Court Opinion

ID: 9706504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:45:07.599534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.318982
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court: We allowed defendant’s petition for rehearing that requested that we reconsider our holding as to defendant’s second contention on appeal in light of our supreme court’s recent decision in People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53 (2003). Defendant argues that Johnson mandates reversing his conviction and remanding the cause for a new trial because the acceptance of such “blatant misconduct” as occurred in this case is exactly what the supreme court warned against in Johnson. The State argues that the Johnson decision should not alter our holding that the improper comments by the prosecutor in this case were harmless. After carefully considering the holding in Johnson, as well as the parties’ arguments regarding that decision, our resolution of this case has not changed. Johnson involved three consolidated appeals where the State sought review of the appellate court decisions reversing DeAngelo Johnson’s, Clyde Cowley’s, and Jimmie Parker’s convictions and remanding the causes for new trials. Cowley and Parker were codefendants of Murray Blue, the defendant in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99 (2000). These three defendants were charged with, among other crimes, the first degree murder of Chicago police officer Daniel Doffyn. Cowley’s trial was severed from Blue’s and these two cases were tried simultaneously, but with separate juries. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 60-61. Parker’s trial took place several months later. Johnson’s trial involved charges resulting from a separate incident. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 61. At the beginning of the Johnson decision, the court wrote: “These consolidated cases come before us in the wake of our decision in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138-39 (2000), wherein a unanimous court held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and trial error had deprived the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial and thus warranted reversal notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. In Blue, this court recognized that a pervasive pattern of error, engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct, had divested defendant of his right to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial, a substantial right that inures to a criminal defendant ‘ “whether guilty or innocent.” ’ Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138, quoting People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). In Blue, where the trial was permeated by the presentation of emotionally charged evidence, and the prosecutors ‘encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts’ (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), the members of this court, acting ‘as guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system’ (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139), reversed and remanded for a new trial. Disposition of the instant cases requires that we further delineate the dimensions of Blue, applying the principles and standards of review utilized in that case.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 60. Because the court in Johnson relied on its decision in Blue, a detailed discussion of the holding in Blue is warranted. In Blue our supreme court held that cumulative errors deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial (Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 104) and reversed his convictions of, among other crimes, the first degree murder of Officer Doffyn. The court identified four errors that occurred during the evidentiary portion of the trial. The first error was the admission of Officer Doffyn’s bloodied and brain-splattered uniform. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 126. The court concluded that the potential prejudice of the evidence outweighed its probative value and that its admission was aimed directly at the sympathies, or outrage, of the jury. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 126. The second error was the admission of the testimony of Officer Doffyn’s father, which was not probative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence but, rather, highlighted the poignancy of the Doffyn family’s loss and suggested that the family’s pain could be alleviated by a guilty verdict. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 131. The third error was the admission of the irrelevant and emotionally charged testimony of Commander Joseph Delopez regarding the “star ceremony” where Officer Doffyn took his oath of office and the commander’s explanation that Officer Doffyn’s star is now displayed in the “honored star case” at Chicago police department headquarters. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 133. The fourth error was the prosecutors’ hostile treatment of a witness, repeatedly interjecting their own testimony “through thinly veiled ‘objections,’ ” and their violation of the advocate-witness rule. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 135-36. The Blue court also identified as errors two improper themes in the prosecutor’s closing arguments. The first was the argument that the jury’s verdict should be a vehicle to vindicate the Doffyn family. The court said that the argument that Officer Doffyn’s father, mother, and child needed to “hear” from the jury was patently immaterial to the defendant’s guilt or innocence and the State’s reference to their loss was an erroneous appeal to the jury’s emotions. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 130. The second improper argument identified by the court was the prosecutor’s argument that the jury should send a message in support of the police. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 132. The court concluded: “[T]he trial court allowed the State to argue two emotion-laden themes to the jury, neither of which was probative of defendant’s guilt for the several crimes charged against him. The nakedly prejudicial nature of the arguments was intensified by parallel evidence which, perhaps by design, reinforced the tragedy of the loss suffered in this case by the police force and by the family of Daniel Doffyn. Consequently, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jury to hear these arguments.” Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 134. Next, the court turned to the State’s argument that, irrespective of any error, the evidence against the defendant was so overwhelming that absent the errors the outcome of the case would not have been different. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 137-38. In response to this argument the court explained: “[Prejudice to a defendant’s case is not the sole concern that drives our analysis of defendant’s appeal: ‘A criminal defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial’ conducted according to law. People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). This due process right is guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. [Citations.] Additionally, when a defendant’s right to a fair trial has been denied, this court must take corrective action so that we may preserve the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] To determine whether defendant’s right to a fair trial has been compromised, we employ the same test that this court uses whenever it applies the second prong of the plain error test. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). We ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant’s trial was fundamentally fair. [Citations.] *** [W]hen an error arises at trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and protected. Critically, the court will act on plain error regardless of the strength of the evidence of defendant’s guilt.” (Emphasis in original.) Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. In employing this test the court in Blue concluded: “In this appeal, we hold that a new trial is necessary in order to preserve the trustworthiness and reputation of the judicial process. We do not disagree that the evidence proving defendant’s guilt is overwhelming. Nonetheless, regardless of the weight of the evidence, as guardians of constitutional rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system, we must order a new trial when, as here, we conclude that defendant did not receive a fair trial. Each of the errors detailed above, in and of itself, casts doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process. Cumulatively, we find that the errors created a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice to defendant’s case. [Citations.] The argument by State’s counsel concerning the Doffyn family and the police encouraged the jury to return a verdict grounded in emotion, and not a rational deliberation of the facts. Therefore, by allowing the State to suggest improper considerations to the jury, the trial court errantly allowed the jury to consider ‘evidence’ not relevant to defendant’s alleged crimes. Combined with the introduction of the dead officer’s bloodied uniform, moreover, the errors assumed a synergistic effect. In particular, if we view together the manner and duration of the uniform’s display, the appeal to the jurors to demonstrate their gratitude to the police force, the introduction of Doffyn’s oath of office and testimony that his star occupies an honored place at police headquarters, we discern an intent by the State to place the jury’s responsibility as citizens on trial, as much as the State placed defendant on trial. [Citation.] The State’s overbearing conduct in pursuit of defendant’s convictions was further demonstrated by the assistant State’s Attorneys’ behavior at trial. The tendency of the prosecutors to interject editorializing objections unfairly negated evidence that may have been favorable to defendant. The fact the objections were made— and sometimes sustained — by government representatives suggested that, because knowledgeable authorities found the testimony in question incredible, then the jury should reach the same conclusion. Under these circumstances, defendant did not receive a fair trial. [Citations.] In sum, the trial court allowed the guilty verdict to rest on considerations other than the evidence alone. Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s convictions and sentence and remand for a new trial.” Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139-40. Returning to our discussion of Johnson, in reversing Cowley’s and Parker’s convictions, the court identified three instances of trial error that occurred in both trials: (1) the admission and display of Officer Doffyn’s bloodied and brain-splattered uniform, (2) the emotionally charged testimony of Officer Doffyn’s father, and (3) the testimony of Commander Delopez that served only to highlight the ceremonies and oath associated with Officer Doffyn’s service and duties as a police officer. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 72. The court in Johnson noted that Cowley was tried simultaneously with Blue and, consequently, with the exception of the prosecutors’ violation of the advocate-witness rule, the identical evidentiary errors identified in Blue also occurred in Cowley’s trial. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 85. As to Parker’s trial, the court identified five instances of improper argument by the prosecution: (1) remarks aimed at the sympathies of the jury implicitly asking the jury to send a message of support of law enforcement (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 75-76); (2) twice utilizing a metaphor in an argument on accountability likening the defendant to an animal, that is, “ ‘If you run with the pack, you share the kill’ ” (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 80); (3) mischaracterizing the evidence and the applicable law, and suggesting that defense counsel was deceptive in his dealings with the jury (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 81); (4) two improper references to a school’s proximity to the location where the defendants parked their car (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 83); and (5) references to Officer Doffyn’s family that could be construed only as “strained attempts to invoke the jury’s sympathy and thus influence its decision” (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 83). As to Parker’s trial, the Johnson court concluded: “As in Blue, we see in this case cumulative error and a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice that denied defendant a fair trial and cast doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 139. We note that the prejudice in this case, as in Blue, was engendered in the main by prosecutorial misconduct. As in Blue, the coalescence of improper, emotion-laden evidence, and inflammatory argument obviously designed to exploit that evidence, created a synergism of parallel errors. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 134, 139. As in Blue, a new trial is necessary in this case to preserve and protect the integrity of the judicial process, as ‘the trial court allowed the guilty verdict to rest on considerations other than the evidence alone.’ See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-40.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 84. When the court turned its attention to Cowley’s trial, it identified the following instances of improper argument during the prosecutor’s closing arguments: (1) unnecessary and irrelevant references to Officer Doffyn’s surviving family members; (2) the same animal metaphor found objectionable in Parker’s trial; (3) the same irrelevant reference to the proximity of a grammar school found objectionable in Parker’s trial; (4) the same improper implied send-a-message-to-the-community theme that was utilized in Parker’s trial; and (5) improperly casting the jury’s decision as one between good and evil. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 86-87. The court affirmed the reversal of Cowley’s convictions for reasons similar to its affirmance of the reversal of Parker’s convictions. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 87. In overturning the appellate court’s reversal of Johnson’s conviction, the court found all of the allegations of trial error (including the admission of gang affiliation evidence; the admission of testimony that allegedly apprised the jury that the defendant had taken and failed a polygraph; and the admission of the defendant’s prior arrests and adjudications of delinquency) to lack merit (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 102-09) before finding that the prosecutor’s comments in closing argument improperly suggested that Johnson was required to present evidence at trial. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 115. The court went on to conclude, however, that the improper comments did not result in substantial prejudice to the defendant in that they were not a material factor in his conviction. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 115, citing People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548, 573 (2000). The Johnson court held further: “[T]he prosecutor’s comments, quite simply, did not result in substantial prejudice to Johnson under these circumstances, and thus, they do not warrant reversal of Johnson’s convictions. As there was neither cumulative error, nor a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct and related trial error, the appellate court’s reliance upon Blue was misplaced.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 117.  We now turn to an analysis of the impact the decisions in Blue and Johnson have on the matter at bar. Ordinarily a prosecutor’s improper comment will not result in the jury’s verdict being disturbed on appeal unless the remark caused substantial prejudice to the defendant, taking into account the content and context of the comment, its relationship to the evidence, and its effect on the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial trial. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 115, citing Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. Errors in closing argument must result in substantial prejudice such that the result would have been different absent the complained-of remark before reversal is required. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573. In this case, because the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, he was not prejudiced in the sense that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the prosecutor’s two improper remarks during the State’s rebuttal closing argument. However, as our supreme court noted in Blue, there can be a special circumstance where a criminal defendant is deprived of a fair trial even when the evidence of his guilt is overwhelming, i.e., where his substantial constitutional right to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial conducted according to law has been affected to such a degree that his trial was not fundamentally fair. In this special circumstance, the error is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process and the court must act to correct the error so that the fairness and reputation of the process may be preserved and protected. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. In Johnson and Blue the court found that the defendants Blue, Cowley, and Parker were deprived of their right to a fundamentally fair trial due to the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and trial error, warranting reversal notwithstanding overwhelming evidence of their guilt. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 84-85; Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-39. In reversing Cowley’s and Parker’s murder convictions, the court followed its analysis in Blue where it held that the cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct and trial error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 60, citing Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. The court found “cumulative error and a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice that denied defendant a fair trial and cast doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 84.  Defendant’s right to a fair trial, however, was not affected to the same extent that Blue’s, Cowley’s, and Parker’s rights were in Blue and Johnson. Defendant’s trial, like Blue’s, Cowley’s, and Parker’s, involved improper argument by the prosecution in a case where the evidence proving defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. However, defendant’s trial was not like Blue’s, Cowley’s, or Parker’s, where there was cumulative error demonstrating a pervasive pattern of unfair prejudice by the prosecution. Blue’s trial involved four trial errors and the prosecution’s argument of two improper, emotion-laden themes. Cowley’s and Parker’s trials contained three instances of trial error and at least five instances of improper argument by the prosecution. In contrast, this defendant’s trial contained only two improper arguments by the prosecutor during the State’s rebuttal closing argument and not a single allegation of trial error. The improper arguments in this case were the negative comment regarding defendant’s choice to exercise his constitutional right to have a jury trial, and the comment that defendant’s purpose in lying was to avoid responsibility for his crime and to laugh at the police after he was back on the street. Unlike Blue’s, Cowley’s, and Parker’s trials, these arguments did not coincide with or parallel any emotion-laden evidence improperly admitted at trial. Consequently, there was no synergistic or cumulative effect to the improper argument depriving defendant of a fair trial. Rather, like Johnson’s trial, defendant’s trial did not involve a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct and related trial error. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant’s substantial right to a fair, orderly, and impartial trial conducted according to law was not affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant’s trial was fundamentally fair. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. We do not believe that the errors were so grave as to threaten the integrity of the judicial process such that we must act to correct the error so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and protected. See Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138. Johnson and Blue hold that, even in a case where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is overwhelming, a defendant is deprived of his right to a fair trial where the prosecution makes improper arguments that are related to improperly admitted, emotion-laden evidence, resulting in a jury verdict grounded in emotion rather than rational deliberation of the facts. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 84-85; Blue, 189 Ill. 2d at 138-39. Defendant would have us reverse his conviction in a case where there was no trial error that related to the prosecution’s improper arguments and where the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. We decline to so extend the holdings in Blue and Johnson. The cumulative impact of multiple improper remarks by the prosecutor in closing argument may result in prejudice to a criminal defendant. People v. Whitlow, 89 Ill. 2d 322, 341 (1982). Such cases typically involve prejudice to a defendant in the ordinary sense such that absent the improper comments the outcome of the trial would have been different. Defendant directs us only to People v. Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d 656 (1984), as authority for reversal of a conviction based on cumulative error consisting solely of improper argument by the prosecution in a case where the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. See Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 663. The case at bar, however, is readily distinguished from Ray. As we concluded in our original majority opinion, the errors in Ray were much more pervasive than those in this case. In Ray the improper remarks by the prosecutor included, but were not limited to: (1) an attack on the professional integrity of defense counsel, accusing him 16 times of lying, as well as trying to confuse and intimidate the jury (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 660); (2) a misstatement of the applicable law on the presumption of innocence (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 661); (3) an impermissible comment on the defendant’s failure to testify, which violated his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 661); (4) the impermissible intimation that there existed inculpatory evidence that was rendered inadmissible as a result of defense counsel’s objections (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 661); (5) improper comments suggesting that witnesses were afraid to testify because the defendant had threatened or intimidated them (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 662); (6) an improper intimation that the defendant had a prior criminal history (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 662); and (7) numerous improper comments suggesting that the defendant had manipulated his constitutional rights to escape conviction (Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 662-63). Unlike the prosecutor’s closing argument in Ray, the prosecutor’s two improper comments during closing argument in defendant’s trial did not “read like a veritable hornbook of ‘do nots,’ ” nor did they create “an atmosphere inimical to the even-handed dispensation of justice and thus result! ] in prejudice to defendant.” Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 659-60. Additionally, defendant argues that Johnson mandates a finding that several comments made by the prosecutor that we deemed proper in our original majority opinion were in fact impermissible. We disagree. First, defendant points out that Johnson clarified that it is improper for the State to accuse defense counsel of trying to confuse the jury “[ujnless predicated on evidence that defense counsel behaved unethically.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 82. Defendant maintains that, because there was no indication that defense counsel behaved unethically, the majority erred when it concluded that such argument was proper in light of defense counsel’s attempt to use minor discrepancies to discredit the State’s evidence. In this case defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 — 501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)) and filing a false police report of the theft of a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(6) (West 2000)). There was little dispute that the elements of DUI were established after defendant admitted during his trial testimony that his blood-alcohol content was over 0.08 and there was testimony that defendant admitted to driving the car in an attempt to get it out of the snow. As to the charge of filing a false police report of the theft of a vehicle, the State was required to prove that the report was false (see 625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(6) (West 2000)). As the defense took the position that the report to the police was not false because someone really did steal defendant’s car, the prosecution was certainly entitled to argue to the jury that defendant’s trial testimony so indicating is a lie. After so arguing, the prosecutor made the following remarks: “[T]he defense wants to say, Well, this is a problem and this is a problem and this is a problem’ because they don’t want you to put all the facts and your common sense together, and amazingly they’ve sat here and argued for a period of time about two issues that I can’t believe they’re even talking about and that is intoxication. See, and that’s, of course, that’s the defense; that’s the tactic, right. Well, Officer Craft did this and the machine did that and blah-blah, blah-blah, blah. Folks, that is not even an issue in this case. I asked him flat out, Were you over the legal limit?’ ‘Yeah, oh yeah.’ ‘Beyond .08?’ ‘Yeah.’ What do we need a machine for? But see, that’s the way. That’s the tactic, of course, you know let’s get back in the jury room and let’s, convince [sic] about the machine and let’s convince [sic] about this and dah-dah dah-dah dah, and pretty soon there’s 12 of you and there’s reasonable doubt all over the place because your [sic] thinking about all sorts of things that have nothing to do with the facts and circumstances and hárd evidence in this case. Folks, this is not an issue in this case. When the Defendant confesses on the witness stand to being under the influence aiid above .08, that is not an issue. Okay?” Rather than an accusation that defense counsel was trying to confuse the jury, by these remarks the prosecutor was merely making the point to the jury that portions of defense counsel’s closing argument focused them on an issue that, as a result of defendant’s trial testimony, was not in dispute. The prosecutor was calling the jury’s attention to defense counsel’s tactic of focusing them on the calibration of the Breathalyzer machine when, irrespective of the accuracy of that machine, defendant had admitted that his blood-alcohol content was over the legal limit. This was not improper argument. Next, defendant claims for the first time in his petition for rehearing that the prosecutor improperly referred to him as a “rat” in his rebuttal closing argument. Parties may not argue new points in a petition for rehearing (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7); People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2000)) and, therefore, this claim is waived. Defendant maintains that his opening brief “recognized” this remark as one of the numerous improper comments made by the prosecutor. Although defendant’s opening brief stated that “[a]ccording to Weber, criminal defendants are ‘like rats in a maze’ because they ‘try to get out of it,’ ” “recognizing” the remark is not the same as arguing a point for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7). 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Defendant did not explain why the remark was improper or cite to any authority indicating that the comment was improper as was required by Rule 341(e)(7). See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Therefore, defendant is not permitted to raise this contention in his petition for rehearing. Next, defendant argues that Johnson mandates reversal based on the prosecutor’s comment that indicated that defendant and defense counsel encouraged defendant’s wife to lie on his behalf by claiming that she did not remember what she told the police about the incident on the night in question. As we noted in our original majority opinion, it is not clear that the prosecutor made such a claim. In fact the statement “bringing in [the persons who made the statements] and having them say T don’t remember’ ” was made in a general way in explaining the need for the prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule. There was no specific reference to defendant or to his counsel. Defendant cites a portion of the Johnson decision where the court pointed out an improper remark by the prosecutor suggesting that the jury should be suspicious of defense counsel because he asked more questions of the prospective jurors during voir dire than did the State. The Johnson court concluded that “[although the prosecutor did, immediately thereafter, acknowledge that it was not improper to ask additional questions, the ambiguity of the trial court’s ruling on the objection may well have reinforced the impression of defense deception left by the State’s earlier comment.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 82-83. Presumably, defendant is arguing that a prosecutor cannot correct an improper comment where the trial court does not sustain the defendant’s objection to that comment. Unlike the prosecutor in Johnson, however, the prosecutor in this case was not trying to correct an obvious impropriety like an insinuation that defense counsel’s deceptiveness was demonstrated by his asking too many questions during voir dire. Rather, the prosecutor in this case was clarifying an ambiguous remark that drew an objection. The complained-of remark could have been heard as a general explanation for the substantive use of a witness’s prior inconsistent statement or, as defendant characterizes the remark, an accusation that defendant and his counsel encouraged defendant’s wife to lie. Under such circumstances, the prosecutor’s comments following the trial court’s overruling of the objection were not a correction of an obvious improper remark but, rather, a clarification of what was meant by the remark, that is, that he did not mean to suggest that defense counsel and defendant put defendant’s wife up to lying. We need to address one other point raised by defendant in his petition for rehearing. Defendant takes the position that because the prosecutor in this case repeated the same type of misconduct during defendant’s trial as this court had previously admonished him to be improper, the improper remarks made during defendant’s trial were intentional and deliberate. We disagree. Defendant’s reference to this court’s prior admonitions to this prosecutor can mean only the admonishment in People v. Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d 723 (2001). The two Supreme Court Rule 23 orders referred to in the dissent to the majority opinion did not contain admonishments and were both handed down after defendant’s trial. Consequently, any lesson taught in those dispositions could not have been ignored by the prosecutor during defendant’s trial. The Johnson court did note that “a pattern of intentional prosecutorial misconduct may so seriously undermine the integrity of judicial proceedings as to support reversal under the plain error doctrine” (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 64) and explained that its decision “signalled] [its] intolerance of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct that deliberately undermines the process by which we determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence” (Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 117). However, nowhere in Johnson did the court indicate that prior admonishments to the prosecutor regarding his improper comments in other cases are appropriately considered in deciding if a pattern of intentional misconduct exists in the trial being reviewed. In any event, we do not believe that the admonishment contained in Slabaugh, that “[w]e trust that errors will not be repeated on retrial” (Slabaugh, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 728), establishes that the two improper comments made in this case were intentional or calculated to deliberately undermine defendant’s right to a fair trial. The two improper comments during the State’s rebuttal closing argument hardly constitute a pattern of intentional misconduct like that present in the trials of Cowley, Parker, and Blue, where multiple trial errors during the evidentiary phase of those trials paralleled with multiple improper remarks during the State’s closing arguments deprived those defendants of fair trials. Additionally, we believe that the prosecutor’s remarks concerning defendant’s choice to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial constituted a miscalculated response to a remark by defense counsel that the prosecutor misunderstood. In response to defense counsel’s statement during closing argument that once defendant chose to assert his right to plead his innocence he had no choice but to go to trial, the prosecutor said: “But Mr. Nack begins his argument by asking you: there’s no other choice, there is no other choice for this Defendant, right? No other choice. He’s got to take this case to trial and profess his innocence. Well, not quite. Okay? There is something that about 80 to 90 percent of Defendants do in this country and that is they be [sic] honest, forthright. They go into the courtroom and they plead guilty. MR. NACK: Objection. That’s grounds for a mistrial, Judge. THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. MR. WEBER: It happens everyday. You hear about it all the time. Right? You know what? That story I gave was pretty stupid and I think it’s time for me to accept responsibility for my stupidity in driving drunk and filing a false police report and I’ll plead guilty. MR. NACK: Objection, Judge. That is improper argument. He has the constitutional right to a jury trial. It’s improper argument. THE COURT: It’s argument; it’s overruled. Go ahead.” The prosecutor obviously misunderstood defense counsel’s argument because he clearly contended that defense counsel claimed that defendant’s only option was to go to trial. Defense counsel made no such comment and, absent invitation, a negative comment about a defendant’s exercise of his constitutional rights is improper (People v. Mulero, 176 Ill. 2d 444, 462 (1997)). Consequently, the prosecutor’s comments were improper and the trial court should have sustained defense counsel’s objections to them. However, the fact that the improper remarks were made in response to a point made by defense counsel that was misconstrued by the prosecutor indicates that there was no preconceived plan constituting an intentional pattern of misconduct or any deliberate attempt to deprive defendant of a fair trial as was evident in Johnson and Blue. Nevertheless, our holding in this case should not be interpreted as approval of the prosecutor’s improper remarks, which our supreme court has aptly observed have become far too common in criminal trials. We simply hold that in this case the two improper comments by the prosecutor did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. We join Justice Hutchinson in urging that trial judges vigorously guard against improper argument and unprofessional conduct. Affirmed.