Court Opinion

ID: 9723470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:16:38.23612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:38.832252
License: Public Domain

TAMURA, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s decision directing vacation of the trial court’s discovery order runs counter to the basic principle underlying criminal discovery.
The rationale for criminal discovery was recently summarized in People v. Municipal Court (Street) (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 739 [153 Cal.Rptr. 69], where the court stated: “Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery, supra, at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 586 [305 P.2d 1] (app. dism. 358 U.S. 646 [3 L.Ed.2d 568, 79 S.Ct. 537], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810]): ‘Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case,. . . ’ Justice Traynor wrote: ‘There remains to be articulated how much the right [to pretrial discovery] encompasses. The defendant must show better cause for discovery “than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.” A showing, however, that the defendant cannot readily obtain the information through his own efforts will ordinarily entitle him to pretrial knowledge of any unprivileged evidence, or information that might lead to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that *697might lead to the discovery of evidence, if it appears reasonable that such knowledge will assist him in preparing his defense. Moreover, in the absence of a countervailing showing by the prosecution that the information may be used for an improper purpose, discovery is available not merely in the discretion of the trial court, but as a matter of right. ’ (Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery (1964) 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228, 244, italics added.)” (People v. Municipal Court (Street), supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 739, 749-750.)
Consistent with the rationale of criminal discovery, our high court has stated that the requisite showing for discovery “may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery other than ‘a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 537 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305]; Griffin v. Municipal Court (1977) 20 Cal.3d 300, 306 [142 Cal.Rptr. 286, 571 P.2d 997].)
In Caldwell v. Municipal Court (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 377 [129 Cal.Rptr. 834], the court applied the foregoing principles in passing upon the adequacy of a defendant’s showing for the production of complaints against police officers and police investigative records in the context of misdemeanor charges of battery on a police officer and obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties. The municipal court denied discovery and a petition for writ of mandate to the superi- or court was denied. On appeal from the superior court judgment, the reviewing court rejected the People’s contention that the defendant had made an inadequate showing. The court stated: “The Attorney General argues that, in the present case, the showing in support of discovery was insufficient in that ‘there is no allegation based on personal knowledge that the officers actually used excessive force or. ..that appellant is actually going to rely on a defense of self-defense.’ But to require a personal showing by appellants would potentially involve interference with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Even though the defense has not been able to point to specific prior acts of violence, the official records desired to be examined were identified with reasonable particularity and the pertinence to the defense of the requested information was demonstrated. The court should have granted discovery subject to the right of the public agency to assert privilege un*698der Evidence Code section 1040.” (Caldwell v. Municipal Court, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d 377, 380.)
Here, as in Caldwell, the charges are battery on a police officer and interference with the officer’s performance of his official duties. Defendant moved for discovery of complaints against the police officer for use of excessive force in the performance of his duties and copies of all police reports filed by the officer during the past three years for alleged violations of Penal Code sections 148 or 243. The motion was supported by defense counsel’s declaration in which he stated, inter alia: “I am further informed and believe that the conduct of Officer Richard Con-don towards the defendant Susan M. Bonner is material and relevant consideration to the defense of the defendant in that the degree of provocation and the issue of self defense may in fact be an issue at said trial. [1i] It is not possible to obtain said information through the efforts of defense counsel without an order of this court.”
The motion first came on for hearing before Judge Cox who questioned whether there had been a sufficient showing that self-defense would be an issue in the case. Judge Cox did not rule on the motion, however, and the matter thereafter came before Judge Hildreth. When informed of Judge Cox’ reservation concerning the adequacy of the showing made, Judge Hildreth stated: “Just as an individual judge, I have a feeling that in light of the type of charge that basically you are entitled to the information unless there is some showing or some indication that by no stretch of the imagination is self-defense going to be an issue. I think almost invariably by the nature of the charge it is something that should be explored by defense counsel.” The judge granted the discovery motion.
The majority holds that Judge Hildreth abused his discretion in granting the motion as it related to the arrest reports because defendant failed to present any plausible justification for their production. I disagree. In light of the nature of the charges, the judge could reasonably infer from counsel’s declaration that self-defense, provocation and excessive force would be issues in the case. In this type of case “the required ‘plausible justification’ for criminal discovery is readily apparent” (Bortin v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 873, 878 [135 Cal.Rptr. 30]) and Judge Hildreth properly so noted in making his order. “A defendant’s motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand.” (Pitchess v. Superior *699Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 535.) Whether a plausible justification has been shown, therefore, is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court and all reasonable inferences should be drawn in support of its determination. The majority, however, invalidates the order by doing precisely the opposite.
The majority relies on Lemelle v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 148 [143 Cal.Rptr. 450], a decision of this court from which I also dissented. There, defendant was charged with, among other offenses, battery upon a police officer and resisting arrest. He sought discovery of a number of items, including arrest reports filed by the named officers during the past 10 years for alleged violations of Penal Code sections 148 or 242-243 and records of any psychiatric or psychological tests of either officer. The trial court denied discovery and defendant sought a writ of mandate from this court to compel discovery. The same majority that decided this case, speaking through the same author, held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery of the requested items. The majority felt that the usefulness of the arrest reports was “speculative and remote at best” (at p. 163), but since it was conceivable that they could lead to relevant evidence, defendant had “satisfied the requirement of plausible justification.” (At p. 164.) The majority nevertheless held that the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, could have concluded that complying with a demand for such reports covering a 10-year period would be so burdensome and disproportionate to the minimal value of the information to defendant that the request for the discovery order should be denied. (I had no quarrel with that aspect of Lemelle; my dissent was directed to the denial of discovery of the psychiatric and psychological test records.)
Thus, in Lemelle, the majority drew inferences to support an order denying discovery. By the same token, where the trial court in the exercise of its discretion has granted discovery, all reasonable inferences should be indulged to support the order. Indeed, an order denying discovery should be subjected to greater scrutiny than one granting discovery.
The municipal court did not exceed the bounds of reason in making its discovery order. I would affirm the judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate.
*700Appendix A
DECLARATION OF COUNSEL
I, P. TIMOTHY PlTTULLO, being first duly sworn do state:
1. I am a duly licensed attorney at law and represent SUSAN M. BONNER, defendant in the above-captioned matter.
2. I am informed and believe and based upon this information and belief allege that the defendant in the abóve-captioned matter is charged with Penal Code § 243, Battery Upon a Police Officer.
3. I am further informed and believe that the victim and police officer in this case is Officer Richard Condon of the Ontario Police Department.
4. I am further informed and believe that the conduct of Officer Richard Condon towards the defendant Susan M. Bonner is material and relevant consideration to the defense of the defendant in that the degree of provocation and the issue of self defense may in fact be an issue at said trial.
It is not possible to obtain said information through the efforts of defense counsel without an order of this court.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on August 28, 1978, at Upland, California.
P. Timothy Pittulo (signed) p. Timothy pittulo