Court Opinion

ID: 9818465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 05:47:43.732715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:11.174653
License: Public Domain

JOHN G. HILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because a rational jury could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a building owned by a school district, which had formerly been used as a middle school but which was not being used as a school at the time of the offense, was a school, where there was no evidence as to whether the non-use of the premises as a school was permanent or temporary. As the majority notes, “school” is defined as a private or public elementary or secondary school. The only reasonable conclusion one can reach is that a building that is a former school that is not being used as a school at the time of the offense is not a school for purposes of the drug-free zone section relied upon in this case, unless its non-use is temporary, such as for a recess or holiday.
In reaching the conclusion that the jury could have reasonably determined that the building in question was a school, the majority relies upon the opinions in Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 754 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.2008); and Beardsley v. State, 738 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). I find all of these cases to be distinguishable.
In Young, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to show that the location in question was near a school where two officers testified that the premises in question was a school and a map was presented showing that the offense was committed near a school. Young, 14 S.W.3d at 753-54. While, as noted by the majority, the Young court held that the name of the premises alone might be sufficient to create a presumption that it is a school, in this case the State presented evidence that rebutted such a presumption by eliciting testimony that the building was still owned by the school district even though it was not being used “at that moment.” In Young, no evidence was presented that would show the premises in question was not being used as a school at the time of the offense.
The other cases cited are cases that show that we, as the reviewing court, are to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Bartlett, 270 S.W.3d at 150 n. 5; Beardsley, 738 S.W.2d at 684. I agree with these courts that we are required to give such deference to the jury’s verdict. However, the test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence requires that we not give such deference where, as here, a rational factfinder could not have made the determination it made beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither Robinson nor the State developed evidence from which one could reasonably determine whether Franklin Middle School was a school at the time in question. Instead, after two officers testified that Franklin Middle School was a school within the proper distance, a third officer, a police sergeant, testified that the building was still owned by the school district but was not being used as a school “at that moment.” This testimony showed that the building, although known as Franklin Middle School as shown by the *824testimony of the other two officers, was not in use as a middle school or any other school at the time of the offense. The State presented no testimony showing that the third officer was mistaken or that the non-use was temporary. I would suggest that where, as here, the State presents evidence that appears to clarify the status of the premises as not being a school, without presenting further evidence showing that the premises is a school, the finder of fact cannot reasonably determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the premises is a school. I would note that Brooks, Bartlett, and Beardsley did not involve a sufficiency of the evidence issue in a drug-free zone case.
I agree with the majority’s suggestion that a school need not necessarily be in session at the time of an offense in order to be a school for the purpose of determining whether an area is a drug-free zone. However, while this offense occurred on or about December 30, 2009, which could have been during a holiday period, the officer’s testimony was that the school was not in use as a school at that time. There was no suggestion that its non-use at the time in question was because of a school holiday or other recess. I would submit that there is a difference between a school that is temporarily not in session because of a recess, such as a summer recess, or a holiday period, and one that is not in use as a school.
The State appears to suggest in its brief that the jury could reasonably find that the premises was a school because the definition of “school” in Section 481.134 of the Texas Health and Safety Code makes no requirement that the school be open. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134 (West Supp. 2012). However, I would suggest that a premises formerly used as a school, but no longer in use as a school, is not a school unless the non-use is shown to be temporary. The word “school” has several definitions, including “an institution where instruction is given, especially to persons under college age” and “a building housing a school.” See Dictionary.Com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ school?s=t. Neither of these definitions appears to include either an institution where instruction is not given or a building that is not housing a school.
Because I find that a rational jury could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the premises in question was a school, I would sustain Robinson’s second issue.