Court Opinion

ID: 9733496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:09:19.631563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.054487
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
The Legislature clearly intended to create drug-free school zones through enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (Section 7). To accomplish that task, the Legislature made drug offenses carried out in school zones separately-punishable crimes, and increased mandatory-minimum penalties for drug transactions in school zones. In eliminating the separate school-zone violations through the doctrine of merger, the Court has turned the law on its head and created free-crime zones out of school yards.
Despite its assertion to the contrary, ante at 55, 601 A.2d at 1155, the majority permits a heroin pusher in a school yard to receive no greater punishment than a heroin pusher in a high-crime area. Under the Court’s opinion, a heroin pusher convicted of both a first-degree Section 5 crime and a third-degree Section 7 crime would receive a maximum parole-ineligibility term of only five years, one conviction, one Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction (DEDR) penalty, one fine, and one Criminal Laboratory Analysis (CLA) fee. Under my result such *57an offender could receive a parole-ineligibility term of at least five years for his Section 5 conviction, in addition to a consecutive ineligibility term of three years for his Section 7 conviction, two separate convictions, two separate DEDR penalties, two separate fines, and two separate CLA fees. The majority ignores the fact that the non-merger provision does more than simply preserve the mandatory sentence for Section 7 offenses; it also preserves the underlying conviction, a significant factor if defendant again violates the law, and the additional substantial DEDR penalties, fines and fees that are imposed after each separate conviction.
The late Senator Graves, sponsor of the Drug-Free School Bill, stated that with this statute, “We’re going to say to drug dealers: ‘Stay away from our kids, stay away from our schools.’ ” State v. Gonzalez, 123 N.J. 462, 470, 588 A.2d 816 (1991) (O’Hern, J., dissenting). By assuming that the Legislature intended imposition of no greater penalty for a heroin sale in a school yard than for a heroin sale anywhere else, the majority eliminates that all-important message.
The majority’s result contravenes the Legislature’s clear intent as expressed by the plain language of Section 7, its legislative history, and simple common sense and logic. The Legislature never intended the convoluted result reached by the Court. No constitutional principle requires such an inversion of legislative purpose.
I
Fundamental principles of statutory construction require that in interpreting any statute, courts initially consider its plain language. Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 128, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987). The non-merger language of Section 7 could not be clearer:
Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S. 2ai-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for a violation of* * * N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 * * * or N.J.S.A. 20:35-6. [N.J.S.A. 2035-7 (emphasis added).]
*58“No merger” means “no merger.” A section 7 conviction is not to merge with any Section 5 conviction. Words selected by the Legislature are deemed to have been chosen for a reason, Gabin v. Skyline Cabana Club, 54 N.J. 550, 555, 258 A.2d 6 (1969), and such language is to be given its ordinary meaning, Town of Morristown v. Woman’s Club, 124 N.J. 605, 610, 592 A.2d 216 (1991). The majority’s cramped and one-dimensional construction of “with” violates those basic tenets of statutory construction. As Judge Stem stated in State v. Graham, 245 N.J.Super. 257, 261-62, 584 A.2d 878 (App.Div.1991):
The Legislature’s express statement that an offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 shall not merge ‘with’ seems to clearly prohibit exactly what [the majority] suggests it permitted. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 does not permit merger of offenses under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 into N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7, or vice versa, provided that the ineligibility term survives. It plainly prohibits the merger of each ‘with’ the other. [The] conclusion [of the majority] would have support if the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 permitted the merger of one offense “into” the other, or didn’t bar their merger, so long as the ineligibility term survived. The Legislature certainly knew how to provide for the survival of the mandatory ineligibility term without prohibiting merger when, for example, it enacted the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c, which requires imposition of a mandatory ineligibility term but does not prohibit merger of Graves Act and other offenses. [(Citations omitted).]
The legislative history also supports the conclusion that the Legislature intended to create separate offenses and separate punishments under Section 5 and Section 7. For example, the two sections were introduced separately in the Legislature. Section 7 was introduced by Senator Graves and was a bill unto itself. L.1987, c. 101. Section 5 was introduced by Assemblyman Kern as part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986. Both bills evolved from a proposal by Governor Kean entitled Blueprint for a Drug-Free New Jersey, published October 1986. For a complete history of the enactment of both bills see Gonzalez, supra, 123 N.J. at 467, 588 A.2d 816.
In enacting Section 7 the Legislature created a new third-degree crime to deal with persons who distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of a school or a school bus. The *59Legislature specifically determined that punishment for violation of Section 7 would
not merge for sentencing purposes with punishment imposed for the underlying violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a, since this section responds to a separate and distinct danger apart from drug distribution generally, that is, the distribution of drugs within a designated school safety zone. [Official Commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act, L.1987, c. 106 (Official Commentary).]
The clear legislative intent is recognized by a leading commentator:
Notwithstanding that the section refers to violations of another section (2C:35-5), it is clear that it is not meant to be a special sentencing provision like 2C:43-6c, the Graves Act, which it resembles, but is meant to define a separate offense. * * * The special provisions on merger and the special defenses would require that conclusion even without recourse to legislative history. Thus, what is created is a separate crime of the third degree with its own provisions related to sentencing, the most important being a required minimum sentence. [John M. Cannel, New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated Comment 2 to N.J.S.A. 2C.-35-7 at 555 (1991) (Cannel).]
Similarly, on signing the school-zone bill, Governor Kean stated that “[t]his new law and its mandatory sentence provision is separate and apart from any other penalty which might be imposed by the Court for other drug violations.” News Release, Office of the Governor (April 15, 1987) (emphasis added). In describing the new legislation former Attorney General Cary Edwards also stated that “[i]t’s now a separate crime in New Jersey to sell drugs in a school building or on school property.” Gonzalez, supra, 123 N.J. at 470, 588 A.2d 816.
II
Because of the Legislature’s clear intent to create separate offenses with separate punishments, there is no violation of the Double-Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. It is undisputed that where the Legislature “intended * * * to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the constitution.” Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). Similarly, because of the Legislature’s clear intent, we need not *60examine the second prong of federal double-jeopardy analysis established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306, 309 (1932). I note, however, that Blockburger does not call for merging the crime with more elements (Section 7) into the crime with fewer elements (Section 5), which is the result of today’s holding. No federal constitutional case has ever required the merger of a crime with the greater elements into the crime with the lesser elements.
Nor has any violation of the New Jersey Constitution taken place. This Court has “eschewed technisms and inflexibility when resolving merger issues.” State v. Cole, 120 N.J. 321, 327, 576 A.2d 864 (1990); State v. Currie, 41 N.J. 531, 539, 197 A.2d 678 (1964). Instead, we follow a balancing test in which we consider the following six factors:
1. whether the legislature intended to create separate offenses;
2. whether the statutes protect different interests;
3. whether merger would frustrate the Code’s sentencing scheme;
4. whether the offenses would merge under the Code’s merger provision (N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8);
5. whether the specific proofs offered to prove the offenses would be the same; and
6. the consequences of the defendant's transgression(s).
[State v. Davis, 68 N.J. 69, 81-82, 342 A.2d 841 (1975).]
Each case, of course, turns on its specific facts. For example, on several occasions we have rejected claims that Davis requires merger of two or more offenses. See, e.g., Cole, supra, 120 N.J. 321, 576 A.2d 864 (robbery, aggravated assault, and kidnapping do not merge with aggravated sexual assault); State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 527 A.2d 1362 (1987) (child endangerment does not merge with aggravated sexual assault); State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 480 A.2d 912 (1984) (aggravated assault does not merge with possession of handgun for purpose of using it unlawfully); Davis, supra, 68 N.J. 69, 342 A.2d 841 (possession of illegal drugs does not merge with distribution of illegal drugs). In other cases, however, we have held that Davis required merger of two convictions. See, e.g., State v. Mirault, 92 N.J. 492, 457 A.2d 455 (1983) (aggravated assault *61on police officer merges with first degree robbery); State v. Best, 70 N.J. 56, 356 A.2d 385 (1976) (possession of dangerous knife merges with robbery while armed with dangerous knife).
Applying the Davis factors to the present case discloses that the no-merger language of the statute should prevail. The legislature clearly intended to create separate offenses and separate punishments. The legislative history demonstrates that the school-zone statute was designed to protect different interests from those protected by Section 5. The Commentary accompanying the school-zone provision states that the statute “responds to a separate and distinct danger apart from drug distribution generally, that is, the distribution of drugs within a designated safety zone.” See Cannel, supra, at 554.
Although it preserves the mandatory term, the Court’s opinion clearly frustrates the Legislature’s attempt to create separate convictions, separate penalties, separate fines, and separate fees under the two sections. The Legislature specifically provided
for greatly enhanced economic sanctions designed to take the profit out of drug trafficking. The bill not only establishes greater ordinary fines for most drug offenses, but further permits the court to impose cash fines based on three, and in some cases, five, times the street value of the controlled dangerous substance involved.
In addition, the bill provides for a mandatory Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Penally to be assessed against each person convicted, adjudicated delinquent or placed in supervisory treatment for a drug or drug paraphernalia violation. This mandatory penalty is based on the degree of the offense and ranges from $500.00 for a disorderly persons offense to $3,000.00 for a first degree crime.
In addition to the fines, any person convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for a drug offense will be assessed a criminal laboratory analysis fee. This fee will be used to fund forensic laboratories and to reimburse the State or county for the cost of testing suspected drugs. All moneys collected from a defendant are to be applied first to the Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty, then to any forensic laboratory fee and then to the Drug Enforcement and Demand Reduction Fund. [Statement of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, December 18, 1986, at 4.]
The Court ignores entirely the monetary penalties, fines, and fees. Although there may be many instances in which those are not realistically collectible, that is a matter of legislative *62judgment. There were 3,496 persons sentenced for school-zone violations during 1990. Even assuming that half of those would have been able to pay only the $1000 DEDR penalty, there would be approximately $1,750,000 available either for drug-rehabilitation therapy or for law-enforcement purposes. I cannot believe that the Legislature would have intended to forego those separate penalties, together with the other fines and fees for the separate injuries to the public, namely, the sale of drugs on school property.
Nor does N.J.S.A. 2C:l-8 compel a merger of Section 7 into Section 5. Here, the proof required to establish the greater Section 5 offense will not establish every element of the lesser Section 7 offense. Specifically, it will not establish that the drug sale took place within 1,000 feet of a school. Therefore, Section 7, as the lesser offense, cannot be merged into the greater Section 5 offense, because all the statutory elements of a Section 7 offense are not also elements of a Section 5 offense.
A lesser offense is necessarily included in a charge of the greater offense if the proof necessary to establish the greater offense will of necessity establish every element of the lesser offense. Under this approach, a lesser included offense is included in a greater if all the statutory elements of the lesser are also elements of the greater. [Cole, supra, 120 N.J. at 328, 576 A.2d 864 (citations omitted).]
In State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 118, 527 A.2d 1362 (1987), we emphasized that “merger may be improper even where a single course of conduct constitutes a violation of two different criminal statutes. The factor critical to the merger decision in this case stems from the different interests protected by the statute violated.” (emphasis added).
The offenses here are clearly different: one is aimed at drug distribution and the other at prohibiting the sale of drugs on or near school property. Moreover, the consequences of the criminal statutes transgressed clearly are not the same. Merger would not adequately redress the injury suffered by society because of the sale of drugs in the school environment.
*63The Court overlooks the fact that the no-merger provision also preserves the underlying conviction. The number of convictions does make a difference with respect to later convictions. The Court’s interpretation implies that the Legislature accepted preservation of the underlying convictions merely as a necessary incident to preservation of the mandatory sentence. The Graves Act belies that interpretation. The Graves Act imposes a mandatory sentence on defendants who commit certain offenses with a firearm. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. Thus, that statute makes clear that the Legislature knew how to impose mandatory sentences without requiring two criminal convictions. If the Legislature chose to impose a mandatory sentence on those who commit a Section 5 offense within a school zone, it would have written the school-zone statute as a sentencing provision in a manner similar to the Graves Act. This is especially true in light of the fact that Senator Graves was also the primary sponsor of Section 7. The Legislature, however, because of its deep concern that drugs not be distributed within 1,000 feet of a school zone, instead chose to use a no-merger provision, thus preserving two separate convictions, two separate DEDR penalties, two separate fines, and two separate CLA fees, as well as the mandatory sentence.
The Court’s result is also illogical. The Court concludes that there is a merger of all Section 5 convictions, including those of the first-and second-degree, into school-zone convictions, while preserving the mandatory sentencing imposed under the purportedly “merged” Section 7. Absent any indication in the statutes or their history that the Legislature envisioned such a unique sentencing scheme, that it intended such an illogical result is difficult to believe. If the Legislature had intended such a result, it would have said so explicitly, as it did in the Graves Act.
Ill
The key factor in whether separate convictions merge has always been the intent of the Legislature to protect different *64interests. As the majority recognizes, “[o]n its face, that provision prohibits merger of a school-zone conviction with any other violation of Section 5.” Ante at 49, 601 A.2d at 1152. The Court may not think that two convictions with the additional penalties, fines, and fees, are important so long as there is an enhanced sentence, but the Legislature certainly did. Although the Court may not like the way the Legislature achieved its purpose, there can be no doubt about what the Legislature intended.
No federal or state constitutional principles prohibit the application of Section 7, the Legislature’s no-merger provision. I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justice O’HERN joins in this opinion.
.For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK and STEIN — 5.
For reversal — Justices O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 2.