Court Opinion

ID: 9530560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:06.455511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:09.924859
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons:
First, I regard the legal basis for the opinion unsubstantial, technical and frivolous.
Secondly, it produces a palpably unjust result.
The defendant, a lawyer admitted to practice before this Court, incurred numerous parking meter tickets over a period commencing January 23, 1956, and continuing to October 16, 1956. He failed to respond to any of the notices directing him to appear in the Traffic Violations Bureau within five days and to pay $1.00. As a consequence of this failure on his part, the City and County of Denver on January 22, 1957, filed 24 charges and issued summonses and complaints against the defendant. At the trial in the Municipal Court on April 5 and 6, 1957, the defendant was found guilty of 27 separate violations of Section 521.8 of the ordinances pertaining to one hour meter over-parking and 1 violation of Section 521.17-1 prohibiting parking for more than one hour on particular streets. Defendant appealed the case to the Superior Court and following a trial there he was convicted of 23 meter violations and 1 over-parking violation. His final sentence was a fine of $20.00 on each of 24 violations plus five days in jail.
It is noteworthy that the defendant is not in a position *79of having in good faith offered to pay $1.00 under protest, nor did he offer to pay $1.00 for each violation at any time. His contention throughout has been that the entire system is void and that he consequently owes nothing. Had the defendant merely tested the validity of this system of ordinances in good faith, he would stand in a different position. The equities would then favor him and he could argue that it was and is unfair to penalize him for litigating. The defendant, however, is in a very poor position to so argue in view of the fact that no good faith is apparent. He waited until the authorities grabbed him by the scruff of the neck, so to speak, and pulled him into court. Then and only then did he raise any protest about validity, so he has little ground for saying that a discrimination occurs because he is penalized more than the responsible citizen who pays his fine in accordance with the law and the notice which is given to him.
In reaching its conclusion that the City is bound by the schedule of fines promulgated pursuant to Section 521.1-2 of the Municipal Ordinances, the majority opinion merely paraphrases this ordinance and quotes companion ordinances and then holds that these lead to the “inescapable conclusion that a definite penalty has been provided” which rules out the general ordinance under which this defendant was sentenced. Examination, however, of the text of Section 521.1-2 does not lead to any such conclusion. This section provides:
“The municipal judge or judges who hear traffic cases shall designate the special offenses under the traffic ordinances of this city in respect to which payments of fines may be accepted by the traffic violations bureau in satisfaction thereof, and shall specify by suitable schedules the amounts of such fines for first, second, or subsequent offenses, provided, such fines are within the limits declared by ordinance, and shall further specify what number of such offenses shall require appearance before the court.”
*80Sections 522.2-1 and 522.2-2 and 523.8-1 and 523.8-2, quoted in the majority opinion, read together with the section above quoted, reveal that the schedule type of fine is applicable only if the matter is disposed of administratively, that is, by payment of the $1.00 within five days. These ordinances provide that in the event of failure to take advantage of this administrative or cafeteria system a complaint will be filed and a summons will be issued. It seems to me clear from a reading of the above ordinances that once this happens all previous commitments disappear. In other words, the defendant who elects not to abide by this system is subject to all of the hazards of a court trial and particularly to the general penalty provision which is not to exceed ’90 days in jail or a $300.00 fine. This system is spelled out in the ordinances very clearly and as I view it there is no justification for the view adopted by the majority that it is ambiguous. It has been clear and unequivocal for many, many years and its language has been sufficiently free of doubt to bring about the collection of many hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue.
The fault, as I see it, in the majority opinion is its refusal to recognize the distinction between the administrative disposition of the case through the Traffic Violations Bureau and disposition in a two-day contested court trial whereby all of the guaranties of due process are invoked. In distinguishing between the single violator and the flagrant violator, both the council and the Municipal Court have found and declared that these two cases are to be treated differently.
The second justification for the Court’s decision, namely, that defendant is deprived of equal protection of the laws because of the distinction which is made between the person who voluntarily pays his fine within the prescribed time and the person who fails to appear and must be summoned is premised upon the proposition that the distinction between the two types of cases is an unreasonable classification and a discrimination *81against an individual who does not see fit to pay his fine. It strikes me that there is a genuine and a reasonable basis for classifying the flagrant violator and the “responsible” violator. Apart from the difference in the individual and the difference in the extent of culpability, which factors justify different treatment, there is a highly practical reason and that is maintenance of an orderly system and keeping the peace in the community. It seems to me that it is much more unreasonable to classify the flagrant violator and the “good faith” violator in the same category, and that is what the majority opinion does.
The practical problem which is faced in any system of enforcement of traffic is well stated by Warren, Traffic Courts, p. 67:
“While non-appearances involve a great deal of extra clerical work and represent a definite and serious leakage in traffic law enforcement, these factors may well be termed secondary to the problem they represent for law enforcement in general. Communities where violators ignore their tickets or summonses can have no respect for traffic law enforcing agencies. Even a relatively small non-appearance problem may soon get out of hand because of the general public’s ability to sense that they can ‘get away with it.’ Nor do the evil effects stop there. The honest and law-abiding citizen becomes disgruntled as a result of the story of an acquaintance which convinces him that he is punishing himself unnecessarily by being honorable. Good law enforcement is impossible in the face of such a practice. * * *”
Apart from its highly questionable legal basis, the majority strikes me as being highly unjust. It condemns the practice of giving a man a reward for responding and paying administratively and thus waiving his right to “make a federal court case” out of it and yet it fails to take into account that it in turn is rewarding irresponsibility. The record here discloses a shameless attitude. It indicates the defendant either calculated all *82of the hazards and disobeyed the laws notwithstanding the presumption of their validity or that he recklessly and wantonly ignored the alleged violations. His culpability is extreme in either case. Notwithstanding the complete lack of responsibility, the majority goes out of its way to discover and open up an escape loophole which will permit him to avoid penalty. Noteworthy also is the fact that the majority opinion contains no single word of censure and from this it can be concluded it encourages people to follow a line that was taken by this defendant. The decision, therefore, strikes a severe and serious blow to law enforcement and to responsibility to law.
Both the Municipal and the Superior Courts discharged their duties with commendable restraint.
In my opinion, the judgment of the Municipal Court should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Moore joins in this dissent.