Court Opinion

ID: 9365892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 16:00:24.242115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.243616
License: Public Domain

22-1253-cv
     Nwoye v. Obama

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 25th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               GUIDO CALABRESI,
 7               MYRNA PÉREZ,
 8               ALISON J. NATHAN,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye,
13
14                          Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16                    v.                                                   22-1253
17
18   Barack Hussein Obama, Former President
19   of the United States of America/Senior
20   Citizen, Michelle LaVaughn Robinson
21   Obama, Former First Lady of the United
22   States of America/Senior Citizen,
23
24                     Defendants-Appellees.
25   _____________________________________
26
27   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                           Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye, pro se,
28                                                      Philadelphia, PA.
29
30   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                          No appearance.
1           Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

2    New York (Caproni, J.).

3           UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

4    DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED

5    for further proceedings consistent with this order.

6           Appellant Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye, who is proceeding pro se, sued Barack and Michelle

7    Obama for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Nwoye’s complaint alleged

 8   that by discussing two programs (the 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Summit and Power Africa

 9   Initiative) with a partner at Sidley Austin LLP, he entered into an implied consultancy contract

10   with the Obamas, and he was never compensated under the contract. He also alleged that the

11   Obamas were unjustly enriched by his work in Sidley Austin’s Africa-Asia Agricultural Enterprise

12   Pro Bono Program. Without providing prior notice or warning, the district court dismissed the

13   complaint sua sponte, reasoning that the Obamas were likely absolutely immune from suit. The

14   district court also concluded that even if absolute immunity did not apply to Michelle Obama,

15   Nwoye failed to state a claim against her because he did not establish a link between his claims

16   and her conduct.

17          We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the

18   case, and the issues on appeal, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our decision.

19          I.      Recusal

20          As a threshold matter, Nwoye argues that the district court judge should have recused

21   herself because she was appointed by President Obama.

22          This Court has rejected the claim that “a judge is not impartial solely because an attorney

23   is embroiled in a controversy with the administration that appointed the judge.” MacDraw, Inc. v.

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 1   CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998). “Judges generally have political

 2   backgrounds to one degree or another but must be presumed, absent more, to be impartial.” Id.

 3   “Neither 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) nor Canon 2A of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges

 4   requires recusal,” because a judge hearing a case involving the conduct of the president who

 5   appointed them does not “create in reasonable minds” a perception of partiality in the judiciary.

 6   In re Exec. Off. of the President, 215 F.3d 25, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (published single-judge

 7   order).

 8             The district court judge need not have recused herself because she was appointed by

 9   President Obama. See id. (explaining that judge’s lifetime appointment and duty to impartially

10   discharge duties dispelled any doubt that judge was partial to appointing president). Moreover,

11   the record does not reflect any actions by the district court that would warrant recusal. The fact

12   that the district court dismissed Nwoye’s complaint is not evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United

13   States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (holding that an adverse ruling is “almost never” evidence of

14   bias).

15             II.    Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard

16             Although a court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a

17   claim, it generally should not do so without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. See

18   Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994); Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck

19   Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018); Ethridge v. Bell, 49 F.4th 674, 682 (2d Cir. 2022). We have

20   recognized narrow exceptions to this rule “in cases involving frivolous in forma pauperis

21   complaints . . . or frivolous habeas petitions,” Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988)

22   (citation omitted), or “in the context of sua sponte dismissals without notice for lack of subject

23   matter jurisdiction,” Catzin, 899 F.3d at 82. But even then, it must be “unmistakably clear that

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1    the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective.” Snider v.

2    Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1999). “A hasty dismissal without notice can backfire by

3    leading to appeals and remands in cases where, had notice been provided, we otherwise might

4    affirm.” Moroshkin v. Dietsche, No. 22-487-cv, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30262, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov.

5    1, 2022) (cleaned up). The issuance, for example, of an order to show cause why a complaint

 6   should not be dismissed sua sponte for a stated reason, will typically suffice to provide notice and

 7   an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Catzin, 899 F.3d at 83 (“Hearing from the parties either in

 8   person or on the papers . . . goes a long way towards reasoned decisionmaking and enhances the

 9   fairness of the proceedings.”); Andrews v. Hall, No. 22-1298(L), 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 1262, at

10   *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2023) (“[T]he district court satisfied this requirement by warning [plaintiff]

11   that his claims were vulnerable to dismissal on [a stated] basis . . . and inviting his response.”).

12          Following these cases, we conclude that the district court should have given Nwoye notice

13   and an opportunity to be heard before dismissing his complaint.

14          For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND

15   for further proceedings consistent with this order.

16                                                  FOR THE COURT:
17                                                  Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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