Court Opinion

ID: 9964402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 21:01:38.346968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:23.832007
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10742
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        HENRY MARTIN STEIGER,
        a.k.a. Henry Matthew Steiger,
        a.k.a. H M Steiger,
        a.k.a. Robert Woods,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10742

                        D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00043-RV-2
                             ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, JORDAN,
        ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA,
        BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
                While on federal probation, Henry Steiger was convicted in
        state court of murdering the mother of his infant child on the
        baby’s first birthday. The government moved to revoke Steiger’s
        probation for committing this new offense, and the district court
        agreed. After revoking Steiger’s probation, the district court im-
        posed a modified sentence well above Steiger’s advisory guidelines
        range—the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment to
        run concurrently with the state court’s murder sentence. The dis-
        trict court did not explain why it chose that sentence, and Steiger
        did not object to the lack of explanation.
               Steiger argues that we should vacate his sentence and re-
        mand for the district court to explain why it chose twenty years.
        The law requires a district court to state in open court its reasons
        for choosing a particular sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and all
        parties agree the district court failed to do that here. We have
        adopted a “per se rule of reversal” that requires us to vacate any
        sentence imposed without an explanation. United States v. Parks,
        823 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Bonilla,
        463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 438
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        22-10742                Opinion of the Court                           3

        F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006). Under those precedents, Steiger’s
        failure to object is irrelevant.
                We took this appeal en banc to answer two questions. First,
        we asked whether we should overrule our precedents that impose
        the “per se rule of reversal” and, instead, review unpreserved Sec-
        tion 3553(c) objections for plain error. We conclude that we
        should. Our court stands alone in imposing a “per se rule of rever-
        sal,” but there is nothing special about Section 3553(c) errors that
        justifies this different standard of review. Second, we asked
        whether the district court in fact committed a plain error when it
        sentenced Steiger. We conclude it did not. We hold that, when the
        sentencing record makes clear a district court’s reasons for impos-
        ing a particular sentence, a district court’s failure to explain its rea-
        sons for the chosen sentence does not affect the defendant’s sub-
        stantial rights. It is abundantly clear on this record that the district
        court sentenced Steiger to the statutory maximum because of the
        nature of the unusually egregious state-law offense he committed
        on probation, so there is no plain error.
               In addition to this Section 3553(c) error, Steiger argues that
        the district court committed procedural errors in arriving at his sen-
        tence and that a twenty-year sentence is substantively unreasona-
        ble. We remand to the panel to consider Steiger’s additional argu-
        ments.
                                        I.

              Henry Steiger pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud
        and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Due to some
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10742

        legal technicalities not relevant here, Steiger’s recommended cus-
        todial sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was
        only zero to six months’ imprisonment. The district court did not
        impose any prison time, but it did sentence Steiger to three years’
        probation. A sentence of probation necessarily implies trust that
        the defendant will not reoffend while serving the sentence. See
        U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, pt. A, § 3(b). Steiger breached that trust a mere two
        months into his probation, and he did so in a most egregious way—
        by committing second-degree murder. After a Florida state jury
        convicted Steiger of that crime, the district court held a hearing to
        revoke Steiger’s probation and to resentence him on the federal
        conspiracy and wire fraud offenses.
                 The hearing was dedicated almost exclusively to a discus-
        sion of Steiger’s heinous conduct underlying his second-degree
        murder conviction. The district court heard evidence that Steiger
        strangled to death the mother of his infant daughter—on the baby’s
        first birthday and while the baby was in her mother’s arms. Steiger
        then hid the woman’s body in a 55-gallon barrel and stowed the
        barrel in a trailer. When interviewed by law enforcement about the
        woman’s disappearance, Steiger disclaimed knowledge of her
        whereabouts. Eventually, police discovered the woman’s body.
        Steiger admits to hiding the body and lying about it to law enforce-
        ment, but he maintains that he did not commit murder. As Steiger
        tells it, he found the woman dead and thought she committed sui-
        cide. He says he thought the woman’s death would cause him to
        lose custody of his daughter, so he frantically tried to “cover [his]
        tracks,” which made him look “like a guilty person.”
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                         5

               The district court rejected Steiger’s claim of factual inno-
        cence. The district court instead found by a preponderance of the
        evidence what the Florida state jury had already found beyond a
        reasonable doubt—Steiger murdered the mother of his infant
        daughter. Cf. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997). Ac-
        cordingly, the district court ruled that Steiger “violated the terms
        and conditions of [his] probation” by committing the state law of-
        fense of second-degree murder and revoked Steiger’s probation.
                Having found that Steiger committed second-degree mur-
        der in violation of the terms of his probation, the district court im-
        posed a new sentence for Steiger’s federal conspiracy and wire
        fraud convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2). The government ar-
        gued that a guidelines sentence of twelve to eighteen months’ im-
        prisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, would “greatly understate[] the
        seriousness” of Steiger’s commission of “arguably . . . the most
        egregious of offenses while on probation,” and emphasized the dis-
        trict court’s ability to sentence up to twenty years’ imprisonment
        per count, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Steiger requested that he be sen-
        tenced to time served. When imposing its sentence, the district
        court began by explaining that it had “carefully considered all the
        evidence presented,” Steiger’s allocution, and “all of the factors set
        out in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)], as well as the applicable guidelines and
        policy statements” and relevant judicial precedents. The district
        court then sentenced Steiger “to be imprisoned for a term of 20
        years on each count, . . . to be served concurrently” with each
        other and the life sentence imposed by Florida in the second-degree
        murder case.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10742

               The district court never explicitly said that it was imposing
        a twenty-year sentence because Steiger committed a violent crime
        in a heinous manner. But there’s no doubt everyone was on the
        same page. Immediately after imposing its sentence, the district
        court asked if Steiger had “any objections to any of [the court’s]
        findings or conclusions of law or anything that need[ed] to be am-
        plified on the record with regard to the sentence [the court] im-
        posed.” Steiger said no.
               Steiger appealed, arguing that his sentence is an excessively
        harsh upward variance and that the district court did not take the
        steps necessary to calculate an adequate sentence. The three-judge
        panel assigned to the case could not reach those issues, however.
        Under our precedent, any Section 3553(c) error required automatic
        reversal. See United States v. Steiger, 83 F.4th 932, 936–38 (11th Cir.),
        vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 86 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). So
        the district court’s omission of an express explanation of its reason-
        ing halted the appeal. See id. Neither the absence of a contempora-
        neous objection nor the presence of a record that otherwise made
        clear the basis of the sentence mattered. The panel had no choice
        but to reverse and remand so the district court could formally sup-
        plement the record with information everyone already knew: Stei-
        ger received a long sentence because he committed murder.
                Concurring with the Steiger panel’s application of our prece-
        dents, Chief Judge Pryor lamented the incoherence and incon-
        sistency of our “per se rule of reversal” for Section 3553(c) errors.
        Steiger, 83 F.4th at 938–40 (Pryor, C.J., concurring). In any other
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                          7

        context and in every other circuit to have addressed the issue, an
        appellate court would review the record only for plain error. See id.
        (Pryor, C.J., concurring).
               We voted to take the case en banc and asked the parties to
        brief two questions. First, we asked whether we should overrule in
        part our cases creating the per se rule of reversal for Section 3553(c)
        errors and hold that plain error review applies. Second, we asked
        whether, if plain error review does apply, the district court com-
        mitted plain error here.
                                       II.

               Criminal defendants in federal court have the right to know
        the reason for their sentence so they can understand the process
        and challenge their sentence on appeal. To ensure that a defendant
        has that information, the law requires that a district court “state in
        open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sen-
        tence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If the district court imposes a sentence
        within the range recommended by the United States Sentencing
        Guidelines, “and that range exceeds 24 months,” then the district
        court must explain “the reason for imposing a sentence at [the] par-
        ticular point” that the court chose “within that range.” Id.
        § 3553(c)(1). If the district court imposes a sentence outside the
        guidelines range, then the district court must state orally during the
        sentencing hearing “the specific reason for the imposition of a sen-
        tence different from” the guidelines range. Id. § 3553(c)(2). The dis-
        trict court must also “state[] with specificity” those reasons “in a
        [written] statement of reasons.” Id.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10742

                The district court’s obligation under Section 3553(c) is to
        “adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
        appellate review.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). The
        adequacy of an explanation necessarily depends “upon the circum-
        stances of the particular case.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S.
        109, 116 (2018). In “conceptually simple” cases in which “the record
        makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and
        arguments,” a district court’s statement that a within-guidelines
        sentence is “appropriate” can be sufficient. Rita v. United States, 551
        U.S. 338, 358–59 (2007). But “major departure[s]” from the guide-
        lines range require that a district court identify a “more significant
        justification” at the hearing and on the written “statement of rea-
        sons form” created by the Sentencing Commission. See Gall, 552
        U.S. at 50; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
               Although it isn’t onerous to comply with Section 3553(c),
        the district court here said nothing to explain its sentence. The dis-
        trict court imposed a sentence above the sentencing guidelines
        range but said nothing about why it was varying upward. On the
        other hand, Steiger did not object to the district court’s lack of ex-
        planation. The district court expressly asked him whether he
        needed any clarification, and, through counsel, he said no. Thus,
        we are left with our two questions: (1) Should we automatically
        vacate Steiger’s sentence for this unobjected-to error or apply cus-
        tomary plain error review? (2) If we review for plain error, is there
        any reason to believe that the district court’s error affected Steiger’s
        substantial rights or undermined the fairness of the sentencing pro-
        cess?
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                         9

                                       A.

               We begin by holding that an unobjected-to Section 3553(c)
        error warrants review for plain error only. In doing so, we overrule
        in part our cases that established the per se rule of reversal.
                Two general rules frame the issue here. The first is that we
        don’t reverse based on errors (even preserved ones) that are harm-
        less—that is, if they didn’t affect the outcome of the proceeding.
        See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083,
        1095 (11th Cir. 2024). The second is that we won’t reverse for any
        error (even an outcome-changing one) when the party claiming er-
        ror did not object below unless the error is “plain”—meaning that
        it is obvious and it affected substantial rights—and it undermined
        the fairness of the proceeding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Puckett v.
        United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009).
               We recognized a Section 3553(c) exception to these back-
        ground rules in United States v. Williams. In Williams, the district
        court violated Section 3553(c)(1) when it imposed a sentence
        within a guidelines range that exceeded twenty-four months with-
        out explaining why it picked a particular point within that range.
        438 F.3d at 1274. Despite the defendant’s failure to object, the Wil-
        liams panel “reject[ed] the government’s argument that this error
        [was] subject only to plain error review.” Id.; see also Bonilla, 463
        F.3d at 1181 n.3. The Williams panel instead applied de novo review,
        creating what we later came to describe as a “per se rule of rever-
        sal.” Parks, 823 F.3d at 997. That rule was later extended from Sec-
        tion 3553(c)(1) to Section 3553(c)(2) and, until today, has mandated
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10742

        automatic reversal any time a district court does not explicitly lay
        out the logic behind its sentence. See id. at 995–97 & n.31.
                No other circuit has followed Williams. The Second and Sev-
        enth Circuits have held that a contemporaneous objection is nec-
        essary to preserve a Section 3553(c) issue. See United States v. Villa-
        fuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Burns, 128
        F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit has reasoned that
        plain error review is all but mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal
        Procedure 52 and Supreme Court precedent. See United States v.
        Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–77 (4th Cir. 2010). The First, Third, Fifth,
        Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits apply plain error to
        unpreserved Section 3553(c) errors without much ado. See United
        States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
        Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Izaguirre-
        Losoya, 219 F.3d 437, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Eversole,
        487 F.3d 1024, 1035 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d
        1069, 1089 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613
        (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (10th
        Cir. 2007); United States v. Ransom, 756 F.3d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir.
        2014).
               We are likewise convinced that Williams was wrong. In de-
        parting from the plain error standard, the Williams panel felt itself
        bound by United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990),
        and United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d 823 (11th Cir. 1991). But those
        precedents do not require that result.
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        22-10742                Opinion of the Court                           11

               For starters, neither precedent addressed the standard of re-
        view for unobjected-to Section 3553(c) errors. See Veteto, 920 F.2d
        at 826; Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1572–73. In Veteto, the defendant ob-
        jected; he didn’t understand why he received such a long sentence,
        so he asked for clarification. 920 F.2d at 824. The district court ex-
        pressly refused to explain itself. Id. We understandably remanded
        for clarification. See id. at 826–27. In Parrado, the district court like-
        wise provided no summary of reasons at the end of the hearing. See
        911 F.2d at 1570. But there was no discussion in Parrado about
        whether the defendant objected, and there was no discussion about
        the standard of review that would apply to unpreserved errors.
                If anything, the result in Parrado suggests that we implicitly
        rejected an automatic reversal rule—because we affirmed. Instead
        of reversing based on the district court’s lack of explanation alone,
        the panel in Parrado searched the record for some evidence that the
        district court’s error had affected the defendant’s ability to under-
        stand his sentence. In particular, the panel asked whether the dis-
        trict court’s reasoning was evident, even though it had failed to ex-
        plain itself. Then, because the panel held that the record was suffi-
        ciently clear, it reasoned that reversal was unwarranted. See id. at
        1573.
               Obviously, neither precedent mandates reversal for all Sec-
        tion 3553(c) errors. Williams therefore not only broke the general
        rule of plain error review by forgiving a defendant’s failure to ob-
        ject, but Williams also put itself in tension with the precedents it
        relied on for that rule.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10742

                Other justifications for the Williams rule fare no better. The
        Parks panel, engaging in its duty to reconcile conflicting cases, pos-
        ited that the Williams rule is justifiable because a Section 3553(c)
        error can be identified “on a silent record.” Parks, 823 F.3d at 995–
        96. That is, Section 3553(c) requires a statement of reasons; any
        sentence imposed without such a statement is clearly unlawful; and
        so, a contemporaneous objection is unnecessary to develop the rec-
        ord for appellate review. See id.
                That justification falls flat for at least two reasons. First, it
        prizes record development at the expense of the timely objection
        rule’s other aims that are fully applicable in the Section 3553(c) con-
        text—“foster[ing] finality of judgment[s] and deter[ring] ‘sandbag-
        ging,’” United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998),
        and giving the district court the chance to “correct or avoid the
        mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome,”
        Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134. Second, the Parks justification creates even
        more tension with our precedents. We regularly review for plain
        error even if the record would not have benefited from a contem-
        poraneous objection. See Steiger, 83 F.4th at 940 (Pryor, C.J., con-
        curring) (noting that plain error review applies to challenges under
        Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(B) and to challenges that a district court
        failed to articulate reasons supporting its decision to seal an order).
        That an error may be obvious on a silent record does not answer
        whether we should reverse because of that error—even when a de-
        fendant has preserved an objection, we still ask whether the error
        was harmless before we reverse. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                         13

                Finally, there is no reason to conclude that a Section 3553(c)
        error is one of the rare “structural errors” that requires us to “re-
        vers[e] without regard to the mistake’s effect on the proceeding.”
        United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004). The “de-
        fining feature of a structural error is that it affects the framework
        within which” the proceeding occurs, as opposed to an error that
        occurs within a structurally sound proceeding. Weaver v. Massachu-
        setts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (cleaned up). For example, a district
        court’s failure to adequately instruct a jury on reasonable doubt is
        a structural defect because that trial becomes incapable of produc-
        ing a constitutional verdict. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,
        277–82 (1993). But a district court’s failure to adequately instruct
        the jury on an element of a charged crime is not structural because
        it remains possible for us to assess the guilty verdict based on the
        evidence. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1999).
                A district court’s failure to explain the reason for a sentence
        is not structural. The federal sentencing framework requires that
        district courts resolve factual disputes, calculate the guidelines
        range, consider the Section 3553(a) factors, impose a reasonable
        sentence, and adequately explain the basis for the sentence im-
        posed. If a district court makes a mistake while performing one of
        those functions, it has erred within the context of a structurally
        sound sentencing proceeding. United States v. Perez, 86 F.4th 1311,
        1319–20 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied 2024 WL 1143718 (U.S. Mar.
        18, 2024). If the defendant timely objects, we review for harmless
        error. If not, then plain error applies.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10742

               In short, there’s simply no basis to depart from the general
        rule of plain error review for unobjected-to errors. We therefore
        hold that an unobjected-to Section 3553(c) error warrants only
        plain error review. To the extent Williams or any of its progeny—
        including Bonilla and Parks—conflicts with our decision today,
        those precedents are overruled.
                                         B.

                We must now decide whether the district court committed
        plain error by failing to “state in open court . . . the specific reason
        for the imposition of a sentence” outside the guidelines range or
        file a written statement of reasons. 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2). The plain
        error test has four elements. An appellate court must find that (1)
        the district court committed an error; (2) the error was “plain”; and
        (3) the error “affect[ed] a substantial right.” United States v. Caldwell,
        81 F.4th 1160, 1175 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Clayton v.
        United States, 144 S. Ct. 870 (2024) (citation omitted). If all three
        conditions are met, then an appellate court has discretion to correct
        the forfeited error if it (4) “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integ-
        rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United
        States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997).
                The government does not dispute that Steiger satisfies the
        first and second elements. We agree. The district court erred when
        it did not state in open court the specific basis of its upward vari-
        ance or file a written statement of reasons. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
        And its obligation to make such explanations is clear from the “ex-
        plicit language of [the] statute.” United States v. Bankston, 945 F.3d
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        22-10742                Opinion of the Court                         15

        1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The parties disagree
        about the third and fourth elements, however. So that is where we
        turn.
                For the third element of plain error, Steiger must establish
        that the district court’s Section 3553(c) error “affect[ed] a substan-
        tial right.” Caldwell, 81 F.4th at 1175. A district court’s compliance
        with Section 3553(c) ensures that the defendant understands his
        sentence, and it creates a record of the district court’s reasoning.
        Both aims implicate a defendant’s ability to make an informed de-
        cision of whether to appeal and, if he does appeal, his ability to
        meaningfully attack the legality of the sentence. Many of our sister
        circuits have held, therefore, that the substantial right at issue in a
        Section 3553(c) challenge is the right to meaningful appellate re-
        view of a sentence. See United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 247 (2d
        Cir. 2005); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2002);
        United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2008); United
        States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2018). We agree. The
        primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral and written state-
        ment is so that a defendant can meaningfully appeal the sentence.
        See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Accordingly, a Section 3553(c) error does
        not affect a defendant’s substantial rights if the record is clear
        enough to allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence.
               Section 3553(c)’s role in the sentencing process also informs
        Steiger’s burden for the fourth element—whether “the error seri-
        ously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
        proceedings.” Caldwell, 81 F.4th at 1175 (citation omitted). Section
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10742

        3553(c) enables district courts imposing sentences to “treat like
        cases alike.” Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1572. It gives “information to crim-
        inal justice researchers” and aids “the Sentencing Commission in
        its continuous reexamination of its guidelines and policy state-
        ments.” Veteto, 920 F.2d at 826 n.3 (citation omitted). And Sec-
        tion 3553(c) explanations inform the public of the reasons justifying
        criminal sentences. See Parks, 823 F.3d at 997 & n.30. All of these
        purposes are satisfied if the record is clear about a district court’s
        reasons for imposing a sentence, even if it did not make the express
        statements that Section 3553(c) requires.
                Putting everything together, the third and fourth elements
        of plain error rise and fall, in this context, based on one thing: the
        clarity of the record. An ambiguous record could prevent a defend-
        ant from understanding his punishment, impede appellate review,
        and undermine public confidence by making a sentence appear se-
        cretive and arbitrary. But if the basis of the sentence is clear on the
        face of the record, then the defendant is not left out of the loop,
        appellate courts can effectively review the legality of the sentence,
        district judges can use the sentence as a comparator, and the public
        won’t be left to guess why the defendant received the sentence he
        did. Accordingly, we hold that a Section 3553(c) error warrants re-
        versal under plain error review only when the district court’s rea-
        soning is unclear on the face of the record. See Dominguez Benitez,
        542 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Guzman, 603 F.3d 99, 110 (1st
        Cir. 2010); Gore, 298 F.3d at 325–26; Vences, 169 F.3d at 613.
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                         17

               The government disagrees that a defendant in Steiger’s po-
        sition can establish plain error if the district court’s reasons for a
        sentence are ambiguous. Instead, the government argues that a de-
        fendant in Steiger’s position must establish that he would have
        been sentenced to a lower sentence but for the Section 3553(c) er-
        ror. The government’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.
               First, the government focuses on the wrong outcome. We
        often describe an appellant’s burden under plain error review as
        establishing that the “outcome” of the judicial proceeding would
        have changed. See Daniels, 91 F.4th at 1095. But we define the “out-
        come” that must have been affected by considering the nature of
        the rule violated by the district court and the role that rule plays in
        the judicial process. For example, when a defendant says his guilty
        plea was unknowing or involuntary in violation of Federal Rule of
        Criminal Procedure 11, our focus under plain error review is on the
        “effect of Rule 11 error on the defendant’s decision to plead,” not
        on whether the defendant would have otherwise avoided a guilty
        verdict. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 84. Here, Section 3553(c) is
        directed at the “outcome” of whether there is a record for appeal,
        not on the outcome of the sentencing proceeding in the district
        court.
               Second, Section 3553(c) is unusual in that it is not a rule that
        guides a legal decisionmaker to a particular result—it is a rule that
        a decisionmaker must comply with after reaching a result. To be
        sure, on plain error review, we usually expect an appellant to prove
        that a better overall result—i.e., a not-guilty verdict or a lesser
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10742

        sentence—would have occurred without an error. But that is be-
        cause most cases implicate rules that facilitate the overall result of
        a proceeding. For example, when the proceeding is sentencing, we
        ask whether the sentence would be different but for erroneous sen-
        tencing enhancements or an inaccurate sentencing guidelines
        range. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1319 (11th Cir.
        2022); United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826, 829–30 (11th Cir. 2014).
        But Section 3553(c) is different. It doesn’t guide a district court’s
        sentencing discretion; it becomes relevant only after the district
        court has exercised that discretion and made its decision. It makes
        no sense to apply a change-of-result test to a post-result error.
                For his part, Steiger argues that this framework for evaluat-
        ing plain error reads the word “specific” out of 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(c)(2). His point is that Section 3553(c)(1) requires only a
        statement of “the reason” behind a guidelines sentence; Section
        3553(c)(2), on the other hand, demands an explanation of “the spe-
        cific reason” (emphasis added) underlying any non-guidelines sen-
        tence. But Steiger’s argument is beside the point. The difference in
        specificity between Section 3553(c)(1) and Section 3553(c)(2) goes
        to whether the district court violated Section 3553(c) in the first
        place, not whether the violation affected a defendant’s substantial
        rights or undermined public confidence. Said differently, a defend-
        ant’s substantial rights do not vary between Section 3553(c)(1) and
        Section 3553(c)(2). Nor does the public’s confidence in the fairness
        and integrity in the proceedings. If someone with knowledge of the
        sentencing record can understand the reasons for the sentence
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        22-10742               Opinion of the Court                       19

        imposed, then a district court’s technical violation does not warrant
        reversal under plain error review.
                Applying that view of plain error review here, we cannot say
        the district court plainly erred. A reasonable person familiar with
        the sentencing record would understand that Steiger received an
        above-guidelines sentence because, while he was out on probation,
        he brutally murdered the mother of his infant daughter, hid her
        body, and then lied to law enforcement about it. Steiger’s second-
        degree murder conviction and his conduct underlying the convic-
        tion were the only topics of discussion at the revocation and sen-
        tencing hearing. Nearly all the time spent at that hearing was ded-
        icated to getting straight the gruesome details of the crime. The
        district court found as a matter of fact that Steiger committed the
        crime, quickly dismissing Steiger’s factual-innocence argument.
        And although Steiger asked for a sentence of time served, the gov-
        ernment suggested a higher sentence because of Steiger’s disturb-
        ing conduct. Because the district court’s reasoning is clear on the
        face of the record, Steiger cannot establish plain error. A remand in
        this circumstance would be a wasteful formality for the district
        court to state on the record what everyone already knows.
                                       C.

                To be clear, this opinion does not address whether the dis-
        trict court’s reasons for varying upward were appropriate or other-
        wise resolve whether Steiger’s sentence is lawful. He raised multi-
        ple procedural and substantive arguments on appeal. The panel in-
        itially assigned to this case was foreclosed from reaching those
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10742

        arguments because of our per se rule of reversal. Today’s holding—
        that the district court’s failure to explicitly state its reasons for an
        upward variance was not plain error because those reasons are ob-
        vious on the face of the record—simply removes the barrier to re-
        view.
                                        III.

               We REMAND to the panel for further proceedings con-
        sistent with this opinion.
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        22-10742               Jordan, J., Concurring                       1

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Cir-
        cuit Judges, Concurring:
              I join Judge Brasher’s well-written opinion in full but write
        brieﬂy to oﬀer some cautionary thoughts.
               Justice Holmes once remarked that “hard cases” can “make
        bad law.” Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)
        (Holmes, J., dissenting). But easy cases sometimes bring diﬃculties
        of their own. Our aﬃrmance in this case, under plain error review,
        is made relatively simple by the fact that Mr. Steiger murdered the
        mother of his child while on probation. But most cases will not be
        so easy. In run of the mill cases—where many diﬀerent facts and
        arguments may be in play at sentencing—analyzing the substantial
        rights prong of the plain error analysis may not be as straightfor-
        ward. I doubt very much that many cases in the future will be this
        cut and dry.
               While on federal probation, Mr. Steiger was convicted in
        state court of the second-degree murder of the mother of his child.
        The probation oﬃce petitioned the district court to revoke his pro-
        bation on this one ground, and the conviction was understandably
        the focus of the revocation hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Steiger
        argued that he should be sentenced to time-served because he was
        already facing life imprisonment on the second-degree murder con-
        viction and because—despite the jury verdict—he had not commit-
        ted the murder. All parties, including Mr. Steiger, understood that
        the advisory guidelines range for the probation violation was 12 to
        18 months. And Mr. Steiger did not object to the government’s
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        2                      Jordan, J., Concurring               22-10742

        representation that, according to probation, the district court was
        statutorily authorized to sentence him to 20 years for each of his
        four original federal oﬀenses and to run the sentences consecu-
        tively, for a maximum sentence of 80 years.
                The district court sentenced Mr. Steiger to four terms of 20
        years, but ran those terms concurrently with each other and with his
        state court life imprisonment sentence. All of this is to say that the
        probation revocation sentence did not come out of left ﬁeld. Nor
        is it hard to discern the district court’s reasoning—there was only
        one reason for the revocation and for the sentence, and that was
        Mr. Steiger’s commission of murder.
                But sentencing is often a more complicated aﬀair, with op-
        posing recommendations from the parties, competing aggravating
        and mitigating facts, possible enhancements, departures, and vari-
        ances, and disputed guideline provisions. If a district court does
        not adequately explain its reasons for a sentence, those reasons may
        not be apparent from the record. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace,
        597 F.3d 794, 805 (6th Cir. 2010) (2-1 decision) (ﬁnding plain error
        where the majority (a) “simply [could] not determine whether the
        district [court] considered the disparity between [the co-defend-
        ants’] sentences,” and (b) disagreed with the dissent’s contention
        that “it [wa]s clear” that the district court considered the argument,
        which it deemed “conceptually straightforward”).
               We do not provide a benchmark today on when a “district
        court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record.” Maj. Op. at
        16. A defendant’s ability to satisfy his or her burden under plain
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        22-10742                Jordan, J., Concurring                        3

        error review is therefore going to be fact-speciﬁc and subject to a
        case-by-case adjudication. This is the right call, as a really easy case
        like this one can make it diﬃcult to provide broad guidance for the
        future.