Court Opinion

ID: 9917366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 06:04:59.155473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:25.045636
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 11, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 361654
                                                                     Isabella Circuit Court
HECTOR WILLIAM GALINDEZ,                                             LC No. 2021-001436-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and O’BRIEN and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right his jury-trial convictions of two counts of delivering
methamphetamine, MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(i) and MCL 333.7212(1)(h), second offense, MCL
333.7413(1); possession of methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i) and MCL 333.7212(1)(g);
possession of a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.224(1)(d); and two counts of carrying a concealed
weapon, MCL 750.227(2). We affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         Defendant’s convictions arise from his delivering methamphetamine to a confidential
informant. The informant began working with the Michigan Investigative Narcotics Team after a
methamphetamine pipe was discovered in her vehicle. As part of this work, the confidential
informant coordinated with the lead detective of defendant’s case to conduct two controlled buys
involving defendant. She agreed that, during a previous hearing in defendant’s case, she had
testified against defendant when she had a pending criminal charge. Although no one had
promised her that her charges would be reduced, she ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser offense,
and her recommended sentence allowed her to attend drug treatment instead of serving jail time.

        When testifying about the first controlled buy, the confidential informant told the jury that
defendant contacted her and asked her whether she wished to purchase some methamphetamine.
After consulting with the lead detective, the informant agreed to set up the purchase. The lead
detective testified that, at the prebuy meeting location, he saw a videoconference conversation
between the informant and defendant about where to meet. The confidential informant drove to
that location and entered a brown vehicle. Although the lead detective testified that he could not

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see the occupants of the brown vehicle, a different surveillance officer testified that he recognized
the person in the driver’s seat as defendant. The confidential informant testified that she handed
defendant money and he handed her methamphetamine.

        As to the second controlled buy, the confidential informant testified that defendant again
contacted her and offered to sell her methamphetamine, and after consulting with the lead
detective, the informant again set up the purchase. The purchase was to take place in a home. The
confidential informant was equipped with a video recording device and driven to the home by the
lead detective’s partner. Although the informant was the only person who went into the home, the
recording showed defendant separating the methamphetamine for the sale. When defendant was
eventually arrested, methamphetamine, knives, and a small bat were discovered in his car. The
jury found defendant guilty of the previously described offenses.

       This appeal followed.

                             II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

        On appeal, defendant challenges several statements made by the prosecutor during trial
that, according to defendant, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. First, defendant challenges
the prosecutor’s statements in his opening and closing remarks that the jury should “do the right
thing” by convicting defendant, contending that these remarks constituted an impermissible civic-
duty argument. Second, defendant challenges the prosecutor’s statements in his closing rebuttal
that the informant “testified well,” arguing that such a statement improperly bolstered the
informant’s credibility. Reviewing the prosecutor’s statements in context, we conclude that
defendant’s arguments lack merit.

        Defendant failed to preserve an appellate challenge to the prosecutor’s contested statements
by challenging the statements before the trial court, so his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
reviewed for plain error. People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 62; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). To
establish plain error, the defendant must show that (1) error occurred, (2) the error was clear or
obvious, and (3) the error affected defendant’s substantial rights, which generally requires showing
that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

       The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial. People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Issues of
prosecutorial error are analyzed “on a case-by-case basis, reviewing the prosecutor’s comments in
context and in light of the defendant’s arguments.” Lane, 308 Mich App at 62-63.

        First addressing defendant’s civic-duty argument, while prosecutors are generally “given
great latitude regarding their arguments,” People v Mullins, 322 Mich App 151, 172; 911 NW2d
201 (2017), they nevertheless “should not resort to civic duty arguments that appeal to the fears
and prejudices of jury members,” People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Such arguments are generally improper because they “inject issues into a trial that are broader than
the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” inviting jurors to suspend their judgment and decide the case
not on the facts but on extraneous considerations. Lane, 308 Mich App at 66. Despite this
limitation, prosecutors are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from that

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evidence as it relates to their theory of the case, Bahoda, 448 Mich at 282, and are even free to
urge the jury to find the defendant guilty on the basis of the evidence and argue that, as a result,
justice will be done, Lane, 308 Mich App at 66.

        Reviewing the prosecutor’s statements urging jurors to “do the right thing” in context, we
conclude that these statements did not amount to improper civic-duty arguments. Throughout the
prosecution’s lengthy opening statement, the prosecutor repeatedly urged the jury to focus on the
facts and evidence, and said that, if the jury did so, “I’m confident that it will lead you to—or lead
us to the right conclusion. And that is, that we have to do the right thing and we’ve got to hold the
Defendant Hector Galindez accountable, all right?” The prosecutor made similar statements
during his initial closing and rebuttable arguments; after summarizing the counts and the evidence
that the prosecutor believed supported each count, he ended by urging the jury to “do the right
thing” and hold defendant accountable.1 These statements by the prosecutor did not inject issues
broader than defendant’s guilt or innocence into the trial. Nor did the prosecutor ask the jury to
suspend its powers of judgment and find defendant guilty on the basis of civic duty; rather, he
urged the jury to “do the right thing” by finding defendant guilty on the basis of the facts and
evidence that had been presented to it. Accordingly, defendant has not established an error, much
less the clear or obvious error that he must show to meet the plain-error standard.

        Second, addressing defendant’s argument that the prosecutor impermissibly bolstered the
informant’s credibility, “the prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the
effect that he has some special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” Bahoda, 448 Mich
at 276. In a similar vein, the prosecutor may not suggest that he or she has knowledge unknown
to the jury that establishes the witness testified truthfully. People v Jackson, 313 Mich App 409,

1
    During his initial closing, the prosecutor stated in relevant part:
                  Folks, with that said and again all of these offenses were committed in
          Isabella County by the Defendant. And I think the time has really come that we got
          to do the right thing. Yeah, it’s a long investigation. This is end of it right here.
          Now, the time has come that we’ve got to do the right thing. We got to rely on our
          common sense. We’ve got to rely on the facts and evidence and we’ve got to hold
          the Defendant accountable. We’ve got to return guilty verdicts on all counts.
          Thank you. [Emphasis added.]
And during rebuttal, the prosecutor stated:
                  Now as I said folks, you’ll have all of the exhibits I believe during
          deliberations. You’ll be able to examine them. I encourage you to do so. I don’t
          know if you’ll have the actual knives or weapons or so forth. But if that is the case,
          I would encourage you to look at them. Look at everything, the lab reports. If you
          want to watch the videos again, I believe the Court will allow that. And folks if
          you need to look at it, that’s fine. But at the end what it comes down to is this is
          the end. It’s been a long road, I get it. This is the end and we’ve got to do the right
          thing and we have to hold the Defendant accountable. And we have [to] hold the
          Defendant accountable by finding him guilty on all counts. Thank you. [Emphasis
          added.]

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426; 884 NW2d 297 (2015). A prosecutor may, however, comment on a witness’s credibility
during closing arguments. Id.

       Considering the prosecutor’s statements allegedly vouching for the confidential
informant’s credibility in context, we conclude that they were not improper. During closing
arguments, defense counsel argued that the confidential informant had a lot at stake because she
had committed a crime and was an addict who needed to produce something if she wanted to
receive a break in her own case. In response, the prosecutor argued:

       Well, you saw her testify. She testified pretty well. She never testified in a jury
       trial before. She was nervous. She’s not a—you know she’s not an expert witness.
       CI’s aren’t expert witnesses. I mean that’s somebody that came up here and told
       you they were addicted to meth.

The prosecutor then summarized the informant’s motives to testify and the facts that he believed
corroborated her testimony before reiterating that she “presented well.” The prosecutor
subsequently urged the jury to focus on the elements of the crimes instead.

        It is not clear how a statement that a witness testified well despite having never testified
before bolsters the credibility of that witness. Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument
that the statements could be interpreted as comments on the informant’s credibility, they were not
improper considering (1) defendant’s attack on the informant’s motives for testifying and (2) the
fact that a prosecutor is permitted to comment on a witness’s credibility during closing arguments,
so long as they do not amount to impermissible vouching. The prosecutor’s remark in this case
did not come close to impermissibly “vouching” for the confidential informant’s credibility; the
prosecutor urged the jury to focus on the facts in evidence, and the prosecutor’s argument did not
imply a special knowledge of the informant’s credibility.

         Alternatively, defendant argues that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by
failing to challenge the prosecutor’s statements. Because defendant has not established any error,
he cannot establish that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance. See Jackson, 313 Mich
App at 431.

                           III. ADDICT-INFORMER INSTRUCTION

       Defendant next argues that he was deprived of his right to a properly instructed jury
because the trial court refused to give an addict-informer instruction. We disagree.

        This Court reviews de novo claims of instructional error. People v Traver, 502 Mich 23,
31; 917 NW2d 260 (2018). When reviewing a claim of instructional error, this Court reviews the
instructions as a whole. Id. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision
regarding whether a specific jury instruction applies. People v Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230,
239; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). “The trial court abuses its discretion when its outcome falls outside
the range of principled outcomes.” Id.

        A defendant has the constitutional right to present a defense. Const 1963, art 1, § 13; US
Const, Ams VI and XIV. An instructional error that affects a defendant’s theory of the case may
infringe on that defendant’s right to present a defense. People v Leffew, 508 Mich 625, 643; 975

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NW2d 896 (2022). Jury instructions “must not exclude from jury consideration material issues,
defenses or theories if there is evidence to support them.” Traver, 502 Mich at 31. See also MCR
2.512(B)(2).

        In this case, defendant sought an addict-informer jury instruction, which would have
instructed the jury that it should examine the confidential informant’s testimony closely and be
careful about accepting it because she was addicted to a drug. See M Crim JI 5.7. See also People
v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 601; 808 NW2d 541 (2011) (explaining that the addict-informer
instruction “is a cautionary instruction that advises a jury that testimony given by an addict-
informant should be examined closely and considered with special scrutiny”). “[A]n instruction
concerning special scrutiny of the testimony of addict-informants should be given upon request,
where the testimony of the informant is the only evidence linking the defendant to the offense.”
People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 40; 597 NW2d 176 (1999) (quotation marks and citation
omitted; alteration in original), overruled in part on other grounds by People v Thompson, 477
Mich 146, 148 (2007). See also People v McKenzie, 206 Mich App 425, 432; 522 NW2d 661
(1994) (explaining that the addict-informer instruction “is to be used where the uncorroborated
testimony of an addict informant is the only evidence linking the accused with the alleged
offense”). Testimony by the informant is not the only evidence linking the defendant to the offense
when testimony by police officers also links the defendant to the offense. Griffin, 235 Mich App
at 40.

        In this case, the confidential informant’s testimony was not the sole link between defendant
and the offenses. During the first offense, the lead detective personally observed defendant arrange
the meeting location with the informant, and a different officer identified defendant as the driver
of the vehicle from which the informant emerged with methamphetamine. The second offense
was recorded, and defendant was visible on the video separating methamphetamine. Because the
informant’s testimony was not the only link between defendant and the offenses, the trial court
was not required to give an addict-informer instruction.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                             /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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