Court Opinion

ID: 9667404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:44:52.303612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.699120
License: Public Domain

TODD, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The question of jurisdiction under Minn.Stat. § 170.55 (1980) involves the process of statutory construction and the applicable legal rules to such a process. It appears to me that the majority opinion violates some of the basic principles of statutory construction.
Subdivision 1 of Minn.Stat. § 170.55 (1980) in its entirety provides:
The use and operation by a resident of this state or his agent, or by a nonresident or his agent of a motor vehicle with*727in the state of Minnesota, shall be deemed an irrevocable appointment by such resident when he has been absent from this state continuously for six months or more following an accident, or by such nonresident at any time, of the commissioner of public safety to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action or proceeding against him or his executor, administrator, or personal representative growing out of such use and operation of a motor vehicle within this state, resulting in damages or loss to person or property, whether the damage or loss occurs on a highway or on abutting public or private property. Such appointment is binding upon the nonresident’s executor, administrator, or personal representative. Such use or operation of a motor vehicle by such resident or nonresident is a signification of his agreement that any such process in any action against him or his executor, administrator, or personal representative which is so served, shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon him personally or on his executor, administrator, or personal representative. Service of such process shall be made by serving a copy thereof upon the commissioner or by filing such copy in his office, together with payment of a fee of $2, and such service shall be sufficient service upon the absent resident or the nonresident or his executor, administrator, or personal representative; provided that notice of such service and a copy of the process are within ten days thereafter sent by mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known address and that the plaintiff’s affidavit of compliance with the provisions of this chapter is attached to the summons.
Examining the language of the statute as applied to this case discloses the following: Calvin George Martin was involved in a Minnesota accident with a Minnesota resident, the plaintiff, Donna Wood. At the time of the accident, Martin was a resident of the State of Iowa. Therefore, under the clear and unambiguous language of the statute, Martin was deemed to have irrevocably appointed the commissioner of public safety to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in any action arising out of the accident and whether brought against him or his executor, administrator or personal representative. Further, this appointment is binding upon Martin’s executor, administrator or personal representative. The statute then provides that the service made in this case shall be of the same legal force and validity as if served upon him personally or on his executor, administrator, or personal representative and such service shall be sufficient service. The statute further requires that notice of such service together with a copy of the process shall, within 10 days of the service of process, be mailed by the plaintiff to the defendant at his last known address. This was complied with by the plaintiff Wood.
Considering the facts of this case in the light of the statutory language, it appears eminently clear that service of process was complete when service was made on the commissioner. The statute imposes a condition subsequent which if not complied with would apparently void the completed service. However, in this case, the condition was complied with so that is not an issue. It is interesting to note that the statute when speaking of service of process includes the defendant, his executor, administrator or personal representative. However, when imposing the condition subsequent, namely notice, this statute only requires that the plaintiff mail the notice to the last known address of the defendant. There is no duty imposed upon the plaintiff to determine if the defendant is deceased.
The statute provides that the service of process upon the commissioner is binding upon the defendant, his executor, administrator or personal representative. Thus jurisdiction attaches over whomever is the appropriate person. In this case it is indicated that there is no probate proceeding in Iowa. However, there obviously wás some personal representative of the defendant in Iowa because the process was delivered to the deceased’s insurance company who in*728terposed an answer. Thus the very purpose for giving notice was accomplished; namely that the non-resident or his representative was made aware that jurisdiction had attached in Minnesota.
Further, contrary to the majority opinion, I do not believe the term “personal representative” involves a legal appointment. Rather, I conclude the opposite. The use of the terms “executor” and “administrator” indicates that the legislature was cognizant of words which describe a legally appointed representative of a deceased person. The term “personal representative” is broader in scope and includes anyone who acts on behalf of the decedent.
The majority opinion fails to address the statutory criteria. The initial premise is that service upon a dead person is a nullity. I have no dispute with that statement, but the service that I find valid here is not upon the defendant, but upon his personal representative whose attorney in fact under the statute is the commissioner of public safety. Thus the demise of the defendant is immaterial. Jurisdiction was obtained because the statute irrevocably appoints the commissioner as attorney in fact for the personal representative of the defendant and mandates that service on the commissioner is the same as personal service of the process on the personal representative. Jurisdiction attached and since the condition subsequent was complied with, has not been voided or defeated in any way.
I would further point out that the majority opinion is inconsistent with our recent decision in Warembourg v. Chickasha Mobile Homes, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.1982). In that case we upheld substituted service on a foreign corporation which was made 10 months after the corporation had filed a certificate of dissolution in the state where it was incorporated. We there stated:
Instead, the record indicates that the plaintiffs followed the statutory procedures contained in section 303.13, subd. 1(3) by effecting service upon a foreign corporation through the Minnesota Secretary of State. The statute requires that process be sent to the foreign corporation’s last known address and does not speak of trustees nor agents. Such service was therefore statutorily sufficient. Moreover, the rationale of the rules relating to service of process, that service be limited to those who could reasonably be expected to apprise the corporation of the service and pendency of the action, has been satisfied as a practical matter. Kopio’s, Inc., v. Bridgeman Creameries, Inc., 248 Minn. 348, 355, 79 N.W.2d 921, 926 (1956).
326 N.W.2d at 18.
I fail to perceive why we should proceed to a narrow construction of a substituted service statute when we have so recently adopted a broader view.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court. An answer has already been interposed and appropriate motions can be made to substitute the correct legal representative of the defendant as the named defendant in the litigation.