Court Opinion

ID: 9492552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:43:54.126848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:21.820380
License: Public Domain

DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
It is undisputed that when Officer Harvey requested permission to look in Mr. Worley’s amphetamine-laden shopping bag, the first words uttered by Mr. Worley in response were, “You’ve got the badge.” Mr. Worley’s testimony before the magistrate judge suggested that these were his last words as well. Officer Harvey and Officer Clinton both testified, however, *388that Mr. Worley went on to say, “I guess you can.” The magistrate judge — who had an opportunity to observe Mr. Worley’s demeanor on the witness stand, as well as the officers’ — found that Worley did in fact say, “I guess you can.” That finding stands unchallenged, and we must take it as given that Mr. Worley’s testimony as to how he answered Officer Harvey’s request was incomplete.
Mr. Worley further testified, in response to a series of pointed questions from his lawyer, that he did not feel he could say no to a police officer; that he did not feel he could walk away from Officer Harvey; and that he did not “feel ... [that he] had any choice in him looking in that Host Marriott bag.”
Based on this and similar testimony given by Mr. Worley as to his subjective feelings, defense counsel argued that Wor-ley “merely acquiesced to [sic] the officer’s authority rather than giving his unequivocal, voluntary consent to the search.” But pointing out that the officers had never asserted authority to conduct the search without consent and had not otherwise attempted to trick or coerce Mr. Worley into “acquiescence,” the magistrate judge rejected defense counsel’s argument. As a matter of law, the magistrate judge concluded,
“Defendant’s subjective belief is not enough to negate voluntariness. Defendant ‘must show more than a subjective belief of coercion, but also some objectively improper action on the part of the police.’ United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir.1995).”
Objectively, the magistrate judge went on to conclude, a reasonable police officer would understand Mr. Worley’s answer to Officer Harvey’s request as unequivocally affirmative:
“Defendant gave verbal consent with the words ‘You’ve got the badge, I guess you can.’ These words express consent to search within the context of the facts. See United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 672, 675 (6th Cir.1985) (holding defendant’s response to request to search by saying ‘no problem,’ and response to subsequent request to search box within the suitcase with ‘you’re looking,’ valid consent to search under the facts).”
“Furthermore, defendant’s age, intelligence and education indicated the ability to freely consent; the questioning of defendant took place in public and was of short duration; defendant’s experiences with law enforcement in 1991 and the early 1980’s suggested a familiarity with his rights and with criminal procedure; and, there was no evidence whatsoever of coercion or intimidation by the officers. All of the evidence showed that defendant’s consent was voluntary.”
I agree — and the district judge did too, at first. Upon further consideration, however, and after acknowledging that “I did want Mr. Worley here,” the district judge concluded that Mr. Worley’s response “was not an unequivocal expression of free and voluntary consent. In fact, it was merely — -it was — it was something of the opposite, it was an expression of futility in resistance to authority....”
With respect, I am not persuaded that a reasonable police officer standing in Officer Harvey’s shoes would have taken Mr. Worley’s words as the “opposite” of free and voluntary consent. The consent was rueful rather than cheerful, to be sure, but it was uncoerced consent. Mr. Worley— no stranger to police procedure — was not forced to give an affirmative response to the officer’s request, and the response clearly was affirmative. “I guess you can,” as a matter of plain English, does not mean “I guess you can’t.”
To the extent that the district court’s granting of the motion to suppress rests on a conclusion of law, I think the conclusion was erroneous. To the extent that it may rest on a finding of fact, I think the finding was clearly erroneous — and I am strengthened in this view by the circumstance that although the magistrate judge was given an opportunity to hear from Mr. *389Worley in person, the district judge was not.
It seems to me, in short, that the magistrate judge got it right. I would therefore reverse the order in which the district court granted the motion to suppress.