Court Opinion

ID: 9944629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:03:57.972456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:55.815991
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                   Electronically Filed
                                                   Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                   CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                   26-FEB-2024
                                                   07:51 AM
                                                   Dkt. 107 SO

                            NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                  IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                          OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

                STATE OF HAWAI#I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
                   RYAN SAFFEELS, Defendant-Appellant

          APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                     (CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(2))

                    SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
  (By: Leonard, Acting Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)

             Defendant-Appellant Ryan Saffeels (Saffeels) appeals

from the February 28, 2023 Judgment; Conviction and Sentence;

Notice of Entry (Judgment) entered in the Circuit Court of the

Second Circuit1 (Circuit Court), convicting him of three counts

of Third Degree Sexual Assault, in violation of Hawaii Revised

Statutes (HRS) § 707-732 (2014).2

     1/
             The Honorable Peter T. Cahill presided.
     2/
             HRS § 707-732(1) provides, in part:

                   § 707-732 Sexual assault in the third degree.
             (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in
             the third degree if:
                   (b)   The person knowingly subjects to sexual
                         contact another person who is less than
                         fourteen years old or causes such a person
                         to have sexual contact with the person[.]
  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

            Saffeels raises two points of error on appeal,

contending that the Circuit Court erred in denying his October 3,

2022 motion to dismiss the charges (Motion to Dismiss) for

failure to commence trial within 180 days of the indictment, in

violation of his right to a speedy trial under (1) Hawai#i Rules

of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 and (2) the United States and

Hawai#i Constitutions.

            Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we

resolve Saffeels's points of error as follows:.

            HRPP Rule 48(b) provides:

                  (b) By court. Except in the case of traffic
            offenses that are not punishable by imprisonment, the court
            shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with
            or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not
            commenced within 6 months[.]

            "HRPP Rule 48 is intended to ensure an accused a speedy

trial, which is separate and distinct from [the] constitutional

protection to a speedy trial."        State v. Fukuoka, 141 Hawai#i 48,

55, 404 P.3d 314, 321 (2017) (citation & quotation marks

omitted).    "The six-month period under HRPP Rule 48 is equivalent

to 180 days."     State v. Hernane, 145 Hawai#i 444, 450, 454 P.3d

385, 391 (2019).     HRPP Rule 48(c) identifies certain periods of

delay that are not chargeable against Plaintiff-Appellee State of

Hawai#i (State), and which "shall be excluded in computing the

time for trial commencement."

            Though Saffeels was indicted on June 8, 2020, it is

undisputed that he consistently waived his right to a speedy

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trial until December 20, 2021, while pursuing plea negotiations.

The parties dispute, among other things, whether each of the

subsequent trial delays are "excluded" from the 180-day

calculation under HRPP Rule 48, or are chargeable to the State.

In particular, the parties dispute whether a State-requested

trial continuance from March 30, 2022, to August 29, 2022,

granted over Saffeels's objection, and based on the

unavailability of a witness who was a minor (Minor Witness), is

excluded.    The parties also disagree whether the length of that
particular trial delay should be measured starting on the date

the continuance was granted, which would amount to 158 days, or

on the date the trial was originally scheduled, which would

amount to 152 days.      Nonetheless, it appears the parties

otherwise agree that a minimum of 109 other days are chargeable

to the State.      Thus, whether the length of the particular

continuance for the Minor Witness is 152 or 158 days, if it is

also chargeable to the State, the total chargeable days would

necessarily exceed 180.

            HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i) excludes from computation delays

caused by the State's continuance due to the unavailability of

material evidence, under specific circumstances, as follows:
                  (c) Excluded periods. The following periods
            shall be excluded in computing the time for trial
            commencement:
                  . . . .
                  (4) periods that delay the commencement of trial
            and are caused by a continuance granted at the request
            of the prosecutor if:
                  (i) the continuance is granted because of the
            unavailability of evidence material to the
            prosecution's case, when the prosecutor has exercised
            due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are

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           reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will
           be available at a later date[.]

(Emphasis added).

           The use of the conjunctive "and" in subsection

(c)(4)(i) indicates the elements of due diligence and reasonable

belief as to subsequent availability must both be satisfied.        See

State v. Crouser, 81 Hawai#i 5, 11, 911 P.2d 725, 731 (1996)

(holding that, where the elements of a statute are "set out in

the conjunctive, rather than the disjunctive," the other side

need only disprove one element to defeat it).
           It appears that the Minor Witness is the son of a woman

Saffeels lived with while the case was pending, and that he was

present, though perhaps not awake, at the time the incident took

place.   At the March 24, 2022 hearing where the State requested

the continuance, Saffeels indicated that the Minor Witness had

been sent to live with his brother in Texas three weeks prior,

due to issues at school, and he would return to O#ahu in August

of that year.    Thus, there were reasonable grounds to believe the

Minor Witness could testify at a later date, which satisfies the
element of subsequent availability.        However, at the October 27,

2022 hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, the Circuit Court

indicated that the State failed to "exercise due diligence" in

procuring the Minor Witness's testimony, as it admitted to having

"rushed" a separate subpoena for the Minor Witness just one week

before scheduled trial—and only after it realized the subpoena

did not previously "go out with the rest of" the trial subpoenas

a month prior—and the circumstances did "not excuse" the State's

failure to "get the subpoena out earlier."         Moreover, it appears

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the State did not end up calling Minor Witness to testify at the

subsequent trial.    Thus, it is dubious, at best, whether the

delay was due to the "unavailability of evidence material to the

prosecution's case," to satisfy the elements for exclusion in

HRPP Rule 48(c)(4)(i).   (Emphasis added).

           We thus conclude that the delay caused by the State's

continuance to secure the testimony of Minor Witness should be

charged to the State, and that at least 180 days chargeable to

the State had elapsed at the time Saffeels moved for dismissal.
Therefore, the Circuit Court erred in denying the Motion to

Dismiss.   In light of this conclusion, we need not reach any of

the parties' other arguments, nor do we reach Saffeels's second

point of error, that the State violated his constitutional right

to a speedy trial.   Rees v. Carlisle, 113 Hawai#i 446, 456, 153

P.3d 1131, 1141 (2007) ("[J]udicial restraint requires that

courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the

necessity of deciding them.").

           As to whether Saffeels is entitled to a dismissal of

the charges with or without prejudice, this determination should

be made by the Circuit Court in the first instance.      See State v.

Choy Foo, 142 Hawai#i 65, 70, 414 P.3d 117, 122 (2018); State v.

Liu, CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2016 WL 3063668 (Haw. App. May 27, 2016)

(SDO).

           Therefore, the Circuit Court's February 28, 2023

Judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for entry of an

order of dismissal, with or without prejudice, in the Circuit

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Court's discretion, after considering the factors established in

State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981).

           It is also hereby ordered that Saffeels's Motion for

Release Pending Appeal filed on July 2, 2023 is dismissed as

moot.3

           It is further ordered that all pending motions are

denied as moot.

           DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, February 26, 2024.

On the briefs:                            /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
                                          Acting Chief Judge
Gerald T. Johnson,
Court-Appointed Attorney                  /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
 for Defendant-Appellant.                 Associate Judge

Renee Ishikawa Delizo                     /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,              Associate Judge
City and County of Honolulu,
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

     3/
         This ruling is without prejudice to any relief Saffeels may seek in
the Circuit Court in light of this Summary Dispostion Order.

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