Court Opinion

ID: 9514323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:48:39.170608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:16.090600
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 39] I respectfully dissent on Issue II. To me there must be an evidentiary basis to overturn this conviction on an abuse of discretion standard of review. I would submit that such evidence cannot be found in this record. We have defined an abuse of discretion as:
An abuse of discretion has been defined by this Court as a decision which is not justified by and clearly against reason and evidence. We will not reverse a decision if ‘we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances could reasonably have reached that conclusion.’
Dakota Cheese, Inc. v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
[¶ 40] I agree with the majority that three requirements must be met in order to justify a continuance for an absent witness: (1) the testimony of the absent witness is material; (2) the defendant has used due diligence to procure the attendance of the witness or her deposition; and (3) it is reasonably certain the presence of the witness or her testimony will be procured by the time to which the trial would be postponed. State v. Davies, 33 S.D. 243, 247-48, 145 N.W. 719, 720 (1914). If the defendant fails on any of the above three criteria, the trial court has not abused its discretion and there is no basis for reversal of the conviction. State v. Shape, 517 N.W.2d 650, 656 (S.D.1994).2
*409In my opinion the Defendant has failed to establish the first prong, that being the “testimony” of the absent witness is material. The trial court was informed by the defense counsel that T.F. had told her story to the Defendant’s mother who had told it to defense counsel. Thus, what was presented to the trial court was not evidence, but counsel’s description of hearsay upon hearsay. The trial court, in its ruling denying the motion for continuance pointed this out when it said, “[o]f course, that is if in fact she would even testify as you feel she would.”
[¶ 42] Given the lack of prior notice to the Defendant, he claims this is the best that could be done under the circumstances. However the Defendant failed to provide an evidentiary basis to allow the trial court to consider the importance of this so-called “evidence” by failing to establish of the nature of T.F.’s testimony which could have been done after the trial.
[¶ 43] SDCL 23A-29-1 allows a motion for new trial to be made within ten days after filing of the judgment. The Defendant represented he would obtain T.F.’s attendance in one day.3 This motion could have been brought either under SDCL 16 — 6—59(a)(4) newly discovered evidence, or (a)(7) error of law in rejection of evidence. This could have been done by live testimony of T.F. at the hearing, Pickering v. State, 260 N.W.2d 234 (S.D.1977), by affidavit, State v. Gerdes, 258 N.W.2d 839 (S.D.1977), or deposition, State v. Furlow, 87 S.D. 634, 213 N.W.2d 705 ( 1973).
[¶ 44] Until such time as I am provided with some actual evidence as to the nature of T.F.’s testimony, I am unprepared to state that hearsay upon hearsay is a proper basis to find the trial court abused its discretion and this conviction should be overturned.
[¶ 45] I concur in Issue I.
[¶ 46] I am hearby authorized to state that Justice KONENKAMP joins this dissent.

. We have also recognized the prejudice to the parties resulting from the decision to grant or deny a continuance is a factor to be considered by the trial court. In re Adoption of C.T.E., 485 N.W.2d 591, 594 (S.D.1992). The evidentiary nature of the "testimony" that would have sup*409posedly been given by T.F. was not withheld from the jury. The Defendant testified in rebuttal contrary to the testimony of Y.F. with the same evidence that defense counsel represented would be given by T.F. if T.F. were present to testify. Thus, the nature of the claimed testimony of T.F. would not be new evidence but only bolsters the testimony already given by the Defendant.

. The question of whether the Defendant could have complied with the third prong of the test, that being it is reasonably certain the presence of the witness or her testimony will be procured by the time to which the trial would be postponed, is also in doubt. Clearly she had been asked to come by Defendant's mother and had apparently indicated she would be there at some point during the day. At the time defense counsel requested the one day continuance, he informed the trial court, "She [T.F.] had to be in court in Mitchell today for an insufficient funds check charge. She has no phone. I don't know why she isn't here." (emphasis added).