Court Opinion

ID: 9891328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 12:12:23.898088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.730473
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                             FILED
                                 September 2023 Term
                                                                         October 16, 2023
                               _____________________                           released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                          EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

                                    No. 22-0109                               OF WEST VIRGINIA

                               _____________________

                                 ARON FREELAND,
                              Petitioner below, Petitioner,

                                           v.

          WILLIAM K. MARSHALL, COMMISSIONER, WEST VIRGINIA
            DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION,
                       Respondent below, Respondent.

         _________________________________________________________

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                      The Honorable Kenneth D. Ballard, Judge
                              Civil Action No. 20-P-285

               REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
         _________________________________________________________

                             Submitted: September 26, 2023
                                Filed: October 16, 2023

Edward L. Bullman, Esq.                            Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Bullman and Bullman                                Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia                          Grant Newman, Esq.
Counsel for the Petitioner                         Assistant Solicitor General
                                                   Charleston, West Virginia
                                                   Counsel for the Respondent

JUSTICE HUTCHISON delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                             SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

              1.     “A de novo standard of review applies to a circuit court’s decision to

grant or deny a writ of mandamus.” Syl. Pt. 1, Harrison County Commission v. Harrison

County Assessor, 222 W. Va. 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008).

              2.     “Interpreting a statute . . . presents a purely legal question subject to

de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Department, 195

W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995).

              3.     “Mandamus lies to require the discharge by a public officer of a

nondiscretionary duty.” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Greenbrier County. Airport Authority v.

Hanna, 151 W. Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967).

              4.     “Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary

situations[.]” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State ex rel. Sowards v. County Commission of Lincoln

County, 196 W. Va. 739, 474 S.E.2d 919 (1996).

              5.     “Mandamus will issue where the undisputed facts show that petitioner

has clear legal right to the performance of the act demanded, and a corresponding duty rests

upon respondent to perform that duty; and that there is no other adequate remedy open to

                                              i
petitioner.” Syl., Board of Education of Fayetteville Dist. v. Lawson, 113 W. Va. 60, 166

S.E. 696 (1932).

              6.     “It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language

in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a

mandatory connotation.” Syl. Pt. 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees Insurance

Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).

              7.     “It is settled that in mandamus proceedings where a public officer

willfully fails to obey the law, costs will be awarded.” Syl. Pt. 3, Nelson v. West Virginia

Public Employees Insurance Board, 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).

                                             ii
HUTCHISON, Justice:

              The Petitioner, Aron Freeland, a convicted felon incarcerated in the West

Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DCR”) penal system, appeals a final

order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered on January 13, 2022, denying his

requested writ of mandamus against the Respondent, William K. Marshall, DCR

Commissioner (“the Commissioner”). 1 Finding that the circuit court erred in denying a writ

of mandamus, we reverse and remand this case for entry of an order consistent with this

opinion.

                         I.     Facts and Procedural Background

              The Petitioner filed a self-represented petition for a writ of mandamus against

the Respondent on October 7, 2020. In this petition, the Petitioner claimed the

Commissioner had a duty to “develop a policy directive and/or operational procedure that

is in compliance with the [sic] W. Va. Code § 15A-4-17(i) that was passed in July 2018 in

HB 4338 during the legislative session.” 2 On October 7, 2020, West Virginia Code § 15A-

4-17(i) provided, “[t]he superintendent may, with the approval of the commissioner, allow

extra good time for inmates who perform exceptional work or service.” During the

       1
        During this litigation, William K. Marshall replaced Betsy Jividen as the DCR
Commissioner. We previously substituted Commissioner Marshall as the Respondent in
this case under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(c).

      The legislative history shows that this legislation actually was passed in March of
       2

2018 with an effective date of July 1, 2018.
                                             1
pendency of the Petitioner’s mandamus case in circuit court, the Legislature amended West

Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i) (effective April 30, 2021) in S.B. 713 so that is now reads:

                    (i)(1) An eligible inmate may receive extra good time in
               the sole discretion of the commissioner for meritorious service
               or performing extra assigned duties during emergencies; and

                       (2) In addition to the good time granted under subsection
               (c) of this section and that authorized by subdivision (1) of this
               subsection, an eligible inmate serving a felony sentence may
               receive up to 90 days good time per program for successfully
               completing an approved, but not required, academic or
               vocational program, which is not part of the inmate’s required
               individualized reentry programing plan. The commissioner
               shall adopt a written policy to effectuate the purposes of this
               subsection.

               On August 6, 2021, the circuit court appointed the Petitioner counsel and on

December 15, 2021, convened a hearing on the Petitioner’s mandamus request. At the

hearing, the Petitioner’s counsel argued that the Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in

amended West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i) imposed a mandatory duty upon the

Commissioner to adopt a written policy and the Legislature’s use of the term “subsection”

applied that duty to the entirety of (i), both (1) and (2)—which were subdivisions of

subsection (i). 3

       3
        At oral argument before us, the Commissioner argued that because the Petitioner
did not file an amended complaint, he could not rely on the 2021 amendments to West
Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i). However, the unpled claims under the 2021 statutory
amendments were tried with the Commissioner’s implicit consent at the circuit court’s
mandamus hearing. Therefore, we exercise our discretion to constructively amend the
complaint. See Louis J. Palmer and Robin Jean Davis, Litigation Handbook on West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure 489 (5th ed. 2017) (“An appellate court has the
discretionary power under certain circumstances to amend a complaint constructively to
recognize unpleaded claims. Constructive amendment is a judicially crafted doctrine that
                                               2
              The Commissioner, though, asserted the sentence “[t]he commissioner shall

adopt a written policy to effectuate the purposes of this subsection” applied only to (i)(2)

and not (i)(1) because the right to good time under (i)(1) rests in the Commissioner’s “sole

discretion.” The Commissioner also informed the circuit court that, while no written policy

existed as to (i)(2), “the [Division of Corrections] is currently working on policy language

for that subsection as required by the statute.”

              By written order entered January 13, 2022, the circuit court denied the

requested writ of mandamus finding, in pertinent part:

                  The clear language of both W. Va. Code § 15A-4-17(i) and
              also the amendments [to it in 2021 in S.B. 713] place the
              authority [to award good time] in the sole discretion of the
              commissioner with approval from the superintendents.
              Nothing in this section requires or contemplates a policy
              directive and/or operational procedure relating to extra good
              time. Therefore, the Petitioner fails to demonstrate “the
              existence of a clear legal right in the petition to the relief
              sought.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling,
              153 W. Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969). Further, the Petitioner
              has failed to establish “the existence of a legal duty on the part
              of respondent to do the thing which petitioner seeks to
              compel.” Id.

   The Petitioner appealed the denial of the writ of mandamus to this Court.

courts have extrapolated from the language of Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15(b). As a general
rule, an appellate court will permit an amendment only when the effect will be to
acknowledge that certain issues upon which the lower court’s decision has been based or
issues consistent with the trial court’s judgment have been litigated.”); see W. Va. R. Civ.
P. 15(b) (“When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.”).
                                              3
                                 II.     Standard of Review

       The case before us is an appeal of a denial for a writ of mandamus. This Court’s

review in such cases is plenary, as we have held, “[a] de novo standard of review applies

to a circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a writ of mandamus.” Syl. Pt. 1, Harrison

Cnty. Comm’n v. Harrison Cnty. Assessor, 222 W. Va. 25, 658 S.E.2d 555 (2008). This

case also requires us to address West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i) (2021). In matters of

statutory interpretation, we also owe the circuit court no deference. “Interpreting a statute

. . . presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part,

Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t, 195 W. Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). With

these standards in mind, we look to the issues at hand.

                                       III. Discussion

              On an appeal of a final order from circuit court in a mandamus case, this

Court’s obligation is to determine “de novo whether the legal prerequisites for mandamus

relief are present.” State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 196 W. Va. 208, 214, 470 S.E.2d 162,

168 (1996). Thus, we commence with examining those prerequisites.

              “Mandamus lies to require the discharge by a public officer of a

nondiscretionary duty.” Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Greenbrier Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Hanna,

151 W. Va. 479, 153 S.E.2d 284 (1967). Such a non-discretionary duty may arise because

of a statutory obligation. See, e.g., Syl. Pt. 2, Hickman v. Epstein, 192 W. Va. 42, 450

S.E.2d 406 (1994) (“The function of a writ of mandamus is to enforce the performance of

                                             4
official duties arising from the discharge of some public function, or imposed by statute.”).

Because “[m]andamus is a drastic remedy to be invoked only in extraordinary situations[,]”

Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State ex rel. Sowards v. Cnty. Comm’n of Lincoln Cnty., 196 W. Va. 739,

474 S.E.2d 919 (1996), “it should be invoked sparingly.” State ex rel. Billings v. City of

Point Pleasant, 194 W. Va. 301, 303, 460 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1995). A party seeking a writ

of mandamus shoulders a heavy burden. State ex rel. Richey v. Hill, 216 W. Va. 155, 160,

603 S.E.2d 177, 182 (2004). “To invoke mandamus the relator must show (1) a clear right

to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the thing relator

seeks; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy.” Syl. Pt. 2, Myers v. Barte, 167 W.

Va. 194, 279 S.E.2d 406 (1981). If a petitioner fails to satisfy any of these factors,

mandamus will not issue. See State ex rel. Burdette v. Zakaib, 224 W. Va. 325, 331, 685

S.E.2d 903, 909 (2009) (a failure to satisfy any of the three mandamus elements is fatal to

the request for mandamus). Conversely, while the mandamus factors pose significant

hurdles, they are not insurmountable; when a Petitioner satisfies all three elements, a writ

of mandamus will issue. “Mandamus will issue where the undisputed facts show that

petitioner has clear legal right to the performance of the act demanded, and a corresponding

duty rests upon respondent to perform that duty; and that there is no other adequate remedy

open to petitioner.” Syl., Bd. of Educ. of Fayetteville Dist. v. Lawson, 113 W. Va. 60, 166

S.E. 696 (1932). We turn now to determining whether the Petitioner has carried his burden

as to the mandamus elements.

                                             5
                                               A.

               The Petitioner has a clear legal right, and the Commissioner
               has a corresponding legal duty.

       The crux of this case involves the final sentence of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-

7(i)(2), which provides, “[t]he commissioner shall adopt a written policy to effectuate the

purposes of this subsection.” We have held that “[t]he primary object in construing a statute

is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 1, Smith v. State

Work. Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). That intention is to be

garnered first and foremost from the language the legislature uses in the statute. “In order

to ascertain legislative intent, it is necessary to consider the wording of the statute at issue.”

Lowe v. Richards, 234 W. Va. 48, 55, 763 S.E.2d 64, 71 (2014). “It is basic in our law and

universally accepted that where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain

meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.” Crockett v.

Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 718, 172 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1970). Thus, in matters of statutory

review, “[w]e look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning,

answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is

foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co., 195 W. Va. at 587, 466 S.E.2d at 438.

               We find the text of West Virginia Code § 15A-7-17(i) is plain. The final

sentence of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2) uses the word “shall.” “It is well

established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a

contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.”

                                                6
Syl. Pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982).

Further, the Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in a statute also ordinarily indicates that

the duty imposed is non-discretionary. Currey v. State of W. Va. Hum Rts. Comm’n, 166

W. Va. 163, 166, 273 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1980) (“The use of the word ‘shall’ throughout this

section indicates that the commission’s duties are nondiscretionary.”). Hence, the

Legislature’s use of the word “shall” normally imposes a mandatory, non-discretionary

duty to perform the action mandated. We therefore conclude that West Virginia Code §

15A-4-17(i)(2) imposes upon the Commissioner a clear legal duty to (and correspondingly

in this case grants to the Petitioner a legal right to have the Commissioner) adopt a written

policy effectuating the purposes of “this subsection.”

              The parties, though, differ as to what constitutes “this subsection.” The

Petitioner asserts that “this subsection” applies to all of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i),

i.e., both (i)(1) and (i)(2). The Commissioner contends in his summary response 4 that “this

       4
         During oral argument in this Court, the Commissioner’s counsel raised several
arguments that were not made in his summary response. We have explained that “appellate
courts generally do not consider issues or arguments raised for the first time in oral
argument because such issues or arguments are waived by failure to include them in the
appellate brief.” Argus Energy, LLC v. Marenko, ___ W. Va. ___, ___, 887 S.E.2d 223,
228-29 (2023) (footnotes omitted). Thus, we summarily refuse to consider the
Commissioner’s new arguments—save one. The Commissioner asserted in his oral
argument to this Court that the Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and
that this deprived the courts of jurisdiction. Alleged defects in jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, even when the first time is at oral argument on appeal. Id. at ___, 887 S.E.2d
at 229. This recognition does not aid the Commissioner, though, as the exhaustion of
administrative remedies doctrine is not jurisdictional. “The general requirement of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional doctrine, but is a matter of
comity, within the discretion of the trial court.” Syl. Pt. 5, Wiggins v. Eastern Associated
                                              7
subsection” applies only to West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2), but not as to (i)(1). 5 We

agree with the Petitioner.

              “Courts are obligated to ‘presume that a legislature says in a statute what it

means and means in a statute what it says there.’” State ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 236 W.

Va. 528, 533, 782 S.E.2d 223, 228 (2016) (quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249, 253–254 (1992)). The Legislature used the terminology “this subsection” in

West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2). It is obvious from West Virginia Code § 15A-4-

17(i)(2) that the term “subsection” encompasses all its component parts which are

Coal Corp., 178 W. Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987). Consequently, the Petitioner waived
reliance on the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, at the very least, by not asserting it
in his summary response. And were we to address exhaustion, we would still rule against
the Commissioner because “[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
inapplicable where resort to available procedures would be an exercise in futility.” Syl. Pt.
1, State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. of Kanawha Cnty. v. Casey, 176 W. Va. 733, 349 S.E.2d 436
(1986). We believe exhaustion is excused here under this futility doctrine. See infra-Part
III.B.
       5
         While this appeal was pending, the Commissioner adopted Policy Directive No.
151.06 (eff. May 30, 2022) which addressed good time under subdivision (2) of subsection
(i). To the extent the Petitioner is claiming mandamus relief to compel the Commissioner
to adopt a written policy as to (i)(2), we find any such claim moot with the Commissioner’s
adoption of Policy Directive No. 151.06. “The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel
the performance of a duty already discharged.” Syl. Pt. 1, Monongalia Improvement Co. v.
Morris, 106 W. Va. 243, 145 S.E. 387 (1928); see also Almakalani v. McAleenan, 527 F.
Supp. 3d 205, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citation omitted) (“‘Defendants discharged any non-
discretionary duty they may have owed to Plaintiff. . . . Plaintiff’s claim is thus moot insofar
as it seeks a writ of mandamus to order Defendants to perform duties they have already
performed.’”).

                                               8
denominated      “subdivision[s].” See id. (“In addition to the good time granted under

subsection (c) of this section and that authorized by subdivision (1) of this subsection . . .

.”). 6 Thus, the term “this subsection” in West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i) necessarily

includes the entirety of subsection (i), that is, both of its subdivisions (i)(1) and (i)(2). If

the Legislature had meant to limit the Commissioner’s duty only to subdivision (2), then

the final sentence of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2) would have read “[t]he

commissioner shall adopt a written policy to effectuate the purposes of this

subsectiondivision.” The Legislature did not so pen West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2)

and “we cannot rewrite the statute . . . nor can we interpret the statute in a manner

inconsistent with the plain meaning of the words.” VanKirk v. Young, 180 W. Va. 18, 20,

375 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1988).

              The Commissioner further argues mandamus relief is unavailable because

the Legislature vested him with the “sole discretion” to award additional good time under

West Virginia Code § 15A-7-4(i)(1). The Commissioner’s position misconstrues the

Petitioner’s argument.

       This is substantiated by the West Virginia Legislature’s Bill Drafting Manual that
       6

explains a “subsection” is an independent part of a section and is usually delineated by a
lower-case letter. W. Va. Leg., Bill Drafting Manual 48 (Rev. ed. Dec. 2018); see also W.
Va. Leg., Bill Drafting Manual 43 (Rev. ed. Dec. 2022). According to the Bill Drafting
Manual, dependent subparts of a subsection are termed “subdivisions.” W. Va. Leg., Bill
Drafting Manual 48 (Rev. ed. Dec. 2018); see also W. Va. Leg., Bill Drafting Manual 43
(Rev. ed. Dec. 2022).
                                               9
              The Commissioner correctly identifies that mandamus ordinarily will not lie

to control discretion. “Mandamus cannot be employed ordinarily to control official

discretion.” Syl. Pt. 1, Reynolds v. State Rd. Comm’n, 111 W. Va. 398, 162 S.E. 319, 319

(1932); see also Beverly Grill, Inc., v. Crow, 133 W. Va. 214, 219, 57 S.E.2d 244, 246

(1949) (“This Court has held, in numerous decisions, that mandamus will not lie to control

an administrative or executive officer in the performance of a discretionary act, in the

absence of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ulterior motive or

misapprehension of law upon the part of such officer.”). The Petitioner, though, is not

claiming that the Commissioner must award him good time under West Virginia Code §

15A-4-17(i)(1). If that was the Petitioner’s position, the Commissioner’ argument that

mandamus does not lie in this case might have merit. Instead, the Petitioner is arguing the

Commissioner must adopt a written policy to effectuate the purposes of subdivision (1) of

subsection (i). And mandamus will compel the adoption of a written policy as directed by

the Legislature for that duty is non-discretionary. See Rogers v. Hechler, 176 W. Va. 713,

717, 348 S.E.2d 299, 303 (1986) (“[N]ondiscretionary duties include the promulgation of

rules and regulations pursuant to legislative mandate.”); accord State ex rel. East End Ass’n

v. McCoy, 198 W. Va. 458, 472, 481 S.E.2d 764, 778 (1996). 7

       7
         We hasten to add that while mandamus lies to compel the Commissioner to adopt
a written policy, the contents of that policy rest within the Commissioner’s sole discretion
and generally cannot be controlled by mandamus. See Richmond Funeral Directors’ Ass’n
v. Groth, 120 S.E.2d 467, 470-71 (Va. 1961) (mandamus will lie to compel a City Director
to promulgate parking regulations when directed to do so by municipal ordinance but will
not lie to compel what the contents of the regulations should be).
                                             10
                                             B.

                   The Petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law.

              The circuit court did not address whether the Petitioner had an adequate

remedy at law that would bar mandamus relief. For the following reasons, we conclude

that there are no other adequate remedies.

              While “[g]enerally mandamus is not an appropriate remedy where another

sufficient and specific remedy exists[,]” State ex rel. Lawhead v. Kanawha Cnty. Ct., 129

W. Va. 167, 169, 38 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1946), “if such other remedy is inadequate or is not

equally as beneficial, convenient and effective, mandamus will lie.” State ex rel. Smoleski

v. Cnty. Ct. of Hancock Cnty., 153 W. Va. 307, 312, 168 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1969). The

Petitioner’s brief asserts he “has no other adequate remedy at law. Petitioner has exhausted

his administrative remedies by filing grievances and writing directly to the office of the

commissioner.” The Commissioner’s summary response does not respond to the

Petitioner’s claim that the Petitioner has no other adequate remedy besides mandamus. The

Commissioner’s failure to address this contention in his summary response legally

constitutes his tacit agreement that the Petitioner has no other adequate remedy at law. See

W. Va. R. App. P. 10(d) (“If the respondent’s brief fails to respond to an assignment of

error, . . . the Supreme Court will assume that the respondent agrees with the petitioner’s

view of the issue.”); id. 10(e) (“A summary response need not comply with all the

requirements for a brief set forth in this rule but must contain an argument responsive to

                                             11
the assignments of error[.]”). Thus, we consider the Commissioner’s failure to respond to

Petitioner’s claim that he has no other adequate remedy other than mandamus as a

confession of error. See, e.g., 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 477 (2018) (“If an appellee

fails to respond to an issue in its brief, the court may treat the failure to respond as a

confession that the appellant’s position is correct[.]”).

               A confession of error is not dispositive, though. We have held that a

confession of error does not relieve this Court of its judicial duty to independently examine

the error confessed to determine if the confession of error is meritorious. See, e.g., Syl. Pt.

1, Sorongon v. W. Va. Bd. of Physical Therapy, 232 W. Va. 263, 752 S.E.2d 294 (2013)

(per curiam) (“In a case where the appellee confesses error and indicates that the judgment

should be reversed, this Court, upon ascertaining that the errors confessed are supported

by law and constitute cause for the reversal of the judgment . . . will reverse the

judgment[.]” Syl. pt. 4, Petition of Hull, 159 W.Va. 363, 222 S.E.2d 813 (1976).”); see also

5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1081 (2019) (“[T]he appellate court is not relieved of its duty

to perform its judicial function by a party’s filing of confession of error, as it is still

obligated to independently examine the errors confessed in order to protect the public

interest.”).

               In the circuit court, the Commissioner asserted that the DCR grievance

system provided an adequate remedy in lieu of mandamus. However, given the

Commissioner’s consistent position throughout this litigation (both in the circuit court and

                                              12
before this Court) that he was not obligated to adopt a written policy as to (i)(1), resort to

the DCR grievance system would have proven futile. See, e.g., Athlone Indus., Inc. v.

Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 707 F.2d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (resort to

administrative remedies would have been futile as it was “highly unlikely that the [agency]

would change its position if the case were remanded to it” as it had “defended [its] position

before this and other courts.”). A futile administrative remedy is no remedy at all. See

Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 537 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A futile

state remedy is not significantly different from no remedy at all.”). Having independently

reviewed whether the Petitioner has an adequate remedy other than mandamus to compel

the Commissioner to adopt a written policy as directed by West Virginia Code § 15A-4-

17(i), we conclude he does not.

              The Petitioner has surmounted the high hurdles to prove entitlement to a writ

of mandamus by establishing all three mandamus elements. The circuit court should have

granted a writ of mandamus against the Commissioner ordering him to adopt a written

policy to effectuate the purposes of subsection (i), which means both of subsection (i)’s

subdivisions. Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand this case to

the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus. 8

       8
        The Petitioner asks the writ require the Commissioner to adopt a written policy
within forty-five days. We decline to require the Commissioner to act by a date certain, as
we are confident the Commissioner will act with dispatch in obeying the writ.

                                             13
                                             C.

                             The Petitioner is entitled to costs.

              The Petitioner avers that he “was required to expend his own limited funds

to obtain performance of the Respondent of a mandatory duty” and that “he is entitled to

recover his expenses such as postage and copies.” We agree.

              West Virginia Code § 53-1-8 provides, “[t]he writ peremptory shall be

awarded or denied according to the law and facts of the case, and with or without costs, as

the court or judge may determine.” Indeed, “[i]t is settled that in mandamus proceedings

where a public officer willfully fails to obey the law, costs will be awarded.” Syl. Pt. 3,

Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982). The

Commissioner asserts he acted honestly and in good faith in refusing to adopt a written

policy, so an award of costs is precluded. See Ney v. W. Va. Work. Comp. Fund, 186 W.

Va. 180, 183, 411 S.E.2d 699, 702 (1991) (per curiam) (“[C]osts will not be awarded in

mandamus proceedings against a public officer who is honestly and in good faith

endeavoring to perform his or her duty as he or she conceives it to be.”). The plain language

of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i)(2) belies the Commissioner’s position. When a public

official deliberately and knowingly has refused to exercise a clear legal duty, a presumption

exists in favor of awarding expenses that can be rebutted only upon a showing that

extraordinary circumstances exist making an award of expenses inappropriate. W. Va.

Educ. Ass’n v. Consol. Pub. Ret. Bd., 194 W. Va. 501, 514, 460 S.E.2d 747, 760 (1995).

                                             14
The Commissioner has not argued any extraordinary circumstances exist precluding an

award of costs. As such, we also remand this case to the circuit court for further

proceedings to determine the nature and amount of costs to which the Petitioner is entitled. 9

                                      III.    Conclusion

              For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the January 13, 2022, judgment of the

Circuit Court of Kanawha County and remand this case for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

                                                    Reversed and remanded with directions.

       9
        The costs available to the Petitioner are of a limited duration. Since he prevailed
because of the 2021 amendments to West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(i), he may only claim
costs he incurred after April 30, 2021, the effective date of that subsection.
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