Court Opinion

ID: 9664604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:22:21.27222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:03.527288
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge
(dissenting).
I dissented in Dempsey v. State, 496 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973), and I dissent here.
In Dempsey the majority, without holding that a written motion to quash a revocation motion is required, wrongly held the “objection” was untimely because it came after the State had read its motion and the plea of “untrue” was entered. This holding was made despite the fact that the oral motion to quash was contained in the same sentence, the same breath as the plea of “untrue” and was prior to the revocation hearing and before any witness testified.
The majority now says the instant case is controlled by Dempsey and that the oral motion to quash the revocation pleadings came too late since it was made after the revocation proceedings started. The record reflects the following at the beginning of the hearing:
“THE COURT: All right, gentlemen.
“THE STATE; Your Honor, if it please the Court, may we have this marked as State’s Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2?
“MR. BOYD (Defense): Your Honor, before this case proceeds, I would like to make a motion, if the Court please.
“THE COURT: Yes, sir; you may make it. Go ahead and make it.”
Thereafter, the motion to quash the revocation pleadings was made pointing out, among other things, that the pleadings did not inform the appellant of the party from whom the property was alleged to have been taken, nor the type of property, nor its value, etc.
*302The motion to quash was overruled and then, unlike Dempsey, the motion to revoke was read for the first time and then testimony was offered.
To stretch the erroneous and harsh decision of Dempsey to the instant case and say that the oral motion to quash comes too late is wrong, wrong, wrong. Today’s holding means that when the court in a revocation hearing says, “Good morning, „ counsel,” it is then too late to call the trial court’s attention to defects in the pleadings. This is not and can never be good law.
It is to be remembered that while the allegations in a motion to revoke need not strictly comply with the requirements of an indictment, they should fully inform the probationer so that he and his counsel will know what he will be called upon to defend against. Campbell v. State, 456 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Wilcox v. State, 477 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). And where the basis of the revocation is a violation of a penal law, the “allegations must give fair notice and should allege a violation of the law.” Jansson v. State, 473 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971). See also Gamble v. State, 484 S.W.2d 713 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). When the motion fails to fully inform the probationer he is denied the rudiments of due process. Kuenstler v. State, 486 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).
This court has repeatedly held that due process applies to revocation hearings. See e. g., Campbell v. State, supra.
This is indeed a sad day for this court to ignore fundamental fairness and due process by holding that a probationer must proceed to defend against a general vague allegation of a violation of a probationary condition merely because his counsel does not speak before the court says “All right, gentlemen.” Such a holding as in the instant case puts a stamp of approval upon sloppy pleading by the State and only encourages more of the same by making it difficult for defense counsel to object to the same.
I dissent vehemently.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.