Court Opinion

ID: 9889714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:13.472087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:17.993452
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: October 11, 2023

                        S23A0547. KINLAW v. THE STATE.

        BETHEL, Justice.

        A Glynn County jury found Harold Dean Kinlaw guilty of the

malice murder of Felipe Herrera, the aggravated stalking and

kidnapping of Kinlaw’s former wife Damaris Kinlaw, and other

related crimes.1 Kinlaw appeals, arguing that the evidence was

        1 The crimes occurred on January 18, 2004. On May 19, 2004, a Glynn

County grand jury indicted Kinlaw and Jamie Teresa Morris for malice murder
of Herrera (Count 1), felony murder of Herrera (Count 2), and kidnapping of
Damaris (Count 3). Kinlaw was separately indicted for the aggravated assault
of Damaris (Count 4), aggravated stalking (Count 5), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime (Counts 6 and 7), and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon (Count 8). The State subsequently filed notice of its intent
to seek the death penalty against Kinlaw. Morris pleaded guilty to conspiracy
to commit kidnapping and testified against Kinlaw at trial.
      At the guilt-innocence phase of Kinlaw’s trial, which was conducted from
November 7 to November 18, 2008, the jury found Kinlaw guilty of Counts 1
and 3 through 8. The sentencing phase was conducted from November 18 to
November 22, 2008; the jury found the existence of two statutory aggravating
circumstances and fixed a sentence of life without parole for malice murder.
The trial court sentenced Kinlaw to serve life in prison without parole on Count
1, twenty years in prison each on Counts 3 and 4, ten years in prison on Count
insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking and

that the trial court erred by refusing to provide an interpreter for a

witness at trial, by excluding evidence that Herrera had threatened

Kinlaw, by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and

self-defense, and by employing an improper remedy after finding

that the State had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106

5, five years in prison each on Counts 6 and 7, and five years in prison on Count
8, with Counts 3 through 8 to be served consecutively to Count 1 and to each
other. Count 2 was nolle prossed.
       On December 10, 2008, Kinlaw’s trial counsel timely filed a boilerplate
motion for new trial. On December 11, 2008, Kinlaw filed a pro se motion for
appointment of appellate counsel. New attorneys filed entries of appearance in
November 2009 and May 2014, but it does not appear from the record that
those attorneys took any action on Kinlaw’s appeal. In November 2019, current
appellate counsel, the third post-trial counsel to enter an appearance in this
case, was appointed by the Georgia Public Defender Council to represent
Kinlaw. Current appellate counsel filed amended motions for new trial on
October 23, 2020, and February 17, 2021. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied Kinlaw’s motion for new trial, as amended. Kinlaw filed a timely notice
of appeal, and his appeal was docketed in this Court to the April 2023 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
       We are troubled by the inordinate and unexplained delay between the
filing of Kinlaw’s motion for new trial in December 2008 and the filing of an
amended motion for new trial nearly 12 years later. So, yet again, we remind
the bench and bar that long post-conviction delays “put at risk the rights of
defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a
full trial,” and we “reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the
criminal justice system . . . to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction
motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” (Citation
and punctuation omitted.) Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 258 (811 SE2d 420)
(2018).
                                       2
SCt 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986). For the reasons explained below, we

affirm.

     1. The evidence at trial showed as follows. On January 18,

2004, Kinlaw shot and killed Herrera, who was engaged in a

romantic relationship with Damaris. Kinlaw and Damaris were

divorced in December 2003; the final judgment and decree of divorce

incorporated a permanent restraining order, which prohibited

Kinlaw from contacting Damaris.2 On the morning of the crimes, co-

indictee Jamie Morris, who was Kinlaw’s girlfriend, dropped off

Kinlaw near Damaris’s home. Armed with a handgun, Kinlaw hid

in Damaris’s carport underneath a cloth-covered picnic table.

Herrera arrived later, and he and Damaris sat in the carport

drinking coffee, unaware that Kinlaw was hiding nearby.

     Eventually, a gust of wind disturbed the tablecloth and

revealed Kinlaw, who emerged from beneath the table with his gun

pointed at Damaris and Herrera. Damaris jumped in front of

     2   The final judgment converted a previously entered temporary
restraining order to a permanent restraining order and indicated that Kinlaw
was “bound by that [o]rder on penalty of felony aggravated stalking.”
                                     3
Herrera, screaming, “Please don’t, Harold, please don’t.” Herrera

moved toward Kinlaw, reaching for the arm with which Kinlaw was

holding the gun. Kinlaw fired the gun three times, striking and

killing Herrera. Kinlaw then forced Damaris into her truck, drove to

a nearby parking lot where Morris was waiting, and transferred

Damaris to Morris’s vehicle. Morris drove the trio to a hotel in North

Carolina where Kinlaw was arrested two days later.

     2. Kinlaw challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his conviction for aggravated stalking, which was predicated on his

violation of the permanent restraining order incorporated into the

divorce decree. When we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain a conviction,

     we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
     verdict, draw every reasonable inference from the
     evidence that is favorable to the verdict, ignore any
     conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, [and] assume
     that the jury reasonably believed every word of testimony
     favorable to the verdict and reasonably disbelieved every
     word unfavorable to it.

(Punctuation omitted.) State v. Thomas, 311 Ga. 407, 420 (4) (858

SE2d 52) (2021).

                                  4
     Kinlaw first asserts that, because the judge presiding over his

divorce action orally indicated prior to the entry of the final divorce

decree that he would dismiss the case,3 the underlying protective

order was void and could not support the aggravated stalking

conviction. But the divorce action, in fact, was not dismissed because

the judge’s “oral pronouncement” was not reduced to writing and, so,

was of no legal effect. See Williams v. Williams, 295 Ga. 113, 114 (1)

(757 SE2d 859) (2014) (“[A]n oral pronouncement by a trial court

during a hearing is not a judgment until it is reduced to writing and

entered as a judgment.”); Tyree v. Jackson, 226 Ga. 690, 694 (2) (177

SE2d 160) (1970) (“[W]hat the judge orally declares is no judgment

until the same has been reduced to writing and entered as such.”).

And, in fact, the case proceeded to the entry of the final divorce

decree, which incorporated the permanent restraining order.

     3 At a hearing held after Damaris obtained a temporary restraining order

against Kinlaw in connection with her petition for divorce, Kinlaw’s counsel
represented that the parties had engaged in sexual relations after the divorce
was initiated. On that basis, the judge orally indicated that he would dismiss
the divorce case, but a written order memorializing the oral dismissal was not
entered.
                                      5
Accordingly, this argument fails.

      Next, pointing to a notation in the written divorce decree that

he did not appear for the final hearing, Kinlaw asserts that the State

failed to prove an element of aggravated stalking because, he says,

there was no evidence that he knew he was subject to a permanent

restraining order. In that regard, this Court has held that, to prove

the crime of aggravated stalking,4 the State must show only that the

defendant was “aware that a court order was in effect that

prohibited” contact with the victim. State v. Carlisle, 280 Ga. 770,

772 (2) (631 SE2d 347) (2006).

      Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

shows that, despite his absence from the final hearing, Kinlaw was

aware of the divorce decree and its contents. Damaris testified that

on January 1, 2004 — several weeks after the entry of the divorce

decree but before the crimes at issue here — Kinlaw kidnapped her

      4 See OCGA § 16-5-91 (a) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated

stalking when such person, in violation of a . . . permanent restraining
order . . . follows, places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or
about a place or places without the consent of the other person for the purpose
of harassing and intimidating the other person.”).
                                       6
at knifepoint, held her for about a week, then released her.

According to Damaris, Kinlaw knew that his business had been

awarded to Damaris in the divorce decree and that she was in the

process of selling it, and he let her go because “he wanted money”

from the sale. An investigating officer testified that, after being

arrested, Kinlaw acknowledged that he and Damaris were divorced

and claimed that, on the day of the crimes, he went to see Damaris

about money obtained from the sale of his business. These facts

tended to show that Kinlaw knew at least some specific provisions of

the divorce decree, making it less likely that he did not know about

the included restraining order. And Morris, Kinlaw’s co-indictee,

testified that, days before the crimes, Kinlaw attempted to visit

Damaris at home under cover of night while dressed all in black but

was “spooked because of a dog barking and seeing a cop car and the

lights come on at that house.” From this evidence, the jury could

reasonably infer that Kinlaw was aware of the contents of the

divorce decree, including the permanent restraining order, and

therefore knew that he was prohibited by court order from

                                 7
contacting Damaris. See Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 868 (3) (c)

n.3 (823 SE2d 291) (2019) (“[J]urors are authorized to make such

reasonable inferences and reasonable deductions as ordinarily

prudent persons would make in light of their everyday experience

and knowledge of human conduct and behavior.” (punctuation

omitted)). We thus conclude that the evidence was sufficient to

support Kinlaw’s conviction for aggravated stalking.

     3. Kinlaw next challenges the trial court’s refusal to provide an

interpreter to facilitate Damaris’s trial testimony. This claim fails.

     The record shows that Damaris is a native Spanish speaker for

whom English is a second language. At trial, early in the State’s

direct examination, Damaris indicated that she did not understand

several   questions,     prompting         the   prosecutor     to   rephrase.

Eventually,5 Kinlaw’s counsel interjected, and the following

exchange took place during a bench conference:

     KINLAW’S COUNSEL: Your Honor, this is, by my count,
     the fourth time—this is, by my count, the fourth time that

     5 The record reflects that, at this point in the State’s direct examination,

the prosecutor had posed approximately one hundred questions to Damaris
and that Damaris expressed difficulty understanding five of those questions.
                                       8
     the witness has indicated difficulty understanding the
     questions that were asked by the prosecuting attorney.
     This morning when we interviewed her at the District
     Attorney’s Office she had two members of her family
     interpreting for her. And I believe the January 7, January
     9, and January 20 interviews, at least the January 7 and
     January 9 interviews, she also had an interpreter. If she
     needs an interpreter, then we need to get the interpreter
     now and not in the middle of the examination. And if she
     is having trouble following the direct, she is never going
     to follow the cross.
     THE STATE: Is that an objection?
     KINLAW’S COUNSEL: I—I would ask that the Court
     qualify her understanding of the English language
     outside the presence of the jury, or just let’s go ahead and
     get the interpreters.
     THE STATE: I’ve talked to her for the last week, Judge.
     She understands me.
     THE COURT: I don’t see any need to do anything at this
     point. You’ve made your observation. I’m going to let the
     examination continue.

Before resuming questioning, the prosecutor asked Damaris to

indicate if she could not understand a question, and Damaris agreed

to do so.

     Later, during cross examination, Damaris sought clarification

as to whether “fearful” meant “afraid.” Another bench conference

ensued during which Kinlaw’s counsel again opined on the need for

an interpreter, stating, “I’m going to renew the point we previously

                                  9
raised which is she is going to hide behind the language barrier

every time she has an uncomfortable question, and that’s why she

needs to have the interpreters here like she did all the times she was

interviewed.” The trial court again disagreed, explaining that

“[t]here is no problem of any substance with her communication” but

that “[t]here may be a problem of substance with the way you ask

the questions when you use words like ‘characterization’ and stuff

like that.” Twice more during cross examination when Damaris

expressed confusion, the court summoned the parties to the bench

and directed Kinlaw’s counsel to use “plain English” and “the

simplest of language” in questioning her.

      On appeal, Kinlaw maintains that the trial court erred by

refusing to provide an interpreter for Damaris.6 We question

      6 Kinlaw further asserts that the absence of an interpreter during
Damaris’s testimony violated his right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he also appears to
challenge Damaris’s competency as a witness. But Kinlaw did not object to
Damaris’s testimony on either basis in the trial court, so those claims are not
preserved for appellate review. See Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 621 (4)
(680 SE2d 850) (2009). Because this case was tried in 2008 under Georgia’s
former Evidence Code, plain-error review of these evidentiary matters is not
available. See Lane v. State, 312 Ga. 619, 622 (1) (864 SE2d 34) (2021).
                                      10
whether trial counsel’s requests for an interpreter constitute

objections and whether the trial court’s responses constitute rulings

such that this claim is preserved for appellate review. See Ellis v.

State, 287 Ga. 170, 172 (2) (695 SE2d 35) (2010) (“It is the rule in

Georgia that objections should be made with sufficient specificity for

the trial court to identify the precise basis. It is not important in

what format the allegation is cast so long as it is clear to the court

the specific error alleged that the court may have the opportunity to

correct [it].”). Assuming without deciding that this claim is

preserved for our review, we conclude that it presents no cause for

reversal.

     “Interpreters are required to ensure meaningful access to our

legal system by non-English speakers.” Gomez v. State, 301 Ga. 445,

462 (11) (801 SE2d 847) (2017). See also Georgia Supreme Court

Rules for the Use of Interpreters for Non-English Speaking and

Hearing Impaired Persons. We have recognized that the absence of

a qualified interpreter for a criminal defendant who cannot

effectively communicate in English may implicate constitutional

                                 11
concerns. See Cisneros v. State, 299 Ga. 841, 849-850 (3) (a) (792

SE2d 326) (2016); Ling v. State, 288 Ga. 299, 300-301 (1) (702 SE2d

881) (2010) (“[F]ailure to provide adequate interpretation services to

a defendant in criminal proceedings implicates due process

concerns.”). Here, Kinlaw’s claim arises not from the trial court’s

refusal to provide an interpreter for Kinlaw himself, however, but

from its refusal to provide an interpreter for Damaris, a witness for

the State. In this context, we “review a [trial] court’s determination

as to the use of an interpreter for an abuse of discretion,

which . . . amounts to an inquiry on whether the failure to provide

an interpreter made the trial fundamentally unfair.” (Citations and

punctuation omitted.) See United States v. Belfast, 611 F3d 783, 822

(VI) (F) (11th Cir. 2010) (addressing claim arising from trial court’s

refusal to provide an interpreter to facilitate witness testimony). Cf.

Ling, 288 Ga. at 300 (1). And in order to prevail on a claim arising

from the lack of an interpreter, an appellant must demonstrate that

he was actually harmed by the interpreter’s absence. See Gomez,

301 Ga. at 463 (11) (a).

                                  12
     In rejecting this claim below, the trial court, after “thoroughly

review[ing] the trial transcripts,” found that, “[o]f the instances cited

by Kinlaw, very few definitively signal that Damaris did not

understand the words used.” The trial court further found that

“Damaris never requested an interpreter herself”; that, “when

clarification was needed, she asked for it”; and that her “answers, on

balance, were ultimately responsive to the questions asked.” Finally,

the trial court noted that Kinlaw “presented no evidence that

Damaris’s testimony was hampered by the lack of an interpreter or

that she would have given different answers had one been secured.”

These factual determinations are supported by the record, and, as

in the trial court, Kinlaw has neither identified any testimony he

was unable to elicit from Damaris nor argued that his questioning

of Damaris was limited in any respect due to the absence of an

interpreter. Thus, on the record before us, we cannot say that the

absence of an interpreter rendered Kinlaw’s trial fundamentally

unfair in violation of due process. See Belfast, 611 F3d at 822 (VI)

(F) (no fundamental unfairness arising from absence of interpreter

                                   13
for witnesses who spoke “heavily accented English” where record

showed that, when testimony was difficult to understand, the trial

court interrupted the witness to ask for clarification and the witness

in fact clarified his testimony). Cf. Gomez, 301 Ga. at 463 (11) (a) (no

reversible error arising from trial court’s failure to appoint separate

interpreters for appellant and his co-defendant where appellant

failed to show “that he was actually harmed by sharing an

interpreter”); Cisneros, 299 Ga. at 850-851 (3) (a) (appellant failed

to demonstrate that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by

the flawed interpretation of Spanish-speaking witnesses’ testimony

where “none of the alleged errors prevented appellant from

effectively presenting his defense” and there was “no instance where

the meaning of a witness’ testimony was altered in a legally

significant manner”). See also Davis v. State, 292 Ga. 90, 92 (734

SE2d 401) (2012) (“‘In order to declare a denial of [due process,] a

court must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected the

trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.’” (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,

                                  14
458 U. S. 858, 872 (III) (B) (102 SCt 3440, 73 LE2d 1193) (1982)).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

     4. Kinlaw next argues that the trial court erred by excluding

evidence that Damaris told Kinlaw’s mother that Hererra would

“take care of” Kinlaw and that Kinlaw’s mother conveyed this

purported threat to Kinlaw. According to Kinlaw, this evidence was

admissible to support his claims of voluntary manslaughter and self-

defense. Kinlaw’s trial, which occurred in 2008, is governed by our

former Evidence Code. Under the former Evidence Code, “a murder

victim’s reputation for violence is irrelevant and inadmissible in

criminal proceedings” but “may be offered as evidence by the accused

upon the accused making a prima facie showing that the victim was

the aggressor and was assaulting the accused, who was acting to

defend himself.” Morris v. State, 303 Ga. 192, 194 (II) (811 SE2d 321)

(2018). The trial court found that Kinlaw failed to make such a

prima facie showing, a decision we review for abuse of discretion.

See Tarpley v. State, 298 Ga. 442, 444 (2) 782 SE2d 642) (2016).

     There was no abuse of discretion here. The evidence recounted

                                 15
above clearly shows that Kinlaw, not Herrera, was the aggressor —

Kinlaw, in violation of a permanent restraining order, went to

Damaris’s home while armed with a handgun, secreted himself

under a table, and, when his presence was revealed, aimed his

weapon at Damaris and Herrera before ultimately shooting the

unarmed Herrera, who was merely reaching toward Kinlaw’s arm.

See Wainwright v. State, 305 Ga. 63, 72 (5) (b) (828 SE2d 749) (2019)

(a victim is not the aggressor when he is unarmed and is merely

trying to disarm his assailant). The evidence thus supports the trial

court’s finding that Kinlaw failed to make a prima facie showing

that Herrera was the aggressor. Accordingly, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of Herrera’s alleged

threats. See Tarpley, 298 Ga. at 444 (2).

     5. Kinlaw further complains that the trial court erred by

refusing his requests to charge the jury on the defense of

                                 16
justification7 and on voluntary manslaughter8 because, he says,

there was slight evidence to support these charges.9 To that end,

Kinlaw points to evidence that Herrera attempted to disarm Kinlaw,

which he argues authorized both jury charges. He also asserts that

a voluntary manslaughter instruction was supported by evidence

that Damaris was dating Herrera, which Kinlaw’s trial counsel

speculated could have incited Kinlaw’s jealousy. The trial court was

right to deny Kinlaw’s requests.

      As evidence that he was justified in shooting Herrera, Kinlaw

cites testimony that Herrera reached toward the arm with which

Kinlaw was holding the handgun just before Kinlaw shot Herrera.

But as we have already discussed, the evidence shows that Kinlaw

      7 See OCGA § 16-3-21 (a) (“A person is justified in threatening or using

force against another when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes
that such threat or force is necessary to defend himself or herself or a third
person against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force[.]”).
       8 See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a) (“A person commits the offense of voluntary

manslaughter when he causes the death of another human being under
circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the
result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.”).
       9 See, e.g., Swanson v. State, 306 Ga. 153, 155 (2) (829 SE2d 312) (2019)

(“To authorize a jury instruction, there need only be slight evidence at trial
supporting the theory of the charge.”).
                                      17
initiated the confrontation by pointing a handgun at Herrera and

Damaris and that Herrera reached toward Kinlaw’s gun only

because Kinlaw was threatening him and Damaris. And there was

no evidence that Herrera was armed or that he threatened Kinlaw

in any way. Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly

found that a justification defense was not supported by even slight

evidence. See Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 72 (5) (b) (evidence that

appellant shot victim when victim began to overpower appellant’s

accomplice did not support justification instruction because victim

initiated physical struggle with accomplice only after appellant

pointed a gun in victim’s face while demanding that second victim

empty his pockets); Brunson v. State, 293 Ga. 226, 227-228 (744

SE2d 695) (2013) (no justification charge warranted where evidence

showed that unarmed victim initiated struggle with appellant only

after appellant threatened victim with a gun). See also OCGA § 16-

3-21 (b) (1), (2) (“A person is not justified in using force . . . if

he . . . [i]nitially provokes the use of force against himself with the

intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the

                                  18
assailant” or if he “[i]s attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing

after the commission or attempted commission of a felony[.]”).

“Indeed, it would turn the law on its head to allow an armed

aggressor, who confronts an unarmed nonthreatening victim, to

claim self-defense when the victim is shot during the victim’s

struggle    to   disarm     the    aggressor.”     (Punctuation       omitted.)

Wainwright, 305 Ga. at 72 (5) (b).

      A voluntary manslaughter instruction also was unwarranted.

The fact that Herrera reached for Kinlaw’s arm in an effort to

disarm him in response to Kinlaw’s pointing a gun at Herrera and

Damaris shows, at most, that Herrera “physically resisted” Kinlaw’s

unlawful act, “which is not the type of provocation which demands a

voluntary manslaughter charge.” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v.

State, 313 Ga. 698, 700 (873 SE2d 123) (2022). Nor was Kinlaw

entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction on the basis of

adultery10 or sexual jealousy. “[N]one of the parties were married,”

      10 In his brief, Kinlaw mischaracterizes Damaris as his wife and argues

that a “fresh disclosure” of her “infidelities” could warrant a conviction on the
killing only for voluntary manslaughter.
                                       19
so “no instruction regarding adultery as a provocation for voluntary

manslaughter was warranted.” Tepanca v. State, 297 Ga. 47, 49 (4)

(771 SE2d 879) (2015). Likewise, the mere fact that Damaris,

Kinlaw’s former wife, was dating Herrera was not alone “sufficient

to excite sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable

person.” (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 50 (4). The trial court,

therefore, did not err by refusing to charge the jury on either

justification or voluntary manslaughter.

     6. During jury selection, the trial court found that the State’s

peremptory strikes of two potential jurors, J. W. and I. B., who are

both black, violated Batson, 476 U. S. at 89 (II) (B) (“[T]he Equal

Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential

jurors solely on account of their race.”). The trial court indicated

that, to remedy the Batson violations, it would seat J. W., the first

of the two potential jurors stricken by the State, and that the parties

would redo the strike process beginning with the first potential juror

after J. W. As to I. B., the trial court explained that “the reason

offered for [striking] her is not a sufficient race neutral reason” and

                                  20
indicated it would “let the State determine how . . . to proceed from

there.” Kinlaw did not object to this course of action. The trial court

thereafter sat J. W. as a juror and the parties proceeded to restrike

the jury as directed by the trial court. The State again struck I. B.

After the jury was selected, defense counsel announced his

satisfaction with its composition but then asserted that the State’s

restriking of I. B. “re-raises the Batson issue.” The trial court

inquired, “I thought you said you did not want to challenge it at this

point. . . . I thought you just announced that.” Counsel responded,

“[W]e will stand by that announcement,” and, when the trial court

asked again if Kinlaw was satisfied with the jury’s composition,

counsel responded affirmatively.

     Kinlaw now argues that the trial court erred both by

implementing what he characterizes as an improper remedy and by

permitting the State to restrike I. B. But Kinlaw failed to object to

the trial court’s remedial action and he acquiesced to the jury’s

composition before the jury was sworn. Thus, these issues are not

                                   21
preserved for appellate review.11 See Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741,

746 (5) (707 SE2d 80) (2011); Holmes v. State, 273 Ga. 644, 645 (2)

(543 SE2d 688) (2001).

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      11 We express no opinion regarding the propriety of the remedial action

employed by the trial court.
                                     22