Court Opinion

ID: 9966134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-05 21:13:06.578759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:25.050730
License: Public Domain

In the Court of Criminal
              Appeals of Texas
                           ══════════
                          No. WR-91,029-02
                           ══════════

            EX PARTE NOLAN RYAN OVERSTREET,
                               Applicant

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
         On Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
         In Cause No. C-396-W012330-0714331-B
               In the 396th District Court
                     Tarrant County
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

      YEARY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KELLER, P.J.,
joined.

      In 2000, Applicant pled guilty to the offense of failing to register
as a sex offender, which was a state-jail felony at the time of the
commission of the alleged offense in 1998. Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 668,
§§ 1, 10, pp. 2260, 2264, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. The convicting court judge
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reduced Applicant’s punishment to that for a Class A misdemeanor,
under Section 12.44(a) of the Texas Penal Code, and sentenced him to
90 days in the county jail. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.44(a). 1
       In 2023, Applicant filed this subsequent                  post-conviction
application for writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07, Section 4. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4. The convicting court has now
recommended that this Court conclude that Applicant has satisfied the
gateway for proceeding in a subsequent writ application, as provided for
in Section 4(a)(1) of Article 11.07. 2 Specifically, the convicting court

       1 Although Applicant was punished as if he had committed a Class A

misdemeanor, he was convicted of a state-jail felony. Therefore, Article 11.07
is the appropriate vehicle by which to seek post-conviction relief. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 1 (“This article establishes the procedures for
writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a felony
judgment imposing a penalty other than death.”); Ex parte Palmberg, 491
S.W.3d 804, 805 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[A] state jail felony conviction
that is punished as if it were a Class A misdemeanor is still subject to collateral
attack in an Article 11.07 post-conviction application for writ of habeas
corpus.”). Moreover, although Applicant long ago completed his 90-day
sentence, he has established collateral consequences “sufficient to establish
‘confinement’ so as to trigger application of art. 11.07.” Ex parte Herrington,
310 S.W.3d 452, 457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

       2 Section 4(a)(1) reads:

              Sec. 4 (a) If a subsequent application for writ of habeas
       corpus us filed after final disposition of an initial application
       challenging the same conviction, a court may not consider the
       merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application
       unless the application contains sufficient specific facts
       establishing that:

              (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could
       not have been presented previously in an original application or
       in a previously considered application filed under this article
                                                          OVERSTREET – 3

recommends that we conclude that Applicant has established a new
legal basis for his claim—i.e., one that was unavailable to him when he
filed his initial writ application.
       The Court now grants habeas relief. But the Court’s opinion fails
to articulate the basis, in light of the requirements contained in Code of
Criminal Procedure article 11.07, Section 4, for permitting Applicant to
proceed to a merits determination on his claim of actual innocence. 3 It
simply asserts that Applicant “states the he has previously unavailable
evidence of his actual innocence[,]” without identifying whether this
justifies granting him relief in a subsequent writ application based upon
Section 4(a)(1)’s reference to previously unavailable facts or previously
unavailable law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a)(1) (allowing
judicial review of claims in a subsequent writ application if “the factual
or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date” the previous
application was filed).

       because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable
       on the date the applicant filed the previous application[.]

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a)(1).

       3 Nothing about the fact that Applicant is claiming so-called “actual

innocence,” per se, exempts him from having to satisfy the provisions of Section
4 of Article 11.07, governing the reviewability of claims in a subsequent post-
conviction writ application. See Ex parte Sledge, 391 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (“[T]here is nothing irrational about the legislative exercise
of its prerogative to draw a definite statutory line beyond which the State’s
substantial interest in the finality of its judgments overcomes all other policy
interests, including the interest of habeas corpus applicants indefinitely to
preserve a forum in which to challenge—even on jurisdictional grounds—the
validity of their convictions.”). The Legislature may likewise legitimately
prohibit a subsequent habeas corpus applicant from litigating a claim of actual
innocence if he could have raised that claim in a previous application.
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       In my view, Applicant has established neither a new factual basis
nor a new legal basis for his actual innocence claim. The Court therefore
errs in reaching the merits of his claim, much less in granting him relief.
I respectfully dissent.
                                I. BACKGROUND
       The basis for Applicant’s failure-to-register conviction was an
offense he was convicted of committing in 1997, in the state of Colorado,
before moving to Texas. Applicant filed his initial writ application in
2020. In that application, Applicant alleged actual innocence grounded
upon his claim that the Colorado offense does not amount to a
“reportable offense” for purposes of a prosecution for failing to register
as a sex offender. He made this claim notwithstanding that, at least as
of 2006, the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) had declared the
Colorado statute under which he was convicted to be “substantially
similar” to a Texas offense for purposes of Applicant’s duty to register.
See Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 211, §§ 2, 19, pp. 400, 405, eff. Sept. 1, 2001
(enacting then-Article 62.0101, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
making DPS responsible for determining the substantial similarity of
out-of-state offenses for sex-offender registration purposes, and making
it retroactive); Acts 2005, 79th. Leg., ch. 1008, §§ 1.01, 4.01(a), pp. 3388,
3422, eff. Sept. 1, 2005 (amending former Article 62.0101 and
recodifying it as Article 62.003; also making the amendment
retroactive). On June 17, 2020, this Court denied Applicant relief on the
merits of that initial actual innocence habeas claim. 4

       4 Applicant also claimed in his initial writ application that his guilty

plea had been involuntary. We denied relief on both claims. Thus, we “finally
disposed” of Applicant’s entire initial writ application, triggering Article 11.07,
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       The very next day, on June 18, 2020, Applicant appealed DPS’s
determination with respect to substantial similarity to a Travis County
district court, in accordance with Article 62.003(c) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.003(c) (“An
appeal of a determination made under this article [regarding
substantial similarity, by DPS] shall be brought in a district court in
Travis County.”). On October 30, 2020, the district court in Travis
County granted Applicant’s motion for summary judgment, reversing
DPS’s determination regarding substantial similarity. DPS then
appealed that determination to the Third Court of Appeals, which
docketed the appeal as a civil matter, assigning it a civil cause number. 5

Section 4’s limitations on subsequent writ applications. See Ex parte Torres,
943 S.W.2d 469, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (“[A] ‘final disposition’ of an initial
writ [for purposes of triggering Section 4’s limitations on subsequent writs]
must entail a disposition of all the claims raised.”).

       5 Article 62.003 says nothing about the losing party from an appeal to

the Travis County district court pursuing a further appeal in the court of
appeals. Neither the parties, in their briefs to the court of appeals, nor the
court of appeals in its opinion, identified a statute that confers appellate
jurisdiction on the Third Court of Appeals. Tex. Dept. of Pub. Safety v.
Anonymous Adult Montana Resident, No. 03-20-00565-CV, 2022 WL 1652137
(Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2022) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
This Court has said that, under Article V, Section 6, of the Texas Constitution,
“a statute must expressly give the courts of appeals jurisdiction.” Whitfield v.
State, 430 S.W.3d 405, 407−08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6
(“Said Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . which shall extend
to all cases of which the District Court or County Courts have original or
appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be
prescribed by law.”) (emphasis added). It is unclear to me by what legislative
authority the court of appeals entertained DPS’s appeal. I have no occasion in
evaluating the present post-conviction writ application, however, to address
the court of appeals’ jurisdiction in that (albeit related) civil matter. In any
event, my conclusion would remain the same even if any available statutory
authority to appeal from the DPS determination must end in the district court.
                                                       OVERSTREET – 6

       On May 25, 2022, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Applicant’s behalf. Tex. Dept. of Pub.
Safety v. Anonymous Adult Montana Resident, No. 03-20-00565-CV,
2022 WL 1652137 (Tex. App.—Austin May 25, 2022) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). More than a year later, on August 14, 2023,
Applicant filed the present, subsequent writ application. Applicant now
argues that, in view of the appellate reversal of DPS’s determination
that his Colorado conviction is for an offense that is “substantially
similar” to a Texas offense, he had no duty to register as a sex offender
and, therefore, cannot be found to have committed the offense of failing
to do so.
       In his sole ground for relief, Applicant claims: “Newly available
evidence shows that [he] is actually innocent.” Under “Facts Supporting”
this ground, his writ application merely cites the decisions of the district
court and court of appeals reversing DPS’s determination of substantial
similarity. He does not designate whether he deems himself entitled to
proceed in this subsequent writ application because of new facts or new
law. But in his memorandum in support of the writ application,
Applicant argues only that “[t]his application falls under the
‘previously unavailable legal basis’ exception to the bar against
subsequent applications.” Memorandum in Support of Application
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4−6.
       In its recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, the
convicting court agrees, concluding that “[t]he reversal of DPS’s
substantial similarity determination by the [district court], which was
affirmed by the Third Court of Appeals, is a legal basis for Applicant’s
                                                         OVERSTREET – 7

actual-innocence claim that was unavailable when he filed his initial
habeas application.” Findings and Order ## 34−41. The convicting court
also specifically recommends that we reject the State’s counter-
argument that the appellate determination that DPS was wrong is
really a factual basis for relief that Applicant could have pursued prior
to filing his initial writ application. Id. ## 33−34.
       In the State’s view, however, Applicant failed to exercise due
diligence by filing his initial writ application before first prosecuting his
appeal of DPS’s determination of substantial similarity. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(c) (“[A] factual basis of a claim is unavailable
on or before [the date that an initial writ is filed] if the factual basis was
not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or
before that date.”). For reasons I will next endeavor to articulate, I agree
with the State.
         II. ARTICLE 62.003, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
       Present Article 62.003 of the Code of Criminal Procedure places
the primary responsibility on DPS for determining “whether an offense
under the laws of another state . . . contains elements that are
substantially similar to the elements of an offense under the laws of this
state.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 62.003(a). It also expressly provides
that “[a]n appeal of a determination made under this article shall be
brought in a district court in Travis County.” Id. art. 62.003(c). This has
been the state of the law since 2001. Acts 2001, 77th Leg., ch. 211, §§ 2,
19, pp. 400, 405, eff. Sept. 1, 2001. Still, I am not entirely convinced that
the appeal to the Travis County district court was timely in this case, or
that the Third Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the district
                                                       OVERSTREET – 8

court’s determination. See note 5, ante. I am also not sure that, even if
the court of appeals did have jurisdiction, it properly docketed the case
as a civil matter. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3 (providing that the Texas
Supreme Court’s “appellate jurisdiction . . . shall extend to all cases
except in criminal law matters”); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5 (providing that
this Court’s appellate jurisdiction extends to “all criminal cases of
whatever grade”). It seems odd to me to regard a determination about
the meaning of penal statutes as a civil law matter as opposed to a
criminal law matter.
      In any event, the statute is crystal clear that the district court in
Travis County, at least, had subject matter jurisdiction to review DPS’s
determination. Also, DPS does not seem to have pursued discretionary
review of the Third Court of Appeals’ affirmance of DPS’s determination,
so it makes no difference in this case whether the matter is properly
regarded as civil or criminal—assuming it may be appealed beyond the
district court at all. I therefore have no reason at this point to question
the validity of the district court’s determination, and I will regard it as
law of the case for purposes of this subsequent writ application.
                       III. NEW FACTUAL BASIS?
      The way Applicant drafted his ground for relief suggests he
intended to pursue subsequent habeas corpus review under the “new
facts” provision in Article 11.07, Section 4(a)(1): “Newly available
evidence shows that [Applicant] is actually innocent.” (Emphasis added.)
In that event, I must agree with the State that Applicant has not
demonstrated sufficient diligence in pursuing his claim. If the new
“evidence” of Applicant’s innocence is the appellate determination that
                                                             OVERSTREET – 9

the Colorado offense of which he was convicted is not “substantially
similar” to any Texas penal offense, then he could have sought that
appellate determination before he filed his initial writ application. If
that is his new fact, as he seems to allege, 6 it cannot be said that it was
“not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or
before that date.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(c). Thus, we are
not at liberty to reach the merits of his claim on that account.
                            IV. NEW LEGAL BASIS?
       In his supporting memorandum of law, however, Applicant
exclusively invokes the “new law” exception under Section 4(a)(1),
rather than “new facts” as suggested by the writ application itself. But
in my view, he has not demonstrated that he should be allowed to
proceed under this exception either. Before “new law” may justify a court
in reviewing the merits of a subsequent-writ claim, it must go to “the . .
. legal basis” for that claim. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a)(1).
The legal basis for Applicant’s claim, however, is so-called “actual
innocence.” 7

       6 Under “FACTS SUPPORTING” Applicant’s single ground for relief,

his writ application asserts, in totality: “[Applicant] pleaded guilty to failing to
register as a sex offender based on a Colorado conviction. The 201st District
Court and the Third Court of Appeals have since concluded that [Applicant’s]
Colorado offense is not reportable.”

       7 I am speaking here of what the Court typically refers to as an “actual

innocence” claim. For my part, I would simply characterize it as a claim for
relief under the Elizondo standard, after this Court’s opinion in Ex parte
Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). As I have explained
repeatedly, satisfying this admittedly high burden is still “not the same as
establishing that the applicant is manifestly innocent.” Ex parte Cacy, 543
S.W.3d 802, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (Yeary, J., concurring). See Ex parte
Chaney, 563 S.W.3d 239, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (Yeary, J., concurring) (“I
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       “Actual innocence” has been an available legal basis for a post-
conviction writ application since 1996, when this Court decided Ex parte
Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). And that legal basis
for relief has been available even for applicants who pled guilty, as
Applicant did, since Ex parte Tuley, 109 S.W.3d 388 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (op. on original sub.). In fact, Applicant did argue actual innocence
in his initial writ application. He simply failed to adequately develop the
fact that the Colorado offense for which he was convicted was not
“substantially similar” to a Texas offense prior to filing his initial writ
application.
       In concluding that Applicant is invoking a previously unavailable
legal basis for relief, the convicting court relies upon two opinions from
this Court. Findings and Order # 25. Those opinions observe that “a legal
basis was previously unavailable if subsequent case law makes it easier
to establish the claim and renders inapplicable factors that had
previously been weighed in evaluating the merits.” Ex parte Barbee, 616
S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Ex parte Chavez, 371
S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). I do not think this principle

do not regard the Elizondo standard as sufficiently rigorous to justify the
nomenclature ‘actual innocence.’”); Ex parte Mallet, 602 S.W.3d 922, 925−26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (Yeary, J., concurring) (agreeing that the applicant
satisfied Elizondo, but advocating that the Court “avoid the label ‘actual
innocence’”); Ex parte Santillan, 666 S.W.3d 580, 580−81 (Tex. Crim. App.
2023) (Yeary, J., concurring) (agreeing that the applicant had probably
established true “actual innocence,” and was therefore entitled to relief, but
refusing to join the Court’s opinion because it declared him “actually innocent”
simply because he satisfied the Elizondo standard”); Ex parte Lane, 670 S.W.3d
662, 680 n.1 & 684−85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (Yeary, J., dissenting) (arguing
that in an initial writ application, the applicant established that he was
“absolutely innocent”—as opposed to “actually innocent”—of failure to register,
having proven in the writ proceeding that he had no reportable conviction).
                                                         OVERSTREET – 11

applies in this case.
       In Chavez, for example, the applicant relied upon the extension of
the availability of false evidence claims to the State’s unknowing use of
false evidence, recognized earlier in Ex parte Chabot, 300 S.W.3d 768,
772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Chavez, 371 S.W.3d at 204−05. And in
Barbee, the new law that the applicant asserted (unsuccessfully) was the
recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in McCoy v.
Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018). Applicant identifies no comparable case
from this Court, the Supreme Court, or even “a court of appellate
jurisdiction of this state[,]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(b), that
identifies a new or modified standard that makes the legal basis for his
claim—“actual innocence”—newly available or easier to prove.
       Applicant cites no subsequent case that has, for example,
moderated Elizondo’s “Herculean” standard for establishing a claim of
actual innocence. Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538, 545 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). And the extension of the application of that standard to cover
guilty pleas occurred, as I have noted, in 2002, in Tuley. The fact that
some new development in the litigation history of Applicant’s actual
innocence claim may have resulted in law of the case that could
ultimately, if timely raised, have helped him does not mean that the
legal standard itself has morphed in a way that should excuse his failure
to pursue that new development earlier. 8

       8 An analogy based upon post-conviction DNA testing comes readily to

mind. Under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a convicted
person may obtain a judicial determination that, if the results of post-
conviction DNA testing were favorable, and “had the results been available
during the trial of the offense, it is reasonably probable that the person would
not have been convicted.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.04. But Chapter 64—
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       I agree with the State, therefore, that Applicant’s asserted
justification for re-raising his actual innocence claim is more in the
nature of a new factual basis than a new legal basis. It is certainly not
what Barbee/Chavez contemplated would be regarded as a previously
unavailable legal basis for relief. For that reason, I reject the convicting
court’s recommendation that we find Applicant has articulated a new
legal basis for his claim.
                    V. ACTUAL INNOCENCE GATEWAY?
       Under Article 11.07, Section 4(a)(2), a subsequent post-conviction
application for writ of habeas corpus may proceed to a merits
determination if the applicant establishes that, “by a preponderance of

itself—provides no other relief to the convicted person. Instead, he must seek
relief in another forum: this Court, in the guise of a post-conviction application
for writ of habeas corpus. See Whitfield, 430 S.W.3d at 409 (“In the system that
the statutes have created, after a final decision of a court of appeals of a DNA-
testing appeal in a non-death-penalty case, the results of the proceeding may
be used for an application for post-conviction habeas-corpus relief under Article
11.07.”).
        Suppose an inmate filed an initial Article 11.07 writ application
alleging that new DNA testing would prove his innocence, but he had not yet
sought such testing. Suppose that only after we denied relief did he seek DNA
testing, and that he then obtained a favorable result. Suppose he then filed a
subsequent writ application and alleged “new law” in the form of the convicting
court’s favorable determination that “it is reasonably probable that [he] would
not have been convicted.” Suppose, further, that the technology of DNA testing
had not advanced during the interim, and that he could not, therefore,
reasonably invoke Article 11.073 as a new “legal basis” for relief. See Ex parte
Kussmaul, 548 S.W.3d 606, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“[Applicants] rely on
a legal basis, Article 11.073, that was unavailable on the date [they] filed their
previous applications.”). Would this Court still say that “the legal basis” for his
claim could not have been reasonably formulated before he filed his initial writ
application? After all, he already made an actual innocence claim in that initial
application, and nothing prevented him from seeking DNA testing under
Chapter 64 before he filed it.
                                                     OVERSTREET – 13

the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution[,] no
rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a)(2). We are not called
upon to determine whether Applicant should be permitted to proceed
with his claim by virtue of this provision, however. Applicant does not
cite it in any of his pleadings as a ground for proceeding under Section
4.
      This Court has made it clear in the past that, even with respect
to post-conviction applications for writs of habeas corpus that are
prepared pro se, “as a court of law we may not create claims that the
Court sua sponte believes meritorious when they are not arguably
present in an applicant’s pleadings.” Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344,
350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Ex parte Hicks, 640 S.W.3d 232, 235−36
(Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (Yeary, J., dissenting). Especially because
Applicant is now represented by able counsel, this Court should not sua
sponte “create” Applicant’s arguments for him even if it thinks those
arguments would have merit. Because Applicant himself offers no
argument why he should be allowed to proceed under Article 11.07,
Section 4(a)(2), I would not reach out and hold that he may.
                           VI. CONCLUSION
      For these reasons, I would dismiss Applicant’s subsequent post-
conviction application for writ of habeas corpus as failing to satisfy the
strictures of Section 4 of Article 11.07. Because the Court does not, I
respectfully dissent.

FILED:                                               May 1, 2024
PUBLISH