Court Opinion

ID: 9718988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:39:41.313052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.871963
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.,
concurring.
It is a fundamental principle of evidence that trial testimony is always subject to impeachment by the opposing party, whether that testimony is presented through a prior recorded statement or by having the witness take the stand. This principle is well stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Flaherty dissenting from the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court and applies with special force to this case, where impeachment evidence which appellee sought to use at trial was not even available at the time of the preliminary hearing.
Nonetheless, on this record it is clear that the evidence sought to be admitted for the purpose of impeachment was properly excluded. To establish the admissibility of the prior tape-recorded statement, appellee was obliged to authenticate it. Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 450 Pa. 575, 301 A.2d 632 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967). See also Commonwealth v. Henderson, 483 Pa. 345, 396 A.2d 1202 (1979). See generally McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 218 et seq. (Cleary, ed. 1972).
Here, appellee’s offer of authentication was merely that the tape recording had “mysteriously” been found in the mailbox of appellee’s son in an unpostmarked, unstamped package addressed to “J. S. Jr.,” that the tape recording had remained with family members until the time of trial, and that Mrs. Mastrota had identified the voice on the tape recording as that of James Mastrota, her husband. Appellee *542could establish neither the circumstances in which the challenged tape recording had been made nor a chain of custody covering the period from the time the tape recording had been made until it came into the possession of the Sandutch family. In these circumstances, the trial court acted properly in ruling the tape recording inadmissible.
The trial court’s denial of appellee’s request to use James Mastrota’s pretrial suppression motion application was also clearly a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion. In denying the request, the trial court permitted appellee to introduce the testimony that Mastrota had given at the suppression hearing — far more probative evidence than the excluded application. Manifestly, appellee has no legitimate basis for complaint.
As the evidence at issue was properly deemed to be inadmissible impeachment evidence, I concur in the result.
O’BRIEN, C. J., joins in this concurring opinion.