Court Opinion

ID: 9781414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:36:58.111643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.264123
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, C. J.,
J., Concurring and Dissenting.—I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in proceeding with the trial in this matter while an appeal from the denial of defendant’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion (Code of Civ. Proc., § 425.16) still was pending in the Court of Appeal, but I believe the error should be found harmless and thus, unlike the majority, I would affirm the judgment.
There can be little question but that, under the circumstances of this case, a reversal of the trial court’s judgment and a remand for a new trial would serve no legitimate purpose. The trial court’s error—going forward with the trial while its pretrial ruling on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion still was on appeal—did not affect the actual trial of the case, the jury’s verdict, or the content of the judgment in any respect whatsoever. All that will be accomplished by a reversal is the wasting of considerable time, effort, and resources.
The California Constitution provides that “[n]o judgment shall be set aside ... in any cause ... for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) By statute, trial court error provides a ground for reversal only if it affects “the substantial rights of the *202parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) No judgment may be reversed on the basis of an error or defect in the proceedings unless “a different result would have been probable if such error ... or defect had not occurred or existed.” (Ibid.) In the present case, it is undisputed that the error complained of—the failure of both the trial court and the Court of Appeal to stay proceedings pending appeal of the denial of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion—did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
Cases cited in the majority opinion contain language indicating that a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pending an appeal, but most of these cases were decided in the procedural context of a petition that sought an extraordinary writ to prohibit the trial court from conducting further proceedings pending an appeal. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 196-197 & fn. 9.) But, as this court has observed, the term “jurisdiction,” which is used in a variety of situations, “has so many different meanings that no single statement can be entirely satisfactory as a definition.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 287 [109 P.2d 942].) Most of the cases relied upon by the majority employ the language of fundamental jurisdiction but were decided in a context that did not require reference to jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, as opposed to jurisdiction in the broader sense used in the context of writ proceedings.
There have been a few cases, procedurally analogous to the present one, in which a judgment after trial was reversed because a prior appeal was pending at the time of trial, based on the theory that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction pending the appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Sonoqui (1934) 1 Cal.2d 364 [35 P.2d 123] [after the defendants’ motion for a new trial was granted, the defendants were retried and convicted while the People’s appeal of the decision on the new trial motion was still pending; convictions reversed]; People v. Owens (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 831 [164 P.2d 28] [pending the People’s appeal from the trial court’s postconviction order granting the defendant’s motion for an arrested judgment, the defendant was tried on new information; convictions reversed]; Rosenberg v. Bullard (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 118 [37 P.2d 521] [pending the plaintiff’s appeal from order granting the defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment, case was tried and judgment was entered for the plaintiff; judgment reversed].) These cases applied the principle that the trial court lacked jurisdiction pending the appeal, but did not address the question of whether reversal of such a judgment after trial in this context was in fact consistent with the California Constitution’s provision prohibiting reversal absent a miscarriage of justice. In each of these cases, a criminal conviction or civil judgment was reversed even though there clearly was no miscarriage of justice—the trial in each case was not affected in any way by the trial court’s error in going forward during the pendency of the appeal. Indeed, in these cases, it was not the party who took the pretrial appeal who benefited from the characterization of the trial court proceedings *203as lacking in subject matter jurisdiction. Under these authorities, if defendants rather than plaintiffs had prevailed after trial in the present case, plaintiffs would be entitled to reversal of the judgment on the theory that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter it, even though it would be obvious that plaintiffs had suffered no harm. In short, I see no justification for the anomalous results reached in these few cases and would overrule or disapprove them.
In other contexts, this court has not hesitated to overrule or disapprove earlier California decisions that applied a rule of automatic reversal without giving due consideration to the California Constitution’s requirement that no judgment be set aside absent a miscarriage of justice. (See, e.g., People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 101 P.3d 994] [trial court’s failure to rule on a motion for new trial is subject to harmless error analysis], overruling People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7 [161 P.2d 934]; Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298] [no category of instructional error in civil cases requires automatic reversal], overruling and disapproving contrary implications in prior decisions; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509-510, fn. 17 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037] [holding that the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless error analysis under the California Constitution], overruling a line of inconsistent cases.)
We faced an issue analogous to the one presented here, in the context of the previously well-settled rule that denial of a substantial right at the preliminary hearing in a criminal case rendered the ensuing commitment illegal and entitled the defendant to have the information set aside on timely motion. (See, e.g., People v. Napthaly (1895) 105 Cal. 641, 644-645 [39 P. 29].) The defendant may seek writ relief to compel the setting aside of an information before trial on the ground that, because of substantial error at the preliminary hearing, his or her commitment for trial was illegal. (See, e.g., Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 880-881 [59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304].) Applying reasoning very similar to that embraced in the majority opinion in the present case, we held in People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498 [6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225] that the denial of a substantial right at the preliminary hearing required reversal of a subsequent conviction without a showing of prejudice. The theory behind this automatic reversal rule was that “where the accused is not legally committed within the meaning of section 995 of the Penal Code, the commitment is voidable. Upon proper objection, the superior court has no jurisdiction to proceed.” (Id. at p. 503, italics added; see Greenberg v. Superior Court (1942) 19 Cal.2d 319 [121 P.2d 713].)
*204Subsequently, however, this court reconsidered and rejected the per se reversal rule that had been adopted in People v. Elliot. (People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 528-530 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) We explained in Pompa-Ortiz that the “source of the difficulty in Elliot is the uncritical use of the term ‘jurisdiction’ when assessing the effect of an illegal commitment on the trial in superior court.” (Id. at p. 528.) “The presence of a jurisdictional defect which would entitle a defendant to a writ of prohibition prior to trial does not necessarily deprive a trial court of the legal power to try the case if prohibition is not sought.” (Id. at p. 529.) We concluded that irregularities in preliminary hearing procedures that are not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense must be reviewed, after trial, under the appropriate standard of prejudicial error. Although the holding in Pompa-Ortiz is not directly applicable here, that decision demonstrates that we should not uncritically apply jurisdictional language from writ cases when considering whether an error requires reversal on appeal from a final judgment.
We have acknowledged that an exception may be made to the general rule that an error does not require reversal absent a showing of prejudice when the error involves a structural defect in the conduct of the proceedings that results in an unfair trial or “defies evaluation for harmlessness.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 579; see People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 501.) Although an actual absence of jurisdiction in the fundamental sense would be the type of fundamental defect that constitutes a miscarriage of justice and requires reversal, the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction pending an appeal of a pretrial order is not comparable to the type of jurisdictional problem that is properly characterized as an absence of jurisdiction in its fundamental sense. In Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at page 289, we described lack of jurisdiction “in its most fundamental sense” as “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties.” As examples of lack of jurisdiction “in its most fundamental or strict sense,” we noted that a state court has no jurisdiction to (1) determine title to land outside its borders; (2) adjudicate the marital status of persons when neither is domiciled within the state; (3) render a personal judgment against one not personally served with process within its borders; or (4) determine a case where the type of proceeding or amount in controversy is beyond the jurisdiction defined for that particular court by statute or constitutional provision. (Ibid.)
In these examples, the absence of jurisdiction is complete. In such circumstances, it is impossible for a reviewing court to conclude that “a different result would have been probable if such error ... or defect had not occurred or existed.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) If a trial court proceeds to issue a judgment even though it lacks fundamental jurisdiction over a party or the subject matter (such as a piece of property or a marriage that exists outside *205the state), a different result would be inevitable if the error had not occurred, because in the absence of error the case would have been dismissed.
The temporary absence of jurisdiction in a trial court while an appeal is pending is not comparable to these examples of the absence of fundamental jurisdiction. Rather, it is more consistent with the description in Abelleira of the broader meaning of lack of jurisdiction that justifies writ review, in which the trial court lacks only the power “to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.” (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 17 Cal.2d at p. 288.) The procedural prerequisite that was lacking in the case before us was a resolution of the pending appeal, which would permit the trial court properly to go forward with the trial. Unlike the situation in which fundamental jurisdiction is lacking, the absence of jurisdiction in this case was only temporary and only partial. Once the appeal on the motion is resolved, the trial court regains jurisdiction to try the case. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, the trial court was not completely divested of jurisdiction over the case, and still could conduct proceedings in collateral matters that did not affect the appeal. The trial court (and the Court of Appeal as well) simply made an error in determining whether or not trial of the case was a proceeding that was affected by or embraced in the pending appeal, within the meaning of section 916.1
Although it may be conceivable that, under some circumstances, the conduct of proceedings in the trial court pending an appeal might constitute such a fundamental defect in the proceedings that automatic reversal is required, that is not the case where, as here, the case is tried pending the appeal of a pretrial order and the pretrial order is ultimately upheld. In this situation, the reviewing court readily can ascertain that the error had no effect on the outcome of the case and that the result would have been the same even if the error had not occurred and the trial had been stayed until after the resolution of the appeal.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I do not believe that requiring automatic reversal is necessary or effective to ensure a party’s right to preserve the status quo pending an appeal, any more than automatic reversal is necessary to preserve other legal rights, including constitutional rights, that are subject to harmless error analysis. (See, e.g., People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 506-507 [rejecting the argument that the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession requires automatic reversal in order to deter *206improper law enforcement conduct].) To recognize the possibility that an error may be deemed harmless does not transform a trial court’s erroneous action into a correct one, nor does it encourage trial courts to act unlawfully. If the trial court correctly interprets and follows the mandate of Code of Civil Procedure section 916, the status quo will be maintained until the appeal is resolved. If the trial court does not understand or follow the law, the appellate court has the authority to protect the appealing party’s interests, as well as its own power to act pending an appeal, by issuing a writ to require the trial court to comply with section 916.
In the presumably rare instance in which both the trial court and the appellate court misunderstand or fail to enforce the law, and proceedings continue to judgment despite a pending appeal, the appellate court must examine all the circumstances to determine whether the failure to stay the trial was prejudicial. If the judgment is tainted by the trial court’s erroneous actions, reversal of the judgment would be appropriate and consistent with California Constitution, article VI, section 13.2 Reversing a judgment that ultimately was not affected by the pending appeal, however, does not further the interests of justice in any way and is not necessary to enforce the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 916.
Accordingly, I would overrule or disapprove prior California decisions to the extent they purport to hold that a trial court’s action in erroneously going forward with a trial while an appeal is pending constitutes an action taken in the absence of fundamental subject matter jurisdiction that necessarily requires automatic reversal of the judgment. I conclude that under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution and the applicable statutory provisions set forth above, a trial court’s error of this nature may not properly be treated as reversible per se, but rather justifies a reversal of a judgment rendered after trial only when there is an appropriate basis for finding the error to constitute a miscarriage of justice. In the present case, the error clearly was not prejudicial, and I believe it defies both common sense and the logic and policy of our state constitutional harmless error provision to reverse the judgment and require a new trial in these circumstances.
*207The counterintuitive result arrived at by the majority is not the creature of constitutional or statutory compulsion; it emanates entirely from earlier decisions rendered by this court and the Courts of Appeal. I believe it is time to disavow these self-imposed formalistic constraints and arrive at a fairer and more logical outcome in this case and in future proceedings.

 As the majority notes, plaintiffs do not rely on the theory that the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction in the sense described in Abelleira. The parties’ failure to advance this position, however, does not preclude us from upholding the judgment. This court is not bound by the parties’ concessions on issues of law. (Desny v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 729 [299 P.2d 257].)

 It is true that if it is ultimately determined that the defendant should not have been required to go to trial, a reversal of the judgment will not totally cure the harm because the defendant already will have been required to bear the anxiety and expense of a trial. But the inadequacy of reversal as a complete remedy exists whether reversal is mandated on a per se basis (based on the theory that the trial court’s error resulted in an absence of jurisdiction in the fundamental sense) or is mandated only upon a finding that the error actually was prejudicial. The vice of the unwarranted invocation of lack of fundamental jurisdiction is that it compels a reversal of the judgment even when it is clear that the error did not in the least affect the validity of the judgment.