Court Opinion

ID: 9698831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:00:53.122778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:43.568685
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C. J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. I believe, however, that the opinion decides more than the issues presented and perhaps makes too sweeping a pronouncement.
The majority notes that the threshold issue before the court is whether section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, applies to “a coaching contract.” The majority then concludes that “a contract to coach is not a contract subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943.” While I con*564cur that the facts in this case justify reaching a conclusion that the contract to coach in this case was not intended to be covered by the provisions of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, I am not prepared to say that in no instance might a contract “to coach” not be subject to the requirements of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943.
The majority presumes that calling one “a coach” thereby precludes the individual from being “a teacher” within the meaning of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943. Section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, provides in part: “Except for the first two years of employment under any contract entered into after February 26, 1975, any contract of employment between an administrator or a teacher who holds a certificate which is valid for a term of more than one year and a Class I, II, III, or VI district shall be deemed renewed and shall remain in full force and effect until a majority of the members of the board vote on or before May 15 to amend or to terminate the contract for just cause at the close of the contract period.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In reaching its conclusion, the majority apparently concludes that in order for one to be “a teacher” the individual must teach what is generally recognized and traditionally thought to be a course taught by “a teacher.” The evidence in this case does not provide us with a sufficient basis to reach the conclusion that in every instance one who is called “a coach” has not been employed to perform a function intended to be covered by section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, and in fact is “a teacher.” As an example, in Class IV and V school districts the term teacher means and includes all full-time certificated “educational employees” and even includes full-time nurses duly licensed by the State of Nebraska. See § 79-1255, R. R. S. 1943.
It is conceivable to me that one may be employed with the title of “coach” and in fact be a teacher in*565tended to be protected under the provisions of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that larger school districts may employ an individual whose principal duty and basis of employment is his ability to teach athletes how to perform in an athletic event and to fill in the remainder of the “teacher’s time” with courses in driver’s education or something similar. Under the majority’s opinion a school district might be permitted to eliminate the teacher’s employment as “coach” and limit his duties solely to one class in driver education. Such action might totally defeat the purpose of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943. Whether the provisions of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, apply or not should not depend upon whether the individual is called “teacher” or “coach.” The deciding factor should be what the principal basis of the employment was, what function was principally to be performed by the school employee, and whether the employee has the right to refuse the assignment. If in fact the evidence discloses that the involvement in athletics is indeed extracurricular not only for the students but for the employee as well, and one which the employee could have refused and still retained principal employment with the school district, I would agree with the majority. On the other hand, if the evidence in a particular case discloses that the principal motivation for' employment of the educational employee was his or her ability to “coach” and the additional duties were simply to fill out the day so that the coaching activity was clearly not “extracurricular” for the employee even though it may in fact be extracurricular for the student, I would hold to the contrary. In today’s teaching scheme it is not unreasonable to assume that a “teacher” may be hired as a “coach” to teach physical education as well as basketball or football. That would be no different than hiring a “teacher” to teach music and lead the band. I have some diffi*566culty understanding why one who is hired as athletic director of a high school with duties to teach football as well might not have the benefit of section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943, just because his contract describes him as a “coach.” The title standing alone should not be the deciding factor. The actual work involved should be the critical issue.
That is why I have difficulty with the language in the case of Rochester Ed. Ass’n v. Independent Sch. Dist., 271 N. W. 2d 311 (Minn., 1978), cited by the majority. The Minnesota case provides in part: “[B]oth decisions bifurcated the teachers’ contracts between regular and ‘extra duty’ assignments and held that the position of ‘coach’ was not within the applicable statutory definition of ‘teacher’ entitled to protection.” That would be true if in fact in every instance it was clear that the coaching position was extra duty and not the regular assignment. We have no way of knowing that to be the case in every situation.
It is likewise for the same reason that I find fault with the decision of State v. Smith, 142 So. 2d 767 (Fla. App., 1962), cited by the majority, wherein apparently the Florida court held: “Such tenure under the continuing contract of employment held by appellant does not extend to the right of reemployment as a coach or athletic director.” To be sure, in some school districts the position of athletic director may be no different than the position of counselor or department chairman. I suspect we would not hesitate to find that either a department chairman or a counselor who devoted the principal part of his time to fulfilling that function would be covered under section 79-1254, R. R. S. 1943. Likewise, I find the language in Chiodo v. Board of Educ. of Special School Dist. No. 1, 298 Minn. 380, 215 N. W. 2d 806, cited by the majority, too broad for this case. I would not declare in advance that anyone called “coach” is not a “teacher” entitled to the benefits of *567the tenured teacher act. I would have simply concluded that based upon the facts in this case, it appears that Neal’s work as coach was indeed extracurricular and one which he could refuse to do without jeopardizing his position as a teacher and therefore not covered within the tenured teacher act. I would not, however, have gone beyond that finding.