Court Opinion

ID: 9904750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 19:03:32.818455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.008934
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 P. v. Samoata CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080333

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD288011)

 MATATOA SAMOATA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
         Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa
A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Matatoa Samoata lured a drug dealer to an elementary school by
agreeing to buy a pound of marijuana for $1500, only Samoata brought $700
of counterfeit money and a loaded gun. During the transaction, Samoata shot
the drug dealer and the drug dealer’s companion. The dealer was seriously
injured and the companion killed. The jury convicted him of first degree
murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter, and found true firearm
allegations and a great bodily injury allegation.
      On appeal, Samoata asserts the trial court committed three errors:
(1) failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on uncharged conspiracy and use of
a coconspirator’s statements; (2) failing to exercise its discretion to dismiss
his sentence enhancements or to impose a lesser firearm enhancement; and
(3) failing to determine his ability to pay before imposing fines and fees.
Assuming without deciding the court had a sua sponte duty to give
conspiracy-related instructions under the circumstances of this case, we
conclude any error was harmless. We decline to remand for resentencing
because Samoata forfeited his claims of any sentencing error and we find no
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The judgment is affirmed.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                        I.
                                 Trial Evidence
A.    The Marijuana Deal and Shooting

      On November 3, 2020,1 Samoata used his brother’s Instagram
account⎯“NoahSamoata123”⎯to set up a deal where he would buy a pound

1    Further unspecified dates are from the year 2020 unless noted
otherwise.

                                        2
of marijuana from Erik S. for $1500. The next day, Samoata switched to his
brother’s Snapchat account⎯“noahsamoata”⎯to ask Erik if he wanted to buy
a gun. Erik did not say anything about buying a gun, but he agreed to meet
“noahsamoata” in front of an elementary school next to the house where
Samoata lived with his family.
      On November 6, Erik drove with his friend, Andrew Briseno, from
Bakersfield to San Diego to meet “noahsamoata.” Briseno rode in the front
passenger seat and, without Erik’s knowledge, brought a gun with him. The
pound of marijuana was in the car, in a plastic bag inside of a backpack.
When they got close to the elementary school, Briseno placed the backpack by
his feet on the front passenger floorboard.
      Samoata was standing outside by the school. Although Erik was
actively chatting with “noahsamoata” through Snapchat, Samoata was not
using a phone. When Erik became suspicious and threatened to leave,
“noahsamoata” told Erik it was his “first time” and he had sent a friend—
Samoata—who had the money. Erik pulled up to Samoata and asked, “You
want to buy some weed?” Samoata said “yeah” and got in the back seat of
Erik’s car, directly behind Briseno. Samoata handed money to Erik. While
Erik counted the money, the backpack with the marijuana remained next to
Briseno. Neither Erik nor Briseno ever gave Samoata the backpack.
      Erik noticed the money was short and looked “weird” or “fake.” He
stopped counting and began examining the money. Then Samoata said, in an
aggressive tone of voice, “Give me that shit right now.” As Erik turned to
look back at Samoata, Samoata shot him in the left side of his face, under the
eye; another shot hit Erik in the foot. Erik immediately blacked out. When
he woke up, his car was on the sidewalk. Briseno was unresponsive in the

                                       3
front passenger seat, bleeding from two gunshot wounds to the back of the
head.
        A neighbor walking her dog heard three or four gunshots “right in a
row.” She then saw Samoata run back toward his house. So when the police
responded, she directed officers to Samoata’s house. Samoata barricaded
himself in the attic, ignoring the police’s commands to surrender. Hours
later, Samoata emerged and was arrested.
        In the attic, the police found Erik’s backpack with the pound of
marijuana, a Beretta semiautomatic handgun loaded with five cartridges,
other assorted firearms (including a shotgun and rifle), two empty firearm
magazines, boxes of ammunition, and shotgun shells. Samoata’s and
Briseno’s DNA was on the Beretta. Ballistics testing established that the
bullets and cartridge casings recovered from Erik’s car, and from Erik’s
clothing and Briseno’s body, were all fired from the same Beretta.
        Briseno’s handgun was discovered on the front passenger side
floorboard of Erik’s car with the handle facing up. There was no evidence it
had been fired. About $700 in counterfeit hundred dollar bills was found on
the driver’s seat and center console.
        Erik sustained serious injuries to his face, jaw, and foot that required
several surgeries. Briseno died after arriving at the hospital. The cause of
his death was gunshot wounds to the head. One bullet entered behind his
left ear and exited through his jaw bone in a left to right, back to front, and
downward trajectory. A second bullet that penetrated the back of his head
and became lodged inside was removed from Briseno’s scalp during the
autopsy.

                                         4
B.      Samoata’s Varying Accounts of the Shooting
        Samoata gave varying accounts of what happened to law enforcement.
He first asserted he was home playing video games and did not hear any
gunshots. He then claimed the victims had been “threatening to kill [his]
brother,” “kidnap [his] sisters and human traffic them,” and “kill the rest of
[his family].” When he heard the front doorknob “jiggle,” he believed it was
the victims coming to harm his family. So he armed himself with the
Beretta, chased the victims to their car, opened their car door, and fired three
or four gunshots from outside of the car. After the police told Samoata they
were checking for DNA inside Erik’s car, Samoata explained he had opened
the car door “to check [the victims’] status” after he fired the gun. He claimed
he then hid the gun in a neighbor’s trash can, and failed to come out of the
attic when SWAT surrounded his house because he thought he had a
warrant.
        Samoata denied the shooting was related to a marijuana deal, told the
police they would have to ask his brother because his brother uses Snapchat,
and insisted “[t]hese guys were really threatening [his] family.” When
Samoata learned one of the victims had survived the shooting, he admitted
there had been a marijuana deal, but denied it was prearranged. Instead,
Samoata said he had been sitting on the front porch of his house when the
victims “rolled up.” They yelled to him, “Hey, hey,” so he walked over to their
car. He gave the driver fake money, and the driver started counting it. At
this point, the driver (not the passenger) reached into the driver’s side door
pocket. It was then that Samoata shot the driver and the front passenger.
        Samoata admitted at trial that all of his statements to the police were
lies.

                                        5
      He testified he was going to “[s]cam [Erik] with fake money to get a
pound of weed,” and then “just leave.” He thought the deal “would go bad”
because he “had fake money,” so he brought a gun with him “[j]ust in case the
deal went bad.” He made sure the gun was “hot loaded,” meaning the
magazine was full and there was one round in the chamber, so it was “ready
to go.”
      Samoata testified that when he got in the car and sat in the back
passenger seat, he passed the money to Erik when Erik asked for it. Then
Briseno passed him back “the bag of weed.” When Erik discovered it was
fake money, he looked at Briseno, and “then [Briseno] went to reach for
something, and [he] heard a metal clicking.” And that is when Samoata
reached for his gun and “just randomly shot.” Samoata admitted neither
Erik nor Briseno verbally threatened him, and he did not see a gun. He
claimed he “didn’t take aim on anyone,” although he acknowledged he shot
Erik directly in the face, and Briseno twice in the back of the head. He then
ran back to his house and hid because he was scared of the police.
          Samoata admitted he had communicated with Erik using his brother’s
Instagram and Snapchat accounts, and he had purchased the fake money
“ahead of time” in order to “do these marijuana setup ripoffs.” Samoata and
his brother were also communicating with other people “to do these setups
during th[e] same time frame” he set up the marijuana deal with Erik. He
further admitted he sent Erik a Snapchat message asking Erik if he wanted
to buy a “strap.” He was not really trying to sell Erik one of his guns;
instead, he was just checking to see if Erik would be armed.

                                       6
                                       II.
                                    Verdicts
      The jury found Samoata guilty of the first degree murder of Briseno

(Pen. Code,2 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a); count 1) and not guilty of the
attempted murder of Erik S. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 2) but guilty of its
lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 192,
subd. (a), 664). As to count 1, the jury found true that Samoata personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm and proximately caused death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). On count 2, the jury found true Samoata personally
used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of the attempted voluntary
manslaughter.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
          Samoata Fails to Establish Prejudicial Instructional Error
      Samoata contends the trial court committed instructional error because
it failed to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 416 (Evidence of Uncharged

2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        7
Conspiracy)3 and CALCRIM No. 418 (Coconspirator’s Statements).4
Although Samoata did not request these instructions, he asserts the court
had a sua sponte duty to give them because the court admitted evidence
pursuant to the coconspirator hearsay exception in Evidence Code section

1223.5 We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v. Posey

3       CALCRIM No. 416 states in relevant part, “A member of a conspiracy
is criminally responsible for the acts or statements of any other member of
the conspiracy done to help accomplish the goal of the conspiracy.” It sets
forth the elements of a conspiracy, including that “[t]he defendant intended to
agree and did agree with [a coparticipant] to commit [the alleged crime]”;
“[a]t the time of the agreement, the defendant and . . . the other alleged
member[ ] of the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would commit
[the alleged crime]”; and “[the] defendant[,] [or the coparticipant,] [or
(both/all) of them] committed [at least one of] the following overt act[s] to
accomplish [the alleged crime].” (Ibid.)

4     CALCRIM No. 418 provides, in relevant part, “In deciding whether the
People have proved that [the defendant] committed [any of] the crime[s]
charged, you may not consider any statement made out of court by [a
coconspirator] unless the People have proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that: [¶] 1. Some evidence other than the statement itself
establishes that a conspiracy to commit a crime existed when the statement
was made; [¶] 2. [The coconspirator was a member] of and participating in
the conspiracy when [he] made the statement; [¶] 3. [The coconspirator]
made the statement in order to further the goal of the conspiracy; [¶] AND [¶]
4. The statement was made before or during the time that [the defendant
was] participating in the conspiracy. [¶] A statement means an oral or
written expression, or nonverbal conduct intended to be a substitute for an
oral or written expression.”

5     Evidence Code section 1223 provides: “Evidence of a statement offered
against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The
statement was made by the declarant while participating in a conspiracy to
commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the objective of that
conspiracy; [¶] (b) The statement was made prior to or during the time that
the party was participating in that conspiracy; and [¶] (c) The evidence is
offered either after admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the
                                        8
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) Assuming without deciding that such a sua
sponte duty existed in this case, we reject Samoata’s claim because he fails to
establish prejudice from the asserted instructional error.
A.    The Evidence Assertedly Triggering a Sua Sponte Duty to Give
      CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418
      The evidence assertedly triggering a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM
Nos. 416 and 418 consisted of messages sent to and from the Instagram and

Snapchat accounts of Samoata’s brother, Noah Samoata,6 between November
3 (when Samoata admitted he first contacted Erik to set up the marijuana

deal) and November 6 (the date of the shooting).7 In its motion to admit the
evidence, the prosecution argued the messages were nonhearsay because they
were offered not for their truth but as circumstantial evidence of other
relevant matters, such as the existence of a plan and conspiracy to rob a
marijuana dealer, and to explain Erik’s actions. In the alternative, the
prosecution argued the messages were admissible under the coconspirator
hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 1223.
      Specifically, the evidence admitted at trial consisted of four categories
of Instagram and Snapchat messages:
      (1)   All messages exchanged between Erik and Noah’s Instagram and
Snapchat accounts from November 3 through November 6. The trial court
ruled these messages were admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of
explaining Erik’s actions and as circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to

facts specified in subdivisions (a) and (b) or, in the court’s discretion as to the
order of proof, subject to the admission of such evidence.”

6     To avoid confusion, we refer to Noah Samoata by his first name.

7      Samoata does not challenge the trial court’s decision to admit evidence
of the Instagram and Snapchat messages.

                                         9
rob. Erik testified he received these Instagram and Snapchat messages. And
as we have mentioned, Samoata admitted at trial he sent these messages to
Erik, including the two messages asking Erik if he wanted to buy a gun for
the purpose of ensuring Erik would not be armed during the marijuana deal.
      (2)   Solicitations for marijuana sent from Noah’s Snapchat account to
40 to 50 other Snapchat users, during the same time frame Erik received
solicitations from Samoata through Noah’s Instagram and Snapchat

accounts.8 Some of the recipients, like Erik, were also asked whether they
wanted to buy a gun. The prosecution proffered this evidence to show
Samoata was “searching for people to set up and rob.” Again, Samoata
admitted he and his brother were also communicating with other people “to
do these setups” when he set up the marijuana deal with Erik.
      (3)   Videos sent from Noah’s Snapchat account to a Snapchat user
named “Eli” on November 5. Samoata testified Noah sent the videos to “Eli,”
another potential setup victim, although “Eli” backed out of the deal. One
video showed two people with what appeared to be counterfeit hundred dollar
bills. Several aspects of this video (the money, the people’s hands and
clothing, music playing in the background, and a bedspread visible in the
video) were identical to a video Erik received from Noah’s Snapchat account.
The remaining videos showed both Samoata and Noah with the murder
weapon as well as three firearms and a box of ammunition that were
recovered from Samoata’s attic after the shooting. The trial court ruled these
videos were relevant and admissible to show Samoata’s access to the murder

8     The remaining three categories of evidence were introduced through an
investigator from the District Attorney’s office who reviewed records
produced by Instagram and Snapchat in response to warrants.

                                      10
weapon and ammunition, and found they were not offered for the truth but as
circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy to commit a robbery.
      (4)   A Snapchat audio message sent from Noah’s account to a
Snapchat user named “Kenneth” on November 4. Samoata admitted Noah
sent a message to “Kenneth” but denied knowing why Noah sent it. In the
message, the speaker said there was going to be a “lick . . . tonight” and “he’s

gonna have a pound.”9 (Erik was initially supposed to deliver the marijuana
to San Diego on November 4, but ended up delivering it on November 6
instead.) The District Attorney’s investigator testified “lick” was street slang
that could mean “a robbery,” “to . . . come up on something,” or “to take
something from somebody else,” but “wouldn’t really refer to . . . a theft when
you’re going to sneak and take something without them knowing.” Samoata
testified his definition of a “lick” was “[c]ome up” or “[g]etting over on
somebody,” and “[g]etting over on somebody” means “[t]rying to get
something for free.” The trial court admitted the audio message as
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to rob Erik of marijuana.
B.    Analysis
      The parties dispute whether the trial court had a sua sponte duty to
instruct the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418. Until recently, the Bench
Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 provided, “The court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on the use of a coconspirator’s statement to incriminate a defendant

9     The message in its entirety was: “Hey yo bro, can you get back to me
bro? (unintelligible) hey so bro there’s a lick bro, tonight bro. I need you for
tonight, . . . . This thing has no strap for sure bro. I know there’s a
(unintelligible) another thing. This dude has a whole bunch of money, and
he’s gonna have a pound bro, a pound. And it’s gonna be fire - fire. So, . . . .
blood, can you come through . . . ? And if the lick (unintelligible) I’ll give you
half or a quarter of it . . . .”

                                        11
if the statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section 1223.”
(CALCRIM No. 418 (Aug. 2016 rev.) (2022 ed.) pp. 186–187, citing People v.
Jeffery (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 209, 215 and People v. Herrera (2000) 83
Cal.App.4th 46, 63.) If a court instructs a jury with CALCRIM No. 418, it
must also give either CALCRIM No. 415 (Conspiracy) or CALCRIM No. 416.
(See Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418.) Whereas Samoata relies on this
Bench Notes guidance for his position that the court was obligated to sua
sponte instruct the jury on conspiracy and use of a coconspirator’s
statements, the People contend neither of the cases cited in the Bench Notes
(Jeffery and Herrera) stand for such a proposition.
      We do not need to resolve this aspect of the parties’ dispute. In March
2023—after Samoata filed his opening brief, but before the People’s
respondent’s brief and Samoata’s reply brief were filed—the Bench Notes
accompanying CALCRIM No. 418 were revised. They now state: “It is an
open question whether the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the use
of a coconspirator’s statement to incriminate a defendant. (See People v.
Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 251–252 [(Prieto)]; People v. Sully (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1195, 1231–1232 [(Sully)].) On request, the court must give this
instruction if the statement has been admitted under Evidence Code section
1223.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023 rev.), italics added.)
Neither side has argued the guidance from the revised Bench Notes is an
inaccurate statement of the law.
      The parties also dispute whether a duty to instruct was triggered in
this case. Samoata contends it was because the trial court admitted the
Instagram and Snapchat messages sent from Noah’s account under Evidence
Code section 1223. The People contend no such duty arose because the court

                                      12
did not admit the messages under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay
rule. Rather, it admitted them as nonhearsay.
      The People are correct that the trial court admitted the messages as
nonhearsay. But this does not necessarily compel the conclusion that
instructions on conspiracy and use of a coconspirator’s statements were not
required. “ ‘ “ ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a
request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to
the issues raised by the evidence’ ” and “ ‘necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 667.)
In ruling the messages were admissible, the court reasoned, in part, that they
were circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to rob. The relevance and the
nonhearsay purpose for which the messages were offered thus depended on
the existence of a conspiracy between Samoata and his brother.
      The current Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 state there may be “a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the use of a coconspirator’s statement to
incriminate a defendant.” (Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023
rev.), italics added.) The quoted language does not reference Evidence Code
section 1223 or confine the possible sua sponte instructional duty to cases
involving this hearsay exception. Here, although it was established at trial
that certain Instagram and Snapchat messages originating from Noah’s
account were sent by Samoata, there was also evidence some of them were
sent by Noah. Although the messages were used to prove facts other than the
matters asserted within them, it is still the case that “a coconspirator’s
statement” was used “to incriminate” Samoata. (See Bench Notes to
CALCRIM No. 418 (Mar. 2023 rev.).) Taken to their logical conclusion, the
revised Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 418 suggest it is an “open question”

                                        13
whether a sua sponte duty to give CALCRIM No. 418 (and with it, CALCRIM
No. 416) exists in a case such as this.
      Ultimately we find it unnecessary to answer this question. In Sully
and Prieto, the California Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the definition of an
uncharged conspiracy and the requirements for admissibility of a
coconspirator’s statements where such statements were admitted at trial
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1223. (Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1231;
Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 251.) We take the same approach here. That
is, even if we “ ‘[a]ssum[e] the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct the
jury under these circumstances,’ the error was harmless.” (Prieto, at p. 251,
quoting Sully, at p. 1231.)
      The failure to instruct jurors regarding coconspirator statements is
governed by the state law harmless error standard and is deemed harmless
unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant
would have been achieved in the absence of the error. (Prieto, supra, 30
Cal.4th at pp. 251‒252; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1231‒1232; see People
v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) The defendant bears the burden of
demonstrating prejudice under this standard. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5
Cal.5th 186, 201.)
      Samoata fails to carry his burden of showing there is a reasonable
probability instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418 would have
improved his results at trial. This is his theory of prejudice: The Instagram
and Snapchat messages influenced the jury’s determination whether he
intended to commit a robbery at the time of the shooting, which in turn

                                          14
affected its decision as to whether the homicide of Briseno constituted felony

murder.10
      Samoata’s prejudice arguments suffer from two fundamental flaws.
First, he broadly characterizes all of the messages sent from Noah’s
Instagram and Snapchat accounts as “text and video evidence from Noah,”
“Noah’s . . . messages,” and “Noah’s conduct and statements.” He asserts “the
arrangements [with Erik] were made by Noah sending messages over social
media.” These are not accurate characterizations of the evidence. Contrary
to Samoata’s apparent effort to portray all of the Instagram and Snapchat
messages as statements of Noah, Samoata testified at trial that he sometimes
used Noah’s Instagram and Snapchat accounts, and he specifically used them
in this case to communicate with Erik. Samoata admitted he located Erik on
Instagram; he used Noah’s account to send Erik messages through
Instagram; and he entered into an agreement via these messages for Erik to
sell him a pound of “weed” in exchange for $1500. Samoata further testified
it was his voice in the Snapchat audio messages asking Erik if he wanted to
buy a “strap,” and that he sent these messages to confirm Erik would not be
armed. Samoata also admitted he and Noah were the two people shown in
the Snapchat videos sent from Noah’s account. To the extent these videos
recorded Samoata’s verbal and nonverbal expressions, the expressions were
his own, not his brother’s. The imprecision with which Samoata

10    The jury was instructed on first degree willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder; first degree robbery murder (and, correspondingly, the
elements of robbery); justifiable homicide committed in self-defense; and
voluntary manslaughter arising from imperfect self-defense. It was also
instructed on attempted murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter
arising from imperfect self-defense.

                                      15
characterizes the trial record undermines the persuasive value of his
prejudice arguments.
      Second, and more importantly, Samoata does not meet his burden of
affirmatively establishing that instructing the jury with CALCRIM Nos. 416
and 418 likely would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. He
merely argues that “[i]f properly instructed on uncharged conspiracy and how
to consider coconspirator statements, the jury may well have found that the
prosecution failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that either
[(1)] a conspiracy between Noah and [Samoata] existed or that [(2) Samoata]
was a member of any conspiracy when Noah was sending texts about guns or
doing a ‘lick.’ ” (Italics added.) He does not support this assertion with a
citation to legal authority, and he does not develop the argument further.
Samoata’s bare assertion about what the jury “may” have found raises only
an abstract possibility of prejudice. Arguments that raise only an abstract
possibility of prejudice do not satisfy the Watson standard. (Richardson v.
Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.)
      Having reviewed the record, we also do not agree with Samoata’s
assertion that a jury, instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418, would
have found insufficient evidence that “a conspiracy between Noah and
[Samoata] existed.” The evidence of a conspiracy between Noah and Samoata
was strong. Samoata admitted he found Erik on Instagram by searching for

terms like “plugs” or “weed,”11 that he messaged Erik because he was trying
to “[s]cam [Erik] with fake money to get a pound of weed,” and that he
personally procured the fake money that was to be used to pull off the
scheme. Samoata testified he became involved after Noah asked him to “do

11    As Erik explained, a “plug” means “someone who has weed.”

                                       16
the deal” because Noah was scared. Samoata specifically admitted sending
Erik the message, “Yo, you want to buy a strap,” and that his purpose in
doing so was to see if Erik would be armed. He acknowledged that asking if
the victim wanted to buy a gun was “something [Samoata] . . . or [Noah]
would do when . . . trying to do these setups.” He admitted that when Erik
arrived in San Diego, Samoata was “outside to do the setup” while Noah was
communicating with Erik. Samoata’s testimony alone amply proved a
conspiracy between him and Noah existed. (See CALCRIM No. 416 [“An
agreement may be inferred from conduct if you conclude that members of the
alleged conspiracy acted with a common purpose to commit the crime.”].)
      We also do not agree with Samoata’s claim the jury would have found
insufficient evidence that “[Samoata] was a member of any conspiracy” when
the messages about guns or doing a “lick” were sent. (See CALCRIM No. 418
[People must establish that “[t]he statement was made before or during the
time that [the defendant was] participating in the conspiracy”].) The
message to “Kenneth” about a “lick” was sent on the afternoon of November
4, and the videos showing Noah and Samoata with guns were sent to “Eli” on
November 5. These communications were all sent after November 3, when
Samoata sent his first Instagram message to Erik. Samoata testified he sent
messages to Erik in order to “[s]cam him with fake money to get a pound of
weed,” and he became involved in doing the deal with Erik at Noah’s behest.
The messages about guns or a “lick” all postdated the point when Samoata
first became involved in the scheme.
      Samoata’s other prejudice arguments are similarly unavailing. He
observes that in closing arguments to the jury, his trial counsel argued no
robbery was committed because Briseno handed Samoata the backpack with
the marijuana before Samoata began shooting. He points out that the jury

                                       17
sent a note asking whether the backpack changed possession when Briseno
handed it to Samoata, and contends the jury’s note shows it was focused on
whether a robbery, and therefore a robbery-murder, occurred. The difficulty
with this argument is that the social media messages had no bearing on the
jury’s determination of whether Briseno gave Samoata the backpack before
the shooting. In Samoata’s version of the events, it was Briseno who handed
the backpack over, making it Briseno’s decision whether to do so. The
Instagram and Snapchat messages sent from Noah’s account were sent by
Samoata and Noah. The messages reflected their intentions, not the mindset
of Briseno.
      Finally, Samoata contends the prosecutor “leaned heavily” on the
Instagram and Snapchat messages in her closing arguments to the jury “to
prove theories of both premeditated and robbery-felony murder.” But
because Samoata does not establish there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
would have declined to consider any of the messages had it been instructed
with CALCRIM Nos. 416 and 418, this contention fails. To the extent that
Samoata complains the prosecutor told the jury the messages showed a
“plan” or “conspiracy to rob,” whereas his own counsel told the jury Samoata’s
intent was “to ‘scam,’ ” it is apparent from the record the real dispute at trial
was not whether a conspiracy existed, but whether its object was to “rob” or
to “scam” the victims. The jury was instructed on the legal definition of
robbery pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1600. It was also instructed pursuant to
CALCRIM No. 200 that it was required to follow the court’s instructions
rather than the attorneys’ comments on the law. We presume that in
deciding whether Samoata intended to commit a robbery that “the jury
followed the instructions notwithstanding the prosecution’s arguments.”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, 62; People v. Osband (1996) 13

                                       18
Cal.4th 622, 717 [courts of review “ ‘presume that jurors treat the court’s
instructions as a statement of law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments
as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade’ ”].)
                                        II.
   Samoata Fails to Establish He Is Entitled to a Remand for Resentencing
      In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found the following aggravating
sentencing factors to be true: (1) the offense involved great violence, great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness; and (2) Samoata was armed with or used a handgun during the
commission of “the offense.” The trial court sentenced Samoata to 25 years to
life for the first degree murder of Briseno (count 1) and 25 years to life for the
associated section 12022.53, subdivision (d), firearm enhancement. On the
attempted voluntary manslaughter of Erik (count 2), the court imposed the
middle term of three years plus the middle term of four years for the section
12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm enhancement, and the mandatory three
years for the section 12022.7, subdivision (a), great bodily injury
enhancement. All terms were run consecutively, making Samoata’s total
sentence 60 years to life.
      Samoata seeks a remand for resentencing on two claims of error. First,
he contends the trial court, in imposing sentence, failed to recognize or to
exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), to strike any or
all of the enhancements, or under People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688
(Tirado) to substitute his firearm enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d), with a lesser included firearm enhancement. Second, he
contends the court failed to determine his ability to pay pursuant to People
v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164 (Dueñas); alternatively, his
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the imposition of fines and fees

                                        19
without a Dueñas hearing. We conclude Samoata fails to establish he is
entitled to a remand for resentencing on any of these grounds.
A.    Section 1385, Subdivision (c)(2)
      Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 81) amended section 1385 to provide that the presence of one of
nine enumerated mitigating circumstances “weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement . . . unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1; see
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) On appeal, Samoata contends two mitigating
circumstances exist in his case: “(B) Multiple enhancements are alleged in a
single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement
shall be dismissed. [¶] (C) The application of an enhancement could result
in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be
dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) He asserts the trial court was required “to

dismiss all of the enhancements[12] and impose a sentence of 25 years to life.”
      Samoata filed a sentencing brief asking the trial court to exercise its
discretion “pursuant to Section 1385” to dismiss or strike the sections
12022.53, subdivision (d), and 12022.5, subdivision (a), firearm
enhancements, and the section 12022.7, subdivision (a), great bodily injury
enhancement. In support of his request, he cited his youth (he was 20 when
he committed the offenses and 22 at the time of sentencing), remorse, and
“limited prior non-violent criminal history.” He asked for a total sentence of
25 years to life. At the sentencing hearing, Samoata reiterated the request to
strike the enhancement allegations “pursuant to 1385,” for the additional

12   Samoata is incorrect. Subdivision (c)(2)(B) of section 1385 only
authorizes dismissal of all but one of the enhancements, not all of them.

                                         20
reasons that he suffered from medical problems and had acted out of an
unreasonable belief that he was in danger.
       Although Samoata’s trial counsel did not request dismissal of
enhancements under subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385, Samoata contends
this issue has not been forfeited, for two reasons: because his trial counsel
cited section 1385 in seeking dismissal of enhancements; and because the
trial court was “statutorily required to exercise its discretion and consider
statutory mitigating factors” and “[t]here is no indication the court did
either.” We reject these contentions and conclude the issue has been
forfeited.
       First, we disagree with Samoata’s claim that his trial counsel’s citation
to section 1385 was sufficient to preserve the specific sentencing issue he
raises on appeal. The forfeiture rule applies to alleged sentencing errors just
as with other claims of trial court error. “[U]nless a party makes a
contemporaneous objection, he or she generally cannot challenge a court’s
ruling for the first time on appeal.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th
589, 594; see People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234 [“It is settled that
failure to object and make an offer of proof at the sentencing hearing
concerning alleged errors or omissions in the probation report waives the
claim on appeal.”].) Although Samoata’s trial counsel cited section 1385 at
sentencing, the citation to the statute was generic and did not specifically
reference subdivision (c)(2), and his counsel relied on entirely different
factual grounds than those Samoata invokes on appeal. Where, as here,
counsel’s trial court objections fail to reasonably specify the claim presented
on appeal, the issue is forfeited. (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1,
21.)

                                       21
      Even if not forfeited, Samoata’s attempts to establish that the trial
court affirmatively committed an abuse of discretion are unpersuasive. While
Samoata contends the court was required to exercise its discretion under
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), and asserts “[t]here is no indication” the court
exercised its discretion, we do not infer an abuse of discretion from a silent
record. The court was presumably aware of current law in effect at the time
of sentencing, including Senate Bill 81, which became effective on January 1,
2022, three months before Samoata was sentenced. “[I]n light of the
presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable
law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot presume error
where the record does not establish on its face that the trial court
misunderstood the scope of that discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 515, 527 (Gutierrez); see People v. Martinez (1998) 65
Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [“[the] general rules concerning the presumption of
regularity of judicial exercises of discretion apply to sentencing issues”].)
      Seeking to avoid the doctrine that we cannot infer an abuse of
discretion on a silent record, Samoata attempts to recast the trial court’s
authority under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), as mandatory rather than
discretionary. He analogizes this case to People v. Panozo (2021) 59
Cal.App.5th 825, 840–841. In Panozo, this court addressed a claim of

sentencing error under section 1170.9,13 which authorizes alternative

13     Section 1170.9 provides, in relevant part, “(a) In the case of any person
convicted of a criminal offense who could otherwise be sentenced to county
jail or state prison and who alleges that the person committed the offense as
a result of sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress
disorder, substance abuse, or mental health problems stemming from service
in the United States military, the court shall, prior to sentencing, make a
determination as to whether the defendant was, or currently is, a member of
the United States military and whether the defendant may be suffering from
                                        22
commitment for eligible military veterans convicted of felonies, and section

1170.91,14 which requires courts to consider evidence a military veteran is
suffering from trauma as a circumstance in mitigation at sentencing.
(Panozo, at pp. 832, 835–836.) Observing that both statutes repeatedly used
the word “shall” to describe the court’s sentencing obligations (id. at p. 836;
see § 1170.9, subd. (a) [stating “the court shall, prior to sentencing, make a
determination as to whether . . . the defendant may be suffering from
[trauma, substance abuse, or mental health problems] as a result of [military]
service,” italics added]), we concluded that both provisions, by their plain
language, “unambiguously obligate a sentencing court to consider a
defendant’s service related PTSD, substance abuse, or other qualifying
conditions” (Panozo, at p. 836). Because the statutes described the court’s
obligations as mandatory, we held that “compliance with the mandates of

sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the person’s
service. The court may request, through existing resources, an assessment to
aid in that determination. [¶] (b)(1) If the court concludes that a defendant
convicted of a criminal offense is a person described in subdivision (a), and if
the defendant is otherwise eligible for probation, the court shall consider the
circumstances described in subdivision (a) as a factor in favor of granting
probation.”

14    Section 1170.91 provides, in relevant part, “(a) If the court concludes
that a defendant convicted of a felony offense is, or was, a member of the
United States military who may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic
brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental
health problems as a result of the defendant’s military service, the court shall
consider the circumstance as a factor in mitigation when imposing a
sentence. This consideration does not preclude the court from considering
similar trauma, injury, substance abuse, or mental health problems due to
other causes, as evidence or factors in mitigation.”

                                       23
sections 1170.9 and 1170.91 cannot be inferred from an ambiguous record.”
(Id. at pp. 836–837.)
      Panozo’s holding does not apply here. Although subdivision (c)(2)(B)
and (C) of section 1385 use the words “shall be dismissed,” other courts have
consistently rejected the contention that they mandate dismissal of
enhancements. (See People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 294–297;
People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 238–240, review granted
Apr. 19, 2023, S278786; People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 15–21;
People v. Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 395–398, review granted
Mar. 22, 2023, S278309 (Walker).) These courts have reasoned that the
statutory words “shall be dismissed” cannot be read in isolation and have
considered the statute’s repeated characterization of the dismissal authority
it confers as discretionary. (See, e.g., Walker, at pp. 396‒398; Lipscomb, at
p. 18; Anderson, at p. 239; Mendoza, at pp. 295–296.) We find the reasoning
and holdings of these cases to be persuasive, and need not repeat their

analysis here.15
      The presence of statutory language confirming the authority conferred
is discretionary distinguishes section 1385, subdivision (c), from the statutes
at issue in Panozo. Further, section 1385, subdivision (c), unlike section
1170.9, does not state that the court must “make a determination” about the
defendant’s condition “prior to sentencing.” (Cf. § 1170.9, subd. (a).) These

15    Although Samoata emphasizes that Walker, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at
pages 399–400 construed section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), as tipping the
balance “in favor of dismissal” unless the mitigating circumstances favoring
dismissal are “rebutted by the court’s finding that dismissal would endanger
public safety,” it is still the case that Walker held the dismissal authority
conferred by the statute is discretionary (see Walker, at pp. 396–398, review
granted).

                                      24
distinctions between the statutes at issue in Panozo and section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C), render Panozo’s holding inapplicable to

Samoata’s claim of sentencing error.16
      Samoata argues to the extent we conclude (as we have) that his trial
counsel’s inaction resulted in forfeiture of his claim that he was entitled to
dismissal of enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C),
he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject the claim
because he fails to show that he was prejudiced. To demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show that counsel’s performance
was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” (Wiggins v.
Smith (2003) 539 U.S. 510, 521, citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland).) To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Strickland, at p. 694.) In demonstrating prejudice, the defendant
“must carry his burden of proving prejudice as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ not
simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.”
(People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937 (Williams).)

16    Two other cases cited by Samoata (In re D.L. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
1240, and In re Sean W. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1177) are also
distinguishable. In re D.L., like Panozo but unlike this case, involved a
failure to fulfill judicial duties that were mandatory rather than
discretionary. (See In re D.L., at p. 1244 [juvenile court failed to fulfill its
mandatory duty to conduct a hearing and consider juvenile’s suitability for
deferred entry of judgment].) In In re Sean W., the juvenile court made
statements on the record that affirmatively showed it was unaware of the
scope of its discretion. (See In re Sean W., at pp. 1181–1182.) Such a
scenario did not occur here.

                                        25
      Even if we assume counsel’s performance was deficient, Samoata fails
to carry his burden of establishing that he suffered resulting prejudice. (See
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [“If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that
course should be followed”].) As we have explained, subdivision (c)(2) of
section 1385 states dismissal of enhancements is not justified if the court
finds it would “endanger public safety.” (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2) [“ ‘Endanger
public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.”].)
      Samoata barely touches on this requirement in his appellate briefing.
His closest attempt to address it consists of a bare assertion that the
mitigating circumstances in subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C) of section 1385 were
not “rebutted [by evidence public safety would be endangered by dismissal of
the enhancements] on this record.” He fails to elaborate on this point or to
explain why he believes it is so. Such an undeveloped assertion unsupported
by legal argument is not sufficient to meet an appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate prejudice. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th
581, 616, fn. 8 [“We need not consider such a perfunctory assertion
unaccompanied by supporting argument.”]; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th
279, 304 [rejecting appellant’s claim where it was presented “perfunctorily
and without supporting argument”].)
      Moreover, contrary to Samoata’s perfunctory assertion, the jury found
true that Samoata committed an offense that involved “great violence, great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” The trial court echoed this finding in its sentencing decision,
stating it “was impacted by the callousness, the viciousness, the violence that

                                        26
the defendant engaged in when he discharged his gun at two separate young
men, killing one and almost killing the other.” Samoata fails to discuss the
jury’s finding or the court’s reliance on it at sentencing, both of which
undermine his contention the mitigating circumstances in subdivision
(c)(2)(B) and (C) were not rebutted. We conclude Samoata has not
established he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to seek dismissal
of his enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C).
Consequently, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
B.    Tirado
      Samoata alternatively argues a remand for resentencing is required
because the trial court did not understand it had the discretion to substitute
a lesser firearm enhancement for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
enhancement. His argument relies in part on Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th 688,
in which the California Supreme Court held sentencing courts have
discretion under subdivision (h) of section 12022.53 to strike or dismiss a
section 12022.53, subdivision (d), enhancement and impose one of the lesser
enhancements in subdivisions (b) or (c) of section 12022.53 even where, as
here, the lesser enhancements were not charged in the information or found
true by a jury. (Tirado, at pp. 696, 700.) Under section 12022.53, a violation
of subdivision (d) carries a sentence of 25 years to life; a violation of
subdivision (c) results in a consecutive sentence of 20 years; and a violation of
subdivision (b) results in a consecutive sentence of 10 years. (See § 12022.53,
subds. (b)–(d).) Under subdivision (h) of section 12022.53, “[t]he court may,
in the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of
sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required to be
imposed by this section.”
      Section 12022.5 authorizes enhanced sentences for use of a firearm in
the commission of any felony, unlike section 12022.53, which applies only to
                                        27
specified felonies. (Id., subd. (a).) The sentences available under section
12022.5 are generally shorter than the sentences authorized by section
12022.53. (See § 12022.5, subd. (a) [providing for a term of imprisonment in
state prison of three, four, or 10 years].) Courts of Appeal are divided on
whether Tirado’s holding can be extended to support the trial court’s exercise
of discretion to strike a section 12022.53 enhancement and substitute an
uncharged enhancement under section 12022.5. (Compare People v. Johnson
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1086‒1093 [holding the trial court does have
discretion to substitute an uncharged lesser enhancement for a
stricken section 12022.53, subdivision (b), enhancement], review granted
Dec. 14, 2022, S277196, with People v. Lewis (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 34, 39‒42
[disagreeing with Johnson and holding section 12022.53 does not authorize
imposition of more lenient enhancements outside its statutory framework].)
      Samoata asks us to follow Johnson, and urges us to remand his case for
resentencing because the trial court “appeared unaware of its discretion” to
substitute a lesser enhancement under subdivisions (b) or (c) of section
12022.53, or section 12022.5, subdivision (a), in place of the 25-year-to-life
sentence he received under section 12022.53, subdivision (d). We need not
decide whether Johnson’s holding is correct. Even if we assume courts have
discretion to substitute a section 12022.5 enhancement for one imposed under
section 12022.53, Tirado was decided in January 2022, well before the April
2022 sentencing hearing in this case. The court was presumably aware of
Tirado and its potential implications at the time of sentencing. Again, we
cannot presume an abuse of discretion where, as here, “the record does not
establish on its face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that
discretion.” (Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.)

                                       28
      Further, Samoata’s trial counsel failed to ask for a lesser firearm
enhancement penalty at the time of sentencing, thereby forfeiting the
opportunity to challenge the court’s failure to substitute the firearm
enhancement of which he was convicted for a lesser one. Although Samoata
claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to request this relief at
sentencing, he fails to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s
allegedly deficient performance. (See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.)
His prejudice argument is that the court “may well have” imposed a lesser
enhancement if requested to do so because it imposed the middle term rather
than the upper term for the count 2 firearm enhancement.
      We do not agree with this reasoning. At the time Samoata was
sentenced, the middle term of any determinate sentencing triad was the
presumptive sentence. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1); see Stats. 2021, ch. 731 [eff.
Jan. 1, 2022; enacting Sen. Bill No. 567 (2021‒2022 Reg. Sess)].) Courts
could impose upper term sentences only in limited circumstances. (See
§ 1170, subd. (b)(2) [stating, in part, “[t]he court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation
of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term”].) The trial court’s finding that the circumstances in
aggravation were not sufficient to support an upward departure from the
presumptive middle-term sentence on the count 2 firearm enhancement does
not support the conclusion it would have departed downward and imposed a
lesser penalty on the count 1 firearm enhancement had Samoata’s counsel
asked it to do so.
      Moreover, the record otherwise fails to disclose a reasonable probability
the trial court would have granted such relief. The court denied Samoata’s
motion to dismiss the count 2 firearm enhancement under section 1385 in

                                        29
favor of imposing a four-year prison term. It is not likely that a court
unwilling to grant Samoata a four-year sentencing reprieve from a firearm
enhancement penalty would grant him a reprieve of 10 years or more if given
the opportunity.
C.    Dueñas
      The trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4),
a $10,000 stayed parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45), a court
security fee of $80 (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), and a criminal conviction
assessment fee of $60 (Gov. Code, § 70373). Samoata appeals these fines and
fees on the grounds the court failed to determine his ability to pay before
imposing them pursuant to Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at page 1164. He
contends his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution were violated as a result.
      Samoata forfeited these claims by failing to assert an inability to pay
objection or to request a hearing regarding his ability to pay when the trial
court imposed the fines and fees. (See People v. Venegas (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 32, 42 [failure to object to fines and fees forfeits appellate
challenge based on asserted inability to pay]; People v. Greeley (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 609, 624 [“At the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing, Dueñas
had already been decided, and there is no reason why defendant could not
have requested an ability-to-pay hearing based on Dueñas.”].) Samoata
alternatively contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
such an objection at sentencing. However, he fails to address the element of
prejudice that is a required component of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. (See Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 937 [defendant bears the burden
of proving prejudice].) We therefore reject this contention.

                                       30
                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

                                 31