Court Opinion

ID: 9947959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:04:27.222678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.864806
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                        2024 IL App (4th) 230245-U
                                                                                        FILED
This Order was filed under                                                             March 5, 2024
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                   NO. 4-23-0245
                                                                                       Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                        4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed         IN THE APPELLATE COURT
                                                                                         Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                               OF ILLINOIS

                                           FOURTH DISTRICT

     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )      Appeal from the
                Plaintiff-Appellee,                               )      Circuit Court of
                v.                                                )      Woodford County
     THOMAS J. TAZELAAR,                                          )      No. 22CF124
                Defendant-Appellant.                              )
                                                                  )      Honorable
                                                                  )      Charles M. Feeney III,
                                                                  )      Judge Presiding.

                     JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                     Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                                  ORDER
    ¶1       Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) defendant received the effective
                   assistance of counsel, (2) the offenses were not committed as part of a single
                   course of conduct, and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a
                   32-year sentence.

    ¶2               Following a September 2022 bench trial, defendant, Thomas J. Tazelaar, was

    found guilty of four counts of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2022)). The trial court later

    sentenced defendant to 40 years’ imprisonment.

    ¶3               In December 2022, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the sentence,

    alleging the trial court abused its discretion and imposed an excessive sentence. In March 2023,

    the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion and reduced the sentence to 32 years’

    imprisonment.
¶4             Defendant appeals, arguing (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to move for a directed verdict on the grounds the State did not prove he committed the

offense of burglary on June 20, 2022, beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) his aggregate 32-year

sentence violates section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730

ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2022)); and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. We

affirm.

¶5                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶6                                 A. The Charges and Bench Trial

¶7             In July 2022, a grand jury indicted defendant on four counts of burglary (720

ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2022)). The indictments alleged defendant, on June 20, 2022 (count 1),

June 21, 2022 (count II), June 23, 2022 (count III), and June 24, 2022 (count IV), “knowingly

and without authority entered a building located at 302 Ash Lane, East Peoria, Illinois, with the

intent to commit therein a theft.”

¶8             In September 2022, defendant’s bench trial commenced, at which the following

evidence was adduced.

¶9                                        1. Donald Besler

¶ 10           Donald Besler testified he owned Millpoint Mobile Home Park and Campground

(Park), located approximately three miles south of Spring Bay, Illinois. The Park provided

campsites and mobile home lots for rent, and Besler testified he collected rent and checked in

campers at a two-bedroom house located at 302 Ash Lane in East Peoria, Illinois, which

functioned as the Park’s office.

¶ 11           Besler testified he hired defendant approximately one year before the offenses

occurred, and defendant began living at the Park after a mobile home was “kind of given to

                                                -2-
him.” Besler usually employed two or three people at a time to perform general maintenance and

landscaping. Besler’s employees were also responsible for showing campers to their camping

areas. If Besler was unavailable, his employees typically took campers to their area, and Besler

would “come back later and check them in.” Park employees were generally not allowed in the

office. Besler testified that, other than one longtime employee and the cleaning lady, employees

were not given keys to the office unless special circumstances required it. According to Besler,

no Park employees were allowed in the office at night.

¶ 12           Prior to the offenses in June 2022, Besler testified he left anywhere between “a

couple hundred” to “several thousand dollars in the office.” However, Besler changed the

office’s locks and purchased a cellular “deer hunting camera” when he noticed money

“disappearing” from the office’s cash drawer, as well as $100 he set aside for the cleaning lady.

He installed the camera “in the office on top of a grandfather clock that was pointing towards

*** the front door” and ensured the camera was working properly. Besler also began leaving just

$8 in the cash drawer at night, and he observed pry marks on the office’s door and doorjamb

when he put up the camera. The pry marks subsequently “got worse.”

¶ 13           Besler testified the camera took photographs, which were automatically uploaded

to a memory card and sent to his phone. The State then introduced four photographs labeled as

People’s exhibit Nos. 1 through 4, which, Besler testified, accurately represented the Park’s

office as it was on June 20, 2022, through June 24, 2022. In the first photograph of interest,

timestamped at 10:02 p.m. on June 20, 2022 (People’s exhibit No. 1), an individual can be seen

exiting the Park’s office wearing a backwards-facing baseball cap. The next photograph

(People’s exhibit No. 2) shows defendant entering the office at 8:10 p.m. on June 21, 2022.

People’s exhibit No. 3 depicts defendant entering the office at 12:02 a.m. on June 23, 2022,

                                               -3-
holding a tool in his right hand, which, Besler testified, resembled a screwdriver. Finally,

People’s exhibit No. 4 shows defendant inside the office at 1:20 a.m. on June 24, 2022. Besler

testified defendant did not have permission to be in the office at any of those times on any of

those dates. The $8 Besler left “in the drawer every night” was missing the following day. Based

on that, Besler estimated defendant stole at least $32.

¶ 14           Besler testified he decided to confront defendant after defendant “broke the

camera.” According to Besler, the confrontation occurred on “the same day that [he] called the

police” and Besler told defendant he “didn’t want [defendant] around any more.” Besler found

the camera’s batteries, memory card, and antenna while “tearing down” defendant’s mobile

home. And although Besler never recovered the camera’s “phone card,” he testified no additional

money had gone missing from the office’s cash drawer since reporting the incidents to police.

¶ 15                                    2. Michael Mattern

¶ 16           Michael Mattern, a deputy with the Woodford County Sheriff’s Office, testified

he met with Besler at the Park’s office at approximately 5:40 p.m. on June 24, 2022. Besler

“wanted to file a theft report” and stated he “had camera evidence.” Mattern then identified

People’s exhibit Nos. 1 through 4 as the photographs Besler showed him. Besler suspected

defendant of the theft and told Mattern he had recovered the camera’s memory card and batteries

from defendant’s mobile home. Mattern did not inspect the camera or its components. When

Mattern attempted to speak with defendant at his trailer, Mattern was informed by a neighbor

“that [he] wasn’t there.”

¶ 17           As part of his investigation, Mattern took pictures of the damage to the Park

office’s door and doorjamb, which he identified as People’s exhibit Nos. 8 and 9, respectively.

Mattern testified the damage “looked as if it was newer.” With respect to the damage done to the

                                                -4-
office’s door, Mattern “pointed out where the wood appear[ed] fresh as if it’s a lighter color and

*** not the color of the paint.” Mattern testified the same was true of the office’s doorjamb,

noting “the wood has been disturbed and pressed in, and the paint is pushed and discolored.”

¶ 18                                       3. Defendant

¶ 19           Defendant testified he began working at the Park in May 2021 and had resided in

a trailer on the property since April 2022. While employed, defendant performed odd jobs

around the Park, such as setting up or demolishing mobile homes, maintenance, and landscaping.

He generally worked until “Besler wanted to call it a day.”

¶ 20           Defendant testified he was asked to work in the office one week prior to June 24,

2022, because Besler “was intoxicated.” Defendant claimed Besler gave him an office key, but

he did not return it because he began working in the office more frequently. Defendant testified

he worked in the office on June 20, 2022, for “like, 15 minutes,” long enough “to have the

person come in and put them on the lot and then go home.” He testified he worked in the office

again the following day but stated his hours “varied.” Defendant also admitted being in the office

at 12:02 a.m. on June 23, 2022, but insisted the tool in his hand was not a screwdriver based on

how he held it. However, defendant acknowledged whatever tool he was photographed holding

could easily fit between the office’s door and doorjamb. Finally, defendant denied being in the

Park’s office at 1:20 a.m. on June 24, 2022, and claimed “it was a lot earlier than that. Like,

midnight again.” When asked why he was in the office during those early hours of the morning,

defendant stated a camper came in needing “a spot for the night, and they were only *** going to

stay one day.” When asked, “What about the other day,” defendant answered, “We always had

campers come in.”

                                                -5-
¶ 21           After hearing closing arguments, the trial court found defendant guilty of all four

counts of burglary. In doing so, the court found Besler’s testimony honest and “very credible,”

noting, “[Besler] was very clear on those particular days he put $8 in there and every morning $8

was gone. And that was bait, *** and he caught a fish, and the fish is in the pictures.”

¶ 22                B. Defendant’s Sentence and Motion for Reconsideration

¶ 23           In November 2022, the trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing. The

presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated defendant was 31 years old, had no children, and

maintained close relationships with his parents and siblings. Defendant denied having ever been

diagnosed with a mental disorder or condition. He further denied receiving any form of mental

health counseling in the past. Defendant possessed a high school diploma and attended college

courses while previously incarcerated but did not obtain a degree. Defendant’s criminal history

included seven felony convictions and one misdemeanor conviction. The PSI also indicated

defendant had one pending case against him (Tazewell County case No. 22-CM-281) for

obstructing identification.

¶ 24           The State recommended defendant be sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment. In

support of its recommendation, the State highlighted defendant’s criminal history and argued,

“[F]rom the age of 18 to now, [defendant] has been in the court system repeatedly, for the same

type of cases.” The State further argued for the imposition of discretionary consecutive sentences

under section 5-8-4(c)(1) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(1) (West 2022)). The State

believed such sentences were “necessary for this defendant to understand that he cannot come

into someone else’s place of business, house, school, things like that. He can’t take other

people’s stuff.”

                                               -6-
¶ 25           Defense counsel recommended defendant be sentenced to seven years’

imprisonment, despite defendant’s eligibility for extended-term sentencing, and emphasized the

nonviolent nature of the offenses. In support of his recommendation, counsel noted there had

been “no contemplation of causing harm to anybody, or no showing that any harm was caused or

threatened.” Counsel also asked the trial court to consider the assistance defendant provided to

his parents, who appeared to be in “ill health.”

¶ 26           In sentencing defendant, the trial court considered the PSI, defendant’s history

and characteristics, the nature of the offenses, the evidence presented at trial, and the statutory

factors in aggravation and mitigation. In mitigation, the court found “defendant’s criminal

conduct did not cause nor threaten serious physical harm to another.” Nor did defendant

“contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to

another.”

¶ 27           In aggravation, the trial court found a sentence was necessary to deter others from

committing the same offense and considered defendant’s criminal history—which involved “this

exact same type of behavior”—to be “the most significant factor by far.” The court stated:

                       “You committed a burglary in 2009, and then *** you

               committed a felony theft. And *** after you were sentenced for the

               felony theft, you committed *** a Class 1 felony burglary of a

               school, or daycare, or worship facility. *** A mere three months

               *** after that burglary, you committed another felony, telephone

               harassment. You were sentenced to prison.”

The court continued:

                                                   -7-
                        “And of course you learned so much from that experience

                of going to prison, that *** within two years you managed to

                commit a criminal damage to property here in Woodford [County].

                *** And within eighth [sic] months of you being sentenced on that,

                you committed the Class 1 felony burglary of a school or daycare

                in Woodford County case 2014-CF-162. And within 11 months of

                that sentence *** on criminal damage to property, you committed

                another burglary of a school or daycare.”

¶ 28            The trial court determined defendant was incapable of conforming his conduct to

the requirements of the law, found defendant was a danger to the public, and imposed

consecutive 10-year prison sentences for counts I through IV, totaling 40 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 29            In December 2022, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of his sentence.

Defendant argued the trial court imposed an excessive sentence in light of the relevant factors in

mitigation that his “criminal conduct did not cause serious physical harm to another” and he “did

not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm to

another.” Defendant further argued the court “failed to follow Article [I], Section [11] of the

Illinois Constitution [(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11)], which states as follows: ‘All penalties shall

be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring

the offender to useful citizenship.’ ”

¶ 30            In March 2023, the matter proceeded to a hearing on defendant’s motion to

reconsider the sentence. Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court reiterated defendant had

seven felony convictions, for which he was sentenced to two terms of probation that were

terminated unsuccessfully and five terms of imprisonment. The court also noted “this case

                                                  -8-
represents the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh felony of the defendant.” But because

defendant’s 40-year sentence exceeded the State’s recommendation, the court granted

defendant’s motion and reduced his sentence to consecutive 8-year prison terms for counts I

through IV, totaling 32 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 31           This appeal followed.

¶ 32                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 33           On appeal, defendant argues (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to move for a directed verdict on the grounds the State did not prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of count I, (2) his aggregate 32-year sentence violates section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the

Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2022)), and (3) the trial court imposed an excessive

sentence. We address each of defendant’s arguments in turn.

¶ 34                           A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 35           Defendant first argues he was denied the effective assistance of his trial counsel

when counsel failed to move for a directed verdict regarding count I at the close of the State’s

case-in-chief. A defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is analyzed under the

two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Veach,

2017 IL 120649, ¶ 29, 89 N.E.3d 366. To prevail, “a defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was (1) deficient and (2) prejudicial.” People v. Westfall, 2018 IL App (4th)

150997, ¶ 61, 115 N.E.3d 1148. “Failure to satisfy either prong negates a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel.” People v. Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88, 129 N.E.3d 755. “ ‘If

it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,

*** that course should be followed.’ ” People v. Garcia, 2021 IL App (1st) 190026, ¶ 26, 220

N.E.3d 309 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

                                                -9-
¶ 36           Prejudice is established when a reasonable probability exists, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Evans,

209 Ill. 2d 194, 219-20, 808 N.E.2d 939, 953 (2004). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Moore, 2020 IL 124538, ¶ 29, 161 N.E.3d 125. “ ‘The likelihood of a

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.’ ” People v. Pope, 2020 IL App (4th)

180773, ¶ 63, 157 N.E.3d 1055 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)). “When

presented with a motion for a directed verdict, ‘[a] court is compelled to direct a verdict in favor

of defendant *** if, in viewing all evidence in favor of the State, the evidence overwhelmingly

favored defendant such that the jury could not have concluded otherwise.’ ” (Emphasis in

original.) People v. Bruemmer, 2021 IL App (4th) 190877, ¶ 59, 192 N.E.3d 823 (quoting People

v. Rascher, 223 Ill. App. 3d 847, 854, 585 N.E.2d 1153, 1158 (1992)).

¶ 37           Here, defendant argues the State failed to prove he knowingly and without

authority entered the Park’s office with the intent to commit a theft on June 20, 2022. See 720

ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2022). Defendant contends, had his trial counsel moved for a directed

finding, it would have been granted because “none of the admitted photographs show [him] in

the office on June 20, 2022.” Therefore, the trial court would have had no choice but to rely on

Besler’s testimony, which defendant characterizes as “incomplete, contradictory, and

insufficient.” But, in determining whether a directed verdict is appropriate, “[t]he trial judge does

not pass upon the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses in testing the

sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict.” People v. Connolly, 322

Ill. App. 3d 905, 915, 751 N.E.2d 1219, 1227 (2001). Instead, “a motion for a directed verdict

*** asks whether the State’s evidence could support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable

                                               - 10 -
doubt, not whether the evidence does in fact support that verdict.” (Emphases in original.)

Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 915. Considering the evidence most strongly in the State’s favor,

we cannot find defendant suffered any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s decision not to

move for a directed finding because the evidence did not overwhelmingly favor defendant so as

to make a not guilty verdict inevitable.

¶ 38           During its case-in-chief, the State presented witness testimony and photographs

suggesting defendant was in the Park’s office without permission, thereby inviting the trial court,

as fact finder, to infer defendant stole money from the office’s cash drawer on four nights in June

2022. Prior to the break-ins, Besler testified he left anywhere between “a couple hundred” to

“several thousand dollars in the office.” However, Besler changed the office’s locks and

purchased a cellular “deer hunting camera” after he noticed money “disappearing” from the

office’s cash drawer, as well as $100 he set aside for the cleaning lady. He installed the camera

“in the office on top of a grandfather clock that was pointing towards *** the front door” and

ensured the camera was operating correctly. Besler also began leaving only $8 in the office’s

cash drawer at night, and when he put up the camera, he observed pry marks on the office’s door

and doorjamb, which subsequently worsened. Mattern testified the damage to the door

“appear[ed] fresh as if it’s a lighter color and *** not the color of the paint.” The same was true

of the doorjamb. Mattern testified the wood was “disturbed and pressed in, and the paint [was]

pushed and discolored.”

¶ 39           According to Besler, the camera took still photographs that were automatically

uploaded to a memory card and sent to his phone. The State then introduced four photographs

labeled as People’s exhibit Nos. 1 through 4, which were admitted into evidence. Besler testified

People’s exhibit Nos. 1 through 4 accurately represented the Park’s office as it was on June 20,

                                               - 11 -
2022, through June 24, 2022. People’s exhibit No. 1 showed an individual exiting the Park’s

office wearing a backwards-facing baseball cap at 10:02 p.m. on June 20, 2022. People’s exhibit

No. 2 showed defendant entering the office at 8:10 p.m. on June 21, 2022. People’s exhibit No. 3

depicted defendant entering the office at 12:02 a.m. on June 23, 2022, holding a tool in his right

hand which, Besler testified, resembled a screwdriver. People’s exhibit No. 4 showed defendant

inside the office at 1:20 a.m. on June 24, 2022. Defendant did not possess an office key, and

Besler testified defendant did not have permission to be in the office at any of those times on any

of those dates. In fact, none of Besler’s employees were allowed in the office at night. Moreover,

the $8 Besler placed “in the drawer every night” was missing the following day, causing Besler

to estimate defendant stole at least $32. He also found pieces of the broken camera in

defendant’s trailer, specifically the camera’s batteries, memory card, and antenna. Besler never

recovered the camera’s “phone card,” but he testified no additional money had gone missing

from the office’s cash drawer since reporting the incidents to police.

¶ 40           Accordingly, when viewing all the evidence in the State’s favor, we cannot say it

overwhelmingly favored defendant. See Bruemmer, 2021 IL App (4th) 190877, ¶ 59. In other

words, a reasonable trier of fact could view this evidence and find defendant guilty of count I.

See Connolly, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 915. Consequently, we conclude defendant suffered no

prejudice as a result of defense counsel’s decision not to move for a directed verdict. See

Hibbler, 2019 IL App (4th) 160897, ¶ 88.

¶ 41                      B. Improper Aggregate Consecutive Sentences

¶ 42           Next, defendant argues his sentence must be reduced, alleging his offenses were

committed as part of a single course of conduct during which his criminal objective did not

change and, thus, the maximum aggregate term of imprisonment should be 28 years, which is the

                                               - 12 -
total of the maximum extended terms available for a Class 2 felony (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35 (West

2022)). Defendant acknowledges he did not properly raise this issue before the trial court but

asks us to consider it as plain error or, alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 43            Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

were not brought to the attention of the trial court. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

The doctrine, however, serves as a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of procedural

default. People v. Ahlers, 402 Ill. App. 3d 726, 733, 931 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (2010). This court

may review unpreserved issues under the plain error doctrine, which we have explained as

follows:

                “The plain-error doctrine allows a court to disregard a defendant’s

                forfeiture and consider unpreserved error in two instances:

                        ‘(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the

                evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to

                tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the

                seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or obvious error

                occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of

                the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial

                process.’ ” People v. Matthews, 2017 IL App (4th) 150911, ¶ 16,

                93 N.E.3d 597 (quoting People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48,

                23 N.E.3d 325).

¶ 44            Defendant asserts his claim is cognizable as first-prong plain error. “Under the

first prong of plain-error analysis, ‘[w]hat makes an error prejudicial is the fact that it occurred in

a close case where its impact on the result was potentially dispositive.’ ” People v. Stevens, 2018

                                                 - 13 -
IL App (4th) 160138, ¶ 71, 115 N.E.3d 1207 (quoting People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 68, 89

N.E.3d 675). “Thus, for purposes of the first prong, the claimed error—substantial or not—has to

be of such a nature that it might have tipped the scales against the defendant.” (Emphasis in

original.) People v. Ely, 2018 IL App (4th) 150906, ¶ 18, 99 N.E.3d 566. “In determining

whether the evidence adduced at trial was close, a reviewing court must evaluate the totality of

the evidence and conduct a qualitative, commonsense assessment of it within the context of the

case.” Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 53.

¶ 45           “Under both prongs of the plain-error analysis, the burden of persuasion remains

with the defendant. [Citation.] As the first step in the analysis, we must determine whether any

error occurred at all.” Matthews, 2017 IL App (4th) 150911, ¶ 17. “If error did occur, we then

consider whether either prong of the plain-error doctrine has been satisfied.” People v. Sykes,

2012 IL App (4th) 111110, ¶ 31, 972 N.E.2d 1272.

¶ 46           Section 5-8-4 of the Unified Code states, in pertinent part:

               “For sentences imposed under the law in effect on or after

               February 1, 1978, the aggregate of consecutive sentences for

               offenses that were committed as part of a single course of conduct

               during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the

               criminal objective shall not exceed the sum of the maximum terms

               authorized under Article 4.5 of Chapter V for the 2 most serious

               felonies involved, but no such limitation shall apply for offenses

               that were not committed as part of a single course of conduct

               during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the

               criminal objective.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(f)(2) (West 2022).

                                               - 14 -
¶ 47           “ ‘The determination of whether a defendant’s actions constitute a single course

of conduct’ or is part of an unrelated course of conduct ‘is a question of fact for the trial court to

determine, and a reviewing court will defer to the trial court’s conclusion unless that conclusion

is against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” People v. Robinson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130837,

¶ 102, 35 N.E.3d 1095 (quoting People v. Hummel, 352 Ill. App. 3d 269, 271, 815 N.E.2d 1172,

1174 (2004)). “So long as the trial court’s conclusion is supported by the record, i.e., not

unreasonable or arbitrary, we will not reverse its decision.” People v. Daniel, 311 Ill. App. 3d

276, 287, 723 N.E. 2d 1279, 1289-90 (2000).

¶ 48           Here, although the trial court made no explicit finding regarding whether

defendant’s offenses were part of an unrelated course of conduct, “there is a presumption that a

trial court knows the law and applies it.” Robinson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130837, ¶ 103; see People

v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 83, 475 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1985) (“Because a court of review

cannot presume the existence of an error that the record does not demonstrate affirmatively, it

must resolve silence in the record against the defendant.”). Because defendant’s 32-year prison

sentence exceeds the sum of the maximum terms allowed for two Class 2 felonies (see 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2022)), we must presume the court found the offenses were not committed

as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature

of the criminal objective.

¶ 49           In resolving this issue, we note our supreme court encountered a somewhat

similar situation in People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 613 N.E.2d 740 (1993). In Bole, the

defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of criminal sexual assault. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 190. The

defendant committed the offenses against his 14-year-old stepdaughter on three separate days

within one week in February 1989. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 191. Ultimately, the trial court found the

                                                - 15 -
offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct and sentenced the defendant to

three consecutive terms of imprisonment under the then-applicable provisions of section 5-8-4(a)

of the Unified Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, ¶ 1005-8-4(a)). Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 191. At that

time, section 5-8-4(a) required consecutive sentences for the subject offenses when committed as

part of a single course of conduct. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 198. However, on appeal, our supreme

court analyzed whether the offenses were committed as part of a single course of conduct and

ultimately concluded they were not. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 194. In so finding, the supreme court

acknowledged the offenses were part of a long-standing pattern of sexual abuse but noted the

assaults were “separate events, committed several days apart, with substantial interruptions in

time.” Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 193-94.

¶ 50           Defendant, on the other hand, urges us to rely upon the Second District’s

unpublished decision in People v. Thompson, 2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, but we find

Thompson distinguishable. In that case, the defendant was found guilty of 12 counts of

unlawfully disseminating child pornography after he sent four e-mails containing multiple lewd

images to a single individual during an e-mail exchange lasting less than 90 minutes. Thompson,

2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, ¶¶ 1, 42. Following the defendant’s convictions, the trial court

imposed consecutive 6-year prison sentences for each count, for a total of 72 years in prison.

Thompson, 2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, ¶ 2. On appeal, the defendant argued his acts

constituted a single course of conduct during which his criminal objective did not change and

thus, his aggregate 72-year sentence violated section 5-8-4(f)(2) of the Unified Code. Thompson,

2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, ¶ 34. The Second District agreed, noting the longest gap in

communication was for 49 minutes, and it determined the four e-mails sent by the defendant

                                                - 16 -
were part of a single course of conduct “with no independent criminal objective breaking the

course of conduct.” Thompson, 2022 IL App (2d) 190950-U, ¶ 42.

¶ 51           Here, unlike in Thompson, the present offenses were not committed within

minutes of each other during a single interaction which lasted less than 90 minutes, and we see

no meaningful difference between the situation presented in Bole and this case. The record

clearly establishes the burglaries were separate events, committed on four different nights

spanning five days in June 2022, with substantial periods of time elapsing between them. C.f.

Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 193-94. As such, the instant offenses did not constitute a single course of

conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective, and

the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive eight-year sentences on all four counts of

burglary. See Daniel, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 287. Accordingly, our plain error analysis need go no

further because “without error, there can be no plain error.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Hood, 2016 IL 118581, ¶ 18, 67 N.E.3d 213. Additionally, “the absence of error

nullifies any ineffective assistance of counsel argument because counsel’s performance is not

deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue.” People v. Stone, 2018 IL App (3d) 160171, ¶ 20,

100 N.E.3d 672.

¶ 52                                  C. Excessive Sentence

¶ 53           Finally, defendant contends his 32-year sentence is excessive and asks this court

to exercise its authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) and

reduce his sentence to seven years’ imprisonment or remand for a new sentencing hearing.

¶ 54           When the trial court’s sentencing decision is within the statutory range for the

offense, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Aquisto, 2022 IL App

(4th) 200081, ¶ 111, 205 N.E.3d 812. A sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion where it is

                                               - 17 -
greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or where it is manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 111. In

determining what sentence to impose, the trial court may consider (1) the defendant’s history,

character, and rehabilitative potential, (2) the seriousness of the offense, (3) the need to protect

society, and (4) the need for punishment and deterrence. People v. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th)

200599, ¶ 34, 203 N.E.3d 961. The seriousness of the offense is the most important sentencing

factor, and the trial court need not give greater weight to rehabilitation or mitigating factors than

to the severity of the offense. Aquisto, 2022 IL App (4th) 200081, ¶ 112. We may not substitute

our judgment for that of the trial court merely because we might have weighed a factor

differently. Klein, 2022 IL App (4th) 200599, ¶ 37.

¶ 55           In the case before us, defendant was convicted of four counts of burglary, a Class

2 felony. 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a), (b) (West 2022). A person convicted of a Class 2 felony is subject

to a sentencing range of three to seven years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West

2022). But because defendant was eligible for an extended term sentence, he was subject to a

sentencing range of 7 to 14 years’ imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1), 5-4.5-35(a)

(West 2022). When a sentence falls within the statutory range of sentences possible for a

particular offense, it is presumed reasonable. People v. Musgrave, 2019 IL App (4th) 170106,

¶ 56, 141 N.E.3d 320. Since the trial court’s eight-year sentence for each count falls within the

relevant sentencing range, we will not disturb the sentence absent an abuse of discretion.

¶ 56           Defendant argues his sentence is excessive because it “is grossly disproportionate

to the seriousness of the offense when considering the underlying facts,” and his conduct

represented the minimum necessary to account for the charged offenses. Defendant cites People

                                                - 18 -
v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, 69 N.E.3d 425, and People v. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st)

151540, 95 N.E.3d 1162, to support his argument.

¶ 57           In Busse, the defendant received a 12-year prison sentence for burglary based on

the theft of $44 in quarters from a university vending machine. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941,

¶ 1. The applicable Class X sentencing range was 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Busse, 2016 IL

App (1st) 142941, ¶ 26. On appeal, the appellate court reduced defendant’s sentence to the

minimum 6-year term because it concluded the 12-year sentence was disproportionate to the

petty nature of the offense. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶¶ 34-37. In Allen, the defendant

was sentenced to 10½ years in prison for burglary of a vehicle. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540,

¶ 7. On appeal, the appellate court, relying on Busse, held the defendant’s sentence did not reflect

the low level of seriousness of the offense, and thus, reduced the defendant’s sentence to the six-

year minimum of the Class X sentencing range. Allen, 2017 IL App (1st) 151540, ¶¶ 15, 22.

¶ 58           However, neither Busse nor Allen supports defendant’s argument because they

were decided on their particular facts and circumstances. See People v. Cunningham, 2018 IL

App (4th) 150395, ¶ 55, 115 N.E.3d 423 (rejecting cross-case comparative sentencing as a basis

for challenging a sentence). More importantly, this court has already disagreed with the

reasoning in Busse and Allen, noting the respective majorities in those cases improperly

substituted their own judgment for that of the General Assembly and the trial court. See

Cunningham, 2018 IL App (4th) 150395, ¶¶ 53-55.

¶ 59           Here, the trial court considered the PSI, defendant’s history and characteristics,

the nature of the offenses, the evidence presented at trial, and the statutory factors in aggravation

and mitigation. While the court recognized “defendant’s criminal conduct did not cause nor

threaten serious physical harm to another,” the court ultimately found a 32-year sentence was

                                                - 19 -
appropriate in light of defendant’s extensive criminal history involving “this exact same type of

behavior.” Defendant’s criminal record consisted of one misdemeanor conviction for criminal

sexual abuse, seven felony convictions—five of which related to either burglary or theft—and

one pending case for obstructing identification. Moreover, at the hearing on defendant’s motion

to reconsider, the court pointed out that despite unsuccessfully completing two terms of

probation and serving five terms of imprisonment, “this case represents the eighth, ninth, tenth,

and eleventh felony of the defendant.” Given the present offenses, defendant’s lengthy criminal

background, and his potential to recommit similar offenses, we cannot say the court abused its

discretion by sentencing defendant to 32 years’ imprisonment in this case. See Aquisto, 2022 IL

App (4th) 200081, ¶ 111.

¶ 60                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 61           For all these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 62           Affirmed.

                                               - 20 -