Court Opinion

ID: 9848509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:21:13.604315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:21.144719
License: Public Domain

*709GEER, Judge,
dissenting.
In this case, the trial court erred in failing to submit to a jury the following aggravating factor: “The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.16(d)(8) (2007). In State v. Blackwell, 361 N.C. 41, 49, 638 S.E.2d 452, 458 (2006) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 47, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1834 (1999)), cert denied, 550 U.S. 948, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1114, 127 S. Ct. 2281 (2007), our Supreme Court held that such Blakely1 errors must be reviewed by the appellate courts to determine “whether the evidence against the defendant was so ‘overwhelming’ and ‘uncontroverted’ that any rational fact-finder would have found the disputed aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based upon my review of the record, including the jury’s verdict, I cannot conclude that the evidence was overwhelming or uncontroverted as to the aggravating factor, and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
In State v. Rose, 327 N.C. 599, 605, 398 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1990) (emphasis added), our Supreme Court held that in order to find the aggravating factor at issue in this case, there are “two considerations: (1) whether the weapon in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person; and (2) whether a great risk of death was knowingly created.” While State v. Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 393, 474 S.E.2d 336, 345 (1996), seems to establish that a semiautomatic pistol “in its normal use is hazardous to the lives of more than one person,” the issue still remains whether defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. In order to establish that prong of the aggravating factor, the State would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) knowingly, (2) created a great risk of death, (3) to more than one person.
At the original trial and at the sentencing hearing, defendant presented evidence from four expert witnesses — two of whom were doctors from Dorothea Dix Hospital — regarding defendant’s history of mental illness, including his discharge from the military with a 30% mental disability rating, his diagnosis as suffering from a psychotic disorder, his hospitalizations, and his psychotic symptoms. The evidence also indicated that defendant had ceased taking his medications — which included an antipsychotic drug, a mood stabilizer, and antidepressants — for the 10 months prior to the shooting. Each of the *710expert witnesses testified with respect to the 28 October 1999 shooting incident that defendant had suffered a psychotic episode that interfered with his ability to know the difference between right and wrong. The State did not present any contrary expert evidence either at the original trial or at the resentencing hearing.
Although defendant did not testify at the original trial, he testified at the resentencing hearing. He explained that he had unsuccessfully been trying to get an appointment at the VA hospital to adjust his medications, but the first appointment he could obtain was for 1 November 1999, three days after the shooting. Defendant testified that he told doctors in 1999 that he was trying to get the police to kill him. He explained that he knew there was a police substation at the convenience store and went there because he thought “if I’m shooting a round off in the air or something and trying to get, hopefully they’ll take me out, because the pain, my mental anguish was so much I couldn’t bear it no more.”
In light of the extensive evidence presented regarding defendant’s state of mind — the focus of the aggravating factor — certainly, we cannot say that the evidence of the aggravating factor was uncontroverted. Nor, given the State’s lack of expert testimony supporting its position, can I agree that the evidence in support of the aggravating factor was overwhelming.
The majority opinion bases its conclusion that the evidence meets the Blackwell standard on an assumption that the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense during the original trial necessarily establishes the second prong of the aggravating factor’s test. This assumption is contrary to both the record and the law of this State.
It is apparent from the jury’s actual verdict that it found defendant’s evidence of his mental status persuasive even though it did not believe that defendant had met his burden of proving insanity. Although, with respect to the two officers actually struck by defendant’s bullets, the jury found defendant guilty of the general intent crime of assault with a firearm upon a law enforcement officer, it found defendant not guilty of attempted first degree murder. See State v. Goble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 46 (2000) (“Therefore, to commit the crime of attempted murder, one must specifically intend to commit murder.”). Likewise, the jury declined to find defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, but, instead, found him guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
*711In short, the jury specifically concluded that the State had failed to prove defendant acted with an intent to kill even though defendant had shot one officer in the chest three times. I believe that the jury’s verdict indicates that there is a reasonable possibility that it would also have found that defendant did not knowingly create a risk of death to more than one person. This possibility is even stronger when one considers that a sentencing jury would have the benefit of defendant’s testimony that he was attempting, in effect, to commit suicide.
The jury’s rejection of the insanity defense does not, as a legal matter, conclusively establish the existence of the aggravating factor. As our Supreme Court observed in State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 565, 213 S.E.2d 305, 316 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 226 S.E.2d 631 (1980), a defendant’s mental capacity may be a “crucial factor” with respect to a number of issues in a criminal case, including insanity, but the “test of sufficient mental capacity” will vary depending on the specific issue. I have found no authority that suggests that a jury’s finding that a defendant failed to prove to its satisfaction that he was insane necessarily resolves the question whether the State has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly created a risk of death to more than one person. The evolution of our State’s law regarding diminished capacity suggests, however, that a jury’s rejection of the insanity defense is not conclusive.
It is now established in North Carolina that a defendant may offer evidence of diminished mental capacity not only to prove insanity, but also to negate the ability to form a specific intent. See, e.g., State v. Page, 346 N.C. 689, 698, 488 S.E.2d 225, 231 (1997) (“A defendant is entitled to present evidence that a diminished mental capacity not amounting to legal insanity negated his ability to form the specific intent to kill required for a first-degree murder conviction on the basis of premeditation and deliberation.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 139 L. Ed. 2d 651, 118 S. Ct. 710 (1998); State v. Staten, 172 N.C. App. 673, 685, 616 S.E.2d 650, 659 (“The defense of diminished capacity neither justifies nor excuses the commission of an offense, but rather negates only the element of specific intent, and the defendant could still be found guilty of a lesser included offense.”), appeal dismissed and disc, review denied, 360 N.C. 180, 626 S.E.2d 838 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1081, 164 L. Ed. 2d 537, 126 S. Ct. 1798 (2006); State v. Williams, 116 N.C. App. 225, 231, 447 S.E.2d 817, 821 (1994) (“The defense of diminished capacity applies to the element of specific *712intent to kill which is an essential element of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury.”), appeal dismissed and disc, review denied, 339 N.C. 741, 454 S.E.2d 661 (1995). If a jury may both reject an insanity defense and find that the State failed to prove specific intent because of a defendant’s mental incapacity, I can see no reason why the same should not be true with respect to the aggravating factor in this case.
I do not believe that this Court’s prior opinion in this case, State v. Sellers, 155 N.C. App. 51, 574 S.E.2d 101 (2002), holds otherwise. The prior panel simply concluded that “[wjhere, as here, the jury has found defendant’s evidence regarding insanity lacking, we find there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable judge to find that, despite the expert testimony to the contrary, defendant acted ‘knowingly.’ Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding this aggravating factor.” Id. at 58, 574 S.E.2d at 106 (emphasis added). In other words, we previously held only that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of the aggravating factor. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the rejection of the insanity defense mandated a finding of the aggravating factor. See State v. Hurt, 361 N.C. 325, 331, 643 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2007) (holding that although the evidence was such that “the jury could have found the [heinous, atrocious, and cruel] aggravator,” it did not follow “that the jury necessarily would have found it beyond a reasonable doubt”).
I believe Hurt controls. Although the evidence at trial.meant that the original jury could have found defendant knowingly created a risk of death to more than one person, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have made this finding. Despite evidence that defendant shot one officer in the chest three times, the jury refused repeatedly to find that defendant acted with an intent to kill. How can this Court, without substituting its own view of the evidence, conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury which did not believe defendant intended to kill would also find defendant knowingly created a risk'of death to more than one person? Maybe the jury would have, but maybe it would not. I would, therefore, remand for a new sentencing hearing.

. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).