Court Opinion

ID: 9374461
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 23:02:02.12921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.559686
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/23 Rojas v. Orion Plastics Corp. CA2/4
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                   DIVISION FOUR

   JONATHAN ROJAS,                                                    B307485
          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
          v.                                                          Super. Ct. No.
                                                                      19STCV03420)
   ORION PLASTICS
   CORPORATION,

         Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
 Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
      Amaro Baldwin, Michael L. Amaro, Rudie D. Baldwin,
 Sanaz Cherazaie and Mary E. Bevins for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Berman, Berman, Berman, Schneider & Lowary, Evan A.
 Berman and Gina M. Genatempo for Defendant and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      Jonathan Rojas appeals from the trial court’s summary
judgment in favor of Orion Plastics Corporation (Orion) on his
action for personal injuries sustained while working at Orion. On
appeal, Rojas contends the trial court erred in determining Orion
was his employer as a matter of law, and in ruling he was
statutorily barred from bringing a tort action against Rojas based
on the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. (See Lab.
Code, §§ 3602, subds. (a), (d)(1) & (d)(2).)1 For the reasons
discussed below, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The following facts are undisputed. Chartwell Staffing
Agency (Chartwell) employed Rojas, and assigned him to work at
Orion in August 2016, pursuant to the “Revised Service
Agreement” and “Service Agreement” between Chartwell and
Orion (collectively, the services agreement). Rojas worked as a
“packer” at Orion from August 2016 until February 3, 2017, when
he was injured while working on a machine used to manufacture
commercial plastic bags. The incident occurred when Rojas’s
supervisor at Orion allegedly instructed him to insert his arm
into the machine to clear a jam.
      Rojas filed a workers’ compensation claim for the incident.
On November 20, 2018, the State of California Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board issued its Order Approving the
Compromise & Release entered into between Rojas and
Chartwell.

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Labor Code.

                                2
       After receiving the workers’ compensation settlement, on
January 31, 2019, Rojas filed a complaint for personal injury
damages against Orion.2 Orion moved for summary judgment,
asserting the workers’ compensation settlement Rojas received
for his injuries while working at Orion was his exclusive remedy
for those injuries. It argued that the undisputed evidence
demonstrates that although Chartwell was Rojas’s original or
“general” employer, Orion was Rojas’s second or “special”
employer. It follows, according to Orion, that Rojas is barred from
bringing a civil action for tort damages under section 3602,
subdivision (d).3 In opposition, Rojas contended Orion failed to
meet its burden of proving both that Orion paid workers’
compensation insurance that covered Rojas’s incident, and that
Orion controlled Rojas’s employment activities such that Rojas
should be considered a special employee.
       The trial court granted Orion’s motion, finding the evidence
demonstrated Orion contracted with Chartwell to cover Rojas’s
workers’ compensation claims. It further found Orion was Rojas’s
special employer as a matter of law. It therefore held Orion is
protected from tort liability by the worker’s compensation
exclusivity rule. The court entered judgment in favor of Orion,
and Rojas timely appealed.

2     Rojas named two additional entities as defendants, neither
of which is a party to this appeal.

3     As discussed in more detail below, under section 3602,
subdivisions (a), (d)(1) and (d)(2), workers’ compensation is the
employee’s sole remedy for job-related injuries, and both the
general and the special employer are immune from lawsuits
alleging personal injury liability.

                                 3
                          DISCUSSION

A.    Standard of Review

       “A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no
triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant moving for summary judgment must show that one or
more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be
established or that there is a complete defense. (Id., subd. (p)(2).)
If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to present evidence creating a triable issue of material
fact. (Ibid.) A triable issue of fact exists if the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the fact in favor of the
party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
       “We review the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment
motion de novo, liberally construe the evidence in favor of the
party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of the opponent. (Miller v. Department of
Corrections (2005) 36 Cal.4th 446, 460 (Miller).) We must affirm a
summary judgment if it is correct on any of the grounds asserted
in the trial court, regardless of the trial court’s stated reasons.
[Citation.]” (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 631, 636-637.)

B.    Dual Employers and the Workers’ Compensation
      Exclusivity Doctrine

      Generally, an employer that provides workers’
compensation coverage for its employees is not liable in tort for
negligent injury to those employees. (§ 3602, subd. (a).) The
workers’ compensation system recognizes that employees may

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work for dual employers, with the original or “general” employer
hiring out employees to the “special” employer. (Kowalski v. Shell
Oil Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 168, 174-175 (Kowalski).) Section 3602,
subdivision (d)(1) addresses this scenario by providing, in part:
“[A]n employer may secure the payment of compensation on
employees provided to it by agreement by another employer by
entering into a valid and enforceable agreement with that other
employer under which the other employer agrees to obtain, and
has, in fact, obtained workers’ compensation coverage for those
employees. In those cases, both employers shall be considered to
have secured the payment of [workers’ compensation].” Thus,
under section 3602, subdivision (d)(1), if the general employer
agrees to obtain, and does obtain, worker’s compensation
coverage for the employees on behalf of the special employer, “the
employee is generally limited to a statutory workers’
compensation remedy for injuries he receives in the course of his
employment with the special employer; he may not bring a
separate tort action against either employer.” (Riley v. Southwest
Marine, Inc. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1248 (Riley).)
       “In determining whether a special employment relationship
exists, the primary consideration is whether the special employer
has ‘“[t]he right to control and direct the activities of the alleged
employee or the manner and method in which the work is
performed, whether exercised or not . . . .”’” (Kowalski, supra, 23
Cal.3d at p. 175.) “Factors relevant to determining whether an
employee is the borrowed employee of another include: (1)
whether the borrowing employer’s control over the employee and
the work he is performing extends beyond mere suggestion of
details or cooperation; (2) whether the employee is performing
the special employer’s work; (3) whether there was an agreement,

                                 5
understanding, or meeting of the minds between the original and
special employer; (4) whether the employee acquiesced in the new
work situation; (5) whether the original employer terminated his
relationship with the employee; (6) whether the special employer
furnished the tools and place for performance; (7) whether the
new employment was over a considerable length of time; (8)
whether the borrowing employer had the right to fire the
employee and (9) whether the borrowing employer had the
obligation to pay the employee.” (Riley, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1250.)
       “Circumstances which tend to negate the existence of a
special employment relationship include the following factors: the
worker is skilled and has substantial control over operational
details, the worker is not engaged in the borrower’s usual
business, the worker works only for a brief period of time, does
not use the tools or equipment of the borrowing employer but
uses his own tools or the tools of the lending employer and the
borrower employer neither pays the worker nor has the right to
discharge him.” (Riley, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1250.)
       Whether a special employment relationship exists is
generally a question reserved for the trier of fact. (Kowalski,
supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 175.) “However, if neither the evidence nor
inferences are in conflict, then the question of whether an
employment relationship exists becomes a question of law which
may be resolved by summary judgment.” (Riley, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at p. 1248.)

                                6
C.    The Trial Court Properly Granted Summary
      Judgment

       Rojas contends the trial court erred by concluding Rojas’s
tort action against Orion was barred as a matter of law by the
workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine for two reasons:
(1) triable issues of material fact exist regarding whether
Orion provided workers’ compensation coverage for Rojas; and
(2) triable issues of material fact exist regarding whether a
special employment relationship exists between Orion and Rojas.
We address each contention in turn below.
       As discussed above, section 3602, subdivision (d)(1) allows
an employer that borrows or leases an employee from another
employer, i.e., a staffing agency, to fulfill its statutory obligations
to obtain workers’ compensation insurance by contracting with
the staffing agency to obtain such coverage. (See § 3602, subd.
(d)(1) [“[A]n employer may secure the payment of compensation
on employees provided to it by agreement by another employer by
entering into a valid and enforceable agreement with that other
employer under which the other employer agrees to obtain, and
has, in fact, obtained workers’ compensation coverage for those
employees”].) Section 3602, subdivision (d) “was enacted ‘to allow
general and special employers to come to an agreement to ensure
that the workers are fully covered by workers’ compensation
insurance but not to burden both employers with redundant
premium payments.’ (Assem. Com. on Insurance, Rep. on Assem.
Bill No. 914 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) May 2, 1995, p. 3; see also
Sen. Com. on Industrial Relations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No.
914 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) July 12, 1995, p. 1).” (InfiNet
Marketing Services, Inc. v. American Motorist Ins. Co. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)

                                   7
        Here, Chartwell and Orion entered into a services
agreement under which Chartwell provided employees to Orion
in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The services
agreement provided “Chartwell . . . agrees to maintain . . .
workers’ compensation insurance . . . .” Thus, under the plain
terms of the services agreement, Orion “secured the payment” of
workers’ compensation coverage for Chartwell employees who
were assigned to Orion.
        Rojas contends a material triable issue of fact exists
regarding whether “Orion paid workers’ compensation premiums
for [ ] Rojas’[s] benefit.” He argues that Michael Selix, Orion’s
operations manager, could not say in his deposition “whether
Orion paid workers compensation insurance premiums that
covered [ ] Rojas” and Orion “did not have any documentation to
support the claim . . . that Orion paid workers compensation
insurance premiums for Mr. Rojas’[s] benefit.” But nothing in the
language of the statute or the legislative history suggests the
employer must provide the precise agreement regarding payment
of premiums. Rather, under section 3602, Orion needed only to
enter into a valid agreement with Chartwell under which
Chartwell agreed to obtain, and did obtain, workers’
compensation coverage for Rojas. As discussed above, the
undisputed evidence demonstrates Orion contracted with
Chartwell to obtain workers’ compensation coverage for
employees provided to Orion (see the services agreement), and
Chartwell did in fact obtain workers compensation coverage for
Orion (see the workers’ compensation settlement).
        Having concluded Orion secured the payment of workers’
compensation insurance that covered Rojas, we now turn to

                                8
whether the evidence demonstrates Orion was Rojas’s special
employer as a matter of law. We hold it does.
       In support of its motion for summary judgment, Orion
provided the following evidence: (1) Rojas worked at Orion
exclusively from August 2016 to February 2017; (2) all
information regarding Rojas’s schedule was provided to Rojas by
Orion; (3) according to Rojas’s complaint and deposition
testimony, Rojas worked under the supervision of an Orion
supervisor; (4) Rojas testified in his deposition that all training,
guidance, and supervision was provided by Orion; (5) Rojas
signed a document with an “Orion Plastics” header titled “Winder
Safety Training,” confirming Orion trained Rojas on the “winder-
safety shut off emergency wire” and that Rojas will follow the
safety training procedures at all times; (6) Rojas testified he
attended monthly meetings at Orion; and (7) according to Rojas’s
deposition testimony and documents in his personnel file, Orion
provided Rojas with essential equipment, including gloves, a
knife, a blade cutter, a hairnet, and ear protection. Based on this
evidence, we conclude Orion met its prima facie burden of
establishing it was the special employer of Rojas because it had
“‘“[t]he right to control and direct the activities of [Rojas] or the
manner and method in which the work is performed, whether
exercised or not . . . .”’” (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 175.)
       The burden therefore shifted to Rojas to establish the
existence of a triable issue of fact regarding Orion’s special
employment status. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Rojas argues material factual disputes exist based on the
following facts: (1) the services agreement requires Orion to
notify Chartwell before changing a temporary worker’s duties; (2)
Chartwell issued paychecks to Rojas; (3) Orion did not have the

                                  9
power to terminate Rojas—it could only request Chartwell to
reassign him; (4) the Workers Compensation Order Approving
the Compromise & Release lists only Chartwell as the employer.
This evidence is insufficient to create a triable issue of material
fact. These facts demonstrate Chartwell issued paychecks to
Rojas, and retained the ultimate power to terminate Rojas and
change his job duties. As discussed below, however, these facts
are insufficient to preclude a finding that Orion, as a matter of
law, was Rojas’s special employer.
       In Riley, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1246 a labor broker,
Manpower, Inc., hired the plaintiff, Riley. Manpower then
assigned Riley to work for Southwest Marine. (Ibid.) Riley’s
deposition testimony established the following: he agreed to the
Southwest Marine work assignment; he was an unskilled general
laborer who was working exclusively at Southwest Marine’s job
site; Southwest Marine personnel trained Riley, provided his
daily job instructions and supervised his work; Southwest Marine
provided all safety equipment and work tools; Riley worked for
Southwest more than briefly; he had been on the job for over
seven months at the time of his injury; and Riley believed
Southwest Marine had the power to discharge him. (Id. at p.
1250.) Although Manpower handled all payroll matters (id. at p.
1246), the court held “[t]hese facts unequivocally establish as a
matter of law, that a special employment relationship existed
between Riley and Southwest Marine.” (Id. at p. 1250)
       Similarly, in Wedeck v. Unocal Corp. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
848, 852 (Wedeck), the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s
finding on summary judgment that Unocal Corporation was
Wedeck’s special employer as a matter of law. There, plaintiff
Wedeck, a chemist, worked for Lab Support, a temporary

                                10
employee leasing agency. (Ibid.) The undisputed facts
demonstrated “Wedeck received ongoing training and instruction
from Unocal chemists concerning the work she was to perform in
the chemical laboratory; she referred to Unocal procedures
manuals and followed Unocal’s procedures and instructions in
performing her work; Unocal provided Wedeck with all of her
work assignments in the laboratory; and her quality assurance
tests were monitored by Unocal supervisors for completeness.”
(Id. at pp. 858-859.) These facts showed “Unocal had the right to
control and direct Wedeck’s activities and the manner in which
her work was performed.” (Id. at p. 858.) The court noted it
disagreed with Wedeck to the extent she contended a “triable
issue of fact arises from an evidentiary conflict as to Unocal’s
ability to discharge her from employment at Lab Support.” (Id. at
p. 862.) It explained: “Despite retaining the right to terminate the
special employment relationship, the ability of a special employer
to discharge the employee from his or her general employment
would be unusual indeed, particularly in the labor broker
context.” (Ibid, emphasis in original.)
       Like the facts in Riley and Wedeck, here the undisputed
evidence demonstrates: Orion trained and supervised Rojas;
Orion provided Rojas with necessary equipment; Rojas was
engaged in Orion’s usual business; Orion set Rojas’s schedule,
Rojas worked for Orion more than briefly (approximately six
months); and Rojas worked for Orion exclusively during that time
period. We agree with Riley and Wedeck that these facts
establish, as a matter of law, a special employment relationship
existed between Rojas and Orion. (See also Kowalski, supra, 23
Cal.3d at p. 177 [“Evidence that (1) the employee provides
unskilled labor, (2) the work he performs is part of the employer’s

                                11
regular business, (3) the employment period is lengthy, and (4)
the employer provides the tools and equipment used, tends to
indicate the existence of special employment relationship”].)
       Rojas’s attempt to distinguish Riley and Wedeck is
unavailing. Rojas contends that unlike the training and
supervision provided in those cases, here, “Orion did not
provide . . . training regarding operation of the particular
machine [ ] Rojas was using at the time of the incident” and
Orion does not have evidence “it provided [ ] Rojas with the same
level of training that it provides other employees in [ ] Rojas’[s]
position.” That the training may have been insufficient or
inadequate, however, does not refute the fact Orion provided all
training, guidance, and supervision; Rojas does not contend
Chartwell provided any training or supervision.
       Moreover, Rojas’s reliance on Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d
168 is misplaced. In Kowalski, the California Supreme Court
reversed the trial court’s grant of a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict because there was substantial evidence to support the
jury’s finding that plaintiff was not Shell Oil Company’s special
employee. (Id. at p. 179.) The facts in Kowalski are
distinguishable, however. There, unlike here, plaintiff was not
permanently assigned to Shell, he only worked on the Shell
premises for approximately two and a half months, Peterson (the
contractor company that employed plaintiff) provided all tools
and equipment to plaintiff, and plaintiff was at all times under
the direct supervision of Peterson, not Shell. (Id. at pp. 178-179.)
Accordingly, Kowalski does not assist Rojas.
       Finally, we reject Rojas’s argument that the services
agreement provides Chartwell is Rojas’s “only employer.” The
services agreement provides that “[a]ll persons furnished by

                                 12
[Chartwell] to fill positions with [Orion] shall remain employees
of [Chartwell] at all times.” This provision does not state, as
Rojas contends, that Chartwell is Rojas’s sole employer, nor does
it preclude a finding that Rojas was in a dual employment
situation. (See Riley, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1251 [“Riley’s
evidence he was [the temporary agency’s] employee did not raise
a material factual dispute; Riley was in a dual employment
situation. At the time of his injury, [the temporary agency] was
not Riley’s sole employer; Riley also had a ‘special’ employer, [the
employer to which the temporary agency assigned Riley]”].)
       On this record, we conclude Rojas failed to carry his burden
to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists regarding
whether Orion was Rojas’s special employer at the time of the
incident. As discussed above, Orion secured workers’
compensation insurance for Rojas under the terms of its services
agreement with Chartwell; thus, under section 3602, subdivisions
(d)(1) and (d)(2), Rojas is precluded from bringing his tort action
against Orion for his work-related injuries. The trial court
therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of Orion.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Orion is awarded its costs on
appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                             CURREY, Acting P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

DAUM, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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