Court Opinion

ID: 9697069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:05:04.235743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:28.990778
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
Some additional facts are material. At no time during any of the occurrences here did the police officer ever turn on his red lights or his siren. During the entire time Officer Ferry observed defendant’s van, the only erratic driving he observed or testified about was the wide turn and overcorrection into the wrong lane of traffic which first attracted the officer’s attention.
When the officer stopped his cruiser in front of the defendant’s car, the defendant had already turned off his ignition and lights and gotten out of the van. It was 1:30 a.m. There is no evidence that there was any light in the area except for the headlights of the police cruiser, and the defendant was looking into those lights. There is no evidence that the defendant could see any indicia of police identity on the car, nor that the man driving the car was a police officer. Officer Ferry, when he opened his car door, called to the defendant to come over to him, *394and that command started defendant’s flight. Thereafter Officer Ferry identified himself as a police officer, ordered the defendant to stop, and ran after him.
When Officer Ferry opened the outer door of the house, he could not see anyone, nor determine whether the defendant had gone up the stairs from the landing or down the stairs. Officer Ferry then returned to his cruiser and radioed for assistance. There is no evidence as to the exact amount of time it took for Officer Kruse to respond, although there is evidence that it was prompt. Both officers then returned to the side door of the residence.
There were then lights on inside and they could see the defendant, with his shirt off, standing five or six steps down the stairs. They opened the door and went in onto the stair landing. They did not knock or ring the doorbell, announce their official purpose, nor request permission to enter. The side door through which the officers entered defendant’s residence opened onto a landing on an inside stairway. Steps led up from the landing to the first floor of the residence, and steps led down from the landing to the basement. The stairway was a commonplace residential stairway, and the evidence will not support the conclusion that it was a vestibule or public area.
At no time while they were in the house did the officers tell the defendant he was under arrest, nor tell him what their purpose was, even after they saw his eyes and smelled his breath. It was only after the defendant was forcibly removed from the house, and after he refused to perform the sobriety tests ordered by the officers, that the defendant was formally arrested and taken to the police station.
Distinctions between a misdemeanor and a felony are critical in this case. Although the majority opinion tacitly concedes that the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of aleo*395holic liquor is a misdemeanor, the distinctions between a misdemeanor and a felony in the context of this case are ignored.
The offense of driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor, section 39-669.07, R. R. S. 1943, although it is a crime, is not designated as either a misdemeanor or a felony. It appears in the statutes under the category of “Serious Traffic Offenses.” It is, nevertheless, clear that a violation of that section is a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Repetition of the offense enhances the penalty, but does not change the nature of the offense. It is also clear from the record here that neither of the arresting officers had any cause to believe that the defendant might be guilty of a felony of any kind.
The common law did not authorize the arrest of persons guilty or suspected of misdemeanors except in cases of a breach of the peace. Prior to 1967 in Nebraska a peace officer was authorized to arrest a person for a misdemeanor without a warrant only if the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the officer. In 1967 the Legislature, for the first time, broadened that authority. Section 29-404.02, R. R. S. 1943, now provides: “A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed:
“(1) A felony; or
“(2) A misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person either (a) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested; (b) may cause injury to himself or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested; (c) may destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of such misdemeanor; or (d) has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer.”
The statute retained the traditional authority for a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor committed in the presence of the officer, and added authorization *396to arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors committed outside his presence only if there was reasonable cause to believe a misdemeanor had been committed and reasonable cause to believe that one of the three specific circumstances set out in subsection (2) (a), (b), or (c) might occur.
It will be noted that whether the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the officer or outside his presence, reasonable cause to believe that the person has committed a misdemeanor is still a necessity. The facts in this case clearly gave Officer Ferry the authority to make an investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle in order to determine whether there was probable cause for an arrest. The fact that the defendant momentarily drove his vehicle on the wrong side of the road, however, did not constitute probable cause to make an arrest for driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor. A founded suspicion which will support a momentary investigatory or detention stop cannot be equated with probable cause, nor will such founded suspicion, without more, justify an arrest. Much less does it justify a warrantless entry into a house to make an arrest.
If there was “hot pursuit” to begin with by Officer Ferry, it certainly ended when he returned to his patrol car and called for assistance. The officers’ conduct after they entered the defendant’s residence demonstrates that they entered the residence to seek evidence that would furnish probable cause for an arrest and not to arrest the defendant on probable cause already established. Even if it were conceded for purposes of argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while intoxicated, there was still no authority to enter the defendant’s residence as they did here.
Section 29-411, R. R. S. 1943, provides in relevant part: “ * * * when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may break *397open any outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he is refused admittance; * * It is obvious that this section applies only to felonies and not to misdemeanors. It is also obvious here that even if the statute applied to a misdemeanor arrest, the specific terms of the statute were not complied with. The officers here did not request admission, nor were they refused. They simply opened the door and entered the residence. Even after their entry the officers did not tell the defendant he was under arrest, nor tell him what the purpose for entering was.
The majority opinion ignores the requirements of section 29-411, R. R. S. 1943, and indirectly holds that its procedural requirements may be ignored, even for a misdemeanor. Freedom from intrusion into the privacy of one’s home is the cornerstone of the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Even where the crime is a felony and there is probable cause for arrest, a warrant is ordinarily required in order to justify a forcible entry into a person’s residence. This court has consistently held that a search or seizure in a place of residence without a warrant is not justified under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States except for probable cause and the existence of exigent circumstances or other recognized exception. State v. Patterson, 192 Neb. 308, 220 N. W. 2d 235. None of the statutory circumstances spelled out in section 29-404.02, R. R. S. 1943, were present here.
Every case cited in the majority opinion involves a felony. The case of United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, did not hold that hot pursuit constituted exigent circumstances. The defendant Santana was standing on the threshold of her house holding a sack that the officers reasonably believed contained drugs and bait money. There was probable cause to make the *398arrest and “the need to act quickly.” When the officers sought to arrest her, she escaped into the vestibule of the house, where they arrested her. The Supreme Court held that the defendant, standing in an open doorway, was in a public place when the police, acting on probable cause, first sought to arrest her. The court determined that the defendant could not thwart the otherwise proper arrest in a public place by retreating into a private place, and that the arrest and seizure of her person under those circumstances did not violate the Fourth Amendment. There is little resemblance between that case and this one. “Hot pursuit” does not establish probable cause, nor transform a misdemeanor into a felony. In this misdemeanor case it means only that the police were following the defendant. Even that “hot pursuit” ended several minutes before the officers entered the defendant’s house.
The majority opinion here holds that without knocking, requesting permission, or announcing their identity and purpose, police officers may enter a suspect’s house without a warrant, in the middle of the night, to investigate, or to seize and arrest a person for a misdemeanor which the officers reasonably suspect may have been committed; provided the officers had followed the suspect to the house, saw him enter, and entered themselves a few minutes thereafter. No case in the United States that we have been able to find has ever gone so far. If the majority opinion is correct, the Fourth Amendment guaranty: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated * * *” becomes meaningless.
Clinton and White, C. Thomas, JJ., join in this dissent.