Court Opinion

ID: 9514731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:24.684172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.429181
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 34.] I would affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant in this case based upon the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Initially, I agree with the Court’s determination that the affidavit in support of the search warrant in this case was deficient because it failed to show a basis for West’s belief in the informant’s reliability or corroboration of the informant’s information by personal observation or other research. The key language in the affidavit referring to the informant simply states: “[t]he information was received from a reporting party who wished to remain anonymous.” While after the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the rigid, two-pronged, basis of knowledge/reliability test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), for determining probable cause is no longer the law, some facts bearing on the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge must be provided to the magistrate issuing the warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 76 L.Ed.2d at 543.
[¶ 35.] No information was provided as to whether the confidential informant was a citizen informer, or a paid or voluntary informant working with law enforcement. Nor did the affidavit state whether the informant had supplied law enforcement with information concerning illegal activity in the past. Finally, the magistrate was not aware that the confidential informant had obtained his information about Martinez through another individual, who also wished to remain anonymous. Thus, without this background, the magistrate could not possibly have known how the informant obtained his information or determined the credibility of the information. People v. Kershaw, 147 Cal.App.3d 750, 195 Cal.Rptr. 311, 315 (1983) (citing People v. Reagan, 128 Cal.App.3d 92, 180 Cal.Rptr. 85 (1982)). I therefore agree with the Court’s conclusion that there was an absence of probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant in question.5
[¶ 36.] Despite these deficiencies, however, the officers in this case acted “in objective good faith” in relying upon the search warrant signed by the magistrate. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 689 (1984). The appropriate test of an officer’s good faith is “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 977 (6th Cir.2000) (Gilman, J., concurring) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 n. 23, 82, L.Ed.2d at 698 n. 23). I cannot conclude that the affidavit at issue was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 699) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir.1985) (stating “[cjourts cannot make the good faith of an officer turn upon whether his reliance on a warrant was misplaced. It is only when the reliance was wholly unwarranted that good faith is absent.”).
*644[¶ 37.] While the affidavit fails to meet the probable cause test, it hardly sinks to the level of a “a bare-bones” affidavit. Rather, like the affidavit in State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825 (S.D.1988), it was invalidated because of inadequate information provided about the background of the informant. In Saiz we upheld the validity of the search under the good-faith Leon standard despite the invalidity of the warrant.6
[¶ 38.] Herein the facts detailed in the affidavit were very particular in describing what vehicle Martinez was thought to be driving, who he was travelling with, where the individuals were travelling from, when they would be arriving at their destination, and what illegal substance was being transported by them. The affidavit stated that the confidential informant had informed Deputy Sheriff Cudmore that Martinez was driving a white Mercury Cougar *645with California license plates. It also provided the exact time Martinez had left California — 11:00 a.m. on April 1, 1999, and that he was travelling to Red Scaffold, South Dakota. The affidavit also provided that Martinez was travelling with two Mexican males and that he was transporting a large quantity of marijuana. Finally, the affidavit included information that Martinez’s movements were going to be tracked, as according to the informant Martinez was expected to obtain a motel room at the Branding Iron Motel in Faith, South Dakota, or the Super 8 Motel in Eagle Butte, South Dakota. This is at least as much or even more detail than the facts provided to the magistrate in Saiz. The officers in this case acted in good faith in relying upon the anticipatory search warrant issued by the magistrate in conducting the search of the white Mercury Cougar.
[¶39.] Testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that the law enforcement officers involved in this case were familiar with the confidential informant providing the information about Martinez. While such evidence is not admissible to salvage the deficient warrant affidavit (State v. Smith, 281 N.W.2d 430, 433 (S.D.1979)), it shows that the officers were not attempting to mislead the issuing magistrate or withhold information which would lead an objectively reasonable officer to conclude the warrant was improperly obtained. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d at 828. Cudmore and other officers had used the confidential informant that provided the information from the other anonymous citizen informant between four or five times. Cudmore testified that the informant had never been paid in any way for the information he offered to law enforcement.
[¶ 40.] Cudmore also testified that based upon his own knowledge, the informant was able to provide sufficient and credible information concerning Martinez, and that Sheriff Menzel and Trooper Severyn also believed the information was “very credible.” Cudmore testified that on “four or five different occasions” he was able to make arrests based upon tips that had been given by the confidential informant utilized in this case. In addition, Cudmore testified that the confidential informant had indicated to him that the information was provided by a “reliable” third party, and that the third party had knowledge that Martinez had possibly “brought back different loads of marijuana in the past.”
[¶ 41.] Agent West spoke with Sheriff Menzel and was advised that Menzel was “familiar with the informant.” West testified that: “I believe he informed me that the information he was receiving from the informant was going to be credible.” Finally, Menzel informed West that he had confiscated drug paraphernalia from Martinez in the past.
[¶ 42.] In an absence of the informant’s ability to provide precise details concerning Martinez, Belmontes and Valenzuela and track their whereabouts from California to South Dakota, the exclusionary rule might apply. However, under the facts of this case, it appears to me that the officers possessed a sufficient amount of details to reasonably believe in good faith that the informant’s information included in the affidavit was true and accurate. In addition, some of the officers had previously worked with the confidential citizen informant involved in this case.7
*646[¶ 43.] The plurality contends that if the state’s argument were adopted, “an officer could submit an inadequate affidavit to a magistrate, which the officer knows is inadequate, and then willy-nilly go out and conduct the search because he has a “good faith” shield against any subsequent challenge.” I find this contention to be without merit. Such acts clearly did not happen here. The Supreme Court emphasized in Leon that “the standard of reasonableness ... is an objective one.” 468 U.S. at 919 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. at 3419 n. 20, 82 L.Ed.2d at 696 n. 20 (emphasis added). “Thus, the determination of whether the good faith exception applies in a particular case does not depend on the subjective beliefs of the officers involved.” Allen, 211 F.3d at 978 (Gilman, J. concurring in result) (citing United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1035 n. 3 (5th Cir.1985) (“Because the Leon standard is objective, the testimony of the agent who prepared the affidavit ... is not particularly relevant.”); United States v. Gant, 759 F.2d 484, 487-88 (5th Cir.1985) (“[T]he determination of good faith will ordinarily depend on an examination of the affidavit by the reviewing court.”)).
[¶ 44.] What did happen here is that the request for a search warrant and supporting affidavit were presented to a law trained magistrate judge who possessed a legal education and many subsequent years of judicial service. In essence, the new standard of this Court requires that a law enforcement officer such as a sheriffs deputy possess a more sophisticated understanding of this area of the law than is required of a judge who has the authority to issue the warrant to begin with. Rather than promote the use of warrants which has always been the preference of the law, this rationale as applied to the facts of this case invites abandonment of applications for a search warrant by law enforcement in the more promising hope that a warrant exception may come to the officer’s rescue. This avoids the risk that a reviewing judge or appellate court may disagree with the initial judicial determination of probable cause and then go on to hold the officer could have not been acting in good faith, as with the benefit of studied hindsight, a bare plurality of this Court today holds “a judicial mind in view of the law and the circumstances could [not] have reached the same conclusion.” Barber, 1996 SD 96 at ¶ 14, 552 N.W.2d at 820.
[¶ 45.] For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that even though the affidavit in this case did not provide enough detail about the confidential informant or any corroboration of the information by the officers involved, it was sufficient to fit within the good faith exception of Leon. Thus, I would affirm the denial of Belmontes’ motion to suppress.
[¶ 46.] MILLER, Chief Justice, joins this dissent.

. Although the State spends a substantial portion of its brief arguing that probable cause did exist, in State v. Saiz, 427 N.W.2d 825, 826 (S.D.1988) the failure of the State to file a notice of review on the issue of probable cause, which it lost at the trial court level, rendered the issue moot on appeal to this Court. As the State did not file a notice of review on the issue of probable cause in this case, Saiz controls on that issue.

. The trial court, which refused to suppress the search in this case, was also the trial court in Saiz■ A review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein shows that the trial court determined it to be the same type of case and even cited to Saiz for authority upon which to base its decision. Today the Court in ruling contrary to Saiz fails to overrule it or even to adequately distinguish it from the facts of this case. In both the present case and Saiz, the invalidity was based on the lack of probable cause contained in the warrant affidavit. "The Supreme Court, however, has determined that evidence is admissible when police officers reasonably rely on a warrant that is subsequently invalidated because a judge finds there was an insufficient basis for the issuing magistrate to find probable cause.” Saiz, 427 N.W.2d at 828. In both cases the "error” of the issuing magistrate was a reliance upon an affidavit that was subsequently found by the trial court to lack probable cause. Moreover, in Leon, the police "misconduct” was again the same, an affidavit lacking in probable cause. 468 U.S. at 903 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. at 3410 n. 2, 82 L.Ed.2d at 685 n. 2. This police "error” of an insufficient affidavit ultimately becomes the responsibility of the neutral magistrate:
In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter. It is the magistrate’s responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. ”[0]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.” Penalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
Id. at 920-21, 104 S.Ct. at 3419, 82 L.Ed.2d at 697 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, in both Leon and Saiz the validity of the search was upheld based on the good-faith standard despite the underlying inadequate warrant affidavit.
The rationale of the plurality is even more questionable given the standard of review of this Court is "abuse of discretion.” The plurality merely concludes that "[w]e disagree with the trial court’s application of the good faith exception.” However, to rise to the level of an abuse of discretion, which is the applicable standard of review, the question is “not whether we would make a similar ruling, but rather whether a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could have reasonably reached the same conclusion.” State v. Barber, 1996 SD 96 ¶ 14, 552 N.W.2d 817, 820. Without so acknowledging, the plurality today is simply adopting the rationale of the dissent in Saiz without stating how this Court erred in that case or how the trial court in the case before us abused its discretion.
The concurrence in result overrules the determination of the trial court based on a de novo standard of review. While other jurisdictions may apply this standard, we have adhered to an abuse of discretion standard of review. State v. Vento, 1999 SD 158 ¶ 5, 604 N.W.2d 468, 469 (citing State v. Anderson, 1996 SD 59 ¶ 8, 548 N.W.2d 40, 42 (citing State v. Ramirez, 535 N.W.2d 847, 848 (S.D.1995); State v. Smith, 477 N.W.2d 27, 31 (S.D.1991); State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 630 (S.D.1991). Moreover, Belmontes does not raise the standard of review as an issue to this Court in his brief. We have repeatedly said that we will not gratuitously decide issues not raised on appeal to this Court. If we are to abandon the abuse of discretion standard of review in favor of a de novo standard, it should be raised at the trial court with an appropriate record developed and then appealed and briefed to this Court. As a matter of fundamental fairness, all parties should be appraised that this is a contested issue and be allowed to argue the merits of such a substantial change in our jurisprudence before it occurs.

. Although not determinative because the events occurred after the issuance of the warrant, the events that unfolded between the time of the issuance and the warrant's execution would not have caused an objectively reasonable officer to question the accuracy of the information contained in the affidavit. The officers had been given detailed information on the course in which Martinez was travelling from California to South Dakota, and the informant repeatedly updated them on the whereabouts of Martinez, Belmontes and Valenzuela. Law enforcement were informed that Martinez and the others had to make a travel stop in Wendover, Nevada, and in Rollins, Wyoming, due to inclement weather, which would delay their arrival in South Dakota. Also, the informant was able to pro*646vide the precise location of where the vehicle had broken down, and finally informed law enforcement that Martinez had arrived during the night of April 3.
The informant was able to relate to the officers that Carmen Collins, Martinez’s mother, had picked the men up to take them to Faith in order to have two flat tires fixed. Notably, just as predicted by the informant, Severyn located Collins' vehicle approximately four miles south of Faith. See People v. Sousa, 18 Cal.App.4th 549, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 264, 273 (1993), where the court held that the events that unfolded between the time of the issuance of the anticipatory warrant and its execution and were consistent with the claims of the informant, could be used to corroborate the otherwise uncorroborated information in the affidavit provided by an informant.