Court Opinion

ID: 9488373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:43:05.27951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:50.433685
License: Public Domain

FAGG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, joined by LOKEN, HANSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
The Court ignores a major defect in proof on Brown’s free exercise claim and takes over the district court’s fact-finding function *660on Brown’s statutory claim of religious discrimination. I thus respectfully dissent.
It is well-established that to prove a free exercise violation, a religious adherent must initially show the challenged governmental action burdened the adherent’s religious practices. Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir.1988); Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1392-93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 510, 130 L.Ed.2d 417 (1994). The burden must be substantial rather than a mere inconvenience. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1392-93. To rise to the level of a substantial burden, the governmental action must either pressure the religious adherent to commit an act the religion forbids, or prevent the adherent from engaging in conduct the religion requires. Id. at 1393 (applying substantial burden requirement to decide Free Exercise Clause not violated by investigation of whether police chiefs religious views impermissibly affected his work performance).
Although the Court recognizes the substantial burden requirement, ante at 656, the Court ignores Brown’s failure to show the County’s actions rose to the level of a substantial burden on his religious practices. The record lacks any evidence that Brown’s born-again Christianity required him to display religious items in his office or to engage in the religious activities restricted by the reprimand. Indeed, the district court found Brown did not prove the removal of the items from his office inhibited his ability to exercise his religion freely. 832 F.Supp. at 1316. “Brown does not dispute the [district] court’s factual findings” with respect to his First Amendment claims. Brief for Appellant at 5. The district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous anyway. As for the religious activity restrictions, the Court recognizes the prayers at departmental meetings were spontaneous, infrequent, and inconsequential. Ante at 656. The evidence about the change in Brown’s religious practices after the reprimand shows the restrictions merely inconvenienced Brown. Rather than engaging in group prayers during work, Brown simply went across the street to the library at lunchtime to read his Bible and pray with others. The reprimand did not restrict Brown’s private prayers. Brown has not shown any substantial, concrete harm to his religious practice resulted from Polk County’s actions. The Court misplaces reliance on evidence that Brown’s “religious beliefs are extremely important to him and play a central role in his life.” Ante at 658. The fact that Brown sincerely held his religious beliefs does not mean the County’s actions substantially burdened Brown’s exercise of those beliefs. Because Brown failed to show the County’s actions substantially burdened his religious practices, the Court should not even reach the Pickering analysis on Brown’s free exercise claim. See Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1395. As explained in the vacated panel opinion, however, I would hold the balance of interests tips in the County’s favor in this case, primarily given Brown’s status as a supervisor of fifty employees. See 37 F.3d at 408-10.
Assuming the mixed-motives analysis applies to Brown’s statutory religious discrimination claim, I would remand for the district court to decide whether the County would have fired Brown absent his religious activities. In making the finding on appeal, the Court disregards the timing of Brown’s discharge and the evidence showing Brown’s consistently poor work performance. In my view, the district court could reasonably find the County would have discharged Brown regardless of his religious activities.
After the County administrator, Ray Sears, chose Brown to become director of the County’s information services department (ISD) in mid-1986, the ISD experienced many problems. In Brown’s 1988, 1989, and 1990 performance evaluations, Sears expressed concern with Brown’s ability to communicate, delegate authority, and maintain predetermined schedules. The ISD experienced significant delays in meeting project deadlines in late 1989, prompting an unprecedented departmental evaluation by an outside consulting firm and a departmental restructuring. In July 1990 Brown received the single reprimand for religious activity at work and Sears removed the items from Brown’s office. No religious activities were reported after the reprimand. Four months later, in November 1990, Sears reprimanded Brown for exercising poor judgment about budgetary matters. The same month, Sears ordered an investigation into reports that ISD computers were still being used for per*661sonal matters even though Brown had tried to eliminate the problem. The investigation revealed ISD computers contained pornography and personal budgets. Sears asked for Brown’s resignation after receiving the results of the computer investigation on December 3, 1990.
The Court places too much stock in Sears’s testimony that he did not know whether Brown would have been fired absent the reprimand for religious activities. Ante at 657-58. Sears’s statement is equivocal and must be considered in light of the entire record. Given the overwhelming evidence of inadequate performance in relation to the single reprimand for religious activity, and the fact that Sears did not terminate Brown until pornography was found on the ISD’s computers five months after the religious reprimand, I believe the district court could reasonably find the County would have fired Brown absent his religious activities.
I would remand Brown’s statutory religious discrimination claim, but otherwise affirm the district court.
Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, and McMILLIAN, FAGG, BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, MAGILL, BEAM, LOKEN, HANSEN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.