Court Opinion

ID: 9728921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:19:06.172637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.134723
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 31. {concurring). I concur in the Majority opinion, and briefly explain my reasons.
¶ 32. First, I agree with the Majority that quite properly a convicted defendant cannot recover against his or her lawyer for legal malpractice that allegedly caused the defendant's conviction unless the defendant can show by the civil burden of proof that he or she was actually innocent of the crime and, also, that the lawyer's malpractice was a cause of the conviction. Hicks v. Nunnery, 2002 WI App 87, ¶¶ 34-50, 253 Wis. 2d 721, 747-756, 643 N.W.2d 809, 820-824.1 see no neutral-principled reason why the same rule does not apply in the postconviction setting. Constitutional principles and technical rules of trial that may permit guilty defendants to avoid conviction are, as Hicks recognized, " 'not intended to confer any direct benefit outside the *530context of the criminal justice system. Thus, defense counsel's negligent failure to utilize them to secure an acquittal or dismissal for a guilty defendant does not give rise to civil liability.'" Id., 2002 WI App 87, ¶ 43, 253 Wis. 2d at 751, 643 N.W.2d at 822 (quoted source omitted). Accordingly, as I see it, a convicted defendant who claims that a lawyer's postconviction malpractice deprived that defendant of a postconviction remedy must establish three things by the normal civil burden of proof, that: (1) but for the postconviction lawyer's negligence the defendant would have gotten a new trial; and, if so (2) the defendant would have been acquitted on the retrial; and, also (3) the defendant is actually innocent of the crime. See id., 2002 WI App 87, ¶ 50, 253 Wis. 2d at 755, 643 N.W.2d at 824 ("We emphasize that the question of a plaintiffs innocence is in addition to, not a substitute for, a jury question regarding whether the plaintiff would have been found not guilty absent the defendant's negligence."). I agree with the Majority that Walter David Tallmadge has not made the requisite summary-judgment showing here. See Transportation Ins. Co. v. Hunzinger Constr. Co., 179 Wis. 2d 281, 290, 507 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Ct. App. 1993) (party resisting summary judgment has burden to set forth specific facts to establish elements on which they have burden of proof at trial).
¶ 33. Second, I agree with the Majority that a beneficiary of a trust does not have standing to seek disgorgement of trust funds the beneficiary claims were improperly paid to, or improperly retained by, a third person unless the beneficiary shows either that: (1) the trustee or trustees had an interest in connection with the matter that was adverse to the beneficiary, or (2) the trustee or trustees had failed to seek the disgorgement even though asked to do so. Schaefer v. *531Schaefer, 91 Wis. 2d 360, 368, 283 N.W.2d 410, 415 (Ct. App. 1979). I agree with the Majority that Tallmadge has not passed summary-judgment muster in connection with either alternative. See Transportation Ins. Co., 179 Wis. 2d at 290, 507 N.W.2d at 139 (party resisting summary judgment has burden to set forth specific facts to establish elements on which they have burden of proof at trial).
¶ 34. I write separately to also point out that the two issues presented by this appeal (lawyer malpractice and disgorgement of money paid to that lawyer) are separate inquiries; that is, recovery seeking disgorgement of funds paid to a lawyer that he or she did not earn does not depend, as would a malpractice action, on the defendant's proof of actual innocence.
¶ 35. Based on the foregoing, I concur in the Majority opinion.