Court Opinion

ID: 9865305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:31:01.101353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:24.388814
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holland,
dissenting.
Prom the majority opinion herein I respectfully dissent.
Reference will be herein made to the parties as the people and Woolsey, as they were aligned in the trial court, where the defendant in error, the people, prosecuted and convicted Woolsey as an officer and director of an insolvent bank under an information charging that on October 20, 1931, he did fraudulently, knowingly and feloniously receive and assent to the reception of a certain deposit of money, of the personal property and moneys of the Equity Cooperative Oil Company, by said bank, the Union State Bank of Yuma, Colorado, a banking corporation, being then and there insolvent, and that he at the time and before the reception of the deposit, had full knowledge that the bank was insolvent, and so he, in the manner and form aforesaid, then and there did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away the money and other valuable things of the Equity Cooperative Oil Company, of the total value of $59.64 contrary, etc. A year later, and on April 19, 1932, this information was filed, defendant arraigned April 18, 1933, and trial began April 18, 1934. On a verdict of guilty, after the overruling of a motion for new trial, Woolsey was sentenced to serve from five to seven years in the state penitentiary, and he prosecutes error to reverse the judgment of conviction.
The testimony on behalf of the people was brief and established only the following material points: That the deposit was made October 20, 1931; that it was received *74by Mabel Olsen, bookkeeper and teller; that on that day Woolsey was in Denver; that Woolsey was at that time a director and cashier of the bank; that in the opinion of several witnesses, the bank was then insolvent; that Mabel Olsen took her general directions and orders from Woolsey, who was in active charge of the bank; that the bank was closed October 20, 1931. Woolsey entered a plea of “not guilty,” and contended that the bank was not insolvent, also that the closing of the bank was due to a “silent run” due to the depressed conditions. He did not testify in his own behalf.
It is undisputed that the deposit was received by Mabel Olsen, in the absence of Woolsey, and the record is silent as to any attempt at proof by the people, of any assent to the reception of the deposit, on the part of Woolsey, or to show any authority in him to close the bank, or to revoke the authority of Mabel Olsen, as bookkeeper and teller, to receive deposits. The people seemed content to try the case on the theory expressed at the trial by Mr. Chutkow, appearing as special prosecutor as follows: “There are just three issues that can be tendered in this ease, first, whether or not a deposit was made; second, whether the bank at the time was insolvent; and, third, the knowledge of the defendant. There cannot be any other issues in this particular case because those are the elements of the crime defined. ’ ’
In face of an information, charging larceny, the above theory of the case was adopted by the trial court, and in my opinion, submitted to the jury under erroneous instructions. Before a conviction can stand, the charge contained in the information must be sustained. The gist of the information was, that he did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away the money and other valuable things, etc. This charge was not sustained, neither was there any attempt to prove it. Woolsey, upon a “not guilty” plea fixed the issue, and submitted to trial upon the charge as laid. Depriving *75Mm of Ms constitutional rigMs, lie was tried and convicted of a separate and distinct crime, by establisMng wbat was erroneously thought to be a prima facie case, apparently under section 2676, O. L. 1921 (section 40, chapter 44, S. L. 1913), wMch is as follows:
“No bank shall receive any deposit when it is insolvent, nor shall any officer, director or employe of any bank knowingly permit the same. An action may be had to recover any deposits received in violation hereof, and the bank and all officers, directors and employes thereof knowingly permitting the same, and their personal representatives, may be joined as defendants, and joint and several judgment be recovered against them.
“No officer, director or employe of any bank shall receive or assent to the reception of any deposit of money or other valuable thing by such bank or create or assent to the creation of any debt or liability by such bank after he shall have had knowledge of the fact that such bank is insolvent. Upon the trial of any person charged with an offense under this section, evidence of the failure of such bank at any time within thirty days after the reception of such deposit or the creation of such indebtedness, shall be received as prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the person charged, that such bank was insolvent at the time of the reception of such deposit or the creation of such indebtedness. ’ ’ And section 2740, C. L. 1921, being section 85, chapter 44, S. L. 1913: “Any person who shall wilfully or knowingly fail to perform any act required, and as required by sections 22, 23, 40, 42, 58 and 63 hereof, or who shall commit any act in violation of said sections, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be pumshed by a fine of not to exceed two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the pemtentiary for a term not to exceed twenty years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
The trial and conviction for having committed an offense, under the statute quoted, being another and differ*76ent offense than that charged in the information, is void and beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. To say that the defendant did “feloniously steal and carry away” the money, a positive charge of theft, is mere uninjurious surplusage, is in effect saying that “in addition to violating a statute regulating the operation of a bank, you are also a thief.” This surely is not a recommendation commending defendant to the jury who had his liberty in its hands.
It is apparent from the instructions in this case that the prosecution and the trial court erroneously relied solely upon a so-called prima facie case, as is evidenced by instruction No. 2, which is as follows:
“In this case the People must establish beyond a reasonable doubt and from all of the evidence in the case the following elements:
“1. That a deposit of $59.64 was made in The Union State Bank of Yuma, Colorado, a banking corporation, on or about the 20th day of October, 1931.
“2. That at the time the said deposit was made The Union State Bank of Yuma, Colorado, was insolvent.
“3. That at that time the defendants had knowledge of the insolvency of said bank. ’ ’
This instruction was lacking in an additional element necessary to be established before a conviction could be sustained. The defendant is charged with having received and assented to the reception of a bank deposit. The instruction given is equivalent to saying to the jury that when the matters therein named are proven, then a prima facie case is made and nothing more is required. When it was definitely established by the people’s evidence that the defendant was absent from the county when the deposit was received by Mabel Olsen, an employee of the bank, and that the defendant did not personally receive the deposit, then it at once became absolutely essential, in order to sustain a conviction, under the statute, to show that the defendant assented to its *77reception. The statute provides that evidence of the bank’s failure within thirty days from the reception of the deposit shall be received as “prima facie evidence” of knowledge of the person charged with so receiving and assenting to the deposit, of the bank’s insolvency. The statute does not make an officer of an incorporated bank criminally liable simply because he is such officer, and does not make him criminally liable because a deposit was received by the bank, or because the statute says that under the circumstances he had knowledge of insolvency. He must receive the deposit or assent to its reception. The receipt of the deposit in this case was a reception by the bank. To assert that its reception by Mabel Olsen, under the circumstances related, was the criminal act of the defendant is so repugnant to a fair conscience that it nowhere should have support in the law. If such was recognized, as it is by the majority opinion in this case, the evil that can follow is at once apparent. The people made no attempt to show that the defendant ever said or did anything from which any inference could be drawn that he in any respect assented to the reception of the deposit as charged, and the people’s evidence is wholly barren of any showing that he, alone, as a director, or cashier, had any authority to close the bank or to revoke the authority of Mabel Olsen to receive deposits. The court, by instruction No. 6, in a most affirmative way, instructed the jury that the defendant was guilty, should they find that he was merely negligent as to keeping himself informed as to the financial condition of the bank, and when the jury found, from the evidence, that the bank was insolvent and that a deposit was received while it was insolvent, then it was not necessary for the people to prove a specific intent to injure, but it was only necessary to prove “criminal negligence.” The jury was further instructed that the defendant was bound to exercise that reasonable degree of care and diligence that an ordinarily prudent person would do in like circumstances to *78keep himself advised concerning the financial condition of the bank, and that the knowledge he conld have thus obtained, he is “presumed to possess,” and if he failed to exercise this degree of care and diligence, he would be guilty of criminal negligence, and should be found guilty. Mere negligence on the part of a bank official in failing to exercise reasonable diligence in such matters does not amount to criminal negligence unless it is also established that the defendant had a criminal intent and a guilty knowledge, and proceeded with a reckless disregard of the rights of others which the statute was designed to protect. The “criminal negligence” referred to in instruction No. 6, and as therein applied to the defendant, presumes both his knowledge of the insolvency of the bank and his assent to the reception of the deposit; it makes no allowance for defendant in case he had received misleading information while exercising reasonable diligence concerning the solvency of the institution. All of these important and vital questions are of fact for the jury’s determination. With such an affirmative direction in the instructions, it clearly makes ordinary negligence, for which a civil liability would attach, “criminal negligence” in this case.
It appears that this defendant was convicted for the acts of a third person over which it was not shown he had any control. He was convicted upon a so-called prima facie case, made up to the exclusion of the “assent” which constituted the gravamen of the offense charged, and without the jury believing, as instructed, that the “receipt or assent to the reception of” was an element of the crime, and it was told that defendant’s failure to revoke the authority of Mabel Olsen, whether he had such authority or not, would amount to an assent of the reception of the deposit. It is therefore apparent that the conviction of the defendant in this case rested upon two propositions: That the bank failed within thirty days after the deposit was made therein; and whether defendant had exercised reasonable diligence *79to keep informed, instead of its resting npon the only-question upon which he could have been convicted, namely, that he had assented to the reception, of a deposit in, an insolvent hank with guilty knowledge of its insolvency.
For these particular reasons, I think the judgment should be reversed.