Court Opinion

ID: 9947753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 17:00:53.289706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:32.114984
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MAR 5 2024
                                                                          MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIE HAMMERLING; KAY JACKSON, No. 22-17024
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,                      D.C. No.
                                         3:21-cv-09004-CRB
                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

    v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

GOOGLE, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company,

                    Defendant-Appellee.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of California
                    Charles R. Breyer, Senior District Judge, Presiding

                        Argued and Submitted February 14, 2024
                               San Francisco, California

Before: MILLER, BADE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

         In this putative class action, Plaintiffs-Appellants Marie Hammerling and Kay

Jackson      sued    Defendant-Appellee     Google,   LLC,    alleging     that   Google

(1) surreptitiously collected personal information from Android users by tracking

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
their download and use of third-party mobile applications (“apps”) and (2) used that

data for purposes other than those contemplated by the Privacy Policy. Plaintiffs

brought ten claims for relief, including claims for fraud, breach of contract, and

invasion of privacy, and accompanying requests for injunctive and declaratory relief.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiffs appealed. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals de novo, Ballinger v.

City of Oakland, 24 F.4th 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2022), and we affirm.

      1. Plaintiffs allege three related fraud claims under California’s various

consumer protection statutes. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1709 (“section 1709”); Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code §§ 17200 et seq. (Unfair Competition Law or “UCL”); Cal. Civ. Code

§§ 1750 et seq. (Consumer Legal Remedies Act or “CLRA”). To plead a fraud claim

under any of these statutes, Plaintiffs must allege (among other elements) that

Google made an actionable misrepresentation. Lazar v. Superior Ct., 909 P.2d 981,

984–85 (Cal. 1996) (section 1709); Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, 108 Cal. Rptr. 3d

682, 687, 697 (Ct. App. 2010) (UCL and CLRA). An actionable misrepresentation

can result from either an affirmative misstatement of a material fact or an omission

of a material fact. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2018); Durell,

108 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 697.

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      Google urges that it has not made an actionable misstatement or omission

because it affirmatively disclosed the challenged data collection practices in its

Privacy Policy. The Policy, which applies broadly to all Google’s products and

services, explains that Google collects data about users’ “[a]ctivity on third-party

sites and apps that use [Google’s] services.”1         The Policy defines Google’s

“services” to include the “Android operating system.” Given that express definition

of “services,” Google contends that by explaining it collects data on “third-

party … apps that use [Google’s] services” it has sufficiently explained that Google

collects activity data in third-party apps downloaded to Android devices because

those third-party apps “use” the Android operating system. We agree.

      The district court, in its first dismissal order, rejected Google’s reading of the

operative phrase “apps that use [Google’s] services” because, in its view, “it [wa]s

at least as plausible that a reasonable consumer would read” the phrase to mean

“apps ‘that require users to sign into Google services.’” When considering the

operative complaint, the district court did not revisit its analysis of that phrase,

explaining that it could not conclude that Plaintiffs were aware of and consented to

1
  Plaintiffs also fault Google for using the data “in order to unfairly compete with
rivals and develop competing products.” Google’s product development efforts fit
comfortably within the Policy’s explanation that Google reserved the right to use the
data to “[m]aintain & improve [its] services,” “[d]evelop new services,” and
“[p]rovide personalized services, including content and ads.” Plaintiffs thus fail to
state a claim based on any alleged misrepresentation regarding Google’s use of the
data it collected.

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its breadth. We review questions of contract interpretation de novo, Doe I v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009), and we disagree with the district

court. Read in the context of the Policy as a whole, the phrase “apps that use

[Google’s] services” unambiguously discloses Google’s collection of user activity

data in third-party apps.

      Essential to the district court’s reasoning was its observation that under

Google’s reading, “somewhat counterintuitively, every single app could be

construed as an ‘app[] that use[s] our services’ because … the Policy defines

Google’s services to include the operating system itself.” But where a contract

expressly defines a term, we cannot reject that definition simply because it may

deviate from our expectations. “The words of a contract are to be understood in their

ordinary and popular sense … unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or

unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the latter must be

followed.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1644 (emphasis added); see also L.A. Lakers, Inc. v.

Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2017). The Policy’s broad definition of

“service” clearly includes the Android operating system, which all apps on an

Android phone use.

      Nor, as Plaintiffs contend, does Google’s reading render the phrase “apps that

use [Google’s] services” mere surplusage. The Privacy Policy, which applies to

Google’s entire “range of services” used by “millions of people daily,” must be read

                                          4
in context and construed as a whole. See Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618

F.3d 970, 975 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1641). While it is true

that every third-party app on an Android device uses Google’s services because all

such apps depend on the Android operating system, that is not necessarily true for

every third-party app on other, non-Android devices. The Policy provides many

other examples of Google services—including Maps, YouTube, and Chrome—that

might just as easily be used, for example, on an iPhone or a laptop running Windows.

Thus, the phrase “apps that use [Google’s] services” both (1) provides an important

limitation on Google’s ability to collect data and (2) unambiguously applies to all

third-party apps that use Android.

      Because Google disclosed the challenged data collection efforts in the Policy,

Plaintiffs’ fraud claims fail to allege an actionable misrepresentation and were

therefore properly dismissed.

      2. Plaintiffs’ contract claims were correctly dismissed for the same reason.

Under California law, a breach-of-contract claim has four elements: (1) existence of

a contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damages. In

re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig. (“Facebook Tracking”), 956 F.3d 589,

610 (9th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs contend that Google breached the contract by

collecting their activity data from third-party apps, but as explained above, the

contract expressly contemplates such collection. Plaintiffs thus fail to state a claim

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for breach of contract. And because the parties have an express contract governing

the subject matter, Plaintiffs cannot seek to hold Google accountable for an implied

contract in the alternative. “California courts have made clear that these two causes

of action are mutually exclusive: ‘There cannot be a valid, express contract and an

implied contract, each embracing the same subject matter, existing at the same

time.’” Berkla v. Corel Corp., 302 F.3d 909, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wal-Noon

Corp. v. Hill, 119 Cal. Rptr. 646, 650 (Ct. App. 1975)).

      3. Google’s disclosure similarly precludes Plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of

privacy under common law and the California Constitution.2 “Because of the

similarity of the tests, courts consider the claims together and ask whether: (1) there

exists a reasonable expectation of privacy, and (2) the intrusion was highly

offensive.” Facebook Tracking, 956 F.3d at 601 (citing Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc.,

211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009)). “[T]he relevant question” as to the first element

“is whether a user would reasonably expect that [Google] would have access to the

user’s individual data.” Id. at 602. Unlike Facebook Tracking, where the “privacy

disclosures at the time allegedly failed to acknowledge” the challenged data

collection practices, id., the Policy here expressly disclosed Google’s intention to

track their activity on third-party apps. As a result, Plaintiffs have no reasonable

2
  Because Plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their claim under California’s
Invasion of Privacy Act, we do not consider that claim.

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expectation of privacy in that data.3 Their invasion of privacy claims were therefore

properly dismissed.

      AFFIRMED.

3
  That leaves only Plaintiffs’ claims for unjust enrichment and for injunctive and
declaratory relief. Assuming an independent claim for unjust enrichment exists
under California law, it cannot lie where the defendant has not committed some
predicate actionable wrong. McBride v. Boughton, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 121–22
(Ct. App. 2004) (“[R]estitution may be awarded where the defendant obtained a
benefit from the plaintiff by fraud, duress, conversion, or similar conduct.”). Here,
where Plaintiffs have identified no actionable wrong, their derivative claim for
unjust enrichment claim fails, as do their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief.

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