Court Opinion

ID: 9640342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:03:33.068874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.139844
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
(dissenting). In this case, the majority concludes under its holding in State v. Deatore, 70 N. J. 100 (1976), also decided today, that it was error for the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant as to his silence and failure to disclose exculpatory information to the police *99at the time of his arrest. Notwithstanding the impropriety of these questions, the majority affirms Alston’s conviction on the ground that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ante at 98.
My views on these issues are set out in my separate opinion in State v. Deatore, supra. There I dissociated myself from any efforts on the part of the majority to erode the principles of Miranda v. Arizoria, 384 Z7. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) and subvert the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. Because the actions of the prosecutor in this case infringed upon those principles and guarantees (as the majority readily admits), and because counsel for defendant vigorously objected that these questions violated his client’s right against self-incrimination, cf. State v. Macon, 57 N. J. 325, 333-34 (1971), I would reverse and remand for a new trial free from such prosecutorial indiscretion. Only through such judicial sanctions can the rights of this criminal defendant be vindicated.
In short, I reemphasize that where a defendant relates an exculpatory story at his trial, counsel for the State may not question defendant as to his silence or his failure to volunteer information at or near the time of his arrest.
Sullivan and Schreiber, JJ., concurring in the result.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clifford and Schreiber and Judge Conford — 6.
For reversal and remandment — Justice Pashman — 1.