Court Opinion

ID: 9898714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 00:03:10.152987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:12.423984
License: Public Domain

NOTICE
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            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

ADAM PHILLIP IVES,
                                                     Court of Appeals No. A-13900
                           Petitioner,             Trial Court No. 3AN-21-06756 CR

                    v.
                                                             OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                           Respondent.              No. 2761 — October 13, 2023

             Petition for Review from the District Court, Third Judicial
             District, Anchorage, David Nesbett, Judge.

             Appearances: Tristan Bordon, Assistant Public Defender, and
             Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the
             Petitioner. Heather Stenson, Assistant Attorney General, Office
             of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney
             General, Juneau, for the Respondent.

             Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
             Judges.

             Judge HARBISON.

             On January 15, 2020, Adam Phillip Ives was arrested on a fugitive from
justice warrant based on information that he had committed a crime in the state of
Washington and had fled to Alaska.1 The case was dismissed ninety-one days later,
when Washington failed to secure a governor’s warrant. But in September 2021, Ives
was again arrested and charged with being a fugitive based on the same Washington
arrest warrant. The district court found that Ives’s first case had no bearing on whether
he could be committed in the second fugitive case, and the court ordered Ives to post
bond in order to be released from custody.
              Ives filed a bail appeal, arguing that the bail set by the district court was
excessive. Ives also argued that AS 12.70.140 and AS 12.70.160 limit an accused
person’s detention without a governor’s warrant to a single ninety-day period at most,
not renewable ninety-day periods accomplished by re-arresting and re-charging a
previously discharged prisoner.
              While Ives’s bail appeal was pending before this Court, the district court
reduced Ives’s bail and Ives was released from custody. We declined to exercise our
discretion to review the district court’s bail order.
              However, we recognized that Ives’s appeal raised an important question of
law that justified immediate review: whether the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(UCEA) authorizes the commitment of a defendant on a fugitive from justice warrant
after the defendant was previously committed for ninety days based on the same
allegation.2 We accordingly converted the bail appeal into a petition for review and
accepted the petition in order to address this question.3 Approximately two months after

   1
      See AS 12.70.120 (authorizing the issuance of an Alaska arrest warrant for a fugitive
from another state).
   2
       Alaska R. App. P. 402(b)(4).
   3
       Ives v. State, 2021 WL 4963601 (Alaska App. Oct. 22, 2021) (unpublished bail order).

                                           –2–                                        2761
we granted Ives’s petition, before the briefing was complete, a governor’s warrant was
issued and Ives was extradited to Washington.
              Although Ives’s case is moot because he was extradited to Washington
while this petition was pending,4 we have determined that his case raises an important
question of law that is capable of repetition but evading review.5 For the reasons
explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under Alaska law, a fugitive from justice
may be committed without a governor’s warrant for a maximum of a single ninety-day
period and that such a “commitment” includes both incarceration and bail restraint.

       The extradition procedure set out by Alaska’s UCEA
              Under the extradition clause of the United States Constitution, when a state
locates a fugitive from justice within its jurisdiction, the locating state must deliver the
fugitive to the state from which the fugitive fled upon request of the executive authority
of the requisitioning state.6 Alaska, like a majority of other states, has adopted the
UCEA, which sets out a mechanism by which states may comply with this constitutional
mandate.
              The UCEA is codified in Alaska as AS 12.70.010 through AS 12.70.290.
Under these statutes, a fugitive from justice may be arrested and detained in Alaska
based on information from the requisitioning state that the fugitive has been charged with

   4
      See Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n, Loc. 1324 v. Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165, 1167
(Alaska 2002) (explaining that a claim is moot if it no longer presents a live controversy).
   5
       State v. Roberts, 999 P.2d 151, 153 (Alaska App. 2000) (holding that, under the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine, a court may resolve an otherwise moot issue
“when the issue is one of public interest which is capable of repetition and may repeatedly
circumvent review”).
   6
       U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.

                                           –3–                                          2761
a crime, has escaped, or has broken the terms of bail, probation, or parole.7 The warrant
used to effectuate the fugitive’s initial arrest is known as a “fugitive warrant.”8 But the
fugitive cannot be extradited to the requisitioning state until that state formally submits
a demand to the governor of Alaska, and the governor of Alaska signs a warrant of
arrest.9 This warrant is commonly referred to as a “governor’s warrant.”10
              Because a fugitive may not be released to the requisitioning state until a
governor’s warrant has been issued and served, there is necessarily a lapse in time
between when a fugitive is arrested on a fugitive warrant and when the fugitive may
lawfully be released to a representative of the requisitioning state for extradition. The
UCEA thus requires that, upon arrest, the fugitive must be committed “to jail” for a
period of up to thirty days during which the requisitioning state may perfect the process
for securing a governor’s warrant.11 This commitment may be extended for, at most, an
additional sixty days if the requisitioning state has been unable to obtain a governor’s
warrant within the initial thirty-day period.12 Under the UCEA a fugitive is entitled to

   7
        AS 12.70.120; see also Ford v. Moses, 606 P.2d 795, 795 (Alaska 1980). Under
Alaska law, a fugitive from justice is defined as “a person who, having committed or been
charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction and is found within the territory of
another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the former state.” Brown
v. State, 518 P.2d 770, 773 (Alaska 1974).
   8
       See Laverty v. State, 963 P.2d 1076, 1077-78 (Alaska App. 1998). Alaska Statute
12.70.130 also authorizes the warrantless arrest of a fugitive in limited circumstances not
applicable to Ives’s appeal.
   9
        AS 12.70.020-.070.
   10
        See Ford, 606 P.2d at 796.
   11
        AS 12.70.140.
   12
        AS 12.70.160.

                                             –4–                                            2761
be released on bail during this period, unless the underlying offense of extradition is a
capital crime.13

        The UCEA allows the court to commit a defendant for a single maximum
        period of ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant
              In his petition, Ives contends that the UCEA only allows for a single
commitment of up to ninety days pending the service of a governor’s warrant.
According to Ives, once that period has been exhausted, a fugitive may not be re-arrested
for the same out-of-state conduct unless the requisitioning state has obtained a
governor’s warrant. Ives notes that to allow otherwise would permit a fugitive to be
subjected to potentially “indefinite detention via a continuous cycle of catch-and­
release,” effectively circumventing the statutory time-frame established by
AS 12.70.140 through AS 12.70.160.
              The State concedes that, prior to the issuance of a governor’s warrant, the
UCEA prohibits commitment in excess of an aggregate of ninety days, and we conclude
that this concession is well-founded.14 However, the State contends that a fugitive may
be arrested and detained on the same fugitive warrant multiple times, so long as the
composite total of the various periods of commitment does not exceed ninety days. As
we are about to explain, we reject this contention and conclude that only a single period
of prerequisition commitment for the same out-of-state conduct is authorized by the
UCEA.

   13
        AS 12.70.150.
   14
      See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to
independently evaluate any concession of error by the State in a criminal case).

                                           –5–                                        2761
               When interpreting a statute, Alaska’s courts employ a “sliding scale”
analysis under which a court considers the legislature’s intent as well as the language of
the statute itself.15
               In accordance with this principle, we first consider the UCEA’s plain
language, and we conclude that the meaning of the statutory language is clear. In
relevant part, the UCEA states that a judicial officer shall commit a fugitive “for not
more than 30 days, as will enable the arrest of the accused to be made under a warrant
of the governor.”16 But it also provides that, if the fugitive is not served with a
governor’s warrant by the expiration of this initial commitment, the judge or magistrate
may either “discharge the accused or may recommit the accused for a further period of
not more than 60 days.”17 Thus, under the plain language of the statute, the UCEA
provides for an initial thirty-day confinement period pending service of a governor’s
warrant, which may be extended for an additional sixty days, but it does not authorize
commitment for longer than a total of ninety days, nor does it authorize more than one
prerequisition commitment.
               The legislative history of this statute supports this interpretation. When the
legislature adopted the UCEA, it explicitly stated that the act should be “so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate the general purposes to make uniform the law of those
states that enact it.”18 Thus, we must interpret the language of the act as consistently as

   15
      See, e.g., State v. Fyfe, 370 P.3d 1092, 1094-95 (Alaska 2016); Anchorage v. Beezley,
435 P.3d 978, 981 (Alaska App. 2018).
   16
        AS 12.70.140.
   17
        AS 12.70.160.
   18
        AS 12.70.270.

                                            –6–                                         2761
possible with the courts of other adopting jurisdictions.19           And all of the other
jurisdictions to have considered this question agree that the act allows only for a single
commitment of no more than ninety days prior to the service of a governor’s warrant.
              For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court has explained that “the outer
limit of time for which a demanded person may be held in custody pending issuance and
service of a governor’s rendition warrant is the 90-day limit (initial 30 days, plus further
60 days) mandated by the UCEA.”20 The West Virginia Supreme Court has similarly
held that “a defendant incarcerated under a fugitive warrant . . . may not be held solely
on that warrant for a period exceeding the aggregate of ninety days.”21 Courts in
Florida,22 Montana,23 Nebraska,24 New York,25 Ohio,26 Oklahoma,27 Pennsylvania,28

   19
      See Evans v. State, 820 P.2d 1098, 1100 n.2 (Alaska App. 1991); Laverty v. State, 963
P.2d 1076, 1079 n.8 (Alaska App. 1998).
   20
        State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d 29, 36 (Minn. 1998).
   21
        State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 641 S.E.2d 153, 159 (W. Va. 2006).
   22
        Orton v. State, 431 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. Dist. App. 1983).
   23
        State v. Holliman, 805 P.2d 52, 53-54 (Mont. 1991).
   24
        Bell v. Janing, 199 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Neb. 1972).
   25
        People ex rel. Brandolino v. Hastings, 421 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
   26
        State v. Haynes, 456 N.E.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Ohio App. 1982).
   27
        Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985).
   28
        Commonwealth ex. rel. Coffman v. Aytch, 361 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Super. 1976).

                                           –7–                                         2761
Texas,29 Vermont,30 and Wisconsin31 have all similarly concluded that the ninety days
prescribed by the UCEA is the outer limit of a state’s authority to hold a fugitive pending
the issuance of a governor’s warrant.32
              As authority for its claim that the UCEA authorizes multiple commitments,
the State cites only to State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, a case that arose in West
Virginia.33 In that case, Jason Eric VanMetre was arraigned on criminal charges in West
Virginia, given a trial date, and released on bail. After this, he was arrested on a fugitive
from justice warrant based on crimes he allegedly committed in Virginia. VanMetre
asked to waive extradition proceedings and to be relinquished to the Virginia authorities,
but the West Virginia prosecutor claimed that she had discretion to prevent VanMetre
from being extradited to Virginia until after resolution of the crimes he allegedly
committed in West Virginia. The trial court entered an order permitting VanMetre to

   29
        Lanz v. State, 815 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. App. 1991).
   30
        In re Hval, 537 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 1987).
   31
        State ex rel. Lykins v. Steinhorst, 541 N.W.2d 234, 238, 240 (Wis. App. 1995).
   32
        The ninety-day statutory time limit is tolled for periods where the fugitive’s
confinement is justified by charges pending in Alaska. See Paley v. Bieluch, 785 So. 2d 692,
695 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001) (“Petitioner’s allegations indicate that for most of the time in
question, he was held on local charges as well as the fugitive warrant. There is no indication
that he has been held in excess of the statutory period solely on the fugitive warrant.”); In re
Lane, 845 P.2d 708, 710 (Kan. App. 1992) (“[T]he district court did not err in allowing Lane
to be detained for more than 90 days because the filing of the local charges tolled the running
of the 90-day period for so long as he was held on those charges.”); State ex rel. Ehlers v.
Endicott, 523 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Wis. App. 1994) (“[T]he thirty-day and optional sixty-day
extension periods for detention only pertain to those fugitives who are not already in custody
pending other charges or serving other sentences. Ehlers was already incarcerated, serving
a sentence for the conviction of another crime, and therefore the time limits are inapplicable.”
(citation omitted)).
   33
        State ex rel. Games-Neely v. Sanders, 641 S.E.2d 153 (W. Va. 2006).

                                             –8–                                           2761
waive extradition and be released to Virginia, prior to the conclusion of the criminal
proceedings against him.34
               On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed this
order. The supreme court of appeals first held that, under the West Virginia UCEA, a
defendant incarcerated under a fugitive warrant may not be held solely on a fugitive
warrant for a period in excess of ninety days.35 The court then held that, when a person
charged with committing a crime in West Virginia is arrested on a fugitive warrant for
crimes committed in another state, the defendant may waive extradition proceedings in
the fugitive case.36 However, if the defendant executes such a waiver, the prosecutor
then may elect not to enforce the waiver until after the West Virginia criminal case is
concluded.37 Thus, VanMetre could not voluntarily turn himself over to Virginia
authorities before being tried on the West Virginia charges.
               The State suggests that this case stands for the proposition that the UCEA
authorizes multiple prerequisition commitments, as long as they do not exceed an
aggregate of ninety days. But we do not construe the holding of the case in this way.
Indeed, if this were true, the court’s second holding — that the prosecutor has authority
to delay enforcement of the defendant’s waiver of extradition — would have been
unnecessary. If more than one prerequisition commitment were permitted, the prosecutor
could have simply dismissed the fugitive case against VanMetre prior to his waiver of
extradition and then re-arrested him on the fugitive warrant after the West Virginia case

   34
        Id. at 154-55.
   35
        Id. at 156-59.
   36
        Id. at 159-61.
   37
        Id. at 161-63.

                                          –9–                                       2761
was resolved. We accordingly reject the State’s suggestion that this case stands for the
proposition that multiple prerequisition commitments are authorized by the UCEA.
              We have been unable to locate a single case from any jurisdiction that
interprets the UCEA (or other state equivalent) to authorize more than one period of
commitment.38 Indeed, some jurisdictions go so far as to only allow one extension of up
to sixty days beyond the thirty-day initial commitment,39 although others permit multiple
extensions as long as they do not exceed a total of sixty days — i.e., as long as the total
aggregate commitment period does not exceed ninety days.40 And, as the State
acknowledges, at least one jurisdiction has determined that a detention for ninety days

   38
      As we explain later in this opinion, “commitment” under the UCEA refers to court-
ordered restraint on a defendant’s liberty, including both imprisonment and release on bail.
   39
       See, e.g., Christopher v. Tozer, 263 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Mo. 1954) (holding that the
UCEA gives the court “a limited discretionary power to commit the accused for one time
period not to exceed thirty days, and thereafter to order one recommitment for a further
period of not to exceed sixty days.”); Treadway v. Heidtman, 284 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1973) (holding that the court may recommit the fugitive for only one period not to
exceed sixty days when the initial period of commitment expires); People v. White, 140
N.W.2d 578, 579 (Mich. App. 1966) (concluding that “the use of the article ‘a’ appearing in
the phrase ‘a further period’ authorized the lower court to recommit one time while awaiting
the execution of the governor’s warrant”).
   40
       See, e.g., Alliey v. Lamm, 711 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Colo. 1986) (holding that the court
did not abuse its discretion when it granted multiple continuances because the UCEA
“reposes discretion in the court to extend the initial thirty day commitment for an additional
sixty days”); Odom v. State, 524 P.2d 217, 219 (Kan. 1974) (holding that the UCEA does not
limit the court to granting only one continuance and instead authorizes more than one
continuance as long as the sixty-day statutory limit is not exceeded); Commonwealth ex rel.
Colcough v. Aytch, 323 A.2d 359, 364 (Pa. Super. 1974) (holding that “although it is not
good practice to grant numerous continuances,” granting multiple continuances totaling not
more than sixty days is allowed under the UCEA).

                                           – 10 –                                        2761
without rendition in one jurisdiction defeats future detention on the same warrant by any
other jurisdiction.41
              We accordingly join the other courts that have addressed this issue in
concluding that, under the UCEA, a fugitive may not be committed for a period of time
greater than ninety days while awaiting the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant.
We also conclude that, once this commitment has expired, the fugitive may not again be
committed based on the same out-of-state conduct, except upon the service of a
governor’s warrant.

        A fugitive is committed for purposes of Alaska’s UCEA if they are
        physically incarcerated or if they are restrained on bail or bond
              Given that the UCEA allows for only a maximum period of ninety days of
“commitment” prior to the service of a governor’s warrant, the next question raised by
this case is whether “commitment” refers to both incarceration and release on bail, or
only to incarceration.
              Alaska Statute 12.70.140 provides that a fugitive arrested on an out-of-state
warrant in Alaska shall be committed “to jail for not more than 30 days . . . unless the
accused gives bail . . . or until legally discharged.” But under AS 12.70.150, a fugitive
from justice shall be released on bail during this period unless the underlying crime of
extradition is a capital offense. Furthermore, if the requisitioning state does not obtain
a governor’s warrant within the initial thirty-day period, the court “may discharge the
accused or may recommit the accused for a further period of not more than 60 days, or

   41
      In re Hval, 537 A.2d 135, 139 (Vt. 1987). The record does not indicate that Ives was
previously detained as a fugitive in any other jurisdiction, and we accordingly express no
opinion with regard to this issue.

                                          – 11 –                                      2761
. . . may again take bail . . . but within a period of not more than 60 days after the date
of the new bond or undertaking.”42
               In the briefs submitted to this Court, Ives contends, and the State agrees,
that these and other references to “commitment” in the UCEA refer both to incarceration
and to bail release. We conclude that the State’s concession is again well-founded.43
               As the State points out, when AS 12.70.140 is read in isolation, it could
suggest that the thirty-day limit on commitment is only applicable if the fugitive is in jail,
but not if they have been released on bail. However, when we engage in statutory
construction, we must, whenever possible, “interpret[] each part or section of a statute
with every other part or section, so as to create a harmonious whole.”44 And as the State
acknowledges, when AS 12.70.140 is read in conjunction with the following two
provisions of the statute, the more compelling interpretation is that the statutory time
frame (the mandatory thirty-day commitment and the discretionary sixty-day extension)
applies regardless of whether the fugitive is incarcerated or released on bail.
               This is also the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of other
UCEA jurisdictions.45 Indeed, we have found only a single case to the contrary.46

   42
        AS 12.70.160.
   43
      See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to
independently evaluate any concession of error by the State in a criminal case).
   44
        Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 761 (Alaska 1999).
   45
       See, e.g., Orton v. State, 431 So. 2d 236, 237 (Fla. Dist. App. 1983) (holding that
UCEA requires discharge of the accused “from custody or bond” after the expiration of the
aggregate ninety-day statutory time period); Stynchcombe v. Whitley, 242 S.E.2d 720, 721
(Ga. 1978) (“If the warrant is not executed during the 90-day maximum detention period, the
accused is clearly entitled to be discharged from jail or bail.”); State v. Phillips, 587 N.W.2d
29, 34, 36 (Minn. 1998) (“Under the clear language of the UCEA and the facts of this case,
                                                                                    (continued...)

                                             – 12 –                                         2761
              Because the legislature’s express intent in adopting the UCEA was that the
law should be interpreted as consistently as possible with other jurisdictions, we give
significant weight to the near-unanimity of the approach taken by other jurisdictions.
Given that this approach is in accord with our interpretation of the statute’s plain
language, we now hold that “commitment” for purposes of the UCEA refers to both
incarceration and constraint on bail.

        Conclusion
              For the reasons explained in this opinion, we conclude that, under the
UCEA, any commitment to await the issuance and service of a governor’s warrant is
limited to a single period of up to ninety days. We also conclude that commitment
includes both incarceration and release on bail or bond. After such a commitment has
ended, a fugitive may not be again arrested for the same out-of-state conduct, except
upon the service of a governor’s warrant.

   45
        (...continued)
the district court was without the authority to hold Phillips in custody and to continue his
bond beyond 90 days from his . . . arraignment. . . . Demanded persons have the right . . .
to be confined for only reasonable periods of time, be it through incarceration or bail.”); In
re Colasanti, 249 A.2d 1, 3 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1969) (“The sections only limit the time
during which one arrested as a fugitive may be kept in jail (or on bail in lieu thereof) pending
the completion of extradition proceedings and the issuance of the governor’s arrest
warrant.”); Carter v. State, 708 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Okla. 1985) (same); Lanz v. State, 815
S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. App. 1991) (“[Texas’s UCEA] outlines the procedure to be utilized
in the issuance of a fugitive warrant and provides that an individual arrested pursuant to such
a warrant shall not be committed or held to bail for a longer time than ninety days.”).
   46
       People v. Williams, 391 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (N.Y. Crim. 1977) (“[The dictionary]
defines ‘commitment’ as a ‘consignment to a penal or mental institution.’”). Contra, e.g.,
Jones v. People, 404 N.Y.S.2d 525, 526 (N.Y. Cnty. 1978) (“It is apparent that this 90 day
limit would be the maximum time that the fugitive could be detained or held on bail.”).

                                            – 13 –                                         2761
             In the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska

 Adam Phillip Ives,                                   Court of Appeals No. A-13900
                Petitioner,
                                                                 Order
             v.                                            Petition for Rehearing
 State of Alaska,
                      Respondent.                       Date of Order: 10/13/2023
Trial Court No. 3AN-21-06756CR

                  Before:      Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison, Judges

                        The State of Alaska seeks rehearing of our decision in Ives v. State,
__ P.3d __, 2023 WL 2721359 (Alaska App. Mar. 31, 2023). The State asserts that this
Court misconceived the State’s concession in this case. The State contends that it did
not concede that, once an initial commitment has expired, a fugitive may not again be
committed based on the same out-of-state conduct. 1 The State therefore asks us to
amend our decision to remove our contrary conclusion or, alternatively, to provide
analysis in support of our holding.
                  In response, Adam Phillip Ives agrees that the State did not concede this
point in the briefing to this Court. But he contends that we should issue an amended
decision that continues to maintain, and indeed further explains, this point of law.

         1
              See Ives v. State, __ P.3d __, 2023 WL 2721359, at *3 (Alaska App. Mar. 31,
2023).
                                                  Ives v. State - p. 2
                                                  File No. A-13900 – 10/13/2023

                We agree with the parties that the State did not concede that only a single
period of prerequisition commitment is authorized by the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act. Because our decision could be read to suggest that the State conceded this, and
because it contains an insufficient analysis of this point of law, we GRANT the petition
in part. An amended opinion that does not suggest the State conceded this point of law
will be issued concurrently with this order. The opinion clarifies the reasons for our
conclusion that a fugitive may not be subjected to multiple prerequisition commitments
for the same out-of-state conduct.
                IT IS ORDERED:
                1.    Opinion No. 2742, issued on 3/31/2023, is WITHDRAWN.
                2.    Opinion No. 2761, is issued on this date in its place.
                3.    In all other respects, the petition for rehearing is DENIED.

                Entered at the direction of the Court.

                                                Clerk of the Appellate Courts

                                                _______________________________
                                                Meredith Montgomery

 cc:   Court of Appeals Judges
       Judge Nesbett
       Publishers (Op. No. 2742, 3/31/2023)

Distribution:
                                                Bordon, Tristan, Alaska Public Defender Agency
                                                Stenson, Heather, Office of Criminal Appeals