Court Opinion

ID: 9587138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:18:21.642191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:03.068803
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting.
The adjective recitation of facts in the majority opinion leaves little doubt as to the result it will obtain. In my view the sole operative facts are as follows. An otherwise healthy child collapsed while in school. A trained emergency medical technician who was employed as a school librarian was immediately called to the scene and helped attend to the child. Because of the instructions of the principal, there was a delay of approximately eight minutes before an ambulance was called. The child was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy was performed, but no cause of death was determined except a probable obstruction in the air passage. Although expert witnesses testified by way of deposition that earlier arrival at the hospital might have permitted the saving of the life of the child, they did not know that would have been done, nor did they fault the actions of the emergency medical technician and the ambulance personnel.
In my view the only issue presented is whether the trial court’s issuance of summary judgment was correct. At that juncture any conflict in the facts, or inferences arising therefrom, must be construed most favorably toward plaintiffs. Applying that standard, it is my view that the only question presented herein is whether there existed a duty on the part of the school principal to have ordered the calling of an ambulance in a more expeditious fashion. I know of no statutory or common law “duty” imposed in such a situation. Hence, in my view there has been no breach of such a “duty” under the instant circumstances. While the death of the child is indeed tragic, there is no showing in the record before the trial court or this Court as to the cause, or how if at all it could have been prevented. In the absence of a “duty” there can be no “tort” and no imposition of liability under the Tort Claims Act.
Even assuming that the action or inaction by the personnel involved in the instant case somehow constituted tortious conduct, nevertheless I.C. § 6-904(1) provides: “A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 1) arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exercising ordinary care, ...” (Emphasis added.) Here the facts demonstrate no lack of ordinary care on the part of the school principal in delaying a call for an ambulance while the child was under the care of the emergency medical technician. In my view the facts, even when viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the plaintiffs, demonstrate no triable question of lack of ordinary care.
I am aware of the decision by this Court in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986) which stated that the “discretionary function” contained in the Tort Claims Act “does not include functions which involved any element of choice, judgment or ability to make responsible decisions; otherwise every function would fall within the exception.” I did not participate in the Sterling decision and herein indicate my disagreement with that language. To argue, as does Sterling, that the exercise of discretion does not involve any element of choice, judgment or decision making, is a contradiction of terms.
As to the other allegations of negligence asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint, such as failure to have medical supplies and equipment available, failure to provide adequate medical emergency training to school personnel, failure to establish adequate policies, practices or procedures regarding the training of personnel in emergency first *334aid, inadequate training of the principal in procedures for providing and securing medical assistance, and negligently training the principal in emergency first aid, are all policy decisions of the school board which are tied directly or indirectly to the budgetary constraints under which school districts operate under state law. Hence, in my view all those issues fall within the constraints of the Tort Claims Act and demonstrate the immunity of the school district and its employees.
I further dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which deals with plaintiffs’ claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. I consider it inappropriate for the majority of this Court to undertake such a major change in the law of this jurisdiction based on the scant record before it, and the absence of any decision by the trial court in this regard. See Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho 1137, 695 P.2d 1276 (Ct.App.1985); Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Young, 384 So.2d 69 (Miss.1980); Prosser & Keeton on Torts ¶ 54, p. 364 (5th ed.).