Court Opinion

ID: 9906048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:03:29.640767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.905392
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 In re E.M. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

                                                            B318653
 In re E.M. et al., Persons Coming
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                              (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. DK21526A–B)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 A.T.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephanie Davis, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
      Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       A.T. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order selecting
a permanent plan of legal guardianship for children E.M. and
A.M. Mother’s sole contention is that the order, issued pursuant
to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26,1 must be
reversed because the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to give notice of the
hearing to the Fernandeño Tataviam Band of Mission Indians
(the tribe or Tataviam tribe). The Tataviam tribe is not a
federally recognized tribe. Although mother concedes the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply in this case, she asserts
notice was required under section 306.6, which permits the
juvenile court to allow a non-federally recognized tribe limited
participation in dependency proceedings. We conclude mother
forfeited her argument by not raising it below, and, even if not
forfeited, we would conclude her claim fails on the merits.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In light of the limited issue mother raises on appeal, we
provide only a brief summary of the background of this case.
       E.M. came to the attention of DCFS in May 2016, after it
received a report that mother and father had engaged in domestic

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.

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violence in front of E.M., who was then five years old. DCFS
opened an investigation. In June 2016, mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana. Father tested
positive for marijuana. The parents agreed to participate in
voluntary family preservation services. In February 2017,
mother again tested positive for methamphetamine. She also
failed to comply with the plan for voluntary services.
       In March 2017, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf
of E.M., based on the parents’ domestic violence and substance
abuse. The court removed E.M. from mother, but he remained in
father’s care. In May 2017, the court sustained the petition and
declared E.M. a dependent of the court. The court allowed E.M.
to remain in father’s custody and ordered services for both
parents. The same month, mother and father had a second child,
A.M.
       Both parents were incarcerated in July 2017 due to father’s
hit-and-run accident that caused the death of a child. Although
mother was not involved in the accident, she told DCFS that she
was arrested for “hiding” father.
       In August 2017, DCFS filed a section 342 petition on behalf
of E.M. and a section 300 petition on behalf of A.M. The
section 342 petition alleged there was no one to care for E.M.
because both parents were incarcerated. The section 300 petition
alleged A.M. was at risk of harm due to the parents’ prior
domestic violence and substance abuse. The juvenile court
detained both children.
       In October 2017, DCFS reported father had been sentenced
to 25 years in prison and mother to three years of probation. The
adjudication and disposition hearings were continued multiple
times. In November 2018, the juvenile court sustained portions

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of the pending section 300 and 342 petitions, declared A.M. a
dependent of the court, ordered E.M. to remain a dependent of
the court, and removed both children from the parents’ custody.
DCFS eventually placed the children with paternal great aunt,
D.M. The juvenile court denied father reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). In July 2019, the
juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services and set
a section 366.26 hearing.
       In November 2019, DCFS filed a section 366.26 report
recommending that the court appoint D.M. as the children’s legal
guardian and terminate jurisdiction. After several continuances,
the court eventually held a section 366.26 hearing for both
children on February 14, 2022.2 Father did not appear, but
indicated through counsel that he agreed with the plan of legal
guardianship with D.M. Mother objected to legal guardianship
and to monitored visitation. The court found that although the
children were adoptable, an exception to adoption applied
because the children were living with a relative who was
unwilling or unable to adopt them but was willing to provide
them a home through guardianship. D.M. was selected as the
legal guardian.

2      The juvenile court took the section 366.26 hearings off
calendar after father’s successful appeal of the jurisdiction and
disposition orders as to A.M., and after mother filed a section 388
petition to change court orders. In father’s appeal, we reversed
the juvenile court’s order asserting dependency jurisdiction over
A.M., due to the court’s failure to appoint counsel for father
despite his numerous requests. (In re Andrew M. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 859.) The juvenile court reset the section 366.26
hearings after conducting new jurisdiction and disposition
hearings in A.M.’s case.

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ICWA and Section 306.6 Background
      At the detention hearing in March 2017, father filed an
ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status form indicating
he had no Indian ancestry as far as he knew. The court found
ICWA did not apply as to father. Mother also filed an ICWA-020
Parental Notification of Indian Status form, which indicated she
was or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, the
Tataviam tribe. Mother’s counsel told the court he had spoken
with the secretary of the tribe, which was in the process of
seeking federal recognition, but was not yet a federally
recognized tribe. The court ordered DCFS to notice “appropriate
federal and tribal agencies of this matter to determine whether or
not this case falls under ICWA.” DCFS sent notice pursuant to
ICWA to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the
Interior, and the tribe.
      In April 2017, DCFS interviewed maternal grandmother,
who reported she was registered with the tribe. Maternal
grandmother told DCFS she had registered E.M. and was waiting
to receive his registration number. She also reported mother was
not enrolled in the tribe and had not obtained her registration
number as an adult. Mother confirmed she was not registered or
enrolled.
      Attached to A.M.’s section 300 petition was an ICWA-010
Indian Child Inquiry form. The form stated that on July 28,
2017, maternal aunt told DCFS she “will enroll” A.M. in the tribe.
The detention report states that on that same date, maternal
aunt said “she has registered [A.M.] into the Tataviam tribe.”
      In September 2017, DCFS filed a jurisdiction and
disposition report indicating the Tataviam tribe is not federally
recognized. The same month, DCFS provided an ICWA-030 form

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notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Secretary of the Interior,
and Tataviam tribe of the October 2017 jurisdiction and
disposition hearings.
       In October 2017, DCFS reported it had received a letter
from the Tataviam tribe. The letter stated the tribe “is not a
federally recognized [t]ribe,” but is “state recognized,” and the
children “are descendants of a member [of] the [t]ribe” and “an
individual who is on [the] California Judgment Roll.” The letter
indicated that while the “minors are not presently enrolled
members of the tribe,” they could be enrolled with the submission
of applications, copies of the minors’ birth certificates, and a copy
of mother’s birth certificate.
       At the June 22, 2018 adjudication hearing, a representative
from the Tataviam tribe, Pamela Villaseñor, appeared. Due to
the illness of minor’s counsel, the court continued the hearing to
August 1, 2018.
       The tribe did not appear at the August 1, 2018, hearing.
However, the court continued the proceedings to September 18,
2018, due to court congestion. The court indicated the tribe had
asked to participate in the adjudication hearing, so it ordered
DCFS to notify the tribe of the new hearing date.3
       On September 18, 2018, the court again continued the
adjudication hearing due to court congestion. The court signed
an attorney order requiring DCFS “to notice and provide reports
to Pamela Villasenor of the Tataviam Tribe,” and to “make best
efforts to provide minors’ long form birth certificates to Tataviam

3     It is unclear when or how the tribe made this request. The
record does not include any document from the tribe requesting
notice or an oral request in any of the transcribed proceedings.

                                 6
tribe.” The court continued the adjudication hearing to
November 20, 2018.
       On November 20, 2018, DCFS filed a last minute
information report indicating that on November 19, DCFS had e-
mailed E.M.’s birth certificate and a copy of the detention reports
to Villaseñor, and notified her of the hearing scheduled for the
next day. Villaseñor did not appear at the November 20 hearing.
At the hearing, the court concluded ICWA did not apply, but
found the children may be eligible for membership in the
Tataviam tribe.
       In November 2019, Villaseñor appeared in court for the
section 366.26 hearing. She stated her name for the record but
did not ask to be heard or make any further statements. The
court continued the hearing to January 24, 2020, and announced
that at that time “we should be able to proceed with the legal
guardianship.” A tribal representative did not appear at the
January 24, 2020, hearing, at which time the court again
continued the section 366.26 hearing.
       Two years later, in February 2022, the court proceeded
with the section 366.26 hearing and ordered legal guardianship
as the permanent plan. The tribe was not present. The court
again found that ICWA did not apply.
       Mother timely appealed from the court’s February 2022
order.
                           DISCUSSION
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred in ordering a
permanent plan of legal guardianship without first providing
notice to the tribe under section 306.6. DCFS asserts that
mother forfeited this argument by not raising it below. DCFS
also argues section 306.6 does not apply and did not require

                                 7
further notice, and any error was harmless.4 We find no error
and affirm the order.
I.    Section 306.6
      “Section 306.6 was enacted as a part of a comprehensive
reorganization of statutes relating to application of the [ICWA].
[Citation.] The requirements of the ICWA apply only to federally
recognized tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(8).) Section 306.6 permits
the court in a dependency action to allow a tribe which is not
federally recognized to appear in the proceeding and present
information to the court.” (In re A.C. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 282,
286 (A.C.).) Under the statute, a tribe “may” participate in a
juvenile dependency proceeding “upon request of the tribe.”
(§ 306.6, subd. (a).) The tribe may “upon consent of the court: [¶]
(1) Be present at the hearing. [¶] (2) Address the court. [¶]
(3) Request and receive notice of hearings. [¶] (4) Request to
examine court documents relating to the proceeding. [¶]
(5) Present information to the court that is relevant to the
proceeding. [¶] (6) Submit written reports and recommendations
to the court. [¶] (7) Perform other duties and responsibilities as
requested or approved by the court.” (§ 306.6, subd. (b)(1)–(7).)
      Tribal participation under section 306.6 is thus
discretionary. Section 306.6, subdivision (d) explains that the
provision “is intended to assist the court in making decisions that
are in the best interest of the child by permitting a tribe in the
circumstances set out in subdivision (a) to inform the court and
parties to the proceeding about placement options for the child

4     DCFS additionally contends that mother lacks standing to
challenge errors in notice to the tribe and the tribe forfeited any
opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Because we affirm
on other grounds, we do not reach these arguments.

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within the child’s extended family or the tribal community,
services and programs available to the child and the child’s
parents as Indians, and other unique interests the child or the
child’s parents may have as Indians.”
       “By its terms, the statute does not require that any notice
be sent to a nonrecognized tribe. (§ 306.6.) Further, the statute
specifically does not apply either notice provisions found in the
ICWA or provisions in state law implementing notice provisions
of the ICWA to this situation. (§ 306.6, subd. (d).)” (A.C., supra,
155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 286–287.)
II.    Mother Forfeited Her Claim of Error
       Mother did not raise any claim of error regarding notice to
the tribe in the juvenile court. At the February 2022 section
366.26 hearing that is the subject of this appeal, she only objected
to the plan of guardianship and to monitored visitation.
       While a parent may generally raise a claim of insufficient
notice to a tribe under ICWA for the first time on appeal (In re
Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 13–14 (Isaiah W.)), mother concedes
ICWA is inapplicable here. However, using ICWA cases as an
analogy, she claims that a parent’s failure to object to defects in
notice under section 306.6 does not forfeit the argument. We
disagree.
       In ICWA cases, “the primary parties protected . . . are the
Native American tribes . . . . Thus, the law allows a parent to
raise failure to comply with ICWA on appeal, even if the issue
was not raised in the trial court, because ‘[t]he parent is in effect
acting as a surrogate for the tribe in raising compliance issues on
appeal.’ [Citation.]” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 204.)
However, even in an ICWA case, “[o]nce the child’s tribe has
appeared and has not asked, on its own behalf, that any prior

                                 9
actions be invalidated, this rationale does not apply. The parent
has an independent right to invalidate prior actions, but there is
every reason to hold that this can be waived.” (In re S.B. (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1159 (S.B.).)
       Even if mother may challenge the lack of notice to a non-
federally recognized tribe on appeal—an issue we do not decide—
we see no reason to disregard the standard rules of appellate
forfeiture in this case. As in S.B., the tribe appeared in the
proceedings and has not asked at any point that any prior actions
be invalidated. This is not a case in which the tribe failed to
receive any notice of the proceedings and was therefore wholly
unaware of them. (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 13–14
[tribe’s right to intervene or assert jurisdiction over child is
“ ‘meaningless if the tribe has no notice that the action is
pending’ ”], italics added.)
       “ ‘As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on
appeal any point not raised in the trial court. Any other rule
would permit a party to play fast and loose with the
administration of justice by deliberately standing by without
making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.]’
[Citation.]” (S.B., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1158–1159.)
Further, “[i]n dependency proceedings, as elsewhere, a litigant
forfeits an appellate argument by failing to raise it before the
trial court.” (In re D.P. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1282, 1292.)
Mother has forfeited her claim.
III. Mother Has Not Established Section 306.6 Applies
       Even if mother did not forfeit her argument, we would
conclude that her claim lacks merit. The parties agree the
Tataviam tribe is not a federally recognized tribe and therefore
notice to the tribe was not mandated by federal law or state law

                               10
applicable in ICWA cases. (In re K.P. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1,
6.) Mother instead asserts that notice was required under section
306.6. Because mother has not met her burden of establishing
the predicate factual basis for section 306.6 to apply, we reject
her claim.
       As noted above, section 306.6 applies in “a dependency
proceeding involving a child who would otherwise be an Indian
child, based on the definition contained in [ICWA], but is not an
Indian child based on status of the child’s tribe . . . .” (§ 306.6,
subd. (a).) ICWA defines “ ‘Indian child’ ” as “any unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of
an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
       There is no evidence that either E.M. or A.M. is a member
of the tribe. Maternal grandmother said she had “registered”
E.M. in April 2017, and maternal aunt said she had or would
enroll A.M. in July 2017. However, as of October 2017, the tribe
indicated neither child was an enrolled member. While the tribe
stated that both children were eligible for enrollment, there is no
evidence they subsequently became enrolled members. Similarly,
there is no evidence the children are the biological children of “a
member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) Maternal
grandmother informed DCFS that mother was not enrolled with
the tribe and mother confirmed she was not registered or
enrolled.5

5      We further note that the tribe’s letter to DCFS did not
indicate that either the children or mother are members of the
tribe, despite their lack of enrollment or registration. Instead,

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       Accordingly, mother has not established the children meet
the definition of Indian child in Title 25 United States Code
section 1903(4), such that section 306.6 applies. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“trial court judgment is
ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error”].)
IV. Mother Has Not Shown Prejudicial Error
       Finally, even assuming section 306.6 was otherwise
applicable, we would find mother has failed to establish any
prejudicial error.
       Section 306.6 did not mandate notice to the Tataviam tribe
of the section 366.26 hearing. (A.C., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
p. 287.) At most, the tribe was permitted to request and receive
notice of hearings, with the court’s consent. Yet, there is no
evidence that the tribe requested any further participation or
notice of hearings, other than what it received.
       The only indication in the record that the tribe made any
request of the court is the court’s statement at the continued
adjudication hearing on August 1, 2018, that the tribe wanted to
participate in the adjudication hearing. The court ordered DCFS
to notify the tribe of the continued adjudication hearing,
scheduled for November 20, 2018, and DCFS provided notice.
When the tribe later appeared before the court on November 26,
2019, it did not request notice of any future hearings, or to
otherwise participate in the proceedings.

the letter indicated the children are “descendants of a member in
the [t]ribe,” and that to enroll the children, the tribe would “need
to see linkage of their maternal grandmother [L.G.].”

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       Mother cites no legal authority to support her claim that
DCFS or the court was required to do more than it did to notice
the tribe under section 306.6. Indeed, section 306.6,
subdivision (d) explicitly states, “This section shall not be
construed to make [ICWA], or any state law implementing
[ICWA], applicable to the proceedings . . . .” Therefore, as the
court in A.C. recognized, “It is apparent that in enacting section
306.6, the Legislature had in mind the notice and substantive
provisions of the ICWA but specifically chose not to require any
notice beyond that already required by the ICWA, i.e., notice to
federally recognized Indian tribes. It is not our province to insert
language into a statute the Legislature chose to omit. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1858.)” (A.C., supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 287.)
Section 306.6 does not require DCFS or the court to provide
notice to a tribe where, as here, there is no evidence the tribe
requested notice.
       Moreover, mother has not established she (or the tribe)
suffered prejudice by any error such that reversal would be
warranted. (S.B., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1162 [harmless
error standard applies to review of claims of failure to comply
with a state standard above what ICWA requires].) The tribe
sent a letter to DCFS and appeared twice before the court.
However, the tribe did not provide any information to the court
other than how the children could be enrolled. When the tribe
appeared in court for the section 366.26 hearing in November
2019, the court announced that it would likely choose
guardianship as the permanent plan. The tribe did not object or
provide any relevant information to persuade the court
otherwise. Over two years later, the court ordered a permanent
plan of guardianship.

                                 13
      There is no evidence that, at any time, the tribe had
information to provide to the court about placement options or
programs available to mother or the children. Further, there is
no indication that, had the tribe appeared at the section 366.26
hearing, it would have provided any new or pertinent information
to assist the court, or that it would have advocated for a
permanent plan other than legal guardianship with the children’s
relative. Mother has not established that the lack of specific
notice to the tribe of the February 2022 section 366.26 hearing
was prejudicial.

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                       DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court order is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                              ADAMS, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             EGERTON, J.

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