Court Opinion

ID: 9687416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:27:41.783798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:16.150400
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring in affirmance). Plaintiff’s case was based upon a theory that defendant was guilty of gross negligence or of wilful and wanton misconduct. His declaration did not charge simple negligence. This is confirmed by his declaration and by his concise statement of facts submitted in support of his application for leave to appeal to this Court. Mr. Justice Adams has written, and I agree, that plaintiff’s proofs would not have supported a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of gross negligence or of wilful and wanton misconduct.
The circuit judge’s instruction to the jury on the trespass statute was inapplicable to this case and should not have been given. The statute, quoted at page 434 of Justice Adams’ opinion, does not purport to establish any standard of conduct or duty of care owed by any person going upon such railroad properties to the railroad or to anyone else. 1 Rather, the statute declares the status of persons wrongfully on railroad tracks.  It is *439only when a statute establishes such standards of conduct3 that its breach constitutes, by our precedent decisions, negligence per se,4 a presumption of negligence,5 or prima facie guilt of negligence.6 Accordingly, the circuit judge erred in instructing the jury as he did with reference to the trespass statute.
Notwithstanding such error, however, we would not be justified in reversing this judgment. Plaintiff’s right to prevail depended upon his proof of defendant’s guilt of gross negligence or of wilful and wanton misconduct. His failure to offer any such proofs was unrelated to the instructional error.
Accordingly, I cast my vote to affirm.
Black, J., did not sit.

 Cf., for example, the prima facie ease of negligence that arises in a rear-end collision (CLS 1961, § 257.402 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2102]) or the rule of conduct imposed by the assured clear distance statute (CLS 1961, § 257.627 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 9.2327]).

 2 Restatement, Torts (Second) § 286, the predecessor of which is referred to with approval twice in our reports (Richardson v. Grezeszak [1959], 358 Mich 206, 234 [concurring opinion], and Patzer v. Bowerman-Halifax Funeral Home [1963], 370 Mich 350, 353), sets forth the following qualifications as to when a standard of conduct defined by legislation may be adopted by a court:
“The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a elass of persons whieh includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest whieh is invaded, and
(e) to protect that interest against the hind of harm whieh has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.”
The Michigan statute does not declare such a standard of conduct, but, rather, declares a status. See Antonio v. Long Island R. Co. (1942), 265 App Div 874 (38 NYS2d 42), affirmed (1943), at 290 NY 718 (49 NE2d 1002); and Bain v. New York Central Railroad (CA 2, 1965), 342 F2d 801.

 Annis v. Britton (1925), 232 Mich 291, and Cookson v. Humphrey (1959), 355 Mich 296.

 Hanna v. McClave (1935), 271 Mich 133.

 Noonan v. Volek (1929), 246 Mich 377.