Court Opinion

ID: 9895728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 16:11:24.877946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:25.814510
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Marcia Carnahan, Donald M.                  :
Carnahan, Paul Boas, and                    :
Christopher Coleman,                        :
                 Appellants                 :
                                            :
       v.                                   : No. 1082 C.D. 2022
                                            :
Slippery Rock Township Zoning               :
Hearing Board, Slippery Rock                :
Township, and Heilman Pavement              :
Specialties, Inc.                           : Submitted: October 10, 2023

BEFORE:         HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                            FILED: November 8, 2023

       Appellants Marcia Carnahan, Donald M. Carnahan, Paul Boas, and
Christopher Coleman (collectively Appellants) appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Butler County’s (Common Pleas) September 7, 2022 order. Through that
order, Common Pleas affirmed Appellee Slippery Rock Township Zoning Hearing
Board’s (Zoning Board) November 22, 2021 decision (Decision), in which the Board
had denied Appellants’ substantive validity challenge to Slippery Rock Township
(Township) Ordinance No. 2020-1.1 We affirm.
                                       I. Background
       On April 6, 2020, HEI-WAY Premium Asphalt (HEI-WAY)2 filed an
application with the Township’s Board of Supervisors regarding a property located

       1
           Slippery Rock Township, Butler County, Pa. Ordinance No. 2020-1 (2020).

       2
          HEI-WAY was Appellee Heilman Pavement Specialties, Inc.’s (Heilman) predecessor-
in-interest regarding the Property. Heilman’s Br. at 6; see Common Pleas Op., 11/23/22, at 2.
at the intersection of Stoughton Road and New Castle Road in Slippery Rock,
Pennsylvania (Property). Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1a-2a, 229a.3
              [The Property] is a relatively large parcel as compared to
              its residentially[ ]zoned neighbors, comprising 14.52
              acres, and is rectangular in shape, with the longer, parallel
              boundary lines arranged, roughly, in a north/south
              direction, and the shorter boundary sides arranged, again
              roughly, in an east/west direction. [Id. at 242a]. The
              property is bisected by the Slippery Rock Township and
              Worth Township boundary line, into approximately two
              triangles, such that the eastern/northeastern portion of the
              property is located within Slippery Rock Township, and
              the western/southwestern portion is located within Worth
              Township. [Id. at 242a; Supplemental Reproduced Record
              (S.R.R.) at 291a4].
Common Pleas Op., 11/23/22, at 2. In its application, HEI-WAY listed its proposed
use for the Property as “[c]ommercial development for [c]old-mix asphalt plant with
product storage and associated facilities including scale(s) and scale house[,]” and
requested that the Board of Supervisors rezone the Property from RC-1 Rural
Conservation to L-I Light Industrial. R.R. at 1a.5 On May 11, 2020, the Township’s
Planning Commission voted unanimously to recommend that the Board of
Supervisors rezone as Light Industrial both the Property and two nearby parcels of
land. Id. at 4a. The Board of Supervisors then held a public hearing on June 8, 2020,
regarding the proposed zoning changes and, on June 22, 2022, enacted Ordinance

       The Property’s street address is listed in different portions of the Reproduced Record as
       3

661 New Castle Road and 490 Stoughton Road. See R.R. at 1a-2a, 229a.

       4
           This document is not a true supplemental reproduced record, as it was submitted by
Appellants as an addendum to their Reproduced Record. However, for simplicity’s sake, we will
refer to it as such, because that is how Appellants elected to title their filing.

       5
        At that point in time, the Property was owned by Glen and Ruth Cooper, while HEI-WAY
was merely the Property’s proposed buyer. R.R. at 1a. HEI-WAY ultimately completed its
purchase of the Property on August 8, 2020. Heilman’s Br. at 5.
                                               2
No. 2020-1, which changed the zoning classification of those three lots from Rural
Conservation to Light Industrial. Id. at 35a-36a; S.R.R. at 264a-303a.
      Thereafter, on September 8, 2021, Appellants filed their substantive validity
challenge to Ordinance No. 2020-1, but only as to its effect upon the Property. See
R.R. at 65a-67a. The Zoning Board held a hearing regarding Appellants’ challenge
on October 27, 2021, and, after considering the parties’ respective arguments and
evidentiary submissions, denied the challenge on November 22, 2021. Appellants
then appealed this denial to Common Pleas, which took no additional evidence and,
on September 7, 2022, affirmed the Board’s Decision, in full. This appeal to our
Court followed shortly thereafter.
                                     II. Discussion
      Preliminarily, we must address Heilman’s argument that Paul Boas does not
have standing to maintain the instant appeal. Heilman’s Br. at 16-20. Heilman
moved to challenge Boas’ standing during the course of the Zoning Board’s October
27, 2021 hearing, and though the Zoning Board stated in its Decision that “[b]ased
on the testimony given in this matter by Boas, [it did] not believe he [met] the
standard for being a [p]arty,” the Zoning Board nevertheless declined to grant
Heilman’s motion. Decision at 6-7. Heilman then reiterated its challenge to Boas’
standing during the course of appellate proceedings before Common Pleas, but
Common Pleas denied that challenge without explanation. See Common Pleas
Order, 9/7/22, at 2. As a prevailing party that was not ultimately aggrieved by either
the Zoning Board’s Decision or Common Pleas’ subsequent order, Heilman was not
required to file a protective cross-appeal in order to preserve this issue for
consideration at a later juncture. See McGuire on behalf of Neidig v. City of
Pittsburgh, 250 A.3d 516, 526 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021); Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank
v. Com., 83 A.3d 107, 112-13 (Pa. 2013); but see Firearm Owners Against Crime v.

                                           3
Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467, 476 nn. 8 & 13 (Pa. 2021) (appellees waived ability to
challenge determination that they lacked standing regarding certain claims due to
their failure to file cross-appeal).
       In order to have standing, a party must be “aggrieved,” in that the party must
have an interest in the matter that is substantial, direct, and immediate. William Penn
Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 282-83 (Pa. 1975).
              A substantial interest is one in which there is “some
              discernible adverse effect to some interest other than the
              abstract interest of all citizens in having others comply
              with the law.” William Penn, . . . 346 A.2d at 282. A
              “direct” interest requires a showing that the matter
              complained of causes harm to the party’s interest. Upper
              Bucks [Cnty.] Vocational–Technical [Sch. Educ. Ass’n] v.
              Upper Bucks [Cnty.] Vocational-Technical School Joint
              Comm[.], . . . 474 A.2d 1120 ([Pa.] 1984). An “immediate”
              interest is something more than a “remote consequence”
              and centers on the causal nexus and proximity between the
              action complained of and the injury to the party
              challenging it. William Penn, . . . 346 A.2d at 283;
              Skippack [Cmty.] Ambulance [Ass’n], Inc. v. [Twp.] of
              Skippack, . . . 534 A.2d 563 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1987). The
              requirement that the interest be “immediate” is also met
              where it falls within the “zone of interests sought to be
              protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
              question.” Upper Bucks [Cnty.], . . . 474 A.2d at 1122.
              Finally, the rationale underlying the requirement that the
              party be “aggrieved” or “adversely affected” by the action
              at issue is to ensure that a legal challenge is made by the
              appropriate party.
Pittsburgh Tr. for Cultural Res. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh,
604 A.2d 298, 303-04 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992). “[A] party who appears before a zoning
board may only appeal an adverse decision to court if that party has standing per this
. . . traditional understanding of the concept.” S. Bethlehem Assocs., LP v. Zoning
Hearing Bd. of Bethlehem Twp., 294 A.3d 441, 448 (Pa. 2023); see Section 916.1(b)

                                          4
of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), 53 P.S. § 10916.1(b) 6
(“Persons aggrieved by a use or development permitted on the land of another by an
ordinance or map, or any provision thereof, who desires to challenge its validity on
substantive grounds shall first submit their challenge to the zoning hearing board for
a decision thereon under [S]ection 909.1(a)(1) [of the MPC7].”); 2 Pa. C.S. § 752
(“Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a local agency who has a direct interest
in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with
jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 (relating to judiciary and
judicial procedure).”).
                 A key component of the William Penn standing analysis,
                 and whether an objector is “aggrieved” for purposes of the
                 MPC, is whether the proposed use in question, or, in a
                 substantive validity challenge, the challenged ordinance,
                 actually causes the injury complained of by the objector.
                 William Penn, 346 A.2d at 282; see also Worthington [v.
                 Mount Pleasant Twp.], 212 A.3d 582, 593 (Pa. Cmwlth.
                 2019)] (“theoretical concerns do not satisfy the legal
                 requirement that [the objector] have a substantial, direct,
                 and immediate interest to have standing”); Laughman [v.
                 Zoning Hearing Bd. of Newberry Twp., 964 A.2d 19, 23
                 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)] (a mere concern of remote
                 consequences is not direct because all citizens share
                 concerns regarding traffic and safety).
Lodge v. Robinson Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 283 A.3d 910, 926 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2022).
        In this instance,8 Boas testified before the Zoning Board that he resides along
Slippery Rock Creek, “about seven or eight miles” from the Property. R.R. at 167a.

        6
            Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by Act of December 21, 1988, P.L.
1329.

        7
         Added by Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329, 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(1).
        8
        The relevant case law offers conflicting guidance regarding the proper standard of review
regarding standing in zoning matters. In Lodge, we stated that an appellate court is bound by the
(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                                5
Boas’ residence is thus not in close proximity to the Property and its location,
standing alone, cannot support a determination that he has standing in this matter.
See Laughman, 964 A.2d at 22. Boas also stated that he is an avid kayaker who
regularly spends time on the Creek, which abuts the Property, often passes by the
Property while kayaking to-and-from his home downstream, and is concerned that
pollution from the proposed cold-mix asphalt plant (whose placement on the
Property would not be allowed absent the Property’s rezoning) will negatively affect
his ability to use and enjoy the Creek. See R.R. at 167a-71a. Such concerns, however,
are merely speculative at this juncture, and cannot serve as a basis for conferring
standing upon him. Worthington, 212 A.3d at 593. Consequently, we conclude that
Boas was not aggrieved in this instance and dismiss him from this matter for lack of
standing.
       With that question resolved, we now turn to the substance of the arguments
posed by Marcia Carnahan, Donald M. Carnahan, and Christopher Coleman

credibility and evidentiary weight determinations made by the factfinder regarding an individual’s
standing and, thus, is limited to applying a narrow abuse of discretion and error of law standard of
review to such a determination. 283 A.3d at 925-26. However, more recently in South Bethlehem,
the Supreme Court noted that “[s]tanding exists as a jurisprudential doctrine to protect the courts
and the public from improper plaintiffs” and went on to “find” that the appellant in that matter
lacked standing to appeal an adverse zoning ruling, due to his failure to articulate a substantial,
direct, and immediate interest in the outcome of that ruling, without expressing any apparent
deference to the factfinder. See 294 A.3d at 446-48. Given the Supreme Court’s treatment of
standing in South Bethlehem, as well as its observations in other cases that “[s]tanding is a
justiciability concern, implicating a court’s ability to adjudicate a matter[,]”Papenfuse, 261 A.3d
at 481, and that “[j]usticiability questions are issues of law, over which our standard of review is
de novo and the scope of review is plenary[,]” Robinson Township, Washington County v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 917 (Pa. 2013), we conclude that Lodge is not
consistent with Supreme Court precedent in the context of standing. This is somewhat of an
academic point here, though, because the Board also effectively found that Boas lacked standing,
despite its ultimate failure to grant Heilman’s motion.
                                                 6
(Remaining Appellants).9 As they did when before the Zoning Board and Common
Pleas, Remaining Appellants assert that Ordinance No. 2020-1 is substantively
invalid with regard to the Property because the Ordinance (a) had spot zoned the
Property; (b) violated article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,10
otherwise known as the Environmental Rights Amendment; (c) contravened the
development objectives laid out in the Township’s Zoning Ordinance11 and Butler
County’s comprehensive plan; and (d) would both harm the public health, safety,
and welfare and potentially create a private nuisance. Appellants’ Br. at 38-59.
Accordingly, Remaining Appellants maintain that the Zoning Board abused its
discretion and committed errors of law by denying their challenge to Ordinance No.
2020-1. Id. at 38.

          9
           As Common Pleas took no additional evidence in this instance, our standard of review is
restricted to determining whether the Zoning Board committed an abuse of discretion or an error
of law in this matter. Penn St., L.P. v. E. Lampeter Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 84 A.3d 1114, 1119
n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). “We may conclude that the [Zoning] Board abused its discretion only if
its findings are not supported by substantial evidence. . . . By ‘substantial evidence’ we mean such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Valley
View Civic Ass’n v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 640 (Pa. 1983). (citations omitted).
         In light of this limited standard of review, we must avoid the inclination to measure and
assess the multitude of factors and considerations that support a zoning ruling, and “must exercise
self-restraint as to substituting our opinions far removed from the particular zoning hearing for the
well-considered decision of [the Zoning Board].” Cohen v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of
Phila., 276 A.2d 352, 355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971). “It is, after all, the sole function of the [Zoning]
Board, in the performance of its role as fact[]finder, to evaluate witness credibility and assign
evidentiary weight.” Lower Allen Citizens Action Grp., Inc. v. Lower Allen Twp. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 500 A.2d 1253, 1258 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (punctuation omitted). Indeed, the “Zoning . . .
Board as fact[]finder is the ultimate judge of credibility and resolves all conflicts in the evidence,”
Eichlin v. Zoning Hearing Board of New Hope Borough, 671 A.2d 1173, 1175 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996),
and has “the power to reject even un-contradicted testimony if it finds it lacking in credibility.”
Lower Allen, 500 A.2d at 1258.

          10
               PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.

          11
               Zoning Ordinance of the Township of Slippery Rock, Butler County, Pa., as amended
(2017).
                                                  7
A zoning ordinance is valid when it promotes public
health, safety or welfare, and its regulations are
substantially related to the purpose the ordinance purports
to serve. Boundary Drive Assocs. v. Shrewsbury Twp. Bd.
of [Sup’rs], . . . 491 A.2d 86 ([Pa.] 1985) (citing Village of
Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, . . .
(1926)). A validity challenge generally attacks zoning on
substantive due process grounds, i.e., whether an
ordinance is substantially related to a legitimate interest.
Springwood Dev. Partners, L.P. v. Bd. of [Sup’rs] of N.
Cornwall Twp., 985 A.2d 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
In Pennsylvania, the constitutionality of a zoning
ordinance is reviewed under a substantive due process
analysis. McGonigle v. L. Heidelberg Twp. Zoning
Hearing Bd., 858 A.2d 663 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Under
such analysis, the party challenging the validity of
provisions of the zoning ordinance must establish that they
are arbitrary and unreasonable and have no substantial
relationship to promoting the public health, safety and
welfare. Id.; see also Open Pantry Food Marts v. Twp. of
Hempfield, . . . 391 A.2d 20 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1978) (court
may declare an ordinance to be an invalid exercise of the
police power only where it is proven that its provisions are
clearly unreasonable and have no relation to public safety).
....
Before a reviewing tribunal may declare a zoning
ordinance unconstitutional, the challenging party must
clearly establish the provisions of the ordinance are
arbitrary and unreasonable. Adams Outdoor Adver., LP v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. of Smithfield Twp., 909 A.2d 469 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2006). . . . A legislative enactment can be
declared void only when it violates the fundamental law
clearly, palpably, plainly and in such a manner as to leave
no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the court. Id. Indeed,
“[w]here the validity of an ordinance is debatable, the
ordinance will be upheld as valid, and if there is room for
difference of opinion as to whether the ordinance is
designed to serve a proper public purpose, the court should
not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body
which enacted the legislation.” Trigona v. Lender, 926
A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) . . . (citing Bilbar
Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Easttown Twp., . . . 141
A.2d 851 (Pa. 1958)).
                               8
Plaxton v. Lycoming Cnty. Zoning Hearing Bd., 986 A.2d 199, 205 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2009).
      As for spot zoning in particular, substantive validity
             challenges [of that nature] have at their conceptual core
             the principle that lawful zoning must be directed toward
             the community as a whole, concerned with the public
             interest generally, and justified by a balancing of
             community costs and benefits. These considerations have
             been summarized as requiring that zoning be in
             conformance with a comprehensive plan for the growth
             and development of the community. Spot zoning is the
             antithesis of lawful zoning in this sense. In spot zoning,
             the legislative focus narrows to a single property and the
             costs and benefits to be balanced are those of particular
             property owners.
             In Appeal of Mulac, . . . 210 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa.] 1965), we
             [defined] “spot zoning” . . . “as a singling out of one lot or
             a small area for different treatment from that accorded to
             similar surrounding land indistinguishable from it in
             character, for the economic benefit of the owner of that lot
             or to his economic detriment is invalid ‘spot’ zoning.”
             Viewed more generally, “spot zoning . . . is an arbitrary
             exercise of police powers that is prohibited by our
             Constitution.” United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City
             of Philadelphia, . . . 635 A.2d 612, 620 ([Pa.] 1993).
             While the size of the zoned tract is a relevant factor in a
             spot zoning challenge, “the most important factor in an
             analysis of a spot zoning question is whether the rezoned
             land is being treated unjustifiably different from similar
             surrounding land.” Schubach v. Silver, . . . 336 A.2d 328,
             336 ([Pa.] 1975).
In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 729 (Pa. 2003). For a
substantive validity challenge based upon an allegation of spot zoning to be
successful, the challenger must prove that the contested ordinance treats a parcel of
land differently than “surrounding land [that is] similar in character[,]” as well as
“that the provisions at issue are arbitrary and unreasonable and that they have no
relation to the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.” Conshohocken
                                           9
Borough v. Conshohocken Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 261 A.3d 582, 596 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021). As concerns regarding an ordinance’s effect upon the public health,
safety, and welfare are part of the spot zoning analysis, we will address Remaining
Appellants’ first and fourth arguments in tandem.
      In denying Appellants’ spot zoning challenge and concluding that Ordinance
No. 2020-1 did not endanger the public health, safety, and welfare, the Zoning Board
found, in relevant part:
             11. The evidence . . . establishes that the . . . Property is
             and was before 2020 adjoined by a parcel that was zoned
             Light Industrial. In addition, the evidence establishes that
             the . . . Property was rezoned along with two other parcels,
             which have been used for salvage yard operations and
             which adjoin the same Light Industrial parcel as the . . .
             Property, so that the effect of the rezoning was to expand
             the Light Industrial [z]one to accommodate existing and
             proposed uses. In addition, the evidence establishes that
             the . . . Property was given a zoning classification that was
             consistent with the uses of adjacent properties which
             include a concrete products manufacturing plant, a salvage
             yard, and a large mining operation.
             ....
             13. Under these circumstances where the rezoned property
             is combined with other previously Light Industrial[-
             ]zoned property, and is being permitted to be used in a
             manner consistent with existing surrounding uses of land,
             . . . the change of the zoning classification to Light
             Industrial for the . . . Property did not constitute improper
             [s]pot [z]oning.
             ....
             20. Although there was evidence presented by residents of
             the area regarding their fears and concerns about how
             Light Industrial uses, or the proposed cold[-]mix asphalt
             facility might harm the neighboring property owners and
             citizens by creating increased industrial and truck traffic
             noise and odors, by causing environmental hazards by
             release of hazardous chemicals and substances during the
             course of the industrial operations that would pollute the

                                          10
             Slippery Rock Creek and cause harm to aquatic and wild
             life in the area, and cause health risks to neighbors, there
             was no scientific or substantive evidence presented to
             demonstrate that such uses including the proposed cold[-]
             mix asphalt facility would cause such harms. In addition,
             there is no evidence, or suggestion, that the uses permitted
             in the Light Industrial [z]oning [d]istricts in other areas of
             [the] Township[,] or elsewhere, are dangerous to the
             health, safety and welfare of the citizens such they should
             not be permitted.
             21. For the above reasons, the [Zoning] Board concludes
             that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the
             health and safety of Township residents would be harmed
             by the change of the zoning classification for the . . .
             Property.
             ....
             23. Although the zoning change was prompted by a single
             company making the request for purposes of
             accommodating that company’s proposed use, there was
             no direct evidence supporting a conclusion that the change
             would not have been granted if proposed by any other
             person, or that that company would be granted the permits
             for its proposed use. The [Zoning] Board finds that there
             is no evidence that the Board of Supervisors was acting
             solely to benefit a single business entity to the exclusion
             of others. Accordingly, the [Zoning] Board concludes
             there is no basis to overturn the action to rezone the . . .
             Property on this basis.
Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (F.F. & C.L.) ¶¶11, 13, 20-21,
23. As cogently explained by Common Pleas, these determinations find ample
support in the record:
             Directly to the south of the subject parcel, in Worth
             Township, is property owned by Allegheny Mineral
             Corporation, which is mined for limestone. [R.R. at 242a].
             Situate[d] directly to the west of the subject parcel, also in
             Worth Township, is property owned by Sidley R.W. Inc.,
             on which is operated a concrete plant. [Id.] Located
             directly to the northwest and situate in both Worth and
             Slippery Rock Townships is property owned by SAC
             Citrus, Inc., which is utilized as a car wash. [Id.] Finally,
             to the north/northeast of the property, yet not quite
                                           11
abutting the subject parcel, are the two parcels owned by
PCS Metals, Inc., that were also rezoned Light Industrial
per Slippery Rock Township Ordinance No. 2020-1.
These two properties are utilized as a scrap yard.
Christopher Coleman and Marcia Carnahan were among a
number of residents who testified before the Zoning . . .
Board as to the general nature of the area and the
properties surrounding the subject parcel. Christopher
Coleman testified that he lives approximately 250 to 300
yards from the subject property. [R.R. at 143a, 153a]. He
also lives [50] yards away from the Sidley R.W. Inc.,
concrete production plant. [Id. at 153a-54a]. One parcel of
property separates his property from the concrete plant.
[Id. at 154a]. He can look out of his kitchen window and
see the entire operation. [Id. at 156a]. The PSC Metals,
Inc., scrap yard is located 500 to 600 yards from his
property. [Id. at 159a-60a]. He further testified the
limestone quarry operated by Allegheny Mineral
Corporation lies to the east and slightly down Stoughton
Road from Marcia Carnahan’s property. [Id. at 160a, 162a].
Marcia Carnahan testified that the PSC Metals, Inc.,
“junkyard” has existed across the street from her house
since 1978 through the present. [Id. at 121a, 135a]. She
further testified that the area is not quiet, [id. at 117a], and
that, “we have trucks coming in and out and we also have
the highway on [Route] 108/New Castle Road.” [Id. at
134a]. The trucks enter and leave from the limestone
quarry owned and operated by Allegheny Mineral
Corporation. [Id. at 102a; see also S.R.R. at 277a] (similar
testimony as to adjacent property uses). During the June 8,
2020[] Board of Supervisors hearing, resident Dennis
Allen testified that the limestone trucks pass right by the
subject property. [S.R.R. at 280a].
Thus, the evidence before the Zoning . . . Board
established that the uses of the properties immediately
abutting three of the four sides of the subject parcel are
industrial in nature, and that the area already sustains
heavy industrial truck use. Additionally, the PSC Metals,
Inc., properties, while not abutting the subject property,
are also utilized for industrial ventures. . . .
With regard to the issue of whether the decision to rezone
the subject property was arbitrary or unreasonable, during
the June 8, 2020 . . . Board of Supervisors public hearing,
                               12
Chairman Paul A. Dickey noted that the Supervisors’
reasoning for including the two PSC Metals, Inc., parcels
in the zoning map change stemmed from these properties
having inadvertently and erroneously not been labeled as
Light Industrial on the previous zoning map, stating,
       [It was the intention of the Planning Commission
       and Supervisors to have the . . .] PSC Metals
       [properties] as [sic] industrial and somehow it got
       mislabeled on the map. That was the whole point in
       having the industrial site up there, is because that
       facility was there when zoning was enacted. And
       until [recently], we all believed that the [PSC]
       Metals [properties were zoned] Light Industrial.
[S.R.R. at 278a]. Also during said meeting, when asked by
a township resident as to what benefit the rezoning would
bring to the [T]ownship, Tracy Frampton, Chairman of the
[Township’s] Planning Commission, testified as follows.
First, he noted that the Planning Commission recognized
that there exist few industrial uses throughout the entire
Township. [S.R.R. at 281a]. He further noted that the
Planning Commission (recognizing that a portion of the
subject property lies in Worth Township) considered that
one of the abutting properties in Worth Township, the
cement factory, has been in industrial use for [60] years or
more. [Id.] He testified that the Planning Commission
reviewed aerial photos of the region, and considered that
industrial uses were already “bleeding” into the area. He
stated the subject parcel appeared to be part of a complex
already served by access roads. [Id. at 281a-82a].
The above evidence demonstrates that pre[]existing
conditions prompted the placement of the [L]ight
[I]ndustrial zone in the northwestern area of the Township
where the [Property] is located, that there exists very little
light industrial use in the entire Township, that the area
wherein the subject parcel lies is already supporting
industrial traffic and industrial uses, and that the subject
property is currently served by access roads that will
support an industrial use. . . .
During the June 8, 2020[] Board of Supervisors[] hearing,
residents expressed concern about possible pollution from
the proposed cold-mix plant. Scott Foreman, an engineer
with HEI-WAY, testified as to the differences between a
hot[-]mix asphalt plant and a cold[-]mix asphalt plant. He
                              13
            testified that the proposed cold[-]mix asphalt plant is
            considerably different from a hot[-]mix plant, as it is much
            smaller, roughly 10 feet by 45 feet, and does not use heat;
            therefore, it does not need or utilize any smokestacks. [Id.
            at 293a, 301a]. Mark Lazzari, [the Township’s] Assistant
            Zoning Officer, noted that special exceptions to zoning
            ordinances (a cold[-]mix asphalt plant being a special
            exception in a [L]ight [I]ndustrial zone) must meet
            specific performance and development standards, which
            standards address fire protection, electric disturbances,
            noise, odors, and air pollution, and that any application for
            a special exception for the cold[-]mix asphalt plant would
            have to meet these standards prior to approval. [Id. at
            294a-96a]. He further testified that there exist zoning
            regulations that can be utilized to minimize impacts on
            residential properties, such as setbacks and screenings. [Id.
            at 296a].
Common Pleas Op., 11/23/22, at 6-10. Furthermore, as the sole arbiter of witness
credibility and evidentiary weight, the Zoning Board was operating well within its
discretion when it deemed Appellants’ testimony unpersuasive regarding the
potential impact of the Property’s rezoning. Eichlin, 671 A.2d at 1175; Lower Allen,
500 A.2d at 1258.
      Remaining Appellants also assert, in the context of this argument, that
Ordinance 2020-1 will harm the public health, safety, and welfare, because the
Property’s rezoning “may” eventually result in the creation of a public nuisance if
and when a cold-mix asphalt plant is erected thereon. Appellants’ Br. at 56-59.
            The courts of the Commonwealth follow the description
            of private nuisance developed in the Restatement (Second)
            of Torts. Private nuisances are “nontrespassory
            invasion[s] of another’s interest in the private use and
            enjoyment of land.” 4 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 821D, p.
            100. [Am. Law. Inst. 1979.]
            Section 822 of the Restatement sets forth the elements of
            liability for private nuisance as follows:
                    One is subject to liability for private nuisance if, but
                    only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion

                                          14
                     of another’s interest in the private use and
                     enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either:
                          (a) intentional and unreasonable, or
                          (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable
                          under the rules controlling liability for
                          negligent or reckless conduct, or for
                          abnormally dangerous conditions or
                          activities.
             [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (Am. Law Inst.
             1979)]. In evaluating a private nuisance claim, the key
             question is whether one person has impaired another
             person’s private right of use or enjoyment of their land.
             The Restatement indicates that []any one of the types of
             conduct that serve in general as the bases for all tort
             liability may invade a person’s private right of use or
             enjoyment of their land.[ Id.] A defendant may be liable
             for the invasion of such use and enjoyment when the
             interference is intentional and unreasonable or the result
             of negligent, reckless or abnormally dangerous conduct.
             Id.
Diess v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 905 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (cleaned up).
In order “to restrain a threatened nuisance it must clearly appear that a nuisance will
necessarily result from a contemplated act which it is sought to enjoin.” Kelly v. City
of Phila., 115 A.2d 238, 241 (Pa. 1955).
             Where [relief] is sought [regarding] an anticipated
             nuisance, it must be shown (a) that the proposed
             construction or the use to be made of property will be a
             nuisance per se; (b) or that, while it may not amount to a
             nuisance per se, under the circumstances of the case a
             nuisance must necessarily result from the contemplated act
             or thing. The injury must be actually threatened, not
             merely anticipated; it must be practically certain, not
             merely probable.
Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Sun Co., 138 A. 909, 912 (Pa.
1927).
      Remaining Appellants do not dispute that a private nuisance does not exist at
this point; instead, they only raise prospective concerns about the potential harm that
                                           15
might result if a cold-mix asphalt plant is built on the Property. Moreover,
Remaining Appellants’ implicit argument that Ordinance No. 2020-1 will itself
potentially create a private nuisance is incorrect. Even if a private nuisance
eventually comes into existence, it would not be directly attributable to the
Property’s rezoning; rather, any such nuisance would be spawned by the precise
manner in which the Property is or will be used, not by the predicate zoning change.
See Diess, 935 A.2d at 905 (a private nuisance results from nontrespassory conduct
that impairs another person’s use and enjoyment of their land). In other words,
Remaining Appellants’ private nuisance argument is far too speculative and
attenuated at this juncture to be viable.
      Thus, in sum, the Zoning Board did not abuse its discretion or commit an error
of law when it rejected Appellants’ spot zoning challenge. There is substantial
evidence to support its determinations that Ordinance No. 2020-1 did not treat the
Property differently than similar, surrounding parcels of land, was not arbitrary or
unreasonable, and did not pose a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.
Remaining Appellants’ first and fourth arguments are therefore without merit.
      Moving on to Remaining Appellants’ second argument, the Environmental
Rights Amendment reads as follows:
             The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
             preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
             values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
             resources are the common property of all the people,
             including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
             resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and
             maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
             This constitutional provision grants two separate rights to
             the people of this Commonwealth. The first right is
             contained in the first sentence, which is a prohibitory
             clause declaring the right of citizens to clean air and pure
             water, and to the preservation of natural, scenic, historic
                                         16
             and esthetic values of the environment. This clause places
             a limitation on the state’s power to act contrary to this
             right, and while the subject of this right may be amenable
             to regulation, any laws that unreasonably impair the right
             are unconstitutional.
             The second right reserved by [the Environmental Rights
             Amendment], set forth in its second sentence, is the
             common ownership by the people, including future
             generations, of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.
             ....
             The third clause of [the Environmental Rights
             Amendment] establishes a public trust, pursuant to which
             the natural resources are the corpus of the trust, the
             Commonwealth is the trustee, and the people are the
             named beneficiaries.
Pa. Env’t Def. Found. v. Com., 161 A.3d 911, 931-32 (Pa. 2017) (citations and
footnote omitted). Thus, the Commonwealth, as trustee, has a fiduciary obligation
             to comply with the terms of the trust and with standards
             governing a fiduciary’s conduct. The explicit terms of the
             trust require the government to “conserve and maintain”
             the corpus of the trust. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. The
             plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain
             implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation,
             diminution, or depletion of our public natural resources.
             As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a duty to act
             toward the corpus of the trust—the public natural
             resources—with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.
Id. at 932 (quoting Robinson Twp, 83 A.3d at 956-57). The term “Commonwealth,”
as used here, “encompasses all agencies and entities of the Commonwealth
government, both statewide and local,” meaning that each one has “a fiduciary duty
to act toward the corpus with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.” Id. at 928 n.23.
      Our Supreme Court, referencing Pennsylvania trust law, has determined that
the Environmental Rights Amendment
             imposes two basic duties on the Commonwealth as the
             trustee. First, the Commonwealth has a duty to prohibit the
             degradation, diminution, and depletion of our public
             natural resources, whether these harms might result from
                                         17
              direct state action or from the actions of private parties.
              Second, the Commonwealth must act affirmatively via
              legislative action to protect the environment. Although a
              trustee is empowered to exercise discretion with respect to
              the proper treatment of the corpus of the trust, that
              discretion is limited by the purpose of the trust and the
              trustee’s fiduciary duties, and does not equate to mere
              subjective judgment.
Id. at 932-33. Consequently, the Township, as a local component of our
Commonwealth’s government, must act in accordance with these duties as trustee
of the environment and the public natural resources within its domain. Furthermore,
the Township must pursue “not only reactive but also anticipatory protection of the
environment [and public natural resources] for the benefit of current and future
generations.” Id. at 919 (quoting Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 963); see id. at 931
(“The second right reserved by [the Environmental Rights Amendment], set forth in
its second sentence, is the common ownership by the people, including future
generations, of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources.”); Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d
at 959.12
       Remaining Appellants’ assertion that Ordinance No. 2020-1 violates the
Environmental Rights Amendment is unviable for largely the same reasons that its
aforementioned spot zoning allegations cannot carry the day. In their brief,
Remaining Appellants argue that
              [p]ermitting an incompatible, “Island of Industry” to
              benefit one particular developer in this community with
              zero considerations of health, safety, quiet enjoyment,

       12
              Within the public trust paradigm of [the Environmental Rights
              Amendment], the beneficiaries of the trust are ‘all the people’ of
              Pennsylvania, including generations yet to come. The trust’s
              beneficiary designation has two obvious implications: first, the
              trustee has an obligation to deal impartially with all beneficiaries and,
              second, the trustee has an obligation to balance the interests of
              present and future beneficiaries.
Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 959.
                                                18
             property values, community welfare, air quality, water
             quality, noise, either citied comprehensive plan, etc. is not
             an action of a reasonably prudent trustee, is penny wise
             and dollar foolish and is the action of a “mere proprietor”
             of the people’s natural resources, which in the
             Commonwealth          of      Pennsylvania    is     clearly
             unconstitutional.
Appellants’ Br. at 52-53. As already mentioned, though, there is substantial evidence
in the record that supports the Zoning Board’s determinations that the Property was
not treated differently than similar, surrounding parcels of land, many of which were
either already zoned for or used for Light Industrial purposes, as well as that rezoning
the Property did not pose a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. In
addition, the Zoning Board specifically rejected Appellants’ Environmental Rights
Amendment-based claim, ruling:
             15. The evidence presented [by Appellants] consisted of
             speculation and nothing more than personal opinions
             based on various experiences and conjecture. It did not
             establish substantive or scientific evidence of
             environmental harm that may befall the area as a result of
             the cold[-]mix asphalt facility, or of any other industrial
             use that might be permitted in a Light Industrial [z]one.
             Furthermore, the impact of any proposed use in the Light
             Industrial [z]one that requires a [s]pecial [e]xception to be
             permitted, such as the cold[-]mix asphalt facility, is
             subject to an examination of its potential environmental
             hazards in conjunction with the special exception
             proceeding.
Decision, F.F. & C.L. ¶15. Given the evidence of record and the Zoning Board’s
broad latitude regarding witness credibility and evidentiary weight determinations,
we see no basis for disturbing its conclusion that Ordinance No. 2020-1 does not
violate the Environmental Rights Amendment.
      Finally, Remaining Appellants’ third argument is, to reiterate, that Ordinance
No. 2020-1 is inconsistent with the development objectives articulated in the
Township’s Zoning Ordinance and Butler County’s comprehensive plan. Remaining

                                          19
Appellants quote part of Section 102 of the Zoning Ordinance and highlight that it
states that one of the Zoning Ordinance’s purposes is “[t]o preserve prime agriculture
and farmland considering topography, soil type and classification and present use.”
Zoning Ordinance § 102.C.; see Appellants’ Br. at 53-54. Remaining Appellants,
however, provide no legal analysis whatsoever regarding this purported clash
between the Zoning Ordinance and Ordinance No. 2020-1. Of even greater concern,
they misleadingly omit another part of Section 102, which provides that the Zoning
Ordinance is also designed “[t]o accommodate reasonable overall community
growth, including population and employment growth and opportunities for
development of a variety of residential dwelling types and nonresidential uses.”
Zoning Ordinance § 102.E. Facilitating the Property’s development by rezoning it
as Light Industrial, i.e., a nonresidential use, certainly comports with the language
used in Section 102.E. As for Butler County’s comprehensive plan, it is well settled
that, though this type of
             plan is a useful tool for properly guiding growth and
             development of the community, it is only intermediate and
             inconclusive steps in the land use planning. Unlike a
             specific and regulatory zoning ordinance, a
             comprehensive plan is, by its nature, an abstract
             recommendation as to desirable approaches to land
             utilization and development of the community.
CACO Three, Inc. v. Bd. of Sup’rs of Huntington Twp., 845 A.2d 991, 995 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2004). As such, a substantive validity challenge cannot be brought against
a zoning ordinance on the basis of its alleged incompatibility with a comprehensive
plan. Briar Meadows Dev., Inc. v. S. Ctr. Twp. Bd. of Sup’rs, 2 A.3d 1303, 1307 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2010); see Section 303(c) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10303(c)
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of [the MPC], no action by the governing
body of a municipality shall be invalid nor shall the same be subject to challenge or
appeal on the basis that such action is inconsistent with, or fails to comply with, the
                                          20
provision of a comprehensive plan.”). Thus, Remaining Appellants’ third argument
is utterly baseless.
                                III. Conclusion
       In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas’ September 7,
2022 order.

                                     __________________________________
                                     ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                      21
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Marcia Carnahan, Donald M.         :
Carnahan, Paul Boas, and           :
Christopher Coleman,               :
                 Appellants        :
                                   :
     v.                            : No. 1082 C.D. 2022
                                   :
Slippery Rock Township Zoning      :
Hearing Board, Slippery Rock       :
Township, and Heilman Pavement     :
Specialties, Inc.                  :

                                 ORDER

     AND NOW, this 8th day of November, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Court of Common Pleas of Butler County’s September 7, 2022 order is AFFIRMED.

                                   __________________________________
                                   ELLEN CEISLER, Judge