Court Opinion

ID: 9384977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 18:03:45.432921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.059236
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                          Docket No. 49781

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )
                                                 )    Filed: April 5, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
                                                 )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                              )
                                                 )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 MICHAEL TERRY WOODBY,                           )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                 )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
        Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                 )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
       County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge.

       Order denying motion to modify terms of probation, reversed and case remanded.

       Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney
       General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

GRATTON, Judge
       Michael Terry Woodby appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to modify the
terms of probation. Woodby argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying the
wrong standard, specifically Idaho Criminal Rule 35, in ruling on Woodby’s motion. We reverse
and remand.
                                                 I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Woodby pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c), and the district court imposed a sentence of five years with two years
determinate. The district court suspended the sentence and placed Woodby on probation for a
period of five years, until April 2022.

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        In February 2021, Woodby admitted to violating the terms of probation. During the
disposition hearing, the district court orally revoked and reinstated probation for another five years.
Defense counsel objected, arguing that based on the maximum potential sentence authorized by
statute, probation could only run until April 2024. In response, the district court stated the term of
probation would run for the remainder of time available under law and it would identify the specific
length of that term in the ensuing order. The ensuing order stated: “This term of probation shall
expire at 11:59 p.m. on April 27, 2024, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.” The order also
stated that probation would be reinstated upon the same terms and conditions entered by the court
on April 28, 2017. The original order included a term that probation would expire on April 27,
2022.
        At a later hearing, Woodby claimed that there was ambiguity in the order reinstating
probation as to when his probation expired--April 2022 or April 2024. The district court noted it
was “a bit ambiguous” and encouraged Woodby to file a motion to put the issue before the court
in the “right posture” so it could consider what to do. Woodby subsequently filed a motion to
“modify/clarify,” arguing that the date on which his probation would expire was ambiguous
because the court did not orally pronounce a specific date that his probation would expire during
the disposition hearing and because the order revoking and reinstating probation was unclear about
whether probation would expire in April 2022 or in April 2024. Woodby argued the district court
should resolve the ambiguity by “clarify[ing].”        Woodby acknowledged that the requested
clarification did not align with the district court’s “stated intent at the time of disposition,” but
contended it would be “fair” to “allow[ ]” probation to expire in 2022 instead of 2024 because
Woodby had been in custody since the disposition hearing and would remain in custody until June
2022. The district court denied Woodby’s motion. The district court stated it was considering
Woodby’s request to “modify/clarify” his probation as a plea for leniency under I.C.R. 35. The
district court found that because Woodby had been and would continue to be incarcerated during
the majority of his probation, certain terms of probation such as completing treatment programs,
paying court costs, and completing community service would remain unsatisfied and the factors
governing sentencing would not be fulfilled if the term of probation was modified. Woodby timely
appeals.

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                                                 II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       The trial court’s decision to extend or otherwise modify the length of probation is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gibbs, 162 Idaho 782, 785, 405 P.3d 567, 570 (2017). When
a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-
tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
                                                III.
                                           ANALYSIS
       Woodby argues that the district court abused its discretion because it acted inconsistently
with the applicable legal standards by analyzing Woodby’s motion to modify or clarify the terms
of probation as a plea for leniency under I.C.R. 35. Woodby asserts that the plain language of
I.C.R. 35 only governs correcting or reducing a sentence, not modifying probation, and, as such,
cannot apply to motions to modify the terms of probation, particularly where a more specific statute
already exists. Woodby also argues that I.C.R. 35 is a higher standard, requiring a showing of an
excessive sentence through new or additional information, than the good cause standard required
to modify the terms of probation. Woodby asserts that the district court should have reviewed
Woodby’s motion under I.C. §§ 20-221 and 20-222. The State concedes that I.C.R. 35 is not the
applicable legal standard. However, the State argues that the district court properly denied
Woodby’s motion to modify or clarify the length of his probation because he had not successfully
completed all the necessary terms and conditions of probation.
       In response, Woodby argues that it is not for this Court to usurp the function of the district
court by recognizing that the district court expressly cited the wrong legal standard, but then, in
the first instance, effectively applying the correct law to affirm the district court. According to
Woodby, “upon determination that a trial court has abused its discretion, ‘the appellate remedy
ordinarily is not to usurp the judge’s authority by exercising such discretion ourselves.’ Rather,
the appropriate remedy ‘is to remand the case for reconsideration in light of the correct legal
standard.’” H2O Environmental, Inc., v. Farm Supply Distributors, Inc., 164 Idaho 295, 300, 429
P.3d 183, 188 (2018) (quoting Evans v. Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 387, 723 P.2d 925, 931

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(Ct. App. 1986)). In addition, Woodby argues “if a decision, taken as a whole, appears to reflect
a misapprehension of law, the proper appellate response is to vacate the decision and to remand
the case for reconsideration in light of the proper legal framework.” Urry v. Walker and Fox
Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 755, 769 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989). Finally, “[w]hen the
discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the appellate court is
to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings.” Montgomery v. Montgomery,
147 Idaho 1, 6-7, 205 P.3d 650, 655-56 (2009).
       We agree that remand is necessary when the trial court’s decision, taken as a whole, appears
to reflect a misapprehension of law and is affected by that error of law. According to I.C. §§ 20-
221 and 20-222, trial courts may modify the terms or duration of probation based on good cause.
Gibbs, 162 Idaho at 788, 405 P.3d at 573. Here, the district court cited to the I.C.R. 35 standard
but did not cite to or reference the good cause standard in I.C. §§ 20-221 and 20-222. The failure
to do so is unsurprising in light of the genesis and nature of the motion, which was seeking
clarification of an ambiguity and not modification of an otherwise unambiguous term of probation.
Nevertheless, because the motion acknowledged the district court’s intent to extend probation until
2024 and asked the court to revert to the earlier expiration date (2022) as a matter of “fair[ness],”
and the district court considered that request, the proper standard was good cause. While the
district court recognized that the decision was discretionary, because the district court did not apply
the correct legal standard in declining to modify the terms of Woodby’s probation, remand is
necessary for reconsideration under that standard.
                                                  IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       The district court denied Woodby’s motion to modify or clarify the terms of his probation
based on application of an incorrect legal standard. Therefore, the district court’s denial of
Woodby’s motion is reversed and this case is remanded for application of the correct standard.
       Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

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