Court Opinion

ID: 9385731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-08 00:00:34.225655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.372713
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60875     Document: 00516704908       Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/07/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                               FILED
                                                                       April 7, 2023
                                 No. 21-60875                        Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                               Clerk

   Maria Cristina Tobar,

                                                                    Petitioner,

                                     versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                  Respondent.
                  ______________________________

                     Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A094 054 378
                  ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Haynes, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:
         Maria Cristina Tobar is a native and citizen of El Salvador. An
   Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her application for Temporary Protected
   Status (“TPS”), finding that she was ineligible for such relief because she
   had not satisfied the continuous physical presence requirement. Tobar
   appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the
   IJ’s decision. We find no error and DENY Tobar’s petition for review.
Case: 21-60875     Document: 00516704908           Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                    No. 21-60875

                                         I.
          Tobar is a native and citizen of El Salvador. She originally entered the
   United States in 1997 under her birth name, Guadalupe Tobar. That same
   year, Tobar was apprehended by immigration officials and ordered removed
   in absentia. But as is often the case, Tobar remained in the United States. At
   some point, she sought to adjust her immigration status by applying for
   TPS—a discretionary form of relief that allows noncitizens to remain in the
   United States—but she applied under a different name. Tobar was granted
   TPS in 2003 under that different name and continued to renew her TPS using
   that information.
          TPS, however, requires noncitizens to maintain a continuous physical
   presence in the United States for a set period of time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a;
   Castillo-Enriquez v. Holder, 690 F.3d 667, 668–69 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing 8
   U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)). Leaving the country can break a noncitizen’s
   continuous physical presence. See Castillo-Enriquez, 690 F.3d at 668-69
   (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)). That said, noncitizens may leave the
   country without disturbing their continuous physical presence if their
   absences from the United States are “brief, casual, and innocent.” 8 U.S.C.
   § 1254a(c)(4). According to immigration regulations, a “brief, casual, and
   innocent” absence is a departure from the United States that is “of short
   duration and reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose(s) for the
   absence.” 8 C.F.R. § 1244.1.
          Since obtaining TPS, Tobar has departed the United States only on
   one occasion, but she was out of the country for 111 days. In 2015, she quit
   her job and returned to El Salvador to visit her sick father, whom she hoped
   to see once more before he passed away. She considered seeking permission
   from immigration officials to leave the United States but decided not to do so
   because her TPS was not in her own name.

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                                             No. 21-60875

            Upon her return, Tobar was apprehended by Border Patrol Agents.
   The Department of Homeland Security initiated formal removal proceedings
   against her. At her hearing before the IJ, Tobar conceded to being removable
   as charged. Tobar, nonetheless, sought relief from removal by applying once
   more for TPS—this time using her own name. 1
            At her removal hearing, the IJ determined that Tobar’s trip to El
   Salvador was a problem. That is, the IJ determined that she was ineligible for
   TPS because her 111-day absence disrupted her continuous physical presence
   in the United States. Tobar argued that her absence did not disrupt her
   presence because the absence was “brief, casual, and innocent.” The IJ,
   however, disagreed and concluded that her absence was not brief, casual, and
   innocent because it was not “of short duration” as required by 8 C.F.R. §
   1244.1.
            Tobar appealed to the BIA. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision,
   concluding that Tobar was not statutorily eligible for TPS because her
   absence did not meet the definition of “brief, casual, and innocent.” The BIA
   specifically held that Tobar “did not meet her burden of establishing that a
   departure of 111 days is a ‘short duration’ that was reasonably calculated to
   accomplish the purpose of her absence from the United States.”
            The IJ had made additional findings of fact that supported the BIA’s
   holding. First, the IJ found that although Tobar’s father had been diagnosed
   with cancer in 2002, Tobar had waited thirteen years to return to see him.
   Second, the IJ found that although Tobar stated her father had passed away
   only a week after her return to the United States in 2015, other evidence,
   which she does not seem to dispute, indicated that he did not pass away until

            _____________________
            1
              Tobar also sought relief by applying for cancellation of removal, which the IJ denied. On
   appeal to the BIA, Tobar did not contest the denial of cancellation of removal.

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                                     No. 21-60875

   2017. Thus, resting on such findings, the BIA concluded that the evidence
   did “not establish that it was necessary for her to remain for that length of
   time.” Accordingly, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied Tobar
   relief. This petition for review followed.
                                         II.
          Generally, we review only the final decision of the BIA. Orellana-
   Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Wang v. Holder,
   569 F.3d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009)). Here, the BIA issued its own opinion and
   elaborated on its own reasoning, so we review the BIA’s decision. Orellana-
   Monson, 685 F.3d at 517. “The BIA’s conclusions of law are reviewed de
   novo, although deference is given to the BIA’s interpretation of immigration
   regulations if that interpretation is reasonable.” Barrios–Cantarero v. Holder,
   772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Hernandez-Castillo v.
   Moore, 436 F.3d 516,519 (5th Cir. 2006)). That is, when the BIA’s legal
   conclusion embodies an interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation, we
   defer to the BIA’s interpretation unless it is “plainly erroneous or
   inconsistent with the regulation.” See Dominion Ambulance, L.L.C. v. Azar,
   968 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Chase Bank USA,
   N.A. v. McCoy, 562 U.S. 195, 208 (2011)).
                                         III.
          On appeal, Tobar’s primary contention is that the BIA erred in
   concluding that her absence did not meet the definition of a “brief, casual,
   and innocent absence” under 8 C.F.R. § 1244.1. In her view, the BIA
   misinterpreted the regulation by applying a per se rule that absences
   exceeding three months can never be absences “of short duration and
   reasonably calculated to accomplish” their purposes. Tobar contends that
   this interpretation was legal error because there is no statutory or regulatory
   TPS provision indicating that a departure exceeding three months cannot

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                                     No. 21-60875

   qualify as a brief, casual, and innocent absence. She further argues that 111
   days was a relatively short period of time given the circumstances.
          We can agree that the phrase “of short duration and reasonably
   calculated to accomplish the purpose(s) for the absence” is not further
   defined in § 1244.1, nor is it defined in similar regulatory provisions. The lack
   of a single, precise definition indicates, however, that the regulation is
   malleable—that is, it is to be interpretated in the light of given circumstances.
   Consequently, we defer to the BIA’s interpretation of the regulation in the
   context of this case unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
   regulation.
          Here, we see nothing suggesting that the BIA’s application of the
   regulation’s terms to the circumstances surrounding Tobar’s absence was
   plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation itself. Dominion
   Ambulance, 968 F.3d at 434; Corzo-Rodriguez v. Holder, 559 F. App’x 358, 362
   (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (deferring to BIA’s interpretation of regulation
   when it was not plainly erroneous). The BIA came to its determination that
   Tobar’s absence from the United States was not “of short duration and
   reasonably calculated to accomplish” her purpose of visiting her sick father
   in the light of a factual record that shows: (1) that she quit her job before she
   departed; (2) that she was gone for 111 days; (3) that she had waited thirteen
   years since her father’s cancer diagnosis to visit him; and (4) that the
   evidence, contrary to what she said, indicated that his death was not
   imminent—he did not die until two years after her return to the United
   States. Thus, on the totality of the record before us, we cannot say that the
   BIA erred in its conclusion that Tobar failed to satisfy the continuous
   physical presence in the United States required to be eligible for TPS.

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Case: 21-60875     Document: 00516704908          Page: 6   Date Filed: 04/07/2023

                                   No. 21-60875

                                       IV.
          For the reasons given above, Tobar’s petition for review of the BIA’s
   decision is
                                                                    DENIED.

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