Court Opinion

ID: 9375463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 21:00:41.694408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.215500
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

                                   ________________

                                      No. 22-2183
                                   ________________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                   TERRELL FORTH,
                                               Appellant
                                    _____________

                   On Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of New Jersey
            (D.C. Criminal Nos. 1-04-cr-00511-001 and 1-05-cr-00001-001)
                      District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
                                  ________________

                   Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on February 9, 2023

       Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

                                (Filed: February 27, 2023)

                                   ________________

                                       OPINION *
                                   ________________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

       Appellant Terrell Forth was sentenced to 42 months of imprisonment for violating

the terms of his supervised release for a second time. Forth appeals that sentence as

substantively unreasonable. We will affirm.

                                              I.

       In 2005, Forth pleaded guilty to three federal criminal offenses in two separate

cases. In the first case (District of New Jersey No. 1:04-cr-00511), Forth pleaded guilty to

one count of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. In the second case (District of

New Jersey No. 1:05-cr-00001), Forth pleaded guilty to two counts of bank robbery. The

two cases were consolidated for sentencing, and the District Court sentenced Forth to an

aggregate term of 160 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release.

       On February 23, 2017, Forth was released from custody and began to serve his

period of supervised release. But shortly thereafter, Forth violated the terms of his

supervised release by committing another criminal offense—trafficking crack cocaine.

Forth pleaded guilty to the supervised release violation and, on May 16, 2018, the District

Court sentenced Forth to a total term of 36 months in prison followed by 18 months of

supervised release.

       On July 24, 2020, Forth was released from custody 1 and his second term of

supervised release began. Again, Forth quickly violated the terms of his supervised

1
  Forth was released from state custody on that date because, after Forth completed his
federal custodial sentence for the violation of the terms of his supervised release, he was
transferred to state custody to serve time for the drug trafficking conduct.
                                              2
release. Specifically, on September 13, 2020, Forth was involved in a motor vehicle stop.

Forth presented a fraudulent driver’s license to a police officer and then, during a search

incident to arrest, was found to have on his person three to four grams of crack cocaine,

three to four grams of marijuana, and $1,722 in cash. A subsequent search of Forth’s

vehicle also uncovered thirty strips of Suboxone—for which Forth had no prescription—

hidden inside of the CD player. Based on this conduct, Forth was charged with multiple

state criminal offenses, and he ultimately pleaded guilty to identity crime and possession

of a controlled dangerous substance. Forth was sentenced by the state court to three years

in prison.

       Based, in part, on the same conduct, the United States Probation Office sought to

revoke Forth’s term of supervised release for a second time. On June 7, 2022, pursuant to

an agreement with the United States, Forth pleaded guilty to violating the terms of his

supervised release by committing the state identity and drug crimes. Before sentencing

Forth for the violation, the District Court heard and considered presentations from

defense counsel, the Government, and Forth. During the hearing, the District Court heard

arguments in favor of a light sentence, including that Forth was remorseful for his

criminal conduct, could become a productive member of society with the right tools, and

had secured a job and a place to live upon his release from custody. After careful

consideration, the District Court sentenced Forth to an aggregate term of 42 months in

prison, finding that a longer sentence was necessary to deter Forth’s criminal conduct and

“protect the public from further crimes of the defendant given what is a very clear risk of

                                             3
recidivism.” A.091:20–21. Forth appeals his 42-month sentence as substantively

unreasonable.

                                            II.2

       Forth contends his 42-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. Specifically,

Forth argues the District Court “failed to reasonably apply the § 3553(a) factors to the

circumstances of this case,” placing too much weight on the criminal conduct underlying

the violation and not enough emphasis on the other § 3553(a) factors. Forth’s Br. 11. As a

result, Forth maintains that the District Court imposed a sentence that is “greater than

necessary to fulfill the objectives of sentencing” and must be vacated as substantively

unreasonable. Forth’s Br. 7. We disagree.

       In determining an appropriate term of imprisonment upon revocation of a

defendant’s term of supervised release, district courts are guided by most of the factors

provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Such factors include “the need

for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to

protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–

(C). We will vacate a sentence as substantively unreasonable only if “no reasonable

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d

Cir. 2009) (en banc). Accordingly, under this highly deferential standard of review, “[w]e

2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). We review
Forth’s argument “that his sentence of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable for
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017).
                                             4
may not reverse the district court simply because we would have imposed a different

sentence,” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008), or because the district

court “fail[ed] to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve,”

United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2020).

       Here, the District Court’s 42-month sentence was substantively reasonable. The

District Court thoroughly considered mitigating factors and arguments in favor of a

lighter sentence, including that Forth was remorseful for his criminal conduct and could

become a productive member of society with the right tools, had been misled by his state

court defense attorney to believe that any time served for the violating state crimes would

be subtracted from his federal sentence for the violation, had received helpful drug

treatment while in state custody, had obtained a GED while incarcerated, had secured a

job and a place to live upon his release from custody, and had been sufficiently punished

for the underlying criminal offenses, which were almost twenty years old.

       As noted, the District Court concluded that, based on Forth’s engagement in

criminal conduct shortly after serving a 36-month sentence for his first supervised release

violation, a 42-month sentence was necessary to adequately deter Forth “from engaging

in criminal conduct again” and to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant

given what is a very clear risk of recidivism.” A.091:10–21.

       From the record, it is evident that the District Court reasonably weighed the

§ 3553(a) factors and did not place excessive weight on the seriousness of the criminal

conduct underlying his violation of supervised release. Indeed, based on Forth’s history

of criminal conduct—including twice committing criminal offenses within weeks of

                                             5
starting a term of supervised release—it was reasonable for the District Court to conclude

that a 42-month sentence was necessary to adequately deter Forth from engaging in

future criminal conduct and to protect the public from further crimes. In addition, the

District Court reasonably determined that a 42-month sentence was necessary based on

“the nature and circumstances of” Forth’s violation, “as well as his history and

characteristics of failure to comply with supervision and to take advantage of the

programming offered to him.” A.094:10–14. Accordingly, we are not convinced that “no

reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on [Forth] for the

reasons the district court provided,” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568, and conclude that Forth’s

sentence was substantively reasonable.

                                            III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                             6