Court Opinion

ID: 9588776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:34.801158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:48:50.660291
License: Public Domain

EAGLES, Judge.
We first consider whether plaintiffs benefits should have been terminated after 18 January 1994. Plaintiff has the initial burden of proving he was rendered disabled as a result of a work related injury. Watson v. Winston-Salem Transit Authority, 92 N.C. App. 473, 475, 374 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1988). The term “disability” means “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment.” G.S. 97-2(9). Accordingly, in Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., our Supreme Court ruled that in order to find a worker disabled under the Act the Commission must find:
(1) that plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in the same employment, (2) that plaintiff was incapable after his injury of earning the same wages he had earned before his injury in any other employment, and (3) that this individual’s incapacity to earn was caused by plaintiffs injury.
305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982). However, once a Form 21 agreement is signed the employee is presumed totally disabled. Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Indus., 123 N.C. App. 200, 205, 472 S.E.2d 382, 386 (1996), cert. denied, 344 N.C. 629, 477 S.E.2d 39 (1996). Once the disability is shown or stipulated by entry of a Form 21 agreement, there is a presumption that it continues until the employee returns to work at wages equal to those he was receiving at the time his injury occurred. Watkins v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 279 N.C. 132, 137, 181 S.E.2d 588, 592 (1971); Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C. 185, 189, 63 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1951). Likewise there is a presumption that a disability ends when the employee returns to work at the same wages. Id.
Upon a showing of disability by the employee, the employer must produce evidence that suitable jobs are available for the employee and that the employee is capable of getting a job. Burwell v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 114 N.C. App. 69, 73, 441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994); Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Medical Ctr., 101 N.C. App. 24, 33, 398 S.E.2d 677, 682 (1990). A job is “suitable” if the employee is able to perform *499the job, given her “age, education, physical limitations, vocational skills, and experience.” Franklin, 123 N.C. App. at 206, 472 S.E.2d at 386 (quoting Burwell, 114 N.C. App. at 73, 441 S.E.2d at 149). A finding of a maximum medical improvement is not the equivalent of finding that the employee is able to earn the same wage and does not satisfy the defendant’s burden of disproving an employee’s disability. Watson, 92 N.C. App. at 476, 374 S.E.2d at 485.
Plaintiff argues that the Industrial Commission erred by failing to apply the presumption that the plaintiff’s temporary total disability continues until he or she returns to work at the same wage earned prior to the injury. We agree.
Here, plaintiff has carried his initial burden of showing that he was disabled. The defendants have admitted liability by entering into the Form 21 agreement. Plaintiff began to receive benefits for his temporary total disability on 28 August 1993 and continuing for “necessary weeks.” By January 1994, three doctors had released plaintiff to return to work. However, “[a]n employee’s release to return to work is not the equivalent of a finding that the employee is able to earn the same wage earned prior to the injury, nor does it automatically deprive an employee of the benefit of the Watkins v. Motor Lines presumption.” Radica v. Carolina Mills, 113 N.C. App. 440, 447, 439 S.E.2d 185, 190 (1994). As in Radica, there is no evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff retained any earning capacity after he was released by his doctors. The defendant-employer has not met its burden of proving that the plaintiff-employee was capable of earning the same wages. A release from a doctor is not enough to rebut the presumption of a disability. Accordingly, the Full Commission erred when it terminated plaintiff’s benefits after 18 January 1994.
Reversed.
Judge WYNN concurs.
Judge WALKER dissents.