Court Opinion

ID: 9379258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 13:02:43.050791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.265692
License: Public Domain

***********************************************
    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-
ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-
lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was
released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-
ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions
and petitions for certification is the “officially released”
date appearing in the opinion.

   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut
Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of
discrepancies between the advance release version of an
opinion and the latest version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is to
be considered authoritative.

   The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the
opinion as it appears in the Connecticut Law Journal and
bound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not
be reproduced and distributed without the express written
permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publica-
tions, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
***********************************************
      MARIA J. DERBLOM, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE
          OF FRED H. RETTICH), ET AL. v.
           ARCHDIOCESE OF HARTFORD
                    (SC 20584)
     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiffs, who were the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest
   that R had made to a defunct archdiocesan school (OLM) under the
   auspices of the defendant archdiocese, sought, inter alia, to establish
   and enforce the terms of a constructive trust. The plaintiffs are the
   executrix of R’s estate, eleven former students of OLM and their parents,
   and M Co., which operates a private Catholic school that purports to
   be OLM’s successor. Before his death, R donated a large sum of money
   to OLM, as it was important to him that parents be able to send their
   children to a Catholic school in the town of Madison, where OLM was
   located. After R died, his residual estate was distributed to OLM pursuant
   to his will, which contained a residuary clause in favor of OLM ‘‘or its
   successor, for its general uses and purposes.’’ The defendant thereafter
   announced that it would close OLM and another archdiocesan school
   and open a new school in the town of Branford. Some parents of students
   attending OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, subsequently
   formed M Co., intending to establish a new Catholic school in Madison
   that would retain OLM’s mission. In their complaint, the plaintiffs
   alleged, inter alia, that R’s bequest to OLM should be viewed as an
   endowment that resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff
   students, with the defendant acting as trustee, and that the defendant
   had an equitable duty to convey the unspent portion of the bequest to
   M Co., as OLM’s ‘‘successor,’’ or back to R’s estate. The executrix of
   R’s estate also sought a judgment declaring whether the endowment
   should be conveyed to M Co., or some other appropriate entity, for the
   benefit of the plaintiffs or if the endowment to OLM had lapsed with
   no clear successor, such that the funds should be returned to R’s estate.
   The defendant moved to dismiss the action, contending that none of
   the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the terms of a completed charitable
   gift to a school. The defendant relied on the common-law rule, codified
   by statute (§ 3-125), that the state attorney general has the exclusive
   authority to bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable gift.
   The plaintiffs objected on the ground that they had standing under the
   exception to that rule for persons who have a special interest in the
   enforcement of a charitable trust. The trial court, however, granted
   the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Court affirmed,
   agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The
   Appellate Court concluded that R’s bequest to OLM was an outright or
   absolute gift to OLM, rather than an endowment that resulted in a
   charitable trust, and that the special interest exception did not apply
   when, as in the present case, the charitable gift is unencumbered by
   specific restrictions on its use. On the granting of certification, the
   plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court properly
   upheld the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ action for lack of
   standing:

1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that R’s bequest to OLM was
    an outright, unrestricted gift:

   When a donor specifies that a gift must be used for the donee’s ‘‘general
   uses and purposes,’’ the only limitation on the donee’s use of the gift is
   that the donee must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed by the
   donee’s charter or articles of incorporation, and, because this limitation
   applies to all charitable gifts, regardless of whether it is expressly
   included in the instrument conferring the gift, the ‘‘general uses and
   purposes’’ language in R’s bequest to OLM evinced an intent that it was
   unrestricted rather than restricted.

   Moreover, the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that R’s gift to
   OLM was restricted on the ground that R specified in his will that, if
   OLM became incapable of possessing or using the gift, the unspent
   portion should go to OLM’s ‘‘successor,’’ as that claim was based on
   allegations that R’s will evinced an intent that M Co., as the entity with
   the mission that most closely approximates the mission of OLM, should
   be the cy pres beneficiary of the gift to OLM, rather than on any allegation
   that M Co. was OLM’s successor corporation in the legal sense, and the
   plaintiffs’ claim was inadequately briefed insofar as the plaintiffs did not
   refer to the cy pres doctrine in their briefs or cite to any authority for
   the proposition that proof of such intent means that there is an implied
   restriction on the trust or gift such that a potential cy pres beneficiary
   has standing to initiate proceedings to enforce the donor’s intent.

2. The Appellate Court correctly determined that, under the specific facts and
    circumstances of the present case, the plaintiffs did not have standing
    to bring an action to enforce R’s unrestricted bequest to OLM under
    the special interest exception to the rule that the state attorney general
    has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift:

   When a donor has made a gift to a charitable organization that is
   unrestricted by any contractual terms or qualifications, the donee organi-
   zation is the sole beneficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its
   use is that the organization must use it in furtherance of the duties
   imposed on it by its charter or articles of incorporation, and this court
   was not aware of any case in which a court had held that the potential
   beneficiaries of a charitable organization have standing to bring an action
   to compel the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner.

   Moreover, even if there were rare instances in which the beneficiary of
   a charitable organization could be found to have a special interest suffi-
   cient to confer standing to bring an action to force the organization to
   use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner, this was not such an
   instance, as students enrolled in educational institutions constitute a
   constantly fluctuating group, and concluding that a particular student
   or group of students has standing to bring an action to enforce the terms
   of a trust created to benefit the institution would undermine the primary
   purpose behind the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive
   standing to bring such an action, which is to limit the number of persons
   who have standing to initiate litigation.
      Argued November 21, 2022—officially released March 14, 2023

                            Procedural History

   Action to establish a constructive trust, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Haven, where the court, Pierson, J., granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judg-
ment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the
Appellate Court, Lavine, Prescott and Alexander, Js.,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the
plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
  Drzislav Coric, with whom were Brandon Marley
and, on the brief, Cody A. Layton, for the appellants
(plaintiffs).
  Lorinda S. Coon, with whom were John W. Sitarz
and, on the brief, Kay A. Williams, for the appellee
(defendant).
                          Opinion

   ROBINSON, C. J. The sole issue in this certified
appeal is whether the plaintiffs,1 who are the putative
beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest, have standing
under the special interest exception to the common-
law rule, codified at General Statutes § 3-125, that the
attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the
terms of a charitable gift, to enforce the terms of a
bequest from Fred H. Rettich to Our Lady of Mercy
School (OLM) in Madison. The plaintiffs appeal, upon
our granting of their petition for certification,2 from the
judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the
trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss filed by
the defendant, the Archdiocese of Hartford. Derblom
v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 203 Conn. App. 197, 217,
247 A.3d 600 (2021). On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that
the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that they
lacked standing to bring this action. We conclude that
the plaintiffs do not come within the ‘‘special interest’’
exception to the attorney general’s exclusive standing
to bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable
gift. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Appel-
late Court.
   The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the
following facts, as alleged in the complaint or as estab-
lished by uncontested evidence submitted in conjunc-
tion with the motion to dismiss. ‘‘In April, 2012, Rettich
executed a will that contained a residuary clause in
favor of OLM ‘or its successor, for its general uses
and purposes.’3 Beginning in 2004, OLM had become
an archdiocesan school under the auspices of the
defendant.
  ‘‘It was important to Rettich that residents of Madison
be able to send their children to a Catholic school in
Madison. Prior to the execution of his will leaving the
residue of his estate to OLM, Rettich had donated
$500,000 to OLM. OLM later sent a letter to Rettich that
marked the anniversary of that donation and informed
him that $200,000 of the donated funds had been used
by OLM to establish an endowment to ‘ensure [OLM’s]
future.’ The letter stated that the money was ‘invested
and protected by the [defendant] for the exclusive use
of OLM by US Trust.’ In his will, Rettich made no refer-
ence to his earlier donation or to any endowed funds
or existing trust benefiting OLM.’’ (Footnote in original;
footnote omitted.) Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford,
supra, 203 Conn. App. 200–201.
  ‘‘Rettich died on September 27, 2013. [The named
plaintiff, Maria J. Derblom, the executrix of Rettich’s
estate] administered Rettich’s estate, and, in April, 2015,
she filed a final accounting of the estate with the Pro-
bate Court. The Probate Court accepted the accounting
and ordered distribution in accordance with it. The
amount of Rettich’s residual estate was $4,745,110.86.
The estate remitted that amount by check to OLM.4
   ‘‘More than two years later, in January, 2018, the
defendant announced that it would be closing OLM and
another parish school in Branford, Saint Mary School.
It indicated that it intended to open a new school, East
Shoreline Catholic Academy (ESCA), which would be
located at the former Saint Mary School site in Branford.
According to a press release appended to the underlying
complaint, ‘[t]he formation of ESCA is not considered
a merger, because [OLM and Saint Mary School] will
cease to exist and a new corporation . . . will be
formed. ESCA, however, will continue to be operated
by the same three parishes [that operated OLM and
Saint Mary School].’
  ‘‘On February 28, 2018, shortly after the announce-
ment of OLM’s closing, some parents of students attending
OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, formed
the plaintiff corporation, Our Lady of Mercy School of
Madison, Inc., with the intent to form a new Catholic
school in Madison that, as alleged in the complaint,
would ‘[keep] the current mission and vision of OLM
intact.’5 The plaintiffs further alleged that, ‘[s]ince its
founding, [the plaintiff corporation] has raised over $1
million in additional pledges to augment the endowment
by [Rettich], filed for 501c (3) status,6 developed a finan-
cial plan, identified a sponsor of independent Catholic
schools and developed a curriculum. Additionally, [the
plaintiff corporation] is in the process of hiring a princi-
pal and teachers for the school.’ . . .
   ‘‘In April, 2018, the plaintiffs initiated the underlying
action. The complaint contained seven counts and incor-
porated by reference and attached a number of exhibits.
Count one was brought on behalf of the plaintiff stu-
dents and alleged that Rettich’s bequest to OLM should
be viewed as an endowment that resulted in a construc-
tive trust benefiting the plaintiff students with the defen-
dant acting as trustee. It asserted that the defendant
has an equitable duty to convey the corpus of that alleged
trust to the plaintiff corporation or, alternatively, back
to Rettich’s estate for distribution because the defen-
dant ‘would be unjustly enriched if it were permitted
to retain the endowment and disseminate it at its own
discretion and for purposes wholly unrelated to the
operation and preservation of OLM or a rightful succes-
sor.’ Count two, also brought on behalf of the plaintiff
students, sounded in breach of fiduciary duty [and was]
premised on the defendant’s having closed OLM and
its alleged misappropriation of the ‘endowment’ from
Rettich. Counts three and four were brought by the
plaintiff parents and effectively tracked the first two
counts, sounding in constructive trust and breach of
fiduciary duty. Counts five and six were brought by the
plaintiff corporation and Derblom, respectively, and, as
in the prior counts, alleged the existence of a construc-
tive trust and an equitable duty on the part of the defen-
dant to convey any and all funds to the plaintiff corporation
for the intended beneficiaries or, alternatively, to the
estate. Finally, in count seven, Derblom asserted on
behalf of the estate ‘a legal and/or equitable interest in
the endowment made to OLM, by reason of danger of
loss or uncertainty’ and sought a declaratory judgment
‘determining [1] whether the endowment shall be con-
veyed to [the plaintiff corporation] or some other appro-
priate entity for the benefit of the [p]laintiffs; [and] [2]
whether the endowment to OLM has lapsed with no
clear successor and all funds shall be returned to
[Rettich’s estate] for dissemination to his rightful heirs
at law.’ ’’ (Footnotes altered; footnote in original; foot-
notes omitted.) Id., 201–204.
   The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending
that none of the plaintiffs had standing to bring an
action to enforce the terms of a completed charitable
gift to a school because, under Connecticut law, only
the attorney general has such standing. Id., 204. The
plaintiffs objected to the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the special interest exception to that rule
applied. Id., 204–205. The trial court concluded that the
special interest exception does not apply to outright
charitable gifts and that, even if it did, the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the special interest exception
applied to their claim. Id., 205–206. Accordingly, the
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.,
205.
   The plaintiffs then appealed to the Appellate Court,
claiming that the trial court had incorrectly (1) ‘‘con-
strued Rettich’s bequest as an absolute or outright gift
to OLM rather than as an endowment that created or
resulted in some type of charitable trust benefiting the
plaintiffs’’; id., 208; and (2) ‘‘concluded that a common-
law special interest exception to the rule that the state’s
attorney general has exclusive authority to bring an
action to enforce Rettich’s charitable gift is limited in
Connecticut to actions involving charitable trusts and,
thus, was inapplicable to confer standing on the plain-
tiffs in the present case involving a gift.’’ Id., 212. The
Appellate Court concluded that Rettich’s bequest was
an outright gift to OLM; id., 211–12, 217; and that the
special interest exception did not apply in cases in
which a charitable gift is unencumbered by specific
restrictions on the use of the gift. Id., 217. Accordingly,
the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had
correctly determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing
to bring their claims and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court. Id. This certified appeal followed. See foot-
note 2 of this opinion.
  The plaintiffs claim on appeal that the Appellate
Court incorrectly determined that they did not have
standing to enforce the terms of Rettich’s bequest to
OLM under the special interest exception to the rule
that the attorney general has exclusive authority to
enforce the terms of a charitable gift. In support of this
claim, the plaintiffs contend that the Appellate Court
incorrectly determined that (1) Rettich’s bequest was
an unrestricted gift to OLM, and (2) the special interest
exception to the rule that the attorney general has exclu-
sive authority to enforce the terms of charitable dona-
tions does not apply to unrestricted gifts. We disagree
with the plaintiffs’ claims.
  We begin with the standard of review applicable to
a ruling on a motion to dismiss. ‘‘A motion to dismiss
tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the
court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the
court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determi-
nation] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, 315
Conn. 606, 614, 109 A.3d 903 (2015).
   ‘‘Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery
in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction
of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or
representative capacity, some real interest in the cause
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest
in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . [When] a
party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently
without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the
cause.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC,
309 Conn. 307, 318, 71 A.3d 492 (2013).7
   Well established principles govern who has standing
to enforce the terms of a charitable gift or trust. ‘‘At
common law, a donor who has made a completed chari-
table contribution, whether as an absolute gift or in
trust, had no standing to bring an action to enforce the
terms of his or her gift or trust unless he or she had
expressly reserved the right to do so. [When] property
is given to a charitable corporation and it is directed
by the terms of the gift to devote the property to a
particular one of its purposes, it is under a duty, enforce-
able at the suit of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral, to devote
the property to that purpose.’’ (Emphasis in original;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of
Bridgeport, 243 Conn. 1, 5–6, 699 A.2d 995 (1997). ‘‘The
theory underlying the power of the [a]ttorney [g]eneral
to enforce gifts for a stated purpose is that a donor
who attaches conditions to his gift has a right to have
his intention enforced. . . .The donor’s right, however,
is enforceable only at the instance of the attorney gen-
eral . . . and the donor himself has no standing to
enforce the terms of his gift when he has not retained
a specific right to control the property, such as a right
of reverter, after relinquishing physical possession of
it. . . . As a matter of common law, when a settlor of
a trust or a donor of property to a charity fails specifi-
cally to provide for a reservation of rights in the trust
or gift instrument, neither the donor nor his heirs have
any standing in court in a proceeding to compel the
proper execution of the trust, except as relators. . . .
There is no such thing as a resulting trust with respect
to a charity. . . . [When] the donor has effectually
passed out of himself all interest in the fund devoted
to a charity, neither he nor those claiming under him
have any standing in a court of equity as to its disposi-
tion and control.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 7–8; see R. Chester et al., The Law of Trusts and
Trustees (3d Ed. 2005) § 414, p. 47 (‘‘[a]s a general rule,
no private citizen can sue to enforce a charitable trust
merely on the ground that he believes he is within
the class to be benefited by the trust and will receive
charitable or other benefits from the operation of the
trust’’). ‘‘Connecticut is among the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have codified this common-law rule and has
entrusted the attorney general with the responsibility
and duty to ‘represent the public interest in the protec-
tion of any gifts, legacies or devises intended for public
or charitable purposes. . . .’ General Statutes § 3-125.’’
Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of
Bridgeport, supra, 7 n.3.
   This court noted in Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc.,
that there is an exception to the rule that the attorney
general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of
a charitable trust for persons who have ‘‘a special inter-
est in the enforcement of the charitable trust . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 8 n.4; see also
id., 8–9 and n.4 (recognizing that ‘‘[f]iduciaries, such as
trustees or cotrustees, have historically been deemed
to have a special interest so as to possess standing’’ to
enforce terms of charitable trust but rejecting claim
that donor had standing to enforce terms of charitable
gift); Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 235 Conn.
572, 588, 668 A.2d 688 (1995) (recognizing ‘‘a ‘special
interest’ exception to the general rule that beneficiaries
of a charitable trust may not bring suit to enforce the
trust, but rather are represented exclusively by the
attorney general,’’ but rejecting plaintiff’s claim that, as
life trustee of university without power to vote or to
manage university’s affairs, she had standing to bring
action challenging validity of contract entered into by
university (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gra-
bowski v. Bristol, 64 Conn. App. 448, 449, 451, 780
A.2d 953 (2001) (plaintiffs who owned property abutting
municipal park that was subject to terms of testamen-
tary charitable trust had special interest giving them
standing to bring action to compel defendant to comply
with terms of trust); Russell v. Yale University, 54 Conn.
App. 573, 574, 579, 737 A.2d 941 (1999) (recognizing
that person with special interest in charitable trust may
have standing to bring action to enforce terms of trust
but rejecting claim that heir of trust settlor, alumni
donors and students had special interest in enforcing
terms of charitable gift to university); 4 Restatement
(Third), Trusts § 94 (2), p. 4 (2012) (‘‘[a] suit for the
enforcement of a charitable trust may be maintained
only by the [a]ttorney [g]eneral or other appropriate
public officer or by a [cotrustee] or successor trustee,
by a settlor,8 or by another person who has a special
interest in the enforcement of the trust (emphasis
added; footnote added)); R. Chester et al., supra, § 414,
p. 51 (‘‘the courts have permitted private individuals,
whose positions with regard to the charitable trust were
more or less fixed, to sue for its enforcement’’); cf.
Belcher v. Conway, 179 Conn. 198, 202–204, 425 A.2d
1254 (1979) (trustees of charitable trust brought action
seeking modification of trust pursuant to cy pres
doctrine).
   ‘‘The [special interest] concept and its application
involve a balancing of policy concerns and objectives.
The [special interest] requirement provides a safeguard
for charitable resources and trustees by limiting the risk,
and frequency, of potentially costly, unwarranted litiga-
tion;9 but the recognition of [special interest] standing,
in appropriate situations, is justified by society’s inter-
est in honoring reasonable expectations of settlors and
the donor public and in enhancing enforcement of chari-
table trusts, in light of the limitations (of information
and resources, plus other responsibilities and influences)
inherent in [a]ttorney [g]eneral enforcement.’’ (Foot-
note added.) 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, com-
ment (g), p. 9. Courts determining whether the special
interest exception applies have considered a wide vari-
ety of factors, ‘‘including the remedy sought, the pres-
ence of fraud, the availability of the attorney general
and the nature of the [benefited] class . . . .’’ M. Blasko
et al., ‘‘Standing To Sue in the Charitable Sector,’’ 28
U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 76 (1993); see Restatement, Charitable
Nonprofit Organizations § 6.05, p. 527 (2021).10
                             I
  Because whether the Appellate Court correctly deter-
mined that Rettich’s gift to OLM was unrestricted has
some bearing on whether the plaintiffs have special
interest standing to bring this action, we first address
that claim. The plaintiffs make two arguments in sup-
port of their claim that the gift was restricted. First,
they contend that Rettich specified that the gift must
be used only for OLM’s ‘‘general uses and purposes,’’
which the plaintiffs contend imposes a restriction. Sec-
ond, they contend that the gift was restricted because
Rettich specified that, if OLM became incapable of pos-
sessing or using the gift, the unspent portion should go
to its ‘‘successor . . . .’’ We disagree with both con-
tentions.
   ‘‘The construction of a will presents a question of law
to be determined in light of facts [that] are found by
the trial court or are undisputed or indisputable. . . .
[If] the issue before us concerns the court’s legal conclu-
sion regarding the intent of [a testator] as expressed
solely in the language of [a] will, we must decide that
issue by determining, de novo, whether that language
supports the court’s conclusion. . . . Our primary objec-
tive in construing . . . [a] will is to ascertain and effec-
tuate [the testator’s] intent. . . . In searching for that
intent, we look first to the precise wording employed
by the [testator] in [the] will . . . [because] the mean-
ing of the words as used by the [testator] is the equiva-
lent of [his] legal intention—the intention that the law
recognizes as dispositive. . . . The question is not
what [he] meant to say, but what is meant by what [he]
did say.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Canaan National Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn.
330, 335–36, 586 A.2d 562 (1991).
   We first address the plaintiffs’ claim that Rettich
intended to restrict the use of his gift to OLM when he
specified that it must be used only for OLM’s ‘‘general
uses and purposes.’’ This court has held that, when a
donor makes a bequest for the donee’s ‘‘general pur-
poses,’’ ‘‘the essence of his bequest . . . [clearly is] the
attainment of the objectives for which the [donee] was
organized. The [general purposes] language . . . does
not manifest an intention to restrict the bequest . . . .’’
Connecticut Children’s Aid Society v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 147 Conn. 554, 560, 163 A.2d 317
(1960). In other words, when the donor has specified
that a gift must be used for the donee’s ‘‘general uses
and purposes,’’ the only limitation on the use of a chari-
table gift is that the organization must use it in further-
ance of ‘‘the duties imposed [on] it by its charter or
articles of incorporation . . . .’’ G. Bogert & G. Bogert,
The Law of Trusts and Trustees (2d Ed. Rev. 1992)
§ 324, p. 380; see id. (‘‘[i]n the case of the absolute
gift full ownership of the property given vests in the
corporation, subject to the duties imposed [on] it by
its charter or articles of incorporation’’ (emphasis omit-
ted)). This limitation applies to all charitable gifts,
regardless of whether it is expressly included in the
instrument conferring the gift. Thus, if the plaintiffs
were correct that Rettich’s use of the language ‘‘general
uses and purposes’’ constituted a restriction on the use
of the gift, all charitable gifts would be ‘‘restricted,’’
which would render the concept meaningless. We con-
clude, therefore, that Rettich’s use of the ‘‘general uses
and purposes’’ language did not evince any intent to
restrict the bequest within the meaning of the relevant
legal principles. To the contrary, it evinced an intent that
the gift was unrestricted.
   We also reject the plaintiffs’ claim that Rettich intended
to restrict the use of his gift to OLM when he specified
that the gift should go to OLM’s successor if OLM should
cease to exist. The plaintiffs disagree with the Appellate
Court’s conclusion that this language was ‘‘common-
place testamentary verbiage intended to avoid a poten-
tial failure of the residuary bequest in the event that
OLM had ceased to exist or changed its name before
Rettich died and before he had an opportunity to amend
his will.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Derblom v. Archdio-
cese of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 212. Instead,
the plaintiffs argue that an unresolved question of fact
exists as to whether Rettich intended that ‘‘common-
place’’ meaning or instead meant to express a specific
intention that the unspent portion of the bequest would
go to whichever entity is deemed to be OLM’s successor
if OLM ceased to exist after OLM took possession of
the residue of Rettich’s estate.
   We conclude that the plaintiffs cannot prevail on their
claim, even assuming that the plaintiffs are correct that
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Rettich intended that the unspent portion of his bequest
to OLM would go to the entity that is deemed to be
OLM’s successor if OLM ceased to exist after taking
possession of the bequest, and even assuming that there
is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Our
Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., is indeed OLM’s
‘‘successor,’’ as that term is used in Rettich’s will. We
note that the plaintiffs have not alleged that Our Lady
of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., is OLM’s successor
corporation in the legal sense that it has succeeded to
all of OLM’s rights and obligations. See, e.g., Larkin v.
Burlington, 172 Vt. 566, 569, 772 A.2d 553 (2001) (‘‘[t]he
boilerplate language ‘successors and assigns,’ when
referring to corporations, ordinarily applies only when
another corporation, through legal succession, assumes
the rights and obligations of the first corporation’’).
Rather, they allege that, by specifying that the gift
should go to OLM ‘‘or its successor,’’ Rettich’s will
evinces his intent that, if OLM were to become incapa-
ble of possessing or using his bequest, the remainder
of the bequest should be given to the entity the mission
of which most closely approximates OLM’s mission—
i.e., the operation of a school for Catholic students in
the town of Madison—and that entity is Our Lady of
Mercy School of Madison, Inc. Thus, the plaintiffs are
effectively contending that Rettich’s will evinced an
intent that Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc.,
should be the cy pres beneficiary of the bequest to
OLM. See Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University
of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 10 n.8 (‘‘[t]he rule of
[cy pres] is a rule for the construction of instruments
in equity, by which the intention of the party is carried
out as near as may be, when it would be impossible
or illegal to give it literal effect’’ (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Duncan v.
Higgins, 129 Conn. 136, 140, 26 A.2d 849 (1942) (‘‘[o]rdi-
narily [when] an organization to which a charitable gift
or devise is made is incapable of taking it, the question
whether its payment to another organization will be
permitted is determined [on] the basis of the applicabil-
ity of the cy pres doctrine or doctrine of approximation;
and that doctrine will be applied only [when] the court
finds in the terms of the will, read in the light of sur-
rounding circumstances, a general intent to devote the
property to a charitable use, to which the intent that it
go to the particular organization named is secondary’’).
   Even if the plaintiffs could establish that Rettich
intended that the cy pres doctrine should be applied to
his gift, however, they have not cited any authority for
the proposition that proof of such intent means that
there is an implied ‘‘restriction’’ on the trust or gift such
that a potential cy pres beneficiary, or other beneficiar-
ies of the original donee organization, has standing to
initiate proceedings to enforce the intent.11 Indeed, the
plaintiffs have not referred to the cy pres doctrine at
all in their briefs to this court. Because this claim is
inadequately briefed, we decline to address it.12 See,
e.g., Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut, 323
Conn. 26, 33, 144 A.3d 420 (2016). We conclude, there-
fore, that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Rettich’s bequest to OLM was restricted.
                             II
   Having concluded that Rettich’s bequest to OLM was
unrestricted, we next address the plaintiffs’ claim that
the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the spe-
cial interest exception to the rule that the attorney
general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of
charitable donations does not apply to unrestricted
gifts. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended in their com-
plaint that Rettich’s bequest to OLM resulted in a con-
structive trust benefiting the plaintiff students and
parents, and thereby conferred on them a special inter-
est in the enforcement of the bequest.13 We conclude
that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the
exception does not apply under the specific facts and
circumstances of the present case.
   As the Appellate Court noted, ‘‘[t]he law recognizes
a distinction between a donor who expresses an intent
to make a donee a trustee and one who intends to make
an absolute gift.’’ Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford,
supra, 203 Conn. App. 210. ‘‘In the case of a trust the
legal title . . . is in the corporation [only], subject to
the duties imposed [on the trustees] by the terms of
the trust instrument and by the law of charitable trusts
. . . .’’ (Emphasis altered.) G. Bogert & G. Bogert,
supra, § 324, p. 380. Thus, a charitable trust by its very
nature creates a narrowly defined class of persons who
have a special interest in its enforcement or modifica-
tion, namely, the trustees who have a legal obligation
to administer the trust. See Carl J. Herzog Foundation,
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 8–9
n.4; 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94 (2), p. 4 (‘‘[a]
suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust may be
maintained . . . by a [cotrustee] or successor
trustee’’). In addition, if the instrument creating the trust
identifies specific persons as beneficiaries, members of
that class of persons may have a special interest in the
enforcement of the trust sufficient to confer standing.
See 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, comment (g)
(1), p. 9 (when charitable trust is ‘‘designed so that . . .
one or more identifiable persons will become entitled
to benefits under the terms of the trust,’’ particular
charitable institution or identifiable individual may have
standing to enforce terms of trust); R. Chester et al.,
supra, § 414, p. 51 (‘‘the courts have permitted private
individuals, whose positions with regard to the charita-
ble trust were more or less fixed, to sue for its enforce-
ment’’); M. Blasko et al., supra, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 70 (to
demonstrate special interest, potential plaintiff ‘‘must
show that she is a member of a small identifiable class
that the charity is designed to benefit’’). For example,
‘‘if the purpose of a charitable trust is to pay the salary
of the pastor of a particular church, the pastor has
[special interest] standing (as does the church) to
enforce the trust.’’ 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94,
comment (g) (1), p. 9. Similarly, ‘‘the purpose of a chari-
table trust to contribute to the costs of medical care
for ‘needy residents’ of a specified small town ordinarily
can be enforced by any reasonably qualified member
of the community. So, too, if a college is trustee of a
trust the terms of which direct that its income be used
to provide [graduate study] scholarships each year to
selected students graduating from the college, based
on prescribed procedures and criteria, the trust purpose
may be enforced by one or more of the current students
who might reasonably expect to meet the criteria.’’ Id.,
p. 10. It is significant that in none of these situations
does the finding of a special interest sufficient to confer
standing significantly undermine the primary purpose
of the rule that the attorney general has exclusive
authority to enforce the terms of a charitable trust or
gift, namely, to limit the number of persons who have
standing to initiate litigation. See id., p. 9; see also R.
Chester et al., supra, § 414, p. 48.
   Charitable gifts are different from trusts. ‘‘Frequently
a gift is made to a charitable corporation, either without
mention of any particular purpose or with a statement
that the object is to aid one or all of the causes for
which the corporation operates. . . . In the case of the
absolute gift full ownership of the property given vests
in the corporation, subject to the duties imposed [on]
it by its charter or articles of incorporation and by the
terms of any agreements it makes by contract or in its
acceptance of a qualified gift. The [a]ttorney [g]eneral
has the power, as a representative of the state and
by quo warranto or other proceedings, to compel the
corporation to perform these duties . . . .’’ (Emphasis
omitted; footnotes omitted.) G. Bogert & G. Bogert,
supra, § 324, pp. 379–81.
   Thus, when a donor has made a gift to a charitable
organization that is unrestricted by any contractual
terms or qualifications, the organization is the sole ben-
eficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its use is
that the organization must use it in furtherance of ‘‘the
duties imposed [on] it by its charter or articles of incor-
poration . . . .’’ Id., p. 380. There simply are no ‘‘terms’’
or ‘‘restrictions’’ for the benefit of particular persons
to be enforced (unless, arguably, the charitable organi-
zation’s charter or articles of incorporation identify spe-
cific individuals who are its exclusive beneficiaries).
The plaintiffs have not identified, and our research has
not revealed, a single case in which a court has held that
the potential beneficiaries of a charitable organization
have standing to bring an action to compel the organiza-
tion to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner.14
See 4 Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, reporter’s note
to comment (g) (3), pp. 21–22 (‘‘[a] disposition to [a
charitable] institution for a specific purpose . . . cre-
ates a charitable trust of which the institution is the
trustee, [in contrast to] an outright devise or donation
to such an institution, expressly or impliedly to be used
for its general purposes, which, although charitable,
does not create a trust [that is subject to enforcement
by a person having a special interest] as that term is
used in this Restatement’’ (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
   Even if we were to assume that there may be excep-
tionally rare cases in which the beneficiary of a charita-
ble organization could be found to have a special
interest sufficient to confer standing to bring an action
to force the organization to use an unrestricted gift in
a specific manner, we conclude that this is not such a
case.15 Multiple courts, including the Appellate Court,
have held that, because students enrolled in an educa-
tional institution constitute a constantly fluctuating
group, to conclude that a particular student or group
of students has standing to bring an action to enforce
the terms of a trust created to benefit the institution
would undermine the primary purpose of the rule that
the attorney general has exclusive standing to bring
such an action, namely, to limit the number of potential
litigants. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819)
(class of college students is ‘‘fluctuating, and no individ-
ual among [the] youth has a vested interest in the institu-
tion, which can be asserted in a [c]ourt of justice,’’ and,
therefore, individual students would not have standing
to enforce terms of trust through which college was
created); Russell v. Yale University, supra, 54 Conn.
App. 579 (‘‘absent special injury to a student or his or
her fundamental rights, students do not have standing
to challenge the manner in which the administration
manages an institution of higher education’’ or trustees’
discretionary acts); Miller v. Alderhold, 228 Ga. 65, 69,
184 S.E.2d 172 (1971) (‘‘[i]t is inconceivable that one
[eighteen year old] boy or girl the day after his or her
admission to a private college could go into court or
through the [s]tate’s [a]ttorneys, and seek to enjoin
the trustees in the management and operation of the
college, and ask for a receiver solely because he or
she was a student’’); Kolin v. Leitch, 343 Ill. App. 622,
628–30, 99 N.E.2d 685 (1951) (students did not have
special interest sufficient to confer standing to bring
action to enforce terms of trust created for benefit of
school); cf. Kania v. Chatham, 297 N.C. 290, 292, 254
S.E.2d 528 (1979) (unsuccessful applicant for college
scholarship did not have special interest in enforcing
terms of scholarship trust because he was ‘‘a member
of a group comprised of hundreds of candidates from
which the [t]rustees, in their sole discretion, selected
recipients,’’ and ‘‘[t]o grant [the] plaintiff standing to
maintain [the] action would only open the door to simi-
lar actions by other unsuccessful nominees’’).16 We find
the reasoning of these cases persuasive, particularly as
applied to an unrestricted monetary gift to an educa-
tional institution that can be used for any purpose con-
sistent with the institution’s charter or articles of
incorporation. We further note that the plaintiffs in the
present case have not claimed that OLM’s use of
Rettich’s bequest has violated any terms of its charter
or articles of incorporation. See M. Blasko et al., supra,
28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 64 (courts often consider nature and
extent of alleged wrongdoing when determining
whether plaintiff has standing to enforce terms of chari-
table trust). We conclude, therefore, that the plaintiff
students and parents do not have a special interest
sufficient to confer standing to bring an action to
enforce Rettich’s unrestricted gift to OLM.
   In support of their claim to the contrary, the plaintiffs
rely heavily on the Superior Court’s decision in Grabow-
ski v. Bristol, Superior Court, judicial district of New
Britain, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (June 3, 1997) (19
Conn. L. Rptr. 623).17 The issue in Grabowski was
whether the plaintiffs—residents, taxpayers and citi-
zens of the city of Bristol—had standing under the spe-
cial interest exception to enforce the terms of a
charitable trust establishing a municipal park. See Gra-
bowski v. Bristol, supra, 19 Conn. L. Rptr. 623, 625–626.
The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs, who owned
property abutting the park, had such standing. See id.,
626. In support of this conclusion, the court cited to
Kapiolani Park Preservation Society v. Honolulu, 69
Haw. 569, 751 P.2d 1022 (1988) (Kapiolani). See Gra-
bowski v. Bristol, supra, 626. In Kapiolani, the plaintiff,
a nonprofit corporation, the members of which included
persons who lived adjacent to and made frequent use
of a public park that was the subject of a charitable
trust, brought an action against, among others, the city
and county of Honolulu, as trustee, to enforce the terms
of the trust. See Kapiolani Park Preservation Society
v. Honolulu, supra, 570–71. The Hawaii Supreme Court
held that, ‘‘[when] a trustee of a public charitable trust
is a governmental agency . . . and that agency does
not file periodic accounts of its stewardship, and will
not seek instructions of the court as to its duties, even
though there is a genuine controversy as to its power
to enter into a particular transaction, and [when], in
such a case, the attorney general as parens patriae, has
actively joined in supporting the alleged breach of trust,
the citizens of [Hawaii] would be left without protec-
tion, or a remedy, unless we hold, as we do, that mem-
bers of the public, as beneficiaries of the trust, have
standing to bring the matter to the attention of the
court.’’ Id., 572.
   We conclude that the trial court’s ruling in Grabowski
is limited to the facts of that case. The primary case
on which the trial court in Grabowski relied, Kapiolani,
has been characterized as representing ‘‘the liberal end
of the spectrum [of] cases granting [special interest]
standing . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 4
Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, reporter’s note to
comment (g) (1), p. 17. We disagree with these cases
to the extent that they can be read to support the broad
proposition that any member of the public may bring
an action to enforce the terms of a charitable trust
when there is a genuine controversy as to whether the
terms of the trust have been breached and the attorney
general has refused to bring an action to enforce the
terms. Such a rule would be entirely inconsistent with
the purpose of the rule that the attorney general has
exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable
gift or trust, namely, to eliminate the risk and frequency
of unwarranted litigation by limiting the scope of poten-
tial litigants. See id., § 94, comment (g), p. 9; R. Chester
et al., supra, § 414, pp. 47–48. Instead, we conclude
that Grabowski stands for the narrow proposition that
persons who own land abutting a public park that is
subject to the terms of a trust have a special interest
sufficient to confer standing to bring an action to
enforce those terms. Thus, Grabowski does not support
the plaintiffs’ claim that students and their parents have
standing under the special interest exception to enforce
an unrestricted monetary gift to an educational insti-
tution.
   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the
Appellate Court correctly determined that Rettich’s
bequest to OLM was unrestricted and that the plaintiffs
did not have standing under the special interest excep-
tion to bring an action to enforce the bequest. The
Appellate Court, therefore, properly affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court dismissing this action.
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
   The plaintiffs are Maria J. Derblom, in her capacity as the executrix of
the estate of Fred H. Rettich; eleven former students of Our Lady of Mercy
School (OLM), a defunct Catholic school in Madison, and their parents; and
Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., which operates a private school
that purports to be the successor of OLM. The eleven student plaintiffs are
Luke Ciocca, John Ciocca, Julia Coric, Amanda Coric, Vladimir Coric III, Mia
Lombardi, Thomas Piagentini, Jack Piagentini, Kathryn Piagentini, Julianna
Picard, and Alessandra Picard. The parent plaintiffs are Stephen Ciocca,
Jacqueline Ciocca, Vladimir Coric, Ann Coric, Tom Lombardi, Roberta Lom-
bardi, Joe Piagentini, Kelly Piagentini, John Picard, and Tara Picard.
    2
      We granted the plaintiffs’ petition for certification to appeal, limited to
the following issue: ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that the
plaintiffs, as putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest, did not have
standing to enforce the terms of that bequest under the ‘special interest’
exception to the rule giving the state’s attorney general exclusive enforce-
ment authority?’’ Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, 336 Conn. 938, 938–39,
249 A.3d 354 (2021).
    3
      ‘‘A residuary clause disposes of any remaining estate property after all
other specific bequests, devises and obligations of the estate are satisfied.
See Warner v. Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 2 Conn. App. 729, 732, 483
A.2d 1107 (1984). The clause in Rettich’s will provided: ‘All the rest, residue,
and remainder of my property of every kind and description, real, personal
and mixed, whatever situated (all of which is hereinafter referred to as
‘‘[r]esidue’’), remaining after the payment of estate, inheritance, succession,
transfer and death taxes or duties, in accordance with [a]rticle VII hereof
(but excluding any property over which I may have a power of appointment
at my death), I give and bequeath, in memory of Fred H. [and] Rosa Rettich,
to [OLM], 149 Neck Road, Madison, Connecticut, or its successor, for its
general uses and purposes.’ ’’ Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra,
203 Conn. App. 200 n.5.
    4
      ‘‘Payment was by check dated July 8, 2015, and made payable to OLM.
According to the complaint, those funds have ‘come under the possession
and/or control of the [d]efendant . . . .’ In an affidavit submitted by the
defendant with its motion to dismiss, the Reverend Daniel McLearen, a
diocesan priest serving at one of the two local parishes in Madison and
Guilford that ‘jointly-sponsored’ OLM, averred that the funds from Rettich’s
estate ‘were deposited in an account established by [the two parishes] in the
name of [OLM]’ and that McLearen is ‘the sole signatory on that account.’ ’’
Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 201 n.7. As the
Appellate Court noted, the current status of this account is unclear from
the record and has no bearing on the issues before us in this appeal. See id.
    5
      ‘‘The record indicates that the plaintiff corporation [subsequently]
founded a new private school in Madison named Our Lady of Mercy Prepara-
tory Academy. The plaintiff corporation asserts that this new school is an
‘independent Catholic’ school. The defendant disputes this characterization.
In a letter from the Archbishop of Hartford to the First Selectman of Madison,
the Archbishop, citing canon law, explained that ‘no school may bear the
title Catholic school without the consent of the competent ecclesiastical
authority,’ that he, as that authority, had not consented to a new Catholic
school in the area in question, and that, ‘[t]herefore, any new OLM school
is not, and should not present itself, as a Catholic school.’ . . . A copy of
the letter was appended as an exhibit to the defendant’s reply to the plaintiffs’
opposition to the motion to dismiss.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Derblom v.
Archdiocese of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 202 n.9. As the Appellate
Court noted, the religious status of Our Lady of Mercy Preparatory Academy
has no bearing on the issues before us in this appeal. See id.
    6
      ‘‘Section 501 (c) (3) of title 26 of the United States Code is the provision
of the Internal Revenue Code that allows for federal tax exemption for
certain nonprofit organizations. Donors who make charitable contributions
to § 501 (c) (3) organizations may also be entitled to a deduction for federal
income tax purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018).’’ Derblom v. Archdiocese
of Hartford, supra, 203 Conn. App. 203 n.10.
    7
      When a complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the
record, ‘‘the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider
these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume
the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those allega-
tions are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undis-
puted facts]. . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support
of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction
is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraf-
fidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action with-
out further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no
proof to rebut the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence
that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not
supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but
may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Cuozzo v. Orange, supra, 315 Conn. 615–16.
    8
      As we have indicated, the rule in Connecticut is that the settlor of a
charitable trust does not have automatic standing to enforce the terms of
the trust unless the settlor has reserved a property interest in the trust. See
Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, supra, 243
Conn. 7.
   9
     See also Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 614 (D.C. App. 1990) (‘‘policy
reasons for limiting standing’’ are ‘‘to prevent vexatious litigation and suits
by irresponsible parties who do not have a tangible stake in the matter’’
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sarkeys v. Independent School District
No. 40, Cleveland County, 592 P.2d 529, 534 (Okla. 1979) (‘‘[i]f a third party
were permitted to sue as a matter of right, the charity could be subjected
to frequent, unreasonable and vexatious litigation, the court dockets could
become clogged, and the trust assets could be wasted in unnecessary [attor-
ney’s] fees’’); R. Chester et al., supra, § 414, p. 48 (purpose of rule that
attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce terms of charitable trust
is ‘‘so that the trustees may not be vexed by frequent, ill-considered suits
leading to unnecessary litigation’’); M. Blasko et al., ‘‘Standing to Sue in the
Charitable Sector,’’ 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 37, 52 (1993) (‘‘[s]trict standing rules
were designed to prevent vexatious litigation by disinterested parties’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
   10
      Section 6.05 of the Restatement of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations
provides in relevant part: ‘‘A private party has a special interest for purposes
of . . . bringing or intervening in an action to enforce the purposes to
which charitable assets are devoted and the administrative terms that govern
charitable assets . . . only upon demonstrating all of the following con-
ditions:
   ‘‘(a) the state attorney general is not exercising the office’s authority to
protect the public’s interest in the charitable assets at issue . . .
   ‘‘(b) the charitable assets at issue will not be protected without the grant
of standing to the private party;
   ‘‘(c) the alleged misconduct is egregious or the circumstances are serious
and exigent;
   ‘‘(d) the relief sought is appropriate to enforce the purposes of the charity
or the purposes to which particular charitable assets are devoted; and
   ‘‘(e) the private party has a substantial connection to:
   ‘‘(1) the matter at issue and the charity . . . or
   ‘‘(2) the charitable assets at issue . . . .’’ Restatement, Charitable Non-
profit Organizations, supra, § 6.05, p. 527.
   11
      Our research reveals persuasive authority for the proposition that a
potential cy pres beneficiary does not have standing to initiate a cy pres
proceeding, at least in the absence of a special interest. See Arman v. Bank
of America, N.T. & S.A., 74 Cal. App. 4th 697, 705, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410
(1999) (‘‘a charitable corporation even if named as a possible successor
trustee by the dissolving corporation does not have, as a possible beneficiary
under application of cy pres, an interest different in kind from that of the
public generally, which is represented exclusively by the [a]ttorney [g]en-
eral’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), review denied, California Supreme
Court, Docket No. S082593 (December 15, 1999); In re Veterans’ Industries,
Inc., 8 Cal. App. 3d 902, 921, 88 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1970) (applying principle
that ‘‘[b]eneficiaries of a charitable trust, unlike beneficiaries of a private
trust, are ordinarily indefinite and therefore unable to enforce the trust [on]
their own behalf’’ to potential cy pres beneficiaries (internal quotation marks
omitted)); In re Trustco Bank, 33 Misc. 3d 745, 754, 929 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2011)
(potential cy pres beneficiary ‘‘lack[s] standing to commence a cy pres
proceeding unless it is the named trustee or is in possession of the subject
disposition’’); cf. Belcher v. Conway, supra, 179 Conn. 202–204 (trustees of
charitable trust brought action seeking modification of trust pursuant to cy
pres doctrine).
   12
      Because the primary relief that the plaintiffs are seeking is, in effect, a
declaration that Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., is the cy pres
beneficiary of Rettich’s gift, it is arguable that our conclusion that the
plaintiffs have failed to adequately brief the scope and contours of the cy
pres doctrine is dispositive of their entire claim and that we need not address
their contention that the special interest exception applies to unrestricted
charitable gifts. Nevertheless, because the sole issue that the parties address
in their briefs is whether the special interest exception applies to unrestricted
gifts, we address that issue rather than disposing of the case on the basis
of an issue that was not briefed.
   13
      As we explained in part I of this opinion, the plaintiffs also claim that
Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., has a special interest in enforcing
Rettich’s bequest as OLM’s ‘‘successor.’’ We have rejected that claim as
inadequately briefed. The plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at oral argument
before this court that Derblom, in her capacity as the executrix of Rettich’s
estate, does not have standing to bring this action. See footnote 14 of
this opinion.
    14
       The plaintiffs’ reliance on Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital
Center, 281 App. Div. 2d 127, 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2001), is misplaced. The
court in Smithers concluded that a donor had standing under the special
interest exception to enforce the terms of a gift to a charitable organization
that was subject to numerous restrictions. See id., 130 (describing restric-
tions). In the present case, the plaintiffs claim only that the plaintiff students
and parents, and Our Lady of Mercy School of Madison, Inc., have standing
to bring this action. The plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at oral argument before
this court that donors, which would include Derblom, in her capacity as
the executrix of Rettich’s estate, do not have standing to enforce the terms
of a restricted or unrestricted gift to a charitable organization or a trust
under Connecticut law; see Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University
of Bridgeport, supra, 243 Conn. 5; and the plaintiffs have not requested
that we reconsider that rule in light of more modern developments. See 4
Restatement (Third), supra, § 94, reporter’s note to comment (g) (3), p. 20
(‘‘[T]he settlor’s [special interest] standing stated in [s]ubsection (2) [of § 94]
and in this [c]omment represents a departure from the general insistence
of traditional trust doctrine that the settlor, as such, lacks standing to enforce
a charitable trust . . . . There is . . . impressive and growing authority
. . . for the contrary proposition [that, unlike under the traditional rule,
donors have standing to enforce gifts to charitable organizations] . . . .
Given the historical underenforcement of charitable trusts in both England
and the United States, it would seem that allowing the settlor to enforce
his or her own trust might well be a step in the right direction . . . [and]
a small price to pay for the settlor’s generosity. The risk of repetitious or
harassing litigation, which underlies the requirement that one who seeks
to enforce a charitable trust have a special interest in doing so, seems
quite low insofar as the settlor is concerned.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
    15
       Indeed, the defendant does not ask this court to adopt a categorical
rule barring the application of the special interest exception to unrestricted
charitable gifts but recognizes that, because the determination of special
interest standing is highly fact specific, we should limit our consideration
to the specific facts and circumstances of the present case.
    16
       There is some authority to the contrary. See Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d
1210, 1212 (Ala. 1977) (‘‘the interest of the students, staff and faculty as
beneficiaries in the financing of the educational institution with which they
are associated is a sufficient special interest to entitle them to bring suit’’);
Dominy v. Stanley, 162 Ga. 211, 215–16, 133 S.E. 245 (1926) (patrons and
former patrons of school had standing to bring action to enforce terms of
trust requiring trustees to use land for school purposes). We note that there
are innumerable cases applying the special exception doctrine, and, given
the unavoidably subjective nature of the balancing process that courts
employ when determining whether the doctrine applies, it would probably
be possible to identify cases supporting almost any claim under the doctrine.
See M. Blasko et al., supra, 28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 74 (noting that ‘‘various [case
specific] facts and subjective factors . . . can influence a court’s decisions’’
and that, ‘‘[b]ecause the law regarding standing to sue in the charitable
sector is in flux, the courts have more room than usual to decide the issue
based on whether a judge feels that a plaintiff deserves a chance to present
her case’’). The Alabama decision in Jones has been distinguished from the
cases in which courts have held that students do not have a special interest
in enforcing the terms of a charitable trust for the benefit of an educational
institution on the ground that the plaintiffs in Jones raised serious allegations
of fraud. See Jones v. Grant, supra, 1211; see also M. Blasko et al., supra,
65. Several other cases in which students and local citizens have been found
to have standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a trust benefiting
an educational institution are distinguishable either because the issue of
special interest standing was not raised; see Greene v. Thompson, 227 Ark.
1089, 305 S.W.2d 136 (1957); Duffee v. Jones, 208 Ga. 639, 68 S.E.2d 699
(1952); Thompson v. Hale, 123 Ga. 305, 51 S.E. 383 (1905); or because
standing was found not on the basis of a special interest but, rather, on
the basis of the principle that, when ‘‘the parties are numerous, and it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court within a reasonable time,
one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Conner v. Heaton, 205 Ark. 269, 274, 168 S.W.2d 399 (1943).
    17
       We assume that the plaintiffs rely on the decision of the trial court in
Grabowski because the Appellate Court’s opinion in a subsequent appeal
in that case dealt with the issue of standing somewhat summarily. See
Grabowski v. Bristol, supra, 64 Conn. App. 451 (summarily agreeing, without
any analysis or citation to authority, with trial court’s conclusion that ‘‘the
allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrated that the plaintiffs had
a special interest in [enforcing the terms of a trust creating a public park]
because, unlike members of the general public, their property adjoined
[the park]’’).