Court Opinion

ID: 9584616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:50:45.220404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:31.395580
License: Public Domain

*22Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). In coming to my conclusions in this case I must take into consideration the following established facts: The cause of action is planted upon the action rendered by Bonnie Ester-brook on October 6, 1948, in giving plaintiff an X-ray treatment in the office of the defendant; that Bonnie Esterbrook had never assisted defendant in giving X-ray treatments to plaintiff; that she was never authorized to give plaintiff an X-ray treatment ; and that prior to the above date she had never given plaintiff an X-ray treatment.
' It is also well established that the operation oían X-ray machine can only be performed by one having special knowledge of its uses and method of operation. Dr. R. C. Hildreth testified:
“There is quite a bit to the discretion of dosage from X-ray machine, the way it is produced and the way it is measured. Inside of the X-ray tube there is a change in the form of energy from electricity into X-ray, just like in certain power plants for steam locomotion, you throw in coal and water and you make steam, which is a different type of energy. Also inside of X-ray tube you apply electricity and against the target of the tube the energy is changed into the form of X-ray, it comes out of the tube. Now you can measure the amount of electricity that goes into the X-ray, you can measure that like you do amperes and volts; when you put your motor in the house you put on kilowatts or watts, which is merely volts, time and electricity, so you measure electricity from wattage per unit. A unit of electricity is a watt, and the other units are amperes and volts, amperage is time, voltage is watt. You can measure the electricity that goes into the tube, which is an indirect and inaccurate measurement because the power is so inefficient in forming the X-ray. Now when you measure the power that comes out of the tube you have to use another unit of measurement, a unit like a gallon, or a quart of X-ray, we call the *23unit the Boentgen—we write it simply ‘E’, 300 B, or 300 Boentgens, that is the unit of X-ray dose that comes out of the tube, and we use special instruments for measuring the dose that comes out of the tube. There are other factors that are important, like time, is of some value, distance is much more important than time, the filter is of some value too, but anyone using X-ray machine for a treatment needs to know how many units he is putting on to the skin surface at a certain distance; it is not of great value to know how much, to know too much about the amount of electricity going into the machine, because the machine is very efficient.”
In Facer v. Lewis, 326 Mich 702, an action was brought to recover damages for the alleged malpractice by a physician in the use of an X-ray. In the above case we had occasion to discuss the skill necessary in the use of X-ray machines. We there said (p 714):
“Although laymen generally are acquainted with the fact that X-rays are destructive and may result in burns or other serious conditions, yet the testimony of plaintiff’s own medical witness was such as to clearly demonstrate that an X-ray treatment for warts involves questions of skill, judgment, and practice beyond the knowledge of laymen and upon which a jury would need the advice of experts to determine whether or not the claimed acts of defendant were improper.”
Other courts have also taken this same position by ruling that the use of X-ray equipment requires a special personal skill. See Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Fike, 177 Ark 907 (9 SW2d 318); Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Headstream, 173 Ark 1104 (295 SW 16); Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark 481 (228 SW 397, 13 ALR 1403); Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn 219 (97 NW 882, 64 LRA 126, 103 Am St Rep 504).
*24In Dorr, Gray & Johnston v. Fike, supra, the Arkansas court clearly demonstrated that the use of X-ray demands as similar a skill as any other medical treatment when it said (p 908):
“A physician or other person undertaking to use X-rays is held to the same measure of responsibility as in administering other forms of medical treatment. He impliedly contracts with the patient that he possesses ordinary skill in administering X-rays, and that he will exercise reasonable skill, care, and diligence in his treatment or diagnosis of the patient.”
I agree with the plaintiff that according to the general principles of agency law in this State “the phrase ‘in the course or scope of his employment or authority,’ when used relative to the acts of a servant, means while engaged in the service of his master, or while about his master’s business.” Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192 Mich 624, 627; that it is not essential that the act be especially authorized by the master. Cook v. Michigan Central R. Co., 189 Mich 456; that “A servant is within the scope of his employment, although conducting his master’s business in a manner contrary to instructions.” Loux v. Harris, 226 Mich 315, 322. Also, see Michael v. Kircher, 335 Mich 566; that “It is elementary that persons dealing with an agent may rely on his apparent authority, * * * and that such authority is to be gathered from all of the facts and circumstances properly admitted in evidence.” Faber v. Eastman, Dillon & Co., 271 Mich 142, 145; that “ ‘ “Whenever a principal has placed an agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in assuming that such agent is authorized to perform in behalf of the principal the particular act, and such particular act *25had been performed, the principal is estopped from denying the agent’s authority to perform it.” ’ ” Grinnell v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich 509, 525; that “The general rule is that the powers of an agent are prima facie coextensive with the business intrusted to his care.” Grossman v. Langer, 269 Mich 506, 510. See, also, 1 Restatement, Agency, ch 7, § 267, p 590.
Having in mind the skill required in the operation of an X-ray machine, the first question that presents itself to us is the authority of Bonnie Esterbrook in attempting to give an X-ray treatment to plaintiff: on the day in question. Plaintiff urges that the general rules of agency and master and servant apply to the medical and chiropractic professions and that defendant is bound by the acts of his employee. In 41 Am Jur, Physicians and Surgeons, § 112, pp 223, 224, it is said:
“It is the established rule that a physician or surgeon must exercise due care in selecting his assistants, and on the simplest principles of the law, agency, or of master and servant, a physician or surgeon may be liable for the neglect or fault of his employee or servant, such as an assistant who is working under his direction, for injury resulting therefrom to a patient.” (Italics ours.)
It is evident that the trial court had the above rule in mind when he granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict:
“However, it would seem that for the defendant to be bound by the acts of his agent in this case it must be shown that the act complained of wás either the usual practice; customary practice, or under such circumstances as defendant could reasonably have anticipated, or mode under the supervision or direction of the defendant.”
*26However, it is to be noted that none of the above quoted decisions involve the relationship between a professional man and his nonprofessional servant, nor do the cases cited in Mr. Justice Kelly’s opinion cite cases involving the issue in the ease at bar. Plaintiff cites and relies on Mullins v. DuVall, 25 Ga App 690 (104 SE 513). The court held defendant liable for the negligence of his assistant in administering an injection because the defendant had specifically authorized the servant to perform this professional service. Other cases in this field of the law are Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Service Co., 51 Cal App2d 327 (124 P2d 878), where a nurse negligently administered allergy tests; McCullough v. Langer, 23 Cal App2d 510 (73 P2d 649), where a nurse negligently administered a heat treatment; Simons v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 94 Mont 355 (22 P2d 609), where a nurse used the wrong chemical solution in treating the patient.
The 2 cases I have found dealing with the relationship between an osteopath and his nonprofessional servant and a chiropractor and his nonprofessional servant, Noren v. American School of Osteopathy, 223 Mo App 278 (2 SW2d 215), affirming, 298 SW 1061, certiorari denied, 322 Mo 991 (18 SW2d 487);  Carver Chiropractic College v. Armstrong, 103 Okla 123 (229 P 641), are also not applicable to the case at bar. In both of these cases the servant was again authorized to perform the professional act which caused the injury.
Like physicians, dentists, chiropractors, or any other professional persons, an attorney has special professional skills which he uses when rendering professional services to his clients. The attorney’s secretary or clerk generally does not have such skills *27and therefore the courts have held that the attorney is not liable for the negligence of his secretary or clerk in rendering an unauthorized legal service, such as where the clerk offered to settle a suit, Alternan v. Weil, 80 Misc 337 (142 NYS 465); where a clerk had made an affidavit in support -of a motion to punish a judgment debtor for contempt, Eyre v. Stubbert, 71 Misc 147 (128 NYS 4); where verbal notice of the defendant’s intention to file an appeal given to the district attorney’s clerk was not considered sufficient notice. Page v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 122 Cal 209 (54 P 730).
In Chapman v. Muskegon County Board of Supervisors, 169 Mich 10, we had occasion to express our thinking upon the right of a physician to delegate his services to another physician. In that case plaintiff was hired by a township board to render services to one Bessie Peterson and family. Plaintiff authorized a Dr. Smith to render the family services, and in an attempt to collect for services for Dr. Smith, we said (p 18):
“We think it would be going too far to hold that a physician, having a contract of employment with a health board, might hire another physician to do the actual work, and himself collect for the service. It may well be supposed that the element of personal fitness enters into the contract.”
Mr. Justice Kelly relies on Riley v. Roach, 168 Mich 294 (37 LRA NS 834). In that ease defendant was held not liable when his chauffeur, without the consent of the owner, used the owner’s automobile and was involved in an accident.
In Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Bayfield, 37 Mich 205 (16 Am Neg Cas 87), we held that a master is liable for injuries to his servant resulting *28from the master’s negligence in exposing the servant to risks which the latter is incapable of appreciating.
In Loux v. Harris, 226 Mich 315, defendant, as owner of a garage and gasoline station, was held liable for the action of his agent while delivering a can of gasoline contrary to the express orders of defendant. In none of the above cases is there any authority involving the issue in the case at bar.
In Loveland v. Nelson, 235 Mich 623, relied upon by Mr. Justice Kelly, there was an action for malpractice in the extraction of a tooth by defendant, a dentist. In that case there was no question of agency involved and it has no relationship to the issue involved in the case at bar.
In Klitch v. Betts, 89 NJL 348 (98 A 427), plaintiff, a 10-year-old boy, had a tooth extracted by Dr. Snively, an employee of the defendant. The extraction resulted in the fracture of the boy’s jawbone. It was there held that there was sufficient evidence of the relationship between defendant and Dr. Snively to be submitted to a jury. It should be noted in the above case that there was no question involved as in the case at bar as Dr. Snively was a qualified dentist and not a mere office employee.
In McDonald v. Dr. McKnight, Inc., 248 Mass 43 (142 NE 825), Dr. Campbell was in charge of defendant’s dental office. He authorized Mr. Friedman, who was employed in laboratory work, to extract a tooth. Defendant was held liable for damages in the faulty extraction of the tooth. In the above case the employee was expressly authorized to make the extraction.
In McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa 355 (65 A2d 243), it was held that:
“Evidence that surgeon, having undertaken to perform Caesarian delivery and care for infant until turned over to family physician, selected an interne *29to assist him and care for infant at time of delivery and had complete control of operating room and every person in it during operation presented a question for jury as to whether interne, though in general employ of nonprofit charitable hospital, was temporary servant of surgeon for whose negligence in performing task assigned to him of inserting silver nitrate solution into infant’s eyes surgeon would be liable.” (Atlantic syllabus.)
In the above case the services rendered by the interne or agent were expressly authorized by the defendant.
We have in mind that physicians, surgeons, dentists, chiropractors and practitioners of other schools of medicine, as well as attorneys, offer their patients or clients a personalized service based on special skill. In the case at bar defendant was rendering a professional service to plaintiff through the use of the X-ray. We also have in mind that while Bonnie Esterbrook had previously helped to give plaintiff diathermy treatments, she had never given him X-ray treatments, nor had plaintiff been told by defendant that Bonnie Esterbrook could give him such treatments. It also appears to us that a change in the clinic’s routine, which involved professional skill, should have put plaintiff on notice that she might have been acting beyond the scope of her employment. In our opinion the attempt of Bonnie Esterbrook to render, without specific authority, an X-ray treatment, was not incidental to those acts she was authorized to perform, and therefore not within the scope of her authority.
The judgment non obstante veredicto should be affirmed, with costs to defendant.