Court Opinion

ID: 9584840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:11.946602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:43.851635
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s denial of Baranco’s motion for directed verdict in Case No. A94A2111.
This reversal is premised upon the holding that Bradshaw completed the transaction by writing Baranco the $12,170 check after ac*173quiring knowledge of the falsity of Baranco’s alleged misrepresentations. However, Bradshaw testified that when she wrote the $12,170 check, Baranco’s finance manager, Hale, told her that it was for auditing purposes only and that if financing suitable to her needs was not arranged, she could bring back the car and get all of her money back. Therefore, there is a material issue of fact on the question of whether Bradshaw completed the transaction between herself and Baranco when she wrote the $12,170 check.
In its first enumeration, Baranco argues that any reasonable purchaser should have realized that execution of the purchase and sale documents, together with the other events that transpired in this case, would result in a legally binding purchase and sale transaction. However, Baranco has made no showing that there was a legally binding purchase and sale transaction or that the terms of the purchase and sale documents render Bradshaw’s reliance upon Baranco’s misrepresentations unjustifiable as a matter of law. Compare Doanes v. Nalley Chevrolet, 105 Ga. App. 846, 848 (1) (125 SE2d 717) (1962) (relied upon by the majority).
In its second enumeration, Baranco argues that the evidence demands a finding that Bradshaw waived any fraud by accepting delivery of the vehicle with actual knowledge that the lease had been rejected. The evidence does not demand any such finding. Bradshaw’s evidence was that her purchase of the car was contingent upon her obtaining suitable financing in lieu of the lease.
Whether the facts and circumstances establish false representations by Baranco and justifiable reliance by Bradshaw is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Miles Rich Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mass, 201 Ga. App. 693, 698 (3) (b) (411 SE2d 901) (1991). For example, whether Baranco’s statement to her, that the unauthorized depositing of the $7,000 check was a “mistake,” was honest or a subterfuge geared to effecting a sale, is a matter of credibility. There is also evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that, despite what Baranco told Bradshaw about holding the $12,170 check, it intended to deposit it. Bradshaw testified that about an hour after she stopped payment, Baranco’s Mr. Jones said to her: “Don’t you know, by the way, that it’s against the law in Georgia to stop payment on a check.” The jury could find that the representations made by Baranco about the nature of the transaction as it progressed over time, about the reason for requiring Bradshaw’s signature on sale documents, about the purpose and use to be made of the checks, were false and deviously misleading, a guise to effect a sale.
“Fraud is subtle in nature, and ‘slight circumstances may be sufficient to carry conviction of its existence.’ [Cits.] . . . Actionable fraud may be proved by circumstantial evidence. [Cit.] Whether the operative facts and circumstances establish actionable fraud ‘is a mat*174ter peculiarly within the province of a jury to determine.’ [Cits.]” Marshall v. W. E. Marshall Co., 189 Ga. App. 510, 513 (6) (376 SE2d 393) (1988). Except in “plain and indisputable cases,” so are questions of “the truth and materiality of representations made by a defendant, and whether the plaintiff could have protected himself [or herself] by the exercise of proper diligence.” Brown v. Techdata Corp., 238 Ga. 622, 625 (234 SE2d 787) (1977).
Decided February 15, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 31, 1995
George L. Barron, Jr., Schulten & Ward, William S. Schulten, David L. Turner, for appellant.
Jason M. Braswell, R. Glen Galbaugh, for appellee.
The verdict was reached after a full presentation of evidence concerning the dealings between the parties and a complete charge to the jury on the principles of fraud in the context of contract. There being evidence in support of the jury’s verdict, an affirmance is required under well-recognized legal principles of appellate review. See, e.g., Thompson v. Hardy Chevrolet-Pontiac-Buick, 203 Ga. App. 499, 503 (3) (417 SE2d 358) (1992).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.