Court Opinion

ID: 9902765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:23:17.466138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:02.622157
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
              _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D22-0758
                   LT Case No. 2022-DR-011922
              _____________________________

EDWARD J. MANGO,

      Appellant,

      v.

KATHLEEN M. MANGO,

      Appellee.
              _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Brevard County.
James H. Earp, Judge.

Richard J. Feinberg, of Law Office of Richard J. Feinberg, Indialantic,
for Appellant.

Nicholas A. Shannin and Carol B. Shannin, of Shannin Law Firm P.A.,
Orlando, for Appellee.

                       September 1, 2023

PER CURIAM.

      AFFIRMED.

BOATWRIGHT and KILBANE, JJ., concur.
SOUD, J., concurs with opinion.
          _____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
           _____________________________

                       2
SOUD, J., concurring with opinion.

      I concur with this Court’s affirmance in this case and write
to address Appellant Edward Mango’s assertion that the trial court
erred by not making written findings on the factors set forth in
section 61.08, Florida Statutes (2021), 1 in its Supplemental Final
Judgment denying Appellant’s Amended Supplemental Petition
for Modification of Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.

                                I.

      Appellant, the former husband, and Appellee Kathleen
Mango, the former wife, were divorced in 2003 after a twenty-two-
plus-year marriage. More than fourteen years thereafter, Former
Husband filed his Amended Supplemental Petition seeking to
eliminate or reduce the permanent periodic alimony paid to his
former wife.

      The Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage sub judice
incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement, and
pertinent here, required Former Husband to pay to Former Wife
permanent periodic alimony of $750 bi-weekly. Importantly, at
trial on Former Husband’s amended supplemental petition,
Former Husband abandoned his claim that his ability to pay
alimony was diminished. 2 Rather, he sought elimination or
reduction of his alimony obligation because Former Wife’s income
had increased more than two-fold during the eighteen years since

      1 Subsequent to the trial in this cause, the Florida
Legislature in 2023 amended section 61.08, Florida Statutes. The
2023 amendments, even were they to apply to this case, in my
view, do not change the analysis or result. Further, and
importantly, section 61.14(1)(a), the language of the statute
governing modification of alimony that is applicable to this case,
remains unchanged.
      2 Former Husband conceded that his retirement from NASA

under unique circumstances was voluntary. He also acknowledged
income earned in his role as a full-time college professor, in
addition to his pension.

                                 3
the dissolution of the marriage and, as a result, she had an
allegedly diminished need for alimony.

      Former Wife, however, testified that her standard of living
at time of trial was substantially worse than during the marriage.
At the time of trial, she was driving a twenty-one-year-old car with
approximately 200,000 miles and residing at times with her adult
daughter. Further, she had taken no trips for more than three
years (the last being a trip to St. Louis after her mother died) and
was making minimum payments on her credit cards to ensure she
could pay her other bills. Former Wife testified that “all [her] life
[was]” was making sure she had enough money to pay her bills.
She contrasted her situation with the standard of living she and
Former Husband enjoyed during their marriage, agreeing with
Former Husband’s testimony that they had lived paycheck to
paycheck, but explaining that they lived well on his income, going
on vacations and keeping season passes to Disney World, and
mostly buying new cars.

      The trial court entered its Supplemental Final Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage denying Former Husband’s Supplemental
Petition, finding Former Wife had a continuing need for alimony
and Former Husband’s ability to pay his ongoing support
obligation had not materially decreased. Therein, pertinent here,
the trial court made certain findings regarding the parties’
respective incomes at the time of dissolution of marriage, the filing
of Former Husband’s petition, and at the time of trial. The trial
court also made findings as to the parties’ respective employment
and the assets and liabilities of the parties at times pertinent to
this case.

                                 II.

     The trial court’s denial of Former Husband’s petition to
modify alimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Dunn v.
Dunn, 277 So. 3d 1081, 1085 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

            Discretion, in this sense, is abused when
            the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or
            unreasonable, which is another way of
            saying that discretion is abused only

                                  4
            where no reasonable man would take the
            view adopted by the trial court. If
            reasonable men could differ as to the
            propriety of the action taken by the trial
            court, then it cannot be said that the trial
            court abused its discretion.

Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980) (citation
omitted).

       Consideration of the trial court’s denial of the Former
Husband’s supplemental petition rightly begins with section 61.14,
Florida Statutes, titled “Enforcement and modification of support,
maintenance, or alimony agreements or orders.” Of course, when
interpreting statutes, Florida courts “follow the ‘supremacy-of-text
principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a governing
text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their
context, is what the text means.’” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery
Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 56 (2012)). This Court also is guided by Justice Joseph
Story’s view that “every word employed in [a legal text] is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the
context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge
it.” Advisory Op. to Governor re: Implementation of Amend. 4, the
Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020)
(quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 157-58 (1833)).

      Section 61.14(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in part:

            When the parties enter into an agreement
            for payments for, . . . support,
            maintenance, or alimony, . . . or when a
            party is required by court order to make
            any payments, and the circumstances
            or the financial ability of either party
            changes . . . either party may apply to the
            circuit court . . . for an order decreasing or
            increasing the amount of support,
            maintenance, or alimony, and the court

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            has jurisdiction to make orders as equity
            requires, with due regard to the
            changed         circumstances      or    the
            financial ability of the parties . . .
            decreasing, increasing, or confirming the
            amount of separate support, maintenance,
            or alimony provided for in the agreement
            or order. . . . Except as otherwise provided
            in s. 61.30(11)(c), the court may modify an
            order of support, maintenance, or alimony
            by increasing or decreasing the support,
            maintenance, or alimony retroactively to
            the date of the filing of the action or
            supplemental action for modification as
            equity requires, giving due regard to
            the changed circumstances or the
            financial ability of the parties . . . .

§ 61.14(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, the express
language of the statute requires trial courts to consider the
changed circumstances or financial abilities of both parties. The
statute is devoid of any specifically identified factors trial courts
must consider in giving due regard to the asserted changed
circumstances or financial abilities of the parties.

      Consistent with this statute, this Court has previously held
that to warrant the granting of the Supplemental Petition, Former
Husband, as the party seeking modification, was required to
establish: “(1) a substantial change in circumstances, (2) that was
not contemplated at the time of the final judgment of dissolution,
and (3) that is sufficient, material, involuntary, and permanent in
nature.” Dunn, 277 So. 3d at 1085 (citing Pimm v. Pimm, 601
So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1992)). Further, “[w]hen faced with a request
to modify alimony, a court should consider the parties’ income, the
payee’s need for alimony, and the payor’s ability to pay.” Id.

       Based upon the record before this Court, the trial court was
well within its discretion to deny the Supplemental Petition,
having concluded there was not a legally sufficient change in
circumstances. Specifically, the record substantially supports the
trial court’s finding that Former Wife has a continuing need for

                                  6
alimony. This is particularly true considering the purpose of
permanent periodic alimony, which “is to provide for the needs and
necessities of life for a former spouse as they were established
during the marriage of the parties.” Mallard v. Mallard, 771
So. 2d 1138, 1140 (Fla. 2000) (citing Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201)
(emphasis added).

       Former Husband argues, inter alia, however, that the trial
court erred by failing to make specific findings concerning the
listed factors set forth in section 61.08, Florida Statutes. These
factors are to be considered when the trial court in a dissolution
action—having already determined one spouse has need for
alimony and the other spouse has the ability to pay alimony—
decides the type and amount of alimony to be awarded. See § 61.08,
Fla. Stat.; see also n.3, infra. Former Husband’s argument fails.

       As an initial matter, section 61.14, governing modification of
alimony, makes no mention whatsoever of section 61.08 or the
findings required thereby. By the express language of section
61.14, the trial court must give “due regard to the changed
circumstances or the financial ability of the parties.” § 61.14(1)(a),
Fla. Stat. Thus, the statute itself provides no requirement that a
trial court make findings regarding the 61.08(2) factors that may
be relevant to a given case.

       Further, it is only after a petitioner establishes a legally
sufficient change in circumstances or financial abilities of the
parties warranting modification of alimony that Florida courts
have required trial courts to specifically consider in writing those
relevant factors enumerated in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes,
in determining the modified amount of alimony to be awarded.
See Suarez v. Suarez, 284 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)
(“Once a party moving for alimony modification provides
substantial, permanent, and unanticipated change in
circumstances, ‘a trial court must consider and make specific
factual findings for each of [the] factors [within section
61.08(2)].’”); see also Befanis v. Befanis, 293 So. 3d 1121 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2020) (holding the former spouse was entitled to modification
of alimony based upon requisite showing of legally sufficient
change in circumstances, and in light thereof, remanding to trial
court for determination of “the amount of alimony based on the

                                  7
factors set forth in section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes . . . .”); accord
Davis v. Maloch, 287 So. 3d 689, 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019) (“In
making an alimony modification [i.e., determining the modified
amount of alimony to be granted], the court must look at all
relevant factors in section 61.08.”); Albu v. Albu, 150 So. 3d 1226,
1228 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“In determining the extent of
modification, the trial court should consider those factors listed in
section 61.08, Florida Statutes, to the extent that they are relevant
in a modification proceeding.”). 3

      Of course, holding that a trial court is not bound to review
the enumerated 61.08(2) factors until it has first concluded a
legally sufficient change in circumstances exists, in no way relieves
the court of the duty imposed by section 61.14 to determine
whether legally sufficient changed circumstances exist. And in
giving the due regard required by section 61.14, the trial court will
necessarily consider the parties’ income, the payee’s need for
alimony, and the payor’s ability to pay. See Dunn, 277 So. 3d at
1085, discussed supra.

      As a result, it is foreseeable that certain evidence pertaining
a trial court’s consideration of changed circumstances and
financial abilities of the parties required in section 61.14 may also
be relevant to certain of the factors enumerated in 61.08(2).

      3
         It is noteworthy that a similar two-step analysis is
contemplated in a trial court’s initial determination of alimony in
a dissolution proceeding. When “determining whether to award
alimony[,]” section 61.08 requires the trial court to “first make a
specific factual determination as to whether either party has an
actual need . . . and whether either party has the ability to pay
alimony[.]” § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). If the trial court
determines the requisite need for and ability to pay alimony exists,
“then in determining the proper type and amount of
alimony . . . the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to” those set forth in (a)-(j). Id. (emphasis
added). See Reese v. Reese, 363 So. 3d 1202 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023);
see also Roth v. Roth, 312 So. 3d 1021, 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021).
The 2023 amendment to section 61.08, Florida Statutes, makes
this two-step process clear. See § 61.08(2)-(3), Florida Statutes
(2023).

                                    8
However, it cannot be claimed as error when a trial court—having
determined modification of alimony is not justified—does not
expressly analyze in writing those factors set forth in 61.08(2),
which are to be considered by the court in deciding the amount and
type of alimony. Where, as here, a trial court finds no legally
sufficient change in circumstances exists to warrant modification
of alimony, the trial court need not further expressly consider the
factors listed in section 61.08(2).

                               III.

      Accordingly, the Supplemental Final           Judgment     of
Dissolution of Marriage is properly affirmed.

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