Court Opinion

ID: 9385733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-08 00:00:36.923162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.355155
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20312       Document: 00516704952             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/07/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                                                                  April 7, 2023
                                       No. 22-20312
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   Rachael Crivelli,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                           versus

   Montgomery County Emergency Services District
   Number 7,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:20-CV-1990

   Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Rachael Crivelli brought this suit against her former employer,
   Montgomery County Emergency Services District No. 7 (“MCESD7”), for
   discrimination under Title VII. She alleged (1) that MCESD7 retaliated
   against her for complaining about a former fire chief’s sexist comments,

          *
              Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
   should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
   forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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                                    No. 22-20312

   (2) that after she failed a fitness test, MCESD7 terminated her because of her
   sex, and (3) that MCESD7 engaged in retaliatory sabotage of her post-
   termination employment. The district court entered a thorough order
   granting summary judgment for MCESD7. Crivelli appeals, focusing solely
   on her second allegation. We AFFIRM.
                               I. Background
          Crivelli was a firefighter at MCESD7. In 2017, MCESD7 hired
   Howard Rinewalt as its Chief of Firefighting.        Chief Rinewalt quickly
   promoted Crivelli to Captain—the first time a woman had attained that rank
   in the history of Montgomery County.
          Shortly after taking office, Chief Rinewalt changed MCESD7’s
   physical fitness assessment. Before, the assessment had involved activities
   such as climbing ladders, carrying dummies, and dragging hoses. Chief
   Rinewalt redesigned the assessment to closely mirror the United States
   Navy’s Physical Fitness Standard. Firefighters were required to perform
   three exercises: sit-ups, push-ups, and either a timed run or a timed rowing
   exercise. The new assessment is age- and gender-adjusted. For example, 31-
   year-old Crivelli was required to do 13 push-ups; a man of her age would have
   been expected to do 35.
          The gravamen of Crivelli’s complaint is that she was terminated for
   repeatedly failing the new physical fitness assessment. Four other individuals
   never managed to pass the test. All were men, and all were terminated or
   resigned. Every woman but Crivelli passed the test on their first try, for a
   pass rate of 80%; the pass rate for men was 77%.
                         II. Standard of Review
          “This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
   novo, applying the same standards as the district court.” Johnson v. World

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   All. Fin. Corp., 830 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is
   appropriate where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
   any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to material fact arises when
   “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
   nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248,
   106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). And the “evidence of the non-movant is to be
   believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at
   255, 2513.
                               III. Discussion
          Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to
   “discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex.”
   42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Such discrimination “can be established through
   either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572,
   578 (5th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
   evidence, courts apply the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
   Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). First, the plaintiff must make a
   prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802, 1824. Then the burden shifts
   “to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
   the employee’s rejection.” Id. If the employer does so, the plaintiff must
   prove that the reason was pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804, 1825.
          To make a prima facie case of discrimination, an employee must
   demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified
   for the position at issue; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and
   (4) others similarly situated but outside the protected class were treated more
   favorably in nearly identical circumstances. Saketkoo v. Adm’rs of Tulane
   Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th 990, 997–98 (5th Cir. 2022).

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          The district court granted summary judgment on the second and
   fourth factors, finding that Crivelli was not qualified for the position and was
   not treated less favorably than male firefighters in nearly identical
   circumstances. She challenges both findings.
          Because she failed MCESD7’s physical fitness assessment, Crivelli
   was not qualified for the position at issue. It is true that she has significant
   experience in firefighting, as well as many certifications and training
   experiences. Yet as the district court correctly noted, qualifications are an
   employer’s prerogative. Johnson v. Louisiana, 351 F.3d 616, 622 (5th Cir.
   2003) (“An employer may establish job requirements, and rely on them in
   arguing that a prima facie case is not established because the employee is not
   ‘qualified.’”). MCESD7 was free to establish new physical assessment
   standards and require its employees meet those standards.
          Crivelli argues that the new physical fitness assessment was not a
   “business necessity,” see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431,
   91 S. Ct. 849, 853 (1971), and that the old assessment more closely measured
   the physical capabilities necessary in her line of work. But this argument
   confuses the standard for disparate-treatment claims, like the one brought
   here, with the standard for disparate-impact claims like the one in Griggs. See
   Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577–78, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672–73 (2009). In
   disparate-treatment cases, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima
   facie case of discrimination, which includes showing that she has the requisite
   qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In disparate impact
   cases, the plaintiff must instead show a statistical disparity caused by some
   employment practice. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658,
   109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125 (1989). Once a disparity is shown, the employer
   “carries the burden of producing evidence of a business justification for his
   employment practice.” Id. at 659, 2126. Crivelli has not brought a disparate-
   impact claim, and has not shown a statistical disparity that would give rise to

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   such a claim. This court thus has no grounds to indulge in judicial second-
   guessing of MCESD7’s business decisions. Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc.,
   119 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 1997).
          Crivelli attempts to show that she was treated less favorably than
   similarly situated male firefighters by pointing to several modifications that
   Chief Rinewalt made to the Navy’s Physical Fitness Standard. He allowed
   the use of footboards for the sit-up portion of the test and allowed rowing
   exercises to substitute for the 1.5 mile run. Both modifications were made
   due to requests made by male firefighters. Crivelli argues that, because the
   Chief made these modifications, he should have also modified the test to
   allow her to do what she called “girl” push-ups—push-ups with knees
   touching the ground—in lieu of the regular push-up requirement. Further,
   she alleges that some of the men’s tests were overseen by other male
   firefighters, but that her test was overseen by a Crossfit trainer, another
   allegedly discriminatory difference.
          These criticisms miss the mark. This court requires plaintiffs to
   demonstrate that they were treated less favorably than similarly situated
   employees under “nearly identical circumstances.” Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at
   998. But there is no evidence that MCESD7 refused to let Crivelli take
   advantage of footboards or the rowing exercise option, which would be the
   relevant nearly identical circumstance. There is only evidence that Chief
   Rinewalt allowed some modifications to the test and refused others. It was
   within his purview to decide whether to modify the traditional push-up
   requirement of the Navy test, and he declined to do so. Even so, Chief
   Rinewalt did make other allowances for Crivelli: the record shows that she
   was given five chances to pass the assessment, two more than the written
   policy authorized, and more than any other firefighter was given. Finally,
   there is only evidence that one male employee had his test overseen by
   another male firefighter instead of a third party. That testee, however, was a

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   part-time worker with a scheduling conflict that prevented him from testing
   during normal business hours. His case is therefore not “nearly identical”
   to Crivelli’s. See Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.
   2009) (holding that similarly situated employees must have “the same job or
   responsibilities”).
                              IV. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error of law or fact
   and affirm essentially for the reasons stated in the comprehensive order of
   the district court. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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