Court Opinion

ID: 9443290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:16:55.426326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:26.488518
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I do not agree with the majority’s view that the charge of the trial judge was inadequate. The trial judge read the complete text of the applicable statute to the jury as part of his instructions. The statute specifically provided that there must be an “intent to convert to his own use”. The reading of the statute as part of his instructions, where the language of the statute is “clear and concise” is sufficient. Wheeler v. United States, D.'C.Cir., 1951, 190 F.2d 663. The phrase “with intent to convert to his own use” is one which the average layman could be expected to understand. Moreover, at another point in his charge, in referring to the statute the trial judge defined the word “stealing” as used therein as follows: “Stealing commonly refers to larceny and larceny is the unlawful taking or carrying away of the goods of another with the intent to convert them to your use" (Emphasis supplied.)
In my opinion the jury was clearly instructed that in order to find the defendant guilty on count 1 it had to determine that *323there was “an intent to convert to his own use” the appropriated whiskey. It is well settled that the charge of the trial judge must he considered in its entirety and not as a piecemeal proposition. Boyd v. United States, 1926, 271 U.S. 104, 46 S.Ct. 442, 70 L.Ed. 857; Sachs v. Government of the Canal Zone, 5 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 292, cer-tiorari denied, 338 U.S. 858, 70 S.Ct. 100, 94 L.Ed. 525.
I do not think that Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 242, is apposite. In that case the statute did not require existence or proof of “intent”. The Supreme Court held, nevertheless, that the intent must be proved. The second point involved in that case was that while the defendant testified that he had no intent to convert but thought that the articles were abandoned property, the trial judge specifically ruled as a matter of law that the defendant’s state of mind and lack of intent ■“[was] no defense.”
For the reasons stated I would affirm the judgment of conviction upon the first count. I concur with the maj ority that there should be an affirmance of conviction on the second count.