Court Opinion

ID: 9790237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:49:24.941546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:47:12.320347
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. In my opinion there is more than sufficient evidence from which to conclude that plaintiffs and Far West intended the right of access to be mutual and that the condition of the premises would put a reasonable person on notice that plaintiffs had a potential interest in the access way between the shopping center and plaintiffs’ restaurant.
*273The majority makes no effort to deal with the import of the word "common” in the Far West letter to plaintiffs. If the letter merely referred to "access,” I would agree that no reciprocal rights were intended. However, the presumption is that the parties intended something by the word. ORS 42.230. When the letter was written, there was no access of any kind along the north side of plaintiffs’ property. There was a creek separating their restaurant from a plant nursery. It cannot be contended therefore that the parties intended Far West to have a right to use an existing access in common with plaintiffs. It must refer to construction of a new access which the patrons of each would be entitled to use. The conclusion of the majority (slip op. p. 5, line 4) that the letter evidences only an intent to grant access to defendant is untenable. 1
Even the language which the majority deems critical does not necessarily support its conclusion. In my view, the language is equally consistent with the interpretation that defendant was attempting to persuade plaintiffs to go through with a previously discussed arrangement, one of the selling points of which was that access would be "common,” with the prospect of increasing plaintiffs’ (as well as defendant’s) business.1
The majority next concludes the memorandum is insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, ORS 41.580, although it fails to state just how this letter is insufficient as a memorandum. On the contrary, the letter expresses the consideration (access to Far West), is in writing and is signed by an agent of Far West. It also states the terms upon which the interest is to be conveyed (simple exchange of access rights with defendant to do the construction as part of building the parking lot). Webster et ux v. Harris, 189 Or 671, 679, 221 P2d 644 (1950). As far as I can determine, this satisfies the statute.
*274Since the letter was a sufficient memorandum, plaintiffs’ testimony was admissible as to the circumstances surrounding the agreement. He testified to nothing which varied the terms of the letter, other than to state that the written offer was orally accepted, proof of which is permissible under Oregon law. Alpha Phi of Sigma Kappa v. Kincaid, 180 Or 568, 571-72, 178 P2d 156 (1947). In fact, the agreement has been completely performed, which removes it from the statute of frauds entirely. Grover v. Sturgeon, 255 Or 578, 584, 469 P2d 617 (1970).
Finally, the majority states that the circumstances were not sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the right of access across plaintiffs’ north boundary existed. In doing so, it relies heavily on the blueprint for construction of the parking lot. At best, this drawing is ambiguous. The direction of the arrows is equally consistent with a plan to direct traffic in the same direction as the parking stalls. Photographs and other exhibits in the record reveal that there was absolutely nothing to prohibit drivers from going either direction across the boundary line. The trough along the entire line caused by the settling of asphalt under the wheels of vehicles and plaintiffs’ testimony that a person who watched the lot for several minutes would see traffic in both directions indicate that such traffic was observable and frequent. There was no evidence to the contrary.
In my view, this is sufficient to put a purchaser of the shopping center on notice that some interest may exist in plaintiffs. Had defendant bothered to inquire by means of a simple phone call, plaintiffs would have told them they claimed right of access. Perhaps defendant would have seen the letter and agreed with the majority that it was at odds with plaintiffs’ asserted interest, but that has no bearing on the matter of notice. It is not all that surprising that plaintiffs did not take it upon themselves to contact defendant about the access unless it can be said that a person in plaintiffs’ position would necessarily communicate with every prospective purchaser on the subject. Plaintiffs may well have assumed that Far West would have pointed out the mutual access to its successor (and on down the line) since they had no reason to believe the arrangement was no *275longer satisfactory prior to the attempted construction of the wall.
I conclude that there was an express easement of access here and therefore respectfully dissent.

 The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion with rhetoric: does the agreement require defendant to operate the shopping center in perpetuity; would defendant, if it put a building on the boundary, be obliged to tunnel through it to continue access? Obviously, defendant is no more disadvantaged than any landowner who, for a contemplated benefit, arranges a mutual easement with a neighbor and subsequently determines the easement is not as advantageous as originally projected. Defendant may certainly go out of the shopping center business, if it desires, in which case the access would be of little use to plaintiffs and would likely fall into disuse. The fact that defendant made a bad bargain is not a basis for relief in this court.