Court Opinion

ID: 9792666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:33:53.185052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.563766
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
From judgments in favor of defendants after trial before a jury in actions to recover damages (a) for the wrongful death of the son of David B. and Annie M. Higgins and (b) personal injuries to plaintiff William Edward Tice resulting from a collision between an automobile in which the deceased and injured were riding and an electric interurban street car owned and operated by the defendant corporation, plaintiffs appeal.
The essential facts are these:
August 4, 1936, Leonard Wright was driving an automobile in which William Edward Tice and John Arthur Higgins, the son of plaintiffs David B. and Annie M. Higgins, were riding. While crossing the defendant corporation’s right of way at Venice and Sepulveda Boulevards in the city of Los Angeles, the automobile was struck by an interurban car owned and operated by defendant corporation. Defendant Nordquist was the motorman of the car. As a result of the accident John Arthur Higgins died and William Edward Tice received serious personal injuries.
*75After the ease was tried and the jury instructed, counsel for the respective parties entered into a stipulation reading in part as follows:
“First, that in the absence of counsel the Court may, upon the request of the jury, bring the jury into Court and reread to the jury any instruction previously given, or may give any new instruction upon any matter that may be requested providing any such new instruction is in writing or taken down in shorthand.”
Subsequently, and while the jury were deliberating, the jurors requested additional instructions. The bailiff informed the clerk of the request, who contacted the trial judge by telephone. The trial judge gave an instruction to the clerk, which the latter wrote on a piece of paper and handed to the bailiff, who in turn delivered it to the jury.
This is the sole question necessary for us to determine:

Did the trial judge commit prejudicial error in giving an instruction to the jury out of court and out of the presence of the court?

This question must be answered in the affirmative. The law is established in California that it is prejudicial error to give additional instructions to a jury other than in open court, in the absence of a waiver of this right by the parties. (Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 8 Cal. (2d) 648, 655 [67 Pac. (2d) 682].) In the case cited our Supreme Court, in holding it to be reversible error to give instructions to the jury out of the presence of the court, thus states the rule at page 655:
“The remaining error charged was that the court communicated with the jury after their retirement by sending them a message by the bailiff and without the presence of counsel. This is an improper irregularity. Section 614 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that, if the jury desire further instruction, it shall be conducted into court and the information desired given in the presence of or after notice to counsel. Any other method of communication is held to go to the substance of the right of trial by jury and because of its nature is deemed to be prejudicial except in very exceptional circumstances. (Redman & Yontz v. Gulnac, 5 Cal. 148; Soukoian v. Cadillac Taxi Co., 68 Cal. App. 604 [229 Pac. 1015]; People v. Bruneman, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 75 [40 Pac. (2d) 891].)”
*76In the instant case it is true that counsel stipulated that in the absence of counsel the court might “bring the jury into court and . . . give any new instruction upon any matter that may be requested providing any such new instruction is in writing or taken down in shorthand”. However, the procedure .followed by the court herein did not conform to the stipulation of counsel, and there is nothing in their stipulation waiving their right to have the jury instructed in court according to the provisions of section 614 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Nor is the requirement that the procedure set forth in the code section be followed a so-called technical rule. It is a matter of common knowledge that counsel frequently stipulate that in their absence the trial judge may return the jury into open court and there give to them new and additional instructions, the purpose being to save the time of the court. It is also a matter of common knowledge in the legal profession that ordinarily, when such a stipulation is entered into, counsel either remain in the courtroom or leave a clerk or associate with instructions to communicate with them immediately, should the jury desire additional instructions, in order that they may be present and protect the rights of their client by either assisting the court in framing the instructions to be given, by proposing additional instructions, or objecting to instructions proposed by the opposing party or the court.
For the foregoing reasons in my opinion the judgments should be reversed and new trials ordered. •
A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on January 5, 1940, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:
THE COURT.
In their petition for rehearing, the plaintiffs urge this court to set forth in haec verba or in substance the instructions of which they complain. To do this fairly would necessitate the inclusion of the instructions as a whole, which comprise 49 pages of the transcript, and to consider their arguments fully would require a discussion of the authorities cited and the contentions made by plaintiffs with respect to the criticized instructions, which contentions cover some 48 pages of their opening brief. This would extend the opinion unduly.
*77In People v. Groves, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 317, 321 [49 Pac. (2d) 888, 50 Pac. (2d) 813], a similar request was made and in its order denying a rehearing this court set forth at length the reasons why the request should be denied. The reasons given in the Groves case are applicable to the present situation.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.
A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on February 8, 1940. Curtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a hearing.