Court Opinion

ID: 9557453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:21.354596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.566266
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
specially concurring:
I concur in the announced result, which I feel can be arrived at more directly and definitely than appears in the opinion delivered by the Chief Justice.
The parties appear here in the same order as they appeared in the trial court. I refer to them by name.
Jaynes’ action was to recover attorney’s fees alleged to be due him from Marrow.
Neither party demanded a jury trial within the time limits set forth in Rule 38 (b), R.C.P. Colo. More than one year after the time allotted for so doing had expired, Marrow filed his written demand for a jury trial and offered no reason for his tardiness. Jaynes filed written objections to the granting of Marrow’s demand.
The trial judge did not expressly grant Marrow’s demand but did overrule Jaynes’ objections, and in so doing stated in pertinent part:
“The court overrules the objection of the plaintiff to the calling of a jury for the trial of this case for the reason that the same would not prejudice the plaintiff. Ample time has been given to the plaintiff for such jury trial.”
A jury was called, trial had resulting in a verdict in favor of Marrow and judgment entered on the verdict.
Jaynes is here by writ of error seeking reversal and remand for trial without a jury.
There is no contention or even suggestion by Jaynes *143that the verdict and judgment thereon are not correct, nor is there contention or suggestion that complete substantive justice has not been done.
Counsel for Jaynes confines his argument to the alleged procedural injustice perpetrated in compelling Jaynes to try the case before a jury and seeks reversal on that and no other ground.
Marrow failed to exercise procedural rights granted to him by Rule 38 (b), R.C.P., and any rights that he may have had to a trial by jury were lost as provided by Rule 38 (d),R.C.P.:
“(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand [for jury] as required by this rule and to file it as required by rule 5 (d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. * *
Marrow’s motion for a jury trial should have been denied; Jaynes’ objections should have been sustained and the trial court’s rulings to the contrary were erroneous. However, the error is harmless and any discussion of the correctness of the court’s rulings with reference to the motion and objections is, for reasons hereinafter stated, purely academic.
Rule 39 (b), R.C.P., states in pertinent part:
“ * * * notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made, the court in its discretion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues.”
This rule imposes no duty on the trial judge; he does not, under this rule, have to rule upon any matter presented by the litigants in making his determination. The rule provides for affirmative action. It grants to the trial judge, charged with the duty of seeing to it that disputed facts are properly resolved, carte blanche authority to “in [his] its discretion” or in other words, “if he so chooses,” enlist the aid of a jury in the performance of his judicial duties. In the exercise of this authority he is subject to no limitation or restraint other than his judicial conscience may impose.
*144Trial by jury, a cherished appurtenance to our judicial process, is not bad per se, and abuses or failures, when they occur, are subject to correction by the court. Prejudicial error cannot arise out of permitting a jury to pass upon questions of fact.
Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Knauss join in the foregoing.