Court Opinion

ID: 9638528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:46:15.918915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:16.437512
License: Public Domain

Grimes, J.,
dissenting: Granting that the court has the power to enter the order it has, I would not go so far so soon and therefore cannot join in the opinion of the court. If the personal freedom of even one lawyer is to be curtailed on the basis that it is necessary for the public good, then that necessity should be clearly established by demonstrating that less drastic means will not meet the need.
I recognize that for the protection of the public, requirements with respect to qualifications and professional conduct may be imposed on those who practice law. I am not convinced, however, that compulsory membership in an association which may take positions on controversial legislation is necessary to produce adequate results in these areas. This court can impose ethical standards on all lawyers and can require them to contribute toward the expense of enforcement machinery without requiring membership in an association.
By decreeing unification for three years, presumably the court intends to take another look at the problem in 1972; but what can be seen then? If there has been improvement this will not prove that satisfactory gains could not have been made by means less injurious to personal liberty because such means will not have been tried. Against what then will we measure the loss in personal freedom to determine if it has been worth the price. We have the obligation I think to try the less onerous means first *270before embarking upon this plan.
Since unification is being decreed I would not approve the provision of the by-laws relating to disciplinary procedures as presently proposed and would require any amendments to the by-laws as well as to the constitution to be approved by this court.