Court Opinion

ID: 9844779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:08:50.325941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.827537
License: Public Domain

SPEAR, Justice
(dissenting).
Adherence to the reasoning in my specially concurring opinion in Ebersole v. State, 91 Idaho 630, 428 P.2d 947, beginning at page 953, compels my dissenting to the majority opinion in this cause.
My opinion in Ebersole is equally applicable to the cause at hand and to reiterate-it here would unnecessarily lengthen this-, dissent. Therefore I merely adopt the reasoning thereof.
The difference in the two causes lies in-the fact that in Ebersole there were no court-minutes filed with or taken by the clerk of the court, in addition to a lack of a court reporter’s transcript, and therefore there: was a total lack of any written record or its. equivalent of the proceedings on the arraignment of the accused. Not so here.. The clerk’s minute entry, as pointed out in-, the majority opinion, recites that:
“The Court asked the Defendant if he-had an Attorney to which he replied that he did not. He was then asked by the Court if he wanted an attorney and he-stated that he did not.”
It is true the minute entry does not contain the magic words that the defendant had been advised also that in the event he lacked the sufficient funds to hire an attorney the-court would appoint an attorney to defend, him at the cost of the county.
However, this deficiency in the minute-entry is amply and adequately supplied by the testimony of the district judge who presided at the arraignment and the sheriff who-attended the arraignment in the course of' the habeas corpus proceedings.
As stated in Ebersole:
“* * * The district court obviously-could apply the usual test of credibility to evaluate the conflicting allegations and. evidence. We cannot say that the finding [that the accused had been properly advised of his constitutional rights] should be rejected as clearly erroneous or-question the determination that appellant failed to meet his burden of proving the-lack of a knowing or intelligent waiver by a preponderance of the evidence, even in the face of the presumption against such, waiver relied upon so heavily in the majority opinion.
*151“The finding of the district court concerning the allegation of the demand for counsel and refusal of the court to grant the same and the finding that in fact appellant did waive his right to counsel in a knowing and intelligent manner is clearly supported by the docket entry recitations as well as by the testimony adduced. Where the district court findings are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence they will not be disturbed upon appeal.” (Citations)
It is my opinion that these authorities require affirming the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial court in the habeas corpus proceeding.
The majority opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would require the presence of a reporter at every criminal arraignment, no matter how difficult or impossible the circumstances may have been. The opinion insists upon a reporter’s transcript of the arraignment proceedings in every habeas corpus proceeding in which a petitioner alleges that one or more of his constitutional rights were abridged in the course of the arraignment proceedings. In other words, the majority holds this is the only way the petitioner’s contentions properly can be tested in a hearing on his writ. I hasten to agree with the majority that having a reporter’s transcript of the exact proceedings at the arraignment is the best method, but I cannot agree that it is the only method.
As stated in Ebersole, I am going to adhere to the fundamental rule that the burden of proof is upon the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding to establish the deprivation of his constitutional rights particularly that of assistance of counsel at state expense in event he is an indigent; and if, as in the case at hand, there are the official court minute entries coupled with, and supported by, competent and substantial evidence establishing to the satisfaction of the trial judge that the defendant in fact was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights, then such a finding of fact by the trial judge presiding at the habeas corpus proceedings cannot be disturbed by this court on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons it is my opinion the order of the trial court quashing the writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed.