Court Opinion

ID: 9609352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:26:33.86564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.328406
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — The majority, reversing a unanimous Court of Appeals decision, establishes a rule for search warrants that completely fails to meet either the "veracity" or "personal knowledge" components demanded by the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. This error would be serious if limited to just this case. It is not. The rules we furnish to our lower courts and police officers regarding requirements for search warrants form the basis for frequent daily application. If we furnish erroneous standards, as the majority does in this case, we must bear the serious consequences of future mistakes that will invalidate otherwise proper convictions for more serious crimes.
With respect to the "veracity" requirement, the officer affiant stated: "The informant is reliable in that he/she has *969given information regarding drug trafficing [sic] and use in the past which has proven to be true and correct." The statement provides no meaningful inference of reliability. I • agree entirely with the unanimous Court of Appeals in this respect:
Not only does the affidavit fail to disclose whether the information ever led to any arrests or convictions, it also fails to reveal whether the informant generally provided "true and correct information." As one perceptive commentator has written:
"Previously reliable informer," "informer of proven reliability," "informer who has given accurate information in the past" — these vague phrases hint at a consistent history of reliability, but are really highly ambiguous. The instances of inaccurate information may have outnumbered instances where the information proved correct. The information may have led directly to an arrest and conviction or may only have served as a vague lead which later was verified in some particulars but not in others. * * *
The "reliable information in the past" recital * * * lacks any factual indication of how reliable the informer is. The magistrate is, in effect, relying upon the factual determination of the arresting officer that the informer is sufficiently reliable, and not upon his own independent judicial determination. This does not square either with the Aguilar [a. Texas, 378 U.S. 108] demand for "underlying circumstances" or with the requirement that the essential facts supporting the assertion of probable cause be made known to the reviewing magistrate. Where reliability is important, the facts supporting reliability are as essential as any others to a showing of probable cause. With such facts, the magistrate can challenge the reasonableness of the officer's belief in his informer's reliability. When the further possibility is considered that an officer has not made a good faith assessment of the informer's reliability, or may even know him to be unreliable, the dangers in acceptance of vague averments of reliability become even more obvious. Judicial acceptance may tempt officers to make superficial averments of reliability without proper support; and some officers, while they may be above wholesale fabrication, may not be *970adverse to some stretching of the truth on occasion.
1 W. LaFave, [Search and Seizure], at 516-17, citing Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federal Courts, 53 Cal. L. Rev. 840, 846, 848 (1965). Although a number of cases in other jurisdictions regard as adequate general assertions that prior information has proved to be "correct," United States v. Guinn, 454 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1972), or "true and correct," see, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 25 N.C. App. 269, 212 S.E.2d 669 (1975), we find more persuasive those decisions which have held such assertions to be conclusory and thus insufficient. See, e.g., Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1032 (6th Cir. 1974) (dictum); Byars v. State, 259 Ark. 158, 533 S.W.2d 175 (1976); 1 W. LaFave, at 515-16, and other cases cited therein.
Where, as here, an affidavit in support of a search warrant states merely that a confidential informant's past information has been "true and correct," without providing further underlying facts from which the issuing magistrate can independently assess the informant's credibility, we hold that Aguilar's second prong remains unsatisfied.
State v. Fisher, 28 Wn. App. 890, 895-96, 626 P.2d 1020 (1981).
The majority presents two bases for disagreement with the Court of Appeals. It first cites a comparable affidavit in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 268, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725, 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960) (implicitly approved by reference in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 84 S. Ct. 1509 (1964)) which alleged the informant "'has given information to the undersigned on previous occasion and which was correct"; and second, the majority claims that the underlying facts of the affidavit would permit an impartial magistrate to conclude the informant was credible. Neither basis justifies reversal of the Court of Appeals, and both simply underscore the further infirmity of the affidavit — that it does not articulate underlying circumstances by which a magistrate could independently make a determination of probable cause.
With respect to the majority's first basis for disapproval, the Jones affidavit is distinguishable from the affidavit in *971this case in three important respects.
First, Jones is a questionable benchmark since it is a pre-Aguilar case and its affidavit was not evaluated under Aguilar's 2-prong test. See W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 517 (1978). Under the principles derived from Aguilar, the Jones affidavit might very well be upheld "upon an admission-against-penal-interest theory". W. LaFave, supra at 517.
Second, the statements of the informant in Jones were not the only basis upon which the warrant issued. The informant's tip in Jones was corroborated by other sources who provided the same information and by the personal knowledge of the affiant officers that the suspects were narcotics users who had needle marks in their arms.
Third, the Jones affidavit stated the informant had given true and correct information to the affiant. The affidavit in this case stated only the informant had given information which had proven true and correct. Not only do we not know the meaningfulness of that information or the "track record" of the informant, we know nothing of the basis of the affiant’s knowledge that the informant is reliable.
The majority's attempt to cure these defects by looking to the underlying facts of the affidavit as "a whole" is fruitless. While underlying circumstances of an affidavit may, if independently verifiable, corroborate the disclosures of an unreliable informant, no such circumstances exist in this case. The facts recited by the majority at page 966 do not permit "the magistrate to judge for himself both the probable credibility of the informant and the reliability of his information". United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 588, 29 L. Ed. 2d 723, 91 S. Ct. 2075 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). All of the majority's "facts", except the information about the controlled buys,1 are dependent upon the *972trustworthiness of the informant; none of the majority's facts are self-verifying and none corroborates the affidavit's bare allegation of credibility.
Finally, the affidavit reveals nothing of the officer affiant's personal knowledge of the informant's credibility or how the affiant came to know about the informant's tip. To satisfy the "personal knowledge" component of the Aguilar /Spinelli test, the affidavit must disclose not only how the "informant obtained his or her information," but how that information was then obtained by the affiant officer. Since the affidavit is silent as to circumstances corroborating the informant's credibility and as to the officer affiant's personal knowledge both of that credibility and of the informant's tip, a magistrate could not make an independent determination of probable cause without relying completely on supposition that the affiant had personal knowledge of the informant's disclosures and that the informant was credible. The majority's facts do nothing to eliminate conjecture and render the affidavit a tangible reference by which the magistrate could form an independent judgment. The following sample affidavit illustrates the point: *973This affidavit, while obviously preposterous, also contains "facts." But those "facts" cannot provide a basis for finding probable cause unless a magistrate takes it on good faith that they were given by a reliable informant, and that the affiant has personal knowledge of that reliability and of the informant's disclosures. As such, those "facts" are really conclusions; conclusions which a magistrate is not authorized to make because they cannot be independently drawn. Unless we desire to permit the issuance of warrants to search the moon for green cheese, we must require more of a warrant than the bare affidavit that provided the sole basis for probable cause in this case.
*972That within the past 72 hours a reliable informant, known to the affiant, has visited the moon and observed green cheese.
The informant is reliable in that he/she has given information regarding dairy products and their use in the past which has proven to be true and correct. The informant has made two controlled buys to wit: the informant was searched, given money, observed to enter and return from a residence with dairy products purchased from within.
The informant stated that creatures who live on the moon are known to conceal cheese on their persons and in their vehicles. The informant further stated that one of the moon creatures, John Doe, gains a major source of income from the sale of cheese and stolen moon rocks.
*973Rosellini and Williams, JJ., concur with Utter, J.

 Controlled buys, which are objectively verifiable by police, have no relation to an informant's credibility. See W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 512 (1978). At most, they reflect only cooperativeness. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals stated: "Since the affidavit does not state that these buys were made at the residence in question, or even from defendants, it is [not] probative of the *972informant's credibility ...” (Footnote omitted.) State v. Fisher, 28 Wn. App. 890, 896-97, 626 P.2d 1020 (1981).