Court Opinion

ID: 9928365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:03:21.074386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:04.540092
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    IN THE MATTER OF THE                      §
    PETITION OF JOSEPH BUDNER                 §
    ELAD FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS                 § No. 417, 2023
    CORPUS                                    §

Before VALIHURA, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

                                           ORDER

         This 30th day of January, 2024, it appears to the Court that:

         (1)    The petitioner, Joseph Budner Elad, is the defendant in ejectment

proceedings filed by Truist Bank in the Superior Court concerning property located

at 2700 Philadelphia Pike, Claymont, Delaware (the “Property”).1 Elad has filed a

complaint seeking to invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of

habeas corpus. The complaint alleges that various Superior Court judges have

violated Elad’s natural and constitutional rights and federal statutes and asserts

various errors in the ejectment proceedings and a related mortgage foreclosure action

in which Elad also is a defendant.2 Elad seeks the following relief: (i) to void all

orders issued in the ejectment and foreclosure proceedings; (ii) to assemble a grand

jury and conduct a jury trial to establish alleged wrongdoing by the Superior Court

judges in connection with the proceedings relating to the Property; (iii) removal of

1
    Truist Bank v. Elad, N23C-02-243 (Del. Super.).
2
    JDT Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. Elad, N17L-06-100 (Del. Super.).
the judges from their judicial positions; and (iv) damages of more than $40,000,000

from the judges and others.3

       (2)     Before discussing the merits of this matter, we address some procedural

issues. On January 5, 2024, Truist Bank filed a motion to affirm. Supreme Court

Rule 25(b) permits motions to affirm in “civil appeals from orders denying petitions

for extraordinary writs.” But Elad did not file this matter as an appeal from the

Superior Court’s denial of extraordinary writs, and Rule 25(b) therefore does not

permit a motion to affirm.4 Moreover, Rule 43, which “governs the exercise of the

Court’s original jurisdiction over proceedings involving . . . extraordinary writs[,]”

provides that “[a]n answer is requested to be filed within 20 days of the filing of the

complaint. . . .”5 Although the operative complaint in this matter was filed on

November 27, 2023, the time to file an answer began to run after December 12, 2023,

when the Court granted Elad’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis.6 Thus, even if

3
  Elad has filed various documents in the Superior Court making similar allegations and seeking
similar relief. E.g., Truist Bank v. Elad, N23C-02-243, Docket Entry Nos. 42, 47, 48, 53.
4
  See DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 25(b) (“Motions to affirm may only be filed in civil appeals from orders
denying petitions for extraordinary writs. . . . In all other cases in which a party seeks expedited
resolution of a civil appeal, the party shall follow the procedures set forth in subparagraph e.”).
5
  Id. R. 43(b)(ii).
6
  See In re Elad, No. 417, 2023, Docket Entry No. 2, Letter from Senior Court Clerk to Elad (Del.
filed Nov. 15, 2023) (acknowledging initial filing in this matter, directing Elad to file a Form N
Complaint and to pay the filing fee or file a motion and affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis, and
stating that “[t]he time to file an answer under Rule 43(b)(iii) will not start to run until the filing
fee is paid or the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted”).

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deemed an answer under Rule 43, Truist Bank’s filing was untimely.7 For these

reasons, the motion to affirm is stricken.

        (3)     On January 9, 2024, the Clerk’s office struck Elad’s response to the

motion to affirm. Rule 25 does not permit any response to a motion to affirm unless

requested by the Court.8 Similarly, Rule 43 does not permit any further submissions

following an answer to the complaint, unless directed by the Court.9 The Court

therefore concludes that the response was appropriately stricken.

        (4)     Turning to the merits of the complaint, we conclude, after careful

review, that this action must be dismissed.10 As an initial matter, this Court has no

original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus.11 Moreover, habeas relief is

not available to Elad because he is not detained, and the matter therefore is without

merit even if viewed as an appeal from the Superior Court’s denial of the requests

7
  The last day of the twenty-day period following the Court’s granting of Elad’s motion to proceed
in forma pauperis was January 1, 2024, a legal holiday; an answer, if any, therefore was due by
the end of the day on January 2, 2024. DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 11(a).
8
  See id. R. 25(a)(iii) (“There shall be no briefing, argument or response to the motion, unless
requested by the Court.”).
9
  See id. R. 43(b)(ii) (permitting the filing of an answer and providing that “unless the Court
otherwise directs, no further submissions of the parties shall be accepted”); id. R. 43(b)(vii) (“Upon
receipt of the writ, no further submission by the petitioner will be accepted without leave of the
Court.”).
10
   See id. R. 29(c) (permitting sua sponte dismissal of a petition seeking to invoke the original
jurisdiction of the Court over extraordinary writs); see also id. R. 43(b)(ii) (“If the complaint is
directed against a judge who does not desire to appear or participate in the proceeding, the judge
may so advise the Clerk by letter. . . . The complaint shall not be taken as admitted whether or not
such a letter is submitted.”).
11
   In re Cantrell, 678 A.2d 525, 526 (Del. 1996); see also In re Boston, 1988 WL 19719, at *1
(Del. Feb. 29, 1988) (“It is clear that this Court has no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus.”).

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for habeas relief that he filed in that court.12 “[T]he writ of habeas corpus under

Delaware law provides relief on a very limited basis.”13 The “sole purpose” of a writ

of habeas corpus under Delaware law “is to determine the legality of a detention and

not the underlying merits of a controversy.”14 Elad is not detained by the State;

therefore, habeas relief is not available.15

       (5)     The complaint also is without merit to the extent that it seeks a writ of

mandamus.16 “A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy issued by this Court

12
   See, e.g., In re Elad, No. 417, 2023, Docket Entry No. 7, Complaint in Proceedings for
Extraordinary Writ, at 4 (Del. filed Nov. 27, 2023) (alleging that Superior Court judges “illegally
denied or dismissed” Elad’s “Habeas Corpus filings”).
13
   Hall v. Carr, 692 A.2d 888, 891 (Del. 1997).
14
   In re Hargreaves, 1986 WL 16284, at *1 (Del. Jan. 7, 1986); see also Hall, 692 A.2d at 891
(stating that a writ of habeas corpus under Delaware law “provides an opportunity for one illegally
confined or incarcerated to obtain judicial review of the jurisdiction of the court ordering the
commitment”).
15
   Cf. Taylor v. State, 2002 WL 31477136, at *1 (Del. Nov. 4, 2002) (“[I]t appears that Taylor has
been released from prison and is currently serving a probationary sentence at Level II. As such,
he is not a person ‘imprisoned or restrained of liberty’ within the meaning of the statute governing
habeas corpus and his request for habeas corpus relief is moot.” (citation omitted)); Family Court
v. Alexander, 522 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Del. 1987) (“The nature of the writ of habeas corpus in
Delaware strongly suggests that once the person for whose benefit the writ has issued is no longer
in custody the proceedings are at an end. . . . In Delaware, therefore, only the legality of current
deprivations of liberty are controvertible in habeas corpus proceedings.”); Olson v. Anstreicher,
327 A.2d 603, 604 (Del. 1974) (stating that “[i]n Delaware habeas corpus is a writ designed to
obtain the ‘speedy release of persons illegally deprived of their liberty’” and determining that
habeas relief was not available to a person challenging his involuntary commitment to the
Delaware State Hospital because he had been released on convalescent leave and could challenge
any recall from convalescent leave under the statute establishing procedures for involuntary
commitments).
16
   Elad’s complaint, filed on November 27, 2023, does not appear to refer to a writ of mandamus,
but certain of his other filings, including the document by which he commenced this action on
November 14, 2023, do. In recognition of Elad’s status as a self-represented litigant, we have
afforded Elad leniency in presenting his claims to this Court and have reviewed his various filings
to discern the substance and decide the merits of his claims. See generally Gunzl v. R&K Motors

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to compel a trial court to perform a duty.”17 A writ of mandamus will issue only if

the petitioner can show: (i) that he has a clear right to the performance of a duty; (ii)

that no other adequate remedy is available; and (iii) that the Superior Court has

arbitrarily failed or refused to perform its duty.18 “[I]n the absence of a clear showing

of an arbitrary refusal or failure to act, this Court will not issue a writ of mandamus

to compel a trial court to perform a particular judicial function, to decide a matter in

a particular way, or to dictate the control of its docket.”19

        (6)     Elad’s complaint is based on various claims of legal error in the

foreclosure and ejectment proceedings. For example, Elad asserts that he was not

properly served, was denied due process, and was denied a jury trial; the bank did

not present an original promissory note to demonstrate a debt; the court should not

have allowed seizure of the Property because Elad had surplus equity; and the court

illegally denied or dismissed his habeas corpus filings. To the extent that the

complaint seeks to void the Superior Court’s orders—or otherwise compel a

different result—in the foreclosure or ejectment proceedings based on such claims

& Machine Shop, 2004 WL 1058367, at *1 (Del. May 4, 2004) (stating that the Court “affords
self-represented litigants a degree of leniency in filing documents on appeal”).
17
   In re Foster, 2010 WL 424659, at *1 (Del. Feb. 5, 2010); see also In re Bordley, 545 A.2d 619,
620 (Del. 1988) (“The peremptory writ of mandamus has traditionally been used only to confine
a trial court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority
when it is its duty to do so.” (internal quotations omitted)).
18
   Bordley, 545 A.2d at 620.
19
   Id.

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of legal error, this action cannot provide the relief he seeks.20 Similarly, Elad’s

requests for assembly of a grand jury and a jury trial concerning alleged wrongdoing

by the Superior Court judges, removal of the judges from their judicial positions,

and damages are well beyond the scope of relief available in a mandamus proceeding

and are not supported by a showing of a clear right to the performance of a duty.

       NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the complaint in proceedings for

extraordinary writ is DISMISSED.

                                              BY THE COURT:

                                              /s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
                                              Justice

20
  See id. (stating that the Court will not issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to decide
a matter in a particular way).

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