Court Opinion

ID: 9777792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:19.285916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.451787
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
On rehearing the State asserts that a majority of this Court erred on original submission when it sustained the appellant’s third ground of error, to-wit: “The court erred in not declaring a mistrial when it learned that one of the jurors had not informed Appellant’s counsel of his relationship to the Complaining Witness [, a fellow worker, during the voir dire examination] because the lack of that information did not allow Appellant’s counsel to adequately and properly strike his jury panel list.” In light of what the majority opinion states in the opinion on rehearing, I agree that this Court erred on original submission when it sustained the appellant’s ground of error, but do so for different reasons. Therefore, I only concur in the decision to sustain the State’s motion for rehearing on this point.
What will be sufficient to mandate the granting of a motion for mistrial, or the granting iof a new trial, because a juror failed to respond to questioning by the trial judge or counsel during the voir dire examination, must of necessity be decided on an ad hoc basis.
In this instance, because the juror’s relationship with the complaining witness was shown only to be casual, and also because the complaining witness only testified before the jury to the fact that his residence was burglarized by an unknown person, the majority opinion correctly holds that the failure by the juror to disclose during the voir dire that he knew the complainant was insufficient to mandate the granting of a new trial.
I part company with the majority opinion, and thus cannot join that part of the opinion, because it implicitly holds that failure by a prospective juror to divulge a mere casual employment relationship with the complaining witness will never constitute reversible error. Again, such a complaint must be judged on the facts of the particular case.
In this instance, because the majority opinion does not state that the complaining witness was asked to be physically identified during the voir dire process, I must assume that he was not physically singled out to the prospective jurors at that time. Thus, it is quite likely that even though the name of the complainant might have been mentioned to the prospective jurors during the voir dire process, the name of the complainant did nót “ring any bells” for the challenged juror.
In principle, I find that the issue here is controlled by this Court’s decision of Pigg v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 521, 287 S.W.2d 673 (1956), in which this Court held that reversible error did not occur when a juror in that cause did not advise the trial judge or the attorneys for the parties during the voir dire of the fact that he had “casually” known the injured party for several years. The juror made this fact known after the *910injured party had testified. The juror testified that the omission resulted because of his poor eyesight. In rejecting the defendant’s contention, this Court stated the following: “We have concluded that the fact that the juror knew the witness ‘only when he saw him’ would not affect his verdict and was not grounds for a mistrial ...” (287 S.W.2d at 674).
Given the state of the record before us, I agree with the majority opinion that the trial judge did not err in failing to grant the appellant’s motion for mistrial because the juror did not divulge the fact that he had a casual relationship with the complainant. Thus, I only join this part of the opinion.
The majority opinion, however, erroneously holds that the argument of the prosecuting attorney, to-wit: “Today you [the jurors] are the voice of Franklin County. We [the people of Franklin County and law enforcement] can’t do the job without you. We’re fighting a war on crime,” constitutes a proper plea for law enforcement. In so holding, the majority opinion relies upon Holloway v. State, 525 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), in which the prosecuting attorney argued, “And certainly you [the jurors] can consider what many people call ‘a war on crime,’ ” which this Court found to be a proper plea for law enforcement. As should be obvious to anyone, such reliance is totally misplaced because of the obvious differences between the arguments.
I find that this argument merely represents “nothing more than an effort to put new garb on an old emperor.” Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). This was not a plea for law enforcement; it was instead a plea to the jury “to lend an ear to the community rather than a voice.” Prado v. State, 626 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). A prosecuting attorney’s argument that represents or amounts to a plea to the expectations or demands of the community has long been condemned by this Court. See the authorities cited in Dorsey v. State, 709 S.W.2d 207, 209 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Teague, J., dissenting opinion).
The majority opinion thus errs in approving the above argument as a proper plea for law enforcement. Given the argument of the prosecuting attorney, the majority opinion’s holding that it was a proper plea for law enforcement conflicts with many, many of this Court’s past decisions. See supra. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent to overruling the appellant’s contention that the argument was improper.