Court Opinion

ID: 9390705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:04:58.814988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.331331
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2022-CA-0220-MR

JOSEPH WILLIAMS                                    APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 14-CR-00388

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2022-CA-0223-MR

JOSEPH WILLIAMS                                    APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 15-CR-00092

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE
                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND ECKERLE,
JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This is a consolidated appeal by Joseph Williams, pro se,

(“Williams”) from the denial of his Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42

motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed the briefs, the

record, and the trial court order, we affirm.

                                       FACTS

             On April 7, 2015, Williams was found guilty of first-degree assault

and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. He was sentenced to 40 years

of incarceration, which sentence he appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court. In

Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 2015-SC-0370, 2017 WL 634766, *1 (Ky.

Feb. 16, 2017), the Supreme Court set forth the following summary of the facts:

                    Appellant and Stephanie Wells lived together,
             enduring for twenty years a tumultuous relationship that
             included having a seventeen-year-old son. According to
             Wells’ testimony, the couple had a disagreement at home
             that escalated to the point of violence. Wells testified that
             Appellant beat her with his fist, striking her in the eye
             and on the back of her head. She also testified that he
             kicked her shoulder and the side of her face with his foot,
             and then left the residence. Conscious of her need for
             medical attention, Wells sent a text message to Appellant
             asking for his help. He returned to the residence, but
             instead of coming to her aid, Appellant resumed his

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               assault on Wells, hitting her again, causing her to fall and
               strike the back of her head. While she was on the ground,
               Appellant stomped on her face with his foot. Eventually,
               Wells managed to call 911. She told the 911 operator
               that her injuries occurred when she fell on her porch
               steps. Paramedics found her lying unconscious and
               unresponsive on the porch; they called the police.

                     Appellant denied assaulting Wells. A neighbor
               who was drunk at the time of the alleged assault told the
               police that he saw Wells fall off the porch.

                      Wells’ injuries included an epidural hematoma,
               which required brain surgery and treatment by
               neurologists and other brain specialists. The emergency
               room physician who examined Wells had served as a
               military physician and had experience dealing with head
               trauma. He testified that it was not likely that a fall down
               the porch steps onto concrete caused the hematoma.
               Instead, he opined that the force that caused Wells’
               hematoma was significant, comparable perhaps to a fall
               from a distance of twice one’s height. Wells is now
               completely physically disabled.

               The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. This motion was filed

two years later by Williams and asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate and call an eyewitness to testify, and for failing to retain an

expert to rebut the testimony of the Commonwealth’s medical expert. The trial

court denied RCr 11.42 relief, without holding an evidentiary hearing. Williams

also contends that denial of a hearing requires reversal on appeal.1

1
 Appellant actually raised six claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court, all of
which were addressed in the trial court’s order of November 16, 2021. On his appeal to this
Court, however, he has raised only three arguments. Failure to present an argument on those

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                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              A denial of an RCr 11.42 motion is reviewed on appeal for an abuse

of discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ky. 1998). “To

succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must satisfy the

two-prong test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). ‘First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.’” Wagner v. Commonwealth, 483 S.W.3d

381, 383 (Ky. App. 2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). With this in

mind, we review the allegations of Williams.

                                        ANALYSIS

              The first issue pertains to the failure to call a witness at trial. The

witness is actually referenced in the Supreme Court’s factual summary above, as “a

neighbor who was drunk at the time of the alleged assault” and who told the police

that he saw Wells fall off the porch. While this neighbor was not called, there was

testimony from the investigating officer acknowledging that the neighbor had said

he saw her fall.

other asserted issues on appeal “constitutes abandonment and/or waiver of [those] argument[s].”
Prescott v. Commonwealth, 572 S.W.3d 913, 927 (Ky. App. 2019).

                                              -4-
             Thus, the jury heard about the witness’s statement, but because the

witness appeared to lack credibility, it appears to have been a reasonable trial

strategy to not call the witness. Decisions related to witness selection are generally

not subject to second guessing, and trial strategy is given the presumption of

correctness. Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Ky. 2001) (citation

omitted).

             Secondly, Williams contends that his counsel was ineffective for not

adequately investigating and securing “alibi” witnesses on his behalf. The trial

court addressed this assertion, noting that there was no evidence in the record

suggesting that there were any alibi witnesses. In response, Williams contends that

this “lack of information” in the record actually supported his claim to the right to

an evidentiary hearing. However, he then refers only to the aforementioned

eyewitness/neighbor for his contention that an alibi might have been presented.

             We have addressed that potential witness, and find that there were

insufficient other allegations or even suggestions of other “alibi” witnesses below.

Any other alleged and unidentified witnesses who might have been called to

establish an alibi would have been inconsistent with his own testimony that he was

at the residence, as well as inconsistent with the other witnesses’ testimony, and

the defense presented by his trial counsel. Again, given the presumption of

                                         -5-
correctness of trial strategy and the lack of anything more than a vague, general

claim about alibi witnesses, we find no error. Id. (citation omitted).

             Next, Williams contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to

retain an expert to refute the testimony of the Commonwealth’s medical expert.

Specifically, he argues, counsel should have retained an expert to advance his

theory that Wells sustained her injuries from a fall, not from an assault. He does

not identify an expert who might have testified to this or what evidence might have

been presented. A similar claim was made and rejected in Haley v.

Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 744 (Ky. App. 2019), due to the movant failing to

establish the second prong of prejudice required under Strickland. We believe that

holding is indistinguishable from the case at bench.

             In Haley, the appellant contended his counsel was ineffective for

failing to call an expert on ballistics to counter the Commonwealth’s ballistics

expert. Haley, 586 S.W.3d at 751-52. Our Court addressed those claims, noting

that trial counsel had presented the defense and established the weakness of the

Commonwealth’s ballistics evidence through cross examination and argument. Id.

at 752.

             Similarly, in addressing this claim, the trial court noted that the

injuries to Wells were sufficiently proven and that counsel did present the defense

that Williams did not cause them, but that they were a result of a fall. He was able

                                          -6-
to inform the jury of the 911 call that Wells made, reporting that she had fallen

down the stairs. He explained to the jury that the pivotal question in the case was

how Wells sustained the injuries, and elicited testimony from the officer that the

neighbor said he saw her fall. Counsel cross-examined the emergency room doctor

regarding medications that might have caused her to fall and the basis for his

opinions that the injuries were not likely caused by a fall. It is clear from the

record that this theory of the case was presented to the jury, and while counsel did

not retain an expert witness to further advance this theory, this still falls within

reasonable trial strategy. Again, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct fell “within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Ky. 2007) (citation omitted).

             We further conclude that the failure of counsel to retain an expert did

not prejudice Williams, the required second prong under Strickland. The jury

heard from nearly every witness and from counsel repeatedly that there was some

evidence to support Williams’s theory that Wells merely fell. However, none of

this evidence was sufficient to overcome the evidence that Williams inflicted the

injuries upon Wells. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that there was “a

reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been

different” or that “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”

                                           -7-
of this case existed. See Haley, 586 S.W.3d at 752 (citing Teague v.

Commonwealth, 428 S.W.3d 630, 633 (Ky. App. 2014)).

             Williams next contends that the trial court erred in not granting him a

hearing on these claims. When a defendant moves the court for relief under

RCr 11.42, “[a]n evidentiary hearing is only required if there is a material issue of

fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by

an examination of the record.” Haley, 586 S.W.3d at 750 (quoting Fraser v.

Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001)). See also Bowling, 981 S.W.2d

at 549 (quoting RCr 11.42(5)).

             If the trial court was ultimately correct “in denying an RCr 11.42

motion without a hearing, then it is error to order ‘a nugatory hearing to determine

trial strategy.’” Haley, 586 S.W.3d at 751 (quoting Commonwealth v. Searight,

423 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Ky. 2014)). Where the record is clear that a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel would ultimately fail the prejudice prong of

Strickland, “the trial court should be affirmed even in the absence of such a

hearing.” Id. (citation omitted).

             Having determined that Williams failed to prove deficient

performance or that he suffered prejudice due to counsel’s performance, we find no

error in the trial court’s denial of a hearing. “The Strickland test requires the

movant to carry the burden of meeting both prongs in order to succeed with an

                                          -8-
ineffective assistance of counsel argument[,]” and he has not met that burden.

Searight, 423 S.W.3d at 231 (citation omitted).

            Accordingly, the Christian Circuit Court is affirmed.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Joseph Williams, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
Burgin, Kentucky                          Attorney General

                                          Christina L. Romano
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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