Court Opinion

ID: 9691894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:22:53.256348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:27.711678
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
FAULKNER, Justice.
Mrs. Snider states in her brief on application for rehearing that time was of the essence of the option; that the court held time was not the essence of the option in this case.
Mrs. Snider cites National Security Insurance Company v. Stewart, 43 Ala.App. *322274, 188 So.2d 774 (1965) and Murphy v. Schuster Springs Lumber Co., 215 Ala. 412, 111 So. 427 (1926) as saying “the period of time in the case of an option is of the essence of the agreement.” In Murphy Tustice Somerville said in reference to an option that time is ordinarily of the essence and should be strictly construed. He further said, “the generally recognized principle that in option contracts, unless expressly negatived, time is always of the essence. . . . ” Justice Somerville then construed the contract before the court as one being applicable to the strict rule of performance and held that the facts and circumstances did not excuse the delay in performance of the contract. In National Security Insurance Company the Court of Appeals said “the period of time in the case of an option is of the essence of the agreement,” and the doctrine of waiver was not applicable.
This court said in the original opinion that, “It does not appear from the record of this case that time was of the essence.” We construed the agreement, and from the facts and circumstances of this case, and the actions of the parties, concluded that the agreement was not one for strict construction.
Opinion extended.
Application for rehearing overruled.
HEFLIN, C. J., and ALMON and EMBRY, JJ., concur.