Court Opinion

ID: 9609524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:28:13.490251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:50.987638
License: Public Domain

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I write separately because I believe that it is undisputed, from Elam’s own deposition, that Dr. Breeding provided Elam *472with information from which Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice. Since I believe that the relevant content of these statements is not actually in dispute, and that these statements were sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, I would find that there is no factual dispute and that summary judgment was appropriate, and I would affirm the district court’s decision.
Initially, I agree with the majority that Kentucky’s discovery statute applies, and that it can be triggered either by what the plaintiff subjectively knew or — more importantly in this case — by what the plaintiff objectively should have discovered. Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 413.140(2); Wiseman v. Alliant Hosps., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709, 712 (Ky.2000) (noting that the “knowledge necessary to trigger the statute is two-pronged; one must know: (1) he has been wronged; and, (2) by whom the wrong has been committed”). Furthermore, I agree that where there is an issue of disputed fact as to when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his cause of action, that factual issue should be resolved by the jury. Lynn. Min. Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Ky.1965); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). However, “[wjhere the pertinent facts are not in dispute, the validity of the defense of the statute of limitations can and should be determined by the court as a matter of law.” Lynn, 394 S.W.2d at 759 (emphasis added).
Here, applying the objective standard required by Kentucky’s discovery statute, the facts show that summary judgment should be granted as a matter of law. Initially, the majority acknowledges that “Elam’s recollection of the conversation with Dr. Breeding contains statements from which a reasonable juror could find that Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice.” (Majority Op. at 468.) The majority opinion then goes on to quote from Elam’s deposition, which provides what I believe to be the critical statement by Dr. Breeding:
Q. Do you remember what you were told about the results of the cardie cath?
A. The results of the cath? I just remember that he told me that some stents were placed in a place that shouldn’t [sic] have been placed. And that was the result, that I was going to have to have open heart surgery. Q. All right. Who told you that?
A. Dr. Breeding.
(Elam Dep. 104 (emphasis added).) This statement clearly shows that Elam recollected that Dr. Breeding, a medical expert, informed him that the stents, which Elam knew had been inserted by Dr. Menzies, had been improperly placed. As a result, he was going to have to have bypass surgery. The language Elam recollected Dr. Breeding using was simple and unambiguous, and Dr. Breeding clearly found fault with the procedure that Dr. Menzies had undertaken. At this point, regardless of what he subjectively understood, Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice, which triggered the Kentucky discovery statute.
Confronted with this unambiguous language, the majority seeks to create a factual dispute by pointing to three other statements in Elam’s deposition.1 Howev*473er, none of these statements undermine what Elam should have discovered after hearing Dr. Breeding’s clear comments, and since Kentucky applies an objective, not just a subjective, standard, what Elam should have discovered is the critical inquiry. In the first statement, Elam was asked, “[d]id you form a belief that your problems that you started experiencing in August 2005 were related to something that Dr. Menzies had done, or not done, in his care of you,” to which he replied: “No, I didn’t form a belief at all. My wife and I talked to it in detail, you known, about that I could have had more blockage. And we didn’t have a clue, you known, what was going on.” (Elam Dep. 108.) In the second statement, Elam was asked if, “[ajround the time that you had your bypass surgery, did you suspect that Dr. Menzies may have done something wrong in how he cared for you in July and August,” to which he replied: “I didn’t never suspect. I told you that I thought the world of Dr. Menzies.” (Elam Dep. 107.) Clearly, both of these statements go to Elam’s subjective beliefs, to what he personally believed about Dr. Menzies and, in particular, to whether he subjectively believed that Dr. Menzies committed malpractice. However, the Kentucky discovery statute can be triggered by what Elam should have discovered, not simply by what he subjectively believed. Here, Dr. Breeding’s comments, as recollected by Elam, clearly informed Elam that Dr. Breeding, an expert, believed that the stents had been incorrectly placed. After hearing these comments, Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice.
Furthermore, the majority also points to a third statement, in which Elam was asked, “I thought you said something, like, the stents had been put in the wrong place,” to which he replied:
A. Well, [Dr. Breeding] said they were placed — I can’t — the main artery comes down, and then he said when you’ve got two vessels going together, that you can’t place two stents together, some way or another. He used medical terms, and I didn’t understand all the medical terms or whatever, you know.
Q. Okay. Did you understand this physician to be critical of what Dr. Menzies had done with the stents?
A. He seemed to be, a little bit.
(Elam Dep. 106.) To trigger the Kentucky discovery statute, Elam needed to be put on notice of Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice, not of the medical specifics that created the potential malpractice. The fact that Elam did not understand all the medical terms or exactly how Dr. Breeding believed that the stents had been misplaced is both to be expected and irrelevant. Elam was neither a doctor nor an expert in cardiology, that is why it was so important that Dr. Breeding inform him that the stents had been wrongly placed. Dr. Breeding was the expert, and Dr. Breeding was able to and did explain, in clear and unambiguous terms, that he believed that the stents had been “placed in a place that shouldn’t [sic] have been placed.” (Elam Dep. 104.) Furthermore, at the end of this statement, Elam again acknowledged that — ultimately—he understood that Dr. Breeding was critical of Dr. Menzies’ stenting procedure.
*474Similarly, the testimony of Elam’s son and wife does not refute what Elam should have discovered based on his recollection of Dr. Breeding’s comments. Elam’s son, Wesley, stated that:
I’m wanting to say that he said that the stint [sic] was placed in the wrong place to start with, that was what would cause this blockage to occur. That’s the best of my knowledge. The way I, I was shaking. I was scared. But I’m pretty sure that that’s what he said because I mean my brain was just going 100 different ways. I mean I didn’t know what to do.
(Wesley Elam Dep. 18-19.) To the best of his knowledge, Perry Elam confirmed, that Dr. Breeding told Elam of Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice. Perry Elam’s imperfect recollections do not create a factual dispute. Elam’s wife, Randi, also testified that she was not sure if Dr. Breeding was “saying that the stints [sic] were contributing to the problem or taking, had not taken care of the problem.” (Randi Elam Dep. 49.) Initially, both of these statement suggest that there was something wrong with the stenting procedure. However, Randi Elam did not recollect exactly what Dr. Breeding said and, unlike her husband, could not remember the conversation clearly. Her unclear recollections do not undermine or dispute Elam’s clear recollections of Dr. Breeding’s comments that the stents had been “placed in a place that shouldn’t [sic] have been placed.” (Elam Dep. 104.) Furthermore, regarding Elam’s malpractice claim, it is what he knew or should have discovered that provided the critical information. Elam recollected, more clearly than his wife or his son, that Dr. Breeding had told him that the stents had been incorrectly placed.
In short, I believe that the majority fails to undertake the objective inquiry into what Elam should have discovered that Kentucky law requires. Indeed, the majority notes that, “[i]n light of Elam’s repeated testimony that he did not think he had been wronged, a jury should decide when the statute begins to run.” (Majority Op. at 471.) I agree that there is evidence that Elam subjectively “did not think” that he had been wronged. But Kentucky law demands that we examine not only what Elam thought but also what he should have discovered. I believe that it is undisputed that Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice after Dr. Breeding’s comments, and he did not need to be a medical expert to do so — Dr. Breeding was the expert and he told Elam of Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice in clear, easily understandable terms. Since what Elam should have discovered is undisputed, summary judgment was appropriate.
The majority also faults Dr. Menzies for not deposing Dr. Breeding. However, Dr. Menzies already had testimony from Elam’s own mouth clearly stating what he recollected that Dr. Breeding had told him about Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice. As discussed above, nothing in the record disputed what he should have discovered from these statements. It is what Elam knew or should have discovered that triggered the Kentucky discovery statute. Since Elam provided clear testimony of what Dr. Breeding told him, from which he should have known of Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice, it would have been superfluous for Dr. Menzies to also depose Dr. Breeding.2 Indeed, because Elam had *475provided such unfavorable testimony during his deposition, and because Dr. Breeding was equally available3 to both parties, it seems that Elam, if anyone, should have deposed Dr. Breeding.
The majority’s reliance on the unpublished decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Van Landingham is also misplaced. Van Landingham v. Georgia Pacific Corp., No.2007-CA-002601-MR, 2009 WL 2475258 (Ky.App. Aug. 14, 2009). In Van Landingham, there was a dispute as to when Van Landingham discovered that asbestos may have caused his health prob*476lems. Id. The majority points out that Van Landingham’s surgeon and primary physician both had evidence suggesting that Van Landingham was informed of the possibility that asbestos caused his health problems. (Majority Op. at 470.) However, critically, the surgeon stated that “he could not specifically remember if he spoke with Van Landingham” about the possibility that asbestos caused his health problems and the primary physician had placed a question mark next to the comments in his chart indicating that asbestos may have caused Van Landingham’s health problems and actually stated that, “he could not be sure that Van Landingham [instead of the surgeon] had personally relayed the information to him.” Van Landingham, 2009 WL 2475258, at *1-*2. Thus, neither of these witnesses could provide definitive evidence as to what information had been provided to Van Landingham during the critical time period. Furthermore, Van Landingham himself did not provide direct evidence that he had been informed of the asbestos at a time when it would have caused the Kentucky discovery statute to run. Id. at *2-*3 (filing an affidavit stating that, in the relevant time period, “he had not been diagnosed with nor did he suspect that he suffered from asbestosis or any other disease caused by asbestos exposure”). In contrast, in this case, Elam provided direct evidence of the information he received from Dr. Breeding: he specifically stated in his deposition that he had been told by Dr. Breeding that the stents were “placed in a place that shouldn’t [sic] have been placed,” at a time early enough to trigger the Kentucky discovery statute and bar his claim. (Elam Dep. 104.) As noted above, none of the other evidence disputes this. Thus, it is simply inaccurate for the majority to claim that, “[t]he defendant in Van Landingham presented far more evidence that the plaintiff should have known of his injury than Dr. Menzies has proffered here.” (Majority Op. at 470.) Rather, in contrast to the defendant in Van Landingham, Dr. Menzies provided undisputed testimony from Elam’s own mouth from which Elam clearly should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice on a date which would have caused the discovery statute to run.
I do not find any dispute of material fact as to when or whether Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice because Elam’s own deposition reveals that he remembered Dr. Breeding clearly telling him that the stents were incorrectly placed on October 20, 2005; therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. Consequently, I would affirm the district court’s decision.

. The majority notes that, "a juror could find that Elam should not have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice because he reasonably believed that he needed open heart surgery because the stents had become obstructed by blockage through no fault of Dr. Menzies.” (Majority Op. at 468.) Initially, I note that our inquiry centers around what a reasonable jury, not just any hypothetical juror, could find. More importantly, once Dr. Breeding, a medical expert who had just examined Elam, told Elam, in clear and unambiguous language that a reasonable person would have understood, about Dr. Menzies’ *473potential malpractice, Elam could not simply ignore or disregard that information. To ignore or disregard it would have made any belief to the contrary unreasonable, not reasonable as the majority implies. Furthermore, from this information, Elam should have discovered Dr. Menzies’ potential malpractice, which is all that is required to trigger the Kentucky statute of limitations.

. The only Kentucky case that the majority cites to for the proposition that Dr. Menzies should have deposed Dr. Breeding, Welch v. L.R. Cooke Chevrolet Co., 314 Ky. 634, 236 S.W.2d 690, 691-92 (1950), involved the failure to call the only witness closely associated with the origins of a fire at an automobile repair shop. Unlike that case, Dr. Breeding *475was not the only, or even the critical, witness to the conversation that triggered the Kentucky discovery statute. Instead, Elam, along with his family, were also participants and witnesses to the conversation. Furthermore, Elam was the critical witness because it is what Elam knew or should have discovered that triggered the Kentucky discovery statute. Therefore, Welch is not applicable here. The other cases and authorities that the majority cites to are also inapplicable because, as noted above, Dr. Breeding would have testified to the same conversation that Elam recollected; therefore, his testimony would have been cumulative and inferior to the critical testimony that Dr. Menzies already had from Elam himself. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 202-03 (J. Chadbourn, ed. 1979) ("[I]t seems plain that possible witnesses whose testimony would be for any reason comparatively unimportant, or cumulative, or inferior to what is already utilized, might well be dispensed with by a party on general grounds of expense and inconvenience, without any apprehension as to the tenor of their testimony.”) (emphasis in original); 2 McCormick On Evidence § 264 (noting that "if the testimony of the witness would be merely cumulative, the inference is unavailable” and that “[t]he possibility that the inference may be drawn invites waste of time in calling unnecessary witnesses or in presenting evidence to explain why they were not called. Failure to anticipate that the inference may be invoked entails substantial possibilities of surprise.”); see also Kostelec v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 F.3d 1220, 1229 (8th Cir.1995) (insurance company in a dispute over whether the claimant caused the fire leading to the claim through arson failed to call as a witness the person who initially saw smoke emanating from the building and reported the fire and who, therefore, possessed unique, non-cumulative information).

. The majority states that, "a witness is not considered ‘equally available' if, as in this case, the witness has special knowledge of relevant facts for the party with the burden of proof.” (Majority Op. at 469 (citing Welch, 236 S.W.2d at 691-92).) I do not think Dr. Breeding had special knowledge of the relevant facts in this case because Elam (and his family) were also present for this conversation and our inquiry revolves around what was actually said to Elam and what Elam should have discovered. However, I also disagree with this characterization of when a witness is not considered "equally available.” Welch does not discuss when a witness is equally available and involved a former employee of the defendant, who had unique, non-cumulative knowledge. Welch, 236 S.W.2d at 691—92. Furthermore, as Judge Merritt has previously noted, Kentucky follows “the general rule that a witness is not considered ‘equally available’ if he is presumptively interested in the outcome or if his relationship to one party would reasonably be expected to make his testimony naturally more favorable to that party.” Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1245 (6th Cir.1988) (citing Kentucky cases for this proposition and involving a witness who, as a doctor who was employed by the defendant hospital, was not equally available to both parties); see also 2 McCormick On Evidence § 264 ("If a witness is ‘equally available’ to both parties, courts often state that no inference springs from the failure of either to call the witness. This statement can hardly be accurate, as the inference may be allowed when the witness could easily be called or subpoenaed by either party. What is meant instead is that when the witness would be as likely to be favorable to one party as the other, no inference is proper.”) (citations omitted). Here, Dr. Breeding was Elam's physician, and there is no reason to believe that Dr. Breeding was presumptively interested in the outcome. Furthermore, there is no reason — other than Elam’s own deposition testimony — to believe that Dr. Breeding's testimony would be more favorable to Dr. Menzies than to Elam. Therefore, I believe that Dr. Breeding was equally available to both Elam and Dr. Menzies.