Court Opinion

ID: 9709681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:53:01.907101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.875519
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join that part of the court’s opinion affirming the defendant’s convictions. I do not agree with the majority, however, that the defendant’s death sentence must be vacated, and therefore I dissent from that portion of the court’s judgment. The majority concludes that the death penalty is excessive in the present case and reduces the defendant’s sentence to a term of natural life imprisonment (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b)), In support of this holding, the majority relies primarily on People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 253, People v. Buggs (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 284, and People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, .cases in which this court vacated death sentences as excessive. I dissented from that portion of the court’s judgment vacating the sentence in Buggs, and I continue to believe that the death penalty was proper punishment in that case. But even if it is assumed that the facts of Johnson, Buggs, and Carlson provide a reliable baseline for' determining the appropriateness of the death penalty in all circumstances, I do not believe that those cases compel the court’s result here. In today’s decision, the majority virtually ignores the aggravating evidence introduced in the proceedings below, including the defendant’s long history of abusive behavior toward the murder victim, Susan Newman, and the defendant’s killing of his second wife, Mary Leger. As is so common in cases of this type, the history of violence committed by the defendant is much more extensive than the list of offenses disclosed by his formal criminal record. According to testimony presented at the sentencing hearing, the defendant had long abused both his former wives. Billie Sue Cullison, the older daughter of the defendant and Susan, testified that the defendant had repeatedly beaten Susan during the course of the couple’s 17-year marriage. The defendant attempted to kill Susan in 1983, after the couple had separated but before their divorce was made final. On that occasion, the defendant entered the marital home one night and placed a gun to Susan’s head. Billie Sue interceded and was able to persuade her father to leave the premises peacefully. Other evidence established that the defendant also had physically abused his second wife, Mary Leger. A Ridgway police officer testified that he had been summoned to the defendant’s home six or seven times in response to complaints of domestic disputes and on each occasion noticed bruises on Mary. In support of its decision, the majority emphasizes that the defendant was in the final stages of obtaining a divorce from Mary Leger when he committed the murder involved here. The majority fails to consider, however, that the defendant also killed Mary Leger on the same evening he murdered Susan Newman. According to the evidence, the defendant first shot and killed Mary in Ridgway, in Gallatin County. Later, the defendant drove to neighboring Saline County and entered the Eldorado home occupied by Susan Newman and her husband, Monte Newman. The defendant shot the Newmans, killing Susan and wounding Monte. The defendant was charged in the circuit court of Gallatin County with first degree murder for Mary’s death; he was convicted of second degree murder in a partially stipulated bench trial conducted after the conclusion of the Saline County proceedings at issue here. See People v. Leger (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 333. If, as the majority states, the defendant's offenses were the result of longstanding marital discord and physical problems, including his consumption of alcohol and of a wide variety of ethical drugs, then those circumstances may help explain the defendant’s actions. They fail to excuse his crimes, however. Measured against an individual’s history of violence and the seriousness of his offenses, evidence of that nature will at some point cease to be mitigating. I believe that point was reached in this case. The defendant’s lengthy history of abusive behavior and his series of offenses on the day in question, including the killing of two persons and the attempted murder of a third, together distinguish the present matter from cases such as Johnson, Buggs, and Carlson, in which this court found the death sentence to be an excessive penalty. Sentencing determinations are among the most difficult decisions a judge is called upon to make. In the bench proceeding in this case, the trial judge carefully considered the circumstances of the offense and the parties’ evidence in aggravation and mitigation. In this regard, the judge took note of the defendant’s personal and physical problems. The trial judge expressly distinguished Carlson, correctly observing that in the present case the defendant’s divorce preceded the murder by a much longer period of time. The judge thoroughly assessed the relevant considerations and concluded that the death penalty was the proper sanction for the defendant’s conduct. On this record, I cannot agree with the majority that the sentence imposed by the trial judge is excessive. JUSTICE HEIPLE, also concurring in part and dissenting in part: I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which vacates the defendant’s death sentence. A review of the record demonstrates that the sentence was not excessive, that all relevant factors were considered, and that the trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion. The evidence presented reveals that on the evening of September 4, 1987, the defendant first shot and killed his estranged wife, Mary, in Gallatin County. Shortly thereafter, the defendant drove to neighboring Saline County and broke into the home of his former spouse, Susan Newman, while she and her husband, Monte Newman, were sleeping. The defendant then proceeded to shoot Susan three times and shot Monte three times. Susan died but Monte survived the brutal attack. The defendant then drove to his parents’ house and when his mother noticed blood on the defendant’s shirt he stated, “I killed those two whores and that man.” Following his arrest, the defendant told a jail officer that he wished Monte had died also. At the second stage of the death sentence hearings, the trial court heard the following evidence in aggravation. Billie Sue Cullison, the defendant’s and Susan Newman’s daughter, testified that the defendant had previously held a gun to her mother’s head and threatened to kill her and that she had seen the defendant beat her mother on numerous occasions. The defendant’s criminal record shows that he has two battery convictions stemming from his abusive treatment of Susan. Reverend Russell Helton stated that the defendant had threatened to kill him when he was counseling Susan during the divorce proceedings. In mitigation, evidence was presented that the defendant had suffered a mining injury and that at the time of the incidents he was taking 10 different prescription drugs. In addition, the defendant had a long history of alcohol problems. Evidence was also presented that the defendant was suffering from emotional distress caused from his impending divorce from Mary. Several witnesses testified that the defendant did not display any violent tendencies. The defendant also served as union president for the mine workers over several years and he had been honorably discharged from the Air Force, receiving four medals of commendation. In sentencing the defendant to death the trial judge stated: “It is the duty of the court to weigh the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors, which I have done, both statutorily and nonstatutorily, and I must conclude that there are no mitigating factors in this case sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty.” In so finding, the trial judge specifically found that: (1) the defendant “premeditatedly and cold-bloodedly over a period of five-years intended to wait until such time” as he could kill Susan; (2) the defendant was not acting under extreme mental or emotional distress at the time he committed the offenses but that based on his conduct and statements his acts were deliberate; and (3) the defendant’s claim of amnesia blackout were wholly unsupportable. Finally, the trial judge in handing down his sentence stated to the defendant: “I am finding, Sir, that based on your prior conduct, I am concluding that over a period of years you have demonstrated that you cannot be rehabilitated. That you, Sir, are indeed a danger to society. I am sorry that you have undergone the physical problems that you have; nevertheless, these problems did not give you the right, nor the divorce problems, give you the right to take another human life — that of Susan Newman.” The majority decision finds that the sentence was excessive and that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating effect of defendant’s emotional distress related to his impending divorce. In fact, the trial judge, while not specifically mentioning the marital problems that the defendant was having, stated that he had considered the defendant’s “divorce problems” and that this did not excuse his actions. Further, the trial judge found that even if the defendant was suffering from extreme mental and emotional distress at the time the crimes were committed, this mitigating factor would not necessarily preclude the imposition of the death penalty given the overwhelming evidence in aggravation. From the foregoing record it appears that the trial judge scrupulously complied with the guidelines laid down in the statute for imposing the death penalty. The death sentence was warranted under the facts of the case and the applicable law. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.