Court Opinion

ID: 9523841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:47:31.927534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:15.402299
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, specially concurring: I concur in the judgment of the court and in the court’s opinion insofar as it holds that defense witness James Storz’ testimony was improperly admitted. I do not agree, however, with the court’s decision that the birth certificate should have been allowed into evidence. In so deciding, the court not only disregards the statutory limitations on the evidentiary use of a birth certificate, but also misapplies the rules that this court has set out concerning the admissability of prior consistent statements. With certain exceptions, the data contained on a birth certificate is hearsay, and the certificate therefore is inadmissible to prove the truth of the statements contained therein. (Howard v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank (1901), 189 Ill. 568, 573-74; see also E. Cleary & M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence secs. 803.1, 803.14 (3d ed. 1979); S. Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rules 3:16, 3:17, at 93-94 (2d ed 1979); McCormick, Evidence sec. 316 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).) Section 25 of our Vital Records Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, par. 73 — 25) sets out the few permissible evidentiary uses of a birth certificate, thereby defining the exceptions to the hearsay rule in this area. As construed by this court, the statute directs that a birth certificate be considered as prima facie evidence of only the child’s name, sex, birthplace, and date of birth. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 111½, pars. 73-25(2), (6); People ex rel. Moran v. Teolis (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 95, 105.) The dissenting justice in the appellate court correctly observed that other declarations on the certified copy of the birth certificate, such as those relating to parentage, are inadmissible hearsay. (See People ex rel. Ashford v. Ziemann (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 34, 42 (Stamos, P.J., dissenting).) Accordingly, it has been held that a birth certificate may not be used to prove the mother’s residence, although stated therein (People ex rel. Moran v. Teolis (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 95, 105), or to prove that a child is his mother’s second offspring (Howard v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank (1901), 189 Ill. 568, 573-74). The facts that a birth certificate may properly certify were not seriously disputed at trial in this case. Instead, the central issue was the identity of the child’s father. Although the birth certificate did not name the father, it did state his age and birthplace. Plaintiff, after having identified a certified copy of the birth certificate, called defendant as an adverse witness to confirm that his age and birthplace correspond with those listed on the certificate for the child’s father. Plaintiff’s attempt to admit the birth certificate was an obvious effort to imply that defendant was indeed the father described on the document. Because her strategy exceeds the purposes for which that document properly could be offered, I would affirm the trial court decision to exclude the birth certificate. Plaintiff also sought to illustrate her consistency by showing that the birth certificate, which she had signed well before bringing this suit, declared the child’s father to be a man of the same age and with the same birthplace as the man she later named as defendant. In more common evidence-law terms, she tried to bolster her credibility as a witness by introducing her own prior consistent statement. This court has consistently held that proof of a witness’ out-of-court statements which corroborate the witness’ trial testimony are inadmissible. An exception is recognized when the offer is made to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper motive. (E.g., People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 501; People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 389; Lyon v. Oliver (1925), 316 Ill. 292, 303.) In the case at bar, the court notes that defendant's charges of recent fabrication and improper motive are inherent in his contesting this paternity action. It thus concludes that the exception applies to allow the birth certificate into evidence. I disagree. The exception relied upon only applies in cases where the corroborating statement was made “when the motive did not exist or before the effect of the account could be foreseen.” (Lyon v. Oliver (1925), 316 Ill. 292, 303.) Orneases illustrate this principle. In People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, an alibi witness testified that the defendant was at her house at the time of the killing. However, the trial judge did not permit her to testify that she had told police the same story several weeks after the killing. This court held that references to the prior consistent statement were properly excluded. The statement was made to police well after the killing and after eyewitnesses had identified the defendant in a lineup. The testimony could not come in under the exception for rebuttal of a recent fabrication charge because “[e]very motive for fabricating a false statement existed [when she told her story to police] that existed at the time of the trial.” (People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 374, 389.) Also, in People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, a State’s witness had borrowed $5,000 from defendant several years before the alleged crime and had repeatedly refused to repay the money. When this witness testified to defendant’s guilt, his credibility was attacked with a claim that the unpaid debt gave rise to an improper motive. To bolster his own veracity, the witness testified that he had identified the defendant to police immediately after the alleged crime. We held that this prior consistent statement was improperly admitted. Because of the longstanding $5,000 debt, this witness had the same motive for falsely identifying defendant immediately after the crime that he had when he testified at trial. (People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 487, 499-501.) See also People v. Powell (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 465, 474-75. As with the statements barred in Clark and Emerson, the birth certificate in the case at bar falls within the general rule against prior consistent statements, rather than within the exception. If plaintiff in fact testified falsely, her motive — to identify the child’s father — arose when she learned that she was pregnant. Indeed, both parties testified that shortly after she learned of the pregnancy, plaintiff told defendant that he was the father. Under these circumstances, plaintiff should be prevented from using her own statements on the birth certificate as an apparent documentation of the veracity of her trial testimony. By allowing its admission, the court sanctions the precise self-serving tactic that our cases have repeatedly barred. It is in this respect that I think the court has misapplied the law of prior consistent statements. On this basis, as well as the hearsay ground discussed earlier, I would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the birth certificate.