Court Opinion

ID: 9764986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:47:17.133742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:39.743574
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM, M. DENDER, Special Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Justice Daughtrey stated how our analysis begins in this type case in her dissent in State v. Schimpf, 782 S.W.2d 186, 196 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990), as follows:
Although analysis of the problem escalates rapidly into a state of juridical complexity, it begins on rather mundane territory with two well-established principles: first, that a trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony and, second, that the decision to allow such evidence cannot be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Rhoden, 739 S.W.2d 6, 13 (Tenn.Crim.App.1987). The trial court’s discretion is not absolute, of course, and cannot be exercised as a matter of whim or caprice. Instead, the admissibility of expert testimony must be determined under an equally well-known standard — whether the evidence “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-*731sue_” Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See also proposed Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 (“substantially assist”); see also City of Columbia v. C.F.W. Constr. Co., 557 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Tenn.1977).
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 is in effect at this time and is essentially the same as the stated federal rule with the exception that it contains the wording “substantially assist.”
When we start with these simple principles, it seems to me that the majority opinion misses the point in this case as compared with the decision in State v. Schimpf, supra.
State v. Schimpf, supra, is relied upon by the majority as controlling in this case. I simply do not see that case as controlling, because that case involved testimony concerning “post-traumatic stress syndrome.” The case sub judice involves testimony concerning “recantation.”
It appears to me that there is a significant difference in expert testimony concerning “post-traumatic stress syndrome” and expert testimony concerning “recantation.” The significant difference is that the testimony concerning “post-traumatic stress syndrome” is intended to prove the child has been the victim of child sex abuse; whereas, the testimony concerning “recantation” is simply an explanation of a phenomenon which occurs with children. Recantation is not a reliable indicator that the child has, or has not, been sexually abused; and it was not offered for such in this case.
The only time the testimony in this case tended to indicate that the child was the victim of child sex abuse was when Ms. Be-neke testified that children who have recant ed, in cases where nothing had happened, are not likely to reaffirm their initial position. (The child in this case had reaffirmed his original version of the incident.) There was no contemporaneous objection. The trial judge had allowed Ms. Beneke to testify after a hearing on a motion in limine; and in my opinion, all of her testimony is satisfactory except for this statement, and this statement had not come out in the hearing on the motion in limine. Under these circumstances, I believe it was necessary for there to be a contemporaneous objection in order for this testimony to be considered for the purpose of reversing the action of the trial judge. If there had been a contemporaneous objection at this point in the evidence, the trial judge could easily have sustained the objection and given the jury proper instructions. See Tennessee Rule of Evidence 103(a) and the comments on that rule in Tennessee Law of Evidence, Second Edition (1990).
I do not consider Ms. Beneke’s testimony as purely for the purpose of rehabilitating or bolstering the victim in this case; rather, I consider it to be allowed under Rule of Evidence 702, to “substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence”; that is, the evidence that the child had recanted his initial version of the incident. I also believe Tennessee Rule of Evidence 704 specifically provides that such evidence is not to be disallowed just because it goes to the ultimate issue of the credibility of the child victim. Of course, the ultimate decision on the credibility of the witness lies with the jury; but that does not prevent expert evidence to assist the jury in “understanding the evidence” and making that ultimate decision.
I have reviewed Sparkman v. State, 469 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn.Crim.App.1970), which is the case cited in State v. Schimpf, supra, at 192, for the proposition that “most importantly, the evidence should not relate to the credibility of witnesses”; and I do not find these words or any implication that the case stands for that proposition. In fact, in Sparkman the defendant testified that he remembered “nothing from the time he ordered his second beer at Rogers’ Shady Park Inn until he awoke in jail that afternoon,” as well as numerous other statements concerning his mental difficulties and failing memory. A psychiatrist testified for the defense to the effect that the defendant “did not know the nature and quality of his acts nor that they were wrong”; but the jury found the defendant guilty, contrary to the opinion of the psychiatrist. The jury was allowed to hear the psychiatrist’s testimony and consider it along with all of the other evidence. Clearly the credibility of the defendant was in question, and the testimony of the psychia*732trist related to the credibility of the defendant.
Sparkman v. State, supra, states:
Of course, it is settled beyond question that the weight and value of expert testimony is for the jury and must be received with caution. Mullendore v. State, 183 Tenn. 53, 191 S.W.2d 149. This applies to the expert opinions of medical men. Crane Enamel Co. v. Jamison, 188 Tenn. 211, 217 S.W.2d 945. Where there is any conflict between expert testimony and the testimony as to the facts, the jury is not bound to accept expert testimony in preference to other testimony, and must determine the weight and credibility of each in the light of all the facts shown in the ease. Act-O-Lane Gas Service Co. v. Clinton, 35 Tenn.App. 442, 245 S.W.2d 795; East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Peltz, 38 Tenn.App. 100, 270 S.W.2d 591. Expert medical opinion regarding the functioning of the human body must always be more or less speculative. Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182; Great American Indemnity Company v. Friddell, 198 Tenn. 360, 280 S.W.2d 908.
The Tennessee Rules of Evidence became effective on January 1, 1990, and the opinion in State v. Schimpf supra, was filed March 23, 1989, in the Court of Criminal Appeals. It seems to me that the Rules of Evidence certainly undermine any holding in that case that: (1) “the evidence must not invade the province of the jury” and (2) “the evidence should not relate to credibility of witnesses.”
I realize that State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn.1993), solidifies the holding that it is error to allow the testimony of experts concerning “symptoms of post-traumatic stress syndrome” in child sex abuse cases. A careful reading of that case leads me to the opinion that the reason such testimony is not allowed is that it attempts to prove the guilt of the defendant. Testimony on “recantation” does not attempt to prove the guilt of the defendant. It will simply “substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence” that the alleged child victim recanted.
This court has previously held that it was not error to allow a social worker for the Tennessee Department of Human Services to testify concerning the definition of “recantation.” See the unreported opinion of this court in State v. Steven K. Sterna, No. 01C01-9007-CR-00163, 1991 WL 135006 (Tenn.Crim.App., Nashville, July 24, 1991).
I believe there is sufficient evidence in the record that the trial judge carefully considered the proposed evidence, exercised his discretion in a responsible manner in deciding that the evidence was competent after weighing the proposed evidence, and immediately after permitting the evidence to be entered in the trial gave a correct instruction to the jury. I do not believe that there has been “a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion” in allowing such testimony, and I would affirm the convictions.