Court Opinion

ID: 9897390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:58.613981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.918331
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          May 19 2023, 8:44 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Amanda O. Blackketter                                     Theodore E. Rokita
Blackketter Law, LLC                                      Attorney General of Indiana
Shelbyville, Indiana                                      Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                          Courtney Staton
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Tony Lawrence Richey,                                     May 19, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1107
        v.                                                Appeal from the Shelby Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable R. Kent Apsley,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          73D01-2110-F4-020

                                  Opinion by Judge May
                           Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                             Page 1 of 25
[1]   Tony Lawrence Richey appeals following his conviction of Level 4 felony

      possession of a firearm as a serious violent felon (“SVF”). 1 Richey raises three

      issues on appeal, which we revise, reorder, and restate as:

                 1. Whether officers unconstitutionally seized Richey in violation
                 of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
                 Constitution and Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution
                 prior to discovering a firearm;

                 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence that Richey
                 had committed an SVF-qualifying offense; and

                 3. Whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it
                 admitted evidence of more than one of Richey’s prior
                 convictions.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History                                2

[2]   On October 28, 2021, Deputy Justin Parker of the Shelby County Sheriff’s

      Department was on duty in a marked police car when he received a dispatch

      regarding a suspicious person walking on a bridge over the Flat Rock River in

      rural Shelby County. Deputy Parker responded to the call and found an

      individual camped underneath the bridge. The individual told Deputy Parker

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.
      2
       We heard oral argument in this matter on April 4, 2023, in Indianapolis. We commend counsel for their
      able presentations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                             Page 2 of 25
      that he had not been walking on the bridge, but he packed up his camp and

      called a relative to pick him up. Deputy Parker’s shift ended shortly thereafter,

      and he began driving back to his house. Deputy Parker passed Richey, who

      was walking on the road, during the drive back to his house. He did not

      recognize Richey, but the two exchanged waves.

[3]   Deputy Parker arrived at his house and changed clothes. He then got in his

      personal vehicle to drive to an appointment in Greenwood. As Deputy Parker

      was driving to Greenwood, he saw Richey again. Deputy Parker stopped to

      speak with Richey, and he asked Richey where he was going. Richey said he

      was trying to get to Indianapolis. Deputy Parker thought this was unusual

      because Richey was not walking in the direction of Indianapolis, but Deputy

      Parker continued driving to his appointment in Greenwood. However, en route

      to the appointment, Deputy Parker found out the appointment was cancelled,

      and he decided to visit relatives who lived nearby. While visiting his relatives

      and approximately three-and-a-half hours after Deputy Parker first saw Richey,

      Deputy Parker saw Richey walking around again. Deputy Parker noted that,

      even though it was raining, Richey was not wearing rain gear. It was also near

      dusk, and Deputy Parker knew there were not any gas stations or restaurants

      nearby.

[4]   Deputy Parker thought it would be best if a uniformed officer came to check on

      Richey. Deputy Parker then called Deputy Kenneth Thompson, another

      Shelby County Sheriff’s deputy, and he continued to watch Richey as Richey

      walked into nearby woods. Deputy Thompson was on duty at the time, and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023         Page 3 of 25
      when Deputy Thompson arrived, he used his intercom to request anyone in the

      woods to come out. No one exited the woods, and Deputy Thompson left to

      respond to another call.

[5]   Deputy Parker called Officer John Searle, an off-duty Shelbyville Police Officer,

      and told him about Richey. Deputy Parker then returned to visiting with his

      relatives. A short while later, Officer Searle saw Richey while Officer Searle

      was driving to a gas station to put gasoline in his patrol vehicle. Officer Searle

      noticed Richey was walking with the flow of traffic, and he initiated a stop of

      Richey. Officer Searle turned on his patrol car’s red and blue lights, and he

      directed Richey to stand in front of the patrol vehicle. Officer Searle called

      Deputy Parker, and Deputy Parker arrived on the scene in his patrol vehicle

      with his red and blue lights activated. Deputy Parker asked Richey if he had

      been walking on the Flat Rock River bridge earlier in the day, and Richey

      indicated that he was walking around in that area. Richey was cooperative

      with the officers. He gave the officers varying answers regarding his intended

      destination, but he did acknowledge he would like a “courtesy ride.” 3 (Tr. Vol.

      3
          At trial, the State questioned Deputy Parker:

                 Q. Okay. What’s a courtesy ride?

                 A. I mean, it, it’s just that, it’s a free taxi ride pretty much paid for by the tax payers, I
                 guess. So, I mean, we do that multiple times, we get, we get people that, you know, walk
                 from one place to another and sometimes they can be a hindrance, you know, a lot of
                 people decide to walk on the interstate, which is illegal, we pick those people up instead

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                       Page 4 of 25
      II at 66.) During this time, neither Officer Searle nor Deputy Parker

      handcuffed Richey or conducted a pat down search of Richey. They also did

      not put Richey in a patrol car. The officers never affirmatively told Richey that

      he was free to leave or that he was not free to leave.

[6]   After speaking with Richey, the officers called Deputy Thompson and asked

      him to come to the scene to give Richey a courtesy ride. Deputy Thompson

      arrived approximately eleven minutes after Officer Searle stopped Richey.

      After speaking with the other officers on the scene, Deputy Thompson “just

      walked up to Mr. Richey and was like ‘So, hey, man, you, you want a ride?’

      Like, ‘Where you, where you wanna go?’” (Id. at 155.) Richey responded

      affirmatively and asked to be driven to Edinburgh. As Deputy Thompson and

      Richey were walking to Deputy Thompson’s car, Deputy Thompson asked

      Richey if he had any weapons because Deputy Thompson always makes sure

      the individuals who accept courtesy rides from him are unarmed before getting

      into his vehicle for officer safety. Richey responded that he had a gun, so

      Deputy Thompson performed a pat down search of Richey. Deputy Thompson

      discovered a handgun and ammunition during the search and arrested Richey

      on suspicion of carrying a handgun without a license.

                of ticketing them or something else and just get them to where they need to go and that
                way it, you know, one less thing we have to worry about.

      (Tr. Vol. II at 67.)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                    Page 5 of 25
[7]   The next day, the State charged Richey with Level 4 felony unlawful possession

      of a firearm by an SVF. On March 8, 2022, Richey filed a motion to suppress

      the handgun and ammunition because the evidence was discovered during an

      illegal seizure. The trial court held a hearing on Richey’s motion on March 16,

      2022. On March 18, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying Richey’s

      motion to suppress. The trial court found Officer Searle stopped and detained

      Richey when he encountered Richey walking on the wrong side of the road, but

      “[w]hat began as a brief detention became a consensual encounter with a

      couple of the neighbors who also happened to be police officers, until Deputy

      Thompson could arrive, which he did a short time later.” (App. Vol. II at 81.)

[8]   The trial court then held a jury trial beginning on March 22, 2022. Richey

      objected when the State offered the handgun and ammunition as evidence, and

      the trial court overruled the objection. The State also introduced certified court

      records from the Owen County Circuit Court that indicated “Tony Lawrence

      Richey,” born August 30, 1972, was convicted on January 11, 1995, of eight

      total felony counts consisting of three counts of Class B felony burglary, three

      counts of Class C felony burglary, one count of Class C felony arson, and one

      count of Class D felony automobile theft, for crimes committed in 1994.

      (State’s Ex. Vol. I at 21-29.) Stephen Cradick, the Owen County Sheriff from

      1991 to 1999, testified that he was involved in the investigation of this offender

      in 1994, but he could not identify Richey as that offender at the time of

      Richey’s trial because of the passage of time between the 1994 burglaries and

      the 2022 trial.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023            Page 6 of 25
[9]    The certified court records from Owen County also included the presentence

       investigation report (“PSI”), which described the offender’s tattoos as: “Lion-

       Right. lower-arm, Skull-rht. upper arm, Heart-back, DG thumb, face on back,

       grim reaper on left arm.” (Id. at 26) (errors in original). Lieutenant Shana

       Carrell, the assistant jail commander of the Shelby County Jail, testified that the

       jail took pictures of Richey’s tattoos when he was booked into the jail in 2021,

       and Lieutenant Carrell took additional photographs of Richey’s tattoos a few

       days prior to trial. 4 Lieutenant Carrell testified Richey had a skull tattooed on

       his right upper arm, a heart tattooed on his back, and a face on his back.

       Lieutenant Carrell explained Richey’s arms were heavily tattooed, and it was

       possible some of the tattoos Richey had on his arm in past years were covered

       by subsequent tattoos. The trial court also required Richey to show his bare

       arms and upper back to the jury. In addition, the State introduced a recorded

       call Richey made from the Shelby County Jail in which he said, “I own up to

       what I did wrong” and referenced “a case that I had in Owen County.” (State’s

       Ex. 15 at approx. 11:47.)

[10]   The jury found Richey guilty as charged. On April 26, 2022, the trial court

       sentenced Richey to a term of seven years. The trial court ordered Richey to

       serve the first six years of his sentence incarcerated in the Indiana Department

       4
         During oral argument, Richey’s counsel acknowledged some of the photographs of Richey’s tattoos
       included in the appellate record are not legible, but she stated she believed the photographs shown to the jury
       were able to be seen clearly. Moreover, the jury was able to personally observe Richey’s tattoos.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                   Page 7 of 25
       of Correction, and the trial court suspended the final year of Richey’s sentence

       to probation.

       Discussion and Decision
       1. Constitutionality of Search
[11]   Richey argues the officers lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate a

       Terry 5 stop and detained him longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of

       the stop. He contends, based thereon, that the gun and ammunition should not

       have been admitted at trial because they were obtained following an

       unconstitutional seizure. Thus, Richey appeals the admission of the evidence at

       trial. See Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 586-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)

       (explaining issue is appropriately framed as challenge to admission of evidence

       at trial when defendant objected at trial and appeals from a completed trial,

       even though defendant filed a pre-trial motion to suppress).

[12]   Generally, we review a trial court’s decision on the admission of evidence for

       an abuse of discretion. Mack v. State, 23 N.E.3d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),

       trans. denied. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against

       the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or if the court

       misapplies the law.” Id. However, the constitutionality of a search or seizure is

       a matter of law that we review de novo. Holloway v. State, 69 N.E.3d 924, 929

       5
           Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1869 (1968).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023              Page 8 of 25
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. When making such a determination, we

       “consider the foundational evidence from the trial as well as the evidence from

       the motion to suppress hearing which is not in direct conflict with the trial

       testimony.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

       1.1 Officer Searle’s Terry stop of Richey

       1.1.1 Fourth Amendment

[13]   The Fourth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution provides:

               The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
               papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
               shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
               probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
               particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
               or things to be seized.

       “The Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant

       supported by probable cause.” Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020). However, there are several exceptions to the warrant requirement,

       and the State bears the burden of proving at trial that one of those exceptions

       applies before it may admit evidence collected during a warrantless seizure. Id.

[14]   One exception to the warrant requirement is the so-called Terry stop, which is

       “a brief investigatory stop falling short of traditional arrest.” Clark v. State, 994

       N.E.2d 252, 263 (Ind. 2013). Such a stop “permits an officer to stop and briefly

       detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has reasonable suspicion

       supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot[,] even if the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023             Page 9 of 25
       officer lacks probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The

       reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied when “the facts known to the

       officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would

       cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred

       or is about to occur.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2002). It “entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized

       suspicion or hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a

       preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “[A] set of individually innocent facts,

       when observed in conjunction, can be sufficient to create reasonable suspicion

       of criminal activity.” Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind. 2003). “What

       constitutes reasonable suspicion is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the

       totality of the circumstances is considered.” Polson v. State, 49 N.E.3d 186, 190

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). We must strike a balance between the interests of public

       safety and an individual’s right to be free of arbitrary law enforcement

       interference. Id.

[15]   Richey asserts Officer Searle lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a Terry stop

       of him. However, police officers may initiate a stop when they observe even a

       minor traffic violation, State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006), and

       Officer Searle observed Richey walking on the wrong side of the road, which is

       a Class C infraction. See Ind. Code § 9-21-17-14 (“If neither a sidewalk nor a

       shoulder is available, a pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall

       walk as near as practicable to an outside edge of the roadway. If the roadway is

       two-way, the pedestrian shall walk only on the left side of the roadway.”) &

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023           Page 10 of 25
       Ind. Code § 9-21-17-24 (“A person who violates this chapter commits a Class C

       infraction.”). Thus, Officer Searle possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion

       to initiate a stop. 6 See Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. 2009)

       (holding officer had reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to pull over the

       defendant’s vehicle).

       1.1.2 Indiana Constitution

[16]   While the language of Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution mirrors

       the Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1, Section 11 independently.

       Hardin v. State, 148 N.E.3d 932, 941 (Ind. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2468

       (2021). Under the Indiana Constitution, we assess the reasonableness of a

       search or seizure by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id. While

       other considerations may impact our analysis, we balance three factors when

       examining the reasonableness of a search or seizure: “1) the degree of concern,

       suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion

       6
         In Neeley v. State, we held the officers’ stop of Neeley was unlawful even though Neeley was walking on the
       wrong side of the road. 70 N.E.3d 866, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). We noted “none of the officers ever
       informed Neeley that he had been stopped for walking on the wrong side of the road” and one officer testified
       it “‘wasn’t a real big deal[.]’” Id. Richey likens his case to Neeley because “none of the officers spoke to
       Richey about walking on the wrong side of the road…[and] Officer Searle testified that he has never ticketed
       anyone for that infraction, and he was not going to ticket Richey for it.” (Appellant’s Br. at 17-18.) We
       acknowledge the stop of Richey bears several similarities to the stop in Neeley. However, well-established
       Fourth Amendment precedent from both the United States Supreme Court and our Indiana Supreme Court
       allows police officers to initiate a traffic stop upon observation of a traffic violation. See, e.g., Whren v. U.S.,
       517 U.S. 806, 819, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996) (holding traffic stop was reasonable under the Fourth
       Amendment when officers had probable cause to believe the defendant violated the traffic code); State v. Keck,
       4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014) (“If an officer observes a driver commit a traffic violation, he has probable
       cause—and thus also the lesser included reasonable suspicion—to stop that driver.”). Moreover, Deputy
       Parker observed Richey wandering in the rain for several hours without rain gear, and the sun had set by the
       time Officer Searle stopped Richey. Thus, the stop was also motivated by a concern for Richey’s safety.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                     Page 11 of 25
       the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities,

       and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356,

       361 (Ind. 2005).

[17]   Officer Searle had a high degree of knowledge Richey committed a traffic

       violation based on his personal observation of Richey walking on the road with

       the flow of traffic. In addition, Officer Searle had knowledge Richey might be

       lost or otherwise in need of assistance. Moreover, the initial stop was a small

       intrusion on Richey’s normal activities, and “law enforcement has at least a

       legitimate, if not a compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws[.]” Marshall v.

       State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 113 (2019).

       Therefore, we hold Officer Searle’s stop of Richey did not violate Richey’s

       rights under the Indiana Constitution. See id. (holding traffic stop for speeding

       did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Indiana Constitution).

       2.2 Duration of the Terry stop and Deputy Thompson’s search of Richey

       2.2.1. Fourth Amendment

[18]   Richey next argues that, even if Officer Searle’s initial stop of him was lawful,

       the stop became unconstitutional when officers held him at the scene longer

       than necessary. A police officer violates the Fourth Amendment’s shield

       against unreasonable seizure when the officer holds someone beyond the time

       needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made. Rodriguez v. U.S.,

       575 U.S. 348, 350, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612 (2015). “Authority for the seizure

       thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023          Page 12 of 25
       have been—completed.” Id. at 1614. However, a consensual encounter does

       not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Powell v. State, 912 N.E.2d 853, 859

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[19]   The Fourth Amendment is triggered only “when there is a show of authority

       such that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.”

       State v. Scott, 966 N.E.2d 85, 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “The test for

       whether such a reasonable impression existed is what a reasonable person,

       innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizen’s shoes.”

       Id. at 89. The test “is necessarily imprecise” and “is designed to assess the

       coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on

       particular details of that conduct in isolation.” Id. Factors that may indicate to

       a reasonable person that the person is not free to leave include: “(1) the

       threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an

       officer, (3) the physical touching of the person, or (4) the use of language or

       tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be

       compelled.” State v. Augustine, 851 N.E.2d 1022, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[20]   Richey notes Deputy Parker arrived approximately nine minutes after Officer

       Searle stopped Richey, and Deputy Thompson arrived nearly eleven minutes

       after the stop. During this time, Richey stood in front of Officer Searle’s police

       vehicle. Richey leaned on the hood of Officer Searle’s vehicle, and both

       Deputy Parker and Officer Searle activated their red and blue police lights.

       Richey contends all these facts indicate he was not free to leave.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023          Page 13 of 25
[21]   However, neither Officer Searle nor Deputy Parker handcuffed Richey. They

       also did not display any weapons or search Richey. The officers never grabbed

       Richey or threatened him. Contra Neeley v. State, 70 N.E.3d 866, 874 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2017) (holding Terry stop progressed to unlawful seizure when officers

       physically restrained the defendant for thirteen minutes and threatened him

       with injury and arrest). Richey gave varying answers regarding his intended

       destination, but he never expressed an unwillingness to accept a ride. Officer

       Searle testified that, during the encounter: “I think I said something like, you

       know, another officer is on his way and [Richey] just stayed.” (Tr. Vol. II at

       137.) Because neither Officer Searle nor Deputy Parker was on duty, they

       wanted to wait for Deputy Thompson to arrive to give Richey a courtesy ride.

       Deputy Thompson simply asked Richey “‘So, hey, man, you, you want a ride?’

       Like, ‘Where you, where you wanna go?’” (Id. at 155.) He did not demand

       Richey get into his vehicle, and Deputy Thompson testified that for officer

       safety he always asks someone if the person has a weapon before giving the

       person a courtesy ride. A reasonable person in Richey’s position would have

       felt free to decline the offer of a courtesy ride or to express a desire to continue

       traveling on foot, but Richey did neither. Therefore, Richey’s Fourth

       Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated

       because the initial Terry stop of Richey turned into a consensual encounter

       before the officers discovered the handgun on Richey. See McLain v. State, 963

       N.E.2d 662, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding search of defendant’s vehicle

       was part of a consensual encounter and did not implicate the defendant’s

       Fourth Amendment rights when the search occurred after officer’s traffic stop of
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023           Page 14 of 25
       defendant had concluded), trans. denied. While Deputy Thompson did search

       Richey after Richey disclosed he possessed a handgun, such a search was

       necessary to ensure Deputy Thompson’s safety. See N.W. v. State, 834 N.E.2d

       159, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding pat down search of juvenile due to

       concern for officer safety did not violate Fourth Amendment), trans denied.

       1.2.2 Indiana Constitution

[22]   Richey also argues the duration of the stop violated his rights under the Indiana

       Constitution because he “had been stopped by police for twelve minutes before

       the firearm was discovered” and “there was no justifiable law enforcement need

       to detain Richey for 12 minutes.” (Appellant’s Br. at 22.) Indiana Code section

       34-28-5-3 provides that whenever a law enforcement officer believes in good

       faith that a person committed a traffic violation, the officer may detain the

       person for a time sufficient to inform the person of the allegation, obtain the

       person’s identification information, and allow the person to execute a notice to

       appear. Moreover, in Quirk, our Indiana Supreme Court held evidence found

       by officers during a search of the defendant’s vehicle must be suppressed

       because the officers’ continued detention of the defendant after issuing a

       warning ticket was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution. 842 N.E.2d

       at 343.

[23]   However, as we explained above, Officer Searle’s Terry stop of Richey turned

       into a consensual encounter prior to Deputy Thompson’s discovery of the

       firearm. Richey was free to decline the offer of a courtesy ride and continue

       walking. However, he chose to accept the offer, and Richey voluntarily
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023         Page 15 of 25
       disclosed he had a gun when Deputy Thompson asked whether he had any

       weapons. See Powell, 912 N.E.2d at 863 (holding consensual encounter did not

       violate the defendant’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

       Constitution). Once Richey disclosed that he had a firearm, Deputy Thompson

       had a significant need to search Richey for weapons to ensure Deputy

       Thompson’s safety during the courtesy ride, and Deputy Thompson’s pat down

       search of Richey was minimally intrusive. Richey’s possession of the gun also

       raised concern and suspicion regarding whether he could legally possess a

       firearm. Because Officer Searle’s Terry stop of Richey turned into a consensual

       encounter before the discovery of the firearm and Deputy Thompson’s search of

       Richey after Richey disclosed he had a handgun was reasonable, the officers did

       not violate Richey’s rights under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana

       Constitution. See Triblet v. State, 169 N.E.2d 430, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)

       (holding pat down search for weapons to ensure officer safety was reasonable

       under the Indiana Constitution), trans. denied.

       2. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[24]   Richey also asserts “the State’s limited identity evidence for the 1994 burglary

       offender was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Richey was

       that offender, and his conviction must be reversed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 9.) We

       apply a well-settled standard of review when evaluating claims of insufficient

       evidence:

               Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims . . . warrant a deferential
               standard, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023         Page 16 of 25
               witness credibility. Rather, we consider only the evidence
               supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn
               from that evidence. We will affirm a conviction if there is
               substantial evidence of probative value that would lead a
               reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was guilty
               beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 262-63 (Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

[25]   “The State must prove every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable

       doubt.” Willis v. State, 983 N.E.2d 670, 672 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The statute

       defining unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF provides that someone

       convicted of one of several listed felonies, including burglary as a Class A or

       Class B felony if committed before July 1, 2014, is an SVF. Ind. Code § 35-47-

       4-5(b)(16)(A). An SVF who knowingly or intentionally possesses a firearm

       commits a Level 4 felony. Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5(c).

[26]   Richey argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence of his identity to

       prove he was the 1994 burglary offender. In Payne v. State, we held the State did

       not present sufficient evidence the defendant committed a previous violent

       felony when “the only evidence the State introduced to prove Payne’s identity

       as the defendant in the robbery cause was the evidence of the robbery

       defendant’s name and birth date.” 96 N.E.3d 606, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),

       trans. denied. Likewise, in Woodward v. State, 187 N.E.3d 311, 322 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2022), reh’g denied, we held the State failed to present sufficient evidence

       that the defendant, Zachary Woodward, was an SVF because, while the State

       presented evidence that an individual named Zachary Woodward was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023         Page 17 of 25
       convicted of dealing in a controlled substance in 2008, “the State did not

       introduce evidence of the defendant Woodward’s social security number nor

       any other evidence linking defendant Woodward to the previous conviction.”

       Id. at 320. Richey likens his case to Woodward and notes the State did not

       present photographs or fingerprints of the 1994 offender, evidence of that

       offender’s social security number, or witness testimony identifying Richey as

       the 1994 offender.

[27]   Yet, in Hernandez v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court explained:

               Certified copies of judgments or commitments containing a
               defendant’s name or a similar name may be introduced to prove
               the commission of prior felonies. While there must be
               supporting evidence to identify the defendant as the person
               named in the documents, the evidence may be circumstantial. If
               the evidence yields logical and reasonable inferences from which
               the finder of fact may determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
               it was a defendant who was convicted of the prior felony, then a
               sufficient connection has been shown.

       716 N.E.2d 948, 953 (Ind. 1999) (internal citations omitted), reh’g denied.

[28]   Sheriff Cradick investigated the 1994 burglaries and testified that “Tony

       Lawrence Richey” had been convicted of perpetrating the burglaries. (Tr. Vol.

       II at 211.) The charging information, plea agreement, and abstract of judgment

       from the case stemming from those burglaries included an offender with the

       same name and date of birth as Richey. Moreover, the State presented the PSI,

       which included additional details regarding the offender like his height, race,

       hair color, and eye color. All these details matched Richey. The PSI also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023        Page 18 of 25
described the tattoos of the offender who committed the 1994 burglaries, and

the State presented evidence of the tattoos on Richey’s body at the time of trial.

Lieutenant Carrell testified that some of the tattoos on Richey’s body at the

time of trial matched the descriptions listed in the PSI for the offender who

committed the 1994 burglary. In addition, the State introduced into evidence a

jail telephone call in which Richey referenced an Owen County case. Richey

argues this evidence is not sufficient to prove he was the offender convicted of

Class B felony burglary in 1995 because tattoos can be added, removed, or

modified over time and Richey’s reference to an Owen County case could mean

a case other than the 1994 burglaries. However, these arguments are simply

invitations for us to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review

precludes. See Walker v. State, 678 N.E.2d 402, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)

(“Walker’s argument is substantially an invitation to reweigh the evidence and

reexamine the victim’s credibility as a witness, which our standard of review

precludes us from accepting.”). A reasonable finder of fact could weigh the

matching name, date of birth, and physical characteristics described in the

Owen County Court records, the tattoos, and Richey’s statement during the jail

call to mean Richey was the offender convicted of Class B felony burglary in the

Owen County case. See Oster v. State, 992 N.E.2d 871, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

(holding the State presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s identity to

support a habitual offender finding when the defendant’s parole officer testified

that despite a slight name difference, the defendant was the person referred to in

previous court records), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023        Page 19 of 25
       3. Admission of Prior Convictions
[29]   Lastly, Richey argues the trial court committed fundamental error when it

       admitted evidence of more than one of Richey’s prior convictions. As

       explained above, we generally review a trial court’s decision on the admission

       of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Mack, 23 N.E.3d at 750. However, if a

       party fails to object to admission of the challenged evidence before the trial

       court, the issue is waived for appeal unless the admission constitutes

       fundamental error. Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2012), trans. denied. “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and

       applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,

       the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the

       defendant fundamental due process.” Id. This exception is available only in

       “egregious circumstances,” when the claimed error either makes a fair trial

       impossible or constitutes a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary

       principles of due process. Id. “The mere fact that error occurred and that it was

       prejudicial will not satisfy the fundamental error rule.” Purifoy v. State, 821

       N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. To constitute fundamental

       error, a defendant must show greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error.

       Id. Richey failed to object at trial to the evidence he now challenges and thus

       he must demonstrate fundamental error.

[30]   Indiana Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or

       other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on

       a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023          Page 20 of 25
       However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as

       proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

       absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. Rule 404(b) “is designed to

       prevent the jury from making the ‘forbidden inference’ that prior wrongful

       conduct suggests present guilt.” Byers v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind.

       1999) (quoting Barker v. State, 695 N.E.2d 925, 930 (Ind. 1998)). “Simply

       stated, evidence is inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) when its

       only apparent purpose is to prove that the defendant is a person who commits

       crime.” Wilson v. State, 931 N.E.2d 914, 919-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.

       denied. Nonetheless, if relevant, “evidence of other crimes may be admissible

       for purposes other than to show the defendant’s character or propensity to

       commit the crime charged.” Id. at 920.

[31]   Here, the State offered and the trial court admitted evidence that on January 11,

       1995, Richey was convicted of three counts of Class B felony burglary, three

       counts of Class C felony burglary, one count of Class C felony arson, and one

       count of Class D felony automobile theft. This evidence included copies of the

       charging information, an abstract of judgment, and documents associated with

       Richey’s plea agreement. Richey contends the only prior conviction with any

       relevance to the instant case “was one conviction for burglary as a Class B

       felony which was necessary to prove the SVF element.” (Appellant’s Br. at 24.)

       He asserts admission of the additional convictions amounts to fundamental

       error.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023       Page 21 of 25
[32]   To obtain a conviction, the State was required to prove both that Richey

       possessed a firearm and that he was an SVF. See Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5.

       Overwhelming evidence demonstrates Richey possessed a handgun. Richey

       admitted he had a gun before getting into Deputy Thompson’s car, and Deputy

       Thompson found a handgun in Richey’s waistband immediately thereafter.

       Both Deputy Parker and Officer Searle saw the handgun at the scene, and in a

       subsequent jail phone call, Richey stated, “they caught me with a weapon.”

       (St. Ex. 8 at 3:06.)

[33]   With respect to Richey’s SVF-status, the State was required to prove Richey

       was convicted of one count of Class B felony burglary in 1995. Therefore, the

       State needed to present evidence that (1) a trial court entered judgment of

       conviction for a serious violent felony prior to the date of Richey’s possession of

       a handgun in the instant case and (2) that judgment of conviction was entered

       against Richey. The abstract of judgment indicated the Owen Circuit Court

       entered a judgment of conviction for Class B felony burglary against “Tony

       Richey” on January 11, 1995. (State’s Ex. Vol. I at 24.) The charging

       information, joint motion to enter guilty plea, and PSI from that case provided

       additional details regarding the offender and those details matched Richey.

[34]   The concern here, though, is not that the certified court documents from Owen

       County were admitted at all, but rather that the documents disclosed seven

       other felony convictions beyond the one conviction the State needed to prove its

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023        Page 22 of 25
       case. 7 The disclosure of these additional felony convictions was error. See, e.g.,

       Baker v. State, 997 N.E.2d 67, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding it was error for

       the trial court to admit evidence of defendant’s prior bad acts but error was

       nonetheless harmless).

[35]   However, Rule 404(b) “is designed to prevent the jury from making the

       ‘forbidden inference’ that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.” Laird

       v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. “The effect

       of Rule 404(b) is that evidence is excluded only when it is introduced to prove

       the forbidden inference of demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit

       the charged crime.” Id. at 1777. It is not disputed that Richey possessed a

       handgun as he approached Deputy Thompson’s vehicle, and therefore, there is

       no danger that the jury drew an inference that Richey committed the charged

       possession offense merely because Richey committed criminal acts in the past.

[36]   The Owen County court documents were introduced to prove Richey was the

       individual convicted of Class B felony burglary in Owen Circuit Court on

       January 11, 1995. Once the jury concluded Richey was that individual, the

       7
         We note this issue could have been avoided had the State presented the charging information for only one
       count of Class B felony burglary and redacted references to Richey's additional convictions from the abstract
       of judgment, PSI, and plea agreement documents it introduced from the Owen County case. See, e.g.,
       Wilson, 931 N.E.2d at 920 ("Initially, we observe that any unrelated character evidence contained in Wilson's
       BMV record should have been redacted from Wilson's record before it was admitted at trial.") Likewise, it
       would have been better practice for Richey to have objected to admission of the documents in unredacted
       form or for the trial court to have sua sponte ordered redaction in light of the well-established rule "that
       evidence of a defendant's prior criminal history is highly prejudicial and should not be admitted." Null v.
       State, 690 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                Page 23 of 25
       State had succeeded in proving Richey’s SVF-status. Whether Richey was

       convicted of any additional offenses, and what those offenses might have been,

       was immaterial. The number of convictions in 1995 would not make a jury

       more or less likely to find Richey was the Tony Lawrence Richey convicted in

       1995. Thus, the fact that the jury learned Tony Lawrence Richey was

       convicted of multiple other felonies in 1995 does not constitute fundamental

       error. 8 See Warren v. State, 182 N.E.3d 925, 934 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (holding

       officer’s testimony that he initially believed brown substance found in

       defendant’s house was heroin constituted harmless error because “we are

       satisfied that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence

       contributed to the jury’s verdict”).

[37]   Richey also argues fundamental error occurred because, despite an agreement

       among the parties not to include the term “serious violent felon” in the trial

       court’s reading of the charging information when instructing the jury, the term

       was nonetheless included. (Appellant’s Br. at 26.) We have recommended that

       trial courts “reference the predicate felony as one ‘enumerated under [Indiana

       Code section] 35-47-4-5’ rather than as a ‘serious violent felony.’” Spearman v.

       State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 550 n.8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), reh’g denied, trans. denied.

       8
         Richey also asserts the trial court committed fundamental error when it “admitted the charging information
       with some details regarding all three prior Class B felony burglaries.” (Appellant’s Br. at 27.) However,
       Richey fails to explain how the disclosure of these details denied him a fair trial, and we decline to hold that
       disclosure of these minimal details constituted fundamental error. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 683
       n.7 (Ind. 2013) (noting defendant failed to show how introduction of character evidence amounted to
       fundamental error).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023                                  Page 24 of 25
       However, the State did not emphasize the facts of the underlying burglaries,

       and the trial court used the SVF term a limited number of times. The trial court

       also instructed the jury regarding the presumption of innocence and the State’s

       burden to prove Richey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial

       court’s limited use of the term did not amount to fundamental error. See Ray v.

       State, 846 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding trial court’s error in

       instructing the jury that the defendant had a prior robbery conviction during

       prosecution for being an SVF in possession of a handgun was harmless), trans.

       denied.

       Conclusion
[38]   Officer Searle lawfully stopped Richey upon observing a traffic violation, and

       the Terry stop turned into a consensual encounter before Deputy Thompson

       discovered the handgun. The State presented sufficient evidence that Richey

       committed an SVF qualifying offense because Richey’s name, date of birth,

       physical characteristics, and tattoos matched those of an offender convicted in

       1995 of Class B felony burglary in Owen County. In addition, the trial court

       did not commit fundamental error when it admitted evidence of Richey’s other

       felony convictions in 1995. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[39]   Affirmed.

       Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1107 | May 19, 2023       Page 25 of 25