Court Opinion

ID: 9896932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:12.315103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:48.610121
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                SUMMARY
                                                           November 2, 2023

                               2023COA103

No. 22CA1246, Rudnicki v. Bianco — Professional Liability —
Medical Malpractice — Pre-Majority Medical Expenses;
Remedies — Interest on Damages — Prejudgment Interest;
Health and Welfare — Health Care Availability Act — Limitation
of Liability

     In this medical malpractice action, a division of the court of

appeals rejects the defendant doctor’s contention that the district

court should have computed prefiling, prejudgment interest on the

jury’s award of pre-majority medical expenses to the minor plaintiff

from the date the Colorado Supreme Court decided Rudnicki v.

Bianco, 2021 CO 80, which abolished the common law rule

precluding minors from recovering that category of damages. The

division concludes that Rudnicki did not alter the date from which

prefiling, prejudgment interest is calculated under section 13-21-

101(1), C.R.S. 2023. Thus, the division concludes that the plaintiff
was entitled to prefiling, prejudgment interest on his pre-majority

medical expenses from the date his cause of action accrued.

     The division also rejects the doctor’s contention that the

district court erred by awarding prefiling, prejudgment interest in

an amount that would make the total award exceed the $1 million

damages limitation under the Health Care Availability Act (HCAA),

section 13-64-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023. Generally following the

rationale of Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022 COA 87M, ¶ 107 (cert. granted

Apr. 10, 2023), the division concludes that prefiling, prejudgment

interest on past and future economic damages may exceed the $1

million cap in the HCAA, provided the other statutory requirements

for exceeding the cap are met.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                     2023COA103

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1246
El Paso County District Court No. 14CV34013
Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge

Alexander Rudnicki; and Francis Rudnicki as parents, guardians, and next
friends; and Pamela Rudnicki, as parents, guardians, and next friends,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Peter Bianco, D.O.,

Defendant-Appellant.

                          JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                               Division VII
                        Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
                        Tow and Schock, JJ., concur

                        Announced November 2, 2023

Wahlberg, Woodruff, Nimmo & Sloane LLP, David S. Woodruff, Megan K.
Matthews, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, Kendra N. Beckwith, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Defendant, Peter Bianco, D.O., appeals the district court’s

 entry of judgment on the jury’s award of damages for pre-majority

 medical expenses to plaintiff, Alexander Rudnicki.1 Dr. Bianco

 contends that the court erred by awarding prefiling, prejudgment

 interest on those damages (1) from the date Alexander was born

 (the date of injury) rather than the date the Colorado Supreme

 Court determined he was entitled to recover such expenses in

 Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80; and (2) resulting in a total award

 in excess of the $1 million damages limitation under the Health

 Care Availability Act (HCAA), section 13-64-302(1)(b), C.R.S. 2023.

¶2    Resolving Dr. Bianco’s first contention requires us to

 determine the impact of Rudnicki, if any, on the date from which

 prefiling, prejudgment interest on an award of pre-majority medical

 expenses should be calculated. Dr. Bianco contends that because

 Alexander was not entitled to recover his pre-majority medical

 expenses as a measure of damages until Rudnicki abolished the

 1 We refer to Alexander by his first name because that is how the

 supreme court referred to him in Rudnicki v. Bianco, 2021 CO 80.
 We intend no disrespect by doing so. Alexander’s parents, Francis
 and Pamela Rudnicki were originally individual plaintiffs as well but
 as discussed below, infra Part I, their individual claims were
 dismissed.

                                   1
 common law rule precluding such recovery, interest should accrue

 from the date of the supreme court’s ruling rather than from the

 date of Alexander’s birth. Based on the plain language of sections

 13-21-101(1) and 13-80-108(1), C.R.S. 2023, we conclude that

 Alexander is entitled to collect prefiling, prejudgment interest on his

 pre-majority medical expenses from the date his cause of action

 accrued, which was the date of his birth.

¶3    Resolving Dr. Bianco’s second contention requires that we

 consider whether prefiling, prejudgment interest on economic

 damages may be awarded in an amount that would make the total

 award exceed the $1 million damages limitation under the HCAA.

 We generally agree with the rationale of Scholle v. Ehrichs, 2022

 COA 87M, ¶ 107 (cert. granted on other grounds Apr. 10, 2023),

 which held that “prefiling, prejudgment interest is part of ‘damages’

 capped under the HCAA, subject to being uncapped upon a

 showing of good cause and unfairness.” See § 13-64-302(1)(b).

 Prefiling, prejudgment interest on Alexander’s pre-majority medical

 expenses is a part of his past and future economic damages. And

 the district court found the requisite good cause and unfairness to

 award past and future economic damages exceeding the HCAA

                                    2
 damages limitation. Thus, we conclude that Alexander is entitled to

 prefiling, prejudgment interest on his pre-majority medical

 expenses from the date of his birth, without limitation.

                  I.   Background and Procedural History

¶4    On October 5, 2005, Alexander was severely injured when Dr.

 Bianco negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a

 vacuum extractor to assist in his birth. Alexander suffered scalp

 abrasions and bruising on his skull and required immediate,

 intensive medical treatment. As a result of his injuries, Alexander

 has required and will require ongoing physical, occupational, and

 speech therapy. Alexander has intellectual disabilities and is

 enrolled in special education. He is unlikely to be able to live

 independently in the future. See Rudnicki, ¶ 4.

¶5    In 2014, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in their individual

 capacities and as parents, guardians, and next friends of Alexander,

 sued Dr. Bianco for medical malpractice. The parents’ individual

 claims against Dr. Bianco were dismissed as time barred, and the

 case proceeded to a jury trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff.

 See id. at ¶ 5; see also § 13-80-102.5(1), (3)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2023.

                                     3
¶6    After a two-week trial, a jury found that Dr. Bianco had acted

 negligently, causing Alexander injuries, and awarded Alexander a

 total of $4 million in damages, including more than $3.6 million in

 past and future economic damages. As relevant to this appeal,

 those economic damages included $391,000 for past medical

 expenses Alexander had already incurred and future medical

 expenses he would probably incur from the date of judgment until

 he reached age eighteen (pre-majority medical expenses).2 See

 Rudnicki, ¶ 5.

¶7    Arguing that the common law only allowed Alexander’s

 parents, not Alexander himself, to recover pre-majority medical

 expenses, see Pressey v. Child.’s Hosp. Colo., 2017 COA 28, ¶ 26,

 and that the parents’ claims were time barred, Dr. Bianco moved

 the district court to reduce Alexander’s damages award by the

 2 The jury awarded Alexander $325,000 for past medical expenses

 and $110,000 for future medical expenses he would probably incur
 until he reaches age twenty-two. Dr. Bianco did not challenge forty
 percent, or $44,000, of the $110,000 award, which is the proportion
 of future medical expenses Alexander would probably incur after
 age eighteen (his current age) but before he turns twenty-two.
 Thus, this appeal relates only to prejudgment interest on pre-
 majority medical expenses Alexander would probably incur before
 he turned eighteen.

                                  4
 amount the jury attributed to his pre-majority medical expenses.

 Reasoning that it was bound by Pressey, the court reduced the

 damages award by $391,000.

¶8    Dr. Bianco also moved the court to reduce Alexander’s total

 award to $1 million, citing the damages limitation in section 13-64-

 302(1)(b) of the HCAA. But the court found that there was good

 cause to exceed the damages cap. It reasoned that applying the cap

 in this case would be “manifestly unfair” to Alexander given the

 substantial evidence presented at trial regarding his life-long need

 for “constant supervision” and “considerable assistance with

 performing the basic tasks of living that most of us take for

 granted,” and his inability to contribute in any meaningful way to

 the costs of such care. The court concluded that the jury’s findings

 were the proper measure of the fair, reasonable, and necessary

 damages Alexander incurred and declined to further reduce the

 award.

¶9    Finally, Dr. Bianco moved the court to apply the HCAA

 damages cap to limit Alexander’s recovery of prejudgment interest

 for the period beginning on the date the action accrued and ending

 on the date the complaint was filed (prefiling, prejudgment interest),

                                   5
  citing section 13-64-302(2). Because Alexander’s damages award

  exceeded the $1 million cap, Dr. Bianco argued that no prefiling,

  prejudgment interest should be awarded.

¶ 10    The court did not initially resolve whether prefiling,

  prejudgment interest was subject to the $1 million cap and instead

  ordered Alexander’s counsel to file a proposed order “to include

  prejudgment and post-judgment interest” based on the modified

  award of damages. Alexander’s counsel submitted two proposed

  orders, one that capped prefiling, prejudgment interest and one that

  did not. Ultimately, the court entered judgment in favor of

  Alexander in the amount of $4,633,174.59, consisting of

  $3,554,000 in damages plus $1,079,174.59 in prejudgment interest

  calculated from the date the suit was filed to the date of judgment

  (post-filing, prejudgment interest). The court explained that its

  prior “reference to prejudgment interest was meant to include

  interest from the date of the filing of the complaint and not pre-

  filing interest.”

¶ 11    Alexander appealed the district court’s decision to reduce the

  judgment by the amount of pre-majority medical expenses. See

  Rudnicki v. Bianco, (Colo. App. No. 18CA0215, June 6, 2019) (not

                                     6
  published pursuant to C.A.R. 35e)). A division of this court

  affirmed, concluding that Alexander was not entitled to recover pre-

  majority medical expenses under the then-existing common law

  rule. See id.

¶ 12   Alexander then petitioned for certiorari review by the Colorado

  Supreme Court. See Rudnicki, ¶ 10. The supreme court granted

  certiorari, in relevant part, to decide whether to adhere to the

  common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may

  recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their

  unemancipated minor child. See id. at ¶ 1 n.1. The supreme court

  reasoned that the traditional rationales for the common law rule no

  longer apply and that the realities of the modern health care

  economy compelled it to abandon the common law rule and to

  conclude that either the unemancipated minor child or their

  parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses,

  although double recovery is not permitted. See id. at ¶ 2. The

  supreme court reversed the decision of the division, overruled

  Pressey, and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 44, 49.

¶ 13   On remand, the parties agreed that, following Rudnicki,

  judgment should be entered in Alexander’s favor for $391,000 in

                                     7
  damages for pre-majority medical expenses. But they disputed

  when prejudgment interest began to accrue and how much

  prejudgment interest could be awarded.

¶ 14   Alexander requested $319,120.27 in prefiling, prejudgment

  interest, calculated from the date the action accrued — October 5,

  2005 — until the date the complaint was filed, and another

  $647,233.30 in post-filing, prejudgment interest, calculated from

  the date the complaint was filed — October 31, 2014 — until the

  date the judgment entered. Dr. Bianco argued that Alexander was

  only entitled to prejudgment interest from the date the supreme

  court issued Rudnicki — December 13, 2021 — for a total of

  $15,876.89. Alternatively, Dr. Bianco argued that Alexander was

  not entitled to recover any prefiling, prejudgment interest because

  he had already been awarded “the maximum total amount

  allowable” under the HCAA damages limitation. But Dr. Bianco

  agreed that Alexander could recover post-filing, prejudgment

  interest from the date the complaint was filed until the date the

  judgment was entered, for a total of $360,636.28.

¶ 15   The district court adopted Alexander’s proposed form of

  judgment, which included prefiling, prejudgment interest calculated

                                    8
  from the date Alexander was born, as well as post-filing,

  prejudgment interest calculated from the date the complaint was

  filed. The court further ordered that its prior decision that

  Alexander’s damages could exceed the $1 million cap under the

  HCAA “still applie[d],” so the cap did not limit the amount that

  could be recovered as prejudgment interest.

                                 II.       Analysis

¶ 16   The only issue remaining for us to decide on appeal is whether

  the district court erred by including in its final judgment prefiling,

  prejudgment interest on Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses,

  calculated from his date of birth. We first determine the date from

  which the prefiling, prejudgment interest should be calculated

  under section 13-21-101(1). We then determine whether such

  interest should be limited by section 13-64-302(1)(b).

                           A.    Standard of Review

¶ 17   Dr. Bianco’s contentions require that we interpret and apply

  several Colorado statutes, which we do de novo. See McCulley v.

  People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10. In construing a statute, we aim to

  effectuate the legislature’s intent by giving the language its plain

  and ordinary meaning. See id. “We must interpret the statute as a

                                       9
  whole and in the context of the entire statutory scheme, giving

  consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts.” Id.

¶ 18   If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the

  statute as written and look no further. See Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt.,

  Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 12. However, if a statute is ambiguous — “that

  is, reasonably susceptible [of] more than one interpretation” — we

  turn to other interpretive aids to discern the legislature’s intent. Id.

  at ¶ 13. These aids include legislative history, the end to be

  achieved by the statute, and the consequences of a given

  construction. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2023; see Morris v. Goodwin, 185

  P.3d 777, 779 (Colo. 2008).

         B.   Prefiling, Prejudgment Interest May Be Recovered from
                        the Date the Cause of Action Accrued

¶ 19   Dr. Bianco contends that the district court erred by awarding

  prefiling, prejudgment interest from Alexander’s date of birth

  because he was not legally entitled to those damages until the

  supreme court’s decision in Rudnicki. Based on the plain language

  of the governing statutes, we disagree.

¶ 20   Prejudgment interest on damages awarded in a personal injury

  action is specifically authorized by section 13-21-101(1). Seaward

                                     10
  Constr. Co. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 973 (Colo. 1991). Under that

  statute, a plaintiff may recover prejudgment interest on damages

  “from the date the action accrued” until the day before the

  complaint was filed — prefiling, prejudgment interest — and from

  the date the complaint was filed to the date judgment entered —

  post-filing, prejudgment interest. § 13-21-101(1); Ochoa v. Vered,

  212 P.3d 963, 970 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 21   The legislature has defined when a personal injury action

  accrues in section 13-80-108(1): “[A] cause of action for injury to [a]

  person . . . shall be considered to accrue on the date both the injury

  and its cause are known or should have been known by the exercise

  of reasonable diligence.” See Jones v. Cox, 828 P.2d 218, 223 (Colo.

  1992) (“We hold that a cause of action accrues on the date that both

  the physical injury and its cause were known or should have been

  known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”); see also § 13-80-

  102.5(1).

¶ 22   Based on the plain language of the applicable statutes, which

  are clear and unambiguous on this point, Alexander may recover

  prejudgment interest on his damages from the date his injury and

  its cause were known or should have been known by the exercise of

                                    11
  reasonable diligence. See §§ 13-21-101(1), 13-80-102.5(1), 13-80-

  108(1). It is undisputed that Alexander’s injury and its cause were

  known on the date of his birth, October 5, 2005. Alexander’s action

  against Dr. Bianco accrued on that date, and he is entitled to

  prefiling, prejudgment interest from that date to the day before his

  complaint was filed. See § 13-21-101(1); Ochoa, 212 P.3d at 970.

¶ 23   Despite the statutes’ plain language, Dr. Bianco contends that

  “Colorado law has not addressed at what point prejudgment

  interest begins to accrue when the law changes to allow a plaintiff

  to recover a new category of damages after the plaintiff’s cause of

  action accrues.” Dr. Bianco essentially asks us to hold that a cause

  of action accrues for purposes of computing interest under section

  13-21-101(1) when the plaintiff becomes legally entitled to a

  particular category of damages. Because Alexander became legally

  entitled to recover pre-majority medical expenses when the supreme

  court decided Rudnicki, Dr. Bianco argues that the date of the

  decision should be the date from which interest on that category of

  damages is calculated. He argues that section 13-21-101 is “silent”

  as to when prejudgment interest may be recovered under these

  circumstances and encourages us to look to the legislature’s intent

                                    12
  in authorizing prejudgment interest to determine the statute’s

  meaning. For four reasons, we are not persuaded.

¶ 24   First, the date a personal injury action accrues does not

  depend on when the plaintiff incurs a specific category or amount of

  damages. The word “injury” in section 13-80-108(1) means

  “physical injury,” not “injury upon which a claimant can sustain a

  cause of action.” Jones, 828 P.2d at 223; see also Brodeur v. Am.

  Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 147 n.8 (Colo. 2007) (“We note

  that an injury is different from the damages that flow from the

  injury.”). If the plaintiff is able to “ascertain whether she has

  sustained any damage,” the “fact of injury” is known for purposes of

  accrual. Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Colo. 1991).

  “Pursuant to the language of section 13-80-108(1), damages do not

  need to be known before accrual of a claim.” Brodeur, 169 P.3d at

  147 n.8; see also Taylor v. Goldsmith, 870 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Colo.

  App. 1994) (a plaintiff’s claim accrues “on the date the fact of injury

  and its cause are known or should have been known”; the

  “plaintiff’s uncertainty as to the full extent of the damages does not

  prevent the filing of a timely complaint”).

                                     13
¶ 25   Second, although Rudnicki held that a minor child is entitled

  to recover a new category of damages, it did not create a new cause

  of action. Rudnicki, ¶ 46. The supreme court emphasized that its

  decision answered “the narrow question of who may seek a specific

  remedy when an unemancipated minor is injured. It does not create

  a new class of claims for the court to adjudicate. Nor does it impose

  new duties or obligations on the parties.” Id. (emphasis added).

  Section 13-21-101 is plainly concerned with the date the “action”

  accrued. Because Rudnicki did not create a new “action,” it does

  not impact the date from which prejudgment interest is calculated

  under that statute.

¶ 26   We are not persuaded otherwise by the out-of-state cases Dr.

  Bianco cites because they are distinguishable either based on the

  unique language of the applicable interest statute or because the

  change in the law created a new right to maintain an action rather

  than a new right to seek a specific remedy. See Diaz v. State, 2016

  MT 270, ¶ 12 (the applicable statute provided that prejudgment

  interest was recoverable from the day that the “right to recover . . .

  is vested in the person” (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-211 (West

  2023))); Cardi Corp. v. State, 561 A.2d 384, 385-88 (R.I. 1989) (the

                                    14
  applicable statute calculated interest from “the date the cause of

  action accrued,” but the court concluded that the plaintiff’s claim

  did not accrue until the legislature passed an act that waived

  sovereign immunity, which first gave the plaintiff the “right to sue

  the state”).

¶ 27   Third, we are not persuaded by the distinction Dr. Bianco

  draws between the accrual of a cause of action and the entitlement

  to a specific category of damages. Dr. Bianco contends that

  prefiling, prejudgment interest on Alexander’s pre-majority medical

  expenses “cannot logically compensate [Alexander] for the loss of

  such damages during a period in which he was not entitled to

  recover them.” True, as Dr. Bianco points out, a plaintiff is only

  entitled to interest on damages to which they are legally entitled.

  See Morris, 185 P.3d at 780 (the plaintiff was not entitled to interest

  on damages awarded by the jury that exceeded defendant’s

  proportion of comparative fault or that exceeded the HCAA’s cap on

  noneconomic damages); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d

  14, 19 (Colo. 1990) (Prejudgment interest “represents a legislatively

  prescribed award for any delay in plaintiff’s receipt of money to

  which he has been found legally entitled.” (quoting Houser v.

                                    15
  Eckhardt, 35 Colo. App. 155, 160-61, 532 P.2d 54, 57 (1974))). But

  that unremarkable tenet says nothing about the date from which

  such interest should be calculated once the plaintiff becomes legally

  entitled to damages. Section 13-21-101(1) does. Even though

  Alexander did not become “legally entitled” to pre-majority medical

  expenses until the supreme court decided Rudnicki, now that he is

  legally entitled to those damages, section 13-21-101(1) allows him

  to claim interest “from the date the action accrued.” (Emphasis

  added.) We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute. See Yen, LLC v.

  Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2021 COA 107, ¶ 32.

¶ 28   We acknowledge that the supreme court has determined that

  prejudgment interest cannot be awarded on punitive damages in

  part because the “right to punitive damages does not exist until

  such damages are awarded by a trier of fact.” Seaward Constr. Co.,

  817 P.2d at 976. But a complete reading of Seaward Construction

  reveals that its result was driven by the different purposes for

  awards of punitive damages and awards of compensatory damages

  and prejudgment interest.

¶ 29   The supreme court reasoned that punitive damages “are a

  distinct form of damages awarded for a particular purpose” — “not

                                    16
  as compensation to the injured party for the wrong done, but as a

  punishment of the wrongdoer as an example to others.” Id. at 973-

  74 (quoting Ark Valley Alfalfa Mills, Inc. v. Day, 128 Colo. 436, 440,

  263 P.2d 815, 817 (1953)). By comparison, compensatory damages

  “are awarded to cover loss caused by the negligence of another and

  are intended to make the injured party whole.” Id. at 975.

¶ 30   To that end, “[t]he addition of prejudgment interest to a

  judgment for compensatory damages recognizes that the loss

  caused by the tortious conduct occurred at the time of the resulting

  injury but that the damages paid to compensate for that loss are

  not received by the injured party until later.” Id. Such interest is “a

  component of damages rather than interest as such” and is meant

  to compensate the plaintiff for “the time value of the award

  eventually obtained against the tortfeasor.” Id. at 976 (quoting

  Starke, 797 P.2d at 19); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ross, 180

  P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2008).

¶ 31   “The same cannot be said of prejudgment interest on punitive

  damages,” which “do not compensate for loss resulting from the

  injury” and to which the injured party has “no entitlement of any

  kind . . . unless and until awarded by the trier of fact.” Seaward

                                    17
  Constr. Co., 817 P.2d at 975. Prejudgment interest on punitive

  damages “would serve merely as an additional penalty and is not

  necessary to make the injured party whole.” Id. at 976. Thus,

  allowing prejudgment interest on punitive damages “would be

  inconsistent with the compensatory purpose of section 13-21-101.”

  Id. The supreme court concluded that prejudgment interest is not

  authorized on an award of punitive damages. Id. at 979.

¶ 32   Because the prefiling, prejudgment interest at issue in this

  case is a component of compensatory damages intended to make

  Alexander whole for a loss he suffered at birth — even though he

  did not become legally entitled to that category of damages until

  Rudnicki — an award of such interest is consistent with the

  compensatory purpose of section 13-21-101.

¶ 33   Fourth, we disagree with Dr. Bianco that our interpretation is

  contrary to legislative intent. As just discussed, awarding prefiling,

  prejudgment interest from Alexander’s date of birth furthers the

  compensatory purpose of the statute. But Dr. Bianco argues that

  awarding nearly seventeen years of prejudgment interest has “the

  punitive effect of dramatically increasing [Dr. Bianco’s] liability

  without serving the intended purpose of such interest.” He further

                                     18
  asserts that such an award is unfair because it punishes him

  “solely because the supreme court determined that changing

  circumstances wholly beyond [his] control justified changing the

  law on which [he] relied.”3 In essence, Dr. Bianco argues that our

  plain language interpretation leads to an absurd result.

¶ 34   Although we must avoid interpretations that lead to absurd

  results, we may only disregard the plain language of a statute

  “when the resultant absurdity is ‘so gross as to shock the general

  moral or common sense.’” Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Idaho Springs,

  192 P.3d 490, 494 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson,

  282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)). Short of that, it is the legislature’s

  responsibility to address unintended consequences and undesirable

  results. Id.

  3 Dr. Bianco asserts that awarding prefiling, prejudgment interest in

  this case does not serve to deter a defendant from wrongfully
  withholding payment. This argument appears to relate to section
  5-12-102, C.R.S. 2023, rather than section 13-21-101, C.R.S. 2023.
  Although prejudgment interest under the former statute is
  calculated from “the date of wrongful withholding,” § 5-12-102(1)(a),
  interest under the latter statute is calculated from “the date the
  action accrued,” § 13-21-101(1). See also Colwell v. Mentzer Invs.,
  Inc., 973 P.2d 631, 641 (Colo. App. 1998).

                                     19
¶ 35   Seventeen years of interest on medical expenses Alexander

  incurred because he was injured at birth seventeen years ago by Dr.

  Bianco’s negligence does not shock the general moral or common

  sense. The result does not justify overriding the plain language of

  the statute. See id.; Ryser v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 COA 88,

  ¶ 45 (policy considerations did not justify disregarding the plain

  language of the applicable statute).

¶ 36   Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by

  awarding Alexander prefiling, prejudgment interest from the date

  his cause of action accrued, which was his date of birth.

           C.   Interest in Excess of the HCAA Damages Limitation

¶ 37   Dr. Bianco contends that the district court erred by awarding

  prefiling, prejudgment interest resulting in a total award that

  exceeds the $1 million damages limitation in the HCAA. We

  conclude that the plain language of section 13-64-302 supports the

  award.

                                    20
         1.    Prefiling, Prejudgment Interest on Economic Damages
                 May Exceed the Damages Limitation in the HCAA

¶ 38   The HCAA limits the “total amount recoverable for all

  damages” in a medical malpractice action to “one million dollars.”

  § 13-64-302(1)(b). But there is an exception to the limitation:

              [I]f, upon good cause shown, the court
              determines that the present value of past and
              future economic damages would exceed such
              limitation and that the application of such
              limitation would be unfair, the court may
              award in excess of the limitation the present
              value of additional past and future economic
              damages only.

  Id. The HCAA also limits noneconomic damages to $300,000,

  without exception. § 13-64-302(1)(b), (c). Prefiling, prejudgment

  interest awarded pursuant to section 13-21-101 “is deemed to be a

  part of the damages awarded in the action for the purposes of this

  section and is included within each of the limitations on liability.”

  § 13-64-302(2).

¶ 39   Thus, prefiling, prejudgment interest is an element of damages

  subject to the $1 million damages cap. See id.; see also Seaward

  Constr. Co., 817 P.2d at 976. But if the court finds the requisite

  good cause and unfairness, can prefiling, prejudgment interest be

  awarded if doing so results in a total award beyond the cap?

                                    21
¶ 40   A division of this court recently answered this question

  affirmatively. See Scholle, ¶¶ 103-108. The Scholle division

  reasoned that

             [d]amages are capped under the HCAA, subject
             to being uncapped upon a showing of “good
             cause” and “unfair[ness].” § 13-64-302(1)(b),
             (1)(c). Prefiling, prejudgment interest is part of
             damages. § 13-64-302(2). As a matter of pure
             logic, then, prefiling, prejudgment interest is
             part of “damages” capped under the HCAA,
             subject to being uncapped upon a showing of
             good cause and unfairness . . . .

  Id. at ¶ 107.4

¶ 41   Dr. Bianco urges us not to follow Scholle, arguing that the

  division’s analysis is flawed. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 70, ¶

  13 (one division of the court of appeals is not bound by another).

  Even if good cause and unfairness are found, only “past and future

  economic damages” can exceed the cap, and Dr. Bianco contends

  that prefiling, prejudgment interest is not part of “past and future

  economic damages.” We agree with the Scholle division’s

  4 The Colorado Supreme Court declined to grant a cross-petition for

  certiorari on the question whether prefiling, prejudgment interest
  may be awarded in excess of the $1 million damages cap under the
  HCAA. See Scholle v. Ehrichs, (Colo. No. 22SC639, Apr. 10, 2023)
  (unpublished order).

                                    22
  conclusion, subject to one clarification. Because only past and

  future economic damages may exceed the $1 million limitation, we

  conclude that only prefiling, prejudgment interest on past and

  future economic damages may exceed that limitation.

¶ 42   The plain language of the statute supports our conclusion.

  Section 13-64-302(2) provides that prefiling, prejudgment interest is

  “part of the damages awarded” and “is included within each of the

  limitations on liability” set forth in paragraph (1). (Emphasis

  added.) There are two such limitations on liability: a hard cap of

  $300,000 on “noneconomic loss or injury,” which cannot be

  exceeded; and a soft cap of $1 million on “all damages,” which can

  be exceeded by an award of “past and future economic damages” if

  the other requirements of the statute are met. § 13-64-302(1)(b);

  see also Ochoa, 212 P.3d at 970.

¶ 43   This structure makes clear that the legislature did not view

  prefiling, prejudgment interest as a standalone category of

  damages. Instead, it contemplated that prefiling, prejudgment

  interest on a particular category of damages is part of the damages

  awarded for that category. Prefiling, prejudgment interest on

  noneconomic damages must be part of the noneconomic damages

                                     23
  awarded; otherwise, there would be no reason to specify that

  prefiling, prejudgment interest is subject to the noneconomic

  damages cap. See Dupont v. Preston, 9 P.3d 1193, 1199 (Colo. App.

  2000) (reasoning under the former, lower economic damages

  limitation that a “plaintiff may not recover more than $250,000 in

  noneconomic loss, inclusive of prejudgment interest”), aff’d on other

  grounds, 35 P.3d 433 (Colo. 2001). If prefiling, prejudgment

  interest was itself a separate category of damages, it would be

  subject only to the $1 million cap on “all damages,” and the

  legislature’s reference to “each” limitation would be meaningless.

  See People v. Iannicelli, 2019 CO 80, ¶ 47 (“We cannot . . . interpret

  statutory language in such a way as to render any of the statute’s

  terms meaningless.”).

¶ 44   Following the same logic, prefiling, prejudgment interest on

  “past and future economic damages” is part of “past and future

  economic damages” and is awardable beyond the $1 million

                                    24
  limitation, provided the other requirements of the statute are met.

  § 13-64-302(1)(b); see Scholle, ¶ 107.5

¶ 45   We are not persuaded to reach a different result by the

  statute’s legislative history. Of course, because the statute is

  unambiguous, we need not look to other aids of statutory

  construction, such as legislative history. See Nieto, ¶ 12. We may

  nonetheless do so to assess Dr. Bianco’s contentions and support

  our conclusion based on the plain language of the statute. See

  B.G.’s, Inc. v. Gross, 23 P.3d 691, 696 (Colo. 2001) (considering

  legislative history to support plain language interpretation of a

  statute); Adams v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 187 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Colo.

  App. 2008) (considering legislative history to assess the defendant’s

  contentions).

¶ 46   The legislature adopted section 13-64-302 in response to

  Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 911 (Colo.

  5 Prefiling, prejudgment interest on any category of damages that is

  neither “past and future economic damages” nor considered
  noneconomic losses for purposes of the HCAA’s noneconomic loss
  limitation, see Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 441-42 (Colo. 2001)
  (“[N]oneconomic damages for physical impairment and
  disfigurement are not included in the definition of noneconomic loss
  contained in the HCAA’s cap on such damages.”), remains limited
  by the $1 million total damages cap without exception.

                                    25
  1993), which held that prejudgment interest was not included in

  the damages subject to the $1 million limitation under the HCAA.

  See Dupont, 9 P.3d at 1199. As a result, Dr. Bianco argues that

  allowing prefiling, prejudgment interest to exceed $1 million is

  contrary to the legislature’s intent to include such interest within

  that limitation. But our interpretation does not run afoul of the

  legislature’s intent to course correct after Scholz. Under our

  analysis, prefiling, prejudgment interest is subject to the $1 million

  damages limitation, consistent with the plain language of section

  13-64-302(2). But the legislature also provided a mechanism to

  allow past and future economic damages — of which prefiling,

  prejudgment interest is a component — to exceed that limitation

  upon a showing of good cause and a finding of unfairness. See

  § 13-64-302(1)(b); Scholle, ¶ 107. It did not provide that prefiling,

  prejudgment interest may never exceed the cap. Had that been its

  intent, it would have said so explicitly. See Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d

  1064, 1067 (Colo. 2007); People v. Denhartog, 2019 COA 23, ¶ 20.

¶ 47   We are also not convinced to reach a different result by Dr.

  Bianco’s reliance on Wallbank v. Rothenberg, where the trial court

  entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding over $1.3 million

                                    26
  without addressing whether good cause existed for exceeding the

  damages cap and without addressing prejudgment interest. 74

  P.3d 413, 420 (Colo. App. 2003). The division determined that a

  remand was necessary for the court to make findings on both

  issues. Id. It explained that “[u]nder the one million dollar

  limitation, the Wallbanks may not recover additional amounts for

  prefiling interest.” Id. at 420. Then, the division concluded that, “if

  the trial court finds good cause and unfairness justifying the award

  for lost future earnings, then prefiling interest also may not be

  awarded for that portion of the judgment that exceeds one million

  dollars, because prefiling interest is included in the total limit.” Id.

¶ 48   How the Wallbank division reached its conclusion about

  prefiling, prejudgment interest is unclear to us. Based on the plain

  language of section 13-64-302(1)(b) and the jury’s verdict, the trial

  court could not have found good cause to exceed the damages

  limitation. The division analyzed the 2002 version of the statute,

  which allowed the court to exceed the cap if the amount of “lost

  past earnings and the present value of lost future earnings”

  combined with the amount of past and future “medical and other

  health care costs” would exceed the limitation. § 13-64-302(1),

                                     27
  C.R.S. 2002; compare § 13-64-302(1), C.R.S. 2023 (allowing the

  court to exceed the cap for “past and future economic damages”).

  But the plaintiff was awarded only $166,060 in past and future lost

  earnings and medical expenses. A prerequisite for exceeding the

  cap was not met. The division also cited Shannon v. Colorado

  School of Mines, 847 P.2d 210, 213 (Colo. App. 1992), which held

  that prejudgment interest could not be awarded on future lost

  wages under section 5-12-102, C.R.S. 1992; it did not analyze

  section 13-21-101. Given these differences, we do not find

  Wallbank helpful. See Chavez, ¶ 13.

¶ 49   We are similarly unpersuaded by Dr. Bianco’s citation to

  Ochoa, 212 P.3d at 970. There, the plaintiff received a

  noneconomic damage award that was “properly reduced to

  $250,000” under the then-existing noneconomic damages limitation

  in the HCAA. Id. The plaintiff acknowledged that she could not

  recover prefiling, prejudgment interest on her noneconomic

  damages because such interest was subject to and could not exceed

  the noneconomic damages cap. Id. But she sought to recover more

  post-filing, prejudgment interest by calculating such interest on the

  sum of the capped amount of damages plus the prefiling,

                                   28
  prejudgment interest that she otherwise would have been entitled to

  but for the noneconomic damages cap. Id. The division rejected the

  plaintiff’s argument because calculating post-filing, prejudgment

  interest on prefiling, prejudgment interest in excess of the

  noneconomic damages limitation — prefiling, prejudgment interest

  the plaintiff was not entitled to recover under the statute — would

  be inconsistent with section 13-21-101. Id. at 970-71.

¶ 50   Notably, the HCAA does not provide a mechanism for the trial

  court to exceed the noneconomic damages limitation upon a

  showing of good cause and a finding of unfairness. See § 13-64-

  302(1)(b). Nor did Ochoa involve a question of whether prefiling,

  prejudgment interest was recoverable where the trial court made

  appropriate findings to exceed the total damages cap. Ochoa is

  likewise unhelpful. See Chavez, ¶ 13.

¶ 51   Finally, we are not swayed by Dr. Bianco’s contention that our

  plain language interpretation goes against the policy purposes of

  the HCAA. In relevant part, the HCAA was enacted “to assure the

  continued availability of adequate health-care services . . . by

  containing the significantly increasing costs of malpractice

  insurance.” § 13-64-102(1), C.R.S. 2023. Dr. Bianco contends that

                                    29
  awarding prefiling, prejudgment interest beyond the total damages

  limitation will significantly increase costs associated with practicing

  medicine in Colorado and result in “astronomical awards of

  prejudgment interest” that will ultimately result in a decline in

  quality medical care.

¶ 52   We recognize that adhering to the $1 million damage limitation

  furthers the legislature’s stated policy reasons for enacting the

  HCAA. See id. Even so, the legislature expressly authorized courts

  to award past and future economic damages that exceed that

  limitation if there is a showing of good cause and a finding of

  unfairness. See § 13-64-302(1)(b). The legislature apparently

  recognized that the policy behind the HCAA should, under certain

  circumstances, yield to a plaintiff’s right to be made whole.

  Balancing competing policy interests is a task for the legislature.

  See Burnett v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2015 CO 19, ¶ 13. It is not

  our job to second-guess those policy judgments. See Fontanari v.

  Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 2023 COA 15, ¶ 28.

¶ 53   Alexander’s past and future economic damages, including his

  award of pre-majority medical expenses, exceeded $1 million. The

  district court found good cause to exceed the $1 million damages

                                    30
  limitation and determined that it would be “manifestly unfair” to

  apply the limitation in this case. Dr. Bianco does not challenge

  those findings on appeal. Prefiling, prejudgment interest is an

  element of Alexander’s past and future economic damages. Thus,

  the court did not err by awarding prefiling, prejudgment interest on

  Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses, even though his total

  damages award exceeded $1 million.

          2.    The Law of the Case Does Not Alter Our Conclusion

¶ 54   Dr. Bianco contends that, even if prefiling, prejudgment

  interest on economic damages may exceed the HCAA damages

  limitation, the district court nonetheless erred by departing from its

  previous ruling declining to award Alexander any prefiling,

  prejudgment interest. Dr. Bianco contends that, under the “law of

  the case,” the court was not free to modify that ruling unless it was

  “no longer sound because of changed conditions, factual errors in

  the previous ruling, intervening changes in the law, or manifest

  injustice resulting from the original ruling.” People v. Allen, 885

  P.2d 207, 212 (Colo. 1994).

¶ 55   But had the court ruled that Alexander was not entitled to

  prefiling, prejudgment interest on his award of pre-majority medical

                                    31
  expenses — whether based on “law of the case” or not — that ruling

  would have been erroneous, as we have explained. We are not

  bound by the “law of the case” to affirm a lower court’s erroneous

  ruling. See Sidman v. Sidman, 2016 COA 44, ¶ 10 (explaining that

  “the law of the case from the district court [does] not bind us on

  appeal”).

                               III.   Disposition

¶ 56   The judgment is affirmed.

       JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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