Court Opinion

ID: 9892365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:12:01.896514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:27.503174
License: Public Domain

J-S28020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JEFFREY MARK FONDRK                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 99 WDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Criminal Division
                    at No(s): CP-65-CR-0003252-2019

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

       Appellant, Jeffrey Mark Fondrk, appeals from the September 15, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland

County that imposed an aggregate sentence of 13 to 26 years’ incarceration

after a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder and aggravated

assault.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

       This case arises out of two separate incidents. The first occurred
       on November 26, 2016, when [the victim, Appellant’s wife,] was
       treated at [a hospital] for a head injury. As a result of that
       hospital visit, aggravated assault charges were filed against
       [Appellant]. A preliminary hearing on those charges was held on
       January 17, 2017, and the charges were held for court. [The]
       magisterial district [court] set a bond condition that [Appellant]
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c) and 2702(a)(1), respectively.
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     was to have no contact with [the victim] and refrain from visiting
     their shared residence.[FN1]

        [Footnote 1: The aggravated assault charge was] nolle
        prossed by the Commonwealth after [the victim’s] death [in
        2017,] and [new charges, including an aggravated assault
        charge, were filed against Appellant at trial court docket
        number CP-65-CR-0003252-2019.]

     The second incident occurred on July 8, 2017, when Pennsylvania
     State Police responded to a 911 [emergency services] call from
     the [] residence [shared by the victim and Appellant, reporting]
     an unconscious victim. [The] victim was transported to the
     hospital where she died on July 18, 2017. As a result of the state
     police investigation, [Appellant] was charged with the following:

        Count One: Murder of the First Degree, in violation of 18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a);

        Count Two: Murder of the Third Degree, in violation of 18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c);

        Count Three: Aggravated Assault, in violation of 18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1);

        Count Four: Intimidation of a Witness or Victim, in violation
        of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(3);

        Count Five: Retaliation Against a Witness, Victim, or Party,
        in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4953(a).

     A jury trial was held before [the trial] court in June [] 2022. The
     [trial] court granted [Appellant’s] motion for acquittal at Counts
     Four and Five at trial. The jury ultimately found [Appellant] guilty
     at Counts Two and Three [and not guilty at Count 1].

     [Appellant] was sentenced by [the trial] court on September 15,
     2022[,] to the following terms and conditions: at Count Two, 10[
     to ]20 years[’] incarceration at a state correctional institution,
     receive a dual-diagnosis evaluation, complete recommended
     treatment, submit a [deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”)] sample, pay
     costs and fees, and have no contact with [the] victim's family; at
     Count Three, 3[ to ]6 years[’] incarceration[, which was set to run
     consecutively] to [the sentence imposed at] Count Two [and
     included] the same terms and conditions [as imposed at Count
     Two. Appellant] received credit for time served from July 22,
     2019[, to September 15, 2022, a total of 1,152 days. Appellant]

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        subsequently filed [a] post-sentence motion[] on September 20,
        2022.

        [Appellant] filed a brief in support of his post-sentence motion[]
        on November 1, 2022. [Appellant] contended that his convictions
        for both [third-degree] murder [] and aggravated assault were
        "not supported by the weight of the evidence to such a degree
        that the convictions should offend the [trial] court's sense of
        justice." [Appellant] asserted that the Commonwealth did not
        prove that he acted with the requisite malice to support his
        conviction for [third-degree] murder[.] Additionally, [Appellant]
        claimed that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he caused
        [the] victim's injuries for the aggravated assault [conviction].

        The Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to [Appellant’s]
        post-sentence motion[] on December 5, 2022.

Trial   Court   Opinion,     1/10/23,     at   1-3   (record   citations,   extraneous

capitalization, and emphasis omitted). On January 10, 2013, the trial court

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion. This appeal followed.2

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [] Appellant's
        post-sentence motion where the Commonwealth failed to prove []
        Appellant acted with the requisite malice to sustain a third-degree
        murder conviction, rendering his conviction against the weight of
        the evidence?

        2. Whether the trial court erred in denying [] Appellant's
        post-sentence motion where the Commonwealth failed to prove
        (1) [] Appellant caused a 2016 head injury to his then-wife and
        (2) that the wound was consistent with serious bodily injury in
        order to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault?

____________________________________________

2 The trial court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b). On February 27, 2023, the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
relying on its January 10, 2023 opinion that accompanied the order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion.

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Appellant’s Brief at 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Appellant’s issues raise claims that the jury’s verdicts were against the

weight of the evidence,3 for which our standard and scope of review is as

follows:

       Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of
       [the trial court’s] discretion, not of the underlying question of
       whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because
       the trial [court] had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
       presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
       to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial [court] when
       reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is [or is
       not] against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
       assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the [trial]
       court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
       weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
       the interest of justice.

Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014), citing

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). A trial court abuses

its discretion “where the course pursued represents not merely an error of

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the

law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of

partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Horne, 89 A.3d at 285-286 (citation

____________________________________________

3 To the extent Appellant purports  to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
introduced in support of his convictions, a review of Appellant’s appellate brief
dispels such claims. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-22 (stating, “the weight of
the evidence suggests [] Appellant’s conviction for [third-degree murder]
should not stand as the jury should not have found [] Appellant acted with
malice in contributing to [the victim’s] death[; t]he weight of the evidence
suggests the jury erred in two respects in convicting [] Appellant of
aggravated assault”).

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omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013)

(stating, “[t]he term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom[,]

and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within the framework of the

law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the [trial

court]”). For an appellant to prevail on a weight of the evidence claim, “the

evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and uncertain that the verdict shocks

the conscience of the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d

795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted),

appeal denied, 833 A.2d 143 (Pa. 2003).

      When the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on
      the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's
      decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so
      unreliable [or] contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon
      pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on
      appellate review.

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal

denied, 64 A.3d 630 (Pa. 2013). Importantly, “[a] motion for new trial on the

grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes

that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Widmer, 744 A.2d at

751; see also Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 437 (Pa. Super.

2023) (stating that, “[a] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that

sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence

is to be believed” (citation, original quotation marks, and original brackets

omitted)).

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       Regarding his conviction for third-degree murder,4 Appellant contends

that the jury’s determination that he acted with malice is contrary to the

weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 16-21. Instead, the evidence,

Appellant asserts, “suggests [he] acted negligently, not maliciously, with

respect to providing [the victim] the care she needed after falling as he did

not know the severity of her injury.”            Id. at 18.   Appellant avers that

“[t]owards the end of her life, [the victim] was an unhealthy anorexic who

suffered from anemia and was incapable of controlling her alcoholism[, and

the victim] frequently injure[d] herself by falling due to her intoxication.” Id.

at 19. Appellant argues that his testimony at trial, as well as the testimony

of his and the victim’s son, support a finding that the victim “did not appear

to be injured and there was no reason to alert 911 [emergency services] until

____________________________________________

4 Section 2502(c) of the Crimes Code defines third-degree murder as all other

kinds of murder aside from first-degree murder (intentional killing) and
second-degree murder (perpetration of a felony). 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c).
Caselaw has established that in order to convict a person of third-degree
murder, the Commonwealth must prove that the person acted with malice and
that the person’s actions resulted in the death of another.                 See
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013); see also
Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 322 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(stating, “[t]hird[-]degree murder occurs when a person commits a killing
which is neither intentional nor committed during the perpetration of a felony,
but contains the requisite malice”), appeal denied, 224 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2020).
“The malice required to sustain a third[-]degree murder or aggravated assault
conviction exists where the accused acts in gross deviation from the standard
of reasonable care, failing to perceive that such actions might create a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or serious bodily injury” and may be
“inferred from the circumstances of the accused's conduct.” Akhmedov, 216
A.3d at 322 (citation and original quotation marks omitted).

                                           -6-
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the following day when she did not awake.” Id. Appellant asserts that “his

acts appear to be more in line with an individual[] wholly unequipped to

navigate his wife’s alcoholism and his own lack of medical training.” Id. at

20. Appellant contends his “acts or omissions were not born of ill-will or a

callousness toward his wife’s apparent distress[, thereby giving rise to a

finding of malice. Rather, his acts or omissions were born from his] ignorance

of [the victim’s] need for immediate medical treatment as her state was no

different than the unconscious state he had found her in dozens of times

before.” Id. at 20-21.

      In finding that Appellant’s third-degree murder conviction was not

against the weight of the evidence, the trial court stated that “the jury's

conclusion that [Appellant] acted in a way which transcended negligence and

reached the level of malice does not shock one's sense of justice upon review

of the evidence and testimony presented during trial.” Trial Court Opinion,

1/10/23, at 7. It was reasonable, the trial court concluded, for the jury to find

that Appellant “consciously disregarded an unjustifiable and extremely high

risk that his actions or lack of actions may cause death or serious bodily

injury.” Id. The trial court noted that Appellant “was inconsistent about the

incident while testifying [at trial], indicating he only heard [the victim’s] head

hit the [piece of furniture] first then admitting to seeing and hearing the

incident.” Id. at 6 (record citation omitted). The trial court further explained

that the evidence presented at trial demonstrated that (1) Appellant “had

knowledge of his wife's anorexia, anemia, depression, slight stature,

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alcoholism, and medical history[; (2) Appellant] admitted to grabbing [the

victim] by the face to push her away from him the night of the incident[; (3)

Appellant] did not try to wake [the victim], even though she was unconscious

after the incident[ but, instead,] drank a [carbonated beverage] and watched

part of a [television] show while [the victim] lay unconscious beside him[; (4)

Appellant] went to work the next day and left [the victim] on the floor[; and

(5) Appellant only] called 911 [emergency services] approximately 43 hours

after the incident.” Id. at 6 (record citations omitted).

       Critical to finding Appellant guilty of third-degree murder was the jury’s

determination of witness credibility.            Here, the trial court, in denying

Appellant’s post-sentence motion raising a weight of the evidence claim,

considered the evidence presented at trial and the reasonableness of the jury’s

credibility determination. In particular, the trial court noted that Appellant, in

his testimony at trial, was inconsistent about the events leading up to the

victim’s injuries, and ultimately to her death.5 Id. at 6.      The trial court also
____________________________________________

5 At trial, Appellant explained that the victim sustained her injuries when she

hit her head on a piece of furniture after Appellant pushed her away from him
in the course of an argument. N.T., 2/23/22, at 326-328. After the victim hit
her head on the furniture, she remained on the floor in what Appellant
described as a “passed out state” due to her consumption of alcohol. Id. at
328. Appellant testified that a short time later, after watching television, he
went to bed and left the victim lying on the flooring, figuring that the victim
would eventually wake up and come to bed. Id. at 330. Later, Appellant
testified that, before Appellant went to work the next morning, he and his son
put the victim in bed. Id. at 332. Still later, Appellant testified that the victim
was already in bed before he went to work the next morning and that he
checked on her condition before leaving for work and found she continued to

                                           -8-
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explained that the Commonwealth witness, who was admitted as an expert in

forensic pathology, testified that the autopsy results and his post-mortem

examination of the victim’s body contradicted the explanation that the victim’s

injuries were sustained from a fall during which the victim struck a piece of

furniture. N.T., 6/22/22, at 246. Appellant’s assertion that the trial court

erred by denying his post-sentence motion raising a weight of the evidence

claim based upon his testimony and the testimony of his son (see Appellant’s

Brief at 18-19) invites this Court to do nothing more than reassess the witness

credibility and reweigh the evidence in an attempt to convince us to alter the

result reached by the jury, as fact-finder, and considered by the trial court as

in alignment with the evidence presented at trial.       We decline Appellant’s

invitation since the jury, while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and

weight of the evidence is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622, 634 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff’d,

263 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022). Moreover, we

discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Appellant’s

conviction of third-degree murder was not against the weight of the evidence.

____________________________________________

breathe. Id. at 335-336. At some point, Appellant returned home early from
work, found the victim unresponsive, and someone called 911 emergency
services. Id. at 336-337.

                                           -9-
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       Regarding his conviction of aggravated assault,6 Appellant contends that

the inconsistency of the victim’s statements surrounding the cause of her

injuries in 2016, i.e., one time stating she fell out of bed and hit her head on

a nightstand and another time stating Appellant caused the injury, “suggest[s]

that the weight of the evidence favors the notion that [] Appellant did not

cause the injury to [the victim, and] her statements regarding the cause of

her injury are not to be believed[.]” Id. at 23-24. Appellant argues that “[a]s

both the cause and severity of the [victim’s] injury are unclear, the jury was

forced to render a verdict based on speculation and conjecture[, which was

contrary to] the weight of the evidence.” Id. at 25.

       In finding that Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction did not “shock

one’s sense of justice given the totality of the evidence provided at trial[,]”

the trial court found that “a reasonable jury could perceive [the victim’s]

inconsistent statements [regarding the cause of her injury in 2016] within the

context of a difficult domestic violence dynamic wherein [the victim] wanted

to protect [Appellant,] her husband.” Id. at 11. The trial court noted that the

jury viewed pictures of the victim’s extensive injuries and heard the victim’s

accusations that “her husband beat[] her and had done so multiple times a

month for going on ten years[.]” Id. at 9 (original quotation marks and record
____________________________________________

6 Section 2702(a)(1) of the Crimes Code states that a person is guilty of
aggravated assault if the person “attempts to cause serious bodily injury to
another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly under
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).

                                          - 10 -
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citations omitted).   In particular, the trial court explained that, while the

victim, at various times, claimed her 2016 injury was caused by falling out of

bed and hitting her head on the nightstand, both an emergency medical

services (“EMS”) technician, who responded to the 911 emergency services

request, and an investigating police officer testified that they did not observe

any blood on the nightstand despite the fact the victim was “bleeding profusely

from her head” due to her injury. Id. at 9-10.

      Appellant’s conviction of aggravated assault rests upon credibility

determinations regarding the testimony and weight assigned to the evidence,

which, as discussed supra, rests fully within the purview of the jury. The jury,

as fact-finder, was free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence when

considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be assigned to

the Commonwealth’s proof. Dunkins, 229 A.3d at 634. Moreover, as the

trial court explained, the jury’s decision to convict Appellant of aggravated

assault (and to reject the victim’s one-time explanation that she struck her

head on the nightstand after falling out of bed) is supported by the testimony

of the EMS technician and investigating police officer that there was no

evidence of blood on the nightstand. As such, we find Appellant’s weight of

the evidence claim to be without merit.

      In sum, based upon on review of the record and the trial court’s

rationale, we discern no abuse discretion in the trial court’s determination that

the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 10/23/2023

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