Court Opinion

ID: 9697670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:25:26.629783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:34.413858
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Senior Judge KELLEY.
I respectfully dissent. Whether a claimant’s injury occurred in the course of his or her employment as defined by Section 301(c)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Act1 (Act), is a question of law subject to our plenary review. Williams v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 850 A.2d 37 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004). Section 301(c)(1) provides that compensa-ble injuries include, inter alia:
All injuries caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business or affairs thereon, sustained by the employe, who, though not so engaged, is injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the employer, or upon which the employer’s business or affairs are being required by the nature of his employment.
As this Court has recently stated:
Case law has now well established that an employee not engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer must satisfy three conditions under the Act in order for her injury to be “in the course of employment.” Dana Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Gearhart), 120 Pa.Cmwlth. 277, 548 A.2d 669 (1988), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 522 Pa. 606, 562 A.2d 828 (1989). The Act dictates that: (1) the injury must have occurred on the employer’s premises; (2) the employee’s presence thereon was required by the nature of his employment; and (3) the injury was caused by the condition of the premises or by the operation of the employer’s business thereon.
Markle v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bucknell University), 785 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 568 Pa. 729, 797 A.2d 918 (2002).
Herein, the WCJ found, and the Board affirmed, that none of the three elements set forth in Markle were proven by Claimant. However, upon review, I disagree *1269and would hold that Claimant was acting within the course of her employment at the time of her injury.
First, contrary to the majority’s holding, I believe that Claimant’s injury occurred on Employer’s premises. The majority concludes that Employer’s payment to reserve a spot for its employees was at most a mere benefit of employment because it was an “optional” program and the employees were responsible for paying for the parking spot at least in part. The majority concludes further that this “benefit” is no different than an agreement by an employer to pay portions of health insurance costs of an employee. However, I believe that the majority’s conclusions, based on the fact that the parking program was optional, are tenuous at best. I would propose that all employer provided parking programs are, to some extent, optional. The Act is to be construed liberally and Claimant’s decision to take advantage of Employer provided parking, whether optional or not, should not be to her detriment.
In this case, Employer entered into a lease with Colonial Parking to provide automobile parking spaces to its employees, including Claimant. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 240a. The terms of the lease provided that the number of parking spaces and the rates for the parking spaces for Employer’s employees shall be given out by Employer’s authorized representatives in its Corporate Security Department. Id. The terms of the lease further provided that Employer would provide proper identification forms to its employees for presentation to Colonial Parking and that Employer shall have 24 hour, 7 day a week use of the parking spaces during the term of the agreement. Id. at 240a-241a. In addition, Employer’s fact witness, Cheryl Diehl, testified that Employer pays the rates for the parking spaces and assigns the spaces to interested employees who pay half the parking expense through payroll deduction. Id. at 83a. Ms. Diehl also testified that Employer owns four parking lots for employee parking and leases additional spaces from three independently owned parking lots, which includes the Colonial Parking lot. Id. at 85a.
The fact that Employer did not own the lot in which its employees parked or that the parking lot was not contiguous to Employer’s building is of no moment. Case law has previously held that parking lots leased by employers for their employees constitute “premises” of the employer. See e.g. Carl v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (G.H. Delp Company), 79 Pa.Cmwlth.332, 469 A.2d 347 (1984) (The lease and other circumstances established that the claimant had parked her car in an authorized parking lot which constituted “premises” of the employer.). Since the Act is not premised upon the wrongdoing or negligence of the employer, but rather is bottomed upon the employment relationship, there is no necessity to require a finding of ownership or control. Epler v. North American Rockwell Corporation, 482 Pa. 391, 393 A.2d 1163 (1978); See also Williams, 850 A.2d at 39 (“Our courts have long held that an employer’s premises includes reasonable means of access to the workplace, whether or not the specific piece of land is owned by the employer”.).
Thus, I would hold that Claimant was injured on Employer’s premises. I would hold further that that Claimant was required to be on Employer’s premises and that her injury was caused by the condition of the premises.
As stated in Epler, if the employee was in the area where the injury was sustained directly because of his or her employment, the injury is compensable. Epler, 482 Pa. at 397, 393 A.2d at 1167. In Williams, this *1270Court pointed out that case law clearly establishes that an employee’s presence in the parking lot immediately before or after he or she arrives at or departs from the workplace is required by the nature of his employment. Williams, 850 A.2d at 39.
Herein, Claimant was in the Colonial Parking lot at the time of her injury because she had just left work and was walking to her car which was parked in a space provided to her by Employer through its lease with Colonial Parking. Accordingly, she was in the parking lot directly because of her employment. Moreover, the fact that she did not have to park there is irrelevant. Again, the Act is to be construed liberally and Claimant’s decision to take advantage of Employer provided parking should not be to her detriment.
Finally, Claimant’s injury whs caused by the condition of the premises. Pursuant to Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony, the parking lot was snow and ice covered at the time of Claimant’s injury and it was that actual physical condition of the parking lot that caused her to fall and sustain an injury.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Board’s order and remand the matter with instructions to further remand to the WCJ for findings with respect to the balance of the evidence presented by the parties and a determination of the amount of compensation benefits, if any, which are payable in respect of Claimant’s January 3, 2001 injury.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 411(a).