Court Opinion

ID: 9940394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:00:38.887647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:49.867349
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11808    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 02/14/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11808
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       TROY MARKEITH GRIFFIN,
       a.k.a. OGC,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cr-00453-MSS-AEP-1
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11808

                            ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Troy Markeith Griffin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
       filed motions in the district court, seeking dismissal of the indict-
       ment against him and suppression of evidence used at his criminal
       trial. The district court dismissed the motions, concluding that it
       lacked jurisdiction to consider them. After careful consideration,
       we affirm.
                                         I.
               In November 2015, Griffin, along with several others, was
       charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count
       One), Hobbs Act robbery (Count Two), and brandishing a firearm
       in furtherance of a crime of violence, specifically the conspiracy
       charged in Count One (Count Three). A jury found Griffin guilty
       of all three crimes. The district court sentenced him to a total sen-
       tence of 294 months’ imprisonment: 210 months for Counts One
       and Two, followed by a consecutive sentence of 84 months for
       Count Three. On an initial direct appeal, we affirmed Griffin’s con-
       victions and sentence. See United States v. Griffin (Griffin I), 724 F.
       App’x 808 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished).
             Griffin, proceeding pro se, filed a § 2255 motion to vacate his
       sentence, primarily raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
       During those proceedings, the district court ordered the govern-
       ment to address the effect of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319
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       23-11808                   Opinion of the Court                        3

       (2019), on Griffin’s conviction on Count Three. In response, the
       government conceded that this conviction should be vacated. The
       district court subsequently vacated the conviction on Count Three
       but otherwise denied Griffin relief. The district court then held a
       new sentencing hearing and imposed a sentence of 235 months for
       Counts One and Two.
             Griffin appealed. He argued that his new sentence was not
       substantively reasonable. But we concluded that the “district court
       was within its discretion to resentence him to 235 months’ impris-
       onment” and affirmed. United States v. Griffin (Griffin II), No. 21-
       12727, 2023 WL 239763, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 2023) (un-
       published). Griffin also argued on appeal that the district court
       abused its discretion by not vacating all of his convictions and or-
       dering a new trial. Id. at *2 n.1. We dismissed this portion of the
       appeal, concluding that we “lack[ed] jurisdiction to entertain” it be-
       cause Griffin did “not have a certificate of appealability.” Id.
               After we issued our decision in Griffin II but before the man-
       date in that appeal issued, Griffin filed a motion in the district court
       under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), seeking dismis-
       sal of the indictment. He argued that the defect with respect to the
       firearm charge in Count Three infected the “whole of the indict-
       ment” and that, as a result, the indictment was “not plain, concise[,]
       or definite.” Doc. 425 at 1–2. 1 A few days after Griffin filed this mo-
       tion, we issued the mandate in Griffin II.

       1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11808

              After reviewing Griffin’s Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the district
       court issued an order, noting that Griffin was challenging the in-
       dictment but that any “claim collaterally attacking his convictions
       and sentences” had to be raised in a motion to vacate filed under
       28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 428 at 2. The district court explained that it
       could construe Griffin’s filing as a § 2255 motion but warned him
       about the limit on second or successive § 2255 motions. The court
       asked Griffin whether he agreed that his motion should be con-
       strued as seeking relief under § 2255. Griffin responded that he did
       not agree with his motion being construed as a motion to vacate
       under § 2255 and stated that he was proceeding instead under Rule
       12(b)(3). He later filed a motion to suppress “all and any evidence”
       pertaining to the firearm charge in Count Three. Doc. 430 at 2. He
       purported to file that motion under Rule 12(b)(3) as well.
              The district court dismissed both of Griffin’s motions. The
       court explained that because an appellate court had previously af-
       firmed his convictions and sentences, Griffin’s case was “no longer
       pending” before the district court, and thus it “lack[ed] jurisdiction
       to rule on” the motions. Doc. 431 at 2. This is Griffin’s appeal.
                                        II.
              We review “de novo questions regarding a district court’s
       subject matter jurisdiction.” United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889,
       902 n.6 (11th Cir. 2020).
                                        III.
              Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 provides that certain
       types of motions, including motions to suppress and some types of
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       23-11808                    Opinion of the Court                                  5

       motions raising defects in indictments, must be filed before trial.
       Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B), (C). If a defendant files one of these
       motions after the start of trial, the motion is “untimely,” and a
       court may consider the motion only if the defendant “shows good
       cause” for the delay. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(c)(3); United States v. An-
       dres, 960 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2020).
               In addition, when an appeal is filed, the district court is di-
       vested of jurisdiction “over the matters at issue in the appeal, ex-
       cept to the extent that the trial court must act in aid of the appeal.”
       Shewchun v. United States, 797 F.2d 941, 942 (11th Cir. 1986). In
       United States v. Diveroli, while a defendant’s direct appeal was pend-
       ing, he filed a motion to dismiss in the district court, arguing that
       there was a defect in the charging document. 729 F.3d 1339, 1340–
       41 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the district court considered the mer-
       its of the motion, we held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
       motion while the defendant’s direct appeal was pending. Id. at
       1341–43. And in United States v. Elso, we held that a district court
       “lacked authority to hear” a Rule 12(b)(3) motion filed after the de-
       fendant’s direct appeal proceedings had concluded. 571 F.3d 1163,
       1166 (11th Cir. 2009). 2

       2 At the time Diveroli and Elso were decided, an earlier version of Federal Rule

       of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) was in effect. Under that version of the rule, a
       district court could hear a claim that the indictment failed to state an offense
       so long as the motion was filed “while the case [was] pending.” Elso, 571 F.3d
       at 1166 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)). Even considering that Rule 12(b)(3)
       was later amended to provide that such a motion be filed before trial, Diveroli
       and Elso nevertheless tell us that a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a
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       6                        Opinion of the Court                    23-11808

               Here, by the time Griffin filed his Rule 12(b)(3) motion to
       dismiss, the district court had vacated his conviction on Count
       Three and imposed a new sentence on Counts One and Two. In
       addition, we had issued our opinion in Griffin II affirming the new
       sentence, although we had not yet issued the mandate for that ap-
       peal. Because the direct appeal was pending in an appellate court
       when Griffin filed the motion to dismiss, the district court lacked
       jurisdiction to consider it. See Diveroli, 729 F.3d at 1341. It is true
       that we issued the mandate in Griffin II a few days later. But because
       we affirmed, our decision meant that Griffin’s direct appeal pro-
       ceedings had concluded, and his case had ended. See Elso, 571 F.3d
       at 1165–66. The district court thus lacked jurisdiction to consider
       his motion to dismiss. See id. at 1166. Similarly, the district court
       lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to suppress because Grif-
       fin filed it after his direct appeal had concluded. 3 Id.
              AFFIRMED.

       Rule 12(b)(3) motion filed while the defendant’s direct appeal is pending or
       after his appellate proceedings have concluded.
       3 Also pending before the Court is Griffin’s Motion for Default. That motion

       is DENIED.