Court Opinion

ID: 9443341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:17:57.95387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:27.377638
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
When a case starts going wrong there is probably little, if anything, an appellate judge can do to set things aright. In the present case we can perhaps console ourselves against concern for a possible partial failure of justice by the knowledge that li-bellant brought most of his troubles upon himself. I concur in the opinion on the main issue he attempted to raise and agree that he did enter into a formal contract by which he is bound. On two points only am (I troubled. I am not sure but that the work actually done may have afforded some benefit to the claimant here, beyond all the latter’s expenses, for which libellant should have recovery. And the case has resulted not merely in long delay, but in inordinate costs against the libellant — apparently totaling $2,200 already — for a reference to a ¡commissioner which should never have been ordered in the first place. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 3 Cir., 186 F.2d 393. But as to the first point, libellant, notwithstanding the lengthy proceedings, gave no. indication of any likelihood that he could prove a benefit against claimant’s contention of expense caused. And as to the second, libel-lant was at least partially responsible for the nature and course of the proceedings below. Consequently I am constrained1, albeit with some lingering doubt, to concur in the result.
One matter of wider interest than the fortunes of the parties deserves further mention. The opinion denies any relief to libellant for possible benefits conferred because his default under his contract was “wilful,” and not merely “negligent.” Those emotive words do often appear as claimed rationale in this troublesome field; but, as Professor Corbin has so clearly demonstrated, they are more valuable to characterize a result reached than to aid in decision. As he says of “wilful”: “Its use indicates a childlike faith in the existence of a plain and obvious line between the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue and unforgivable sin.” 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1123, 1951. Here libellant’s default was based on his conclusion — apparently sound — that his hurried night estimates were improvident. Is that business judgment wilful, whereas had he merely stalled completion, or otherwise been unbusiness-like, he would have been only negligent ? I endorse Professor Corbin’s view that we ought to reject these emotional grounds of decision and do what he demonstrates the courts tend to do in reality, namely, look to whether real benefit has been conferred or not. 5 Corbin, id. and notes 8,10, and 11.