Court Opinion

ID: 9397571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 16:10:29.836143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.900098
License: Public Domain

J-S09009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                             :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                             :
              v.                             :
                                             :
                                             :
 LEVI LEE EVANS                              :
                                             :
                    Appellant                :   No. 1050 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 28, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001345-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED: May 25, 2023

      Appellant, Levi Lee Evans, appeals from the aggregate judgment of

sentence of six to twelve years’ incarceration, followed by two years’

probation, imposed after he was convicted of rape of an unconscious person,

18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(a)(3), conspiracy to commit rape of an unconscious person,

18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a), indecent assault (without consent), 18 Pa.C.S. §

3126(a)(1), and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 35

P.S. § 780-113(a)(3). Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the

evidence to sustain his sex-offense convictions.      After careful review, we

affirm.

      The trial court set forth a lengthy summary of the evidence presented

at Appellant’s non-jury trial, as follows:

      The instant case arises out of an investigation of sexual assaults
      of [E.M.] and [K.S.] on January 18, 2018[,] in Greensburg,
      Westmoreland County. The evidence presented at a non[-]jury
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     trial established that Patrolman Justin Scalzo, of the City of
     Greensburg Police Department, received a call to respond to the
     Autumn Brook Apartments for a possible sexual assault. (Non-
     Jury Trial Transcript [(]“[N.T. Trial,”)] 9/14/21[,] at 11). Upon
     arrival, Patrolman Scalzo stated that he was met by [E.M.] and
     [K.S.] who relayed that they were victims of a sexual assault that
     occurred the night and morning prior to Patrolman Scalzo’s arrival.
     ([Id.] at 11-12). According to Patrolman Scalzo, the victims
     identified Benjamin Davis and [Appellant] as the individuals
     accused of committing these assaults. ([Id.] at 12). Patrolman
     Scalzo testified that [E.M.] explained [that] she, [K.S.], Mr. Davis,
     and [Appellant] were at her apartment hanging out and using
     marijuana when she was given a drink which caused her to
     blackout and[,] during that time, she felt as though she was a
     victim of sexual assault. ([Id.]…). According to Patrolman Scalzo,
     [K.S.] reported a similar experience of alleged sexual abuse.
     ([Id.] at 12-14). Patrolman Scalzo described [E.M.] as being
     “very emotional” and “very much shaken[.”] ([Id.] at 12-13).
     Patrolman Scalzo testified that [E.M.] was crying, vomiting in the
     bathroom, and had “a look of maybe a traumatic experience upon
     her face.” ([Id.]…). According to Patrolman Scalzo, [K.S.] was
     “very withdrawn” and “had a worrisome and traumatic look on her
     face” as well. ([Id.] at 13). Pursuant to his investigation,
     Patrolman Scalzo indicated that he secured two used condoms,
     two empty condom wrappers, and clothing items belonging to the
     victims. ([Id.] at 14). Patrolman Scalzo stated that after
     speaking with the victims, he suggested that they both go to the
     hospital to have a rape kit conducted, and he accompanied them
     to the hospital for that purpose. ([Id.] at 14-15).

     Patrolman Scalzo testified that he did not detect “any type of large
     odor of an alcoholic beverage” from the victims which would
     suggest that they were “completely blacked-out drunk[.”] ([Id.]
     at 17). However, Patrolman Scalzo indicated that the victims had
     a “drowsy appearance, which I, kind of, looked at it that they had
     possibly had something slipped into a drink and drugged.”
     ([Id.]…). The parties stipulated that none of the analyses of the
     blood and/or urine samples given at the hospital by the victims on
     the following day[,] nor any of the drinks collected from [E.M.’s]
     residence[,] contained any identifiable date-rape drug. ([Id.] at
     16, 18-19).

     [E.M.] testified that in January of 2018, she was living at the
     Autumn Brook Apartments in Greensburg. ([Id.] at 22). [E.M.]
     indicated that on January 17, 2018, she had plans to hang out

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     with [K.S.], who was a really good friend of hers, and [K.S.]
     invited Benjamin Davis and [Appellant]. ([Id.] at 22-24). [E.M.]
     testified that she met Mr. Davis, who she knew as “Spen Ben” and
     [Appellant], who she knew as “Tampa[,]” approximately two
     weeks prior to the incident through [K.S.], and she interacted with
     them a little bit over Facebook and met [them] once or twice.
     ([Id.] at 23-24). [E.M.] testified that she spoke to Mr. Davis on
     Facebook prior to the incident, and she told him that she was not
     interested in engaging in sex. ([Id.] at 24).

     Text message exchanges between [E.M.] and Mr. Davis were
     admitted as Commonwealth’s Exhibit One. [E.M.’s] message to
     Mr. Davis indicated that, “I ain’t looking for dick[.”] ([Id.] at 28).
     [E.M.] explained that she meant, “I wasn’t looking to be sexual
     with anybody, but I was just pretty much trying to hang out as
     friends.” ([Id.]…). A message from [E.M.] two days prior to the
     incident stated, “I’m just bluntly putting it out there for all cuz I’m
     tired of people thinking I need dicked down.” ([Id.] at 29).

     On the night of the incident, [E.M.] testified that she and [K.S.]
     met Mr. Davis and [Appellant] at the Sunoco on Mount Pleasant
     Road between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m.[,] and drove them to Sheetz
     before driving back to [E.M.’s] apartment at around 11:00 p.m.
     ([Id.] at 29-31). Once back at her apartment, [E.M.] indicated
     that they ate their food and smoked marijuana in her bedroom.
     ([Id.] at 31). [E.M.] stated that she had smoked marijuana prior
     to this incident, and she confirmed that she was familiar with the
     sensation that marijuana gave her and the effects it had on her
     body. ([Id.] at 33). [E.M.] stated that she ended up falling asleep
     while smoking which was uncommon for her, and when she was
     woken up, she “didn’t feel right” — “I didn’t feel like I could move.”
     ([Id.] at 33-34). [E.M.] testified that she was wearing a pair of
     shorts and a shirt when she fell asleep.              ([Id.] at 34).
     Subsequently, [E.M.] indicated that she was woken up on the
     other side of her bed to someone penetrating … her vagina and a
     figure standing behind her, who[m] she believed to be Mr. Davis.
     ([Id.] at 35-36). [E.M.] testified that she ended up falling back
     asleep and was awoken to another figure with dreadlocks, who[m]
     she believed to be [Appellant] behind her, penetrating her in her
     vagina. ([Id.] at 38-39). [E.M.] stated that she was not fully
     conscious, and she could not move or scream during these
     encounters. ([Id.] at 37-38). Additionally, [E.M.] testified that
     she was unable to move her body, roll over, or lift her arms. ([Id.]
     at 38). Once again, [E.M.] indicated that she was unable to move
     or speak, and after being conscious for no more than 20 seconds,

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     she fell back asleep. ([Id.] at 39-40). During these encounters,
     [E.M.] testified that [K.S.] was asleep next to her in her bed.
     ([Id.] at 39-40).

     [E.M.] stated that she awoke in the morning in the living room
     where she was lying naked on a futon with Mr. Davis behind her.
     ([Id.] at 40-41). [E.M.] testified that she was freaking out, she
     was extremely dizzy, and she went into the bathroom and began
     calling for [K.S]. ([Id.] at 41). [E.M.] indicated that [K.S.]
     eventually came into the bathroom and revealed that she found
     four used condoms on [E.M.’s] bedroom floor. ([Id.]…). [E.M.]
     testified that she was sick and throwing up. ([Id.] at 43).
     According to [E.M.], she and [K.S.] then drove Mr. Davis and
     [Appellant] to a different Sunoco. ([Id.]…). After dropping off
     Mr. Davis and [Appellant], [E.M.] indicated that she and [K.S.] sat
     in the hospital parking lot for a couple hours, and then went back
     to her apartment before calling the police. ([Id.]…). After the
     incident, [E.M.] sent Mr. Davis a Facebook message indicating the
     following:

        Since ya’ll wanna treat me like a hoe when I told you I didn’t
        want dicked down, don’t ever hit me up, period. And then
        to act like nothing happened? I wasn’t even fully awake, let
        alone know Tampa touched me. Be glad I ain’t being petty.
        I got all DNA and condoms and messages.

     (See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1; [N.T. Trial] at 46-47).

     [E.M.] testified that after writing the above message, and while
     sitting outside the hospital, [Appellant] called her phone “trying
     to talk things out[.”] ([Id.] at 45). [E.M.] indicated that she was
     … certain that she had never been to [Appellant’s] residence prior
     to this incident. ([Id.] at 50).

     [K.S.] confirmed that she has known [E.M.] for 12 or 13 years,
     she knew [Appellant] for approximately nine years, and she has
     known Mr. Davis for about 13 years. ([Id.] at 69-70). [K.S.]
     testified that on January 17th into the 18th of 2018, there were
     plans for her, [E.M.], Mr. Davis, and [Appellant] to get together
     at [E.M.’s] apartment to watch Netflix and smoke marijuana.
     ([Id.] at 71). [K.S.] stated that she messaged [Appellant] and
     [E.M.] messaged Mr. Davis that they “wanted no sexual activities
     happening” on the night of the incident. ([Id.] at 72). [K.S.]
     confirmed that she and [E.M.] picked up Mr. Davis and [Appellant]
     at approximately 10:00 pm to 11:00 pm, they traveled to Sheetz,
     and then went back to [E.M.’s] house after midnight. ([Id.]…).

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     Upon arrival back at [E.M.’s] apartment, [K.S.] testified that Mr.
     Davis rolled a blunt, [Appellant] broke up a pill, which she believed
     to be Xanax, and put it into the blunt, and the four of them smoked
     it. ([Id.] at 73-74). [K.S.] testified that she has smoked
     marijuana before and has used Xanax prior to the date of the
     incident, and she confirmed that she is familiar with the effects
     those drugs, both individually and together, have on her body.
     ([Id.] at 74). After smoking the marijuana, [K.S.] indicated that
     she fell asleep wearing clothing; however, [K.S.] testified that she
     was awoken to [Appellant] pulling her pants down and “tapping
     his penis on my butt[.”] ([Id.] at 74-78). [K.S.] said she told
     [Appellant] no, and “he respected that and just moved on to
     [E.M.] with Ben[.”] (Id. at 78). [K.S.] testified that at that point
     she was not able to move, and she observed [E.M.] on the bed
     next to her; however, her body was on the opposite side of the
     bed from where she fell asleep. ([Id.] at 78-79).

     [K.S.] testified that she observed Mr. Davis next to [E.M.], who
     appeared to be sleeping, trying to take her clothes off; however,
     [K.S.’s] vision started to become blurred and her eyes shut.
     ([Id.] at 79). [K.S.] testified that she woke up again and saw
     both Mr. Davis and [Appellant] on top of [E.M.], and she heard
     [E.M.] telling them “no, to stop, and that she didn’t want it[.”]
     ([Id.] at 79-80). After waking up the next day, [K.S.] testified
     that only she and [Appellant] were in the bedroom at that time.
     ([Id.] at 80). [K.S.] indicated that she was still unalert and had
     difficulty walking, but she heard [E.M.] crying in the shower, and
     she asked [E.M.] what happened. ([Id.] at 81). After talking with
     [E.M.] and being informed that she was raped by both Mr. Davis
     and [Appellant] and in pain, [K.S.] testified that she told Mr. Davis
     and [Appellant] to get their belongings and told them that they
     were taking them home “because they did [E.M.] wrong[.”]
     ([Id.]…). According to [K.S.], they dropped off Mr. Davis and
     [Appellant], waited in the hospital parking lot for two hours, and
     then returned back to [E.M.’s] apartment and called the police.
     ([Id.] at 82-83).

     [K.S.] testified that during this time, she was texting back and
     forth with [Appellant] via Facebook. ([Id.] at 82-83). During the
     non[-]jury trial, the Commonwealth introduced screenshots of
     Facebook message exchanges between [K.S.] and [Appellant],
     whose name appeared as “Tellemboutdat[.”] ([Id.] at 83-85;
     See Commonwealth’s Exhibit Two.) Communication between
     [K.S.] and [Appellant] revealed that [K.S.] messaged, “O[h] God,
     I’m piss[ed] off cus shes crying cus y’all played her that’s [weird

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     as fuck truth].”     ([N.T. Trial] at 86-87).       [Appellant] then
     responded “how[,”] to which [K.S.] replied, “[C]us u ain’t asked
     her to fuck her, you just did.” ([Id.] at 86…). [Appellant] replied,
     “[I]t looks like she cool wit it. U feel, fell asleep n left her now,
     datz that’s weird as fuck truth.” ([Id.]…). Additionally, the
     messages revealed that [Appellant] wrote, “[T]ell her I said my
     fault didn’t think she cared.” ([Id.] at … 87).

     [Appellant] also elected to testify during the non[-]jury trial.
     [Appellant] stated that he first met [E.M.] through [K.S.], after
     New Year’s of 2018, and they smoked marijuana. ([Id.] at 103-
     []04). [Appellant] testified that prior to the incident, he and
     [E.M.] had sex three to four times, including at his residence.
     ([Id.] at 104). [Appellant] indicated that on the date of the
     incident, [K.S.] invited him over to [E.M.’s] apartment, and [K.S.]
     told him to invite a friend, and he invited Mr. Davis. ([Id.] at
     105). [Appellant] testified as soon as they arrived back at [E.M.’s]
     apartment, the four of them went into [E.M.’s] bedroom and
     smoked a blunt that [Appellant] rolled. ([Id.] at 106-[]07).
     [Appellant] denied putting any Xanax into the blunt. ([Id.] at
     106). [Appellant] testified that after they were done smoking
     weed, “[I] slapped my dick off [K.S.’s] butt[,”] and asked [K.S.]
     if she wanted to have sex, but [K.S.] said no. ([Id.] at 109, 115-
     []16). [Appellant] claims that [K.S.] was not passed out at that
     time. ([Id.] at 116). According to [Appellant], while in the
     bedroom in the presence of Mr. Davis and [K.S.], he then asked
     [E.M.] if she wanted to have sex, and [E.M.] said she did not care.
     ([Id.] at 109-[]10). [Appellant] indicated that he then had
     consensual sex with [E.M.] while [K.S.] was lying on the bed next
     to her, and after he was finished, he observed [E.M.] get up and
     walk out of the room. ([Id.] at 110). [Appellant] testified that
     Mr. Davis was not in the room at this time. ([Id.] at 111).
     [Appellant] denied forcing [E.M.] in any way and denied that she
     was unconscious while he was having sex with her. ([Id.] at 112).
     [Appellant] indicated that he used a condom while having sex with
     [E.M.]. ([Id.] at 131).

     [Appellant] initially testified that he never saw Mr. Davis have sex
     on the date of the incident; however, he later recanted and
     indicated that “I just remembered that the bed was shaking, so
     they probably could have been having sex[.”] ([Id.] at 117, 136).
     [Appellant] later confirmed that he did observe Mr. Davis have sex
     with [E.M.]. ([Id.] at 142). On the following morning, [Appellant]
     indicated that all four of them smoked marijuana again[,] and
     then [E.M.] and [K.S.] dropped him and Mr. Davis back off. (Id.

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       at 118-[]19). After they were dropped off, [Appellant] testified
       that he and [E.M.] were texting each other. ([Id.] at 119-[]20).
       [Appellant] denied conspiring with Mr. Davis to rape or sexually
       assault the victims. ([Id.] at 122). On cross-examination,
       [Appellant] testified that the reason why he and Mr. Davis were
       invited to [E.M.’s] apartment was to have sex and smoke. ([Id.]
       at 123-[]24). [Appellant] testified that while engaging in sex with
       [E.M.], he did not think [E.M.] “liked it” because she was not
       moaning and did not say anything during sex. (Id. at 133-[]36).

       [Appellant’s] mother, Stephanie Hudson[,] also testified at trial.
       Ms. Hudson testified that on a date prior to the date of the
       incident, [E.M.] was at Ms. Hudson’s residence with [Appellant].
       ([Id.] at 148). The parties made the following stipulations at the
       non[-]jury trial: If called as character witnesses for [Appellant],
       Westmoreland County Prison inmates Erza Grant, Jesse Lawson,
       and Elijah Vento would testify that [Appellant] had a reputation as
       a peaceful, law-abiding person in the community of Greensburg.
       ([Id.] at 154-[]60). The parties also stipulated that Mr. Grant had
       pending charges for attempting to murder three law enforcement
       officers in the City of New Kensington; Mr. Lawson had current
       pending charges for aggravated assault; and Mr. Vento had
       current pending charges for possession of a firearm and hindering
       apprehension. ([Id.]…).

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/4/22, at 1-9.

       Based on this evidence, the court convicted Appellant of the above-

stated offenses.      On February 29, 2022, the court sentenced him to the

aggregate term set forth supra.            Appellant filed a timely, post-sentence

motion.      After the court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on

September 9, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 13,

2022.1 He thereafter complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.
____________________________________________

1 By order dated September 8, 2022, and entered on September 9, 2022, the
trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion by operation of law.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 720(B)(3)(a) requires judges to
decide post-sentence motions within 120 days of filing. If the judge fails to

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1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On November

4, 2022, the court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, Appellant states two

issues for our review:
       1. Whether the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to
          convict … Appellant of indecent assault [(]without consent[)]
          when … Appellant’s actions were de minimus [sic] and
          discontinued once consent was explicitly revoked?

____________________________________________

decide the motion or grant an extension within that timeframe, the motion
“shall be deemed denied by operation of law.” Id. When a post-sentence
motion is denied by operation of law, the clerk of courts must enter an order
“forthwith” on behalf of the court stating that the post-sentence motion is
deemed denied. Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). This Court has previously held
that a breakdown occurs when the clerk of courts fails to enter an order
deeming a post-sentence motion denied by operation of law and notifying the
defendant of the same. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 820 A.2d 734, 735
(Pa. Super. 2003). When a trial court denies a post-sentence motion after the
120-day period and the appellant then appeals within 30 days of the date of
that decision, this Court has found that the notice of appeal is timely. See
id.; see also Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super.
1995) (holding that the appellant’s notice of appeal, filed within 30 days of
the untimely order denying post-sentence motion, was timely).

      Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion within 10 days of his
judgment of sentence. Pursuant to Rule 720(B)(3)(a), the trial court was
required to decide the motion by July 5, 2022 — 120 days after the motion
was filed. The trial court did not decide the motion by that date, nor did
Appellant ask for an extension of time for the trial court to decide the motion.
Accordingly, after 120 days passed, the clerk of courts was required to
immediately enter an order denying the motion by operation of law. The clerk
of courts did not enter the appropriate order in this case. The trial court
eventually denied the post-sentence motion by operation of law on September
9, 2022. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on September 13, 2022. Pursuant
to Perry, we find that there was a breakdown in the operations of the court,
and we allow the instant appeal to proceed, as Appellant’s notice of appeal
was filed within 30 days from the date that the order denying his post-
sentence motion was entered on the docket.

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      2. Whether Appellant’s convictions were against the weight of the
         evidence due to the conflicting and disparate testimony of the
         alleged victims and the lack of supporting physical evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his

conviction of indecent assault.

      “Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge
      presents a question of law.” Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d
      29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Our standard of review is de
      novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
      Walls, 144 A.3d 926 (Pa. Super. 2016). In conducting our
      inquiry, we examine[,]

         whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
         derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable
         to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to
         establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
         doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our
         judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the
         evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts
         regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak
         and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
         fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
         evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the
         fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
         For purposes of our review under these principles, we must
         review the entire record and consider all of the evidence
         introduced.

      Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super.
      2014) (quotation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2021),

appeal denied, 285 A.3d 879 (Pa. 2022).

      Indecent assault (without consent) is defined as follows:
      (a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of indecent assault if
      the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the
      complainant to have indecent contact with the person or

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      intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with
      seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual
      desire in the person or the complainant and:

         (1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent;

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1). “Indecent contact” is defined as, “[a]ny touching of

the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or

gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

      Appellant contends that this Court has too broadly construed the term

“other intimate parts,” resulting in “virtually any part of the human body”

being included    within   that phrase.        Appellant’s   Brief   at 12   (citing

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 47 A.3d 155, 158 (Pa. Super. 2012) (finding that

the back of a person’s legs fell within the definition of ‘other intimate parts’)).

He maintains that it is therefore “unclear which parts of the human body are

not ‘intimate’ for purposes of 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3103.” Id. Appellant further

avers that the evidence was insufficient to support his indecent assault

conviction because his “alleged conduct [was], at best, de minimis with

respect to intimate contact[,]” and because there was “implied consent due to

[his and E.M.’s] prior sexual history.” Id. at 12-13.

      Both these arguments are meritless. Initially, Appellant is correct that

this Court has

      interpreted the phrase “other intimate parts” to encompass more
      than sexual organs. For example, in [Commonwealth v.] Capo,
      [727 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super. 1999), we] … interpreted “other
      intimate parts” to include the shoulders, neck, and back.
      Similarly, then-Judge, now Justice Wecht in Fisher, supra, opined
      that “[t]he backs of the legs can be intimate parts of the body,
      just as the shoulders, neck, and back were in Capo[]….” Fisher,
      47 A.3d at 158; see also [Commonwealth v.] Evans, [901 A.2d

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      528, 533 (Pa. 2006)] (holding evidence was sufficient to convict
      defendant of indecent assault where defendant wrapped his arms
      around victim and inserted his tongue into victim’s mouth because
      such act would not occur outside of sexual or intimate situation).

Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 313 n.16 (Pa. 2022). Recently,

in Gamby, our Supreme Court declined “to speak to whether the body parts

at issue in these decisions are properly considered ‘intimate parts….’”       Id.

However, the Court adopted our general interpretation of the phrase,

explaining that “other intimate parts” is

      not limited to only sexual body parts, but rather, was also intended
      to mean a body part that is personal and private, and which the
      person ordinarily allows to be touched only by people with whom
      the person has a close personal relationship, and one which is
      commonly associated with sexual relations or intimacy.

Id. at 313-14 (footnotes omitted).

      Under the definition set forth in Gamby, we have no trouble concluding

that the victim’s bare buttocks is a ‘sexual or other intimate part’ as

contemplated by the indecent assault statute. The buttocks is unquestionably

a part of one’s body that is ordinarily touched only by people with whom one

has a close personal relationship, and it is commonly associated with intimacy.

Indeed, this Court has suggested that one’s buttocks is a sexual or intimate

part of one’s body comparable to one’s genitalia or breasts.                 See

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“While

[the] phrase[, ‘sexual or other intimate parts,’] is not statutorily defined, this

Court has not limited its meaning to a person’s genitalia, buttocks or breasts

for indecent assault.”). Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to show

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that Appellant’s act of touching the victim’s bare buttocks with his penis

constituted contact with a ‘sexual or other intimate part’ of the victim’s body.

      We also reject Appellant’s argument that indecent contact must be more

than ‘de minimis’ to constitute indecent assault, and his assertion that a victim

can impliedly consent to contact simply by having had prior sexual relations

with her attacker. Notably, Appellant cites no legal authority to support either

of these claims. In any event, K.S. testified that Appellant’s “tapping his penis

on [her] butt” woke her from sleep. N.T. Trial at 76. We disagree that such

contact was ‘de minimis.’ We also disagree that the sleeping victim impliedly

consented to this sort of intimate touching simply because she had allegedly

had sexual contact with Appellant on prior occasions. This is especially true

where the evidence demonstrated that K.S. told Appellant before the incident

that she “wanted no sexual activities happening” that night. Id. at 71-72.

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction of indecent

assault.

      Next, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence to sustain his sex-

offense convictions. He avers:

      In many respects, [] Appellant’s accuser’s testimony was so
      inconsistent it calls into question whether the crimes in question
      occurred. [E.M.] testified she awoke to [] Appellant behind her,
      penetrating her vagina with what she believed to be his penis.
      [N.T. Trial] at 39. She later recounted that she was not certain
      the individual behind her was [] Appellant and she was unsure
      whether his penis was being used to penetrate her vagina. Id. at
      58-59. This testimony alone should be sufficient to vacate []
      Appellant’s conviction for Rape of an Unconscious Victim[,] as
      [E.M.] could neither identify [] Appellant as the perpetrator or

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     confirm he was, in fact, engaging in sexual intercourse with her.
     See 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 3121(a)(3) (providing [that] a rape is
     committed when a person engages in sexual intercourse with a
     complainant). To make matters more shocking to the court’s
     conscience, [E.M.] later admitted [that] she had previously
     testified at a [Protection From Abuse (PFA)] hearing [that] she
     could not recall the events of this incident at all. Id. 52-53. Not
     only was [E.M.’s] testimony internally inconsistent, it is admittedly
     inconsistent with her prior testimony under oath.

     [K.S.’s] testimony only sways the weight of the evidence further
     in the direction of [] Appellant[’s] being convicted of offenses he
     did not commit. [K.S.] claimed she woke up and saw both Davis
     and [Appellant] standing over [E.M.], who was saying she didn’t
     want it. Id. at 79-80. This testimony runs counter to [E.M.’s]
     own statements, where she noted she could neither move nor
     speak during the assault. Id. at 36-38. [K.S.] went further in
     vividly describing [E.M.’s] legs being in the air with someone
     between them. Id. at 80. Again, this testimony was contradicted
     by [E.M.], who stated she was penetrated from behind. Id. at 35,
     39. Nevertheless, [K.S.] testified she never saw [] Appellant
     having sex with [E.M]. Id. at 97.

     Given the plain contradictions in testimony by the alleged victims,
     the convictions against [] Appellant should be vacated for shocking
     the court’s sense of justice. When these apparent discrepancies
     are viewed in conjunction with the lack of physical evidence,
     justice is further wounded. Both alleged victims submitted saliva
     samples, blood draws for drug screening, and submitted rape kits.
     Id. at 82. In contradiction to their testimony, both individuals
     tested negative for the presence of any date-rape drugs. Id. at
     18. All drinks found at the scene also tested negative for the
     same. Id. at 19.

     Recall, testimony was given that all four of the individuals in this
     matter consumed the same drugs at the same time, with the drugs
     seemingly only having an incapacitating effect on the females.
     See [id.] at 33, 73. The chief mystery in this matter is how both
     women became incapacitated after sharing the same drugs with
     the two perpetrators who appeared to suffer no ill-effects. When
     examined in light of the lack of date-rape drugs in either’s system,
     it becomes apparent that the testimony regarding their
     unconsciousness should be granted virtually no weight. The
     issues regarding physical evidence, in conjunction with the
     inconsistent testimony cannot be overlooked.           As such, []

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       Appellant should be granted a new trial[,] as all of his convictions
       appear to be against the weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 14-17.

       Appellant’s arguments are unconvincing. Initially, he claims that certain

inconsistencies in E.M.’s and K.S.’s testimony cast doubt on whether he

actually had sexual intercourse with E.M., yet he himself admitted at trial that

he had sex with E.M. See N.T. Trial at 109, 115-16.2 Thus, the question for

the trial court, sitting as the fact-finder, was whether that sexual intercourse

– and Appellant’s contact with K.S., which he also admitted, see id. – was

consensual. While Appellant insists that the court should have discredited the

victims’ claims that they did not consent due to the inconsistencies in their

testimony and the lack of physical evidence to corroborate their claims, the

trial court disagreed. It explained:

       In the present case, this [c]ourt had the opportunity to hear and
       see the evidence presented and to assess the credibility of the
       witnesses. The [c]ourt finds that the entirety of the evidence
       presented at trial convinces the [c]ourt that the evidence was in
       support of the verdict rendered. Through the duration of the non-
____________________________________________

2 Appellant also misconstrues E.M.’s testimony about her statements during a
PFA hearing. During cross-examination, E.M. was asked if she remembered
“testifying at a PFA hearing in this case … on February 26, 2018[,]” to which
E.M. replied, “Yes.” N.T. Trial at 52. E.M. was then asked if she would agree
that, “at that time, [she] testified that [she] had no recollection of the
incident.” Id. E.M. explained what she meant by that testimony, stating:
“Meaning there [were] parts of the rape that I was not aware, like, of what
had happened. There [were] times that I was not awake.” Id. Inquiring
further, defense counsel then asked E.M. if she meant that “there are bits and
pieces that you have no recollection of?” Id. at 53. E.M. responded, “Yes. I
don’t know what happened when I was not awake.” Id. Based on E.M.’s
explanation, we do not discern any significant discrepancies between her PFA
hearing testimony and her testimony at Appellant’s trial.

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      jury trial, the [c]ourt considered the following evidence: the
      testimony from [E.M.] … that she was penetrated by both Mr.
      Davis and [Appellant] at a time where she was unable to move or
      talk; the testimony of [K.S.] … that Mr. Davis and [Appellant] were
      on top of [E.M.] and she heard [E.M.] telling them “no, to stop,
      and that she didn’t want it”; the testimony of [Appellant] … that
      he had sex with [E.M.] while using a condom and he did not think
      [E.M.] “liked it” because she was not moaning and did not say
      anything during sex; the message from [Appellant] to [K.S.]
      indicating, “[I]t looks like she cool wit it” and “[T]ell her I said my
      fault didn’t think she cared”; the message from [E.M.] to Mr. Davis
      two days prior to the incident saying that “I ain’t looking for dick”
      and “I’m tired of people thinking I need dicked down”; the
      message from [E.M.] after the incident saying[,] “since y’all want
      to treat me like a hoe when I told you I didn’t want dicked down,
      don’t ever hit me up”; the message from [Appellant] purportedly
      blaming [K.S.] for falling asleep and leaving [E.M.]; the testimony
      of [Appellant] … that he saw Mr. Davis having sex with [E.M.]; the
      testimony of [Appellant] … that the reason why he and Mr. Davis
      were invited to [E.M.’s] residence was to have sex and smoke; the
      testimony of Officer Scalzo [regarding E.M.’s] emotional state
      following the incident; the testimony of Officer Scalzo … that he
      located two used condoms on [E.M.’s] bedroom floor; the
      testimony of [K.S.] … that she was awoken to [Appellant’s] pulling
      her pants down and tapping his penis against her bare butt asking
      her to have sex; the testimony of [K.S.] … that she said no, but
      she was not able to move at that time, and [Appellant’s] testimony
      … that[,] “[I] slapped my dick off [K.S.’s] ass” and [that he] asked
      [K.S.] if she wanted to have sex, and she said no.

      Despite minor inconsistencies, the [c]ourt finds the testimony of
      [E.M.] and [K.S.] to be credible and corroborated. Based upon
      this [c]ourt’s review of the entire record, this [c]ourt does not find
      that the verdicts are inconsistent or so contrary to the evidence as
      to shock this [c]ourt’s sense of justice.

TCO at 12-13.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. We have held

that “the lack of corroborating physical evidence does not undermine the

victim’s   testimony”     when     deemed      credible   by    the    fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 1047 (Pa. Super. 2016). Indeed,

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“[t]his Court has long-recognized that the uncorroborated testimony of a

sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a

defendant, despite contrary evidence from defense witnesses.”          Id. (citing

Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 562 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

and internal punctuation omitted)). Here, there was no dispute that Appellant

had sexual intercourse with E.M., and that he touched his penis to K.S.’s bare

buttocks. The court found credible the victims’ testimony that they did not

consent to this contact, during which they were unconscious or semi-

conscious. We agree with the Commonwealth that there was no “ill-will, bias,

or prejudice present during the process of the non-jury trial[,] nor was there

a misapplication of law or manifestly unreasonable exercise of judg[ment]” by

the trial court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 18. Rather, “[t]he [court] properly

used [its] discretion to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of

each witness’s testimony.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence to

sustain his convictions.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2023

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