Court Opinion

ID: 9670153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:15:59.037629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.870242
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Chief Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict in favor of the employer and that the trial court did not err in submitting separate verdict forms with respect to Aurora and Dodd.
I do not agree, however, that contributory negligence can never be a defense in an action based upon strict liability. It may very well be that the traditional definition of contributory negligence might have to be modified in instructing a jury in a strict liability case, but more difficult judicial feats have been accomplished, e. g., creating the concept of strict liability itself. It is too facile an explanation to say that because the defendant manufacturer’s negligence is not material, plaintiff’s cannot be. The concepts of assumption of the risk and misuse of the product may not contain the dread word, but in practice they are not so distinguishable from the defense of contributory negligence that it is permissible to instruct on the former and not on the latter. Striking the reference to negligence from the Engberg ease may make it possible to apply an algebraic process in determining which defenses are available, but it does not really explain why a plaintiff’s misconduct, when described in terms of negligence, should be any less a bar to his recovery than when it is described as some other form of conduct or misconduct that has the effect of relieving the manufacturer of liability.
In summary, although I would hold that on the facts before us the instructions on contributory negligence were not warranted, I would not abandon that defense in a proper case.