Court Opinion

ID: 9673256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:09:07.465228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:25.456540
License: Public Domain

Lindemer, J.
At issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge erroneously denied a motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict in an action for indemnification brought by the owner of a vehicle against a negligent driver. The vehicle in question was owned by the Flint Dodge Company. At the time of the accident the car was being driven by Mrs. Gloria Diane Martorelli. As is customary in the marketing of automobiles, Flint Dodge was permitting Martorelli to test-drive the vehicle. It was during this trial period that the accident occurred.
Anna and Frank Tahash were injured when their vehicle was struck by the Dodge. Mrs. Ta-hash brought suit in her own name and as administratrix of her husband’s estate (Mr. Tahash died of causes unrelated to the accident) against Flint Dodge and Martorelli. In each of these actions *424Flint Dodge filed a cross-complaint for indemnification against Martorelli. Flint Dodge alleged that its liability, if any, was passive in nature and arose solely by operation of law.
At trial, neither of the occupants of the vehicles involved in the accident could recall details of its occurrence. Several motorists and policemen were called to testify concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident. This evidence indicated that, during a snowstorm, the Flint Dodge/Martorelli vehicle went out of control, spun, and collided with the oncoming Tahash vehicle.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Martorelli testified that Flint Dodge was the owner of the vehicle and that the test drive was being conducted at the suggestion of a salesman.
At the conclusion of proofs both of Tahash’s actions ended in directed verdicts of liability against both defendants, although the jury was permitted to deliberate upon the amount of damages to be awarded. A decision on Flint Dodge’s motion for a directed verdict on its cross-complaint for indemnification was reserved by the trial judge pending the jury’s decision.
The jury returned with a verdict in favor of Martorelli on the cross-claim. The trial judge then considered the motion for directed verdict on the cross claim as a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denied it. In a memorandum opinion filed June 27, 1975, the Court of Appeals affirmed. On December 5, 1975, this Court granted Flint Dodge’s application for leave to appeal. 395 Mich 803 (1975).
I.
The Michigan . civil liability statute, MCLA 257.401; MSA 9.2101 provides that:
*425"The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of such motor vehicle whether such negligence consists of a violation of the provisions of the statutes of the state or in the failure to observe such ordinary care in such operation as the rules of the common law requires. The owner shall not be liable, however, unless said motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.”
The statute imposes liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle without regard to whether the owner was guilty of negligence. However, the liability of the driver to the injured party must still be established through proof of negligence on the part of the driver.
In directing liability against each of the defendants, the trial judge did not explicitly state the theory by which each defendant was held responsible. However, in our opinion, the record leaves no doubt as to the theory which pertains to the liability of either defendant. Martorelli’s liability was based on her negligent operation of the motor vehicle, while Flint Dodge’s liability was based upon the statute. We find no evidence in the record nor has there been any claim by either counsel which would lead us to conclude otherwise.
II.
It is generally agreed that there may be indemnity in favor of one who is held responsible solely by operation of law. In such cases, the actual wrongdoer must bear the entire burden of the judgment. Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 51, p 310; Restatement Restitution, § 96, p 418; 41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity, § 20, p 706.
*426In Dale v Whiteman, 388 Mich 698; 202 NW2d 797 (1972), an owner of a motor vehicle (Whiteman) was held liable to plaintiff (Dale). Whiteman’s liability was predicated upon MCLA 257.401; MSA 9.2101 and was described as liability "without personal fault”. Whiteman prevailed on his cross claim for indemnification against the employer of the driver on a motion for summary judgment. In upholding Whiteman’s right to indemnity, the court said:
"We prefer to base such right upon the ' equitable principle that Whiteman was without personal fault or as the United States Supreme Court reasoned in Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v Oregon Stevedoring Co, Inc, 376 US 315, 324; 84 S Ct 748; 11 L Ed 2d 732 (1964): [Liability should fall upon the party best situated to adopt preventive measures and thereby to reduce the likelihood of injury.’ ” Dale v Whiteman, supra, 706.
Appellee has been unable to single out any evidence suggesting negligence on the part of Flint Dodge. Instead she characterized the lawsuit for indemnification as an effort by Flint Dodge to pawn off its share of the verdict onto "young Gloria Martorelli with her big family of small children”.
Appellee argued that Martorelli was not involved in the negotiation with Flint . Dodge and that all suggestions concerning the test drive came from the salesman. It was also suggested that Flint Dodge took a calculated risk in loaning out its vehicle to Martorelli, chancing the possibility of accident against the probability of sale. Finally, appellee contends that as only Flint Dodge could profit or derive a benefit from the test drive it should be unable to avoid its share of the liability.
*427These arguments are not evidence of culpable negligence on the part of appellant. Appellee cites no act or omission by which Flint Dodge breached a duty it owed to the plaintiff.
In Lunderberg v Bierman, 241 Minn 349, 355; 63 NW2d 355; 43 ALR2d 865 (1954), a case whose facts are similar to Dale v Whiteman, supra, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:
"[W]here the owner of an automobile has become liable to a third person injured by one to whom the owner has granted permission to drive his car solely- -by virtue of the financial liability act, such owner is entitled to recover indemnity from the operator of the car in the absence of any active negligence chargeable to the owner.”
The Lunderberg v Bierman language fits the facts presented by this appeal. Flint Dodge has become liable solely by operation of Michigan’s civil liability statute. Flint Dodge is entitled to indemnity from Martorelli.
Our review of the trial judge’s refusal to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was done in accord with the principle set forth in Sparks v Luplow, 372 Mich 198; 125 NW2d 304 (1963). We have reviewed the record in a light most favorable to Martorelli. In spite of that advantage we must still conclude that as Flint Dodge’s liability to plaintiff was mandated by operation of law and as there was no evidence in the record that Flint Dodge was negligent, the trial judge erred in failing to grant judgment n.o.v.
The decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Flint Dodge on its cross-*428claim for indemnification against Martorelli. Costs are awarded to appellant.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Lindemer, J.