Court Opinion

ID: 9676190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:17:11.954546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:45.253751
License: Public Domain

*201MADDOX, Justice.1
The primary question presented by this appeal is whether an Industrial Development Board is “the state or any county or municipal corporation or subdivision thereof in this state” within the meaning of Alabama’s public bonding statute [Title 50, § 16, Code of Alabama, 1940].
This section began as a bill of inter-pleader filed by the Industrial Development Board of the City of Scottsboro, Alabama, against Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., Western Concrete, Inc., Vulcan Materials, and others.
The Industrial Development Board of the City of Scottsboro was formed under the provisions of Title 37, §§ 815-830, Code of Alabama, 1940. I.D.B. agreed with Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. to construct and equip a manufacturing plant for Revere in Jackson County. Revere agreed to lease the facility for a specified number of years. The rentals would be used by I. D.B. to pay off the bonded indebtedness. Western Concrete had agreed to furnish the concrete for the construction of the plant. When I.D.B. was told by suppliers that Western was delinquent in the payment of their bills, I.D.B. took action.
In the interpleader action, I.D.B. alleged that it owed Western $17,308 under its contract with Western. I.D.B. interpleaded the other respondents, all of which were creditors of Western. The interpleaded respondents had sold to Western merchandise which was used, at least in part, to produce concrete, which went into the construction of the Revere plant. There was no dispute about the amount Western owed these suppliers. The problem was that the $17,308 I.D.B. still owed Western was far short of being enough to pay all of Western’s suppliers. That is probably the reason for the cross-bills filed by Western’s creditors. Each wanted to be paid in full. In any event, each of Western’s creditors filed a cross-claim against Western, the George A. Fuller Company, Inc., and its surety, The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. The gist of each cross-claim was that each supplier had furnished to Western supplies and materials in prosecution of the work provided for in the contract between I.D.B. and Fuller, and that Western still owed each of them for the supplies and materials. Each claimed that Western was a subcontractor of Fuller. Each claimed that Fuller, as principal, and Aetna, as surety, had issued a payment or materialmen’s bond as required by Title 50, § 16, and that this bond inured to each materialman’s benefit.
*202In its final decree the court found (1) that Fuller held itself out to be a general contractor (2) that it maintained this status while the various claimants supplied materials in the furtherance of its contract, and (3) Fuller was, in fact, a general contractor.
The court further found that Western was a subcontractor of Fuller at all pertinent times and that Fuller and Aetna were liable for the value of all materials furnished in the prosecution of the work under Fuller’s contract. The court decreed that the provisions of Title 50, § 16, Code of Alabama, were to be read into the bond and that any provisions in the bond inconsistent with the statute were of no force and effect. The court also found that the materials furnished were used or furnished in the prosecution of the work for the construction of I.D.B.’s plant.
Fuller and Aetna appealed.
As already indicated, the threshold question is whether I.D.B. is “the state or any county or municipal corporation or sub-division thereof in this state” within the meaning of Title 50, § 16, which is commonly known as the Alabama public bonding statute. Title 50, § 16, in pertinent part reads:
“Any person, firm or corporation entering into a contract with the state or any county or municipal corporation or subdivision thereof in this state for the repair, construction or prosecution of any public buildings or public work, highways or bridges, shall be required, before commencing such work, to execute a * * * bond * * * with the obligation that such contractor or contractors shall promptly make payments to all persons supplying him or them with labor, materials, feed-stuffs or supplies for or in the prosecution of the work provided for in such contract * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.)
For this statute to be applicable to the contract and bond in question, I.D.B. must fall within the category of the “state or any county or municipal corporation or subdivision thereof.” Does I.D.B. fall within this category ? We think not.
This Court has had opportunity to pass upon the designation of industrial development boards on several occasions. Each time this Court has ruled that such boards are public corporations which are “separate entities from the state” and from any political subdivision, including a city or county, within which they are organized. Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So.2d 175 (1950); Edmonson v. State Industrial Development Authority, 279 Ala. 206, 184 So. 2d 115 (1966). In the recent case of Knight v. West Alabama Environmental Imp. Authority, 287 Ala. 15, 246 So.2d 903 (1971), this Court held that the public corporation there involved was not part of the state or a subdivision of the state.
The import of the decisions by this Court involving industrial development boards and other like instrumentalities, is that industrial development boards, while they are public corporations established by the state, county, or city, and while they enjoy certain immunities from taxation, they are not the “state or any county or municipal corporation or sub-division thereof in this state.”
Both sides strenuously argue whether Western’s status was that of a “subcontractor” or “materialman.” Fuller and Aetna claim Western was a “materialman.” Western’s suppliers claim Western was a “subcontractor” of Fuller. If the public bonding statute was applicable, it would be very important for us to decide whether Western was a “subcontractor” or whether it was a “materialman.” We have decided, however, that the public bonding statute is inapplicable; therefore, there is no need for us to determine what status Western occupies.
The judgment of the trial court is re versed and remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
MADDOX, Justice.

. The writer of this opinion was not sitting when the oral arguments were presented. However, the writer has listened to tape recordings of the entire oral arguments. In fact, the writer has listened to some portions of the oral arguments more than once.