Court Opinion

ID: 9399380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 19:01:23.664025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.546577
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11822    Document: 21-1      Date Filed: 06/02/2023   Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11822
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        BRANDON RASHAD DOWDELL,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 7:21-cr-00017-WLS-TQL-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11822

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Defendant Brandon Dowdell appeals his conviction for
        being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g)(1). On appeal, Dowdell argues that the district court erred
        (1) in dismissing his original November 13, 2018, indictment
        without prejudice, rather than with prejudice; and (2) in denying
        his motion to dismiss his subsequent May 12, 2021, indictment for
        the same offense. After careful review of the record and the parties’
        briefs, we affirm.
                       I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               Because this appeal involves both statutory and
        constitutional speedy trial claims, we recount the procedural
        history in detail.
        A.    2018 Indictment and Initial Appearance
                On November 13, 2018, a federal grand jury indicted
        Dowdell with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dowdell was appointed
        counsel on November 27, 2018, but he was not arrested on this
        § 922(g) indictment until August 12, 2019.
               Then on August 13, 2019, pursuant to a writ of ad
        prosequendum, Dowdell was brought before the federal district
        court for his initial appearance. At this time, Dowdell was
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        22-11822               Opinion of the Court                         3

        incarcerated on state charges in the Lowndes County Jail in
        Valdosta, Georgia.
              At Dowdell’s initial appearance, a magistrate judge ordered
        that Dowdell be detained pending trial. That same day, the
        magistrate judge issued a pretrial order directing the parties to turn
        over discovery by September 12, 2019.
        B.    Government’s Motion to Continue
               On October 21, 2019, the government moved under the
        Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, to continue Dowdell’s trial in
        furtherance of the ends of justice. It asserted that a “continuance
        would best serve the interests of justice and would not unduly
        prejudice either party.” It also requested that the period of delay
        be excluded from the speedy trial clock.
              Dowdell opposed this motion, arguing that a continuance
        was not warranted because the speedy trial clock already had
        expired.
        C.    Dowdell’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment with Prejudice
                One week later, on October 28, 2019, Dowdell, through
        counsel, moved to dismiss his indictment with prejudice under the
        Speedy Trial Act, asserting that more than 70 days had elapsed
        since his November 13, 2018, indictment and his August 13, 2019,
        initial appearance. Dowdell observed that, once the speedy trial
        clock expires, a district court has discretion to dismiss the
        indictment with or without prejudice after considering the 18
        U.S.C. § 3162(a) factors. Dowdell also contended that (1) the
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11822

        pretrial delay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,
        and (2) the government failed to comply with its discovery
        obligations, in violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights
        and the magistrate judge’s pretrial order.
               On January 9, 2020, the district court held a hearing on
        Dowdell’s October 28 motion to dismiss. During this hearing,
        Dowdell argued that he was in the Lowndes County Jail for
        approximately 270 days because there was a “federal hold” on his
        case. He also contended that the 2018 indictment should be
        dismissed with prejudice because (1) he had been unable to
        investigate his case or prepare a defense, (2) he did not receive
        discovery from the government for over a year, and (3) he could
        have difficulty tracking down witnesses for his trial.
               As to the November 2018 indictment, the government
        responded that (1) the speedy trial period did not begin to run until
        August 13, 2019, when Dowdell made his initial appearance;
        (2) under § 3161, the government’s October 21 motion tolled the
        speedy trial clock; and (3) the 70-day deadline had not expired.
        Instead, the government pointed out that only 68 days had expired.
              Alternatively, the government requested that, if the district
        court determined that there was a speedy trial violation, the
        indictment be dismissed without prejudice.
                 Regarding the discovery delays, the government stated that
        (1) it had issues uploading the discovery materials to its server, and
        (2) it sent the discovery to Dowdell by FedEx on October 30, 2019,
        only about a month after the September 12 discovery deadline.
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        22-11822              Opinion of the Court                        5

                At the conclusion of the January 2020 hearing, the district
        court dismissed Dowdell’s indictment without prejudice. The
        court observed that (1) Dowdell’s counsel “sat on [his] hands for
        the better part of a year” and did not bring the speedy trial matter
        to the court’s attention; and (2) if the court had known about the
        issue, it “would have taken steps to correct it.”
        D.    2021 Indictment and Initial Appearance
              On May 12, 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Dowdell with
        one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation
        of § 922(g)(1), based on the same conduct underlying the
        November 2018 indictment.
                On May 17, 2021, the government secured another writ of
        ad prosequendum so that Dowdell, who was still incarcerated in the
        Lowndes County Jail, could be brought before the district court for
        his initial appearance.
               On June 22, 2021, Dowdell’s initial appearance was held
        before a magistrate judge. Dowdell consented to pretrial detention
        “in light of [his] pending state charges.”
        E.    Denial of Dowdell’s July 16, 2021, Motion to Dismiss the
              2021 Indictment
               On July 16, 2021, Dowdell moved to dismiss his 2021
        indictment with prejudice, arguing that (1) the speedy trial clock
        had expired, (2) the 974-day pretrial delay between his November
        2018 indictment and his July 2021 motion to dismiss violated his
        constitutional speedy trial rights, (3) the district court back in
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11822

        January 2020 should have dismissed his 2018 indictment with
        prejudice, and (4) he was prejudiced by the government’s failure to
        try him within the deadlines established by the Speedy Trial Act
        and the Sixth Amendment.
                On November 16, 2021, the district court denied Dowdell’s
        motion to dismiss. The district court found that (1) the speedy trial
        clock had not expired on the 2021 indictment, and (2) the district
        court lacked jurisdiction to review whether the 2018 indictment
        should have been dismissed with prejudice, relying on United States
        v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir. 1988), which concluded that
        “any challenge to the dismissal of the indictment without prejudice
        must await the defendant’s subsequent conviction.”
        F.     Dowdell’s Second Motion to Dismiss, Guilty Plea, and
               Sentence
               On January 3, 2022, Dowdell filed a second motion to
        dismiss his 2021 indictment under the Speedy Trial Act and the
        Sixth Amendment.
              During a January 25, 2022, pretrial conference, the parties
        informed the district court that (1) Dowdell intended to enter a
        conditional guilty plea to the § 922(g)(1) offense and (2) he would
        reserve the right to appeal the denial of his July 16, 2021, motion to
        dismiss the 2021 indictment.
               On January 31, 2022, the district court denied Dowdell’s
        second motion to dismiss as moot because he was pleading guilty
        to the charged offense.
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        22-11822               Opinion of the Court                         7

               On February 3, 2022, Dowdell entered a conditional guilty
        plea to the § 922(g)(1) offense. Dowdell’s plea agreement states:
        “[T]he defendant and the Government agree that this plea
        agreement is conditioned on the defendant’s right to have an
        appellate court review the district court’s order denying his motion
        to dismiss (Doc. 29).”
               Further, Dowdell’s attorney and the prosecutor signed a
        “Conditional Guilty Plea” document pursuant to Federal Rule of
        Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). That document states that Dowdell
        “reserves the right to have an appellate court review the Order
        Denying his Motion to Dismiss the Indictment issued by this Court
        on November 16, 2021.”
               The factual proffer contained in Dowdell’s plea agreement
        stated that: (1) Dowdell’s ex-girlfriend called the authorities after
        Dowdell became irate during a FaceTime conversation, pointed a
        gun at her, and threatened her grandmother; (2) Dowdell, who was
        the subject of a warrant for a state probation violation, fled on foot
        after two Valdosta Police Department officers approached his
        residence; and (3) Dowdell was later apprehended, and the officers
        found a pistol in the sleeve of a sweatshirt that he discarded after
        he fled from the house.
                At the change-of-plea hearing, the government informed the
        district court that (1) Dowdell was entering a conditional plea, and
        (2) he was reserving the right to appeal Document 29, which is the
        order denying the motion to dismiss the 2021 indictment. The
        district court observed that (1) “part of” Dowdell’s position in that
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11822

        motion to dismiss the 2021 indictment was that “the first
        indictment that was dismissed under [the] Speedy Trial [Act]
        should have been with prejudice,” and (2) the district court
        determined that in the 2021 case it could not review its previous
        order dismissing the 2018 indictment without prejudice. Both
        parties agreed that the district court was accurately characterizing
        Dowdell’s position and the district court’s order. At the conclusion
        of the hearing, the district court accepted Dowdell’s guilty plea.
               The presentence investigation report calculated an advisory
        guidelines range of 70 to 87 months based on a total offense level
        of 21 and a criminal history category of V. At the sentencing
        hearing, the district court calculated an advisory guidelines range
        of 70 to 78 months1 and sentenced Dowdell to 78 months’
        imprisonment, followed by 3 years’ supervised release.
                            II.     DOWDELL’S APPEAL
              On appeal, Dowdell argues the district court erred (1) in
        dismissing his 2018 indictment without prejudice, rather than with
        prejudice; and (2) in denying his motion to dismiss his 2021
        indictment for the same offense.
            As a threshold matter, there is an issue as to whether
        Dowdell’s guilty plea preserves challenges only to the denial of the

        1 We recognize that the district court (1) calculated the advisory guidelines
        range as 70 to 78 months at Dowdell’s sentencing hearing, but (2) indicated in
        its Statement of Reasons that that range was 70 to 87 months. We do not
        address this contradiction because Dowdell does not raise this issue.
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        22-11822               Opinion of the Court                         9

        motion to dismiss his 2021 indictment, and not to the dismissal of
        his 2018 indictment without prejudice.
               As noted earlier, Dowdell’s plea agreement and the
        conditional plea document were both, on their face, conditioned
        on his “right to have an appellate court review” the district court’s
        order denying his motion to dismiss the 2021 indictment. Further,
        Dowdell’s speedy trial challenge to his 2018 indictment is
        non-jurisdictional, and a guilty plea generally results in waiver of
        all non-jurisdictional defects that are not preserved in the
        defendant’s conditional guilty plea. United States v. Pierre, 120 F.3d
        1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 1997).
               On the other hand, during the plea colloquy, the district
        court recognized that part of the motion to dismiss the 2021
        indictment was based on the court’s failure to dismiss the 2018
        indictment with prejudice. Moreover, the government on appeal
        does not raise the issue of waiver as to Dowdell’s 2018 indictment
        challenge but instead briefs the merits of the dismissal of the 2018
        indictment being without prejudice, rather than with prejudice.
               Accordingly, we do not address waiver and proceed to
        consider Dowdell’s claims that his 2018 indictment should have
        been dismissed with prejudice. Cf. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d
        1277, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply on appeal a waiver
        or procedural forfeiture rule to a defendant’s challenge of the
        admissibility of a confession because the government did not argue
        the issue was waived or forfeited).
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        10                        Opinion of the Court               22-11822

                           III.     SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
        A.     General Principles
                The Speedy Trial Act requires that a federal criminal
        defendant be tried within 70 days of the filing of an indictment
        against him or his arraignment, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C.
        § 3161(c)(1). The Act excludes from the 70-day calculation certain
        periods of delay, including the “delay resulting from any pretrial
        motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of
        the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.”
        Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
               The date on which an event occurs, including the date of
        arraignment, the date a pretrial motion is filed, and the date a
        pretrial motion is resolved, is not counted in calculating the
        statutory period. United States v. Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th
        Cir. 2010); United States v. Yunis, 723 F.2d 795, 797 (11th Cir. 1984).
        If a defendant is not brought to trial within the 70-day period, the
        defendant may move to dismiss the indictment, and the district
        court must grant that motion and dismiss the indictment. 18
        U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).
               In granting a Speedy Trial Act dismissal, “[a] district court
        has the discretion to dismiss an indictment with or without
        prejudice.” United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1100 (11th Cir.
        2019). The district court “must consider three factors when
        determining the method of relief: (1) ‘the seriousness of the
        offense’; (2) ‘the facts and circumstances of the case which led to
        the dismissal’; and (3) ‘the impact of a reprosecution on the
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        22-11822                  Opinion of the Court                              11

        administration of this chapter and on the administration of
        justice.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2)). “Where the
        defendant is charged with a serious crime, the delay was minor, the
        defendant suffered no prejudice from the delay, and the
        government did not actively seek delay, dismissal should be
        without prejudice.” Jones, 601 F.3d at 1257 (considering whether
        the defendant’s indictment should have been dismissed without
        prejudice where the Speedy Trial Act was violated).
        B.     No Speedy Trial Act Violation as to 2018 Indictment
               As to the 2018 indictment, Dowdell’s speedy trial clock
        began to run on August 14, 2019, the day after his arraignment on
        the November 2018 indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1);
        Yunis, 723 F.2d at 797 (observing that the arraignment date is
        excluded). 2 The clock ran until October 20, 2019, the day before
        the government filed its motion to continue, for a total of 68
        days. See Jones, 601 F.3d at 1255 (stating the date on which a
        pretrial motion is filed is excluded). One week later, on October
        28, 2019, Dowdell filed a motion to dismiss his indictment, which
        also tolled the speedy trial clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
                The clock was tolled until January 9, 2020, the date of the
        hearing on, and the disposition of, Dowdell’s motion to dismiss the
        indictment and the government’s motion to continue, which the
        district court denied by implication. See id.; Jones, 601 F.3d at 1255.

        2 “We review for an abuse of discretion whether a district court should dismiss

        an indictment with or without prejudice for a violation of the Speedy Trial
        Act.” Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1100 n.17 (quotation marks omitted).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11822

        Therefore, when the district court dismissed the 2018 indictment
        on January 9, 2020, the 70-day speedy trial clock had not lapsed.
        C.     Dismissal of the 2018 Indictment Without Prejudice
               Because no Speedy Trial Act violation occurred, we cannot
        conclude that the district court abused its “broad discretion” when
        it dismissed the November 13, 2018, indictment without prejudice.
        United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010)
        (quotation marks omitted). In fact, the district court was not
        required to grant Dowdell’s motion to dismiss the 2018 indictment
        at all—much less with prejudice—given the Speedy Trial Act was
        not violated as to his 2018 indictment.
               And, as the government points out, even when the Speedy
        Trial Act is violated, the district court still has the discretion to
        dismiss an indictment without prejudice, and Dowdell has not
        shown the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the
        indictment without prejudice.
               In sum, given the seriousness of Dowdell’s charge and the
        absence of any speedy trial delay, the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in dismissing the November 13, 2018, indictment
        without prejudice. See Jones, 601 F.3d at 1257; United States v. Russo,
        741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Where the crime charged is
        serious, the [district] court should dismiss [with prejudice] only for
        a correspondingly severe delay.”).
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        22-11822               Opinion of the Court                        13

        D.    Denial of Dowdell’s Motion to Dismiss the 2021
              Indictment
               Next, Dowdell argues that the district court erred in denying
        his motion to dismiss the May 12, 2021, indictment because it failed
        to consider the nearly 17-month preindictment delay between the
        January 9, 2020, dismissal of his 2018 indictment and his May 12,
        2021, reindictment. This argument also lacks merit.
                This Court has long held that, when an indictment is
        dismissed on the motion of the defendant, and the defendant is
        later indicted for the same offense, the speedy trial clock “begin[s]
        to run anew from a subsequent arrest or indictment rather than
        from the date of the original arrest or indictment.” United States v.
        Brown, 183 F.3d 1306, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 1999); see also United States
        v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Where an indictment
        is dismissed on the motion of the defendant, or for reasons other
        than the motion or request of the government, the 70-day time
        period begins to run anew with the return of a superseding
        indictment.”).
                Because the November 13, 2018, indictment was dismissed
        on Dowdell’s October 28, 2019, motion, the speedy trial clock reset
        when Dowdell was indicted for the same offense on May 12, 2021.
        See Brown, 183 F.3d at 1310–11; Rubin, 733 F.2d at 840. Thus, the
        district court did not err when it failed to consider the
        preindictment delay between the 2018 indictment and the 2021
        indictment.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11822

               Dowdell does not otherwise challenge the denial of his
        motion to dismiss his May 12, 2021, indictment on Speedy Trial Act
        grounds. We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in finding that the speedy trial clock had not expired.
         IV.    SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
               The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
        provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
        the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. The
        Supreme Court has established a four-factor test to determine
        whether a defendant has been deprived of the constitutional right
        to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the
        delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and (4) the
        prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33,
        92 S. Ct. 2182, 2191–93 (1972).
               “The first factor, length of the delay, serves a triggering
        function.” United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292, 1298 (11th Cir.
        2018). Unless some “presumptively prejudicial” period of delay
        occurred, we need not examine the other three factors. United
        States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 827 (11th Cir. 1999). “Delays
        exceeding one year are generally found to be presumptively
        prejudicial.” United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir.
        2006) (quotation marks omitted).
                In Ingram, our Court did not consider the defendant’s
        preindictment delay when deciding whether his Sixth Amendment
        speedy trial delay was presumptively prejudicial for purposes of the
        first Barker factor. Id. at 1339. Our Court explained that “[o]nly
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        22-11822                  Opinion of the Court                              15

        pretrial delay following a person’s arrest, charge, or indictment is
        relevant to whether the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth
        Amendment is triggered.” Id.
                When an indictment is dismissed, and the defendant is later
        charged with the same offense, “[a]ny undue delay after charges
        are dismissed, like any delay before charges are filed, must be
        scrutinized under the Due Process Clause, not the Speedy Trial
        Clause.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S. Ct. 1497,
        1501 (1982); see also United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1209
        n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (“The Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee
        was no longer effective for McDaniel’s original indictment once the
        district court dismissed it . . . .”); United States v. Hernandez, 724 F.2d
        904, 906–07 (11th Cir. 1984) (concluding that, where the original
        indictment was dismissed on the defendant’s motion, and the
        defendant was reindicted for the same crimes one month later, the
        Sixth Amendment speedy trial delay began to run on the date of his
        arraignment after his second indictment).
                Dowdell argues that the nearly 23-month delay between his
        initial August 12, 2019, arrest and his June 22, 2021, initial
        appearance on the second indictment deprived him of his Sixth
        Amendment right to a speedy trial. 3 However, Dowdell’s
        argument ignores that the November 13, 2018, indictment was

        3 Whether the government violated a defendant’s constitutional right to a
        speedy trial is a mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Machado, 886
        F.3d 1070, 1079 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018). We review a district court’s legal
        conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11822

        dismissed on Dowdell’s motion, and Dowdell was reindicted on
        May 12, 2021, for the same offense. For purposes of the Sixth
        Amendment speedy trial analysis, we consider only the
        nine-month delay between the May 12, 2021, indictment and
        Dowdell’s February 3, 2022, guilty plea. See MacDonald, 456 U.S. at
        7, 102 S. Ct. at 1501; McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1209 n.2; Hernandez, 724
        F.2d at 906–07.
               This nine-month delay was not presumptively prejudicial.
        See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336. We therefore conclude that Dowdell’s
        right to a speedy trial was not violated without reaching the other
        Barker factors. See Register, 182 F.3d at 827; see also United States v.
        Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that an
        eight-month delay between the defendants’ indictment and their
        trial was “insufficient to merit a Sixth Amendment speedy trial
        violation inquiry”).
               We also reject Dowdell’s argument about how he was
        placed on a “federal hold” while he was in state custody. The
        record shows that, before Dowdell’s reindictment on May 12, 2021,
        he was in state custody on pending state charges. In any event, as
        the Supreme Court has recognized, “an arrest or indictment
        by one sovereign would not cause the speedy trial guarantees to
        become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by another
        sovereign.” MacDonald, 456 U.S. at 10 n.11, 102 S. Ct. at 1503 n.11.
        Because Dowdell had only state charges between the January 9,
        2020, dismissal of Dowdell’s 2018 indictment and his May 12, 2021,
        indictment, no constitutional speedy trial delay occurred.
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        22-11822                  Opinion of the Court                              17

              Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        denying Dowdell’s motion to dismiss his 2021 indictment on Sixth
        Amendment grounds. 4
                                 V.      CONCLUSION
              For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s (1) dismissal
        of the 2018 indictment without prejudice, and (2) denial of
        Dowdell’s motion to dismiss the 2021 indictment.
               AFFIRMED.

        4 To the extent that Dowdell contends that the 17-month preindictment delay
        between the January 9, 2020, dismissal of his 2018 indictment and his May 12,
        2021, reindictment violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights, this
        argument is also without merit. “To prove a due process violation resulting
        from a pre-indictment delay, [a defendant] must show: (1) actual prejudice to
        [his] defense from the delay; and (2) that the delay resulted from a deliberate
        design by the government to gain a tactical advantage.” United States v.
        Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir.1995). Even if Dowdell could
        demonstrate actual prejudice to his defense, he does not argue, and the record
        does not show, that the government delayed in indicting Dowdell to gain a
        tactical advantage. See id.