Court Opinion

ID: 9776358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:34.571624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.848401
License: Public Domain

OPINION

HOLLAND, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which McCORMICK, P.J., MANSFIELD, KELLER, PRICE, WOMACK, and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
A jury found appellant, Jimmy Howlett, guilty of criminal mischief. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(a)(2). The trial court assessed punishment at a $500 fine and four years confinement, but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed appellant on community supervision for four years. On appeal, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Howlett v. State, 946 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1997). We granted the State’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court’s failure to submit a requested jury instruction on limitations was error.1
I.
On August 12, 1993, a Lone Star Gas Company construction crew discovered an unauthorized tap connected to the inlet riser of the gas meter while repairing a leak in a main gas line in the alley behind appellant’s residence. The tap consisted of a saddle valve in the side of the service line which diverted gas before it went through the metering device. The saddle valve was in the “on” position and gas was flowing out of the line and into the valve. Further investigation uncovered copper tubing buried on appellant’s property which led to appellant’s garage. There was copper tubing sticking out of the baseboard in appellant’s garage that was unconnected, but the ends of the tubing appeared to have been recently cut, and the threads on two nearby gas heaters suggested that they recently had been disconnected from the copper tubing.
Appellant was subsequently charged with criminal mischief. The indictment alleged he intentionally and knowingly tampered with the tangible property of the Lone Star Gas Company resulting in pecuniary loss and substantial inconvenience to the owner on or about August 5, 1993. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 28.03(a)(2).2 Specifi*665cally, appellant was charged with the installation of an unauthorized tap which diverted gas before it went through the meter. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 28.03(c)(2)-(3). Appellant filed an application for a pre-trial writ of habeas corpus alleging the statute of limitations had run. The basis for the application was that undisputed testimony established that if the offense occurred it occurred “sometime around the year 1985 when the tap was installed” which was outside the applicable limitations period.3 Tex.Code Cbim. PRO. Ann. art. 12.01(6). After conducting a hearing, the trial court denied the writ application.
The Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed. Ex parte Howlett, 900 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, pet. refd). The question on appeal was “when does the statute of limitations commence to run for the offense of criminal mischief by the unauthorized diversion of natural gas: at the time the unauthorized tap is first installed or at a later date when it causes pecuniary loss to the owner?” Id. at 938. The Court of Appeals determined that, under the facts of the case, the offense was a “continuing” offense that was “being committed as long as the tap [was] installed and gas [was] being diverted, causing loss to the owner.” Id. Overruling appellant’s sole point of error, the Court of Appeals held “limitations could be calculated from August 5, 1993, the date alleged in the indictment.” Id.
At the guilt/innocence portion of trial, appellant requested a jury instruction on the statute of limitations. The trial court denied appellant’s request. On appeal appellant claimed the trial court’s failure to give the limitations instruction was error. Howlett, 946 S.W.2d at 875. The State claimed the Court of Appeals had resolved the limitations issue in the habeas corpus appeal, and thus, consideration of this issue was foreclosed pursuant to the doctrine of “law of the case.”
The Court of Appeals disagreed. The court observed that “the issue of limitations [could] be raised as a challenge to the indictment (question of law) or as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence (question of proof).” See Howlett, 946 S.W.2d at 874, 875. The court concluded that appellant’s challenge to the failure to give a jury instruction on limitations was a question of proof, and held the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction was error “[b]ecause the issue of limitations had been raised and the jury was to decide the issue.” Id. at 875. Concluding the error was harmful because “appellant hotly contested the limitations issue” and the jury was permitted to find “appellant guilty for conduct not within the limitations period,” the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.4 Id. at 876.
*666The State now claims the Court of Appeals’ holding conflicts with the “law of the case.” The State contends that to be entitled to a jury instruction on limitations, appellant had to point to some evidence that called the matter into question. The State claims there had to be some evidence that the diversion of gas terminated three years prior to the date alleged in the indictment before appellant was entitled to a jury instruction because according to the law of the case “the offense of criminal mischief was continuing in nature.” The State claims the trial court did not err in refusing to give the limitations instruction because the undisputed evidence established the offense continued up to the date alleged in the indictment.
Appellant asserts that “law of the case” does not apply to this case because the Court of Appeals’ holding that the offense was a continuing in nature was “clearly erroneous.” He contends pecuniary loss is not an element of the offense of criminal mischief because this Court has held that “the knowing and intentional tampering with the tangible property of the owner or a third person without the owner’s consent is an offense even if it does not cause pecuniary loss.” Williams v. State, 596 S.W.2d 862, 864 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Appellant claims whether the natural gas continued to flow through the illegal valve until the time of discovery alleged in the indictment is of no consequence. As such, appellant asserts every element of the offense was completed in 1985 and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that he was entitled to a jury instruction on limitations.
II.
Before we can resolve the issue presented we must determine whether the Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence under the appropriate legal standard. We begin our analysis by examining the doctrine of “law of the case” to determine whether it governs the issue of limitations.
In its most basic form the doctrine “provides that an appellate court’s resolution of a question of law in a previous appeal of the same case will govern the disposition of the same issue when raised in a subsequent appeal.”5 Law of the case is a court-made doctrine designed to promote judicial consistency and efficiency that eliminates the need for appellate courts to prepare opinions discussing previously resolved matters. Ex parte Granger, supra; LeBlanc v. State, 826 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd). The doctrine assures trial courts that they can rely on the appellate court’s disposition of an issue in presiding over the case and provides an incentive for trial courts to follow these decisions closely. See Lee v. State, 67 Tex. Crim. 137, 148 S.W. 706, 713 (1912) (opinion on motion for rehearing) (if rule were otherwise “trial courts would in a great measure be at sea, and would feel inclined and be authorized to give but little weight to the decisions of the [appellate] court.”).
The doctrine’s application is not inflexible. Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d at 516. An appellate court may reconsider its earlier disposition of a point of law if the court determines there are “exceptional” circumstances that mitigate against relying on its prior decision. Id. Where the facts and issues are identical in a second appeal, the most common “exceptional” circumstance is that the earlier appears to have been “clearly erroneous.” Id.
In the habeas corpus appeal the Court of Appeals held the offense of criminal mischief set out in Section 28.03(a)(2) is *667“continuing” in nature and was “still being committed as long as the tap [was] installed and gas [was] being diverted, causing loss to the owner.” Ex parte Howlett, 900 S.W.2d at 938. The court’s disposition of this point of law became the “law of the case” throughout all future proceedings in the case, including the trial on the merits. See e.g., Ware, 736 S.W.2d at 701; Granviel, 723 S.W.2d at 147; Willis, 479 S.W.2d at 303. Appellant claims the Court of Appeals’ determination of this point of law was “clearly erroneous” because according to Williams v. State, 596 S.W.2d 862 (Tex.Crim.App.1980) the object offense of criminal mischief does not require proof of pecuniary loss. Because pecuniary loss is not an element of the offense, appellant asserts the offense was completed in 1985 when each element of the crime had occurred. Barnes v. State, 824 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). We disagree.
Appellant’s reading of Williams is erroneous. The defendant in Williams was charged with criminal mischief under Section 28.03(a)(2). The indictment alleged the defendant “impaired and interrupted telephone communications,” but contained no allegation that the illegal conduct resulted in “pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience” to the owner. Williams, 596 S.W.2d at 864. The defendant claimed on appeal that the indictment was void because the indictment omitted an essential element of the offense. Overruling the defendant’s ground of error, we determined the State did not omit an essential element because the offense of criminal mischief set out in subsection (a)(2) requires proof of “pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience” to the owner. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.03(a)(2) (emphasis added); See Williams, 596 S.W.2d at 864-65. We noted that subsection(a)(2) permits proof of either “pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience” because it expands prior law to protect against “tampering” with the property “conduct that falls short of damaging the property but nevertheless interferes with the owner’s proprietary rights or abuses the property in a way that diminishes its value.” Id. (citing practice commentary to Section 28.03 of the Texas Penal Code). We concluded the indictment alleged “substantial inconvenience” because the conduct alleged, tampering with a public service, is a third degree felony under the statute even if no pecuniary loss results. Id. at 865.
Contrary to appellant, Williams does not eliminate the “pecuniary loss” element under subsection (a)(2). Instead, according to Williams the State must prove the accused’s conduct caused either pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to the owner. In the instant case, the indictment alleged the owner sustained “pecuniary loss and substantial inconvenience.” Although both elements were alleged in the conjunctive the State had the burden of proving either of them. See e.g., Cowan v. State, 562 S.W.2d 236 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). In light of the indictment in the instant case, we cannot say the Court of Appeal’s holding that “the offense continued to occur as long as the unauthorized valve was in place and the owner suffered pecuniary loss” was clearly erroneous. Hence, the Court of Appeals’ resolution of this issue was the law of the case.
Having determined the law applicable to appellant’s claim, we now address whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court was required to submit the requested limitations instruction. Limitations is a defense that must be raised by the evidence and which the defendant must timely bring to the trial court’s attention before the court has a duty to instruct the jury on limitations. See Proctor v. State, 967 S.W.2d 840, 844 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Where evidence that the offense is within the limitations period is undisputed the trial court has no duty to instruct the jury on the limitations defense. Id.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the appellant raised limitations, but failed to cite to any evidence in the record *668on which it relied and we find none.6 Howlett, 946 S.W.2d at 875. The uncon-troverted evidence showed the initial diversion of gas began in 1985, when the appellant installed the unauthorized valve, and continued until August 5, 1993, the date alleged in the indictment. No evidence was presented showing that the flow of gas terminated prior to August 1993 causing the limitations period to begin.7 Because the evidence was undisputed that the owner suffered pecuniary loss up to a date alleged in the indictment, there was no fact issue for the jury to decide relating to limitations. We hold the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on a limitations defense.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
MEYERS, J., did not participate.

. In its two grounds for review, the Slate asks this Court to address: (1) whether the defensive issue of limitations may be raised by evidence outside the presence of the jury; and (2) whether a finding of a continuing offense obviates a limitations instruction absent evidence before the jury showing termination of the offense.

. Article 28.03 provides in relevant part:
*665(a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner:
(1) he intentionally or knowingly damages or destroys the tangible property of the owner;
(2) he intentionally or knowingly tampers with the tangible property of the owner and causes pecuniary loss or substantial inconvenience to the owner or a third person; ...
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(c) For the purposes of this section, it shall be presumed that a person who is receiving the economic benefit of public communications, public water, gas, or power supply, has knowingly tampered with the tangible property of the owner if the communication or supply has been:
(1) diverted from passing through a metering device; or
(2) prevented from being correctly registered by a metering device; or
(3) activated by any device installed to obtain public communications, public water, gas, or power supply without a metering device.

. Undisputed evidence established that in the fall of 1985 appellant's ex-wife told an Abilene police officer that she had observed appellant place the tap on the line. See Ex parte Howlett, 900 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1995, pet. ref'd).

. In its harm analysis the Court of Appeals also cited the jury note sent to the trial judge during deliberations questioning whether finding the offense occurred on the date allege in the indictment was necessary and *666whether the disconnection in August 1993 constituted tampering. Howlett, 946 S.W.2d at 876.

. Ex parte Granger, 850 S.W.2d 513, 523 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (citing Ware v. State, 736 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1987)); see e.g., Granviel v. State, 723 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ex parte Calvin, 689 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Willis v. State, 479 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.Crim.App.1972).

. To support its holding that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the limitations defense, the court of appeals relied on Van Hoang v. State, 939 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Howlett, 946 S.W.2d at 875. Proctor overruled Van Hoang because in that case there was no evidence raising the limitations defense. The undisputed evidence showed the limitations period had been tolled. Proctor, 967 S.W.2d at 844.

. The dissent claims appellant was entitled to a jury instruction on limitations because "the issue of limitations was vigorously contested at trial by both sides.” Slip op. at 11. A defendant is not entitled to a limitations instruction, however, simply because he insists the prosecution is limitations-barred. Proctor, 967 S.W.2d at 844. Because limitations is now a defensive issue, there must be some evidence that the prosecution is limitations-barred before a limitations instruction will be warranted. Id. Once the jury is presented with some evidence calling limitations into question, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution is not limitations-barred.
The record evidence cited by the dissent does not demonstrate the trial court erred in refusing to give a limitations instruction because it does not show appellant stopped illegally diverting the gas prior to August of 1993, let alone outside the limitations period. Instead, the extensive evidence cited by the dissent simply shows the State’s witnesses neither possessed actual knowledge of the illegal diversion nor were aware of the number of cubic feet of gas appellant diverted to his residence. Limitations, however, is not raised by the inability of witnesses to testify as to whether something happened.
Appellant failed to introduce any evidence during his trial showing he stopped diverting the gas outside the limitations period. Instead, appellant testified that he was innocent and attempted to impeach the credibility of the State’s witnesses on cross-examination by questioning them regarding having witnessed the diversion of gas and whether they could testify as to the amount of gas diverted. Appellant did not controvert the State's circumstantial evidence that the illegal diversion of gas continued until the tap was discovered on August 5, 1993.