Court Opinion

ID: 9956498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 14:12:12.148268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:34.009547
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. H.,                           :
                                 : CASE SEALED
                      Petitioner :
                                 :
             v.                  : No. 739 C.D. 2022
                                 : Submitted: May 5, 2023
Department of Human Services,    :
                                 :
                      Respondent :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
              HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK                                     FILED: April 2, 2024

              K. H. (Petitioner) petitions for review of an interlocutory order of the
Department of Human Services (DHS), Bureau of Hearings and Appeals’ (BHA)
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), denying his Motion to Compel Discovery
(Discovery Motion) in a child abuse expunction appeal. Petitioner contends that the
ALJ erred in denying the Discovery Motion because he has a statutory and
constitutional right to review investigative files relevant to the child abuse finding.
Because the order is interlocutory, and not appealable as a collateral order, we quash
the appeal.
              In July 2021, the county Children and Youth Services (CYS) notified
Petitioner that he was the subject of a report of suspected child abuse involving his
minor child, E.J. (Child). Following the investigation, CYS issued an indicated
report (CY-48 Report) naming Petitioner as a perpetrator of child abuse based on
findings of indecent assault, indecent exposure, and inadequate shelter/housing. By
letter dated September 2, 2021, DHS notified Petitioner that he was listed in the
statewide database as a perpetrator in an indicated report of child abuse.
             Petitioner appealed the determination to the BHA. He requested a copy
of the underlying reports of the abuse from CYS. On December 30, 2021, CYS
provided a redacted CY-48 Report. By letter dated February 11, 2022, CYS notified
Petitioner that he was not entitled to receive any additional documents from the file
because discovery in child abuse expunction cases was limited to the information in
the statewide registry, the redacted CY-48 Report, and information relied upon by
experts to conclude that child abuse occurred. CYS informed Petitioner that it
planned to present the CYS caseworker, Child, and Child’s mother as witnesses at
the hearing and that CYS would provide a finalized witness list with the Unified Pre-
Hearing Filing.
             On February 24, 2022, Petitioner filed the Discovery Motion to compel
the delivery of all evidence gathered against him. Specifically, Petitioner requested
all evidence favorable to him in CYS’s possession, all prior statements made by
alleged victims and witnesses, all investigative reports, and all other evidence
otherwise required to be delivered to comply with the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. VI. CYS opposed the Discovery
Motion asserting confidentiality.
             Following argument and briefing, by order dated June 28, 2022, the
ALJ denied Petitioner’s Discovery Motion. The ALJ determined that Petitioner is
not entitled to receive the requested information or review it in camera. The ALJ
concluded that Petitioner is only entitled to the information in the statewide registry
and the redacted CY-48 Report, which were provided to him. As for the other

                                          2
information requested, the ALJ opined that such information is confidential and
protected from disclosure under the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL),
23 Pa. C.S. §§6301-6388.
               From this interlocutory order, Petitioner filed a petition for review with
this Court seeking to appeal the order as a collateral order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313
(Rule 313). Because discovery orders are generally not appealable as they do not
dispose of the litigation, this Court directed the parties to address the appealability
of the June 28, 2022 order in their principal briefs along with the merits. As this is
a threshold inquiry, which implicates our jurisdiction, we first address the
appealability of the order.
               Petitioner argues that the ALJ’s order denying his Discovery Motion
constitutes a collateral order appealable as of right under Rule 313. According to
Petitioner, the order meets Rule 313’s three-part test for a collateral order:
separability, importance, and irreparable loss. First, the order is clearly separate
from and collateral to the substantive issue of whether the abuse occurred. Second,
Petitioner has a fundamental liberty interest in his reputation that is too important to
be denied review. Third, there exists no effective means of reviewing the order after
a final judgment. Petitioner claims that if this Court does not review the issue at this
juncture, he “will have no opportunity to prepare an alibi defense, no chance to
measure or test the accuser’s claim, no chance to prepare an adequate cross-
examination based on prior statements, and no chance to evaluate whether the
witness[es’] testimony is tainted before the factual record is made.” Petitioner’s
Brief at 10.
               DHS counters that the order does not meet the criteria for an appealable
collateral order. Although DHS concedes that the order meets the first two prongs

                                            3
of the collateral order test, it maintains that Petitioner fails to meet the third prong.
According to DHS, Petitioner’s claim will not be irreparably lost if review is
postponed until final judgment in the case. DHS maintains that the documents
requested are confidential under the CPSL.           The order denying Petitioner’s
Discovery Motion preserves CYS’s claim of confidentiality. If CYS was required
to turn over all allegedly protected material to Petitioner, it would be impossible to
“unring the bell” and restore CYS’s claim of confidentiality. Respondent’s Brief at
9. On the other hand, an order refusing the production of confidential material, if
erroneous, may be corrected on appeal; any right will not be irreparably lost.
Therefore, DHS argues that the order is not collateral.
             “As a general rule, an appellate court’s jurisdiction extends only to
review of final orders.”     Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Association,
977 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. 2009) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) (“[A]n appeal may be taken
as of right from any final order[.]”)). “A final order” is any order that “(1) disposes
of all claims and of all parties; . . . [or] (3) is entered as a final order pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this rule [(relating to orders granting interlocutory review of
particular issues)] . . . .” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b).
             Generally, discovery orders are not considered final orders, but
interlocutory orders that are “not appealable until there is a final judgment in the
underlying action.” Smith v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 740 A.2d 1200, 1203 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1999). However, under the collateral order doctrine, an interlocutory order
may be appealable if the order “[(1)] is an order separable from and collateral to the
main cause of action [(2)] where the right involved is too important to be denied
review and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Rule

                                            4
313 tests “separability, importance, and irreparable loss.” Brooks v. Ewing Cole,
Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 364 (Pa. 2021). “[W]here an order satisfies Rule 313’s three-
pronged test, an appellate court may exercise jurisdiction even though the order is
not final.” Id. at 370.
             “If the test is not met, however, and in the absence of another exception
to the final order rule, there is no jurisdiction to consider an appeal of such an order.”
Brooks, 259 A.3d at 370. “As an exception to the rule of finality, the collateral order
rule is interpreted narrowly, and each prong must be satisfied before an order will
be considered on appeal.” Sylvan Heights Realty Partners, L.L.C. v. LaGrotta, 940
A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. “A narrow
construction of the doctrine not only avoids piecemeal determinations and
protraction of litigation but also furthers judicial accuracy because an appellate court
is more likely to decide an issue correctly in the context of a complete adjudication
and a full development of record.” Northumberland County Children & Youth
Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 2 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)
(Northumberland CYS); accord Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129.
             “[W]here a discovery order could shed light on the substantive
allegations at issue but could be resolved without analysis of the merits of the
underlying issue, the severability prong of Rule 313 [i]s satisfied.” Rae, 977 A.2d
at 1126 (citing Ben v. Schwartz, 729 A.2d 547 (Pa. 1999)). In the context of a child
abuse expungement case, this Court has held that the issue of the perpetrator’s
entitlement to the information requested is “clearly separate from and collateral to
the substantive issue” of whether the perpetrator committed the abuse.
Northumberland CYS, 2 A.3d at 797-98. As for the second prong of the test, an
individual’s constitutional right to protect his reputation constitutes a right too

                                            5
important to be denied review. Id. at 798. As for whether a discovery order satisfies
the third prong of the collateral order test, the disposition appears to turn on whether
the order compels or denies the production of evidence. See Ben, 729 A.2d at 552.
             Ben is the “seminal case” for interpreting the collateral order doctrine.
Rae, 977 A.2d at 1126. In Ben, our Supreme Court determined that an order
compelling an agency to produce its investigative files pertaining to complaints filed
against a dentist was appealable under the collateral order exception to a final order.
729 A.2d at 552. With regard to the third prong, the Supreme Court explained:

             The remaining prong of the collateral order doctrine
             requires us to consider whether the order permitting
             discovery of the [agency’s] investigative files is such that
             if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the
             claim will be irreparably lost. The [agency] argues that
             because the subpoenaed documents would be in the
             possession of the [plaintiffs] and the other participants
             remaining in the malpractice action if the [agency] is
             required to produce the investigative file, subsequent
             appellate review would be moot. In essence, the
             disclosure of documents cannot be undone. We agree.
             [T]here is no effective means of reviewing after a final
             judgment an order requiring the production of putatively
             protected material.
Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
             Cases relying on Ben for an immediate appeal have involved discovery
orders compelling disclosure of confidential information. See, e.g., In re Estate of
McAleer, 248 A.3d 416, 424 (Pa. 2021) (order compelling discovery of
communications protected by the attorney-client privilege was immediately
appealable); Commonwealth v. Flor, 136 A.3d 150, 155 (Pa. 2016) (“discovery
orders rejecting claims of privilege and requiring disclosure constitute collateral
orders that are immediately appealable under Rule 313”); Commonwealth v.

                                           6
Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 782 (Pa. 2014) (discovery order compelling Commonwealth
to produce materials that it contended were protected under work-product doctrine
was reviewable as a collateral order); In re Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating
Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 215 (Pa. 2014) (reviewing orders that purportedly violated
attorney-client privilege and other statutory privileges); Commonwealth v. Harris,
32 A.3d 243, 251 (Pa. 2011) (“We reaffirm our holding in Ben . . . that orders
overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable
under [Rule] 313.”); Cooper v. Schoffstall, 905 A.2d 482, 485 n.3 (Pa. 2006)
(holding discovery orders implicating important privacy rights are immediately
appealable); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 876 A.2d 939, 944 (Pa. 2005) (applying
Ben in criminal context on appeal from order granting disclosure of arguably
privileged materials); In re S.H., 272 A.3d 1000, 1005 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (order
requiring the disclosure of privileged information was immediately appealable under
Rule 313); Township of Neshannock v. Kirila Contractors, Inc., 181 A.3d 467, 472
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (order directing disclosure of allegedly privileged documents
was immediately appealable under Rule 313); Dauphin County Social Services for
Children & Youth v. Department of Public Welfare, 855 A.2d 159, 161 n.1
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (discovery order compelling disclosure of agency records was a
collateral order); Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2001) (order granting the production of documents despite arguments that they were
protected under the attorney-client privilege was a collateral order).
             In Northumberland CYS, this Court applied Ben in determining whether
an order granting a motion to compel qualified as a collateral order in the context of
a child expunction hearing. Therein, an alleged perpetrator of child abuse filed a
motion to compel the agency to produce the expert report of the victim child’s

                                          7
treating physician, medical records, and films upon which he relied in forming his
opinion, and any and all information contained in the agency’s investigatory file.
Northumberland CYS, 2 A.3d at 796. The BHA granted the motion in part and
directed the agency to provide all medical records and films of the victim child that
the agency’s expert would use in the child abuse expungement hearing. Id. The
agency sought review of the order as a collateral order asserting the confidentiality
of the information in its possession under the CPSL. Id. at 798. After determining
that the issue of the perpetrator’s entitlement to the information requested was
separate from and collateral to the substantive issue and that the perpetrator’s right
to reputation was too important to be denied review, we examined the third prong of
the collateral order test. Id. at 797-98. We concluded that “there exists ‘no effective
means of reviewing after final judgment an order requiring the production of
putatively protected material.’” Id. (quoting Ben, 729 A.2d at 552) (emphasis
added). We explained that if we deferred review of the BHA’s discovery order until
its final decision on the child abuse appeal, “the parties’ challenge to the order would
be irreparably lost and remain unresolved.” Id.
             As the Superior Court has observed, and the foregoing cases illustrate,
Ben “has historically been restricted to review of discovery orders granting
disclosure of arguably privileged information, and not to orders denying disclosure
of arguably privileged information.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 173 A.3d 294, 299
(Pa. Super. 2017). The order at issue here did not compel discovery but rather denied
the request for disclosure of confidential information. Although this Court has not
addressed this nuance, the Superior Court has, concluding that orders denying the
discovery of arguably confidential or privileged records do not meet the third prong
of the collateral order test. See Parker, 173 A.3d at 297-98; see also Commonwealth

                                           8
v. Sabula, 46 A.3d 1287, 1293 (Pa. Super. 2012) (concluding order denying
defendant’s motion to compel enforcement of pre-arrest agreement between
Commonwealth and defendant was not appealable as collateral order under Ben).1
              For example, in Parker, the Superior Court concluded that an order
denying a criminal defendant’s pretrial motion in limine for the production of a sex
offense victim’s confidential medical, psychological, and therapy records was not a
collateral order and quashed the appeal. The defendant admitted that he wanted the
confidential documents to use as exculpatory evidence, to prepare his defense, and
to impeach the victim. As for the third prong, the Superior Court explained that if
the defendant “is ultimately convicted, the [trial court’s] decision to preclude
[d]efense evidence can be reviewed through [the defendant’s] right to direct
appeal[;] thus, the claim will not [be] lost.” Parker, 173 A.3d at 297. The Court
held that review of the issue would not be irrevocably lost if review was postponed.
Id.
              Upon review, we similarly conclude that the discovery order at issue
here does not qualify as a collateral order. Although the order clearly meets the first
two prongs of the collateral order test, see Northumberland CYS, 2 A.3d at 797-98,
it does not meet the third. Unlike the order at issue in Ben and its progeny, the order
here did not compel the production of purportedly protected material but denied it.
The distinction is determinative, particularly considering that the collateral order
rule must be interpreted narrowly. See Rae, 977 A.2d at 1129. The law is well
settled that “[d]iscovery orders involving privileged [or confidential] material are
generally appealable because if immediate appellate review is not granted, the

       1
         In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
                                             9
disclosure of documents cannot be undone and subsequent appellate review would
be rendered moot.” MarkWest Liberty Midstream & Resource, LLC v. Clean Air
Council, 71 A.3d 337, 342 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (emphasis added). In other words,
the privilege or confidentiality asserted will become irreparably lost if review is
postponed because, by then, the information will have been revealed to the opposing
party in the lawsuit.
             However, such is not the case when a discovery order denies access to
information. Contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the propriety of the discovery
denial will not be irrevocably lost if review is postponed but subject to review on
appeal. As for Petitioner’s claims of prejudice by having to cross-examine witnesses
without the benefit of their prior statements (including the victim’s) and by having
to build a defense without being able to test, evaluate, or investigate the information
gathered, such claims can be remedied by a new hearing should he ultimately prevail
on this discovery issue. See Sabula, 46 A.3d at 1293 (“Orders that make a trial
inconvenient for one party or introduce potential inefficiencies, including post-trial
appeals of orders and subsequent retrials, are not considered as irreparably lost. An
interest or issue must actually disappear due to the processes of trial.”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). For these reasons, we conclude that the order
presently before us is not immediately appealable.
             Accordingly, we quash the appeal.

                                        MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

                                          10
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. H.,                           :
                                 : CASE SEALED
                      Petitioner :
                                 :
             v.                  : No. 739 C.D. 2022
                                 :
Department of Human Services,    :
                                 :
                      Respondent :

                                ORDER

           AND NOW, this 2nd day of April, 2024, the above-captioned appeal is
QUASHED.

                                   __________________________________
                                   MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge