Court Opinion

ID: 9737791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:34:35.014863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.496972
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in result in part.
I concur in Issue 5 and concur in result in Issues 1^4.
I choose to address separately Issues 1-4 because I have reservations about certain conclusions reached by Judge Buchanan and further believe Judge Buchanan’s language on judicial knowledge is overly broad.
Issue 1. Does the record establish Young’s prior sentences and probation history?
The testimony of Willie Storie, a probation officer with the Marion County Criminal Court Probation Department, received without objection, establishes the prior history of this proceeding. Storie testified at the probation revocation hearing that Young was convicted in the trial court on November 19, 1976 of the unlawful use of a credit card and uttering a forged instrument. He further stated Young received the benefit of P.L. 591 and, as a result, had his statutory sentences suspended and received three years probation. Therefore, Young’s first issue is meritless.
Issue 2. Were the conditions of Young’s probation too vague to be applicable?
Only two alleged conditions of Young’s probation are in issue: (1) that Young successfully complete the P.L. 59 drug treatment program and (2) that Young not be convicted of a subsequent offense.
At the probation revocation hearing Sto-rie testified the probation agreement, signed by Young, contained the condition that he complete the P.L. 59 drug treatment during his three years probationary period. Further, Young’s verified application for treatment as a drug abuser contains the following:
“8. That he has been advised by his attorney that if Defendant elects to receive treatment and is accepted, he may be placed on probation ... and if he adheres to the treatment program and fulfills the other conditions of probation, he will be discharged, but any failure to adhere to the treatment program is a breach of probation which could result in revocation of probation and execution of sentence.”
This evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that a condition of Young’s probation, known to him, was his successful completion of the drug treatment program.
*1088The record is devoid of any evidence that the probation agreement contained any condition relating to a subsequent conviction. However, this deficiency is cured by I.C. 35-7-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.) which provides:
“... If it shall appear that the defendant has violated the terms of his probation or has been found guilty of having committed another offense, the court may revoke the probation or the suspension of sentence and may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.”
Therefore, it is inconsequential that the evidence fails to establish the probation agreement contained a condition relating to a subsequent conviction. The statute specifically provides that under the circumstances of a subsequent conviction the trial court may revoke the probation and impose sentence.
Issues 3 and 4: Did the evidence support the finding that Young violated the conditions of his probation? Did the evidence support the finding that Young was convicted of another crime prior to the expiration of his probation?
The evidence supports the finding that Young was convicted of a subsequent offense within the period of his probation. Mr. Storie testified Young received three years probation. While the record is unclear as to the date of sentencing, the earliest possible date is November 19, 1976. Hence the three years had not elapsed on May 4, 1979, the date Storie testified, without objection, that Young was sentenced by this same trial court for the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, necessarily a new penal code offense. Therefore, the evidence supports the trial court’s revocation of Young’s probation on the basis he committed a subsequent crime contrary to the provisions of I.C. 35-7-2-2.
Finally, I take advantage of Judge Buchanan’s comments on the cogent objections made by Young’s counsel at the revocation hearing to make the observation that evi-dentiary objections guard rights and must not be deprecated. Counsel, even in the face of hostility, must persevere in exercising the right to protect the client and, at the same time, the trial judge must recognize counsel’s duty and exercise judicial restraint to ensure counsel has the opportunity to make his record.

. Acts 1974, P.L. 59, Sec. 18, p. 253.