Court Opinion

ID: 9919639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 20:07:24.049146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:44.439232
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Yoonessi v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2024-Ohio-169.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Mahmood Yoonessi, M.D.,                              :

                 Appellant-Appellant,                :
                                                                               No. 23AP-160
v.                                                   :                      (C.P.C. No. 21CV-1658)

State Medical Board of Ohio,                         :                 (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Appellee-Appellee.                  :

                                           D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on January 18, 2024

                 On brief: Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Todd W. Collis,
                 Daniel S. Zinsmaster, and Gregory A. Tapocsi, for
                 appellant. Argued: Gregory A. Tapocsi.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Grant Wilson, and
                 Kyle C. Wilcox, for appellee. Argued: Grant Wilson.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

        {¶ 1} Mahmood Yoonessi, M.D., appeals the judgment of the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas affirming the order of the State Medical Board of Ohio (hereinafter
“SMBO”), denying his motion to supplement the administrative record and permanently
denying his application to reinstate his license to practice medicine in Ohio. He argues that
the court committed legal error by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence that was not
part of the record before the SMBO, and that the SMBO’s notice of opportunity hearing was
deficient because the action was based upon charges that were not included in that notice.
        {¶ 2} Yoonessi         is   originally     from        Iran   and    he   completed      his   first
obstetric/gynocological residency there in 1966. He was licensed to practice medicine in
Ohio in 1972, but his Ohio license expired in 1974 after he moved to New York. His Ohio
license lapsed in 1976, and he has not practiced in Ohio nor held a medical license in Ohio
No. 23AP-160                                                                             2

at any point thereafter. Yoonessi worked as an associate obstetric/gynocological professor
at the State University of New York—Buffalo, as well as in private practice for many years,
but that relationship ended in 2002 amid a dispute about whether he was required to
comply with a work rule regarding employment at certain area hospitals. Around that same
time, Yoonessi began to be investigated by the New York Medical Board (“NYMB”) for
negligence and other issues relating to patient care from 1989 through 2000. After a 10-
day hearing, the NYMB issued a 32-page order on June 5, 2002 revoking Yoonessi’s New
York license. That decision was allowed to remain in place by the New York Supreme Court
in December 2003. The California Medical Board also revoked Yoonessi’s license that same
year. Yoonessi applied to have his New York license reinstated in 2005 with limited
success; but ultimately, in 2013, the New York Board of Regents denied restoration of
Yoonessi’s New York license at a hearing for which he asserts he did not receive notice and
did not have the ability to appear.
       {¶ 3} In April 2020, Yoonessi applied to have his Ohio license restored. A hearing
was held on November 30, 2020 before a hearing examiner of the SMBO, at which Yoonessi
testified on his own behalf. Yoonessi contends that at that hearing he was precluded from
introducing “certain mitigating relevant evidence concerning the facts that served as the
basis for the New York Board’s allegations.” (Emphasis sic.) (Brief of Appellant at 5.) On
February 9, 2021, the hearing examiner issued a report and recommendation endorsing
permanent denial of Yoonessi’s application. (Mar. 15, 2021 Report & Recommendation,
attached to Notice of Appeal at 1-32.) The SMBO considered and ratified the report and
recommendation by a 10-0-2 vote at its March 10, 2021 regular meeting. (Mar. 10, 2021
Excerpt, attached to Notice of Appeal at 1-3.)
       {¶ 4} Yoonessi filed a timely notice of appeal with the SMBO and the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas on March 15, 2021, and the trial court issued an order
affirming the SMBO’s order. (Feb. 16, 2023 Decision and Entry.) This timely appeal
followed.
       {¶ 5} Yoonessi’s merit brief asserts two assignments of error with the trial court’s
judgment, and in his reply brief, Yoonessi for the first time asserts a new assignment of
error. We begin our analysis of this case by rejecting Yoonesi’s supplemental assignment
of error. Yoonessi’s reply brief contends that pursuant to TWISM Ents., L.L.C. v. State Bd.
No. 23AP-160                                                                                  3

of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, 172 Ohio St.3d 225, 2022-Ohio-
4677, the SMBO’s “interpretation of the ethical and legal requirements of the medical
profession” (Reply Brief of Appellant at 2), is not entitled to deference, and that the SMBO’s
interpretation of the “bootstrap” statute, R.C. 4731.22(B)(22), is incorrect and not entitled
to deference:
                Pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding in the TWISM
                decision, mandatory deference to the Board’s interpretation of
                a statute or rule is improper.

Id. Reply briefs are designed “to afford the appellant an opportunity to respond to the brief
of the appellee, not to raise a new argument for the first time. Cullinan v. Ohio Dept. of Job
& Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-390, 2016-Ohio-1083, ¶ 19, citing State v. Mitchell,
10th Dist. No. 10AP-756, 2011-Ohio-3818, ¶ 47 (“A reply brief affords an appellant an
opportunity to respond to an appellee’s brief, * * * and it is improper to use it to raise a new
issue.”). More importantly, Yoonessi’s TWISM argument has no application here. TWISM
rejects deference to agency interpretations of statutes as a matter of separation of powers,
because “[w]hen a court defers to an agency’s interpretation of the law, it hands to the
executive branch the judicial authority ‘to say what the law is.’ ” TWISM at ¶ 34, quoting
State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 31. Yoonesi cites no authority that
would extend TWISM to prevent the SMBO from relying upon its own expertise as to “the
technical and ethical requirements of its profession,” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio
St.3d 619, 621 (1993), or any authority that would forbid the SMBO from determining
whether he was eligible for license reinstatement. Indeed, he could not do so—neither
action is an “agency interpretation of the law” that would fall within the ambit of TWISM,
but simply an application of the law and the SMBO’s expertise to the facts of Yoonessi’s
case. It is undisputed that Yoonessi’s license was suspended in both New York and
California, and Yoonessi does not dispute that R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) empowers the SMBO to
refuse to reinstate his license on that basis alone. The trial court did not defer to the SMBO
on its interpretation of the law, and TWISM does not reach so far as to restrict the SMBO
from serving the precise function that the legislature created it to serve. See TWISM at ¶ 3
(“[I]t is the role of the judiciary, not administrative agencies, to make the ultimate
determination about what the law means. Thus, the judicial branch is never required to
defer to an agency’s interpretation of the law. As we explain, an agency interpretation is
No. 23AP-160                                                                                4

simply one consideration a court may sometimes take into account in rendering the court’s
own independent judgment as to what the law is.”). (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, even
if Yoonessi had properly presented his TWISM argument, we would reject it, but given his
failure to do so requires no more of this court’s attention.
       {¶ 6} Yoonessi’s merit brief presents the following two assignments of error for this
court’s consideration:
              [I.] The Common Pleas Court committed legal error by
              affirming the Board’s decision to deny Dr. Yoonessi’s ability to
              introduce mitigating evidence pertaining to the underlying
              charges in the Board’s Notice of Opportunity for Hearing.

              [II.] The Common Pleas Court committed an abuse of
              discretion in finding that the Board’s Order was supported by
              reliable, probative, and substantive evidence and was in
              accordance with law because the action was based upon
              charges or reasons that were not included in the Board’s Notice
              of Opportunity for Hearing.

Both assignments of error are subject to the rule that when reviewing an order from the
SMBO, a common pleas court is required to affirm the order if it is supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence, and is in accordance with law. R.C. 119.12(M). See
also Pons at 621. But as the appellate court, our review is even more limited than that of
the trial court—it is not the function of the appellate court to examine the evidence; rather,
it is to determine only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Absent an abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, a court of appeals may not substitute its judgment
for that of either the SMBO or the trial court, but must instead affirm the trial court’s
judgment. Id. And in Pons, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “when reviewing a medical
board’s order, courts must accord due deference to the board’s interpretation of the
technical and ethical requirements of its profession.” Id.
              The purpose of the General Assembly in providing for
              administrative hearings in particular fields was to facilitate
              such matters by placing the decision on facts with boards or
              commissions composed of [people] equipped with the
              necessary knowledge and experience pertaining to a particular
              field. A medical disciplinary proceeding is a special statutory
              proceeding conducted by twelve persons, eight of whom are
              licensed physicians. R.C. 4731.01. Thus, a majority of the board
              members possess the specialized knowledge needed to
              determine the acceptable standard of general medical practice.
No. 23AP-160                                                                            5

              Hence, the medical board is quite capable of interpreting
              technical requirements of the medical field and quite capable
              of determining when conduct falls below the minimum
              standard of care.

Id. at 621-23. R.C. 4731.22(B)(22), which governs the SMBO’s action in this case, provides
as follows:
              Except as provided in division (P) of this section, the board, by
              an affirmative vote of not fewer than six members, shall, to the
              extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend a license or
              certificate to practice or certificate to recommend, refuse to
              issue a license or certificate, refuse to renew a license or
              certificate, refuse to reinstate a license or certificate, or
              reprimand or place on probation the holder of a license or
              certificate for * * * [a]ny of the following actions taken by an
              agency responsible for authorizing, certifying, or regulating
              an individual to practice a health care occupation or provide
              health care services in this state or another jurisdiction, for
              any reason other than the nonpayment of fees: the limitation,
              revocation, or suspension of an individual’s license to
              practice; acceptance of an individual’s license surrender;
              denial of a license; refusal to renew or reinstate a license;
              imposition of probation; or issuance of an order of censure or
              other reprimand.

(Emphasis added.)
       {¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Dr. Yoonessi contends that the SMBO was
wrong for quoting the New York report and recommendation in his notice of hearing in this
case, and that the hearing officer’s report and recommendation should not have relied upon
the New York report without allowing Yoonessi a chance to rebut and mitigate the
allegations and findings of that report with extrinsic evidence.
       {¶ 8} In his reply brief, Yoonessi apparently accepts that he is not entitled to
relitigate his New York suspension:
              [The SMBO argues that] a Board hearing cannot be used to re-
              litigate a prior administrative decision, a proposition with
              which Dr. Yoonessi has agreed throughout the hearing process.
              With that said, Dr. Yoonessi did not attempt to re-litigate the
              underlying action in New York. Instead, the crux of Dr.
              Yoonessi’s argument in this regard is that he was prohibited
              from meaningfully presenting or addressing mitigating or
              exonerating evidence concerning the facts that served as the
No. 23AP-160                                                                                6

              basis for both the New York Board’s allegations and the Board’s
              permanent denial of the restoration of his Ohio application.

(Reply Brief of Appellant at 8-9.) But the distinction that Yoonessi is trying to make here—
the distinction upon which both of his assignments of error rest—does not withstand
scrutiny. The only possible relevance of “mitigating or exonerating evidence concerning
the facts” underlying the allegations in New York is to attack the basis of his New York
suspension. Yoonessi does not dispute the existence of that suspension, nor does he dispute
that the SMBO is justified in denying his application for reinstatement based on the
existence of that suspension alone. He does not contend that he has been precluded from
offering evidence of mitigation related to his activities subsequent to the New York
suspension, nor does he contend that he has been precluded from offering evidence of
subsequent activities separate and apart from those that formed the basis of his New York
suspension that might justify the reinstatement of his license in Ohio. Instead, he wishes
to admit evidence regarding the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the New York
suspension with the sole goal of arguing that the SMBO should evaluate those
circumstances differently than the NYMB did, and on that basis refuse to rely upon the New
York suspension to disapprove his Ohio reinstatement.
       {¶ 9} But it would insult judicial comity to force an administrative agency in a state
considering reciprocal discipline to either completely ignore or, alternatively, to completely
reexamine and reweigh the procedural and factual circumstances upon which discipline
was originally imposed. It is beyond dispute that Ohio may take notice of the proceedings
in New York and California, restate what those proceedings were in reference to and what
factual determinations were reached, and examine how a similar case would be sanctioned
in Ohio without probing whether New York and California reached the correct result, failed
to consider relevant mitigating evidence, or imposed punishments that were too harsh.
That is precisely what R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) authorizes.
       {¶ 10} This court has affirmed trial court decisions in several similar cases based
largely on the simple determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the SMBO’s decisions were supported by reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence. See, e.g., Gross v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-437, 2008-Ohio-
6826 (surgeon was licensed in multiple states, and surgeon’s Ohio practice was limited and
placed on probationary status by the SMBO under R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) when the surgeon’s
No. 23AP-160                                                                                7

license to practice medicine in Colorado was permanently placed on inactive status);
Angerbauer v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-88, 2017-Ohio-7420 (SMBO
order permanently denying doctor’s application to practice in Ohio affirmed by trial court
and on appeal as there was substantial, probative, and reliable evidence to support SMBO’s
finding that action taken by the state of Washington due to doctor’s unprofessional conduct
both ‘limited’ and imposed ‘probation’ on his license); Edmands v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio,
10th Dist. No. 16AP-726, 2017-Ohio-8215 (SMBO was authorized to permanently deny
doctor’s application for certificate to practice medicine where he had been reprimanded in
West Virginia and his license in that state was on probation); and Coniglio v. State Med.
Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-298, 2007-Ohio-5018, ¶ 7 (SMBO properly disciplined
Ohio and New York doctor who was denied license to practice in Nevada based solely on
Nevada Board discipline, and even if Nevada Board’s decision was “based on something or
nothing, R.C. 4731.22 permits the State Medical Board of Ohio to discipline appellant * * *
[and] [w]e, as an appellate court, are bound to follow R.C. 4731.22.”). (Emphasis added.)
We reach the same result here, and conclude that the trial court’s decision was not an abuse
of discretion. We therefore overrule Yoonesi’s first assignment of error.
       {¶ 11} In his second assignment of error, Yoonesi contends that his due process
rights were violated because the SMBO’s order denying his application was based on
charges that were not included in his R.C. 119.07 notice of hearing, and that because this
case was brought under R.C. 4731.22(B)(22), the so-called “bootstrap statute,” any reliance
on the circumstances and underlying determinations of the New York case necessarily
results in a denial of his procedural due process rights.
       {¶ 12} It is axiomatic that “[d]ue process entitles an individual to fair notice of the
precise nature of the charges to be brought forth at a disciplinary proceeding.” Applegate
v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-78, 2007-Ohio-6384, ¶ 23, citing Althof v.
Ohio State Bd. of Psychology, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-1169, 2007-Ohio-1010, ¶ 19. But due
process is not violated unless the individual is actually disciplined for activities not
mentioned in the hearing notice. Id. (holding that failure of notice of hearing to mention
an incident discussed at hearing “did not violate Applegate’s due process rights because
Applegate was not disciplined for the disputed misconduct”).
No. 23AP-160                                                                                8

       {¶ 13} Yoonesi apparently believes that the SMBO’s denial of his reinstatement was
based on actions in New York that were both the precise subject of the New York suspension
but were also not part of that suspension, which he refers to as the “underlying findings in
the New York action.” (Brief of Appellant at 8.) But the notice of hearing specifically relied
upon R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) and both included and incorporated by reference copies of the
2002 New York license revocation, the 2013 New York denial of reinstatement, the 2003
California license revocation and petition denial, and the 2008 California denial of
reinstatement. (See State’s Hearing Ex. 1A). And the hearing officer’s decision, adopted by
the SMBO, rested on the legal conclusion that “[t]he 2002 New York Order, 2013 New York
Denial, 2003 California Revocation, 2003 California Petition Denial, and 2008 California
Denial, as described in Findings of Fact 2 through 5 above, individually and/or collectively”
were “ ‘actions taken by an agency responsible for authorizing, certifying, or regulating an
individual to practice a health care occupation or provide health care services’ as that clause
is used in R.C. 4731.22(B)(22)” and should be the basis of reciprocal discipline in Ohio.
(Mar. 15, 2021 Report & Recommendation at 29, quoting 2003 California Board Order.)
Because those actions were included in the notice and were the basis of both the hearing
officer’s recommendation and the SMBO’s action, Yoonesi cannot establish a violation of
his due process notice rights. Compare…with Applegate at ¶ 23. As the trial court correctly
recognized, “[c]ontrary to [Yoonessi’s] assertions otherwise, he was notified of the subject
matter of the hearing and his due process rights were not violated.” (Feb. 16, 2023 Decision
& Entry at 21.) Accordingly, Yoonessi’s second assignment of error lacks any merit and is
overruled.
       {¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Yoonessi’s two assignments of error
and his proposed supplemental assignment of error, and affirm the judgment of the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                         Judgment affirmed.
                         MENTEL, P.J., and LELAND, J., concur.