Court Opinion

ID: 9752914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:44:19.854765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:00.232656
License: Public Domain

*420Concurring Opinion by
Rhodes, P. J.:
The majority opinion properly sustains the conviction of the defendant.
• The dissenting opinion ignores the fact that the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case turned on the credibility of the prosecutrix which was solely a matter for the jury.
Prosecutrix testified that she had relations with the defendant, at least three times during the month of September, 1953,1 and, further, that she had no relations with any other individual. Defendant admitted having relations with the prosecutrix as late as September 21st. He also testified that he saw the prosecutrix about the first or second of October. The testimony in this case, if believed, establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility was solely for the jury. ■ A reversal in this case, after the stamp of credibility has been attached to the prosecutrix’ testimony by the jury, would result in this Court’s taking unto itself the functions of the jury.
In Com. v. Young, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 279, 283, 60 A. 2d 831, 833, quoting from DeLee-Greenhill, Principles and Practice of Obstetrics, Eighth Edition (1943), in an opinion by Judge Hirt, we said: ‘. . . pregnancy has been found to vary from two hundred and twenty to three hundred and thirty days, the average being two hundred and seventy days.’ ” Obviously, the possibility existed that the defendant in the present case was the father of the child. The length of time a pregnancy is extended beyond the average time for pregnancies may be a relevant matter for the jury to consider in its determination of credi*421bility. But, while the length of time involved may decrease the probabilities of a defendant’s being the father, it does not affect the possibility of his being the father. The matter here is one entirely for the consideration of the jury.
The instant case is distinguishable from Com. v. Young, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 279, 60 A. 2d 831, and Com. v. Jodlowsky, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 284, 60 A. 2d 836. In those cases the prosecutrix admitted having relations with someone other than the defendant during the period involved. As was correctly said in Com. v. Young, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 279, 283, 60 A. 2d 831, 833: “But a prosecutrix may not be permitted to select one of two men as responsible if both of them had intercourse with her about the time that conception may have occurred.” In the instant case, however, prosecutrix specifically denied having relations with anyone other than defendant during the time conception may have occurred, and her character is not otherwise questioned.
Defendant claims that the trial judge erred in his charge to the jury when he stated, in effect, that the period of gestation may vary from two hundred twenty to three hundred thirty days. This is a fact of which a court may take judicial notice. However, it should be noted that the court below merely repeated verbatim what we said in Com. v. Young, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 279, 60 A. 2d 831. In my opinion, it was not error for the trial judge to quote fi*om an applicable decision of this Court, but, even if it were, it was not prejudicial error requiring a reversal in this case.

 Prosecutrix also testified, on cross-examination:
“Q. You are certain you had no relations at all with Warren after September? A. I’m not certain. I mean the only way I can tell is by these letters and by that I think so.”