Court Opinion

ID: 9861129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:43:53.478985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:15.859589
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Givan, J.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. Much confusion arises in this case by reason of the fact that there were outstanding arrest warrants in possession of the police officers for two persons who were on the *273premises entered, but whose prior offenses had no connection with the crime for which appellant was arrested.
There is much said in this Court’s majority opinion and in the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals concerning these facts. While it was true the arresting officers had every right to enter the premises to serve the outstanding arrest warrants, it is the position of this writer that this fact is extraneous to the matters now before this Court concerning the arrest of the appellant.
The case before us presents almost an identical factual situation with the case of Ker v. California (1963), 374 U.S. 23, 10 L.Ed.2d 726, 83 S.Ct. 1623. The police officers had had Ker under observation for some time on suspicion of dealing in marijuana. They had been informed by a reliable informant that Ker was obtaining a supply of mar juana from a certain known source. On the evening of the arrest, they observed Ker in the presence of this source, although they were unable to observe any transaction between them. They proceeded to Ker’s apartment where they obtained a pass key from the building manager. By use of the pass key they entered Ker’s apartment unannounced and without a warrant and arrested him in his living room. At the time of the arrest, they looked into the kitchen and observed a package of marijuana. Further search of the house disclosed a second package of marijuana.
In the case at bar the appellant’s home had been under surveillance for several days on suspicion that he was dealing in drugs. On the night of the arrest a reliable informant, at the request of police officers, entered appellant’s home, and after remaining a short while, returned to the waiting police officers and told them a quantity of metamphetamines was being cut in an upstairs bedroom. After receiving such information, the police officers spent the next half hour attempting to obtain a search warrant for the premises, but were unable to contact either a deputy prosecuting attorney or a magistrate. Having thus failed, the officers approached the house of the *274appellant and knocked on the door. When appellant answered their knock and ascertained their purpose, he slammed the door in their face, immediately after which the officers heard the sound of persons running inside the house. At that time the officers broke open the door, arrested the appellant, went immediately to the upstairs bedroom and did, in fact, find a quantity of metamphetamines in the process of being cut.
In the Ker case, the Supreme Court of the United Statés, after first observing that California had a statute permitting arrest without a warrant upon probable cause, held that the search was proper. Indiana has a similar statute. See IC 35-1-21-1, BURNS IND. ANN. STAT., 1956 Repl., § 9-1024. This statute has been judicially determined to authorize the arrest without a warrant for a felony when the police officers haye reliable information as to the commission of the crime. Hanger v. State (1928), 199 Ind. 727,160 N.E. 449. Observing the well known fact that narcotics seldom remain in the same place for a long period of time and are easily disposed of upon danger of apprehension, the Supreme Court in Ker, at p. 39, stated:
“ ‘Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with section 844.’ ”
In Ker, as in the case at bar, it was contended that the search was unreasonable in that the officers could have obtained a search warrant before entering the premises. In answer to this contention the Supreme Court, at p. 41, stated:
“The practicability of obtaining a warrant is not the controlling factor when a search is sought to be justified as incident to arrest, United States v Rabinowitz, 339 US 56, 94 L ed 653, 70 S Ct. 430.”
It is the opinion of this writer that transfer should be denied in this case for the reason the police officers had reasonable cause to believe that a felony was being commit*275ted inside the house of the appellant at the time they entered. Although the officers are to be commended for attempting to obtain a search warrant within the first half hour of the receipt of such knowledge, this attempt and its resultant failure, does not alter the fact that they had probable cause to enter the premises without a warrant nor does this case come within the facts of Trupiano v. United States (1948), 334 U.S. 699, 92 L.Ed 1663, 68 S.Ct. 1229, where the officers were in possession of the information sufficient to secure a warrant for some three weeks prior to the arrest, for in the case at bar, although the premises of the appellant had been under surveillance for some time, there is nothing in this record to indicate that sufficient probable cause existed for the obtaining of a search warrant until the development of the facts within a half hour of appellant’s arrest.
The record in the case at bar discloses excellent police work within the requirements of the Constitution and the United States Supreme Court decisions.
I would, therefore, deny transfer.
Arterburn, C. J., concurs.
Note.—Reported at 314 N.E.2d 750.