Court Opinion

ID: 9368798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 01:00:32.00003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.102906
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50578    Document: 00516636674         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/06/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                           FILED
                                                                     February 6, 2023
                                 No. 21-50578                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                           Clerk

   Richard Luna,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Lorie Davis, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
   Institutions Division; Felipe Gonzalez, Warden, Terrell Unit, Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division; Bryan
   Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice;
   Ar'Lisa Simon-Hastings, Chief Classification, Terrell Unit, Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division,

                                                      Defendants—Appellees.

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 1:20-CV-685

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and King and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         Plaintiff-appellant Richard Luna appeals the entry of summary
   judgment dismissing his First and Eighth Amendment claims against
   defendant-appellee Ar’Lisa Simon-Hastings. We REVERSE in part,
Case: 21-50578      Document: 00516636674          Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/06/2023

                                    No. 21-50578

   AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Luna’s First
   Amendment retaliation claim, and REMAND for further proceedings.
                                         I.
          In May 2020, Luna, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit in Texas state
   court against several officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   where he remains an inmate. He alleged, inter alia, violations of his First and
   Eighth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of a housing
   transfer and subsequent physical altercation. According to Luna, he had
   previously been sexually harassed and threatened by inmates in boot camp
   housing; after asking the sergeant for a transfer to the main building on
   account of the harassment and threats, he was assigned housing in the main
   building. After several months, however, Simon-Hastings reassigned Luna to
   boot camp housing on January 7, 2020, and Luna was assaulted in boot camp
   housing that same day. Luna further alleged that, when Simon-Hastings saw
   him following the assault, she told him that the assault would teach him a
   lesson about going over her head with housing moves.
          Defendants removed the case to federal court, whereupon the district
   court granted their motion to dismiss all of Luna’s claims except for two:
   Luna’s First Amendment retaliation and Eighth Amendment failure-to-
   protect claims against Simon-Hastings. On June 9, 2021, the district court
   granted Simon-Hastings’ motion for summary judgment on qualified
   immunity grounds, concluding that Luna’s proffered evidence was
   insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether
   Simon-Hastings was aware that Luna faced a substantial risk of serious harm
   when she authorized his transfer back to boot camp housing. The district
   court dismissed Luna’s remaining claims with prejudice, which Luna
   appealed.

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                                          II.
          We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   applying the same standard used by the district court. Nickell v. Beau View of
   Biloxi, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is
   proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
   We view the evidence and draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the
   nonmovant; however, “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences,
   and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for
   summary judgment.” Brown v. City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.
   2003). The pleadings and other filings of pro se litigants are construed
   liberally. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019).
          A qualified immunity defense alters the typical summary judgment
   burden of proof. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). “Once
   an official pleads the defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must
   rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the
   official’s allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law.” Id.
   The defense has two prongs, both of which must be rebutted to overcome
   qualified immunity: “whether an official’s conduct violated a constitutional
   right of the plaintiff; and whether the right was clearly established at the time
   of the violation.” Id.
                                         III.
          Luna maintains that, contrary to the district court’s ruling, he raised
   a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his failure-to-protect claim under
   the Eighth Amendment. We agree.
          Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty . . . to
   protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v.
   Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-

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   Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)). “It is not, however, every injury
   suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates into
   constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.”
   Id. at 834. To succeed under his failure-to-protect claim, Luna must show
   that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
   harm and that Simon-Hastings acted with deliberate indifference to his
   safety. Id. An official acts with deliberate indifference when she “knows of
   and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”; she must “be
   aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
   of serious harm exists” and draw the inference. Id. at 837.
          The district court determined that there was no evidence, beyond
   Luna’s “conclusory allegations,” showing that Simon-Hastings was aware of
   facts from which she could infer that Luna faced a substantial risk of serious
   harm when she authorized his transfer to boot camp housing on January 7,
   2020. In so doing, the district court treated Luna’s allegation that Simon-
   Hastings told Luna, following the assault, that “this will teach you a lesson
   about going over my head with housing moves,” as a conclusory allegation
   insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact. We hold that Luna’s
   allegation is not conclusory and, in addition to other facts, establishes a
   genuine dispute as to whether Simon-Hastings was deliberately indifferent to
   the substantial risk of serious harm that Luna faced in boot camp housing.
          “Self-serving affidavits and declarations, like all summary judgment
   evidence,” must be given by competent witnesses and set out facts, made on
   personal knowledge and admissible in evidence, that are “particularized, not
   vague or conclusory.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 161
   (5th Cir. 2021). “[W]hen we have held self-serving affidavits or depositions
   insufficient to create a fact issue, it is because their contents were either
   conclusory, vague, or not based on personal knowledge.” Id.; see also In re
   Deepwater Horizon, 48 F.4th 378, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2022) (“It is unremarkable

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   that evidence submitted by one side at the summary judgment stage will be
   ‘self-serving’; the question is whether that self-serving evidence is
   ‘conclusory, vague, or not based on personal knowledge.’” (quoting
   Guzman, 18 F.4th at 161)).
          Whether a sworn statement is conclusory “is necessarily a fact-bound
   analysis that will depend on the facts and claims at issue.” Lester v. Wells
   Fargo Bank, N.A., 805 F. App’x 288, 292 (5th Cir. 2020). “[M]ore detailed
   and fact-intensive” statements can raise genuine disputes of material fact,
   while “[b]road legal or factual assertions . . . unsupported by specific facts
   are generally held to be conclusory.” Id. (citing Rushing v. Kan. City S. Ry.
   Co., 185 F.3d 496, 513 (5th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “self-serving and, to
   an extent, conclusional” attestations may support a denial of summary
   judgment where such evidence proffers “potential explanations, based on
   their personal observations” and other specific facts), superseded by
   amendment, Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), on other grounds as recognized in Mathis
   v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 459 n.16 (5th Cir. 2002)); see Guzman, 18 F.4th
   at 161 (concluding that defendants’ affidavits were competent summary
   judgment evidence because, inter alia, they concerned specific “personal
   experiences” and were “particularized rather than vague or conclusory”); In
   re Deepwater Horizon, 48 F.4th at 383–86 (relying on declaration by plaintiff’s
   president to conclude that there was a genuine dispute of material fact).
          In Johnson v. Johnson, for example, the plaintiff’s complaint and
   affidavit laid out detailed factual allegations regarding a series of events that
   occurred over a period of eighteen months; in evaluating his failure-to-
   protect claim, we did not treat his allegations, which, like here, contained
   specific statements made by defendants, as conclusory. 385 F.3d 503, 526–27
   (5th Cir. 2004). Instead, we determined that, “[g]iven the facts that we must
   assume for purposes of this appeal,” the defendants did not respond

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   reasonably to the threats faced by the plaintiffs and contravened clearly
   established law. Id. at 527.
          Here, Luna’s allegation that Simon-Hastings told him that the January
   7 assault would teach him a lesson is supported by specific facts contained in
   his complaint. The complaint alleged that Luna had experienced threats and
   harassment from other inmates in boot camp housing beginning on May 22,
   2019, which led to his decision to ask the sergeant for a housing transfer on
   August 26, 2019. Luna filed an officer protection investigation for threat of
   violence at that time, but its outcome was unsubstantiated due to a lack of
   evidence. Nevertheless, Luna was brought before the Unit Classification
   Committee (“UCC”), which handles housing assignments, and three days
   after requesting a transfer, he was moved to a different building. Because
   Simon-Hastings reviews the basis for housing assignments made by the UCC
   as part of her duties, Luna alleged that she had personal knowledge that he
   was transferred because of the threats and harassment he purportedly
   experienced. Then, on January 7, 2020, Simon-Hastings transferred Luna
   back to boot camp housing, and he was assaulted. Luna alleged that Simon-
   Hastings saw him following the assault, at which point she made the
   statement in question. Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Luna’s
   allegation regarding the statement is not conclusory when viewed in this
   context: he explained his and Simon-Hastings’ shared history leading up to
   the alleged statement and described her possible motivation in saying it.
   Taken in a light most favorable to Luna, Simon-Hastings’ statement,
   alongside the other facts contained in his complaint, shows that she was
   aware that Luna faced a risk of being assaulted upon his transfer back to boot
   camp housing.
          Because the statement is not conclusory, the district court erred in not
   considering it when determining whether there was a genuine dispute of
   material fact regarding Simon-Hastings’ deliberate indifference to the

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   substantial risk of serious harm that Luna faced. Simon-Hastings argues that
   there is not a genuine material factual dispute with respect to whether she
   was aware that Luna faced a serious risk to his safety or even whether Luna’s
   safety was substantially at risk in boot camp housing because the August 2019
   investigation was unsubstantiated due to a lack of evidence. In the alternative,
   she avers that there is not a genuine material factual dispute with respect to
   whether she was deliberately indifferent to Luna’s need for protection
   because: (1) the official response to Luna’s grievance indicated the transfer
   back to boot camp housing “was an unintentional act not meant to cause
   [Luna] harm”; and (2) on January 14, 2020, Simon-Hastings ensured that
   Luna would never again be housed with the inmate who allegedly assaulted
   him by adding a note to Luna’s housing file.
          Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to Luna, as we are
   required to do, we disagree. As an initial matter, the substantial risk of serious
   harm that Luna faced was apparent: he had been harassed and threatened by
   other inmates at least twice before his transfer, and at least one of these times
   those inmates threatened to kill Luna and told him that they would sexually
   assault him when he was dead; when he was transferred back, he was
   assaulted almost immediately, several of his teeth were knocked out, his arm
   was dislocated, and his face was battered and lacerated. Simon-Hastings’
   statement suggests that she was aware of the earlier assault and the risk that
   a similar incident could take place upon Luna’s transfer back to boot camp
   housing. It is plausible that other officials were not aware of Simon-Hastings’
   alleged motive for the transfer and that she separated Luna from the assailant
   because she had no other choice: the threat had been substantiated by the
   officer protection investigation relating to the January 7 assault. Therefore,
   these facts are consistent with Luna’s allegation that Simon-Hastings
   transferred Luna back to boot camp housing to teach him a lesson about
   seeking housing transfers from other officials, knowing that he faced a

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   substantial risk of being assaulted by the inmates who he had previously
   reported to prison officials during the August 2019 officer protection
   investigation.
          We conclude that this statement is sufficient to create a genuine
   material factual dispute. However, we do not decide whether, given this
   factual dispute, Simon-Hastings violated clearly established law. The district
   court did not reach this issue, and “we are a court of review, not of first
   view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005).
          Regarding the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Luna’s
   First Amendment retaliation claim, Luna does not raise the issue in his
   briefing before this court. Accordingly, this issue has been abandoned, and
   we do not consider it. Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (stating that arguments that have not been briefed have been abandoned).
                                        IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE in part, AFFIRM the
   district court’s summary judgment dismissal of Luna’s First Amendment
   retaliation claim, and REMAND for further proceedings.

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