Court Opinion

ID: 9966198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 14:07:14.223055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:45.611858
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-4013-21

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.M., K.G., and L.G. (dismissed
from litigation),

          Defendants,

and

J.C.,

     Defendant-Appellant,
___________________________

IN THE MATTER OF E.CM.,

     Minor.
____________________________

                   Submitted April 23, 2024 – Decided May 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright and Whipple.
             On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
             Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County,
             Docket No. FN-16-0053-20.

             Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
             appellant (Beth Anne Hahn, Designated Counsel, on the
             briefs).

             Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
             respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney
             General, of counsel; Mary L. Harpster, Deputy
             Attorney General, on the brief).

             Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law
             Guardian, attorney for minor (Meredith A. Pollock,
             Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin,
             Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on
             the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Defendant, J.C. (Juan) 1 appeals from the Family Part's July 15, 2022 order

finding he abused or neglected his daughter, E.CM. (Ella), born in October 2018,

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c). No findings were made against Ella's mother

E.M. (Erin), Ella's babysitter K.G. (Kelly), or Kelly's daughter L.G. (Lila), and

they are not parties to this appeal.

      Erin and then-ten-month-old Ella were living in a room in Kelly's home

for eight months, when, on August 26, 2019, Erin left Ella in Kelly's care and

1
  Because the parties have the same initials, we use pseudonyms for ease of
reference.
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                                       2
went to work at 5:30 p.m. Kelly was a licensed daycare provider and regularly

provided care for Ella while Erin worked overnight. Juan did not live at that

home.

        Erin bathed Ella before she left and did not see any marks or bruises on

her at that time. Ella was moving her arms normally and appeared "fine." That

evening, Ella continued to behave as she typically would—she was happy,

walked around, and had no difficulty moving or lifting her arms. At about 8:00

p.m., Juan arrived at the home and saw Ella in her crib. He described Ella as

"grumpy" because she did not want to watch what Kelly's nephew was watching

on the television. Juan then left to run an errand for Kelly. He later confirmed

to the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office (PCPO) that, when he left, Ella

remained in the crib and was "fine." Around 9:00 p.m., Kelly gave Ella a bath;

Ella splashed the water and had no marks or bruises on her. Kelly plac ed Ella

on Erin's bed with a bottle, which Ella held with two hands. Kelly watched Ella

in the bedroom until Juan came back at about 10:00 p.m. and took over Ella's

care.

        Although Ella had a crib, Juan left her on the bed and lay down next to

her to sleep. The next morning, at about 4:30 a.m., Juan called Kelly to watch

Ella because he needed to leave for work. Juan told Kelly Ella had been restless

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                                        3
and crying all night. Kelly lay down with Ella in the bed and noticed she was

hot and whining. She gave Ella Tylenol, but this did not help. Thinking Ella

might be hungry, Kelly made her a bottle. Although Ella usually reached eagerly

for her bottle and held it with both hands, that morning she reached out only

with her right hand and then did not feed very long. Her left arm remained lying

on the bed. Kelly tried changing Ella's diaper, but Ella still would not feed.

Kelly lay down with Ella again, and they both slept until 6:00 a.m., when Kelly

got up and asked her daughter Lila to watch Ella.

      When Erin returned home from work shortly thereafter, Ella was lying on

her stomach on the bed. Erin noticed she was not her usual happy self. Instead,

she looked at Erin "in a pouty way," appeared lethargic, and whined. When Erin

picked her up, Ella's arm was hanging down oddly. Erin gave her a bottle, which

Ella picked up with only one hand, contrary to her usual custom of using both

hands. When Erin touched Ella's left arm, Ella started to cry.         Erin then

examined Ella more closely and saw red marks that appeared to be scrapes on

her chest, and a bruise on her forehead. Erin and Kelly took Ella to St. Joseph's

Regional Medical Center, where x-rays revealed a fracture of her left humerus,

the bone in her upper arm.      The hospital contacted the Division of Child

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                                       4
Protection and Permanency (Division). The Division referred the case to the

PCPO.

      When Juan arrived at the hospital, he admitted he might have "squished"

Ella while he was sleeping because he slept deeply and did not feel or remember

anything. At the hospital, he argued with Erin and twice yanked Ella out of

Erin's arms so he could hold her.

      Two days later, Detective Kristin Falotico of the PCPO interviewed Juan,

who confirmed that Ella was "fine" when he arrived at Kelly's home on August

26. He further confirmed he had no concerns for Kelly's care of Ella since Ella

had "never had a bump or anything" while in Kelly's care.         Instead, Juan

speculated Kelly's nephew had caused Ella's injuries, although Juan had not seen

him hurting Ella and could not say how the injuries occurred.

      Division investigator Tamika Jones followed up and interviewed Juan,

who again confirmed Ella was "fine" when he took over her care and repeated

his admission he might have rolled onto Ella while he was sleeping. Juan also

admitted to marijuana use and agreed to attend a substance abuse assessment

and parenting evaluation. Both Erin and Kelly expressed concern to Jones that

Juan was too rough with Ella. Kelly reported she had seen Juan grab Ella by her

legs and hold her upside down. The Division initiated a safety protection plan

                                                                          A-4013-21
                                       5
that barred Juan and Kelly from unsupervised contact with Ella and

memorialized Juan's agreement to be evaluated.

      On November 6, 2019, the trial court granted the Division care and

supervision of Ella and restrained Juan, Kelly, and Lila from unsupervised

contact with her. The Division completed its investigation and substantiated

Juan and Kelly for physical abuse and inadequate supervision. The Division

made a finding of "not established" against Lila, and the court dismissed her

from the litigation on December 5, 2019.

      The court held a fact-finding trial. Because both Juan and Kelly had been

substantiated, the Division initially intended to utilize a burden-shifting strategy.

In light of the recently decided New Jersey Division of Child Protection and

Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353 (2021), however, the Division revisited

their investigation and determined the finding against Kelly should more

properly be "not established." The Division then sought a Title 9 finding only

against Juan. Because the Division had not completed changing their internal

records to reflect the new finding at the time of trial, the investigation summary

provided as evidence reflected both Juan's and Kelly's substantiation. Kelly

remained in the litigation so she could contest the process if issues arose.

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                                         6
      During the trial, Tamika Jones testified about her investigation of the

August 27, 2019 referral. Jones stated she spoke with Erin, Juan, and Kelly and

watched the recordings of their interviews by the PCPO; none of them provided

an accidental explanation for Ella's injuries. Erin reported to Jones that Juan

was verbally aggressive, although she denied any domestic violence. While he

speculated Kelly's nephew might have injured Ella, Juan stated, at the time he

took over her care in the evening, Ella was behaving normally, and he did not

observe any injuries. Jones confirmed Juan admitted he was the only person

caring for Ella between 10:00 p.m. on August 26 and 4:00 a.m. the next morning,

and he had slept with her in the bed and might have "squished" her arm or rolled

over on her. He denied smoking marijuana that evening but admitted he usually

smoked "one blunt" in order to fall asleep.

      Jones also testified the Division changed Kelly's initial substantiation

because even Juan admitted there had never been any concerns with her care of

Ella or any other child she babysat. After Jones watched the PCPO's interviews

of Lila and Kelly's nephew, she determined there was insufficient evidence

either of them had injured Ella.

      Madesa Espana, MD, Chief of the Child Protection and Safety Center at

St. Joseph's, testified about her examination of Ella and review of Ella's medical

                                                                            A-4013-21
                                        7
records. Without objection, the court qualified her as a pediatric physician with

expertise in child abuse and neglect cases. As part of her review, Dr. Espana

completed a physical exam of Ella in the emergency room on August 27, 2019,

and interviewed Erin and Juan.

      At that time, Ella had limited range of motion in her left arm and the

slightest movement caused her pain. She had fresh semicircular and linear

abrasions on her chest that appeared to be scratch marks or nail marks. Dr.

Espana confirmed the Division's photograph of Ella's injuries accurately

depicted those marks. Dr. Espana opined such abrasions could be caused by

pressure or rubbing of the skin, but Ella could not have made the marks herself,

as they were too long to have been made by her fingernails. And, while the

injuries could have been accidental, no one had provided Dr. Espana with an

explanation regarding how Ella's injuries were accidently inflicted. Dr. Espana

also could not tell when Ella bruised her forehead, but opined the bruise was

most likely caused by Ella's forehead hitting a surface, although no information

was provided about any such incident. Additionally, Dr. Espana stated a CAT

scan showed a small area of bleeding on the surface of Ella's brain, which could

be caused by a fall, by being shaken, or by an incident such as a car accident.

                                                                           A-4013-21
                                        8
      X-rays of Ella taken at the hospital revealed her fractured left humerus.

Follow-up x-rays in September 2019 showed the fracture healing, which

confirmed the injury had been recent when the first x-rays were taken in August.

The break was an oblique fracture, also called a spiral fracture, caused by the

bone being twisted and bent. Dr. Espana confirmed the humerus is "quite strong

and not easy to break," and breaking it would have caused Ella immediate pain.

According to Dr. Espana, Ella could not have created the "significant force"

needed to cause this break because ten-month-old children, "don't fracture their

extremities based on their just regular activities."

      Dr. Espana also reviewed Ella's medical records, including those from her

pediatrician and the hospital. She found nothing in these records, or the hospital

laboratory reports, to explain Ella's injuries. Dr. Espana considered possible

medical causes for the broken bone, but Ella showed no signs of any genetic or

metabolic condition, such as fragile bone disease, so she ruled out these causes.

Dr. Espana testified the fracture was "highly concerning for an inflicted or

abusive injury" because Ella's caretakers had not provided an account that would

explain it, Ella could not have caused it on her own, and there was no medical

explanation. Falling from the crib or having an adult roll over and "squish" her

were possible explanations for Ella's broken humerus, while squeezing was not.

                                                                            A-4013-21
                                         9
      The Division also called Kelly, who testified about the events of August

26 and 27, 2019. Kelly confirmed she had been a licensed caregiver for eight

or nine years, during which time no allegations of abuse or neglect were ever

made against her.

      Kelly testified that, on August 26, no one had been alone with Ella besides

Juan. Contrary to Juan's statements to the PCPO, Kelly testified Ella had been

awake and drinking her bottle when Juan took over her care. At the time, she

was able to move both her arms, and "[s]he was perfect." Kelly testified that

Ella was hot and "uneasy" when she took over her care from Juan at 4:30 a.m.

on August 27. She tried feeding Ella and changing her diaper, but Ella would

not feed and remained "uneasy" and was "crying a little bit." Ella attempted to

grab the bottle with her right hand while "she just left [her left hand] . . . on the

bed." Kelly did not notice any marks on Ella's abdomen when she changed her

diaper because the room was dim, and she did not lift up Ella's shirt. Kelly

denied anything had occurred while she cared for Ella that could have caused

the injuries. She also confirmed Juan stated at the hospital that, when he sleeps,

"he doesn’t feel anything that he does."

      Although Juan's attorney reported receiving approval for an expert, he did

not present any witnesses or evidence.

                                                                               A-4013-21
                                        10
      The Law Guardian supported the Division's request for a Title 9 finding

against Juan.

      On July 15, 2022, the judge issued an oral opinion and order, finding by a

preponderance of the competent, material, and relevant evidence that Juan had

abused or neglected Ella under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).          The litigation was

dismissed that same day. This appeal followed.

      On appeal, Juan argues his conduct was not grossly negligent, and the

court relied on incompetent testimony and impermissibly served as an expert,

turning Title 9 into a strict liability statute. He also argues the trial court

misapplied the principles enunciated in J.R.-R.

      We review the factual findings and conclusions of a trial judge with

"deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and its feel of the case

based upon the opportunity of the judge to see and hear the witnesses." N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J. Super. 46, 78 (App. Div. 2003)

(citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). We likewise "defer to

the trial court's assessment of expert evaluations." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 221 (App. Div. 2013) (citing In re

Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 382 (1999)). In addition, "[b]ecause of

the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate

                                                                             A-4013-21
                                       11
courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Cesare, 154 N.J. at

413.   We should not disturb the trial judge's findings unless they are "so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms

Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). On the other

hand, a trial court's "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that

flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." N.J. Div.

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552-53 (2014) (quoting

Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378

(1995)).

       New Jersey's child welfare laws strike a "balance between two competing

interests: a parent's constitutionally protected right 'to raise a child and maintain

a relationship with that child, without undue interference by the state,' and 'the

State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children.'" N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 17-18 (2013) (first quoting

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008), then quoting

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 347 (1999)). Of

those laws, Title 9 aims to "protect children 'who have had serious injury

inflicted upon them' and make sure they are 'immediately safeguarded from

                                                                               A-4013-21
                                        12
further injury and possible death.'" Id. at 18 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a)). "The

law's 'paramount concern' is the 'safety of the children' and 'not the culpability

of parental conduct.'" Ibid. (first quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a), then quoting G.S.

v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 157 N.J. 161, 177 (1999)). With that focus

in mind, Title 9 states a child is abused or neglected when that child's

            physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
            impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
            impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
            guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a minimum
            degree of care . . . in providing the child with proper
            supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting
            or allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial risk
            thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal
            punishment; or by any other acts of a similarly serious
            nature requiring the aid of the court.

            [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).]

      Juan argues the trial court erred in determining his co-sleeping with his

ten-month-old daughter was grossly negligent within the meaning of Title 9. He

asserts, in doing so, the trial judge "speculate[d] and fill[ed] in missing gaps

because the State failed to offer any evidence or testimony whatsoever

demonstrating co-sleeping poses an imminent risk of substantial harm." Juan

further contends the State did not address in its case "what Juan, as an ordinary

person, understood about the risks of co-sleeping." According to Juan, "[t]hose

requisite evidential links are missing." He offers several independent med ical

                                                                            A-4013-21
                                       13
sources, not provided at trial, to argue that co-sleeping is not grossly negligent.

In his reply brief, he clarifies these studies are not offered as proof that any

particular stance is correct, but to emphasize "the proposition that there exist[]

considerable differences of opinion and varying considerations on the topic of

co-sleeping."    Also on reply, Juan emphasizes the trial court "had no

particularized evidence before it establishing what it found to be reckless

conduct as a matter of law."

      The trial judge found Juan "admitted to sleeping in the same bed with the

child on the evening in question and even stated that perhaps he rolled over and

squished the child's arm." In comparing Juan's admitted actions to those found

grossly negligent in N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.R., 419 N.J. Super.

538 (App. Div. 2011), the judge explained "[A.R.'s] actions in placing a child, a

[ten]-month-old child, on a twin bed without railings next to an operating

radiator and with another sleeping child were deliberate. And the events that

followed, although not intended by defendant, were not brought about by

accidental means." Explaining the phrase "not brought about by accidental

means," the trial judge cited G.S., 157 N.J. at 175, and stated our Supreme Court

"held that, ['w]here an action is deliberate, the actor can or should foresee that

                                                                             A-4013-21
                                       14
his conduct is likely to result in injury as a matter of law, that the injury is caused

by['] 'other than accidental means.'"

      Further, the trial judge referenced our holding in A.R., stating:

             If an intentional act produces an unintended result, the
             injury is not accidental. A parent or guardian can
             commit child abuse even though the resulting injury is
             not intended. [The Division] and the courts must
             examine the circumstances leading up to the injury to
             determine whether it was caused by accidental means.
             The intent of the parent or guardian is irrelevant.

             [A.R., 419 N.J. Super. at 543 (quoting G.S., 157 N.J. at
             175).]

      The judge then acknowledged "not every physical injury caused by other

than accidental means falls within the parameters of [N.J.S.A.] 9:6-8.21(c),"

(quoting A.R., 419 N.J. Super. at 544), and that failure "to exercise a minimum

degree of care . . . refers to conduct that is grossly or wantonly negligent but not

necessarily intentional," (internal quotation marks omitted). Addressing the

"minimum degree of care" standard, the trial judge again relied on the Supreme

Court's analysis in G.S. to state:

             [c]onduct is considered willful or wanton if . . . done
             with the knowledge that injury is likely to or probably
             will result. . . . Because risks that are recklessly
             incurred are not considered unforeseen perils or
             accidents in the eyes of the law, actions taken with
             reckless disregard for the consequences also may be
             wanton or willful. . . .

                                                                                 A-4013-21
                                         15
            [G.S., 157 N.J. at 178 (citations omitteed).]

      Finally, the trial judge summarized the applicable standard as "[w]here an

ordinary, reasonable person would understand that a situation poses dangerous

risks and acts without regard for the . . . potentially serious consequences, the

law hold[s] him responsible for the injuries he caused." (Quoting id. at 179).

      With that framework established, the judge stated, "[c]ommon sense

dictates that a [ten]-month-old child should not be sleeping on a bed with an[]

adult who could unconsciously roll over and squish or even suffocate the child,

causing serious injury or even asphyxiation," and therefore the Division proved

its case by a preponderance of the evidence.

      In a Title 9 action, "prima facie evidence that a child . . . is an abused or

neglected child" is provided by proof (1) of "injuries sustained by a child or of

the condition of a child," and (2) that those injuries or condition are "of such a

nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts

or omissions of the parent or guardian." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a). In New Jersey

Division of Child Protection & Permanency v. J.R.-R., our Supreme Court

expanded on the statutory language, explaining "if the injury is one that

ordinarily would not occur in the absence of abuse or neglect, if the child was

under the supervision of a parent, and if there is no indication the injury was the

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                                       16
result of a mere accident, then [the Division] has presented prima facie evidence

of abuse or neglect." 248 N.J. at 371.

      Here, the trial court's legal analysis was largely an accurate synopsis of

the current case law, but its conclusion resulted from the mistaken application

of what is meant by "other than accidental means," notwithstanding a lack of

proof the child's injuries were "of such a nature as would ordinarily not be

sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent or

guardian." See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a).

      The trial judge explained the phrase "other than accidental means," by

misquoting the holding in G.S. to state, "[t]he G.S. Court . . . held that, ['w]here

an action is deliberate, the actor can or should foresee that his conduct is likely

to result in injury as a matter of law, that the injury is caused by' 'other than

accidental means.'" (citing G.S., 157 N.J. at 175). The actual quote from G.S.,

however, states that "[w]here an action is deliberate, and the actor can or should

foresee that his conduct is likely to result in injury as a matter of law, that injury

is caused by 'other than accidental means.'" 157 N.J. at 175 (emphasis added).

      Ordinarily, the omission of one word in an oral decision is not dispositive,

but here, the omission of the single word—"and" in the above quote—changed

the definition of the phrase, "other than accidental means," from having two

                                                                                A-4013-21
                                         17
conditions—in the Supreme Court's version—to having one—in the trial judge's

interpretation. 2   The trial judge's subsequent discussion then omitted any

analysis to support the finding that "it was reasonably foreseeable that [Juan's]

conduct was likely to cause injury."

      Secondly, a prima facie case that a child is abused or neglected requires

proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a child's injury or condition is

"of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason

of the acts or omissions of the parent or guardian." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a). This

element is entirely absent from this case. During her testimony, Dr. Espana

testified the characteristics of Ella's injury were "highly concerning for an

inflicted or abusive injury." The Division caseworker testified the claim of

abuse against Juan was substantiated "based on the absolute circumstances that

the child was hospitalized. She had . . . an inflicted injury and she required

medical attention," and the Division relied on "interviews with . . . the family,

[including the m]other[]" to determine "there was a concern, that they thought

2
    In the trial judge's analysis, merely finding the "action is deliberate" was
sufficient to then presume that "the actor can or should [have] foresee[n] that
his conduct [wa]s likely to result in injury as a matter of law." In the G.S.
framework, however, an action is caused by "other than accidental means" when
it is both deliberate and "the actor can or should foresee that his conduct is likely
to result in injury as a matter of law." G.S., 157 N.J. at 175.
                                                                              A-4013-21
                                        18
that, you know, [Juan] could've caused the injury." None of this testimony was

sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Ella's injuries were

"of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason

of the acts or omissions of the parent or guardian." See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a).

      In his oral opinion, the trial judge found Juan "admitted to sleeping in the

same bed with the child on the evening in question and even stated that perhaps

he rolled over and squished the child's arm." The judge then found "[c]ommon

sense dictates that a [ten]-month-old child should not be sleeping on a bed with

an[] adult who could unconsciously roll over and squish or even suffocate the

child, causing serious injury or even asphyxiation." In reviewing testimony by

the Division's expert, the trial judge made no mention of any testimony

regarding the risks or benefits of co-sleeping. The only time the trial judge

referred to Juan's culpability, was in finding he "failed to exercise a minimum

degree of care and the child was seriously injur[ed] as . . . a direct result . . . of

his actions." The trial judge did not address what a "minimum degree of care"

would have required under the specific circumstances of the case. Moreover,

no evidence was produced at the hearing to support the judge's "common sense"

assertion, and the court did not analyze whether Juan "[could] or should [have]

                                                                               A-4013-21
                                         19
foresee[n] that his conduct [was] likely to result in injury as a matter of law."

See G.S., 157 N.J. at 175.

      Instead, the trial judge appears to have accepted the Law Guardian's

unsupported pronouncement that co-sleeping with a ten-month-old child was

gross negligence, when the Law Guardian asserted,

            I mean, sleeping with a ten-month-old child technically
            is . . . gross negligence, Your Honor, and I believe a
            child of that age should be put in a crib and will have a
            separate bed, Your Honor. That's the reason why the
            Division does not allow a child to sleep with a parent,
            because when they are in deep sleep, they do[] not know
            where [the child is] and how [to] . . . move around the
            child.

      No evidence was presented during trial to support the Law Guardian's

assertion. Additionally, although the Law Guardian alleged "the Division does

not allow a child to sleep with a parent," the Division made no such statement

during the case in chief or offer any evidence to support that statement. Instead,

the testimony and evidence offered during the fact-finding hearing focused on

the questions of "who did what?" and "how bad were the child's injuries?" The

Division carried their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

Juan was responsible for Ella's care when she was severely injured. But it did

not address—let alone prove—that Juan neglected to show a minimum degree

                                                                            A-4013-21
                                       20
of care in deciding to co-sleep with his ten-month-old daughter before she was

injured.

      We acknowledge the issue of co-sleeping has been treated differently in

our courts nationwide. Compare State v. Morrison, 233 A.3d 136, 152 (Md.

2020) (finding that a mother's sleeping in a bed with her four-month-old baby

and her four-year-old child after drinking approximately four beers was not "a

gross departure from what would be expected of an ordinary reasonable

person"), with State v. Merrill, 269 P.3d 196 (Ut. Ct. App. 2012) (finding

sufficient evidence of actual and perceived risk of co-sleeping with a three-and-

a-half-month-old baby when defendant was a heavy sleeper who had lost another

child under similar circumstances) and Bohannon v. State, 498 S.E.2d 316, 323

(Ga. 1998) (determining that a "rational trier of fact could find 'conscious

disregard' from the fact of placing a baby, less than three months old, in a bed

so that it would be between two intoxicated and subsequently sleeping adults "

two weeks after the defendant and a child abuse investigator from the State had

discussed the threat the former's alcoholism posed to her child).

      We, therefore, decline to conclude that co-sleeping is either always

grossly negligent, or never grossly negligent. Instead, as with all child abuse

and neglect cases, a defendant's purported culpability in a case where a child

                                                                           A-4013-21
                                      21
may have been harmed while co-sleeping must be determined after careful

examination of the factual circumstances in that specific case. In that regard,

we note that, in a 2014 decision, we explicitly declined to find that "co-sleeping

constitute[d] child abuse or neglect," distinguishing between co-sleeping in

general and "co-sleeping with an infant while under the influence of illegal

drugs." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.O., 438 N.J. Super. 373,

385 n.4 (App. Div. 2014) (emphasis added).

      Here, the record does not address the size of the bed where Juan and Ella

slept. Contrast with A.R., 419 N.J. Super. at 545-46 (relying, in part, on the fact

a father placed his ten-month-old on a twin bed without railings to find his

conduct "amounted to gross negligence and supports" the finding of abuse or

neglect). Also, notably, the trial court explicitly "assume[d] [Juan] was sober

on the evening in question," yet still found him grossly negligent. Contrast with

Morrison, 233 A.3d at 152 (finding that a mother's sleeping in a bed with her

four-month-old baby and her four-year-old child after drinking approximately

four beers was not "a gross departure from what would be expected of an

ordinary reasonable person").

      Finally, Juan argues the trial court misapplied the New Jersey Supreme

Court's holding in J.R.-R. by "relieving the [Division] of its burden [to prove its

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case], admittedly ignoring record evidence, accepting testimony rife with

embedded hearsay, and . . . equat[ing] the inferential with the strictly liable."

(Citing 248 N.J. 353 (2021)). He also contends the trial court erred in permitting

the Division to change its finding against Kelly from "substantiated" to "not

established," "years after it concluded its investigation wherein, as the

caseworker would admit at trial, it could not determine who was responsible for

the child's alleged injuries." We disagree.

      In our view, the trial court correctly applied the holding in J.R.-R. but, for

the reasons we have stated, mistakenly found the Division satisfied its burden

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a). Because the record does not contain sufficient

credible evidence to support a finding Juan was grossly negligent, we are

constrained to reverse the judge's finding that the Division established Ella was

an abused or neglected child.

      Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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