Court Opinion

ID: 9592928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:18:07.804184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:12:55.786916
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with the majority’s result, the concern I have with both the majority and dissenting opinions is that they seem to confuse the issue of negligence per se with the question of causation. The discussion of OCGA § 40-6-73 and the duty to yield is irrelevant here.
Plaintiff’s sole enumeration of error is the trial court’s charging of OCGA § 40-6-46, regarding no-passing zones. It is clear that there was sufficient evidence, to justify a charge thereon, that the driver of the automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger violated that Code section. I
However, plaintiff argues, and the dissent agrees, that the estab-l lishment of defendant’s violation of OCGA § 40-6-73 removes from! *203the jury the issue of plaintiff’s driver’s negligence. This interpretation of § 40-6-73 implicitly removes the issue of proximate cause from the jury. Taken to its extreme, this logic would result in an exiting automobile being absolutely liable for a collision, even if such vehicle exited onto a street at night and collided with a speeding vehicle which had its lights off. Moreover, this position converts cases involving OCGA § 40-6-73 into matters of summary adjudication. Even assuming the dissent’s interpretation of OCGA § 40-6-73 to be correct, I disagree with the consequences the dissent concludes are required by such interpretation.
Negligence per se is not liability per se. Negligence per se is actionable negligence only where it is the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Sumner v. Otasco, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 177 (333 SE2d 28) (1985). Proximate cause is for the jury to decide.1 DeKalb County Hosp. Auth. v. Theofanidis, 157 Ga. App. 811 (278 SE2d 712) (1981); Garner v. Driver, 155 Ga. App. 322 (270 SE2d 863) (1980).
I would affirm the trial court on the sole basis that the evidence authorized the charge.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley and Judge Pope join in this special concurrence.

 As noted above, the plaintiff here was a passenger and the trial court’s charges on iroximate cause were properly adjusted to this factual situation.