Court Opinion

ID: 9955649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:02:41.237854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.537217
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Dixon CA2/8
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  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                   B325051

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA469610)
                   v.

BRANDON J. DIXON,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. H. Clay Jacke, II, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
      Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                          **********
       Defendant and appellant Brandon J. Dixon aided and abetted
two accomplices who shot at a group of five people, killing one and
seriously wounding another. Defendant appeals from his conviction
by jury of one count of first degree murder, four counts of
premeditated attempted murder and one count of shooting at an
occupied vehicle. He contends the verdicts are not supported by
substantial evidence and that the court’s instructions to the jury on
murder and attempted murder were infirm. He further contends
the record does not show the court understood the scope of its
discretion in imposing the firearm enhancements. Defendant also
requests correction of his presentence custody credits.
       We direct the superior court to correct the presentence
custody credits on remand and otherwise affirm the judgment of
conviction in its entirety.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
1.     The Charges
       Defendant was charged with one count of murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), four counts of premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2–5), and one count of
shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6). As to all counts, it
was alleged the crimes were gang related and that a principal
personally used and discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds. (b)–(e)(1)). It
was also alleged defendant had suffered two prior convictions for
serious felonies (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)).
2.     Background
       The Rolling 40’s Neighborhood Crips and the Rolling 60’s
Neighborhood Crips are affiliated criminal street gangs with
territories that border one another in south Los Angeles. Starting
in 2014, the two gangs, although technically aligned, often feuded

                                  2
with each other, stemming from a dispute about a homicide that
occurred that year.
      Defendant is a Rolling 60’s gang member. In the months
leading up to the shooting in this case on July 1, 2018, defendant
had regular contact, both in person and by phone, with two other
Rolling 60’s gang members, Omario Guerrero and Dejone Wright,
both of whom were several years younger than defendant. Guerrero
was a minor. (Charges against Guerrero and Wright were resolved
separately before trial via plea agreements.) Photographs of
defendant, Guerrero and Wright flashing Rolling 60’s hand signs,
along with other active members of the gang, were shown to the
jury.
      Garry Dorton, a former Rolling 40’s gang member and the
murder victim in this case, was a community gang intervention
worker for a nonprofit organization that worked with the City of
Los Angeles Mayor’s Office Gang Reduction & Youth Development
program. Mr. Dorton’s work involved outreach to community
members and gang members following gang-related incidents,
mentoring youths, and organizing and participating in “peace-
keeping events” such as baseball and softball games between gang
members. On July 1, 2018, Mr. Dorton was at Peck Park in San
Pedro where such a baseball game was being played.
      T.M. was at the park that day watching the game with a
friend. (We refer to witnesses only by their first names or initials to
protect their privacy.) A loud “commotion” arose behind where T.M.
and her friend were seated in beach chairs. A group of 15 to 40 men
were in the parking lot yelling at each other. T.M. testified they
were “dark skin[ned],” but she was too far away to be certain of the
race or age of any of the men involved in the disturbance. Because
there were little kids in the park, T.M. decided to call 911, and then

                                  3
she and her friend left. The audio recording of her 911 call was
played for the jury.
       Officer Cristian Portillo of the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) was on patrol with his training officer that afternoon.
Sometime around 5:00 p.m., they received a radio call about a
disturbance at Peck Park. They arrived at the park within a few
minutes but did not see anything unusual going on at that time.
3.     The Crimes
       Around 7 o’clock that same evening, Kevin P. arrived at the
home of his friend F.J., who lived in the 4500 block of Van Ness
Avenue–an area controlled by the Rolling 40’s gang. The home was
known as a location where Rolling 40’s gang members went to
socialize, drink and gamble. Kevin used to live in the neighborhood
and remained friends with F.J. and his adult son T.J.
       When Kevin arrived at F.J.’s home, he encountered
Mr. Dorton (the community gang intervention worker who is the
murder victim in this case) in front of the house and spoke with him
for about five minutes before he went inside. Kevin had been
Mr. Dorton’s neighbor for 22 years. Mr. Dorton’s truck was parked
in the driveway, and there were two women seated in the truck
whom Kevin did not know, one seated in the front passenger seat
and the other in the back seat. Kevin came back outside to talk
with Mr. Dorton and T.J., who were standing close together on the
passenger side of Mr. Dorton’s truck. Kevin leaned back against a
nearby palm tree with his back to the street as he talked with
Mr. Dorton and T.J.
       Kevin was startled by the sound of multiple gunshots. He ran
towards F.J.’s front door. Kevin was hit by multiple bullets in his
stomach and neck. From inside the house, F.J. also heard
“multiple” shots and immediately opened the door to see what was
going on. He saw two men in the street, about four to five feet

                                 4
apart, shooting at Mr. Dorton’s truck, as Mr. Dorton stood by the
passenger side of the truck. After the shooting stopped, F.J. helped
Kevin inside his home while T.J. called the police. Kevin eventually
underwent multiple surgeries to repair the damage from the
multiple gunshot wounds. Kevin testified he did not see the driver
or the shooters because he had not been facing toward the street.
T.J. denied seeing what had happened, but admitted he called 911.
       Three other witnesses testified about what they saw or heard
regarding the shooting. Florinda B. was driving home from work on
Van Ness Avenue. A small black car ahead of her came to an
unexpected stop in the middle of the road. Two males jumped out
and headed toward the sidewalk. Florinda drove around the black
car. She did not look at the driver of the car. She then heard
several loud noises she assumed were fireworks since it was almost
the Fourth of July. Video footage recovered from security cameras
on the street showed her van driving past a black Mazda.
       Danny B. was working in his front yard when a dark-colored
car “zoom[ed]” down the street and stopped “abruptly” near F.J.’s
home. Two men immediately jumped out of the car, both holding
handguns. They ran “towards the group of men” in the driveway
and fired multiple shots. Danny saw muzzle flash from both guns
and estimated he heard at least 15 shots. The two men then ran
back to the car, and it sped off. Danny testified he did not see the
face of either shooter and did not see the driver of the car. The
police recovered the video footage from the security camera on the
front of Danny’s home which captured the shooting. Portions of the
video were played for the jury.
       Rodrigo M. was watching television when he heard “several”
popping sounds he thought were fireworks. He went to his front
door and opened it. He saw two people in the street in front of F.J.’s
home with their arms outstretched. Both of them had guns and

                                  5
were shooting toward a truck parked in F.J.’s driveway. Rodrigo
immediately closed his door and stayed inside until after the police
arrived. He was not able to identify the driver of the car or the
shooters.
      LAPD Officer Richard Oke and his partner were the first to
arrive on the scene. Officer Oke saw Mr. Dorton on the ground,
next to the passenger side of his truck. He appeared to be dead
from gunshot wounds. Officer Oke went inside the home and spoke
with Kevin, who was bleeding but alive. Portions of Officer Oke’s
body camera footage were played for the jury. An autopsy later
confirmed that Mr. Dorton died from a fatal gunshot wound.
4.    The Investigation
      LAPD Homicide Detective Clifton Rose was assigned to
investigate the shooting incident and murder of Mr. Dorton.
Detective Rose was aware of the feud between Rolling 40’s and
Rolling 60’s gang members that had been ongoing for several years.
He learned that defendant was a Rolling 60’s gang member who
was on parole, and that one of the conditions of his parole required
him to wear an ankle monitoring device with GPS tracking.
Detective Rose discovered that defendant’s ankle monitor showed
he was at the scene of the shooting and had also been at Peck Park
earlier in the day, sometime after 5:00 p.m.
      Video footage from security cameras and nearby traffic
cameras showed the shooters arrived on Van Ness Avenue in a
black Mazda with a white Uber sticker on the windshield and a
Nevada license plate. Detective Rose discovered the Mazda was a
rental car. The agency that owned the car reported that it had not
been returned and considered it stolen.
      The police went to defendant’s home on West 133rd Street
looking for the black Mazda. When they arrived, they did not see
the Mazda, but there was a red Kia parked in front with a female in

                                 6
the driver’s seat. A male passenger was seated in the back. The
officers could not identify either individual as they drove by.
       Shortly thereafter, the officers drove to a duplex in the
3200 block of West 59th Street. The duplex was a known hangout
or “stronghold” for the Rolling 60’s gang. The prosecution’s gang
expert testified that members used the location as a safe place to
socialize, to plan criminal activities, and to store cars and weapons.
       When the officers drove past the duplex, they saw the same
red Kia parked out front that they had seen at defendant’s house
less than an hour before. The same female was in the driver’s seat,
and they saw a male passenger in the back seat, whom they
observed was wearing a baseball hat.
       The red Kia started to drive off. The officers were driving in
the opposite direction, so they had to turn around to follow the Kia.
By the time they caught up with the red Kia, the male passenger
was no longer in the car. When the driver failed to signal before
turning, the officers pulled the car over. During the traffic stop,
they saw a white Uber sticker on the floorboard of the car and a key
fob in the backseat. The key fob was later identified as the keys for
the black Mazda.
       That same day, the police located the black Mazda parked on
West 59th Street a short distance away from the Rolling 60’s
stronghold.
       Video footage from security and traffic cameras, analysis of
cell phone and cell tower records, and the GPS tracking information
for defendant’s ankle monitor showed his movements on July 1,
2018. Early in the afternoon, defendant drove the black Mazda to a
carwash and met up with one of the accomplices in the shootings,
Guerrero, who was wearing distinctive red pants with a white
stripe down the side. They hung out together at the carwash for

                                  7
about an hour. Defendant then drove the Mazda back to his home
on West 133rd Street.
       Meanwhile, Guerrero and the other accomplice, Wright, went
to a shopping mall a short distance away. The video footage
recovered from security cameras showed them in clothing that was
consistent with the clothing worn by the shooters depicted in the
video footage of the shooting (Guerrero in the red pants and Wright
in acid washed jeans).
       Around 5:00 p.m., defendant went to a gas station and then
drove to Peck Park, lingering in the parking lot area for about
10 minutes before making a stop at a liquor store and eventually
going to the Rolling 60’s stronghold on West 59th Street around
6:20 p.m. Defendant remained at the gang stronghold until around
7:15 p.m. Cell phone records showed that Guerrero and Wright
were also at the stronghold during this time period.
       The GPS records showed defendant then left the stronghold
and travelled into Rolling 40’s territory, arriving at F.J.’s house on
Van Ness just before 7:30 p.m. Video footage showed the black
Mazda driving past F.J.’s home, circling around the block and then
returning and stopping in front of F.J.’s home. Two individuals
jumped out of the Mazda wearing hoodies over their heads and the
same distinctive clothing Guerrero and Wright were wearing earlier
in the day. Both individuals had their arms outstretched in a
shooting position. After the shooters ran back to the Mazda and
jumped in, the Mazda sped off. Defendant’s GPS monitor showed
that he travelled back to Rolling 60’s territory and returned to the
gang stronghold on West 59th Street.
       The hood of Mr. Dorton’s truck sustained damage consistent
with ricochet impacts from bullets. A bullet path analysis was
performed and indicated the bullets that likely left those impact

                                  8
marks were fired from the back driver’s side of the truck toward the
front passenger side.
       LAPD Sergeant Jaime Avila testified as the prosecution’s
gang expert. He explained that gang members often used stolen
cars to commit crimes and then abandoned them afterward because
they were not easily traced back to them. Gang members were also
well aware of the prevalence of security cameras and routinely
covered their heads or faces when committing crimes. He explained
that gang culture is based on earning and maintaining respect, and
that acts of disrespect, even a verbal argument, could lead to
retaliation against a rival gang member or the gang in general, and
an escalation in violent conduct. Retaliation could be, and often
was, exacted by other members of the gang and not necessarily by
the individual who was disrespected. Sergeant Avila said that
younger gang members, particularly minors, were often assigned to
carry out shootings because gang members know that minors often
receive shorter prison sentences than adults.
5.     The Verdict and Sentencing
       The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder for the
fatal shooting of Mr. Dorton, shooting at an occupied motor vehicle,
and four counts of premeditated attempted murder for the shots
fired at Kevin, T.J. and the two women in Mr. Dorton’s truck.
       In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury found true, as to all
six counts, that the crimes were gang related within the meaning of
Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C), and that a
principal discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury within
the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). The
jury also found true the allegation that defendant had suffered two
prior serious felonies in 2014 and 2015 (burglary and attempted
burglary). The court granted defendant’s oral motion to strike both
of his prior strike convictions in the interests of justice.

                                  9
        The court sentenced defendant to a life term plus 75 years to
life, calculated as follows: 25 years to life on count 1, plus a
consecutive life term on count 2 (minimum parole eligibility of
seven years), plus consecutive firearm enhancements of 25 years to
life on each of counts 1 and 2. The court imposed concurrent
sentences on counts 3, 4 and 5 and imposed and stayed sentence on
count 6. The court orally awarded 1,095 actual days of presentence
custody credits. The abstract of judgment reflects an award of
1,460 days.
        This appeal followed.
                             DISCUSSION
1.      Murder (Count 1)
        Defendant contends his conviction for the murder of
Mr. Dorton must be reversed due to instructional error and a lack of
substantial evidence. He says the circumstantial evidence, viewed
in conjunction with the jury instructions, allowed the jury to find
him guilty of Mr. Dorton’s murder by imputing the malice of the two
shooters to him without concluding he personally harbored malice,
contrary to the changes to murder liability effected by Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). We disagree.
        a.    The jury instructions
        We review a claim of instructional error de novo,
independently assessing the wording of any challenged instruction
and determining whether it accurately states the law. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) We “must consider whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial court’s instructions
caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the
Constitution.” (Ibid.) Jury instructions are not viewed in isolation
but “ ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial
record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the
jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ” (Ibid.)

                                 10
      Here, the jury was given instructions that accurately stated
the current law of liability for aiding and abetting a murder.
CALJIC No. 3.01 told the jury that a person is liable as an aider
and abettor when “[w]ith knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator” and, with the intent of encouraging or facilitating the
commission of that crime, the person aids, promotes or encourages
the commission of that crime.
      The jury was also correctly instructed on the elements of
murder, the definition of malice, and first and second degree
murder. As relevant here, CALJIC No. 8.10 told the jury that a
finding of murder required the unlawful killing of another with
malice aforethought. CALJIC No. 8.11 informed them that malice
may be express or implied and express malice required a specific
intent to kill. CALJIC No. 8.20 instructed that a finding of
premeditated first degree murder required express malice.
      Collectively, these instructions informed the jury that in order
to convict defendant of first degree murder as an aider and abettor,
it would have to find he had the specific intent to kill, he knew of
his accomplices’ intent to kill, and he aided and encouraged the
murder of Mr. Dorton. There was no error in instructing the jury as
to the requisite intent to kill.
      Moreover, the prosecutor did not proffer any theory of implied
malice or imputed malice, or that defendant and the shooters acted
only with a conscious disregard for human life, or that defendant
could be guilty of murder even if he only intended to aid and abet
some other act like assault. Defendant concedes he was prosecuted
on the sole theory that he directly aided and abetted the shooters.
Defendant has not shown there was any ambiguity or confusion
created by the jury instructions that would have allowed a
reasonable jury to misapply the law and find him guilty on an
implied malice theory.

                                 11
       Defendant’s reliance on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972 and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257
(Maldonado) in arguing that the instructions were ambiguous and
allowed that possibility is misplaced. Langi concluded that the
standard aiding-and-abetting instructions are “ill suited” to the
crime of second degree murder. (Langi, at p. 982.) Nothing in
Langi’s analysis of the instructions on aiding and abetting applies
to a first degree murder committed with intent to kill.
       Maldonado involved first degree murder but it also has no
application here. The defendant there appealed from the denial of a
resentencing petition pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.
(Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1259.) The court reversed
and remanded for an evidentiary hearing because it could not say
unequivocally that the jury had not been misled by the jury
instructions. (Id. at p. 1269.) The court explained that the jury had
been presented with a lying-in-wait murder theory and lying-in-
wait instructions, and “first degree lying-in-wait murder can be
based on a theory that the perpetrator acted with implied malice
rather than an intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 1267.) The jury here was
not presented with any similar option.
       b.    The evidence
       We review the evidence according to the familiar standard.
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942–943 [reviewing court
considers the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine if it contains evidence, both direct and
circumstantial, that is reasonable, credible and of solid value,
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;
the court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of all
facts and inferences the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from
the evidence].)

                                 12
       Defendant concedes, as he did in the trial court, that the GPS
evidence from his ankle monitor showed he was “in the area” of the
murder. But he contends the balance of the evidence did not
establish he drove the Mazda to the scene or that he was anything
other than a passenger in the vehicle who had no knowledge of a
planned shooting or any intent to kill. He says the prosecution’s
theory of his role in the shooting rests on speculation arising from
the evidence that he was driving the Mazda earlier in the day.
Defendant’s argument disregards much of the evidence and the
reasonable inferences therefrom on which the jury was entitled to
rely in finding him guilty of murder.
       Numerous factors may be considered in assessing aiding and
abetting liability, including “ ‘presence at the scene of the crime,
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense.’ ” (People
v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054 (Nguyen).) Evidence of
motive is another relevant factor. (People v. Glukhoy (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599.)
       There was substantial evidence of all of these factors. There
was evidence of an ongoing feud between the Rolling 60’s and
Rolling 40’s gangs. Defendant and the shooters were active
Rolling 60’s gang members, and Mr. Dorton was a former Rolling
40’s gang member. The GPS evidence, the cell phone and cell tower
records, and the video footage from multiple security cameras and
traffic cameras established that defendant was driving the stolen
Mazda throughout the day and was meeting and talking in person
and over his cell phone with his accomplices, Guerrero and Wright,
including at the Rolling 60’s hangout on West 59th Street
immediately before and after the shooting.
       This evidence, along with the testimony of the gang expert,
reasonably supported the conclusion that defendant, Guerrero and
Wright met up at the gang’s stronghold to plan an attack, then

                                 13
drove together into Rolling 40’s territory to a home that was a
known Rolling 40’s hangout. They drove past the home and saw
three potential victims standing together in the driveway next to a
truck with two other victims seated inside, then went around the
block and returned to shoot and kill their intended targets as part
of the long-running feud between the two gangs and in likely
retaliation for the earlier skirmish at Peck Park.
       The nature of the attack also supported the conclusion it was
a planned, premeditated attack and not one that Guerrero and
Wright simply decided to undertake spontaneously on their own,
unbeknownst to defendant. That there was no evidence that any of
the defendants expressly voiced an intent to kill Mr. Dorton does
not diminish the substantial circumstantial evidence of intent.
“ ‘Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost inevitably
circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct
evidence to support a conviction.’ ” (Nguyen, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 1055.)
2.     Attempted Murder (Counts 2–5)
       Defendant argues all four attempted murder convictions also
must be reversed because of a lack of substantial evidence and a
failure of the jury instructions to clearly instruct that defendant, as
an aider and abettor, had to personally harbor an intent to kill as to
each attempted murder victim. We disagree.
       “To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend
to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. The defendant’s mental
state must be examined as to each alleged attempted murder
victim. Someone who intends to kill only one person and attempts
unsuccessfully to do so, is guilty of the attempted murder of the
intended victim, but not of others.” (People v. Bland (2002)
28 Cal.4th 313, 328; accord, People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90,
120 [doctrine of transferred intent “does not apply to attempted

                                  14
murder. ‘To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must
intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else.’ ”].)
        As explained above, the court’s instruction on aiding and
abetting accurately stated the law. The jurors were instructed on
the elements of attempted murder with CALJIC No. 8.66 which told
them that attempted murder requires “[a] direct but ineffectual act
. . . by one person towards killing another human being” and the
person committing the act must harbor express malice “namely, a
specific intent to kill.” Combined with CALJIC No. 3.01, the
instructions adequately informed the jury that the perpetrator of
the attempted murder, and anyone who aided the perpetrator, must
have acted with a specific intent to kill. Moreover, the jurors were
instructed with CALJIC No. 17.02 which told them that each count
is a distinct crime and “You must decide each Count separately.”
        The evidence discussed above in connection with the murder
of Mr. Dorton also constitutes substantial evidence of defendant’s
guilt as an aider and abettor for the attempted murders of Kevin,
T.J. and the two female victims.
        Defendant says there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the two female
victims were visible to defendant and the shooters and were targets
of the shooting. Defendant says Kevin’s testimony is improbable
and should be disregarded because he testified he was not looking
in the direction of the street or truck at the time of the shooting.
We disagree. Kevin was not looking in the direction of the street or
shooters when the gunfire erupted, but that does not make
improbable his testimony that Mr. Dorton arrived with two female
passengers a half hour before the shooting and that they remained
in the truck during Kevin’s conversations with Mr. Dorton before
and at the time of the shooting. (People v. Truong (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [testimony of a single witness is sufficient to

                                 15
support a conviction, unless it is physically impossible or inherently
improbable].)
       Moreover, there was no evidence the women in the truck were
not visible to defendant and the shooters. Defendant made an
initial pass around the block, then returned to park near the truck,
when the shooters got out and fired in close proximity to the truck.
There was no evidence of any obstructions between them and the
truck, nor evidence it was dark outside at the time. Indeed, Kevin
testified that when he arrived around 7:00 p.m., it was still light
outside given that it was a summer evening. And, the bullet path
analysis was strong circumstantial evidence of an intent to kill and
shooting at an occupied vehicle. The same evidence that supports
the murder and the other two attempted murders supports these
two attempted murder charges. Defendant is asking us to reweigh
the evidence and draw contrary inferences, which we cannot do.
(People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
3.     Shooting at an Occupied Vehicle (Count 6)
       Defendant contends count 6 also fails for lack of substantial
evidence. He reiterates his argument there was no evidence to
support a jury finding that he and the shooters were aware there
were two people sitting in Mr. Dorton’s truck. The contention is
without merit. The same evidence that supports the attempted
murder charges constitutes substantial evidence supporting
defendant’s conviction as an aider and abettor of shooting at an
occupied vehicle.
4.     The Firearm Enhancements
       Defendant contends the record does not reflect the trial court
understood the scope of its authority with respect to imposing the
fire enhancements pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53. He
requests the 25-year firearm enhancements be stricken on counts 3
through 6 as to the victims who were not physically injured. He

                                 16
also requests remand for resentencing on counts 1 and 2 to allow
the court the opportunity to consider imposition of a lesser term
firearm enhancement on those two counts in accordance with People
v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado).
        We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to strike or
dismiss a sentencing enhancement under the deferential abuse of
discretion standard. (Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
478, 490; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373–374 [order
denying motion to strike prior conviction allegation reviewed for
abuse].) We find no abuse of discretion.
        Penal Code section 12022.53 specifies separate enhancement
terms based on the type and nature of firearm use during the
commission of an enumerated felony: a 10-year term for personal
use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); a 20-year term for personal
and intentional discharge (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and a 25-year-to-
life term for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm that
causes great bodily injury or death to “a person” other than an
accomplice (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Subdivision (e)(1) imposes
vicarious liability on aiders and abettors for the qualifying acts of
any principal in a gang-related offense. Here, the jury’s true
findings as to all counts were based only on subdivisions (d) and
(e)(1).
        Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (h) grants the
sentencing court the discretion to strike or dismiss an enhancement
in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385. Almost six
months before the sentencing hearing in this matter, Tirado held
that a sentencing court has not only the authority to strike or
dismiss an enhancement under section 12022.53 as reflected in
subdivision (h), but the discretion to impose one of the lesser terms,
even if those lesser terms were not charged. (Tirado, supra,
12 Cal.5th at pp. 692, 700.)

                                 17
        “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ”
(People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361.) The record here does
not contain evidence demonstrating the court was unaware of its
authority under Tirado, a decision which had been in effect for
almost half a year.
        Defendant says it was “clear” the court’s intent was for him to
receive a fair sentence that was not grossly disproportionate to the
determinate terms given to the shooters in plea agreements with
the prosecutor. The record does show that the court exercised its
discretion not to impose a maximum sentence, but nothing in the
record makes it clear the court was unaware it had the authority to
reduce defendant’s sentence further.
        At the outset of the hearing, the court exercised its sentencing
discretion to grant defendant’s motion to strike his two prior strike
convictions, finding it was in the interests of justice to do so and
explaining that a nonstrike sentence would still be “substantial.”
The court said it believed a sentence involving strikes would be
“unjust” given the facts and circumstances of the case and
defendant’s role in it.
        The court then imposed the 25-year enhancements as to both
counts 1 and 2 involving the murder of Mr. Dorton and the multiple
gunshot wounds to Kevin P. The court acknowledged it had been
asked to exercise its discretion to strike the enhancements and said
it saw “no reason to.” The court said it could not excuse what
defendant did.
        As to the three attempted murder counts with victims who
were not physically injured (counts 3–5), the court imposed the 25-
year enhancement on each count but exercised its discretion to run
all of those sentences concurrently, on both the substantive offenses

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and the enhancements. On count 6, the court imposed and stayed
sentence pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
       The court chose to exercise its discretion by striking the prior
strikes and imposing concurrent sentences on counts 3 through 5
and staying the sentence on count 6. This does not reflect an
arbitrary or abusive exercise of discretion, nor does it show that the
court did not know it could have imposed lesser firearm
enhancements had it wished to reduce defendant’s sentence further.
       Finally, defendant references a comment by the court during
its discussion with counsel about the verdict forms for the
attempted murder counts. The court said that if the jury comes
back with a true finding that is “inconsistent” with the law, the
court would strike it and that defendant would not be “punished for
something he could not be.”
       The jury’s true findings were not inconsistent with the law,
and the 25-year firearm enhancements pursuant to Penal Code
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) were lawfully imposed. In People
v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1048 (Oates), the Supreme Court
interpreted the language of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The
defendant in Oates fired two shots at a group of five people, injuring
just one. (Oates, at p. 1052.) The defendant was convicted of five
counts of attempted murder and the trial court imposed subdivision
(d) enhancements as to each of the five counts. (Ibid.) The
Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in doing so.
(Id. at pp. 1052–1053.)
       Oates explained that the 25-year section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement applied by its own terms to
“ ‘any person’ who, ‘in the commission of’ a specified felony,
‘personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately
causes great bodily injury . . . or death, to any person other than an
accomplice.’ (Italics added.)” (Oates, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1055.)

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“Had the Legislature wanted to limit the number of subdivision (d)
enhancements imposed to the number of injuries inflicted, or had it
not wanted subdivision (d) to serve as the enhancement applicable
to each qualifying conviction where there is only one qualifying
injury, it could have said so.” (Id. at p. 1056.)
5.    The Custody Credits
      At the sentencing hearing, the court awarded defendant
1,095 actual days of presentence custody credits, acknowledging
counsel’s comment that the calculation could be inaccurate. The
abstract of judgment however reflects an award of custody credits in
the amount of 1,460 days. As the parties agree, the correct number
of presentence custody credits is 1,457, reflecting defendant’s actual
days in custody from the date of his arrest on July 13, 2018,
through the July 8, 2022 sentencing. On remand, the superior
court shall correct the abstract of judgment to reflect 1,457 actual
days of presentence custody credits.
                            DISPOSITION
      The case is remanded with directions to the superior court to
award 1,457 actual days of presentence custody credits and to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward it to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment of
conviction is affirmed in all other respects.

                              GRIMES, Acting P. J.
      WE CONCUR:

                        WILEY, J.      VIRAMONTES, J.

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