Court Opinion

ID: 9408863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 21:05:10.346098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:47.369142
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 210128-U

                                   Order filed July 13, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-21-0128
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 06-CF-1265
                                                      )
      CAMERON ALLEN PURYEAR,                          )       Honorable
                                                      )       Paul P. Gilfillan,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Brennan and Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court did not commit manifest error by denying defendant’s third-stage
                  postconviction petition.

¶2          Defendant, Cameron Allen Puryear, appeals the Peoria County circuit court’s denial of his

     successive postconviction petition following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant argues

     that the court committed manifest error where his successive postconviction petition sufficiently

     established a claim of actual innocence that would change the outcome on retrial. We affirm.
¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The State charged defendant with two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1),

     (2) (West 2006)) for the death of John Buckley. On November 27, 2007, the matter proceeded to

     a jury trial. The evidence at trial showed that Allen Buckley, John’s brother, lived with John and

     owned a white car that they both used. Officers were investigating a shooting in the neighborhood

     and questioned John and Allen. While speaking with the officers, Allen observed the “No Love”

     gang watching him and John. Approximately one week later and shortly after 11 p.m., Allen heard

     two gunshots close to his apartment. He observed John stumble through the door and collapse.

     John died later that night from a gunshot wound to the chest. That same night, defendant attended

     a party at Nicole Mitchell’s residence at 1622 Linn Street located on the southeast side of the Linn

     and Richmond intersection. Defendant posed for a photograph holding an automatic “military

     gun.” Shortly after 11 p.m., defendant, along with several other individuals, entered Nicole’s house

     looking “scared.” Erica Mitchell, Nicole’s sister, who also attended the party, saw defendant just

     after 11 p.m. near Nicole’s residence at the intersection of Linn and Richmond, walking with

     another man toward a white car. After hearing gunshots, defendant ran back to Nicole’s house and

     told Erica that he “shot somebody.” Defendant washed his hands with bleach. The other man had

     defendant’s black hooded sweatshirt and asked for ammonia. After, the man threw the sweatshirt

     into the basement. John’s girlfriend, Chelsea Tyler, testified that she was on the phone with John

     when she heard another voice say, “[w]e heard motherfuckers snitching.” Police located a black

     hooded sweatshirt with a white stain of unknown origin in the basement laundry area of Nicole’s

     residence.

¶5          The jury found defendant guilty. The court sentenced defendant to 71 years’ imprisonment.

     On direct appeal, defendant presented several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. People v.

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     Puryear, No. 3-08-0092 (2009) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We

     affirmed, finding that any errors committed were not prejudicial in light of the overwhelming

     evidence of defendant’s guilt. Defendant filed a postconviction petition alleging various

     ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. Following a second-stage proceeding,

     the court dismissed defendant’s petition. Defendant did not appeal.

¶6          Defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, which is the

     subject of this appeal. The petition alleged a claim of actual innocence, in that Pamela Krasner

     “was looking at [defendant] when the gunshots rang out and [defendant] is innocent of this crime.”

     Krasner averred that on the night of the murder, she was watching defendant when she heard two

     gunshots. Krasner concluded that defendant could not have been the shooter.

¶7          Defendant filed an amended postconviction petition, alleging that Margo Trapper provided

     newly discovered evidence that would change the result on retrial. Specifically, Trapper averred

     that she was at 1700 N. Linn Street, located on the northeast side of the Linn and Richmond

     intersection. Trapper was “sitting on [her] front porch observing a group of several people hanging

     out on the corner of Linn and Richmond.” Trapper stated that she saw defendant and several others

     outside when she heard two gunshots. Trapper explained that she was “without a doubt certain that

     [defendant] was on the corner on Linn and Richmond at the time those two gunshots were fired

     because [she could] specifically recall making eye contact with [defendant] to see weather [sic] or

     not it was him that had gotten shot.” Because it was an area where “a lot of gang members hung

     out,” Trapper was afraid that someone would hurt her or her family if she spoke to police. Trapper

     was “very familiar with [defendant],” whose sister was friends with Trapper’s brother. Trapper

     stated that defendant “could not have fired those gunshots” because “[h]e was right in front” of

     Trapper at the time. Trapper came forward after she spoke to defendant’s mother and did not want

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       defendant “sitting in prison for something *** he could not have done.” The court advanced

       defendant’s petition to an evidentiary hearing.

¶8            Trapper testified that she lived with her sister, Krasner, on the night of the murder. Krasner

       had since passed away. Tapper had known defendant “for a very long time” due to their siblings

       being friends and living in the same neighborhood, and she could “point him out from anybody in

       the room.” On the night of the murder, defendant was outside while Trapper was on her porch. At

       some point, defendant asked Trapper for a cigarette. Sometime after that, Trapper heard a gunshot

       and “instinctively” thought, “where is [defendant]?” Trapper specifically remembered making eye

       contact with defendant because she was so close to defendant that he was “essentially” at her

       house. Trapper was willing to come forward now after talking to defendant’s mother. Following

       the murder, Trapper moved out of the state and “[did not] think about” the case. Trapper never

       contacted defendant’s attorney at the time of the trial or spoke to anyone about what she knew

       because she was “scared.” On cross-examination, Trapper testified that she had seen defendant

       “probably” 50 or 100 times. After the murder, Trapper “bounced around,” living in different places

       but lived in the Peoria area until 2010.The court denied defendant’s petition. Defendant appeals.

¶9                                               II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10          Defendant argues on appeal that the court committed manifest error by denying his

       successive postconviction petition where he sufficiently established a claim of actual innocence

       that would change the outcome on retrial. Specifically, defendant’s actual innocence claim derives

       from a new witness, Trapper, who, defendant contends, provided evidence that defendant could

       not have been the shooter. Defendant asserts that Trapper’s testimony is newly discovered because

       she was unwilling to come forward sooner.

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¶ 11           The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) permits a criminal defendant to challenge the

       proceedings which resulted in his conviction by asserting that “there was a substantial denial of

       his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 725

       ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018). The Act contemplates the filing of a single postconviction

       petition. People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42. A defendant must obtain leave of court to file

       a successive postconviction petition. People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 47; Robinson, 2020 IL

       123849, ¶ 43; 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018). A defendant may obtain leave by alleging “a

       fundamental miscarriage of justice based on actual innocence.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 42

       (citing People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 23). If the circuit court does not dismiss the

       successive postconviction petition at the first stage, the petition will proceed to the second stage.

       People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 245-46 (2001). At the second stage, a defendant must make a

       substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006).

       If the State is unsuccessful in moving to dismiss the petition at the second stage, then the cause

       advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Id. at 472. At the third-stage evidentiary hearing, the

       defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence a substantial violation of a constitutional

       right. People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 92. The circuit court, as the finder of fact at the

       hearing, makes credibility determinations and weighs the evidence. People v. Reed, 2020 IL

       124940, ¶ 51. Accordingly, we review a circuit court’s ruling following a third-stage evidentiary

       hearing for manifest error. 1 Id. Manifest error is error that is “clearly evident, plain, and

       indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98,

       quoting People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004)).

               1
                Defendant argues that we should review his claim de novo. As explained by the court in Reed,
       2020 IL 124940, ¶¶ 13, 51, the standard of review is manifest error where the court heard new testimony.
       See cf. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 24 (During the third-stage hearing “the circuit court heard no
       new evidence; instead, the court reviewed the trial transcripts and heard arguments of counsel.”).
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¶ 12          To establish a claim of actual innocence, the evidence must be: (1) newly discovered;

       (2) material and not merely cumulative; and (3) of such a conclusive character that it would

       probably change the result on retrial. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47. “Newly discovered

       evidence is evidence that was discovered after trial that the [defendant] could not have discovered

       earlier through the exercise of due diligence.” Id.

¶ 13          First, we address whether Trapper’s testimony is newly discovered evidence. Trapper’s

       testimony established that she had known defendant for a “very long time,” had grown up in the

       same neighborhood where their siblings were friends, and previously saw defendant “probably”

       50 or 100 times. Upon hearing the gunshots, Trapper “instinctively,” thought “where is

       [defendant]?” and proceeded to make eye contact with defendant to make sure he was not the

       victim of the shooting. The testimony established that Trapper and defendant knew one another,

       and Trapper was within defendant’s view and in the same vicinity at the time of the crime. See cf.

       People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 334 (2009) (the witness indicated that he was in a place where he

       would not have been seen by defendant at the time of the crime, and thus, the court found that the

       witness was unknown to defendant and became an unavailable witness when he moved shortly

       after the crime). In this case, defendant holds the knowledge of facts pertaining to his alibi defense

       where the hearing testimony showed he was with Trapper at the time of the crime. See Edwards,

       2012 IL 111711, ¶ 37 (witness affidavits were not considered newly discovered where defendant

       knew the witnesses who were with him the night of the crime and, by exercising due diligence,

       could have discovered and subpoenaed them to testify at trial).

¶ 14          Moreover, the record does not show any effort of due diligence by defendant to contact or

       subpoena Trapper for trial, who lived in the Peoria area at the time of defendant’s trial and for

       approximately three years after. See cf. People v. Burrows, 172 Ill. 2d 169, 183 (1996) (the court

                                                         6
       did commit manifest error in its factual determination that “defendant made genuine, but

       unsuccessful, efforts to locate [the witness] before [defendant] was tried and convicted,” thus, the

       court considered the witness’s testimony newly discovered). The possibility that defense counsel

       might not have been able to locate Trapper in time for trial is an insufficient basis to establish her

       testimony was newly discovered. See id.; see also Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 37.

¶ 15          We reject defendant’s argument that Trapper was unavailable for her failure to come

       forward sooner due to her fear of retribution. Initially, we note that defendant’s focus for this

       contention is rooted in cases that rely on an individual’s fifth amendment right in finding that no

       amount of due diligence could have produced the evidence at trial. See cf. Edwards, 2012 IL

       111711, ¶ 38 (codefendant’s testimony was “newly discovered” because “[n]o amount of diligence

       could have forced him to violate [his fifth amendment] right if he did not choose to do so”); People

       v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984) (codefendant’s testimony was newly discovered because

       defendant could not compel them to violate their fifth amendment right); People v. Alexander,

       2014 IL App (2d) 120810, ¶ 27 (the court found that “even if defendant had discovered this

       information prior to trial, defendant could not have forced [the witness] to waive his fifth

       amendment right to avoid self-incrimination,” thus, the witnesses’ affidavit was newly discovered

       (internal quotations omitted)); see cf. People v. Parker, 2012 IL App (1st) 101809, ¶ 83 (because

       the codefendant’s affidavit included statements of self-incrimination, the evidence could not have

       been discovered sooner through due diligence). While fear of retribution may establish

       unavailability of a witness in certain circumstances, defendant failed to satisfactorily support his

       contention that such fear is sufficient here to consider Trapper’s testimony newly discovered

       evidence. See People v. Rosalez, 2021 IL App (2d) 200086, ¶ 126.

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¶ 16          Further, the legitimacy of Trapper’s fear of retribution is a credibility determination that

       is for the court as fact finder to decide. See Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51. The circuit court here

       made credibility findings that while certain aspects of Trapper’s testimony were credible, there

       were also aspects of her testimony that were not, leading it to conclude that her testimony could

       not overcome the overwhelming evidence against defendant. Based on our review of the record,

       we do not find this decision unreasonable.

¶ 17          For these reasons, Trapper’s testimony is not newly discovered. See id. Because we find

       defendant’s evidence is not newly discovered, we need not determine the remaining factors. See

       Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 47. Accordingly, the court did not commit manifest error by denying

       defendant’s successive postconviction petition.

¶ 18                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 20          Affirmed.

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