Court Opinion

ID: 9951732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 21:02:19.863586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:17.013303
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 P. v. Zendejas CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050396, H050397
                                                                    (San Benito County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. Nos. CR1901331,
                                                                     CR2100492)
             v.

 FRANCISCO SANCHEZ ZENDEJAS,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                I. INTRODUCTION
         A complaint in September 2019 charged defendant in case No. CR1901331 with
felony criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); count 1),1 felony attempting to
dissuade a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 2), felony dissuading a witness from
reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 3), six misdemeanor counts of violating
criminal protective orders (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, and 14), three
misdemeanor counts of disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); counts 6, 10, and
15), three misdemeanor counts of disturbing the peace by loud noise (§ 415, subd. (2);
counts 7, 11, and 16), and misdemeanor resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer
or emergency medical technician (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 12).2 While disposition of

         1
           All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
         2
           The complaint was later deemed to constitute the information.
the charges in case No. CR1901331 was pending, an information was filed in
March 2022 against defendant in case No. CR2100492, charging defendant with felony
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a); count 1), two felony counts of violating domestic
violence protective orders (§ 166, subd. (c)(1), (4); counts 2 and 3), and felony stalking
(§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 4).
       Pursuant to plea agreements defendant signed in April 2022, defendant pleaded no
contest in May 2022 to three felony counts: one count of criminal threats as alleged in
count 1 of case No. CR1901331, and two counts of violating domestic violence
protective orders as alleged in counts 2 and 3 of case No. CR2100492. Defendant agreed
to be sentenced to three years (the upper term) for count 1 in case No. CR1901331 and to
consecutive terms of eight months (one-third of the middle term) for each of counts 2
and 3 in case No. CR2100492. The trial court accepted defendant’s pleas and dismissed
the remaining counts. Consistent with the plea agreement and the probation officer’s
recommendation, the trial court in August 2022 sentenced defendant to an aggregate term
of four years four months, consisting of the upper term of three years for count 1 in case
No. CR1901331 and consecutive terms of eight months for each of counts 2 and 3 in case
No. CR2100492.
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) was amended effective January 1, 2022 to read in
relevant part: “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when
there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” In this appeal,3 defendant

       3
         Defendant was sentenced pursuant to a single plea but filed separate notices of
appeal for the two trial court case numbers. This court granted defendant’s motion to
have his appeals considered together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and
disposition.

                                               2
contends that the trial court failed to comply with amended section 1170, subdivision (b)
by sentencing him to the upper term of three years for the criminal threats count without
the facts used to justify imposition of the upper term having been admitted by defendant
or found true at trial. Because the relevant amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)
went into effect on January 1, 2022, more than seven months before defendant’s
sentencing hearing, we find that defendant forfeited this argument by failing to object at
sentencing. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment.
                                   II. BACKGROUND
       A detailed account of the facts relating to the charged offenses is not necessary to
resolve the issue raised in this appeal. Briefly, the probation officer’s report stated
concerning case No. CR1901331 that a man was awoken by the sound of rocks hitting his
house and when he went outside to investigate, defendant yelled that he would shoot the
man and threw gravel toward him. The probation officer’s report stated concerning case
No. CR2100492 that a man and his wife were sitting in their backyard when defendant
appeared and threatened to kill the man, violating restraining orders protecting the man
and his wife from defendant.
       Consistent with the terms of the April 2022 plea agreements in the two cases, the
probation officer’s report recommended that defendant be sentenced to the upper term of
three years for the criminal threats count in case No. CR1901331, and that defendant be
sentenced to consecutive terms of eight months (one-third of the middle term) for each of
the two counts of violating domestic violence protective orders in case No. CR2100492,
for a total sentence of four years four months. On August 11, 2022, the trial court
sentenced defendant in accordance with this recommendation. Prior to imposition of
sentence, the trial court asked defendant and defendant’s trial counsel if they had any
questions, and both replied that they did not. Likewise, neither defendant nor his trial
counsel objected following the trial court’s imposition of sentence.

                                              3
                                    III. DISCUSSION
       Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by sentencing him to the upper term of
three years for the criminal threats count without the aggravating factors supporting
imposition of the upper term being admitted by defendant or found true at trial. If this
court determines defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object at sentencing,
defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
       Defendant signed his written plea agreements on April 6, 2022, he entered his no
contest pleas on May 12, 2022, and he was sentenced on August 11, 2022. Effective
January 1, 2022 – prior to defendant signing his plea agreements, entering his no contest
pleas, and being sentenced – Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 567) amended section 1170, subdivision (b) “to make the middle term the
presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment; a court now must impose the middle
term for any offense that provides for a sentencing triad unless ‘there are circumstances
in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459, 464.)
       Senate Bill 567 applies retroactively to judgments not final when the legislation
took effect on January 1, 2022. (People v. De La Rosa Burgara (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th
1054, 1061, review granted Feb. 21, 2024, S283452 (De La Rosa Burgara).) This court
has also held that the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Stamps (2020) 9
Cal.5th 685 (Stamps) requires retroactive application of Senate Bill 567 to a negotiated
plea agreement with a stipulated sentence. (De La Rosa Burgara, supra, at pp. 1054,
1063; see also People v. Todd (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 381–382, review granted
Apr. 26, 2023, S279154 (Todd).) Other Courts of Appeal have reached a different
conclusion, holding that Senate Bill 567 does not require remand in a case involving a

                                             4
negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated sentence. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 1051, 1057–1059, review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277314 (Mitchell);
People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, 334, review granted Apr. 26, 2023, S278690
(Sallee).) The issue is pending before the California Supreme Court in Mitchell.4
       The Attorney General asserts that this court should follow Mitchell and Sallee to
hold that Senate Bill 567 does not apply to a negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated
sentence. The Attorney General also argues that defendant’s agreement to a stipulated
sentence estops him from asserting error under amended section 1170, subdivision (b).
As an alternative argument, the Attorney General contends that even if the trial court
failed to properly apply amended section 1170, subdivision (b), remand is not required
because any error was harmless.
       In reply, defendant asserts that the Attorney General’s arguments are inapplicable
because his sentence was not stipulated. He acknowledges that the written plea
agreements stated he would be sentenced to three years for the criminal threats count and
would receive consecutive eight-month sentences for each of the two counts of violating
domestic violence protective orders, for an aggregate sentence of four years four months
in prison. However, he argues that his trial counsel did not stipulate to the length of the
sentence when the parties put the terms of the plea agreement on the record in court, and
that his counsel also said the two counts of violating domestic violence protective orders
would “ ‘run concurrent’ ” to the criminal threats count. Thus, defendant argues that the
terms of his plea agreement were ambiguous, and therefore the sentence was not
stipulated.

       4
         The California Supreme Court granted review of the following issue in Mitchell:
“ ‘Does Senate Bill No. 567 (Stats. 2021, ch. 731), which limits a trial court’s discretion
to impose upper term sentences, apply retroactively to defendants sentenced pursuant to
stipulated plea agreements [i.e., plea agreements with a stipulated sentence]?’ ” (People
v. Kelly (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 1, 4, fn. 2.)

                                              5
       However, as the Attorney General points out in a surreply brief,5 no such
ambiguity exists. Defendant signed a plea agreement in case No. CR1901331 in which
he agreed to be sentenced to three years in prison for the criminal threats count. His plea
agreement noted that this sentence would run consecutive to the sentence in case
No. CR2100492. Likewise, defendant signed a plea agreement in case No. CR2100492
in which he agreed to serve eight months for each of the two counts of violating domestic
violence protective orders for a total of 16 months, consecutive to the sentence in case
No. CR1901331. The trial court sentenced defendant in accordance with these
agreements. The references by defendant’s trial counsel to concurrent sentences came
when the parties discussed the plea agreement with the trial court. Trial counsel
misstated that the two counts of violating domestic violence protective orders were to
each carry a sentence of 16 months, with the two counts running concurrently to each
other and consecutive to the criminal threats count. Despite trial counsel’s misstatement
of the agreed-upon sentence, there was no ambiguity that defendant agreed to be
sentenced to the upper term of three years for the criminal threats count, that defendant
agreed to be sentenced to a total of 16 months for the two violating domestic violence
protective orders counts, that the sentence for the two violating domestic violence
protective orders counts was to run consecutive to the three-year sentence for the criminal
threats count, or that the aggregate sentence defendant agreed to was four years four
months. Thus, the Attorney General correctly argues that this situation involves a
negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated sentence.
       Cases such as De La Rosa Burgara and Todd, holding that Senate Bill 567 applies
retroactively to a negotiated plea agreement with a stipulated sentence, did not involve a
situation where Senate Bill 567 was in effect at the time of sentencing. Both De La Rosa
Burgara and Todd cited Stamps as support for their holdings. (De La Rosa Burgara,

       5
           The Attorney General’s motion for leave to file a surreply brief is granted.

                                               6
supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1054, review granted; Todd, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 380,
review granted.) In Stamps, the defendant entered into a plea agreement in exchange for
a specified term and then requested on appeal that his case be remanded so the trial court
could consider whether to strike his serious felony enhancement under amendments to
section 1385, subdivision (a) that took effect while his appeal was pending. (Stamps,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 692.) Our Supreme Court held that the defendant could seek relief
under the amended law despite his plea agreement, because his appeal did not attack the
plea itself but instead “seeks relief because the law subsequently changed to his potential
benefit.” (Id. at p. 698.) This court in Todd found Stamps “instructive” and held that a
defendant who negotiated for a stipulated sentence to an upper term before the enactment
of Senate Bill 567 should be free to choose whether to waive or invoke the requirements
of amended section 1170, subdivision (b). (Todd, supra, at p. 380; see id. at p. 381.)
       Defendant’s sentencing hearing took place on August 11, 2022, more than seven
months after the effective date of Senate Bill 567. Defendant also signed his plea
agreements and entered his no contest pleas months after the effective date of Senate
Bill 567. Despite this, defendant raised no objection concerning the sentence. As this
court stated in Todd, a defendant who received a stipulated sentence to an upper term
before the enactment of Senate Bill 567 should be free to choose whether to waive or
invoke the requirements of this measure. It logically follows that a defendant who
chooses not to invoke those provisions in the trial court when given the opportunity to do
so by existing legislation forfeits the right to raise the issue on appeal. “ ‘A party in a
criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not
object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in which the stated
reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court
purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed
the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid

                                               7
reasons . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) “Strong
policy reasons support [the forfeiture] rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a
claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could
have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon
the party the duty of looking after his [or her] legal rights and of calling the judge’s
attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in
most cases be careful to be silent as to his [or her] objections until it would be too late to
obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an
appeal.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.)
       After the effective date of Senate Bill 567, defendant agreed to be sentenced to the
upper term for the criminal threats count, implicitly stipulating that circumstances in
aggravation justified the imposition of the upper term, as required by amended
section 1170, subdivision (b). If defendant believed further establishment of the facts
justifying imposition of the upper term was required, he had the opportunity to object to
the trial court’s imposition of the sentence he agreed to. He did not do so, forfeiting his
claim. As other Courts of Appeal have recognized, forfeiture applies where the
defendant fails to object to an upper term sentence after the effective date of Senate
Bill 567. (People v. Hall (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1101–1102, review granted
Feb. 28, 2024, S283530; People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1047 (Achane);
People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 241, review granted Apr. 19, 2023,
S278786.)
       Defendant did not just fail to object to the trial court’s pronouncement of sentence;
rather, he bargained for the sentence the court imposed. “[T]he specification of a
maximum sentence or lid in a plea agreement normally implies a mutual understanding of
the defendant and the prosecutor that the specified maximum term is one that the trial
court may lawfully impose . . . .” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 768.) Thus:
“Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate

                                               8
courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in
reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The
rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their
bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain
through the appellate process. [Citations.]” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290,
295.)
        Defendant does not assert that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction in his
case. Instead, he asserts that forfeiture does not apply because his sentence was
unauthorized. We do not agree. “[A]n unauthorized sentence or one in excess of
jurisdiction is a sentence that ‘could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in
the particular case.’ [Citation.] The appellate court may intervene in the first instance
because these errors ‘present[] “pure questions of law” [citation], and [are] “ ‘clear and
correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing” ’
and without ‘remanding for further findings.’ [Citation.] The rule exists because
correction of sentencing error that is evident from the record and needing no
redetermination of facts does not significantly impact the state’s interest in finality of
judgments. [Citation.] ‘In such circumstances, an individual’s interest in obtaining
judicial review of an allegedly illegal sentence cannot be ignored.’ [Citation.]” (In re
G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130.) Defendant here does not raise a pure question of law
in a situation where the sentence could not have been imposed under any circumstance.
Instead, he asserts that the trial court failed to comply with existing statutory
requirements concerning factual determinations involved in imposing the upper term.
His request for judicial review of the sentence would significantly impact the state’s
interest in the finality of judgments where defendant not only failed to object to the
sentence at trial but in fact bargained for this sentence. The imposition of the upper term
for the criminal threats count in this situation does not constitute an unauthorized
sentence. (See Achane, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 1044 [no unauthorized sentence

                                              9
where trial court imposed the upper term despite allegedly not complying with
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) that were already in effect].) Thus,
defendant has forfeited his claim that the trial court erred in imposing the upper term
sentence for the criminal threats count.
       Defendant asserts that if this issue is forfeited, he received ineffective assistance of
counsel based on his counsel’s failure to object. “ ‘In assessing claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether the
defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that is, a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Gamache (2010)
48 Cal.4th 347, 391.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective
assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed
to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation. All other claims
of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.
[Citations.]” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Here, the criteria for
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal are not met. The record
does not affirmatively disclose trial counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the
challenged omission. Trial counsel was not asked for a reason for the failure to object to
the sentence. Finally, there could be a satisfactory explanation for the failure to object;
namely, that defendant agreed to a disposition he believed was advantageous (including
that 17 counts between the two cases would be dismissed) and he wanted the trial court to
approve the agreement.
       The Attorney General notes that the abstract of judgment erroneously designates
the two counts of violating domestic violence protective orders as belonging to case
No. CR1901331, not case No. CR2100492. We will order correction of the abstract.

                                              10
                                   IV. DISPOSITION
       The abstract of judgment (Judicial Council form CR-290) dated August 11, 2022,
is ordered corrected as follows: item 1 shall be corrected to list defendant’s convictions
for violating domestic violence protective orders (counts 2 and 3) as assigned to case
No. CR2100492. The clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare and transmit to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation an amended abstract of judgment. The
judgment is affirmed.

                                            11
                     BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P.J.

WE CONCUR:

DANNER, J.

BROMBERG, J.

People v. Zendejas
H050396
H050397