Court Opinion

ID: 9764049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:08:41.119309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:52.831623
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s reasoning with regard to its application of the Discovery Rule to an Informed Consent action despite its characterization as a battery. I also am in agreement with the majority’s suggestion that perhaps the time has come for Informed Consent Cases to be reclassified to reflect their true nature.
My disagreement, however, arises over the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment. According to the majority, there was no need for the jury to decide when appellant should reasonably have known that she had a cause of action, i.e., that she had been injured and that the injury was caused by another party’s conduct. Larthey v. Bland, 367 Pa.Super. 67, 532 A.2d 456 (1987). However, our Court has previously stated that:
[Ojrdinarily most questions relating to the applicability of the defense of the statute of limitations are questions of *155fact to be determined by the jury. 2 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 289. Specifically, the question of whether a plaintiff has exercised due diligence in discovering the incidence of his injury is usually a jury question. Irrera v. Southeastern Pennsyvlania Transportation Authority, 231 Pa.Super. 508, 331 A.2d 705 (1974); Carney v. Barnett, 278 F.Supp. 572 (E.D.Pa.1967). “Whether the statute has run on a claim is usually a question of law for the judge, but where, as here, the issue involves a factual determination, i.e. what is a reasonable period, the determination is for the jury.” Smith v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134, 142, 153 A.2d 477, 479 (1959).
Taylor v. Tukanowicz, 290 Pa.Super. 581, 586, 435 A.2d 181, 183 (1981).
Appellant here is not claiming merely that she suffered physical harm; a fact which could have been discovered soon after her “complications” began. But, rather, she is challenging the sufficiency of the information given to her by appellee prior to her agreeing to surgery. Thus, she would have had to realize that the possibility of her physical harm was something to which she should have been alerted. This is something which may not have been discoverable until consulting with another physician who would explain to appellant whether her complications were something about which she could have been warned, or whether they were sufficiently rare that such warning was not warranted.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of a partial summary judgment and remand for a jury determination as to when appellant should have discovered the alleged insufficiency of the pre-operative information given by appellee.
CIRILLO, President Judge, joins this dissenting opinion.