Court Opinion

ID: 9913428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 21:06:47.282181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:59.308943
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Littler, 2023-Ohio-4759.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                           ROSS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,                 :
                               :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,        :   Case No. 22CA37
                               :
    v.                         :
                               :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RYAN T. LITTLER,               :   ENTRY
                               :
    Defendant-Appellant.       :   RELEASED 12/26/2023

                                              APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.

Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, Pamela C. Wells, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.

Smith, P.J.

         {¶1} Ryan T. Littler appeals the September 1, 2022 Judgment Entry of

Sentence of the Ross County Court of Common Pleas. Littler asserts a sole

assignment of error challenging the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea,

given that a lack of competency had been suggested earlier during the trial court

proceedings. For the reasons which follow, we find no merit to the assignment of

error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

         {¶2} On February 5, 2021, Mr. Littler was indicted in Case Number

21CR44, for Count One, Aggravated Murder, R.C. 2903.01, with a firearm
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                 2

specification, and Count Two, Murder, R.C. 2903.02, also with a firearm

specification. The indictment alleged that on or about January 6, 2021, purposely

and with prior calculation and design, Littler caused the death of Joseph Sprouse.

The record contains few details surrounding Mr. Sprouse’s death.

      {¶3} Both parties indicate that Mr. Sprouse was shot when Mr. Littler

discovered Sprouse exiting a trailer in Littler’s driveway. The State’s brief

indicates that Littler suspected Sprouse was stealing from him. Littler’s brief

makes the same assertion, but also indicates that Sprouse attacked him. Littler

claims not to have known that it was Sprouse when he shot at the intruder.

      {¶4} Upon arraignment, Littler was appointed counsel and later co-counsel.

On July 2, 2021, Littler’s attorneys filed a Motion for Determination of

Competency. The reason for the motion was set forth as follows:

             Counsel met most recently with Mr. Littler at the Ross County
      Jail on June 10, 2021, 25, and 28 for approximately one or two hours
      each visit. During those meetings it became increasingly obvious to
      counsel for the Defendant that [Littler’s] ability to communicate in a
      rational and coherent fashion was becoming more labored with each
      visit. Mr. Littler’s condition became most obvious during the meeting
      on June 25, when Mr. Littler met with both counsel for the first time.
      It appeared that the addition of new counsel created a reset that further
      effects his ability to assist in his defense.

The trial court granted the motion.

      {¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(G)(3), Kevin J. Edwards, Ph.D., a forensic

psychologist at the Netcare Forensic Center, conducted a forensic evaluation of
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                                                3

Mr. Littler on September 6, 2021. Dr. Edwards prepared a report dated September

13, 2021.1 In the report, Dr. Edwards explained that he conducted a competency

interview approximately two hours in length. During the interview he gathered a

personal history and conducted a mental status examination and a behavioral

observation. Dr. Edwards reviewed documents relating to the criminal

proceedings. Dr. Edwards gave several opinions: (1) Littler did not have a

historical diagnosis, and his current mental condition was not marked by

impairment consistent with a mental disorder; (2) Littler did not meet criteria for

intellectual disability; (3) Littler had intact capacity for factual and rational

understanding of the nature and objective of the legal proceedings against him;

and, (4) Littler was capable in assisting in his own defense. At Littler’s

competency hearing on October 6, 2021, both parties stipulated to Dr. Edwards’

report. Thereafter, the trial court found, having reviewed the report and based

upon the stipulation of both parties, that Littler was competent to proceed to trial. 2

         {¶6} Littler’s case was scheduled for a jury trial. However, on August 19,

2022, Littler entered into a plea agreement to resolve the underlying matter subject

of this appeal and another felony case, 21CR33.3 The record reflects that Littler

1
  The cover letter attached to the report contains an apparent error, showing the date as “September 13, 2020.”
2
  During the proceedings, Littler filed a pro se motion to dismiss the case against him as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Littler also filed a motion to dismiss his counsel. The trial court overruled these motions.
3
  According to the Ross County Clerk of Courts, this case was a two-count indictment, both counts being complicity
to felonious assault and involving different victims. We may take judicial notice of such matters. See State v.
Hazelton, 4th Dist. Washington No. 22CA18, 2023-Ohio-2498, at fn.1.
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                   4

executed a written Plea of Guilty which also set forth the terms of the plea

agreement.

      {¶7} Littler was sentenced on August 26, 2022. During the dispositional

hearing, the trial court heard from several of Joseph Sprouse’s family members.

Mr. Sprouse was a Marine Corps veteran and hero of the war in Iraq. Mr.

Sprouse’s mother and other family members indicated that Mr. Sprouse struggled

with his health and made poor choices when he returned from his service. Littler

also spoke and apologized to Sprouse’s family. When the trial court sentenced

Littler, he described as tragedy the fact that Mr. Sprouse had lost his life and Mr.

Littler, also a veteran, had lost his freedom.

      {¶8} The trial court imposed a prison term of 20 years to life, along with the

mandatory gun specification of 3 years to be served first and consecutively. The

sentence imposed in Case Number 21CR33 was to be served concurrently. The

trial court also awarded restitution to Mr. Sprouse’s mother for funeral expenses.

      {¶9} This timely appeal followed.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      I.     DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WAS
             OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND
             FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
             CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE
             OHIO CONSTITUTION AND CRIM. R. 11(C).
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                   5

                          A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      {¶10} Littler challenges the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of

his plea to aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and the

accompanying firearm specification, R.C. 2941.145. Crim.R. 11(C)(2) governs the

acceptance of guilty pleas by the trial court in felony cases and provides that a trial

court should not accept a guilty plea without first addressing the defendant

personally and:

      (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
          voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges
          and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that
          the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the
          imposition of community control sanctions at the sentencing
          hearing.

      (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
          defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
          contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
          proceed with judgment and sentence.

      (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
          understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the
          rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her,
          to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the
          defendant's favor, and to require the state to prove the
          defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which
          the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself
          or herself.

      {¶11} “Thus, prior to accepting a guilty plea, a ‘court must inform the

defendant that he is waiving his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,

his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his right of compulsory
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                     6

process of witnesses.’ ” State v. Tolle, 2022-Ohio-2839, 194 N.E.3d 410, at ¶ 9

(4thDist.), quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981),

paragraph one of the syllabus. See also Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). “In addition to these

constitutional rights, the trial court must determine that the defendant understands

the nature of the charge, the maximum penalty involved, and the effect of the

plea.” State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347, 2016-Ohio-5487, 71 N.E.3d 180,

¶ 41.

        {¶12} When reviewing a defendant's constitutional rights (right to a jury

trial, right to call witnesses, etc.), a trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(c). Tolle, supra, at ¶ 10; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-

5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 18. In contrast, when reviewing a defendant's non-

constitutional rights (maximum penalty involved, understanding effect of plea,

etc.), a trial court must substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).

Tolle, at ¶11; State v. Veney, supra, ¶ 18. “ ‘[S]ubstantial compliance’ means that

‘under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the

implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.’ ” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-Ohio-4913, at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Puckett, 4th Dist.

Scioto No. 03CA2920, 2005-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 10, citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio

St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977); State v. Carter, 60 Ohio St.2d 34, 396 N.E.2d

757 (1979).
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                     7

         {¶13} In Veney, the Court held as follows regarding the acceptance of guilty

pleas:

               “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the
         plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
         Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea
         unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and
         the Ohio Constitution.” Veney, supra, at ¶ 7, quoting State v.
         Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450 (1996); State v.
         Montgomery, supra, at ¶ 40; State v. Barker, 129 Ohio St.3d 472,
         2011-Ohio-4130, 953 N.E.2d 826, ¶ 9.

See also, Tolle, at ¶ 12. “ ‘It is the trial court's duty, therefore, to ensure that a

defendant “has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its

consequence.” ’ ” Tolle, at ¶ 13, quoting Montgomery at ¶ 40, quoting Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969); State v. Conley, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 19CA1091, 2019-Ohio-4172, at ¶ 34.

         {¶14} When appellate courts evaluate whether a defendant knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered a guilty plea, a court must independently

review the record to ensure that the trial court complied with the Crim.R. 11

constitutional and procedural safeguards. See Tolle, at ¶ 14; State v. Leonhart, 4th

Dist. Washington No. 13CA38, 2014-Ohio-5601, at ¶ 36; State v. Eckler, 4th Dist.

Adams No. 09CA878, 2009-Ohio-7064, at ¶ 48; Veney, supra, at ¶ 13. (Internal

citations omitted.)

                                B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

         {¶15} In his brief, Littler does not assert that the trial court
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                   8

failed to meet the procedural safeguards for acceptance of his plea. Instead, he

argues that because his competency to stand trial was placed at issue earlier in the

proceedings, this somehow affects his competency to enter pleas. Littler contends

that at the plea hearing, the trial court never revisited the competency issue and

allowed him to plead guilty, despite the earlier suggestion in the record. Littler

concludes this omission by the court demonstrates a violation of his due process

rights. Thus, Littler urges us to conclude that his plea was not knowingly and

voluntarily made, must be vacated, and the finding of guilt reversed. For the

reasons which follow, these arguments are completely without merit.

        {¶16} Due process requires a criminal defendant be competent

to stand trial. State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA33, 2021-Ohio-2866, at

¶ 14; see Lechner, supra, at ¶ 25; State v. Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 1995-

Ohio-310, 650 N.E.2d 433. “It has long been accepted that a person who lacks the

capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to

consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to

a trial.” Drope v. Missouri, 95 S.Ct. 896, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). Thus,

“[c]onviction of an accused while he or she is legally incompetent is a violation of

due process.” State v. Merryman, 4th Dist. Athens No. 12CA28, 2013-Ohio-4810,

¶ 14.
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                   9

      {¶17} “ ‘The United States Supreme Court established the test for

competency and requires the court to determine if an accused “has sufficient

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of

the proceedings against him.” ’ ” Smith, at ¶15, quoting Lechner, supra, at ¶ 26,

quoting Dusky v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Ohio has

codified the competency test in R.C. 2945.37(G) as follows:

             A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If,
      after a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the
      evidence that, because of the defendant's present mental
      condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature
      and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of
      assisting in the defendant's defense, the court shall find the
      defendant incompetent to stand trial and shall enter an order
      authorized by section 2945.38 of the Revised Code.

      {¶18} Under the above subjective test, if a defendant is capable of

understanding the nature and objective of the proceedings and assisting in the

defense, then the defendant is competent to stand trial. Smith, supra, at ¶ 16. A

defendant with mental illness or intellectual deficiencies may still be competent to

stand trial. See Lechner, at ¶ 27.

             “Incompetency must not be equated with mere mental or
      emotional instability or even with outright insanity. A defendant
      may be emotionally disturbed or even psychotic and still be
      capable of understanding the charges against him and of assisting
      his counsel.” Lechner, supra, quoting State v. Bock, 28 Ohio
      St.3d 108, 110, 502 N.E.2d 1016 (1986).
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                  10

      {¶19} At Littler’s competency hearing both parties stipulated to the report’s

findings and the trial court found Littler competent to proceed to trial. The

competency standard for entering a plea “is the same as the competency standard

for standing trial.” State v. Morrison, 4th Dist. Adams No. 07CA854, 2008-Ohio-

4913, at ¶ 11. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391, 113 S.Ct. 2680 (1992);

State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1064, ¶ 57; State v. Bolin, 128 Ohio

App.3d 58, 713 N.E.2d 1092 (1998); State v. Jenkins, 3d. Dist. Henry No. 07-05-

06, 2005-Ohio-5616, ¶ 8. However, “ ‘[a] finding that a defendant is competent to

stand trial * * * is not all that is necessary before he may be permitted to plead

guilty or waive his right to counsel.’ ” Morrison, supra, quoting Godinez at 400-

401. As discussed above, “a trial court must satisfy itself whether the waiver of his

constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.” Godinez, supra. (Citations

omitted.)

    {¶20} In Merryman, the appellant appealed his convictions

upon guilty pleas to one count of kidnapping and two counts of rape. He first

argued that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him competent to stand

trial because although two defense experts evaluated him and found him not

competent, the trial court credited the state’s expert who did find competency.

Merryman argued that due to some evidence of incompetency, his plea was not
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                               11

voluntary and violated his due process rights. This court rejected both arguments.

We observed:

           The crux of Merryman's argument that his pleas were not
       voluntary is based on his assertion that he was incompetent to
       make the plea because Dr. Bram's and Dr. Reardon's reports find
       him incompetent to stand trial. However, we have already
       concluded that the trial court properly found Merryman
       competent to stand trial in spite of expert testimony to the
       contrary. Therefore, we reject Merryman's underlying premise
       that he was not competent to enter a guilty plea. It follows, ipso
       facto, that his “voluntariness” argument is meritless.

Merryman, at ¶ 38. We concluded:

        Although Merryman does not specifically contend that the trial
       court failed to satisfy the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), a
       review of the record indicates that the trial court properly advised
       Merryman of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty
       involved, the effect of the plea, as well as all of the rights
       Merryman was waiving by pleading guilty. The record indicates
       that Merryman understood the consequences of his plea and
       understood what rights he was waiving. Thus, we cannot say that
       Merryman's plea was anything but knowingly and voluntarily
       made.

Id. at ¶ 39.

   {¶21} In Smith, supra, from the the beginning of the proceedings Smith was

uncooperative and belligerent, refused to acknowledge his legal name, interrupted

the judge and his attorney, filed various irregular documents pro se, refused to

acknowledge the court’s jurisdiction, and had to be removed from the courtroom

during the trial court proceedings. During Smith’s jury trial, he was removed to

jail due to his behavior. He watched the trial proceedings from the remote
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                12

location, except for his own testimony. On appeal, Smith claimed that the trial

court abused its discretion in determining he was competent to stand trial during

the pretrial proceedings. However, based upon our review of the record, we did

not agree. Like Littler, Smith had a court-ordered competency evaluation, was

found competent and capable of assisting in his own defense, and the parties

stipulated to the competency report at the competency hearing. We found, despite

Smith’s multiple and repeated outbursts and objections, the record demonstrated

that the trial court handled Smith’s competency determination properly and in

accordance with the controlling statutes.

      {¶22} As previously discussed, the parties stipulated to Dr. Edwards’ report

at Littler’s competency hearing and the trial court made a finding of competency.

And as noted above, the competency standard for entering a plea is the same as for

standing trial. Given that Littler has not challenged his plea on any other basis, our

analysis could safely end here. Nevertheless, we will briefly examine the plea

colloquy.

      {¶23} We note that after the prosecutor explained the terms of the plea

agreement, to which Littler’s counsel acknowledged understanding of the terms,

the trial court addressed Littler as follows:

         Mr. Littler, before I can accept your pleas in both of these
      cases, I need to ask you a series of questions to make sure you
      understand the nature of these proceedings and any potential
      penalties that you are facing.
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                             13

The court asked Littler’s name, age, date of birth, educational level, fluency

in English, ability to read and write, and citizenship and military status.

Littler responded appropriately and affirmatively. The colloquy continued

in pertinent part:

      Court:         All right, are you presently under the
                     influence of any medication, drugs,
                     or alcohol?

      Defendant: No, Your Honor.

      Court:         Do you now or have you ever suffered from any
                     mental illness, disease, or incapacity?

      Defendant: No, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)

      ***

      Court:         Has anybody threatened or coerced you into
                     entering this [sic] pleas today?

      Defendant: No, Your Honor.

      Court:         Aside from the plea negotiation has anyone
                     promised you anything in exchange for your pleas?

      Defendant: No, Your Honor.

      Court          Now, Mr. Marks has read into the record the terms
                     of the plea agreement that you have reached with
                     the state. Did you hear what the prosecuting
                     attorney just said?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                      14

      Court:      Is that the same information you discussed with
                  your attorneys before today’s hearing?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      ***

      Court:      Do you have any specific questions for the court
                  about the terms of that plea agreement?

      Defendant: No, Your Honor.

      ***

      Court:      *** Did you have an opportunity to review those
                  plea forms with your attorneys?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      ***

      Court:      Do you believe you understood what those plea
                  forms said?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      Court:      And did you voluntarily sign those plea
                  forms?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      Court:      Do you understand that by signing the plea forms
                  you are making a complete admission of your guilt
                  to the charges listed in those plea forms?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      Court:      All right. You understand that while you and the
                  state have presented to the court a recommendation
                  for sentencing this court does not have to accept it?
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                 15

      Defendant: That is correct Your Honor.

      ***

      Court:        All right. Knowing that the court is not obligated to
                    follow the plea recommendation do you still wish to
                    proceed with your plea today?

      Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.

      {¶23} As in Smith, the trial court handled Littler’s competency

determination properly and in accordance with the controlling statutes. As in

Merryman, Littler has not specifically contended that the trial court failed to satisfy

the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2). However, as in Merryman, our review of

the trial court proceedings herein convinces us that the trial court properly advised

Littler of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty involved, the effect of

the plea, as well as all the rights Littler was waiving by pleading guilty. The

record herein indicates that Mr. Littler understood the consequences of his plea and

understood what rights he was waiving. Therefore, we cannot find that Mr.

Littler’s plea was anything but knowingly and voluntarily made.

      {¶24} Based on the foregoing, we find no merit to Littler’s argument in this

appeal. Accordingly, we overrule the sole assignment of error and affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                              JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Ross App. No. 22CA37                                                                  16

                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed to
Appellant.

      The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON
BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR
THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant
to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the
pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the
Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hess, J., & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                 For the Court,

                                 __________________________________
                                 Jason P. Smith
                                 Presiding Judge

                             NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.