Court Opinion

ID: 9829886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:42:26.382224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:08.405176
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In this motion it is claimed that we erred in our conclusions of fact in finding that plaintiffs hold title to surveys Nos. 11 and 3, under a regular chain of title from and under the sovereignty of the soil down to themselves, “because there is no evidence in the record, nor any introduced, to show that title to survey No. 3 had ever passed out of the state of Texas.”
[8] It is claimed that attention was called to the absence of such evidence by appellant’s brief under the sixth assignment of error. That assignment was not entitled under the rules of this court to consideration, because there is no such statement subjoined as is required by rule 31 (67 S. W. xvi). Lewis v. Houston Elec. Co., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 625, 88 S. W. 489, 112 S. W. 593; Certainly the rule does not contemplate that an appellant can have this court read the whole statement of facts by saying, “See entire statement of facts,” for a verification of a statement made under a proposition in his brief. But, when the entire record is looked to, it does not appear that appellant’s motion for a new trial contained any such ground therefor as is presented in this motion. If an assignment is not so briefed as to require its consideration, an appellate court cannot be compelled to consider it on a motion for rehearing.
But was it essential under the facts shown in this case that plaintiff show a patent from the state? Pretermitting the question as to whether the land in controversy was ever patented by the state, the evidence shows the title of plaintiff as follows: (1) That F. H. Robertson, master commissioner, under a decree of the United States Circuit Court of the Northern District of Texas, on September 25, 1890, sold certain lands mentioned in said decree, which included two surveys of the following description: “640 acres of land in Pecos county, Texas, known as survey No. 11, in block No. 129, on the waters of Pecos river, a tributary of the Rio Grande about 36 miles south, 51 degrees east from Fort Stockton, located by virtue of land scrip No. 70 issued December 18, 1880 and patented to the Texas & St. Louis Railway Company on February 15, 1887, by letters patent No. 25 Vol. 103 * * * 640 acres of land in Pecos county, Texas, known as survey No. 3, block No. 129, on the waters of Pecos river, a tributary of the Rio Grande, about 3414 miles south, 51 degrees east from Fort Stockton located by virtue of land scrip No. 66, issued December 18, 1880 and patented to the Texas & St. Louis Railway Co. on February 16, 1887 by letters patent No. 46 Yol. 103” —which sale was made by said commissioner to Gist Blair, which sale was on October I 21, 1890, duly confirmed by said federal court, and the master was ordered to execute and deliver to said purchaser a deed to the land so sold; and that said commissioner, in pursuance to said order, did on February 17, 1891, make and deliver such deed to said purchaser, Gist Blair. (2) That on July 2, 1896, said Gist Blair by his deed of that date sold and conveyed the said lands, including the two surveys above described, to A. Oppenheimer. This deed describes the two surveys just as they are described in the deed by the master commissioner to Blair. (3) That on November 14, 1S9S, A. Oppenheimer, by his deed of that date, conveyed, among other lands, said sections Nos. 3 and 11, in block 129, to J. C. Smith. (4) In this deed reference is made to the other two for more particular description. (5) On January 23, 1901, J. C. Smith conveyed said surveys Nos. 3 and 11 in block 129 to R. R. Wakefield, reserving in his deed of conveyance a vendor’s lien on the land for the unpaid purchase money. (6) On September 15, 1904, R. R. Wakefield, and his wife, Ida F., reconveyed said two surveys to J. G. Smith. (7) In the interim, between the dates of the two last-mentioned deeds, Wakefield went into possession of the land and made the improvements which are involved in this controversy. In his answer the defendant alleged that he purchased such improvements from Wakefield, who delivered the same to him.
[9] In the absence of any objection to the recitals in the aforementioned deeds, we think it sufficiently appears from them, when taken in connection with the decree under which the deed from the master commissioner to Gist Blair was made, that the plaintiff showed title to both surveys under the sovereignty of the soil down to himself.
Besides, it is apparent that any title that defendant had or claimed in either of the surveys was obtained from Wakefield, and, as Wakefield went into possession under a deed from plaintiff and afterwards recon-veyed it to him, plaintiff’s title was superior to the defendant’s under that source.
[10] As is contended by the appellant, the sole question in this case is one of boundary between survey No. 10 and surveys Nos. 3 and 11 in block 129; i. e., whether the land described in plaintiff’s petition lies within Nos. 3 and 11 as alleged in the petition or is a part of lot survey No. 10 as claimed by appellant. If it is comprehended by Nos. 3 and 11, as alleged, it is plaintiff’s land, but, if it is within the boundaries of No. 10, it was the defendant’s.
The verdict for the plaintiff, when read in connection with the charge, necessarily determines that the parcels of land sued for are within surveys Nos. 3 and 11; and hence it follows that it can be no part of survey No. 10, as claimed by appellant. Black v. Feeney, 137 S. W. 1161, decided by this court on May 3, 1911.
The motion is overruled.