Court Opinion

ID: 9673294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:09:40.581913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:21.345403
License: Public Domain

Bashara, P. J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. This is an action for breach of contract on an insurance policy. The trial judge granted defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment grounded on the statute of limitations. GCR 1963, 116.1(5). Plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff was insured by the defendant as a lienholder on an aircraft owned by TRB Flying Service. On or about September 30, 1967, J. D. Vickers converted the aircraft.
By a letter dated December 13, 1967, the plaintiff advised the defendant of a potential claim under the policy as a result of the conversion of the aircraft.1 In a letter on December 12, 1968, the defendant notified the plaintiff that the conclusion of a criminal action pending against Vickers was necessary before any further action could be taken. The defendant advised the plaintiff by a letter of June 9, 1969, that its investigation indicated no basis for plaintiff’s claim.
The plaintiff brought this action on May 13, 1974. Relying on Friedberg v Insurance Co of North America, 257 Mich 291; 241 NW 183 (1932), Dahrooge v Rochester German Insurance Co, 177 Mich 442; 143 NW 608 (1913), and McGuire v Continental Insurance Co, 39 Mich App 612; 197 *157NW2d 846 (1972), the trial judge determined that the cause of action accrued on the date of the conversion and was barred by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. MCLA 600.5807(8); MSA 27A.5807(8).
The statute of limitations for suits on insurance policies begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues. Lukazewski v Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World, 270 Mich 415, 423; 259 NW 307 (1935), Griffin v Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co, 250 Mich 185, 189; 229 NW 509 (1930). Generally, this depends upon the terms of the insurance policy. 14 Callaghan’s Michigan Civil Jurisprudence, § 471, p 525. For instance, in the cases relied upon by the trial judge the insurance contract itself provided or incorporated a statute which limited the insured to commencing suit within a specific time "after the happening of the loss”, Friedberg v Insurance Co of North America, supra, 292, or "after the fire”, Dahrooge v Rochester German Insurance Co, supra, 448, or "after inception of the loss”, McGuire v Continental Insurance Co, supra, 613.
I am of the opinion that Schimmer v Wolverine Insurance Co, 54 Mich App 291, 297; 220 NW2d 772 (1974), is a good example of proper application of the law. In Schimmer the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for refusal to defend her in a prior lawsuit. In the original action the plaintiff was served with process on February 6, 1964. Subsequently, she requested the defendant to defend her pursuant to certain homeowner’s policies issued by the defendant. On May 7, 1964, defendant refused her request. The action was commenced on January 14, 1971. A panel of this Court found that the cause of action accrued on the date the defendant refused to defend, and the *158action was therefore barred by the six-year statute of limitations.
In the instant case the undisputed facts disclosed that the defendant notified the plaintiff on June 9, 1969, that the plaintiffs claim was without foundation. Since there were no contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, I see no reason to treat this action any differently than any other breach of contract action. Therefore, the cause of action accrued when the alleged breach occurred on June 9, 1969. The suit was commenced well within the six-year statute of limitations.
I would reverse and remand with costs to abide the outcome.

 Plaintiffs complaint alleges a conversion of the aircraft on or about September 30, 1967. Defendant was not advised of the claim until December 13, 1967. The insurance contract clearly states that proof of loss should be filed with the company within 60 days after the loss. Further, factual development of the date of loss may be necessary under the procedures outlined in GCR 1963, 117.3 to disclose whether summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(3) is appropriate. See Dailey v Mid-States Insurance Co, 321 Mich 438; 32 NW2d 698 (1948).