Court Opinion

ID: 9582163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:16.344292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:29.994341
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority treats this as a suit in equity brought under Code Ann. § 81 A-160 (a) to set aside a judgment alleged to be void on its face. (It is not treated as a suit under § 81A-160(e) as the complainant has failed to show fraud, etc., unmixed with negligence or fault of the complainant.) In my view the complainant cannot sue in equity because he had an adequate remedy at law. He could have raised this issue in his motion for new trial, Code Ann. § 81A-155 (a), or his motion to set aside the default, and he could have appealed an adverse ruling. By failing to utilize the available remedy at law, complainant waived, in my view, the right to raise the issue in a subsequent suit in equity and he should be estopped from doing so now.
"The appellant had an adequate remedy at law by appeal, which he failed to exercise. Thus his equitable action to declare the judgment void will not lie, as equity will not entertain jurisdiction where there is an adequate and complete remedy at law.” Burch v. Williams, 226 Ga. 10, 12-13 (172 SE2d 417) (1970).
One difficulty with the majority decision is that the plaintiff in the original suit presumably was entitled to attorney fees if awarded by a jury. If the original defendant, the complainant here, had raised this issue by motion and on appeal, the absence of a jury award could have been cured by the grant of a new trial and the plaintiff could have received any jury award due her. By foregoing the right of appeal and by utilizing the separate *713complaint in equity, the original defendant may have precluded the original plaintiff from obtaining an award of attorney fees. Hence I would add laches to my reasons for denying this equitable relief.
As was said in Hite v. Waldrop, 230 Ga. 684, 685 (198 SE2d 665) (1973): "There must be an end to litigation. It is futile for the courts to decide issues if those same issues may be relitigated by the losing parties, contending that error was committed in the previous decisions.” While usually lamenting lack of finality of litigation, the majority in this case has contributed to the problem, in my view, rather than solving it. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Undercofler and Justice Marshall join in this dissent.