Court Opinion

ID: 9716570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:44:04.71114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.891996
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE PINCHAM, dissenting: I dissent. There existed a genuine issue of material fact which preeluded the valid entry of summary judgment against plaintiff and in favor of the defendant. Moreover, the trial court relied on grossly incompetent evidence in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, Annie F. Austin, a nurse, filed against defendant, St. Joseph Hospital, her former employer, a two-count complaint which alleged that she was discharged from her employment at St. Joseph Hospital in retaliation for her filing a claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission for her work-related back injury. Defendant simply denied the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff was deposed and her deposition testimony established the following: Plaintiff was hired as a staff nurse by defendant hospital on January 25, 1982. The contract of employment between plaintiff and defendant hospital was set forth in an employee handbook, which plaintiff acknowledged receiving. The provisions in the handbook were in effect in November 1984, when plaintiff was discharged. Plaintiff was injured on May 7, 1984. She filled out an incident report. Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Shin, one of defendant’s health care physicians, and was placed on “light duty.” Later, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Hyman, a physician associated with defendant hospital during the time she was hospitalized there in June 1984. During her hospitalization at defendant hospital, plaintiff requested to be transferred to Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Hospital (Rush), because she was not receiving acceptable treatment from the defendant hospital staff. Because defendant refused to pay for the transfer, plaintiff called her sister to get an ambulance to take her to Rush. When defendant learned of those arrangements, defendant agreed to transfer her with the stipulation that she accept treatment from a physician referred by defendant. Plaintiff, however, declined to accept treatment from that referred physician because she felt he would not perform an objective examination. Dr. Hyman said if she left without defendant transferring her, she would lose her “workers’ ” (workers’ compensation benefits). When plaintiff called her sister for the ambulance, Dr. Scott arranged for her transfer to Rush. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation payments retroactively in May or June. After she was discharged from Rush, plaintiff complained about not receiving certain workers’ compensation payments. On July 6, 1984, plaintiff’s attorney filed an application for adjustment of plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff continued to receive treatment from Dr. Wayne Williamson and a treatment group at Cook County Hospital following her discharge from Rush. In August 1984, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Leonard Smith at the request of either defendant or the insurance carrier associated with the workers’ compensation benefits, and she received Dr. Smith’s report. After she was examined by Dr. Smith plaintiff received a letter from Janet Poeppelman, defendant’s risk manager, late in October 1984, requesting that plaintiff contact her office to schedule a return to work date. Prior to receipt of that letter, plaintiff had a telephone conversation on October 15 with Pam Linke, a head nurse, about returning to work. Plaintiff was aware that Dr. Smith’s opinion was that she was able to report to work and that she was to report to work on Monday, October 22, 1984, and that her workers’ compensation payments would stop on October 19. Plaintiff’s doctors told her that she could return to work as long as she did not have to do any lifting or if she was able to control the sitting and standing that she had to do. After receiving the late October letter from Poeppelman, defendant’s risk manager, plaintiff telephoned defendant and spoke to Peggy, who worked in the risk management department, and asked to speak to Poeppelman, who was on vacation. Plaintiff also sent a certified letter dated October 25, 1984, to Poeppelman in response to Poeppelman’s letter. Plaintiff told Dr. Wayne Williamson about Poeppelman’s letter when she next saw him, and she also told him of her termination from defendant hospital, i.e., that she had received a telegram terminating her employment on Saturday, November 3,1984. Plaintiff called Linke because she was surprised by the letter. She told Linke that she was not able to return to work full duty. Linke responded that she was instructed to send the letter because plaintiff was not at work on October 29 or the 31st. During October 29, 30 and 31, 1984, the three days plaintiff did not report for work, plaintiff was scheduled for two days of physical therapy at Rush. After receiving the notice of discharge, plaintiff contacted Donna Wilke regarding using defendant’s grievance procedure and filled out a grievance report. Thereafter, plaintiff met with Linke, O’Mara and Janet Burdulis on November 13, 1984. Plaintiff did not receive a telegram dated December 3, 1984, advising plaintiff that her grievance procedure was scheduled for December 7, 1984, because she was then out of town at Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, from December 2 through 9, 1984. On December 7, 1984, while she was in Minnesota, she telephoned her mother, who told her that she had received the telegram. Plaintiff told her mother to telephone defendant concerning the grievance matter. Before going to Mayo, plaintiff spoke to Burdulis on three occasions by phone regarding scheduling the grievance proceeding. Burdulis cancelled the date they had agreed on but never contacted her thereafter regarding a different date. Plaintiff told Burdulis to get back to her regarding scheduling a different date because plaintiff had scheduled “some medical appointments.” Plaintiff did not say she was going to Mayo Clinic. When she spoke to Burdulis after she arrived back from Mayo Clinic, she was told that the grievance procedure had taken place without her. Burdulis told plaintiff that because she had not appeared, she forfeited her right to a grievance hearing. Plaintiff later spoke to Joseph Bucolo regarding scheduling another grievance hearing date. Plaintiff stated that she did not recall being told by anyone associated with defendant that they were unhappy that plaintiff had filed a workers’ compensation action and that she had no contact with any individual in that regard. Plaintiff did, however, receive feedback from “a couple of girls,” Jane Babula, Margie and Helen. Defendant moved for summary judgment and attached to the motion plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the deposition exhibits. Plaintiff filed a motion to strike defendant’s summary judgment motion. The basis of plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s motion for summary judgment was that defendant’s motion was insufficient on its face to demonstrate that no issue of fact existed, in that the only evidence relied on by defendant in support of its motion for summary judgment were plaintiff’s deposition testimony and attached exhibits. At the hearing of defendant’s motion for summary judgment on May 20, 1987, the court struck plaintiff’s motion to strike defendant’s motion for summary judgment simply because plaintiff’s counsel was not present to argue the motion. The court allowed defendant’s counsel, however, to present his argument, and ruled in defendant’s favor and granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s subsequent motion to reconsider was denied and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. Plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion for summary judgment should have been stricken because defendant could not and did not establish, through plaintiff’s deposition testimony and attached exhibits, defendant’s intent in terminating plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff also argues that defendant could not rely on the exhibits attached to the deposition because plaintiff could not competently testify as to them. Essentially, plaintiff’s argument is that defendant did not present any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, as to the reason for plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff relies on Cunningham v. Addressograph Multigraph Corporation-Bruning Division (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 396, 409 N.E.2d 89. Plaintiff also argues that the pertinent exhibit attached to her deposition testimony, particularly the telegram informing plaintiff that her termination was because she violated hospital absenteeism policy, was inadmissible hearsay. In Cunningham, plaintiff filed an action against defendant employer for retaliatory discharge alleging his termination was based on anticipation of plaintiff filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Defendant moved for summary judgment with supporting affidavits of defendant’s plant personnel manager that plaintiff’s termination was due to plaintiff’s violation of the defendant’s call-in policy. Plaintiff filed counteraffidavits admitting that, although he had violated the policy, he thought the violation would be waived. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. On appeal, the court of review in Cunningham concluded that defendant’s affidavits reasonably implied that plaintiff’s discharge was for violation of defendant’s call-in policy and that plaintiff’s admission corroborated that fact. The court noted, however, in affirming the summary judgment for defendant in Cunningham that plaintiff’s affidavits could not overcome evidence of defendant’s intent in terminating plaintiff, established by defendant’s affidavits, because plaintiff could not competently establish, through his own affidavits, defendant’s intent. The Cunningham court held: “From the foregoing summary of the pleadings and affidavits it can be seen that the central issue in this case is the defendant’s intent or motive in discharging plaintiff. We have concluded that the defendant’s affidavits reasonably imply that the discharge was for violation of the company’s call-in policy and that this is corroborated by plaintiff’s admission that he violated that policy. We have further concluded that plaintiff’s affidavits do not competently counter those of the defendant since plaintiff could not competently testify as to the defendant’s state of mind. No facts alleged by pleadings or affidavit would support an inference of defendant’s state of mind." (Emphasis added.) 87 Ill. App. 3d at 398. Plaintiff quite correctly points out that in Cunningham, unlike in the instant case, defendant there moved for summary judgment with supporting affidavits, significantly absent in the instant case. The requisite relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the telegram dated November 2, 1984, and attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which stated that plaintiff’s discharge was for her failure to report to work for three days, was properly considered by the trial court in granting defendant summary judgment. It is plaintiff’s position that defendant provided no proper foundation for the telegram, or other letters allegedly written by defendant, to be admitted as substantive evidence during plaintiff’s deposition. Plaintiff states that inasmuch as the documents were only identified by plaintiff in her deposition, that mere identification is grossly insufficient to establish a proper foundation for the admission of the telegram into evidence as substantive evidence for the truth of the matters asserted therein, because plaintiff could not and did not testify as to the telegram’s contents, namely, defendant’s intent in terminating plaintiff, as the aforequoted language of Cunningham clearly holds. Plaintiff’s argument is persuasive. The letters and telegrams were inadmissible hearsay (Baehr v. Health & Hospital Governing Comm’n (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 43, 407 N.E.2d 817), which could not be considered as competent evidence in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Hendricks v. Deterts (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 976, 301 N.E.2d 625). Here, defendant did not present any affidavits that would provide a basis for admission of the contents of the letters, or to establish defendant’s intent in terminating plaintiff. Without such an affidavit, the admission of the telegram as evidence of defendant’s intent as substantive evidence was improper and the court’s reliance thereon was similarly inappropriate. A question of fact therefore existed which precluded summary judgment. Other than defendant’s simple denial that plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim, defendant presented no evidence to disprove plaintiff’s allegations. While plaintiff’s deposition testimony provides little proof that she was fired for that reason, such proof would almost be impossible from plaintiff’s lips inasmuch as it is defendant’s intent which forms the basis for plaintiff’s action of retaliatory discharge. For that reason summary judgment was particularly inappropriate, in that the factual issue was the defendant’s intent. (Beauvoir v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 294, 484 N.E.2d 841.) Without any affidavit from defendant, the defendant’s intent in discharging plaintiff was a genuine issue of fact to be determined at trial. The majority in the instant case improperly affirms the summary-judgment against plaintiff in favor of the defendant simply and only because of its ill-founded and unsupported conclusion that plaintiff’s deposition testimony did not establish that plaintiff’s discharge by defendant was retaliatory, and without any indication from any source whatever that plaintiff’s deposition was the only evidence on the issue available to plaintiff, or that there was no other evidence on the issue available to plaintiff, and in the total absence of any evidence that plaintiff’s discharge was not retaliatory, as plaintiff alleged it was. On the state of the record before us, plaintiff was clearly entitled to her day in court on an evidentiary hearing and a determination of the merits of the allegations of her complaint against the defendant and the defendant’s answer thereto. The trial court therefore erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, I dissent.