Court Opinion

ID: 9929246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 03:00:52.87293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.100940
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
PENLAND, HAYES, and MORRIS
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Private E2 WYATT K. HARBAUGH
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20220527

Headquarters, Fort Drum
James A. Barkei, Military Judge
Colonel Christian E. Beese, Staff Judge Advocate (pretrial)
Lieutenant Colonel Jessica M. Farrell, Acting Staff Judge Advocate (post-trial)

For Appellant: Jonathan F. Potter, Esquire; Major Bryan A. Osterhage, JA.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA.

26 January 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent
MORRIS, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted appellant,
pursuant to his pleas, of one specification of production of child pornography, three
specifications of possession of child pornography and two specifications of sexual
abuse of a child involving indecent exposure in violation of Articles 134 and 120b,
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 934, 920b [UCMJ]. The military
judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge and 49 months of confinement.
The convening authority took no action on the sentence.

This case is before the court for review pursuant to Article 66, UCMJ. In one
of three errors appellant submits pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431
(C.M.A. 1982), appellant identifies delay in the post-trial processing of his case.”

“We have given full and fair consideration to appellant’s other Grostefon matters
and find them to be without merit.
HARBAUGH — ARMY 20220527

We believe appellant’s post-trial delay claim merits discussion, but no relief, and
affirm the findings and the sentence.

BACKGROUND

Appellant identifies in his headline Grostefon pleading that the Office of the
Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) failed to provide an explanation for the 160 days it
took from the day his sentence was adjudged to docketing at this court. In fact, it
was 172 days from sentence to docketing. The military judge sentenced appellant on
20 October 2022. On 9 January 2023, appellant’s defense counsel responded to an
inquiry from the OSJA that he apologized for the delay but “PV2 Harbaugh has no
clemency matters to submit.” The staff judge advocate’s advice and convening
authority’s action did not occur until 31 January 2023, which was 103 days after the
sentence was adjudged. The military judge completed the entry of judgment one
week later, on 7 February 2023, and authenticated the record of trial on 27 February
2023. The military judge sua sponte included a note on his authentication memo that
the court reporter had completed a permanent change of station. The record then sat
inexplicably for another 34 days before it was forwarded to this court on 4 April
2023. The OSJA failed to provide any explanation for this processing timeline.
Appellant did not make any speedy post-trial processing requests, nor did he request
relief or allege that he suffered any prejudice.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

We review claims that an appellant has been denied the due process right to a
speedy post-trial review and appeal de novo. United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353,
359 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F.
2006) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 60 M.J. 239, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2004). We also
set forth the framework for our analysis of speedy post-trial review and appeal cases
utilizing the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo: (1) the length of the delay; (2)
the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant's assertion of the right to timely review
and appeal; and (4) prejudice. 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101
(1972). No single factor is required for finding a due process violation and the
absence of a given factor will not prevent such a finding. Toohey, 63 M.J. at 359.
(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; Moreno, 63 M.J. at 136). After Winfield, we no
longer have a presumptive number of processing days to aid in determining whether
a delay was presumptively reasonable. United States v. Winfield, 83 M.J. 662, 665
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 2023). “Instead, we will scrutinize even more closely the
unit-level explanations for post-trial processing delays between final adjournment
and appellate docketing... [s]taff judge advocates who decline to memorialize delays
with thorough, credible, and relevant specificity do so at the peril of their units’
cases on appeal.” Jd. at 665-666.
HARBAUGH — ARMY 20220527

Turning to the post-trial delay in the processing of appellant’s case. While
the government, yet again, failed to provide any explanation for the post-trial delays
in this case, the longest period of the 172-day delay was the 103-days between
adjournment of the trial and completion of the action. Though it is unclear how
much of that time is attributable to the defense, on 9 January 2023, 81 days from the
adjournment of appellant’s trial, defense counsel apologized for his delayed
notification to the government that appellant did not intend to submit Rule for
Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 1106 matters. Afterwards, the case moved forward at a
reasonable pace whereby the military judge completed his authentication of the
record on 27 February 2023, just 27 days after action. Then, it inexplicably took
another 36 days for the OSJA to put the record in the mail.

While the delays in the post-trial processing of this case, which included four
volumes and a 166-page transcript was not a model of efficiency, we still find no
due process violation “due to the lack of Barker prejudice resulting from the delay.”
Id. at 666. “In balancing the other three factors” we also would not find that the
post-trial delay “was so egregious that tolerating it would adversely affect the
public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.” Jd.
(citing United States v. Anderson, 82 M.J. 82, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2022). “A delay like the
one in the present case is not severe enough to taint public perception of the military
justice system. It did not involve the years of post-trial delay we saw in cases such
as Moreno, Toohey, and Bush. There is no indication of bad faith on the part of any
of the Government actors. There is also no indication of prejudice.” See United
States v. Bush, 68 M.J. 96, 104 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (concluding that, despite a seven-
year post-trial delay attributed to the government, the lack of prejudice made any
due process error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Anderson, 82 M.J. at 87-88.
Appellant’s sentence was appropriate under Article 66(d) notwithstanding the delay
in the post-trial processing of his case. Article 66, UCMJ.

CONCLUSION
The findings and the sentence are AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge PENLAND and Judge HAYES concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.
Clerk of Court