Court Opinion

ID: 9852276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:34.370811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.927881
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring and concurring specially.
I fully concur with both the reasoning employed and the result reached by the majority. However, in view of the significance of the constitutional right at stake — the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation — I am compelled to enter the fray to voice my concern with the dissent’s position. (The reference to the dissent refers to Judge Eldridge’s dissent.)
The importance of the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses cannot be overstated. The clarity and undeniability of that amendment are firm, and today we reaffirm our commitment to it. Embodied in this constitutional right is the ability to cross-examine one’s accusers. As the United States Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers.”22 Such pointed “[c]ross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”23 And, “while cross-examination does not guarantee truth, it will, hopefully, make untruth more difficult.”24 Given the reality that this fundamental right is integral to the truth-seeking process, we should zealously guard against its unnecessary abrogation. Popular notions to the contrary, truth still remains at the epicenter of our judicial system.
Here, the dissent states unequivocally that “[t]he injection of [sentencing] in a jury’s deliberation as to guilt or innocence is improper.” Context is key, and the dissent recontextualizes the sce*562nario. The cases cited by the dissent only involve the injection of the defendant’s possible punishment into the trial — not the possible punishment of a State’s witness.25 Thus, contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, there is no hard and fast rule that it is improper to inject the issue of a witness’ possible punishment.
In two cases this Court has ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination of a State’s witness regarding the minimum or maximum punishment that the witness avoided by striking a deal with the State.26 This Court did so because a trial court “retains wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, based on such concerns as the prevention of prejudice and of questioning on subjects that are only marginally relevant.”27 I see no reason to limit a defendant’s ability to impeach a State’s witness by delving into the exact nature of the deal that the witness made with the State. Indeed, such bias in a witness “is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.”28 And, unlike the dissent, I do not believe that oblique references to “lengthy sentences” carry the same weight as evidence that the accomplice-witness “saved himself” a minimum of 15 years by virtue of reaching a deal with the State. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that those two cases must be disapproved in order that a better, more reasonable rule be established.
The dissent is evidently troubled by the fact that, in addressing the accomplice’s potential sentence had he not pled guilty, the jury would inadvertently be informed of the possible sentence that the defendant faced as both had been charged with the same crime. Indeed, I acknowledge that tension exists between the defendant’s right to thoroughly cross-examine an accomplice-witness to establish bias and the defendant’s right to a bifurcated trial, in which his punishment is not addressed until his guilt is established.29 But these rights inure to the defendant’s benefit. Thus, it should be the defendant’s decision to choose to exercise one right to the detriment of another.
Even if the bifurcated trial does inure to the State’s benefit, also, I do not believe that such interest justifies abrogating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to thoroughly cross-examine the witnesses against him. Rather, I believe that “[t]he State’s policy interest in *563[preserving the bifurcated process] cannot require [the] yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness.”30
Finally, I disagree with the dissent’s contention that any error was harmless. Although Vogleson’s attorney did ask whether the accomplice “saved himself” 15 years by pleading guilty, the trial court did not allow the accomplice to answer the question. Even assuming that the jury could infer that the answer would have been affirmative, I do not believe a defendant should be forced to impeach a crucial witness inferentially. To the contrary, a defendant retains the right to establish the exact nature and extent of any bias on the part of a State’s witness, which includes the ability to delve into the details of the deal reached with the State. To hold otherwise would greatly erode the effectiveness of the fundamental constitutional right of confrontation. Hence, I concur with the majority.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller joins in this concurrence and special concurrence.

 (Punctuation omitted.) Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 316 (94 SC 1105, 39 LE2d 347) (1974).

 Id. at 316.

 Farley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 687, 696 (484 SE2d 711) (1997) (Ruffin, J., concurring specially).

 See Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) (527 SE2d 867) (2000); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518 (14) (207 SE2d 494) (1974); Green v. State, 206 Ga. App. 539, 541 (2) (426 SE2d 65) (1992).

 See Whitlock v. State, 239 Ga. App. 763, 765-766 (2) (521 SE2d 901) (1999); Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) (499 SE2d 351) (1998).

 (Emphasis supplied.) Whitlock, supra at 766.

 (Punctuation omitted.) Davis, supra at 316.

 See OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). See also Ford, supra.

 Davis, supra at 320.