Court Opinion

ID: 9633643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:55:27.778403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:39.146226
License: Public Domain

Andersen, J.
(concurring in the result) — In the past, I have expressed my view that the public disclosure act opens the public record doors much wider to the press and the *734public than the majority of the court is willing to concede.* 3 In the case at bench, however, I am constrained by the trial court's findings and conclusions that "[t]he information sought by the Plaintiff constitutes specific investigative records as defined by RCW 42.17.310(l)(d) compiled by investigative law enforcement and penology agencies" and that " [t]he non-disclosure of the names of the complaining witness, any other witnesses, and the charged officer in the case of internal affairs investigations is essential to effective law enforcement".4 The code section so referred to by the trial court is one of the specific statutory exemptions from disclosure contained in the public disclosure act.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that in this case we are required to reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
Durham, J., concurs with Andersen, J.

In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 618, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (Andersen, J., dissenting).

This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in resolving factual issues. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Statements of fact included within conclusions of law will be treated as findings of fact. Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 567, 383 P.2d 900 (1963); Redmond v. Kezner, 10 Wn. App. 332, 343-44, 517 P.2d 625 (1974).