Court Opinion

ID: 9613368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:26.038955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:28.354155
License: Public Domain

CORNISH, Judge,
specially concurs:
A homicide which occurs during the commission of a felony enumerated in 21 O.S. Supp.1980, § 701.7(B), is classified as first degree murder. To warrant a verdict of first degree murder, the trier of fact must find there was no break in the chain of events between the initial crime and the homicide. See, Clark v. State, 558 P.2d 674 (Okl.Cr.1977).
The trial court instructed that there were three possible predicate felonies for application of the felony-murder. rule. The court told the jury that if it found the defendant had caused the victim’s death while in the commission of any or all of the three recited felonies, it should find him guilty of murder in the first degree.
The correctness of the instructions for each of the underlying felonies was therefore crucial. In its instructions, the trial court included escape from lawful custody as a possible predicate for felony-murder. Yet that instruction misstated the law on escape. As Judge Brett discusses in his opinion, the escape statutes refer to escapes from confinement or from the custody of *368the Department of Corrections. The trial court, however, defined escape in terms of fleeing from arrest. The facts do not support a finding of escape, but rather the misdemeanor of eluding a police officer. See, Grimes v. State, 499 P.2d 942 (Okl.Cr.1972).
This Court can in no way determine which of the crimes the jury found as the basis for felony murder.1 It is entirely possible that the jury found the armed robbery at the grocery store and the homicide represented one continuous transaction. It is equally possible, however, that the jury found the predicate crime was flight from the incident with the police officer. If that were the case, then the verdict of first degree murder would be based on erroneous instructions and not supported by the facts.
It is conceded that the protraction of events over time and distance accentuate the problem of determining whether the facts warranted application of the felony-murder rule. It is a legitimate assumption, however, that one who plans a robbery and carries it out has also planned to escape from the scene of the crime. His flight is an integral part of the crime. This writer therefore does not agree that the armed robberies had been completed before the homicide occurred.
Since asportation is an element of robbery, the felony is still in progress while the defendant is fleeing from the scene with the stolen property. Carter v. United States, 223 F.2d 332, cert. den. 350 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 324, 100 L.Ed. 827 (1955); Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735 (C.A.D.C.1975). However, mere coincidence in time between the murder and the robbery is insufficient to support a felony-murder conviction. United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301 (D.C.Cir.1975). Disunity in time, place, and purpose between the commission of a robbery and the later homicide may make the two felonies distinct. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 337 Pa. 171, 10 A.2d 431 (1940).
Robbery, however, is not confined to a fixed locus, but is frequently spread over considerable distance and varying periods of time. People v. Salas, 7 Cal.3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal.Rptr. 431 (1972). The fact that the killing does not take place on the premises of the original crime may be important in determining whether there was an appreciable interval between the alleged termination of the robbery and the homicide. It is not, however, decisive of that issue. Commonwealth v. Dellelo, 347 Mass. 427, 209 N.E.2d 303 (1965). Nor does lapse of time necessarily terminate the perpetration of a robbery. State v. Beal, 470 S.W.2d 509 (Mo.1971).
It is not until the defendant reduces the property to his unmolested dominion and control that the asportation ends and the robbery is terminated. People v. Kendrick, 56 Cal.2d 71, 363 P.2d 13, 14 Cal.Rptr. 13, (1961); State v. Beal, supra. Termination of the crime depends largely on whether the robber has reached what he regards as a place of temporary safety. See, State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 234 S.E.2d 563 (1977).
In People v. Kendrick, supra, 363 P.2d 13, the killing occurred about 48 minutes after the robbery. The police officer, who was fatally shot by the defendant, had apparently stopped him for a traffic violation and had no information about the robbery. The homicide was committed while the defendant was in hot flight with the stolen property and in the belief that the officer was about to arrest him for the robbery. There, the California court held the killing fell within the felony-murder rule.
In the present case, had the jury received proper instructions, this writer would have relied on the above analysis. The events were so closely connected so as to be inseparable in terms of time, place, and causal relationship, forming one continuous trans*369action. However, because of the incorrect instructions and the other trial errors discussed in the opinion, the conviction of murder in the first degree is not sustainable. The evidence, however, supports murder in the second degree under 21 O.S.Supp.1980, § 701.8(1). The appellant’s sentence therefore should be commuted to life imprisonment.

. The information charged the following offenses which were construed as possible predicates for felony-murder:
“While fleeing from the scene of said robbery of Jim Peck [Oklahoma City Police Department Officer] and while fleeing from the robbery of Jim L. Price and Little Jim’s Supermarket and while escaping from lawful custody and while still in the commission of said robberies, defendant did cause the death of Brandi Michelle Harris. .. . ”