Court Opinion

ID: 9550967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:45:48.764892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:50.005993
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion in this case. Although I would agree with the Court’s holding that Mr. Whelan, by virtue of the statute, had a vendor’s lien, I disagree with the Court’s analysis with respect to waiver of that lien.
*292Title 42 O.S.1971, § 26, provides that the seller of real property has a special or vendor’s lien for “so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured . . In the case before us, the entire debt was secured by the pledge of stock. The fact that the stock turned out to be relatively worthless is immaterial. The material fact is how much of the debt the pledge was meant to secure, not how much the pledged property is worth. See 77 Am.Jur.2d 572, “Vendor and Purchaser”, § 410, which states:
“As a general rule, the taking of other independent security for the purchase money does operate as an implied waiver of the lien, and the fact that said security proves worthless is immaterial.”
I believe that the emphasis, in the Majority Opinion, placed on the value of the collateral was erroneous, and for that reason I must dissent.
I am authorized to state that LAVENDER, V. C. J., and BERRY, J., concur in the views herein expressed.