Court Opinion

ID: 9530614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:36.087491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:11.437021
License: Public Domain

Hunter, J.
(dissenting) — -The rule that this court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court in child custody matters unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion, is so well established that citation is unnecessary.
The majority has in effect followed this rule but has avoided its impact by holding the trial court erroneously applied the tender-years doctrine to a child of school age. The majority has thereby created a rule placing school-age children beyond the purview of the tender-years doctrine. I disagree.
First, the majority is in error as to the facts to which it applies this announced rule. The minor child, at the time of the hearing on November 5, 1958, and the entry of the decree of modification on December 18, 1958, was not of school age, having become five years of age on November *785, 1958. This court can take judicial notice that six years is the accustomed age for the enrollment of children in public schools.
Second, I am convinced the majority has imposed an arbitrary limitation upon the tender-years doctrine. This court has never attempted to limit the application of the doctrine by years and months. Such a limitation is in conflict with the accepted rule that each child custody case must turn on its own particular facts. Moreover, any rule applied in child custody matters must necessarily be flexible. It must not be circumscribed by artificial and arbitrary limitations lest such limitations frustrate the court’s paramount objective of acting for the best interest and welfare of the child.
The majority opinion assumes the tender-years doctrine is premised only upon the constant physical needs of an infant. There is no authority for such an assumption. On the contrary, as this court has observed, physical care is but a minor part of rearing a child. Braun v. Braun, 31 Wn. (2d) 468, 197 P. (2d) 442 (1948); Warnecke v. Warnecke, 28 Wn. (2d) 259, 182 P. (2d) 699 (1947).
The majority fails to consider that the welfare of a child is best served by insuring that it will learn the moral and spiritual values essential to the development of good character, for which a mother’s untiring patience and devotion make her the most effective teacher during a child’s impressionable years.
Finally, the majority disregards a child’s need for emotional security during those impressionable years, which is best provided by a mother’s constant love and understanding.
The trial court should be affirmed.