Court Opinion

ID: 9495802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:10:39.955785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:12.080871
License: Public Domain

ROSEN, District Judge,
dissenting.
My disagreement with the majority is a narrow but dispositive one. Specifically, I do not share the majority’s view that the record before us permits the inference that Defendant/Appellee Kroger Company’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff/Appellant Stanley Johnson was a pretext for race discrimination. Rather, I believe that the incidents cited by Johnson as supporting this inference are not suggestive of racial bias, are temporally far removed from Kroger’s discharge decision, and, most importantly, have not been shown to have played any role in this decision. Thus, I respectfully dissent.
*870I.
Johnson acknowledges, and the majority recognizes, that Kroger has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Johnson’s employment. Specifically, Kroger states that Johnson was discharged for poor job performance. Before turning to Johnson’s claim that this reason is pretextual, I find it instructive to briefly summarize the significant body of evidence that supports Kroger’s stated basis for its decision.
According to Kroger, zone manager Nancy Noyes made the decision to terminate Johnson, in consultation with Mike Purdum of Kroger’s human resources department. Noyes testified that, in making this decision, she drew upon her own direct observation of Johnson’s job performance during a series of walkthroughs, spanning from November of 1995 to late June of 1996, of the Wheelersburg store where Johnson served as comanager. Noyes also received input from members of her staff who had conducted additional inspections of the Wheelersburg store. As reflected in Noyes’ testimony and the contemporaneous reports of her and her staff, these walkthroughs consistently revealed a number of problems while Johnson was in charge of the store, including failure to ensure the quality and appearance of meat and produce, lack of familiarity with Kroger’s policies and accounting methods and the store’s budget and sales figures, and unkempt conditions. Noyes discussed these problems with Johnson, but saw no improvement in these areas. Significantly, Johnson does not and cannot dispute these documented deficiencies in his job performance.
Apart from considering these shortcomings, both documented and directly observed, Noyes testified that she also received input from Mike Purdum of human resources and Johnson’s direct supervisor, store manager Dan Newman. Noyes stated that she spoke to Purdum to ensure that every possible effort was being made to overcome Johnson’s deficiencies or, failing that, to identify a job that might be better suited to his customer relations skills. Regarding Newman, Noyes testified that he was an additional source of information about Johnson’s performance, with Newman’s reports tending to confirm the direct assessments of Noyes and her staff. According to Noyes, Newman expressed frustration that Johnson’s shortcomings might reflect poorly upon him as store manager, but Noyes urged Newman not to intervene, and instead to allow Johnson “the opportunity to follow through on his responsibilities.” (Noyes Dep. at 93, J.A. at 658.)
Upon reviewing Johnson’s employment record in the late summer or early fall of 1996 and discerning no improvement in his job performance, Noyes consulted with Purdum and decided to offer Johnson a transfer to a service director position. Noyes stated that she and Purdum made this decision, and that “[i]t was certainly not” Newman’s decision to remove Johnson from his job as comanager. (Noyes Dep. at 165, J.A. at 675.) To the contrary, Noyes testified that when she advised Newman of her decision, Newman responded by asking whether “there was anything more he could do to help” Johnson in his existing position. (Noyes Dep. at 165-66, J.A. at 675-76.) Newman confirmed this account at his deposition, stating that he told Noyes that “if you wanted to continue with [Johnson] as he was, I could live with that.” (Newman Dep. at 213-14, J.A. at 622-23.)
Noyes deemed Newman’s proposal unacceptable, however, concluding that Johnson had been afforded a sufficient opportunity to correct his shortcomings and had failed to do so. Accordingly, when Johnson refused to accept a transfer, Noyes *871discharged him. This is the backdrop against which Johnson must produce sufficient evidence to permit an inference of race discrimination — a documented record of poor performance over many months as witnessed by a number of individuals, including the principal decisionmaker herself, and an employee’s failure to overcome these deficiencies even after being specifically and repeatedly informed of them.
II.
Kroger having proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, Johnson must show that Kroger’s stated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231 F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir.2000). As stated by the majority, we have characterized evidence of pretext as taking one of three forms. See Dews, 231 F.3d at 1021. The majority holds, and I agree, that Johnson cannot establish the first of these three forms of pretext — ie., that Kroger’s proffered reason “has no basis in fact,” Dews, 231 F.3d at 1021 — in light of the unrefuted documentaiy evidence of deficiencies in Johnson’s job performance. The majority further concludes, and I again agree, that Johnson’s appeal to the third type of pretext — ie., that Kroger’s stated reason “was insufficient to warrant” Johnson’s discharge, Dews, 231 F.3d at 1021 — fails for lack of evidence that any similarly-situated employee was treated more favorably despite comparable performance problems.
This leaves only the second method of establishing pretext, by offering evidence sufficient to permit the conclusion that Kroger’s proffered reason “did not actually motivate” its discharge. decision. Dews, 231 F.3d at 1021. We have explained that this form of pretext “is of an entirely different ilk” from the other two:
There, the plaintiff admits the factual basis underlying the employer’s proffered explanation and further admits that such conduct could motivate dismissal. The plaintiffs attack on the credibility of the proffered explanation is, instead, an indirect one. In such cases, the plaintiff attempts to indict the credibility of his employer’s explanation by showing circumstances which tend to prove that an illegal motivation was more likely than that offered • by the defendant. In other words, the plaintiff argues that the sheer weight of the circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it “more likely than not” that the employer’s explanation is a pretext, or coverup.
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994).
The majority holds that Johnson has produced sufficient evidence of such an unlawful “coverup” here, through a combination of two inferences that the majority finds permissible: (i) that Johnson’s direct supervisor, Dan Newman, was motivated by racial animus, and (ii) that Newman played a significant role in Johnson’s discharge. I find the evidence wanting on both of these points, and especially the latter. Thus, even if the trier of fact could conclude that Newman’s treatment of Johnson was marred by racial bias, the record precludes any finding that this played a role in Kroger’s discharge decision.
Regarding Newman’s purported racial animus toward Johnson, my own review of the record leads me to a conclusion quite different from the one advanced by Johnson and accepted by the majority. The only allegedly race-based remarks that are attributed to Newman are: (i) his alleged statement that the forthcoming transfer of Johnson to Wheelersburg would hurt the store’s business, because of the lack of African-American customers at this location; and (ii) his purported statements at a department head meeting just before *872Johnson’s arrival in Wheelersburg that Johnson was not very intelligent and that the employees needed to work with him. Accepting, for the moment, that these remarks are indicative of racially discriminatory views, Newman necessarily must have made them before Johnson’s transfer to Wheelersburg in January of 1995, or nearly two years before Johnson was terminated in November of 1996. This sizable temporal gap precludes any reliance upon these alleged statements as supporting an inference of discrimination in Johnson’s eventual discharge. See Phelps v. Yale Security, Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025-26 (6th Cir.) (holding that discriminatory remarks made “nearly a year before” the challenged employment decision could not support an inference of discrimination), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861, 114 S.Ct. 175, 126 L.Ed.2d 135 (1993).
These alleged remarks also are far too ambiguous to raise such an inference. See Phelps, 986 F.2d at 1025-26. Regarding the possible impact of Johnson’s transfer upon business at the Wheelers-burg location, it is noteworthy that Johnson himself expressed a similar concern at the time, stating a reluctance to relocate to Wheelersburg because of “the racial intolerance that was characteristic of that area.” (Johnson Dep. at 201, J.A. at 386.) Seemingly, then, Newman and Johnson were making the very same observation about the potential biases of Wheelers-burg customers. As for Newman’s purported remark to his department heads that Johnson was not very intelligent, Newman himself testified (i) that he had been told by Johnson’s previous supervisor, Randy Roberts, that Johnson was “the worst comanager he’d ever had” and that “he was absolutely useless as a co-manager,” and (ii) that he relayed this information to his department heads, stating that Johnson “didn’t have the reputation of being the best comanager but we would work with him and see what we could do.” (Newman Dep. at 37-38, J.A. at 582-83.) While I agree with the majority that such statements are disparaging, whether framed in terms of Johnson’s intelligence or otherwise, I see nothing in them (or elsewhere in the record) to suggest that Newman considered Johnson’s race in making these remarks, or that Newman would not have made the very same comments about any comanager, regardless of his race, whose arrival at the Wheelersburg store was preceded by accounts of poor job performance.1
*873Nevertheless, the majority determines that the evidentiary weaknesses in these alleged remarks are overcome by the totality of evidence of Newman’s supposedly poor treatment of Johnson and his purportedly discriminatory views. In reaching this conclusion, however, I fear that the majority has too readily adopted Johnson’s unsubstantiated gloss upon the record. Johnson claimed in an affidavit, for example, that Newman “criticizfed] and belittl[ed] me on a frequent basis before customers and subordinates,” and “humiliated me in front of employees.” (Johnson Aff. at ¶ 17, J.A. at 110.) Yet, when questioned on this subject at his deposition, Johnson identified only a single instance of public criticism within the first week or two after his transfer to Wheelersburg, and this incident occurred in front of vendors rather than employees or customers. (See Johnson Dep. at 222, J.A. at 399.) Moreover, the two employees cited by Johnson as having witnessed Newman’s purportedly “demeaning” treatment of him, (Appellant Br. at 14), actually testified that they never saw Newman speak to Johnson in a disrespectful tone or berate him in public. (See Cooper Dep. at 34, J.A. at 251; Tackett Dep. at 22, J.A. at 735; see also Gunnoe Dep. at 13, J.A. at 306 (stating that Newman “was a hard man to get along with sometimes,” but that he had never witnessed Newman yell at Johnson).)2
Despite this record, the majority states that “Johnson and Newman had a dysfunc*874tional relationship from the start,” that “Johnson and other employees” testified that Newman had “criticized [Johnson] in public,” and that “[s]everal employees testified that Newman had never treated Caucasian comanagers in a similar manner.” (Majority Op. at 4-5, 14.) The evidence, in my view, does not support this account. Most significantly, the lone example of differential treatment identified by Wheelersburg employees was that Newman seemed less communicative and had less interaction with Johnson than with other comanagers under his supervision. (See Apel Dep. at 30, J.A. at 224; Cooper Dep. at 20, J.A. at 247; Tackett Dep. at 17, J.A. at 730.)3 Any weak inference of race-based animus that could possibly arise from this evidence is undercut by Johnson’s own testimony that, upon working with Newman and perceiving the “demeaning content and tone” in their conversations, he decided to “talk to [Newman] on the fringes, otherwise keep to myself.” (Johnson Dep. at 334, J.A. at 436.)
Similarly, even accepting the majority’s characterization of the Wheelersburg store as “not a model of racial tolerance,” (Majority Op. at 4), I find no evidentiary support for the inference that this somehow reflected Newman’s own racially intolerant views. In order to tolerate or foster racist behavior, it seems to me, one must be aware of it and yet take no action. The record before us supports neither of these propositions. Of the four employees who testified that they had heard racial jokes at the Wheelersburg store, none said that Newman was aware of such jokes or present when they were made. (See Bobst Dep. at 8, J.A. at 237; Cooper Dep. at 18-19, J.A. at 245-46; Gunnoe Dep. at 14, J.A. at 307; Jarrells Dep. at 18, J.A. at 315.)4 Nonetheless, there is evidence that, prior to Johnson’s arrival in Wheelersburg, Newman took preventative action against the use of any such inappropriate language in the future. If any inference could arise from this evidence, one way or the other, it seems to me that such precautionary measures should be welcomed, as a means of promoting civil behavior and ensuring that employees are aware of their responsibility to maintain an open and tolerant workplace environment.5 And, again, I note that any such cautionary remarks by New*875man seemingly would have comported with Johnson’s own concern that the Wheelers-burg community had a reputation for racial intolerance.
Accordingly, if Johnson’s claim of discrimination rests upon the premise that Newman’s conduct toward him was racially motivated — and the majority acknowledges that it does — I view the record as inadequate to support this proposition. The most that can be said is that Newman and Johnson did not get along very well. There is not a shred of evidence, however, that considerations of race had anything to do with this. To the contrary, the record indicates that Newman clashed with a number of employees, without regard to their race. Even so, not one Kroger employee was prepared to say that Newman’s conduct toward Johnson (or anyone else) was racially motivated. (See, e.g., Apel Dep. at 32-33, J.A. at 225-26; Billiter Dep. at 16, 25, J.A. at 229, 232; Cooper Dep. at 9, 25-26, J.A. at 244, 248-49; Groves Dep. at 19-20, J.A. at 300-01; Gunnoe Dep. at 13-14, 24-25, J.A. at 306-07, 310-11; Jar-rells Dep. at 18, 23, 33-34, J.A. at 315, 320-22; Tackett Dep. at 10, 25, J.A. at 723, 738.)
But, in any event, all of this is mere preamble to my principal disagreement with the majority. Even assuming that Newman might have exhibited racial animus toward Johnson at some point, the record utterly fails to support the further and legally essential proposition that this alleged bias seeped into upper management’s decision to discharge Johnson. To the contrary, rather than encouraging or endorsing Johnson’s discharge, Newman actually opposed this action, asking the principal decisionmaker, zone manager Nancy Noyes, whether there was anything more that he could do to assist Johnson in remaining as comanager of the Wheelers-burg store.
Our precedents eschew any bright-line rule as to whether a direct supervisor’s discriminatory remarks or conduct should or should not be deemed relevant to a discharge decision made by someone higher up the corporate ladder. In McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir.1990), for example, we disregarded certain age-based comments allegedly made by the plaintiffs direct supervisor, Chris Bakaitis, because the plaintiff “was fired by Bakaitis’ supervisor, Carl Raglin, and Bakaitis’ discriminatory remarks are not attributable to Raglin.” More recently, we emphasized that “statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by deci-sionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself [can not] suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden ... of demonstrating animus.” Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 369 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 237-38 (6th Cir.1995), by contrast, we found relevance in a direct supervisor’s age-related remark, where the testimony at trial indicated that this supervisor and the ultimate decisionmaker “worked closely together and consulted with each other on personnel decisions,” these individuals themselves testified about their collective decision to fire the plaintiff, and the direct supervisor actually “prepared and signed the termination report.” More generally, we have identified a number of factors to be considered in assessing the probative value of a direct supervisor’s statements or conduct, including this individual’s role in the challenged personnel decision, his or her position in the overall corporate hierarchy, and the existence or absence of a direct temporal or other nexus between the allegedly discriminatory conduct and the adverse employment action. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-57 (6th Cir.1998).
*876None of these factors assist Johnson in his effort to inject Newman’s alleged racial animus into Nancy Noyes’ discharge decision. The record establishes, and the majority acknowledges, that Noyes alone made the decision to terminate Johnson, with others called upon to provide only limited input into this decisionmaking process. Compare Wells, 58 F.3d at 237-38 (citing evidence of a joint decision between the plaintiffs direct supervisor and a higher level manager). Moreover, it cannot be said that Newman occupied a senior position in Kroger’s corporate hierarchy, such that his statements or conduct could be deemed indicative of a companywide policy or practice of race discrimination. Compare Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 357 (noting that the alleged statements in that case were made by “the most senior managers”). Rather, it is clear that Newman’s authority does not extend beyond the employees at the Wheelersburg location. Finally, I have already noted the absence of a direct nexus, whether temporal or otherwise, between Newman’s allegedly discriminatory conduct and statements — most or all of which were roughly contemporaneous with Johnson’s transfer to Wheel-ersburg in January of 1995 — and Noyes’ discharge decision nearly two years later. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 196 F.3d 655, 662-63 (6th Cir.1999) (holding that an isolated remark made by the plaintiffs supervisor lacked a sufficient nexus to the plaintiffs termination several months later).
Despite all this, the majority holds that the record leaves open the possibility that Newman’s alleged racial bias might have influenced Noyes in her decisionmaking process. According to the majority, Newman’s possible influence upon Noyes can be inferred from a combination of four factors: (i) Newman’s day-to-day supervision of Johnson; (ii) the joint participation of Newman and Noyes in rating Johnson’s job performance as “marginal” in a January 1996 evaluation; (in) Noyes’ discussions with Newman regarding the problems she observed during her visits to the Wheelersburg store in late 1995; and (iv) Noyes’ consultation with Newman before reaching her ultimate decision to offer Johnson a transfer to a service director position. And, indeed, if these factors were viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, I might agree that they could serve as indicia of Newman’s role in the decision-making process. Any such conclusion, however, would run afoul of Noyes’ more specific and wholly unrefuted testimony on each of these points.
All of the various considerations identified by the majority derive their legal significance from the opportunity they might provide Newman to influence Noyes’ decision. Yet, the record establishes that these opportunities were limited at best, and did not, in fact, alter Noyes’ decision-making process or its final outcome. In particular, Noyes testified that she had her own criteria for assessing Johnson’s performance as a comanager; in her view, “[hjaving been a co-manager for nine years, [Johnson] ought to pretty much be able to run that entire store in [Newman’s] absence.” (Noyes Dep. at 91, J.A. at 656.) Yet, her walkthroughs of the Wheelers-burg store in Newman’s absence revealed that Johnson was not meeting this standard. Noyes stated, for example, that she never witnessed any “major” or “long-term improvements” during these visits, and that Johnson never succeeded in “get[ting] the whole job done” that she expected from him. (Id. at 169-70, J.A. at 679-80.) As noted earlier, the contemporaneous reports of Noyes and her staff confirm her testimony on this subject, as they disclose a variety of problems while Johnson was in charge of the store.
Throughout this several-month period in which Noyes and her staff observed John*877son’s deficient job performance and determined what to do about it, Newman was consulted almost exclusively in a fact-gathering role, “reporting back to [Noyes] how [Johnson] was reacting and performing.” (Id. at 165, J.A. at 675.) There is no evidence that Newman identified any deficiency in Johnson’s performance that had not been directly observed by Noyes and her staff. Nor, more generally, does the record disclose any instance of Newman “poisoning the well” of information upon which Noyes based her appraisals of Johnson’s performance.
Even on the one occasion where Newman played a larger role in assessing Johnson’s job performance — specifically, his preparation of Johnson’s January 1996 evaluation — the record demonstrates that Noyes was substantially involved in this process, and did not simply take Newman’s word on the subject. Noyes testified that she expressly consented to Johnson’s “marginal” rating, and discussed the matter with Newman to ensure that they “agreed on how we were perceiving [Johnson’s] performance.” (Id. at 103, J.A. at 665.) Noyes also met directly with Johnson to discuss this unfavorable review, and expressly addressed (and refuted) Johnson’s attempt to shift the blame to Newman. When Johnson complained that the shortfalls in his performance were the result of Newman not training him properly, Noyes responded that it was “part of a co-manager’s responsibility” to “go and motivate themselves to get this information,” and that “it’s not good just to blame one store manager in nine years for not teaching you anything.” (Id. at 120, J.A. at 669.)
Moreover, on those infrequent occasions when Noyes invited Newman to express his opinion about Johnson and his job performance, the record reveals that Newman often used these opportunities to serve as an advocate for Johnson, and not a detractor. Most significantly, when Noyes informed Newman that she was considering terminating Johnson, Newman responded by asking whether “there was anything more he could do to help” Johnson. (Id. at 165-66, J.A. at 675-76.) More generally, while Newman occasionally expressed a desire to do more to address the problems that Noyes had identified at the Wheelers-burg store, and voiced his frustration that these deficiencies would reflect poorly upon him as store manager, Noyes responded by expressly directing Newman to “hold back” in order to “give [Johnson] the opportunity to show what he could do.” (Id. at 91-93, J.A. at 656-58.)
Noyes’ testimony, in short, belies any suggestion that she acted as a mere conduit of Newman’s alleged racial prejudice, or his “cat’s paw,” in reaching the decision to discharge Johnson. In this regard, this case is far different from Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877-78 (6th Cir.2001), in which we found support for a “cat’s paw” theory in senior management’s failure to conduct an independent investigation, and its reliance instead upon the account of an allegedly biased lower-level employee. Here, by contrast, Noyes testified that she based her decision upon an independent assessment of Johnson’s job performance, informed principally by her own direct, repeated, and unchallenged observations. Absent any basis to disregard Noyes’ testimony on this point — and, of course, Johnson cannot withstand summary judgment on the mere hope that a jury might not believe her, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) — the record is clear that Newman provided no input into Noyes’ decision beyond his ability to observe Johnson’s day-to-day performance, which merely corroborated Noyes’ own assessment of Johnson’s shortcomings.
*878This leaves only the possibility that Noyes herself evidenced discriminatory animus in making her discharge decision. Initially, I note that such a contention would be difficult to square with Noyes’ offer to transfer Johnson to a different position which, in her view, was better suited to his strengths; Johnson was discharged only after he refused this offer. Moreover, the majority implicitly acknowledges the lack of evidence that Noyes acted with discriminatory motives. At most, explains the majority, “the record is silent” concerning Noyes’ treatment of Johnson as compared to other employees, whether or not similarly situated. (Majority Op. at 868.) Nonetheless, the majority engages in speculation on this point, observing that an inference of discrimination might arise if, for example, “Noyes blamed Johnson for the problems at the [Wheel-ersburg] store without reprimanding other potentially blameworthy employees.” (Id.)
I readily agree that this sort of differential treatment, if shown through evidence and left unexplained, would tend to strengthen Johnson’s claim of discriminatory discharge. Indeed, there are all sorts of hypothetical events which, had they occurred, might have assisted Johnson in showing that Kroger acted with discriminatory motives. Yet, a silent record and mere conjecture cannot satisfy Johnson’s burden to show that Kroger’s stated, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him is a mere pretext for race discrimination. Rather, affirmative evidence is required, and Johnson has produced none that would permit the inference that Noyes’ decision rested in any part upon considerations of Johnson’s race.
III.
As the majority recognizes, the claim of discrimination in this case rises or falls upon the premises that Stanley Johnson’s direct supervisor, Dan Newman, was racially biased, and that Newman brought this alleged animus to bear upon Kroger’s discharge decision. In my view, there is only a scintilla of evidence as to the first of these propositions, and none whatsoever as to the second. Thus, I would affirm the District Court’s award of summary judgment to Kroger, and I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of this ruling.

. Indeed, one of the two employees — and not several, as stated by the majority — who claimed to have heard Newman comment about Johnson’s intelligence further testified:
Q: Okay. What did you think when [Newman] told you that the ... comanager was not that smart?
A: What did I think?
Q: Yeah. Did you find that an odd comment to make?
A: No, not from Mr. Newman.
Q: No, not from Mr. Newman. Why not?
A: Because Mr. Newman never thought that anyone was smart except for himself. Mr. Newman was an egomaniac that should have been released from Kroger's employment years ago. He treated everyone like dirt....
Q: Did you think that he discriminated against people?
A: He treated everyone equally.
Q: Okay. He treated everyone like dirt?
A: He treated everyone like dirt, yes.
Q: Okay.
A: Regardless of race. I don't think that race is the issue here. I think we're dealing with a person who had a severe ego problem, that thought only that no one possessed intelligence other than him.
(Cooper Dep. at 8-9, J.A. at 243-44.) Likewise, the other employee who reported this remark did not believe that it was racially motivated. (Tackett Dep. at 10-12, J.A. at 723-25.)

. The only other evidence of allegedly belittling conduct is found in the deposition testimony of Paul Gaines, who preceded Johnson as comanager of the Wheelersburg store. Gaines' account of this alleged incident is not terribly illuminating, however:
A:.... I have seen [Newman] belittle Stan [Johnson] on different things at like company meetings and stuff like that. Stan would say something and [Newman] had to add his two cents worth to kind of belittle what Stan just said.
Q: Can you give me an example?
A: No, I can't. I can't give you exact words from four or five years ago.
Q: No, I’m not asking you to say exact words. I said an example.
A: No, I can’t.
Q: What company meeting was it?
A: Just one of the zone meetings or whatever.
Q: And what was it that Mr. Johnson said?
A: Like I said, I can't tell you that word for word.
Q: I’m not asking you for exact words right now. I'm asking you if you can remember the substance of what he said.
A: No, I can't. I can't remember.
Q: And you can't remember what Mr. Newman said?
A: No.
Q: We just have all you can say so far that's happened?
A: That's what you've got.
Q: Without any specifics?
A: That's what you've got.
(Gaines Dep. at 85-86, J.A. at 291-92.)
Whatever Gaines might have witnessed, it clearly did not occur in front of Johnson’s subordinates or customers, as Gaines and Johnson did not work together at the Wheel-ersburg store. Nor was Gaines asked whether Newman's conduct on this occasion was unique to Johnson, or whether Newman might have acted similarly toward other co-managers. More generally, though Gaines speculated at one point that Newman perhaps might have "picked on” Johnson more than him, Gaines could not "say exactly” how this was so. (Gaines Dep. at 63, J.A. at 284.) The remainder of Gaines’ deposition, in contrast, is replete with testimony that Newman treated his comanagers equally, albeit poorly. Gaines opined, for example, that Newman "never had a very good record of trying to train comanagers,” was "notorious for giving bad evaluations,” had a "pretty bad reputation,” had "a record of ... comanagers quitting” on him, was the "type of guy [who] didn't like anybody that customers liked better than himself,” did not "like anybody interfering or even trying to help him run his store,” and had the attitude that "[i]f anything happened at the store, it was the comanager’s fault or the department head's fault,” (id. at 11, 12, 18, 21, 63, J.A. at 260, 261, 266, 269, 284.)

. Although Johnson claims (and the majority accepts) that Newman offered more training to other comanagers than to Johnson, the sole employee cited as stating this proposition actually testified merely that Newman seemed to "spend more time” with other comanagers than with Johnson, but that she would not have been in a position to know how much training was being done during this time, nor whether Newman had provided operational training to Johnson back in the office and out of her sight. (See Apel Dep. at 30, 41, J.A. at 224, 228.) In contrast, an individual in a better position to comment on this subject, Paul Gaines (the comanager who preceded Johnson in Wheelersburg), stated that Newman "never had a very good record of trying to train comanagers.” (Gaines Dep. at 12, J.A. at 261.)

. Only one of these employees was able to identify a particular individual who had made racial slurs. (See Cooper Dep. at 18-19, J.A. at 245-46.) Cooper identified this individual as Tom Gunnoe, one of the other three Wheel-ersburg employees who accused unnamed coworkers of telling racial jokes, but was unable to say which of his fellow employees had done so. According to Gunnoe, ”[i]t could be anybody from baggers to truck drivers,” and it "was just something that happens.” (Gunnoe Dep. at 14, J.A. at 307.)

.Indeed, if Newman had instead done nothing, the majority presumably would have concluded (and I likely would have agreed) that his acquiescence in racially intolerant conduct could be indicative of his own discriminatory views. This seems to suggest, then, that bare evidence of racial jokes in a workplace can support an inference of a supervisor's racial animus, regardless of his level of awareness of this conduct or the stance he takes toward it.