Court Opinion

ID: 9836931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:33.806295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.368601
License: Public Domain

EFFRON, Judge
(dissenting):
When an accused alleging unlawful command influence meets his burden of production by presenting evidence that reflects an appearance of unlawful command influence, the burden shifts to the Government to prove either that there was no unlawful command influence or that, even if there was unlawful command influence, there was no prejudice to the accused. See United States v. Gerlich, 45 MJ 309, 310 (1996). In this case, the military judge found that “[t]here was, at least, the appearance of improper command influence when CAPT Schork withdrew from the [pretrial agreement] after the conversation with Acting AIRPAC [CAPT Eckart], and against the advice of his [staff judge advocate],” but concluded that she was powerless to provide an appropriate remedy.
The majority attempts to distinguish the present case from Gerlich on the grounds that in Gerlich, the superior officer initiated the alleged improper contact. This distinction is insignificant. In military life, subordinates regularly contact their superiors on a wide variety of matters. If such contacts provided superior officers with an unrestricted opportunity to engage in unlawful command influence, Article 37, UCMJ, 10 USC § 837, would provide little protection to either subordinates or accused servicemem-bers. The majority also notes that CAPT Schork and CAPT Eckart were old friends. It is quite common in military life for professional associations and shared hardships to ripen into deep friendships. Members of the *33armed forces frequently must put aside such friendships on a wide variety of matters, ranging from the preparation of personnel ratings to orders that could place an old friend in harms way. When a subordinate contacts a superior on a military justice matter that rests within the discretion of the subordinate, the superior must scrupulously avoid improper influence on the subordinate’s discretion, regardless of whether their relationship is otherwise characterized by friendship.
In the present ease, CAPT Schork, like the convening authority in Gerlich, testified that his superior’s comment made him reexamine his position. The next day, CAPT Schork withdrew from the pretrial agreement. In his testimony, CAPT Schork, like the convening authority in Gerlich, attempted to deny that CAPT Eckart, through his question, had exerted improper command influence. This Court has in the past recognized that a subordinate may have difficulty “ascertaining for himself or herself the actual influence a superior has on that subordinate.” Gerlich, 45 MJ at 313, citing United States v. Rosser, 6 MJ 267, 272 (CMA 1979); United States v. Zagar, 5 USCMA 410, 18 CMR 34 (1955); United States v. Adamiak, 4 USCMA 412,15 CMR 412 (1954). Because the record is clear that it was the prompting of the acting convening authority that caused CAPT Schork to rethink his position and withdraw from the pretrial agreement, the military judge correctly identified unlawful command influence.
I disagree with the majority’s suggestion that transferring the case to a different chain of command cured the unlawful command influence. At the time of the contact between CAPT Schork and CAPT Eckart, appellant had entered into a pretrial agreement. A convening authority has discretion to withdraw from a pretrial agreement at any time before the accused has begun performance. See RCM 705(d)(4)(B), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1998 ed.). Like other discretionary acts by officials in the court-martial process, however, such a withdrawal cannot properly be the product of unlawful command influence.
In this case, the convening authority’s discretion was tainted by unlawful command influence. Transferring the case ensured that any action taken after the transfer would be free from the taint of unlawful command influence, but it did not remove the taint of unlawful command influence from the discretionary action already taken.
Even though the new convening authority would have had the right to withdraw from the pretrial agreement after the transfer, the prejudice flows from the circumstances of the case. A decision to abide by an agreement already in place is qualitatively different from the decision-making process that goes into the negotiation of a new pretrial agreement. Appellant was prejudiced by CAPT Schork’s failure, after concluding that his conversation with CAPT Eckart had at least the appearance of impropriety, to transfer appellant’s case with the original pretrial agreement intact. At that point, until appellant acted in reliance on the agreement, the new convening authority would have had the right to withdraw from the agreement, but appellant would not have had the unfair burden of having to try to negotiate a new agreement as a direct result of the unlawful command influence.