Court Opinion

ID: 9535016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:44:39.848881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:09.332861
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority approaches this case from a jurisdictional perspective and holds that the trial court would be without authority to reduce or modify the 60-day jail sentence at the end of the two-year probationary term since such a proceeding would not be initiated within 30 days after the sentence was imposed. (See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—1(c).) Finding the sentence to be of a nature other than periodic imprisonment and therefore not subject to modification as such under section 5 — 7—2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 7—2), the majority vacates the 60-day jail sentence. Such a holding is erroneous. The court correctly demonstrates that the 60-day sentence is not periodic imprisonment within the terms of section 5 — 7—1 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 7—1). However, section 5 — 6—3 of the Unified Code of Corrections in force at the time of appellant’s sentencing hearing authorized the trial court to impose as a condition of probation a period of imprisonment: “The court shall not require as a condition of the sentence of probation or conditional discharge that the offender be committed to a period of imprisonment in excess of 3 months. Persons committed to imprisonment as a condition of probation or conditional discharge shall not be committed to the Department of Corrections.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—3(d).) This statute clearly authorizes the trial court to impose a straight term of imprisonment as a condition of probation. (People v. Hanson (1977), 44 Ill. App. 3d 977, 986-87, 359 N.E.2d 188; People v. Gonzalez (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 838, 843, 357 N.E.2d 616; People v. Mercer (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1054, 355 N.E.2d 234.) That is what occurred in this case. Moreover, the majority is in error when it states that the circuit court would be without authority to modify or reduce the 60-day jail sentence in any proceeding initiated more than 30 days after sentence was first imposed. As a condition of probation, the jail term was subject to section 5 — 6—4(f) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1978 Supp., ch. 38, par. 1005-6-4(f)): “(f) The conditions of probation, of conditional discharge and of supervision may be modified by the court on motion of the probation officer or on its own motion or at the request of the offender after notice to the defendant and a hearing.” Thus, not only was the jail term a proper condition of probation, but it was subject to review by the trial court at any time on its own motion. Therefore, giving due deference as we should to the trial court in the area of sentencing, I find nothing improper in the sentence as imposed. Since I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court, I respectfully dissent.