Court Opinion

ID: 9405018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 06:00:18.094895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:18.586311
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CARMINE J. PUCCIARIELLO,                        DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        AT-1221-16-0718-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: June 26, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Carmine J. Pucciariello, Punta Gorda, Florida, pro se.

           William P. Vines, Esquire, College Park, Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction
     because he did not exhaust his administrative remedy with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC).      Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the la w to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of t he case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     find that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that he exhausted
     his remedies with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), instead of that he failed
     to “nonfrivolously allege” that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement, we
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).
                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant, who was employed by the agency as an Aviation Safety
     Inspector, retired in 1999 as a part of a settlement agreement in an Equal
     Employment Opportunity Commission matter.            Pucciariello v. Department of
     Transportation, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-16-0718-W-1, Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 5, Subtabs 4c, 4d. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the agency
     agreed to issue the appellant a Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR)
     authorization, 2 which he could renew if he satisfied all regulatory requirements or

     2
       Pursuant to authority delegated by the Federal Aviation Administration, a DAR issues
     certificates identifying aircraft as airworthy and conducts inspections, testing, and
     examinations necessary to issue such certificates. Pucciariello v. United States,
     116 Fed. Cl. 390, 395-96 (2014); see 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1) (2010); 14 C.F.R.
     § 183.33.
                                                                                      3

     was otherwise qualified to hold the DAR. Id., Subtab 4d. On January 25, 2012,
     the agency terminated the appellant’s DAR authorization. Id., Subtab 4a.
¶3        On or around June 26, 2015, the appellant filed an IRA appeal, in which he
     alleged retaliation for whistleblowing activity.   Pucciariello v. Department of
     Transportation, MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-15-0646-W-1, Initial Appeal File
     (0646 IAF), Tab 8.     The appellant withdrew the appeal during a telephonic
     conference call, and the administrative judge dismissed the appeal as withdrawn.
     Id. at 1-2. The administrative judge advised the appellant that in order to file
     another IRA appeal, he would need to await the issuance of a closure letter by
     OSC or the passage of 120 days from his filing with OSC. Id. at 2 n.2.
¶4        In August 2016, the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal asserting that the
     agency terminated his DAR authorization in reprisal for whistleblowing activity.
     IAF, Tab 1.     He did not request a hearing.       Id., Subtab B at 1-a.     The
     administrative judge issued an order on jurisdiction and proof requirements, IAF,
     Tab 3, but the appellant did not submit a response. The agency filed a motion to
     dismiss arguing, among other things, that the appellant failed to exhaust his
     administrative remedy with OSC.      IAF, Tab 5, Subtab 1.    The administrative
     judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
     IAF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 3. In pertinent part, he found that the
     appellant failed to “nonfrivolously allege” that he exhausted his OSC remedy. ID
     at 3. He noted that he was dismissing the appeal without prejudice and, thus, the
     appellant could file a new IRA appeal on the same subject matter after he
     exhausted his OSC remedy. ID at 3 n.3.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review claiming that he exhausted his
     administrative remedy with OSC. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 1, 11.
     His petition also includes a motion to strike the agency’s first set of
     interrogatories, request for production of documents, and request for admissions.
     Id. at 12. The agency has not filed a response.
                                                                                       4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6        The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
     exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous
     allegations that (1) he engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a protected
     disclosure, and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
     decision to take or fail to take a personnel action.        Yunus v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 3
¶7        Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an employee is required to “seek corrective
     action from [OSC] before seeking corrective action from the Board” through an
     IRA appeal. Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 122 M.S.P.R. 3,
     ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015).              The substantive
     requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has provided OSC with a
     sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Chambers v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is
     limited to those issues that have been previously raised with OSC, but appellants
     may give a more detailed account of their whistleblowing activities before the
     Board than they did to OSC. Id. Appellants may demonstrate exhaustion of their
     OSC remedies with evidence regarding their initial OSC complaint and other
     communications with OSC concerning their allegations.              See Baldwin v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 8 (2010).        The appellant
     also must show either (a) OSC has notified him “that an investigation concerning
     [him] has been terminated” and “no more than 60 days have elapsed since
     notification was provided” to him, or (b) 120 days have elapsed since the
     appellant sought corrective action from OSC and he “has not been notified by
     3
        The termination of the appellant’s DAR authorization occurred before the
     December 27, 2012 effective date of the Whistleblower P rotection Enhancement Act of
     2012 (WPEA). Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476. Even if we
     considered the WPEA amendments in our analysis of this matter, a different outcome
     would not be warranted. Moreover, we have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted
     during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it does not affect the
     outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                       5

      [OSC] that [it] shall seek corrective action on [his] behalf.”          5 U.S.C.
      § 1214(a)(3); Wells v. Department of Homeland Security, 102 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 6
      (2006).
¶8          First, the appellant must prove exhaustion of his remedies before OSC by
      preponderant evidence, not make a nonfrivolous allegation of exhaustion, as the
      administrative judge found in his initial decision.      Mason v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 9 (2011). However, the administrative
      judge notified the appellant of the appropriate burden of proof in his order on
      jurisdiction and proof requirements, IAF, Tab 3 at 2, and referenced the
      appropriate standard in the initial decision, ID at 2. Thus, because the appellant
      was on notice of the correct burden of proof and we have applied that burden in
      considering the issue herein, we find this error to be harmless. See Panter v.
      Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (finding that an
      adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to the appellant’s substantive rights
      provides no basis for reversing an initial decision).
¶9          On review, the appellant asserts that he filed a complaint with OSC, but the
      “file” was “returned” to him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. He submits one page of what
      seems to be a multi-page letter, dated June 26, 2015, that was address ed to the
      Office of Inspector General, OSC, and the Board’s Atlanta Regional Office. Id.
      at 11. The “subject” of the letter is labeled “Whistleblower Protection [A]ct,”
      and he alleges therein that the agency engaged in, among other things, an abuse of
      power, a denial of due process, and a denial of the rule of law. Id.
¶10         The appellant’s June 26, 2015 letter was available prior to the close of
      record below. However, because his letter may be relevant to the issue of Board
      jurisdiction, a matter that may be raised at any time, Pirkkala v. Department of
      Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 5 (2016), we have considered it. We find that the
      page of the letter the appellant provided is insufficient to prove OSC exhaustion
      because it does not identify any alleged disclosures or the termination of the DAR
      authorization; instead, it only contains conclusory allegations of agency
                                                                                            6

      wrongdoing. See Lewis v. Department of Army, 58 M.S.P.R. 325, 332 (1993)
      (Whistleblower Protection Act requires that complaint seeking corrective action
      from the Special Counsel state both the “personnel action” and the “disclosure of
      information” at issue); see also Ellison v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 7 F.3d
      1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the test of the sufficiency of an
      employee’s charges of whistleblowing to OSC is the statement that he makes in
      the complaint requesting corrective action, not his post hoc characterization of
      those statements). Accordingly, we find that the letter did not provide OSC with
      information sufficient to pursue an investigation into any allegation that the
      agency had taken any retaliatory personnel action against the appellant. Because
      the appellant’s letter is insufficient to prove OSC exhaustion, we find that it does
      not warrant an outcome different from that in the initial decision. 4           Miller,
      122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶ 18.
¶11         The record reflects that, on the same day that the initial decision was issued,
      the appellant filed a motion for extra time to respond to the agency’s motion to
      dismiss. IAF, Tab 9. Because the appellant is not an e -filer, we presume that he
      was unaware of the issuance of the initial decision.          We have reviewed the
      appellant’s motion, but we find that none of its contents would change the
      outcome of this matter on review.        See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (explaining the
      Board’s criteria for granting a petition for review). Accordingly, we deny the
      appellant’s motion.
¶12         The appellant’s petition for review also includes a motion to strike the
      agency’s discovery requests.      PFR File, Tab 1 at 2, 12.         Issues relating to
      discovery must be raised before the administrative judge or they are precluded on
      review.   Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 31 M.S.P.R. 406, 409-10

      4
       The administrative judge alternatively found that the appellant, as a DAR, was not an
      agency employee or an applicant for employment who could be subjected to a personnel
      action for purposes of the whistleblower protection statutes. ID at 3. The appellant
      does not appear to challenge this finding on review. Because we find t hat the appellant
      has not proven exhaustion with OSC, we need not address this issue.
                                                                                      7

(1986). Because it does not appear that the appellant raised this issue before the
record closed below, we deny this motion.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your s ituation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                         8

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                  9

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     10

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           11

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.