Court Opinion

ID: 9914158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 18:02:02.848528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:25.372906
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 In re C.R. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    In re C.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court                                       C097796
    Law.

    SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES                                            (Super. Ct. No. STK-JD-DP-
    AGENCY,                                                                            2021-0000342)

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

    P.R. et al.,

                    Defendants and Appellants.

          The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of appellants V.S. (mother) and
P.R. (father), freeing the minor for adoption, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 Father now challenges that and previous rulings arguing, inter alia, that
he was denied due process during the dependency hearings, and insufficient evidence

1         Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                             1
supported various rulings made by the juvenile court.2 Both parents contend the San
Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to
comply with the initial inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. We shall conditionally
affirm, subject to further ICWA compliance.
                      LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       On September 7, 2021, the Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant
to section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), along with a detention/jurisdiction report.
       Section 300 Petition
       The petition alleged that the minor C.R., who was nearly seven months old, was
placed into protective custody after mother “failed to participate in voluntary services,
which included allowing her support group to check in a few times a week, follow up
with mental health services and comply with her prescribed medication regimen.”
According to the Agency, mother continually struggled with providing proper care and
supervision of the minor and the Agency listed several examples in the petition. The
single example of a substantiated allegation of neglect occurred in May 2021, when
mother repeatedly administered Tylenol without a medical reason and fed the minor, then
three months old, water, orange juice and infant gas drops without a pediatrician’s
approval or recommendation. The minor’s pediatrician had also voiced concerns over the
minor’s slow weight gain and feeding schedule. Several additional allegations of general
neglect were inconclusive upon investigation.
       The petition also alleged that mother appeared to have untreated mental health
issues, which severely impaired her ability to care responsibly for the child. Specifically,

2       Mother and father each filed separate briefs. There is no indication either joined
or adopted issues raised in the other’s brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1),
(a)(5).)

                                              2
that mother was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, was under the care of a
psychiatrist, and was prescribed Lexapro. Mother was not compliant with medication
and missed her behavioral health appointments. The Agency also alleged that “mother
[was] unable to follow simple conversations if she becomes agitated or stressed.” The
Agency further alleged that mother spoke in phrases that were nonsensical, such as
referring to herself as Judge Judy, referenced “being a tree and someone lighting her up,”
made comments that she’s from Franklin and “she was an exclamation point,” and
repeatedly chanted the words “chair, listening, brightness.”
        Under subdivision (j) of the petition, the petition alleged that mother’s parental
rights as to the minor’s half sibling were terminated in March 2011 after mother’s
problems with drug use and domestic violence put the half sibling at substantial risk of
harm.
        As to father,3 the allegations contained in the petition stated, “father to the minor
is currently homeless and cannot reside with the mother due to Section 8 rules regarding
criminal convictions. . . .”
        Detention and Jurisdiction Hearings
        Both mother and then-alleged father were present at the detention hearing. At the
hearing, the juvenile court found a prima facie showing had been made that the minor
came within the meaning of section 300 and continued presence in the home of the parent
would be contrary to the child’s welfare. The minor was ordered detained with
temporary placement and care vested with the Agency. The court ordered paternity
testing for father, which subsequently concluded father was the minor’s biological father.
        The jurisdictional hearing began on October 5, 2021. Mother was present with her
attorney. Father and his appointed counsel were also present. While we have not been

3      On March 1, 2022, the juvenile court declared father to be the presumed father of
the minor. No issue is raised as to paternity.

                                               3
provided with a reporter’s transcript for this hearing, the clerk’s transcript indicates father
waived his right to a trial and submitted on the jurisdictional determination. The clerk’s
transcript also indicates the court found the allegations of the petition true and that the
minor came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The juvenile court
set a new court date, October 19, to serve as the continued jurisdiction hearing for
mother, and as a “dispo setting as to father.” Father’s appearance was excused for that
date.
        Mother failed to appear at the October 19 hearing, and father’s appearance had
been previously waived. The juvenile court proceeded with the hearing and again found
the allegations in the petition true and that the minor came within the provisions of
section 300, subdivision (b)(1). Counsel for the Agency requested two psychological
evaluations for mother, stating it sought to bypass her services. The juvenile court
granted that request. Father’s counsel, who was present without father, requested any
referrals for available services. The court asked whether there was an address on file for
father; the Agency responded, “He’s homeless, so we do not [have one].” The court
requested father’s counsel relay any contact information to the Agency.
        Disposition Hearing
        In January 2022, two psychological evaluations were ordered for father.
        In May 2022, a disposition report was filed. By this time father had been declared
the presumed father of the minor. In the disposition report, the social worker noted that
in September 2021, visitation was scheduled with the parents to take place in the home of
the paternal grandmother, with whom the minor was placed. Referrals were made for
parenting classes for the parents, but the parents did not engage in those services. In
November 2021, a therapy referral was submitted for father. In February 2022, a bus
pass was given to father to engage in services. According to the Agency, father “ha[d]
not taken advantage of any of the reunification services that have been provided and truly

                                              4
believes that he only needs to get a permanent job so that he can obtain an apartment for
him and his family.”
       The report also summarized the psychological evaluations for father. In one, Dr.
Gary Cavanaugh opined that father had a neurocognitive disorder, dyslexia, a personality
disorder, and substance abuse disorders. Dr. Cavanaugh opined that father’s mental
health disability “does impair his ability to utilize your reunification services and benefit”
from them and “I am doubtful that even with reunification services that he would be
capable of adequately caring for the child within 12 months unless there was a
responsible adult who could assume the primary care for the child.” Dr. Cavanaugh
recommended a guardian ad litem be appointed for father. Dr. Baljit Atwal also
evaluated father and opined that he had a moderate intellectual disability. Dr. Atwal also
opined that “it is unlikely that [father] will benefit from reunifications services” due to his
cognitive limitations and his lack of stable housing. Dr. Atwal also agreed that “it is
unlikely that reunification services within the next 12 months will make [father] capable
of caring for his child in a competent manner.” The Agency’s position was that under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), reunification services need not be provided to father
because there was clear and convincing evidence, provided by two professionals, that
father was suffering from a mental disability rendering him incapable of utilizing those
services.
       On May 31, 2022, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for father, at father’s
counsel’s request.
       The disposition hearing was scheduled to begin on August 4, 2022. Father
appeared with his attorney and guardian ad litem. The Agency indicated it was not
prepared to go forward with the contested hearing as the social worker was out ill. When
the court asked, “What’s the position of the parties,” father’s counsel stated, “He
understands the position of the Agency. He would, of course, want services, but he
understands the situation and would submit and oppose. He would ask that his visitation

                                              5
remain intact, though.” After a discussion about mother’s whereabouts, the juvenile
court continued the hearing for mother. At father’s request, the juvenile court waived his
appearance at the continued hearing stating, “I think we resolved — he’s already offered
a submission and I’ve accepted it, so just have mother. But he need not be present if
we’ve addressed his other issues.” There was no objection to continued visits between
father and the minor.
       The disposition hearing was continued to August 11. It appears neither father nor
his guardian ad litem appeared; father’s attorney is not mentioned in the minute order and
no transcript of that hearing has been provided. At the hearing, mother opposed and
submitted on the report. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent and removed
custody of the minor from the parents.4 The court found reasonable efforts had been
made to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from the home but that, by clear and
convincing evidence, there was a substantial danger to the minor if returned home and
there were no reasonable means by which the minor could be protected without removal.
Finally, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that father suffered from a
mental disability that rendered him unable to adequately care for his child and that due to
his disability, he was incapable of utilizing reunification services. Thus, the court did not
order reunification services for father. The court set a hearing pursuant to section 366.26
for December 7, 2022, and directed the clerk to mail father the writ process information
by mail to the last known address.
       Section 366.26 Hearing
       On November 14, 2022, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report. Both parents
appeared at the December 7, 2022, hearing. At that time, the court set a contested 366.26

4     The juvenile court adopted the findings and orders in the disposition report filed
on May 27, 2022, and adjudged the minor dependent and removed the custody of the
minor from the parents.

                                              6
hearing for January 10, 2023, and personally ordered both parents to appear. The parents
failed to appear at the contested 366.26 hearing. At the Agency’s request, and over the
objection of the parents’ counsel, the court proceeded with the hearing.
       The court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was likely the minor
would be adopted, it was in the minor’s best interest to have parental rights terminated,
and doing so was not detrimental to the minor. The court found none of the exceptions
pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) existed and terminated the rights of both
parents. The court ordered the minor placed for adoption.5 The court and parties had no
objection to the parents visiting the minor, however, who was placed with paternal
grandparents.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                      Writ Advisements
       “An order denying reunification services and setting the section 366.26 hearing is
not an appealable order; it can be reviewed only by a writ petition. (In re Athena P.
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 624-625.) The failure to take a writ from a nonappealable
dispositional order forfeits any challenge to that order[.] [However, an] except[ion]
[exists] if the juvenile court fails to advise a parent of the writ petition requirement. In
that case, the parent generally has good cause to be relieved of the requirement. (Id. at
p. 625.)” (In re J.R. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 513, 525.) That is what father claims here.
       Father did not challenge the order setting a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 by
filing a petition for extraordinary writ, but he argues there is good cause to consider his
claims of error on appeal because the juvenile court provided defective notice of his right
to file such a petition. In response, the Agency acknowledges the writ advisement was
mailed five days after the hearing and was sent to mother’s address, where father was not

5      The juvenile court adopted the findings and orders in the section 366.26 report.

                                               7
living. Nevertheless, the Agency argues that father never designated a mailing address,
never indicated he did not actually receive the writ packet and, because father had 12
days from the date of mailing of the writ advisement in which to file his intent to file a
writ, he has forfeited his claims. We agree there is good cause to consider father’s
claims.
        A. Additional Background
        The minute order from the August 11 disposition hearing states that the court
declared the minor a dependent of the court, removed the minor from the parents’
custody, and set a hearing under section 366.26. The order further states “The clerk is
ordered to mail the FATHER the writ process information and forms within 24 hours to
LKA.”
        In the disposition report filed on May 27, 2022, father’s address was listed as
mother’s address in Stockton. Several pages later, however, the report also indicated that
“On October 27, 2021, an Absent Parent Locater was completed for [father]. The report
indicated that [father’s] mailing address was [in Lodi]. There is also the address which
belongs to the mother, [in Stockton]. [Father] has confirmed that he will get his mail if
sent to [Lodi].”
        The writ advisement packet was mailed, five days later, to father at mother’s
address in Stockton. The advisement was subsequently returned as “Return to Sender,
Unclaimed, Unable to Forward.”6 It does not appear the writ advisement was ever
mailed to father’s address in Lodi.
        B. Analysis
        “Section 366.26, subdivision (l), provides that an order setting a section 366.26
hearing ‘is not appealable at any time’ unless ‘[a] petition for extraordinary writ review

6    The record reflects the writ advisement packet was mailed with a certified article
number. The envelope marked “Return to Sender” had the same certified number.

                                              8
was filed in a timely manner,’ the petition raised the substantive issues and they were
supported by an adequate record, and the writ petition ‘was summarily denied or
otherwise not decided on the merits.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1); see § 366.26, subd. (l)(2).)
This writ requirement is implemented by the California Rules of Court. (See § 366.26,
subd. (l)(3); [Cal. Rules of Court,] rules 8.450, 8.452; see also [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule
8.403(b)(1).)” (In re A.H. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 337, 347.) “Failure to file a petition
for extraordinary writ review within the period specified by rule, to substantively address
the specific issues challenged, or to support that challenge by an adequate record shall
preclude subsequent review by appeal of the findings and orders made pursuant to this
section.” (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(2).)
       Notice of the parent’s right to writ review of the setting order “must be given
orally to those present when the court orders the hearing under section 366.26.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.590(b)(1).)7 If the parent is not present when the court orders a
hearing, “within 24 hours of the hearing, the advisement must be made by the clerk of the
court by first-class mail to the last known address of the party.” (Rule 5.590(b)(2).) The
notice “must include the time for filing a notice of intent to file a writ petition,” and
copies of Judicial Council forms JV-825 and JV-820 “must accompany all mailed notices
informing the parties of their rights.” (Rule 5.590(b)(3), (4).)
       Notwithstanding a parent’s failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ, when
the court orders a hearing under section 366.26, courts have, as a consequence of the
juvenile court’s failure to adequately inform the parent of their right to file a writ petition,
found good cause to address the merits of a challenge to such orders in an appeal from
the order terminating parental rights. (In re Frank R. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 532, 539;
In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1110; In re Harmony B. (2005)
125 Cal.App.4th 831, 838-839; In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1038; In re

7      Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                               9
Rashad B. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 442, 450; In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716,
722-726.) It is the parent’s burden to show good cause for failure to file a notice of intent
and request for record and a writ petition pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (l). (In
re Cathina W., at p. 722.)
       Here, there is no dispute the juvenile court clerk did not serve father with notice of
his writ review rights within 24 hours of the juvenile court setting the section 366.26
hearing, as expressly mandated by rule 5.590(b)(2). “A parent who is absent from the
setting hearing has only 12 days after the date the notice is mailed to file her notice of
intent to file a writ petition (rule 8.450(e)(4)(B)), so strict compliance with the time for
giving notice is crucial to implementing the Legislature’s stated intent that reasonable
efforts be made to complete appellate review within the applicable time periods for
conducting the permanency hearing (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(A)).” (In re A.A. (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1241.) The juvenile court’s five-day delay in giving father notice
thwarted that legislative intent. (Ibid.) Indeed, as the packet was returned unclaimed, it
is reasonable to conclude, as we do here, that father never received it. We further
conclude the juvenile court clerk erred in mailing the notice to father at mother’s address
when the Lodi address was provided prior to the disposition hearing and was his
confirmed mailing address.
       “At the first appearance by a parent or guardian in proceedings under section 300
et seq., the court must order each parent or guardian to provide a mailing address. [¶] (1)
The court must advise that the mailing address provided will be used by the court, the
clerk, and the social services agency for the purposes of notice of hearings and the
mailing of all documents related to the proceedings. [¶] (2) The court must advise that
until and unless the parent or guardian, or the attorney of record for the parent or
guardian, submits written notification of a change of mailing address, the address
provided will be used, and notice requirements will be satisfied by appropriate service at
that address.” (Rule 5.534(i); see § 316.1, subd. (a).) When the juvenile court complies

                                              10
with section 316.1, subdivision (a), and rule 5.534(i), but the parent fails to inform the
court of his or her new mailing address, the parent’s failure to receive advisement of writ
review rights mailed pursuant to rule 5.590(b)(2) does not constitute good cause to
excuse the parent’s failure to file a petition for extraordinary writ. (In re A.H., supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 348-351.) Here, the transcript for the detention hearing is not
included in the record. The minute order for that date does not specifically reflect that
the juvenile court directed father to complete Judicial Council form JV-140
(“Notification of Mailing Address”). Nor is there any indication the juvenile court
informed father of the importance of updating his mailing address or that the court
inquired into father’s address if/when he failed to submit the form.
       Normally, where the record is silent as to what was done, it will be presumed that
what ought to have been done was not only done but rightly done. (Steuri v. Junkin
(1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 758, 760.) The failure to provide an adequate record to support the
contentions on appeal and support the appellate arguments with appropriate citations to
material facts in the record waives the issues on appeal. (Duarte v. Chino Community
Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) However, even if we were to presume that the
juvenile court complied with section 316.1, we conclude “the notice to [father] was
untimely and was not mailed to an address where [he] would likely receive it.” (In re
A.A., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240.)
       Whatever the status of father’s initial designation of his address, the record shows
he notified the social worker that his mailing address was in Lodi. This address first
appears in the record in the social worker’s disposition report filed on May 27, 2022 —
well before the August dispositional hearing. Furthermore, this address was paternal
grandmother’s address, with whom the minor was placed. (Cf. In re Rashad B., supra,
76 Cal.App.4th at pp. 445-450 [finding the maternal grandmother’s address, where a
minor was placed, was a logical candidate for designation as a mailing address].)

                                              11
       We thus conclude the juvenile court did not provide father with timely and
adequate notice of his right to seek appellate review of the order setting the hearing, as
mandated by rule 5.590(b). Therefore, notwithstanding father’s failure to file a petition
for extraordinary writ, we find good cause to consider his claims of error in this appeal.
                                              II
                       Appointment of Father’s Guardian Ad Litem
       On May 31, 2022, father’s counsel requested appointment of a guardian ad litem
in light of Dr. Cavanaugh’s opinion that such an appointment would be prudent. The
juvenile court effectively granted that request by asking, “Who’s up today to pick up an
appointment as guardian? [¶] Ms. Thomas, thank you.” Father now contends on appeal
the juvenile court violated his due process rights by appointing a guardian ad litem
without conducting an inquiry into his lack of capacity to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings or meaningfully assist his counsel and in the absence of
substantial evidence of incompetence. We conclude that the juvenile court violated
father’s due process rights when it appointed him a guardian ad litem, because he did not
consent to the appointment and the court did not inquire into whether or not father was
competent. We also conclude insufficient evidence supports the appointment. However,
we determine these errors did not result in prejudice to father.
       Before explaining our reasoning, we must settle some of father’s preliminary
complaints. First, he contends that neither he nor his counsel were present during the
appointment and that, effectively, the court sua sponte appointed the guardian ad litem.
We disagree. With respect to father’s presence, there is a discrepancy between the
transcript, which reported both father’s counsel’s and father’s appearance, and the minute
order, which reflects father failed to appear. “ ‘The California Supreme Court has . . .
stated that “a record that is in conflict will be harmonized if possible.” ’ (People v.
Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 880, citing, inter alia, People v. Harrison (2005)
35 Cal.4th 208, 226.) If that is not possible, however, ‘we do not automatically defer to

                                             12
the reporter’s transcript, but rather adopt the transcript that should be given greater
credence under the circumstances of the particular case. [Citations.]’ (Contreras, supra,
at p. 880.)” (In re D.B. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 252, 257-258.) Here, the circumstances
support adopting the reporter’s transcript. In addition to counsel’s representation, the
court appeared to speak to father in stating, “I’m going to ask Father to make and keep an
appointment with Ms. Thomas prior to [the next court] date.”
       Next, father seemingly acknowledges counsel was present for him at the hearing,
but it was not his appointed counsel, but rather someone father characterizes as merely an
appearance attorney, who he claims had never represented him before and was not
appointed to do so. However, we note the record before us establishes that counsel who
appeared for father on May 31 was a member of the same legal team as appointed
counsel and appeared more times on behalf of father than anyone else. Indeed, contrary
to father’s claim, counsel had represented father in at least three court dates prior to
requesting appointment of a guardian ad litem.
       Finally, father also claims that the appointment violated his constitutional rights
to: free speech under the First Amendment; to be free from unreasonable seizures under
the Fourth Amendment; and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
only his due process claim is developed beyond a conclusory claim, we limit our
discussion to that argument.
       A. Analysis
       When the juvenile dependency court has knowledge of a party’s incompetence, it
has an obligation to appoint a guardian ad litem. (In re A.C. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 146,
155.) The test of mental incompetence “is whether the parent has the capacity to
understand the nature or consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in
preparing the case. [Citations.]” (In re James F. (2008) 42 Cal.4th 901, 910.) “The
effect of the guardian ad litem’s appointment is to transfer direction and control of the
litigation from the parent to the guardian ad litem, who may waive the parent’s right to a

                                              13
contested hearing. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) Accordingly, a parent is entitled to due process
prior to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. (In re Sara D. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
661, 669.)
       When a “parent’s attorney concludes that a guardian ad litem should be appointed,
the attorney must either (a) approach the client and request consent to the appointment, or
(b) not consult with the client and approach the court directly. If the attorney consults
with the client and receives consent for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, the due
process rights of the parent will be protected, since the parent participated in the decision
to request the appointment.” (In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 668.) Father’s
due process challenges present issues of law that we review de novo. (In re A.B. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1420, 1434.)
       Here, although father was present when his counsel requested appointment of a
guardian ad litem, the record before us does not establish that the court first explained to
father what the appointment means in general and what it would mean to father or asked
if he consented to such appointment. Nor does the record reflect that counsel consulted
with father on such. (In re Jessica G. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1189.) Instead, the
court asked father to make and keep an appointment with the guardian ad litem. On this
record, it cannot be said that this exchange satisfied due process requirements. (See In re
Joann E. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 347, 355-356 [the parent must be informed of the
significance of the appointment to establish knowing consent to appointment of guardian
ad litem].) The juvenile court or counsel should have explained to father the purpose of a
guardian ad litem and why his attorney felt one should be appointed, other than the fact
that Dr. Cavanaugh believed such an appointment would be prudent. Father should have
then been given an opportunity to respond. (In re Sara D., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at
p. 672.) This was not done.
       To the extent father also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the
appointment of the guardian ad litem, we agree with him. The test of whether a parent is

                                             14
incompetent is whether the parent has the capacity to understand the nature or
consequences of the proceeding and to assist counsel in preparing the case. (In re James
F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 910; In re Jessica G., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186.) Here,
father’s counsel appeared to rely solely on the opinion of Dr. Cavanaugh in requesting
the guardian ad litem appointment. Father’s counsel did not make a record of the
foundation or factual basis of father’s incompetence. While Dr. Cavanaugh and
Dr. Atwal both diagnosed father with cognitive impairment, there is simply no evidence
in the record that father did not understand the nature of the proceedings or was unable to
assist counsel in protecting his interests.
       While father contends that the error in appointing the guardian ad litem is
structural error that requires reversal, we find the harmless error analysis outlined by the
Supreme Court in In re James F. governs. “[E]rror in the procedure used to appoint a
guardian ad litem for a parent in a dependency proceeding[, however,] is trial error that is
amenable to harmless error analysis rather than a structural defect requiring reversal of
the juvenile court’s orders without regard to prejudice.” (In re James F., supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 915.) “We will assume, without deciding, that the harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of review is applicable in this case, because it provides a more
cautious approach in that if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt it will also be
harmless by clear and convincing evidence.” (In re Esmeralda S. (2008)
165 Cal.App.4th 84, 94.)8 A due process violation may be held harmless if the record
contains substantial evidence of the parent’s incompetence (In re James F., at p. 911) or

8       As noted by the court in In re Esmeralda S., our Supreme Court declined to
determine whether the appropriate harmless error standard of review in juvenile
dependency proceedings for constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or
harmless by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Esmeralda S., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th
at p. 94, citing In re James F., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 911, fn. 1.)

                                              15
if the outcome of a proceeding has not been affected (id. at p. 918; see also In re Samuel
A. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 67, 83, In re Esmeralda S., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 93).
       Having determined the record before us does not contain substantial evidence of
father’s incompetence, we proceed to determine whether the error was harmless by
considering whether the appointment of a guardian ad litem for father in this case
affected the outcome of the disposition or termination hearings. (In re Esmeralda S.,
supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 93.) In support of his claim that he was prejudiced by the
erroneous appointment, father cites to In re Samuel A., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th 67. In that
case, the mother exhibited unruly and obstructive behavior. The court unsuccessfully
attempted to address the mother’s behavior, such as calling security, issuing restraining
orders, and appointing different counsel. (Id. at pp. 83, 74-77.) The court then appointed
a guardian ad litem and ordered the mother’s communication with counsel to come
exclusively through the appointed guardian. (Id. at p. 77.) The appellate court in Samuel
A. found there was not substantial evidence of the mother’s incompetence and the
appointment resulted in the mother being “prohibited from communicating directly with
counsel purportedly representing her” at the permanency planning hearing (id. at p. 81,
fn. 8), which could have affected her “right to actively participate” in the hearing (id. at
p. 82). In short, the challenged appointment of a guardian ad litem violated the mother’s
due process right to directly communicate with counsel. (Id. at p. 81.) Here, in contrast
to Samuel A., father does not argue that any comparable communication impediments
resulted from the appointment of his guardian ad litem.
       Nor does father provide any reason as to how the appointment of the guardian ad
litem may have affected the outcome of the case. “A finding that the juvenile court’s
error was prejudicial must be based on a claim of prejudice rather than speculation of
possible prejudice — because it is simply inefficient to reverse a dependency judgment
based upon speculation that an offending parent may have handled the case differently
than his or her guardian ad litem.” (In re Esmeralda S., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 96.)

                                              16
On the record before us, nothing suggests father was prejudiced by the appointment
because the record demonstrates the guardian ad litem played no role in the outcome of
the case at all. Indeed, the guardian ad litem was silent throughout the proceedings.
Father does not argue that the guardian ad litem interfered with his ability to express his
wishes to the court or to argue any relevant legal or factual position — which counsel did
on father’s behalf by seeking continuances and services for father. Nor does father argue
that the appointment of the guardian ad litem precluded him from offering any evidence
he wished. Thus, it appears from the record that father remained unencumbered by the
guardian ad litem to fully participate in the proceedings and that the hearings would have
proceeded in the same manner absent the appointment. As will be discussed post, there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s finding that mother was
not capable of caring for the minor due to a history of neglect and untreated mental health
issues. And there is substantial evidence to support the finding as to father’s
homelessness and inability to competently care for the minor due to his cognitive
disabilities. This evidence supported the juvenile court’s dispositional and termination
hearings. Under these circumstances, the outcome of the disposition or termination
hearings would have been the same regardless of the appointment. (See In re Esmeralda
S., at pp. 95-96 [due process violation in appointment of guardian ad litem was found
harmless where nothing in the record suggested that the parent was unable to express her
thoughts to the court and the record did not support the conclusion that the outcome of a
proceeding was affected by the violation].)
       We thus conclude the appointment of the guardian ad litem did not affect the
outcome in this case and any error in appointing the guardian ad litem was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                              17
                                              III
                                         Jurisdiction
       Father contends the juvenile court erred in its jurisdictional finding as to father.
He argues the only allegation pertaining to him was that he was homeless and, under
recently enacted legislation, a jurisdictional finding may not be based solely on father’s
homelessness. Father is mistaken.
       Dependency jurisdiction may be assumed over a child under section 300 if, as
alleged here, there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer serious physical harm or
illness as a result of the parent’s failure or inability to adequately supervise or protect the
child (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A)), the parent’s willful or negligent failure to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(C)), or the
inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s
or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse (§ 300, subd.
(b)(1)(D)). “The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume
jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re R.V. (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 837, 843.) “The focus of section 300 is on averting harm to the child.”
(In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.)
       It is important to note that “[J]urisdiction is taken over the child, not over or ‘as to’
the parent(s). (See §§ 300, 355, subd. (a) [at jurisdiction hearing, court considers whether
minor is a person described by § 300 and considers evidence ‘relevant to the
circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court’].)” (In re A.J. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 7, 14.) “The court gains personal
jurisdiction over a parent when the parent is properly noticed. (In re Daniel S. (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 903, 916.) Likewise, disposition is made of the child. (See §§ 355,
subd. (a), 358 [proper disposition is made ‘of the child’]; see also § 355.1.)” (Ibid.)
       “For this reason, there is only one simultaneous adjudication of jurisdiction, and
one simultaneous disposition. These orders are child-centric, not parent-centric, and

                                              18
cannot be ‘split’ as to each parent.” (In re A.J., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.) Father
asks us to “reverse the jurisdictional findings as to father and all disposition orders that
followed for him.” As indicated above, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders were not as to father, and we decline to reverse them.
       To the extent father argues that in light of a recent legislative amendment to
section 300, subdivision (b), the juvenile court erred in sustaining the (b-6) allegation,
namely that father was homeless and unable to reside with mother due to Section 8
housing rules, and had previously been convicted of misdemeanor battery, we disagree.
       Effective January 1, 2023, subdivision (b)(2)(C) of section 300 provides: “A child
shall not be found to be a person described by this subdivision solely due to . . . [¶]
. . . [i]ndigence or other conditions of financial difficulty, including, but not limited to,
poverty, the inability to provide or obtain clothing, home or property repair, or
childcare.” (See Stats. 2022, ch. 832, § 1.)
       “The relevant inquiry under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), is whether
circumstances at the time of the jurisdictional hearing ‘ “subject the minor to the defined
risk of harm.” ’ ” (In re L.B. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 402, 411.) We review the
jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence, and it is the parent’s burden on appeal to
show there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s order. (Id. at pp. 411-
412.) However, to the extent statutory interpretation is involved, our review is de novo.
(Id. at p. 412.)
       Contrary to father’s claim, the newly added provision under subdivision (b)(2)(C)
is not applicable here. The plain language of the amendment regarding indigency and
homelessness states that the provision took effect on January 1, 2023. The jurisdictional
finding in this case took place in 2021 — well before the provision was added or became
effective. There is no indication in the statute that this amendment was meant to have
retroactive effect, and father does not argue otherwise. (In re Cindy B. (1987)
192 Cal.App.3d 771, 779-780 [“The Legislature may make a law retroactive in its effect,

                                               19
but only when the intention to do so clearly appears”].) Even if the added provision was
retroactive, father’s homelessness was one of many factors placing the minor at risk of
harm pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) such that subdivision (b)(2)(C) would still
not apply. (See In re M.D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 836, 856 [concluding § 300, subd.
(b)(2)(C) inapplicable where indigence was not the sole factor placing a minor at risk of
harm pursuant to § 300, subd. (b)(1)].)
       Finally, contrary to father’s position, “a jurisdictional finding good against one
parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of
either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]
This accords with the purpose of a dependency proceeding, which is to protect the child,
rather than prosecute the parent.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397.)
Here, the allegations found true by the juvenile court included that mother was not
capable caring for the minor due to a history of neglect and untreated mental health
issues. Father does not address the sufficiency of the allegations pertaining to mother and
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.
                                             IV
                            Disposition and Bypassing Services
       Father asserts that the juvenile court erred in removing the minor from father’s
care and bypassing services to father. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to
deny placing the minor with father, the noncustodial parent, and alternatively that the
juvenile court should have placed the minor with paternal grandparents under a
guardianship rather than terminating father’s parental rights. We disagree.
       A. Removal of The Minor
       Pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1), the juvenile court may remove a child
from the physical custody of a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence,
“[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there

                                             20
are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without
removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd.
(c)(1).) “If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first
determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at
the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody,
the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that
parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being
of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
       Additionally, “pursuant to sections 361, subdivision (a), and 362, subdivision (a),
orders limiting the control of the parents of a dependent child and providing for the care,
custody, supervision, conduct and support of that child, including removing the child
from the custody of a noncustodial parent and determining where that child shall live
while under the jurisdiction of the court, are proper so long as the evidentiary record
supports the court’s findings that the orders are reasonable and necessary for the
protection of the child. (In re Julien H. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1090.)” (In re
Anthony Q. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 336, 350, italics added.)
       “A juvenile court’s removal order at a disposition hearing will be affirmed on
appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147,
154.) “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing
evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)

                                             21
       Contrary to father’s claim, the juvenile court made the requisite findings for
removal from mother’s physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). The
findings and orders adopted by the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that there was a substantial danger to the minor if returned to mother’s home and there
are no reasonable means by which the minor can be protected without removal. Father
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s findings as to
the allegations pertaining to mother.
       Also contrary to father’s claims, the juvenile court distinguished between
circumstances faced by mother and father and considered alternatives to removal of the
minor. Although, as the Agency notes, father never requested the minor be placed with
him, the juvenile court considered the appropriateness of placing the minor with him.
Rejecting that possibility, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that
placement with father “would create a substantial danger” to the minor with no
reasonable means to protect the minor without removal.
       It appears from the language used, the juvenile court relied upon section 361,
subdivision (c) in removing the custody of the minor from both parents, instead of the
language in section 361.2, subdivision (a). However, we find the juvenile court’s
reliance on section 361 rather than section 361.2 harmless error because the court’s
finding, if appropriate, also satisfies a finding that placement with father would be
“detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child”
under section 361.2, subdivision (a).
       We also find In re Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pages 339, 352-353
instructive. In Anthony Q., the appellate court found the juvenile court relied on the
wrong statute in ordering a child removed from a noncustodial parent. (Id. at p. 339.)
Nevertheless, the error was deemed harmless considering the juvenile court’s broad
discretion as to dispositional (custody) orders and, under section 361, subdivision (a)(1),
to “limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child by any parent.” (Anthony

                                             22
Q., at p. 346.) Further, section 362, subdivision (a), vests the juvenile court with
authority to make “any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody [and]
conduct . . . of the child.” (Anthony Q., at p. 346.; see also § 245.5 [juvenile court may
make all orders “to the parent . . . [it] deems necessary and proper for the best interests of
. . . the minor”].) In short, the juvenile court has broad authority to make a dispositional
order it deems reasonably necessary to protect the child’s well-being, including an order
limiting a parent’s control of the child, and determining the child’s placement. (Anthony
Q., at pp. 353-354.)
       Applying these principles here, the juvenile court had broad authority to enter the
dispositional orders it deemed reasonably necessary to protect the minor. (§§ 361, 361.2,
362; In re Anthony Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 353.) Under the standard set forth in
Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th 989, substantial evidence exists as to father’s
homelessness and inability to competently care for the minor due to his cognitive
disabilities such that the court did not err in concluding that limitations on father’s control
over the minor were necessary to protect the minor’s well-being and that placement with
father would be detrimental to the minor’s well-being. (See Anthony Q., at pp. 353-354.)
       Father also contends alternative arrangements could have been made to avoid
removal of the minor from his custody. He claims, without citing evidentiary support
from the record, that he could have arranged for the minor’s placement with paternal
grandmother on his own without a removal order from the court. He notes that paternal
grandparents already had five other grandchildren under legal guardianship, and he could
have arranged for the minor to join them. He faults the court for failing to advise him
regarding the guardianship option under section 360.
       Under section 360, a guardianship may occur when a parent informs the juvenile
court they are not interested in services after a child has been declared a dependent.
(§ 360, subd. (a).) When the parent “has advised the court that the parent is not interested
in family maintenance or family reunification services and has executed a written waiver

                                              23
of any of those services, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of adjudicating the child a
dependent child of the court, order a legal guardianship . . . .” (§ 360, subd. (a)(1).)
Here, there is no indication father advised the court of his desire to have a guardian
appointed or that he executed a written waiver of services. It has long been the general
rule that, on appeal, “a party . . . cannot successfully complain because the trial court
failed to do something which it was not asked to do and which was not before the court.”
(State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Maloney (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 33, 42; see also In re L.A.
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 413, 427 [“we find that the Legislature intended to authorize the
juvenile court to order a legal guardianship [under section 360] at the disposition hearing
when the custodial parent agrees to waive reunification services and that parent, the child
(when appropriate), and the court agree that it is in the best interests of the child”].)
Accordingly, the argument that the court should have considered a guardianship is
forfeited.
       B. Bypass of Services
       Father claims the juvenile court erred in bypassing services to him. Citing to
Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1424, he contends that “[m]ild
mental retardation is not a sufficient ground, in itself” for removal before the parent has
an opportunity to participate meaningfully in reunification services. The Agency argues
that the evidence of father’s long-time transient status, together with evidence that father
would not benefit from reunification services and would not be able to learn to care for
the minor on his own, justified bypassing services. We find substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding based on clear and convincing evidence.
       Absent specific statutory exceptions, parents are usually afforded services to
effectuate reunification of families subject to dependency proceedings. (In re Anthony
Q., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at pp. 345-346; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 285, 302.) Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), provides such an
exception, allowing the bypass of reunification services if the parent suffers from a

                                              24
mental disability rendering him or her incapable of utilizing those services. Where the
bypass provisions are used to deny services, the juvenile court must make its findings by
clear and convincing evidence. (§ 361.5, subd. (b); T.J. v. Superior Court (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238-1239, disapproved on another ground in Michael G. v.
Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 631, fn. 8.)
       On review, we utilize the standard of review as stated in O.B., mentioned ante.
We determine “whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a
reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true[,] . . .
view[ing] the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.”
(Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
       In this case, two psychologists evaluated father and opined he would not benefit
from reunification services due to his neurocognitive disorder and mental disability.
Procedurally, the two evaluations by qualified mental health professionals satisfied the
requirements of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2), and Family Code section 7827,
subdivisions (a) and (c) to show that father was incapable of utilizing reunification
services due to a mental disability. (See Linda B. v. Superior Court (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 150, 152-153.) Furthermore, there were no objections to the
qualifications of either psychologist or to the introduction of the evaluations during the
proceedings and absent such a timely and clear objection any evidentiary defect is
waived. (See In re Joy M. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 11, 19-21.)
       This case is unlike Tracy J., cited by father. In that case, the mother was
physically disabled, and the father was diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded. (Tracy J.
v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1419-1420.) Neither one could parent
without the other. According to the evaluating psychologist, the father was capable of
utilizing reunification services but his prognosis for reunifying with the child was poor.
(Id. at p. 1420.) Reunification services were provided; the parents made progress and
demonstrated they were able to learn about nutrition, safety, and basic childhood

                                              25
necessities. (Id. at p. 1422.) However, the appellate court ultimately found services were
unreasonable because they did not account for the mother’s physical disabilities and
remained limited to no more than four hours a week, without evidence showing the
parents’ behavior had jeopardized or would jeopardize the child’s safety. (Id. at p. 1427.)
       Here, in contrast, both psychologists opined that father did not have the capacity to
benefit from reunification services and father did nothing to provide evidence to the
contrary. Despite the fact that referrals were made for parenting classes and therapy for
each parent, neither parent engaged in those services. According to the Agency, father
“has not taken advantage of any of the reunification services that have been provided and
truly believes that he only needs to get a permanent job so that he can obtain an
apartment for him and his family.” Thus, on the record before us, there is substantial
evidence supporting the court’s decision to bypass services to father.
                                              V
                                          Visitation
       Father argues the juvenile court erred in failing to order visitation at the
disposition hearing and otherwise delegated its authority to set a minimum number and
duration of visits between parents and the minor. He argues that as a result, he was
deprived of meaningful visitation crucial to building a beneficial parental bond which, in
turn, compromised his due process rights to establish and litigate the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of parental rights. We disagree.
       When the juvenile court orders children removed from parental custody, the court
generally must provide for visitation as an element of the family reunification process.
(See In re Nicholas B. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1138 [citing statutory authority].)
Where the court orders visitation to take place, the details of frequency and duration may
be delegated to the guardian to determine, as they “are simply aspects of the time, place
and manner of visitation.” (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1376; see id. at
pp. 1376-1377.)

                                              26
       In this case, the juvenile court ordered visitation at the detention hearing and gave
the Agency discretion as to how to arrange supervised visits. Within two weeks,
supervised visitations began. Over time, the visits increased from one hour to two hours,
twice a week. In the disposition report, the social worker reported that supervised visits
were occurring two times a week in the paternal grandmother’s home. The social worker
noted, “The current visitation with the father is reasonable and appropriate and should
continue.” At the disposition hearing on August 4, father stated he wanted reunification
services and for “his visitation [to] remain intact.” The court stated there were no
objections to father’s continued visitation with the minor. Indeed, nobody ever objected
to visitation between father and the minor, and father never sought more visits.
       Father claims the juvenile court failed to make a visitation order at the conclusion
of the disposition hearing. We disagree. Again, while we have not been provided with
the transcript of the August 11 disposition hearing, the minute order from the disposition
hearing reflects that the court “adopt[ed]” the disposition report, and the case plan
included within the disposition report includes a visitation schedule for both parents of
twice weekly supervised visits. If father wanted something different, he should have said
so. As he did not object below, or seek more visitation, we conclude he forfeited his
challenges to visitation. A party generally forfeits the right to claim error as grounds for
reversal on appeal when he or she fails to object in the trial court. (In re Dakota H.
(2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222.) Principles of forfeiture apply in dependency
litigation and preclude a party from “standing by silently” until the conclusion of the
proceedings. (Id. at p. 222.)
       Moreover, “ ‘due process requires parents be given notice that is reasonably
calculated to advise them an action is pending and afford them an opportunity to defend.’
(In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114.)” (In re Mia M. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 792, 807.) Here, father had visitation and notice of the section 366.26
hearing. He was afforded an opportunity to build his relationship with the minor and to

                                             27
present evidence of the beneficial parental relationship exception. Father chose not to
attend the hearing or to provide any such evidence. There was no due process violation.
                                            VI
                                          ICWA
       Father and mother contend that the Agency and the juvenile court failed to comply
with the duty of inquiry under the ICWA as to Indian heritage by failing to inquire of
maternal and paternal grandparents as to their ancestry. Parents argue that because the
notices were sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the tribes prior to conducting
a complete inquiry, they were incomplete and therefore defective. The Agency argues
there was insufficient evidence of a reason to believe father was of Indian heritage. The
Agency also argues that they made efforts to inquire of mother’s relatives and that any
reason to believe mother had Indian ancestry was dispelled by the responses from the
tribes. We agree with the parents that the matter must be remanded because the Agency
and the juvenile court failed to comply with their duty of further inquiry under section
224.2, subdivision (e).
       A. Additional Background
       Father completed a parental notification of Indian status form (ICWA form)
indicating he had no Indian ancestry. Mother’s ICWA form indicated that she is or may
be a member of the Navajo and/or Cherokee tribe. In the detention/jurisdiction report,
the Agency noted “the mother stated she is Native American and reported that she is
Cherokee. When asked about any relatives being registered she stated none of them
were. She was not able to indicate which side of the family was Cherokee.” In the
disposition report, the Agency noted it “has made efforts [to] make ongoing inquiries of
the family.”
       The Agency sent ICWA-030 notices to the BIA. The notice listed the names,
addresses, and dates and places of birth for the child’s parents and grandparents. As to
mother, great-grandmother’s name, date and place of birth were listed. Two maternal

                                            28
great-grandfathers were listed: one with a name and date of birth and the other with an
address and date and place of birth listed. As to father, one paternal great-grandmother’s
and one great-grandfather’s name and place of birth were listed.
       In preparation for the ICWA hearing, the Agency filed a declaration of efforts to
identify tribal affiliation. The declaration listed the tribes upon which ICWA notices
were served, including the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the
Navajo Nation, the Ramah Navajo Chapter of the Navajo Nation, and the United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.9 The tribes responded that
according to their records, the minor is not considered an Indian child. The juvenile court
found that the ICWA did not apply in this matter.
       B. Analysis
       “The ICWA protects the interests of Indian children and promotes the stability and
security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian
children from their families, and by permitting tribal participation in dependency
proceedings. [Citations.] A major purpose of the ICWA is to protect ‘Indian children
who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.’ ” (In re A.W.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) The ICWA defines an “ ‘Indian child’ ” as a child who
“is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
The juvenile court and the Agency have an affirmative and continuing duty, beginning at
initial contact, to inquire whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be,
an Indian child. (Rule 5.481(a); § 224.2, subd. (a).)

9       Initially, a response was not received from the United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma in over 60 days. It appears the tribe did respond and
stated the minor was not an Indian child.

                                             29
         “[S]ection 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency
proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his [or her] family,
the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be
an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason
to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as
practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a
reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section
224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to inquire at the first appearance
whether anyone ‘knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id.,
subd. (d) [defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child as defined under § 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.)
         Due to changes in California law over the past few years, agencies now have a
broader duty of inquiry and a duty of documentation (§ 224.2, subd. (b); rule
5.481(a)(5)), and courts have been tasked with determining how to assess error when the
agency fails to discharge its now-broad duty of inquiry. In addition, section 224.2,
subdivision (e), imposes a duty of further inquiry regarding a child’s possible Indian
status “[i]f the court, social worker, or probation officer has reason to believe that an
Indian child is involved in a proceeding, but does not have sufficient information to
determine that there is reason to know that the child is an Indian child.” (See also rule
5.481(a)(4) [further inquiry must be conducted if the social worker “knows or has reason
to know or believe that an Indian child is or may be involved”].) Further inquiry
“includes, ‘but is not limited to,’ interviewing, as soon as practicable, extended family
members to gather the biographical information required by section 224.3, subdivision
(a)(5), to be included in ICWA notices, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and

                                               30
contacting ‘the tribe or tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected to
have information regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or eligibility.’ ”
(In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 309, 317; § 224.2, subd. (e)(2).) The juvenile court
must find the agency engaged in a “proper and adequate further inquiry” and that the
agency exercised “due diligence” before finding that the ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2,
subd. (i)(2); In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 601.)
       If those inquiries result in reason to know the child is an Indian child, notice to the
relevant tribes is required. (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); § 224.3.) The governing federal
regulations require ICWA notices to include, if known, the names, birthdates, birthplaces
and tribal enrollment information of all direct lineal ancestors of the child. (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.111(d)(3) (2022).) State law mandates inclusion of “[a]ll names known of the
Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, or Indian
custodians, including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well as their
current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enrollment
information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other identifying
information, if known.” (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C).)
       Both parents claim the juvenile court and the Agency failed to conduct a further
inquiry into the minor’s Indian ancestry and, as a result, the notices sent to the BIA and
tribes were incomplete. We review a claim of inadequate inquiry for substantial
evidence. (Adoption of M.R. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 542; In re Rebecca R. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.) Although reviewing courts have generally agreed that
reversal is dependent on showing prejudice, or a miscarriage of justice, approaches for
assessing prejudice have varied. (See, e.g., In re E.V. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 691, 698; In
re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578; In re J.C.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 80; In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069; In re
Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744; In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 355,
review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276056.) The California Supreme Court has granted

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review in In re Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 769, and we anticipate further clarification
on this issue.
       Here, the record shows that mother indicated she may have Navajo or Cherokee
ancestry. Section 224.2, subdivision (e)(1) specifies that “[t]here is reason to believe a
child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the court, social worker, or
probation officer has information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child
is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(1).) Courts have broadly construed the reason to believe standard. (In re Benjamin
M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [“ ‘Reason to believe’ is broadly defined as
‘information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a member or may
be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe’ ”]; In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 303,
317 [§ 224.2, subd. (e) “forecloses [a] narrow interpretation of what constitutes reason to
believe”].) Its broad application is essential to the remedial purpose of the affirmative
and ongoing duty to inquire under California law. (In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275,
295.) Applying those principles here, mother’s statement provided a reason to believe
the minor in this case is an Indian child.
       This reason to believe triggered the further inquiry requirement, but the record
fails to demonstrate that such an inquiry was conducted of any family member other than
mother. At best, the Agency made attempts to conduct further inquiries of the family.
On the record before us, we do not know the nature of those attempts. Nor was there a
finding that due diligence was made. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to find the duty
of further inquiry was satisfied. California law requires that further inquiry be
undertaken by the social worker (§ 224.2, subd. (e)), which includes extended family
members, and only after that further inquiry has concluded may the court find that the
ICWA does not apply to the proceedings. (§ 224.2, subds. (e)(2)(A), (i)(2) [“If the court
makes a finding that proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required in
this section have been conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an

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Indian child, the court may make a finding that [the ICWA] does not apply to the
proceedings”].) “Additional investigation may not develop further information
establishing the need for ICWA notice, but it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s
and [Agency’s] ‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire.’ ” (In re T.G., supra,
58 Cal.App.5th at p. 295.) The juvenile court erred in finding that the ICWA did not
apply when neither the court nor the Agency conducted a further inquiry into the minor’s
Indian ancestry.
       In light of the record, and the remedial purpose underlying the ICWA and related
California law intended to protect third party rights, we apply the analytical framework
set forth by the California Supreme Court in In re A.R. for assessing harm, and we
conclude the error is prejudicial. (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 252-254 [recognizing
that while we generally apply a Watson likelihood-of-success test to assess prejudice, a
merits-based outcome-focused test is not always appropriate because it cannot always
adequately measure the relevant harm and where the injury caused by the error is
unrelated to an outcome on the merits, tethering the showing of prejudice to such an
outcome misplaces the measure, at the expense of the rights the law in question was
designed to protect].) Although the parents were asked about Indian ancestry, the
juvenile court and Agency nonetheless failed to ensure a reliable finding that the ICWA
does not apply by failing to make further inquiries with extended family members to
ensure the Agency gathered all available information to provide to the tribes, and
remanding for an adequate inquiry in the first instance is the only meaningful way to
safeguard the rights at issue. (In re A.R., at pp. 252-254.) The record demonstrates that
the maternal grandmother and maternal great aunt were part of mother’s support team
and were in touch with the Agency on some level. In addition, the Agency had the names
and addresses of maternal and paternal grandparents. The Agency was required to
inquire of these relatives or provide explanation of their inability to do so. (See In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 317 [further inquiry includes interviewing, as soon

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as practicable, extended family members to gather the biographical information to be
included in ICWA notices].)
       Because the notices sent to the BIA and the tribes were based on information from
an inadequate further inquiry, they were sent without the benefit of any additional
information that may have been gleaned from that inquiry. As a result, the notices were
incomplete. Accordingly, we remand the case to the juvenile court for further
proceedings to address compliance with the inquiry provisions of the ICWA and provide
that information to the BIA. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A)-(C), 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
                                     DISPOSITION
       The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally affirmed, subject only to
full compliance with the ICWA as described by this opinion. If, on remand, the juvenile
court determines the ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its previous orders terminating
parental rights and conduct further proceedings consistent with the ICWA, including a
new section 366.26 hearing. (25 U.S.C. § 1914; § 224, subd. (e).) On remand, the
parents shall have counsel reappointed and be provided due process, including notice and
the right to be heard, for all ICWA compliance proceedings.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

   /s/
MAURO, J.

    /s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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