Court Opinion

ID: 9848412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:19:04.439676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:17.136997
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent regarding the reversal of the district court’s grant of sum*524mary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs claims of unlawful arrest (III B 2); violation of Brady1 (III C); and malicious prosecution (III G). On the remaining issues, I concur and join in the majority opinion.
I.
I agree with the majority and the district court that, based upon the present factual record, prosecutor Spies was not entitled to summary judgment on her defense of absolute immunity. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority and agree with the district court that Spies was entitled to summary judgment in her favor on her defense of qualified immunity.
An arresting agent is entitled to qualified immunity “if a reasonable officer could have believed [the] arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the arresting officers possessed.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.... [T]he court should ask whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances, not whether another reasonable, or more reasonable, interpretation of the events can be constructed ... years after the fact.” Id. at 228, 112 S.Ct. 534.
“The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground of belief of guilt.” United States v. Romero, 452 F.3d 610, 615-16 (6th Cir.2006), cert. denied — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1321, 167 L.Ed.2d 130 (2007). “When determining whether an arrest was supported by probable cause, we utilize a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” Id. at 616 (internal quotation omitted). “The standard of probable cause does not require indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence, but only so much reasonably trustworthy information as to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrestee has committed or is committing an offense.” United States v. Shaw, 464 F.3d 615, 623 (6th Cir.2006) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “[A] finding of probable cause may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, “the probable cause requirement does not require that [police] possess evidence sufficient to establish [even] a prima facie case of guilt at trial.... ” Romero, 452 F.3d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, the district court ruled that, “[a]t the time the plaintiff was arrested and charged, there was a reasonable basis to conclude that probable cause existed.” In support of its finding, the district court stated that “there was ... substantial evidence to corroborate [Harris’s] confession”:
Devan’s aunt knew about and informed authorities about the prior threat the plaintiff had made on Devan’s life. It was corroborated that the plaintiff was walking alone coming home from a friend’s house around the time Devan disappeared. In fact, he had been seen entering the wooded area where Devan’s body was found just near the time that Devan was last seen, heading for that wooded area. Suspiciously, the plaintiff gave the police at least five different versions about where he was and the route he took home before finally admitting the truth. Anthony Harris admitted to a prior act of violence against Devan. Furthermore, the plaintiff confessed that the murder weapon was a *525knife owned by a friend of his. A knife was recovered and, at the time probable cause was determined, was awaiting transportation to the lab for analysis.
Although the district court erred in considering Harris’s confession and the knife, the remaining evidence cited by the district court was sufficient to constitute probable cause for the arrest. Under the totality-of-the-cireumstances, I conclude that the combination of the following evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest: (1) Harris had threatened to kill the victim; (2) shortly after the homicide, Harris was seen in the wooded area near the victim’s body; (3) Harris gave conflicting explanations regarding his whereabouts at the time of the killing; and Harris had previously assaulted the victim. Although the record indicates that other individuals might also be suspects, in my view, the evidence relating to Harris, considered in its totality, was sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that Harris had committed the homicide. Such a belief need not be correct to be reasonable. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227,112 S.Ct. 534.
II.
Next, regarding the alleged Brady violation, the majority opinion acknowledges that plaintiffs amended complaint does not plead a claim based upon a violation of Brady v. Maryland. Furthermore, it concedes that, in opposing defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not move to amend his complaint to assert a Brady claim. Nonetheless, the majority reverses the summary judgment granted in favor of defendants on this unplead claim based upon the “course of proceedings” exception to our notice-pleading requirement. I respectfully disagree.
Our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the plaintiff to plead with specificity only a small class of cases. For instance, claims based upon fraud or mistake must be alleged with particularity. Fed. R.CrvP. 9(b). Regarding all other claims, the plaintiff must state sufficient facts to place the defendant on notice of the claims asserted against him by pleading “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (in pertinent part).
The majority opinion cites nothing contained in the amended complaint that would place defendants on notice of plaintiffs Brady claim. Instead, Judge Moore relies on the “course of the proceedings” exception to our pleading rules. Under this exception, claims that are tried by the mutual consent of the parties are treated as if they were pleaded. In the present case, the error of using this exception is that the alleged notice of the claim arises from questions posed at a discovery deposition. Under our rules, discovery is broad: “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (in pertinent part; emphasis added).
Objections regarding the lack of relevancy of questions need not be raised at the time of the deposition:
Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(d)(3)(A).
Further, despite the lack of relevancy of the questions to the claims asserted, absent a privilege or protective order, a deponent must answer questions posed at a discovery deposition: “A person may instruct a deponent not to answer only when *526necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(d)(1) (in pertinent part).
Unlike Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir.2005), the amended complaint is not “ambiguous” regarding the claim at issue. Moreover, “[tjaken as a whole” the amended complaint did not provide defendants with notice of an alleged Brady claim. Cf. Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir.2001). Further, there is no indication by the questions themselves that the parties consented to the adjudication of a Brady claim. On the contrary, it is reasonable to believe that both counsel assumed that the deposition questions and their answers might lead to relevant evidence. In such an event, plaintiff would decide later whether to assert a Brady claim based upon the information learned through discovery. If plaintiff chose to sue for such a claim, defendants could reasonably expect notice by a motion to amend and an opportunity to be heard. Questions posed at discovery depositions are often far-ranging. Most importantly, the fundamental tenets of procedural due process counsel against liberally creating claims by implication from the asking of discovery questions. See generally, Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”).
For these reasons, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs unplead Brady claim.
III.
Finally, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of the grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor on plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim. In Swiecicki v, Delgado, 463 F.3d 489 (6th Cir.2006), we observed that Ohio requires three necessary elements for a malicious prosecution claim: “(1) malice in instituting (or continuing) the prosecution, (2) lack of probable cause, and (3) termination of the action in favor of the defendant.” Id. at 503 (citing Trussed v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142, 559 N.E.2d 732, 735 (Ohio 1990)).
In the present case, although the district court erred in considering Harris’s confession and the knife, the other evidence connecting Harris to the crime, as discussed above, was sufficient to give rise to probable cause for prosecution. For this reason, plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim fails.
In addition, as the Ohio Court of Appeals held in Vesey v. Connolly, 112 Ohio App. 225, 175 N.E.2d 876 (Oh.Ct.App.1960):
a finding of guilty of a criminal offense by a court having jurisdiction to try and dispose of the case, even though later and finally reversed by a reviewing court, raises a conclusive presumption of probable cause and constitutes a complete defense in a later action for malicious prosecution brought by the defendant in the criminal case against the instigator thereof.
Id. at 878 (emphasis added). See also Tilberry v. McIntyre, 135 Ohio App.3d 229, 733 N.E.2d 636, 641 (Oh.Ct.App.1999).
Here, by operation of Ohio law, the guilty verdict rendered by the trier of fact constitutes a conclusive presumption of probable cause and a complete defense to plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim. The majority opinion cites no Ohio authori*527ty to the contrary. Further, although Judge Moore assumes a Brady violation exception to Ohio’s “conclusive presumption” of probable cause, as detailed above, plaintiffs amended complaint fails to plead facts in support of a Brady claim.
IV.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).