Court Opinion

ID: 9844440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:02:53.718159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.328221
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice
(special concurrence).
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I agree that Rodriguez is dispositive of the federal equal protection clause argument, and further agree with the majority’s conclusion regarding the state equal protection clause.
The essence of the dissent in this case is that the state equal protection clause does not itself “generate substantive rights” but rather serves as an enforcer of rights delineated elsewhere. Since the express guarantee of a uniform education is delineated in the constitution, it is concluded that a fundamental right is established which must be enforced through the provisions of the equal protection clause. I disagree. In Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973), the New Jersey court pointed out that such reasoning inevitably leads to a requirement of equal protection for the ownership of property since that also is guaranteed in the constitution. I would doubt that we are now ready, if ever, to adopt such a completely egalitarian concept. By the same parity of reasoning, the guarantee in our constitution of “safety” will require the redesign of the financing systems of county and municipal governments because of varying degrees of fire and/or police protection afforded residents of different counties or municipalities of the state.
Neither the majority nor the dissent has discussed certain other troublesome aspects of the case. This matter was brought as one for declaratory judgment. In my judgment it has been converted into one of mandate. The defendants are certain state and county officials, all of which are vested with constitutional and statutory duties and authority, none of which encompass authority to restructure the system for financing education in Idaho. Indeed, if any of the defendant officials should fail or refuse to perform the duties incumbent on them by the presently existing statutes, they would be subject to the directions of an extraordinary writ. There is a complete absence of any refusal by any defendant herein to perform any clear ministerial duty. There is a demonstrable inability as a matter of law on the part of any of the defendants to comply with what has been required of them by the trial court. This court has repeatedly held that an officer will not be coerced or required to perform an act unless it be a clear legal duty. Vandenberg v. Welker, 74 Idaho 508, 264 P.2d *8121029 (1953); Allen v. Smylie, 92 Idaho 846, 452 P.2d 343 (1969); Felton v. Prather, 95 Idaho 280, 506 P.2d 1353 (1973). As clearly recognized by the trial court, it is within the plenary power of the legislature, and the legislature alone, under the provisions of our constitution to restructure the system of financing education within the State of Idaho. Since neither the legislature itself, its officers nor members are parties to this action, I fail to discern how the trial court’s judgment can be binding on them.
The trial court rendered judgment in this cause on the basis of a motion for summary judgment. That motion was submitted to the court on the basis of stipulated facts. That stipulation does not contain any agreement that a necessary correlation exists between quality of education and the amount of assessable real property lying within a school district, or for that matter, any correlation between quality of education and the amount of dollars spent per pupil. One of the affidavits accompanying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment specifically denies the existence of any such correlation. Nevertheless, the learned trial judge concluded as a matter of law that such correlation did and does exist and that therefore the plaintiffs were being denied uniform education contrary to what the legislature is required to provide under our constitution.
I deem that summary judgment upon controverted facts to be error. I also deem such an a priori progress to the trial court’s finding to be erroneous. Rather obviously the trial court relied upon the approach utilized in Robinson v. Cahill, supra. Other courts have refused to utilize such an a priori approach. See Northshore School District v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974). Although the decision in Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) is heavily relied upon, even there the California court refused to affirm an a priori approach and remanded the matter for evidence.
I would note that there is continued controversy as to the relationship of quality of education to financing. The dispute still rages and many argue that most of the variation in achievement fas a measure of the quality of education] exists within a school or from school to school within a school district, all of which theoretically are equally funded and therefore there can exist no absolute correlation between quality, opportunity and achievement, and different levels of funding. The same controversy exists as close to home as the Boise school district.
I am constrained to observe that in my opinion this case in truth and fact has nothing to do with education, the quality or lack thereof, or the inequality of educational opportunity as between school children in Idaho. It was not alleged or proven by plaintiffs that their children are denied any educational opportunity. It was not alleged, proven, or argued that the educational quality available to plaintiffs’ children was any less than that of any other child in the state. Conspicuous in this regard is the lack of any such finding by the trial court.
The argument of plaintiffs is solely that the district in which they reside has léss assessable property than other districts and therefore higher local ad valorem taxes must be levied to support the educational system within their district. It is over-simplistic to argue that each child in Idaho should have the same amount of money spent on its education as does every other child. Plaintiffs themselves readily admit that such complete uniformity is undesirable, if not impossible, to obtain. They point out the desirability of spending different sums on pupils at primary levels as contrasted with those at secondary levels; spending different sums on handicapped, exceptional, disadvantaged and special situation children as contrasted with a normal or average child (whatever those terms may mean); spending more for a child which has transportation problems as contrasted with one who does not; *813spending different sums of money for children desirous or needful of special curriculum by way of vocational training or other needs as contrasted with normal academic oriented programs.
All of these differences result in inequality of expenditures from pupil to pupil, all are present in the existing scheme of financing, and plaintiffs are candid in admitting their existence, and what is more important, demanding that these inequalities be continued. Thus it is my opinion that this case does not involve uniformity and/or equality of expenditure of money per pupil throughout the State of Idaho but rather it is an attempt to obtain uniformity of taxation of real property in the various school districts throughout the state.
Setting aside all the above problems, the quintessence of the trial court’s decision is the necessity for a relatively equal dollar amount expenditure per pupil across the State of Idaho. The court found “dollar input per pupil is plainly relevant and the court has been shown no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the mandate of article 9, section 1.” Plaintiffs are therefore forced to contend that they may have their arguments both ways, i. e., that there be mandated a financing system in Idaho in which all children of school age have substantially the same amount of dollars assigned to and expended upon their education and at the same time that fiscal uniformity or equality per pupil is undesirable and unobtainable.
The “problem” in Idaho, as seen by the plaintiffs, is solely related to the money available for education purposes from real property tax sources in one district as contrasted with others. The distribution of moneys by the State under the legislative formula is based on factors plainly designed to accomplish inequality of expenditures per pupil across the State of Idaho. Of these factors and inequalities, plaintiffs do not complain except as they tend to exacerbate the fundamental “problem” of unequal assessed valuation from one school district to another.
Justice Donaldson, in his dissenting opinion, chides the majority for failing to set out a standard or test by which compliance with the constitution can be meassured. I suggest the same criticism may be leveled at the dissenting opinion and the judgment of the trial court. The only standard utilized by the trial court is expenditure per pupil, a standard which is repudiated by plaintiffs. By what standard then is the present or any future system of financing education to be judged? How may the legislature determine if a proposed new financing system is offensive to the constitution without a standard ? No such standards have been articulated by the parties either here or in the lower court and we know of no decision by any other court in any other jurisdiction which has done so. I respectfully suggest that a decision condemning a present system serves no purpose unless it promulgates a standard and examines viable alternatives.
Albeit the reapportionment cases were decided under the federal constitution, they brought about large and sweeping changes in sociological and governmental concepts. They too were concerned with uniformity and equality. Those changes however were mandated in a context with standards and legislative guidelines clearly enunciated. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964) and Robert B. McKay, Reapportionment, (1965).
If we are to say, as did the trial court, that the legislature has failed to comply with its constitutional mandate and that its efforts in devising a system for the financing of education in Idaho have been irrational or unreasonable, I suggest we should examine what the legislature could or should have done or should do in the future.
The legislature, as a practical matter, could take the moneys available at the state level for common schools and divide it into equal portions for each school district. *814It is conceded that such distribution would not be desirable nor ameliorate the fiscal problems of education in this state. There is no argument but that the legislature from a practical standpoint could allot the moneys available at the state level for common schools to each school district in the state on the basis of the number of pupils therein. It also appears to be conceded that such a distribution would fail to alleviate the fiscal needs of education in the state since it would ignore the many factors which everyone, including the plaintiffs herein, agree require differing amounts of money to be spent on different types of pupils and which is contemplated in the present legislative system of ADA and WADA factors.
Inferentially at least, it is suggested that in the area of the presently existing school districts and their ability to raise taxes from real property exists the opportunity and need for change. Exactly how that change is to be accomplished is not articulated either here or below. Perhaps the entire state should be redesigned with new school districts, each of which would have a reasonably identical amount of taxable property valuation within its boundaries. Idaho’s widely and wildly divergent geography, land values, assessment practices, concentration or sparsity of student population, differences in the “mix” of students, difficult and at times impossible transportation, varying degrees and amounts of bonded indebtedness, almost dictate that the presently existing “problem” would be replaced with another of weirdly gerrymandered districts requiring extensive relocation and construction of physical plants, more extensive transportation of students, more rigid state control of local assessment practices, chaos in the area of bonded indebtedness and almost certainly a depreciation of educational quality. An additional factor which would have of necessity to be contained in any equation for change is our state’s non-taxable land resulting from the checkerboarded government ownership of approximately 70 to 75% of the total land area of the state.
Another alternative might be the abolition of all local funding of our educational system and the assumption of all educational funding at the state level. If all funding were to come from the state, local control of the schools would disappear. To argue that funding would come from one source and control from another is to ignore practical reality. Cf. Education Commission of the States, Compact, April, 1975.
One may have certain reservations concerning the continued validity of the basic educational philosophy expressed in Andrus v. Hill, 73 Idaho 196, 249 P.2d 205 (1952), when measured by today’s standards and demands. Nevertheless the desirability of continued local control of the common schools is at least arguable. Questions such as the scholastic use of physical plants on a year-round basis through the use of staggered scheduling or longer daily staggered hours of class to the end that more students may be accommodated in one plant; desired or necessary curriculum expansion or contraction; the usage of visual and other teaching aids; the size, of athletic and other extra-curricular programs and the funding therefor; the design, structure and furnishing of buildings; such mundane matters as to the desirability of air-conditioning or carpeting in schools; all are questions which require answers and not merely discussion. Arguments erupt at the drop of a hat as to what is or is not necessary in an educational system, what is or is not a frill, what does or does not detract from the quality of education, what reduces available money and time of students, both of which could better be devoted to more orthodox academic education. What some denominate frills are asserted by others as necessary to the full-rounded education experience and enrichment of the future life of our children.
The major policy question involved is whether local people whose children will attend the schools should make those sort of decisions through their elected boards and, what is perhaps more important, back up their decisions with the imposition of taxes upon themselves to pay for such pro*815grams. On the other hand, should those types of decisions emanate from non-personally involved people at a state level. I make no pretense of possessing the wisdom necessary to furnish a definitive answer to the basic question of state versus local control. I doubt that any of my brethren on this bench make any such pretense.
The most important question, however, to be resolved if funding were to take place at the state level is determining the level at which funding per student should be set statewide. I would have to assume that if the legislature were to embark upon such a complete state funding it would arrive at a “uniform” figure per pupil somewhere near the present average, mean or median expenditure per pupil in the state. Obviously all pupils presently funded at the higher level would have their quality of education decreased [assuming the trial court to be correct in its finding of a necessary relation between funding and quality]. This is a result for which plaintiffs do not argue and inferentially at least their position is to the contrary. Such a statewide funding solution would also ignore the presently existing bonded indebtedness of the various school districts and somehow would require the assumption of that indebtedness by the state posing questions of constitutional validity. A necessary ingredient of any such plan would be the total prohibition of any local funds being used to enrich or amplify the state funded program. Otherwise the enrichment of the state program would again bring about the very lack of “uniformity” of which plaintiffs complain.
There may be other possible alternatives but none have as yet been suggested. In my judgment they would probably include some of the undesirable results suggested above and for some children in the state the quality of their education would decline. Again, in my judgment, no scheme for uniformity can be devised by any person no matter how well intentioned‘which will divide up the responsibility of funding of education within the State of Idaho without the consideration of one absolute, i. e., how much money should be expended per pupil on a statewide basis. The problem becomes nearly insuperable in view of plaintiffs’ argument that we must continue to be unequal in certain facets of our educational system, depending upon the different needs of individual children.
The most fundamental questions at this point appear to be: How much faster can we go in achieving an ideal in the financing of education; how much financial inequality from pupil to pupil is necessary because of the varying needs of those individual pupils; what is the minimum or maximum per average pupil financial expenditure to be; are school districts in the name of uniformity to be prohibited from enriching a basic state-financed program; and is local autonomy and control of the schools in Idaho to disappear?
I suggest that the answers to such questions must come from the legislative branch of government. It may be no better equipped to grapple with and solve those problems than is this court. They have been attempting over the years to better the system of education in this state. Perhaps it is those actions over the past years that we should examine as a basis for our determination if their attempts to better the financial system have been arbitrary, capricious, illogical and detrimental to the school children of Idaho.
It is beyond argument that not too many years ago the common school education system in Idaho was in many respects substandard. In too many places it was characterized by the one-room schoolhouse with outdoor privies and other undesirable aspects. Sparsity of student population within some of the then existing school districts, together with limited finances, made difficult the employment of competent teachers, restricted the curriculum offerings and made transportation nightmarish. Many of the then existing school districts were unrealistic in terms of numbers of children within the district, the amount of assessable real property contained in the *816district and/or the ability of the district to finance an education for their children.
In the years 1946-47 there were 1,082 school districts within the State of Idaho. Biennial Report, State Board of Education, 1948-50. In 1947 and again in 1963 the legislature acted to require consolidation of the school districts in Idaho. I.C. § 33-501 et seq., I.C. § 33-310 et seq. By requiring the then existing school districts to consolidate, it was hoped to eliminate substandard education and upgrade educational opportunity for the school children in Idaho. At the present time school districts have been consolidated and reorganized and reduced in numbers to 115 districts.
We should perhaps examine the track record of the legislature to determine whether or not “there has been entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed” (Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 [1964]). In 1910 state funds derived from a chain-store tax, a beer tax, and land endowment earnings were appropriated in the amount of $228,558.31 for the support of common schools in the state. By 1934 that amount had grown to $709,562.67. Biennial Report, State Board of Education, 1929-30, 1935-36. In 1939 the first moneys were appropriated by the legislature from the state general fund to the public school income fund in the amount of $2,000,000 for a two year period. S.L.1939, Ch. 173, § 1. Most recently the 1975 legislature has allocated (S.L.1975, Ch. 104) $118,046,500 in state funds to the support of the common schools for a one year period. Additionally, that same legislature (Ch. 144, 215, S.L.1975) has allocated an estimated $12,000,000 of state funds to the various counties for deposit in the county school funds for the purpose of reducing ad valorem taxation in the counties.
The above discussion indicates that there is little continued validity of the trial court’s findings regarding the relative percentages and amounts of money used to finance education in Idaho from state, county and school district sources.
In my opinion the actions of the legislature in recent years for financing education in Idaho have been taken with a view to the retention of the maximum amount of local autonomy and control, and an attempt to upgrade education in the state. Those actions'should not be surprising in view of the mandate set down by this Court in the case of Andrus v. Hill, supra. Legislators, being mortal, usually fall short of perfection. The obtention of perfection in governmental affairs is impossible, in part, because of the ebb and flow of political forces, differing individual concepts of perfection and the reality of taxing the public in one form or another for the cost of all governmental activities. I make no pretense of omniscience and concede that the resolution of socio-politico-educational policy decisions lie outside the ambit of our constitutional authority and within that of the legislature. I find no gross neglect on the part of the legislature in attempting to perform its constitutional duty in the field of education.
McFADDEN, J., concurs.