Court Opinion

ID: 9492324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:38:26.362635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:47.658734
License: Public Domain

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote the majority *207opinion, in which Judge WIDENER joined. Judge HAMILTON wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:
Here we have an appeal by the government from the district court’s suppression of evidence (drugs) found in the trunk of the defendants’ car. The government contends that the defendants’ actions — ie., exiting the interstate after apparently noticing drug checkpoint signs as well as other factors — gave the police officers reasonable suspicion to search the vehicle. The defendants argue that each of the factors upon which the government relies is in itself innocent and that the factors when taken together simply do not add up to reasonable suspicion. After reviewing the briefs and the record, we conclude the district court’s ruling suppressing the items turned up by the police in such a search was correct.
I.
Brugal and two passengers, Adames and DeJesus, were driving north on Interstate 95 near Ridgeland, South Carolina during the early morning hours of October 31, 1997. As they approached Ridgeland, South Carolina, their gasoline tank was three-quarters empty. Brugal exited the interstate at Exit 22, a decision he would later regret.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., the South Carolina Highway Patrol (SCHP) placed two “drug checkpoint ahead” signs on the side of Interstate 95 near Exit 22, which is in Ridgeland. The signs, which were placed at intervals of one thousand feet and five hundred feet before the exit were made visible to motorists by safety flares and reflective lettering.
There was no actual “drug checkpoint” on the interstate. Rather, according to one of the troopers, the SCHP employed the ruse to investigate traffic violations. To that end, two SCHP officers, Sergeant Honeycutt (at whose direction the signs were placed) and Jackie Lynn Lawson, and Larry Shoemaker of the Ridgeland Police Department went to Exit 22’s off ramp to create a traffic checkpoint. When cars exited the interstate, the officers would detain them to determine whether the drivers had committed any traffic violations and possibly whether any drugs were present.
Exit 22 led to Highway 17 South. The officers selected it because they considered it a “dead” exit — ie., the service stations and other businesses to which its travel advisory sign led were closed. Although the stores were in fact closed, the district court found that a motorist using Exit 22 could reach the well-lit, 24-hour gas stations accessible from Exit 21.
Sergeant Honeycutt left the checkpoint at 3:20 a.m. to respond to an emergency elsewhere and left Trooper Lawson in charge of the checkpoint. Brugal took Exit 22 during Honeycutt’s absence, leaving the interstate at approximately 3:30 a.m.1 Trooper Lawson stopped Brugal and requested his driver’s license and the vehicle’s registration. Brugal produced his valid driver’s license, which was issued in New York, and his rental contract in lieu of the vehicle’s registration.
Brugal gave Trooper Lawson his license and the rental contract. The rental contract stated that the car had been rented in Miami and was to be returned to Miami within the week. Trooper Lawson ob*208served that Brugal had already paid the rental fee and was otherwise in compliance with the contract. Lawson then asked Brugal why he had left the interstate and where he was going. Brugal told Lawson that he needed fuel and was headed to Virginia Beach. Lawson returned Bru-gal’s license but kept the rental contract. The trooper then looked into the vehicle, using his flashlight, and saw the three pieces of luggage that the three occupants had with them. Lawson then asked Bru-gal to pull over onto the shoulder of the road.
Brugal complied with Lawson’s request and pulled off the road. Lawson then pulled his unmarked cruiser behind Bru-gal’s car, turned on his headlights, and engaged the video camera mounted on the dash of his cruiser. Lawson then requested that the three defendants step out of the car, which they immediately did. He then asked Brugal if he could search the vehicle. Brugal told the trooper, “no problem.” Trooper Lawson repeated his request to conduct a search, and Brugal again consented.
Trooper Lawson proceeded to search the interior of the vehicle, but found nothing. He then turned his attention to the three pieces of luggage in the vehicle. Two of the three bags contained packages slightly larger than bricks.2 Believing that the packages contained illegal narcotics, Trooper Lawson arrested the defendants, impounded the vehicle, and confiscated the packages. Further examination revealed that the packages contained approximately eight kilograms of cocaine and one kilogram of heroin.
II.
All agree that the checkpoint stop was a seizure that triggered a Fourth Amendment analysis. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990). The analysis applicable here is that applicable to investigative detentions, since traffic stops more closely resemble investigative detentions than custodial arrests. See United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 351, 121 L.Ed.2d 266 (1992). The officers’ actions here were constitutional if the officers had reasonable suspicion that Brugal was engaged in criminal activity. See id. at 877. The government’s challenge is to the district court’s determination that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to pull Brugal over further. Under the standard announced in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), we review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo. See id.
The government contends that the district court erroneously concluded that reasonable suspicion was absent. It points to ten factors that it claims constitute reasonable suspicion when viewed collectively. They are: (1) Brugal exited 1-95 at the first available exit after the large, illuminated signs indicating that a drug checkpoint was ahead (although there really was no drug checkpoint); (2) It was 3:30 a.m.; (3) Exit 22 is a “dead” exit, i.e., it has no open stores or gas stations, and there is little lighting at that time of morning; (4) Brugal was traveling north on 1-95 from Miami, which is a major drug route from a major source city for drugs; (5) Brugal claimed that his fuel was low, but he had a quarter of a tank left; (6) Brugal passed two exits within the previous ten miles at which there were 24-hour gas stations whose signs were well lit and visible from the highway; (7) Brugal possessed a New York driver’s license; (8) Brugal rented the car in Miami, which is a common pattern for drug dealers (ie., flying to Miami, renting a car and driving north); (9) Brugal and his two comrades had little luggage, yet claimed that they were traveling to Virginia Beach from.Miami; and (10) The other persons who exited at Exit 22 *209were from South Carolina and were headed to a South Carolina destination.3
Brugal contends that the district court correctly found that reasonable suspicion was absent for the additional detention. He claims that none of those factors themselves are acts of wrongdoing and that even when viewed collectively, those factors apply to such a large number of innocent people that no suspicion should have arisen. Compare Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (holding that reasonable suspicion was absent where the police only had information that the defendant fit some of the drug courier profile characteristics and the defendant made some possibly evasive movements because of the possible applicability to large numbers of innocent people), with United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (holding that completely innocent behavior did give rise to reasonable suspicion). But here no reasonable suspicion was revealed.
The Supreme Court has noted that “reasonable suspicion” is a term that defies precise definition, and describes it as “ ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695-96, 116 S.Ct. 1657 (citation omitted). Moreover, it is a term that contemplates the “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (citation omitted).
More specifically, under both Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, the determinations of police officers are entitled to some deference. Although the Supreme Court recently held that determinations of reasonable suspicion are subject to de novo review, it “hastened] to point out that a reviewing court should take care to ... give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657. The Fourth Circuit has noted previously that in analyzing reasonable suspicion, it is important to “eredit[ ] the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir.1993). The government would have us stop here and rule the search valid.
Even when deferring to the officers, however, we still conclude that they had insufficient reason to suspect that Brugal and his companions were involved in illegal activity when they ordered Brugal to pull over for further investigation. Brugal does not claim that the initial traffic stop was unconstitutional, and the district court found that it was proper under the Fourth Amendment. Trooper Lawson testified that he and the other officers had set up a traffic stop just off the ramp for Exit 22. The officers put up large, illuminated signs that stated that there was a drug checkpoint ahead (although there really was no checkpoint on 1-95 itself). The officers did not search — or even request consent to search — all exiting motorists for drugs; rather, they considered the checkpoint they established at the exit to be a traffic checkpoint. Thus, they checked motorists’ driver’s licenses and registrations, and released those motorists who had committed no traffic violations.
*210Traffic stops have a rather defined scope. We have held that when conducting such a stop, the police:
may request a driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation. When the driver has produced a valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.
Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 at 876 (quoting United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.1988) (citations omitted)). As a result, Brugal, who had committed no traffic violations, was entitled to continue his journey unless the officers had a justifiable reason to suspect that he was engaged in illegal activity. See Rusher, 966 F.2d at 876-77.
The government’s principal argument is that Brugal left the interstate in response to the drug checkpoint signs, which it claims that the district court found as a fact, and that fact alone justified the additional detention. However, that argument ignores two important points. First, the district court did not find that Brugal had in fact left the interstate for that reason, although it did find that the government was entitled to that inference for the purposes of the suppression hearing. Second, and more important, any inference that Brugal left the interstate for that reason should have been dispelled by the information gained at the traffic stop. We have concluded that reasonable suspicion was absent where we have found that the officers’ additional investigation should have allayed their concerns about criminal activity. See United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613, 618-19 (4th Cir.1997).
That last point is very important here. Assuming that the requisite suspicion arose from Brugal’s decision to exit the interstate when he did, it certainly should have been allayed by Brugal’s responses. After stopping Brugal and checking his driver’s license and registration, Lawson asked Brugal why he selected Exit 22. Brugal told Lawson that he was low on fuel. Brugal, having driven a long way, was low on fuel-his tank was three-quar- ters empty. Even the officers themselves later acknowledged that Brugal needed fuel.
The governmentresponds to those facts by arguing that Brugal passed by two well-lit, visible all-night gas stations in the ten miles stretch preceding Exit 22. In particular, Exit 21, a mile south of Exit 22, led to such a gas station.
However, 'twofacts render that argu- ment insignificant. First, the travel advi- sory sign leading to Exit 22 indicates that gas is available at that exit. While those stations were closed at the time Brugal left the interstate, nothing in the record sug- gests that Brugal had any reason to know that.4 Second, the well-lit all-night gas station to which Exit 21 led was accessible from Exit 22 and was visible from the top of Exit 22’s ramp. Had Brugal been al- lowed to continue up the ramp, the very gas station to which the government refers would have been visible and accessible to him. In short, Brugal proffered a valid and easily verifiable (or refutable) reason for choosing Exit 22, and that reason should have allayed any concerns that he was engaging in illegal activity. The government’s
The government’sother theory of Bru- gal’s motives also falls short. It contends that reasonable suspicion existed to search Brugal because his rental of a car in Miami and subsequent travel north on Interstate 95 to New York, in the officers’ experience, a common pattern followed by drug smug- glers. Those smugglers rent cars in Mia- mi for one-way travel and drive north on Interstate 95 to New York. However, two facts directly challenge that theory. First, there is no evidence that Brugal was trav- indicate the *211eling to New York. When asked where he was going, he told the officers that he and his passengers were on their way to Virginia Beach. Second, the rental contract— with which Brugal had complied until he was stopped — required Brugal to return the car to Miami within the week. One-way travel was not contemplated by the agreement. Thus, the facts before the officers establish that Brugal did not fit into their general pattern of drug trafficking behavior. Thus, neither Brugal’s choice of exit nor mode of travel created reasonable suspicion even when viewed with the remaining factors below.
The dissent’s arguments regarding Bru-gal’s travel habits demonstrate the extent of speculation required to conclude that Brugal was engaged in illegal behavior. First, it argues that the police were properly suspicious of Brugal because he flew into Miami from New York, rented a car and drove north. See post at 214. However, nothing in the record even suggests that the police had any proof at the time of the search that Brugal had flown in from New York or had arrived in Miami from New York at any time close to his renting the car. At the time of the search, all the officers knew of Brugal’s connection to New York was that he possessed a driver’s license issued there. Thus, all the police knew was that they had a New York driver who rented a car in Miami. As even the dissent admits, there is nothing inherently suspicious or unusual about a New Yorker renting a car in Miami. See post at 214 (“Admittedly, standing alone, there is nothing atypical about an individual from New York City renting a vehicle in Miami. I am sure many individuals from New York City do so.”).
Second, the argument with respect to Brugal’s decision to rent the car for round-trip, rather than one-way travel, also points out the lack of reasonableness for suspecting illegal behavior. The dissent argues that Brugal may well have been an intelligent criminal attempting to outsmart police officers who were suspecting a one-way rental. However, were we to find that Brugal properly drew the officers’ suspicion by renting the vehicle for round-trip travel when the officers believed that one-way travel was a hallmark of criminal activity, then we would essentially make him indistinguishable from almost every other person who rents a car. Most — if not all — automobile rental contracts call for either one-way or round-trip travel. Considering both choices to be equal marks of criminal activity only makes us return to the proposition that drivers licensed in New York who rent cars in Miami are suspicious. As stated above, we decline to brand all such drivers as criminals.
The remaining factors relied upon by the officers, even when viewed collectively, encompass such a “large category of presumably innocent travelers” that reasonable suspicion did not attach. Reid, 448 U.S. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752. For example, the second, fourth and ninth factors (late night travel, travel from a source city and insufficient luggage for the trip, respectively) were the combination of factors present in Reid, and were rejected as a basis for finding reasonable suspicion even when viewed collectively. See id. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752.5 But see Lender, 985 F.2d at 154 (holding that lateness of hour is properly considered as a factor raising suspicion). We have even remarked that courts place too much reliance on travel from source cities. See United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116, 126 (4th Cir.1991). Even the government admits that the last factor' — 'that Brugal was licensed to drive by the state of New York — is insignificant in itself. In light of the large number of drivers from New York, and the lack of any evidence that Brugal had any intention of returning there when he was stopped, *212we find that this factor adds little to the analysis even when combined with the other factors.
Given those facts, Brugal’s case is distinguishable from those cases cited by the government where the Supreme Court has held (or we have held) that reasonable suspicion existed. None of the defendants in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985), Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10, 109 S.Ct. 1581, or Lender, 985 F.2d at 153, provided the police with innocent explanations of their conduct, much less explanations that could be verified immediately to refute the suspicions. Moreover, Sharpe and Lender are further distinguishable because the defendants in those cases evaded the police after the police appeared and attempted to approach them. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683, n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (stating that the defendant sped up as soon as the officer pulled behind him and his friend); Lender, 985 F.2d at 154 (stating that the defendant “turned his back” and began to leave when the police approached and “refused” to stop when the police requested that he do so). As a result, we find that reasonable suspicion did not exist to detain Brugal after his driver’s license and rental contract were verified.
The final question is whether Brugal validly consented to the search. The district court did not reach the issue, but it is pressed here as an alternative basis for reversing the district court’s determination. There is no question that Brugal told the officers that they may search the vehicle. However, that consent was given after he was pulled over to the side of the road for the additional detention that we have ruled illegal. While the Supreme Court has maintained that the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent to search his belongings is a question of fact determined in light of all of the circumstances, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the Court has also invalidated consent by a suspect illegally detained. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). We think that, under the circumstances of this case, Brugal’s consent was also tainted by the illegal detention. In light of our decision, then, Brugal’s consent subsequent to the illegal detention will not justify the search. Accordingly, the judgment is hereby

AFFIRMED.

. Brugal and the government dispute the location of the initial stop. Brugal argues that Trooper Lawson stopped the car while he was in the right lane of the exit ramp, which later merges into Highway 17 South. The government, on the other hand, argues that Trooper Lawson stopped Brugal near the stop sign at the end of the exit ramp. The district court noted the disagreement but did not make an express finding as to Brugal's exact location on the ramp. However, the district court's later discussion of Brugal's opportunity to seek gas on Highway 17 South indicates that it resolved the ambiguity in his favor.

. The third bag contained women’s clothes, but no incriminating materials.

. Trooper Lawson testified that when Brugal exited the car after being asked to pull over for the second phase of the detention, he stretched in such a way as to set off a "red flag” in Lawson's mind. Lawson testified that he has been trained to interpret such movements by detainees, and that Brugal’s stretch indicated that he was under stress. However, Brugal did not stretch until the officers already had made their decision to detain him further. Thus, Brugal’s stretch does not factor into our analysis. Even if the stretch was an indication of nervousness, Brugal's circumstances — he was pulled over by an officer on a dark exit ramp at 3:30 a.m. — could well have caused that reaction.

. It is not disputed that Brugal is not from the area, and the travel advisory sign does not indicate gas station’s hours of operation.

. In Reid, the defendant (and his friend) flew into Atlanta from Fort Lauderdale, Florida (considered a source city for drugs) early in the morning. Both the defendant and his friend carried only a carry-on bag. See id. at 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752.