Court Opinion

ID: 9512811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:26:44.561504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:36.735656
License: Public Domain

Justice ENOCH
filed a concurring opinion.
In 1995,1 wrote that Senate Bill 71 was, in my opinion, unconstitutional.2 That is still my opinion. But that question was decided to the contrary by the Court then, and the question before us is only what must a school district plead to demonstrate a claim that Senate Bill 7 operates unconstitutionally now. On this narrow question, I generally agree with the Court’s opinion and with its judgment. Therefore I concur.
I write separately to note that I too make a distinction between “accreditation” and “general diffusion of knowledge.” But I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that whether a violation under Texas Constitution article VIII, section 1-e3 has occurred can be demonstrated simply by alleging that the school district must tax at the rate set by the State to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge rather than accreditation.
For a prohibited state property tax to exist, the Legislature must both dictate the tax to be collected and dictate what is *586to be done with the tax.4 Under the Texas Constitution, it is the Legislature that must provide for the general diffusion of knowledge, not the school districts.5 The Court slides over this distinction by asserting, generally, that the Legislature has chosen to satisfy its obligation to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge through school districts, and thus, this equates to ordering the school districts to provide for the general diffusion of knowledge.6 I am not persuaded. The Legislature, through the Texas Education Code, requires only that school districts provide an accredited education.7
On the narrow question before us, I agree with the Court that the school districts should be afforded the opportunity to plead that they must tax at the tax rate set by the State to provide an accredited education. But I do not agree that the school districts can assert the need to provide for a general diffusion of knowledge and implicate an impermissible state ad valorem property tax.
That said, I join the Court’s judgment to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

. Act of May 28, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479.

. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 750 (Tex.1995) [.Edgewood IV] (Enoch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

. Tex. Const, art. VIII, § 1-e.

. See Edgewood IV, 917 S.W.2d at 737 (quoting Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d at 502).

. See Tex. Const, art. VII, § 1.

. 107 S.W.3d 584.

. See Tex. Educ.Cope §§ 39.071-.076.