Court Opinion

ID: 9948288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 20:00:37.036396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:26.458561
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 24a0099n.06

                                       Nos. 22-5142/5162

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                    Mar 06, 2024
                                                        )                   KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        )
        Plaintiff - Appellee,                           )
                                                               ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                        )
        v.                                                     UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                        )
                                                               COURT FOR THE WESTERN
                                                        )
 MARCUS BENNETT (22-5142); ERIC BENNETT                        DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
                                                        )
 (22-5162),                                             )
                                                                                      OPINION
        Defendants - Appellants.                        )
                                                        )

Before: GRIFFIN, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges

    GRIFFIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which BUSH and READLER, JJ., joined.
READLER, J. (pp. 18–19), delivered a separate concurring opinion, in which BUSH, J., joined.

       GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

       A confidential informant for the United States Postal Inspection Service purchased heroin

from defendants Marcus and Eric Bennett during eleven controlled buys, but the CI died before

their trial. The evidence admitted at trial included testimony from a postal inspector about

statements the deceased CI made to law enforcement, as well as the inspector’s interpretations of

communications between defendants and the CI. A jury ultimately convicted Marcus and Eric of

conspiracy to distribute heroin and Eric of related firearms offenses. On appeal, defendants raise

issues concerning the admission of the CI’s statements and the inspector’s testimony, as well as

the district court’s sentencing determinations. We affirm.
Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

                                                I.

        The Postal Inspection Service began investigating brothers Marcus and Eric Bennett

following the non-fatal shooting of postal carrier Da’Ron Lester. Lester believed that Eric shot

him at Marcus’s direction—apparently Marcus was supposed to receive a package of narcotics in

the mail and suspected that Lester kept the package.

        Postal Inspector Aaron Mehall led the investigation into the Bennetts. Investigators tapped

and tracked Marcus’s phone, which revealed several calls to the USPS help line for tracking

parcels. Those parcels came from known drug-source states, contained fictitious return addresses,

and carried large sums of money. Phone calls also revealed that Marcus was in contact with known

narcotics traffickers.

        Though the investigation into the Bennetts initially focused on Lester’s shooting, it

morphed into a narcotics-trafficking investigation after Quanta Malone offered to become a CI and

purchase heroin from defendants. Malone ultimately helped law enforcement conduct eleven

controlled buys with the Bennetts over the course of several months, all of which Malone captured

in audio and video recordings. Inspectors also documented most communications between Malone

and the Bennetts leading up to their meetings. Malone purchased heroin from Eric at the first five

controlled buys, and from Marcus at the remaining six.

        In addition to the controlled buys, law enforcement executed search warrants at the Victory

Lane Bar & Grill (“the Victory Lane”), from which Marcus sold drugs; a home on Gilligan Street

next to the Victory Lane, where Marcus’s then-girlfriend, Juliyah Young, resided; and Marcus’s

home. The searches yielded 418.65 grams of heroin at the Gilligan Street house, but law

enforcement did not find any drugs at the other locations. Following a vehicle chase by law

enforcement, Eric was arrested on the same day as the searches. Law enforcement detained Eric

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

and searched his vehicle, where they found a loaded firearm in the glove box and retraced Eric’s

path to find two packages of heroin that he had thrown out of his vehicle’s window. Marcus was

arrested a few months later after he had sold drugs to Malone on two additional occasions.

       A grand jury indicted Marcus and Eric for conspiracy to distribute heroin, conspiracy to

murder a federal employee, attempted murder of a federal employee, and forcible assault of a

federal employee. It indicted only Eric for discharge of a firearm during a violent crime,

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the use or possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug-trafficking crime.

       Malone died before trial began, so Marcus and Eric moved to exclude all recordings of the

controlled buys that Malone had captured as inadmissible hearsay and violative of the

Confrontation Clause. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion.

       Marcus and Eric proceeded to trial. The jury convicted Marcus and Eric of conspiring to

distribute heroin, and it convicted Eric of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing

a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court sentenced Marcus to 168

months in prison and Eric to 200 months in prison. Defendants timely appealed.

                                                II.

       Marcus and Eric appeal their convictions, arguing that the district court erred by admitting

at trial certain testimony given by Inspector Mehall. They assert that Mehall’s testimony about

Malone stating he could buy heroin from defendants violated their Confrontation Clause rights.

Marcus separately challenges Mehall’s testimony interpreting “plain English” statements made by

Malone as contrary to Federal Rule of Evidence 701. We consider these arguments in turn.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

                                                A.

       Marcus and Eric first raise the same Confrontation Clause challenge. Mehall twice testified

that Malone stated to law enforcement that he believed he could purchase heroin from the Bennetts.

This testimony, defendants argue, violated the Confrontation Clause because Mehall testified as

to testimonial out-of-court statements that were offered for the truth of the matter and made by

Malone, whom the Bennetts could not cross examine. Neither Marcus nor Eric contemporaneously

objected to this testimony.

       We review preserved Confrontation Clause arguments de novo, United States v. Powers,

500 F.3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2007), and unpreserved ones for plain error, United States v. Collins,

799 F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2005).

Because defendants failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we would normally review their

Confrontation Clause argument for plain error.1 However, the government must ask for plain error

review, and it did not do so here. We therefore review defendants’ Confrontation Clause argument

de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2011), subjecting any

violations to a harmless-error analysis, United States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 697 (6th Cir. 2008).

       1
         Below, defendants argued the admission of the recordings violated the Confrontation
Clause. But their appeals focus on the issue of Malone’s statements to law enforcement, which
they did not raise below (let alone contemporaneously object to) and thus is unpreserved. See
United States v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 332 (6th Cir. 2009) (raising an issue for the
first time on appeal); United States v. Ford, 761 F.3d 641, 653 (6th Cir. 2014) (contemporaneous
objection requirement).
        Further, although Eric contended at oral argument that his appellate brief marginally
challenged the district court’s admission of the recordings, it did not and instead raised an
authentication issue with one of the recordings. This authentication argument, which Eric raised
for the first time on appeal, also was not properly preserved and is arguably abandoned because he
failed to fully develop it. See, e.g., Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1063
(6th Cir. 2014). In any event, the admission of the recordings was proper under both the Sixth
Amendment and the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 54 F.4th 884,
887–88 (6th Cir. 2022).
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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

Whatever lens we use to review this argument is immaterial because any error the district court

may have committed in admitting Mehall’s testimony regarding Malone’s statements was

harmless.

       The Confrontation Clause guarantees every criminal defendant the right “to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Consequently, defendants are permitted

to cross-examine the government’s witnesses at trial. See Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18

(1985) (per curiam). “[W]hen a witness can’t testify at trial and hasn’t been cross-examined, the

Confrontation Clause forbids entry of the witness’s statements that are: (1) testimonial and

(2) hearsay.” United States v. Harrison, 54 F.4th 884, 887 (6th Cir. 2022).

       Mehall’s testimony about Malone’s inculpatory statements is undoubtedly problematic.

Malone’s out-of-court statements were testimonial, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–

52 (2004); United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 670–71, 675 (6th Cir. 2004), and used for the

truth of the matter asserted (to prove that he could buy heroin from the Bennetts), see United States

v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 683 (6th Cir. 2009). However, any purported Confrontation Clause

violation does not warrant reversal because any such error was harmless. See McGee, 529 F.3d at

697. Defendants engaged in eleven controlled buys, all of which were captured on audio and video

recordings; numerous witnesses testified about the Bennetts’ criminal enterprise; the Bennetts’

phone records revealed drug-trafficking activity; law enforcement recovered a distribution-level

quantity of heroin at the Gilligan Street house; and the Lester shooting was a speculated

consequence of the Bennetts’ drug trafficking. See id.; Powers, 500 F.3d at 510. Defendants take

issue with only two words (i.e., “Yes” and “Correct”) of Inspector Mehall’s dayslong testimony,

which was a minuscule portion of the evidence provided over the course of the six-day trial.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

The evidence at trial overwhelmingly implicated the Bennetts in a conspiracy to distribute heroin,

so they are not entitled to relief despite the alleged error.

                                                   B.

        Next, Marcus challenges additional portions of Inspector Mehall’s testimony. He argues

that when Mehall—who testified only as a lay witness—interpreted Malone’s “plain English” text

messages and phone calls, he violated Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Because Marcus failed to

object at trial to the testimony he challenges on appeal, we review his evidentiary argument for

plain error.2 See United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 349 (6th Cir. 2017). To establish plain

error, Marcus must demonstrate that “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious or clear;

(3) the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d

506, 512 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

        Rule 701 allows lay witnesses to give opinion testimony if the opinion is “(a) rationally

based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or

to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. The party offering testimony under

this rule bears the burden of establishing all three requirements. United States v. Freeman,

730 F.3d 590, 595–96 (6th Cir. 2013). “The function of lay opinion testimony is to describe

something that the jurors could not otherwise experience for themselves by drawing upon the

witness’s sensory and experiential observations that were made as a first-hand witness to a

        Marcus contends that we should review his evidentiary claim for abuse of discretion based
        2

on defendants’ objection at trial to “anything” Malone said. But as explained above, defendants
objected to the recordings, not Mehall’s testimony. So we review this claim for plain error. Cf.
United States v. Poulsen, 655 F.3d 492, 510 n.6 (6th Cir. 2011); Ford, 761 F.3d at 653.
                                                  -6-
Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

particular event.” United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted).

       In the context of a law enforcement officer testifying under Rule 701, his lay opinion is

admissible only if the officer “is a participant in the conversation, has personal knowledge of the

facts being related in the conversation, or observed the conversations as they occurred.” Id.

(citation omitted). Although officers may “interpret intercepted messages in which they neither

participated nor observed first-hand,” “[a]n officer’s lay testimony goes too far when it includes

vague statements about the investigation, repeatedly relies on the general knowledge of the entire

department or agency, or otherwise fails to limit the testimony to personal experience.” United

States v. Honeysucker, 2023 WL 142265, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 2023) (citing Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d

at 379; Freeman, 730 F.3d at 596–97).

       Marcus appeals the admission of much of Mehall’s testimony under Rule 701(b), arguing

that the testimony at issue was not necessary to help the jury because it interpreted “plain English”

communications. For example, texts and phone calls between Malone and Marcus revealed

statements such as “Can’t get ahold of little bra. Trying to get right,” “I done backed up for real,”

“I’m about to get back in the flow of things,” “Just one. Just one. One whole,” and “Need ya.”

Mehall interpreted such statements to mean that Malone arranged to buy heroin from Marcus.

       On one hand, much of Mehall’s testimony did not violate Rule 701 because several of

Malone and Marcus’s communications were cryptic (e.g., “I done backed up for real,” “I went on

and finessed me a little play, man. Got a little something popping, man,” and “Just one. Just one.

One whole”), and Mehall’s interpretation of these statements certainly could have aided the jury.

See Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at 380 (“When it comes to interpreting language from intercepted

communications, an agent can be helpful when she uses her personal knowledge of the case to

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

interpret cryptic language.”); see also Young, 847 F.3d at 350 (“We hold that the district court did

not plainly err in admitting Agent Whitsett’s testimony because, as the district court noted during

trial, ‘[t]here was enough slang and jargon used that [Agent Whitsett’s] testimony as to what they

were talking about was necessary and will be helpful to the jury.’” (brackets in original)). Such

testimony was therefore properly admitted. See Young, 847 F.3d at 350–51 (finding no plain error

in a law enforcement officer’s testimony opining that “quarter” means a “quarter ounce of crack

cocaine”).

       On the other, a jury likely could have interpreted some of these communications without

Mehall’s assistance. For example, phrases like “I’m gonna need you tomorrow, if that’s cool,”

“I was handling it right now,” and “I’m about to get back in the flow of things” are not slang or

jargon that require translation. By “interpreting even ordinary English language,” Mehall “spoon-

fed his interpretations of the phone calls [and text messages] and the government’s theory of the

case to the jury.” Freeman, 730 F.3d at 597. Thus, the admission of Mehall’s commentary

regarding these ordinary, plain communications violated Rule 701. See Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d at

381 (“[A] case agent testifying as a lay witness may not explain to a jury what inferences to draw

from recorded conversations involving ordinary language because this crosses the line from

evidence to argument.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

       But once again, the district court’s error does not require reversal given the overwhelming

evidence of defendants’ drug trafficking. Further, the communications at issue here all preceded

controlled buys. A rational jury could consult the text messages and transcripts of phone calls and

reasonably conclude on its own that “Need ya,” for example, means that Malone was seeking to

purchase heroin, especially given that he did, in fact, purchase heroin soon after these

communications. Although some of Mehall’s testimony violated Rule 701, the admission of this

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

testimony did not affect Marcus’s substantial rights or the outcome of the trial, barring any relief.

See Honeysucker, 2023 WL 142265, at *8.

                                                 III.

       Defendants additionally appeal their sentences. Marcus challenges the district court’s

imposition of the Guidelines’ drug-house enhancement, and Eric challenges the adequacy of the

government’s 21 U.S.C. § 851 notice and the district court’s relevant-conduct findings concerning

drug weight attributable to him.

                                                  A.

       Marcus argues the district court erred in applying to his sentence the two-level drug-house

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). The government bears the burden of establishing

by a preponderance of the evidence that a sentencing enhancement applies. United States v. Byrd,

689 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2012). “Whether a district court properly applied a sentencing

enhancement is a matter of procedural reasonableness.” United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 388

(6th Cir. 2023). When evaluating procedural reasonableness, “we review the district court’s

interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Id. “Under clear-

error review, we affirm a district court’s finding of fact so long as the finding is plausible in light

of the record viewed in its entirety.” United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2021)

(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). There exists an intra-circuit split, however, over

the proper standard to apply when reviewing mixed questions of law and fact concerning

sentencing enhancements. See United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2014). Here,

because the application of the drug-house enhancement was not erroneous under either standard,

we need not resolve the split.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

       Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level enhancement

for drug crimes if the defendant “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or

distributing a controlled substance.” United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013)

(“[T]he drug-house enhancement applies to anyone who (1) knowingly (2) opens or maintains any

place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.”). With respect

to the “maintaining” element, the only element at issue here, we must consider “whether the

defendant held a possessory interest in . . . the premises” and “the extent to which the defendant

controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. “If a defendant

does not have a legal interest in the premises, the enhancement may still apply if the government

makes a sufficient showing of de facto control.” United States v. Hernandez, 721 F. App’x 479,

484 (6th Cir. 2018). De facto control, however, requires “something more than the act of

distribution from the premises.” Id. Notably, “[m]anufacturing or distributing a controlled

substance need not be the sole purpose for which the premises was maintained,” but it must be

“one of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17.

       After the district court applied, over Marcus’s objection, the two-level drug-house

enhancement, it sentenced Marcus to 168 months’ imprisonment—a term at the bottom of his

Guidelines range. Marcus now appeals the district court’s finding that he “maintained” the

Gilligan Street house—where over 400 grams of heroin were found in the ceiling over the water

heater. Marcus did not hold a legal or possessory interest in the Gilligan Street house; rather,

Juliyah Young (Marcus’s then-girlfriend) resided at the Gilligan Street house during the relevant

time. As such, he presumably argues that he was merely a “casual visitor” at the house, which is

insufficient for the drug-house enhancement to apply. See Hernandez, 721 F. App’x at 484.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

        At trial, Young testified that the heroin found at her home was not hers and that she did not

know it was located there. Young never explicitly testified that the heroin found in the Gilligan

Street home belonged to Marcus or that he “allowed” her to stay at the home, although the district

court erroneously stated the contrary at sentencing.

        Even though the district court misstated Young’s trial testimony at sentencing, it did not

err in imposing the drug-house enhancement because the record supported the application of the

enhancement.     See id. (explaining that other actions like “supervising,” “protecting,” and

“[maintaining] continuity [at]” a location can constitute “maintenance” under § 2D1.1(b)(12) (first

alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Russell, 595 F.3d 633, 644 (6th Cir. 2010))). The

government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the heroin found at the Gilligan Street

house was Marcus’s and that he stored it there prior to distribution on one of the many occasions

he visited the home to sell drugs in the alley between the Victory Lane and the Gilligan Street

house. Indeed, the day after law enforcement searched the home, Marcus called the cousin with

whom he operated the Victory Lane and said, “They got her, but they missed me, dude. They

missed me.” Mehall testified that this statement meant that law enforcement found Marcus’s

heroin at the Gilligan Street (i.e., “her” or Young’s) house, but they failed to find his heroin at the

Victory Lane. Law enforcement also found additional indicia of drug trafficking at the house: a

“powdery substance” packaged in little plastic baggies and a duffel bag with a press and mixer in

it. The government sufficiently showed Marcus’s de facto control of the Gilligan Street house for

the purpose of storing heroin prior to distribution, and thus, the district court did not err in applying

the drug-house enhancement.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

                                                 B.

       Eric also challenges his sentence.        He first takes issue with the adequacy of the

government’s § 851 information and notice of his four prior felony drug convictions following a

change in the law triggering an enhanced sentence under this statute. Although Eric originally

argued in his appellate brief that we review this argument de novo, he conceded at oral argument

that plain error review applies, given his failure to raise the issue before the district court. See

United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 796 (6th Cir. 2011).

       To increase Eric’s statutory mandatory-minimum sentence for his conspiracy conviction,

the government filed an information and notice of his four prior felony drug convictions pursuant

to §§ 851 and 841(b)(1)(B)(i). After the government filed the § 851 notice and before the Bennetts’

trial, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which, in part, amended the requirements to

impose an enhanced sentence for this type of conviction. See United States v. Fields, 53 F.4th

1027, 1031 (6th Cir. 2022). Following the First Step Act’s enactment, a defendant is eligible for

an enhanced drug-conspiracy sentence if he has at least one prior conviction for a “serious drug

felony,” not a “felony drug offense,” as previously required. Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i).

Relevant here, a “serious drug felony” does not encompass mere possession offenses, unlike a

“felony drug offense.” Compare 21 U.S.C. § 802(57), with § 802(44). See also 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A). After this definitional change, three of Eric’s four prior offenses—which were

merely possession offenses—no longer triggered an enhanced mandatory-minimum sentence for

his conspiracy conviction. Yet, the government did not amend the § 851 notice to reflect the

change in the law.

       Eric argues that the government’s failure to amend the § 851 notice means it failed to meet

its burden to prove that he was previously convicted of a “serious drug felony,” so the district court

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

improperly increased his mandatory-minimum sentence from five to ten years. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i).   Notwithstanding, Eric’s Guidelines range was 140–175 months on the

conspiracy-to-traffic-heroin and felon-in-possession convictions, plus a mandatory 60-month

consecutive sentence for his conviction for possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.

The district court ultimately sentenced Eric to 200 months’ total imprisonment (140 months on the

conspiracy and felon-in-possession offenses and 60 months on the remaining offense), which was

at the bottom of the Guidelines range.

       There was no error in calculating Eric’s mandatory-minimum sentence. Despite the

government’s failure to amend the § 851 notice, Eric still had one previous conviction that

constituted a serious drug felony:       trafficking cocaine in Jefferson County, Kentucky.         At

sentencing, the government explained why Eric’s mandatory-minimum sentence under

§§ 841(b)(1)(B)(i) and 851 was ten years due to his prior drug-trafficking conviction. Thus, the

district court did not err in calculating Eric’s mandatory-minimum sentence for his conspiracy

conviction.3

       In any event, even if the district court erred, such error did not affect Eric’s substantial

rights because the district court imposed a sentence greater than a five- or ten-year mandatory

       3
         Eric argues that the district court further erred under § 851(b), which gives defendants the
opportunity to “affirm[] or den[y]” that they have previously been convicted of the offenses alleged
in a § 851 notice. 21 U.S.C. § 851(b). He complains that the district court never gave him the
opportunity to dispute his alleged prior offenses, especially given the purported deficiencies in the
government’s notice. But the district court did not err because Eric was precluded from
challenging the validity of his prior serious drug felony, which “occurred more than five years
before the date of the information alleging such prior conviction.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). Moreover,
even if the district court erred, any such error was harmless. See United States v. Hill, 142 F.3d
305, 313 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court’s failure to engage in a § 851(b) colloquy
was harmless because the defendant never filed a § 851(c)(1) response challenging his prior
convictions: “there is no reason for a district court to conduct a hearing on the validity of the prior
convictions when a defendant fails to first meet the requirements of 21 U.S.C. [§] 851(c), which
requires that a defendant give advance notice concerning the basis of his challenge”).
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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

minimum on the conspiracy conviction. Nothing in the record indicates that the district court felt

constrained by the ten-year mandatory minimum or that it would have imposed a lesser sentence

had it found the five-year mandatory minimum appropriate. See United States v. Haque, 315 F.

App’x 510, 529 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court “did not feel bound by any statutory

minima,” so any error was harmless).

                                                 C.

       Eric raises one final challenge to his sentence: that it is procedurally unreasonable because

the district court attributed certain drug weight to him that was not relevant conduct. We review

the district court’s factual determination regarding the quantity of drugs involved in an offense for

clear error.4 United States v. McReynolds, 964 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2020). “A factual finding

is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support that finding, the reviewing court

on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Russell, 595 F.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Both Eric and Marcus were found guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

between 100 and 1000 grams of heroin. Eric’s base offense level was calculated based on a total

of 742.52 grams of heroin, which accounts for the heroin recovered from the Gilligan Street house

search; from Eric’s arrest, where he discarded the two packages of heroin out of his car’s window;

and from all eleven controlled buys—only five of which Eric directly participated in. Over Eric’s

objection that he should be held responsible for only the amount of heroin he directly sold to

Malone, the district court found all 742.52 grams to be relevant conduct based on defendants’

conspiracy. On appeal, Eric argues that the drugs recovered from the Gilligan Street house and

       4
        Framing his argument as one challenging procedural reasonableness, both Eric and the
government contend that our review is for abuse of discretion. But because his argument is more
appropriately framed as a factual challenge to relevant conduct, our review is for clear error.
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the amount of drugs Marcus directly sold—especially during buys that occurred after Eric was

arrested and incarcerated—should not have been considered relevant conduct under U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3. Thus, Eric contends his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.

         “For defendants convicted of drug crimes, the base offense level at sentencing depends

upon the amount of drugs involved in the offense.” McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 562 (citation

omitted). A defendant’s base offense level is derived from his “relevant conduct,” as defined under

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Id. “Relevant conduct” includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided,

abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant,” as well

as actions jointly undertaken by co-conspirators if such actions were “[(1)] within the scope of the

jointly undertaken criminal activity, [(2)] in furtherance of that criminal activity, and

[(3)] reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity; that occurred during the

commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of

attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). Relevant

conduct need not be charged, United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 2003), and it can

even include acquitted conduct, United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).

         For conspiracies, “the scope of relevant conduct with regard to the drug amounts involved

in a conspiracy under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is ‘significantly narrower’ than the conduct needed to

obtain a conspiracy conviction.” McReynolds, 964 F.3d at 563 (citation omitted). But “in order

to hold a defendant accountable for the acts of others [under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)], a district court

must make two particularized findings: (1) that the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s

agreement; and (2) that they were foreseeable to the defendant.” Id. (brackets in original). At

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

sentencing, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a certain drug

quantity is attributable to the defendant as relevant conduct. Id.; Gill, 348 F.3d at 151.

       Eric argues that his relevant conduct includes only the drugs that he directly sold to Malone

plus the drugs recovered during his arrest: 267.84 grams of heroin. This argument erroneously

narrows the scope of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). True, Eric directly sold heroin to Malone during

only five of the eleven controlled buys, but Eric was still a member of the conspiracy, and Marcus’s

sales were reasonably foreseeable in connection with their heroin-trafficking scheme. Law

enforcement obtained tracker and tracer warrants for both defendants’ phones, and

communications from their phones, as well as surveillance of defendants, revealed evidence of

joint heroin trafficking. And during the beginning of Malone’s time as a CI, Marcus referred

Malone to Eric to buy heroin. Although Marcus continued to sell heroin to Malone after Eric’s

arrest, the record does not show that Eric ever withdrew from the conspiracy. With respect to the

heroin found at the Gilligan Street house, on the day that Eric was arrested, Marcus and Eric had

a cryptic phone conversation while Marcus was at the Gilligan Street house immediately before

Marcus and Eric met at Marcus’s house. At that meeting, Eric presumably obtained from Marcus

the packages of heroin that Eric discarded during his arrest later that day. Based on the evidence

at trial, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the heroin recovered from

the Gilligan Street house and from Marcus’s sales should be included in Eric’s relevant conduct.

       To be certain, the district court made particularized findings at sentencing that all 742.52

grams of heroin were attributable to Eric. The district court consulted two examples in the

application notes of § 1B1.3 where a defendant’s relevant conduct was limited, despite being in a

conspiracy, and the court explained why Eric’s case was distinguishable from those examples. See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.4(C)(v), (vii). Unlike in the application-note examples, the district court

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

here opined that “there’s no evidence that Eric only agreed to distribute a certain number of grams

or only complete one delivery” or that Eric ever withdrew from the conspiracy. The district court

was not clearly wrong in its relevant conduct determination, especially considering that Eric was

found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiring to distribute between 100 and 1000 grams

of heroin. Our precedent allows sentencing courts to consider acquitted conduct as relevant

conduct, so it certainly was not clear error for the district court to consider as Eric’s relevant

conduct a total drug quantity that he had been convicted of conspiring to distribute. See White,

551 F.3d at 385.

                                                IV.

       We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

       CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join today’s opinion in full. I write

separately to draw attention to a line of precedent that deserves revisiting.

       As the Court correctly notes, in criminal cases, we ordinarily review unpreserved errors

using the plain-error test. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 500 F.3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2007).

That is so for many reasons. Start with the fact that doing so is mandated by Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 52(b). But there are other justifications. For example, this practice encourages

defendants to raise issues in a timely manner, which allows for their fulsome development at trial

and prevents delays caused by multiple appeals and remands. It also honors the district court’s

threshold role in resolving disputed issues. See also United States v. del Carpio Frescas, 932 F.3d

324, 333–44 (5th Cir. 2019) (Oldham, J., concurring) (outlining the history and purposes of plain-

error review). As the plain-error standard recognizes, it would be unfair to hold a district court to

the same standard when an issue “was not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

       Yet despite these many commendable goals, we deviate from our customary standard of

review when the government fails to ask for this more forgiving standard. United States v.

Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2011). It is difficult to understand why. Over a decade

ago, then-District Judge Thapar questioned this practice.          See id. at 770–73 (Thapar, J.,

concurring). Still today, I find his reasoning persuasive. As he explained, our approach conflicts

with the plain text of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)—reason enough to raise deep

suspicions. Id. at 771. But Judge Thapar went further. Drawing on his experience in the district

court, he noted that our modified approach leads us to evaluate the district court’s judgment as if

it had considered and ruled on an issue—when in fact it has not, due to no fault of its own. Id. at

770–71. That is hardly fair to our colleagues on the trial court. In the end, the lone party to benefit

is the defendant, who receives a more generous standard of review, despite his own inattention.

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Nos. 22-5142/5162, United States v. Bennett, et al.

       True, the government sometimes is similarly inattentive, as in this instance, by failing to

raise with us Bennett’s omission in the district court. But that should not deprive the appeals court

of affording the district court the deference it is owed. How to evaluate the district court

proceedings is a decision more appropriately within the province of the court than the parties. See

K & T Enterprises, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 175 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The parties, however,

cannot determine this court’s standard of review by agreement. Such a determination remains for

this court to make for itself.”); United States v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634, 639 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) (“A

party’s concession on the standard of review does not bind the court.”). We would not, for

instance, review a grant of summary judgment for an abuse of discretion merely because the

parties, for whatever reason, asked for it. See United States v. Murguia-Rodriguez, 815 F.3d 566,

579 (9th Cir. 2016) (Callahan, J., dissenting). The government, in other words, may not tinker

with the standard of review, intentionally or unwittingly, by failing to highlight a defendant’s

forfeiture. That does not mean the government’s hands are tied should it believe a miscarriage of

justice occurred in the district court. In that case, the government may concede error, thereby

putting a thumb on the scale for us as we consider the issue.

       These concerns notwithstanding, this practice remains the law in our Circuit, one we are

bound to follow. As the circuits are not all of one mind on the matter, further review, either by

our en banc court or the Supreme Court, would be welcomed.

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