Court Opinion

ID: 9656607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:52:17.701705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:52.943138
License: Public Domain

*680KELLER, Justice, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and I would affirm the Fayette Circuit Court’s judgments of conviction and sentence in these cases. I write separately, however, because I disagree with certain aspects with the majority’s analysis, specifically: (1) Part 11(2) (“Death Qualification Question”), in which the majority’s dicta calls into question longstanding Kentucky precedent holding that a fair and impartial juror must be able to consider the full range of penalties provided for an offense; (2) Part 11(6) (“Batson challenge”), in which the majority mis-characterizes Appellants’ objection to the Commonwealth’s exercise of peremptory challenges; (3) Part 111(3) (“Character evidence”), in which today’s majority becomes the first Kentucky court to hold in a published opinion that a person “unlawfully enters” another’s residence if he or she gains entry to the residence through subterfuge; and Part V(5)(a) (“EED miti-gator”), in which the majority dismisses this Court’s previous, more-than-reasonable conclusion that “[wjhether extreme emotional disturbance is used as an element of the murder, manslaughter, or mitigating circumstance instructions, the jury should be instructed as to its definition.” 1 Although I do not intend to dwell upon any of these topics at great length, I hope to clarify my views as to each of them.
As to Part 11(2), I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s “death penalty qualification” question did not deprive Appellants of their right to a meaningful voir dire examination because the trial court permitted Appellants’ trial counsel to question jurors regarding their ability to consider the full range of penalties.2 I take issue, however, with the “full court press” that the majority employs upon Grooms v. Commonwealth,3 wherein this Court stated that “a juror should be excused for cause if he would be unable in any case, no matter how extenuating the circumstances may be, to consider the imposition of the minimum penalty prescribed by law.”4 Today’s majority characterizes the Grooms court’s conclusion as anomalous and mere dictum. Less than two years ago, however, this Court again stated “[w]e remain convinced that, in all criminal cases, the right to a fair and impartial jury requires the jury to possess the ability to consider the full range of penalties [.]”5 Although the majority states, without citation of authority, that the Commonwealth of Kentucky stands alone in requiring the disqualification of a juror who cannot consider the minimum authorized sentence in a capital case, this contention, if true, is not a valid criticism of this Court’s past attempts to ensure that such cases are tried before fair and impartial jurors, and it is certainly not a valid reason to abandon long-standing policy. If today’s majority opinion is an indication that the Court intends to retreat *681from precedent that supports the commonsense notion that a fair and impartial juror must “be able to consider any permissible punishment”6 — including both the maximum and the minimum sentences authorized by law — the Court will do so over my dissent.7
As to Part 11(6), the majority misstates Appellants’ objection. Appellants questioned the Commonwealth’s use of eight of its nine peremptory challenges against male members of the jury panel — i.e., an objection premised on only the jurors’ gender, not their race. Thus, regardless of the races of these eight jurors removed from the jury panel, Appellants made a prima facie case for discrimination on the basis of gender.8 In any event, the trial court found that the Commonwealth elected to challenge the jurors for non-discriminatory reasons, and I agree with the majority that the trial court’s finding in that regard is supported by substantial evidence.
In Part 111(3), the majority concludes that the erroneous introduction of character evidence regarding the victim’s careful nature was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “both appellants admitted at trial that they ‘unlawfully entered’ the victim’s home.”9 Because the evidence at trial largely compelled the conclusion that Appellants were guilty of First-Degree Burglary under one or more theories, I agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that this evidence did not prejudice Appellants. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that Appellant Go-forth’s version of the events — in which he and Appellant Caudill obtained admission into the victim’s home by falsely representing to the victim that they needed to use her telephone — constituted “unlawful entry” as defined in Chapter 511 of the Kentucky Penal Code. KRS 511.090(1) provides that “[a] person ‘enters or remains unlawfully’ in or upon premises when he is not privileged or licensed to do so.”10 And, the Commentary to KRS 511.020 explains that Kentucky’s burglary crimes’ “knowingly enter or remain unlawfully” requirement “is intended to ... emphasize! ] the unlawfulness of the intrusion. ... Burglary is not committed by ... invited guests who enter buildings under privilege even though they have intention to commit a crime while there.”11 In fact, in Tribbett v. Commonwealth,12 where the appellant obtained entry into the victim’s home ostensibly in order to make use of the victim’s firing range,13 but actually to *682rob and murder the victim, the Court made no mention of today’s majority opinion’s “subterfuge” theory and, in fact, held that “Tribbett and his two companions were invited by [the victim] into his home. As such, they were mere licensees. ”14 Today’s majority opinion thus unnecessarily embraces a new theory of “unlawful entry” burglary that appears inconsistent with both the commentary to KRS 511.020 and our case law interpreting it.
As to Part V(5)(a), I agree with the Dean plurality that EED as a mitigating circumstance is conceptually the same as EED as a defense, and that the McClellan v. Commonwealth15 definition applies in either case. The “even though the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not sufficient to constitute a defense to the crime” language in KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2) advises the jurors that the existence of EED that: (1) lacks a reasonable explanation or excuse, or (2) is of lesser degree — i.e., one that does not cause a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s judgment and cause one to act uncontrollably — can nevertheless be considered in mitigation of penalty. Accordingly, I believe that, in cases where the evidence supports an instruction on the KRS 532.025(2)(b)(2) mitigating circumstance, the instructions should define EED so that the jury can make a meaningful determination as to whether that mitigating circumstance is present. Here, however, I agree with the result reached by the majority because there was no evidence to warrant a finding of EED, as defined by McClellan, in either phase of the trial. And, thus, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt-because Caudill could not have been prejudiced by the fact that the trial court’s instructions omitted the McClellan definition.
STUMBO, J., joins this concurring opinion.

. Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900, 909 (1989) (emphasis added).

. X would observe, however, that the majority opinion erroneously suggests that the minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of both Murder and First-Degree Robbery, First-Degree Burglary, or First-Degree Rape is thirty (30) years. The majority's arithmetic ignores not only the context of counsel’s question — i.e., what sentence the juror could consider for the Murder — but also the fact that the trial court could order sentences to run concurrently. KRS 532.110(1).

. Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131 (1988).

. Id. at 137.

. Lawson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 53 S.W.3d 534, 541 (2001) (emphasis added).

. Shields v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1991) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, supra note 5. See also Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 119 (2002) ("[A] juror is disqualified if he or she cannot consider the minimum penalty ...."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 145, 154 L.Ed.2d 54 (2002); Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 837 (1999), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1018, 121 S.Ct. 581, 148 L.Ed.2d 498 (2000).

. See Furnish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 34, 54-57 (2003) (Keller, J., dissenting); Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 808-812 (2001) (Keller, J., dissenting), cert. denied 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152 L.Ed.2d 829 (2002).

. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (holding that peremptory challenges cannot be exercised on the basis of gender). Cf. Wiley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 978 S.W.2d 333 (1998) (holding that the defendant could not exercise his peremptory challenges on the basis of gender).

. Majority Opinion, 120 S.W.3d 635, 660 (2003).

. KRS 511.090(1) (emphasis added).

. KRS 511.090, Official Commentary (Banks/Baldwin 1974).

. Ky., 561 S.W.2d 662 (1978).

. See Walker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 656, 657 (1978).

. Tribbett v. Commonwealth, supra note 12 at 664 (emphasis added).

. Ky., 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 1057, 107 S.Ct. 935, 93 L.Ed.2d 986 (1987).