Court Opinion

ID: 9368888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 13:05:04.20827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.473936
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                       No. COA22-411

                                Filed 07 February 2023

Wake County, No. 20 CVS 13650

KIARASH BASSIRI, Plaintiff,

              v.

WADE PILLING, Defendant.

        Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 29 November 2021 by Judge Dawn M.

Layton in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 November

2022.

        Mills & Alcorn, L.L.P., by Cynthia A. Mills, for plaintiff-appellant.

        Daphne Edwards and Ashley Fillippeli for defendant-appellee.

        ZACHARY, Judge.

        Plaintiff Kiarash Bassiri appeals from the trial court’s order granting

Defendant Wade Pilling’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) (2021). After careful review, we

reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                  I.     Background

        Plaintiff and his wife were married in 2010 and lived together in North

Carolina in what Plaintiff describes as a “happy and loving marriage,” in which

“genuine love and affection existed.” In 2019 and continuing until January 2020,
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                                   Opinion of the Court

Defendant and Plaintiff’s wife began a friendship that evolved into a romantic,

intimate relationship. Plaintiff and his wife eventually separated, although they

remained legally married when Plaintiff commenced this suit against Defendant.

      On 1 December 2020, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint against Defendant,

asserting claims for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. On 12 March 2021, Defendant filed a responsive

pleading in which he first moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1) and (2), alleging that the trial court lacked both

subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. Defendant’s responsive pleading also

included his answer and affirmative defenses.

      On 26 May 2021, Plaintiff served Defendant with discovery, including a set of

interrogatories. On 26 July 2021, Defendant served Plaintiff with his verified

responses and objections to the interrogatories. In Defendant’s responses, Defendant

averred, inter alia, that he and Plaintiff’s wife had “engaged in some intimate activity

when [Defendant] first met her in October 2019 in California, in November 2019 in

Nevada, and about a month later in Utah, but [they] did not engage in sexual

intercourse.” Defendant further acknowledged that he has “only seen [Plaintiff’s wife]

in person on three occasions”—in California, Nevada, and Utah. Most other contact

between them occurred via email, text messages, and social media such as Facebook

and Snapchat.

      On 26 August 2021, Defendant took a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of his

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                                   Opinion of the Court

Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, leaving pending his

Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. That same day, Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss came on for hearing in Wake County Superior Court.

      By order entered on 29 November 2021, the trial court determined that it

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for alienation of affections

and criminal conversation and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss those claims.

In its order, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:

             11. In Plaintiff’s Interrogatories, Plaintiff asked Defendant
             to identify the location of any intimate activity he engaged
             in with Plaintiff’s Wife.

             12. In Defendant’s verified Interrogatory Responses to
             questions 13, 14, 15 and 17, Defendant stated that he had
             only seen Plaintiff’s Wife in person on three occasions:

                    A. In October 2019 in California at a conference
                    where he initially met her;

                    B. In November 2019 in Nevada; and

                    C. In January 2020 in Utah.

             13. In Defendant’s verified Interrogatory Responses,
             Defendant stated he has never met Plaintiff’s Wife in the
             state of North Carolina.

             14. There is no evidence to support Plaintiff’s allegation
             that any intimate act in which Defendant engaged with
             Plaintiff’s Wife occurred in the state of North Carolina.

             15. There is no evidence that Defendant has ever been to
             North Carolina, traveled to North Carolina, or engaged in
             any act with Plaintiff’s Wife in North Carolina.

             16. There is no evidence that Defendant engaged in any act

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                           Opinion of the Court

      with Plaintiff’s Wife other than meeting her in person
      outside the state of North Carolina, in California, Nevada,
      and Utah. There is evidence that Defendant and Plaintiff’s
      [W]ife communicated via Facebook, Snapchat, emails and
      texts while Plaintiff[’s Wife] was in North Carolina.

      17. There is no evidence, as alleged in Plaintiff’s
      Complaint, that Defendant committed the acts alleged in
      the pleading in the state of North Carolina; on the contrary,
      there is credible evidence that Defendant has never been
      to North Carolina, has never traveled to North Carolina,
      has never met Plaintiff’s Wife, for any purpose, in the state
      of North Carolina, and only met Plaintiff’s Wife in person
      outside the state of North Carolina three times: once
      initially at a dental conference where he spoke in
      California in 2019, at another dental conference at which
      he spoke in November 2019 in Nevada, and in January
      2020 in Utah. There is evidence that Defendant and
      Plaintiff’s [W]ife communicated via Facebook, Snapchat,
      emails and texts while Plaintiff[’s Wife] was in North
      Carolina.

The trial court thus concluded:

      1. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
      N.C. Gen. Stat[.] § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), over Plaintiff’s
      claims for alienation of affection[s] and criminal
      conversation because there is no evidence that an act
      underlying a claim for alienation of affection[s] or criminal
      conversation occurred between Plaintiff’s Wife and
      Defendant within the state of North Carolina.

      2. Alienation of affection[s] and criminal conversation are
      transitory torts and for North Carolina substantive law to
      apply a Plaintiff must show that the alleged torts occurred
      in the state of North Carolina. See Jones v. Skelley, 195
      N.C. App. 500, 506-513, 673 S.E.2d 385, 389-394 (2009). If
      the tortious injury occurred in a state that does not
      recognize alienation of affections and criminal
      conversation, the matter cannot be tried in North Carolina
      and North Carolina courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.

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                                   Opinion of the Court

              See id.

              3. “A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
              North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure represents a
              challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction
              over the plaintiff’s claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule
              12(b)(1) (2018). ‘Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the
              power of the court to deal with the kind of action in
              question.’ Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353
              S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987). ‘Whenever it appears by the
              suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
              jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
              the action.[’] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(h)(3) (2018).”
              Dipasupil v. Neely, 268 N.C. App. 466, 834 S.E.2d 451
              (2019) (unpublished). Subject matter jurisdiction is a
              prerequisite to personal jurisdiction. Id.

              4. Because the evidence shows that no alleged intimate act
              between Plaintiff’s Wife and Defendant underlying the
              actions for alienation of affection[s] and criminal
              conversation occurred in the state of North Carolina,
              pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat[.] § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(1), this
              Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss
              said actions.

        On 9 December 2021, Plaintiff took a voluntary dismissal of his claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal

from the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss on 22 December

2021.

                          II.   Appellate Jurisdiction

        Ordinarily, this Court only hears appeals from final judgments. See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1)–(2). “A final judgment is one which disposes of the cause as to all

the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially determined between them in the trial

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                                    Opinion of the Court

court.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361–62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381, reh’g

denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). By contrast, “[a]n interlocutory order is

one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but

leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire

controversy.” Id. at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381.

      The trial court’s order granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to two of

Plaintiff’s claims, but left pending Plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Therefore, the trial court’s order was not a final judgment at the

time that it was entered. “At that point, [P]laintiff’s appeal would have been

interlocutory because the entire case was not disposed of.” Tarrant v. Freeway Foods

of Greensboro, Inc., 163 N.C. App. 504, 507–08, 593 S.E.2d 808, 811, disc. review

denied, 358 N.C. 739, 603 S.E.2d 126 (2004). However, Plaintiff took a voluntary

dismissal of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress before filing his

notice of appeal. This dismissal rendered the trial court’s order a final judgment. See

id. at 508, 593 S.E.2d at 811 (declining to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal after the

plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remaining claims, as “[a]ll claims and judgments

[we]re final with respect to all the parties, and there [wa]s nothing left for the trial

court to determine”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s appeal is properly before this Court, and

we proceed to review the merits of his appeal.

                                 III.   Discussion

      On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that it

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                                          Opinion of the Court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his claim for alienation of affections and thus

granting Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.1 Much of the appellate briefing

in this case concerns the trial court’s finding of fact that there exists “evidence that

Defendant and Plaintiff’s [W]ife communicated via Facebook, Snapchat, emails and

texts while Plaintiff[’s Wife] was in North Carolina.” Plaintiff contends that this

finding undermines the trial court’s conclusion of law that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction. We agree, albeit on a more fundamental basis; unlike the thornier issues

of personal jurisdiction and conflict of laws posed by the facts of this case, the issue

of subject-matter jurisdiction is resolved simply by recognition of the broad grant of

general jurisdiction to our trial courts.

        After careful review, we conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that

it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim for alienation of affections.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to dismiss with

regard to Plaintiff’s alienation of affections claim and remand to the trial court for

further proceedings.

A. Standard of Review

        Whether a trial court possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a

        1  Plaintiff makes no argument on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Defendant’s
motion to dismiss as regards the criminal conversation claim. This claim is therefore “deemed
abandoned.” Wilkerson v. Duke Univ., 229 N.C. App. 670, 679, 748 S.E.2d 154, 161 (2013); see also
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which no reason or
argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”). Further, because Plaintiff took a voluntary
dismissal of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the present appeal solely concerns
the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for alienation of affections.

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                                  Opinion of the Court

question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Clark v. Clark, 280 N.C. App. 403,

418, 867 S.E.2d 704, 717 (2021). “Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court need not

confine its evaluation of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to the face of the pleadings, but may

review or accept any evidence, such as affidavits, or it may hold an evidentiary

hearing.” Smith v. Privette, 128 N.C. App. 490, 493, 495 S.E.2d 395, 397 (citation

omitted), appeal withdrawn, 348 N.C. 284, 501 S.E.2d 913 (1998). Also, “[u]nlike a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, consideration of matters outside the pleadings does not convert

the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to one for summary judgment.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

      When conducting de novo review, “this Court considers the matter anew and

freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.” Farquhar v. Farquhar,

254 N.C. App. 243, 245, 802 S.E.2d 585, 587 (2017) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). However, if “the trial court resolves issues of fact” in an order

granting a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, then “those findings are binding on the appellate

court if supported by competent evidence in the record.” Smith, 128 N.C. App. at 493,

495 S.E.2d at 397.

B. Analysis

      “It is a universal principle as old as the law that the proceedings of a court

without subject-matter jurisdiction are a nullity. Put another way, subject-matter

jurisdiction is the indispensable foundation upon which valid judicial decisions rest,

and in its absence a court has no power to act.” Lakins v. W. N. Carolina Conf. of

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                                   Opinion of the Court

United Methodist Church, 283 N.C. App. 385, 397–98, 873 S.E.2d 667, 677 (2022)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Subject-matter jurisdiction is “the

power of the court to deal with the kind of action in question.” Clark, 280 N.C. App.

at 418, 867 S.E.2d at 717 (citation omitted). “A court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter if it has the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which

the action in question belongs.” Balcon, Inc. v. Sadler, 36 N.C. App. 322, 324, 244

S.E.2d 164, 165 (1978).

       By contrast, personal jurisdiction is “the power to bring the person to be

affected by the judgment before the court so as to give him an opportunity to be

heard.” Id. In that subject-matter jurisdiction concerns the kind of action in question

rather than the person affected by the action, subject-matter jurisdiction often exists

where personal jurisdiction does not. See High v. Pearce, 220 N.C. 266, 271, 17 S.E.2d

108, 112 (1941) (“Properly speaking, there can be no jurisdiction of the person where

there is none of the subject matter, although the converse might indeed, and often

does, occur.”).

       Because Defendant took a voluntary dismissal with prejudice of his Rule

12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the trial court never

considered that issue; hence, the question of whether the trial court had personal

jurisdiction over Defendant is not before us. Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was the only motion that the trial court

considered and upon which it ruled in the order from which Plaintiff appeals, and

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therefore we confine our analysis solely to the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

      “Subject[-]matter jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts by either the North

Carolina Constitution or by statute.” Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353

S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987). Section 7A-240 of our General Statutes broadly confers

subject-matter jurisdiction upon the superior and district courts of this state:

             Except for the original jurisdiction in respect of claims
             against the State which is vested in the Supreme Court,
             original general jurisdiction of all justiciable matters of a
             civil nature cognizable in the General Court of Justice is
             vested in the aggregate in the superior court division and
             the district court division as the trial divisions of the
             General Court of Justice. Except in respect of proceedings
             in probate and the administration of decedents’ estates, the
             original civil jurisdiction so vested in the trial divisions is
             vested concurrently in each division.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-240 (emphasis added).

      On the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, both parties cite Jones v. Skelley.

195 N.C. App. 500, 673 S.E.2d 385 (2009), superseded in part on other grounds, N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 52-13(a) (2015). In Jones, this Court stated that “if the tortious injury

occurs in a state that does not recognize alienation of affections, the case cannot be

tried in a North Carolina court.” 195 N.C. App. at 506–07, 673 S.E.2d at 390 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wise v. Hollowell, 205 N.C. 286, 289,

171 S.E. 82, 83 (1933) (“[I]f the act complained of is insufficient to constitute a cause

of action there[,] it is likewise insufficient here.”). “Establishing that the defendant’s

alienating conduct occurred within a state that still recognizes alienation of affections

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                                    Opinion of the Court

as a valid cause of action is essential to a successful claim since most jurisdictions

have abolished the tort.” Hayes v. Waltz, 246 N.C. App. 438, 443, 784 S.E.2d 607, 613

(2016).

      However, it does not necessarily follow that the alleged alienating conduct

must have occurred in North Carolina in order for a plaintiff to raise a valid

alienation of affections claim over which the trial court would have subject-matter

jurisdiction. Rather, the alienating conduct must have “occurred within a state that

still recognizes alienation of affections as a valid cause of action[.]” Id. In the case at

bar, there are two states in which allegedly alienating conduct may have occurred

and which recognize a cause of action for alienation of affections: North Carolina and

Utah. See Heiner v. Simpson, 23 P.3d 1041, 1043 (Utah 2001).

      Although this Court has previously addressed the issue of subject-matter

jurisdiction in the context of alienation-of-affections claims in which the allegedly

alienating conduct occurred across multiple states, in each of those prior cases, North

Carolina was the only jurisdiction involved that recognized the claim of alienation of

affections. See, e.g., Dipasupil v. Neely, 268 N.C. App. 466, 834 S.E.2d 451, 2019 WL

6133850, at *1 (2019) (unpublished) (in which a Florida resident sued a Virginia

resident over conduct alleged to have occurred in Minnesota and Washington, D.C.,

while the plaintiff resided in North Carolina); Jones, 195 N.C. App. at 505, 673 S.E.2d

at 389 (“Plaintiff contends a material issue of fact exists as to the state in which the

alleged alienation of affections occurred, North Carolina, which recognizes the tort,

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                                   Opinion of the Court

or South Carolina, which has abolished the tort . . . .”); Darnell v. Rupplin, 91 N.C.

App. 349, 351, 371 S.E.2d 743, 745 (1988) (“[The] defendant’s involvement with [the]

plaintiff’s husband . . . spanned four states: North Carolina, Maryland, Virginia, and

Washington, D.C. Of these four states, North Carolina is the only one that recognizes

a legal cause of action for the tort of alienation of affections.”). Thus, the sufficiency

of the claim in each of these cases was dependent upon whether the alleged injury

occurred in North Carolina.

      The question of whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is

frequently conflated with the question of where the alleged alienating conduct and

injury occurred because North Carolina is often the only jurisdiction involved that

recognizes the claim. Indeed, the factual determination of where the allegedly

injurious conduct occurred is critical to the eventual choice-of-law analysis that

determines whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a valid cause of action under

the applicable substantive law. See Darnell, 91 N.C. App. at 351, 371 S.E.2d at 745

(“The substantive law applicable to a transitory tort [such as alienation of affections]

is the law of the state where the tortious injury occurred, and not the substantive law

of the forum state.”). Nonetheless, that factual determination is irrelevant to the

foundational question of whether the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over

“the kind of action in question.” Clark, 280 N.C. App. 403, 418, 867 S.E.2d 704, 717

(citation omitted). Instead, the choice-of-law analysis is more properly assessed

pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, rather than

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                                   Opinion of the Court

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Church

v. Carter, 94 N.C. App. 286, 289, 380 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1989) (“The alleged failure of a

complaint to state a cause of action for which relief can be granted . . . does not equate

with a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.”).

      Here, the dispositive question of law—whether the trial court possesses

subject-matter jurisdiction over the kind of action in question—is a deceptively

simple one. The kind of action presented is one for alienation of affections, a tort over

which the trial courts of this state indisputably possess subject-matter jurisdiction.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-240; see also, e.g., Darnell, 91 N.C. App. at 351, 371 S.E.2d

at 745. Whether Plaintiff has successfully stated a claim for which relief may be

granted under the substantive law applicable to his claim consistent with our conflict-

of-laws rules is downstream of and irrelevant to the resolution of this straightforward

question of law.

      Accordingly, even though several of the trial court’s findings of fact concerning

Defendant’s actions or presence in North Carolina are supported by competent

evidence, these findings of fact do not support the trial court’s conclusion that it

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s alienation of affections claim. The

trial court’s order must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

      On remand, should the evidence persuade the finder of fact that the tort of

alienation of affections occurred in either North Carolina or Utah, then the

substantive law of the applicable jurisdiction will apply. See Cooper v. Shealy, 140

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N.C. App. 729, 736, 537 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2000). “Should it be determined that the

tort[ ] occurred in [California or Nevada], then no substantive law could apply since

none of these alleged acts are [a] tort[ ] in th[ose] state[s]. In that event, the case

would, by necessity, be dismissed.” Id.

                                IV.    Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s Rule

12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is reversed and Plaintiff’s claim

for alienation of affections is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

      Judges ARROWOOD and GRIFFIN concur.

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