Court Opinion

ID: 9728328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:05:07.593932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.604058
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Nix :
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the kitchen knife, a picture thereof, and the series of inflammatory photographs were properly admitted into evidence. Accordingly, I must dissent.
I.
In justifying the introduction of the knife and the photograph depicting that knife, the majority refers to United States v. Ramey, 414 F. 2d 792 (5th Cir. 1969). There the court properly pointed out that weapons, although not identified as the actual weapon used, are properly authenticated when they are found in the possession of the accused at the time of his arrest, or in the alternative, where circumstances surrounding the finding justify an inference of the likelihood that the weapon was in fact the one used in the perpetration of the crime. In the case before us, I do not believe that *88this test has been met. First, the knife was not found upon the person of the appellant and secondly, the testimony suggests not a similarity between the knife found and the knife used but rather clearly indicates that the knife introduced was not the weapon used to commit the crimes.
Had the testimony at trial been limited to a showing that after the commission of the alleged crimes the appellant was seen putting the knife away in his kitchen and that a subsequent search of the kitchen revealed a knife similar to the one described, I would agree that there was a sufficient basis for the introduction of the knife. Here, however, the very witness who observed the appellant putting away the knife unequivocally stated that this was not the weapon that he had referred to. The pertinent testimony of this witness, Ernest Sewell, is as follows: “By Mr. Czap [Assistant District Attorney]: Q. Mr. Sewell, you said the knife was about 12 inches long? A. Yes. Q. And you said it had a handle? A. Yes, it did. By the Court : Q. What color handle did it have? A. Brown. By Mr. Czap: Q. I show you what have [sic] been marked Commonwealth’s exhibit 1; can you identify that? A. No, I have never seen it before. Mr. Darmopray : What’s the answer? Mr. Czap : Cannot identify it. By Mr. Czap : Q. Do you see what it is? A. Yes, I see what it is. Q. What is it? A. It’s a knife. Q. A kitchen knife? A. Yes. Q. Yon can’t say you saw that before? A. No.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority however ignores this positive statement that the knife introduced was not the murder weapon and chooses to rely upon a number of cases which stand for the proposition that the lack of positive testimony to identify a particular weapon as the one used in the commission of a crime does not necessarily preclude its admissibility. With this basic principle I *89agree. However, the cited cases are distinguishable from the instant situation since in those instances a lack of positive identification was found not to be controlling either because witnesses testified as to the similarity between the weapon admitted and the one used in the commission of the crime,1 or the facts surrounding the discovery of the weapon were sufficient to support the inference that the defendant used it during the commission of the crime.2
In the instant case there was nothing unique involved in the discovery of the knife which would justify an inference of the likelihood that it was the murder weapon. Where else but a kitchen drawer would one expect to find a kitchen knife. Nor were there any independent witnesses who testified to the similarity between the murder weapon and the kitchen knife. To the contrary, the only positive testimony concerning the identification of the knife was made by the witness Sewell, who allegedly viewed the entire crime, including the cleansing of the murder weapon, and he clearly denied ever having seen this particular knife.
Under these facts, the knife should not have been admitted into evidence since, in my view, from the evi*90dence presented the jury was precluded from inferring that the exhibit was in fact the murder weapon.
II.
I am also in disagreement with the majority’s determination that the admission of the prejudicial and inflammatory photographs was not an abuse of discretion. In Commonwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 278-79, 241 A. 2d 119, 121 (1968), this Court stated: “We are of the opinion that the proper test to be applied by a trial court in determining the admissibility of photographs in homicide cases is whether or not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.” Applying this test to the case before us, I am forced to conclude that the pictures, particularly the two depicting the bodies of the deceased, were completely unnecessary and the prejudicial effect far outweighed any possible probative value.
The majority attempts to justify the admission of this evidence on the basis that the Commonwealth’s alternative theory was that of a premeditated, non-felony, first-degree murder. They argue that it was necessary for the Commonwealth to establish the use of a deadly weapon on a vital portion of the body and that the pictures served this purpose. The record, however, reveals that the Commonwealth had also introduced the testimony of Dr. Catherman, the pathologist who performed the autopsy; Sharon Kerzner, a laboratory technician; Officer Ashmore, the first officer to arrive at the scene; and Ernest Sewell, the co-defendant. Each of these witnesses testified as to the nature of the injuries and the condition of the bodies. The pictures, at best, were cumulative as to this issue. In addition, there was no serious contradiction by the defense either *91as to the nature of the wounds or the cause of death, While I agree that there may be instances where pictures should be permitted to aid in establishing a specific intent to kill, this case was not one where there was a need to risk the possible prejudice inherent in the exhibit.
This Court observed in Commonwealth v. Peyton, 360 Pa. 441, 62 A. 2d 37 (1948), that although the admission of photographs in a homicide case to show the body of the deceased is largely within the discretion of the trial judge, a flagrant abuse of that discretion will not be permitted. “The practice of admitting such exhibits unless they have essential evidentiary value is condemned. When the facts that these exhibits would tend to prove can be proved by testimony without the use of photographs which tend to excite the emotions of those who view them, such testimony should be used exclusively and photographs should not be admitted.” 360 Pa. at 450, 62 A. 2d at 41.
In the instant case, no one questions the fact that the pictures, particularly those depicting the bodies of the deceased were in fact inflammatory. Therefore, in view of the limited purpose they served in establishing an element of the Commonwealth’s case, I am forced to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing their admission.
I would reverse the judgment of sentence and order a new trial for the reasons stated above.

 United States v. Cunningham, 423 F. 2d 1269 (4th Oir. 1970) (several witnesses testified as to the similarity between the gun admitted and the one used) ; United States v. Ramey, 414 F. 2d 792 (5th Oir. 1969) (gun identified as being similar to one used during the robbery) ; Pinkney v. United States, 363 F. 2d 696 (D.O. Oir. 1966) (eyewitness identified knife as being similar to the murder weapon). See United States v. Gordon, 455 F. 2d 398 (8th Oir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 970 (1972) (conflict in testimony of two witnesses as to identification of two guns found not to be significant; there was at least some testimony as to similarity and one of the participants positively identified one of the two weapons).

 United States v. Ramey, supra; Pinkney v. United States, supra (knife found in patrol wagon after defendant had been a passenger) ; Commonwealth v. Ross, 266 Pa. 580, 110 Atl. 327 (1920) (defendant admitted stabbing the victim and knife found in an open cellar in alley where defendant admittedly threw it).