Court Opinion

ID: 9619756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:32:33.657422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:44.102783
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur for the reason that even imminent possible possession does not constitute “constructive possession” as that term is legally defined.' The State must prove “that defendant alone or jointly with another had actual or constructive possession of [the contraband], . . . Constructive possession is shown where one knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise *421authority or control over a thing. [Cits.]” Smith v. State, 205 Ga. App. 810, 811 (424 SE2d 56) (1992).
Decided February 3, 1998.
Leo E. Benton, Jr., for appellant.
Lydia J. Sartain, District Attorney, Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Even considering the testimony of Brookshire’s son and his companion Watson, and without concern for further corroboration, neither evidence nor a reasonable inference is available on this record to prove that Brookshire had the power to exercise control of the marijuana at any time. She certainly did not have it alone, as the marijuana was in the car of her son, the driver, and there is no evidence that he gave her the keys after he and Watson arrived.
Nor could it be found that both mother and son jointly shared the requisite power at any time. The son, with Watson as aider and abettor, solely possessed the power to retain the marijuana, give it to Brookshire or someone else, drive off with it, or any one of a number of possibilities. Although there is some evidence that Brookshire intended to exercise authority and control over the marijuana as part of engagement in buying and distributing marijuana, control had not yet passed to her. Anticipation of possession, even when the possessor’s anticipation coincides, does not constitute “authority or control” over an object. The officers stopped the progress of the apparent plan too early to allow any act of possession by her to occur.
“A ‘crime’ is a violation of a statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence.” OCGA § 16-2-1. Thus the act of possession must be in the present, not in the future, to constitute the crime charged.
The Smith case is comparable because it also involves a planned and attempted possession which was thwarted before it matured.