Court Opinion

ID: 9607458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:58:57.258723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:39.125245
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 2 but respectfully dissent as to Division 3.
The count on intentional infliction of emotional distress also requires jury resolution under the evidence favorable to Stewart. If believed, the nursing home released Stewart’s husband after merely calling the probate judge, whose response is rank hearsay and thus not probative. Sarantis v. Kroger Co., 201 Ga. App. 552, 553 (411 SE2d 758) (1991). The nursing home made no further check, gave no notice, and obtained no forwarding address, even though the home knew that Stewart was the patient’s wife, that she visited about every two weeks from out of state, and that she was financially responsible for his care.
It is true that “[wjhether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a question of law.” Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (2) (409 SE2d 835) (1991). But as recognized in that case, in which the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendant, “If the evidence shows that reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme and outrageous conduct and resultingly severe emotional distress, the jury then must find the facts and make its own determination.” Id. In reviewing this case, which is from a grant of summary judgment, we must draw all reasonable inferences against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion. Jonesboro Tool & Die Corp. v. Ga. *848Power Co., 158 Ga. App. 755, 758 (282 SE2d 211) (1981).
There is evidence to support the four elements of the tort, as outlined in the case of Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 176 Ga. App. 227, 230 (1) (335 SE2d 445) (1985):
1. The conduct was intentional or reckless in that the nursing home administrator, with full knowledge of Stewart’s relationship to the questionably competent elderly patient, did not inform her of the action to be taken or obtain information as to where Stewart could find him. “Heartless” is an apt term accepted in Bridges. Id. at 230. Nor did the administrator take proper steps to assure that the person to whom she released the patient was authorized to take charge of him, knowing the patient was not capable of caring for himself.
2. In considering whether this was extreme and outrageous, the relationship of the parties (the nursing home had physical control of Stewart’s husband), the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s particular susceptibility (the nursing home took no steps to inform the patient’s wife of his whereabouts), and the severity of the resultant harm (Stewart was not told until she called to check on him that he was gone, and she never saw her husband again once he was removed to Michigan) are appropriate to take into account. Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, 220 Ga. App. 498, 499-500 (469 SE2d 776) (1996). The law does not, in the circumstances of this case, preclude the finding that the nursing home’s actions were “ ‘of such serious import as to naturally give rise to such intense feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, fright or extreme outrage as to cause severe emotional distress.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517, 521 (388 SE2d 362) (1989). For all she knew, her husband may have thought that she abandoned him. “Once the evidence shows that reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme or outrageous conduct, the jury must find the facts and make its own characterization.” Id. Some, but not all, claims will be found “ ‘not to rise to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness as a matter of law.’ ... [Cit.]” Clark v. Arras, 212 Ga. App. 695, 696 (443 SE2d 277) (1994); Yarbray, supra at 706. Like Gordon, Yarbray, Trimble, and McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hosp., 167 Ga. App. 495, 498-499 (2) (306 SE2d 746) (1983), this is not one of them.
3. Once he was taken to Michigan, Stewart attempted to find him -but was unsuccessful. Whether her endurance of this anguish was caused in whole or in part by the nursing home’s actions is a jury question, as it cannot be said as a matter of law that the nursing home’s actions were.not a cause or too remote a cause. See OCGA § 51-12-9; Jones v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 192 Ga. App. 806, 807 (386 SE2d 386) (1989).
4. The severity of the distress is qualitative and quantitative and cannot be precisely measured. Although the nursing home’s actions *849were not such as would terrify or frighten, a jury could find they were sufficiently insulting as naturally to humiliate or embarrass Stewart. See Bridges, supra at 229. As adopted in Bridges and in Yarbray, supra at 706, emotional distress includes “‘all highly unpleasant mental reactions such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea.’ ” Bridges, supra at 230, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1), comment j. When extreme, it warrants liability. Id.
Decided December 5, 1996.
Lecora Bowen, for appellant.
M. Scott Barksdale, for appellee.
The evidence thus far developed does not show that Stewart’s claim in this count is one of the “fictitious, inflated or trivial claims” against which the court of law must guard by circumscription. See Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co. &c., 187 Ga. App. 222, 224 (369 SE2d 541) (1988).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this opinion.