Court Opinion

ID: 9940043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:01:20.250841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:18.907834
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 13 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JENINA D. MAZON,                                No.    23-15243

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00198-SAB

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                Stanley Albert Boone, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted February 9, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Claimant Jenina Mazon appeals the district court’s decision affirming the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her applications

for disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Mazon alleges disability due to a

traumatic brain injury and skull fracture, as well as a seizure disorder, with

symptoms of memory loss, depression, and anxiety. “We review the district

court’s order affirming the ALJ’s denial of social security benefits de novo and

reverse only if the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the

record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” Smith v.

Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

      1.     Mazon first challenges the ALJ’s analysis of the medical opinions of

her treating neurologist, Dr. Stecker, and the state’s consultative examiner,

Dr. Swanson. Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ was required to explain

how persuasive she found these medical opinions based on two factors:

supportability and consistency. See 20 C.F.R. § 1520c(b)(2); Woods v. Kijakazi,

32 F.4th 785, 791–92 (9th Cir. 2022). The ALJ did so.

      2.     As to Dr. Stecker, the ALJ reviewed his “Physician’s Medical Source

Statement” form questionnaire and found it unpersuasive because he “failed to

provide any support for his opinion” and “included only conclusions regarding

functional limitations without any rationale for those conclusions.” In so doing,

the ALJ adequately analyzed the supportability of Dr. Stecker’s opinion. “While

an opinion cannot be rejected merely for being expressed as answers to a check-

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the-box questionnaire, the ALJ may permissibly reject check-off reports that do not

contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d

1141, 1155 (9th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).1 As to the consistency of Dr.

Stecker’s opinion, the ALJ found his analysis inconsistent with Dr. Swanson’s

consultative examination and intelligence testing, and Mazon’s own reporting of

her ability to independently perform daily activities. These, too, are valid reasons

to discount a physician’s testimony. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041

(9th Cir. 1995) (noting that inconsistency with independent clinical findings in the

record or another doctor’s opinion is an appropriate reason to reject a contradicted

opinion of a treating physician).

      3.     Mazon’s contention that the ALJ gave “undue weight” to the opinion

of Dr. Swanson is not supported by the record. The ALJ merely found Dr.

Swanson’s analysis “somewhat persuasive” and expressly considered that Dr.

Swanson rendered his opinion before Mazon started having seizures. At bottom,

the ALJ’s analysis of the supportability and consistency of Drs. Stecker’s and

Swanson’s opinions is supported by substantial evidence.

      4.     Mazon asserts that the ALJ improperly rejected her testimony, which,

1
  While Mazon asserts that “support for [Dr. Stecker’s] conclusions was included
in his treatment notes,” the record belies that assertion. As the district court noted,
the lone treatment note that Mazon identifies indicates she was seen and examined
by Dr. Fan Mo, DO, not Dr. Stecker.

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she contends, supports a disability finding. Rejection of a claimant’s testimony

requires clear and convincing reasons. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015

n.18 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ provided such reasons in its partial rejection of her

testimony.

      The ALJ found Mazon’s allegations of debilitating symptoms inconsistent

with objective medical evidence in the record, including several neurological

examinations in which Mazon was consistently observed to be alert and without

significant deficiencies in her memory, attention, fund of knowledge, or

concentration abilities. Moreover, the ALJ found Mazon’s alleged symptoms

inconsistent with reports of her admitted daily activities, such as one report from

June 2020 in which a physical therapist wrote that Mazon lived with her boyfriend

and “provides for [her] own needs with all [activities of daily living].” See also

Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1165 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Engaging in daily

activities that are incompatible with the severity of symptoms alleged can support

an adverse credibility determination.”). The ALJ also noted that Mazon’s failure

to seek any mental health treatment was inconsistent with the alleged severity of

her mental health symptoms. See also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th

Cir. 2012) (“A claimant’s failure to assert a good reason for not seeking treatment .

. . can cast doubt on the sincerity of the claimant’s pain testimony.” (citation

omitted)).

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      In sum, the ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons to discount the

severity of Mazon’s alleged symptoms. While Mazon on appeal criticizes various

non-dispositive aspects of the ALJ’s reasoning and suggests an alternative

interpretation of the evidence, she has failed to establish reversible error. See

Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154.

      5.     The ALJ determined at step five in the sequential disability evaluation

that Mazon has the residual functional capacity to perform jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy and therefore denied social security

benefits. Mazon challenges the ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination

based on her previous contentions that the ALJ improperly disregarded Dr.

Stecker’s opinion and her own subjective allegations. We reject this argument as it

“simply restates” her previous arguments. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539

F.3d 1169, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a step-five argument that “simply

restates” arguments about medical evidence and testimony).

      AFFIRMED.

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