Court Opinion

ID: 9385529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 06:00:13.693811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:02.560819
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NINA M. COLEMAN,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DA-3443-17-0273-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: April 6, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Nina M. Coleman, Dallas, Texas, pro se.

           Morgan Kinney, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal of the agency action removing her from her Disaster

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                       2

     Assistance Employee position because the authority under which she was
     appointed specified that that she was appointed “without regard to the provisions
     of Title 5.” For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the initial decision and
     DISMISS the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, relying on a different legal basi s
     than the administrative judge.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        Beginning June 8, 2008, the appellant was continuously employed with the
     agency as a Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) 3 under a series of temporary
     appointments. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 8 at 68‑91, 97. The legal authority
     identified on the appellant’s Standard Form (SF) 50 for the appointment is Pub.
     L. No. 93-288, known as the Stafford Act. 4        Id. at 97.    By a letter dated
     February 13, 2017, the appellant was informed that she was terminated, effective
     immediately, based on one specification of failure to follow instructions and one
     specification of failure to follow a written agency policy. IAF, Tab 8 at 60-63.
     The termination letter informed the appellant that, because of the nature of her
     appointment under the Stafford Act, she was not entitled to Board appeal rights,
     but that she could appeal the final decision to the agency’s Cadre Management
     and Training Branch Chief within 5 days. Id. at 62. The letter also informed the
     appellant that, if she believed that her termination was the result of prohibited
     discrimination, she could file a complaint with the agency’s Equal Employment
     Opportunity office. Id.

     3
       The agency noted and the appellant does not dispute that in November 2011, the
     agency changed the designation of the DAE position title to “Reservist.” IAF, Tab 8
     at 9, 82.
     4
       The legal authority for the appellant’s appointment was the Disaster Relief Act of
     1974 (1974 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat 143, which was amended by the Disaster
     Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments of 1988 (1988 Act), Pub. L.
     No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689. Section 102(a) of the 1988 Act renamed the 1974 Act
     “The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act ” (Stafford Act)
     (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.).
                                                                                     3

¶3        On April 13, 2017, the appellant filed the instant appeal with the Board
     challenging her termination. IAF, Tab 1. The agency filed a motion to dismiss
     the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tab 8 at 7-19. The administrative judge
     informed the appellant in a show cause order that the Board may not have
     jurisdiction over her appeal. IAF, Tab 12. The appellant filed a response to the
     order. IAF, Tab 14. In an initial decision, the administrative judge dismissed the
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction.    IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID).       The
     administrative judge determined that because the appellant ’s appointment was a
     temporary appointment made pursuant to the Stafford Act, her position was
     excluded from coverage under chapter 75 of Title 5. ID at 5.
¶4        In reaching this decision, the administrative judge relied on an Office of
     Personnel Management (OPM) regulation, 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(d)(12), which
     states that “[a]n employee whose agency or position has been excluded from the
     appointing provisions of Title 5, United States Code, by separate statutory
     authority” is excluded from coverage of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 unless there is a
     provision specifically placing that employee under the protections of chapter 75.
     Id. Citing similar language in the Stafford Act authorizing the agency to hire
     temporary personnel “without regard to the provisions of Title 5 of the United
     States Code,” the administrative judge determined that the Board lacked
     jurisdiction to review the appellant’s termination.     ID at 5; see 42 U.S.C.
     § 5149(b)(1). The administrative judge also cited Thiess v. Witt, 100 F.3d 915,
     916-17 (Fed. Cir. 1996), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
     Circuit determined that similar language elsewhere in the Stafford Act excluded
     those appellants from coverage under certain provisions of 5 U.S.C. chapter 63
     pertaining to leave. ID at 5.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that the Board has
     jurisdiction over her termination appeal and that the agency violated her
     Constitutional due process rights in removing her. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1 at 4-6.     The agency has filed a response in opposition to the
                                                                                      4

     appellant’s petition, and she has filed a reply and supplemental reply. PFR File,
     Tabs 3-4, 6.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the language of 42 U.S.C.
     § 5149 precludes Board jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal of her removal.
¶6        The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation.       Maddox v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The appellant has the burden
     to prove by preponderant evidence that her appeal is within the Board ’s
     jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). A preponderance of the evidence is
     that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record
     as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is more likely
     to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
¶7        As noted above, the administrative judge based her decision tha t the Board
     lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal on OPM regulation 5 C.F.R.
     § 752.401(d)(12), coupled with language in the Stafford Act stating that
     appointments were made under that hiring authority “without regard to the
     provisions of Title 5.”    ID at 5.     However, in reaching this decision, the
     administrative judge did not consider the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lal v.
     Merit Systems Protection Board, 821 F.3d 1376 (2016). The appellant in Lal
     appealed her removal as a Distinguished Consultant at the Department of Health
     and Human Services, which was a position created under a statutory special
     appointment authority, 42 U.S.C. § 209(f). Id. at 1377. The administrative judge
     dismissed the appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction, concluding that section 209(f)
     granted appointments “without regard to civil-service laws,” and that, under
     5 C.F.R. § 752.401(d)(12), this language deprived the Board of jurisdiction over
     the appellant’s removal appeal.       Lal v. Department of Health and Human
     Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0852-I-1, Final Order, ¶ 2 (Mar. 25,
     2015).   The Board agreed, affirming the initial decision.      Id., ¶¶ 4-14; Lal,
                                                                                       5

     821 F.3d at 1377-78. However, on appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board,
     concluding that under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454,
     92 Stat. 1111, and the Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
     No. 101-376, 104 Stat. 461 (codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 7511), absent a
     specific exclusion of appeal rights or exemption from section 7511’s definition of
     “employee,” a statute broadly exempting an appointment from “the civil-service
     laws” did not strip the Board of jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an adverse
     action taken against that employee.      Lal, 821 F.3d at 1379-80.    Instead, the
     Federal Circuit concluded, the Board must look to the language of the
     appointment authority to determine whether it included a specific exclusion of
     chapter 75 appeal rights. Id. at 1380-81. The court also concluded that to the
     extent OPM’s interpretation of 5 C.F.R. § 752.410(d)(12) called for a contrary
     result, it had “no force or effect.” Id. at 1381. Concluding that nothing in the
     broad statutory language stating that appointments under section 209(f) were
     made “without regard to the civil-service laws” exempted the appellant’s position
     from section 7511(a)’s definition of “employee,” the Federal Circuit reversed and
     remanded the Board’s decision. Id.
¶8        Subsequently, in Malloy v. Department of State, 2022 MSPB 14, the Board
     applied the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lal for the first time, reversing and
     remanding the initial decision dismissing the appellant’s adverse action appeal for
     lack of Board jurisdiction. In Malloy, the Board concluded that the implementing
     language for the appointment authority at issue in that case only explicitly
     excluded “chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of Title 5,” and made no
     reference to chapter 75 appeal rights.    Id., ¶ 12.   Relying on Lal, the Board
     concluded that because the appointing authority did not explicitly exclude
     appointees from the protections of chapter 75 (specifically, those relating to
     removal), as it did with chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53, the appellant
     was not precluded from pursuing her appeal rights pursuant to chapter 75. Id.
                                                                                        6

¶9          In the instant case, the administrative judge observed that the Stafford Act
      authorized agencies to hire temporary personnel “without regard to the provisions
      of Title 5,” and to “employ experts and consultants in accordance with [ 5 U.S.C.
      § 3109], without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of
      chapter 53 [of Title 5] . . . .” ID at 5; see 5 U.S.C. § 5149(b)(1). Relying on this
      language, as well as OPM’s language in 5 C.F.R. § 752.401(d)(12), the
      administrative judge concluded that the Board lacked the authority to review the
      termination of any employee hired under the Stafford Act, including the
      appellant. ID at 5. Although not noted by the administrative judge, significantly,
      the language of the Stafford Act does not exclude such employees from the
      coverage of chapter 75.
¶10         In light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lal, and the Board’s decision in
      Malloy, the administrative judge’s conclusion—that the “without regard to the
      provisions of Title 5” language in the Stafford Act appointing authority
      categorically precluded Board review of the termination of any employee hired
      under the Act—was in error. Instead, as the Board noted in Malloy, to decide
      whether an agency action falls within the coverage of chapter 75, the statutory
      language authorizing the employee’s appointment must be examined to discern
      whether the action is specifically excluded from the coverage of chapter 75. See
      Lal, 821 F.3d at 1379-81; Malloy, 2022 MSPB 14, ¶¶ 9-13. We therefore vacate
      the administrative judge’s finding in this regard.

      We dismiss the appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because she does not
      meet the statutory definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1).
¶11         Although the holdings in Lal and Malloy instruct that the “without regard to
      the provisions of Title 5” language of the Stafford Act is insufficient to
      categorically exclude individuals appointed under that act from chapter 75
      coverage, nothing in either decision altered the appellant’s obligation to
      otherwise demonstrate that she meets the definition of an “employee” with
      chapter 75 appeal rights in order to prove that the Board has jurisdiction over her
                                                                                      7

      appeal. Specifically, the appellant still must show that she is an “employee” with
      Board appeal rights as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1).       See Lal, 821 F.3d
      at 1379-81.
¶12        The appellant argued below that the she qualifies as an “employee” under
      section 7511(a)(1) because she was (1) an individual in the excepted service, who
      (2) was not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment
      pending conversion to the competitive service. IAF, Tab 4 at 3; see ID at 3.
      Under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C), a nonpreference eligible in the excepted service
      only qualifies as an “employee” with Board appeal rights if she:
            (i) is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial
            appointment pending conversion to the competitive service; or
            (ii) has completed 2 years of current continuous service in the same
            or similar positions in an Executive agency under other than a
            temporary appointment limited to 2 years or less.
      5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C).         The Board has jurisdiction if either 5 U.S.C.
      § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i) or (ii) is satisfied. Van Wersch v. Department of Health and
      Human Services, 197 F.3d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
¶13        As the administrative judge correctly noted, the appellant did not provide
      any evidence demonstrating that she was serving in a probationary or trial period
      or that her position was one that was pending conversion to the competitive
      service. ID at 2. Instead, the administrative judge noted that the appointments
      each had a “not to exceed date” and thus were temporary appointments in the
      excepted service.   ID at 2, 5.    Indeed, as the administrative judge noted, the
      condition-of-employment document signed by the appellant prior to the effective
      date of her first temporary appointment states that the appellant’s appointment is
      a “temporary civil service excepted position,” and that the appellant could be
      “terminated at any time, with cause . . . or without ca use . . . .” ID at 2; IAF,
      Tab 8 at 103.
¶14        Reviewing the SF-50s in the appellant’s submitted personnel file, the
      administrative judge also observed that the SF-50 documenting the appellant’s
                                                                                          8

      first temporary appointment identified her appointment as a “not to exceed”
      (NTE) appointment. 5     ID at 2.     Additionally, box 34 of each of the SF-50s
      documenting the subsequent temporary appointment renewals identified the
      appointment type as within the excepted service, the appellant’s tenure as “none,”
      and her work schedule as “intermittent.” IAF, Tab 8 at 72, 75, 78, 82-83, 86, 89,
      97. Each of the appellant’s temporary appointments also specified an NTE date
      that was less than 2 years in the future, and none of the appointments exceeded a
      2-year      period,   disqualifying    the   appellant    from     coverage     under
      section 7511(a)(1)(C)(ii).    Id.; see Roy v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      672 F.3d 1378, 1381 (2012) (noting that the language of section 7511(a)(1)(c)(ii)
      “leaves no room to doubt that the two-year continuity requirement must be
      satisfied by service in the same or similar permanent positions”) (emphasis in
      original); see also OPM Guide to Processing Personnel Actions, 6 Ch. 35 at 15,
      available        at      https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-
      documentation/personnel-documentation/processing-personnel-actions/gppa35.
      pdf (noting that a temporary appointment is one made for a limited period of time
      with a specific NTE date determined by the authority under which the
      appointment is made).
¶15        Further, nothing in the language of the Stafford Act specifies that
      appointments made under the Act are subject to a probationary or trial period or
      that they are positions “pending conversion to the competitive service.”          See

      5
        Although “the SF-50 is not a legally operative document controlling on its face an
      employee’s status and rights,” it still can be considered as evidence when determining
      the nature of an action. Grigsby v. Department of Commerce, 729 F.2d 772, 776 (Fed.
      Cir. 1984).
      6
        While OPM guides and handbooks lack the force of law, the Board has held that they
      are entitled to deference in proportion to their power to persuade. See Warren v.
      Department of Transportation, 116 M.S.P.R. 554, ¶ 7 n.2 (2011) (addressing an OPM
      retirement handbook), aff’d, 493 F. App’x 105 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Luten v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 110 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 9 n.3 (2009) (granting “some deference”
      to an OPM retirement handbook). Here, OPM’s Guide is persuasive as to its definition
      of a temporary appointment).
                                                                                             9

      generally 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. To the contrary, the statutory provisions of
      the Stafford Act grant agencies the authority to appoint “temporary personnel,
      experts, and consultants” and to incur obligations “arising out of the temporary
      employment of additional personnel . . . .”          42 U.S.C. § 5149(b) (emphasis
      added).
¶16         Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction because
      the appellant has failed to demonstrate that she meets the statutory definition of
      an “employee” with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1). 7

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Meri t
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.

      7
        It appears that the appellant is requesting to join an Individual Right of Action (IRA)
      appeal to this matter. PFR File, Tab 6 at 3; see Coleman v. Department of Homeland
      Security, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-17-0500-W-1. However, because the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over the appellant’s removal appeal in the instant case, her request is
      denied. The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision in her IRA
      appeal and the Board will issue a separate decision in that case.
      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        10

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                 11

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).           If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respe ctive
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employme nt
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, th e
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     12

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                13

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.