Court Opinion

ID: 9897764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:47.672741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:43.808339
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Ortiz and Senior Judge Annunziata
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Fairfax, Virginia

              AMELIA ELZE
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1358-22-4                                 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
                                                                                  OCTOBER 3, 2023
              JEANNETTE LEYTON

                                    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                                                Robert J. Smith, Judge

                               Alicia Lehnes Summers (Stephanie M. Dahl & Associates, on
                               briefs), for appellant.

                               Michael J. Shevlin (Shevlin Smith, P.C., on brief), for appellee.

                      Amelia Elze failed to stop her vehicle at a red light and rear-ended Jeannette Leyton, forcing

              Leyton’s vehicle into a third vehicle. Leyton sued Elze for injuries she suffered in the car accident.

              A jury returned a verdict for Leyton, awarding her damages totaling $203,000. Elze appeals the

              trial court’s pretrial findings regarding its Rule 4:10 order, the sanctions it imposed for Elze’s

              violation of the Rule 4:10 order, and its exclusion of an exhibit at trial. For the following reasons,

              we affirm.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                      “When parties come before us with a jury verdict that has been approved by the trial court,

              they hold the most favored position known to the law.” Colas v. Tyree, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Jan. 26,

              2023) (quoting Xspedius Mgmt. Co. of Va. v. Stephan, 269 Va. 421, 424 (2005)). “[W]e view the

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from it in the light most favorable” to

Leyton as the prevailing party at trial. Id. at ___ (quoting Xspedius, 269 Va. at 425).

       On December 1, 2018, Leyton was stopped at a red light behind another vehicle on her way

home from work. Elze hit Leyton’s vehicle from behind and propelled it forward into the vehicle in

front of Leyton. The car accident caused injuries to Leyton’s lower back and head, so she was

transported to the hospital. Following her discharge from the hospital, Leyton’s symptoms

worsened and she began experiencing neck and shoulder pain.

       A neurologist diagnosed Leyton with permanent whiplash, caused by the December 2018

car accident, and prescribed steroids and a muscle relaxant. Leyton also received nerve block

injections. Leyton regularly experienced significant pain, had difficulty moving her head,

experienced headaches, and had persistent lower back pain.

       On October 13, 2020, Leyton sued for Elze’s negligence. The trial court entered a consent

order under Rule 4:10 for Leyton to submit to a medical examination by Dr. Ian Wattenmaker. In

relevant part, the trial court’s order limited Dr. Wattenmaker’s questions of Leyton during the

examination to “the medical standard of care associated with the patient/plaintiff’s history and any

complaints since the plaintiff’s deposition in February 2022.” The trial court’s order also prohibited

counsel and Dr. Wattenmaker from referring to the examination as an independent medical

examination.

       Dr. Wattenmaker conducted the Rule 4:10 examination and issued his written report on June

20, 2022. In his written report, under a heading titled “History of Present Illness,” Dr. Wattenmaker

noted that he had questioned Leyton about the car accident, including how it occurred and what

symptoms she felt afterward. He also inquired about Leyton’s past medical history.

Dr. Wattenmaker opined, before reviewing Leyton’s medical records, that her symptoms at that

time could not be anatomically explained by the December 1, 2018 car accident and therefore were

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not caused by the accident. Dr. Wattenmaker then reviewed Leyton’s medical records and reached

the same conclusion—that she did not suffer any permanent injury because of the car accident.

       At his deposition, Dr. Wattenmaker explained that one of “the most important aspect[s]” of

his examination “was the history [he] obtained from” Leyton. Dr. Wattenmaker asked Leyton

whether she had any prior difficulty with symptoms or conditions involving her neck or lower back

before the car accident. Dr. Wattenmaker reviewed Leyton’s provided history and medical records

and determined that Leyton had experienced neck and lower back pain before the car accident.

Dr. Wattenmaker also referred to the examination as an independent medical examination more

than once during his deposition.

       On July 22, 2022, Leyton moved to exclude Dr. Wattenmaker as a witness at trial or to

strike portions of his testimony because he had not limited the scope of his examination and

questions to events after Leyton’s deposition in February 2022 and referred to his examination as an

independent medical examination. At a hearing, the trial court found that the express language of

the order prevented Dr. Wattenmaker from asking about history and complaints before Leyton’s

February 2022 deposition. The trial court also found that Dr. Wattenmaker was not permitted to

call the exam an “independent” medical examination. When asked to identify segments of the

deposition that the court should excise to resolve the evidentiary challenge, Elze identified two

sections of Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony that the trial court’s ruling affected and believed that those

passages could be removed from the report and testimony. Leyton countered that considering the

total deposition, it was clear that Dr. Wattenmaker relied on the medical history he inappropriately

solicited during the exam.

       After reviewing the transcript of Dr. Wattenmaker’s deposition, the trial court found that it

was not possible to exclude Dr. Wattenmaker’s consideration of Leyton’s history from the

deposition because it was “very clear” that Dr. Wattenmaker’s answers were given in relation to his

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“treatment history and the history that he took.” Thus, the trial court excluded Dr. Wattenmaker’s

testimony in its entirety.

        At trial, Elze stipulated liability for the car accident and the matter proceeded on the issue of

damages. Leyton testified that before the accident, she had been self-employed for more than ten

years cleaning nine or ten houses and had not experienced any pain while doing this work. After the

accident, Leyton cleaned seven or eight houses and experienced head, neck, lower back, and

shoulder pain while working. After Leyton took a job caring for one family five days per week, and

cleaning two houses one day per week, the level and frequency of Leyton’s pain was reduced.

Before the car accident, Leyton regularly exercised, taking Zumba and Tae Bo classes, running, and

lifting weights multiple times per week. Since the accident, however, she was unable to continue

the exercise program she had previously followed.

        Although Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony was excluded at trial, Elze introduced several

exhibits in her case-in-chief. When Elze sought to introduce Leyton’s emergency room records

from August 25, 2017, to attack Leyton’s credibility, Leyton objected on relevancy grounds,

arguing that Elze had stipulated to liability and that the December 1, 2018 car accident caused

Leyton’s injuries. Leyton asserted that the hospital records from a separate injury could mislead the

jury. Elze responded that Leyton’s discovery responses either did not disclose the 2017 accident, or

if she did disclose the accident, her responses indicated that she did not seek medical attention. The

trial court noted that a lot of the inconsistency in Leyton’s testimony was due to a “language

misunderstanding” in the courtroom and found that the hospital records had insufficient indicia of

reliability because Leyton did not speak English well. Thus, the trial court sustained Leyton’s

objection.1

        1
         Leyton primarily spoke Spanish but attended and participated in her deposition without
an interpreter because none was available and she “did [her] best to answer the questions as [she]
understood them.” At trial, Leyton acknowledged that she was in a car accident on August 25,
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        The jury awarded Leyton $203,000 in damages. On appeal, Elze argues that the trial court

erred in finding that the Rule 4:10 order precluded Dr. Wattenmaker from asking Leyton about her

medical history. Elze also argues that the trial court’s sanction for the Rule 4:10 violation—the

blanket exclusion of Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony—was overbroad and prejudicial. Finally, Elze

argues that the trial court erred when it excluded the August 25, 2017 emergency room medical

records based on its sua sponte finding that Leyton had communication difficulties.

                                              ANALYSIS

                                I. Interpretation of the Rule 4:10 Order

        “[T]rial courts have the authority to interpret their own orders.” Davis v. Commonwealth,

70 Va. App. 722, 732 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W.

Wyne Excavating, Inc., 260 Va. 137, 144 (2000)). “This Court ‘defer[s] to the trial court’s

interpretation of its own order.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Leitao v. Commonwealth, 39

Va. App. 435, 438 (2002)). “That interpretation, however, must be reasonable, and [this Court] will

‘apply an abuse of discretion standard.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bajgain v. Bajgain, 64

Va. App. 439, 453 (2015)). “The abuse of discretion standard recognizes that a court has a ‘range

of choice’ and that ‘its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not

influenced by any mistake of law.’” Payne v. Payne, 77 Va. App. 570, 590 (2023) (quoting

Galiotos v. Galiotos, 300 Va. 1, 10 (2021)). “Thus, only when reasonable jurists could not differ

can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Stark v. Dinarany, 73 Va. App. 733, 746 (2021)

(quoting Galiotos, 300 Va. at 11).

2017, and went to the emergency room but was released that night. In her interrogatory answers,
Leyton stated she had experienced a “rear-end collision in the last five years” and that she
suffered from body aches but sought no medical attention afterward. Leyton’s treating
chiropractor and neurologist testified at trial that they did not have Leyton’s August 2017
emergency room records during their treatment.
                                                  -5-
        Elze argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Rule 4:10 order precluded

Dr. Wattenmaker from asking Leyton about her medical history. She asserts that the order plainly

allowed questions pertaining to the history of Leyton’s claimed injuries and that the trial court’s

interpretation of the order was overbroad and unreasonable. We disagree.

        Paragraph 4(d) of the Rule 4:10 order expressly provides that Dr. Wattenmaker was

“permitted to only ask questions associated with the medical standard of care associated with the

patient/plaintiff’s history and any complaints since the plaintiff’s deposition in February 2022.”

(Emphasis added). That language can be understood in more than one way and is, therefore,

ambiguous. After considering the language and structure of the order, the trial court noted that it

“would be more persuaded that the limitation was only applying to complaints if it was broken

down into separate sub paragraphs.” The trial court found, however, that “if you read [the] sub

paragraph . . . with appropriate grammar and sentence structure,” the inquiry was limited to history

and complaints after February 2022. Based on that interpretation of its own order, the trial court

found that the limitation applied to the entirety of the subparagraph. We find the court’s

interpretation was reasonable and, therefore, within the trial court’s discretion.

                           II. Exclusion of Dr. Wattenmaker’s Testimony

        If a party fails to obey a Rule 4:10 discovery order, a trial court may prohibit the disobedient

party from introducing the designated matter into evidence. Rule 4:12(b)(2)(B). “The Supreme

Court has made clear that ‘[a] trial court generally exercises “broad discretion” in determining the

appropriate sanction for failure to comply with an order relating to discovery.’” Stark, 73 Va. App.

at 745 (alteration in original) (quoting Walsh v. Bennett, 260 Va. 171, 175 (2000)). “‘Because the

trial court “exercises broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction,”’ this Court reviews

its decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting Galloway v. Cnty. of Northampton, 299 Va.

558, 563 (2021)).

                                                  -6-
       Elze argues that the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony because the

sanction was overbroad and prejudicially excluded the presentation of evidence in defense of her

case. She also argues that the trial court could have excised only the improper portions of

Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony and contends that the record does not support the conclusion that

Dr. Wattenmaker’s entire testimony was tainted.

       We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Wattenmaker’s

testimony. Elze identified two passages that she believed could be redacted from the deposition

transcript. However, the trial court considered the transcript in its entirety and found that because

Leyton’s history was the foundation of Dr. Wattenmaker’s examination, deposition, and ultimate

opinion, there was no way to strike Dr. Wattenmaker’s use of Leyton’s history in violation of the

order. Indeed, Dr. Wattenmaker stated that one of the most important aspects of his examination

was the medical history he obtained from Leyton. Dr. Wattenmaker believed it was medically

necessary to his physical examination that he obtain Leyton’s history, and he used that reported

history to correlate physical findings during the examination. Dr. Wattenmaker also directly

compared his physical findings during the examination with Leyton’s reported history and

symptoms and concluded that Leyton’s provided history was inconsistent with a cervical spine

injury and that she did not suffer a whiplash injury as a result of the December 1, 2018 car accident.

As the trial court found, it is readily apparent from the deposition transcript that Dr. Wattenmaker’s

answers directly related back to the history he took, which violated the express provisions of the

agreed order.

       “[A]n appellate court should not simply rubber stamp every discretionary decision of a trial

court.” Walsh, 260 Va. at 175. It was, however, within the trial court’s discretion to exclude

Dr. Wattenmaker’s testimony. The trial court found itself without the ability to sufficiently sanitize

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the references to Leyton’s history after considering the transcript as a whole. Thus, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Dr. Wattenmaker’s deposition testimony.

                        III. Exclusion of the August 25, 2017 Medical Records

        “The admissibility of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling

will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Warnick v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 251, 263 (2020) (quoting Amonett v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 1,

9 (2019)). Elze argues that the trial court erred in excluding Leyton’s August 25, 2017 emergency

room records. Elze asserts that the medical records were relevant because they showed that Leyton

made complaints of neck and back pain more than a year before the car accident and thus

undermined her credibility. Elze also argues that any language barrier goes to the weight of the

evidence, not admissibility. We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion by

excluding the challenged evidence because any such error was harmless.

        “In a civil case, the erroneous exclusion of evidence is reversible error when the record fails

to show plainly that the excluded evidence could not have affected the verdict. Thus, [appellate

courts] consider the potential effect of the excluded evidence in light of all the evidence that was

presented to the jury.” Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 642 (2016) (quoting Barkley v.

Wallace, 267 Va. 369, 374 (2004)). The exclusion of relevant, but cumulative evidence, does not

constitute reversible error. Pace v. Richmond, 231 Va. 216, 227 (1986) (citing Eason v. Eason, 203

Va. 246, 254 (1962)).

        During cross-examination, Leyton testified that she was in a car accident on August 25,

2017, and went to the emergency room. Leyton testified that after the emergency room providers

examined her, she left; Leyton could not remember exactly what the providers did. Leyton

acknowledged that she told the providers she experienced neck and back pain immediately after the

2017 car accident. Introducing the challenged medical records would have been cumulative of the

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uncontested evidence already before the jury through Leyton’s testimony. Leyton conceded that she

had reported neck and back pain. Considering Leyton’s admission regarding the earlier injury, we

find that Elze overstates any impeachment value the medical records carried. We conclude that

these cumulative medical records would not have resulted in a different outcome.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We find no reversible error here because the trial court reasonably interpreted its own order,

which included limitations on the examination to which the parties agreed. Having found that

Elze’s expert disobeyed those agreed-upon limitations, the trial court imposed an authorized

sanction. Finally, there was no reversible error in the exclusion of cumulative evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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