Court Opinion

ID: 9525515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:04:29.128016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:12.501450
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: I dissent. The petitioner filed a complaint and was entitled to a hearing. The majority opinion “assumes” that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing. Instead of a hearing, the Board of Review, without a hearing and upon some unknown basis, entered ex parte orders denying relief in two instances and lowering an assessment in the other instance. The Board then in effect said, ‘You have your decision, now do you want a hearing?” Such procedure is not in accordance with the statutory scheme, not in accordance with the case law, and not in accordance with any semblance of due process. The statutory language now applicable, being section 108 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 120, par. 589(4)), is essentially the same as the statutory language under consideration in the case of People ex rel. Ahlschlager v. Board of Review (1933), 352 Ill. 157, 185 N.E. 248. The court there stated: “These provisions of the statute imposed the duty upon the board of review to grant a hearing to each of the relators in this case upon his complaint filed with that board.” (352 Ill. 157, 168, 185 N.E. 248.) The court then made reference to two earlier cases under the Revenue Act of 1872 that reached the same conclusion. Thus, we need not “assume” that the petitioner has a right to a hearing because the right is absolute. The backward procedure here employed is neither permissible nor desirable. The petitioner was entitled to a hearing in a neutral forum and mandamus should have issued to compel such procedure and such a hearing. The fact that the Board of Review tendered an after-the-fact hearing is, in my opinion, irrelevant.