Court Opinion

ID: 9882589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:05.974793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:31.811709
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Heskett v. Morris, 2023-Ohio-3236.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                      LICKING COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 RICHARD HESKETT                                JUDGES:
                                                Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                                Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 2023 CA 00034
 KELLY MORRIS, ADMINISTRATOR
 OF THE ESTATE OF KATHLEEN L.
 MORRIS, ET AL.,

          Defendants-Appellants                 OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Licking County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CV 00956

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        September 12, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendants-Appellants

 PATRICK S. CARPENTER                           MICHAEL J. KING
 JAROD B. ROSE                                  BRANDON A. BORGMAN
 Schaller, Campbell & Untied                    950 Goodale Boulevard, Suite #200
 32 North Park Place                            Columbus, Ohio 43212
 Newark, Ohio 43058
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                         2

Hoffman, J.
        {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Kelly Morris, Administrator of the Estate of Kathleen L.

Morris, appeals the judgment entered by the Licking County Common Pleas Court

denying her Civ. R. 60(B) motion for relief from the default judgment which judgement

awarded Plaintiff-appellee Richard Heskett $81,572.95 on his complaint for promissory

estoppel and unjust enrichment.

                                        STATEMENT OF THE CASE1

        {¶2}    On August 26, 2022, Appellee filed the instant action in the trial court

against Appellant in her fiduciary capacity, and against other heirs of the Estate of

Kathleen Morris individually, including Appellant in her individual capacity.                 The

complaint set forth claims for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment based on

Appellee’s claims for funds he expended during his relationship with Kathleen Morris,

which included a down payment on a house, a fence, a television, and a refrigerator. The

complaint averred Appellant, through counsel, had denied his claim against the Estate for

these items in the probate case. Appellant was served with the complaint on August 30,

2022. Appellant failed to file a timely answer. Appellee filed a motion for default judgment

on October 18, 2023. The trial court entered default judgment against Appellant on

October 19, 2023, in the amount of $81,572.95. However, default judgment was only

entered against Appellant in her capacity as administrator of the estate, and the claims

against all of the individual defendants remained pending.

        {¶3}    Appellant filed a motion for Civ. R. 60(B) relief from judgment based on

excusable neglect. In her motion, she asserted she was uncertain when she learned of

1 A rendition of the facts is unnecessary to our resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                       3

the instant litigation, but she claimed she did not sign for or accept delivery of certified or

express mail. She averred she believed her counsel in the probate case had been made

aware of the instant action, and would act accordingly. She realized her error when she

received the motion for default judgment, and filed an answer on November 3, 2022. The

trial court denied the Civ. R. 60(B) motion, finding Appellant failed to raise a meritorious

defense.

        {¶4}   Appellant subsequently determined the default judgment was not a final

order because outstanding claims remained against the individual defendants. Appellant

moved for reconsideration of the default judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) on March 21,

2023.    On March 24, 2023, Appellee dismissed all outstanding claims against the

individual defendants, rendering the default judgment final. At 1:21 p.m. on April 24, 2023,

Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the February 15, 2023 judgment of the trial court

denying her Civ. R. 60(B) motion. The trial court filed a judgment overruling her motion

to reconsider pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) at 4:11 p.m. on April 24, 2023. At 4:29 p.m. on

April 24, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to convert her Civ. R. 54(B) motion into a Civ. R.

60(B) motion, which the trial court overruled on May 1, 2023.

        {¶5}   It is from the February 15, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant

prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:

               THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

        REFUSING TO SET ASIDE ITS ENTRY OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

        {¶6}   Appellee has raised a cross assignment of error from the same judgment:
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                      4

                THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT

        APPELLANT’S        FAILURE      TO     TIMELY      ANSWER       APPELLEE’S

        COMPLAINT WAS THE RESULT OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT.

        {¶7}    This case comes to us on the accelerated calendar. App.R. 11.1, which

governs accelerated calendar cases, provides, in pertinent part:

                (E) Determination and judgment on appeal.

                The appeal will be determined as provided by App.R. 11.1. It shall

        be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the reason

        for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary

        form.

                The decision may be by judgment entry in which case it will not be

        published in any form.

        {¶8}    This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned

rule.

                                          DIRECT APPEAL

                                                  I.

        {¶9}    Appellant first argues the default judgment did not become a final order until

Appellee filed his notice of dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants on

March 24, 2023, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in applying the Civ. R.

60(B) standard of review rather than reconsidering and vacating the judgment pursuant
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                        5

to Civ. R. 54(B). While we do agree the judgment being appealed did not become a final

appealable order until March 24, 2023, we disagree with Appellant’s contention the trial

court abused its discretion in applying the Civ. R. 60(B) standard of review.

       {¶10} “Under the doctrine of invited error, an appellant, in either a civil or a criminal

case, cannot attack a judgment for errors committed by himself or herself, for errors that

the appellant induced the court to commit, or for errors which the appellant is actively

responsible.” In re J.B., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-63, 2011-Ohio-3658, 2011 WL 3077311, ¶

10. “Under this principle, a party cannot complain of any action taken or ruling made by

the court in accordance with that party's own suggestion or request.” Id.

       {¶11} Appellant invited the error she now complains of by filing a motion for Civ.

R. 60(B) relief. She did not seek relief pursuant to Civ. R. 54(B) until after the trial court

held a hearing on her Civ. R. 60(B) motion, and overruled the motion. Before the trial

court could rule on her Civ. R. 54(B) motion, two procedurally significant events occurred:

(1) Appellee dismissed the claims against the individual defendants, which rendered the

default judgment a final order, making Civ. R. 60(B) and not Civ. R. 54(B) the appropriate

procedural mechanism by which to seek to vacate the order; and (2) Appellant filed a

notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court overruling her Civ. R. 60(B) motion,

thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to consider her Civ. R. 54(B) motion. We

find the trial court did not err in considering Appellant’s Civ. R. 60(B) motion under the

standard of review applicable to a Civ. R. 60(B) motion.

       {¶12} Appellant next argues the trial court erred in overruling her Civ. R. 60(B)

motion, finding she did not have a meritorious defense to the action.
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                       6

        {¶13} In GTE Automatic Electric v. ARC Industries, 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150–151,

351 N.E.2d 113 (1976), the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the factors necessary to recover

under Civ.R. 60(B). “[T]he movant must demonstrate: (1) the party has a meritorious

defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one

of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a

reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more

than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.” Where any

one of the foregoing requirements is not satisfied, Civ.R. 60(B) relief is improper. State

ex rel. Richard v. Seidner, 76 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 1996-Ohio-54, 666 N.E.2d 1134. “A

motion for relief from judgment under Civ. R. 60(B) is addressed to the sound discretion

of the trial court, and that court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing

of abuse of discretion.” Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987).

        {¶14} In her motion, Appellant argued she had a meritorious defense because in

her role as administrator of the estate in the probate case, she denied Appellee’s claims

because they were not supported by sufficient proof or documentation. She attached the

affidavit of Brandon Borgmann, who served as counsel to Appellant in the probate case,

which averred Appellee’s claim was properly rejected due to lack of sufficient proof or

documentation, which he believed is a meritorious defense to the complaint in the instant

case.

        {¶15} We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant’s

assertion of a meritorious defense was general and conclusory and therefore insufficient

to merit Civ. R. 60(B) relief. Appellant’s claim she had grounds to reject Appellee’s claim

in the probate court does not provide a meritorious defense to the instant action, which is
Licking County, Case No. 2023 CA 00034                                                     7

a claim for damages based on promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment asserted in the

general division of the Common Pleas Court.           Appellant’s assignment of error is

overruled.

                      CONDITIONAL CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

                                                 I.

       {¶16} In his conditional cross assignment of error, Appellee argues the trial court

abused its discretion in finding Appellant’s failure to answer the complaint was the result

of excusable neglect. Appellee’s assignment of error is rendered moot by our conclusion

the trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s Civ. R. 60(B) motion for failure to set

forth a meritorious defense.

       {¶17} The judgment of the Licking County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur