Court Opinion

ID: 9396807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:21.475112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.955856
License: Public Domain

J-S15013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 WALTER PAUL RAVEN                      :
                                        :
                    Appellant           :   No. 1204 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-40-CR-0003629-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                FILED: MAY 23, 2023

     Walter Paul Raven appeals from the order entered on March 9, 2022,

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”).    For the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand for the

appointment of counsel.

     This Court has previously detailed the history of this case.        See

Commonwealth v. Raven (“Raven I”), 97 A.3d 1244 (Pa.Super. 2014);

Commonwealth v. Raven (“Raven II”), 169 A.3d 1165 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(unpublished memorandum).       Briefly, Appellant pled guilty in 2013 to a

plethora of drug-related offenses resulting from a morphine sale at case

number 3629-2012 (“Docket 3629”), and to multiple motor vehicle-related

offenses in connection with a hit-and-run accident where Appellant struck a

motorcycle, killing the two occupants, at case number 3415-2012 (“Docket

3415”).     The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of
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incarceration of seventy-eight to 300 months. This Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance

of appeal. See Raven I, supra, appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).

Appellant timely filed a first PCRA petition, which the PCRA court denied after

a hearing and his appeal garnered no relief. See Raven II, supra, appeal

denied, 172 A.3d 585 (Pa. 2017).

      On March 5, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition.

Understanding that such petition was patently untimely, Appellant averred

that he met the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s time bar. As

the new evidence pertained to an officer involved in the investigation of Docket

3629, Appellant only included Docket 3629 in the petition’s caption.        The

caption for all subsequent PCRA filings also included only Docket 3629.

      The PCRA court appointed Leonard Gryskewicz, Jr., Esquire, who sought

to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (1988),

and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (1988) (en banc). The PCRA

court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and granted counsel’s motion to

withdraw. Appellant pro se filed a response, alleging that his petition met one

of the timeliness exceptions and that Attorney Gryskewicz had provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by seeking to withdraw instead of amending

his petition.   See Response in Opposition to Notice of Intent to Dismiss,

7/16/21. The Commonwealth filed a response, arguing that the petition was

untimely and that the PCRA court should either rule on the new claim of

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ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel or permit Appellant to develop the issue

further at a hearing.

       On February 3, 2022, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. See

N.T. PCRA Hearing, 2/3/22, at 2 (court explaining that after it “did an order

basically dismissing your PCRA, . . . you filed a motion to be heard so that’s

why we are here today” and then asking Appellant if he was “prepared to go

forward with [his] case”).           Appellant appeared pro se and attempted

unsuccessfully to introduce various news articles into evidence pertaining to

the substance of his pro se PCRA petition. Appellant, clearly struggling with

presenting his case, advised the court that he was in poor health and that he

did not have a lawyer. See id. at 2-5. The Commonwealth argued against

the merits and attempted to ascertain the correct procedure for addressing

Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel in light of our

Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa.

2021),1 as follows:

       . . . “I’m not sure, honestly, the best way to go. The Court could
       tell him or appoint new counsel to investigate his claim of
       ineffectiveness of counsel of Mr. Gryskewicz since he’s alleging
       them.

____________________________________________

1 In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme
Court abandoned the approach, existing at the time Appellant filed his Rule
907 response, of utilizing Rule 907 as the sole mechanism for challenging
PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id. at 397-98, 400-01. In its place, the Court
implemented “a modified and flexible . . . approach allowing a petitioner to
raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel at the first opportunity, even if on
appeal.” Id. at 405.

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              The Court could . . . since he’s not presented any evidence,
        other than claims of articles that would really be hearsay, dismiss
        it and let it go to the Superior Court. In which case, they would
        have to follow the rules of Bradley if he filed a brief alleging the
        ineffectiveness [sic] assistance of Mr. Gryskewicz.

              Or the Court, I guess, could appointment [sic] him counsel
        now and we could try to do it now, and see what happens once
        that occurs. . . .

              ....

              That said, I think the new case of Bradley kind of throws
        us into a little bit of a procedural limbo as to how best to proceed.

N.T. PCRA Hearing, 2/3/22, at 8-10.

        Appellant, unfamiliar with the Bradley decision, insisted that he was

raising a “Brady claim.”2 N.T. PCRA Hearing, 2/3/22, at 11. In response, the

Commonwealth noted “[t]hat raises the issue of someone who is pro se, who

really doesn’t know the rules and knows what’s going on.” Id. Finally, the

Commonwealth averred that Attorney Gryskewicz should have an opportunity

to be heard before being found ineffective. The PCRA court took the matter

under advisement.

        On March 9, 2022, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition. In the

accompanying memorandum, the PCRA court did not address Appellant’s

claim that Attorney Gryskewicz was ineffective, instead construing that issue

as an ineffectiveness claim regarding his attorneys during the direct appeal

____________________________________________

2   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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and initial PCRA proceedings. On August 29, 2022, Appellant filed the instant

appeal.3

       At the outset, we are compelled to sua sponte address the court’s denial

of Appellant’s right to counsel in connection with his PCRA petition.          See

Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d 1286, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2011) (ruling

that, where it appears that an indigent PCRA petitioner was denied his rule-

based right to counsel, “this Court is required to raise this error sua sponte

and remand for the PCRA court to correct that mistake.”).
____________________________________________

3 Below is a non-exhaustive list of the myriad problems pertaining to this
appeal that undoubtedly emanated from and were compounded by Appellant’s
denial of his right to counsel, discussed infra:

       -   Neither the PCRA court’s order nor its memorandum advised
           Appellant of his right to appeal.

       -   Appellant purported to file another petition on April 11, 2022, raising
           the same claims and requesting the appointment of counsel. Nothing
           happened with that petition.

       -   Appellant filed two notices of appeal, one for each lower court docket,
           in an attempt to comply with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d
           969 (Pa. 2018). Since the PCRA court order only listed Docket 3629,
           this Court quashed the appeal with respect to Docket 3415 because
           no order appeared on the docket pertaining to that lower court docket
           number.

       -   Given the gross untimeliness of the appeal, this Court issued a rule
           to show cause order as to why the appeal should not be quashed.
           Appellant filed a response detailing his attempts to timely file a notice
           of appeal without the benefit of counsel and this Court discharged
           the rule to show cause order.

       -   The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement
           pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA
           court merely urged this Court to quash the appeal as untimely.

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       Our Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that the PCRA court appoint

counsel to represent an indigent petitioner any time it determines an

evidentiary hearing is necessary. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D); see also, e.g.,

Commonwealth          v.   Laboy,   230   A.3d     1134,   1138–39       (Pa.Super.

2020). Critically, the only time a PCRA petitioner should appear pro se at an

evidentiary hearing is if he has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his

right to counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82

(Pa. 1998) (“When a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-

conviction and appellate stages, an on-the-record determination should be

made     that   the   waiver   is   a   knowing,    intelligent,   and    voluntary

one.”). Moreover, “[i]f the appointment of counsel is deemed necessary for

purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing, then the petitioner requires

the assistance of counsel throughout the litigation of the issue,” including the

appeal process. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 965 A.2d 280, 284 (Pa.Super.

2009).

       Here, based on Appellant’s response to the Rule 907 notice and his claim

of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, the PCRA court determined that an

evidentiary hearing was warranted. Therefore, Appellant was entitled to the

appointment of counsel “for purposes of conducting an evidentiary hearing”

and “throughout the litigation of the issue,” including the instant appeal. Id.

Appellant was denied this right without a knowing and voluntary waiver.

Accordingly, we vacate the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA

petition, remand for the appointment of counsel to assist Appellant with the

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evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claim, and

shall continue to assist Appellant thereafter in the litigation of that claim.

      Order vacated.         Case remanded for the appointment of counsel.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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