Court Opinion

ID: 9685273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:27:36.917077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.854214
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
responding to separate dissent of WMte, C. J.
In Ms separate dissent, WMte, C. J., states: “The statute requires the defendant be brought to trial (not a completed trial) within 6 months (not counting excludable time). He was ‘brought to trial’ on February 16, 1977.” TMs is simply not so, and is an incorrect statement, not supported by fact or law. WMle it is true that defendant’s original trial date was set for February 16, 1977, that trial was continued because of defendant’s absence from the state, wMch period was properly includable under the provisions of the statute in question. A case which is merely brought to point of having been set and then dropped is not “brought to trial.” In Tunis v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 59 Cal. 2d 465, 30 Cal. Rptr. 135, 380 P. 2d 823 (1963), the court held that an action is not “brought to trial” within the rule requiring action to be brought to trial within 5 years after being filed, until trial is commenced, and the statute is not satisfied by having a trial date set before expiration of such period on a date subsequent thereto. Obviously the swearing of an actual trial jury, or the swearing of witnesses in a trial to the court, are necessary steps in bringing a case to trial, since only at that point does jeopardy attach. See, also, Diverco Constructors, Inc. v. Wilstein, 4 Cal. App. 3d 6, 85 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1970). In the instant case, trial was neither held nor commenced within the 6-month period provided by statute.
It is also sigMficant that neither of the dissenting opiMons in tMs case mentions, comments upon, or attempts to explain away the failure of the trial court to comply with the rules set down by tMs court in State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N. W. 2d 604 (1972), which require the trial court to make specific *338findings as to the cause of any extension and the period of extension attributable to such cause, as discussed in the majority opinion. Admittedly, this was not done.
I feel constrained to follow the clear language of section 29-1207, R. R. S. 1943, as written by the Legislature, and State v. Alvarez, supra, by the court; and under those authorities the defendant is entitled to have vacated his conviction of the charge of operating a motor vehicle while his operator’s license was revoked.