Court Opinion

ID: 9495188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:56:54.920574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:52.611993
License: Public Domain

HERLONG, District Judge,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result to reverse the district court but on a different basis. Barker asserts that the Rooker-Feldman, infra, doctrine divested the district court of jurisdiction. I agree. While I also agree with the majority’s reasons for reversal, I believe that the question of jurisdiction must first be resolved. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir.2000) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional). Because it appears that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested the district court of jurisdiction, I would reverse on that ground.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). In making this determination, one pivotal question is whether “the federal plaintiff seeks to set aside a state court judgment or whether he is, in fact, presenting an independent claim.” Brown & Root, 211 F.3d at 202 (internal quotations omitted).
The facts in this case and Brown & Root are essentially the same. Like in Brown & Root, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., was raised before the California state court and the state court decision preceded the federal court decision. See J.A. 931, 964, & 1111. Therefore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine appears to divest the district court of jurisdiction. As such, I would reverse on the alternate ground that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.