Court Opinion

ID: 9546829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:36:05.734242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:55.023456
License: Public Domain

Grady, C. J.
(concurring in the result) — I concur in the result reached in the foregoing opinion, but do not subscribe to the view that the allegations in the pleadings that, at the time Wasmer made the original promise to appellants, he was not acting as an officer of the corporation but was acting in his individual capacity, and that, in making the promise referred to, Wasmer was-not acting as an “employer” as that term is defined in the wage stabilization act, etc., were conclusions of the pleader and were not such allegations of fact as would be treated as true by a demurrer, or as admitted facts when considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Such statements are regarded as conclusions or those of ultimate facts, depending upon the way in which the words are used and the intent of the one using them. In order to express the thoughts to be conveyed in other than a direct manner, would require the use of many words and a circuitous process which would be objectionable upon the ground that evidence was being pleaded, which is one of the inhibitions expressed by authorities on pleading. If one desires to convey the idea that another acted not as an officer of a corporation, but in his individual capacity, or that he was not acting as an employer at a particular time or under particular circumstances, all he needs to do is to just say so, and no one will misunderstand what he means. This is what is meant by our statute which admonishes us to plead ultimate facts in plain and concise language.
Ever since code pleading was devised, many courts have been struggling with common-law concepts of pleading with much resultant confusion and conflict of viewpoint, and the effort to simplify pleading has often been in a measure thwarted. This is quite well demonstrated when one considers the question of what is or what is not a conclusion of the pleader, whether it be one of law or fact. A discourse *603on the subject is found in 41 Am. Jur. 290, and 300, Pleading, §§ 6, 7, 8,16 and following sections, and in 1 Bancroft’s Code Pleading 90, § 43 et seq.
Many pleaders will set forth a series of statements and follow them with their conclusions therefrom. Not much trouble is found in condemning the conclusion part, although it may be of aid in informing a party what he has to meet. Often, however, the pleader may be accused of setting forth evidentiary matters instead of ultimate facts. The situation is sometimes met by requiring the question of proper pleading to be tested upon a motion to strike or to make more definite and certain, according to which form the pleader has adopted, but if this is not done, by holding the pleading good as to form if the objection is first made by demurrer or by motion for judgment on the pleadings.
February 19, 1954. Petition for rehearing denied.