Court Opinion

ID: 4243623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2018-02-08 21:34:15.272643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:23.010999
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals
                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
                               ________________
                               NO. 09-17-00448-CV
                              _________________

                           IN THE INTEREST OF J.P.

________________________________________________________________________

                    On Appeal from the 317th District Court
                          Jefferson County, Texas
                        Trial Cause No. C-225,478-A
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant S.P., the mother of the minor child J.P., appeals the trial court’s

final order terminating her parental rights.1 We affirm.

      On December 21, 2016, the Department of Family and Protective Services

(the “Department”) filed its Original Petition for Protection of a Child, for

Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship against S.P. and J.P.’s father, R.W. Following separate evidentiary

      1
        To protect the identity of the minor child, we have not used the names of
the child, parents, or other family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
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hearings, the trial court signed orders terminating the parental rights of R.W. and

S.P., respectively.2 After the trial court rendered judgment against her, S.P. perfected

her appeal.

      S.P.’s appellate counsel subsequently filed a brief that presents counsel’s

professional evaluation of the record and concludes that there are no arguable

grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967);

In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (applying

Anders procedure in an appeal from termination of parental rights). S.P.’s appellate

counsel has further provided this court with documentation evidencing that he sent

S.P. a copy of the brief, the reporter’s record, and the clerk’s record to her last known

address, along with a detailed notice advising S.P. of her right to file a pro se brief.

See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This Court also

notified S.P. of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the deadline for doing

so. S.P. did not file a pro se response.

      We have independently examined the entire appellate record in this matter,

and we agree with counsel’s conclusion that no arguable issues support an appeal.

We further find no arguable error requiring us to order appointment of new counsel

      2
        R.W. did not appeal from the order terminating his parental rights, and he is
not a party to this appeal.
                                        2
to re-brief this appeal. Cf. id. at 511. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order,

but we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d
24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (holding that a court-appointed appellate attorney’s duty extends

through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals).

      AFFIRMED.

                                               ______________________________
                                                     CHARLES KREGER
                                                           Justice

Submitted on February 6, 2018
Opinion Delivered February 8, 2018

Before McKeithen, CJ, Kreger, and Horton, JJ

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