Court Opinion

ID: 9764503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:24:52.961765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.427564
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order transferring venue in a civil action from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County for the convenience of parties and witnesses pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 1006(d).
The action was commenced in March of 1988 by Catharyn A. Turner II against E. James Kohl, M.D. and Bryn Mawr Hospital. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that she had been subjected to negligent treatment by Dr. Kohl, her orthopedic surgeon, and by the nurses at Bryn Mawr Hospital, which had resulted in surgery on a healthy right knee instead of an injured left knee. The defendant-hospital filed preliminary objections raising an issue of venue on the grounds that it did not do business in Philadelphia. These preliminary objections, however, were withdrawn by the hospital before they were ruled upon. Thereafter, Dr. Kohl filed a petition to transfer venue on the theory of forum non conveniens. The trial judge denied Dr. Kohl’s motion by order dated March 2, 1990.
On November 7, 1990, plaintiff filed a petition for an accelerated listing and individual judge assignment. Her petition was granted, and the case was assigned to a second trial judge by order dated January 30, 1991. Shortly thereafter, the *509defendant-hospital filed a petition to transfer on the grounds of forum non conveniens. After considering the defendant’s petition and the plaintiff’s response thereto, the trial judge assigned to handle the case entered an order granting the petition and transferring the case to Montgomery County for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. A motion to reconsider was summarily denied, and plaintiff appealed.
“As a general rule it is improper for a trial judge, absent new evidence, to overrule an interlocutory order by a judge of the same court in the same case.” Reed v. Reed, 354 Pa.Super. 284, 288, 511 A.2d 874, 876 (1986), citing, Robert Wooler Co. v. Fidelity Bank, 330 Pa.Super. 523, 536-537, 479 A.2d 1027, 1034 (1984); Bersani v. School District of Philadelphia, 310 Pa.Super. 1, 4, 456 A.2d 151, 153 (1982); Marmara v. Rawle, 264 Pa.Super. 229, 238, 399 A.2d 750, 755 (1979). See also: Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, 410 Pa.Super. 506, 600 A.2d 568 (1991). “[Tjhis rule is not a matter of jurisdiction per se; rather it is a rule of sound jurisprudence based on the policy of fostering finality of pre-trial applications so that judicial economy and efficiency can be maintained.” Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 517, 556 A.2d 827, 831 (1989).
The defendant-hospital calls our attention to the fact that its preliminary objections to the propriety of venue were withdrawn and not decided. Therefore, the hospital argues, it has not had a prior opportunity to present its claim that the venue chosen by the plaintiff was inconvenient for parties and witnesses. However, a prior petition raising the same issue, i.e., the convenience of the parties and witnesses, was presented earlier by Dr. Kohl, and this petition was denied by another judge. The hospital’s later petition offered no additional facts or changed circumstances. To allow multiple petitions for change of venue under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d) until such time as a judge can be found who will look favorably upon such a petition does not serve judicial economy or judicial efficiency. It matters not that each petition is presented by a different defendant, for the issue is the same, i.e., the convenience of the parties and witnesses. Unless circumstances have changed, therefore, a second petition for change of venue under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d) should not be presented after a first *510petition has been considered and denied. See: Okkerse v. Howe, supra.
The trial court suggested that the decision of the Supreme Court in Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hospital, 525 Pa. 237, 579 A.2d 1282 (1990), constituted newly decided legal authority which compelled a transfer of venue. The decision in Purcell, however, pertained to proper venue under Pa.R.C.P. 2179. It did not pertain to and did not alter the principles applicable to changes of venue for the convenience of parties and witnesses under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d).1
The present action had been given an accelerated listing and was ready for trial. Venue in Philadelphia was proper, and a prior petition to transfer venue for the convenience of parties and witnesses under Pa.R.C.P. 1006(d) had been denied. Under these circumstances, we hold, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to grant a second petition to transfer venue in the absence of changed circumstances. To do so served only to delay; it did not serve judicial economy or the efficiency of a unified judicial system.
Order reversed.
KELLY, J., files a concurring statement.

. The author of the court’s opinion in Purcell observed expressly that "[t]he issue of forum non conveniens was not raised in this appeal or in the courts below ... and [w]e do not address that issue.” Id. at 248 n. 4, 579 A.2d at 1287 n. 4.