Court Opinion

ID: 9583018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:03.206218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:04.533172
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice:
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court holding that the South Carolina Industrial Commission did not have jurisdiction over appellant Edna Vespers’ occupational disease claim. We reverse.
*96Appellant was employed by respondent Springs Mills, Inc., for a period of nine months before she filed her claim for the occupational disease, byssinosis. Prior to this employment in South Carolina, she had been exposed to cotton dust in the same type of employment (textiles) for seventeen years in North Carolina.
The sole issue raised is whether appellant’s claim satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of S. C. Code § 42-11-10, et seq. (1976). We hold it does.
The Workmen’s Compensation Act should be given a liberal interpretation because the purpose of the Act is remedial and humanitarian Hines v. Hendricks Canning Co., et al., 263 S. C. 399, 211 S. E. (2d) 220 (1975); Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 200 S. C. 228, 20 S. E. (2d) 733 (1942). The right to compensation under the Act is wholly statutory and subject to the restrictions contained therein. Owens v. Herndon, 252 S. C. 166, 165 S. E. (2d) 696 (1969).
Three restrictions are dispositive of the issue raised:
Section 42-11-10 provides in pertinent part:
“No disease shall be deemed an occupational disease when:
“(1) It does not result directly and naturally from exposure in this State to the hazards peculiar to the particular employment . . .”
Section 42-11-40 provides:
“In no case shall an employer be liable for compensation for an occupational disease unless such disease was contracted by the employee while in the employ of the employer as a direct result of the employment.”
Section 42-11-60 provides:1
“No compensation shall be payable for any pulmonary disease arising out of the inhalation of organic or inorganic *97dusts unless the claimant shall have been exposed thereto by his employment for a period of at least one year and unless he suffers a total disability therefrom.”
Code provisions relating to occupational diseases should be construed together and in relation to the other provisions of this title. Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Co., 236 S. C. 13, 112 S. E. (2d) 711 (1960).
The trial judge interpreted these provisions as requiring appellant to have contracted the disease during her employment for a period of at least one year within the State of South Carolina. We disagree and concur in the interpretation reached by the Full Commission who considered all provisions of this title.
In order for appellant to have a valid claim, she must prove:
(1) The disease resulted from exposure in South Carolina to cotton dust peculiar to the textile industry;
(2) She worked in the textile industry for a period in excess of one year; and
(3) That she contracted the disease while working for respondent.
The term “contracted” is a term of art which has been defined for compensation purposes in occupational disease cases as “disablement or death.” Glenn v. Columbia Silica Sand Company, supra.
We held in Drake v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 241 S. C. 116 at 121, 127 S. E. (2d) 288 (1962), “[s]o construing them (Code provisions) we conclude that in occupational disease cases compensability accrues when disability ... or death occurs.”
The one year exposure requirement in § 42-11-60 refers to exposure in the same type of employment, and not exposure in this State. See: Hodges v. Work*98men’s Compensation Commissioner, et al., 123 W. Va. 563, 17 S. E. (2d) 450 (1941).
Appellant contracted byssinosis for jurisdictional purposes when she was disabled by the disease some nine months after respondent hired her. She had worked in the textile industry for approximately eighteen years, had been exposed to cotton dust during her employment in South Carolina, and contracted the disease while in respondent’s employ. Appellant’s claim satisfies the jurisdictional requirements under S. C. Code § 42-11-10, et seq. (1976).
We reverse the order of the circuit court and re-instate the order of the Commission awarding benefits under the Act to appellant, Edna Vespers.
Reversed.
Lewis, C. J., and Harwell, J., concur.
Littlejohn, J., dissents.
Gregory, J., disqualified.

 This section was amended in 1977 changing exposure for byssinosis from one year to seven years. The claim here arose prior to 1977.