Court Opinion

ID: 9668636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:20:02.965141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.660974
License: Public Domain

*487ON MOTÍON FOR REHEARING
In his motion for rehearing appellant insists that we erred in our original opinion in-holding that the failure to join as parties the parents of Thomas H. Stevens was not such fundamental error as to require the reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
Appellant says that the decisions upon which we have relied do not hold that in determining the existence of fundamental error the courts will not look into the statement of facts. What they hold, according to appellant, is that fundamental error will not be found if to do so requires the appellate court to weigh the evidence. Appellant’s position here is that since the fact relied upon in this case appears uncontro-verted in the statement of facts, the court may look to the statement of facts to determine the existence of fundamental error.
Among the cases cited and quoted by appellant in his brief in support of his contention are East Line & Red River R. R. Co. v. Culberson, 68 Tex. 664, 5 S.W. 820 (1887); Ft. Worth & D. C. R. R. Co. v. Wilson, 85 Tex. 516, 22 S.W. 578 (1893); San Antonio & A. P. R. R. Co. v. Mertink, 101 Tex. 165, 105 S.W. 485 (1907); San Antonio Portland Cement Co. v. Gschwender, 191 S.W. 599 (Tex.Civ.App.1917); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Anderson, 206 S.W. 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1918); Galveston-Houston Electric R. R. Co. v. Reinle, 264 S.W. 783 (Tex.Civ.App.1924) ; Universal Transport & Distributing Co. v. Cantu, 84 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Civ.App.1935); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947); Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541, 305 S.W.2d 162, 68 A.L.R.2d 1062 (1957); and Webb v. Huffman, 320 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Civ.App.1959).
Some of the above cited cases do use the phrase “examine and weigh” the evidence, or similar phrases. The Cantu case, supra, refers to the “undisputed evidence”. In the Culberson, Wilson, Mertink, Gschwen-■der and Reinle cases, supra, the matter .of non-joinder of parties was brought to .the attention of the trial court in the motion for new trial, or otherwise, consequently the question of fundamental error 'was not in any of the cases.
Webb v. Huffman, supra, apparently supports appellant’s contention, though the opinion does not disclose whether complaint was made in the trial court. However, the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, in reversing the trial court’s judgment, also sustained points of error which had been preserved by proper assignments in the trial court. Writ of Error was refused n. r. e., therefore we cannot know whether our Supreme Court approved the holding as to fundamental error.
Appellee, on the other hand, vigorously contends that we were correct in our original opinion when we held that we may not look into the statement of facts to discover fundamental error. In support of this view we think that authorities may properly be cited as follows: Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 118 Tex. 644, 23 S.W.2d 697; White v. Glengarry Oil Co., 137 Tex. 626, 156 S.W.2d 523; Insurors Indemnity & Ins. Co. v. Associated Ind. Corp. et al., 139 Tex. 286, 162 S.W.2d 666; City of Santa Anna v. Leach, 173 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.Civ.App.1943) ; Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947); Lane v. Fair Stores, Inc., 150 Tex. 566, 243 S.W.2d 683 (1951); Krottinger v. Marchand, 252 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Civ.App.1952) ; ICT Ins. Co. v. Gunn, 294 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.1956) ; McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957); Palmer v. Honea, 324 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.Civ.App.1959); 29 Tex.Law Rev. 369; 38 Tex.Law Rev. 538, 541.
It has often been held even since the repeal of Art. 1837, V.A.C.S. that we are authorized to consider errors which have been assigned, or which are “apparent upon the face of the record”, though Rule 374, T.R.C.P. does not expressly include the quoted phrase. What is the meaning of “Record” as so used ? Our Supi eme Court has definitely held that the “record” for pur*488poses of considering fundamental error does not include the statement of facts. Texas & P[acific] Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 118 Tex. 644, 23 S.W.2d 697, 698. (Opinion adopted by the Supreme Court). We quote from the opinion in the last named case:
“The statute does not mean that any error which can be ascertained by looking into the record, including the evidence, will constitute that error ‘apparent upon the face of the record.’ This would be to make all errors fundamental errors, for every error may be made to appear by an examination of the entire record. The language of the statute, therefore, is used in a more restricted sense. The statute has been subsequently construed in a negative way so as to exclude an examination by the;court of the statement of facts to determine whether or not there be any evidence to support the judgment. Ford & Damon v. Flewellen (Tex.Com.App.) 276 S.W. 903; Blackmon v. Trail (Tex.Com.App.) 12 S.W.2d 967. The statute does not define what is. meant by ‘the record,’ but in the negative way just noticed it has been construed to exclude that part of the record which supplies the facts upon which the court bases his judgment.
“The ‘record’ as here used evidently means, as at common law, those proceedings which lie at the foundation of the court’s power to render the judgment, such as the petition, the citation, the verdict, and the judgment proper. It does not include instruments not thus fundamental, such as bills of exceptions, statement of facts, and the like.” (Emphasis ours).
Similar holdings are made in other cases. In White v. Glengarry Oil Co. et al., 137 Tex. 626, 156 S.W.2d 523, 524, (opinion adopted by Supreme Court) it is said:
“Furthermore, without resorting to the statement of facts, the Court of Civil Appeals could not have discovered that the evidence conclusively established the limitation plea of these last named defendants; hence, the situation did not present a fundamental error or ‘error in law apparent on the face of the record.’ ”
In Insurors Ind. & Ins. Co. v. Associated Ind. Corp. et al., 139 Tex. 286, 162 S.W.2d 666, 670, our Supreme Court said:
“If it requires an examination of the statement of facts to disclose error, no question of fundamental error is presented. Moore v. Krenex, Tex.Com.App., 39 S.W.2d 828; Texas & P[ac], Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 118 Tex. 644, 23 S.W.2d 697; Davenport v. Taylor County Tuberculosis Ass’n., Tex.Civ.App., 72 S.W.2d 407; Horton v. Hill, Tex.Civ.App., 95 S.W.2d 751; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Patton, Tex.Civ.App., 92 S.W.2d 1083; 3 Tex.Jur., pp. 808, 809, 810; Tex.Jur.Sup., pp. 232, 233. These authorities could be greatly extended, but they are sufficient to show that the rule here announced is the settled law. From what we have said it is evident that we cannot review the question as to whether a trial court committed error in entering judgment non obstante veredicto for Insurors Indemnity and Insurance Company.”
In Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979, 984, Chief Justice Alexander of our Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion said:
“I am in accord with the judgment rendered in this case, but I desire to make it clear that in my opinion the rule which permits a Court of Civil Appeals to reverse a judgment for unassigned error must be given a much more strict and narrow interpretation than was permissible prior to the adoption of the present rules. * * * It is my opinion that the Court of Civil Appeals is authorized to reverse a judgment of the trial court upon an unassigned error only when it involves a matter of public interest and when the record affirmatively and con- . *489clusively shows that the appellee was not entitled to recover, where the record affirmatively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction over the subject matter.”
Lane v. The Fair Stores, Inc., 150 Tex. 566, 243 S.W.2d 683, 685 was a case in which the Supreme Court refused to consider a statement of facts which had been filed late. However, the court also made this statement:
“If it requires an examination of the statement of facts to reveal error, then it is not fundamental error.”
In Krottinger v. Marchand, 252 S.W.2d 217, 218 (Tex.Civ.App.1952) it is said:
“Before a court may reverse a case based upon fundamental error, it must make its finding solely from an examination of the pleadings, the judgment and other records of the case, without the assistance of the statement of facts.” (Emphasis ours.)
The views expressed by Chief Justice Alexander in his concurring opinion in Ramsey v. Dunlop, supra, are not part of the majority opinion in that case. However in a later Per Curiam opinion our Supreme Court has gone a long way toward embracing the views of the former Chief Justice. We quote from the opinion in McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957):
“Since the Rules make no provision for consideration of errors apparent on the face of the record, the concept of fundamental error is much narrower than it was under Art. 1837, and many errors formerly treated as fundamental may not be so regarded now. The majority opinion in the Ramsey case does not attempt to give an all-inclusive definition of the term, but holds that an error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared by the statutes or Constitution of our ■ State, is fundamental. When the, record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error will also be regarded as fundamental.” .
It is to be noted that even prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941 it was held that we were not to refer to the statement of facts in considering alleged fundamental error. In view of the “much narrower” concept now controlling, we must adhere to our opinion that we may not look into the statement of facts in the instant case to discover fundamental error.
Can we say that the record before us presents a jurisdictional question? Appellant says that it does and points to the strong language used by Justice Gaines in East Line & Red River R. Co. v. Culberson, 68 Tex. 664, 5 S.W. 820. However, in that case the defendant raised the question of nonjoinder in the trial court by a motion in arrest of judgment and in a motion for new trial, so fundamental error was not involved.
We do not agree with appellant. In the later case of Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lilly, 23 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Opinion adopted by Supreme Court) it is said:
“There is a vast difference between jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. The power to hear and decide, which is jurisdiction, includes the power to decide wrong as well as right. In this connection it may be conceded that the judgment awarding the item of costs against the partially successful appellant to the county court was wrong and in violation of the statute. Nevertheless the county court had the power, in the sense of jurisdiction, to render the judgment he did.”
In Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 12 S.W. 828, 829 there is this statement:
“It has been decided that, where the objection for non-joinder is made at *490proper time, the suit should be abated until proper parties are joined in the action, either as actual parties, or included by proper allegations in the benefit of the action, ( [Houston & Texas C.] Railway Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31; [Galveston, H. & S. A.] Railway Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189.)” (Emphasis ours).
The view above expressed finds support in an opinion of this Court. In St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W. 696, 698, Justice Talbot, speaking for the Court, said:
“A fundamental error is one apparent upon the face of the record. The affidavits referred to constitute no part of the record in this cause, and the fact, if it be a fact, that the deceased, John Anderson, left his father surviving him not appearing from the record, the error charged and sought here to be assigned is not fundamental. The matter called to the attention of the court in the assignment is not jurisdictional, but a nonjoinder of parties, * * * . Nor did appellant, by plea in abatement or by any form of objection whatever, complain of the nonjoinder of the father, and suggest or urge that the suit be arrested until he was made a party or included by proper averments in the benefit of the action.” (Emphasis ours.)
In the case now before us appellant did not, by plea in abatement, or by any form of objection whatever complain in the trial court of the nonjoinder of the parents of Thomas H. Stevens.
Tex-Jersey Oil Corp. v. Beck, 157 Tex. 541, 305 S.W.2d 162, 165, 68 A.L.R.2d 1062 was a case in which there was no mention in the pleadings or the evidence of the existence or a non-existence of the decedent’s father. Justice Calvert, writing the opinion then went on to say:
“The question was not raised by plea in abatement, special exception, or other pleading or motion in the trial court.”
Here the 101st District Court of Dallas County, Texas, certainly had jurisdiction of the subject matter of this suit. Perhaps, as appellant claims there was a non-joinder of parties. But as we see it the non-joinder of parties, not disclosed on the face of the record, is not a fatal jurisdictional defect as contemplated by our Supreme Court in considering fundamental error.
Lastly, this case is not one of general public interest as contemplated in our Supreme Court holdings in regard to fundamental error. In Ramsey v. Dunlop, supra, an election contest was involved — certainly a matter of public interest. It is true that- we are concerned here with the proper application of a statute. Art. 4675, V.A.C.S. In a broad sense all statutes and their proper application are matters of public interest. But we believe that in the limited sense intended by our Supreme Court with reference to fundamental error, this is not a case of “general public interest” as was the Ramsey case, for instance. The case of Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lilly, supra, also involved the application of a statute, but a claim of fundamental error was overruled.
In his motion for rehearing appellant again complains that special issue No. 2 was not submitted in proper form. Since we did not in our original opinion quote the issue in full we do so now:
“SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 2. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the motivating influence of Defendant, Carl B. Schafer, in transporting Thomas H. Stevens in the automobile at the time and on the occasion of the collision in question was the furtherance of a business deal in which the defendant, Carl B. Schafer, had the expectation of tangible benefit of pecuniary nature. Answer “yes” or “no” ANSWER: YES.” (Emphasis ours.)
*491Among other things appellant charges the issue as drawn does not restrict the jury’s consideration to the proper time element with reference to when “the furtherance of a business deal” was involved. Appellant argues that part of the time Stevens and appellant were together they were not engaged in “the furtherance of a business deal,” but were merely engaged in a social meeting, during which latter time the Guest Statute would apply.
We do not agree with appellant. The phrase “at the time and on the occasion of the collision in question” clearly confines the jury to a consideration of the purpose of their being together at the time of the fatal collision.
We have carefully considered all the points raised in appellant’s motion for rehearing. We are of the opinion that all of them should be overruled.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.