Court Opinion

ID: 9473090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:19:02.07555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:18.755973
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court that a state’s inadvertent or mistaken waiver is not an effective waiver of the exhaustion requirement. Since I find a mistake clearly appearing in the record, I would hold that the state’s waiver is ineffective. Having found no effective waiver, I would not address the issue of whether the state’s attorney has authority to waive the exhaustion requirement. Even if I were to agree that the state’s waiver is effective and that a state’s attorney has the power to make such a waiver, I would remand to the district court for a discretionary determination of whether the waiver should be accepted.
The court recognizes that following Davis v. Campbell, 608 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir.1979), “mistaken or inadvertent statements regarding exhaustion cannot rise to the level of waiver at all,” ante at 708, whether those statements are unequivocal or ambiguous. That the state’s pleading concerning exhaustion is unequivocal on its face is irrelevant to the determination of whether a waiver is effective or, on the other hand, tainted by mistake or inadvertence. Here, the majority finds the state’s contention at oral argument and in the appellate briefs that its concession was “a big mistake” insufficient to render this waiver ineffective. The court, however, ignores the evidence of mistake that clearly appears on the record.
In response to. Purnell’s petition, the state characterized Purnell’s claims on exclusion of psychiatric testimony and failure to declare a mistrial as state law attacks on the district court’s exercise of discretion. As such, the state was correct in pleading that Purnell “raised all the above grounds” before the Missouri Supreme Court on appeal and that the state consequently “concedes that [Purnell] has exhausted his available state remedies.”
Despite the state’s characterization, the district court found constitutional implications in Purnell’s claims. After reading Purnell’s state supreme court brief and the *712Missouri Supreme Court’s opinion, the district court became skeptical of whether Purnell had effectively raised his constitutional claims in state court and asked for briefs on the issue. The state then recognized its mistake, changed its position, and requested dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court recognized that the state’s assessment of Pur-nell’s claims in its original pleading was mistaken because the petition raised constitutional claims that had not been effectively raised in state court.
The error clearly appears in the record before the district court: the state conceded exhaustion based on the mistaken premise that Purnell’s habeas claims were the same nonconstitutional claims that had been presented to the state court in Pur-nell’s direct appeal. In my view, the court should not extend that concession to embrace the constitutional claims addressed in Part I of the court’s opinion. Davis holds that an erroneous concession that exhaustion has occurred is not an effective waiver. Since the record shows the state’s concession was erroneous, Davis compels af-firmance of the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Thus it is not necessary or appropriate for us to address the issue of whether a state’s attorney has power to make a waiver.
Even if I were to agree that Missouri’s pleading constitutes an effective waiver of the. exhaustion requirement and that the state’s attorney has power to make that waiver, I would not direct the district court immediately to consider Purnell’s petition on its merits. The court recognizes that “ordinarily it will be appropriate for federal district courts to have the discretionary power to accept or reject a waiver of exhaustion,” ante at 710. I agree that a district court should be allowed to consider, subject to review for abuse of discretion, circumstances such as those discussed in McGee v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 1206, 1214 (5th Cir.1984), and Thompson v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir.1983), and reject even an effective waiver if justice or the public interest so requires. I also agree that rejection of a state’s waiver may be “ ‘the extraordinary course,’ ” ante at 710. Nevertheless, the district court must consider whether to accept or reject a waiver in every case in which a waiver appears. Here, the district court made no such determination because it found there was no waiver. The majority’s conclusion that “the ultimate disposition of this case will be advanced by consideration of Purnell’s claims on their merits” invades the province of the district court and strips it of its discretionary power by requiring acceptance of the waiver on grounds of expediency alone.
I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of Purnell’s petition for failure to exhaust state remedies. Even if I thought the state had waived its right to insist on exhaustion, the district court should have an opportunity to determine whether that waiver should be accepted. Accordingly, I dissent from Part II of the court’s opinion.