Court Opinion

ID: 9944951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:59:28.524051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:03.553741
License: Public Domain

I dissent.
 INTRODUCTION
The majority opinion in this case has made a shambles of the principles of appellate review and given substance to the view, widely held in trial court circles, that result-oriented reviewing courts have an *Page 1002 
unfortunate habit of retrying the facts of cases on appeal. Theoretically, those of us on the reviewing courts, given the opportunity for quiet reflection, review the record objectively, accepting the findings of the court below as to the facts, then rule on abstract principles of law in determining whether or not the lower court has committed error and, if so, whether that error is prejudicial. Here, the majority, apparently outraged at the alleged mistreatment of appellant at the hands of the authorities, has blatantly retried the case under the guise of an "independent examination of the uncontradicted evidence" and in so doing holds that Judge Campbell, who literally agonized over this matter, has committed "palpable error." To the contrary, if anyone is guilty of "palpable error" it is the majority.
Judge Campbell knew exactly as much as we know about this case plus a lot more because he saw and heard the witnesses. He properly analyzed the pertinent authorities and concluded that appellant's statement to Officer Hilder should be rejected but that, in spite of Officer Hilder's improprieties, appellant's statement to Ms. Hall had been given freely and voluntarily. Since it is not our function to resolve conflicts in the testimony nor to reweigh the evidence and since the record fully supports Judge Campbell's ruling, I would sustain him. I agree that Officer Hilder violated appellant's right to counsel. I agree that, regardless of provocation, the counselor had no right to slap the appellant. As I will indicate, I am not quite as shocked that the counselors removed appellant's clothes and put him in a receiving room for a three-hour cooling off period. However, I do not conceive it to be our prerogative, under the guise of judicial review, to exorcise all of the demons with which our hagridden society is afflicted. As Justice Robert S. Thompson said recently,1 "We are judges, not shamans."
 THE RULE OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The most significant limitation on appellate review is that we deal with a cold record. We do not see or hear the witnesses. It is for that reason that all matters of credibility are left to the trier of fact. We do not second-guess the trial judge as to whether to believe or not to believe a witness. This is because a written transcript of testimony is but a pallid reflection of what actually happened in court. It does not and cannot reflect demeanor, attitude, intonation, expression, inflection or personality. As Judge Jerome Frank said, when writing for the rather awesome court of Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand and himself, a transcript *Page 1003 
resembles a "pressed flower." In a flight of borrowed rhetoric, he further wrote, "`The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried.'" (Broadcast Music, Inc. v.Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 [81 U.S.P.Q. 506].) This court said in Meiner v. Ford Motor Co.,17 Cal.App.3d 127 at p. 140 [94 Cal.Rptr. 702], "On the cold record a witness may be clear, concise, direct, unimpeached, uncontradicted — but on a face to face evaluation, so exude insincerity as to render his credibility factor nil. Another witness may fumble, bumble, be unsure, uncertain, contradict himself, and on the basis of a written transcript be hardly worthy of belief. But one who sees, hears and observes him may be convinced of his honesty, his integrity, his reliability." (See 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1975 Supp.) pp. 45-46.)
In the old days when trial judges certified all transcripts whether an objection had been made or not, I used to read those transcripts and was appalled at how little the transcript actually reflected the trial I had conducted. Given problems of observation, recollection, expression and self-interest, it is difficult enough to project an incident from the past into the courtroom through the giving of testimony. But by the time that incident has been removed from reality one more step by its reduction to a written transcript, we are dealing with a most tenuous reenactment of the original incident.
At the trial level the judge may use all of his senses in his evaluation of a witness' testimony. He sees the witness. He hears the witness. He can, if he wishes, reach out and touch him. If he gets close enough, he may even smell him and, given enough stress, might even bite him. But in the reviewing courts all we have are sterile pages of questions and answers. To the trial judge the witness is alive — a living, breathing, perspiring fellow human being. To us, he is a shadow, reduced to an impersonal 8 1/2 x 11 page of transcript. Given the record in this case, it takes a temerity beyond my capability to second-guess Judge Campbell on his evaluation of the evidence.
Obviously, the majority is outraged at the treatment of this 16-year-old2 child, who was beaten, brutalized and starved. It is a touching picture. The majority holds that appellant's tender age is of such moment and the treatment he received so gross that when he had his conversation *Page 1004 
with Ms. Hall, he could not, as a matter of law, make a voluntary statement.
Well, let's look at this 16-year-old child and at the abuse he suffered.
 THE CHILD
As a trial judge, I served six highly educational years in the juvenile court. One of the first things I learned was that chronological age is seldom an indication of sophistication nor the experience factor. One 16-year-old may be callow, unsophisticated, immature. Another may be sophisticated, knowledgeable, savvy and mature. I do not mean that we should go back to the ancient concept that children are merely small adults and hold them to the same standards as adults. (If I had my druthers I would choose the concept that adults are merely large children.) But any assumption that the appellant was some kind of a frightened child by reason of the comparatively short time that had elapsed between birth and the time he kicked this two-year-old child to death is simply unrealistic.
Never having seen the appellant,3 I searched the record for some clue as to just what kind of a person Judge Campbell decided had made a voluntary statement to Ms. Hall.
In the first place, appellant is a thoroughly emancipated human being. He was not jerked from the security and protected environment of his parent's home into court. When this all occurred, he was living with a woman who had two children, who, although they feared him — and apparently with good reason4 — called him "Daddy." As the Attorney General points out, the appellant was actually the head of a household. His life style was that of an adult, not a child. *Page 1005 
Next, he is no stranger to law enforcement and to court proceedings. I can reasonably infer that he has been on probation because of the inquiry made concerning his probation officer at the time of intake. I can also reasonably infer that he has had some contact with the police authorities when he admits to having been advised of his constitutional rights on at least one prior occasion. Few among my readers can claim that distinction. He is certainly no beginner about the law or his rights. As the majority notes, he carefully inquired of Ms. Hall as to whether any statement he made could be used against him. That is hardly the inquiry of an unsophisticated child. Whatever the appellant's chronological age may have been he was "court smart" and knowledgeable in these matters beyond his years.
Also, the appellant was certainly not cowed by the authorities. He was willful and agressive to the point of arrogance. When taken to juvenile hall, he would not give an intake officer the time of day and tells one of them — the "black bastard" — to "kiss my ass." Then, even though Ms. Hall practically begged him not to talk about the case, he insisted on doing so and, in addition, decided to take the polygraph test against his attorney's advice. Perhaps his decisions were not sound decisions but they were hardly the decisions of a frightened child whose spirit had been completely broken by the authorities.
Yes, the appellant was 16 years of age but he was hardly a naive, unsophisticated youngster fresh from the pen of a Booth Tarkington. Penrod or Sam, he wasn't.
 THE TORTURE
Next, the majority expresses shock and outrage because the counselor, that "black bastard," slapped appellant when told by appellant to kiss his ass. I concur that the acts of this counselor were legally indefensible and cannot be condoned, but, given the circumstances, I find them understandable — a spontaneous reaction to an insulting remark. Again, we have the problem of trying to relive an incident. We do not know the tone, inflection or intonation of that remark. Now, knowing that the appellant is white and the counselor black, I'll give better than track odds that the remark was made in a manner which was insulting beyond expression. As a fellow human being, I can understand the reaction of the counselor. Everyone has his breaking point. That, of course, does not excuse the counselor's action. The appellant was in custody and custodians simply are not permitted the luxury of spontaneous reactions *Page 1006 
even if the person in custody hits, kicks, scratches, bites, spits or is unbearably insulting. The counselor's retaliation was improper and legally indefensible. However, given that one slap — and the appellant's version differs radically from that of all the rest of the witnesses5 — I doubt that its effects would carry through to the extent that it caused a statement a couple of days later not to be the product of a rational intellect and a free will. I doubt that it had any relevance at the time of appellant's conversation with Ms. Hall. I doubt very much that he was afraid Ms. Hall was going to slap him.
The majority expresses outrage at the fact that the appellant was stripped and left naked for three hours in an empty cell. He was told to take off his clothes and left for three hours in the holding cell. The majority finds this is because he was being uncooperative. At the risk of nitpicking, I would point out that he was stripped and put in the holding cell not because he was being uncooperative but because the counselors thought he was on the edge of violence. The factors that caused the stripping were physical and psychological ones. He was "very tense," "he clenched his teeth and fists" and "threw down his shoes violently."
I hate to keep harping about my own experience as a juvenile court judge but I must add some personal experience at this point. In order to be a better juvenile court judge, I attempted to familiarize myself with the whole operation — intake, supervision, investigation — the whole ball of wax. I spent many hours observing the intake operation. From this, I learned that a holding cell is not a punishment cell. There are two reasons for holding cells. One is for segregation. The juvenile court is quite ecumenical. In one evening a juvenile hall may fall heir to a murderer, some muggers, a covey of gang rapists, then, in the next breath, they receive a truant, a runaway and some poor youngster who simply can't get along with his maladjusted parents. Thus, instant segregation is necessary. Another reason for holding cells is the protection of the minor. Many of those who come into juvenile hall are pretty uptight and thus they are put into "empty cells" for their own protection. These cells are "bare" not for punishment but because the authorities want nothing to be available by which a minor can hurt himself. In addition, a minor's belt or anything else with which he might *Page 1007 
hurt himself is always removed. In some cases he may be stripped. I am not enough of an expert in the principles of penology or the mystique of the proper handling of those in custody to defend the practice but it is considerably more humane than a strait jacket. In this case, after a three-hour cooling off period, the minor was given pajamas, sheets and a blanket and apparently spent the rest of the night in about as much comfort as anyone can who is undergoing the understandable unpleasantness of incarceration. I doubt that this incident was so traumatic that it broke down this appellant's will to the extent that a couple of days later he could not make a voluntary statement.
Again, at the risk of appearing unfeeling, the fact that the appellant missed some meals is hardly an incident of earth-shaking importance. It was certainly no fault of the authorities. He refused breakfast and lunch and by the time he arrived back at the juvenile hall, the kitchen was closed. Having gone hungry on more than a few occasions during the Depression, I am acutely aware that it is no fun but I doubt that the result of a one-day fast was such that the appellant's will was broken down.
 THE VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
I agree with the majority and with Judge Campbell that Officer Hilder's interview with the defendant violated his constitutional right to counsel6 and was properly kept out. I am not so sure that the statement was as, a matter of law, coerced but in the interest of a modicum of brevity in this encyclopedic dissertation I won't debate the issue — a decision I know the reader will enthusiastically approve.
However, from this admitted violation of the appellant's constitutional right, the majority leaps to the appellant's conversation with Ms. Hall and determines as a matter of law that the statement appellant made to her was involuntary on the basis of "uncontradicted evidence." The majority says "the fact that the statements were not the immediate result of the interrogation does not compel the conclusion that they were *Page 1008 
voluntary." Of course not. Nothing in this record compels the conclusion that the statements were voluntary. I merely respectfully submit that nothing in this record compels the conclusion that they were involuntary either. I simply contend that the record supports Judge Campbell's determination that as a matter of fact they were voluntary.
 THE RETRIAL
Completely usurping Judge Campbell's prerogative, the majority then proceeds to retry this case. A few examples suffice:
(1) The cumulative effect of the coercion and illegal conduct of the authorities "compels the conclusion" that the statements were untrue.
(2) The appellant "might well have concluded" that making the statement to Ms. Hall would not make his case any worse than he had already made it.
(3) The Miranda warnings of Ms. Hall did not — apparently as a matter of law — "constitute a significant break in the chain of events."
(4) "Manifestly" the same hopes and fears which had induced appellant to make a statement to Officer Hilder continued to operate upon appellant in his conversation with Ms. Hall.
(5) "Manifestly" nothing Ms. Hall could say would erase the psychological effects of earlier suggestions implanted in appellant's mind by Officer Hilder.
The only thing "manifest" is that the majority is retrying this case. Under the guise of uncontradicted evidence, it now draws inferences directly contrary to those which Judge Campbell, as the trier of fact, could reasonably draw from the evidence.
The efforts of the majority to bring the case within the rationale of People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.3d 991 [88 Cal.Rptr. 161,471 P.2d 961] is pure sophistry. Harrington and its progeny hold that statements made to his probation officer are inadmissible when the probation officer encourages the defendant-probationer to do so to curry favor in the expectation of the favorable report. Here, Ms. Hall repeatedly told the appellant that the facts of his offense did not concern her and she did not want to speak about them. Since his purely voluntary statements to Ms. *Page 1009 
Hall were not made in the context of a potential probationer seeking a favorable report, the rationale of Harrington is not applicable. (See People v. Carter, 34 Cal.App.3d 748, 751
[110 Cal.Rptr. 324].)
 THE DENOUEMENT
Thus, inevitably, I return to the central issue — the proper application of the principles of appellate review. Judge Campbell saw and heard the witnesses. We did not. Judge Campbell expressed himself as being appalled at the treatment of the defendant and expressed a sense of outrage at the conduct of the probation and police officers. He specifically held that the appellant had been struck and that there was no justification for stripping and putting him naked into a holding cell. He denied admission of appellant's statement to Officer Hilder because of that officer's violation of appellant's constitutional rights. However, with these facts in mind, he further held that at the time of the interview with Ms. Hall the appellant clearly knew that he had access to the advice of counsel, that he was quite aware of his right not to make a statement, that there were no threats, inducements or force used, that the statements were not coerced and were not the result of any interrogation but were actually volunteered over the protests of Ms. Hall. This holding is supported by substantial evidence and is not overcome by "uncontradicted evidence" to the contrary. I find nothing "palpably erroneous" in Judge Campbell's decision. The only thing "palpably erroneous" about this case is the decision of the majority.
Since the appellant's other contentions are without merit, I would affirm the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 22, 1976. Gardner, P.J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent's petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 28, 1976. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
1 In re Roger G., 53 Cal.App.3d 198, 204 [125 Cal.Rptr. 625] .
2 While it does not have a single thing to do with this issue, I will have to go along with the Attorney General's statement that the appellant was "almost seventeen." According to the petition the appellant was 16 years and 11 months of age at the time of this murder.
3 At this point my curiosity got the best of me. I looked at the coversheet of the probation officer's report and discovered that the appellant is 5' 11" and weighs 135 pounds which just happen to be my own dimensions. While neither of us could ever make it as a linebacker for the Pittsburgh Steelers, neither of us could be classified as cuddly toddlers, whether 16 or 64.
Then just to show how blind justice is at this level, I was not really sure just what color the appellant was until I read this coversheet. I assumed he was white because of his reference to the counselor who slapped him as a "black bastard." But it did not show in the transcript. Judge Campbell knew. He saw him. And sometimes, given the proper context in a case, pigmentation of the skin of a witness can be important in evaluating testimony. While justice is color blind, the rest of society sometimes is not. Anyone who thinks that witnesses are not influenced by race or color simply lives in a dream world.
4 I hope that when this modern day Sonny Wisecarver moves in with his next woman that she has no small children.
5 I note that Judge Campbell had some question as to whether the appellant really got a bloody nose from the slap or whether he induced his own nose bleed in order to draw attention to his plight. The counselors were in accord that he was slapped in the neighborhood of the ear. They were unanimous in testifying that he was not hit on the nose, and that when they left him there was no blood. Strangely enough, the next morning a nurse found no evidence of trauma to the nose.
6 Lest my seeming lack of sympathy for this appellant be construed as any feeling on my part that he was not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution, I would point out that long before Gault and at a time when such a stand was far from popular, I was screaming for constitutional rights for young people. (See Gardner, The Error of 1899 (Aug. 1963) FBI L. Enforcement Bull.; Gardner, Let's Take Another Look at theJuvenile Court (Winter 1964) Juvenile Ct. Judges J.; Gardner,The Juvenile Court a Challenge to Lawyers (1965) State Bar J.; Gardner, Kent and the Juvenile Court (1963) A.B.A.J. (cited inGault). *Page 1010