Court Opinion

ID: 9928331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 16:05:18.697777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:23.443920
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                        Opinion filed January 31, 2024.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                             ________________

                              No. 3D22-1649
                         Lower Tribunal No. 08-1460
                            ________________

                     Philip Morris USA Inc., et al.,
                                  Appellants,

                                      vs.

                  The Estate of Roberta Eisen, etc.,
                                   Appellee.

      An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Reemberto
Diaz, Judge.

      Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P., and Scott A. Chesin, Michael Rayfield
(New York, N.Y.), and Melissa N. Madsen; Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer
LLP, and Geoffrey J. Michael, and Frank Cruz-Alvarez (Washington, DC),
for appellant Philip Morris USA Inc.; King & Spalding, L.L.P., and Drew T.
Bell (Austin, TX), William L. Durham II, and Philip R. Green (Atlanta, GA), for
appellant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

      Eaton & Wolk, PL, and Douglas F. Eaton, for appellee.

Before SCALES, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
      PER CURIAM.

      Affirmed. See Chacon v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 254 So. 3d 1172,

1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“Being a ‘resident’ for Engle class membership

purposes has a different meaning from ‘legal resident’ or ‘domicile’ – terms

that typically arise out of a statutory context – and we decline to equate the

two terms. We conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury

regarding the distinction between ‘resident’ and ‘citizen,’ and affirm . . . .”);

see also Nolan v. Kalbfleisch, 369 So. 3d 346, 347-48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)

(concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for

new trial based on an expert witness’s isolated remarks that the court

promptly instructed the jury to disregard, observing that “[a] witness’s

comment warrants a mistrial only when it is prejudicial enough ‘to vitiate the

entire trial.’” (quoting Hamilton v. State, 703 So. 2d 1038, 1041 (Fla. 1997)));

Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Cuculino, 165 So. 3d 36, 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)

(“Contrary to Philip Morris’s assertion, the verdict reflects that the jury was

not inflamed or highly prejudiced by the improper comments because the

jury did not completely find in favor of Mr. Cuculino. . . . [T]he jury found in

favor of Philip Morris on Mr. Cuculino’s intentional tort claims, thereby

precluding the jury from reaching the issue of punitive damages, which is

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often substantially more than compensatory damages in Engle-progeny

cases.”).

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