Court Opinion

ID: 9889583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 18:08:49.97296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:18.218987
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 In re J.F. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re J.F. et al., Persons Coming                                   B319628
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP00714)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 JOVANNI F.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Ashley Price, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed in part
with directions and dismissed in part.
      Jane B. Winer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jane E. Kwon, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
             ____________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

      Jovanni F., father of six-year-old J.F. and five-year-old
V.F., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and
disposition orders declaring J.F. and V.F. dependent children of
the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j),1 and removing them from
Jovanni.2 Jovanni challenges two of the court’s jurisdiction
findings: one under section 300, subdivision (a), based on his
history of domestic altercations with the children’s mother, and
the other under section 300, subdivision (b), based on his sexual

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2     As we explain, shortly before making these findings and
orders the juvenile court terminated an earlier assertion of
jurisdiction over J.F. and V.F. with custody and visitation orders
that, among other things, granted sole physical custody to the
children’s mother. Jovanni appealed from those orders
concurrently with his appeal from the jurisdiction findings and
disposition orders. However, because Jovanni’s briefs do not
challenge the court’s order terminating jurisdiction or the custody
and visitation orders, he has abandoned his appeal from those
orders. (See In re M.B. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 617, 620, fn. 1.)

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abuse of J.F. and V.F’s older sibling, V.C. Jovanni also contends
the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law.
      We conclude Jovanni’s appeal from the jurisdiction findings
is moot, but we exercise our discretion to review the finding
under section 300, subdivision (a), and conclude substantial
evidence did not support that finding. We do not exercise our
discretion to review the appeal from the finding under
section 300, subdivision (b). The Department concedes and we
agree it did not comply with ICWA’s inquiry requirements.
Therefore, we reverse the jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (a), and direct the juvenile court to ensure the
Department complies fully with the inquiry and, if necessary,
notice provisions of ICWA and related California law. We
dismiss the rest of Jovanni’s appeal as moot.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     A.       The Juvenile Court Sustains an Earlier Petition and
              Removes the Children; We Reverse in Part,
              Conditionally Affirm in Part, and Dismiss in Part
       “Jovanni and his girlfriend, Vanessa R., were living with
their children, J.F. and V.F., and Vanessa’s 13-year-old daughter
(by another father), V.C., when in February 2021 the Department
filed a section 300 petition alleging juvenile court jurisdiction

                                3
over J.F. and V.F.[3] In identical counts pleaded under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), the Department alleged
Jovanni and Vanessa had ‘a history of engaging in physical and
verbal altercations in the presence of the children.’ More
specifically, the Department alleged: On one occasion, Vanessa
pushed Jovanni in the presence of V.C.; on another occasion,
Vanessa pulled Jovanni’s beard; on another occasion, Vanessa
elbowed Jovanni in the mouth, bruising his lip; in V.C.’s presence
Jovanni threatened to take the children from Vanessa; on
multiple occasions law enforcement responded to Jovanni and
Vanessa’s home because of altercations; and these physical and
verbal altercations between Jovanni and Vanessa endangered the
children’s physical health and safety, placing them at risk of
serious physical harm.” (In re Vanessa C. (Jun. 29, 2022,
B312468) [nonpub. opn.], original fn. omitted.)
      “In addition, in identical counts pleaded under section 300,
subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), the Department alleged Jovanni
‘sexually abused’ V.C. More specifically, the Department alleged
that on one occasion Jovanni entered V.C.’s bedroom and rubbed
her inner thigh area above the knee with his hand; while
continuing to rub her thigh, he moved his hand toward her waist;
and he then placed his fingers inside her pants, while she
repeatedly told him to stop. The Department also alleged that on
another occasion Jovanni fondled V.C.’s breasts while she lay in
her bed and that on still another occasion he ‘demonstrated
putting a condom on a cucumber’ for V.C. The Department
alleged Vanessa knew of these instances of sexual abuse, failed to

3      The Department also alleged juvenile court jurisdiction
over V.C., but that was not relevant to Jovanni’s earlier appeal in
this case, and it isn’t relevant to this one.

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take action to protect V.C., and allowed Jovanni unlimited access
to V.C. and her siblings. The Department further alleged
Jovanni’s sexual abuse of V.C. and Vanessa’s failure to protect
V.C. endangered V.C.’s physical health and safety and placed her
and her siblings at risk of serious physical harm.” (In re
Vanessa C., supra, B312468.)
       “At a jurisdiction hearing in April 2021, the juvenile court
sustained all five counts. At disposition the court declared J.F.
and V.F. dependent children of the court, removed them from
their father, and released them to Vanessa. The court ordered
Jovanni to participate in counseling programs for domestic
violence, parenting, and sexual abuse and ordered him to have
monitored visits with J.F. and V.F. and no visits with V.C.
(though the court gave the Department ‘discretion to liberalize’
his visits (actually, lack of visits) with V.C.).” (In re Vanessa C.,
supra, B312468, fn. omitted.)
       Jovanni appealed from the jurisdiction findings and
disposition orders. The Department argued Jovanni’s appeal
from the jurisdiction findings was nonjusticiable because he
contested only those findings relating to his conduct and not
those relating to Vanessa’s. We rejected that argument,
concluding that at least some of the jurisdiction challenges were
justiciable because they contested findings that served as bases
for the juvenile court’s disposition orders. We held substantial
evidence supported the jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on Jovanni and Vanessa’s history of
domestic violence, but did not support the jurisdiction finding
based on that conduct under section 300, subdivision (a), because
there was no evidence of any nonaccidental injury to the

                                  5
children.4 We also concluded that, although there was evidence
V.C. recanted allegations Jovanni sexually abused her, the
juvenile court credited V.C.’s initial allegations over her
recantation—a determination we were not free to reevaluate—
and that therefore substantial evidence supported the
jurisdiction finding under section 300, subdivision (d), based on
Jovanni’s sexual abuse. We determined Jovanni’s appeal from
the other jurisdiction findings based on his sexual abuse (under
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j)) was nonjusticiable because
he could not identify any relief we could provide by reversing
those findings while affirming the finding under section 300,
subdivision (d). (In re Vanessa C., supra, B312468.)
      So, we reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding
under section 300, subdivision (a); affirmed the jurisdiction
finding under section 300, subdivision (b), based on Jovanni and
Vanessa’s domestic violence; affirmed the finding under
section 300, subdivision (d), based on Jovanni’s sexual abuse; and
dismissed Jovanni’s appeal from the jurisdiction findings under
section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), based on his sexual abuse.
We also affirmed the disposition orders.5 (In re Vanessa C.,
supra, B312468.)

4      Section 300, subdivision (a), “provides for jurisdiction when
‘[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally
upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian . . . .’” (In re
Jonathan B. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 115, 118.)

5     Because the juvenile court and the Department had not
complied with ICWA’s inquiry requirements, we conditioned the
affirmances on compliance with our direction that the juvenile

                                 6
      B.      The Juvenile Court Terminates Its Jurisdiction,
              Sustains Another Petition, and Removes the Children;
              Jovanni Appeals Again
       In the meantime, while that appeal was pending, the
juvenile court held a six-month review hearing under section 364
and found the conditions justifying its initial assumption of
jurisdiction over J.F. and V.F. no longer existed and were not
likely to exist if the court withdrew its supervision and
terminated its jurisdiction. In February 2022 the court
terminated its jurisdiction and issued custody and visitation
orders providing for joint legal custody of J.F. and V.F. by
Jovanni and Vanessa, sole physical custody of the children by
Vanessa, and monitored visits between Jovanni and the children.
       Two days later V.C. found Vanessa sitting in bed with a
knife, saying she did not want to live anymore. V.C. took J.F.
and V.F. back to her bedroom, locked the door, and called Jovanni
and the police. Vanessa was ultimately taken to a hospital,
where she was placed on a 72-hour hold under section 5150.
       Two weeks later, having again detained J.F. and V.F., the
Department filed a new petition alleging juvenile court
jurisdiction over the children under section 300, subdivisions (a),
(b), (d), and (j).6 In almost identical counts pleaded under
section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), the Department repeated

court ensure the Department comply fully with the inquiry and, if
necessary, notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.
(In re Vanessa C., supra, B312468.)

6     Again, the Department also alleged juvenile court
jurisdiction over V.C. based on the counts alleged under
section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (d).

                                7
the domestic violence allegations it made under those same
subdivisions in the previous petition, adding that Jovanni had
not consistently participated in or completed a court-ordered
“Domestic Violence program for Batterers” or court-ordered
“counseling to address child safety.” In identical counts under
section 300, subdivisions (b), (d), and (j), the Department
repeated the sexual abuse allegations it made under those
subdivisions in the previous petition, adding that Jovanni had
not consistently participated in or completed various court-
ordered programs, including sexual abuse counseling for
perpetrators, and that over the last several months he had
contact with V.C., J.F., and V.F. that violated juvenile court
orders.
       At a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
March 2022, the juvenile court sustained the new section 300
petition as pleaded, declared J.F. and V.F. dependent children of
the court, and removed them from Vanessa and Jovanni. Jovanni
timely appealed.

                               8
                           DISCUSSION

      A.      Jovanni’s Challenges to the Jurisdiction Findings Are
              Moot, But We Exercise Our Discretion To Reverse the
              Finding Under Section 300, Subdivision (a)
       The “principle that ‘[d]ependency jurisdiction attaches to a
child, not to his or her parent’ [citation], means that ‘“[a]s long as
there is one unassailable jurisdictional finding, it is immaterial
that another might be inappropriate”’ [citation]. Thus, where
jurisdictional findings have been made as to both parents but
only one parent brings a challenge, the appeal may be rendered
moot. [Citation.] The same is true where there are multiple
findings against one parent; the validity of one finding may
render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others.” (In re
D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283-284.)
       Even so, if a parent challenges only one or some of multiple
jurisdiction findings, the challenge may not be moot where the
parent demonstrates “a specific legal or practical consequence
that would be avoided upon reversal” of the challenged finding(s).
(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283; see id. at p. 277 [“a case is
not moot where a court can provide the plaintiff with ‘effect[ive]
relief,’ and in “this context, relief is effective when it ‘can have a
practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status’”].) Thus, for example, a parent’s challenge to only one of
multiple jurisdiction findings may not be moot where the
challenged finding “‘serves as the basis for dispositional orders
that are also challenged on appeal.’” (Id. at p. 283.)
       Here, the juvenile court made jurisdiction findings against
both parents, and only Jovanni has appealed. Moreover, he
challenges only the findings against him under section 300,

                                  9
subdivision (a), based on his and Vanessa’s domestic violence,
and section 300, subdivision (b), based on his sexual abuse of
V.C.—not the finding against him under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on his and Vanessa’s domestic violence or
those under section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), based on his
sexual abuse of V.C.7
       Nor has Jovanni identified any specific legal or practical
consequence that reversing the findings he challenges would
avoid. In fact, he has withdrawn any challenge to the juvenile
court’s disposition orders and concedes he “does not challenge the
underlying facts or the finding that [he] sexually abused V.C.”
Therefore, Jovanni’s appeal from the jurisdiction findings under
section 300, subdivision (a), and under section 300, subdivision
(b), based on his sexual abuse of V.C. is moot.
       “Even when a case is moot,” however, “courts may exercise
their ‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.”
(In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 283.) “As a rule, courts will
generally exercise their discretion to review a moot case when
‘the case presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely
to recur,’ ‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy
between the parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for
the court’s determination.’” (Ibid.) Outside these circumstances,
courts reviewing rulings in dependency proceedings may
“properly consider[ ] a variety of factors” (id. at p. 285), including
that a dismissal for mootness may have ““‘the undesirable result
of insulating erroneous or arbitrary rulings from review”’” (ibid).
(See id. at p. 287 [in dependency proceedings reviewing courts

7     After initially challenging the jurisdiction findings under
section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), in his opening brief, Jovanni
withdrew those challenges in his reply brief.

                                  10
“must decide on a case-by-case basis whether it is appropriate to
exercise discretionary review to reach the merits of a moot
appeal, keeping in mind [various] broad principles and
nonexhaustive factors”].)
      It is appropriate to exercise our discretion to reach the
merits of Jovanni’s appeal from the jurisdiction finding under
section 300, subdivision (a), because dismissing it for mootness
would insulate a patently erroneous ruling—indeed, one that
ignores our decision in the prior appeal—from review. As
discussed, in our previous decision we reversed the juvenile
court’s earlier jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (a), for lack of substantial evidence because there was
no evidence any of the children suffered nonaccidental injury.
And as the Department acknowledges, “virtually all the factual
assertions” in the jurisdiction findings Jovanni challenges “are
identical to the factual assertions from the children’s prior
dependency petition.” The Department also concedes “there is no
new evidence to support nonaccidental injury to a child.” The
juvenile court thus erred (again) in finding it had jurisdiction
over the children under section 300, subdivision (a).
      In contrast, there is no reason—and Jovanni offers none—
to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of Jovanni’s
challenge to the jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (b), based on his sexual abuse of V.C., particularly
because he does not challenge two other jurisdiction findings
based on identical facts (or even dispute those facts). Therefore,
we dismiss the appeal from that finding as moot.

      B.    The Department and the Juvenile Court Failed To
            Comply with ICWA’s Inquiry Requirements

                                11
       Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 “out of concern that ‘an
alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies.’ [Citation.] Congress
found that many of these children were being ‘placed in non-
Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions,’ and that the
States had contributed to the problem by ‘fail[ing] to recognize
the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural
and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and
families.’ [Citation.] This harmed not only Indian parents and
children, but also Indian tribes. As Congress put it, ‘there is no
resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.’” (Haaland v.
Brackeen (2023) 599 U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 1609, 1623.) ICWA “thus
aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families.” (Id.
at p. __; 143 S.Ct. at p. 1625.)
       “ICWA and governing federal regulations (25 C.F.R.
§ 23.101 et seq.) set minimal procedural protections for state
courts to follow before removing Indian children and placing
them in foster care or adoptive homes” (In re Rylei S. (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 309, 316), including asking “each participant ‘at
the commencement’ of a child custody proceeding ‘whether the
participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.’” (In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 140; see
25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a); In re J.C. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 70, 77.)
California law “‘more broadly imposes on social services agencies
and juvenile courts (but not parents) an “affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire” whether a child in the dependency
proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”’” (J.C., at p. 77; see
§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 237.)

                                12
       “[S]ection 224.2, subdivision (b), requires the child
protective agency to ask ‘the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an
interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or
neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child and
where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.’”
(In re J.C., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 77; see In re H.V. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 433, 437; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1).)
Although this duty is “commonly referred to as the ‘initial duty of
inquiry,’ it ‘begins with the initial contact’ (§ 224.2, subd. (a)) and
continues throughout the dependency proceedings.” (J.C., at
p. 77; see Haaland v. Brackeen, supra, 599 U.S. at p. __; 143 S.Ct.
at p. 1623 [when a state court adjudicates a foster care or
adoption proceeding, “ICWA governs from start to finish”]; In re
Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 319.) In addition, the
“‘juvenile court “has a responsibility to ascertain that [the child
protective agency] has conducted an adequate investigation’”
[citation], and must determine whether ICWA applies to the
child’s proceedings.” (In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 31; see
§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); J.C., at p. 78; Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.481(b)(3).) The court may not “find that ICWA does not apply
when the absence of evidence that a child is an Indian child
results from a [child protective agency] inquiry that is not proper,
adequate, or demonstrative of due diligence.” (In re Josiah T.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 408; see In re L.S. (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198.)
       Jovanni contends, the Department concedes, and we agree
the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with
ICWA’s inquiry requirements. At the detention hearing on the
current petition, the juvenile court found it had no reason to

                                  13
know J.F. or V.F. was an Indian child, the only ICWA finding it
appears to have made before adjudicating the petition and
removing the children. The Department acknowledges, however,
it did not ask the various members of the children’s extended
family about possible Indian ancestry, including paternal aunts
Raquel M., Denise F., and Jannel L.; the children’s paternal
grandmother; and the children’s maternal grandparents.
Therefore, we direct the juvenile court to ensure the Department
conducts a proper inquiry under ICWA and related California
law. (See In re Rylei S., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 326.)

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                         DISPOSITION

      The juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding under section 300,
subdivision (a), is reversed. The juvenile court is directed to
ensure the Department complies fully with the inquiry and, if
necessary, notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.
The remainder of Jovanni’s appeal challenging the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction findings is dismissed as moot.

                                     SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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