Court Opinion

ID: 9680892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:40:38.983918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.145606
License: Public Domain

Conley Byrd, Justice, dissenting. The majority in making the area searched to come within its definition of a “garden” ignore the testimony in the record including the pictures — i.e., plaintiff’s Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5. Officer Ed Wolfe with the Arkansas State Police at page 33 of the record was specifically asked: “Q. At the time you got there were you looking in the direction where these things were located? Would they have been visible to the naked eye? A. Right, if you had been looking in the general direction they would have been visible. Q. They were not within any enclosure of any sort, or high fence or anything like this? A. No, sir, half of them wasn’t. Q. You would call it sort of an open field? A. Yes, it would have been an open field; one row of corn in the middle, and an open field.” Sheriff Rufus Nichols with reference to the location of the marijuana at page 45 of the record testified as follows: “Q. Was this marijuana that was growing, was it out in the open; and by open, I mean was there any fences, big high fences, or anything obstructing your vision? A. No, there wasn’t any fences. Q. Would you refer to it as being in an open field? A. Well, it was in a field, I’d say south of his home, or southwest.” In addition to the foregoing, appellant introduced defendant’s Exhibit § 1 (attached hereto as an appendix) and in doing so readily admitted that there was a pond between his trailer and the growing marijuana that is not shown on the exhibit. At page 57 of the record appellant testified as follows, to-wit: “Q. But except for the barbed wire fence, it is just an open field? A. Yes. Well, I put up a few wires across it, and had no trespassing signs all around. My cars was up here, and I had a lot of trouble with people stealing.” While I admit that a true garden would ordinarily fall within the confines of what the ordinary person would consider the curtilage of his home, I submit that to call the one row of corn and the few vegetables here grown among the ten rows of marijuana anywhere from 200 to 300 feet in length a garden bastardizes the plain meaning of the term garden even within the definitions of a garden set out in the majority opinion. As pointed out in Romano v. Thrower, 261 Ala. 361, 74 So. 2d 235 (1954), the fact that vegetables are grown in an area for a money crop as distinguished from personal use does not constitute the area a “garden.” The definitions of a garden cited by the majority and taken from Black’s Law Dictionary and 68 Am. Jur. 2d at page 676 both require that the space be used for family purposes. Whether the appellant was raising the 1400 marijuana plants here (a pick-up truck load) for family purposes or for commercial purposes was certainly a fact issue for the trial court and I cannot say that his finding could be said to be against the totality of the evidence. Neither can the majority rely upon the fact that the search here was part of the fruit of the poisonous vine. Our cases hold that one who must rely upon that theory to suppress evidence has the burden of showing that the illegal search of the curtilage furnished a clue for the open field search, Walton & Fuller v. State, 245 Ark. 84, 431 S.W. 2d 462 (1968). No such evidence was here shown. The quote of the trial court set out in the majority opinion would lead one to believe that the trial court considered the area in question a garden. I consider the quote to be taken out of context. The statements of the trial court are hereinafter set out as follows: “. . . You cannot get a search warrant now for a house and then search a garage, or any other appurtenance to the house. So it has been extended to not only the house, but the judicial interpretation includes all other buildings. You are protected from a search without having a valid warrant. However, it is the Court’s opinion that the protection of the constitution as to unreasonable search does not extend to fields or gardens or things of that nature, and does not believe it was necessary in order to make the search to have any search warrant at all. So, regardless of the validity of the search warrant, the Court believes that the field itself is not protected from a search without any kind of a search warrant. So you have raised some very interesting points, and also the search warrant does not describe what is to be searched other than actually the trailer itself. But in spite of that, Mr. Braden, the Court does not feel like the constitution affords this type of protection to a search of a field, but only to homes or buildings, but not to fields. So the Court is going to overrule your motion to suppress, and hold that even if the search warrant here is invalid then the officers would have a right to make a search without any search warrant at all. Anything obtained from the field would be admissible into evidence, and the Court will note your exceptions to the Court’s ruling.” For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent. Harris, C.J., and Fogleman, J., join in this dissent. APPENDIX [[Image here]] DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT NO. 1