Court Opinion

ID: 9770719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:19:56.250851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:20.056998
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
Applicant contends the jury that sentenced him to death was unable to consider and give mitigating effect to evidence of his mental retardation, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.1 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Applicant is not entitled to relief because the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support his claim.

I

In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death penalty in Texas for the offense of rape violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.2 Subsequently, the Texas legislature narrowed the scope of death penalty crimes to murder committed in specified circumstances, and required the jury to answer special issues regarding deliberateness, future dangerousness, and in some instances, provocation. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268-69, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2954-55, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court upheld the new Texas death penalty scheme as facially constitutional, in part, because the special issues permitted the jury’s consideration of mitigating factors. Id. at 272-74, 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2956-57, 2958. Not only must the defendant be allowed to present mitigating evidence to the jury, but the jury “must also be able to consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing [its] sentence.” Penry, 492 U.S. at 319, 109 S.Ct. at 2947 (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987)).
In 1989, that Court held that the special issues of article 37.071(b) were unconstitutional as applied to Johnny Paul Penry because they did not provide the jury with a vehicle in which to give full mitigating effect to evidence of Penry’s mental retardation, arrested development, and background of childhood abuse. Penry. At Penry’s trial, a psychiatrist testified “that Penry suffered from organic brain damage and moderate [mental] retardation, which resulted in poor impulse control and an inability to leam from experience,” id, at 308, 109 S.Ct. at 2941, and that the organic brain disorder was probably caused at birth, but could have been the result of early childhood beatings. Id. at 308-309, 109 S.Ct. at 2941-42. Penry’s sister testified that their mother frequently beat Penry with a belt over the head when he was a child, and that he was regularly locked in his room for long periods without access to a toilet. Id. at 309, 109 S.Ct. at 2941-42. The State presented rebuttal testimony from two psychiatrists who testified that Penry was not suffering from a mental defect at the time of the offense; however, the two psychiatrists also testified that Penry was unable to learn from experience. Id, 309-10, 109 S.Ct. at 2941-42.
The Supreme Court noted that evidence of Penry’s mental retardation, arrested development, and abused background had “relevance *64to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues,” and that the jury could not consider and give mitigating effect to that evidence absent an additional jury instruction. Id. at 322, 109 S.Ct. at 2948-49. Further, Peltry's evidence was considered to be double-edged under the second special issue in that it simultaneously diminished blameworthiness for the crime, but also indicated a probability of future dangerousness, id. at 324, 109 S.Ct. at 2949-50, and that the jury could only give aggravating effect to that evidence. Id. at 323, 109 S.Ct. at 2949. Thus, an additional instruction was mandated, one “informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penr/s mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death penalty.” Id. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2951-52.
Following Penry, this Court has been presented with numerous claims from other defendants sentenced to death asserting that absent a “Penry instruction,” their sentencing juries could not and did not give mitigating effect to such evidence as, for example, alcoholism/drug abuse, troubled background, and certain types of mental illness. In cases too numerous to mention, this Court has rejected such claims as not falling within the Penry rule. See, e.g., Robison v. State, 888 S.W.2d 473 (Tex.Crim.App.)(childhood sexual abuse, schizophrenia, drug abuse, and remorse), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1162, 115 S.Ct. 2617, 132 L.Ed.2d 859 (1995); Mines v. State, 852 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(insanity and manic depression), vacated, 510 U.S. 802, 114 S.Ct. 42, 126 L.Ed.2d 13 (1993);3 Ex parte Jacobs, 843 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(troubled background, cooperation with police, remorse, and positive character traits), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3046, 125 L.Ed.2d 731 (1993); Ex parte Harris, 825 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(circumstances of offense, remorse, cooperation with police, youth, and alcoholism). With one exception,4 this Court has sustained a Penry claim only when there is evidence of mental retardation. See Rios v. State, 846 S.W.2d 310, 315 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1051, 113 S.Ct. 1946, 123 L.Ed.2d 651 (1993); Richard v. State, 842 S.W.2d 279, 280-83 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Ex parte McGee, 817 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 655-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). But even in those cases, the evidence of mental retardation was always something more than what was presented in this case.

II

The American Psychiatric Association (APA) has stated that the essential feature of mental retardation is “significantly subav-erage general intellectual functioning” ac*65companied by “significant limitations in adaptive functioning,” the onset of which must occur before age 18. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 39 & 46 (4th ed. rev.1994)(hereinafter DSM-IV); see also American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD), Classification in Mental Retardation 1 (Herbert J. Grossman ed.1983)(here-inafter AAMD)(“Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period”). While dementia shares characteristics with mental retardation, its onset may occur after age eighteen. DSM-IV at 45, 137, 139.5 However, for Penry purposes, courts should not distinguish between mental retardation and dementia. See James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luekasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 414, 422-23 (1985).
“General'intellectual functioning is defined by the intelligence quotient (IQ or IQ-equivalent) obtained by assessment with one or more of the standardized, individually administered general intelligence tests (e.g., Wes-ehler Intelligence Scales for Children — Revised, Stanford Binet, Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children).” DSM-IV at 39. “Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning is defined as an IQ of about 70 or below (approximately 2 standard deviations below the mean).” Id.; see also AAMD at 1. Professionals are flexible in their clinical assessments of mental retardation, sometimes determining that someone with an IQ of above 70 is mentally retarded or that someone with an IQ of below 70 is not mentally retarded. AAMD at 23. IQ tests differ in content and in the way they measure IQ. Id. at 56-57; see Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 152. Therefore, it is important to know which test was administered in determining what an IQ score represents.
“Impairments in adaptive behavior are defined as significant limitations in an individual’s effectiveness in meeting the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, and/or social responsibility that are expected for his or here[ 6] age level and cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and, usually, standardized scales.” AAMD at 11. Such standardized methods of measuring an individual’s adaptive functioning or behavior include the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales and the AAMD Adaptive Behavior Scale. DSM-IV at 40. A determination of adaptive functioning may also be made by teacher evaluation and educational, developmental, and medical history. Id. Thus, an individual should not be classified as mentally retarded unless he is deficient in both intellectual functioning, as indicated by IQ, and in adaptive behavior.7
*66In the instant case, applicant’s parole officer testified at punishment that applicant’s parole record reflected that his IQ was 67. He testified that when applicant was incarcerated for a previous offense, the Texas Department of Corrections administered to applicant a test to determine his IQ, hut the parole officer was “not sure exactly what kind of test, what they test them for.” The parole officer further testified that applicant’s parole record did not purport to be a psychologist’s report, rather it was a record of applicant’s criminal and social history. The parole officer acknowledged that the parole record did not indicate by whom or under what circumstances the test was administered.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury:
I’m sure the Defense is going to ask you to forgive [applicant] for what he’s done. Say that he has a low IQ and that you should give him another chance. Well, ladies and gentlemen, you be the judge of that. If you feel like that’s what you need to do, then that’s what you need to do. But I ask you to make your decision based on the facts.
Defense Counsel remarked:
Then I called a witness who testified he’s [applicant's] parole officer. Uncontro-verted evidence that when [applicant] was examined, when he got out of the penitentiary, by the officials who determined how to classify him, how to treat him, the same information that was communicated to his parole officer, what to do for him, how to help him when he’s out on parole. • Information that the prison psychiatrist had, the information that they gave is that [applicant] has got a 67 IQ. The same guy that told this poor unfortunate woman that was trying to work that day, “Well, if I let you in there, will you leave?” And he believed her. This guy with the 67 IQ, and she goes in and, sure enough, she escapes, just like she should have.[8] That is un-controverted testimony before you, that we have got a man before us that has got an intelligence quotient before us that is that low.
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Now you’re charged with acting as [applicant’s] peers. You have to judge him as his peers. That’s going to be hard for you to do. None of you grew up where he grew up. Only one of you is black and none of you are suffering from a 67 IQ.
The prosecutor responded:
[Defense Counsel] has told you that [applicant] has an IQ of 67. We heard no expert testimony from a psychologist who administered a battery of psychological tests. All we have got is this little piece of paper with a number of things listed in which someone — we don’t know who has — written in 67. But whether he has a low IQ or not is not really,.the issue. Because the legislature, in asking you to address that question [the second special issue], the reasons why he became a danger are not really relevant. The fact that he is a danger, that the evidence shows he’s a danger, is the criteria to use in answering that question.
The evidence presented at applicant’s trial did not show that applicant was mentally retarded as the AAMD or the APA has defined it. There was no testimony regarding when applicant’s IQ was measured or what tests where used to measure it. There was no testimony as to the range of IQ or what is considered mentally retarded. There was no testimony or notation on the parole record that applicant was mentally retarded. And, the record is devoid of any evidence indicating that applicant’s adaptive functioning was that of a mentally retarded individual.
*67Primarily relying on an unpublished opinion, applicant contends evidence of an IQ of below 70 alone requires a “Penry instruction.” However, “[ujnpublished opinions have no precedential value and must not be cited as authority by counsel or by a court.” Tex.R.App. P. 77.3. The AAMD and the APA disagree with applicant’s contention, and in the cases holding that a “Penry instruction” was required, the evidence of mental retardation consisted of more than evidence of an IQ below 70. See Penry (organic brain damage caused at birth or early childhood abuse and an inability to learn from experience); see also Rios, 846 S.W.2d at 315 (testimony from doctors regarding when and how defendant’s IQ was measured and conclusion that he was mentally retarded); Richard, 842 S.W.2d at 280-83 (severe childhood abuse and doctor’s conflicting conclusion that defendant was mentally retarded); Ex parte Williams, 833 S.W.2d at 151-52 (testimony regarding when and how defendant’s IQ was measured and conflicting conclusions as to whether defendant was mentally retarded); Ex parte McGee; 817 S.W.2d at 79-80 (organic brain damage and severe childhood abuse); Ex parte Goodman, 816 S.W.2d at 385-86 (testimony that defendant was mentally retarded and possibly suffered from brain damage); Ramirez, 815 S.W.2d at 655-56 (childhood abuse, doctor’s conflicting testimony as to whether defendant was mentally retarded, and psychological evaluation assessing intelligence and likelihood of organic brain dysfunction).
For these reasons, applicant is not entitled to relief.9 I therefore join in the judgment of the Court.
PRICE, J., joins.

. Appellant also claims the jury was unable to consider and give mitigating effect to evidence of his youth and youthful incarceration. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have rejected claims that evidence of youth and good prison record requires an additional jury instruction. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)(youth); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988)(good prison disciplinary record); Jones v. State, 843 S.W.2d 487, 497 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)(good behavior in prison), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 1858, 123 L.Ed.2d 479 (1993); Ex parte Jacobs, 843 S.W.2d at 520 (education during prison); Ex parte Harris, 825 S.W.2d at 122 (youth).

. Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), was decided in conjunction with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Also decided with Furman was Jackson v. Georgia. In Branch and Jackson, the defendants were assessed the death penalty for committing rape; in Furman, the defendant was assessed the death penalty for committing murder.

. The Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded Mines to us in light of Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993).

. Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 75-76 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232, 111 S.Ct. 2856, 115 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1991). In Gribble, the defendant was sentenced to death for murder during the course of a kidnapping. Gribble claimed he had consensual sex with the deceased. Gribble presented evidence of a troubled childhood. Gribble’s mother was institutionalized for mental illness and his father for burglary. Further, Gribble’s mother sexually abused him when he was a small child. A psychoanalyst testified that those experiences, even if delusional, indicated the same mental illness as suffered by Gribble’s mother, and that throughout his adult life, Gribble suffered from a delusional fear of sexual domination which resulted in violence towards women. This Court held that under Penry, Gribble was entitled to an additional jury instruction.
In a case in a category by itself, this Court held the third special issue of article 37.071(b) was unconstitutional as applied. First v. State, 846 S.W.2d 836, 837-42 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). In First, the defendant was sentenced to death for murdering more than one person in the same criminal transaction. First and three acquaintances were leaving a bar when one of them attacked First and repeatedly slammed his head onto the sidewalk. When the attacker attempted to flee with one of the other acquaintances, First shot them. First’s attacker was not the first named victim in the indictment. Since article 37.071(f) precluded the jury from considering the provocation of any other deceased besides that of the first named in the indictment, we held that the third special issue was unconstitutional as applied to First because the jury could not give mitigating effect to evidence of provocation on the part of First’s attacker.

. Mental Retardation is more common among men than women. Id. at 44.

. In the Persons with Mental Retardation Act, the Texas legislature has adopted definitions similar to the AAMD and the APA regarding mental retardation:
"Adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness with or degree to which a person meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of the person’s age and cultural group.
* * * * * *
"Mental retardation” means significantly sub-average general intellectual functioning that is concurrent with deficits in adaptive behavior and originates during the developmental period.
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"Persons with mental retardation” means a person determined by a physician or psychologist licensed in this state or certified by the department to have subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive behavior.
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"Subaverage general intellectual functioning” refers to measured intelligence on standardized psychometric instruments of two or more standard deviations below the age-group mean for the tests used.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 591.003(1), (13), (16) & (20) (Vernon 1994).

. At punishment, a woman testified regarding an extraneous offense in which applicant and two men drove up to her while she was waiting for a bus to take her to work and forced her into their car. The men drove her to a vacant apartment where they took turns sexually assaulting her. Afterwards, they drove her to another apartment where she managed to escape by telling applicant that she needed to take a bath. Applicant asked her if she was going to escape, she said no and applicant allowed her to go to the bathroom where she escaped through the window and subsequently notified the police.

. Applicant is simply not entitled to relief on his claim because there is not enough evidence in the record to support it. The majority comes to this conclusion, too, Tennard., at 61, but goes on to offer another basis for denying relief. Assuming arguendo there had been enough evidence in the record of mental retardation, the majority says that reading Penry, and subsequent Supreme Court cases like Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993), and Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993), together, applicant still would not have been entitled to an additional instruction because there was no evidence that his low IQ "rendered him unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct when he committed the offense, or that his low IQ rendered him unable to learn from his mistakes or diminished his ability to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his conduct.” Id. at 61-62. While I don’t necessarily disagree with this reasoning, it is dicta and unnecessary to the disposition of applicant’s claim. Moreover, it overrules several cases from this Court, without acknowledgment. See Rios, supra; Ex parte Williams, supra; Ex parte Goodman, supra.