Court Opinion

ID: 9860186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:13:38.044629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:54.894712
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CARTER, specially concurring: I specially concur with the majority’s ruling because I believe a plain error analysis should be applied to this case. The majority’s ruling, I respectfully suggest, is inconsistent with our supreme court’s most recent rulings on plain error versus harmless error review. In the instant case, defendant did not make a timely objection of the alleged error regarding the trial judge’s ex parte communication with the jury at trial or raise the issue in a posttrial motion. However, the only argument defendant raises on appeal is that the trial court erred in conducting an ex parte communication with the deliberating jurors without the presence of defendant or counsel. Failing to object at trial and failing to raise the issue in a posttrial motion ordinarily results in the forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 350, 856 N.E.2d 349, 355 (2006). The plain error analysis applies where the defendant, as in the instant case, has failed to make a timely objection and it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177, 830 N.E.2d 467, 474 (2005); Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 350-54, 856 N.E.2d at 355-57; People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 409-10, 848 N.E.2d 982, 989 (2006); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363, 786 N.E.2d 1019, 1025 (2003). In contrast, where a defendant has made a timely objection, it is the State who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice, proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same absent the error. See Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177, 830 N.E.2d at 474. As developed under the plain error doctrine, a reviewing court can reach a forfeited or waived error affecting substantial rights in two circumstances. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177, 830 N.E.2d at 475. A court will consider plain error when the evidence is closely balanced or when the error is so serious that it impacts the integrity of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 178-79, 830 N.E.2d at 475. In Illinois, under the second category of plain error, a court considers the presumptively procedural error that may not have affected the outcome, but still must be remedied. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 185, 830 N.E.2d at 479. Both categories of plain error take into account the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 185, 830 N.E.2d at 479. In the second category, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, 830 N.E.2d at 479-80. This substantial rights prong guards against errors that are likely to erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186, 830 N.E.2d at 479; accord Allen, 222 Ill. 2d at 353, 856 N.E.2d at 356. Jury deliberations are a critical stage of trial and involve substantial rights which require that the defendant has a right to be present and participate in person and by counsel involving any communications between the judge and the jury. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 162, 705 N.E.2d 850, 890 (1998); People v. McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d 420, 459, 660 N.E.2d 832, 849 (1995); People v. Childs, 159 Ill. 2d 217, 227, 636 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1994). These cases all indicate that an ex parte communication between judge and a jury deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to be present at and to participate for his protection in a critical stage of trial. The cases also indicate the verdict will not be set aside where it is clear or apparent that no harm or prejudice resulted from an ex parte communication. Although all of the above cases indicate that the State has the burden of proving that any error in the ex parte communication is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and are issue specific, they all predate the Herron procedural forfeiture analysis. See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 162, 705 N.E.2d at 891 (no objection at trial or posttrial, but waiver less rigid when based on judge’s conduct); McDonald, 168 Ill. 2d at 460, 660 N.E.2d at 849 (defendant did object both at trial and in postsentencing motions resulting in no waiver); Childs, 159 Ill. 2d at 228, 636 N.E.2d at 538 (burden is on the party gaining advantage from errors and appellate court opinion indicates defendant objected at trial upon hearing of the judge’s ex parte communication (People v. Childs, 230 Ill. App. 3d 993, 996, 596 N.E.2d 108, 111 (1992)). But see People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204, 231, 568 N.E.2d 837, 847-48 (1991) (court puts burden on defendant to prove prejudice from ex parte communication although issue was raised in posttrial motion). After Herron, Nitz, and Allen, as to the issue of ex parte communication between the judge and jury, courts should apply a harmless-error analysis when a defendant has made a timely objection and has raised the issue in a posttrial motion, but where defendant has failed to make a timely objection or to raise the issue in a posttrial motion, a plain error analysis should be applied. In the harmless-error analysis, the State has the burden to prove prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt. However, under a plain error analysis, the defendant has the burden of proving prejudice. In the instant case, I believe that the defendant in his argument has met his burden to show that the trial court’s ex parte communication deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to be present at jury deliberations and caused him prejudice impacting the integrity of the process. Regardless of the strength of the evidence in this case, the defendant in his argument has shown that the judge’s action without the defendant and his counsel present was error that impacted the fairness of the trial, based on the particular circumstances presented. The trial judge told the jury to continue deliberating after the jury sought help from the court. We have no idea what suggestions the defense might have made to the trial judge. But we do know that the defendant’s first trial had ended in a deadlocked jury prompting a mistrial. At the second trial, it appears that the jury was stalemated again at a vote of 11-1. Given the importance of the right involved in this case and the circumstances presented, I believe that the defense has met its burden, albeit legally arguing the pre-Herron position that the State had the burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not prejudiced. For the reasons stated, I specially concur.