Court Opinion

ID: 9864670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:48:57.024883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:13.078353
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
Appellant in his petition for a rehearing complains that in the decision filed in this ease (ante, p. 728 [270 Pac. 268]) the court failed to consider the rule as announced in the case of Southwest Paving Co. v. Wilson, 57 Cal. App. 251-255 [206 Pac. 776, 778], as follows: “That a particular description in the plans and specifications, which is at variance with the general description of the resolution of intention, creates an ambiguity which renders the proceedings void.”
*736Due consideration was given to this contention, although the point was not elaborated in the opinion filed. The resolution o£ intention, while providing for the improvement of two blocks therein described, also by its terms excepted work already done to official line and grade. It also provided, “That all of the work and improvement was to be done in accordance with the plans and specifications made therefor, which plans are hereby referred to and made a part hereof.”
It is true that the plans and specifications did not follow the exact language of the resolution. Nevertheless, they do set out an estimate of the work to be done thereunder, which estimate is as follows: “Concrete curb and gutter, 550 lin. feet. Grading, 385 cubic yards; macadam, 200 cubic yards.”
The city engineer testified that such estimate shows on its face that there was contemplated to be but one block of street improvement; that it specifically stated the number of lineal feet of curbing and gutter, the amount of excavation, and a certain amount of cubic yards of macadam, and that any contractor would use these figures as a check of the amount of the work to be done under the contract.
It is, therefore, patent and subject to mathematical demonstration that the work contemplated by the plans and specifications, and as stated in the engineer’s estimate thereof, was much less than tioo blocks, as contended by appellant. There can be no question but that the resolution of intention, as well as the plans and specifications, contemplated the exception of work already done to official line and grade. A reasonable construction placed upon the plans and specifications makes them harmonize with the resolution of intention and takes the case out of the rule laid down in Southwest Paving Go. v. Wilson, supra.
Appellant states, as second ground for rehearing, that the court neglected to pass upon his contention that the city council failed to comply with the provisions of section 2 of Ordinance No. 395, in so far as “It failed to follow the provisions of the general law of the State of California, in taking the proceedings up to and including the posting and publication of the notice inviting sealed proposals or bids as therein provided.”
*737The contention is that the respondent did, from the outset of these proceedings, contemplate that the work was to be done by the city; that they announced in the resolution of intention and notice calling foh the bids, “That all the work shall be done in pursuance of Ordinance Numbered 395.” It is claimed that because of this expression used in the resolution of intention, open and competitive bidding for the doing of the work was defeated, and that no contractor would bid on the job because the resolution of intention stated that the city intended to do the work by day labor under said ordinance. There was, however, a bid submitted for the doing of said work, but which was rejected, because the same was not accompanied by a certified check as required by the resolution of intention.
A complete answer to this contention is to be found in Ordinance No. 395 itself. Section 3 of the city charter of Santa Rosa (Stats. 1923, p. 1298) provides: “All public improvements, including the improvement, widening or opening of streets or highways, may be done under and in pursuance of the general laws of the state, or procedural ordinances adopted by the Council or the electors, and the whole or any portion of the cost thereof paid out of the City Treasury or assessed on the property benefited.”
Ordinance No. 395 is a procedural ordinance, and by its terms it not only gives the city the right, under certain conditions, to reject bids and do the work, but it provides for certain procedural acts which operate upon successful bidders or contractors who are making public improvements covered by said ordinance. It is just as reasonable to assume that the reference to Ordinance No. 395 in the resolution of intention was for the purpose of notifying the bidders of its procedural provisions, as it is to say that the city at all times contemplated to reject any and all bids and to do the work by day labor.
We find no merit in this contention of appellant.
Appellant’s last contention in his petition for a rehearing is that this court was in error in stating that the clause excepting “Prom all of the above described work such portions as are now constructed to the official line and grade” was set out in the resolution ordering the plans and the resolution adopting the plans.
*738It is true that, in this respect, the decision was in error, and that each of said resolutions did not make such an exception; hut its mistake in this respect we deem immaterial. It is by the resolution of intention that jurisdiction is acquired (see authorities cited in opinion on file), and the discrepancies in the resolution ordering the plans and the resolution adopting the plans does not make void the proceedings. The resolution calling for bids, however, did have the identical exception as noted in the resolution of intention.
In determining the work to be done under the resolution of intention extrinsic aid is not required to clear up any uncertainty in such proceeding. The work excepted which constitutes an improvement on the street in question is a monument itself on the ground, easily identified by inspection and clearly referred to in the resolution of intention. (San Francisco Paving Co. v. Dubois, 2 Cal. App. 42 [83 Pac. 72] ; Williams v. Bergin, 116 Cal. 56 [47 Pac. 877].)
The petition for a rehearing is denied.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 29, 1928.
All the Justices present concurred.