Court Opinion

ID: 9796563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:00:06.600207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:37.413707
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
concurring in the judgment only:
I agree with the judgment of the court because I believe that the plaintiff has failed to allege a compensable injury resulting from the breach of a duty owed her by the defendant. I also agree with the court's decision not to reach the question whether Colorado permits recovery for commercial damages under either the rubric of privacy or publicity or whether a plaintiff must prove the value of her identity when she seeks commercial damages. I would not, however, use a case that admittedly does not involve commission of the tort, as the vehicle to adopt for the jurisdiction a tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation of another's name or likeness, even to the extent that the majority does so. Similarly, I would not reach the question of a first amendment privilege in this case because I believe that use of the name and picture of the plaintiff under these cireum-stances simply does not implicate any value deserving of protection by a private action for damages.
Largely for reasons set out in the majority's explanation of the cause of action for appropriation of another's name or likeness, I do not consider it to be a natural outgrowth of our development of the right to privacy. Even when limited to the case of "personal," as distinguished from "commercial," damages, to the extent that the interest to be protected does not truly involve private matters or the so-called right "to be let alone," it is substantially different from other kinds of actions for invasion of privacy. While I do not reject the notion, which I believe to be the essence of the Restatement's articulation of the tort, that the appropriation without permission of certain values associated with a person's name or likeness, like reputation, prestige, or standing in a particular community, should be protected against, it is clear to me that publication of a person's felony conviction record does not involve such a value. I am concerned that by eliminating the need for appropriation of any such value altogether, and basing a cause of action on the mere "use" of a person's name or likeness, the majority creates an extremely broad duty, which then requires a concomitantly broad first-amendment privilege as a limitation.
At least where I do not consider it necessary to the resolution of the controversy before us, I would not decide a constitutional issue or abandon the caution with which we have approached adoption of the tort of invasion of privacy in the past.