Court Opinion

ID: 9853840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:07.536341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:10.119094
License: Public Domain

STILWELL, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
Although I agree completely with the analysis in Parts II, III.A, III.B, V, and VI of the majority opinion, I disagree with Parts III.C and IV and do not believe there was evidence from which the jury could have inferred Prescott was anything but an at-will employee. I believe this case is controlled by the rule stated in Orsini v. Trojan Steel Corp., 219 S.C. 272, 64 S.E.2d 878 (1951).
In Orsini, Orsini left one job in Atlanta for a similar position in Columbia based in part, Orsini testified, on the promise of “a lifetime job.” Orsini testified that, approximately two weeks after beginning his new job, he borrowed a pickup truck from his employer for the purpose of driving to Savannah, Georgia, on some personal business. Orsini’s new employer’s manager testified Orsini had borrowed the truck to find a place to live in Columbia and was to report for work and return the truck Saturday morning. Upon Orsini’s return from Savannah Monday morning, the manager informed him that he was letting him go. The jury returned a verdict for Orsini for $2,250 on his breach of contract claim.
The supreme court reversed the jury verdict. It held as a matter of law that Orsini’s at-will employment status had not been altered by the promise, stating,
The general rule is that under ordinary circumstances a contract to furnish employment permanently, or so long as the employee’s services shall be properly performed, or for a similar indefinite period, is no more than an indefinite hiring, terminable at the will of either party, and is therefore unenforceable as to its duration.
Id. at 276, 64 S.E.2d at 879 (emphasis added). In the present case, the promise testified to by Prescott, that he would have continued employment “as long as [he] did [his] job [and] kept [his] nose clean,” cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the promise contemplated by the rule handed down in Orsini, that at-will employment is not altered by promises of continued employment “so long as the employee’s services shall be properly performed.”
*398The majority nevertheless holds that “[e]ven if pursuant to an Orsini ‘durational’ analysis Prescott was an employee at will, this does not end the inquiry, as an employer may otherwise alter at-will status.” The majority further holds that a jury could reasonably find that the promise altered Prescott’s at-will status by finding he was promised he would be terminated only for cause. I disagree and believe that was the very issue that Orsini decided against the employee as a matter of law.1
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that Small I and Small II have any application to the facts of the present case. Although those cases provide an example of how an employer can alter an employee’s at-will employment status with promises of a non-durational nature, here, the only promise Prescott claims his employer made was a durational one. In contrast to the present case, in the Small cases, there was evidence that the employer had issued and distributed an employee handbook that provided for a four-step procedure for firing employees, that the company later issued a bulletin to all employees setting forth in full the termination procedure, and that the company orally assured Small that the procedure would be followed. These cases, in my view, simply have no bearing on the issue of whether Prescott’s employer’s alleged promise that Prescott would be employed “as long as [he] did [his] job [and] kept [his] nose clean,” could alter his at-will status.
Because I find this case is controlled by the law as stated in Orsini and because I agree with the analysis in the balance of the majority’s opinion, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims.

. The issue in Orsini was not whether Orsini was entitled to permanent employment regardless of whether he performed capably. Rather, the issue was whether the employer's promise of lifetime employment precluded the employer from firing Orsini without just cause. Therefore, I believe Orsini clearly stands for the proposition that a durational promise such as the one allegedly made in this case does not alter an employee's at-will status.