Court Opinion

ID: 9388742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:07:36.897122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.299461
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re K.F., 2023-Ohio-1286.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE K.F., ET AL.                            :
                                              :              No. 112086
Minor Children                                :
                                              :
[Appeal by K.G., Mother]                      :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 20, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                      Case Nos. AD-19914703 and AD-19914704

                                        Appearances:

                 Valore & Gordillo LLP and Matthew O. Williams, for
                 appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee CCDCFS.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:

                   Appellant K.G. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s decision

awarding permanent custody of her minor children K.F. (d.o.b. 11/13/2014) and T.F.

(d.o.b. 11/2/2016) (collectively “the children”) to the Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”). For the following

reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

               On December 9, 2019, the agency filed a complaint for abuse, neglect,

dependency and temporary custody to the agency with respect to mother’s three

children, K.F., T.F., and K.T. (d.o.b. 1/16/19). K.F. and T.F. share a biological father,

Tr.F. Tr.F. failed to establish paternity of the children, had previously engaged in

domestic violence with Mother, and did not participate in the underlying

proceedings; as such, Tr.F. is not relevant to this appeal. K.T.’s father, S.T., was in a

relationship with Mother for the duration of the underlying case and actively

participated in the case with respect to K.T. The instant appeal involves only K.F.

and T.F.; a separate appeal was filed by S.T. regarding the custody of his child, K.T.1

Thus, we will address the facts of the case as they relate to K.F. and T.F.

               The complaint alleged that on or about December 5, 2019, all three

children were observed with multiple injuries. K.F. had injuries on his ear, chest,

and back. T.F. had a black eye and injuries to his forehead, stomach, arm, and back.

Medical professionals determined that the injuries to K.F. and T.F. were from being

hit with a cord; police intervention was required, and a criminal investigation was

pending. The complaint went on to allege that Mother had an anger management

      1K.T. is not a subject of this appeal. The juvenile court granted K.T.’s father’s
motion for legal custody. CCDCFS appealed that decision in In re K.T., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 111996.
problem for which she was not currently in treatment and regularly hit the children

with cords and threw things at them.

              The complaint further alleged that Mother failed to provide for the

children’s basic needs, specifying that the children lacked clean clothing and smelled

of urine. The complaint further alleged that Mother had depression, posttraumatic

stress disorder, and anxiety, for which she was not currently in treatment, which

prevented her from providing a safe home for the children.

              The magistrate granted the agency’s motion for predispositional

temporary custody and ordered Mother to have no contact with the children. The

children were first placed in a temporary placement and eventually placed with

Mother’s godmother, (“Godmother”), and her husband (collectively, “the foster

parents”), in February 2020. The children remained with the foster parents for the

duration of these proceedings.

              In October 2020, CCDCFS filed an amended complaint, alleging that

Mother had been criminally charged with multiple counts of felony and

misdemeanor endangering children and misdemeanor domestic violence related to

all three children’s injuries. In December 2020, the court found the children abused,

neglected, and dependent. At that time, the court lifted Mother’s no-contact order.

              The court granted two extensions of temporary custody. In January

2021, CCDCFS moved for its first extension of temporary custody, asserting that

Mother and S.T. needed additional time to complete the case plan and that Mother

needed more time to rebuild her relationship with the children. The court granted
this motion. In May 2021, CCDCFS moved for a second extension of temporary

custody. The agency’s motion acknowledged Mother’s progress but asserted that

because all of the case plan objectives had not yet been completed, “the risk to the

children [had] not been sufficiently reduced.”

               On November 9, 2021, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary

custody to permanent custody with an affidavit from agency social worker April

Palidar (“Palidar”) in support of the motion. Palidar’s affidavit averred that Mother

had been convicted in her criminal case on three counts of child endangering and

one count of domestic violence, with all three children as victims.2 Palidar further

averred that Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from probation in that case, that

the children continued to express fear of their mother, that Mother had been

inconsistent in mental health services and had failed to benefit from family

counseling with the children, and that Mother and S.T. continued to “engage in an

unstable and volatile relationship which impacts their ability to provide for the basic

and emotional needs of the children.”

               On February 28, 2022, S.T. filed a motion for legal custody of K.T.

               The children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) submitted reports on

February 18, 2020 (recommending temporary custody to the agency), January 26

2021 (recommending a first extension of temporary custody), February 25, 2021,

      2 In Mother’s criminal case, she pled guilty to three counts of endangering children,

a misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), with all three children as victims, and
one count of domestic violence, a misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2919.25, with K.F. as
a victim.
and June 30, 2022. In her final report, the GAL noted that K.F. was actively engaged

in trauma therapy, but has continued to talk about the things Mother did to him and

his nightmares, and he reported being nervous that something bad would happen to

him if he returned to his Mother. The GAL noted that while the children had made

some progress in their time away from Mother, they began to regress when visitation

with Mother resumed.      The GAL ultimately recommended that it was in the

children’s best interests for the agency’s motion to modify temporary custody to

permanent custody be granted. Specifically, the GAL stated:

      The children have been removed from their Mother’s custody for over
      2 years. The children were adjudicated abused and dependent. The
      children K.F. and [T.F.] received non-accidental injuries caused by
      their Mother. Mother had a restraining order and had not visited the
      children for about a year. Visitation has been detrimental for the
      children and no progress [has been] reached with family counseling.
      The children K.F. and [T.F.] continue working with mental health
      providers for their trauma. CCDCFS has concerns regarding Mother’s
      mental health. Social worker reported [Mother’s] housing is not
      appropriate. Mother and [S.T.’s] relationship is unstable. [S.T.]
      indicated on 5/17/2022 that he is looking for a suitable house for the
      family. He indicated that he is in a relationship with the children’s
      mother and both wish reunification with the three children. Social
      worker reported concerns regarding [S.T.’s] anxiety [and] past
      domestic violence with the children’s Mother. The children have been
      placed with a kinship placement with fictive kin. The children’s basic
      needs are met at placement. The children have a strong bond with
      caregiver.

              On July 1, 2022, the court held a trial on the agency’s motion for

permanent custody and S.T.’s motion for legal custody of K.T. Godmother testified

that she was Mother’s godmother, having grown up with Mother’s mother.

Godmother testified that the children were placed with her in February 2020.
Godmother testified that when the children were first placed with her and her

husband, they were underweight. Godmother testified in detail about the various

trauma responses the children exhibited. She testified that the children were very

loving and liked to laugh, but they also did not like to be touched, would jump if

someone spoke loudly, ate off the floor, and had other behavioral issues. Godmother

testified that K.F. and T.F. had regular nightmares.

              With respect to K.F., Godmother testified that he pulled his hair out

several times and regularly had bathroom accidents when he was nervous or

anxious. Godmother testified that this behavior often coincided with seeing his

Mother.

              With respect to T.F., Godmother testified that he would purposely

misbehave on days that visits with Mother were scheduled, saying, “[H]e has been

purposely misbehaving on visit day so that I would maybe ground him and he would

say, well, I will stay home and you don’t have to — you know, you can ground me. I

will stay home.” Godmother also testified that T.F. had a lot of anger and gets

anxious; he sometimes makes himself throw up when he is upset.

              Godmother testified that she had a relationship with Mother, but it

primarily centered around communications regarding visitation and other matters

related to the children. Godmother testified that she and her husband would intend

to adopt the children if they were allowed. She further testified that she had spoken

to S.T. about the possibility of remaining involved in the children’s lives if
permanent custody were to be granted, saying that it would be possible with the help

of a therapist and after the children had healed from their trauma.

              When asked if the children had ever said anything to her about what

their lives were like with Mother, Godmother stated:

      So they started to tell us stories here and there, and then when [Kelsey
      Cirkvencic, the children’s licensed professional counselor] was
      involved, [K.F.] started to tell more stories.

      And so she has heard these stories as well, and [K.F.’s] been very
      consistent with the details and he’s talked about one time he pooped in
      his pants and got in trouble and said that [Mother] was going to call the
      police on him and was gonna leave him by the side of the road because
      he wasn’t allowed to do that.

      And still that’s fixated in his head. Kelsey did mention once that she
      thinks that’s why some of the bathroom issues are going on with him,
      because he talks about it a lot. He’s very, very focused on it.

      He said that [T.F.] used to crawl out of the window all the time and that
      they were left alone in the house a lot, and that also he said that he ate
      chicken nuggets one time that were [T.F.’s] and so he had to sleep on
      the porch for a while at night, locked out on the porch, and he gets
      hysterical about shutting the door on him.

      He leaves the bathroom door open. He doesn’t like to shut it all the
      time. He’s starting to close it a little now, but he’s just like very scared
      about shutting doors and things and he said he couldn’t get in and it
      scared him, and [T.F.] talks about being locked in this kitchen once.

      I don’t know details on that because he’s not very forthcoming, and
      again, you know, he was really little and so I’m not sure about that.

              The children’s licensed professional counselor, Kelsey Cirkvencic

(“Cirkvencic”), testified that she had worked with K.F. beginning in May 2020 and

T.F. beginning in May 2021. Cirkvencic testified that the agency referred the

children to her due to physical abuse. Cirkvencic testified that she had diagnosed
K.F. and T.F. with posttraumatic stress disorder related to physical abuse and

trauma by Mother. Cirkvencic went on to testify that at one point, she had attempted

to integrate Mother into her therapy with the children, and Mother often seemed

disengaged. Cirkvencic’s testimony generally corroborated Godmother’s testimony

related to the children’s trauma-related behavioral issues.

               Palidar testified that she was the agency social worker assigned to this

case in December 2020. Palidar testified as to Mother’s criminal case stemming

from her physical abuse of the children and resulting convictions for child

endangering related to all three children.      Palidar also testified that she had

discussed the case with Mother and learned that Mother had been unsuccessfully

discharged from her probation after testing positive for drugs.

               Palidar testified that Tr.F. had very sporadic involvement in the case

and had not consistently participated in visitation with the children or with the case

overall, and he had a 2018 domestic violence criminal case in a different jurisdiction

in which Mother was the victim. Palidar also testified that the children had reported

that Mother’s abuse was ongoing, but at some point during the pendency of the case,

Mother and S.T. were approved for unsupervised visitation. Palidar testified that

unsupervised visits could not happen at Mother and S.T.’s home because the agency

had safety and sanitation concerns; the visits happened in community

environments, such as parks and libraries. Palidar testified that as of the date of

trial, she would not recommend giving Mother unsupervised in-home visitation.

Further, she testified that she still had concerns about Mother’s ability to parent the
children, stating that although Mother had completed a parenting program, the

children continued to express that they were fearful of Mother and T.F.’s anxiety in

particular continued to worsen related to Mother. Palidar ultimately testified that

she believed it was in the children’s best interests to remain with the foster parents

permanently.

               S.T. testified on his own behalf in support of his motion for legal

custody of K.T. Finally, the GAL testified as to her recommendation that all three

children should be placed in the agency’s permanent custody. The GAL reiterated

that the children had been removed from their Mother for over two years, K.F. and

T.F. had intentional physical injuries caused by their Mother while she was living

with S.T., and even when Mother was able to participate in visitation with the

children, visitation was ultimately detrimental to the children due to the trauma.

The GAL testified that Mother was engaged in various case plan services and was

compliant with parenting classes and the agency had given Mother an opportunity

to try to rebuild her bond and trust with the children, but that did not happen.

               On September 29, 2022, the juvenile court granted the agency’s

motion for permanent custody of K.F. and T.F. and granted S.T.’s motion for legal

custody of K.T. In corresponding journal entries, the court made the following

findings with respect to K.F. and T.F.:

      The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that pursuant to
      O.R.C. [sic] 2151.414(B)(1):
      (d) the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services
      agency or private child placing agency for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two month period.

      The Court finds that the child’s continued residence in or return to the
      home of [Mother] or [Tr.F.] would be contrary to the child’s best
      interest.

      The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
      the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child to the
      home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification. Relevant
      services provided to the family include: Mental Health counseling,
      substance abuse counseling, and parenting courses.

The court went on to cite statutory factors R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e) before

going on to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that a grant of permanent custody

was in the best interests of the children.

               Mother appeals, presenting two assignments of error for our review:

      I. The trial court’s award of permanent custody and termination of the
      appellant’s parental rights is against the manifest weight of the
      evidence.

      II. The trial court erred when it allowed hearsay testimony concerning
      statements about abuse allegedly made by appellant’s minor children.

Law and Analysis

I. Manifest Weight

               Mother’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court’s award

of permanent custody to the agency and the termination of her parental rights was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Mother argues that the

court’s termination of her parental rights was against the manifest weight of the

evidence because the alleged abuse was poorly described in the record, there was

little evidence to suggest that the children’s emotional and behavioral problems had
improved while in agency custody, and the agency’s allegations that Mother was not

benefiting from case plan services were unsupported by the record.

               A parent has a fundamental interest in the care and custody of his

children. In re L.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343, ¶ 20.

However, parental rights are not absolute: “‘The natural rights of a parent are always

subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or controlling

principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th

Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

“By terminating parental rights, the goal is to create ‘a more stable life’ for dependent

children and to ‘facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.’” In re R.G.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104434, 2016-Ohio-7897, ¶ 21, quoting In re N.B., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, citing In re Howard, 5th Dist.

Tuscarawas No. 85 A10-077, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 5 (Aug. 1, 1986).

               On a motion for permanent custody, a juvenile court must satisfy the

two-prong test set forth in R.C. 2151.414 before it can terminate parental rights and

grant permanent custody to the agency. The juvenile court must find by clear and

convincing evidence that any one of the conditions set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)

through (e) apply and that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent

custody to the agency. In re R.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108537, 2020-Ohio-3032,

¶ 19-20.

               Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “‘that measure or

degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,” but not
to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal

cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538,

2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469,

120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

              The juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that

one of the following five conditions applies under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1):

      (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children service agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
      of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
      temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
      child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

      (b) The child is abandoned.

      (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who
      are able to take permanent custody.

      (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
      children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
      or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child
      has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
      services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
      months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
      division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
      previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
      state.

      (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents
      from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated
      an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions
      by any court in this state or another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

               Here, Mother does not dispute that the court satisfied the first prong

by finding, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the children were in the

temporary custody of CCDCFS for “twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-

two month period.” At the time of trial, the children had been in agency custody for

over two years. Instead, Mother challenges the second prong, which requires a

juvenile court to find that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.

               R.C. 2151.414(D) provides a list of factors for the court to consider in

determining the best interest of the child. Here, the court considered the factors in

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e):

      (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
      parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
      providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

      (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
      the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
      child;

      (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
      been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
      agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
      a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division
      (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously
      in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state;

      (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
      whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
      permanent custody to the agency;
      (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
      apply in relation to the parents and child.

Specifically, the court’s journal entry referred to the children’s ongoing trauma

related to Mother and the fact that they were “frightened and hesitant to being in

her company.” The court also referred to the wishes of K.F. and T.F., stating that

they “voiced their concerns to their [social] worker and advised her that they do not

want to be around Mother” and moreover, refused to participate in family

counseling with Mother. The court also referred to the children’s custodial history

and secure placement with the foster parents.

              This, together with the ample evidence in the record of Mother’s

abuse of the children, shows that clear and convincing evidence supported the trial

court’s decision to grant the agency’s motion for permanent custody. Mother’s

arguments lack merit.

              While Mother argues that the alleged abuse is “extremely poorly

described” in the record, our review of the record reveals an extensive depiction of

Mother’s ongoing abuse of the children. Each witness testified, in varying degrees,

as to the nature of the abuse and its ongoing impact on the children. While the

children did not testify at trial, their wishes were communicated clearly through the

GAL’s testimony and multiple reports. Moreover, the record reflects that Mother

pleaded guilty to endangering children in a separate criminal case that resulted from

her abuse of the children. Mother’s assertions in her briefs are entirely at odds with

the overwhelming majority of the evidence in the record.
               Mother also attempts to misconstrue her children’s trauma responses

as evidence that, contrary to the agency workers’ testimony, the children were not

“improving” in their placement with Godmother. This is an extreme distortion of

the testimony and evidence in the record. Godmother, the children’s licensed

professional counselor, the agency social worker, and the GAL all testified as to how

the children’s behavioral issues were a direct result of their abuse at the hands of

Mother. Specifically, testimony was elicited that certain behavior correlated with

the children resuming contact with Mother, in the form of visitation, following the

termination of the no-contact order in place for the first year of this case. The

children’s emotional and behavioral issues that Mother attempts to use as evidence

that they are not thriving in agency custody were a product of their ongoing fear of

Mother. Finally, with respect to whether Mother has benefited from case plan

services, the record reflects that Mother had successfully engaged in numerous case

plan services. The record also reflects, however, that Mother was inconsistent with

mental health treatment and pled guilty to endangering the children. Furthermore,

even if Mother had met all of her case plan goals to the satisfaction of the agency and

the court, it is well established that

      [a] parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not
      substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to be
      removed — the case plan is simply a means to a goal, but not the goal
      itself. Hence, the courts have held that the successful completion of
      case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody
      to a social services agency.
In re S.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111081, 2022-Ohio-2277, ¶ 38 (internal citations

omitted). Here, Mother’s substantial compliance with the case plan clearly failed to

remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed. Therefore, the trial

court’s grant of permanent custody to the agency was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II. Hearsay

               In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court

erred when it allowed hearsay testimony concerning statements about abuse

allegedly made by the children. Specifically, Mother challenges testimony from

Godmother and Cirkvencic, over objection, regarding “stories” told by the children

about their alleged abuse at Mother’s hands.

               The rules of evidence apply to dispositional proceedings pursuant to

R.C. 2151.353(I). Nevertheless, a trial court has broad discretion in admitting or

excluding evidence, and absent an abuse of discretion and a showing of material

prejudice, a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be upheld. In re

C.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100532 and 100534, 2014-Ohio-2403, ¶ 37, citing In

re J.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 93240 and 93241, 2009-Ohio-6224, ¶ 67, citing

State v. Martin, 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 129, 483 N.E.2d 1157 (1985). Further, the

juvenile court is presumed to be able to disregard improper testimony. Id. at ¶ 38.

Therefore, the admission of hearsay testimony in parental rights cases, even if error,

is not considered prejudicial unless it is shown that the judge relied on improper
evidence in making their decision. Id., citing In re J.T., citing In re Lucas, 29 Ohio

App.3d 165, 504 N.E.2d 472 (3d Dist.1985).

               As an initial matter, we note that much of the testimony Mother

appears to be challenging was offered to provide an explanation for the children’s

ongoing behavioral and emotional issues, and not to prove that the children were

abused. Even if Mother is correct in her assertion that the testimony of Godmother

and Cirkvencic constituted inadmissible hearsay, she has failed to establish, or even

argue, that the trial court relied on this testimony in making its decision. This is

especially so where evidence of the children’s trauma-related behavioral issues

appeared throughout the record, and not just in the testimony from these two

witnesses, and evidence of the abuse the children suffered also appeared throughout

the record, including in the form of evidence regarding Mother’s convictions for

endangering children. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the trial court

abused its discretion in admitting testimony from Godmother and Cirkvencic as to

the children’s accounts of their abuse. Therefore, Mother’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR