Court Opinion

ID: 9895809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 18:04:15.649049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:48.841083
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 In re J.K. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re J.K. et al., Persons Coming                          B324983
Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                         (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                     Super. Ct.
AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                       No. 22CCJP01089A, B)

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

JONATHAN K.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tamara E. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
      Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly G. Emling, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Jonathan K. (father) appeals from a juvenile court order
sustaining a petition filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 3421 concerning his son J.K. (born September 2009)
and daughter C.K. (born April 2014), and denying his request for
custody of the children. Father argues the section 342 petition
should have been dismissed and the matter should be remanded
to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes.
We find no reversible error and affirm the orders.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family
       When the proceedings were initiated, J.K. and C.K. were
living in California with Ch.K. (mother).2 Father was living in
Michigan with his girlfriend and her four children.
Referral and investigation
       On February 28, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
alleging mother drank alcohol daily, smoked marijuana in front
of C.K., did not feed C.K. and left the child alone or with
homeless people. The caller further alleged mother drinks and
drives and does not provide for C.K.’s basic needs. The caller was
concerned for C.K.’s safety.
       A social worker interviewed C.K. at school on March 1,
2022. C.K. informed the social worker that she lived with her
mother and brother and that mother’s boyfriend “Uber”

1    All further unattributed statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2     Mother is not a party to this appeal.

                                 2
sometimes slept there. Though mother and Uber fight, C.K.
denied seeing any physical fighting in the home. C.K. reported
mother drinks beer and sometimes gets drunk, getting “a little
crazy” she would sometimes fall on the ground. (Boldface
omitted.) When mother would fall, C.K. would try to help her.
Mother also smoked inside the home. C.K. reported mother
sometimes gave her a “whooping” and hit her on the legs with a
belt.
       J.K. was interviewed at his middle school. He confirmed
that he resided with his mother and sister. J.K. had no concerns
about mother’s boyfriend and indicated he did not pay much
attention to mother’s life. He was unaware that mother drank.
       During mother’s interview at the family home, she reported
that maternal grandmother (MGM), although now clean, used to
be a “crack head” and that MGM’s boyfriends raped mother when
mother was young. Mother admitted she had a drinking
problem, stating that she would test positive for alcohol and
marijuana, which she did on March 1, 2022. Mother disclosed a
2021 conviction for driving under the influence, for which she was
attending classes. Mother said she moved to California from
Michigan due to violence to her inflicted by father.
       MGM told the social worker that mother was an alcoholic,
and mother’s boyfriend physically assaulted J.K. MGM
explained that J.K. would not report the events in the home to
police or social workers because mother threatened to have him
sent to juvenile hall. MGM tried to keep C.K. away from
mother’s home as much as possible because mother and her
boyfriend were always fighting. MGM believed mother’s
boyfriend was a drug dealer, had a gun, and had recently served
a five-year prison sentence. Maternal aunt (MA) said she had

                                3
concerns for years about mother’s drinking. There had been
times when there was no food at home and the children came to
her to eat. MA further shared there had been times when
mother’s boyfriend and J.K. fought, and the police had been
called. MA reported mother was frequently in physical
altercations with her boyfriend.
      Mother’s boyfriend was unwilling to drug test and stated
the matter had nothing to do with him. Two neighbors reported
hearing loud bangs and fighting between mother and her
boyfriend. DCFS became aware that boyfriend had a case with
DCFS concerning his seven-year-old son, based on the boyfriend’s
domestic violence and substance abuse. The boyfriend failed to
reunify with his son.
      A school social worker reported J.K. had serious attendance
and behavior problems at school. The counselor would often see
J.K. in the lunchroom being inappropriately physical with other
students. School staff would correct the behavior only to have it
repeated. J.K. was having trouble following rules and procedures
at school.
      DCFS spoke with father in Michigan by phone. Father said
he spoke to the children by phone daily, but it had been a long
time since he had seen them. Father had no concerns regarding
mother’s alcohol use and said if there was an issue, he would fly
to California to get his kids. Father had no issues with mother
except she left Michigan with the children without his consent
while he was incarcerated. Father said he helps support the
children financially. Though not working, father said he was
looking for work. Father admitted to a long history with law
enforcement but was looking to change. Father’s girlfriend, A.S.,
told DCFS father lived with her and her four children. Paternal

                               4
grandmother indicated that mother exhibited a drinking problem
while living in Michigan.
       Michigan child welfare reported an incident in 2017 when
C.K. was found unsupervised in a hallway by a neighbor.
       Police records logged 10 telephone calls to the police
regarding mother’s home between 2019 and 2021, for complaints
including felony spousal abuse, child welfare check, battery,
family disturbance, restraining order violation, attempted
suicide, and arguments.
Removal and section 300 petition
       On March 17, 2022, the juvenile court authorized removal
of the children from mother pursuant to a protective custody
warrant. The children were detained with MGM.
       On March 23, 2022, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
alleging that mother physically abused C.K. and abused alcohol
and marijuana, which subjected the children to risk of harm.
       On March 29, 2022, DCFS provided a last minute
information for the court indicating that J.K. did not want to
move to Michigan to be with his father and wanted to stay in
California.
       On March 29, 2022, the juvenile court detained the children
from both parents. The court explained that even though father
was nonoffending and noncustodial, by requesting custody DCFS
had met its burden of showing release to father’s custody would
be detrimental to the children. The court described the evidence
of detriment as a “totality of the factors,” including uprooting the
children, then seven and 12 years old, from the only life they
have known, to place them with their father, who they did not
know and had not seen in over four years. Further, the court
noted the children had a bond with MGM and father’s criminal

                                 5
history included possession of firearms and a potential history of
domestic violence with mother. The court also noted father’s
girlfriend had a history with child protective services in
Michigan. Based on that the court found it would be detrimental
to the children to uproot them and have them live with father in
Michigan.
Subsequent reports
       J.K. reported to DCFS that his biggest concern was
mother’s drinking. He added mother had told him her boyfriend
hit her, and the boyfriend once chased J.K. through the
apartment and hit him. J.K. said father called frequently after
he was released from prison, but J.K. was “not close” to father.
       C.K. reported mother had fallen at a store due to her
drinking, and mother and her boyfriend smoked weed in C.K.’s
presence. C.K. said father used to call every day until they
moved in with MGM. C.K. did not want to live with father. She
felt safe with MGM or mother, provided mother’s boyfriend was
not there.
       Father told the social worker he was serving a four-year
sentence in Ohio when mother moved the children to California.
He had been convicted of unlawful possession of a vehicle,
possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a firearm.
Father said he sent J.K. a cash card when J.K. had no food.
Father was in arrears on child support.
Amended section 300 petition and adjudication
       On April 13, 2022, DCFS filed a first amended section 300
petition. The amendments added allegations that father knew or
should have known of mother’s substance abuse and failed to
protect the children, and father was unable to provide
appropriate parental care and supervision. The amendments

                                6
also added allegations regarding mother and mother’s male
companion.
       The adjudication hearing on the amended petition took
place on April 25, 2022. Father testified that he called the
children every day or every other day and sent them money.
Father had not seen the children in person since they left
Michigan as he was not allowed to leave the state, and neither
mother nor MGM were amendable to having the children visit
him. Father was in compliance with his probation but had
warrants for child support. He was convicted of domestic violence
against mother years ago but had participated in anger
management, cognitive thinking and substance abuse classes
while incarcerated. Father served four years in custody for
assault (2015 to 2019) and one year in custody for possession of a
firearm (2020 to 2021).
       After hearing argument the juvenile court sustained
allegations concerning mother’s substance abuse, physical abuse
of C.K., sibling abuse as to J.K., and mother’s failure to protect
the children from mother’s companion’s violence. All allegations
pertaining to father were stricken and dismissed.
       The juvenile court proceeded directly to disposition, hearing
testimony from father and father’s girlfriend regarding the
children potentially moving to Michigan to live with them. The
matter was continued to April 27, 2022.
       On April 27, 2022, DCFS provided last minute information
for the court detailing father’s physical abuse of mother as
follows: Father had just been released from a reentry program,
and he and mother were no longer in a relationship. Father came
to mother’s home and threw her cell phone after seeing messages
on it. Mother yelled at him to leave, and father put her in a

                                 7
choke hold to keep her from screaming. Father was picked up by
the police, and a stay away order issued. A couple of days later
he was released from jail and returned to mother’s home late at
night. Neighbors called the police, and father was arrested for
violating the stay away order. At trial father was convicted.
Mother reported other incidents of domestic violence that had not
been reported to the police. In one incident, when mother was
seven months pregnant with C.K., father pushed her and she
landed on her stomach. Father ripped a screen off the wall that
landed on mother while she was lying there. When father
finished beating her, he urinated on her in front of J.K., saying,
“look at your mom, she is so pathetic.”
       The disposition hearing was continued to June 1, 2022.
Section 342 petition
       On May 31, 2022, DCFS filed a section 342 petition on
behalf of the children.3 The section 342 petition contained the
following allegation as to father:
       “The children[’s] . . . father . . . has a long history of violent
criminal convictions dating from 2008-2020 including felony
convictions for assault, and domestic violence related convictions.
The father is currently on federal probation as of January 2022
due to his criminal history. Said conduct, criminal history and
acts by the father impairs [sic] his ability to adequately parent
and protect the children, maintain a suitable, safe and stable
home, and places the children at substantial risk of harm.”

3     Section 342 permits DCFS to file a subsequent petition
after a minor has been found to be a person described by section
300, alleging new facts or circumstances other than those under
which the original petition was sustained.

                                    8
       DCFS filed a last minute information for the court on
June 1, 2022, setting forth father’s criminal history as follows:
2009—assault and battery (60 days’ custody); 2009—disorderly
person/disturbing the peace (60 days’ custody); 2009—firearm
discharge in a building, possession of marijuana with intent to
deliver, possession of cocaine, less than 25 grams (20 months to
four years’ custody); 2011—unlawful use of motor vehicle, four
years’ probation (365 days’ custody); 2012—breaking and
entering without owner’s permission (90 days’ custody); 2013—
domestic violence (12 months’ probation, 93 days’ custody);
2015—attempted controlled substance delivery/manufacture (12
months’ custody); 2016—felonious assault (three years’ custody,
three years’ postrelease supervision); 2016—domestic violence
involving a woman with whom father had a one year-old child,
second offense (12 months’ custody); 2016—possession of cocaine,
heroin or narcotic under 25 grams (five years’ probation, time
served); 2020—failure to obey court officer and unlawful
transportation of a firearm, which resulted in federal supervision.
The filing also reflected arrests in 2020 for assault and domestic
violence; strong-arm robbery; carrying a concealed weapon and
violation of a preliminary injunctive order. Father’s federal
supervision included drug treatment and testing, a mental health
evaluation and mental health treatment. Father provided no
evidence to DCFS that he was in compliance with these
requirements.
Father’s request for dismissal and demurrer
       On June 1, 2022, father requested the section 342 petition
be dismissed, arguing the section 342 petition presented no new
information, as DCFS knew father had a significant criminal
record. The juvenile court denied father’s request, finding the

                                9
petition presented information not contained in previous reports
from DCFS. The court compared the new allegations with
previous statements regarding father’s criminal history and
concluded “on its face there appears to be new facts that were not
known to [DCFS].”
       Father filed a demurrer the same date. The court set a
hearing for June 15, 2022.
       On June 15, father’s counsel argued that the section 342
petition was inappropriate under California Rules of Court, rule
5.560(b), which requires new information, and father’s criminal
history was not new as it had been discussed and documented
throughout the proceedings. DCFS argued that the specifics
alleged in the section 342 petition were initially inaccessible to
them because they were from out of state and investigation was
required. Further father had minimized his criminal history.
The juvenile court agreed and overruled the demurrer.
       On August 26, 2022, DCFS filed a last minute information
for the court indicating father had failed to provide DCFS with
proof of his participation in any services.
Adjudication
       On August 26, 2022, the adjudication of the section 342
petition was held. Following argument, the juvenile court
sustained the petition. The court ordered the parents to comply
with the case plans previously ordered with respect to the section
300 petition.
       The court proceeded to disposition, where the children were
ordered removed from the parents and suitably placed with
MGM, with reunification services for both parents, monitored in-
person visits, and unmonitored telephone calls and virtual visits
for father.

                               10
Facts pertaining to ICWA
       DCFS filed a form ICWA–010(A) with the initial petition on
March 23, 2022. The form indicated DCFS had inquired of the
parents about the children’s Indian status and that the parents
gave no reason to believe that the children were Indian children.
The detention report also indicated that on March 1, 2022,
mother denied having any Native American ancestry, and on
March 2, 2022, father too denied having any Native American
ancestry. The detention report noted that in a 2017 Michigan
child welfare investigation mother and father both denied the
children were eligible for membership in any American Indian
tribe.
       On March 28, 2022, both parents filled out ICWA–020
forms marking the selection “[n]one of the above” as to any
applicable Indian ancestry.
       At the detention hearing on March 29, 2022, the juvenile
court instructed: “To the mother and father, although you have
indicated that you have no knowledge of any Indian ancestry,
please, inquire of all your relatives. And if you learn that there’s
a possibility of Indian ancestry, if you can provide that
information to the social worker and to your lawyer so that the
Department can make contact and do further investigation with
respect to possible Indian ancestry. Do you understand . . . ?”
Both parents responded affirmatively.
       The minute orders from the March 29, 2022 detention
hearing stated, “The Court does not have a reason to know that
this is an Indian child, as defined under ICWA, and does not
order notice to any tribe or the BIA. Parents are to keep the
Department, their Attorney and the Court aware of any new
information relating to possible ICWA status. ICWA–020, the

                                11
Parental Notification of Indian Status is signed and filed. . . . [¶]
Parents to make DCFS aware of any information re possible
ICWA ancestry. DCFS is to follow up in [sic] parent’s [sic]
information.”
      In an interview on April 6, 2022, father again told DCFS he
did not have Native American ancestry.
      DCFS filed a request for judicial notice in this appeal,
which includes a status review report in the case dated
February 24, 2023.4 In it DCFS indicates on September 26, 2022,
a DCFS social worker spoke to MA, who denied knowledge of any
Native American ancestry. On October 11, 2022, the social
worker spoke with MGM, who also denied any knowledge of
Native American ancestry.
Notice of appeal
      Father filed a timely notice of appeal on September 21,
2022.

                          DISCUSSION
I.    Section 342 petition
      Father argues the section 342 petition should have been
dismissed because evidence of father’s criminal history did not
support a finding of current risk of substantial harm to the
children.5 As set forth below, we find father’s extensive criminal

4     The request for judicial notice also contains information
regarding J.K.’s arrest for possession of a loaded gun, J.K.’s
probation report, and documentation of a protective custody
warrant for J.K., who was missing from his caregiver. The
request for judicial notice is granted.
5     We may consider the merits of father’s appeal although
jurisdiction over the children is based solely on the court’s

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history, which includes acts of violence against mother, provided
sufficient evidence to sustain the section 342 petition.
       A.      Applicable law and standard of review
       Section 342, subdivision (a), provides that a petitioner shall
file a subsequent petition when a child has been found to be
described by section 300, and the petitioner alleges new facts or
circumstances other than those under which the original petition
was sustained. The trial court must “determine whether newly
alleged facts or circumstances establish jurisdiction independent
of facts alleged in the section 300 petition.” (In re Travis C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225.) “All procedures and hearings
required for an original petition are applicable to a subsequent
petition . . . .” (§ 342, subd. (b).)
       Because the section 342 petition contained allegations that
J.K. and C.K. were children described by section 300, subdivision
(b), we look to the applicable standards for assumption of juvenile
court jurisdiction under that section. Section 300, subdivision
(b)(1) provides that a juvenile court may assume jurisdiction if
the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of any of the
following: the failure or inability of the child’s parent to
adequately supervise or protect the child; the willful or negligent
failure of the child’s parent to adequately protect the child from
the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left;
the willful or negligent failure of the parent to provide the child
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or the

findings regarding mother’s conduct where, as here, the outcome
of the appeal could mean the difference between father being an
“‘“offending” parent versus a “non-offending” parent.’” (In re
Quentin H. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 608, 613.)

                                 13
inability of the parent to provide regular care for the child due to
the parent’s mental illness, developmental disability, or
substance abuse.
       “‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of
current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm.’” (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
795, 805.) Despite section 300’s requirement that the child be
subject to a risk of harm at the time of the proceeding, “the court
need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the
child.” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216.)
“The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child
presently needs the court’s protection.” (Ibid.) A parent’s past
conduct may be probative in this analysis. (Ibid.)
       “‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.”’” (In re
I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) We must “‘“review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that

                                 14
a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is
appropriate].”’” (Ibid.)
      B.     The evidence supports the juvenile court’s
             determination that father’s conduct put the
             children at risk of serious physical harm
      Father’s criminal conduct included physical violence,
including two episodes of domestic violence. Father was arrested
as recently as 2020 for domestic violence and assault. Father
was last released from custody in 2021 and did not provide DCFS
with confirmation of his compliance with the conditions for his
release, which included drug treatment and mental health
treatment.
      The juvenile court reasonably inferred from these facts that
the children would be at risk of harm if placed with father. There
was evidence in the record father had engaged in domestic
violence in the presence of J.K. Such violent behavior in the
home places children at risk. “The mere ‘[e]xposure to domestic
violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding’” under
section 300, subdivision (b), even where the child who witnessed
such behavior was not injured. (In re L.O. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
227, 239.) Mother’s testimony that father had pushed her,
urinated on her, and demeaned her in front of J.K. was sufficient
to warrant jurisdiction where there was no evidence in the record
that father had completed any programs or understood the
negative impact of this behavior. On the contrary, the record
suggests father’s violent acts had continued both in and out of the
home. Under the circumstances, the juvenile court reasonably
concluded father’s behavior placed the children at risk of harm.
      Father acknowledges that evidence of past conduct may be
probative of current conditions. (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41

                                15
Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) However, father argues DCFS must
show a nexus between the past conduct and the current risk of
harm. (In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583.) Father
argues that his incarceration and criminal record do not support
a finding of a substantial, current risk of harm to the children.
Father cites In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767 (J.N.) as
support for his argument. In J.N., “the sole evidentiary basis for
the jurisdictional finding as to Father” was “his incarceration and
criminal record.” (Id. at p. 775.) The J.N. court acknowledged “it
is possible that evidence of a parent’s violent criminal record
could support a reasonable inference of risk to the parent’s child,”
but found the evidence in the record before it did not. (Ibid.) The
J.N. court explained: “Nothing in the record suggests any of
Father’s crimes were against children or involved children. The
record also does not support that Father’s criminal conduct ever
placed J.N. in danger during the approximately two years he
appears to have been involved in J.N.’s life. And although DCFS
may be correct that Father exposing J.N. to his criminal ways
could put J.N. at risk, the record does not provide any
nonspeculative basis for the court to conclude that Father is
likely to do so.” (Ibid.) Significantly, in J.N., the father “was not
convicted of any crime involving domestic violence,” and although
there had been a single allegation of domestic violence in the
past, it was determined to be inconclusive. (Id. at p. 776.)6

6      The J.N. court also noted that its “conclusion that Father’s
criminal history did not put J.N. at risk . . . is further bolstered
by the fact that Father was not even eligible for parole until more
than two years after” the time of the jurisdictional hearing.
(J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 776.)

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       Here, in contrast, father had more than one conviction for
domestic violence as well as a recent arrest for the crime.
Mother’s testimony that father subjected her to domestic violence
in front of J.K. suggests that the children would be at risk from
father’s behavior. These facts support the juvenile court’s
determination that release to father’s custody presented a
current risk of harm to the children.
II.    ICWA
       Father argues remand is required because certain maternal
and paternal relatives, including MGM, MA, and the paternal
grandmother, were not asked about the children’s possible Indian
heritage. This appeal is from the jurisdictional and dispositional
phase; therefore the matter is ongoing. Because DCFS and the
juvenile court have an ongoing duty to comply with ICWA and
related California law throughout the pendency of these
proceedings, remand is unnecessary.
       A.     Applicable law
       ICWA and related California statutes reflect the
Legislature’s intent “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families.”
(25 U.S.C. § 1902; see In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706,
fn. 3.) An “Indian child” is defined as any unmarried person
under the age of 18 who is either a member of an Indian tribe or
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a) & (b).)
       “Because it typically is not self-evident whether a child is
an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate certain

                                17
inquiries to be made in each case. These requirements are
sometimes collectively referred to as the duty of initial inquiry.”
(In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741
(Benjamin M.).) “The duty to inquire begins with the initial
contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting
child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information
that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The
court and child welfare department “have an affirmative and
continuing duty” to inquire whether a child for whom a petition
under section 300 may be or has been filed may be an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       Under California law, the child welfare department’s initial
duty of inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Under ICWA, the
term “extended family member” is “defined by the law or custom
of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or
custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen
and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or
second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
       The juvenile court must also inquire at each participant's
first appearance in court whether the participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.
(c).) In addition, the juvenile court must instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child. (Ibid.)

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       If the “initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child
is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make
that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e), italics
added.) [I]f that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to
inquire at the first appearance whether anyone ‘knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id., subd. (d)
[defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child
is an Indian child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a
‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child as defined under
§ 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.)
       We review a juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the
substantial evidence test, “‘which requires us to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the court’s
ICWA finding.” (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 777,
review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) Even if substantial
evidence does not support the juvenile court’s ICWA findings, we
may not reverse unless we find that error was prejudicial. (Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 13; Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 742.)
       B.     No error occurred
       The ICWA investigation is ongoing in the present matter.
As evidenced by DCFS’s request for judicial notice, two of the
three individuals father mentioned in his briefing have since
been asked about Indian ancestry.
       Although the juvenile court made an initial finding that
ICWA does not apply in this case, it retains the power and duty

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to subsequently change that finding if new information gives the
court reason to believe that the subject children are Indian
children. (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 176.) Thus, “an
ICWA appeal at the jurisdiction and disposition stage” is
premature “where there will necessarily be further dependency
proceedings in the juvenile court (at which continuing ICWA
duties apply) and a basis for later appeal if for some reason the
remedial ICWA investigation [DCFS] is now undertaking falls
short.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 638.)
      Based on the evidence provided thus far in the proceedings,
the juvenile court did not err in making its preliminary
determination that ICWA was inapplicable. Because the record
before us makes clear the ICWA investigation was ongoing below,
should it become known, or should there be reason to know, that
the children are Indian children, the notice requirement will be
activated, and the relevant tribes will need to be notified. The
jurisdictional and dispositional findings regarding father need
not be reversed in order to direct the juvenile court and DCFS “to
do something they recognize they must do anyway.” (In re S.H.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.)

                         DISPOSITION
      The orders are affirmed.

                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

LUI, P. J.                          HOFFSTADT, J.

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