Court Opinion

ID: 9811952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:33:48.910938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:08.074837
License: Public Domain

Beown, J.,
concurring: I concur in the judgment of the Court ordering • a new trial and a repleader in this case, but I differ from my brethren in the view that they take of tbe instrument under consideration. The language used in the timber deed is as follows: “And said party of tbe second part accepts this deed with the condition that he, his heirs and assigns, will erect no mill on the streams leading into the fish pond on said land, which, with thirty acres adjoining the same, had been leased to E. H. Lee and others for fishing and bunting.”
I am of opinion that the language used shows clearly that a condition subsequent was annexed to the-grant at tbe time of its execution, forfeiture of which entitled tbe plaintiffs to a restoration of the property granted and-for damages for such of it as has been destroyed since the breach of the condition. The language contained in the deed is peculiarly clear and expressive, and leaves no doubt in my mind as' to tbe intent of tbe parties. Tbe grantee is made to accept tbe deed upon tbe condition and terms embodied in tbe grant.
*402' It is well settled that the intention of the parties to the instrument is to govern, and that such intention is to be gathered from a reasonable and natural interpretation of the words used. The parties to this instrument have not used the words ordinarily employed to express a covenant or an agreement to do or not to do a particular thing. They have used the only words in the English language that will express their meaning without resort to the context. They have said that the timber is granted “with condition,” and the grantee, upon the face of the deed, is made to accept the deed with the condition expressed. There is nothing in this condition that is unreasonable or contrary to the policy of the law. There is no reason for misinterpreting this language or perverting its real meaning. The words are such that they speak for themselves. In Such case the manifest intention of the party is always given effect. 8 R. C. L., III.
The owners of this property had a right to impose such conditions as they saw fit when they conveyed it.
It is well settled that owners of land may annex any condition to a conveyance of it as he sees fit, provided it is not against public policy. Cowell v. Springs, 100 U. S., 55; Plumber v. Tuggs, 41 N. Y., 442.
In R. R. Co. v. Singer, 49 Minn., 301, the language creating the condition is very similar to the language employed in this instrument. In that ease it appears on the face of the instrument that it was accepted on condition that intoxicating liquors should not be sold on the premises. The Court held that the words created a condition subsequent, a breach of which forfeited the estate.
In Firth v. Morovich, 116 Pac., 129, the Court upheld a forfeiture on .-account of breach of building requirements.
Thomas v. Record, 47 Me., 500. A forfeiture was held in case of .failure to support.
In Sperry v. Pond (Ohio), 24 Am. Dec., forfeiture was had for failure to maintain a grist mill.
Taylor v. Sutton, 15 Ga., 103, holds that any reasonable condition is good as a condition when not against public policy.
There are many cases upholding forfeiture for conditions broken as to maintaining liquor place. Cowell v. Colonnade Springs Co., 100 U. S., 61.
I differ with my learned brother as to his construction of the case of R. R. v. Carpenter, 165 N. C., 465. That was a grant of leave to the railroad company for purpose of building railroad tracks and other structures incident to the operation of a railroad. The word condition is not used in the deed, and it is not specified that the grantee “accepts the deed upon condition.” The language used is that the conveyance is made upon consideration. There is a proviso in the deed as follows; *403“Provided said railroad locates or causes to be located within 12 months from this date — a sidetrack, flag station, and other conveniences given ■other mill companies at some suitable point on said manufacturing company’s lands.” This proviso, it was contended, was a condition subsequent, and that the failure to locate the station within the 12 months forfeited the grant. The Court held that the failure to locate the grant within the 12 months did not forfeit the estate granted.
A perusal of that case will show that taking the deed as a whole, there is no intention to create a forfeiture, as I think is clearly manifested in the deed from the plaintiffs in this case to the defendant.
I do not think it is necessary that the common-law cer'gmony of a reentry should be performed, as a condition precedent to the prosecution ■of this action, whatever necessity there may have anciently been for such a proceeding, the reason for it ceased with the disappearance of the fictions and devices resorted to to maintain the old action of ejectment. Plumb v. Tuggs, supra; Cornelius v. Ivins, 26 N. J. Law, 376; Ruck v. Rock Island, 97 U. S., 693; Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N. C., 275. In the latter case the condition expressed in the deed was decided to be a condition subsequent,f and the Court based its decision upon the fact that the intention of the parties was plainly expressed in the instrument itself.
In the case at bar I fail to see what apter words could be used to express the intention of the parties than those which they have employed.
The Chief Justice concurs in this opinion.