Court Opinion

ID: 9720028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:13:13.928494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.241160
License: Public Domain

Hennessey, J.
This is an appeal from a decree of the Housing Court of the City of Boston reversing the action of the Boston Rent Control Administrator granting the appellant (landlord) certificates of eviction against twenty-one tenants of twenty apartments in Long Wharf in the city of Boston (tenants). The landlord’s applications for the certificates of eviction assigned as the basis therefor St. 1970, c. 842, § 9 (a) (10) (act). Each of the tenants filed an opposing statement. A hearing was held before a represen*576tative of the administrator, at which the landlord and tenants were represented by their respective counsel.
The administrator, in granting the applications, found “that the landlord proved an intention to renovate the units and that the nature of the work required the units to be vacated, and that such renovation was not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of the statute.” On a petition for review filed by the tenants pursuant to St. 1970, c. 842, § 10, the judge of the Housing Court reversed the administrator’s decision. In substance he ruled that the landlord’s intentions are in conflict with the purposes of the statute. We affirm.
We examine first the nature of the review in the Housing Court. Although St. 1970, c. 842, § 10, is entitled “Judicial Review” it clearly provides in eviction matters for a de nova court proceeding specifically comparable to a declaratory relief proceeding under G. L. c. 231A. In this proceeding an aggrieved person may challenge the action of a rent control board or administrator. “[Ejxclusive original jurisdiction over such proceedings” was lodged in any District Court having territorial jurisdiction over the locus of the controlled rental unit. By G. L. c. 185A, inserted by St. 1971, c. 843, § 1, however, the Legislature amended the exclusiveness of this grant of jurisdiction, creating the Housing Court of the City of Boston, and endowing it with jurisdiction “concurrent with the district courts and the superior court” under “so much of any... general or special law ... as is concerned with the health, safety or welfare of any occupant of any place used, or intended for use, as a place of human habitation.” ( § 3.)
We are thus reviewing the decision of the Housing Court judge on the evidence presented before him.1 We are not directly concerned with the actions of the administrator. *577Our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether the judge was plainly wrong in any of his findings of fact, and (2) whether the judge correctly applied the law. We concluded that there was no error. As to the first inquiry, the judge made voluntary findings of fact which clearly do not purport to be complete findings. None of these findings was plainly wrong. Indeed they were plainly correct. We have concluded from our own examination of the record, as shown below, that most of the facts of the case are undisputed. Certain further allegations of fact now urged by the landlord are not supported in the record.
Nor was there error in the judge’s ruling, in reversing the administrator’s decision, that the evictions here were “in conflict with the provisions and purposes of. .. [the] act.” St. 1970, c. 842, §9 (a) (10).
Most of the facts are undisputed. They are as follows. The twenty units are located in the Custom House Block, which is comprised of a total of fifty-one housing units. The building is located within an area generally controlled by the Boston Redevelopment Authority. Extensive renovation has been accomplished as to the interior and exterior of the building. The thirty-one units with which we are not directly concerned are not subject to rent control. These have been either newly built or substantially renovated under the landlord’s plans to rehabilitate the entire building. Substantial work which affects the entire building has already been done, including a new roof, new elevators, a new water main service, new boilers, and a new electrical system. The evidence warrants a conclusion that the extensive renovations planned for the twenty rent-con*578trolled units will require, as the administrator found, that the units be vacant during the work.
There are certain disputed assertions of facts. The landlord contends that the Boston Redevelopment Authority threatened to take the building by eminent domain unless the renovations were accomplished. The landlord appears to urge also, although it is not entirely clear, that the proposed renovations have been shown to be necessary for continued occupancy of the twenty units. As shown later in this opinion, we believe that neither of these contentions is supported by the evidence.
Under § 9 (a) the act sets out nine specific grounds, as shown in the margin,2 for eviction from a unit subject to rent control. None of these has any application to this case. There is a tenth and more general ground on which the administrator purported to act in this case. This (§ 9 [a] [10]) authorizes the granting of certificates of eviction in *579those cases where the landlord has “just cause” and where “his purpose [in evicting the tenant] is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of... [the] act.”
We need not consider to what extent, if any, the judge may exercise discretion as to what constitutes “just cause” under this section. We hold that, as a matter of law, the purpose of the eviction here is not consistent with the provisions and purposes of the act. We reach this conclusion on evidence in the record, summarized above, which is undisputed and may fairly be said to be binding on the landlord.
The declaration of emergency in § 1 of the act is an appropriate place for us to look for legislative purpose (see Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686 [1971]), and we find that section is informative in this instance. It declares, as shown in full in the margin,3 that there is a serious housing emergency, particularly in urban areas, and that the emergency has resulted in a “substantial and increasing shortage of rental housing accommodations for families of low and moderate income” (emphasis supplied). The tenants point out that the language in the declaration of emergency with respect to housing for families of low and moderate income does not appear in the original Boston rent control enabling act, St. 1969, c. 797. From this, they argue, correctly we think, that it can be inferred that in accepting the act in 1970 the city council and the mayor were adding to the expressed purposes of rent control in Boston by incorporating in the *580new rent control scheme for the city the specific reference to low and moderate income housing which had not been included in the 1969 law.4
From the plain language of § 1 it is clear that one of the principal purposes of the act is to preserve and expand the supply of housing for families of low and moderate income. The record establishes that the twenty units presently carry rents from $145 to $315 a month. If the proposed renovation takes place, rents on the units will increase by at least $120 to $125 a month. Both parties have clearly assumed in their briefs and arguments that this will remove the apartments from the low and moderate rental market. Presumably, this change will be permanent. This result would be in conflict with what is clearly a central purpose of the act. Nor would the proposed rehabilitation meet the spirit and intent of the act in any way calculated to mitigate the loss to the market of twenty low and moderate rental units. The total number of available units, at any and all rental levels, would not be increased by the rehabilitation; the net effect would be to convert twenty low and moderate rental units into twenty high-rent units. Clearly the administrator could not validly permit evictions in these circumstances, as the trial judge ruled.
We cannot accept the landlord’s argument that the rehabilitation is required by reason of the units’ deterioration. The landlord emphasizes evidence which he presented before the administrator and which was incorporated in the Housing Court record showing that the apartments, which were constructed in the 1940’s, have plumbing which needs modern replacements and have unsafe firewalls. However, there is no evidence whatsoever that public authorities have directed that any changes must be made *581in the interests of health or safety. All of the evidence presented before the Housing Court is consistent with the obvious purpose of the intended evictions, viz.: to rid the units of tenants in order that, after rehabilitation, the units will bring substantially higher rents. The evidence does not warrant a conclusion that the units will be unsuited for occupation, as at present, unless rehabilitated. Thus, in all the circumstances shown in the record we consider it fair to treat this as a case which presents the single issue of whether evictions may be ordered, not for necessary maintenance, but for optional upgrading of the apartments. Our conclusion is that evictions may not be ordered for that purpose.
It does not follow, as the landlord argues, that it is left with the option of either demolishing the units or allowing them to deteriorate for lack of repair. For all that appears, necessary repairs may be done without evictions. Also, § 7 (a) of the act guarantees a “fair net operating income” to the landlord, and this must necessarily provide for essential repairs.
Other arguments of the landlord are not convincing. He contends that in some manner the rehabilitation of the twenty units was ordered by the Boston Redevelopment Authority under threat of a land taking. This is not shown in the record; correspondence from the Authority to the landlord at best extended praise for the rehabilitation. The landlord also argues that the units not subject to rent control have already been renovated at great cost, and that it would be incongruous to deny similar treatment to the remaining twenty units. The short answer to this is that the work on the other units was commenced without prior guaranties as to rent control by any public official and that the functions of the administrator and the court cannot thus be foreclosed in advance.
We recognize that the act probably has the effect in this instance, and others, of preventing the earning by the landlord of the maximum profit which these twenty units might yield in an uncontrolled market. It is not for this court to consider any argument addressed to the desirability of the statute. The parties are of course entitled to *582full protection of their rights under such a law. Additionally we must, with full regard for the acute conditions which necessitated the act, give most careful consideration to the effect of our decision on the shortage of low and moderate income housing. Cf. Post v. Cashin, 323 Mass. 316, 318 (1948); Russell v. Treasurer & Recr. Gen. 331 Mass. 501, 509 (1954).

Decree affirmed.

 The State Administrative Procedure Act, G. L. c. 30A, is not applicable here. Section 14 of c. 30A provides for judicial review only of final decisions of agencies made in an adjudicatory proceeding. The administrator here is not an agency as defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1. Gentile v. Rent Control Bd. of Somerville, ante, 343, 349 n. 6. Moreover, the tenants, although they received one in the present case, were not entitled as of right to a hearing before the administrator. Gentile v. Rent *577Control Bd. of Somerville, supra. Accordingly, the proceeding before the administrator was not an “adjudicatory proceeding” as defined in G. L. c. 30A, § 1. Natick Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 616 (1958). First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn. 349 Mass. 273, 274-275 (1965).
It is not clear from the briefs of the parties whether they considered the proceeding in the Housing Court as subject to G. L. c. 30A, or as comparable to a G. L. c. 231A proceeding. For all that appears, only the evidence produced before the administrator was presented before the judge. In any event, it makes little difference, since we have been able to establish the facts, and the conclusion which the judge reached is required as a matter of law from those facts.

 “Section 9. Evictions, (a) No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a controlled rental unit unless:
(1) the tenant has failed to pay the rent to which the landlord is entitled;
(2) the tenant has violated an obligation or covenant of his tenancy other than the obligation to surrender possession upon proper notice and has failed to cure such violation after having received written notice thereof from tbe landlord;
(3) the tenant is committing or permitting to exist a nuisance in, or is causing substantial damage to, the controlled rental unit, or is creating a substantial interference with the comfort, safety, or enjoyment of the landlord or other occupants of the same or any adjacent accommodation;
(4) the tenant is convicted of using or permitting a controlled rental unit to be used for any illegal purpose;
(5) the tenant, who had a written lease or rental agreement which terminated on or after this act has taken effect in a city or town, has refused, after written request or demand by the landlord, to execute a written extension or renewal thereof for a further term of like duration and in such terms that are not inconsistent with or violative of any provisions of this act;
(6) the tenant has refused the landlord reasonable access to the unit for the purpose of making necessary repairs or improvements required by the laws of tbe United States, the commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or for tbe purpose of inspection as permitted or required by the lease or by law, or for the purpose of showing the rental unit to any prospective purchaser or mortgagee;
(7) the person holding at the end of a lease term is a subtenant not approved by the landlord;
(8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy of himself, or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law;
(9) the landlord seeks to recover possession to demolish or otherwise remove the unit from housing use____”

 “Section 1. Declaration of Emergency. The general court finds and declares that a serious public emergency exists with respect to the housing of a substantial number of the citizens in certain areas of the commonwealth but especially in the cities of the commonwealth regardless of population and towns with a population of fifty thousand or over, which emergency has been created by housing demolition, deterioration of a substantial portion of the existing housing stock, insufficient new housing construction, increased costs of construction and finance, inflation and the effects of the Vietnam war, and which has resulted in a substantial and increasing shortage of rental housing accommodations for families of low and moderate income and abnormally high rents; that unless residential rents and eviction of tenants are regulated and controlled, such emergency and the further inflationary pressures resulting therefrom will produce serious threats to the public health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of the aforementioned communities and in other communities adjacent to them; that such emergency should be met by the commonwealth immediately and with due regard for the rights and responsibilities of its local communities.”

 In much the same vein, the judge reasoned that § 9 follows closely the rent control law formerly in effect in New York as shown in 65 McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y. Anno. § 8585. He found significance in that the New York law included a specific provision for eviction “for the immediate purpose of substantially altering or remodeling . . . [the premises],” and that § 9 did not include such a ground. Therefore he inferred a conscious deletion by the Massachusetts drafters, which in turn would weigh against inferring such a ground from the general language of the “just cause” clause. There is some validity to this reasoning, but the landlord argues with considerable conviction that there are other dissimilarities between the two statutes which cast doubt on the judge’s inference.