Court Opinion

ID: 9403473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 14:06:43.029211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.600715
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13352

             MARK A. ADAMS    vs.   SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC USA.

            Middlesex.       March 8, 2023. - June 21, 2023.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Anti-Discrimination Law, Age, Termination of employment, Prima
     facie case, Burden of proof. Employment, Discrimination,
     Termination. Practice, Civil, Summary judgment, Burden of
     proof.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
October 11, 2017.

     The case was heard by William M. White, Jr., J., on a
motion for summary judgment.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     Robert S. Mantell (Ilir Kavaja & Paul L. Nevins also
present) for the plaintiff.
     Dawn Reddy Solowey (Christopher W. Kelleher also present)
for the defendant.
     Monica R. Shah, Lucie Gulino, & Michaela C. May, for
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association & others, amici
curiae, submitted a brief.
                                                                     2

    KAFKER, J.    Mark Adams sued his former employer, Schneider

Electric USA (Schneider Electric), for age discrimination after

he was laid off in a 2017 reduction in force.    Schneider

Electric was granted summary judgment by the Superior Court, and

the Appeals Court, in a divided decision, reversed.     We granted

further appellate review to clarify the summary judgment

standards in employment discrimination cases, including the

correct application of the "cat's paw" theory of liability and

the "stray remarks" doctrine.

    Adams was fifty-four years old at the time of the layoff.

He had been an electrical engineer in the research and

development (R&D) group of the home and business networks (HBN)

division of the company in Andover since 2007, when Schneider

Electric acquired his previous employer.

    Adams produced evidence that officials at Schneider

Electric wanted to increase "age diversity" in the company in

general, and the HBN R&D group in particular, by hiring recent

college graduates and reducing the number of older employees.

Consistent with this policy, Adams's R&D group in Andover was

targeted for reductions in force while a younger R&D group in

India was not.   Human resources (HR) executives also stressed

the need for age diversity and referenced making budget

reductions to make room for such diversity.     After Adams was

laid off, his name appeared on a list exemplifying this policy.
                                                                     3

Finally, statistical evidence, albeit contested, demonstrated

that the layoffs had a disparate impact on those over fifty

years of age.

    HBN R&D's director of engineering in Andover, Kenneth

Colby, who had selected employees for the reduction in force,

denied knowledge of any such personnel policy and claimed that

he did not use employees' ages to determine whom to lay off.        He

explained that his primary criterion was who would have the

least impact on the group's work.      Thus, he claimed, Adams was

selected because much of his time was spent working for other

Schneider Electric divisions.

    The motion judge granted summary judgment to Schneider

Electric.   The judge determined that Adams could not show that

Colby's stated justification for his termination was pretextual,

because Colby acted alone in selecting employees for the

reduction in force, and all comments suggesting age

discrimination came from other officials at Schneider Electric.

The Appeals Court reversed.   Adams v. Schneider Elec. USA, 101

Mass. App. Ct. 516, 531 (2022).     It determined that there were

two bases on which Adams could show pretext.     First, he could

show that Colby was an "innocent pawn" of a discriminatory

corporate strategy, or second, he could show that Colby himself

acted with age-based animus and that his description of his

process was false.   Id. at 528-529.    The Appeals Court further
                                                                      4

stated that Colby's claim that he did not consider age must be

disregarded at this stage, because "[o]n summary judgment, a

court 'must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party

that the jury is not required to believe.'"     Id. at 531, quoting

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151

(2000).

    We conclude that the grant of summary judgment was

improper.    It is possible, and consistent with liability under

the employment discrimination statute, for a mid-level manager

directed to lay off employees in his or her division to be found

to further a discriminatory corporate policy without knowingly

doing so.    See Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hosp., 473 Mass. 672, 688

(2016).     This is an example of the so-called cat's paw or

innocent pawn theory of liability.     There was also sufficient

evidence, and not just stray comments by those outside of the

decision-making process, to create a genuine issue of material

fact whether Schneider Electric had such a corporate policy to

replace older employees with younger recent college graduates.

Multiple corporate executives, including those involved in the

layoffs, made remarks to this effect.     In addition, there is

sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to dispute

whether Colby did not in fact consider age.     He met with

representatives from HR during the selection process who gave

him information on the ages of employees, and he was aware of
                                                                    5

the desire to improve HBN R&D's age diversity, at least in the

period shortly after the layoffs.    In fact, he participated in

college recruiting trips in 2017 and dissuaded a subordinate

manager from hiring more experienced engineers.

     Finally, although we reach the same conclusion as the

Appeals Court, we nonetheless emphasize that the Appeals Court's

statement that on summary judgment courts are required to

disregard all testimony of a moving party that a jury is not

required to believe was an incorrect, or at least incomplete,

statement of summary judgment law.    On summary judgment, courts

must determine whether the undisputed facts entitle the movant

to judgment as a matter of law.     See Le Fort Enters., Inc. v.

Lantern 18, LLC, 491 Mass. 144, 148-149 (2023) (Le Fort).     As

the dissent in the Appeals Court noted, "potential disbelief in

Colby's testimony" alone does not a dispute of fact make.

Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 535-536 (Meade, J., dissenting).

Rather, Adams must point to specific material in the record that

could lead a jury to doubt Colby's credibility -- a burden of

production that Adams has satisfied here.1

     1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the
Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association, Fair Employment
Project, Inc., and Lawyers for Civil Rights.
                                                                      6

    1.   Background.     We summarize the evidence in the summary

judgment record in the light most favorable to Adams, the

nonmoving party.     See Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149.

    a.   Corporate age diversity goals.     Schneider Electric

appeared to have a corporate strategy of hiring younger

employees and reducing the number of older employees to improve

"age diversity" at the company.     Significant evidence in this

regard is associated with Amanda Arria, the global vice-

president of HR with responsibility for HBN at the time of the

relevant events.     As she described her job, "I am responsible

for partnering with the leadership team to ensure we have the

right people strategies in place for . . . business success."

    In a 2015 e-mail message regarding a potential new hire,

the then-head of HBN R&D globally said to Arria:      "Business

Power team [which contained the HBN R&D group] in Andover needs

age diversity.     The embedded system team leader recognizes this

and has been stocking his team with young talent.     I'd like to

encourage this more."     Subsequently, the company appeared to do

just that.

    Schneider Electric implemented a hiring freeze in 2016

(still in effect during the litigation).     It conducted

reductions in force in April and May of 2016, in addition to the

one in 2017 in which Adams was terminated.     In the April layoff,

six of the seven terminated employees were over forty, and five
                                                                     7

were over fifty.    In May, all nine were forty-eight or older,

and six of the nine were over fifty.     In the January 2017

layoff, discussed more infra, all eight terminated employees

(including Adams) were over fifty.     Despite the hiring freeze

and these layoffs, Schneider Electric continued its ongoing

recruiting program to hire recent college graduates.    Arria

explained in a deposition that this was because recent graduates

"brought fresh skills," not because they were younger, but she

also said that the company was attempting to achieve a "diverse

workforce" through hiring, "whether that's age" or other

employee attributes.

     In addition, in a 2016 HR presentation, Arria indicated

that one of HBN's goals was to improve "age/gender

demographics," and a recent achievement, perhaps relating to

that goal, was the April 2016 reduction in force.    A recruitment

policy from 2016 stated:    "The maximum employment age with

Schneider Electric is 58 or 60 years as per the respective legal

entity guidelines."2

     b.    Budget reductions.   Around October 2016, leadership at

Schneider Electric determined that they needed to make further

budget reductions in the HBN division:     there was, as Arria

termed it, a "cost take-out challenge globally."     Arria

     2   No such legal entity guidelines appear in the record.
                                                                     8

explained that Pankaj Sharma, the senior vice-president of

engineering, made the decision to reduce costs and "gave cost

take-out targets to each of his leaders" in the groups he

oversaw.

    In December 2016, Sharma told Colby that he would need to

cut his group's budget by twenty-two percent.     Colby inferred

from this that he would need to reduce headcount, as labor costs

were the majority of the budget.     Arria confirmed:   "it was

understood that, yes, we had to make some cuts in personnel

costs."    In contrast, the HBN R&D group in Bangalore, India, was

given a budget reduction target that did not require layoffs.

Their lower target could instead be met by eliminating "travel,

supplies and things like that."     The employees in India were

younger than those in Andover:     the majority were in their

thirties, whereas in Andover, the majority were over fifty.

    Also in December 2016, Arria met with Michelle Gautreau, an

HR director working under her, to discuss the budget reductions.

Gautreau's handwritten notes from the meeting included the line

"deeper cuts for college grads."     It is not clear whether that

meant that the college recruiting program would be curtailed as

part of the budget reductions (as Gautreau explained in her

deposition), or that the layoffs they were discussing were being

done to make room in the budget to hire recent college

graduates.
                                                                     9

    In any case, after Sharma gave him his marching orders,

Colby set out to determine whom to cut.    He stated that based on

advice from his supervisor, Jim Munley, he selected employees

for the reduction in force by looking at (1) which employees

were working outside his division; (2) whose termination would

have the least impact on the division's goals; and (3) whether

management roles could be consolidated.    Colby stated that age

was not a factor and that he was not aware that company

leadership was concerned with the age of employees or that there

was a policy of regularly laying off older employees to create

space for young talent.

    According to Colby, he alone made the initial decisions

about whom to lay off, although he exchanged a few drafts of his

list with HR.   Gautreau stated that she discussed the layoffs

with Colby, provided advice, and gave him a list of employee

details that included their ages, saying, "It's just one tool

that will help you make the decision."    Colby cleared the final

list with a small group of executives and HR personnel,

including Sharma, Munley, Gautreau, and Arria.    Sharma asked for

one employee, a recently widowed sixty-six year old, to be

excluded from the layoff.   Ultimately, seven employees who

reported directly to Colby were laid off, all of whom were over

fifty, out of forty-three in the R&D group supervised by Colby

and seventy-four total in the HBN division in Andover.
                                                                   10

    Colby explained in his deposition that Adams was included

on the layoff list because he did not spend much time on the

division's projects:   "the majority of his time was spent doing

work, very good work, but for another division, field quality

and global supply chain. . . .   [B]y selecting Mark, along with

other individuals, it had less of an impact on the projects that

I was responsible for."   Colby had worked with Adams since 1998,

and he considered Adams "extremely hard working," "a great

problem solver," and "a very good friend"; in Adams's

deposition, Adams stated that he did not believe that Colby bore

discriminatory animus toward him.   Colby suggested transferring

Adams to the field quality division, but that team lacked the

budget.   Adams was notified by telephone of his layoff on

January 27, 2017, sometime after the other employees were laid

off, as he had been traveling on company business.

    Colby apparently did not suggest transferring Adams to

global supply chain, the other division for which he had been

working at Schneider Electric.   Christopher Granato, the vice-

president of that division, was not informed in advance about

the layoff.   About one month after Adams was laid off, Granato

asked Colby about potentially hiring Adams as a contractor.

Colby discouraged Granato from doing so, explaining that "HR may

not want that to happen for a couple reasons."   Granato replaced
                                                                   11

Adams with part-time work from a field quality division employee

and by hiring two new employees in the Philippines.

    The parties introduced dueling statistical evidence

regarding whether the layoffs had a disparate impact on older

employees.   The plaintiff's expert stated that "there was a

clear indication of age bias in the selection of those laid off

by Schneider [Electric]," determining that there was a disparate

impact on employees who were fifty and older.   Schneider

Electric's expert identified several deficiencies in the

plaintiff's expert's analysis:   the plaintiff's expert compared

the laid off employees to the entire division, rather than only

those who reported directly to Colby, and he did not control for

job function, which Colby testified had factored into the

selection criteria.   The defendant's expert found that employees

over forty were not selected for terminations at higher-than-

expected rates.   While he also found, like the plaintiff's

expert, that employees over fifty were terminated at higher

rates when not controlling for job function, he explained that

this finding was highly sensitive to minor tweaks to the data,

which "casts doubt on whether the data allows for reliable and

robust statistical findings."    The defendant's expert also

pointed out that the average age of employees declined only

slightly after the reduction in force (from 48.9 to 47.1) and
                                                                    12

that the five oldest employees were retained, casting doubt on

Adams's age discrimination theory.

       c.   Post-layoff evidence.   Evidence from after Adams was

laid off also supported his claim that his layoff had been part

of a discriminatory policy.     Jiri Cermak, Arria's boss and the

senior vice-president of HR, suggested in several presentations

that the company needed to hire "[m]ore early career talents,"

although they might "need to create the space" to do so through

"restructuring" or "[w]orkforce planning."     In an e-mail message

to the head of HBN R&D globally, Arria suggested that to solve

the "age demographic challenges" the division faced in Andover,

       "we could potentially encourage a few employees to retire
       and make some budget reductions/room to hire in some of the
       college talent we have been discussing. There are some
       legal cautions we would need to take to run a program like
       this, but if we are careful with our wording and execution
       we can pull this off effectively in a way that our
       employees would feel like it was a benefit to them, and
       benefit the R&D organization as well."

A jury could interpret "budget reductions" subject to "legal

cautions" to be a euphemism for required "layoffs," as Colby

did.

       Arria reiterated this strategy in several e-mail messages

to Cermak later in 2017, including commenting that "[we] have a

few creative ideas we are fl[e]shing out around early retirement

packages to continue to make room for more early career talent."

In a subsequent e-mail message to Cermak in July 2017, she
                                                                  13

wrote:   "As you are aware most of our action[s] have already

occurred earlier this year and are noted here, but we do have

some ideas around offering an early retirement package which

would also help us make some room for some additional early

career hires"; the attached document contained a list of

"involuntary departures" that included Adams.   A reasonable

interpretation of this communication is that Arria viewed

Adams's "involuntary departure" as one "action" from earlier in

the year that helped make "room for . . . early career hires."

    Colby also was involved in "age diversity" strategies, at

least after the January 2017 reduction in force.   He

participated in college recruiting trips in 2017 and told a

subordinate manager to "hold off" on "hiring people with

experience" until after a meeting about college recruiting.

Colby's updated 2017 goals from his superiors included

"[i]mprov[ing] [Andover] team talent demographics mix th[r]ough

early retirement program and university fresh talent

recruiting."   In addition, in Colby's deposition, he indicated

that he was aware of the company's need for "a good succession

plan," that he had been told to focus his hiring on "recent

college graduates," and that he knew that diversity was one of

the HBN division's goals.

    Other evidence indicated pejorative attitudes toward the

ability of older workers.   A 2017 presentation listed weaknesses
                                                                    14

of the HBN R&D Andover office, as opposed to HBN R&D's other

locations (including the India office), which included an

"[a]ging workforce" and "[l]ow energy level and speed."        During

the same year, Cermak suggested in an e-mail message that

"people over 50y" should probably not be included in a talent

development program, as they "should be oriented rather on the

other side of [their] career stage."

     d.   Procedural history.   Adams sued Schneider Electric in

the Superior Court for age discrimination, alleging disparate

treatment in violation of G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1B).3     The trial

judge granted summary judgment, explaining that Adams conceded

that Colby "harbored no discriminatory animus toward him" and

produced no evidence to rebut Colby's testimony that he alone

made the decision to select Adams for the reduction in force.

     A split panel of the Appeals Court reversed the grant of

summary judgment.   Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 531.    The

Appeals Court majority explained that, taking the evidence in

the light most favorable to Adams, there were two possible bases

on which a fact finder could find that Adams's layoff was

     3 Adams also brought additional discrimination claims
against Schneider Electric, including one that alleged disparate
impact; claims against other Schneider Electric employees for
aiding and abetting discrimination; and a claim that he was
wrongfully terminated for reporting safety hazards. All of
these claims either were voluntarily dismissed or have been
waived on appeal. Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 517 n.2.
                                                                      15

discriminatory.   First, Adams could show that even if Colby

"implemented the [reduction in force] neutrally," it was

"tainted" -- that is, the decision to implement a layoff in the

first place was a deliberate corporate strategy to shed older

workers.    Id. at 527.   Second, Adams could show that,

notwithstanding Colby's deposition testimony, "Colby was aware

of management's age animus and therefore selected workers over

age fifty . . . in accordance with company policy."        Id. at 529.

The Appeals Court further explained:

    "Colby's testimony that he did not consider age in the
    layoff is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. At
    this stage, we must disregard Colby's claim that he used
    only neutral criteria to select employees for the
    [reduction in force]. On summary judgment, a court 'must
    disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
    the jury is not required to believe.'"

Id. at 531, quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.

    The dissent would have affirmed the grant of summary

judgment.   Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 532 (Meade, J.,

dissenting).   The dissent viewed evidence of an ageist corporate

policy as mere "stray remarks" from nondecision makers "culled

from over 9,000 pages of discovery materials."     Id. at 535

(Meade, J., dissenting).     In addition, the dissent rejected the

proposition that Colby's testimony should be disregarded on

summary judgment because a jury might not believe it.       See id.

at 535-536 (Meade, J., dissenting) ("A potential disbelief in

Colby's testimony is not a 'specific fact' for purposes of Mass.
                                                                      16

R. Civ. P. 56, 365 Mass. 824 [1974]").       Thus, there was no basis

on which to disregard Colby's testimony for the purposes of

summary judgment.

    This court granted Schneider Electric's application for

further appellate review.

    2.      Discussion.   a.   Standard of review.   Adams contests

the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Schneider

Electric.     We review a decision to grant summary judgment de

novo.    See Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149.    "'Summary judgment is

appropriate where there is no material issue of fact in dispute

and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.' . . .    'We review the evidence in the light most favorable

to the party against whom summary judgment entered,'" in this

case, Adams.    Id. at 148-149, quoting HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v.

Morris, 490 Mass. 322, 326-327 (2022).       Summary judgment is "a

disfavored remedy in the context of discrimination cases based

on disparate treatment . . . because the ultimate issue of

discriminatory intent is a factual question."        Bulwer, 473 Mass.

at 689, quoting Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Sys. Boston,

Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 439 (1995).

    b.      McDonnell Douglas framework.    General Laws c. 151B,

§ 4 (1B), bars age discrimination in employment:       it is unlawful

"[f]or an employer in the private sector, by himself or his

agent, because of the age of any individual, . . . to discharge
                                                                  17

from employment such individual."   To prove a claim of

employment discrimination under the statute, a plaintiff must

show "that he or she is a member of a protected class; that he

or she was subject to an adverse employment action; that the

employer bore 'discriminatory animus' in taking that action; and

that that animus was the reason for the action (causation)."

Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 680, quoting Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434

Mass. 493, 502 (2001).   It is undisputed that Adams was a member

of a protected class, as he was over forty years old,4 and that

his layoff constituted an adverse action.   Therefore, the

question is whether he can show animus and causation.     See

Bulwer, supra.

     Plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases often rely on

indirect or circumstantial evidence to prove these two elements.

See Verdrager v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo,

P.C., 474 Mass. 382, 396 (2016), citing Sullivan v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 444 Mass. 34, 39-40 (2005).   See also Desert Palace,

Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99-100 (2003) (in discrimination

cases, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but

may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct

evidence" [citation omitted]).   In determining whether a

     4 In the antidiscrimination statute, "[t]he term 'age'
unless a different meaning clearly appears from the context,
includes any duration of time since an individual's birth of
greater than forty years." G. L. c. 151B, § 1 (8).
                                                                    18

plaintiff can survive summary judgment, we use "the familiar

three-stage, burden-shifting paradigm first set out in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-805 (1973) (McDonnell

Douglas)."   Verdrager, supra, quoting Sullivan, supra.

       In the framework, first, the plaintiff must make out a

"prima facie case of discrimination"; second, "the employer can

rebut the presumption created by the prima facie case by

articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its

[employment] decision"; and third, the employee must provide

evidence that the articulated reason is pretextual.     Bulwer, 473

Mass. at 681, quoting Blare, 419 Mass. at 441, 443.     McDonnell

Douglas does not set out the elements of the claim or the burden

of proof:    it is simply "a method of organizing evidence" "in

the context of summary judgment" (citation omitted).5     Lipchitz,

434 Mass. at 508.    Although the plaintiff bears a burden of

production in steps one and three, "the burden of persuasion at

summary judgment remains with the defendants."    Bulwer, supra at

683.

       Here, Adams produced sufficient evidence to make out a

prima facie case.    In a reduction-in-force case, the plaintiff

       The McDonnell Douglas test is not used at trial. Instead,
       5

"[w]e encourage trial judges to craft instructions that will
focus the jury's attention on the ultimate issues of harm,
discriminatory animus and causation." Lipchitz, 434 Mass. at
508.
                                                                  19

"establishes a prima facie case of discrimination by producing

evidence that she is a member of a class protected by G. L.

c. 151B; she performed her job at an acceptable level; she was

terminated"; and "her layoff occurred in circumstances that

would raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination."6

Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 41, 45.   "[T]he plaintiff's initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case is not intended to be

onerous."   Id. at 45.   The first three of these elements are

uncontested:   Adams was over forty, and Colby characterized him

as a "great problem solver" who did "very good work," despite

selecting him for the layoff.    As to the fourth element, the

apparent desire of Schneider Electric's management to clear

space for younger workers, described supra, constitutes

circumstances that could raise an inference of discrimination.

Moreover, some statistical evidence suggests that employees over

fifty were terminated at higher-than-expected rates.    See id. at

46 n.16 (statistical evidence may help prove prima facie case).

     For the second prong of McDonnell Douglas, it is

uncontested that Schneider Electric articulated a "legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason" for its decision to lay off Adams.

     6 The fourth element is typically framed as whether the
employer replaced the plaintiff with someone similarly
qualified. Sullivan, 444 Mass. at 41. However, this would be
"nonsensical in a reduction in force case," because "the very
purpose of a workforce reorganization is generally to reduce the
number of employees." Id.
                                                                    20

Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 681.   Colby explained that he had to

implement a reduction in force for budgetary reasons.       Following

advice from his supervisor, he selected Adams because "the

majority of his time was spent doing work . . . for another

division."    Adams's work outside of the R&D group had nothing to

do with his protected class.

    The question therefore becomes whether Adams has produced

enough evidence to create a material dispute of fact regarding

whether Schneider Electric's stated nondiscriminatory reason was

pretextual.   Adams presented two theories that the Appeals Court

determined satisfied this burden:   first, under the so-called

"cat's paw" theory, Colby could have been an "innocent pawn" of

a discriminatory corporate strategy to shed older workers, or

second, Colby himself could have attempted to lay off older

workers in furtherance of a discriminatory policy.    Adams, 101

Mass. App. Ct. at 528-529 & n.23.   We take each theory in turn.

    c.     Discriminatory corporate strategy.   There was

sufficient evidence in the summary judgment record to create a

genuine issue of material fact whether Schneider Electric had a

corporate policy to remove older staff to make room for younger

workers.   On numerous occasions, corporate executives expressed

concern about the age of their workforce, particularly in the

division in which Adams worked.   They also expressed a

preference for "more early career talents" and complimented a
                                                                  21

manager in Adams's division who was "stocking his team with

young talent."   They also stressed the need to make room for

this younger talent.   Various strategies were discussed to

achieve this goal, including budget reductions and voluntary and

involuntary terminations of older workers.   In a series of e-

mail messages, for example, Arria, the global vice-president of

HR, suggested "budget reductions" could make "room" for new

younger hires.

    Consistent with this strategy, budget reduction

requirements were selectively enforced, with voluntary and

involuntary terminations appearing to target older workers.     The

younger R&D office in India, for example, was given a budget

reduction target that did not require layoffs, while the older

Andover office was given one that did require layoffs.   Despite

mandatory budget reductions and required layoffs, hiring younger

employees via college recruiting continued to be encouraged,

including in Adams's group.   Finally, Adams's statistical

expert's findings were consistent with the theory of replacing

older workers with younger ones, as the data, in the light most

favorable to Adams, indicated that the layoffs had a

disproportionate effect on employees over fifty.

    The dissent in the Appeals Court considered much of this

evidence, particularly the suggestive e-mail messages, to be

mere stray remarks by "nondecision makers" that do not support a
                                                                   22

finding of a prohibited motive.    See Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct.

at 535 (Meade, J., dissenting).    We disagree.   Although "stray"

ageist remarks by those in the company not involved in the

relevant employment decision may not, at least alone, be

probative of discrimination against a particular plaintiff,

there was more than that here.    See generally Price Waterhouse

v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring);

Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 333-338 (D.

Mass. 2011) (critically reviewing history and practice of stray

remarks doctrine).7

     Multiple high ranking corporate executives, including

those, such as Arria, involved in the layoffs, sounded a

consistent theme.     The corporate executives, including those in

HR responsible for educating the workforce on discrimination,

expressed a preference for younger workers, observed that there

were too many older workers, and suggested ways to change the

"demographics mix" through voluntary and involuntary termination

of older workers while hiring new and younger college graduates.

     7 As suggested by the Appeals Court dissent, Adams, 101
Mass. App. Ct. at 535 n.7 (Meade, J., dissenting), we take this
opportunity to clarify that any ageist, sexist, or racist
remarks by those involved in the decisional process may be
considered probative of discrimination against a particular
plaintiff. Cf. Blare, 419 Mass. at 447 n.9, quoting Fontaine v.
Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 314 n.7 (1993) ("[I]solated or
ambiguous remarks [by a decision maker], tending to suggest
animus based on age, are insufficient, standing alone, to prove
an employer's discriminatory intent").
                                                                   23

See Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 314 n.7 (evidence sufficient for jury

to find that top executive's remarks indicated "that he thought

that the managers of these companies were too old and that

younger managers should be found to take their places").     See

also Wynn & Wynn, P.C. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against

Discrimination, 431 Mass. 655, 667 (2000), overruled on other

grounds by Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against

Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549 (2004), cert. denied sub nom.

Wilfert Bros. Realty Co. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against

Discrimination, 543 U.S. 979 (2004) ("The statements by [the

managing partner] . . . were not stray remarks.   They were made

by a person with the power to make employment decisions").

     Adams's division was also the focal point of these remarks,

and all eight of the employees selected in the January 2017

layoff, including Adams, were over fifty.8   Consistent with the

corporate strategy of replacing older workers with younger ones,

in September 2017, after the forced layoffs, Colby told a

     8 The Appeals Court dissent accurately points out that the
five oldest employees in the group were retained and that the
statistical evidence as a whole may be challenged in a variety
of ways. Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 533 (Meade, J.,
dissenting). While the jury will have the opportunity to
consider this evidence as well, and the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from it, such evidence is not sufficient to
support an award of summary judgment for Schneider Electric on
this record as a whole. To the contrary, it shows that a
genuine issue of material fact exists when viewed in light of
the plaintiff's competing evidence.
                                                                   24

manager under him to "hold off" on "hiring people with

experience" until after a meeting regarding an "upcoming

recruiting trip."    The next month, Colby was given an explicit

annual performance goal along the same lines -- to improve the

"demographics mix" of his team through college recruiting and

early retirements.

    All of this evidence was sufficient to create a genuine

issue of material fact whether Adams's group of older employees,

and thus Adams, were targeted for layoffs to make room for

younger hires.

    Under this theory, Colby's knowledge of the strategy or

lack thereof is unnecessary.    It would constitute unlawful

discrimination if executives at the company targeted the HBN R&D

group for layoffs in the first place because of the age of the

employees in that group, even if Colby himself was ignorant of

the larger scheme when he selected individual employees for

termination.   "Even if Colby were the sole decision maker for

which particular employees would be [laid off] and the innocent

pawn of an undisclosed corporate strategy tainted by unlawful

discriminatory animus, a rational fact finder could conclude

that the [reduction in force] was unlawful."    Adams, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. at 527-528.

    This type of fact pattern has been called a "cat's paw"

case, after a fable in which a monkey convinces a cat to roast
                                                                   25

chestnuts, and then makes off with the finished product, leaving

the cat with a burned paw and no chestnuts to show for it.      See

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 415 n.1 (2011).      See also

Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2350

(2021), quoting Webster's New International Dictionary 425 (2d

ed. 1934) ("A 'cat's paw' is a 'dupe' who is 'used by another to

accomplish his purposes'").    Although this court has not used

that evocative terminology, it is clear that the employment

discrimination statute supports liability for such "monkey

business."    The statute makes it illegal "[f]or an employer in

the private sector, by himself or his agent" to subject an

individual to an adverse employment action on the basis of age.

G. L. c. 151B, § 4 (1B).    A corporate employer acts through

multiple agents.    See Staub, supra at 420 ("An employer's

authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated among

multiple agents," not just "[t]he one who makes the ultimate

decision").   A discriminatory corporate decision is not

insulated from liability just because it is implemented by

managers with limited decision-making authority, unaware that

they are being used as "pawns" or "paws."

    Our employment cases have recognized the issue of corporate

responsibility, although generally in the context of an ultimate

decision maker relying on biased input from lower rungs of the
                                                                  26

corporate ladder.9   For example, in Bulwer, a hospital's decision

not to renew the plaintiff doctor's contract was made by an "ad

hoc committee" that relied on allegedly racially biased

performance evaluations and testimony from other physicians at

the hospital.   Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 686-688.   We explained:

     "Where 'the decision makers relied on the recommendations
     of supervisors [whose motives have been impugned], the
     motives of the supervisors should be treated as the motives
     for the decision. . . . An employer [may not] insulate its
     decision by interposing an intermediate level of persons in
     the hierarchy of decision, and asserting that the ultimate
     decision makers acted only on recommendation.'"

Id. at 688, quoting Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor

Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 569-570 (1981), overruled on

other grounds by Wynn & Wynn, P.C., 431 Mass. at 669.     See

Verdrager, 474 Mass. at 403 ("adverse employment decisions . . .

were made by individuals who were acting independently from the

plaintiff's immediate supervisors and who were not accused of

harboring the discriminatory views alleged to have been held by

those supervisors," but decisions were "based . . . on the

opinions" of those supervisors); Trustees of Forbes Library, 384

Mass. at 570 (library trustees fired employee based on

     9 This is consistent with the origins of the doctrine. In
Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990), in
which Judge Richard Posner brought the "cat's paw" language into
antidiscrimination law, the plaintiff employee's biased manager
recommended to the "Career Path Committee" that the employee be
fired. In Staub, 562 U.S. at 415, likewise, the HR department
fired the employee based on his biased supervisors' reports.
                                                                    27

recommendations from supervisors who intended to retaliate

against employee for protected union activity).

    Although the discrimination may have taken place at a

different level of decision-making in the instant case, that is

to say among top managers rather than mid-level managers or

supervisors, the result is still the same:    the company remains

responsible for the discrimination.   Corporate liability is

perhaps even more clear-cut, as the allegedly discriminatory

action that resulted in termination was taken further up the

corporate hierarchy.

    Federal courts have found employment discrimination in

situations similar to that in this case.     For example, a

corporation was liable for a discriminatory firing where it was

found to have a long-standing practice of age discrimination

"under the stewardship of its president," even though the

employee's "immediate supervisor," the "key" decision maker, did

not appear to be biased.   Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d

1331, 1334, 1342 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The battle plan of the

admiral is a valid datum in assessing the intentions of the

captain of a single ship in the flotilla").    Likewise, summary

judgment was improper where a company's chief executive officer

had indicated that he wanted to fire the plaintiff in

retaliation for a wage-related lawsuit, although the plaintiff

was ultimately fired by someone else.   Travers v. Flight Servs.
                                                                     28

& Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 144, 145 (1st Cir. 2013).     "[T]he

retaliatory animus resided at the apex of the organizational

hierarchy. . . .   A rational juror could conclude that such

strongly held and repeatedly voiced wishes of the king, so to

speak, likely became well known to those courtiers who might rid

him of a bothersome underling."    Id. at 147.   See Cravens vs.

Pact, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 1:19-cv-01357 (D.D.C. Feb. 27,

2020) (company could be liable under cat's paw theory where

chief executive officer allegedly had sexist attitudes that

influenced corporate actions).    Similarly, this court has

affirmed corporate liability where a law firm's biased managing

partner instructed the management committee not to hire the

plaintiff.   Wynn & Wynn, P.C., 431 Mass. at 667 n.24.

    d.   Colby's credibility.     The Appeals Court also concluded

that a "rational fact finder could find that Colby was aware of

management's age animus and therefore selected workers over age

fifty . . . in accordance with company policy."     Adams, 101

Mass. App. Ct. at 529.   We agree with this conclusion, but we

disagree in part with the court's analysis, particularly its

suggestion at the end of its opinion that it must disregard all

of Colby's testimony at the summary judgment stage, simply

because he is an interested witness and a jury might not find

him credible.
                                                                    29

     As the dissent explained, a fact is not disputed just

because it has been put forth by the moving party.    Rather, the

nonmoving party bears a burden of production:    it is "required

to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact."    Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149, quoting Haverty v.

Commissioner of Correction, 437 Mass. 737, 759 n.28 (2002),

S.C., 440 Mass. 1 (2003).     See Barron Chiropractic &

Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Norfolk & Dedham Group, 469 Mass. 800,

804 (2014) ("If the moving party . . . asserts the absence of

any triable issue, the nonmoving party must respond and make

specific allegations sufficient to establish a genuine issue of

material fact").     See also Sullivan v. Lawlis, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

409, 415 (2018).10

     Reeves, the United States Supreme Court case cited by the

Appeals Court, is not to the contrary.    The Appeals Court

     10The summary judgment standard is no different in an
employment discrimination case. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148,
quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993)
("trial courts should not 'treat discrimination differently from
other ultimate questions of fact'"); Yee v. Massachusetts State
Police, 481 Mass. 290, 302 (2019) ("Yee may satisfy this
[summary judgment] burden by offering evidence which, when
viewed in the light most favorable to Yee, is sufficient to
convince a reasonable jury that the reasons the State police
offered . . . were not the real reasons"); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at
680. Indeed, under the Appeals Court's standard, step two of
the McDonnell Douglas test would be pointless: courts could
simply disregard an employer's proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason because a jury is not required to
believe it.
                                                                  30

majority appears to have taken the phrase "disregard all

evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not

required to believe" out of context.   The full context from

Reeves shows that the Supreme Court simply meant that when

deciding judgment as a matter of law, courts should avoid

weighing evidence:

    "[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor
    of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
    determinations or weigh the evidence. . . . 'Credibility
    determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
    drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
    functions, not those of a judge.' [Anderson v. Liberty
    Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).] Thus, although the
    court should review the record as a whole, it must
    disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
    the jury is not required to believe. See [9A C.A. Wright &
    A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, at 299
    (2d ed. 1995)]. That is, the court should give credence to
    the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that
    'evidence supporting the moving party that is
    uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that
    that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.' Id."

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150-151.   See LaFrenier v. Kinirey, 550 F.3d

166, 168-169 (1st Cir. 2008) (clarifying meaning and application

of Reeves and stating that on "summary judgment we need not

exclude all interested testimony, specifically testimony that is

uncontradicted by the nonmovant" [citation omitted]); Lauren W.

ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 271-272 (3d Cir.

2007) ("in considering a motion for summary judgment the court

should believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently

implausible even if the testimony is that of an interested
                                                                    31

witness"); Luh v. J.M. Huber Corp., 211 Fed. Appx. 143, 146 (4th

Cir. 2006) (to be disregarded, "testimony must display some

indicia that it is not credible"); Stratienko v. Cordis

Corp., 429 F.3d 592, 597-598 (6th Cir. 2005).   In other words, a

court must determine judgment as a matter of law based on all

uncontested evidence, that is, evidence favoring the nonmovant

and "uncontradicted and unimpeached" evidence favoring the

movant.   Uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, even from

interested witnesses favoring the moving party, is to be

considered on summary judgment.   In evaluating evidence favoring

the moving party, the Supreme Court did not say "only" evidence

from a disinterested party should be given credence.    Rather, it

explained that uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence shall be

given credence, "at least to the extent" that it is provided by

disinterested parties.   Indeed, in Reeves, supra at 144, an age

discrimination case, the Supreme Court specifically stated that

the plaintiff had "made a substantial showing that [the

employer's] explanation" for his firing "was false."    Such

analysis figured prominently in the Court's decision.     See id.

at 151.

    Thus, to survive summary judgment, Adams could not simply

state that Colby was an interested witness and thus his

testimony could be disregarded.   Adams was required instead to

identify specific material in the record that would support a
                                                                   32

jury finding that Colby relied on age in selecting employees for

the reduction in force, despite his testimony to the contrary.

     Although the Appeals Court may have confused this

requirement, the record, which we review de novo, establishes

that Adams met his burden.    Le Fort, 491 Mass. at 149.     As

reasons to doubt Colby's assertion, the summary judgment record,

as highlighted by the Appeals Court, includes (1) the statements

made by corporate executives demonstrating discriminatory animus

against older employees; (2) that Colby had met with Sharma and

Arria, who had articulated such views, while formulating the

layoff list, and thus "a rational jury could infer that the

wishes of senior management were expressed in those meetings";

(3) everyone on Colby's layoff list was over fifty; and (4)

Colby's efforts to dissuade Granato from rehiring Adams for

another division.    Adams, 101 Mass. App. Ct. at 529-531.    To

that, we would add that Colby stated shortly after the layoffs

that he knew that age diversity was a goal of the division and

that he had been asked to focus his hiring on recent college

graduates.

    The fact that Adams admitted that he did not believe that

Colby bore discriminatory animus toward him does not change this

analysis.    Adams's statement was not a legal conclusion that

Colby did not select him for the reduction in force for a

proscribed reason.    It merely reflected his belief that Colby
                                                                    33

was not personally biased against him.     Indeed, like his view

that Colby was unbiased, other parts of Adams's deposition

testimony about the mechanics of the reduction in force proved

to be inconsistent with what was learned in discovery and could

be disregarded by a jury if introduced at trial -- for example,

Adams stated that his layoff was entirely HR's decision.

    In sum, on these facts, a jury could find that Colby

inferred (or was directly told) that his managers wanted him to

select older employees for the reduction in force to improve the

demographic balance of the R&D team, and that he did so.       In

other words, Adams has produced circumstantial evidence that

satisfies his burden of production to show a dispute of fact

regarding Colby's testimony.    See Yee v. Massachusetts State

Police, 481 Mass. 290, 302 (2019); Bulwer, 473 Mass. at 682.

    3.     Conclusion.   Because corporate decisions involve

multiple actors, an innocent decision maker can further a

discriminatory purpose.    Here, Adams produced evidence from

which a jury could find that he was selected for the reduction

in force as part of a corporate strategy to lay off older

workers.    Although this theory does not require that Colby knew

about the strategy, a jury could also find that he did and that

he selected Adams in accordance with it.     As Adams produced

sufficient evidence to create a dispute of fact regarding

whether he was terminated due to discriminatory animus, the
                                                           34

grant of summary judgment is reversed, and the matter is

remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

                                   So ordered.