Court Opinion

ID: 9951768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 23:02:21.735879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:22.254135
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/18/24 Price v. Superior Court CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 RONALD PRICE,
             Petitioner,
 v.                                                                      A168445
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN
 MATEO COUNTY,                                                           (San Mateo County
             Respondent;                                                 Super. Ct. Nos.
 THE PEOPLE,                                                             HC2370, SC021392A)

             Real Party in Interest.

THE COURT:*
         Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court
to rule on habeas corpus claims that were embraced by respondent’s orders to
show cause (OSC’s) but not adjudicated by an order filed in conformity with

California Rules of Court, rule 4.551(g).1 We conclude petitioner is entitled to

the requested relief.2

         * Before Jackson, P. J.; Simons, J.; and Burns, J.
         1
             All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
         2
        We grant the petition by way of this memorandum opinion because
“[t]he Courts of Appeal should dispose of causes that raise no substantial

                                                               1
      Rule 4.551(g), governing superior court habeas corpus proceedings,
provides that “[a]ny order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus must
contain a brief statement of the reasons for the denial. An order only
declaring the petition to be ‘denied’ is insufficient.” As the court typically
most familiar with the underlying criminal proceeding, the superior court’s
statement of reasons for denying relief is often invaluable to an appellate
court entertaining a subsequent original habeas corpus petition.
Additionally, an explanatory order identifying the claims presented in the
superior court and the reasons for their denial permits a higher court to
ensure that a petitioner has meaningfully exhausted their habeas corpus
remedy in the superior court as to all asserted claims. (See In re Hillery
(1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 293, 294.) Furthermore, when an evidentiary hearing
has occurred, even though we independently review the record, the superior
court’s factual findings may be entitled to deference under certain
circumstances. (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 249, abrogated on
other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 370–371 [176
L.Ed.2d 284].)
      In response to petitioner’s two habeas corpus petitions filed in pro. per.,
and a supplemental petition filed by petitioner’s later appointed counsel,
respondent issued OSC’s on all the petitions and the claims therein

(approximately 23 claims).3 Following the filing of returns and traverses, an
evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Leland Davis III.

issues of law or fact by memorandum or other abbreviated form of opinion.”
(Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
      3
        The OSC’s indicate respondent determined petitioner stated a
prima facie case for relief; in other words, after assuming the truth of
petitioner’s factual allegations, the court preliminarily concluded petitioner

                                        2
      On November 3, 2021, Judge Davis issued an order broadly denying
“[t]he Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” but only providing reasons for
denying a few of the almost two dozen claims asserted in the various
petitions. But, as petitioner observes, that order does not identify those
claims by number, making it difficult to determine with any precision which
of the claims were denied based on the court’s expressed reasoning.
      On March 2, 2023, in response to petitioner’s attempt to obtain a ruling
on what he described as unadjudicated claims, a different judicial officer
(Judge Michael K. Wendler) first determined that Judge Davis’s denial order
had addressed the arguments made in petitioner’s counsel’s October 26, 2020
postevidentiary hearing memorandum. As for other claims, Judge Wendler’s
order stated: “Although the order denying the Petition did not explicitly
identify the claims previously raised that were not pursued by Petitioner
after the close of evidence, Petitioner’s Memorandum . . . makes clear that
Petitioner was no longer pursuing these claims that Petitioner now contends
were not adjudicated. The trial court properly deemed these claims
abandoned, and consequently, there are no valid claims that were not
adjudicated by the trial court in the habeas proceeding.” The March 2, 2023
order is problematic, for a variety of reasons we shall explain.
      As petitioner aptly observes, nothing in Judge Davis’s November 3,
2021 order reflects a determination that he, as the judge presiding over the
OSC proceedings and evidentiary hearing, “deemed” petitioner’s

unadjudicated claims abandoned.4 Moreover, the parties to this mandate

would be entitled to relief if he proved his factual allegations. (People v.
Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474–475 (Duvall); rule 4.551(c)(1).)
      4
        We have not located any information in the record explaining why
petitioner’s request for a ruling was not resolved by Judge Davis. Nor can we

                                        3
proceeding have not drawn our attention to anything in the record—including
the October 26, 2020 memorandum referenced in Judge Wendler’s March 2,
2023 order—reflecting petitioner’s express abandonment or withdrawal of the
remaining claims.
      The conclusion that petitioner abandoned all claims not referenced in
the November 3, 2021 order is incorrect to the extent the record reveals
petitioner litigated (albeit unsuccessfully) during the evidentiary hearing the
admissibility of inculpatory statements made by petitioner’s deceased brother
(Raymond Price). Plainly, petitioner’s unadjudicated claims relying on that
evidence were not abandoned. Yet the November 3, 2021 order denying relief
did not reference the denial of petitioner’s motion to admit those statements;
nor did it identify and discuss petitioner’s habeas corpus claims dependent on
those statements.
      Additionally, the record reflects discussions between counsel and the
court on how to handle habeas corpus claims not litigated or addressed at the
evidentiary hearing. Petitioner’s counsel pressed for an order on those claims
and/or never suggested such claims could be ignored in lieu of a dispositional
order under rule 4.551(g).
      Petitioner’s first attorney during the proceedings below (John Halley)
acknowledged there were claims as to which evidence had not been
presented, and stated that “the court will need to make an order on all of the
claims. They need to be disposed of.” Judge Davis stated he would seek
guidance from counsel on those issues “because I don’t want to leave anything
undone . . . .” Attorney Halley promised to confer with petitioner and provide
a status of each individual claim.

discern a basis in the record for Judge Wendler’s determination that Judge
Davis in fact “properly deemed these claims abandoned . . . .”

                                       4
      An incomplete follow-up discussion occurred at a truncated March 13,
2020 hearing, during which petitioner’s counsel began explaining that the
claims made in the in pro. per. habeas corpus petitions were “either
subsumed into the supplemental pleading” being litigated, with counsel then
identifying an additional issue “regarding the admissibility of statements of
witness Craig Jackson. Portion of claim 13 that appears in the January 3rd,
2012 petition.” Counsel did not complete his presentation at that hearing
since the court needed to adjourn to handle other matters, but counsel did not
retreat from his previously stated position that the court needed to issue an
order on all of petitioner’s claims.
      Subsequently, petitioner retained new counsel (Manisha Daryani of the
Law Offices of Beles & Beles), who appeared at a November 20, 2020 hearing.
Judge Davis began the hearing by seeking to clarify “exactly which issues
remain to be dealt with.” The People asserted that the scope of the
habeas corpus hearing and “the only two issues for the Court to decide”
involved the evidence and issues petitioner had presented during the
evidentiary hearing. As for the remaining claims as to which petitioner had
failed to present evidence, the People stated “they would . . . be denied,
because there had been a failure of proof by the defense.” In other words, the
People themselves recognized the need for an explanatory ruling regarding
those claims.
      Attorney Daryani identified as an additional issue before the court the
claim regarding Raymond Price’s declarations, noting the court had
precluded evidentiary testimony on that claim. As mentioned, Judge Davis’s
November 3, 2021 order does not mention that claim. While attorney
Daryani’s October 26, 2020 memorandum, and counsel’s arguments at the
January 15, 2021 hearing, focused on the issues litigated during the

                                        5
evidentiary hearing, the People do not point to, and we have not
independently located, any statement by counsel suggesting petitioner’s
remaining habeas corpus claims were expressly abandoned or not in need of
                            5
resolution by a court order. The fact that counsel may have focused on a
limited universe of claims during the evidentiary hearing does not itself
mean the superior court was relieved of its duty to adjudicate all of
petitioner’s claims and explain its reasons for doing so in an order compliant
with rule 4.551(g).
      Therefore, as a factual matter, the record does not support Judge
Wendler’s March 2, 2023 conclusion that an order adjudicating petitioner’s
remaining claims was not required. Moreover, as a legal matter, it is unclear
from the briefing before us why claims not pursued during the evidentiary
hearing or in subsequent briefing should be deemed abandoned, as opposed to

being subject to denial because petitioner failed to meet his burden of proof 6
or perhaps based on conclusions the court reached following its review of the

parties’ formal pleadings.7 What is clear is that, “[a]fter [an] evidentiary
hearing, the court . . . will then either grant or deny relief based upon the law
and the facts so determined.” (Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 740.) It is the

      5
        That attorney Daryani did not abandon such claims is buttressed by
the fact that counsel’s law firm filed a petition in this court in case No.
A166140, of which we take judicial notice, seeking to compel respondent to
issue an order under rule 4.551(g) on petitioner’s remaining habeas corpus
claims “to fully adjudicate” them.
      6
       See Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [“Because a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal
judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient
grounds for relief, and then later to prove them”]; see also rule 4.551(c)(1).
      7
       See People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738–740 (Romero); see also
Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 476–479; rule 4.551(d) & (e).

                                        6
superior court’s responsibility under rule 4.551(g) to express the reasons for
denying relief as to each claim. When, as here, the court is faced with ruling
on numerous claims presented, rule 4.551(g) necessarily contemplates that
the court will identify the claims as to which its explanations pertain.
      In accordance with our notification to the parties that we might do so,
we will direct issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (See Palma
v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177–180.) Petitioner’s
right to relief is obvious, and no useful purpose would be served by issuance
of an alternative writ, further briefing, and oral argument. (Ng v. Superior
Court (1992) 4 Cal.4th 29, 35; see Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th
1232, 1236–1237, 1240–1241; see also Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1240–1244.)
      Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, commanding respondent to set
aside and vacate its November 3, 2021 and March 2, 2023 orders, and to issue
a new and different order that includes a brief statement explaining
respondent’s reasons for the resolution of each of petitioner’s habeas corpus

claims, identifying those claims by claim number.8
      While this court cannot dictate the manner in which further
proceedings occur in respondent superior court, we provide some comments
for respondent’s consideration. Assuming Judge Davis remains available, it
may be more expeditious for him, as the judge who presided over the OSC

      8
         We acknowledge the petition’s request for relief is broader in scope
than that sought by petitioner’s motion that led to respondent’s March 2,
2023 order. Nevertheless, we agree with petitioner that considerations of
judicial economy warrant writ relief compelling a statement of reasons as to
“all claims so there will be no further question as to which claims were
denied or why.”
       To the extent not addressed in this opinion, petitioner’s remaining
requests for relief are denied.

                                       7
proceedings and evidentiary hearing, to ensure compliance with this court’s
peremptory writ of mandate. Additionally, in recognition of the complexity of
the habeas corpus proceedings litigated below and the numerous claims
asserted by petitioner, we note that nothing in this opinion shall be viewed as
precluding respondent from obtaining the parties’ assistance and input before
it issues an order complying with the peremptory writ of mandate.
      To prevent further delay, this opinion shall be final as to this court
within 10 days of its filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

                                        8