Court Opinion

ID: 9943239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 21:04:04.696549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:34.304893
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 Chapman v. Aloha Dive Shop CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 DONNA CHAPMAN,                                               B322703

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BC713453)
           v.

 ALOHA DIVE SHOP et al.,

      Defendants and
 Appellants.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Judge. Affirmed.

         Gregory B. Byberg for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Pollak, Vida & Barer, Daniel P. Barer, Anna L. Birenbaum;
Hewitt & Raphael, Stephen L. Hewitt and Patricia M. Bakst for
Defendants and Appellants.

                              ******
        A man in his 50s training to become a SCUBA1 diver died
soon after resurfacing from his fifth dive in the open ocean. His
mother sued the dive instructor as well as the dive shop and its
owner for wrongful death, and a jury awarded her more than $1
million in damages. The trial court overturned the jury verdict
after finding no evidence that any gross negligence by the dive
instructor, the dive shop, or its owner caused the man’s death.
We independently conclude that there is no substantial evidence
supporting the element of causation, and thus affirm the trial
court’s order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.      Facts
        In September of 2016, Christopher Gallie (Gallie) went to
the Aloha Dive Shop (located in the San Fernando Valley) to
learn how to SCUBA dive. The Aloha Dive Shop was owned and
operated by Christopher Russello (Russello). This was not the
first time Gallie started this process; he had signed up with a
different dive shop in 2013, and had obtained a medical clearance
to dive—which was necessitated by Gallie’s age and self-
identification as a smoker—but he did not provide this clearance
to the Aloha Dive Shop. Gallie signed a waiver form absolving
the Aloha Dive Shop and its instructors of liability for anything
but gross negligence.

1    SCUBA is an acronym for Self-Contained Underwater
Breathing Apparatus.

                                2
       SCUBA dive training involves three educational
components: (1) academic instruction and testing, (2) practice
dives in a confined body of water like a swimming pool using
SCUBA equipment, and (3) open water dives in the ocean. A
certified dive instructor must supervise each step. Deborah
Nusbaum (Nusbaum) acted as Gallie’s dive instructor; because
Nusbaum was not certified as an instructor until shortly before
Gallie began the open water dives, Russello supervised her for
the earlier portions of Gallie’s training.
       Gallie was unable to complete the academic instruction and
testing online—which should have taken him around five hours
to complete—so Nusbaum instead provided him more than eight
hours of classroom instruction and testing.
       Gallie completed his pool dives.
       Gallie completed three ocean dives on his first day of open
water dives in the Two Harbors area of Catalina Island on
November 6, 2016. The dives were “uneventful.”
       Gallie ventured to the same area of Catalina for a second
day of open water dives on December 3, 2016.
       Russello supervised Gallie’s first dive that day. Because
Gallie looked “uncomfortable” in the water and “panicked,”
Russello ordered him out of the water and told him, “The dive is
done.” Gallie insisted that he do another dive, but with
Nusbaum.
       Nusbaum supervised Gallie’s second dive that day. They
descended in tandem to 20 to 25 feet below the ocean’s surface,
where Nusbaum tested Gallie’s skills for 15 minutes. Then Gallie
suddenly “took off” for the bottom of the ocean, descending to 82
feet below the surface. Nusbaum gave chase; when she caught up
with him at 82 feet below, she used hand signals to verify that

                                3
Gallie was “okay.” Nusbaum then started a guided and regulated
ascent, to ensure that Gallie did not ascend too fast. At first,
Nusbaum held onto Gallie’s buoyancy device with her hands, but
eventually let go as they ascended in tandem, face-to-face. When
they had ascended to 70 feet below the surface, Gallie “bolted”
upward, “kicking hard” and swimming at full speed to reach the
surface. Again, Nusbaum gave chase, trying to grab his fins to
slow or stop him, but he kept kicking.
       When Nusbaum reached the ocean’s surface seconds behind
Gallie, she questioned him to see if he was suffering from
barotrauma because he had ascended at a faster-than-
recommended pace. Gallie seemed physically fine as well as
mentally coherent. Nusbaum thus resumed the skills check,
having Gallie inflate his buoyancy device, swap out his regulator
for a snorkel, and start to swim for the current line dragging
behind the dive boat.
       Once they started swimming along the current line toward
the boat, Gallie stopped and told Nusbaum he was tired, so she
advised him to just hold onto the line so others could drag the
line onto the boat without having Gallie exert himself any
further. Gallie then told her he was fine, and resumed
swimming. Moments later, Gallie stopped moving. Within
seconds, Nusbaum pulled Gallie’s head out of the water, put a
regulator in his mouth to prevent him from swallowing water,
and yelled for help. Three others dove into the ocean and pulled
Gallie on board the dive boat, where they administered CPR.
Gallie’s skin tone was already ashen, and he was declared dead.

                               4
II.    Procedural Background
       A.    Complaint
       In July 2018, Gallie’s mother, Donna Chapman (plaintiff),
sued Nusbaum, Russello and the Aloha Dive Shop (collectively,
defendants).2 In the operative first amended complaint, plaintiff
alleged (1) a claim for wrongful death caused by defendants’
gross negligence, and (2) a survival claim for compensatory and
punitive damages for the harm Gallie endured before he died.
       B.    Jury trial
       The matter proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in April
2022. In addition to calling as witnesses Gallie’s mother and
brother, the captain of the dive boat, the investigating officer,
Russello, Nusbaum, and competing experts on whether Russello
and Nusbaum acted in a grossly negligent manner, plaintiff and
defendants each presented an expert witness on the issue of
causation.
       Plaintiff called Dr. Vadims Poukens, the deputy medical
examiner with the coroner’s office who had performed the
autopsy on Gallie. After completing a physical examination, X-
ray, toxicology examination, and microscopy examination of
Gallie’s body, Dr. Poukens opined that he had found no physical
injury or physical evidence of any natural cause of death, found
no toxicological or microscopic cause of death, found no evidence
of a stroke or heart attack, found no evidence of an air embolism
(which happens when a too-rapid ascent causes air bubbles to
form in the bloodstream or internal organs), and found no
evidence of any salt water in Gallie’s lungs or stomach (which one

2     Plaintiff also sued the boat and its owners that transported
Gallie to his fatal dive. Plaintiff did not proceed to trial against
those parties, so we do not discuss them further.

                                 5
would “expect to find” if a person had experienced aspiration or
asphyxiation from drowning).3 Dr. Poukens frankly admitted
that he “could not find any evidence . . . to conclude that [Gallie’s]
death was the result of any specific mechanism.” However,
because Dr. Poukens had a “duty” to list something as the “official
cause of death,” and because coroners use the label “drowning”
when they cannot explain a death that happened in the water,
Dr. Poukens listed the “official cause of death” on Gallie’s death
certificate as “drowning.” At no point did Dr. Poukens opine to
any reasonable medical probability that Gallie died from a
particular mechanism or that Gallie’s death was caused by
anything defendants did or did not do.
       Defendants called Dr. John Millington, a physician
specializing in hyperbaric medicine. Dr. Millington initially
suspected that the two “most likely” causes of Gallie’s death were
either arrythmia (an irregular heartbeat) or an air embolism.
But because there was “no . . . evidence” of arrythmia (which can
be detected only as it is happening and leaves no postmortem
trace), Dr. Millington opined that “the most likely” causes—which
he ranked a “50/50”—were either an air embolism or “sudden
death syndrome,” the term used when middle-aged men “all of a
sudden just go into . . . severe arrythmia” when swimming back
to a dive boat. In light of the absence of any evidence of “what
caused [Gallie’s] death from a physical, anatomical, microscopic”
or “historic” “standpoint,” Dr. Milligington ultimately opined that
he could not “say to a medical certainty what the cause of . . .
Gallie’s death was.”

3     Testing of Gallie’s SCUBA equipment also uncovered no
issues.

                                  6
       After the jury returned three defective special verdicts and
the court on each occasion ordered the jurors to resume
deliberations, the jury returned a special verdict finding
defendants grossly negligent in causing Gallie’s death,
attributing 70 percent of the fault to Nusbaum and 30 percent to
Russello,4 and awarding plaintiff $60,950 in past economic
damages and $1 million in past noneconomic damages.
       C.    Posttrial motions
       Defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Following full briefing and a
hearing, the trial court issued a 12-page order granting both
motions.
       The court granted defendants’ motion for a JNOV after
finding “insufficient evidence to support the [jury’s] verdict that
defendants’ acts, considered either individually or collectively,
were a cause of . . . Gallie’s death.” Specifically, the court noted
that there was “no evidence that Gallie’s death was caused to a
reasonable medical probability by the SCUBA dive” and “no
evidentiary showing of a causal connection between any
deficiencies in Gallie’s SCUBA instruction and [his] unfortunate
death.” Although Dr. Poukens had listed the official cause of
death as “drowning,” the court noted the undisputed evidence
that Dr. Poukens had “found no physical evidence of drowning.”
       As an alternative ruling, the court also granted defendants’
motion for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the evidence of
causation was “insufficient,” (2) the evidence of gross negligence
was “insufficient,” (3) plaintiff’s attorney had prejudicially

4     The jury also found Gallie negligent but that his negligence
was not a substantial factor in causing his death and therefore
attributed no percentage of responsibility to him.

                                 7
misrepresented Dr. Poukens’s opinion during closing argument,
and (4) the jury’s special verdict was internally inconsistent.
       D.    Appeal
       Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2022—after
the trial court had issued its order granting posttrial relief but
two days before the court had entered judgment for defendants.
We exercise our discretion to treat plaintiff’s premature notice of
appeal as effective.5 (E.g., Boyer v. Jensen (2005) 129
Cal.App.4th 62, 69.)
                             DISCUSSION
       Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion for JNOV and a new trial.6
       An order granting JNOV is appropriate “‘only if it appears
from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party
securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence to
support the verdict.’” (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104,
110.) We independently review the substantiality of the
evidence. (Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.
Co. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143.) “Of course, the
substantiality of the evidence is measured against the elements
the plaintiff must prove; what those elements are, and what they

5    Defendants also filed a “protective” cross-appeal, which we
dismiss as moot.

6      Defendants ask us to treat plaintiff’s appeal as waived due
to deficiencies in the opening brief and significant omissions in
the appendix plaintiff prepared. Although we agree with
defendants that plaintiff’s briefing and appendix do not comply
with the California Rules of Court in many respects, we will not
punish plaintiff for her lawyer’s shortcomings and exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of her appeal.

                                 8
mean, are questions of law that we also independently review.”
(Lopez v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 244, 253.)
       To prevail on a claim for wrongful death, a plaintiff has the
burden of proving (1) the defendant engaged in negligent conduct
(or, in this case, grossly negligent conduct); (2) the victim died;
and (3) the defendant’s grossly negligent conduct caused the
victim’s death. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 390
[elements of wrongful death]; Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA,
Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 640 [same elements apply, even
when standard is gross negligence].)7
       To establish the element of causation, the plaintiff must
establish that it is “reasonably probable”—that is, more probable
than not—that the defendant’s negligent (or, here, grossly
negligent) conduct caused the victim’s death. (Beebe v. Wonderful
Pistachios & Almonds LLC (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 351, 370;
Espinosa v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th
1304, 1314; Jennings v. Palomar Pomerado Health Systems, Inc.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1118.) The plaintiff need not prove
this causal link by excluding all other possible causes of death
(Cooper v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 555, 580; Espinosa, at p. 1314), but must prove
“‘something more than a “50-50 possibility”’” (Belfiore-Braman v.
Rotenberg (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 234, 247); it is not enough to
show a “possibility” of a causal link or to rely upon speculation or
conjecture (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163
Cal.App.3d 396, 402; Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25

7     The elements for a survival claim are the same, except that
instead of causing the victim’s death, the defendant’s negligence
must cause harm (except for pain and suffering) suffered by the
victim prior to death. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.34.)

                                 9
Cal.4th 763, 775-776). When causation is beyond the common
experience of jurors (as it often is when the cause of death turns
on specialized medical knowledge), the plaintiff must present
expert testimony linking the cause of death to the defendant’s
negligence (or, here, gross negligence) to a “reasonable medical
probability.” (Jennings, at p. 1118; see generally Hernandez v.
County of Los Angeles (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1614 [“Where
the complexity of the causation issue is beyond common
experience, expert testimony is required to establish causation”];
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Com. (1946) 28
Cal.2d 329, 338 [“cause of death . . . was a question for the
determination of medical experts”]; People v. Sims (1993) 5
Cal.4th 405, 436 [expert testimony appropriate when assessing
cause of death from drowning]; cf. People v. Catlin (2001) 26
Cal.4th 81, 146 [cause of death may be within common experience
of jurors when it is not medically complex]; Cavero v. Franklin
General Benevolent Society (1950) 36 Cal.2d 301, 309 (Cavero)
[cause of injury can be within common experience in situations
where a sponge is left in a body or where a patient is burned with
hot compresses, which are not medically complex].)
       We independently agree with the trial court that plaintiff
did not sustain her burden of proving that Gallie’s death was
“more probably than not” the result of any gross negligence by
defendants. There was no evidence establishing the actual cause
of Gallie’s death. Although Dr. Poukens listed drowning as the
official cause of death, it is undisputed—by Dr. Poukens
himself—that he listed that cause of death because he could not
actually find any mechanism for Gallie’s death (including any
salt water in Gallie’s lungs or stomach) and because “drowning”
is the default cause of death used when an unexplainable death

                               10
occurs in the water. “Drowning” is effectively the “none of the
above” answer. Thus, plaintiff’s assertion on appeal that it is
“obvious [that Gallie] died by drowning” is flatly contradicted by
the record. Because no witness was able to identify what
ultimately caused Gallie’s death, it is no surprise that no witness
testified that this unknown cause of death was more probably
than not linked to anything defendants did or did not do. This
void in the evidence is fatal to plaintiff’s claims.
       Plaintiff makes what boils down to four arguments in
response.
       First, plaintiff argues that, even if there was no affirmative
evidence establishing that defendants’ acts probably resulted in
Gallie’s death, a jury could reasonably infer causation because all
other possible causes of death had been eliminated. To be sure,
causation may sometimes be established through a process of
elimination. (E.g., Minder v. Cielito Lindo Restaurant (1977) 67
Cal.App.3d 1003, 1009; Brancati v. Cachuma Village, LLC (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 499, 506; George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co.
(1949) 33 Cal.2d 834, 844.) But here, the undisputed evidence
eliminated all of the causes of death that might be linked to
defendants’ conduct: Gallie did not drown (potentially caused by
gulping water once he surfaced) because there was no salt water
in his lungs or stomach; Gallie did not suffer from an air
embolism (potentially caused by too rapid an assent) because
there were no air bubbles in his blood or his organs; Gallie did
not suffer from a heart attack or stroke (from being in the water
or from stress) because there was no physical evidence of either.
Because there was “‘clear, positive, [and] uncontradicted’”
evidence that Gallie’s death was not more probably than not due
to anything defendants did or did not do, the inference plaintiff

                                 11
asks us to draw—namely, that Gallie’s death must have been due
to what defendant’s did or did not do—is not a reasonable one; on
this record, granting JNOV was appropriate. (Casetta v. United
States Rubber Co. (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 792, 814-815 (Casetta).)
Indeed, were we to ignore the evidence affirmatively eliminating
the link between Gallie’s death and defendants’ conduct, we
would in effect be conclusively presuming causation from proof of
gross negligence and the victim’s subsequent death, thereby
eliminating any need for plaintiff to prove the element of
causation; we decline plaintiff’s invitation to rewrite the tort of
wrongful death to eliminate that element. (Youst v. Longo (1987)
43 Cal.3d 64, 74 [refusing to “essentially eliminate the tort’s
element of causation”].)
       Second, and along similar lines, plaintiff seems to suggest
that a wrongful death verdict in her favor might be upheld on a
res ipsa loquitur-type theory—namely, that causation should be
presumed (unless and until rebutted) because an unexplainable
death occurring during SCUBA dive training likely results from
gross negligence in that training.
       We reject this suggestion for three reasons.
       To begin, plaintiff waived this theory because she did not
request a res ipsa loquitur instruction below. (Gagosian v.
Burdick’s Television & Appliances (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 316,
319.)
       More to the point, a presumption of causation under res
ipsa loquitur is appropriate only when “it can be said, in the light
of past experience, that [the victim’s injury or death] probably
was the result of negligence [or, here, gross negligence] by
someone and that the defendant[s are] probably the person[s] . . .
responsible.” (Siverson v. Weber (1962) 57 Cal.2d 834, 836, italics

                                12
added; Faulk v. Soberanes (1961) 56 Cal.2d 466, 470; cf. Brown v.
Poway Unified School Dist. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 826 (Brown)
[res ipsa loquitur does not apply to slip and fall cases because
they are “not so likely to be the result of negligence as to justify a
presumption to that effect”].)8 To be “probab[le],” it must be
“‘“more likely than not”’” that the victim’s injury or death was the
result of (gross) negligence and the result of (gross) negligence by
the defendant(s). (Rodela v. Southern California Edison Co.
(1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 708, 712-713, italics added; Newing v.
Cheatham (1975) 15 Cal.3d 351, 360 [for presumption to apply,
defendant’s negligence must be “the most probable”
explanation].) “[R]es ipsa loquitur will not apply if it is equally
probable that the” injury was not due to (gross) negligence or that
“the [(gross)] negligence was that of someone other than the
defendant.” (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1952) 39
Cal.2d 436, 443, italics added.) Here, the record is devoid of
evidence—whether from experts or from lay witnesses—that
deaths arising in the course of SCUBA dive training are more
probably than not the result of negligence (or gross negligence),
or that the negligence is more probably than not the negligence of
the instructors and dive shop owners. (See Crawford v. County of
Sacramento (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 791, 792-793 [refusing to

8      This threshold requirement is encapsulated and
implemented in the three classic prerequisites to the applicability
of res ipsa loquitur—namely, “‘“(1) the [victim’s injury] must be of
a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence; (2) [the injury] must be caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; [and] (3) [the injury] must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.”’”
(Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 825-826.)

                                 13
apply res ipsa loquitur to presume that patient’s death during
surgery was due to negligence of anesthetist because “medical
testimony neither established nor furnished evidence from which
a lay jury could reasonably infer the probability of such
negligence”]; Engelking v. Carlson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 216, 221-222
[same, due to evidence that victim’s injury to peroneal nerve may
occur when there is no negligence at all], disapproved of in
Seneris v. Haas (1955) 45 Cal.2d 811, 827; cf. Quintal v. Laurel
Grove Hospital (1964) 62 Cal.2d 154, 164 [res ipsa loquitur
appropriate where “there was testimony that 90 per cent of the
deaths resulting from cardiac arrest occurred by reason of faulty
intubation”]; Cavero, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 311 [same, where
victim’s death during tonsil surgery probably does not occur
absent negligence].)
       Further, even if we assume that the res ipsa loquitur
theory applies, it erects a rebuttable presumption that was
conclusively refuted in this case by the undisputed medical
testimony that Gallie did not die from any cause connected to
defendants’ conduct, thereby making JNOV appropriate.
(Casetta, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at pp. 814-815; cf. Haft v. Lone
Palm Hotel (1970) 3 Cal.3d 756, 762-763 [res ipsa loquitur
appropriate when no evidence rebuts presumption].)
       Third, plaintiff argues that the burden of proving causation
somehow shifted to defendants because they offered contrary
expert testimony regarding causation and because of the newly
enacted Evidence Code section 801.1. This argument rests on a
misreading of the record and a misunderstanding of the newly
enacted provision of the Evidence Code. For starters, defendants
did not offer contrary testimony on the issue of causation because
both Dr. Poukens and Dr. Millington agreed that they could not

                                14
determine Gallie’s cause of death. What is more, a defendant’s
introduction of evidence to undermine or contradict a plaintiff’s
expert witness on causation does not somehow relieve the
plaintiff of her burden of proof on that element; defendants here
were not trying to establish an affirmative defense, so plaintiff’s
citation to cases involving affirmative defenses are irrelevant.
(Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454,
469 [“Of course, at trial, a defendant raising an affirmative
defense has the burden of proving it”].) And Evidence Code
section 801.1 premises the admission of testimony by defense
experts as well as plaintiff’s experts on a showing of a causal link
by a “reasonable medical probability,” but “does not preclude” a
defense expert from opining that an opinion by a plaintiff’s expert
about causation was incorrect. (Evid. Code, § 801.1, subds. (a) &
(b).) Here, however, neither expert opined to any particular cause
of death or causal link. So, even if we assume that this newly
enacted provision applies retroactively (since it did not take effect
until 20 months after the trial in this case), Evidence Code
section 801.1 is irrelevant.
       Fourth and finally, plaintiff argues that the trial court was
wrong to overrule “the decision of the jury.” But overturning a
jury verdict is the whole point of a JNOV motion—namely, to test
whether that decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Where, as here, it is not, the jury’s factually unsupported decision
is entitled to no weight. We reject plaintiff’s implicit invitation to
mandate the denial of all JNOV motions.
                             *     *      *
       In light of our affirmance of the trial court’s order granting
JNOV and entering judgment for defendants, the propriety of the

                                 15
court’s order granting a new trial is moot. (In re Coordinated
Latex Glove Litigation (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 594, 614.)
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment for defendants is affirmed. Defendants are
entitled to their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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