Court Opinion

ID: 9594978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:29.740132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:25.514564
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I can concur with the majority’s opinion only as to its holding regarding the real property. I am the first to admit that the disposition of tractor attachments in a divorce proceeding does not seem to be a matter worthy of a written dissent. But my concern is not with the mundane farm implements in this case, but rather with the majority’s failure to apply well established principles of law that mandate affirmance of the trial court’s ruling regarding those tractor attachments.
It is well established that the court may construe a verdict in the light of the pleadings and the evidence adduced at trial in order to conform to the reasonable intendment of the jury. See Turley v. Turley, 244 Ga. 808 (262 SE2d 112) (1979); Gough v. Gough, 238 Ga. 695 (2) (235 SE2d 9) (1977). The judge in the case at bar had presided at the trial of the divorce and had the pleadings before him when he construed the jury’s verdict and ruled against Mr. Mitchell’s claim for the tractor attachments. It is also well established that the appealing party has the burden of proving error by the record and that in the absence of anything to the contrary, this court should presume that a judge’s ruling was authorized by the pleadings, admissions made by the parties, or by the evidence at trial. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 259 Ga. 838 (388 SE2d 688) (1990); Newton v. Newton, 222 Ga. 175 (2) (149 SE2d 128) (1966). Accord Law v. Coleman, 173 Ga. 68 (1) (159 SE 679) (1931). Mr. Mitchell, the appellant, chose not to include the pleadings or the trial transcript in the record on appeal, and the majority — without benefit of those pleadings or the evidence heard by the jury — has chosen to accept at face value Mr. Mitchell’s *185unsupported assertion that the trial court’s ruling did not reflect the reasonable intendment of the jury, thereby ignoring the presumption of validity the law accords to the trial court’s ruling.
Decided June 14, 1993.
Albert B. Wallace, Stephen B. Wallace II, for appellant.
Arch W. McGarity, Thomas D. Carr, for appellee.
That “tractor” does not include tractor attachments for ownership-by-accession purposes has no bearing on what the jury in this divorce case intended to include in its award or whether this trial court erred in determining the reasonable intendment of the jury, as shown by pleadings and evidence not before the appellate court. That an appellant claims a trial court’s ruling was wrong does not justify ignoring legal presumptions and the evidentiary burdens placed on appealing parties. Because I would require Mr. Mitchell to prove the trial court’s ruling was error and because there is nothing in the record to rebut the presumption that the trial court’s ruling was correct, I dissent.