Court Opinion

ID: 9427276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:20:15.453281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:05.796395
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I concur fully in the Court’s opinion, but with great reluctance ; in my view respondent is entitled to the award of treble damages ordered by the District Court. Given the Court’s analysis of the legal issues involved here, the opinion today has no occasion to focus on Greyhound’s egregious behavior toward Mt. Hood Stages — aimed at total destruction of a competitor. In the present case the jury found Greyhound not only to be in violation of the Sherman Act, but that it had fraudulently concealed its antitrust violations for more than a decade. Moreover, the Interstate Commerce Commission found that petitioner’s actions were “inspired by a desire to stifle competition,” in particular an intent to “injure or destroy” respondent. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 104 M. C. C. 449, 461 (1968). Beyond its unlawful conduct, Greyhound took the added step of willfully disobeying the enforcement order of the United States District Court. In assessing criminal fines of $600,000 against Greyhound, the District Court, in a careful and detailed opinion, observed that Greyhound had “displayed a contemptuous reluctance to even commence compliance” with the court’s order. United States v. Greyhound *338Corp., 370 F. Supp. 881, 884 (ND Ill. 1974). The District Court went on to note:
“In determining the extent of Greyhound's willful defiance of the order, the court recognizes Greyhound's record of purposeful non-action, protracted resistance, and emasculating interpretations of the order. The court also notes Greyhound's 'paper compliance’ program and the reluctance with which Greyhound’s top management became actively involved in securing compliance with the order. All of this suggests that Greyhound’s failure to comply with certain parts of the order was deliberate.” Ibid.
These determinations by the District Court were upheld in every respect by the Court of Appeals. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F. 2d 529 (CA7 1974).
There is no question that Mount Hood has been injured substantially by Greyhound. Moreover, were it not for the statute of limitations in the Clayton Act, respondent would clearly receive the full measure of treble damages. However, I am bound to agree with the Court’s opinion that the explicit language of § 5 (i) of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 16 (i) (1976 ed.), precludes a statutory tolling of the statute of limitations. But as the Court carefully stresses, ante, at 337 n. 21, we expressly do not reach respondent’s claim that the limitations period should be tolled on equitable grounds. The Court, of Appeals explicitly left this question open, 555 F. 2d 687, 701 n. 34, and the Court’s opinion today leaves it free to re-examine the issue on remand.*
*339Since the Court’s remand allows for an inquiry into the issue of equitable tolling, the Court of Appeals may apply traditional equitable principles in reaching its decision. See, e. g., 2 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 90-143 (5th ed. 1941).

The authority of a federal court, sitting as a chancellor, to toll a statute of limitations on equitable grounds is a well-established part of our jurisprudence. See, e. g., American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538 (1974); Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424 (1965) ; Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U. S. 342, 347-349 (1944). With respect to the limitations period of the Clayton Act, equitable tolling is particularly appropriate since the addition of a federal *339limitations period in the Act was essentially a “procedural” change in the statute. American Pipe, supra, at 558 n. 29.