Court Opinion

ID: 9782922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:30:24.094096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:16.776377
License: Public Domain

AMY, J.,
dissenting.
| ,In my opinion, an affirmation is warranted as I find that the evidence submitted demonstrates an absence of genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether an attempt to “ride” the pump was a reasonably anticipated use pursuant to La.R.S. 9:2800.54(A).
It seems to me that the plaintiffs focus on the state of the products liability law as it existed before the 1988 enactment of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, now the exclusive remedy against manufacturers for an allegedly defective product. The pre-LPLA law included a “normal use” standard, which included all intended uses of a product, including all reasonably forer seeable uses and misuses. Blanchard v. Midland Risk Ins., 01-1251 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/02), 817 So.2d 458, writ denied, 02-1517 (La.9/20/02), 825 So.2d 1178, writ denied, 02-1594 (La.9/20/02), 825 So.2d 1181. As the majority points out, the LPLA does not hold a manufacturer responsible for all foreseeable uses of a product. Id. Instead, a manufacturer is liable for uses it 12should reasonably expect of an ordinary consumer. Butz v. Lynch, 99-1070 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/23/00), 762 So.2d 1214, writ denied, 00-2660 (La.11/17/00), 774 So.2d 980. See also Daigle v. Audi of America, Inc., 598 So.2d 1304 (La.App. 3 Cir.) (quoting John Kennedy, A Primer on the Louisiana Products Liability Act, 49 La. L.Rev. 565 (1989)), writ denied, 604 So.2d 1306 (La.1992).
In light of the LPLA standard and upon review of the record, I find no evidence indicating that this accident occurred pursuant to a use reasonably expected of an ordinary consumer. Further, and even assuming the misuse in this case could be considered a use as encompassed by the applicable statute, I find no evidence that it should have been reasonably anticipated at the time the pump was manufactured in the early 1950s. The jurisprudence relied on by the plaintiffs involved occurrences well after that date. Also, that jurisprudence involved attractive nuisance claims *1020and not ones controlled by the LPLA, which I believe to be the law applicable to this case.
Because I would affirm the trial court’s judgment, I respectfully dissent.