Court Opinion

ID: 9384683
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:37.004563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.540138
License: Public Domain

J-S39040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    TEAH VIRGINIA HARTRANFT                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 438 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-21-CR-0000452-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

       Appellant Teah Virginia Hartranft appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after she was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) and

resisting arrest. Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw

and an Anders/Santiago1 brief. After review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this matter as follows:

       On November 3, 2019, at approximately 1:00 A.M., Officer Evan
       Shipley of the Mechanicsburg Borough Police was on patrol in the
       vicinity of North Walnut Street when he encountered a vehicle
       making a left turn without using its turn signal. Officer Shipley
       decided to follow that vehicle and, upon observing it make a
       second turn without the operator using a turn signal, he initiated
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1Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,
978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J-S39040-22

     a traffic stop. The driver and sole occupant of the vehicle was
     identified at trial as Appellant.

     Upon speaking with Appellant, Officer Shipley immediately noticed
     that her eyes were glassy and bloodshot, that she had some
     slurred speech and that she had difficulty correctly identifying her
     driver’s license to produce it for him. Eventually, Officer Shipley
     asked Appellant to leave her vehicle, and he observed that she
     had an odor of alcohol on her breath, that she had difficulty
     standing without swaying, and was leaning against her vehicle.
     During this time, Officer Shipley was joined by Officer Ethan
     Paulus, also of the Mechanicsburg Borough Police.

     Officer Shipley further noted that as the interaction continued,
     Appellant became louder and more excited in her conduct.
     Eventually, Appellant was asked to perform Standard Field
     Sobriety Tests (SFST), which she initially complied with, but
     ultimately refused to continue performing on the basis that she
     was disabled. Based on all of his observations of Appellant, as
     well as her refusal to perform SFSTs, Officer Shipley placed
     Appellant under arrest on suspicion of DUI, pending transport to
     the Cumberland County DUI booking center.

     Once the decision was made to place Appellant under arrest, she
     ceased any cooperation with the police and escalated her
     agitation. Notably, Appellant began to talk over the officers in an
     attempt to drown them out, then went limp and had to be
     physically placed inside the police cruiser. During the drive to the
     DUI booking center, Appellant began yelling at the officers, and
     otherwise expressed that she was irate with them. Upon arriving
     at the booking center, Appellant’s behavior escalated again, as
     she continued yelling at the officers and demanded that one of
     them take out his gun and shoot her. Appellant then shoved
     Officer Shipley and attempted to break away, leading to her being
     pinned against the vehicle until additional staff from the booking
     center came outside and helped get Appellant under control.
     Eventually, Appellant attempted to kick one of the booking center
     staff and was placed in a restraint chair for transport into the
     building. Appellant was ultimately processed by the DUI booking
     center.

     The formal information against Appellant was filed on April 15,
     2020, with the final pretrial conference held on August 11, 2021,
     and a jury trial being held on August 31, 2021. Following a one-
     day trial, and as discussed above, Appellant was convicted on the

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        charges of DUI — general impairment, and resisting arrest.[2] . .
        . Prior to sentencing, on October 15, 2021, Appellant, through
        her previous counsel, filed a motion to continue sentencing, which
        was granted on October 18, 2021, with a new sentencing date set
        for November 30, 2021.

        On November 30, 2021, Appellant presented argument regarding
        whether her previous, out-of-state DUI convictions should be
        counted for sentencing purposes, leading to this court entering an
        order on that date continuing sentencing until December 14,
        2021. A further condition of that order was to place Appellant on
        a TAD (Transdermal Alcohol) bracelet, due to the court receiving
        information that Appellant was drinking alcohol while awaiting
        sentencing.     On December 14, 2021, the Commonwealth
        requested and was granted a continuance of sentencing, as it
        awaited receipt of out-of-state conviction records for Appellant.
        Sentencing finally occurred on January 18, 2022, and resulted in
        Appellant receiving a sentence of incarceration of ten (10) days to
        twenty-four (24) months of incarceration, with one day of time
        credit, at the charge of DUI — general impairment,[3] followed by
        a sentence of eighteen (18) months of consecutive probation on
        the charge of resisting arrest. Additionally, immediately following
        Appellant’s sentencing, Appellant’s previous counsel orally moved
        to withdraw, and, with Appellant’s consent, was granted leave to
        do so by order of court entered on that same date.

        On January 28, 2022, Appellant filed a timely, self-represented
        post-sentence motion. By order of court filed January 31, 2022,
        the Commonwealth was given twenty (20) days to respond to that

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2   75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

3 On the DUI charge (third offense), graded as a misdemeanor of the second-
degree, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the statutory minimum term of
ten days and the statutory maximum term of two years of incarceration. See
Order, 1/18/22; see also 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3803(a)(2), 3804(a)(3). The record
further reflects that Appellant was ordered to undergo alcohol-related
treatment. See Order, 1/18/22; Suspension of Operating Privilege, 1/20/22;
75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(d) (providing that when the defendant is assessed and
ordered to undergo additional treatment, the trial court “shall impose a
minimum sentence as provided by law and a maximum sentence equal to the
statutorily available maximum”).

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      motion and timely did so by way of written response filed on
      February 7, 2022.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/10/22, at 1-6 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      On February 9, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying

Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Order, 2/9/22. Therefore, Appellant had

thirty days, or until March 11, 2022, in which to file a timely notice of appeal.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a). Appellant filed her notice of appeal on March

15, 2022, making it facially untimely.

      However, we note that on February 18, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se

motion requesting the appointment of counsel. On March 2, 2022, the trial

court noted that it had been unavailable to rule on Appellant’s motion and

appointed Counsel to represent Appellant.      Order 3/2/22.     The order also

extended the appeal period from March 11, 2022, to March 15, 2022. Id.

Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal on March 15, 2022.

      Generally, courts are not permitted to extend the time for filing an

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 501 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. Super. 1985)

(that the timeliness of an appeal is jurisdictional and “[a] court may not

enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal as a matter of grace or

indulgence” (citations omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). However, the general rule

does not preclude this Court granting relief in the case of fraud or breakdown

in the processes of the court.    Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d

133, 136 (Pa. Super. 1995); Pa.R.A.P. 105, note.

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      Here, we conclude that there was a breakdown in the processes of the

courts. Our review of the record reveals that the docket entry for the February

9, 2022 order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion does not contain a

notation regarding service of the order on Appellant.        See Pa.R.Crim.P.

114(C)(2)(c) (providing that trial court criminal docket entries shall contain,

inter alia, “the date of service of the order or court notice”); see also

Commonwealth v. Hess, 810 A.2d 1249, 1253 (Pa. 2002) (noting that Rule

114’s language leaves no question that trial court clerk’s obligations regarding

docket entries are not discretionary); In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 509 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (interpreting similar civil rule, Pa.R.Civ.P. 236, and holding that

where there is no indication on trial court docket that notice has been given,

appeal period has not started to run).     Moreover, we note that the order

denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion appears to have been served on

Appellant’s prior counsel but not on Appellant. See Trial Ct. Docket Entry,

2/9/22. Because the record fails to indicate when Appellant was served with

the order denying her post-sentence motion, we conclude there was a

breakdown in the court’s operation.      See Braykovich, 664 A.2d at 136

(noting that this Court may permit enlargement of the filing period in

extraordinary circumstances, including situations in which there was a

breakdown in court processes). For these reasons, we decline to quash the

appeal.

      After Appellant filed her notice of appeal, the trial court ordered

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

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pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In lieu of Rule 1925(b) statement, Counsel

filed a notice of intent to file an Anders/Santiago brief pursuant to Rule

1925(c)(4). On May 10, 2022, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief identifies two potential issues:

      1. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant was
         intoxicated to a degree as to be found incapable of safely
         driving.

      2. The evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant had
         resisted arrest.

Anders/Santiago Brief at 16, 25 (formatting altered).

      “When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review

the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s

request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa.

Super. 2008) (citation omitted).   Counsel must comply with the technical

requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for leave to

withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of the record,

counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) providing a

copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant that he has

the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise additional

arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s attention. See

Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en

banc).

      Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago, namely:

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       (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
       citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
       counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
       counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
       counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
       Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
       case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
       that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

       “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted).

       Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for

seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter

explaining her appellate rights, and supplying Appellant with a copy of the

Anders/Santiago brief.4           See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290.       Moreover,

____________________________________________

4 On January 17, 2023, this Court discovered that along with the motion to
withdraw, Anders/Santiago brief, and letter to Appellant, Counsel failed to
include a certificate of service or any indication that the Counsel had provided
these documents to Appellant. Accordingly, this Court directed Counsel to
provide Appellant with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the
Anders/Santiago brief, and the letter informing Appellant of her rights, along
with copies of any enclosures, and further direct Counsel to include certificates
of service reflecting that Appellant was served with these documents. Order,
1/17/23. Counsel complied with this Court’s order on January 23, 2023.
Appellant did not file a response.

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Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief complies with the requirements of

Santiago. Specifically, Counsel includes a summary of the relevant factual

and procedural history, refers to portions of the record that could arguably

support Appellant’s claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is

frivolous. See Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that

Counsel has satisfied the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago,

and   we   will   proceed   to   address   the   issues   raised   in   Counsel’s

Anders/Santiago brief.

      As stated, in the Anders/Santiago brief, Counsel identifies two issues

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Appellant’s convictions

for DUI and resisting arrest. The following principles governs our review:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proof of proving every element of the
      crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while
      passing on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
      evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
      evidence.

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Commonwealth v. Bragg, 133 A.3d 328, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

      The relevant DUI statute states:

      (a) General impairment.—

         (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing
         a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
         rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
         actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).      “The Commonwealth must establish that the

defendant (1) was operating a motor vehicle (2) after imbibing a sufficient

amount of alcohol such that he was rendered incapable of safely operating the

motor vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 665 (Pa. Super.

2020) (citations omitted).

      To prove a person is incapable of driving safely, the Commonwealth

must prove:

      that alcohol has substantially impaired the normal mental and
      physical faculties required to operate the vehicle safely;
      substantial impairment means a diminution or enfeeblement in
      the ability to exercise judgment, to deliberate or to react prudently
      to changing circumstances and conditions. The meaning of
      substantial impairment is not limited to some extreme condition
      of disability. Section 3802(a)(1) . . . is a general provision and
      provides no specific restraint upon the Commonwealth in the
      manner in which it may prove that an accused operated a vehicle
      under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered him
      incapable of safe driving.

Id. (citation omitted and formatting altered).

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     Moreover, when a defendant is charged with DUI in violation of 75

Pa.C.S. § 3802, “the fact that the defendant refused to submit to chemical

testing . . . may be introduced in evidence along with other testimony

concerning the circumstances of the refusal. No presumptions shall arise from

this evidence[,] but it may be considered along with other factors concerning

the charge.”    75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e).         DUI may be proven through

circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Segida, 985 A.2d 871, 880 (Pa.

2009).

     Additionally, the crime of resisting arrest is defined as follows:

     A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with
     the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful
     arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a
     substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone
     else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to
     overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5104. A defendant’s use of passive resistance can be sufficient

to establish the crime of resisting arrest.         See Commonwealth v.

Thompson, 922 A.2d 926, 928 (Pa. Super. 2007) (explaining that Section

5104 criminalizes “resistance behavior that requires substantial force to

surmount” and holding that a defendant’s act of interlocking her arms and

legs with her husband caused the officers’ attempts to place her under arrest

to be “exhaust[ing]” and amounted to “substantial force” needed to overcome

defendant’s resistance).

     Here, the interaction between Appellant and Officer Shipley began at

approximately 1:00 a.m., when Officer Shipley saw Appellant make a left turn

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without using her turn signal. See N.T., 8/31/21, at 53-54. Officer Shipley

testified that in addition to failing to use her turn signal, Appellant made a

wide turn nearly striking the curb. The officer followed Appellant’s vehicle and

conducted a traffic stop because of Appellant’s failure to use her turn signal,

which is a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code.5 Once stopped, Officer Shipley

approached Appellant’s car and observed that Appellant’s speech was slurred,

and that her eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Officer Shipley also testified

that Appellant was having difficulty finding her driver’s license, and that he

watched as Appellant flipped through her purse past her license four separate

times. Officer Shipley testified that during his interaction with Appellant, he

continued to notice her slurred and exaggerated speech.           Officer Shipley

explained that slurred exaggerated speech and the driver’s inability to locate

their driver’s license are specific signs of intoxication for which he was trained

to watch. See id. at 54-61.

       In light of these observations, Officer Shipley asked Appellant to exit the

car. At that time, Officer Ethan Paulus arrived on the scene in a separate

police vehicle. Officer Shipley testified that he suspected Appellant was either

having either a medical emergency or under the influence and incapable of

____________________________________________

5Although Appellant does not challenge the legality of the motor vehicle stop,
we note that the stop was legal. Officer Shipley testified that he stopped
Appellant’s vehicle due to Appellant’s failure to use a turn signal in violation
of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3334. The officer’s observation of this violation provided
probable cause to stop the vehicle. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Prizzia,
260 A.3d 263, 267 (Pa. Super. 2021).

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safe driving.   As Appellant exited the vehicle, Officer Shipley noticed that

Appellant smelled of alcohol, and that she was unable to stand without

support. Officer Shipley further stated that Appellant started to sway as she

stood, and that although Appellant began the field sobriety tests, she

ultimately failed to complete them and claimed that she had a disability.

Officer Shipley testified that Appellant’s demeanor changed, and she became

louder and more excited. See id. at 62-65.

       Based    on   the   totality   of   Appellant’s   actions   and   the   officer’s

observations, Officer Shipley concluded that Appellant was incapable of safe

driving and placed Appellant under arrest on suspicion of DUI. The officer

testified that his patrol car is equipped with a camera, and the video of his

interaction was played for the jury. See id. at 65-70.

       Once Officer Shipley placed Appellant under arrest for suspicion of DUI,

he placed Appellant in handcuffs, and asked her to enter the patrol car.

Appellant repeatedly refused to get in the police vehicle. Appellant then talked

over the officers and dropped to her knees still refusing to enter the police

vehicle. Appellant refused to move and was “dead weight.” Id. at 77. At

that point, Officer Shipley and Officer Paulus picked-up Appellant and

physically placed her in the patrol vehicle. See id. at 77-78.

       Officer Shipley said it took “substantial effort” to get Appellant into the

car.   Id. at 78.    Officer Shipley testified that he transported Appellant to

County DUI booking center, and while Appellant was seated in the back of the

patrol car, she would go from quiet to irate.            When Officer Shipley and

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Appellant arrived at the DUI booking center, Appellant was irate, and she told

Officer Shipley to take out his gun and shoot her.         Officer Shipley had to

physically remove Appellant from the car. Officer Shipley then testified that

Appellant pushed him away and tried to run from him. Officer Shipley had to

hold Appellant up against the car, and Appellant was flailing her arms.

Additional officers came to assist Officer Shipley with Appellant. All of this

was captured on video and shown to the jury. Appellant continued screaming

and kicking at the officers. Officer Shipley testified that Appellant’s behavior

was so combative that they had to place Appellant in a restraint chair. Officer

Shipley said that when he attempted to read the DL-26B form6 to Appellant,

she continued to be combative and refused to sign the acknowledgement that

she was read the DL-26B.           Officer Shipley testified that Appellant was so

combative that the officers did not give Appellant a pen or pencil because of

officer safety concerns. See id. at 77-95.

       Cumberland County Correctional Officer Jamie Starner testified that he

was working DUI processing when Officer Shipley brought Appellant to the

booking center. Officer Starner testified that Appellant was belligerent and

screaming “kill me, kill me” when she was removed from Officer Shipley’s car.

Id. at 147. Officer Starner stated that Appellant began to kick at him, and

____________________________________________

6 DL-26B is Department of Transportation form that includes the implied
consent warnings regarding chemical testing and penalties. See 75 Pa.C.S. §
1547(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Robertson, 186 A.3d 440, 443 n.1
(Pa. Super. 2018).

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that because of her behavior, it was very difficult to restrain Appellant. Officer

Starner further testified that it took more than five officers to hold Appellant

in order to secure her in the restraint chair. See id. at 147-153.

      After review, we conclude that the Commonwealth provided sufficient

evidence to prove Appellant guilty of DUI and resisting arrest. See Bragg,

133 A.3d at 330-31. At trial, the jury heard testimony from the arresting

officer, Shipley, and one of the correctional officers, Starner, who assisted in

securing Appellant. The Commonwealth also presented video evidence which

depicted Appellant’s driving, her arrest, and her actions both inside the police

car and at the DUI booking center. As noted, at 1:00 a.m., Officer Shipley

observed Appellant nearly strike a curb while making a turn in her vehicle,

and the officer further observed that Appellant failed to use her turn signal

when making this turn.      When the officer stopped Appellant’s vehicle and

asked her to exit the car, there were further indications of intoxication to a

degree that rendered Appellant unable to drive safely including slurred speech,

inability to stand without assistance, bloodshot eyes, difficulty locating her

driver’s license, and Appellant smelled of alcohol. See Clemens, 242 A.3d at

666 (discussing indicia of intoxication that rendered an individual incapable of

safe driving).   Further, Appellant became combative with the officers and

refused chemical testing. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(e). On this record, viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient

for the jury to find Appellant guilty of DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).

See Segida, 985 A.2d at 880 (holding that circumstantial evidence was

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sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty

of DUI); see also Clemens, 242 A.3d at 665.

      Moreover, Appellant’s combative behavior, which included her passive

resistance of acting like dead weight along with her active resistance of flailing

her arms and kicking which caused more than five officers to use substantial

force to control Appellant to place her in a restraint chair, was sufficient to

prove the elements of resisting arrest.       See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104; see also

Thompson, 922 A.2d at 928 (holding that a defendant’s use of passive

resistance can be sufficient to establish the crime of resisting arrest).

      For these reasons, we agree that Counsel’s assessment that the

sufficiency claims presented in the Anders/Santiago brief are frivolous.

Further, our independent review of the record does not reveal any additional,

non-frivolous issues. See Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291; Flowers, 113 A.3d at

1250. For these reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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