Court Opinion

ID: 9377657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:04:21.457636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.436875
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                           Docket No. 49794

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                  )
                                                  )    Filed: March 8, 2023
         Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
                                                  )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                               )
                                                  )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 PATRICK D. BATTENFELDER,                         )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                  )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
         Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                  )

        Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
        County. Hon. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge.

        Order for restitution, affirmed.

        Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jenny C. Swinford, Deputy
        Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

        Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
        General, Boise, for respondent.
                  ________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
        Patrick D. Battenfelder appeals from an order for restitution. We affirm.
                                                  I.
                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        Battenfelder entered into a plea agreement with the State and pled guilty to felony
malicious injury to property for damaging a vehicle. According to his plea agreement, Battenfelder
“agree[d] to pay restitution for all charged, uncharged, and dismissed conduct in this case or in
any case dismissed by the terms of this offer in an amount to be determined or in the amount of
$ TBD.” The State initially sought $1,000 in restitution to the victim and $7,831.80 to the victim’s
insurer. Battenfelder objected and the district court set an evidentiary hearing to determine
restitution.

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       At the hearing, the State presented testimony from the victim and a claims manager from
the victim’s insurer. According to the claims manager, the estimated cost to repair the vehicle was
$10,411.18. The claims manager explained that the insurance company decided to declare the
vehicle a total loss rather than pay to repair the vehicle because, at the time of making the decision,
the vehicle’s estimated salvage value made totaling the vehicle the better option. Ultimately, the
salvage value was less than estimated, leaving the insurance company with a net cost of $13,182.38
for totaling the vehicle. During his argument, Battenfelder noted that he was represented by the
public defender’s office, which showed that the district court had “previously found him indigent.”
The district court ordered restitution in the amount of $1,500 to the victim and $13,182.38 to the
victim’s insurer, for a total of $14,682.38. Battenfelder appeals.
                                                  II.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
       Idaho Code Section 19-5304(2) authorizes a sentencing court to order a defendant to pay
restitution for economic loss to the victim of a crime. The decision whether to order restitution,
and in what amount, is within the discretion of a trial court. State v. Torrez, 156 Idaho 118, 119,
320 P.3d 1277, 1278 (Ct. App. 2014); State v. Bybee, 115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct.
App. 1989). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
       Battenfelder asserts the district court “did not exercise reason” in awarding restitution
because, according to Battenfelder, the district court failed to give “sufficient weight to [certain
information] that rendered the full amount ‘inappropriate or undesirable.’” (Quoting I.C. § 19-
5304(2)). The State responds that “the district court acted well within its discretion.” We hold
that Battenfelder waived the arguments he asserts on appeal and that, even if considered, he has
failed to show error.

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       As part of Battenfelder’s plea agreement, he agreed to pay restitution “in an amount to be
determined or in the amount of $ TBD.” On appeal, Battenfelder does not challenge the district
court’s determination that the victim and the victim’s insurer actually incurred a total of
$14,682.38 in costs. Instead, Battenfelder’s argument on appeal concerns the propriety of the
district court awarding this amount. Whether Battenfelder waived this argument depends on the
scope of his plea agreement. Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, they are generally
examined in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 369, 372, 336
P.3d 302, 305 (Ct. App. 2014). As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of unambiguous
terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law to be decided by the appellate
court. Id.
       A plea agreement can waive a challenge to the propriety of awarding restitution. See State
v. Foeller, 168 Idaho 884, 888, 489 P.3d 795, 799 (2021). In Foeller, the plea agreement provided
that the defendant would “pay restitution/reimbursement: If applicable per statute: for all charges,
even those dismissed.” Id. (brackets omitted). The Idaho Supreme Court held that, by including
the words “per statute,” the plea agreement incorporated “the statutory factors for assessing
restitution.” Id. Consequently, the defendant did not waive consideration of the factors listed in
I.C. § 19-5304(2), which allows restitution for a victim of a crime. Foeller, 168 Idaho at 888, 489
P.3d at 799. Here, by contrast, the restitution clause in Battenfelder’s plea agreement does not
refer to a statute or otherwise require restitution to be awarded in compliance with a restitution
statute. We hold that the restitution clause of Battenfelder’s plea agreement is unambiguous and
that, based on the plain language, the only unresolved aspect of restitution was the amount--a
determination that Battenfelder does not challenge on appeal. In short, Battenfelder cannot agree
to pay whatever the district court determines is the amount of restitution and then assert it was
improper to order him to pay that amount. Consequently, Battenfelder waived consideration of
whether the district court erred in determining that it was proper to award $14,682.38 in restitution
to the victim and the victim’s insurer.
       Even if the merits of Battenfelder’s argument are considered, he has failed to show error.
Battenfelder asserts the district court “should have given greater weight” to his counsel’s comment
that Battenfelder was represented by the public defender’s office and “should have given more
weight” to the insurance company’s “decision to total rather than repair” the vehicle “and its

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resulting higher net loss.” Idaho Code Section 19-5304(2) provides that the trial court “shall order
a defendant found guilty of any crime which results in economic loss to the victim to make
restitution to the victim” unless the trial court determines a restitution order would be
“inappropriate or undesirable.” The policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer
economic loss and the factors in I.C. § 19-5304(7) guide a trial court’s decision to order restitution.
Torrez, 156 Idaho at 119, 320 P.3d at 1278; Bybee, 115 Idaho at 543, 768 P.2d at 806. These
factors include the amount of the victim’s economic loss; the defendant’s financial resources,
needs, and earning ability; and such other factors as the trial court deems appropriate. I.C.
§ 19-5304(7). In considering these factors, a trial court is “free to weigh the evidence.” State v.
Garcia, 170 Idaho 708, 714, 516 P.3d 578, 584 (2022). Battenfelder’s arguments merely invite
this Court to reweigh the information presented to the district court, which we will not do on
appeal. Consequently, Battenfelder has failed to show that the district court erred in awarding
restitution of $1,500 to the victim and $13,182.38 to the victim’s insurer.
                                                 IV.
                                          CONCLUSION
       Battenfelder waived the argument he asserts on appeal and, in any event, he has failed to
show the district court erred in awarding restitution. Accordingly, the order for restitution is
affirmed.
       Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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