Court Opinion

ID: 9559574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:31:41.951178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:37.920117
License: Public Domain

*103EDMONDS, J.
Driver and Motor Vehicles Services (DMV) appeals the circuit court’s judgment vacating its order suspending petitioner Walls’ driving privileges because of his refusal to take an Intoxilyzer breath test for blood alcohol content. In this administrative proceeding, the administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Walls had consented to perform field sobriety tests and had had an opportunity to consult with counsel before deciding whether he would submit to the breath test. On review, the circuit court reversed the ALJ’s rulings. The state appeals, and we review the ALJ’s decision for substantial evidence and errors of law. ORS 813.450(4); Shakerin v. MVD, 101 Or App 357, 360, 790 P2d 1180 (1990). We conclude that the ALJ did not err and, accordingly, reverse the circuit court.
The ALJ found the following facts. On June 2,1996, Officer Janzen was on duty monitoring traffic on the St. Helens Highway in Portland. At approximately 8:00 p.m., Janzen saw a Corvette convertible driven by Walls. Using a laser radar gun, Janzen measured the vehicle’s speed at 70 mph in a 45 mph speed zone. He stopped Walls for the speeding violation. Walls pulled over in a timely manner.
Janzen noticed an empty beer can on the floor in the front passenger side of Walls’ car and a full can of beer on the passenger seat. Walls smelled of alcohol, and his movements were sluggish. When Janzen asked him if he had been drinking, Walls said he had just been drinking on a boat. Janzen asked Walls to get out of the vehicle, and he complied with the request. Janzen then gave Walls Miranda warnings, which he said he understood. Janzen testified that he asked Walls to take some field sobriety tests and that he agreed to take them.1 Janzen explained that he did not give Walls the *104statutory field sobriety test warning or the admonition that his failure to take the tests could be used against him in a court of law. See ORS 813.136. Janzen administered four field sobriety tests, all of which indicated to Janzen that Walls was under the influence of alcohol.
At the conclusion of the field sobriety tests, Janzen placed Walls under arrest for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). He then had Walls transported to a police station. While there, Janzen explained to Walls his right to refuse to take the Intoxilyzer breath test and the statutory consequences if he refused. Walls said that he wanted to talk to an attorney before deciding whether to take the test. It was approximately 8:55 p.m. at that time. Walls told Janzen that he wanted to call Bill Scalf, an attorney, but that he did not know Scalfs telephone number. The officer looked in the telephone book and identified Scalfs telephone number. Because Walls had been handcuffed for safety reasons, Janzen dialed the number on the telephone and held the receiver to Walls’ ear. Walls’ telephone call got an answering machine that did not give an after-hours telephone number for Scalf. Walls wanted to call another attorney that he knew, but Janzen could not find that attorney’s telephone number in the phone book.
Walls then asked if he could call his girlfriend, and Janzen dialed the number for him. Walls asked his girlfriend to find Scalfs home telephone number. She said that she would look for it and would call back. When she called back, she reported that she could not locate the number. The girlfriend told Walls that she had talked to his brother and that the brother had said not to take the test until Walls had an opportunity to talk to an attorney. Walls told his girlfriend to find him an attorney.
When Walls’ conversation with his girlfriend was over, it was 9:20 p.m. Janzen told Walls that he would have to make a decision about taking the breath test. Walls decided not to take the test. He did not ask to contact anyone else after speaking to his girlfriend the second time. At 9:36 p.m., attorney Michael Greenlick called to speak with Walls. Jan-zen told him that it was too late because Walls had already *105refused to take the test and was on his way to the booking area.
In the administrative proceeding that resulted from Walls’ failure to take the breath test, the ALJ ordered Walls’ driver’s license suspended. Specifically, the ALJ ruled:
“In this case, [Walls] voluntarily gave verbal consent to performing the [field sobriety] tests, after being requested to do so by the officer. The officer did not demand or otherwise coerce [Walls] into performing the tests. [Walls] was not informed of any consequences of refusing to perform the tests, which could also be construed as possibly adding a coercive element. Since [Walls] consented to performing the [field sobriety tests] it is not necessary for the officer to have probable cause and exigent circumstances before administering the [field sobriety tests]. The [field sobriety test] results and other observations made by the officer after the [field sobriety tests] are admissible.
* * * *
“[T]he officer gave [Walls] a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney or others. The fact that the attempts to contact the first two attorneys were unsuccessful does not mean [Walls] did not have a ‘reasonable opportunity.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
Walls sought review of the ALJ’s order in the circuit court, which vacated the suspension order. It ruled that “[t]here are not substantial facts or evidence in the record to show that [Walls] voluntarily consented to performing field sobriety tests” and that “[t]here are not substantial facts in the record to support a finding that [Walls] was given a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel prior to his refusal to submit to the breath test.” We disagree with the circuit court’s rulings, as amplified below.
Walls argues that there is insufficient evidence from which the ALJ could have concluded that he consented to do the field sobriety tests. Under ORS 813.450(4)(b)(C), a motorist may seek review of the suspension of a driver’s license on the ground that the department’s exercise of discretion to suspend the license violated a constitutional provision. Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, is implicated by a request that a motorist consent to undergo field sobriety *106tests. State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 31-37, 880 P2d 451 (1994). In this case, the officer sought Walls’ consent to take the field sobriety tests.2 The results of the field sobriety tests furnished probable cause for the arrest. If the arrest was without probable cause, Walls’ refusal to take the breath test was of no legal import. Thus, if the consent to take the field sobriety tests was involuntary, Walls’ refusal to take the breath test is vitiated. The facts on which the ALJ relied to find that Walls voluntarily consented are uncontroverted and, thus, substantial evidence supports his underlying findings in that regard. The question for us to decide is whether, as a matter of law, those facts support the conclusion that the consent was voluntary.
Walls relies on our holding in State v. Lowe, 144 Or App 313, 926 P2d 332 (1996). Lowe involved an appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence of the defendant’s performance of field sobriety tests and the result of an Intoxilyzer test. In Lowe, we held:
“The record contains no testimony about what words [the officer] actually used to explain to defendant that he ‘wanted’ defendant to take field sobriety tests. Without knowing what [the officer] said to defendant, and in the light of defendant’s testimony that he felt he had no choice but to take the tests, we conclude that the state has not met it burden of proving that defendant’s consent was voluntary. See State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 160-61, 585 P2d 681 (1978).” Id. at 318.
We concluded that the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion to suppress on the record before us.
Lowe involved a criminal prosecution. A DMV license suspension is not a criminal proceeding. Gildroy v. MVD, 315 Or 617, 621, 848 P2d 96 (1993). Nonetheless, the constitutional standard regarding the voluntariness of a consent to search is the same, and we decide, as a matter of law, *107whether the facts suffice in that regard. In assessing the voluntariness of a consent to search, we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Walls’ consent was-given by an act of “free will or was the result of coercion, express or implied.” State v. Wolfe, 295 Or 567, 572, 669 P2d 320 (1983).
The record establishes that Janzen asked Walls to take the field sobriety tests and that he agreed to take them. Janzen did not advise him about the consequences of refusing to take the field sobriety tests. Before Janzen asked Walls to take the tests, he gave him Miranda warnings that explained that he had a right to an attorney and that anything he said could be used against him. Walls said that he understood those rights and never invoked them.3 Walls did not testify or offer evidence that he felt that he had no choice but to take the tests. Consequently, there is no evidence of express or implied coercion, unlike what occurred in Lowe. Under the circumstances, we hold that Walls’ consent to take the field sobriety tests was voluntary. On this record, the ALJ properly concluded that Walls had consented to take the field sobriety tests.
Next, we turn to the issue of whether Walls was provided a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before he refused to submit to the breath test. In Moore v. Motor Vehicles Division, 293 Or 715, 723, 652 P2d 794 (1982), the court held that a driver subject to a license suspension, who asks to speak to an attorney, “must be afforded [a] reasonable opportunity to do so unless or until it would interfere with effective administration of the [breath] test.” However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that blood alcohol evidence begins to dissipate shortly after consumption ceases and, therefore, that a driver must be tested as soon as practicable. State v. Milligan, 304 Or 659, 666, 748 P2d 130 (1988). The burden is on Walls to establish that his opportunity to consult with counsel was unreasonably restricted. Ranger v. MVD, 122 Or App 141, 144, 856 P2d 1050 (1993). *108Whether he was denied a reasonable opportunity to communicate with his lawyer depends on the circumstances of the officer’s interference with that opportunity and the reasons therefor.4
Janzen and Walls spent about 25 minutes trying to contact an attorney. During that time, Walls attempted to contact Scalf and talked to his girlfriend twice. Walls argues that, because he told his girlfriend to contact a lawyer after he was unable to find Scalf s telephone number, it was unreasonable for Janzen to require him to make an immediate decision and not to afford him any more time to reach another attorney. We disagree. By that time, almost one and a half hours had lapsed after Walls had been arrested. There was nothing to indicate to the officer that any further extension of time would result in Walls’ contacting an attorney. Walls had been furnished a 25-minute time period to contact an attorney and had made several phone calls with that purpose. All the law requires is that he be given a “reasonable opportunity” under all the circumstances. In light of the fact that blood alcohol dissipates over time, there is no requirement that a motorist be furnished an unending opportunity to obtain legal advice about taking a breath test. We hold that Walls has not carried his burden of demonstrating that he was denied a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel under the circumstances.5
*109Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the order of suspension.

 The following colloquy took place between the ALJ and Janzen:
“[ALJ]: [Dlid you ask him to take a field sobriety test?
“[Janzen]: Yes, I did.
“[ALJ]: And what was his response?
‘TJanzen]: That he would take them.
'[Janzen]: He agreed to take the test.'

 In State v. Ramos, 149 Or App 269, 272, 942 P2d 841 (1997), we held that “consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement and that probable cause is not a necessary prerequisite to asking a defendant for consent to perform field sobriety tests in the context of a DUII stop.” (Emphasis in original.)

 Typically, field sobriety tests contain components that are testimonial in nature and potentially self-incriminating. State v. Fish, 321 Or 48, 60, 893 P2d 1023 (1995).

 The dissent cites State v. Penrod, 133 Or App 454, 892 P2d 729 (1995), for the proposition that “the right to consult with counsel in a DUII setting includes the right to a private consultation.” 154 Or App at 110. However, in Penrod, we based the analysis on Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel.” (Emphasis supplied.) The Supreme Court held in Gildroy v. MVD, 315 Or 617, 621-22, 848 P2d 96 (1993), that Article I, section 11, does not apply to administrative proceedings. Moreover, unlike here, the defendant’s attorney in Penrod asked the officer to leave the room so he could have a private telephone conversation with his client. The dissent also says that “it is apparent that the way in which J anzen handled this matter required an excessive amount of time and interfered with Walls’ right to consult with counsel.” 154 Or App at 111. However, Walls never complained to Janzen about Janzen holding the telephone. In fact, Janzen did everything that Walls asked him to do and gave him 25 minutes to contact an attorney. Walls never asked Janzen if he could contact anyone else after he spoke to his girlfriend the second time. The dissent would hold the state responsible for not honoring a request that was never made at the time of the telephone calls.

 The facts of Farley v. MVD, 137 Or App 492, 905 P2d 248 (1995), rev den 323 Or 114 (1996), are similar to this case. In that case, the petitioner called his wife *109and asked her to contact a particular attorney. The officer also offered to contact a local attorney and provided the petitioner with a list of telephone numbers and names of attorneys in the area. The petitioner declined, saying that he only wanted to talk with his Portland attorney. Id. at 494. In analyzing whether the petitioner had been given a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel, we examined the total length of time that had lapsed from the time the petitioner had been stopped to when the officer recorded the refusal. Id. at 496. In that case, it had been just over an hour since the petitioner had been stopped, and the petitioner had been given 19 minutes to find an attorney. Ultimately, we held that petitioner was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.