Court Opinion

ID: 9944819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:40:08.638006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:22.381230
License: Public Domain

ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
After appellees (the two daughters) filed their brief on suggestion of error, the Court's request for a reply by appellants (the guardian ad litem for the grandchildren, the executors, and trustees) was complied with, to which appellees submitted a rebuttal brief. Sup. Ct. Rule 14(3). The issues have been briefed and considered en banc by the Court, with the present briefs putting more emphasis on the first point hereinafter discussed than was done on original submission. Carter v. Berry, 136 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1962).
The questions are: (1) Is the gift contingent, or finally vested in a closed class at the end of lives in being (the daughters)? (2) Does the all-or-nothing rule of Leake v. Robinson, infra, concerning class gifts, some of which might possibly vest beyond the period of perpetuities, pertain to this testamentary trust? (3) If it does, is the all-or-nothing rule sound and should it be applied here? (4) If not, we must determine and apply a rule of law which is in accord and consistent with the purposes and policy of the rule against perpetuities, the dominant intent of the testator, and a logical and fair interpretation of the will.
In essence, Johnston's will left eighty per cent of his estate (after the death of his sister, Mrs. Cooper) to trustees. The trust was to continue as an active trust, *Page 357 
and terminate "when my youngest grandchild (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become 25 years of age; provided, however, that in no event shall said trust estate continue for a longer period than 35 years from the date of this" will. Upon termination of the trust, the trust estate remaining shall be "transferred, delivered over, divided and distributed by my trustees to my said grandchildren per capita."
The trustees were given power to expend such portion of income or corpus as they in their sole discretion determined to be reasonable for support, maintenance and education of the grandchildren. Such expenditures were to be charged against the account of the particular grandchild and deducted from his share when final distribution was made. A spendthrift provision provided the trust fund was not liable for debts of any beneficiary, and no beneficiary had the power to convey, mortgage or anticipate the income or any share in the corpus, "it being my will that no right of disposition of any such property shall vest in any beneficiary until the same shall have been actually transferred or paid over to said beneficiary." The will stated that no provision was made for Johnston's two daughters, because he had previously made adequate provision for them.
The will was executed in 1955, so the maximum period of the trust estate would terminate in thirty-five years, in 1990. At his death testator left surviving him two children, daughters: Mrs. Lounora J. Berry, then twenty-four years of age, with three children (testator's grandchildren), then approximately six, five, and three years of age, respectively. The other daughter, Mrs. Jerryldine J. Ferguson, then twenty-two years of age, is also married but has no children.
(Hn 7) Appellees contend, and the chancery court held, that this testamentary devise, bequest and trust violates the rule against perpetuities. The classic statement of the rule, accepted by most of the courts, is that formulated *Page 358 
by Gray: No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th Ed. 1942), Sec. 201; McCormack v. Blanks, 226 Miss. 767,85 So.2d 204 (1956); Comment, 28 Miss. L.J. 88 (1956). The rule against perpetuities is a rule invalidating interests which vest too remotely. It is not a rule against suspension of the power of alienation of property through the creation of interests in unborn or unascertained persons. (Hn 8) It is not satisfied by the fact that there are persons in being who can together give a complete title to a purchaser. However, both principles stem from the general policy against withdrawal of property from commerce. Leach and Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities (1957), Sec. 24.3.(Hn 9) In other words, an interest violating the rule against perpetuities fails because it vests too remotely; it may be, and usually is, freely alienable at all times. We are not concerned here with the "succession of donees" statute. Miss. Code 1942, Rec., Sec. 838; see Custy and Brand, Future Interests — The Mississippi Two Donee Statute and the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 30 Miss. L.J. 221 (1959).
In our original opinion, we held that the intention of the testator should control if reasonably possible, and an ambiguous will would be construed so that it would not be invalid under the rule against perpetuities. A vested interest is not obnoxious to the rule, and the interests of the three grandchildren living at testator's death vested in them. The gift was to a class, which at that time consisted of those then living. The court pretermitted any decision on participation in the class by grandchildren of testator born after his death, but incidentally in a dictum observed that, in gifts of a life estate with remainder to a class, the remainder vests in those members of the class in being at testator's *Page 359 
death, subject to being opened up for additional members before the date fixed for final ascertainment of membership.
 I.
In support of the trial court's decree, appellees rely upon the all-or-nothing rule in class gifts. The source of the doctrine is the leading English case of Leake v. Robinson, 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817). It involved a devise in trust to testator's grandson, W.R.R., for life, and after his death to his children who should attain twenty-five; and if W.R.R. die without issue, or the issue die before attaining twenty-five, to pay to the brothers and sisters of W.R.R. who should attain twenty-five. He died without leaving issue, but left eight brothers and sisters surviving him, three of whom were born after the testator's death. The court held that testator intended to include all the brothers and sisters living at the time of W.R.R.'s death, and not simply those living at testator's death; that the gift was not vested until the donees attained twenty-five, since the only gift was in the direction to pay; and consequently the whole gift was void for remoteness. It was argued the gift could be split and upheld as to those of testator's grandchildren who were living at his death, though void as to those born afterwards; but the court refused to so hold, saying the question was of a gift to a class and not a bequest to individuals.
In brief, the English rule is that, if the interest of one class member can possibly vest too remotely, the entire class gift must fail. The court in Leake v. Robinson felt that it was bound by Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox Ch. 324 (1787), in which apparently the point was not raised by counsel and was not discussed by the court. Invalidity was assumed. Seven years later Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jur. 357 (Ch. 1794), followed Jee v. Audley, and struck down the entire class gift, although the question was recognized as being one of "construction". *Page 360 
There then followed Leake v. Robinson. The subsequent history of that rule in England "can be described in two words: stare decisis." Professor W. Barton Leach has analyzed the entire doctrine in a comprehensive and perceptive manner. Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938). The approximately ten American courts which have considered the class gift doctrine have followed the English cases beginning with Leake v. Robinson. 6 American Law of Property (1952), Sec. 24.26.
Whether we should follow the rule of Leake v. Robinson is a denovo, open question in this jurisdiction. The only Mississippi case referring to it is Caldwell v. Willis, 57 Miss. 555 (1880). Caldwell is not in point and, moreover, was incorrectly decided. Testator made a bequest to his son, Daniel Willis, during his life, and after his death "to his child or children then living and the descendents of such child or children and their heirs forever." The court concluded the gift was to all descendants to the remotest generations as a class, and held it was void. On that assumption, the limitation over was too remote. The court then reached what Gray calls "the extraordinary result that A (Daniel Willis) took an absolute interest." Apparently this was based on a misinterpretation of a statement in Harris v. McLaran,30 Miss. 533, 570 (1855). See Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942), Secs. 398, 249. Testator clearly intended to leave a remainder to the life tenant's children living at his death. The construction of an intent to make the gift to descendents to the remotest generations as a class was impossible to carry out, but, when reached, the gift was manifestly void. Nor was there any basis for vesting the entire estate in the life tenant. The unwarranted construction of this class gift resulted in an unnecessary and obiter reference to Leake v. Robinson. *Page 361 
In sum, the all-or-nothing rule, first adopted in Leake v. Robinson, is to this effect: A gift of property "to be divided among a class of persons was totally invalid if it was possible that the interest of any member of the class would vest beyond the period of perpetuities. Or, to put it differently, a class gift is not `vested' in any member within the meaning of that word as used in the Rule against Perpetuities until the interestsof all members have vested." Leach and Tudor, The Rule against Perpetuities (1957), Sec. 24.26. This unique application of the rule against perpetuities to class gifts requires, first, that a class gift must stand or fall as a unit, and cannot be split; and second, both the maximum and minimum membership in the class must be determined within the period of the rule. The class gift must be certain to vest within lives in being and twenty-one years, and it must be certain also to close within that time. Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, (1956), Sec. 1265. See also Phillips, Some Suggestions to Wills Draftsmen: Complex Dispositive Plans in General, Class Gift Provisions in Particular, 40 N.C.L. Rev. 23 (1961); 41 Am. Jur., Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation, Sec. 52; 70 C.J.S., Perpetuities, Sec. 17; Anno., 56 A.L.R. 2d 450 (1957); Anno., 155 A.L.R. 698 (1945).
If we should apply the all-or-nothing rule to the trust created by Johnston's will, the result would be invalidation of the entire gift to testator's grandchildren, and inheritance of the estate by his daughters for whom he had already provided, and whose participation in his estate he expressly excluded because of earlier provisions for them. The dominant idea of the entire will is that testator's grandchildren shall have the bulk of his estate. His determination that his daughters shall not have it is manifest.
(Hn 10) We think the measuring lives in being are the lives of testator's daughters, Mrs. Berry and Mrs. Ferguson. The period within which interests must vest, if *Page 362 
they are to be valid, is twenty-one years after any reasonable number of lives in being at the creation of the interest. If testator had said "when my youngest grandchild (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become twenty-one years of age", instead of "shall become twenty-five years of age", the validity of the devise would be clear. All grandchildren must be born in the lives of the testator's own children, and these must perforce he lives in being at testator's death. Both the maximum and minimum membership of the class would then be determined within the period of the rule.
(Hn 11) The lives in being which are the measure of the period must be indicated by the creating instrument, but they need not be mentioned in it. The testator need not intend the particular lives in question to be the measure for purposes of the rule, but, if it is necessarily inferable from the instrument that all future interests will vest within the period of lives in being at the creation of the interests, the rule is complied with. Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests, Sec. 1223.(Hn 12) The lives used as a measure of the period need not be those of persons who take anything under the instrument. Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805). They need not be holders of previous estates, and need not be connected in any way with the property or the persons designated to take it. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 641 (1938); Leach and Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities (1957), Sec. 24.13.
In the instant case, the lives in being in the will are those of Johnston's two daughters. Their issue determine the identity of his grandchildren.
The chancellor erroneously found that the gift was for a period in gross, twenty-one years, without any precedent lives in being. Our original opinion did not develop this point, but apparently assumed only a period in gross. However, our conclusion, stated above, is that *Page 363 
the lives in being are those of testator's daughters. In that view, the devise to his grandchildren as a class is good if thevesting is not postponed to a time after they become of age, for they must all become of age within twenty-one years after the death of their parents (testator's daughters), and the parents must all have been born or begotten in testator's lifetime.
Was the gift vested or contingent? The power given the trustees to make payments to the grandchildren before final distribution is a strong circumstance pointing toward vesting. If the final gift is contingent, no account could be taken of these payments, although the will expressly provides that each child's share should be charged therewith. Moreover, the absence of any provision for limitation over upon the contingency of death of a beneficiary before time for final distribution raises an inference of intent to vest at testator's death and finally at end of the lives in being. Coddington v. Stone, 217 N.C. 714,9 S.E.2d 420, 422-423 (1940).
On the other hand, the gift to the grandchildren is a gift to pay and distribute when the youngest reaches twenty-five. And this makes the gift prima facie contingent. Johnston had wishes which are really inconsistent, and the wishes for vesting, it might be argued, are less weighty than the stated intention of a postponed vesting.
(Hn 13) However, considering the will as an entirety, we hold that the vesting in the grandchildren occurred within the period of the rule against perpetuities. No grandchild could be born to testator later than the time when the survivor of his two daughters died (with the possible addition of a nine month's gestation period), and therefore the class would necessarily close at that time, at the end of lives in being. The twenty-five years refers to the time of distribution, not to vesting. The estates in the grandchildren living at the testator's death vested in them subject to be reopened within the period *Page 364 
of lives in being, that of testator's daughters. The share of a grandchild who dies, whether or not the youngest has attained the age of twenty-five or the thirty-five year period has expired, would pass to his heirs. If a grandchild dies before the time of distribution, his heirs inherit his share. Paragraph three of the will states that distribution shall be made "to my said grandchildren, per capita". By this testator purposed that each grandchild should receive an equal share, and, as stated, the interest of the grandchild would become vested in him upon his birth. This construction is consistent with the rule against perpetuities and effectuates, we think, the testator's intention. He did not say that grandchildren should receive a share when and if they lived until the youngest attained the age of twenty-five years. The distribution was to be made at that time, but the class would necessarily close during lives in being, those of the daughters of testator.
 II.
Nevertheless, the rule of Leake v. Robinson tends to deny a vesting under these circumstances. The will provided for distribution upon one of two events, testator's youngest grandchild reaching the age of twenty-five years, or thirty-five years after the date of the will, which would be 1990. Until the event happens, it may be impossible to state which of them will be controlling. The daughters could have children up until the time of their deaths. Some of the children could die, and others live. Under the class gift rule, there is a possibility that the daughters may live beyond their deaths. Some of the children could die, and others live. Under the class gift rule, there is a possibility that the daughters may live beyond 1990, and then have children. These hypothetical contingencies, the latter of which is certainly not reasonable or probable, would under the Leake rule make the gift contingent, since all of the participants in the class could not finally be determined. Parker v. *Page 365 
Parker, 252 N.C. 399, 113 S.E.2d 899 (1960); Burruss v. Baldwin,199 Va. 883, 103 S.E.2d 249 (1958); Gwin v. Hutton, 100 Miss. 320, 56 So. 446 (1911); Kates v. Walker, 82 N.J. 157, 82 A. 301 (1912); Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Or. 595, 230 P. 554 (1924); Thomas v. Pullman Trust and Savings Bank, 371 Ill. 577,21 N.E.2d 897 (1939). The will contains several factors indicating an intention to postpone vesting until the time of distribution. Among them is the provision that income and corpus, if necessary, are first to be applied to the bequest to the widow. In the trial court, but not here, counsel for the executors admitted that, because of the provisions for distribution, "it would be necessary for a grandchild to survive the termination of the trust estate in order to share in such distribution." Further, Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. 900 (1891), 28 L.R.A. 328, held, under substantially similar facts, that the gift was contingent. Gray, Sec. 863.
Johnston's inconsistent wishes in this respect, as to the date of vesting, the extended application of the Leake v. Robinson rule by many courts in related situations, and the desirability of meeting this issue head-on under the inconsistent terms of this will and the authorities, have all persuaded us that it is necessary and proper to deal also with the issues in this case on a second basis, namely, that, under the rule of Leake v. Robinson, the gift is contingent. On both foundations, we hold the gift to the grandchildren is valid.
The question is whether, as a de novo proposition in this jurisdiction, we should follow Leake v. Robinson and its successors from other jurisdictions, or adopt a different rule. In the immense literature of primary and secondary authorities discussing and frequently applying that case, we have found no satisfactory rationalization for it. Sir William Grant stated that to permit some members of the class to take when others cannot is to "make a new will for the testator". The American *Page 366 
Law Institute says that the ascertained members of the class do not constitute its intended full membership; and the size of the shares of the ascertained members remains unfixed. It concludes: "The plan of my conveyor would normally be emasculated by sustaining part only of the class gift." 4 A.L.I., Restatement, Property (1944), Sec. 371, Comment a. The American cases applying Leake v. Robinson have not attempted an explanation or rationale for the rule, and rely upon it simply as settled doctrine. 6 American Law of Property, Sec. 24.26.
(Hn 14) Whether testator's plan would be emasculated by sustaining a part only of the class gift, or by reducing the age contingency, here twenty-five, to twenty-one, should become a question of fact in each particular case. Infectious invalidity is not a universal doctrine, as will be hereinafter noted. Where part of the testator's plan is valid and part invalid, the normal procedure is to examine the total plan of testator, and determine whether that part which is invalid is so integral to the total plan that it can be inferred testator would have preferred all to fail, rather than to have the valid part stand alone. If the valid part actually accomplishes most of testator's desires, then that portion should stand. The all-or-nothing rule ignores the proposition that the problem is one of separability, not of perpetuities; a question of construction, not of application of a rule of law. There is no reason to totally amputate an arm in order to save an infected finger. The general dispositive intent should control. (Hn 15) The court should save such parts of the gift as the rigid requirements of the rule do not strike down, provided such action carries out the testator's principal purpose. This approach will preserve the policy of the rule, and at the same time preserve so far as may be the intention of testator.
All of the scholars in this field criticize the doctrine of Leake v. Robinson and its indiscriminate application. *Page 367 
6 American Law of Property, Sec. 24.26. Simes and Smith say there is no rational basis for it. Simes and Smith, Sec. 1265. Leach has demonstrated that in his pioneering reexaminations of the doctrine. Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638 (1938); Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938); Leach and Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities (1957), Secs. 24.26-24.29; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1349 (1954); Leach, Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1411 (1957); Leach, Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (1960); Leach and Logan, Perpetuities: A Standard Saving Clause to Avoid Violations of the Rule, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1141 (1961). See also Lynn, Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 Univ. Chi. L. Rev., 488 (1961); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 (1953). Gray concedes that there is no rational basis for the rule, and "Leach's arguments are difficult to meet except upon the ground of authority." Gray, pp. 396-397, fn. 4.
Moreover, the courts applying the class gift doctrine have established at least two "exceptions" to it. Where there is a gift of a stated sum to each person described by a class designation (as distinguished from a gift of a fund to be divided among the class), some members may take their gifts though the gifts to others are void. Gifts of specific sums to a class can be part good and part bad. Storrs v. Benbow, 2 M. K. 46, 39 Eng. Rep. 862 (1833), 3 De G.M. and G. 390, 43 Eng. Rep. 153 (1853); 4 Restatement, Property (1942), Sec. 385; Gray, Sec. 389; Simes and Smith, Sec. 1266; Leach and Tudor, Sec. 24.28. *Page 368 
Also, under the rule of Cattlin v. Brown, where there is a gift to a class of classes, some may take though others fail. 11 Hare 372, 377, 1 Eq. 550, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (1853); Gray, Secs. 391, 392; Simes and Smith, Sec. 1267; 4 Restatement, Property (1944), Sec. 389; Leach and Tudor, Sec. 24.29.
Another conflicting line of authority is illustrated by Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855), which held that the invalidity of a divesting gift leaves the vested gift absolute and does not defeat it. When a condition subsequent or a limitation is void by reason of its being impossible, repugnant or contrary to law, the estate becomes vested in the first taker, discharged of the condition or limitation over, according to the terms in which it was granted or devised. See Leach, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329, 1335-1336, 1352; Anno., 56 A.L.R. 2d 450 (1957).
These three lines of authority are well settled and appear to us to be sound. They establish a conflict of principle with the doctrine of Leake v. Robinson, and are in substance authorities opposed to that case. We think the principles applied in them have a rational and reasonable basis, which is wholly lacking in Leake v. Robinson. They are consistent with the traditional approach by this and other courts toward effectuating the dominant intent of a testator, insofar as that may be done. The all-or-nothing rule fails to recognize that the court is dealing with a situation in which there is a valid vested interest subject to partial divestment by an invalid gift.
(Hn 16) The common law should be but is not always a product of rational processes and growth. This question is new in this jurisdiction. We decline to adopt the patent anomaly and ill-considered doctrine of Leake v. Robinson and its successors. It is not good logic or sound law. *Page 369
 III. (Hn 17) What is the essence of the problem? It is twofold: To construe this devise to carry out the dominant purpose of the testator, if possible, and to preserve the purpose of the rule against perpetuities by invalidating only those interests which vest too remotely. There seems to be no reason, under the policy of the rule against perpetuities, why a gift in a will such as this should not be cut down to size. The following applies to the second basis of this decision, on the assumption that, under the all-or-nothing rule, the gift is contingent.
In most perpetuity cases, gifts fail, if at all, (a) because the gift is contingent upon a person's reaching an age in excess of twenty-one, and (b) because the gift includes persons unborn at the creation of the interest (as Johnston's will expressly provided.) There are two alternative, available answers.
(Hn 18) First, the Court could hold that the gift was valid as to the donees living at the time of the creation of the interest, here the three then-living grandchildren, and could eliminate unborn children. Whether the entire gift should fail is a question of fact in each particular case. It should be determined whether the total plan of testator and the portion which is invalid are so integral and related to one another that it can be inferred that testator would have preferred all to fail, rather than to have the valid part stand alone. Certainly the problem is one of separability, not of perpetuities. It is a question of construction, not of application of a rule of law. 6 American Law of Property, Sec. 24.26; Leach and Tudor, Sec. 24.26; Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuties and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1938).
Although it may be suggested that one cannot split a contingency unless the testator or settlor has done so by the terms of the instrument, it nevertheless is a fact that courts do sometimes split contingencies when *Page 370 
different persons are involved. Simes and Smith, Sec. 1265. Moreover, this first alternative, holding the gift valid as to donees living at time of creation of the interest, is in accord and consistent with three lines of authority illustrated by the rules applied in Brattle Square Church v. Grant, Storrs v. Benbow, and Cattlin v. Brown.
Although this course might be proper in a case where it would effectuate substantially the dominant intent of testator, we decline to apply it here. The dominant idea of the whole will is that testator's grandchildren, whether living at the time of his death or born thereafter, should have the bulk of his estate. He clearly did not intend that his daughters, Mrs. Berry and Mrs. Ferguson, should have it. At the death of the lives in being (testator's daughters), all of the grandchildren will necessarily be in being and determined. Johnston wanted all of his grandchildren to take, not just those living at the time of his death. If this were the only choice, we would not hesitate to take it. And it would be consistent with the three lines of authority discussed above, as being a valid vested interest subject to partial divestment by an invalid gift. However, it would not effectuate testator's dominant purpose as substantially as another established and logical principle of law and line of cases pertinent to this problem.
(Hn 19) The second alternative to prevent failure in toto
of a class gift which is partially invalid is supported by reasoned precedents which we think are pertinent to this will. It is the saving principle of cy pres or equitable approximation as applied to testamentary gifts. Cy pres in the United States is a doctrine of approximation, is applicable to devises, and is an essential element of equity jurisdiction. It is a simple rule of judicial construction, designed to aid the court to ascertain and carry out, as nearly as may be, the intention of the donor. It is applicable where it is impossible beneficially to apply the property left by the testator in the exact *Page 371 
way he provided, and his directions cannot be carried into effectin toto. 10 Am. Jur., Charities, Secs. 123, 124.
The leading case on this point is Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 612,31 A. 900, 28 L.R.A. 328 (1891). In an opinion by Chief Justice Charles Doe, the court considered a will in which the testator left surviving him an unmarried daughter and a married son, 35 years of age, who had a wife and four children living at the testator's death. Barker committed the bulk of his estate to trustees, and provided, among other things, that "when the youngest of said children (of the testator's son) shall arrive at the age of forty years, then all my estate shall be theirs, to have and hold the same, to them and their heirs." The son sought construction of the will, and contended this provision was void because inhibited by the rule against perpetuities, the gift being to grandchildren both born and unborn. This contention was rejected.
The court said the dominant idea of the whole will was that testator's grandchildren should have the bulk of his estate, and no less dominant was his determination that his own children should not have it. It assumed the gift was contingent. The question was whether testator's appointment of the time of vesting in the grandchildren was wholly or partially void for remoteness, because he said "forty" instead of "twenty-one"; and whether his inability to postpone vesting as long as he wished would justify not giving the property to those to whom he devised it. Testator's two children were the lives in being. The doctrine of general intent is a rule of approximation, which makes the least sacrifice of a testator's declared intention, rejecting no more of his will than the law makes necessary, and preferring the greater part and the weightiest intent. The dominant intent, the court said, was that testator's grandchildren receive the property. The time of receiving it was secondary. *Page 372 
The last nineteen of the forty years were too remote, the remainder of the time and of the will was valid. The appointed time was changed by an intended approximation, because a testator's disposition is not invalidated beyond the bounds of necessity. "The construction is cy pres because it is an ascertainment of his intent."
His intent that his grandchildren should have the remainder overrode the lesser intent that they should not have it until the youngest was forty years old. The latter was modified by his intent that they have it. The forty years were reduced to twenty-one by testator's general approximating purpose appearing from the will. Hence the court directed that the estate be divided among the grandchildren when the youngest of them reached twenty-one instead of forty years of age. The exact operation of the will was changed, but it was done upon a basis of equitable approximation, that it was better to arrest the process of alteration short of the point of total avoidance, if the law can sanction any part of testator's plan.
Three analogies were cited by the court: A lease of forty years, made under a power to lease for twenty-one years, is good for twenty-one; a testamentary gift to a tenant for life of a power to lease for sixty-three years is not wholly void, under a statute restricting such periods to twenty-one years, but void only for the excess; and attempts by testator's to create successive life estates extending beyond the limit fixed by the rule against perpetuities, in which the courts gave effect to the devises as far as possible. Persons no less than time are amenable to the operation of the American doctrine of cy pres or equitable approximation. Jackson v. Brown, 13 Wend. 437 (N Y 1835).
The problem is one of separability and of construction, not a "remorseless" application of law. Further, separability has been applied where gifts were made to *Page 373 
a plurality of persons, some of the provisions being repugnant to the rule against perpetuities, while others were not. The latter were separated from the void ones and upheld, under the principle of equitable approximation. In re Kerns' Estate, 296 Pa. 348,145 A. 824 (1929); Johnson v. Preston, 262 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907).
The approximation doctrine has been applied to trusts for accumulation. Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Vesey 227, 31 Eng. Rep. 117 (1798). The subsequent Thellusson Act limited trusts for accumulation to twenty-one years from the death of testator. In Griffiths v. Vere, 9 Ves. Jr. 127, 32 Eng. Rep. 550 (1803), a testamentary trust was held valid for the period allowed by the statute, twenty-one years, and void only as to the excess over that period. To the same effect are Longdon v. Simson, 12 Ves. Jr. 295, 33 Eng. Rep. 113 (1806), and In re Lady Rosslyn's Trust, 16 Sim. 390, 60 Eng. Rep. 925 (1848).
In Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903), the Kentucky Court applied the approximation doctrine to a trust for accumulation created by the will of a citizen of New Hampshire. The trust in favor of the grandchildren was held valid by reducing the period of accumulation from thirty-three years to twenty-one years. Pennsylvania's statute on trusts for accumulation, similar to the Thellusson Act, was held to invalidate trust provisions only to the extent of the excess not permitted by the statute. Brown v. Williamson's Executors, 36 Pa. St. 338 (1860).
Another established analogy is this: A testator devises his estate to his grandchildren in equal shares, and then directs that of the share of each granddaughter the income shall be paid to her for life and the principal conveyed to her children in fee. The gift to the children of the granddaughter is bad for remoteness, the modification of the devise is rejected, and each granddaughter *Page 374 
takes a fee. Whitehead v. Bennett, 22 L.J. Ch. 1020; Gray, Secs. 880, 423 et seq., 431. In short, when there is a good absolute gift, and "the settlor or testator goes on, in an additional clause, to modify the gift, and, by modifying it, makes it in part too remote, the modification is rejected in toto and the original gift stands." Ibid., Sec. 423; Sears v. Putnam,102 Mass. 5 (1869), Comment in Gray, Sec. 429.
In Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908), testator, domiciled in Hawaii, left a will disposing of a large estate, and providing that the balance of his estate was to be placed in trust "for as long a period as is legally possible, the termination or ending of said trust to take place when the law requires it under the statute." Upholding this clause, the court stated that its duration was restricted to the period defined in the rule against perpetuities, and legal for that period, namely, lives in being at its creation and twenty-one years thereafter. Fitchie v. Brown applied the principle of separability and equitable approximation, and held that a testamentary trust should be given effect as far as permitted by the rule against perpetuities.
The English Property Act of 1925 incorporates the cy pres modification adjudged in Criffiths v. Vere. Law of property Act (1925), XV Geo. 5, Ch. 20, Sec. 163; see Mass. Acts, 1954, c. 641; Vt. Acts of 1957, No. 177.
James Quarles comprehensively discusses The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, in 21 N.Y.U. Law Q. Rev. 384 (1946). He concludes: "It appears that the cy pres doctrine, for a long stretch of years, has been applied in Perpetuity and Income Accumulation cases and found to work satisfactorily by England, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania; that it was applied in Kentucky in a case involving the will of a New Hampshire testator; and that the doctrine *Page 375 
has been approved and made use of by the Supreme Court of the United States."
New Hampshire has consistently followed its 1891 decision in Edgerly v. Barker. Wentworth v. Wentworth, 77 N.H. 400, 92 A. 733
(1914); Flanders v. Parker, 80 N.H. 566, 120 A. 558 (1923); Gale v. Gale, 85 N.H. 358, 159 A. 122 (1932); Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Haskell, 96 N.H. 89, 91, 70 A.2d 210, 71 A.2d 408 (1950); Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207
(1953).
Leach and Tudor think the Rule adopted in Edgerly v. Barker is sound, and "difficulties have not arisen". Ibid., pp. 210, 41, 183, 194, 202, 233; see also 6 American Law of Property, Sec. 24.26, fn. 2. Simes and Smith conclude that Edgerly v. Barker is a well-considered opinion. Simes and Smith, Secs. 1257, 1265. John Chipman Gray thought Edgerly v. Barker was unsound. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed., 1942), Secs. 857-893. However, the fourth edition, edited by Roland Gray, concedes, in effect, that the rule of Leake v. Robinson is illogical, and Leach's argument, that it is a matter of construction and separability, is "difficult to meet except upon the ground of authority." Gray, at pp. 396-397.
(Hn 20) The doctrine of equitable approximation is a basic part of equity jurisdiction. It is a rule of judicial construction designed to carry out the intention of the donor, and is applicable to devises. 10 Am. Jur., Charities, Secs. 123-124; 14 C.J.S., Charities, Secs. 50, 52; 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1953), Secs. 433, 434. In National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167 Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933), this Court refused to adopt the cy pres doctrine insofar as it comprehends the exercise of the ancient perogative power as to charities. This is generally the rule in the United States. 14 C.J.S., Charities, Sec. 52. In Savarika a charitable trust was held to be invalid because of indefiniteness in all of its *Page 376 
characteristics. However, Savarika recognized that the modified American doctrine of equitable approximation is an essential element of equity jurisdiction. 167 Miss. at 593. Mississippi Childrens Home Society v. City of Jackson, 230 Miss. 546, 555,93 So.2d 483 (1957), again recognized the equitable doctrine of approximation, as distinguished from perogative cy pres, but declined to apply it in that instance because the donor himself had declared how the charitable trust should be administered. See also 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., by Symons, 1941), Secs. 1027-1029; 4 Scott, Trusts (2d ed., 1956), Secs. 395 etseq.
(Hn 21) In summary, the American doctrine of equitable approximation is supported by established precedents related to the problem in this case. It should be applied here. Moreover, it is logical and equitable. Appellees want us to strike down the dominant idea of the entire will, that testator's grandchildren should have the bulk of his estate, and thereby to vest it in his daughters, despite his manifest intent that they should not have it. The time when the grandchildren should have the estate was secondary and subordinate to the intent that they should receive it.
Appllees seek to overthrow this dominant idea and have the trust declared entirely void for remoteness, because testator was unable to postpone the vesting of the property for as long as he wished, when the youngest grandchild, born and unborn, shall become twenty-five years of age. If he had said, "when my youngest grandchild (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become twenty-one years of age", the validity of the devise to them could not be questioned. The issue is one of separability and of interpretation, not of arbitrary application of a rule of law. If an examination of the testator's will in the light of the circumstances in which it was written leads to the conclusion that his general dispositive intent would be better carried out by invalidating *Page 377 
the gift in toto, rather than reducing the age contingency to twenty-one within the period of perpetuities, then the entire gift should fail. But that circumstance does not exist in this case.
Here as in Edgerly v. Barker testator's dominant intent should be effectuated, to give his grandchildren the bulk of his estate. The intent that they should have it when the youngest reached twenty-five was only secondary. The latter is subordinate to the former. That which is dominant should be carried out by an adjudication, under the doctrine of equitable approximation, that the estate shall be distributed to testator's grandchildren when the youngest reaches twenty-one years of age. This adjudication rejects no more of the will than the law makes it necessary to reject. The time is changed by an intended approximation, because this is an ascertainment of his intent. The will is not invalidated beyond the bounds of necessity. The twenty-five years are reduced to twenty-one by testator's general approximating purpose and dominant intent.
Furthermore, there is no evidence in this will that Johnston intended a partial intestacy; the entire document indicates the contrary. This application of equitable approximation is in accord with the able opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Edgerly v. Barker, subsequent cases following that decision and applying the principles of construction and separability, at least three independent lines of authority, and the views of most of the scholars who have worked extensively in this field. More importantly, equitable approximation carries out the dominant, primary idea of the testator, and at the same time preserves the policy of the rule against perpetuities.
Accordingly, the suggestion of error filed by appellees is overruled. However, the judgment is modified and corrected by striking therefrom the phrase "in all respects", prior to the phrase "it is ordered"; and in *Page 378 
paragraph 1 of the judgment, after the phrases "to be valid in all respects", there shall be inserted the following, preceded by a comma: "except that by equitable approximation the trust shall continue and terminate when the youngest grandchild (whether now living or hereafter born) shall become twenty-one years of age, but in no event for a longer period than thirty-five years from the date of the said will."
Suggestion of error overruled; judgment modified and corrected.
All Justices concur.