Court Opinion

ID: 9903380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:35:34.39806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.934868
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                      NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                      FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                      DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

N.H., A CHILD,

            Petitioner,
                                            Case No. 5D23-795
 v.                                         LT Case No. 2023-CJ-000120

STATE OF FLORIDA,

           Respondent.

________________________________/

Opinion filed March 27, 2023

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
A case of Original Jurisdiction.

Charlie Cofer, Public Defender, and
Elizabeth Hogan Webb, Assistant Public
Defender, Jacksonville, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and
Daren Shippy, Assistant Attorney
General, Tallahassee, for Respondent

BOATWRIGHT, J
      N.H., a minor child, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus after

she was placed in home detention. N.H. challenges the finding of probable

cause at her detention hearing. Because the trial court properly found that

the detention order was supported by probable cause, we deny the petition.

                              Background

      N.H. was a student attending public school in Duval County, Florida on

the day of the incident. On top of N.H.’s desk, one of her teachers (“the

Teacher”) observed a piece of paper in plain sight containing a written threat

to kill the Teacher and one of N.H.’s other teachers. One side of the paper

read “N.H.’s hunting and fishing show,” followed by a list of items, including

a camera and a microphone, a fishing pole, a fishing line, and––notably––a

gun. The other side said, “Kill,” and then listed the Teacher’s last name and

the last name of another teacher of N.H. After viewing the threatening kill list

on N.H.’s paper, 1 the Teacher promptly reported it to the school’s principal,

who then notified the school’s resource officer.

      The school then contacted N.H.’s mother, who informed the school

staff that she had found a journal containing some alarming statements at

      1
       At the detention hearing, the assistant state attorney represented to
the court that he had spoken to the school resource officer, who advised that
the Teacher had seen the word “Kill” on the paper while N.H. was at her
desk.

                                       2
N.H.’s house approximately a week before, then N.H.’s mother gave the

journal to the school resource officer. The journal contained a written plan to

kill others, including N.H.’s family members and the Teacher. N.H.’s journal

listed weapons that would be used, including a knife, gun, rope, and

pocketknife, along with times, such as “12:50 school” and “3:01 school.”

Based on these facts, N.H. was arrested for violating section 836.10, Florida

Statutes (2022), which is entitled: “Written or electronic threats to kill, do

bodily injury, or conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.”

      At the ensuing detention hearing, N.H.’s counsel argued that there was

no probable cause to believe an offense had been committed because the

State could not prove N.H.’s written note was “sent, posted, or transmitted”

within the meaning of section 836.10. The State responded by arguing that

section 836.10 was applicable because the Teacher saw the written threat

to kill on N.H.’s desk while N.H. was sitting at the desk.

      After considering the arguments and evidence, the trial court found

there was probable cause for the charge. N.H.’s detention risk assessment

score warranted secure detention, but the court, in its discretion, released

N.H. to her mother on intensive home detention.

      N.H. subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in which she again argues that the State did not establish probable cause to

                                       3
support her detention for the act of “sending, posting, or transmitting” a

written threat to kill in violation of section 836.10. N.H. argues that section

836.10 requires a showing of some affirmative act on behalf of the defendant

evidencing an intent to communicate the writing’s contents. N.H. does not:

(1) challenge that the paper contained a written threat to kill, (2) claim that

this was an expression of fantasy or imagination, (3) deny that she prepared

the written threat, or (4) deny that she placed it where the Teacher could

view it. The State’s position is that because N.H. “publicly displayed” the kill

list on top of her desk at school, she had “posted” it within the meaning of

the statute. We agree with the State.

                                   Analysis

      The legality of a juvenile’s detention may be properly challenged

through the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. N.W. v. State, 300

So. 3d 803, 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (citations omitted). This includes issues

related to the trial court’s probable cause determination under Florida Rule

of Juvenile Procedure 8.010. L.A. v. Carter, 623 So. 2d 1219, 1220 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1993). At a detention hearing, the finding of probable cause is

determined in a nonadversarial proceeding where the trial court must

determine whether there is probable cause to believe the child has

committed a delinquent act. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.010(g)(1). In making this

                                        4
determination, the court shall apply the standard of proof necessary for an

arrest warrant, and its finding may be based upon a sworn complaint,

affidavit, deposition under oath, or, if necessary, upon testimony under oath

properly recorded. Id.

      The    nonadversarial     nature       of   the   proceeding    does    not

require presentation of witnesses and full exploration of their testimony on

cross-examination to determine probable cause. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

U.S. 103, 120 (1975). “[Probable cause] does not require the fine resolution

of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance

standard demands”; instead, it is found through informal modes of proof,

such as written testimony and hearsay. Id. at 121. As such, there is no

requirement that a trier of fact resolve disputes in the evidence in order for

probable cause to be found.

      “‘Probable cause’ means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported

by circumstances strong enough in themselves to warrant a cautious person

in belief that the named suspect is guilty of the offense charged.” Johnson v.

State, 660 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1995) (citing Dunnavant v. State, 46 So. 2d

871 (Fla. 1950)). “Probable cause ‘requires only a probability or substantial

chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity’; it ‘is not a

high bar.’” J.J. v. State, 312 So. 3d 116, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (quoting

                                         5
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)). “Probable cause

doesn’t require proof that something is more likely true than false. It

requires only a fair probability, a standard understood to mean something

more than a bare suspicion but less than a preponderance of the evidence

at hand.” Id. at 120 (quotations and citations omitted in original) (quoting

United States v. Denson, 775 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014)). Probable

cause is also often a conclusion drawn from reasonable inferences. State v.

Cote, 547 So. 2d 993, 995 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Thus, “[i]n dealing with

probable cause . . . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.

These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,

act. The standard of proof is . . . correlative to what must be proved.”

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,

174–75 (1949)).

      Determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause are

reviewed de novo on appeal. Jenkins v. State, 978 So. 2d 116, 122 (Fla.

2008) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). “However,

the court should review findings of historical fact only for clear error and give

due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local

law enforcement officers.” Id.

                                       6
      As N.H. did not contest that she prepared the kill list, the dispositive

question is whether there was probable cause to find that N.H.’s act of

placing it on her desk constituted the “posting” of a written threat to kill in

violation of section 836.10(2). The current operative version of section

836.10(2) provides:

            (2) It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or
            transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or
            transmission of, a writing or other record, including
            an electronic record, in any manner in which it may
            be viewed by another person, when in such writing
            or record the person makes a threat to:

            (a) Kill or to do bodily harm to another person; or

            (b) Conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.

            A person who violates this subsection commits a
            felony of the second degree, punishable as provided
            in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

 The term “post,” which is in dispute, is not defined under chapter 836.

      When interpreting a statute, Florida courts adhere to the “supremacy-

of-text principle,” meaning that “[t]he words of a governing text are of

paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text

means.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla.

2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)); Richman v. Calzaretta, 338 So. 3d

1081, 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Consequently, “[t]he words of a statute are

                                      7
to be taken in their natural and ordinary signification and import; and if

technical words are used, they are to be taken in a technical sense.” Lab’y

Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So. 3d 318, 323 (Fla. 2022) (quoting James Kent,

Commentaries on American Law 432 (1826), quoted in Scalia & Garner,

Reading Law at 69 n.1).

      According to the Florida Supreme Court, when “the [L]egislature has

not defined the words used in a [statute], the language should be given its

plain and ordinary meaning.” Debaun v. State, 213 So. 3d 747, 751 (Fla.

2018) (quoting Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch.,

Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009)). “When considering the [plain]

meaning of terms used in a statute, this Court looks first to the terms'

ordinary definitions [,which] . . . may be derived from dictionaries.” Id.

(quoting Dudley v. State, 139 So. 3d 273, 279 (Fla. 2014)); see also Kidwell

Grp., LLC v. ASI Preferred Ins. Corp., 351 So. 3d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA

2022); Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla. 2022) (“When a

contested term is undefined in statute or by our cases, we presume that the

term bears its ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, taking into

consideration the context in which the word appears. And we typically look

to dictionaries for the best evidence of that ordinary meaning.”).

                                      8
      As the State has argued that the writing in question was “publicly

displayed,” it is thus important to focus on the word “post” as used in section

836.10(2)(a). Because Chapter 836 does not define “post,” the best evidence

of the ordinary meaning of that term is the dictionary definition.

      The Macmillan English Dictionary defines “post” as “to put information

or a message where the public can see it.” Post, Macmillan English

Dictionary (2d ed. 2007). 2 The American Heritage Dictionary defines “post”

as “[t]o display (an announcement) in a place of public view.” Post, The

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016). 3 In

turn, “display” is defined as “[t]o present to view; cause to be seen.” Display,

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016).

      2
        The Dissent utilizes Black’s Law Dictionary to define “post.” However,
it is more appropriate to use a dictionary that would define the words as to
what a reasonable person would understand the words to mean at the time
the statute was enacted and not a technical legal definition. See Lab’y Corp.
of Am., 339 So. 3d at 323 (“The words of a statute are to be taken in their
natural and ordinary signification and import; and if technical words are used,
they are to be taken in a technical sense.” (internal quotation omitted)). N.H.
has not argued that “post” is a legal term of art.
      3
         The Dissent also focuses on the word “announcement” used in this
definition, but we note, grammatically speaking, the use of parentheses
indicates that the term “announcement” is extraneous information. See
Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style 28 (3d ed. 2013).
In any event, the definition of “announcement” is “[t]he act of making known
publicly,” Announcement, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (5th ed. 2011), which conforms with the provided definitions.

                                       9
      Given these definitions, the plain and ordinary meaning of “post,” as

used in section 836.10(2)(a), can be understood as making it unlawful to

cause a writing, which threatens to kill or do bodily harm to another person,

to be seen in public. Significantly, regarding causing a writing to be seen in

public, section 836.10(2)(a) explicitly states that this can be accomplished

“in any manner in which it may be viewed by another person.” Therefore, the

mode or means whereby the written threat to kill is made public does not

matter as long as it can be viewed by another person.

      Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient probable cause for the

trial court to find that N.H. violated section 836.10 when she placed a written

threat to kill her teacher, on her desk, out in the open in a public school

classroom. There is no indication that N.H. tried to hide the written threat that

she placed on her desk; rather, she placed the kill list on her desk, in plain

view in a public setting where her teacher was able to view it. Therefore,

N.H.’s acts can be characterized as the posting of a writing that threatens to

kill another person in any manner in which it may be viewed by another

person.

      N.H.’s argument that she did not intend to communicate the writing to

anyone in public is unavailing. We acknowledge that Florida courts, when

interpreting previous versions of section 836.10, have concluded that there

                                       10
is a “mens rea” element present in the statute. 4 See N.D. v. State, 315 So.

3d 102, 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020); T.R.W. v. State, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D341c

(Fla. 4th DCA Feb. 15, 2023); Smith v. State, 532 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA

1988). Those same courts have indicated that determining the defendant’s

intent is a question reserved for the trier of fact. See T.R.W., 48 Fla. L.

Weekly at D341c; Puy v. State, 294 So. 3d 930, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020);

State v. Cowart, 301 So. 3d 332, 335 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020); see also State v.

Williamson, 348 So. 3d 48, 51 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (holding that the question

of intent is precisely the type of question that should be left to the trier of

fact). The reason for this is that intent is normally “inferred from the acts of

the parties and the surrounding circumstances. Being a state of

mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact,”

who “has the opportunity to observe all of the witnesses.” State v. West, 262

So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (internal citations omitted); see also

State v. Jones, 642 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (finding that “[i]ntent

is generally a question for the trier of fact because a defendant's mental

intent is hardly ever subject to direct proof and must be established by

      4
        Florida courts when reviewing different versions of section 836.10
have focused on whether the written communication was intended to be an
actual threat and not whether intent to actually communicate or post the
threat is necessary. The courts differ as to whether intent in this regard is
subjective or objective.

                                       11
surrounding circumstances”). As stated previously, factual disputes reserved

for the trier of fact are not at issue in a nonadversarial probable cause

determination. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 121. Therefore, the trial court,

during the nonadversarial probable cause determination, was not required to

find intent on N.H.’s behalf in order to find probable cause.

                                 Conclusion

      Accordingly, we deny the petition as the trial court properly found

probable cause. It is important to note that we are merely affirming the trial

court’s finding that there was probable cause to believe N.H. violated section

836.10, which requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal

activity and not an actual showing of such activity. J.J., 312 So. 3d at 119.

N.H. is free to raise such defenses as she may have and to require the State

meet its burden of proof in later proceedings.

      DENIED.

EDWARDS, J., concurs.
MACIVER, J., dissents, with opinion.

                                      12
MACIVER, J., dissenting.                        Case No. 5D23-795
                                                LT Case No. 2023-CJ-000120

      I am unable to join in the majority denial of the petition. Petitioner

argues that her liberty is presently restrained without a genuine finding of

probable cause. I agree. The probable cause burden is a low bar, but it is

not a rubber stamp. Based on the facts presented at the probable cause

determination hearing, it was not met here.

      At the detention hearing, the trial court must first determine whether

probable cause exists, and if so, whether other statutory needs of detention

exist. Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.010(h); § 985.255(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2022). “If the court

finds that such probable cause does not exist, it shall forthwith release the

child from detention.” Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.010(h). Indeed, it is a fundamental

principle of American law that a person’s liberty cannot be significantly

restrained without probable cause that a criminal act has or is being

committed.

      The relevant testimony at the detention hearing follows:

             THE COURT: As for PC, Ms. Ches?

             MS. CHES: Your Honor, these papers were found on
             her desk by one of the teachers who’s listed in the
             threat. She was on -- she was at the desk with the
             paper, she had just written it. I did speak to this
             officer, I think yesterday, as did Ms. Liesch,
             authorizing, you know, this charge based on the fact

                                       13
            that the victim saw the piece of paper with the words
            kill, and the names underneath it. And then the
            additional information gathered from the journal at
            home with her plans to kill others. I acknowledge that
            that is not part of this charge; however, it is part of
            the underlying concern the State has with this written
            threat that was observed by the teacher.

            THE COURT: Okay. I think it's enough PC …

      Petitioner is detained based upon a finding of probable cause that she

violated section 836.10(2), Florida Statutes (2022), which provides:

            (2) It is unlawful for any person to send, post, or
            transmit, or procure the sending, posting, or
            transmission of, a writing or other record, including
            an electronic record, in any manner in which it may
            be viewed by another person, when in such writing
            or record the person makes a threat to:

            (a) Kill or to do bodily harm to another person; or

            (b) Conduct a mass shooting or an act of terrorism.

            A person who violates this subsection commits a
            felony of the second degree . . . .

      No argument is made that the actions in this case constitute “sending”

or “transmitting” a written threat. The dispute turns entirely upon the statutory

interpretation of the term “post”; specifically, what activity reasonably may be

found to fall within the term “post.” Petitioner argues that the plain language

of section 836.10, Florida Statutes (2022), as outlined in the jury instruction,

makes clear that such a threat must be, in some manner, relayed or

                                       14
dispatched. In answer, the State cites to several cases in which the

perpetrator expressly acted to relay the threat in question. The State then

argues that the “public display in this case of her written threat to Teacher #1

is analogous to her posting the threat on social media, which is sufficient to

violate the statute.”

   The State’s argument is, essentially, that because the paper was in a

public place where it might be viewed by another person, the author had

“posted” the written threat. For the reasons that follow, I cannot agree with

the State’s position and believe that Petitioner argues the better

understanding of the law.

      When interpreting a statute, Florida courts adhere to the “supremacy-

of-text principle,” which means “[t]he words of a governing text are of

paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is what the text

means.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla.

2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)); Richman v. Calzaretta, 338 So. 3d

1081, 1082 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022). Further, “[w]hen a contested term is

undefined in statute or by our cases, we presume that the term bears its

ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, taking into consideration the

context in which the word appears.” Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d

                                      15
594, 599 (Fla. 2022). In Conage, the Florida Supreme Court receded from

the opinion that the ordinary-meaning principle required a court to end its

statutory analysis when the terms had an unambiguous fixed meaning. See

id. at 598. There the Court observed:

            It would be a mistake to think that our law of statutory
            interpretation requires interpreters to make a
            threshold determination of whether a term has a
            “plain” or “clear” meaning in isolation, without
            considering the statutory context and without the aid
            of whatever canons might shed light on the
            interpretive issues in dispute.

Id.

      At risk of oversimplification, a primary takeaway from Conage is that

context always matters. Similarly illustrated:

            Of course, words are given meaning by their context,
            and context includes the purpose of the text. The
            difference between textualist interpretation and so-
            called purposive interpretation is not that the former
            never considers purpose. It almost always does. The
            subject matter of a document (its purpose, broadly
            speaking) is the context that helps to give words
            meaning . . . .

Scalia & Garner, supra.

      So, what context can we derive from the text of the statute? As a

starting point, the State of Florida has not criminalized bad thoughts. Even

the most wicked of hypothetical deeds is not against the law when it exists

only in one’s imagination. Even when those thoughts are reduced to writing,

                                      16
the State of Florida has not chosen to criminalize such behavior. The text of

the statute does not prohibit the writing alone, but rather the sending,

transmitting, or posting of the writing. Imagination and fantasy, in writing, is

recognized as just that. That the fantasy may evince something more

provides a strong incentive for some form of familial and social intervention,

but it is not criminalized. What the State has criminalized is the making of

threats. The difference between a disturbing thought that has been reduced

to writing and the making of a threat is the existence of a communicative

act—a sending, transmitting, or posting. That Petitioner was caught at her

desk with the writing is not the same as Petitioner taking any step to

communicate the thoughts as a threat.

      In my view, the plain meaning of the word “post”—read within the

context illustrated above—is sufficient to resolve any suggested ambiguity.

To the extent that doubt lingers, we can turn next to definitions found in

reliable dictionaries. Again, we are compelled to rely on context to choose

between competing definitions and to identify the boundaries of those

respective definitions.

      The American Heritage Dictionary defines “post” as “[t]o display (an

announcement) in a place of public view.” Post, The American Heritage

Dictionary           of            the           English            Language,

                                         17
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=post (last visited Feb. 13,

2023). Of note is the fact that the thing displayed in a place of public view is

“an announcement.” It does not refer to the display of one’s generalized

thoughts or considerations. To “post” is to display “an announcement.” It is,

in short, to announce. That Petitioner was caught at her desk with the writing

is not the same as the Petitioner announcing the thoughts as a threat.

      We can look as well to Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “post” as

“to publicize or announce by affixing a notice in a public place.” Post, Black’s

Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2004). Again, the definition refers to an act of

communication—“publicize or announce.” That Petitioner was caught at her

desk with the writing is not the same as the Petitioner publicizing or

announcing the thoughts as a threat.

      While not relevant to the textual mandate of the statute, I do observe

the policy considerations at play here. The seriousness of mass violence

certainly compels the most determined response—both legislatively and

judicially. However, criminal prosecution is not the only tool available, and

the overuse of criminal justice solutions—for example, placing a child in

jeopardy of a second-degree felony—might crowd out other more rational

and reasonable approaches.

                                      18
      Finally, I need to address the peculiarity of writing a dissent, where

constitutionally I would have the authority to unilaterally order the writ over

my own signature. “A district court of appeal or any judge thereof may issue

writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or any judge thereof or

before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.” Art. V,

§ 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). The writ of habeas corpus is only

the demand that the person in custody be brought before a court. Typically,

the order issuing the writ will also include the direction to that court to release

the petitioner—due to the underlying error leading to the unlawful custody.

The authority to decide the underlying issue and order the remedy is, in my

view, separate from the authority to order the petitioner’s appearance before

a court. The court below has already made (in my opinion, in error) a

probable cause determination. The authority to reverse that determination is

attendant but still separate from the habeas corpus writ, and thus falls within

the authority of the court, not any individual judge. Appellate courts must

exercise their authority by decision of either a three-judge panel or by a

decision en banc. Because I lack the authority to unilaterally order the

dismissal of the case below, an order to produce the Petitioner would, by

itself, be fruitless. I therefore respectfully dissent from the denial of the writ.

                                        19