Court Opinion

ID: 9678931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:36:34.073041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:46.343971
License: Public Domain

WHITE, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the condition of the overpass was too remote to Shawn Twine’s crime to be a direct cause of Olga Maxiaeva’s death. That issue should have been decided by a jury, after both sides had an opportunity to present evidence on causation.
In Oldaker v. Peters,1 a section 537.600 case against the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, the court of appeals stated:
Proximate cause, and hence, a causal connection, are present if the evidence shows the negligence to have been the efficient cause which set in motion the chain of circumstances leading up to the injury.... The negligence of the defendant need not be the sole cause of the injury, as long as it is one of the efficient causes thereof, without which injury would not have resulted.
A public entity can, therefore, on sufficient pleadings, be sued under section 536.600 concurrently with another party at fault. For example, in Fox v. City of St. Louis,2 plaintiffs ear was hit by an oncoming car. Although there was evidence of the other driver’s negligence, the court of appeals reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the city, as the pleadings sufficiently alleged negligence on the part of the city for the lack of a stop sign. The court stated “[p]roof of *62negligence concurring with that of [the city] to cause the accident would not defeat [plaintiffs] claim, but would only permit an apportionment of fault.”3 Yet the majority apparently would have concluded on the pleadings that the car that hit the plaintiff completely cut off the city’s liability as a matter of law because it was not the lack of a stop sign that collided with the plaintiffs ear.
In Beyerbach v. Girardeau Contractors,4 plaintiff, in her vehicle, approached a bridge that was closed to one lane due to construction. She made a complete stop to allow the oncoming traffic to cross and was hit by a car behind her. Notwithstanding evidence of negligence by the other driver, the court of appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of the Commission because the pleadings sufficiently alleged negligence on the part of the Commission for failing to keep both lanes of traffic open and for inadequate and unsafe warning signs. Under the analysis of the majority opinion, the court of appeals erred in reversing summary judgment as even the most generous reading of the plaintiffs allegations would demonstrate that it was not the construction and inadequate warning signs that crashed into the plaintiffs ear. While I believe that section 537.600 must be construed strictly, it is just as imperative that it be construed consistently.
The pleadings in the underlying case alleged that the Commission, concurrently with Shawn Twine, directly caused the death of the deceased. In response to the Commission’s motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs offered the affidavit of an expert stating that “the condition of the overpass contributed to the incident which resulted in the death of the decedent.” Plaintiffs also offered documentation on the insufficiency of the fence used by the Commission in preventing objects being thrown from overhead structures. This was sufficient to survive summary judgment on the causation element.5
This ease does differ from the above cases in that Twine’s eventual guilty plea injects a criminal reckless act into the equation,6 as opposed to concurrent negligent acts in the traditional sense.7 It still remains that the test for direct cause is whether the Commission’s alleged negligence set into motion the chain of events that caused the injury. The pleadings presented a genuine dispute as to that issue. Since the other three statutory elements were sufficiently pleaded, a jury— and not this Court — should have made the initial determination as to whether Twine’s actions were “surprising, unexpected, or freakish”8 in light of the alleged dangerous condition.
*63As the pleadings present genuine issues of material fact as to all four elements necessary to maintain suit against a public entity under section 537.600.1(2), I would quash the writ.

. 869 S.W.2d 94, 100 (Mo.App.1993) (affirming jury verdict against Commission even where there was no direct evidence that condition caused injury, but only expert testimony).

. 823 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.App.1991).

. Id. at 24 (citing Cole v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, 770 S.W.2d 296 (Mo.App.1989) (reversing dismissal for failure to state a claim and allowing plaintiff’s case involving an automobile collision to go forward against Commission, despite evidence of negligence of other driver, where pleadings sufficiently alleged negligence of Commission for inadequate signs.))

. 868 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.App.1994).

. See Smith v. Missouri Highway and Transp. Com’n, 826 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Mo.App.1992) (holding, on direct appeal of jury verdict adverse to the Commission under section 537.600.1(2), that an expert’s testimony that "suggested the condition of the intersection contributed to the accident” was sufficient to submit the element of causation to the jury.)

. “A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter if [the person] [r]ecklessly causes the death of another person.” Section 565.024, RSMo 1994.

. A criminal act by a third party does not automatically bar recovery. "In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant’s contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.” Unir Comparative Fault Act section 1, 12 U.L.A. 127 (1996) (emphasis added). The Commissioners’ Comment on this section states "The Act applies to 'acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property ... of others.’ This includes the traditional action for negligence but covers all negligent conduct, whether it comes within the traditional negligence action or not. It includes negligence as a matter of law, arising from court decision or criminal statute.” Id. (emphasis added). See Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15, 17 Appendix A (Mo. banc 1983) ("Insofar as possible this and future cases shall apply the doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the Uniform Comparative Fault Act [sections] 1-6 ...”).

.See Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 865 (Mo. banc 1993).