Court Opinion

ID: 9946040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 22:02:44.055646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:22.172584
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                            2d Crim. No. B323018
                                       (Super. Ct. No. 1014465)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,        (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 JESSE JAMES
 HOLLYWOOD,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       “The fabric of the law will stretch only so far before it will
unravel.” (People v. Martin (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 825, 828.)
Appellant seeks to stretch the newly enacted reduced murder
penalties to his case. It just will not stretch and the fabric
unravels. Leniency for a person who orders his cohorts to murder
a 15-year-old child with a machine gun? The child is dead and
our answer is, no.
       Jesse James Hollywood appeals from the trial court’s denial
of his petition for resentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1172.6.)1 He was
previously convicted of first degree murder with a special

        1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
circumstance finding that the murder occurred during the
commission of a kidnapping. Appellant contends the trial court
erred in summarily denying his petition because the record of
conviction did not conclusively establish that he aided the actual
killer in the commission of the murder. We affirm.
                      Procedural Background
       Appellant was convicted, by jury, of first degree murder (§§
187, subd. (a), 189) and kidnapping (§ 207). The jury found true
the special circumstance allegation that the murder occurred
during the commission of a kidnapping in violation of section 207
and with the intent to kill, within the meaning of section 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)(B). The jury also found true an allegation that
appellant’s co-principal possessed an assault weapon or machine
gun during the commission of the murder. (§ 12022, subd. (a)(2).)
The People sought the death penalty, but the jury decided
appellant should be sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole (LWOP). The trial court imposed a sentence of LWOP for
the murder plus three years for the firearm enhancement. The
trial court also imposed a determinate term of eight years for the
kidnapping.
       We affirmed appellant’s conviction and sentence in an
unpublished opinion. We recited the People’s theory and the
evidence which supports it. Appellant denied ordering the
murder but admitted to ownership of the murder weapon.
(People v. Hollywood (Feb. 27, 2012, B222453) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In 2021, appellant petitioned for resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95). The trial court appointed
counsel to represent him. After reviewing the jury instructions
and the jury’s special verdict forms, the trial court ruled that

                                2
appellant was not eligible for resentencing because the jury found
he had the intent to kill during the commission of a kidnapping.
            Consideration of Evidence at the Prima Facie
                        Or Stage One Hearing
             The trial judge who ruled on the petition was the
trial judge who presided at appellant’s jury trial. He was
certainly aware of the facts and circumstances resulting in the
victim’s death. There is no need to restate the facts in detail.
The Attorney General correctly describes the offense in two
sentences: “[A]ppellant was a drug dealer who kidnapped and
ordered the murder of a child to enforce a debt appellant believed
the child’s brother owed appellant. Appellant’s subordinates
committed the murder at his specific direction.” These facts and
circumstances were recounted in our pretrial opinion granting
relief to appellant (recusal of the prosecutor), in the Supreme
Court opinion reversing our decision, and in our nonpublished
appellate opinion affirming the judgment of conviction. As
indicated, they were, and are, well known, to the trial judge who
heard the testimony in a protracted death penalty trial.
       The California Supreme Court has told us that the trial
court should not weigh the evidence at a stage one hearing. (See
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).) There must,
of necessity, be an exception where the trial judge ruling on
resentencing, heard the evidence at a death penalty trial and
where the Supreme Court recites these facts in the same case.
(Hollywood v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721, 725
(Hollywood).) The Supreme Court’s statements of law are
binding upon the trial court and the Court of Appeal (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 457) unless the
new case is factually “fairly distinguishable” from the case where

                                3
the Supreme Court has declared the law. (People v. Triggs (1973)
8 Cal.3d 885, 890-891, disapproved on another ground in People
v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896, fn. 4.) This is the
situation in the instant appeal.
       This was a notorious, senseless, and brutal homicide and
everyone, including the appellant and his attorney, are aware of
what factually happened. Our ruling will eliminate “clearly
meritless” petitions, which serves the legislative purpose to deny
relief to a “major participant” in a felony murder case. (See
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) A petition for resentencing is
not a “game” to be played by checking a box on a form. It is a
search for truth in resentencing. We recognize that appellant can
introduce new evidence at a stage two hearing. But his theory of
the case, including his own testimony, was heard and rejected at
his trial. (See ante p. 2.)
                         Specific Contentions
       Appellant contends the record of conviction may have
conclusively established that he had the intent to kill during the
commission of a kidnapping, but it did not establish the actus
reus requirement set forth in section 189, subdivision (e)(2), that
is, that he aided and abetted the actual killer during the
commission of murder with the intent to kill.
       The People contend appellant is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law because aiding and abetting an enumerated felony
under section 189 with the intent to kill suffices to constitute
felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2) and such a
finding precludes a petitioner from section 1172.6 relief. We
agree with the People.

                                4
                  Legislative Changes and Case Law
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) To that end, Senate Bill
1437 amended section 188 by adding a requirement that, except
as stated in section 189, subdivision (e), all principals to murder
must act with express or implied malice. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule by adding
section 189, subdivision (e) to provide that, “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if
one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual
killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was
a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which
establishes a procedure for a defendant convicted of felony
murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences
theory to petition for resentencing if the petitioner “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437. (§
1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The trial court may deny a section 1172.6

                                 5
petition at the prima facie stage (e.g., after appointing counsel
and before holding an evidentiary hearing) where the record of
conviction establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.
970-971.) This occurs where, as here, the record of conviction
establishes that a petitioner was not convicted under any theory
of liability affected by Senate Bill 1437. (See, e.g., People v.
Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 956 [special circumstance
finding includes elements required for felony murder]; People v.
Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945 [first degree murder
conviction based on direct aiding and abetting with intent to kill
ineligible for section 1176.2 relief].)
       Section 189, as amended by Senate Bill 1437, provides that
“All murder that is . . . committed in the perpetration of . . .
kidnapping . . . is murder of the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (a).)
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides that “A participant in the
perpetration . . . of [kidnapping] in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of [three categories] is proven,” including,
subdivision (e)(2): “The person was not the actual killer, but, with
the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
       Appellant Is Not Entitled to Relief as a Matter of Law
       Here, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s section
1172.6 petition because the jury’s true finding on the special
circumstance allegation established ineligibility for relief as a
matter of law. As the trial court explained, “This is not a natural,
probable consequences theory of liability. This is not a reckless
disregard for human life special circumstance. This is a case in
which the jury found that he had the intent to kill, and the relief

                                 6
is not available to non-killers who, nonetheless, had the intent to
kill.”
        Appellant disagrees claiming the verdict form cited by the
trial court shows the jury found appellant guilty under a felony
murder theory without specifically finding the actus reus
requirement in section 189 subdivision (e)(2) to be true. Relying
on People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90 (Ervin) and the
dissenting opinion in People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566
(Lopez), review den. May 31, 2023, appellant contends Senate Bill
1437 “required not just an intent to kill, but intent to kill when
acting to aid the killing.” (Lopez, at p. 586 (dis. opn. of Raphael,
J.) italics added.)
        But appellant’s contention has been rejected in Lopez,
which held that the defendant’s actus reus of assisting with the
underlying felony is sufficient and not changed by Senate Bill
1437. (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 578-580.) As Lopez
explained, the California Supreme Court rejected the same
argument in People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884. (Lopez, at
pp. 577-578.) In Dickey, the Court examined the felony-murder
special circumstance language set forth in section 190.2,
subdivision (c) (former subdivision (b)), which is nearly identical
to the language used in section 189, subdivision (e)(2). (Dickey, at
pp. 900-901.)
        We agree with the majority’s analysis in Lopez and
conclude the actus reus element of section 189, subdivision (e)(2)
requires an aider or abettor to have aided, abetted, or assisted a
qualifying felony during which a killing occurs. As the author of
Senate Bill No. 1437, said, the harshest punishment remains
“‘“for those who intentionally planned or actually committed the
killing.”’” (Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.)

                                 7
       We are not persuaded that Senate Bill 1437 rendered
Dickey inapplicable simply because it predated the legislative
amendment. This is particularly true given the language in
section 189, subdivision (a) and our Supreme Court’s
interpretation of a phrase nearly identical to that used in the
amended section 189, subdivision (e)(2), neither of which were
discussed by Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th 90.
       Based on the foregoing, we decline to adopt the alternative
interpretation of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) espoused by
appellant and the dissent in Lopez. Moreover, we reject
appellant’s contention that the absence of an express reference to
190.2, subdivision (c) in the amended section 189, subdivision
(e)(2) means the Legislature intended to alter this specific ground
for liability under the felony murder rule. Because the
Legislature used the same phrase interpreted by our Supreme
Court in Dickey when amending section 189 to state the new
felony-murder rule, we assume they intended it to have the same
meaning. (See Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.)
       Thus, “[d]efendants who aid a qualifying felony with an
intentional plan to kill (i.e., an intent to kill) are the exact type of
offender” who remain liable for murder under Senate Bill 1437.
(Lopez, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.) We emphasize that
appellant provided the machine gun to his cohorts and ordered
them to kill the decedent. (See Hollywood, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p.
725.) The trial judge heard this evidence at the trial and there is
no showing that this did not occur. The Legislature did not
intend to provide sentencing relief or meaningless evidentiary
hearings for someone who directs his cohorts to murder an
innocent child.

                                   8
       Checking a box on a printed form saying the petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder, given the record of
conviction, is ridiculous. Appellant is a “direct aider and abettor”
as a matter of law. Reversal for an evidentiary hearing would be
a futile act. (In re Pratt (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 795, 880.)
                              Disposition
       The order denying appellant’s petition for relief pursuant to
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                                 YEGAN, J.
I concur:

            GILBERT, P. J.

                                 9
CODY, J. CONCURRING:
       I concur in the judgment because I agree appellant’s
conviction for aiding and abetting an enumerated felony murder
under section1 189, subdivision (e)(2) with intent to kill precludes
relief under section 1172.6. (People v. Lopez (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 566, 579 [“Defendants who aid a qualifying felony
with an intentional plan to kill (i.e., an intent to kill) . . . can still
be convicted of first degree murder under the recent changes to
murder liability”].) I write separately because I do not agree that
factfinding is appropriate at the prima facie stage in this case.
       At the prima facie stage, the court “should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis);
see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 720 [rejecting an
approach that “would entail factfinding prohibited at the prima
facie stage”].) The majority concludes an exception must exist
here because the judge who ruled on the petition heard the
evidence at a lengthy death penalty trial, and multiple opinions,
including a Supreme Court opinion, recite the facts of the case.
(Maj. opn. ante, at p. 3.)
       However, regardless of the trial’s duration or the potential
punishment available, the judge who presided over the trial will
often hear the section 1172.6 petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)
[“The petition shall be filed with the court that sentenced the
petitioner . . . . If the judge that originally sentenced the
petitioner is not available to resentence the petitioner, the
presiding judge shall designate another judge to rule on the
petition.”].) And an opinion resolving a direct appeal is virtually
guaranteed for posttrial murder convictions. Neither of these

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                    1
common occurrences warrants deviating from Lewis’ prohibition
on factfinding at the prima facie stage.
       The rare feature of this case is that, prior to trial, both this
court and our Supreme Court issued opinions. But because those
opinions were issued before the facts could be determined in the
crucible of trial, the factual recitations in those opinions are not
of value in ruling upon a section 1172.6 petition. Our pretrial
opinion quoted from the People’s factual summary of the
underlying crimes. (Hollywood v. Superior Court (Oct. 5, 2006,
B188550) opn. ordered nonpub. Dec. 20, 2006, S147954.) Our
Supreme Court likewise stated: “As did the Court of Appeal, we
draw our description of the crime from the People’s opposition to
Hollywood’s petition for a writ of mandate.” (Hollywood v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721, 725.) Adopting the
People’s pretrial assessment of the facts is, in my view,
incongruous with adjudicating a section 1172.6 petition.
Moreover, given that these two pretrial opinions considered
whether prosecutorial recusal was justified, the recitation of
underlying case facts was incidental to each opinion’s focus.
       Therefore, I respectfully depart from the majority opinion
to the extent it endorses factfinding at the prima facie stage in
this case.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                       CODY, J.

                                   2
                      Brian E. Hill, Judge
            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
                _____________________________

     Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.