Court Opinion

ID: 9635007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:11.809947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:14.135676
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The Appellant, Dr. Melo, argues he was required by KRS 342.020 to provide his treatment notes, along with his statement for services, regarding his treatment of Steven Barnett, notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 214.181. I do not agree.
Under the workers’ compensation scheme for payments of medical services, KRS 342.020(1), the employer or others acting on his behalf are required to make payments for services rendered to an employee within 30 days of receipt of a “statement for services.” 803 KAR 25:096, Section 1(5) defines a “statement for services” as a completed HCFA 1500 along with an attached copy of legible treatment notes, hospital admission and discharge summary, or other supporting documentation. This allows the health care provider, where appropriate, to provide documentation that does not include references to sensitive information, i.e., HIV/AIDS *600information. Pursuant to 803 ICAR 25:096, Dr. Melo was authorized to provide “other appropriate documentation” in order to receive payment for his services; assuming it was even necessary.
The Appellant’s argument that KRS 342.020 and 803 EAR 25:096 required him, without regard to the nature of the information he possessed, to provide his treatment notes, in contravention of KRS 214.181, is not compelling. The Kentucky General Assembly recognized many members of the public are deterred from seeking testing and treatment because they misunderstand the nature of the test or fear that results will be disclosed without their consent. KRS 214.181(1). Given this fear, the General Assembly was careful when drafting KRS 214.181, to put in Section (5)(c), which provides a specific list of persons to whom HIV/AIDS test results might be disclosed.1 Mr. Barnett’s employer was not one of the persons noted to be privy to this information.
Clearly, under the established rules of statutory construction, when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, one in a broad, general way and the other specifically, the specific statute prevails. DeStock # 14, Inc. v. Logsdon, 993 S.W.2d 952 (Ky.1999); Land v. Newsome, 614 S.W.2d 948 (Ky.1981); Riddle v. Scotty’s Development, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 385 (Ky.App.1999); Reisinger v. Grayhawk Corportion, 860 S.W.2d 788 (Ky.App.1993). KRS 214.181 is the more specific statute. Therefore, the only way to comply with the demands of KRS 214.181 is to limit the disclosure of information to the persons noted in section (5)(c). This resolution also meets our standards on reconciliation. “Where there is an apparent conflict between statutes or sections thereof, it is the duty of the court to try to harmonize the interpretation of the law so as to give effect to both sections or statutes if possible.” Ledford v. Faulkner, 661 S.W.2d 475 (Ky.1983).
Finally, and possibly the most compelling ground for resolution, as well as the impetus for KRS 214.181, is the public policy concern evidenced by the loss of employment resulting from this case. As is now well known, the transmission of HIV/AIDS does not occur through everyday contact with infected persons, rather, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, HIV/AIDS is spread by sexual contact with an infected person, by sharing needles and/or syringes with someone who is infected, or, less commonly, through blood transfusions.2 However, this knowledge often does not remedy the discrimination towards and the stigma felt by persons infected by the disease.
Dr. Melo was aware, according to his own deposition testimony, of KRS 214.181 and patient privacy rights. He attended a continuing medical education course dealing specifically with HIV/AIDS confidentiality prior to the disclosure of Stephen Barnett’s private medical condition. Furthermore, Dr. Melo’s assistant told Mr. Barnett that she did not realize that the HIV/AIDS information was in the treatment note until he pointed it out to her. Moreover, Dr. Melo, an infectious disease specialist, practices predominantly in a field of medicine which demands a higher degree of attention to the rights of his patients.
We do consider that physicians are trained in medicine, not the intricacies of the law, and that even judges struggle *601with the proper interpretation of these complicated issues. Yet we cannot ignore the impact disclosure can have on an affected person’s life. This is the reason for KRS 214.181 and it cannot be attained if KRS 342.020 and 803 KAR 25:096, Section 2(5) are interpreted otherwise.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed herein, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, sending this matter back to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
COOPER and KELLER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. Refer to Footnote 1 of Majority Opinion.

. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for HIV, STD and TB Prevention, Divisions of HIV/AIDS Prevention, Fact Sheet, HIV and Its Transmission <http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pubs/facts/transmission.htm > (accessed Feb. 18, 2005).