Court Opinion

ID: 9605035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:29:38.844273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:41.645059
License: Public Domain

WALTERS, Chief Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part.) I concur in the discussion of Points 1, 3 and 4. I do not agree that defendant was not prejudiced as a result of the incompleteness of the record of testimony presented to the grand jury by an eye witness. No Spanish interpreter could be found, it is said, in Rio Arriba County. The transcript of the grand jury testimony shows four occasions when in answer to typical leading questions used throughout examination of this witness, the reporter recorded the witness’s response as “(Speaking Spanish).” There is not the slightest clue how long the “Speaking Spanish” answers ran on, or what they contained. My disagreement with the majority on this issue is predicated on the following: 1. One of the purposes of recording grand jury testimony is to “ensur[e] that the defendant may impeach a prosecution witness on the basis of his prior inconsistent statements before the grand jury.” 8 Moore’s Federal Practice 6-17, ¶ 6.01[7]. When failure to record testimony creates a vacuum, it is asking the defendant to perform an impossibility by requiring him to prove that trial testimony differed from grand jury testimony to demonstrate he was prejudiced. How can he compare one record with another that is incomplete? Impingement upon an accused’s right to confront a witness against him is unconstitutional. Mascarenas v. State, 80 N.M. 537, 458 P.2d 789 (1969). 2. The requirement of recording testimony is mandatory. Section 31-6-8, N.M. S.A. 1978. N.M.R.Crim.P. 29.2, N.M.S.A. 1978 (1982 Cum.Supp.), presupposes the recording of grand jury testimony. Cases collected in the annotation of that rule bear out the presupposition. 3. Pedroncelli, upon which the majority relies, is distinguishable. That case was concerned with loss of testimony presented at a preliminary hearing. Counsel for defendant fully participates in preliminary hearing proceedings and is fully advised of the testimony adduced. He knows whether the evidence given then conflicts with testimony at trial; he is not defending (or attempting to impeach) in the dark. 4. The majority cites State v. Chouinard for the proposition that each case is to be decided on its own facts. Chouinard also declares that the good faith of the State is irrelevant if lost evidence is material and prejudicial to the defendant. If witness Chavez’s grand jury testimony was different from what she gave at trial, it was material. N.M.R.Evid. 401, 607, 613, N.M. S.A. 1978. If it was material on that ground, its loss was prejudicial to defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation. Valles v. State, 90 N.M. 347, 563 P.2d 610 (Ct.App.1977). 5. The grand jury questions asked this witness were so consistently and blatantly leading as to amount to testimony by the prosecutor. We said in State v. Sanchez, 95 N.M. 27, 618 P.2d 371 (Ct.App.1980), that this method of questioning violated § 31-6-7, N.M.S.A. 1978. 6.Defendant does not complain of invalidity of the indictment because of improper influence by the State on the grand jury— which is the thrust of all of the federal cases cited by the majority. Defendant claims he was deprived of a “most useful tool” in “effective cross-examination” (State v. Romero, 87 N.M. 279, 532 P.2d 208 (Ct.App.1975)), which amounts to denial of his Sixth Amendment privilege, and thus prejudiced conduct of the trial. Defendant asks that the indictment be dismissed as a penalty for prosecutorial misconduct in depriving him of a trial right, not because the indictment was invalid from the outset. Improper prosecutorial influence on the grand jury differs distinctly from the State’s obligation to preserve grand jury evidence for use at trial. The federal cases cited, and the discussion of whether probable cause existed to indict, have no application to the issue presented here by defendant, nor do they answer the question raised. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s discussion of the issue raised in defendant’s Point II.