Court Opinion

ID: 9387209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-16 15:00:22.406169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.176687
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-10157        Document: 00516713269             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/14/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                        April 14, 2023
                                        No. 20-10157
                                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Ruben Garcia Ciriaco,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 3:19-CR-293-1

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jolly and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Ruben Garcia Ciriaco (Garcia) appeals his sentence, arguing for the
   first time on appeal that the district court erred by sentencing him under 8
   U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which carries a 20-year maximum sentence, instead of
   § 1326(b)(1), which carries a 10-year maximum sentence. Garcia further
   argues for the first time on appeal that the sua sponte elevation of the
   statutory penalty provision violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury and

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 20-10157         Document: 00516713269          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/14/2023

                                       No. 20-10157

   his Fifth Amendment due process rights, but he recognizes that these two
   claims may be foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States.1 The
   Government moved for a limited remand, which motion was carried with the
   case. Reviewing for plain error, we modify the judgment to reflect a
   § 1326(b)(1) conviction, affirm the sentence, and remand to the district court
   for the limited purpose of correcting the written judgment to reflect that
   Garcia’s statutory penalty provision is § 1326(b)(1).
                                            I
          Garcia was charged with and pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after
   removal from the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(1).
   Previously, in 2017, Garcia was convicted of illegal reentry under
   § 1326(b)(1). He has not committed a felony since that conviction.
          The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) listed the maximum
   term of imprisonment as 10 years under § 1326(b)(1), but stated that
   “[b]ecause [Garcia] has an aggravated felony conviction, [Garcia] qualifies
   for the 20-year maximum penalty under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) & (b)(2).”
   Section 1326(b)(2) applies if the defendant’s prior removal was “subsequent
   to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony.”2 The PSR did not
   identify the alleged prior aggravated felony conviction, though it listed
   Garcia’s three prior felony drug convictions. The PSR correctly calculated
   that Garcia’s sentencing guidelines range was 37 to 46 months.
          At the beginning of Garcia’s sentencing hearing, the district court
   indicated that the higher 20-year maximum penalty would apply under
   § 1326(b)(2) “due to the aggravated felony.” Garcia requested a sentence at

          1
              523 U.S. 224 (1998).
          2
              8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).

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                                     No. 20-10157

   the low end of the guidelines range, arguing that although he had a number
   of prior offenses, those offenses were already accounted for in the guidelines
   range. In response, the Government emphasized Garcia’s past history of
   removals from the United States, as well as his three prior felony offenses.
   Garcia did not argue that § 1326(b)(2) was inapplicable or otherwise object
   to the application of that subsection.
          Noting that Garcia had “all of these priors,” the district court
   discussed his drug offenses and his previous removals from the United
   States. The court concluded by stating that “after eight removals . . . and . . .
   these other offenses, I think the fairest thin[g], the most just punishment,
   considering the safety of the community and providing just punishment, and
   all of the other 3553 factors is 46 months.” Consequently, Garcia was
   sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment, the top end of his guidelines range.
          The court’s written judgment recorded that Garcia was sentenced
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). In a footnote, the judgment stated that
   “[w]hile the Indictment charged defendant with a violation of 8 U.S.C.
   § 1326(a) and (b)(1), the defendant agreed on the record at his . . . sentencing
   that he qualifies for the 20-year maximum penalty under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
   and (b)(2), because he has a previous conviction for an aggravated felony.”
   Garcia timely appealed.
                                            II
          Garcia argues that he should have been convicted and sentenced
   under § 1326(b)(1) because he does not have a prior “aggravated felony”
   conviction as required under § 1326(b)(2). Because Garcia failed to object to

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                                            No. 20-10157

   the district court’s application of § 1326(b)(2), our review is for plain error
   under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).3
           Plain-error review involves four prongs.4 “First, there must be an
   error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned. Second, the
   error must be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious. Third, the error must
   have affected the defendant’s substantial rights . . . .”5 If Garcia establishes
   the first three prongs, then this court has discretion to correct the error, but
   only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.”6 “Meeting all four prongs is difficult,
   ‘as it should be.’”7
           The first two prongs are satisfied. As the Government concedes, the
   district court plainly erred by sentencing Garcia under § 1326(b)(2) because
   Garcia does not have a qualifying aggravated felony conviction. Therefore,
   we turn to the third and fourth prongs of plain-error review.
                                                  A
           To satisfy the third prong of plain-error review, “the defendant
   ordinarily must ‘“show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,” the
   outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’”8 “To meet this

           3
            Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
   considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”).
           4
               Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
           5
               Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016) (citations omitted).
           6
            Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
   U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
           7
               Id. (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9 (2004)).
           8
            Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904-05 (2018) (quoting Molina-
   Martinez, 578 U.S. at 194).

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                                           No. 20-10157

   standard the proponent of the error must demonstrate a probability
   ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”9 “In the context of
   sentencing, we ask ‘whether the error increased the term of a sentence, such
   that there is a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand.’”10
          Based on the evidence of Garcia’s four voluntary departures, four
   prior removals, and his commission of other felony drug offenses, the district
   court found that the most just punishment, taking into account community
   safety and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, was a within-guidelines, 46-
   months sentence. The district court did not rely on the incorrect statutory
   maximum when fashioning the sentence, nor does the record, taken as a
   whole, suggest that § 1326(b)(2) was used as a starting point or as a
   framework to determine the sentence imposed.11 Instead, the framework
   used was the properly-calculated advisory guidelines range and the § 3553(a)
   factors, which resulted in a within-guidelines sentence that did not exceed
   the 10-year statutory maximum under § 1326(b)(1).12 Garcia therefore has
   not established a reasonable probability that the district court’s sentence was
   influenced by its misunderstanding of the applicable statutory maximum.
   Nor has Garcia carried his burden of showing that the district court’s error
   affected his substantial rights. He is not entitled to resentencing.

          9
             United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dominguez
   Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83).
          10
             United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 424 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
   (quoting United States v. Garcia–Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir. 2009)).
          11
             Cf. Molina-Martinez, 578 U.S. at 199-200; United States v. Rodriguez-Pena, 957
   F.3d 514, 516 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
          12
               See United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 369 (5th Cir. 2009).

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                                            No. 20-10157

                                                 B
         We grant the Government’s motion for a limited remand in part and
   deny it in part as unnecessary, insofar as the Government further requested
   an order forwarding the district court’s order on remand to this court for
   further processing of the appeal. Finally, the modification of the judgment
   renders moot Garcia’s arguments that the district court’s sua sponte
   sentencing of him under § 1326(b)(2) violated his Sixth and Fifth
   Amendment rights.13
                                        *        *         *
         For       the     foregoing     reasons,      the     CONVICTION              AND
   SENTENCE ARE AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, and the MOTION
   FOR        LIMITED            REMAND              FOR        CORRECTION                OF
   JUDGMENT is GRANTED.

         13
              See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 2006).

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