Court Opinion

ID: 9448597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:41:05.186645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:30.100488
License: Public Domain

TUTTLE, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal by Negro plaintiffs, residents of the City of Jacksonville, Florida, from a judgment of the trial court refusing to enjoin two private individuals, who had purchased two separate golf courses formerly operated by the City, from restricting the use of the golf courses to white patrons only.
Earlier in the litigation the trial court had enjoined the City of Jacksonville from continuing to operate the golf courses on a racially segregated basis. Thereafter, the City, after taking bids, on terms very favorable to any prospective purchaser, including the right to make a very small down payment and an extended period for paying the balance of the purchase price, accepted bids from the two former golf professionals at the two respective courses for the purchase of the two courses. In one instance there was a down payment of $10,000, and a mortgage for $590,000, for a total purchase price of $600,000; and in the other instance there was a down payment of $15,000, and a mortgage of $600,000, for a total purchase price of $615,000.
Each of the two conveyances contained the following reversionary clause, which had the effect of assuring that the two golf courses would be continued to be used by the purchasers only “for the purpose of a golf course.” This rever-sionary clause is in the following language:
“This conveyance is made upon the express condition that the property hereby conveyed shall be continually *321maintained by the Grantee, its successor and assigns, as a golf course which shall be used only for the purpose of a golf course; and if said property be not so maintained or should it be converted to other Use, said property will immediately revert to the Grantor, its successor or assigns, and it shall be lawful for the Grantor, its successors or assigns to re-enter and repossess said property and thereafter to peaceably hold and enjoy the same as if this conveyance had not been made.”
This reversionary clause was inserted in the deeds pursuant to ordinance passed by the City Commissioners of the City of Jacksonville, and upon the recommendation of one of the City Commissioners, Thomas, who had held the post on the Commission administering the financing of the city’s golf courses, parks, and other public amusement places. Commissioner Thomas testified that the reverter clause that he suggested to be placed in the deed was designed for the purpose of insuring the citizens of Jacksonville of having golfing facilities.1
It is not contended by the appellants that the deeds were not made in good faith — that is to say, that there were any side agreements or understandings between the City and the purchasers to the effect that the purchasers would operate the golf courses on a segregated basis if they acquired title to them. The basis of their claim that they are entitled to the relief sought is that, by virtue of the restrictive covenant in the deed, the City projected its control into the hands of the new owners. Thus, they contend, action of the owner is still City action. There is thus no issue of fact here for our determination. The only question is a legal one: Do the agreed facts compel the conclusion that the operation of the golf course in the hands of the new owners continue to be state action within the purview of the XIV Amendment?
It is conceded, as it must be by the appellees, that if the City of Jacksonville had entered into a long term lease with these grantees, under which an estate for years or a leasehold had been created, to enable the lessees to continue the operation of the City’s golf courses, the City would still be involved to the extent necessary to constitute such operation state action. Such is clearly the law, not only in this Circuit but in the other Circuits in which the courts have passed on this proposition. In the case of Derrington v. Plummer, 5 Cir., 240 F.2d 922, this Court said:
“No doubt a county may in good faith lawfully sell and dispose of its surplus property, and its subsequent use by the grantee would not be state action. Likewise, we think that when there is no purpose of discrimination, no joinder in the enterprise, or reservation of control by the county, it may lease for pri*322vate purposes property not used nor needed for county purposes.” (Emphasis added).
In that case we held that a lessee of county courthouse space for restaurant facilities stood in the place of the county and that “His conduct is as much state action as would be the conduct of the County itself.”
The United States Supreme Court has recently said in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, at page 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, at page 861, 6 L.Ed.2d 45:
“ * * * in its lease with Eagle the Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of state participation. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive may be. It is of no consolation to an individual denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith. Certainly the conclusions drawn in similar cases by the various Courts of Appeals do not depend upon such a distinction. By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so ‘purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
On the other hand, it is clear, and it is conceded by the appellants, that there is no requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise that a city must continue to operate such public amusement facilities as a golf course if it decides for any reason that it no longer wishes to do so. See Frank Hampton et al. v. City of Jacksonville, Fla., 5 Cir., 304 F.2d 319, in which we have held that the City of Jacksonville has the legal authority to withdraw from the field of operating swimming pools completely, if it desires to do so. And see City of Montgomery, Ala. v. Gilmore, et al., 5 Cir., 277 F.2d 364; and Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 4 Cir., 276 F.2d 890. The appellees rely heavily on these decisions, and on the case of Eaton v. Board of James Walker Memorial Hospital, 4 Cir., 261 F.2d 521, as distinguishing the rights of Negro plaintiffs to non-discriminatory use of formerly publicly owned facilities which had been sold in a bona fide sale to private parties, from those cases in which a like claim is made as to formerly publicly owned and operated facilities subsequently leased to private lessees for operation.
Conceptually, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to find any rational basis of distinguishing the power or degree of control, so far as relates to the state’s involvement, between a long-term lease for a particular purpose with the right of cancellation of the lease if that purpose is not carried out on the one hand, and an absolute conveyance of property, subject, however, to the right of reversion if the property does not continue to be used for the purpose prescribed by the state in its deed of sale. Appellees in this case stress the fact that there is no “immediate control,” and that there is no “present interest” in the City of Jacksonville. These are empty phrases when considered in connection with the absolute obligation on the part of the present owners of the property that they immediately, presently and always use the leased property for golf course purposes, and no other. This is complete present control even though the daily operation is, of course, not subject in other matters to the City’s direction.
In the case of Boman v. Birmingham Bus Company, 5 Cir., 280 F.2d 531, we noted that when a state authorizes a *323city to grant a franchise for public transportation to a local bus or street car company, such transportation service is performed by the franchise holder as a service performed for the benefit of the people of the state. The private company is, to that extent, exercising a part of sovereignty in that it is performing a state function. So, too, where the City of Jacksonville, which has long been in the business of operating golf courses for its residents, elects to sell the golf courses, but only on condition that they continue to be used in such manner that the public will still enjoy their benefits in the same capacity, the city is permitting the private individual to perform this part of the City’s function.
Appellees’ reliance on Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, supra, is misplaced. In that case there was an outright sale of a swimming pool without any restriction or reversionary clause of any kind. The inclusion of the restrictive covenant here is a distinguishing factor of the utmost legal significance. With reference to the Fourth Circuit case of Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra, it appears that it was decided before the Supreme Court announced its decision in the Wilmington Parking case, supra. Being unable, as we are, to find any valid distinction between the effect of the lease in the Wilmington Parking Authority ease and the sale with a reversionary interest in the Walker Hospital case, we doubt whether the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit would have decided the Hospital case as it did had it followed the Supreme Court decision. In any event, we feel that this Court’s decision in Derrington v. Plummer, supra, expresses the law of this Circuit, which furnishes the guide to our action.
We conclude that the inclusion of the reversionary clause in these conveyances constituted the purchasers of the two golf courses state agents, within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The judgment of the district court, therefore, must be Reversed and the case Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

. Commissioner Thomas’ testimony on this point was as follows:
“A. I recommended to the City Attorney that he include a reverter clause in the specifications because both of our appraisers when they went out and appraised the property, they said that the best potential value of the golf courses was the continued use as a golf course, so therefore, rather than to confuse the issue more, I recommended the reverter clause be placed in it and they be sold for the continued use as golf courses, so that the City may derive the highest sale price from the courses.
“Q. Commissioner, did you not only say that the purpose of the reverter clause was to provide and to assure the citizens of Jacksonville of some golfing facilities, something in that ordér?
“A. I believe I did say that with the reverter clause, the golf courses could not be diverted to warehousing projects, that the citizens of the City of Jacksonville would have golfing facilities.
* * * * * * *
“Q. Now, this reverter clause that you had in the deed, as you said, was designed for two purposes, one was to get the highest and best value for the property as golf courses and the other was to insure the citizens of Jacksonville of having golfing facilities, am I correct in that statement?
“A. Yes.”