Court Opinion

ID: 9468926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:26:53.78291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:06.914504
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the result reached by Judge Gibbons because I believe: (1) that there is substantial evidence on the record to support the Board’s finding of unfair labor practices on the part of the company; (2) that under the circumstances present here the Board did not commit legal error or abuse its discretion in imposing a bargaining order; and (3) that the Board, by incorporating the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, satisfied this Court’s requirement that the justification for a bargaining order be sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful appellate review. In view of Judge Garth’s dissent, however, I write separately to address the continuing uncertainty that appears to exist in this Court regarding the findings that are necessary to support a bargaining order.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), the Supreme Court concluded that the National Labor Relations Board was authorized to impose a bargaining order not only in exceptional circumstances involving “outrageous” anti-union practices on the part of an employer, but also in situations “marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine [a union’s previously-demonstrated] majority strength and impede the election processes.” Id. at 614. In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court indicated that such an order was appropriate when “the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order.” Id. at 614-15, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. Most particularly, considering the difference that divides our Court today, the Justices cautioned against excessive judicial second-guessing of administrative decision-making in this area: because “the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own,” its choice of remedy was to be given “special respect” by reviewing courts. Id. at 612 n.32, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n.32. The Gissel opinion was silent, however, in regard to precisely what degree of unfair labor activity was sufficient to justify issuance of a bargaining order, whether the Board itself was obligated to make findings in this connection independent of the ALJ, or with what exactitude any conclusion that a bargaining order was necessary had to be documented and supported.
In the aftermath of Gissel, bargaining orders issued by the NLRB ordinarily were given effect by the various appellate *110courts.1 It is “no secret,” NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460, 470 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), however, that at least in this Circuit,2 in the past several years the Board has enjoyed only mixed success in its efforts to enforce Gissel orders as remedies for unfair labor practices.3 The checkered pattern formed by our recent eases can be attributed to three general judicial concerns. First, the Court has insisted that the record contain a sufficient “basis in fact” to support a finding by the Board that a bargaining order is appropriate. See, e.g., K & K Gourmet Meats, supra, 640 F.2d at 467 — 70; Rapid Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 148-51 (3d Cir. 1979). Second, the Court has concluded, although only after a considerable controversy, that the Board is free to adopt verbatim the findings and reasoning of an ALJ without stating separately and independently its own reasons for imposing a bargaining order. See NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 519 (3d Cir. 1981) (in banc); Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 61-63 (3d Cir. 1978). Finally, the Court has indicated that either the ALJ or the Board must “articulate [those] factors that justify the choice of this remedy over the ordering of a new election.” See Permanent Label, supra, 657 F.2d at 519. It is this third concern that is implicated in the present proceeding.
Our request that the NLRB “provide a statement of reasons leading to the imposition of a bargaining order,” id. at 521, can be traced to NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc., 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976). In that decision, the Court first announced that Gissel orders imposed by the Board would not be enforced absent “ ‘ “specific findings” as to the immediate and residual impact of the unfair labor practices on the election process . . . [and] “a detailed analysis” assessing the possibility of holding a fair election in terms of any continuing effect of misconduct, the likelihood of recurring misconduct, and the potential effectiveness of ordinary remedies.’ ” Id. at 244 (quoting Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir. 1973)). The Court’s stated reasons for mandating that the Board justify its order in such a fashion were threefold: an articulation require-
ment would “serve[ ] as a prophylaxis against an arbitrary exercise of the Board’s power” (quoting Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1975)), facilitate the exercise of meaningful judicial review, and “contribute[ ] to the growth and predictability of this important area of labor law,” Armcor, supra, 535 F.2d at 245. Imposing upon the Board an obligation to explain and defend any bargaining order it issued could not help but “ ‘guarantee the integrity of the administrative process,’ ” id. (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 2374-2375, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 (1973)).
Whatever the theoretical virtues of the articulation requirement enunciated in *111Armcor4 in practice it has proved somewhat perplexing to determine precisely what sort of explication on the part of the Board is sufficient to survive judicial scrutiny. In the Armcor decision itself, for example, one member of the panel disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Board had failed to justify adequately its resort to a bargaining order. Armcor, supra, 535 F.2d at 246 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Nor is it easy to reconcile the arguably inconsistent results reached in four cases that immediately followed Armcor, two of which rejected the Board’s findings as conclusory and inadequate, see Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Craw, 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977), and two of which enforced bargaining orders despite objections that the Armcor standards had not been satisfied, see NLRB v. Daybreak Lodge Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 585 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977). In a number of more recent instances, panels again have split with respect to whether the Board had convincingly demonstrated that more traditional remedies were inadequate to ameliorate whatever unfair labor practices had been identified. See Electrical Products Division of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 210, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980); NLRB v. Garry Manufacturing Co., 630 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980). And, on no fewer than three occasions, this Court has elected to assemble in banc in order to consider various aspects of the articulation requirement for bargaining orders. See Permanent Label, supra; Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc., No. 77-1495 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 1978) (unreported per curiam; denying enforcement of a bargaining order by an equally divided vote). In my view, the case at bar amounts to yet another chapter in this Court’s sisyphean struggle to give meaning to the articulation requirement imposed on the Board by Armcor without running afoul of the Supreme Court’s instruction that the Board’s “choice of remedy ... be given special respect by reviewing courts,” Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n.32.
Although there is much to commend in the analysis set forth by Judge Garth in his dissent in this case, I am persuaded that the opinion rendered by the ALJ and adopted by the Board constitutes “minimally sufficient compliance,” Eagle Material Handling, supra, 558 F.2d at 167 n.ll, with Armcor and its progeny. I arrive at this conclusion for a number of reasons. First, the ALJ’s justification as to the need for a bargaining order was as comprehensive and persuasive as that approved in previous instances by our full Court, compare, e.g., Permanent Label, supra, 657 F.2d at 520-21; Hedstrom, supra, 629 F.2d at 310 n.4; see also Kenworth Trucks, supra, 580 F.2d at 62 n.4. Second, I believe that the proposition advanced in the dissent here, however meritorious it may be, cannot be reconciled with the explicit holding of the in banc Court only a few months ago that “it is sufficient for the ALJ to provide an extensive list of the factors giving rise to [a] recommendation that a bargaining order be issued.” Permanent Label, supra, 657 F.2d at 521. In this case, as in Permanent Label, I believe that were we “to require that the ALJ also specifically state each inference drawn from these factors, no matter how obvious it is from the opinion, we would elevate form over substance and overstep the appropriate limits of judicial review of the Board’s choice of remedy.” Id. Third, in a previous in banc decision, we stressed that “ ‘an elaborate explanation of the factors giving rise to the conclusion that a bargaining order is needed is not essential,” *112Hedstrom, supra, 629 F.2d at 309 (quoting Kenworth Trucks, supra, 580 F.2d at 60 (emphasis added)) and that “[t]he requirement of a reasoned analysis . . . was meant neither to burden the Board nor to ‘limit the issuance of bargaining orders whenever necessary,’ ” Hedstrom, supra, 629 F.2d at 309 (quoting Armcor, supra, 535 F.2d at 245). Absent further guidance from either the Supreme Court, our full Court, or the Congress,5 it would not appear in order at this time either to retreat from these clear precepts or to hold that the Board is required, as a matter of law, to focus in depth upon each and every issue raised in the dissenting opinion. As I see it, the position urged in the dissent does not pay sufficient heed to the Supreme Court’s explicit instruction that the Board’s “choice of remedy’’ be given “special respect” by a reviewing court. Gissel, supra, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n.32. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525, 98 S.Ct. 1197,1202, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (courts should not “engraft[] their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress”); Kenworth Trucks, supra, 580 F.2d 55, 61-63 (3d Cir. 1978) (Opinion on Rehearing) (reversing, in light of Vermont Yankee, an earlier determination that a bargaining order had not been adequately justified by the Board).6
For these reasons, therefore, I join in the Court’s conclusion that the NLRB has sufficiently explained why a bargaining order is necessary to remedy the unfair labor practices committed by Eastern Steel.

. See Comment, Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Orders in the Third Circuit: The Rise and Fall of the Armcor Standards, 25 Vill.L. Rev. 913, 917, 920-21 (1979-1980) (citing cases).

. For recent developments in other Circuits, see generally Comment, The Gissel Bargaining Order, the NLRB, and the Courts of Appeals: Should the Supreme Court Take a Second Look?, 32 S.C.L.Rev. 399, 403-23 (1980).

. Compare NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (in banc); NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1980) (in banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996, 101 S.Ct. 1699, 68 L.Ed.2d 196 (1981); Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 210, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980); NLRB v. Daybreak Lodge Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 585 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1978); Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1978); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978); and NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977) (enforcing bargaining orders) with NLRB v. K & K Gourmet Meats, Inc., 640 F.2d 460 (3d Cir. 1981); Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Craw, 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977); Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977); and NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1976) (denying enforcement of bargaining orders).

. Compare Comment, supra note 1, at 926-28 (concluding that the Board should be required to make “specific findings” and provide a “reasoned analysis” when issuing Gissel orders) with Permanent Label, supra, 657 F.2d at 522-28 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (criticizing the Armcor rule for having been “promulgated without authority” and for the ease with which “panels of this court have manipulated it primarily to achieve the results a given panel majority desires”).

. In view of the controversy that has arisen not only in this Circuit but in several other Circuits as well with respect to various procedural and substantive issues involving the Board’s imposition of bargaining orders, see Comment, supra note 2, it might be salutary for the Congress to consider adopting whatever legislation is necessary to clarify the law, restore uniformity among the Circuits, and reduce the prodigious amount of litigation that has been spawned in this area because of the lack of a definitive national rule.

. The Supreme Court, albeit in a somewhat different context, recently reiterated that appellate courts were not to “substitute [their own] judgments] for those of the Board with respect to the issues that Congress intended the Board [to] resolve,” lest “the role of the judiciary in administering regulatory statutes ... be enormously expanded and its work . . . become more complex and time-consuming.” The majority of the Court “doubt[ed] that this is what Congress intended in subjecting the Board to judicial review.” Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 720, 70 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982).