Court Opinion

ID: 9959648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:06:17.832164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:42.638627
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

                                  No. 22–0903

             Submitted December 13, 2023—Filed March 8, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

      Resister,

vs.

KADIN JEFFREY MILLER,

      Applicant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Stephen A. Owen,

District Associate Judge.

      The defendant challenges the district court’s determination that the crime

of harassment was sexually motivated requiring the defendant to register as a

sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A. DECISION OF COURT OF

APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED.
      McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices

joined except Christensen, C.J., who filed a dissenting opinion.

      Lucas M. Taylor (argued) of Anderson & Taylor, PLLC, Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert (argued), Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.
                                        2

MCDONALD, Justice.
      Kadin Miller recorded himself having consensual sexual intercourse with

his girlfriend. According to Miller, the relationship ended on bad terms. To

“annoy[]” his former girlfriend and “get back at her” for the way the relationship

ended, Miller posted the video of them having intercourse on a pornography

website without his former girlfriend’s consent. Miller was convicted of

harassment in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5)

(2019). He was sentenced to serve two years in prison for this offense and ordered

to register as a sex offender. The narrow question presented in this appeal is

whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller was required to

register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A.

                                        I.

      Under Iowa law, “[a] person who has been convicted of any sex offense . . .

shall register as a sex offender as provided in [chapter 692A] if the offender

resides, is employed, or attends school in this state.” Id. § 692A.103. Although

the sex offender registration statute is not punitive for constitutional purposes

when applied to an adult, State v. Aschbrenner, 926 N.W.2d 240, 247–48 (Iowa

2019); State v. Pickens, 558 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Iowa 1997), the statute does
impose significant consequences on those required to register. Information

regarding the offender is placed on an internet site accessible to the public. Iowa

Code § 692A.121. The offender is required to appear in person to register with

the sheriff of each county where the offender has a residence, maintains

employment, or is in attendance as a student. Id. § 692A.104(1). The offender is

required to notify the sheriff within five business days of any changes in relevant

information. Id. § 692A.104(2)–(5). Even when there is no change in relevant

information, the offender is required to verify relevant information on a periodic
basis. Id. § 692A.108. The offender is required to pay additional fees and civil
                                            3

penalties. Id. § 692A.110. The offender is subject to exclusion zones, limiting

where he or she can reside. Id. §§ 692A.113–114. The offender is also prohibited

from working in certain occupations. Id. § 692A.115. Failure to comply with any

of these requirements subjects the offender to additional criminal sanction. Id.

§ 692A.111.

         The Code sets forth a comprehensive list of sex offenses that require an

offender to register as a sex offender. Id. § 692A.102. Some offenses are per se

sex offenses for which a conviction, standing alone, requires registration. Cf. In

re Det. of Huss, 688 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2004) (discussing per se sexually violent

offenses in Iowa Code section 229A.2(8)). Examples of per se sex offenses

include, but are not limited to, certain categories of sexual abuse, “dissemination

or exhibition of obscene material to minors,” “[r]ental or sale of hard-core

pornography, if delivery is to a minor,” and “[r]eceipt or possession of child

pornography.” Iowa Code § 692A.102(1)(a)(1)–(4), (10), (12). Other offenses are

not per se sex offenses for which conviction, standing alone, requires

registration. Cf. Huss, 688 N.W.2d at 66 (discussing non per se sexually violent

offenses). For these offenses, an offender is required to register only if the state

proves “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “a judge or jury” that the offense was
“sexually motivated.” Iowa Code § 692A.126(1).

         The Code lists sixty-seven different offenses that are per se sex offenses.

Id. § 692A.102. This case does not involve one of those sixty-seven offenses but

instead involves a non-per se sex offense—harassment in the first degree, in

violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5). See id. § 692A.126(1)(f); id.

§ 708.7(5). The Code provides that “[a] person commits harassment when, with

intent     to   intimidate,   annoy,   or   alarm   another   person,”   the   person

“[d]isseminates, publishes, distributes, posts, or causes to be disseminated,
published, distributed, or posted a photograph or film showing another person
                                         4

in a state of full or partial nudity or engaged in a sex act, knowing that the other

person has not consented to the dissemination, publication, distribution, or

posting.” Id. § 708.7(1)(a)(5).

      The State charged Miller with this offense in April 2021. Miller moved to

bifurcate any trial in the case. He argued the adjudication of guilt for the

harassment offense should be tried separately from the determination of whether

the alleged crime was sexually motivated. He argued these were separate and

distinct issues and trying them together would prejudice him in any criminal

trial. The district court granted the motion. It reasoned that the “nature of the

case . . . favors bifurcation. The essential elements of harassment in the first

degree do not implicate sexual motivation.” The district court further reasoned

that while the crime involved “images of a sexual nature, neither the elements

nor the essential facts automatically inure to a sexual motivation. The

defendant’s motivation may have been sexual, but not sexual gratification.” The

district court noted that Miller’s “motivation may also have been something else

entirely different such as revenge or attention.”

      Although the district court granted Miller’s motion to bifurcate the

proceedings, there was no trial on the adjudication of guilt; Miller entered a
written guilty plea as charged. The guilty plea provided Miller with notice that he

could be placed on the sex offender registry. The guilty plea explained that Miller

was entitled to a separate trial “on the sole question of whether this crime was

‘sexually motivated.’ ” The guilty plea further provided that the issue of sexual

motivation would be tried to the court rather than a jury. The guilty plea provided

that the court “may consider [Miller’s] statements in this plea in making that

determination.” In the written guilty plea, Miller admitted the following:

            That between May and July of 2019, I was in a relationship
      with [J.G.]. Our relationship ended on bad terms. I had in my
      possession a video recording of [J.G.] and myself engaged in sexual
                                        5

      intercourse. On or about September of 2019, I posted the video on
      the internet. I knew [J.G.] had not consented to the posting of the
      video. My intent was to get back at her for our relationship ending
      on bad terms by annoying her with the video being public. The video
      was posted while I was in Boone County Iowa.

The written guilty plea also provided that Miller did not admit “that [he]

committed this crime because [he] was ‘sexually motivated.’ ” The district court

accepted the plea and set the matter for sentencing.

      While the harassment case was pending, Miller was charged with separate

crimes in February 2022. He was charged with operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated (OWI), first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a)

(2022), and possession of a controlled substance, second offense, in violation of

Iowa Code section 124.401(5). Miller pleaded guilty to OWI, and the State agreed

to dismiss the possession charge. Sentencing for the OWI offense was combined

with sentencing on the harassment charge.

      At the time set for sentencing, the district court held a combined

proceeding. During the first phase of the proceeding, the district court held a

trial on the issue of whether Miller’s offense was sexually motivated. After the

parties presented evidence and argument, the district court proceeded to

sentencing.
      Although the Code assigns the burden of proof to the State at trial on the

issue of sexual motivation, see Iowa Code § 692A.126(1) (2019), the district court

had the defense proceed first. Miller called Dr. Tracy Thomas to testify at trial.

Dr. Thomas is a board-certified forensic psychologist. She frequently performs

psychological evaluations for use in criminal and civil proceedings. In particular,

she performs a variety of evaluations related to sex offenders, including risk

assessments and psychosexual evaluations.

      Dr. Thomas testified about this type of crime generally. She testified this
crime was referred to as “revenge porn.” Dr. Thomas explained that she had
                                         6

performed research in this area and was “familiar with the research literature.”

She explained that people engage in this type of crime “for revenge. They are

angry. They are upset. They feel like they have been embarrassed, . . . they feel

like their self-esteem has taken a hit, so they engage in this behavior as a way

to kind of let their anger out to get back at the victim, to embarrass them in the

way that the person doing the revenge porn feels they have been embarrassed.”

At bottom, the crime “is really based on anger and revenge.” Dr. Thomas testified

that it would be “atypical” for this type of crime to be sexually motivated. To

determine whether this type of crime was sexually motivated, Dr. Thomas

testified she would look at whether the crime was meeting the sexual needs of

the offender—i.e., whether they are “aroused by what they are doing.” She would

want to know whether the offender is “doing the behavior and then masturbating

to it, fantasizing sexually about it. Are they getting physically aroused by it?” In

her opinion, that would show a “sexual motivation component.”

      Dr. Thomas also opined about Miller’s motivation specifically. She

conducted a psychosexual evaluation of Miller. To prepare her psychosexual

evaluation, she reviewed the trial information, minutes of testimony, and

relevant criminal history. She then gave Miller a psychological test and
conducted an in-person interview with him. She concluded that Miller did not

have a paraphilic disorder. “There was no indication of antisocial traits,

psychopathy.” She also concluded there is “no indication of criminal thinking or

just kind of a criminal or generally antisocial presentation.” She testified Miller

has a history of chronic depression and anxiety, has low stress tolerance, and

carries great self-doubt regarding interpersonal relationships. These conditions

cause Miller to suffer embarrassment and anger when his interpersonal

relationships fail.
                                         7

      When asked whether Miller’s commission of this crime was sexually

motivated, Dr. Thomas testified that she did not see any evidence of sexual

motivation. There was no evidence Miller was sexually aroused or sexually

gratified by committing the crime. In addition, if Miller were aroused by posting

sexual videos, he would tend to do it with some frequency. In her view, if the

crime were done for the purpose of sexual gratification, it would be “ongoing.”

She concluded:

      I will say though that when I do these evaluations I would always
      look at the alternative hypotheses and saying what evidence is there
      that this is sexually motivated. And when I . . . make that list there
      . . . really is nothing on that side of sexually motivated, so I did
      consider both hypotheses, and all of the data in this case really lined
      up to indicate that it is based on revenge and a desire for him to get
      some of his self-worth -- feelings of self-worth back.

      The State did not call an expert witness, but it did call three fact witnesses:

Andrew Leeck, Amanda Moore, and investigating officer John Mayse. At the time

of trial, Leeck was engaged to J.G. He testified that he used to be friends with

and work with Miller. One day at work Miller showed him the video. Leeck

testified that he began dating J.G. some time after Miller showed him the video.

Leeck testified that he could identify J.G. in the video because of a distinct tattoo

shown in the video. After Leeck started dating J.G., he told her about the video.

J.G. asked her friend Amanda Moore to view the video. Moore testified that she

viewed the video online at J.G.’s request. The video was posted on a pornography

website. Moore recorded the video from the website using her phone. Moore’s

recording was admitted into evidence. The video showed Miller and J.G. engaged

in sexual intercourse. The video posted on the website had over 1,000 views.

There were comments posted about the video on the website, but they are not

legible in the video. Officer Mayse testified that he was alerted to the video and
started an investigation. He testified that J.G. did not consent to Miller posting

the video online.
                                         8

      In findings pronounced from the bench and supplemented in the written

sentencing order, the district court concluded the crime was sexually motivated.

The district court reasoned that Miller had sex with J.G. for his sexual

gratification and that sexual gratification “carried on when he determined that

he was going to distribute that video.” The district court’s written sentencing

order stated that “[c]hoosing a pornography website demonstrate[d] defendant’s

continued interest in the sexually obscene content of the video. It was available

to him over the course of time to satisfy his interest in the ongoing sexual content

of the video for his sexual gratification.” The district court noted that “[s]howing

[the video] to a male friend also demonstrate[d] [Miller’s] ongoing interest in

sharing his sexual interest in the video.” The district court sentenced Miller to

two years in prison for the harassment charge and one year in prison for the OWI

offense to be served consecutively. The district court ordered Miller to register as

a sex offender pursuant to chapter 692A.

      The defendant appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of

appeals. On appeal, the defendant argued the State failed to prove sexual

motivation beyond a reasonable doubt. He also argued the district court

considered an impermissible factor in imposing sentence and abused its
discretion in imposing the sentences. The court of appeals found that there was

good cause to consider the appeal, that there was sufficient evidence to support

the district court’s finding of sexual motivation, that the district court did not

consider an improper factor in imposing sentence, and that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.

                                        II.

      We then granted Miller’s application for further review. “On further review,

we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal.” State v.
Vandermark, 965 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Burton v. Hilltop Care
                                         9

Ctr., 813 N.W.2d 250, 255 (Iowa 2012)). We exercise our discretion to address

only Miller’s challenge to the sex offender registration requirement. The court of

appeals decision is final as to all other issues.

      The State was required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Miller’s

crime was sexually motivated. Iowa Code § 692A.126(1); see also id. § 708.7(5).

“Reasonable doubt is one of the most recognizable concepts in our criminal

justice system. It sets forth a demanding burden of proof on the government.”

State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2022). To meet this demanding standard,

the State was required to introduce evidence that could convince a rational fact

finder that the crime was sexually motivated. See State v. Chapman, 944 N.W.2d

864, 871 (Iowa 2020). In reviewing the evidence, we “consider all evidence in the

record, including evidence that does not support” the finding. State v. Huser, 894

N.W.2d 472, 490 (Iowa 2017). Evidence raising only “suspicion, speculation, or

conjecture” is not sufficient evidence to support a finding. Id. (quoting State v.

Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa 2006)).

      “ ‘Sexually motivated’ means that one of the purposes for commission of a

crime [was] the purpose of sexual gratification of the perpetrator of the crime.”

Iowa Code § 229A.2(10) (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 692A.101(29) (defining
“sexually motivated” for the purposes of chapter 692A to mean “the same as

defined in section 229A.2”). Under the plain language of the statute, it was not

sufficient for the State to show that the crime involved sexual content or the

offender had an interest in sexual content. Instead, the State was required to

prove the “commission of [the] crime” was for the “purpose of sexual gratification

of the perpetrator of the crime.” Id. § 229A.2(10). As applied here, that means

the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller’s

harassment of J.G. was done for the purpose of his sexual gratification. Cf.
                                        10

Chapman, 944 N.W.2d at 871 (stating the fact finder must find “beyond a

reasonable doubt that the child endangerment was sexually motivated”).

      We cannot conclude the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

First, the district court’s findings did not focus on the relevant statutory

inquiry—whether the crime was sexually motivated. Instead, the district court

focused on whether Miller had a sexual interest in the video. Evidence that Miller

showed Leeck the video, the district court reasoned, was evidence of Miller’s

“ongoing interest in sharing his sexual interest in the video.” The district found

that Miller posted the video on a pornography website, Pornhub, to make the

video “available to him over the course of time to satisfy his interest in the

ongoing sexual content of the video for his sexual gratification.” But the question

before the district court was not whether the video was available to Miller on the

website. The question before the district court was whether Miller’s commission

of the crime—the harassment of J.G. by posting without her consent a video of

her engaged in a sex act—was done for the purpose of his sexual gratification.

See Iowa Code § 229A.2(10); see also id. § 692A.101(29).

      Second, even when the district court focused on the statutory standard,

the district court’s inferences were not reasonable or supported by the record.
The district court reasoned that because the sex act was performed for the

purposes of sexual gratification, then Miller’s act of posting the video several

months later was also for the purposes of sexual gratification. In the district

court’s view, the sexual gratification that Miller received during sexual

intercourse “carried on” when he published the video. But the logic does not

follow. The two incidents were separate acts occurring months apart. Miller’s

motivation in filming a consensual sex act with his then-partner has no bearing

on his motivation to post that video on the internet at least three months later
after the parties had ended their relationship. See State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d
                                        11

817, 820 (Iowa 2008) (reversing conviction for indecent exposure and explaining

that it was not sufficient to establish exposure was sexually motivated merely

because in a separate act “prior to this exposure [the defendant] sought to satisfy

his sexual desires” (emphasis omitted)). Similarly, the district court reasoned

that Miller’s showing the video to Leeck was evidence of sexual motivation, but

the record does not support the inference. Leeck testified that when Miller

showed him the online video, there “[w]asn’t much discussion. I didn’t make any

comments, and I don’t believe he did either at the time so it was really out of

nowhere honestly.” Likewise, the district court’s speculation that Miller could

have posted the video on a pornography website for the purpose of accessing it

for his own sexual gratification is not a reasonable inference given that Miller

had possession of the video and did not need to post it to access it.

      Third, setting aside these issues with the district court’s finding, when the

record is viewed as a whole, the State simply failed to prove its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. It is true that intent or purpose is seldom capable of direct

proof and that we allow the fact finder to infer that a person acted with the

purpose to arouse or gratify the person’s sexual desires from the person’s

“conduct, remarks, and all surrounding circumstances.” State v. Jorgensen, 758
N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 2008). But, even allowing for that, the State failed to

marshal the evidence necessary to prove that Miller committed the crime of

harassment for his own sexual gratification. In the written guilty plea accepted

by the court, Miller stated his purpose was “to get back at [J.G.] for our

relationship ending on bad terms.” The State failed to present evidence of any

statements supporting an inference that Miller’s commission of the crime of

harassment was sexually motivated. Cf. State v. Rodriguez, No. 15–1002, 2016

WL 4051696, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016) (holding defendant’s statements
made during an assault were substantial evidence of sexual motivation). The
                                        12

State failed to present evidence of conduct supporting a reasonable inference

that Miller’s commission of the crime of harassment was sexually motivated. Cf.

Jorgenson, 758 N.W.2d at 837 (finding sufficient evidence of sexual gratification

based on the defendant’s fondling of his penis); State v. Busch, No. 19–1612,

2020 WL 7385256, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2020) (holding that defendant

touching of victim’s private area was substantial evidence of sexual motivation);

State v. Blair, 798 N.W.2d 322, 326 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (finding there was

sufficient evidence of intent to satisfy sexual desires based on defendant’s

stroking his penis). The State failed to present evidence of any surrounding

circumstances supporting a reasonable inference that Miller’s commission of the

crime of harassment was sexually motivated. Cf. State v. Kuhn, No. 19–1895,

2021 WL 1017128, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2021) (discussing

circumstances of surreptitious recording scheme as sufficient evidence to prove

sexual motivation).

      In contrast to the lack of any evidence in support of the State’s case, Miller

presented strong evidence that his commission of the crime of harassment was

not sexually motivated. Dr. Thomas opined to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty, after reviewing the relevant scientific literature and conducting a
psychosexual evaluation of Miller, that the crime “was not sexually motivated

and that [Miller was] not the typical person who would be put on the sex offender

registry given that lack of sexual motivation.” Instead, she opined, Miller posted

the video for the purpose of revenge and not for the purpose of his own sexual

gratification. Dr. Thomas’s opinion was unrebutted by expert testimony and

unrebutted by any other evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. We do not

imply and do not hold that the State was required to provide a competing expert

to rebut Dr. Thomas’s opinion, but it was required to come forward with some
                                         13

evidence that would prove sexual motivation beyond a reasonable doubt when

the record is viewed as a whole. The State failed to do that here.

      In reaching a contrary conclusion, the dissent relies on evidence not in the

record, including data regarding usage of the pornography website at issue in

this case and research theories, findings, and conclusions contained in

secondary source materials. This evidence may have been relevant to the

question presented to the district court, but the State did not introduce any such

evidence. Our task on appeal is to judge the sufficiency of the evidence admitted

at trial and not the possible sufficiency of the evidence in a different trial. The

dissent concedes, on the actual record made in this case, we would be creating

a per se sex offense but argues that creation of a per se sex offense would be

“consistent with what the legislature intended.” We respectfully disagree. The

legislature identified sixty-seven per se sex offenses, see Iowa Code § 692A.102,

but harassment in the first degree is not one of them.

      Were we to conclude this record was sufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that this crime was sexually motivated, we would transform

this crime of harassment into a per se sex offense. That we cannot do. The

legislature has drawn a distinction between per se sex offenses and other
offenses that require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one of

the purposes for commission of the crime was the sexual gratification of the

offender. If the legislature wanted to treat a violation of section 708.7(1)(a)(5) as

a per se sex offense, it certainly knew how to do so, but it did not do so. “[I]t is

not our role to rewrite the Iowa statute in the guise of interpretation,”

construction, and application of the statute. Goche v. WMG, L.C., 970 N.W.2d

860, 866 (Iowa 2022). “We must give effect to the statutory requirement providing

that a district court can order a defendant to register as a sex offender only upon
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was sexually
                                          14

motivated.” Chapman, 944 N.W.2d at 873. Thus, on this record, under this

statutory scheme, we must conclude the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt Miller harassed J.G. for the purposes of his own sexual

gratification.

                                          III.

      This brings us to the question of remedy. We discussed this issue of

remedy in some detail in State v. Chapman. Id. at 874–78. In that case, the

district court improperly considered the minutes of testimony in making the

determination that the defendant’s crime was sexually motivated after the

defendant entered an Alford plea to the underlying crime. Id. at 872–73. We

concluded this was akin to the district court considering an improper factor at

sentencing and remanded the case to afford the state “the opportunity to

establish that Chapman’s conduct was sexually motivated beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. at 878. But this case does not involve a procedural or evidentiary

error. This case involves a failure of proof at trial.

      A party that fails to present sufficient evidence to prove its case on the

merits in the trial court does not get a do-over. See Des Moines Civ. & Hum. Rts.

Comm’n v. Knueven, 988 N.W.2d 694, 705 (Iowa 2023) (concluding there was
insufficient evidence under correct legal standard and remanding for dismissal

of the count in a civil case); State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 315 (Iowa 2023)

(holding there was insufficient evidence to support criminal conviction and

remanding for dismissal of that charge); In re D.S., 856 N.W.2d 348, 355 (Iowa

2014) (holding there was insufficient evidence to support delinquency

adjudication and remanding for dismissal of petition); Henderson v. Mullenix,

No. 19–0626, 2020 WL 1049872, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020) (holding

there was insufficient evidence to support issuance of protective order and
remanding for dismissal); accord State v. Jackson, 819 N.W.2d 288, 297 (Wis.
                                       15

Ct. App. 2012) (holding there was insufficient evidence of sexual motivation and

remanding to amend judgment and remove requirement that defendant register

as a sex offender). We thus vacate that part of the court of appeals decision

affirming the district court’s finding that Miller’s crime was sexually motivated,

and we reverse the district court’s finding that Miller’s crime was sexually

motivated.

      DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED.
      All justices concur except Christensen, C.J., who files a dissenting opinion.
                                         16

                                                           #22–0903, State v. Miller

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice (dissenting).
        Miller not only made a video of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with

the victim, but he also posted it on Pornhub—a pornographic website that

anyone can access—and personally went around showing it to at least one other

person without the victim’s knowledge or consent. Yet, the majority takes the

untenable position that Miller’s actions were not sexually motivated. I must

respectfully dissent and would affirm the district court’s finding that Miller’s

actions were sexually motivated, thereby requiring him to register as a sex

offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A (2019). If this is not the sort of

case that the legislature intended to result in the perpetrator’s registration as a

sex offender, then I do not know what set of facts is.

        I. Background Facts and Information.

        This case involves what is colloquially referred to as “revenge porn.”

“[R]evenge porn” is typically understood as “the distribution of sexually graphic

images of individuals without their consent.” Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne

Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 345, 346 (2014)

[hereinafter Citron & Franks]. It includes images originally obtained with and
without consent, “usually within the context of a private or confidential

relationship.” Id. However, contrary to what the term “revenge porn” suggests,

many individuals who distribute sexually graphic images do so with motives

other    than   personal   vindictiveness,    such   as   “greed,   voyeurism,   and

self-aggrandizement.” Mary Anne Franks, Cyber C.R. Initiative, Drafting an

Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A guide for Legislators 2 (2021) [hereinafter

Franks, A Guide for Legislators]. In a study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights
                                               17

Initiative (CCRI),1 “the vast majority of perpetrators—nearly 80%—report[ed]

being motivated by something other than the desire to hurt the victim.” Id. at 2;

see also Asia A. Eaton, Holly Jacobs, & Yanet Ruvalcaba, Cyber C.R. Initiative,

2017 Nationwide Online Study of Nonconsensual Porn Victimization and

Perpetration: A Summary Report 4 (2017) [hereinafter Eaton, Jacobs, &

Ruvalcaba, 2017 Summary Report].

       Further, “the term revenge porn implies that the victim instigated the harm

by doing something for which the perpetrator is seeking revenge,” thereby

supporting “rape myths that blame victims for their own abuse.” Yanet

Ruvalcaba & Asia A. Eaton, Am. Psych. Ass’n, Nonconsensual Pornography

Among U.S. Adults: A Sexual Scripts Framework on Victimization, Perpetration,

and Health Correlates for Women and Men 1 (2019). Thus, the act of distributing

sexually graphic images without the person’s consent is more appropriately

described by the term “nonconsensual pornography,” which is a form of “image-

based sexual abuse.” Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, Image-Based Sexual

Abuse, 37(3) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 534, 536–37 (2017) [hereinafter McGlynn &

Rackley] (“The use of the phrase ‘sexual abuse’ immediately and accurately

conveys the significant harms that may occur and reflects the experiences of
victim-survivors. It also identifies image-based sexual abuse as a form of sexual

violence, locating it within sexual offence law and policies. . . . [P]erhaps the most

familiar form of image-based sexual abuse is the practice of so-called ‘revenge

         1The CCRI is a “nonprofit organization dedicated to the protection of civil rights in the

digital era.” Brief for Cyber Civil Rights Initiative and Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 1, Gonzalez vs. Google LLC, 598 U.S. 617 (2023) (No. 21–1333). “CCRI works with
tech-industry leaders, policymakers, courts, and law enforcement to address online abuses
including nonconsensual pornography . . . .” Id. In 2017, CCRI conducted the first-ever
nationwide study that “profile[d] the rates of nonconsensual pornography victimization and
perpetration, including motives for perpetration, deterrents to perpetration, and health outcomes
for victims.” Eaton, Jacobs, & Ruvalcaba, 2017 Summary Report at 4–5.
                                               18

porn.’ ” (footnote omitted)); see also Citron & Franks, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. at

346, 362.

       Prior to 2013, only three states, New Jersey, Alaska, and Texas, had

criminal laws that could be directly applied to nonconsensual pornography.

Franks, A Guide for Legislators at 5 (noting only three states had statutes targeting

nonconsensual pornography prior to CCRI being founded); cf. Cyber C.R. Initiative,

History/Mission/Vision,     https://cybercivilrights.org/about/      [https://perma.cc/8DBJ-

7FFY] (last visited Feb. 29, 2024) (stating that CCRI was founded in 2013). As of

today, forty-eight states have enacted laws targeting nonconsensual pornography.

Franks, A Guide for Legislators at 5; see also Cyber C.R. Initiative, Nonconsensual Distribution

of Intimate Images, https://cybercivilrights.org/nonconsensual-distribution-of-intimate-

images/ [https://perma.cc/5WLU-MBBN] (last visited Feb. 29, 2024) (collecting all state

statutes related to nonconsensual pornography). In 2017, Iowa became the thirty-fifth

state to criminalize the dissemination of nonconsensual pornography when it

enacted Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5). See 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 117, § 2 (codified

at Iowa Code § 708.1(1)(a)(5) (2018)); Brianne Pfannenstiel, Iowa House Passes Bill

Criminalizing    ‘Revenge      Porn,’    Des        Moines    Reg.     (Mar.     27,     2017),

https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/27/iowa-
house-passes-bill-criminalizing-revenge-porn/99714656/ [https://perma.cc/6QRY-4NHV]

(“Iowa . . . bec[a]me the 35th state with legislation aimed at preventing the spread of

nonconsensual pornography.”).

       Under Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5), “[a] person commits harassment

when, with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person,” the person:

       Disseminates, publishes, distributes, posts, or causes to be
       disseminated, published, distributed, or posted a photograph or film
       showing another person in a state of full or partial nudity or engaged
       in a sex act, knowing that the other person has not consented to the
       dissemination, publication, distribution, or posting.
                                        19

      If such a person’s conduct was sexually motivated, the person must

register as a sex offender pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 692A. Id.

§ 692A.126(1)(f); id. § 708.7(5). “ ‘Sexually motivated’ means that one of the

purposes for commission of a crime is the purpose of sexual gratification of the

perpetrator of the crime.” Id. § 229A.2(10) (emphasis omitted).

      On appeal, Miller argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence

to prove that his actions were sexually motivated. However, the majority

understates the significant burden an appellant faces when the issue on appeal

is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We review sufficiency of the

evidence claims for errors at law. State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Iowa

2006). The district court’s finding “must be supported by substantial evidence

which is ‘such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that [the]

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980)). While we do

consider all the evidence presented, not just the evidence tending to support a

finding of guilt, we view the record “in a light most favorable to the State,” which

“includes all legitimate inferences that may fairly and reasonably be deduced

from the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 1999)).
      Determining whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support

a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt “does not require a court to ‘ask

itself whether it believes that the evidence . . . established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’ ” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979) (quoting

Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)). Rather, “the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [state], any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319 (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362
                                         20

(1972), abrogated on other grounds by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390

(2020)).

      We have recognized that “[f]indings of fact in a bench trial have the effect

of a special verdict,” and that “[t]he district court’s findings are binding on us if

those findings are supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Talbert, 622

N.W.2d 297, 301 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). Therefore, we must view “the evidence

in its light most favorable to the judgment, and we construe the findings of the

trial court liberally to uphold, rather than defeat, the result reached.” Id. (quoting

Claus v. Whyle, 526 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Iowa 1994)).

      II. Miller’s Actions Were Sexually Motivated.

      Much like the district court and court of appeals, I believe there is

sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to have found that Miller’s actions

were sexually motivated. Iowa caselaw discussing section 708.7(1)(a)(5) is

limited, and caselaw presenting a similar set of facts to these is even more

limited. However, the “sexual motivation” requirement is found in other areas of

Iowa’s criminal code and can provide guidance for the analytical framework to

apply here.

      Specifically, the crime of indecent exposure, which requires a person to,
among other things, expose their “genitals or pubes to someone other than a

spouse.” State v. Isaac, 756 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa 2008) (quoting State v.

Adams, 436 N.W.2d 49, 50 (Iowa 1989)). But “[i]t is only exposure with a sexual

motivation, inflicted upon an unwilling viewer, which will constitute the offense.”

Id. (quoting 4 John J. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, Iowa Practice: Criminal Law

and Procedure § 217, at 63 (1979)). Such sexual motivation “can be inferred from

the defendant’s conduct, . . . remarks, and the surrounding circumstances.” Id.

at 820. Because a defendant will seldom admit “to having the intention which
the crime requires,” State v. Radeke, 444 N.W.2d 476, 478–79 (Iowa 1989)
                                         21

(quoting Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 3.5(f), at 226

(2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law]), a defendant’s intent is

“rarely capable of direct proof” and instead generally must be shown by

circumstantial evidence, State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d 831, 835 (Iowa 1982) (citing

State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Iowa 1969)).

      From the record, we know that the video in question depicts Miller and the

victim engaging in sexual intercourse. I agree that Miller must have been sexually

motivated at the time of posting—not at the time the video was taken. However,

despite the majority’s assertion to the contrary, I believe Miller’s decision to post

the video on Pornhub is circumstantial evidence of his sexual motivation.

      In 2019, Pornhub, “the world’s largest pornographic website,” had nearly

42,000,000,000 total individual visits, an average of more than 115,000,000

visits per day, and more than 1,300 searches conducted every second. Joshua B.

Grubbs & Shane W. Kraus, Pornography Use and Psychological Science: A Call

for Consideration, 30(1) Current Directions Psych. Sci. 68, 68 (2021) (footnote

omitted); see also Beáta Bőthe, István Tóth-Király, Nóra Bella, Marc N. Potenza,

Zsolt Demetrovics, & Gábor Orosz, Why Do People Watch Pornography? The

Motivational Basis of Pornography Use, 35(2) Psych. Addictive Behav. 172 (2021)
[hereinafter Bőthe et.al]. “Sexual pleasure” is the most frequently reported reason

for visiting a pornographic website. Bőthe et. al, 35(2) Psych. Addictive

Behav. 172 (emphasis omitted) (stating that sexual pleasure was also the most

frequently reported reason for visiting pornographic websites in studies

conducted in 2001, 2002, 2011, and 2016). Understanding this, it is difficult to

imagine there was no sexual motivation behind Miller’s decision to post a video

displaying sexually explicit content onto a website that most people view for their

own sexual gratification. This is especially so given that Miller himself used this
website to access the video at least once when he showed the posting to Leeck,
                                          22

undermining the majority’s position that Miller’s act of showing Leeck the posted

video is not evidence of Miller’s sexual motivation because “Miller had possession

of the video and did not need to post it to access it.” If Miller had possession of

the video and did not need to post it to access it, why show Leeck the video on

Pornhub rather than the video saved to his mobile device? Showing the video to

Leeck on Pornhub is further circumstantial evidence that Miller had some form

of sexual motivation or gratification from posting the video on a pornographic

website without the victim’s consent.

      Further, Miller’s act of showing Leeck the video is substantially similar to

the type of conduct we prohibit with the indecent exposure laws. Miller showed

Leeck a video that depicted his erect genitals to an individual who was not his

spouse. See Isaac, 756 N.W.2d at 819 (stating “[t]he exposure of genitals . . . to

someone other than a spouse” is the first element to the crime of indecent

exposure (quoting Adams, 436 N.W.2d at 50)). It is evident this exposure was

inflicted upon an unwilling viewer, as Leeck’s testimony stated he had not asked

Miller to see the video and that the display was “really out of nowhere honestly.”

See id. Miller’s display of his genitalia to Leeck would be “sexually motivated”

under Iowa’s indecent exposure law. See id. Therefore, Miller’s flashing of the
video to Leeck is a surrounding circumstance that supports a finding of sexual

motivation here. See id. at 819–20.

      The majority focuses heavily on the testimony of Miller’s expert,

Dr. Thomas, to support its conclusion that Miller’s actions were not sexually

motivated. Dr. Thomas testified that to determine whether someone’s actions

were sexually motivated, she looks to see if “they [are] doing the behavior and

then masturbating to it, fantasizing sexually about it[,] . . . [or] getting physically

aroused by it.” Unless Miller himself admits to obtaining some form of sexual
gratification from posting the video or he is caught masturbating to the posted
                                         23

video, the behaviors described by Dr. Thomas are highly unsusceptible to direct

evidence. This shows the importance of the surrounding circumstances, i.e., how

Miller chose to disseminate the video.

      A pornographic website is inherently sexual. Miller did not post the video

to a forum that did not have this same inherent sexuality (i.e., Facebook,

YouTube, Snapchat, etc.). He did not send it to the victim’s friends, family,

coworkers, or any other individual connected to the victim. Had Miller

disseminated it in some manner other than a pornographic website, it would be

a closer call as to whether his actions were sexually motivated; however, that is

not the set of facts we are presented with here.

      Instead, we have an individual who recorded himself having sexual

intercourse with the victim and posted the video to a pornographic website

without the victim’s consent. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the State, and in a manner that seeks to uphold the district court’s finding rather

than reverse the finding, I believe there was sufficient evidence for any rational

trier of fact to have determined that Miller’s actions were sexually motivated. See

Talbert, 622 N.W.2d at 301; Casady, 597 N.W.2d at 804; see also State v. Dible,

538 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1995) (“Findings of the trial court are to be broadly
and liberally construed, rather than narrowly or technically, and, in case of

ambiguity, we will construe findings to uphold, rather than defeat, the

judgment.”); Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dahl, 122 N.W.2d 270, 278 (Iowa 1963) (“In

case of doubt or ambiguity, findings will be construed to uphold, rather than to

defeat, the judgment.”); State v. Abdinur, No. 17–0247, 2018 WL 2731624, at *2

(Iowa Ct. App. June 6, 2018); Labs v. Karteus, No. 13–0777, 2014 WL 250254,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (citing Tindell v. Apple Lines, Inc., 478 N.W.2d

428, 430 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991)) (“On substantial evidence review, we construe the
trial court’s findings broadly and liberally.”).
                                        24

      The majority also cites several cases to support its finding that there was

not sufficient evidence to show Miller’s actions were sexually motivated, but

those cases all included situations in which there was direct evidence of sexual

motivation. In State v. Rodriguez, during the defendant’s strangulation of his

former wife, he stated, “I know it sounds weird, but you’re kind of sexy when

you’re knocked out.” No. 15–1002, 2016 WL 4051696, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

July 27, 2016). The court of appeals affirmed the finding that this statement was

sufficient to show the defendant’s actions were sexually motivated. Id. In State v.

Jorgensen, the defendant was caught openly masturbating after following an

unidentified woman through the store, and such action was relied on to show

sexual motivation. 758 N.W.2d 830, 837 (Iowa 2008). In State v. Busch, the

defendant, an adult, had touched a child’s private area, and the court of appeals

found this sufficient to show that the defendant’s action was sexually motivated.

No. 19–1612, 2020 WL 7385256, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2020). In State v.

Kuhn, the defendant was caught putting a video camera in a restroom prior to

allowing his underage female employees to enter the bathroom to change clothes

or use the restroom. No. 19–1895, 2021 WL 1017128, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Mar. 17, 2021). The court of appeals found this conduct to be evidence that the
defendant acted to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires by recording his

employees in various states of undress. Id. at *4–5.

      While I agree that these cases are situations in which sexual motivation

was properly found, I do not believe these cases support the majority’s contention

that Miller’s actions were not sexually motivated. All the cited cases involve

circumstances in which there was direct evidence of the defendant’s sexual

motivation. But we know that a defendant seldom admits “to having the intention

which the crime requires,” Radeke, 444 N.W.2d at 478 (quoting LaFave & Scott,
Criminal Law § 3.5(f), at 226), and that a defendant’s intent is “rarely capable of
                                        25

direct proof,” Delay, 320 N.W.2d at 835. Again, absent Miller admitting to

obtaining some form of sexual gratification from posting the video or being

caught masturbating to the posted video, there is unlikely to ever be direct

evidence of sexual motivation in this scenario.

      By not finding Miller’s actions to be sexually motivated, the majority is

foreclosing any possibility of these circumstances being considered sexually

motivated absent direct evidence. This is a position I cannot join. “Although there

is no direct evidence that [Miller] was sexually aroused at the time of [posting the

video], this does not undermine [my] confidence in the determination that [Miller]

acted with sexual motivation.” In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 321 (Iowa

2013).

      The majority believes that if we find the “record was sufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that this crime was sexually motivated, we would

transform this crime of harassment into a per se sex offense.” This is not true. If

we were to find Miller’s actions to be sexually motivated, we, at most, would

create a per se sex offense for individuals who post sexually graphic materials

onto pornographic websites without consent. Such a finding would not render

every act of harassment under Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5) a sex offense.
      And, in fact, categorizing the nonconsensual posting of sexually explicit

material to a pornographic website as a sex offense is likely appropriate. The

perpetrators of such crimes are engaging in image-based sexual abuse, Citron &

Franks, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 346, 362; McGlynn & Rackley, 37(3) Oxford J.

Legal Stud. at 536–37, and the victims of such image-based sexual abuse suffer

significant psychological impacts:

      [N]early all victims (93%) reported suffering significant emotional
      distress as a consequence of victimization. Eighty-two percent said
      they suffered significant impairment in social, occupational, or other
      functioning. More than half experienced suicidal thoughts; forty-two
      percent have sought psychological help. Nearly half of all victims
                                        26

      reported being stalked or harassed online by people who have viewed
      their material. A third of victims reported that they experienced
      offline stalking or harassment by people who viewed their material.

             Victims also reported serious effects on their romantic and
      family relationships. A significant percentage of victims reported
      that the experience jeopardized their relationships with family (34%)
      and friends (38%); with thirteen percent reporting that being
      victimized resulted in the loss of a relationship with a significant
      other. More than half of victims fear that the material will be
      discovered by their current or future children. Forty percent of
      victims fear the loss of a current or future partner if that partner
      learns of the disclosure.

            With regard to professional and educational impact, forty-two
      percent of victims had to explain the situation to professional or
      academic supervisors, coworkers, or colleagues. More than a
      quarter of victims left work or school for a period of time as a result
      of the disclosure. Eight percent quit their jobs or dropped out of
      school; six percent were fired from their jobs or expelled from school.
      More than half experienced difficulty concentrating at work or
      school due to the experience. Thirty-nine percent believed that the
      experience affected their professional advancement.

             Victims often limited their use of social media in the wake of
      their experience. A quarter of victims closed down an email address
      due to abusive or harassing messages stemming from the disclosure
      of their intimate material. A quarter shut down their Facebook
      accounts, more than ten percent closed their Twitter accounts, and
      eight percent closed their LinkedIn accounts. Forty-two percent of
      victims report having thought about legally changing their name and
      three percent of victims have done so.

Mary Anne Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 Fla.

L. Rev. 1251, 1263–64 (2017) (footnotes omitted) (reporting the findings of a 2013

study conducted by the CCRI).

      Finding Miller’s actions to be sexually motivated would be consistent with

what the legislature intended when it decided to criminalize nonconsensual

pornography. Iowa Code section 708.7(5), which references how to determine

whether a person found guilty of harassment should register as a sex offender
pursuant to chapter 692A, was added to section 708.7 in 2009. 2009 Iowa Acts
                                        27

ch. 119, § 53 (codified at Iowa Code § 708.7(5) (2011)). It was not until 2017 that

Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5) was enacted to criminalize so called “revenge

porn.” 2017 Iowa Acts ch. 117, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(a)(5) (2018)).

Thus, from 2009 to 2017, the following conduct was considered harassment

under Iowa Code section 708.7:

            (1) Communicates with another by telephone, telegraph,
      writing, or via electronic communication without legitimate purpose
      and in a manner likely to cause the other person annoyance or
      harm.

             (2) Places a simulated explosive or simulated incendiary
      device in or near a building, vehicle, airplane, railroad engine or
      railroad car, or boat occupied by another person.

            (3) Orders merchandise or services in the name of another, or
      to be delivered to another, without the other person’s knowledge or
      consent.

            (4) Reports or causes to be reported false information to a law
      enforcement authority implicating another in some criminal activity,
      knowing that the information is false, or reports the alleged
      occurrence of a criminal act, knowing the act did not occur.

Iowa Code § 708.7(1)(a)(1)–(4) (2009). None of the conduct mentioned above

carries an inherent sexual connotation. It would logically follow that for a person

to be registered as a sex offender for that conduct, there would have to be

evidence of a sexual motivation behind the perpetration of the crime.

      Unlike Iowa Code section 708.1(a)(1)–(4), section 708.7(1)(a)(5) is

inherently sexual as it holds one who

      [d]isseminates, publishes, distributes, posts, or causes to be
      disseminated, published, distributed, or posted a photograph or film
      showing another person in a state of full or partial nudity or engaged
      in a sex act, knowing that the other person has not consented to the
      dissemination, publication, distribution, or posting
                                           28

criminally liable for harassment. Id. § 708.7(1)(a)(5) (2019). This inherent

sexuality evidences the legislature’s intent for individuals who violate section

708.7(1)(a)(5) to be required to register as sex offenders.

      The legislature’s discussion when House File 526, which sought to add

section 708.7(1)(a)(5) to the Code, was being voted on is also instructive. The

introductory remarks to House File 526 stated:

      Disseminating someone’s nude image is a destructive invasion of
      their privacy that can cause irreversible harm to a person’s physical
      and emotional well-being, reputation, and security. . . . However, in
      Iowa, there are currently no legal remedies for prosecuting those
      who distribute these types of images without consent. Typically,
      90% or more of revenge porn victims are women. At last count, there
      were thirty-four states that had enacted laws to protect individuals
      from being victimized in this way.

House Video HF 526 by Heartsill of Marion, Iowa Legislature, at 7:32:56–

7:44:45 PM     (Mar. 27,       2017),   https://www.legis.iowa.gov/dashboard?view

=video&chamber=H&clip=H20170327163935379&dt=2017-03-27&offset=1039

6&bill=HF%20526&status=i&ga=87. This evidences a clear intent by the

legislature to criminalize the type of behavior at issue in this case.

      When House File 526 made it to the senate, section 708.7(5) was amended

to require juveniles who violate section 708.7(1)(a)(5) to be tried in juvenile court

and prevented them from being required to register as sex offenders. Senate

Video HF 526: S-3298 by Garrett of Warren, Iowa Legislature, at 11:40:49–

11:41:26 AM       (April 11,      2017),    https://www.legis.iowa.gov/dashboard?

view=video&chamber=S&clip=s20170411090621780&dt=2017-04-

11&offset=8976&bill=HF%20526&status=r&ga=87.             Clearly,   the   legislature

intended for adults who violate section 708.7(1)(a)(5) to be required to register as

a sex offender.
      Research shows that such a requirement is an effective deterrent to this

type of conduct. Eaton, Jacobs, & Ruvalcaba, 2017 Summary Report at 22. For
                                          29

example, in one study of 159 individuals who reported having shared

nonconsensual pornography, 60% of the perpetrators indicated that knowing

they would be required to register as a sex offender might have stopped them

from sharing the nonconsensual pornography. Id. This was the “most commonly

chosen prohibitive factor participants chose in response to the question ‘What

might have stopped you from sharing the image(s)?’ ” Id. The second and third

most reported prohibitive factors related to imprisonment and knowing that the

nonconsensual distribution of sexually explicit materials was a felony. Id.

         III. Conclusion.

         The majority analyzes the facts of this case through the lens of a

reasonable person “unaffected by the prurient thoughts and desires of a sexually

deviant person.” Isaac, 756 at 822 (Streit, J., dissenting). By only focusing on

Miller’s stated intent—revenge—the majority forecloses any possibility that

Miller’s actions were sexually motivated. See id. Miller’s actions were not those

of a reasonable person, but of a person with a perverted mind. See id. The

majority fails to consider that Miller could have had two concurrent motivations

for posting the video—revenge and sexual gratification—and fails to consider the

significant burden an appellant must overcome on a sufficiency of the evidence
claim.

         Miller’s decision to post a video of himself engaging in sexual intercourse

with the victim to a pornographic website without the victim’s consent is

sufficient circumstantial evidence for any rational tier of fact to have found

Miller’s actions were sexually motivated. The approach taken by the majority

places an unfair burden on the state in proving a defendant’s actions in violation

of Iowa Code section 708.7(1)(a)(5) were sexually motivated in cases where there

is no direct evidence. For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from the
majority and would affirm the district court’s finding that Miller’s actions were
                                      30

sexually motivated, thereby requiring him to register as a sex offender pursuant

to Iowa Code chapter 692A.