Court Opinion

ID: 2964381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:24:51.364617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:55.088414
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

        October 11, 1996    United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2107
                      ROMA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PETER ZANNI,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                               RALPH A. ARUSSO, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The  concurring opinion  by  Judge Lynch  in  the  above-captioned
        case, issued on September 27, 1996, is corrected as follows:

        On page 36, line 3: insert "in" before "stating"

        On page  36, footnote 16:  change "footnote 7  supra" to "footnote  14
                                                       _____
        supra"
        _____

        On page 38, line 6: insert "that" after "likely"

        On page 40, line 9: change "operate" to "have operated"

        On page 42, line 8: change "supra footnote 10" to "supra footnote 17"
                                    _____                  _____

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2107

                              ROMA CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
                                   AND PETER ZANNI,

                               Plaintiffs - Appellants,

                                          v.

                               RALPH R. ARUSSO, ET AL.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                 [Hon. Francis J. Boyle, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                         __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Cyr and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               G.  Robert Blakey, with  whom Ina  P. Schiff,  Henry F. Spaloss
               _________________             ______________   ________________
        and Spaloss & Rosson were on brief for appellants.
            ________________
               Kathleen  M.  Powers, with  whom Marc  DeSisto and  DeSisto Law
               ____________________             _____________      ___________
        Offices  were on  brief for  appellee  Town of  Johnston.   Samuel  D.
        _______                                                     __________
        Zurier, with  whom Julius  C. Michaelson and  Michaelson &  Michaelson
        ______             _____________________      ________________________
        were on brief for appellees aRusso, et al. 

                                 ____________________

                                  September 27, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.   Plaintiffs-Appellants  Roma
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.
                                ____________

          Construction Co,  Inc. ("Roma")  and Peter Zanni  ("Peter Zanni")

          (collectively, "the plaintiffs"),  challenge the district court's

          dismissal  of their  claims  against  Defendants-Appellees  Mayor

          Ralph R. aRusso ("aRusso"), Councilman Benjamin  Zanni ("Benjamin

          Zanni"), Domenic  DeConte, Vincent Iannazi, Anthony  Izzo, et al.
                                                                     ______

          (collectively,  "the  individual  defendants"), and  the  Town of

          Johnston, Rhode Island ("the Town") (together with the individual

          defendants, "the defendants").   Specifically, the district court

          granted  judgment  on   the  pleadings  regarding:     (1) Roma's

          racketeering claims  against  the individual  defendants and  the

          Town under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

          ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.    1964(a),  and R.I. Gen.  Laws   7-15-1  et
                                                                         __

          seq. ("state RICO"); and (2)  Roma's civil rights claims  against
          ____

          the individual  defendants and the  Town under 42  U.S.C.   1983.

          Roma also challenges  the district court's  decision to deny  the

          pro hac vice  admission of attorney G. Robert  Blakey ("Blakey").
          ____________

          For  the following reasons, we reverse the dismissal of the RICO,

          state RICO and civil rights claims, reverse the district  court's

          decision  not  to  admit  Blakey,   and  we  remand  for  further

          proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

                                    I.  BACKGROUND
                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                    We  review  dismissals  pursuant  to Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.

          12(b)(6)  under the  rubric that  all reasonable  inferences from

          properly  pleaded facts are to be drawn in the plaintiffs' favor.

          P rez-Ruiz v.  Crespo-Guill n, 25  F.3d 40, 42  (1st Cir.  1994);
          __________     ______________

                                         -2-

          Dartmouth  Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir.
          _________________    _________________

          1989).

                    Drawing all  reasonable inferences for  the plaintiffs,

          the tale proceeds  as follows.   The plaintiffs  Peter Zanni  and

          Roma  entered into a  real estate development  venture with Harry

          and  Russell  DePetrillo ("the  DePetrillos").    Unknown to  the

          plaintiffs, the DePetrillos had  entered into an arrangement with

          the alleged de facto government of  the Town, with aRusso as "the

          Boss," under which payments  would be made to this  enterprise in

          order to obtain necessary approvals.  After the DePetrillos  sold

          their share, Peter  Zanni was informed of  this preexisting deal,

          and was  warned that his  project was "dead"  if he did  not make

          payments.  Having invested heavily in the project, and reasonably

          believing that he was dealing with a racketeering enterprise that

          had extorted and stolen for years during its control of the Town,

          Peter Zanni paid up.  He  continued paying for three years, until

          he  was  able to  sell his  share of  the  development.   He then

          informed the FBI, and cooperated with its investigation and later

          with prosecutions of official corruption in the Town.

                    Peter Zanni  and Roma  brought federal and  state civil

          racketeering  claims and  federal civil  rights  claims, charging

          that they were  injured by the conduct  of aRusso and his  fellow

          individual defendants, as well  as the Town.  The  district court

          dismissed these charges on  the grounds that the plaintiffs'  own

          conduct rendered them unable to maintain  standing to press their

          claims.     The  plaintiffs   appeal  the  dismissals   of  their

                                         -3-

          racketeering1 and civil  rights claims, as  well as the  district

          court's  decision to  deny the  pro hac  vice admission  of their
                                          _____________

          desired counsel, G. Robert Blakey ("Blakey").

                                   II.  DISCUSSION
                                   II.  DISCUSSION

                    We  address  first  the  plaintiffs'  challenge  to the

          dismissals  of their  causes of  action, and then  confront their

          appeal  of  the district  court's decision  to deny  admission to

          Blakey.

                                 A.  Causes of Action
                                 A.  Causes of Action

                    After setting forth the applicable  standard of review,

          we  turn  first to  the  plaintiffs'  challenge to  the  district

          court's dismissal of their racketeering claims.  We then shift to

          the issue of the plaintiffs' section 1983 claims.

                                1.  Standard of Review
                                1.  Standard of Review

                    Upon  considering a  motion to  dismiss for  failure to

          state a claim under Fed. R.  Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the district court

          should not grant the motion unless it appears to a certainty that

          the plaintiff  would be unable to recover under any set of facts.

          Hospital Bldg.  Co. v. Trustees of  Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.  738, 746
          ___________________    ______________________

          (1976); Gonz lez-Bernal v. United States,  907 F.2d 246, 248 (1st
                  _______________    _____________

          Cir. 1990).  We review under  the same standard, Holt Civic  Club
                                                           ________________

          v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 66 (1978).
             __________________

                              
          ____________________

          1  At oral  argument, the plaintiffs stated that, on appeal, they
          did not wish to challenge the district court's dismissal of their
          racketeering claims against the Town.  Plaintiffs also stipulated
          that they would  not attempt  to assert such  claims against  the
          Town  in the future.   Accordingly, vis-a-vis the  Town, the only
          damage claims we address are those pursuant to section 1983.

                                         -4-

                             2.  The Racketeering Claims
                             2.  The Racketeering Claims

                    RICO creates  a civil remedy for  "[a]ny person injured

          in his business or property  by reason of a violation of  section

          1962  of this chapter."  18 U.S.C.    1964(c).  Subsection (c) of

          section  1962, in  turn, declares  that it  is unlawful  "for any

          person employed  by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,

          or  the  activities  of   which  affect,  interstate  or  foreign

          commerce, to  conduct or participate, directly  or indirectly, in

          the conduct  of such  enterprise's affairs  through a  pattern of

          racketeering  activity or  collection of unlawful  debt."   Id.  
                                                                      ___

          1962(c).  An "enterprise" is  defined to include "any individual,

          partnership, corporation, association or other legal entity,  and

          any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not

          a legal entity."  Id.   1961(4). "Racketeering activity" includes
                            ___

          any  one of a number of enumerated criminal acts indictable under

          federal  or  state law.    See id.     1961(1).   A  "'pattern of
                                     ___ ___

          racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering

          activity . . . the last of which  occurred within ten years . . .

          after the commission  of a prior  act of racketeering  activity."

          Id.   1961(5).
          ___

                    The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' civil RICO

          claims on  the ground  that, by  their own pleadings,  plaintiffs

          were not innocent victims and therefore could  not maintain civil

          RICO  standing.    The  district  court  found  support  for  the

          proposition that only innocent  victims could collect damages via

          civil  RICO in  the legislative  history of  the provision.   See
                                                                        ___

                                         -5-

          Organized Crime Control:  Hearings on S.  30 Before the  Subcomm.
          _________________________________________________________________

          No. 5 of the  House Committee on the  Judiciary, 91st Cong.,  2d.
          _______________________________________________

          Sess. (1970) (stating, in the Act's "Findings and  Purpose," that

          "Congress finds that . . . organized crime activity in the United

          States  harms innocent  investors and  competing organizations");

          116  Cong. Rec.  H35,346-47  (Oct. 7,  1970)  (statement of  Rep.

          Steiger, the  private civil  remedy provision's sponsor)  ("It is

          the  intent of  this body,  I am  certain, to  see that  innocent

          parties who are  the victims of  organized crime have a  right to

          obtain proper redress.").  The district court's reasoning can  be

          better delineated in conjunction with a recitation of plaintiffs'

          claims.   Drawing inferences  in favor of  the plaintiffs,  their

          pleadings suggest the following situation.  The plaintiffs joined

          the  DePetrillos  in  a  real estate  venture,  unaware  that the

          DePetrillos  had  entered  into  a  scheme  in  which  regulatory

          approvals  had   already  been   granted  in  exchange   for  the

          DePetrillos'  payment  of $10,000  to  aRusso  and his  purported

          associates.    The plaintiffs  were  similarly  unaware that  the

          DePetrillos  had agreed  to pay an  additional $40,000.   Several

          years  later, defendant Councilman Benjamin Zanni approached them

          for  the  purported  "balance  due."    As  the   district  court

          emphasized,  the plaintiffs  then faced  a dilemma.    They could

          refuse  to pay, jeopardizing  their $2 million  investment in the

          project,  and   as  the   district  court  suggested   was  their

          obligation, go immediately  to the authorities.   Or, they  could

          submit to this extortion to protect their investment.  They chose

                                         -6-

          the latter route.   The plaintiffs state that they  complied with

          all  rules  and  regulations,   and  did  not  seek  preferential

          treatment,  but  paid to  avoid threatened  adverse consequences.

          Specifically,  the plaintiffs point  to Benjamin  Zanni's alleged

          statement  to Plaintiff Peter  Zanni that the  venture was "dead"

          unless the balance was paid.  Three years later,  after they sold

          their  partnership  interests  in  the  venture,  the  plaintiffs

          contacted the FBI, and assisted agents in a sting operation.

                    Looking at these contentions, one reasonable conclusion

          is  that the plaintiffs made these payments without any intent or

          desire to  subvert governmental processes, but  felt compelled to

          pay  to protect their substantial investment  in the venture, and

          did  not contact the FBI until they  had mitigated risks to their

          investment.   However,  the district  court concluded  that, even

          under this favorable view  of the plaintiffs' conduct they  could

          not be considered innocent  parties, and so could  not, according

          to the district court's interpretation of RICO standing, maintain

          a civil RICO claim.  The district court concluded that, since the

          plaintiffs' own pleadings indicate that they paid $40,000 to  the

          individual defendants to assure  timely processing of permits and

          approvals  necessary  for  their  project,  the  plaintiffs  were

          "neither  innocent nor victims."  Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 906
                                            ________________    ______

          F. Supp. 78, 82 (D.R.I. 1995).

                    The plaintiffs challenge the district court's dismissal

          of  their civil RICO claims on the pleadings.  Plaintiffs dispute

          that  there is any "innocent  party" requirement under  RICO.  In

                                         -7-

          the alternative, the plaintiffs  contend that, even assuming such

          an "innocent  party" requirement, the  district court erred  as a

          matter  of law in concluding, that even taking the most favorable

          view  of the  plaintiffs'  pleadings, they  were necessarily  not

          "innocent  parties."  Although  the district  court spoke  of the

          "innocent party"  requirement as one of "standing," it appears to

          have also considered its "innocent party" requirement as being in

          the nature of an affirmative defense which could be determined at

          the pleadings stage.  The  district court analogized to antitrust

          cases  under  the Clayton  Act  in which  an  "equal involvement"

          defense is recognized.   See Bateman Eichler,  Hill Richards Inc.
                                   ___ ____________________________________

          v.  Berner, 472 U.S. 299,  310-11 (1985); Perma  Life Mufflers v.
              ______                                ____________________

          International Parts Corp., 392  U.S. 134 (1968).  Whether  or not
          _________________________

          there exists such an "innocent  party" requirement is a  question

          of first impression in this circuit and, indeed, we are not aware

          of any  cases anywhere that  adopt such  a requirement.   We need

          not,  however, decide whether or  to what extent  RICO imposes an

          "innocent party"  limitation,  or whether  any  such  requirement

          might take the form  of a standing requirement or  an affirmative

          defense, because  we conclude  that the  district court  erred in

          finding that plaintiffs could  prove no set of facts  which would

          show   their  nonculpability  under  all  potentially  applicable

          criminal statutes.2
                              
          ____________________

          2  In deciding not to address the broader issues discussed in the
          concurring  opinion, we  need  not necessarily  quarrel with  our
          respected  colleague's analysis.   Concededly,  dismissal of  the
          complaint  based  on  appellees'  assertion  of  a fact-intensive
          "equal  involvement"  defense  would   be  inappropriate  on  the

                                         -8-

                    Our  analysis  commences  with an  examination  of  the

          standards under  which the  district court  evaluated plaintiffs'

          behavior.   In  deciding  that such  payments,  even if  coerced,

          forced  it  to conclude  that  the plaintiffs  were  not innocent

          victims, the  district  court cited  two authorities.   See  Roma
                                                                  ___  ____

          Constr. Co., 906 F. Supp. at 81-82 (citing R.I. Gen. Laws   11-7-
          ___________

          4 (1994) and Model Penal  Code   240.1 commentary at  41 (1980)).

          Initially, the district court noted that Rhode Island General Law

            11-7-4 states that

                      [n]o person shall  corruptly give  . .  .
                      any gift or valuable consideration to . .
                      . any public official as an inducement or
                      reward  for  doing or  forebearing  to do
                      . . . any act in relation to the business
                      of . . . the state, city or town of which
                      he or she is an official.

          R.I. Gen. Laws   11-7-4 (1994).  The  statutory language does not

          address the question of  whether one who pays due  to coercion is

          an innocent victim.  The district court did not refer  to, and we

          fail  to find, any Rhode  Island authority for  direction on this

          point.

                    Rather, the  district court  drew on the  commentary to

                              
          ____________________

          undeveloped record  presently before  the court.   The concurring
          opinion hypothesizes that the substance of any such defense would
          be informed by preexisting  federal statutes embodying comparable
          defenses.   By contrast,  the district court's  dismissal depends
          entirely  on  the  existence,  vel  non,  of either  an  absolute
                                         ___  ___
          innocent-victim "standing"  requirement or  a  law-based in  pari
                                                                   __  ____
          delicto  defense,  each of  which, by  its  very nature,  is more
          _______
          readily susceptible  to summary disposition than a fact-intensive
          "equal involvement" defense.   Thus  we caution  that nothing  we
          have  said is meant to  suggest that Congress  intended to create
          either  such  a "standing"  requirement  or  an  in pari  delicto
                                                           __ ____  _______
          defense.

                                         -9-

          the Model Penal Code's definition of bribery to conclude that the

          plaintiffs'  payments, even  if construed  to be  the product  of

          coercion, constituted illegal bribery.  See Roma Constr. Co., 906
                                                  ___ ________________

          F. Supp. at  81.  The  cited commentary to  section 240.1 of  the

          Model Penal Code states that 

                      [a]  private citizen  who responds  to an
                      official's  threat  of adverse  action by
                      paying  money  to  secure more  favorable
                      treatment evidences thereby a willingness
                      to  subvert  the legitimate  processes of
                      government   .   .  .   .   Such  conduct
                      constitutes  a  degree of  cooperation in
                      the undermining of governmental integrity
                      that  is  inconsistent with  the complete
                      exoneration from criminal liability.
           
          Model  Penal Code   240.1 commentary  at 41 (1980).  The district

          court  thus concluded that  since even the  interpretation of the

          pleadings   that   most   favors   the  plaintiffs   requires   a

          determination that plaintiffs capitulated to official  threats of

          adverse action, they were not "innocent parties."  Taken together

          with  its  reading  of  the  legislative  history  that RICO  was

          intended to protect "innocent parties" and with its assessment of

          public policy in the form of "economic  incentives," the district

          court  proceeded  to  dismiss   the  plaintiffs'  claims  on  the

          pleadings.  Roma Constr. Co., 906 F. Supp. at 83.
                      ________________

                    The district court thus ultimately relied on the policy

          concerns it understood to  be addressed in the Model  Penal Code.

          Assuming for  the sake of argument that lack of "innocence" is an

          issue  in  a civil  RICO claim,  the  question must  be addressed

          whether the district court considered the correct sources for the

          definition of  "innocence."   We believe that  where racketeering

                                         -10-

          statutes provide for a civil remedy, at the very least we  should

          deny RICO remedies only  with reference to statutes or  case law,

          not on policy grounds.  See generally Sedima,  S.P.R.L. v.  Imrex
                                  _____________ _________________     _____

          Co.,  473  U.S. 479,  498-500  (1985)  (rejecting,  due  to  RICO
          ___

          statutory language  and legislative history that  counsel a broad

          interpretation,   a  court   of  appeals-imposed   RICO  standing

          limitation as inappropriate  judicial "statutory amendment"  even

          though  the  Court  shared   the  lower  court's  concerns  about

          "extraordinary" uses  of RICO).    As a  result, we  turn to  the

          question  of whether  the  issue  presented  is properly  one  of

          federal common law for  which the Model Penal Code might  prove a

          legitimate source of uniform legal principles, or one to which we

          would apply Rhode Island law.

                    The Supreme  Court has  recognized that federal  courts

          have the power  to formulate  federal common law  when a  federal

          rule  of  decision  is  necessary to  protect  "uniquely  federal

          interests" or when  Congress has  given the courts  the power  to

          develop  substantive law.   Texas  Indus. v.  Radcliff Materials,
                                      _____________     ___________________

          Inc.,  451  U.S.  630, 640  (citing  Banco  Nacional  de Cuba  v.
          ____                                 ________________________

          Sabbatino,  376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) and Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
          _________                                ________    _______

          U.S. 647,  652 (1963)).   Areas of  "uniquely federal  interests"

          include areas such as  "the rights and obligations of  the United

          States, interstate  and  international disputes  implicating  the

          conflicting  rights  of  States  or our  relations  with  foreign

          nations, and admiralty cases."  Id. at 641.   Several courts have
                                          ___

          concluded  that   RICO  does  not   implicate  "uniquely  federal

                                         -11-

          interests," since "[r]egulation of  organized crime does not fall

          within  the  above  categories  and,  although  RICO  is  federal

          legislation, individual states also take active roles in fighting

          organized crime and providing  redress for its injured citizens."

          Friedman v.  Hartmann,  787 F.  Supp. 411,  417 (S.D.N.Y.  1992);
          ________     ________

          Minpeco v.  Conticommodity Servs.  Inc., 677  F.  Supp. 151,  155
          _______     ___________________________

          (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("RICO, although  reflecting Congress' intent  in

          providing creative federal responses to the problems of organized

          crime, does not address  a uniquely federal interest."); Seminole
                                                                   ________

          Electric  v. Tanner, 635 F. Supp. 582,  584 (M.D. Fla. 1986).  We
          ________     ______

          agree that RICO does not concern uniquely federal interests.

                    As a result, we  inquire whether the question presented

          --  is  RICO standing  limited  to "innocent"  parties?  -- falls

          within an area in which  Congress has given the courts the  power

          to develop substantive law.   Texas Industries, 451 U.S.  at 640.
                                        ________________

          The  district court, in effect, decided that the issue of federal

          civil RICO standing  and its relationship to a  party's innocence

          was properly  decided as a matter of uniform federal common law. 

          The  district court  looked to uniform  model codes  and emergent

          trends as guides for  fashioning a federal common law  rule which

          would  foster what  it perceived  as important  federal interests

          underlying civil  RICO.   The district  court suggested that  the

          Congress that enacted RICO in  1970, which referred obliquely  in

          legislative history to the  purpose of aiding "innocent parties,"

          would be cognizant of the emerging Model Penal  Code trend in the

          law  of bribery, presupposing that Congress gave courts the power

                                         -12-

          to develop substantive law regarding this issue.

                    We find  no evidence  of any congressional  intent that

          the "innocence"  of a RICO "victim"  should be made to  turn on a

          uniform federal common  law rule.   Neither party  cites, and  we

          have  been unable  to find,  statutory provisions  or legislative

          history  evidencing such a grant  of authority.   While there has

          been a great deal  of commentary regarding the  appropriate scope

          of  federal common law, see, e.g., Morgan v. South Bend Community
                                  ___  ____  ______    ____________________

          Sch.  Corp.,  797  F.2d  471, 475  (7th  Cir.  1986)  (collecting
          ___________

          commentary), it is not disputed that "when the federal government

          is  not a  party to  the litigation" --  as is  the case  here --

          "neutral  state rules  that  do not  undermine federal  interests

          should  be  applied unless  some  statute  (or the  Constitution)

          authorizes the federal court[s] to create a rule of federal law,"

          id. at  475 (citing Miree  v. DeKalb County,  433 U.S. 25,  28-33
          ___                 _____     _____________

          (1977)).  More  specifically, the  Supreme Court  has rejected  a

          judicially created restriction on RICO  standing, despite voicing

          agreement with the  policy concerns that drove  the limitation in

          question.   See  Sedima,  473  U.S. at  498-500.    As a  result,
                      ___  ______

          assuming  --  without  concluding,  as  we  ultimately  find  the

          plaintiffs to  be  innocent  parties  -- that  RICO  standing  is

          limited  to "innocent parties," we believe that the question of a

          party's innocence must be resolved via the incorporation of state

          law into the federal law of  RICO standing in order to answer the

          instant question.  We  recognize that the incorporation  of state

          law into federal  law implicates a serious problem  of uniformity

                                         -13-

          of federal law throughout  the states.  However, since  RICO does

          not implicate  uniquely federal  interests and  since there  is a

          lack of support for the view that Congress authorized the federal

          courts  to  generate   federal  common  law  in  this  area,  the

          incorporation of state law is  the preferable alternative.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 881 (3d Cir. 1990)
          ____  _________________________

          (finding it appropriate  "to look  to state law  for guidance  in

          deciding  whether   plaintiffs   have  stated   a   nonderivative

          [shareholders']  claim,  [enabling  them to  maintain  standing,]

          rather  than to  fashion federal common  law"); Leach  v. Federal
                                                          _____     _______

          Deposit  Ins.  Corp.,  860  F.2d   1266,  1274  (5th  Cir.  1988)
          ____________________

          (concluding  that "the  incorporation of  state law  to determine

          whether  a shareholder has been  injured under RICO is preferable

          to generating federal common law"  despite the possibility of  "a

          serious  problem  of uniformity  of  federal  law throughout  the

          states"); cf. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935  (8th Cir. 1994)
                    ___ ________________

          (applying federal  common law  of attorney-client privilege  to a

          civil  RICO  action,  where  such application  is  authorized  by

          Supreme Court Standard 503 and Supreme Court case law).

                    As a  result, in  assessing  plaintiffs' innocence,  we

          must  apply  Rhode  Island  bribery  law.    The  district  court

          concluded  that  the  pleadings   rendered  the  plaintiffs  "not

          innocent"  vis-a-vis charges of  bribery.  See  Roma Constr. Co.,
                                                     ___  ________________

          906 F. Supp. at 83 (stating that to allow the plaintiffs standing

          might  result in  a  rule under  which  "[p]ersons, such  as  the

          plaintiffs, could engage in bribery of public officials with full

                                         -14-

          knowledge that if the bribery scheme . . . broke down, they could

          seek a treble  return on their illicit,  but failed investment").

          Turning  to Rhode Island law, however,  this conclusion cannot be

          reconciled  with Rhode  Island's bribery  statute.   The district

          court relied on the Model  Penal Code's bribery provision,  which

          states that 

                    [a] person is guilty  of bribery, a felony of
                    the  third degree, if  he offers, confers, or
                    agrees  to confer upon  another, or solicits,
                    accepts or agrees to accept from another:

                       (1)    any    pecuniary    benefit    as
                      consideration    for    the   recipient's
                      decision,  opinion, recommendation,  vote
                      or  other  exercise  of  discretion  as a
                      public servant, party official, or voter;
                      or

                       (2) any benefit as consideration for the
                      recipient's        decision,        vote,
                      recommendation   or  other   exercise  of
                      official  discretion  in  a  judicial  or
                      administrative proceeding; or

                       (3) any benefit  as consideration for  a
                      violation  of  a known  legal  duty as  a
                      public servant or party official.   

          Model  Penal Code    240.1  ("Bribery in  Official and  Political

          Matters").   While the district court may  have rightly concluded

          that the plaintiffs are  not innocent of bribery under  the Model

          Penal Code, we do not think  that this fact counsels for the same

          conclusion  under   Rhode  Island  law,  since   the  Code's  own

          commentaries expressly  recognize that  the Code does  not follow

          Rhode  Island law.  Part II Model  Penal Code and Commentaries 6,

          n.2 (1980).  Moreover,  unlike Rhode Island's statute,  the Model

          Penal Code  provision contains  no requirement that  a payor  act

                                         -15-

          "corruptly."  Compare R.I. Gen. Laws   11-7-4 ("[n]o person shall
                        _______

          corruptly  give") (emphasis added) with Model Penal Code    240.1
          _________                          ____

          ("[a] person is guilty of bribery . . . if he offers, confers, or

          agrees to confer upon another").3    

                    The  plaintiffs  argue  that  the  Model  Penal  Code's

          omission of the term "corruptly" is no mere semantic distinction;

          rather,  it represents a shift  from the common  law in expanding

          the  scope of bribery sanctions for payors to situations in which

          the  payor does not act corruptly.  See generally James Lindgren,
                                              _____________

          The Elusive  Distinction Between Bribery and  Extortion: From the
          _________________________________________________________________

          Common Law  to the Hobbs Act,  35 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.  815, 824 n.41
          ____________________________

          (1988).  We agree.  "[A] statutory term is generally presumed  to

          have its common-law meaning."   Evans v. United States,  504 U.S.
                                          _____    _____________

          255, 259 (1992); United States v. Aguilar, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115
                           _____________    _______

          S. Ct. 2357, 2370  (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating  that

                              
          ____________________

          3   The federal bribery  and gratuity statute,  18 U.S.C.    201,
          does not, by its  terms, apply to  local officials such as  those
          involved in  the instant  case, 18  U.S.C.    201(a)(1), although
          cases  have held  the  statute applicable  where local  officials
          administer  federally  funded programs.    See  United States  v.
                                                     ___  _____________
          Vel zquez, 847 F.2d 140,  142 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding  deputy
          _________
          sheriff was a  "public official" with respect  to federal bribery
          statute,  where  county  jail  was under  contract  with  federal
          government  to  supervise  federal prisoners);  United  States v.
                                                          ______________
          Gallegos, 510  F. Supp.  1112, 1114 (D.N.M.  1981) (ruling  state
          ________
          government  employee  who  worked  under  direct  supervision  of
          federal official  in administration of federal  grant program was
          "public official" for purpose of  federal bribery statute).   But
                                                                        ___
          see United  States v.  Del  Toro, 513  F.2d  656, 662  (2d  Cir.)
          ___ ______________     _________
          (concluding city  administrator who was  city employee was  not a
          public official even though he administered model cities program,
          for which  the federal  government provided 100%  funding), cert.
                                                                      _____
          denied, 423 U.S.  826 (1975).   No allegation has been  made that
          ______
          the defendants' bribery/extortion scheme was in connection with a
          federal contract or federal funding.

                                         -16-

          "the term 'corruptly'  in criminal laws  has a long-standing  and

          well-accepted meaning").   The term "corruptly"  adds the element

          of corrupt intent to the crime  of bribery.  See generally id. at
                                                       _____________ ___

          2370 (endorsing the  proposition that "[a]n act is done corruptly

          if it's done voluntarily and intentionally to  bring about either

          an  unlawful result or a  lawful result by  some unlawful method,

          with  a hope  or expectation  of either  financial gain  or other

          benefit  to oneself or a  benefit of another  person"); H.R. 748,

          87th Cong.,  1st Sess. 18  (1961) (reporting section  201 federal

          bribery statute)  (stating that "[t]he word  'corruptly' which is

          also  used in obstruction of justice statutes (18 U.S.C.    1503-

          1505) means with wrongful or dishonest intent").

                    We agree that the term "corruptly" indicates a specific

          corrupt   intent  that   differs  from   the  Model   Penal  Code

          commentary's condemnation  of an  involuntary payor's  conduct as

          manifesting  "a  degree  of  cooperation in  the  undermining  of

          governmental  integrity  that is  inconsistent with  the complete

          exoneration from criminal  liability."  Model Penal  Code   240.1

          commentary  at  41.    The  mens  rea  implicated  by "corruptly"
                                      _________

          concerns the  intention to  obtain ill-gotten gain;  by contrast,

          the Model Penal Code converts the  lack of willpower to stand  up

          to abusive authority into a degree of culpability.  See Lindgren,
                                                              ___

          supra at 824 n.41 (stating that "[t]he Model Penal Code has taken
          _____

          the questionable approach of  making it bribery to capitulate  to

          an extortion threat").   Admittedly, to  delve into questions  of

          what  is done  "corruptly" is  more difficult  than to  apply the

                                         -17-

          Model Penal Code's standard.   But as one commentator  has noted,

          "[t]he best that can be said for the [Model Penal Code's bribery]

          provision  is   that  it  makes  difficult   questions  of  crime

          definition  easy, but  this  clarity is  bought  at the  cost  of

          ignoring the  settled  law of  centuries and  current notions  of

          right and wrong."  Id.
                             ___

                    As a result, we  must apply the common law  standard of

          specific corrupt intent, as included in the Rhode Island statute,

          to  the plaintiffs' story.   The plaintiffs claim  that they paid

          only to avoid adverse consequences, that their properties met the

          standards required for  the approvals in question,  and that they

          received nothing  beyond fair  treatment from payees.   Examining

          these claims  with an  eye towards  detecting corrupt intent,  we

          think  that a set of facts could  be found from which it could be

          reasonably  inferred that  the plaintiffs  did not  make payments

          voluntarily to bring about an unlawful result, with the hope of a

          gain for  themselves,  but rather  that  they were  the  innocent

          victims of  a criminal enterprise.  As a result, we conclude that

          Rhode Island's  bribery statute  does not foreclose  a conclusion

          that they are "innocent parties."

                    Citing  United States  v. Mariano,  983 F.2d  1150 (1st
                            _____________     _______

          Cir. 1993) and United States v. Hathaway,  534 F.2d 386 (1st Cir.
                         _____________    ________

          1976),  the defendants assert  that we have  previously held that

          "bribery  and  extortion are  not  mutually  exclusive concepts,"

          Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1159;  Hathaway, 534 F.2d at 395.   However,
          _______                     ________

          we  think  these cases  unavailing  for  three  reasons.   First,

                                         -18-

          neither deals with Rhode Island's bribery statute.  Second,  even

          if these cases compelled us to conclude that bribery and coercive

          extortion are  not mutually  exclusive concepts under  the Rhodes

          Island statute, in the  instant case a genuine issue  of material

          fact  remains as to  the plaintiffs'  intent in  making payments,

          based on  a reading of  the pleadings in  the best light  for the

          plaintiffs.

                    Third,  and finally,  Mariano, at  least, involved  two
                                          _______

          defendants  who  pled  guilty  to   "corruptly  giv[ing]  .  .  .

          [some]thing of value" to  local government officials "with intent

          to influence or reward" those officials, where the officials were

          part  of a  governmental unit  that received  substantial federal

          subsidies, in violation of  18 U.S.C.   666(a)(2).   Mariano, 983
                                                               _______

          F.2d at 1153.  On appeal, both defendants challenged the district

          court's  application  of  the sentencing  guideline  relating  to

          bribery  rather than  the guideline  appropriate to  providing an

          illegal gratuity.   Id. at  1159.   They argued  that "they  were
                              ___

          victims, not  perpetrators, of  an extortionate scheme,  and that

          they  received nothing  extra  in return."    Id.   Applying  the
                                                        ___

          clearly  erroneous  standard of  review,  we  concluded that  the

          "guideline  analogy chosen by the district  court was well within

          its  purview," noting that "when there are two plausible views of

          the record,  the  sentencing court's  adoption of  one such  view

          cannot be clearly erroneous."   Id. at 1160; see United States v.
                                          ___          ___ _____________

          St. Cyr,  977 F.2d 698, 706  (1st Cir. 1992).   In particular, we
          _______

          noted that the Mariano defendants could not "expect the courts to
                         _______

                                         -19-

          swallow their tale uncritically."  Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1160.
                                             _______

                    In this  case, the district court  improperly dismissed

          the plaintiffs' case before it had a chance to swallow, let alone

          digest,  their story.    At this  stage  of the  game,  since one

          plausible view is  that the  plaintiffs were in  fact victims  of

          coercive  extortion, and  since they  have not  pled guilty  to a

          crime that involves "corrupt intent" as an element as we noted of

          the defendants in Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1159, we conclude that the
                            _______

          plaintiffs in the instant case may press on with their claim.  As

          a  result, we  reverse  the  district  court's dismissal  of  the

          plaintiffs' federal  RICO claims.   Accordingly, we  also reverse

          the  district   court's  dismissal  for   lack  of   supplemental

          jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C.   1367, of state RICO claims pursuant
                        ___

          to R.I. Gen. Laws     7-15-2, 7-15-3 and 9-1-2.4  We  remand both

          federal  and  state  RICO   claims  for  further  proceedings  in

          accordance with this opinion. 
                              
          ____________________

          4  Similar  to federal RICO, R.I. Gen.  Laws   7-15-2(c) provides
          that

                      [i]t  shall  be unlawful  for  any person
                      employed  by  or   associated  with   any
                      enterprise to conduct  or participate  in
                      the  conduct  of   the  affairs  of   the
                      enterprise through  racketeering activity
                      or collection of an unlawful debt.

          Rhode Island law also uses broad standing language that resembles
          that of 18 U.S.C.   1964(c) in its provision for civil  liability
          for racketeering offenses.   See R.I. Gen. Laws    9-1-2 (stating
                                       ___
          that "[w]henever  any person  shall suffer  any injury  . . .  by
                            __________                __________
          reason of the  commission of any crime  or offense .  . . he  [or
          she] may recover his [or her] damages for such injury  in a civil
          action against the offender") (emphasis added).

                                         -20-

                    Because we conclude that  even if RICO's civil remedies

          were limited to innocent parties, we would apply Rhode Island law

          to the  question of the  plaintiffs' innocence, and  Rhode Island

          law compels a reversal of the district court's dismissal of their

          claims, we leave  for a later time the question  of whether those

          who are not innocent parties can be denied civil RICO remedies.

                              3.  The Civil Rights Claim
                              3.  The Civil Rights Claim

                    The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim

          that  the individual defendants and the Town acted under color of

          state  authority  and   municipal  practice,  and  deprived   the

          plaintiffs of property  and rights  in violation of  42 U.S.C.   

          1983.

                    Section  1983 authorizes  actions for  equitable relief

          and/or damages against "[e]very  person who under color of  any .

          . .  custom or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects or

          causes to be subjected any citizen  of the United States or other

          person . . .  to the  deprivation of any  rights, privileges,  or

          immunities  secured by the Constitution  and laws."   42 U.S.C.  

          1983.  Furthermore, those who commit actionable wrongs under that

          section "shall be  liable to the  party injured in  an action  at

          law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding in redress."  Id.
                                                                        ___

          In  construing the terms "custom"  and "usage," the Supreme Court

          has instructed that 

                      Congress included customs and  usages [in
                      section 1983] because  of the  persistent
                      and  widespread  discriminatory practices
                      of state  officials . . .  . Although not
                      authorized by written law, such practices
                      of  state  officials  could  well  be  so

                                         -21-

                      permanent   and   well   settled  as   to
                      constitute a  "custom or usage"  with the
                      force of law.

          Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New  York, 436 U.S. 658,
          ______    ________________________________________

          691  (1978) (quoting Adickes v.  S.H. Kress &  Co., 398 U.S. 144,
                               _______     _________________

          167-68 (1970)); see Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st
                          ___ _________    ______

          Cir. 1989).

                    Courts have  set forth two requirements for maintaining

          a section 1983 action grounded upon an unconstitutional municipal

          custom.  First, the  custom or practice "must be  attributable to

          the municipality."  Id. at 1156.   That is, "it must be so  well-
                              ___

          settled  and widespread  that the  policymaking officials  of the

          municipality can  be said to  have either actual  or constructive

          knowledge  of  it yet  did nothing  to  end the  practice."   Id.
                                                                        ___

          Second,  "the custom must  have been the cause  of and the moving

          force behind the deprivation of constitutional rights."  Id.
                                                                   ___

                    The district court concluded that in the facts alleged,

          "there  [was] no  evidence  that  the  Town  []  had  any  policy

          endorsing or advocating extortion and the acceptance of bribes by

          town  officials."    Roma  Constr.  Co.,  906  F.  Supp.  at  83.
                               __________________

          Furthermore,  the district  court  went on  to  state that,  even

          assuming "that there was a de facto municipal policy of extortion

          promulgated  by  aRusso  and   perpetrated  by  the  other  named

          defendants," the  plaintiffs could  not succeed in  their section

          1983 claim because the  alleged policy was not  the cause of  any

          constitutional  harm.  Id.   Noting that there  must be a "direct
                                 ___

          causal link" between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

                                         -22-

          constitutional violation  to find section 1983  liability, id. at
                                                                     ___

          84 (quoting City of  Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)),
                      _______________    ______

          the  district court  concluded  that "in  this case,  the 'causal

          link'  or  'moving  force'  behind  any perceived  constitutional

          violations is the plaintiffs' . . .  continual, voluntary payment

          of bribes to the defendants," id.
                                        ___

                    For  the  reasons  we  have stated  in  our  discussion

          regarding  bribery and coercive  extortion, we think  a finder of

          fact could  reasonably infer  that the plaintiffs'  payments were

          made pursuant to coercive extortion, and thus did not necessarily

          constitute "voluntary payment of bribes" with corrupt intent.  At

          this stage, we must resolve reasonable inferences in favor of the

          plaintiffs.  Thus, we  conclude that the plaintiffs could  show a

          direct causal link between the defendants' coercive extortion and

          the plaintiffs' losses.

                    As  a  result,  we  turn  to the  question  of  whether

          coercive  extortion, if  found, could  be  attributed to  some de
                                                                         __

          facto municipal  policy.   "An unconstitutional policy  or custom
          _____

          may be inferred from  a single decision  or act .  . . [but]  the

          isolated action must be taken by a municipal official with 'final

          policy-making  authority'  in the  relevant  area  of the  city's

          business."  Rodr quez  v. Furtado,  771 F. Supp.  1245, 1257  (D.
                      _________     _______

          Mass.  1991) (citations omitted).   However,  "[t]he fact  that a

          particular  official  --  even  a policymaking  official  --  has

          discretion in the  exercise of  a particular  function does  not,

          without  more,  give rise  to  municipal  liability  based on  an

                                         -23-

          exercise of that discretion."  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
                                         _______    __________________

          U.S. 469, 481-82 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).

                    In their pleadings,  the plaintiffs  have alleged  that

          aRusso  as Mayor, Benjamin Zanni as a town councilman, and others

          operated a de facto government which controlled the Town for more
                     ________

          than  a  decade,   routinely  engaging  in   bribery,  extortion,

          corruption and other unlawful  activities.  While a  showing that

          aRusso acted illegally in the exercise of his discretion as Mayor

          might  not by itself give  rise to municipal  liability, we think

          that under  these pleadings, the plaintiffs could  indeed prove a

          set  of  facts  from  which  a  trier  of  fact  could  infer  an

          unconstitutional  policy or  custom  with respect  to the  Town's

          government.    For example,  a  fact finder  could  conclude that

          extortion of  outsiders, businessmen,  or developers, if  proven,

          was "'the way  things are done and have been  done'" in the Town.

          See Kibbe  v. City of  Springfield, 777  F.2d 801, 806  (1st Cir.
          ___ _____     ____________________

          1985)  (quoting Grandstaff v. City  of Borger, 767  F.2d 161, 171
                          __________    _______________

          (5th  Cir.  1985), cert.  denied,  480  U.S. 916  (1987)),  cert.
                             _____________                            _____

          granted, 475  U.S. 1064  (1986),  cert. dismissed,  480 U.S.  257
          _______                           _______________

          (1987).  As a  result, we reverse the district  court's dismissal

          of  the plaintiffs' section 1983  claim on the  pleadings, and we

          remand for further proceedings on their claim.

                         B.  Blakey's Pro Hac Vice Admission
                         B.  Blakey's Pro Hac Vice Admission
                                      ____________

                    The plaintiffs also appeal the  district court's denial

          of admission pro  hac vice  of their attorney,  G. Robert  Blakey
                       _____________

          ("Blakey").  On May  15, 1995, the plaintiffs moved  for Blakey's

                                         -24-

          admission pro hac vice.  The district court denied the motion  on
                    ____________

          June  2,  1995.   On  June  12,  1995, the  plaintiffs  moved for

          reconsideration of  the court's order; the  district court denied

          the motion for reconsideration on September 25, 1995.

                    The district court articulated two grounds for  denying

          Blakey's pro hac vice admission.  First, the district court noted
                   ____________

          that a previous  motion by the  plaintiffs seeking the  admission

          pro  hac vice of another of their attorneys, Spaloss, had already
          _____________

          been granted.  Second, the district court expressed concern about

          the amount of attorney's fees being generated by the plaintiffs.5

                    The Supreme Court has recognized that "in many District

          Courts, the decision  on whether to grant pro  hac vice status to
                                                    _____________

          an out-of-state  attorney is  purely discretionary."   Frazier v.
                                                                 _______

          Heebe,  482 U.S. 641, 651  n.13 (1987).   However, the plaintiffs
          _____

          argue  that the  U.S. District  Court for  the District  of Rhode

          Island is  not one  of  those courts.   Local  Rule  5(c) of  the

          District of Rhode Island provides in pertinent part that

                      [a]ny  attorney who is  a member  in good
                      standing of the bar  of the United States
                      Supreme Court, of any other United States
                      District court,  or of the  highest court
                      of   any  state,   shall  on   motion  be
                                         ______________________
                      permitted  to appear  once in  a calendar
                      ____________________
                      year in a case  or group of related cases
                      in  association with a  member of the bar
                      of this court who  is actively engaged in
                      the practice  of law within  the State of
                      Rhode Island . . . .

          D.R.I.  R. 5(c) (emphasis added).   The plaintiffs  argue that in
                              
          ____________________

          5   A  successful  civil RICO  plaintiff  may collect  reasonable
          attorney's fees  in  addition  to  treble  damages.    18  U.S.C.
            1964(c).   

                                         -25-

          contrast  to the  Local  Rules of  the  other districts  in  this

          circuit,  Rhode Island's rule does  not by its  terms provide for

          the court's discretion.  Compare D.R.I. R. 5(c) ("shall on motion
                                   _______

          be  permitted to  appear") with  D. Me. R.  3(d)(1) ("may  at the
                                     ____

          discretion of  the Court  . .  . be  permitted to  practice"); D.

          Mass.  R. 6(b)  ("may  appear and  practice  in this  court in  a

          particular  case  by  leave  granted  in the  discretion  of  the

          court"); D.N.H. R. 5(b)  ("may at the discretion of  the court");

          D.P.R. R. 204.2 ("may be permitted").  The plaintiffs assert that

          the District of Rhode  Island has promulgated a rule  under whose

          clear language pro hac vice admission is not discretionary.  As a
                         ____________

          result,  the plaintiffs  claim,  the district  court  erred as  a

          matter  of law  in  concluding that  it  had discretion  to  deny

          Blakey's pro  hac vice admission, or  alternatively, the district
                   _____________

          court abused whatever discretion it had.

                    We  do not consider the  issue of whether  this pro hac
                                                                    _______

          vice rule, which may be nondiscretionary, nonetheless leaves some
          ____

          discretion  to deny  admission.   Even  assuming that  discretion

          existed, the district court's denial of such admission to  Blakey

          was  an abuse  of  that discretion.    The district  court's  two

          articulated  grounds  simply  cannot  support its  action.    The

          district court stated that "[w]e already have  one pro hac vice .
                                                             ____________

          . . [and we're] not going to take  more than one on a case."   We

          may  take judicial notice of the fact  that the District of Rhode

          Island  has  permitted  multiple   pro  hac  vice  admissions  in
                                             ______________

          proceedings that were contemporaneous with the instant case.  See
                                                                        ___

                                         -26-

          Cohen  v.  Brown   Univ.,  879  F.   Supp.  185  (D.R.I.   1995).
          _____      _____________

          Furthermore, regarding  expense, in  the instant  case defendants

          were represented  by more than  ten attorneys, the  plaintiffs by

          two;  additionally, if  the court  was concerned  about excessive

          attorney  fees, it could have addressed that matter later, if and

          when the plaintiffs submitted their attorney fee application.

                    While  it may  be that Blakey  has no right  to pro hac
                                                                    _______

          vice  admission,  see Leis  v. Flynt,  439  U.S. 438,  452 (1979)
          ____              ___ ____     _____

          (holding that an attorney does not have a federal right  to state
                           ________                                   _____

          court pro hac vice  admission), the rights of the  plaintiffs are
                ____________

          another   matter.    Particularly   here,  where  the  plaintiffs

          identified  specific,  logical  reasons  for  their  request,6 we

          conclude that  the district  court's decision, based  on criteria

          that are not set forth in writing, that do not reasonably support

          its  action, and  that do  not appear to  respond to  any general

          policy of  the District of Rhode  Island, amounts to an  abuse of

          discretion. 

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    As  a  result of  the  foregoing, the  judgment  of the

          district court is reversed.  Appellants are allowed costs.
                            reversed.
                            ________   ____________________________

                              
          ____________________

          6   See,  e.g.,  Kevin Roddy,  RICO  in Business  and  Commercial
              ___   ____                 __________________________________
          Litigation (1993) (describing Blakey as "the acknowledged author"
          __________
          of  the federal RICO  statute and of  "excellent" commentaries on
          RICO application).

                                         -27-

                                                        Concurrence Follows

                                         -28-

                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge, concurring.   At issue is whether
                    LYNCH, Circuit Judge, concurring.
                           _____________

          the plaintiffs have stated  a claim under Rule 12(b)(6),  Fed. R.

          Civ.  P.7   The  plaintiffs' complaint  cannot  be dismissed  "if

          relief  could be  granted under  any set of  facts that  could be

          proved consistent with the allegations."   NOW v. Scheidler,  114
                                                     ___    _________

          S. Ct. 798, 803 (1994).  The district court  dismissed the claims

          because it imported  into RICO  a standing  requirement that  the

          plaintiffs must be "innocent  victims."  See Roma Constr.  Co. v.
                                                   ___ _________________

          aRusso, 906  F. Supp. 78, 81  (D.R.I. 1995).  The  review by this
          ______

          court of the dismissal is de novo.  Aulson v.  Blanchard, 83 F.3d
                                              ______     _________

          1, 3 (1st  Cir. 1996).  This ruling, one of  law, was, I believe,

          in error.  The  question is, concededly, one of  first impression

          here.  Because  I analyze  the matter differently  than does  the

          majority, I write separately.

                    The question of who has standing to bring actions under

          RICO is a matter of federal law.  The pertinent provision of RICO

          provides:

                      Any  person injured  in  his business  or
                      property  by  reason  of  a  violation of
                      section  1962 of  this  chapter  may  sue
                      therefor in any appropriate United States
                      district   court    and   shall   recover
                      threefold the damages he sustains and the
                      cost of the  suit, including a reasonable
                      attorney's fee.  

          18 U.S.C.    1964(c).   There is no  qualification on  the phrase

          "any  person injured  in his business  or property"  limiting the

                              
          ____________________

          7   At oral argument, plaintiffs stipulated that their RICO claim
          is not asserted against the town, but only against the individual
          defendants.

                                         -29-

          phrase  to "innocent" persons.   RICO defines a  "person" as "any

          individual or  entity capable  of holding  a legal  or beneficial

          interest in property."  18 U.S.C.    1961(3).  On the language of

          the statute, plaintiffs meet this definition.8

                    In general,  the intent  of Congress manifested  in the

          text of the statute governs the issue of standing:

                      In determining the scope of a statute, we
                      look  first  to  its  language.   If  the
                      statutory language is unambiguous, in the
                      absence    of   "a    clearly   expressed
                      legislative intent to the  contrary, that
                      language must ordinarily  be regarded  as
                      conclusive."

          United  States v.  Turkette, 452  U.S. 576,  580 (1981)  (quoting
          ______________     ________

          Consumer Product  Safety Comm'n v.  GTE Sylvania, Inc.,  447 U.S.
          _______________________________     __________________

          102,  108  (1980)).   The language  of  RICO should  thus  be the

          primary guide  to determining  Congressional intent.   See Sedima
                                                                 ___ ______

          S.P.R.L.  v. Imrex Co., 473  U.S. 479, 495  n.13 (1985).  Indeed,
          ________     _________

          the Supreme Court  has consistently  adhered to  the language  of

          RICO   in   interpreting  its   meaning   and   rejected  surplus

          requirements not  found in  the statutory  language.   See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. at 806  (holding that RICO does not require
          _________

          an economic  motive behind  the racketeering activity);  Reves v.
                                                                   _____

          Ernst  & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177-79 (1993) (looking to statutory
          ______________

          language  to determine the scope  of RICO liability for "conduct"

          or  "participation"); Sedima,  473 U.S.  at 488-92  (holding that
                                ______

          private actions under RICO  do not require a criminal  conviction
                              
          ____________________

          8   Of  course,  other questions  about  the parameters  of  RICO
          standing are not raised by this case, which concerns only whether
          there is an "innocent victim" requirement.

                                         -30-

          on the underlying predicate offenses); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-
                                                 ________

          87 (holding that  the term  "enterprise" as used  in RICO is  not

          restricted  to  criminal enterprises);  cf. Holmes  v. Securities
                                                  ___ ______     __________

          Investor  Protection   Corp.,   503  U.S.   258,  265-69   (1992)
          ____________________________

          (construing  the  word "injury"  to  require  proximate cause  by

          reference to  statutory history  and  judicial interpretation  of

          same language in Clayton Act).

                    Despite the  lack of any "innocent  victim" requirement

          in  the statutory  language, the  district court  relied upon  an

          isolated  statement  in  the  legislative history  to  fashion  a

          requirement  that only "innocent victims" be allowed to sue.  The

          district court's  reliance on  a snippet of  legislative history,

          lifted out of  context,9 to  create an absolute  standing bar  to
                              
          ____________________

          9   The court relies on a  statement by Representative Steiger on
          October 7,  1970, that  "[i]t is  the intent of  this body,  I am
          certain,  to see  that innocent  parties who  are the  victims of
          organized  crime have  a right  to obtain  proper redress."   116
          Cong.  Rec. 35,346-47  (1970).   That  statement was  made during
          debate  over  a proposed  amendment, ultimately  withdrawn, which
          would have authorized private injunctive relief.  See Abrams, The
                                                            ___         ___
          Law of  Civil RICO    1.4,  at 30 (1991).   The  district court's
          __________________
          characterization  of the remarks  as coming from  "the sponsor of
          the  provision that  eventually created  a private  civil remedy"
          could cause a  misapprehension.   In fact, RICO  originated in  a
          bill filed  in  the Senate,  S.  30.   By  October 7,  1970,  the
          Judiciary  Committee had  already reported  out that  bill, which
          included  "the  RICO  provision  ultimately  enacted  as  section
          1964(c), which  created a treble damage remedy."  Id. at 30.  The
                                                            ___
          debate in  which Representative  Steiger made the  quoted remarks
          was over private injunctive relief.

             Further, Representative  Steiger referred,  in  the very  same
          remarks  relied  upon  by  the  district  court,  to  victims  of
          "organized crime."   Yet it was  clear to both the  House and the
          Senate  that  the  reach  of  civil  RICO  extended  well  beyond
          organized  crime.   "Congress  knew what  it  was doing  when  it
          adopted commodious language capable of extending beyond organized
          crime."  H.J.,  Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
                   ___________    __________________________

                                         -31-

          anyone  not "innocent," was inappropriate.  "[E]ven if we were to

          read this statement to  say what [defendants] say[] it  means, it

          would not amount to more than background noise drowned out by the

          statutory  language."    Holmes, 503  U.S.  at  269  n.15.   This
                                   ______

          selection from the legislative  history cannot overcome the plain

          text of RICO, which is unambiguous.  It represents "a rather thin

          reed upon which to base a requirement . . . neither expressed nor

          .  . .  fairly  implied in  the  operative sections  of  [RICO]."

          Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 805.  Even were there occasion to consider
          _________

          the  legislative history  relied upon by  the district  court, it

          says only  that the  statute will  protect innocent  victims, not

          that the statute will deny standing to those who are not innocent

          victims.   See Turkette, 452  U.S. at 591  (noting that "negative
                     ___ ________

          inference[s]"  need  not be  drawn  from  positive statements  in

          legislative history).

                    The  Supreme Court  has emphasized  the broad  reach of

          RICO's  language:   "If  the defendant  engages  in a  pattern of

          racketeering  activity  . .  .  and  the racketeering  activities

          injure the  plaintiff in his business or  property, the plaintiff

                              
          ____________________

          246 (1989); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 ("Congress wanted to
                      ________ ______
          reach both  'legitimate'  and 'illegitimate'  enterprises.    The
          former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity
          nor  immunity from its consequences.   The fact that   1964(c) is
          used against respected businesses  allegedly engaged in a pattern
          of   specifically  identified   criminal  conduct  is   hardly  a
          sufficient  reason  for  assuming  that the  provision  is  being
          misconstrued." (citation  omitted)); Abrams,  supra,   1.1,  at 5
                                                        _____
          ("RICO's  name  might suggest  that the  private cause  of action
          reaches primarily  racketeers and other organized  crime figures.
          Developments  since RICO's  1970  enactment, however,  have  laid
          firmly to rest any suggestion of limited reach.").

                                         -32-

          has  a claim under   1964(c).  There  is no room in the statutory

          language for an additional  . . . requirement."  Sedima, 473 U.S.
                                                           ______

          at 495.  There is nothing  in the language of RICO which suggests

          that Congress  intended to  deny standing  to plaintiffs who  are

          alleged  to have  committed  bribery or  paid extortion,  whether

          under coercion or not.  

                    Standing    involves   three    analytically   distinct

          requirements: injury-in-fact,  a  causal connection  between  the

          injury and the conduct  complained of, and whether the  wrong may

          be redressed.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
                         _____    _____________________

          61  (1992).   All  three elements  of  the standing  inquiry  are

          satisfied  on the  pleadings  here.   Plaintiffs have  adequately

          alleged  injury-in-fact (financial  loss),  a  causal  connection

          (defendants' corruptly demanding payments),  and that the  injury

          will be redressed by  a favorable decision (availability of  RICO

          damages).   See  Sedima,  473  U.S.  at  496  (noting  that  RICO
                      ___  ______

          plaintiff  has standing  only  if "he  has  been injured  in  his

          business or property by the conduct constituting the violation");

          Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436 (1st Cir. 1995).  This is not
          ________    _____

          a  case  where the  plaintiffs attempt  to  assert the  rights of

          others.   Cf.  Carter v.  Berger, 777  F.2d 1173 (7th  Cir. 1985)
                    ___  ______     ______

          (county, not individual taxpayers, may sue under RICO for bribery

          scheme resulting in underpayment of taxes).  Accordingly, I would

          end the standing analysis there.

                    In  considering whether there  is an  "innocent victim"

          standing  requirement, I  doubt  that Congress  intended for  the

                                         -33-

          federal  courts to  refer to  and incorporate  state law.10   The

          defendants argue  that the innocent  victim requirement is  to be

          found  in the  distinction,  found in  some  state laws,  between

          bribery and coercive  extortion.  They buttress their argument by

          reference to provisions  of the Model Penal Code.   The matter of

          whether  the activities  in  which these  plaintiffs engaged  fit

          within the category of bribery or of coercive extortion is, in my

          view, not relevant to the issue of standing.11

                    Although RICO references state law in its definition of

          "racketeering  activity,"12 it  makes no  substantive distinction
                              
          ____________________

          10  Caselaw holding  that minority shareholders suffer  no injury
          to  their property apart from the  injury the corporation suffers
          and so  have no standing to sue under RICO provides no comfort to
          defendants.   Such caselaw  does not  support the principle  that
          reference should be made  to state law to determine  the contours
          of any "innocent victim" defense.  It is true that some decisions
          refer to  state law to define property  interests of shareholders
          as opposed  to corporations to  determine whether the  former may
          bring  a RICO action.   See, e.g.,  Leach v. FDIC,  860 F.2d 1266
                                  ___  ____   _____    ____
          (5th  Cir. 1988),  cert.  denied, 491  U.S.  905 (1989).    Other
                             _____________
          caselaw,  including that  of  this circuit,  see Roeder  v. Alpha
                                                       ___ ______     _____
          Indus., 814 F.2d  22, 29-30  (1st Cir. 1987),  refers to  general
          ______
          principles  of corporate law to  hold that a  shareholder may not
          sue under RICO to vindicate a  duty owed to the corporation.  See
                                                                        ___
          Rand v. Anaconda  Ericsson, Inc.,  794 F.2d 843,  849 (2d  Cir.),
          ____    ________________________
          cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986); Warren v. Manufacturer's Nat'l
          ____________                       ______    ____________________
          Bank  of  Detroit, 759  F.2d 542,  545  (6th Cir.  1985); Abrams,
          _________________
          supra,    3.3.6, at 147-52.   In any event, the  issue of whether
          _____
          state law should be referenced in defining the term "property" is
          simply not present in this case.

          11  If it were, then I  would agree that on the facts pleaded  it
          is impossible  to  draw the  conclusion that  this case  involves
          exclusively bribery.

          12   This  reference to  state law  is in  the context  of RICO's
          definition of  predicate offenses.   From this,  defendants would
                                   ________
          infer a Congressional desire -- expressed nowhere in  the statute
          -- to reference state law with respect to affirmative defenses as
                                                                ________
          well.

                                         -34-

          between "bribery"  and "extortion."   RICO  defines "racketeering

          activity" in 18 U.S.C.   1961(1)(A) to mean, inter alia, "any act
                                                       _____ ____

          or  threat involving . . . bribery [or]  extortion . . . which is

          chargeable  under State  law and  punishable by  imprisonment for

          more than  one  year."   Thus,  the federal  statute  recognizes,

          without distinction, acts "involving" either bribery or extortion

          as predicate offenses  for purposes  of RICO.   Further, even  in

          defining  such a  predicate offense,  state  law plays  a limited

          role:

                      The labels placed  on a state statute  do
                      not   determine   whether  that   statute
                      proscribes  bribery  for purposes  of the
                      RICO  statute.    Congress  intended  for
                      "bribery" to be defined  generically when
                      it  included bribery as  a predicate act.
                      H.R.  Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
                      (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong.
                              _________ __
                      & Admin. News 4007, 4032 ("State offenses
                      are  included by  generic designation.").
                      Thus, any statute that proscribes conduct
                      which  could  be  generically defined  as
                      bribery can be the  basis for a predicate
                      act.

          United States v.  Garner, 837  F.2d 1404, 1418  (7th Cir.  1987),
          _____________     ______

          cert. denied,  486  U.S. 1035  (1988);  accord United  States  v.
          ____________                            ______ ______________

          Forsythe,  560 F.2d  1127,  1137  (3d  Cir.  1977).    Here,  the
          ________

          plaintiffs' complaint also alleges, in addition  to the state law

          predicate offense,  a predicate federal offense,  violation of 18

          U.S.C.    1951 (wrongful use  of official authority  to obstruct,

          delay,  and effect  commercial activity in  interstate commerce).

          That statute also does not draw the distinction defendants urge.

                    Nonetheless,  standing  issues   aside,  the   question

          remains  whether there is some form of requirement in RICO, which

                                         -35-

          may be tested on a motion to dismiss, that plaintiffs be innocent

          victims.   At least two other possibilities  emerge:  that such a

          requirement is inherent  in the cause of action or  that it is an

          affirmative defense.

                    To the extent that  the existence of a cause  of action

          is a matter analytically distinct from the issue of standing, see
                                                                        ___

          Libertad,  53 F.3d at 438 n.5, a  cause of action has been stated
          ________

          here.13  There is nothing in  the language of RICO which suggests

          that  only innocent  plaintiffs  have a  cause  of action.    See
                                                                        ___

          Scheidler,  114 S.  Ct.  at  806  ("[T]he statutory  language  is
          _________

          unambiguous and  [the]  legislative history  [evidences] no  such

          'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary' that would

          warrant  a different  construction." (citation omitted)).   Under

          the proximate causation test of Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268, there is
                                          ______

          a  cause of  action stated.14   The damages  alleged here  on the
                              
          ____________________

          13 But  cf. Sunstein, Standing  and the  Privatization of  Public
             ________           ___________________________________________
          Law,  88. Colum. L. Rev.  1432, 1433 (1988)  (arguing that "[f]or
          ___
          purposes of  standing, the  principal question should  be whether
          Congress has created a cause of action").

          14   It may also be,  as the district court  suggested, see Roma,
                                                                  ___ ____
          906 F. Supp. at 82 n.1, that the plaintiffs' relative culpability
          may  be  considered  in  deciding, under  Holmes,  the  issue  of
                                                    ______
          proximate causation based on the evidence  presented.  See, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____
          Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,  392 U.S.
          _________________________    _________________________
          134,   142-47   (White,   J.,   concurring)   (treating  relative
          culpability,  in   antitrust  context,   as  part   of  causation
          analysis),  overruled on  other  grounds by  Copperweld Corp.  v.
                      _______________________________  ________________
          Independence  Tube  Corp., 463  U.S. 752  (1984).   The  issue of
          _________________________
          proximate  cause may not be  decided at the  pleading stage given
          the allegations in this complaint. 

              Relative culpability may also  be relevant to the  measure of
          damages.   The  opinions in  Perma Life  posit that  the benefits
                                       _____ ____
          received by a plaintiff from its participation in wrongdoing "can
          of  course be  taken  into consideration  in computing  damages."

                                         -36-

          pleadings are  neither remote nor speculative.   These plaintiffs

          have  alleged  direct  injury  to their  property,  which  Holmes
                                                                     ______

          requires.   Holmes, 503  U.S. at 265-69;  see also  id. at 276-86
                      ______                        ________  ___

          (O'Connor, J., concurring) (analyzing the causation issue as part

          of  the standing  issue).   Again, viewing  this as  a matter  of

          whether  there is  an "innocent  victim" requirement  inherent in

          stating  a  cause  of  action, I  do  not  believe  state law  is

          pertinent.

                    The  district  court  opinion also  suggests  that  the

          "innocent  victim" argument  may be  available as  an affirmative

          defense.    If so,  there are  a range  of possibilities  for the

          contours of the  defense.  The range includes  a sort of absolute

          defense if the plaintiff  has done anything wrong, which  is what

          the district court thought and  to which it applied the label  of

          an in pari delicto  defense.15  At the other end of  the range is
             __ ____ _______

          the  position  that  the  relative  guilt  of  the  plaintiff  is

          irrelevant.   That,  I  believe, cannot  be  so,16 and  even  the
                              
          ____________________

          Perma Life,  392 U.S.  at 140;  see also  II Areeda &  Hovenkamp,
          _____ ____                      ________
          Antitrust Law  365c3, at 248 (1995 rev. ed.).
          _____________

          15    This common  law  defense derives  from  the Latin  in pari
                                                                    __ ____
          delicto  potior est conditio defendentis:  "In a case of equal or
          _______  ______ ___ ________ ___________
          mutual fault .  .   . the condition  of the [defending] party  is
          the better one."  Black's Law Dictionary 791 (6th ed. 1990).  The
                            ______________________
          in pari delicto defense, though "[i]n its classic formulation . .
          __ ____ _______
          . narrowly limited  to situations where the  plaintiff truly bore
          at least substantially equal responsibility for his injury . . ."
          is  now generally given "a broad application to bar actions where
          plaintiffs simply  have been involved generally in 'the same sort
          of wrongdoing'  as defendants."  Bateman  Eichler, Hill Richards,
                                           ________________________________
          Inc.  v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1985) (quoting Perma Life,
          ____     ______                                       _____ ____
          392 U.S. at 138).

          16  See, e.g., discussion in footnote 14 supra.
              ___  ____                            _____

                                         -37-

          plaintiffs do not  argue that position.   While some  affirmative

          defenses,  such as the statute of limitations, may on occasion be

          decided on the pleadings, the assertion of an affirmative defense

          here would not afford a basis to dismiss the complaint under Rule

          12(b)(6).  Under  any of  the plausible articulations  of such  a

          defense,  the inferences to be drawn  from the facts pled here do

          not permit dismissal.

                    I would  reject the  proposition, urged  by defendants,

          that an absolute in pari delicto defense is embedded in RICO.  In
                           __ ____ _______

          construing  the language of RICO, the Supreme Court has looked to

          precedent  under the Clayton Act, the statute upon which RICO was

          modeled.   See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 ("We may fairly credit the
                     ___ ______

          91st   Congress,   which   enacted   RICO,   with   knowing   the

          interpretation  federal   courts  had  given  the  words  earlier

          Congresses  had used first in [the Sherman Act], and later in the

          Clayton  Act's   4.   It  used the  same words,  and we  can only

          assume that it intended them to have the same meaning that courts

          had  already  given them."  (citations  omitted)).   The  Supreme

          Court, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
                    _________________________    _________________________

          392  U.S.  134, 138-40  (1968),  overruled  on other  grounds  by
                                           ________________________________

          Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 463 U.S. 752 (1984),
          ________________    _______________________

          explicitly  rejected the existence of  an in pari delicto defense
                                                    __ ____ _______

          under the Clayton Act.   In Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S.  622 (1988),
                                      ______    ____

          the  Court  reaffirmed  that  in   its  contemporary  "broadened"

          construction,  precisely the  construction  contemplated  by  the

          district  court  here,  the  in  pari  delicto  defense  "is  not
                                       __  ____  _______

                                         -38-

          appropriate   in  litigation  arising  under  federal  regulatory

          statutes."  Id. at 632; see Sullivan v. National Football League,
                      ___         ___ ________    ________________________

          34 F.3d 1091, 1107-09 (1st  Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.  Ct.
                                                  ____________

          1252  (1995).  For the  same reasons, an  "unclean hands" defense

          would  seem  to be  unavailable, as  it is  not  a defense  to an

          antitrust  treble  damage  action.   See  Kiefer-Stewart  Co.  v.
                                               ___  ___________________

          Seagram  & Sons,  340 U.S.  211, 214  (1951), overruled  on other
          _______________                               ___________________

          grounds  by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 463 U.S.
          ___________ ________________    _______________________

          752  (1984);  see also  Simpson  v. Union  Oil  Co., 377  U.S. 13
                        ___ ____  _______     _______________

          (1964).

                    That  there is no in pari delicto defense does not mean
                                      __ ____ _______

          there is  no defense at  all in which  the relative guilt  of the

          plaintiffs  may be weighed.  It is  far more likely that there is

          in RICO  an  "equal involvement"  defense similar  to the  "equal

          involvement" defense  recognized under  the Clayton Act  in Perma
                                                                      _____

          Life.17   Recognition of such a defense, patterned on the Clayton
          ____
                              
          ____________________

          17  In  Perma Life,  five concurring Justices,  in four  separate
                  __________
          opinions,  recognized  the  existence  of  the equal  involvement
          defense.  Justice White wrote that he "would deny recovery  where
          plaintiff and defendant  bear substantially equal  responsibility
          for [the] injury  resulting to one of them . .  . ."  392 U.S. at
          146 (White, J., concurring).   According to Justice Fortas, "[i]f
          the fault of the  parties is reasonably within the  same scale --
          if the  'delictum' is approximately  'par' --  then the  doctrine
                   ________                     ___
          should  bar recovery."  392 U.S. at 147 (Fortas, J., concurring).
          Justice Marshall wrote that he "would hold that where a defendant
          in  a private antitrust suit can show that the plaintiff actively
          participated in  the formation  and implementation of  an illegal
          scheme,  and is  substantially  equally at  fault, the  plaintiff
          should  be barred from imposing liability on the defendant."  392
          U.S.  at 149 (Marshall, J.,  concurring).  Justice  Harlan, in an
          opinion  joined by  Justice Stewart,  indicated that  the defense
          should   be  allowed   in  cases   where  "the   plaintiffs  were
          substantially  as much responsible . . . as the defendants."  392
          U.S. at 156  (Harlan, J.,  concurring in part  and dissenting  in

                                         -39-

          Act  defense,  was  extended  to securities  actions  in  Bateman
                                                                    _______

          Eichler,  Hill Richards,  Inc. v.  Berner, 472  U.S. 299,  306-11
          ______________________________     ______

          (1985).  The equal involvement defense is more demanding of those

          asserting it than the  in pari delicto defense and  only bars the
                                 __ ____ _______

          claims of  a  plaintiff who  "truly bore  at least  substantially

          equal responsibility [as the defendant] for the violation" of the

          federal law at issue.  Id. at 308.
                                 ___

                    This circuit  has also recognized an  equal involvement

          defense  in antitrust  actions.   Sullivan, 34  F.3d at  1107 ("A
                                            ________

          plaintiff's   'complete,   voluntary,  and   substantially  equal

          participation' in  an illegal  practice under the  antitrust laws

          precludes recovery  for that antitrust  violation." (quoting CVD,
                                                                       ____

          Inc. v. Raytheon Co.,  769 F.2d 842, 856  (1st Cir. 1985),  cert.
          ____    ____________                                        _____

          denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986))).
          ______

                    Testing the  allegations of  the complaint  against the

          Supreme Court's  articulation of  the equal  involvement defense,

          this complaint  survives  a Rule  12(b)(6)  motion.   Under  that

          defense:

                      a private action for damages . . . may be
                      barred on the  grounds of the plaintiff's
                      own  culpability  only  where  (1)  as  a
                      direct  result  of his  own  actions, the
                      plaintiff  bears  at least  substantially
                      equal  responsibility for  the violations
                      he seeks to  redress, and (2)  preclusion
                      of suit would not significantly interfere
                      with the effective enforcement  of [RICO]
                      and the protection of the . . .  public.

                              
          ____________________

          part).

                                         -40-

          Bateman,  472 U.S. at  310-11.  Both  the Supreme Court  and this
          _______

          court  have  cautioned  against  deciding such  defenses  in  the

          absence of factual development.   See id. at 311 n.21 ("We  note,
                                            ___ ___

          however,  the  inappropriateness  of  resolving  the question  of

          respondents'  fault solely on  the basis  of the  allegations set

          forth in the complaint."); Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1109 ("Ultimately
                                     ________

          . . . these are factual questions for the jury . . . .").

                    The  defendants make  a misplaced  attempt to  argue in

          favor of  the more defendant-helpful  in pari delicto  defense by
                                                __ ____ _______

          relying on Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).  Tafflin, they
                     _______    ______                        _______

          urge,  weakens the  analogy  of RICO  to  the Clayton  Act,  and,

          therefore, to  the equal involvement  defense.   In Tafflin,  the
                                                              _______

          Court held that RICO  did not vest exclusive jurisdiction  in the

          federal  courts where the language of the statute did not purport

          to do so and  the legislative history did not  show that Congress

          addressed the question.   Id. at 460-62.  The  Court rejected the
                                    ___

          argument  that it should derive such an exclusivity from the fact

          that actions under the Clayton Act may only be brought in federal

          court.   Id. at 462-63.   The analogy to the Clayton  Act did not
                   ___

          provide the  answer because  Congress was  also presumed  to have

          operated  against a  backdrop of  well-established  law governing

          when there was  exclusive federal jurisdiction.   Id. at  459-60.
                                                            ___

          There  is  no  such  "judicial default  rule"  which  operates in

          defendants' favor  here.  Cf.  Landgraf v. U.S.I.  Film Products,
                                    ___  ________    _____________________

          114 S. Ct. 1483,  1505 (1994) (discussing judicial  default rules

          in the context of retroactivity of statutes).

                                         -41-

                    Similarly, there  is no  comfort for defendants  in the

          Supreme  Court's  rejection  in  Sedima  of  application  of  the
                                           ______

          "antitrust injury" rule  to RICO.   "[T]his is  so because  'RICO

          injury'  would [otherwise] be  an unintelligible requirement, not

          because there is no parallel between  the two statutes."   Carter
                                                                     ______

          v.  Berger, 777  F.2d  1173, 1176  (7th  Cir. 1985)  (noting  the
              ______

          Court's remark in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 489-90 & n.8, that Congress
                            ______

          relied on the analogy to antitrust).

                    Indeed, RICO was enacted in  1970, after the Perma Life
                                                                 __________

          decision, of which Congress was undoubtedly aware.  The modelling

          of  RICO  on the  Clayton Act  was done  against the  backdrop of

          judicial recognition of an equal involvement defense.   The piece

          of  legislative history relied upon  by defendants, to the extent

          it  should be considered  at all, may be  equally read to support

          the proposition  that Congress implicitly allowed  an affirmative

          equal involvement defense as under the Clayton Act.

                    But defendants do  have a  point.  The  analogy to  the

          Clayton Act is not perfect.  Indeed, the American Bar Association

          report from which the civil RICO provisions emerged suggests that

          not all the accoutrements  of the Clayton Act should  be imported

          into  RICO.   See 115  Cong. Rec.  6995 (1969) (Report  of A.B.A.
                        ___

          Antitrust Section); Abrams, supra,   1.4, at  25-26.  This may be
                                      _____

          a  situation where  Congress did  not explicitly  contemplate the

          question and so congressional "intent" in the classic formulation

          simply does  not  exist.   The  courts  then are  left  with  the

          delicate task of providing the answer.

                                         -42-

                    I  very  much  doubt  that the  federal  definition  of

          "innocence" for  purposes of the equal  involvement defense would

          ordinarily involve  reference to and incorporation  of state law,

          as the  majority asserts.18   The Supreme Court  did not look  to

          state law to define the defense  in either Perma Life or Bateman,
                                                     _____ ____    _______

          nor should we do so here.  Nor has this court looked to state law

          to define the defense under  the Clayton Act in the  aftermath of

          Perma Life.
          _____ ____

                    To say there  is some form of  affirmative defense like

          the  equal involvement  defense does  not describe  precisely the

          content of such  a defense.  Even  the Supreme Court Justices  in

          Perma Life did not agree on  the content.  See supra footnote 17.
          _____ ____                                 ___ _____

          In the absence of  factual findings in which to set the questions

          of the  honing  of such  a  defense,  there is,  and  should  be,

          reluctance  to engage now in  such refinement.   The precision of

          any standard awaits further development.  It is enough now to say

          that  the positions  at the  extremities  -- that  any wrongdoing

          disables  a plaintiff  or that  wrongdoing is  irrelevant --  are

          untenable.
                              
          ____________________

          18  There may be situations, not present here, in which the state
          has  such   an  exceptionally  strong  policy   interest  in  the
          enforcement of  its  own  laws  that  Congress  would  choose  to
          accommodate  that interest in the  RICO enforcement scheme.  This
          may be  more true under  RICO than other  statutes in as  much as
          Congress has  referred  to violations  of state  law in  defining
          predicate offenses under  18 U.S.C.    1961(1)(A).  However,  the
          recognition of an interest  in enforcement is not the same as the
          recognition  of an  interest  in a  defense.   The  Rhode  Island
          bribery  and   extortion  statutes   do  not  evidence   such  an
          overwhelming interest in affording  defendants an in pari delicto
                                                            __ ____ _______
          defense, even before reaching the issue of whether Congress would
          have wanted to import Rhode Island law into RICO.

                                         -43-

                    The  equal involvement  defense  recognized  under  the

          Clayton  Act and  the Securities  Act derives  its contours  from

          federal  policy as recognized by  federal statutes.   There is no

          reason not to apply that paradigm to RICO.19

                    As to the claim under 42 U.S.C.    1983, the plaintiffs

          have adequately alleged that the harm they suffered was caused by

          the  extortionist  policies  and  practices  in  which  the  town

          officials are claimed  to have engaged.  Again, there  is no need

          to  delve into  the  distinction between  coercive extortion  and

          bribery.

                              
          ____________________

          19    The district  court  was  very troubled  by  the  notion of
          rewarding people  who pay  bribes to public  officials with  RICO
          treble damages, whatever the circumstances of the payment.  Roma,
                                                                      ____
          906 F. Supp. at 82-83.   That is certainly a  reasonable concern.
          Policy arguments may be  made both for and against such a result.
          In  the antitrust field, the Supreme Court has noted that because
          of the "important public purposes" served by private suits, it is
          inappropriate  to invoke  "broad common-law barriers  to relief."
          Perma  Life, 392 U.S. at 138.   Thus "the plaintiff who reaps the
          _____  ____
          reward of  treble damages may  be no  less morally  reprehensible
          than  the defendant, but the  law encourages his  suit to further
          the  overriding public policy in  favor of competition."   Id. at
                                                                     ___
          139.

              This strong  enforcement rationale  certainly  is present  in
          RICO,  a statute  intended  to increase  the  arsenal of  weapons
          striking at criminal activity.  In addition, it may be inherently
          unfair  to deny  plaintiffs any  ability to  pursue a  RICO claim
          where their  fault is relatively  small.   An absolute  "innocent
          victim" requirement would create such an undesirable imbalance.
            

                                         -44-