Court Opinion

ID: 9898063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:13.177674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.581793
License: Public Domain

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           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

           In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
           of                                                  No. 83075-9-I

           RICKY MARVIN ARNTSEN,                               DIVISION ONE

                                         Petitioner.           PUBLISHED OPINION

                 COBURN, J. — Ricky Arntsen, through a personal restraint petition (PRP),

          once again challenges his conviction for assault in the second degree. Unlike

          unlawful display of a weapon, assault in the second degree required the jury to

          find both that Arntsen had the specific intent to create reasonable fear and

          apprehension of bodily injury and in fact did create a reasonable apprehension

          and imminent fear of bodily injury. While intent may be inferred from pointing a

          firearm at another, that did not occur here. We are left to determine whether the

          evidence sufficiently established that Arntsen did more than merely display a

          rifle, allowing a jury to infer, without speculating, that he had the requisite intent.

          We hold that it did not. We also hold that the evidence did not establish that

          Arntsen did in fact create an imminent fear of bodily injury. We grant the petition,

          reverse the conviction, and remand to the trial court to vacate.

            Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material
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          No. 83075-9-I/2

                                                   FACTS

                 Kim Koenig was commuting to work one morning in December 2014.

          Koenig drove northbound on Auburn Way, a road with two lanes for traffic and

          one center turning lane. As Koenig approached an intersection, she came upon

          an older model gray Jaguar, driven by Arntsen, 1 which was in the lane closest to

          the turning lane. Koenig noticed the Jaguar had its blinker on to move into the

          right lane and was backing up traffic. Koenig “made a maneuver” in front of the

          Jaguar. Koenig then noticed that Arntsen, while still behind her, started driving

          aggressively with her like she had made him very mad. Koenig testified that it

          was hard to describe, but said Arntsen started to “attack” Koenig’s vehicle with

          his own by driving up to her and stopping just short of hitting her car. He then

          moved into the lane next to Koenig, “acting like he wanted to hit me from the

          other side.” Koenig testified that Arntsen had his window rolled down and was

          yelling and gesturing, pointing to the side of the road, like he wanted Koenig to

          get off the road. Koenig could not hear what Arntsen was saying and tried to

          avoid looking at him during this exchange in an attempt to avoid aggravating him

          further. Arntsen continued “flailing” his arms and yelling at Koenig as they

          proceeded down the road for “a few minutes or seconds.”

                 Arntsen then sped up, positioned his car in front of Koenig’s, “threw his car

          into a turn,” slammed his brakes and came to a stop diagonally, blocking the

          lanes of traffic. Koenig stopped on the road, putting “as much distance” as she

                 1
                  Arntsen maintains that he was not the driver, but for the purposes of this petition,
          he does not challenge identity.

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          No. 83075-9-I/3

          could between herself and Arntsen’s vehicle. 2

                 Arntsen then opened his driver’s side door and exited. Arntsen had covered

          his face with a kerchief like an “old bank robber movie” and was holding a rifle. 3

          Arntsen walked toward Koenig’s car carrying the rifle, but never pointed it at her.

          Koenig immediately called 911 and averted her eyes and focused on talking to the

          911 operator. Based on just peripheral vision and her feelings, she “felt like he

          had come up on the driver’s side” very close to her vehicle before looking up and

          seeing him walk back towards his car.

                 Witness Robert Morrill, who was trying to drive around the backed-up

          traffic on the right, saw Arntsen’s actions from the time he stepped out of his

          vehicle until he left the scene. Arntsen had the gun held straight up in one hand

          as he, according to Koenig, walked up to the driver’s side door of the passenger

          car. 4 Arntsen then moved the rifle from its upward position in one hand down to

          his waist where he held it with two hands. Morrill saw the driver of the jaguar run

          up to the driver’s side of the passenger car that was blocked by the jaguar, turn

                 2
                    This court’s previous opinion, which addressed different issues, described
          Koenig as being “forced off the road by a man driving an older, grayish Jaguar.” State v.
          Arntsen, No. 76912-0-I, slip op. at 3 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2020) (unpublished),
          www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/769120.pdf. While Arntsen blocked Koenig from
          continuing to drive on the road, Koenig’s car never left the roadway.
                  3
                    Witnesses gave conflicting descriptions of the type of rifle used. Koenig said it
          appeared to be a “deer hunting rifle” and not an “assault-style rifle.” Passing motorist,
          Robert Morrill, however, stated that it appeared to be an “AK-47.” The State alleged the
          deadly weapon used in the assault in the second degree was a “rifle.”
                  4
                    Arntsen notes that Morrill described the vehicle as a “passenger car” when
          Koenig was driving a Dodge Caravan, and that Morrill described the person in the car as
          a “man” when Koenig is referred to in the record with female gender pronouns.
          Describing the vehicle as a passenger car does not mean that it was not the Caravan
          driven by Koenig. The record establishes that Morrill used the term “man” generically as
          he testified that he could not see who was in the car.

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          No. 83075-9-I/4

          around, run back to his car, jump in and “t[ake] off.” It happened very quickly and

          Morrill could not hear what, if anything was said. Morrill never saw the driver of

          the vehicle point the rifle at anyone in the car.

                 Arntsen was subsequently charged by amended information with 17

          counts based on this event and unrelated events that occurred before and after

          this road rage incident. The events before and after this incident are not relevant

          to this appeal. Two counts, naming Kim Weyer Koenig as the victim, were based

          on the road rage incident. Count 2 alleged assault in the second degree with a

          deadly weapon, the rifle, under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). Count 3 alleged felony

          harassment. Arntsen represented himself at trial.

                 Koenig testified at trial that when Arntsen first exited his vehicle with the

          rifle, Koenig’s initial thought was that she was going to get shot because she saw

          Arntsen had a rifle and Koenig thought “Why in the world would you have a gun

          unless you were going to use it?” She further explained that though she believed

          Arntsen meant to do her harm, “What kind of harm he meant to do, I don’t know.

          Whether or not I was going to be shot, whether or not he was going to assault

          me, steal my vehicle, I had no idea.” When Arntsen approached and got close to

          Koenig’s car, she explained that “he was not looking to shoot me, he did the [sic]

          not raise the gun like, you know, he wanted to shoot me. He had something else

          in mind. I have no idea what it was. I still don’t know what it was.”

                 In addition to Morrill testifying that he observed Arntsen run up to the

          passenger car, the State asked Morrill if he could “describe the demeanor or the

          appearance of the individual that got out of the car with the firearm?” Morrill said,

                                                     4
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          No. 83075-9-I/5

          “Aggressive. Scary Aggressive.”

                 The jury was instructed on both assault in the second degree with a

          deadly weapon and the lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon.

          The jury found Arntsen not guilty of felony harassment 5 and guilty on all other

          counts, including assault in the second degree with a deadly weapon. In his

          previous direct appeal, Arntsen challenged several convictions including the

          conviction for assault in the second degree, contending, among other issues, that

          the State did not prove that what he held was an actual rifle. See Arntsen, No.

          76912-0-I, slip op. at 15. In that appeal, this court reversed one conviction for

          malicious mischief, but otherwise affirmed. Id.

                 Following that decision, Arntsen submitted a pro se motion to vacate or

          amend judgment and sentence under CR 7.8 to the trial court. See generally

          PRP. Arntsen claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support his

          conviction for assault in the second degree because Arntsen only displayed the

          rifle and never pointed it at another person. He also claimed the law of the case

          required the State to prove the victim’s middle name was “Weyer.” Lastly, he

          claimed that prosecuting him violated his constitutional right to equal protection.

          The trial court transferred his motion to this court for consideration as a PRP.

                 5 The jury was instructed that “A person commits the crime of felony harassment

          when he or she, without lawful authority, knowingly threatens to cause bodily injury
          immediately or in the future to another person, and when he or she, by words or
          conduct, places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried
          out and the threat to cause bodily harm consists of a threat to kill the threatened person
          or another person[.]”

                                                       5
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          No. 83075-9-I/6

                                              DISCUSSION

                 A “petitioner in a personal restraint petition is prohibited from renewing an

          issue that was raised and rejected on direct appeal unless the interests of justice

          require relitigation of that issue.” In re Yates, 177 Wn.2d 1, 17, 296 P.3d 872

          (2013) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 671, 101 P.3d 1

          (2004)). “A petitioner may not avoid this requirement ‘merely by supporting a

          previous ground for relief with different factual allegations or with different legal

          arguments.’” Id. at 17 (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 671).

          The interests of justice are served by reconsidering a ground for relief if there has

          been “‘an intervening change in the law or some other justification for having

          failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior application.’” Id. (internal

          quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 142 Wn.2d

          710, 720, 16 P.3d 1 (2001)).

                 While there was no intervening change in the law and Arntsen does not

          contend there was another justification for not raising the issue in his direct

          appeal, the actual innocence doctrine applies to this case. Ordinarily, the person

          bringing a habeas petition must show cause and prejudice in order to avoid state

          procedural bars to collateral attack. In re Carter, 172 Wn.2d 917, 923, 263 P.3d

          1241 (2011) (citing Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 158 L.

          Ed. 2d 659 (2004)). Where a petitioner is alleging actual innocence to avoid a

          procedural bar that prevents judicial review of an alleged constitutional error, the

          petitioner’s claim of actual innocence is a “gateway” to review by an appellate

          court. Id. at 924 (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L.

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          No. 83075-9-I/7

          Ed. 2d 808 (1995).

                 The actual innocence doctrine applies when a defendant can show by

          clear and convincing evidence that an alleged constitutional error resulted in the

          conviction of an actual innocent defendant and a “fundamental miscarriage of

          justice would otherwise result if the collateral attack is dismissed.” Id. at 923. A

          defendant asserting an actual innocence claim must, at a minimum, make a

          threshold showing of innocence. In re Pers. Restraint of Weber, 175 Wn.2d 247,

          260, 262-63, 284 P.3d 734 (2012).

                 A defendant’s assertion of insufficient evidence asserts a constitutional

          error. In re Crow, 187 Wn. App. 414, 421, 349 P.3d 902 (2015). The State does

          not argue that Arntsen is procedurally barred from again raising a sufficiency

          claim. Here, because the jury convicted Arntsen of assault in the second degree

          with a deadly weapon based on mere display, as prohibited by State v.

          Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d 497, 502-03, 919 P.2d 577 (1996), overruled on other

          grounds by State v. Easterlin, 159 Wn.2d 203, 149 P.3d 366 (2006), Arntsen has

          met the minimum threshold showing of innocence as discussed below.

                                          Standard of Review

                 Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if “after viewing the

          evidence in the light most favorable to the [prosecution], any rational trier of fact

          could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d

          192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992) (citing State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 220-22,

          616 P.2d 628 (1980)). “A sufficiency challenge admits the truth of the State’s

          evidence and accepts the reasonable inferences to be made from it.” State v.

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          No. 83075-9-I/8

          O’Neal, 159 Wn.2d 500, 505, 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). “Direct evidence is not

          required to uphold a jury’s verdict; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient.” Id.

          at 506.

                                        Sufficiency of the Evidence

                 Arntsen contends that the State did not prove the requisite intent to

          support a conviction for assault in the second degree. “A person is guilty of

          assault in the second degree if he . . . under circumstances not amounting to

          assault in the first degree, assaults another with a deadly weapon.” RCW

          9A.36.021(1)(c). The trial court instructed the jury that an assault is “an act done

          with the intent to create in another apprehension and fear of bodily injury, and

          which in fact creates in another a reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of

          bodily injury even though the actor did not actually intend to inflict bodily injury.”

          To convict a defendant of assault in the second degree, the jury must find

          specific intent to create reasonable fear and apprehension of bodily injury. State

          v. Ward, 125 Wn. App. 243, 248, 104 P.3d 670 (2004) (citing State v. Byrd, 125

          Wn.2d 707, 713, 887 P.2d 396 (1995) 6). Such intent may be inferred from

          pointing a gun, but not from mere display of a gun. Eastmond, 129 Wn.2d at

          500. The parties agree that Arntsen never pointed the rifle at Koenig.

                 Arntsen contends that while the evidence may support a conviction for

          unlawful display of a weapon, it is insufficient to prove that he had a specific

          intent to cause Koenig apprehension and fear of bodily injury and did in fact

                 6
                   For clarity, we refer to State v. Byrd, 125 Wn.2d 707 as “Byrd II” because it
          followed State v. Byrd, 72 Wn. App. 774 which we refer to as “Byrd I.”

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          No. 83075-9-I/9

          create a reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury. The

          unlawful display of a weapon statute provides:

                 It shall be unlawful for any person to carry, exhibit, display, or draw
                 any firearm, dagger, sword, knife or other cutting or stabbing
                 instrument, club, or any other weapon apparently capable of
                 producing bodily harm, in a manner, under circumstances, and at a
                 time and place that either manifests an intent to intimidate another
                 or that warrants alarm for the safety of other persons.

          RCW 9.41.270(1).

                 The State concedes that the intent required for assault cannot be inferred

          from mere display, but argues that Eastmond does not preclude inferring intent

          from surrounding facts and circumstances beyond pointing the muzzle at the

          victim. The State argues that because the assault requires specific intent to

          target an individual and the unlawful display does not, this suggests that conduct

          targeting an individual can be sufficient to infer the requisite intent. In the instant

          case the State argues that a jury could have found such intent when Arntsen

          “attack[ed]” Koenig with his car forcing her to stop before advancing on her in a

          “‘[s]cary aggressive’ manner while brandishing his rifle.” (alteration in original).

                 However, this court explained in Byrd I that

                 [t]he gravamen of the offense of unlawful display of a weapon is
                 displaying and handling of the weapon in a manner “that either
                 manifests an intent to intimidate another or that warrants alarm for
                 the safety of other persons.” RCW 9.41.270. The unlawful display
                 statute recognizes that display of a weapon, without any required
                 intent, could be done in a manner to cause reasonable
                 apprehension, fear, or alarm. There is no necessary nexus between
                 reasonable apprehension and the defendant’s actual intent. Under
                 some circumstances, apprehension could be reasonable at the
                 mere sight of a firearm, while the defendant’s intent could be
                 completely innocent.

          State v. Byrd, 72 Wn. App. 774, aff’d State v. Byrd, 125 Wn.2d. 707.

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          No. 83075-9-I/10

                 The State contends that pointing a firearm directly at a person is sufficient,

          but not necessary to establish an intent to cause fear of bodily injury. The State

          cites State v. Star 7 as an example. No. 35145-9-III, slip op. at 4 (Wash. Ct. App.

          Oct. 16, 2018) (unpublished),

          https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/351459_unp.pdf. In Star, the defendant

          unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting two

          convictions of assault in the second degree. Id. at 7. The defendant first

          attempted to approach a woman in a coffee shop and became angry when he

          was unable to get her attention. Id. at 2. He then sat next to her, swore at her

          and pointed a knife “directly at” her. Id. The woman escaped to an employee

          area to hide. Id. A second patron witnessed what happened and was calling 911

          when the defendant “aggressively approache[d]” while “continuing to hold the

          knife out in front of him” and continued to yell profanities at this patron. Id. at 2-3

          (alteration in original). Another witness testified that the defendant’s conduct was

          such that he worried the defendant was going to use the knife. Id. at 3. In

          upholding the conviction, the Star court reasoned that a “rational jury could infer

          from the combination of the hostile verbal encounters, [the defendant’s] visible

          agitation, and the wielding of the knife in a threatening manner directed at [the

          victims]” that Star approached them with the intent to put them in reasonable fear

          and apprehension of bodily harm.” Id. at 7.

                 Star does not help the State. Unlike the defendant in Star, who wielded

                 7
                   While unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals have no precedential value,
          parties may cite them as nonbinding authorities if identified as unpublished and may be
          accorded such persuasive value as the court deems appropriate. GR 14.1(a).

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          No. 83075-9-I/11

          the knife in a threatening manner directed at the victims, in the instant case

          Arntsen did not direct the rifle at Koenig. Koenig herself said Arntsen’s conduct

          was such that she knew he did not want to shoot her and that she had “no idea”

          what he had in mind.

                 Contrary to the State’s suggestion, directing intimidating conduct at

          someone does not necessarily establish sufficient evidence to support the

          requisite intent to support a conviction for assault in the second degree. See

          State v. Ward, 125 Wn. App. 243, 248, 104 P.3d 670 (2004), abrogated on other

          grounds by State v. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011); State v. Murphy,

          7 Wn. App. 505, 512, 500 P.2d 1276 (1972).

                 In Ward, the owner and employee of a repossession company went to

          Ward’s home to repossess his car. 125 Wn. App. at 246. One employee got out

          of the truck to attach the towing mechanism to the repossessed vehicle when

          Ward stood on the porch of his home and, according to the victims, pointed a gun

          at each of them while shouting for them to get away from the car and leave. Id.

          The defendant and his girlfriend testified that Ward told the two men he had a

          gun, ordered them to leave his property, and displayed the gun by opening his

          jacket, but never pointed it at the victims. Id. at 248. Ward’s attorney did not

          offer the lesser included offense of unlawful display of a weapon. Id. at 247-48.

          The Ward court reversed the assault in the second degree conviction reasoning

          that a jury could have decided that Ward committed only unlawful display of a

          weapon if they “did not believe Ward acted lawfully, but doubted whether he

          pointed his gun.” Id. at 249-50.

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          No. 83075-9-I/12

                 In Murphy, the defendant approached two Air Pollution Control Officers

          investigating his business, “bellowing and hollering,” called them “some real first -

          class names,” and told them to “get off [his property] . . . or there is going to be

          trouble” while unholstering his gun. 7 Wn. App. at 507. One of the control

          officers testified that the defendant pointed the gun at the officers. Id. at 508.

          The defendant testified that he held the gun at his side with this finger on the

          trigger, but never pointed it at the officers. Id. at 507. The defendant argued that

          because the given instructions did not include an intent element, the jury could

          still convict him of the crimes charged, even if they believed his testimony that he

          never pointed the gun at officers. Id. at 511. The Murphy court agreed and

          reversed the assault in the second degree conviction because the jury instruction

          failed to include the requisite intent element. Id. at 512.

                 In both Ward and Murphy, the defendants engaged in intimidating conduct

          directed at another even when accepting their version of events that denied

          pointing a gun at another.

                 Arntsen cites State v. Stokes, an unpublished case, to support his

          contention that the deadly weapon must be directed at another to support assault

          in the second degree. State v. Stokes, noted at 157 Wn. App. 1075 (2010). In

          Stokes, two men forced their way into a woman’s home to rob her and hit her in

          the head with a gun in the presence of her two young children and also grabbed

          one child’s shirt, asking the child where the money was. Stokes, 2010 WL

          3760123 at *1. Stokes was convicted of two counts of attempted second degree

          assault for his conduct toward the two children. Id. at *2. The court reversed the

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          No. 83075-9-I/13

          convictions. Id. at *1. The court noted the fact that there was no evidence that

          Stokes pointed the gun at the children, that one of the men threw a cape onto the

          children and told them to cover their faces, and, later, one of the men told the

          children to go into the bathroom. Id. The court reasoned that although Stokes’

          conduct “demonstrate[d] an intent to frighten the children and even a willingness

          to assault them, it does not show that Stokes actually attempted to commit

          second degree assault against the children.” Id. at *3. The Stokes court did not

          consider only the fact that a gun was not pointed at the children.

                 Even when a gun is not directly pointed at another, other evidence may

          still suffice to allow a jury to find that the defendant had the sufficient intent to

          support assault in the second degree. See Byrd II, 125 Wn.2d at 713.

                 In Byrd II, the defendant carried a loaded pistol under a heavy coat and

          went to confront John Lindemulder, the person who was seeing Byrd’s sister-in-

          law after the sister-in-law and Byrd’s brother separated. Id. at 708-09.

          Lindemulder testified that Byrd threatened Lindemulder and put a gun to his

          head. Id. at 709. The Supreme Court observed that if the jury believed

          Lindemulder, it could have found Byrd intended to create apprehension of bodily

          harm, thus satisfying the intent element of second degree assault. Id. at 715.

          What is relevant in our analysis is the Supreme Court’s analysis if the jury were

          to believe Byrd’s testimony.

                 Byrd testified that he expressed concern about the relationship, reminded

          the person about his history of messing around with other women, and as Byrd

          stood in the doorway and was about to leave, pulled his gun and held it in the air,

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          No. 83075-9-I/14

          warning the person that if he continued this type of thing with women, someday

          something could happen to him. Id. at 709-10. Byrd denied threatening the

          person or pointing a gun at him. Id. at 710. The Byrd II court held that “if the jury

          believed Byrd’s evidence,” “it could have found either that Byrd intended to cause

          present apprehension in Lindemulder or that Byrd intended to only intimidate

          Lindemulder; the latter intent is insufficient to support second degree assault.”

          Id. at 715 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court affirmed this court’s decision

          to reverse the conviction because the jury was not instructed that the defendant

          must have intended to create in his or her victim apprehension of bodily harm.

          Id. at 715-16.

                 In the instant case, the jury was properly instructed and was given the

          option of convicting on the lesser included instruction of unlawful display of a

          weapon. Thus, the question before us is whether the evidence sufficiently

          supported inferring the requisite intent beyond speculation. It is important to

          remember that “[w]hether or not the victim’s apprehension is ‘reasonable’

          involves considerations not directly related to a defendant’s specific intent to

          cause apprehension. The required intent involves the mental processes of the

          defendant, whereas the ‘reasonableness’ of the victim’s reaction involves the

          victim’s mental processes.” Byrd I, 72 Wn. App. at 779-80.

                 A verdict does not rest on speculation or conjecture when founded on

          reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial facts. State v. Jameison, 4 Wn.

          App. 2d 184, 197-98, 421 P.3d 463 (2018) (citing State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.

          Padilla, 14 Wn. App. 337, 339-40, 540 P.2d 1395 (1975)). “This proposition

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          No. 83075-9-I/15

          conversely suggests that an inference is not reasonable if based on speculation

          or conjecture.” Id. at 198. “When evidence is equally consistent with two

          hypotheses, the evidence tends to prove neither.” Id. “Washington law, if not the

          federal constitution, demands that inferences in the criminal setting be based

          only on likelihood, not possibility. When an inference supports an element of the

          crime, due process requires the presumed fact to flow more likely than not from

          proof of the basic fact.” Id. at 200 (citing State v. Hanna, 123 Wn.2d 704, 710,

          871 P.2d 135 (1994). “Whether an inference meets the appropriate standard

          must be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular evidence

          presented to the jury in each case.” Id.

                 In Byrd II, even if the jury were to only accept the defendant’s version of

          events, not only did he direct intimidating behavior toward another, he made

          statements, while pulling out a gun and raising it in the air, that something could

          happen to Lindemulder if he continued his behavior. That is not the

          circumstance in the instant case.

                 Following a road rage incident, Arntsen got out of his car with his face

          partially covered and holding a rifle. He approached Koenig’s car without ever

          pointing the rifle at her, walked or ran up to the driver’s side door and then

          walked or ran back to his own vehicle and left. To conclude that this evidence

          sufficiently supports assault in the second degree dangerously allows

          unconscious bias to creep into the process. Without any evidence as to what

          Arntsen said, the jury is left with what he did and what he looked like. When

          evidence of someone’s conduct leaves an unanswered question as to what the

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          No. 83075-9-I/16

          person actually intended, what is left is what the person looked like. The State

          elicited from Morrill, without any further explanation, that he thought Arntsen

          appeared “[s]cary aggressive.”

                 As this court previously explained, which is worth repeating here, the law

          “recognizes that display of a weapon, without any required intent, could be done

          in a manner to cause reasonable apprehension, fear, or alarm. There is no

          necessary nexus between reasonable apprehension and the defendant’s actual

          intent.” Byrd I, 72 Wn. App. at 780.

                 The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Arntsen

          assaulted Koenig, meaning in this circumstance that he specifically intended to

          create in Koenig apprehension and fear of bodily injury. We hold that the

          evidence did not sufficiently allow the jury, without speculating, to find that

          Arntsen had such intent.

                 Also, in order to find that Arntsen committed assault, the State not only

          had to prove that Arntsen had the intent to create in another apprehension and

          fear of bodily injury, but that he in fact created in another a reasonable

          apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury. When Koenig first saw Arntsen

          step out of his car with a rifle, she testified that she initially believed he meant to

          do her “harm” but had “no idea” what type of harm. She further explained that

          when Arntsen approached her vehicle, she said Arntsen “was not looking to

          shoot” her, and that “[h]e had something else in mind,” though she had “no idea

          what it was.” The evidence did not sufficiently support that Arntsen did in fact

          create in Koenig an imminent fear of bodily injury.

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          No. 83075-9-I/17

                                            CONCLUSION

                 Under the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is insufficient to

          support the conviction of assault in the second degree. We need not address

          Arntsen’s other arguments and grant the petition. We reverse the conviction and

          remand to the trial court to vacate.

          WE CONCUR:

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