Court Opinion

ID: 9880686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 14:07:46.488935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:10.442341
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-546

           JOHN DOE, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD NO. 526500

                                       vs.

                        SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY BOARD.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment

 affirming his classification by the Sex Offender Registry Board

 (SORB) as a level two sex offender.           On appeal, the plaintiff

 claims that the hearing examiner abused her discretion by (1)

 classifying him as a level two sex offender, and (2) denying his

 motion for expert funds.        We affirm.

       Discussion.     1.   Classification.      "A reviewing court may

 set aside or modify [SORB]'s classification decision where it

 determines that the decision is in excess of [SORB]'s statutory

 authority or jurisdiction, is based on an error of law, is not

 supported by substantial evidence, or is an arbitrary and

 capricious abuse of discretion."          Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd.

 No. 3177 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 486 Mass. 749, 754 (2021)

 (Doe No. 3177).      See G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7).         We give "due
weight to [SORB's] experience, technical competence, and

specialized knowledge," id., and the burden is on the plaintiff,

as the appealing party, to demonstrate that the decision was

invalid.   See Doe No. 3177, supra at 757.

    "Where [SORB] determines that the risk of reoffense is

moderate and the degree of dangerousness posed to the public is

such that a public safety interest is served by public

availability of registration information, it shall give a level

2 designation to the sex offender."   G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).

See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender

Registry Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 656 (2019) (Doe No. 496501)

(requiring SORB to make three findings by clear and convincing

evidence to issue level two classification).

    Here, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to five counts of rape

of a child with force, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A.

Thereafter, SORB notified the plaintiff of his duty to register

as a level three sex offender, pursuant to G. L. c. 6, § 178K

(2) (c).   After a de novo hearing in which the plaintiff

challenged SORB's recommendation, the hearing examiner

determined that the plaintiff presents a moderate risk of

reoffense and a moderate degree of dangerousness such that a

public safety interest is served by public access to his sex

offender registry information and Internet dissemination.    As a

result, the plaintiff was ordered to register as a level two sex

                                 2
offender, which is a less severe classification than SORB's

recommendation.

    The plaintiff claims that the hearing examiner erred by

concluding that the risk of reoffense is moderate and that a

public safety interest is served by public availability of his

registration information.   Specifically, he maintains that SORB

failed to prove that the plaintiff should be classified as a

level two sex offender by clear and convincing evidence.   We

disagree.

    The hearing examiner found that the plaintiff was eighteen

years old when he and his friend forcefully raped two extra-

vulnerable fourteen year old girls by way of vaginal, anal, and

oral penetration, causing bodily injuries to both victims that

required medical care.   The hearing examiner concluded, in an

abundance of caution, that the relationship between the

plaintiff and one of the victims was extrafamilial and that the

other victim was a stranger to the plaintiff.   The plaintiff has

a history of substance abuse, and substance use contributed to

the rapes.   Additionally, the plaintiff had prior contact with

the criminal justice system, violated probation on two separate

occasions, and received four disciplinary reports while

incarcerated.

    Considering the above facts, the hearing examiner properly

applied high-risk factor 3 and risk-elevating factors 7, 8, 9,

                                 3
10, 12, 13, 18, 19, and 22 to the governing sex offenses.     She

assigned varying weights to each of these factors after

thoroughly and deliberately analyzing the nature of the relevant

facts in her decision.

    The plaintiff erroneously argues that the hearing examiner

"underweighted certain mitigating evidence" in applying risk-

mitigating factors 28, 32, 33, and 34.     Under 803 Code Mass.

Regs. § 1.33(28) (2016), "Factor 28 may be given less weight if

there is a history of probation violations."    Thus, while the

hearing examiner considered that the plaintiff will be on

probation with special conditions for five years after his

incarceration sentence, she was entitled to give this factor

only moderate weight because the plaintiff had two prior

probation violations, regardless of the underlying nature of

these violations.   The hearing examiner was also entitled to

give minimal weight to factor 32 because the plaintiff was

ordered to complete a sex offender evaluation with treatment as

a condition of probation and, at the time of the hearing, had

only completed a sex offender treatment introduction class and a

violence reduction class.

    Moreover, the hearing examiner properly gave only moderate

weight to factor 33.     Although she found that the plaintiff has

supports in his life, the hearing examiner was appropriately

concerned with the authenticity of his romantic relationship,

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his mother's attempts to rationalize what happened, and the fact

that his girlfriend does not believe he committed any sex

offenses.   These facts speak directly to the plaintiff's support

system's ability to provide "guidance, supervision, and support

of rehabilitation."    803 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.33(33).     Finally,

the hearing examiner was entitled to give only minimal weight to

factor 34 because the plaintiff was still incarcerated at the

time of the hearing; thus, the level to which he could

demonstrate stability in the community was limited.

    The plaintiff particularly takes issue with the weight the

hearing examiner gave the psychological evaluation written by

Dr. Jill G. Durand, which the hearing examiner considered under

additional factor 35.    As SORB correctly points out, the

plaintiff did not raise this issue below, so his argument is

waived on appeal.     See Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 65

Mass. App. Ct. 803, 810 (2006).       But even if we were to consider

this issue not waived, we would conclude that the hearing

examiner did not abuse her discretion in limiting the weight

given to this report to the extent the tests and tools Dr.

Durand used were correctly applied to the facts and the extent

each may be seen as a general indicator of risk of reoffense as

an adult offender.

    Finally, the plaintiff claims that the hearing examiner's

"core error was to have concluded that public safety is served

                                  5
by classifying [the plaintiff] as a moderate-risk offender,

thereby requiring Internet dissemination" and that she failed to

make specific findings supporting this conclusion.       The

plaintiff relies on this court's unpublished decision in Doe,

Sex Offender Registry No. 523617 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd.,

97 Mass. App. Ct. 1107 (2020) (Doe No. 523617) to support his

argument.   While unpublished decisions may be cited for their

persuasive value, they are not binding on this court.       See Chace

v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

    But even if we were bound by the decision in Doe No.

523617, the plaintiff's reliance is misplaced.       In that case,

the hearing examiner failed to make any reference to a public

safety interest that would be served by Internet publication of

the plaintiff's registry information in his findings -- he

simply stated that "dissemination of [the plaintiff's] personal

information [was] appropriate."       Doe No. 523617, 97 Mass. App.

Ct. at 1107.   Moreover, the underlying facts of that case did

not "'clearly dictate' that [I]nternet publication serve[d] a

public safety interest" such that a remand for explicit findings

would be unnecessary.   See id.

    By contrast, the hearing examiner here described in detail

the relevant public safety interest that would be served by

public availability of the plaintiff's registration information

based on the facts presented:

                                  6
       "I find by clear and convincing evidence that the
       aforementioned risk factors are evidence of an increased
       risk to re-offend and dangerousness and warrant Internet
       access to the [plaintiff]’s registry information in the
       interest of public safety to prevent female Victims, such
       as the Victims here, from becoming Victims of sex
       offenses. . . . Should [the plaintiff] reoffend, it will
       likely be against an unsuspecting female that he is or is
       not acquainted with and possibly with another male cohort.
       Also, like in this case, the [plaintiff] may be under the
       influence of drugs or alcohol as well as the potential
       victim, thereby rendering her (extra)vulnerable.
       Therefore, teenage girls, their caretakers, and other
       potential [victim]s who become acquainted with or are in
       the company of [the plaintiff] should have access to his
       registry information in order to protect themselves and
       their child(ren)."

       The plaintiff argues that this "speculative and caveat-

filled language" fails to clearly dictate that Internet

publication serves a public safety interest.    This argument,

however, conflates the requirement for the hearing examiner to

make explicit their findings regarding the elements supporting

the sex offender's classification level with the standard for

whether a remand for explicit findings is necessary when this

requirement is not met.    See Doe No. 496501, 482 Mass. at 657

n.4.

       In addition to the language quoted above, the hearing

examiner explicitly noted how the relevant factors affect the

public safety throughout her analysis.    Moreover, the underlying

facts, on which the plaintiff was convicted of five counts of

rape of a child, so clearly dictate the appropriate

classification level that a remand for explicit findings would

                                  7
not be necessary in any case.     Therefore, the hearing examiner

did not err in classifying the plaintiff as a level two sex

offender.

    2.    Expert funds.    The plaintiff also claims that the

hearing examiner abused her discretion by denying his motion for

expert funds.    We disagree.

    "[T]he decision whether to grant an individual sex offender

funds for an expert is a discretionary one, to be based on the

facts presented in an individual case."     Doe, Sex Offender

Registry Bd. No. 89230 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass.

764, 775 (2008).    "[I]n moving for expert witness funds, the

burden [is] on the sex offender to identify and articulate the

reason or reasons, connected to a condition or circumstance

special to him, that he needs to retain a particular type of

expert.     A general motion for funds to retain an expert to

provide an opinion on the sex offender's risk of reoffense,

without more, would appear to be insufficient."     Id.   The

plaintiff's motion for funds failed to meet this burden.

    The plaintiff requested funds for an expert to testify

about adolescent brain development and neurobiological maturity

to demonstrate that the plaintiff's risk of reoffense would be

low because "he was a juvenile in development and maturity."

However, the plaintiff was eighteen years old at the time of the

sex offenses, and thus, he was not a juvenile.     See 803 Code

                                   8
Mass. Regs. § 1.03 (2016) (defining "juvenile").      Therefore, the

expert would not have assisted the hearing examiner in

determining the appropriate classification level for the

plaintiff, and the hearing examiner properly denied the motion

for funds.    See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 15606 v. Sex

Offender Registry Bd., 452 Mass. 784, 794 (2008).

       Moreover, even if we were to agree with the plaintiff's

purported distinction between a "juvenile" and an "adolescent,"

we fail to see how the plaintiff's status as an adolescent is a

condition or circumstance special to him that would justify the

granting of expert funds.    Accordingly, the hearing examiner did

not abuse her discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for

expert funds.

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade,
                                        Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.1),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    September 28, 2023.

1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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