].)
The trial court properly determined that the land here, in an equestrian residential zone, is not land “intended or used for the raising of livestock” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.9.

The Legislature has used similar language in similar contexts. Revenue and Taxation Code section 23701a grants tax exempt status to agricultural organizations. It states, “For purposes of this section, the term ‘agricultural’ includes the art or science of cultivating land, harvesting crops or aquatic resources, or raising livestock.” (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 23701a, subd. (a).)
In excluding uninhabited farm acreage from certain grading districts, Streets and Highways Code section 8121.5 states, “For the purpose of this section, ‘farm acreage’ means any land which is under cultivation or which is being used for pasture or grazing at the time of the hearing.”

The “raising” of horses and other equine, cattle, sheep and goats “including the breeding and training of such animals” is permitted in the A-l and A-2 agricultural zones. (Tit. 22, L.A. County Code, §§ 22.24.070B, 22.24.120B.)