Court Opinion

ID: 9605982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:44:49.323975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:44.548429
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
There can be no doubt that under the rule announced in People v. Wells, ante, p. 330 [202 P.2d 53], evidence of defendant’s mental condition was admissible on the trial of the issue raised by the plea of not guilty. This case presents a good illustration of the confusion that results from the rule announced by the majority opinion in that case. But in addition to that, the majority opinion here misconstrues the record and is unsound in other respects. It holds that the denial of the proffered testimony of the defendant’s mental condition was proper because: (1) The offer of proof was insufficient, and (2) The evidence was irrelevant.
On the first point, it is said: “The asking of questions, unless they disclose the proof expected to be adduced, is not the equivalent of an offer of proof.” That purported rule is *392subject to a well-established exception that an offer of proof is not even necessary or at least it may be most general where the court has indicated that it will exclude all evidence of that character. (Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [185 P.2d 597]; Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal.2d 81 [147 P.2d 604]; Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal.2d 754 [146 P.2d 905]; Caminetti v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 23 Cal.2d 94 [142 P.2d 741]; People v. Duane, 21 Cal.2d 71 [130 P.2d 123].) In the instant case, the record as recited in the majority opinion demonstrates beyond doubt that the court would not allow the introduction of any evidence on defendant’s mental condition. For illustration, with respect to the questions asked of Dr. Mooslin, it is conceded that the object of the questions asked was to dispel “malice aforethought.” The questions were directed solely at defendant’s mental condition—to his emotional and nervous disability. The doctor was never given an opportunity to state the nature of the condition or the effect it had on defendant’s mental state. The questions imply that he had a nervous and emotional .instability. That is no different than the “nervous tension” involved in People v. Wells, supra. But the majority opinion erroneously asserts that “Defendant did not even offer to show the nature of his ‘nervous disability.’ ” He did all he could in the light of the court’s rulings. Defendant is condemned for not showing that which the trial court would not permit him to show. Forms and sufficiency of offers of proof and objections to evidence are not to be strictly examined in criminal cases and especially not where a man’s life is at stake as this court announced in People v. Bob, 29 Cal.2d 321, 325 [175 P.2d 12] : “Notwithstanding the rule that the specific ground for an objection must be given and the particular portion of evidence which is inadmissible must be pointed out where other parts are admissible, ‘technicalities should be liberally viewed when urged against a defendant in a criminal case. And the mere fact that the objection could have been made in better form will not justify a refusal to consider it, where the intention of the defendant could not be misunderstood. So also if it is evident from the discussion over an objection between the court and counsel that another ground of objection perfectly obvious from the nature of the question, would have been overruled if made, this ground will be considered on appeal. ’ (8 Cal.Jur. 503.) (See People v. Boggess, 194 Cal. 212 [228 P. 448]; People v. Shattuck, 109 Cal. 673 [42 P. 315]; People v. Yee Fook Din, 106 Cal. 163 [39 P. *393530]; People v. Darby, 64 Cal.App.2d 25 [148 P.2d 28]; People v. Converse, 28 Cal.App. 687 [153 P. 734].) It is said in People v. Yee Fook Din, supra, at page 166: ‘Appellant could thus have brought here a record presenting his point in a clearer light; but technicalities should be liberally viewed when urged against defendant in a criminal case.’ [Emphasis added.] It is aptly said in People v. Converse, supra, at page 691, where the objection of immaterial matter rather than hearsay was held sufficient: ‘It will not do to say that the ruling complained of was free from error because counsel for the defendant did not see fit to object specially upon the ground that the question called for testimony which in addition to being immaterial was incompetent because hearsay. Objections to questions calling for inadmissible testimony are designed and are required for the purpose of directing the attention of the trial court and of opposing counsel to the particular vice of the testimony sought to be elicited by the question; and it is the general rule that the efficacy of an objection is dependent upon the precision with which it is made. In the present case, however, upon its face the character of the question must have fully apprized the trial court of the hearsay nature of the testimony called for; and it is evident by the discussion of the objection indulged in between the court and counsel that an objection upon the ground of hearsay would have been overruled upon the theory that, notwithstanding its hearsay character, such testimony was admissible upon redirect examination as a material and undisclosed portion of a conversation called for and narrated upon cross-examination. Obviously therefore it would have been useless to have specified incompetency as an additional ground of objection ; and this perhaps was one of the reasons why counsel for defendant failed to do so. ’ [Emphasis added.] In People v. Boggess, supra, at page 232, it is said: ‘While it is true ordinarily that an objection to evidence must be sufficiently specific to inform the court of the scope of the objection, nevertheless, where the record shows, as it does in the instant case, that all the parties, including the court, must have understood the purpose of the objection, it will not be said that the objection failed of its purpose. ’ Such is equally true in the ease at bar. The court said in People v. Darby, supra, at page 33: ‘We do not feel inclined to deprive defendant of his right to demand that he be tried with competent evidence because of the oversight of his counsel in the midst of a difficult trial to remember that he should add the word, hearsay, to the *394statement of his objection.’ ” Likewise, in the instant case no one can doubt what evidence defendant’s counsel was attempting to introduce. Moreover it should be observed that until the case of People v. Wells, supra, decided after the trial in the case at bar, neither counsel nor the court were apprized of the rule that evidence of mental condition bearing upon intent, malice, premeditation and the like was admissible, and thus it was to be expected that the trial court would exclude all such evidence and that defendant’s counsel would not make as precise and full an offer of proof as could have been done. Hence, it should not be too late to rectify that error and in a new trial give full opportunity to apply the rule of People v. Wells, supra.
On the point of relevancy, the majority seems to find immateriality because the evidence was offered on “heat of passion” rather than malice and premeditation and that it was not pertinent to that issue. Assuming it was not, viewing the whole record, I do not believe the offer was so limited by defendant’s counsel. While he spoke of “heat of passion” he also referred to malice and frame of mind. But in addition to that, the testimony of Dr. Mooslin was offered for the specific purpose of dispelling malice and it is so conceded by the majority opinion. The only answer of the majority opinion as to the relevancy of that evidence is that defendant did not show how his nervous and emotional disability affected the absence or presence of malice. How can he be penalized for that when the trial court prevented him from showing such relevancy by that very witness? In other words, the majority opinion holds the evidence irrelevant because defendant did not establish its relevancy, and at the same time, approves the action of the trial court in preventing defendant from showing its relevancy. I do not believe that such reasoning is conducive to the orderly administration of justice.
It seems crystal clear to me that under the rule announced in People v. Wells, supra, the evidence of defendant’s mental condition offered on behalf of defendant in this ease was admissible on the trial of the issue raised by the plea of not guilty, and that had the trial judge been aware of such rule, he would have permitted the introduction of such evidence. To now hold, as does the majority, that the trial court was justified in excluding such evidence, is, in my opinion, the denial, on purely technical grounds, of the right to present the only defense available in a ease of this character. The *395result of such denial can be nothing short of a miscarriage of justice.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 21, 1949. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.