Court Opinion

ID: 9959665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:07:42.696492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.746086
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 5, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2023-CA-0055-MR

ANTONIO WHARTON                                                         APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM TRIGG CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 18-CR-00021

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: GOODWINE, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Antonio Wharton, pro se, appeals from the Trigg Circuit

Court’s order denying his motion for relief under Kentucky Rule of Criminal

Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             The events of this case stem from Wharton’s convictions, following a

jury trial in Trigg Circuit Court, on one count of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (greater than four grams of cocaine), one count of possession

of drug paraphernalia, and being a persistent felony offender. The facts underlying

Wharton’s convictions were outlined by the Kentucky Supreme Court in his direct

appeal as follows:

                  On January 8, 2018, officers of the Trigg County
            Sherriff’s Office (TCSO) sought a search warrant for
            Wharton’s residence. The search warrant affidavit, given
            by TCSO Deputy Jarred Werner, stated the following in
            support of the warrant:

                  On the 8th day of January, 2018 between the hours
            of 0600 and 2000 hours, the Trigg County Sheriff’s
            Office conducted a controlled buy of crack cocaine from
            the above address.

                   Affiant received information from/observed: a
            confidential informant who stated that he/she could
            purchase narcotics from Antonio Marquis Wharton,
            hereinafter Antonio Wharton, a person known to the
            Trigg County Sheriff’s Office to have a history of
            trafficking in narcotics. The confidential informant
            stated that he/she was familiar with Antonio Wharton and
            that he/she could positively identify him. The
            confidential informant positively identified Antonio
            Wharton by photograph. The confidential informant
            stated that he/she was familiar with the address of
            Antonio Wharton,[. . .], and that he/she had purchased
            narcotics from Antonio Wharton at that address multiple
            times from October 2017 until last week, and that he/she
            had most recently purchased narcotics from Antonio
            Wharton at that address four days ago. The TCSO could
            independently corroborate Antonio Wharton’s address
            information by having served him civil service at that
            address.

                                        -2-
       Acting on the information received, affiant
conducted the following independent investigation;
TCSO arranged for the confidential informant to make a
controlled purchase of suspected crack cocaine from
Antonio Wharton at the [. . .], address as provided. The
confidential informant telephoned Antonio Wharton and
arranged a purchase of crack cocaine at [his address], and
the TCSO recorded the conversation. The TCSO
provided the confidential informant with buy money and
the serial numbers were recorded by photocopying the
bills. The confidential informant and the vehicle were
searched, and the TCSO established positive contact with
the confidential informant by cellular telephone, which
was audio recorded. The TCSO monitored the
confidential informant driving to [Wharton’s address].
The drug transaction lasted less than a minute and the
informant was monitored leaving and traveling back to
the TCSO.

      At the SO [(sheriff’s office)] the informant
delivered approximately 1 gram of crack cocaine.

       The informant stated Antonio Wharton stepped out
of the front door, with suspected cocaine in hand, and
then completed the drug transaction. TSCO field tested
the substance, with a positive result for cocaine.

      Based on the above affidavit, a search warrant was
issued, and Wharton’s residence was searched. The
search yielded the following items:

• One box of clear baggies with one box of straight razor
blades;

• One plastic money jar containing $23.64;

• $58.00 located in a purse;

• Eight small rocks of cocaine;

                               -3-
• One small digital scale;

• $13,840.00 cash;

• $29.00 cash;

• $720.00 cash;

• One solid brick of suspected cocaine approximately one
and one-half inches in diameter.

       Wharton was indicted by way of grand jury for
trafficking in a controlled substance weighing more than
four grams, wanton endangerment, possession of drug
paraphernalia, trafficking in a controlled substance
weighing less than four grams, and of being a persistent
felony offender.

       On June 11, 2018, Wharton moved to suppress all
the evidence collected as a result of the search warrant,
alleging that it was illegal. The trial court heard
argument concerning the motion to suppress as required
by RCr 2 8.27. Wharton asked the trial court to allow
him to call Deputy Werner to testify. The
Commonwealth objected to Wharton calling witnesses.
In response to the objection, defense counsel stated on
the record the grounds for the motion to suppress: “I
don't know that we are challenging specifically probable
cause, we are challenging the timing of the warrant, the
signing of the warrant. There is no time listed or date
listed on the warrant itself. That’s what we are
challenging.” The trial court allowed the testimony only
to address any issue of credibility of the confidential
informant (CI), if it were raised.

       The hearing produced more evidence than that
contained in the affidavit, and this evidence was largely
consistent with that contained in the affidavit. The only
differences being that Deputy Werner testified that the
transaction occurred between 6:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.,

                             -4-
rather than between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that the
transaction was not recorded, but was listened in on via
an open call with the CI.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the
Commonwealth argued that defense counsel had not
submitted any proof that the search warrant was not
valid, and asked the court to deny the motion to suppress.
Defense counsel argued that there was insufficient
probable cause for the warrant to be issued because the
time frame included in the search warrant was too large
to be reliable and rendered the search warrant invalid.

      The trial court rendered an order denying
Wharton’s motion to suppress and made the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law:

                 FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Defendant, Antonio M. Wharton is charged in this
case as follows:

Count I-Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, First
Degree, Subsequent Offense, a class B Felony;

Count II-Wanton Endangerment, First Degree, a Class D
Felony;

Count III-Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Complicity,
a Class A Misdemeanor;

Count IV-Trafficking in a Controlled Substance, First
Degree, Subsequent Offense, a Class C Felony; and

Count V-Persistent Felony Offender, First Degree.

2. On January 8, 2018, Trigg County Deputy Sheriff
Jared Werner was involved in a controlled buy of drugs
by a confidential informant from the Defendant Antonio

                           -5-
M. Wharton. The CI was monitored by cell phone in an
“open call.”

3. The CI purchased drugs from the Defendant on that
date between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.

4. After the transaction, Sheriff Deputies obtained a
search warrant from Trigg District Court.

5. Marked bills had been used for the buy but were not
recovered as a result of the search.

6. Items that were seized as a result of the search warrant
include: Box of clear baggies with box of straight
razorblades; money jar (plastic); $23.64 found child’s
room top dresser; $58.00 cash from woman’s purse found
on kitchen table; 8 small rocks of suspected crack
cocaine (under mattress child’s room); 1 small digital
scale under mattress in child’s room; $13,840.00 cash
found in box spring in child’s room;

$29.00 cash found on kitchen table; $720.00 cash from
wallet on MB dresser; and solid block of suspected
cocaine approximately 1 ½ inch in diameter.

7. There was no audio or video tape of the transaction
itself.

8. Deputy Werner had the CI in view at the time of the
purchase and sale outside the residence but not inside
Defendant’s residence. The transaction itself took place
outside the residence.

9. Probable cause was established for the issuance of the
search warrant based upon the totality of the
circumstances.

                            -6-
                                 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

                1. In reviewing an affidavit for issuance of a search
                warrant, extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to
                supply deficiencies and in determining the existence of
                probable cause, the Court must consider the affidavit on
                its face. See Horn v. Commonwealth, 240 S.W.3d 665
                (Ky. App. 2007).

                2. Defendant has the burden of proof that the search
                warrant or affidavit were defective.

                3. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was
                probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.

                4. The search of Defendant’s residence and person did
                not violate his constitutional rights.

                The Commonwealth proceeded on the charges of
                trafficking in a controlled substance weighing more than
                four grams, possession of drug paraphernalia, and of
                being a persistent felony offender. The case went to trial,
                where a jury convicted Wharton on all three counts.

Wharton v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-SC-0178-MR, 2021 WL 5050739, at *1-3

(Ky. Oct. 28, 2021) (footnotes omitted).1 Wharton was sentenced to twenty (20)

years’ imprisonment.

                On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Wharton’s

conviction and concluded that the circuit court acted properly in denying

Wharton’s suppression motion.

1
    We cite this opinion pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 41.

                                               -7-
                 Thereafter, on September 7, 2022, Wharton filed an RCr 11.42 motion

for relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”) and requesting

an evidentiary hearing. The circuit court issued an order denying McCullum’s RCr

11.42 request for relief and motion for an evidentiary hearing motion on February

28, 2022. This appeal followed.

                 We will discuss any additional facts as necessary below.

                                          ANALYSIS

                 On appeal, Wharton argues that he is entitled to relief under RCr

11.42 due to his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in (1) litigating Wharton’s Fourth

Amendment claim at the suppression hearing by failing to challenge the search

warrant adequately, (2) failing to present and argue Brady2 evidence regarding the

terms of his co-defendant’s alleged understanding with the Commonwealth to

testify, and (3) failing to effectively argue that the controlled drug buy was

inadmissible under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (“KRE”) 404(b). Wharton also

requests that this case be remanded for the circuit court to hold an evidentiary

hearing regarding his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

                    1. Strickland Factors and Our Standard of Review

                 In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[t]he movant has the burden of

establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right

2
    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).

                                                -8-
which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction

proceeding.” Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006)

(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279

S.W.3d 151, 159 (Ky. 2009). “RCr 11.42 motions are limited to the issues that

were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Id. at 568 (citation omitted).

             Specifically, a successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 for

ineffective assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance”

and “prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702

S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). In describing these two factors, the Kentucky

Supreme Court has stated that:

             [a] “deficient performance” contains errors so serious
             that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
             guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
             Second, the appellant must show that counsel’s deficient
             performance prejudiced his defense at trial. This requires
             showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
             deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
             reliable. An appellant must satisfy both elements of the
             Strickland test in order to merit relief.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

             Regarding the first prong, “[t]he proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”

                                          -9-
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. Moreover, McCullum’s trial

counsel has “a strong presumption” in his or her favor that the conduct fell “within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Haight v. Commonwealth,

41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Leonard, 279

S.W.3d at 158-59.

             As to the second prong, to establish actual prejudice, the appellant

must show a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome for the proceeding.

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 551 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted). “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Teague v. Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky. App. 2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068). Appellate review of

counsel’s performance under Strickland is de novo. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d at

736.

             Where the trial court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr

11.42 motion, appellate review is limited to “whether the motion on its face states

grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would

invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky.

1967) (citations omitted). An evidentiary hearing is only required “if there is a

material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively

                                         -10-
proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.” Fraser v. Commonwealth,

59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted).

                2. Discussion

                A. Defense Counsel’s Performance Challenging the Sufficiency
                   of the Search Warrant.

             Here, Wharton has four “factors” in support of his argument that his

defense counsel failed to challenge the search warrant sufficiently. First, Wharton

argues that defense counsel’s suppression motion was inadequate and required

more specificity. However, as the circuit court properly determined, Wharton

provided no authority to bolster this claim. Moreover, as the circuit court

observed, it is not uncommon for a defense attorney to file a broad suppression

motion, as it allows them more freedom to pursue their arguments at a later date.

In this case, after filing the suppression motion, defense counsel presented detailed

arguments at the suppression hearing. Defense counsel sufficiently preserved

Wharton’s claims for appeal and the Kentucky Supreme Court reviewed those

claims on their merits. Therefore, the circuit court correctly found no IATC.

             Wharton’s second factor is that defense counsel was ineffective

during the suppression hearing for failing to sufficiently challenge probable cause

for the warrant and the reliability of the CI. However, the Kentucky Supreme

Court already determined in Wharton’s direct appeal that probable cause existed

for the search warrant’s issuance. The Kentucky Supreme Court also discussed the

                                        -11-
CI’s reliability in Wharton’s direct appeal, finding the information reliable.

Wharton, 2021 WL 5050739, at *5. Wharton “cannot raise issues which were

raised and decided on direct appeal” in his RCr 11.42 proceeding. Wilson v.

Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Ky. 1998) (citation omitted).

             Wharton next claims that he received IATC when his defense counsel

did not examine whether Deputy Werner was the true affiant of the affidavit.

However, Deputy Werner’s signature is on the affidavit, and Wharton has provided

no facts or authority to refute his signature as the affiant. Moreover, Deputy

Werner testified at the suppression hearing that the county attorney assisted with

the search warrant affidavit, which is not an uncommon practice. As such, “[a]

court may summarily deny motions asserting claims refuted or otherwise resolved

by the record.” Fowler v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Ky. App. 2021)

(internal quotation marks and citation removed).

             Additionally, Wharton argues he received IATC when his defense

counsel failed to request a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,

98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978) (a “Franks hearing”). In Wharton’s direct

appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether Wharton

was eligible for a Franks hearing, stating that Wharton’s defense counsel had not

presented to the trial court the issue of whether the affidavit contained intentionally

                                         -12-
false statements or statements based upon reckless disregard for the truth.

Wharton, 2021 WL 5050739, at *4.

             A “presumption of validity” exists regarding an affidavit supporting

the search warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684. A defendant is not

entitled to a Franks hearing unless he or she first makes a “substantial preliminary

showing” that the affidavit contained knowing and intentional or recklessly false

statements. Id. at 155, 98 S. Ct. at 2676. Thus, to be entitled to a Franks hearing,

Wharton was required to provide evidence that Deputy Werner knowingly and

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement in

the search warrant affidavit. Id.

             The Franks Court further stated that a defendant’s allegations must be

“more than conclusory” and “be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-

examine.” Id. at 171, 98 S. Ct. at 2684. Further, Wharton must furnish evidence

through affidavits or reliable witness statements or satisfactorily explain their

absence. Id. “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient.” Id.

             In this case, the affidavit indicated that the “open call” call was audio

recorded. However, at the suppression hearing, in response to defense counsel’s

question about whether TCSO had provided the CI with any audio or video

recording equipment, Deputy Werner responded that TCSO was monitoring the CI

through an “open call” on a cell phone the entire time.

                                         -13-
             However, even assuming that Deputy Werner’s testimony was

incorrect, Wharton has failed to offer any proof that Deputy Werner made the

misstatement intentionally and knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth.

Id. Rather, as determined by the circuit court, Deputy Werner’s statement was –

at most – a result of negligence and not with a reckless disregard for the truth. As

previously discussed, claims of negligence are inadequate. Id.

             Wharton further claims the affidavit contained a false statement that

the CI telephoned Wharton and arranged the controlled buy at 90 Linda Lane.

Again, however, Wharton provides no concrete proof that the statement was

dishonest and that the phone call between Wharton and the CI was never

corroborated. Additionally, Wharton has not provided proof that this assumed

false statement was made intentionally and knowingly or with reckless disregard

for the truth. Id. Therefore, the circuit court properly determined there was no

IATC.

                B. Wharton’s Brady Claim.

             Wharton next claims that his trial counsel failed to present and argue

evidence as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.

Ed. 2d 215 (1963). In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held “that the

suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

                                        -14-
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97.

             Here, Wharton argues that his counsel failed to present Brady

evidence about an alleged agreement between Wharton’s co-defendant and the

Commonwealth for his co-defendant to testify. However, at trial, Jasmine

Crenshaw – Wharton’s ex-wife and co-defendant – unambiguously stated that she

did not have a deal with the Commonwealth and “she was not getting anything in

return for testifying.” Moreover, the Commonwealth has denied that any deal

existed. Wharton has made a conclusory statement that there was a deal between

Crenshaw and the Commonwealth with no proof of such an agreement. As stated

by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Roach v. Commonwealth, “[c]onclusory

allegations that counsel was ineffective without a statement of the facts upon

which those allegations are based do not meet [11.42’s] specificity standard and so

warrant a summary dismissal of the motion.” 384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, we affirm as to this

claimed error.

                 C. Wharton’s KRE 404(b) claim.

             Finally, Wharton argues that his defense counsel did not effectively

argue that the controlled drug buy with the CI was inadmissible as evidence of

intent. After the Commonwealth stated its intent under KRE 404(c) to introduce

                                         -15-
evidence of the controlled drug buy with the CI as evidence of intent, Wharton’s

counsel argued against this evidence’s admission, claiming the evidence was

irrelevant as it had occurred earlier in the day prior to the search warrant’s

execution. Ultimately, the circuit court granted the Commonwealth’s motion,

finding the evidence relevant to the issue of intent. The circuit court did instruct

the jury that Wharton was not charged for the controlled buy and this evidence

could only be considered to establish Wharton’s intent to traffic in cocaine and not

evidence of propensity.

             However, the record indicates that Wharton’s defense counsel

effectively argued that the evidence of the controlled drug buy was inadmissible by

arguing that such evidence was irrelevant. While Wharton alleges that defense

counsel did not cite any authority to support his argument, Wharton has not

included any cases that defense counsel overlooked. Rather, in the case Wharton

cites in his brief, the Kentucky Supreme Court determined that evidence of the

controlled buy was admissible pursuant to KRE 404(b) to establish intent to sell.

Walker v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Ky. 2001). As stated by the

United States Supreme Court, “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective

assistance in any given case[,]” and “[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys

would not defend a particular client in the same way.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689,

104 S. Ct. at 2065. The record reflects that Wharton’s defense counsel argued that

                                         -16-
the controlled-buy evidence was not admissible, and his performance was not

deficient in this regard.

             Moreover, Wharton cannot meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.

The circuit court determined there was “overwhelming evidence” of Wharton’s

guilt, including a “damning video tape of the Defendant where he seems to make

an admission of trafficking, the testimony of his wife that he was trafficking in

drugs, [and] the finding of almost twelve grams of cocaine under his child’s bed

along with over $13,000 in cash with no real explanation of derivation[.]” Thus,

there was no reasonable probability that, but for any claimed error of defense

counsel, there would have been a different result.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Trigg Circuit Court’s order

denying Wharton’s RCr 11.42 motion.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Antonio Wharton, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
 LaGrange, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Courtney J. Hightower
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -17-