Court Opinion

ID: 9536260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:52.364815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.724702
License: Public Domain

DONALDSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. It is the law of this state that a parent owes the duty of support to his minor children. In Re Wilson’s Guardianship, 68 Idaho 486, 199 P.2d 261 (1948). If some interested person or some relative, of his own will and volition makes a generous gift to the minor child, is this a sound and logical reason for discharging the father from the duty of support owed to his minor children? Is the father to be relieved of his legal obligations by the occurrence of fortuitous and whimsical events ? By holding that the father is relieved of the support obligations merely because his child is independently wealthy, a reward is bestowed upon the father for not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. Idaho Code §§ 32-1003, 18-401.
In the case at bar, a trust instrument, clear on its face is intended by the grantor to benefit his grandchildren and their mother. These are the sole beneficiaries of the trust. No intention is expressed in the trust instrument to benefit the donor’s son (defendant-respondent). However according to the majority opinion, the grantor’s son becomes a beneficiary of the trust since his obligation of support is discharged by applying the proceeds of the trust for the support and maintenance of the minor children. ’ Nowhere in the trust instrument is such purpose stated. This was not an object of the trust. If such were the intent of the grantor it should have been stated in the instrument. The instrument is explicit in that it is a gift to his grandchildren and their mother. Indeed, an express provision of the trust1 which was created prior to the decree of divorce and the payment provisions incident thereto, specifically precludes the defendant from asserting his present position since the child support provisions provided for in the divorce decree are clearly valid debts of the son; and debts are the very items expressly excluded by the settlor.
I respectfully direct the attention of the majority to their assertion that, no duty or right of any party to the trust is varied in any way by the reception of testimony tending to prove that the settlor intended the trust to discharge his son’s support obligation. This is patently error in my opinion since the designated beneficiaries, viz., the grandchildren and their mother are deprived of their rightful and entire share of the proceeds given them under the instrument since a portion of those proceeds, althought used for their support and benefit, is in reality not a gift to them, but rather a gift to their father since it is the father who is legally obligated to support the children, and he is relieved of the support obligation by the interpretation given the instrument by the majority.
The admission at trial of the testimony probative of the settlor’s intent to benefit his son was clearly erroneous since the admission of such testimony is a violation of the parol evidence rule. The testimony obviously modifies the written words since:
(1)it adds an unintended beneficiary, viz., the settlor’s son;
(2) changes the purpose of the trust since the grandchildren and their mother are no longer the exclusive beneficiaries;
(3) the written words specifically evidence the explicit intent of the settlor that neither the property nor the income involved in the trust shall in anywise be liable for any debts owing by the son or for any debts that may be contracted by him.2
*426■ Such substantial arid serious modifications of a trust' should not be made by this Court or any other' court on the basis of parol evidence unless there is an ambiguity in the trust. Cases involving exceptions to the parol evidence rule involve ambiguity. Since the ambiguity requires clarification resort to parol evidence is permissible. This was the case in Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 68 Idaho 470, 199 P.2d 264 (1948). However as in the case at bar where the instrument is clear on its face it was error to admit parol evidence which not only modified but contradicted the written words.
The Supreme Court of Washington was faced with a similar problem in the case of Huff v. Huff, 68 Wash.2d 501, 413 P.2d 818 (1966) and reasoned that where a child is the beneficiary of a trust, monies received by such child are part of-his estate and since it is the obligation of the parents to support their children there ■ should be no'support money'paid -from the child’s estate; unless and until it is established the parents are unable adequately to. sup-port the child. This- is certainly not-the case of the respondent in the .instant case since he earns more than $10,000.00 per year.

.' “Neither the property involved in this trust nor the income there from shall not in anywise be liable for any debts owing by my said son or for any debts that may be hereafter contracted by him or by tbe beneficiaries herein named.”

. See note 1.