Court Opinion

ID: 9526267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:14:48.915293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:14.767843
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS, dissenting: In this case the evidence established that the defendant, Village of Dolton, knew or was charged with knowledge of the danger or defect causing the injury. The evidence established that the dangerous condition had existed for at least two years prior to the occurrence and that the Village therefore had at least constructive notice of the defect. For these reasons, the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts should be affirmed. MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, with whom MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI joins, dissenting: Mr. Justice Kluczynski and I dissent. An examination of the evidence and the authorities demonstrates that the majority overlooked evidence relevant to the issues and by reason of the oversight applied an erroneous rule of law. The record shows that 155th Place was platted and dedicated as a part of “Hennings E. Johnson’s 2nd Addition to Meadow Lane Subdivision.” Also platted and dedicated were Dorchester Avenue, Blackstone Avenue, Dante Avenue, 154th Place, 155th Place, Sunset Drive and 156th Street. It cannot be determined from the record when Dorchester, Blackstone and Dante Avenues were paved but the testimony shows that these are the principal thoroughfares in that area. There is no evidence that the Village of Dolton, at any time, in any manner, indicated an intent not to accept 155th Place. Although 155th Place was not paved, the Village, in its answer, admitted the allegation of plaintiff’s amended complaint that it' “*** kept, maintained, supervised, operated and controlled a certain water main on 155th Place at or near Dante Avenue ***.” The rule applicable to these facts was stated in Consumers Co. v. City of Chicago, 268 Ill. 113, 132: “In the absence of a contrary intention being shown, we have held acceptance by a municipality of the principal portion or nearly all of the streets of a subdivision raises the presumption of acceptance by it of all of the streets in the subdivision. (Kimball v. City of Chicago, 253 Ill. 105; Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 id. 428.) Also, that evidence of the acceptance of streets by a city is found in the affirmative act of taking possession thereof for the purpose of placing therein water mains or sewers.” In Kennedy v. Town of Normal, 359 Ill. 306, 311-12, the court said: “A municipality may accept a part of the streets and alleys shown upon a plat and reject a part of them, or as to a particular street or alley it may accept a part and reject the remainder of it, (Clokey v. Wabash Railway Co., 353 Ill. 349,) but where the city accepts the most important streets of an addition or the major portion of' them, and has evinced no intention to refuse to accept any of them, it will be deemed to have accepted all of the streets and alleys of that addition.” The question whether the defendant village had accepted 155th Place was one of fact for the jury. Its verdict finds ample support in this record and the judgment should be affirmed.