Court Opinion

ID: 2963671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:45.796945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:44.634151
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 94-2262

                                 CAROL SAWYER PARKS,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                        FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
                        AS RECEIVER FOR OLYMPIC INTERNATIONAL
                               BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                              and Selya, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                _____________________

               David G.  Hanrahan, with whom  Ross D. Ginsberg  and Gilman,
               __________________             ________________      _______
          McLaughlin & Hanrahan, were on brief for appellant.
          _____________________
               Jaclyn C. Taner, Counsel, with whom Ann S. Duross, Assistant
               _______________                     _____________
          General Counsel,  Colleen B. Bombardier, Senior  Counsel, John P.
                            _____________________                   _______
          Parker, Senior Attorney,  and Juanita L.  Dean, Counsel, were  on
          ______                        ________________
          brief for appellee, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 13, 1995
                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.    Plaintiff-appellant  Carol
                    TORRUELLA,  Chief  Judge.
                                ____________

          Sawyer Parks filed suit  in the United States District  Court for

          Massachusetts  to  enjoin   defendant-appellee  Federal   Deposit

          Insurance Company ("FDIC") from  enforcing a subpoena duces tecum
                                                                _____ _____

          seeking  Parks'  personal  financial  papers and  records.    The

          district  court  granted  the  FDIC's motion  to  dismiss  Parks'

          complaint, and for summary  enforcement of the subpoena.   Parks'

          appeal  of   that  decision  presents  the   following  important

          question:    Does  the Fourth  Amendment's  proscription  against

          unreasonable searches and seizures require the FDIC to articulate

          some quantum  of  individualized suspicion  of wrongdoing  before

          subpoenaing a citizen's private financial papers?  Relying on the

          Supreme   Court's  long-held   distinction  between   the  Fourth

          Amendment rights accorded private --  as opposed to corporate  --

          papers, we answer in the affirmative.  Because the district court

          did not review the subpoena under the standard we announce today,

          we  reverse and  remand for  further proceedings  consistent with

          this opinion.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    The FDIC insures deposits in financial institutions and

          is  authorized  by  statute  to  act  as  receiver   for  insured

          institutions  that  fail  and  are  closed  by  their  chartering

          authority.  12 U.S.C.     1811, 1821(c)(2) & (3).  When  the FDIC

          is appointed  receiver for a  failed institution, it  succeeds by

          law  to  "all  rights, titles,  powers,  and  privileges" of  the

          institution's officers  and directors with respect  to the assets

                                         -2-

          of the institution.  Id. at   1821(d)(2)(A).  As a receiver,  the
                               __

          FDIC  is authorized to collect all obligations and moneys owed to

          failed  institutions  for   the  benefit  of  the   institution's

          creditors and shareholders.   Id.   1821(d)(2)(B).  To facilitate
                                        __

          this  function,  Congress  has   authorized  the  FDIC  to  issue

          subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum "for purposes of carrying out
                                  _____ _____

          any  power,  authority,  or  duty  with  respect  to  an  insured

          depository  institution (including determining  any claim against

          the institution and determining and  realizing upon any assets of

          any   person  in   the  course  of   collecting  money   due  the

          institution). . . ."  Id.    1818(n), 1821(d)(2)(I)(i).  The FDIC
                                __

          is empowered to avoid fraudulent transfers, assert claims against

          directors and  officers, and seek court  orders attaching assets.

          Id.    1821(d)(17), 1821(k),  1821(d)(18).  In addition, Congress
          __

          directs  the FDIC, generally, to maximize the return for the sale

          of assets, and to minimize losses.  Id.   1821(d)(13)(E).
                                              __

                    Ms. Parks was a  director of Olympic International Bank

          and Trust  Company ("Olympic") from  May 1987 through  July 1990.

          On June 26, 1992, Olympic was declared insolvent and the FDIC was

          appointed its receiver.   On June  28, 1994, the  FDIC issued  an

          Order of Investigation to  determine whether (1) former directors

          and officers may be liable as a result of any actions or failures

          to act which may have affected Olympic; (2) pursuit of litigation

          would be  cost effective, considering the extent of the potential

          defendants' ability to pay  a judgment; (3) the FDIC  should seek

          to avoid  a transfer of assets;  and (4) the FDIC  should seek an

                                         -3-

          attachment of assets.

                    On  July 28,  1994, the  FDIC issued  a subpoena  duces
                                                                      _____

          tecum to Ms. Parks requesting the following information: 
          _____

                    1.   Your current financial statement and all
                    financial statements listing your  assets and
                    liabilities, (alone or with others).

                    2.   All financial statements of your spouse.

                    3.   All credit applications submitted by you
                    or your spouse, alone  or with others, to any
                    depository institution or any other person or
                    entity.

                    4.   All  records   prepared,  generated,  or
                    received on or  after August 1, 1993  through
                    August 1,  1994, referring or relating to the
                    source  and amount of  any income received by
                    you  or on  your  behalf,  including but  not
                    limited  to  all wages,  salary, commissions,
                    bonuses, interest and dividend  payments, and
                    any other form of income received by you.

                    5.   All federal, state and local tax returns
                    filed by you  either individually or  jointly
                    with  another,  along   with  all  forms  and
                    schedules  filed  with   such  returns   from
                    January 1, 1989 through April 15, 1994.

                    6.   All  records   prepared,  generated,  or
                    received from August  1, 1993 through  August
                    1, 1994  which  refer or  relate  to  stocks,
                    bonds,   securities   or  other   investments
                    currently  owned  by  individually   or  with
                    others,  including  but  not limited  to  any
                    statements showing their value.

                    7.   All  documents  that  reflect, refer  or
                    relate to  any  financial, real  or  personal
                    property  transactions,  including  cash,  in
                    which you,  or anyone acting  on your behalf,
                    or under your control or influence, have been
                    involved, (except as  the attorney,  employee
                    or agent of another party  on transactions in
                    which you had no personal interest), having a
                    value  of  $5,000  or  more,  per  person  or
                    organization  per  year,  including, but  not
                    limited to, the following:

                                         -4-

                      a. all   real   and   personal   property
                      purchases,  sales  or transfers,  with or
                      without consideration;
                      b. all trust participants;
                      c. mortgages,  trusts  or other  liens on
                      security  interests obtained  or supplied
                      to any third party;
                      d. lawsuits; and
                      e. repossessions and returns.

                    8.   All documents referring  or relating  to
                    any  transfer of  assets exceeding  $5,000 to
                    any  entity, account, place or person located
                    outside the United States of America.

                    9.   All records referring or relating to any
                    interest  you hold  in any  real personal  or
                    other  type of  property exceeding  $5,000 in
                    value not described above.

                    10.  All documents referring  or relating  to
                    any  transfer or  assets exceeding  $5,000 to
                    any entity, account,  place or person located
                    outside the United States of America.

                    11.  All records referring or relating to any
                    interest  you hold  in any  real  personal or
                    other  type of  property exceeding  $5,000 in
                    value not described above.

                    Ms. Parks refused to produce the information.  Instead,

          she  filed a complaint  for declaratory and  injunctive relief in

          the United States District Court for Massachusetts arguing, among

          other things,  that compelled  production of the  documents would

          violate her rights under the Fourth Amendment.  The FDIC  filed a

          motion  to dismiss the complaint, and  for summary enforcement of

          the subpoena.   On the same  day that the FDIC  filed its motion,

          the district court,  without the benefit of a  hearing, or even a

          response from Parks, granted the FDIC's motion to dismiss and for

          summary  enforcement   of  the  subpoena.     We  granted  Parks'

          subsequent  motion to  stay enforcement  of the  subpoena pending

                                         -5-

          appeal.

                                         -6-

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                    Ms. Parks argues that  the FDIC subpoena constitutes an

          "unreasonable  search"  of   her  private  financial  papers   in

          violation of her rights  under the Fourth Amendment.   The Fourth

          Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their

          persons,  houses,  papers,   and  effects,  against  unreasonable

          searches  and seizures . . . ."   The Supreme Court has described

          the  subpoena as a "constructive" search, Oklahoma Press Pub. Co.
                                                    _______________________

          v.  Walling, 327 U.S. 186  (1945), which is  therefore subject to
              _______

          Fourth Amendment  limitations.  Donovan v. Lone  Steer, Inc., 464
                                          _______    _________________

          U.S. 408, 415 (1984); United States v.  Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
                                _____________     _______________

          632, 651  (1950)  ("[T]he 'right  to  be let  alone  -- the  most

          comprehensive of rights  and the right  most valued by  civilized

          men,' is not confined literally to searches and seizures as such,

          but extends as  well to  the orderly taking  under compulsion  of

          process . . . .") (citations omitted).  It is beyond dispute that

          Ms. Parks'  has  a "legitimate  expectation  of privacy"  in  her

          privately held  financial papers and  records, and thus  that her

          Fourth Amendment  rights are  implicated by the  FDIC's subpoena.

          See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Nixon v.
          ___ _____________    ________                            _____

          Admin.  of General Serv., 433 U.S.  425, 457-58 (1976) (President
          ________________________

          has  legitimate expectation  of privacy  in his  private papers).

          Cf.  United States  v. Miller,  425 U.S.  435, 440-44  (1975) (no
          __   _____________     ______

          Fourth  Amendment   interest  of  depositor   implicated  because

          financial papers  ceased to be "private  papers" when transferred

                                         -7-

          to bank).1

                    The question  then becomes whether the  subpoena issued

          by the FDIC  was "reasonable"  within the meaning  of the  Fourth

          Amendment.  Florida  v. Jimeno,  500 U.S. 248,  250 (1991)  ("The
                      _______     ______

          touchstone of  the Fourth Amendment  is reasonableness."); United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) ("The purpose of the
          ______    ________

          Fourth   Amendment  is   to  prevent   unreasonable  governmental

          intrusions  into the privacy  of one's person,  house, papers, or

          effects.").  Our  review of  the relevant case  law persuades  us

          that,   although   the  FDIC   met   the   lenient  standard   of

          reasonableness for administrative subpoenas of corporate records,
                                                         _________

          it failed  to meet the  stricter standard of  reasonableness that

          applies  to  administrative  subpoenas  of  personal  papers  and
                                                      ________

          records.

                                          I.
                                          I.

                    The FDIC asserts that the only constraints on its power

          to subpoena an individual's private financial papers are that the

          investigation  be   within   its  authority,   the  subpoena   be
                              
          ____________________

          1  The Supreme Court has recognized that:

                      Of all the rights of the citizen, few are
                      of greater importance  or more  essential
                      to his peace and happiness than the right
                      of personal security, and  that involves,
                      not merely protection  of his person from
                      assault,  but  exemption  of his  private
                                _______________________________
                      affairs,  books,  and  papers   from  the
                      _________________________________________
                      inspection   and   scrutiny  of   others.
                      ________________________________________
                      Without the enjoyment of this  right, all
                      others would lose half their value.

          Interstate Commerce Comm'n  v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447,  479 (1894)
          __________________________     _______
          (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

                                         -8-

          sufficiently  definite, and the information reasonably relevant.2

          The  FDIC relies on our decision in  United States v. Comley, 890
                                               _____________    ______

          F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1989), where we stated that:

                         In  general,  an  agency  subpoena  is
                      enforceable if it is for a proper purpose
                      authorized  by Congress,  the information
                      sought  is relevant  to that  purpose and
                      adequately   described,   and   statutory
                      procedures are followed in the subpoena's
                      issuance.  .  .  .     "As  long  as  the
                      investigation  is   within  the  agency's
                      authority,  the  subpoena   is  not   too
                      indefinite, and the information sought is
                      reasonably  relevant, the  district court
                      must enforce an administrative subpoena."

          Id. at 541 (internal  citations omitted) (quoting EEOC v.  Tempel
          __                                                ____     ______

          Steel Co., 814 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1987)).   Comley, however,
          _________                                        ______

          concerned  corporate papers,  not private  papers.   As explained

          below,  the  Supreme  Court  has long  recognized  a  distinction

          between the two.

                    Comley relied on United States  v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48,
                    ______           _____________     ______

          57-58 (1964), which concerned a challenge by a corporate taxpayer

          to a request  by the IRS  to produce corporate  tax records.   In
                                               _________

          rejecting the  taxpayer's contention that the  IRS must establish

          probable  cause  of  wrongdoing  as a  prerequisite  to  judicial

          enforcement  of the request, the  Powell Court relied  on the two
                                            ______

          cases principally relied on  here by the FDIC --  Oklahoma Press,
                                                            ______________

          327 U.S. 186  and Morton Salt 338 U.S. 632.   Both cases involved
                            ___________

          corporate records, a fact  the Supreme Court evidently considered
                              
          ____________________

          2  As noted previously, the FDIC is empowered to avoid fraudulent
          transfers, assert claims against directors and officers, and seek
          court  orders attaching  assets.   Id.     1821(d)(17),  1821(k),
                                             __
          1821(d)(18).

                                         -9-

          of paramount importance in analyzing the Fourth Amendment issue.

                    In   Oklahoma   Press,  several   newspaper  publishing
                         ________________

          corporations  challenged  the right  of  a  government agency  to

          judicial  enforcement  of  subpoenas  duces  tecum for  corporate
                                                _____  _____

          records  absent a showing of wrongdoing.  In rejecting a probable

          cause standard  for issuance  of an administrative  subpoena, the

          Court  explained that  because  corporations are  created by  the

          state,  they  "are not  entitled  to  all  of the  constitutional

          protections which private individuals have."  Oklahoma Press, 327
                                                        ______________

          U.S. at 204-05.  The court made it quite plain  that its holding,

          and   the  standard   it  established   for  enforcement   of  an

          administrative subpoena  duces tecum under  the Fourth Amendment,
                                   _____ _____

          was  predicated on the fact that corporate, as opposed to private

          papers were at issue.

                         Historically private corporations have
                      been subject to  broad visitorial  power,
                      both in England and in this country.  And
                      it   long   has  been   established  that
                      Congress may  exercise wide investigative
                      power   over   them,  analogous   to  the
                      visitorial  power  of  the  incorporating
                      state, when their  activities take  place
                      within  or  affect  interstate  commerce.
                      Correspondingly it has been  settled that
                      _________________________________________
                      corporations  are not entitled  to all of
                      _________________________________________
                      the   constitutional   protections  which
                      _________________________________________
                      private   individuals   have   in   these
                      _________________________________________
                      matters.
                      _______

          Id. at 204-05 (footnotes omitted).
          __

                    The respondent corporations  in Morton Salt  challenged
                                                    ___________

          the Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC's") power to require them to

          file  reports  indicating  compliance  with a  federal  court  of

          appeal's  decree enforcing  an FTC  cease and  desist order.   In

                                         -10-

          language relied on heavily  by the FDIC  in this case, the  Court

          compared the subpoena  power of an administrative  agency "to the

          Grand  Jury, which does  not depend on a  case or controversy for

          power to  get evidence  but can  investigate merely on  suspicion

          that the  law is being  violated, or  even just because  it wants

          assurance  that it  is  not."   Id. at  642-43.   The comparison,
                                          __

          however,  was made  in  reference to  the corporate  respondent's

          claim  that  the   agency  had  invaded  the  court   of  appeals

          jurisdiction,  it  had nothing  to  do  with respondent's  Fourth

          Amendment  claim.3   The  Court  made  this clear:  "Whether  the

          Commission  has  invaded any  private  right  of respondents'  we

          consider under later rubrics.  Our only concern under the present

          heading  is whether the Commission's order infringes prerogatives

          of the court."  Id. at 643.
                          __

                    The Morton Salt Court did hold -- in the section of the
                        ___________

          opinion which actually concerned the Fourth Amendment -- that the

          FTC need not establish  wrongdoing by the respondent corporations

          in  order to subpoena their financial documents.  The Court based

          this decision on the fact that corporations do not merit the same

          degree of Forth Amendment protections as private individuals.

                         While   they   may  and   should  have
                      protection from unlawful demands  made in
                      the   name   of   public   investigation,
                      corporations can claim  no equality  with
                      _________________________________________
                      individuals  in the enjoyment  of a right
                      _________________________________________
                      to privacy.  They are endowed with public
                      __________
                      attributes.    They  have   a  collective
                      impact  upon  society,  from  which  they
                              
          ____________________

          3   The above quoted language came under a section of the opinion
          entitled "Invasion of Court of Appeals Jurisdiction".

                                         -11-

                      derive   the   privilege  of   acting  as
                      artificial entities.

          Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted).
          __

                    We  think the clear import of Oklahoma Press and Morton
                                                  ______________     ______

          Salt   is  that   the  standard   for  judicial   enforcement  of
          ____

          administrative subpoenas of a private citizen's private papers is

          stricter than that for corporate  papers.  Our research indicates

          that the Supreme Court has never extended the lenient Morton Salt
                                                                ___________

          standard  for administrative  subpoenas  of corporate  records to

          private  records.    Rather,  the Court  has  always  couched the

          standard in the context  of the corporate status of  the subpoena

          target.4  The FDIC  argues that we should nevertheless  apply the

          lenient  Morton Salt standard  governing administrative subpoenas
                   ___________

          of corporate papers to subpoenas for private papers because three

          federal appeals courts have recently done so.  We find  the cases

          cited by the FDIC unpersuasive.

                    In  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Walde,  18 F.3d 943 (D.C.
                        ______________________    _____

          Cir.  1994),  the  court implicitly  held  that  the  RTC is  not

          required to articulate an  individualized suspicion of wrongdoing

          when  it subpoenas  private  records  for determining  liability,

                              
          ____________________

          4  For example, in  Donovan, supra, the Court stated  that, "when
                              _______  _____
          an administrative agency  subpoenas corporate  books or  records,
                                              _________
          the Fourth  Amendment requires that the  subpoena be sufficiently
          limited in scope, relevant in purpose,  and specific in directive
          so that compliance will no be unreasonably burdensome."  464 U.S.
          at 415  (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)
                           ___    _______________
          and citing Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652-53).
              ______ ___________

                                         -12-

          avoiding asset  transfers, and  freezing  assets.   Id. at  946.5
                                                              __

          The court's discussion  of this  issue begins and  ends with  its

          quoting  of the Morton Salt standard  for judicial enforcement of
                          ___________

          an administrative subpoena.   The court completely ignores Morton
                                                                     ______

          Salt's sharp  distinction between corporate  and private  papers.
          ____

          See id. at 946.  Walde,  then, is unpersuasive to the extent that
          ___ __           _____

          it  ignores  the Supreme  Court's  explicit  recognition in  both

          Oklahoma  Press and  Morton  Salt that  private financial  papers
          _______________      ____________

          deserve  stricter  Fourth  Amendment  protection  than  corporate

          papers.

                    In  In  re McVane,  44 F.3d  1127  (2d Cir.  1995), the
                        _____________

          Second  Circuit concluded  that  "although the  Morton Salt  case
                                                          ___________

          recognized that individuals enjoy  greater rights of privacy than

          do  corporations, courts  have nevertheless  applied  the lenient

          Morton  Salt test  to administrative  subpoenas seeking  personal
          ____________

          records."  Id. at 1137.  The court cited two cases as examples of
                     __

          this  seemingly  anomalous  practice  -- Walde  and  the  Supreme
                                                   _____

          Court's decision in United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989).
                              _____________    ______

                              
          ____________________

          5   As noted previously,  these three areas  of investigation are
          authorized by statute.   The court held, however, that  the RTC's
          fourth asserted  area of  investigation -- determining  the cost-
          effectiveness  of a potential lawsuit -- is not authorized by its
          statutory directive  to  maximize  the return  for  the  sale  of
          assets, and  to  minimize  losses.   Id.  at  949;  12  U.S.C.   
                                               __
          1821(d)(13)(E).   The court  therefore held  that when  issuing a
          subpoena for this purpose,  the RTC must demonstrate at  least an
          articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.  Id.  See also In Re McVane,
                                                __   ________ ____________
          44 F.3d 1127,  1139-40 (2d  Cir. 1995) (holding  that, absent  at
          least an articulable suspicion  that a former director  is liable
          to  the  failed  bank,   determining  the  cost-effectiveness  of
          litigation  is not  a  proper  purpose  for  the  issuance  of  a
          subpoena).

                                         -13-

          As noted, Walde  sheds little  light on this  subject because  it
                    _____

          ignores  the Morton  Salt Court's  distinction between  corporate
                       ____________

          documents and personal records.   At least, however, Walde  is on
                                                               _____

          point; Stuart is not.
                 ______

                    Stuart concerned a treaty between the United States and
                    ______

          Canada  that  obliged  the United  States  to  obtain  and convey

          information to Canadian authorities to assist them in determining

          a Canadian taxpayer's income tax liability.  The respondents were

          Canadian citizens  and residents who maintained  bank accounts in

          the United States.  They challenged  the authority of the IRS  to

          issue an administrative  summons to their bank  for their private

          financial   documents,  pursuant   to   a  request   by  Canadian

          authorities,  without  first determining  that  the Canadian  tax

          investigation  had reached a  stage analogous  to a  domestic tax

          investigation's referral  to the Justice Department  for criminal

          prosecution.   489 U.S. at 357.   The Fourth Amendment  was never

          raised  as a  defense by  the  respondent taxpayers;  indeed, the

          Fourth Amendment is  never even mentioned in  the Stuart opinion.
                                                            ______

          The  reason is manifest.   Because the documents  were located at

          the  bank,  and  had thus  been  exposed  to  third parties,  the

          respondents  had  no  reasonable  expectation  of  privacy,  and,

          consequently, no Fourth Amendment interest in the documents.  See
                                                                        ___

          Securities  and Exchange Comm'n  v. O'Brien, Inc.,  467 U.S. 735,
          _______________________________     _____________

          743  (1984)  (Fourth  Amendment  does   not  protect  information

          communicated to a third party); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
                                          _____________    ______

          727,  731-32  (1979) (no  legitimate  expectation  of privacy  in

                                         -14-

          documents  voluntarily turned  over  to bank);  United States  v.
                                                          _____________

          Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1975) (depositor has no expectation
          ______

          of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth Amendment interest" in

          financial records  retained by  bank).   Stuart thus provides  no
                                                   ______

          support for the proposition asserted here by the FDIC.

                    The FDIC  also directs us to the Third Circuit's recent

          decision in Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corp. v.  Wentz, 1995  WL
                      _________________________________     _____

          329921 (3d Cir. 1995).  Wentz is the only administrative subpoena
                                  _____

          case we have found that contains more than a passing reference to

          the distinction  between corporate and private  papers.  Contrary

          to the FDIC's assertions,  however, we think it provides  as much

          support for Parks' position as that of the FDIC.

                    In  Wentz, the  court upheld  an FDIC  subpoena  of the
                        _____

          personal financial documents of  former officers and directors of

          a failed bank.  The court began by citing the lenient Morton Salt
                                                                ___________

          test for enforcement  of an administrative  subpoena.  The  court

          recognized,  however,   that   "[w]hen  personal   documents   of

          individuals, as contrasted with business records of corporations,

          are  the  subject  of  the  subpoena,  privacy  concerns  must be

          considered."   Id. at *2 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599
                         __                ______    ___

          (1977)).  The court  then balanced the governmental need  for the

          information against  the respondents'  privacy interest  in their

          personal  financial  documents,  and concluded  that  the  public

          interest   in  "safeguarding   the  FDIC's   legislative  mandate

          outweighs the  minimal intrusion into the  privacy that surrounds

          the directors' personal financial records . . . ."  Id. at *4.
                                                              __

                                         -15-

                    Wentz  recognized that  subpoenas  for  privately  held
                    _____

          financial   documents  implicate  privacy   concerns  and  should

          therefore  be evaluated  by  a stricter  standard than  corporate

          documents.   As  explained below,  we agree  with Wentz  that the
                                                            _____

          proper inquiry requires a balancing between the governmental need

          to search and  the privacy  interests of the  subpoena target.6  

          Where we  part company with Wentz  is solely in  the mechanics of
                                      _____

          the balancing itself.  We address this issue below.7

                                         II.
                                         II.

                    The  FDIC  asserts the  power  to  rummage through  the

          financial papers of  private citizens based on  nothing more than

          the hope that illegal conduct might be revealed.  We do not think

          that Ms.  Parks  waived  her Fourth  Amendment  interest  in  her

          private  papers by  serving  on  the  board  of  directors  of  a

          federally  regulated bank.   See  In re Sealed  Case, 42  F.3d at
                                       ___  __________________

          1418.   Moreover, we think  it inconceivable that  the Framers of

          the  Constitution, who  knew so  well and  cared so  deeply about

          arbitrary governmental interference in private citizen's affairs,

          would  countenance  such  unbridled  power  in  the  hands  of an

          administrative agency.   See Camara v. Municipal  Court, 387 U.S.
                                   ___ ______    ________________

          523,  528 (1967) (the "basic purpose" of the Fourth Amendment "is
                              
          ____________________

          6   Interestingly, although Wentz  did not explicitly  state that
                                      _____
          the  respondent's  privacy  interest   derived  from  the  Fourth
          Amendment,  the  court  posited  what  is  essentially  a  Fourth
          Amendment reasonableness test.

          7  Other  federal court of  appeals cases cited  by the FDIC  are
          inapposite because, like Comley,  they concern corporate records.
                                   ______
          See, e.g., Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. RTC,
          ___  ____  ______________________________________________    ___
          5 F.3d 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

                                         -16-

          to  safeguard the  privacy  and security  of individuals  against

          arbitrary invasions by government officials").  As Justice Holmes

          observed:

                      Anyone who respects the spirit as well as
                      the letter of  the Fourth Amendment would
                      be   loath   to  believe   that  Congress
                      intended   to   authorize   one  of   its
                      subordinate  agencies  to  sweep all  our
                      traditions  into the  fire and  to direct
                      fishing  expeditions into  private papers
                      on the possibility that they may disclose
                      evidence of crime.  We do not discuss the
                      question  whether it  could  do so  if it
                      tried,  as  nothing  short  of  the  most
                      explicit  language  would  induce  us  to
                      attribute to Congress that intent.

          Federal  Trade Comm'n v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-
          _____________________    ____________________

          06 (1924) (citation omitted).8

                    The question that remains  is what quantum of suspicion

          should be required for judicial  enforcement of an FDIC  subpoena

          of   an   individual's   private   financial   papers.      Since

          reasonableness is the touchstone,  our inquiry requires a careful

          balancing  of "the  nature and  quality of  the intrusion  on the

          individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of

          the  governmental interests  alleged  to justify  the intrusion."

          United States v.  Place, 462  U.S. 696, 703  (1983); Camara,  387
          _____________     _____                              ______

          U.S.  at  534-35  (1967).   In  this  case  there are  compelling

                              
          ____________________

          8    The   dissent  relies   heavily  upon  the   fact  that   an
          administrative subpoena, unlike a search in the criminal context,
          is not  self-executing.  Whatever relevance  this distinction may
          have  in the ordinary case,  it surely has none  in this one.  As
          noted previously, the district court granted the FDIC's motion to
          dismiss,  and for summary enforcement of the subpoena on the same
          day  the  motion  was  filed.    Ms.  Parks  thus  never  had  an
          opportunity to be heard on the motion, or even to respond to it.

                                         -17-

          interests on both sides.   There is  a strong public interest  in

          promptly resolving  the affairs of  insolvent banks on  behalf of

          their creditors and depositors.  Moreover, the FDIC's legislative

          mandate is  clear with respect to  avoiding fraudulent transfers,

          attaching   assets,  and   generally  asserting   claims  against

          directors  and officers  of  failed financial  institutions.   12

          U.S.C.    1821(d)(17), 1821(d)(18), 1821(k).   On the other hand,

          private  citizens have  a significant  expectation of  privacy in

          their  personally held  financial papers.   Indeed,  "papers" are

          specifically listed in the text of the Fourth Amendment.

                    We  think the significant  public interest in resolving

          the affairs  of failed institutions,  as reflected by  the FDIC's

          legislative mandate, deserves considerable weight.  Consequently,

          we  conclude  that the  "balancing  of  governmental and  private

          interests suggests that the  public interest is best served  by a

          Fourth Amendment  standard of reasonableness that  stops short of

          probable cause."  New Jersey v. T.L.O., 325 U.S. 334, 341 (1985).
                            __________    ______

          In  such   cases,  the  Supreme   Court  has  often   utilized  a

          reasonableness   standard  which   requires  the   government  to

          articulate a reasonable suspicion of  wrongdoing by the target of

          the search.  See, e.g., id.  at 342; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
                       ___  ____  __           ________    ______

          873, 881 (1979);  United States v. Mart nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 648,
                            _____________    _______________

          654-55 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881
                         _____________    ______________

          (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  We think this standard
                  _____    ____

          strikes   the  appropriate  balance  between  protecting  private

          citizens' private  papers and  enabling the FDIC  to fulfill  its

                                         -18-

          statutory mandate.9

                    The district  court did  not consider whether  the FDIC

          had articulated reasonable suspicion  of wrongdoing by Ms. Parks.

          Moreover,  we think  that the  affidavit supplied  by one  of the

          FDIC's investigators, which was on record at  the district court,

          does  not provide  such an  articulable suspicion  of wrongdoing.

          The affidavit simply states that the bank lost over eight million

          dollars  as a result of several insider loans which were approved

          or ratified by  the directors of Olympic,  including Parks, after

          the  bank had  received  regulatory warnings  regarding its  loan

          practices.  The investigator concludes that the nature and extent

          of the losses suggests that the directors "were grossly negligent

          and violated their fiduciary duty of loyalty to Olympic in making

          the insider loans."

                    The  affidavit articulates  a generalized  suspicion of

          wrongdoing by the  bank directors,  but fails  to articulate  the

          required individualized suspicion of  wrongdoing by the target of

          the subpoena,  Ms. Parks.  Cf.  Ybarra v. Illinois,  444 U.S. 85,
                                     __   ______    ________

                              
          ____________________

          9    In  conducting  this  balancing,  the  Wentz  court,  supra,
                                                      _____          _____
          apparently  concluded  that  the  FDIC need  not  articulate  any
          quantum  of suspicion because the targets of the subpoena had not
          shown that the information  contained in their personal financial
          records was of such a sensitive nature  that they were "likely to
          suffer  any adverse  effects from  disclosure."   Wentz, 1995  WL
                                                            _____
          329921, at *4 (quoting United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
                                 _____________    ________________________
          638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d  cir. 1980)).  But once it  is conceded, as
          it  must be,  that  a citizen  has  a legitimate  expectation  of
          privacy  in  privately  held  financial papers,  see  supra,  the
                                                           ___  _____
          question  is  not  whether  the individual  will  suffer  adverse
          effects  from disclosure,  but whether  the government  has shown
                                                  ______________
          adequate justification  for searching  the documents.   This, one
          would think, is the whole point of the Fourth Amendment.

                                         -19-

          93, 97 (1980); United States v. Lott, 870 F.2d 778, 783 (1st Cir.
                         _____________    ____

          1989).   See also United States v.  Jaramillo, 25 F.3d 1146, 1150
                   ________ _____________     _________

          (2d  Cir. 1994)  ("any  invasion of  a person's  Fourth Amendment

          interests must be justified at least by 'specific and articulable

          facts'  directed  to  the  person  whose  interests   are  to  be

          invaded").   Similarly, in  McVane, the  court  rejected an  FDIC
                                      ______

          subpoena of  certain former  directors' familial records  because

          the  FDIC  affidavit  stated   only  that  another  director  has

          transferred assets  to family members.   The court  reasoned that

          "the FDIC has articulated  no grounds for suspecting that  any of

          these  Directors  (as  opposed   to  the  unnamed  'other  former
          _____

          director') has transferred assets to family members."  McVane, 44
                                                                 ______

          F.3d at 1139.

                    The FDIC has not shown  that Parks received an  insider

          loan or otherwise benefited from such a loan to another director.

          Cf.  Resolution Trust  Corp.  v. Adams,  869 F.  Supp.  1, 3  n.4
          ___  _______________________     _____

          (D.D.C. 1994) (respondent directors paid themselves approximately

          $8  million in  preferred dividends  of the  failed institution).

          Nor  has the  FDIC  shown  "a  suspicious  asset  transfer  or  a

          questionable payment  by the  target, or deposition  testimony of

          other  former officers  and  directors"  casting  suspicion  upon

          Parks.  Walde, 18 F.3d at 949.  Cf. In Re Sealed Case, 42 F.3d at
                  _____                   __  _________________

          1417 (finding  articulable suspicion due to  respondent directors

          involvement in unusual transfers "between two companies that they

          owned within a bank  that they controlled").  Under  a reasonable

          suspicion standard, if the FDIC has no "specific basis . . . upon

                                         -20-

          which  to suspect that the target engaged in wrongdoing, then the
                                 __________

          subpoena  cannot be enforced."   Walde, 18 F.3d  at 949 (emphasis
                                           _____

          added).  Based on the  current record, we conclude that the  FDIC

          has  failed to articulate specific  facts for suspecting that Ms.

          Parks has engaged in any wrongdoing with respect to her role as a

          director  of Olympic.    Until the  FDIC  can do  so, the  Fourth

          Amendment dictates  that her privately held  financial papers are

          just that -- private.10

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    The Fourth Amendment requires that  the FDIC articulate

          an individualized suspicion of wrongdoing  by the petitioner as a

          prerequisite to  judicial enforcement  of a subpoena  duces tecum
                                                                _____ _____

          seeking her privately  held financial documents.  The judgment of

          the district court is therefore  reversed, and the case  remanded
                                           ________                ________

          for further proceedings to determine whether the FDIC can in fact

          meet this standard.

                           -- Dissenting Opinion follows --

                              
          ____________________

          10   Of course, petitioner  cannot assert any  privacy claim with
          respect  to any documents that  she has already  disclosed to the
          public.   See  Nixon, 425  U.S. at 459  (citing United  States v.
                    ___  _____                            ______________
          Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973)).
          ________

                                         -21-

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge (dissenting).  I believe that this
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
                           _____________

          case is less exotic than the majority suggests.  The FDIC, acting

          within its  statutory authority, 12  U.S.C.   1821(d),  issued an

          order of  investigation to determine, inter  alia, whether former
                                                _____  ____

          directors and  officers of  a failed bank,  Olympic International

          Bank and  Trust Co., may  be liable  as a result  of any  acts or

          omissions  affecting  Olympic.    The  agency  then  directed  an

          administrative  subpoena to  appellant  Parks  (a former  Olympic

          director).  The record makes manifest that the agency issued this

          subpoena in  good faith and for a  statutorily permitted purpose.

          The  majority concedes,  ante at  7, that  the subpoena  "met the
                                   ____

          lenient  standard of  reasonableness"  imposed on  administrative

          subpoenas  under  longstanding case  law.    In  my  view,  these

          validations  are  sufficient.   Precedent  does  not support  the

          additional  limitation  that  the  majority  today  unveils,  the

          Constitution  does  not  require   that  limitation,  and  policy

          considerations counsel against its imposition.

                                          A
                                          A

                    In  the   first  place,  the   majority's  position  is

          completely  unprecedented.   An  administrative  subpoena is  not

          self-executing  and is, therefore, not  itself a search;  it is a

          direction  to  produce  documents and/or  testimony,  subject  to

          judicial review should the subpoenaed  party balk.  See  Oklahoma
                                                              ___  ________

          Press Pub. Co.  v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195,  202 (1945); In re
          ______________     _______                                  _____

          Grand  Jury Subpoena Served Upon Simon Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 75-
          _______________________________________________

          79 (2d Cir.) (Friendly,  J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.  867 (1973).
                                        _____ ______

                                         -22-

          In  other words, a person upon whom an administrative subpoena is

          served   unlike a person subjected to, say, an actual search or a

          Terry  stop    has an  opportunity to  quash the  subpoena before
          _____

          producing the information.

                    At that stage, of course,  the Fourth Amendment can  be

          interposed as a bar to enforcement of the subpoena.   See Donovan
                                                                ___ _______

          v. Lone  Steer, Inc.,  464 U.S.  408, 415 (1984).   Until  today,
             _________________

          however,  no modern federal appellate court has ever held that an

          administrative subpoena which satisfies the traditional four-part

          test  (that   is,  a   subpoena  issued  after   all  appropriate

          administrative  steps  have been  taken,  for  a proper  purpose,

          seeking information that is relevant to that purpose and which is

          not within  the agency's possession) is  unenforceable or subject

          to curtailment solely on the ground that  it implicates "personal

          financial  records"  as  opposed  to "corporate  records."    The

          decisions with which I am familiar run uniformly to the contrary.

          See, e.g.,  RTC v. Frates,  ___ F.3d  ___, ___  (D.C. Cir.  1995)
          ___  ____   ___    ______

          [1995 WL 471777 at  *3] (rejecting articulable suspicion standard

          for enforcing RTC subpoena of personal financial records); In  re
                                                                     ______

          McVane,  44  F.3d 1127,  1136 (2d  Cir.  1995) (similar);  RTC v.
          ______                                                     ___

          Walde, 18 F.3d  943, 946-47  (D.C. Cir. 1994)  (similar); SEC  v.
          _____                                                     ___

          Knopfler,  658 F.2d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1981) (enforcing, on standard
          ________

          showing  for administrative  subpoenas,  SEC  subpoena issued  to

          individuals for personal financial records  relating to potential

          insider trading), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 908 (1982).
                            _____ ______

                    The majority,  without citing  a single case  on point,

                                         -23-

          abruptly departs from this established precedent.  The upshot  is

          to   create   a   singular  benchmark   against   which   certain

          administrative subpoenas henceforth will  have to be evaluated in

          the  First  Circuit    and  only  in the  First  Circuit.   I  am

          unwilling  to venture along this  rocky coast simply  to answer a

          siren's call.

                                          B
                                          B

                    My  principal substantive  objection to  the majority's

          approach is to the notion that the Fourth Amendment distinguishes

          between "personal financial records" and "corporate records" with

          regard  to  administrative  subpoenas.    To  be  sure,  language

          faithfully  quoted by the majority suggests  that, in an earlier,

          more  genteel era,  the Supreme  Court took  care to  confine its

          rulings  to  the  exigencies  of  the  particular  administrative

          subpoena cases then  before it    but those  cases, whether  read

          individually  or  in the  ensemble,  do  not constitute  anything

          approximating a  conclusive holding that the  privacy interest in

          personal  financial  records  must  always  be  accorded  greater

          respect  than a  corporation's privacy  interest in  its records.

          Indeed,  I  read the  language on  which  the majority  relies as

          denoting nothing more  than that the Court desired at the time to

          keep the question open.  And more  recent developments in the law

          have blurred  whatever distinction  these earlier cases  may have

          sought to preserve.

                    The  proof of  the pudding  is the  long line  of cases

          starting with United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964)   cases
                        _____________    ______

                                         -24-

          that  repeatedly have  sanctioned the  authority of  a particular

          agency, the  Internal Revenue  Service (IRS), to  issue summonses

          for  either personal or corporate records  on the minimal showing

          that the majority  today explicitly  rejects.  See  id. at  57-58
                                                         ___  ___

          (explaining that the IRS need  only "show that the  investigation

          will be  conducted pursuant  to a  legitimate  purpose, that  the

          inquiry  may  be relevant  to the  purpose, that  the information

          sought is not already within the [IRS's] possession, and that the

          administrative steps  required by the Code  have been followed").

          Though  Powell  itself dealt  with  a corporate  taxpayer,  it is
                  ______

          transpicuously  clear that  the  Powell standard  applies to  the
                                           ______

          production   of  private   financial   papers  and   records   of

          individuals, that is,  to the production of records pertaining to

          economic or fiscal activity (which, for simplicity's sake, I will

          henceforth call  financial records).   See, e.g., Ryan  v. United
                                                 ___  ____  ____     ______

          States,  379  U.S.  61,  62  (1964)  (upholding  IRS  summons  to
          ______

          individual  taxpayer "for the  reasons given in  United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Powell"); United  States v. McAnlis,  721 F.2d 334,  336-37 (11th
          ______    ______________    _______

          Cir.  1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1227 (1984); United States v.
                       _____ ______                        _____________

          Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 847-51 (5th Cir. 1969).
          _________

                    The  Powell standard remains both the  law of the land,
                         ______

          see, e.g., Tiffany  Fine Arts,  Inc. v. United  States, 469  U.S.
          ___  ____  _________________________    ______________

          310, 323  (1985), and the law of this circuit, see, e.g., Copp v.
                                                         ___  ____  ____

          United States, 968 F.2d 1435, 1437 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
          _____________                                       _____ ______

          113 S. Ct.  1257 (1993).   What is more,  Powell is the  building
                                                    ______

          block around which, up to now, our modern administrative subpoena

                                         -25-

          jurisprudence has been constructed.  See, e.g., United States  v.
                                               ___  ____  _____________

          Comley,  890 F.2d  539, 541  (1st Cir.  1991) (citing  Powell and
          ______                                                 ______

          applying Powell principles  to administrative subpoena issued  by
                   ______

          the Nuclear Regulatory  Commission); SEC v. Howatt, 525 F.2d 226,
                                               ___    ______

          229 (1st Cir. 1975) (same, with respect to subpoena issued by the

          SEC).  There  is no  valid reason why  this standard,  undiluted,

          should not  apply here.   If  Congress can authorize  the IRS  to

          issue summonses calling for  the production of personal financial

          records  on such a bareboned showing without running afoul of the

          Fourth  Amendment, then  it  is clear  to  me that  Congress  can

          authorize  other  agencies to  do the  same.   The cases  and the

          commentators  bear witness  to this  verity.   See, e.g.,  SEC v.
                                                         ___  ____   ___

          Kaplan, 397 F. Supp. 564, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (enforcing subpoena
          ______

          issued by SEC for personal  financial records of an  individual);

          Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure   4.13(e), at 383 (2d ed. 1987)
                           ________________

          (acknowledging rule).

                    Believing, as I  do, that an individual has  no greater

          (legitimate) expectation of privacy in her financial records than

          does a business, I see no reason to conduct the kind of balancing

          that the majority covets  in order to test the  reasonableness of

          an administrative subpoena that  seeks the production of personal

          financial records.  Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt, read together
                              ______________     ___________

          with  the  Powell-Ryan  line  of cases,  lead  inexorably  to the
                     ______ ____

          conclusion  that, to  borrow a  leaf from Gertrude  Stein's book,

          financial  records are financial  records are  financial records.

          This conclusion  holds  true whether  the  records belong  to  an

                                         -26-

          individual  or to  an  enterprise,  and administrative  subpoenas

          seeking such records  are per  se reasonable a  long as they  are

          lawfully   authorized,   relevant,  sufficiently   specific,  and

          procedurally unblemished.

                    Let me be  perfectly clear.  I do not  suggest that the

          minions of an administrative agency can roam at will, like a herd

          of zebra on the veldt, through an individual's personal papers or

          effects.  I am open  to the idea that  there may be a  heightened

          privacy interest in certain  non-business records (e.g., personal

          diaries, letters,  medical records,  and the like)  requiring, in

          turn, a more finely calibrated balance between public and private

          interests before a court lawfully can order such records produced

          in response to a summons.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Wentz, 55 F.3d 905,
                                     ___  ____  ____    _____

          908  (3d  Cir.  1995);  see  generally  LaFave,   supra,  at  383
                                  ___  _________            _____

          (suggesting that, "[i]n the  case of private individuals, perhaps

          the  mere relevance  standard  is sufficient  to protect  privacy

          interests in documents related to economic activity, but arguably

          purely  private  papers  should  be protected  by  requiring  the

          investigatory  body   to  meet  a   more  stringent   standard").

          Recognizing,  however, that  "[w]e  are not  so  outraged by  the

          intrusion on privacy that  accompanies the seizure of [financial]

          records as we  are by the  seizure of a  diary," Couch v.  United
                                                           _____     ______

          States,  409 U.S. 322,  350 (1973) (Marshall,  J., dissenting), I
          ______

          discern  no  constitutional   impediment  to  the  administrative

          subpoena that the FDIC served  on Parks.  Since the record  shows

          conclusively that the  FDIC issued the subpoena for  a legitimate

                                         -27-

          purpose (an investigation into, inter alia, whether Parks may  be
                                          _____ ____

          liable  to  the FDIC),11  that the  inquiry  is relevant  to that

          purpose, that the information requested is not already within the

          agency's  ken,  and  that  the necessary  procedural  bases  were

          touched, the subpoena should be enforced.

                                          C
                                          C

                    Apart  from the  fact  that  the  majority's  brand-new

          standard  is unmoored  both from  precedent  and from  the Fourth

          Amendment, the standard also  fares poorly on policy grounds.   I

          will not  dwell on  this aspect,  except to  note  that the  rule

          envisioned in the majority opinion is inconsistent with the bases

          of the modern administrative state.

                    Administrative investigations differ significantly from

          criminal   investigations:      government   agencies   typically

          investigate  in  order  to enforce  compliance  with  complicated

          structures  of  economic  regulation.    The  ability  to  obtain

          information from  regulated parties and those  persons in privity

          with them typically  is vital  to the success  of the  regulatory

          scheme.  See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338  U.S. 632, 642
                   ___ _____________    _______________

          (1950);  Oklahoma Press,  327 U.S.  at 216;  Stephen G.  Breyer &
                   ______________

          Richard B.  Stewart, Administrative  Law & Regulatory  Policy 975
                               ________________________________________

          (2d ed. 1985).   And it is  a fact of life  that agencies charged
                              
          ____________________

          11   In this instance, it is  immaterial that the FDIC's order of
          investigation listed other objects as well.   See ante at 3.  The
                                                        ___ ____
          requirement that an administrative subpoena  must be issued for a
          proper  purpose  is  satisfied in  the  case  of a  multi-purpose
          subpoena as long as any one of the underlying purposes is proper.
          See Tiffany Fine Arts, 469  U.S. at 324; FTC v. Carter,  636 F.2d
          ___ _________________                    ___    ______
          781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

                                         -28-

          with  regulating  economic   activity  often  cannot   articulate

          probable cause or even reasonable  suspicion that a violation has

          transpired without first examining documents reflecting a party's

          economic activity.   See Kenneth  C. Davis &  Richard J.  Pierce,
                               ___

          Jr., Administrative Law  Treatise    4.1, at 138  (3d ed.  1994).
               ____________________________

          This incipient problem   the need  to hitch the horse in front of

          the cart   is  frequently exacerbated because the  subpoena power

          has great  significance for  most administrative agencies  in the

          conduct of important public business.

                    Partially  for  that  reason  and partially  out  of  a

          concern for  separation of powers   it is trite but true that the

          Judicial Branch must respect the Executive Branch's  prerogatives

          to enforce the  laws, see, e.g.,  Howatt, 521 F.2d  at 229    the
                                ___  ____   ______

          courts  historically have had  a very  circumscribed role  in the

          oversight of  administrative subpoenas.  See,  e.g., Morton Salt,
                                                   ___   ____  ___________

          338 U.S. at 642-43; EEOC v. Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 668 F.2d 304,
                              ____    ______________________

          308-09  (7th Cir. 1981); Goodyear Tire  & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 122
                                   ___________________________    ____

          F.2d 450, 451 (6th Cir. 1941).  To this end, judicial proceedings

          regarding the enforcement  of such subpoenas  are intended to  be

          relatively  informal and  summary in  nature.   See Donaldson  v.
                                                          ___ _________

          United States,  400 U.S. 517,  529 (1971); Bay  Shipbuilding, 668
          _____________                              _________________

          F.2d  at 309.   The  court's sole  function is  to ensure  that a

          subpoena  is issued for a  proper purpose and  in compliance with

          the law.   See Comley, 890 F.2d at 541; FTC  v. Texaco, Inc., 555
                     ___ ______                   ___     ____________

          F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.)  (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S.  974
                                                _____ ______

          (1977).  By handing the targets of agency investigations a potent

                                         -29-

          new weapon, cf. SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467  U.S. 735, 750
                      ___ ___    ______________________

          (1984)  (rejecting  a  notice  requirement  for  third-party  SEC

          subpoenas in  part because  it "would substantially  increase the

          ability  of  persons   who  have  something  to  hide  to  impede

          legitimate  investigations  by  the  Commission"),  the  majority

          facilitates   the   insertion  of   monkey   wrenches  into   the

          administrative machinery, and creates  the potential not only for

          delaying   agency   probes   (thereby   further   eroding  agency

          effectiveness), but  also for  increasing the extent  of judicial

          intrusions into the agency sphere.

                    It is  clear that  Congress feared these  very dangers.

          Having written the FDIC's  organic statute broadly, requiring the

          agency  to  assess  the  conduct  of  officials  employed  by  or

          affiliated  with  federally  insured  banks  from  a  variety  of

          different perspectives, most of  which relate to the governmental

          interest in  minimizing the public's exposure  to financial loss,

          Congress vested generous,  easily enforceable  subpoena power  in

          the FDIC so that the agency could pursue its public mission.  See
                                                                        ___

          H.R.  Rep. No.  681(I), 101st  Cong., 2d  Sess. 170,  186 (1990),

          reprinted in  1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.  6472, 6576,  6592.   Without the
          _________ __

          ability  to use this power  as Congress intended    including the

          ability to subpoena individuals' personal financial records based

          on relevance and nothing more   the FDIC likely will be hamstrung

          in  its  efforts  to perform  the  full  range  of its  statutory

          responsibilities.     Thus,  the  majority's  suggested  standard

          (which, as I have explained, is mandated neither by precedent nor

                                         -30-

          by  constitutional doctrine) unaccountably undermines the ability

          of  the FDIC    and  every other  administrative agency     to do

          Congress's bidding, and thereby frustrates the congressional will

          for no  good reason.12   See Federal Maritime  Comm'n v. Port  of
                                   ___ ________________________    ________

          Seattle, 521 F.2d 431,  433 (9th Cir. 1975) (explaining  that the
          _______

          "very backbone  of an  administrative  agency's effectiveness  in

          carrying  out  the  congressionally mandated  duties  of industry

          regulation is the rapid exercise of the power to investigate").

                                          D
                                          D

                    Because  I  am   convinced  that   my  colleagues   are

          needlessly  infringing upon the  lawful powers  of administrative

          agencies,  and  because  I  fear  the  mischief  that this  well-

          intentioned effort  to resurrect  a moribund  view of the  Fourth

          Amendment may produce, I respectfully dissent.

                              
          ____________________

          12  This does not mean, of course, that I endorse, as a matter of
          policy,  either the FDIC's  penchant for riding  roughshod or its
          aggressive  use of administrative subpoenas.  But the rule of law
          requires  judges  to  subrogate  such  personal  reservations  to
          precedent  and reason.   After  all,  constitutional adjudication
          "must be an overriding judgment founded  on something much deeper
          and more  justifiable than personal  preference."  Sweezy  v. New
                                                             ______     ___
          Hampshire,   354  U.S.   234,   267  (1957)   (Frankfurter,   J.,
          _________
          concurring).

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