Court Opinion

ID: 9562715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:32:52.747164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:29.656105
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur with the majority opinion. However, I do not believe that the “Letter of Intent and Agreement” and later “Modification and Amendment” created a jury question on whether a contract existed between I.M.A. and Rocky Mountain Airways. In my view, the conduct of both parties subsequent to the exchange of the letters provided the evidence to create a jury issue and to support the jury’s finding. I specially concur to express my view of Part II of the court’s opinion.
The majority opinion demonstrates that the two letters from Rocky Mountain to I.M.A. had not yet advanced beyond the negotiation stage in forming the agreement. The first letter stated: “It is understood that this Letter of Intent and Agreement is preliminary in nature, and that each party will work toward more definitive statements and the execution of agreements and resolutions and contracts, that may be required to consummate the overall purposes of this intent and agreement letter.” The letter also said that the contract was “contingent upon satisfaction” of five major “contingencies” (see majority opinion, at 885-886). In view of these explicit statements, it is clear that the two letters were part of the preliminary negotiation between the parties and do not, apart from the action and conduct of the parties, establish the existence of a contract. See Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F.Supp. 1212 (D.Colo.1972); D.A.C. Uranium Co. v. Benton, 149 F.Supp. 667 (D.Colo.1956).
It is basic contract law that any evidence tending to explain or clarify the intent or purpose of the parties is admissible to show whether a writing has been assented to as the final expression of their agreement. Miller v. L.C. Fulenwider, Inc., 146 Colo. 588, 594-95, 362 P.2d 570, 574 (1961). Here the parties’ actions, taken together with the statements in the letters of intent, indicate that a final contract had been reached and that the parties believed all essential contract terms had been finalized. See Federal Lumber Co. v. Wheeler, 643 P.2d 31 (Colo.1981).
Rocky Mountain leased the PUC certification of public conveyance and necessity from I.M.A. for $500 per month. The PUC gave emergency temporary approval for the lease, and Rocky Mountain then began air service between Denver and Durango. I.M.A. also took action to renegotiate the landing lease at the Durango airport and to obtain shareholder approval of the agreement with Rocky Mountain. Finally, Rocky Mountain moved I.M.A.’s office furniture and equipment into the Rocky Mountain hangar in Denver.