Court Opinion

ID: 9521720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:10:39.948056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:31.671685
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While I agree with the majority’s general statement of the standard to be applied in counsel incompetency problems, I feel that the circumstances as shown by the record in this case demand a more thorough analysis of our standard. I further find that a thoughtful application of that standard to the facts here shows that defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and should be granted a new trial.
It is now well settled that a defendant’s right to competent representation at trial is derived from two separate constitutional guarantees — the specific guarantee to the assistance of counsel found in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of our Indiana Constitution and the due process clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The due process guarantee has always been viewed as a concern for the fairness of the trial as a whole including the role played by counsel in the proceedings. The standard used for measuring the effectiveness of counsel in this context has traditionally been the “farce” or “mockery of justice” test applied to the trial as a whole.
However, many jurisdictions have now specifically held that these due process standards are not sufficient to test the separate constitutional guarantee of assistance of counsel. “One may receive ineffective assistance of counsel even though the proceedings have not been a farce or mockery.” Herring v. Estelle, (5th Cir. 1974) 491 F.2d 125, 128 (citation omitted). Although no single standard has been formulated to test the Sixth Amendment guarantee, the emphasis in the various standards employed has shifted from the rudiments of the trial to the quality of representation by counsel. The United States Supreme Court has said that counsel’s performance must be within the “range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, (1970) 397 U.S. 759 at 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773. The standards used most frequently are based upon the test of “reasonably competent assistance of counsel acting as a diligent conscientious advocate.” United States v. Moore, (D.C.Cir.1976) 554 F.2d 1086, 1089. Other federal jurisdictions now use similar tests. See: United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, (7th Cir. 1975) 510 F.2d 634; Gaines v. Hopper, (5th Cir. 1978) 575 F.2d 1147; Wilson v. Cowan, (6th Cir. 1977) 578 *777F.2d 166; United States ex rel. Johnson v. Johnson, (3d Cir. 1976) 531 F.2d 169, cert. den. 425 U.S. 997, 96 S.Ct. 2214, 48 L.Ed.2d 823; United States v. Elksnis, (9th Cir. 1975) 528 F.2d 236; Dunker v. Vinzant, (1st Cir. 1974) 505 F.2d 503, cert. den. 421 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 2404, 44 L.Ed.2d 671; United States v. Reincke, (2d Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 129; Hickock v. Crouse, (10th Cir. 1964) 334 F.2d 95, cert. den. 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 689, 13 L.Ed.2d 572 (1965). Many states have also held that the farce and mockery of justice standard is no longer adequate to describe the quality of representation to which a defendant is constitutionally entitled. Krummacher v. Gierloff, (1981) 290 Or. 867, 627 P.2d 458; People v. Pope, (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859; People v. Blalock, (1979) 197 Colo. 320, 592 P.2d 406; Risher v. State, (1974) Alas., 523 P.2d 421. See also, Annot: Adequate Representation by Counsel, 2 A.L.R. 4th 27.
This Court modified its traditional “mockery of justice” standard with the addition of the “adequate legal representation” requirement in Thomas v. State, (1969) 251 Ind. 546, 242 N.E.2d 919, and continues to espouse this standard. Hollon v. State, (1980) Ind., 398 N.E.2d 1273; Smith v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 898; Crisp v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 115; Cottingham v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 261, 379 N.E.2d 984; White v. State, (1981) Ind. App., 414 N.E.2d 973; Lyles v. State, (1978) Ind.App., 382 N.E.2d 991. A true application of this standard demands a constitutional scrutiny of the quality of representation by counsel as well as of the rudiments of the trial.
Although the focus of our inquiry in assistance of counsel problems has been enlarged, several well-settled principles continue to apply. It is clear that the burden of proving a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel is on the defendant.
“Counsel is presumed to have prepared and executed his client’s defense effectively. State v. Irvin (1973), 259 Ind. 610, 291 N.E.2d 70; Robbins v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 273, 274 N.E.2d 255. This presumption is rationally grounded in the educational and other requirements for admission to the practice of law, but is rebuttable by strong and convincing proof. Robbins v. State, supra. In resolving the issue, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding counsel’s pre-trial preparation and the actual conduct of the trial. Lowe v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 298 N.E.2d 421; Blackburn v. State (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686; Sargeant v. State (1973) 157 Ind.App. 173, 299 N.E.2d 219.” Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 621, 335 N.E.2d 811, 814.
Furthermore, this Court does not try to judge the strategic choices made by trial counsel. Effective advocacy is displayed daily in trial courts by competent attorneys with widely differing approaches, styles, personalities, and strategic inclinations. But effective assistance of counsel does mean conscientious, meaningful representation considering all of the circumstances of the case. We have found that isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness or inexperience does not necessarily amount to ineffective counsel. Cottingham v. State, supra; Lowe v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 610, 298 N.E.2d 421. However, we have also found that the commission of only one error on the part of trial counsel can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, where the counsel’s performance at trial falls short of the constitutionally adequate legal representation required. Smith v. State, supra.
In the instant case, defendant bases' his claim of ineffective representation on the cumulative effect of several errors and claims these errors were the result of inadequate preparation by his attorney and the minimal consultation time which the attorney spent with him. Specifically he alleges that a potentially meritorious alibi defense was never presented, the state’s chief witness was riot effectively impeached, and major strategic decisions, such as the possibility of a separate trial and the advisability of defendant testifying in his own behalf, were never discussed with him. Since the *778burden is on defendant to present specific facts which prove these allegations, it is necessary to review all of the facts in detail. The state’s case was based wholly upon circumstantial evidence.
The record shows that on the morning of February 24, 1972, two men, armed with pistols and wearing ski masks, robbed a branch of the American Fletcher National Bank in Cumberland, Indiana. During the course of the robbery, a deputy sheriff was shot and killed. Defendant’s cousin, William E. Adams, was arrested on the day following the robbery and defendant was apprehended three days later. Defendant was never positively identified as one of the robbers, but his car was identified as the get-away car used during the crime. William Adams gave the FBI a signed statement confessing his part of the robbery. He refused to identify his partner in the robbery, but consistently claimed that defendant was not the one.
The case was venued to Allen County where defendant and William were both convicted at a joint trial in September, 1972. William was represented by a public defender from Allen County, while defendant was represented by an attorney he had retained in Indianapolis. William’s attorney, Barrie Tremper, handled the filing of all papers in Allen County, while defendant’s attorney was responsible for the investigation in Indianapolis. Both men were represented by these same attorneys on their direct appeal, but defendant had declared his status as an indigent at that time and his attorney was then paid by the court.
The state’s case at trial was essentially based on the alleged statements made by defendant to two men after the robbery. One witness, James Taylor, testified at trial that he knew both defendant and William Adams as acquaintances and patrons of his bar. He stated that on the day of the robbery defendant and William had come to his house with a bag of money and two pistols and that defendant said he had shot a man and wanted to use Taylor’s truck. The other witness, Royce Richey, was William’s brother-in-law. Richey testified that William and defendant came to his house on the day of the robbery and one of them stated that they had “wasted” a man. None of the witnesses from the bank could identify defendant as the second robber even though his attorney continuously had him stand up and speak words to them at trial.
Defendant’s counsel did not present any defense witnesses except William Adams. William admitted that his signed statement which he gave to the police was true and further stated that defendant was not his accomplice in the robbery. He said he could not reveal the name of his accomplice because he was in fear for his life if he did. After that testimony, William refused to answer any further questions by taking the Fifth Amendment. The jury found both William and the defendant guilty of first-degree murder and felony murder. At a brief sentencing hearing, both men were sentenced to life imprisonment. Both William and defendant brought a direct appeal to this Court which resulted in an affirmance of their convictions.1
At the post-conviction relief hearing, defendant had been assigned new counsel. He presented several witnesses to substantiate his claim that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. First, he testified that he had met his attorney once, for a brief time, in the Marion County Jail a day or two after he was arrested and talked with him about five minutes. He did not see his attorney again until the first day of trial, six to seven months later. He wrote to his family several times and asked them to contact the attorney, but his family told him that they could not get hold of him either. Defendant said he wanted a separate trial from *779William and also had a list of witnesses he thought should be called on his behalf. No motion for a separate trial was filed and none of his witnesses was called at the trial. Defendant stated that the attorney never asked him what had happened on the day of the crime and never discussed any trial strategy with him. He told the attorney that he was not guilty and that he wanted to testify at the trial. The attorney told him he could testify, but when the trial started he said it would be better if he just stood up and asked permission to address the jury during the closing argument. The court did not grant this permission, so defendant jumped up and told the court that he wanted to testify and had not been allowed to. Defendant stated that he had talked to William’s attorney in Fort Wayne a few times prior to the trial, but only for brief intervals.
Defendant next presented two witnesses who contradicted parts of the state’s case. Neither of these witnesses had testified at the original trial. Defendant’s landlady, Viola Richards, stated that she watched and noted what went on at defendant’s house pretty carefully. She stated that a few days prior to the bank robbery, she saw James Taylor come to the house and exchange guns with William, who was living with defendant at that time. Then, on the morning of the robbery, she saw William and another man she identified as James Taylor leave the house in defendant’s car. She was sure defendant was not the second man. She said she had talked to defendant’s attorney about what she saw and he told her he would subpoena her for the trial. However, she was never subpoenaed on defendant’s behalf. She finally did receive a subpoena from the state as she had been interviewed by the police after the robbery. She testified that she was told to wait at home during the trial and that she would be called and told when she was needed so she wouldn’t have to drive up to Fort Wayne each day. She stated that she did wait at home and was told not to come for several days; then a personal emergency arose, so she called her attorney to ask him to take care of the subpoena and left to take care of the emergency.
Another witness who testified for defendant was Paula Vails, his girlfriend. She testified that defendant had spent the night before the robbery at her house and that he didn’t leave until shortly before 11:00 a. m. Defendant told her he was going to meet William at the Mahogany Bar (Taylor’s bar) and then finish some painting at his parents’ house. Vails testified that she went to the attorney’s office with defendant’s sister and told him all of the above facts. He told her she would have to be a witness at the trial, but she was never subpoenaed. Vails went to the trial anyway with defendant’s family. On the last day of the trial, Vails and defendant’s family ate lunch with the attorney. He told her he was going to call her as a surprise witness and therefore she should not go back into the courtroom that afternoon. He told her to hide in the car and someone would come to get her when it was time for her to testify. However, no one ever came until late in the afternoon when one of defendant’s family came out and told her the case had already gone to the jury. Vails’s testimony about the attorney asking her to hide in the car was corroborated by Thomas Haggard, a friend of defendant’s family, who was also eating lunch with them that day, and by defendant’s sister.
Defendant testified that during the closing argument, which was not recorded, his attorney mentioned that he had been a personal friend of the deputy who was killed and that was the first time defendant knew about that. Haggard testified that he had seen defendant’s attorney eating lunch with the victim’s sister and family on one of the days of the trial.
Defendant’s sister, Judy Sullivan, testified that she continuously received letters from defendant while he was waiting for his trial asking her to contact the attorney and have him come and talk with him. The attorney told her at one point that he was not a babysitter for her brother. Defendant’s mother said she tried to contact the attorney many times and did give him a list of witnesses to interview. She said defend*780ant’s attorney told her that he was too busy in Indianapolis to go to Fort Wayne and that William’s attorney was taking care of things up there.
William Adams testified about the events on the day of the robbery. He said that Taylor had helped to plan the robbery and the second robber was a friend of Taylor. He said it was Taylor who left defendant’s house with him on the morning of the robbery.
The state presented testimony to show that defendant’s attorney had visited the Marion County Jail three times after defendant was arrested and before he was transferred to Allen County. However, there was no clear evidence that the attorney actually saw defendant on each of those visits as he also had other clients in the jail. William’s attorney, Barrie Tremper, testified that he had worked closely with defendant’s attorney at the trial of this cause. He relied on him to do the interviewing and investigating in Indianapolis while he filed the necessary motions and paperwork in Fort Wayne. He said he had many discussions with defendant’s attorney about the ease and received several lengthy letters reviewing their strategy and decisions. He said he thought defendant’s attorney had come to Fort Wayne about half a dozen times before the trial, but he didn’t know if the attorney ever actually saw defendant on those visits. Tremper, personally, saw defendant three or four times prior to the trial, but only for brief conferences lasting five to fifteen minutes. Tremper said he never knew defendant had requested a separate trial and did not know anything about Vails as a possible alibi witness for defendant.
The record does show that the defendant’s attorney cross-examined the state’s witnesses and had apparently reviewed some of the witnesses’ statements prior to trial. However, this cross-examination was focused on the general truthfulness of the witnesses’ testimony and not on specific points important to defendant’s case, such as how long Taylor had really known the., defendant and his family. The record shows that the attorney had never personally interviewed the state’s crucial witnesses, James Taylor and Royce Richey. During the trial, the attorney stated that he did not have copies of certain witnesses’ statements but the prosecutor replied they had been given to his son several weeks previously. The attorney, at different points during the trial, had defendant walk in front of the jury wearing certain clothing allegedly worn by the robber but not admitted into evidence because of an illegal search.
This case involves those attorneys’ functions which are difficult to evaluate for constitutional adequacy. However, defendant has presented us with an affirmative factual basis demonstrating the ineffective representation. Here, defendant was faced with the serious charge of murder and the state’s case against him was not strong, being based upon circumstantial evidence and the alleged general remarks made by defendant to two witnesses who- were not eyewitnesses to the crime. His co-defendant had admitted his own part in the crime. Yet, counsel failed to move for a separate trial, spent only a bare minimal time in consultation with defendant, neglected necessary investigation, failed to interview essential witnesses, and generally refused to talk to defendant or his family during most of the six months defendant was in jail prior to trial. The attorney never discussed any trial strategy with defendant other than to promise him he could testify. This promise was misleading because defendant was never allowed to testify or address the jury. The attorney put on virtually no defense and failed to call any witnesses at trial to support defendant’s alibi defense although these witnesses were readily available and one attended every day of the trial. Here, it is clear the defendant’s trial counsel’s acts and omissions resulted in the withholding of a potentially meritorious defense. There was a lack of adequate consultation with defendant prior to the trial resulting in several strategic choices being made contrary to defendant’s expressed wishes. No effective impeachment evidence about the state’s chief witness, James Taylor, was used at the trial although de*781fendant has shown it was available. The totality of circumstances in this case shows that the quality of representation by defendant’s trial attorney fell far short of the adequate legal representation standard we require. While it is clear that the Constitution does not guarantee errorless or infallible counsel, the errors in the instant case show a lack of reasonable investigation and adequate preparation. The representation as a whole was completely inadequate under our established standards.
I would grant the defendant a new trial.

. At one point during the course of the direct appeal, defendant’s attorney was ordered by this Court to re-brief the case as the original appellate brief was inadequate. During oral argument before this Court, the attorney was further reprimanded for not preparing adequately for the appeal. It appeared that substantially all of the appellate work was done by William’s attorney. Defendant’s attorney is now deceased.