Court Opinion

ID: 9897756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:41.976877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.318344
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges O’Brien and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued by videoconference

              MICHAEL LYNN STABLES
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 0799-22-3                                   JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN
                                                                                   OCTOBER 3, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                      FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GILES COUNTY
                                                  H. Lee Harrell, Judge

                               Ryan D. Hamrick (Hamrick & Hamrick P.C., on briefs), for
                               appellant.

                               Rebecca M. Garcia, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General; Maureen E. Mshar, Assistant Attorney General,
                               on brief), for appellee.

                      Michael Lynn Stables (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial of possession with intent to

              distribute a Schedule II narcotic, third or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.

              Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to require disclosure of the identity of the

              confidential informant who provided a tip that led to the search of appellant’s residence. For the

              following reasons, we affirm.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                      “Under well-settled principles of appellate review, we consider the evidence presented at

              trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below.” Vay v.

              Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 236, 242 (2017) (quoting Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 625,

              629 (2009)). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth

and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492,

498 (1980)).

        In March 2015, appellant pled guilty to four counts of distributing a Schedule II narcotic.

As part of his plea agreement, appellant waived “his rights against search and seizure under the

[Fourth] Amendment of the United States Constitution, [and] Article I, Section 10 of the

Constitution of Virginia” while he was on probation, and for the duration of his suspended

sentence.1 Appellant’s waiver specifically allowed law enforcement “to search his person [and]

residence . . . without first establishing probable cause or obtaining a search warrant.”

        In January 2021, Giles County Sheriff’s Investigator Zach Collins went to appellant’s home

to “[p]erform[] a Fourth Amendment waiver search.” Investigator Collins advised appellant that he

was there to “search[] his person and his residence” and asked if “anything illegal [was] in the

residence.” Appellant responded, “There shouldn’t be.” Appellant did not object to the search

because he “understood that he had waived his Fourth Amendment rights.” In a dresser drawer in

appellant’s bedroom, Investigator Collins found “two baggies containing crystal fragments.” On

another dresser, he found plastic Ziploc baggies and a set of digital scales. Investigator Collins

asked appellant what the fragments were and to whom they belonged. Appellant admitted the

fragments were “meth” and they were his. He gave Investigator Collins the keys to a safe mounted

on the wall in his bedroom. Inside the safe, Investigator Collins found $827 in cash, much of which

was in the form of one-dollar bills bundled together by rubber bands.

        Investigator Collins spoke with a person named Brenda Dalton in the living room. The

investigator noticed “a big bulge in [Dalton’s] front right pocket,” and after learning that she had

        1
         For these March 2015 convictions, appellant received a total sentence of 28 years, with
25 years and 6 months suspended, and 5 years of probation.
                                             -2-
also waived her Fourth Amendment rights in a prior prosecution, he searched her pocket. He found

a bottle containing twenty-eight-and-a-half small round pills.2 A certificate from the Department of

Forensic Science established that the baggies from appellant’s bedroom contained almost 18 grams

of methamphetamine and the pills were oxycodone.

       At trial, the Commonwealth introduced the 2015 plea agreement, which included the Fourth

Amendment waiver, as well as the sentencing order reflecting appellant’s four prior convictions for

distributing Schedule II drugs. Investigator Collins also qualified as an expert witness in the “sale

of street drugs.” He testified that a gram of methamphetamine had a street value of $100. In the

investigator’s opinion, the amount of methamphetamine discovered in appellant’s bedroom was

inconsistent with personal use. He also opined that the baggies, scales, and money were signs of

distribution and inconsistent with personal use.

       During cross-examination, Investigator Collins confirmed that he had “received a tip from a

confidential informant” that led to the search of appellant’s residence. Appellant asked Investigator

Collins to identify the confidential informant. The Commonwealth objected, arguing that the

informant’s identity was not relevant because there was a “Fourth Amendment waiver in this case.”

Appellant responded that he was “entitled to be able to know” the informant’s identity to

“potentially defend himself from any biases, prejudices, information that was given, [and] any type

of relationships that [appellant] shares with this [informant].” He argued that the informant’s

identity was relevant, despite the Fourth Amendment waiver, because the police searched

appellant’s residence only after receiving information from the informant.

       2
          At trial, the Commonwealth proffered that Dalton later explained the pills were on a
table in the living room and that she only picked them up and put them in her pocket when the
police entered the room. When asked why she picked them up, Dalton stated that she “didn’t
know.”
                                                -3-
        The court sustained the Commonwealth’s objection. At the end of the case, appellant

argued that the Commonwealth proved neither that he possessed the oxycodone pills found in

Dalton’s pocket nor an intent to distribute the methamphetamine recovered from his bedroom. The

court disagreed and convicted appellant of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule II

controlled substance, third or subsequent offense.

                                              ANALYSIS

        Appellant’s sole assignment of error is that the court abused its discretion in failing to

require Investigator Collins to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. Initially, we note

that appellant never moved to suppress any evidence and raises no constitutional issue concerning

the search of his home and seizure of the drugs. Rather, appellant challenges the court’s evidentiary

decision to preclude his cross-examination question about the identity of the confidential informant.

        “[Appellate courts] review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence using an

abuse of discretion standard and, on appeal, will not disturb a trial court’s decision . . . absent a

finding of abuse of that discretion.” Kenner v. Commonwealth, 299 Va. 414, 423 (2021) (quoting

Avent v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 197 (2010)). “In evaluating whether a trial court abused its

discretion, . . . we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we consider only

whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s action.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting

Carter v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 537, 543 (2017)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ

can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21

(2006) (quoting Thomas v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 741, 753, adopted upon reh’g en banc, 45

Va. App. 811 (2005)).

        To be admissible, evidence must be “both relevant and material.” Castillo v.

Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 394, 462 (2019) (quoting Patterson v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App.

488, 493 (2013)). “‘Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a

                                                   -4-
fact at issue in the case’ [and] . . . ‘material if it relates to a matter properly at issue’ in the case.” Id.

(alterations in original) (quoting Cousins v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 257, 271 (2010)). “Before

evidence is admitted, its proponent must lay a foundation supporting a finding that it is relevant to

the proponent’s theory of the case.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 194 (2015).

“‘[E]vidence of collateral facts and facts incapable of supporting an inference on the issue presented

are irrelevant and cannot be accepted in evidence. Such irrelevant evidence tends to draw [the

factfinder’s] attention toward immaterial matters’ and therefore is properly excluded.” Lawlor v.

Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 229-30 (2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting Coe v.

Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87 (1986)).

        Here, the informant’s identity was not relevant to any material issue. Appellant waived his

Fourth Amendment right to challenge the search of his residence by executing the 2015 plea

agreement, wherein he expressly consented to searches of his person and residence by law

enforcement “without first establishing probable cause or obtaining a search warrant.” Based on the

waiver, Investigator Collins did not seek or need a warrant before searching appellant’s residence;

he did not need probable cause. Accordingly, the basis for Investigator Collins’s search was not a

material issue for trial, and the informant’s identity was not relevant.

        The informant’s identity was also irrelevant and immaterial because no evidence showed

that he or she actively participated in appellant’s crime. “As a general rule, ‘the identity of a person

furnishing the prosecution with information concerning criminal activities is privileged.’” Hatcher

v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 614, 616 (1994) (quoting Daniel v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App.

736, 739 (1993)). “We have adopted an exception to this rule, however, such that ‘[w]here the

disclosure of an informer’s identity . . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is

essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege [of nondisclosure] must give way.’” Id.

(alterations in original) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957)). That is,

                                                     -5-
when an informant “participates in the transaction that results in the arrest and who the record shows

probably could relate testimony helpful to the defense,” his identity is subject to disclosure.

Stephenson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 247, 250 (1994). A person who does “not participate in

the transaction that leads to the arrest and who could not give information helpful to the preparation

of the accused’s defense” is merely a tipster, whose identity remains privileged. Id. See also Gray

v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 328-29 (1987).

        Here, the evidence established that the involvement of the confidential informant was

limited to providing a “tip” that caused Investigator Collins to perform a search of appellant’s

residence for drugs. No evidence was presented that the information had any connection to the drug

activity occurring at appellant’s residence. Nothing in the record indicates that the informant

participated in a controlled drug deal or witnessed criminal activity at the behest of law enforcement

before the search. See Keener v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 208, 213-14 (1989) (requiring

disclosure of an informant’s identity who both participated in and helped arrange the controlled

drug transaction resulting in conviction). Indeed, appellant’s defense theory was that the evidence

did not establish his possession of the oxycodone pills recovered from Dalton or his intent to

distribute the methamphetamine discovered in his bedroom. Neither of these theories involved the

participation of a confidential informant or even the actuality of a drug deal. Therefore, the identity

of the confidential informant remained privileged. See Stephenson, 18 Va. App. at 250.

        Finally, appellant contends that knowledge of the informant’s identity was relevant to his

decision whether to testify. However, evidence does not meet the standard for relevance merely

because it may affect a litigant’s trial strategy. Instead, relevance hinges on whether the evidence

casts any light on a material fact at issue in the case, and the proponent must lay a sufficient

foundation. Creamer, 64 Va. App. at 194. “The defendant must come forward with something

more than speculation as to the usefulness of the identity of the informer.” Lanier v.

                                                  -6-
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 541, 552-53 (1990). Because appellant’s need for the information

was, at best, speculative, the court did not err in refusing to require Investigator Collins to disclose

it.

        Based on appellant’s 2015 Fourth Amendment waiver, Investigator Collins did not need

probable cause or a search warrant to search appellant or his residence and, as the court found, could

search appellant at any time. Also, no evidence suggested that the confidential informant

participated in the crime for which appellant was on trial—namely, possession with intent to

distribute a Schedule II narcotic. The identity of the confidential informant, and any bias potentially

affecting the information he provided to Investigator Collins, were irrelevant and immaterial to

appellant’s case. The court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection.

                                            CONCLUSION

        Because the identity of the confidential informant was not relevant or material to the case,

the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to require Investigator Collins to disclose it. The

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                                Affirmed.

                                                  -7-