Court Opinion

ID: 9961540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 06:06:44.950145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:54.012827
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

OTIS COOK,                                                            UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      April 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 364163
                                                                      Bay Circuit Court
GREEN HILLS GOLF, INC., doing business as                             LC No. 21-003477-NO
GREEN HILLS GOLF COURSE,

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this premises-liability action, defendant appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order
denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

         This case arises from a trip and fall on a golf course. In September 2018, plaintiff played
golf at defendant’s golf course. It was a warm, cloudy morning, and the ground was wet. Plaintiff
was part of a group of 20 people, which was divided into five foursomes. Each group started on
the first hole, and plaintiff was in the fourth group. On the fifth hole, there is a relatively short,
gradual series of steps leading from the cart path up to the slightly elevated tee box. The steps are
constructed from wooden railroad ties, and there are rubber pads covering the center of each step.
When plaintiff went up the stairs to the tee box for the fifth hole, he did not notice anything about
the stairs that looked dangerous. After hitting his tee shot, plaintiff went down the stairs. Another
member of his foursome was coming up the stairs at the same time.

1
 Cook v Green Hills Golf, Inc, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 31, 2023
(Docket No. 364163).

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       Plaintiff fell as he was walking down the stairs. He described the fall in his deposition:

               I went up, I hit a good shot because I saw, like, an island green, I got on the
       green. Had about, like, a 20-foot put [sic], “Oh, wow, good shot, Otis,” to myself.
       Golf is, you know, you’re trying to focus on the game and your shot and what you
       need to do. And I attempted to walk back down and it was three flights of stairs.[2]

                                               * * *

       As I walked -- came up the stairs, it seems to me that Willie was coming up, so I
       just stayed to the right. And as I walked down, I hit the -- hit something, it snagged
       my feet and I heard three pops, pop, pop, pop. Then I rolled down the three flights
       of stairs and I couldn’t walk on my own for two years after that.

        Plaintiff thought that his left foot became caught in a hole in the wooden step, which caused
him to fall, but he was not certain. After he fell, he immediately felt pain in both of his knees and
his back. Plaintiff testified that he could not move either one of his legs. He was taken to the
hospital by ambulance.

        Plaintiff admitted that he could have walked up to the tee box on the grass without using
the steps. Plaintiff did not know how long the steps had been in their present condition or if anyone
had every complained about the steps before his fall. The hole that plaintiff believed caused his
fall was located on the right side of the steps, from the perspective of a person descending the
steps. As reflected in pictures of the area, the steps showed signs of deterioration.

        Plaintiff filed this action against defendant, alleging a claim of premises liability. Plaintiff
alleged that he suffered injuries to his spine and legs as a result of the fall. Defendant subsequently
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that plaintiff’s claim was
barred because the condition of the steps was open and obvious, there were no special aspects
rendering the steps effectively unavoidable or unreasonably dangerous, and there was no evidence
that defendant knew or should have known of an arguably dangerous condition on the premises.
Plaintiff argued in response that there was a genuine question of material fact whether the
extremely poor condition of the stairs and lack of a handrail constituted special aspects that made
the steps unreasonably dangerous.

        Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
The court concluded that there was a genuine question of material fact whether there were special
aspects rendering the steps unreasonably dangerous. We granted defendant’s application for leave
to appeal. After we granted leave in this case, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Kandil-
Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 104; 1 NW3d 44 (2023).

2
  We note that it is difficult to tell from the pictures in the record how many steps are present, but
the stairway appears much shorter than 3 flights of stairs. At another point in his deposition,
plaintiff described the stairs as consisting of “three rows.”

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                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        A trial court’s summary disposition ruling is reviewed de novo on appeal. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). When considering a motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10), a trial court must consider all of the submitted evidence in the light most favorable
to the opposing party. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019). Summary disposition may not be granted if there is a genuine issue of material fact, which
“exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id.

                                          III. ANALYSIS

         “In a premises liability action, a plaintiff must prove the elements of negligence: (1) the
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages.” Benton v Dart
Properties, Inc, 270 Mich App 437, 440; 715 NW2d 335 (2006). The nature of a land possessor’s
duty to a visitor depends on whether the visitor is classified as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 596; 614 NW2d 88 (2000).

        In this case, there is no dispute that plaintiff was defendant’s business invitee since he was
a patron of defendant’s golf course when he allegedly fell. See id. at 597 (stating that “invitee
status is commonly afforded to persons entering upon the property of another for business
purposes”). An “invitee is entitled to the highest level of protection under premises liability law.”
Id. “The landowner has a duty of care, not only to warn the invitee of any known dangers, but the
additional obligation to also make the premises safe, which requires the landowner to inspect the
premises and, depending upon the circumstances, make any necessary repairs or warn of any
discovered hazards.” Id.

        Recently, the legal framework for the duty element of a premises liability claim in
Michigan has changed significantly. In Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 103-104, our Supreme Court
stated:

               In these combined cases, we must determine the appropriate legal
       framework to apply when an invitee is harmed by a condition on a land possessor’s
       property. In Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc, 464 Mich 512, 516-517; 629 NW2d 384
       (2001), we held that courts must analyze both the open and obvious danger doctrine
       and any exceptions to it under the element of duty. The Lugo Court also held that
       if a danger is open and obvious, only where an invitee “provide[s] evidence of
       special aspects of the condition” will the invitor still owe a duty of care. Id. at 514.
       We conclude that Lugo was wrongly decided and must be overruled in two respects.
       First, we overrule Lugo’s decision to make the open and obvious danger doctrine a
       part of a land possessor’s duty. Rather, we hold that the open and obvious nature
       of a condition is relevant to breach and the parties’ comparative fault. Second, we
       overrule the special-aspects doctrine and hold that when a land possessor should
       anticipate the harm that results from an open and obvious condition, despite its
       obviousness, the possessor is not relieved of the duty of reasonable care. [Emphasis
       added.]

                                                 -3-
        The Supreme Court in Kandil-Elsayed proceeded to set forth the applicable legal
framework in greater detail. First, the Court “reaffirm[ed] the traditional duty owed to invitees:
the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect [them] from an unreasonable risk of harm caused
by a dangerous condition of the land.” Kandil-Elsayed, 512 Mich at 143 (quotation marks and
citation omitted; second alteration in original).

        Next, the Court held that the open and obvious nature of a danger remains an objective
inquiry, determined by considering “whether it is reasonable to expect that an average person with
ordinary intelligence would have discovered it upon casual inspection.” Id. at 144 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). However, whether a condition is open and obvious should no longer
be analyzed as part of the duty element of a premises liability claim because such an inquiry is
instead relevant to the issues of the defendant’s breach and the plaintiff’s comparative fault. Id.

        Finally, the Supreme Court overruled the “special-aspects doctrine” to the “the extent that
it departed from the anticipation-of-harm standard in § 343A of the Second Restatement” and held
that “[r]ather than conduct a narrow analysis of whether an obvious danger is ‘effectively
unavoidable’ or poses an ‘unreasonable risk of severe harm,’ the fact-finder should consider
whether ‘the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such . . . obviousness.’ ” Id. at 147,
quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 343A, p. 218 (ellipsis in original). The Court clarified, “While
we reiterate the viability of the anticipation exception today, as articulated in the Second
Restatement, we make clear that whether a land possessor should anticipate harm from an
otherwise open and obvious danger is a relevant inquiry under breach, not duty.” Kandil-Elsayed,
512 Mich at 147-148. Hence,

       [a]s part of the breach inquiry, the fact-finder may consider, among other things,
       whether the condition was open and obvious and whether, despite its open and
       obvious nature, the land possessor should have anticipated harm to the invitee. If
       breach is shown, as well as causation and harm, then the jury should consider the
       plaintiff’s comparative fault and reduce the plaintiff’s damages accordingly. A
       determination of the plaintiff’s comparative fault may also require consideration of
       the open and obvious nature of the hazard and the plaintiff’s choice to confront it.
       [Id. at 148-149.]

        Here, this Court granted leave to appeal in this case on May 31, 2023, before the Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Kandil-Elsayed on July 28, 2023. This Court has since held that our
Supreme Court’s decision in Kandil-Elsayed “operates retroactively, applying to . . . all cases
currently pending on direct appeal.” Gabrielson v Woods Condo Ass’n, Inc, ___ Mich App ___,
___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 364809); slip op at 2. Accordingly, the Kandil-Elsayed
framework applies to this case. Id. 3

      Under Kandil-Elsayed, the issues whether the condition of the step was open and obvious,
whether defendant should have anticipated the harm despite its obviousness, and whether plaintiff

3
 Although Kandil-Elsayed signified a substantial change in the law of premises liability, appellant
did not file an updated brief addressing our Supreme Court’s decision. Even more troubling is the
fact that appellee failed to fail any type of responsive pleading.

                                                -4-
was negligent in navigating the steps are relevant to breach and comparative fault. Kandil-
Elsayed, 512 Mich at 144 (“Because an ‘open and obvious’ analysis frequently includes an analysis
of the plaintiff’s own behavior—a failure to see a danger, appreciate a danger, or avoid a danger—
situating the doctrine in the breach/comparative-fault analysis will allow the plaintiff’s potentially
negligent response to an open and obvious danger to reduce their damages, rather than cut off all
recovery.”); id. at 148 (“As part of the breach inquiry, the fact-finder may consider, among other
things, whether the condition was open and obvious and whether, despite its open and obvious
nature, the land possessor should have anticipated harm to the invitee.”). Both breach and
comparative fault are typically questions of fact to be decided by the jury. Id. at 112 & n 2, 136.

        Although there appear to be genuine questions of material fact regarding breach and
comparative fault on this record, as previosuly indicated, plaintiff has failed to submit a brief on
appeal in this Court and defendant has failed to provide any discussion or argument addressing the
effect of Kandil-Elsayed on this case, despite its obvious importance. Considering that the trial
court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s decision in Kandil-Elsayed when deciding
the motion for summary disposition and that the parties have been woefully inadequate in their
participation in this Court, we simply vacate the trial court’s ruling due to the intervening change
in the law and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with our Supreme Court’s
opinion in Kandil-Elsayed.

        Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. Though appellee prevailed on
appeal, because he failed to file any responsive pleading, appellee did not prevail due to any action
on the part of his counsel. Accordingly, we deny costs to either party. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel

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