Court Opinion

ID: 9384699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 18:06:18.058971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.792002
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Haywood, 2023-Ohio-1121.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COLUMBIANA COUNTY

                                         STATE OF OHIO,

                                         Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                  TERRANCE L. HAYWOOD,

                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 21 CO 0035

                                 Criminal Appeal from the
                     Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio
                                  Case No. 2020 CR 436

                                          BEFORE:
                  Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                              JUDGMENT:
                                                Affirmed.

Atty. Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General and Atty. Micah R. Ault, Assistant Ohio Attorney
General, 615 West Superior Avenue, 11th Floor, Cleveland, Ohio 44113, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Atty. James R. Wise, 91 West Taggart, P.O. Box 85, East Palestine, Ohio 44413, for
Defendant-Appellant.

                                       Dated: March 31, 2023
                                                                                          –2–

WAITE, J.

       {¶1}    Appellant Terrance L. Haywood was convicted by a jury for the murder of

his former girlfriend Destiny Moody and Appellant was sentenced to twenty-four years to

life in prison. On appeal, he raises five assignments of error. His first assignment of

error, relating to the testimony of the victim's minor son, alleges that the trial court failed

to conduct a thorough in camera voir dire of the child prior to trial. While Appellant is

correct, due to the other extensive evidence proving Appellant's guilt the error does not

rise to the level of prejudicial and reversible error. Appellant also argues that video

evidence did not have a proper foundation, admonitions to the jury to refrain from talking

about the case were insufficient, Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective, and that there

was cumulative error at trial requiring reversal. There is no merit to any of these other

arguments, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                       Factual History

       {¶2}    On October 21, 2019, twenty-six-year-old Destiny Moody, the victim in this

case, was working at McDonald's in Wellsville, Ohio. She ended her shift at 11:39 p.m.

and drove the short distance to her apartment at 407 Main Street in Wellsville. Her friend

Citasia Tisdale was watching Moody's two children at Moody's apartment while the victim

was at work.

       {¶3}    Appellant had been dating Moody for about a year and one-half, and was

staying at her apartment. Appellant is not the father of Moody's children. On or about

September 22, 2019, Appellant was with Moody at a bar in West Virginia. Apparently the

two argued, and he hit her until she was unconscious and fell to the ground. (10/21/21

Tr., p. 843.) A few days before the shooting, Moody told two of her friends that if anything

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                         –3–

happened to her, to look to Appellant as the perpetrator. (10/20/21 Tr., p. 673; 10/21/21

Tr., p. 858.)

       {¶4}     Appellant spent the evening of October 21, 2019, with Michelle Byers at the

New Dimension Bar in East Liverpool. They left the bar in separate cars on October 22,

2019 at 12:20 a.m. Appellant was driving a 2008 GMC Acadia SUV. They drove their

cars to the victim's apartment in Wellsville and arrived at 12:29 a.m. Byers then continued

on to her own home.

       {¶5}     A few minutes after arriving at the victim's apartment, Appellant left to pick

up two friends one block away. Appellant drove them to a location a short distance away.

Appellant returned to the victim's apartment at 1:16 a.m.

       {¶6}     At 2:21 a.m., a surveillance camera from Cindy Mick's house across the

street from the victim's apartment captured the sound of a gunshot being fired. Seconds

later, a surveillance camera from My Bar, also across the street from the victim's

apartment, recorded Appellant running out of the back of her apartment. Both of these

cameras also recorded Appellant kicking in the front door of the victim's apartment at 2:32

a.m. A shoe print taken from the victim's front door had the same tread size and design

as Appellant's. Surveillance footage also captured Appellant hiding numerous items in

an alley behind the house.

       {¶7}     Five phone calls were made from Moody's cellphone between 2:44 a.m.

and 2:54 a.m.

       {¶8}     Citasia Tisdale gave contradictory testimony about the events around the

time of the murder. She had an arrangement with the victim that they would from time to

time watch each other's children, and she was watching two of the victim's children, along

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      –4–

with her own daughter, the night of the murder. She testified that she was awake well

past 3:00 a.m., but claimed to know nothing of the murder, which occurred at 2:21 a.m.,

until she awoke the next morning. She claimed to have found Moody in the morning lying

on the first floor with a head wound, not moving. Tisdale showed no emotion when the

police arrived. She did not tell the police that she had contacted Appellant that night

through text messages and phone calls several times prior to calling 911, but she did later

admit to that at trial. She also communicated with Appellant on Facebook, but then

deleted the messages. One message stated: “Remove these messages when we are

done.” (10/19/21 Tr., p. 473.) In another message Appellant asked Tisdale to find some

guns he had left at Moody's apartment. (10/19/21 Tr., p. 474.) Tisdale called 911 at

10:06 a.m. that morning.

       {¶9}   The police arrived quickly. The victim had a bullet wound on the right side

of her forehead and had no pulse. The police found a shell casing on the floor. They

found that the front door had been kicked in, and the door had a shoe impression on it.

They took a print of the shoe impression.

       {¶10} Police recovered a firearm holster lying near the victim's body. The holster

was sent to the state BCI lab for DNA analysis, and resulted in a match with Appellant's

DNA.

       {¶11} Moody and Appellant had engaged in numerous arguments prior to the

murder, and Moody had been trying to get Appellant to move out of the apartment. When

Moody arrived home from work the night prior to her death, she posted a message on

Facebook that she was single.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      –5–

      {¶12} A few hours after the murder Appellant went to the house of a former

girlfriend, Sadie Allen. Appellant told Allen that he had been to Moody's house after going

to the New Dimension Bar and that he and Moody had been arguing.

      {¶13} Several days after the murder, the police searched the alley behind Moody's

apartment and found a firearm, a gun magazine, and a bag of ammunition. Police

returned the next day and recovered a firearm from the roof of a neighbor's garage. The

firearm from the roof was identified as the murder weapon.          Investigators located

photographs of both weapons on Appellant's Facebook page.

      {¶14} There is an overwhelming amount of video evidence in this case. Police

recovered surveillance video from My Bar across the street from the victim's apartment.

It captured much of what happened outside the victim's residence the night of the murder.

Appellant was identified in that video as the person arriving in the GMC Acadia at Moody's

apartment.

      {¶15} Police also recovered video from Nick's Pizza, which is a few doors away

from the victim's apartment. Additionally, police recovered video from the Fraternal Order

of Eagles in Wellsville, which is a short distance from the victim's apartment. Police

recovered video from Kwik King convenience store, located close to the victim's

apartment. Again, police recovered video from the New Dimension Bar in East Liverpool.

These videos tracked the movements of Appellant and his vehicle that evening as well as

the movements of various witnesses.

      {¶16} Police recovered video from the Wellsville High School football stadium.

Witness Sadie Allen's home was recorded in this video. The video showed Appellant's

GMC Acadia at Allen's home the morning after the murder.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       –6–

       {¶17} A few months after the murder, the victim's minor son J.M. told his uncle

Dustin Emler that “[h]is daddy shot his mommy.” (Tr., p. 872.) A week later, J.M. drew a

picture of a woman with a pool of blood around her and J.M. said “she got shot.” (Tr., p.

873.) Many months later, J.M. told social worker Courtney Wilson that “his dad shot her.”

(Tr., p. 899.) J.M. told Wilson that he saw his mom lying on the ground in a great deal of

blood, that he had heard his mom and dad arguing, and that he saw a gun. J.M. was four

years old at the time. At trial, J.M. could not identify Appellant in the courtroom, but did

identify a photo of Appellant as his dad.

                                       Case History

       {¶18} On November 18, 2020, Appellant was indicted on the following five counts:

murder pursuant to R.C. 2903.02(A), and unclassified felony, with a firearm specification;

aggravated burglary pursuant to R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), a first degree felony, with a firearm

specification; tampering with evidence under R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), third degree felony; and

having a weapon while under a disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), third degree

felony. A five-day trial commenced on October 18, 2021. Before jury selection, the state

dismissed the aggravated burglary charge and the corresponding gun specification. On

October 22, 2021, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all remaining charges and

specifications. On November 3, 2021, the court sentenced Appellant to fifteen years to

life in prison on the murder conviction, three years consecutive on the firearm

specification, three years consecutive for tampering with evidence, and three years

consecutive for having a weapon under a disability. The total sentence was twenty-four

years to life in prison. The sentencing judgment entry was filed on November 4, 2021.

The notice of appeal was filed on November 12, 2021.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                             –7–

       {¶19} Appellant presents five assignments of error on appeal.

                              ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE TESTIMONY OF [J.M.].

       {¶20} On August 2, 2021, the court held an in camera hearing to determine the

competency of J.M., the victim's six-year-old son, to testify about events he witnessed

when the crime occurred. J.M. was four years old at the time of the crime. J.M. testified

at trial that his "dad" shot his mommy. (Tr., p. 882.) Appellant is not J.M.'s biological or

legal father. It is this testimony, combined with the fact that the trial judge failed to ask

J.M. any questions about the crime during the in camera voir dire, that form the basis of

this assignment of error. Appellant argues that the failure to ask questions about the

crime at the voir dire, combined with J.M.'s actual testimony, constitute reversible error.

       {¶21} Evid.R. 601 states that “[e]very person is competent to be a witness except

as otherwise provided in these rules.” Although prior versions of the rule contained a

provision expressly dealing with children under ten years old, the current rule does not.

On the other hand, R.C. 2317.01 states: “All persons are competent witnesses except

those of unsound mind and children under ten years of age who appear incapable of

receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are

examined, or of relating them truly.” Therefore a “trial court must conduct a voir dire

examination of a child under ten years of age to determine the child's competence to

testify.” State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 100. In

this voir dire the court must consider: (1) the child's ability to receive accurate impressions

of fact or to observe acts about which he or she will testify, (2) the child's ability to recollect

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                        –8–

those impressions or observations, (3) the child's ability to communicate what was

observed, (4) the child's understanding of truth and falsity and (5) the child's appreciation

of his or her responsibility to be truthful. Id. citing State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247,

251, 574 N.E.2d 483 (1991). The competency review refers to the time of trial rather than

the time of the crime or subject matter of the testimony. State v. Clark, 71 Ohio St.3d

466, 470-471, 644 N.E.2d 331 (1994). The competency determination is reviewed on

appeal for abuse of discretion. Frazier at 251.

       {¶22} The state contends that the Frazier/Maxwell competency review of a child

witness does not need to include questions about the crime at issue, and cites a long list

of cases supporting this interpretation. It is clear to us that factors one and two of the

Frazier/Maxwell test cited above direct the trial judge to question the child about the

impressions and facts that will be part of the testimony. The interpretation of these factors

by appellate courts have led many to conclude that they only require the trial judge to

determine if the child: has an understanding of truth and lies; can answer general

questions about his or her life; and can adequately discuss and relay back information

presented in the hearing.

       {¶23} For example, the Sixth District case of State v. Jones held that:

       Many Ohio courts have affirmed a trial court's finding of competency in

       cases where the competency hearing did not include questions about the

       crime at issue. Often, a competency hearing contains only general

       questions about the child's everyday life. Although it arguably may have

       been helpful if the trial court in this case had questioned the children as to

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       –9–

       some of the events of the indictment, we find that doing so was not

       necessary to the trial court's competency evaluation.

State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1262, 2011-Ohio-2173, ¶ 17.

       {¶24} Similarly, State v. Brooks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18502, 2001 WL

1295285 (Oct. 26, 2001), held that “a general inquiry is sufficient for a trial court to

determine if a child can perceive, recollect, and truthfully relate events.” Brooks further

held that “[a]lthough it would have been helpful if the trial judge would have questioned

the minor regarding the rape and the circumstances surrounding the rape, it was not

necessary in the trial court's competency determination.” Id. at *3.

       {¶25} We cited Brooks in State v. Anderson, 7th Dist. No. 01-CA-214, 154 Ohio

App.3d 789, 2003-Ohio-5439, 798 N.E.2d 1155, when we found that: “In the present

case, the court determined Brea's competence by asking her questions that

demonstrated that she could recount and relate past events and that she knew she should

tell the truth in court. Therefore, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in

failing to question Brea about the shootings.” Id. at ¶ 66.

       {¶26} The state is therefore correct in explaining the proper standard for reviewing

voir dire questioning of a child witness who is under ten years old, with the caveat that it

was at least the intent of Frazier/Maxwell that voir dire should include questioning about

the crime or the content of the proposed testimony.           This appeal underscores why

questioning the child about the crime itself can sometimes be necessary in determining

competency.

       {¶27} The parties agree that J.M. was not asked any questions in voir dire about

the crime. Appellant is correct that J.M. was not asked questions testing his ability to

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                     – 10 –

receive accurate impressions, whether those are immediate impressions or the child’s

impressions at the time of murder. We also must keep in mind that the voir dire occurred

on August 2, 2021, while the crime occurred on October 22, 2019. At the voir dire, J.M.

was asked about his family (but not about Appellant's involvement in the family), his

daycare, his meals, Christmas presents, his play time, and about telling the truth. J.M.

was also able to tell when the trial judge would say something incorrect (on purpose).

The judge did this to verify that J.M. knew whether the judge was telling the truth or not.

       {¶28} At trial J.M. was asked similar types of questions. The critical piece of

testimony at trial, though, was the following:

       Q.     Okay. The last time that you saw your mom, what happened?

       A.     The cops took me away from and she was away.

       Q.     The cops took you away?

       A.     Yeah, before I could see.

       Q.     Did you see your dad do something to your mom?

       A.     No because the cops took me away.

       Q.     All right. The cops took you away.

       A.     Yeah.

       Q.     Before that happened --

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       – 11 –

      A.       Yeah.

      Q.       -- did you see your dad and your mom?

      A.       Yes.

      Q.       What happened?

      A.       My dad shot my mom, and cops took me away, and I couldn't see

      again.

      Q.       Your dad shot your mom?

      A.       Yes.

      Q.       And the cops took you away so you wouldn't see it again?

      A.       Yes.

      Q.       After your dad shot your mom, did you talk to your dad at all?

      A.       No because I wasn't allowed.

      Q.       You weren't allowed. Okay. What did you do after your dad shot

      mom?

      A.       The cops told me to come outside, so I did, and got in the police car

      and they took me to my grandma's.

      Q.       Did you see your mom on the ground?

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 12 –

       A.     Yes.

       Q.     What did she look like?

       A.     Laying on the ground and blood was everywhere.

(Tr., pp. 881-883.)

       {¶29} This is all the information that was revealed on direct examination. On

cross-examination, J.M. also testified that after his mom came home from work his dad

and mom had an argument inside the house. (Tr., p. 887.) He testified that he was

upstairs watching television when they argued. He testified that he and siblings heard a

shot, and after that they ran outside. (Tr., p. 889.)

       {¶30} Other parts of the record indicate that J.M. did not come forward with this

story immediately. A few months after the murder J.M. told his uncle that his daddy shot

his mommy. This was reported to authorities. J.M. was not interviewed by social worker

Courtney Wilson of Akron Children's Hospital until July 15, 2020, nine months after the

murder. (Tr., p. 894.) J.M. told Ms. Wilson that “his dad shot her.” (Tr., p. 899.) J.M.

told her that there was a great deal of blood, that his mom and dad were arguing outside

before his dad entered the home, and that he saw a gun. (Tr., p. 899.) Ms. Wilson stated

that there was nothing else of importance from that interview. At trial, J.M. did not

remember having this interview. (Tr., p. 885.) Nothing in his trial testimony indicates that

he saw a gun, and at trial he testified that the argument happened inside.

       {¶31} A careful reading of the transcripts reveals that J.M. did not testify he saw

the shooting, but only that “my dad shot my mom.” This is exactly how Ms. Wilson

described it: that J.M. said “that his dad shot her.” He could have been told this by any

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 13 –

number of people rather than having witnessed it himself. The statement “my dad shot

my mom” is actually a conclusion and not testimony regarding witnessing a crime. He

also testified that he was upstairs watching television, heard a shot, and immediately ran

outside. There is no means of testing J.M.'s trial testimony against the answers in the

voir dire because he was not asked what he remembered about the crime during voir dire.

Obviously, a child testifying about his mother's murder is an important piece of evidence,

and yet, J.M. failed to actually state that he saw the murder and seemed to contradict

himself in his testimony.

       {¶32} Based on the specific facts of this case, we must conclude that the trial court

committed error in the voir dire of this child. However, the next important question is

whether the error affected the outcome of the trial. We conclude it did not. The volume

of evidence against Appellant, even without the child's testimony, is overwhelming.

Multiple witnesses and security camera videos placed Appellant and his car at the scene

of the crime at the time of the shooting. Appellant’s DNA matched DNA evidence on the

gun holster, the footprint on the front door matched Appellant's. The murder weapon that

was recovered appeared in photos on Appellant's Facebook page, threats were made on

Facebook, and there was prior evidence of Appellant’s attacks on the victim, including

choking her with a cord, punching her in the face, and beating her until she was

unconscious. The record contains Appellant's prior threats to kill the victim. Appellant

made statements to multiple witnesses that he was at the victim's home the night of the

crime. There is evidence that Citasia Tisdale and Appellant tried to cover up the crime

by making it appear the shooting occurred later in the morning, after Appellant had

departed from the scene. The jurors, if they were paying attention to J.M.'s testimony,

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                    – 14 –

may have noticed the obvious fact that he did not say he saw the murder take place.

Regardless, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence in this case on which to base

a conviction. We conclude that the error in allowing J.M.'s testimony did not affect the

outcome of this case. As the error was not prejudicial, Appellant's first assignment of

error is overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADMONISH THE JURY

       DURING BREAKS IN THE TRIAL.

       {¶33} R.C. 2945.34 states: “If the jurors are permitted to separate during a trial,

they shall be admonished by the court not to converse with, nor permit themselves to

be addressed by any person, nor to listen to any conversation on the subject of the

trial, nor form or express any opinion thereon, until the case is finally submitted to

them.” Appellant argues that the trial court gave a single admonition at the beginning

of the five-day trial, but the next eleven times that the court should have admonished

the jury, the judge merely reminded the jurors of the initial admonishment. Appellant

has no quarrels with the original admonition. He only objects to the cursory nature of

all the subsequent admonitions. Appellee does not disagree with this assessment of

the record, but concludes that the initial admonition was sufficient.          The initial

admonishment covers five pages of the transcript and is very extensive.

       {¶34} Appellee notes that an error in admonishing the jury is not reversible

error unless it is also shown that the jury was in fact guilty of misconduct. State v.

Helm, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150242, 2016-Ohio-500, 56 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 25. The

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                     – 15 –

mere violation of R.C. 2945.34 does not, in and of itself, constitute reversible error:

“R.C. 2945.34 does not prescribe reversal if the trial court fails to comply[.]” State v.

Rose, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 17431, 1999 WL 957715, *2. Appellant does not

disagree, but he argues that this prejudicial error requirement should be waived in this

appeal.

      {¶35} Appellee also points out that Appellant did not object to the abbreviated

jury admonitions, and that failure to object waives all error except for plain error. State

v. McCray, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00133, 2014-Ohio-2289, ¶ 42, citing Warner v.

State, 104 Ohio St. 38, 135 N.E. 249 (1922). There are no objections noted in the

record.

      {¶36} Based on the very clear admonition given by the trial court at the

beginning of trial, the lack of any evidence of juror misconduct, and the failure to

preserve this objection, Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

      DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

      {¶37} Appellant argues that his counsel engaged in ineffective assistance of

counsel, citing six examples.

      {¶38} The test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is two-part: whether

trial counsel's performance was deficient and whether the deficiency resulted in prejudice

to the defendant. State v. White, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 33, 2014-Ohio-4153, ¶ 18,

citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984);

State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 107.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                    – 16 –

       {¶39} In order to prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” State v. Lyons, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 14 BE

28, 2015-Ohio-3325, ¶ 11, citing Strickland at 694; see also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio

St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph three of the syllabus.          The appellant must

affirmatively prove the alleged prejudice occurred. Id. at 693. The appellant also must

demonstrate more than vague speculations of prejudice to prove prejudice. State v. Otte,

74 Ohio St.3d 555, 566, 660 N.E.2d 711 (1996).

       {¶40} If one prong of the Strickland test is not met, an appellate court need not

address the remaining prong. Id. at 697. The appellant bears the burden of proof on the

issue of counsel's effectiveness. A licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v.

Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).

       {¶41} Courts are very deferential to the tactical choices that attorneys make at

trial and “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.”       Bradley at 142, citing Strickland at 689.

Counsel's tactical choices, even those having negative consequences, normally do not

constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carpenter, 116 Ohio App.3d 615, 626, 688

N.E.2d 1090 (2nd Dist.1996).

       {¶42} Appellant's first example of ineffectiveness is that his counsel failed to

object to the lack of any black jurors. Appellant is black.

       {¶43} The constitutional guarantee to a jury trial “contemplates a jury drawn from

a fair cross-section of the community.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527, 95 S.Ct.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                           – 17 –

692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). This is not a specific requirement that the jury “must mirror

the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population." Id. at 538.

“ ‘Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition, but the jury wheels,

pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically

exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably

representative thereof.’ ” State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d at 117, 723 N.E.2d 1054,

quoting Taylor at 538.

       In order to establish a violation of the fair representative cross-section of the

       community requirement for a petit jury array under the Sixth and Fourteenth

       Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant must prove: (1)

       that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the

       community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which

       juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of

       such persons in the community; and (3) that the representation is due to

       systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

State v. Fulton, 57 Ohio St.3d 120, 566 N.E.2d 1195, (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus.

       {¶44} Appellant has presented no evidence of any attem pt to systematically

exclude persons of color from the jury. His argument is based solely on the fact that

there were no black persons on his jury. However, underrepresentation or lack of

representation of a group on a single jury does not constitute systematic exclusion.

State v. Bryan, 101 Ohio St.3d 272, 2004-Ohio-971, 804 N.E.2d 433, ¶ 113; State v.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       – 18 –

McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 444, 700 N.E.2d 596 (1988). Appellant's argument,

therefore, has no merit.

       {¶45} Appellant raises, in very cursory fashion, five other alleged errors made

by counsel. First, counsel at one point called the victim by the wrong name. Second,

the court mentioned that a matter regarding the presentation of exhibits to a particular

witness would be handled at a break, but the matter was not discussed at the break,

and counsel did not object. Third, counsel did not object having the audio recording

played in front of the jury. Fourth, a witness was permitted to testify “regarding other

bad acts” without objection. (Appellant's Brf., p. 11.) Fifth, a witness was allegedly

permitted to give “hearsay testimony” without objection. (Appellant's Brf., p. 11.)

       {¶46} Appellant does not explain how any of these alleged errors are actually

errors as a matter of law, does not explain how any of them may have prejudiced him

at trial, fails to cite a single statute, case or specific rule that is violated, and gives no

further explanation as to how these allegations constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel.

       {¶47} It is not the state’s responsibility to make Appellant's arguments for him,

only to then refute them as part of its own argument. Without any citation of law or

actual argument made in support of Appellant's allegations, all of his trial counsel's

actions can be attributed either to trial tactics, or may be deemed harmless errors,

either of which defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Crim.R. 52 allows

for harmless errors to be disregarded, whether at trial or on appeal. “[T]he harmless-

error rule, was created in essence to forgive technical mistakes.” State v. Morris, 141

Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24 N.E.3d 1153, ¶ 24.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 19 –

         {¶48} For all these reasons, Appellant's third assignment of error is without

merit.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

         THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND

         FACEBOOK POSTS INTO EVIDENCE.

         {¶49} Appellant argues that seven surveillance video recordings and a variety of

postings on the social media platform Facebook should not have been entered into

evidence.     Appellant contends that none of these items were admitted with proper

authentication. Appellant's contentions are incorrect.

         {¶50} Evid.R. 901 requires evidence to be properly authenticated before it is

deemed admissible. “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition

precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.” “This low threshold standard does not

require conclusive proof of authenticity, but only sufficient foundational evidence for the

trier of fact to conclude that the document is what its proponent claims it to be.” State v.

Easter, 75 Ohio App.3d 22, 25, 598 N.E.2d 845 (4th Dist.1991). “[T]here is nothing to

prevent parties from voluntarily stipulating to the admissibility of evidence otherwise

requiring authentication.” Dungan v. Poynter, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA96-09-016, 1997

WL 423348, *1, citing Ohio Evid. R. 901, staff notes.

         {¶51} Starting with the Facebook posts, the parties stipulated to the authenticity

of all of them. (Tr., p. 828.) Parties are permitted to stipulate to authenticity. Therefore,

there is no error in failing to provide further evidence of authenticity.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       – 20 –

       {¶52} Regarding the videos, the parties agree that video evidence is authenticated

in the same manner as photographic evidence.               One method of authenticating

photographic evidence is under the “pictorial testimony” theory, in which the photograph

is merely illustrative of a witness' testimony and must have a sponsoring witness who

must testify "that it is a fair and accurate representation of the subject matter, based on

that witness' personal observation." State v. Green, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 226,

2014-Ohio-648, ¶ 12, citing Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. U.A.W. Local 486, 61 Ohio St.3d

121, 129-130, 573 N.E.2d 98 (1991).

       {¶53} Another way to authenticate photographic or video evidence is via the “silent

witness” theory:    “Under the silent witness theory, photographic evidence may be

admitted upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the process or system that produced

the evidence.” Midland Steel Prods. Co. at 130. Using this method of authentication, “the

photographic evidence is a ‘silent witness’ which speaks for itself, and is substantive

evidence of what it portrays independent of a sponsoring witness.” Id.

       {¶54} “Silent witness” authentication normally requires proof of the reliability of the

video recording system, proof of the custody of the video recording, a showing that the

evidence has not been altered, and that the video being shown is from the camera system

being described. State v. Green, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 226, 2014-Ohio-648,

¶ 13. “It is not necessary that the individual authenticating the footage must have actually

witnessed the events as they occurred, merely that he or she is able to verify that the

material is what it purports to be: in this instance, the complete surveillance footage of the

incident.” Id. at ¶ 14. Reliability can be proven by the video equipment installer, a user

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 21 –

of the equipment, or by a law enforcement officer who investigated the matter. State v.

Vermillion, 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA17, 2016-Ohio-1295, ¶ 17-20.

       {¶55} Authentication is an evidentiary matter and is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard. Green at ¶ 11. “We have defined an abuse of discretion as conduct

that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470,

2018-Ohio-16, 97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 12.

       {¶56} Five of the videos are of the street outside of the victim's apartment and

show vehicle and foot traffic at the time of crime. They are used to track Appellant inside

his vehicle and on foot, and to establish the movements of other persons at or near the

time of the crime. One of the videos also includes the sound of a gun being fired at 2:21

a.m. There are two exhibits from Nick's Pizza because Lieutenant Marsha Eisenhart left

out one video clip from the first exhibit she created for trial, so she created a second one.

       {¶57} The video from Wellsville School District was introduced to corroborate the

testimony of Sadie Allen. The video from New Dimension Bar in East Liverpool was

introduced to corroborate the testimony of Michelle Byers.

       {¶58} Neither party cites to any objections made by Appellant to the authentication

of the videos when they were entered into evidence. Appellant's counsel did object to the

accuracy of the time-stamp on the video provided by Cindy Mick, which could be

interpreted as an objection to authenticity. (Tr., pp. 1019-1021.) Appellant's counsel

raised other objections to the videos, but none of the objections are based on

authentication. Therefore, the challenge to the authentication of the video exhibits is

reviewed for plain error, except for the Mick video, which is reviewed for abuse of

discretion.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 22 –

       {¶59} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), “plain errors” that affect a defendant's

substantial rights “may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the

court.” A court will only take “[n]otice of plain error * * * with the utmost caution, under

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State

v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶60} Wellsville Police Department Lieutenant Eisenhart authenticated the seven

video recordings being challenged by Appellant. Further, the state provided evidence

from the users of each of video, who testified about the footage provided to Eisenhart.

These witnesses all described how the surveillance systems worked, how the digital files

were stored, and how the files were to be delivered to the police. These facts alone satisfy

the authentication standards discussed above for video evidence under a plain error

standard.

       {¶61} Appellant challenges the video from Cindy Mick because she did not testify

about the actual video clip that would be used at trial and because it is not clear how the

Wellsville Police Department obtained the video. This video is from a backyard video

camera. Cindy Mick testified about the type of camera, how it was installed in her yard,

how it recorded images, that it was on a continuous record setting, and that it included

sound. The file and folder structure of the SD card (a digital storage device for holding

electronic data) were examined at trial to show that there was a folder for every hour and

minute of recording. Mick testified that the video clips showed her backyard.

       {¶62} Mick was not asked to view the specific clip that was relevant to trial. This

is not a requirement under Midland Steel Prods. Co., this Court's Green case, or any case

setting forth the "silent witness" method of authenticating video evidence. The "silent

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                     – 23 –

witness" method authenticates the process for recording the videos, not the detailed

content of the videos. Mick testified that she put the SD data card in a baggy, handed it

to the police, and identified the exhibit at trial. There was no abuse of discretion in

allowing this video into evidence.

       {¶63} Appellant challenges the video from My Bar because the entire DVR

recording machine was given to the police instead of a copy of the recording, but the

recording used at trial was not directly on the DVR machine, but a copy of the video on a

flash drive. It is not clear why Appellant believes this was a legal error. Lieutenant

Eisenhart testified that the DVR machine was sent to the state BCI lab, and a copy of the

video was retrieved and put on a flash drive. (Tr., p. 1024.) Appellant did not object to

this authentication at trial, and the chain of custody was discussed at trial. When Roy

Larkins, the owner of My Bar, was on the stand, the state offered to show him all the video

that was on the flash drive, but Appellant's counsel replied that he did not want to see all

of the video content. (Tr., p. 320.)

       {¶64} Appellant objects to the use of the video from New Dimension Bar because

witness Mark Walton, the owner of the bar, was not asked to authenticate the actual video

clip used at trial. As mentioned earlier, this is not required when authenticating a video

clip under the “silent witness” theory.

       {¶65} Appellant objects to the use of the video clips from Nick's Pizza because

the first clip did not show the date and time, but the second clip did. Our examination of

the video clips reveal time stamps on both. The testimony of Lieutenant Eisenhart at trial

was that the two exhibits, 57 (a flash drive) and 205 (a disc), were identical except that

205 had one additional clip on it that was inadvertently left off of exhibit 57. The new

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                       – 24 –

copy, exhibit 205, was produced so that all the clips needed for trial were on one disc.

The record does not support that any error occurred.

         {¶66} Appellant takes issue with the video from the Fraternal Order of Eagles

because witness William Collins, a trustee for the Eagles, did not authenticate the entire

video clip. Again, this is not required under Midland Steel Prods. Co., the Green case, or

any case setting forth the “silent witness” theory of authentication.

         {¶67} Appellant challenges the video from Kwik King because witness Elaine

Austin, who was a clerk and manager at the store, did not know how the video was turned

over to police and because she only authenticated part of the video. She also did not

know whether the data from all cameras was stored on the same digital recorder. Austin

testified about the camera system, where the cameras were located, and that she was

familiar with their use through the prior investigation of a robbery. She identified the video

for one of the cameras and explained what the footage was from that camera. Lieutenant

Eisenhart testified that she went into Kwik King, asked for a copy of the video, and

someone copied it for her. (Tr., p. 1029.) Appellant did object to the introduction of this

video.

         {¶68} There is a very low bar for authenticating evidence, particularly video

evidence under the "silent witness" theory. The purpose of authentication under this

theory is to show the reliability of the process that produced the evidence, and the video

will then speak for itself that it is what it purports to be. Midland Steel Prods. Co. at 129-

130. There was testimony about how the Kwik King surveillance system worked and that

the cameras properly and accurately recorded images from the store. As vague as some

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                        – 25 –

of Lieutenant Eisenhart's testimony was about the video, it did show how the video was

obtained.

       {¶69} Appellant does not appear to be challenging the actual content of the Kwik

King videos, but simply believes that the authentication is not sufficient. Even if the Kwik

King evidence had been excluded from trial, this would not have changed the result of the

trial. The Kwik King video was only one of many pieces of evidence showing that

Appellant was at or near Destiny Moody's apartment at the time of the murder. Appellant

has not demonstrated any prejudice even if there was insufficient authentication of this

video, and there is no basis for sustaining this assignment of error with respect to the

Kwik King video.

       {¶70} Appellant challenges the use of the video from Wellsville High School

football stadium. Witness Bill Ricciardulli, the tech coordinator for Wellsville schools, did

not know how the police obtained the video and there is no further evidence in the record

as to how it became part of the evidence. Ricciardulli otherwise testified as to the design,

installation, and the manner in which the system worked. No objections appear in the

record as to this evidence. He testified that the part of the video he saw at trial was

accurate and true. Without some type of challenge to the content of the video, and with

no objection raised, no plain error can be found as to the inclusion of this evidence at trial.

       {¶71} Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5

       DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO THE CUMULATIVE

       ERRORS IN THE ALLOWANCE OF INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY, THE

       ACTIONS OF COUNSEL AND THE COURT.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 26 –

       {¶72} Appellant argues that there was cumulative error in this case requiring

reversal.   Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a reviewing court will reverse a

conviction when the cumulative effect of errors deprives a defendant of a fair trial even

though each of the instances of error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.

State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 140, citing State

v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, at ¶ 223. Harmless

errors do not become reversible error simply because of the sheer number. State v. Hill,

75 Ohio St.3d 195, 212, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996).           The defendant must make an

affirmative showing that multiple errors deprived him of a fair trial. State v. Hohvart, 7th

Dist. Mahoning No. 06 MA 43, 2007-Ohio-5349, ¶ 37.

       {¶73} The only error Appellant has demonstrated was the deficient voir dire of the

child witness J.M., and since Appellant was not prejudiced by this error it does not rise to

the level of reversible error. With no other demonstrated errors, it is apparent there is no

cumulative error. Appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                        Conclusion

       {¶74} Appellant has raised five assignments of error on appeal. The first was

sustained, as the trial court should have conducted a more thorough voir dire of the child

witness J.M. Nevertheless, this error did not affect the outcome of trial due to the

overwhelming evidence of guilt offered in this case. Thus, it was not reversible error.

Appellant also argued that the court failed to properly admonish the jury to not talk about

the case, but the record contains an extensive admonishment at the beginning of trial and

a reminder of that admonishment many times throughout the trial. Appellant argued that

trial counsel was ineffective, but he could not demonstrate either error or prejudice from

Case No. 21 CO 0035
                                                                                 – 27 –

counsel's actions.    Appellant argued that Facebook posts were not properly

authenticated, but the parties stipulated to authenticity. Appellant argued that seven

videos should not have been admitted as evidence due to lack of authentication, but the

record shows they were properly authenticated. Finally, he argued cumulative error, but

there must be multiple errors on the record for cumulative error to apply. All five of

Appellant's assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed in full.

Robb, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 21 CO 0035
[Cite as State v. Haywood, 2023-Ohio-1121.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs waived.

        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                       NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.