Court Opinion

ID: 9728670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:13:49.977708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.851652
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the petitioner engaged in reckless conduct which created a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury when he handed a loaded shotgun, with the safety off and ready to fire, to his brother. The recklessness of the conduct was evidenced, it says, by both the amount of intoxicants the brothers had consumed and the fact that the petitioner admitted being “high off the drinks, cocaine and heroin”. That the petitioner was aware of his brother’s stated intention to put the gun to his head and pull the trigger is another important factor the majority considered in reaching its decision, as is the fact that the petitioner, when he handed the shotgun to him, in effect, dared his brother to “play Russian roulette” and called his bluff. The Court’s holding is premised upon the petitioner’s guilt being determined, not upon the petitioner’s subjective intention, but rather, by objectively viewing his conduct so as to assess whether it creates the substantial risk against which the statute was designed to protect. By taking this approach, the majority focuses on the wrong issue; it is not the intent with which the petitioner acted so much as it is whether the action .that the petitioner took triggered the protections of the statute.1
*445Although it acknowledges that the petitioner raised the issue, the majority never directly addresses causation, preferring to rest its opinion on, as we have seen, the objective nature of the proof required for conviction. In my opinion, however, the issue of causation is not only pivotal, but dispositive. Whatever the outcome of the discussion concerning the required intent, unless the conduct engaged in is such as to trigger the statute, the intent with which an accused acted is never reached.2 Notwithstanding that the parties may have been drinking and, indeed, may have been hopelessly intoxicated, handing a weapon to someone, whatever the actor’s intent, is too remote an action to create a risk of injury or death. The risk of injury or death is created by pointing and, ultimately, firing the gun. That was done by the victim’s exercise of volition. Consequently, I would hold that the petitioner’s conduct was one step removed from that which is the subject of punishment under Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol), Art. 27, § 120, the Maryland reckless endangerment statute.
The cases upon which the majority relies are not to the contrary. In each of them, the defendant’s conduct, by itself and directly, created the substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury; the person who was the object of that conduct contributed not at all to, and certainly did not participate in, the creation of the risk. Nor was there any indication that it was necessary that he or she do so. In *446People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, 530 N.Y.S.2d 529, 526 N.E.2d 20, 21 (1988), the Court noted that if the gun which the defendant pointed at another person, pulling the trigger, had been capable of firing, the defendant would have been guilty of reckless endangerment. See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 339 Pa.Super. 373, 489 A.2d 207, 210 (1985) (the defendant held the victim’s neck so tightly that she was unable to breathe and pulled her backwards into a room); Hennemeyer v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Ky. 1979) (the defendant fired a gun four times in the direction of police); State v. McLaren, 135 Vt. 291, 376 A.2d 34, 35 (1977) (the defendant pointed a gun at a woman while attempting to kidnap her); People v. Graham, 41 A.D.2d 226, 342 N.Y.S.2d 361, 364 (App.Div.1973) (the defendant intentionally fired a shot eight inches to the side of another person’s head). But see Commonwealth v. Penn Valley Resorts, Inc., 494 A.2d 1139 (Pa.Super.1985). There, the convictions of a corporation for reckless endangerment and involuntary manslaughter were affirmed. The court made clear that serving alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated person is not, by itself, sufficient to constitute either offense. 494 A.2d at 1144. It held, however, that “it was the serving of alcohol, coupled with several crucial elements known to Clancy [the corporation’s president] that established causation ...,” namely
Clancy observed [the victim’s] highly inebriated condition, commented on his drinking problem, observed his violent resistance to friends’ attempts to prevent his driving, refused to call the police, grabbed the keys from [the victim’s friend] and handed them to [the victim] and drove away ridding himself and appellant of the confrontation.
494 A.2d at 1144-45. The court concluded that the evidence “supported a finding that Clancy’s serving of alcohol to [the victim] and subsequent encouragement of [the victim’s] driving his automobile, placed [the victim] in danger of death.” (emphasis added) Id. I submit that the level of “encouragement” present in Penn Valley Resorts is missing in this case.
*447In addition, one of the cases upon which the majority relies Hennemeyer, explicitly states that in order for the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless endangerment, it must be such that the defendant could be convicted of assault should physical injury result. 580 S.W.2d at 214. On the facts of this case, certainly, the petitioner could not have been convicted of, nor even charged with, assault. It may very well be that the unavailability of any alternative charges prompted the prosecution to charge reckless endangerment.
The effect of the majority’s interpretation of § 120 is to hold one adult responsible not only for the reckless conduct of another, but for that person’s intentional conduct, as well. This is so because the majority defines creation of the risk so broadly that it does not only encompass direct possibilities of injury but indirect possibilities as well. In this case, for there to be a possibility of injury, the person allegedly placed at risk must act; unless that person supplements the action of the defendant with an action of his or her own, there really is no danger at all. And because a further action is required of the person allegedly endangered, it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a line between conduct by the defendant that is criminal and conduct by the defendant that is not.
It is the creation of the risk, not the actual harm that occurs, that is controlling, a fact that the majority explicitly recognizes, as it must. See § 120. Therefore, applying the majority’s rationale will lead to absurd results. Applying that rationale, A knowing that B will drive to the rendezvous, intending that B drive home, and actually believing that B will do so, recklessly endangers B by buying B enough drinks to render B intoxicated. Similarly, a person who challenges another to drag race or dares a friend to drive 100 mph on icy roads, intending that he or she does so and knowing that the friend is partial to such activity, is also guilty of reckless endangerment. The same logic suggests that, in this case, the defendant would still be guilty of reckless endangerment had he, aware that his *448brother knew where the rifle was, called his bluff, but without handing him the rifle.
The absurdity of the results is made clear when it is further supposed that, in each of the scenarios posited, the potential victim refused the invitation. Rather than drive the car home, B takes a taxicab; rather than accept the challenge or the dare, the friend unequivocally refuses and goes on his or her way; rather than go and get the gun, or, as in this case, pointing it at his head and firing, the brother replaced the safety and placed the gun down. In each case, it is the action of the person challenged or for whom an opportunity to expose him or herself to a risk is provided that controls whether the risk is created. If that person chooses not to drink the supplied alcoholic beverages or, if he or she does, not to drive the automobile, or, relevant to this case, not to fire the gun, there simply is no exposure to any risk, only an opportunity for such exposure.
If the opportunity provided were exploited, the absurdity is diminished only slightly; it remains the action of the victim that creates the risk of the injury that thereby occurs. Where the victim’s conduct results in his or her injury or death, as a matter of policy, an accused should not be held responsible. See State v. Petersen, 270 Or. 166, 526 P.2d 1008 (1974). In that case, the issue was the propriety of convicting a defendant of recklessly causing the death of another where the victim was killed in a drag race accident in which he and the defendant had agreed to participate. Adopting the dissenting opinion filed in the intermediate appellate court, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the reckless homicide statute “should not be interpreted to extend to those cases in which the victim is a knowing and voluntary participant in the course of reckless conduct.” 526 P.2d at 1009. Relying on Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571,170 A.2d 310 (1961), it did so on the basis of “policy considerations [which] are against imposing responsibility for the death of a participant in a race on the surviving racer when his sole contribution to the death is the participation in the activity mutually agreed upon.” (Footnote *449omitted) State v. Petersen, 17 Or.App. 478, 522 P.2d 912, 921 (1974). See also Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347, 351-54 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1990). The same analysis applies to reckless endangerment cases, in which, as here, there is a mutual agreement to engage in prohibited conduct. However one may choose to characterize the petitioner’s conduct, his brother’s conduct was not only reckless, but intentional and, indeed, it was that intentional conduct which, in the final analysis, was the cause of his death. It was also the conduct which created the risk. And because it was intentional conduct by the victim that created the risk and caused the harm, in this case, more so than in the drag race cases, “A should not, in all justice, be held for the death of B who was an equally willing and foolhardy participant in the bad conduct which caused his death.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 3.12 at 297.3

. It is interesting, if not ironic, to note that Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 120 punishes conduct by imposition of a fine and imprisonment for up to five years, which, under the recent opinion of Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992), would not be a sufficient predicate for the award of punitive damages.

. The intent issue is presented in this case because the case was submitted to the trier of the facts on an agreed true statement of facts, which required the factfinder, under these circumstances to accept as true the evidence presented to it. See Peddicord v. Franklin, 270 Md. 164, 174, 310 A.2d 561, 567 (1973); Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 35, 354 A.2d 499, 505 (1976). Had this been a contested case, my guess is that there would have been no need to address whether the proof of the defendant’s intent must be objective or subjective. The evidence presented in this record would have been sufficient. If believed by the factfinder the evidence presented would have supported a conviction for reckless endangerment, assuming, of course, that the conduct proved came under the statute. The trial court in a contested case would not have been obliged to accept as true the petitioner’s protestations that he lacked an appreciation of the risk or its seriousness.

. Focusing on the requisite intent, it is clear that even the cases relied upon by the majority have a subjective aspect. In People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32, 530 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530, 526 N.E.2d 20, 21 (1988), for example, the Court recognized that "a person acts recklessly when he is aware of but disregards, a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the degree that his behavior does not comport with the manner in which a reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances.” (Emphasis added) In Commonwealth v. Sanders, 339 Pa.Super. 373, 489 A.2d 207, 210 (1985), it was expressly recognized that:
A person commits the misdemeanor of recklessly endangering another person "if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury____” This section is, in effect, an ad hoc reckless conduct statute____ A sine qua non to a conviction is a conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily harm to another person____ (Citations omitted)
Thus, while, as the majority points out, the petitioner’s subjective expectation of what his risk creating conduct entails is not determinative, the majority is wrong when it suggests that the petitioner need not be aware of the risk created. Consciously to disregard a known risk or grossly to depart from a standard of conduct necessarily requires knowledge of the risk and the standard of conduct.