Court Opinion

ID: 9950696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:16:40.921906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:12.266511
License: Public Domain

J-A29021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE MATTER OF: S.D., A MINOR         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: S.L.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 670 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
                           Docket No. 377-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                    FILED: March 14, 2024

      Appellant S.L. (Mother) appeals from the interim order issued by the

Erie County Court of Common Pleas – Orphans’ Court Division, which directed

Appellee K.D. (Paternal Aunt) to pursue custody of 10-year-old S.D. (the

Child) in the Erie Court’s Family Division. The interim order provided Paternal

Aunt with “standing” to file a custody complaint. Until the transfer between

divisions was completed, the order preserved the status quo, whereby

Paternal Aunt would continue to be the Child’s “temporary guardian” and the

parties would temporarily share physical custody. After review, we quash the

appeal as interlocutory.

      The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. In December

2022, Paternal Aunt filed a “petition for appointment of emergency guardian

and for plenary guardian of the person and estate of a minor child.” In her

petition, Paternal Aunt alleged: that the Child’s Father died on November 12,
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2022; that the Child had “little to no contact” with Mother for the preceding 8

years and did not have “an iota of a relationship” with Mother; and that the

Child was bonded with Paternal Aunt and her family. Paternal Aunt further

alleged that she stood “primarily in loco parentis” since Father’s death and

there were no less restrictive alternatives other than the appointment of an

emergency guardian and plenary guardian of the Child’s person and estate.

      While presiding over motions court, the orphans’ court put the

presentation of Paternal Aunt’s emergency petition on the record and held a

“motions court hearing.” See generally N.T., 12/7/22, at 1-27. Paternal

Aunt was present with counsel, and Mother represented herself. Counsel for

Paternal Aunt said his client sought a guardianship to “provide this child with

consistency in her schooling, her medical care…” See N.T., 12/7/22 at 3.

Paternal Aunt testified that she and her sisters (other paternal aunts) had

helped Father raise the Child, and that Mother had not been involved. Mother

disputed the allegation and said she was in the Child’s life every day.

Notwithstanding the domestic relations nature of the action, the presiding

motions court judge (Hon. Joseph M. Walsh, III), issued an interim order

appointing Paternal Aunt as a “temporary guardian of the person” until a final

hearing could be held before a separate judge (Hon. Elizabeth K. Kelly) on

January 26, 2023. See Order of Court, 12/13/22. The parties understood the

December 2022 order to mean that Mother had no form of physical or legal

custody.

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      Both parties appeared with counsel for the January 2023 date, but they

wanted to continue the matter. In the interim, they agreed to leave in place

the temporary guardianship, but they were unable to agree to a physical

custody schedule. The orphans’ court issued another temporary order, dated

February 9, 2023, which kept the temporary guardianship and granted Mother

partial custody for a few hours after school on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and

from 12:00 pm to 6:00 pm on weekends.          The court further directed the

parties to begin reunification therapy with the Child.      Lastly, the court

rescheduled the final guardianship hearing for May 25, 2023.

      At the May 2023 hearing, the parties appeared with new counsel. The

hearing began with respective proffers of testimony.      During the proffer,

counsel for Paternal Aunt anticipated that Mother would challenge her standing

to bring a custody action. Paternal Aunt’s position was that she stood in loco

parentis and that Mother waived her ability to challenge standing. Following

Mother’s responding proffer, the orphans’ court recognized that Paternal Aunt

had essentially brought a custody action. The court indicated that the ligation

would have to be set on a new path, but it would order relief in the interim:

         The orphans’ court: So, what I am going to do is I’m going
                             to move towards an equal shared
                             custody between [Paternal Aunt] and
                             [Mother]. I am going to appoint a
                             guardian ad litem for this Child to
                             represent her interests. And we are
                             going to refer this to custody [court].
                             And I am going to make a finding at
                             this point in time that [Paternal Aunt]
                             does have standing.

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                               [Paternal Aunt’s counsel], your client is
                               going to file a custody action at this
                               point in time. We are going to morph
                               this into a custody proceeding. Once
                               the custody proceeding is underway,
                               we are going to terminate the
                               guardianship. [A]nd pending the
                               outcome of that custody proceeding –
                               particularly because we are facing the
                               summer months – I’m going to enter
                               an order that is going to establish an
                               equal shared custody arrangement
                               between [Paternal Aunt and Mother].

N.T., 5/25/23, at 19-20.

      On the same day, the orphans’ court issued an order directing the

parties to litigate the matter in the Family Division of the Erie County Court of

Common Pleas. See Order of Court, 5/25/23, at ¶1.             The order further

provided: “As set forth at the continued guardianship hearing, Temporary

Guardian [(Paternal Aunt)] has standing to [pursue] custody.” Id. The

orphans’ court also appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the Child

in future custody proceedings.    Id. at ¶2.    Finally, the order awarded the

parties shared physical custody, pending further order. Id. at ¶4. However,

the court left in place the temporary guardianship. Id. at ¶¶3, 5.

      On June 9, 2023, Mother filed a notice of appeal. Initially, she included

nine errors in her concise statement of matters complained of on appeal.

Some of those alleged errors pertained to the decision by Judge Walsh, while

others concerned the orders issued by Judge Kelly. Both trial judges issued

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinions. In her Brief, Mother reduced the alleged errors

to the following three issues, which we reorder for ease of disposition:

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            1. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion by finding
               Paternal Aunt has standing?

            2. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion by granting
               Paternal Aunt a temporary emergency guardianship
               order?

            3. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion by
               awarding Paternal Aunt any physical custody?

Mother’s Brief at 3 (cleaned up).

      Before we address Mother’s claims, we clarify from the outset that no

one contests the orphans’ court’s decision to terminate guardianship

proceedings and transfer the matter to the Family Division of the Erie County

Court of Common Pleas. See Mother’s Answer and New Matter, 5/23/23, at

¶10; see also Mother’s Brief at 4.

      It is unclear why Paternal Aunt sought a guardianship in the first place.

Paternal Aunt initially came to court seeking physical custody as well as the

authority to make medical and educational decisions on the Child’s behalf –

i.e., legal custody. See N.T., 12/7/22 at 3; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322

(defining “legal custody”).      To be sure, Paternal Aunt’s petition for

guardianship included guardianship of the Child’s estate, as well as the Child’s

person, but it seems as though the estate piece was an afterthought. During

the December 2022 motions hearing, Paternal Aunt raised issues only insofar

as they pertained to the Child’s physical safety and welfare.      In fact, the

resulting temporary guardianship order was just for the Child’s person and

was silent to the estate. We note further that Paternal Aunt did not allege

that Father made her a testamentary guardian under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2519(b)

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(“Guardian of the estate”).1 Relatedly, it does not appear as though Father

designated     Paternal    Aunt    to   be     a   “coguardian”   under   the   Standby

Guardianship Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5601-5625.

       We observe that the orphans’ court judge, who granted the temporary

guardianship out of motions court, referenced the local Erie Orphans’ Court

Rule 5.6, which sets forth the procedure for seeking an “emergency

guardianship for the estate or person of a minor.” See Trial Court Opinion by

Judge Walsh (T.C.O. 2), 7/7/23, at 1, n.1 (citing Erie O.C.R. 5.6).2 From what

we discern, Paternal Aunt petitioned for emergency guardianship under 20

Pa.C.S.A. § 5513 (“Emergency guardian”). This was improper. Chapter 55 of

the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code pertains to the “incapacitated

person,” which is defined as “an adult whose ability to receive and evaluate

information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is impaired to

such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to manage his

financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his physical health

and safety.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501 (“Meaning of incapacitated person”)

(emphasis added); see also § 5502 (“Purpose of chapter”); and see

Pa.R.C.P. 2051 (definitions).           Not only did Paternal Aunt fail to allege

incapacity, but the proposed guardianship was for a minor.

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1 Under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2519(a), only a sole surviving parent may appoint a

testamentary guardian of the person.
2 The court also stated that it did “not necessarily disagree” that the case
should be transferred to the family division. See T.C.O. 2, at 3-4.

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       Ultimately, the orphans’ court ruled that Paternal Aunt should have

sought relief under the Domestic Relations Code, specifically the Child Custody

Act (23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340). The May 2023 order, from which Mother

appeals, was merely a placeholder until the transfer of litigation to the Family

Division of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas could be completed.

Paternal Aunt, who changed representation since the filing of the emergency

guardianship petition, does not dispute the court’s order directing her to the

family division. Mother is also in agreement. Indeed, it is Mother’s position

that the Child Custody Act provides her with certain protections and

presumptions which, when applied, defeat Paternal Aunt’s cause of action.

That notwithstanding, Mother still challenges certain temporary provisions

from the May 2023 order, which constitute this appeal.

       We begin with Mother’s first appellate issue – namely, whether the

orphans’ court erred when it granted Paternal Aunt standing to pursue

custody.      Under the Child Custody Act, and in accordance with the

constitutional protections3 afforded to parents, only certain individuals may

petition for custody of another’s child.

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3 Parents have a constitutional right to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control of their children. See, e.g., D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d
204, 210 (Pa. 2016) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)
(plurality)); see also U.S. Const. Amend. 14.

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        In the context of this case, Paternal Aunt would have standing to

pursue custody only if she could prove that she stands in loco parentis4 to the

Child, or that she: (i) has assumed or is willing to assume responsibility for

the Child; (ii) has a sustained, substantial and sincere interest in the welfare

of the Child, according to certain factors; and, perhaps most importantly (iii),

neither parent has any form of care and control of the Child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5324(2), (4)(i)-(iii); but see § 5324(5) (rendering subsection (4)

inapplicable).

       At the May 2023 hearing, Paternal Aunt alleged that she stood in loco

parentis. See N.T., 5/25/23 at 4-5. Additionally, Paternal Aunt argued that

Mother waived her ability to challenge Paternal Aunt’s standing.          Id.   The

resulting May 2023 order provided Paternal Aunt with “standing to purs[u]e

custody,” but the court did not specify under which statutory ground.

Moreover, the respective Rule 1925(a) opinions are largely silent on the issue.

Our review of Mother’s challenge compels us to answer a preliminary question:

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4  The term “in loco parentis” literally means “in the place of a parent”
Raymond v. Raymond, 279 A.3d 620, 627 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing Black’s
Law Dictionary, 781 (7th Ed. 1991) (further citations omitted). A person
stands in loco parentis with respect to a child when he or she assumes the
obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the
formality of a legal adoption. Raymond, 279 A.3d at 627. Critically, in loco
parentis status embodies two ideas: “first, the assumption of a parental
status, and second, the discharge of parental duties.” Id. The rights and
liabilities arising out of an in loco parentis relationship are, as the words imply,
exactly the same as between parent and child. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913,
917 (Pa. 2001). However, the third-party in this type of relationship cannot
place themselves in loco parentis in defiance of the parents’ wishes and
the parent/child relationship. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

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whether the orphans’ court even made a substantive standing decision under

Section 5324.

      Upon review, we conclude the May 2023 order did not actually grant

Paternal Aunt standing to seek any form of custody under the Child Custody

Act; rather, the order merely authorized Paternal Aunt to file the appropriate

pleading in the family division, in order to effectuate the orphans’ court

transfer of the case.

      The May 2023 order provides:

         As the issues presented by the parties pertain to the legal
         and physical custody of the minor child in a manner which
         is more appropriately addressed through the Family Division
         of the Court, [Paternal Aunt] shall, withing thirty days of the
         date of this order, file an appropriate pleading to initiate a
         custody proceeding.        As set forth at the continued
         guardianship hearing, [Paternal Aunt] has standing to
         purs[u]e custody.

Order of Court, 5/25/23, at ¶1 (emphasis added).

      Despite its use of the term “standing”, the orphans’ court never made a

legal finding under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2) or (4). In their respective Rule

1925(a) opinions, the orphans’ court judges did not seem to understand why

Mother raised the claim. Judge Walsh, who issued the temporary guardianship

referred to Judge Kelly’s opinion. See Trial Court Opinion by Judge Walsh

(T.C.O. 2), 7/7/23, at 3-4. Judge Kelly merely stated her belief that she could

not override Judge Walsh’s temporary guardianship order – that doing so is

the purview of the appellate courts. See Trial Court Opinion by Judge Kelly,

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(T.C.O. 1), at 6/28/23, *3-4 (not paginated). Neither opinion analyzed the

standing issue.

       In our view, the orphans’ court did not definitively rule on standing, so

much as it articulated how the case would have to essentially start anew

before the family division – namely, that Paternal Aunt must file a complaint

in the family division, and that she had permission to do so.

       We do not ignore the dialogue between the parties and the orphans’

court during the hearing, wherein the court seemed persuaded by Paternal

Aunt’s argument that Mother waived her ability to challenge standing. See

N.T., at 5/25/23, at 4-5, 17. But in the end, the orphans’ court never ruled

on the issue. In fact, Paternal Aunt concedes that the orphans’ court did not

make a finding relative to custody standing. See Paternal Aunt’s Brief at 5.5

____________________________________________

5 As there appeared to be general confusion about standing procedure, we
remind the court and the litigants of Rule of Procedure 1915.5. and its 2020
amendments.

Under the current iteration of Rule 1915.5, “[a] party may raise standing by
preliminary objection or at a custody hearing or trial.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a)(2)
(emphasis added). The Rule no longer provides that standing may be
contested “by preliminary objection filed within twenty days of service of the
pleading to which objection is made or at the time of the hearing, whichever
first occurs.” See Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a) (emphasis added) (prior version).

Moreover, under the current iteration of the Rule, the custody court may raise
standing sua sponte. Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a)(3).

In the case of a “third-party plaintiff custody action in which standing has not
been resolved by preliminary objection, the court shall address the third-party
plaintiff’s standing and include its standing decision in a written opinion or
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Right or wrong, the orphans’ court believed it was bound by the prior

temporary guardianship order until the case transferred to the family division,

at which point the family court could hit the restart button. But in order for

the case to reach the family division, the orphans’ court believed it had to

permit Paternal Aunt to file there, hence Paragraph 1. See Order of Court,

5/25/23, at ¶1. For these reasons, we conclude that Mother’s challenge to

Paternal Aunt’s standing is premature; the lower court has yet to rule on her

standing to pursue a third-party action under the Child Custody Act.

       In her second appellate issue, Mother argues that that the orphans’

court erred when it left in place the temporary guardianship pending further

order from the family division. We disagree. First, it is apparent that the

continuation of the temporary guardianship was nothing more than an interim

award of temporary legal custody to preserve the status quo. The May 2023

order included a temporary physical custody schedule, but the court did not

explicitly award temporary legal custody. For that, the court simply left the

temporary guardianship in place:

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order.” Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a)(4) (emphasis added), (Explanatory Comment –
2020).

Finally, we note that this Court has recognized the fluid nature of third-party
standing. See M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding
that while the grandparent originally has standing at the time she filed the
custody complaint, the trial court did not err when it dismissed the complaint
for lack of standing; the court was free to consider the change in
circumstances between the grandparent’s complaint and the parents’ petition
to dismiss).

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         ¶3       Pending resolution of the custody proceeding, or
                  further order of court, the December 13, 2022
                  temporary order of court appointing [Paternal
                  Aunt] as the Child’s temporary guardian shall
                  remain in full force and effect.

                                        […]

         ¶5       Mother shall be entitled to receive directly from
                  schools, health care providers and other relevant
                  sources, information concerning the Child.
                  Nevertheless, consistent with the December 13,
                  2022 temporary order of court, Temporary
                  Guardian [(Paternal Aunt)] retains all authority
                  granted to her via her appointment as the Child’s
                  temporary guardian.

Order of Court, 5/25/23 at ¶¶ 3, 5.

      Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have the

authority to issue temporary custody relief:

         At any time after commencement of the action, the court
         may on application or its own motion grant appropriate
         interim or special relief. The relief may include, but is not
         limited to, the award of temporary legal or physical
         custody[.]

Pa.R.C.P. 1915.13 (“Special Relief”).

      Furthermore, Rule 1915.13 should be read broadly, empowering the

court to provide special relief where appropriate, and that the power of the

court shall not be limited to the types of relief cataloged. See id. (Explanatory

Comment – 1981).

      We clarify that the orphans’ court had the authority to issue special

custody relief, because it possessed the powers vested with the whole of the

court of common pleas. As the Judicial Code makes clear:

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         The divisions of a court of common pleas are administrative
         units composed of those judges of the court responsible for
         the transaction of specified classes of the business of the
         court. In a court of common pleas having two or more
         divisions each division of the court is vested with the full
         discretion of the whole court, but the business of the court
         may be allocated among the divisions of the court by or
         pursuant to general rules.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952; see also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 701 (providing that “each

orphans’ court division shall possess the powers vested in the whole court.”);

and see Estate of Gilbert, 492 A.2d 401, 403 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding

that each division of a court of common pleas is vested with the full jurisdiction

of the whole court).

      Here, Paternal Aunt commenced an action seeking a court order allowing

her to care for the Child. But she filed in the wrong division. The remedy for

bringing a proceeding in the wrong division of a court is not dismissal but

transfer to the correct division. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wadzinski,

401 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Pa. 1978)) (further citations omitted).         Under Rule

1915.13, no court has the authority to issue special relief until “after the

commencement of the action.” Naturally, Rule 1915.13 anticipates that the

type of action is a custody action. Although Paternal Aunt filed a guardianship

action, what she sought was custody.

      The orphans’ court had the authority to overlook this defect in the

interest of justice and judicial economy. See Pa.R.C.P. 126 (“The court at

every stage of any such action or proceeding may disregard any error or defect

of procedure which does not affect the substantive rights of the parties.”). For

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housekeeping purposes, the orphans’ court directed Paternal Aunt to file the

required pleading for a custody action. See Order of Court, 5/25/23 at ¶1;

see also Pa.R.C.P. 1915.15. For all intents and purposes, the custody action

had already begun. In its May 2023 order, the orphans’ court was merely

transferring the action to the proper division of court. Under Gilbert, this is

the proper remedy. Gilbert, 492 A.2d at 403. As such, the court had the

authority to act under Rule 1915.13, which is what it did when it left the

temporary guardianship in place.

      Recognizing that Mother’s second appellate issue constitutes a challenge

to an interim award of legal custody, we must confront whether such a claim

is interlocutory. We address this concern mindful of the applicable scope and

standard of review. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal

is a legal question, for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope

of review is plenary. See J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 429 (Pa. 2023).

      It is “well-ensconced in Pennsylvania that an interim custody order is

not appealable.” J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2017). Until

a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing, where it can make proper

findings pursuant to Section 5328(a) (regarding the custody factors), in light

of Section 5327 (regarding parental presumptions), any award of custody is

on an interim basis.    Such awards are “ephemeral and subject to further

modification.” See J.M., 164 at 1263. To consider appeals from these interim

orders would be to conduct piecemeal and inefficient review of the trial court’s

decisions, in direct circumvention of the finality rule. See J.C.D., supra.

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Therefore, we conclude that Mother’s challenge of the continuation of the

temporary guardianship – i.e., legal custody – is interlocutory.

      In her third issue, Mother challenges the court’s interim award of shared

physical custody. See Order of Court, 5/25/23, at ¶4. Although the interim

award constituted an increase in Mother’s custody and was designed to

facilitate parental reunification, we appreciate Mother’s position that Paternal

Aunt should not be entitled to any custody at all. However, the May 2023

order was only temporary.     It was meant to preserve the status quo and

provide stability for the Child, on an interim basis, until such time that the

family court could properly determine the Child’s best interests. Again, an

appeal challenging an interim custody award is interlocutory. See J.M., 164

A.3d at 1263. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not reach merits of

Mother’s third issue.

      In sum, we quash Mother’s appeal as interlocutory. We conclude that

Mother’s standing challenge is not ripe for our review, because the family

division had yet to determine whether Paternal Aunt had standing under 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5324. Moreover, the continuation of the temporary guardianship

was essentially a temporary award of legal custody, which the court could

issue under Pa.R.C.P. 1915.13 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 952. For the same reasons,

the orphans’ court was authorized to make a temporary award of shared

physical custody to preserve the status quo. Because appeals from interim

custody awards are non-reviewable, Mother’s second and third appellate

issues are interlocutory.

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     Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Murray joins.

     Judge Bowes concurs in result.

DATE: 03/14/2024

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