Court Opinion

ID: 9390215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 07:09:03.353418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.421337
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                    No. 07-23-00017-CV

                             IN RE JONNA BASS, RELATOR

                                ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

                                      April 20, 2023
                                        OPINION
                     Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       In this original proceeding, relator Jonna Bass petitions this Court to issue a writ of

mandamus against the Honorable Matt Martindale, Judge of the County Court at Law

Number Two in Randall County. By her petition, Jonna contends the trial court abused

its discretion by granting an untimely motion to transfer venue of the underlying suit for

modification and enforcement under the Texas Family Code. For the reasons discussed

below, we conditionally grant the petition.

                                       BACKGROUND

       Jonna Bass and George R. Parr, IV are the parents of four children.              Upon

dissolution of their marriage in February of 2018, the trial court, Randall County Court at
Law Number Two, signed an agreed final decree of divorce and appointed the parents as

joint managing conservators of their children.

           In September of 2019, Jonna filed, among other things, a petition to modify the

parent-child relationship, a motion to enforce child support, and a motion to enforce a

2018 family violence protective order against George.1 These pleadings were filed in

Randall County Court at Law Number Two, the court of continuing jurisdiction. On

October 8, 2019, George filed an answer, counter-petition to modify, and a motion to

enforce possession of and access to the children. From October of 2019 until February

of 2021, the trial court issued temporary orders, modified temporary orders, enforced the

2018 protective order, and issued a second protective order. In February of 2021, Jonna

requested a bench trial on the pending motions to modify. A few days later, George paid

a jury fee. During the pending litigation, Jonna relocated with the children from Randall

County to Potter County and George relocated to New Mexico.

           In October of 2022, Jonna filed her third application for protective order. The

application was filed in the same cause number as the pending suit affecting parent-child

relationship, as permitted by Texas Family Code section 85.062. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 85.0622 (providing application for protective order may be filed in the court in which

a suit affecting parent-child relationship is pending). In response, George filed an answer,

a motion to vacate the protective order, and a motion to transfer venue. He alleged that

           1
        After the divorce was granted, Jonna obtained a two-year protective order from the Randall
County Court at Law Number One.
           2   Further reference to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to “section ___” or
“§ ___.”

                                                          2
the principal residence of the children and Jonna had been in Potter County for the six-

month period preceding the filing of the motion and that venue is improper in Randall

County. He requested that the trial court transfer venue “of this proceeding” to Potter

County. The trial court held a hearing on George’s motion and granted the motion over

Jonna’s objection. Jonna then filed the instant petition for writ of mandamus, alleging that

the trial court abused its discretion by granting the untimely motion to transfer.

                                   MANDAMUS STANDARD

       Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when a relator can show that

(1) the trial court clearly abused its discretion, and (2) no adequate appellate remedy

exists. In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., L.P., 492 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding)

(per curiam). A trial court clearly abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so

arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker

v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).                When seeking

mandamus relief, the relator bears the burden of proving these two requirements. Id. at

840. Trial courts have no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to

the facts.   In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 875–76 (Tex. 2021) (orig.

proceeding).

                                          ANALYSIS

       In this case, the Randall County Court at Law Number Two acquired continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction over the matters in the decree affecting the children of the marriage

when it issued the decree of divorce in February of 2018. See § 155.001(a). “If a court

of this state has acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, no other court of this state has

                                              3
jurisdiction of a suit with regard to that child . . . .” § 155.001(c). 3 The court retains

continuing jurisdiction unless jurisdiction has been transferred pursuant to the exclusive

transfer provisions of the Family Code or an emergency exists. See § 155.002. The

transfer proceedings in the Family Code governing suits affecting the parent-child

relationship are the exclusive mechanism for transferring the case or challenging venue

and were designed to supplant the regular rules dealing with transfer of venue applicable

in civil cases. See Leonard v. Paxson, 654 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1983) (interpreting the

predecessor transfer statutes of the Family Code).

       It is undisputed that Jonna and the children lived in Randall County when the

underlying proceedings were filed in September of 2019. As such, Jonna was required

to file her petitions to modify and enforce in Randall County. See §§ 156.001 (“A court

with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may modify an order that provides for the

conservatorship, support, or possession of and access to a child.”), 157.001(d) (“A motion

for enforcement shall be filed in the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.”).

       As relevant to this case, “[i]f a suit to modify or a motion to enforce an order is filed

in the court having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a suit, on the timely motion of a

party[,] the court shall, within the time required by section 155.204, transfer the

proceeding to another county in this state if the child has resided in the other county for

six months or longer.” § 155.201(b) (emphasis added). A motion to transfer is timely if it

is made “on or before the first Monday after the 20th day after the date of service of

       3 Section 155.001(c) notes two exceptions, as provided by section 103.001(b) and Chapter 262 of
the Family Code, which are not applicable to this case.

                                                  4
citation or notice of the suit or before the commencement of the hearing, whichever is

sooner.” § 155.204(b). Here, George was served with citation in the underlying suit on

September 28, 2019, and filed his answer, counter-petition to modify, and a motion to

enforce on October 8, 2019. He filed his motion to transfer on November 10, 2022, three

years after the period described in section 155.204(b). As such, George’s motion to

transfer was not timely filed. An untimely motion to transfer gives a trial court no authority

to transfer a case to another court. See Alexander v. Russell, 699 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex.

1985) (per curiam) (holding that court rendering original divorce decree and establishing

original conservatorship for minor children remained the court of continuing and exclusive

jurisdiction despite an attempted transfer that failed to comply with the Texas Family Code

transfer procedure).

       The trial court, Randall County Court at Law Number Two, had continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction of the underlying petitions to modify and enforce, and no other court

of this state had jurisdiction. § 155.001(c). The trial court had no discretion to grant an

untimely transfer. Moreover, the filing of the application for protective order in October of

2022 does not affect the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the

underlying modification and enforcement suit.         See § 85.062(a)(1) (application for

protective order may be filed in court in which suit affecting parent-child relationship is

pending). We hold the trial court abused its discretion by granting an untimely transfer of

the petitions to modify and enforce.

       Parents of children who have a right to venue in a particular county should not be

forced to go through a trial that is for naught. Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.

1987) (per curiam). As previously indicated, the trial court abused its discretion in
                                              5
transferring the modification and enforcement to Potter County. Having trial in Potter

County based on the trial court’s erroneous transfer would ultimately be reversed on

appeal which would render the entire proceeding a nullity. Consequently, we conclude

that Jonna has established that the transfer cannot be adequately remedied by appeal.

                                        CONCLUSION

       We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring the underlying

proceedings to Potter County. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Jonna’s petition for writ

of mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its transfer order of November 30, 2022.

We are confident the trial court will comply, and our writ will issue only if the trial court

fails to comply within fifteen days of this opinion and judgment.

                                                         Judy C. Parker
                                                            Justice

                                             6