Court Opinion

ID: 9561740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:15:05.595402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.426391
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
Russell Sheeks' driver's license was revoked for refusing to take a Breathalyzer test after his arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. The trial court reinstated his license, finding he was suffering from hypothermia rather than the effects of alcohol when he refused the Breathalyzer test, which caused him to be confused so that he did not understand the implied consent warning. The Department of Licensing appeals the reinstatement of Mr. Sheeks' driver's license. We reverse.
On December 23, 1983, at about 11:30 p.m., Russell Sheeks was stopped by Washington State Trooper Curtis Miller after Trooper Miller observed Mr. Sheeks driving erratically. Trooper Miller testified Mr. Sheeks staggered, leaned against his vehicle, had bloodshot and watery eyes, slurred his speech, and smelled of alcohol. Trooper Miller had Mr. Sheeks perform four sobriety tests and, based on his performance and the other indicators, concluded Mr. Sheeks had been driving under the influence of alcohol. Mr. Sheeks was placed under arrest at that time and transported to the Washington State Patrol office. At the patrol office, Trooper Miller advised Mr. Sheeks of his constitutional rights, at which time Mr. Sheeks was allowed to call *67his attorney. Thereafter, Trooper Miller read Mr. Sheeks the implied consent warning and asked him to submit to a chemical test of his breath. Mr. Sheeks, according to the trooper, then stated he was refusing the test on the advice of his attorney. Mr. Sheeks testified he remembered the trooper warning him: "This is it or you go to jail", in the context of discussing the machine's accuracy. The trooper further testified that Mr. Sheeks did not indicate he lacked understanding of the warning given to him that his driver's license would be revoked if he refused to take the test. Mr. Sheeks was released and left the patrol office, waiting outside in the cold until his ride arrived. Weather that night was extremely cold, being approximately 41 degrees below zero, taking into account the wind chill factor. Mr. Sheeks was wearing a sport coat but no overcoat, and he testified the heater in his car had not been working prior to his being stopped.
Trooper Miller sent his sworn report to the Department of Licensing attesting to Mr. Sheeks' refusal to submit to the Breathalyzer test. The Department revoked Mr. Sheeks' driver's license for 1 year pursuant to RCW 46.20-.308. The Department's action was affirmed at an administrative hearing. Mr. Sheeks appealed to superior court, which reversed the Department's decision and reinstated Mr. Sheeks' driving privileges.
The issues are whether the trial court erred in finding that Mr. Sheeks was suffering from hypothermia rather than the effects of alcohol on the night in question; whether Mr. Sheeks was confused at the time he was given the implied consent warnings; and whether the trooper knew or should have known Mr. Sheeks was confused at the time the implied consent warnings were given. The Department of Licensing contends the evidence does not support the court's findings nor does it support the conclusions that Mr. Sheeks' license revocation should be set aside and his driving privileges reinstated. The Department assigns error to the findings that:
*68VIII
Based on the expert testimony of Richard Elston, M.D., more likely than not, Russell K. Sheeks was suffering from hypothermia rather than the [e] fleets of alcohol.
XIII
At the time Russell K. Sheeks was given the implied consent warning he was confused and did not understand that warning.
XIV
Trooper Miller knew or should have known that Russell K. Sheeks was confused at the time the implied consent warning was given because of the length of time Petitioner was out in the -40 degree weather and because Petiti[o]ner was skimp[i]ly clad at that time.
 RCW 46.20.308 directs the Department to revoke a person's license or permit to drive if it receives a sworn report from a law enforcement officer that an arrested DWI suspect has refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath after being informed his refusal will result in revocation of his privilege to drive. RCW 46.20.308 also provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle within this state is deemed to have given consent to a chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his blood. The statute will allow a person to withdraw his preimposed consent by refusing to take the test after being fully advised of the consequences. Strand v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 8 Wn. App. 877, 881, 509 P.2d 999 (1973). The statute contemplates that drivers will be given an opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to take the test. Schoultz v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 89 Wn.2d 664, 669, 574 P.2d 1167 (1978). If a driver explicitly exhibits his lack of understanding or confusion regarding the information given, the officer must clarify that information. A driver has the burden of showing his confusion was apparent to the officer and that he was thereafter denied clarification. Strand, at 883.
Our review is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether those find*69ings support the conclusions of law and judgment. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, Inc. v. Department of Rev., 106 Wn.2d 391, 397, 722 P.2d 787 (1986). Substantial evidence is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise. Nichols Hills Bank v. McCool, 104 Wn.2d 78, 82, 701 P.2d 1114 (1985).
The controlling issue is whether Mr. Sheeks met his burden of showing he was confused. We have examined the record and conclude there is not sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings. In conducting this review, we have been careful to do no more than search for the presence of evidence and not to weigh it or evaluate credibility. We recognize determinations of credibility and weight are within the province of the trier of fact, which this court is not.
Dr. Elston was called by defendant as an expert witness. He was asked to describe the symptoms a person would exhibit if, for 10 to 20 minutes, he was out in 41 degrees below zero weather, clothed in a light sport coat rather than an overcoat. The doctor then described cold injury as classified into two categories. One would be the effect of the cold on hands and feet, numbness, peripheral vascular insufficiency progressing possibly to misuse of the limbs, and possibly even gangrene. The second category would be effects resulting in the dropping of central body temperature with symptoms of shivering or tremors of the body, including hands, feet, mouth and lips. With the shivering there is some slurring of speech which affects a person's ability to express himself. He then went on to state that a person out in this extreme weather in light clothing would more likely than not suffer some of the described symptoms. On cross examination, he further elaborated on the effects of extreme cold on a person who was wet. He also stated hypothermia involved a progression of stages which can eventually result in death. We find nowhere in the record testimony by Dr. Elston that all persons suffering from some of the symptoms of hypothermia will be con*70fused. There is no testimony at which point in the progression of stages a person subjected to extreme cold will become confused. There was no testimony of any symptoms visible to the observer that would indicate a person suffering from the cold was confused. In short, his testimony fell far short of being of benefit to the trier of fact to determine one way or the other whether Mr. Sheeks was suffering from hypothermia to the extent that he was confused and, if he was confused, what symptoms would evidence that confusion. Finally, no mention was made by Dr. Elston as to the effects of alcohol in masking or exacerbating symptoms of hypothermia.
The record is replete with references to the extreme cold and that Mr. Sheeks was exposed to it both while he was driving his car before being stopped, and for an additional 10 to 20 minutes before he was taken to the patrol station. In addition, the friend who picked Mr. Sheeks up at the patrol station described Mr. Sheeks as shivering, rambling and incoherent in his speech. Mr. Sheeks had been waiting outside for his ride. Mr. Sheeks testified that he was shaking and had never been so cold in his life. He said he could not recall the details of his conversation with his attorney. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate that while Mr. Sheeks was in the presence of Trooper Miller, Trooper Miller had any indication that Mr. Sheeks was incoherent or confused. Mr. Sheeks does not contend he told the trooper he was confused, nor in testimony or argument does he direct the court's attention to any specific indicia of confusion evident to the trooper on the night in question.
We conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Sheeks was confused at the time he was read his implied consent warnings. A finding of fact which is without any support in the record cannot stand. Worthington v. Worthington, 73 Wn.2d 759, 440 P.2d 478 (1968); Guard v. Friday Harbor, 22 Wn. App. 758, 592 P.2d 652 (1979). Nor is there any evidence in the record that Mr. Sheeks, when advised of his implied consent *71warnings, clearly manifested confusion to Trooper Miller and was denied clarification. A lack of understanding not made apparent to an officer is of no consequence. Strand, at 878, 883. It may be argued that this case is distinguishable on its facts from Strand since, in this case, the trial judge found the trooper knew or should have known Mr. Sheeks was confused. The implication of this finding is that since Mr. Sheeks was exposed to severe cold for an appreciable period of time, the trooper should have inferred he was confused from this fact alone. There is nothing in the record that would support the court making such a conclusion. There is an appreciable gap between the expert and lay testimony and the court's conclusion Trooper Miller knew or should have know Mr. Sheeks was confused.
This court can conceive of some facts which, when proven, would justify a conclusion that a driver was confused without specific testimony to that effect. For example, if it were proved a suspect were deaf or could not understand English or was severely retarded, and if such a fact were known to the officer, it could be reasonably concluded he should know the suspect might be confused by implied consent warnings. But no such inference will logically follow from exposure to cold without more. In summary, we conclude there was nothing in the record that would support the trial court's finding either (1) that Mr. Sheeks was in fact confused and therefore did not understand the implied consent warnings, or (2) that the fact Mr. Sheeks was shivering and had been subjected to extreme cold was sufficient to support a finding the trooper knew or should have known Mr. Sheeks was confused.
It should be noted that there are varying degrees of confusion. A word may be misunderstood or a driver might not hear a person clearly, resulting in momentary confusion about what is being said. Momentary misunderstanding or culpable confusion on the part of the driver will not excuse refusal to take a Breathalyzer test. The confusion sufficient to excuse a driver's refusal to take the breath test must be so pervasive and so extreme that the driver is unable to *72make a knowing and intelligent decision as to whether or not to take the test. And as previously noted, even when a driver's confusion is actually apparent, a driver must show the officer denied clarification before his test refusal is justified. Strand, at 883.
In its oral opinion, the court did give some explanation as to why the court believed Mr. Sheeks was confused. If the required findings are not made or are inadequate, this court may go to the oral decision or the trial court's statement on the record to supplement the findings or clarify the basis on which the trial court decided the case. In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); Goodman v. Darden, Doman & Stafford Assocs., 100 Wn.2d 476, 481, 670 P.2d 648 (1983). After talking to his attorney, Mr. Sheeks had told the trooper he was refusing to take the test based on advice of counsel. The court stated he knew counsel and found it hard to believe he would give such advice, and therefore this was further evidence of Mr. Sheeks' confusion. However, no evidence was presented at trial that defense counsel did not so advise Mr. Sheeks, or that he would or would not have so advised a client. This is not a proper subject for judicial notice. Therefore, this reason is unsupported by the record.
In summary, although the evidence supports the finding that Mr. Sheeks may have been suffering from some of the effects of hypothermia, it does not support the conclusion he was therefore confused or that he was not affected by alcohol. Additionally, since there was no indication by word or act that Mr. Sheeks was confused or did not understand the warnings, the finding Trooper Miller knew or should have known he was confused is not supported by the evidence.
Reversed, and the decision of the Department of Licensing is reinstated.
Green, J., concurs.