Court Opinion

ID: 9537941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:27:43.899336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:32.576400
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
In support of his application for rehearing, appellee insists that in our original opinion we erred (1) In holding that the assessments and notices given pursuant thereto were valid and not contrary to the constitution, and (2) In reversing the judgment of the trial court denying appellant’s plea in abatement to appellee’s application for writ of mandamus.
In arguing proposition (1), supra, appellee insists that the taxing statute under which the Baxter assessments were made is applicable only to residents of the State of Alabama by its very terms, citing Code of Alabama, Title 51, Sec. 377, which reads in part as follows:
“Tax on individuals. — The tax herein levied and imposed upon every resident of this state, * *
But appellee apparently overlooks the last sentence of Sec. 377, supra, which reads in part as follows:
“Every natural person domiciled in the state of Alabama, * * * shall be presumed to be residing within the state for the purpose of determining liability for income taxes.” (Emphasis supplied)
Appellee insists that in relying upon Campbell v. State, 242 Ala. 215, 220, 5 So.2d 466, 470, we failed to make the distinction between domicile and residence. True, the *142Campbell case, supra, uses the words “resident of the forum who is sojourning in another state”, but the Campbell case cites Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278, which is also referred to by appellee, and which we have carefully read and from which we quote:
“Domicile in the state is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within reach of state’s jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied)
In the Campbell case, supra, Justice Foster said:
“There is a distinction between substituted service and constructive service in this connection. The former includes the act of leaving the process at the residence or place of business of the party (50 Corpus Juris 490), or. of leaving it with an agent or attorney of the' party (50 Corpus Juris 494, section 101), or by mailing it to the party (50 Corpus Juris 495, section 102). Service by publication alone is said more accurately to be constructive service, (50 Corpus Juris 490, section 94, note 69) ; but it is sometimes said to be ‘a substitute for personal service and gives constructive notice only.’ 50 Corpus Juris 496, notes 3, 4. But it is said in Milliken v. Meyer, supra, the service should be reasonably calculated to give him actual notice (unless the proceeding is in rem, when constructive notice will suffice).” (242 Ala. at page 220, 5 So.2d at page 471)
Upon reviewing our original opinion we note that we said:
“We hold that the provisions of Title 51, § 407, supra, for the giving of notice to legal residents of Alabama do not violate the due process clause of the constitution.”
We now hold that the provisions of Title 51, § 407, for the giving of notice to legal residents of Alabama or persons domiciled therein do not violate the due process clause of the constitution, and we adhere to our original opinion that the assessments and the notices were valid.
Before moving on to the appellee’s second insistence in his application for rehearing we take note of his argument that some of the notices could not have reached Baxter until after law day of the proceeding, saying that, “At Baxter’s California address Baxter was notified to file reports within ten days when the Department was informed he would not get mail for possibly a month or more.” True, but the record shows that the preliminary assessments were made on October 17, 1966, but on November 8, 1966, the Department wrote Baxter at his Chatom, Alabama, address that the Department was continuing his file for an additional 30 days, during which he might submit any protest that he might see fit to file. To that letter Baxter replied under date of November 22, 1966 (thus showing that he received the notices of the preliminary assessments), again denying that he was a resident of Alabama during the pertinent years. The Department wrote him follow-up letters on December 2, 1966, January 11, 1967, and May 8, 1967, all of which apparently were ignored, and finally on June 20, 1967, made the assessments final and mailed copies of the assessments to Baxter, with a note attached to each copy that if he were dissatisfied with the final assessment he might take an appeal within 30 days. If the giving of notice and the opportunity for a fair hearing is due process, as the cases hold, it seems to- us that appellee had a full share thereof.
After carefully considering appellee’s second insistence, viz: That since appellant’s plea in abatement was addressed to appellee’s petition as a whole and not to the separate aspects thereof, and we held one aspect of the plea bad, we should not have reversed the trial court for having overruled the plea as a whole, we have reached the conclusion that there is merit in appellee’s insistence. We now affirm the judgment of the trial court in over*143ruling and denying appellant’s plea in abatement to appellee’s petition for the writ of mandamus; but, as hereinabove indicated, we adhere to our reversal of the trial court’s final judgment holding the assessments void.
Application for rehearing granted, opinion extended, affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.