Court Opinion

ID: 9553526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:31:01.277435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:28.564397
License: Public Domain

McWilliams, J.
In view of the dissent authored by Mr. Justice Sutton and concurred in by Mr. Justice Day, which dissent was filed at the time of the denial of the petition for rehearing, I feel constrained to make a few additional remarks.
The Caspian, Saltón and Dead Seas notwithstanding, the rule in Colorado is that all flowing water is presumed to find its way to a stream and is therefore presumed to be tributary in nature. Furthermore, in connection with this presumption, the burden of proof rests upon a party claiming that certain water is not tributary, to prove that it is not tributary by clear and satisfactory evidence. Cline v. Whitten, supra; Cresson Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273, 338 P.2d 278; Safranek v. Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 228 P.2d 975; and DeHaas v. Benesch, 116 Colo. 344, 181 P.2d 453.
My basic quarrel with my dissenting brethren is that, in my view, they would have us abandon our traditional role of serving as a reviewing court, and would apparently convert us into a “super” fact-finding body. Such would most certainly do violence to what has heretofore been our generally accepted function and area of operation.
Our function, as I see it, is not to determine whether the spring water arising on the Ranson property is, or is not, tributary in nature. This is the function of the trial court. The trial court has heard the several witnesses and has made its factual determination. At this stage of the proceedings, then, our only function is to determine whether there is evidence to support the determination thus made by the trial court. And in my judgment there is such supporting evidence.
*485As already noted, at the very outset there is a presumption that the spring water is tributary. And on that same side of the scales must be added the testimony of the hydrologist Hollenbeck.
On the other side of the scales should then be placed the testimony of the geologist Walters, together with certain bits of testimony tending to support his opinion on the matter. All of which adds up, in my mind, to a disputed issue of fact.
It is in this setting that my dissenting brethren would step into a fact-finding role and, in effect, tell the trier of the facts that he should have believed the witness Walters in preference to the witness Hollenbeck, and that he should have determined that Walter’s testimony was of such stature and standing as to overcome the presumption here involved. For us to do that would mean that we are getting into an area of operation where we have no right to be. It would be purely and simply a case of substituting our judgment for that of the trial court. It is for this reason that, regardless of my personal opinion on the merits of the matter, I am of the firm view that the judgment should be affirmed. In our understandable desire to “do justice,” the inclination to set a trial court “straight” on disputed issues of fact may be great, but the inclination should be resisted.