Court Opinion

ID: 9772461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:18:44.762931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.707513
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Hawkins knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Because I believe that the facts in this case are readily distinguishable from the facts in Jackson and because of the importance of an attorney for a fair proceeding, I would reverse the trial court on this issue.
The right to be represented by counsel is protected by both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. VI; Ind. Const, art. 1, § 13. The right to counsel can be waived only by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 499 (Ind.2007). Because of the paramount importance of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings and in recognition that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skills to protect himself at trial, courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-64, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); United States v. Best, 426 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.2005); Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind.2001).
In Jackson, a closely divided Indiana Supreme Court recognized that a defendant’s absence from trial does not constitute a waiver of the right to counsel in every case, but in that case, “the record supported] the trial court’s specific finding that [the defendant’s] absence from trial was a ‘willful, knowing and voluntary act.’ ” 868 N.E.2d at 499. The defendant in Jackson at no time requested pauper counsel or indicated to the trial court that he could not afford an attorney. Instead, the defendant hired counsel from a prominent law firm, discharged counsel, and kept promising the trial court that he would hire new counsel. The defendant, however, neither hired new counsel nor appeared at his final two pretrial hearings or the trial. Our Supreme Court highlighted that the defendant “repeatedly disregarded scheduled events” and that the *769last time the defendant was before the trial court, his counsel was discharged, a new trial date was set, and he was ordered to find new counsel as he said he would. Id. The Court warned that a defendant “cannot manipulate a trial court to thinking that he or she will hire an attorney, fail to show up at trial or send an attorney, and then assert that the right to counsel was not waived because the trial court did not admonish the defendant about proceeding pro se.” Id. at 500; see also Poynter, 749 N.E.2d at 1127-28.
Here, however, the facts are much different. Hawkins, who lived in North Carolina, appeared before the trial court on July 27, 2011. At this hearing, the trial court set a trial date of November 7 and advised Hawkins that he would be tried in absentia if he did not appear. But on October 10, Hawkins’s public defender filed a motion to withdraw, and a hearing was set. Hawkins was notified of both the motion and the hearing and was told that his failure to appear at the hearing would result in a warrant for his arrest and the withdrawal of his public defender. The hearing was held on October 19, and Hawkins appeared by telephone. Because of apparent difficulties in conducting the hearing by telephone, the trial court adjourned the hearing, reset it for October 26, and ordered Hawkins to appear. Hawkins, however, did not appear at the October 26 hearing, following which the trial court granted his public defender’s motion to withdraw and issued a warrant for Hawkins’s arrest. Critically, Hawkins was not notified that his public defender’s motion to withdraw had in fact been granted.
On the morning of Hawkins’s November 7 trial, which was less than two weeks after his public defender’s withdrawal, neither Hawkins nor an attorney was present. The State told the trial court that it had learned that Hawkins was arriving around 1:80 p.m. because he had to take a bus to Indiana. Tr. p. 34. Although waiting thirty minutes, the trial court conducted the trial in Hawkins’s absence anyway. Hawkins arrived several hours after his trial was concluded. Appellant’s App. p. 97. Hawkins was told that his trial was over and was taken into custody. Id. Hawkins later sent a letter to the court explaining his absence.
Unlike in Jackson, Hawkins did not repeatedly ignore scheduled events. Instead, Hawkins (1) did not appear at the rescheduled October 26 hearing and (2) showed up several hours late to his trial, which had already been conducted in his absence. This does not amount to repeatedly ignoring scheduled events. Second, unlike in Jackson, where the defendant had the ability to and did hire an attorney, here Hawkins is indigent and depended on the court for pauper counsel. Third, unlike in Jackson, where the defendant discharged his counsel and told the trial court that he was going to hire new counsel, Hawkins did not discharge his counsel, did not indicate he could or would hire new counsel, and did not know with certainty that his public defender’s motion to withdraw had been granted. And while Hawkins may have been warned earlier that his failure to appear would result in the withdrawal of his public defender, notice was not sent to him that his public defender had in fact been removed. Fourth, here less than two weeks passed between the discharge of Hawkins’s public defender and his trial. Finally, and most importantly, there is no indication here that Hawkins was trying to “game” the system like the defendant in Jackson.
While I do not condone Hawkins’s failure to timely contact the trial court to say that he would be late for his November 7 trial, given these flimsy facts, there is no indication that Hawkins was trying to *770“game” the system, and the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right, Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, I do not believe that the record supports the conclusion that Hawkins knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.1 I would reverse the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

. I agree with the majority that this case has nothing to do with advising Hawkins regarding the pitfalls of proceeding pro se. Rather, this case deals with the waiver of counsel.