Court Opinion

ID: 9720476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:31:38.263049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:18.747820
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in its evaluation of this case. I disagree, however, with the analysis provided.
*132At the heart of this dispute are two provisions governing the scope of judicial review of decisions made by the Civil Rights Commission. Const 1963, art 5, § 29 provides that "[ajppeals from final orders of the commission . . . shall be tried de novo before the circuit court having jurisdiction provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) The Legislature, however, has provided that "[a]n appeal [of decisions made by the Civil Rights Commission] before the circuit court shall be reviewed de novo.” MCL 37.2606(1); MSA 3.548(606)(1) (emphasis added). The distinction between the constitutional phrase "tried de novo” and the use of the statutory phrase "review de novo” is the source of disagreement between the litigants in this case.
In Walker v Wolverine Fabricating & Mfg Co, Inc, 425 Mich 586, 595; 391 NW2d 296 (1986), we considered the conflicting language and concluded that the constitutional phrase "tried de novo” is ambiguous with regard to whether it means a new trial appeal on the record or a new trial appeal based on the production of the new evidence. We determined that, given the Constitutional Convention debates and this Court’s construction of the Fair Employment Practices Act in previous cases, the phrase "appeals . . . tried de novo” means an appeal on the record. Id. We then concluded that
one who is aggrieved by a final decision of the crc and who seeks review in the circuit court is not entitled to an entirely new evidentiary proceeding in the circuit court. Rather, the circuit court shall review the record produced at the crc anew, drawing its own inferences and conclusions from that record. The court shall determine whether the crc’s factual findings and legal conclusions are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, and whether it acted arbitrarily or without authority. [Id. at 617.]
*133As the Court of Appeals recognized, this conclusion articulates two conflicting standards of review. 188 Mich App 147, 153; 469 NW2d 42 (1991). On the one hand, it appears to provide for review de novo, while on the other hand, it appears to provide for limited judicial review. See also Walker, supra at 624. The instant case presents the Court with the opportunity to clarify Walker and articulate the precise scope of judicial review of decisions made by the Civil Rights Commission.
i
This Court’s review of decisions made by the Civil Rights Commission is uniquely different from other types of civil cases. It is well established in our common law that in the ordinary negligence case, for example, this Court will not substitute its judgment of the facts for that of the jury. Detroit & M R Co v Van Steinburg, 17 Mich 99, 120-121 (1868); Dodd v Secretary of State, 390 Mich 606, 611-612; 213 NW2d 109 (1973); Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401, 407; 231 NW2d 46 (1975); McCahill v Commercial Union Ins Co, 179 Mich App 761, 767; 446 NW2d 579 (1989).1
Our decision in Walker was guided not only by the constitutional principles espoused therein, but also by the policy reasons for deferring to the judgment of the Civil Rights Commission. The lead opinion suggests that "[t]o give meaning to the term 'de novo,’ we must hold that a circuit court, in reviewing a decision of the Civil Rights Commis*134sion, may substitute [the referee’s] assessment for the findings, conclusion, and decision of the Civil Rights Commission.” Ante at 116. We expressly rejected this holding in Walker because we determined that the Civil Rights Commission was never intended to be merely a precursor to circuit court action. We concluded that
[t]his interpretation furthermore meets the concerns of Constitutional Convention delegates who wanted to protect the public from an arbitrary and nonresponsible commission without making the commission an ineffective and toothless agency whose actions would be a perfunctory and largely useless prelude to the real action in the circuit court. Our analysis convinces us that trial of appeals on the record is what those who voted for a new civil rights commission really voted for, because anything else would not achieve their purposes. [Id. at 595-596.]
In finding that the Constitutional Convention delegates created an agency whose findings would be upheld by a circuit court providing that substantial evidence supports the Civil Rights Commission’s findings, we forbade the introduction of new evidence on appeal and limited circuit court review to the record. Id. at 596.
As a logical extension of this rule, the substantial evidence rule limits a reviewing court to examining the findings of the commission on the record and ascertaining whether there is a sufficient factual basis on the record to support the commission’s findings. As one author explained, it is not the function of the reviewing court to
look into the record’s evidentiary facts to determine for itself whether on the merits it feels that *135it would make the same finding or, if not, then to remand; its own views on the merits are not competent; its only task is to ascertain the substantiality of the agency’s findings as disclosed by the record. [Forkosch, Judicial de novo review of administrative quasi-judicial fact determinations, 25 Hastings L J 963, 964 (1974).]
In light of the analysis provided in Walker and the policy concerns that guided the Court’s decision, I believe that circuit court review of decisions made by the Civil Rights Commission is limited to determining whether the commission’s findings of fact and legal conclusions are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
n
The lead opinion suggests that "it is clear that the circuit judge substituted his judgment for the judgment of the Civil Rights Commission . . . .” Ante at 116. This observation is not supported by the record. The record reflects that the circuit judge consciously,2 deliberately,3 and methodically4 *136reviewed the entire record5 and the corresponding case law6 before reaching his decision regarding whether the evidence supported the decision to award $30,000 in compensatory damages.7
Indeed, it was the trial judge who thoroughly reviewed each and every page of the referee’s record and the evidence produced to ascertain if the record substantiated the referee’s award of $30,000 in compensatory damages, and if in fact the damages award was indeed compensatory, rather than punitive. One need only examine the trial court’s review of the record in this action to reach this conclusion.8
*138Thus, in applying the substantial evidence test to the record and the evidence presented, the circuit court judge concluded that the evidence did not support the decision to award $30,000 in compensatory damages. Contrary to the majority’s observation, he did not substitute his judgment for that of the Civil Rights Commission.
hi
As the majority recognizes, we held in Dixon v Ford Motor Co, 402 Mich 315, 318; 262 NW2d 666 (1978), that
[t]he constitutional standard for judicial review of agency action — competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record — is not a higher standard than the “clearly erroneous” standard of *139rule 517.1. Rule 517.1 requires that the reviewing court substitute its own appraisal of the record where, on review of the "whole record,” it is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976). If the reviewing court, the Court of Appeals, concludes on its examination of the record that the judgment on appeal is not supported by "competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record,” then it should have a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Because I am not "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the circuit judge who reviewed the record and the evidence submitted in this case, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for an entry of an order pursuant to its original decision. Dixon, supra, p 319.

 Equally established in this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is that we will independently review the evidence and the record in libel cases, without substituting our judgment of the facts for that of the jury, to "ensure that constitutional principles are properly applied,” Rouch v Enquirer & News of Battle Creek (After Remand), 440 Mich 238, 253; 487 NW2d 205 (1992); Locricchio v Evening News Ass’n, 438 Mich 84, 110-114; 476 NW2d 112 (1991), thus using a higher standard of review.

 I have no argument with the finding of the hoard — or Bureau, that there has been a violation of civil rights. It would be ridiculous for me to state that I disagreed with them. The law again is very clear that once a finding is made, they — being the people who judge credibility cases — would be few and far between where a court interjected their opinion. I also have no problem with taking and accepting as true that which was claimed by the claimant herein, so far as the actions and the statements of Mr. Anson.

 Here I agree with the findings, the actions of Mr. Anson did exceed propriety and I have no quarrel with that.

 But, again, I accede to the findings of the administrative law judge, such as they are.

 I have read through this voluminous 575 plus pages of transcript and find that about a good share of it never should have been testified to, had no bearing whatsoever. ... I also find that the briefs as filed either exaggerate or denigrate the facts that took place.

 There’s no argument in this particular case that the judge in that — administrative judge and myself cannot award punitive damages. The case cited by counsel, Eide v Kelsey-Hayes, 431 Mich 26 [427 NW2d 488 (1988)] sets that one out with no reservations. So we’re dealing strictly with compensatory damage.

 No consideration was given, however, to the availability of equal or like employment or labor market or anything else in the Litchfield area. Possibly the claim was within the evidence, and I don’t disturb it.

 I noticed on one occasion, . . . where she can’t sleep nights. I think this is in one of the briefs. The part I found in her testimony, at least, was that on one night she stayed up all night talking with her husband, much less than I can’t sleep nights. This was one where they were discussing some action that had taken place by Anson. Claims that she had a complete change in personalities and so forth. And yet when I read the transcript she apparently was a very happy waitress, known to everybody as "Smiles.” Only when Mr. Anson came around she was not known as "Smiles.” I don’t believe that Mr. — or Mrs. Johnson was a Dr. Jekell [sic] and Mr. Hyde. She apparently did have some concerns when Mr. Anson was present. Difficult for me to understand, however, that she can be known as "Smiles” to the trade for 19 hours a week; for the hour that *137Anson is there, for whatever time period, has a complete change in personality.
Again, I concede to the findings of the administrative law judge. Don’t necessarily agree with them all, but I concede to them.
It appears that each and every problem that was testified to by Mrs. Johnson is attributable to the acts of Mr. Anson. Yet, as Mr. Susskind indicated, there has been no follow-up so far as her problems are concerned. The doctor who she saw, Dr. Jones, Patsy Jones, a chiropractor, apparently assisted her with some tightness in her back, on a half a dozen or so occasions. She wasn’t sure how often. Such ended the medical treatment. No report was made to the Department of Civil Rights until after the employment terminated. And then, as I recall her testimony, she stated the story to four or five or six women at the state building, along with the person who reduced her complaint to writing. And that complaint leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to hearsay, much of which wasn’t substantiated, by the way, insofar as the record is concerned. One statement I recall in that complaint as filed said that many people left the employment of the restaurant because of Anson’s antics. Such was not substantiated from my reading of the record.
Claimant in this case, Miss Johnson, had many problems, she indicated. I was somewhat surprised that neither counsel picked up on one portion of the transcript as to the reason for those problems. I like to quote transcripts that haven’t been quoted in briefs. That way I can convince the attorneys and the appellate courts that I did read them.
On the hearing of December 8, 1987, page 99 — I don’t know who at the time is examining her. I’m looking at the index and it would appear that this is cross examination by Mr. Susskind. I’m going to read a portion of this simply to state what I’m talking about. Showing line 8:
"[Q.] You have not had any reason to treat with a doctor, ani I getting that right?
"A. I go for a mammogram.
"Q. Periodic checkups?
"[A.] Yes.
"Q. Just regular checkup type things?
"A. Uh-huh.
"Q. Okay. And that would include psychologists, psychiatrists, any medical doctor, including chiropractors and whatever, true?
"A. I’ve never went to a psychiatrist or any of that.
"Q. You had mentioned going to Patsy Jones, who is a chiropractor, while you were working there. Did you have just a back sprain or”—
And here I underline, underscore and put in quotes, along with parentheses, if I can do it.
*138"A. No. I was under a lot of stress from the incidents of the verbal abuse. Plus I had — my husband had an accident and just everyday stress. And I had a few deaths in my family. And I would go because my neck — I would be real stiff and Patsy was the one to pull me out of their restaurant and take me down and help me.
"Q. Give you an adjustment?
"A. Yes.”
In reading the testimony I find that Mr. Johnson suffered apparently some severe war wounds, and that subsequent to that, in 1977, if I have my memory correct, was involved in a truck accident and became seriously injured. And according to all the hearsay that came into the hearing, Mrs. Johnson had been advised by Mr. Johnson’s doctors that his life expectancy was not great after he attained the age of 45.
Then she also states on page 99, as I just read, everyday stress, she had some deaths in the family, and she said she was under a lot of stress from the incidents of verbal abuse.
In other words, there’s no one basis for the problems, whatever they may be, of Mrs. Johnson, and she so admitted. It would appear from the transcript or from the findings of the referee or administrative judge, whatever they’re termed, that all the troubles of the world and especially of Mrs. Johnson were laid at the feet of Mr. Anson due to his actions. I mention this only in passing, for the purpose of getting to where we’re headed here, namely compensatory damages. [Emphasis added.]