Court Opinion

ID: 9827942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:56:56.275152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:39.668320
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing. .
In this case it is very true that plaintiff’s suit was not only to set aside the partition agreement, but also the judgment of the court, which recites that it was based upon such agreement and upon evidence to the effect that said agreement made a fair division of the property. It is contended that the agreement is really merged.in the judgment, and this is practically correct, for a judgment setting aside the agreement would be of no assistance to plaintiff as she would still be confronted with the judgment. Her *451theory is that she was induced by fraud to enter into the agreement partitioning the property, and that, relying upon the representations which induced her to mate the agreement, she took no steps to controvert or set aside such agreement when it was introduced in evidence, and that she did not ascertain the falsity of such representations until she returned to Texas in 1913; that the judgment was based upon the agreement ' procured from her by fraud, and if it was based to any extent upon other evidence, such evidence consisted of perjured testimony. Appellant contends that, having held that, in so far as the right to set aside that part of the judgment decreeing a divorce is concerned, plaintiff is barred by limitation, it follows that we should hold the same as to the cause of action relating to property rights, it being clear that plaintiff knew the suit involved the question of the division of the community property. There is a difference to be borne in mind in considering the two causes of action. Plaintiff knew as soon as she knew the judgment was rendered whether or not, as to the divorce portion, it had been rendered on false testimony, and that the testimony related to facts with which she was conversant, and, if the testimony was false, her failure to testify was such an act of neglect that she was in no position to ask that said portion of the decree be set aside. As a matter of fact, she relied most strongly upon setting aside that part of the decree on the theory that the court was without; jurisdiction, contending that she had not been served with citation. The portion of the decree relating to property rights was rendered upon an agreement claimed by her to have been made by reason of false representations made to her, and upon testimony of her husband, who, she had a right to assume, was the only person having knowledge whether or not he had lost all of the community estate except the amount she states he told her he still had. It cannot be said that as to the rendition of this part of the decree she was in fault for believing the representations and assuming that the agreement was in all respects legal, and in failing to appear and cross-examine her husband. It is said in the motion that where a party fails to appear and answer he cannot subsequently maintain an action to set aside a judgment obtained upon false and perjured testimony because of the neglect of the defendant to appear and answer in the suit, when, by so doing, the fraud or perjury could easily have been disclosed. The rule thus stated is doubtless frequently applicable, but two reasons suggest themselves why it is not applicable to this case. In the first place, plaintiff alleged and proved to the satisfaction of the jury that defendant, instead of merely serving her with citation and copy of petition and letting her come into court and settle their property rights, by fraudulent representations procured an agreement from her which not only fixed all such rights, but which operated to induce her not to come into court to settle such rights. In the second place, as her husband was the only person who could testify that said agreement was a fair division, he must have done so, unless the part of the decree reciting that evidence was introduced ’ showing the fairness of the agreement was inserted by mistake, and it is by no means clear that the fraud or perjury could have been easily exposed.
In the case of McMurray v. McMurray, 67 Tex. 665, 4 S. W. 357, the wife, who was sued for divorce and for division of the community property, failed to attend • the trial, being situated very similarly to plaintiff herein, but was represented by an attorney. A decree was entered, and she afterwards brought suit to set aside such decree on the ground that it was rendered upon false testimony given by her husband. The Supreme Court, speaking through Judge Stayton, held that her petition stated facts which entitled her to a re-examination of the question of community property, and to the value of such additional part thereof as in connection with that already decreed to her would give her a share equal to that which the defendant under the law was entitled to retain. According to her contentions it reasonably appeared that had she been present and testified with regard to the grounds upon which the divorce was sought she might have' prevented the divorce from being granted, but her failure to do this was evidently not considered by the court as a fraud upon the court or as affecting her right to set aside the decree in so far as it affected property rights.
It is contended in the motion that:
“If the agreement was fraudulent, it would occupy the same attitude as any other false or perjured testimony which constituted the basis of the judgment.”
It is also contended that a decree will not be reopened because of the falsity of the testimony by which it was obtained, but only because the injured party has been deprived of her right to appear at th'e trial by some fraud of the opposite party. "We do not know whether any very good distinction could be drawn between fraud which deprives a party of knowledge that the trial will take place at a certain time, and fraud which induces a settlement of the controversy, and leads the other party to believe that the attendance at the trial would be a useless formality. But be this as it may, we do not understand that our decisions bear out the theory that in no case will a decree be- set aside upon the ground that it was obtained because of false testimony. Several of the cases referred to in the motion were discussed in the case of McMurray v. Mc-Murray, supra, and our Supreme Court held that such false testimony in itself constituted fraud, using the following language:
“That the willful giving of false testimony by a party to an action in relation to a matter af*452fecting an issue to be tried is fraud of tbe most pernicious character cannot be questioned, and for such conduct it has been held that the injured party is entitled to have' the cause reexamined.”
This court in the case of Avocato v. Dell’Ara, 84 S. W. 443, has followed the MeMur-ray Case, and it has been cited and followed in other cases.
In the case of Davis v. Jones, 149 S. W. 727, it was held that a judgment rendered upon false testimony could be set aside in a suit filed six years after its rendition; it being alleged and proven that appellee, without fault on his part, failed to discover such fact until within a reasonable time before filing Ms suit to set aside the judgment.
We conclude that if false testimony is willfully given by a party to the suit or by others by his connivance or procurement, and if the other party cannot be charged with negligence in failing to prevent judgment being rendered upon such testimony, our courts will entertain a suit to set aside the judgment.
There being no such negligence on the part of plaintiff as would have prevented her from maintaining a suit within the statutory period to .set aside that part of the decree relating to property rights, the only other question is whether her suit is barred by limitation. Appellant attacks both the pleadings and evidence on this issue. It is true that she alleges her diligence and want of knowledge by starting a conclusion, but in- connection with such conclusion other facts alleged by her must be considered. The petition discloses that the entire community estate was reduced to money and notes, and her husband had been in possession thereof for a year, during which time she resided in California; that being estranged from her parents on account of her marriage to defendant, she decided to return to California after making the agreement at El Paso, because her brother, who was the only relative with whom she maintained friendly relations, resided there; that relying upon defendant’s promises to support her and their three children, she invested the $1,200 in a home in California, and, receiving no assistance from him, was compelled to earn a living for herself and children, and had no means to investigate the facts or to go to Texas until the summer of 1913. She charges a conspiracy between her husband and others, which she alleges had its inception prior to the sale of all of their community property, and which was for the purpose of securing to him the bulk of the estate, and that she never learned of this scheme until the summer and fall of 1913, and then proceeds to allege what was done under such conspiracy as discovered by her in 1913. She alleged that when she did go to Texas she learned that the report had been circulated at Sonora, their former home, that defendant had given her $10,000 as her share of the community property, and that such report had probably been started by a statement by him to that effect. The petition is long and involved, and there may be other facts which have a slight bearing, but the foregoing are the most prominent.
Plaintiff shows that she did not suspect the falsity of the allegations with regard to the extent of her husband’s losses until she came to Texas. In the McMur-ráy Case, the court stated that as to community property, a husband is in a restricted sense a trustee for his wife, bound to good faith, and derelict in duty if he conceals knowledge from her necessary to enable her to protect her rights, and that withholding needed information from her is a breach of duty constituting fraud. In this case the allegations show such concealment of the fraud as would prevent the statute from running until the fraud is discovered or by the use of reasonable diligence might have been discovered. The rule to be applied has been stated by Judge Neill, in Pitman v. Holmes, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 487, 78 S. W. 961, as follows:
“The ordinary rule is that in order that it may appear that reasonable diligence has been exercised by plaintiff, or that ho has been guilty of no laches, to discover, or in failing to discover, the fraud, he must allege the fact upon which he relies, so the court may determine from the pleadings whether he is entitled to the relief sought, assuming such allegations are true. If from such allegations the court can say as a matter of law that by the exercise of reasonable diligence plaintiff could have discovered such fraud within such time as his. action would have been barred when the suit was filed, then his petition would be subject to such exceptions as are urged against the plaintiffs by the assignments of error now under consideration. If, on the other hand, the court cannot so say from the allegations, the question is one of fact, and must be submitted to the jury.”
Tbe rules of law are well established, but in applying them to the facts of a case great difficulty is frequently experienced, and it appears to us that sometimes they have been so applied as to practically require the injured party to become suspicious right after the deal is consummated, and start an investigation, although no new facts have come to his knowledge. On the other hand, in some of our cases it is considered that the party is justified in remaining inactive until he has knowledge of some fact which would put him upon inquiry whether the representations were false. Coleman v. Ebeling, 138 S. W. 199-204; Isaacks v. Wright, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 110 S. W. 970; Smalley v. Vogt, 166 S. W. 1. Each case must be decided upon its own facts, and the conduct of the party must not be judged by what a very cautious and suspicious person would have done under the same circumstances, but by what a person of ordinary prudence, situated as was plaintiff, would have done. The question presented by the exceptions to the petition is a close one, under our decisions, but we believe it cannot be said, as a matter of *453law, that by the exercise of reasonable diligence plaintiff could have discovered tbe fraud within such time that her action would have been barred when she filed suit. The question, whether the finding of the jury with reference to the issue of negligence is supported by evidence, is also a close one, but we conclude that we cannot say the evidence does not support such finding.
The motion is overruled.