Court Opinion

ID: 9809460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:14:32.450313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:57.178414
License: Public Domain

OuaRK, O. J.,
dissenting. This is an action begun against the N. C. R. R. Co. (a North Carolina corporation) and the Southern R. R. Co. (a foreign corporation), the former being lessor and the latter lessee of the former’s property. The action was brought to recover $1,500.00 damages for trespass in using the easement in the right of way of lessor company for purposes not covered by the rights acquired by the latter in its capacity as lessee.
This case was here at Fall Term, 1907, 146 N. C., 316. In deciding that any use by the lessee of the property for purposes other than those pertaining to it in that capacity was wrongful, this Court said: “The plaintiffs are entitled in this action to have permanent damages assessed, in the nature of condemnation, for the additional burden placed upon the lot by its use for purposes other than those for which defendant used the lot purely as lessee of the North Carolina Railroad Company, Hodges v. Tel. Co., 133 N. C., 225.” That the Court was speaking generally, in the abstract, and not holding that this lessee company possessed the right of condemnation is clear from this further paragraph. “Whether the Southern Railroad Company, not being a North Carolina *315corporal ion, can talce the property for this additional servitude, under the right of eminent domain * * * * is a matter not now before us.”
When the ease went back, the plaintiffs,' under leave of court, amended their complaint, by adding, among other allegations, that the Southern Railroad Company is a foreign ■corporation and cannot exercise the right of eminent domain by taking any land under its lease from North Carolina Railroad Company, for its own use, or for the use of any other road not an actual or integral part of the North Carolina Railroad, adding, further, that, while insisting that the additional servitude imposed for purposes not incident to its rights as lessee of North Carolina Railroad Company, was “unlawful and tortious and claiming damages for such injuries, the plaintiffs are willing that permanent damages may be assessed in this action for the value of the land,” 'and amended their prayer for judgment by “adding thereto, in the nature of an alternative relief,” the smn of $4,000.00 for permanent damages.
The Southern Railroad Company thereupon filed a petition for removal to the Federal Court, averring that this was a severable controversy affecting .itself alone. But if the Southern Railway Company does not possess the right off eminent domain, it can not be conferred by the plaintiffs. It can be granted by the sovereign alone, and it follows that the amended complaint and prayer for judgment state no cause of actioir, and there is before the Court no legal controversy save for $1,500.00 damages for trespass, which is not removable.
In Mills’ Eminent Domain, sec. 48, it is said: “'The act authorizing condemnation must be express and clear. If there are doubts as to the extent of the .power, they should be resolved adverse to the claim of power. R. R. v. Kip, 46 N. Y., 546; Webb v. R. R., 4 Myl. and Cr., 116. Although a corporation may be engaged in a great public work, in *316which the power of condemnation would be of great service, yet the authority must be clearly conferred. Otherwise the corporation must purchase from the owners as best they can. Thatcher v. Dartmouth Bridge Co., 18 Pick., 501.” The plaintiffs could have sold to Southern Railroad Company, if the latter were authorized to acquire realty in this State, but the plaintiffs could not authorize or call upon the courts to exercise the sovereign powers of eminent domain in favor of a foreign corporation when the legislature has not conferred that power upon it.
In 1 Lewis’ Em. Domain, sec. 242, it is said: “It is solely for the legislature to judge what persons, corporations or other agencies may properly be clothed with this power. Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H., 591.” The same author, sec. 243, says, that “such power of eminent domain when conferred by the legislature is a personal trust and cannot be delegated or transferred, except by legislative authority. Morrison v. Forman, 177 Ill., 421. Purchasers, grantees, lessees, of the property and franchises of. a corporation do'not by such purchase, grant or lease acquire the right of eminent domain,” citing many cases. To same purport, Randolph Em. Domain, sec 108 and. cases cited.
The Southern Railroad Company, being a foreign corporation, with no charter from this State, has had no legislative grant of this power. The general grant, Rev. 2515, is only to corporations created by the authority of this State. The authority conferred on foreign corporations by Rev., secs. 1193, 1194, does not include the right of eminent domain.
The only valid cause of action set out in the complaint is. an action for trespass averring $1,500.00 damages.
But if there is a cause of action, it is for a right of condemnation under the State’s right of eminent domain which a Federal Court has no jurisdiction to administer; besides, it is not a “suit” within the meaning of the Removal Statute— hence this case is not removable. Moon on Removal, sec. *31775, pp. 133, 134, citing R. R. v. R. R., 17 W. Va., 812; R. R. v. Jones (Brewer, J.), 29 Fed., 193; Searl v. School Dist., 124 U. S., 197. “The appropriation of private property for public xise is an act of sovereignty on the part of the State.” Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S., 403; Cherokee Nation v. R. R., 33 Fed., 900. “It is not in any proper sense a judicial act.” R. R. v. Dunlap, 47 Mich., 456; Navigation Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S., 312.
“The question whether property shall be appropriated being solely a non-judicial question to be decided by the State-authorities, a proceeding to determine the propriety or necessity, method or extent of any proposed appropriation is not within the original jurisdiction of a United States Circuit Court or removable thereto from a State Court.” Moon on Removal, p. 138, citing R. R. v. Cookroft, 46 Fed., 881; R. R. v. Montague, 94 Fed., 227, and other cases.