Court Opinion

ID: 9704465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:36:41.502378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.645039
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring in result.
According to the prosecution witness Deel, Deel and Wooten first met appellant Lay in a bar at the end of August or the beginning of September 1992. Upon being asked, Lay said he could supply LSD. The subject was discussed by the three later the same night at Wooten's house. A week later appellant Lay went to Wooten's house and quoted his price for LSD. The week after that, Lay actually sold LSD for the first time to Deel and Wooten, again at Wooten's house. At that time of the first actual sale, Lay gave Deel and Wooten his grandmother's telephone number and told them to call him there when they needed an additional supply. During the next six weeks, leading to the charged crime, this number was actually used in arranging some of the transactions. All but one of the subsequent transactions occurred in Wooten's house. In my opinion, the testimony of Deel, that he and Wooten were sold LSD ten times between the end of August 1992, and the charged sale on October 30, 1992, was specially relevant and admissible under Ind.Evidence Rule 404(b) as probative of a discrete and special eriminal plan to supply drugs to Deel and Wooten at their residence for resale, of which the October 30, 1992 'charged event was a single manifestation. I do, however, agree with the dissent of Chief Justice Shepard that the admissibility of the Deel testimony cannot be sustained by resort to the now-abandoned "common scheme or plan" rationale.
In addition, the fact that Lay was present in the Deel/Wooten house at the time of the charged delivery was not really in dispute at trial. The best inferences for the defense from some of the prosecution's evidence is that Lay was merely an innocent bystander, standing around or simply handing Wooten the sheet of LSD, part of which was sold to the informants. I therefore also conclude that the prosecution was properly permitted to refute or dispel this inference favorable to the defense by presenting the plan and its other manifestations. Under this reasoning, the plan, with its other manifestations, was also admissible under Evid.R. 404(b) as probative of intent and knowledge.
Upon the foregoing basis, I respectfully concur in result.