Court Opinion

ID: 9605828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:42:17.429217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:20.860587
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
*854I concur rather fully in the majority opinion, except for slight differences in arriving at the ultimate result.
I concur in the overruling of State Highway Dept. v. Union Oil Co., 129 Ga. App. 596 (200 SE2d 301). We fell into two errors in that case, (1) in holding that an Act of the Legislature repealing a Section of Harrison Company’s "Georgia Code Annotated” was a repeal of an Act of the legislature so "codified” by Harrison Company, and (2) in holding a valid Act of the legislature of a given year (1966) could repeal an Act of the legislature of a subsequent year (1967) on the erroneous theory that because the first Act was not "effective” until after the second Act became law, the prior Act could repeal the subsequent one. We failed to properly evaluate the distinction between "the effective” date of the operation of the Act and the date it became a law. It is clear to me now that such a futuristic concept of an older Act repealing a younger one is entirely erroneous. For this reason, I concur in the ruling of the majority that Section 41 (e) of the Civil Practice Act (1966) did not repeal the Act of 1967, even though the Civil Practice Act became effective in operation after the 1967 Act became effective both as a law and in operation, and also, for these reasons, I might add neither an express nor an implied repeal of the Act of 1967 took place, and for this reason alone it being sufficient and controlling.
That there is a clear difference and distinction between the time an Act of the Legislature becomes law and the time it becomes effective in operation may be demonstrated.
Code § 102-105 provides: "Laws, after promulgation, are obligatory upon all inhabitants of this State, and ignorance of the law excuses no one.” This section has been in all of our Codes up to the present time, but what constituted "promulgation” has been the subject of varying conditions in the Codes of 1863 (Sections 3, 4); 1868 (Section 3); 1873 (Section 3) and 1882 (Section 3). These sections did not appear in the Codes of 1895, 1910 and 1933. As to rulings in this area prior to the Codes and during the Codes above recited, see Heard v. Heard, 8 Ga. 380 (4); Boston & Gunby v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102; Green v. Hall, 36 Ga. 538; Grinad & Benton v. State, 34 Ga. 270 *855(2). Since the Act of 1876 (Ga. L. 1876, p. 28) it has been the law of Georgia that a law is duly promulgated, after passage by the legislature, by the approval of the governor (Epstin v. Levenson & Co., 79 Ga. 718 (2), 4 SE 328), and becomes effective in operation on the date of such approval, unless the Act otherwise provides.
Though not applicable, the automatic but effective operational date was changed by Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1364, 1365, as amended by Ga. L. 1969, p. 7 (Code Ann. § 102-111) which made provision for "effective” dates at two different times during the year, depending upon when the Act was passed by the legislature as to Acts becoming law by approval of the governor or becoming law without his approval. It appears, therefore, the distinction between the two dates, the time an Act becomes law and the time it becomes effective in operation are two different things. As a matter of fact, the CPA was many times amended while it was effective in operation. Under these circumstances, it would follow that the Act of 1967 could legally act as a modification or repeal by implication of sub-paragraph (e) of Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act if the other facts necessary to create such implied repeal were present. The Act of 1967 covers the entire subject matter of Paragraph (e) of Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act and makes additions thereto. In my opinion, this itself is amply sufficient to hold that the Act of 1967 impliedly repealed Paragraph (e) of Section 41 of the Civil Practice Act. "While repeals by implication are not favored and the intention to repeal must be plain and unmistakable, yet a repeal by implication will result where a statute is manifestly intended to cover the subject-matter of a former statute and to act as a substitute for it, notwithstanding the express provisions of the Acts are not repugnant. Johnson v. Southern Mutual Building & Loan Assn., 97 Ga. 622 (25 SE 358); Jones v. Stokes, 145 Ga. 745 (89 SE 778); Brackett v. Arp, 156 Ga. 160 (118 SE 651); Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664 (6), 691 (135 SE 195); Friedman v. Mizell, 164 Ga. 1 (137 SE 400); Thornton v. State, 5 Ga. App. 397 (3) (63 SE 301); Hardy v. State, 25 Ga. App. 287 (103 SE 267); Peacock v. Larsen, 180 Ga. 444 (178 SE 922).” City of Atlanta v. Goodman, 183 Ga. 834, 835 (189 SE 829). *856See also, Leonard v. State, 204 Ga. 465 (50 SE2d 212); Mosley v. Lanier, 213 Ga. 373 (99 SE2d 118).