Court Opinion

ID: 9541208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:34.416908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:40.350025
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion contradicts the plain language of the inherent risks of skiing statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1992), which clearly and unambiguously states that any danger or condition integral to the sport of skiing is “as a matter of law” an inherent risk of skiing and that no skier may recover from any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.
Statutes should generally be construed according to their plain language. Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); accord Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). Moreover, “[ujnambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning.” Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989). In accordance with these principles, when reviewing a statute, we “assume[] that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.” Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). Put differently, “[w]e must be guided by the law as it is_ When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.” Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 377, 379-80 (1921). Thus, when “statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent.” Brinkerhoff, 779 P.2d at 686; accord Allisen, 763 P.2d at 809.
The inherent risks of skiing statute is plain and unambiguous. It begins by clearly stating its purpose:
It is the purpose of this act ... to clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in the sport, to establish as a matter of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 (1992) (emphasis added). The clear intent of this section is to enumerate certain risks inherent in the dangerous sport of skiing and, as a matter of law, to prohibit skiers injured as a result of such risks from recovering from ski area operators.
In defining these inherent risks of skiing, the statute provides:
“Inherent risks of skiing” means those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: changing weather conditions, variations or steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such as bare spots, forest *1378growth, rocks, stumps, impacts with lift towers and other structures and their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier’s failure to ski within his own ability.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52(1) (1992). According to the unambiguous language of the statute as a whole, (1) any danger or condition integral to the sport of skiing is as a matter of law an inherent risk of skiing and (2) a skier cannot recover from ski area operators for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of skiing.
While the majority has correctly applied the law as set forth in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991), I believe that Clover is clearly wrong and constitutes nothing more than judicial legislation. It should be abandoned as precedent.1 The inherent risks of skiing statute does not, as Clover and the majority state, categorize inherent risks, nor does it establish a “reasonable care” standard for certain types of inherent risks. To the contrary, it plainly states that “no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53 (1992) (emphasis added). Rather than misconstruing the plain language of the inherent risks of skiing statute in order to formulate a judicially prescribed result, this court should apply the plain language of that statute to the facts in this case and leave the possible infirmities of the statute for the legislature to remedy.2
In the case before us, White was injured while skiing down Paradise ski trail, an un-groomed, mogul-filled run designated as “most difficult.” The accident occurred in an area where Wanderer cat track crossed Paradise trail. It is undisputed that cat tracks are a common and necessary feature at ski resorts. Not only, as the majority notes, do they allow an easier way down the mountain for novice skiers and provide snow grooming equipment access to upper portions of the mountain, but they also are used by skilled skiers as routes from trail to trail. As such, they are integral to the sport of skiing.
Cat tracks, like moguls, lift towers, bare spots, rocks, changing weather, snow or ice conditions, variations or steepness in terrain, and surface or subsurface conditions, are often out of the skier’s sight until immediately approached. However, these are exactly the sort of risks that the statute contemplates in stating that “no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53 (1992). Since White’s injuries were a result of an “inherent risk[ ] of skiing,” sec*1379tion 78-27-53 bars his claim against defendants.
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the ground that all the facts indicated that White’s conduct came within the inherent risks of skiing statute.3 Thus, for the reasons stated above, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, I dissent.4

. Although I fully understand the principle of stare decisis and the necessity thereof, it should not be adhered to when the rule established by a case was originally erroneous and more good than harm will come from departing from precedent. State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. 23, 25 & n. 3 - P.2d --, - & n. 3 (March 29, 1994). As Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly noted, "[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable....” Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S.Ct. 444, 451, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940). In keeping with this rule, this court has "not hesitated ... to reverse cas.e law when we are firmly convinced that we have erred earlier.” Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 n. 5 (Utah 1990); see, e.g., Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 25; - P.2d at - State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). Clover is just such a case.

. While such an approach may occasionally result in decisions that seem harsh or unfair, it is tor the legislature, not the judiciary, to remedy such results by amending or repealing the statute. Indeed, [i]f the act is unjust, amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial interpretation.” Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 126, 191 P.2d 612, 625, appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct. 138, 93 L.Ed. 411 (1948); see also Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, C.J., dissenting) C'[I]t is not our prerogative to question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying a given statute. Those are matters left exclusively to the legislature’s judgment and determination.”); Utah Mfrs.’ Ass'n v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 204, 23 P.2d 229, 232 (1933) ("[Fjairly debatable questions as to reasonableness, wisdom, or propriety [of legislative action] are not for the courts but for the Legislature.”); accord Salt Lake City v. Ohms, No. 930580, slip op. at n. 14, 1994 WL 457292, - P.2d -, - n. 14 (Utah August 18, 1994).

. Moreover, the constitutional argument made by White on appeal is not properly before this court. Whit^ first argued his constitutional argument to the trial court only after it had granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and he had filed his notice of appeal of that judgment, raising it in his motion for relief from summary judgment filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Although the trial court properly retained jurisdiction to hear White's 60(b) motion, see White v. State, 795 P.2d 648, 649-50 (Utah 1990); Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 757 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah Ct.App.1988), its denial of that motion was never appealed. Therefore, it would be improper to address White's constitutional argument on this appeal.

. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Zimmerman states that because Clover was decided by the highest court of this state, it is the law in Utah and thus "we should leave the matter where it lies.” It should be noted, however, that although the Chief Justice advocates strict adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in this case, this court has not hesitated to overrule prior precedent in other less-compelling cases. See, e.g., Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.Rep. at 25,-P.2d at-(overruling twenty years of supreme court precedent, based in part on court's assertion that its "rule does not work very well”); Hansen, 734 P.2d at 427 (overruling supreme court precedent because it misconstrued statute and "the decision [was] a recent one”); Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704 (overruling supreme court precedent because its reasoning was "unpersuasive”).
In an apparent attempt to offer a solution to Clover's misguided decision, the Chief Justice states that if the legislature disagrees with Clover's interpretation of the inherent risks of skiing statute, then the legislature can amend the statute. However, given the unequivocal nature of the language "no skier may make any claim against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing,” Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53 (1992) (emphasis added), no amendment by the legislature could make the statute any clearer than it is now.
The Chief Justice also asserts that the only basis I offer for overruling Clover is that I disagree with it. Of course I disagree with it; that is why I dissent. However, even a cursory review of my dissent reveals that it is firmly based on the fact that Clover contradicts the plain language of the statute.