Court Opinion

ID: 9472558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:04:01.100273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:00.742481
License: Public Domain

SKELTON, Senior Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by Judge Aldrich in his opinion in this case, but I do not agree with his holding that the independent source rule is applicable under the facts before us. This rule was neither briefed nor argued. Furthermore, the district court made no finding on the evidence with reference to it. Under these circumstances it may be questionable whether we are authorized to consider it.
In the next place, I do not find any evidence in the record from an independent source that indicated that the items complained of in the motion to suppress were in the Palumbo house or that they might be found therein. The only evidence to this effect came from the officers who executed the affidavit for the search warrant showing probable cause for. its issuance. These were the same officers who made the warrantless entry into the house. While the question may be debatable, in my opinion information obtained from law enforcement officers who apply for a warrant and then violate the fourth amendment by entering, seizing and searching a private residence before the warrant is issued is not independent source information contemplated by the independent source rule. In such case the officers are not independent third parties, but are participants in the warrantless *662entry, search and seizure transaction, and information given by them under these circumstances does not have the independent characteristic required by the rule. Otherwise, all the officers would have to do to enter, search and seize a house would be to first apply for a warrant and then proceed to violate the fourth amendment by making a warrantless entry. They could then say that their illegal act was excused because they had furnished independent source information in applying for the warrant. I cannot believe that the rule was ever intended to authorize such unlawful conduct by the police.
I realize that there is a lot of confusion and uncertainty with regard to the law governing the independent source rule. There is certainly room for argument and differences of opinion as to its meaning and application. It is hoped that the Supreme Court will establish guidelines as to its use when it considers United States v. Segura, 663 F.2d 411 (2 Cir.1981), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1200, 103 S.Ct. 1182, 75 L.Ed.2d 430, in which the Court has already heard argument.
As to the issue before us, I believe we are all agreed that the officers entered the Palumbo house and seized and partially searched it without a warrant, and that there were no exigent circumstances nor exceptions to the fourth amendment that justified their actions. These acts by the officers were clearly a violation of the fourth amendment. However, on their initial entry and search, they did not find anything that was offered or introduced into evidence at Palumbo’s trial. After they had made the preliminary search, they left the house and waited outside until the search warrant arrived, whereupon they made a complete search of the house and premises and found the items that were listed in the motion to suppress. The question before us is whether the original illegal entry, search and seizure of the house spilled over and tainted the later search under the search warrant, as well as the items found in that search. In my opinion, this did not occur. The later search was made in accordance with and under a valid search warrant. Accordingly, the evidence discovered in that search was legal and admissible evidence that was properly introduced into evidence at the trial. See United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324 (2 Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 107, 66 L.Ed.2d 40 (1980), where officers seized a suitcase without a warrant but did not open it until a warrant was obtained, whereupon it was opened and searched. A kilogram of cocaine found inside was held to be admissible evidence. Also see United States v. Christophe, 470 F.2d 865 (2 Cir.1972) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 964, 93 S.Ct. 2140, 36 L.Ed.2d 684 (1973), which is much like our case. There the defendant was arrested and later the officers entered his house without a warrant and secured it by walking through it. Three hours later a valid warrant was obtained and thereafter a full scale search of the house was made and a quantity of heroin was discovered. The heroin was held to be admissible evidence. The court also held that the officers “were entitled to conduct a cursory examination of the premises to see if anyone else was present who might threaten their safety or destroy evidence.”
Accordingly, I would hold that although there was a warrantless police entry and occupancy of Palumbo’s house subsequent to his arrest that violated the fourth amendment, it had no consequences and did not taint items later discovered and seized under a valid search warrant, and that the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the items. I join Judge Aldrich in affirming the judgment of the district court.