Court Opinion

ID: 9697906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:36:49.888227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.885537
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In Department of Transportation v. McGarvey, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 358, 364, 583 A.2d 39, 42 (1990), we held that where a licensee requests to speak to an attorney, or anyone else, prior to taking a chemical test, even though Miranda warnings have not been given, it is incumbent upon the police to inform the licensee that he or she does not have the right to consult with an attorney, or anyone else, and that a citizen’s rights, although applicable to the criminal charges, do not apply under the implied consent law.1
The question in this case, however, is not whether a warning was required to be given, but whether the warning was sufficient under cases recently decided by this court. In *42Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sorg, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 82, 606 A.2d 1270, petition for allowance of appeal denied, 581 Pa. 657, 613 A.2d 561 (1992), we set forth the elements which would constitute a valid warning. As the majority correctly states, we did not require a verbatim reading of the specific language set forth in Sorg. We did, however, require that the “police must, as a minimum, give the same fundamental explanation that was given where the licensee was given the Miranda warnings; to repeat, the licensee must be given, at least” the information set forth by the majority. Id. at 91, 606 A.2d at 1274-75.
The majority recites the warning given to licensee, and states that the sole “missing” elements of Sorg are any reference to the words “civil proceeding” and a statement that licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing may be introduced in evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Slip op. at 725. It is with the first of these conclusions that I cannot agree.
The majority finds that because licensee was told that his “constitutional rights as a defendant in a criminal case do not apply to the taking of a chemical test,” the chemical test was thereby communicated “by implication” as being civil, rather than criminal in nature. Slip op. at 725. I would not so easily find this “implication.”
In Department of Transportation v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 70, 74, 606 A.2d 1264, 1266 (1992), we specifically held that:
[W]here no Miranda warnings are given, but where there is an overt manifestation of confusion over Miranda rights, the O’Connell explanation must include not only a statement that the right to contact an attorney or someone else applies only to criminal proceedings, but also an explanation that chemical testing is not such a criminal proceeding but is a civil proceeding. (Emphasis in original.)
See also Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Ingram, 149 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 170, 612 A.2d 634 (1992).
*43Here, as in Hoover, such an explanation was lacking. As I stated in Attleberger, “[t]he implied consent law intertwines criminal and civil penalties and procedures. Its theory and operation are confusing, even to members of this Court.” It is for this reason that an en banc panel of this court earlier this year set forth the essential elements which an O’Connell explanation must include. The majority today finds that a vague and imprecise warning “by implication” communicates the essential elements required in Sorg and Hoover. Such a decision, rather than furthering the purposes of the implied consent law, will merely breed more confusion and foster additional litigation.
Moreover, our Supreme Court has recently again reaffirmed its ruling in O’Connell. Commonwealth v. Danforth, 530 Pa. 327, 608 A.2d 1044 (1992). Justice Cappy, writing for the majority in Danforth, reiterated that “[t]here is an overwhelming unfairness inherent in the situation where an arrestee is initially told that he has a right to consult with an attorney, and then in conjunction with a request for chemical testing is told that a refusal will result in the suspension of driving privileges without being informed that his right to counsel is inapplicable.” Id. 608 A.2d at 1046. That same inherent unfairness exists where, after an arrestee overtly asserts his right to counsel, the arresting officer merely offers the bald statement that such a right does not now apply. This type of “explanation” serves only to increase rather than to dispel confusion. In order to be meaningful, the explanation must also explain the reason: that the right to counsel applies only to criminal proceedings and that a chemical test request is civil and not criminal in nature.2
More than a quarter century ago, the United States Supreme Court wrestled with a similar problem in attempting to balance constitutional protections against the valid interests of law enforcement. The solution was first set forth in Miranda *44v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Despite the vocal fears of many, the warnings enunciated in Miranda did not foreshadow the end of law enforcement, but rather have been accepted and are today routinely read verbatim to every arrestee by every law enforcement agency in our country. Similarly, the requirements which we have set forth as to what constitutes a sufficient explanation under O’Connell could easily be printed on a warning card and distributed to law enforcement officers throughout the Commonwealth. This is not to say that a verbatim reading of the Sorg warning is mandatory. The warning, however, must expressly, rather than by implication, contain the essential elements as set forth in Sorg. Because the warning given in the present case lacked two of those essential elements, it failed to meet the O’Connell requirements. I would therefore affirm the trial court.
McGINLEY, J., joins in this dissent.

. I continue to believe, however, that even in the absence of Miranda warnings, a licensee is entitled to an explanation that his constitutional right to counsel does not apply to a request for chemical testing. Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 339-342, 583 A.2d 24, 29-31 (1990) (Kelley, J., dissenting), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625, 592 A.2d 45-46 (1991), dismissed as having been improvidently granted, 531 Pa. 450, 613 A.2d 1203 (1992).

. As the majority states, our Supreme Court in Danforth did not require an explanation of the criminal/civil distinction. I do not believe, however, that Danforth in any way alters the requirements imposed in Sorg and Hoover.