Court Opinion

ID: 9925408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 18:02:50.894451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.390776
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Tapia CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061786

                     v.                                                (Super. Ct. No. 96CF0802)

 MIGUEL ANGEL TAPIA,                                                   OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Scott A. Steiner, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
                   Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski, Alan Amann
and Minh U. Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                             *               *               *
              Defendant Miguel Angel Tapia appeals from an order denying his petition
for resentencing made pursuant to Penal Code former section 1170.96 (now Pen. Code,
          1
§ 1172.6). Tapia and four codefendants—Juan Rivera, Carlos Diaz, Guadalupe Vertiz,
and Jorge Castro—were convicted in 1998 of second degree murder for the stabbing
death of Cesar Arroyo. The trial court denied Tapia’s resentencing petition without
issuing an order to show cause on the ground the record of conviction, including Tapia’s
testimony, established beyond dispute that Tapia was the actual killer. We conclude the
trial court should have issued an order to show cause and conducted an evidentiary
hearing and, therefore, reverse and remand for those purposes.

                                          FACTS
I. Attack and Killing of Arroyo
              On March 14, 1996, at around 9:20 a.m., K.L., her boyfriend Cesar Arroyo,
and her sister L.L. were walking northbound on Standard Street in Santa Ana on their
way to a grocery store. A brown-colored car approached them from the opposite
direction, made a U-turn, and pulled up beside them. Rivera jumped out of the car and,
with a beer can in his hand, asked Arroyo, “‘Where you from?’” Arroyo responded, “‘I
don’t claim.” When Rivera asked him again, Arroyo insisted, “‘Really I don’t claim.’”
Rivera proclaimed, “‘We’re from Lopers,” or “‘big, bad Lopers’” and threw the beer can
at Arroyo. K.L. interceded, and the beer can hit her on the head.
              Tapia, Diaz, Vertiz, and Castro then jumped out of the car and with Rivera,
started beating Arroyo. Arroyo, who was five feet 5 inches tall and weighed 131 pounds,
did not fight back. After a minute or two of being beaten, Arroyo fell to the ground
against the fence. He tried to cover and protect himself while Tapia and his codefendants

              1
                 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10). All statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

                                             2
continued to assault him. They continued to kick and hit Arroyo for five to six minutes
                        2
as he lay on the ground. Tapia and Vertiz punched K.L. when she tried to pull them off
of Arroyo.
              At some point, Tapia stepped away and stood behind L.L. A few seconds
later, three of the defendants got back into the car while another stood at the back of the
car and waited. Arroyo managed to stand up. One defendant, identified as wearing a
blue shirt and dark, square pants, went up to Arroyo and pushed him in the chest. Arroyo
started walking, then stumbled and fell to the ground.
              The defendant who pushed Arroyo walked back to the car and got in. Once
all five were inside, they drove away.
              L.L. went to seek help, and police officers arrived shortly thereafter.
Arroyo had been stabbed several times and later died from his wounds.
              Police officers took K.L. and L.L. to a liquor store where the officers had
pulled over a car matching the description of the car the defendants were in. Tapia and
his four codefendants were inside the car. Both K.L. and L.L. identified Tapia as having
participated in the attack on Arroyo.

II. Arroyo’s Autopsy
              Joseph Halka, a pathologist for the Orange County Sheriff-Coroner,
performed an autopsy on Arroyo’s body. Halka testified that Arroyo died from
exsanguination (he bled to death) caused by a stab wound to the heart and left lung.
Halka found a total of seven stab or slash wounds. The wound to the heart was caused by
a knife with a “two-edged configuration,” meaning it was sharp on both edges or sides.
Before Arroyo died, emergency surgery had been performed that altered “some of the

              2
                K.L. testified that while Arroyo was on the ground the defendants hit and
kicked him. L.L. testified that four of the five defendants “piled on” Arroyo as he lay on
the ground and one defendant stood behind her.

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contours” of the wounds. The remaining knife wounds, including defensive slash and
“punctate” wounds, were nonfatal and could have been caused by either a two-edged
knife or a one-edged knife. Arroyo also had bruises and contusions on his body.

III. Tapia’s Police Interview and Trial Testimony
               Police investigators interviewed Tapia early on March 15, 1996. Tapia
admitted that he and his fellow gang members had attacked Arroyo but repeatedly denied
having used a weapon. Tapia told the investigators that, before the attack, “the other
guys said, ‘watch that guy,’” with reference to Arroyo. Diaz (the driver) stopped the car,
everyone got out, and they started attacking Arroyo. When asked why Tapia attacked
Arroyo, Tapia responded, “But was very — if you see him in the street like that, you’re
going to figure he’s a gang member, and you’re going to stop him, and you’re going to
say hey, you understand me?” Tapia claimed he did not have any weapons and did not
stab Arroyo.
               At trial, Tapia testified he was the one who stabbed Arroyo and he had lied
to police when he was arrested. He testified he did have a knife in his pants’ pocket and
                                                                                 3
had obtained the knife from work at a Del Taco, where he use it to cut up boxes. The
knife was “straight” (as opposed to being a folding knife), had a three-inch blade and a
three-inch handle, and was sharp on both edges. He did not have a sheath or pouch for
the knife but on March 14, 1996, he was wearing oversized pants with huge pockets that
could accommodate the knife. Tapia testified he had forgotten about the knife when he
left work at 4:00 p.m.

               3
                 Payroll records for the Del Taco showed that Tapia had last worked there
on February 15, 1995. Tapia’s father, who was the manager of the Del Taco, testified
that knives that were sharp on both edges were used at that Del Taco and that he had not
seen such a knife at the store in March 1996.

                                             4
              Tapia testified that he and his codefendants did not have any discussion
about getting into a fight. Tapia had been drinking earlier that night and was drunk.
Tapia claimed that as the five drove past Arroyo he screamed, “Little Minnie Locotes”
and lifted his hand with five fingers outstretched at a 45-degree angle. The car made a
U-turn and all five passengers got out of the car and attacked Arroyo. Tapia took out the
knife and stabbed Arroyo. Tapia remembered stabbing Arroyo a few times. Tapia did
not remember how it happened because he was drunk and did not recall why he stabbed
Arroyo. When he realized he was stabbing Arroyo with a knife, Tapia got scared and ran
back to the car. He did not think he had seriously injured Arroyo because Arroyo was
still standing and walking.
              Tapia and his codefendants got back into the car and drove off. Later they
returned to the place where they had attacked Arroyo and saw an ambulance. They then
drove to a liquor store to buy more beer. Soon thereafter, they were stopped by police
officers and arrested.
              At first, Tapia claimed that he could not remember what he did with the
knife. But he then testified that he had tossed the knife out of the driver’s side window
while on the way to the liquor store. Tapia claimed none of his codefendants knew he
had a knife, that he had stabbed Arroyo, or that he had tossed the knife out the window.

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. The Jury Trial Leading to Tapia’s Conviction for Second Degree Murder
              Tapia and the four other defendants were charged by amended information
filed in 1997, with the murder of Arroyo. It was alleged the murder was committed for
the benefit of, at the direction of and in association with a criminal street gang.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)
              In May 1998 Tapia and his codefendants were tried together by jury.
Outside the jury’s presence all defendants admitted that they were members of the

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Lopers, that the Lopers was a criminal street gang, and any alleged crimes they were
convicted of committing had been committed for the benefit of the Lopers.
              The jury was instructed on aiding and abetting, conspiracy, murder, express
and implied malice, attempted murder, second degree murder resulting from an unlawful
act dangerous to life, and the lesser included offenses of assault with a deadly weapon,
simple battery, and simple assault.
              The jury convicted all defendants of second degree murder. The jury found
that Tapia had personally used a knife at the time of the commission of the murder.
              The trial court sentenced Tapia to a term of 28 years to life in prison, which
included a principal term of 15 years to life for murder, four years for enhancements, and
nine years for other offenses not relevant here.
              Tapia and the other defendants appealed. In an unpublished opinion, a
panel of this court remanded for reconsideration of presentence custody credits award but
otherwise affirmed the judgment and sentence. (People v. Diaz et al. (Mar. 28, 2001,
G023892).)

II. Tapia’s Petition for Resentencing
              In April 2022, Tapia filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
In a written response, the prosecution argued the petition should be denied at the prima
facie stage because the record of conviction, based on the jury’s true finding that Tapia
personally used a deadly weapon, established he was the actual killer.
              Tapia, for whom counsel had been appointed, filed a brief in support of
resentencing and argued that an order to show cause should be issued based on his
allegations that he was eligible for relief. Tapia argued the jury’s true finding that he
personally used a knife in the murder did not necessarily mean the jury had found he was
the actual killer because it could have found that he displayed the knife or struck the
victim with its butt end.

                                              6
              The trial court denied Tapia’s resentencing petition at a hearing held on
September 8, 2022. Tapia filed a notice of appeal on the same day. About one month
later the trial court issued a statement of decision. The court found: “The record of
conviction, including Petitioner’s own testimony before the jury in this case conclusively
shows that petitioner was the actual killer. [¶] As the actual killer, petitioner would be
guilty of murder under the current law and is ineligible for resentencing under Section
1172.6.”

              PROCEDURE AND STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 1172.6
               By legislation effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended the
felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine of
liability as a basis for a murder conviction. (Stats, 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; see People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984.) The latter result was accomplished by amending
section 188 to provide that, except in cases of felony murder, “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
              To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must file in the
sentencing court a petition alleging these three conditions have been met: (1) the
petitioner was convicted based on a pleading “that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1)); (2) the petitioner was
convicted of murder or attempted murder (id., subd. (a)(2)); and (3) the petitioner could
not now be convicted of murder or attempted murder as those offenses are presently
defined (id., subd. (a)(3)).
              If the petition satisfies certain technical requirements, then the trial court
appoints counsel if the petitioner has requested counsel. (§ 1176.2, subd. (b)(3).) Next,
“the prosecutor shall file and serve a response,” and “[t]he petitioner may file and serve a

                                              7
reply within 30 days after the prosecutor’s response is served.” (Id., subd. (c).) Once
briefing is completed, the trial court determines whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. (Ibid.) If the court finds the petitioner has made a prima facie case,
then the court must issue an order to show cause. (Ibid.)
                 In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6, the trial court’s inquiry is limited: The court, accepting the
petition’s factual allegations as true, makes a “‘“preliminary assessment”’” whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if those allegations were proven. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “‘“If so, the court must issue an order to show
cause.”’” (Ibid.) Within 60 days of issuance of the order to show cause, the trial court
must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief. (§1172.6,
subd. (d)(1).)
                 If counsel is appointed and the parties are given the opportunity for
briefing, the trial court may rely on the record of conviction to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6. (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 957.) “The record of conviction may include the underlying facts as
presented in an appellate opinion, the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing
arguments of counsel.” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) “The record of
conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section
[1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) “In sum, the parties can, and should, use the
record of conviction to aid the trial court in reliably assessing whether a petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief under subdivision (c) [of section 1172.6].” (Id. at p.
972.)
                 “In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) “While the

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trial court may look at the record of conviction after the appointment of counsel to
determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the
prima facie inquiry under subdivision (c) is limited. Like the analogous prima facie
inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings, ‘“the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as
true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue
an order to show cause.”’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual
allegations on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’
[Citations.] ‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.”’” (Id. at p. 971.)

                                        DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review and Standard for Denying Relief Under Section 1172.6
              The trial court denied defendant’s resentencing petition on the ground
defendant had failed to make a prima facie case for resentencing relief. Denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage is warranted only if the record of conviction
demonstrates the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) That is a purely legal conclusion subject de novo review.
(Ibid.)
              “A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if the record
of conviction conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of evidence, or
credibility determinations, that (1) the petitioner was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner
was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission
of murder in the first degree, (3) the petitioner was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, or (4) the petitioner acted with

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malice aforethought that was not imputed based solely on participation in a crime.”
(People v. Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)

II. Tapia Is Entitled to an Evidentiary Hearing
              Tapia argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his resentencing
petition because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish as a matter of
law that he is ineligible for relief. Although Tapia testified he had stabbed Arroyo, Tapia
argues that one or more of the jurors might have disbelieved that testimony, as well as his
testimony that he was not threatened by any codefendant, and found him liable under a
now impermissible theory, in particular, the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
Tapia contends the trial court engaged in factfinding by finding that he was the actual
killer.
              We agree that the record of conviction does not conclusively establish that
Tapia is ineligible for relief. The jurors, who were instructed that they were “the sole
judges of the believability of a witness,” might have disbelieved Tapia’s testimony. The
prosecutor left open the possibility that Tapia was not the stabber. In closing, the
prosecutor argued, “[I]f you believe, as jurors, that one of the defendants was the stabber,
which the evidence obviously shows, in fact, Mr. Tapia admitted being the stabber, but as
you will see when I go through the law dealing with group liability, which is the
uncharged conspiracy or aiding and abetting, either of those theories, that the law holds
all five defendants accountable even though only one of those defendants may be the
stabber. The prosecutor also told the jury, “Whoever the stabber was, whether you
believe it was Mr. Tapia, as he said, or it’s one of the other defendants, that person
clearly acted with the express intent to kill.” (Italics added.)
              The jury’s true finding on the knife-use enhancement does not conclusively
establish that Tapia was the stabber. The jury was instructed on personal use of a deadly
or dangerous weapon and in that instruction was told “the term ‘personally used a deadly

                                              10
or dangerous weapon,’ as used in this instruction, means the defendant must have
intentionally displayed a weapon in a menacing manner or intentionally fired it or
intentionally struck or hit a human being with it.” That instruction did not require the
jury to find that Tapia stabbed Arroyo and killed him in order to return a true finding.
Indeed, the verdict returned by the jury did not even find that Tapia had used a knife in
the commission of the murder: The verdict on the dangerous weapon enhancement states
only that the jury found that Tapia “personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon,
to-wit: KNIFE, at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in COUNT 1
[murder].” (Italics added.) The jury might have found that Tapia brandished the knife,
delivered the nonfatal stabs, or used the knife for a purpose unrelated to the murder at the
time the offense was committed.
              At trial, the prosecutor argued strenuously that all defendants were guilty of
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Without factfinding, the
record does not foreclose the possibility that Tapia was convicted under that doctrine.
              Given the record of conviction, and Tapia’s testimony in particular, it might
seem unlikely that the jury found anybody other than Tapia to be the actual killer.
Tapia’s trial testimony, if believed, would be substantial evidence that Tapia was in fact
the actual killer. But such a credibility determination would be inappropriate at the prima
facie stage because the record does not positively refute the allegations of Tapia’s
resentencing petition. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) At the prima facie stage, the
standard is that the record of conviction must conclusively establish that Tapia is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We cannot say it does. An evidentiary hearing is
therefore in order.
              Our opinion should not be read as indicating whether the trial court should
grant or deny Tapia resentencing relief. Exercising de novo review, we conclude only
that Tapia has met his burden of making a prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6, subdivision (c).

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                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is reversed and the matter is remanded with
directions to the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary
hearing.

                                                 SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

MOORE, J.

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