Court Opinion

ID: 9653160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:39:52.045025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.690379
License: Public Domain

COUNTISS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that we should not, at this time, dismiss the appeal or affirm the trial court judgment, as requested by appellee. For that reason, I concur in the denial of appel-lee’s motion. I disagree, however, with the conclusion that paragraph (a) of Rule 377* is directory instead of mandatory. Had appellee asked us to do so, I would have voted to strike the statement of facts from the record.
I have reached that conclusion because I think the language of paragraph (a) of Rule 377 is clear, direct and unambiguous. It says, “In order to present a statement of facts on appeal, the appellant, at or before the time prescribed for perfecting the appeal, shall make a written request to the official reporter....” The paragraph is complete in itself. It states the procedure to be followed, and the sanction to be applied if the procedure is not followed, and it does so in the kind of language that is overwhelmingly construed to be mandatory. See, e.g., Bay City Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Lewis, 474 S.W.2d 459, 460-61 (Tex.1972). Nothing in the paragraph, or elsewhere in the Rule, suggests we should refer to other Rules in order to resolve a violation of the paragraph. I think the lesson of B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.1982) is applicable here: the Rules “mean exactly what they say.” Thus, I would construe the Rule as the San Antonio Court of Appeals did in Odom v. Olafson, 675 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984, no writ).
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the denial of the motion, but disagree with the interpretation of paragraph (a) of Rule 377.
BOYD, J., joins in this opinion.

 All references to rules are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.