Court Opinion

ID: 9957270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 21:06:00.234545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.393365
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 220513-U

                                   Order filed April 3, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-22-0513
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 21-CF-1738
                                                        )
      NATASHA BRADFORD,                                 )       Honorable
                                                        )       Amy M. Bertani-Tomczak
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Hettel and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) Defendant’s convictions for aggravated battery violated the one-act, one-crime
                  rule. (2) Defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file an assessment waiver.

¶2          Defendant, Natasha Bradford, was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery. On

     appeal, defendant argues that her convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule. Defendant

     further contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file an assessment waiver. We

     affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶3                                              I. BACKGROUND

¶4          Defendant was charged with four counts of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

     3.05(d)(1), (7) (West 2020)) for spraying Pace bus driver Linda Koonce with pepper spray.

     Relevant to this appeal, count I alleged defendant knowingly and without legal justification made

     physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with Koonce, knowing Koonce to be a

     transit employee engaged in the performance of her official duties. Count III similarly alleged

     that defendant caused bodily harm to Koonce.

¶5          Defendant stated during her arraignment and in her affidavit of assets and liabilities that

     she was unemployed and receiving food stamp benefits through the Supplemental Nutrition

     Assistance Program (SNAP). The court appointed the public defender and later modified

     defendant’s bail from $20,000 to a recognizance bond. The matter proceeded to a bench trial and

     defendant was found guilty on all counts. The State later dismissed defendant’s convictions as to

     counts II and IV at a posttrial hearing.

¶6          Defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated defendant was working two

     part-time jobs and receiving section 8 housing and state aid for financial assistance. At

     sentencing, the court merged counts I and III and imposed a term of 24 months’ probation. The

     sentence also included $2119 in fines and assessments. Defendant appealed and the court

     appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD).

¶7                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶8                                     A. One-Act, One-Crime Rule

¶9          On appeal, defendant first argues that her convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule

     because they are based on the same physical act: spraying Koonce with pepper spray. At the

     onset, defendant acknowledges she has forfeited this claim by not raising the issue in circuit

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       court and requests plain error review. The plain error doctrine permits the review of an

       unpreserved error

                       “when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely

                       balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against

                       the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or

                       obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the

                       fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial

                       process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v.

                       Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007).

       Our supreme court has held that violations of the one-act, one-crime rule affect the integrity of

       the judicial process and are therefore reviewable under the second prong of the plain error

       doctrine. People v. Smith, 2019 IL 123901, ¶ 14. The first step in plain error review is to

       determine whether an error occurred. Id.

¶ 10          Convictions for multiple offenses based on the same physical act are prohibited under the

       one-act, one-crime rule. People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. When more than one conviction

       is predicated on the same physical act, a sentence should be imposed for the most serious offense

       and the lesser offenses should be vacated. People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 170 (2009). As a

       matter of law, we review de novo whether a violation of the rule occurred. Smith, 2019 IL

       123901, ¶ 15.

¶ 11          Here, defendant was convicted on two counts of aggravated battery based on the same

       physical act: spraying Koonce with pepper spray. Of the two convictions, aggravated battery

       causing bodily harm (count III) is the most serious offense. See People v. Young, 362 Ill. App. 3d

       843, 853 (2005) (holding a battery conviction based on bodily harm is more serious than battery

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       based on insulting or provoking contact). The State concedes, and we accept, that count I should

       be vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s

       conviction as to count I and affirm defendant’s conviction as to count III.

¶ 12                                        B. Ineffective Assistance

¶ 13          Defendant further contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

       file an assessment waiver (725 ILCS 5/124A-20 (West 2020)). Specifically, defendant asserts

       that she qualified for the waiver because she was receiving SNAP benefits. Defendant argues she

       was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to file because there is a reasonable probability that the

       waiver would have alleviated the financial burden created by the imposition of assessments as

       part of her sentence.

¶ 14          A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel as a constitutional

       right. U.S. Const., amend.VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). An

       ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding sentencing cannot prevail unless defendant

       demonstrates that counsel’s performance fell below minimal professional standards and a

       reasonable probability exists that the sentence was affected by counsel’s deficient performance.

       People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 257 (1997).

¶ 15          Section 124A-20(b)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides that if a

       defendant applying for an assessment waiver is found to be indigent, the court must exempt the

       defendant from payment of any assessments by granting the waiver in full. 725 ILCS 5/124A-

       20(b)(1) (West 2020). A person is considered indigent under the statute if:

                               “(1) He or she is receiving assistance under one or more of the

                      following means-based governmental public benefits programs:

                      Supplemental Security Income; Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled;

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                        Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; [SNAP]; General Assistance;

                        Transitional Assistance; or State Children and Family Assistance.

                                (2) His or her available personal income is 200% or less of the

                        current poverty level, unless the applicant’s assets that are not exempt

                        under Part 9 or 10 of Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure are of a

                        nature and value that the court determines that the applicant is able to pay

                        the assessments.

                                (3) He or she is, in the discretion of the court, unable to proceed in

                        an action with payment of assessments and whose payment of those

                        assessments would result in substantial hardship to the person or his or her

                        family.” Id. § 124A-20(a).

¶ 16             Here, defendant met the criteria to qualify for an assessment waiver, as she indicated in

       court during her first appearance and in her statement of assets and liabilities that she was

       receiving SNAP assistance. Therefore, counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to file an

       application for an assessment waiver. See People v. Harrison, 2022 IL App (3d) 210425-U, ¶ 25.

       Further, because the record reflects that defendant qualified for the waiver, a reasonable

       probability exists that she would have been exempt from the imposed assessments if counsel had

       filed the application. As defendant has demonstrated she was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

       performance, we remand the matter to afford defendant the opportunity to file an assessment

       waiver.

¶ 17             In coming to this conclusion, we reject the State’s contention that the record lacked

       sufficient evidence to establish that defendant would have qualified for the waiver at the time of

       sentencing because her PSI did not include specific information showing she was still receiving

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       SNAP benefits. In support of this assertion, the State relies on People v. Baker, 2022 IL App

       (4th) 210713. In Baker, the defendant claimed the appointment of OSAD qualified her as

       indigent under section 124A-20(a)(3) because assessment payments would result in a substantial

       hardship. Id. ¶ 83. The court held that appointment of OSAD alone was not sufficient to

       demonstrate a substantial hardship. Id. Baker is further distinguishable because the defendant had

       posted a $5000 cash bond that covered the assessments in full and the remainder was refunded to

       the defendant. Id. Baker did not, however, hold that a defendant only qualifies for an assessment

       waiver if they meet the criteria for indigency at the exact moment of sentencing. Rather, section

       124A-20(b) provides that any defendant can apply for an assessment waiver after the

       commencement of an action, but no later than 30 days after sentencing. 725 ILCS 5/124A-20(b)

       (West 2020). Therefore, defense counsel could have filed for an assessment waiver at any time

       during the pendency of the proceedings based on defendant’s affidavit of assets and liabilities,

       which established she received SNAP. See Harrison, 2022 IL App (3d) 210425-U, ¶ 25

       (defendant qualified for an assessment waiver based on her affidavit of assets and liabilities

       indicating she received supplemental security income and temporary assistance for needy

       families). Additionally, defendant’s PSI generally stated she was receiving financial assistance

       from the state. There is a reasonable probability that the state aid she was receiving was in the

       form of SNAP assistance or another program that meets the criteria under section 124A-20(a)(1).

       In the alternative, even if it did not meet those criteria, the financial assistance and section 8

       housing benefits she was receiving suggest she would have had a substantial likelihood of

       qualifying for a waiver under either section 124A-20(a)(2) or (3).

¶ 18                                            III. CONCLUSION

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¶ 19          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and

       remanded to provide defendant or her counsel the opportunity to file an assessment waiver.

¶ 20          Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings as indicated.

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