Court Opinion

ID: 9466776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:27:21.421247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:57.138951
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL E. SMITH, District Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The clearly erroneous rule governs the review of an order of the district court denying a motion to suppress,1 even where the district court makes no express findings but simply denies the motion.2
The evidence bearing upon the validity of the search is contained in the testimony about the exchange between the Drug Enforcement Agent and Ocheltree, as follows:
Q. What happened when you got into the office?
A. I immediately asked him if he had any narcotics on his person, and he said, “No,” and I said, “Can I search your person and your briefcase, and I advised him that he was under no obligation whatsoever to let me search, and if he did give me permission to search, he could deny that permission any time he so desired.
Q. Was there any discussion about the search warrant?
A. Yes, I advised him if he denied me permission to search, that we would attempt to get a search warrant.
Q. That you would attempt to get a search warrant.
A. Yes.
Q. What was his response to that statement?
A. He said he didn’t mind if I searched his briefcase and his person.
Q. Did you do so?
*995A. I did.3
I find in this no direct threat to detain Ocheltree. Perhaps he thought that if he did not consent he would be detained while a search warrant was being obtained, and the inference drawn by the majority is a permissible inference. On the other hand, there were other equally permissible inferences. The record would support a trial judge’s conclusion that Ocheltree knew he had been followed before he was stopped, and when asked to consent, the following considerations could have run through his mind: that if he did not consent he would be permitted to leave; that he would be followed again; that his chances of disposing of the incriminating briefcase were slight; that a consent to a search would evidence cooperation on his part and result in leniency somewhere along the line. If these inferences were drawn, then the choice to consent was voluntary.4
In my opinion it cannot be said that the ruling of the trial judge was clearly erroneous.5
I would affirm.

. United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).

. United States v. Bethea, 598 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1979).

. The parties stipulated to an agent’s report containing a summary of the quoted evidence.

. The word “voluntary” cannot be used here in the same sense as when a choice is made between Cheddar cheese or vanilla ice cream on apple pie. In a consent to search or confession situation, the forces of law have focused upon one individual who, if guilty (as appellant was here), knows exactly what he has done. His problem is how best it minimize the penalties. The choice may be between evils, but it in nonetheless voluntary.

. Cf., United States v. Lopez, 581 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1978).