Court Opinion

ID: 9746908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:43:55.717332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:18.130379
License: Public Domain

SIMS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
—I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the judgment, but, with respect, I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning. I think the free speech guarantees of the California Constitution protect against infringement by private citizens. I also think there has never been a time when the initiative process was more deserving of encouragement. However, this judgment must be affirmed on a narrow ground: appellants failed to prove that this Albertson’s store had replaced the public downtowns of Nevada City and Grass Valley as a public forum. The trial court made a factual finding that, “No evidence established that Albertson’s was a ‘miniature downtown’ as identified by the Pruneyard court [Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899 [151 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341]].” It is therefore appellants’ failure of proof that requires affirmance of the judgment in this case.
I

Article I, sections 2 and 3 of the California Constitution protect against infringement by private conduct

A threshold question is whether the free speech clauses of the California Constitution (art. I, §§ 2, 31) guard against infringement on speech only by the government, or also by private parties, such as Albertson’s. (Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1022 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 336, 29 P.3d 797] (Golden Gateway) [apartment landlord could prohibit tenants association from distributing newsletters by leaving them at apartment doors].) The California Supreme Court in Golden *130Gateway was unable to reach consensus on the question of state versus private conduct. Justice Brown, joined in the lead opinion by Justices Baxter and Chin, concluded California’s free speech clause (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2) contains a state action limitation. (Golden Gateway, supra, at pp. 1023, 1033.) Chief Justice George, concurring in the judgment on other grounds, considered it unnecessary to reach the question of a state action limitation. (Id. at p. 1036 (conc. opn. of George, C. J.).)
Most persuasive in my view, however, is the dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar (joined by Justice Kennard and an assigned justice), that California’s free speech clause, which is broader than the federal clause, has no state action limitation but rather “ ‘runs against the world, including private parties as well as governmental actors.’ ” (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1046-1047, 1054-1059 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.), citing Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 492 [101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720].)
Justice Brown’s lead opinion in Golden Gateway dismissed as “nonbinding dictum” Gerawan’s statement that California’s free speech clause runs against the world including private parties, because the presence of a state actor was undisputed in the earlier case. (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1028-1029, 1047.) Justice Brown further stated: “In any event, the express repudiation of this language by one of the four signatories to Gerawan removes any impediment to reaching a different conclusion based on our careful consideration of the clause’s text and history.” (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1029.)
The “one of the four signatories to Gerawan,” referred to by Justice Brown was, of course, Justice Brown herself, who had concurred in Gerawan without reservation only eight months earlier.
Justice Brown’s assertion (without authority) in Golden Gateway, that her subsequent repudiation of Gerawan undermined Gerawan’s teaching, is contrary to law. Thus, “A rule of law established by a court of last resort, as a precedent, ordinarily cannot be changed or affected except by a controlling decision of such court.
“In the absence of such a controlling decision, the force of a decision as precedent under the stare decisis rule is not affected by the fact that certain justices subsequently withdraw their acquiescence in the decision . . . .” (21 C.J.S. (1990) Courts, § 144, p. 172; Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. City of Beloit (1934) 215 Wis. 439 [254 N.W. 119, 122-123].) Thus, Gerawan, which was decided by four justices, carries more precedential weight than *131the plurality opinion in Golden Gateway, which was decided by three justices. “ ‘[A]ny proposition or principle stated in an opinion [of the Supreme Court] is not to be taken as the opinion of the court, unless it is agreed to by at least four of the justices. [Citations.]’ ” (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 829 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216]; see also Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 903, 918 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 245, 838 P.2d 1198].) And, although Gerawan’s teaching on the private interests protected by California’s free speech guarantee is technically dictum, such dictum is usually highly germane and compellingly persuasive. (People v. Miller (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 200-201 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 410].)
For these reasons, then, and the reasons stated in Justice Werdegar’s dissenting opinion in Golden Gateway, I would follow Gerawan and conclude that article I, sections 2 and 3 of the California Constitution guarantee that the free speech rights of its citizens may not be unreasonably infringed by private interests. Otherwise, we would undermine many free speech guarantees we take for granted, for example, the right to speak on public issues in newspapers. We would also make it possible for corporations to fire employees for engaging in unpopular political speech in their private lives.
Consequently, considering California’s constitutional free speech guarantees to run against the world, including private parties as well as government action, we should “balance the private and societal interest in [the] speech against any competing constitutional concerns,” i.e., balancing the signature gatherers’ wish to disseminate ideas with concern that these activities not interfere with normal business operations and property or privacy rights of occupants and owners. (Golden Gateway, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1049, 1052 (dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.), citing Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 910-911 (Pruneyard).)
II

There are strong societal interests in allowing citizens to exercise their right of speech and petition in the vicinity of a supermarket such as Albertson’s; however, the trial court’s findings offact require affirmance of the judgment

In Pruneyard, our Supreme Court held that article I sections 2 and 3 of the California Constitution protected the gathering of signatures for a petition to the government in a privately owned shopping center. (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 902.) The court noted that, “Members of the public are rightfully on Pruneyard’s premises because the premises are open to the public during *132shopping hours.” (Id. at p. 905.) The same is true of Albertson’s. On this point, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s characterization of the Albertson’s store as a “stand-alone” store. Assuming for the sake of argument that a stand-alone store would not be a quasi-public forum, this Albertson’s is not a true stand-alone store. This Albertson’s store, though it is freestanding, does not stand alone. It is part of a 14-acre (635,976 square feet) shopping center, the Fowler Center, which includes seven separate buildings (126,448 square feet) situated around the perimeter of a central parking lot for 650 vehicles. The “anchor” stores are Albertson’s and a large freestanding hardware store. The other businesses in the shopping center are 10 other retail stores, five restaurants or food retailers, and five service businesses, including a travel agency, photo store, video library, and mail box rental.
It is anomalous to declare that a shopping center may constitute a public forum and then to exclude from that domain the sidewalks in the vicinity of the anchor business where most people go—the supermarket. It does sponsors of an initiative little good to be able to set up their table on the edge of a parking lot where they have, at best, minimal access to citizens on their way to shop in the supermarket.
However, Pruneyard also relied on the practical view that, “central business districts apparently have continued to yield their functions more and more to suburban centers.” (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 907.) The court continued, “The largest segment of the county’s population is likely to spend the most significant amount of its time in suburban areas where its needs and wants are satisfied; and shopping centers provide the location, goods, and services to satisfy those needs and wants.” (Id. at p. 907.)
However, in this case, appellants failed to carry their burden of proving that Albertson’s had replaced the downtown business districts of Nevada City and Grass Valley as a public forum. On this note, the trial court found in its statement of decision, “There was no convincing evidence that the Albertson’s Grass Valley store has replaced central business districts as a favored forum for public congregation. Other than passing observations with regard to the downtown areas, no substantial evidence was provided as to the use of downtown areas as locations for public forums. The evidence presented was [mere] conjecture. The court cannot conclude that ‘[t]he largest segment of the county’s population is likely to spend the most significant amount of its time in suburban areas where its needs and wants are satisfied’ and that the Albertson’s store ‘provides the location, goods, and services to satisfy those needs and wants.’ Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 903.” Contrary to appellants’ contention at oral argument, substantial evidence in the record supports these findings.
*133It is upon this narrow ground—appellants’ failure of proof—that the judgment must be affirmed. In my view, other supermarkets in other locations should view this case with caution, because different proof could well lead to a different result.
This is because the need to encourage free speech, and the initiative process in general, has never been greater.
Thus, in reaching the conclusion that a shopping center should constitute a public forum, Pruneyard said that the right of the people to petition government for a redress of grievances, guaranteed by article I, section 3 of our Constitution, “is . . . vital to a basic process in the state’s constitutional scheme—direct initiation of change by the citizenry through initiative, referendum, and recall. [Citations.]” (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 907-908.)
The need to preserve the initiative process has never been greater, because government at all levels in California has increasingly become subject to the domination and control of monied special interests, leaving the average citizen without an effective voice in government.
This circumstance is reflected in the findings and declarations of the Political Reform Act of 1974 (Gov. Code, § 81000 et seq.), itself adopted by initiative measure and stating in part: “The people find and declare . . . : m... ra
“(c) Costs of conducting election campaigns have increased greatly in recent years, and candidates have been forced to finance their campaigns by seeking large contributions from lobbyists and organizations who thereby gain disproportionate influence over governmental decisions; [f] • . . [1]
“(f) The wealthy individuals and organizations which make large campaign contributions frequently extend their influence by employing lobbyists and spending large amounts to influence legislative and administrative actions . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 81001.)
Unfortunately, the 1974 reform act did not solve the problem of money influencing the making of laws in Sacramento; rather, the situation has only gotten worse. (See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC (2000) 528 U.S. 377, 390 [120 S.Ct. 897, 905-906, 145 L.Ed.2d 886] and authorities cited therein; Wertheimer & Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy (1994) 94 Colum. L.Rev. 1126, 1128-1131, and authorities cited therein; Michael & Walters, The Third *134House (Berkeley Public Policy Press 2002); Maclean, The Strong Arm of the Law (Nov. 2002) Cal. Law., p. 24; Yamamura, Guards' Union Hosts Legislators in Hawaii, Sac. Bee (Dec. 5, 2002) p. A1; Hill, So Far, Prisons Manage to Duck the Budget Ax, Sac. Bee (Dec. 15, 2002) p. A1; Talev, Davis Raised Record Amount, Sac. Bee (Feb. 1, 2003) p. A1; Walters, Davis' Budget Shows Who Has, and Doesn't Have, Real Clout, Sac. Bee (Jan. 21, 2003) p. A3.)
Nor is the local political system immune from undue control by monied interests. The Sacramento Bee newspaper recently ran a series documenting the huge extent to which development interests contributed to the campaigns of members of local boards of supervisors, in order to gain “access” to those board members. (Korber, Across the Region, Campaign Contributions are Pouring into Local Politics, and Some Say Special Interests are . . . Building Influence: Growth Lobby a Growing Business, Records Show, Sac. Bee (Dec. 8, 2002) p. A1; Korber, Developer Dollars Pour into Placer: The Growth Lobby is the Biggest Political Donor in the Fast-expanding County, Sac. Bee (Dec. 9, 2002) p. A1; Korber, In Region, Few Limits to Giving: Contribution Caps Can Blunt Special Interests’ Influence, Backers Say, Sac. Bee (Dec. 10, 2002) p. A1; Korber, Campaign Limits Urged in Placer: A Supervisor Acts Following a Report That Developers are Big Givers, Sac. Bee (Dec. 17, 2002) p. B1.)
In my opinion, a majority of Californians think that the current political system is unduly influenced by money. The reason that voting turnout has hit an all-time low (Vellinga, County Predicts Lowest Turnout: Despite Some Key Ballot Measures, Voter Disillusionment is Expected to Keep Number at 50-55 Percent, Sac. Bee (Nov. 4, 2002) p. B1; Smith, November’s Voter Turnout a New Low, Sac. Bee (Dec. 17, 2002 p. A4) is that average citizens, who do not participate in the political process, believe that, in practical effect, their votes will not matter, because the political process is, in fact, ultimately controlled by big-money special interests. These average citizens therefore simply give up and stop voting. To quote a former politician turned statesman, “I share their pain.” It is not hyperbole to say that democracy in California is in serious trouble.
It is in this context that the right to gather signatures for an initiative petition at a supermarket must be decided. For all its faults, the initiative process remains the last avenue by which ordinary citizens can effect political change.
The initiative process may be flawed and may itself be subject to considerations of financial wealth. Thus, “the enormous expense of collecting *135signatures for initiative petitions has all but priced public interest nonprofit groups out of that procedure, even though the initiative was originally provided for in 1911 as part of a populist movement designed to preserve the power of such groups to counter wealthy lobbyists. See The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform (1975) 48 So.Cal.L.Rev. 922, 943-944.” (Coalition for Fair Rent v. Abdelnour (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 97, 107, fn. 4 [165 Cal.Rptr. 685].)
Nevertheless, the initiative process is the last refuge of representation of the interests and views of average people, as distinct from rich and powerful special interests. Thus, many of our most significant initiative measures were truly the result of populist movements that ultimately carried the day with California’s electorate. These include Proposition 8 (The Victim's Bill of Rights), Proposition 13 (Jarvis-Gann Tax Limitations), Proposition 20 (California Coastal Commission), Proposition 215 (Medical Marijuana Initiative), and Proposition 184 (“Three Strikes”). (See, e.g. Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360] [noting populist theme of Proposition 13 ballot arguments].)
In this political environment dominated by monied special interests, we should be adopting rules of law that encourage rather than discourage the initiative process.
There is an additional policy reason why we should be encouraging a maximum amount of free speech: at the same time that our political process has become controlled by money, our very sources of information—of news—have also been increasingly controlled by those with great wealth.
“The twentieth century technological revolution has fundamentally altered the map of our trifurcated communications system [print, broadcasting, and common carriage]. The printing press has been replaced by the picture tube. The influence of the nation’s 1,730 daily newspapers is dwarfed by that of nearly 10,000 commercial and educational radio stations, not to mention the gargantuan television networks with their myriad affiliates. ... By 1977, broadcasting had grown to the point where the average American consumed four times as many words through the airwaves as through newsprint, and the disparity is increasing.” (Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) Communication And Expression, § 12-25, pp. 1007, 1003, fns. omitted.)
At the same time that we are increasingly receiving our news from television and radio, the cost to buy a radio or television station is prohibitive for all but the most wealthy. Recent issues of the publication Broadcasting & Cable reflect a Yuba City radio station was sold for $3.8 million, a *136Merced television station was sold for $33 million, and a Reno television station went for $41.5 million. (Changing Hands (Oct. 28, 2002; Oct. 14, 2002; Sept. 23, 2002) Broadcasting & Cable.)
Before 1987, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) applied a “fairness doctrine,” requiring broadcast media licensees (1) to provide coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in the community, and (2) to provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues. (Syracuse Peace Council v. F.C.C. (D.C. Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 654, 655.) In 1987, the FCC stopped applying the fairness doctrine. (Id. at pp. 655-656, 657.) The FCC’s decision to dispense with the fairness doctrine has been upheld by the federal courts. (Id. at p. 669; Arkansas AFL-CIO v. F.C.C. (8th Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 1430.)
Since the FCC abolished the fairness doctrine, owners of radio and television stations are not legally required to present points of view with which they disagree.
For the average citizen, access to mass communication is limited. You cannot write a letter to the editor of your local television station. It seems to me obvious that those with great wealth, who own the major media outlets, cannot be counted on gratuitously to broadcast information or opinion that is antithetical to their self-interest. (See generally Hobbes, Human Nature (1650) and Leviathan (1651).) It is therefore important to preserve the opportunity for average citizens to engage in free speech in locations which afford maximum exposure to the public, so that their views may be made known.
All these policy reasons, supporting recognition of a quasi-public forum in the vicinity of a popular supermarket, are crucial to the maintenance of a representative democracy in this state. On the other hand, a supermarket’s interest in totally excluding speech from its vicinity is not strong. The exercise of free speech in a quasi-public forum is subject to “reasonable regulations adopted by [the property owner] to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations . . . .” (Pruneyard, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 911; see also Lushbaugh v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1169-1170 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 700].) Thus, a supermarket may adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions controlling the number of persons or groups that may be present outside the store at any given time. Also, if a citizen or group wanted to hand out leaflets in the vicinity of the store, a supermarket could lawfully require the citizen or group to clean up all leaflets or to pay a reasonable deposit to cover the supermarket’s cost of cleaning up. A private supermarket should not bear the *137cost of cleaning up after those who exercise free speech on its property. Rather, those who exercise speech in the vicinity of the store cannot interfere with normal business operations and should be responsible for any cost of their activity. With the allowance of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, I do not see how there is a burden on a supermarket that outweighs the strong public interest in allowing free speech in the vicinity of its store.
Accordingly, if those who wish to gather signatures for an initiative in the future can prove that a private supermarket has replaced the traditional public forum, I would hold that a private supermarket is a quasi-public forum for free speech purposes. It is of crucial importance that free speech in California remain free.
However, because appellants failed in their proof on a crucial issue, as I have discussed, the judgment is properly affirmed.
Appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 18, 2003. Kennard, J., and Moreno, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).) “The People have the right to . . . petition government for redress of grievances . . . .” {Id. § 3.)