Court Opinion

ID: 9646357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:57:53.880651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:30.655516
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
PER CURIAM:- — -In his motion for rehearing plaintiff denies that he “chose” to submit his case under Kansas law; and urges that he was forced to do so by the refusal of his Instruction B. With the addition of the interstate commerce issue, this instruction hypothesized substantially the same facts as plaintiff’s main instruction. Assuming, but not deciding, both that the form of the instruction was proper, and that plaintiff was entitled to have the instruction given, plaintiff was not prejudiced by its refusal. He failed to make a submissible case under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
In our opinion we adopted plaintiff’s theory that he was injured in the manner claimed. We also assumed that defendant’s “safe place” duty extended to the dock and the area immediately adjacent thereto. We then said: “Plaintiff failed to make a submissible case in that he failed to show that the alleged unsafe condition reasonably could have been anticipated by defendant and that defendant had the required actual or constructive notice of such condition.” We -summarized the evidence which showed a complete failure of proof on these issues.
- Plaintiff proved exactly what he alleged in his petition: the custom of replacing the grain doors in the cars and not leaving them on the dock; that “the falling of the same, and the striking of the plaintiff by the same, was unusual, extraordinary and contrary to the ordinary operation of the same”; and that plaintiff did “not know by whom, when, why or in what position” the door was placed on the dock. Thus, despite the absence of evidence of even one instance of doors having been left on the docks; despite the affirmative uncontradicted evidence that they were never left on the docks; and despite the absence of evidence as to this particular door (the falling of which *990plaintiff conceded was “unusual, extraordinary and contrary to the ordinary operation”), plaintiff contends that the alleged unsafe condition could have been reasonably anticipated by defendant and that defendant had notice, both actual and constructive, of such condition. This is the inference he would have us draw in order to make his case submissible under the Federal act. Such inference not only cannot be reasonably drawn; it is contrary to the only one that can be drawn.
In support of his position plaintiff cites: Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916; Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; and Bailey v. Central Vt. R. Co., 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444. In all three there was evidence from which a proper and reasonable inference of negligence could be drawn. In the Lavender and Bailey cases the evidence was conflicting; in the Tennant case it was uncontradicted.
In the Lavender case, the rule was stated: It is “only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jiiry’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.” 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 744. (Italics ours.)
In the Tennant case, the court said: “In order to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that respondent was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause in whole or in part of the fatal accident. * * * Petitioner was required to present probative facts from which the negligence and the causal relation could reasonably be inferred. ‘The essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked. ’ ’ ’ 321 U. S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 411. (Italics ours.)
In the Bailey case there was evidence upon which to base a reasonable inference. “The debatable quality of that issue, the fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of leaving the question to the jury.” 319 U. S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1064.
In Brady v. So. Ry. Co., 320 U. S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L. Ed. 239, it was said: “The weight of the evidence under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act must be more than a scintilla before the case may be properly left to the discretion of the trier of fact — in this case, the jury. * * * When the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable *991conclusion as to the verdict, the court should determine the proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance with the applicable practice without submission to the jury, or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict.” (Italics ours.)
Under the Federal act defendant was not an insurer of its employees’ safety. Proof of injury without proof of negligence is not enough; and proof that such negligence caused the injury is necessary. Ellis v. Union P. R. Co., 329 U. S. 649, 67 S. Ct. 598, 91 L. Ed. 572; Brady v. So. Ry. Co., supra; Lavender v. Ill. Cen. R. Co., 358 Mo. 1160, 219 S. W. 2d 353; Larsen v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 171 Fed. 2d 841.
In Eckenrode v. Penn. R. Co., 335 U. S. 329, 69 S. Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. 41, verdict for plaintiff was set aside and judgment was entered for defendant. The court said: “There is a single question presented to us: Was there any evidence in the record upon which the jury could have found negligence1 on the part of the respondent which contributed, in whole or in part, to Eckenrode’s death? Upon consideration of the record, the court is of the opinion that there is no evidence, nor any inference which reasonably may be drawn from the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to petitioner, which can sustain a recovery for her.*’ (Italics ours.)
We have reached the same conclusion here and rule that plaintiff failed to make a submissible case under either the Kansas law or the Federal Employers’ Liability Act.
The motion for rehearing is overruled, •