Court Opinion

ID: 9576637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:26:41.663957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:03.821785
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because competent counsel would inform a criminal defendant of a new sentencing statute that will require the defendant to serve more time if he accepts the state’s plea offer than he will if he is tried *583and convicted, I dissent.
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel following a guilty plea, a defendant must show both that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that, in the absence of his attorney’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted upon facing trial.1
In 1994, the legislature proscribed more stringent punishments for the “seven violent felonies,” including armed robbery. OCGA § 17-10-6.1 became effective January 1, 1995, following ratification of a constitutional amendment by Georgia voters. Under OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (3), a person who is convicted of one of seven “serious violent felonies,” including armed robbery, and sentenced to less than life imprisonment is ineligible for parole. However, if that person receives a life sentence, he may be eligible for parole after 14 years.2 Thus, by pleading guilty with the state’s recommendation of a 15-year sentence, Duffy is required to serve one year more than if he had been tried, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The record supports the habeas court’s finding that Duffy’s counsel failed to inform him that he would be ineligible for parole if he pled guilty and received a 15-year sentence. The failure of defense counsel to inform Duffy of the effect of the new sentencing statute applicable to his offense falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The majority equates “constitutionally ineffective assistance” with the deficiency prong. However, deficient performance is only “constitutionally ineffective” when it causes prejudice. In looking at the deficiency prong separately, I would hold that defense counsel’s obligation to his client in entering a guilty plea is not defined by a trial court’s duties in accepting a guilty plea. While the two concepts are interrelated, I am persuaded that the more logical approach is to recognize that a defendant’s sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is separate from a due process claim that a plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.3 Although the result under either inquiry will often be the same, for the sake of clarity in the law and for guidance to the bench and bar, the better practice would be to keep the two issues distinct.
I would affirm the habeas court’s conclusion that counsel’s per*584formance was deficient, but I would remand for consideration of whether Duffy would have insisted on going to trial in light of the strength of the state’s case and the pendency of additional charges for aggravated assault and burglary.
Decided March 1, 1999.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Angelica M. Woo, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Craig L. Cascio, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham joins in this dissent.

 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (106 SC 366, 88 LE2d 203) (1985); Tarwater v. State, 259 Ga. 516, 517-518 (383 SE2d 883) (1989).

 OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (1).

 See Yoswick v. State, 700 A.2d 251 (Md. 1997); Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); Kinnersley v. State, 494 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1993); People v. Moore, 844 P.2d 1261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Chung, 510 A.2d 72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Lyons a Pearce, 694 P.2d 969 (Or. 1985) (en banc); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (93 SC 1389, 35 LE2d 611) (1973); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979).