Court Opinion

ID: 9582089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:22:18.565435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:26.203789
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge’,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with Part I of the majority opinion, but disagree with Part II, and therefore dissent. In my view, the court should have either made its maintenance award *992open ended or retained jurisdiction to modify the maintenance order if the situation justifies it. If the wife is or becomes unable to work, the husband, rather than the public through the welfare department, should help support her.
A. Circumstances Do Not Justify This Award
The parties had been married for some 26 years. The husband’s financial situation demonstrates a financial ability to pay periodic maintenance. The wife’s employment history was very sketchy, involving work as a seamstress and housekeeper. She had not been regularly employed outside the home since 1960. In 1979, the wife’s chronic rheumatic heart condition required open heart surgery resulting in the replacement of the aortic and mitral valves. She was not employed at the time of the hearing, and the question of when she might be gainfully employed was, at best, problematical because of her physical and attendant psychological problems, and her lack of skills. Her income is solely what she could earn from investment of a $50,000 asset awarded her in the property division, plus the $300 per month maintenance for two years.
In Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972), the court stated that:
“[I]n the absence of special circumstances which require or make a lump-sum award of alimony proper, or a compelling reason that necessitates the desirability for such an award, a lump-sum or gross award of alimony should not be made.”
In my view no “special circumstances” or “compelling reasons” appear here to justify an award of maintenance in gross. To the contrary, the wife’s skills and experience were negligible, and her health questionable. Thus, all circumstances militate against such an award in this case. See In Re Marriage of Lodholm, 35 Colo.App. 411, 536 P.2d 842 (1975).
An appropriate order here, in my opinion, would have been an award of maintenance for a fixed period, with the trial court specifically retaining jurisdiction to extend the period in which maintenance would be paid if the wife required support for longer than two years. Alternatively, the maintenance award should have been of indefinite duration, until death or remarriage, subject by law to possible modification under § 14-10-122, C.R.S. 1973. See In Re Marriage of Wagner, 44 Colo.App. 114, 612 P.2d 1147 (1980).
B. The Statute Allows Modification Of “Any” Maintenance Decree
This issue would not be before us if it were not for this court’s holding in In Re Marriage of Gallegos, 41 Colo.App. 116, 580 P.2d 838 (1978). In Gallegos, a division of this court interpreted § 14-10-122, C.R.S. 1973, in what I consider to be an unjustifiably limited manner. It held:
“[WJhere ... maintenance is in a fixed and determinable amount to be paid either in a lump sum or is for a specific amount to be paid over a definite term unless the power to do so is expressly reserved by the court, it is alimony in gross and has the finality of a judgment, and thus, is not subject to modification on the basis of a change in circumstances.”
This holding of Gallegos was made despite the language of § 14-10-122, C.R.S. 1973, which states:
“[T]he provisions of any decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable.” (emphasis added)
I would construe the words “any decree respecting maintenance” as applying to any maintenance decrees, not just to open end decrees. See In Re Marriage of Trohn, 531 P.2d 985 (Colo.App.1975) (not selected for official publication). Dame v. Dame, 628 S.W.2d 625 (Ky.1982) (dissenting opinion). See also Nash v. Nash, 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979).
Consequently, in my view, In Re Marriage of Gallegos, supra, was wrongly decided, and should not be followed. To interpret § 14^10-122 as I urge would lead to *993the socially desirable result of permitting trial courts to determine if there is a need for and ability to pay continued maintenance based upon the actual situation of the parties, rather than requiring it to speculate as to what their situation will be several years in the future. Especially is such speculation difficult where, as here, the court is attempting to determine if a woman who has not worked for a number of years and has few marketable job skills will be able to become employed, and whether she will recover sufficiently from open heart surgery to be able to support herself. As stated by the dissenting Justice in Dame v. Dame, supra:
“[Fjinality to litigation is a strong competing interest. However, ... ensuring reasonable support for one with precarious financial security must hold sway even when the price is a subsequent court hearing.”
C. The Award Here Should Not Be Considered Maintenance in Gross
Finally, even if the Gallegos rule is followed so as to preclude modification of awards of maintenance in gross, I am not at all certain that this type of award — $300 per month for two years — should necessarily be considered as that kind of maintenance. Rather, the more appropriate analysis, in my view, is that contained in Nash v. Nash, supra. There, the court reasoned that only if the terms of the award indicate that the court intended it to be in the nature of a property division should it be considered maintenance in gross, and thus not subject to future modification. Relying on earlier cases, the Nash court pronounced the following formula for deciding whether periodic payments are subject to revision:
“(a) A decree specifying periodic payments for an uncertain time (e.g., until death or remarriage) with no indication of gross amount is alimony and is revisable;
(b) A decree specifying periodic payments for a given time with no indication of gross amount other than by multiplying the amount due by the number of payment periods is alimony and is revisable;
(c) A decree specifying periodic payments to be made until a given sum (i.e., an amount stated) has been paid is division of property or payment of corpus and is not revisable.”
I agree with this view. Paragraph (b) of this rule would apply here. Only if a maintenance award bears the attributes of a property division, e.g., a lump sum to be payable in installments, or if it contains an indication from the court making the award that it is to be treated like property, should it be held not to be subject to future modification.
The award in this case bears all the marks of pure maintenance. If time shows that the trial court’s apparent estimate of the future proves wrong and the wife cannot work because of lack of skills or problems attendant to her open heart surgery the trial court should be able to modify it under § 14 — 10-122, C.R.S.1973. On the other hand, if the wife remarries or becomes financially self sufficient during the two year period, the court should be able to end the maintenance sooner. Like any other decree of maintenance it should be subject to modification as to future installments if there is a change of circumstances.