Court Opinion

ID: 9909044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 15:09:28.928676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:46.419782
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                            No. 04-22-00057-CR

                                          Ryan Xavier GARCIA,
                                                Appellant

                                                       v.

                                           The STATE of Texas,
                                                 Appellee

                     From the 81st Judicial District Court, Atascosa County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 19-08-0206-CRA
                             Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting:          Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                  Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: December 6, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Appellant Ryan Garcia 2 challenges his judgment of conviction for aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon. He argues the trial court erred by (1) admitting extraneous offense evidence over

his objection, (2) denying his motion for directed verdict, and (3) overruling his objection to the

prosecutor’s closing argument. We affirm.

1
 The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Retired) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment
of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
2
 Because many trial witnesses and individuals described by trial witnesses share the surname “Garcia,” we refer to
Appellant Ryan Garcia as “Appellant.”
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                                            BACKGROUND

        Appellant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon after he assaulted

Gabriel Garcia in connection with a May 16, 2019 dispute with Gabriel Garcia’s family over a

stolen dog. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2). A jury found Appellant guilty, and the

trial court sentenced him to twelve years with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice,

Correctional Institutions Division. This appeal followed.

                                 EXTRANEOUS OFFENSE EVIDENCE

        Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting extraneous offense

evidence of four separate incidents: one occurring on April 13, 2019 and three between May 5 and

May 9, 2019.

    A. Law

        “We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extraneous offense evidence under

Rules 404(b) and 403 for an abuse of discretion.” Perkins v. State, 664 S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2022). “Considering that the trial court has the best view of the evidence, an appellate

court will uphold a trial court’s ruling on admissibility so long as it is within the ‘zone of reasonable

disagreement.’” Inthalangsy v. State, 634 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting

Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). “A trial court’s 404(b) ruling

admitting evidence is generally within this zone if there is evidence supporting that an extraneous

transaction is relevant to a material, non-propensity issue.” Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Furthermore, we must uphold an evidentiary ruling “on appeal if it is

correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record,” Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114,

126 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), “even if the trial judge gave the wrong reason for his correct ruling,”

Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469.

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       Extraneous offense evidence “is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to

show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” TEX. R.

EVID. 404(b)(1). However, such “evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of

accident.” Id. R. 404(b)(2).

       Such evidence is also admissible as same-transaction contextual evidence which is

evidence “where ‘several crimes are intermixed, or blended with one another, or connected so that

they form an indivisible criminal transaction, and full proof by testimony . . . of any one of them

cannot be given without showing the others.’” Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469 (quoting Wyatt v. State,

23 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). Same-transaction contextual evidence “illustrat[es]

other aspects of an ‘indivisible criminal transaction’” and “‘illuminate[s] the nature of the crime

alleged.’” Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 469 and Camacho v.

State, 864 S.W.2d 524, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); see also id. (“A jury is entitled to know all

the facts that are ‘blended or closely interwoven’ with a continuous criminal episode.” (quoting

Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986))). “Yet, such same-transaction

contextual evidence must be ‘necessary to the jury’s understanding of the offense’ such that the

charged offense would make little sense without the same-transaction evidence.” Inthalangsy, 634

S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Pondexter v. State, 942 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). “The

standard for admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is high: ‘a trial court cannot admit

extraneous-offense evidence unless a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed the extraneous offense.’” Id. at 757 (quoting Fischer v. State, 268 S.W.3d 552, 558

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). In other words, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in admitting

such evidence if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the evidence is admissible for an

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acceptable purpose, and the evidence showed the defendant was responsible for the extraneous

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

        However, even if a trial court determines evidence is admissible pursuant to rule 404(b),

“Rule 403 may still preclude its admission if the trial court determines that the probative value of

the evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,

misleading the jury, undue delay or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Perkins, 664

S.W.3d at 216. “The fact that an item of evidence shows the defendant in a negative light is not

sufficient to justify its exclusion on Rule 403 grounds: ‘Almost all evidence offered by the

prosecution will be prejudicial to the defendant. Only evidence that is unfairly prejudicial should

be excluded.’” Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 758 (DeLeon v. State, 77 S.W.3d 300, 315 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2001, pet. ref’d)). “Unfair prejudice refers to the evidence’s ‘tendency to tempt the jury

into finding guilt on grounds apart from proof of the offense charged.’” Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at

216 (quoting State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)); see, e.g.,

Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 758.

        After the defendant has objected on Rule 403 grounds, the trial court must balance the

following factors: (1) how compellingly the evidence serves to make a consequential fact more or

less probable; (2) the evidence’s potential “to impress the jury in some irrational, but nevertheless

indelible way”; (3) the time needed to present “the evidence, during which the jury will be

distracted from consideration of the indicted offense; and (4) the proponent’s need for the

evidence.” Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 216 (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W. 2d 372, 389–90

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). We may only reverse the trial court’s judgment “rarely and only after a

clear abuse of discretion.” Id. at 217 (quoting Mozon v. State, 991 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The reviewing court, however, cannot simply

conclude ‘the trial court did in fact conduct the requir[ed] balancing test and did not rule arbitrarily

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and capriciously.’” Id. (quoting Mozon, 991 S.W.2d at 847) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We must “measure the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision

is made.” Id.

   B. Analysis

       Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence on four Rule

404(b) extraneous offenses and failing to provide a limiting instruction on their use. He further

contends the trial court’s actions were contrary to Rule 403 because there was no reference to the

offenses’ probative value, and the offenses were clearly prejudicial. The State contends Appellant

did not preserve error as to the three May 2019 extraneous offenses. It further contends the April

13, 2019 extraneous offense and each of the May 2019 extraneous offenses were admissible under

Rule 404(b) to prove motive, as same transaction contextual evidence, and to rebut Appellant’s

theory of self-defense. As to Rule 403, the State contends the incidents were essential to explaining

Appellant’s motive for the assault and rebutting his justification defense, and without being able

to use the incidents to explain Appellant’s motive, it would have been hard for the jury to make

sense of the May 16, 2019 aggravated assault at issue. Finally, it argues Appellant never asked for

a limiting instruction and, even if he had, the trial court included the submitted jury charge,

mitigating any potential harm.

           1. May 2019 Extraneous Offenses

       Turning first to the May 2019 extraneous offenses, Appellant argues the State sought to

introduce this extraneous offense evidence to demonstrate he was violent and adverse to authority.

Appellant’s counsel objected to the admissibility on the grounds each of the offenses, which

occurred on May 5, 2019, May 7, 2019, and May 9, 2019, were inadmissible under Rules 403 and

404 of the Rules of Evidence. The trial court overruled each of those objections and granted

Appellant a running objection.

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           Assuming the May 2019 extraneous offenses evidence was inadmissible under the Rules

of Evidence, the admission is harmless if the erroneously admitted evidence was already received

in evidence without objection either before or after the complained-of ruling. Valadez v. State, 663

S.W.3d 133, 147–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“[o]verruling an objection to evidence will not result

in reversal when other such evidence is received without objection, either before or after the

complained-of ruling” and “error in admission of evidence may be rendered harmless when

substantially similar evidence is admitted elsewhere without objection” (citing Leday v. State, 983

S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) and Washington v. State, 485 S.W.3d 633, 638–39 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Coble v. State, 330

S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“We have often held that erroneously admitting

evidence ‘will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection,

either before or after the complained-of ruling.’” (quoting Leday, 983 S.W.2d at 718)). Here,

before Appellant objected, Gabriel Garcia testified to the May 5, 2019 extraneous offense,

explaining Appellant threatened his father over the allegedly stolen dog. Gabriel Garcia also

testified, prior to Appellant’s objection, that Appellant ran his daughter—Ardis Garcia—off the

road for the same reason on May 7, 2019. Finally, without objection, multiple witnesses testified

to Appellant’s May 9, 2019 assault on Gabriel Garcia, including Garcia himself. 3 We therefore

cannot conclude Appellant was harmed by the admitted testimony regarding the three May 2019

extraneous offenses; nor can we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in overruling

Appellant’s objection to the admission of the extraneous offenses. 4

3
    Photos of Gabriel Garcia’s injuries from the May 9, 2019 assault were admitted into evidence without objection.
4
  Appellant further argues a mistrial should have been granted. A mistrial is an “extreme remedy” that “should be
exceedingly uncommon” and only required when the impropriety was “‘clearly calculated to emotionally inflame the
jurors’ minds and is of such a character as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression produced on the
jurors’ minds,’ or is ‘so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful and futile.’” Griffin
v. State, 571 S.W.3d 404, 417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (quoting Williams v. State, 417 S.W.3d

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             2. April 13, 2019 Extraneous Offense

        Turning to the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense, immediately before Atascosa County

Sheriff’s Office Deputy Paul Schneider was set to testify, Appellant objected to his testimony on

Rules 403 and 404 grounds; Deputy Schneider was expected to testify about the April 13, 2019

extraneous offense. The trial court overruled the objection and granted Appellant a running

objection to the testimony.

        Deputy Schneider proceeded to testify the Sheriff’s Office was contacted by a complainant

who stated Appellant had shot a vehicle multiple times on a Highway 173 property. The

complainant added Appellant fled in a gold SUV, possibly heading to his girlfriend’s place of

employment—a Highway 97 liquor store. Appellant’s girlfriend lived in a residence on the

Highway 173 property and his girlfriend’s sister and her boyfriend—Matthew “Turk” Garcia—

lived in another. Deputy Schneider dispatched to the property a sheriff’s deputy who encountered

a blue 2001 GMC Sierra with multiple bullet holes and .22 caliber bullets and casings scattered

near the vehicle. Meanwhile, Deputy Schneider drove to the Highway 97 liquor store and found

Appellant and a gold Chevy SUV. After Deputy Schneider detained Appellant, Appellant said he

had had a “run-in” with Turk. Appellant added leading to that day’s events, “he had confronted

Turk because . . . he believed Turk had stolen a dog and that Turk’s brother had the dog.” As a

result, Appellant confronted Turk at his girlfriend’s house, and Turk—who was there with his boss

at the time—armed himself and his boss with an axe and a pipe from his truck. Appellant then told

them he was going to let Turk and his boss leave that day but, if they came back, he would “finish

162, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d)). The record does not show Appellant sought a mistrial,
and the evidence had been already admitted prior to the complained-of testimony. Moreover, the trial court included
a limiting instruction as a part of the jury charge. We therefore cannot conclude the admission of the extraneous
offenses Appellant objected on Rule 404(b) and 403 grounds was clearly calculated to emotionally inflame the jurors’
minds or so prejudicial that further time and expense would be wasteful and futile. See id.

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this.” On the morning of April 13, 2019, Appellant saw Turk and his boss on the Highway 173

property and “took a .22, went over there and . . . shot the truck multiple times” because they were

“trespassing and he was defending his property rights.” At the time he shot at the truck, Turk and

his boss were not inside it. Deputy Schneider also secured the scene and searched the gold SUV

for a firearm, but he did not find one. 5

         The indicted offense—the May 16, 2019 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—

required proper context to be understood by the jury. See Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 757. The

evidence showed Appellant confronted Turk because he believed he had stolen his dog, and the

confrontation ultimately resulted in Appellant firing bullets at Turk’s truck. See Devoe, 354

S.W.3d at 469. The evidence also showed Appellant’s motive—the alleged dog theft—which also

motivated the May 16, 2019 aggravated assault on Gabriel Garcia—Turk’s brother. See TEX. R.

EVID. 404(b)(2) (providing evidence may be admissible to prove motive); Phillips v. State, 534

S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals

has held that, although the existence of a motive for the charged offense is not essential to secure

a conviction, ‘the presence or absence of a motive for a crime is obviously a factor that is related

to the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,’ and therefore proof of motive is generally

admissible.” (quoting Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 682 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996))).

Moreover, Appellant left the scene in a gold Chevy SUV, the same SUV he used during the May

16, 2019 assault. See Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 470 (concluding evidence was contextual evidence

where extraneous offense involved blue truck later used in crime at issue). The April 13, 2019

incident therefore provides important context to Appellant’s aggravated assault on Gabriel Garcia

5
  According to Deputy Schneider, Appellant initially agreed to provide the firearm to authorities, but later declined,
stating it belonged to his girlfriend. The firearm was never recovered.

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and would not make much sense without it. See Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 757; Devoe, 354

S.W.3d at 470. It is therefore within the zone of reasonable disagreement to find both that (1) the

April 13, 2019 extraneous offense evidence showed motive and provided necessary context to a

continuing course of conduct including the crime charged in the indictment in this case—the May

16, 2019 aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—and (2) Appellant was responsible for the

April 13, 2019 extraneous offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

        Turning to our review of “the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which a

Rule 403 decision is made,” the April 13, 2019 incident’s probative value tends to make it more

probable than not Appellant assaulted Gabriel Garcia on May 16, 2019 because of the allegedly

stolen dog. See Perkins, 664 S.W.3d at 217. This factor weighs heavily in favor of admission. As

to the second factor, the evidence’s potential to impress the jury irrationally, the evidence might

have had that effect by leading the jury to believe Appellant had a propensity for violence.

However, there is no reason to think it would irrationally impress the jury more than the detailed

evidence showing Appellant assaulted Gabriel Garcia at his home on May 16, 2019. See

Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 758–59. Moreover, no photographic evidence was presented to the

jury regarding the April 13, 2019 offense. Finally, there is little risk of jury confusion as to whether

Appellant was on trial for the May 16, 2019 aggravated assault, which involved a metal object and

an assault on a person, as opposed to the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense, which involved a

firearm and property damage. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex. Crim. App.

1990) (explaining factor concerns nature of offense). This factor weighs in favor of admission.

        The State also did not spend a great deal of time on the testimony. Only two of the

seventeen witnesses provided testimony on the extraneous offense, and the testimony made up less

than ten percent of the trial transcript. See Inthalangsy, 634 S.W.3d at 759. In the transcript of the

State’s closing argument, the incident was discussed in approximately two paragraphs of a twenty-

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five-page closing argument by two prosecutors. See id. Moreover, the jury charge included a

limiting instruction for the extraneous offense evidence. This factor weighs in favor of admission.

        The State’s need for the evidence was low. On the one hand, the State already had ample

evidence of the May 16, 2019 aggravated assault. On the other hand, Deputy Schneider’s testimony

explicitly provided Appellant’s motive—the stolen dog. Without those statements strengthening

the State’s case, the State would have had to rely on the testimony of others regarding what they

knew about the dog dispute. This factor is neutral. On balance, we cannot conclude the trial court

erred by finding the probative value of the evidence of the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense was

substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.

        Because the trial court’s admission of the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense under Rule

404(b) is within the zone of reasonable disagreement and because we cannot conclude the trial

court erred by finding the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the risk

of unfair prejudice, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence

of the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense. 6

                                             DIRECTED VERDICT

        Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his guilt, and the trial court

therefore abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s motion for directed verdict.

Specifically, he contends the State presented legally and factually insufficient evidence to prove

Appellant (1) used a deadly weapon and (2) committed the aggravated assault intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly.

6
  Because we conclude the admissibility of the April 13, 2019 extraneous offense evidence was within the zone of
reasonable disagreement, we need not consider the State’s argument the evidence was admissible to rebut Appellant’s
self-defense theory. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

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    A. Law

         “We review a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed or instructed verdict

as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Warren v. State, 614 S.W.3d 441, 445

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). See generally Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d

893, 894–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (concluding no meaningful distinction between legal and

factual sufficiency standards and holding Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard only

applicable standard). This requires the reviewing court “to view all of the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict and then determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found

[the] elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gandara v. State, 527 S.W.3d 261, 267–

68 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d). “We may not overturn the verdict unless it is irrational

or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Warren, 614 S.W.3d at 445. “The jury stands

as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the strength of the evidence.” Id. “The jury may

choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses’ testimony.” Id. “When faced with

conflicting evidence, we presume the jury resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party.” Id. 7

         A person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if the person

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another and uses or exhibits a deadly

weapon during the assault. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2). 8

7
  The State contends Appellant did not preserve his complaint regarding the motion for directed verdict on appeal.
Appellant challenges the denial of the motion for directed verdict on legal sufficiency grounds, which may be raised
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Moore v. State, 371
S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“However, this Court has held that ‘a claim regarding sufficiency of the
evidence need not be preserved for appellate review at the trial level, and it is not forfeited by the failure to do so.’”
(quoting Moff)).
8
  A deadly weapon is anything “designed, made, or adapted for the purpose” of inflicting death or serious bodily
injury, or “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.”
TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(17).

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       B. Analysis

           Turning to the evidence presented at trial, Gabriel Garcia testified that on May 16, 2019,

he encountered Appellant and his girlfriend in a store parking lot, and at that time, Appellant

directed profanities at him. Gabriel Garcia further testified he sped away home to avoid them.

Upon arriving home, he began working on his dad’s vehicle. While working on the vehicle,

Appellant and his girlfriend arrived to his house at a high rate of speed. Appellant parked behind

the vehicle Gabriel Garcia was repairing. Appellant exited his gold Chevy Tahoe with a metal

object in hand. When Appellant started moving toward Gabriel Garcia and saying he would pay

for the stolen dog, Gabriel Garcia grabbed a bat to defend himself. Appellant began chasing him

around the Tahoe, and then Gabriel Garcia began chasing Appellant around the Tahoe, while

swinging his bat. Gabriel Garcia testified he may have hit Appellant and the Tahoe’s windshield a

few times before he slipped and fell. 9 Gabriel Garcia testified Appellant then grabbed the bat and

hit him on the head three times, resulting in head wounds that required stitches and bruises on his

arm from trying to block Appellant’s swings to his head. 10

           This testimony was echoed by Joyce Lenz. Lenz testified she was sitting outside of her

mother-in-law’s home at the corner of Brown Avenue and Broadway Street, when she saw a beige

SUV approach Gabriel Garcia’s home “really fast.” She testified Appellant got out, walked onto

Gabriel Garcia’s property, and started screaming at Gabriel Garcia telling him he was going to kill

him. Gabriel Garcia was telling him to go away, and he would “beat up” Appellant. A fight ensued,

and they ran around the vehicle a few times. The Tahoe’s window was broken, but Lenz was not

sure who broke it. She also heard screaming and someone saying “call 911.” She testified she then

9
  Gabriel Garcia testified he only later learned Appellant and his girlfriend had a child in Appellant’s vehicle at the
time.
10
     The State introduced exhibits of the injuries without objection.

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saw Gabriel Garcia run along the sidewalk back to his property, and Appellant followed him and

hit him with a bat. Then, Gabriel Garcia’s head began bleeding. She did not see whether Gabriel

Garcia was armed, and she was uncertain whether Appellant was armed when he exited the vehicle.

She also did not know who armed themselves with the baseball bat and did not see who struck

first. She testified Appellant was accompanied by a woman and a baby.

           Analisha Camacho testified she lived across the street from Gabriel Garcia at the time of

the May 16, 2019 assault. She testified she was in her home that day when she heard her dog

barking. She looked out the window and saw Gabriel Garcia and Appellant in the street fighting

and a vehicle with its back window smashed out. 11 Camacho saw Appellant holding a tire iron and

Gabriel Garcia holding a bat; they were swinging at each other. She also saw a third person with a

child.

           Investigator Daniel Kaufman—who was a canine handler for Atascosa County Sheriff’s

Office in May 2019—testified he responded to the May 16, 2019 assault around 7 p.m. He testified

when he arrived on the scene, Appellant exited his vehicle holding a mechanical ratchet made of

metal and a baseball bat. 12 Appellant followed orders to drop his weapons and was detained by a

sheriff’s deputy. When Investigator Kaufman saw Gabriel Garcia, he was bleeding from the top of

his head. He was not sure who the primary aggressor was at that point, so he detained Gabriel

Garcia and performed first aid on him.

           Two police officers from the Jourdanton Police Department testified about the May 16,

2019 assault. Former Jourdanton police officer Smitty Gonzales testified he was called on May

16, 2019 to Gabriel Garcia’s home for an assault in progress. After arriving on the scene and

11
     Camacho’s 911 call, which contained substantially the same details, was admitted into evidence without objection.
12
  Exhibits admitted into evidence without objection confirmed Investigator Kaufman’s testimony regarding the
weapons.

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reviewing the evidence, he arrested Appellant. He testified Gabriel Garcia had three large injuries

on the back of his head. Investigator Maricarmen Kaufman testified she collected evidence on the

scene including a baseball bat and a wrench. She also secured surveillance footage from the

Atascosa County Probation Office—on the same street as Gabriel Garcia’s home—and DNA from

Appellant and Gabriel Garcia. The surveillance footage, admitted without objection, shows a gold

Chevy Tahoe speeding on Broadway and failing to stop at a stop sign, while heading in the

direction of Gabriel Garcia’s home on May 16, 2019 at approximately 6:37 p.m. Investigator

Kaufman also had the wrench tested for DNA, and the results were positive for Gabriel Garcia’s

DNA. Investigator Kaufman also testified that when officers spoke to Appellant, he informed them

he was defending himself after Gabriel Garcia smashed his window.

       Atascosa County EMS technician David Martinez testified that when he approached

Gabriel Garcia, he was in pain and appeared to have been hit on the head; later, Officers and

Gabriel Garcia informed him Garcia was hit on the head with a blunt object. Martinez observed a

baseball bat, a ratchet, and what looked like a metal pipe.

       Three Atascosa County Adult Probation Office employees also witnessed the incident from

their parking lot approximately one-half to one block away from Gabriel Garcia’s Broadway Street

house. Brittany Ibarra testified she was leaving the office around 6:20 or 6:30 p.m. when she “heard

someone screaming” expletives and saw two individuals yelling at each other. At that point, she

did not see whether Appellant was armed. She then heard a loud bang and saw the back windshield

on Appellant’s vehicle shattered and heard a woman scream “no!” She then saw Appellant grab

something from the vehicle’s passenger side. She went back to the office and a colleague called

911. When she returned outside, she observed Appellant using a bat or a pipe to hit an individual

lying face-up on the ground. Ibarra testified it seemed like Appellant was hitting the individual

with the object based on the “loud impact noise,” but it was possible Appellant was hitting the

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ground itself. When Appellant noticed Ibarra and other Probation Office employees, he placed his

hands in the air and vocalized something they could not hear. He then hit the individual two more

times and then returned to his vehicle; law enforcement then arrived.

       Probation Officer Lara Tristan testified she observed Appellant on Broadway Street

fighting with Gabriel Garcia. She then observed Appellant retrieve an object from a brown vehicle

and proceed to hit Gabriel Garcia with it. Gabriel Garcia fell to the ground, and Appellant kept

hitting him. Tristan returned to her office, called 911, and later went back outside and could still

see Appellant hitting an individual. When Appellant noticed Probation Office employees

watching, he raised his hands and said something she could not hear. A police officer later arrived

and ordered Appellant to drop his weapon, which Tristan believed may have been a pipe.

       Probation Office manager Valerie Campos testified she saw an altercation on Broadway

Street between Appellant and an individual and then saw Appellant retrieve something from the

passenger side of a tan-colored Chevy Tahoe. Appellant and the individual exchanged verbal

remarks before Appellant struck the individual and continued until the individual fell to the ground.

Campos testified Appellant eventually noticed people observing, raised his hands, and then said

something she could not hear. When police arrived, they instructed Appellant to drop his weapon,

and he complied.

       Dr. Oliver Williams—an emergency medicine physician—testified he treated Gabriel

Garcia in the emergency room on May 16, 2019. Gabriel Garcia had three lacerations of two to

four centimeters in length on his head. He added the lacerations could have been caused by a

baseball bat or a heavy metal object, and they could have been deadly had the force of the blows

penetrated the skull.

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could

have found Appellant committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon beyond a reasonable

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doubt because he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Gabriel Garcia

and used or exhibited a baseball bat and/or a ratchet during the commission of the assault. See TEX.

PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a), 22.02(a)(2); Warren, 614 S.W.3d at 445; Gandara, 527 S.W.3d at 267–

68. Given the substantial amount of evidence, we cannot conclude the evidence was either

irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Warren, 614 S.W.3d at 445.

We therefore cannot conclude the evidence was legally insufficient.

                                      CLOSING ARGUMENT

       Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in overruling defense counsel’s

objection for improper closing argument because the State’s closing argument was an

impermissible appeal to community standards. The State contends its closing argument was a

proper plea for law enforcement.

   A. Law

       We review a trial court’s rulings on objections during closing argument for an abuse of

discretion. See, e.g., Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The State is

not permitted to argue the “community demands or is expecting a certain verdict or punishment.”

Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53,

55–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). See generally Cortez v. State, 683 S.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1984) (concluding prosecutor’s statement—only punishment jury could assess that would be

any satisfaction at all to people of county was life sentence—was appeal to community standards).

       “On the other hand, the State is not prohibited from addressing the concerns of the

community.” Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 729; Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at 55–56. It may also make a

general argument juries should deter crime by finding defendants guilty because those arguments

are an acceptable plea for law enforcement. Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 729–30 (concluding

prosecutor asking jury during closing “to send a deterrent message to criminals that killing a peace

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                                                                                                   04-22-00057-CR

officer is unacceptable” not impermissible appeal to community standards because it had been

permitted by Court of Criminal Appeals in past, was plea for law enforcement, and nothing in

remarks suggested prosecutor was asking jury to forgo duty and automatically answer special

issues to ensure defendant received death penalty because victim was peace officer); Borjan, 787

S.W.2d at 55–57. 13

    B. Analysis

        Here, the prosecutor argued during closing: “Imagine the message sent to the victim in this

case if they’re found not guilty.” After Appellant’s counsel objected and the parties had a bench

conference, the court instructed the prosecutor to clarify to the jury, if they do not believe Appellant

is guilty, they should not find him guilty. The prosecutor provided the clarification and further

explained to the jury he wanted to avoid jury nullification. He added the victim “deserves justice.

Message sent to [Appellant] if there’s a not guilty in this case.” After Appellant’s counsel objected

again, the prosecutor explained at the bench he had made the same argument at every trial “that

you should send a message. . . . [C]riminal law is to regulate conduct, and I’m asking them to find

him guilty. I’ve already emphasized that I’m not asking them to do it if they don’t believe it beyond

a reasonable doubt.” The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then proceeded to

argue: “It’s important to send a message to [Appellant] that he is going to be held accountable for

the way that he continues to behave in this community.” Appellant’s counsel again objected and

was again overruled. Finally, the prosecutor argued “[w]e have to enforce the laws of this

community and send the message to this person that we will not stand for this behavior, that it

13
   The State may also argue the impact of the verdict on a particular subset of the community. Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at
55–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

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went on for far too long and then on May 16th, when he committed this assault, is a bridge too

far.”

         To summarize, the prosecutor argued the jury (1) should consider the message sent to the

victim if they found Appellant not guilty; (2) should consider the message sent to Appellant if he

was found not guilty; (3) should send Appellant a message that he will be held accountable; and

(4) the jury has to enforce laws of the community. The first three arguments do not contend the

community demands or expects a certain punishment. See Cortez, 683 S.W.2d at 420–21. And the

final argument, which asked the jury to enforce the law, is clearly a plea for law enforcement. See

Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 729; Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at 55–56.

         Accordingly, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by overruling

Appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument.

                                                  CONCLUSION
         The judgment is affirmed. 14

                                                           Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Do Not Publish

14
   Appellant also argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to reduce pre-trial bail. Because
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to twelve years’ confinement, the
issue is now moot. See, e.g., Ex parte Peyton, No. PD-0677-16, 2017 WL 1089960, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 22,
2017) (per curiam); Danziger v. State, 786 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Henriksen v. State, 500 S.W.2d
491, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Oldham v. State, 5 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet.
ref’d).

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