Court Opinion

ID: 9429414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:43.08531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:19.495752
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
Because I continue to hold the views expressed in my separate opinions in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 512 (1978), Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 325 (1978), Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S. 547, 577-578, 583 (1978), and Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U. S. 594, 606-608 (1981), I am unable to join Justice Powell’s opinion. I do agree with him, however, that the holding in Tyler supports the judgment commanded by his opinion.
There is unanimity within the Court on three general propositions regarding the scope of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the owner of a fire-damaged building. No one questions the right of the firefighters to make a forceful, unannounced, nonconsensual, warrantless entry into a burning building. The reasonableness of such an entry is too plain to require explanation. Nor is there any disagreement concerning the firemen’s right to remain on the premises, not only until the fire has been extinguished and they are satisfied that there is no danger of rekindling, but also while they *300continue to investigate the cause of the fire. We are also unanimous in our opinion that after investigators have determined the cause of the fire and located the place it originated, a search of other portions of the premises may be conducted only pursuant to a warrant, issued upon probable cause that a crime has been committed, and specifically describing the places to be searched and the items to be seized. The issues that divide us in this case are (1) whether the entry by Lieutenant Beyer and his partner at 1:30 p. m. should be regarded as a continuation of the original entry or a separate postfire search, and (2) whether a warrantless entry to make a post-fire investigation into the cause of a fire without the owner’s consent is constitutional.
I
I agree with Justice Powell’s conclusion that Lieutenant Beyer’s entry at 1:30 p. m. was a postfire search rather than merely a continuation of an earlier valid entry, ante, at 296, and disagree with Justice Rehnquist’s position that our decision in Tyler is indistinguishable in this regard, post, at 306-307. In Tyler the Court was willing to treat early morning reentries by the same officers who had been on the premises a few hours earlier1 as a “continuation” of their earlier valid investigation into the cause of the fire. 436 U. S., at 511. The attempt to ascertain the cause of the fire was temporarily suspended in Tyler because visibility was severely hindered by darkness, steam, and smoke. Under these circumstances, the return of the same2 investigators shortly after daybreak to ascertain the cause of the fire was indeed “no more than an actual continuation” of their earlier *301valid search. Ibid. Unlike Tyler, in this case the challenged entry was made by officers who had not been on the premises at the time of an earlier valid search. Moreover, in contrast to Tyler, an investigation of the fire’s origin was not temporarily suspended on account of the conditions at the scene and resumed at the first opportunity when the conditions hampering the investigation subsided. While the investigators in this case waited for the work crew on the scene to pump water out of the basement before making their entry, the delay in their arrival at the scene apparently had nothing to do with the fact that water had collected in the basement. While that fact might have justified a temporary suspension of an investigative effort commenced by investigators at the scene before the premises were abandoned by fire officials, in this case it amounts to a post hoc justification without apparent basis in reality. In general, unless at least some of the same personnel are involved in a return to the premises and the temporary departure was justifiably and actually occasioned by the conditions at the premises, I would apply the test expressed by Justice White for measuring the scope of the emergency that justified the initial entry and search: “[0]nee the fire has been extinguished and the firemen have left the premises, the emergency is over.” Id., at 516. I would only add that the departure of the firemen should also establish a presumption that the fire has been extinguished and that any danger of rekindling is thereafter too slight to provide an independent justification for a second entry, a presumption that could only be rebutted by additional information demonstrating a previously unknown or unrecognized danger of rekindling.
1 — 1 I — I
Presumably most postfire searches are made with the consent of the property owner. Once consent is established, such searches, of course, raise no Fourth Amendment issues. We therefore are concerned with the fire investigator’s right to make an entry without the owner’s consent, by force if *302necessary. The problem, then, is to identify the constraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment on an officer’s authority to make such an entry.
In this context, the Amendment might be construed in at least four different ways. First, the Court might hold that no warrantless search of premises in the aftermath of a fire is reasonable and that no warrant may issue unless supported by probable cause that a crime has been committed. Such a holding could be supported by reference to the text of the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment.3 No Member of the Court, however, places such a strict construction on the Amendment.
Second, the Court might hold that no warrantless search is reasonable but allow postfire searches conducted pursuant to a warrant issued without a showing of probable cause. Following Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., supra, Justice Powell takes this position. In my judgment that position is at odds with the text of the Fourth Amendment and defeats the purpose of the Warrant Clause, enabling a magistrate’s rubber stamp to make an otherwise unreasonable search reasonable.
Third, the Court might hold that no warrant is ever required for a postfire search. If the search is conducted promptly and if its scope is limited to a determination of the cause of the fire, it is reasonable with or without probable cause to suspect arson. Justice Rehnquist has persuasively outlined the basis for that position,4 and has noted that *303in certain cases there may be some justification for requiring the inspectors to notify the building’s owners of the .inspection. Post, at 311, n. 4.
A fourth position — the one I believe the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment command — would require the fire investigator to obtain a traditional criminal search warrant in order to make an unannounced entry, but would characterize a warrantless entry as reasonable whenever the inspector either had given the owner sufficient advance notice to enable him or an agent to be present, or had made a reasonable effort to do so.5
Unless fire investigators have probable cause to believe the crime of arson has been committed, I believe that the homeowner is entitled to reasonable advance notice that officers are going to enter his premises for the purpose of ascertaining the cause of the fire. Such notice would give the owner a fair opportunity to be present while the investigation is conducted, virtually eliminating the need for a potentially confrontational forcible entry. Advance notice of the search is the best safeguard of the owner’s legitimate interests in the privacy of his premises, allowing him to place certain possessions he would legitimately prefer strangers not to see out of sight, and permitting him to be present during the search *304to assure that it does not exceed reasonable bounds. Moreover, the risk of unexplained harm or loss to the owner’s personal effects would be minimized, and the owner would have an opportunity to respond to questions about the premises or to volunteer relevant information that might assist the investigators. It is true, of course, that advance notice would increase somewhat the likelihood that a guilty owner would conceal or destroy relevant evidence, but it seems fair to assume that the criminal will diligently attempt to cover his traces in all events. In any event, if probable cause to believe that the owner committed arson is lacking, and if the justifications for a general policy of unannounced spot inspections that obtain in some regulatory contexts are also lacking, a mere suspicion that an individual has engaged in criminal activity is insufficient to justify the intrusion on an individual’s privacy that an unannounced, potentially forceful entry entails.
Since there was no attempt to give any kind of notice to respondents, this case does not provide a proper occasion for defining the character of the notice that must be given. I am convinced, however, that a nonexigent, forceful, warrantless entry cannot be reasonable unless the investigator has made some effort to give the owner sufficient notice to be present while the investigation is made. Naturally, if the owner is given reasonable notice and then attempts to interfere with the legitimate performance of the fire investigators’ duties, appropriate sanctions would be permissible.
If there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the issuance of a valid warrant by a neutral magistrate will enable the entry and subsequent search to be conducted in the same manner as any other investigation of suspected criminal conduct, without advance notice to the property owner. In such a case, the intrusive nature of the potentially forceful entry without prior notice is justified by the demonstrated reasonable likelihood that the owner of the property will conceal or destroy the object of the search if *305prior notice is provided. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U. S., at 582 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In this case, as Justice Rehnquist has pointed out, post, at 310, n. 3, an argument may be made that the notice requirement is inapplicable because the owners were out of town. But no attempt whatever was made to provide them with notice, or even to prove that it would have been futile to do so. The record does not foreclose the possibility that an effort to advise them, possibly through the same party that notified the representatives of the insurance company to board up the building, might well have resulted in a request that a friend or neighbor be present in the house while the search was carried out and thus might have avoided the plainly improper search of the entire premises after the cause of the fire had already been identified.
I therefore conclude that the search in this case was unreasonable in contravention of the Fourth Amendment because the investigators made no effort to provide fair notice of the inspection to the owners of the premises. Accordingly, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

 Fire Chief See entered with Assistant Chief Somerville at 8 a. m. and Detective Webb accompanied Somerville at 9 a. m. See had been on the scene at 2 a. m. and Webb had arrived at 3:30 a. m. See 436 U. S., at 501-502.

 It is true that in Tyler Assistant Chief Somerville first arrived on the scene at 8 a.m., but presumably he did not observe anything that was not also seen by Chief See or Detective Webb, both of whom had been on the scene earlier.

 As I noted in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U. S. 307 (1978):
“The first Clause states that the right to be free from unreasonable searches ‘shall not be violated’;1 the second unequivocally prohibits the issuance of warrants except ‘upon probable cause.’2” Id., at 326.
“1 ‘The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .’” Id., at 326, n. 1.
“2 ‘[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’” Id., at 326, n. 2.

 To the extent, however, that he relies on the danger of rekindling, I believe his analysis is flawed. I would suppose that Justice Powell *303would also dispense with a warrant requirement if that danger were present. Surely I would. For analytical purposes, I believe we must assume that the postfire investigation cannot be supported on an emergency rationale but rather is justified by the general regulatory interest in preventing similar fires, including those set by arsonists.

 By prohibiting the issuance of any warrant to make an unannounced, nonconsensual entry into the home, unless there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, my reading of the Fourth Amendment carries out the express purpose of the Warrant Clause. Justice Powell’s view that a so-called administrative warrant will suffice does not, I submit, provide the protection contemplated by that Clause. On the other hand, because I am persuaded that a postfire investigatory search is reasonable — even without either suspicion or probable cause — when advance notice is given to the homeowner, the purpose of the Reasonableness Clause can be satisfied without obtaining an administrative warrant that is nothing more than a rubber stamp.