Court Opinion

ID: 9638992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:00:58.083872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:11.250654
License: Public Domain

dissenting.
I dissent. It is clear that the majority of this Court has exceeded the scope of its review by affirming Superior Court’s order remanding for the entry of judgment n.o.v. in favor of appellee Eaton Corporation.
In Tonkovic v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 513 Pa. 445, 455, 521 A.2d 920, 925 (1987), this Court stated that:
In our review of the denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v., or a new trial, we will reverse the trial court only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. In passing on the question, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Appellant, the verdict winner. Evidence supporting the *10verdict is considered and the rest is rejected. Conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of the verdict winner.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The majority of this Court fails to reject evidence that does not support the verdict herein, and indeed, bolsters its argument with testimony presented by appellee Eaton Corporation. For example, where the majority notes that the dimensions and layout of the extrusion press were unnecessary to the design of the electrical control system for which appellee Eaton Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest was responsible, maj. op. at 1247, it is adopting the testimony of Eaton witness Donald Mattia almost verbatim. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.) at 773 (Mar. 5, 1984). Moreover, the majority gives undue emphasis to the fact that it was the proximate location of the limit switch which was responsible for the tragic accident that occurred herein. Maj. op. at 1246. Although it is true that appellee Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft was responsible for the placement of the switch on the rail; the location of the rail, and the design of the steps leading to the pit, even the majority concedes that the unguarded condition of the switch also constituted a defect in the switch. Id.
The evidence presented by appellant regarding the unguarded switch showed that Eaton’s predecessor-in-interest 1) designed the electronic system which controlled the operation of the switch, N.T. at 447 (Feb. 29, 1984); 2) was present when the decision was reached regarding the type of limit switch that would be used on the press, N.T. at 535-36 (Mar. 1, 1984); 3) determined whether a particular angled placement of the switch on the press would have any influence on the electrical control, id. at 537-38; and 4) designed safety features into the electronic system which controlled the operation of the press, id. at 485-88. It certainly was a reasonable inference that appellee Eaton, therefore, was at least partially responsible for the unguarded condition of the switch which “was a defect in design and manufacture as installed and as used.” N.T. at *11544 (Mar. 1, 1984). And the jury so found by assigning 35% of the liability to appellee Eaton.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of Superior Court and reinstate the judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.