Court Opinion

ID: 9544991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:04:22.145263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:51.246147
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting) — The deadly weapon finding should be stricken. In all other respects, the judgment should be affirmed. As an accomplice, Rosenkranz was responsible for the crime of the robbery she was helping her codefendant commit. The Supreme Court has observed that:
The legislature has said that anyone who participates in the commission of a crime is guilty of the crime and should be charged as a principal, regardless of the degree or nature of his participation. Whether he holds the gun, holds the victim, keeps a lookout, stands by ready to help the assailant, or aids in some other way, he is a participant. The elements of the crime remain the same.
State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 264, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). This is because RCW 9A.08.020 reads in pertinent part:
Liability for conduct of another — Complicity. (1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the con*953duct of another person for which he is legally accountable.
(2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime.
(3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:
(а) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he
(ii) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; . . .
(б) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on proof of the commission of the crime and of his complicity therein, . . .
In State v. Baylor, 17 Wn. App. 616, 618, 565 P.2d 99 (1977), Division Two of this court said:
In this state when it cannot be determined which of two defendants actually committed a crime, and which one encouraged or counseled, it is not necessary to establish the role of each. It is sufficient if there is a showing that each defendant was involved in the commission of the crime, having committed at least one overt act as specified in RCW 9.01.030 (superseded for offenses committed after July 1, 1976, by RCW 9A.08.020).
The majority opinion would have it that Rosenkranz as an accomplice is accountable only for conduct of the principal she knew about. If he didn't tell her in advance of his whole plan or if he varied from it during the course of the robbery, then she was not bound. Thus by analogy, if she agreed to help steal money from a safe believed to contain $200 in cash her participation in the crime could only result in third degree theft even though her principal finds and steals $1,600. RCW 9A.56.030 and .050. Or in a case of burglary, if she did not know that as events developed the principal would assault someone during the course of the crime, she could only be convicted of second degree rather than first degree burglary. RCW 9A.52.020 and .030. Such *954results are untenable.
Once Rosenkranz embarked upon the course of helping with the robbery (and to share in the fruits thereof) she became accountable for the conduct of the principal in committing it.
Reconsideration denied March 22, 1983.
Review by Supreme Court pending May 13, 1983.