Court Opinion

ID: 9912965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:37:41.469485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:33.337182
License: Public Domain

136 Nev., Advance Opinion .52.
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   CHARLES SCHUELER,                                 No. 75688-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   AD ART, INC., A FOREIGN
                                                                             FILE
                   CORPORATION,
                   Respondent.
                                                                       CLE

                                                                      BY
                                                                             HIEF DEPUni CLERK

                               Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment
                   in a tort action. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael
                   Villani, Judge.
                               Reversed and remanded.

                   Brenske & Andreevski and William R. Brenske, Jennifer Andreevski, and
                   Ryan D. Krametbauer, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Ray Lego & Associates and Timothy F. Hunter, Las Vegas,
                   for Respondent.

                   Kravitz Schnitzer Johnson, a Professional Corporation, and Alexandra B.
                   McLeod, M. Bradley Johnson, and Bianca Gonzalez, Las Vegas,
                   for Amicus Curiae Las Vegas Defense Lawyers.

                   Robison, Sharp, Sullivan & Brust and Therese M. Shanks, Reno,
                   for Amicus Curiae Nevada Justice Association.

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                    BEFORE GIBBONS, C.J., TAO and BULLA, JJ.

                                                      OPINION

                    By the Court, BULLA, J.:
                                 This appeal arises from a tort action sounding in strict products
                    liability. Appellant Charles Schueler was seriously injured while servicing
                    a large MGM Grand sign located atop a 150-foot tall steel pylon.1 Schueler
                    asserts that respondent Ad Art, Inc., designed, manufactured, and sold the
                    allegedly defective sign to MGM and, therefore, should be strictly liable for
                    his injuries. The district court granted summary judgment in Ad Ares
                    favor, concluding that the sign was not a product for purposes of applying
                    strict products liability.
                                 In this opinion, we address what constitutes a "produce within
                    the context of the doctrine of strict products liability and, specifically, the
                    doctrine's applicability to large fixtures such as the MGM sign.
                    Preliminarily, we discuss the pertinent history of strict products liability
                    and whether a limiting definition of "product" should be adopted in Nevada.
                    We next examine whether large signs, like the MGM sign, are products
                    within the contemplation of section 402A of the Second Restatement of
                    Torts, where, as here, the party allegedly engaged in producing and

                          1 The sign is situated in front of the MGM Grand Resort and Casino
                    on the east side of Las Vegas Boulevard, facing north and south, and
                    features displays on both sides. Specifically, the sign incorporates the
                    MGM's lion logo, large lighted MGM letters, and multiple LED screens that
                    feature various attractions. Although this type of sign is often referred to
                    as a pylon sign, only the display portion of the MGM sign, which is located
                    at the top of the pylon tower, is at issue in this case.

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                     designing the sign was in the business of making such signs. In doing so,
                     we address the relevance of Calloway v. City of Reno,2 on which both parties
                     rely. Finally, we address the relevant arguments raised in this appeal,
                     including whether custom-made products are exempt from the doctrine of
                     strict liability and whether the policy considerations underlying the
                     doctrine of strict products liability provide the appropriate basis for
                     determining whether the MGM pylon sign falls within the ambit of strict
                     products liability.
                                 Applying the principles set forth in section 402A of the Second
                     Restatement of Torts, as well as relevant jurisprudence, we hold that the
                     MGM sign is a product for purposes of strict liability, and therefore, the
                     district court erred when it concluded that the sign was not a product within
                     the contemplation of the doctrine of strict products liability. Consequently,
                     we reverse and remand.
                                                           I.
                                 Ad Art is a commercial sign manufacturer that has existed in
                     various corporate iterations since at least 1968.3 In 1993, MGM

                           2116 Nev. 250, 993 P.2d 1259 (2000).

                           3We recognize that Ad Art raised the issue of successor liability in the
                     district court and that this issue is indeed a contentious one, involving
                     unresolved factual disputes. The district court, however, did not reach the
                     successor liability issue in its order granting summary judgment, and
                     therefore, the matter is not before this court. See N. Nev. Ass'n of Injured
                     Workers v. Nev. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 107 Nev. 108, 111 n.3, 807 P.2d 728,
                     730 n.3 (1991) (declining to address an issue the district court did not rule
                     on in the first instance). Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether
                     successor liability should adhere to Ad Art in the instant case, and nothing
                     in this opinion should be construed as a resolution of that issue. With that
                     said, for purposes of our analysis herein, in general terms, we treat Ad Art
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commissioned Ad Art to design, manufacture, and install its sign. Between
1993 and 1994, Ad Art and local Las Vegas construction subcontractors
installed a 150-foot tall steel pylon embedded in a concrete foundation on
MGM's property, and then Ad Art mounted and installed its large sign on
top of the steel pylon. Ad Art employees designed, engineered, and managed
the production and installation of the sign. Ad Art fabricated the sign in
sections at its manufacturing facility in Stockton, California, and then
shipped the sign by way of truck to Las Vegas, where it was subsequently
attached to the pylon. According to Terry Long, Ad Art's president at the
time, "the installation of the MGM pylon was done by [Ad Art's] people" with
the assistance of some necessary third-party contractors, and after the
installation was completed as intended, "Ad Art didn't do any changing of
the sign." In 2013, MGM hired Schueler to service the pylon sign's LED
display. While Schueler was walking on the sign's interior platform, a panel
of Alucobond, which was affixed to the floor as part of the sign's original
design, allegedly failed, causing Schueler to fall 150 feet to the ground
below. As a result, Schueler suffered serious bodily injury.
            Schueler filed a complaint against Ad Art, alleging, among
others, a cause of action sounding in strict products liability. Ad Art filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was not a successor
corporation; that the MGM sign was not a product for purposes of strict
liability; and that the statute of repose was applicable. The district court
initially denied the motion, concluding that Ad Art was in the business of
manufacturing signs, that the sign was a product subject to strict liability
claims, and that one-of-a-kind products are not precluded from strict

as the manufacturer of the MGM pylon sign that was produced in the early
1990s.

                                      4
liability claims. Ad Art moved for reconsideration and argued that it was
not subject to successor liability and that the sign was not a product for
purposes of strict liability. Upon reconsideration, the district court reversed
course and granted Ad ArVs motion for summary judgment. Specifically,
the district court concluded that the sign was not a product that is subject
to the doctrine of strict liability. The district court, however, did not reach
the issue of successor liability. Schueler now appeals.
                                      II.
            We review a district court's decision to grant summary
judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026,
1029 (2005). Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings and all other
evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Id. On appeal from a summary judgment, this court may be required
"to determine whether the law has been correctly perceived and applied by
the district court." Evans v. Samuels, 119 Nev. 378, 380, 75 P.3d 361, 363
(2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                     III.
            Before addressing the specifics of Schueler's appeal, a
discussion regarding the history of strict products liability and its policy
objectives is appropriate. The doctrine of strict products liability finds its
genesis in the nineteenth-century English case, Winterbottom v. Wright.4 2
Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, The Law of Torts
§ 450 (2d ed. 2017) (hereinafter, Law of Torts). There, the court fashioned

      4(1842) 10 M. & W. 109; 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. Pl.).

                                      5
                    the privity rule, holding that a negligent manufacturer is generally not
                    liable for injuries caused by its defective products unless the victim is the
                    person who actually purchased the product. Id. Courts in the United States
                    adopted the holding in Winterbottom, and the privity rule survived into the
                    twentieth century. Id. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
                    (N.Y. 1916), an opinion authored by Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the New York
                    Court of Appeals effectively abolished the privity requirement in negligence
                    cases, and subsequently, MacPherson was adopted and applied in numerous
                    jurisdictions. Law of Torts, supra, § 450, at 893.
                                Although plaintiffs who lacked privity could now theoretically
                    recover from manufacturers in negligence, this was an onerous process and
                    often bore no fruit because negligence was quite difficult to prove in this
                    type of case. Id. This is so because plaintiffs were required "to prove that
                    a particular party in the product-supply chain had failed to exercise due
                    care." Kyle Graham, Strict Products Liability at 50: Four Histories, 98
                    Marg. L. Rev. 555, 568-69 (2014). As a result, plaintiffs began bringing
                    defective product claims under contract theories, rather than in tort,
                    specifically claims for breach of express or implied warranty; thus, if the
                    plaintiff proved such a breach, the manufacturer would be liable in contract,
                    and the plaintiff need not prove fault. Law of Torts, supra, § 450, at 893-
                    94.
                                Because warranty theories of recovery reintroduced the privity
                    problem, courts again began crafting exceptions to the rule. Id. And in
                    1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court eliminated the privity rule in
                    warranty cases altogether, holding that an implied-warranty claim could
                    survive absent privity and despite manufacturers disclaimers. Henningsen
                    v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80-84, 99-101 (N.J. 1960). But,

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three years later, the Henningsen holding was surpassed by the California
Supreme Coures decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377
P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), "which shifted the focus of products-liability reform
from warranty protections to 'pure tort law." Graham, Strict Products
Liability, supra, at 576.
             In Greenman, a case involving a defective power tool, the court
held, "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 377 P.2d at
900. The Greenman court went on to explain why tort, rather than contract,
was the more appropriate vehicle for strict liability claims. Id. at 901. The
court noted specifically that abandonment of the privity rule "make[s] clear
that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but
by the law of strict liability in tort." Id. Moreover, the court concluded,
"[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such
products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are
powerless to protect themselves."        Id.   In sum, "the Greenman court
regarded warranty as still too closely tethered to the law of sales to provide
an adequate basis for an obligation imposed for public-policy reasons."
Graham, Strict Products Liability, supra, at 577.
            Building on Greenman, Dean William Prosser incorporated and
advanced the ideas expressed therein in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A. Law of Torts, supra, § 450, at 894 (discussing Dean Prosser's
involvement in the drafting of the Second Restatement). Section 402A
provides that if a product is defective and that defect causes harm to person
or property, liability will be imposed upon the manufacturer or distributors,

                                       7
                   notwithstanding the manufacturer's or distributors lack of fault and
                   whether or not they were in privity with the plaintiff.5 Thus, Prosser
                   concisely formulated and promulgated the holding in Greenman, and soon
                   after, courts "widely adopted section 402A." Law of Torts, supra, § 450, at
                   894 (noting that some jurisdictions retained implied-warranty theories of
                   recovery).
                                Although policy rationales underpinning the doctrine vary to
                   one degree or another, they are generally consistent and always have the
                   consumer's or ultimate user's ability to recover in mind. See, e.g., Law of
                   Torts, supra, § 450, at 895-96 (citing compensation, loss spreading,

                         5Section 402A provides:

                                (1) One who sells any product in a defective
                                   condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
                                   consumer or to his property is subject to liability
                                   for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
                                   user or consumer, or to his property, if
                                      (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
                                          selling such a product, and
                                      (b)it is expected to and does reach the user or
                                          consumer without substantial change in
                                         the condition in which it sold.
                                (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
                                   although
                                      (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
                                          the preparation and sale of his product,
                                          and
                                   (b)the user or consumer has not bought the
                                      product from or entered into any
                                      contractual relation with the seller.
                   Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (emphases
                   added).
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deterrence, and representation as policy objectives); see also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (same). Likewise, in Calloway v. City of
Reno, the Nevada Supreme Court identified three policy rationales
supporting the doctrine of strict liability: (1) "promot[ing] safety by
eliminating the negligence requirement" (deterrence); (2) "spread[ingl the
costs of damage from dangerously defective products to the consumer by
imposing them on the manufacturer or seller" (loss spreading); and
(3) "concerns about a plaintiffs ability to prove a remote manufacturer's or
seller's negligence (representation and deterrence). 116 Nev. 250, 268, 993
P.2d 1259, 1271 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. Richard, 120
Nev. 240, 241, 89 P.3d 31, 31-32 (2004). Consequently, the rationales are
generally well defined, consistent, and aimed at protecting users and
consumers by providing an avenue of recovery for losses sustained as a
result of defective products.
            Importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court has traditionally
embraced these principles and long recognized that the doctrine of strict
products liability in tort is governed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A. See, e.g., Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 125 Nev. 185, 192-93,
209 P.3d 271, 276 (2009) (stating that "[Ole Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A governs strict product liability"); Calloway, 116 Nev. at 268,
993 P.2d at 1270-71 (referencing and quoting section 402A); see also
Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 441-42, 420 P.2d
855, 857 (1966) (recognizing the doctrine of strict products liability, citing
Dean Prosser).

                                      9
                                     IV.
                                     A.
            With this historical understanding in mind, we now focus our
discussion on the proper method for determining whether an item or good
is a "product" for the singular purpose of applying the doctrine of strict
products liability. The determination of whether something constitutes a
product for purposes of strict liability is a question of law, which is to be
settled by the court. Brooks v. Eugene Burger Mgmt. Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr.
756, 764 (Ct. App. 1989) ("[W]hether or not the subject object or
instrumentality is a 'product is a question of law for the trial court and
subject to de novo review by [the reviewing court] upon appeal."), see also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 19 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1998)
(“[I]n every instance it is for the court to determine as a matter of law
whether something is, or is not, a product.").
            Although courts must determine as a matter of law whether a
particular item or instrumentality is a product for purposes of strict
liability, doing so is not necessarily an elementary undertaking. This is so,
in part, because the Second Restatement does not provide a standard
definition of what constitutes a product. Instead, it employs the policy
objectives referenced above, along with examples of items that ordinarily
would be considered products. Specifically, comment d of section 402A
provides a nonexhaustive list of tangible items to which the doctrine
applies, including "an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a
water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, and an
insecticide," whereas comment c articulates the policy rationales

                                     10
                     underpinning the doctrine.6 Thus, it appears that the drafters assumed
                     that courts would develop the doctrine of strict liability via the common law
                     by applying the policy objectives to the facts of the case presented, while
                     simultaneously using the nonexhaustive list of items and goods in comment
                     d as guideposts to ensure adherence to the doctrine's stated purpose. In
                     other words, section 402A purposely did not provide a precise definition of
                     product and instead supplied the framework for a case-by-case methodology
                     for determining whether an item is or is not a product for purposes of strict
                     liability.
                                                           B.
                                  Notably, the parties fundamentally disagree about what
                     bestows product status upon an item or instrumentality for purposes of
                     imposing strict products liability. Neither the Nevada Legislature nor the
                     Nevada Supreme Court have adopted a fixed or limited definition of
                     "product" in this context, but the supreme court has recognized the policy
                     objectives articulated in section 402A. Calloway, 116 Nev. at 268, 993 P.2d
                     at 1270-71. Nonetheless, our corpus of law contains no clear method for
                     determining whether an item or good is a product as it relates to strict
                     products liability.

                           6Those policy rationales include (1) "that the seller.. . . has
                     undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward . . . the consuming
                     public who may be injured by [its products], (2) "that the public has the
                     right to and does expect . . . that reputable sellers will stand behind their
                     goods"; (3) "that public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries
                     caused by products or consumption be placed upon those who market them,
                     and be treated as cost of production"; and (4) "that the consumer [or user]
                     of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection . . . and the proper
                     persons to afford it are those who market the products." Restatement
                     (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. c (Am. Law Inst. 1965).
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             In the interest of resolving this unanswered question, this court
issued an order directing supplemental briefing and inviting participation
by amicus curiae on the following question: "What is the proper definition
of a product under Nevada products liability law for purposes of strict
liability?" Schueler v. Ad Art, Inc., Docket No. 75688-COA (Order Directing
Supplemental Briefing and Inviting Participation by Amicus Curiae,
August 22, 2019).
             In Schueler's supplemental brief, he argues that this court
should not adopt a standard definition of product and, instead, recommends
a case-by-case approach, focusing on the public policy objectives that
underpin the doctrine of strict liability. The Nevada Justice Association
filed an amicus brief in support of Schueler, wherein it argues for the
adoption of the definition set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Torts. Ad
Art, on the other hand, does not address the question directly—but appears
to argue for a case-by-case inquiry. Additionally, Las Vegas Defense
Lawyers filed an amicus brief and proffered the following definition of a
product: "a manufactured good capable of traveling through interstate
commerce."
             After careful consideration, we conclude that adopting a fixed
definition of product for purposes of strict liability, such as the Third
Restatement's, is not necessary for two reasons. First, applying the policy
objectives articulated in section 402A, including judicial interpretations and
expansions thereof, is sufficient to resolve the question presented, and
therefore, adopting a limited definition of product is unwarranted at this
time.

                                     12
                                Second, and more important, we conclude that utilizing a case-
                   by-case methodology is the more prudent approach. Although some state
                   legislatures have adopted statutory definitions defining what constitutes a
                   product for purposes of strict liability, e.g., Indiana and Washington,7 courts
                   have largely shied away from concentrating on dictionary definitions and
                   instead focused on the doctrines policy objectives. See, e.g., Fluor Corp. v.
                   Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68, 71 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining "that the
                   policy reasons underlying the strict products liability concept should be
                   considered in determining whether something is a producr (internal
                   quotation marks omitted)); Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 365 N.E.2d 923, 928
                   (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (" [W]e are of the belief that the policy reasons underlying
                   the strict products liability concept should be considered in determining
                   whether something is a product within the meaning of . . . the
                   Restatement."). Thus, as a general rule, the doctrines application should
                   be avoided where its policy objectives are not implicated. This is true even
                   in cases where the allegedly defective product is one that would typically
                   fall within the ambit of strict liability, but, for fact-specific reasons, does
                   not. See, e.g., Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp., 653
                   N.E.2d 661, 671-73 (Ohio 1995) (concluding that because the plaintiff was
                   heavily involved in the design and production of the defective product, the
                   imposition of strict liability did not further the doctrine's policy objectives).
                               The case-by-case approach also allows the doctrine to adapt to
                   technological advances, see, e.g., Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d
                   343, 349 (Haw. 1982) ("In order to cope with technological advances, we
                   decline to establish a firm definition of 'product to which the doctrine of

                         7 See Ind. Stat. Ann. § 34-6-2-114 (LexisNexis 2019); Wash. Rev. Code
                   Ann. § 7.72.010 (West 2017).
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   1947a 44013>
                    strict liability applies."), which is particularly beneficial in the current
                    climate where advances in technology occur frequently. Moreover, as
                    mentioned above, the case-by-case approach is consistent with the text and
                    spirit of section 402A of the Second Restatement. Further, the case-by-case
                    approach finds support in our jurisprudence, which focuses on public policy
                    considerations in applying the doctrine of strict liability. See Calloway v.
                    City of Reno, 116 Nev. 250, 268, 993 P.2d 1259, 1271 (2000) (citing Prosser
                    and Keeton and discussing policy rationales).
                                Accordingly, we conclude that the case-by-case approach is the
                    superior methodology because it is versatile, permitting courts to analyze
                    each case individually and adjust to changes in technology, and because it
                    is consistent with the text and purpose of section 402A. Therefore, when
                    determining whether an item or instrumentality is a product that falls
                    within the scope of strict products liability, courts must apply section 402A
                    of the Second Restatement, including the public policy objectives of the
                    doctrine as well as the relevant precedents interpreting section 402A.
                                This is not to say, of course, that courts are never permitted to
                    use appropriate definitions as guidance when determining whether an item
                    is indeed a product for purposes of strict liability. A court, for example, may
                    find useful the definition of product found in the Restatement (Third) of
                    Torts, which states that "[a] product is tangible personal property
                    distributed commercially for use or consumption. Other items, such as real
                    property and electricity, are products when the context of their distribution
                    and use is sufficiently analogous to [that] of tangible personal property."
                    Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod. Liab. § 19 (Am. Law Inst. 1998).
                    Nevertheless, while this or a similar definition may be beneficial to a court
                    when utilizing the case-by-case approach, it is not a shortcut for avoiding

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consideration of the policy objectives discussed above. Accordingly, if a
court chooses to employ such a definition to assist it in determining whether
an item or good is a product for purposes of strict liability, that court must
still apply the relevant policy objectives of section 402A to establish whether
the item is or is not a product within the meaning of the doctrine of strict
products liability.

                                      V.
            Having concluded that the case-by-case approach in accordance
with section 402A is the best method for determining whether the MGM
pylon sign constitutes a product within the meaning of the doctrine of strict
products liability, we now turn to the merits of the dispute. On appeal,
Schueler argues that the district court erred when it granted Ad Art's
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Schueler contends that the
district court incorrectly determined that the MGM pylon sign is not a
product for purposes of strict product liability. Relying on Calloway, as well
as various extra-jurisdictional cases, Ad Art asserts that the district court
correctly found that the MGM sign is not a product for purposes of strict
liability, and therefore, the district court properly granted summary
judgment in its favor.
            In analyzing Ad Art's motion for reconsideration on its motion
for summary judgment, the district court accepted Ad Art's reasoning that
the sign was not a product and concluded that " [t]he question of whether
the MGM Pylon is a product" for purposes of strict liability turned on the
supreme court's holding in Calloway. The district court went on to find that
the Calloway court "held that townhomes 'were not products for purposes of
strict products liability,'" and that "Mlle Calloway court specifically
overruled [Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971)1 with respect

                                     15
                   to its application of strict products liability." The district court also
                   concluded, relying on Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 807 N.E.2d 480
                   (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (component parts), and Dayberry v. City of East Helena,
                   80 P.3d 1218 (Mont. 2003) (municipal swimming pool), that indivisible
                   component parts, "such as bricks, supporting beams, and railings," are
                   exempt from the doctrine of strict liability, and because "the MGM Pylon
                   sign is [a] one of a kind object and not mass produced," it is not in the stream
                   of commerce and thus "not a product for strict liability purposes."
                                                         A.
                               We conclude that the district court misinterpreted and
                   misapplied Calloway's holding. In Calloway, a group of homeowners filed a
                   class action suit against the project developer, general contractor, various
                   subcontractors, and the City of Reno, alleging construction defect claims in
                   warranty, negligence, and strict products liability. 116 Nev. at 254, 993
                   P.2d at 1261-62. The subcontractors and the City moved for summary
                   judgment on the claims against them. Id. at 255, 271, 993 P.2d at 1262,
                   1272. The district court granted the motion as to the negligence claims,
                   reasoning that the economic loss doctrine barred the claims sounding in
                   negligence "and that [the homeowners] had to rely on their contractual
                   remedies to recover for economic losses."       Id.   The district court also
                   summarily dismissed the homeowners strict liability claims against the
                   subcontractors and the City on the basis that "a townhouse is not a product."
                   Id. at 255, 268, 993 P.2d at 1262, 1270.
                               Thereafter, the homeowners settled their claims against the
                   developer and general contractor but appealed the district court's ruling as
                   to the subcontractors and the City. Id. at 255, 993 P.2d at 1262-63. On

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appeal, the supreme court affirmed the district court, explaining that since
the homeowners losses were purely economic, the doctrine of strict liability
was unavailable because "its application is limited to personal injury and
property damage." Id. at 268, 993 P.2d at 1270 (quoting Culinary Workers
Union, Local No. 226 v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (1982)).
Furthermore, the court concluded, "we agree with the district coures
conclusion, in this instance, that the townhouses are not 'products' for
purposes of strict products liability." Id. (emphasis added). As evidenced
by the court's qualifying language, "in this instance," the holding in
Calloway is narrow and confined to the specific facts of that case, and does
not, as the district court concluded here, stand for the broad proposition that
townhouses are never products for purposes of strict liability.
            In reasoning that Calloway excludes buildings from the
doctrine of strict liability, both the district court and Ad Art appear to rely
on the court's discussion of buildings as products (or non-products) and its
overruling of Worrell. This reliance, however, is misplaced. To be sure, the
Calloway court did explain that "fs}ome courts have concluded that a
building can constitute a 'produce under strict products liability," whereas
others "have concluded that strict products liability does not apply to
buildings." Id. at 268-69, 993 P.2d at 1271. And although the court cited
authorities regarding both legal theories, it did not opine on which method
is better, nor did it expressly incorporate either approach into Nevada law.
Instead, the court immediately segued into its discussion of Worrell v.
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971)—a case involving a contractor

                                     17
who, during a remodeling project, installed a leaky gas line fitting in the
plaintiffs home that failed and caused fire damage.8
             Ultimately, the Calloway court overruled Worrell, holding that
"[t]he contractor who installed the gas line fitting [there] should not have
been subject to the doctrine of strict products liability" because he was "not
engaged in the business of 'manufacturing or selline the defective
product—i.e., the gas line fitting—which section 402A of the Restatement
requires. Calloway, 116 Nev. at 270-71, 993 P.2d at 1272. Thus, the fact
that Worrell involved a building was collateral to the court's holding, as the
issue turned on whether the contractor was a seller or manufacturer of the
faulty product, and the Calloway court concluded he was not, hence the
overruling. In other words, the court overruled Worrell not strictly because
the case involved a building, but because the contractor, who simply
installed the gas line fitting, was not a seller or manufacturer and should
have never been subjected to a strict products liability claim.
             In addition, the Calloway court's primary ground for affirming
the district court's refusal to apply the doctrine of strict products liability

      81n Worrell, a homeowner hired a contractor to do some remodeling,
which "consisted of some carpentry work and the connection of various
appliances in the house to an already existing liquefied petroleum gas
system." 87 Nev. at 205, 484 P.2d at 574. The contractor did not supply the
appliances, but the project required him to install a gas line for a new water
heater. Id. As it turned out, however, the gas line had a leaky fitting, and
the leak eventually caused a fire that damaged the house and personal
property therein. Id. at 206, 484 P.2d at 574-75. The homeowner sued the
contractor for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Id. at 206,
484 P.2d at 575. The district court dismissed the strict liability and
warranty claims, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant on the
negligence claim. Id. On appeal, the supreme court reversed. Id. at 208-
09, 484 P.2d at 576.

                                      18
was based on the economic loss doctrine, not the nature of the product itself
(i.e., townhomes). As the court noted, "[t]he doctrine of strict products
liability was developed to assist plaintiffs who could not prove that products
which caused physical injury at the point of use had been manufactured
negligently." Calloway, 116 Nev. at 268, 993 P.2d at 1270 (alteration in
original) (quoting Local Joint Exec. Bd. v. Stern, 98 Nev. 409, 411, 651 P.2d
637, 638 (1982)). But, where a plaintiff seeks to recover purely economic
losses, the doctrine of strict liability is unavailable because "its application
is limited to personal injury and property damage [other than the product
itself]." Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the "appellants seek
to recover purely economic loss with respect to the defective townhouses,"
the district court correctly dismissed their strict liability claims pursuant to
the economic loss doctrine. Id. Only after reaching this conclusion did the
court conclude that "[m]oreover, we agree with the district coures
conclusion, in this instance, that the townhouses are not 'products for
purposes of strict products liability." Id. (emphasis added). Calloway's
holding therefore can be reduced to three components: (1) parties alleging
only economic loss cannot invoke the doctrine of strict products liability and
instead must rely on warranty claims, 116 Nev. at 268, 993 P.2d at 1270;
(2) strict products liability claims are viable only against those who are
engaged in the business of selling or manufacturing the defective product
in question; and (3) "the structures at issue in [that] case [were] not
'products' for purposes of strict products liability," id. at 254, 993 P.2d at
1261.

                                      19
            Accordingly, there is no language in               Calloway      that
unequivocally and categorically removes buildings, or manufacturers
thereof, from the ambit of strict products liability, and there certainly is no
language that addresses large commercial fixtures such as the sign at issue
here. However, even if Calloway did stand for the proposition that buildings
are not products in the context of strict liability, it would be inapposite here
because this case involves a sign (albeit a large one), and not a building
designed for human occupancy like the townhouses in Calloway.                 As
Schueler noted during oral argument, although the 150-foot tall pylon is
permanently affixed to a concrete foundation, the sign itself can be removed
from the top of the pylon and transported elsewhere, something generally
not true of buildings or residential homes. Thus, to the extent that
Calloway precludes buildings from the application of strict products
liability, we decline to expand its holding, as the district court did, to
conclude that the MGM pylon sign is akin to a commercial or residential
building, thereby precluding the application of strict products liability.
                                      B.
            Applying this understanding of Calloway to the instant case,
we hold that the district court's conclusion that the MGM pylon sign is not
a product for purposes of strict products liability fails as a matter of law.
First, the district court's conclusion that the MGM pylon sign is not a
product is predicated on the premise that, under Calloway, buildings (e.g.,
townhomes) are exempt from the doctrine of strict liability. As explained,
Calloway does not demand such a conclusion. Even if Calloway did permit
such an inference, however, the district court's conclusion would still be
erroneous because the MGM pylon sign is a commercial sign, not a building
intended or designed for human occupancy. And neither Ad Art nor the

                                      20
district court cited to any relevant or persuasive authority supporting the
supposition that commercial pylon signs are significantly analogous to
buildings so as to remove them from the sphere of strict liability. In fact,
Ad Art failed to cite any authority which states that large commercial signs
or the like ought to be treated as buildings for purposes of strict liability.
See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d
1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (rejecting arguments that are not supported by
relevant authority). Nor is this court aware of any authority that has
reached that or a similar conclusion. Moreover, unlike a building or home,
the sign itself can be detached from the steel pylon on which it rests, moved
somewhere else, and replaced with a different sign mounted on top of the
same pylon.
            Second, Schueler is not claiming only economic loss. Indeed, his
complaint alleges that he fell 150 feet while servicing the pylon sign,
resulting in serious bodily injury. Third, Ad Art built and sold the pylon
sign to MGM, and Ad Art was in the business of selling and manufacturing
commercial signs. Unlike the defendants in Calloway or Worrell, Ad Art
was not simply a subcontractor or installer of component parts. On the
contrary, the 1993 work permit lists Ad Art as the general contractor, and
the record further indicates that Ad Art built, sold, and designed the MGM
pylon sign. Therefore, the district court misapplied Calloway when it
granted summary judgment for Ad Art.
                                     C.
            The district court also committed legal error when it concluded
that because "the MGM Pylon sign is [al one of a kind object and not mass
produced," it is not in the stream of commerce and thus "not a product for

                                     21
strict liability purposes."9 Contrary to the district coures conclusion, a
product need not be mass-produced to be in the stream of commerce, nor are
unique products excluded from the realm of strict liability. The term stream
of commerce does not appear in the Restatement Second, and generally, "the
phrase has been used by courts to make the distinction between the one
time or casual seller to whom strict products liability does not apply and a
defendant engaged in the business of selling products." Boddie v. Litton
Unit Handling Sys., 455 N.E.2d 142, 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also 63 Am.
Jur. 2d Products Liability § 658 (1997). In this case, Ad Art was engaged in
the business of making and selling commercial signs; therefore, its products
are inescapably in the stream of commerce.
            Furthermore, the great weight of authority rejects the notion
that unique or custom-made items or goods are not products for purposes of
strict liability, especially where, as here, the defendant builds and sells such
products in the ordinary course of its business. See, e.g., Wirth v. Clark
Equip. Co., 457 F.2d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 1972) ("We think that the custom-
built concept need not be fatal to the plaintiffs case . . . , [as] the basic
structure of the machine here concerned was . . . developed and advertised
by the defendant."); Munhoven v. Northwind Marine, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d
1072, 1074 (D. Alaska 2005) (relying on section 402A, the court rejected
defendanfs argument that a skiff was not a product for purposes of strict

      9Insofar as Ad Art or the district court suggest that the pylon sign has
been integrated into the hotel or casino, we reject this argument. See
Calloway, 116 Nev. at 271 n.5, 993 P.2d at 1272 n.5; Keck v. Dryvit Sys.,
Inc., 830 So. 2d 1, 7 (Ala. 2002); see also Martens, 807 N.E.2d at 493-94.
Moreover, because we conclude the sign is not a building, the Alucobond
flooring of the sign is not an indivisible component part of a building that
works to exempt the pylon sign from the doctrine of strict liability.

                                      22
                   liability because it was custom and not mass produced, holding "Mhere is
                   nothing in Alaskan law, nor the Restatement, imposing such a
                   requirement"); Boddie, 455 N.E.2d at 149 (concluding that a custom
                   conveyor system was a product for purposes of strict liability because the
                   defendant was engaged in the business of selling such products and
                   marketed them to buyers); Sprung v. MTR Ravensburg, Inc., 788 N.E.2d
                   620, 623-24 (N.Y. 2003) (holding that the defendant was not a casual seller
                   because "the product was built for market sale in the regular course of the
                   manufacturer's business," despite the fact that it was one-time, custom
                   fabrication); see also 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 658 (1997)
                   (explaining there is no requirement that the product "be mass-produced or
                   widely marketed, and it is sufficient if a seller is engaged in the business of
                   selling a product, and markets it to a buyer for the buyer's use).
                                Here, Ad Art was engaged in the business of selling and
                   producing commercial signs, it marketed those signs to buyers, and, as
                   shown supra, a product's classification as unique, custom, or one-of-a-kind
                   will not by itself remove it from the doctrine of strict liability. Further,
                   accepting such an argument in this context would potentially lead to absurd
                   results. This is so because, to one degree or another, most commercial signs
                   are inherently unique since they are designed to conform to the
                   specifications of a particular building or piece of real estate and adorned
                   with a business's precise (and perhaps unique) font and logo. Thus, this
                   proposition, if taken to its logical conclusion, would largely insulate
                   commercial sign manufacturers from claims sounding in strict liability,
                   which surely is incon.sistent with the doctrine's intent; nor is it a proposition
                   that this court is willing to endorse.

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             Therefore, we hold that large commercial signs, such as the
MGM pylon sign, are products for purposes of strict liability, when, as here,
the sign was designed, manufactured, and sold by a party engaged in the
business of selling and manufacturing such signs. Furthermore, that a
product is custom-made is not sufficient on its own to remove it from the
province of strict liability.1°
             Accordingly, Schueler's cause of action sounding in strict
products liability is, on its face, viable as against Ad Art because the pylon
sign qualifies as a product pursuant to the application of section 402A.
Simply stated, Ad Art, as the manufacturer and seller of the MGM pylon
sign, cannot avoid the imposition of strict liability by arguing the sign is not
a "produce when it was in the business of manufacturing and selling
commercial signs.
                                      VI.
             Ad Art nevertheless urges this court to affirm the district
court's summary judgment order, positing that the policy objectives of strict
liability would not be furthered by concluding that the MGM pylon sign is a
product for purposes of strict liability, and that because the pylon sign is an
immovable real estate fixture, it is exempt from strict products liability. We
disagree.
             In Calloway, the Supreme Court of Nevada identified three
policy objectives and rationales underpinning the doctrine of strict liability:
(1) "promot[ing] safety by eliminating the negligence requirement,"

      1°We recognize, however, that not all large, commercial signs are
automatically products for purposes of applying strict liability, and we can
imagine scenarios involving different facts and circumstances where a sign
similar to the one at issue in this case may not be considered a product for
purposes of strict liability.

                                      24
                   (2) "spread[ing] the costs of damage from dangerously defective products to
                   the consumer by imposing them on the manufacturer or seller," and
                   (3) removing "concerns about a plaintiffs ability to prove a remote
                   manufacturer's or seller's negligence." Calloway, 116 Nev. at 268, 993 P.2d
                   at 1271; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. Law In.st. 1965).
                   Applying these public policy objectives to this case, we conclude that the
                   MGM sign qualifies as a product for purposes of applying strict liability,
                   contrary to Ad Art's position, as explained more fully below.
                                                        A.
                               Ad Art first contends, and the district court agreed, that the
                   application of strict liability would not promote safety in this instance
                   because "MGM was involved in every aspect of the [sign's] design, and it
                   was not simply the creation of [Ad Art]." This assertion, however, is
                   unsupported by the record, and therefore, this finding is clearly erroneous.
                   Allyn v. McDonald, 112 Nev. 68, 72, 910 P.2d 263, 266 (1996) (rejecting a
                   district court's findings of fact in a summary judgment order where the
                   findings were clearly erroneous).
                               At the time the MGM pylon sign was originally designed and
                   constructed, Terry Long was Ad Art's president. During Long's deposition,
                   he testified that he recalled discussing the sign's development and design
                   with MGM's point man on the project, Fred Benninger. Although
                   Benninger was the point man, nothing in the record suggests that he was
                   involved in the sign's design. In fact, Long testified that it was Ad Art's
                   employees, not MGM's, who oversaw the project's development, including
                   structural integrity and design. While other contractors laid the concrete
                   foundation and assisted in erecting the steel pylon, Ad Art manufactured
                   the sign itself and was responsible for mounting it on top of the pylon. More

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specifically, Long testified that Gordon Kitto was the project manager, Paul
Brengle was the engineer, and Jack Dubois was the designer, all of whom
were employed by Ad Art. Long testified further that the sign was
fabricated in sections at Ad Art's facility in Stockton, California, and then
shipped by truck to Las Vegas and assembled on MGM's property, which
Long stated "was done by our people."11 Long clarified this point later
noting that "we sold the sign to MGM. They paid us. We erected the sign.
They paid us for the sign in full." Thus, the record does not support the
finding that "MGM was involved in every aspect of the [sign's] design."
            With this in mind, permitting Ad Art to be sued under a theory
of strict products liability does in fact further the doctrines safety objective.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., the California Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of
injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves." 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
Imposing this cost on manufacturers creates an incentive to produce safer
products.    This imposition is justified because "the seller.. . . has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward . . . the consuming
public who may be injured by [its products]." Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A cmt. c.
            Here, Ad Art was in the business of manufacturing and
designing commercial signs. The record demonstrates that Ad Art
manufactured, designed, and sold a commercial sign to MGM, releasing its
product into the stream of commerce and thus assuming a duty toward the

     11During his deposition, Long stated that the sign was fabricated in
sections, although he could not recall how many.

                                      26
                   ultimate user. The ultimate user in this case, Schueler, suffered bodily
                   injury from Ad Art's allegedly defective product while he was servicing the
                   sign for MGM. See, e.g., Restatement Second § 402A cmt. 1 (providing that
                   strict liability extends to agents or employees of the purchaser of a defective
                   product). Furthermore, Schueler was entitled to assume that the product
                   was fit for its ordinary use, and Ad Art should have known that the sign
                   would be used without inspection for defects. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900
                   ("A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
                   market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
                   to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."). Therefore, the
                   imposition of strict liability as to Ad Art does further the doctrines safety
                   objective.
                                                         B.
                                Ad Art also contends that because of the pylon sign's unique
                   nature, it had no opportunity to spread costs. In support of this argument,
                   Ad Art cites to Queen City Terminals, Inc. v. General American Transport
                   Corp., 653 N.E.2d 661, 673 (Ohio 1995), contending that, similar to the
                   defendant in Queen City, it was in no better a position to assume the costs
                   associated with injury than MGM because the pylon sign was not a mass-
                   scale enterprise. We conclude, however, that Queen City is distinguishable.
                                In   Queen City, the defendant (Trinity, Inc.), which
                   manufactured the allegedly defective products (train cars), had only limited
                   involvement in the produces design. 653 N.E.2d at 665, 772. In fact, the
                   train cars were developed by a company called GATX, which "own [ed] the
                   design and [retained the] sole right to manufacture" the cars. Id. at 672.
                   GATX commissioned Trinity to manufacture the train cars as part of a one-
                   time commission. Id. Thus, Trinity had never previously built the GATX

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                    train cars, nor is it clear that it had ever built anything comparable. Id.
                    Therefore, Trinity was not engaged in the business of making or selling the
                    particular product in question, and indeed only manufactured the train cars
                    as part of a one-time commission. As a result, Trinity had no opportunity
                    to spread costs. The Queen City court also noted that the plaintiffs "experts
                    were heavily involved in the manufacturing process." Id. (emphasis added).
                    Specifically, plaintiffs experts "requested and received plans for the [train
                    cars], and subsequently "subjected [those plans] to . . . scrutiny," which
                    involved examination by hundreds of engineers and outside consultants. Id.
                    at 672-73.
                                 By contrast, the record in this case indicates that Ad Art
                    fabricated the pylon sign, transported it to Las Vegas in sections, and
                    installed it, which "was done by [Ad Art's] people." The record also shows
                    that Ad Art, not MGM, was heavily involved in the sign's design. And
                    unlike the Queen City defendant, it is beyond doubt that Ad Art was in the
                    business of making, selling, and designing commercial signs that were
                    similar to the one in question. As a result, Ad Art had the opportunity and
                    the incentive to design and develop safe products, as well as the occasion to
                    spread costs.
                                 Furthermore, Ad Art's reliance on Queen City stretches the case
                    beyond its logical bounds, as the court's holding is fact specific. In
                    particular, the court stated that "[t]his holding is not meant to be a panacea
                    for all manufacturers of defective products, but is instead intended to
                    address the rare fcwtual circumstance where the purchaser and lessee of a
                    product are heavily involved in the manufacturing process of the defective
                    item." Id. at 673 (emphasis added). Here, the record does not support the
                    proposition that MGM was "heavily involved in the manufacturing process"

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(01 i94711 46101.
of the pylon sign. Therefore, we conclude that the analogy to Queen City is
inapposite.
                                      C.
              Ad Art further contends that because the sign was custom-built,
it was in no better position than MGM to know of the manufacturer's
negligence. As already articulated, this argument is unsupported by the
record and relevant authorities. Under Calloway, the third policy objective
of strict products liability focuses on "concerns about a plaintiffs ability to
prove a remote manufacturer's or seller's negligence." 116 Nev. at 268, 993
P.2d at 1271. Here, Ad Ares employees designed and engineered the MGM
pylon sign. The sign was then fabricated in sections at Ad Ares facility in
Stockton, California, and then shipped by truck to Las Vegas where it was
assembled "by [Ad Ares] people."
              Furthermore, there is nothing in the record indicating that
MGM or its employees were heavily involved in the sign's manufacturing or
design. Indeed, the record supports a contrary conclusion by demonstrating
that Ad Art was significantly involved in every step of the process, including
design, production, delivery, and installation. Thus, neither Schueler nor
MGM were in a position "to prove that a particular party in the product-
supply chain . . . failed to exercise due care." Graham, Strict Products
Liability, supra, at 568-69. Therefore, we are unpersuaded by Ad Ares
arguments and conclude that the application of strict products liability in
this instance does further the policy objectives of the doctrine.
                                     VII.
              Finally, at oral argument, Ad Art theorized that the pylon sign
is more akin to an immovable real estate fixture and therefore exempt from
strict products liability. We also find this argument unpersuasive. First,

                                      29
                    fixtures are not exempt from the doctrine of strict liability. See, e.g., In re
                    Eighth Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 N.E.3d 891, 901 (N.Y. 2019)
                    ("[T]he fact that something is taxable as real property does not render it
                    outside the realrn of strict liability.      In fact, other affixed taxable real
                    property under the Real Property Tax Law, such as elevators and large
                    turbines, have nevertheless been subject to strict products liability
                    claims . . . ." (emphasis added)); Keck, 830 So. 2d at 6 (explaining that items
                    that are not "part of the structural integrity of the house or buildine are
                    products for purposes of strict liability); Boddie, 455 N.E.2d at 149
                    (concluding that a custom conveyor system housed in a factory was a
                    product for purposes of strict liability).
                                 Second, there is no evidence demonstrating that the sign is now
                    suddenly immovable. Indeed, the record clearly establishes that Ad Art
                    manufactured the pylon sign in California and then transported it to Las
                    Vegas in sections, where it was fully assembled and installed at Ad Art's
                    direction atop the pylon. And, at oral argument, Ad Art acknowledged that
                    the sign could indeed be moved. It stands to reason, therefore, that even
                    though it may be difficult and expensive, the sign could be dismantled from
                    the pylon and moved once again. In fact, if MGM ever sold its hotel casino
                    to another owner to operate under another name, one can imagine that the
                    new operator would do exactly that: remove MGM's sign and mount its own
                    sign on top of the existing pylon.
                                And last, whether or not the sign is movable is not dispositive
                    of the ultimate legal question. By focusing on transportability, Ad Art
                    appears to imply that strict liability applies only to personal chattels, as

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                    contrasted with real chattels (i.e., fixtures).12 But the Second Restatement
                    does not limit the application of strict liability to personal chattels, nor can
                    such a restraint be inferred from the text. Notably, comment a of section
                    402A states that this section deals with "suppliers of chattels," making no
                    distinction between personal and real chattels, and comment d strongly
                    indicates that fixtures (i.e., real chattels) are squarely within the
                    contemplation of section 402A.13 Thus, we reject the notion that fixtures
                    are necessarily immune from claims sounding in strict products liability.14

                          12Chattel, Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) (defining chattel as
                    "[a]n article of personal property; any species of property not amounting to
                    a freehold or fee in land," and distinguishing personal chattels from real
                    chattels); see also Real Chattels, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ("An
                    interest in real estate less than a freehold or fee. See also Fixtures.").
                          13Comment d states, "the rule stated [herein] applies to . . . a water
                    heater [and] a gas stove." Cf Fixture, Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)
                    ("Goods are fixtures when they become so related to particular real estate
                    that an interest in them arises under real estate law; e.g., a furnace affixed
                    to a house or other building.").
                          14We also reject Ad Art's reliance on Dayberry v. City of East Helena,
                    80 P.3d 1218 (Mont. 2003), which held that a municipal swimming pool was
                    not a product for purposes of strict products liability, and conclude that
                    Dayberry is distinguishable from the instant case on the facts and the law.
                    In particular, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court,
                    concluding that the municipal swimming pool was not a product for
                    purposes of strict liability because it was "not in the stream of commerce
                    and [was] neither mass-produced [n]or prefabricated." Id. at 1221. But, as
                    already discussed, mass production is not a requirement of section 402A,
                    and moreover, the plaintiff in Dayberry sued the City of East Helena, not
                    the pool's manufacturer. 80 P.3d at 1219. Thus, consistent with the
                    requirements of section 402A, the claim in Dayberry was not viable against
                    the city because the city was not engaged in the business of making or
                    selling swimming pools. Finally, there is no general consensus among
                    courts that pools are not products for purposes of strict liability. See, e.g.,
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                                                         ****

                                Accordingly, we conclude that the MGM pylon sign is a product
                   within the meaning of strict products liability, as the pylon sign falls
                   directly within the contemplation of section 402A of the Second
                   Restatement of Torts.15 More specifically, large commercial signs, such as
                   the MGM pylon sign, are products for purposes of strict liability, where, as
                   here, they are designed, manufactured, and sold by a party engaged in the
                   business of selling and manufacturing such signs. Further, to the extent
                   that the pylon sign was custom-made for MGM, this alone is insufficient to
                   remove it from the sphere of strict liability, especially because the public
                   policy considerations for applying the doctrine of strict products liability in
                   this case have been satisfied. Therefore, we reverse the district court's

                   Duggan v. Hallmark Pool Mfg. Co., 398 N.W.2d 175, 178 (Iowa 1986)
                   (concluding that the trial court did not err when it submitted to the jury
                   plaintiffs strict liability claim against a pool manufacturer), superseded by
                   statute on other grounds as recognized in Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d
                   224, 230 (Iowa 1992); see also DeCrosta v. A. Reynolds Constr. & Supply
                   Corp., 375 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (App. Div. 1975) (providing that the
                   swimming-pool contractor came within the class of persons who could be
                   held responsible on a theory of strict products liability). However, even if
                   we were inclined to accept the proposition that an in-ground swimming pool,
                   like the one in Dayberr y, is not subject to the doctrine of strict liability, Ad
                   Art has not adequately explained how Dayberry analogizes to the facts of
                   this case—which involves a pylon sign, not a near-permanent in-ground
                   pool. Accordingly, we conclude that any reliance on Dayberry is misplaced.

                          15In so doing, we express no opinion regarding the viability of
                   Schueler's claim generally. Instead, we conclude only that the MGM sign
                   is a product for purposes of strict liability, and therefore, as a matter of law,
                   Schueler's claim cannot be defeated on this basis.

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summary judgment in Ad Art's favor and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.16

                                    Bulla

We concur:

                             , C.J.
Gibbons

Tao

      16Insofar as the parties raised arguments that are not specifically
addressed in this opinion, we have considered the same and conclude that
they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the
disposition of this appeal.

                                      33