Court Opinion

ID: 9897219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:48.618226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:55.432253
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                              Jun 20 2023, 2:18 pm

                                                                    CLERK
                                                                Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                     and Tax Court

                          IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
           Supreme Court Case No. 23S-AD-00158

      In the Matter of the Adoption of S.L.;
                       P.L.,
                  Appellant (Respondent below)

                               –v–

                      M.H. and A.H.,
                  Appellees (Petitioners below).

         Argued: April 27, 2023 | Decided: June 20, 2023
                            Corrected

            Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
                     No. 29D01-2006-AD-964
             The Honorable Michael A. Casati, Judge

   On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,
                         No. 22A-AD-80

                    Opinion by Justice Massa
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Massa, Justice

    Adoptive Parents challenge a Court of Appeals’ decision requiring
them to provide notice to biological Father of the temporary custody of
Child, rendering the trial court’s order void for lack of personal
jurisdiction. While the panel below erred in requiring notice in a
temporary custody matter, we resolve this case on the narrower ground of
no appellate jurisdiction.

Facts and Procedural History
  P.L. (“Father”) is the biological father of S.L. (“Child”). Child was
removed twelve days after birth and placed with M.H. and A.H.
(“Adoptive Parents”) for fourteen months. In May 2015, Grandparents
petitioned for guardianship, which the trial court granted the next day.
Child resided with Grandparents and spent weekends, holidays, and
vacations with Adoptive Parents. By May 2019, Child was placed full time
with Adoptive Parents.

   In June 2020, Adoptive Parents petitioned to adopt Child, and
separately moved for temporary custody, and to consolidate the adoption
and temporary custody cases with the Hamilton Superior Court under
Trial Rule 42(D). Father was not served the petition or motions. And while
Father was entitled to notice of the adoption petition, Ind. Code §§ 31-19-
2.5-3, 31-19-9-1, the law requires no such notice of temporary custody
actions, I.C. § 31-19-2-13.

   The Hamilton Superior Court thus conducted a hearing on the motion
for temporary custody with only Adoptive Parents and Grandparents
present. On July 8, 2020, the court granted Adoptive Parents temporary
custody, determining it was in Child’s best interest to be placed with
Adoptive Parents while the adoption petition was pending. More than a
year later, Father filed a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the trial
court’s order of custody, arguing the order was void ab initio for lack of
personal jurisdiction, based on a lack of notice to which he was not legally
entitled.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-AD-00158 | June 20, 2023       Page 2 of 6
   The trial court denied Father’s motion, finding the temporary custody
order was not void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction, and explained
that Indiana Code section 31-19-2-13 authorizes an ex parte proceeding in
temporary custody matters. Father appealed. In a unanimous,
unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial
court erred in denying Father’s Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion to set aside the
temporary custody order. P.L. v. M.H. and A.H., 194 N.E.3d 654, 2022 WL
3724896, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2022). The panel reasoned that
because Adoptive Parents failed to serve Father with notice of their
adoption petition, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Father,
rendering the temporary custody order void. Id. at *2–3.

  Adoptive Parents sought transfer, which we now grant. See Ind.
Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
   An appellate court must have jurisdiction to review a trial court’s
order, and a court has a duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction
before proceeding to the merits of the case. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 801
N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Appellate jurisdiction cannot be
conferred by the parties or the trial court if the order is “not appealable
either as a final judgment or under Trial Rule 54(B).” Georgos v. Jackson,
790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003). “Whether an order is a final judgment
governs the appellate courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.” Front Row
Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 757 (Ind. 2014) (citing Georgos, 790
N.E.2d at 451). Appellate jurisdiction can be raised at any time and “the
appellate court may consider the issue sua sponte.” Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at
451 (citing Albright v. Pyle, 637 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).
“Jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” Young v. Estate of
Sweeney, 808 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

Discussion and Decision
  This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction is identified by the Indiana
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which were adopted by this Court. See IND.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-AD-00158 | June 20, 2023         Page 3 of 6
CONST. art. VII, § 4 (stating the Supreme Court “shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction under such terms and conditions as specified by rules[.]”).
Appellate jurisdiction is limited to final judgments, interlocutory orders,
and appeals from agency decisions.1 Ind. Appellate Rule 5. This Court’s
authority to exercise jurisdiction “is generally limited to appeals from final
judgments.” Ramsey v. Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fields, 842 N.E.2d 804, 806 (Ind. 2006)).

  The trial court’s denial of the motion to set aside is
not a final appealable order.
    Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) defines a final judgment as a judgment
that “disposes of all claims as to all parties[,]” App. R. 2(H)(1), or “the trial
court in writing expressly determines under Trial Rule 54(B) . . . there is
no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs the entry of
judgment . . . .”App. R. 2(H)(2)2; Ramsey, 959 N.E.2d at 251–52.

    Specifically, a final judgment under Appellate Rule 2(H)(1) disposes
“all issues as to all parties, thereby ending the particular case[,]” and
“leaves nothing for future determination.” Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451
(internal citation omitted). Once a final judgment is issued by the trial
court, it does not require a future decision by that same court. Thompson v.
Thompson, 259 Ind. 266, 269, 286 N.E.2d 657, 659 (1972) (citing Seaney v.
Ayres, 238 Ind. 493, 151 N.E.2d 295 (1958)). This is because “[t]he purpose
of the final judgment rule is to prevent delay in the trial of lawsuits which
would result from limitless intermediate appeals.” Thompson, 259 Ind. at

1 Indiana Appellate Rule 14 instructs that an interlocutory appeal may proceed as: an
interlocutory appeal of right, as a certified discretionary interlocutory appeal, or as an
interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a class action certification. App. R. 14(A)–(C).
Indiana courts have appellate “jurisdiction to entertain actions . . . and to review final orders,
rulings, decisions, and certified questions of an Administrative Agency.” App. R. 5(C)(1). We
limit our discussion to the narrow question of whether this was a final appealable judgment
because this case does not present an interlocutory or agency order.
2 Indiana Appellate Rule 2(H) contains three additional categories of final judgments: final
judgments under Trial Rule 60(C), a ruling on a mandatory or permissive motion to correct
error, and an order “otherwise deemed final by law.” App. R. 2(H)(3)–(5). However, these
categories are not relevant to this case because they are not implicated here.

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269, 286 N.E.2d at 659 (citing Lake Cnty. Trust Co. v. Ind. Port Comm’n, 248
Ind. 362, 229 N.E.2d 457 (1967); Mak-Saw-Ba Club v. Coffin, 169 Ind. 204, 82
N.E. 461 (1907)). Final judgments end the case at the trial level. See Georgos,
790 N.E.2d at 451 (explaining the trial court’s grant of a motion “was not a
final judgment because it did not end the case.”).

  The trial court consolidated the two cases pending before it under Trial
Rule 42(D), thereby creating one case. But this one case had two separate
matters pending before it: one was a motion for temporary custody and
the other was a petition for adoption. On July 8, 2020, the Hamilton
Superior Court issued one order addressing Father’s preliminary motion
to set aside temporary custody, finding it in Child’s best interest to grant
temporary custody pending the adoption under Indiana Code section 31-
19-2-13. Because the petition for adoption was still pending at the time the
trial court issued this preliminary order—thus not disposing of all the
claims—the trial court’s July 8 order was not a final judgment. Georgos,
790 N.E.2d at 451–52; App. R. 2(H)(1) (“A judgment is a final judgment if .
. . it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”).

  The trial court’s order is also not a final judgment under Appellate Rule
2(H)(2) because it lacks a key phrase. An order “as to less than all of the
issues, claims, or parties in an action may become final only by meeting
the requirements of T.R. 54(B).” Martin v. Amoco Oil Co., 696 N.E.2d 383,
385 (Ind. 1998). Trial Rule 54(B) requires a court’s order to “expressly
determine[] that there is no just reason for delay, and in writing expressly
direct[] entry of judgment.” T.R. 54(B); Fields, 842 N.E.2d at 806. These
express directives are required “to provide a bright line so there is no
mistaking whether an interim order is or is not appealable[,]” Georgos, 790
N.E.2d at 452, and safeguard “judicial economy by protecting against the
appeal of orders that are not yet final[,]” Front Row Motors, LLC, 5 N.E.3d
at 757 (quoting Paulson v. Centier Bank, 704 N.E.2d 482, 488 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), trans. denied). Yet the trial court’s order did not use the key phrase
and state that there was “no just reason for delay” or direct entry of
judgment. App. R. 2(H)(2). Instead, the Hamilton Superior Court entered
an interim order, which lacked the key phrasing or an express directive
for entry of judgment and granted temporary custody to Adoptive Parents
until further action by the court. Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 452.

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Conclusion
   Hamilton Superior Court granted only temporary custody while the
adoption petition was still pending. Its order was not a final judgment
under Appellate Rule 2(H) because it neither disposed of all claims for all
parties, Georgos, 790 N.E.2d at 451, nor stated, “there was no just reason
for delay,” T.R. 54(B). The appeal is dismissed.

Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Paul R. Sadler
Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC
Indianapolis, IN

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bryan H. Babb
Steven D. Groth
Seema R. Shah
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
Indianapolis, IN

Timothy R. Stoesz
Stoesz & Stoesz
Westfield, IN

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