Court Opinion

ID: 9628230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:13:25.137103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:00.915172
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McINTYRE,
dissenting.
Hereafter no purchaser can buy real estate in Wyoming, no lending institution can make a loan thereon and no title insurance company can insure the title thereto with reliance upon the 90-day lien affidavit which has been used in this state from time immemorial.
The lien as filed and claimed in this case covers only work and materials furnished and billed for on or about October 31, 1956. Not a single item, lienable or otherwise, was added to the account subsequent to that date. On December 12, 1956 Natrona Roofing Co. gave a ten-year .guarantee on the roof. Then on March 29, 1957 Simpson claims Mr. Lierd called and said his building was leaking on the west wall. Regarding that call Mr. Simpson testified: “Well, I took it for granted it was the Shell Building, and I went down there, and sure enough it was a-leaking on the west wall bad.”
He then related that he and Mr. May, the new owner of Natrona Roofing Co., used about a gallon of plastic cement along that west wall. He testified that neither he nor Mr. May did any further work after that. Whether the work on March'29, 1957, requiring less than an hour in time, was done in fulfillment of the guarantee or gratuitously or as a separate job, plaintiff did not pretend to say. It is apparent, however, that such work was not added to the October 31, 1956 account. It was not claimed in the lien filing as an additional lienable item.
Thus, it seems to me, the account lacked continuity from October 31, 1956 to March 29,1957 — or to such other date as the majority opinion purports to fix as the date upon which the original indebtedness accrued. Such continuity would obviously be essential to make the filing on May 8, 1957 effective. Inasmuch as the last item included in the lien statement, as filed, dated back to October 31, 1957, more than 90 days prior to the May 8, 1957 filing, it cannot be said that plaintiff has complied with the provisions of § 29-11, W.S.1957, in asserting his lien.
If the time which is restricted by the statute can be thus indefinitely extended by acts of this kind, the (90-day) limitation fixed by the legislature in which to file this class of lien can and will be utterly and completely defeated, so that in every case where a right to file a lien has ever existed, the title to the property may for an indefinite period remain in an unsettled and not ascertainable condition, with reference to the character and extent of the mechanic’s lien which may be claimed against such property. For this statement and holding see Gatchell v. Henderson, 156 Neb. 1, 54 N.W.*9162d 227; Disbrow & Co. v. Peterson, 136 Neb. 719, 287 N.W. 220; Gem State Lumber Co. v. Witty, 37 Idaho 489, 217 P. 1027. Also see 57 C.J.S. Mechanics’ Liens § 144, p. 661, for the following:
“After a contract is substantially completed there must be no unnecessary or unreasonable delay in fully completing the work; and the time for filing a lien cannot be extended by a delay for a considerable time to do a small piece of work necessary to full completion * *
To the same effect are Fox & Co. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Baker City, 107 Or. 557, 215 P. 178, 179; General Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Schwartz Bros. Commission Co., 165 Mo. 171, 65 S.W. 318, 321; 10 Thompson on Real Property (1957 Replacement) § 5217.
We are dealing here with a situation where the owner was not a party to the contract involved and had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, that plaintiff was claiming the obligation and right to do “completion work.” In the meantime said owner had accepted the building as a finished job, had paid the original contractor in full and had put a tenant into possession. The requirements of due process of law, if not of equity, should operate to compel the subcontractor-plaintiff to put the owner on notice in some manner, if the subcontractor is going to claim a continuing right, without continuing work and without the knowledge of owner, beyond the statutory 90-day period.