Court Opinion

ID: 9752840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:37:02.186605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:23.078272
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority here holds, among other things, that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in overruling an objection to a portion of the State’s Attorney’s closing argument. It finds that the objected to portion of the closing argument was nothing more than an effort to attack the credibility of an expert witness. In my view, the objected to portion of the closing argument constituted a contradiction of the trial judge’s previous ruling that the sole defense psychiatrist was qualified and competent and, consequently, that his expert opinion, that as a result of mental disorders the appellant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, was admissible. It also contradicted the trial judge’s binding instruction that the jury should consider, among other things, the defense psychiatrist’s expert opinion. Under established Maryland law, a ruling and binding instruction on such matters cannot be disputed by counsel in argument to the jury. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Here the record shows that the appellant was 17-years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. The record further shows that the appellant’s sole defense was insanity. The appellant called only one witness, Dr. Robert B. Lehman (defense psychiatrist), who testified that he was graduated from the University of Maryland School of Medicine in 1971; that in that year he was licensed to practice medicine in the State of Maryland; that he was trained in general psychiatry and child and adolescent psychiatry at the Sheppard-Pratt Hospital; that for seven years he had been in private practice specializing in adolescent and child psychiatry; that he was on the staff of the Baltimore County General Hospital; that he was a clinical instructor in child and adolescent psychiatry at the University of Maryland School of Medicine; and that his clinical and *438educational skills in psychiatry were certified to by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.
When defense counsel asked that the defense psychiatrist be qualified as an expert witness, the State indicated that it had “no questions” and did not cross examine the defense psychiatrist with respect to his qualifications. The trial judge then ruled that the defense psychiatrist was qualified as an expert. The State did not object to the trial judge’s ruling.
The record further shows that the defense psychiatrist gave oral testimony and submitted a written report in which, among other things, he expressed the opinion that, as a result of mental disorders, the appellant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The State did not object to the admission of this evidence.
After the State and the defense rested, the trial judge instructed the jury. With respect to expert testimony, the trial judge said:
“You will recall we have heard several doctors or psychiatrists’ testimony in this case. A witness who has special training or experience in a given field is permitted to express opinions based on observed or assumed facts to aid you in deciding the issues in this case. In weighing the opinions of experts you should consider the expert’s experience, training, and skills, and the expert’s knowledge of the subject matter about which he is expressing an opinion. You should give expert testimony the weight and value you believe it should have. You are not required to accept any expert’s opinion. You should consider an expert’s opinion together with all the other evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the record shows that in closing argument, the State’s Attorney argued to the jury as follows:
“In that regard whom did the defense put on to testify that this defendant was in fact insane at the time of the offense? I submit to you nobody. Nobody testified he was insane at the time of the offense. Dr. Lehman *439testified and Dr. Lehman has no formal training in forensic psychiatry. He has a practice limited to child and adolescent psychiatry. He is not affiliated with any State or mental hospital, and he has in the past only examined five defendants to determine their responsibility at the time of a given offense. He, unlike Dr. Spodak and Dr. Blumberg, is eminently unqualified to give an opinion seven months after the occurrence of an offense as to what the defendant’s mental state was at the time of the offense." (Emphasis added.)
Defense counsel’s objection to this portion of the argument was overruled by the trial judge.
Finally, the record shows that in closing argument, defense counsel placed heavy emphasis on the evidence of insanity adduced by the defense psychiatrist. Initially, in explaining that the State had the burden of proof on the question of sanity, he said:
“All the doctors agree he is crazy.
They all will agree he is crazy. Now, the job of this jury really is to determine how crazy is he. The State has to prove he is sane. The burden of proof is on them, not on us. We have already proved that he is insane, but the burden is on the State to prove he was sane.” (Emphasis added.)
The significance of the evidence of insanity adduced by the defense psychiatrist was again stressed at the conclusion of defense counsel’s closing argument when he said:
“I also leave you with something else that is extremely important. I leave you with a copy of Dr. Lehman’s report, the same exact copy that he gave to me, not edited, not inked out, bad things as well as good. Contrary to what [the State’s Attorney] says, Dr. Lehman’s qualifications are very, very good. He is a specialist in adolescent psychiatry, and he is board certified. That is very difficult to get done. I have prepared a number of *440copies of this report for you to take into the jury room with you to refer to.” (Emphasis added.)
I agree with the majority that “both the State’s Attorney and defense counsel are given wide latitude in the conduct of closing argument, including the right to explain or to attack all the evidence in the case.” Nevertheless, under Maryland law, there are limitations upon the general scope of permissible closing argument. Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 413-23, 326 A.2d 707, 714-20 (1974).
Under Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,1 as construed by this Court, there is an established dichotomy between the role of the trial judge and the jury with respect to the determination of questions of law. Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981); Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. 167, 178-80, 423 A.2d 558, 564-65 (1980). The jury’s authority is limited to deciding “the law of the crime” or “the definition of the crime” as well as “the legal effect of the evidence.” Stevenson, 289 Md. at 178, 423 A.2d at 564. All other legal issues are for the trial judge alone to decide. Stevenson, 289 Md. at 179, 423 A.2d at 565. More particularly, questions of the qualification and competency of expert and other witnesses and the admissibility of evidence are for the trial judge alone to determine and are not for the jury to decide. Stevenson, 289 Md. at 179, 423 A.2d at 564; Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 338, 368 A.2d 1005, 1015 (1977); Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 243 Md. 574, 582, 221 A.2d 894, 898 (1966); Turner v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 428, 433, 132 A.2d 455, 457 (1957). Once evidence is admitted, the jury’s function is limited to determining its weight. Duffin v. State, 229 Md. 434, 436, 184 A.2d 624, 625 (1962); Rasin v. State, 153 Md. 431, 435, 138 A. 338, *441340 (1927); see Bellamy v. State, 50 Md.App. 65, 72-73, 435 A.2d 821, 825 (1981), cert. denied, 292 Md. 376 (1982).
A trial judge’s instructions on the legal questions of the qualification and competency of expert and other witnesses and the admissibility of evidence are binding upon the jury and may not be disputed by counsel in argument to the jury. Montgomery, 292 Md. at 88, 437 A.2d at 656; Stevenson, 289 Md. at 180, 423 A.2d at 565; Md.Rule 4-325(f).2 Manifestly, a trial judge’s rulings on qualification and competency of expert witnesses and on the admissibility of evidence, like a trial judge’s instructions on such legal questions, are binding upon the jury and may not be disputed by counsel in argument to the jury.
The rationale underlying this principle was expressed by this Court as long ago as 1881 in Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 120-21 (1881). There this Court said:
“[Counsel] are still officers of the court, and under its proper control, and if the court expresses an opinion on a question of law, upon which it has a right to express it, and a party considers himself aggrieved by it, he has his remedy, either by petition in the nature of a writ of error, or by a bill of exception. But counsel have no right, and ought not to be permitted to argue against it before the jury, in order to induce them to disregard it.”
This rationale is equally valid today. Arguments that contradict a trial judge’s binding rulings and instructions on questions of law inevitably create confusion and may well induce the jury not to consider evidence for inappropriate reasons—reasons that are contrary to law. While a jury may appropriately disregard admitted expert opinion evidence after considering it and determining that it lacks credibility and, therefore, is not entitled to any weight, it is inappropriate for a jury to disregard such evidence without *442considering it at all. Indeed, the administration of justice is not furthered by permitting counsel to encourage juries not to consider evidence for reasons that are contrary to law. Thus, it is not within the general scope of permissible closing argument to mislead the jury by inducing it to disregard the trial judge’s binding rulings and instructions on questions of law.
Here the trial judge ruled that the defense psychiatrist was qualified and competent and, consequently, that his expert opinion that as a result of mental disorders the appellant was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was admissible evidence to be considered by the jury. Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider that expert opinion. If the State’s Attorney was of the view that the defense psychiatrist was not qualified and that his opinion was inadmissible and should not have been considered by the jury, he should have objected and preserved the issue for review. However, the State’s Attorney did not object. Instead, he argued to the jury that the defense psychiatrist was “eminently unqualified” and that “[njobody testified [that the appellant] was insane at the time of the offense.” In essence, the State’s Attorney argued to the jury that the defense psychiatrist was not qualified and that, consequently, his opinion was inadmissible and should not be considered by the jury.
In sum, the State’s Attorney’s argument was not merely an attack on the credibility of the defense psychiatrist. Rather, it was a contradiction of the trial judge’s previous ruling and binding instruction. It was, therefore, misleading and confusing. The State’s Attorney had no right and ought not to have been permitted to induce the jury not to consider the defense psychiatrist’s expert opinion on the question of sanity for inappropriate reasons—reasons contrary to the trial judge’s previous ruling and binding instruction, and therefore contrary to law. In my view, the objected to portion of the State’s Attorney’s closing argument exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument.
*443In this case, the appellant’s sole defense was insanity. The defense psychiatrist was the only witness that the appellant called. At the time of the trial in this case, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was sane at the time the criminal acts were committed.3 Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 513, 200 A.2d 150, 155 (1964). Consequently, at the moment of truth, the jury’s verdicts depended upon whether the evidence presented by the defense psychiatrist was sufficiently compelling to raise a reasonable doubt as to the appellant’s sanity. The State’s Attorney’s improper closing argument may well have misled and confused the jury, and induced it, for inappropriate reasons, not to consider the only evidence presented by the appellant to raise a reasonable doubt. Under these circumstances, I cannot, upon reviewing the record, declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the objected to portion of the State’s Attorney’s closing argument in no way influenced the jury’s verdicts. Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial.4

. Art. 23 of the Md. Declaration of Rights provides in pertinent part:
"In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.” (Emphasis added.)

. Md.Rule 4—325(f) provides:
"Nothing in this Rule precludes any party from arguing that the law applicable to the case is different from the law described in the instructions of the court stated not to be binding."

. Chapter 501 of the 1984 Laws of Maryland, effective 1 July 1984, provides in pertinent part:
“12-209. Not Criminally Responsible—Plea and Verdict.
“(b) Burden of Proof.
"The defendant has the burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense of not criminally responsible.”

. In light of this conclusion, I need not consider the other issues addressed in the majority opinion.