Court Opinion

ID: 9466450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:16:07.971451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:44.431396
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:

Count I

The majority holds that a § 2314 conviction for transporting in interstate commerce a falsely made, forged or altered security may be obtained without proof that the security was altered prior to its being transported in interstate commerce. The majority misapprehends not only the import of § 2314 but also the limitations inherent in construing criminal statutes.
The majority can cite no case where a § 2314 conviction was sustained without proof that the security was altered prior to movement in interstate commerce. Three circuits, on the other hand, have recognized that the security must be transported across state lines in a forged or altered condition. United States v. Hilyer, 543 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d 41, 45-46 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, there is a rebuttable presumption that the forgery or alteration occurred in the state where the instrument was first found in a forged or altered condition. United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d at 45-46; United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d at 469; Conley v. United States, 23 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1928); United States v. Britton, 24 Fed.Cas. 1239, 1241 (C.C.D.Mass. 1822). See also United States v. Lewis, 560 F.2d 901, 903 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1977). In this case the document was first found in an altered condition in Idaho and no evidence was introduced to suggest it was altered before leaving Utah.
If, as the majority asserts, the “essence of the offense” under § 2314 is only the fraudulent scheme, Maj. Op. at 232, any violation of a local law could become a federal offense merely by the incidental interstate travel of a perpetrator before, after or during the criminal activity. This concept, though interesting, is contrary to the weight of authority. For instance, it is established that § 2314 does not purport to punish larceny, but the transportation in interstate commerce of goods after they have been stolen. Loman v. United States, 243 F.2d 327, 328-29 (8th Cir. 1957). The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that § 2314 “proscribes not the passing but rather the transportation of forged checks.” Gilinsky v. United States, 368 F.2d 487, 490 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added).
The Ninth Circuit, incidentally, is the root source of the idea relied upon by the majority that the interstate element of federal crimes is included solely to justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction rather than a substantive element of the crime. See Maj. Op. at 231. The majority quotes United States v. Newson, 531 F.2d 979, 981 (10th Cir. 1976) and United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 891 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971). However, the factual postures of both Newson and Roselli make them poor precedent for the issue presented here. In both cases, interstate transportation of the securities after they were the subjects of the proscribed activity was established.1 *236The issue in both cases was whether the defendant must have actual knowledge of the interstate transportation. However, a finding that actual knowledge of interstate transportation is not required for conviction under § 2314 does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the interstate element of § 2314 is not substantive.
Lyda v. United States, 279 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 1960), relied upon by the majority, defines the aim of the statute as prohibiting “the use of interstate transportation facilities for goods having certain unlawful qualities.” The Fifth Circuit did not include goods which were to later acquire unlawful qualities. The statute by its terms prohibits “transportpng] in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities,” 18 U.S.C. § 2314, not the forging or altering of securities which have been transported interstate. The place where the scheme is conceived or where its ultimate impact will fall is not made important by the statute. A broad congressional intent to ferret out the evils of theft and fraud wherever they lurk, even if unequivocally established, is not determinative. A criminal defendant can suffer the penalties of a statute only when his conduct satisfies the specific terms used in the statute. The rule is clear that a criminal statute is limited to its terms; it “must be strictly construed and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity.” United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 1015, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973); United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971); United States v. Fisher, 456 F.2d 1143, 1145 (10th Cir. 1972).
Because there is no evidence in this case that the title certificate was altered in Utah prior to being taken to Idaho, there was no showing that § 2314 was violated. I would reverse Count I.

Count II

In discussing Count II, the majority again relies on the argument that “a scheme to defraud ... is the essence of a § 2314 violation.” Maj. Op. at 234. Again, § 2314 requires more than an evil essence. Sparrow’s action in obtaining an Oregon title certificate after disposing of the car may constitute a state crime or even a violation of another federal criminal statute, but it is not a violation of § 2314. Because the Oregon certificate of title was genuinely executed, it was not a forged or falsely made security for purposes of § 2314, even under the Tenth Circuit view prior to this case. See Marteney v. United States, 216 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1954). “Telling a lie does not become forgery because it is reduced to writing.” Re Windsor, 6 Best & S. 522, 122 Eng.Rep. 1288 (1865) (Blackburn, J., concurring).
The majority acknowledges our decision in Marteney where we held that the words “forged” and “falsely made” relate to “genuineness. of execution and not falsity of content.” 216 F.2d at 763. The problem comes in the majority’s discussion of two subsequent decisions, United States v. Crim, 527 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 905, 96 S.Ct. 1497, 47 L.Ed.2d 755 (1976) and United States v. Williams, 498 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1974). Crim and Williams are clearly distinguishable from both Marteney and the facts of this case. In Crim the defendant signed checks with a name he was no longer using. The false signature made the instruments fraudulent in the execution. Likewise, a “spurious, fictitious and unauthorized execution” was at the core of the decision in Williams. 498 F.2d at 551. In Marteney, on the other hand, this court recognized that there could be no violation of § 2314 because “both the warehouse receipt and the true-name check are what they purport to be; . . neither of them are [sic] false or forged in their execution, although they may be false *237in fact.” 216 F.2d at 763. Similarly, in this case, the certificate of title was duly executed by Oregon officials. The certificate itself was precisely what it purported to be. Only the facts underlying the document were false.
The distinction between fraudulent execution and falsity of content is unmistakably drawn in several well reasoned opinions from other circuits. In United States v. Jones, 553 F.2d 351 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968, 97 S.Ct. 2928, 53 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1977), for instance, it was determined that checks issued to the defendant as a result of fraudulent alterations of a company’s accounts payable were not forged or falsely made under § 2314. Although such conduct could constitute fraud or false pretenses, the checks as issued by the company were genuine in execution and were, therefore, not forgeries. 553 F.2d at 355-56. See Cunningham v. United States, 272 F.2d 791, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Brown, 246 F.2d 541, 542-43 (2d Cir. 1957); Wright v. United States, 172 F.2d 310, 311-12 (9th Cir. 1949); Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 1941). See also Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655-59, 82 S.Ct. 1399, 8 L.Ed.2d 750 (1962);2 41 A.L.R. 229, Supplemented, 46 A.L.R. 1529, 51 A.L.R. 568.
Not only does today’s decision run contrary to the language of § 2314 and the uniform decisions of other circuits, it implicitly overturns Marteney without convening en banc as is our practice when reconsidering our prior cases. In addition, the majority violates the rule of strict construction applied to criminal statutes. “The fact that a particular activity may be within the same general classification and policy of those covered [by a criminal statute] does not necessarily bring it within the ambit of the criminal prohibition.” United States v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 380 U.S. 157, 160, 85 S.Ct. 868, 870, 13 L.Ed.2d 728 (1965). See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351-54, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). All of these consequences seem particularly unnecessary in view of the fact that we have sustained the properly pled and proved conviction under Count III, which carries a two-year sentence, as well as six concurrent sentences (four five-year and two six-year sentences) in an accompanying case. See United States v. Robert D. Sparrow, No. 78-1882 (10th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936, 93 S.Ct. 1913, 36 L.Ed.2d 397 (1973).
For these reasons, I would reverse the convictions of Counts I and II.

. In Newson, stolen money orders cashed in Colorado were processed through the Federal Reserve banking system for payment in Minnesota: There was clear testimony that the de*236fendant procured the negotiation of the stolen instruments, thereby causing their interstate transportation. 531 F.2d at 980-81. In Roselli the court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the checks obtained from illegal gambling operations in Los Angeles were then transported to Las Vegas. 432 F.2d at 890.

. Although the court in Gilbert was dealing with the concept of forgery under 18 U.S.C. § 495, it cited with approval cases which had given the same construction. to forgery under § 2314. 370 U.S. at 657, 82 S.Ct. 1399 (citing, e. g., Marteney; Greathouse v. United States, 170 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1948)).