Court Opinion

ID: 9603758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:09:31.365949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:05.103196
License: Public Domain

GEER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s analysis regarding the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss. I respectfully dissent, however, because I believe the trial court erred in not giving a curative instruction when the State presented information outside the record during closing arguments and by allowing testimony regarding *645defendant’s request for an attorney. I would hold that the combination of these errors mandates a new trial.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed McDavid to answer questions as to whether defendant requested an attorney. When the prosecutor was questioning McDavid about what happened at the residence and what defendant told the officers, he further asked:
Q: ... At anytime, talking about all these statements the defendant made, and your conversation with the defendant, at anytime during any of those conversations, did he ever ask for a lawyer to be present?
Mr. Lee: Objection.
The Court: Overruled.
The Witness: Yes, he did .
Q: . . . And when did he tell you, or tell someone that he wanted a lawyer to be present?
A: I was conducting a search of the house
Mr. Lee: Objection. Request to be heard, Your Honor.
[Bench conference.]
The Court: That objection is overruled.
Q: . . . Inspector McDavid, when the defendant invoked his rights to an attorney, was he asked anymore questions about this incident?
A: No, he wasn’t.
These three questions thus specifically reference defendant’s invocation of his right to an attorney.
It is error to allow questions regarding a defendant’s request for an attorney because
[b]y giving the Miranda warnings, the police officers indicated to defendant that they were prepared to recognize his right to the presence of an attorney should he choose to exercise it. Therefore, we conclude that the words chosen by defendant to invoke this constitutional privilege should not have been admitted into evidence against him.
*646State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 284, 302 S.E.2d 164, 172 (1983). Yet, in this case, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to ask three times about defendant’s request for an attorney.
I believe that allowing the State’s questions, over defendant’s objections, regarding defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights. See State v. Jones, 146 N.C. App. 394, 399, 553 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2001) (holding under Ladd that it was error when the prosecutor questioned a detective regarding the defendant’s request for counsel), cert. denied, 355 N.C. 754, 566 S.E.2d 83 (2002). Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b) (2003), this violation is deemed prejudicial unless the State demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was harmless. Ladd, 308 N.C. at 284, 302 S.E.2d at 172 (holding that the defendant was “entitled to a new trial unless we determine that the erroneous admission of this evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). In my view, the majority errs by considering the harm caused by these questions in isolation and not assessing it in conjunction with the harm caused by the State’s closing argument.
As the majority explains, defense counsel specifically noted prior to closing arguments that the record contained no evidence of flight apart from defendant’s having failed to appear at a court date. He stressed specifically that there was no evidence of defendant’s having fled to Canada. The prosecutor assured defense counsel and the trial court that he would “be mindful” and that he “would not intend to introduce” any information on this subject unless defendant’s counsel put forth evidence of defendant’s leaving the country and his reasons why. Moments after this discussion, even though defendant had presented no evidence, the prosecutor displayed to the jury typewritten panels, stating:
15. D went to Canada when he KNEW he had a trial court dated back on 6/11/01 — he knew that he needed to get out of the US b/c he knew he was guilty
16. D didn’t return to the US and turn himself in, he hid (sound familiar?) — Officer Kolbay had to find him and arrest him to make sure he would make his next court date
It is undisputed that the material contained in panels 15 and 16 went outside the record.
The State suggests that the typewritten material was not error because our appellate courts’ prior opinions have dealt only with *647spoken comments from the prosecutor and not written displays in front of the jury. This supposed distinction is immaterial. Indeed, a written display persistently confronting a jury may be more prejudicial than a fleeting remark once voiced, but not repeated. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis & Broun on North Carolina Evidence § 252, at 298-99 (6th ed. 2004) (observing with respect to illustrative evidence that jurors “are quite likely to be influenced by what they see, without being overly concerned about whether it precisely illustrates what they hear”).
I agree with the majority that defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. Nevertheless, because the court refused to issue a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard the information on the panels, the jury may well have considered defendant’s flight to Canada and his subsequent hiding in reaching its verdict. The panels were before the jury long enough to be read, as demonstrated by the fact defendant’s counsel had time to read them and object.
It appears from the record that the trial court attempted to remedy the error by refusing to give an instruction on flight. Unless, however, instructed not to do so, a jury could conclude on its own, as a matter of common sense, that the fact defendant went to Canada and hid after being charged suggested he was guilty. The only method by which the court could have fully cured the error was to specifically tell the jury that they were shown information that was not part of the evidence and to instruct the jurors to disregard the panels. See, e.g., State v. Lake, 305 N.C. 143, 150-51, 286 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1982) (when the district attorney tried to discredit witnesses with facts outside of the record, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial because its “curative instruction adequately averted any possible prejudice to defendant”); State v. Jordan, 149 N.C. App. 838, 844, 562 S.E.2d 465, 468 (2002) (holding that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial when the court did not instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s improper comments); State v. Riley, 128 N.C. App. 265, 270, 495 S.E.2d 181, 185 (1998) (holding that where evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming and the prosecutor made comments “concerning Defendant’s failure to testify,” a new trial was required because the error was “not timely corrected by the trial court”).
In contrast to the majority, I would not consider whether the failure to give the curative instruction standing alone was harmless *648error1 since I believe, in light of the improper closing argument, the State cannot demonstrate that its questions regarding defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. When considering whether the mention of defendant’s post-Miranda request for an attorney is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, our courts have looked at: (1) whether the reference was made by the witness or in a question by counsel; (2) whether the State emphasized or made additional comments or references to the defendant invoking his constitutional rights; (3) whether the State attempted to capitalize on defendant’s request; and (4) whether the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming. State v. Elmore, 337 N.C. 789, 792-93, 448 S.E.2d 501, 503-04 (1994).
In this case, a witness did not simply mention defendant’s request for an attorney in passing. Instead, the State asked three separate questions of McDavid that elicited three times the fact that defendant had asked to have a lawyer present, causing all questioning to cease. The State on appeal has offered no reason that the prosecutor would ask three such questions in a row other than to hammer home the fact that defendant had asked to have a lawyer present while the officers were searching his house and car (where incriminating evidence was found). The jury could readily conclude that this request suggested guilt. Then, in the closing argument, the State again focused the jury’s attention on defendant’s post-arrest conduct. The improper panels indicated that defendant had fled to Canada and hid because, according to the panel, “he knew that he needed to get out of the US b/c he knew he was guilty.”
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the evidence in this case as overwhelming. No one with personal knowledge testified regarding what the package looked like in New York, where the opium came from, or how it ended up in a United States Customs bag. Defendant’s conduct in hiding the opium is not necessarily evidence of guilt since someone who unexpectedly receives contraband in a United States Customs bag and hears the police knocking at the door would likely behave in identical fashion. Although the officers uncovered additional incriminating material in defendant’s car, the jury apparently did not view that evidence as compelling since the jury found defendant not guilty of the charge of maintaining a dwelling for the purpose of keeping controlled substances. The jury could well *649have turned to defendant’s post-arrest behavior — including the request for a lawyer as the search progressed and the flight to Canada — and decided that this behavior tipped the scales as to guilt on the trafficking charge. As a result, “we cannot say that there is or can be no reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached” if these errors had not been made. State v. Allen, 353 N.C. 504, 511, 546 S.E.2d 372, 376 (2001). Accordingly, I would hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial.

. See State v. Westbrooks, 345 N.C. 43, 70, 478 S.E.2d 483, 600 (1996) (holding that an improper remark made during a closing argument does not justify a new trial unless defendant can show prejudice).