Court Opinion

ID: 9590765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:13.751469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:55.144720
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. First, I believe the Equal Protection argument was properly raised in the lower court. In Merriman’s pro se document, entitled “Plaintiffs Traverse to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” he asserted that he “suffered] a disability as to the tolling of the statute of limitations and the same does not run for him.” Although inartfully drafted, I think Merriman sufficiently underscored the disparate treatment received by him as compared to other prisoners who are entitled to the tolling of statutes of limitation pursuant to the disability statute. As such, I find that the constitutional issue is properly preserved for review.
Having found that the constitutional issue is properly preserved, it must be determined whether Merriman was denied equal protection of the laws because he, as a prisoner for life, was not afforded the disability status granted to other prisoners under S. C. Code Ann. § 15-3-40 (Law Co-op 1976). Section 15-3-40 tolls the statute of limitations for an action if “at the time the cause of action accrued,” ... the person is “imprisoned on a criminal or civil charge or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than his natural life.” Merriman was sentenced to prison for life.
When reviewing a statute challenged on Equal Protection grounds, our court gives great deference to a legislatively created classification, and the classification will be sustained if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is “any reasonable hypothesis” to support it. Samson v. The Greenville Hospital System, 295 S. C. 359, 368 S. E. (2d) 665 (1988). To withstand constitutional scrutiny, three conditions must be satisfied: “(1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; (2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; (3) the classification rests on some *113reasonable basis.” Smith v. Smith, 291 S. C. 420, 424, 354 S. E. (2d) 36, 39 (1987).
The legislative purpose of Section 15-3-40(3) is to provide limited relief to several classes of citizens, including prisoners, to prevent statutes of limitation from running while a disability is in effect. I find that classifying prisoners as “disabled” does bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected.
Second, the members of the class, the prisoners, must be treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions. I find that Merriman, sentenced to prison for life, is treated differently from the class of prisoners because he cannot avail himself of the disability statute as other prisoners can. Thus, in my opinion, Section 15-3-40(3) does not pass constitutional muster because it treats prisoners who are “similarly situated” disparately.
Additionally, I find that classifying Merriman in a category different from all other prisoners is not founded on any reasonable basis. With the advent of parole, Merriman is not likely to serve a term as long as his natural life. Therefore, I conclude that it is unconstitutional not to allow Merriman to take advantage of the disability statute which would have tolled the statute of limitations for his cause of action for libel.
I find that Section 15-3-40 violates the Equal Protection clause because it treats persons who are similarly situated, prisoners, disparately for no rational reason. I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the trial judge granting summary judgment and remand this matter for a hearing on the merits.