Court Opinion

ID: 9388206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 00:00:29.515091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:18.836445
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30666     Document: 00516718256          Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/19/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                           FILED
                                                                       April 19, 2023
                                   No. 21-30666                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Rodney P. Gemar,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:17-CR-181-2

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge:
          Rodney P. Gemar was a local law-enforcement agent who worked as a
   taskforce officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Gemar
   was charged with stealing money and property from arrestees, as well as
   destroying evidence of those activities. After a seven-day trial, a jury found
   Gemar guilty on all counts. Following the verdict, Gemar asserted that one
   of the jurors had failed to disclose his acquaintance with Gemar and Gemar’s
   wife, and Gemar moved for a new trial on the basis of juror bias. Without
Case: 21-30666      Document: 00516718256          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/19/2023

                                    No. 21-30666

   holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion and
   sentenced Gemar to twenty-seven months of imprisonment.
          We remand for the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
   question of juror bias.
                                          I
          Gemar worked as a police officer for the Hammond, Louisiana Police
   Department and in 2009 was deputized as a taskforce officer with the DEA.
   Gemar worked with Chad Scott, a special agent with the DEA, and other
   taskforce officers. The Government alleged that from 2009 to 2016 Gemar
   and others stole property and money from arrestees, and that in 2016 Gemar
   destroyed evidence of those activities.
          Gemar and his co-defendant, Scott, were charged with conspiracy to
   convert property of another by an officer or employee of the United States
   and remove property to prevent seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371;
   conversion of property of another by an officer or employee of the United
   States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 654; and removal of property to prevent
   seizure in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a).
          During voir dire, the district court asked the prospective jurors, “The
   defendants in this case are Mr. Chad Scott and Mr. Rodney Gemar. . . . Do
   any of you know Mr. Gemar or any members of his family? Have any of you
   ever heard of Mr. Gemar?” The juror now accused of bias, Juror 27, did not
   respond to the question. The district court also asked if the members of the
   venire could “think of anything else which might have some bearing on your
   qualifications or competence as jurors” or knew “of any reason why you
   think that you should not sit on this case and render a fair, just, honest, and
   impartial verdict?” Juror 27 did not respond.

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            Two months after trial, counsel for Gemar “learned that Juror 27 in
   Mr. Gemar’s trial failed to provide honest and complete information during
   voir dire.” According to Gemar, “Juror 27 was a close friend to Mr. Gemar’s
   wife . . . during high school.” Gemar’s wife submitted a declaration stating
   that she and Juror 27 attended a school dance together in 1995 or 1996, Juror
   27 attended the Gemars’ wedding in 2005, and she and Juror 27 had
   communicated over social media between 2009 and 2017. Photographs and
   screenshots attached as exhibits to the declaration corroborate these claims.
   According to her declaration, Gemar’s wife had not been present in the
   courtroom during voir dire, but she had been in the courtroom throughout
   trial.
            Based on this information, Gemar moved for a new trial under Federal
   Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. He argued that Juror 27 was actually biased
   and impliedly biased, and that Juror 27’s presence on the jury violated
   Gemar’s constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. The district court
   denied the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing and sentenced
   Gemar to twenty-seven months of imprisonment as to each count, to be
   served concurrently.
                                         II
            Gemar challenges the (1) introduction at trial of statements he made
   during proffer sessions, (2) denial of his motion for a new trial, and
   (3) application of a sentencing enhancement. Because we remand for the

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   district court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim of juror bias, we do
   not reach the first and third issues.
           “A criminal defendant has the right to a trial by an impartial jury,
   secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 1 “The remedy for a
   valid implied bias claim is a new trial,” 2 and “[a] claim of alleged bias is
   ordinarily addressed in a hearing where the judge examines the juror and
   obtains assurances of the juror’s impartiality.” 3 We review a district court’s
   decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing for a claim of juror bias for abuse
   of discretion. 4
           Gemar argues that “Juror 27’s prior romantic relationship with the
   defendant’s wife necessitated, at a minimum, a questioning before the
   court.” Gemar asserts that such questioning would reveal that Juror 27 was
   actually biased, entitling Gemar to a new trial.
           The Government responds that the district court “followed Fifth
   Circuit precedent” in ruling on the motion for a new trial without holding an
   evidentiary hearing. The Government is correct that we have previously held
   that motions for a new trial may generally be decided on written submission
   without a hearing. 5 However, we have also recognized that district courts

           1
          United States v. Dejean, 988 F.3d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 2021) (first citing U.S.
   Const. amends. VI, XIV; and then citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
           2
            Solis v. Cockrell, 342 F.3d 392, 400 & n.44 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Dyer v. Calderon,
   151 F.3d 970, 973 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1998)).
           3
            Hatten v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 595, 600 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Brooks v. Dretke,
   444 F.3d 328, 330 (5th Cir. 2006)).
           4
               See United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2010).
           5
             See United States v. Mahmood, 820 F.3d 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The law of this
   circuit is well established that a motion for new trial may ordinarily be decided upon
   affidavits without an evidentiary hearing.” (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d
   1370, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977))).

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                                          No. 21-30666

   may order evidentiary hearings “because of certain unique situations,”
   including allegations of jury tampering. 6 Ordinarily, a hearing is appropriate
   when there is an allegation of juror bias. 7
           In its order explaining the denial of the motion for a new trial, the
   district court acknowledged that a claim of juror bias is usually addressed
   through an evidentiary hearing. Despite this, the district court reasoned that
   “the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court did not err in denying an
   evidentiary hearing where even if the allegations of juror bias were true, the
   juror ‘would not have been subject to a challenge for cause on the basis of the
   omitted information.’”            The district court cited Bey v. Scott 8 for this
   proposition. Bey is an unpublished opinion arising in the habeas context. As
   the court in Bey pointed out, “[t]o receive a federal evidentiary hearing, a
   habeas corpus petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would entitle him
   to relief.” 9 Applying this principle, the court in Bey affirmed the district
   court’s denial of habeas relief on a juror bias claim because petitioner had not
   “allege[d] facts which, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief.” 10 This is

           6
               Id.
           7
            See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (“This Court has long held that the
   remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the
   opportunity to prove actual bias.”); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954)
   (“The trial court should not decide and take final action ex parte on information
   [concerning “private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a
   juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury”], but should determine the
   circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudicial, in
   a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.”); Hatten, 570 F.3d at 600
   (“A claim of alleged bias is ordinarily addressed in a hearing where the judge examines the
   juror and obtains assurances of the juror’s impartiality.” (citing Brooks, 444 F.3d at 330)).
           8
               77 F.3d 477, 1995 WL 798579 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           9
               Id. at *2.
           10
                Id. at *3.

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   not a habeas proceeding. Gemar seeks an evidentiary hearing to develop a
   factual record in the district court in support of a new trial. The standard of
   review is not the same as the one applied in a federal habeas proceeding.
           In denying Gemar’s motion for a new trial, the district court also
   noted that Gemar had not requested an evidentiary hearing. Gemar argues
   that a request for an evidentiary hearing “was not a requirement under the
   local rules and the intent of the motion, with its discussion of an evidentiary
   hearing generally being required within the motion itself along with its
   attachments, demonstrated [Gemar’s] desire to have a full hearing on the
   matter.” The attachments Gemar mentions include a notice of hearing that
   accompanied his motion for a new trial, which further suggests that he
   indicated to the district court his desire for an evidentiary hearing.
           Although not every claim of actual bias on behalf of a juror militates a
   hearing, the district court here abused its discretion by ruling on the motion
   for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. 11                      Gemar has
   established that Juror 27 and Gemar’s wife were friends in high school, that
   Juror 27 attended the Gemars’ wedding, and that Juror 27 and Gemar’s wife
   communicated over social media up until Gemar was indicted. Juror 27 failed
   to reveal any of this information during voir dire. We note that the record is
   silent as to whether Gemar recognized Juror 27 during voir dire or the trial,

           11
               See United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634-35 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We do not
   now hold that any false statement or deliberate concealment by a juror necessitates an
   evidentiary hearing. But we believe that a juror’s refusal to admit his felony status is
   particularly troublesome. Unlike some information sought in voir dire, a question about
   felon status would strike the average juror as extremely serious and sensitive. Lying about
   a factor as important (and as easy to verify through public records) as felon status raises at
   least the inference that the juror had an undue desire to participate in a specific case,
   perhaps because of partiality. Because the record provides no evidence that the motivation
   for the lie was unrelated to bias in this case, it was an abuse of discretion under these facts
   for the trial judge not to have held an evidentiary hearing.” (footnote omitted)).

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   Gemar’s wife recognized Juror 27 during her husband’s trial, whether she
   provided information to Gemar about Juror 27 before the jury reached its
   verdict, and other, obvious, related questions as to what Gemar knew
   regarding Juror 27 and when. Nevertheless, Gemar has made a sufficient
   showing to entitle him to a hearing on his juror bias claim. 12
                                         *        *         *
           We REMAND with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing into
   Juror 27’s possible biases and any other pertinent issues.

           12
              See United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
   district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for an
   evidentiary hearing and new trial because, though the “juror did not disclose any
   relationship with [the defendant] during voir dire,” “[t]here [was] no evidence . . . that this
   was a misrepresentation” and the defendant “did not offer evidence that the juror even
   knew him”); United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1029 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
   defendant “made a sufficient showing of [an actual bias] claim to entitle him to a hearing
   on his claim that he was denied his right to an impartial jury” because the prospective juror
   “was alleged to have concealed a relationship of great significance to her and one that would
   have been of great significance to [the defendant] if he had known of it”).

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