Court Opinion

ID: 9605547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:38.453173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:47.594080
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the catch basin into which Silver fell was a static open and obvious condition of which the owner had no duty to warn her.
This case deals with the first prong of Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 623 (272 SE2d 327) (1980), the owner’s duty to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner has superior knowledge, as discussed in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 736-740 (493 SE2d 403) (1997), and is therefore not affected by the changes in summary judgment evidentiary burdens made in Robinson, supra at 748, regarding the second prong of Alterman Foods, the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the hazard or distraction by the defendant.
As acknowledged by the majority, prior to purchasing the shopping center, Freyer had retained architect Coursey and the two walked over the property so Coursey could evaluate it from a structural standpoint. No problems in design, construction or mainte*248nance were noted. As reflected by the affidavit of Liebmann, Silver’s expert engineer, the claimed defects are of the type which required architectural or engineering expertise to comprehend, which neither Freyer nor the other defendants possessed. Liebmann opined that the catch basin was defectively designed and constructed because the interface between the parking space and the storm drain was too steep an angle. Of course, none of the defendants had anything to do with the design and construction of the catch basin. Additionally, Liebmann stated that the danger “would be obvious ... to any user of the parking lot who could plainly see and become aware of the sharp drop.” In his opinion, Silver did not see the danger “because of the shading caused by her car which prevented her from seeing and appreciating the sharp drop off. . . .” The affidavit, however, does not address the significance of the manhole cover in relation to the culvert and drain opening.
In addition to the facts set out in the majority, Silver acknowledged that she was familiar with catch basins and that one was located near her residence.
Asked what caused her to fall, Silver testified as follows: “I must have just shifted my weight or moved my foot a little, and all of a sudden I went sliding down with both feet into this area. . . .” “There was some shadow cast from the sun in the west. ... I know that there was a shadow here. ... It was like early dusk. Q. Did you have any difficulty seeing where you were going? A. No. . . .” “Q. Do you believe the light conditions had anything to do with your fall? A. I, I really don’t know. Q. Do you know why you fell? A. Because there was a hole there. There was an area that was slanting down that I did not see, and I couldn’t see. ... It looked straight. . . . There was no way I could see it. It looked as if it was a very safe place and a flat place to stand. Q. Before the fall had you looked at this area? A. I walked by and looked and was standing there, and everything seemed perfectly safe to me. . . .” Asked about the differentiation of color between blacktop and concrete, Silver acknowledged a distinction, “but I believe if you go back to where there is a shadow, to me, that night it did not stand out as it does in contrast in this picture. . . .” “I don’t consider when I fell late evening, but I do feel that there was a shadow here which made it look different than it does in this picture.”
The only possible reason Silver gave for not being able to see the sloping hole in the catch basin, which was made of concrete lighter than the parking area of black asphalt, was that the sun was setting and her car was parked so that a shadow was cast on that sloping concrete portion. The photos submitted by Silver of the spot where she fell, with her car parked in approximately the same location as the night she fell, clearly indicate, however, that even when the *249opening of the catch basin is shadowed, the manhole cover on the catch basin, which Silver was facing before her fall, is visible, indicating the location of a culvert for draining water.
(a) First, it must be emphasized that the catch basin into which Silver fell was not a “defect” in the property. It was a planned feature incorporated into the design of the project by the original developer in order to divert rainwater from the premises. Upon purchasing the property, the owner, Domus, had exercised the ordinary care required of an owner and had it inspected and been advised of no problems or “defects” in it. The catch basin cannot, therefore, be said to create an “unreasonable risk of harm” from which the owner/occupier must use ordinary care to protect invitees based on its superior knowledge as discussed in Robinson, supra at 740. The catch basin’s primary purpose was to avoid the accumulation of rainwater on the asphalt in an area where vehicles were invited to park, leaving oily substances which vehicles leave in such areas, and which invitees were invited to traverse. Had there not been a catch basin where one needed to be in such a situation, the owner/occupier risked exposure to claims based on standing water and its attendant hazards, including water mixing with the oily substances in the parking area. See, e.g., Hardeman v. Spires, 232 Ga. App. 694 (503 SE2d 588) (1998) (fall on wet tile on porch); Cleveland v. Snowdrop Properties, 232 Ga. App. 447 (501 SE2d 546) (1998) (fall on wet leaves on sidewalk); Dumas v. Tripps of North Carolina, 229 Ga. App. 814 (495 SE2d 129) (1997) (restaurant patron’s fall on ice while getting out of car in parking lot); Arwood v. Tzen, 224 Ga. App. 722 (481 SE2d 874) (1997) and Van Dyke v. Emro Marketing Co., 211 Ga. App. 744 (440 SE2d 469) (1994) (both involving customers falling due to mixed oil products and water in convenience store parking lots).
(b) Further, there can be no question that the catch basin, whether defective1 or not, was an open and obvious static condition and the only possible reason given by Silver as to why she could not see the hole in the catch basin was a shadow created by her own car.2 This case is factually very similar to and controlled by MARTA v. Fife, 220 Ga. App. 298 (469 SE2d 420) (1996) (whole court). There, as here, a drainage culvert was involved. Fife stepped off of a curb formed by the top of the catch basin and into the culvert which she did not see because she was looking at the door of her sister’s car.
*250Here, as in Fife, “[s]ince the drainage depression was open and obvious, [Po Folks, Freyer and Uberto were] under no duty to warn. An owner or occupier of land has a duty of exercising ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe for invitees. OCGA § 51-3-1. The basis of the owner’s liability is a superior knowledge of the condition that subjected the invitee to an unreasonable risk of harm. [Cit.] The hazard in this case is a ‘static’ condition which is not dangerous unless someone fails to observe it and steps into it. [Cit.] In cases involving static conditions, ‘if the invitee knows of the condition or hazard there is no duty on the part of the proprietor to warn him and there is no liability for resulting injury because the invitee has as much knowledge as the proprietor does and then by voluntarily acting in view of his knowledge, assumes the risks and dangers incident to the known condition.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Rose v. Kennesaw House, 203 Ga. App. 648, 649 (417 SE2d 379) (1992). Also, we have held that where there is nothing to obstruct or interfere with the invitee’s ability to see the static defect, the owner is justified in assuming that the visitor will see it and realize the risks involved. Crenshaw v. Hogan, 203 Ga. App. 104, 105 (416 SE2d 147) (1992).” Fife, supra at 300 (2). See also Tollman v. Zamani, 224 Ga. App. 518 (481 SE2d 232) (1997) (concrete block, approximately ten inches high and thirty inches wide with four metal bolts protruding from the top approximately six inches, held to be open and obvious static condition in parking lot).
Certainly as common, if not more so, are catch basins of the type involved here, as acknowledged by Silver. See Fife, supra; Sullenberger v. Grand Union Co., 201 Ga. App. 194 (410 SE2d 381) (1991) (use of concrete dividers or bumpers in a parking lot does not constitute negligence).
In my opinion, both Po Folks and the owners of the shopping center were entitled to summary judgment. See Poythress v. Savannah Airport Comm., 229 Ga. App. 303, 306 (494 SE2d 76) (1997) (tripping on open and obvious handicapped ramp); Anderson v. Turton Dev., 225 Ga. App. 270, 273 (2) (483 SE2d 597) (1997) (operator of inn entitled to summary judgment although owner, which designed and constructed allegedly defective handicapped ramp, was not). Here, there is no allegation that the owners, Domus and its partners, had anything to do with the design or construction of the catch basin, nor is there any evidence of any failure to maintain the basin or to provide adequate ingress and egress to the restaurant.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this dissent.
*251Decided August 19, 1998
Reconsideration denied September 8, 1998
Bach, Hulsey & Carver, Robert J. Hulsey, Dermer & Black, Stephen F. Dermer, for appellants.
Warshauer & Woodruff, Michael J. Warshauer, Michael R. Goldberg, for appellee.

 As stated above, Liebmann’s only claim of defect was the improper slope in the catch basin as constructed, for which Domus had no responsibility and of which, as far as the record reflects, neither Domus and its partners nor Po Folks was aware.

 Silver does not say that she did not see the catch basin, only that she did not notice the sharp slant of the intake. Therefore, she chose to stand beside what she knew to be a water intake.