Court Opinion

ID: 9630820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:21:51.850589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:45:33.268102
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Circuit Judge,
with whom Circuit Judges WARDLAW, FISHER, and PAEZ join, dissenting, and with whom Circuit Judge GOULD joins in part:
Gilroy holds itself out as the “Garlic Capital of the World,” and no one seriously disputes the claim. In celebration of its status, and recognizing that eating garlic is inevitably a shared experience, Gilroy hosts an annual Garlic Festival in late July. It is not a small affair. Approximately 120,000 visitors participate annually, and more than three million revelers have attended the festival since its inception. Disregarding the Bard’s admonition,1 the festival features “food laced with over two tons of garlic.” It is, according to the promotional materials, a “fun and fragrant” experience, with participants “going bananas over garlic.” The festival is sponsored and managed by the nonprofit Gilroy Garlic Festival Association (“Festival Association”).
Members of the Top Hatters Motorcycle Club, Inc., a non-profit charitable corporation, were expelled from the 2000 Festival for wearing vests bearing their corporate insignia — thereby violating the Festival Association’s unwritten dress code. The Top Hatters filed suit against the City of Gilroy (“City”), the officer enforcing the dress code, and the Festival Association. The district court concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the City’s involvement constituted state action, but held that the wearing of the vests did not constitute expressive conduct violative of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment as to the Festival Association on the basis that it was not a state actor. A three-judge panel of this court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the ground that the Top Hatters had not engaged in protectable expressive conduct. We granted rehearing en banc to reconsider the panel’s decision and ordered that the panel opinion be designated as non-preee-dential and non-citable. The majority has *959declined to reach the First Amendment question, but has elected to hold that neither the Festival Association nor the City was engaged in state action. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Top Hatters, demonstrates that there are genuine issues of fact precluding summary'judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the Festival Association. As the majority notes, it is a well-established principle that a private entity can be subject to liability as a state actor under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724-25, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961) (holding that a privately owned restaurant that leased property from a state-owned parking facility was a state actor). The ultimate question is whether “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right” is “fairly attributable to the [s]tate.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).
In deciding whether conduct of private parties amounts to government action, we engage in a highly factual inquiry. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.1983). While “ ‘there is no specific formula for defining state action,’ ” id. (quoting Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir.1976)), we have traditionally evaluated whether a private actor has engaged in state action by relying on four distinct— but not mutually exclusive — tests: (1) the governmental nexus test, see Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) (courts must consider whether there is a “sufficiently close nexus between the [sjtate and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the [sjtate itself’); (2) the public or governmental function test, see id. at 352, 95 S.Ct. 449 (state action is present when a private entity exercises functions traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state); (3) the state compulsion test, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982) (“a [sjtate normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [sjtate”); and finally, (4) the joint action test, see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (private actors can be considered state actors if they are “willful participant^] in joint action with the [government] or its agents”). Satisfaction of any one of these tests can be sufficient to find state action. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 303, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001); Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9th Cir.2002).
Rather than applying the established four test analysis, the majority, relying on a single case from the Fourth Circuit, considers only the “governmental function” test, and ends its inquiry there. However, unlike the plaintiffs in United Auto Workers v. Gaston Festivals, Inc., 43 F.3d 902 (4th Cir.1995), the Top Hatters do not rest their argument on the governmental function test. Thus, by relying solely on United Auto Workers and narrowing its focus to just the single test considered therein, the majority has set up a straw man to prove what we already know: the Festival Association, in organizing a festival to promote and celebrate garlic, was not likely performing a function that is “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the [sjtate.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d 418 (1982) (in*960ternal quotation marks omitted). The Top Hatters do not argue that it was, and the Festival Association allots only three sentences of its brief to affirm this common sense point. Unfortunately, in limiting its analysis to whether organizing a garlic festival is an exclusive governmental function, the majority ignores both the ultimate state action inquiry and the Supreme Court’s traditional means of answering that question: “tak[ing] a flexible approach ... [and] applying a variety of tests to the facts of each case.” Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir.1995); see also Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296, 121 S.Ct. 924 (noting that a “host of facts” can bear on whether action is fairly attributable to the state and describing numerous tests used by the Supreme Court).
In this case, the test that most reasonably applies to the Festival Association’s relationship with the City is the “joint action” test. Under this test, the Top Hatters have demonstrated that a triable issue of material fact exists as to whether the Festival Association’s actions are “fairly attributable to the [s]tate.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937,102 S.Ct. 2744.
Joint action “exists where a private party is ‘a willful participant in joint action with the [sjtate or its agents.’ ” Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir.1989). The lynchpin of a finding of “joint action” is the existence of “a substantial degree of cooperative action.” Id. Joint action exists when the government “has ‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.’ ” Id. (alteration in original). Thus, the joint action test will be satisfied when the actions of the state and the private party are intertwined or when the parties have a symbiotic relationship. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298-99,121 S.Ct. 924.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Top Hatters, as we are required to do here — a standard the majority fails to mention, let alone apply— demonstrates that the relationship between the City and the Festival Association is sufficiently intertwined to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the joint action test has been satisfied.
First, the festival is not an intimate, private gathering. It is the largest event of the year in Gilroy. As the district court noted, the population of Gilroy expands five-fold during the festival, with the concomitant significant impact on the local economy. Over 4,000 community volunteers — over ten percent of the citizens of Gilroy — work in some capacity at the festival. For the duration of the festival, it engulfs the City. In order to administer this mammoth event safely, the festival required the assistance and involvement of the City’s Engineering Division, Building & Safety Division, Fire Department, Chemical Control Division, and Police Department. In other words, the very nature of the festival requires significant intertwining of resources between the City and the Festival Association.
Second, the presence of an agreement between the government and the private party is also a significant factor in applying the joint action test. “The Supreme Court has said [the joint action test] is satisfied when the plaintiff is able to establish an agreement, or conspiracy between a government actor and a private party.” Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 514 (9th Cir.1997) (citing Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183), rev’d on other grounds, 526 U.S. 808, 119 S.Ct. 1706, 143 L.Ed.2d 978 (per curiam), opinion reinstated, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir.1999).
*961In this case, as a condition of the use of the property, the City required the Festival Association to apply for and receive a special event permit. As one of the conditions for receiving the permit, the City required the Festival Association to staff the festival with City police officers and to reimburse the City for the expense. The number of personnel deployed was to be negotiated between the Festival Association and the City, although the City generally provided twenty-five percent of the festival’s security force. These police officers were considered to be on duty and working within the course and scope of their employment with the City while stationed at the festival.
Third, participation of state actors in the private association is an indicia of joint action. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 924 (examining composition of the membership of a private athletic association in holding it was a state actor). By tradition, the head of security for the Festival Association was a member of the City police force. The 2000 festival was no exception. In the year in question, the head of security for the Festival Association was City Police Sergeant Donald Kludt.
Fourth, although the City’s police officers acted within the course and scope of their employment with the City when deployed at the festival, the officers took orders from the Festival Association with respect to enforcing the Festival Association’s dress code. Before the 2000 festival, City police officers attended briefings as to the parameters of the dress code and were instructed to exclude persons wearing “group clothing that could inspire conflict,” as Gilroy City police officer Brenda Bergman testified.
Officer Bergman, the City police officer who participated in removing the Top Hatters from the festival, testified that Sergeant Kludt was her direct supervisor during the course of her regular employment with the City. Bergman also testified that during the festival, when Sergeant Kludt was serving as head of security, she would take directions from him either in his capacity as her direct supervisor or in his capacity as security chief for the Festival Association.
These facts alone create a triable issue of fact as to whether the substantial cooperation that existed between the City and the Festival Association with respect to the dress code constituted joint action. However, the specifics of the encounter at issue also provide evidence of substantial cooperation and the intertwining of the City and the Festival Association.
We have previously considered the circumstances in which a police officer’s involvement in a private enforcement action constitutes state action such that the private entity is liable in a line of cases involving police presence at private vehicle repossessions and evictions. See, e.g., Meyers v. Redwood City, 400 F.3d 765 (9th Cir.2005); Howerton, 708 F.2d 380; Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir.1981). These cases teach us that “[w]hile mere acquiescence by the police to ‘stand by in case of trouble’ is insufficient to convert” a private enforcement action into one attributable to the state, “police intervention and aid ... does constitute state action.” Harris, 664 F.2d at 1127. Even mere assistance in effectuating an enforcement action or the intimidation of a person so “as to cause him to refrain from exercising his legal right to resist” will support a finding of state action. Id.
In Harris, we found state action where a man holding a security interest in a semi-tractor requested two officers to accompany him while he attempted to repossess the semi-tractor. Id. at 1124. When Harris, the owner of the truck, confronted his *962creditor, one of the officers “stepped in and told Harris to ‘stand back or get away.’ ” Id. In response to Harris’s question about what was happening, the officer explained that the creditor had come to repossess the truck, and that he, the officer, “ ‘came out to stand by.’ ” Id. Harris testified that the officer told him that if he interfered in any way, he would be taken to jail, and that if the officers had not been present, he would have physically resisted the repossession. Id. at 1127. Concluding that an officer’s assistance or intimidation is sufficient to constitute state action, we held that the officer’s conduct had converted the repossession in Hams into state action. Id.
As in Harris, here Officer Bergman did more than merely “stand by in case of trouble”: she actively assisted Kludt in enforcing the Festival Association’s unwritten dress code policy. First, Bergman, at Kludt’s direction, approached the Top Hatters and ordered them to follow her to the festival’s entrance gate. According to plaintiff Donald Desrosiers, he obeyed Bergman precisely because she was clearly an officer: “when a police officer comes up and says follow you, you follow them. That’s the nature of the law.... It felt threatening.” Kludt asked Bergman to approach the Top Hatters precisely because he was hoping for that effect — as an armed, uniformed officer, Kludt believed Bergman “would give some air of authority” to his request that the Top Hatters remove their vests or leave the festival.
Moreover, at least one of the Top Hatters testified that it was Officer Bergman who first informed the Top Hatters of the festival’s dress code policy, and indicated that if they refused to remove their “colors,” they would have to leave the festival. Sergeant Kludt then joined Bergman and the Top Hatters at the festival’s gate, where he repeated Bergman’s ultimatum. Plaintiff Marcelo Orta, Jr. recalled that Officer Bergman supported Kludt by telling the Top Hatters they were a gang and that they “just needed to leave, that they didn’t want our kind there.” Finally, once the Top Hatters had received their refunds, other uniformed Gilroy police officers escorted the plaintiffs to their bikes. Those officers also echoed Kludt and Bergman, saying, “All you have to do is take your patch off, you can go back in.”
Officer Bergman and other uniformed Gilroy police officers actively assisted Sergeant Kludt in enforcing the Festival Association’s dress code by requesting that the plaintiffs follow Bergman, demanding that they remove their vests, and lending Kludt’s own statements “an air of authority.” Moreover, at least two of the Top Hatters testified that they knew Kludt himself to be a Gilroy police officer, as he identified himself to them as such and wore a badge. These actions meet Harris’s standard for state action — Officer Bergman and the other Gilroy officers did more than merely stand by in case of trouble — they actively aided Kludt in enforcing the Festival Association’s dress code.
Our decision in Womancare also supports the conclusion that the Festival Association’s actions are fairly attributable to the state. See 878 F.2d 1145. In Woman-care, we held that a group of anti-abortion protestors had failed to satisfy the joint activity test for state action when employees of a woman’s health center performed citizens’ arrests on protestors whom they believed were violating an injunction. Id. at 1155. While we noted that there “the impetus for the arrests” came from the health center’s employees, not from the police, we emphasized the independence of the police officers. Id. at 1155-56 (“In short, there is no indication in the record *963that state agents failed to use independent judgment....”).
In Womancare, the employees first attempted to serve the protestors with the injunction, and when that effort failed, they called the police. Id. at 1146. Once a police officer had arrived on the scene, the officer conducted “an independent investigation” and then “refused ... to arrest the protestors on his own authority.” Id. at 1155. Additionally, we noted that the protestors had not alleged any facts to contradict the employees’ contention that the “police maintained a policy of neutrality in the dispute.” Id. The plaintiffs had “presented no evidence from which [the] court could infer ‘a prearranged plan, cus: tomary procedure, or policy that substituted the judgment of a private party for that of the police.’ ” Id. (quoting Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 828 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir.1987)).
Here, while the impetus for removing the Top Hatters from the festival also came from the private party and not the state, Sergeant Kludt enlisted Officer Bergman’s aid from the beginning. Rather than calling for police assistance after approaching the plaintiffs as the employees in Womancare did, here Kludt asked Bergman to make the initial contact with the Top Hatters. He relied on her “air of authority” to escort them out of the festival without a confrontation. Moreover, Bergman did not participate as an independent and neutral official, but rather acted at Kludt’s direction to enforce the Festival Association’s policies. Bergman also provided testimony that indicated that Gilroy police officers working at the festival were customarily trained as to the festival’s dress code policy and had the authority to enforce it. Unlike in Woman-care, then, Bergman was not summoned to the scene to exercise her neutral, independent judgment about the situation, but was called in by the Festival Association’s security chair in order to effectuate the plaintiffs’ removal based on the Festival Association’s own policies. There is thus a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bergman’s participation rose to the level of “substantial cooperation” sufficient to establish state action under the joint activity test.
II
The district court properly concluded that triable issues of fact precluded summary judgment as to the City and Officer Bergman on the question of state action.
A
There is really no doubt that Officer Bergman was acting under color of law when she removed the Top Hatters from the festival. She was on duty with the City at the time of the incident. She was acting within the course and scope of her City employment. She was uniformed, visibly armed, and wearing a badge. She was summoned to assist because of her authority as a police officer. She identified herself as an officer, and she used her official authority to remove the Top Hatters from the festival. These factors are clearly sufficient to establish she was acting under color of law when removing the Top Hatters, as the district court properly concluded. See, e.g., Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that an off-duty officer serving as a security officer at a bank was acting under color of law when the officer flashed police identification when arresting the plaintiff).
The City argues that Bergman was only there to “stand by in case of trouble.” The record suggests otherwise and, at the minimum, there is certainly a triable issue of fact as to that assertion. As we noted in Harris, “police intervention and aid [in private enforcement actions] does consti*964tute state action,” and “there may be a deprivation within the meaning of § 1983 ... when [an] officer assists in effectuating [the private enforcement action] ... or so intimidates [the plaintiff] as to cause him to refrain from exercising his legal rightfs]....” 664 F.2d at 1127. The record indicates that Bergman used her authority to assist in removing the Top Hatters, and they acquiesced in response to her official authority and intimidation.
B
The district court also properly concluded that there were triable issues of fact as to the City’s liability under § 1983 for Officer Bergman’s actions. Of course, the mere fact that Officer Bergman was a state actor is not sufficient to establish the City’s liability. To survive summary judgment on the issue of the City’s liability for Officer Bergman’s actions, the Top Hatters must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she acted pursuant to a governmental policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (“[L]ocal governments, like every other § 1983 ‘person,’ ... may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to goveimmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.”). In a Monell claim, there are three ways to show a policy or custom of a municipality: (1) by showing “a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity”; (2) “by showing that the decision-making official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy in the area of decision”; or (3) “by showing that an official with final policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.” Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984-85 (9th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The key question here is whether the City had a policy or custom of enforcing the Festival Association’s dress code at the 2000 festival. There clearly is a triable issue of fact as to that question. Officer Bergman testified that an incident at the 1992 festival “helped inspire a type of policy tightening down dress code type issues.” (Emphasis added). In response to the question of whether she had received any type of directive or order from the supervisor of police operations as to the dress code, she responded that officers stationed at the festival attended briefings where “[the supervisor] would basically give parameters of the dress code.” She summarized these parameters by explaining that “we were trying to exclude group clothing that could inspire conflict.” Consequently, she testified that she would have enforced the dress code on her own initiative to expel visitors dressed in apparent gang colors and probably would have ejected a visitor wearing a Nazi uniform. In short, Officer Bergman’s understanding was that she was “to exclude any type of group clothing that could create a problem” and that she had the authority to confront or eject someone based on dress code. “If there was any type of question on whether something should or should not be permitted,” she explained, “we would contact a supervisor and go through them with their decision.” Sergeant Kludt testified that the Festival Association gave directions to all of the officers concerning the dress code policy. During the incident in question, both he and Officer Bergman explained the dress code policy to the Top Hatters and indicated the policy would be enforced.
*965The direct evidence of custom or policy is much stronger in this case than in others in which we have held there are triable factual issues concerning custom. See Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir.2000) (testimony about “a code of silence” among police officers sufficient to create a triable issue of fact); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1142 (9th Cir.2000) (custom inferred from police conduct); Henry v. County of Shasta 132 F.3d 512, 518 (9th Cir.1997) (same); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir.1995) (911 dispatcher’s testimony that it was the practice of the Sheriffs Department not to classify domestic violence calls as emergencies sufficient to create a triable issue of fact). Indeed, there is no evidence at all in the record that the City officers assigned to the festival were not to enforce— or assist in the enforcement of — the Festival Association’s unwritten dress code.
In considering the grant of summary judgment, we must draw all inferences and construe the record evidence in the light most favorable to the Top Hatters. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Considering the record evidence, there is little doubt that the City had a policy of assisting in the enforcement of the Festival Association’s dress code in 2000. Therefore, there exists a triable issue of fact as to the City’s potential liability under Mo-nell, as the district court correctly concluded. I thus respectfully disagree with the majority that summary judgment was appropriate as to the City.
Ill
The panel decision concluding that the Top Hatters’ constitutional rights were not violated has been designated as non-prece-dential and the majority has declined to reach that issue. Thus, it is unnecessary to discuss that question in any detail. However, if we were to reach the issue, I would hold that under our precedent in Sammartano v. First Judicial District Court, 303 F.3d 959 (9th Cir.2002), the Top Hatters’ act of wearing their motorcycle club vests and insignia was expressive conduct deserving of protection under the First Amendment.
For the reasons expressed herein, I respectfully dissent.

. "And, most dear actors, eat no onions nor garlic, for we are to utter sweet breath.” William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, act 4, sc. 2.