Court Opinion

ID: 9592566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:15:20.069334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:16.949081
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment, but not for the reasons stated by the majority.
Stephen S. Rabinovitz, Judith B. Rabinovitz, Lawrence Rabinovitz and Cindy Mason Rabinovitz filed an action against Accent Rent-A-Car, Inc. (“Accent”), alleging they were injured when James M. Brewer negligently drove an Accent rental car into a taxi cab occupied by the Rabinovitzes. Specifically, the Rabinovitzes allege that Accent negligently entrusted a rental car to Brewer and that Accent was negligent as a matter of law by failing to verify that Brewer had automobile liability insurance as required by OCGA § 40-9-102.2
Upon opposing motions for summary judgment, the undisputed evidence reveals that Brewer had no insurance covering the vehicle he rented from Accent and that Accent had the vehicle insured as required by OCGA § 33-34-4.3 However, there is conflicting evidence *788regarding Accent’s knowledge of Brewer’s lack of insurance and there is evidence that Accent made only a veiled attempt to determine whether Brewer (or any other customer) had automobile liability insurance before turning a rental car over to him. It is my view that these circumstances raise genuine issues of material fact as to Accent’s compliance with OCGA § 40-9-102, i.e., whether Accent established that Brewer had insurance before renting him a car. However, the majority ignores evidence pertinent to Accent’s compliance, vel non, with this statute and holds that (in any event) the Rabinovitzes cannot recover because “OCGA § 40-9-102 was not designed to prevent the collision which [allegedly] caused [the Rabinovitzes’] injuries. . . .” It is my view that this logic misses the mark.
“ ‘In determining whether the violation of the ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purpose of the ordinance and decide (1) whether the injured person falls within the class of persons it was intended to protect, and (2) whether the harm complained of was the harm it was intended to guard against. (Cit.)’ Rhodes v. Baker, 116 Ga. App. 157, 160 (2b) (156 SE2d 545) (1967).” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cooper, 177 Ga. App. 540, 541 (1) (339 SE2d 755). To this end, the Georgia Court of Appeals observed in Continental Cas. Co. v. Owen, 90 Ga. App. 200, 209 (82 SE2d 742), that the purpose of “spot” insurance under Ga. L. 1951, pp. 565, 578, § 23 (now OCGA § 40-9-102) “is ... to guarantee the public against damages by some irresponsible renter of a car of the U-Drive-It.” Id. at 209. With this object in mind, it is my view that the Rabinovitzes fall within the class of persons OCGA § 40-9-102 was intended to protect and that the harm the Rabinovitzes now complain of (i.e., lack of protection from a financially irresponsible rental car driver) is the harm the statute was intended to guard against. I base this conclusion on the undisputed fact that the Rabinovitzes are members of the general public and that they allege damage as a result of the negligence of a financially irresponsible rental car driver. Consequently, it is my view that the controlling issue is whether the Rabinovitzes were harmed by Accent’s alleged failure to comply with OCGA § 40-9-102. Conversely stated, the pivotal issue in the case sub judice is whether the object of OCGA § 40-9-102 was accomplished.
The purpose of OCGA § 40-9-102 “is ... to guarantee the public *789against damages by some irresponsible renter of a car of the U-Drive-It.” Continental Cas. Co. v. Owen, 90 Ga. App. 200, 209, supra. In the case sub judice, it is my view that the object of OCGA § 40-9-102 was met since it is undisputed that Accent had automobile liability insurance covering the collision. In other words, the Rabinovitzes have a guarantee in Accent’s automobile liability insurance policy against damages allegedly caused by Brewer’s irresponsibility. They are therefore not harmed by Accent’s failure to comply with OCGA § 40-9-102 and this is the sole reason I concur in the judgment of the majority opinion.3
Decided July 11, 1994.
F. Clay Bush, for appellants.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Hall F. McKinley III, Douglas M. Baker, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.

 OCGA § 40-9-102 requires a person who rents a car from a rental agency to acquire “spot” insurance covering the rental vehicle and prohibits the rental agency from turning a motor vehicle over to a renter until such insurance is acquired. “[T]his requirement may be satisfied by a vehicle insurance policy that the renter already holds for his own vehicle and that covers the renter while driving another vehicle. Alternatively, the renter may satisfy the statutory mandate by purchasing at the time of rental, an insurance policy that covers the specific rental vehicle.” (Footnote omitted.) Frank E. Jenkins III and Wallace Miller III, Ga. Auto. Ins. Law (Including Tort Law), pp. 182, 183, § 21-8 (1993 ed.).

 OCGA § 33-34-4 now requires minimum coverage as prescribed in the Georgia Motor *788Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. This Code section defines minimum financial responsibility as “$15,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident, and subject to said limit for one person, in the amount of $30,000.00 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and in the amount of $10,000.00 because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident. . . .” OCGA § 40-9-2 (5) (A). It appears that the amounts now described as minimum financial responsibility was the coverage Accent provided for the rental car it turned over to Brewer.

 It seems logical that Accent’s compliance with OCGA § 40-9-102 would have greatly increased the likelihood that the Rabinovitzes would now be covered under two automobile liability insurance policies instead of just one, i.e., the coverage Accent maintained pursuant to OCGA § 33-34-4 and the coverage Brewer should have had pursuant to OCGA § 40-9-102. However, without statutory authorization, I do not believe the Court of Appeals has authority to extend the legislative penalty prescribed for noncompliance with OCGA § 40-9-102, exemption “from the provisions of [Georgia’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act] as provided in Code Section 40-9-4.” Although OCGA § 40-9-4 is awkwardly drafted, it seems that the penalty of “exemption” means that the rental car agency’s insurance policy will be primary rather than secondary. See Jones v. Wortham, 201 Ga. App. 668, 670 (411 SE2d 716); Atlanta Rent-A-Car v. Jackson, 204 Ga. App. 448, 450 (419 SE2d 489).