Court Opinion

ID: 9693901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:09:28.263993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:54.343682
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals
                                NO. 2022-CA-1046-MR

PAUL E. TAYLOR                                                         APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 17-CR-00613

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND JONES, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Paul Everett Taylor appeals from the denial of his

Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42 motion in which he alleged

ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that the trial court erred in not

appointing him counsel to assist him during a RCr 11.42 hearing. We find that the

trial court did err in this case, but that it was harmless error.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                      On April 10, 2017, parole officer Courtney Turpin
               received an anonymous “community complaint phone
               call” alleging that Taylor had been selling heroin at his
               residence. The caller specifically alleged that her family
               member had died after using heroin purchased from
               Taylor. Officer Turpin and another parole officer, Roger
               Copher, went to Taylor’s residence to perform a home
               visit.

                      When they arrived, the officers observed two men
               standing by the mailbox and a woman cleaning a glass
               window near the front door. Both officers testified that
               they believed the woman was Taylor’s wife. As they
               approached, they heard someone say, “P.O.’s here.” The
               officers then heard Taylor’s voice respond, “Who?” As
               they neared the front door, the officers observed Taylor
               go down a hallway and toward the back of the home in a
               “jogging” manner. After the officers knocked on the
               front door, an unknown man exited the house, and the
               woman told the officers that they could enter the home.[1]

                     After entering the home, multiple items of
               suspected contraband were found. A search warrant was
               eventually secured, and a full search of the home was
               conducted. Discussion of the details of those searches is
               unnecessary, as the only issue before us today is whether
               the parole officers’ entry into the home was lawful. The
               searches of the home produced multiple bags of heroin,
               as well as digital scales, an iPhone 6s, over $18,000.00 in
               currency, and bags of synthetic marijuana.

                     Taylor filed a motion to suppress the evidence
               found in the home as fruits of an illegal entry into the
               home. The trial court held a suppression hearing at
               which Parole Officers Turpin and Copher, as well as

1
 The issue of consent is part of this current appeal. Appellant claims that his wife did not give
consent to the officers to enter the residence.

                                                -2-
              Lexington Police Detective Danny Page, testified. Near
              the conclusion of the suppression hearing, defense
              counsel conceded that there was reasonable suspicion to
              search the residence once the officers were inside.
              However, counsel contested the validity of the alleged
              consent to enter the home, the existence of reasonable
              suspicion, and the validity of the anonymous phone call
              that prompted the home visit.

              ...

                     The trial court denied the suppression motion
              without entering any written findings of fact or
              conclusions of law. The court’s oral ruling denying the
              motion was on the basis that the officers received consent
              to enter the residence. The trial court also found that
              even if the parole officers had not received valid consent,
              they had reasonable suspicion to enter and search the
              residence.[2]

Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000343-MR, 2019 WL 6973775, at *1-2

(Ky. Dec. 19, 2019).

              Taylor eventually entered a conditional guilty plea to various drug

related charges in which he reserved the right to appeal the motion to suppress

issue. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Taylor’s conviction and held that

the wife’s consent allowed the officers to enter the home without a search warrant.

2
 See the recent case of Gasaway v. Commonwealth, No. 2021-SC-0457-DG, 2023 WL 4037377
(Ky. Jun. 15, 2023), for a thorough discussion regarding reasonable suspicion to search a
parolee’s property. This case has been designated as to be published, but at the time of this
opinion, it had not yet received a South Western Reporter citation.

                                             -3-
             On May 8, 2020, Taylor filed the underlying RCr 11.42 motion

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Multiple issues were raised, but we are

only concerned with the allegation that, during the suppression motion hearing,

Taylor’s trial attorney was ineffective when he did not present a security camera

recording of Taylor’s arrest and did not have Taylor’s wife testify as to whether

she gave consent to the officers to enter the residence. Taylor also requested that

he be appointed an attorney to help with his motion.

             The trial court granted the request for an attorney and appointed the

Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) to assist Taylor. The DPA reviewed the

case, but believed it was not a case that a “reasonable person with adequate means

would be willing to bring at his or her own expense,” Kentucky Revised Statutes

(KRS) 31.110(2)(c), and moved to withdraw from the case. The trial court granted

the DPA’s motion over Taylor’s objection. Taylor later made another motion for

counsel, but that too was denied.

             The trial court later granted a hearing as to two issues raised in the

RCr 11.42 motion: whether counsel was ineffective for failing to produce a video

recording of the arrest and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to have

Taylor’s wife testify as to the consent to enter issue. Upon being granted the

hearing, Taylor again asked for counsel. This request was also denied. The

                                         -4-
hearing took place on July 19, 2022. During the hearing, Taylor again requested

an attorney, but this request was denied.

             Taylor, his wife, and his trial attorney all testified, with the trial judge

asking questions of the individuals. Taylor’s wife testified that she did not give the

officers consent to enter the home and was not present in the courtroom on the day

of the suppression motion hearing. She also testified that the security camera that

caught the arrest on video automatically erases video after ninety days; therefore,

there was no video available. Taylor’s trial counsel testified that the consent issue

was not raised by the Commonwealth in any discovery prior to the suppression

hearing and he was surprised when the parole officers testified about being given

consent to enter. He testified that had he known consent to enter was an issue, he

would have had Taylor’s wife present at the hearing. Counsel also testified that

neither Taylor nor his wife mentioned the existence of the security camera video

before or after the suppression hearing.

             The trial court overruled Taylor’s RCr 11.42 motion and this appeal

followed.

                                     ANALYSIS

             The only issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in

denying Taylor counsel once it decided to hold an evidentiary hearing. We believe

the trial court did err. RCr 11.42(5) states that if there is a question raised in a RCr

                                            -5-
11.42 motion that cannot be answered solely from the face of the record, “the court

shall grant a prompt hearing and, if the movant is without counsel of record and if

financially unable to employ counsel, shall upon specific written request by the

movant appoint counsel to represent the movant in the proceeding, including

appeal.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, case law states that “[i]f an evidentiary

hearing is required, counsel must be appointed to represent the movant if he/she is

indigent and specifically requests such appointment in writing.” Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted).

             Here, the trial court appointed counsel to Taylor at the outset, but

allowed the DPA to withdraw from representation pursuant to KRS 31.110(2)(c).

KRS 31.110(2)(c) states in pertinent part:

             if the department and the court of competent jurisdiction
             determines that it is not a proceeding that a reasonable
             person with adequate means would be willing to bring at
             his or her own expense, there shall be no further right to
             be represented by counsel under the provisions of this
             chapter.

KRS 31.110(2) states that the DPA can withdraw from the case, but that the

decision should be made in conjunction with the trial court. In addition, the DPA’s

motion to withdraw indicated that it would remain on the case if the court believed

it should. We believe that when the trial court found that an evidentiary hearing

was necessary, it implicitly found that a “reasonable person with adequate means

                                         -6-
would be willing to” bring the RCr 11.42 motion. This necessitated the

appointment of counsel to Taylor pursuant to RCr 11.42(5) and Fraser, supra.

             Failing to appoint counsel to assist Taylor with the evidentiary hearing

was an error; however, a “RCr 11.42 proceeding is not a direct appeal with a

constitutional right to an attorney.” Commonwealth v. Stamps, 672 S.W.2d 336,

339 (Ky. 1984) (citation omitted). As there is no constitutional right to an attorney

in a RCr 11.42 proceeding, it is subject to harmless error analysis.

             No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
             evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order, or
             in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the
             parties, is ground for granting a new trial or for setting
             aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise
             disturbing a judgment or order unless it appears to the
             court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent
             with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
             proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the
             proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of
             the parties.

RCr 9.24.

             We conclude that the failure to appoint counsel to represent Taylor for

the evidentiary hearing was harmless error. First, the two issues that were reserved

for the hearing, the consent to enter and the security video, were discussed and

relevant testimony was presented by Ms. Taylor and Taylor’s trial counsel. In

addition, the consent issue was not the only reason the motion to suppress was

denied. The trial court also held that there was reasonable suspicion that criminal

                                         -7-
activity was going on at Taylor’s house; therefore, the parole officers were entitled

to enter the residence even without consent.3 This means that the defense’s lack of

evidence countering the consent issue did not overly prejudice Taylor during the

suppression hearing. In other words, Taylor’s motion to suppress would have still

been denied absent consent to enter.

                                     CONCLUSION

              Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did err in not

appointing counsel to Taylor once an evidentiary hearing was ordered; however,

we believe this was harmless error under the circumstances of this case. We

affirm.

              ACREE, JUDGE, CONCURS.

              JONES, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND DOES NOT FILE SEPARATE
OPINION.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Andrea Reed                                    Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                            Attorney General of Kentucky

                                               Jenny L. Sanders
                                               Assistant Attorney General
                                               Frankfort, Kentucky

3
 Parolees are entitled to less Fourth Amendment unreasonable search protections than the
average person. See Gasaway, supra.

                                             -8-