Court Opinion

ID: 9885122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:30:48.609258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:44.099378
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting.
I certainly share the majority’s concern that an anonymous prankster may be responsible for the dissemination of informa*57tion that police are permitted to rely upon while conducting investigatory stops. See Op. at 55 n. 6. However, I believe the majority’s position is contrary to controlling precedent and this case is an instance where we must accede to that precedent, leaving correction of the current state of the law to our justices on the supreme court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I. Information Acquired after Stickle’s Investigatory Stop
The majority correctly recites the current rule in Indiana that “[i]f the facts known by the police at the time of the investigatory stop are such that a person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied.” Op. at 54 (emphasis added) (citing Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind.1997)). However, the majority’s basis for suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of Stickle’s search is premised upon information acquired after Stickle’s investigatory stop. Op. at 55. In its decision, the majority states,
In the case before us, the anonymous caller predicted a trip to McDonald’s and an illegal drug transaction ... We note that while the record does not reflect the amount of marijuana police found in the truck, Stickle was charged with “POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA UNDER 80 GRAMS” (App. at 19) and the police “supplemental case report” states “MOTIVE: PERSONAL GRATIFICATION.” (Id.). This relatively small amount suggests the marijuana was for personal use and indicates Stickle and Carter had not gone to McDonald’s to conduct the “illegal drug transaction” the anonymous caller predicted.
Op. at 56 (emphasis added). I respectfully believe that there are two problems with this reasoning.
The fact that Stickle had a small amount of marijuana on him when searched corroborates the prediction of the anonymous caller rather than discredits it.7 As the majority notes, the anonymous caller predicted a “drug transaction”—there is no specification as to whether Stickle was to be the “seller” or the “buyer” of the drugs. If Stickle was to be the buyer, it is entirely logical that he would have either no drugs or a small amount of drugs on him at the time of the investigatory stop. In light of the presence of the police at McDonald’s, it is not difficult to imagine why the seller failed to consummate the predicted transaction before Stickle’s investigatory stop. The presence of a small amount of drugs merely corroborates the informant’s prediction by indicating that Stickle is an individual who likely would have an interest in purchasing drugs.
More importantly, however, I believe the majority's analysis is contrary to controlling precedent. As the majority—citing our supreme court’s holding in Lamp-kins—states, “if the facts known by the police at the time of the investigatory stop are such that a person of reasonable caution would believe that the action taken was appropriate, the command of the Fourth Amendment is satisfied.” 682 N.E.2d at 1271 (emphasis added); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind.1992); Francis v. State, 764 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (noting that the reasonableness of *58the officer’s suspicion must be measured by the officer’s knowledge before the officer conducted the investigatory stop) (emphasis added).
The majority’s reliance on information obtained by way of a search conducted after Stickle’s investigatory stop—for the purpose of questioning the reasonableness of the police’s reliance on the anonymous caller—clearly contradicts the above precedent.
II. Investigatory Stops and Anonymous Tips
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), specifically refers to Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), as good law and cites White as an example of an anonymous tip supported by a sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375. J.L. stated,
In White, the police received an anonymous tip asserting that a woman was carrying cocaine and predicting that she would leave an apartment building at a specified time, get into a car matching a particular description, and drive to a named motel. Standing alone, the tip would not have justified a Terry stop. Only after police observation showed that the informant had accurately predicted the woman’s movements, we explained, did it become reasonable to think the tipster had inside knowledge about the suspect and therefore to credit his assertion about the cocaine.
Id. at 270-71, 120 S.Ct. 1375.
Our case is strikingly similar to White. Stickle’s informant accurately predicted the time and place of Stickle’s arrival, the vehicle Stickle arrived in, and the description of the passenger that accompanied Stickle. These corroborated predictions satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Analysis under the Indiana Constitution leads to the same result. This court has held that we interpret the protections provided by Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, concerning investigatory stops, to be consistent with the federal interpretation of protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See Washington v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied (citing Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052, 1053 (Ind.Ct.App.1994)).
More importantly, our supreme court in Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271, noted,
Because a small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about the individual’s illegal activities. When significant aspects of the caller’s prediction were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.8
Id. (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412) (emphasis added).9
*59Although I agree with the majority’s concern that the mere knowledge of an individual’s itinerary would allow a disgruntled individual to direct an investigatory stop toward an unsuspecting law-abiding citizen and would like to see this issue revisited under the Indiana Constitution, I believe this concern may only be addressed by our supreme court. Consequently, I must respectfully dissent.

. I note that the anonymous informant only gave the police the authority to perform an investigatory stop of Stickle; it was Stickle’s admission of having committed theft that allowed police to exceed the scope of their investigatory stop by searching Stickle and his vehicle.

. Though Lampkins involved both a confidential informant and an anonymous informant, Lampkins does not require corroboration of a confidential informant to justify an investigatory stop based on officer-observed confirmation of activity predicted by an anonymous informant. Rather, Lampkins ’ language indicates that federal authority is what should guide our decision-malting process. Lamp-kins not only quotes this federal authority with approval but concludes by noting that its analysis "satisfied Terry." Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1272. “Terry " obviously is referring to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), which is a federal case.

. The majority also suggests that State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639, 640 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), supports its position, because, as in *59Glass, we are unable to determine whether Stickle’s informant “identified himself in such a way as to place his credibility at risk or as to subject himself to criminal penalties.” Op. at 56. However, in Glass, the anonymous caller’s future-predicted activity was never verified by officer observation. See op. at 56. It is irrelevant whether the anonymous caller disclosed his or her identity in the case at bar. Lampkins, J.L., and White state that if an anonymous caller’s future-predicted activity is verified through officer observation, the officer may conduct an investigatory stop. By definition, an anonymous caller is an individual who has not identified him or herself.