Court Opinion

ID: 9697912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:36:53.810252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.643629
License: Public Domain

*716Daly, J.
(dissenting). It is stated in the opinion, of the majority that the trial court did not err in charging the jury as follows: “Now, there was some reference made in this ease to what is called the low threshold of pain and suffering of this plaintiff and of her having what was called sort of a functional overlay. You may understand what is meant by that. I seem to be a little bit in the dark about it, myself. I think that it boils down to this, that the gentlemen are too polite to say it, but what they mean is that because the plaintiff has been injured and is seeking damages, her injuries are exaggerated to a point which is perhaps beyond reason and that the determination of the lawsuit is very apt to cure a great deal of those complaints. That’s what I take it that they mean by functional overlay. That is not a rule of law, so you are not bound to take it from me. It is just an observation by me. You can use your own judgment in evaluating it.” As appears from this charge, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff’s expert medical witnesses did not testify that her “injuries are exaggerated to a point which is perhaps beyond reason and that the determination of the lawsuit is very apt to cure a great deal of those complaints,” the court stated that they meant to say it but were too polite to do so.
The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that as a result of the injuries occasioned her by the defendant’s negligence she has “a permanent partial disability of ten per cent in her right knee” and “an over-all permanent partial disability of five per cent to ten per eent of her whole body.” One of her expert medical witnesses, Dr. David W. Moser, had testified that, in his opinion, as a result of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, she had a permanent condition which *717would cause considerable pain upon “any insult to her body such as the nature of even a common cold,” that as far as he could determine there was not much functional overlay in this case, and that he did not think that “the litigation has any bearing upon the aggravation of her symptoms.” Another of the plaintiff’s expert medical witnesses, Dr. Gerald S. Greene, an orthopedic surgeon, had testified that, in his opinion, the plaintiff “was a very tense, very nervous person, with again what we call a low threshold for pain, a person who is very sensitive to minor or to less pain than a person with a higher threshold,” and that her injuries had left her with a 10 per cent permanent disability in her right leg. Her third expert medical witness was Dr. William B. Scoville, a neurosurgeon. He had operated on the plaintiff and testified that, in his opinion, she had a permanent disability resulting directly from the injuries she had received and was “a very high strung woman, which occasionally women are, and has a low threshold for pain.” The defendant’s expert medical witness, Dr. Vincent J. Turco, testified that, in his opinion, “this was the type of case in which an early settlement of litigation . . . would be considered as good treatment,” that “there was some functional overlay in the case,” and that “the complaints would subside when the litigation is settled.”
In the opinion of the majority it is stated that the “comment [of the court] bore directly upon the credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony as to her complaints” and that, “[v]iewed in this fight, it was not unlike comments on the credibility of witnesses which have been considered by us in other cases, and under the circumstances of this case the comment was not improper or harmful.” The court, in saying that *718“the gentlemen are too polite to say it, but what they mean is that because the plaintiff has been injured and is seeking damages, her injuries are exaggerated to a point which is perhaps beyond reason and that the determination of the lawsuit is very apt to cure a great deal of those complaints,” made a direct attack upon the credibility of the plaintiff’s expert medical witnesses. It was an assertion that they meant something directly contrary to their spoken words. It was a positive statement that they, in testifying that the injuries to the plaintiff had left her with permanent partial disabilities, meant “that the determination of the lawsuit is very apt to cure-a great deal of those complaints.” The similarity between what the court said they meant and the testimony of the defendant’s expert medical witness-“that the complaints would subside when the litigation is settled” makes crystal clear the court’s indulgence in an argumentative presentation of the-defendant’s claim in contravention of the orderly administration of justice. The difference between the so-called comment and the portions of charges-discussed in the cases cited in the majority opinion is striking.
By expressing its view as it did, the court indulged in an argumentative presentation of the-claim of the defendant upon one of the important issues in the case. It should not have done this. The additional statements made by the court cannot, and do not, save such a charge. Bundy v. Capital National Bank & Trust Co., 124 Conn. 309, 314, 199 A. 561; Ladd v. Burdge, 132 Conn. 296, 299, 43 A.2d 752. The court must leave the jury free to arrive-at their own decision upon any issue of fact and should be careful not to misstate facts or evidence. Heslin v. Malone, 116 Conn. 471, 477, 165 A. 594, *719The practice of a judge in entering into the trial of a. case as an advocate is emphatically disapproved. The jndge is the one person to whom the jnry, with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute impartiality. An expression indicative of favor or condemnation is quickly reflected in the jury box and at the counsel table. To depart from the clear line of duty through expressions or conduct contravenes the orderly administration of justice. It has a tendency to take from one of the parties the right to a fair and impartial trial, as guaranteed under our system of jurisprudence. LaChase v. Sanders, 142 Conn. 122, 125, 111 A.2d 690; Commonwealth v. Myma, 278 Pa. 505, 508, 123 A. 486.