Court Opinion

ID: 9351883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 01:00:19.17652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:04:10.036452
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10122         Document: 00516595722             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/03/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 22-10122
                                     Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                                                                 January 3, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Candace Searcy,                                                                    Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Orchard National Title,

                                                                    Defendant—Appellee.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:21-CV-1910

   Before Davis, Smith, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Plaintiff-Appellant, Candace Searcy, appeals the district court’s order
   remanding this matter to state court as improperly removed. She also
   requests this Court to consider her motions for default judgment filed in state
   and federal court. Because the district court’s remand order is not reviewable
   as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), we DISMISS the appeal.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10122         Document: 00516595722               Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/03/2023

                                           No. 22-10122

           Searcy filed suit in Dallas County District Court against Orchard
   National Title and Courtney Anthony, a real estate broker. She asserted
   claims for breach of contract, fraudulent price gouging, and malpractice in
   connection with a residential real estate contract. Searcy subsequently
   removed her action to federal court on the grounds that she would be unable
   to receive justice in state court. The district court adopted the magistrate
   judge’s recommendation that the case be remanded as “improperly
   removed.” 1
           In her appellate brief, Searcy raises no legal arguments challenging the
   basis for the district court’s remand order, nor does she cite to any legal
   authority indicating that the district court’s decision to remand was
   erroneous. Instead, Searcy argues that she is entitled to a default judgment
   under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21 because the defendants never
   answered her lawsuit.
           Notwithstanding Searcy’s failure to identify any error by the district
   court, this Court must first examine the basis of its jurisdiction to review the
   district court’s remand order. See Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th
   Cir. 1987) (“This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction, on its own
   motion, if necessary.”). “Congress has severely circumscribed the power of
   federal appellate courts to review remand orders.” See Schexnayder v. Entergy
   La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004).                   Specifically, 28 U.S.C.
   § 1447(d), prohibits our review of a remand order that is based “on either a
   lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure.”

           1
              As noted by the magistrate judge, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that “any civil
   action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
   jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
   United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
   pending.” (emphasis added).

                                                 2
Case: 22-10122      Document: 00516595722           Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/03/2023

                                     No. 22-10122

   Schexnayder, 394 F.3d at 283; see § 1447(d). “This bar to review applies even
   if the order might otherwise be deemed erroneous.” Price v. Johnson, 600
   F.3d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
          The remand order was based on a defect in the removal procedure and
   lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, under § 1441(a), a plaintiff is
   not authorized to remove an action to federal court. Moreover, although
   Searcy asserted federal question jurisdiction, she included only state law
   causes of action in her complaint; and she pleaded no facts supporting
   diversity jurisdiction. Consequently, under § 1447(d), we lack jurisdiction to
   review the district court’s remand order.
          Based on the foregoing, this appeal is DISMISSED.

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