Court Opinion

ID: 9716271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:32:53.930814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.307727
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress and therefore respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes that the trial court erred in determining that the search in question was legal based upon what the trial court referred to as "the automobile exception." The majority rejects this conclusion upon its view that, in order to pass constitutional muster, a warrantless search of an automobile is permissible only upon the confluence of three factors-probable cause, impracticality of obtaining a search warrant, and exigent cireumstances. I need not express an opinion on that particular holding because I believe that the trial court's order was sustainable on another ground. See Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.1999) (an appellate court may affirm the trial court's ruling on a motion *46to suppress on any theory supported by the evidence).
One exception to the warrant requirement that has developed in the law involves searches incident to an arrest. Stevens v. State, 701 N.E.2d 277 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). This exception provides that a law enforcement official may conduct a search of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her control. Id. When a vehicle's occupants are arrested, police may search any containers found in the passenger compartment. Stevens v. State, 701 N.E.2d 277. Originally, the rationale for this exception was that it was necessary to protect police officers by removing any weapons that the arrestee might attempt to use. Over time, this exception has expanded such that the search of a suspect's automobile is valid under this rationale even if the suspect has been removed from the scene and the subject vehicle is no longer in the arrestee's area of control.
In the instant case, the trial court expressly rejected the argument that the search was constitutional under the "search incident to arrest" exception. The majority affirms that conelusion upon the basis that the search of Ratliff's truck was not legal because it did not occur contemporaneously in both time and place with his arrest. That holding, in turn, is based upon the majority's view that "the search and arrest must be contemporaneous in both place and time and the scope of a search is limited to the area within the arrestee's immediate control." Op. at 45. The majority cites Townsend v. State, 460 N.E.2d 139 (Ind.1984) as authority for this proposition. I believe that Townsend is inapplicable here because it did not involve an automobile search. Rather, the facts of that case were that the defendant was confronted at his home a short time after he had robbed a man at a different location. The search in question was conducted at the defendant's house.
The instant case, of course, involved the search of a vehicle, not a house. The body of law pertaining to vehicle searches has evolved differently in some respects from other types of search, based in no small part upon the fact that vehicles are mobile. For this reason, I believe that Townsend's requirement of contemporaneousness of time and place of arrest is not applicable to vehicle searches, at least not as the majority has applied it here. Rather, I believe the rule applicable here can be found in Stevens v. State, 701 N.E.2d 277. In that case, the defendant was arrested on suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated. After she was placed in handcuffs and secured in the back of a patrol car, the arresting officer searched the defendant vehicle and discovered what he believed to be contraband under the driver's seat. The defendant moved to suppress the contraband. The trial court denied the motion on grounds that the search was proper as a search incident to arrest.
In affirming the trial court's ruling, this court observed that, under the "search incident to arrest" exception to the general rule requiring a warrant, a police officer may search the arrestee's person and the area inside the vehicle within his or her control. Although traditionally justified on grounds that the purpose of such a search was to protect police officers, the exception "has been expanded such that the search of a suspect's automobile is valid under this exception even if the suspect has been removed from the seene and her vehicle is no longer in her area of control." Id. at 280. Thus, it is clear that the requirement of contemporaneousness is not violated if, for instance, enough time has passed that the defendant has already been removed from the scene. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950 (Ind.1992), cert. denied, *47507 U.S. 976, 113 S.Ct. 1424, 122 L.Ed.2d 793 (1993). With regard to the spatial aspect of the concept of contemporaneousness, I can conceive of no reason why a vehicle search under this exception would be permissible at the location of the arrest, but not permissible in, say, a nearby police impound lot. It would seem to me that, given the inherent mobility of a vehicle, the location of the search is of lesser consequence than the presence or absence of the defendant. In view of the fact that our supreme court has indicated that a search incident to arrest may be performed even after the defendant has been removed from the scene, I believe it is of little import whether the vehicle is searched at the seene of the arrest or, as occurred in the instant case, at a nearby secure police facility. In my opinion, this view is entirely consistent with Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950 and Stevens v. State, 701 N.E.2d 277.
In summary, I would affirm the order of the trial court upon the basis that the search of the defendant's vehicle was proper pursuant to the "search incident to arrest" exception.