Court Opinion

ID: 9753438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:14:24.392682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:36.676429
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
Although I agree with the majority that there is no basis for us to direct that appellant’s guilty plea be withdrawn, I disagree with its remedy for the prosecutor’s failure to abide by the terms of the plea agreement because it unnecessarily interferes with the trial court’s broad discretion in sentencing and gives appellant more than he was entitled to under the agreement.
As an appellate court, we generally have no authority to direct the trial court to impose a particular sentence. See Rider v. United States, 687 A.2d 1348, 1353 n. 10 (D.C.1996) (“We have long recognized that the trial court has broad discretion in matters of sentencing.”) (citations omitted). Nor may we, in my estimation, restrict the trial court, as the majority does, from imposing an aggregate minimum sentence beyond a certain number of years when such a sentence is permissible under the statutes that prescribe sentencing ranges for the relevant offenses. See id. (“Appellate review of sentencing is extremely limited [as] this court ordinarily will not set aside a sentence that is within the limits set by the statute.”) (citations omitted); Williams v. United States, 571 A.2d 212, 214 (D.C.1990) (same). That the majority’s remand order effectively imposes a *36cap on the trial court’s broad discretion in sentencing is evident in this case where the 45-year aggregate minimum sentence the trial court is permitted to impose on remand is less than the aggregate minimum sentence that the trial court actually imposed when it considered the matter free from appellate ■ court intervention. See ante at footnote 9.1
Beyond the intrusion into the trial court’s domain, the majority’s remand order is unnecessary to cure the government’s breach because it overcompensates appellant. Parties to a plea agreement that includes a sentencing recommendation to a judge know that the sentencing judge is not bound by the plea agreement. To restrict the trial court to a sentence that does not exceed what the parties agreed to recommend, thus provides, as a remedy for breach, more than the parties bargained for. See United States v. Bowler, 585 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir.1978) (“[T]o order that the sentences imposed upon the defendant be made to run concurrently would be to grant the defendant more than was promised in the plea agreement and would be an unnecessary intrusion into the district court’s sentencing function.”)
While the government, as the breaching party, is ill-positioned to complain if appellant receives a windfall, the majority’s remedy affects not only the government, but the broader public interest in balancing punishment, rehabilitation and deterrence that is the purview of the sentencing judge’s discretion. To be sure, a plea agreement is a contract to which the parties are bound, and its breach merits a cure. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Sentencing, however, is not a private matter between the prosecutor and the defendant, but a public function in which a trial judge exercises authority vested by the legislature. It cannot be claimed as a prize or used as a sanction for breach of a plea agreement. Thus, I am not persuaded by the majority’s reliance on the “unusual” feature of the plea agreement before us. That both parties agreed to make the same recommendation to the trial court does not divest the trial judge of sentencing discretion.
Where the government has breached its promise under a plea agreement, the court must determine “whether the circumstances ... require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, ... or whether ... circumstances require granting ... the opportunity to withdraw [the] plea of guilty.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495. We have recognized that the preferred remedy in this kind of situation is specific performance of the plea agreement. See Roye v. United States, 772 A.2d 837, 839-840 (D.C.2001). In Roye, we did not order specific performance, but allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea following the government’s breach of the plea agreement because (1) the value of the plea bargain for Roye had changed, as he had negotiated for a sentence limited to time served but, by the time of his appeal, had served more than four years in prison; and (2) remanding the case to a different sentencing judge who would have access to the *37government’s original recommendation against Roye’s release (in breach of the plea agreement) would not provide the “clean” government recommendation that he had bargained for. See id. The majority acknowledges that this case is different from Roye, because here it is still possible for appellant to realize the full value of his bargain — and so withdrawal of the plea is not required — but goes on to state that the danger of potential “taint” in remanding the case to a different resentencing judge alone makes specific performance impossible. See ante at page [11-12]. Even assuming that the second stated basis for the decision in Roye (the taint) is not dicta, the majority’s ruling in this appeal goes beyond Roye by effectively abrogating the remedy of specific performance whenever the government affirmatively breaches a plea agreement that requires the government to take a certain posture before the judge, as the possibility of taint will always exist upon remand for resentencing if the government has voiced a sentencing recommendation in excess of what it agreed to in the plea bargain.
I would remand the ease with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing before a different judge at which the parties perform as agreed in the plea agreement. I recognize that resentencing is an inefficient mechanism, and may not be perfect in curing the breach. It is inefficient because, in order to mitigate the potential taint that could influence the sentencing judge on remand, it is preferable to recruit a second judge who must become familiar with the case.2 It is possibly an ineffective one because of the reality that even a second judge could be influenced by knowing what the government “really” thinks the sentence should be, see id., as well as by knowing (and deferring to) the sentence imposed by the judge who sat through the trial. These difficulties, however, do not justify our reaching beyond what is necessary to address the breach. But they should act as a caution to the government that breach of its plea agreements not only dishonors the government, see United States v. Lezine, 166 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir.1999), but also imposes real costs on the judicial system. Most importantly, the judge on remand must act solely within the parameters of the resentencing hearing. This may be difficult, but not any more so than other tasks demanded of trial judges who are asked, for example, to set aside and not consider in fact-finding inadmissible evidence they have heard in a bench trial. Sentencing judges always know, moreover, that a plea bargain is just that, a bargain, and that the government in all likelihood would prefer a greater offense and stiffer sentence. They also understand, however, that such bargains play a role in the system and that they merit thoughtful consideration by the bench. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 261, 92 S.Ct. 495. Unless the resentencing judge is unable to conduct the resentencing proceeding according to the plea bargain, such that the government’s promise “cannot be fulfilled,” Roye, 772 A.2d at 841, the possible taint to which we alluded in Roye, is by itself insufficient to discard the preferred remedy in the first instance where it has not been shown to be “meaningless or infeasible.” Bowler, 585 F.2d at 856 (citing Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir.1973)). If, ultimately, that remedy proves to be impossible, appellant should be allowed to withdraw his plea. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 *38S.Ct. 495; Bowler, 585 F.2d at 856. But I would not so readily give up on specific performance of the plea agreement.

. I do not think that the fact that the remand order allows the judge to permit withdrawal of the plea adds meaningfully to the trial court's discretion in this case, when we, on appeal, have concluded that withdrawal of the plea would be required unless the trial court imposes a sentence "no greater than” the 45 year sentence that the parties agreed upon. Viewed against the backdrop of the trial court's rejection of the request to withdraw the plea, which we affirm, and the aggregate minimum sentence it imposed, which exceeded 45 years, the discretion on the face of the remand order is illusory. The remand order for all practical purposes imposes a specific sentence.

. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. 495; United States v. Wolff, 326 U.S.App. D.C. 416, 420, 127 F.3d 84, 88 (1997) (listing factors to be considered in deciding whether reassignment to a different judge is necessary); id. at 422, 127 F.3d at 90 (Randolph, J., dissenting) (determining that reassignment should be ordered in every case).