Court Opinion

ID: 9547907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:54:10.616457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:14.229294
License: Public Domain

CARTER J.
I dissent.
In this case the majority holds that where there is a collective bargaining agreement between a union and employer, with a no-strike provision, which has been violated by the union, but there has been no unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.) a state court has jurisdiction to give preventive relief against such violation; but, however, the federal substantive law (29 U.S.C.A. § 185) is exclusively controlling in rights and duties under such collective bargaining agreements where interstate commerce is affected (Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972]); that state courts have jurisdiction generally of proceedings under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act although they must apply the federal substantive law; that in applying such law they (state courts) may give whatever form of relief they deem proper, for example, injunctive relief enjoining the violation of a no-strike provision of the bargaining agreement as in the case at bar. I cannot agree with this latter holding. On the contrary, it is my view that a state court may not give any more stringent or different relief than could be given by a federal court.
The rights under the bargaining agreement being controlled by federal law, that law must also measure the remedies available for otherwise the federal law is not being applied. Turning to the federal law, it is conceded by the majority that federal courts could not give injunctive relief under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. It states: “Some courts have broadly suggested that section 301 authorizes even federal courts to use injunctive process for the ‘full enforcement of the substantive rights created by section 301 (a) . . . ,’ apparently notwithstanding the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. . . . [T]he better view would seem to be that the inclusion of specific instances in the Labor Management Relations Act in which injunctive relief is ex*71pressly authorized negatives any general repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in respect to the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. (See W. L. Mead, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1st Cir.) 217 F.2d 6, 8-10, cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 [77 S.Ct. 21, 1 L.Ed.2d 37]; Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, (S.D. Cal.) 114 F.Supp. 334, 340-341; United Packinghouse Workers v. Wilson & Co., (N.D. Ill.), 80 F.Supp. 563, 567-568.)” (Emphasis added.) The Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq.) to which reference is made prohibits injunctive relief generally or demands compliance with certain requirements before it may be granted. If it is applicable it is conceded that an injunction would not be available in this case if the action were in the federal court. The majority reasons, however, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act relates only to the jurisdiction of federal courts, but there is nothing in section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act which forbids an injunction and the purpose of uniformity in the disposal of labor relations matters affecting interstate commerce is not involved. There are several reasons why those arguments are not persuasive.
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, supra, 353 U.S. 448 [77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972], the United States Supreme Court held that substantive federal law must apply to an action under section 301 to specifically enforce an arbitration provision in a bargaining agreement (the action was in a federal district court) and the Norris-La Guardia Act was not a bar because the failure to arbitrate was not one of the abuses the Norris Act was aimed at and the policy in favor of enforcing such agreements expressed in the Labor Management Relations Act was clear, but in the course of its opinion there is a clear indication that in declaring the federal substantive law applicable it was also including so-called procedural matters of importance such as injunctive relief. For illustration, the court said: “Both the Senate and the House took pains to provide for ‘the usual processes of the law’ by provisions which were the substantial equivalent of § 301(a) in its present form. Both the Senate Report and the House Report indicate a primary concern that unions as well as employees should be bound to collective bargaining contracts. But there was also broader concern—a concern with a procedure for making such agreements enforceable in the courts by either party. . . .
“Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is *72the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. Viewed in this light, the legislation does more than confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations. It expresses a federal policy that federal courts should enforce these agreements on behalf of or against labor organizations and that industrial peace can be best obtained only in that way. . . . And when in the House the debate narrowed to the question whether § 301 was more than jurisdictional, it became abundantly clear that the purpose of the section was to provide the necessary legal remedies. . . .
“It seems, therefore, clear to us that Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes. . . . Other problems will lie in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed the issue involved in the Textile case was whether section 301 authorized a particular remedy, specific enforcement, in case of breach of a bargaining agreement. I deduce from this that the federal law including the remedies available or not available is to be applied when the action is in the state court under section 301.
Moreover, there is additional reason why the remedy such as injunction, should not be given by the state court if it may not be given by a federal court. Such a remedy is more than mere procedure. It goes to the very essence of the right itself. In many instances it would make the difference of whether or not the right could be truly realized. This is especially true in injunctions in labor disputes, such as an injunction against a strike. The case is usually won or lost at the preliminary injunction stage, even before the hearing on the application for a permanent injunction—the final judgment. If a preliminary injunction is obtained, economic circumstances may break the strike and render impotent the efforts of the union to secure the goals sought by it. If it is not secured, management and labor continue their bargaining in the manner contemplated by the law. The purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is to prevent injunctive restraints in such disputes with the thought that management and labor may have a free hand to iron out their problems.
*73A state court, in enforcing rights measured by federal law (rights here under collective bargaining agreement) cannot obstruct or give greater or lesser relief than would be available in a federal court. It is said in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 296 [70 S.Ct. 105, 94 L.Ed. 100], where the question was whether the pleading was sufficient in an action in a Georgia court under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act: “The argument is that while state courts are without power to detract from ‘substantive rights’ granted by Congress in FELA cases, they are free to follow their own rules of ‘practice’ and ‘procedure.’ To what extent rules of practice and procedure may themselves dig into ‘substantive rights’ is a troublesome question at best as is shown in the very case on which respondent relies. Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 [35 S.Ct. 865, 59 L.Ed. 1433]. Other cases in this Court point up the impossibility of laying down a precise rule to distinguish ‘substance’ from ‘procedure.’ Fortunately, we need not attempt to do so. A long series of cases previously decided, from which we see no reason to depart, makes it our duty to construe the allegations of this complaint ourselves in order to determine whether petitioner has been denied a right of trial granted him by Congress. This federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local practice.” (Emphasis added.) And it is said: “It follows also from the rule as to supremacy of the United States within its proper sphere that the individual states may not in any way impair, qualify, or disturb the enjoyment of federal constitutional or statutory rights. Accordingly, a state may not impose any condition requiring relinquishment of a right guaranteed by the federal Constitution; nor may it impose such conditions as it sees fit with respect to rights created and causes of action conferred by an act of congress, or defeat a federal right by forms of local practice.” (81 C.J.S., States, §7.) It is said in Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 75 [76 S.Ct. 559, 100 L.Ed. 941], “Such being the case, the state court is governed by the federal law which has been applied to industrial relations, like these, affecting interstate commerce and the state court erred in enjoining the peaceful picketing here practiced. A ‘State may not prohibit the exercise of rights which the federal Acts protect.’” (Emphasis added.) In the case at bar the right to be not enjoined under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (see, also, 29 U.S.C.A. § 163) is a part of the federal right—a part and parcel of the rights *74which may be exercised with reference to bargaining agreements. Certainly a state court cannot give more relief (in fact, relief which will be the end of the case) than a federal court when administering federal law. If it may, the requirement that the federal law be applied may well dwindle to nothing and there will be no uniformity as is sought by the federal act in labor relations affecting interstate commerce. The right will be no greater than the remedy afforded for its protection which may vary from state to state. If as in Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, supra, 338 U.S. 294, the mere matter of state rules of pleading may not control in the enforcement of a federal law by a state court, then certainly the important and fundamental matter of allowing an injunction under state law cannot stand if the federal law forbids it. In short the federal law is exclusive in the field of bargaining agreements affecting commerce. When a state entertains jurisdiction and applies that law it should be bound by all the important restrictions including those embraced in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It would not be doubted that if section 301 which gives federal courts jurisdiction over actions involving collective bargaining agreements where interstate commerce is affected, but also provided that no injunctive relief was available then no such relief would be proper if the action is in a state rather than federal court. The fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is in a separate statute should not alter the result.
I would therefore, reverse the order granting a preliminary injunction.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied October 8, 1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.