Court Opinion

ID: 9594152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:27:34.45905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:19.857487
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J. pro tempore,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the critical inquiry in this case is whether defendant “reasonably could have believed that the question asked was part of a field sobriety test.” 127 Or App at 11.1 would affirm the trial court, because the record amply supports the trial court’s determination that defendant reasonably could have believed that his refusal to answer the questions would be a refusal to submit to part of a field sobriety test.
ORS 801.272 defines “field sobriety test” as
“a physical or mental test, approved by the Department of State Police by rule after consultation with the Board on Public Safety Standards and Training, that enables a police officer or trier of fact to screen for or detect probable impairment from intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance.”
In determining whether the trial court erred in deciding that defendant reasonably could have believed that the officer’s questions were part of such a “physical or mental test,” we are bound to consider the record in the light that supports the trial court’s result. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968).
*14In State v. Lawrence, 117 Or App 99, 103, 843 P2d 488 (1992), rev allowed 316 Or 142 (1993), we held that
“some type of ‘clear break’ should be provided by police to distinguish field sobriety tests from subsequent investigatory questions, so that motorists do not believe that they are required to respond to the latter.” (Emphasis in original.)
In concluding that there was a “clear break” here between the field sobriety test and the questions, the majority focuses on a limited portion of the record. First, the majority emphasizes that Wilcox told defendant there was “one more test,” and that it was the “last one” immediately before describing the finger-to-nose test. Second, the majority emphasizes that Wilcox said, “Let me ask you a question,” instead of describing another “test” to defendant. On the basis of those two facts, the majority concludes that defendant could not reasonably “have believed that the questions subsequently asked were part of the field sobriety tests.” 127 Or App at 13.
The record, as a whole, supports the trial court’s contrary conclusion. The fact that Wilcox asked defendant a question instead of describing a test is of little significance to the “clear break” analysis in this case, because Wilcox asked defendant questions throughout the entire testing process. Immediately after advising defendant that she was going to administer some field sobriety tests and that his refusal to cooperate could be used against him in court, Wilcox asked defendant questions about the amount of alcohol he had consumed, his level of education, whether he had any medical or hearing problems and whether he was taking any medication. She also interspersed test instructions with questions that arguably related to the tests and his performance on them, such as whether defendant knew his “ABC’s,” and whether his boots were comfortable.
We held in State v. Harrison, 119 Or App 391, 396, 851 P2d 611 (1993), that questions about the defendant’s level of intoxication were “so closely connected to the subject matter of the tests that defendant could have reasonably believed that these questions were testing his sobriety.” The same is true here. Although Wilcox told defendant before the finger-to-nose test that it would be the “last” test, she said nothing after the test to indicate that her questions were not related to the field sobriety tests, or, instead, were seeking *15follow-up information to assist her in determining how well he had performed and whether she should continue with more tests. As the trial court found, there was no temporal break or delay between defendant’s last attempt to touch his nose and the officer’s questions about alcohol consumption. Our holding in State v. Scott, 111 Or App 308, 313, 826 P2d 71 (1992), is pertinent here:
“[T]he officer’s request that defendant rate his level of intoxication on a scale of 1-10 cannot properly be characterized as a field sobriety test. See ORS 801.272; OAR 257-25-020. Rather, it is an example of interrogation that seeks testimony on the central issue in the case. Defendant was asked to provide an answer to the officer’s question after having been read his Miranda rights. He had also been told that refusal to submit to field sobriety tests would be used against him. Defendant could have believed that refusing to rate his level of intoxication would constitute a refusal to submit to appropriate tests. That was not the case.
“Defendant’s response to the question about his level of intoxication should have been suppressed.”
The trial court suppressed the statements on the basis of State v. Scott, supra. Although Scott does not control this case, because it does not address the requirement of a “clear break,” it is instructive. The principle underlying Scott is preservation of the right against compelled self-incrimination. State v. Whitehead, 121 Or App 619, 623, 855 P2d 1149 (1993). As in State v. Scott, supra, the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that the officer’s questions reasonably would lead defendant to believe that the questions about defendant’s level of intoxication were part of a field sobriety test. The court properly suppressed defendant’s responses, because the questions infringe his right against compelled self-incrimination. The trial court applied the correct analysis to the facts that it found. I would affirm the judgment.
I respectfully dissent.