Court Opinion

ID: 9669787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:26.997979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.298702
License: Public Domain

Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s conclusion in the Garvin case, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that sufficient probable cause existed to justify the search of Burkett’s vehicle. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court’s order affirming the district court’s suppression of the Burkett evidence.
DEFENDANT BURKETT
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As noted in the majority opinion, pursuant to a search warrant obtained from the 50th District Court, officers from the Pontiac Police Department executed a search warrant at the house located at 605 Wyoming in Pontiac on November 18, 1993. The warrant described with sufficient particularity both the premises located at 605 Wyoming and Garvin. The warrant did not provide for the search of the curtilage of the premises or any vehicles found at the location. The warrant did specify, however, that all occupants found on the premises at the time of the raid were subject to being searched.
*109Approximately one-half hour before the raid began, Burkett was observed pulling into the driveway of the residence by Officer Phillip Sailor. Burkett was driving a black Ford Bronco. Burkett left the vehicle and entered the house. From the time he entered the house, Burkett did not return to the Bronco. In the affidavit in support of the search warrant, Officer William Pummill states that he had been informed by a confidential informant that cocaine was being stored at the house. The informant told Officer Pummill that in the four weeks before November 18, 1993, the informant had witnessed Garvin in possession of cocaine on three separate occasions. There is no indication in the affidavit that PummilTs informant ever observed Burkett or someone matching his description at the residence during those four weeks.
In granting Burkett’s motion to suppress, District Court Judge William Waterman (who had issued the search warrant) concluded that
the warrant provided no basis for the search of Mr. Burkett’s car, which was locked and secured outside of the premises. Moreover, the court concludes that Mr. Burkett’s presence at 605 Wyoming did not provide any independent grounds for the search of his vehicle.
In this case, the Court finds that there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Burkett for possession of drugs found in the residence. Although he was present, there was no indication that Mr. Burkett was connected to the drugs . . . found. . . .
. . . Accordingly, . . . there was certainly no probable cause to believe that drugs would be located in his car. . . .
Applying [People v] Jackson [180 Mich App 339; 446 NW2d 891 (1989)], the court finds that the search of Mr. Burkett’s car must be supported by an independent basis for probable cause. Clearly, the search of the vehicle cannot *110be justified as a Terry search)[1] as the car was locked and outside of the premises. All parties on the premises were secured inside the house and there was no suggestion that anyone was at or near the car to put the officers safety in jeopardy. The court distinguishes the search of the vehicle from a search of Mr. Burkett’s person, which may have been justified for the [officers’] safety in executing the warrant. The record in this case is simply void of any indication of probable cause that Mr. Burkett was committing a crime.
. . . [People v] Arterberry [431 Mich 381; 429 NW2d 574 (1988),] is not controlling in this case because even if there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Burkett for loitering, the search of his vehicle, which was locked outside, was not a search incident to arrest.
The prosecution then appealed to the circuit court, which affirmed the ruling of the district court.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”2 The United States Supreme Court has consistently observed that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). Accord California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 580; 111 S Ct 1982; 114 L Ed 2d 619 (1991); Chambers v Maroney, 399 US *11142, 51; 90 S Ct 1975; 26 L Ed 2d 419 (1970) (“Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.”). One such exception, the automobile exception, was first recognized by the Court in Carroll v United States, 267 US 132; 45 S Ct 280; 69 L Ed 543 (1925). The Court has also held that the scope of the automobile exception is narrow, California v Carney, 471 US 386, 401; 105 S Ct 2066; 85 L Ed 2d 406 (1985), being “no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately authorize by warrant,” United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 825; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982).
Although the automobile exception has been “specifically established” for almost three-quarters of a century, the “delineation” of its boundaries has been particularly fluid. As first established, the automobile exception was premised on the automobile’s “ready mobility.”3 Carney, supra at 390; Chambers, supra at 51. As the Carroll Court explained,
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. [Carroll, supra at 153.]
*112However, recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court have clearly indicated that “ready mobility” is no longer the sole justification for the automobile exception. As the Court observed in Carney. “Even in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the . . . exception.” Carney, supra at 391. Accord Pennsylvania v Labron, 518 US 938, 940; 116 S Ct 2485; 135 L Ed 2d 1031 (1996).
Yet, while the justification for a search without a warrant no longer is limited to the exigencies of the moment, the law still recognizes that a significant difference exists between those automobiles that are located in public places and those that are located on private property. In the words of the Carney Court:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes — temporary or otherwise — the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second, there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable to a fixed dwelling. [Carney, supra at 392-393 (emphasis added).]
See also People v Taylor, 454 Mich 580, 583, 588; 564 NW2d 24 (1997) (a case involving a vehicle parked in a public parking lot); United States v Sinisterra, 77 F3d 101 (CA 5, 1996); United States v Panitz, 907 F2d 1267, 1271 (CA 1, 1990). As the Court stated in Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 461; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971), a case involving the search without a warrant of a vehicle parked in the driveway of the defendant’s residence: “The word *113‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”
Thus, I do not believe that relevant case law sanctions the search without a warrant of defendant’s vehicle, which was parked, locked, inaccessible to Burkett, and in a private residential driveway when it was searched. Under the circumstances of this case, neither justification for the automobile exception to the warrant provision of the Fourth Amendment comes into play.
Additionally, I do not feel as if the requisite probable cause has been established. The police testified during the preliminary examination that Garvin’s residence had been under surveillance for approximately four weeks before the November 18, 1993, raid. Yet there is no indication that Burkett was ever observed at the location during those four weeks. Indeed, Burkett was not identified — either specifically or by description — in the Garvin search warrant. The majority concludes that the circumstances surrounding Burkett’s arrest “provided the police with probable cause to believe that he was a drug dealer connected in some way with a criminal operation that was involved with the illicit drugs found in that residence.” Ante at 103. If the evidence cited by the majority indicates that Burkett was intimately involved in this particular “criminal operation,” then how could it be that there is no evidence in the record establishing his continuing involvement in the month before the raid?
Further, officers involved in the preraid surveillance of Garvin’s residence testified that Burkett was not observed carrying any packages either to or from his vehicle. One officer admitted that he had no reason to believe that there was any contraband inside *114the vehicle, while another testified that there was nothing particular about the circumstances of Burkett’s visit that would distinguish Burkett from any other visitor that just happened to come by Garvin’s home at that particular time on that particular day. Cf. People v Shabaz, 424 Mich 42, 60; 378 NW2d 451 (1985) (observing that the “[defendant's presence in a high-crime neighborhood does nothing to distinguish him from any number of other pedestrians in the area”).
The majority finds it significant that Burkett ran away from the officers when they entered Garvin’s home. It is well established in our jurisprudence, however, that “flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous . ...” Id. at 64. As the United States Supreme Court observed in an oft-quoted passage from Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963):
“[I]t is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that ‘the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.’ ” [Id. at 483, n 10, quoting Alberty v United States, 162 US 499, 511; 16 S Ct 864; 40 L Ed 1051 (1896).]
The circumstances of this case highlight the danger of placing too much emphasis on flight when evaluating probable cause. For example, there is no indication in the record that the police officers who entered Garvin’s home complied with the knock-and-announce rule. MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). If the police did not announce their presence before forcibly entering the residence, then it would be perfectly *115logical for those inside to flee from the unknown persons breaking into the residence. Cf. Shabaz, supra at 64 (observing that it was reasonable under the circumstances of that case for the defendant to flee when he was “being scrutinized and then ‘tailed’ by-three unknown persons in a ‘private’ motor vehicle . . .”). Therefore, I do not believe that, by itself, Burkett’s flight from the police inside the Garvin residence is a reliable indicator that Burkett was involved in criminal activity. Alone, and under the circumstances of this case, Burkett’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
I also do not believe that the other factors cited by the majority as dispositive resolve this ambiguity in favor of the prosecution. In the words of the majority: “That Burkett was in the residence with a large amount of money, combined with Burkett’s attempt to flee, provided the police with probable cause to believe that he was a drug dealer connected in some way with a criminal operation that was involved with the illicit drugs found in that residence.” Ante at_. As previously noted, however, there was nothing about Burkett’s visit that day that would somehow distinguish him from any other random visitor at the Garvin home. As for the fact that Burkett was carrying several thousands of dollars in cash on his person, this too is capable of an innocent explanation. Surely not everyone who is carrying a large sum of money who also happens to be in either a high-crime area or a location suspected of being the site of criminal activity automatically forfeits their Fourth Amendment rights.
It also appears to me that the majority’s probable cause analysis is predicated on an erroneous premise. *116The majority states that “fewer foundational facts are needed to support a search of a motor vehicle than a house or home.” Ante at 101. In support of this premise, the majority cites People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496; 556 NW2d 498 (1996), and People v Whalen, 390 Mich 672; 213 NW2d 116 (1973). Neither of these cases addressed the reasonable and necessary grounds that need to be established to justify the search of a vehicle without a warrant, let alone one parked on private property. Instead, both cases dealt with the amount of evidence necessary to validate an investigatory stop. LoCicero, supra at 501-502; Whalen, supra at 682. The case at hand does not involve an investigatory stop of Burkett. Rather, the question before us is the validity of the search of his vehicle without a warrant.
Although the automobile exception allows for the search of a vehicle without a warrant, such a search must nevertheless be “based upon probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of crime . . . .” Acevedo, supra at 569 (emphasis added). Accord Carney, supra at 392 (“In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met.” [emphasis added]). The “reasonable suspicion” standard applicable to investigatory stops (which has been characterized as being more than a “ ‘hunch,’ but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause,” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 *117NW2d 849 [1996]4), has no application in the case at hand.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district and circuit courts’ suppression of the evidence and dismissal of the case against Burkett.

 Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).

 US Const, Am IV.

 Historically, a vehicle was considered to be “readily mobile” if it was (1) stopped as it was being used on a public highway, Michigan v Thomas, 458 US 259, 261; 102 S Ct 3079; 73 L Ed 2d 750 (1982), or (2) parked in a public area, Chambers, supra at 51.

 In Ornelas v United, States, 517 US 690; 116 S Ct 1657; 134 L Ed 2d 911 (1996), the United States Supreme Court observed that “[articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible. . . . They are instead fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.” Id. at 695-696. However, while the standards themselves find expression in the applicable factual and historical circumstances of a given case, their application is nonetheless limited to those particular circumstances to which they have been ascribed. Id. at 693 (observing that "[a]n investigatory stop is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion, . . . and a warrantless search of a car is valid if based on probable cause”).