Court Opinion

ID: 9367629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 16:00:27.531193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.731319
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10216   Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 02/01/2023    Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 22-10216
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       YUE ZHU QIU,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A088-777-109
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10216

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA,
       PER CURIAM:
              Yue Qiu, a native and citizen of China, appeals from the
       Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) order dismissing both her
       motion to reopen and her motion to remand proceedings to an Im-
       migration Judge (“IJ”). Below, Qui argued that her proceedings
       should be reopened based on her eligibility for asylum, withhold-
       ing of removal, or relief under the United Nations Convention
       Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
       ment or Punishment (“CAT”) based on the birth of her third child,
       that she will face forced sterilization if she must return to China,
       and based on her conversion to Christianity. On appeal, she argues
       that her proceedings should be reopened because she is prima facie
       eligible for asylum based on her conversion to Christianity. As we
       explain below, we must dismiss in part and deny in part Qiu’s ap-
       peal.
               We review only the decision of the BIA except to the extent
       the BIA expressly adopts the IJ’s opinion. Lopez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
       504 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). When the BIA agrees with the
       IJ’s findings but makes additional observations, we review both de-
       cisions. Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir.
       2009). We construe a motion to remand as a motion to reopen
       proceedings, the denial of which we review for an abuse of discre-
       tion. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 643 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011).
       This review is limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its
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       22-10216               Opinion of the Court                         3

       discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Zhang v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009). The moving party bears
       a heavy burden, as motions to reopen are disfavored, especially in
       removal proceedings. Id.
              We cannot consider facts that were not raised before the
       BIA. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004).
       Somewhat relatedly, we may review an argument only if the peti-
       tioner “has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the
       alien as of right.” INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We have
       said that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, so the failure
       to exhaust precludes our review of a claim that was not presented
       to the BIA. Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 867 (11th Cir.
       2018). “This is not a stringent requirement” and requires only that
       the petitioner “previously argued the core issue now on appeal be-
       fore the BIA.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297
       (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Though exhaustion
       does not require a petitioner to use precise legal terminology or
       provide a well-developed argument to support her claim, it does
       require that she provide information sufficient to enable the BIA to
       review and correct any errors below. Id. Unadorned, conclusory
       statements do not satisfy this requirement. Id. So in determining
       whether a petitioner has exhausted a claim, we must look to the
       substance of the appeal before the BIA for facts and allegations that
       make manifest the petitioner’s attempt to raise this claim before
       the BIA. Id. at 1298.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10216

              As an initial matter, Qiu has abandoned her claims that her
       proceedings should be reopened based on her eligibility for either
       withholding of removal or relief under the CAT by not discussing
       on appeal her prima facie eligibility for either. Similarly, Qiu has
       abandoned her claim that her proceedings should be reopened be-
       cause of her eligibility for asylum based on the birth of her third
       child, and that she will face forced sterilization if she returns to
       China because she does not discuss this claim on appeal to us.
              Further, Qiu failed to exhaust her claim that she was prima
       facie eligible for asylum based on a pattern or practice of persecu-
       tion of Christians in China because she did not present that claim
       to the BIA. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review this claim,
       and we dismiss Qiu’s petition as to this claim.
              That leaves only whether the BIA abused its discretion in
       denying Qiu’s motions to reopen and to remand based on her claim
       that she is eligible for asylum because of her recent conversion to
       Christianity.
              The BIA must consider all evidence that the petitioner intro-
       duced. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir.
       2005). Where the BIA gives reasoned consideration to the petition
       and makes adequate findings, it is not required to specifically ad-
       dress each claim made by the petitioner or each piece of evidence
       presented by the petitioner. Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1369,
       1374 (11th Cir. 2006). The BIA must consider the issues raised and
       announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing
       court to perceive that it has heard and considered all the issues. See
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       22-10216                Opinion of the Court                         5

       id. When a petitioner fails to offer an argument on an issue on
       appeal to us, that issue is considered abandoned. Ruga v. U.S. Att’y
       Gen., 757 F.3d 1193, 1196 (11th Cir. 2014).
              A motion to reopen must state the new facts that will be
       proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be
       supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. INA
       § 240(c)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
       The new evidence must be material, and the noncitizen must
       demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered or
       presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A noncit-
       izen must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.
       Flores-Panameno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1036, 1040 (11th Cir.
       2019). The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen is within
       the discretion of the administrative adjudicator. See 8 C.F.R. §
       1003.2(a); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“the Attorney
       General has ‘broad discretion’ to grant or deny such motions”) (in-
       ternal citations omitted). Thus, a noncitizen who seeks to reopen
       her removal proceedings bears a heavy burden. INS v. Abudu, 485
       U.S. 94, 110 (1988).
             An applicant for asylum must meet the INA’s definition of a
       refugee. INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The INA defines a
       refugee as follows:
              [A]ny person who is outside any country of such per-
              son’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling
              to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail him-
              self or herself of the protection of, that country
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                   22-10216

              because of persecution or a well-founded fear of per-
              secution on account of race, religion, nationality,
              membership in a particular social group, or political
              opinion.

       INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To meet the defini-
       tion of a refugee, the applicant must, with specific and credible ev-
       idence, demonstrate (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily
       listed factor, or (2) a well-founded fear that the statutorily listed fac-
       tor will cause future persecution. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257. Where
       an applicant demonstrates past persecution, a rebuttable presump-
       tion that he has a well-founded fear of future prosecution applies.
       Id. If the petitioner cannot show past persecution, she must
       demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution that is both
       subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Id.
               Similar to the showing required for asylum, an applicant
       seeking the withholding of removal under the INA must demon-
       strate that her life or freedom would be threatened in that country
       because of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
       lar social group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C.
       § 1231(b)(3)(A). Withholding-of-removal claims are governed by a
       more stringent standard than asylum claims, though, requiring the
       applicant to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will
       be persecuted upon return to her home country. Sepulveda v. U.S.
       Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005). If a petitioner is
       unable to meet the standard of proof for asylum, she cannot meet
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       22-10216                Opinion of the Court                          7

       the more stringent standard for withholding of removal. D-Mu-
       humed v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 388 F.3d 814, 819 (11th Cir. 2004).
             An applicant seeking CAT relief must establish that it is
       more likely than not that she would be tortured if removed to the
       proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
              The CAT defines torture as follows:
              [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
              physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-
              son for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or
              a third person information or a confession, punishing
              him or her for an act he or she or a third person has
              committed or is suspected of having committed, or
              intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person,
              or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
              when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
              instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
              a public official or other person acting in an official
              capacity.

       8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Evidence relevant to an applicant’s eligibil-
       ity for CAT relief includes, but is not limited to (1) incidents of past
       torture inflicted upon the applicant; (2) the viability of relocation
       within the country of removal as a means to avoid torture; (3)
       gross, flagrant or mass human rights violations in the country of
       removal; and (4) other relevant country conditions.                  Id.
       § 208.16(c)(3)(i)-(iv). An applicant who is unable to meet the well-
       founded-fear standard for asylum is generally precluded from
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10216

       qualifying for withholding of removal or CAT relief. Forgue v.
       U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1288 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005).
              Here, we cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion
       in denying either Qiu’s motion to reopen or her motion to remand
       because it considered the issues she raised, and it made specific ci-
       tations to the record in support of its decision to deny those mo-
       tions. Similarly, based on this record, we cannot find that the BIA
       did acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner when it determined
       that Qiu’s subjective belief that she would be persecuted based on
       her conversion to Christianity was not objectively reasonable be-
       cause she showed little evidence of persecution of Christians in her
       home Fujian province. Accordingly, we deny Qiu’s petition.
             PETITION DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.