Court Opinion

ID: 9723726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:29:01.372442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:18.759792
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I dissent. The majority opinion completely fails to address the well-established rule of law in Illinois that a defense counsel may not concede his client’s guilt, after a plea of not guilty has been entered, “unless the record adequately shows that defendant knowingly and inteHigently consented to his counsel’s strategy.” People v. Mattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449, 465 (1985). In Mattery, the defendant was charged with the murders of a woman and her two young children. The defendant chose to have a jury trial. In opening argument, defense counsel conceded that defendant had murdered the three victims and was therefore guilty of murder and also eligible for imposition of the death penalty. The defense strategy was to assert a “defense” of compulsion which could be considered as a factor in mitigation at the death sentence hearing. The supreme court reversed the defendant’s murder convictions and death sentence. In doing so, the court held: “ ‘Unquestionably, the constitutional right of a criminal defendant to plead “not guilty” *** entails the obligation of his attorney to structure the trial of the case around his client’s plea. *** In those rare cases where counsel advises his client that the latter’s guilt should be admitted, the client’s knowing consent to such trial strategy must appear outside the presence of the jury on the trial record in the manner consistent with Boykin [a. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969)].” People v. Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d at 463, quoting Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650 (6th Cir. 1981). Our supreme court recently relied on the holding in Mattery in People v. Morris, 209 Ill. 2d 137 (2004). In Morris, the defendant testified regarding the circumstances of the murder of the victim of a vehicular hijacking. The supreme court pointed out that the defendant’s testimony established his guilt based on accountability. Consequently, the supreme court reversed the defendant’s convictions of first degree murder, kidnaping, and aggravated vehicular hijacking and remanded the matter for a new trial. In People v. Dodson, 331 Ill. App. 3d 187, 195 (2002), the appellate court reversed a defendant’s conviction for armed robbery where defense counsel stipulated to the evidence in a bench trial. This evidence included the fact that the weapon used by the defendant was an unloaded pellet gun. The appellate court held that the stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea and that the record did not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights under Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402). The majority assert: “When a defendant is represented by counsel, it is left to the discretion of the trial court whether to inform the defendant of the right against self-incrimination. People v. Blalock, 239 Ill. App. 3d 830, 836 (1993).” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 925. Actually, Blalock’s holding posited this as the standard to apply when a witness is going to testify. Knox, the witness in Blalock, was a codefendant of the defendant on trial. This distinction is significant. Blalock’s jury could not convict Knox no matter how incriminating his testimony was. As the instant case involved the defendant’s own testimony before his jury, the holdings in Hattery and its progeny apply. Commensurate with the holdings in Hattery and Morris, the trial court’s actions in the instant case were required. While these actions certainly did interfere with the attorney/client relationship between defendant and defense counsel, this was the result of applying well-settled legal precedent and not the result of the trial judge meddling in matters not of his concern. This fact would explain why defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to the trial court’s admonishments. While the charges in the instant case alleged the defendant was driving under the influence and while his license was suspended, these are both Class A misdemeanors, subjecting the defendant to the same punishment. Further, the majority say that “an offer of proof as to what the testimony would have been is relevant. People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d 781, 795 (1994).” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 925. The actual wording in Johnson is “even if the admonitions were improper, in the absence of any offer of proof as to what his testimony would have been, defendant is unable to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of [the witness’s] failure to testify.” People v. Johnson, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 795. The majority appear to concede the lack of prejudice when they say “we do not know what defendant would have testified to regarding the DUI charge.” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 927. As the majority explain, “a trial judge’s remarks are proper if they are made outside the presence of the jury [citation], if they are neutral, and if the judge gives the witness additional time to decide whether to testify as well as to consult with counsel [citations].” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 926. The trial judge complied with all of these requirements. The majority assert that “the trial judge ceased to act as a neutral decision maker and resumed the role of a trial strategist. The judge’s remarks are similar to those by the trial judge in Morley.” 354 Ill. App. 3d at 926. In Morley, the defendant called a codefendant as a witness in his trial. After talking to the codefendant on the record, the trial judge entered a room where the codefendant’s attorneys were talking to their client. The trial judge told the codefendant “that he ‘had a shot’ in his case if he did not testify at defendant’s trial and that if [codefendant] ‘testified in this case, there would be two convictions, instead of one.’ ” People v. Morley, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 595. The error in relying on Morley is the same error made in relying on Blalock. While it may be error for a trial judge to tell a codefendant that he will be convicted in his trial if he testifies for his codefendant, it is not error to advise a defendant who confesses his guilt while testifying in his own trial that he is likely to be convicted. Indeed, Hattery and Morris compel the judge to so advise the defendant. Based on the above reasons, I would affirm.