Court Opinion

ID: 9579262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:53:08.827112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:07.180669
License: Public Domain

Haden, Judge,
dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case. My disagreement is not based upon the principles of law enunciated but rather by their application to the facts.
To paraphrase the third syllabus in this case, a manifest necessity warranting the declaring of a mistrial in a criminal case exists when the circumstances are prejudicial or “appear to be prejudicial” to the accused or the state.
Who, in the normal situation, is to be the judge of those “circumstances”, the trial court or the reviewing court? Certainly, one would believe that the trial judge occupies the best position to ascertain what actually occurred in his courtroom. The statute in turn also gives him the latitude of discretion to determine how occurrences or circumstance may affect the outcome of the trial: “And in any criminal case the court may [emphasis mine] discharge the jury, when it appears * * * *15there is manifest necessity for such discharge.” Code, 62-3-7.
It is established beyond question in this jurisdiction that in matters where the legislature has reposed discretion in the lower court, the appellate court will not and should not substitute its judgment for that of the lower court unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Intercity Realty Co. v. Gibson, 154 W.Va. 369, 175 S.E.2d 452 (1970) and cases cited therein.
■In this case the trial court found a manifest necessity and declared a mistrial because testimony in open court occurred before the jury out of the presence of the accused. The state’s witness who was sworn and who had given previous testimony remarked that the accused’s counsel had kept him on the stand for seven hours in the preliminary hearing and that they might remain in this courtroom for two or three weeks. This conversation to the bailiff occurred while the judge, counsel and accused were in chambers. Technical interpretations aside, it would appear “testimony” was given during the trial outside the presence of the accused. Is it not reasonable to assume that the empaneled jury sitting as near as five feet from the witness’ chair in a relatively quiet courtroom during a “break” in the proceeding, would naturally continue to focus some attention on the sworn witness and hear his remarks. In view of the evidence that the jury laughed or giggled at the witness’ remarks, it would be unreasonable to assume otherwise. Is it reasonable to conclude that the laymen jurors were aware that the “trial” had moved with the accused and the court officers to judge’s chambers? To them, the trial occurs in the courtroom and their verdict comes from what they see and hear from the sworn witnesses and arguments of counsel. At least, this is an assumed premise of a fair trial.
Whether those remarks appeared to be prejudicial to a party in the case was a matter for the trial judge to decide. Would he not know more than this Court of the effect *16on the jury of any inference that accused’s counsel would make the proceeding a lengthy trial? Who knew the habits and human characteristics of this jury panel better?
I cannot conclude from the circumstances of events leading to mistrial that the trial court abused its discretion.
As to the law governing this case, both the salutary principles of Former Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity have as a common touchstone or raison d’etre the aim of protecting the accused’s rights in a criminal trial.
Trial courts should be, and are, zealously protective of the rights of the accused. This Court should not, even inadventently, strain a rule to place the trial court in the peril of misapprehending a prejudicial “circumstance” when the statute plainly grants the latitude of discretion. It is to the advantage of all parties, the state, the accused and the taxpayer that the trial court retains unencumbered its discretion to continue or discontinue a criminal trial as the circumstances appear to warrant. No application of a rule by an appellate court should create the result of influencing the neutrality of the trial judge in exercising discretion regarding the basic rights of the parties in a criminal trial.
I am authorized to say that Judge Carrigan concurs in the views expressed in this dissent.