Court Opinion

ID: 9883246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:38:56.567957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.340181
License: Public Domain

ZLAKET, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur that the “quadrant B policy” constituted an unapproved local rule. See Hare v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 540, 542, 652 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1982); Rule 36, Ariz. R.Crim.P. Thus, I reach the same result as the majority. I cannot agree, however, that State ex rel. Bowers v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 34, 839 P.2d 454 (App.1992) should be disapproved “to the extent that it allows a trial judge to automatically reject a plea agreement without individualized consideration because it contains a stipulated sentence.” Ante at 148, 894 P.2d at 691.
The requirement that judges give “full” regard to such plea agreements before rejecting them, ante at 148, 894 P.2d at 691, creates an unenforceable standard and invites unwarranted challenges based on alleged abuses of discretion. Must judges now articulate reasons for rejecting pleas in order to demonstrate that they are not doing so merely because agreements contain stipulated sentences? Will an individual judge’s motives be suspect if he or she, without explanation, rejects a series of pleas containing such stipulations? If so, will hearings be required or permitted to ascertain those motives? I fear there is unintended mischief lurking in today’s decision.
The majority concedes that judges are empowered to reject plea agreements. I am of the additional opinion that they should be permitted to summarily reject those containing stipulated sentences for that reason alone, without having to go through the charade of considering each case individually. My hope is that most judges would not routinely follow such a course of action, at least until we can be sure it causes no damage to the plea-bargaining process that constitutes an integral part of our criminal justice system. Nevertheless, arriving at a general principle applicable to a class of plea agreements, after full consideration of the issue, seems to me more honest, more efficient, and every bit as thoughtful as pondering each agreement individually before rejecting it.
I read and interpret Rule 17, Ariz.R.Crim. P., just as the court of appeals did in Bowers. The trial judge in that case was completely frank about his reasons for rejecting the plea agreement, and it is not difficult to understand or appreciate his view:
On the face of the Agreement in this matter, there is absolutely no discretion by the Court regarding any of the charges that the defendant is pleading guilty to. I do not know whether I would sentence that defendant to more or less....
But there is no question in the Court’s mind that this particular Plea Agreement absolutely eliminates the need for the court. You may as well do it without me.
173 Ariz. at 37, 839 P.2d at 457.
I believe the court’s ruling today not only threatens such candor but also reinforces the purely ministerial role about which the judge in Bowers so vehemently and properly complained. Sentencing is, or at least should be, a judicial function. Regrettably, mandatory sentencing schemes have eliminated a great deal of judicial discretion in such matters. I prefer not to support a rule interpretation that potentially contributes to further erosion of this authority, especially where it is unnecessary to resolve the pending case.