Court Opinion

ID: 9624234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:55:08.613806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:58.904210
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the court’s disposition of this appeal, I find I cannot agree with its rejection of Loveless’ contention that admission of Dr. Mclver’s testimony violated his privilege against self-incrimination because the jailhouse examination had been conducted without a Miranda warning. I am of the view that the Schmerber1 testi*1213monial test is not an appropriate basis for deciding the question where a psychiatric examination is involved. Rather, I think that Loveless’ right to a Miranda warning must be defined by focusing on whether he could constitutionally have been compelled to submit to the tests and evaluation performed by Dr. Mclver during the jailhouse interview.2
Where the accused has not as yet raised an insanity defense, courts have generally held that the state may not compel a psychiatric examination.3 Similarly, where the question is not simply the sanity of the defendant but his dangerousness, and the issue is raised by the prosecution where the defense does not seek to introduce evidence on the issue, the defendant may not be compelled to participate in a psychiatric examination to determine dangerousness.4 Thus, the relevant decisions appear to establish a general rule that the accused may not be compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination unless he first raises the sanity issue as a defense. Under this rule, Loveless could not have been compelled to undergo an examination by Dr. Mclver if he had been made aware of his rights. Therefore, I conclude that Loveless should have been given the benefit of a Miranda warning in the present case.5
There is an additional reason that a Miranda warning should have been given in the case at hand, however. Even if Loveless had been willing to talk to the psychologist, he should have been made aware of the fact that his responses could be used against him on the issue of his sanity. In State v. Corbin, 15 Or.App. 536, 516 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1973), the court required the psychiatrist to personally give the Miranda warnings. In so holding, the court stated;
The key reason for requiring that the psychiatrist repeat such a warning is to dispel any possibility that the defendant may believe that statements made to the psychiatrist would not or could not be used in court against him. The reasons for this possible misapprehension lie in the vagueness of what is protected by the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship. Even more compelling is the need to dispel any belief that statements made to the psychiatrist would be for the defendant’s own good. The defendant must be aware that the psychiatrist is employed by his adversary and is not primarily his healer. Cf. State v. Phillips, supra, 245 Or. 466 at 471, 472, 422 P.2d 670. For these reasons we feel that as a matter of law a defendant must be warned that his Miranda rights apply to the psychiatric examination.6
I think it appropriate to note that implicit in the foregoing is my disagreement with the court’s conclusion that what are in question here are “verbal acts” or non-testimo*1214nial evidence. The real evidence versus testimonial or communicative evidence distinction as articulated in Schmerber is in my view inappropriate in the context of a psychiatric examination, which inevitably involves the mental processes of the defendant in formulating the content of his responses to the psychiatrist. Even assuming arguendo the appropriateness of a Schmer-ber analysis, however, I would hold that, what Dr. Mclver related as Loveless’ responses to his questioning during the jailhouse interview should be characterized as testimonial evidence.

. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). As the Supreme Court itself noted in Schmerber: “Although we agree that this [testimonial/non-testimonial] distinction is a helpful framework for analysis, we are not to be understood to agree with past applications in all instances. There will be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn.” Id. 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d at 916.

. Schmerber, id. illustrates generally that where the state may constitutionally compel an accused to perform an act, it is not required that the accused be warned that he need not perform it.

. United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700, 707 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 1005, 90 S.Ct. 559, 246 L.Ed.2d 497 (1970); Thorton v. Corcoran, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 407 F.2d 695, 700 (1969); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 724 (4th Cir. 1968). See United States v. Malcolm, 475 F.2d 420, 425 (9th Cir. 1973) (issue discussed in dicta but not reached in appeal court’s holding since it was not raised in the district court below).

. Smith v. Estelle, 445 F.Supp. 647, 663-64 (N.D.Tex.1977).

. See State v. Corbin, 15 Or.App. 536, 516 P.2d 1314 (1973). There the court required that a Miranda warning be given by the examining psychiatrist where the examination was conducted in the defendant’s hospital room the day after the crime was committed.

. This additional interest of the defendant in being informed that information obtained at the psychiatric interview may be used against him at trial would be protected in an examination ordered based on the defendant’s decision to raise an insanity defense. By that stage in the proceedings, the accused has been made aware of his status, and presumably has been advised by counsel of the consequences of his choice. Nevertheless, I express no opinion here on the extent of any waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination which may be implied by the defendant’s decision to raise the defense of insanity.