Court Opinion

ID: 9655227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:03:18.272977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:16.881381
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. In point of error two, appellant contends the mass seizure of magazines was unconstitutional. As part of that point, appellant argues the warrant was invalid because the judge did not “focus searchingly” on the issue of obscenity. I agree.
Sometime in September of 1987, Houston Police Officer Tim Cox went to Eastex 24 Hour News Bookstore in Houston and bought four magazines. Officer Cox prepared an affidavit, attached the four magazines as exhibits, and presented them to a judge for a search warrant. The judge *348signed a search warrant that authorized the officer to: (1) seize the four magazines and (2) videotape the front and back covers of all magazines in the adult section whose covers depicted “oral sodomy, actual intercourse, anal sodomy, and actual exhibition of genitals.”
Officer Cox executed the warrant. He seized the four magazines and videotaped the front and back covers of 83 other magazines. The officer was limited to videotaping the covers because each magazine was sealed in a cellophane wrapper.
Officer Cox attached the videotape to a statement, which was not sworn, and presented it to the same judge for a second search warrant.1 The judge notarized the officer’s statement and at the same time signed the second search warrant for the seizure of all copies of the 83 magazines. Officer Cox returned to Eastex 24 Hour News Bookstore and seized all copies of 83 titles, about 300 magazines.
The district attorney’s office filed a complaint and information against Video News, based on the copies of the 83 magazines seized after the second warrant was executed. None of the charges related to the four magazines seized under the first warrant. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the magazines, which the trial court denied after a hearing. After trial, the jury returned a finding of guilty, and the court fined Video News $5,000.
I. Was the mass seizure constitutional?
The police seized all the copies of the 83 titles at Eastex 24 Hour Bookstore. They removed about 300 magazines from circulation. The seizure was constitutionally defective because it involved a seizure of all the copies of the magazines without an adversarial hearing on the question of obscenity.
In Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 109 S.Ct. 916, 927, 103 L.Ed.2d 34 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that when the State confiscates multiple copies of books, the State must first hold an adversarial hearing on their obscenity. Fort Wayne Books involved two appeals of the defendant in different cases, one civil and the other criminal.
In cause number 87-614, the criminal case, defendant was charged with a misdemeanor offense of distributing obscene materials. 109 S.Ct. at 922. The obscene materials on which the charge was based were purchased by an officer, not seized. Id. at 927. In the criminal case, defendant argued that he was entitled to a prompt, post-arrest, adversary hearing on the question of obscenity of the materials he was charged with distributing. The Supreme Court overruled the contention for two reasons: (1) defendant did not ask for a prompt, post-arrest, adversary hearing on the question of obscenity; and (2) the Court said, “unlike No. 87-470, in this case, there was no seizure of any books or films.... ” Id.
In cause number 87-470, the civil case, the same defendant was sued under the state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In that case, the State sought injunctive relief under a civil statute that included forfeiture. The State alleged in its petition that there was probable cause to believe that defendant had violated the state RICO laws. 109 S.Ct. at 921. After an ex parte hearing, the trial court ordered immediate seizure of the bookstore and its contents. In the civil case, defendant argued that the seizure of all copies of the magazines was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court sustained the point and reversed, saying
While a single copy of a book or film may be seized and retained for evidentia-ry purposes based on a finding of probable cause, the publication may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing.
109 S.Ct. at 927. Only after an adversarial hearing, may the State seize multiple copies of books. See also A Quantity of *349Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 1725, 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964).
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly said that an ex parte hearing will not justify a large-scale seizure of books. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 1614, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 492-93, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2794-95, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 502, 93 S.Ct. 2796, 2800, 37 L.Ed.2d 757 (1973); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. State of Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 212-13, 84 S.Ct. 1723, 1726-27, 12 L.Ed.2d 809 (1964). The requirement of a pre-seizure adversarial hearing protects the public from the abridgement of its right to unobstructed circulation of non-obscene materials. Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 213, 84 S.Ct. at 1727.
The United States Supreme Court insists that we carefully scrutinize any large-scale seizure of books, films, or other materials that are presumptively protected under the first amendment. Heller, 413 U.S. at 491, 93 S.Ct. at 2794. Here, the magistrate did not conduct an adversarial hearing to determine whether there was probable cause that the 83 magazines were obscene. Instead, he had an ex parte hearing with the officer that lasted less than 60 seconds.
Under Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), appellant argues that all the magazines must be suppressed because they are the materials obtained as a direct result of an unlawful arrest. I agree.
II. Did the judge focus on the issue of obscenity?
The majority holds
We find that the magistrate, after having focused searchingly on the question of obscenity, did have a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed that the magazines seized were being possessed with the intention to promote obscenity....
The majority cites U.S. v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir.1978) for the proposition that “the magistrate was ‘entitled to take the manufacturer at his word’,” and could rely on the cover of a film box to furnish probable cause. Maybe so. That is not the issue here, however. Here, the magistrate did not examine the covers. At best, the magistrate relied on some unrecorded conversation with the officer.
In this record, there is absolutely no evidence that the magistrate “focused searchingly” on the affidavit. The affidavit shows that Officer Cox appeared before the judge, who administered an oath to him at 4:10 p.m. In that affidavit the officer listed 83 magazines by name, and said that the attached videotape of the covers of the magazines showed they were obscene. At precisely the same moment the judge administered the oath to the officer, 4:10 p.m., the judge signed the search warrant.
At the hearing to suppress, the officer confirmed that he signed his affidavit at 4:10, the same moment the judge signed the warrant. I do not think there was any focus at all on obscenity, much less a searching focus, on the affidavit or the videotape of the covers of 83 magazines.
The officer’s written statement did not become an affidavit until the judge administered the oath. The judge was limited to finding probable cause in the officer’s affidavit and its attachment. He could not rely on unrecorded conversations or un-sworn written statements to reach a decision on probable cause. On this record, it was impossible for the judge to focus searchingly on the affidavit and the attached tape in the time between signing the officer’s affidavit and signing the warrant.
The majority says the dissent must speculate if, when, and how long the judge focused on the affidavit and the attached videotape. Op. 347. No speculation was necessary. I merely read the documents. The affidavit and the warrant show on their face that they were both executed at the same time. The judge could hardly focus searchingly on the affidavit before it became an affidavit. Before the statement was sworn, it was not an affidavit.
Where the State asks for authorization to seize presumptively protected material, *350the magistrate should administer the warrant requirements to leave as little as possible to the discretion or whim of the officer. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 1980, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). The magistrate cannot issue a warrant to seize obscene materials, relying solely on the judgment of the arresting officer that the materials are obscene. Id. at 565, 98 S.Ct. at 1981; Price v. State, 579 S.W.2d 492, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).
We should sustain appellant’s second point of error and reverse the judgment.

. The judge could not have viewed the videotape as part of the executed affidavit. The officer’s affidavit is dated September 15, 1987, and bears a time stamp of 4:10 p.m. The second warrant was dated September 15, 1987, and bears a time stamp of 4:10 p.m.