Court Opinion

ID: 9465287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:41:42.679366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:05.336861
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly states the rule that any communication between judge and jury in the absence of and without notice to the defendant and his counsel creates a presumption of prejudice. See United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 1975). Yet the majority then finds no reversible error because “we cannot find any way in which Brunk was prejudiced” by the communication here. At 913. I disagree.
When an improper communication between judge and jury is established, we are not called upon to identify a way in which the defendant was prejudiced, nor need the defendant specify any particular type of prejudice, because prejudice is presumed. The Government then bears the burden of showing that such improper communication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Blackwell v. Brewer, 562 F.2d 596, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1977) (violation of defendant’s sixth amendment right to be present during trial judge’s questioning of jurors). We have said that the presumption of prejudice arising from a judge’s ex parte communication with the jury “ ‘may be overcome by evidence giving a clear indication of lack of prejudice.’ ” United States v. Treatman, 524 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1975); Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1966).5 I find no such evidence in the record of this case.
*915In this case, the majority observes that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the jury’s request to rehear certain tape recordings. Granted that a trial judge’s decision whether to allow a jury to rehear or reexamine evidence during its deliberations is a discretionary one, see, e. g., United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Carson, 464 F.2d 424, 436-37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 268, 34 L.Ed.2d 219 (1972); Hamilton v. United States, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 372, 433 F.2d 526, 530 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944, 91 S.Ct. 1612, 29 L.Ed.2d 112 (1971), such discretion ought to be exercised only after hearing the positions of the parties. The recording represented critical evidence bearing on Brunk’s alleged fraudulent representations.6 If the trial court had advised both counsel of the jury’s inquiry, they might have agreed to a replay of the crucial tape recordings, and if not, either attorney might have persuaded the court of the propriety of such replay to the jury under the circumstances then existing.
Without notification to the parties and without giving the defendant, Brunk, an opportunity to be heard, the court here refused the jury’s request to rehear evidence. That decision, in my judgment, cannot be said to be nonprejudicial to Brunk.
I would reverse.

. For example, in Jackson v. Hutto, 508 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1975), we held that the judge’s supplementary instructions in response to jury inquiries in the absence of the defendant were harmless error. The presumption of prejudice arising from the communication in Jackson was overcome by the following showing: defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor were present at all times during the communications; the judge’s replies to the jury’s inquiries were clearly correct; and the jury resolved its initial confusion as to whether it might convict on only one count rather than on several counts in favor of the defendant.

. The most contested issue in this case concerns whether Schmitt sent Brunk money out of fear that Brunk would expose their relationship to Schmitt’s parents or because Brunk fraudulently offered to keep Schmitt’s name out of the FBI witness lists. Schmitt’s testimony on this issue, as the majority indicates, was “confused and contradictory,” and the only other pertinent evidence was the recorded phone conversation between Schmitt and Brunk which the jury asked to rehear. By refusing the jury’s request to rehear the recordings in the absence of and without notice to defendant and her counsel, the trial court deprived the jury of information which the jury apparently felt it needed to resolve the confusion in Schmitt’s testimony.