Court Opinion

ID: 9850773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:02:49.295355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:43.131468
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The question presented concerns consecutive sentencing where the offender is convicted of more than one controlled substance offense. In the instant cases, evidence seized in one search was the basis of two convictions (Hadley), and sales to the same undercover buyer (Moreau) or buyers (Morris) were the bases of the multiple convictions. The majority holds that consecutive sentencing is mandatory. I would hold that it is not authorized.
i
The defendants, in these cases, consolidated on appeal, have been convicted of controlled substance offenses for which the statute1 provides a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one *339year (less than fifty grams),2 ten years (fifty but less than 225 grams),3 twenty years (225 but less than 650 grams), and life imprisonment without possibility of parole (650 grams or more).4
On the basis of the evidence seized in a search of his home, Robert Bruce Hadley was sentenced to serve a minimum term of ten to twenty years for possession with intent to deliver fifty to 225 grams, and a minimum term of one to twenty years for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams—the minimum terms aggregating eleven years.
Omott C. Moreau was sentenced to serve three *340consecutive minimum ten- to twenty-year terms— aggregating thirty minimum years—for delivery of more than fifty but less than 225 grams on three separate occasions in a six-week period to the same undercover officer.
Otis Morris was sentenced in Eaton County to serve six (and thus more than the minimum one year) to twenty years for sale of less than fifty grams to an undercover buyer consecutive to sentences that had been imposed in Ingham County for sales in the same two-month period as the Eaton County transaction to an undercover officer who introduced Morris to the buyer in the instant case.
ii
The statute provides that a term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of controlled substance offenses for which there are mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment "shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony ”5 (Emphasis added.)
*341The defendants contend that "another” in "another felony” means a felony other than a controlled substance offense, while the prosecutors contend that a controlled substance offense is also "another felony.”
The majority acknowledges that "the phrase in question may admittedly be susceptible to alternative interpretations,” citing the following "several definitions of 'another’
1. a second; a further; an additional; another piece of cake. 2. a different; a distinct; of a different kind; at another time; another man.—pron. 3. one more; an additional one; Try another. 4. a different one; something different; going from one house to another. 5. one like the first; one copy for her and another for him. 6. one another, one *342(person or thing) in relation to another; each other; Love one another. [The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged Edition.][6]
The majority continues that it is this Court’s obligation "to construe 'another felony’ in a manner that is most consistent with the legislative aim in enacting the statute.”7
The majority further acknowledges that "concurrent sentencing is the norm in this state,”8 but concludes:
Absent a convincing indication that the Legislature meant the term to be interpreted in a limited manner, or a convincing argument that limitation would advance the goal of the sentence enhancement provision, a broad definition of "another felony” provides the most sensible and reasonable interpretation of the legislative expression embodied in the statute, in view of the subject matter of the law and the goal of consecutive sentencing. [People v] Blodgett [13 Mich 127, 168 (1865)]. Given that there are no contrary indications or canons of construction, it follows that "another felony” must be defined to include any other fel*343ony violation for which a defendant is being sentenced. Limitation of the reach of the phrase in such situations would be a distortion of the unrestricted statutory directive without adequate justification.[9]
There are, I believe, however, "contrary indications.”10 There are "canons of construction”11 that support a narrower rather than a "broad definition of 'another felony.’ ”12 The "most sensible and reasonable interpretation of the legislative expression,”13 entirely consistent with the "goal of the sentence enhancement provision”14 is, I believe, the narrower construction.
in
The legislative purpose ("goal”) in requiring that the minimum term of imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a controlled substance offense be served consecutively to a sentence for another felony is to assure that the minimum sentence is not served concurrently with sentences for offenses15 for which concurrent sentencing is the norm.16
The Legislature separately and specifically provided for enhanced sentencing for repeat controlled substance offenders where the offender is convicted of a "second or subsequent” violation of *344the controlled substance act,17 or where the offender has been charged with a felony, and "pending the disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense that is a felony . . . .”18
*345Parenthetically, it is noteworthy that the pending "subsequent offense” controlled substance sentence enhancement provision refers to a "subsequent offense that is a felony,” (emphasis added) which, as set forth in the statute, includes subsequent offenses that are and those that are not controlled substance offenses.19 The textual argument for the "broad definition of 'another felony’ ” adopted by the majority might be somewhat stronger if the Legislature had mandated consecutive sentencing "with any term of imprisonment imposed for commission of a felony” (emphasis added) rather than "another felony.”
To be sure, the "second or subsequent” and the pending "subsequent offense” controlled substance sentencing enhancement provisions do not cover every possible repeat offense, and do not necessarily include multiple offenses arising out of the same search or transaction, or multiple sales to the same undercover officer or buyers. There is, however, no more reason to assume from this omission that the Legislature, in enacting the "another felony” sentence enhancement provision, meant to cover these situations not covered by other sentence enhancement legislation than there is to believe that the Legislature was content to cover the situations dealt with in the separate and specific controlled substance sentence enhancement legislation.
The probability is that the Legislature did not focus at all on the scenarios with which we are confronted in the instant cases._
*346[A]s Karl Llewellyn observed, only infrequently "a legislative intent with some concrete reality can be uncovered in circumstance or legislative history. For the rest, the court’s work is not to find, any more than it is with case law. It is to do, responsibly, fittingly, intelligently, with and within the given frame.” (Emphasis by author.) Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals, p 382. Much the same point was made in language quoted approvingly in Wyandotte Savings Bank v State Banking Commissioner [347 Mich 33], 40-41 [78 NW2d 612 (1956)]: "'"the intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion.” ’ ” 1 Kent’s Commentaries (14th ed), p 462. [People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 564-565; 208 NW2d 504 (1973).]
In McFarlin, the question was whether the statutory provision prohibiting use of a juvenile record as "evidence” "for any purpose whatever” in any civil, criminal, or any other cause or proceeding barred consideration of an adult offender’s juvenile offense record as a factor in imposing sentence. Id., p 565. In holding that such use was not barred, this Court said:
[W]here "language is of doubtful meaning, a reasonable construction must be given, looking to the purpose subserved thereby. Its occasion and necessity are matters of judicial concern, and its purpose should be effected if possible. Its spirit and purpose should prevail over its strict letter. Injustice in its application should be prevented, and absurd consequences avoided.” (Citations omitted.) Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, 321 Mich 526, 531 [33 NW2d 69] (1948).
New words have a "content so intrinsic” that their meaning does not become doubtful in the context of a particular question. Wyandotte Savings Bank v State Banking Comm’r, 347 Mich 33, *34740 (1956). G.A. Endlich, in his treatise on statutory construction, said:
"Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense; and to adhere rigidly to its literal and primary meaning in all cases would be to miss its real meaning in many. If a literal meaning had been Eiven to the laws which forbade a layman to lay ands on a priest, and punished all who drew blood in the street, the layman who wounded a priest with a weapon would not have failed within the prohibition, and the surgeon who bled a person in the street to save his life, would have been liable to punishment. On a literal construction of his promise, Mahomed II.’s sawing the Venetian governor’s body in two, was no breach of his engagement to spare his head; nor Tamerlane’s burying alive a garrison, a violation of his pledge to shea no blood. On a literal construction, Paches, after inducing the defender of Notium to a parley under a promise to replace him safely in the citadel, claimed to be within his engagement when he detained his foe until the place was captured, and put him to death after having conducted him back to it; and the Earl of Argyll fulfilled in the same spirit his promise to the laird of Glenstane, that if he would surrender he would see him safe to England; for he hanged him only after having taken him across the Tweed to the English bank. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes (Linn & Company ed 1888), § 25, pp 33-34. [389 Mich 563-564.]
IV
In McFarlin, this Court also said that the "teleological approach has great appeal to judges who recognize that law should make sense to the people who must live with it. In Magnuson v Kent Co Bd of Canvassers, 370 Mich 649, 657 [122 NW2d 808] (1963), this Court said: 'We may in the construction of an ambiguous statute look to the result of the construction to aid us in determining legislative intent.’ ’,20 (Emphasis added.)
*348The result of the "broad definition of 'another felony’ ”21 adopted by the majority is that an undercover officer may, as in Moreau, buy two ounces of cocaine from the offender on one day, twelve days later three ounces, and twenty-six days later two ounces, and the offender is subject to minimum sentences aggregating thirty years—ten minimum years for each sale in the six-week period. Thus, if the authorities were to decide to delay arresting the offender for another six weeks, they might arrange three to seven additional sales, adding thirty to seventy minimum years—tantamount to a life sentence of sixty to one hundred minimum years. That construction should "aid us” in determining that the Legislature did not so intend. The result for which the majority writes is not "consonant to reason and good discretion.”
The majority’s construction further enlarges the power of the prosecutor in plea bargaining, adding additional hammers to the prosecutor’s already substantial armory. The construction adopted by the majority abdicates our responsibility to prevent injustice in the application22 of this sentence enhancement provision.
v
I would, in all events, remand in Hadley and Moreau to consider whether there are "substantial and compelling reasons” to depart from the mandatory minimum consecutive sentences.23
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.

 MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401), MCL 333.7403; MSA 14.15(7403).

 Otis Morris was convicted in April, 1989, of delivering in late 1988, less than fifty grams of cocaine, and was sentenced in May, 1989, to five to twenty years. While free on bond and awaiting sentencing, Morris delivered less than fifty grams to an undercover officer in April, 1989, and then delivered less than fifty grams to the same officer in early May, 1989. He was convicted of two counts of delivering less than fifty grams and sentenced to ten to twenty years concurrent with each other and consecutive to the May, 1989, sentence.
Dealing with the same officer to whom he sold cocaine in late April and early May, 1989, Morris and the undercover officer proceeded from Ingham County, where all the other transactions had occurred, across the border to Eaton County, where another undercover buyer purchased less than fifty grams, for which, following conviction, Morris was sentenced to serve a six- to twenty-year consecutive sentence in the instant case.

 During a search of Robert Bruce Hadley’s home, located in Eaton County, the police found a variety of different controlled substances. He was charged with eight counts relating to various drugs and pleaded guilty of one count of possession with intent to deliver fifty to 225 grams of pethidine and one count of possession with intent to deliver under fifty grams of morphine. He was sentenced to serve consecutive minimum terms of ten to twenty and one to twenty years for those convictions, which were based on evidence obtained in the same search.
Omott C. Moreau was convicted pursuant to three one-count informations of delivering fifty to 225 grams in Oakland County on evidence that he sold two ounces of cocaine to an undercover officer, twelve days later sold three ounces to the same officer, and twenty-six days later, sold two ounces to the same officer. He was sentenced to serve three consecutive ten- to twenty-year sentences.

 None of the defendants in the instant cases were convicted of controlled substance offenses involving 225 grams or more.

 (1) Except as authorized by this article, a person shall not manufacture, create, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a controlled substance, a prescription form, an official prescription form, or a counterfeit prescription form. A practitioner licensed by the administrator under this article shall not dispense, prescribe, or administer a controlled substance for other than legitimate and professionally recognized therapeutic or scientific purposes or outside the scope of practice of the practitioner, licensee, or applicant.
(2) A person who violates this section as to:
(a) A controlled substance classified in schedule 1 or 2 that is a narcotic drug or a drug described in section 7214(a)(iv) and:
(i) Which is in an amount of 650 grams or more of any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for life.
(ii) Which is in an amount of 225 grams or more, but less than 650 grams, or any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 20 years nor more than 30 years.
*341(iii) Which is in an amount of 50 grams or more, but less than 225 grams, or any mixture containing that substance is guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 20 years.
(3) A term of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2Xa) or section 7403(2Xa)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall be imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of another felony. An individual subject to a mandatory term of imprisonment under subsection (2)(a) or section 7403(2Xa)(i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of that sentence, or parole during that mandatory term, except and only to the extent that those provisions permit probation for life, and shall not receive a reduction in that mandatory term of imprisonment by disciplinary credits or any other type of sentence credit reduction.
(4) The court may depart from the minimum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (2)(a)(ii), (iii), or (iv) if the court finds on the record that there are substantial and compelling reasons to do so. [MCL 333.7401; MSA 14.15(7401) as last amended by 1994 PA 221.]
Section 7403 prescribes the same penalties for possession, as distinguished from possession with intent to deliver, of the same quantities, except that the penalty for possession of less than twenty-five grams is a discretionary "not more than 4 years”; the one-year minimum is for possession of twenty-five but less than fifty grams.
Section 7403 also provides for departure from a minimum term for "substantial and compelling reasons to do so.”

 Ante, p 326, n 11, and accompanying text.
See also Random House Webster’s College Dictionary, p 57:
another. ... 1. being one more or more of the same; further; additional: Please have another piece of cake. 2. different; distinct; of a different kind: at another time; another man. 3. very similar to; of the same kind or category as: another Martin Luther King, Jr.—pron. 4. one more; an additional one. 5. a different one; something different: going from one thing to another. 6. one like the first: one copy for her and another for him. 7. a person other than oneself or the one specified: He told her he loved another.

 Ante, p 326.

 Id., citing People v Sawyer, 410 Mich 531, 534; 302 NW2d 534 (1981).

 Ante, pp 327-328.

 Id., p 328.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id.

 Id.

 E.g., the common' law, now statutory, offenses, assaultive (murder, criminal sexual conduct) and theft (robbery, burglary, larceny).

 See n 8 and accompanying text.

 (1) An individual who was convicted previously for a violation of any of the following offenses and is thereafter convicted of a second or subsequent violation of any of the following offenses shall be imprisoned for life and shall not be eligible for probation, suspension of sentence, or parole during that mandatory term:
(a) A violation of section 7401(2)(a)(ii) or (iii).
(b) A violation of section 7403(2)(a)(ii) or (iii).
(c) Conspiracy to commit an offense proscribed by section 7401(2)(a)(ii) or (iii) or section 7403(2)(a)(ii) or (iii).
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (1) and (3), an individual convicted of a second or subsequent offense under this article may be imprisoned for a term not more than twice the term otherwise authorized or fined an amount not more them twice that otherwise authorized, or both.
(5) For purposes of subsection (2), an offense is considered a second or subsequent offense, if, before conviction of the offense, the offender has at any time been convicted under this article or under any statute of the United States or of any state relating to a narcotic drug, marihuana, depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic drug. [MCL 333.7413; MSA 14.15(7413).]
See n 5 for text of § 7401(2)(a)(ii) and (iii). Section 7403 prescribes the same penalties for possession, as distinguished' from possession with intent to deliver, of the same quantities.

 (1) Beginning April 1, 1988, and through December 31, 1991, if a. person who has been charged with a felony, pending the disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense that is a felony, upon conviction of the subsequent offense or acceptance of a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere to the subsequent offense, the sentences imposed for the prior charged offense and the subsequent offense shall run consecutively.
(2) Beginning January 1, 1992, if a person who has been charged with a felony, pending the disposition of the charge, commits a subsequent offense that is a felony, upon conviction of the subsequent offense or acceptance of a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, or nolo contendere to the subsequent offense, the following shall apply:
(a) Unless the subsequent offense is a major controlled substance offense, the sentences imposed for the prior charged offense and the subsequent offense may run consecutively.
(b) If the subsequent offense is a major controlled substance *345offense, the sentences imposed for the prior charged offense and the subsequent offense shall run consecutively.
(3) The department of corrections shall report to the legislature no later than June 1, 1991, on the impact that the amendatory act that added this subsection has had on prison capacity and population. [MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2).]

 Id.

 McFarlin, supra, p 565.

 Ante, p 328.

 See Webster v Rotary Electric Steel Co, supra, p 531. See also Marquis v Hartford Accident & Indemnity (After Remand), 444 Mich 638, 644; 513 NW2d 799 (1994).

 In Morris, the consecutive minimum sentence imposed was six years rather than the mandatory one-year minimum. The judge apparently chose to depart upward.