Court Opinion

ID: 9956488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 14:09:18.815311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:33.836311
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0365-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AKMAL A. ALVARANGA,
a/k/a AKMAL K. RUSSELL,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Argued March 12, 2024 – Decided April 2, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright, Paganelli and Whipple.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 18-06-
                   0372.

                   Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel
                   and on the brief).

                   Steven K. Cuttonaro, Deputy Attorney General,
                   argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin,
                   Attorney General, attorney; Steven K. Cuttonaro, of
                   counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Akmal Alvaranga appeals from his September 27, 2022

judgment of conviction after a jury trial for the murder of Danny Diaz-

Delgado. We affirm.

      On March 23, 2018, Diaz-Delgado wanted to buy a video game console

in anticipation of his younger brother's birthday. He answered a Facebook

Marketplace ad offering a PlayStation for sale and arranged to meet the seller

at a location in East Trenton. Instead of buying the PlayStation, Diaz-Delgado

was robbed of $240, kidnapped, bound with tape, and locked in a garage with

defendant, while co-offender Rufus Thompson used Diaz-Delgado's ATM card

to withdraw another $740. Defendant stayed with Diaz-Delgado alone in the

garage.

      Accounts differ as to when Thompson returned to the garage and what

happened then, but Diaz-Delgado was eventually loaded—bound and gagged—

into the back of a car and driven to a wooded area in Hamilton. There, he was

led from the car and walked to the edge of a creek, where he was shot nine

times from behind. Later, Thompson and defendant moved Diaz-Delgado's car

to a nearby alleyway. The body and the car were located by law enforcement

within two days.

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      Following an intensive investigation, police arrested Thompson and

seized his cell phones, which were later forensically analyzed. Information

gleaned from Thompson's phones, in combination with other results of the

ongoing investigation, led police to arrest defendant.             Defendant was

interviewed by Detectives Castaldo and Diaz of the Mercer County

Prosecutor's Office, who presented him with the Uniform Complaint Arrest

Warrant Notification form and the Uniform Rights form. Defendant answered

the detectives' questions and detailed his involvement with the case.

      Defendant and Thompson were charged with first-degree murder,

N.J.S.A.    2C:11-3(a)(1),   (2);     first-degree     felony   murder,    N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; first-degree kidnapping,

N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1), (2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an

unlawful   purpose,   N.J.S.A.      2C:39-4(a);      and   second-degree   unlawful

possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Thompson pled guilty to the

murder charge and was sentenced to forty-five-years in prison. Defendant

proceeded to trial.

      Defendant moved to suppress his statement, asserting Detectives

Castaldo and Diaz ignored his assertion of his right to silence. A hearing was

held before Judge Robert C. Billmeier, who denied the motion, issuing a

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thorough written opinion and order on November 8, 2018. Judge Billmeier

found defendant waived his Miranda 1 rights and did not invoke his right to

remain silent.

       Just before trial, Judge Darlene J. Pereksta granted defendant's motion

for reconsideration of his motion to suppress and conducted a hearing.

Defendant argued he lacked the capacity to knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. One expert each testified for defendant

and the State.    Judge Pereksta denied defendant's motion to suppress his

statement.

       A jury trial began before Judge Pereksta a few days later. The jury

heard testimony from various officers involved in the investigation, a friend

and family members of the victim, and Rufus Thompson. On June 16, 2022,

the jury convicted defendant on all charges.        Defendant was given a life

sentence on the murder charge, with other sentences to run concurrently. This

appeal timely followed.

       Defendant raises the following issues on appeal, which we record here

verbatim:

             I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
             DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
                                                                        A-0365-22
                                      4
            STATEMENT BECAUSE HE: 1) INVOKED HIS
            RIGHT TO SILENCE WHEN HE SAID HE DID
            NOT WANT TO TALK ANYMORE AND
            DEMANDED THAT HE BE BROUGHT TO JAIL;
            AND 2) LACKED THE CAPACITY TO MAKE A
            KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND VOLUNTARY
            WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT.

                  A. Defendant Invoked His [] Right to
                  Silence When He Said That He Did Not
                  Want to Talk Anymore and Demanded
                  That He Be Brought to Jail.

                  B. Defendant Lacked the Capacity To
                  Make a Knowing, Intelligent, and
                  Voluntary Waiver of His Right to Remain
                  Silent.

            II. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO
            DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
            TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO TAILOR THE
            DURESS JURY INSTRUCTION TO ACCOUNT
            FOR DEFENDANT'S UNIQUE LIMITATIONS.

            III. GIVEN DEFENDANT'S LIMITED ROLE IN
            THE    CRIME,  HIS  MANIPULATION   BY
            THOMPSON, AND HIS UNIQUE PHYSICAL AND
            MENTAL LIMITATIONS, THE LIFE SENTENCE
            SHOULD BE REDUCED TO A THIRTY-YEAR
            TERM.

      We review a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Sims, 250 N.J. 189, 218 (2022). Trial judges are entrusted

with "'a wide latitude of judgment,' and, therefore, the trial court's evidentiary

ruling 'will not be upset unless . . . there has been a clear error of judgment.'"

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                                       5
Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 313

(1988)). Similarly, "a trial court's factual findings in support of granting or

denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings are

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. S.S., 229

N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)).

      "When faced with a trial court's admission of police-obtained statements,

an appellate court should engage in a searching and critical review of the

record to ensure protection of a defendant's constitutional rights."    State v.

L.H., 239 N.J. 22, 47 (2019) (quoting State v. Hreha, 217 N.J. 368, 381-82

(2014)). A reviewing court will also generally "defer to a trial court's factual

findings concerning the voluntariness of a confession that are based on

sufficient credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (citing State v. Elders, 192

N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). Legal questions are reviewed de novo. Ibid.

      As with other credibility determinations, we defer to a trial court's

assessment of the weight given to expert testimony, considering it for an abuse

of discretion. State in the Int. of M.P., 476 N.J. Super. 242, 288-89 (App. Div.

2023); see also State v. Yohnnson, 204 N.J. 43, 62 (2010).

      We review jury instructions de novo, as jury instructions outline the law

that jurors are to apply during deliberations on a case, and a claim of an error

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                                      6
in such instructions is a claim of legal error. See Restaurant Enters. v. Sussex

Mut. Ins. Co., 96 N.J. Super 26, 32 (App. Div. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,

52 N.J. 73 (1968) (finding jury instructions erroneous as a matter of law).

      We will generally refuse to consider an issue not raised and addressed at

the trial court level unless it is jurisdictional or "substantially implicate[s]

public interest." State v. Walker, 385 N.J. Super 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006)

(citing Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). We may

consider an issue not raised to the trial court "if it meets the plain error

standard or is otherwise of special significance to the litigant, to the public, or

to achieving substantial justice, and the record is sufficiently complete to

permit its adjudication." Ibid.

      Our review of a sentence imposed by a trial court "is relatively narrow

and is governed by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Blackmon, 202

N.J. 283, 297 (2010).

                                        I.

      Defendant argues both motion judges erred in denying his motions to

suppress portions of his statement to police—first, based on a purported

attempt to invoke his right to remain silent and, second, on an inability to

voluntarily waive that right. We address each in turn.

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                                        7
      "The right against self-incrimination[, encompassing the right to remain

silent and the threshold required to waive that right, is] guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and this [S]tate's common law,

now embodied in statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-19, and evidence rule, N.J.R.E.

503." S.S., 229 N.J. at 381-82 (quoting State v. Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383, 399

(2009)).   Our courts apply a "totality of the circumstances" analysis in

considering whether a defendant's statement was "the product of an essentially

free and unconstrained choice" or "the defendant's will [was] [instead]

overborne and [their] capacity for self-determination critically impaired."

State v. Dorff, 468 N.J. Super. 633, 644 (App. Div. 2021) (first alteration in

original) (quoting State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 113 (1997)). The State bears the

burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstance." State v.

A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313

(2000)).

      Under New Jersey common law, contrary to the Federal practice,

defendants need not be clear and unambiguous when invoking their right to

remain silent. Compare Berghuis v. Thompson, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010)

("[A]n accused who wants to invoke [their] right to remain silent [is required]

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                                       8
to do so unambiguously.") with S.S., 229 N.J. at 382 ("[A] request, however

ambiguous, to terminate questioning . . . must be diligently honored.")

(alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bey (Bey II), 112 N.J. 123, 142

(1988)). Once a defendant in New Jersey indicates, even ambiguously, they

want to invoke their right to remain silent, the interrogator is required to cease

questioning immediately and—if the invocation was ambiguous—"inquire of

the suspect as to the correct interpretation." S.S., 229 N.J. at 382-83 (quoting

State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283 (1990)).

      Defendant argues during his custodial interview with Detectives

Castaldo and Diaz on April 13, 2018, he not only demanded to be taken to jail,

but also explicitly stated he no longer wanted to speak to them. Defendant

asserts: both declarations sufficiently expressed his desire to cease answering

questions as to effectively invoke his right to remain silent, the investigators'

subsequent questions violated his right to remain silent, and the portion of the

statement following the purported invocation of this right should have been

suppressed.

      Defendant asserts his statement—"Mother fucker take me to jail now.

That's where I'm going anyway. Lock me up, just throw away the key, man.

Life, fuck it,"—demonstrated his desire to end the interview. But detectives

                                                                           A-0365-22
                                       9
were not in the room when defendant made that declaration.             We cannot

conclude it was an effective invocation of his right to remain silent, as the

record does not demonstrate whether the police officers heard it and, if so,

when they heard it.

      Shortly after the detectives re-entered the interrogation room, however,

the following exchange occurred:

            DEFENDANT: I know I ain't the smartest person in
            the world. I know I ain't dumb, neither.

            DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Okay.

            DEFENDANT: Oh, man, I just want to get this done
            over with. I don't even want to talk about it no more. 2

            DETECTIVE CASTALDO: You don't want to talk to
            me anymore, or are you just—

            DEFENDANT: No, I don't—

            DETECTIVE CASTALDO: I don't understand what
            you're saying.

            DEFENDANT: I've got to deal with him.

            DETECTIVE CASTALDO: With who?

            DEFENDANT: Even if I don't see him or I see him, I
            still got to deal with him.

2
  Though various transcripts of the interview recorded the second sentence of
this declaration as "I don't even want to talk about nothing," Judge Billmeier
found defendant had actually said the sentence reported above.
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                                     10
DETECTIVE CASTALDO: You got to deal with
who? Who are you talking about?

DEFENDANT: Rufus. I still got to deal with him.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Okay.

DEFENDANT: Either one way or another.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Okay.

DEFENDANT: It's not about trial, whatever. It's not
like that. It just came down—

      ....

DETECTIVE CASTALDO:                Well, you       said
something, you don't even want to talk about it.

DEFENDANT: I got to—

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Do you still want to—

DEFENDANT: I got to make a decision.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: But do you still want to
talk to us?

DEFENDANT: I still got to make a decision of— I
know it's the right thing to do. I'm just saying that
that's where— I'm trying to think of my head, if he
going to do life or he gonna do a couple years. That's
what I'm waiting on.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO:            Okay.   You're talking
about Rufus?

DEFENDANT: Yeah.

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                        11
DETECTIVE CASTALDO:              Why— why are you
worried about—

DEFENDANT: I'm just—

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: —what he's going to do?

DEFENDANT: No, because, it's even to— you know
what I mean, like, out there in Trenton, it's either to be
killed or be killed. The society is messed up, and
that's how that was before.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: So, are you afraid if he
gets out, he's going to hurt you or your family? Is that
what you're saying?

DEFENDANT: I'll be happy if he's dead.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO:               Why would you be
happy?

DEFENDANT: Because at the same time, I don't have
no worries.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Okay. Do you want to
tell me your side of the story anymore or—

DEFENDANT: I feel like— I feel like I did got set
up.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: Okay. Tell me how.

DEFENDANT: I know I'm coming back.

DETECTIVE CASTALDO: How do you feel like you
got set up? Talk to me about that.

                                                             A-0365-22
                          12
            DEFENDANT: I'm gonna just tell you the truth,
            because the same way as my mind already set up, even
            if you all put me in there with him or you all don't,
            whatever.

      Defendant asserts his statement, "I don't even want to talk about it no

more," was a clear and unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent,

and the court erred finding that statement was ambiguous and not clear.

      In his November 8, 2018 opinion, Judge Billmeier disagreed, finding

"the attendant circumstances . . . warrant a finding . . . defendant's statement

was ambiguous."      The judge examined proximal statements as well as

defendant's tone and manner when he made the statement, while at the same

time acknowledging "S.S.'s admonition to avoid valuing considerations such as

tone and posture at the expense of the actual words used," (citing 229 N.J. at

385). Judge Billmeier found this case was a "rare one in which . . . defendant's

conduct confutes the superficial meaning of his words."          After finding

defendant's statement ambiguous, the judge determined the investigators

responded appropriately with questions narrowly directed at determining

whether defendant was willing to continue with questioning and showed

considerable forbearance throughout the relevant portion of the interview.

According to the judge, defendant also made clear he was not invoking his

Miranda rights when he expressed his decision to tell the investigators the

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                                     13
truth.    Based on a "'searching and critical' review of the record to ensure

protection of a defendant's constitutional rights," L.H., 239 N.J. at 47 (quoting

Hreha, 217 N.J. at 381-82), Judge Billmeier ruled defendant did not invoke his

right to remain silent. Having undertaken the same critical review here, we

discern no abuse of discretion.

         Defendant's second argument challenges Judge Peretska's ruling

rejecting the arguments that physical and mental handicaps prevented

defendant from making a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his

Miranda rights.     Defendant contends the trial court erred by crediting the

State's expert, Dr. Loius Schlesinger, over defendant's expert, Dr. Daniel

Cooke. Based on our review, we discern no abuse of the judge's discretion in

doing so.

         In crediting Dr. Schlesinger over Dr. Cooke, the trial judge found Dr.

Cooke's explanation of defendant's poor test performance and observations of

defendant's demeanor during the evaluation implausible and naïve in failing to

consider whether defendant was malingering. The trial judge also found Dr.

Cooke's explanations of the standard by which to assess competency for

purposes of Miranda was not supported by the case law, (citing State v.

Carpenter, 268 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div. 1993)).

                                                                          A-0365-22
                                      14
      The court credited the opinion of Dr. Schlesinger, who examined

defendant on two separate occasions—for over five hours total—and

administered numerous tests, assessing defendant's IQ, personal history, and

adaptive functioning—or ability to function in the world. In response to the

State's question "whether or not there was an intellectual disability that . . .

would somehow impede [defendant's] ability to waive Miranda," Dr.

Schlesinger testified, "No, there[ is] no basis to conclude he[ is] intellectually

disabled. He has what[ is] called borderline intellectual functioning." Dr.

Schlesinger reported defendant "seemed to display a concerted effort to look

confused and intellectually limited, particularly when discussing anything that

had to do with homicide or court/legal process." Dr. Schlesinger concluded

defendant was "intentionally trying to do poorly" on the tests, and he was,

instead, "functioning[] and . . . ha[d] a good grasp of important legal concepts,

. . . [potentially] more than the average person." He opined defendant was

competent to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda

rights.

      On the other hand, Dr. Cooke asserted defendant displayed no such

competence. Dr. Cooke spent about "two and a half to three hours" taking a

history, administering tests, and interviewing defendant and concluded

                                                                           A-0365-22
                                      15
defendant had a "mild intellectual disability."     Dr. Cooke never assessed

defendant's adaptive functioning, because it "would have nothing to do with

his ability to make a knowing, intelligent[,] or voluntary waiver of Miranda."

He opined, defendant "does not understand th[e] basic right [to remain silent]

and could not exercise that right."       Dr. Cooke also decided defendant's

apparent "lack of effort [in completing a test] is because of feeling pressured,

because of getting frustrated when he reaches the limits of his ability, not

wanting to say something that[ is] wrong, his tremendous distractibility," and

not due to malingering.

      Given   the   deferential   standard   of   review   afforded   credibility

determinations, we conclude there is sufficient credible evidence in the record

to support the trial judge's crediting of Dr. Schlesinger over Dr. Cooke and

finding defendant "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived his

Miranda rights; we discern no abuse of the court's discretion.

                                       II.

      Defendant argues for the first time on appeal the trial judge should have

sua sponte tailored the jury instruction on duress so jurors could consider

defendant's particular susceptibility to Thompson's violent threats, and the

court's failure to do so denied his rights to due process and a fair trial. He

                                                                          A-0365-22
                                     16
argues this failure was clearly capable of producing an unjust result. The court

instructed the jury with a charge that closely followed the Model Charge on

duress. Because defendant did not object to the charge, we do not "consider

questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J.

1, 20 (2009) (quoting Nieder, 62 N.J. at 234).

        Even reviewing for plain error, however, "clearly capable of producing

an unjust result," State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389 (2020) (quoting R. 2:10-2),

we reject this argument. Minimal evidence was advanced during the trial to

support the need to specially tailor the duress charge.

                                       III.

        Finally, defendant asks us to remand his conviction for resentencing

because the trial judge should have accounted for his "limited role in the

crime, his manipulation by Thompson, and his unique physical and mental

limitations" when imposing a sentence following his conviction. Defendant

contends the trial court should have found mitigating factors two, three, and

four:

             (2) The defendant did not contemplate that the
             defendant's conduct would cause or threaten serious
             harm;

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                                      17
            (3) The defendant acted under a strong provocation;

            (4) There were substantial grounds tending to excuse
            or justify the defendant's conduct, though failing to
            establish a defense.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2) to (4).]

      Defendant did not directly argue for any specific mitigating factors

during the sentencing hearing on September 7, 2022. Counsel, however, did

remind the court of the expert testimony presented at the pre-trial hearing

regarding impairments and asserted Thompson not only preyed on Danny

Diaz-Delgado, but he also preyed on defendant.

      Here, the trial judge's sentencing conformed with the appropriate

guidelines and addressed aggravating factors upon which all parties agreed:

factors three, six, and nine. The trial judge then rejected defendant's assertions

his limitations made him particularly susceptible to Thompson's influence and

found the aggravating factors clearly substantially outweigh the non-existent

mitigating factors. The judge's findings of aggravating and mitigating factors

are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record, and the sentence

imposed is not so unreasonable as to shock the judicial conscience.

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                                      18
      To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments,

we are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion

in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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