Court Opinion

ID: 9643185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:21:20.692729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.016589
License: Public Domain

Holcomb, J.,
dissents.
HOLCOMB, Justice.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. I understand that malicious prosecution is not favored in law. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Kirkland, 225 S.W.2d 906, 909 (Tex.CivA.pp. — San Antonio 1949, writ refd. n.r.e.). As so amply stated in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., v. Lieck, “It is important that every citizen should be protected against malicious prosecutions and it is equally important that crimes should be punished.” Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tex.1994). Society must have sufficient means to prosecute wrong doers. By the same token, a citizen must be protected against oppressive litigation for unjustified criminal prosecution that results in pecuniary loss and loss of reputation. Id.
The majority held that they saw “no evidence to support the finding of lack of probable cause; [or] at best, there exists only a scintilla of evidence to support the finding.” In reviewing a “no evidence point,” this Court must consider all of the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the jury’s findings and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex.1990); In re Kings Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1951). The point must be overruled if there is any evidence of probative force to support the finding. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of Error, 38 Tex.L.Rev. 361 (1960).
A complainant has probable cause if the facts and circumstances that are within the knowledge of the complainant gives credence to a reasonable belief that the accused was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 920-21 (Tex.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 938, 104 *338S.Ct. 1911, 80 L.Ed.2d 460 (1984). This is an objective standard that must be applied at the inception of the prosecution and cannot depend on the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused. Id. at 920. Therefore, for Richey to prove that Brookshire lacked probable cause to file criminal charges, he had to either prove that Brookshire did not believe, or that a reasonable person would not have believed, that he was guilty of theft at the time charges were filed against him. See Browning-Ferris Industries, 881 S.W.2d at 298 (Tex.1994). To be convicted of the crime of theft, the prosecutor must prove that Richey had the “intent to deprive the owner of the property,” not just inadvertent appropriation.
My disagreement with the majority opinion is two-fold. First, I believe the majority correctly stated the standard upon which we must view the evidence in a “no evidence” challenge; however, they incorrectly applied the standard and viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Brookshire. Second, I believe the majority overlooked the primary factor that apparently offended the jury — Brookshire’s decision to prosecute Richey for theft, regardless of whether it had probable cause to support its decision. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, I believe the evidence clearly shows that Farris’ actions were unreasonable and unbending, not just to Richey, but to every similarly situated customer at Brookshire.
Brookshire argued, and a majority of this Court holds, that the “undisputed facts conclusively prove” that Brookshire had probable cause to file the criminal complaint. However, the facts that were presented before the jury were anything but conclusive. At the time of this incident, Kelley Richey was married and had three children. He graduated with a business degree from the University of Texas in Petroleum Management and earned a living investing money in oil ventures for other people. Richey’s gross income for the year in which this incident occurred was $200,000.
Before Richey came to the Super 1 Store, he had helped a friend install a wooden floor in a utility trailer. With a grocery list in his hand, Richey came into the Super 1 to pick up various items for his family. When Rich-ey got a grocery cart, he put a package of cigarettes in it. Farris became suspicious and began following Richey around the store. Over a period of time, Farris watched Richey twiddle the package of cigarettes and drop them back in his cart. According to Farris, Richey had made eye contact with Farris and knew that Farris was watching him. Knowing that he was being watched, Richey “concealed” the cigarettes in his left pocket anyway and continued to shop.3 Would a reasonable, prudent person conclude that a customer who knew he was being watched by an employee of the store would purposefully steal an item? According to Far-ris — Yes!
At the check-out stand, Richey wrote a check in the amount of $51.75 for the groceries in his cart, but failed to pay $1.47 for the package of cigarettes in his pocket. Richey then proceeded to sack his own groceries. While sacking his groceries, Richey began reading the back of an Eggo box. Although Farris admitted that Richey did not appear nervous, nor was it an unusual occurrence for a customer to read the back of a grocery box in the check-out line, Farris concluded that Richey knew he was being watched and was stalling to “figure out what he should do” about the cigarettes in his pocket. Would a reasonable, prudent person conclude that a customer was stalling to cover up a $1.47 theft of cigarettes, when the customer did not appear nervous, the customer had just paid for groceries, the customer knew that he was being watched by store employees, and the customer still had plenty of money in his pocket to pay for the cigarettes? According to Farris and every Brookshire employee that testified — Yes!
On leaving the store, Richey noticed the charity bin by the exit, left his grocery cart, and got a paper sack and filled it with 28 jars of baby food. He then went back through *339the check-out line, paid $8.89 in cash for the baby food, and then deposited the sack of baby food in the charity bin. Farris told the jury that, in his opinion, Richey re-entered the store to buy baby food for the charity bin just to “cover up for the cigarette theft.” Would a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances conclude that a customer would return to the store to pay $8.89 in cash for food for the charity bin so that the customer could “cover up” the theft of a package cigarettes? According to Farris and every Brookshire employee that testified — Yes!
Based on his suspicions, Farris and another Brookshire employee detained Richey. After being asked by Farris if he had forgotten to pay for something, Richey first said “No,” then said that he must have inadvertently put the cigarettes in his pocket. Far-ris admitted that Richey did not yell or run from them when he was confronted and that Richey offered to pay for the cigarettes. Brookshire refused Richey’s offer, as well as his attempt to explain his actions. In fact, Richey testified, and Farris admitted, that after he was detained by Brookshire for questioning, no Brookshire employee engaged in any kind of conversation with Rich-ey. Richey admitted that “it was a silly mistake” and that he tried to explain, but no one would let him talk, and “they wouldn’t even recognize [him] at all.” Would a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances give a customer an opportunity to talk if the customer had just spent over $60.00 for merchandise from the store? According to Farris and every Brookshire employee that testified — No!
Brookshire’s failure to act was as incriminating as its actions. Generally, a party who files a criminal complaint in good faith, makes full and fair disclosure of all of the facts and circumstances known to the party. See Compton v. Calabria, 811 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). However, if the defendant knowingly makes false statements to the prosecuting attorney or withholds material information from the prosecuting attorney, a different situation arises. Andrews v. Dewberry, 242 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1951, writ ref d n.r.e.). Should the party who filed the complaint fail to act in good faith when the party discloses the material facts known at the time, a jury can infer that probable cause did not exist. Eans v. Grocer Supply Co., 580 S.W.2d 17, 21 (TexApp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ).
Farris admitted that Brookshire stressed accuracy in the internal reports employees make regarding incidents of shoplifting that occur in its stores. He confirmed that he filled out the internal report on Richey while he was waiting for the police to come so that the details of the incident would be “fresh on his mind.” However, neither the internal report nor the report filled out for the City of Tyler Police Department gave any indication that Richey had initially paid for groceries, nor did it mention that he had returned to the store to purchase baby food to place in the charity bin.
Both reports basically stated that Richey walked into the store, took cigarettes, didn’t pay, and then left the store. Farris did not include in Richey’s report any of the other factors that he considered to be incriminating to support his decision to prosecute Richey for theft. Farris failed to mention Richey’s alleged “shifty looks,” his “stalling tactics,” or his “nervous twitch,” until three years later when Farris testified at the civil trial to defend Brookshire against Richey’s claim for malicious prosecution. Farris admitted that any other facts and circumstances surrounding the incident didn’t “mean a hill of beans” to him, nor did he think that any other facts were relevant. All that mattered to Farris was that Richey took an item out of the store without paying for it. Had Farris included the other factors which contributed to his decision, the reports would have accurately reflected the circumstances under which Brookshire decided to prosecute Richey, and could have supported, mitigated, or refuted Brookshire’s defense that it had probable cause to prosecute. Would a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances fail to accurately describe the suspicious circumstances that led to a decision to file criminal charges against a suspected shoplifter? No witness seemed to have an answer for this question.
*340Because material facts were not reported in Brookshire’s internal report, or in the City of Tyler’s police report, the jury could have believed that Brookshire did not act in good faith when it filed the criminal complaint against Richey and that it lacked probable cause to file the charges. Farris’s “civil trial recollection” of Richey’s “suspicious conduct” could have been construed by the jury to have been fabricated. At a minimum, the jury could have inferred that Brookshire lacked probable cause to file criminal charges against Richey.
The jury may have also been concerned with Farris’s actions in light of Brookshire’s store policy. As manager of the store, Far-ris confirmed that when a customer leaves the store without paying for an item, he is not restricted to filing a criminal complaint. Similar testimony was given by Brookshire’s District Manager and its corporate officer in charge of loss control. Brookshire’s store policy reads in part:
Whenever you observe suspicious conduct, you may warn the suspected shoplifter against shoplifting, you may remind the customer to pay for all merchandise, or request that a customer leave the store....
You should detain a customer to investigate ownership of merchandise if you are:
(1) sure an employee saw a suspected shoplifter conceal merchandise, and
(2) sure that the suspected shoplifter still has the merchandise in his possession, and
(3) sure that the suspected shoplifter has an opportunity to pay for the concealed merchandise by having passed through the cheek out stand, and
(4) if after a reasonable investigation, you believe the person is guilty of shoplifting, then you call the police and don’t accept payment for the merchandise.
(Emphasis added.)
All the Brookshire employees who testified had worked for Brookshire 20 plus years and had worked their way through the ranks to management. Each of them vowed strict compliance with Brookshire’s policy. They confirmed that they were expected to evaluate each circumstance and investigate the facts prior to calling the police; however, each employee also admitted that, in reality, their evaluations regarding a customers’ intent to steal was limited to whether a customer had left the store without paying for merchandise. Kevin Santone, a Brookshire employee for 22 years and the district manager in charge of six Super 1 stores in the area, testified that he had never dismissed any criminal charges against any customer who had left the store without paying for an item. Similar testimony was given by Jack Edward Millican, a Brookshire employee for 21 years.
Farris admitted that, out of approximately 348 customers who had left the store without paying for an item, he had never exercised any options afforded to him by Brookshire’s policy except to file criminal charges. In accordance with his actions involving the previous 348 customers, Farris admitted that he did not do any investigation on Richey nor did he give him any opportunity to talk before Farris filed criminal charges. Without any questions asked, without any explanations allowed, without any consideration given to the circumstances surrounding Richey’s actions, Farris filed criminal charges the following day.
On February 1, 1990, Richey’s attorney gave Brookshire a chance to reevaluate their position and wrote the following letter: Dear Mr. Brookshire:
I represent Kelley Richey of Tyler, Texas. He’s also a close friend and has been my brother-in-law for almost seventeen years. Shortly before last Christmas, in the early morning hours, he was doing some grocery shopping in the Super 1 Food Store in Tyler. He purchased roughly $30.00 worth of groceries. As he was about to leave, he observed a display requesting food donations in the store. He went back into the store and purchased $11.00 worth of baby food which he deposited in the charity display. While in the store, he had inadvertently placed a pack (one pack) of cigarettes in his jacket pocket. The manager called the police who cited Mr. Richey for misdemeanor theft. The trial is scheduled for March 19 and I. have requested *341that it be before a jury. This letter is written in the hope that the matter can be resolved without going that far. First, Mr. Richey concedes that putting the cigarettes in his jacket pocket was a stupid thing to do, but, he had every intention of paying for them. Had anyone simply pointed it out, he would have paid for them as he did for the other $41.00 worth of groceries he purchased. A man doesn’t go into a store to steal a pack of cigarettes when he spends $11.00 on baby food for a charity display.
Mr. Richey grew up in Tyler, went to Robert E. Lee and the University of Texas. He’s married with three daughters and a successful businessman with a six figure income. He is not a thief. The incident was unfortunate and a silly mistake on his part. It has already caused him a great deal of embarrassment.
I would simply ask that you review the facts of this case — speak to the manager— and consider if justice would best be served by pursuing it any further. Mr. Richey is certainly not going to plead guilty when he had no intention of stealing anything.
As a former felony prosecutor, I recognize that stores such as yours suffer from the intentional acts of shoplifters. However, there was no such intention here and had the store manager just reminded him of the cigarettes when he was checking out, the matter would have been resolved immediately. Unfortunately, the police were called first and here we are.
I would appreciate it if you would advise me of your intentions regarding the prosecution of this case. It is in municipal court, NO. 032764. If you can’t bring yourself to make an exception under these circumstances, then we have no choice but to let a jury decide. I’m hoping that won’t be necessary.
Brookshire never responded. No telephone call — no consideration that its position may have been extreme in light of the circumstances. I submit that there was evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Farris’s analysis of the circumstances was, at best, calloused and unreasonable. A customer who leaves the store without paying for $1.47 pack of cigarettes, but has written a check in the amount of $51.75 for groceries and has reentered the store to pay $8.89 in cash for food to place in a charity bin, was not afforded any consideration that the customer’s failure to pay for the package of cigarettes may have been inadvertent. In fact, Farris testified that it made “perfect sense” to him that a customer would go back into a store and spend $8.89 in cash to put food in a charity bin so that the customer could cover up the theft of one package of cigarettes. The record is clear that the issue of probable cause, or the lack of it, never crossed Farris’s mind. It wasn’t necessary ... Brookshire prosecutes everyone, regardless of the circumstances.
Brookshire employees were also proud that they are much more intolerant if Brook-shire employees leave the store without paying for merchandise. Jack Edward MMcan, Director of Safety and Loss Control testified that he had worked for Brookshire for 21 years. He stated that if a Brookshire employee is caught leaving the store with an item without paying for it, the employee is fired. However, in Brookshire’s General Information Booklet for employees, it states:
Partners will not be punished for honest errors, but it is the Company’s intention to let partners know dishonesty will not be tolerated.
Millican admitted that employees are not punished if the employee takes something from the store inadvertently, and that the employee would be allowed to explain the circumstances upon which he had left the store without paying for merchandise. If after the investigation, Brookshire determined that the employee’s acts were unintentional, the employee would not be punished.
Every Brookshire employee conceded that people sometimes make mistakes and that they had never known of an incident where a suspected shoplifter dropped food in a charity bin in an effort to cover up for the theft of an item; however, each one stated that every customer who walks out the door without paying for an item is considered a thief. No act is inadvertent. There is no room for a mistake. Any consideration that the per-*342eeived shoplifting activity by the customer may have been inadvertent is not a part of the analysis Brookshire employees afford to a customer before filing a criminal complaint against the customer for theft.
Kevin Santone, the district manager of six Super 1 stores, testified that once Brookshire considers you a thief, you are always considered a thief. Even though the jury acquitted Richey of all criminal charges that had been filed against him, Santone stated that Richey was still considered a thief to Brookshire and that Richey could not come back into the store. There are no exceptions. Regardless of the circumstances, theft charges will be filed, the customer will be prosecuted, and even if the customer is acquitted, the customer is still a thief to Brookshire. Remembering that we are to view this incident from the standpoint of a reasonable prudent person under the circumstances, I conclude that the there was more than a scintilla of evidence for the jury to find that neither Farris, nor any Brookshire employee, ever stopped to determine whether there was probable cause to convict Richey. It wasn’t necessary ... Brookshire prosecutes everyone, regardless of the circumstances. No set of circumstances could have been presented to prevent Brookshire from filing criminal charges against Richey for theft.
From the record, I believe that the jury was not only convinced that the evidence supported their verdict, but was also incensed by Brookshire’s actions. In assessing his damages, Richey asked the jury to award him the sum of $9,200.00, which represented $100.00 a day for every day between the time the incident occurred and the date that the jury acquitted him of the criminal charges that Brookshire had filed. During the jury deliberations, the record reflects that the jury sent a note to the judge and asked whether they were limited by the amount of damages Richey had requested. After further deliberations, the jury awarded Richey $18,400.00 in actual damages and an additional $18,400.00 in exemplary damages. This award was after the jury had been informed that: (1) shoplifting is a large problem for Brookshire; (2) the number one item shoplifted at Brookshire stores is cigarettes; (3) people of all ages and all economic backgrounds shoplift; and (4) shoplifters do illogical things.
I do not minimize the difficulty a retail store has in attempting to control shoplifting, and I do not think the jury did. There is a delicate balance between protecting against wrongful prosecution and encouraging the reporting of criminal conduct. As with any other cause of action, if the elements of malicious prosecution are proven by the plaintiff and the defendant has put forth every piece of evidence it had to defend against the allegations and the jury finds for the plaintiff, liability has been established. In this case, there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s finding that Brookshire was liable for maliciously prosecuting Richey. In analyzing the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of each witness when it attempts to arrive at a verdict. Lawson-Avila Construction, Inc. v. Stoutamire, 791 S.W.2d 584 (TexApp. — San Antonio 1990, writ denied). After hearing Brookshire’s concerns and difficulty in controlling shoplifting in its stores, the jury found that Brookshire filed criminal charges against Richey maliciously and awarded him four (4) times the amount of damages that he had requested. Although our evaluation of the facts may have been different, none of us were present to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses and we must not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id. Points one through four should be overruled and the judgment should be affirmed.

. The jury heard testimony that it is not unusual for a smoker to put cigarettes in a pocket by habit.