Court Opinion

ID: 9385697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 20:00:57.33378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.949582
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11404    Document: 39-1     Date Filed: 04/07/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11404
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       KIEON JENNINGS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cr-60193-BB-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11404     Document: 39-1     Date Filed: 04/07/2023    Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11404

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Kieon Jennings appeals his 120-month sentence for intent to
       distribute fentanyl, cocaine, and cocaine base, and possession of a
       firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He argues that
       the special condition of supervised release prohibiting him from as-
       sociating with documented gang members while on supervised re-
       lease is not reasonably related to sentencing goals, not factually
       supported, and violated his constitutional rights.
              We normally review the imposition of special conditions of
       supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Taylor,
       338 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). Under this standard of review,
       we will not reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in the
       conclusion it reached. Id. Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed
       forfeited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
       stances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–72 (11th Cir.
       2022) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
              It is well-settled that disputed facts are not evidence upon
       which the district court can rely. United States v. Rodriguez,
       732 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). When a defendant challenges
       one of the factual bases of his sentence, the government has the
       burden of establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance of the
       evidence. United States v. Little, 864 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.
       2017). This burden must be satisfied with reliable and specific
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       22-11404               Opinion of the Court                         3

       evidence. United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir.
       2009). The preponderance of the evidence standard requires only
       that the trier of fact believes that the existence of a fact is more
       probable than its nonexistence. United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d
       1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). In order to meet this standard, the ev-
       idence submitted to prove the existence of the fact in question must
       bear some indicia of reliability. Id. In short, the trier of fact must
       find the existence of a fact more probable than not in order to sat-
       isfy the standard. United States v. Dimitrovski, 782 F.3d 622, 628
       (11th Cir. 2015).
               A district court may order special conditions of supervised
       release so long as each condition: (1) is reasonably related to the
       nature and circumstances of the offense, history, and characteris-
       tics of the defendant; the need for adequate deterrence; the need to
       protect the public; and the need to provide the defendant with
       needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment in an ef-
       fective manner; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than
       is reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals of deterrence, pro-
       tecting the public, and rehabilitation; and (3) is consistent with any
       pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
       18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(3); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D).
               It is not necessary for a special condition to be supported by
       each relevant § 3553(a) factor; rather, each factor is an independent
       consideration to be weighed. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d
       1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 2010). While a condition of supervised release
       should not unduly restrict a defendant’s liberty, a condition is not
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11404

       invalid simply because it affects a probationer’s ability to exercise
       constitutionally protected rights. Id.
              Here, the district court abused its discretion in overruling
       Jennings’s objections and imposing the gang association special
       condition of supervised release because the district court relied on
       disputed facts and the undisputed record failed to support the con-
       dition. Taylor, 338 F.3d at 1283; Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1305.
              Jennings objected to the PSI’s suggestion that he was a “doc-
       umented gang member,” pursuant to Florida Statue § 874.03, as
       well as to the PSI’s inclusion of factual descriptions of alleged of-
       fense conduct in Paragraphs 38–47 and 49–61. Jennings then reit-
       erated these objections during his sentencing hearing. Because Jen-
       nings challenged facts contained in the PSI that would be used as
       the factual basis for a special condition of supervised release, the
       burden shifted to the government to prove that Jennings was a
       “documented gang member” by a preponderance of the evidence
       using reliable and specific evidence. Little, 864 F.3d at 1290; Mar-
       tinez, 584 F.3d at 1027. While the government initially opposed
       Jennings’s objections through a written response and proffered ev-
       idence showing Jennings’s gang ties, it withdrew its response and
       any opposition to Jennings’s gang-related objections during the
       sentencing hearing. Realizing that the government had withdrawn
       its opposition to Jennings’s objections and its proffer of evidence,
       the district court expressly said it was making no findings of fact
       with respect to any gang affiliations. See Sentencing Trans. Doc.
       71 at 13, 14.
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       22-11404               Opinion of the Court                        5

              Due to Jennings’s objections and the government’s failure to
       prove the disputed facts, the record was devoid of any evidence
       that Jennings was a designated “documented gang member” under
       Florida Statute § 874.03, of any evidence of any gang membership
       with the Alwoods Gang, Gangster Disciples, or any other gang, or
       any affiliation or association with any gang. Because the record
       was devoid of evidence showing any gang ties whatsoever, the spe-
       cial condition of supervised release barring him from associating
       with documented gang members while on supervised release was
       not reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the of-
       fense, history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for ad-
       equate deterrence, or the need to protect the public. 18 U.S.C. §
       3583(d)(1). Additionally, the condition resulted in a greater depri-
       vation of liberty than reasonably necessary to accomplish the goals
       of deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitation, and it was
       inconsistent with the pertinent policy statements issued by the Sen-
       tencing Commission. Id.(d)(2)–(3).
              Therefore, we vacate Jennings’s sentence as to the condition
       of supervised release that he challenges on appeal. Jennings’s sen-
       tence apart from the special condition of supervised release at issue
       on appeal is affirmed because he forfeited any arguments regarding
       his sentence by not raising them on appeal. Campbell, 26 F.4th at
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11404

       871–72. This case is remanded for further proceedings not incon-
       sistent with this opinion.1
              VACATED AND REMANDED.

       1 Having vacated the special condition, we need not address Jennings’s consti-
       tutional challenges thereto.