Court Opinion

ID: 9907859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:06:45.074867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:48.114257
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3182-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL W. SANDERS,
a/k/a MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
MICHAEL WILLIAM,
MIKE WILLIAMS,
and MIKE SANDERS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted September 27, 2023 – Decided December 7, 2023

                   Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 16-10-2408.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Anderson David Harkov, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).

                   William E. Reynolds, Atlantic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Mario Christopher Formica,
             Chief Counsel to the Prosecutor, of counsel; Linda
             Anne Shashoua, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

       Defendant Michael Sanders appeals from the April 20, 2022, Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

       We glean these facts from the record. On October 19, 2016, defendant

was indicted on one count of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-

1(a)(2). On January 19, 2017, defendant entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to

the charge, see R. 3:9-3(c), and testified during his plea colloquy that he robbed

a bank on July 28, 2016, while threatening the teller that he had a gun in his

waistband. The teller gave defendant over $600 in cash. Because he had been

a bank customer and his identity was not obscured, bank employees recognized

defendant, who subsequently turned himself in voluntarily and confessed after

being administered Miranda1 warnings.

       Defendant had three prior robbery convictions and was on parole for the

latest conviction when he committed the offense. As a result, the State objected

to the non-negotiated plea and sought a fifteen-year prison sentence, subject to

1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Nonetheless, the trial

court gave a conditional indication that it would sentence defendant to a twelve-

year NERA sentence, concurrent to the parole violation sentence he was already

serving, with credit for time served as determined by the court.

      During the plea colloquy, defendant confirmed his understanding of the

terms of his guilty plea as discussed in open court and as memorialized in the

plea forms. Defendant acknowledged his potential exposure to a mandatory

extended term sentence of life in prison, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.1, and his

understanding that if the court decided "the interests of justice would [not] be

served" by the imposition of a twelve-year NERA sentence, R. 3:9-3(c), he

would have the option of withdrawing his guilty plea. After ensuring that the

plea complied with the requirements of Rule 3:9-2, the court accepted

defendant's guilty plea and scheduled sentencing.

      At the March 3, 2017, sentencing hearing, the court found aggravating

factors three, six, and nine based on defendant's high risk of re-offense,

extensive prior criminal history, and need for deterrence, and mitigating factor

twelve based on defendant's voluntary surrender and confession. See N.J.S.A.

2C:44-1(a)(3), (6), (9), (b)(12). The court sentenced defendant to twelve years

of imprisonment, subject to NERA, for the armed robbery, to run concurrent

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with the parole violation sentence. The court also awarded 85 days of jail credit,

and 150 days of gap-time credit. See State v. C.H., 228 N.J. 111, 117 (2017)

(explaining that only jail credits reduce a parole ineligibility term as well as the

underlying sentence imposed).

      Defendant did not file a direct appeal. However, defendant filed a timely

PCR petition, supplemented by assigned counsel's brief. In his PCR petition

and brief, among other things, defendant asserted his attorney was ineffective

by failing to explain the difference between jail and gap-time credit. According

to defendant, he pled guilty expecting to receive all 235 days in custody as jail

credit but only received 85 days of jail credit.

      Following oral argument conducted on March 23, 2022, the PCR court

issued a written decision dated April 20, 2022, denying defendant's PCR petition

without an evidentiary hearing. The judge reviewed the factual background and

procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal principles, and

concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel (IAC). This appeal followed.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:

            POINT ONE

            THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
            GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN

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            EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE THERE WAS
            NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT PLEA
            COUNSEL EVER EXPLAINED TO DEFENDANT
            THAT HE WOULD NOT RECEIVE JAIL CREDIT
            FOR MOST OF THE TIME HE WAS
            INCARCERATED PRIOR TO SENTENCING AND
            ANY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN COUNSEL AND
            DEFENDANT THAT TOOK PLACE COULD ONLY
            BE REVEALED THROUGH AN EVIDENTIARY
            HEARING.

            POINT TWO

            THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
            WHEN IT FAILED TO CONCLUDE THAT AS A
            RESULT OF PLEA COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
            ADVISE DEFENDANT THAT HE WOULD NOT
            RECEIVE FULL JAIL CREDIT FOR THE TIME HE
            SERVED IN CUSTODY PRIOR TO SENTENCING,
            COMBINED WITH HIS FAILURE TO EXPLAIN TO
            DEFENDANT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN JAIL
            CREDIT AND GAP-TIME CREDIT, THAT
            DEFENDANT ENTERED AN INVOLUNTARY
            GUILTY    PLEA,    WITHOUT     A    FULL
            UNDERSTANDING OF ITS CONSEQUENCES,
            DEPRIVING     DEFENDANT       OF     HIS
            CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

      "[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's

determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster,

429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013). "If the court perceives that holding

an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant

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is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997) (citations omitted).

      An evidentiary hearing is only required when a defendant establishes "a

prima facie case in support of [PCR]," the court determines that there are

"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is

necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354

(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).       "[W]here . . . no

evidentiary hearing was conducted," as here, "we may review the factual

inferences the [trial] court has drawn from the documentary record de novo,"

and "[w]e also review de novo the court's conclusions of law." State v. Blake,

444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016).

      "To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most

favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b). To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by

a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357

(2009), that his or her attorneys' performance fell below the objective standard

of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

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(1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58

(1987), and that the outcome would have been different without the purported

deficient performance.    Stated differently, a defendant must show that: (1)

counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.

      To establish the prejudice prong to set aside a guilty plea based on IAC, a

defendant must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have

insisted on going to trial." State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alteration

in original) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). To that end, "'a

[defendant] must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain'"

and "insist on going to trial" would have been "'rational under the

circumstances.'" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011)

(quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). That determination

should be "based on evidence, not speculation." Ibid.

      Failure to meet either prong of the two-prong Strickland/Fritz test results

in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012)

(citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway to

choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not, to

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dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was

constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation

omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

      Applying these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the PCR

judge's denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing, and

we affirm the denial substantially for the reasons stated in the judge's cogent

written opinion. Even if his attorney was deficient, defendant cannot show it

would have been rational under the circumstances to reject the plea offer when

he was facing the possibility of mandatory life imprisonment and the specter of

overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Rountree, 388 N.J. Super. 190,

215 (App. Div. 2006) (rejecting defendant's IAC claim based only on

defendant's "'bald assertions'" that his "misunderstanding" of gap-time credit

caused him to turn down an offer (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999))). Thus, defendant failed to establish the prejudice

prong to warrant PCR relief or an evidentiary hearing.

      Affirmed.

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