Court Opinion

ID: 9610170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:37:32.730845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:56.936714
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice, Retired.
In a jury trial in the Laramie County District Court, appellant Andrew J. Johnson was convicted of aggravated burglary and first degree sexual assault. The jury also found him to be a habitual criminal.
Counsel for appellant raised five issues on appeal:1
*1284I. Was the Appellant improperly denied his right to waive a trial by jury?
II. Was the suppression ruling of the trial judge proper?
III. Was it reversible error for the trial judge to exclude evidence of the victim’s prior reports of sexual assault based on trial counsel’s failure to comply with § 6-2-312 W.S.1977.
IV. Was it reversible error for the trial judge to allow the state to present witnesses which were not provided to the Defendant under the reciprocal discovery provision of Rule 16.1 W.R.Cr.P.?
V. Did the prosecutor impermissibly comment on the Defendant’s right to be innocent until proven guilty?
The State of Wyoming states the issues to be:
I. Does the “Supplement Brief of Appellant” filed pro se raise any issues cognizable by this court?
II. Does a criminal defendant have an unqualified right to waive a trial by jury?
III. Was the trial court’s denial of appellant's motion to suppress the identification of appellant’s eyeglasses proper?
IV. Was the admission of appellant’s identification of his eyeglasses harmful error, requiring reversal of appellant’s convictions?
V. Did the trial judge properly exclude evidence of the victim’s prior conversations of sexual assault?
VI. Did the trial judge properly allow the state to present witnesses previously noticed to the defendant, but not noticed to the defendant under the reciprocal discovery provision of Rule 16.1 W.R.Cr.P.?
VII. Did the prosecutor impermissi-bly comment on appellant’s right to be silent until proven guilty?
We affirm.
In the evening of June 10, 1989, the victim was drinking in a bar with friends. Appellant Andrew J. Johnson, known as “A.J.,” came into the bar. The victim had previously met A.J. through her boyfriend. The victim and A.J. talked about the latter’s recent break-up with his girlfriend. They decided to check out a few well-known watering holes in Cheyenne.
The victim did not have identification to gain entrance into certain establishments, so she and A.J. drove to her house to look for her I.D. Upon arriving at her house, A.J. went to the living room, sat down in a chair and remained there while the victim looked for her I.D. She did not find it. Nevertheless, they went to the Cheyenne Club with assurances from A.J. that he could gain her admittance to the bar. From there they went to the Mayflower, where they were asked for identification. The victim remembers A.J. reaching into his back pocket and showing his identification card at the Mayflower. After leaving the Mayflower, the victim drove home, leaving A.J. at an unidentified building.
After reaching her house, the victim went to bed. She was awakened sometime later by a banging on her door, and a voice she recognized as A.J.’s. She heard the glass on the door break and footsteps move across the glass. The victim could see the intruder clearly and recognized him as appellant, Andrew J. Johnson. The victim jumped out of bed, pushed appellant and ran toward the bathroom. Appellant grabbed the victim’s arms, twisted them behind her back, and threw her face down onto the floor and proceeded to ravish her. Appellant then turned the victim over onto her back and again raped her.
A downstairs neighbor heard the victim scream, dialed 911 and reported what she was hearing. Officer Alan W. Spencer responded to the 911 call. He noted the broken glass inside the apartment and supposed that someone standing outside the apartment must have broken the windows. Spencer heard crying, whimpering and *1285muffled yells coming from the apartment. The victim was sobbing and in a hysterical emotional state. Through her cries, the victim said, “He hurt me, he hurt me.” Officer Spencer asked, “Who hurt you?” The victim responded that it was “A.J.” who had hurt her.
Officer Spencer found appellant’s identification on the floor of the victim’s apartment. The identification packet was properly received into evidence as state’s exhibit 13. State’s exhibit 13 consisted, in part, of a Wyoming identification card and a Wyoming driver’s license. Both items of identification show appellant wearing glasses, and the glasses worn in the identification appear identical to the glasses found at the victim’s apartment. Spencer showed the identification to the victim and asked, “Is this the A.J. you’re talking about?” The victim, upon looking at the picture, went into hysterics, but eventually responded, “Yes, that’s A.J.”
About two days after the rape, the victim found a pair of glasses in her bedroom. She thought the glasses must have belonged to appellant, so she called Detective Stanford of the Cheyenne Police Department. Appellant subsequently identified the glasses as his. The victim remembered appellant wearing his glasses at the bar after they had looked for her identification, and she testified at trial that she had never seen appellant without his glasses.
Appellant appeals from his jury conviction.
I
At his arraignment and again before trial, appellant requested that his case be tried before the court without a jury. The state did not consent to a nonjury trial. Because of the state’s refusal to waive a jury trial, the court directed that the case be heard by a jury.
The waiver of right to a jury trial is controlled by W.R.Cr.P. 24(a). This rule provides:
Trial by jury. — Cases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the state.
This rule confers upon the defendant a “qualified” right to waive a jury trial. The right is qualified because waiver requires approval of the court and consent of the state. In Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 854 (Wyo.1980), 37 A.L.R.4th 304, 315 (1985), this court stated:
In other words, the rules implicitly acknowledge that the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right of the defendant, the waiver of which is qualified in the context that it may not be exercised without the approval of the court and the consent of the State.
An accused does not have a right to a trial to the court. In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36, 85 S.Ct. 783, 790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630, 638 (1965), the Court pointed out that:
We find no constitutional impediment to ■conditioning a waiver of this right [the right to trial by jury] on the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial judge when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury — the very thing that the Constitution guarantees him.
Appellant contends, that there is an exception to the general rule that the state must consent to a nonjury trial. In support of this contention he refers to Singer:
We need not determine in this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant’s reasons for wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government’s insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where “passion, prejudice ... public feeling” or some other factor may render impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury.
Singer, 380 U.S. at 37-38, 85 S.Ct. at 791 (footnote omitted).
Referring to the quotation from Singer, appellant states in his brief to the court:
This passage creates an exception to the generally accepted proposition that there *1286is no constitutional impediment to conditioning the Defendant’s right to waive a jury trial upon the approval of the court and the consent of the state. The court points out that in certain cases trial to a jury would violate the Defendant’s right to an impartial trial. This is exactly such a case.
This case involves an accused who is a black and an alleged sexual assault victim who is white. The crime is alleged to have occurred in Cheyenne, Wyoming, a community with a limited number of black persons. The number of blacks is so limited that not one black was impan-elled on the jury venire, and obviously no blacks sat on the Appellant’s jury. This situation is sufficient to implicate the Appellant’s ability to receive a fair jury trial. However, additionally is the fact that the crime appellant was accused of is one of the type which tends to arouse the passions, prejudice and public feelings of any community. * * * Appellant had no chance of receiving an impartial jury trial.
While appellant phrases this issue as a denial of a right to a nonjury trial, his argument is that he was denied the right to an impartial jury. If the right to a fair and impartial jury is questioned, a motion for a change of venue is the proper recourse under W.R.Cr.P. 23(a). Appellant has presented no evidence, to either the trial court or this court, that would tend to show prejudice so great as to deprive him of an impartial jury. An accused is guaranteed the right to a trial by jury; he is not guaranteed the right to a nonjury trial. Trial by jury was not error. This conclusion is supported, almost without exception, by other jurisdictions which have a rule the same or very similar to Wyoming’s. Annotation, Right of Accused, in State Criminal Trial, to Insist, Over Prosecutor’s or Court’s Objection, on Trial by Court Without Jury, 37 A.L.R.4th 304, 310-15 (1985).
II
On Tuesday, June 13, 1989, Detective Stanford received a call over his police radio concerning additional evidence at the victim’s house. He proceeded to the victim’s house and was shown the glasses. On June 29, Detective Stanford was told that appellant wanted his glasses. In fact, from the time appellant was arrested on June 11, 1989, until June 29, 1989, he had made several requests for his glasses. The detention nurse at the county jail checked appellant’s personal property for his glasses, but none were found. Appellant became angry and demanded his glasses. He stated that he knew Detective Stanford had them and threatened to sue the county for denying him medical care. Appellant told the detention nurse to call Detective Stanford, which she did. Stanford, after being summoned to the jail by appellant, brought the glasses to appellant. Detective Stanford asked appellant if the glasses were his. Appellant answered affirmatively. The glasses were not given to appellant but were preserved for evidence.
Before trial, appellant made a motion to suppress the inculpatory statements made by him to Detective Stanford regarding his ownership of the glasses. At the suppression hearing, Detective Stanford testified that he felt an identification of the glasses was important because it would place the defendant at the scene of the crime. He further testified that it was his intent to get an identification of the glasses when he went to the jail.
Appellant contends in his second issue that the statements made by him regarding ownership of the glasses should have been suppressed because his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated. The right to counsel attaches when adversarial criminal proceedings against the accused have been commenced. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wyo.1983). “Once an accused has expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation until counsel is made available, unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.” Griffin v. State, 749 P.2d 246, 253 (Wyo.1988). Griffin defines “interrogation” as *1287“only words or actions by police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 253-54.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981), the Court held that an accused person in custody who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” In the case here, appellant learned at the preliminary hearing that the police had his glasses, and he demanded their return and told the detention nurse to specifically call Detective Stanford. The trial court found that appellant initiated the further communication, exchange or conversation with the police, and denied suppression of his statement.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-89, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 306-07 (1980), the Supreme Court defined the term “interrogation” for constitutional purposes. The Court recognized that “ ‘[interrogation’ * * * must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” The Court then defined interrogation as “any words or actions on the part of police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. The Innis court points out that the definition of interrogation “focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.” Id.
Arguably, according to the Innis definition of interrogation, appellant cannot be said to have been interrogated by the police. He demanded his glasses, which he knew Detective Stanford had, then he demanded to speak with Detective Stanford. There is no evidence of coercion or compulsion. Appellant voluntarily gave whatever statements he made regarding his glasses; the police responded to the demands made by appellant.
In Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 1936-37, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987), the Court points out that the purpose behind the decisions in Miranda and Edwards is to prevent “government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.”
The state argues that when appellant told the detention nurse that he knew the police had his glasses, he was voluntarily giving a statement in an unrestrained environment. The State argues further that the simple act of verifying that the glasses held by the police were the glasses appellant claimed were his cannot be said to amount to coercive interrogation. We would have no problem with the introduction of the glasses into evidence except that Officer Stanford admitted that he intended to have appellant identify the glasses in order to place him at the scene of the crime.
Whether the trial court improperly denied appellant’s motion to suppress his statements to Officer Stanford is a close question. We will, for the purposes of this case, assume that denial of the motion was error. However, the state’s evidence against appellant is so overwhelming that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The'proper analysis to be employed in this case is that found in Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358 (Wyo.1979). There the court held that, “[bjefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the burden is on the State to demonstrate and the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 367.
Appellant’s claim of a sixth amendment violation is only his statement identifying his glasses, not the introduction of the glasses into evidence. Notwithstanding testimony relating to appellant’s identification, the glasses could still have been introduced into evidence and the jury could have reasonably inferred from other evidence that they belonged to appellant.
*1288To reiterate, during the trial, the victim testified that while she and appellant were out on the night of June 10, 1989, she remembered appellant taking off and wiping his glasses. The victim’s boyfriend and appellant’s friend also testified concerning the glasses. He stated that he did not wear glasses himself and had never seen appellant without his glasses. Officer Bilk-ie, who arrested appellant, testified that appellant was not wearing glasses when he was arrested, and he did not wear glasses to the station.
The appellant’s defense was based upon the premise of mistaken identity. The evidence regarding the glasses is only one piece of evidence establishing identity. There is much more. The victim testified that she was at home in bed when a banging on her door woke her up with a voice saying “let me in.” The victim testified that she recognized the voice as that of appellant. The victim testified that she recognized appellant as the person who raped her. The police found appellant’s driver’s license and state identification card at the scene of the crime. The state’s expert witness conducted tests on the seminal fluid found in the victim. The state’s expert was able to exclude 95 percent of the population. Appellant is among the five percent who could have left the seminal fluid. The evidence presented by the state identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime is overwhelming. There is no possibility that, in the absence of the error, the verdict would have been more favorable to appellant. Campbell, 589 P.2d at 367.
Ill
Appellant attempted to introduce evidence at trial that the victim had falsely reported a previous sexual assault. The trial judge refused to allow this evidence based upon appellant’s failure to file proper notice under the Wyoming Rape Shield Act, W.S. 6-2-312 (June 1988 Repl.).2 Appellant contends, however, that the Rape Shield Act was inapplicable in this case. According to appellant, it was not the purpose of this line of questioning to smear the victim’s credibility through introduction of her prior sexual activity. Rather, appellant contends he attempted to impeach the witness through the use of prior false reports to the police and the fact that these false reports related to sexual assaults is a coincidence. The attack on the victim’s credibility was grounded in untruthfulness, not in prior sexual activity, according to appellant’s theory.' Appellant contends that the offered testimony should have been received under the purposes listed in W.R.E. 404(b).3
Appellant attempted to introduce evidence that, at some time in the past, the victim had told a person in a bar that she had been sexually assaulted. The court allowed appellant to make an offer of proof. Counsel for appellant asked whether the victim had told people in a bar that she had been sexually assaulted; the victim denied any such conversation. Appellant then offered evidence consisting of a witness who would testify that the victim, in a barroom conversation, told him that she had been sexually assaulted. There is no indication in the record that the victim ever made a police report concerning a sexual assault or that any alleged prior conversation concerning a sexual assault was false.
Since appellant grounds his contention of error on Rule 404(b), we note that in Gra*1289bill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 808 (Wyo.1980), this court held the principal test to determine admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b)
is whether or not it tends directly to prove or disprove a consequential fact such as intent or knowledge, or whether or not it may tend to establish a proposition such as motive, which through a series of inferences may tend to establish the probability of a consequential fact such as intent or knowledge.
Appellant’s proffered evidence does not meet the criteria for admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b). He did not claim that the victim harbored some resentment toward him, nor that she had any other motive or plan to implicate him. Likewise, there was nothing in the evidence to suggest that the prior assault was reported, or if it was reported, that it was done falsely or to harass. The evidence sought to be introduced would not tend to establish any such fact, and the record does not support any inference that the victim employed some sort of scheme or plan or had any motive to accuse appellant of rape. The excluded evidence would have only served to attack the credibility of the victim. This court, in Velos v. State, 752 P.2d 411, 414 (Wyo.1988), held that evidence of prior sexual conduct used to attack a victim’s credibility was inadmissible under W.R.E. 608(b).
Finally, appellant has not presented any authority or cogent argument in support of his contention that the proffered evidence should have been admitted and we need not address the issue further.
IV
In appellant’s fourth assignment of error he argues that:
Reversible error was committed when the trial court allowed the state to present witnesses which were not noticed to the defense under the reciprocal discovery provision of Rule 16.1, W.R. Cr.P.[4]
On August 10, 1989, in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 16.1, the state made demand on appellant for notice of alibi. On August 22, 1989, in response to this demand, appellant listed three alibi witnesses. On September 12, 1989, the state filed a precipe for subpoena listing the state’s witnesses. A copy of the precipe was given to appellant’s trial counsel about two weeks before trial. Counsel for appellant and appellee discussed the expected testimony of the witnesses and appellant’s counsel made notations on the precipe. The state did not further respond to appellant’s notice of alibi. The state argues that the witnesses listed in the precipe were the witnesses who would incriminate appellant and, if necessary, also rebut alibi witnesses.
It does not appear that W.R.Cr.P. 16.1 has any application to this case. At trial, appellant did not call the witnesses he had listed as alibi witnesses nor did other witnesses say anything about an alibi. W.R. Cr.P. 16.1 is applicable only if an alibi witness does, in fact, testify at trial.
Appellant brings to our attention People v. Jarrett, 22 Ill.App.3d 61, 316 N.E.2d 659 (1974) and Smith v. State, 319 So.2d 14 (Fla.1975). In both of these cases, alibi witnesses were called by appellant at trial and .the state responded by calling rebuttal witnesses. The Illinois and Florida courts *1290determined that allowing the rebuttal witnesses to testify was error because the state had not disclosed to appellant the names of the rebuttal witnesses.
The cases cited by appellant have no application to the case before this court. Succinctly, there were no alibi witnesses nor any rebuttal witnesses. In any event, appellant cannot in good faith contend that he was surprised that the victim, who was listed as a witness, would incriminate him and place him at the scene of the crime.
Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit.
V
Appellant’s fifth assignment of error states: “The prosecutor made improper comment on the defendant’s right to remain innocent until proven guilty.” As nearly as we can determine from appellant’s brief, he makes two complaints in this assignment of error: (1) through questioning, the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s right to remain silent; and (2) through questioning, the prosecutor suggested that the defendant should prove his innocence.
Detective Stanford testified at trial that appellant was able to identify the pair of eyeglasses as being his.5 Appellant contends that this testimony constituted an improper comment on his right to remain silent. We cannot follow appellant’s reasoning on this alleged error. It does not seem possible that the jury could have determined that the eyeglass identification related to appellant’s right to remain silent. Appellant did not testify at trial. Remaining silent at trial cannot preclude the state from introducing statements made by him at another time and place.
• The test for determining what constitutes an improper comment by a prosecutor is set forth in Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168 (10th Cir.1955), and adopted by Wyoming in Oldham v. State, 534 P.2d 107 (Wyo.1975). The test, as defined in Knowles, is:
[Wjhether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. It is not improper'for the government to draw attention to the failure or lack of evidence on a point if it is not intended to call attention to the failure of the defendant to testify.
Knowles, 224 F.2d at 169 (citation omitted).
Other alleged error with respect to the eyeglass identification is discussed in the second assignment of error.
The second incident claimed by appellant to be a comment on his right to remain silent occurred during the testimony of Jal-ene Griffin, a forensic scientist. Appellant contends that during redirect of this witness, the prosecutor proceeded on a line of questioning which elicited the response that the defendant could have had his own tests made by the state crime laboratory.
By Mr. Forwood
q * * * [W]ho does the state crime lab perform work for?
A. Various agencies of Wyoming state.
Q. Such as the prosecutor’s office?
A. Yes.
Q. The police?
A. Police departments, sheriff’s offices.
Q. Do you do work for a defense agency?
A. That has been done. But I have not personally.
Q. Do you know if that takes place?
A. Yes, it can.
Q. And if defense counsel, for example, requests a test be done, that should be run[?]
MR. SERELSON: Your Honor, because of the presumption of innocence, there’s no burden on Mr. Johnson to prove anything.
*1291MR. FORWOOD: Your Honor, I don’t want to leave the jury with the impression that the tests are only done for the state.
Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53 (Wyo.1986) is authority for our determination that, in the case before us, there was no comment, through questioning, on appellant’s right of silence. In that case, defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. During trial, the prosecutor asked a police officer whether “the defendant ever ask[ed] to be taped so he could preserve that for evidence at trial?” Id. at 55. This Court affirmed Gomez because “[i]n this case there simply was no comment upon Gomez’ exercise of his right of silence.” Id. at 56. The alleged improper comments in this case are even more innocuous than the comments in Gomez. Here, as in Gomez, the prosecutor’s statements simply do not constitute comments upon appellant’s right of silence. Furthermore, the testimony regarding the tests do not suggest that defendant need prove his innocence. The testimony merely shows that the state laboratory facility is not exclusively available to the police, sheriff or the prosecution.
VI
Appellant, in his pro se supplemental brief filed with this court, raises six issues, none of which are supported by authority or cogent argument. Footnote 1 sets out the issues raised by appellant pro se.
In his first pro se issue, appellant contends that it was error for the district court to sentence him as a habitual criminal because, when he pled guilty to prior felonies, the court failed, during the plea hearings, to inform him that his guilty pleas may be later used against him in a habitual criminal hearing.
In Carson v. State, 755 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo.1988), the court held that the “trial court’s duty to insure that a defendant understand the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters one extends only to direct consequences of such a plea.” Possible use of the guilty plea at a later habitual criminal proceeding for sentence enhancement of a subsequent conviction is a collateral consequence. Under W.R.Cr.P. 15, the trial court is not required to inform the defendant of all the possible collateral consequences.
In Issue II raised pro se by appellant, he claims that State’s Exhibit 12 was altered. The exhibit was a photograph of an area in the victim’s apartment. When Exhibit 12 was identified by Detective Spencer at trial, he marked the spot where he found appellant’s identification. The exhibit was received into evidence. Appellant’s pro se argument with respect to Issue II is spurious.
Appellant’s pro se Issue V addresses remarks made by the prosecutor concerning what appellant was wearing on the night of the attack. While the actual items of apparel were not introduced into evidence, there was testimony from witnesses concerning the attire of appellant on the night of the attack. The attire of appellant was introduced as testimonial evidence rather than physical evidence. This testimony supports the statements made by the prosecutor. In support of this issue, appellant cites venerable Ruling Case Law (22 R.C.L. 104 (1918)) explaining the duties of the district attorney. The excerpt from R.C.L. has nothing to do with this case.
In pro se Issues III, IV and VI, appellant makes reference to perjured testimony and false evidence. In a pro se reply brief, appellant attempts to raise still another issue. In this brief he charges the attorney general with perjury. Appellant has an obsession with perjury. His concept of perjury is that if a statement is contrary to his version of a fact, it is perjury. There is no merit to appellant's perjury argument.
We have carefully considered the five issues raised by appellate counsel. We have also considered the six issues plus one raised by appellant pro se. We do not find reversible error.
Affirmed.
URBIGKIT, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.

. Appellant filed a brief pro se and raised additional issues:
I. Should the trial judge have allowed the district attorney to use the habitual criminal under the provision of s. 6-10-201 et seq. W.S.1977, against the appellant when the District Court of the First Judicial District, did not advise the appellant of his constitutional right, either as a deprivation of due process of law or as a denial of equal protection of the laws?
II. It was reversible error for the trial judge to aIIo[w] the state to alter the photograph, to make an identification card appear in it.
*1284III. Did the forensic scientist crime laboratory give perjured testimony; prior to her written report?
IV. Did the district attorney use false evidence?
V. Did the district attorney make remarks before the jury that went beyond the evidence?
VI. Did police, detective, and victim give perjured testimony during the court hearings about my eye-glasses?

. W.S. 6-2-312 reads in pertinent part:
(a) In any prosecution under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-305 or for any lesser included offense, if evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the character of the victim is to be offered the following procedure shall be used:
(i) A written motion shall be made by the defendant to the court at least ten (10) days prior to the trial stating that the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of the victim and its relevancy to the defense[.]

. W.R.E. 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. — Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

4. W.R.Cr.P. 16.1 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Notice by defendant. — Upon written demand of the attorney for the state stating the time, date, and place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant shall serve within ten (10) days, or at such different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the state a written notice of his intention to offer a defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to establish such alibi.
(b) Disclosure of information and witness.— Within ten (10) days thereafter, but in no event less than ten (10) days before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for the state shall serve upon the defendant or his attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the state intends to rely to establish the defendant’s presence at the scene of the alleged offense and any other witnesses to be relied on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi witnesses.

. A more detailed account and discussion of the eyeglass problem is discussed in the second assignment of error.