Court Opinion

ID: 9505631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:13:23.160834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:39.694611
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting
This case presented us with an opportunity to restore to Indiana’s jurisprudence important principles of our state constitution. By doing so, we could have vividly exemplified the Rule of Law notwithstanding the allure of pragmatic commercial interests. We should hold that the ten-year statute of repose provision in the Indiana Products Liability Act violates both the Right to Remedy and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Indiana Constitution.
Right to Remedy Clause
Within the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution, Section 12 provides in relevant part: All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.1 The majority today holds that the statute of repose in the Indiana Products Liability Act, which denies remedy to citizens injured by defective products that happen to be more than ten years old,2 does not violate this provision. Noting prior eases that have considered the Due Course of Law Clause of the Indiana Constitution analogous to the Due Process of Law Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the majority correctly acknowledges that the two provisions are not synonymous, but nevertheless finds the statute of repose provision proper because it concludes that there is no constitutional right to remedy in Indiana. I disagree.
Our standard of review of state constitutional claims is well established. Proper interpretation and application of a particu*986lar provision of the Indiana Constitution requires a search for the common understanding of both those who framed it and those who ratified it. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 75-76 (Ind.1994); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 412 (Ind.1991). Furthermore, “the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision.” Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996); Eakin v. State ex rel. Capital Improvement Bd. of Managers of Marion County, 474 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind.1985). In order to give life to their intended meaning,- we “examin[e] the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions.” Indiana Gaming Comm’n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994). See also Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 957 (Ind.1993); State Election Bd. v. Bayh, 521 N.E.2d 1313 (Ind.1988). In construing the constitution, we “look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.” Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 391 (1871)). The language of each provision of the Constitution must be treated with particular deference, “as though every word had been hammered into place.” Warren v. Indiana Tele. Co., 217 Ind. 93, 102, 26 N.E.2d 399, 403 (Ind.1940).
The framers emphatically declared, and the ratifiers approved, that “every person for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.” Ind. Const, art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). In choosing the language of this provision, they did not say that every person might have whatever remedy the common law or the legislature may allow from time to time, nor did they merely reiterate the language of the then-existing federal Due Process Clause, which states that “[n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. V. They did not craft Section 12 merely to provide “due process.” Instead, our framers and ratifiers unequivocally enhanced the protections afforded by our state constitution, expressly establishing the additional right to remedy for injuries suffered.
Indiana first adopted a “remedy by due course of law” provision as part of its original Constitution in 1816.3 This provision was retained with only slight modification (replacing “lands, goods” with “property”) when our present Constitution was adopted in 1851. When Section 12 was adopted in 1851 (and when adopted in its initial form in 1816), the only source of federal due process protection was that provided in the Fifth Amendment, which did not contain a right to remedy clause and was not applicable to the states. From the time of the Declaration of Independence until after the Civil War, the rights and liberties of citizens were protected against government infringement only by the declarations of rights in the individual states. Justice Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 Temple L.Rev. 989, 998 (1996). The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,4 which includes the Due Process Clause that is applicable to the states, was not adopted until 1868, and *987thus could not have served as the model for Article I, Section 12 of Indiana’s 1851 Constitution.
When the framers of our constitution adopted Article I, Section 12, the primary definition of the term “remedy” was “[t]he means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury.”5 2 BouvieR’s Law Dictionary 436 (14th ed. 1878). Thus, the Right to Remedy Clause does not entitle a person to automatic reparation or recompense, but rather ensures access to the courts to seek reparation or recompense for wrongful injury.
Thirty-seven other state constitutions6 also include a “remedies” provision.7 These provisions trace their roots to chapter 40 of the Magna Carta: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice.”8 It is this assurance of access to justice that is embodied in our Right to Remedy Clause.
*988The right to remedy for injury has long been important in Indiana and our nation. Although the historical records from the 1816 and 1851 conventions provide no direct evidence of the intent of the framers regarding this clause, this Court declared within the first decade following the adoption of our present Right to Remedy Clause: “ ‘No one,’ says Judge Story, ‘will doubt that the Legislature may vary the nature and extent of remedies, so always that a substantial remedy exists.’ ” Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116, 122 (Ind.1861) (quoting Story’s Com. § 1379). Later, this Court reiterated the importance of remedy: “It has always been a general principle under our legal system that for every wrong there should be a remedy.” State ex rel. Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 142, 73 N.E.2d 174, 179 (Ind.1947). Chief Justice of the United States John Marshall also stated: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60, 69 (1803).
Applying our well-established methodology of constitutional interpretation, I con-elude that Section 12 provides separate and distinct protections and is not coextensive with federal due process jurisprudence. I am also convinced that Section 12 ensures not only that procedures must comply with due course of law, but further that both the text and the history provide strong support for understanding Section 12 of Indiana’s Bill of Rights to provide a substantive right to remedy for injuries suffered.
The legislature has the authority to modify or abrogate common law rights as long as such change does not interfere with constitutional rights.9 Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1283 (Ind.1999); State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind.1992). Although constitutional rights may be subjected to legislative restraints and burdens necessitated by the State’s exercise of its police power to promote the peace, safety, and well-being of the public, this police power is not unlimited: “[Tjhere is within each provision of our Bill of Rights a cluster of essential values which the legislature may qualify but not alienate.” Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 (Ind.1993). “A right is impermissibly alienated when the State materially burdens one of the core values which it em*989bodies.” Id. The right to remedy for injury is such a core value.
While legislative qualifications of this right may be enacted under the police power, the total abrogation of an injured person’s right to remedy is an unacceptable material burden.10 The statute of repose provision in the Products Liability Act is no mere qualification. It does not merely limit the time within which to as-serf a remedy, nor does it merely modify the procedure for enforcing the remedy. Nor is it a narrow, limited immunity necessitated by police power. On the contrary, the repose provision completely bars the courthouse doors to all persons injured by products over ten years old, even for claims alleging negligence, and even where the products were designed, built, sold, and purchased with the expectation of decades of continued use.11 Although this *990provision denies all Indiana citizens access to justice ensured by the Right to Remedy Clause, it is especially pernicious to those economically disadvantaged citizens who must rely on older or used products rather than new ones.
I would find that the Products Liability Act repose provision, Indiana Code section 34r-20-3-l(b), violates our Right to Remedy Clause, Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
Equal Privileges and Immunities
Section 23 of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution declares: “The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” Ind. Const. art. I, § 23. In Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994), this Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the common understanding of the framers and ratifiers of Section 23 and the early decisions interpreting and implementing this provision. We concluded:
To summarize, we hold that Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion.
*991Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80. As we explained in Collins, the first requirement actually consists of two sub-elements: (1) “such classification must be based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics which rationally distinguish the unequally treated class;” 12 and (2) “the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to such distinguishing characteristics.” 13 644 N.E.2d at 79.
The Products Liability Act’s repose provision states that “a product liability action must be commenced ... within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer.”14 Ind.Code § 34-20-3-l(b). The statute, on its face, distinguishes two classes of persons for unequal treatment: a user or consumer injured within ten years after the delivery of the product, and a user or consumer injured more than ten years after the delivery of the product. By artificially distinguishing as a separate class those citizens injured by defective products more than ten years old, and by forbidding them access to legal recourse for their injuries, this statute violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, Section 23 of the Bill of Rights of the Indiana Constitution. Thus, the first of the two Collins requirements compels our rejection of the ten-year repose provision.
I believe that the majority’s misapplication of Collins begins with its focus upon *992unequal treatment of different classes of products, rather than upon unequally treated classes of people. When a statute is challenged as violating Section 23, we must evaluate the disparate treatment afforded to the benefited or burdened class.15 Products are not sued; they do not receive immunity from suit under the statute; and thus, they receive neither a benefit nor a burden. It is people who receive unequal treatment under the statute.
Perhaps because it focuses upon products rather than people, the majority bypasses the required threshold question as to whether the legislative classification is based upon distinctive, inherent characteristics that rationally distinguish the unequally treated classes. This is sub-element (1) of the first of the two Collins requirements. The majority fails to consider this prerequisite question. It is only when the classification is based upon inherent distinctions that the analysis can proceed to evaluate whether the disparate treatment is reasonably related to the characteristics distinguishing the classifications.
Despite the legislature’s acknowledged power to properly classify in order to legislate effectively, the Indiana Constitution demands more than simply a rational relationship between the legislative goal and the classification. While we generally do not question the legislature in its policy-making role, “‘[ljegislative classification becomes a judicial question ... where the lines drawn appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.’ ” Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 80 (quoting Chaffin, 261 Ind. at 701, 310 N.E.2d at 869). A classification “must furnish a reason for and justify the making of the class; that is, the reason for the classification must inhere in the subject-matter, and rest upon some reason which is natural and substantial, and not artificial.” Bedford Quarries Co. v. Bough, 168 Ind. 671, 674, 80 N.E. 529, 529 (1907). Similarly, we have explained:
[Wjhile some classification of the subjects of legislative action is necessary, and a reasonable classification based upon actual differences which inhere in the different subjects and embrace all within the class and the reason for the classification will be upheld, a classification, to be valid, must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class so different from another as to suggest the necessity for different legislation with respect thereto. An artificial, arbitrary, and unreasonable classification, as by designating certain individuals by name or description out of a larger number whose situation and needs do not differ from theirs, is forbidden by the constitution.
Davis Constr. Co. v. Board of Comm’rs, 192 Ind. 144, 150, 132 N.E. 629, 631 (1921) (emphasis added). See also Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State, 188 Ind. 173, 181, 122 N.E. 584, 587 (1919); Railroad Comm’n of Ind. v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 179 Ind. 255, 262, 100 N.E. 852, 854 (1913); Bedford Quarries, 168 Ind. at 674, 80 N.E. at 529-30. It is not sufficient simply to identify the characteristics of the members of the group that will receive the benefit:
The law requires something more than a mere designation of characteristics which will serve to divide into groups. Arbitrary selection or mere identification cannot be justified by calling it classification. The characteristics which can serve as a basis of a valid classification must be such as to show an inherent difference in situation and subject-matter of the subjects placed in different classes which peculiarly requires and necessitates different or exclusive legislation with respect to them.
*993... The Legislature cannot take what might be termed a natural class of persons, split that class in two, and then arbitrarily designate the dissevered factions of the original unit as two classes, and thereupon enact different rules for the government of each.
Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 199 Ind. 95, 101-03, 155 N.E. 465, 467 (1927) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, a legislative classification violates Section 23 when it is not based upon substantial distinctions that make one class so different from another as to necessitate different legislation with respect thereto or when it simply designates certain individuals by name or description out of a larger number whose situation and needs do not differ.
The unequal treatment provided by the repose provision of the Products Liability Act is wholly unrelated to any distinctive, inherent characteristics that rationally distinguish the unequally treated classes of people. In other words, there is nothing that naturally inheres in the group of people designated for unequal treatment that separates them into distinctive classes. The parties who are injured by defective products more than ten years old do not necessarily differ from the parties who are injured by such products that are only nine years old. The ten-year product age line does not distinguish classes'of people based upon their inherent characteristics. Using such a line as a basis to treat unequally different classes of people clearly violates both the language and the spirit of Section 23.16 We have said before, “There is no more jealously guarded principle of constitutional law than that which forbids class legislation.” Dep’t of Public Welfare of Allen County v. Potthoff, 220 Ind. 574, 583, 44 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1942).
One further point is significant. Although Collins notes that courts evaluating a Section 23 claim must exercise deference to legislative discretion, such deference is relevant only to sub-element (2), not sub-element (1), of the first requirement of the Collins test.17 Consideration of legislative goals and purposes is appropriate when determining sub-element (2), whether the disparate treatment is reasonably related to the distinguishing characteristics of each class. But it is not germane to the initial judicial evaluation under sub-element (1), whether sufficient distinctive, inherent characteristics exist that rationally justify the creation of separate classes of people for unequal treatment. Because it is this first sub-element that is violated by the repose provision, the issue of the reasonableness of the relationship between the distinguishing characteristics and the *994legislature’s unequal treatment does not arise.
When this Court in Collins reviewed the history of Section 28, synthesizing history and case law, we intended that its protections apply “fully, equally, and without diminution to prohibit any and all improper grants of unequal privileges or immunities.” 644 N.E.2d at 80. Our expectation was, and should still be, “that our independent state privileges and immunities jurisprudence will evolve in future cases facing Indiana courts to assure and extend protection to all Indiana citizens.... ” Id. at 81.
Indiana Code section 34-20-3-l(b) takes a natural .class of persons (users or consumers of a product), splits that class in two, designates the dissevered factions of the original unit as two classes (persons injured by a product within ten years of its delivery and persons injured by products more than ten years after its delivery), and enacts different rules unequally governing each. Such discrimination is unconstitutional. See Fountain Park Co., 199 Ind. at 101-03, 155 N.E. at 467. I would find that the Products Liability Act repose provision, Indiana Code section 34-20-3-l(b), violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause, Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution.
Conclusion
The Indiana Constitution guarantees that injured citizens have the right to remedy, and it prohibits the legislature from dividing people into unequally treated classes that are not based on inherent, natural distinctions. All people should have equal access to seek remedy for injuries they suffer, and those responsible should be held accountable. The interests of justice demand nothing less. This Court should hold that the repose provision violates the Indiana Constitution.
RUCKER, J., concurs.

. The lull provision states: "All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” Ind. Const, art. I, § 12.

. The time limit in the statute of repose is triggered, not by the actual age of the product, but by the date of delivery to the first user or consumer.

. The provision read: “That all Courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by the due course of law; and right and justice administered without denial or delay.” Ind. Const, art. I, § 11 (1816).

. The Fourteenth Amendment, under which many of the due process protections were recognized and applied to the states, was adopted more than ten years after our state constitution. It provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor *987deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.

. The term "remedy” continues to mean: "The means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated. The means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury, as distinguished from right, which is a well founded or acknowledged claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1294 (6th ed.1990) (citations omitted). See also Ballentine's Law Dictionary 1088 (3d ed. 1969) ("The means employed to enforce a right or redress an injury. The means or method whereby a cause of action or corresponding obligation is effectuated and by which a wrong is redressed and relief obtained. The appropriate legal form of relief by which remediable right may be enforced.") (citations omitted); Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (Unabridged) 1920 (1966) (“the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong: the relief (as damages, restitution, specific performance, an injunction) that may be given by a court for a wrong”); West’s Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 647 (1985) ("The means by which a right is enforced; the steps by which the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated....”).

. The thirty-eight states with some version of a remedies provision include: Ala. Const, art. I, § 13; Ariz. Const, art. 2, § 11; Ark. Const. art. 2, § 13; Colo. Const, art. II, § 6; Conn. Const, art. 1, § 10; Del. Const, art. I, § 9; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 21; Ga. Const, art. 1, § 1, ¶ 12; III. Const, art. 1, § 12; Ind. Const, art. 1, § 12; Ky. Const. Bill of Rights § 14; La. Const, art. 1, § 22; Me. Const, art. 1, § 19; Md. Const, art. 19; Mass. Const, art. 11, pt. 1; Minn. Const, art. 1, § 8; Miss. Const, art. 3, § 24; Mo. Const, art. 1, § 14; Mont. Const. art. II, § 16; Neb. Const, art. I, § 13; N.H. Const, art. 14, pt. 1; N.C. Const, art. I, § 18; N.D. Const, art. I, § 9; Ohio Const, art. I, § 16; Okla Const, art. 2, § 6; Or. Const, art. 1, § 10; Pa Const, art. 1, § 11; R.I. Const. art. I, § 5; S.C. Const, art. I, § 9; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 20; Tenn. Const, art. 1, § 17; Tex. Const art. 1, § 13; Utah Const, art. 1, § 11; Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. 4; Wash. Const, art 1, § 10; W. Va. Const, art. 3, § 17; Wis. Const. art. 1, § 9; Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 8. See generally John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of the State Courts, 26 Wake Forest L.Rev. 237, 284-88 (1991) (collecting state constitutional remedies provisions).

. Although several of these state constitutions do not include "due course” language in their remedies provisions, the primary objective of these provisions is to guarantee access to courts to seek remedy. In several state constitutions, "remedy” is modified to describe the quantity, quality, or timeliness of the remedy. See, e.g., Ark Const, art 2, § 13 ("certain remedy”); Colo. Const, art. II, § 6 ("speedy remedy”); III. Const, art I, § 12 ("certain remedy”); La. Const, art. 1, § 22 ("adequate remedy”); Mass. Const, art. 11, pt. 1 (“certain remedy”); Minn. .Const, art. 1, § 8 ("certain remedy”); Mo. Const, art. 1, § 14 ("certain remedy”); Mont. Const, art. II, § 16 (“speedy remedy”); N.H. Const, art. 14, pt. 1 ("certain remedy”); Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6 ("speedy and certain remedy”); R.I. Const. art. I, § 5 ("certain remedy”); S.C. Const. art. I, § 9 ("speedy remedy”); Vt. Const. Ch. I, art. 4 ("certain remedy”); Wis. Const. art. 1, § 9 ("certain remedy”).

. This clause of the Magna Carta is the source of the action for trespass on the case, as embodied in the statute of Westminster II. The last section of that statute, chapter 50 provided: “(2) Moreover, concerning the statutes provided where the Law faileth; and for Remedies, lest suitors coming to the King's court should depart from thence without Remedy, they shall have writs provided in their cases.” 13 Edw. 1, c. 24, cited in Donna B. Haas Powers, State Constitutions’ Remedy Guarantee Provisions Provide More Than Mere “Lip Service” to Rendering Justice, 16 Toledo L.Rev. 585, 585 n. 3 (1985).

. In asserting that the General Assembly may modify or abrogate the common law and that some common law remedies have been abolished by the legislature without conflict with the Indiana Constitution, the majority places substantial reliance on Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 553, 10 N.E.2d 619 (1937), and Sidle v. Majors, 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763 (1976). In Pennington, however, this Court upheld the legislation abolishing alienation of affections because the husband did not have a property right to the affections of his wife, because a wife was no longer the "property” of her husband in the eyes of the law, and because the marital relation was subject to the control of the legislature. Id. at 556-59, 10 N.E.2d at 621-22. Thus, the statute did not abrogate a remedy for injury to "person, property, or reputation" as protected by Section 12. In Sidle, this Court, while upholding legislation burdening, but not abrogating, a motor vehicle passenger's legal recourse for the injuries caused by the driver, expressly acknowledged:
“[Article I, Section 12] embraces the principle of natural justice that in a free government every man should have an adequate legal remedy for injury done him by another.
The inquiry, in every case, must be directed to the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed upon. Undoubtedly, arbitrary and unreasonable abolishment of a right of action to redress injury to the essential rights of person or property is prohibited. Certainly, the legislature may not ... abolish a remedy given by the common law to essential rights without affording another remedy substantially adequate.”
Sidle, 264 Ind. at 223, 341 N.E.2d at 773-74 (quoting Gallegher v. Davis, 183 A. 620, 624 (Del.Super.Ct.1936)). To the extent that these and other cases may be read to provide some support for the legislative authority to completely abrogate common law remedies, they fail to adhere to the intended principles of Section 12 and should be superseded.

. In asserting that this Court’s decision in Martin v. Richey does not affect its analysis, the majority distinguishes this case and our decision in Martin, stating that Martin held that "a claim that exists cannot be barred before it is knowable,” whereas here a "rule of law ... says, in effect, that products that produce no injury for ten years are no longer subject to claims under the Product Liability Act.” Op. at 979. This strips Martin of its rationale and restricts it to the narrowest possible holding.
In Martin, we held that the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations, as applied, was unconstitutional under Article I, Section 12 of our Constitution "because it requires plaintiff to file a claim before she is able to discover the alleged malpractice and her resulting injury, and, therefore, it imposes an impossible condition on her access to the courts and pursuit of her tort remedy.” Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1279. We concluded that it was "so unreasonable” for the statute of limitation to “require [the plaintiff] to file a claim before such claim existed” that it “violate[d] Section 12.” Id. at 1285. Similarly, in the present case, the statute of repose required the plaintiffs to file a claim before they were able to discover the allegedly negligent conduct and the resulting injury, and thus before such claim existed, in order for them to receive a remedy for the injuries caused by the product. The statute of repose, therefore, imposes an impossible condition on their access to the courts to pursue their remedy, an otherwise valid tort claim. This too is unreasonable.
Building upon its distinction between Martin and this case, the majority reasons that the legislature may extinguish a cause of action before a plaintiff’s claim accrues and thereby deprive a person of a remedy, as long as the legislation is a rational means to achieve a legitimate legislative goal. If the majority is correct on this point, the legislature, upon establishing a legitimate legislative goal, could extinguish, for example, medical malpractice causes of action (before any plaintiff's claim accrues) as long as that legislation is a rational means to achieve that legitimate legislative goal. Under such legislation, no party injured by a negligent doctor would ever have a valid claim of medical malpractice, because no claim would accrue.
We long ago rejected such reasoning:
To construe the medical malpractice statute as a legislative bar on all malpractice actions under all circumstances unless commenced within two years from the act complained of (discoverable or otherwise) would raise substantial questions under the Article 1, § 12 guarantee of open courts and redress for injury to every man, not to mention the offense to lay concepts of justice.
(Chaffin v. Nicosia, 261 Ind. 698, 703-04, 310 N.E.2d 867, 870 (1974)). Martin demonstrated the Court's continued recognition of these concerns expressed in Chaffin. Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1283 (quoting Chaffin). Like the Court in Martin and Chaffin, I believe that the statute of repose violates Article 1, Section 12 by precluding all product liability actions unless commenced within ten years of delivery to the initial user.

. The majority asserts that strict liability for product flaws did not exist in 1851 but was adopted as part of the Product Liability Act in 1978. It is important to note that the Product Liability Act was not the beginning of claims brought by parties injured by products. The plaintiffs persuasively argue that the statute of repose abrogates legal protections and remedies that have been available to persons injured by products for more than six hundred years of Anglo-American law. Here in Indiana, the same legal protections and remedies were afforded persons injured by products, until the statute of repose was adopted. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Sandefur, 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519 (1964); Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919); Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Williams, 111 Ind.App. 502, 37 N.E.2d 702 (1941); Holland Furnace Co. v. Nauracaj, 105 Ind.App. 574, 14 N.E.2d 339 (1938); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Keller, 98 Ind.App. 607, 184 N.E. 913 (1933); Laudeman v. Russell & Co., 46 Ind. *990App. 32, 91 N.E. 822 (1910). Furthermore, over a quarter of a century ago, our common law advanced to permit such claims on a theory of strict liability in tort. See Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 261 Ind. 86, 92-93, 300 N.E.2d 335, 339-40 (Ind.1973) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, providing for strict liability in product liability action). See also Galbreath v. Eng’g Constr. Corp., 149 Ind.App. 347, 273 N.E.2d 121 (1971); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind.App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc., 147 Ind.App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970). With the enactment of the Product Liability Act, the legislature initially entered the field of product strict liability in tort, but the legislature did not supersede claims against negligent manufacturers in product negligence liability cases. See Koske v. Townsend Eng’g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 442-43 (Ind.1990).
The 1978 Product Liability Act contained a statute of repose provision, requiring any product liability action . to be commenced within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer. Pub.L. No. 141-1978, § 28 (codified at Ind.Code § 33-1-1.5-5) (current version at Ind.Code § 34-20-3-1). This provision was amended in 1983, thereby requiring any product liability action "in which the theory of liability is negligence or strict liability in tort” to be commenced within ten years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer. Pub.L. No. 297-1983, § 6 (codified at Ind.Code § 33-1-1.5-5) (current version at Ind.Code § 34-20-3-1). In 1995, the statute was amended again, requiring "all actions brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a product regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought.” Pub.L. No. 278-1995, § 1 (codified at Ind.Code § 33-1-1.5-1) (current version at Ind.Code § 34-20-1-1). In 1998, the legislature amended the Product Liability Act again, making this statute applicable to "all actions that are; (1) brought by a user or consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm caused by a product; regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought.” Pub.L. No. 1-1998, § 15 (codified at Ind.Code § 34-20-1-1). The ten-year statute of repose provision governs "in any product liability action in which the theory of liability is negligence or strict liability in tort.” Pub.L. No. 1-1998, § 15 (codified at Ind.Code § 34-20-3-1).
As this statute has evolved, it has engulfed all common law tort claims previously available to those seeking remedy for injuries resulting from dangerous and defective products. In guaranteeing a substantive right to remedy for injuries suffered, our Constitution does not necessarily ensure the right to seek recovery under a theory of strict liability, but it certainly must embrace the principle that every person should have a reasonably adequate legal remedy for injury wrongfully done him by another.

. In Collins, this Court faced a claim that Section 23 was violated by the unequal treatment of two classifications: (1) agricultural employers in contrast to agricultural employees; and (2) agricultural employers in contrast to employers generally. We acknowledge that certain language employed in Collins was imprecise and may be read to suggest that we applied legislative deference to determine whether there were inherent distinctions between the classifications. Id., 644 N.E.2d at 81 ("Applying the required deferential standard of review, we find that there are inherent distinctions between these classifications that are reasonably related to the exemption.”). When reviewed in the full context of the discussion, however, it becomes apparent that the focus of our legislative deference in Collins was not on sub-element (1), the classification into groups naturally distinguished by inherent distinctions, but rather on sub-element (2), the reasonable relation of the disparate treatment to the distinguishing characteristics.

. Citing Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1281-82, the majority explains that, "even if the statute is valid under the first prong of Collins, it may be invalid under the second prong if, as applied to a subset of a facially homogenous class, it confers a different privilege or harm.” Op. at 981. Martin instructed that, under the second prong, a statute that provides preferential treatment may be invalid when, on the face of the statute, the preferential treatment is not uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated or when, as applied to particular plaintiffs, the preferential treatment is not uniformly applicable and equally available. See Martin, 711 N.E.2d at 1280-82.
Furthermore, in Martin, we applied Article I, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution and held that the plaintiff "cannot be foreclosed from bringing her malpractice suit when, unlike many other medical malpractice plaintiffs, she could not reasonably be expected to discover the asserted malpractice and resulting injury within the two-year period given the nature of the asserted malpractice and her medical condition.” Id. at 1282. As we explained, "Simply put, the statute precludes Melody Martin from pursuing a claim against her doctor because she has a disease which has a long latency period and which may not manifest significant pain or symptoms until several years after the asserted malpractice.” Id. at 1279. Likewise, in the present case, the statute precludes the plaintiffs from pursuing a claim against the manufacturer because the product did not manifest its alleged design defects until John McIntosh was injured some thirteen years after the manufacturer's allegedly negligent conduct, which happened to fall outside the ten-year statutory period. James and Sondra McIntosh should not be foreclosed from bringing their product liability action in this case when, unlike many other plaintiffs injured by defective products, they could not reasonably be expected to discover the negligent design and manufacture within the ten-year period given the fact that the injuries did not occur until after the period expired.

. It further provides that "if the cause of action accrues at least eight years but less than ten years after that initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Ind.Code § 34-20-3-1 (b).

. Section 23 applies to both statutes that create a privilege and those that impose a burden. "[I]mplicit in an enactment that imposes an unequal burden is the grant of a special privilege or immunity to persons or classes exempted from the new burden.” Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 77.

. To support its conclusion, the majority argues that the statute of repose, "on its face,” applies to everyone, that all citizens are prevented from accruing claims based on products in use longer than a decade, and that the plaintiffs belong to no subset of that class. It is important to the majority that the plaintiffs are treated no differently from other people injured by a product more than ten years after it is first used or consumed.
The fallacy of this argument is apparent if we consider a claim arising under a hypothetical rule declaring, "State universities may only admit students under the age of thirty years." Stated differently, this rule permits only persons under the age of thirty to begin their studies at a state university. Under the majority’s construction, the same rule applies to everyone — no one over the age of thirty can begin a state university education. If a prospective student begins when under thirty years of age, there would be no bar. But, if a prospective student attempts to begin when over thirty years of age, there would be a bar. Nevertheless, the majority would conclude that no violation of our Equal Privileges Clause has occurred. What is clear, however, is that, under this general law, which applies to everyone, a class within the population (those who are over the age of thirty) is prevented from taking advantage of the privilege. Such is the case with the repose provision.

. The dissent does not share the majority’s apprehension that allowing judicial evaluation of inherent characteristics providing the basis for unequal treatment would invalidate a host of statutes in which legislative classifications permit remedies for some losses but not for others. The scenarios the majority sets forth are ones in which it would appear that the classification of people may well be based upon inherent differences and thus that the disparate treatment accorded these classifications would be entitled to reasonable deference to legislative discretion.