Court Opinion

ID: 9766605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:54:49.079383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:24.038599
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
In their motion, for rehearing appellants say:
“This Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that Appellants were authorized by Art. 6674u, R.C.S., to erect the sign, which was not erected, reading, 'Slick, Fresh Oil.’ ”
They say that Art. 6674u “does not attempt to state what signs a contractor is ‘authorized’ to place upon such road.” We quote from Art. 6674u:
“ ‘Warning Sign.’ Every sign, signal, marking, and device erected or placed upon any street, road or highway barricade, or erected or placed upon any street, road or highway which is under construction or being repaired in any way by the State Highway Department or any political subdivision of the 'State, or any contractor or sub-contractor doing road, street or highway construction or repair work, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding motor vehicular traffic or otherwise stating the conditions under which traffic by motor vehicle may be had upon such street, road or' highway. A warning sign shall include, but shall not be limited to, a flagman placed upon any street, road or highway by the State Highway Department or any political subdivision of the State or by any contractor or sub-contractor for the purpose of directing traffic around or upon such street, road or highway as is under construction or in the process of being repaired.”
Section 2 of the Article provides that:
“It shall be unlawful for any person to * * * disobey the instructions, signals, warnings, or markings of any warning sign placed upon any street,, road or highway barricade or placed upon any street, road or highway under construction or being repaired under the provisions and authority of this Act, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police officer.”
We see no conflict in the provisions of Art. 6674u and Sec. 36(a) of Art. 6701d, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St., and Sec. 13 of Art.‘827a, P.C., but the provisions are cumulative at least to the extent of authorizing certain persons to erect signs for the purpose of directing traffic and provides that such signs when so erected are authorized because it is unlawful for any person to disobey the warning of such signs.
Ralph Lassiter one of the partners of the firm of L & S Contractors and also a superintendent for appellants testified:
“Q. You are familiar with the practices of the Highway Department and of other road builders in Texas in building and constructing highways, aren’t you ? • A. I am familiar with it, yes, sir; I learn something every day.
“Q. I will show you a picture here of a warning device; have you seen the originals of that in use? A. Yes, sir, I have.
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“Q. It is a fact, isn’t it, Mr. Lassi-ter, that such a device as is shown in that picture, or one similar to it, is customarily used when oil is applied on topping and traffic is allowed to come on it? A. On certain projects.
“Q. On certain projects? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Would that be a project where hot oil is applied and traffic is allowed on it? A. If you don’t have a detour; if the State doesn’t set up a. detour.
*401“Q. If the State doesn’t set up a detour for them and if the traffic is put on the hot oil it is customary to use similar warning devices to that, isn’t it? A. In some cases, yes, sir.”
We adhere to our holding that the sign was not an unlawful or an unauthorized sign. Moreover the testimony of Mr. Las-siter shows that when conditions as testified to here exist it is customary to use a sign like or similar to the one exhibited to him. There was also evidence that there was no warning on the barricade.
Although we have answered' appellants’ objection to the effect that they were not authorized to erect the sign we think the evidence of Mr. Lassiter shows nonconformity with-a general custom and that the failure to erect the sign could properly be considered as some evidence of negligence. Hubb Digs Co. v. Bell, Tex. Com.App., 1 S.W.2d 575; Cameron Compress Co. v. Whitington, Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 527; Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968, 160 A. L.R. 1445; Solo Serve Co. v. Howell, Tex. Civ.App., 35 S.W.2d 474, er. ref.
As we noted in our original opinion the question of “earning capacity” was injected into the instruction accompanying issue 68 by appellants’ objection to the instruction as contained in the first draft of the charge. Also as there noted the instruction was amended and as given it limited the jury’s consideration of the impairment of earning capacity to meet the objection. This amendment was apparently approved by appellants as is evidenced by their objections and exceptions to issue 68 and its amended accompanying instruction which we quote in full:
“Defendants object and except to ¡Special Issue No. 68 and the instruction given in connection therewith for the reason that the said instruction requires the Jury to answer Special Issues 63, 64, 65, 66 and 67 in the affirmative, or suggests to the Jury that such issues ought to be answered in the affirmative and thus that the issues lettered A, subsidiary to each of'such issues, ought to be answered and is thus a comment on the weight of the evidence. The second paragraph of such explanatory instruction is further objected to -for the reason that it does not require the Jury to exclude from their consideration medical, hospital, surgical, nurses or ambulance expenses due solely or partly to ailments for physical conditions, if any, which she may have had before the accident in question, and hence permits the Jury to find damages in excess of the amount permitted by law. Such second paragraph of such explanatory instruction is further objected to for the reason that it permits the Jury to compensate the plaintiff- for future medical and hospital expenses due solely - to pre-existing ailments or conditions. Such explanatory instruction is further objected to because it fails to direct the Jury to .exclude from their award any amounts of money which, had plaintiff not been injured, would have had to be paid by plaintiff in the form of income taxes upon the realization of an equivalent sum of money as taxable income, thus giving plaintiff a windfall.”
,.The instruction here complained of was doubtless given in response to appellants’ objection to the instruction contained in the first draft of the charge, and any error resulting from the giving thereof was invited. Southern Uhderwriters v. Boswell, 138 Tex. 255, 158 S.W.2d 280.
We have considered all matters presented in appellants’. motion for rehearing but adhere to the conclusion reached in our original opinion.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.