Court Opinion

ID: 9365609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 17:07:50.596269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:46.380627
License: Public Domain

J-A01003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    DULCE HUERTAS                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    EL BOCHINCHE RESTAURANT AND                :   No. 248 EDA 2022
    RUTHMIRA GIRALDO                           :

               Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 3, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                              No(s): 181002851

BEFORE:       LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                           FILED JANUARY 24, 2023

        In this premises liability action, Dulce Huertas (Appellant) appeals from

the judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas,

following a jury trial, in favor of defendants El Bochinche Restaurant and

Ruthmira Giraldo (collectively, Appellee).         Appellant first contests the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings regarding: (1) the hearsay exceptions for a

statement made during medical treatment and business records;1 and (2) the

rule of completeness, which governs the admission of a part of a writing in

order to correct a misleading impression created by another part of the

____________________________________________

1   See Pa.R.E. 803(4), (6).
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writing.2 Appellant also challenges the timeliness of the trial court’s mid-trial

granting of her motion in limine, which allegedly permitted Appellee’s opening

argument to refer to the subsequently precluded evidence. We affirm.

                                        I. Facts

        El Bochinche Restaurant is located on North 5th Street in Philadelphia.

Giraldo is the proprietor. On the evening of October 22, 2016, Appellee hosted

a private party, on its premises, for family and friends. A security guard, Larry

Tucker, checked the identifications of patrons and monitored the festivities.

In this matter, Appellant generally avers: (1) Appellee negligently failed to

protect her from reasonably foreseeable injuries; (2) Appellant was assaulted

by a patron, Jose Mina, whom she did not know; and (3) Appellant suffered

injuries as a result.3 Appellant’s Complaint, 10/19/18, at ¶¶ 8-9.

        We first review the pertinent trial testimony. Giraldo, the proprietor,

testified to the following:4         she has been friends with Jose Mina for

approximately 20 years. N.T. Vol. I, 6/22/21, at 183. Mina arrived at the

____________________________________________

2   See Pa.R.E. 106.

3 In her complaint, Appellant also raised a claim of a Dram Shop Act violation,
averring Appellee wrongfully provided alcohol to a visibly intoxicated Mina.
See 47 P.S. § 4-493(1) (it shall be unlawful for liquor licensee to sell or furnish
liquor to any person visibly intoxicated); Juszczyszyn v. Taiwo, 113 A.3d
853, 858 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A violation of the Dram Shop Act is deemed
negligence per se.”). However, this claim was abandoned by the time of trial.

4 Giraldo, Appellant, and several other witnesses testified with a Spanish
interpreter.

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party around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. with four people, including Appellant. Id.

at 143-44, 184. Mina introduced his friends, again including Appellant, to

Giraldo. Id. at 144. Later that night, Giraldo observed Appellant and another

woman fighting and pulling each other’s hair.       Id. at 148; N.T. Vol. II,

6/23/21, at 31. Mina separated the two women, and Security Guard Tucker

escorted them outside. N.T., 6/22/21, at 148-49. Giraldo stated Mina was

not intoxicated that night and she did not see him hit anyone. N.T., 6/22/21,

at 183-86, 189; N.T., 6/23/21, at 34.

      Security Guard Tucker testified that when Appellant arrived at the party,

she appeared “tipsy.” N.T. Vol. III, 6/24/21, at 57-58. Later, he was informed

“something [was] going on” in the back of the restaurant, and he observed

Appellant and another woman “tussling.” Id. at 54, 55, 62, 78. Tucker gave

commands to stop, separated the women, and escorted them out. Id. at 55-

57. Tucker denied there was anyone else separating the women, but agreed

that no man was involved in the fight. Id. at 82, 83.

      Meanwhile, Appellant provided a different account of events.         She

testified to the following: she arrived at the party alone and met her female

friend there. N.T. Vol. VI, 6/29/21, at 26, 28. Later in the night, Appellant

went to the bathroom and saw a young woman, on the floor, with her face

bleeding and appearing to have “been beat up.” Id. at 31. Appellant helped

the woman clean up. Id. Outside the bathroom, Appellant offered to take

her home. Id. A man, whom Appellant did not know and who appeared to

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be intoxicated, “mov[ed] through the crowd” and hit Appellant three times in

her face. Id. at 31, 33. He had a gun. Id. at 32. Other men intervened to

help Appellant, and one man drove Appellant home in her car. Id. at 32-33.

Appellant then drove herself to the police station.5 An officer took her to El

Bochinche Restaurant, but the man who hit her was no longer there.6 Id. at

34. Around 5:30 a.m., Appellant sought treatment for her left eye area at the

emergency department at Nazareth Hospital, and she was transported to

Temple University Hospital for surgery.              See id. at 35-37; Trial Ct. Op.,

6/23/22, at 4. Appellant gave a statement to police a few days later.

       Philadelphia Police Detective James Sloan testified that he interviewed

Appellant on October 26, 2016, three days after the alleged incident. N.T.,

6/23/21, at 102.       At trial, he read aloud her written interview, which was

consistent with her testimony — that in the restaurant she saw a young

woman who appeared to have been beaten up; Appellant helped her; and a

man hit her three times in the face. Id. at 103. Appellant gave a description

of the man, but did not know him.              Id.     at 104, 106.   Detective Sloan

____________________________________________

5Appellant initially went to the 25th Police District, but was informed it was
not “the right corresponding district,” and an officer took her to the
appropriate district. N.T., 6/29/21, at 34.

6 Giraldo similarly testified that approximately an hour and a half after her
removal, Appellant returned to the restaurant with a police officer, stated they
were looking for someone, but left when they did not see him. N.T., 6/22/21,
at 145.

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attempted to retrieve surveillance video from El Bochinche Restaurant, but

the videos from that night “had been taped over.” Id. at 111. Fifteen days

later, Appellant informed Detective Sloan she learned the man was named

Jose Mina. Id. at 107-08. Appellant provided his address and a description

of his car and license plate. Id. at 108. Mina did not testify at trial.7

                               II. Procedural History

       Appellant filed the underlying complaint on October 19, 2018, raising

one count of negligence against Appellee. On June 19, 2021, the Saturday

before trial was to begin, Appellant filed a motion in limine to preclude

evidence of her prior, unrelated automobile accidents and assaults.

Appellant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Other Incidents, 6/19/21,

at 3-5. The court heard argument on the morning of trial, but deferred a

ruling.   In opening arguments, however, Appellant referred to these prior

incidents, and then Appellee did the same. N.T., 6/22/21, at 87-88, 90. Later,

mid-trial, the court granted Appellant’s motion to preclude the evidence.

N.T., 6/29/21, at 100.

       The witnesses testified as summarized above. Pertinent to Appellant’s

claims on appeal, we note the following evidentiary rulings. First, the trial

____________________________________________

7Detective Sloan testified Mina was charged for this alleged assault against
Appellant, was arrested in Florida, and had a preliminary hearing, but the
detective did not know the current status of the criminal charges. N.T.,
6/23/21, at 117-19.

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court admitted, over Appellant’s objection, a statement in Appellant’s

Nazareth Hospital record: “Pt [Appellant] reports she was punched in [one]

eye last night while walking down the street.”       See N.T., 6/29/21, 7-11;

Nazareth Hospital EDM *Live*, 10/23/16 (Nazareth Statement).           However,

the trial court denied Appellant’s request to admit a statement from her

Temple University Hospital, Ophthalmology Department record:

      [Appellant] was at a restaurant/bar Saturday night – at about
      [1:00 a.m. 10/23. S]he was assisting a young woman on her way
      from the bathroom. An unknown male punched her about the left
      side of her face around the eye three times with a closed fist. . . .

Temple Health Report, 10/24/16, at 1 (Temple Statement); see also N.T.,

6/29/21, at 95-97

      On July 6, 2021, the jury found in favor of Appellee. On the verdict slip,

the jury indicated its finding, in response to the first question, that Appellee

was not negligent.    The jury thus did not reach the remaining questions

regarding: the causation of Appellant’s injuries; Appellant’s own negligence;

and the amount of damages.

      Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court did

not rule on. Upon praecipe by Appellant, judgment was entered on January

3, 2022, in favor of Appellee. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a

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court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on

appeal.8

                    III. Statement of Questions Involved

        Appellant presents four issues for our review:

        1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
        denying Appellant’s post- trial motion request for the trial court to
        vacate the verdict and [o]rder a new trial.

        2. Whether the trial court improperly permitted [Appellee] to
        enter into evidence and publish to the jury a narrative statement
        from Appellant’s Nazareth Hospital medical records, despite the
        same being unreliable hearsay, over Appellant’s strenuous
        objections.

        3. Whether the trial court improperly prohibited Appellant from
        bringing out a narrative statement from Appellant’s Temple
        Hospital medical records that would have completely contradicted
____________________________________________

8   Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement set forth the following two claims:

        1. The trial court committed an error of law and abuse of
        discretion by not granting [Appellant’s] post-trial motion request
        for the trial court to vacate the verdict and Order a new trial.

        2. The trial court committed an error of law and abuse of
        discretion by committing the several serious erroneous
        evidentiary rulings at the trial of this matter, as described in
        [Appellant’s] post-trial motion.

Appellant’s Statement of Errors Complained of Upon Appeal Pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 2/15/22, at 1-2. The first claim baldly challenges the
denial of her post-trial motion, without stating any particular claim. The
second issue similarly, vaguely refers to “several serious evidentiary rulings.”
See id. We remind Appellant’s counsel that “[a]n overly vague or broad Rule
1925 statement may result in waiver[,]” and a “Rule 1925(b) statement must
be detailed enough so that the judge can write a Rule 1925(a) opinion[.]” See
Majorsky v. Douglas, 58 A.3d 1250, 1258 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).

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      a narrative of “fraud” that was promulgated by Appellee[ ] based
      upon an incomplete set of records[.]

      4. Whether the trial court failed to timely rule upon a motion in
      limine filed by Appellant, with the effect that [Appellee was]
      permitted to repeatedly call Appellant a liar during their opening
      statement with reference to “other incidents” that the trial court
      later acknowledged were not relevant to this case and which were
      not allowed to be brought into evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

  IV. Standard of Review, General Hearsay Rule, & Negligence Law

      We note the relevant standard of review:

      We review a trial court’s decision concerning the admissibility of
      evidence for an abuse of discretion. “An abuse of discretion is not
      merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
      misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
      partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” In addition, before
      a ruling on evidence constitutes reversible error, it must have
      been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.

Adams v. Rising Sun Med. Ctr., 257 A.3d 26, 33 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citations omitted).

      We consider the general rule against hearsay:

      “‘[H]earsay’ is defined as an out-of-court statement, which is
      offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
      [See Pa.R.E. 801.] Generally, hearsay is inadmissible because it
      is deemed untrustworthy since it was not given under oath and
      subject to cross-examination. However, the law recognizes that
      there are some circumstances attendant to the making of out-of-
      court statements that provide sufficient guarantees of their
      trustworthiness to depart from the requirement that the declarant
      be subject to cross-examination.         That is the rationale
      underpinning exceptions to the hearsay rule. Thus, it is burden of
      the proponent of hearsay evidence to convince the court of the
      admissibility of the evidence under an exception before such
      testimony will be admitted.

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Adams, 257 A.3d at 35-36 (some citations omitted).

       Finally, we note that to prove negligence, a plaintiff must establish there

was:

       “(1) a legally recognized duty that the defendant conform to a
       standard of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3)
       causation between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)
       actual damage to the plaintiff.”

            The duty element of negligence is akin to the duty element in
       a claim of premises liability, as both are defined by a
       reasonableness standard: “The duty owed to a business invitee is
       the highest duty owed to any entrant upon land. The landowner
       is under an affirmative duty to protect a business visitor not only
       against known dangers but also against those which might be
       discovered with reasonable care.”

Massaro v. McDonald’s Corp., 280 A.3d 1028, 1035-36 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citations omitted).

              V. Admission of Nazareth Hospital Statement

       In her first issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in admitting, as

unreliable hearsay, the statement in Nazareth Hospital record. Appellant’s

Brief at 10. As stated above, this statement was, “[Appellant] reports she

was punched in [one] eye last night while walking down the street[.]”

Nazareth Statement.

       By way of background, we first summarize the following: at trial,

Appellee sought to admit the statement under two hearsay exceptions — as a

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Pa.R.E. 803(4) statement made in the course of medical treatment 9 and a

Pa.R.E. 803(25) admission by a party-opponent.10 N.T., 6/29/21, at 7. The

trial court agreed the statement was admissible under both exceptions and,

furthermore, under the business-record exception.11 N.T., 6/29/21, at 10-12.

In its opinion, the court addresses the admission of the evidence under all

three exceptions. Trial Ct. Op. at 5-8.

       On appeal, Appellant first avers:

       Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the Nazareth Statement was
       not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement[,] because
       [Appellee] failed to establish that it reliably recorded [Appellant’s]
       own words — it was neither established that the person who
       recorded the statement wrote down [Appellant’s] verbatim words
       nor that a translator was present to translate [Appellant’s] words
       since she did not fluently speak English. . . .

____________________________________________

9 See Pa.R.E. 803(4) (the following is not excluded by general rule against
hearsay: a statement that “(A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to
— medical treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment; and (B)
describes medical history, past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof”).

10 See Pa.R.E. 803(25)(A) (a party may offer against an opposing party a
statement made by that opposing party).

11 See Pa.R.E. 803(6) (a record is not excluded by rule against hearsay if: (A)
the record was made at or near the time of the event by someone with
knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
activity of a “business,” (C) making the record was a regular practice of that
activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian
or other qualified witness, or by certification; and (E) neither the source of
information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness).

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Appellant’s Brief at 10 (emphasis added). We disagree with both components

of this argument.

      Foremost, it does not appear, as Appellant asserts, that the trial court

found the Nazareth Statement was admissible as a prior inconsistent

statement. Appellant has not cited the place in the record where the court

made such a ruling.     See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c) (if reference is made to the

evidence, appellant’s argument must set forth a reference to the place in the

record where the matter referred to appears). Furthermore, even if the court

had found a prior inconsistent statement, Appellant’s supporting reasoning —

whether the statement accurately memorialized what she in fact said — goes

to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility under any particular

hearsay exception. Accordingly, no relief is due on this line of reasoning.

      Next, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting the Nazareth

Statement under the business record exception. Appellant contends that if a

medical record is admitted under the business record exception, it is

“competent to show only the fact of hospitalization, the treatment prescribed,

and the complaints and symptoms stated by the plaintiff.” Appellant’s Brief

at 11, citing Williams v. McClain, 520 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Pa. 1987).

      We emphasize, however, that the trial court also found two additional

bases for admitting the Nazareth Statement: it was a statement made in the

course of medical treatment and it was an admission by a party-opponent.

See Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7 (“The out-of-court statement was made by . . .

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Appellant to her treating physician within hours of sustaining her injuries and

was clearly contemplated and communicated for the purposes of a medical

diagnosis or treatment[,]” and, “Appellant communicated to her treating

physician relevant facts relating to show how she sustained her injuries, and

the defense offered the statement in support of its theory that she sustained

her injuries outside of El Bochinche Resturante.”). See also N.T., 6/26/21,

at 10-11 (trial court finding, “[I]t was important for the health care providers

at Nazareth Hospital to know why [Appellant] went there in the first place.”).

       On appeal, Appellant does not present any challenge to these bases for

admitting the Nazareth Statement. Thus, even if we were to agree with her

business records argument, in the absence of any dispute to the other two

bases for admission, we would affirm this ruling.12 Accordingly, no relief is

due.

                VI. Preclusion of Temple Hospital Statement

       In her second issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in precluding

a statement in her Temple University Health, Department of Ophthalmology

record. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. That record stated that Appellant told the

medical staff:

____________________________________________

12 See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Scott, 271 A.3d 897, 908 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(this Court may affirm on any legal basis). We emphasize we offer no opinion
on the admission of the Nazareth Statement under the business records
hearsay-exception.

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     [Appellant] was at a restaurant/bar Saturday night — at about 1
     am 10/23[. S]he was assisting a young woman on her way from
     the bathroom. An unknown male punched her about the left side
     of her face around the eye three times with a closed fist. . . .

Temple Statement.

     We first set forth the context of the trial court’s ruling.   The parties

argued about the admissibility of the Temple Statement at the same time the

trial court considered the Nazareth Statement. See N.T., 6/29/21, at 9-10.

Citing the rule of completeness, or Pa.R.E. 106, Appellant claimed the Temple

Statement and the Nazareth Statement should be considered together as one

complete medical record. See N.T., 6/29/21, at 9, 12-13, 94. The trial court

disagreed, reasoning the Temple Statement would not clarify the Nazareth

Statement, and in fact would contradict it. Id. at 96-97. Furthermore, the

court reasoned, Appellant could not present the Temple Statement because it

would not be against a party opponent — that is, Appellant could not present

a statement that she herself previously made. Id. at 13, 97.

     On appeal, Appellant first contends the Temple Statement should have

been admitted under Pa.R.E. 613(c) as a prior consistent statement, to

rehabilitate her following the presentation of the Nazareth Statement.

Appellant’s Brief at 14-15. We deem this claim waived for appeal, as it was

not raised before the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Rosser, 135 A.3d

1077, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc) (“Where the trial court denies relief

on one theory, a defendant may not attain appellate relief on a new theory for

that same relief.”); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 909 A.2d 839, 845 (Pa. Super.

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2006) (“A theory of error different from that presented to the trial jurist is

waived on appeal, even if both theories support the same basic allegation of

error which gives rise to the claim for relief.”) (citation omitted). We add that

Appellant’s citations to the trial transcripts, for her objections, all relate to her

rule of completeness argument. See Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant does

not cite any place in the record where she raised a “prior inconsistent

statement” argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c).

      Next on appeal, Appellant reiterates her rule of completeness argument.

In support, she contends the Temple and Nazareth Statements “are closely

related.”   Appellant’s Brief at 17.      She further reasons “[t]he Nazareth

Statement is only one sentence long,” and she was “only briefly evaluated

[there] before being rushed by ambulance to Temple Hospital[.]”                  Id.

Appellant thus asserts her “full statement of the event was recorded only at

Temple.” Id. at 18. Finally, Appellant alleges she was prejudiced, by the

preclusion of the Temple Statement, because Appellee was “able to create the

false impression that [she] said one thing to the police and jury [but]

something else entirely to her medical treaters[.]” Id. at 16, 18. We conclude

no relief is due.

      Rule 106, “commonly referred to as the ‘rule of completeness,’”

provides:

      Remainder of or Related Writings or Recorded Statements

      If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement,
      an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of

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      any other part — or any other writing or recorded statement —
      that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

Pa.R.E. 106; Commonwealth v. Raboin, 258 A.3d 412, 422 (Pa. 2021). The

rule’s comment states:

      The purpose of Pa.R.E. 106 is to give the adverse party an
      opportunity to correct a misleading impression that may be
      created by the use of a part of a writing . . . that may be taken
      out of context. This rule gives the adverse party the opportunity
      to correct the misleading impression at the time that the evidence
      is introduced. The trial court has discretion to decide whether
      other parts, or other writings . . . ought in fairness to be
      considered contemporaneously with the proffered part.

Pa.R.E. 106, cmt. Our Supreme Court has explained Rule 106 is invoked as

follows: (1) a writing is introduced; (2) the writing creates “a misleading

impression[;]” and thus (3) “the adverse party [may] seek admission of all or

part of that or another writing . . . in order to provide context.” Raboin, 258

A.3d at 422-23. We conclude no relief is due.

      First, we disagree with the trial court’s rationale, at trial, that the rule

of completeness was inapplicable because the Temple Statement would not

serve to clarify the Nazareth Statement, but in fact to contradict it. See N.T.,

6/29/21, at 97. See also Trial Ct. Op. at 9 (“Appellant’s reliance on Rule 106

is misplaced [because the Temple Statement] in no way makes clearer the

accuracy of [the Nazareth Statement].”). Indeed, the purpose of admitting a

writing under Rule 106 is “to correct a misleading impression” created by

another writing introduced by the adverse party. See Pa.R.E. 106, cmt.

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      However, we agree with the additional reasoning set forth in the trial

court’s opinion — that the Temple Statement and Nazareth Statement are not,

in fact, a part of the same writing. See Trial Ct. Op. at 9. The court reasoned:

      Appellant was first taken to Nazareth Hospital where she gave a
      recorded statement during a distinct medical examination to a
      distinct medical provider. She was later transported to Temple
      Hospital — another distinct medical provider — wherein she gave
      yet another recorded stating during a separate, distinct, medical
      examination. . . .

Id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments to the contrary — that

the brevity of both her Nazareth Hospital visit and the Nazareth Statement

make it somehow reliant or dependent on the longer Temple Statement and

Temple Hospital treatment. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18 (“In this context

[Appellant’s] full statement of the event was recorded only at Temple.”)

(emphasis added). Appellant does not dispute that she visited two unrelated

hospital systems. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that that Rule

106 does not apply. See Pa.R.E. 106; Adams, 257 A.3d at 33.

      Additionally, we agree with the trial court’s rationale that Appellant was

not prejudiced by the preclusion of the Temple Statement. See Trial Ct. Op.

at 10. See also Adams, 257 A.3d at 33. The salient evidence from the

Temple Statement that Appellant sought to present was that she incurred the

injury at the restaurant. This evidence was merely cumulative of Appellant’s

trial testimony, as well her recorded interview with Detective Sloan. See N.T.,

6/23/21, at 103; N.T., 6/29/21, at 31.        See also Commonwealth v.

Yocolano, 169 A.3d 47, 53 (Pa. Super. 2017) (harmless error can be found

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where erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other

untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously

admitted evidence).

      Finally, the relevance of the Temple Statement — specifically, the place

where Appellant incurred her injury — would ostensibly go to the cause of her

injuries. This is but one of the four factors a plaintiff must establish for a

negligence claim. See Massaro, 280 A.3d at 1035-36. Appellant overlooks

that the jury specifically found Appellee was not negligent, under the first

factor. Indeed, in so finding, the jury did not reach the second question on

the verdict sheet — whether Appellee’s negligence was a factual cause of

Appellant’s injuries. Jury Verdict Sheet, 7/1/21, at 1. Accordingly, no relief

is due.

      VII. Timeliness of Trial Court’s Ruling on Motion in Limine

      In her final issue, Appellant asserts the trial court failed to timely rule

on her motion in limine to preclude evidence of prior incidents. Appellant’s

Brief at 19.   Although the court ultimately granted her motion, Appellant

asserts the court’s belated decision allowed Appellee to refer to the prior

incidents in its opening argument. Id. at 19, 22. Appellant thus maintains

she was prejudiced. Id. We conclude no relief is due.

      A trial court has broad powers over the conduct of a trial, and we review

a court’s ruling on an objection during counsel’s opening statement for an

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 919 A.2d 943, 949 (Pa.

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2007). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate

court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of

manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 949-50.

      We first note that in complaining of the timing of the trial court’s ruling,

Appellant ignores the timing of her own filing. In its opinion, the trial court

explained the following: on June 16, 2021, one week before trial, it conducted

a hearing on the parties’ pre-trial motions in limine. That Saturday, June 19th,

Appellant filed an additional motion in limine, seeking to preclude evidence of

other incidents — two motor vehicle accidents and two assaults — involving

herself. See Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11.

      Monday, June 21, 2021, was a court holiday, and trial was scheduled to

begin the next day, June 22nd. Trial Ct. Op. at 11. While Appellee was able

to file a response to the motion in limine on the 22nd, the trial court was not

aware of the new filing until that day. Id. Appellant explained the new motion

arose from a deposition, which had “just occurred.”       N.T., 6/22/21, at 30.

Nevertheless, the trial court stated its desire to provide both parties with the

opportunity to present their issues, even though it would delay the start of

trial. Id. at 52. See also Appellant’s Brief at 7 (acknowledging “[t]he trial

judge held a very long hearing”).

      We next summarize the parties’ competing arguments. First, Appellant

explained that in a deposition, Appellee’s expert neurologist was repeatedly

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asked about Appellant’s prior motor vehicle accidents and assaults.         N.T.,

6/22/21, at 30. However, Appellant asserted, there was no basis or expert

report for a medical causation issue, and thus she sought to exclude any

evidence or suggestion that her present injury was the result of a preexisting

condition. Id. at 30-31. Appellee responded with an entirely different purpose

for presenting the evidence: to show Appellant’s incredibility. Appellee stated

that when Appellee’s expert neurologist asked about her medical history and

any prior traumas, Appellant denied she had any. Id. at 31-32.

      The trial court explained it was aware of the “expectant jury awaiting

entry to the courtroom,” as well as the need for further argument on the

motion, and thus deferred a formal ruling. Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Nevertheless,

with respect to Appellee’s incredibility claim, the court advised the parties that

if a witness “make[s] an inconsistency on the stand, [the] other party has a

right to cross-examine [and] follow up on that.” N.T., 6/22/21, at 52-53. The

court stated, “I don’t want to elaborate too much on my ruling because I’ll

leave it up to the parties to take the appropriate action if the situation calls

for it[.]” Id. at 54.

      Appellant’s counsel sought clarification on whether their opening

arguments could refer to “what the doctors said[.]” N.T., 6/22/21, at 54. The

court responded, “[I]f it’s going to impeachment or something like that, . . .

you’re allowed to bring that in[,]” but instructed the attorneys not to discuss

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anything they believed, in good faith, would not be admissible during the trial.

Id. at 55-56.

      Next, in Appellant’s opening argument, counsel referred to the prior

incidents and Appellant’s response to questions about them:

      There’s some things that have happened to [Appellant] over the
      years, couple car accidents, she’s been assaulted a couple
      times[.] She didn’t go to the emergency room and report it, it’s
      not something she thought about until afterward. She didn’t feel
      any effects afterward[.] And when she’s asked about it later,
      she doesn’t really talk about it[,] she talks about the incident
      that impacted her, and you’re going to hear from her exactly what
      that is.

N.T., 6/22/21, at 87-88 (emphases added).

      Appellee’s counsel then stated in opening argument:

          This, ladies and gentlemen, is a fraud. [Appellant] is coming
      to you telling you something that is completely untrue. It is
      completely false. . . .

         [Appellant’s] counsel talked of these various details that will
      come up, these prior assaults[ and] motor vehicle accidents. . . .

           You see, we took [Appellant’s] deposition[, which is] sworn
      testimony[,] under oath. . . .

           [Appellant] was specifically asked whether or not she was
      involved in any motor vehicle accidents. She said, No[.]

          She was then shown medical records . . . from [two motor
      vehicle accidents.]

          She was also asked whether or not she was ever assaulted
      before this incident. And she said, I was not, under oath. [That
      response] is nothing short of a blatant lie.

N.T., 6/22/21, at 90-92.

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      As stated above, Appellant’s complaint on appeal is that in opening

argument, Appellee improperly discussed the prior incidents, which the trial

court subsequently ruled were not admissible. She wholly ignores, however,

that it was her own counsel who raised it first in opening argument. We thus

disagree with Appellant’s contention that she was prejudiced by Appellee’s

opening argument statements. See Parker, 919 A.2d at 949.

      Furthermore, Appellant also ignores additional discussion by the trial

court. The court had given the jury both a preliminary instruction and final

instruction that the attorneys’ opening statements were not evidence, and

that the jury was not to consider the opening statements “as established

facts.” Trial Ct. Op. at 13, citing N.T., 6/22/21, at 73; N.T., 7/1/21, at 6.

“The law presumes that the jury will follow the instructions of the court.”

Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 A.3d 1203, 1222 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citation omitted). Appellant presents no argument to the contrary. For the

foregoing reasons, we conclude no relief is due on this final issue.

                              VIII. Conclusion

      For the above stated reasons, we deny relief on Appellant’s multiple

evidentiary claims. Thus, we affirm the judgment entered in favor of Appellee.

      Judgment affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/24/2023

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