Court Opinion

ID: 9962300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:00:54.365563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:19.462237
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2113     Document: 010111036565                          FILED
                                                       Date Filed: 04/23/2024   Page: 1
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Tenth Circuit

                                      PUBLISH                         April 23, 2024
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                       Clerk of Court
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                          _________________________________

  TRAVELERS CASUALTY INSURANCE
  COMPANY OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                        No. 23-2113

  A-QUALITY AUTO SALES, INC.;
  FELICIA RICHESIN, individually and as
  owner of A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc.;
  SHAWN RICHESIN, individually and as
  owner of a A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc.,

        Defendants - Appellants,

  and

  RNS AUTO SERVICES, LLC; SAM
  MONTOYA, individually and as owner
  and principal of RNS Auto Services, LLC;
  MIKE KOTA; GLYNN PATRICK
  AGUILAR,

        Defendants.
                          _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of New Mexico
                         (D.C. No. 1:22-CV-00545-KWR-LF)
                        _________________________________

 Geoffrey R. Romero, Law Offices of Geoffrey R. Romero (Phillip G. Sapien and
 Joseph A. Sapien, Sapien Law, LLC, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico,
 for Defendants – Appellants.
Appellate Case: 23-2113    Document: 010111036565        Date Filed: 04/23/2024       Page: 2

 Jennifer A. Noya, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A. (Shannon N. Nairn with
 her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff – Appellee.
                          _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 McHUGH, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

       In this insurance dispute case, Appellants seek reversal of the district court’s

 entry of declaratory judgment that the amount available under an insurance policy is

 at most $500,000 rather than $1,000,000. Specifically, Appellants assert that (1) the

 dispute was not ripe for resolution under Article III of the Constitution, (2) two

 different abstention doctrines should have caused the district court to stay or dismiss

 the case, and (3) summary judgment was prematurely granted against them before

 they could take discovery to develop material facts necessary to oppose summary

 judgment.

       Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s

 entry of declaratory judgment.

                                  I.   BACKGROUND

       In January 2016, Felicia and Shawn Richesin purchased a Subaru at an auto

 auction with the intent to conduct any necessary repairs before reselling the vehicle

 from the dealership they owned, A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc. (together with Felicia

 and Shawn Richesin, the “Richesins”). Before reselling the vehicle, the Richesins

 took it to Sam Montoya d/b/a RNS Auto Services (together with its principals and

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 employees, “RNS”) for a mechanical evaluation, inspection, and repairs. On

 February 2, 2016, the Richesins retrieved the Subaru from RNS, but when they drove

 it onto the highway, they began noticing mechanical issues with the car. The

 Richesins pulled onto the side of the highway where Ms. Richesin exited the vehicle

 and was struck by another car, causing severe injuries.

       At the time of the incident, RNS had an effective garage insurance policy (the

 “Policy”) from Travelers Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”). The Policy

 provided commercial general liability coverage with a per-occurrence limit of

 $500,000, and a “General Aggregate” limit of $1,000,000. App. Vol. II at 323. The

 Policy defined “Occurrence” as “an accident, including continuous or repeated

 exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” Id.

       The driver of the vehicle that struck Ms. Richesin was underinsured, so the

 Richesins looked to RNS and its insurer, Travelers, for additional compensation for

 her injuries. On April 16, 2016, Travelers offered the Richesins $500,000—what they

 believed to be the Policy limit—in exchange for a release of RNS. The Richesins’

 counsel rejected the offer, taking the position that there were multiple occurrences

 and therefore the Policy’s aggregate limit of $1,000,000 was available.

                               A.    The State Litigation

       On December 23, 2016, the Richesins filed suit against Travelers and nine

 other parties—a mixture of individual and entity defendants along with their

 insurers—in New Mexico state court asserting more than a dozen tort and state

 statutory claims. As to Travelers, the state court complaint asserted one count for

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 unspecified declaratory judgment regarding the Policy, and one tort count for loss of

 consortium. Travelers moved to be dismissed on grounds that under long-standing,

 New Mexico Supreme Court precedent, injured third parties do not—absent limited

 circumstances—have standing to sue the tortfeasor’s insurer: “there is no privity

 between an injured party and the insurer of the negligent defendant in the absence of

 a contractual provision or statute or ordinance to the contrary; therefore the injured

 party has no claim directly against the insurance company.” App. Vol. I at 215

 (quoting Raskob v. Sanchez, 970 P.2d 580, 581 (N.M. 1998)). The state court granted

 Travelers’ motion on October 30, 2017, and dismissed all claims against Travelers

 with prejudice.

        In early 2022, nearly five years after Travelers was dismissed from the state

 court litigation, the Richesins and RNS entered into a series of agreements under

 which RNS would (1) direct Travelers to pay the $500,000 per-occurrence Policy

 limit to the Richesins, (2) stipulate to its liability for the Richesins’ injuries and agree

 to allow the state court to “award legal damages . . . upon an evidentiary hearing,”

 (3) assign its rights under the Policy to the Richesins, and (4) assign to the Richesins

 “90% of all bad faith and related claims” RNS may have held against any insurer.

 App. Vol. I at 11–12. In exchange, the Richesins agreed they would not seek

 satisfaction of any judgment entered in the state court litigation against RNS.

        Travelers subsequently paid the Richesins $500,000 subject to a reservation of

 “all policy defenses.” Id. at 12.

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        Following the assignment of the Policy to the Richesins—which cured the

 privity defect that caused Travelers’ dismissal from the state litigation in 2017—

 Travelers moved to intervene for purposes of seeking declaratory judgment on the

 question of which Policy limit applies. The Richesins opposed intervention, arguing

 that (1) the motion to intervene was untimely, (2) intervention was “not proper in the

 instant litigation,” and (3) Travelers’ intervention would cause them prejudice. App.

 Vol. II at 308–09. In response to the Richesins’ opposition, Travelers withdrew its

 motion to intervene in the state court litigation.

                              B.     The Federal Litigation

        On July 22, 2022, less than two weeks after the Richesins filed their opposition

 to Travelers’ intervention in the state court action, Travelers filed a complaint in

 federal district court asserting a single count against the Richesins and RNS for a

 judicial declaration “that the accident in which Felicia Richesin was injured is a

 single occurrence and the [Policy] liability coverage limit for this accident is

 $500,000.” App. Vol. I at 15.

        On September 12, 2022, the Richesins moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) the

 district court should abstain, as a discretionary matter, under the doctrine announced

 in Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company of America., 316 U.S. 491 (1942), and

 (2) the district court was compelled to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37

 (1971).

        On January 23, 2023, while the Richesins’ motion to dismiss remained

 pending, Travelers moved for summary judgment on its sole claim for declaratory

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 judgment. Travelers’ motion contained a mere five statements of undisputed material

 facts consisting of excerpts of the Policy and an assertion that the “State Court

 Complaint arises from a single occurrence.” App. Vol. II at 324.

       In opposing summary judgment, the Richesins did not dispute any of

 Travelers’ statements of undisputed material facts and offered no argument regarding

 why Travelers’ construction of the Policy was wrong. Instead, the Richesins asserted

 that the motion for summary judgment was premature and “must be stayed to afford

 defendants an opportunity to conduct discovery.” Id. at 339.

       On June 22, 2023, the district court denied the Richesins’ motion to dismiss,

 concluding that the Brillhart factors weighed in favor of entertaining the action under

 the Declaratory Judgment Act. The district court did not address the Richesins’

 argument that abstention was required under Younger.

       About two weeks later, on July 7, 2023, the district court granted summary

 judgment to Travelers, declaring that “the February 2, 2016[,] accident in which

 Felicia Richesin was injured ‘is a single occurrence and the [Policy] coverage limit

 for [that] accident is $500,000.’” App. Vol. II at 377 (third alteration in original)

 (quoting App. Vol. I at 15). With respect to the Richesins’ argument that they needed

 discovery before opposing summary judgment, the court construed it as a motion

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 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) and denied it on both procedural and

 substantive grounds.1

                                     II.    ANALYSIS

        On appeal, the Richesins assert (1) the dispute was not ripe for resolution as an

 Article III justiciability matter, (2) the district court erred by declining to abstain

 under Brillhart, (3) the district court erred by declining to abstain under Younger, and

 (4) the district court erred by denying their Rule 56(d) motion, thereby denying them

 discovery needed to meaningfully oppose Travelers’ motion for summary judgment.

 We address each assignment of error in turn below.

                 A.      Ripeness in the Declaratory Judgment Context

        The Declaratory Judgment Act states in pertinent part that

        [i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . , any court of
        the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare
        the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
        declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.2

 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).

        The Act’s reference to “case[s] of actual controversy,” the Supreme Court

 holds, refers to “Cases” and “Controversies” that are justiciable under Article III of

        1
         The Richesins did not answer the complaint within the fourteen-day period
 prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4) following the denial of their
 motion to dismiss.
        2
         As the language of 28 U.S.C.§ 2201(a) implies, the Declaratory Judgment
 Act merely creates the remedy of declaratory relief and does not, on its own, confer
 subject-matter jurisdiction. Travelers’ complaint pleaded diversity jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

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 the Constitution. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)

 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937)). “Article III has

 long been interpreted as forbidding federal courts from rendering advisory opinions.”

 Columbian Fin. Corp. v. BancInsure, Inc., 650 F.3d 1372, 1376 (10th Cir. 2011). “It

 is not the role of federal courts to resolve abstract issues of law.” Id. “Rather, they

 are to review disputes arising out of specific facts when the resolution of the dispute

 will have practical consequences to the conduct of the parties.” Id.

       The Supreme Court instructs that courts may exercise their authority to resolve

 a declaratory judgment action consistent with Article III when “the facts alleged,

 under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between

 parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant

 the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting

 Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).

       It is the final portion of the above justiciability test—“sufficient immediacy

 and reality”—with which the prudential doctrine of ripeness is concerned. That is,

 ripeness considers timing: whether events have progressed far enough to be sure that

 declaratory judgment will resolve a live dispute with practical consequences. See

 New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64 F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir. 1995).

 We have distilled Article III’s ripeness requirement into a two-factor analysis,

 examining (1) “the fitness of the issue for review,” and (2) “the hardship to the

 parties” of withholding judicial review. See Tex. Brine Co., LLC & Occidental Chem.

 Corp., 879 F.3d 1224, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2018).

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        With respect to the “fitness for review” factor, we consider “whether

 determination of the merits turns upon strictly legal issues or requires facts that may

 not yet be sufficiently developed.” Id. at 1229 (emphasis omitted) (quotation marks

 omitted). And relevant here, the “fitness” inquiry also considers “whether the case

 involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or

 indeed may not occur at all,” circumstances which, when present, preclude a finding

 of ripeness. New Mexicans for Bill Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499 (quoting 13A

 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3532 at 112). With

 respect to the “hardship” factor, we consider “whether withholding review will place

 the parties in ‘a direct and immediate dilemma.’” Tex. Brine Co., LLC, 879 F.3d at

 1230 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1327 (10th Cir. 2016)).

 “Ripeness is a question of law, which we review de novo.” New Mexicans for Bill

 Richardson, 64 F.3d at 1499.

        The Richesins’ principal argument in connection with their ripeness challenge is

 that the need to resolve the question of which Policy limit applies depends on an

 uncertain or contingent future event that may or may not occur as anticipated.

 Specifically, the Richesins argue that the state court’s award of damages at some

 unknown time in the future may or may not exceed $500,000 (the Policy limit that

 Travelers believes, and the district court concluded based on the unambiguous language

 of the Policy, applies).3

        3
         The Richesins relatedly argue that the dispute is not ripe because, after the
 state court awards damages per the agreement between the Richesins and RNS,
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         We have little trouble concluding Travelers’ complaint established Article III

  jurisdiction. Our precedent is clear that district courts may, consistent with Article III,

  exercise their authority to resolve insurance coverage disputes via the Declaratory

  Judgment Act so long as there exists a real controversy between the parties regarding

  their rights and responsibilities under the relevant policy. Such circumstances are present

  where “an identifiable[,] specific [insurance] claim has risen above the horizon,” even

  when the “injured party . . . ha[s] [not] sued the insured.” Columbian Fin. Corp., 650

  F.3d at 1383–84 (collecting cases establishing that insurance coverage disputes are

  justiciable under the Declaratory Judgment Act even in the absence of underlying tort

  litigation). The Richesins provide no authority, and we have found none, for the

  proposition that a suit seeking a judicial declaration of the limits available under a policy

  is not ripe unless and until judgment in the underlying tort litigation is entered in an

  amount above the policy limit advocated by the insurer.

  “Travelers can be joined in the state case and the parties can litigate the coverage
  issue.” Opening Br. at 26. Boiled to its essence, this argument implies that a
  declaratory judgment action is never ripe if the underlying dispute can conceivably
  be litigated in a future, coercive suit. To state the argument is to refute it; the
  Declaratory Judgment Act provides the federal courts with a mechanism to resolve
  the rights and responsibilities of parties before a coercive suit, and the attendant time
  and expense, is initiated. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (“[A]ny court of the United States,
  upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal
  relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further
  relief is or could be sought.”). If the Richesins’ preferred conception of ripeness in
  the declaratory judgment context were countenanced, the Declaratory Judgment Act
  would be rendered nugatory since most, if not all, issues properly resolved in
  declaratory judgment actions are capable of being litigated in a future, coercive suit.
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         The Richesins unambiguously concede they have demanded more from Travelers

  than $500,000 under the Policy. See Oral Argument at 11:17–11:22, Travelers Cas. Ins.

  Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., No. 23-2113 (10th Cir. March 19, 2024),

  https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/oralarguments/23-2113.mp3 (the court:

  “There’s no dispute that your demand from Travelers is more than $500[,000].”

  Appellants’ Counsel: “That is . . . correct.”). And Travelers has consistently maintained

  that the accident was a single occurrence and therefore the Policy limit is $500,000. Thus,

  there exists a real controversy between the parties.

         Travelers’ invocation of the Declaratory Judgment Act to conclusively establish its

  rights and responsibility under the Policy before it faced the coercive action the Richesins

  admit they intend to bring is in the heartland of disputes properly resolved under the

  Declaratory Judgment Act. We are therefore satisfied that “the facts alleged, under all the

  circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having

  adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

  declaratory judgment.” MedImmune, Inc., 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Md. Cas. Co., 312

  U.S. at 273). We thus hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this

  ripe request for declaratory judgment.

                                 B.     Brillhart Abstention

         The Richesins next argue that even if the district court had Article III jurisdiction

  to hear and resolve this case, it should have nevertheless abstained from hearing the case

  under Brillhart.

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         The Brillhart abstention doctrine is potentially implicated whenever a

  litigant’s request for declaratory relief in federal court threatens “[g]ratuitous

  interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition of a [parallel] state court

  litigation.” 316 U.S. at 495. “Ordinarily,” the Brillhart Court opined, “it would be

  uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory

  judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court presenting the same

  issues, not governed by federal law, between the same parties.” Id.

         As the Court later characterized the effect of Brillhart:

         The question for a district court presented with a suit under the Declaratory
         Judgment Act, the [Brillhart] Court found, is “whether the questions in
         controversy between the parties to the federal suit, and which are not
         foreclosed under the applicable substantive law, can better be settled in the
         proceeding pending in the state court.”

  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282 (1995) (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495).

         The Richesins face an exceedingly steep hill in seeking reversal of the district

  court’s decision not to abstain under Brillhart owing to an onerous standard of review.

  “The Supreme Court has long made clear that the Declaratory Judgment Act ‘gave the

  federal courts competence to make a declaration of rights; it did not impose a duty to do

  so.’” State Farm Fire & Cas Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 982 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting

  Pub. Affs. Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962)). This feature of the

  Declaratory Judgment Act, the Supreme Court instructs, has long “been understood to

  confer on federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare

  the rights of litigants.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. As a result, we accord considerable

  deference to a district court’s determination whether to entertain a declaratory judgment

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  action and review its decision only for a “clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. City

  of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1179 (10th Cir. 2002).

         “To guide the district courts in the exercise of such substantial discretion,” id.

  at 1183, we have adopted several factors to be weighed by a district court when asked to

  abstain from hearing a declaratory judgment action in favor of parallel state court

  litigation, directing courts to consider:

         [1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy; [2] whether it
         would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue; [3]
         whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of
         “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to res judicata”; [4]
         whether use of a declaratory action would increase friction between our
         federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and
         [5] whether there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.

  Mhoon, 31 F.3d at 983 (alterations in original) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825

  F.2d 1061, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987)).

         “We give the district court’s assessment of each [Brillhart/Mhoon] factor great

  deference,” and we do “not reevaluate the district court’s assessment of each” factor. City

  of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d at 1179, 1183. Rather, the scope of our review is limited to

  considering only “whether the court’s assessment was so unsatisfactory as to constitute

  an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1179.

         The district court faithfully conducted the Brillhart/Mhoon exercise, analyzing

  how each factor applied to the relationship between the federal declaratory action and the

  purportedly parallel state court litigation and concluding that each factor weighed in favor

  of exercising its discretion to hear and resolve Travelers’ declaratory judgment action.

  The Richesins have not directed us to any portion of that analysis that contained error, let

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  alone that the district court’s assessment of the Brillhart/Mhoon factors “was so

  unsatisfactory as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1179. We thus affirm the

  district court’s decision not to abstain under Brillhart.

                                  C.     Younger Abstention

         “Younger provides that a federal court must abstain from deciding a case

  otherwise within the scope of its jurisdiction in ‘certain instances in which the

  prospect of undue interference with state proceedings counsels against federal

  relief.’” Elna Sefcovic, LLC v. TEP Rocky Mountain, LLC, 953 F.3d 660, 669–70

  (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013)).

  As a mandatory abstention doctrine, we review the district court’s decision to abstain

  or decline to abstain under Younger de novo. Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational & Pro.

  Licensing of Dep’t of Com., 240 F.3d 871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001).

         The Supreme Court has admonished that the “[c]ircumstances fitting within

  the Younger doctrine . . . are ‘exceptional.’” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73 (quoting New

  Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368

  (1989)). Indeed, the possibility of Younger abstention is triggered only when the state

  proceeding falls into one of the following categories: “(1) state criminal prosecutions,

  (2) civil enforcement proceedings [that take on a quasi-criminal shape], and (3) civil

  proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state

  courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.” Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II,

  Inc., 65 F.4th 500, 522 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Sprint, 571 U.S. at 79. The Court

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  has “not applied Younger outside these three ‘exceptional’ categories,” which “define

  Younger’s scope.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78.

         If and only if the state court proceeding falls within one of the enumerated

  “exceptional” types of cases, may courts analyze the propriety of abstention under the

  so-called Middlesex conditions. Those conditions ask whether there exists “(1) an

  ongoing state judicial . . . proceeding, (2) the presence of an important state interest,

  and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.”

  Courthouse News Serv. v. N.M. Admin. Off. of Cts., 53 F.4th 1245, 1256 (10th

  Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

         In Sprint, the Supreme Court made clear that the Middlesex conditions are

  “additional factors appropriately considered by the federal court before invoking

  Younger,” but that those factors do not control the application of Younger. Sprint,

  571 U.S. at 81. This is so because when applied to a case that does not present one of

  the three “exceptional” state court proceedings, “the three Middlesex conditions

  would extend Younger to virtually all parallel state and federal proceedings.” Id.

  Therefore, the sine qua non of Younger abstention is the presence of an “exceptional”

  state court proceeding, and Younger extends “no further.” Id. at 82. Only after the

  court determines the case falls within the three categories of exceptional cases do the

  Middlesex factors come into play.

         Both before the district court and on appeal, the Richesins ignored the threshold

  question of whether the state court proceeding qualifies as one of the “exceptional” cases

  to which Younger might apply. In its response brief, Travelers points out this defect, but

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  in reply, the Richesins make no meaningful attempt to situate the state court proceeding

  within one of the “exceptional” categories. Instead, they merely assert in conclusory

  fashion that “there is no question that there is an ongoing state court civil proceeding with

  which Travelers seeks to interfere,” and then proceed to argue that the Middlesex factors

  mandate abstention.4 Reply Br. at 13.

         As explained above, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that Younger does not

  apply merely because there exists a parallel or related state court proceeding. See Sprint,

  571 U.S. at 82 (“[W]e today clarify and affirm that Younger extends to the three

  ‘exceptional circumstances’ identified [in prior precedent], but no further.”). Because the

  Richesins have wholly failed either before the district court or on appeal to even attempt

  to explain how the state tort litigation arising from a car accident qualifies as one of the

  enumerated “exceptional” cases, and further because our own review confirms that it

  does not, we conclude the district court did not err by declining to abstain under Younger.

                                       D.      Rule 56(d)

         Finally, the Richesins complain that the district court erred by denying their

  Rule 56(d) motion, contending they established their need to take discovery before

  they could meaningfully oppose summary judgment. Rule 56(d) provides as follows:

         When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a nonmovant shows by
         affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
         essential to justify its opposition, the court may:

         4
          The Richesins’ Younger arguments provide a useful illustration of the Sprint
  Court’s concern that, when “[d]ivorced from” an exceptional state court proceeding,
  “the three Middlesex conditions would extend Younger to virtually all state and
  federal proceedings.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 81 (2007).
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        (1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
        (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or
        (3) issue any other appropriate order.

        “We review . . . the district court’s denial of deferment for expanded discovery

  pursuant to Rule 56(d) . . . for an abuse of discretion.” Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc.,

  812 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (internal quotation

  marks omitted).

        In opposing Travelers’ motion for summary judgment, the Richesins asserted,

  as a statement of additional undisputed material fact and based on a supporting

  affidavit from their counsel, that they were “unable to meaningfully and substantively

  respond to Plaintiff’s Motion because of the following reasons:”

        a. The parties have not conducted any written discovery in this case.
        b. The parties have not deposed Bijan Malboub, the agent, who issued the
        policy in question.
        c. The parties have not deposed company representatives of Travelers
        regarding the coverage at issue.
        d. There are significant factual issues regarding the coverage that was sought
        by RNS and coverage that was sold and ultimately bound by Malboub and
        Travelers.
        e. Disposition of these factual issues is critical to the coverage issues raised
        by Plaintiff in their Complaint and their Motion.
  App. Vol. II at 337.

        Before the district court, but not on appeal, the Richesins vaguely argued that

  Mr. Malboub’s subjective intent in selling the Policy to RNS could have changed the

  meaning of the Policy limits: “Whether Mr. Malboub intended to sell $1M in

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Appellate Case: 23-2113     Document: 010111036565         Date Filed: 04/23/2024     Page: 18

  coverage versus $500,000 remains to be seen and discovered.”5 Id. at 340. The

  Richesins further stated before the district court that they might have

  “misrepresentation and negligent procurement claims” against Travelers based on the

  conduct of Mr. Malboub. Id. at 341.

         The district court concluded the Richesins’ request was procedurally improper

  because they “should have filed their motion for Rule 56(d) discovery before, and not

  at the same time as, their response to the summary judgment motion.” Id. at 374.

  Because the Richesins “responded to the motion for summary judgment and did not

  dispute the material facts,” the district court ruled that it “would therefore exercise its

  discretion and decline to consider [the Richesins’] Rule 56(d) motion.” Id. at 375.

         But the district court also ruled in the alternative, concluding that it “would

  deny [the Richesins’] Rule 56(d) request on the merits.” Id. at 375. In its merits

  analysis, the district court reasoned that the Richesins had

         not shown how additional time would lead to discovery creating a genuine
         dispute of material fact, as (1) they have expressly not disputed the
         material facts in this summary judgment motion, and (2) they seek
         discovery as to potential future claims which have not been asserted in
         this case or any other.

         5
           Presumably, the Richesins meant to argue not that Mr. Malboub’s subjective
  intent could have changed the terms of the Policy, but rather that statements he made
  to RNS when selling the Policy may have altered its terms or supplied new ones. We
  pause to note that the Policy, like virtually all modern contracts, contains language
  conclusively foreclosing any contract claims based on an alleged breach of a term not
  contained within the written agreement. See App. Vol. I at 82 (“This policy contains
  all the agreements between you and us . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Appellate Case: 23-2113     Document: 010111036565          Date Filed: 04/23/2024     Page: 19

  Id. at 376. The district court also questioned the Richesins’ avowed intent to bring

  additional claims in light of their failure to file an answer to the complaint at all, let

  alone an answer asserting the counterclaims of “misrepresentation and negligent

  procurement.” Id. at 341.

         We discern no error, let alone an abuse of discretion, in the district court’s

  denial of the Rule 56(d) motion. The Richesins did not dispute any of Travelers’

  material facts, and those facts entitled Travelers to summary judgment. The discovery

  sought by the Richesins was incapable of altering the summary judgment analysis,

  and the district court properly concluded as much.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

         For the reasons articulated, we AFFIRM the district court in full.

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