Court Opinion

ID: 9859563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:01:38.622173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:53:01.951922
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting from division II).
I would like to achieve the result which the court majority reaches in division II but I think the language and purpose of § 96.-16(4) do not permit it. The majority says the error here is not the kind which comes within § 96.16(4), but that section does not differentiate between kinds of errors; it authorizes recovery for “any” error, and any means every or all. Moreover, individuals on strike are not entitled to unemployment benefits but the commission errone*705ously paid benefits anyway, and the very purpose of § 96.16(4) is to protect the unemployment benefits fund from erroneous payments.
I. The commission made two errors here leading to its payment of benefits. The first was its erroneous initial determination of eligibility, which it corrected upon subsequent full appeal. That error was compounded by a second error in thinking that Iowa Beef was not going to appeal from the initial determination when no appeal was taken by November 23, 1973 — whereas Iowa Beef had not yet then received the initial determination through the mail. With a complicated statute such as chapter 96, which makes entitlement or disentitlement hinge on myriad factual and legal situations, all sorts of errors in making payments are bound to occur — errors on facts, on procedure, or on interpretation of the chapter.
Early in the life of chapter 96, the legislature evidently recognized the need, by statutory authorization, for recovery by the commission of benefits paid on account of any error. The question is whether we are going to give full effect to that statutory authorization according to its language and intent. The unemployment benefits chapter first appeared in the Code of 1939. Subsection 1551.22(D) of the chapter provided in pertinent part:
Any person who, by reason of the nondisclosure or misrepresentation by him or by another, of a material fact (irrespective of whether such nondisclosure or misrepresentation was known or fraudulent) has received any sum as benefits under this chapter while any conditions for the receipt of benefits imposed by this chapter were not fulfilled, or while he was disqualified for receiving benefits, shall, in the discretion of the commission, either be liable to have such sum deducted from any future benefits payable to him under this chapter or shall be liable to repay to the commission for the unemployment compensation fund, a sum equal to the amount so received by him, and such sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in section 1551.20 subsection “B” for the collection of past-due contributions.
In 1941 the legislature amended the subsection by adding to the first part the following words which I have italicized:
Any person who, by reason of any error, or by reason of the nondisclosure or misrepresentation . . . . 49 G.A. ch. 104, § 1.
The commission is correct that the present case comes within the language of § 96.16(4). Claimants received unemployment benefits. They received the benefits while they were ineligible. They received the benefits due to errors — the commission’s error in its initial determination of eligibility and its error in thinking Iowa Beef was not going to appeal. The commission had blocked the funds but released them when the date it thought was the last for appeal had passed. We give “any” in the section its ordinary broad signification. § 4.1(2). “Any” means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1960). See also State v. Steenhoek, 182 N.W.2d 377, 379 (Iowa) (“any” is “synonymous with ‘every’ and ‘all’ ”); Herman v. Muhs, 256 Iowa 38, 126 N.W.2d 400; Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Bettendorf, 241 Iowa 358, 41 N.W.2d 1; Gatewood v. Russel], 29 Colo.App. 11, 478 P.2d 679; Williams v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 30 Conn.Sup. 123, 303 A.2d 749; State v. Rucker, 211 Md. 153, 126 A.2d 846; State v. Continental Baking Co., 72 Wash.2d 138, 431 P.2d 993. The court said this regarding “any” in Motor Cargo, Inc. v. Board of Twp. Trustees of Richfield Twp., 52 Ohio Op. 257, 259, 117 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Com.Pl.), “In construing statutes the word ‘any’ is equivalent and has the force of ‘every’ or ‘all’.” Also, “The word ‘any’ excludes selection or distinction.” The court stated in the case of In re Belefski’s Estate, 413 Pa. 365, 375, 196 A.2d 850, 855, “The word ‘any’ is generally used in the sense of ‘all’ or ‘every’ and its meaning is most comprehensive.” And in Hime v. City of Galveston, 268 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex.Civ. *706App.), “Further, the word ‘any’ has been construed to mean: ‘each’ or ’every’ or ‘all’. (Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., p. 119); and particularly in construing statutes, the word ‘any’ is equivalent to and has the force of ‘every’ and ‘all’.” Other definitions are “ ‘indiscriminately of whatever kind,’ or ‘no matter what one’ ”, Bale v. Ryder, 290 A.2d 359, 360 (Me.); “all-comprehensive and the equivalent of the words ‘every’ . . . and ‘all’ ”, Hamilton Fire Ins. Co. v. Cervantes, 278 S.W.2d 20, 24 (Mo.App.); “defined judicially to mean ‘all’ or ‘every’ and the use of the word imports no limitation”, Shilbury v. Board of Supervisors of County of Sullivan, 54 Misc.2d 979, 982, 284 N.Y.S.2d 124, 129. Manifestly the errors here come within the words “any error.”
II. Since § 96.16(4) covers the present situation, by virtue of that section the commission has an “interest” in recovering the benefits erroneously paid for the unemployment compensation fund.
III. Claimants contend, however, that although the language of § 96.16(4) applies, the commission is estopped to recover the benefits because its representatives notified claimants to file claims. But in so doing, the representatives did only what they had a right to do — notified claimants to file so that the weeks in question would not be lost in case claimants ultimately prevailed. When claims are ultimately found otherwise valid, unemployment compensation claimants do not take kindly to denial of past weeks’ benefits upon application of the rule that claims cannot be back dated. See Ritchey v. Iowa Employment Security Comm’n, 216 N.W.2d 580 (Iowa).
Claimants also contend that repayment of the benefits will work hardship on them, and the district court mentioned this factor in its findings. I realize that the union strike benefits probably are not large. Nonetheless, probably most unemployment-benefit claimants are in straitened circumstances; they are out of work. Requiring repayment works financial hardship on them whatever the cause of the error for the commission’s payment of the benefits. But the legislature must have been cognizant of this when it amended § 96.16(4) to permit recovery for “any” error. If we refuse to let the commission enforce § 96.-16(4) here, we invade the policy province of the legislature. This we should not do.
Unemployment benefits were erroneously paid to persons who were not entitled to them. Section 96.16(4) authorizes recovery for “any” error, and the purpose of the section is to protect the fund against just such payments. I would reverse on this branch of the case also.
REYNOLDSON, J., joins in this dissent.