Court Opinion

ID: 9476453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:56:32.613192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:19.934594
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I am unwilling to concur in the court’s judgment, I concur in its opinion except that part of the opinion concerning shackling of persons already found to be guilty of serious violent crimes.
The court holds that Elledge is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the majority feels that shackling Elledge without first holding a hearing violated Elledge’s constitutional right to a fair trial. I believe that the per se rule the court adopts today represents an extension of the law unre-quired by the Constitution or binding precedent. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Before examining the law in this area, it is important to remember the situation in which this shackling occurred. Elledge had confessed to and pled guilty to the violent, brutal murder of Margaret Strack. Moreover, by the time he faced sentencing for the Strack murder, Elledge also had been convicted of a second murder that he *1453committed during an armed robbery some two days after he killed Strack. See Elledge v. Florida, 346 So.2d 998, 999-1000, 1001 (Fla.1977). In other words, Elledge was not a person who, in a fit of passion, had committed one aberrant killing in an otherwise exemplary life. The state trial judge declared, on the record, that he had received information from law enforcement officials that, while in prison, Elledge had vowed that because “he had nothing to lose” he intended to assault the courtroom bailiff while at sentencing. Moreover, the judge stated that he had been informed that, while in prison, Elledge had become proficient at karate. After stating this information on the record, the judge ordered the prisoner’s legs shackled. Although an objection was made to the shackling, the defense did not request a hearing,1 nor did the defense contest the factual accuracy of the judge’s statements,2 request curative instructions or suggest alternative, less restrictive means of restraint.
The court says that in such a situation the state trial judge violates the Constitution unless he holds a hearing before restraining the already-convicted defendant. In other words, the court today creates what seems to be a per se rule that requires a state trial judge always to hold a hearing before shackling a defendant at the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial— even when no hearing is requested. I cannot agree that the Constitution requires this.
Three major points refute the court’s position. First, this case is not controlled by precedent because no federal court has addressed the constitutional impact of shackling at sentencing. All of the cases decided by federal courts involve courtroom security restraints of an accused at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. The primary constitutional concern at the guilt-innocence phase — fear that the restraint will interfere with the defendant’s presumption of innocence — is not present here; the absence of this pivotal concern renders the guilt-innocence phase cases inapposite to sentencing phase shackling. Second, even when an accused’s presumption of innocence is directly impacted — i.e., when the accused is restrained at the guilt-innocence stage— federal appellate courts have not reversed a trial judge’s exercise of discretion in imposing restraint. Third, we are reviewing a state court proceeding; therefore, we examine this case solely for constitutional error and not under our powers of supervision. That is, our personal views of how the state trial judge ought to have acted are irrelevant, as is whether we would require, in our supervisory capacity, a federal trial court to have acted differently.
The court says that we are bound by precedent to reach the result it reaches.3 I *1454must stress, however, that this is a case of first impression. Neither the United States Supreme Court, nor any federal circuit court of appeals has addressed the constitutional impact — if any — of physical restraints imposed on a convicted murderer at the sentencing stage of a bifurcated state trial. Instead, the case law concerns shackling at the guilt-innocence stage of trial. The distinction between the two settings is crucial because the single major analytic thrust of all the guilt-innocence phase cases is to determine whether the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence 4 was infringed by the security measure adopted by the trial court.5
Elledge is unentitled to a presumption of innocence; once that overriding concern is eliminated from the evaluation, our analysis must be different. The guilt-innocence stage cases are materially different in three respects. When the defendant’s right to a presumption of innocence is not present the defendant’s constitutional interest in remaining unshackled is severely reduced. Moreover, the court is notified that courtroom security is at issue. Finally, in such a setting a juror’s view toward the shackles is substantially altered because the shackles are expected. Cases involving the guilt-innocence phase shackling of defense witnesses provide an apt illustration of these significant differences.
On occasion, courts have ordered a defendant’s witnesses shackled when those witnesses are inmates in maximum security prisons. Shackling an inmate witness is analogous to shackling a defendant at the sentencing phase and reflects the three differences mentioned above.
First, the decision to shackle an inmate witness is similar because such a witness, as a convicted felon, has no right to a presumption of innocence. See Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 637 (7th Cir.1982) (“Presumably, a person confined in a maximum security institution has committed at least one serious breach of the law. With respect to that offense, he is not presumed innocent.”)
Second, courts facing this issue in the inmate-as-witness setting have recognized that one’s status as a convicted felon raises the presumption that the inmate is dangerous; phrased differently, it places the trial court on notice that courtroom security is at risk. “Should such a [convicted felon] ... harbor any thoughts of escape, revenge or violence, the courtroom would provide the most obvious opportunity to act on them. Less intrusive measures may have an even more detrimental impact on the jury than shackles.” Id. See United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 794 (7th Cir.) (decision to shackle witnesses was prudent given fact that most witnesses were murderers), amended in part on other grounds, 777 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied sub nom. Silverstein v. United States, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1647, 90 L.Ed.2d 191 (1986), cert. denied sub nom. Gometz v. United States, — *1455U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 1647, 90 L.Ed.2d 191 (1986). The same is true whenever any person convicted of a violent felony appears before the court.
Shackling an inmate witness is similar to sentencing phase shackling for a third reason: the jurors view the shackles differently and are likely less prejudiced by the shackles. “The prejudice caused by shackling was mitigated by the jury’s awareness that the entire dramatis personae in the two cases were prison inmates — most of them murderers — and guards. The shackles could not have come as a surprise.” Id. (emphasis added). See generally Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.1985) (shackling of witness was justified by security concerns consisting of witness’s prisoner status, seriousness of witness’s prior conviction and that case involved prison gang). This analysis recognizes the common sense proposition that most citizens would not be surprised at— and probably would endorse — the practice of physically restraining felons convicted of violent crimes when those felons are removed from the controlled environment of their penal institutions. The Supreme Court acknowledged this practical, “common human experience” reality in Hol-brook when it noted that four uniformed troopers in the courtroom “are unlikely to have -been taken [by the jury] as a sign of anything other than a normal official concern for the safety and order of the proceedings. Indeed, any juror who for some other reason believed defendants particularly dangerous might well have wondered why [more extensive security precautions were not in effect.]" Holbrook, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1347, 89 L.Ed.2d at 536 (emphasis added). The jurors in Elledge’s case certainly had “some other reason” — i.e., other than the shackles — to believe Elledge was dangerous; many might have wondered why the state did not impose additional restraints given Elledge’s homicidal past.
Holbrook indicates that in deciding whether a particular security measure is inherently prejudicial courts must rely on “reason, principle, and common human experience.” Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d at 535 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). Fountain, Harrell and Wilson all illustrate by analogy that shackling at the sentencing phase raises different concerns than guilt-innocence phase shackling and is not inherently prejudicial. The court admits as much when it notes that there is “no definitive answer as to how the shackling at sentencing would affect the jury.” Supra, at 1451.6 Thus, reason, principle and common human experience demonstrate that sentencing phase shackling cannot be inherently prejudicial.
Significantly, even when the presumption of innocence is directly at risk — i.e., when an accused is shackled at the guilt-innocence stage of trial — the federal courts of appeal and United States Supreme Court have refused to intellect their view of what trial courts ought to do. Decisions con*1456cerning courtroom security are accorded broad discretion. Simply put, the amount of security required in a particular courtroom, for a particular felon, in a particular community on a particular day is a highly intuitive decision that must be based on experience, common sense and sensitivity to all the circumstances of the moment. Obviously, the trial judge is the best person to make such decisions; reviewing courts consequently reverse only for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir.1985); Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 636 (7th Cir.1982); Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541, 544 (6th Cir.1981); Passman v. Blackburn, 652 F.2d 559, 568 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022, 102 S.Ct. 1722, 72 L.Ed.2d 141 (1982).
A survey of the case law concerning the use of shackles and other security measures at the guilt-innocence phase demonstrates my point. The court has not cited, nor have I found, a single case in which either a United States Circuit Court of Appeals or the United States Supreme Court has overturned a trial judge’s decision to employ courtroom security measures even at the guilt-innocence phase. That is, even when the security procedure strikes at the bedrock precept that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, courts have been loath to interfere with the trial court’s use of discretion in the area of security-related decisions. It is counterin-tuitive to reach a different result when the fundamental concern is not present.
Moreover, not only should we generally defer to a trial court’s discretion in courtroom-security decisions, our scope of review is severely restricted. Our task “is not to determine whether it might have been feasible for the State to have employed less [intrusive] security measures in the courtroom.” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1347-48, 89 L.Ed.2d at 536. Although if we were exercising our supervisory capacity “we might express a preference” that less intrusive measures be adopted, “we are much more constrained when reviewing a constitutional challenge to a state court proceeding.” Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d at 536-37. It is important for us to remember that “all a federal court may do in such a situation is look at the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d at 537.
Therefore, it is irrelevant, for constitutional review purposes, whether the state trial judge considered less intrusive alternative restraints or did not issue, sua sponte, curative instructions. See Wilson v. McCarthy, 770 F.2d 1482, 1485 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1985) (while it “may have been the better course” for court to issue curative instruction, court of appeals “decline[d] to impose upon the trial court the mandatory responsibility of giving such an instruction.”); Woodard v. Perrin, 692 F.2d 220, 221 (1st Cir.1982) (“a judge should consider less restrictive measures before deciding to shackle a defendant”) (emphasis added). It may have been the better course to consider less restrictive alternatives, issue sua sponte curative instructions or conduct a sua sponte hearing. What we may view as the better course, however, is not always required by the Constitution. See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at-, 106 S.Ct. at 1347-48, 89 L.Ed.2d at 536-37.
In. summary, I believe that today’s court has overstepped the proper boundary between federal and state courts and has extended case law that is fundamentally inapposite to the situation this case presents. When the pivotal issue of presumption of innocence is lacking, the defendant’s constitutional rights are significantly less. Treating unconvicted persons the same as convicted persons grossly trivializes the rights of persons not convicted of crimes. Shackling can look harsh; and I personally would not impose it lightly. Nevertheless, under the facts as presented here, shackling Elledge did not deprive him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.7
*1457We are unjustified in placing yet another aspect of state trial practice under the heavy-handed superintendence of the federal courts. The court today vests convicted felons with a new federal constitutional right; that is, the right to appear in court unfettered unless a hearing is held first and the evidence at the hearing shows us that shackling was truly essential.8 The restriction on the powers of state courts has not been shown to be imperative to assure the fundamental fairness of sentencing proceedings. I do not believe appellant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because he was shackled; therefore, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

.Although the court apparently places great weight on Elledge’s question — i.e., "May I say something” — it is unwilling to categorize this question as a request for a hearing. I agree that this question cannot be viewed as a hearing request. Elledge was neither pro se nor co-counsel pro se. In such a setting the trial judge is justified in listening solely to the defense’s representative — in this case, the lawyer. In fact, the trial judge may be required to listen solely to the defense’s representative. See generally State v. Tait, 387 So.2d 338, 339-40 (Fla.1980); Thompson v. State, 194 So.2d 649, 650-51 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1967). Needless to say, there may have been several tactical reasons why defense counsel did not actually want his client to be heard regarding this supposed attack on the bailiff. For example, defendant’s story may have buttressed rather than undercut the view that defendant was dangerous or counsel may have feared that defendant would perjure himself. See generally Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 994, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (counsel’s duty of advocacy and loyalty is limited to lawful conduct; counsel cannot take steps that aid presentation of false evidence).

. The defense has never denied the factual accuracy of the assault claim in any subsequent stage of Elledge’s proceedings.

. For example, the majority states that a reversal is required if “controlling precedents are faithfully followed.” Supra, at 1451. Moreover, the court contends that Holbrook’s holding definitively answered the shackling question once and for all: “Nothing in Holbrook indicates that the Supreme Court did not intend its ruling to apply to the penalty phase of a capital case”; and "it is unreasonable to believe that the Court made its rule in Holbrook unaware that capital case trials are bifurcated". Id. at 1451, n. 22.
A case is only authority for what it actually decides. Holbrook is not a shackling case; in fact, the Court only briefly mentions shackling in passing. It also is significant that Holbrook involves guilt-innocence phase security mea*1454sures; the Court emphasizes throughout its opinion that its concern is whether the security measure somehow infringed the accused’s right to a presumption of innocence. As a last point, I believe it also is relevant that the defendants in Holbrook were merely charged with robbery. In stark contrast, Elledge had been convicted of not one, but two, brutal murders when he appeared for his sentencing. See Elledge v. Florida, 346 So.2d 998, 1001 (Fla.1977) ("[Elledge] had at the time of the [first Strack trial] been convicted of the Nelson murder")

. While not specifically set forth in the Constitution, the precept that a defendant is presumed innocent by the American justice system until proven innocent has been deemed a critical part of the right to a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).

. I agree that courts addressing the issue of courtroom restraints on occasion have mentioned other factors — e.g., restraints are somewhat of an affront to courtroom decorum, shackling may confuse the defendant — than possible impact on the presumption of innocence. None of those cases imply in any way, however, that the other factors would be sufficient, if standing alone, to violate the Constitution. Nor do they imply that the analysis would be identical if the presumption of innocence was not at risk. In fact, even in those cases in which other factors are mentioned, the critical issue emphasized by all of those courts is whether the security measure might interfere with the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence.

. In fact, shackling may help a murderer avoid the death penalty; some empirical evidence exists that supports such a view. In a poll released on January 12, 1987 by the Associated Press, 86 percent of the people polled stated that they supported the death penalty. Significantly, the number one justification cited for the death penalty — given by 42 percent of its supporters— was "to protect society from future crime that person might commit.” That is, many people who support the death penalty view it as a means, albeit an extreme one, to ensure that the criminal will not commit the same kind of crime in the future. Shackles are an outward sign that the criminal is securely controlled and demonstrates that the state can and will prevent the prisoner from being able to commit violent crimes again.
This information is not meant to prove that shackles in fact aided Elledge. Instead, I believe this kind of data demonstrates that we do not know how a sentencing juror reacts when he sees that a felon convicted of a violent murder is shackled. I therefore agree with the court’s statement that "there is no definitive answer” as to whether shackles are prejudicial. This seems to me to lead to the inexorable conclusion that it cannot be inherently prejudicial to shackle a defendant at the sentencing phase of his trial. Because this court has no more reason to believe that such shackling is prejudicial than to believe that it is not, this court should not hold that sentencing phase shackling is inherently prejudicial. Certainly, I am unwilling to presume prejudice.

. Because we need only decide whether the steps taken in this case violated Elledge’s constitutional rights, it suffices here to conclude that in this particular setting — i.e., when (1) a state trial judge, (2) shackles the defendant for specific, articulable reasons, in addition to the defend*1457ant’s status as a felon convicted of a violent murder, (3) enters those reasons in the record, (4) the defense does not request a hearing, (5) the defense does not request curative instructions, and (6) the defense does not suggest less intrusive restraints — shackling the defendant at the sentencing phase of a state murder trial at which the death penalty is sought does not offend the Constitution. I emphasize that I do not intimate that any of these elements is necessary or that the absence of one or more of them would affect my view. I also do not preclude the possibility that, as a matter of constitutional law, the trial judge could, without holding a hearing, have the defendant physically restrained at the sentencing phase of a bifurcated state trial solely on the basis of the defendant’s status as a violent felon. Although I agree that it is normally a good practice to hold a hearing before restraining defendants or witnesses, I do not think that the Constitution requires a hearing in all circumstances.

. Federal courts are "forever adding new stories to the temple of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.” Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181, 63 S.Ct. 877, 889, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1654-55, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). I would not add to the temple in these circumstances.