Court Opinion

ID: 9627419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:21.358714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:47.911442
License: Public Domain

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The principal question presented on this appeal is whether alleged discriminatory surveillance by a retail merchant, in which members of a particular racial group are watched more closely than others while shopping, constitutes a violation of the rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The issue is not whether such conduct by a merchant is condemnable or unlawful under some other civil rights statute, but whether the district court properly applied the specific provisions of § 1981 to the record in this case. The majority opinion, in my view, deviates from the prevailing view of the federal courts that have applied § 1981 to the retail shopping environment. The district court, hewing to that body of precedent, concluded that the claims of the thirteen appellants in this case should be dismissed, while the claim of one plaintiff, who later settled with Dillard’s, presented a genuine issue of fact for trial. Because I believe the district court’s approach represents a better application of the statute and is more harmonious with the present state of the law, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision that reverses the judgment of the district court.
I.
Section 1981 provides that all persons shall have the same right “to make and enforce contracts.” The version of this statute enacted in 1874 did not apply to conduct, such as racial harassment, that occurred after the formation of a contract and did not interfere with the right to enforce established contract rights through legal process. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175-85, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989). In 1991, Congress amended the statute to broaden its scope by defining the phrase “make and enforce contracts” to include “the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). Since then, the courts of appeals have recognized that § 1981 prohibits racial harassment that affects the performance of a contract or the enjoyment of the benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship. See, e.g., Elmahdi v. Marriott Hotel Services, Inc., 339 F.3d 645, 652 (8th Cir.2003); Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir.2000); Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1432 (10th Cir.1998). It is also clear that § 1981 applies to discrimination that “blocks the creation of a contractual relationship” that does not yet exist. Domino’s Pizza v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006).
The court accurately states the elements of a § 1981 claim as including (1) membership in a protected class, (2) discriminatory intent by the defendant, (3) engagement in protected activity, and (4) interference with that activity by the defendant. See Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir.2004). Before turning to the specific allegations and evidence in this case, the majority engages in a lengthy discussion of the applicable legal standards. It is well to consider first, there*714fore, the soundness of this analysis, particularly as it relates to the third and fourth elements.7
The third element of the § 1981 claims in this case requires proof that the plaintiff was engaged in protected activity in the retail shopping environment. The majority ultimately concludes that a plaintiff must make a “tangible attempt to contract” and show that she “actively sought to enter into a contract with the retailer” to meet this element. Ante, at 704. These standards are consistent with the approach set forth in the law of our sister circuits, which has firmly required that a shopper in a retail establishment must show an attempt to purchase, involving a specific intent to purchase an item and a step toward completing that purchase, to state a claim under § 1981.
The 1991 amendments to § 1981 broadened the scope of the statute, but they *715retained the statute’s focus on contract obligations. Indeed, Congress “positively reinforced that element by including in the new § 1981(b) reference to a ‘contractual relationship.’ ” Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 477, 126 S.Ct. 1246 (emphasis in original). A plaintiff, therefore, “must point to some contractual relationship in order to bring a claim.” Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.2001).
The Tenth Circuit specifically refrained from adopting an expansive interpretation of § 1981 that would “protectf ] customers from harassment upon entering a retail establishment.” Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1118 (10th Cir.2001). Stating that it could not “extend § 1981 beyond the contours of a contract,” the court rejected the claim of a plaintiff who failed “to make or attempt to make a purchase” at a department store. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit found itself “aligned with all the courts that have addressed the issue” in requiring that “there must have been interference with a contract beyond the mere expectation of being treated without discrimination while shopping.” Id. (citing Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1201 (D.Kan.1999); Sterling v. Kazmierczak, 983 F.Supp. 1186, 1192 (N.D.Ill.1997); Lewis v. J.C. Penney Co., 948 F.Supp. 367, 371-72 (D.Del.1996)).
The Seventh Circuit likewise upheld the dismissal of a claim brought by two shoppers who were examining time stamps and discussing the advantages and disadvantages of three or four models when they were approached by police: Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 414-15 (7th Cir.1996). Because the shoppers failed to demonstrate that they would have attempted to purchase the merchandise, they failed to state a claim under § 1981. Interference with “prospective contractual relations,” said the court, was insufficient, even though the incident in question “understandably may have discouraged them from patronizing the store.” Id.; see also Shawl v. Dillard’s, Inc., 17 Fed.Appx. 908, 912 (10th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (holding that the plaintiff had “not shown an actual contract loss” because “[t]he only thing that prevented her from purchasing the sandals was that the salesperson had been rude to her and she believed that he would get a commission if she purchased the sandals at that time,” so she “opted not to pursue the contract”). Decisions that have recognized a claim under § 1981, by contrast, involved completed purchases or specific attempts to purchase merchandise. Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 538 (8th Cir.2007) (holding that shopper satisfied third element by selecting a specific item in display case and communicating to sales clerk her desire to purchase that item); Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 435 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that plaintiffs who had purchased and received a gift package entitling the recipient to a variety of salon services had demonstrated a contractual relationship); Williams v. Staples, Inc., 372 F.3d 662, 668 (4th Cir.2004) (holding that the plaintiff sought to enter a contractual relationship when he offered payment by check); Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 874 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that a plaintiff who had selected merchandise for purchase by placing it in her cart, had the means to purchase, and would have purchased the merchandise had she not been asked to leave the store had shown a sufficient contractual relationship to bring a § 1981 claim).
A customer’s act of taking goods from a sales rack or shelf in a retail establishment does not by itself create a contractual relationship. Courts have found a contractual relationship in that circumstance only where the customer takes possession of an *716item with the intent to purchase it and acts for the purpose of doing so. Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (Okla.1979); Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 188 Ga.App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691, 693-94 (1976); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 278 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1, 8 (1975); Gillispie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C.App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441, 444 (Ct.App.1972). When a customer lifts an item from a shelf or rack for the purpose of examining it to decide whether to make a purchase, there is no contractual relationship with the seller, McQuiston v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir.1986), and the customer has not “sought to enter” into a contractual relationship as required to state a claim under § 1981. See Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976)). An attempt to contract, not mere interest in an item, is required to satisfy the third element of § 1981.
The majority recites that a plaintiff may meet the fourth element of a § 1981 claim — interference with protected activity — by presenting evidence that the retailer “thwarted” the shopper’s attempt to make a contract. Ante, at 705 (citing Green, 483 F.3d at 539). If properly applied, this formulation is consistent with the decisions of other circuits, and with the Supreme Court’s explanation that § 1981 applies to discrimination that “blocks” the creation of a contractual relationship. Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246.
It is well recognized, however, that not all conduct of a merchant that offends a customer is sufficient to constitute actionable interference with a contractual relationship for purposes of § 1981. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has held that where a shopper abandoned his purchase due to a merchant’s mistreatment of the shopper’s daughter, the merchant did not “actually interfere” with or “thwart” an attempted purchase in a manner that violated § 1981. Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358-59 (5th Cir.2003). In that circuit, “a § 1981 claim must allege that the plaintiff was actually prevented, and not merely deterred, from making a purchase or receiving a service after attempting to do so.” Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted); accord Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 752 (5th Cir.2001); see Henderson v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., No. 96 C 3666, 1996 WL 617165, at *3-4 (N.D.Ill. Oct.23,1996).
The Seventh Circuit similarly has held that where a shopper opts not to contract with a merchant because the shopper is offended by certain racially motivated activity of an employee of the store, there is no claim under § 1981. In Bagley v. Ameritech Corp., 220 F.3d 518 (7th Cir.2000), a customer left a store after he was offended by the behavior of an assistant sales manager, who said she “would not serve” the customer and “gave him the finger.” Id. at 520. The court held that while it could not fault the customer for .taking offense, this offensive conduct was insufficient to state a claim under § 1981, because the merchant was “not responsible for terminating the transaction.” Id. at 522.
A primary shortcoming of the majority opinion, in my view, is that it fails to establish an appropriate objective standard for determining what conduct of a retail merchant is sufficient to “thwart” or “block” a shopper’s attempt to purchase merchandise. For the most part, the court opts simply to call for “careful line-drawing, case by case,” ante, at 705, without providing any standard by which to locate that line in this case or future cases. The closest thing to a governing *717standard is the majority’s suggestion that when a shopper chooses to abandon a purchase after an action of the merchant that is “demeaning and humiliating,” ante, at 708, then the merchant has “thwarted” the transaction. To the extent this “demeaning and humiliating” test is the standard, however, it fails to distinguish the opinions of other circuits concluding that discriminatory surveillance or watchfulness is not actionable, see Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir.2002); Hampton v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 247 F.3d 1091, 1108 (10th Cir.2001), or decisions holding that other demeaning or humiliating actions of a merchant do not constitute actionable interference under § 1981. Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358-59; Bagley, 220 F.3d at 522; see also Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d at 415 (rejecting claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which is “construed in tandem” with § 1981, where although store’s summoning of police to investigate shoppers was “undoubtedly disconcerting and humiliating,” and “understandably may have discouraged them from patronizing the store,” no actions of the police or the store personnel “actually impaired or interfered with their right to make a purchase”).
While I believe, therefore, that the majority’s approach is more expansive than the statute will support, Dillard’s position regarding the “interference” element is conversely'too narrow. Dillard’s takes the Fifth Circuit’s language that a plaintiff must be “actually prevented, not merely deterred” from making a contract to an unreasonable extreme by asserting that racial harassment could never amount to a violation of § 1981 in the retail context, so long as the victimized customer eventually would be permitted to make a purchase. Suppose, for example, that a merchant established two checkout lines, one for African-American customers and one for white customers, but required African-American customers to wait in line for several hours before making a purchase, while white customers were serviced immediately. Or suppose that African-American customers were permitted to make purchases only after running a gauntlet of racial slurs and epithets, physical threats, and refusals of service by multiple store clerks. The rather implausible implication of Dillard’s position is that these hypothetical shoppers, if they choose to forego an opportunity to purchase on these conditions, are merely “deterred” from making a contract, and are thus not deprived of the “same right” to make contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. At some point, racially motivated harassment effectively “blocks the creation of a contractual relationship,” Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246, and gives rise to liability under § 1981. See Green, 483 F.3d at 539.
To define what level of racial harassment is sufficient to constitute interference with the right to make and enforce contracts under § 1981, I would turn to the body of law that already has developed in our court and other circuits concerning racial harassment and § 1981 in the employment context. In 1991, Congress expanded the scope of § 1981 to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson, which determined that racial harassment after the formation of a contract did not violate the previous version of § 1981. 491 U.S. at 175-85, 109 S.Ct. 2363; see H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 89-93 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 627-631. After the 1991 amendments, it is clear that racial harassment may, in certain circumstances, deprive a minority citizen of the “same right” to make and enforce contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens.
We have held, however, that Congress did not legislate that all racial harassment will trigger liability under § 1981, even *718though it may be offensive and reprehensible, and even though it may burden or have a negative effect on the enjoyment of contractual rights. To interfere with the right to make and enforce contracts in the employment environment, racial harassment must be “severe or pervasive,” Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir.2003), as it “would be viewed objectively by a reasonable person” and “as it was actually viewed subjectively by the victim.” Elmahdi, 339 F.3d at 652; see Patterson, 491 U.S. at 208, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part) (“The question ... should be whether the acts constituting harassment were sufficiently severe or pervasive as effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially neutral manner.”). Whether this “high threshold of actionable harm” is satisfied in, the employment context depends on such factors as whether the environment is “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” whether the plaintiff has been subjected to a “steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment,” and whether the harassment includes conduct that is physically threatening or humiliating, as opposed to an “offensive utterance.” Elmahdi, 339 F.3d at 652-53. In the workplace setting, the severity and pervasiveness of alleged harassment is typically measured over a period of time, whereas harassment in a retail environment must sometimes be evaluated on a single occasion involving a single alleged contractual event, but the touchstone of “severe or pervasive” harassment need not be altered.
Although Congress in 1991 was advised that “most litigation under section 1981 is employment discrimination litigation,” H.R.Rep. No. 102-40(1); at 90, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 628, the amended statute applies to “all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship.” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994). Nothing in the text of the statute suggests that courts should deem certain harassment insufficient to interfere with the “enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship” in an employment context, but consider the same harassment sufficient to interfere with the “making” of a contract in the retail context, cf. ante, at 704-05 n. 5, given that both situations are encompassed within the same statutory definition of “make and enforce contracts.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). There is no good reason to believe that Congress intended to make actionable a broader range of harassment in the retail shopping context — an area that was not even the focus of legislative attention in 1991 — than in the employment area, which was the driving concern behind the legislation. Indeed, the body of precedent that has developed in the federal Courts concerning § 1981 in the retail context appropriately “reflects a concern that too broad a reading would produce countless lawsuits based on minor or imagined discourtesies inflicted on customers by retail employees.” Garrett, 295 F.3d at 107 (Boudin, C.J., dissenting in part).
Accordingly, while I agree with the appellants that racial harassment in the retail shopping environment may result in liability under § 1981, and disagree with Dillard’s apparently blanket position to the contrary, I believe that a plaintiff must show that such conduct by a merchant rises to the level of severe or pervasive harassment to establish a violation of the statute. This standard is consistent with the leading decisions in the retail context, which hold that a shopper’s voluntary decision to leave an establishment, in the face of conduct that is offensive but not objectively severe or pervasive harassment, does not show the requisite interference with contractual rights under § 1981. *719E.g., Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358-69; Bagley, 220 F.3d at 521-22; see also Morris, 89 F.3d at 415. It also aligns with our court’s decision in Green, which held that where a sales clerk “explicitly refused service” to two shoppers based on race, “treated them at all times with pronounced hostility,” “discouraged her coworker from assisting them by questioning their ability to pay,” directed “a most egregious racial slur” and “forceful racial insult” at the shoppers, and “actively hindered” the efforts of another sales clerk to serve the customers, the plaintiffs had shown conduct sufficiently severe to constitute actionable interference. 483 F.3d at 539.
II.
Turning to the specific claims at issue in this appeal, the district court resolved nine of them on a motion to dismiss, holding that an allegation of discriminatory surveillance alone was insufficient to state a claim under § 1981. The complaint in this case involved seventeen plaintiffs, thirteen of whom have appealed. In the complaint, each plaintiff made a summary allegation, quoted by the majority, that he or she had been “deprived of services” while similarly situated white persons were not, or had received services “in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a reasonable person would find objectively discriminatory.” (Appellants’ App. at 50-85). To explain the grounds on which their claims rested, plaintiffs Crystal Gregory, Alberta Turner, and Carla Turner included factual allegations concerning their shopping experiences at Dillard’s, and alleged that employees of Dillard’s had taken certain actions based on race in those instances that gave rise to liability under § 1981. In sharp contrast to Gregory and the Turners, the nine appellants considered on the motion to dismiss alleged in their factual section of the complaint only that “each experienced ... instances at Dillard’s Columbia, Missouri store in which they were followed and/or otherwise subjected to surveillance based upon their race.” (Appellants’ App. at 50).
A civil rights complaint “must contain facts which state a claim as a matter of law and must not be conclusory.” Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.1995); see also Nickens v. White, 536 F.2d 802, 803 (8th Cir.1976). While a plaintiff need not set forth “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), or “specific facts” that describe the evidence to be presented, Erickson v. Pardus, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam), the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n. 3. A district court, therefore, is not required “to divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised,” Bediako, 354 F.3d at 840, and it need not “conjure up unpled allegations” to save a complaint. Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted).
In this case, the nine motion-to-dismiss appellants did spell out the factual basis for their claims. The grounds upon which their claims rest is an assertion that Dillard’s caused them to be followed and surveilled while they were in the store. (Appellants’ App. at 50). This factual allegation fails to state a claim. Absent an allegation that the plaintiffs attempted to purchase merchandise, the complaint fails to meet the foundational pleading requirements for a suit under § 1981, because it does not satisfy the third element that the plaintiffs attempted to make a contract. Protected activity under the statute does not extend to “the mere expectation of being treated without discrimination while *720shopping.” Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1118; accord Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101.
Nor does the complaint allege sufficient interference with asserted protected activity to state a claim under the fourth element. The First Circuit, observing that “[i]n a society in which shoplifting and vandalism are rife, merchants have a legitimate interest in observing customers’ movement,” held that an allegation of discriminatory surveillance is insufficient to state a claim under § 1981. See Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101. The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion, stating that “discriminatory, surveillance” is “not actionable under § 1981.” Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1108. Racially biased watchfulness, however reprehensible, does not amount to severe or pervasive harassment that is actionable. It does not “block” a shopper’s attempt to contract. See Domino’s Pizza, 546 U.S. at 476, 126 S.Ct. 1246. It is evident to me that the district court’s requirement of “per se interference”— used when discussing the claims of plaintiffs who had not alleged anything “other than being followed or subjected to surveillance,” ante, at 701 — was simply another way of expressing the same conclusion. I thus agree with the district court that the reasoning of Garrett resolves these claims, and I would not reverse the district court for evaluating the complaint based on the factual allegations actually made by the plaintiffs.
The § 1981 claims of four other appellants were dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. The majority affirms with respect to one appellant, but reverses the judgment as to the other three. The district court properly applied the law to the applicable facts, and I would affirm the judgments on all of these claims as well.
Crystal Gregory presented evidence that a sales associate followed her as she selected a couple pairs of pants from a rack and took them to a fitting room at Dillard’s. Gregory testified that when she came out of the fitting room, the sales associate had a “little smirk on her face,” and that two officers were right outside the fitting room leaning on clothing racks. (Appellants’ App. at 286). Gregory said she returned to the fitting room, removed the pants, and then took the pants to the counter, where the sales clerk was “getting ready to ring me up.” (Id. at 287). At that point, Gregory told the sales clerk that she was not buying the pants.
The district court correctly concluded that this evidence does not establish interference with protected activity sufficient to prove a violation of § 1981. Evidence of surveillance or watchfulness on its own is insufficient to state a claim, Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101; Hampton, 247 F.3d at 1108, and the majority’s effort to distinguish “merely being watched” from “being treated in a demeaning and humiliating fashion,” ante, at 708, suggests a distinction without a difference on this record.- In Garrett, three employees monitored the plaintiff throughout his visit to a store, and “at least one of them accompanied him throughout his visit.” 295 F.3d at 96. Nonetheless, the Garrett court held that this active trailing of a minority shopper amounted to no more than an “unadorned” — and legally insufficient — claim that the plaintiff was carefully watched while on the premises. Id. at 101. The addition of a smirk on the face of a Dillard’s sales clerk does not meaningfully distinguish this case from Garrett, cf. ante, at 708, particularly where Gregory admits that Dillard’s did not refuse to contract, but rather that a sales clerk was “getting ready to ring [her] up” when Gregory herself declared that she would not make a purchase. As noted, several courts have *721held that conduct of a merchant that may be described as demeaning or humiliating does not amount to actionable interference with a contractual interest when a shopper abandons a purchase. See Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358-59 (holding no actionable interference where plaintiff voluntarily set product on counter and left without trying to buy it after sales clerk made racially derogatory remarks and mistreated plaintiffs daughter); Bagley, 220 F.3d at 520 (holding no actionable interference where plaintiff left store after customer was “offended” by sales clerk who refused to serve him, made obscene gesture, and previously stated that “I hate f* * *ing Mexicans”); Morris v. Office Max, Inc., 89 F.3d at 415 (holding no actionable interference although store’s conduct was “undoubtedly disconcerting and humiliating”); see also Denny, 456 F.3d at 435, 437 (recognizing that while “[t]he Reconstruction Congress wrote broadly,” a plaintiffs “failure to advance a pending or current contractual relationship [has] proved fatal to a § 1981 claim,” and distinguishing Morris on that basis) (Wilkinson, J.); Garrett, 295 F.3d at 102 (“We do not think that a customer can hold a merchant liable for denying the right to a refund that the customer never pursued”).
In another apparent attempt to distinguish Garrett, the majority asserts that when Gregory “went to the manager on duty to complain, she received no offer of assistance and left the store,” and concludes from these facts that a manager “thwarted and interfered with” Gregory’s attempt to purchase a pair of pants. Ante, at 707. The entirety of evidence on this point is a snippet of Gregory’s deposition testimony concerning what happened after Gregory told the sales clerk that she did not wish to purchase the pants: “And so I talked to the manager, and I believe her name was Janet. And she was not of much help, almost as if she did not care, and so I left and I left very upset.” (Appellants’ App. at 288). The evidence thus establishes only Gregory’s subjective opinion that the manager was “not of much help.” There is no evidence whatever concerning what Gregory asked the manager to do or what the manager offered to do. It is not a reasonable inference from this testimony that the manager blocked an attempt to purchase a pair of pants, when it is undisputed that Gregory declined a sales clerk’s offer to ring up the sale. And even the majority’s unduly generous reading hardly distinguishes Garrett. In that case, the customer’s § 1981 claim was dismissed even though the store manager responded with “patently false” information when the customer called to complain about racially discriminatory treatment. Garrett, 295 F.3d at 97.
The claims of Alberta and Carla Turner were properly dismissed for similar reasons. The Turners presented evidence that after Alberta purchased several pairs of shoes at the Dillard’s store, she, Carla, and Carla’s children began to examine clothing in the children’s department. Carla took her daughter to a fitting room, and when she exited the room, a sales associate and a security guard were outside looking at them. The security guard then followed Carla as she walked through the store to rejoin Alberta. Upset by the surveillance, Alberta took the clothing items to a sales counter, told the associate that she would not make a purchase, and told another clerk that “you just made someone lose a sale.” (Appellee’s App. at 170).
Again, the evidence presented by the Turners shows, at most, discriminatory surveillance and watchfulness, which is not *722actionable under § 1981. Moreover, as with Ms. Gregory, Dillard’s demonstrated its willingness to contract by selling shoes to Alberta Turner on the very same visit, but the Turners nonetheless abandoned their effort to purchase children’s clothing. On this record, the district court properly dismissed the claims. Garrett, 295 F.3d at 101; Arguello, 330 F.3d at 358-59; Bagley, 220 F.3d at 521-22; see also Morris, 89 F.3d at 415.8
* * *
Our court has made clear that “[s]ection 1981 does not provide a general cause of action for race discrimination,” Youngblood, 266 F.3d at 855, and other circuits have declined to recognize a § 1981 claim based on racially-motivated surveillance by a retail merchant. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the claims brought under § 1981.9

. My analysis of the third and fourth elements makes it unnecessary to consider the second element of the plaintiffs' claims, but it is noteworthy that the majority opinion overstates the evidence presented to the district court on that point in several respects. For example:
• The majority emphasizes twice that Dillard's had adopted a “zero tolerance policy” for shoplifters, but that "white shoplifters ... were sometimes allowed to leave if they returned stolen merchandise or paid for it.” Ante, at 697-98, 709. In fact, the words “zero tolerance policy” appear nowhere in the testimony cited by the appellants. As for "white shoplifters,” there is evidence in the record about one white person who was followed in the store by security officer Kenneth Gregory on suspicion that he intended to shoplift a hat, but was stopped and questioned by store manager Don Edson before he exited the store. (Appellants' App. at 141-42). Gregory said that he would have apprehended the man for shoplifting if he left the store premises with the hat. (Id. at 141). He testified that when several other "people” asked Gregory "not to be arrested” and "to reimburse the store,” Edson directed that they be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. (Id. at 142). There is no evidence concerning the race of the “people” who were prosecuted or that any white person arrested by Gregory for shoplifting was not prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Gregory testified that he "concluded” that Edson would not have stopped a similarly-situated black person suspected of preparing to shoplift a hat, but he produced no evidence that Edson ever intentionally refrained from questioning a suspected black shoplifter under similar circumstances. (Id. at 143).
• The majority emphasizes twice that former employee Rick Beasley "observed ‘systematic’ racial discrimination at Dillard’s that he said was carried out by many employees.” Ante, at 698, 709. In fact, while Beasley intimated vaguely that “a number” of employees may have engaged in unspecified "discrimination,” he named only two employees, saying “I wouldn't call them racists,” but that "maybe they had tendencies to watch folks that should not [sic].” (Appellants’ App. at 153). As for the assertion of "systematic” racial discrimination, Beasley gave this response when asked about a store manager: "Do I think he’s letting it happen? Not personally. But because it’s systematic, it happens. And if it's not brought to his attention with credible evidence, he can’t do anything about it.” (Id. at 155). Beasley did not attribute any scheme or plan to Dillard's. His statement actually expresses the opposite thought. Beasley’s point was that individual employees would "take their own personal views and do the things they wanted to do,” (id. at 153), and unless this "systematic” [sic] activity of individual employees was brought to the attention of the store manager, "he can't do anything about it.” (Id. at 155). Indeed, Beasley’s view was that Dillard's should perform a study that compared the treatment of young Caucasian men with an "urban look” with that of young African-American men with an "urban look” to determine whether they would be treated differently by store employees. (Id. at 162).
• The majority says Maren Snell testified that she "frequently witnessed African Americans” unsuccessfully attempt to return merchandise carrying POP labels. Ante, at 698. Snell actually testified that there were "a few instances,” and when pressed for details, she could identify only one. (Appellants' App. at 189-90).

. To bolster its argument with "corroborative evidence” of an alleged "larger pattern of race based harassment and denial of services,” the majority asserts that "Michael Richmond and Debra Hamilton testified ... that they were denied service.” Ante, at 708. The evidence does not support this broad characterization. Richmond testified that on one occasion, a salesperson turned and walked away from him when he attempted to check out, but that another salesperson offered to assist him before he left the store, and that he made other purchases at Dillard’s earlier on the same day. (Appellants’ App. at 230-34). Richmond said that on another occasion, a Dillard's salesperson tried to direct him away from expensive jewelry and toward bargain-priced jewelry. Richmond responded by saying, “I want to see this shit here,” which led the sales clerk to say "[y]ou have no reason to be rude,” and prompted Richmond’s own mother to chastise him. He then left the department, complained to an assistant manager (who said she was "really sorry” that Richmond felt he was treated poorly), and left the store. (Id. at 221-22). Hamilton testified that she thought a salesperson once served a woman who arrived at a sales counter after Hamilton had arrived. Hamilton conceded, however, that the other customer did not confirm Hamilton’s belief about who arrived first, and that after Hamilton said, "I thought I was here first,” the salesperson said, "Well, I’m sorry.” (Id. at 249). Hamilton testified that she then said, "Don't worry about it now” and "went ahead and left.” (Id. at 248-49). Appellants cite no evidence concerning the race of the other shopper involved, and Hamilton made no assertion that the sales clerk refused to provide service after Hamilton said, "I thought I was here first.”

. The majority proceeds to conclude that the district court also erred in dismissing with prejudice the appellants’ claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act. These claims were before the district court based on supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Whether the MHRA, through its definition of "place of public accommodation,” extends to retail establishments is a novel question of state law. Because I conclude that the district court properly dismissed the federal claims, I would remand the case with directions to modify the final judgment so as to dismiss the claims under the MHRA without prejudice, so they may be decided by the courts of Missouri. See Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 314-15 (8th Cir.1997); Ivy v. Kimbrough, 115 F.3d 550, 552-53 (8th Cir.1997) (“In most cases, when federal and state claims are joined and the federal claims are dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, the pendent state claims are dismissed without prejudice to avoid needless decisions of state law ... as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).