Court Opinion

ID: 9386776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 16:07:52.254577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:08.438614
License: Public Domain

J-S06023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    REYNALDO FLORES                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1364 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 24, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-54-CR-0000723-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: APRIL 13, 2023

        Appellant Reynaldo Flores appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence entered after a jury found him guilty of possession of controlled

substance by an inmate (possession by an inmate), possession of controlled

substance (simple possession), and possession of drug paraphernalia (drug

paraphernalia).1 Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of the crime

lab’s test results at trial and the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant also

argues that the trial court erred by sentencing Appellant in absentia.        We

affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a.2), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and (32), respectively.
J-S06023-23

     The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this

matter as follows:

     At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that [Appellant]
     had possession of a contraband BIC lighter, Suboxone and drug
     paraphernalia which was located during a strip and cell search
     while [Appellant] was housed as an inmate at SCI Mahanoy.
     Correctional Officer Roberto Sosa (“Sosa”) testified that on July
     29, 2019 [Appellant] was housed in the restrictive housing unit
     (“RHU”) at SCI Mahanoy and was subjected to a strip search based
     on information that [Appellant] was in possession of contraband.
     The search was videotaped. The search occurred in the Level 5
     strip room. [Appellant] was instructed to take off one article of
     clothing at a time. When [Appellant] took off his pants, an object
     fell onto the floor and it was determined that [Appellant] had a
     BIC mini lighter which was restricted and considered contraband
     for any inmate housed in the RHU. Sosa placed [Appellant’s]
     pants, which contained one back pocket, on a chair. Another
     officer was present and searched [Appellant’s] pants pocket,
     which contained a black fingertip balloon. [Appellant] denied that
     the balloon was his. Sosa testified that the correctional officers
     routinely use black rubber gloves while working with the inmates,
     which are then disposed of, and the inmates take the gloves out
     of the garbage and either sell or redistribute them to other
     inmates.

     Lieutenant Steven Taylor (“Taylor”) testified that he was involved
     in the strip search of [Appellant] on July 29, 2019. Taylor
     searched [Appellant’s] shirt and then his pants, in which Taylor
     found a fingertip to a black glove that was formed into a ball shape
     in the back pocket. Taylor contacted the security lieutenant and
     together they opened the black fingertip which contained orange
     strips later confirmed to be Suboxone.

     Corrections Officer Bruce Mason (“Mason”) testified that on July
     29, 2019 he was directed to go to [Appellant’s] cell and remove
     [Appellant’s cellmate] and search the cell. Mason searched the
     cell along with another officer with [Appellant] present outside the
     cell. Mason found a small piece of cellophane containing seven
     small pieces of an orange color in the back of the cell in a small
     metal desk attached to the wall. [Appellant] admitted that the
     suspected drugs were his.

                                    -2-
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     Lieutenant Jodi Cobian (“Cobian”) testified that she was involved
     in an investigation on July 29, 2019 concerning [Appellant]. She
     was approached by Taylor who had information that [Appellant]
     had brought contraband into the RHU and wanted to be housed in
     a cell with a certain [cellmate]. While [Appellant’s] cell was
     searched, she spoke to [Appellant’s] cellmate. After searching the
     cell, Mason brought her a Styrofoam ball which contained little
     orange pieces individually wrapped in Styrofoam. Testing later
     confirmed it to be Suboxone. After strip searching [Appellant],
     Taylor brought her a small blue BIC lighter and a tip of [a] black
     glove which contained Suboxone strips.          The evidence was
     photographed and placed into an evidence bag which was placed
     into an evidence locker, which is locked and kept within a locked
     office. The evidence bag contains identification information on the
     outside including the name of the prison, case number, the
     suspected inmate’s name and number; date and time of recovery,
     who recovered it, and a description of the items, as well as a chain
     of custody. Cobian admitted that Suboxone is permitted in the
     prison if the inmate has a prescription, but that it is a pill which is
     administered in the medical unit, not a strip. She notified
     Pennsylvania State Police of the incident the next day via email.

     Trooper Andrew Letcavage (“Letcavage”) testified that he is a
     Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) officer and the affiant in this
     case. When PSP receives an extraordinary incident report (“EOR”)
     from the prison, they pick up the evidence from the prison,
     photograph it; package it, place it in a secure room and then it is
     signed out and transported to a laboratory. Letcavage did not
     become a member of the criminal investigation unit until February
     21, 2020, so a different officer was initially working the case until
     Letcavage filed the charges against [Appellant], which resulted in
     a five[-]month delay. There was a further two[-]month delay in
     time between the incident and when the PSP officer picked up the
     evidence at the prison. Letcavage was not the officer who
     transported the evidence to the Bethlehem Regional Police Crime
     Laboratory (“[crime l]ab”), which did the testing.

     Brendan McCann (“McCann”) is a forensic scientist with the [crime
     l]ab, specializing in drug identification. He was admitted as an
     expert witness in the field of drug identification without objection.
     McCann was assigned to test the mixture of cellophane wrappings
     and orange films and fragments contained in the evidence
     envelope concerning this investigation. He conducted two tests,
     a presumptive and a confirmatory, identified the substances as
     buprenorphine, common name Suboxone, a Schedule 3 controlled

                                      -3-
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      substance. The total net weight was 2.13 grams. He repackaged
      the evidence in bags within a secured envelope and wrote a report
      dated October 18, 2019. His report indicated that the package
      had been transported to the [crime l]ab by Trooper Daniel R.
      Phillips (“Phillips”). McCann testified that the [crime l]ab received
      the evidence [on] September [16,] 2019, and that it was normal
      for the actual testing to take about one month to occur after
      receipt of the evidence.

      After the Commonwealth rested, the Commonwealth moved for
      the admission of all of its exhibits, including Commonwealth
      Exhibit 2, the property records, and Exhibit 5, the lab report, to
      which Defendant objected. Both objections were based on the
      lack of chain of custody testimony by Phillips. The objections were
      overruled.

                                  *    *    *

      [Appellant testified] that on July 29, 2019, he was first strip
      searched in his cell which was videotaped but the video was
      missing and had not been produced by the Commonwealth
      regarding that preliminary search. Then he walked through a
      body scanner and was then taken to the strip room. [Appellant]
      admitted that he had a lighter which fell out of his back pants
      pocket, but denied that he had a black balloon in his pants, and
      also denied that the drugs in his cell were his and that he never
      said that [they] were his. On cross examination, [Appellant] was
      at first unable to explain how the lighter was not discovered during
      the first strip search in his cell. Then he testified that they “felt
      it” during the strip search but allowed him to keep it in his pocket.

      [On April 6, 2021, t]he jury found [Appellant] guilty of all three
      charges.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/21, at 2-6.

      The Honorable Cyrus P. Dolbin deferred sentencing to May 24, 2021 for

the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report.         N.T. Trial,

4/6/21, at 153-54; Order, 4/6/21.      On May 24, 2021, Appellant failed to

appear for the sentencing hearing. The Commonwealth presented testimony

from Schuylkill County Adult Probation Officer Sara Dudley. Officer Dudley

                                      -4-
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testified that while preparing Appellant’s PSI report, she attempted to contact

Appellant, and she discovered that Appellant was currently incarcerated in

Osceola County, Florida.        N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 5/24/21, at 3-4.   Officer

Dudley further explained that Appellant had been detained on a bench warrant

for absconding from supervision while he was on probation for an unrelated

case in Berks County. Id. at 4. She also testified that there were no pending

extradition proceedings involving Appellant at that time. Id. Appellant’s trial

counsel objected to the trial court proceeding with sentencing Appellant in

absentia.     Id.   The trial court overruled the objection and imposed an

aggregate sentence of two to four years’ imprisonment consecutive to any

other sentence Appellant was currently serving.      Appellant did not file any

post-sentence motions.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal nunc pro tunc2 and a timely

court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.         The Honorable Christopher

Hobbs issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion adopting the August 31, 2021 opinion

written by the now-retired Judge Dolbin. See Trial Ct. Op, 10/27/22, at 1-2.

____________________________________________

2 Appellant previously filed a notice of appeal on June 29, 2021. This Court
quashed that appeal as untimely on April 5, 2022. Commonwealth v.
Flores, 881 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 1016659 (Pa. Super. filed April 5, 2022)
(unpublished mem.). Appellant then filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on
May 5, 2022, and the PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel to represent
Appellant. Thereafter, PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on June
23, 2022. On September 15, 2022, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s
petition and reinstated Appellant’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc.

                                           -5-
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      Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we reorder as

follows:

      1. Did the trial court err in [admitting] the lab results into
         evidence?

      2. Did the Commonwealth fail to sufficiently establish the
         elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt?

      3. Did the [trial] court err in sentencing [Appellant] in absentia?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (some formatting altered).

                        Admissibility of Lab Results

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

evidence of the crime lab’s test results because there was a gap in the chain

of custody for the drugs. Id. at 11-13. In support, Appellant notes that the

Commonwealth did not present testimony from Trooper Phillips, who

transported the drugs to the crime lab from the State Police barracks. Id. at

12.   Appellant claims that Trooper Phillips’ testimony was necessary to

establish that there was no break in the chain of custody between when the

drugs were collected on July 29, 2019, and when they were delivered to the

crime lab on September 16, 2019. Id. Therefore, Appellant contends that

because there was a gap in the chain of custody for the drugs, the crime lab’s

test results were inadmissible.

      In reviewing Appellant’s claim, our standard of review is as follows:

      Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are within the
      sound discretion of the trial court and we will not reverse a trial
      court’s decision concerning admissibility of evidence absent an
      abuse of the trial court’s discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
      merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or

                                      -6-
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      misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
      partiality, as shown by the evidence of record. If in reaching a
      conclusion the trial court overrides or misapplies the law,
      discretion is then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court
      to correct the error.

Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 78 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

      This Court has explained:

      There is no requirement that the Commonwealth establish the
      sanctity of its exhibits beyond all moral certainty. It is sufficient
      that the evidence, direct and circumstantial, establish a
      reasonable inference that the identity and condition of the exhibits
      remain unimpaired until they were surrendered to the court. . . .

      Moreover, [t]here is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce
      as witnesses all persons who were in a position to come into
      contact with the article sought to be introduced in evidence.
      Physical evidence may be properly admitted despite gaps in
      testimony regarding custody. Pointedly, this Court has upheld the
      chain of custody based on less testimony. Lastly, [the defendant]
      incorrectly argues this issue as though it were related to the
      admissibility of the evidence. Gaps in the chain of custody, the
      underlying issue of [the defendant’s] argument, go to the weight
      of the evidence and not its admissibility.

Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 67 A.3d 19, 29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 950 (Pa. Super. 2016) (the same); Pa.R.E. 901(a)

(stating that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an

item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is”).

                                      -7-
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     In Feliciano, the defendant argued “that the trial court erred in

admitting into evidence two envelopes that contained the packets of cocaine

purchased from [the defendant] because there were gaps in the chain of

custody.”    Feliciano, 67 A.3d at 28.      On appeal, the Feliciano Court

concluded that although the Commonwealth did not present any evidence as

to how the envelopes were delivered to the crime lab, the “chain of custody

was more than sufficient[]” because there was testimony from the officer who

placed the drugs into the sealed envelopes and the forensic scientist who

opened the envelopes and tested their contents. Id. at 28-29.

     Here, at trial, Appellant objected to the admission of lab report because

of there was a gap of in the chain of custody for the drugs. See N.T. Trial at

104-05.

     In addressing Appellant’s claim on appeal, the trial court explained:

     The law is clear that physical evidence may be properly admitted
     despite gaps in testimony regarding its custody. Gaps in the chain
     of custody go to the weight to be given to the testimony, not to
     its admissibility. There was no evidence supporting an argument
     that the envelopes containing the alleged drugs had been
     tampered with; the drugs, lighter and glove tip were identified by
     several corrections officers as having been the same drugs they
     found on [Appellant’s] person and in his cell.

          . . . . Every hypothetical possibility of tampering need not
          be eliminated; it is sufficient that the evidence, direct or
          circumstantial, establishes a reasonable inference that the
          identity and condition of the exhibit remained unimpaired
          until it was surrendered to the trial court. . . .

     [Commonwealth] v. Hudson, 414 A.2d 1381, 1387 ([Pa.]
     1980). We believe that the exhibits were properly admitted.

                                     -8-
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Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/21, at 6-7 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

      Initially, we note that although Appellant claims that the evidence was

inadmissible due to a gap in the chain of custody, that issue goes to the weight

of the evidence, rather than its admissibility. See Feliciano, 67 A.3d at 28-

29; Witmayer, 144 A.3d at 950. Accordingly, as more fully discussed below;

to the extent that Appellant asserts a weight claim challenging the chain of

custody for the drugs, he has waived this issue by failing to raise it before the

trial court and no relief is due. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); see also Pa.R.A.P.

302(a).

      In any event, on this record, we discern no abuse of discretion by the

trial court in admitting the evidence. See LeClair, 236 A.3d at 78. Here, the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence establishing the chain of

custody for the drugs and their authenticity. See Hudson, 414 A.2d at 1387;

Feliciano, 67 A.3d at 28-29; see also Pa.R.E. 901(a). As noted previously,

the record reflects that Lieutenant Taylor, Officer Sosa, and Officer Mason

recovered the orange strips from Appellant’s person and from his cell on July

29, 2019.   See N.T. Trial at 60-62, 73-76, 81-83.       Lieutenant Taylor and

Officer Mason then gave the orange strips to Lieutenant Cobian, who placed

them in an evidence bag, sealed and dated the bag, and secured the bag in

an evidence locker. See id. at 88-90. Trooper Letcavage testified that the

staff at SCI Mahanoy gave the evidence bag to a PSP trooper, who placed it

in a PSP envelope, and then deposited the evidence inside a locked evidence

                                      -9-
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room at the PSP Frackville Barracks. See id. at 24-30. In his lab report,

McCann indicated that PSP Trooper Phillips submitted the evidence to the

crime lab on September 16, 2019. See id. at 56. McCann testified that the

sealed evidence envelope contained “crumpled orange films” which he tested

and then resealed in the evidence envelope.        See id. at 50.   Under these

circumstances, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Feliciano,

67 A.3d at 29 (explaining that an exhibit is admissible where there is sufficient

evidence to “establish a reasonable inference that the identity and condition

of the exhibits remain unimpaired until they” were brought to court (citation

omitted)).

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

       In his second claim, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his convictions for possession by an inmate, simple possession,

and drug paraphernalia.3 Appellant’s Brief at 14-16. Specifically, Appellant

claims that there was no admissible evidence establishing that the items he

____________________________________________

3 It is well settled that a vague challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
may result in waiver. See Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072
(Pa. Super. 2017). This is particularly important where the defendant was
convicted of multiple crimes, which each contain multiple elements that the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.                         See
Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). Here,
Appellant raised the following sufficiency claim: “[t]he Commonwealth failed
to prove Counts 1, 2[,] and 3 because of the break in the chain of evidence.”
Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/21/22. The trial court addressed Appellant’s
sufficiency claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and the case against Appellant
was relatively straightforward. Therefore, we decline to find waiver. See
Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007) (per curiam).

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possessed were a controlled substance. In support, Appellant reiterates his

claim that the crime lab’s test results were inadmissible because of a gap in

the chain of custody for the drugs.     Id. at 15.   Appellant concludes that

“[w]ithout the [crime] lab results, the Commonwealth could not sufficiently

prove any of the counts against [Appellant] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

at 15-16 (citing, inter alia, Witmayer, 144 A.3d at 950).

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

      The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
      evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
      the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
      evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
      crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
      may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
      fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced
      is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

      Furthermore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do
      not review a diminished record. Rather, the law is clear that we
      are required to consider all evidence that was actually received,
      without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or
      whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are correct.

                                    - 11 -
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Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted and formatting altered)).

       Here, as noted previously, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is based on his

assertion that the crime lab’s test results are inadmissible.       However, in

reviewing a sufficiency claim, we must consider all of the evidence presented

at trial, “without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or

whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are correct.”    See id. (citation

omitted). Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim that if this

Court excludes certain evidence from our review, the remaining evidence is

insufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions.4,5 See id.

                              Sentencing In Absentia

       Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him in

absentia. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. Appellant contends that the trial court

violated his constitutional right to be present during his sentencing hearing.

____________________________________________

4 In any event, we agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence
to establish that Appellant possessed Suboxone, a Schedule 3 controlled
substance, and drug paraphernalia. See N.T. Trial at 50-57, 60-62, 73-76,
81-83. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim is meritless.

5 As previously stated, gaps in the chain of custody go to the weight of the
evidence. See Feliciano, 67 A.3d at 29; Witmayer, 144 A.3d at 950.
Challenges to the weight of the evidence must be preserved either orally prior
to sentencing, in a written motion before sentencing, or in a written post-
sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Therefore, to the extent that
Appellant is raising a weight claim based on a gap in the chain of custody for
the drugs, he has waived the issue by failing to raise it before the trial court.
See id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

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Id. at 13. Appellant notes that he was not able to attend the May 24, 2021

sentencing hearing because he was incarcerated in Florida and that the

Commonwealth and trial court were aware of his location. Id. at 14. Appellant

argues that he was not able to attend his sentencing because of his

incarceration on a bench warrant, and that he did not knowingly and

intelligently waive his right to be present during sentencing. Id. Therefore,

Appellant concludes that the trial court violated his constitutional right to be

present during sentencing.

      We review a trial court’s decision to hold a trial or sentencing hearing in

absentia for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilson,

712 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1998) (stating that “[t]he decision to conduct the

hearing in the defendant’s absence nevertheless remains within the discretion

of the trial judge”); Commonwealth v. Hilburn, 746 A.2d 1146, 1149 (Pa.

Super. 2000) (stating that “[t]his Court uses the same analysis for absence at

the sentencing phase as it does for absence at trial” (citation omitted)).

      In Wilson, our Supreme Court explained:

      A person accused of a crime has a constitutional right pursuant to
      the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
      1, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to be present at every
      stage of a criminal trial. In non-capital cases, a defendant may,
      by his actions, waive this right expressly or implicitly. The waiver
      must be knowing and voluntary. When a defendant is initially
      present at the time the trial commences, then flees or fails to
      attend further proceedings, he or she is deemed to have
      knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to be present.
      Courts in this Commonwealth have consistently held that a trial
      court may, in its discretion, conduct a trial in absentia when the
      defendant absconds without cause after the trial commences.

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Wilson, 712 A.2d at 737; see also Hilburn, 746 A.2d at 1149 (holding that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by trying the defendant in absentia

where she failed to appear for trial even though the trial court informed her

after jury selection that the trial would begin the following morning).

      Rule 602 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

      The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial including
      the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at
      the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this
      rule. The defendant’s absence without cause at the time
      scheduled for the start of trial or during trial shall not
      preclude proceeding with the trial, including . . . the
      imposition of sentence.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(a) (emphasis added); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 602, cmt

(explaining that “[a] defendant’s presence may be deemed waived by the

defendant intentionally failing to appear at any stage of the trial after proper

notice”).

      “Where the Commonwealth has demonstrated by a preponderance of

the evidence that the defendant is absent ‘without cause’ and that he

knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be present, he may be tried in

absentia.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 737 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(citations omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 602, cmt (the same).

      Here, the trial court explained:

      At the sentencing hearing on May 24, 2021, the court was
      informed that [Appellant] was currently in Florida. Counsel for the
      [Appellant] appeared. Sara Dudley, a Schuylkill County Adult
      Probation Officer, testified that she knows [Appellant], that she

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     attempted to contact [Appellant] to get information from him for
     his [PSI], that she was unable to do so because [Appellant] was
     currently in custody in Osceola County, Florida and that Florida
     was not going to extradite him. She testified that after the trial
     in the within matter, [Appellant] absconded and Berks County,
     where [Appellant] was serving probation, issued a bench warrant
     and [Appellant] was picked up in Florida. [Appellant’s] counsel
     objected to having [Appellant] be sentenced in absentia; counsel
     had spoken to [Appellant] that day and [Appellant] was
     incarcerated in Florida and was unable to be present to testify.

     We initially note that our court has the capability to conduct
     hearings using video conferencing, and no efforts were made by
     [Appellant] or his counsel to request a continuance of the
     sentencing so that [Appellant] could participate, either prior to or
     on the day of his sentencing. There was simply an objection
     lodged to his being sentenced in absentia.

     A defendant has the right after indictment to be present for all of
     his criminal proceedings.      However, such a right can be
     relinquished, by waiver or by one’s actions. . . .

     Here, the date of sentencing was given verbally by this court to
     [Appellant] after the jury’s verdict was rendered on April 6, 2021.
     A PSI was also verbally ordered on April 6; 2021, giving
     [Appellant] the opportunity to participate in the preparation of the
     PSI and giving [Appellant] two months to prepare for his
     sentencing date on May 24, 2021 at 2:00 PM. [Appellant]
     voluntarily left Pennsylvania and absconded to Florida while under
     Berks County supervision, and while knowing that he was to be
     sentenced in Schuylkill County on May 24, 2021. The Berks
     County Court of Common Pleas issued a bench warrant and
     [Appellant] was arrested and detained in Florida as a result.

     [Appellant’s] counsel was present for the sentencing and
     presented no argument as to the sentencing itself or as to why
     [Appellant] had absconded to Florida, and whether he did so
     voluntarily or otherwise. The only argument presented was the
     fact that [Appellant] wished to be heard and was unable to be
     physically present to testify because he was incarcerated in
     Florida. This court is unaware of any effort made by [Appellant]
     or his counsel to ask for a continuance or to make arrangements
     to have [Appellant] appear via video conference. The court
     considered the PSI prior to sentencing [Appellant]. [Appellant]
     had a chance to participate in the preparation of the PSI, but failed

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       to do so, and was unable to be reached by the Adult Probation
       officer. We believe that we properly sentenced [Appellant], albeit
       in his absence.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/21, at 7-9 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

       Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s decision to sentence Appellant in absentia. See Wilson, 712

A.2d at 739. The record reflects that Appellant was present for his trial, and

that the trial court informed him that the sentencing hearing was scheduled

for May 24, 2021.           See N.T. Trial at 153-54.      At sentencing, the

Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant had subsequently left

Pennsylvania and that he was apprehended in Florida prior to the scheduled

sentencing hearing.        See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g at 3-4.      Therefore, the

Commonwealth proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was

absent without cause and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right

to be present for sentencing by absconding from supervision. See Wilson,

712 A.2d at 7379; Hilburn, 746 A.2d at 1149; Hill, 737 A.2d at 259.

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.6 For these reasons,

we affirm.

____________________________________________

6 To the extent the trial court suggests that it properly sentenced Appellant in
absentia because Appellant’s counsel failed to request a continuance or
accommodations to allow Appellant to remotely participate in the sentencing
hearing, we note that this is erroneous. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/21, at
8/31/21, at 7-9. As stated above, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
establish that proceeding in the defendant’s absence is appropriate. See Hill,
737 A.2d at 259. However, this Court “may affirm a decision of the trial court
if there is any basis on the record to support the trial court’s actions, even if
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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J-S06023-23

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/13/2023

____________________________________________

we rely on a different basis.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 A.2d 602, 606
n.5 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Therefore, we affirm for the reasons
stated above.

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