Court Opinion

ID: 9897415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:16.736901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.495164
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Apr 28 2023, 9:25 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William O. Harrington                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Harrington Law, P.C.                                        Attorney General of Indiana
Danville, Indiana
                                                            Natalie F. Weiss
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Matthew G. Cranfill, as Personal                            April 28, 2023
Representative of the Estate of                             Court of Appeals Case No.
Josephine F. Cranfill, Deceased,                            22A-CT-2062
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                        Appeal from the Putnam Circuit
                                                            Court
        v.                                                  The Honorable Matthew L.
                                                            Headley, Judge
State of Indiana Department of                              Trial Court Cause No.
Transportation,                                             67C01-2006-CT-394
Appellee-Defendant.

                                   Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023                               Page 1 of 12
      Case Summary
[1]   Matthew Cranfill, as personal representative of the Estate of Josephine Cranfill,

      (“Cranfill”) appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the

      Indiana Department of Transportation (“Department”). After the death of

      Josephine in a collision at the intersection of a state highway and a county road,

      Cranfill filed a complaint against the Department and others. Cranfill argued

      that the Department was negligent by failing to reduce the speed limit of the

      highway due to a history of collisions at the intersection. The trial court found

      that the Department was immune pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act

      (“ITCA”), Indiana Code Chapter 34-13-3, and granted summary judgment to

      the Department. We agree that the Department is immune from Cranfill’s

      claims based upon the adoption-of-laws immunity provision, and we affirm.

      Issue
[2]   Cranfill raises two issues. We, however, address one dispositive issue, which

      we restate as whether the Department is entitled to immunity under the

      adoption-of-laws provision of Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(8).

      Facts
[3]   On October 2, 2019, Josephine was a front seat passenger in a vehicle driven by

      Isaac Joiner traveling eastbound on County Road 1000 North in Hendricks

      County. Joiner stopped for a stop sign at the intersection of County Road 1000

      North and S.R. 267. Traffic on County Road 1000 North was required to stop

      at a stop sign at the intersection, but traffic on S.R. 267 was not required to stop

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023         Page 2 of 12
      at the intersection. When Joiner attempted to cross S.R. 267, his vehicle was

      struck by Jerry Jarman’s vehicle, which was traveling northbound on S.R. 267.

      Jarman’s vehicle struck the passenger side of Joiner’s vehicle, and Josephine

      died as a result of the collision.

[4]   The Department has been aware of the history of “right angle crashes”1 and

      safety concerns at this intersection since approximately 2014. Appellant’s App.

      Vol. III p. 181. In 2016, the Department installed additional signage at the

      intersection, including “Intersection Ahead” warning signs, oversized stop

      signs, supplemental stop signs, reflective strips on the sign posts, and a “Stop

      Ahead” warning sign. Id. at 73. Additional concerns arose regarding the

      intersection in the summer of 2019 because I-65 was closed, and detoured

      traffic was routed to S.R. 267. At the time of the collision, the speed limit on

      S.R. 267 was fifty-five miles per hour; shortly after the collision, the

      Department reduced the speed limit to forty-five miles per hour until a traffic

      signal could be installed.

[5]   In October 2019, the Department issued a “Notice of Official Action,” which

      provided:

               Whereas, under and by virtue of the Statutes of the State of
               Indiana relative to traffic regulation, the [Department] has the
               authority and the duty to adopt regulations in the interests of the

      1
        A “right angle crash” involves a “driver that turns off of one of the minor approaches, and either goes
      straight through or makes a left turn or a right turn . . . [and] gets struck by a high speed car . . . .”
      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 181.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023                                  Page 3 of 12
              safety and convenience of the traveling public using the
              highways, including streets in cities and towns, under the control
              of said Department, be it known that the following traffic
              regulation is hereby adopted.

              Speed shall be temporarily regulated on SR 267 in and near
              Brownsburg, Hendricks County as follows:

              All Traffic Temporarily on SR 267 from 700’ north of the center
              of CR 1000 N [ ] to 700’ south of the center of CR 1000 N [ ] for
              a total distance of approximately 1400’. Existing Speed Limit:
              55mph. Proposed Speed Limit: 45 mph.

              NOTE: This action amends and/or supersedes previous official
              actions establishing speed limits at the aforementioned location.
              The temporary speed zone shall be removed at the time of the
              permanent signal installation or at the discretion of the District
              Deputy Commissioner.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 96. The traffic signal was installed at the

      intersection in October 2020.

[6]   In October 2019, Cranfill filed a complaint against the Department and others,

      which he later amended in April 2020. As to the Department, Cranfill brought

      a wrongful death action and alleged negligence by the failure of the Department

      to maintain the intersection of S.R. 267 and County Road 1000 North in a

      reasonably safe condition. The Department filed an answer and affirmative

      defenses and alleged, in part, that it was immune from liability pursuant to

      Indiana Code Chapter 34-13-3.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023           Page 4 of 12
[7]   In June 2022, Cranfill filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing the

      Department’s discretionary function immunity defense is inapplicable. The

      Department then filed a motion for partial summary judgment and argued that:

      (1) the Department was immune under the discretionary function provision of

      Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(7) and the adoption-of-laws provision of

      Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(8) from any claims brought by Cranfill that

      it was negligent in failing to reduce the speed limit; and (2) the Department was

      immune under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(18) from any claims brought

      by Cranfill that it was negligent in the design of S. R. 267. 2

[8]   On August 17, 2022, the trial court granted partial summary judgment to the

      Department. The trial court found that the Department was entitled to

      immunity under the adoption-of-laws provision of Indiana Code Section 34-13-

      3-3(a)(8) and that the Department was entitled to immunity under the

      discretionary function provision of Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(7).

[9]   The Department then filed a motion for entry of final judgment and argued that

      the trial court’s immunity finding was a complete bar to Cranfill’s action against

      the Department. On August 23, 2022, the trial court agreed and found that

      Cranfill’s sole remaining theory of liability related to the Department’s failure to

      implement a reduced speed limit and that the Department was immune from

      2
        The Department filed a motion to strike certain paragraphs of an affidavit designated by Cranfill. The
      record, however, does not contain an order addressing the motion to strike.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023                               Page 5 of 12
       that claim. Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of the

       Department. Cranfill now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   Cranfill challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the

       Department. “‘When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for

       summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.’” Minser v. DeKalb

       Cnty. Plan Comm’n, 170 N.E.3d 1093, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Burton

       v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020)). “Summary judgment is

       appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine

       issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

       as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 128 N.E.3d

       450, 452 (Ind. 2019)); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).

[11]   The summary judgment movant invokes the burden of making a prima facie

       showing that there is no issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment

       as a matter of law. Burton, 140 N.E.3d at 851. The burden shifts to the non-

       moving party which must then show the existence of a genuine issue of material

       fact. Id. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt as to any facts or

       inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

[12]   We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo.

       G&G Oil Co. of Indiana v. Cont’l W. Ins. Co., 165 N.E.3d 82, 86 (Ind. 2021). “We

       limit our review to the materials designated at the trial level.” Gunderson v.

       State, Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 90 N.E.3d 1171, 1175 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023          Page 6 of 12
       Because the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we also

       reiterate that findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court

       aid our review, but they do not bind us. In re Supervised Estate of Kent, 99 N.E.3d

       634, 637 (Ind. 2018). Nor is our standard of review or analysis altered by the

       parties’ filing of cross-motions for summary judgment – we simply “consider

       each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to

       judgment as a matter of law.” Erie Indem. Co. v. Estate of Harris, 99 N.E.3d 625,

       629 (Ind. 2018) (quoting SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 677 (Ind.

       2015)).

[13]   The parties’ arguments concern whether the Department has immunity under

       the ITCA. “Indiana has long held that the government ‘has a common law

       duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets and sidewalks

       in a reasonably safe condition for travel.’” Ladra v. State, 177 N.E.3d 412, 415

       (Ind. 2021) (quoting Catt v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Ind.

       2002)). “‘Pursuant to the ITCA, governmental entities can be subject to

       liability for tortious conduct unless the conduct is within an immunity granted

       by Section 3 of [the] ITCA.’” City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135, 138

       (Ind. 2016) (quoting Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l Trust Ins. Co., 3

       N.E.3d 1, 5 (Ind. 2014)).

[14]   Cranfill argues that the Department was negligent for failing to reduce the speed

       limit on S.R. 267 prior to the October 2019 collision and that the trial court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023         Page 7 of 12
erred by finding the Department was entitled to immunity. 3 Although the trial

court found the Department is immune pursuant to multiple sections of Indiana

Code Section 34-13-3-3(a), we find dispositive the adoption-of-laws provision,

subsection (8), which provides:

        A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of
        the employee’s employment is not liable if a loss results from the
        following:

                                                *****

        (8) The adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or
        enforce:

                 (A) a law (including rules and regulations); or

                 (B) in the case of a public school or charter school, a
                 policy;

        unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false
        imprisonment.

                                                *****

3
 Relying upon Ladra, Cranfill argues that the immunity provisions do not apply because the Department
knew about a dangerous condition at the intersection and had ample opportunity to respond. Ladra,
however, pertained to immunity under Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(3), not the subsection at issue here.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023                              Page 8 of 12
       The Department argues that, under this ITCA provision, it is entitled to

       immunity for the failure to adopt a lower speed limit on S.R. 267.

[15]   In general, the maximum speed limit on a highway is fifty-five miles per hour.

       See Ind. Code § 9-21-5-2(a)(2). The Department, however, has statutory

       authority to “alter” the maximum speed limits. Ind. Code § 9-21-5-3(2).

               Whenever the Indiana department of transportation determines
               on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that a
               maximum speed set forth in this chapter is greater or less than is
               reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at an
               intersection or other place or on part of the state highway system,
               the Indiana department of transportation may determine and
               declare a reasonable and safe maximum limit at the intersection
               or on the part of the state highway system.

       Ind. Code § 9-21-5-12(a) (emphasis added).

[16]   We addressed this same issue in Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Gessinger, 541 N.E.2d

       559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), trans. denied, which we find persuasive here. There, a

       motorcyclist was seriously injured in a collision that occurred while employees

       were leaving a factory and turning onto S.R. 19. The speed limit on S.R. 19

       was fifty-five miles per hour, and there were no warning signs, signals, or other

       traffic control devices on S.R. 19 in the vicinity of the factory. The motorcyclist

       filed a complaint against the factory and the State. The motorcyclist argued, in

       part, that the State should have reduced the speed limit on S.R. 19 in the area of

       the factory. The trial court granted summary judgment to the State, and the

       motorcyclist appealed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023        Page 9 of 12
[17]   On appeal, this Court held:

               The State first claims that the 55 mph speed limit on SR 19 in
               front of [the factory] creates no basis for liability because of IC
               34-4-16.5-3(7) [see now Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(8)]
               which states:

                        (7) the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or
                        enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the
                        act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false
                        imprisonment;

               The State argues that the establishment of a speed limit is the
               adoption of a rule or regulation by the State which is immune.
               Likewise, the State claims, the failure to reduce the speed limit
               constitutes the failure to adopt a rule or regulation which is also
               immune. The Indiana General Assembly has established the
               maximum lawful speed limit on highways as fifty-five (55) miles
               per hour except when a special hazard exists. IC 9-4-1-57 [see
               now Ind. Code § 9-21-5-2(a)(2)]. We regard the State’s action as
               adopting a rule or regulation within the plain meaning of the
               statute. Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, we only look
               at its plain meaning. [ ]

               The speed limit is alterable by the State Highway Commission
               pursuant to IC 9-4-1-61 [see now Ind. Code § 9-21-5-12(a)]
               whenever it is determined on the basis of an engineering and
               traffic investigation that the maximum speed is greater than is
               reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any
               place in the state highway system. Gessinger argues that the
               ability to alter the speed limit is a discretionary decision of the
               State Highway Commission pursuant to Peavler [v. Bd. of Comm’rs
               of Monroe Cnty., 528 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1988)]. However, a
               distinction exists between the decision by the Highway
               Commission to change a legislatively enacted speed limit, as in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023            Page 10 of 12
                  the present case, and a county’s decision to place a warning sign,
                  as in Peavler.

                                                          *****

                  Because of these reasons the State is immune from liability for
                  failing to reduce the posted maximum speed limit.

       Holiday Rambler, 541 N.E.2d at 563-64 (emphasis added).4

[18]   Our Court has reached similar results in the context of other governmental

       entities. See, e.g., Lee ex rel. Estes v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 75 N.E.3d

       518, 531 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“The wording of Indiana Code section 34-13-3-

       3(8) makes it clear that the City is immune for any failure to adopt or enforce a

       law, rule or regulation; as such, the City cannot be liable because it did not erect

       4
           Holiday Rambler also held:
                To determine whether or not a part of the highway is extra hazardous necessitating a reduction
                in the speed limit pursuant to IC 9-4-1-61 [see now Ind. Code § 9-21-5-12(a)], an inspection of the
                highway would have to be performed. This function of the State Highway Commission would
                also be immune pursuant to IC 34-4-16.5-3(11) [see now Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(a)(12)]
                which states:
                  (11) failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate or negligent inspection, of any
                  property, other than the property of a governmental entity, to determine whether the property
                  complied with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety;
       Holiday Rambler, 541 N.E.2d at 563-64. Cranfill argues that Holiday Rambler is inapplicable here because,
       under the inspection immunity provision, the property cannot involve property of a governmental entity, and
       S.R. 267 is the property of a governmental entity. The State contends that application of the adoption-of-
       laws immunity provision does not require evidence of an engineering and traffic investigation and that the
       investigation is merely a prerequisite for the Department to reduce the speed limit. We agree with the State.
       This paragraph of Holiday Rambler merely provided an additional reason for immunity separate from the
       adoption-of-laws immunity. Here, Cranfill makes no argument regarding the Department’s failure to
       conduct an engineering and traffic investigation, and the parties do not argue that the inspection immunity
       provisions apply here. The adoption-of-laws immunity provision applies to the failure to adopt a rule and/or
       regulation—here, the failure to change the speed limit—and it is unnecessary to address the Department’s
       failure to conduct an engineering and traffic investigation as part of the failure to change the speed limit.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023                                   Page 11 of 12
       a stop sign at the Marr Road crosswalk or enact a lower speed limit.”); Carter v.

       Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 837 N.E.2d 509, 522 n.20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)

       (holding that “the County would be immune under the Indiana Tort Claims

       Act for its failure to pass an ordinance to reduce the speed limit on Edgewood

       Avenue”), trans. denied; Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Harrison v. Lowe, 753 N.E.2d

       708, 720 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “the County is immune for its

       failure to adopt ordinances to erect or change the placement of stop signs or to

       reduce the speed limit at the intersection in question”), trans. denied; Joseph v.

       LaPorte Cnty., 651 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“LaPorte’s

       decision to set the speed limit at forty-five m.p.h. is shielded by immunity from

       suit under the ITCA as a legislative function.”), trans. denied.

       Conclusion
[19]   The Department’s failure to lower the speed limit on S.R. 267 involved the

       “adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce” a rule and/or

       regulation. See I.C. § 34-13-3-3(a)(8). Accordingly, under the ITCA, the

       Department is immune from liability for Cranfill’s claims. Thus, the trial court

       properly granted summary judgment to the Department. We affirm.

[20]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-2062 | April 28, 2023         Page 12 of 12