Court Opinion

ID: 9906013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:32.268059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.948942
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Martinez CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D081288

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. SCS247733)

 JAMES MARTINEZ,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Ana Espana, Judge. Request for judicial notice granted. Affirmed.
          Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, Alan L. Amann and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant James Martinez appeals after the trial court summarily

denied his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former
section 1170.95) without an evidentiary hearing. Because Martinez was not
convicted on a theory for which section 1172.6 potentially affords relief, we
affirm the trial court’s order.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Given the nature of this case, and the restrictions on the evidence that
may be considered, a lengthy recitation of the facts is unnecessary. The
People charged Martinez and codefendant Sean O’Neil with two counts of
attempted murder. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) Count 1 involved the use of a
firearm against the victim, R.R. As to count 2, the victim was a police officer
and the attempted murder was allegedly accomplished by means of a motor
vehicle. The second incident gave rise to three additional charges—assault
with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, R.C. (§ 245, subd. (c), count 3),
resisting an executive officer (§ 69, count 4), and evading an officer with
reckless driving (Veh. Code § 2800.2, subd. (a), count 5). In 2012, a jury
found both defendants guilty on all five counts with various enhancements.
      In 2012, Martinez and O’Neil appealed their convictions, asserting
multiple errors. As to Martinez, this court ordered a 30-year parole eligibility

term stayed, but otherwise affirmed the judgment.2 As to O’Neil, we
reversed his convictions on counts 2 through 5 on the grounds of insufficient
evidence.

1    Further section references are to the Penal Code unless noted
otherwise.
2     We have taken judicial notice of the record on the previous appeal.
(People v. Martinez et al. (July 23, 2014, D062720) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                        2
      Nearly a decade after his conviction, Martinez filed a petition under

section 1172.63 requesting that his convictions for attempted murder—counts
1 and 2—be vacated and he be resentenced. His supporting declaration
consisted of a preprinted form where he checked boxes that stated (1) a
complaint, information, or indictment was filed against him that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable causes doctrine;
(2) he was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following
a trial, or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have
possibly been convicted of murder or attempted murder; and (3) he could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes
made to sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019. The People opposed
Martinez’s petition, and the trial court summarily denied it without issuing
an order to show cause.

                                  DISCUSSION

      Martinez asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage. He contends the court
inaccurately interpreted the jury’s findings and that, because the jury
received instructions on the natural and probable consequence doctrine, he is
not facially barred from resentencing relief. We disagree.
      When a trial court reviews a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6, it first determines if the petitioner has shown a prima facie case for

3    Assembly Bill No. 200 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) renumbered section
1170.95 to 1172.6, effective June 30, 2022.
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relief under the statute. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).)
The court accepts the allegations as true and evaluates whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if he or she proves the allegations.
(Ibid.) The court may review the record of conviction, including to a limited
extent any prior appellate opinion, to determine if the petitioner’s allegations
are rebutted by the record. (Id. p. 972.) But the court may not engage in
factfinding and weighing credibility at the prima facie stage of petition
review. (Id. at p. 971, citing People v. Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965,
979–980.)
      A court’s decision to deny a resentencing petition at the prima facie
stage “ ‘is appropriate only if the record of conviction demonstrates that ‘the
petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.’ [Citations.] This is a
purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.’ ” (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
      In this case, the trial court indicated it had reviewed the jury verdict
forms, the second amended information, the court minutes from the jury trial
through sentencing, and the appellate opinion issued by this court in July,
2014. It found that Martinez was facially ineligible for resentencing on count
1 because he “was found to be the person who attempted to kill the victim by
shooting him multiple times with a firearm.” The court concluded that, as
the direct perpetrator, Martinez was not convicted under a theory of felony
murder or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Further,
the court found Martinez was facially ineligible for resentencing on count 2
because he “was found by the jury to be the person who attempted to kill [the]
Chula Vista police officer” and Martinez himself “was the person behind the
wheel.”

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      Martinez contends that the trial court erred by denying his section
1172.6 petition for relief without an evidentiary hearing. He asserts he was
eligible for relief: (1) on count 1, because the trial court misinterpreted the
record when it concluded Martinez personally discharged the firearm; and
(2) on count 2, because the jury received a natural and probable consequences
instruction. We address each count in turn.

A.   Attempted Murder Using a Firearm—Count 1

      The jury received CALCRIM No. 600 on attempted murder with respect
to counts 1 and 2, and CALCRIM No. 402 on natural and probable
consequences doctrine only with respect to counts 2 through 5. Accordingly,
we evaluate count 1, attempted murder using a firearm, without considering
the natural and probable consequences doctrine instruction. The attempted
murder instruction (CALCRIM No. 600) explicitly stated that the perpetrator
must have “intended to kill” the victim. The jury found Martinez and his
codefendant guilty of attempted murder using a firearm as charged in
count 1.
      Martinez is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law on count 1
because he was convicted of attempted murder. The only theory of attempted
murder specified by section 1172.6 is “attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” (Id., subd. (a); see People v. Coley
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [the statute “applies by its terms only to
attempted murder based on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine”].) While Martinez’s jury received a natural and probable
consequences instruction, it was neither for count 1 nor Martinez’s role in
count 2, as we discuss below. Martinez acknowledges the instruction was
“only given on count two.”

                                        5
      Accordingly, Martinez was not convicted of attempted murder on count

1 on any theory implicated by section 1172.6.4 (See, e.g., People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 946 [summary denial of section 1172.6 petition
affirmed where record demonstrated trial court did not instruct jury on
natural and probable consequences doctrine; People v. Offley (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 588, 599 [“if the jury did not receive an instruction on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury could not have
convicted the defendant on that basis, and the petition should be summarily
denied”].)

B.   Attempted Murder Using a Motor Vehicle—Count 2

      The jury also found Martinez and his codefendant O’Neil guilty of
attempted murder using a motor vehicle as charged in count 2. We later
reversed O’Neil’s conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence. (People v.
Martinez et al., supra, D062720.)
      The Legislature effectively eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine for murder and attempted murder by adding
subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that “[m]alice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) Under section
1172.6, a person convicted of attempted murder based on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine may petition the sentencing court to vacate
the sentence and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he could not have
been convicted of attempted murder because of these statutory changes.

4      Given that Martinez’s conviction on count 1 is facially ineligible for
relief, we need not address whether the trial court misinterpreted the record
when it stated that the jury found that “Martinez personally used and
discharged a firearm.”
                                        6
(See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 959–960.) If the jury received no
instructions on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, Martinez
would be ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
      In this instance, however, the jury did receive instructions on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. They were told that if
“[d]uring the commission of Attempted Murder as charged in Count One,
a coparticipant in that Attempted Murder as charged in Count One,
committed the crimes [charged in Counts Two through Five],” then the
other coparticipant in the count 1 attempted murder could also be guilty of
the crimes charged in counts 2 through 5 if they were a “natural and probable
consequence” of the first attempted murder. In other words, before it could
resort to the natural and probable consequence doctrine to convict anyone on
counts 2 through 5, it had to first determine there was a direct perpetrator of
those crimes.
      Here, the record clearly reveals that the jury convicted Martinez as the
direct perpetrator on counts 2 through 5. The verdict forms conclusively
establish—without fact finding or weighing of evidence—that Martinez was
the one who attempted to murder R.C. using a motor vehicle. The People
charged only Martinez with personally using “a deadly and dangerous
weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle” (count 2). And the jury agreed, finding that
Martinez, and only Martinez, “did personally use a deadly and dangerous
weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle” in the commission of the attempted murder.
Because the jury found that Martinez personally drove the car that hit R.C.,
it was required to find that he had the intent necessary for attempted
murder. The instruction regarding the natural and probable consequences
doctrine then permitted the jury, at least in theory, to impute Martinez’s

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murderous intent to his codefendant O’Neil. Martinez was not convicted
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; consequently, he is
ineligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.

                                DISPOSITION

      The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                            DATO, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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