Court Opinion

ID: 9955875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:02:21.501497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.789341
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Ramirez CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H051248
                                                                    (Santa Cruz County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. F19139)

             v.

 IVAN TAPIA RAMIREZ,

             Defendant and Appellant.

         Facing a murder charge for killing a teenager, defendant Ivan Tapia Ramirez
pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)1) and active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) (hereafter street terrorism). In
accord with a plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Ramirez to an upper term of 11
years in prison for his voluntary manslaughter conviction and a concurrent upper term of
three years for his street terrorism conviction. In addition, the court ordered Ramirez to
pay a restitution fine and two assessments, totaling $5,540.
         On appeal, Ramirez contends the three-year term imposed for his street terrorism
conviction should have been stayed under section 654. He further contends the trial court

         1
             Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by imposing the restitution fine
and assessments.
       For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A. The Offense Conduct2
       On October 16, 2009, 16-year-old Tyler T. and other teenagers gathered in Santa
Cruz, drank beer, and smoked marijuana. As the teens rode in a car, the driver shouted at
two men who were standing on a street corner. The men responded with gestures. The
driver stopped the car. The teens got out and approached the men. Some other men
joined the confrontation, and a fight ensued.
       As the teens ran back toward their car, someone tripped Tyler. Two or three men
punched and kicked Tyler in his face, torso, and stomach as he lay on the ground. One of
the attackers held a silver or chrome object while striking Tyler. Tyler was stabbed 17
times and died at the scene.
       The police considered the scene to be within a “stronghold” of Brown Pride Santa
Cruz, a Sureño street gang. A police officer opined that Ramirez was an active Sureño
gang member at the time of the crime. The officer also opined that Tyler and some of the
teenagers were associated with a Norteño gang called West Side Santa Cruz.
       On the night of the killing, Ramirez visited a hospital for treatment of a fractured
finger and lacerations on his hand. During the police investigation, one of the assailants
told the police that Ramirez had participated in the attack on Tyler. In addition, the
police found Ramirez’s fingerprints on beer cans discovered at the scene.3

       2
         Because Ramirez pleaded no contest to two offenses and the details of his crime
are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, we include only a short summary of the
offenses based on the preliminary hearing evidence.
       3
         In his briefing, the Attorney General acknowledges that the preliminary hearing
evidence “did not establish that [Ramirez] participated in any other felonious conduct on
October 16, 2009,” apart from that which was charged.
                                                 2
       Almost 10 years after the killing, in 2019, the police arrested Ramirez in Mexico
and brought him back to Santa Cruz County for prosecution.
       B. The Charges
       On April 12, 2023,4 the Santa Cruz County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging Ramirez with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), street terrorism
(§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2), and voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); count 3). As
to count 1, the amended information alleged that the murder was committed for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the
specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), (5)).
       C. Change of Plea Hearing
       On April 12, the parties appeared in court and the trial court said, “I’m told we
have a resolution on this matter and what I understand it to be is that Mr. Ramirez will be
pleading to [c]ounts 2 and 3 in the [a]mended [i]nformation. . . . [¶] The understanding
is that there will be a total prison commitment of 11 years. [¶] And we will be getting a
probation report and putting sentencing out but we’re going to take the plea today. [¶]
Count 1, the murder charge will be dismissed today.”
       The trial court asked Ramirez’s defense counsel and the prosecutor if it had
“missed” anything in describing the plea agreement. Defense counsel said he could not
“think of anything,” and the prosecutor said, “The only other thing, it’s a technical thing,
that the time on [c]ount 2 will be concurrent to the time on [c]ount 3. [¶] Other than that,
nothing else.” The following discussion ensued:
       “[Court]: It’s actually probably [section] 654, but might be stayed. I don’t know.
We’ll see.
       “[Prosecutor]: I don’t think so.

       4
           Unless otherwise indicated, all dates were in 2023.
                                                  3
         “[Court]: You can do the research on that. [¶] Mr. Ramirez, do you understand
what’s going on, sir?
         “[Ramirez]: Yeah.
         “[Court]: Have you had enough time to talk to [defense counsel] and ask
questions and get advice?
         “[Ramirez]: Yeah.”
         Ramirez’s defense counsel did not comment on the discussion about the
concurrent sentence on count 2 and section 654.
         Later in the plea colloquy, the trial court had the following exchange with
Ramirez:
         “[Court]: So the maximum penalty for the manslaughter charge is 11 years in
state prison. [¶] You’ve agreed that we can impose that rather than bring in evidence of
aggravating factors just because -- as part of this disposition. [¶] You understand that,
sir?
         “[Ramirez]: Yeah. Yeah.
         “[Court]: You’re agreeable to the 11 years, right?
         “[Ramirez]: Yeah.
         “[Court]: The maximum penalty for the . . . gang charge is three years in prison.
But that’s going to run concurrent so you’re looking at 11 years.
         “[Ramirez]: Okay.” (Italics added.)
         After the trial court found that Ramirez had knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his rights, Ramirez pleaded no contest to street terrorism (count 2)
and voluntary manslaughter (count 3). Additionally, the court dismissed the murder
charge (count 1) on the district attorney’s motion in the “interest of justice, in light of the
plea.”

                                                   4
       C. Probation Officer’s Report
       The probation officer’s report prepared for Ramirez’s sentencing described the
plea agreement as including a “[s]tipulated sentence” of 11 years in prison. The report
further stated that there were no section “654 [i]ssues” (boldface omitted) and suggested
that the trial court impose the upper term of 11 years for count 3 plus three years
concurrent for count 2.
       The probation report noted Ramirez’s current age as 36 years. Regarding
Ramirez’s mental health, the probation report stated that Ramirez “did not disclose any
mental health concerns” and said he is “doing well.” Similarly, regarding Ramirez’s
physical health, Ramirez “did not disclose any health concerns” to the probation officer
and “report[ed] being active by exercising.” Ramirez further stated that he had
“completed his [g]eneral [e]ducation with [the] Santa Cruz County Office of Education”
and came within one month of completing a nursing assistant program at Everest College
(before he fled the country after the present crime).
       Regarding Ramirez’s employment status, the probation report said, “Mr.
[Ramirez] indicated he does not have a source of income, as he has been housed in [jail]
custody since February 27, 2019. Prior to his arrest in Mexico in relation to the
underlying matter, Mr. Ramirez worked as a machinist for four years and [six] years with
Western Union in customer service. [¶] Income: None [¶] Source: None [¶] Assets:
None [¶] Debts: None.”
       The probation report recommended that Ramirez be ordered to pay a $5,400
restitution fine, a $5,400 parole revocation fine (to be stayed pending any revocation), an
$80 court operations assessment, and a $60 court facilities assessment.
       D. Sentencing
       At Ramirez’s sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that this case involved a
“stipulated and agreed upon sentence.” When the court asked defense counsel if he had
“[a]ny input” on the sentence, counsel raised a question about presentence custody
                                                 5
credits. After the court said that it had calculated the conduct credits using a 15 percent
multiplier, defense counsel objected and urged the court to use a 33 percent multiplier.
The court did not accede to counsel’s suggestion. Defense counsel made no comment on
the probation report’s recommendation for concurrent sentencing or the court’s statement
that the sentence had been agreed to.
       The trial court sentenced Ramirez to the upper term of 11 years in prison for his
manslaughter conviction (count 3). For the street terrorism conviction (count 2), the
court sentenced Ramirez to a three-year concurrent upper term.
       The trial court ordered Ramirez to pay a $5,400 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd.
(b)). Defense counsel asked if the restitution fine would be stayed. The court responded,
“No, the parole revocation restitution fine of [$]5,400 will stayed pending successful
completion of parole.” (See § 1202.45.) Thereafter, the following exchange occurred:
       “[Defense counsel]: I do have a comment, Your Honor, that under [People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157], he not be [sic] imposed that restitution fine. He
has no ability to pay that.
       “[Court]: They have work him in the prison [sic]. He’ll pay it.
       “[Defense counsel]: It should be noted because he doesn’t have the ability to pay
it.
       “[Court]: I appreciate that.
       “[Defense counsel]: So we object.
       “[Court]: Duly noted. [¶] There’s also $80 in court operations fees. [(§ 1465.8)]
$60 in facility fees.” (Gov. Code, § 70373.) Defense counsel did not object to these
assessments.
       In addition, the trial court ordered $7,495 in direct victim restitution (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)).

                                                  6
          Ramirez appealed from the judgment “based on the sentence or other matters
occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.” He did not request a
certificate of probable cause.
                                      II. DISCUSSION
          A. Section 654
          Ramirez contends the trial court erred under section 654 by imposing a concurrent
three-year term on count 2. He claims the court, instead, should have stayed execution of
that term. He further asserts that his claim is preserved for appellate review because it
involves the imposition of an unauthorized sentence, and he did not waive his section 654
rights.
          The Attorney General responds that Ramirez’s claim is barred by California Rules
of Court, rule 4.412(b) (rule 4.412(b)) because Ramirez agreed to a specified prison term
and failed to assert his section 654 claim when the agreement was discussed in court.
                1. Legal Principles
          Section 654 “precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course
of conduct.” (People v. Assad (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 187, 200.) “[T]he purpose of
section 654 ‘is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.)
          In People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, our Supreme Court concluded that
“section 654 precludes punishing a defendant for active participation in a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) where the only evidence of such prohibited participation was
the commission of a charged offense for which the defendant was also convicted and
sentenced.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1418, citing Mesa, at
pp. 197–198.)
          Even concurrent sentences on convictions subject to section 654 are prohibited;
the sentence on one of the two applicable convictions must be imposed and then stayed.
(People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 591–592.)
                                                   7
       Generally, the failure to object in the trial court under section 654 “does not forfeit
the issue on appeal.” (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1338, citing
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354, fn. 17 [“the court acts in ‘excess of its
jurisdiction’ and imposes an ‘unauthorized’ sentence when it erroneously stays or fails to
stay execution of a sentence under section 654”].)
       However, the duty of a reviewing court to correct a section 654 error, even when
the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, is itself subject to an exception.
“Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence, appellate
courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in
reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The
rationale behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their
bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better the bargain
through the appellate process. [Citations.] While failure to object is not an implicit
waiver of section 654 rights, acceptance of the plea bargain [can be]. ‘When a defendant
maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which would have required the
imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided a potentially harsher
sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the defendant waived
any rights under such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain.’ ” (People v. Hester
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 (Hester).)
       California Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b) codifies “the case law rule that defendants
are estopped from complaining of sentences to which they agreed.” (Hester, supra, 22
Cal.4th at p. 295 [addressing the predecessor rule, Cal. Rules of Court, former rule
412(b)].) Rule 4.412(b) provides in pertinent part that “[b]y agreeing to a specified term
in prison . . . personally and by counsel, a defendant who is sentenced to that term or a
shorter one abandons any claim that a component of the sentence violates section 654’s
prohibition of double punishment, unless that claim is asserted at the time the agreement
is recited on the record.”
                                                   8
               2. Analysis
       There is no dispute that if we were to conclude Ramirez did not waive his rights
under section 654, that section would apply, and his unstayed, concurrent sentence on
count 2 would be improper. The parties, however, dispute whether Ramirez waived his
section 654 rights.
       Ramirez asserts that he did not waive his claim of section 654 error because his
plea agreement “did not include a concurrent term on the gang count” (boldface omitted).
He asserts further that “the trial court explicitly rejected any notion of a concurrent term
on the gang count being a component of the plea agreement – and stated that whether to
stay the gang count under section 654 would be a decision that the court would make at
sentencing.”
       We are not persuaded. At the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor said
Ramirez’s sentence on count 2 would be concurrent to the sentence on count 3. The
prosecutor also said, “I don’t think so” when the trial court commented that the sentence
was “probably [section] 654” and “I don’t know. We’ll see.” Despite making this
comment about the possible application of section 654, later in the hearing, the court told
Ramirez that his three-year prison term on “the gang charge” is “going to run
concurrent” (italics added). Ramirez replied by saying “Okay.” Subsequently, the
probation officer’s report suggested a concurrent three-year term for count 2, reinforcing
that Ramirez’s plea deal had included a concurrent term.
       Notwithstanding the trial court’s comment about the potential application of
section 654, the record here supports a finding that Ramirez waived his section 654
rights. The prosecutor emphasized that a concurrent sentence was proper under the
negotiated plea agreement, the court told Ramirez during the plea colloquy that his prison
term on count 2 would “run concurrent,” and, consistently, the probation officer proposed
concurrent sentencing. At no point during the plea hearing or sentencing did Ramirez’s
counsel state that imposition of a concurrent term on count 2 would be contrary to the
                                                  9
plea agreement he had negotiated with the prosecutor. Under these circumstances, we
conclude Ramirez agreed to a specified sentence that included a concurrent term on count
2 and “abandon[ed] any claim that a component of the sentence violates section 654’s
prohibition of double punishment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.412(b); see Hester,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 295–296.)
       B. Restitution Fine and Assessments
       Ramirez asserts that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his
constitutional right to due process by arbitrarily and irrationally imposing a $5,400
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), an $80 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), and a
$60 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). He claims that he is indigent and
has no ability to pay the restitution fine and assessments. He further asserts “the mere
fact that an inmate is serving a prison sentence does not in any way equate to an ability to
earn prison wages.” He asks this court to vacate the restitution fine and assessments due
to his indigency and inability to pay.
       The Attorney General responds that the restitution fine is not unconstitutionally
excessive, and its imposition did not violate due process.5 Regarding the two
assessments, the Attorney General contends Ramirez forfeited any challenge to those
assessments by failing to object to their imposition. Additionally, the Attorney General
asserts that, regardless of forfeiture, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the restitution fine or assessments and any error was harmless because the record
demonstrated Ramirez’s ability to pay.

       5
         Ramirez makes no argument in his opening brief that the restitution fine is
unconstitutionally excessive. He also fails to reply to the Attorney General’s assertion
that the “proper analytical framework” for imposition of a restitution fine is the excessive
fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. (See People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1069–1071 (Aviles).) Under these circumstances, we do not address any issue
regarding the application of the excessive fines clause to the present case.
                                                  10
              1. Legal Principles
       Section 1202.4, subdivision (d) provides that in setting a restitution fine above the
$300 minimum for a felony conviction, “the court shall consider any relevant factors,
including, but not limited to, the defendant’s inability to pay, the seriousness and gravity
of the offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by the
defendant as a result of the crime, the extent to which any other person suffered losses as
a result of the crime, and the number of victims involved in the crime. . . . Consideration
of a defendant’s inability to pay may include the defendant’s future earning capacity. A
defendant shall bear the burden of demonstrating the defendant’s inability to pay.
Express findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of the fine shall not
be required. A separate hearing for the fine shall not be required.”
       “In Dueñas, the Court of Appeal reversed an order imposing the court operations
assessment and the court facilities assessment after concluding that it was ‘fundamentally
unfair’ and violated the defendant’s due process rights under the federal and California
Constitutions to impose these assessments without determining the defendant’s ability to
pay these amounts. [Citation.] The court also concluded that the execution of a
[minimum] restitution fine under section 1202.4 ‘must be stayed unless and until the trial
court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the defendant has the present
ability to pay the restitution fine.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 224
(Ramirez).)
       Panels of this court and other Courts of Appeal have reached differing conclusions
on whether Dueñas was correctly decided. (See, e.g., People v. Hicks (2019) 40
Cal.App.5th 320, 325–329, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Santos
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 933–934 (Santos); People v. Adams (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
828, 831–832; People v. Petri (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 82, 92.)
       “The California Supreme Court has granted review of two related issues in light of
Dueñas: 1) Must a court consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or
                                                 11
executing fines, fees, and assessments; and 2) If so, which party bears the burden of proof
regarding defendant’s inability to pay. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 95,
. . ., review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)” (Ramirez, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at
p. 224, fn. 8.)
       “[F]orfeiture applies where a defendant fails to object to the imposition of fines
and fees at sentencing proceedings that took place after Dueñas.” (Ramirez, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 225, citing People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624.)
Further, courts have held that the defendant bears the burden not only to raise the issue of
inability to pay a fine or assessment but also to “present evidence of his or her inability to
pay the amounts. . . . The trial court then must consider all relevant factors in
determining whether the defendant is able to pay the fines, fees and assessments to be
imposed. Those factors may include, but are not limited to, potential prison pay during
the period of incarceration to be served by the defendant.” (People v. Castellano (2019)
33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490; Santos, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 934 [“[I]t is the defendant’s
burden to demonstrate an inability to pay, not the prosecution’s burden to show the
defendant can pay.”].)
       A trial court’s determination regarding the defendant’s ability to pay a restitution
fine or assessments is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Potts (2019) 6
Cal.5th 1012, 1057; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1321; People v. Whisenand
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1393.) A trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.)
                  2. Analysis
       As for whether Ramirez’s current challenge to the two assessments was forfeited
by his failure to object at sentencing, we conclude there was no forfeiture under the
present circumstances. Although Ramirez’s defense counsel did not voice any objection
after the trial court imposed the court operations assessment and court facilities
                                                 12
assessment, counsel had already objected to the $5,400 restitution fine based on
Ramirez’s inability to pay. Given that the court rejected counsel’s inability-to-pay
objection to the restitution fine, it would have been reasonable for counsel to conclude
that objecting further to the lower-cost assessments on the same ground was futile and
would have been rejected. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820; cf. People v.
Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1154.)
       Regarding the merits of Ramirez’s challenge to the restitution fine and
assessments, Ramirez focuses his argument on the trial court’s statement about his ability
to work in prison. He asserts that the court’s reliance on his “theoretical ability to earn
prison wages without any sort of evidence about [his] eligibility for in-custody
employment or the availability of employment” amounts to “false assumptions” and is
arbitrary and irrational. He points to an apparent “90 [percent] unemployment rate in
California prisons” and claims that even if he can secure a job, it will be impossible for
him to pay off the restitution fine and assessments “by the time he is released from
prison.” In turn, citing Dueñas, Ramirez claims that the court’s arbitrary and irrational
decision violates his rights to due process.
       Assuming arguendo that Dueñas was correctly decided, Ramirez has not
persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion and violated due process by finding
he would be able to pay the restitution fine and assessments. A court may properly
consider potential prison wages in determining an ability to pay fines and assessments.
(People v. Oliver (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1101; Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1077.) Further, a court is not precluded from considering other relevant factors,
including earning capacity after release from prison. (See People v. Cervantes (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 213, 229; Aviles, at p. 1076; Santos, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 934.)
Because a trial court is not required to make express findings concerning a defendant’s
ability to pay a restitution fine, the absence of express findings does not demonstrate it
failed to consider relevant factors. (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1043;
                                                 13
§ 1202.4, subd. (d); see also Evid. Code, § 664 [“It is presumed that official duty has
been regularly performed.”].)
       The record supports the trial court’s determination that Ramirez has an ability to
pay the $5,540 imposed on him. As documented by the probation officer’s report (see pt.
I.C., ante), Ramirez is a relatively young person. He successfully completed his general
education, attended college, and held jobs for several years prior to his arrest in 2019. He
reported to the probation officer that he suffers no physical or mental impairments and
that he has no outstanding debts. In addition, Ramirez presented no evidence to the trial
court showing that he will be unable to work in the future. In fact, Ramirez told the
probation officer that “he would like to continue supporting and providing for his family
upon completion of his sentence.”
       We cannot conclude based on this record that the trial court abused its discretion
or violated due process in determining that Ramirez had an ability to pay the restitution
fine and assessments. Therefore, Ramirez has not demonstrated error in the trial court’s
imposition of the restitution fine, court operations assessment, and court facilities
assessment.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

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                           ______________________________________
                                      Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H051248
People v. Ramirez