Court Opinion

ID: 9796279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:53:36.352456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:40.072834
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision. I write separately to point out that, in my view, this court’s recent decision In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932] (Nicholas H.), which holds that a nonbiological father may nonetheless meet the statutory definition of a “presumed” father, makes the majority’s outcome in this case a foregone conclusion.
I.
Emily B. and Elisa B. began living as a couple in 1993. Each woman wanted to bear her own child; eventually each underwent artificial insemination with sperm from the same donor so that their offspring would be genetically related. In 1997, Elisa gave birth to a son, Chance. In 1998, Emily gave birth to twins (son Ry and daughter Kaia). Ry was bom with serious health problems, including Down’s syndrome. All three children were given the same hyphenated surname. As they had planned, Emily stayed home and cared for the three children, while Elisa worked to support the family. Elisa claimed all three children as her dependents for tax purposes and on an application for health insurance, and she described herself in a job interview as the mother of triplets.
In late 1999, the couple separated, but for some time Elisa continued to pay rent and living expenses for Emily and the twins. In December 1999, Emily began receiving public assistance from El Dorado County. In May 2001, Elisa told Emily that because she no longer had a full-time job she could not continue to support Emily and the twins. The next month, the county filed a petition in the superior court to determine that Elisa was a parent of the twins bom to Emily, the first step in making Elisa financially responsible for them.
The trial court, relying on this court’s test in Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776] (the preconception intent to become a parent), mled that Elisa had intended to bring about the birth of Emily’s children, and thus her obligation to them should be “the same legal duty and responsibility of a man found to be a presumed father”—that is, a man who has received a child into his home and openly held it out as his *128natural child. (Earn. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).)1 It ordered Elisa to pay child support for the twins. Elisa successfully petitioned the Court of Appeal for writ relief. The Court of Appeal reasoned that under California’s statutory scheme Elisa was neither the natural nor the adoptive mother of her partner’s twins, nor could she be their father, and therefore Elisa had no legally recognized parental status with respect to the twins. Accordingly, it directed the trial court to vacate the child support order.
II.
Under California law, a man “is presumed to be the natural father of a child” in various circumstances involving his marriage or attempted marriage to the child’s mother, or if he “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” (Earn. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).) Section 7650 expressly directs that “[i]nsofar as practicable,” the provisions pertaining to the father and child relationship apply in determining the existence of a mother and child relationship. (§ 7650.)
In Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, this court held that a nonbiological father who receives a child into his home and holds the child out as his natural child can be the “presumed” father of the child. If a nonbiological father can by his conduct meet the statutory definition of a presumed father, then by parity of reasoning a nonbiological mother can become a presumed mother, as the majority concludes. Here, Elisa became a presumed mother of the twins to which Emily gave birth when she both received the twins into her home and openly held them out as her natural children. (§ 7611, subd. (d).)
The legal presumption of fatherhood or motherhood created by receiving and holding out the child as one’s natural child “may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.” (§ 7612, subd. (a).) We concluded in Nicholas H, supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, that the action was not an appropriate one in which to allow rebuttal of the presumption, because the result there would have been to leave Nicholas fatherless.
This case too is not “an appropriate action” in which to rebut the presumption of presumed motherhood. (§ 7612, subd. (a).) The county, which since 1999 has provided the twins with public financial assistance and medical care, brought on their behalf an action in superior court to establish their parentage as a predicate to obtaining a court order requiring Elisa to pay child support. Young Ry and Kaia, no less than any other children in this state, have a right to support from both their parents. Those parents are *129Emily, as the biological mother, and Elisa, because she meets the statutory definition of a presumed mother. To permit rebuttal of the legal presumption that Elisa is the presumed mother of the twins would leave the twins with the support of only one parent, Emily, who, until now, has been receiving financial support and medical care from the taxpayers of the county in which she and the twins reside.
Had a man who, like Elisa, lacked any biological connection to the twins received them into his home and held them out as his natural children, this case would, under this court’s holding in Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, undoubtedly have resulted in a determination that he met the statutory criteria for being the presumed father of the twins. These legal principles apply with equal force in this case, where Elisa, whom the county seeks to hold financially accountable for support of the twins, meets the statutory criteria of a presumed mother, a status that brings with it the benefits as well as the responsibilities of parenthood. The flip side of a familiar adage comes to mind: What is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose.

 All further statutory references are to the Family Code.