Court Opinion

ID: 9646934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:17:04.604951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:43.839675
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion holds plaintiff’s claims against defendants Muster and Eve-loff for abuse of process and for malicious prosecution are sufficiently stated. I do not agree and would affirm the judgment of dismissal of all counts. I adopt portions of the opinion prepared for the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals by Andrew Jackson Higgins, Special Judge, which follow without the use of quotation marks.
The elements to sustain an action for abuse of process are: (1) that the defendant made an illegal, improper, perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of process; and (3) that damage resulted from the irregularity. National Motor Club of Missouri, Inc. v. Noe, 475 S.W.2d 16, 24 (Mo.1972).
Plaintiff’s petition does not demonstrate that defendant lawyers made an illegal, improper or perverted use of process in the habeas corpus proceeding. The writ of ha-beas corpus is properly employed to procure custody and possession of a minor child where the parent to whom custody was awarded is enforcing such award. In re Wakefield, 365 Mo. 415, 283 S.W.2d 467, 471-472 (banc 1955); In re R. L. K., 508 S.W.2d 232 (Mo.App.1974). This is so even though another court may have concurrent jurisdiction where the purpose of the writ is not to interfere with the other court’s jurisdiction but to properly secure custody pending any change of custody under consideration. In re L. G., 502 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.App.1973). The writ of attachment is properly employed to secure compliance with the writ of habeas corpus. See Rule 91.19, which provides that if a person upon whom a writ of habeas corpus is served refuses or neglects to obey the same within the time prescribed without excuse shown, an attachment for his person shall issue commanding his apprehension and immediate delivery to the court. And although Rule 91.15 provides that return to a writ of habe-as corpus shall be made within 24 hours, return may be required forthwith or immediately; the court is not required to allow the maximum time for return. State v. Nangle, 365 Mo. 198, 280 S.W.2d 96, 99 (banc 1955).
The elements of an action for malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or prosecution of the proceedings against the present plaintiff; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant; (3) its termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and (6) damage by reason thereof. McFarland v. Union Finance Co., 471 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo.App.1971); Huffstutler v. Coates, 335 S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo.1960).
Plaintiff’s petition does not demonstrate that defendant lawyers acted in absence of probable cause and with malice. Attorneys have the right to act and advise upon information the client reveals to them. Nothing short of complete knowledge on the part of the attorneys that the action is groundless and that the client is acting solely for illegal or malicious motives should make them liable for their actions. Peck v. Chouteau, 91 Mo. 138, 3 S.W. 577, 581 (1887). See also Henderson v. Cape Trading Co., 316 Mo. 384, 289 S.W. 332 (1926). The client has a duty of inquiry prior to institution of suit, Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47, 67 S.W. 650 (1902); but failure of the client to do so does not give rise to a cause of action against the attorneys who act on the infor*687mation given them, Peck v. Chouteau, supra.
Appellant argues that the foregoing principles of law do not apply to defendants because the petition alleges that they “knew” that the child was not in plaintiff’s custody, “knowingly and wilfully” acted in violation of law, and “maliciously, without reasonable or probable cause” acted with intent to injure plaintiff. The habeas corpus action and the aiding writ of attachment had, for their foundation, facts verified by Sarah Iveda Stafford; and defendants’ actions therein did not, as previously shown, expose them to actions for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff’s allegations that defendants’ actions were knowing, wilful, or malicious are but conclusions which are not admitted by a motion to dismiss and are not facts supportive of inferences. Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 396 S.W.2d 566, 569-570 (Mo.1965); Tolliver v. Standard Oil Co., 431 S.W.2d 159 (Mo.1968).
I respectfully dissent.