Court Opinion

ID: 9694503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:44:24.731675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:36.217155
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Fully aware that there are circumstances where an individual may invoke equity to abate a nuisance, I believe the majority greatly overstates the historical availability of an *178action in equity to challenge a use of property alleged to be in violation of a zoning ordinance.
In Burne v. Kearney, 424 Pa. 29, 31-32, 225 A.2d 892, 893-94 (1967), we noted “the general rule that zoning ordinances provide adequate procedural remedies for testing their validity and application and that equity will not lie in such field.” We recognized, however, that courts had “permitted equity to lie in certain restricted and limited situations and, to that extent, have engrafted an exception on the general rule.” Id. (Emphasis added.) The majority, however, turns this general rule on its head, stating that
[wjhere deliberate violations of a zoning ordinance have the effect of wrongfully infringing on the property rights of a neighbor, that neighbor is entitled to prompt vindication in a court of equity without regard to alternate administrative remedies that might be available,
at 948. Despite the absence of supporting citations for this “principle” (which is not surprising since the “principle” is manufactured out of whole cloth), the majority brazenly states that “[w]e have always so held and we continue to do so.” Id. Burne v. Kearney is expediently overruled, although even the casual observer will wonder why this would be necessary if “we have always held” the principle announced by the majority today.
Burne v. Kearney is instructive on the limits of the reach of equity: “as a prerequisite to the attachment of equity jurisdiction, the adjoining or neighboring property owner must aver — and later prove — that the alleged violation of the zoning ordinance has resulted in an injury not common to all the neighboring property owners but 'special and peculiar’ to his property.” Id., 424 Pa. at 32, 225 A.2d at 894. Further, “diminution in value of a property per se, does not equate the requisite 'special and peculiar’ injury to property.” Id., 424 Pa. at 33 n. 4, 225 A.2d at 894 n. 4. Nothing in our Leopardi decision, quoted so extensively by the majority, necessitates or even suggests a change in this longstanding rule. Indeed, our Leopardi opinion contained the qualification that enforcement by an aggrieved individu*179al includes “in appropriate circumstances” an action in equity, citing, among others, Burne v. Kearney.
In this case, the complaint alleged only that “the Plaintiff has sustained irreparable damage in that the value of the Frye Property has been materially diminished and in that the Plaintiff has been prevented from successfully marketing said property____” Complaint, U 48. I find this insufficient as a matter of law to invoke the court’s equity jurisdiction sought to enforce the zoning ordinance. I would affirm the order of Commonwealth Court.
CAPPY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.