Court Opinion

ID: 9519328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:14:11.110231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:17.876490
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I cannot agree with the majority’s suggestion that Davis v. Alaska, (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, applies only to cross-examination as to “improper influences which might have caused the witness to have a faulty identification.” This insight into Davis seems to have escaped every other court considering that case. See e.g. United States v. Garrett, (6th Cir. 1976) 542 F.2d 23; Salazar v. State, (Alaska 1976) 559 P.2d 66; Commonwealth v. Johnson, (1974) 365 Mass. 534, 313 N.E.2d 571; State v. DeLawder, (1975) 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446; State v. Hemb, (1975) 305 Minn. 120, 232 N.W.2d 872; State v. Hilling, (N.D. 1974) 219 N.W.2d 164; State v. Jalo, (Or. App. 1976) 557 P.2d 1359.
Appellant wished to impeach Birlson by showing that Birlson had a motive to kill the decedent. The tendency of the existence of such a motive to cast suspicion of the murder on Birlson provides Birlson with an ulterior motive to incriminate appellant. This is very similar to impeachment attempted in Davis: Davis wished to show that the juvenile probationer, because of his status, had an ulterior motive for testifying against Davis. I would hold that there is no necessity to reach the constitutional issue, however, because the trial court erred as a matter of Indiana law in precluding appellant from showing Birlson’s motive for falsely accusing appellant.
*91“Credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that he may have an ulterior motive or may be under compulsion to testify.” Hall v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 512, 371 N.E.2d 700, 701.
The point is not that Birlson is “biased against appellant because of his prior fight with the decedent.” Evidence of this fight is relevant to show Birlson’s ill will toward the decedent. Such evidence, in conjunction with Birlson’s opportunity to kill the decedent in the fatal altercation, placed Birlson in a position in which it behooved him to divert suspicion from himself by accusing appellant. While this impeachment might not have convinced the jury to disbelieve Birlson, it was relevant to their evaluation of Birlson’s credibility, was impeachment of recognized propriety, and should have been admitted.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 373 N.E.2d 886.