Court Opinion

ID: 9790248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:34.427467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:13.373062
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting, joined by RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice.
I disagree with the majority opinion. In my view, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to reopen the hearing because the additional evidence she sought to introduce was merely cumulative. Moreover, I would hold .that because appellant chose not to seek a continuance of the July 5th custody hearing so that a home study could be conducted, she waived her. right to a home study.
Mrs. Sanguinetti contends that the superior court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to reopen the hearing so that she could obtain and produce the results of a home study. She argues that “[r]efusal of a home study ... denied [her] the opportunity to show the current relationship of the child with his mother in her home environment through a trained social worker.” However, at the custody hearing, a Mr. Newcome from the Department of Health and Social Services testified that he had interviewed Mrs. Sanguinetti several times and that she seemed to be doing well with the child. Furthermore, the master’s findings indicated that appellant is a person suitable to have custody of the child. Additional information on this score would have been merely cumulative and I do not think it was needed by the master. Evidently, the superior court felt likewise and the decision was essentially one committed to its discretion. Thus, since the further evidence which appellant sought to introduce was merely cumulative, I would find no abuse of discretion in denying her motion to reopen the custody hearing.1
*918I would also hold that because appellant chose not to seek a continuance of the July 5th custody hearing so that a home study could be conducted, she waived her right to a home study. As noted by the majority, the standard of proof for an implied waiver was articulated in Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978) where we said:
To prove an implied waiver of a legal right, there must be direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right, or acts amounting to an estoppel by the party whose conduct is to be construed as a waiver, [citations omitted].
576 P.2d at 112. Appellant knew that no home study evidence would be presented at the hearing, yet she decided to go ahead with the evidence she had. Proceeding with the hearing in this situation strikes me as being direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon her right to the home study.
It seems to me quite unsound to allow an attorney who decides to proceed with the trial rather than seek a continuance to later reopen the trial. When appellant learned that the home study evidence would not be available for the hearing, she had a choice to make. She could either move for a continuance until the study had been conducted or she could waive her right to it. She could not wait and gamble on the outcome and then raise the question when she perceived that things had gone badly.
For these reasons I would affirm.

. Many courts from other jurisdictions have held that it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to reopen a case for introduction of evidence which is merely cumulative. See, e. *918g., Middlekauf v. Vinson, 106 Cal.App.2d 204, 234 P.2d 742, 744 (Cal.App.1951); Martinez v. Research Park, Inc., 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200, 207 (N.M.1965); Tsubota v. Gunkel, 58 Wash.2d 586, 364 P.2d 549, 552 (Wash.1961).