Court Opinion

ID: 9694514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:44:53.383122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:02.671971
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I must take issue with the majority’s underlying premise that a confidential relationship existed between these parties. Since that conclusion is unsupported by the credible evidence, then the remainder of the majority’s analysis must also fall.
In Frowen v. Blank, 493 Pa. 137, 425 A.2d 412, 416-417 (1981), this Court defined a confidential relationship as follows:
The general test for determining the existence of such a relationship is whether it is clear that the parties did not deal on equal terms. McClatchy’s Estate, supra [433 Pa. *107232, 249 A.2d 320 (1969) ]; Carson Estate, 431 Pa. 311, 245 A.2d 859 (1968); Brooks v. Conston, supra; Null’s Estate, supra; Leedom v. Palmer, supra.
We have had occasion to describe a confidential relationship as follows:
Confidential relation is not confined to any specific association of the parties; it is one wherein a party is bound to act for the benefit of another, and can take no advantage to himself. It appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed; in both an unfair advantage is possible. Leedom v. Palmer, supra, 274 Pa. at 25, 117 A. at 411. See also Scott Estate, supra [455 Pa. 429, 316 A.2d 883 (1974)]; Peoples First Nat’l Bk. & Trust Co. v. Ratajski, 399 Pa. 419, 423, 160 A.2d 451, 552 (1960); Kees v. Green, 365 Pa. 368, 374, 75 A.2d 602 (1950); Hamberg v. Barsky, 355 Pa. 462, 50 A.2d 345 (1947).
A confidential relationship was again described in Brooks v. Conston, 356 Pa. 69, 76-77, 51 A.2d 684 (1947):
Confidential relation is any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party and can take no advantage to himself from his acts relating to the interest of the other party: Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, 117 A. 410; Harrison v. Welsh, 295 Pa. 501, 145 A. 507 [1929]; Null’s Estate, 302 Pa. 64, 153 A. 137. This Court has recently defined confidential relationship in Drob v. Jaffe, 351 Pa. 297, 41 A.2d 407 [1945]. Mr. Justice Horace Stern said, p. 300 [41 A.2d 407]: “... a confidential relationship is not limited to any particular association of parties but exists wherever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counsellor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other’s interest ...” That case was cited with approval in Hamberg v. Barsky et al, 355 Pa. 462, 466, 50 A.2d 345, and in Shook v. *108Bergstrasser, 356 Pa. 167, 51 A.2d 681 [1947]. See also: McCown v. Fraser, 327 Pa. 561, 192 A. 674; Metzger v. Metzger, 338 Pa. 564, 14 A.2d 285 [1940]; Stewart Will, 354 Pa. 288, 47 A.2d 204 [1946]; Dichter Will, 354 Pa. 444, 47 A.2d 691 [1946]. (Emphasis added).
In the case sub judice it is clear that a confidential relationship did not exist between the parties. The evidence established that the appellant was retained to appraise the fair market value of the farm. Appellant had no obligation to either market or attempt to sell the property. However, appellant was retained to sell another piece of estate property which he satisfactorily did without incident.
Furthermore, the executrix was represented by legal counsel in the administration of the estate. Not only did the attorney for the executrix have estate experience but he also had a real estate broker’s license. In fact, the offer in question was mailed directly to the estate’s attorney. The executrix had a full opportunity to discuss appellant’s offer with her attorney and did so prior to accepting the offer. Finally the estate’s attorney witnessed the executrice’s signature on the sales agreement, prior to returning it to the appellant.
The record also establishes that the executrix had received some experience in the selling of real estate when she sold the Church Street property. Prior to accepting the sale of the Church Street property, the executrix twice rejected offers as inadequate. Likewise, she also initially rejected appellant’s offer for the farm. At the time she did accept the appellant’s offer, she had in her possession another appraisal indicating that the farm property was worth twice as much as appellant’s offer.
Finally, according to the testimony of the executrix, the fraud allegedly perpetrated by the appellant consisted of appellant not counseling her into obtaining a higher price for the property. This appellee was not required to do. As noted, his obligation was to appraise the property, not to list or sell it.
*109The record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that a confidential relationship existed. Here we have an executrix, represented by legal counsel who is a licensed real estate broker, who consults that attorney prior to entering into an agreement for the sale of estate property. The appellant’s duty was to give his opinion as to the value of the property for estate tax purposes. This he did. It was not his responsibility to counsel the executrix so as to maximize the estate return on the sale of the farm property. As such, he had no duty to assist the executrix in obtaining a higher price for the property. Under these facts, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding a confidential relationship existed between the parties.
Although I agree with the majority’s interpretation of 20 Pa.C.S. § 3360(a) and the application of Estate of Hughes, supra, I find that its reliance upon Section 3360(a) is misplaced because no confidential relationship executed between the parties. As stated previously, Section 3360(a) requires a finding of fraud before an agreement will be declared unenforceable based upon inadequate consideration. Applying Section 3360(a) without the appropriate factual predicate will effectively neutralize that section. In this instance, the beneficiaries should have sought relief through a surcharge action. Under these facts, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition to restrain the sale of property.
NIX, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.