Court Opinion

ID: 9713750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:21:40.598172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.308247
License: Public Domain

*815SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1.
I do not agree that the issue of specific performance has been rendered moot. Had Dahlins not consummated the sale as ordered, arguably they would have found themselves in contempt. I do not believe there was any legal compulsion for them to seek a stay pending appeal, although they ran a risk that if they obtained a reversal upon appeal, Amoco might have done something in the interim to encumber the property. In any event, I do not believe that in obeying the court order, Dahlins give up their right to seek a determination that the trial court was wrong in ordering specific performance.
We should decide the issue upon the merits with regard to the severability of the provisions concerning the restrictive covenant vis-a-vis the option to purchase. Absent a majority, however, it would serve no useful purpose to discuss the issue in this separate opinion.
II. (A)
It would appear that after notification of the breach, Amoco continued with the construction. Such would seem to remove the breach from even the "grossly negligent" category and place it within an intentional, if not malicious, category. In this connection, the majority acknowledges that the lease in question was prepared by Amoco but holds that Amoco was warranted in assuming that the lease was no different from other similar leases but which allowed construction on the leased premises. In my estimation such assumption was unwarranted, if in fact it was made. The lease in question clearly contained a modification which precluded the construction of buildings. It was the duty of Amoco to be aware of its business dealings and to know the contents of legal documents governing that corporate enterprise. If the question were submitted to the jury, a reasonable conclusion could be drawn that Amoco either ignored the modification or was "grossly negligent" in failing to notice it.
In the case before us, an award of actual damages was made, albeit in the nominal sum of one dollar. Given the facts of this case, that award carries with it the permissibility of a punitive damage award. Arlington State Bank v. Colvin (1989) 1st Dist., Ind.App., 545 N.E.2d 572. Although I may agree that by belatedly exercising the option, most, if not all of the sting was taken from the encroachment, the question of punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury.
II. (B)
I concur.
II. (C)
I concur in result.
II. (D) and (E)
I concur.
IIL
I concur in part and dissent in part.
Dahlins have demonstrated no prejudice in the judgment itself which could be attributed to a conflict of interest. The relationships here were remote and were asserted as suspect only after trial and judgment. Under such circumstance, even assuming merit to Dahlin's argument, the judge would have had to grant a new trial in order to recuse himself. I agree that cause for reversal is not indicated in this regard.
I do however, dissent from the approval given by the majority to the sanctions imposed under Trial Rule 37(A)(4). The Dah-lins were attempting to discover the depth and nature of the relationship which carried with it the appearance of a conflict in interest. The Probate Commissioner is an officer of the court. It was not inappropriate for the Dahlins to seek to learn more about his connection with Amoco through the Bank. Some conflicts are created not by direct activity of the attorney in the litigation, but rather by another member of the same law firm. Similarly, that the trial judge himself does not have a direct conflict, will not necessarily eliminate the ne*816cessity for a recusal. To be sure, a litigant may not indulge in mere "fishing expeditions". However, a party may not determine whether to seek recusal unless he has knowledge of or tries to determine the existence and extent of a possible conflict. The Dahlins should not have been compelled to pay the costs of the protective order sought by the Bank and joined by Amoco.
IV.
I concur.