Court Opinion

ID: 9852656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:34:20.376928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:31.718661
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the unprecedented application the majority opinion gives to Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1971). Argersinger applies only "where imprisonment actually occurs . . . those [sentences] that end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty.” Id. pp. 39,40. The imposition of a suspended sentence, such as Morgan received on one conviction here in issue, does not invoke Argersinger: "It is noted that as to the first of Cottle’s convictions . . . [he] received a . . . suspended sentence, but there is nothing in the record to show that Cottle was imprisoned for this conviction. If that is so, then the rule in Argersinger does not apply.” Cottle v. Wainwright, 477 F2d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1973).
The majority opinion applies Argersinger to all misdemeanor cases irrespective of whether there was actual imprisonment. This means all felony sentences in which previous misdemeanor sentences were considered in the sentencing phase of the trial are now subject to attack throughout the state if the record is silent as to whether the accused was represented by counsel.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Undercofler and Justice Ingram join in this dissent.