Court Opinion

ID: 9474675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:04:53.362752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:15.086586
License: Public Domain

NIES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting-in-part.
I respectfully dissent with respect to the disposition of the issue of mitigation of the penalty by other members of this panel.
I.
The lead opinion concludes that the issue of mitigation should not be considered because it was not argued during the hearing before the presiding official, in effect, holding the issue to have been waived. Allred did raise the issue to the presiding official. Indeed, the opinion of the presiding official specifically states that “the agency must establish that a lesser penalty would be ineffective under the circumstances of the particular case.” The presiding official apparently did not find it necessary to go on to discuss mitigation in her opinion because she ruled in favor of Allred on the nexus issue.1 Thus, I do not agree that the matter is not before us.
I initially was confused over whether mitigation was properly raised below because of a statement in the government’s brief, “Because petitioner did not make the argument before the Board when he had the opportunity to do so, he cannot raise it now on appeal. Lizut v. Department of the Army, 717 F.2d 1391, 1395-96 (Fed.Cir. 1983).” (Emphasis added.) I consider this argument by the government to have been a serious disservice to the court. The words “to the Board” were read by this member of the panel to mean that Allred’s argument was not presented to the presiding official. To verify the correctness of the government’s assertion, in view of petitioner’s challenge to it, it was necessary to obtain the official record. The official record before the presiding official and the board includes an attachment to the initial pleadings of a summary of petitioner’s oral response to the deciding official, several paragraphs of which were devoted to the issue of mitigation. In any event, as the presiding official stated, it is always part *1134of the agency’s affirmative burden of proof to establish the reasonableness of the penalty. In view of the pleadings here, and the presiding official’s statement, there can be no arguably viable assertion that the agency was somehow relieved of that burden in its case against Allred.
Returning to the government’s misleading statement, the government apparently means that petitioner did not raise the issue of mitigation to the full board. Petitioner here was not required to petition the board before appealing to this court nor to raise any issue which is in the case to the full board to preserve an issue for appeal to this court. A petition for review to the full board prior to judicial appeal is wholly optional with an employee. Petitioner filed none in this case. In James v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 755 F.2d 154 (Fed.Cir.1985), modifying James v. F.E.R.C., 747 F.2d 1581 (Fed.Cir. 1984), this court twice reviewed, at the request of the government, the petition for review procedures of the board and the Lizut decision. Because of the procedural traps which otherwise would be created for employees, it was held in James that this court will only refrain from treating issues raised by an employee for the first time on appeal to this court and those issues expressly waived as in Lizut. James, 755 F.2d at 155-56. Lizut is appropriately cited only where there is a waiver.2 There was no waiver here. The government’s argument on this issue is legally frivolous, and I would censure the writer.
II.
With respect to the issue of mitigation, upon overturning the presiding official’s decision on the nexus issue, the board had an incomplete determination of the propriety of Allred’s removal under Chapter 75. It was then incumbent on the full board either to decide the issue of mitigation itself on the basis of the evidence in the record or to remand to the presiding official for such consideration. Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 MSPB 313, 318, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 290 (1981).
A number of mitigating factors listed in Douglas are present in this case which indicates that mitigation of the penalty is a genuine issue here, and the failure to consider the issue cannot be deemed insignificant. Since the issue was not discussed below, there may be more than those set forth below:
(1) Mr. Allred is charged with violating standards of conduct of the agency. This is not, however, a typical child molestation case. The misconduct of Mr. Allred is that he hired a prostitute who turned out to be a minor. As a first offender, the State of Georgia allows Mr. Allred to clear himself of a criminal record.3 Thus, the misconduct is not deemed egregious under Georgia law.4
*1135(2) Mr. Allred has 25 years of exemplary government service both with respect to the quality of his work and the absence of any prior discipline.
(3) It is acknowledged by the agency that the offense has had no effect on his ability to perform satisfactorily as an accountant.
(4) Co-workers testified that they could continue to work with him, even as their supervisor.
(5) The Director of Operations for HEW’s Washington Office testified that petitioner could still function effectively.
(6) There was little evidence — and it is hearsay — of publicity associated with the offense. It was not a “notorious” incident. There were no press reports.
(7) There is evidence that Mr. Allred is undergoing counselling, has a supportive family, and has the potential for rehabilitation. This Douglas factor mirrors 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(c)(7), which makes consideration of the presence of rehabilitation or efforts toward rehabilitation mandatory in connection with OPM initiated removals. As far as I can determine from the record, the agency violated Douglas in this respect.
This court has held that the MSPB’s “failure to consider a significant mitigating circumstance constitutes an abuse of discretion.” VanFossen v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 748 F.2d 1579, 1581 (Fed.Cir.1984).5 The failure to consider efforts toward rehabilitation alone requires reversal and remand. Accordingly, the adverse action of removal cannot lawfully stand.
IV.
With respect to nexus, to the extent the board’s finding rested on proof that Allred’s position required contacts with state and federal officials outside the agency so that he would be a poor representative of the agency, that finding has a sufficient evidentiary base and must be upheld. However, that factor justifies removal from that particular position, but not from the agency. It is at this point that nexus and mitigation become closely intertwined. The lead opinion correctly observed that “nexus” describes a relationship between an employee’s misconduct and that employee’s job related responsibilities. As with any concept describing a relationship between two matters, nexus cannot be said to exist or not exist until those two matters have been clearly defined. In this regard, nexus is conceptually similar to the relationship we call relevance, the existence or non-existence of which cannot be ascertained without first clearly defining those matters between which the relationship is to be tested, e.g., a piece of evidence and a fact sought to be proved. Remove either and the relationship neither exists nor does not exist; its consideration is simply non sequitur. I recite this simple logic to illustrate that an inherent prerequisite to any discussion of nexus is the answer to the question “nexus to whatl”, which answer must be given in terms of the responsibilities of a particular position.6 The other *1136prerequisite, the fact and nature of the misconduct, is not at issue in this case. It cannot be held that every type of sex offense is a basis for removal from every position in the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) (1982) specifically prohibits discrimination against any employee “on the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee ... or the performance of others.”
Even though there is nexus between Mr. Allred’s off-duty conduct and the particular job-related responsibilities of the position from which he was removed, the efficiency of the service has been proved to require no more than that he be demoted to a level where he no longer interacts with outsiders. See, e.g., White v. United States Postal Service, 768 F.2d 334, 336 (Fed.Cir. 1985); Brown v. Dept. of Transportation, FAA, 735 F.2d 543, 548 (Fed.Cir.1984). Because of lack of proof of nexus to other positions for which Allred was qualified, there is no obstacle to imposition of a lesser penalty.
In view of the above, I would remand.

. While it is understandable that the presiding official would prefer to limit an opinion to one or more dispositive issues, this case illustrates the necessity for a presiding official to discuss the issues which would be reached only in the event of reversal on a decided issue.

. Lizut was among the first cases heard by the new court. The alternative holding on exhaustion of administrative remedies was premised on the usual procedure involving a mandatory appeal to an intermediate body. That procedure does not apply to MSPB proceedings. Accordingly, only the waiver holding of Lizut is viable.

. The Superior Court's order in the criminal proceeding against Mr. Allred stated that because of the applicability of the Georgia First Offenders Act, "it is the judgment of this Court that no judgment of guilt or sentence be imposed at this time, but that ... defendant is hereby placed on probation" under specified terms. The effect of compliance with the terms of probation under this Act is described in Ga. Code Ann. § 27-2728 (1968) which states, in pertinent part:
Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation, or upon release by the court prior to the termination of the period thereof, the defendant shall be discharged without court adjudication of guilt. Such discharge shall completely exonerate the defendant of any criminal purpose, shall not affect any civil right or liberties, and he shall not be considered to have a criminal conviction. [Emphasis added.]

. Georgia law provides that the plea entered in this case cannot be used as evidence. Ga.Code Ann. § 27-1410 (1946). Without the testimony that Mr. Allred admitted at least some sexual misconduct to his supervisor, the evidence against him could not be held to constitute a preponderance.

. In Mitchum v. T.V.A., 756 F.2d 82, 84 (Fed.Cir.1985), this court stated that the “presiding official is required to ascertain whether the agency has responsibly balanced the relevant factors in the individual case and selected a penalty within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.” See also Connolly v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 766 F.2d 507, 514 (Fed.Cir.1985).

. None of our precedent endorses supplanting the employee’s specific job responsibilities with the "agency mission” in the nexus analysis. Although seductive language may exist in Masino v. U.S., 589 F.2d 1048, 218 Ct.Cl. 531 (1978), that case involved the removal of a customs inspector whose specific job duties required him to enforce federal laws against the illegal importation of marijuana, because of his personal use and transportation of marijuana. The mere fact that the responsibilities of Masino’s position coincided with one of the agency’s missions is simply inadequate to support a rule that the two are interchangeable. Giles v. U.S., 553 F.2d 647, 213 Ct.Cl. 602 (1977), is no different. Giles' specific job responsibility was to secure payments and filings of tax returns by delinquent taxpayers. He was removed because he failed to file or to timely file his tax returns in accordance with a specific regulation applicable to IRS employees. Thus, I cannot read these cases as disregarding the job responsibilities of a particular position in favor of the far broader and oft ill-defined "agency mission," and although an agency mission may in some circumstances le*1136gitimately be a factor to be considered, I believe it has improperly been elevated in this case to the level of an offensive instrument by means of which a vague standard of morality has been interpolated between the lines of Title 5 of the United States Code. I doubt Congress so intended.