Court Opinion

ID: 9586589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:13:05.562716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:44.155446
License: Public Domain

Calhoun, Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
The Court has taken the position that the “language of the will created a contingent equitable interest in the named persons which became vested in the survivors at the time of distribution.” Whether an interest of a beneficiary in an estate is vested or contingent depends upon the intention of the testator as determined by the language of the will when read in its entirety and in the light of surrounding circumstances. 5 Page, Wills, Section 43.3, pages 336-37.
The pertinent language of the Wilkinson will provides:
“I. Upon the death of my said beloved Wife, Lula Z. Wilkinson, then I desire and direct that said trust estate shall terminate. My said Co-Trustees shall then make final accounting and settlement of their administration thereof and shall divide the then principal or corpus of said trust estate, together with any undistributed earnings and profits thereof into five parts of equal value and shall make final distribution of said five parts as follows:
“i. To my daughter Caroline Wilkinson Guthrie, one of said equal parts.
*513“ii. To my said daughter Genevra Wilkinson Staker, one of said equal parts.
“iii. To my son Earl Durbin Wilkinson, one of said equal parts.
“iv. To my daughter Mary Frances Wilkinson Nistendirk, one of said equal parts.
“v. To my step-son Robert Elbon Stalnaker, one of said equal parts.
“vi. In the event, prior to the termination and distribution of said trust estate, said Caroline Wilkinson Guthrie, or said Genevra Wilkinson Staker, or said Earl Durbin Wilkinson, or said Mary Frances Nistendirk, or said Robert Elbon Stalnaker, or any one or more of them shall have died, then I desire and direct my said Co-Trustees as follows.
“ (a) If any such decedent shall leave a child or children him or her surviving, then the share of said trust property which otherwise would have gone to such decedent shall be paid over to such child or children, share and share alike.
“ (b) If any such decedent leave no child nor children her or him surviving, then the share of said trust property which otherwise would have gone to any such decedent, or to the said child or children of such decedent, if any, shall be distributed by my Co-Trustees among and paid over to such of my said daughters, son and stepson as may be then in life or to the child or children of any of them who may have died leaving a child or children surviving, per stirpes.
“ (c) I declare it to be my intention and purpose that said trust property, upon the termination of said trust, shall go to said Caroline Wilkinson Guthrie and to said Gen'evra Wilkinson Staker, and to said Earl Durbin Wilkinson, and to said Mary Frances Wilkinson Nistendirk and to said Robert Elbon Stalnaker or to the child or children of any of them who may have died and to no other person or persons.” (Italics supplied.)
An examination of the Wilkinson will in its entirety discloses an intention of the testator to provide primarily *514for his wife, during her lifetime, and for his five children. The testator, Ashby J.' Wilkinson, then provided for alternative methods of distribution in the event of the death of one or more of his children “prior to the termination and distribution” of his trust estate.
The precise question presented for decision is whether the designated beneficiaries must only have survived the life tenant, Lula Z. Wilkinson, or whether they must survive until an actual, physical, and final distribution of the assets of the trust estate is made, regardless of how long final distribution is delayed. The answer requires a determination of the intention of the testator as disclosed by the language of the will.
Although the testator used the language “prior to the termination and distribution of said trust estate” in making provision for alternate methods of distribution in the event of the death of one or more of his children, he also provided in Subsection I of Section VI that, upon the death of his wife, the “trust estate shall terminate” and that it was his intention that the trust propery would pass “upon the termination of said trust” to the five named beneficiaries or to the child or children of any of them who may have died.
In Subsection H of Section VI, the testator made a provision for the distribution of income of the trust estate which might exceed the amount of income reasonably necessary to supplement the income of his wife and to provide a reasonable reserve against unforseen contingencies. That provision states that any surplus income shall be paid in quarterly installments to the five named beneficiaries and that in the event of the death “of any one or more of said five persons prior to the termination of my trust estate said surplus income shall be distributed in the same manner as herein provided for the final distribution of my estate.” (Italics supplied.)
The language quoted above clearly indicates that the testator intended to make a distinction between the time *515the trust was to terminate and the time the assets were to he finally distributed. That same language clearly discloses his intention to require only that the named beneficiaries survive the death of his wife. I am of the opinion that the testator, by his will, clearly indicated his intention to cause the estate to vest in the remaindermen upon the death of the testator, subject to being divested as to any one or more of the named beneficiaries who might die prior to the death of the life tenant.
If the decision of the Court in this case is correct, where has the title to the testator’s real estate and the ownership of his personal estate been since the date of his death? The bare legal title to the real estate and the ownership of the personal estate may be said to have been in the trustees; but, if so, they were holding the estate merely as trustees for the benefit of the owners of the property devised by the will. Can it be said reasonably or legally that, during the long, indefinite period of time from the date of the testator’s death until the date of final distribution, legal title to the real estate and the ownership of the personal estate was in a state of suspension and not in any sense in the beneficiaries of the will?
In the second point of the syllabus in Tharp v. Tharp, 131 W.Va. 529, 48 S.E.2d 793, the Court stated: “A will should be construed as vesting the estate devised or bequeathed at testator’s death in the absence of language therein clearly indicating an intention on the part of testator to postpone vesting until a future event; and where the provisions of the will render doubtful whether testator intended the estate to be vested or contingent, the douibt will be resolved in favor of the vesting of the estate.” See also Young v. Lewis, 138 W.Va. 425, 76 S.E.2d 276.
I am of the opinion that, upon the death of the testator, Genevra Wilkinson Staker took a vested remainder subject to being divested if her death occurred prior to the death of the life tenant. Having survived the death of the life tenant, her right to take under the provisions of *516the will became absolute. Her interest was, therefore, transmissable under the provisions of Code, 1931, 36-1-9, a portion of the language of which is as follows: “Any interest in or claim to real estate or personal property may be lawfully conveyed or devised. * * Her interest passed, therefore, to Lewis A. Staker as the executor and sole beneficiary of her will.
For reasons stated in this dissenting opinion, I would reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cabell County.