Court Opinion

ID: 9753312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:07:22.57021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:33.646836
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge
dissenting.
The jury in this case did not return a verdict in favor of each defendant. Rather, it rendered a special verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues. See Maryland Rule 2-522(c). The formulation of a judgment consistent with the written findings of the jury then became the responsibility of the trial judge. Edwards v. Gramling Engineering Corp., 322 Md. 535, 548-50, 588 A.2d 793 (1991). The judgment here entered, a judgment for costs in favor of each defendant, was not consistent with the findings of the jury.
The jury was asked:
On July 14, 1988,
1. Was Douglas Monroe Green guilty of negligence?
2. Was Hugo Anthony Procopio, Jr., guilty of negligence?
The jury answered “NO” to each question. The plaintiff, who was a passenger in the unfavored vehicle, asserts quite logically that if the favored driver was not negligent, then the favored driver was entitled to the right-of-way, and under the undisputed facts of this case, the unfavored driver failed to yield that right-of-way. Thus, says the plaintiff, the trial judge should have entered judgment for the plaintiff against the unfavored driver upon the jury’s finding that the favored driver was not negligent. That argument overlooks one vital *325fact—the jury also found the unfavored driver was not negligent.
I conclude that under the facts of this case the jury’s answers were fatally inconsistent and that the trial judge should have refused to enter judgment in favor of any party, and instead granted a new trial.
It is questionably true that unless the favored driver lost the right-of-way, the unfavored driver failed to yield that right-of-way in this case. The unfavored driver argues that the favored driver did lose the right-of-way because he was negligent and a cause of the accident. But that is not the finding of the jury. Under the jury’s finding that the favored driver was not negligent, the right-of-way was not lost.
The majority seeks to avoid a finding of inconsistent answers by suggesting that the plaintiff simply failed to sustain his burden of proof as to either driver. That argument does not stand up under scrutiny.
With respect to the favored driver, there were two parties who had an interest in proving that he was operating negligently—the plaintiff and the unfavored driver. The plaintiff was required to show that the favored driver was negligent in order to recover against him. The unfavored driver was required to show that the favored driver was negligent in order to divest the favored driver of the right-of-way, and thus possibly avoid liability on his own part. Assuming, as the majority posits, that neither of these parties was able to successfully shoulder that burden of persuasion, the result is that the favored driver avoids liability, and the right-of-way remains with him. Under the facts of this accident not in dispute, and under the legion of cases decided pursuant to the Maryland Boulevard Law, the unfavored driver is liable to the passenger because his failure to yield the right-of-way was clearly a proximate cause of the accident. As a matter of law, the plaintiff sustained the burden of persuasion as to the unfavored driver, because the statutory right-of-way granted to the favored driver remains firmly in place, and because the *326failure of the unfavored driver to yield the right-of-way was clearly a proximate cause of this accident.
I would reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
Judge RODOWSKY joins in this opinion.