Court Opinion

ID: 9897945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:16.713498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:49.331057
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                DIVISION ONE
                     Respondent,
                                                No. 84012-6-I
              v.
                                                OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
 ALFONSO V. SENIOR JR.,

                     Appellant.

      DWYER, J. — Alfonso Senior Jr. appeals from the judgment and sentence

entered on resentencing following his conviction by jury verdict of second degree

murder with a firearm enhancement. On appeal, Senior asserts that the

resentencing court erred by imposing the requirement that he register as a felony

firearm offender. This is so, he contends, because RCW 9.41.330, which

mandates the imposition of the registration requirement, was not in effect when

he committed the offense.

      We conclude that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the

mandate that the sentencing court impose the registration requirement applies

only when the offender was convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after

June 9, 2016. See RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). Senior was convicted of the pertinent

offense on November 10, 2011, several years prior to the effective date of the
No. 84012-6-I/2

statute. Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to strike the firearm

registration requirement from the judgment and sentence.1

                                                  I

        On November 10, 2011, Alfonso Senior Jr. was found guilty by jury verdict

of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement.2 Senior’s offender score,

as calculated at sentencing, included out-of-state convictions for possession of a

controlled substance. Thus, Senior moved for resentencing following our

Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521

(2021), which invalidated our state’s strict liability drug possession statute.

        At the resentencing hearing, the State advised the court that it was

required by statute to impose the felony firearm registration requirement as part

of Senior’s judgment and sentence. The resentencing court determined that it

was mandated to impose the requirement pursuant to RCW 9.41.330(3). The

court thus ordered Senior to register as a felony firearm offender.

        Senior appeals.

                                                  II

        Senior contends that the resentencing court erred by imposing in the

judgment and sentence the requirement that he register as a felony firearm

         1 Senior raises additional claims of error that are resolved in the unpublished portion of

this opinion.
         2 Senior was additionally convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. However,

because that conviction was premised on prior convictions for possession of a controlled
substance, it was vacated on resentencing following our Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).

                                                  2
No. 84012-6-I/3

offender. We agree.3 The plain language of the statute mandates that the

sentencing court impose the registration requirement when an offender is

convicted of a felony firearm offense on or after June 9, 2016. The conviction for

which the registration requirement was imposed on Senior occurred several

years prior to the effective date of the statute. Accordingly, the resentencing

court was not authorized to impose the registration requirement.

        The meaning of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.

Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)

(citing State v. Breazeale, 144 Wn.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001); State v.

J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001)). “Our primary duty in interpreting

a statute is to discern and implement legislative intent.” Johnson v. Recreational

Equip., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 939, 946, 247 P.3d 18 (2011). “If a statute’s meaning

is plain on its face, we must ‘give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of

legislative intent.’” Broughton Lumber Co. v. BNSF Ry., 174 Wn.2d 619, 627,

278 P.3d 173 (2012) (quoting Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9-10). “To

determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the

context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the

statutory scheme as a whole.’” State v. Donaghe, 172 Wn.2d 253, 262, 256 P.3d

1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281

(2005)).

        3 Senior’s counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration

requirement. We exercise our discretion pursuant to RAP 2.5(a) to consider this claim of error on
the merits.

                                                3
No. 84012-6-I/4

       Washington’s felony firearm registration statute requires that “[a]ny adult

or juvenile residing, whether or not the person has a fixed residence, in this state

who has been required by a court to comply with the registration requirements of

this section shall personally register with the county sheriff for the county of the

person’s residence.” RCW 9.41.333. Our state legislature first enacted the

statute in 2013. LAWS OF 2013, ch. 183, § 3. Once codified, it provided:

       On or after July 28, 2013, whenever a defendant in this state is
       convicted of a felony firearm offense or found not guilty by reason
       of insanity of any felony firearm offense, the court must consider
       whether to impose a requirement that the person comply with the
       registration requirements of RCW 9.41.333 and may, in its
       discretion, impose such a requirement.

Former RCW 9.41.330(1) (2013).

       In 2016, our legislature amended the statute to require the sentencing

court to impose the felony firearm registration requirement in certain

circumstances. RCW 9.41.330(3). Thus, pursuant to the current version of the

statute, the sentencing court must consider whether to impose the registration

requirement whenever an offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense but is

mandated to impose the requirement when the offense is committed “in

conjunction with” a particular listed offense. RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). As currently

codified, the statute provides:

       (1) On or after June 9, 2016, except as provided in subsection (3)
       of this section, whenever a defendant in this state is convicted of a
       felony firearm offense or found not guilty by reason of insanity of
       any felony firearm offense, the court must consider whether to
       impose a requirement that the person comply with the registration
       requirements of RCW 9.41.333 and may, in its discretion, impose
       such a requirement.
               ....

                                          4
No. 84012-6-I/5

               (3) When a person is convicted of a felony firearm offense or
        found not guilty by reason of insanity of any felony firearm offense
        that was committed in conjunction with any of the following
        offenses, the court must impose a requirement that the person
        comply with the registration requirements of RCW 9.41.333:
               (a) An offense involving sexual motivation;
               (b) An offense committed against a child under the age of
        eighteen; or
               (c) A serious violent offense.

RCW 9.41.330 (emphasis added).

        Senior asserts that the sentencing court erred by imposing the firearm

registration requirement on resentencing.4 We agree. By its plain language, the

statute requires that the court impose the registration requirement on sentencing,

and it permits the court to do so only when an offender is convicted of a firearm

offense “[o]n or after June 9, 2016.” RCW 9.41.330(1). Contrary to the State’s

assertion, the prospective language in subsection (1) applies not only to the

sentencing court’s discretionary imposition of the registration requirement, but

also to subsection (3), which mandates imposition of the registration requirement

when, as here, the offender is convicted of a felony firearm offense “in

conjunction with . . . [a] serious violent offense.” RCW 9.41.330(3)(c). A plain

reading of the statute indicates that the legislature included the language “except

as provided in subsection (3) of this section,” RCW 9.41.330(1), to distinguish

between circumstances in which the sentencing court may impose the

registration requirement and circumstances in which it must impose that

requirement. The State’s assertion that this language exempts subsection (3)

         4 Specifically, Senior contends that the court erroneously imposed the registration

requirement because he committed the pertinent offense prior to June 9, 2016. As we discuss
herein, the relevant date is the date of conviction, not the date on which the conduct underlying
that conviction occurred. See RCW 9.41.330(1), (3). Senior is nevertheless correct that the
resentencing court was without authority to impose the registration requirement.

                                                 5
No. 84012-6-I/6

from the requirement that the conviction occur “[o]n or after June 9, 2016,” RCW

9.41.330(1), is contrary to the statutory language. Reading the statute as a

whole, as we must, we conclude that our legislature intended the effective date of

the statute to apply to the mandatory imposition of the registration requirement

set forth in RCW 9.41.330(3).

       Were we to determine that the statute is ambiguous, and thus to engage

in statutory construction, our conclusion would remain unchanged. See State v.

Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 955, 51 P.3d 66 (2002) (when a statute is ambiguous,

the court will resort to principles of statutory construction to determine legislative

intent); Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wn.2d 390, 399, 191 P.2d 858 (1948) (“In

construing statutes which re-enact, with certain changes, or repeal other statutes,

or which contain revisions or codification of earlier laws, resort to repealed and

superseded statutes may be had, and is of great importance in ascertaining the

intention of the legislature.”). Pursuant to the 2013 version of the felony firearm

registration statute, the sentencing court was granted the discretion to impose

the registration requirement when the defendant was convicted of a felony

firearm offense on or after the effective date of the statute. See former RCW

9.41.330(1). Our legislature amended the statute in 2016 only to add subsection

(3), which provides that, in certain circumstances, the sentencing court must

impose the registration requirement. See RCW 9.41.330(3). The legislature

again indicated that the statute applies only when the offender is convicted of a

felony firearm offense on or after the statute’s effective date. RCW 9.41.330(1).

The 2016 amendment to the registration statute indicates intent to distinguish

                                           6
No. 84012-6-I/7

between the circumstances in which the requirement may be imposed and those

in which it must be imposed by the sentencing court. It does not demonstrate

legislative intent that the statute’s effective date applies only when imposition of

the registration requirement is discretionary.

       We additionally reject the State’s assertion that the felony firearm

registration requirement is consonant with our state’s sex offender registration

statute. See RCW 9A.44.130. That statute provides that “[a]ny adult or juvenile

residing . . . in this state who has been found to have committed or has been

convicted of any sex offense or kidnapping offense . . . shall register with the

county sheriff for the county of the person’s residence.” RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a).

Pursuant to its statutory language, the sex offender registration statute

automatically applies to any individual who meets the requirements set forth

therein. In contrast, a person is required to register as a felony firearm offender

only after a sentencing court has imposed the registration requirement. RCW

9.41.333(1) (requiring that any person residing in our state “who has been

required by a court to comply with the registration requirements of this section”

register with the appropriate county sheriff); see also RCW 9.41.330(1), (3)

(providing that the court “must consider whether to impose” or “must impose” the

registration requirement, depending on the circumstances of the felony firearm

conviction). Thus, unlike the sex offender registration requirement, the felony

firearm registration requirement is triggered only after imposition of the

requirement by the sentencing court. As discussed herein, by its plain language,

                                          7
No. 84012-6-I/8

the statute authorizes imposition of the requirement only when the requisite

conviction occurred “[o]n or after June 9, 2016.” RCW 9.41.330(1).

      Pursuant to its plain language, the felony firearm registration requirement

must be imposed by the sentencing court and may be imposed only on offenders

convicted of a requisite offense “[o]n or after June 9, 2016.” RCW 9.41.330(1).

The date of Senior’s conviction, upon which the resentencing court premised the

imposition of the registration requirement, was November 10, 2011. Thus, the

court was not authorized to impose the requirement pursuant to the felony

firearm registration statute. Accordingly, we remand to the superior court to

strike the registration requirement from the judgment and sentence.

      The remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will

be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished

opinions. See RCW 2.06.040.

                                        III

      Senior further contends that the standard range sentence imposed by the

resentencing court must be reversed. This is so, he asserts, because the court

disregarded evidence presented in support of a lower sentence within the

standard range and failed to exercise its discretion in imposing the sentence. We

disagree. The Sentencing Reform Act of 19815 (SRA) provides that a sentence

imposed within the statutory standard range may not be appealed. Accordingly,

Senior may not appeal from the sentence imposed here.

      5 Ch. 9.94A RCW.

                                        8
No. 84012-6-I/9

                                         A

       On November 10, 2011, Senior was sentenced to 260 months of

incarceration, 15 months above the midpoint of the applicable standard range

sentence, plus an additional 60 months of incarceration for a firearm

enhancement. Because the offender score used at sentencing included

convictions for possession of a controlled substance, Senior sought resentencing

following the Blake decision, 197 Wn.2d 170. A resentencing hearing was held

on April 22, 2022.

       Because the judge who had presided over Senior’s trial and original

sentencing had retired, a different judge presided over the resentencing. Senior

requested a minimum standard range sentence of 123 months of incarceration

plus 60 months for the firearm enhancement. In support of this request, Senior

detailed his “exemplary behavior” while incarcerated, as well as his voluntary

completion of chemical dependency treatment and anti-violence programs and

his efforts to engage in educational opportunities. Based on the facts of the

crime, the State sought a high-end standard range sentence of 234 months of

incarceration plus 60 months for the firearm enhancement.

       During the hearing, the resentencing judge explained at length her

considerations in determining the appropriate sentence. She “read everything

that [she] could regarding the crime that was in the court file” and reviewed the

original sentencing transcript. The resentencing judge additionally considered

the evidence presented by the defense in support of its resentencing

recommendation, including numerous letters from Senior’s friends and family, his

                                         9
No. 84012-6-I/10

behavioral record and work history while incarcerated, and documents regarding

the substance abuse treatment and anti-violence programs that he completed.

The resentencing judge further explained that she “looked at how [Senior]

responded to this crime over the course of the last decade,” which she found

“disturbing.” She concluded that, although Senior had “made tremendous strides

in the prison,” his conflicting accounts of the crime demonstrated that Senior had

not “fully own[ed] what [he] did.”

       The resentencing judge imposed a standard range sentence of 186

months of incarceration, 15 months above the midpoint of the applicable

standard range, plus 60 months for a firearm enhancement. She noted that,

although the standard range for the offense had changed, the original sentencing

judge had also imposed a sentence of 15 months above the midpoint of the

applicable standard range. The resentencing judge explained that she had “read

all the materials that were submitted to [her] not once, but twice” and had “[given]

this sentence great thought.” The sentence imposed, she explained, was based

on her conclusion that Senior had not yet made the “final step” of accepting

accountability for his actions in committing the crime.

                                         B

       The SRA provides that “[a] sentence within the standard sentence

range . . . for an offense shall not be appealed.” RCW 9.94A.585(1). Thus, as a

matter of law, there can be no abuse of discretion regarding the length of the

sentence imposed when that sentence is within the presumptive sentence range.

State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183, 713 P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986).

                                         10
No. 84012-6-I/11

RCW 9.94A.585 is not, however, “an absolute prohibition on the right of appeal.”

State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 328-29, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997) (citing

State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423, 771 P.2d 739 (1989)). “Rather, it

precludes only appellate review of ‘challenges to the amount of time imposed

when the time is within the standard range.’” Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at

329 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Herzog, 112 Wn.2d at 423).

Thus, appellate review is available if the sentencing court failed to comply with

constitutional requirements or with the procedural requirements of the SRA.6

State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82, 139 P.3d 334 (2006).

        A “procedural” appeal to a standard range sentence is permitted when

“the sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by

the SRA, and . . . the court failed to do so.” State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 712,

854 P.2d 1042 (1993). The SRA mandates that the sentencing court

        consider the risk assessment report and presentence reports, if
        any, including any victim impact statement and criminal history, and
        allow arguments from the prosecutor, the defense counsel, the
        offender, the victim, the survivor of the victim, or a representative of
        the victim or survivor, and an investigative law enforcement officer
        as to the sentence to be imposed.

RCW 9.94A.500(1). The statute further requires that when “the defendant

disputes material facts [used at sentencing], the court must either not consider

the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing on the point.” RCW 9.94A.530(2). When

no objection is raised to the facts presented, those facts are considered to be

        6 Such claims of error do not challenge the length of the sentence.   Rather, they
challenge the constitutionality of the basis for the sentence or the procedure by which the
sentence was imposed. See, e.g., Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 329-30.

                                                11
No. 84012-6-I/12

“acknowledged.” RCW 9.94A.530(2). Only if the sentencing court failed to follow

either of these statutory requirements can an appellant assert a cognizable

procedural claim of error to a standard range sentence. Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 712.

       In addition, when the sentencing court imposes a standard range

sentence following the defendant’s request for an exceptional sentence, review

of the sentence is permitted if “‘the court has refused to exercise discretion at all

or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional

sentence below the standard range.’” State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56,

399 P.3d 1106 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. McGill,

112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002)). Thus, we review the imposition of a

standard range sentence when the sentencing court erroneously believed that it

lacked the authority to impose an exceptional sentence. See, e.g., McFarland,

189 Wn.2d at 56 (sentencing court erroneously believed it could not impose

concurrent sentences for firearm-related offenses); McGill, 112 Wn. App. at 99

(sentencing court erroneously believed that it lacked authority to impose an

exceptional sentence below the standard range). In such circumstances, the

challenge is to “the underlying legal determinations by which the sentencing court

reaches its decision,” and appeal is permitted because “every defendant is

entitled to have an exceptional sentence actually considered.” McFarland, 189

Wn.2d at 56 (citing Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330). However, a

sentencing court “that has considered the facts and has concluded that there is

no basis for an exceptional sentence has exercised its discretion, and the

defendant may not appeal that ruling.” Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330.

                                         12
No. 84012-6-I/13

                                                 C

        Senior asserts on appeal that his sentence must be reversed because the

resentencing court “ignored his request for a mitigated standard range sentence

and ignored the evidence he presented, thus failing to meaningfully consider the

valid mitigating factors.”7 He further contends that reversal is required because

the resentencing court “adopted in its entirety the rationale of the original

sentencing [court],” thus failing to exercise its own discretion.8 We disagree. The

resentencing court fully complied with the procedural requirements of the SRA

and neither categorically refused to exercise its discretion nor relied on an

impermissible basis in imposing the standard range sentence. Accordingly, the

SRA precludes Senior’s challenge to the standard range sentence imposed by

the resentencing court.

        First, the resentencing court fully complied with the procedural mandates

of the SRA. See RCW 9.94A.500(1), .530(2).9 The statute requires that a

sentencing court consider any presentence reports available and allow argument

from defense counsel and the offender. RCW 9.94A.500(1). Notwithstanding his

assertion that the resentencing court “ignored the evidence he presented,” Senior

does not identify any particular evidence that the court failed to consider. The

record is devoid of support for his assertion.

        7 Br. of Appellant at 8.
        8 Br. of Appellant at 8.
        9 Senior did not object to the resentencing court’s consideration of any material facts

presented. Thus, the court was not required to disregard any such facts or to hold an evidentiary
hearing pertaining to any challenged facts. See RCW 9.94A.530(2).

                                                13
No. 84012-6-I/14

       Indeed, the resentencing judge explained at length the evidence that she

considered in determining the appropriate sentence. She explicitly noted her

consideration of the evidence presented by Senior. She explained that she had

“read all the materials that were submitted to [her] not once, but twice” and had

“[given] this sentence great thought.” To the extent that Senior is asserting that

his standard range sentence may be appealed due to a failure of the court to

adhere to statutory mandates, his assertion is wholly without merit. To the

contrary, the record clearly demonstrates the resentencing court’s adherence to

the procedural requirements of the SRA. “It is almost self-evident that, while

cloaking his arguments in ‘procedure,’ [Senior’s] ultimate object . . . in seeking

resentencing is to receive a lower sentence within the standard range.” Mail, 121

Wn.2d at 714.

       Second, Senior has not shown that the resentencing court failed to

exercise its discretion, such that he may appeal from the standard range

sentence imposed. The appeal of a standard range sentence is permitted when

the sentencing court erroneously believed that it was without authority to exercise

discretion. See, e.g., McFarland, 189 Wn.2d at 56; McGill, 112 Wn. App. at 99.

However, Washington courts have allowed such an appeal only when the

sentencing court denied the defendant’s request for an exceptional sentence

below the standard range. Senior made no such request here.

       We have explained that “[a] court refuses to exercise its discretion if it

refuses categorically to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard

range under any circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose

                                         14
No. 84012-6-I/15

a sentence below the standard range.” Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330.

Senior’s claim of error, however, is not premised on an “underlying legal

determination[]” of the resentencing court that it was without authority to impose

a lesser sentence, see McFarland, 189 Wn.2d at 56; nor does the record

demonstrate that the resentencing court categorically refused to exercise its

discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. See Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn.

App. at 330. Rather, the resentencing court here thoroughly considered the

pertinent evidence yet disagreed with Senior regarding the appropriate length of

his sentence. This was an appropriate exercise of sentencing discretion. See

Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330-31.

        Pursuant to the SRA, a defendant may not appeal from a standard range

sentence when the challenge asserted is to the length of the sentence imposed.

Here, Senior challenges the length of the standard range sentence imposed on

resentencing. Senior has demonstrated neither that the sentencing court failed

to comply with the requisite statutory requirements in imposing the sentence nor

that the court categorically refused to exercise its discretion. Accordingly, his

challenge to the standard range sentence is precluded by the SRA.10

                                                IV

        Senior additionally contends that the resentencing court evidenced bias by

purportedly failing to consider his efforts to improve himself and in adopting the

        10 Senior asserts, for the first time in his reply brief, that he was deprived of his due

process right to an impartial judge and decision when the resentencing court imposed the
standard range sentence. He thus argues that his challenge to the sentence is not barred by the
SRA. However, contrary to Senior’s suggestion, his claim of error clearly implicates the length of
the sentence imposed, not a purported constitutional infirmity in the imposition of that sentence.

                                                15
No. 84012-6-I/16

rationale of the original sentencing judge. He asserts that such bias resulted in

violation of his due process rights and the appearance of fairness doctrine. We

disagree. This claim of error is premised on a factually inaccurate portrayal of

the record. The resentencing judge’s appropriate exercise of her discretion

evidences judging—not bias. Senior’s claim is without merit.

      “Under the state and federal constitutions, a criminal defendant has the

right to be tried and sentenced by an impartial court.” State v. Solis-Diaz, 187

Wn.2d 535, 539-40, 387 P.3d 703 (2017) (citing U.S. CONST. amends VI, XIV;

WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22). This right is an “essential element of due process.” In

re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 692, 101 P.3d 1 (2004). The law

requires not only an impartial judge, but also that the judge appear to be

impartial. State v. Worl, 91 Wn. App. 88, 96, 955 P.2d 814 (1998). A trial judge

is presumed to have properly discharged his or her duties without bias or

prejudice, and “[t]he party seeking to overcome that presumption must provide

specific facts establishing bias.” Davis, 152 Wn.2d at 692. Moreover, “[j]udicial

rulings alone almost never constitute a valid showing of bias.” Davis, 152 Wn.2d

at 692.

      Here, Senior contends that the resentencing judge evidenced bias by

considering that he had not taken full accountability for the crime and by

referencing the details of that crime. He asserts that the judge disregarded

evidence of his efforts to improve himself, instead simply adopting the rationale

of the original sentencing judge. Senior’s assertions, however, are without

support in the record. He points to no comments of the resentencing judge that

                                        16
No. 84012-6-I/17

allegedly demonstrate bias, and he inaccurately asserts that the judge failed to

consider evidence in favor of a lesser sentence. The record demonstrates,

contrary to Senior’s assertion, that the resentencing judge thoroughly considered

all of the evidence and appropriately exercised her discretion in determining an

appropriate sentence. When a judge judges, that demonstrates judging—not

bias. Senior’s assertion of bias is without merit.

       Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

                                         17