Court Opinion

ID: 9916170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 16:00:43.394658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:20.697883
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1085     Document: 010110980478      Date Filed: 01/09/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 9, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  LACIE NELSON,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 22-1085
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00757-CMA)
  DEAN WILLIAMS, Executive Director,                          (D. Colo.)
  Colorado Department of Corrections;
  PHIL WEISER, Attorney General, State
  of Colorado,

        Respondents - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MORITZ, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       In 2009, a Colorado jury convicted Lacie Nelson of eight counts of sexual

 assault on a child. After unsuccessfully appealing her conviction and the denial of

 her state-court post-conviction motion, Ms. Nelson sought habeas relief under

 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She argued (among other things) that (1) defense counsel provided

 ineffective assistance in violation of her Sixth Amendment rights by failing to

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1085    Document: 010110980478        Date Filed: 01/09/2024    Page: 2

 investigate and present evidence that the victims’ older brother had been accused of

 sexually assaulting a child, and (2) the trial court admitted expert testimony allegedly

 vouching for the victims’ credibility in violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right

 to due process. Applying the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

 (AEDPA), the district court denied habeas relief. This court granted Ms. Nelson a

 certificate of appealability (COA) on these two claims. Because Ms. Nelson fails to

 demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of her claims involved an

 unreasonable application of federal law or rested on an unreasonable determination of

 the facts, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

 I.    Background

       For short periods in 2002 and 2003, Ms. Nelson and her husband, Roy Nelson,

 lived with the Gonser family, which consisted of Shannon Gonser (who is Roy’s

 sister), Shannon’s husband, Lee Gonser, their three sons—C.G., D.G., and Dn.G.—

 and their daughter. All of the Gonser children were under the age of 13 at that time.

 After Roy and Ms. Nelson moved out of the Gonsers’ home, Shannon and Lee

 separated and they eventually divorced.

       Lee and the four children moved in with his sister, Diana. When Diana

 overheard C.G. and D.G. talking about sexual abuse, she questioned them and then

 reported her conversations to Lee. Lee notified the police. Ann Smith, a forensic

 interviewer, interviewed D.G. in February and March 2004 and Dn.G. in March 2004.

 D.G. reported to Ms. Smith that his mother, Shannon, had verbally, physically, and

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 sexually abused him. Dn.G. reported that Shannon had verbally and physically

 abused him.

       About a year later, in early 2005, D.G. reported sexual abuse involving

 Shannon, Roy, and Ms. Nelson to both Lee and his psychologist. The police did not

 investigate allegations against Roy and Ms. Nelson until 2006. Ms. Smith

 re-interviewed D.G. in April 2006 and Dn.G. in December 2006. Both D.G. and

 Dn.G. reported sexual abuse by Roy and Ms. Nelson to Ms. Smith.

       C.G., D.G., and Dn.G. testified at Ms. Nelson’s trial and were subject to cross

 examination by defense counsel. The jury also viewed D.G.’s and Dn.G.’s

 videotaped interviews with Ms. Smith. The prosecution endorsed Ms. Smith as an

 expert regarding forensic interviewing of children and adolescents. As relevant to

 this appeal, she testified that during forensic interviews, she looks for signs that a

 child has been suggested or coached. She described coaching as “the overt

 purposeful intent to get a child to say something that may not be true.” R., Vol. 2

 (Trial Tr. Jan. 9, 2009) at 13. And she stated that “[s]uggestibility is when you

 introduce an idea into a child either consciously or unconsciously about an event, and

 they adopt that event to be the truth.” Id. Ms. Smith then testified that during her

 interviews with D.G. and Dn.G. she did not see any behaviors or statements by them

 that were consistent with a child who has been coached or suggested. See id. at

 15-16. Ms. Nelson did not object to this testimony during the trial.1

       1
           We note that Ms. Nelson presented her own expert witness in clinical and
                                                                            (continued)
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        In closing argument, the prosecution contended that the crux of the case was

 whether the jurors believed D.G. and Dn.G. The defense argued the victims’ false

 allegations of abuse by Ms. Nelson were part of a quest by Lee and his sister, Diana,

 to “tak[e] down Shannon Gonser and possibly her family,” id. (Trial Tr. Jan. 12,

 2009) at 69, and also stemmed from the “vast pornography viewed in the home,” id.

 at 34, as well as the boys’ conversations with each other about abuse. Defense

 counsel also contended the victims’ allegations were implausible, pointing to, among

 other things, their delayed disclosure about abuse by Ms. Nelson, inconsistencies in

 their accounts, and the incredible nature of the abuse they alleged. In rebuttal, the

 prosecutor stated, “Suggestibility and coaching . . . ., that’s really what this case is

 about.” Id. at 72. The prosecutor argued that the victims’ testimony, demeanor, and

 emotion were not coached or suggested, reminding the jurors of Ms. Smith’s

 testimony that she observed no signs of coaching or suggestion during her interviews

 with D.G. and Dn.G.

        In her direct appeal, Ms. Nelson argued (among other things) that Ms. Smith

 improperly vouched for the victims’ credibility, in violation of her Fourteenth

 Amendment right to due process. The Colorado Court of Appeals (CCA) rejected

 this contention and affirmed her conviction.

 forensic psychology who testified about the concepts of confabulation, cognitive
 distortion and dissonance, and false memories. Ms. Nelson’s expert further testified
 that Dn.G.’s statements recorded by Diana in early 2008 were possibly coached. See
 R., Vol. 2 (Trial Tr. Jan. 9, 2009) at 77-79.

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       Shannon was also prosecuted on child sexual assault and other charges. In her

 second trial,2 the jury acquitted Shannon of all remaining charges.

       After Ms. Nelson’s unsuccessful appeal and Shannon’s acquittal, Ms. Nelson

 filed a post-conviction motion in the trial court. As relevant to this appeal, she

 argued her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence

 that C.G.—D.G.’s and Dn.G.’s older brother—had been accused of sexually

 assaulting a neighbor’s child and was being prosecuted for that offense at the time he

 accused Shannon of sexual abuse. The trial court held Ms. Nelson failed to

 demonstrate either ineffective assistance or prejudice. The CCA affirmed, holding

 only that Ms. Nelson failed to demonstrate prejudice.

 II.   Discussion

       We review de novo the district court’s decision denying habeas relief. Smith v.

 Duckworth, 824 F.3d 1233, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2016). But because the CCA rejected

 Ms. Nelson’s claims on the merits, we apply AEDPA’s highly deferential standard of

 review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this standard, Ms. Nelson must show that

 the CCA’s adjudications of her claims were (1) “contrary to, or involved an

 unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law” and/or (2) “based on

 an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

 [s]tate[-]court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(1)-(2).

       2
         The CCA reversed Shannon’s convictions from her first trial on an
 evidentiary error.
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       A.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), to establish

 prejudice based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he defendant must show

 that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

 result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

 probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

       In her post-conviction motion, Ms. Nelson argued that, because evidence

 regarding the sexual-assault allegation against C.G. was introduced at Shannon’s

 second trial and Shannon was acquitted, such evidence would necessarily result in

 Ms. Nelson’s acquittal as well. The CCA rejected this assertion as speculative.

 Ms. Nelson also argued that “the evidence was absolutely crucial to establish a

 motive for the children to fabricate allegations of sexual assault against Ms. Nelson

 and to show that C.G. had knowledge of the ramifications of being accused of such a

 crime.” R., Vol. 1 at 289 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But the

 CCA stated that Ms. Nelson did not explain and it was “unable to discern any logical

 connection between the unadmitted evidence” and C.G.’s suggested motive to

 fabricate allegations against his aunt, Ms. Nelson. Id. at 290. The court also noted

 that all of the Gonser children would have been aware of the ramifications of

 allegations of sexual assault by the time of Ms. Nelson’s trial. And it concluded that,

 “[t]o the extent the evidence had any probative value, it was merely cumulative of

 other (more plausible) impeachment evidence.” Id. Applying Strickland, the CCA

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 “conclude[d] that Ms. Nelson failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the

 introduction of this evidence would have led to a different result.” Id. at 291.

       Ms. Nelson argues the CCA unreasonably applied the Strickland prejudice

 standard. “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable application of federal law

 is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter,

 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

 determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as

 fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id.

 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard is intended to be difficult to meet.

 Id. at 102. And because the Strickland standard is both general and highly

 deferential, establishing an unreasonable application of it under § 2254(d)(1) “is all

 the more difficult.” Id. at 105.

       In ruling on Ms. Nelson’s habeas application, the district court acknowledged

 the prosecution’s case hinged on the victims’ credibility. But the court concluded

 that the evidence of C.G.’s prosecution for sexual assault at about the same time he

 accused Shannon of sexual assault, but a full year before D.G. first accused

 Ms. Nelson of sexual assault, “does not squarely undermine the credibility of the

 victims’ allegations against Ms. Nelson.” R., Vol. 1 at 794 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). It reasoned that D.G.’s and Dn.G.’s alleged bias and motive to fabricate

 sexual abuse allegations against Ms. Nelson based upon C.G.’s sexual assault

 prosecution “is less logical and more attenuated than the motive and bias that was

 presented to and rejected by the jurors—i.e., the ongoing animosity against Shannon

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 and members of her family stemming from the divorce and custody battle.” Id. at

 795. The district court therefore held that Ms. Nelson failed to show under

 § 2254(d)(1) that the CCA unreasonably applied Strickland’s prejudice standard and

 denied her relief.

       Ms. Nelson argues the CCA’s no-prejudice determination is an unreasonable

 application of Strickland because the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict consisted

 of the uncorroborated testimony of the two victims, which was weakened by their

 delayed disclosures, the inconsistencies and increasing specificity in their

 descriptions of the abuse over time, and the fantastical nature of their assertions

 regarding the abuse. But we agree with the district court that fair-minded jurists

 could disagree whether the CCA correctly applied Strickland’s general and highly

 deferential prejudice standard. Thus, Ms. Nelson has not satisfied the high bar of

 § 2254(d)(1) by showing that the CCA unreasonably applied clearly established

 federal law. We affirm the district court’s denial of relief on Ms. Nelson’s

 ineffective-assistance claim.

       B.     Admission of Alleged Vouching Testimony

       Because Ms. Nelson failed to object to Ms. Smith’s testimony as improperly

 vouching for the victims’ credibility, the CCA reviewed her due-process claim for

 plain error. It concluded as follows:

              [Ms.] Nelson does not claim that any of the prosecution’s expert
       witnesses stated that any of the victims were telling the truth on a specific
       occasion. Instead, [she] objects to testimony about the experts’
       interviewing techniques, experiences, and observations of child victims of
       sexual abuse generally and of the victims in this case specifically. [She]

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       contends the experts’ testimony made the jury more likely to view the
       victims’ inconsistencies as a natural part of the process of truthful
       disclosure.
              However, testimony is not inadmissible simply because it supports
       the prosecution’s position.
              Here, [Ms.] Smith testified about the disclosure process for victims
       of child sexual abuse, including their level of susceptibility to suggestion,
       frequent barriers to disclosure, and reasons for delaying disclosure.
       [Ms.] Smith testified about her interviews during therapy sessions with the
       victims in this case in the context of patterns and behaviors typical of
       victims of child sexual abuse, but she did not offer her opinion on their
       credibility. [Ms.] Smith’s testimony did not rise to the level of plain error.

 R., Vol. 1 at 181-82 (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted).

       Ms. Nelson contends that the CCA made an unreasonable factual

 determination under § 2254(d)(2) in finding that Ms. Smith did not offer an opinion

 on the victims’ credibility. This court cannot “conclude a state court’s factual

 findings are unreasonable merely because [it] would have reached a different

 conclusion in the first instance.” Johnson v. Martin, 3 F.4th 1210, 1218 (10th Cir.

 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a factual determination is

 unreasonable when the state “court plainly and materially misstated the record” or

 when “reasonable minds could not disagree that the finding was in error.” Smith v.

 Sharp, 935 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 Moreover, the CCA’s factual determinations are subject to a rebuttable presumption

 of correctness under § 2254(e)(1) that can only be overcome by clear and convincing

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  evidence.3 The district court held that the CCA’s finding that Ms. Smith did not offer

  her opinion on the victims’ credibility was not an unreasonable interpretation of

  Ms. Smith’s testimony.

        Ms. Nelson does not argue that the CCA misstated the record. She asserts that

  Ms. Smith’s testimony “necessarily implied her belief that the boys were telling the

  truth” and that Ms. Smith “went well beyond [the] threshold line” into vouching for

  the victims’ credibility “when she testified that D.G. and Dn.G. showed no signs of

  coaching or suggestibility.” Aplt. COA Appl./Opening Br. at 39, 40.4 But we

  conclude that Ms. Nelson fails to show that reasonable minds could not disagree on

  precisely where that line is and whether Ms. Smith’s testimony crossed it. Nor has

  she demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the CCA’s conclusion is

  incorrect.

        This court alternatively granted a COA on the issue whether the CCA’s

  adjudication of Ms. Nelson’s vouching claim resulted in a decision that involved an

  unreasonable application under § 2254(d)(1) of the due-process standard in Lisenba

  v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941). The Respondent argues that Lisenba is not

  clearly established federal law applicable to Ms. Nelson’s claim. “Whether the law is

        3
          This court has observed that “[t]he Supreme Court has not yet defined the
  precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1).” Johnson, 3 F.4th at
  1218 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Ms. Nelson does not contend that
  § 2254(e)(1) does not apply to the CCA’s adjudication of her claim.
        4
         Contrary to Ms. Nelson’s assertion in her reply brief, the COA on her
  due-process claim is expressly limited to this testimony by Ms. Smith.
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  clearly established is the threshold question under § 2254(d)(1).” House v. Hatch,

  527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008). But based upon our holding that Ms. Nelson

  has not overcome the hurdle of § 2254(d)(2), we need not address whether clearly

  established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, applies to her claim

  challenging alleged vouching testimony. By failing to show that the CCA

  unreasonably determined there was no vouching testimony by Ms. Smith, Ms. Nelson

  has failed to establish a necessary prerequisite for a due-process claim based on

  improper vouching.

         In any event, Respondent supports his contention by citing this court’s

  decision in Andrew v. White, 62 F.4th 1299, 1312-13, 1315-16 (10th Cir. 2023), in

  which we held that Lisenba was not clearly established federal law for a claim that

  the admission of allegedly irrelevant bad-acts evidence deprived a defendant of due

  process. Ms. Nelson does not acknowledge Andrew, much less attempt to distinguish

  it. We will not craft an argument for her. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126,

  1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999). We affirm the district court’s denial of relief on

  Ms. Nelson’s due-process claim.

  III.   Conclusion

         We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                             Circuit Judge

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