Court Opinion

ID: 9590394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:54:27.759974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:22.879432
License: Public Domain

SOSA, Senior Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion only as to its discussion regarding the trial court’s failure to instruct on second degree murder. I believe the failure to give the instruction here deprived Defendants of a fair trial. As the majority opinion rightly indicates, second degree murder requires objective knowledge on the part of a defendant that a person will be killed or seriously harmed. First degree murder on the other hand requires a subjective knowledge that death or serious injury will result. These two tests differ substantially and required precise instructions to guide the jury in determining which particular degree of homicide Defendants may have committed. The majority acknowledges the evidence was conflicting as to whether Defendants McCrary and Burdick were subjectively aware that their behavior would create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. This is supported by the fact that the magistrate in the bind over order originally found probable cause only for second degree murder. In addition the prosecution itself requested an instruction on second degree murder, thereby indicating its view that the evidence would support such a conviction. Finally, the trial judge indicated that based on the evidence, he would have convicted on second degree murder. There was thus a clear factual issue whether Defendants had subjective or objective awareness of the danger of their acts. Defendants were entitled to have the jury consider this factual question. Absent a second degree murder instruction, there is simply no guarantee that the jury ever considered whether Defendants acted with the objective knowledge that death or serious injury would result, as required by second degree murder, or whether they acted with an actual subjective awareness as required by first degree murder. Commentary to the Uniform Jury Instructions on second degree murder indicates that an instruction on second degree murder should not be given where the evidence only supports first degree murder. NMSA 1978, UJI Crim. 2.11 (Repl.Pamp.1982), Committee Commentary. The evidence in this case did not exclusively support first degree murder. Failure to give a second degree murder instruction deprived Defendants’ jury of an instruction on a lesser included offense of the offense charged, NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1B (Cum.Supp.1983), as well as an instruction clearly warranted by the evidence presented. This deprived Defendants of their right to a fair trial and was fundamental error. See State v. Vallejos, 86 N.M. 39, 519 P.2d 135 (Ct.App.1974). State v. Najar, 94 N.M. 193, 608 P.2d 169 (Ct.App.1980) is the most recent authority directly relied upon by the majority for its conclusion that Defendants waived any error that occurred by objecting to the prosecution’s tender of the instruction. The Najar court however, referred to the fundamental error doctrine by concluding that the conviction there would stand since no such error existed. The implication is clear: the presence of fundamental error is grounds for reversal. Fundamental error exists in the instant case. In my view, because fundamental error is involved, there is abundant authority for fully considering the instruction issue notwithstanding any asserted waiver on Defendants’ part. This Court clearly may consider errors not properly preserved for appeal where such errors deprive the accused of a fundamental right. State v. Ramirez, 98 N.M. 268, 648 P.2d 307 (1982); State v. Baca, 89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976); State v. Vallejos; NMSA 1978, Crim., Child.Ct., Dom.Rel. & W/C App.R. 308 (Repl.Pamp.1983). The failure to instruct on second degree murder is inconsistent with State v. Doe, 672 P.2d 654 (1983), and State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 660 (1983). Together these cases stand for the proposition that fundamental error may lie for failure to properly instruct the jury on the necessary elements of an offense presented by the evidence. Jackson reversed a murder conviction and remanded for a new trial since the second degree murder instruction given did not contain the necessary elements of that offense not covered in other instructions. In Doe the defendant’s failure to tender an instruction on general criminal intent or to object to the failure to give the instruction was held not reversible error. However, the holding was based not only on the failure to object but on the conclusion that the instructions adequately addressed the necessary elements of the crime at hand. The instant case is not simply one wherein the instruction given differed from the required instruction in some important respects. Here, despite the request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of second degree murder, it was altogether omitted. Defendants may well be guilty of first degree murder or they may be guilty of second degree murder. Whether they acted with a subjective awareness or an objective knowledge that death or serious injury would result was a question of fact that should have been submitted to the jury under proper instruction. It was not. The defendant in Jackson presumably will have his jury properly instructed on retrial. The defendant in Doe had her jury properly instructed. The Defendants here did not. Under the circumstances, the failure to instruct deprived Defendants of a fair trial. Defendants’ objection to the instruction, viewed by the majority as a waiver, should be immaterial in light of the fact that the prosecution itself requested it. In the federal courts, the long established rule is that an instruction on a lesser included offense must be given where the evidence would permit a jury to rationally find a defendant guilty only of that lesser offense. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 (1973); Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349, 85 S.Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L.Ed.2d 882 (1965); Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 323, 16 S.Ct. 839, 842, 40 L.Ed.2d 980 (1896). Some states have held that reversible error exists in homicide cases where a trial court does not sua sponte give a lesser included offense instruction warranted by the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 112 Ariz. 261, 540 P.2d 1242 (1975); State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 1127, 47 L.Ed.2d 328 (1976); State v. Jones, 220 Kan. 136, 551 P.2d 801 (1976). Michigan limits this rule to first degree murder cases since second degree murder is a lesser included offense and since there are significant differences in sanctions between first and second degree murder. People v. Jenkins, 395 Mich. 440, 236 N.W.2d 503 (1975). The court in Jenkins concluded that the trial judge is required to give a lesser included offense instruction warranted by the evidence even over objection. Id. While I believe this latter rule to be a sound one, the majority need not go this far to reach a just result in this case. In first degree murder cases, where either the prosecution or the defense requests a second degree murder instruction warranted by the evidence, it should be given where failure to do so would result in fundamental error. This limited rule would assure murder trials wherein juries are given complete instructions warranted by the evidence. It would also render less likely the possibility that a jury, deprived of proper instruction on a lesser included offense, might convict on a greater offense whose sanction far exceeds what a particular defendant deserves. This approach would make it more likely that culpable defendants will be convicted of precisely that degree of homicide of which they are guilty. The majority result on the other hand essentially countenances a practice wherein the defense or the prosecution is allowed to take an all or nothing gamble that the jury will either convict on the greater offense of first degree murder or acquit. Under this practice, some defendants will suffer greater sanctions than they justly deserve while other culpable defendants will go free. For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for a new trial wherein a second degree murder instruction should be given.