Court Opinion

ID: 9448709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:43:18.251594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:31.788617
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM F. SMITH, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
Judge KALODNER and I are in complete agreement with the views expressed by Judge STALEY but desire to imple*19ment what he has said with these observations :
The respondent here argues that the only negligent acts or omissions found by the trial judge were those which occurred within the territorial limits of Japan and Korea, and that therefore the claim for damages was one “arising in a foreign country,” and within the pertinent exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C.A. 2680 (k). The argument is predicated upon a narrow construction of the findings of fact. We are of the opinion that these findings must be read in their entirety, and as thus read, accorded an interpretation broader than that given to them by the respondent.
The findings of fact, exclusive of those pertaining to the issue of damages, are contained in fifteen numbered paragraphs. The argument of the respondent seems to rest primarily, although not entirely, on the fourteenth paragraph, which reads as follows:
“The vibration which shook the left engine loose from its mounting was produced by a propeller imbalance not induced by any external force or the breaking of any of the propeller blades. Despite some evidence to the contrary, proper inspection, installation and maintenance of the left engine and propeller would have prevented This Malfunction and the ineffective feathering of the propeller on June 4,1954.” (Emphasis by this Court).
This finding, as we interpret it, refers only to the malfunction of the propeller as the cause of the vibration. When considered in the light of the related findings it may not be interpreted as a factual determination by the trial judge that the exact cause of the accident was the malfunction of the propeller.
There is evidence in the record that the aircraft was so constructed that it could remain airborne on a single engine, and, barring other mechanical failure, could have returned safely to the base in Korea if the disabled engine had not been torn from its mounting by the excessive vibration. There is further evidence that the immediate cause of the disaster was the loss of the engine.
The ultimate findings of the trial judge are summarized in the fifteenth paragraph, which reads as follows:
“The procurement, installation, maintenance and Operation of [the aircraft] was exclusively under the control of the respondent. The failure of the left propeller and loss of the left engine should not occur in the absence of negligence. Under the circumstances of this case, and particularly since the aircraft and libellant were lost in the Sea of Japan more than a nautical league off K-3 Korea, the libellant is entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The failure of the respondent to explain satisfactorily the-malfunction of the propeller and its. failure to feather and the Shaking Loose of the Left Engine and Its. Dropping Into the Sea leads to the conclusion that the respondent was negligent.” (Emphasis by this Court).
When this summary is read in the light of the specific findings of fact which precede it, it is clear that the trial judge-found that the respondent had failed to explain satisfactorily either the malfunction of the propeller or the loss of the engine, the immediate cause of the disaster. The conclusion that the respondent was negligent was predicated on the-respondent's failure to offer a satisfactory explanation under the rule of res ipsa loquitur. The conclusion was obviously based upon a consideration of' the evidence as a whole.
 The aircraft was under the exclusive management and control of the respondent, and in the absence of any evidence as to the precise cause of the-accident, the facts and circumstances surrounding its occurrence justified the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 267 F.2d 281 (3 Cir. 1959). *20We are of the opinion that the law of admiralty was determinative of the respondent’s liability in the absence of evidence that the accident resulted solely from an act or omission which occurred within the territorial limits of Japan and Korea.