Court Opinion

ID: 9899883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:11.027308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.902732
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Haynes CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A163965
 v.
 DAMONE HAYNES,                                                          (Alameda County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No. 20CR002198)

         Defendant appeals from a judgment following his conviction by a jury
for murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); first count),1 carjacking (§ 215, subd.
(a); third count), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
fourth–fifth counts), and enhancements for personally and intentionally
discharging a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d)), personally
using a firearm (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and personally
inflicting great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant seeks reversal
on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
carjacking and felony murder; there was instructional error allowing for the
possibility that some jurors based their verdict on the felony-murder theory
for which there was insufficient evidence; and his codefendant’s counsel acted

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated

otherwise.

                                                               1
as a “second prosecutor,” which made defendant’s trial grossly unfair and
denied him due process of law. We affirm.2
                              BACKGROUND
I.    Shooting and Initial Investigation
      Defendant and his codefendant Anthony Rhodes (Rhodes) were tried
together for the murder and carjacking of Charles Billings. Terrell Martinez
(Martinez) was also charged with carjacking and being an accessory to the
murder. Martinez’s case was severed for trial.
      At 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 2019, Oakland police were dispatched to
Bancroft Avenue in Oakland after 911 calls reported a man lying in the
roadway. The police found Charles Billings lying face down in the bike lane
with multiple gunshot wounds. He had been shot in his temple, chest, hand,
hip, and thigh. He had $500 in his pocket and a black mark on his shirt
suggesting he was shot at close range. Billings was pronounced dead at the
scene.
      A witness at the scene provided police with the license plate number of
Billings’s van. The van was not present at the scene when police arrived.
The police also obtained surveillance video from several homes in the area.3
The video shows a black sedan pull behind Billings’s van at approximately
2:48 a.m. The passenger in the front seat exits the sedan and approaches the
van. About 45 seconds later, a second man exits the rear of the sedan and
walks to the van. Two or three flashes illuminate the inside of the van, and

      2 By separate order filed this date, we deny Haynes’s petition for writ of

habeas corpus (case No. A166983) raising claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
      3 The surveillance video of the incident was described by the prosecutor

as “very grainy and very far away,” such that the specific individuals could
not be identified.

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Billings falls out of the van onto the road. The driver of the sedan exits the
vehicle. The gunman walks around to the back of the van and fires another
round in Billings’s direction. The gunman walks toward Billings and fires
three more rounds at him. As the gunman then walks toward the back of the
van, the van drives away. The gunman then walks up to Billings and fires
another round at very close range. At 2:51 a.m., the sedan pulls forward, the
gunman enters the sedan, and the sedan follows the van.
      Surveillance footage from a gas station showed the sedan traveling on
98th Avenue with Billings’s van close behind, at 2:54 a.m. Surveillance
footage from cameras in San Leandro show a black Impala sedan and
Billings’s van traveling close together shortly after 6:00 a.m.
      On July 31, 2019, the police located Billings’s van in San Leandro. Two
shell casings were recovered on the front passenger seat. There were two
strike marks on the driver’s side armrest and bullet holes in the interior of
the driver’s door. The police also recovered suspected heroin and cocaine.
      On August 4, 2019, the police located and towed the Impala sedan seen
in the surveillance video. Terrell Martinez’s DNA was found on the steering
wheel.
II.   Martinez’s Testimony
      Martinez testified that he met defendant when the two were in prison
in 1999. In 2019, Martinez met Rhodes through defendant. On the night of
July 25, 2019, Martinez was at home, where he lived with his girlfriend,
Ericka J., when defendant called him, looking for heroin. At 2:00 a.m. on
July 26, defendant and Rhodes went to Martinez’s home, asking for heroin.
Martinez said he did not have any, and Rhodes and defendant said they knew
someone who had some. Rhodes called Devon B., but Devon B. said he was
out of town. Then Rhodes suggested they go meet Billings, and he asked

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Martinez for a ride. They agreed that defendant and Rhodes would buy
heroin from Billings and give some to Martinez in exchange for giving them a
ride. Martinez drove Ericka’s black Passat.4 Rhodes was in the front
passenger seat, and defendant was in the back seat behind Rhodes.
Defendant directed Martinez to Billings’s location, and he parked behind the
van.
       Rhodes got out of the car and walked up to the van’s passenger side.
Rhodes opened the rear passenger side door and leaned into the van. About a
minute later, Rhodes waived defendant over. Defendant walked up to the
van and opened the front passenger door. Martinez heard two pops and
looked up. He saw Billings get out of the van on the driver’s side, screaming,
and walk toward the back of the van. Billings fell onto the street near the
back bumper of the van. Martinez froze in disbelief. Martinez jumped out of
the car and asked defendant what he was doing. Defendant walked to the
back of the van and shot Billings a couple of times while Billings was on the
ground. Rhodes drove away in the van. Defendant told Martinez to get back
in the car, and he complied. Defendant got in the front passenger seat of the
car, held the gun in his lap, and told Martinez to follow the van.
       Martinez pulled alongside the van at a stoplight, and defendant told
Rhodes to follow them. Defendant directed Martinez to drive to San Leandro,
and Rhodes followed in the van. Defendant made a phone call during the
drive. Martinez drove, at defendant’s direction, to a parking lot behind
Marcello M.’s apartment complex. At the time, Martinez did not know
Marcello M. The gate to the parking lot was open when he arrived. Rhodes
parked the van on the street outside the complex. Defendant and Rhodes

       4 Martinez had access to Ericka J.’s black Volkswagen Passat and a

black Chevrolet Impala owned by Ericka J.’s mother, Verva J.

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searched the van for about 10 to 15 minutes while it was parked on the
street. Then they told Martinez to search the van, and he did so for about 5
to 10 minutes, but he did not find anything. Defendant and Rhodes gave
Martinez some “IDs and paperwork” and told him to throw it away. When
Martinez went to throw away the papers, it looked as though defendant and
Rhodes were showing each other something, but Martinez could not tell what
it was.
       The three of them got back into the Passat. Defendant and Rhodes told
Martinez to drive them to 98th Avenue in Oakland. Martinez dropped them
off there, and then he went back home.
       Rhodes arrived at Martinez’s home at 6:30 a.m. and told Martinez that
defendant wanted Rhodes and Martinez to move the van. Martinez drove
Rhodes back to San Leandro in Verva J.’s Chevrolet Impala. Rhodes moved
the van about two blocks away. Martinez then drove to a convenience store
and a methadone clinic before dropping Rhodes off at a BART station.
       Martinez was interviewed during the police investigation. The police
did not show Martinez the surveillance video before they spoke with him.
Martinez initially said he knew nothing about the incident. He then told the
police that he went to Billings’s van to buy heroin but did not know what was
going to happen and as soon as the shooting started he drove off alone and
went straight home. Eventually, Martinez told the police the more detailed
version of what happened. Martinez testified at trial without any
agreements from the district attorney’s office.
III.   Telephone Records
       The police reviewed Billings’s cell phone records and found that three
hours before the shooting, Billings received a call from a number ending in
6544. The 6544 number was registered to Gloria P. Thirteen minutes before

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the shooting, the 6544 number received a call from a number ending in 6322.
Martinez testified that in July 2019, Rhodes loaned him a phone with the
6322 number and he used it for about a month and a half. However,
Martinez said that on the night of the incident, Rhodes used the phone with
the 6322 number to contact Devon B. Based on cell tower records, both
phones were in East Oakland 13 minutes before the shooting. An inspector
from the Office of the Alameda County District Attorney was qualified as an
expert in cell phone detail interpretation and cell phone plotting. He
reviewed phone records provided to him, including records for the 6544
number and the 6322 number. He testified that between 2:37 a.m. and 3 a.m.
on July 26, 2019, there was no contact between these two phones, which
suggested to him that the people using the phones were together. Both
phones continued to communicate with each other after the murder and
appeared to travel to San Leandro. Immediately after the shooting, the 6544
number also made repeated attempts to contact Marcello M.’s phone number.
Ten minutes after the shooting, the 6322 number used a cell tower less than
a mile from where Billings’s van was found.
      When defendant was arrested at a home in Hayward, the police
searched the residence and found four phones, including the 6544 number. A
woman named Sandra P. (with the same last name as Gloria P.) was present
in the home at the time of defendant’s arrest.
                                DISCUSSION
I.    Sufficient Evidence Supports Carjacking and Felony-murder
      Theory
      Defendant was charged with murder under two theories:
premeditation and deliberation (§ 187, subd. (a)), and felony murder based on
a carjacking (§§ 189, subd. (e)(1), 215, subd. (a)). He was also charged
separately with carjacking. The jury was instructed on first degree murder

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based on premeditation and deliberation, and on felony murder premised on
an unlawful killing during the commission or attempted commission of
carjacking and as a coparticipant in the carjacking. (CALCRIM Nos. 521,
540A, 540B.) The jury was also instructed with CALCRIM No. 548 as
follows: “The defendant has been prosecuted for murder under two theories:
(1) malice aforethought, and (2) felony murder. Each theory of murder has
different requirements, and I will instruct you on each. You may not find the
defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree that the People have
proved that the defendant committed murder under at least one of these
theories. You do not all need to agree on the same theory, but you must
unanimously agree whether the murder is in the first or second degree.”
         Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his
convictions for carjacking and felony murder based on carjacking.
Specifically, he claims there is no substantial evidence that he intended to
steal Billings’s van when he used force against him. We disagree.
         Carjacking “is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession
of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, . . . against his or
her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the
person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession,
accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 215, subd. (a).) “The requisite
intent—to deprive the possessor of possession—must exist before or during
the use of force.” (People v. Gomez (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 609, 618,
disapproved on other grounds in People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523;
§ 20.)
         “ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in
a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could
find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal,

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we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] ‘Although we must
ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it
is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility
of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination
depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute
our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.
[Citations.]’ ” (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)
      Defendant argues there was no evidence that he and his coperpetrators
intended to steal Billings’s van or that they killed him in order to take his
van. Instead, defendant asserts that the evidence shows they drove to
Billings’s location in their own vehicle and, thus, did not need Billings’s van
to escape. Nor was there any evidence that this was a “ ‘thrill seeking theft’ ”
or that any words were spoken or threats made to Billings demanding that he
relinquish the van. Defendant further argues there was no evidence that he
and his coperpetrators wanted to steal drugs or money from the van or from
the victim, given that the police recovered drugs from the van and the scene
of the shooting and found $500 in Billings’s pocket. Finally, defendant claims
there was no evidence of any preconceived plan to search the van or that
anything was taken from the van. However, he acknowledges Martinez’s
testimony that after the van was searched, defendant directed Martinez to
throw away some “IDs and paperwork.” According to defendant, the evidence
suggests Billings was shot for reasons other than the taking of his van.
      While defendant posits alternative inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence, this is not enough to warrant reversal. (People v. Ochoa, supra,

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6 Cal.4th at p. 1206; People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215 [where
the circumstances reasonably justify jury’s findings, a judgment may not be
reversed simply because circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding].)
      While there is no direct evidence of defendant’s stating an intention to
steal Billings’s van, the circumstances support the jury’s finding. (See People
v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 355 [“Mental state and intent are rarely
susceptible of direct proof and must therefore be proven circumstantially”].)
Defendant arrived at the scene with his coperpetrator and then shot Billings,
who fell out of his van. As soon as Billings was out of the van, defendant’s
coperpetrator immediately drove the van away. Defendant followed close
behind the van and then directed Martinez to move in front of the van as they
traveled to San Leandro. Once they arrived at the San Leandro location,
defendant and his coperpetrator searched the van and then directed Martinez
to throw away paperwork. It also appeared to Martinez that after defendant
and Rhodes searched the van, they were looking at something, but Martinez
could not see what it was. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could
find that defendant formed the intent to steal the van before or during his
use of force against Billings. As explained in People v. Johnson (2015) 60
Cal.4th 966, where the defendant entered the victim’s home, killed her, and
then took her car from the garage, “[t]he jury could readily conclude
defendant intended to steal when he entered the victim’s house with a
weapon and beat her to death. It did not have to conclude he killed the
victim for no apparent reason and only then decided to steal. When one kills
and then takes substantial property from the victim, a reasonable jury can
ordinarily find the killing was for the purpose of taking the property.” (Id. at
pp. 971, 988; see People v. Gomez, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 622 [act of

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taking a car by one who steals the keys can imply that the key thief intended
to steal the car when the thief took the keys].)
      We reject defendant’s claim there was insufficient evidence to support
his conviction for carjacking and first degree murder under a felony-murder
theory based upon carjacking. Accordingly, we need not consider defendant’s
argument that his murder conviction must be reversed because there is a
reasonable probability that the jury relied upon the allegedly
unsubstantiated felony-murder theory.
II.   Unanimity Instruction
      Defendant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with
CALCRIM No. 548 and failing to instruct with CALCRIM No. 3500
(unanimity instruction). He claims his constitutional rights were violated by
the failure to instruct the jury that they needed to be unanimous as to the
theory of first degree murder. However, his argument is based upon his
claim that the felony-murder theory was unsubstantiated because there was
insufficient evidence to establish the intent element of carjacking. It is well
settled that a unanimity instruction is not required where a defendant is
charged with first degree murder under alternative theories of premeditation
and felony murder. (See People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 44 [declining
to reconsider settled precedent holding, “ ‘ “[A]s long as each juror is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty of murder as
that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide unanimously by which
theory he is guilty” ’ ”].) As discussed post, we find sufficient evidence
supports defendant’s conviction for carjacking. Accordingly, as defendant
recognizes, where there is sufficient evidence on both theories of first degree
murder, the lack of a unanimity instruction does not require reversal.
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639.)

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III.   Codefendant’s counsel’s actions did not result in grossly unfair
       trial or violate defendant’s due process rights.
       Defendant’s final argument is that reversal is required because
Rhodes’s counsel acted as a “second prosecutor” in their joint trial, which
made defendant’s trial grossly unfair and violated his due process rights.
Defendant acknowledges that this case involved defendants charged with
common crimes and involved common events and victims and was thus a
“ ‘classic case’ ” for a joint trial. (§ 1098; People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th
686, 713.) Defendant did not move to sever his trial from codefendant
Rhodes, and he does not contend that the trial court erred in failing to sever
the trials or that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting severance.
Instead, defendant argues that his claim is cognizable on appeal because
even when joinder is proper before evidence is presented, a reviewing court
may still reverse a conviction where, because of joinder, “ ‘ “ ‘a gross
unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due
process of law.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Flinner, at p. 713.)
       As explained in People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 851, while some
appellate courts have reached the merits of a defendant’s constitutional
arguments even when no motion to sever was made, the California Supreme
Court has never held that review for gross unfairness is available in the
absence of a motion to sever. We find that even assuming such review is
available, defendant has not established any gross unfairness or due process
violations resulting from joinder.
       Defendant complains that Rhodes’s counsel implicated defendant
during his opening statement by telling the jury that defendant and Martinez
were in contact before and after the homicide and that they planned the

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murder with others.5 He further complains that Rhodes’s counsel’s cross-
examination of Officer Moriarty “assumed the ultimate fact that [defendant]
had been using the 6455- number [sic]” and that defendant was present
before, during and after the murder. Rhodes also offered a cell phone expert
who testified that the 6455 phone was in Oakland on July 26th at 2:37 a.m.
and traveled to San Leandro by 3:03 a.m. Defendant acknowledges that
objections were sustained as to many of codefendant Rhodes’s exhibits but
states, without further analysis, that “they were, nonetheless, effectively
used to spotlight [defendant] as the shooter.” Finally, defendant complains
that Rhodes’s counsel’s closing argument emphasized that defendant,
Martinez, Marcello M., and Devon B. made over 100 phone calls to each other
over a two-day period and stated that they were a “clique” planning the
murder.6

      5 One example from Rhodes’s counsel’s opening statement is when he

discusses the surveillance video of the shooting and states: “Then in the
video you see that initially an unknown man, average size, apparently
walking up to Billings’ van. At 2:50:37 you see a man limp up the van.
2:50:54 Martinez gets out of his car. He opens the door, and he stands there,
and he watches the murder go down. 2:51:13 Martinez picks up Haynes in
the car after the final shot. Martinez leads the way past 98th. The van
follows Martinez to [Marcello M.’s] apartment in San Leandro. Haynes calls
[Marcello M.] seven times.” (Sic.)
      6 Rhodes’s counsel stated in his closing argument:   “You may recall
from my opening statement that I presented you with a timeline of the phone
calls, more than 100 phone calls between four men—Martinez, Haynes,
[Devon B.], and [Marcello M.]—over the course of a two-day period, and you
are going to see those calls are not random. This is a matter of something
that is being planned, something that is likely been [sic] festering for quite a
while. Just exactly what the issue was is not entirely clear, but we do know
that these are dope dealers with a heroin run with four ounces of heroin.” He
further argued, “[W]e got [Devon B.], we got Terrell Martinez, [Marcello M.],
and Damone Haynes. That’s a clique, you know. That’s a group of people
that have known each other since high school. Anthony Rhodes is not part of

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      Our Supreme Court has rejected the “second prosecutor” argument
advanced by defendant in cases where there are actual conflicting defenses7
and has found that “[s]imply because the prosecution’s case will be stronger if
defendants are tried together, or that one defense undermines another, does
not render a joint trial unfair.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014)
60 Cal.4th 335, 379.) “[W]hen there is sufficient independent evidence of the
defendants’ guilt, the actual presentation of conflicting defenses at trial does
not reduce the prosecution’s burden or otherwise result in gross unfairness.”
(Id. at p. 380.) Here, there was independent evidence supporting defendant’s
conviction, including Martinez’s eyewitness testimony and testimony that the
cell phone number the police associated with defendant was found in the
house where defendant was arrested. Rhodes’s counsel’s references to cell
phone records for the phone number associated with defendant did not reduce
the prosecution’s burden or make defendant’s trial grossly unfair. Much of
what defendant complains of were statements Rhodes’s counsel made during
opening statements and closing arguments. The jury was instructed that
statements and argument of counsel are not evidence. (CALCRIM Nos. 104,
200.) We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v.
Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 717.) Further, Rhodes’s counsel clarified
during his argument that a phone number is not necessarily a proxy for a
person, but that he assumed defendant possessed the phone with the 6544
number. Similarly, when he cross-examined Officer Moriarty, Rhodes’s
counsel referred to the phone number that Officer Moriarty “associate[ed]

this clique. He’s not someone they’re going to share information with about
committing a homicide.”
      7 Rhodes and defendant did not have conflicting defenses where they

each asserted the other was alone culpable. Rather, they both argued that
the phone records did not prove who was using the phones.

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with [defendant] . . . .” Nor did Rhodes’s cell phone expert’s testimony
regarding the location of the 6544 phone violate defendant’s rights. The
People’s cell phone expert and investigating police officer testified to the
same information.
      As the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Jackson (1996)
13 Cal.4th 1164, when it rejected a similar “second prosecutor” argument,
“[The defendant] does not identify any evidence elicited by [the codefendant’s]
counsel that would have been inadmissible at a separate trial. The mere fact
that a damaging cross-examination that the prosecution could have
undertaken was performed instead by codefendant’s counsel did not
compromise any of defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights.” (Ibid.;
People v. Flinner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 716 [“ ‘no denial of a fair trial
results from the mere fact that two defendants who are jointly tried have
antagonistic defenses’ and one offers evidence ‘that is damaging to the other
and thus helpful to the prosecution’ ”].)
      Defendant has not established that the action of Rhodes’s counsel
caused defendant’s trial to be grossly unfair or violated defendant’s due
process rights.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                             Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A163965/People v. Damone Haynes

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