Court Opinion

ID: 9898155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:49.790689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:48.395533
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                             Washington State
                                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Division Two

                                                                                             October 10, 2023

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                            DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56665-6-II

                                   Respondent,

           v.

    ROGER KAREEM WOODARD,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                   Appellant.

          GLASGOW, C.J. — Kristina Woodard lived with her three children.1 Roger Woodard,

Kristina’s former husband and the children’s father, was staying in Kristina’s home when he forced

his way into Kristina’s bedroom and stabbed her multiple times. The State charged Roger with

attempted first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, and first degree burglary. The charging

document alleged that a domestic violence aggravator applied to the attempted murder charge.

Roger waived his right to a jury trial. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted Roger of all three

charges. It imposed an exceptional sentence upward and a lifetime no-contact order covering

Kristina and the three children.

          Roger appeals his convictions and sentence. He argues that he did not validly waive his

right to have a jury decide whether the domestic violence aggravator applied. Additionally, he

argues that his convictions for first degree attempted murder and first degree kidnapping violate

1
    To avoid confusion, we refer to the parties by their first names.
No. 56665-6-II

his right to be free from double jeopardy, so the kidnapping conviction must be vacated.

Alternatively, he argues that because the attempted murder and kidnapping convictions

encompassed the same criminal conduct, they should count as one offense for the purpose of

calculating his offender score. Roger raises a number of other arguments in a statement of

additional grounds for review (SAG), including an assignment of error to the portion of the lifetime

no-contact order covering his children.

       We remand for the trial court to consider on the record whether the challenged portion of

the no contact-order banning contact with Roger’s children for life was reasonably necessary in

light of Roger’s fundamental right to parent. The court should modify the no-contact order if

necessary. We otherwise affirm.

                                             FACTS

                                          I. BACKGROUND

       The trial court found the following facts, and they are unchallenged on appeal. Roger and

Kristina were a divorced couple. They shared three children: DW, BW, and VW. At the time of

the incident that led to Roger’s convictions, DW was nine years old, BW was three years old, and

VW was one years old.

       In September 2019, Roger was temporarily living with Kristina and the children after being

evicted from his apartment. Kristina gave Roger “until the end of September to find a new place.”

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 68 (Finding of Fact (FF) I.). She told him “he could sleep in the upstairs

loft or on the downstairs couch.” Id. She did not allow him to sleep in her bedroom. The bedroom,

which was upstairs, “had a locked door, and Kristina was the only person with a key.” Id. Kristina

locked the bedroom’s door whenever she left her home and whenever she was in the bedroom.

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No. 56665-6-II

                                            II. INCIDENT

         Toward the end of September, Roger forced his way into Kristina’s suite and slashed her

with a knife. Kristina screamed for DW to call 911. DW appeared “with a phone but could not

unlock it.” CP at 69 (FF III., IV.). Roger grabbed DW’s shirt, took the phone, and “told DW to go

downstairs and quiet his sisters . . . who were crying in the living room.” Id. (FF IV.).

         After DW went to his sisters, “Kristina managed to slide down the stairs, but [Roger] sat

on her thighs so she could not get out.” Id. (FF IV.). Roger continued slashing her. “Kristina

attempted to go to the front door to get out, but [Roger] prevented her from leaving.” He put the

knife to Kristina’s face and said, “‘[D]on’t make me do this.’” CP at 69 (FF IV.).

         Roger eventually went to the three children, who were sitting on the couch. “Kristina went

to the front door again, but [Roger] closed it shut and forced her to stay inside the residence.” Id.

(FF V.) The children were screaming and looking at Kristina. When Kristina escaped to the

backyard, Roger followed her, stabbed her several more times, and then walked away from the

house.

         Neighbors came to help Kristina, and paramedics transported her to the hospital with life-

threatening injuries. Kristina’s injuries included “deep lacerations to her face, a deep laceration

across her throat, a stab wound to her mouth, a stab wound to the chest resulting in a collapsed

lung, and a stab wound to the abdomen.” CP at 71. (FF X.).

                              III. CHARGES AND JURY TRIAL WAIVER

         The State charged Roger with attempted first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, and

first degree burglary, all with deadly weapon enhancements. The charging document alleged that

the attempted murder involved domestic violence and that at least one of the following

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No. 56665-6-II

circumstances applied: the “offense was part of an ongoing pattern of . . . abuse of the victim

manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time;” the “offense occurred within

sight or sound of the victim’s . . . minor children;” or Roger’s “conduct during the commission of

the . . . offense manifested deliberate cruelty or intimidation of the victim.” CP at 6. A crime

involves domestic violence when it is committed by “one intimate partner against another intimate

partner.” Former RCW 10.99.020(5) (2019). Intimate partners include former spouses and

individuals with a child in common. Former RCW 10.99.020(7); former RCW 26.50.010(7)

(2019).

          Roger waived his right to a jury trial. He signed and filed a written waiver:

          1.     I have been informed and fully understand that I have the right to have my
                 case heard by an impartial jury selected from the county where the crime(s)
                 is alleged to have been committed:

          2.     I have consulted with my lawyer regarding the decision to have my case
                 tried by a jury or by the court;

          3.     I freely and voluntarily give up my right to be tried by a jury and request
                 trial by the court.

CP at 16.

          At a hearing on the waiver, defense counsel told the trial court, “Mr. Woodard has received,

I can assure the bench, more advisement on this case, both written and oral, than any client in the

Pierce County Jail.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Sept. 21, 2021) at 33. In a colloquy with the

judge, Roger confirmed that he signed the waiver, that he went over it with his attorney, and that

he was able to ask any questions he had about it.

          The trial court asked, “You understand that, constitutionally, you have the right to a jury

trial, and that right exists for your benefit. Do you understand?” VRP (Sept. 21, 2021) at 34. Roger

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No. 56665-6-II

answered affirmatively. He also confirmed that he wished to waive his right to a jury trial and have

a bench trial. The trial court found that Roger’s waiver was “done knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily.” VRP (Sept. 21, 2021) at 35.

       At the end of the hearing, defense counsel acknowledged, “[I]n the event the [State]

prevails, they’re going to be asking for an exceptional sentence that would approach a century in

prison.” VRP (Sept. 21, 2021) at 36.

                          IV. TRIAL COURT FINDINGS AND SENTENCING

       After a bench trial, the trial court entered findings consistent with the facts described above

and found Roger guilty of attempted first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, and first degree

burglary. The trial court concluded that Roger was armed with a deadly weapon during the

commission of each crime.

       A person is guilty of attempted first degree murder when they form a premeditated intent

to cause another person’s death and take a substantial step to cause that person’s death. RCW

9A.32.030(1)(a); see also In re Pers. Restraint of Borrero, 161 Wn.2d 532, 537-38, 167 P.3d 1106

(2007). The trial court found that Roger “took a substantial step of slashing Kristina numerous

times on her face and neck, and stabbed her in the chest, abdomen, and mouth.” CP at 71 (FF XII.).

It found that Roger “intended to commit the crime . . . as evidenced by the deliberate nature of the

attack and the severity of the wounds[,] to include a severe cut across Kristina’s throat.” Id. It

added that “the intent to cause Kristina’s death was premeditated” because Roger “walked upstairs

to confront Kristina already armed with a knife and continued his attack throughout the home and

into the backyard.” Id. And the trial court found that the domestic violence aggravator applied,

finding that Kristina and the defendant were intimate partners because they “were former spouses

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No. 56665-6-II

and had three children together,” that Roger attempted to murder Kristina “within the sight and

sound of Kristina’s three children,” and that Roger’s conduct “manifested deliberate cruelty

towards [Kristina] as evidenced by the serious nature of the injuries.” CP at 72 (FF XII.).

       A person is guilty of first degree kidnapping when they intentionally abduct “another

person with intent . . . [t]o inflict bodily injury on” them. RCW 9A.40.020(1)(c). The trial court

found that Roger “restrained Kristina’s movements by using and threatening to use deadly force,”

noting that Roger held a knife to her face and said, “‘[D]on’t make me do this’” when she tried to

leave her home; shut the door, pushed Kristina to the floor, and slashed her throat when she tried

to leave again; and stabbed Kristina in the chest during her “third attempt to escape.” CP at 72-73

(FF XIII.). The trial court added that Roger “kept Kristina in the home knowing she was in a place

where no one would likely find her and took away her ability to get help through her son.” CP at

73 (FF XIII.).

       At sentencing, defense counsel argued for a standard range sentence, stating that the range

was “massive” and that it gave the trial court “plenty of discretion.” VRP (Feb. 4, 2022) at 10-11.

The trial court decided to impose an exceptional sentence upward. In the judgment and sentence,

the trial court found that substantial and compelling reasons justified an exceptional sentence

upward for attempted first degree murder, checking a box next to the following statement:

“Aggravating factors were . . . found by the court after the defendant waived jury trial.” CP at 55.

       The trial court sentenced Roger to 340 months for the attempted first degree murder

conviction and 68 months for the first degree kidnapping conviction, which would be served

consecutively. The trial court imposed 116 months running concurrently for the first degree

burglary conviction. For the three deadly weapon enhancements, the trial court sentenced Roger

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No. 56665-6-II

to three consecutive terms of 24 months. The total term of confinement was 480 months. The trial

court also imposed a lifetime no-contact order covering Kristina, DW, BW, and VW.

       Roger appeals his convictions and sentence.

                                            ANALYSIS

                               I. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

       Roger argues that his jury trial waiver was invalid, contending that the “State cannot prove

that [he] waived his right to have a jury decide whether” any aggravating factors supported an

exceptional sentence. Br. of Appellant at 12. Roger also points out that the trial court erroneously

failed to enter written findings to support the exceptional sentence it imposed. The State concedes

that the trial court was required to enter written findings and contends that the “remedy for failure

to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law is to remand the case for entry of those

findings and conclusions.” Br. of Resp’t at 30. We hold that Roger validly waived his right to a

jury trial and that remand is unnecessary under the facts of this case.

       An appellant may argue for the first time on appeal that the record is insufficient to satisfy

the constitutional requirements for waiver of the right to a jury trial. State v. Cham, 165 Wn. App.

438, 446-47, 267 P.3d 528 (2011). “We review the sufficiency of the record to establish a valid

waiver de novo.” Id. at 447.

       A “defendant has the right to a jury trial on any aggravating factor that supports an

exceptional sentence, except the fact of a prior conviction.” Id. at 446. With a few exceptions,

RCW 9.94A.535(3) provides “an exclusive list of” aggravating “factors that can support a sentence

above the standard range.”

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No. 56665-6-II

        For a waiver of the right to a jury trial to be valid, the “record must adequately establish

that” the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Benitez, 175 Wn. App. 116, 128,

302 P.3d 877 (2013). “The State bears the burden of establishing a valid waiver, and absent a

record to the contrary,” we indulge “in every reasonable presumption against waiver.” Cham, 165

Wn. App at 447. Where a defendant waives their right to a jury trial, the trial court does not need

to engage in a colloquy or give “‘on-the-record advice as to the consequences of [the] waiver.’”

Id. (quoting State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719, 725, 881 P.2d 979 (1994)). A record sufficiently

demonstrates a waiver’s validity if it “‘includes either a written waiver signed by the defendant, a

personal expression by the defendant of an intent to waive, or an informed acquiescence.’” State

v. Trebilcock, 184 Wn. App. 619, 632, 341 P.3d 1004 (2014) (quoting Cham, 165 Wn. App. at

448).

        For example, in Trebilcock, we held that a defendant validly waived her right to a jury trial

on aggravating factors even though her waiver occurred before the State amended the charging

document, during her bench trial, to add the aggravating factors. 184 Wn. App. at 632-33. We

reasoned that the defendant signed a written waiver, defense counsel said the parties had discussed

the decision to waive “over a period of months,” the defendant said on the record that she

understood the right she was waiving, the defendant did not move to rescind her waiver when the

State amended the charging document during trial to add aggravating factors, and defense counsel

indicated multiple times during trial and sentencing that the defendant understood and agreed that

a judge would decide the aggravating factors. Id.

        In contrast, in State v. Hos, we held that a jury trial waiver was invalid. 154 Wn. App. 238,

252, 225 P.3d 389 (2010). There, the defendant “did not sign a written jury trial waiver” and the

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No. 56665-6-II

trial court did not question the defendant “on the record to determine whether she knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to a jury trial, or even whether she had discussed the

issue with her defense counsel or understood what rights she was waiving.” Id.

       Here, the record demonstrates that Roger validly waived his right to a jury trial. Unlike in

Hos, the record contains both a signed written waiver and Roger’s personal expression of an intent

to waive the right. The written waiver was broad, stating that Roger understood that he had “the

right to have [his] case heard by an impartial jury,” that he had consulted with defense counsel

“regarding the decision to have [his] case tried by a jury,” and that he was “freely and voluntarily”

giving up that right. CP at 16 (emphasis added). At a hearing on the waiver, defense counsel said,

“Mr. Woodard has received, I can assure the bench, more advisement on this case, both written

and oral, than any client in the Pierce County Jail. . . . He is doing so knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily.” VRP (Sept. 21, 2021) at 33. Roger confirmed he was able to review the waiver with

defense counsel and ask any questions he had about it. Later in the hearing, defense counsel said,

“[I]n the event the [State] prevails, they’re going to be asking for an exceptional sentence that

would approach a century in prison,” thus acknowledging the likelihood of an exceptional sentence

if the charged aggravators were found. VRP (Sept. 21, 2021) at 36.

       Additionally, unlike the defendant in Trebilcock, Roger was aware of the domestic violence

aggravator during the waiver, which took place about three weeks before his trial began. At the

time of the waiver, the most current charging document alleged that the domestic violence

aggravator applied to the attempted murder charge. The two subsequent charging documents made

the same allegation. Thus, his “case” inherently included the aggravator.

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No. 56665-6-II

       We hold that Roger validly waived his right to have a jury determine whether the domestic

violence aggravator applied. The State correctly notes that RCW 9.94A.535 required the trial court

to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the exceptional sentence it

imposed. But remand for entry of separate findings and conclusions is not needed where a trial

court enters the written findings necessary to support an aggravator after a bench trial and the

judgment and sentence explains that the exceptional sentenced is based on the aggravator. RCW

9.94A.535(2). In this case, after the bench trial, the trial court entered written findings in support

of the domestic violence aggravator: Roger committed attempted first degree murder within sight

of the children, who could see their mother as she was being attacked, and Roger’s conduct

manifested deliberate cruelty. CP at 72, 74-75 (describing the attack in detail). While the trial court

did not expressly state that it imposed the exceptional sentence because of the domestic violence

aggravator, the judgment and sentence contains language explaining that the exceptional sentence

was based on the aggravator the court found after Roger waived a jury trial. Separate findings and

conclusions would therefore be superfluous here.

       We affirm Roger’s sentence.

                                       II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

       Roger argues that the trial court violated his rights under the double jeopardy provisions of

the federal and state constitutions when it imposed consecutive sentences for the first degree

kidnapping conviction and the attempted first degree murder conviction. He contends that the

conduct that gave rise to the kidnapping and attempted murder charges constituted a single offense.

We disagree.

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No. 56665-6-II

         We “may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” RAP

2.5(a) (emphasis added). Although Roger did not argue below that his double jeopardy rights were

violated, the State concedes, and we agree, that a defendant may raise a double jeopardy claim for

the first time on appeal. State v. Brewer, 148 Wn. App. 666, 673, 205 P.3d 900 (2009).

A.       Double Jeopardy Principles

         The United States Constitution and the Washington Constitution provide defendants

coextensive protections from double jeopardy. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9;

State v. Reeder, 184 Wn.2d 805, 825, 365 P.3d 1243 (2015). In part, they protect a defendant from

“multiple punishments for the same offense, imposed at a single criminal proceeding.” State v.

Potter, 31 Wn. App. 883, 886, 645 P.2d 60 (1982).

         “Within constitutional constraints, the legislative branch has the power to define criminal

conduct and assign punishment for such conduct,” so we cannot resolve a double jeopardy question

“without determining what punishments the legislative branch has authorized.” State v. Calle, 125

Wn.2d 769, 776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995).

         Where conduct violates two separate statutes, we look to the language of those statutes to

determine whether the legislative branch intended to allow multiple punishments for the conduct.

State v. Louis, 155 Wn.2d 563, 569, 120 P.3d 936 (2005). When examining legislative intent does

not explicitly resolve the issue, we apply the Blockburger2 test. In re Pers. Restraint of Knight,

196 Wn.2d 330, 337, 473 P.3d 663 (2020); State v. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 776, 108 P.3d 753

(2005). Here, the State concedes that the legislature did not authorize cumulative punishments for

first degree kidnapping and attempted first degree murder.

2
    Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).

                                                 11
No. 56665-6-II

       Under Blockburger, if a defendant’s crimes “are the same in law and in fact, they may not

be punished separately absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.” Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777.

We consider the elements of each crime as charged and proved, not simply at “the level of an

abstract articulation of the elements.” Id. If “‘each offense, as charged, includes elements not

included in the other, the offenses are different and multiple convictions can stand.’” State v. Peña

Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d 808, 824, 318 P.3d 257 (2014) (quoting Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 777). But even

if the evidence needed to support a conviction for one of the crimes would have been sufficient to

warrant a conviction for the other crime, we determine whether each conviction required proof of

a fact that the other did not. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 772. If the record demonstrates that the State

relied on distinct acts to prosecute each separate offense, the offenses are not the same in fact, and

our double jeopardy inquiry ends. See Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 826.

       For example, in In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, the Washington Supreme Court held that

the defendant’s convictions for attempted first degree murder and first degree assault violated

double jeopardy where both “crimes were based on the same shot directed at the same victim, and

the evidence required to support” the attempt conviction was sufficient to support the assault

conviction. 152 Wn.2d 795, 820, 100 P.3d 291 (2004).

       In contrast, the court held in Borrero that the defendant’s convictions for attempted first

degree murder and first degree kidnapping with intent to facilitate robbery did not violate double

jeopardy where the defendant threatened a person with a firearm, tied him up, took his cannabis,

and threw him into a river. 161 Wn.2d at 534-35, 540. Although the charging document listed the

elements of both crimes “in only ‘generic’ terms,” the court reasoned that proof the defendant

threw a bound person into a river supported attempted murder but not kidnapping with intent to

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No. 56665-6-II

facilitate robbery. Id. at 539. And it reasoned that proof the defendant tied the person up and took

his cannabis while threatening him with a firearm supported kidnapping with intent to facilitate

robbery but not attempted murder. Id.

B.      First Degree Kidnapping and Attempted Murder

        We agree with the parties that the legislature has not explicitly disclosed its intent with

respect to multiple punishments for first degree kidnapping and attempted first degree murder, so

we must apply the Blockburger test. See id. at 536-38 (applying the Blockburger test where the

defendant argued that his convictions for attempted first degree murder and first degree kidnapping

violated double jeopardy).

        Under the Blockburger test, the trial court did not violate double jeopardy. First degree

murder and first degree kidnapping are not the same in law or in fact. They are not the same in law

because each offense includes elements not included in the other. A person is guilty of first degree

kidnapping under RCW 9A.40.020(1)(c) when they intentionally abduct “another person with

intent . . . [t]o inflict bodily injury on [them].” To “[a]bduct” is “to restrain a person by either (a)

secreting or holding [them] in a place where [they are] not likely to be found, or (b) using or

threatening to use deadly force.” RCW 9A.40.010(1) (emphasis added). In contrast, a person is

guilty of attempted first degree murder under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a) when they form a

premeditated intent to cause another person’s death and take a substantial step to cause that

person’s death. See Borrero, 161 Wn.2d at 537-38. Unlike attempted first degree murder, first

degree kidnapping requires proof that the defendant restrained someone. And unlike first degree

kidnapping, attempted first degree murder requires proof of premeditated intent to cause a person’s

death. These offenses are thus not the same in law.

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No. 56665-6-II

       Moreover, the offenses are not the same in fact. The trial court’s findings show that the

State relied on distinct acts to prosecute Roger for first degree kidnapping and attempted first

degree murder. The trial court supported the first degree kidnapping conviction by finding, among

other things, that Roger held Kristina in a place where she was unlikely to be found: he prevented

DW from calling 911 and he shut the front door when Kristina tried to leave her house. These facts

were necessary for finding that Roger restrained Kristina, but they were not necessary for

supporting the attempted first degree murder charge. Moreover, the trial court supported the

attempted first degree murder charge by finding that Roger formed a premeditated intent to cause

Kristina’s death. Specifically, it found that “the deliberate nature of the attack and the severity of

the wounds,” including “a severe cut across Kristina’s throat,” showed Roger’s “intent to cause

Kristina’s death.” CP at 71 (FF XII.) And it found that the intent was premeditated because Roger

was armed with a knife when he first confronted Kristina and Roger “continued his attack

throughout the home and into the backyard.” Id. Proof that the attack was severe enough to show

intention to kill was not necessary for supporting the first degree kidnapping charge, which

required proof of an intent to inflict bodily injury but not proof of an intent to cause death. And,

as stated above, convicting Roger of first degree kidnapping did not require proof of his

premeditated intent to cause Kristina’s death.

       The trial court did not violate double jeopardy by convicting Roger of both first degree

kidnapping and attempted first degree murder.

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No. 56665-6-II

                                  III. SAME CRIMINAL CONDUCT

       Roger argues that the attempted first degree murder conviction and the first degree

kidnapping conviction encompassed the same criminal conduct, so for purposes of calculating his

offender score, the trial court should have counted the offenses as one crime. The State responds

that Roger “has waived the issue” because “he failed to make this argument before the trial court.”

Br. of Resp’t at 18. The State further responds that Roger’s convictions did not encompass the

same criminal conduct because “although the crimes involved the same victim, they did not have

the same criminal intent.” Id. at 21. We agree with the State.

       For purposes of calculating a defendant’s offender score, if the sentencing court enters a

finding that some or all of the defendant’s “current offenses encompass the same criminal

conduct[,] then those current offenses shall be counted as one crime.” Former RCW

9.94A.589(1)(a) (2015). Crimes encompass the same criminal conduct when they “require the

same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place, and involve the same victim.” Id.

       Here, the attempted first degree murder conviction and the first degree kidnapping

conviction did not encompass the same criminal conduct. As explained above, the two crimes did

not involve the same intent.

       Moreover, because “application of the same criminal conduct statute involves both factual

determinations and the exercise of discretion,” a defendant who does not argue below that their

offenses encompass the same criminal conduct waives this challenge to their offender score on

appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 875, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). Given that

Roger did not argue below that the convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct, he waived

the challenge to his offender score.

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No. 56665-6-II

                                      IV. SAG ARGUMENTS

        Roger’s statement of additional grounds (SAG) raises a number of other claims. Among

them is an assignment of error to the lifetime no-contact order covering his children. We remand

for the trial court to consider on the record whether this condition violates Roger’s constitutional

right to parent and whether modification of the order is necessary. The remainder of Roger’s claims

fail.

A.      Lifetime No-Contact Order

        Roger contests the lifetime no-contact order covering his children.

        A trial court may impose crime-related prohibitions as part of any sentence. Former RCW

9.94A.505(9) (2019). A “trial court has the discretion to impose a crime-related prohibition up to

the statutory maximum for the crime of which the defendant is convicted without resort to

aggravating factors of any kind.” In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367, 375, 229 P.3d

686 (2010). “We review the imposition of crime-related prohibitions for an abuse of discretion.”

State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 653, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001). However, more “careful review of

sentencing conditions is required where those conditions interfere with a fundamental

constitutional right.” State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

        Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, parents have a

fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). That right “can be restricted

by a condition of a criminal sentence if the condition is reasonably necessary to prevent harm to

the children.” Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 654.

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No. 56665-6-II

       In State v. DeLeon, the defendant had sexually abused his former wife’s children and the

trial court imposed a no-contact order covering the defendant’s biological children, but the trial

court did not consider the defendant’s right to parent when it imposed the no-contact order. 11 Wn.

App. 2d 837, 839, 456 P.3d 405 (2020). The trial court did not analyze on the record whether a no-

contact order was reasonably necessary to achieve the compelling state interest in protecting the

children from harm, nor did it consider whether less restrictive alternatives were available. Id. at

841. As a result, we held that the record was insufficient to ensure meaningful appellate review,

acknowledging that on remand the trial court might conclude that less restrictive alternatives were

not available. Id. at 841-42. Division One recently reached the same conclusion in State v. Reedy,

where a defendant was convicted of raping and molesting his child and the trial court imposed a

lifetime no-contact order covering the child. 26 Wn. App. 2d 379, 384, 386, 527 P.3d 156 (2023).

Division One reasoned that while the State’s interest in protecting the child “from further abuse

[was] abundantly clear,” there was an “outstanding factual question” about how or to what extent

the trial court should have tailored the conditions related to that interest, “short of the de facto

termination of [the defendant’s] parental rights.” Id. at 394-95.

       Here, the trial court did not consider on the record whether a lifetime no-contact order

covering Roger’s children was reasonably necessary to accomplish the compelling interest in

protecting them, and it did not consider whether less restrictive alternatives were available in light

of Roger’s right to parent. While such alternatives may not exist in light of the abundantly clear

interest in protecting the children, the trial court must consider this on the record. We remand for

the trial court to consider this issue and revise the no-contact order if necessary.

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No. 56665-6-II

B.     Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Roger argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions.

Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was the person who attacked

Kristina while she was in the backyard, that Kristina was transported to the hospital with life-

threatening injuries, that the attempted murder was premeditated, and that he was armed with a

deadly weapon on the night of the incident. He also argues that Kristina did not testify credibly.

We disagree and hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Roger’s convictions.

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence in support of a conviction following a bench

trial, we determine whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and

whether the findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law.” State v. Smith, 185 Wn. App.

945, 956, 344 P.3d 1244 (2015). “‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-

minded, rational person that the findings are true.” Id. at 956-57 (quoting State v. Stevenson, 128

Wn. App. 179, 193, 114 P.3d 699 (2005)). “A defendant challenging a trial court’s finding of fact

bears the burden of demonstrating that the finding is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at

957. “A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence in support of a conviction admits the truth of the

State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it.” Id.

       Substantial evidence supports the finding that Roger was the person who attacked Kristina

while she was in the backyard. Kristina testified that after she escaped to the backyard, she

collapsed and “heard the gate latch make a noise.” 5 VRP at 484. Then, “somebody appeared,”

stabbed her twice, and “ran off towards the side of the house where [there was] no gate in the

backyard.” 5 VRP at 485. When asked when she realized Roger had come back to the backyard,

Kristina said it was when Roger pulled her up and stabbed her in the face. Her testimony supports

                                                18
No. 56665-6-II

the finding that Roger was the person who attacked her. Russell Sage, a neighbor, testified that

shortly after he heard someone scream, he saw Roger climb over the top of the fence at his house

and walk away. His testimony corroborates Kristina’s testimony.

       Substantial evidence supports the finding that Kristina was transported to the hospital with

life-threatening injuries. A paramedic who responded to the incident testified that Kristina’s

injuries were life-threatening. And a doctor who treated Kristina testified that after the incident,

she arrived at the hospital with life-threatening stab injuries.

       Substantial evidence supports the finding that the attempted murder was premeditated.

“[P]remeditation is ‘the deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life’

and involves ‘the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or

reasoning for a period of time, however short.’” State v. Pirtle, 127 Wn.2d 628, 644, 904 P.2d 245

(1995) (quoting State v. Gentry, 125 Wn.2d 570, 597-98, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995)). Premeditation

“must involve more than a moment in point of time.” RCW 9A.32.020(1). Kristina testified that

after Roger repeatedly stabbed her and she began screaming for help in the backyard, he returned

to stab her in the mouth and abdomen. It is thus reasonable to infer a premeditated intent to cause

Kristina’s death: by stabbing Kristina in the mouth, Roger made it harder for her to get help, and

by leaving her with multiple stab wounds, he increased the likelihood that Kristina would die

before help arrived.

       Substantial evidence supports the finding that Roger was armed with a deadly weapon. A

“deadly weapon” is “an implement or instrument which has the capacity to inflict death and[,]

from the manner in which it is used, is likely to produce or may easily and readily produce death.”

RCW 9.94A.825. Kristina testified that Roger repeatedly stabbed her, and as stated above, a doctor

                                                  19
No. 56665-6-II

that treated Kristina on the night of the incident testified that she arrived at the hospital with life-

threatening stab injuries.

       We will not disturb the trial court’s finding that Kristina testified credibly. “We defer to

the fact finder on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness

of the evidence.” State v. Ague-Masters, 138 Wn. App. 86, 102, 156 P.3d 265 (2007). Here, the

trial court was the fact finder, and we defer to its finding that Kristina’s testimony was credible.

       Finally, Roger challenges a number of findings that are not crucial to the ultimate findings

of guilt: that he had been evicted from an apartment, that he wore a white T-shirt on the night of

the incident, that he had a knife when he walked upstairs to confront Kristina, that DW came out

of his room with a phone during the incident, and that he briefly appeared in Kristina’s home

security footage that night. With exception to the finding that DW came out of his room already

holding a phone, rather than retrieving a phone from another room,3 substantial evidence supports

these findings.4 More significantly, even if these findings were unsupported by the record, the

remaining evidence would be sufficient to uphold Roger’s convictions.

       There is no basis for us to reverse the convictions for insufficient evidence.

3
  Kristina testified, “I had assumed that as there was no other phone [upstairs], it would be my
phone from my bedside table . . . So he went from his room to the bedroom to retrieve the phone.”
5 VRP at 466.
4
  See 5 VRP at 438 (Kristina’s testimony about Roger staying with her because he was facing
eviction); 2 VRP at 43, 74 (neighbors’ testimony about seeing Roger wearing a white T-shirt on
the night of the incident); 4 VRP at 334-35 (the State offering a bloody white T-shirt into
evidence); 5 VRP at 461-63 (Kristina’s testimony about Roger slashing her shortly after he came
upstairs); 10 VRP at 966 (statement in the trial court’s oral ruling that the court viewed the home
security footage “a number of times” and saw “a person in a white T-shirt running back towards
the gate”).

                                                  20
No. 56665-6-II

C.      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        Roger argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Roger contends that

defense counsel was ineffective when he failed to object “when the trial judge stated that [he] was

seen as a” person with a white T-shirt “captured on the . . . home camera video;” when Kristina

identified him as the person who entered the yard and stabbed her in the mouth and abdomen;

when the State offered a white T-shirt covered in blood into evidence; and when the State and

Kristina said Kristina had written the word “help” on the kitchen island using her blood. Statement

of Additional Grounds (SAG) at 16-17. Roger further contends that defense counsel “was on his

phone heavily [throughout] trial, texting to friends and other clients.” SAG at 17. Roger’s claims

fail.

        The federal and state constitutions guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel.

State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017); U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST.

art. I, § 22. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show “‘that counsel’s

performance was deficient’ and that ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” State v.

Carson, 184 Wn.2d 207, 216, 357 P.3d 1064 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). To prevail, the

defendant must meet both the deficiency requirement and the prejudice requirement. Estes, 188

Wn.2d at 457-58.

        Counsel’s performance was deficient if it fell “‘below an objective standard of

reasonableness based on consideration of all the circumstances.’” Id. at 458 (quoting State v.

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). To establish that counsel performed

deficiently, the defendant must show that there were no “‘legitimate strategic or tactical reasons

                                                21
No. 56665-6-II

supporting the challenged conduct.’” State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 755, 278 P.3d 653 (2012)

(quoting McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 336). We strongly presume that counsel’s representation was

reasonable. Estes, 188 Wn.2d at 458.

       1.      Failure to object

       “A few or even several failures to object are not usually cause for finding” deficient

performance. State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239, 250, 494 P.3d 424 (2021). For example, it is a

legitimate trial tactic for an attorney to forgo objecting when they wish to avoid highlighting

certain evidence. Id. at 248.

       Here, counsel did not perform deficiently when he refrained from objecting in the instances

Roger points out. When the trial court said it saw a person in a white T-shirt in the security footage,

the court was delivering its ruling. Objecting would have been improper and futile. When Kristina

and the State said Kristina wrote the word “‘help’” on the kitchen island using her blood and when

Kristina identified Roger as the person who stabbed her while she was in the yard, it was reasonable

for counsel to refrain from objecting to avoid highlighting this particularly graphic evidence, which

was not in Roger’s favor. 5 VRP at 475; 9 VRP at 879.

       Additionally, Roger does not state what basis counsel would have had for objecting when

the State offered the white T-shirt into evidence. Multiple witnesses testified that Roger was

wearing a white T-shirt on the night of the incident, and a deputy sheriff who arrested Roger the

next day testified that during the arrest, Roger was wearing the T-shirt the State offered. Given the

amount of evidence that Roger was wearing a white T-shirt when he committed the crimes, it

would have made little sense for defense counsel to object to this evidence in an attempt to argue

that Roger was misidentified.

                                                  22
No. 56665-6-II

         2.     Inattentiveness at trial

         Roger argues that during trial, “as testimony was underway, counsel opened an attachment

on his phone and . . . [he] could hear a person talking.” SAG at 17. “The trial judge then asked

counsel if he needed [a] moment.” Id. In arguing that defense counsel was ineffective because he

was on his phone throughout trial, Roger references a portion of the trial transcript noting a

“[p]hone noise disturbance” during Kristina’s testimony. 5 VRP at 437. The State’s attorney said,

“Go ahead and go outside.” Id. The trial court asked defense counsel if he needed a moment, and

defense counsel replied, “I’m turning it off.” Id. The State’s attorney then continued her direct

examination of Kristina.

         The transcript does not give a clear indication of what took place, and Roger does not

support his argument with additional record citations to establish his counsel’s alleged

inattentiveness. His argument thus appears to depend on facts outside our record, and it cannot be

resolved on direct appeal.

D.       Additional Trial-Related Claims

         Roger raises several claims related to his bench trial. We conclude that these claims lack

merit.

         1.     Judicial bias

         Roger argues that he did not receive a fair trial because the trial court judge was biased

against him. He reasons that the judge referred to Kristina “as the ‘victim’” during trial and that

the “judge failed to disclose that she was previously a prosecutor” or that she was “part of a

woman’s victim . . . organization.” SAG at 1b. We conclude that Roger has not established bias.

                                                 23
No. 56665-6-II

       “Criminal defendants have a due process right to a fair trial by an impartial judge.” In re

Pers. Restraint of Swenson, 158 Wn. App. 812, 818, 244 P.3d 959 (2010). “‘Impartial’ means the

absence of actual or apparent bias.” Id. (quoting State v. Moreno, 147 Wn.2d 500, 507, 58 P.3d

265 (2002)). We presume “that a trial judge properly discharged [their] official duties without

bias.” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). “The party seeking

to overcome that presumption must provide specific facts establishing bias.” Id.

       Roger has not overcome the presumption that the trial court judge was impartial. The judge

referring to Kristina as the victim once during a two-and-a-half-week trial does not establish bias.

And there is no information in our record about whether the judge was previously a prosecutor or

involved in any particular organizations, so we cannot evaluate Roger’s arguments on those

subjects on direct appeal. A personal restraint petition is the appropriate vehicle for claims based

on facts outside the record.

       2.      Right to remain silent

       Roger argues that the trial court violated his right to remain silent under the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution because it found, based on his demeanor, that he

was not credible. He contends that a person’s “demeanor equates to a form of communication”

and if a person “[chooses] to be emotionless, it should be their right and not used against” them.

SAG at 7. We disagree.

       As stated above, we defer to the fact finder’s determinations of witness credibility. Ague-

Masters, 138 Wn. App. at 102. In determining whether a defendant who testifies is credible, the

fact finder is entitled to consider the defendant’s manner while they testify. See State v. Barry, 183

Wn.2d 297, 305, 352 P.3d 161 (2015).

                                                 24
No. 56665-6-II

       In this case, the judge was the fact finder, and she was entitled to make a credibility

determination based on Roger’s demeanor while he testified. We will not disturb this credibility

determination on appeal.

       3.      Trial transcript availability

       Roger argues that his due process rights have been violated because the portion of the trial

transcript “that captured [Kristina’s] testimony of [him] calling the police went missing.” SAG at

15. Roger appears to claim that there was a transcription error. His argument necessarily relies on

information outside of our record, so we cannot address it on the merits. A personal restraint

petition is the appropriate vehicle for this claim.

                                           CONCLUSION

       We remand for the trial court to consider on the record whether the lifetime no-contact

order covering Roger’s children was reasonably necessary in light of his right to parent and

whether modification of the order is needed. We otherwise affirm.

                                                  25
No. 56665-6-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                   Glasgow, C.J.
 We concur:

 Veljacic, J.

 Che, J.

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