Court Opinion

ID: 9743076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:25:15.733629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.190844
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, dissenting: I would affirm the award of the Industrial Commission. Dr. Savitt, in response to a hypothetical question, was asked “whether or not there might be a causal connection between either the lifting [of the 35-pound tract books] or the getting up from the desk and the pushing of the chair out from under the desk in the semi-stooped position” and the claimant’s accident. The doctor responded, “I think there might be a connection.” There was no objection to this testimony. The majority, in treating this testimony, states: “In response to this multiple question, including the either/or disjunctive question listed as No, 3, the doctor answered simply T think there might be a connection’ without specifying to which part or parts he was responding.” And continuing its microscopic criticism notes: “It should also be noted that the question which evoked the quoted response from the doctor did not request that the answer be based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” But such considerations omit a very important fact, the absence of any objection. It cannot be urged here that it is not clear what “part” of the question the witness was responding to or that the testimony is not based upon “a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Any such complaints could have been raised by objection at the time the evidence was offered. Such objection would have provided the examiner the opportunity to amend the form of the question. This is the very purpose of an objection. See People v. Trefonas (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 92, 98. When evidence is received without objection, as it was here, no impropriety as to its form can be considered. But even more than that, this evidence must be given its natural probative value. In Ascher Bros. Amusement Enterprises v. Industrial Com. (1924), 311 Ill. 258, 261, it was observed: “These statements were hearsay and incompetent, but being received without objection they are to be considered and given their natural probative effect as if they were in law admissible.” On this review we must, under the law, treat this case as if the doctor had expressed an opinion upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty that petitioner’s condition of ill-being might be causally related to lifting a 35-pound tract book. Such being the case, the issue was one of fact for the Industrial Commission with which this court has steadfastly refused to interfere. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 137; Perry v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 418; Abbey Labor Service, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 213; Illinois Valley Irrigation, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 234; Owens-Corning Fiberglass v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 247; Rolla v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 351; Sahara Coal Co. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 353. Dr. Savitt further noted, as the majority points out, when “asked what significance ‘might be attached’ to the work activity the last week in January 1971, including the lifting of the heavy books,” that “ T think every time this person lifted a heavy object it tended to increase the pressure in the brain and with the background of hypertension, I would think that every additional increase in the pressure in the brain might tend to weaken the aneurysm to the point where it ruptured.’ (Emphasis added.)” This makes clear that it was the doctor’s opinion that lifting heavy objects tended to increase the pressure in petitioner’s brain, and that because of her preexisting physical condition such additional increase in pressure would have a tendency to weaken the aneurysm. But the majority’s treatment of his testimony would seem to be inconsistent with the well-established law recognized by it (68 Ill. 2d at 29-30), that all the employee must prove was that the accident was a causative factor in bringing about the injury, and that recovery may be had for an aggravation of a disease condition. Apart from an improper evaluation of Dr. Savitt’s testimony, the majority’s conclusion is inconsistent with other decisions of this court. It has been consistently held that recovery may be had for an exacerbation of preexisting conditions such as chronic heart disease or rupture of a congenital aneurysm, so long as the exacerbation or rupture is work-associated, even though the onset takes place away from work. In Cossident v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 33, an employee called to a part of the plant, from two to four city blocks away, ran the distance. He experienced pain in his left arm, chest and dizziness. He was later hospitalized for acute myocardial infarction. The doctor that testified on claimant’s behalf stated that he suffered from a coronary insufficiency which probably preexisted the incident and could have been aggravated by any moderate strain. The Industrial Commission found there was no causal relationship between the claimant’s employment and the heart attack. Yet this court reversed such findings as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, and remanded the cause to the Industrial Commission for the entry of a proper award. In Illinois Valley Irrigation, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 234, claimant unloaded iron pipes from a company truck at a job site, and then left to play golf. After his golf game, he complained of not feeling well and slept in a chair that night because of “indigestion.” During the next two days at the job site he experienced the same pain. On the second night, after admission to the hospital, the diagnosis was heart disease of an unknown cause manifested by congestive heart failure. He performed office and clerical work after these incidents until his death two months later, while announcing a Little League baseball game. An award of compensation was affirmed. The only difference that can be said to exist between the medical testimony in Illinois Irrigation and here is that in Illinois Irrigation its form was better — a meaningless circumstance where there is, as here, no objection. In Gus T. Handge & Son Painting Co. v. Industrial Com. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 201, a painter, 10 minutes after a coffee break, complained of illness. He appeared to be pale, gasping for breath, and perspiring profusely. He died shortly after being taken to the hospital, and the diagnosis was the rupture of a blood vessel adjacent to the heart, an aneurysm. This is a developmental or congenital condition. The evidence was that an aneurysm could be accelerated by exertion and that the actual rupturing is more likely to occur in times of unusual physical strain. There was no evidence that any medical witness predicated his opinion on some unusual happening in the course of claimant’s employment. In sustaining an award, this court noted: “Respondent attempts to distinguish this case from other heart cases previously considered by this court where awards have been sustained on the ground that in such other cases the heart attack was preceded by trauma, exertion or emotional involvement. We never have limited, recovery to those workmen who lift exceedingly heavy things or who work under intense heat. The rule applies to all workmen alike. If a workman’s existing physical structure gives way under the stress of his usual labor, his death is an accident which arises out of his employment.” (Emphasis added.) (33 Ill. 2d 201, 205.) See also Wirth v. Industrial Com. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 475; Guardian Electric Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Com. (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 530. We cannot, consistent with prior decisions, set aside the award of the Commission in favor of Rosalie Rogers. Worse yet, future cases will be determined according to the decisions we have alluded to. This will, of course, aggravate the injustice done this petitioner today. MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this dissent.