Court Opinion

ID: 9452447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:40:56.289789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:13.215170
License: Public Domain

CHOATE, Senior District Judge
(dissenting) :
There are some areas in which I am entirely in accord with this court’s opinion. First, I concur with the result of the decision on the first issue discussed. In my view the admissibility of relevant, accurate photographs in a state proceeding does not raise a question of constitutional dignity.
As to the second issue, I agree that Burns was not constitutionally entitled to consult with an attorney or have one present during his interrogation, since the temporal factor makes Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758 (1964), and Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), inapplicable to this cause under Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772 (1966).
Third, I agree that neither due process nor other constitutional mandate was violated by the procedure where the state introduced only a part of a confession into evidence, since the defendant, without taking the stand himself, was at liberty to introduce the rest of the statement.
As to the remaining point, with all due respect, I am in earnest opposition.
The proper place of the writ of habeas corpus in the judicial system is “one of great importance — a remedy against illegal restraint — but it is not a substitute for or an alternative to appeal, nor is it a burial ground for valid state procedures.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 448, 83 S.Ct. 822, 853 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
It seems to me that the majority has used its imagination to contrive a constitutional fault that does not really exist in the state court proceedings with respect to the defendant’s confession and the adequacy of hearings on that issue. The result is “to subvert the integrity of state criminal justice.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 760 (1963). My conclusion is based upon the following considerations:
1. At Burns’s trial by the Criminal District Court No. 2, Harris County, Texas, the trial court indicated its awareness that Burns’s counsel was questioning the circumstances under which Burns was interrogated prior to his confession. After a full and fair hearing, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntary.
2. Burns’s motion for a new trial received full hearing by the trial court. In that motion his counsel admitted that the “voluntary statement of the Defendant showed Defendant had committed the offense.” (Emphasis supplied.)
3. His appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas was scrupulously considered, and a comprehensive opinion was written, wherein it was stated:
“The voluntary statement of appellant was offered in evidence. Prior to it being admitted, the careful trial judge afforded appellant’s counsel the opportunity of, and he fully examined state’s witness, Captain M. F. Patton of the Harris County Sheriff’s Office, *605on voir dire, out of the presence of the jury, on the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession. No question of force or coercion was raised, the appellant’s counsel did inquire if appellant was intoxicated at the time that he gave the statement, and the witness responded that he was not. Appellant’s counsel then stated that he objected to the confession, but he did not state upon what grounds. The trial judge then stated that he held the confession admissible. The jury was then brought in and the confession admitted into evidence and no further nor other objection was urged nor was any motion to strike made.” Burns v. State, 388 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.Crim. App.1965).
4. The appellate court again examined the record upon Burns’s motion for rehearing of the appeal. Id. at 699.
5. Burns’s petitions for writ of ha-beas corpus were considered by the Court of Criminal Appeals and by the district court below. The latter court entered five orders in the matter, totalling eleven and one-half pages.
All this is to say that Mr. Burns’s plight has not been taken lightly nor handled summarily by the judiciary. Yet now this court finds possible error unnoticed or uncorrected by the previous judges who have applied their time and wisdom to assuring due process to this defendant. The majority conclusion that Burns has not been given an adequate hearing concerning the issue of the vol-untariness of his confession is strained indeed, and completely improper when the record of the state proceedings clearly shows that he received as full a hearing as he sought regarding the factual foundation for his constitutional claim.
Further, in the prior considerations of this petitioner’s cause, the courts’ conclusions that his confession was admissible were not erroneous. There has never been any allegation or indication of force, coercion, or persuasion of either a physical or mental nature.
Not even Burns’s testimony in his own behalf — that he “was feeling pretty spry” that evening — could be construed as evidence that he was intoxicated at the time he made his confession to the extent that his “will was overborne.” Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961). In short, no reason or allegation of fact appears to justify questioning the admissibility of Burns’s confession.
Until the decision in Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, the role of the Constitution has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous confessions. Law enforcement agencies were justified in relying on that standard prior to the Escobedo and Miranda decisions. Johnson v. State of New Jersey, supra. The facts alleged fall well short of coercion or undue pressure in my view.
The majority conclusion is based upon Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774 (1964), which is not applicable in the case at bar. Here, the jury did not determine both issues of voluntariness of the confession and of guilt or innocence of the defendant, which was the practice condemned in Jackson. No instructions on the issue of voluntariness were given by the court or requested by defendant.
Like every capital case, this is one of serious moment. The opinions and orders of the courts below disclose an appreciation by their judges of their constitutional obligations to the defendant, the state and the nation. Taylor v. State of Alabama, 335 U.S. 252, 264, 68 S.Ct. 1415, 92 L.Ed. 1935 (1948). I believe it is time to place some trust in the courts who have the practical responsibility of trying and disposing of criminal matters on the basis of reality rather than supposition.