Court Opinion

ID: 9390711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:05:05.413437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.359589
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2021-CA-0499-MR

DONNA HARDIN                                                       APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CI-004041

STEVEN POND                                                          APPELLEE

                                 OPINION
                                VACATING
                              AND REMANDING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Donna Hardin brings this appeal from an April 14, 2021,

Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment and

dismissing Hardin’s negligence claims against Steven Pond upon the basis of

qualified official immunity. We vacate and remand.
                                  BACKGROUND

             Pond was a police officer with the Louisville Jefferson County Metro

Government. On July 16, 2019, Officer Pond was on patrol in his police cruiser

and spotted a stolen vehicle at a Speedway gas station. Officer Pond confirmed

that the vehicle was stolen and then ordered the driver out of the vehicle. The

driver disregarded Officer Pond’s commands and drove away in the vehicle.

Officer Pond pursued the driver of the stolen vehicle. The driver lost control of the

stolen vehicle and hit a vehicle driven by Hardin. Hardin suffered injuries as a

result of the accident.

             On July 13, 2020, Hardin filed a complaint against, inter alios, Officer

Pond. Hardin alleged that Officer Pond negligently and in violation of various

Louisville Metro Police Department Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)

initiated and continued the vehicle pursuit that caused the accident and her injuries.

In particular, Hardin claimed:

                           FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
                    (General Negligence in the Pursuit of Subject)

             ....

             33) In violation of SOP 12.1.1 Policy, the officer should
             never have initiated the pursuit because the defendant
             was not committing a violent felony. Browning’s vehicle
             is defined as a “speeding vehicle” for the purposes of the
             policy. A violent felony for purposes of this policy does
             not include theft of vehicle. Specifically, the policy
             defines “violent felony offender” which includes several

                                         -2-
offenses all involving danger of serious injury to
individuals. [Hardin] contends that [Louisville Metro
Police Department] LMPD is negligent in the initiation
and in the pursuit of Browning.

34) In violation of SOP 12.1.1, the officer should not
initiate a pursuit when the conditions of pursuit cause a
violent felony. As detailed in the facts above, the officer
states before he ever gets into his vehicle the Defendant
(Pond) states, “Sub. then pulled out of the parking lot at a
high rate of speed with the intent to elude police. By
fleeing, sub. created a substantial risk of serious physical
injury or death to others on the roadway.” This specific
fact as stated by the officer in his Uniform Citation, was
indication that the pursuit should not have occurred and
that the damage to [Hardin] should have been
foreseeable.

35) In violation of SOP 12.1.3, the officer failed to
evaluate these factors before the pursuit, and failed to
recognize them. Particularly, the officer failed to
recognize the area or location characteristics.
Specifically, the pursuit proceeded down Greenwood
Road in a highly traveled area in a residential section of
. . . Jefferson County. The officer failed to recognize that
the pursuit in this congested area was a foreseeable cause
of the injuries to [Hardin].

36) Pursuant to SOP 12.1.9, the officer was required to
terminate the pursuit for several reasons. Primarily, the
officer must terminate the pursuit when he believes it is
not safe to continue the pursuit. Officer states that the
Browning left the parking lot at a high rate of speed and
continued at a high rate of speed. Officer states the
Browning struck another vehicle before colliding into
[Hardin]. Under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life, Browning
wantonly engaged in conducted [sic] causing him to
strike Mr. Keeney’s vehicle which created a risk of
substantial danger of death or serious physical injury.

                            -3-
Further, the officer should terminate the pursuit when the
officer loses visual contact with the subject. The officer
should have concluded this pursuit immediately when
Browning sped off and out of sight before the officer was
ever in his vehicle.

37) Pursuant to SOP 12.1.3, the officer should have
considered the nature and seriousness of the underlying
offense. In particular, the underlying offense is theft of
the motor vehicle. In the additional facts, LMPD had the
specific information that Browning was photographed
taking the vehicle by witness, which allowed detectives
to make an identification. Browning had a prior record
and could have been easily identified by mugshot or
other identification programs. Further, the value of the
vehicle listed as $6,500 per the Officer’s report. The
officer could easily have let Browning leave, and no
individual would have been injured and they could have
later identified Browning by photograph. Additionally,
the officer initiated this pursuit under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human
life as the officer wantonly engaged in conduct over a
$6,500 vehicle, when they had pictures of Browning and
identifiable information of the vehicle. There is no
justification for this negligent, high-speed pursuit, which
was foreseeable to result in death or serious physical
injury.

....

           SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress – Against
              The Individual Defendants)

....

45) The foregoing conduct caused [Hardin] to suffer
severe and extreme emotional distress. The individual
defendants’ conduct was the proximate cause of harm

                            -4-
and damage to [Hardin], and by reason of the foregoing
alleged acts and conduct, [Hardin] is entitled to damages
against the individual defendants, all according to proof
at trial.

46) The individual defendants engaged in the
aforementioned acts maliciously, callously, oppressively,
wantonly, recklessly, fraudulently, with deliberate,
indifference to the rights allegedly violated, despicably
and with evil motive and/or intent, and in disregard of the
rights of the [Hardin]. [Hardin] is therefore entitled to
and does seek exemplary damages against the individual
defendants.

....

            THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
 (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress – Against
             The Individual Defendants)

48) [Hardin] hereby incorporates by references all of the
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 47 above,
and though fully set forth herein.

49) The negligent actions of the individual defendants, as
set forth above, [were] extreme and outrageous. Said
negligent conduct was foreseeable to cause, and was the
proximate cause of, severe emotional distress to [Hardin].
The individual defendants, by their negligent acts and/or
omissions, conducted themselves in a manner that went
beyond all common notions of decency. The individual
defendants engaged in conduct intended to cause extreme
indifference to human life. The individual defendants,
through their actions and the actions of their agents,
directly injured [Hardin] by their failure to act in
accordance with common notions of fairness and
decency.

50) The foregoing negligent conduct caused [Hardin] to
suffer severe and extreme emotional distress. The

                            -5-
             individual defendants’ negligent actions [were] the
             proximate cause of harm and damage to [Hardin], and by
             reason of the foregoing alleged acts and conduct,
             [Hardin] is entitled to damages against the individual
             defendant, all according to proof at trial.

Complaint at 6 – 10.

             Officer Pond filed a motion to dismiss. Pond argued he was entitled

to qualified official immunity. Specifically, Pond maintained that his decision to

initiate and continue the vehicle pursuit was discretionary. Additionally, Officer

Pond asserted that his actions were in conformity with the SOP.

             On April 14, 2021, the circuit court rendered summary judgment

concluding that Officer Pond was entitled to qualified official immunity. The

circuit court concluded that Officer Pond’s decisions to initiate and continue the

vehicle pursuit constituted a discretionary act. This appeal follows.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             To begin, as matters outside the pleadings were presented in the

motion to dismiss, the circuit court properly treated the motion as a motion for

summary judgment. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02. Summary

judgment is proper where there exists no material issue of fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service

Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). There being no factual issues, our

review of a summary judgment looks only to questions of law, whereupon our

                                         -6-
review is de novo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016); see

also Peterson v. Foley, 559 S.W.3d 346, 348 (Ky. 2018). Our review proceeds

accordingly.

                                       ANALYSIS

               Hardin contends that the circuit court improperly rendered summary

judgment concluding that Officer Pond was entitled to qualified official immunity.

Relying upon Special Order #19-001, issued by Chief of Police Steve Conrad, and

various SOP, Hardin maintains that Officer Pond’s decision to initiate and continue

the vehicle pursuit was ministerial:

               [T]he LMPD “Special Order” details that [Officer Pond]
               should initiate a pursuit if a vehicle is stolen and the
               commanding officer has determined prior to initiating a
               pursuit, that the vehicle is stolen. The Special Order’s
               sole purpose is to temporarily amend prior operating
               procedures, to now instruct officers to pursue stolen
               vehicles if the officer follows additional directives. The
               Special Order was specifically written to eliminate the
               discretionary decision making of [Officer Pond]. In
               application of both the SOPs and the Special Order,
               [Officer Pond] was not required to make any decision
               about the appropriateness of the pursuit. This decision is
               not discretionary because there is no need to discern the
               correct action in a legally uncertain environment, because
               [Officer Pond’s] actions to be taken were clearly detailed
               within the Special Order. There is no legally uncertain
               environment, because Officer Pond is following an [sic]
               executing a fixed set of directives given to him by his
               commanding officers.

                                          -7-
Hardin’s Brief at 10 (citation omitted). Thus, Hardin asserts that Officer Pond was

not entitled to qualified official immunity.1

              In Kentucky, a public official sued in his individual capacity for

negligence may be entitled to the shield of qualified official immunity. To be

entitled to qualified official immunity, the public official must have engaged in a

discretionary act as opposed to a ministerial act. A ministerial act is generally “one

that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when the officer's duty is

absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act

arising from fixed and designated facts.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522

(Ky. 2001). Conversely, a discretionary act is one “involving the exercise of

discretion and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment[.]” Id. at

522. When the public official performs a discretionary act, the official is entitled

to qualified official immunity if such act was carried out within the scope of her

employment and in good faith. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523. As most acts are

1
  Donna Hardin cites to Mattingly v. Mitchell, 425 S.W.3d 85 (Ky. 2013) as dispositive. We
disagree. In Mattingly, a Louisville Metro Police Officer initiated a vehicle pursuit of a BMW
for speeding on the Watterson Expressway. The BMW eventually struck another vehicle causing
injuries to its occupants. Id. Under the relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 12.1.9, an
officer shall not initiate a vehicle pursuit for a traffic infraction or nonviolent felony. The
Supreme Court determined that use of the word “shall” in SOP 12.1.9 and other SOP indicated a
ministerial act as opposed to a discretionary act. The SOP as set forth in Mattingly, and the SOP
at issue in this appeal are different in their terminology and effect. As a result, we view
Mattingly, 425 S.W.3d 85 as distinguishable.

                                              -8-
neither purely discretionary or purely ministerial, it is the “dominant nature of the

act” that controls. Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ky. 2010).

             To resolve this appeal, we must examine several SOP and Special

Order #19-001. The relevant SOP are as follows:

             12.1 PURSUITS

             12.1.1 POLICY

             It is the policy of the LMPD that the pursuit operation of
             a police vehicle is justified only when the need of
             immediate apprehension outweighs the dangers created
             by the pursuit.

             A “fleeing vehicle,” for the purposes of this policy, is
             defined as one that increases speed, refuses to stop,
             extinguishes its headlights and/or taillights, or uses other
             evasive means with the intent to elude a police officer
             following a signal to stop given by the officer to the
             driver of a motor vehicle. Absent an overt act to flee
             from the police, if he/she may do so with due regard, an
             officer may attempt to catch up to the vehicle and remain
             behind it for a reasonable amount of time in order to
             verify the driver is aware he/she is being directed to stop.
             Once the driver is aware of the officer’s presence and the
             driver either refuses to stop or takes evasive maneuvers,
             the officer must adhere to this pursuit policy and
             Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS).

             The officer must have a reason to believe the violator
             being pursued has committed, or is wanted on a warrant
             for committing, a violent felony. Officers may also
             pursue a motor vehicle under the following additional
             special circumstances:

                                         -9-
       • The suspect is a known subject who has been
       previously identified as a violent felony offender
       for offenses defined in this policy;
       • The suspect is a known subject who is the focus
       of an ongoing investigation for a violent felony;
       • When the officer has reasonable suspicion that
       the subject in the vehicle has committed, is about
       to commit, or is currently committing a violent
       felony as defined in this policy; or
       • When a suspect is operating a stolen emergency
       vehicle, as emergency vehicles may contain
       weapons or present a danger to homeland security
       when stolen.

In all pursuits, a commanding officer will acknowledge,
engage in, and directly control the pursuit as soon as
practical.

....

Officers must pursue with the vehicle’s emergency lights
and siren in continuous operation. Police vehicles are
exempt from most traffic regulations, pursuant to KRS
189.940. However, no portion of this statute relieves the
driver from operating the vehicle with due regard for the
safety of all persons using the roadway.

....

12.1.3 PRIMARY UNIT RESPONSIBILITIES
[Kentucky Association of Chiefs of Police Model
Policies] KACP 21.2a-b)

The decision to initiate a pursuit must be based on the
pursuing officer’s reasonable belief that the
circumstances outlined in SOP 12.1.1 have been met.

The pursuing officer will consider the following factors
in determining whether to initiate a pursuit:

                           -10-
      • The nature and seriousness of the offense
      • The amount of vehicular and pedestrian traffic in
      the area
      • The likelihood of successful apprehension
      • The area or location characteristics
      • The availability of assistance
      • The environmental conditions (e.g. lighting and
      weather)
      • The performance capabilities of the pursuit
      vehicle
      • The condition of the road surface on which the
      pursuit is being conducted
      • The officer’s familiarity with the geographic area
      of the pursuit

The officer initiating a pursuit should, as soon as
practical, provide the following information by radio:

      • Car number
      • Location
      • Direction of travel
      • Approximate speed
      • Reason for pursuit
      • Vehicle description
      • License number, if known
      • Number and description of occupants
      • Traffic conditions

The failure to provide this information to MetroSafe may
result in an immediate termination of the pursuit by a
commanding officer. The initiating unit will be in
command and bear operational responsibility for the
pursuit until the pursuit is acknowledged by a
commanding officer.

12.1.9 TERMINATION (KACP 21.2g)

Pursuits will be terminated when the risks created by
continuing the pursuit outweigh the need for an
immediate apprehension.

                           -11-
            An officer’s decision to terminate a pursuit for safety
            reasons is not subject to criticism or review.

            Pursuits will be terminated immediately when any of the
            following occur:

                   • A supervisor in charge of the pursuit, or a higher-
                   ranking officer, issues an order of termination;
                   • The officer loses visual contact and the likelihood
                   for apprehension is decreased;
                   • The officer doesn't believe that it is safe to
                   continue the pursuit; or
                   • The officer is out of radio range or loses contact
                   with MetroSafe.

            Pursuits may be terminated by the pursuing officer, the
            supervisor in charge of the pursuit, or any commanding
            officer of a higher rank than the supervisor who is in
            charge of the pursuit. Supervisors will be held
            accountable for the failure to exercise authority under
            this section.

            ....

And, Special Order #19-001, reads in relevant part:

            Vehicular Pursuit Initiation Modification for Verified
            Stolen Autos
            Special Order #19-001

            Effective immediately, I am approving LMPD officers to
            initiate a vehicle pursuit under the following special
            circumstances:

                   • The officer has determined, prior to initiating a
                   pursuit, the vehicle is stolen (via MetroSafe); and
                   • The commanding officer will acknowledge, over
                   the radio, the verified stolen vehicle to continue
                   the pursuit. The commanding officer will be in

                                        -12-
                    close proximity, engage in, and directly control the
                    pursuit.

             SOP 12.1.1 is entitled “Policy.” To be permitted to initiate a vehicle

pursuit, SOP 12.1.1 mandates the officer possess “a reason to believe the violator

being pursued has committed, or is wanted on a warrant for committing, a violent

felony.” Additionally, SOP 12.1.1 specifically mandates that an officer is

permitted to initiate a vehicle pursuit if: (1) the suspect is known and has been

previously identified as a felony offender, (2) the suspect is known to be under

investigation for a violent felony, (3) the officer possesses a reasonable suspicion

that the subject has committed, is going to commit, or is committing a violent

felony, or (4) the suspect is fleeing in a stolen emergency vehicle, which may

contain weapons or present a danger to homeland security. And, Special Order

#19-001 provides that a vehicle pursuit is additionally permitted when: (1) the

officer determines the vehicle is stolen before initiating the pursuit and (2) the

commanding officer acknowledges the verified stolen vehicle and the commanding

officer will be in “close proximity, engage in, and directly control the pursuit.”

             Taken together SOP 12.1.1 and Special Order #19-001 set forth the

limited circumstances when an officer is permitted to initiate a vehicle pursuit. As

a consequence, a vehicle pursuit is only permitted when the limited circumstances

of SOP 12.1.1 or Special Order #19-001 exist, and these are ministerial mandates

that require neither judgment nor deliberation by an officer. See Meinhart v.

                                         -13-
Louisville Metro Gov’t, 627 S.W.3d 824, 834 (Ky. 2021).2 However, if the limited

circumstances set forth in either SOP 12.1.1 or Special Order #19-001 do occur,

the decision by an officer to actually initiate such a pursuit is then controlled by

SOP 12.1.3.

               So, SOP 12.1.3 is triggered only when the limited circumstances of

either SOP 12.1.1 or Special Order #19-001 exist. Once triggered, an officer’s

ultimate decision to actually initiate a vehicle pursuit under SOP 12.1.3 is

dependent upon various factors, including traffic in the area, likelihood of success,

environmental conditions, and availability of assistance. Under SOP 12.1.3, it is

clear that an officer’s decision to, in fact, initiate a vehicle pursuit requires the

deliberation and exercise of judgment by the police officer. See Meinhart, 627

S.W.3d at 834. As a result, we conclude that an officer’s decision to actually

initiate a vehicle pursuit under SOP 12.1.3 is discretionary. See Meinhart, 627

S.W.3d at 834.

               As to termination of a vehicle pursuit, SOP 12.1.9 provides generally

that a pursuit should be terminated “when the risks created by continuing the

pursuit outweigh the need for an immediate apprehension.” More specifically,

2
  In Meinhart v. Louisville Metro Gov’t, 627 S.W.3d 824 (Ky. 2021), the Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether a Louisville police officer’s initiation and continued pursuit of a
vehicle involved discretionary and/or ministerial acts. While the legal issue presented in
Meinhart was identical to the legal issue presented in this appeal, the particular SOP relevant to
disposition of Meinhart and this appeal differ in terminology. Although not dispositive, we rely
upon the reasoning contained in Meinhart.

                                               -14-
SOP 12.1.9 requires a vehicle pursuit to terminate when: (1) a supervisor or

higher-ranking officer orders termination thereof, (2) the “officer loses visual

contact and the likelihood for apprehension is decreased,” (3) the officer does not

“believe it is safe to continue” the vehicle pursuit, or (4) the “officer is out of radio

range or loses contact with MetroSafe.”

              SOP 12.1.9 includes both discretionary and ministerial acts. The

general requirement to terminate a vehicle pursuit when the risks are greater than

the need to immediately apprehend the suspect is inherently discretionary. See

Meinhart, 627 S.W.3d at 834. It involves the balancing of risks versus benefits

and necessarily involves the use of judgment. However, SOP 12.1.9 continues and

sets forth specific instances when a vehicle pursuit must be terminated. Some of

the listed instances involve the use of the officer’s judgment (discretionary), and

some merely require the officer to comply with its directive when certain facts are

present (ministerial).

              In particular, SOP 12.1.9 directs a vehicle pursuit to be terminated

when a supervisor/higher-ranking officer orders same or when the officer loses

radio contact/out of radio range. See Meinhart, 627 S.W.3d at 834. As an officer

must terminate a vehicle pursuit, without any deliberation or exercise of judgment,

when either factual scenario set forth above occurs, these are inherently ministerial

directives.

                                          -15-
             Conversely, SOP 12.1.9 also requires a vehicle pursuit to be

terminated when the officer loses visual contact and the likelihood for

apprehension is decreased or when the officer no longer believes the vehicle

pursuit is safe to continue. See Meinhart, 627 S.W.3d at 834. As the exercise of

judgment and deliberation is essential by the officer under each of these scenarios,

these are discretionary acts. See id. For example, the determination of whether the

likelihood for apprehension is decreased would require the examination of a wide

range of facts occurring during the pursuit coupled with the officer’s experience.

See id.

             Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Pond was only permitted to

initiate the vehicle pursuit if the ministerial mandates set forth in either SOP 12.1.1

or Special Order #19-001 were present. However, if the ministerial mandates set

forth in either SOP 12.1.1 or Special Order #19-001 were present, Officer Pond’s

decision to then, in fact, initiate the vehicle pursuit was a discretionary act pursuant

to SOP 12.1.3. Additionally, we are of the opinion that Officer Pond’s decision to

continue and not terminate the vehicle pursuit may have involved both or either

discretionary and/or ministerial acts per SOP 12.1.9, depending upon the relevant

facts.

             In its summary judgment, the circuit court erred by concluding that all

of Officer’s Pond’s actions were discretionary and by failing to make any

                                         -16-
distinction between the discretionary and/or ministerial directives under the

relevant SOP. We, therefore, vacate the circuit court’s summary judgment as to

Officer Pond’s entitlement to qualified official immunity and remand for the circuit

court to reconsider the issue in light of this Opinion.

             We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson

Circuit Court is vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this

Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 William M. Thompson III                    Michael J. O’Connell
 Somerset, Kentucky                         Gregory Scott Gowen
                                            Louisville, Kentucky

                                         -17-