Court Opinion

ID: 9612782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:11:16.809007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:23.023004
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion may only mean that “rape trauma syndrome” evidence is properly admitted to explain delay in reporting a rape or sexual assault. However, it can be given a broader interpretation that does violence to or overrules existing precedent. See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.1981). The unmistakable impact of the “rape trauma syndrome” evidence in this case was to bolster the victim’s testimony and to prove that a rape actually occurred. The testimony relating to the rape trauma syndrome went beyond explaining the delay in reporting the assault and for that reason I would affirm the court of appeals reversal of the defendant’s conviction and order a new trial.
In this case, Officer Wyka, head of the Victim Services Unit of the Colorado Springs Police Department, did not examine the victim, but was qualified as an expert on victimology. The prosecution justified the admission of her testimony on the theory that the victim had not reported the assault for eighty-nine days and that the defense would rely on the delay to establish consent. The defendant, however, did not rely upon the reporting delay but upon an alibi defense. Without determining if the evidence satisfied Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), the trial court admitted Wyka’s testimony, over objection, as to her experience in dealing with sexual assault victims and to the various symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome. To add credibility to the opinion of Officer Wyka and to establish that the victim was in fact raped, the prosecution called a number of witnesses, who knew the victim, to testify that she displayed the symptoms and reactions that Officer Wyka identified in the rape trauma syndrome.
In my view, the testimony and arguments relating to the rape trauma syndrome were improperly admitted because the trial court made no finding that the evidence satisfied the Frye test. When the Frye test is satisfied, evidence of symptoms indicating that a person is a rape victim may be admissible to prove that she in fact was raped. To admit the untested testimony under the title, “rape trauma syndrome,” however, permits a conclusion that a sexual assault occurred even though the syndrome may be caused by other unidentified traumatic events.
In the court of appeals opinion, Judge Metzger, speaking for a unanimous court, analyzed the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome testimony under the general scientific acceptance standard in Frye and concluded that the danger of prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence. People v. Hampton, 728 P.2d 345 (Colo.App.1986). Although I agree with Judge Metzger’s conclusion that the Frye test applies to rape trauma syndrome testimony, I believe that the case should be remanded to permit the trial court to apply the Frye test to the facts of this case. The court of appeals creates a per se exclusionary rule for rape trauma syndrome testimony that does not permit consideration of the purpose for which the testimony is offered or its reliability. In my view, the *955potential unreliability of rape trauma syndrome testimony requires that the Frye test be applied by the trial court on a case-by-case basis.
In Frye v. United States, the court refused to admit the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, which is akin to a lie detector test, to show that the defendant was telling the truth. The court stated in Frye:
Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Frye test has been adopted in Colorado to insure the reliability of scientific testimony. People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d at 354. I see no reason to abandon our use of the Frye test in favor of CRE 702 in light of the extensive authority from other jurisdictions which holds that “rape trauma syndrome” evidence may-be inadmissible under the Frye test.
In my view, the admissibility of “rape trauma syndrome” evidence under the Frye test is far from certain. Other jurisdictions, which have addressed the admissibility of “rape trauma syndrome” evidence, have found it unreliable under the Frye test to prove that a sexual assault occurred. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984); People v. Pullins, 145 Mich.App. 414, 378 N.W.2d 502 (1985); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.1982); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.1984). The syllogistic reasoning behind the admission of rape trauma syndrome evidence is that all rape victims have the rape trauma syndrome. Accordingly, since this victim has the rape trauma syndrome, she has been raped. This logic falsely indicates that all rape victims suffer from the same symptoms.
Recognition of the symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome in a victim may not prove that a rape occurred. Rape is a traumatic experience that may create the same symptoms in most victims. The rape trauma syndrome is a subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder, which refers to the development of symptoms following a psychologically traumatic event not generally encountered in human experience. Smith, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 20 Trial 92 (1984); American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 236 (3d ed. 1980). Post-traumatic stress disorder and its characteristic symptoms may occur in victims of all violent crimes including rape. Characteristic symptoms identified by the American Psychiatric Association include reoccurring nightmares about the traumatic incident, headaches, sleep disturbance, and diminished responsiveness to the outside world. American Psychiatric Association, supra at 237. Since the symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome may follow any traumatic incident, an expert’s testimony about the rape trauma syndrome leads to the questionable conclusion that all people who have suffered a severe trauma and have the symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome have been raped. In many instances, trauma that causes the syndrome may not involve rape. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d at 250-251, 203 Cal.Rptr. at 460, 681 P.2d at 301 (“Although there are patterns that have been observed, the ongoing studies reveal that a host of variables contribute to the effect of rape on its victims ... ‘[cjlearly, the concept of a typical rape victim has no place within the context of post rape adjustment.’ ”); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 229 (“The characteristic symptoms [of the rape trauma syndrome] may follow any psychologically traumatic event.”).
Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie detector tests, or voice prints, the rape trauma syndrome was not designed to determine whether the victim was in fact raped. Instead, it was developed by professional *956rape counselors as a therapeutic tool to help identify, predict, and treat emotional problems experienced by patients. People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d at 249-250, 203 Cal.Rptr. at 459, 681 P.2d at 300; State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d at 230; Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va.L.Rev. 1657 (1984) (concluding that expert testimony about the rape trauma syndrome is inadmissible under the Frye test). Because it was developed as a therapeutic and not as a diagnostic tool, it may not be sufficiently reliable in determining whether a rape occurred to satisfy the Frye test.
Because rape trauma syndrome evidence has the potential to produce unreliable testimony, I do not believe a per se rule of admissibility, as endorsed by the majority, is desirable. At the same time, I believe that a per se rule of inadmissibility, as endorsed by the court of appeals, is unnecessarily stringent and may well result in the exclusion of testimony that is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Frye test. In my view, the reasoning of the Idaho Supreme Court, regarding the creation of a per se rule in the context of hypnotically induced testimony, is insightful:
While each of the ... approaches discussed above have merit, they all advocate to a greater or lesser extent a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility which is inconsistent with the general trend of witness competency that every person is competent to be a witness. While each of the ... approaches focuses on an important consideration to be evaluated by a trial court in determining competency, they do so to the exclusion of other considerations, and thus unnecessarily tie a trial court’s hands in determining the competency of a witness to testify. If we were to adopt the rule that hypnotically induced testimony should be left to cross examination and impeachment, there would still be circumstances where testimony admitted under that rule had been rendered tainted and unreliable due to the methods used in hypnosis. Thus, a per se rule of admissibility would in some circumstances allow for the admission of unreliable testimony, an undesirable result in our judicial system, where we strive to reach verdicts based only on reliable testimony. On the other hand, a per se rule of inadmissibility ... would, in some circumstances, disallow reliable testimony, thus thwarting the truth seeking function of our judicial system.
State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 618, 624, 682 P.2d 571, 577-78 (1984); see People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo.1987) (advocating a case-by-case approach for determining whether posthypnotic testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible).
Accordingly, I would reverse and order a new trial.
I am authorized to say that KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in this dissent.