Court Opinion

ID: 9391264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 18:00:55.058747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.367586
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MAMADOU MOUSTAPHA SIDY,                        )
                                               )
               Plaintiff,                      )
                                               )
       v.                                      )      Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01089 (UNA)
                                               )
CYBERSECURITY AND                              )
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY                        )
AGENCY LEGISLATIVE,                            )
                                               )
                Defendant.                     )

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 1, and

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained,

the court will grant the IFP application and dismiss the complaint without prejudice.

       Plaintiff, who resides in Senegal, sues the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security

Agency (“CISA”). From there, the complaint is difficult to follow. Although any of the

surrounding circumstances and the specific alleged wrongdoing are completely unclear, plaintiff

contends that he is employed by CISA and broadly asserts that is he owed unpaid wages. He also

seeks damages “and everything a CISA employee is entitled to.” He cites to certain federal statutes

and subsections of the Code of Federal Regulations, all of which involve records management by

federal agencies, but none of which convey a private right of action. Plaintiff fails to explain the

applicability of this legal authority, if any, to his claims. Indeed, his intended claims are entirely

ambiguous. As exhibits, he attaches correspondence from the Department of Homeland Security

the Office of Information Policy within the Department of Justice regarding two Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”) requests. But the complaint itself does not once reference the FOIA,

nor does seek any relief available under that statute. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), (4)(B)(1).
       First, Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1)

a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668-71 (D.C. Cir.

2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted

so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the

doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a

“complaint [] contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated,

nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments

[,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C.

2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017).

The instant complaint falls squarely within this category.

       Second, plaintiff has failed to establish this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Without

more information, plaintiff’s demand for unpaid wages is ostensibly a breach of contract claim.

The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, gives the United States Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to

render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded, inter alia, upon any express

or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not

sounding in tort. This grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Federal Claims is “exclusive,” but “only

to the extent that Congress has not granted any other court authority to hear the claims that may

be decided by the [Court of Federal Claims].” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 910 n.48

(1988). Absent other grounds for jurisdiction, a claim is subject to the Tucker Act’s stringent

jurisdictional restrictions if, in whole or in part, it explicitly or “in essence” seeks more than

$10,000 in monetary relief from the federal government. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d
959, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Heller, Ehrman, White & MacAuliffe v. Babbitt, 992 F.2d 360, 363

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (a plaintiff “may not, by creatively framing their complaint, circumvent a

congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction.”). Here, plaintiff seeks in excess of $10,000.

Accordingly, this court is want of jurisdiction, and assuming he could make out a viable claim, he

would be nonetheless be required to seek recourse in the Court of Federal Claims.

       Put simply, the complaint is vague, confused, and fails to provide adequate notice of any

claim. Furthermore, plaintiff fails to establish this court’s jurisdiction or to present a valid basis

for relief. Consequently, the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. An order consistent with

this memorandum opinion is issued separately.

Date: May 1, 2023

                                               Tanya S. Chutkan
                                               TANYA S. CHUTKAN
                                               United States District Judge