Court Opinion

ID: 9482407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:49:10.819772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:58.139141
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because the restriction of recross examination comports with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The most “damaging” evidence from Ronald Fino’s testimony on redirect examination was not new, so the district court had discretion to prohibit recross. And even if the court erred by imposing the prohibition, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).
Where new evidence is raised on redirect examination, the trial court must give the opposing party an opportunity to cross examine on the new matter. United States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 280 (3d Cir.1952). Otherwise the privilege of recross examination lies within the sound discretion of the court. 196 F.2d at 280. Riggi and Timpani argue that Fino’s redirect raised several new matters. Of these, the most “damaging” is the testimony that Riggi was the “boss or the acting boss of the DeCaval-cante family.” 1 App. 1006.
For all practical purposes, this testimony is not a new matter. The issue of Riggi’s affiliation with organized crime had been raised in the direct examinations of both Fino and Jesse Hyman. The overwhelming inference to be drawn from Fino’s direct testimony is that: Riggi was a prominent mobster with connections to the New York, Buffalo, and Cleveland Mafia organizations.
Discussions of the mob and Riggi’s role and influence in the Mafia permeated Fino’s direct examination. For example, in describing the manner in which Mafia members introduced others, Fino testified on direct:
Q. How did Sam Pieri introduce John M. Riggi to you?
A. He told John Riggi that my father was a friend of theirs, or a friend of ours, and that I was his son, a relative of a friend.
Q. What did that mean?
A. That meant that my father was a made man. It was how they would talk to each other, introduce people, made people, or—
App. 901 (emphasis added). Fino testified earlier that Sam Pieri was a capo in the Buffalo mob and that his father was “a soldier, became a capo, and eventually the acting boss of the Buffalo family.” App. 900, 870.
Fino also testified that Riggi was the “president for the Northern New Jersey Mason Tenders” and that he “was [the business manager] for Local 394.” App. 883, 886. When asked how persons obtain *1379such positions, Fino testified, “Usually through who they knew, organized crime people_ They would decide who became members of the union.” App. 890.
In a crucial exchange, Fino directly implicated Riggi as a organized crime figure. Fino testified:
Q. What was the purpose of your meeting with John Riggi?
A. Joseph Todaro, Jr. wanted me to see John Riggi to get his support for me because the Buffalo family wanted me to be the next vice president-regional manager.
Q. The Buffalo family wanted you to take the position of Mike Lorello as vice president-regional manager?
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. And what was the purpose of meeting with John Riggi for that?
A. To gain his support and to let him know of others that supported me.
* sfc * * jjc jjc
Q. What was discussed?
A. I discussed that, Joseph Todaro wanted me to see you for your [Rig-gi’s] support, and that Chicago, the family in Chicago was supporting me, and Arthur Coia in New England was supporting me and family up there, and then I also had support of Cleveland and Buffalo, Buffalo supporting me.
Q. When you say, for instance, the support of Cleveland and Buffalo, what support were you referring to?
A. Organized crime support. The families.
Q. And what was Joseph Todaro, Jr.’s position at that time?
A. He was the underboss in the Buffalo family.
Q. What did John Riggi have to say about that?
A. Well, he told me he would support me, but that he went on to express that those areas didn’t have any say-so on what takes place in New York and New Jersey, that that’s controlled by the families over here, and that Cleveland and those families already have to answer down here anyway.... He told me that “even though people, those guys look at me” — I don’t know if these were the exact words, words to this effect, “even though those people look at me as a boss, and I have to answer, too,” and he made the gesture over to New York City and winched his chin a little bit.
jjc jjc * Jfe jfc Jjc
Q. What did it [motion to chin] mean?
A. That was a motion that was given when we were talking about a powerful Mafia figure in the Genovese family-
App. 915-18 (emphasis added and quotation marks added for clarity). This testimony shows that Riggi is a mob boss, that he “supports” Fino’s bid for a new union position, and that even he has to answer to the New York Mafia. True, Fino did not say this as succinctly or plainly as he did on redirect, but he did say it.
The district court did not make its “no-recross” policy clear to counsel until after Fino’s redirect, but this does not change the fact that Riggi had a chance to cross examine on the issue. Although Fino’s testimony clearly implicated Riggi as a mobster, the defense chose not to squarely confront Fino on the issue. Instead they chose to impeach Fino by trying to show bias. The only foray into Riggi’s character or status was this question, “And do you remember commenting that my client was a quiet and humble man?” Fino answered, “Yes, that’s correct, I remember saying that. He is.” App. 967. The Confrontation Clause is not violated when defense counsel does not take, whether by design or neglect, an opportunity to cross examine on points he considered prejudicial to his client. See United States v. Howard, 751 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1984) (no violation of confrontation right when defendant declined for tactical reasons to cross examine).
Fino’s testimony on redirect was not to raise a new matter, but ostensibly to clarify the potential contradiction raised on cross examination.
Q. Do you recall on cross-examination you said that you had described John *1380M. Riggi as a quiet and humble man? Do you recall those words?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. In fact, during the time when you knew John M. Riggi, were you aware of John M. Riggi’s position in organized crime?
A. Yes, I was.
App. 1005. The testimony was elicited to rebut defendants’ attempt to impeach what was already said and to prevent jury confusion.
Aside from Fino, Hyman also testified to Riggi’s status in organized crime. He testified on direct, “Sam DeCavalcante was the boss of the [crime] family and that John Riggi was his underboss.” App. 1136. Thus Riggi and Timpani had at least two opportunities to cross examine assertions that Riggi was the “acting boss of the DeCavalcante family.” The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees an “opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give the defendants another opportunity to challenge the witnesses. See Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir.1987) (no violation of confrontation right when defense counsel was afforded more than an adequate opportunity to cross examine), modified on other grounds 830 F.2d 968.
But even if the district court erred, it was harmless because Fino’s testimony on redirect was immaterial to the offenses for which Riggi and Timpani were convicted, was corroborated by Hyman’s testimony, and was cumulative. In Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the Court said that upon finding error a reviewing court must consider “whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 106 S.Ct. at 1438.
The Court then set forth several factors to consider: “These factors include the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” 106 S.Ct. at 1438 (emphasis added). Because recross is to redirect as cross is to direct, these factors apply equally to recross examination.
First, Fino was an important witness for the prosecution. But his testimony on redirect is immaterial to whether Riggi or Timpani violated the Hobbs or Taft-Hartley Acts.2 Although that testimony was material, in fact crucial, to the RICO charges, both Riggi and Timpani were acquitted of those charges. Under the Hobbs Act, the “ability to intimidate” is not an element or a consideration as the majority argues. Maj. op. p. 1377, fn. 3. The Hobbs Act makes a threat a crime in and of itself regardless of whether it was viable. Moreover, the Taft-Hartley Act says absolutely nothing about violence; the illegality is requesting the money. Riggi and Timpani made threats to various people. That is clear. This testimony was immaterial. They violated the Taft-Hartley Act, and were properly convicted of it. In other words, the testimony does not go to prove any element of the charges of which Riggi and Timpani were found guilty. It simply was not a “material point.”
Second, Fino’s testimony is cumulative. Hyman gave the same testimony on his *1381direct examination: “Sam DeCavalcante was the boss of the [crime] family and that John Riggi was his underboss.” He testified in great detail as to his involvement with organized crime, his relationship with members of various crime gangs, and the relationship among their members, including the status of Riggi in the DeCavalcante organization. The defendants had ample opportunities to cross examine Hyman on these matters.
Third, that Hyman was “impeached” by evidence of bias is irrelevant because Fino corroborated much of his testimony on direct examination. Hyman testified that he was deeply involved in business dealings with mobsters, including Riggi. Fino corroborated this testimony:
Q. Do you know of a relationship between Jesse Hyman and the Defendant, John M. Riggi?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. How did you know about that?
A. From Sam Pieri.
Q. Who was Sam Pieri?
A. Sam Pieri was a capo in the Buffalo family.
Q. What did Sam Pieri tell you about Jesse Hyman and John Riggi?
A. That he made arrangements through John Riggi to set up dental clinic — or a dental clinic in the New Jersey area.
App. 896-97. And Fino also corroborated Hyman’s testimony concerning Riggi’s connections to the Mafia. His testimony did not portray Riggi as one controlled or intimidated by organized crime; it portrayed Riggi as controlling it. Riggi was in charge; he made the deals; he influenced those around him; and he called the shots. For example, Fino testified on direct:
Q. Was there any discussion by John M. Riggi about the position of John Cor-sentino as his successor?
A. We talked about communications in the future once John retired, but John indicated to me he would still be calling the shots. He could still be calling the shots to go to John Corsentino on future things to help him out.
Q. But John Riggi would still be calling the shots on the local [union]?
A. Yes. Again, I don’t know if those are the right words, but words that meant that.
Even without his testimony on redirect, Fino corroborated much of Hyman’s testimony on direct. As the court’s opinion notes, Fino was a “reliable and believable witness.”
Given Fino’s testimony on direct, that Riggi was “the acting boss of the DeCaval-cante family” was not new testimony. It merely summarized in one sentence what was said on direct, and it corroborated what Hyman said on direct. The majority concludes that the reversible error in this case was “the district court’s absolute ban on recross examination ..." Maj. op. at 1376, but a bad, or even an erroneous, trial policy does not become reversible error until there is prejudice. Riggi did not receive a perfect trial, but he received a fair one. My position is that there was no prejudice because Riggi had his chance. Moreover, because Fino’s testimony on redirect was immaterial, corroborated, and cumulative, and the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, I would affirm.

. Fino also testified on redirect that he was "suffering" because of his cooperation with the government. As the court's opinion notes, this matter is not as important as Fino’s testimony concerning Riggi's status. Prohibiting recross on this matter is harmless error.

. Riggi was convicted for violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186(b). Timpani was convicted for violating the Hobbs Act. The Hobbs Act, § 1951 provides:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any articles or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in further-anee of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than 110,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
The Taft-Hartley Act, § 186(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) of this section.