Court Opinion

ID: 9964583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:15:59.089837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:35.997562
License: Public Domain

2024 WI 17

                  SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP333

COMPLETE TITLE:        Erik A. Andrade,
                                 Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police
                       Commissioners,
                                 Respondent-Respondent.

                            REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                            Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 390, 965 N.W.2d 178
                                        (2021 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         April 30, 2024
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         October 9, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Milwaukee
   JUDGE:              Jeffrey A. Conen

JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ,
JJ., joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:
       For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed       by    Brendan   P.   Matthews   and   Cermele   &   Matthews,   S.C.,
Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Brendan P. Matthews.

       For the respondent-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Stacie H. Rosenzweig and Halling & Cayo, S.C., Milwaukee. There
was an oral argument by Stacie H. Rosenzweig.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Scott B. Thompson, T.R.
Edwards, and     Law Forward, Inc., Madison, on behalf of Black
Leaders Organizing for Communities.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by William E. Fischer,
Kyle J. Gulya, and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Neenah, on behalf
of League of Wisconsin Municipalities.

    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Jonathan Cermele and
Cermele   Law,   S.C.,   Milwaukee,       on   behalf   of   Milwaukee   Police
Association and Green Bay Professional Police Association.

                                      2
                                                                          2024 WI 17
                                                                  NOTICE
                                                    This opinion is subject to further
                                                    editing and modification.   The final
                                                    version will appear in the bound
                                                    volume of the official reports.
 No.    2020AP333
(L.C. No.   2019CV564)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                              :            IN SUPREME COURT

Erik A. Andrade,

            Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner,                           FILED
       v.
                                                                  APR 30,2024
City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police
Commissioners,                                                    Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court

            Respondent-Respondent.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, KAROFSKY, and PROTASIEWICZ, JJ.,
joined. ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

       REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                   Affirmed.

       ¶1    BRIAN    HAGEDORN,    J.    Former     Milwaukee      Police        Officer

 Erik Andrade challenges his termination for a series of posts

 and   comments      he   made    on    Facebook.         The     posts      garnered

 significant     local    and    national     attention     following        a    civil

 rights lawsuit that brought them to light.                      As part of its

 internal    investigation       into   the   posts,    the     Milwaukee        Police
 Department     informed    Andrade     of    the   policies      he    potentially
                                                                                  No.    2020AP333

violated and scheduled an interview.                             During that interview,

Andrade      reviewed      and        read       the     relevant      portions         of     those

policies out loud.                The investigator then questioned Andrade

about      the    posts,        one    by     one.           Andrade      was    afforded        the

opportunity        to      respond          to     their        intended         meaning,        his

understanding of how they might be received by the public and

affect     the    Department's          work,          and   whether      he    believed        they

violated Department policy.

      ¶2     Following the internal investigation, the Department

formally     charged       Andrade          with   violating        two     policies.           Both

charges cited Andrade's posts as the basis for the violations.

The   responsibility            then    shifted         to     Chief   of       Police       Alfonso

Morales     to     determine          his    guilt       and    impose      the    appropriate

punishment.         The Chief had internal affairs reach out to the

Milwaukee        County    District          Attorney's        Office,      which       explained

that Andrade's posts would diminish his credibility in court so

severely that they would no longer use him as a witness.                                       Given

the critical importance of testifying in police work, this fact
convinced the Chief that termination was appropriate.                                   The Chief

formally found Andrade guilty of the charges and discharged him

for one of them.            The Chief filed a complaint containing the

same charges and allegations with the entity that reviews his

decision——the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners.                                        Neither

the initial charges, the Chief's order of discharge, nor the

complaint        with     the     Board       mentioned         Andrade's        inability        to

testify.

                                                   2
                                                                    No.   2020AP333

      ¶3      After a full evidentiary trial, the Board issued a

detailed decision determining that Andrade was guilty of the

violations     and     the   punishments     he   received   were   appropriate.

Andrade then filed two actions in the circuit court.                  The first—

—a statutory appeal under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(20) (2017-18)1——

focused on whether there was just cause to sustain the charges.2

The second——a petition for a writ of certiorari——alleged that

the   Board    committed      legal   and     jurisdictional    errors.        The

circuit court upheld the Board's decision, Andrade appealed on

his certiorari petition, and the court of appeals affirmed.

      ¶4      Before    us,    Andrade     challenges    his   termination      on

procedural grounds.           First, he contends it fell short of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee.                  He argues that

due process required the Department to explain why Chief Morales

terminated him instead of imposing a lesser form of discipline.

As such, the Department should have told him that Chief Morales

made his decision based on the DA's determination that they

would no longer use Andrade as a witness.                Andrade insists that
the Department's failure to tell him this prior to termination

means he was not given an explanation of the evidence supporting

      1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2017-18 version.
      2Wisconsin. Stat. § 62.50(20) reads in part: "Any officer
or member of either department discharged, suspended or reduced,
may, within 10 days after the decision and findings under this
section are filed with the secretary of the board, bring an
action in the circuit court of the county in which the city is
located to review the order."

                                         3
                                                                      No.     2020AP333

his   termination     in    violation    of     the      United     States    Supreme

Court's decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.3

      ¶5     The law does not support Andrade's claim.                     For public

employees     terminable      only     for    cause,        Loudermill       generally

entitles a terminated employee to notice of the charges, an

explanation     of   the    evidence    supporting        them,     and     some    pre-

termination opportunity to respond.             The scope and nature of the

pre-termination procedures can vary depending on the nature of

the   post-termination       proceedings      and     the    interests       that    are

implicated.      The Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantees

in this context are not rigid and formal; they are flexible,

giving employers wide latitude on the process and nature of the

notice due when terminating employees.

      ¶6     Here, the Department notified Andrade of his conduct

(the Facebook posts) and what policies this conduct violated.

The Department provided Andrade an opportunity to respond to the

allegations before the Chief imposed punishment.                          The Chief's

decision to terminate was confirmed after a full administrative
hearing before the Board, as well as judicial review of the

Board's decision.          We conclude the Due Process Clause does not

require a more exacting and rigid pre-termination process than

what Andrade received.

      ¶7     Andrade's      second   argument       is   that      Chief    Morales's

complaint did not comply with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) because it

did   not   sufficiently      explain   the    reasons       for    the    discharge.

      3   470 U.S. 532 (1985).

                                         4
                                                                      No.    2020AP333

However, the complaint listed the policies Andrade violated and

referenced the Facebook posts that formed the basis for the

violations.     The statute requires nothing more.

                                  I.    BACKGROUND

     ¶8    On    January      26,       2018,      Milwaukee     police      officers

arrested Milwaukee Bucks player Sterling Brown, using force and

shocking him with a Taser.                Officer Erik Andrade transported

Brown to the police station after his arrest.                    Later that day,

Andrade   posted    about    the       encounter    on   his   personal      Facebook

page.4    Over the following months, Andrade posted a number of

other "inappropriate, disrespectful and defamatory comments"——as

the Chief would later describe them——on Facebook.

     ¶9    Sometime       later,    a    member    of    the   City   of    Milwaukee

Common Council shared Andrade's posts with the Department.                        The

Department's Internal Affairs Division opened an investigation

in May.    Things escalated on June 19 when Sterling Brown sued

the City, Chief Morales, and the police officers present at the
scene of his arrest, including Andrade.                  Brown's complaint cited

many of Andrade's offensive posts as an admission that Andrade

and other officers could engage in "unlawful attacks and arrests

of African Americans without justification" or a "fear of real

discipline."       That    same    day,    the     Milwaukee    Journal      Sentinel

     4 Andrade posted the following:    "Nice meeting Sterling
Brown   of   the  Milwaukee  Bucks   at   work  this  morning!
LOL#FearTheDeer."  "Fear the Deer" is a popular slogan for the
Milwaukee Bucks.

                                           5
                                                                   No.    2020AP333

published    an     article   about       the   lawsuit   featuring      Andrade's

posts.

     ¶10    The day after Brown filed the lawsuit, an officer from

Internal Affairs called Andrade to inform him that they were

investigating       allegations     he    posted   inappropriate      content    on

social media.         Internal affairs also sent Andrade a written

notice,     which    he   signed,        that   summarized   several      of    the

offending posts and referenced two Department policies (called

"Core Values") that his conduct implicated.5                 The notification

further warned, "Disciplinary action may result," and set the

date Andrade was "required to provide verbal responses and/or

'Memorandum' Reports(s)."6

     ¶11    Internal      Affairs     interviewed     Andrade   on       June   28.

During the interview, investigators asked Andrade to read aloud

     5 The Department summarized the posts as follows:      "The
Milwaukee Police Department is presently investigating you
concerning   an   allegation-That   you   allegedly  posted   an
inappropriate comment regarding your on-duty contact with
Milwaukee Bucks basketball player Mr. Sterling Brown on social
media.   It is also alleged that you posted other inappropriate
comments to include one with a picture of NBA Basketball player
Kevin Durant, a shared post from a Facebook account that alleged
that African Americans lie to police, a comment celebrating
overtime pay accompanying a use of force, comments via your
Facebook account regarding innocent African Americans, police
brutality and mass incarceration, and a comment regarding
Cleveland Cavaliers NBA basketball player JR Smith."
     6 The parties state that in response, Andrade filed a
"written response to charges." Several witnesses at the hearing
before the Board referenced it as well.   However, a copy does
not appear to be in the record.

                                           6
                                                                               No.     2020AP333

relevant portions of the Department policies he was given notice

of earlier.

       ¶12    The first policy violation concerned social media use.

This    was    based       on     Core    Value      1.00      (entitled       "Competence")

referencing "Guiding Principle" 1.05.                          Core Value 1.00 reads:

"We are prudent stewards of the public's grant of authority and

resources.           We     are       accountable        for     the     quality       of     our

performance and the standards of our conduct.                            We are exemplary

leaders       and    exemplary         followers."             Guiding       Principle       1.05

provides:           "All    department          members     shall      be     familiar       with

department      policy,         procedures       and    training       and    shall    conduct

themselves accordingly."                  Investigators therefore had Andrade

read portions of the Department's social media policy during the

interview.             Andrade           read     Standard        Operating          Procedure

685.15(A)(5), which provides:                    "As public employees, members do

not lose their rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. and

Wisconsin      constitutions.                However,     speech,       on    or     off    duty,

pursuant        to         your       official          duties         and      professional
responsibilities as members of the Milwaukee Police Department

is not protected.               Members are free to express themselves as

private citizens on [social media sites] to the degree that

their     speech      is        not    disruptive         to    the      mission       of     the

department."          Andrade         also    read     Standard     Operating        Procedure

685.15(A)(10):         "Members must be aware that their communication

on [social networking sites] can be used by a skilled defense

                                                 7
                                                                No.     2020AP333

attorney     in   impeaching   testimony     in   association      with     their

professional duties as a member of the department."7

      ¶13    In addition to the social media policies, Andrade was

also asked to read Core Value 3.00 (entitled "Integrity") and

Guiding Principle 3.01.           Core Value 3.00 reads:      "We recognize

the complexity of police work and exercise discretion in ways

that are beyond reproach and worthy of public trust.                    Honesty

and truthfulness are fundamental elements of integrity.                     It is

our   duty   to   earn   public    trust   through   consistent       words   and

actions.     We are honest in word and deed."         Andrade also recited

Guiding Principle 3.01:        "Our behavior shall inspire and sustain

the   confidence    of   our   community.      Whether   on   or      off   duty,

      7Andrade insists that he had no idea his ability to testify
was relevant to his discipline.    He suggests this warning only
pertained to the violation of Core Value 1.00, which he is not
appealing, and for which he was suspended, not terminated. And
even then, Andrade says, he was only on notice that a skilled
defense attorney could use his postings for impeachment, not
that he wouldn't be able to testify at all.

     The record paints a much different picture.    All of this
was investigated together——same documents, same interview, based
on the same Facebook posts——before the Chief imposed discipline.
Andrade was well aware that his credibility as a witness was
relevant to the investigation over his posts.

     In addition, Andrade took down his Facebook page the very
day Brown filed his lawsuit. He said he felt that he was being
made to "look a certain way"; he was being "portrayed as a
racist in the media nationwide." Andrade's posts were all over
CNN, ESPN, and sports outlets of all kinds. Andrade testified,
"I'm seeing my name everywhere, I'm getting calls from
everybody." It is hard to imagine that a police officer facing
this magnitude of criticism would fail to consider the
possibility that it could affect his ability to serve as a
credible witness.

                                       8
                                                                            No.     2020AP333

department     members       shall     not    behave       in    such   a     way    that    a

reasonable person would expect that discredit could be brought

upon the department, or that it would create the appearance of

impropriety or corruptive behavior."                       Andrade acknowledged he

was familiar with these policies.

       ¶14   The investigator then reviewed each post with Andrade,

one by one.         He asked standard questions such as whether Andrade

made the post, what the post meant, why he posted it, how it

might be received by the public, whether he regretted posting

it,    and   whether       he   thought      it     violated       Department        policy.

Generally, Andrade admitted the posts were his and explained

that    they   were        designed    to     educate,          enlighten,     and/or       be

humorous.       Although        he    acknowledged         they    could      be    seen    as

unprofessional        by    some,     he     did     not    believe        they     violated

Department policy.

       ¶15   On August 23, 2018, the Department officially charged

Andrade      with     violating       the    same     Core        Values     and     Guiding

Principles he was put on notice of prior to and during his
interview.      The first charge alleged that Andrade violated Core

Value 1.00; the second alleged that Andrade violated Core Value

3.00.     Both violations were a result of Andrade's Facebook posts

that    contained       "inappropriate,            disrespectful        and       defamatory

comments to various memes and videos."

       ¶16   This put the ball in the court of Chief of Police

Alfonso Morales.           Chief Morales had to determine whether to find

Andrade guilty of the charges and what discipline to impose.
The Chief had Internal Affairs reach out to the Milwaukee County
                                             9
                                                                                 No.       2020AP333

District      Attorney's          Office     and      asked      whether      Andrade's          posts

would affect his credibility as a witness.                             They said yes.             The

comments diminished his credibility so severely that the office

would never call him to testify.                        Even more, Kent Lovern, the

second in command at the DA's Office, stated that the posts

would fall into the category of Brady material.8                              This means that

if Andrade served as a witness in a criminal proceeding, the

District       Attorney's          Office       would       be    required          to     disclose

evidence      of     Andrade's        bias      and    untrustworthiness             to     defense

counsel as impeachment evidence.

       ¶17     Lovern would later testify before the Board that his

office added Andrade to an internal list of officers subject to

such       disclosures.            The    list     contained          three    categories          of

officers:            (1)    never        call    as     a     witness;        (2)        call    with

qualifications; and (3) call anytime, but disclose.                                         Andrade

fell into the first category.                      Lovern testified that the DA's

office       would    not        prosecute      cases       relying      primarily          on    the

testimony of officers placed into the do not call category.
       ¶18     This    was       of   grave      concern         to   Chief    Morales.            He

believed       that        the     ability       to     testify        was     an        "extremely

important" aspect of policing.                     He likened it to Detective Mark

Fuhrman in the trial of O.J. Simpson, whose use of racist terms

significantly damaged his credibility.                           The mere presence of an

       If a witness previously behaved in a way that harms his or
       8

her credibility, the prosecutor is constitutionally required to
turn evidence of this behavior over to the defendant. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972).

                                                 10
                                                                          No.    2020AP333

officer unable to testify on an investigation could stymie or

taint a later prosecution.                  Chief Morales therefore determined

that       while   he   would       have    handed    down     a    severe    punishment

regardless, the inability to testify changed the calculus and

persuaded him that termination was appropriate.

       ¶19     On September 12, 2018, almost three weeks after the

Department issued formal charges, Chief Morales issued an order

that found Andrade guilty of the charges and imposed discipline.

The    Chief       suspended      Andrade      for    30     days   without      pay     for

"[p]osting         content     to    a     social     networking       site     that     was

disruptive to the mission of the department."9                            And for the

charge of "Failure to inspire and sustain the confidence of our

community,"10 the Chief discharged him from the Department.                              The

order did not explain the reasoning for the chosen level of

discipline.

       ¶20     The Chief's decision, however, is not the final word.

Wisconsin law requires Milwaukee to establish a Board of Fire

and Police Commissioners.                  Wis. Stat. § 62.50(1h).            One of the
Board's       duties    is   to      review    a     police    chief's       disciplinary

decisions.         Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17).             After the chief discharges

or suspends an officer for more than five days, he must file his

written       notice    of     discharge       with    the     Board    along     with     a

       Andrade violated "Core Value 1.00-Competence, referencing
       9

Guiding    Principle  1.05,   referencing   Standard   Operating
Procedures relating to Social Networking Sites (SNS), Section
685.15(A)(5)."

       Andrade violated "Core Value 3.00-Integrity, referencing
       10

Guiding Principle 3.01."

                                              11
                                                                              No.     2020AP333

complaint        "setting       forth      the    reasons       for   the     discharge     or

suspension."            Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).                 The discharged officer

then may choose to appeal the chief's decision to the Board.

Id.     In that case, the Board holds a trial where the discharged

officer "shall have full opportunity to be heard in defense and

shall be entitled to secure the attendance of all witnesses

necessary for the defense at the expense of the city."                                     Wis.

Stat.       § 62.50(16).         In     the      end,    the    Board    is    tasked      with

determining whether there is "just cause" to sustain the charges

and,        if    so,    what     discipline            to     impose.         Wis.     Stat.

§ 62.50(17)(a)-(b).             It does so by analyzing and applying seven

standards         set     forth       in      the       statutes.11            Wis.     Stat.

§ 62.50(17)(b).

       ¶21       Accordingly, Chief Morales filed a complaint with the

Board, listing the two violations and the punishment for each.

The    complaint        stated    that      Andrade's        Facebook    posts      were   the

       They are: (1) "Whether the subordinate could reasonably
       11

be expected to have had knowledge of the probable consequences
of the alleged conduct"; (2) "Whether the rule or order that the
subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable"; (3) "Whether the
chief, before filing the charge against the subordinate, made a
reasonable effort to discover whether the subordinate did in
fact violate a rule or order"; (4) "Whether the effort described
under subd. 3. was fair and objective"; (5) "Whether the chief
discovered substantial evidence that the subordinate violated
the rule or order as described in the charges filed against the
subordinate"; (6) "Whether the chief is applying the rule or
order   fairly    and   without    discrimination    against   the
subordinate";   and   (7)   "Whether   the   proposed   discipline
reasonably relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation
and to the subordinate's record of service with the chief's
department." Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17)(b).

                                                 12
                                                                               No.     2020AP333

basis       for    both        violations.           Andrade     appealed       the       Chief's

decision to the Board, and in December 2018, a hearing examiner

presided          over     a    two-day     trial       before     a    panel        of     three

commissioners.

       ¶22    The panel split up Andrade's trial into two phases.12

During       phase       one,     the   panel        heard     evidence       and     arguments

regarding the first five "just cause" standards.                                    Both sides

gave     opening         and     closing     statements.           Both       sides       called

witnesses and conducted direct and cross examinations.                                And both

sides presented exhibits.                  After each side rested, the panel

examined      the        five   standards     and      concluded       that    the     evidence

supported both charges.                   The panel then moved to the second

phase during which it heard evidence and arguments regarding the

final two standards, including what discipline to impose.                                     In

the end, the panel determined that both the suspension and the

       Although not relevant to our determination that he
       12

received sufficient pre-termination notice, Andrade's actions
before and during the trial contradict his argument that he was
blindsided by the Chief's testimony about the inability to
testify. A month before trial, Andrade's attorney listed Chief
Deputy District Attorney Kent Lovern on his witness list, and
then subpoenaed the Brady disclosure list created and maintained
by the DA's office.         During trial, Andrade's attorney
extensively questioned Lovern about the list and Andrade's
ability to testify. The City continues to point out in briefing
that Andrade obviously knew of the list and thought it might be
relevant; why else would it be subpoenaed and addressed through
cross-examination by Andrade's attorney?    Yet Andrade ignores
all of this in his briefing and represents he had no idea any of
this was relevant.

                                                13
                                                        No.   2020AP333

discharge punishments were appropriate.13      It issued a written

decision   memorializing   and   explaining   its   determination   on

January 4, 2019.14

     ¶23   Andrade then filed two appeals to the circuit court——a

statutory appeal and a petition for a writ of certiorari——which

the court consolidated.    Andrade challenged the panel's decision

on several bases.15   Relevant here, he argued that the Board did

not have just cause to sustain the second charge (for which he

was terminated) and that——contrary to the notice mandates of due

process and Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13)——he was unaware prior to the

hearing that his inability to testify was an issue.

     ¶24   The court disagreed.    After reviewing the record, the

court found substantial evidence to support the panel's just

     13The dissent apparently disagrees. It spends considerable
time   suggesting    the   punishment   Andrade  received   was
inappropriate and egregious, selecting and quoting favored
testimony from the hearing. None of this is before us, however.
The Board confirmed the Chief's choice of discipline; it is
inappropriate given the procedural posture of this case to
second guess this conclusion.
     14The Board concluded in part: "Andrade's posts managed to
repeat every negative stereotype plaguing big city police
departments, i.e., racism, use of excessive force, disregard for
ethnic sensitivities, distrust of the public, and incurring
excessive overtime.      The negative impact of the posts was
magnified by the extensive local and national publicity that
followed. . . . We   conclude    that  the   posts   and   comments
undermined trust in the department, disrupted the mission of the
department,   undermined    public  confidence,   discredited   the
department, and created the appearance of impropriety and
corruption in the department."
     15The Honorable Jeffrey A. Conen of the Milwaukee County
Circuit Court presided.

                                  14
                                                                       No.       2020AP333

cause decision on the merits.                    It also held that the Chief

complied with the notice requirements of due process and Wis.

Stat. § 62.50(13).         The Chief did not charge Andrade for his

inability to testify; rather, it was an "impact" of the conduct

leading to the charges.

      ¶25     Andrade appealed the court's certiorari decision to

the   court    of    appeals,     which    affirmed.         Andrade       v.    City    of

Milwaukee      Bd.    of   Fire     &     Police        Comm'rs,    No.     2020AP333,

unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2021).                              Andrade

followed with a petition for review to this court, but we held

the   matter    in    abeyance     pending        our    decision     in       Green    Bay

Professional Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2023 WI 33, 407

Wis. 2d 11,     988    N.W.2d 664.16            After    deciding   Green        Bay,    we

granted Andrade's petition.

                                 II.     DISCUSSION

      ¶26     The question in this case is whether the Milwaukee

Police Department complied with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) when it terminated

Andrade.        Procedurally,           this     question     comes       to     us     via

      16Green  Bay  involved   an   officer's  challenge  to  an
arbitration decision upholding his demotion.      Green Bay Pro.
Police Ass'n v. City of Green Bay, 2023 WI 33, ¶1, 407
Wis. 2d 11, 988 N.W.2d 664.   Before us, the officer claimed he
was not afforded sufficient due process under Loudermill. Id.,
¶11.   We held that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard
the law when he determined that the Department provided adequate
notice to the officer.   Id.   Given the deferential standard of
review, Loudermill's requirements were not squarely presented to
us. Id., ¶12.

                                           15
                                                                No.     2020AP333

certiorari, and in this context, we limit our review to two

questions:      whether the Board proceeded on a correct theory of

law and whether it kept within its jurisdiction.17                  Gentilli v.

Bd. of Police and Fire Comm'rs of Madison, 2004 WI 60, ¶21, 272

Wis. 2d 1, 680 N.W.2d 335.          Andrade at times argues both, but he

does    not   develop   a   separate    argument   as    to   why     the    Board

exceeded its jurisdiction.          Given that we have said proceeding

"on    a    correct   theory   of    law    includes    complying     with    the

requirements of due process," we will analyze Andrade's claim on

this basis and will not separately examine whether the Board

exceeded its jurisdiction.          Miller v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of

Lyndon Station, 2023 WI 46, ¶9, 407 Wis. 2d 678, 991 N.W.2d 380;

see also Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67,

¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our

       We normally ask four questions on certiorari:
       17                                                     (1)
whether the decision-maker "kept within its jurisdiction"; (2)
"whether it proceeded on a correct theory of law"; (3) "whether
its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and
represented its will and not its judgment"; and (4) "whether the
evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or
determination in question."     Voters with Facts v. City of Eau
Claire, 2018 WI 63, ¶71, 382 Wis. 2d 1, 913 N.W.2d 131 (quoting
another source).     But a statutory appeal under Wis. Stat.
§ 62.50 permits the circuit court to review the Board's "just
cause" determination, and the court's final decision cannot be
appealed. Wis. Stat. § 62.50(22); Gentilli v. Bd. of Police and
Fire Comm'rs of Madison, 2004 WI 60, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 1, 680
N.W.2d 335.   Thus, when officers initially file both an appeal
under § 62.50 and a petition for a writ of certiorari in the
circuit court, appellate courts only review the former two
certiorari   questions   because   the   latter two   mirror  the
unappealable just cause determination conducted by the circuit
court   under   § 62.50.       Gentilli,    272  Wis. 2d 1,  ¶21.
Accordingly, Andrade only appealed the certiorari decision to
the court of appeals and to us.

                                       16
                                                                           No.    2020AP333

neutral role to develop or construct arguments for parties; it

is up to them to make their case.").

                                  A.    Due Process

       ¶27    We begin with the constitutional challenge.                         Andrade

argues that the Board proceeded on an incorrect theory of law

because Chief Morales violated his due process rights when he

terminated Andrade without mentioning his inability to testify

as a basis for the punishment.

       ¶28    The    Fourteenth        Amendment        to     the     United      States

Constitution provides that states cannot "deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."                                U.S.

Const. amend. XIV, § 1.              To establish a due process violation,

there must first be "a liberty or property interest of which a

person has been deprived."               Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216,

219 (2011).         The Supreme Court has held that a public employee

subject      to   termination     only    for     cause,      like    Andrade,      has    a

property interest in continued employment.                           Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985).                           This is not

in    dispute.       Thus,     the     question    before      us     is   whether       the

procedures        used    to   deprive    Andrade       of     that    interest         were

constitutionally sufficient.             Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219.

       ¶29    Since every deprivation is different, the demands of

due process vary as well.                Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

334   (1976).        But    the   Supreme       Court   has    addressed         what    due

process demands in particular situations.                        Loudermill is one
such instance.           Loudermill arose as two consolidated cases, the
                                           17
                                                                              No.     2020AP333

first       of   which         involved   an   employee       who    was    dismissed       for

dishonesty but had no opportunity to rebut or respond prior to

termination.           470 U.S. at 535.              The second case involved a bus

mechanic         who      was    dismissed     for     failing      an     eye    exam,     and

similarly        had      no    opportunity     to     respond.          Id. at     536,   548.

State law provided that both employees could only be terminated

for cause.             Id. at 535.        The Court therefore considered what

process the Constitution requires an employer to provide when

terminating a public employee who may only be discharged for

cause.       Id.

       ¶30       After considering the various interests,18 the Court

concluded          that     "some    kind      of     hearing"      is    required     before

discharging a for-cause employee.                       Id. at 542.         The components

of the "hearing" must include "oral or written notice of the

charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence,

and an opportunity to present his side of the story."                                  Id. at

546.        The     Court       explained      that    this    process      "need     not    be

elaborate"——the            formality,       scope,     and    procedural         requirements

       The Supreme Court has outlined three factors to guide the
       18

determination of what due process requires:

       First, the private interest that will be affected by
       the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
       deprivation of such interest through the procedures
       used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
       substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
       Government's interest, including the function involved
       and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
       additional or substitute procedural requirement would
       entail.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

                                                18
                                                             No.    2020AP333

may   "vary,   depending   upon    the   importance   of   the     interests

involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings."               Id. at

545; id. at 547 n.12.      The point of the pre-termination process

is to provide "an initial check against mistaken decisions——

essentially,   a   determination    of   whether   there   are   reasonable

grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are

true and support the proposed action."        Id. at 545-46.

      ¶31   Andrade's basic contention is that he was not given an

explanation of the evidence supporting his discharge prior to

his termination.19    Andrade focuses on the fact that, even though

Chief Morales would have disciplined him no matter what, his

discipline would not have risen to the level of discharge absent

the fact that Andrade could no longer testify.20             In his eyes,

       Andrade's briefing is not entirely consistent on when he
      19

believes this notice was required.    But his reply brief and
statements during oral argument make clear that he is focusing
on the pre-termination notice——that is, notice prior to his
termination on September 12, 2018.

       As potential evidence that the inability to testify was
      20

simply an after-the-fact rationalization, Andrade represents
that he was still testifying up until the date of his discharge.
This suffers from three flaws.

     First, the record does not support his contention. Andrade
cites to an exchange his attorney had with Attorney Lovern
during cross-examination where his attorney stated: "I want you
to assume that Andrade was chairing a trial up until the day——
for your office up until the day he was fired.     Would that be
inconsistent with your testimony today?"    Attorney Lovern said
no, because he recalled telling his assistant to put Andrade on
the Brady list as soon as he met with members from the
Department. Andrade's attorney then said that he could provide
"that information after this."   Based on this record, he never
did. When performing common law certiorari review——which is the
case here——we review "the record compiled by the municipality
                                    19
                                                                 No.    2020AP333

then, his inability to testify constituted evidence against him

that the Chief should have disclosed prior to terminating him.

Andrade argues he needed this information so that he could make

any plausible arguments that might prevent the discipline.

      ¶32   Not so.     Andrade confuses the factors leading to the

Chief's choice of discipline with the evidence of the violations

in the first place.       Chief Morales did not charge Andrade for

his   inability    to   testify.        As     the   Chief    explained,      his

conclusions   about     the   policy        violations    differed     from   his

decision about how to discipline Andrade.                 Loudermill does not

require an explanation of the reasons discharge was the chosen

punishment    as   opposed    to   suspension        or    something     lesser.

Rather, Loudermill just requires an explanation of the basic

reasons the employee is being disciplined.                Andrade proposes far

and [do] not take any additional evidence on the merits of the
decision."   Ottman v. Town of Primrose, 2011 WI 18, ¶35, 332
Wis. 2d 3, 796 N.W.2d 411.      We therefore cannot rely on a
representation that is not in the record.

     Second, at this stage of the proceedings, we accept the
Board's findings of fact——which Andrade does not challenge——as
long as "any reasonable view of the evidence supports them."
Id., ¶53. In its decision, the Board recounted and credited the
testimony of Chief Morales and Attorney Lovern, among others,
who testified regarding conversations they had before the
termination about Andrade's inability to testify.     Accepting
Andrade's representation runs contrary to the factual findings
of the Board that ground our review.

     Finally, even if the DA's Office used Andrade as a witness
up till the time of the discharge, that fact is irrelevant to
the legal issue before us: whether the pre-termination process
was constitutionally sufficient. Whether Andrade actually could
be used as a witness or was guilty of violating Department
policy is simply not before us.

                                       20
                                                                             No.    2020AP333

more    rigid,      formal,      and    exhaustive       notice     requirements        than

Loudermill        commands.            Nothing      in    Loudermill         requires       an

exhaustive pre-termination explanation of every fact or factor

that    might     be     considered      in   the    disciplinary          process.        An

employer need not detail all the consequences of an employee's

misconduct, nor must it show in detail how those consequences

might inform the employer's choice of discipline.                            The employer

must simply notify the employee of the charges and evidence and

give    them      an   opportunity       to   respond.          That's     exactly      what

happened here.

       ¶33     From     the     beginning,     Andrade      was     told     by    Internal

Affairs      that      they   were     investigating       him    for      violating       two

identified Department policies because he posted inappropriate,

disrespectful,            and      defamatory            comments       on         Facebook.

Investigators showed him and asked him about every concerning

post.        He   knew    that    violations       such    as    this    could      lead    to

discipline up to and including suspension and discharge.                                   And

following the investigation, the Department charged Andrade with
violating the previously identified policies due to his Facebook

posts.21       He was therefore on notice of the charges (the rule

       Andrade and the amicus brief by the Milwaukee Police
       21

Association contend that even if no notice of the discharge
rationale was necessary, the procedures giving Andrade notice of
the nature of the investigation and the investigatory interview
itself were insufficient.   They say Loudermill requires notice
of the "charges," which requires something more than an
investigation.   This reads Loudermill too woodenly, as we have
explained.   And in any event, the Department formally notified
Andrade of the charges on August 23, 2018 prior to his
termination on September 12. This notice included the policies
violated and the behavior that caused those violations——the
                                              21
                                                                         No.     2020AP333

violations)       and    the    evidence    supporting          them   (the     Facebook

posts).        It should not have surprised Andrade, then, when the

Chief discharged him for one of the violations.22

       ¶34     Even more, Loudermill instructs that the "nature" of

the post-termination review informs the "formality," "procedural

requisites," and "scope" of the pre-termination process.                          Id. at

545; id. at 547 n.12.              Here, there can be no question Andrade

received thorough         post-termination         review.        After discharging

Andrade, the Chief filed a formal complaint with the Board that

explained the charges and evidence.                The Board then held a full-

blown trial, giving Andrade the opportunity to call his own

witnesses and cross-examine the Department's.                          Afterward, the

Board       considered    seven    comprehensive        standards      in    making    its

"just cause" determination.              The end result was a detailed, ten-

page        written     decision     containing         findings       of      fact    and

conclusions       of    law,    thereby    providing       a    robust      substantive,

procedural,       and    evidentiary      check    on     the    discipline      Andrade

received.        After that, Andrade appealed to the circuit court,
which       reviewed    the    Board's    just    cause    determination.             These

extensive post-termination procedures eliminate any doubt that

Andrade had all the notice and opportunity to be heard that the

Constitution requires.

Facebook posts.

       Even if one might consider the ability to testify as
       22

additional evidence that Andrade's conduct failed to sustain the
confidence of the community, Loudermill does not require
employers to notify employees of every jot and tittle supporting
their decision.

                                           22
                                                                                     No.       2020AP333

       ¶35     In sum, we hold that Andrade received all the process

he     was     due    under        the       Fourteenth         Amendment.            He     received

sufficient pre-termination notice of the charges and evidence

against him, and he was afforded an opportunity to respond.

This     was     supported             by    post-termination            review       at     multiple

levels.        Andrade received the "initial check against mistaken

decisions" that Loudermill commands.                              Id. at 545.              Therefore,

his contention that the Board applied an incorrect theory of law

when it sustained the charges against him is not supported by

the facts or law.

                              B.        Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13)

       ¶36     Andrade also briefly argues that Chief Morales failed

to comply with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).                             This provision requires

the    police        chief        to     notify      the       Board     of    a     discharge        or

suspension greater than five days, and to include "a complaint

setting      forth     the        reasons      for       the    discharge       or    suspension."

§ 62.50(13).           Andrade          contends         the    complaint       did      not     do   so
because it failed to mention the inability to testify.

       ¶37     Andrade's          error       here       is    similar    to       his     analytical

error regarding due process.                        He suggests the "reasons for the

discharge" language means he must be informed of the reasons the

punishment       rose        to        the   level       of     discharge       rather         than    a

suspension or some other lesser punishment.                               But that's not what

the    statute       says.             It    says    "reasons      for        the    discharge        or

suspension"——in other words, the reason some serious form of
discipline       was    imposed.               The       statute       does    not       require      an
                                                    23
                                                                           No.   2020AP333

explanation of all the reasons a specific level of discipline

was chosen.

      ¶38     Here, the complaint Chief Morales filed with the Board

was simple, straightforward, and consistent with the statute.

The   Chief     listed    the   Department        policy      Andrade      violated    for

charge one, the punishment of a 30-day suspension, along with

the evidence supporting the violation——the Facebook posts.                             The

complaint also listed the Department policy Andrade violated for

charge two, the punishment of discharge, along with the evidence

supporting the violation——the Facebook posts.                            As we explain

above,    the    inability      to    testify      was       not   the    conduct     that

violated the policies, but rather a consequence of Andrade's

conduct     that    informed         the    level       of     punishment        imposed.

Therefore, the complaint submitted by Chief Morales to the Board

complied with § 62.50(13).

                                III.       CONCLUSION

      ¶39     Andrade     challenges        the    process         by    which   he   was
terminated.        He    argues that the          Due Process Clause required

Chief    Morales    to    notify     him    of    the    reasons         underlying   the

Chief's choice of discipline.                Andrade also contends that the

complaint submitted by Chief Morales to the Board did not set

forth the reasons for the discharge in compliance with Wis.

Stat. § 62.50(13).          Based on the facts of this case, neither

challenge succeeds.          Both pre-termination and in the complaint

to the Board, Andrade received the process due to him under
Wisconsin law and the U.S. Constitution.
                                           24
                                                               No.   2020AP333

    By   the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of     appeals   is

affirmed.

                                  25
                                                                    No.   2020AP333.akz

    ¶40     ANNETTE      KINGSLAND          ZIEGLER,         C.J.     (dissenting).

Because of his behavior on social media, Officer Erik Andrade

("Andrade")     may   very   well   have     ultimately       received      the   same

discipline.     I do not condone his behavior.                But as an accused,

Andrade is owed certain due process rights, rights which are

constitutionally and statutorily protected.1                  Andrade was denied

these due process rights.

    ¶41     Fundamental to those basic due process rights, Andrade

has the right to receive notice of what he is being charged

with.    He has a statutory right to receive notice as to the

evidence supporting the decision to terminate him.                        And, after

having   been   placed   on    notice   but     before       the    discipline      was

imposed,    Andrade    has    the   fundamental        due    process       right    to

present a defense as to why the proposed action should not be

taken.     Because Andrade was denied these fundamental due process

rights, I dissent.

                                        I

    ¶42     While employed with the Milwaukee Police Department
("the Department"), Andrade posted and shared multiple posts to

    1  See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.").

                                        1
                                                              No.   2020AP333.akz

his   private    Facebook   page.2        A   local    alderman     obtained     a

screenshot of Andrade's social media posts and shared it with

the assistant chief of police.            Shortly after being notified,

the   Department's     Internal   Affairs     office    followed    up   on    the

screenshot, conducting an extensive investigation into Andrade's

social media posts.

      ¶43   At   the   conclusion    of   a   lengthy    investigation        into

Andrade's    posts,     Andrade     was   charged      with   violating        two

provisions of the Department's Code of Conduct——core values3 and

      2Officer Andrade's posts stemmed initially from the
Department's high-profile arrest of Milwaukee Bucks player
Sterling Brown.    Brown allegedly double-parked in a disabled
parking spot outside of a Walgreens store and responding
officers tased and forcibly arrested him.    Brown subsequently
filed a civil lawsuit against the Department and the officers
involved in his arrest, arguing the Department used excessive
force and deprived him of his civil rights. Andrade was present
at Brown's arrest and assisted with transport and was therefore
one of the officers named as a defendant in Brown's complaint.
He was the only officer not disciplined for his role. However,
Andrade's social media postings came to light in part because
Brown's complaint highlighted several of Andrade's postings as
an admission that officers had free rein to engage in "unlawful
attacks and arrests of African-Americans without justification"
and without "fear of real discipline."

     Andrade's right to due process is not conditioned on how
the court or the public perceives the content of his posts.
This dissent does not attempt to excuse or overlook the posts;
they are inexcusable. However, courts have a responsibility to
safeguard the due process rights of all litigants, regardless of
any personal feelings on what litigants stand accused of.
      3The pertinent core value provisions of the Department's
Code of Conduct are as follows:

      1.00 - Competence.
      We are prudent stewards of the public's grant of
      authority and resources.  We are accountable for the
      quality of our performance and the standards of our
                                2
                                                              No.    2020AP333.akz

social   media   use.4     Per     the   Chief's   charging    order,    Andrade

"post[ed]    content      to   a    social   networking       site    that    was

    conduct. We          are   exemplary     leaders    and    exemplary
    followers.

    . . .

    3.00 - Integrity.
    We recognize the complexity of police work and
    exercise discretion in ways that are beyond reproach
    and worthy of public trust. Honesty and truthfulness
    are fundamental elements of integrity. It is our duty
    to earn public trust through consistent words and
    actions. We are honest in word and deed.
    [Guiding Principle] 3.01
    Our behavior shall inspire and sustain the confidence
    of our community. Whether on or off duty, department
    members shall not behave in such a way that a
    reasonable person would expect that discredit could be
    brought upon the department or that it would create
    the appearance of impropriety or corruptive behavior.
    4  The pertinent provisions of the Department's Standard
Operating Procedures on Social Networking Sites (SNS) are:

    [685.15      USE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES]

    A.      PRECAUTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS.

    . . .

    5.      As public employees, members do not lose their
            rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. and
            Wisconsin Constitutions.  However, speech, on or
            off duty, pursuant to your official duties and
            professional responsibilities as members of the
            Milwaukee Police Department is not protected.
            Members are free to express themselves as private
            citizens on SNS to the degree that their speech
            is   not  disruptive  to   the  mission  of   the
            department.

    . . .

    10.     Members must be aware that their communication on
            SNS can be used by a skilled defense attorney in
            impeaching testimony in association with their
                                  3
                                                                 No.    2020AP333.akz

disruptive to the mission of the department" and "fail[ed] to

inspire and sustain the confidence of our community."                     The Chief

issued   a   personnel     order      outlining   Andrade's      discipline       for

violating    those   two    provisions       of   the   Department's       Code   of

Conduct, imposing a 30-day suspension without pay in response to

Andrade "[p]osting content to a social media networking site

that was disruptive to the mission" of the Department.                     However,

in response to Andrade's "[f]ailure to inspire and sustain the

confidence of our community," the Chief terminated Andrade.                       As

required by Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), the Chief notified the Board

of Police and Fire Commissioners ("the Board") of his decision

to suspend and terminate Andrade.                 Andrade then appealed his

termination.

    ¶44      During Andrade's two-day post-termination disciplinary

appeal hearings, the Chief repeatedly testified that it was the

fact that he could not use Andrade as a witness that resulted in

his termination.         But for Andrade's inability to be used as a

witness, the Chief testified that

    [Andrade] was going to get disciplined.   He brought
    discredit to the department on discipline and as I
    stated earlier, the purpose of firing him is I can't
    use him as a witness in court.
    ¶45      According     to   the     Chief's    testimony,      the     district

attorney's inability to use Andrade as a witness in court was

the sole reason the Chief terminated Andrade:

    [MPD Counsel]         . . . I think your testimony was he
                         only got fired because the DA's position

             professional       duties       as   a     member     of      the
             department.

                                         4
                                                                   No.   2020AP333.akz

                            took   it  over  the  edge.  To  bring
                            discredit to the department would have
                            only led to severe discipline. Is that
                            fair?

       [Chief]              Yes.

       [MPD Counsel] Same thing with the second charge. You
                     wouldn't have fired him for failing to
                     inspire and sustain the confidence in
                     our community but for the DA's decision.
                     Is that fair?

       [Chief]              That is fair.

       [MPD Counsel]        I don't want to beat a dead horse,
                            although I know that expression is not
                            supposed to be used anymore.    Are you
                            saying that [Andrade] was solely fired
                            because of the DA's decision at the end
                            of the day?

           . . .

       [Chief]              Yes.
       ¶46       The district attorney's assertion that he would not be

able to use Andrade as a witness put the "inability to testify"

directly at issue.           In fact, the Chief testified that "if there

was    a    DA     that   would    use   [Andrade],"   then   he    would    welcome

Andrade to reapply to the Department.                The Chief again testified

that       he    would    not     have   dismissed     Andrade     but    for    that

determination:

       [MPD Counsel] Now let's assume that wasn't the case.
                     Let's assume he could still testify.
                     Would this still be discipline-worthy
                     conduct by Mr. Andrade?

       [Chief]             Absolutely.

       [MPD Counsel] Can you give us a sense of how serious it
                     would be without the testimony piece of
                     it?

                                            5
                                                                      No.    2020AP333.akz

      [Chief]            It would imposed heavy discipline (sic).
                         I probably would have not -– or I would
                         not have dismissed him. I would not have
                         fired him had it not been for his
                         inability to testify in court or be used
                         by the district attorney's office to
                         testify in court.
      ¶47    The Board ultimately upheld the                     imposed discipline,

concluding that "[Andrade's] posts and comments undermined trust

in the department, disrupted the mission of the department, and

created     the    appearance    of    impropriety         and   corruption        in   the

department"        so   the   resulting      termination         "underscore[d]         the

seriousness of the offense."                Andrade appealed his termination

to the Milwaukee County circuit court,5 which, on review, upheld

the   Board's       decision.         The    court    of     appeals        also   upheld

Andrade's termination, determining the reason Andrade had been

terminated——the         inability     to    testify    as        a   witness——was        "a

consequence of his failure to inspire and sustain the confidence

of the community and the harm he has done to the department's

mission."         Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Bd. of Fire & Police

Comm'rs, No. 2020AP333, unpublished slip op., ¶36 (Wis. Ct. App.

Aug. 31, 2021).           Finally, Andrade petitioned this court for
review.

                                            II

      ¶48    The United States Constitution recognizes due process

as a fundamental right afforded all litigants.                       This fundamental

right to due process "includes the right to . . . procedural due

process."     State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, ¶40, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911

N.W.2d 17.         "Procedural      due     process    imposes        constraints        on

      5   The Hon. Jeffrey A. Conen, presiding.

                                            6
                                                                         No.       2020AP333.akz

governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or

'property'       interests      within    the     meaning          of   the    Due      Process

Clause      of     the . . . Fourteenth               Amendment."             Matthews          v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).                          "Procedural due process

requires     that       government    action          'be    implemented           in   a     fair

manner.'"        Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶40; see also State v. Laxton,

2002 WI 82, ¶10 n.8, 254 Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784; United

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).                            To succeed on a

procedural        due    process     claim,       "a        plaintiff     must          show    a

deprivation       by    state    action     of    a     constitutionally             protected

interest in 'life, liberty, or property' without due process of

law."     Penterman v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 211 Wis. 2d 458, 473,

565 N.W.2d 521 (1997) (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,

125-26 (1990)).

      ¶49    "The minimum procedural protections required by the

Due Process Clause vary depending on the context."                                  Miller v.

Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vill. of Lyndon Station, 2023 WI 46,

¶12, 407 Wis. 2d 678, 991 N.W.2d 380 (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S.
at 334 ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural

protections       as     the    particular       situation         demands.")           (quoting

another      source)).            "The    essential            requirements             of     due

process . . . are          notice     and        an    opportunity            to     respond."

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).

Due     process     fundamentally        requires           "the    opportunity          to    be

heard."      Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting

Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).                           "The opportunity
to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed

                                             7
                                                                               No.    2020AP333.akz

action       should     not      be    taken       is     a     fundamental          due    process

requirement."           Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.                        "If the right to

notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is

clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can

still be prevented."             Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).

       ¶50    Though       the    Board          upheld       the     Chief's        decision      to

terminate        Andrade      over         his   perceived          inability        to    testify,

Andrade was not provided with that information as the basis for

discharge        until        post-termination.                  Through       this         failure,

Andrade's        constitutional            right   to     due       process,    as        guaranteed

under Loudermill, was violated.                         Through this failure, Andrade

was likewise denied the statutory procedural rights he was due

as required by Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), which required the Chief

to provide Andrade with the reasons for his discharge and to do

so    at   the    same     time       he    imposed       the    correlating          discipline.

Andrade       was       provided           alternative          reasons        for         discharge

throughout        the    pre-termination            process——for            violation        of    two

provisions of the Department's Code of Conduct——before he was
finally provided the actual reason necessitating his discharge——

his    perceived        inability           to   testify——in          the    post-termination

proceedings.

                 A.     Per Loudermill, Andrade Was Owed More Due
                               Process Than He Received.
       ¶51    The majority is correct that "due process guarantees

in this context are not rigid and formal; they are flexible."

Majority      op.,      ¶5.       However,         the    process       due     cannot        be   so
flexible as to have no solid parameters or shape at all.                                     At its

foundation, procedural due process requires that the accused be
                               8
                                                                            No.    2020AP333.akz

provided "notice and an opportunity to respond" to the charges

presented,         as   well    as       "an    explanation           of    the     employer's

evidence."         Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.

       ¶52     Relying on its prior determination in Eldridge,6 in

Loudermill, the United States Supreme Court held that procedural

due    process       entitles        a   tenured       public         employee      "to       [pre-

termination process] consisting of oral or written notice of the

charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence,

and    an     opportunity           to   present       his   side          of     the     story."

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.                   The pre-termination process itself

does not necessarily need to be formal, so long as it affords

the employee an opportunity to make any "plausible arguments"

that       might   prevent     the       discipline.         Id.       at   544.          A    pre-

termination hearing "should be an initial check against mistaken

decisions——essentially,              a    determination          of    whether      there       are

reasonable         grounds     to    believe        that   the    charges         against       the

employee are true and support the proposed action."                                Id. at 545-

46.
       ¶53     Loudermill       and      its   predecessor        Eldridge         combine       to

place very specific obligations on the government, "impos[ing]

constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals

       Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (finding
       6

that "identification of the specific dictates of due process
generally    requires     consideration    of   three    distinct
factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural    safeguards;    and    finally,  the    Government's
interest . . .").

                                                9
                                                                             No.    2020AP333.akz

of . . . 'property' interests."                       Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332.                 The

government       must       provide           an     employee        with    notice       and    an

opportunity to be heard regarding the specific charges that are

determined after an investigation has been completed, as well as

the specific evidence related to the charges.                                That notice and

opportunity to be heard on the specific charges and evidence

must be provided pre-termination.                           As to the Eldridge factors,

the     property        interest          affected           is      high:   Andrade           faced

termination         from    his     job       as     a    police     officer.        That       high

interest is juxtaposed against the minimal governmental interest

at stake.       That governmental interest is minimal given that all

the    Chief,    and       ultimately         the     Board,      had   to   do    was    provide

Andrade with the appropriate notice of the real reason for his

termination——his            perceived          inability           to    testify,        not    his

"failure       to     inspire       and        sustain         the      confidence       of     the

community."

       ¶54   Yet, Andrade was not provided these basic requirements

of due process pre-termination.                          The parties do not dispute the
fact    that     Andrade       had        a        legitimate      property        interest      in

retaining       his    job,    as    the           United    States      Supreme     Court      has

recognized the importance of protecting this property interest:

       [T]he   significance of   the  private   interest  in
       retaining employment cannot be gainsaid.      We have
       frequently recognized the severity of depriving a
       person of the means of livelihood.     While a fired
       worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will
       take some time and is likely to be burdened by the
       questionable circumstances under which he left his
       previous job.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (citations omitted).

                                                    10
                                                                       No.   2020AP333.akz

       ¶55    By    not    complying       with   the     "imposed    constraints"        on

their decision to deprive Andrade of his property interest, the

Chief,    and      ultimately      the     Board,   ran     the    risk     of   erroneous

deprivation of Andrade's property interest.                         And, this is what

occurred.          Due process guards against the accused having to

guess what the accuser is thinking by requiring the accuser to

provide the accused with specific notice.                      But here, Andrade was

forced to play a bait-and-switch guessing game due to the lack

of specificity provided him which due process requires.                                  The

lack    of    notice      thus    impacted        Andrade's       "opportunity      to   be

heard," Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267, and his corresponding ability

to mount a robust defense to the deprivation of his property

interest.

       ¶56    The majority mistakenly relies on the presence of a

witness list to show that Andrade was in fact on notice such

that Loudermill's requirements were satisfied.                            Majority op.,

¶22 n.12.       But this reliance is misplaced:                   Loudermill requires

pre-termination "notice and an opportunity to respond."                                  The
witness      list    in    question      was      filed    post-termination,         after

Andrade      had    already      been    deprived    of    his     property      interest.

While    a    witness      list    may     provide      some      helpful    context     in

preparing a legal defense, a witness list, by itself, does not

provide      enough       due    process    to     satisfy     the    requirements       of

Loudermill by identifying the perceived inability to testify as

the reason for Andrade's termination.

       ¶57    Notably, the notice required under Loudermill differs
from the notice required under a Chapter 164, Wis. Stats., PI-21

                                             11
                                                                                  No.    2020AP333.akz

notice.7               While     Loudermill          requires           employers       to    provide

employees with notice and the chance to respond to "charges"

leveled      after        an    investigation            but     before       termination,       PI-21

notice requires that the employee be "informed of the nature of

the    investigation             prior      to    any       interrogation."              Wis.    Stat.

§ 164.02(1)(a).                  The        purpose         of     the        PI-21     notice       and

investigatory hearing is to focus the officer on the areas of

questioning            and     the    "nature       of   the      investigation."             Andrade

participated in a PI-21 and was put on notice of two charges for

which       he    was     being       investigated.               The     investigatory         notice

specifically——and only——referenced Core Value 1.00 (Competence)

and     Guiding          Principle          1.05,      as      well      as    Core     Value     3.00

(Integrity) and Guiding Principle 3.01 as the basis for which

Andrade          was    being        investigated.             Andrade        testified       that   he

provided a written response to these specified charges.8                                      He also

had    the       opportunity          to    respond      verbally         in    the     accompanying

interview process.

       ¶58        But Andrade was not "informed of the nature of the
investigation" into his conduct.                            The PI-21 provided no reason

for Andrade to believe that his ability to testify was somehow

at issue or being questioned.                        That allegation appeared nowhere

on    the    form       itself.            Nor   was     it      raised       during    the   ensuing

       The PI-21 is intended to comply with the requirements of
       7

Wis.   Stat.   § 164.02(1)(a),  which   states   that  "the  law
enforcement officer under investigation shall be informed of the
nature of the investigation prior to any interrogation."

       As the majority likewise notes, while the parties
       8

reference this written response in the record, the response does
not appear to be a part of the official record.

                                                    12
                                                          No.   2020AP333.akz

interview process, when Andrade had the opportunity to respond.

While Andrade read the Department's social media policies aloud

during his PI-21, the policies themselves did not inform him

that he    was being terminated for his perceived inability to

testify.      In   fact,   testimony    from   the   interviewing   officer

confirms that Andrade's perceived inability to testify was not

something the Department's Internal Affairs Division considered

during its investigation into Andrade's conduct.9

     ¶59    Since Andrade was not placed on notice of the real

reason for his termination until post-termination, he was robbed

of the "full panoply of due process protections" he was owed

pre-termination.10     That included his ability to respond to the

charges leveled and provide evidence to challenge the charges

and discipline imposed.        While the district attorney alleged

that Andrade would have been unable to be used as a witness

going forward, Andrade did not have a reasonable opportunity to

challenge that assertion prior to being terminated.             Had he been

provided access to the "full panoply of due process protections"
from the beginning, Andrade may have had the opportunity to

present evidence in his defense to challenge his termination.

He could have defended himself differently, or more robustly,

     9 At the post-termination hearings, Andrade's interviewing
officer testified that Andrade's perceived inability to testify
was "not something that [the Internal Affairs Division]
specifically looked at, no. That was something that was brought
in as a consideration by the chief's office as to the
discipline" after the initial investigation concluded.
     10   Andrade, No. 2020AP333, ¶51 n.1 (Dugan, J., dissenting).

                                       13
                                                                       No.   2020AP333.akz

had he known with specificity that his property interest was at

stake.

       ¶60   For example, had Andrade actually been provided due

process, perhaps Andrade could have presented evidence as to

other officers charged with violating the same provisions of the

code    of   conduct    that    he    was,11      in    an     attempt    to   make   any

"plausible     arguments"       that        might       prevent     the      discipline.

Loudermill,    470     U.S.    at    544.        He    could    have   challenged     the

blanket assertion that he could not testify, providing proof of

other similarly Giglio-impaired officers12 who nonetheless were

       According to the testimony of the president of the
       11

Milwaukee Police Association ("MPA"), when the Chief and others
were determining the level of discipline to impose on Andrade,
there were three similarly situated officers who were charged
with violations of the same social media policy provision as
Andrade, Standard Operating Procedure 685.15(A)(5). One officer
"took a one-day suspension apparently after he trashed the
department [publicly] on Facebook." Another officer was charged
with posting content to a social media networking site "that was
destructive to the mission of the department," and received a
four-day suspension for his violation; this officer was offered
the opportunity to reduce his four-day suspension for violation
of the policy down to a two-day suspension if he wrote a letter
of apology to the individuals he targeted in his post. Finally,
a third officer had two charges, one for violating the same
social media policy provision as Andrade, and another for
violating Core Value 3.00 Guiding Principle 3.01, also for use
of Facebook. He was suspended one day for the first charge of
violating the social media policy, and had his second charge
(the Facebook post charge for making public comments and
threatening to injure a gunshot victim he was responsible for
guarding) dismissed by the Chief.

       "The United States Supreme Court first imposed a duty on
       12

the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants
in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)."   State v. Wayerski,
2019 WI 11, ¶71, 385 Wis. 2d 344, 922 N.W.2d 468 (Ziegler, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).

                                            14
                                                             No.   2020AP333.akz

able to testify in order "to present reasons . . . why [the]

proposed action should not be taken . . . ."                Loudermill, 470

U.S. at 546.13      He could have provided evidence of the fact that

the basis for his termination appeared nonsensical, given that

the same district attorney's office was using him to chair a

homicide    trial   up   until   the   date   of   his   discharge.14      Such

challenges would have been appropriate, given that "[p]rocedural

due process requires that government action 'be implemented in a

          In the wake of Brady, courts responded to the
     need to refine its application and scope. In Giglio
     v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972), the
     Supreme Court held that in addition to exculpatory
     evidence, the prosecution is required to disclose
     favorable, material evidence that could be used to
     impeach prosecution witnesses.

Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶74 (Ziegler, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
     13   The MPA president testified:

     There is no testimony or evidence in the record that
     Officer Andrade can't testify in municipal court and
     that he can't testify in federal court. Both of those
     things would be in Milwaukee County and in previous
     cases where an officer has been determined not to be
     able to testify in those places, that's been in the
     Internal Affairs file. . . . Again, no evidence that
     he can't testify, period, but there is no evidence
     that he won't be allowed to testify in municipal court
     or in federal court.
     14Andrade's   counsel   represented  repeatedly  throughout
briefing and at oral argument that at the same time the district
attorney's office was pushing for Andrade's termination over a
perceived inability to testify, the district attorney's office
was using Andrade as a witness chairing a homicide trial. This
assertion is repeated and alluded to in the post-termination
appeal hearing record, though documentation supporting this
representation does not appear in the record.

                                       15
                                                                  No.    2020AP333.akz

fair manner.'"         Hager, 381 Wis. 2d 74, ¶40; see also Laxton, 254

Wis. 2d 185, ¶10 n.8.

       ¶61    The     Milwaukee    Police       Association   ("MPA")      maintains

records      and     "comparables"    on    the    individuals    who     are    under

investigation, as well as the outcomes of those investigations.

In   the     post-termination      appeal       hearings,   the   MPA's    president

relied on those records to testify that from his experience in

handling       and     tracking     officer       discipline,     the     level     of

discipline Andrade received compared to other officers charged

with    the    same     social    media    policy     provision    violation       was

"egregious":

       In all cases, when we compare what one officer did to
       another officer and ultimately, what the discipline
       that was doled out was, it is a difficult process
       because they are all different, but if you take a look
       at, say, this person posted something on Facebook or
       social networking and, then, you compare what the
       discipline ended up being, we have already discussed
       the results, that this is egregious as far as
       discipline.
In his testimony, the MPA president based his opinion on the

fact that other officers charged with the same violation tended

to     receive      suspensions      or    written    reprimands        rather    than

termination:

       [Andrade's Counsel] Do you recall the average length of
                           discipline  for   individuals   that
                           were   not   discharged?   (Emphasis
                           added.)

       . . .

       [MPA]                      I think it was, like, 30 days or
                                  less,   maybe even  ten days  or
                                  less. . . .

                                           16
                                                         No.    2020AP333.akz

    [Andrade's Counsel] Do   you   recall   three  of   the
                        disciplines were reprimands and two
                        were dismissed outright?

     [MPA]                 I am looking      at   them   now,     yes.
                           Absolutely.

     [Andrade's Counsel] The highest discipline was ten days
                         besides the 30-day one?

     [MPA]                 That is correct.
     ¶62    There were officers who were initially discharged for

violation of code of conduct provisions.           And those officers,

unlike Andrade, committed crimes yet were still not disciplined
to the level Andrade was.15

     ¶63    The MPA's president also testified as to the district

attorney's assertion that Andrade could not serve as a witness

going     forward,   calling   the    district    attorney's      assertion

"unprecedented":

     [MPA]           I think we have established and I think
                     Officer Andrade probably -– I won't speak
                     for him -– wishes that those posts
                     weren't put out there, but certainly,
                     these posts don't rise to the subjective
                     level of the district attorney's office

     15Of the officers who were discharged, one was originally
discharged but had the discharge reduced to a 35-day suspension,
even though "his situation garnered significant media attention"
as Andrade's did.     A second officer, who was charged with
violating Core Value 3.00 Guiding Principle 3.01 by "[b]ehaving
in such a way that a reasonable person would expect that
discredit could be brought upon the Department," received only a
district-level written reprimand, although her emails also
contained material that likewise contained what both counsel and
the MPA president described as "overtly racist" content.
Another officer was charged with "intentionally or with reckless
disregard for the truth mak[ing] an untrue statement" for lying
to federal agents and Internal Affairs, yet was promoted to
detective and was allowed to continue testifying.

                                     17
                                                         No.       2020AP333.akz

                    to say that they are impeachable toward
                    credibility.

    [MPD Counsel] So    you   disagree         with     the          DA's
                  determination.

    [MPA]           I    absolutely      do,     yes.         It       is
                    unprecedented.

    [MPD Counsel] So your testimony is that the DA's office
                  has never deemed anyone unable to serve
                  as a witness in criminal cases -– an
                  officer.

    [MPA]           No. That is interesting.           That is
                    perception. The way you look at one post
                    and the way I look at a post are two
                    different things and certainly, when I
                    was    specifically   talking    about   an
                    individual who posts something on a
                    social    network   to,    then,    be   so
                    compromised    that  he   can   no   longer
                    testify, I have never heard of that.
    ¶64    The record bears that out as well.           Counsel asserted

throughout briefing and oral argument before this court that

nearly 120 officers were included on the Giglio-impaired list,

yet Andrade was the one "being singled out."          The other officers

were still able to remain on the force and testify, challenging

the notion that Andrade was somehow uniquely situated and his

termination was the only logical result to his charges.

    ¶65    Given that the most stringent discipline imposed for

similar code of conduct violations were suspensions, it seems

highly suspect to demand that Andrade be on notice of something

he was never charged with, and be on notice of a discipline that

no other officers facing the same violation received.                 It is a

disservice to due process to demand that Andrade defend himself
against   an   accusation   provided   after   the    fact,    and      defend

                                  18
                                                                        No.   2020AP333.akz

himself against a discipline which by all accounts was above and

beyond what others in his situation endured.16

       ¶66       It is not reading Loudermill "too woodenly" as the

majority asserts, majority op., ¶33 n.21, to recognize that due

process      demands       Andrade    be   on      notice    and     provided    with   the

actual reason for his termination prior to depriving him of his

property interest in continued employment.                         Nor is it demanding

more    than       due     process    requires        to    expect    that    Andrade    be

provided the evidence substantiating the actual reason for his

termination,         so    as   to   enable     him    to   defend     himself    and   his

interests.          Andrade's perceived inability to testify was not

merely a consequence of Andrade's misconduct, as the majority

states.          Majority op., ¶¶32, 38.              Andrade's perceived inability

to testify was the "sole" reason for his termination.                            The Chief

testified as much during Andrade's post-termination hearing in

front       of    the     Board.      Accordingly,          this   "sole"     reason    for

        This apparent disparity is found by a full review of the
       16

testimony in the record. Particularly given the opening
paragraph of this dissent, it is disingenuous to insinuate that
the dissent is "suggesting the punishment Andrade received was
inappropriate and egregious" or that it is second guessing the
discipline imposed upheld. Majority op., ¶22 n.13. Rather, the
dissent respects the constitutional and statutory process that
is due. The dissent shines light on the hole at the foundation
of the majority's argument——that Andrade was provided, in any
measure, the notice he was due.     As I stated at the outset,
Andrade may have ultimately received the same discipline due to
his conduct. Again, I do not condone his behavior. But Andrade
was owed the "essential requirements of due process" prior to
the   imposed   discipline  and  deprivation  of   his  property
interests.    The record amply supports that Andrade was denied
these "essential" due process protections.

                                              19
                                                                            No.    2020AP333.akz

termination cannot be both a consequence of the decision to

terminate and a part of the decision to terminate.

      ¶67    Due process is "flexible" per Eldridge but it is not

flexible on "[t]he essential requirements" of "notice and an

opportunity to respond" and "the opportunity to present reasons,

either in person or in writing, why [the] proposed action should

not be taken . . . ."               Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.                  And, if the

due process right "to notice and a hearing is to serve its full

purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time

when the deprivation can still be prevented," so it must be

provided     pre-deprivation               of     Andrade's          property        interest.

Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81.

      ¶68        Andrade was provided notice and the opportunity to

respond     to    the     charges       of      two    specific      violations        of    two

provisions       of     the    Department's           Code   of   Conduct.          Had     those

specified charges been the reason that Andrade was terminated,

due   process         could     have      been     satisfied.          But        Andrade    was

terminated        for    a     third,      unspecified         and    unnoticed        reason.
Andrade's        fundamental        due      process       rights    were     impermissibly

violated.

            B.        Per Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), Andrade Was Owed
                          More Due Process Than He Received.
      ¶69    Andrade          was   also     owed      a     heightened      level     of    due

process per Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13), which required the Chief to

provide a complaint "setting forth the reason[]" for Andrade's

termination.            The statute seems to require even broader due
process protections than are due under the "flexible" Eldridge

standard Loudermill relies on.                    But, given that the Chief failed
                                                 20
                                                                    No.    2020AP333.akz

to comply with the statute's directive to supply the reason for

Andrade's    termination,       Andrade's       due    process           rights     were

violated.

      ¶70   "[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language

of the statute."         State ex. rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane

Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                             "If

the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the

inquiry."     Id.        "Statutory   language         is    given        its   common,

ordinary,    and    accepted    meaning,        except       that     technical      or

specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or

special definitional meaning."            Id.     Finally, "[i]n construing

or   interpreting    a   statute    the   court       is     not    at     liberty   to

disregard the plain, clear words of the statute."                    Id., ¶46.

      ¶71   Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(13) provides the disciplinary

process     for     handling       police       officer            suspensions       or

terminations.17     Section 62.50(13) mandates that where discharge

       Section
      17            62.50(13)      provides,      in        pertinent       part,    as
follows:

           NOTICE OF DISCHARGE OR SUSPENSION; APPEALS. The chief
      discharging or suspending for a period exceeding 5
      days any member of the force shall give written notice
      of the discharge or suspension to the member and, at
      the same time the notice is given, shall also give the
      member any exculpatory evidence in the chief's
      possession related to the discharge or suspension.
      The chief shall also immediately report the notice of
      the discharge or suspension to the secretary of the
      board of fire and police commissioners together with a
      complaint setting forth the reasons for the discharge
      or suspension and the name of the complainant if other
      than the chief.       Within 10 days after the date of
      service of the notice or a discharge or suspension
      order the members so discharged or suspended may
      appeal from the order of discharge or suspension or
                                   21
                                                                    No.    2020AP333.akz

or suspensions are concerned, the chief must provide the officer

facing       discipline     with       notice     of     the       discipline       and

simultaneously provide a complaint "setting forth the reasons

for the discharge or suspension."               Id.

       ¶72    The     statute's    process    requirements         align     with   the

"essential requirements of due process" from Loudermill, namely,

providing       the    accused    with   "notice       and    an   opportunity       to

respond" to the specific charges filed.                 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at

546.      By requiring the Chief to provide written notice of the

"reasons for the discharge" to the offending officer and the

Board, this statutory process provides the accused with "[t]he

opportunity      to    present    reasons . . . why          the   proposed     action

should not be taken."            Id.   Compliance with the statute ensures

that the officer facing discipline is provided both with notice

as   to   the    specific    charges     levied,       and   the    opportunity      to

respond and defend against those noticed charges.                         The Board's

limited role then is to work within the parameters of those

specified charges in determining whether the accused violated
the rules or orders noticed in the charges filed.                            See Wis.

       discipline   to   the   board  of   fire   and  police
       commissioners, by filing with the board a notice of
       appeal in the following or similar form . . . .

(Emphasis added.)

                                         22
                                                         No.   2020AP333.akz

Stat. § 62.50(17)(b)5.      This procedural due process structure is

reiterated throughout the applicable statutory section.18

       ¶73    But the Chief put Andrade on notice of two "charges"

pre-termination that he recognized post-termination as differing

from    the    actual   reason   for    Andrade's   termination.       Pre-

termination, Andrade was charged with "failure to inspire the

confidence of the community" and terminated on the basis of that

noticed charge.     But post-termination, the Chief identified that

Andrade's perceived inability to testify was actually the sole

"charge" necessitating his termination.             The statute requires

the Chief to have provided Andrade with notice on that "reason

for the discharge" in the complaint he filed with the Board.

But the Chief neglected to do so.           That failure to comply with

the statutory requirements interfered with Andrade's "essential"

due process rights to be on notice of the actual charge for

which he faced termination.

       See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.50(16) ("The accused shall
       18

have full opportunity to be heard in defense and shall be
entitled to secure the attendance of all witnesses necessary for
the defense . . . ."); § 62.50(17)(a) ("Within 3 days after
hearing the matter the board . . . shall . . . determine whether
by a preponderance of the evidence the charges are sustained.
If the board or panel determines that the charges are sustained,
the board shall at once determine whether the good of the
service requires that the accused be permanently discharged or
be suspended without pay for a period not exceeding 60 days or
reduced in rank.    If the charges are not sustained the accused
shall be immediately reinstated in his or her former position,
without prejudice."); § 62.50(17)(b) ("No police officer may
be . . . discharged    by   the   board . . . based   on   charges
filed by . . . the    chief . . . unless  the   board   determines
whether there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, to
sustain the charges.").

                                       23
                                                                        No.    2020AP333.akz

      ¶74    The     majority         incorrectly         reads     the       statute      to

"require[]        nothing    more"     than       that    the   complaint        list     the

policies which Andrade violated and reference the social media

postings forming the basis of the violations.                       Majority op., ¶7.

But what the statute actually requires is clear:                          that the chief

immediately report the notice of the discharge or suspension to

the secretary of the Board, "together with a complaint setting

forth the reasons for the discharge or suspension."                            Wis. Stat.

§ 62.50(13) (emphasis added).                 While the Chief and the Board

determined        that      Andrade     violated          two   provisions        of      the

Department's Code of Conduct, the record posits that the Chief

would    have      disciplined        Andrade      for     those    infractions,          but

instead terminated him because of the district attorney's office

determination that they would not be able to use Andrade as a

witness going forward.              The Chief testified repeatedly to this

effect in the post-termination appeal hearings.                               This actual

reason      for    Andrade's        termination          appears       nowhere     in     the

complaint, though it is statutorily required.
      ¶75    The     Chief     failed        to    comply       with     the     "reasons"

requirement of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) when he put Andrade on

notice of termination for reasons other than the actual reason

for Andrade's termination.              The Chief also failed to comply with

the statute's "timing" requirement.                      Andrade received notice of

the     actual     reason     for      his    termination          during      the      post-

termination appeal hearings.              These hearings took place some two

months after the Chief issued his personnel order and complaint
outlining his imposed discipline, namely, Andrade's termination

                                             24
                                                                       No.   2020AP333.akz

for "failure to inspire confidence in our community."                              But the

statute    demands       the    terminated        officer   be     provided       something

more:    the    reasons        for    termination      at    the    time     of    imposed

discipline.

    ¶76        Since the Chief failed to include the inability to

testify——what he admitted was the "sole" reason that Andrade was

discharged——in       the        complaint         accompanying       the      notice      of

discharge, the Chief failed to comply with the plain directive

of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13).                  Andrade's due process rights were

violated.

                                             III

    ¶77        Andrade    did        not   receive    due    process       when    he   was

terminated from the Department for his perceived inability to

testify.       Andrade was deprived of his property interest without

having ever been placed on notice of the actual charge, nor

provided the opportunity to respond.                        This deficient process

fails to satisfy either the "flexible" Eldridge standard relied

on in Loudermill or the more demanding standard required by Wis.
Stat. § 62.50(13).             It is not necessary to consider the content

of the offensive Facebook postings.                     They are distasteful and

unbecoming of police officers.19                     But due process, even when

flexible,       demands    certain         "essential       requirements"         be    met,

    19 Though the contexts between this case and Miller v.
Carroll differ, the warning I provided should be heeded by all
public officials.    The risks of public officers using social
media vastly outweigh the benefits. See Miller v. Carroll, 2020
WI 56, ¶67, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542 (Ziegler, J.,
concurring) (cautioning the Wisconsin bench about the hazards of
using social media such as Facebook in order to avoid due
process violations of parties' rights).

                                             25
                                                                     No.       2020AP333.akz

namely, that the accused be provided "notice and an opportunity

to respond."           Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.                These "essential

requirements"      of     due   process       were    not    provided      here.        Due

process under the statute required the Chief to provide Andrade

with    a    complaint    "setting         forth    the   reasons"       for     Andrade's

termination at the time that discipline was imposed.                            The Chief

testified that the sole reason for Andrade's termination was his

perceived       inability       to    testify.            Yet,    that     reason       for

termination was not provided to Andrade until post-termination.

       ¶78     Ultimately, due to his behavior, Officer Andrade may

still have received the same discipline.                     In pointing out that

Andrade was not provided the process he was due, this dissent

does not condone his behavior.                     Rather, this dissent respects

the constitutional and statutory process Andrade was due, and

acknowledges that due process requires Andrade receive notice of

the    facts    that    support      the    discipline      and   what     he    is   being

disciplined for.         He was not provided that.

       ¶79     For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
       ¶80     I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL

BRADLEY joins this dissent.

                                             26
    No.   2020AP333.akz

1