Court Opinion

ID: 9629630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:46:16.59635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:55.289515
License: Public Domain

LEE, J.,
dissenting.
On August 27, 1977, the prosecutrix, a hitchhiker, told the Oregon State Police that she had been raped. She gave a detailed description of the rapist and the incident. Two days later at approximately 5 p.m., Officer Cofer apprehended defendant and immediately advised him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR 3rd 974 (1966). Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights and signed a "rights card.” After he was informed of the charge, defendant admitted that he had picked up a hitchhiker on the day in question but claimed that he had dropped her off in Garibaldi without incident. Cofer took defendant to the Tillamook patrol office to put his statement on tape.
After arrival at the office, Cofer testified that defendant said that he realized that "he was in pretty serious trouble” and "[m]aybe he should talk to an attorney.” Cofer then offered defendant the use of the phone and he placed several calls to attorneys. Defendant was unsuccessful in contacting an attorney but did reach one recording device and he left his name "with the recording.” No restriction was placed on the number of calls defendant was allowed to make. Defendant’s last attempt to call an attorney was made *216at 6:35 p.xn. While defendant and Cofer were "standing there getting ready to go,” the officer said:
"You know that story you told me earlier wasn’t the truth and it won’t be hard to break down.”
Defendant then admitted that his original statement was not the truth and said, "Well, maybe I should tell you about it.” Cofer asked defendant to make any further statement on tape and defendant said, "Let me tell you about it first.”
Defendant then related that on August 27,1977, he had picked up a hitchhiker and taken her to Pacific City, then to a spot out of town where they kissed. Defendant called her a tease and she hit him in the face with a clump of dirt after which he got angry and threatened her with a tire iron, threw her down, forced himself upon her, and had intercourse with her. Then Cofer again advised defendant of his rights, which defendant acknowledged that he understood, and thereafter, the second version of the incident was taped.
Defendant contends that Cofer’s comment concerning his first statement, after he had expressed a desire to see an attorney, violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 473-75, which states:
"* * * If the individual indicates in any manner, at anytime prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel * * (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The Miranda rule has been followed in Oregon by proscribing police use of "less than subtle forms of inducement and persistent persuasion.” State v. Suggs, 13 Or App 484, 490, 511 P2d 405 (1973). In that case, *217despite defendant’s requests for an attorney, police persisted in telling him that an attorney would not be necessary unless he had something to hide. Such attempts to persuade defendant not to see an attorney are improper. State v. Paz, 31 Or App 851, 572 P2d 1036 (1977), rev den 282 Or 189 (1978); State v. Garrison, 16 Or App 588, 519 P2d 1295, rev den (1974).
The instant case, however, is distinguishable in that the comment by Cofer did not attempt to persuade defendant to do anything. When defendant volunteered the second statement, Cofer listened to that version of what happened and then again advised defendant of his Miranda rights before having defendant repeat it on tape. Cofer’s casual comment concerning the first explanation simply marked the point in time when defendant voluntarily abandoned his quest for an attorney and chose to give the second statement. In effect, defendant voluntarily waived his right to counsel and to remain silent.
I would find that the historical facts justify the trial court’s finding that "defendant did change his mind” and voluntarily made the statements. Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 443 P2d 621 (1968). Cf. State v. Warner, 284 Or 147, 585 P2d 681 (1978).
I would affirm, so I respectfully dissent.