Court Opinion

ID: 9532608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:23:08.791911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:47.574962
License: Public Domain

Loiselle, J.
(concurring). I concur. My only purpose in concurring by a separate opinion is to make sure that my concurrence is not construed as a tacit approval of a court obtaining jurisdiction over a person by way of sanction.
The court found that Goldman did not cooperate with the notice of discovery in New York.1 By imposing sanctions for failure to comply, the court invoked Practice Book §171 (c), effective July 1, 1978, now renumbered § 231. Section 231 provides in part: “If any party . . . has failed to appear and testify at a deposition ... or has failed otherwise substantially to comply with any other discovery order . . . the court may, on motion, make *229such order as the ends of justice require [including] ...(c) The entry of an order that the matters regarding which the discovery was sought or other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order . . . .” Here the court ordered that jurisdiction over Goldman was established for the purposes of this action in accordance with Chrysler’s claim. Goldman, however, was not a “party” as required by § 231 and defined in § 216 until the court asserted jurisdiction over him. The court cannot lift itself by its own bootstraps by imposing the sanction of jurisdiction against a person over whom jurisdiction has not yet been established.
Beyond the rules of practice, jurisdiction is the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it. LaReau v. Reincke, 158 Conn. 486, 492, 264 A.2d 576 (1969); Brown v. Cato, 147 Conn. 418, 422, 162 A.2d 175 (1960); Samson v. Bergin, 138 Conn. 306, 309, 84 A.2d 273 (1951). It is well established that a court is without power to render a judgment if it lacks jurisdiction and that everything done under the judicial process of courts not having jurisdiction, is, ipso facto, void. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 364 (1816); Marshall v. Clark, 170 Conn. 199, 205, 365 A.2d 1202 (1976); Clover v. Urban, 108 Conn. 13, 17, 142 A.2d 389 (1928).
In this case, the issue of jurisdiction was put squarely to the court by the motion to dismiss. The court was then under a duty to determine its own jurisdiction. At that time jurisdiction depended on whether Harold Parker was served in Connect*230ient as an agent of Goldman.2 If in fact Parker was not an agent of Goldman at the time of service, any order of the court is void. A finding of jurisdiction is not a matter within the discretion of a court but a legal determination to be reached upon the facts and the pleadings. The fact that a named defendant has failed to cooperate or that the evidence necessary to establish jurisdiction is difficult to obtain cannot supplant a legal determination by the court of its jurisdiction.
In this opinion Healey, J., concurred.

 Although Goldman agreed to be deposed, he refused to comply with the order as given. Whether Goldman’s failure to cooperate was excused due to Chrysler’s lack of specificity in the notice of deposition need not be considered here because the court’s ruling shows that the court acted within its discretion in that respect.

 There is no claim that Goldman might be subject to jurisdiction under the “minimum contacts” rule as enunciated in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212, 97 S. Ct. 1269, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976) and discussed in Hodge v. Hodge, 178 Conn. 308, 317-18, 422 A.2d 280 (1979).