Court Opinion

ID: 9520412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:39:26.263113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:12.791635
License: Public Domain

*286Edwards, J.
{dissenting). This is a continuation, of a legislative dispute, over zoning in the city of "Warren, which has recently been transferred to this Court. In Dequindre Development Co. v. Charter Township of Warren, 359 Mich 634, this Court by majority decision held residential zoning for a certain 17-acre parcel of vacant land to be unconstitutional. Prior to this decision the boundary between R-l and industrial zoning in this area ran to the south and west of the 17-aere parcel. By that decision the majority of our Court redrew the boundary so it now runs on the north and east of the same parcel.
The primary argument for rezoning was an adjacent nonconforming use in the presence of a trailer park which threatened to burst its seams. Logically, it might have been expected that the 17 acres rezoned by Dequindre, supra, north of the trailer park would have been used for its expansion.
In the present case the city of Warren appeals from the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring it to issue various building permits and enjoining it from enforcing its zoning ordinance to prevent expansion of the very same trailer park which was the subject of comment in Dequindre, supra. The effect of the writ of mandamus issued in the court below, however, would be to hold unconstitutional residential zoning on the other side of the trailer park to its south and west.
We read much of what has been presented here as suggesting in effect that since we have assumed legislative responsibility for zoning north of the trailer park, we should do so south of the trailer park likewise.
Having disagreed with the original mistake made in Dequindre Development Co. v. Charter Township of Warren, supra, we feel no responsibility for enlarging it. The original zoning in this area was well *287within the legislative discretion. It should not have been interfered with in Dequindre. It should not now be subject to judicial interference again.
Further, if the wisdom of this matter were properly to be considered in this Court, we should give some thought to the equities of the property owners in the approximately 6 blocks of the residentially developed and zoned land lying west of this disputed area. By the action of the court below these blocks-would become a residential island completely surrounded by commercial or industrial uses. Presumably the interests of these lonely homeowners may have been in the minds of the local legislative body.
Actually, we should remind ourselves of our own words in Brae Burn, Inc., v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425, 431:
“Our laws have wisely committed to the people of a community themselves the determination of their municipal destiny, the degree to which the industrial may have precedence over the residential, and the areas carved out of each to be devoted to commercial pursuits. With the wisdom or lack of wisdom of the determination we are not concerned. The people of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its growth and its life. Let us state the proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function to approve the ordinance before us as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and responsibility in the premises. As Willoughby phrased it in his treatise, Constitution of the United States (2d ed, 1929), vol 1, § 21, p 32: ‘The constitutional power of a law-making body to legislate in the premises being granted, the wisdom or expediency of the manner in which that power is *288exercised is not properly subject to judicial criticism or control.’ ”
Judgment granting writ should be reversed. Costs should be awarded to appellant.
Smith and Souris, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.