Court Opinion

ID: 9912200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 19:11:00.38321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:53.323639
License: Public Domain

12/21/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                         Assigned on Briefs December 5, 2023

                  DARIUN BAILEY v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
                    No. 13-02737      Jennifer J. Mitchell, Judge
                      ___________________________________

                            No. W2023-00809-CCA-R3-PC
                        ___________________________________

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dariun Bailey, of second-degree murder,
aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-
two years of incarceration. State v. Bailey, No. W2015-00542-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL
3645141, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 29, 2016), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2016).
This Court affirmed his convictions on appeal. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for
post-conviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant to this appeal, that his trial counsel:
failed to adequately review and inspect discovery, coerced the Petitioner into testifying,
and failed to adequately meet with the Petitioner to review the evidence and prepare him
for trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After review,
we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JAMES
CURWOOD WITT, JR., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Rosalind E. Brown, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Dariun Bailey.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; G. Kirby May, Assistant Attorney
General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Vicki Carriker, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                         OPINION
                                          I. Facts
                                          A. Trial

       This case arises from the Petitioner shooting and killing his girlfriend’s brother. In
our opinion addressing the Petitioner’s direct appeal, we summarized the State’s proof as
presented at trial as follows:
       In February of 2013 Donnesha Adams was living at the Cedarwood
Apartments with [the Petitioner], who was her long-time boyfriend, and their
two-month-old daughter, M.A. . . . Ms. Adams testified that she and [the
Petitioner] lived in the apartment together “[o]n and off.” On February 20,
2013, Ms. Adams left the apartment at approximately 1:45 p.m. with [the
Petitioner] and M.A. to go to work. She planned to drive [the Petitioner] to
his grandmother’s house on Merryville Street, and she was going to drive
M.A. to Ms. Adams’[s] mother’s house so that her mother, Djana Bailey,
could babysit.

        When Ms. Adams arrived at [the Petitioner]’s grandmother’s house,
she and [the Petitioner] had already been arguing in the car. Ms. Adams
pulled up in front of the residence, and [the Petitioner] told her that she could
not leave. He then removed her keys from the ignition and threw them in the
street. [The Petitioner] eventually picked the keys up and placed them back
in the ignition; however, he continued to tell Ms. Adams that she could not
leave. She and [the Petitioner] continued arguing, and [the Petitioner] said
that he wanted to keep M.A. with him for the day at the Merryville residence.
Ms. Adams refused because the child did not have any of her supplies there.
Everything was at Ms. Bailey’s home. Ms. Adams and [the Petitioner] began
tussling in the car over M.A.’s infant carrier. [The Petitioner] managed to
get the child out of the car, and he took her into the house. He walked back
outside and told Ms. Adams to go to work. Ms. Adams then refused to leave
without her daughter. By then, Ms. Bailey had called several times. [The
Petitioner] answered Ms. Adams’[s] phone and told Ms. Bailey that Ms.
Adams was on her way there. Ms. Adams also briefly spoke with Ms. Bailey
and told her that [the Petitioner] had taken the child into the house. [The
Petitioner] eventually brought M.A. back outside and strapped her back
inside the car. Ms. Adams then attempted to leave but she and [the Petitioner]
began arguing again over money.

       Ms. Adams testified that [the Petitioner] pulled a black and silver gun
from his pants and pointed it at her. She was “terrified.” Ms. Adams then
saw a red car drive up, and her brother, Antonio Adams, stepped out of the
vehicle. [The Petitioner] thought that Ms. Adams had called her brother to
the address, and he said, “[S]o that’s how ya’ll going to do it.” [The
Petitioner] and Mr. Adams, the victim, began fighting in the street, and Ms.
Adams heard a gunshot. The victim “limped round” to the back of her car
and got in on the passenger side. He did not tell Ms. Adams that he had been
shot, and he said, “[L]et’s go.” She saw [the Petitioner] “dart” inside the
house. As Ms. Adams attempted to restart her car after the engine stopped,
[the Petitioner] walked up and shot out the passenger-side window of the

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vehicle where the victim was sitting. Ms. Adams was not sure how many
times [the Petitioner] fired the weapon. She said that the gun [the Petitioner]
used the second time was completely black. Ms. Adams testified that [the
Petitioner] walked around the front of her car to the driver’s side and told her
to “move.” Ms. Adams ducked, and [the Petitioner] shot the victim several
more times. M.A. was in the back seat of the car during the shooting. [The
Petitioner] then “ran off [ ] in the yard.” The victim said that he was dying
and told Ms. Adams to go. Ms. Adams drove the victim to Methodist North
Hospital. She said that as she drove, the victim kept falling over and
knocking her car out of gear. She had to hold the victim with her shoulder
and drive at the same time. They arrived at the hospital within five to seven
minutes. The victim later died as a result of his wounds. Ms. Adams testified
that she never saw the victim with a gun prior to the shooting.

        Kenetria Young, the victim’s girlfriend, testified that on February 20,
2013, Ms. Bailey, the victim’s mother, called the victim and asked him to
check on Ms. Adams because she was worried about Ms. Adams. Ms. Young
and the victim picked up her son from school and then drove to Merryville
Street. Ms. Young’s other child was also in the car at the time. Ms. Young
testified that they pulled up and saw Ms. Adams’[s] car parked on the side of
the street. Ms. Adams was sitting inside the car, and [the Petitioner] was
standing to the side of the vehicle. Ms. Young parked her car, and the victim
got out and closed the door. The victim walked toward [the Petitioner], and
the two men began “fist fighting.” Eventually both men fell to the ground
and were hitting each other. At that point, Ms. Young did not see a gun. Ms.
Young testified that [the Petitioner] got up and ran into the house, and the
victim got up and got into the car with Ms. Adams. Ms. Young said that [the
Petitioner] walked back out of the house, stopped “middle ways of the yard,”
and he fired what Ms. Young thought was two or three shots. [The Petitioner]
then walked to the car and kicked the window. Ms. Young testified that [the
Petitioner] “ran around the front of the car to the driver’s side. He opened
the door[,] and he started firing shots.” After that, [the Petitioner] ran back
into the yard, and Ms. Adams drove away. Ms. Young called 911, and the
operator instructed her to go to the hospital. [The Petitioner] remained
standing in the yard.

       Officer Kyle Craig of the Memphis Police Department testified that
he responded to Methodist North Hospital on February 20, 2013. As he
arrived, Ms. Adams drove up with the victim. Officer Craig spoke with Ms.
Adams who was hysterical and worried about the victim. She told Officer
Craig that “my boyfriend shot my brother.” Officer Craig also saw a baby in
the backseat of Ms. Adams’[s] car. He secured the vehicle until the crime
scene unit arrived at the hospital.

                                       3
        Officer Michael Spearman, a crime scene investigation (CSI) officer,
collected four nine[-] millimeter shell casings from the scene on Merryville
Street. From there Officer Spearman drove to Methodist North Hospital and
collected a bullet fragment taken from the victim and the victim’s clothing.
He also photographed Ms. Adams’[s] car. Officer Spearman later returned
to the Merryville address to assist in executing a search warrant. He collected
a nine[-]millimeter black High Point pistol located in the master bedroom
inside of a black gun box. Officer Spearman also found a .32 caliber revolver
in a shoe box under the couch in the “den area.” Officer Hope Smith, also a
CSI officer, testified that she processed Ms. Adams’[s] car and located four
bullet fragments in the car.

        Special Agent Eric Warren, a forensic scientist with the Tennessee
Bureau of Investigation (TBI) Crime Laboratory, Firearms Unit, testified that
he examined two firearms (a High Point Model C9 pistol and a revolver),
eight “live” rounds or cartridges, five bullet fragments, and four cartridge
cases recovered in the present case. Special Agent Warren determined that
the four cartridge cases were fired from the same weapon but not from the
High Point Model C9 that he examined. He noted that the revolver was
damaged and incapable of being fired. Special Agent Warren determined
that four of the bullet fragments had characteristics of being fired from a High
Point firearm. Due to the condition of the bullet fragments, Special Agent
Warren could not say for certain that the bullets were fired from the High
Point weapon that he examined. He also could not say for certain how many
bullets were represented among the four fragments. Special Agent Warren
testified that the fifth bullet fragment, recovered from the hospital, was larger
than the other four. He determined that it and one of the other four fragments
were fired from the same weapon.

        Dr. Erica Curry performed an autopsy on the victim. She testified that
the victim had a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest and four wounds
to his right forearm. “Three of them were entrance wounds and one was an
exit wound.” The victim also had “two entrance gunshot wounds to his right
thigh.” Dr. Curry testified that she recovered five bullets and one fragment
from the victim’s body. There were abrasions, scratches, and bruises to
various areas of the victim’s body that “could be consistent” with being in a
fist fight. Dr. Curry testified that the victim’s body showed signs of “pseudo
stippling” which meant that “a bullet travels through [an] intermediary target
either on or another object before it actually hits the body.” She agreed that
the “pseudo stippling” could have been caused by the bullet striking a
window. Dr. Curry noted that the victim’s toxicology report was positive
“for the metabolites of marijuana.” She testified that the cause of the victim’s

                                       4
       death was multiple gunshots wounds, and the manner of death was homicide.
       Dr. Curry opined that the fatal wound was the one to the victim’s chest.

Bailey, 2016 WL 3645141, at *1-3. The Petitioner also offered proof that the Petitioner
appeared in “shock” after the initial shooting and that, shortly after the shooting, the
Petitioner stated that the victim was trying to kill him. The Petitioner’s witnesses said that,
after the first shooting, the victim appeared to be wrapping a gun in a white shirt and that
the Petitioner then grabbed a gun from the grass and shot the victim again. The Petitioner
testified on his own behalf and stated that the victim attacked him and was shot by the
victim’s own weapon during the altercation. The Petitioner said that he went inside,
grabbed a gun, went back outside, and shot the victim at least six times, some of which
were while the victim was seated in Ms. Adams’s car while M.A. and Ms. Adams were
both in the car. The Petitioner testified that he disposed of his weapon in the river after the
shooting.

        Based upon this evidence, the jury convicted the Petitioner of second-degree murder
of Mr. Adams, aggravated assault of Ms. Adams, and reckless endangerment of M.A., and
the trial court sentenced him to twenty-two years of incarceration.

                                     B. Post-Conviction

        The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. In it, he alleged that
his trial counsel (“Counsel”) was ineffective because Counsel: failed to adequately review
and inspect discovery, coerced the Petitioner into testifying, and failed to adequately meet
with the Petitioner to review the evidence and prepare him for trial. The post-conviction
court held a hearing on the petition, during which the parties presented the following
evidence:

       The Petitioner testified that his first counsel, who was appointed, never provided
him with any information including anything regarding discovery. His first counsel
informed him that, if he went to trial, he would receive fifty-one years of incarceration.
The Petitioner recalled that, in July 2014, his family combined funds to hire an attorney,
Counsel. Between July 2014 and the Petitioner’s trial in January 2015, he met with
Counsel once in person. At that meeting, which occurred one month before his trial,
Counsel did not review the discovery file or discuss a defense with him and just told him
that he was set for trial. The Petitioner said he never got a chance to prepare his defense.
Later, the Petitioner testified that, at his meeting with Counsel, the Petitioner had his
discovery packet with him, but Counsel did not explain the trial process to him.

        The Petitioner said he was unaware how Counsel developed the witnesses that
testified on his behalf. He did not know that his brother was going to testify on his behalf.
The Petitioner said he never received any copies of witness statements and never discussed
with Counsel whether he planned to testify.

                                               5
        The Petitioner testified that, during trial, he learned that law enforcement had
performed a gun powder residue test on the victim. The Petitioner testified that, the
medical examiner who testified at trial said that the test came back positive, meaning that
the victim had gun powder residue on his hands. 1 The Petitioner said that the medical
examiner said that she gave the “results” to the State but that she did not see them again.
The Petitioner said his trial would have resulted differently had he known about the test
results before trial. He said Counsel should have known of these results and should have
better prepared a self-defense claim.

       During cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that his first counsel represented
him for approximately one year and that the two never discussed his case. The Petitioner
agreed that Counsel presented witnesses to support the Petitioner’s claim of self-defense
and that the Petitioner also testified on his own behalf regarding his self-defense claim. He
also conceded that he was convicted of a lesser-included offense than charged, having been
charged with first-degree murder and convicted of second-degree murder.

        The Petitioner agreed that the medical examiner testified at trial that the victim had
shot a weapon the day of this incident, which helped the Petitioner’s case. Counsel then
cross-examined the doctor. The Petitioner agreed that Counsel filed a motion for new trial
and an appeal alleging that the State had wrongfully withheld the gunshot residue tests
based on Brady v. Maryland. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not grant him relief on
this issue.

        Counsel testified that he was sure he would have visited the Petitioner in jail after
the Petitioner’s family retained him. Counsel said that he reviewed the discovery that the
State had provided, and, because it did not contain a report for gunshot residue, he assumed
that there was not one. He agreed that he did not have the swabs tested until after the trial.

        1
          The facts of the case presented differ from the Petitioner’s testimony. The medical examiner in
this case testified that she took swabs of the victim’s hands, but that testing would not definitively show
whether he fired a weapon. The State provided the defense an autopsy report that showed that the swabs
had been taken. Counsel never asked for the swabs before trial. We concluded first that the evidence had
not been withheld and second that the evidence was not material. We stated:

                 Moreover, [the Petitioner] has not shown that the evidence was material. [The
        Petitioner] admitted at trial that he was no longer threatened by the victim when he went
        inside the house, retrieved a gun, and walked back outside and shot the victim numerous
        times while the victim was seated in a car with the door shut and was presumably trying to
        leave the scene. As found by the trial court, even if the victim had fired a weapon earlier
        in the altercation, self-defense was no longer necessary when [the Petitioner] shot the
        victim. There was no testimony that the victim had a gun after he got into the car with Ms.
        Adams.

Bailey, 2016 WL 3645141, at *6.

                                                    6
He said that he “totally missed” that they existed in the autopsy report. The judge, he said,
allowed him to argue during closing argument that the State had not proven their case
because they did not offer the results of those swabs.

       Counsel said that he did not hire a private investigator. He said that, by the time he
was hired, the trial date had been set, so Counsel had to rely on the public defender’s
investigation.

        Counsel said that the major problem in this case was that the fight between the
Petitioner and the victim had ceased when the Petitioner went into the apartments and
retrieved a gun. The Petitioner came back out and started shooting. Further, two witnesses
testified that the victim did not have a gun, and no gun was found at the scene.

        During cross-examination, Counsel testified that he had practiced law for almost
fifty-five years and specialized in criminal defense. He said that he filed a motion in limine
in this case to exclude drugs and other evidence found at the Petitioner’s house that had
nothing to do with this case.

        Counsel was certain that he met with the Petitioner and his family and said he did
not think he needed a continuance in this case. He said that he cross-examined the medical
examiner about the fact that neither she nor the State tested the gunshot residue swabs. He
also argued the lack of testing during his closing argument. Counsel testified that, in the
case, the Petitioner shot the victim outside the car and then also while the victim was inside
the car, with the car door closed, while his girlfriend and child were in the car. The four
shell casings found at the scene were all fired from the same weapon.

      Counsel said he presented evidence to the jury showing that the victim was the initial
aggressor.

        The Petitioner then asked to withdraw his petition. The post-conviction court
discussed with him that, if his petition was successful, the State could pursue charges of
first-degree murder against him, as that was the initial indictment. The Petitioner said that
he did not want to gamble and wanted to withdraw his petition.

       The post-conviction court granted his motion to withdraw his petition on June 10,
2022. On June 23, 2022, the post-conviction court without explanation reinstated his
petition. On May 5, 2023, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s petition for
post-conviction relief.

                                        II. Analysis

        On appeal, the Petitioner contends that Counsel was ineffective because: (1) he
failed to review and inspect discovery because he failed to notice that the State had taken

                                              7
but not independently tested gunshot residue swabs; (2) coerced the Petitioner to testify;
and (3) failed to adequately prepare him for trial. The State counters that the Petitioner did
not prove these claims, and we agree.

       In order to obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her
conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional
right. T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2018). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual
allegations in the petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
§ 40-30-110(f) (2018). Upon review, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the
evidence below; all questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value
to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved
by the trial judge, not the appellate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn.
1999) (citing Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997)). A post-conviction
court’s factual findings are subject to a de novo review by this Court; however, we must
accord these factual findings a presumption of correctness, which can be overcome only
when a preponderance of the evidence is contrary to the post-conviction court’s factual
findings. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s
conclusions of law are subject to a purely de novo review by this Court, with no
presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

       The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee
Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d
453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following
two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

               First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was
       deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
       counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by
       the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient
       performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
       errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose
       result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be
       said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the
       adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d
417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

       In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine
whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must show that

                                                8
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House v.
State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.
1996)).

        When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court
should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, taking
into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Mitchell, 753
S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Under the two-prong test enunciated by
Strickland, and adopted by our Tennessee courts, a petitioner must show that counsel made
errors that were so serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so that he
was denied a fair trial. The reviewing court should avoid the “distorting effects of
hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of
the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689-90. In doing so, the reviewing court must be highly deferential and “should indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Finally, we note that a defendant in a
criminal case is not entitled to perfect representation, only constitutionally adequate
representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In other
words, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘we address not what is
prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp,
483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)).
Counsel should not be deemed to have been ineffective merely because a different
procedure or strategy might have produced a different result. Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d
276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). “‘The fact that a particular strategy or tactic failed
or hurt the defense, does not, standing alone, establish unreasonable representation.
However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical choices applies only if the choices
are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’” House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting
Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369).

        If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable
standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by
demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability must
be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994).

                                       A. Discovery

       The Petitioner contends that Counsel was ineffective because he did not notice that
the State had taken, but not tested, gunshot residue swabs from the victim’s hands. The
post-conviction court found that the Petitioner had not offered proof at the hearing about

                                             9
what the test results of the swabs would have shown and noted that the results could have
shown that the victim did not have gunshot residue on his hands. The post-conviction court
further noted that there was overwhelming proof that the Petitioner shot the victim once
and the gun malfunctioned. The Petitioner then went inside his grandmother’s house,
retrieved another weapon, came back out and shot the victim again at close range. The
post-conviction court concluded that the Petitioner had failed to prove prejudice. We agree.

        The Petitioner did not present any evidence at the post-conviction hearing to show
what testing of the gunshot residue swabs would have shown. “As a general rule, this is
the only way the petitioner can establish that . . . the failure to have a known witness present
or call the witness to the stand resulted in the denial of critical evidence which inured to
the prejudice of the petitioner.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869 (Tenn. 2008) (citing
Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)). By failing to produce a
gunshot residue test result at the hearing, the Petitioner has failed to present evidence to
meet the burden required of him. See Lewis v. State, No. W2020-00653-CCA-R3-PC, 2021
WL 3140352, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2021) (holding that “[b]y failing to show
how ballistics tests or expert testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial, [the
p]etitioner has failed to prove this allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel by clear
and convincing evidence.”), no perm. app. filed; Roberson v. State, No. E2020-00643-
CCA-R3-PC, 2021 WL 2373819, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2021) (concluding
that the petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief because the petitioner did not
present any evidence at the post-conviction hearing that further DNA or lubricant testing
would have changed the outcome of the case, and we cannot grant relief based on
speculation.”) (citing Moffitt v. State, No. W2016-02487-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 4124166,
at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 18, 2017) (stating that, because the petitioner “did not offer
any DNA testing[,] there is no proof that any of this evidence would have aided the
[p]etitioner’s defense”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2018)). Accordingly, because
any results of the gunshot residue tests are speculative, the Petitioner cannot show that he
was prejudiced by Counsel’s failure to notice that gunshot residue swabs had been taken,
but not tested by the State. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this issue.

                                 B. Petitioner’s Testimony

        The Petitioner next contends that Counsel was ineffective because he coerced the
Petitioner into testifying, which harmed the Petitioner’s case as the Petitioner felt
unprepared. The post-conviction court noted that the decision of whether to testify was
left to the Petitioner and that, while he may have felt unprepared, he chose to testify. It
concluded that the Petitioner had not proven that Counsel was deficient in this regard, and
we agree.

       The evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing does not preponderate against
the post-conviction court’s finding. Counsel met with the Petitioner before trial, and the
two were both operating from a self-defense strategy. The Petitioner said that he had a

                                              10
copy of the State’s discovery packet at that meeting. The Petitioner did not present any
evidence to support his claim that Counsel “coerced” him into testifying, and the post-
conviction court found that the Petitioner chose of his own free will to testify. The
Petitioner offered his perspective in support of the self-defense theory, and Counsel called
witnesses to support that defense. The Petitioner has not offered proof that he was coerced
into testifying or that Counsel was deficient in this regard. He is not entitled to relief on
this issue.

                        C. Failure to Meet and Prepare for Trial

       Finally, the Petitioner contends that Counsel was ineffective because he did not
adequately meet with the Petitioner before trial to review the evidence or prepare the
Petitioner for trial. The post-conviction court found that the Petitioner had not proven his
claim by clear and convincing evidence. We agree.

       The Petitioner testified at trial that Counsel only met with him once before trial. Jail
records indicate that Counsel met with the Petitioner on at least two occasions, December
14, and December 30, 2014, which was shortly before the January 2015 trial. The
Petitioner said he never received discovery, and then later testified that he had discovery
with him during the one and only meeting he had with Counsel.

       We conclude that Counsel and the Petitioner both were aware that the Petitioner was
asserting self-defense at trial. Counsel and the Petitioner, who at trial testified on his own
behalf, presented this claim through the Petitioner and other witnesses. The Petitioner was
convicted of a lesser-included offense. The Petitioner has offered no evidence as to how
meeting more frequently with Counsel would have aided his defense. We conclude that
the post-conviction court did not err when it denied relief on this claim. The Petitioner is
not entitled to relief on this issue.

                                      III. Conclusion

   Based on the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

                                               ____________________________________
                                                    ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE

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