Court Opinion

ID: 9567882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:42.162517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:59.259781
License: Public Domain

*872TRAYNOR, J.
I concur in the judgment.
I agree with the main opinion regarding the instruction concerning the installation, operation, and maintenance of the wigwag signals. I cannot agree, however, as to the negligence of the driver of the automobile. The driver stopped at the crossing in response to the warning given by the wigwag and waited until two trains passed and the wigwag ceased operating. The crucial question is whether it was negligence thereafter to cross the tracks without looking for approaching trains. A jury is in no better position than this court to answer this question. There is every reason why this issue, often raised in practice, should be settled by this court and not left to the oscillating verdicts of juries. (See Holmes, The Common Law, 123.) The court therefore should determine the standard of reasonable conduct for deciding whether or not the conduct in question was negligent. (See concurring opinion in Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.2d 354, 364 [149 P.2d 848]; concurring opinion in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, ante, pp. 581, 593 [177 P.2d 279].) In my opinion the invitation to cross implicit in the cessation of the wigwag and the absence of other factors that might serve to warn of danger relieved the driver of the duty to look for approaching trains. He therefore complied with the requirements of due care when he stopped and waited for the cessation of the wigwag before proceeding to cross the tracks. Such a driver is in a different position from a driver who finds the wigwag silent or in a stationary condition when he approaches the tracks and crosses them without looking for approaching trains. The former is assured by the operation of the wigwag that it is functioning and will warn of approaching trains, whereas the latter, having no such assurance, must anticipate the possibility that the wigwag is not functioning. (See Will v. Southern Pacific Co., 18 Cal.2d 468, 474-475 [116 P.2d 44]; 53 A.L.R. 975; 99 A.L.R. 732.)
Moreover, the instruction with respect to the driver’s negligence was unnecessary and misleading. The plaintiffs were the guests of the driver and his negligence was not imputable to them. (Campagna v. Market St. Ry. Co., 24 Cal. 2d 304, 309 [149 P.2d 281]; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 174 [223 P. 470]; Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737 [164 P. 385] ; see Restatement, Torts, § 490.) “The ultimate question for the determination of the jury was whether defendants were guilty of negligence contributing to plain*873tiffs’ injuries. The conduct of the driver of the automobile, not being in issue, was admissible in evidence only to the extent that it might aid in the determination of the question of the negligence of defendants.” (Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 57 Cal.App.2d 695, 698 [135 P.2d 424].) The vice of such an instruction is that it tends to lead the jury to believe that their verdict depends on the negligence of the driver. (See Krupp v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., supra; Benowden v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 73 Cal.App. 383, 387 [238 P. 785] ; Lund v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 25 Cal.2d 287. 293-294 [153 P.2d 705].)
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 26, 1947.