Court Opinion

ID: 9713936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:26:41.025945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.319170
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COLWELL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. After considering the totality of the circumstances, I believe Officer Dowdle lacked sufficient facts, at the time of the stop, to justify an investigatory stop. Thus, the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress was manifestly erroneous, and I would reverse and remand for a new hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. My inquiry begins with a determination as to when Officer Dowdle stopped defendant. Without a stop, there is no seizure, and absent a seizure, the fourth amendment is not implicated. People v. Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d 530, 547 (1992). A seizure occurs when a police officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) (opinion of Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.). The test for determining when a police officer has seized a citizen is whether, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to leave. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501-02, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 239, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1326 (1983). In City of Highland Park v. Lee, 291 Ill. App. 3d 48, 54 (1997), this court found that a police officer’s use of emergency lights constituted a show of authority used to restrain a citizen’s liberty, and, thus, the traffic stop was a seizure. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-75, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 571-73, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1978-80 (1988) (suggesting that activation of siren or flashing lights might constitute a seizure); 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(a), at 97 n.45, 109 n.100 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 1998) (cases cited therein). In contrast, in People v. Long, 99 Ill. 2d 219, 231 (1983), our supreme court found that no stop occurred when a police officer, in his squad car, followed the defendant’s truck for about a quarter of a mile before the defendant voluntarily pulled over, since the officer never activated his squad car’s light or siren. See also People v. Erby, 213 Ill. App. 3d 657, 662 (1991) (no stop occurred when a police officer shined a light into a parked car where the officer did not use his flashing police lights as a show of authority); People v. Graves, 196 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277 (1990) (no stop occurred when a police officer drove up to the side of the defendant’s parked car, “particularly where there is no evidence that the officer activated any emergency lights or displayed any other overt signs of authority”); Taggart, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 547 (where the officer did not activate his mars light or any other signal lights, no stop occurred until the police officer asked the defendant to remain near his squad car). Accordingly, I find that a stop occurred when Officer Dowdle activated his squad car’s lights and siren. The majority relies on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991), but the facts in that case are distinguishable. In Hodari, the defendant ran down an alley when he noticed a police officer’s unmarked car round a comer. An officer, on foot, chased and caught the defendant. That case did not involve the activation of a police light or siren, nor did it involve the stop of a vehicle in traffic. Thus, Hodari provides no support for the majority’s position. The next question is whether the stop was reasonable. The majority admits that, without the fact that defendant continued to travel after Officer Dowdle activated his car’s lights and siren, Officer Dowdle’s observations provided insufficient corroboration of the anonymous informant’s tip. The court in People v. Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d 627 (1993), however, rejected the consideration of any facts occurring after the officer activated his squad car’s lights. In Messamore, after receiving an anonymous informant’s call, the police followed a vehicle for four to six blocks without incident before activating their squad car’s lights. The defendant drove about one-eighth to one-fourth of a mile before stopping in a parking lot. Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 628-29. The State argued that the stop was justified because the defendant continued to drive after the police activated their lights. Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 630. The court, however, stated that the requirements for a stop must be met prior to the stop. “To hold otherwise would allow police officers to justify a stop using events occurring after their reasonable suspicion was supposed to have been formed to support their actions.” Messamore, 245 Ill. App. 3d at 630. I also refuse to consider any facts occurring after Officer Dowdle activated his lights and siren. Additionally, when considering the totality of the circumstances, the facts do not support a stop. For example, the anonymous informant did not identify the location on Route 83 where he observed the brown Cadillac heading south from the Lake Villa area. The suspect may have been too far north on Route 83 to travel south and reach the intersection with Rollins Road in the two minutes it took Officer Dowdle to locate defendant after receiving the radio dispatch. Similarly, the informant indicated that the suspect was traveling south on Route 83, but Officer Dowdle first observed defendant in the eastbound lane of Rollins Road waiting for the traffic light at the intersection with Route 83. Thus, in two minutes, defendant would have had to travel south from an unidentified location on Route 83, turn right on Rollins Road, and turn around across two lanes of westbound traffic to reach the location where Officer Dowdle first observed him. In addition, defendant denied being on Route 83 that evening, and his testimony was uncontradicted. Moreover, defendant’s explanation regarding his presence at the intersection was plausible. Defendant testified that, since his wife was going to be home late, he was traveling from his house to a Mexican take-out restaurant in Rollins Plaza, east of the intersection of Route 83 and Rollins Road. Defendant explained that he lived seven houses north of Rollins Road and west of the intersection. Thus, he turned left on Rollins Road and was eastbound when he was pulled over. Office Dowdle also testified that defendant was ultimately traveling to a Mexican restaurant. Moreover, Officer Dowdle followed defendant for 400 to 500 feet before activating his car’s lights and siren. Officer Dowdle, however, admitted that he did not observe any erratic driving. Furthermore, Officer Dowdle testified that, to the best of his recollection, the anonymous informant provided a partial license plate number. Officer Dowdle’s report, however, did not include the partial license plate number. In addition to these factual weaknesses, the majority’s reliance on Village of Gurnee v. Gross, 174 Ill. App. 3d 66 (1988), is misplaced. In Gross, unlike this case, the radio dispatch identified the exact location (4200 block of Blackstone) where the reckless driving complaint originated and included an entire license plate number. Furthermore, the officer in Gross, with his lights activated, clearly instructed the defendant to pull over, but the defendant continued driving before pulling over after the officer had turned around and followed him. The facts in this case are also in contrast with the facts in People v. Diaz, 247 Ill. App. 3d 625 (1993). In Diaz, the informant’s tip contained information similar to the information provided the police in this matter, but the Diaz court relied solely on the officer’s own observations of the defendant’s erratic driving to justify the stop. Diaz, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 627. In this case, Officer Dowdle did not observe any erratic driving. On the other hand, the facts in this case are similar to the facts in City of Lake Forest v. Dugan, 206 Ill. App. 3d 552 (1990). In Dugan, this court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress. The informant in Dugan provided the police with a more detailed tip than the tip in this case, but, like this case, there was no evidence the officer observed any bad driving. Dugan, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 555.