Court Opinion

ID: 9753529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:17:14.920008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:57.592358
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, J.,
concurring:
I concur in the judgment and in Parts I through IV of the Court’s opinion. I disagree, however, with Part V of the opinion. The issue discussed by the Court in Part V, namely whether “the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in construing the meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 16-205.1,” is not properly before the Court because it was not raised before the administrative agency. Moreover, even if the issue were properly before us, the “reasonable grounds” standard in a civil statute should be applied by the administrative *260trier of facts as a matter of common sense, without becoming entangled in the intricacies of criminal law and the law of arrest. The “reasonableness” standard has been applied by triers of fact in a multitude of civil proceedings without courts or agencies delving into the criminal law of arrests, detentions, police encounters, etc.
I.
It is a settled principle of Maryland administrative law that, in an action for judicial review of an adjudicatory administrative agency decision, the reviewing courts should decline to consider “an issue not raised before the agency,” Brodie v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 367 Md. 1, 4, 785 A.2d 747, 749 (2001). Chief Judge Bell for the Court explained in Department of Health v. Campbell, 364 Md. 108, 123, 771 A.2d 1051, 1060 (2001):
“Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.) § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article provides that ‘a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision.’ Thus, it is the final decision of the final decision maker at the administrative level ... that is subject to judicial review. Accordingly, the reviewing court, restricted to the record made before the administrative agency, see Cicala v. Disability Review Bd. for Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 254, 260, 418 A.2d 205, 209 (1980), may not pass upon issues presented to it for the first time on judicial review and that are not encompassed in the final decision of the administrative agency. Stated differently, an appellate court will review an adjudicatory agency decision solely on the grounds relied upon by the agency. See County Council of Prince George’s County v. Brandywine Enterprises, Inc., 350 Md. 339, 349, 711 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1998) and cases cited in note 1, supra.”
See, also, e.g., Board of Education v. Heister, 392 Md. 140, 147 n. 5, 896 A.2d 342, 346 n. 5 (2006) (“ ‘It is the function of the reviewing court to review only the materials that were in the record before the agency at the time it made its final deci*261sion,’ ” and an appellate court should not review a question which was “interjected in the case” in the circuit court); Motor Vehicle Administration v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 128, 887 A.2d 1042, 1050 (2005) (“ ‘Because the issue of alleged error was not raised during the administrative proceeding, it was not properly raised in the judicial review proceeding, and therefore is not properly before us,’ ” quoting Cicala v. Disability Rev. Bd. for Prince George’s Co., 288 Md. 254, 263, 418 A.2d 205, 210-211 (1980)); Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Woodmont Country Club, 348 Md. 572, 582 n. 3, 705 A.2d 301, 305 n. 3 (1998) (“Judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to issues raised before the agency”); Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 634, 664 A.2d 862, 881 (1995) (“We have repeatedly pointed out that judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to the issues or grounds dealt with by the administrative agency”), and cases there cited.
No issue concerning the interpretation or “meaning of ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in § 16-205.1” (majority opinion at 254, 923 A.2d at 107) was ever raised or decided at the administrative hearing in the instant case. Although counsel for the respondent Shepard, in oral argument before the ALJ, used both the phrase “probable cause” and the statutory phrase “reasonable grounds” in arguing that the police officer did not have a sufficient basis to believe that Shepard was driving his motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, counsel for Mr. Shepard made absolutely no argument with respect to the meaning of the phrase “reasonable grounds.” Furthermore, although the ALJ, in the oral ruling rejecting counsel’s arguments, pointed out that the statutory standard was “reasonable grounds” rather than “probable cause,” the ALJ rendered no opinion or legal conclusion with respect to the meaning of the “reasonable grounds” standard. It was not an issue at the administrative hearing but was raised for the first time in the Circuit Court.
At the administrative hearing, on February 9, 2006, counsel for Mr. Shepard (Mr. John F.X. Costello) made what he categorized as three arguments relating to whether Mr. Shep*262ard should be sanctioned pursuant to § 16-20 5.1 of the Transportation Article.
Mr. Costello initially argued that Mr. Shepard’s preliminary breath test (PBT) results, included in the police officer’s certification (Form DR-15A), should not be admitted into evidence. Counsel relied upon a Court of Special Appeals opinion holding that PBT results were inadmissible in circuit court criminal cases.1 The ALJ pointed out that a recent Court of Appeals opinion held that PBT results were admissible in administrative hearings.2 Nevertheless, the ALJ ruled that, “if you don’t want me to consider the PBT, I have no problem not considering it. I’ll just read everything but the PBT.”
Counsel’s next arguments at the administrative hearing concerned the certification form. Mr. Costello argued that the refusal to take an alcohol concentration test “was not signed by the test technician” and that, because of the police officer’s punctuation in the certification, the certification did not comply with § 16-205.1. This latter contention seemed to be that, because of the absence of a comma, it was not clear whether “this officer is certifying under his reasonable grounds that this man was under the influence of alcohol” or whether “he’s certifying that based on the reasonable grounds he was driving a motor vehicle after consuming a controlled dangerous substance. There’s absolutely no indication whatsoever that he was operating a motor vehicle after consuming a controlled dangerous substance.” The ALJ, without ruling upon these contentions at the time, asked respondent’s counsel to make “your third argument.”
The third and final argument by respondent’s counsel was that the evidence was insufficient for the police officer to have had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Shepard was driving while under the influence of alcohol. In particular, *263counsel contended that “[t]here is absolutely no evidence before the Court [the ALJ] as to what the standard field sobriety test results were.” While Mr. Shepard’s attorney at times used the phrase “probable cause,” as well as the statutory phrase “reasonable grounds,” he at no time made or intimated any contention regarding the meaning or interpretation of the statutory language “reasonable grounds.” The argument was completely factual, based on the asserted absence of substantial evidence. Counsel’s entire argument was as follows:
“ATTORNEY JOHN F.X. COSTELLO:
“The third argument is when the Court looks at the reasonable grounds and excludes the impermissible PBT from [our] standpoint as the Court has agreed to do so the four corners of the reasonable grounds certification does not amount to probable cause. There is absolutely no evidence before the Court as to what the standard field sobriety test results were. They’re not outlined at all. All the Court has before Your Honor is driving a motor vehicle at a high rate of speed with a strong odor of alcohol and bloodshot watery eyes. The fact that the officer chooses not to give you the test results is an indication of his own disbelief in either the test results or his belief that the test results would be indicative of something other than probable cause of intoxication. As Your Honor knows, the whole purpose for field sobriety tests is that odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes standing alone is not evidence of probable cause of an individual’s inability to operate a motor vehicle safely. Here we got a man that is driving a vehicle very well at a very high rate of speed. That in and of itself militates against any inference of probable cause of impaired ability to drive due to alcohol, number one. Number two, the officer chooses not to give this Court any benefit of what the field sobriety test results showed. To the extent that they don’t, that is an inference against the officer and to the extent that the officer needs those field sobriety tests upon which to base his certification of probable cause to *264arrest, and that’s the whole reason that they’re done, a failure is indicative of probable cause but compliance with or a successful completion of field sobriety tests is an indication of just the opposite. When he purposely chooses not to give you the benefit of those results there’s got to be an honest inference that they would not have been helpful. Whether the Court wants to argue or whether you want to accept it under a spoliation theory or just a failure to certify under a reasonable grounds theory. He could have come in and said nystagmus gaze constitutes a failure, that the man could not walk safely, he could not do walk-and-turn, he could not do the one-leg stand. He hasn’t given you the benefit of any of that. And the whole reason that he had to do them was that candidly you and I both know that it does not amount to probable cause if an individual is lawfully operating a motor vehicle, i.e. within the lanes, at a high rate of speed and simply has an odor of alcohol and bloodshot eyes. If that were the case then there would be no need for the field sobriety test.”
Immediately following the above argument, the ALJ asked whether counsel had any additional arguments; the ALJ did not want to be “sandbagged” by some additional contention made later. The following colloquy occurred:
“ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FRIEDMAN:
“Okay. Anything else?
“ATTORNEY JOHN F.X. COSTELLO:
“Not at this time.
“ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE FRIEDMAN:
“Okay. I’m going to rule so I want to know whether there are any other arguments. You stated three. I’m going to rule on all three of your arguments. I don’t want you then to be telling me that you have another argument so I want to have all the arguments at once. “ATTORNEY JOHN F.X. COSTELLO:
“I appreciate that. And what I meant by not at this time is if you don’t rule in our favor and I put on *265evidence, I have a right to renew my motion. Nothing more.”
Counsel then had Mr. Shepard testify. At the conclusion of that testimony, counsel reiterated his argument that there was insufficient evidence and asserted that Mr. Shepard’s testimony confirmed the alleged insufficiency. Again, no statutory interpretation argument was made.
The ALJ thereupon delivered an oral ruling, rejecting those arguments which the ALJ had not previously ruled upon. With respect to the principal argument by Mr. Shepard’s counsel, the ALJ stated:
“The issue in this case is reasonable grounds. The reasonable grounds as stated by the officer are much more than sufficient. He has stated more than sufficient reasonable grounds to request that you take a test. That’s what he was doing here. The standard field sobriety tests are identified contrary to counsel’s statement. HGN, walk-and-turn, one-leg stand, he says that those tests were done.”
At no time did the ALJ make any conclusions concerning the interpretation of “reasonable grounds” as used in the statute. As previously mentioned, the ALJ did point out that the statutory standard was “reasonable grounds” and not “probable cause.” Nothing was said, however, about the meaning of “reasonable grounds.” Finally, no statutory interpretation issue was mentioned in the ALJ’s written conclusions of law.
As emphasized time after time in our cases, courts should not judicially review adjudicatory administrative decisions on grounds not raised before the administrative agency. The General Assembly, as a matter of public policy, has determined that administrative agencies and administrative law judges should initially rule upon issues falling within the jurisdiction of the agencies and ALJs. Permitting agencies and ALJs to be “sandbagged” by new legal issues raised for the first time in circuit courts is directly contrary to the legislative policy.
*266III.
Even if the statutory interpretation issue were before us, there is no good reason to utilize the somewhat complicated criminal law concepts of arrest, “probable cause,” “reasonable articulable suspicion,” etc., with their federal law and state law components, and apply such concepts to a “reasonableness” standard in a state law civil proceeding.
There is no issue presented in this case, and rationally there could be no issue, that Mr. Shepard was lawfully arrested under Maryland law. He committed a misdemeanor in the presence of a police officer, i.e., driving a motor vehicle in excess of 132 miles per hour.3 See Maryland Code (2001), § 2-202(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article. No other criminal law issue is involved. The license suspension proceeding, based upon Mr. Shepard’s refusal to take an alcohol concentration test, is entirely a civil administrative proceeding, subject to a statutory civil action for judicial review. While three or four issues may have been raised at the administrative hearing, the only surviving issue is whether the police officer had “reasonable grounds to believe” that Mr. Shepard was “driving ... while under the influence of alcohol [or] while impaired by alcohol ...,” § 16-205.1(b)(2) of the Transportation Article.
Courts and adjudicatory agencies have traditionally applied the “reasonableness” standard in civil proceedings without utilizing or drawing analogies to criminal law concepts. A multitude of negligence cases, of all types, require triers of fact to determine the “reasonableness” of defendants’ conduct. See, e.g., Polakoff v. Turner, 385 Md. 467, 477, 479-480, 869 A.2d 837, 843, 845 (2005) (“The trier of fact must ... evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances. * * * [T]he trier of fact must determine whether the defendant acted reasonably given the circumstances”); Brooks v. Lewin Realty, 378 Md. 70, 84-85, *267835 A.2d 616, 624 (2003). Similarly, in the present case, the ALJ as trier of fact should decide whether the police officer had “reasonable grounds” under all of the circumstances. The ALJ did find that “reasonable grounds” were present, and that finding was supported by substantial evidence. This should be the end of the matter.
Judge GREENE joins this concurring opinion.

. Harmon v. State, 147 Md.App. 452, 809 A.2d 696 (2002).

. Motor Vehicle Administration v. Weller, 390 Md. 115, 887 A.2d 1042 (2005).

. If, at first glance, this seems unrealistic, it should be noted that Mr. Shepard was driving a Porsche.