Court Opinion

ID: 9535950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:47:11.579231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:23.782237
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, dissenting: “The question ‘Why?’ states a primitive and insistent human need. The small child, punished or deprived, demands an explanation. The existence of a rationale may not make the hurt pleasant, or even just. But the absence, or refusal, of reasons is a hallmark of injustice. So it requires no learning in law or political philosophy to apprehend that the swift ukase, without explanation, is the tyrant’s way. The despot is not bound by rules. He need not justify or account for what he does.” Marvin Frankel (former United States district court judge), Criminal Sentences 39 (1972). I do not agree that sections 5—4—1(c) and 5—8—1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 1005—4—1(c), 1005—8—1(b)) would be unconstitutional if interpreted as mandatory rather than directory. I believe the majority’s sua sponte application of the separation of powers doctrine goes far beyond the point the purposes of the doctrine dictate. Article II, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 states: “The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” It neatly and compactly expresses a doctrine that has become one of the fundamental principles of good governance since the time of Montesquieu: separation of powers. Similar provisions were in our previous Illinois constitutions. See Ill. Const. 1870, art. III; City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 173-74; Field v. People ex rel. McClernand (1839), 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79; 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 566-67 (indicating the different language in the 1970 Constitution was not meant to change the law of separation of powers). The doctrine was never meant to create rigidly separated compartments or a divorce among the three departments of government. (See Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58; In re Estate of Barker (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 113, 119; City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 174; Hill v. Relyea (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 552, 557.) As early as 1839, this court stated in Field v. People ex rel. McClernand (1839), 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 79, 83-84: “[The constitutional provision calling for separation of powers] does not mean that the legislative, executive, and judicial power should be kept so entirely separate and distinct as to have no connection or dependence, the one upon the other; but its true meaning, both in theory and practice, is, that the whole power of'two or more of these departments shall not be lodged in the same hands, whether of one or many. That this is the sense in which this maxim was understood by the authors of our government, and those of general and State governments, is evidenced by the Constitutions of all. In every one, there is a theoretical or practical recognition of this maxim, and at the same time a blending and admixture of different powers. This admixture in practice, so far as to give each department a constitutional control over the other, is considered, by the wisest statesmen, as essential in a free government, as a separation.” More recently, in City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Board (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 170, 174-75, the court, after quoting the above from McClernand, stated: “It has been generally recognized that separation of powers does not forbid every exercise of functions by one branch of government which conventionally is exercised by another branch. Professor Frank Cooper (1 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 16 (1965)) observes: ‘[T]he real thrust of the separation of powers philosophy is that each department of government must be kept free from the control or coercive influence of the other departments.’ ” Accord, Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 58-59; People v. Farr (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 209, 213; see also Hill v. Relyea (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 552, 557. James Madison, the father of the United States Constitution, agreed. Federalist Paper No. 47, of which Madison is generally credited with being the author, states that the accumulation of powers in the same hands may be called the very definition of tyranny and that such a situation is exactly what the doctrine of separation of powers was intended to prevent. It emphasizes, however, that the doctrine was not meant to so rigidly separate the governmental branches as to allow one branch no control over or no partial agency in the act of the others. It states that in fact some blending of power is inevitable. The specific issue before us is whether sections 5—4—1(c) and 5—8—1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 1005—4—1(c), 1005—8—1(b)) are infringements on judicial prerogative. Both sections require the trial judge to specify on the record the factors which led him to the particular sentence pronounced. The majority notes in passing that previous cases have held that the legislature has the power to enact laws governing judicial practice that do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary. (See People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 560; People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268, 274; Strukoff v. Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 53, 59; Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 149; People v. Callopy (1934), 358 Ill. 11, 15.) In Youngbey this court said: “The General Assembly has the power to enact law governing judicial practices when the laws do not unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of the judiciary ***.” (Emphasis added.) (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 560.) Little more than lip service is given to this precedent, however. In fact, reading the majority opinion, one gets the feeling that the conclusion that a mandatory reading of the statutes would be unconstitutional has been reached before this standard is mentioned. No enlightenment as to why this infringement on judicial power is undue is offered. Instead, the majority asserts that, unlike in previous cases, the statutes at issue here involve a procedure to be followed during the actual sentencing. According to the majority, they affect the content of the sentence, and therefore strike at the heart of a clear judicial function. Thus, they are unconstitutional if interpreted to be a mandate to the court. The statutory sections in issue do not in any way affect the ability of a trial judge to pronounce the sentence he feels is most appropriate. They dictate nothing as to the substance of the sentence. The trial judge has the freedom to sentence a defendant to anything he deems appropriate; all the statutes require is that he state what factors influenced him in arriving at his decision. They “dictate the actual content” only in the sense that they require that reasons for the sentence must be made a part of the record. Thus, they change the substance of the sentence only if we believe that many of the sentences imposed by the judiciary are completely without justification. This court has tolerated statutes which are at least as intrusive if not more intrusive on judicial power than the statutes involved in this case. In In re Griffin (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 48, we recognized only recently that section 5—1(5) of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 705—1(5)) is an important safeguard in the process of committing a juvenile to the custody of the Department of Corrections. It provides that “[w]hen commitment to the Department of Corrections is ordered, the court shall state the basis for selecting the particular disposition, and the court shall prepare such a statement for inclusion in the record.” In deciding whether to commit juveniles to the Department of Corrections trial courts exercise the same broad discretion as they exercise in the criminal-sentencing process. We saw no reason to raise a constitutional objection to the statute in Griffin, and I do not see how it was any less intrusive on judicial power than the statutes involved in this case. Moreover, it seems to me that the statute in Youngbey, which this court upheld despite arguments that it violated the separation of powers provision, was even more intrusive on judicial power than the statute involved in this case. That statute requires that a presentence report be given to and considered by the judge before he sentences a defendant. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005—3—1.) Unlike the statutory sections being considered here, it directs a judge to actually consider factors that he might otherwise wish to ignore. He is required to make the content of the presentence report a part of his thought process. Even more obtrusive are the many statutes in our criminal code that set the maximum and minimum punishments for particular kinds of crime. These, surely, strike at the very heart of the sentencing function that the majority claims is “exclusively” judicial. Yet for centuries legislatures have exercised this power, and courts have accepted the authority of legislatures to fix the punishment for crimes without suggesting that their doing so is a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislature of this State obviously has an interest in ensuring that our entire system of criminal justice is workable and fair to all concerned with it. Legislators declare what acts will be illegal and provide the permissible range of punishments. They put the ball in motion and obviously are interested in what comes after. By requiring judges to give reasons for the sentences they impose, legislators may become better informed and able to set punishment ranges. The cause of uniformity in punishment is promoted and appellate review of sentencing errors is facilitated, all without imposing any hardship on or taking any discretion away from the trial judge. The ability of the courts to decide individual cases and sentence individual defendants is completely unimpaired. It should be noted that this is not a case in which a legislative enactment conflicts with a judicial rule of procedure. There is no rule that prohibits criminal trial judges from giving reasons for the sentences they impose (in fact, the constitutionality of such a rule could be seriously questioned). If such a conflict had existed, the separation of powers issue would be very different. The court would be faced with the question of which law to follow, the rule or the statute, and perhaps then an analysis of whether the subject matter was essentially legislative or judicial would be relevant. An unfortunate aspect of the majority’s decision is that it emasculates a fair and wise pronouncement of our legislature. The sections of the Unified Code of Corrections in issue here, by requiring that reasons be set forth in sentencing, attempt to prevent the injustice Judge Frankel so eloquently described. Otherwise the sentencing procedure, more than any other aspect of a criminal trial, may appear to be arbitrary and capricious. Numbers may seem to have been taken out of a hat. By interpreting these statutes as directory rather than mandatory, this court has created a situation in which a defendant could request that a trial judge state the factors influencing his sentencing decision and be summarily denied. In such a case the statutes would be merely suggestions to the judiciary; nothing would give the defendant a right to an explanation. The result will be the creation in the eyes of the public of an imperial judiciary — a judiciary that is too busy fighting battles with the legislature over an imaginary encroachment on its independence to understand its relationship with the legislature and the people in proper perspective.