Court Opinion

ID: 9393369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 23:02:14.186774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:52.924232
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/9/23 P. v. Villalobos CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
  California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                      or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E078380

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. INF1701501)

 HILARIO VILLALOBOS,                                                      OPINION

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Charles J. Koosed, Judge.

Affirmed with directions.

         Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, and

Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                              1
       A jury convicted Hilario Villalobos of committing numerous sex offenses against

his minor nephew. On appeal, Villalobos contends that the trial court erred by not

instructing the jury on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome and that defense

counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to an amendment to the

information after the prosecution rested. He also argues that there are errors in the

sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment. We correct those clerical errors,

but we otherwise affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       John Doe was born in January 2003. Villalobos was born in December 1976 and

is Doe’s great-uncle. Doe met Villalobos in 2014. Villalobos lived with Mary B. Doe

visited Villalobos on weekends.

       In January 2018, Villalobos was charged by information with (1) two counts of

aggravated sexual assault by means of forcible oral copulation with a child under 14

years old (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(4), counts 1 & 4); (2) three counts of aggravated

sexual assault by means of sodomy with a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 269,

subd. (a)(3), counts 2, 5, & 7); (3) two counts of aggravated sexual assault by means of

sexual penetration with a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(5), counts

3 & 6); and (4) one count of making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, count 8).

(Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Count 7 was amended after the

prosecution’s case-in-chief to allege one count of sodomy by force on a minor 14 years

old or older. (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C) (section 286(c)(2)(C).)

                                             2
       Doe testified at trial, when he was 18 years old. Sometime around July 2015, Doe

spent the night at Mary’s and was going to sleep in the same bed as Villalobos. When

Doe got into the bed, Villalobos started touching him. Villalobos pulled down Doe’s

underwear, touched Doe’s penis, and rubbed Doe’s penis up and down. Doe described

the incident in detail.

       One week later, Villalobos told Doe that he “couldn’t say anything because

something would happen.” Villalobos did not explain what he meant, but the threat

caused Doe to be fearful.

       Doe did not tell anyone about the incident because he feared that adults would not

believe him. Doe did not go to Mary’s house to visit Villalobos again.

       In mid-2016, Doe, his mother, and his stepfather moved into a two-bedroom

apartment in the city where Villalobos lived. Two months later, in October or November

2016, Villalobos moved into the apartment with Doe’s family. Villalobos spent his first

night at the apartment in Doe’s twin bed with Doe. Villalobos touched and sucked Doe’s

penis, licked and sucked Doe’s buttocks, and ejaculated. Doe described the incident in

detail. Doe did not tell anyone about what had happened because he was afraid that

Villalobos “would do something to” him.

       Two days after Villalobos moved in, Villalobos and Doe switched bedrooms and

had separate beds. Villalobos continued to touch and to suck Doe’s penis approximately

three to four times per week. Villalobos also inserted his finger into Doe’s anus, made

Doe touch his penis, and put his penis in Doe’s mouth.

                                            3
       After living with Doe’s family for two months, Villalobos attempted to penetrate

Doe’s anus with his penis. Villalobos thereafter penetrated or attempted to penetrate

Doe’s anus with the tip or the head of his erect penis about once per week. Doe also

testified that Villalobos did not “get his penis inside of [Doe’s] butt.” Doe explained:

“He was never successful. Just the tip.”

       Doe testified that the other sexual behavior continued at a rate of three to four

times per week throughout the period that Villalobos and Doe shared a room. Doe’s

attempts to push Villalobos away or to get away from Villalobos were mostly

unsuccessful, because Villalobos would push Doe down, overpower Doe, and force Doe

to submit.

       In late July 2017, when Doe was a freshman in high school, Doe told a school

therapist that he felt unsafe at home and was suicidal. Doe told the therapist that he was

keeping a secret that involved a person in his family.

       A law enforcement officer arrived at Doe’s residence later that day and took Doe

and his mother to the police station. Two officers interviewed Doe. Doe disclosed that

Villalobos had sexually abused him. Doe told the officers that among other things

Villalobos had penetrated Doe’s anus with the tip of his erect penis approximately four

times per week. Doe said that Villalobos would force him into the bed. Doe said that

Villalobos had last penetrated his anus with his penis one week earlier. Villalobos had

“just stopped” because that week Doe threatened to tell his therapist, whom Doe was

seeing because he was suicidal. Doe said that Villalobos first sexually abused him two

                                             4
years earlier when Doe was visiting Villalobos at Villalobos’s house. Doe expressed

concern about something happening to Villalobos because Doe’s mother was not working

and Villalobos helped pay the rent.

        After the interview, officers took Doe to a hospital, where a forensic medical

examination was conducted. Photographs of Doe’s anus were taken as part of the

examination. The photographs revealed that the entire surface of the anus appeared red

and irritated and that some tissue had an “increased area of vascularity” or appeared “a

little fuller.”

        A follow-up examination was conducted approximately two and one-half weeks

later. Photographs of Doe’s anus were taken at that examination too. No redness,

irritation, or fullness of any tissue was depicted in the photographs taken at the follow-up

examination. The photographs depicted “a normal exam.”

        Asked to assume that Doe had disclosed that he “had suffered from chronic

continuous forced sodomy ending approximately a week or more” before the first

examination, a forensic medical examination expert confirmed that the differences

depicted in photographs of Doe’s anus from the two examinations “could be consistent

with” Doe’s having been sexually abused.

        The month after Doe reported the abuse, Denise Bowman conducted a second

forensic interview of Doe. The additional interview was conducted because Doe had

newly disclosed that Villalobos had used a gun. In the second interview, Doe told

Bowman that when Villalobos sexually abused him, Villalobos would display a gun by

                                             5
placing it on a desk. Villalobos would threaten to kill Doe and Doe’s mother with the

gun, and then he would anally penetrate Doe.

       Bowman explained that for some child victims of sexual abuse, the child discloses

details of the abuse piecemeal, so that the child can assess how the information is

received. Disclosing additional information after an initial, more limited disclosure is

common. Bowman explained that in addition most children do not disclose abuse

“immediately.” Bowman explained that there are many reasons why children delay

disclosure, and she opined that delayed disclosure is common. If a perpetrator tells a

child to keep abuse a secret, then that could affect a child victim’s ability to disclose.

Bowman explained how and why child victims of sexual abuse often provide inconsistent

accounts of the abuse.

       Villalobos testified on his own behalf. He denied ever having sexually abused

Doe. Villalobos’s brother, a nephew, and Mary’s son testified on Villalobos’s behalf.

       The jury convicted Villalobos of two counts of aggravated sexual assault by means

of forcible oral copulation with a child under 14 years old (§ 269, subd. (a)(4), counts 1 &

4) and one count of making criminal threats (§ 422, count 8). The jury also convicted

Villalobos of five counts of attempted aggravated sexual assault by means of sexual

penetration or sodomy with a child under 14 years old (§ 269, subd. (a)(3), (5), counts 2,

3, 5, 6, & 7.) The trial court sentenced Villalobos to an aggregate term in state prison of

46 years and two months to life.

                                               6
                                       DISCUSSION

A. Jury Instruction on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome

       Villalobos argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the

jury on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome in light of Bowman’s testimony.

We are not persuaded.

       1. Relevant Proceedings

       Defense counsel requested that the jury be instructed with CALCRIM No. 1193

concerning child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. CALCRIM No. 1193 provides

in relevant part: “You have heard testimony from [named expert] regarding child sexual

abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome

relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases.

Testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior

of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse.” (Italics added.)

       The court and counsel initially discussed the jury instructions off the record. The

court later addressed defense counsel’s request for CALCRIM No. 1193 on the record.

The court indicated that it was not inclined to give the instruction because the term child

sexual abuse accommodation syndrome had never been introduced into evidence, so the

instruction would probably confuse the jury.

       With respect to an unspecified concern that defense counsel had expressed off the

record concerning Bowman’s testimony, the court stated that it believed “that the expert

instruction covers that.” The court told defense counsel: “If you don’t think that it does,

                                               7
you’re certainly free to present a special instruction if you like and I’ll consider it. If you

don’t think that—if your goal is to make sure that this jury is instructed that what

[Bowman] said was—you know, doesn’t mean [Villalobos] did anything, because all

she’s doing is reporting what she’s being told from the person and then giving her

background and experience, I think all of that is covered in the expert instruction. But if

you feel it’s not, please provide a special to me. But this particular one, [CALCRIM No.]

1193, I don’t think is applicable given the way the evidence is presented.” Defense

counsel said that he would review “the testimony again to see if I need to or not.” No

special instruction was requested or given.

       2. Analysis

       A “court may properly refuse an instruction offered by the defendant if it

incorrectly states the law, is argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing

[citation], or if it is not supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Moon (2005) 37

Cal.4th 1, 30 (Moon); People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 558 (Bolden).) We

independently review claims of instructional error. (People v. Lopez (2021) 73

Cal.App.5th 327, 336.)

       Bowman did not testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.

No evidence was otherwise admitted about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.

There consequently was not substantial evidence to support an instruction on the

syndrome. The trial court accordingly did not err by failing to instruct the jury with

                                               8
CALCRIM No. 1193. (Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 30; Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

p. 558.)

       Villalobos argues that the jury nevertheless should have been instructed with

CALCRIM No. 1193 because “Bowman addressed multiple components of the syndrome

in her testimony, including delayed disclosure, secrecy, and unconvincing disclosure.”

The argument lacks merit. There is no evidence in the record that the concepts testified

to by Bowman were related to child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Nothing in

CALCRIM No. 1193 would inform the jury about how to assess Bowman’s testimony

about delayed discovery, secrecy, or unconvincing disclosure because the instruction

does not mention any of those concepts. Rather, it addresses “child sexual abuse

accommodation syndrome,” (CALCRIM No. 1193) a term that was never used in

Bowman’s testimony.

       For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to

instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193.

B. Amendment of Count 7

       Villalobos contends that after the prosecution concluded its case-in-chief the trial

court granted his oral motion for acquittal on count 7 pursuant to section 1118.1, and the

court therefore erred by replacing that count with a lesser related offense. Villalobos also

argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

amendment. The People counter that the argument is meritless because the court did not

grant the motion for acquittal. We agree with the People.

                                              9
       1. Relevant Proceedings

       Count 7 of the information alleged that on or between January 21, 2017, through

July 17, 2017, Villalobos committed aggravated sexual assault by means of sodomy with

a child under 14 in violation of section 269, subdivision (a)(3) (section 269(a)(3)). After

the prosecution rested, defense counsel moved under section 1118.1 for acquittal on

count 7 because Doe was 14 years old during the alleged period. The prosecutor agreed

that Doe was 14 years old during the alleged period and asked to proceed with an alleged

violation of section 286(c)(2)(C) as a lesser included offense. Defense counsel submitted

on the prosecutor’s request, and the trial court granted the prosecutor’s request.

       The court asked the clerk if it would be easier for the clerk if the court dismissed

count 7 as it was charged and add a count 9 “or just allow [the prosecutor] to modify it in

the amended to reflect the [section] 286(c)(2)(C)?” The clerk responded, “We can amend

it.” The court asked the prosecutor and defense counsel if that was acceptable, and both

agreed that it was.

       The court clarified with the prosecutor that in section 286(c)(2)(C) the prosecutor

was referring to “the language of any person that commits an act of sodomy with another

person who is a minor 14 years of age or older when that act is accomplished against the

victim’s will by means of force, duress, menace, or fear of immediate unlawful bodily

injury on the victim or another person.” The prosecutor confirmed that the court had

identified the correct section. The court explained that it did not believe it needed to tell

the jury that the count was being modified or instruct them about the modification

                                             10
because “they haven’t memorized what the counts or charges are, and we’re not adding a

count. It’s just being amended to a lesser charge due to the age as testified to by the

minor.” The parties agreed.

       The minute order reflecting that day’s proceedings states that the court entertained

argument on Villalobos’s oral motion to dismiss under section 1118.1 and that “Oral

motion by People re Amend Count 7 is called for hearing. [¶] Motion/Petition granted.

[¶] Court amends Count 07 to a violation of [section 286(c)(2)(C)]. [¶] [Section] 1118.1

Penal Code motion made by defense counsel is Denied.”

       Count 7 was amended to allege that on or between January 21, 2017, through

July 17, 2017, Villalobos committed sodomy by force on a minor 14 years old or older in

violation of section 286(c)(2)(C).

       After both sides rested, the court addressed the need to arraign Villalobos on the

amended information as to count 7. The court stated: “So there was a discussion about

Count 7. And defense had made [a section] 1118.1. People had submitted. It had been

granted. People had asked leave to amend to change Count 7 to the sodomy of a child

over 14 but under 18. That request was granted. And the clerk had asked [the

prosecutor] to provide an Amended Information as to Count 7.” Defense counsel

acknowledged that he had received the amended information, waived a formal reading of

it, stipulated to an advisement of constitutional rights, and entered a plea of not guilty.

       The court asked counsel whether they had reviewed the newly added instruction to

address the amended offense in count 7. Defense counsel responded: “Yes. And just to

                                              11
clarify one thing, your Honor. I think there was some discussion about instead of

amending Count 7, adding a Count 9. The reason why I’m bringing that up is—is when

there’s a [section] 1118.1 granted, they cannot refile those charges. But this wasn’t a

situation where that actually occurred. It was more amending according to proof and

adding a different count. We had all agreed it would just be easier and simpler to just

amend Count 7. The defense was in agreement with that.” The court responded, “Okay.

Thank you.”

       2. Analysis

       Villalobos contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by failing to object to the amendment of count 7 because the trial court had

granted Villalobos’s motion under section 1118.1 for acquittal on count 7 and thus could

not amend count 7 to allege a violation of the lesser related offense under section

286(c)(2)(C). We do not agree with Villalobos’s characterization of the record.

       The record reflects that at the hearing on Villalobos’s motion for acquittal the trial

court granted the prosecution’s motion to amend count 7 to conform to proof instead of

granting Villalobos’s motion for acquittal. The minute order from that hearing accurately

states that the trial court denied Villalobos’s motion for acquittal and granted the

prosecution’s motion to amend the count according to proof.1

1       In his opening brief, Villalobos also contends that the minute order from the
hearing on the motion for acquittal indicates “that the entry of judgment of acquittal took
place prior to the amendment to the pleading.” In his reply brief, Villalobos concedes
that the People “correctly note[] that the minutes do not contain an entry of judgment of
acquittal as to count seven.”

                                             12
       Villalobos’s argument to the contrary is based on the trial court’s misstatement at

a later hearing, when the court summarized its prior ruling arraigning Villalobos on the

amended information. At that hearing, the trial court did say it had previously granted

Villalobos’s section 1118.1 motion on count 7. Villalobos contends that the trial court’s

statement at the arraignment hearing created “some confusion” as to whether the acquittal

motion had been granted. We do not agree. The record from the prior hearing reflects

that the motion was not granted. Moreover, at the arraignment hearing, defense counsel

cleared up any possible confusion. Defense counsel explained that the court had not

granted the acquittal motion but instead had amended the count according to proof.

Defense counsel’s description of what happened at the prior hearing was accurate.

       Villalobos’s only claim of ineffective assistance is that defense counsel should

have objected to the amendment of count 7 because the trial court granted the motion for

acquittal on that count. Because the trial court did not grant that motion, we reject the

ineffective assistance claim.

C. Clerical Error

       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that Villalobos did not have the

ability to pay, so the court struck all applicable fines and fees. The sentencing minute

order and the abstract of judgment nevertheless reflect that the court imposed a $300

restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and a suspended $300 parole revocation fine

(§ 1202.45, subd. (c)).

                                             13
       “When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and

the minute order, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Morales (2014) 224

Cal.App.4th 1587, 1594.) We have the inherent authority to correct an abstract of

judgment or a minute order that does not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the trial

court. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)

       The parties agree, and we concur, that the sentencing minute order and the abstract

of judgment should be corrected to reflect that the court did not impose fines under

section 1202.4 or section 1202.45. We remand to the trial court to correct the sentencing

minute order and the abstract of judgment accordingly.

                                      DISPOSITION

       We direct the trial court to amend the sentencing minute order and the abstract of

judgment to reflect that the court did not impose fines under section 1202.4 or section

1202.45 and to forward certified copies of the amended documents to the Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
                                                               MENETREZ
                                                                                             J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                Acting P. J.
MILLER
                          J.

                                            14