Court Opinion

ID: 9958210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 15:02:20.396675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:05.176907
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2079   Document: 43     Page: 1   Filed: 04/08/2024

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                      RIMCO INC.,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-2079
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of International
 Trade in No. 1:21-cv-00537-MAB, Chief Judge Mark A.
 Barnett.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: April 8, 2024
                 ______________________

    JOHN M. PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New York,
 NY, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
 PATRICK KLEIN; RICHARD F. O'NEILL, Seattle, WA.

     BEVERLY A. FARRELL, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, New
 York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented
 by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY, JUSTIN REINHART MILLER; FARIHA KABIR,
 YELENA SLEPAK, Office of Assistant Chief Counsel, Bureau
 of Customs and Border Protection, United States Depart-
 ment of Homeland Security, New York, NY; IAN ANDREW
Case: 22-2079     Document: 43     Page: 2    Filed: 04/08/2024

 2                                             RIMCO INC. v. US

 MCINERNEY, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforce-
 ment and Compliance, United States Department of Com-
 merce, Washington, DC.
                ______________________

     Before PROST, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
      Importer Rimco Inc., appeals the United States Court
 of International Trade’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
 jurisdiction over an action seeking judicial review of a de-
 nied protest. Rimco asserts the Court of International
 Trade’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction to review de-
 nial of protests pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alterna-
 tively, residual jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
 Because Customs and Border Protection’s assessment of
 countervailing and antidumping duties is not a protestable
 decision, and because jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1581(c) would have been available if Rimco had not failed
 to exhaust the appropriate administrative remedies, we af-
 firm the CIT’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
 tion.
                               I
                               A
     Antidumping duties (AD) and countervailing duties
 (CVD) work to remedy domestic injuries caused by goods
 imported at unfair prices or receiving countervailable sub-
 sidies from foreign governments. Guangdong Wireking
 Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d
 1194, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The U.S. Department of Com-
 merce and the U.S. International Trade Commission are
 the agencies charged with conducting CVD and AD inves-
 tigations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673. During these investiga-
 tions, Commerce determines whether, and to what extent,
 merchandise imported into the United States is being sold
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                             3

 at prices below fair value, or benefits from countervailable
 foreign subsidiaries. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d, 1673d.
     After concluding an investigation, Commerce deter-
 mines the appropriate AD and CVD rates required to ad-
 dress any domestic injuries or unfair practices related to
 certain foreign exporters, producers, or governments. 19
 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(1), 1673d(c)(1). These rates can be es-
 tablished for specific entities or on a country-wide basis de-
 pending on the source and extent of the harm. 19 U.S.C.
 §§ 1671d(c)(1)(B), 1673d(c)(1)(B). Congress has supplied
 Commerce with a statutory scheme that provides methods
 for establishing AD and CVD rates for individually and
 non-individually investigated entities, as well as an “all-
 others” rate based on multiple considerations, including
 facts available. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(5), 1673d(c)(5),
 1677e.
     This court has recognized that Commerce has “broad
 authority to interpret . . . and carry out th[is] statutory
 mandate.” Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1401,
 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). However, its methodology must nev-
 ertheless be reasonable. See Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts &
 Crafts Co. v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
 2013) (quoting “reasonable method” requirement contained
 in 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(B)).
     After Commerce makes final AD and CVD determina-
 tions, it publishes the rates in a final order. In accordance
 with rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
 (APA) § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 553, Commerce then provides notice
 of opportunity for interested parties, such as importers, to
 request and/or participate in administrative review of the
 final orders. At the close of the notice of opportunity period,
 Commerce issues liquidation instructions, directing the
 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) to assess
 entries subject to the orders at the final published respec-
 tive rates.
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 4                                           RIMCO INC. v. US

                              B
      On March 28, 2019, after completing CVD and AD in-
 vestigations, Commerce published final CVD and AD de-
 terminations on certain steel wheels from China. See
 generally Certain Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic
 of China: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determi-
 nation, 84 Fed. Reg. 11,744 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 28,
 2019) (Final CVD Determination); Certain Steel Wheels
 From the People’s Republic of China: Final Determination
 of Sales At Less-Than-Fair-Value, 84 Fed. Reg. 11,746
 (Dep’t Commerce Mar. 28, 2019) (Final AD Determination).
 In its Final CVD Determination, Commerce established an
 entity rate of 457.10 % for two mandatory respondents
 based on total adverse facts available, as authorized under
 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), and an all-others rate of 457.10 %, as
 authorized under 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(5)(A). See Certain
 Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic of China: Final Af-
 firmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 84 Fed. Reg.
 at 11,745. Because no companies participated in the AD in-
 vestigation, Commerce established a China-wide entity
 rate of 231.08 % for the Final AD Determination. See Cer-
 tain Steel Wheels From the People’s Republic of China: Fi-
 nal Determination of Sales At Less-Than-Fair-Value, 84
 Fed. Reg. at 11,747.
     On May 24, 2019, Commerce issued the AD and CVD
 orders in a single publication. Certain Steel Wheels From
 the People’s Republic of China; Antidumping and Counter-
 vailing Duty Orders, 84 Fed. Reg. 24,098–24,100 (Dep’t
 Commerce May 24, 2019).
     On May 1, 2020, Commerce published a notice of op-
 portunity to allow requests for administrative review of the
 AD order and CVD order for the periods August 31, 2018,
 through December 31, 2019, and October 30, 2018, through
 April 30, 2020, respectively. See Antidumping or Counter-
 vailing Duty Order, Finding, or Suspended Investigation;
 Opportunity to Request Administrative Review, 85 Fed.
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                            5

 Reg. 25,394, 25,396 (Dep’t of Commerce May 1, 2020). This
 notice provided interested parties, with an opportunity to
 participate in the administrative review process to ensure
 that their entries from the reviewable time periods were
 assessed at the proper rates during liquidation. As is rele-
 vant to this appeal, Rimco, a North Dakota-based importer
 and reseller of wheels subject to the orders, is an interested
 party to which the notice applied. See 19 U.S.C. 1677(9)(A)
 (defining “interested party” to include “the United States
 importer[] of subject merchandise”). Yet, neither Rimco,
 nor any other interested party, requested administrative
 review of any transactions covered by the respective peri-
 ods of review.
      Because no interested party requested administrative
 review of the AD or CVD orders, Commerce issued liquida-
 tion instructions directing Customs to assess entries sub-
 ject to the orders at the final published rates. During
 liquidation, Customs then applied the instructed rates
 when assessing goods subject to the respective orders.
 Rimco made various consumption entries of goods subject
 to liquidation in accordance with the AD and CVD orders.
      On March 16, 2021, Rimco filed a protest challenging
 Customs’ assessment of AD and CVD on its imported goods
 as “‘excessive fines’ in contravention of the Eighth Amend-
 ment.” Appellant’s Br. at 5. On March 30, 2021, Customs
 denied the protest on the basis that “19 U.S.C. [§] 1514
 does not authorize protests or petitions against Commerce
 calculations or findings.” Appellee’s Br. at 8. Rimco then
 filed an action before the U.S. Court of International Trade
 (CIT), seeking judicial review of Customs’ denial of protest.
 Rimco asserted the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1581(a), or alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
     The Government moved to dismiss Rimco’s action for
 lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a
 claim. On July 8, 2022, the CIT granted the Government’s
 motion on jurisdictional grounds and dismissed the action
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 6                                            RIMCO INC. v. US

 with prejudice. 1 J.A. 1. The CIT held that it lacked juris-
 diction under § 1581(a) because Customs’ ministerial ap-
 plication of AD and CVD rates, pursuant to Commerce’s
 liquidation instructions, was not a protestable decision.
 J.A. 10–12. Instead, the CIT found that the true nature of
 Rimco’s action was “a challenge to the countervailing and
 antidumping duty rates set by Commerce in the respective
 orders . . . .” J.A. 19. Therefore, the CIT concluded that it
 lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i) “because jurisdiction
 pursuant to section 1581(c) was available and would not
 have been manifestly inadequate” had Rimco sought ad-
 ministrative review of Commerce’s AD and CVD determi-
 nations. J.A. 13.
     Rimco appeals the CIT’s dismissal. We have jurisdic-
 tion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
                              II
     We review a dismissal granted by the CIT for lack of
 subject-matter jurisdiction de novo as a question of law.
 Hutchinson Quality Furniture, Inc. v. United States, 827
 F.3d 1355, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
     The burden of establishing jurisdiction is on the party
 invoking it. Norsk Hydro Can., Inc. v. United States, 472
 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The well-pleaded factual
 allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and all
 reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the claimant.
 Hutchinson, 827 F.3d at 1359.
                              III
     The CIT’s general jurisdiction is statutorily defined un-
 der 28 U.S.C. § 1581. Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United
 States, 963 F.2d 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The “particular

     1 Because the CIT dismissed the action for lack of sub-

 ject-matter jurisdiction, it did not reach the motion to dis-
 miss for failure to state a claim. J.A. 3 n.1.
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                            7

 laws over which the Court of International Trade may as-
 sert jurisdiction” are further specified in each subsection of
 § 1581. Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 1547,
 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Relevant to this appeal are subsec-
 tions (a), (c), and (i).
     Section 1581(a) of title 28 grants the CIT “exclusive ju-
 risdiction [over] any civil action commenced to contest the
 denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under [19 U.S.C.
 § 1515].” Section 1515 of title 19 governs Customs’ review
 of “a protest . . . filed in accordance with section 1514 of
 this title.” Importantly, § 1514 provides a limited list of
 seven circumstances in which a party may file a “protest
 against decisions of Customs.” 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1)–(7).
 Because “[s]ection 1514(a) applies exclusively to Customs
 decisions . . . [it] does not embrace decisions by other agen-
 cies.” See Mitsubishi Elec. Am., Inc. v. United States, 44
 F.3d 973, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added and inter-
 nal quotations omitted).
     Section 1581(c) provides the CIT with “exclusive juris-
 diction [over] civil actions commenced under [19 U.S.C.
 § 1516a].” Section 1516a specifically governs judicial re-
 view of Commerce’s determinations in antidumping and
 countervailing duty proceedings.
     Section 1581(i), commonly referred to as the CIT’s “re-
 sidual” grant of jurisdiction, “may not be invoked when ju-
 risdiction under another subsection of § 1581 is or could
 have been available, unless the remedy provided under
 that other subsection would be manifestly inadequate.”
 Sunpreme Inc. v. United States, 892 F.3d 1186, 1191 (Fed.
 Cir. 2018) (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States,
 283 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The party asserting
 § 1581(i) jurisdiction has the burden to show that such al-
 ternative remedy would be manifestly inadequate. Id.
     Claimants seeking judicial review by the CIT may not
 “ignore the precepts of subsection 1581 and attempt[] to
 circumvent” Congress’ clear statutory procedures and
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 8                                                RIMCO INC. v. US

 safeguards. Nat’l Corn Growers, 840 F.2d at 1556. Simi-
 larly, claimants are prohibited from using creative plead-
 ing to expand the CIT’s statutory jurisdiction. Norsk Hydro
 Can., 472 F.3d at 1355. Thus, when asserting § 1581 juris-
 diction, “mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either
 a party or a court, cannot be controlling.” Id. Instead, we
 must look at the facts asserted in the pleadings and deter-
 mine the true nature of the action. See Hutchinson, 827
 F.3d at 1360. This factual inquiry requires our court to
 identify the particular agency action underlying the
 claimed harm, so that we may determine which subsection
 of § 1581 provides the CIT with proper jurisdiction. Id.
                                 A
     Rimco asserts that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction
 under § 1581(a), and argues the CIT erred in finding “that
 there was no ‘decision’ by [Customs] against which a pro-
 test would lie.” Appellant’s Br. at 29. In support of its posi-
 tion, Rimco alleges that Customs’ “liquidation decision is
 protestable, even if it [is] . . . carried out ministerially.” Ap-
 pellant’s Br. at 29. We disagree.
      Contrary to Rimco’s assertion, when Customs’ role is
 purely ministerial, liquidation of entries subject to AD and
 CVD orders is “not a ‘decision’ under § 1514(a).”
 Thyssenkrupp Steel N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 886 F.3d
 1215, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). A
 protestable decision under § 1514(a) requires Customs to
 have “engage[d] in some sort of decision-making process.”
 Indus. Chems., Inc. v. United States, 941 F.3d 1368, 1371
 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States,
 114 F.3d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997), aff’d, 523 U.S. 360
 (1998)). Conversely, this court has consistently held that
 “‘merely ministerial’ actions are not protestable under
 [§] 1514.” Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977). This is
 because unlike typical § 1514(a) decisions that involve sub-
 stantive determinations, Customs lacks discretion when
 “merely follow[ing] Commerce’s [liquidation] instructions.”
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                           9

 Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977; see also ARP Materials, Inc. v.
 United States, 520 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1358 (Ct. Int’l Trade
 2021), aff’d, 47 F.4th 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Customs’ role
 in collecting those duties was ministerial rather than a de-
 cision under section 1514(a).” (internal quotations omit-
 ted)). Because Customs cannot “modify . . . [Commerce’s]
 determinations, their underlying facts, or their enforce-
 ment,” its liquidation of entries subject to AD and CVD or-
 ders cannot be protested. Mitsubishi, 44 F.3d at 977
 (cleaned up).
     While this court has recognized a limited range of cir-
 cumstances in which Customs’ underlying liquidation pur-
 suant to AD or CVD orders may be subject to protest, we
 find no such circumstance here. See, e.g., Koyo Corp. of
 U.S.A. v. United States, 497 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir.
 2007) (holding that deemed liquidation under 19 U.S.C.
 § 1504(d) is subject to protest when Customs fails to exe-
 cute liquidation instructions); Cemex, S.A. v. United States,
 384 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Cus-
 toms made a particular “decision” when it erroneously rec-
 ognized a deemed liquidation at an “as entered” rate
 instead of applying the final rate). Rimco has not alleged
 that Customs made any substantive determinations or un-
 dertook any discretionary actions that would constitute
 § 1514(a) decisions. Instead, Rimco asserts that Customs
 was “required by law to go through the liquidation process”
 and simply acted on Commerce’s liquidation instructions
 that it was “bound by statute to carry out.” Appellant’s Br.
 at 29.
     Accordingly, because Customs’ role in liquidating en-
 tries subject to the AD and CVD orders was merely minis-
 terial and required no substantive determinations, the CIT
 properly determined that there was no protestable decision
 under § 1514(a). Therefore, the CIT lacks § 1581(a) juris-
 diction over Rimco’s action.
                              B
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 10                                            RIMCO INC. v. US

      Rimco alternatively argues that the CIT erred in find-
 ing that it lacked residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i).
 Whether a party may properly invoke § 1581(i) is a two-
 step inquiry. See Erwin Hymer Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. United
 States, 930 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2019). First, we de-
 termine whether jurisdiction under a different subsection
 of § 1581 could have been available, and second, if such ju-
 risdiction was available, we ask whether the provided rem-
 edy would have been manifestly inadequate. Id.
      Because the availability of jurisdiction under other
 subsections of § 1581 depends on the particular type of
 agency action challenged, we must first determine the true
 nature of an action. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United
 States, 544 F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the
 trial court’s decision to look to the true nature of the action
 in determining jurisdiction). The CIT concluded that the
 true nature of Rimco’s action was to challenge Commerce’s
 AD and CVD rate determinations. We agree.
      Although Rimco contends that this suit “is not a chal-
 lenge to . . . any Commerce determination,” Appellant’s Br.
 at 30, this conclusory statement directly contradicts
 Rimco’s own argument. Rimco’s opening brief explicitly
 states that “[its] claims that the CVD and AD[] rates as-
 sessed against it are unconstitutional ‘excessive fines’ re-
 sults from Commerce’s decision to base the rates on
 [adverse facts available].” Appellant’s Br. at 10–11 (empha-
 sis added). Rimco also posits that some of Commerce’s final
 determinations were not based on “lawful calculated
 rate[s].” Id. at 14. Further, most of Rimco’s factual allega-
 tions relate to Commerce’s AD and CVD investigations and
 subsequent final rate determinations. Thus, in view of the
 totality of Rimco’s allegations, the true nature of its action
 is to challenge Commerce’s AD and CVD rate determina-
 tions.
    Interested parties are directed to raise challenges to
 Commerce’s    AD     and   CVD      determinations via
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                            11

 administrative review proceedings governed by § 1516a of
 title 19. Subsequent judicial review of such proceedings is
 available under the CIT’s § 1581(c) exclusive jurisdiction.
 Rimco alleges that it would have lacked standing to pursue
 § 1581(c) jurisdiction because it was not a party to Com-
 merce’s earlier AD and CVD investigations. Appellant’s
 Br. at 14–15. But this argument provides no explanation
 as to why, in light of Commerce’s notice of opportunity,
 Rimco failed to seek administrative review of the orders.
 Because Rimco, as an interested party, had the opportunity
 to seek administrative review of Commerce’s AD and CVD
 determinations, jurisdiction under § 1581(c) would have
 been available but for Rimco’s own failure to pursue the
 proper administrative remedy.
                               C
     Because jurisdiction was available under § 1581(c), the
 CIT’s residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i) is unavailable
 unless Rimco can show that the remedy afforded by subsec-
 tion (c) would be manifestly inadequate. A remedy is not
 inadequate simply because a party believes such remedy is
 unavailable. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 544 F.3d at 1294. Ra-
 ther, a manifestly inadequate remedy requires “an exercise
 in futility, or ‘incapable of producing any result; failing ut-
 terly of the desired end through intrinsic defect; useless,
 ineffectual, vain.’” Id. (quoting Oxford English Dictionary
 (2d ed. 1989).
     Rimco contends that the CIT’s proposed administrative
 pathway is not a workable option for importers to raise con-
 stitutional claims. Appellant’s Br. at 10. In an attempt to
 frame the § 1581(c) remedy as inadequate, Rimco alleges
 that Commerce “lacks institutional competence to judge
 the constitutionality of its own determinations” and there-
 fore argues that it was not required to exhaust its admin-
 istrative remedies. Appellant’s Br. at 16. We disagree with
 this argument for two reasons.
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 12                                           RIMCO INC. v. US

      First, Commerce is required to review the statutory ap-
 propriateness of its AD and CVD rates, including those
 based on adverse facts available. During the administra-
 tive review process, Commerce would have considered facts
 to determine whether its rates were proportional to the
 harm they were intended to address and “necessary to
 serve the purpose of deterrence.” See BMW of N. Am. LLC
 v. United States, 926 F.3d 1291, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (not-
 ing that because rates based on adverse facts available
 (AFA) work to incentivize cooperation, “an unusually high
 rate is permissible when it is ‘necessary to serve the pur-
 pose of deterrence”). Furthermore, because the test for ex-
 cessiveness turns on a proportionality determination, see
 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)
 (“[t]he touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
 Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality”),
 Commerce could typically dispose of the constitutional is-
 sue by reviewing the rates for statutory compliance (i.e.,
 finding the rates not excessive). See KYD, Inc. v. United
 States, 607 F.3d 760, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[A]n AFA
 [anti]dumping margin determined in accordance with the
 statutory requirements is not a punitive measure, and the
 limitations applicable to punitive damages assessments
 therefore have no pertinence to duties imposed based on
 lawfully derived margins such as the margin at issue in
 this case.”). Rimco itself concedes “that a correctly calcu-
 lated CVD or AD[] rate would not be susceptible to consti-
 tutional challenges under the Eighth Amendment.”
 Appellant’s Br. at 14 n.10. And when “an administrative
 proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional
 question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pur-
 sued.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of State of Cal. v. United States,
 355 U.S. 534, 539–40 (1958). Therefore, because Commerce
 could have removed the constitutional issue by addressing
 the statutory appropriateness of its rate determinations,
 administrative review was the proper remedy.
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 RIMCO INC. v. US                                            13

     Second, this court has rejected the argument that it
 would necessarily be futile to seek administrative remedies
 when an agency is unable to make constitutional findings.
 See Bowling v. McDonough, 38 F.4th 1051, 1057–59 (Fed.
 Cir. 2022) (holding that it would not have been futile to
 raise constitutional challenges before an agency, even if the
 agency could not address the constitutional issue). As we
 explained in Bowling, this is because the agency will nev-
 ertheless serve its immensely useful record-development
 and fact-finding functions. See Bowling, 38 F.4th at 1059;
 see also Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (“The
 basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an ad-
 ministrative agency to perform functions within its special
 competence—to make a factual record, to apply its exper-
 tise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial con-
 troversies.”). So even if there were a scenario, however
 unlikely, where a calculated rate might comply with statu-
 tory reasonableness but nonetheless violate the excessive
 fines component of the Eighth Amendment, administrative
 exhaustion would still be required. Because administrative
 review could have established an invaluable record as to
 the factual basis for Commerce’s AD and CVD determina-
 tions, irrespective of the constitutionality issue, it would
 not have been futile for Rimco to seek such remedy.
     Rimco could have sought § 1516a administrative re-
 view to sufficiently challenge Commerce’s AD and CVD de-
 terminations. Had Rimco been dissatisfied with
 Commerce’s administrative review determination, it could
 have rightfully sought judicial review on the record under
 the CIT’s exclusive jurisdiction. This is the exact statutory
 process outlined by Congress in § 1581(c). As discussed
 above, it is neither unworkable, nor futile.
     Because Rimco has failed show that the available rem-
 edy provided by § 1581(c) would have been manifestly in-
 adequate, § 1581(i) jurisdiction is improper. As noted by
 the CIT, “Rimco failed to pursue the administrative avenue
 available to it and thereby missed its opportunity to
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 14                                          RIMCO INC. v. US

 challenge the rates set by Commerce. It cannot avoid the
 consequences of that failure through the exercise of the
 court’s section 1581(i) jurisdiction.” J.A. 19.
                             IV
     Because Customs’ ministerial assessment of antidump-
 ing and countervailing duties is not a protestable decision,
 and because jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) would
 have been available and not manifestly inadequate if
 Rimco had not failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
 we affirm the Court of International Trade’s dismissal for
 lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
                        AFFIRMED