Court Opinion

ID: 9532635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:23:28.938146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.842966
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that Judge Anderson erred when he prohibited Smithart from arguing that David DeForest committed the crime. However, in my judgment, this error was more of a handicap to Smit-hart’s defense than the majority perceives it to be.
At the outset of the trial Smithart indicated that he wanted to organize his defense around the theme that David DeForest committed the crime. In an offer of proof Smit-hart’s attorney set out a circumstantial case against DeForest. DeForest was a key prosecution witness who placed Smithart at the scene of M.L.’s abduction. Therefore, by his own testimony, DeForest was present at the scene and placed himself in a position to have committed the crime. Smithart’s attorney pointed out that DeForest did not report seeing Smithart at the scene of the abduction until nearly three weeks after M.L. disappeared. He argued that DeForest had made several inconsistent statements about seeing Smithart on Tazlina Drive. He contended that DeForest had made inconsistent statements about his activities the afternoon M.L. was abducted. He claimed that DeForest’s inconsistent statements suggested that he had fabricated the report. DeForest had previously been convicted of attempted burglary, a crime of dishonesty. Because of this conviction he was prohibited from possessing weapons. DeForest originally denied possessing any weapons to police investigators. However, he ultimately admitted to possessing weapons in violation of the law, including a .22 caliber weapon which was the type of weapon the police believed had been used to kill M.L. DeForest worked in a shop which could have yielded the paint chips and metal particles which were found on M.L.’s clothing. Smithart’s attorney argued that the circumstantial case against DeForest was sufficient to allow him to argue to the jury that the evidence suggested DeForest committed the crime, or at least that the circum*1290stantial ease against DeForest was sufficiently strong to create a reasonable doubt that Smithart committed the crime.
By taking this position at the outset of the case, Smithart’s attorney took a big risk. If the prosecution could convince the jury that DeForest could not have committed the crime, Smithart’s case would suffer a serious blow. However, if Smithart could convince the jury that there was a reasonable chance that DeForest committed the crime, he could establish a reasonable doubt of Smithart’s guilt. We all agree that Smithart was entitled to an opportunity to argue this theory of the ease to the jury. Although I concede that it is a close question, I don’t believe that Smithart’s attorney can be faulted for not pressing Judge Anderson to modify or clarify his ruling. The attorney made a clear offer of proof at the start of the trial setting out his proposed strategy. Judge Anderson refused to let him follow that strategy. During the trial Smithart’s attorney did not present any evidence which significantly differed from his offer of proof. It does not seem unreasonable to me for the attorney to assume that Judge Anderson would stand by his original ruling. As a result, the attorney was prevented from arguing to the jury his theory of the ease that there was a reasonable doubt concerning Smithart’s guilt because there was similar circumstantial evidence to support the conclusion that David DeForest had committed the crime, and that DeForest had testified against Smithart to deflect suspicion.
It is true that Smithart was able to introduce much of the evidence which supported his theory that DeForest was an alternative suspect. However, because Smithart was unable to argue this theory to the jury and rest his case on it, his defense lacked any cohesion. He was unable to assemble the circumstantial evidence which suggested that DeForest could have committed the crime into an argument which might have made sense to the jury. In my view this was a serious handicap to the effective presentation of Smithart’s defense.
Whether this handicap was rendered harmless because of the strong case against Smithart is also a close question. Although the physical evidence against Smithart was compelling, I am not convinced that it was sufficient to overcome the fact that Smithart was prevented from arguing his theory of the case to the jury. I therefore dissent from the court’s decision affirming Smithart’s conviction.