Court Opinion

ID: 9743628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:38:58.238903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:50.524324
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DOWNING, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I would affirm the dismissal of the defendant villages Hillside and Westchester for the following reasons: I The court should take judicial notice of the location, one-half mile west of Wolf Road on the north side of 22d Street, and whether it is located within either defendant village. It seems questionable whether two villages and the County of Cook would have joint jurisdiction. As the majority note (point IV), the village of Westchester raised this issue in the trial court and before this court. The village of Hillside did not raise the issue. This court can take judicial notice of the territorial boundaries of municipalities. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 24, pars. 2 — 1—1 and 7— 6 — 8; Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers secs. 46:12, 46:13 (4th ed. 1972); Sublette Exchange Bank v. Fitzgerald (1912), 168 Ill. App. 240; Bruson v. Clark (1894), 151 Ill. 495, 497, 38 N.E. 252.) We can also take judicial notice of a matter which the circuit court failed to so do. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 51, par. 48g; Wheeler v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 841, 852, 298 N.E.£d 329; Ashland Savings & Loan Association v. Aetna Insurance Co. (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77-78, 309 N.E.2d 293. According to the records of the County of Cook, the specific location alleged in the complaint is not located within either defendant village. If this is the fact, then I think the court should take judicial notice. It is recognized that the defendant villages failed to provide an adequate record on this point. However, in the interest of judicial economy, I would affirm the dismissal on this ground, subject to the right of the plaintiff to submit, during the time for petition for rehearing, any verified evidence to the contrary. I also realize that the more traditional procedure would be to remand the matter to the circuit court for a hearing. But this is really a simple issue which could be more efficiently handled in this fashion. II The complaint does not allege a reasonably foreseeable legal duty on the part of the defendant villages. In Cunis v. Brennan (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617, a minor thrown some 30 feet from an automobile following a collision had his leg impaled upon a drain pipe protruding from the ground on a parkway maintained by the defendant village of LaGrange. In concluding that the complaint did not allege a legal duty as to the village, the supreme court said: “[I]n determining whether there was a legal duty, the occurrence involved must not have been simply foreseeable ***; it must have been reasonably foreseeable. The creation of a legal duty requires more than a mere possibility of occurrence. *** Prosser (Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971), sec. 31, at 146) comments: ‘No man can be expected to guard against harm from events which are not reasonably to be anticipated at all, or are so unlikely to occur that the risk, although recognizable, would commonly be disregarded.’ In judging whether harm was legally foreseeable we consider what was apparent to the defendant at the time of his now complained of conduct, not what may appear through exercise of hindsight.” 56 Ill. 2d 372, 375-76, 308 N.E.2d 617, 619. As said in Ortiz v. City of Chicago (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 902, 908, 398 N.E.2d 1007, “[a] municipality is not expected to anticipate unusual or extraordinary happenings.” I think the conclusive nature of the allegations in the complaint present such an “unusual or extraordinary happening.” I realize there is always a clash between the desire of allowing a plaintiff a day in court and the duty of a plaintiff to file a legally cognizable complaint. In my opinion, this complaint is deficient in that it alleges conclusions rather than facts. Assuming the location to be within a defendant village, I do not find a legal duty on either village. Consequently, I would resolve the clash in favor of defendants and affirm the circuit court. III I concur as to the affirmance of counts I, III, V and VI and dissent as to counts II and IV.