Court Opinion

ID: 9902705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:22:16.187375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:57.622749
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                   _____________________________

                        Case No. 5D23-2754
                   LT Case No. 2023-DP-000111-A
                   _____________________________

IN RE: JANE DOE,

    Appellant.
                   _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County.
John D. Galluzzo, Judge.

Joanna Tolbert, of Central Florida Legal Group, PLLC, Lake
Mary, for Appellant.

                        September 15, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Appellant, a fifteen-year-old pregnant female (“the minor”),
appeals from the circuit court’s dismissal of her petition for judicial
waiver of the statutory requirements that her legal guardian be
informed of and consent to her planned abortion. Because the
dismissal rests on a legal error rather than a factual finding, we
vacate it and remand for a new hearing.

                                  I.

     On August 29, 2023, the minor filed her petition in the
Eighteenth Judicial Circuit. That same day, the court set the
petition for a hearing and appointed counsel for her. 1

    1 Consistent with section 390.01116, Florida Statutes (2023),

and Rule 9.147(f) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, we
     The court held the hearing on August 31, 2023. The court
began by asking the minor whether she attends school, what kind
of school she attends, and when she first discovered her pregnancy.
The minor shared that she attends high school, and that she
learned she was six-weeks pregnant approximately two weeks
before the hearing, meaning that she was approximately eight-
weeks pregnant at the time of the hearing. The minor then
testified that her pregnancy had resulted from voluntary sex at a
high school party, and she has not been informed by any medical
professional that she suffers from a medical condition that would
make her pregnancy high-risk.

      At this point, the court paused its questioning of the minor,
stating, “I have a real problem. And this is nothing about you. . . .
There is a new state law that went into effect July 1st. . . . [I]t was
enacted under Florida Statute 390.011 [sic], and it prevents me
from allowing you to obtain . . . a termination of your pregnancy . .
. after six weeks.” The court then stated that under the new law, it
could authorize a waiver of parental notice and consent past six
weeks of gestational age only “if you had a medical condition that
required it because of your own health and safety, or if you were
subject to any type of incest.” The court thus announced that “I
don’t have any choice but to deny the petition,” observing that the
minor did not have any writing signed by a doctor stating that she
had a medical condition.

     The court then extended counsel’s appointment for the
purpose of appeal “so that [counsel] can try and see if you can get
this sorted out, but I’m stuck.” After learning that the minor was
fifteen years old, the court stated, “just by your age alone, I think
that you would otherwise qualify” for judicial waiver. The minor
then stated that she lives with her grandmother, they “don’t really
have a good relationship,” and “it’s not really easy to talk to her
about it.” Instead of inquiring further into the nature of the minor’s
relationship with her grandmother and the reasons for her
communication difficulties, the court asked her a few unrelated
questions about her employment, her income from that

recite only portions of the record that cannot be used to identify
the minor.

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employment, her ability to independently support the child and
live on her own with the child, and whether she has cared for a
child before.

     After the minor answered these few additional questions and
informed the court that she does not make enough money to
independently support the child and has never cared for a child
before, the court stated: “[B]ased upon your status as being cared
for by your grandmother, the difficulties in the relationship with
your grandmother, and being able to . . . carry this child and
support the child independently . . . I would have otherwise
granted the request but for the change in the statute.” 2 This appeal
then followed.

                                  II.

     The Florida Parental Notice of and Consent for Abortion Act
generally prohibits the performance or induction of abortions on
pregnant minors unless their parents or legal guardians are
notified of the abortion and have provided written informed
consent to the abortion. See § 390.01114(3), (4)(a), (5)(a), Fla. Stat.
(2023). These statutory requirements of parental notice and
consent may be waived upon a minor’s petition if a court “finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the minor is sufficiently
mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. §
390.01114(6)(c). If the court makes that finding, it must be based
on consideration of the eight factors set forth in the statute. Id. If
the court does not make the specified finding, “it must dismiss the
petition.” Id.

     Dismissals of judicial waiver petitions receive exceedingly
deferential appellate review. Under the statute, “[t]he reason for
overturning” an order that declines to grant a judicial waiver
petition “must be based on abuse of discretion by the court and
may not be based on the weight of the evidence presented to the

    2 We note that the judicial waiver statute expressly prohibits

a judge from considering “financial best interest or financial
considerations or the potential financial impact on the minor or the
minor’s family if the minor does not terminate the pregnancy.” §
390.01114(6)(d), Fla. Stat. (2023).

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circuit court since the proceeding is a nonadversarial proceeding.”
Id. § 390.01114(6)(b)2.

     Here, the circuit court correctly acknowledged that it cannot
waive the requirements of parental notice and consent where the
minor’s planned abortion would take place beyond the allowable
gestational age of the fetus. A court cannot, in other words, purport
to authorize a minor to consent to an illegal abortion. We
nonetheless are compelled to vacate the circuit court’s dismissal
here because it rests on a legal error: a failure to appreciate that
Florida’s prohibition on abortions beyond six weeks of fetal
gestational age has yet to take effect.

     Section four of Florida’s recent Heartbeat Protection Act, Ch.
2023-21, Laws of Fla., amends section 390.0111, Florida Statutes,
to generally prohibit physicians from knowingly performing or
inducing abortions where the fetus has reached a gestational age
of more than six weeks. However, section nine of the Act provides
the following about the Act’s effective date:

            Except as otherwise expressly provided in
            this act . . . this act shall take effect 30
            days after any of the following occurs: a
            decision by the Florida Supreme Court
            holding that the right to privacy enshrined
            in s. 23, Article I of the State Constitution
            does not include a right to abortion; a
            decision by the Florida Supreme Court in
            Planned Parenthood v. State, SC2022-
            1050, that allows the prohibition on
            abortions after 15 weeks in s. 390.0111(1),
            Florida Statutes, to remain in effect,
            including a decision approving, in whole or
            in part, the First District Court of Appeal’s
            decision under review or a decision
            discharging jurisdiction; an amendment to
            the State Constitution clarifying that s.
            23, Article I of the State Constitution does
            not include a right to abortion; or a
            decision from the Florida Supreme Court
            after March 7, 2023, receding, in whole or

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            in part, from In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186
            (Fla. 1989), North Fla. Women’s Health v.
            State, 866 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2003), or
            Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State,
            210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017).

Ch. 2023-21, § 9, Laws of Fla.

    None of these contingencies have yet occurred. Therefore,
under the plain text of section nine of the Act, the Act’s prohibition
on abortions past six weeks of fetal gestational age has not yet
taken effect. The circuit court abused its discretion when it held
otherwise.

                                 III.

     We now must determine the appropriate appellate remedy.
This appeal arrives in an unusual posture, as the circuit court
expressly declined to hold a full waiver hearing, did not consider
the full list of factors enumerated in section 390.01114(6)(c), and
did not make or decline to make the factual finding described in
that statute. Consequently, on this record, we are unable to
determine whether the minor is entitled to waiver of the default
statutory requirements that her legal guardian be informed of, and
give written informed consent to, the minor’s planned abortion.

     Given the under-developed record, we vacate the circuit
court’s order, remand this case for the court to hold a new and full
hearing, and direct the court to rule on the minor’s petition within
three business days after the remand. See § 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla.
Stat. (2023). Moreover, based on our review of the record, we direct
the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court to reassign the petition
forthwith to another circuit judge. The new judge’s ruling must be
based on a consideration of all the factors enumerated in section
390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes (2023), and the ruling must make
the factual finding described in that statute (whether or not, “by
clear and convincing evidence,” the minor is “sufficiently mature
to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy,” § 390.01114(6)(c)).

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    VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

LAMBERT and PRATT, JJ., concur.
PRATT, J., concurs with opinion.
HARRIS, J., concurs in part with opinion.

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                                                Case No. 5D23-2754
                                      LT Case No. 2023-DP-000111-A
PRATT, J., concurring.

     “‘Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants[.]’” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Louis Brandeis,
Other People’s Money 62 (Nat’l Home Libr. Found. ed. 1933)).
There isn’t much sunlight in Florida’s judicial waiver statute.
Every day, courts across the State authorize unemancipated
pregnant minors—those still under the care of parents or
guardians whom the law otherwise presumes to act in the minors’
best interests—to procure secret abortions that are hidden from
the very adults who superintend all their other life decisions. We
do not review these judicial waivers. The statute provides for
appellate review only of decisions not to grant waiver petitions, see
§ 390.01114(6)(b)2., Fla. Stat. (2023), and it expressly states that
“[a]n order authorizing a termination of pregnancy under this
subsection is not subject to appeal,” id. § 390.01114(6)(g). In other
words, the system is built to keep judicial waivers beyond the
sunlight of appellate review, no matter how far they might depart
from the law—which makes parental consent the rule, and judicial
waiver the exception—and no matter how far they might depart
from the facts developed at the hearing. That is, assuming there is
any meaningful hearing at all.

     This appeal offers us a very rare look into the mindset of a
court that, but for its mistaken view of the law, would allow an
unemancipated juvenile to give consent for someone with a
medical license to end the human life developing within her womb
without any input from the grandmother who is raising her. That
peek through the doorway is a disturbing one. The circuit judge
below expressly declined to hold a full waiver hearing that
examines all the factors that the judicial waiver statute directs
him to consider. He likewise declined to make the factual finding
that the statute requires before a minor’s waiver petition can be
granted. But in the very same hearing that he cut short, the judge
unequivocally stated that he “would have otherwise granted the
request but for” his mistaken reading of the Heartbeat Protection
Act, Chapter 2023-21, Laws of Florida.

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     There’s a term for this kind of statement made on the record
in open court: “prejudgment.” Or, in more common parlance, a
“rubber stamp.” There’s no other way to interpret what the circuit
judge said, and I fervently concur in the court’s decision to take the
rare step of ordering that this case be immediately reassigned
away from a judge who stated that he had already made up his
mind before he even heard the case. We have not only the authority
to order that remedy, but also the obligation to do so.

     Our drastic but necessary remedy sends a clear message:
Florida’s judicial waiver statute is not a rubber-stamp regime. If it
were, the Legislature would have left the paperwork processing to
the Department of Health, the Department of Children and
Families, or any number of other state or local agencies. But it
didn’t. Instead, the Legislature left the decision to judges, and it
required them to exercise judgment. Specifically, the statute
requires judges to await a full record, consider the full list of
statutory factors, and only then determine whether “clear and
convincing evidence” supports the factual finding upon which a
judicial waiver must be predicated. Anything less does a disservice
to the law and the minors in crisis who invoke it.

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                                                Case No. 5D23-2754
                                      LT Case No. 2023-DP-000111-A
HARRIS, J., concurring in part.

     I am in full agreement with the majority that this case should
be remanded so that the trial court can conduct a full evidentiary
hearing on the minor’s petition and make the requisite factual
findings regarding her maturity to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy. I write separately simply to address the relevance,
or lack thereof, of fetal gestational age at this stage of the
proceedings.

     The majority concludes that a trial judge cannot waive the
parental notice and consent requirements where the statutory
fetal gestational limit has been exceeded. This prohibition is read
into the statute—where it does not exist—purportedly under the
assumption that granting such a waiver would be tantamount to
authorizing consent to an illegal abortion. It does no such thing. In
granting a petition for judicial waiver, the court is merely
determining that the petitioner is “sufficiently mature to decide
whether to terminate her pregnancy.” It does not, either explicitly
or implicitly, authorize an abortion to occur, nor does it in any way
trump the health care provider’s statutory obligation to assure
that the pregnancy is one which is eligible for termination. It
merely eliminates two of the obstacles the legislature has
appropriately enacted before a minor can terminate her
pregnancy. In other words, the minor still must go to a licensed
physician who must then determine, among other things, the
gestational age of the fetus and whether the abortion can occur.

     As the majority correctly notes, in order to grant the judicial
waiver of the statutory notice and consent requirements, the trial
court is required to consider the eight factors set forth in section
390.01114(6)(c), Florida Statutes. None of these factors includes
the gestational age of the fetus. In fact, this issue is not mentioned
one time in the “Procedure for Judicial Waiver” subsection. Section
390.0111, Florida Statutes, specifically deals with fetal gestational
age. That section explicitly, and appropriately, requires a
physician to determine the gestational age of the fetus. It
mandates an ultrasound procedure to determine the probable
gestational age of the fetus, and it imposes civil and criminal

                                  9
penalties, as well as disciplinary sanctions, against a physician
who does not comply. Clearly the legislature intended that the
onus of determining appropriate fetal gestational age be placed on
the physician performing the termination procedure. Our opinion
today should not be read to in any way transfer that obligation to
the trial court judge, whose review in determining whether a
minor should be allowed to obtain an abortion without notification
or consent should be limited to a consideration of eight specific
statutory factors.

     Regardless of a minor’s “best guess” as to how far advanced
her pregnancy is, the trial judge should not be compelled to accept
her testimony, which on this issue may be over-estimated, under-
estimated, or simply wrong. Whether a petitioner is beyond the
gestational age requirement for obtaining a pregnancy
termination is something that should, and can only, be determined
by a medical professional. Accordingly, I would find that
gestational age of the fetus is an irrelevant factor for the court’s
consideration when determining whether the minor petitioner is
sufficiently mature to decide whether she can consent to an
abortion and bypass the statutory notice requirements.

       A problem with allowing or even authorizing the trial judge
at this stage of the proceedings to consider gestational age is
apparent in the majority’s opinion, which holds that the trial court
cannot waive parental notice and consent “where the minor’s
planned abortion would take place beyond the allowable
gestational age of the fetus.” The trial judge cannot know, nor
could it know, control or dictate, when a “planned abortion” would
occur. A judicial waiver does not come with an expiration date. For
example, a minor who is five weeks pregnant, eligible for judicial
waiver under any version of the statute, could obtain the judicial
waiver and then decide to wait a month, 60 days, or 90 days before
actually seeking the procedure. That is why, regardless of any
judicial waiver she may hold in her hand, the legislature properly
placed the burden of determining gestational age on the health
care providers, because it should be the day of the procedure, not
the day of the judicial waiver hearing, that controls. Requiring a
trial judge to determine, or even consider, fetal gestational age
when determining the pregnant mother’s maturity level would

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impose a gatekeeping function on the courts, which the legislature
could have, but obviously chose not to impose.

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