Court Opinion

ID: 9645251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:18:44.877802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:14.335439
License: Public Domain

HECHT, Justice,
dissenting.
As the Fifth Circuit has correctly concluded, there are two possible constructions of the limitations tolling provisions in the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 4590i, § 4.01. Because I believe the Court has chosen the less plausible of the two, without full regard for the purpose of the provisions, I respectfully dissent.
Section 10.01 of the Act prescribes a two-year limitation period for health care liability claims. Section 4.01(a) requires that a claimant give notice to each person against whom a claim is made at least 60 days before filing suit. Section 4.01(c) states that “[njotice given as provided in this Act” tolls limitations for 75 days following the giving of notice, “and this tolling shall apply to all parties and potential parties.” Simple as these provisions seem, applying them is anything but simple.
A hypothetical illustrates the problem. Assume that P claims that DI, D2, D3 and D4 were all negligent in caring for him during a period of illness. Assume that the two-year limitations period expires on P’s claims against defendants on June 1, June 10, June 20 and July 1 of the same year, respectively. Notice to D2 on June 10 tolls the running of limitations on P’s claim against D2 for 75 days, thus allowing 60 days for the notice period and 15 additional days in which to file suit.
The Fifth Circuit’s first question is whether notice to D2 on June 10 tolls limitations as to D3 and D4. The Court answers “yes”, reasoning that, in the words of the statute, “this tolling [as to D2] shall apply to all parties and potential parties.” As the Court notes, notice to one defendant after limitations has run on a claim against another has no effect on the barred claim; it remains barred. Ante at 938 n. 5. Thus, in my example, notice to D2 on June 10 does not toll limitations as to D1 since the limitations period'applicable to D1 has already expired and there is nothing to toll. As to D3 and D4, however, the Court holds *940that the notice to D2 tolls limitations as to both of them for 75 days from the giving of notice to D2.
There are two problems with this construction of the statute. First, it would require that notice to D3 on June 20 also tolled limitations as to D2, D3 and D4 for 75 days following June 20, thus extending the limitations period as to each of these three defendants by 10 days (June 20-June 10). If the notice periods did not overlap, the extension could be for the entire tolling period. Thus, if P notified D2 on February 1, all limitations periods would be tolled by 75 days, and if P then notified D3 on May 1, all limitations periods would be tolled by an additional 75 days. By notifying defendants 75 days apart, P could thus extend limitations by as many 75-day periods as there were defendants. The Court rejects this result, not very surprisingly, but it does not explain why. It does not because it cannot. The statute as construed by the Court affords no basis for rejecting its untoward consequences. The Court cannot avoid the undesirable affects of its construction simply by disavowing them, and if they cannot be avoided, then one must question whether the construction is correct.
The second problem with the Court’s construction is that if notice to one defendant tolls limitations as to all, but only once, what happens if P notifies one defendant but does not notify another defendant until less than 60 days before the expiration of limitations as to that second defendant? Returning to the hypothetical, if P notifies D2 on June 10, what happens if P does not notify D3 until September 3, the 75th day after June 20, when limitations against D3 expires? Is D3 nevertheless entitled to 60 days notice? The Court answers “yes”. May P sue D3 after September 3? The Court answers “no”; suit must be brought before limitations, as tolled, expires. So, is the suit abated until the notice period to D3 expires? The Court answers “yes”. Although these answers provide a workable scheme, they reveal the second difficulty with the Court’s construction of the statute. The purpose of the tolling provision is to allow a claimant to give notice up to the last day of the limitations period and still give the defendant 60 days to respond before suit is filed. The Court’s construction detaches the tolling provision from its purpose. In the Court’s view, it is possible that one defendant will have the benefit of the 60-day presuit negotiation period, but that all other defendants will be denied that benefit, thus impairing the purpose of the tolling provision.
I believe the more plausible reading of section 4.01 is that giving notice to a defendant tolls limitations as to that defendant, no matter how many defendants there are, but not as to all defendants. The language, “and this tolling shall apply to all parties and potential parties”, makes clear that after P notifies D2, tolling limitations as to D2, timely notice to D3 also tolls limitations as to D3. It does not mean, however, that notifying D2 tolls limitations as to D3. I concede that this construction does not fully account for the statutory language, “all parties and potential parties”, unless “and potential parties” was added out of abundance of caution. But this difficulty seems far less significant to me than those raised by the Court’s construction.
The Court rejects this view for the reason that it “would create a collateral fact issue as to which of the defendants the claimant had reason to know of and when such knowledge was acquired.” Ante at 938. Such “collateral” fact issues are, of course, unavoidable under either the Court’s construction or the one I believe is correct. Neither construction makes it more or less certain, or more or less relevant, when a claimant learned of the identity of a defendant. The Court also says that it prefers its construction to mine because of simplicity. I suggest, however, that if simplicity is the standard to be applied, the Court’s construction is seriously wanting. The second question raised by the Fifth Circuit, and the problems attendant to it, need not be addressed under my view. For the Court, they are unavoidable.
*941The difference between the two constructions, I think, is principally one of perspective. If the tolling provision is made the focal point of analysis, then I believe the Court’s construction is the better view. Whether and when to toll are the issues, not why. But if the purpose of the provision — allowing a plaintiff the full two years to file suit but also ensuring that a defendant has time to respond to notice of a claim before he is sued — is the focal point, then I believe the view I have advanced is better. The result is not much different, only that in the Court’s view some defendants may not have an opportunity to respond to a claim before they are sued. It cannot be denied that this effects some prejudice and to some extent compromises the purpose of the provision, although as a practical matter, the effect is often very small. See Hines v. Hash, 843 S.W.2d 464, 468-469 (Tex.1992) (failure to give notice of a claim under the Texas Consumer Protection — Deceptive Trade Practices Act before filing suit may not significantly prejudice defendant).
However small the difference may be in the practical effects of the two constructions of this statute, the proper perspective is still important. At one point in history, the view that the earth is the center of the universe was crucial. To support this view, it was necessary to describe the motion of all other heavenly bodies relative to the earth. While this can be done, as Ptolemy demonstrated, the Copernican view that the earth is but one body moving among others avoids unnecessary complications. The effects are roughly the same, though the perspective is much different.
So it is here. I would answer the first question certified by the Fifth Circuit “no” and would not reach the second question. This result fully satisfies the purpose of the statute. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and ENOCH, J., join in this dissenting opinion.