Court Opinion

ID: 9722371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:27:31.299054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:31.628664
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial court found as a fact that there had been "some agreement'" between the defense and the prosecution upon which appellant relied in giving up his privilege against self-incrimination and in subjecting himself to interrogation. The court found the terms to be that appellant agreed to speak truthfully and tell all he knew about the death of Tichenor and then pass a polygraph test and that, in exchange, the State promised to provide appellant with protection and "generally consider the giving of testimony in dealing with the Defendant." It is apparent that the trial court's wording here has an ambiguous quality. However, as a representation of one lawyer to another in the context of this negotiation, words having this same force would be received as testified to by defense counsel, namely, as a promise that in general his client would not have to face the consequences of his revelations to the police about the death of Tichenor, ie., as a use immunity promise.
Appellant answered all of the questions put to him by the police over as many as ten sessions. He did not take a polygraph test as agreed because his lawyer and the prosecutor could not agree on the proper *1247procedures. This fact is uncontradicted. I would hold the State to this immunity agreement and require a new trial at which appellant's statements to interrogators would be excluded. See Bowers v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 203.
If the State's promise of special protection from others and of special deference towards him in the criminal matters then facing him did not constitute a promise not to use his statements against him in a future prosecution, it would nevertheless constitute the type of promise by the State which can bring about a confession, statement, or waiver of rights not freely self-determined. Ashby v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192.
Upon objection to the admission of appellant's later statements at trial, the burden was properly upon the State to prove vol-untariness. To this, end the prosecutor provided evidence (1) that the promise of the State was for protection only, a premise rejected by the trial court, (2) that inconsistencies in appellant's numerous statements showed falsehood and a breach of the terms of the agreement, and (8) that appellant did not pass a polygraph test. There was uncontradicted evidence by the defense, however, that the polygraph test did not occur because the State refused to permit defense counsel to restrict the questions which might be asked, contrary to the agreement. Upon the basis of this showing, I do not believe the State can be deemed to have satisfied its burden to prove that appellant's statements and waivers of rights were voluntary as required by the Fifth Amendment. If the Fifth Amendment was violated when appellant's statements were admitted against him at his trial, as is assumed arguendo in the majority opinion, such error could not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As point ed out in the majority opinion, one of these statements provided the open door through which the State was able to introduce damning evidence that appellant committed theft of a blue Oldsmobile Delta 88.