Court Opinion

ID: 9908067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:01:22.326732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:31.265283
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
         FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LORENZO DOMINGUEZ,                                No. 22-55731
individually, on behalf of others
similarly situated, and on behalf of the            D.C. No.
general public,                                  8:20-cv-01784-
                                                    JLS-KES
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
                                                    OPINION
BETTER MORTGAGE
CORPORATION,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
             for the Central District of California
         Josephine L. Staton, District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted June 6, 2023
                    Pasadena, California

                    Filed December 7, 2023

    Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr., David F. Hamilton, * and
             Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

*
 The Honorable David F. Hamilton, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
2              DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

               Opinion by Judge David F. Hamilton;
     Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Collins

                          SUMMARY **

                           Labor Law

    The panel (1) affirmed the district court’s order imposing
a communication restriction on the defendant employer in a
putative collective and class wage-and-hour action under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and state law; and (2) dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction the employer’s appeal from the
district court’s order nullifying agreements between the
employer and current and former employees.
    The lead plaintiff objected after his former employer
responded to his lawsuit seeking unpaid overtime wages by
trying to persuade employees to agree not to join any
collective or class action and to encourage employees to
settle their claims individually. The district court found that
the employer’s communications were misleading and
coercive. The district court therefore nullified the new
employment agreements and release agreements, and it
ordered the employer to communicate with current and
former employees about wage-and-hour issues only in
writing and with prior approval.
   The panel held that the employer’s appeal was timely,
even though the district court’s order imposing the

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.               3

communication restriction was entered on May 17, 2022,
more than 30 days before the filing of the notice of appeal,
because the employer filed in substance a motion to
reconsider the restriction, thus tolling the time to file the
notice of appeal. The employer timely filed its notice of
appeal within 30 days of the district court’s order refusing to
modify the May 17 order.
    The panel held that, in this interlocutory appeal, it had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) to review the
communication restriction because the restriction, which
imposed a prior restraint, was injunctive in
nature. Affirming in part, the panel held that the restriction
was both justified and tailored to the situation created by the
employer’s misleading and coercive communications, and
the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
imposing the restriction.
    Dismissing in part, the panel held that it lacked
jurisdiction to review the district court’s order nullifying
new employment agreements and release agreements signed
in response to the employer’s communications that the
district court found to have been misleading and
coercive. The panel held that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the nullification order because the
issue was raised in an interlocutory appeal and did fit any
exception, such as pendent appellate jurisdiction, that would
allow for review.
    Judge Collins concurred in Parts II and III(A) of the
opinion, concluding that the panel had appellate jurisdiction
over the district court’s order requiring the employer to
obtain prior court approval before engaging in certain
communications with potential class members. As to the
merits of the employer’s challenges to the communications
4           DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

order, imposing a prior restraint, Judge Collins wrote that he
would vacate that order and remand for further
consideration, and he therefore dissented from the majority’s
contrary disposition. Concurring in the judgment in part,
Judge Collins agreed with the majority’s ultimate conclusion
that the panel lacked appellate jurisdiction over the further
portions of the district court’s orders nullifying certain
agreements between the employer and some of its
employees.

                        COUNSEL

Anton Metlitsky (argued), O’ Melveny & Myers LLP, New
York, New York; Adam J. Karr, O’ Melveny & Myers LLP,
Los Angeles, California; Paul A. Holton, O’Melveny &
Myers LLP, Newport Beach, California; Susannah K.
Howard and Racquel B. Martin, O’Melveny & Myers LLP,
San Francisco, California; for Defendant-Appellant.
Matthew C. Helland (argued) and Daniel S. Brome, Nicholas
Kaster LLP, San Francisco, California; C. Andrew Head and
Bethany A. Hilbert, Head Law Firm LLC, Chicago, Illinois;
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              5

                         OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

    This appeal presents recurring issues facing district
courts in managing whether and how prospective parties are
brought into wage-and-hour lawsuits under the collective
action procedures of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
and class actions brought under state laws. See generally
Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989)
(collective actions); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89
(1981) (class actions). In wage-and-hour cases like this one,
such issues can arise, for example, when an employer tries
to discourage current and former employees from
participating and thus to minimize the employer’s exposure
in the lawsuit. Here, the lead plaintiff in this suit seeking
unpaid overtime wages objected after his former employer
responded to his lawsuit by trying to persuade employees to
agree not to join any collective or class action and to
encourage employees to settle their claims individually.
    The district court found that the employer’s
communications to solicit these agreements were misleading
and coercive. The court therefore nullified the new
employment agreements and release agreements, and the
court ordered the employer to communicate with current and
former employees about wage and hour issues only in
writing and with prior court approval. Other district courts
in this circuit and elsewhere have addressed similar conduct.
See, e.g., Camp v. Alexander, 300 F.R.D. 617, 620, 624–26
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases, requiring curative notice,
and invalidating opt-out agreements where defendant
obtained them using misleading information).
6            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

    In this appeal, the employer challenges the district
court’s nullification of signed agreements and its restriction
on communications with employees. The lead plaintiff
defends the district court’s actions on the merits and
questions appellate jurisdiction. As explained below, we
have appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s restriction
on the employer’s communication with members of the
putative class and collective action, and on the merits we
affirm the restriction, finding it both justified and tailored to
the situation created by the employer’s misleading and
coercive communications. We lack appellate jurisdiction,
however, over the district court’s order nullifying
agreements between the employer and current and former
employees. We therefore do not reach the merits of the
nullification issue.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
    A. The Lawsuit is Filed
    Lead plaintiff Lorenzo Dominguez worked for defendant
Better Mortgage Corporation as an underwriter. He alleges
that Better Mortgage violated federal and state wage-and-
hour laws, primarily by failing to pay overtime to him and
other mortgage underwriters. He sued in September 2020
under both the federal FLSA, which allows collective
actions by similarly situated plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b), and California statutes, which may be applied
through class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23.
    B. The Employer’s Quick Response
    Better Mortgage wasted no time in trying to reduce its
risk in the new lawsuit by reducing the size of the potential
class and collective action. On October 19, 2020, Better
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.             7

Mortgage held a virtual meeting with all then-current
underwriter employees.       Managers said they were
“reviewing a legal claim against the company, alleging
that … [underwriting] roles should be eligible for overtime
pay.” Managers also said they did not believe the allegations
were true.
    Managers then tried to persuade the current underwriters
to sign agreements that would reduce the company’s
exposure in this lawsuit. The company offered the
underwriters $5,000 each for quickly signing an agreement
releasing their non-FLSA claims in this lawsuit. Better
Mortgage managers also said in the same virtual meeting
that underwriters would receive a new mandatory
employment agreement, but they did not indicate how the
new agreement differed from prior agreements. They said
only vaguely that it would include “updates.”
    Later in the evening of October 19, Better Mortgage sent
the new employment agreement to underwriters by email.
The new agreement included a new clause requiring
arbitration of all employment-related claims—and only in an
individual proceeding, not a class or collective arbitration.
The new employment agreement did not mention the
pending lawsuit. Better Mortgage management told the
underwriters that signing the new agreement was a condition
of continued employment.
    That same evening, Better Mortgage also emailed
underwriters a form release agreement for this lawsuit, as
discussed in the virtual meeting. The release agreement
summarized the pending lawsuit, provided a link to the
Dominguez complaint, and said that signing would waive
“any and all claims (except those under the FLSA) that were
or could have been asserted in the Lawsuit.” The release
8             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

agreement did not mention arbitration or explain that,
although employees would not be waiving claims under the
FLSA through this agreement, they would be waiving their
ability to pursue those claims collectively by signing the new
employment agreement sent earlier in the evening. Both
proposed agreements came in email messages that warned in
bold font not to share the emails. In some tension with that
instruction, the release agreement said that employees had a
right to consult an attorney, but it added that Better Mortgage
would not pay attorney fees for any consultation.
    The next morning, October 20, 2020—after many
underwriters had already signed the new employment
agreement—Better Mortgage sent a “recap” email. That
email called attention, for the first time, to the new
employment agreement’s arbitration clause. That email did
not explain that the clause would bar collective pursuit of
claims in this lawsuit.
    C. Response in the District Court
    Almost a year later, on October 1, 2021, plaintiff
Dominguez filed a motion asking the district court to
invalidate both the new employment agreements and release
agreements that had been signed by prospective plaintiffs.
His motion also sought to restrict Better Mortgage’s ability
to communicate with putative class and collective action
members without court approval. When Dominguez filed
that motion, no class had been certified under Rule 23, nor
had the court approved collective treatment of the FLSA
claims. 1

1
 On the same day that Dominguez filed his motion to nullify the signed
agreements, Better Mortgage filed a motion asking the court to deny
               DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.                       9

    On May 17, 2022, the district court issued the first of two
orders at the center of this appeal. This first order (a) found
that Better Mortgage obtained signatures on the new
employment agreements and release agreements through
coercion and misleading information, and (b) invalidated
new employment agreements and release agreements “as to
any employee who was already employed at the time the
agreements were presented.” The court also (c) ordered
Better Mortgage to send a court-approved curative notice to
underwriters who had signed the employment agreement and
told the parties to confer and submit proposed language for
the notice within fourteen days. Id. Last, the court (d)
ordered Better Mortgage to refrain from communicating
“with putative class members regarding the subject matter of
this litigation” except in writing as approved by the court.
Id. Better Mortgage did not appeal the first order. 2
    Counsel conferred but could not agree on language for
the court-ordered curative notice. On May 31, 2022, counsel
submitted a joint notice of their disagreements and their
competing proposals. The parties disagreed on which

class certification. Better Mortgage argued that most putative members
had signed the release agreement and the employment agreement
containing the arbitration agreement. The court held argument on the
issue of class certification and denied Better Mortgage’s motion to deny
certification at the same time it nullified signed the agreements and said
it would impose restrictions on communications.
2
  As for the $5,000 individual payments already made by Better
Mortgage under the signed release agreements, the district court
“prohibit[ed] Defendant from requesting reimbursement” and reserved
for later in the lawsuit the question whether Better Mortgage might be
entitled to an offset for payments already made. Better Mortgage has not
raised any issue about payments in this appeal.
10           DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

employment agreements the court meant to invalidate as
well as on the scope of the communication restriction.
    On July 21, 2022, the district court addressed those
disputes in the second order at the center of this appeal. The
court made clear that it invalidated agreements “as to all
putative class members” and rejected Better Mortgage’s
interpretation of the communication restriction that would
have allowed the company to communicate with employees
about “wage and hour matters (as opposed to the lawsuit
specifically).” Better Mortgage then moved to stay the May
17 and July 21 orders pending resolution of the appeal. The
court granted a stay of the part of the second order “relating
to the request by Defendant that was not addressed in the
May 17, 2022 Order, namely, that Defendant have
permission ‘to discuss wage and hour matters (as opposed to
the lawsuit specifically)’ with members of the potential
class.” The court denied a stay of other portions of its orders.
This appeal followed.
    We explain next in Part II why this appeal is timely. In
Part III, we turn to the communication restriction. We find
that we have appellate jurisdiction over that challenge, and
we affirm that restriction on the merits. Finally, in Part IV,
we explain why we do not have appellate jurisdiction over
the district court’s order nullifying signed release
agreements and new employment agreements with former
employees and underwriters who were current employees in
October 2020.
II. Timeliness of the Appeal
    The district court entered two orders covering the issues
appealed, the first on May 17, 2022, which announced the
injunctive restriction on Better Mortgage’s communications
with underwriters and the nullification of signed agreements,
              DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.                   11

and the second on July 21, 2022, which, among other things,
resolved issues about the corrective communication to
underwriters. Better Mortgage filed its notice of appeal on
August 1, 2022. Counting from May 17, the notice of appeal
was filed after the applicable 30-day jurisdictional deadline
in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Our
jurisdiction depends on whether there is a sound basis for
extending that 30-day deadline. We find that there is.
    Better Mortgage offers two principal grounds for
extending the deadline. The first is that the district court’s
second order on July 21 resolved a genuine ambiguity in the
May 17 order regarding communications with potential class
members and plaintiffs. If a later order materially changes
the substance of an earlier order, the later order can restart
the clock for appeal of the entire earlier order, “even where
the appeal concerns a different matter from that revised by
the district court.” United States v. Doe, 374 F.3d 851, 854
(9th Cir. 2004); see also Burlington Northern Inc. v. United
States, 459 U.S. 131, 138 n.5 (1982) (appeal was timely
where second order “‘[resolved] a genuine ambiguity in a
judgment previously rendered’ and dealt with a question
which was not ‘plainly and properly settled with finality’”)
(quoting FTC v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 344
U.S. 206, 211–12 (1952) (refusing to allow second order to
restart clock for appeal because first order “was for all
purposes final. It put to rest the questions which the parties
had litigated…. It was neither ‘tentative, informal nor
incomplete’”)). 3
   Dominguez argues that the district court’s May 17 order
was not ambiguous but quite clear, requiring Better

3
  A different holding in Minneapolis-Honeywell was later superseded by
statute. See Catz v. Chalker, 566 F.3d 839, 841 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
12             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

Mortgage to “communicate with putative class members
regarding the subject matter of this litigation only in writing
and with Court approval” (emphasis in original). We do not
need to resolve this debate over the clarity of that first order
because we agree with Better Mortgage’s second argument
for the appeal being timely.
     The second argument is that Better Mortgage filed in
substance a timely motion to reconsider that injunction, thus
tolling the time to file a notice of appeal until the district
court ruled on its motion. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv).
Such a motion to reconsider or amend the May 17 order’s
prior restraint was due within 28 days of that order. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 54(a) & 59(e). The parties filed their court-
ordered joint document on May 31, which is well within that
allowed time. 4 Accordingly, that document suffices if it
constituted a “motion to alter or amend” an “order from
which an appeal lies.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) & 54(a).
    A “motion” must be in writing unless it is made during a
hearing or a trial, and it must “state the relief sought” and
“state with particularity the grounds for seeking the order.”
See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b). In determining whether a document
qualifies as a motion under Rule 59(e) to alter or amend an
appealable judgment or order, we have made clear that
“nomenclature is not controlling,” and a document “will be
considered a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the
judgment [or appealable order] where it involves

4
  That also happens to be within the 14-day time limit for motions to
reconsider under the Central District of California’s Local Rules. See
C.D. CAL. L. CIV. R. 7-18. However, a local rule cannot shorten the 28-
day time limit specified in the national rules with respect to an order that
is appealable as of right. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(A), 59(E); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (stating that a “local rule must be consistent with”
national rules).
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.             13

reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a
decision on the merits.” United States ex rel. Hoggett v.
University of Phoenix, 863 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citations omitted).
    The substance of the parties’ May 31 joint statement
satisfies these criteria so that the document counts as a Rule
59(e) motion by Better Mortgage with respect to the May 17
order’s restriction on its communications with its current and
former underwriters. In the joint statement, Better Mortgage
took the position that the phrase “subject matter of this
lawsuit” should be explained to mean “only the lawsuit
itself” and not any matter that is “part of the subject matter
of the lawsuit,” such as the “wages and hours” of current
employees. The document also sets forth Better Mortgage’s
reasons for requesting that “explanation”—namely, that this
clarification “is far more narrowly tailored,” as assertedly
required by Gulf Oil. The document made clear that Better
Mortgage wanted the district court to modify its May 17
order immediately to make clear that, despite having used
the phrase “regarding the subject matter of the litigation,”
the order should not bar either communications with
employees about “wage and hour matters” or
communications for the purpose of “obtain[ing] factual
information to defend itself in this litigation.” The document
set forth with sufficient particularity the ground on which
Better Mortgage sought that modification. Thus, “look[ing]
to the substance, not simply the title,” of the May 31
document “to determine whether it is in substance a motion
to alter or amend the judgment,” Hoggett, 863 F.3d at 1108,
the document counted as a motion by Better Mortgage to
alter or amend the May 17 order.
  Accordingly, the time for Better Mortgage to appeal the
May 17 order did not begin to run until its requested
14             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

modification was denied in the July 21 order. And because
the notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the July 21
order, Better Mortgage’s appeal is timely and brings up
before us both the May 17 order imposing the prior restraint
and the July 21 order refusing to change it. That does not
resolve all issues of appellate jurisdiction, however. 5
III. The Communication Restriction
    We now turn to defendant’s challenge to the second
order’s communication restriction in this interlocutory
appeal. We first find that we have appellate jurisdiction over
this challenge. We then affirm the restriction as a tailored
response to defendant’s misleading and coercive
communications intended to restrict the scope of the lawsuit.
     A. Appellate Jurisdiction Over the Communication
        Restriction
    The district court’s restriction was injunctive in nature.
Jurisdiction exists over appeals from “[i]nterlocutory orders
of the district courts … granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions….” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The statute
provides jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order that is
not labeled as an injunction yet has the “‘practical effect’ of

5
   Plaintiff Dominguez argues that the joint statement cannot be
considered a motion under Rule 59(e) because it did not comply with the
format and other requirements of the Local Rules of the Central District
of California. Any such defect as to form did not preclude a document
that was filed within the Rule 59(e) time limit from serving as a Rule
59(e) motion that resets the time for filing an appeal. See Feldman v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 660, 665–66 (9th Cir. 2003) (motion to
reconsider extended time to appeal despite failure to comply with district
court’s local rule requiring a statement that parties conferred before
motion was filed).
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              15

granting or denying an injunction” and threatens “serious
and perhaps irreparable harm if not immediately reviewed.”
Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2319 (2018) (quoting
Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981)).
    The communication restriction at issue here prevents
Better Mortgage from communicating with employees about
wage and hour matters absent court approval. This aspect of
the order is injunctive in nature. That is sufficient for
appellate jurisdiction under Section 1292(a). Great Rivers
Co-op. of Southeastern Iowa v. Farmland Industries, Inc.,
59 F.3d 764, 765–66 (8th Cir. 1995) (exercising jurisdiction
under § 1292(a) in appeal from district court order restricting
communications with potential class members and requiring
corrective notice); cf. Aguilar v. Walgreen Co., 47 F.4th
1115, 1121–22 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2022) (distinguishing Great
Rivers and dismissing interlocutory appeal where district
court order invalidating opt-outs from class action did not
require or prohibit any speech).
   B. Merits of the Communication Restriction
    Before addressing the more difficult jurisdictional
problem presented by the appellate challenge to the order
nullifying the new employment agreements and release
agreements, we resolve the merits of Better Mortgage’s
challenge to the communication restriction.
    Better Mortgage argues that the district court abused its
discretion in issuing any restriction on communications
given the facts. In the alternative, Better Mortgage argues
that even if some restriction was justified, the order issued
was too broad in scope.
    The Supreme Court recognizes that district courts have
the duty and the power to oversee communications from
16          DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

both defendants and class counsel with potential class
members and FLSA collective action participants, but also
that this power must be exercised cautiously. In Gulf Oil Co.
v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981), the Court taught that a
district court may issue “an order limiting communications
between parties and potential class members … based on a
clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of
the need for a limitation and the potential interference with
the rights of the parties.” This power flows from Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(1), which allows district
courts to “issue orders that … impose conditions on the
representative parties or on intervenors … [and] deal with
similar procedural matters.”
    In Hoffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167–68
(1989), the Court applied the same principles to a court order
regulating communications with potential plaintiffs in a
collective action proceeding under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, which uses the collective action
procedures of the FLSA.           See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b),
incorporating § 216(b). Hoffman-La Roche cited Gulf Oil
and said that the “same justifications” for a district court
exercising control over communications in a class action
exist in a collective action. 493 U.S. at 171. The FLSA’s
enforcement provision grants the court “managerial
responsibility to oversee the joinder of additional parties to
assure that the task is accomplished in an efficient and proper
way,” including by regulating communications with
prospective parties to ensure they are brought into an action
in an efficient manner while being notified clearly and
accurately of claims they may have and available options for
pursuing relief. Id. at 170–71. At the same time, caution is
essential: “In exercising the discretionary authority to
oversee the notice-giving process, courts must be scrupulous
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.             17

to respect judicial neutrality. To that end, trial courts must
take care to avoid even the appearance of judicial
endorsement of the merits of the action.” Id. at 174.
    Here, Better Mortgage beat plaintiffs’ counsel and the
district court to the punch, sending communications to
potential plaintiffs before the court could begin to oversee
joinder. The court found that those communications were
misleading and coercive. The court therefore issued the
communication restriction and began overseeing distribution
of a curative notice. We review case management orders
such as these for an abuse of discretion. See Gulf Oil, 452
U.S. at 103. District courts have “broad authority to exercise
control over a class action and to enter appropriate orders
governing the conduct of counsel and parties.” Id. at 100;
see also Hoffman La-Roche, 493 U.S. at 171.
    The district court carefully parsed Better Mortgage’s
communications and determined that they were misleading.
The district court’s detailed order shows a careful analysis
of the prior communications and how those communications
affected the employees’ understanding of their options in
this pending lawsuit. The misleading and coercive nature of
these efforts was clear. For example, the court noted that
employees had to sign the new employment agreement to
continue working for Better Mortgage. Compounding this
pressure was the fact that the arbitration clause in that
agreement would prevent collective pursuit of claims in this
suit. This coercive tactic—telling employees they would be
fired if they did not agree to have claims already being
asserted on their behalf in a pending lawsuit channeled out
of that collective and class action in a federal court into
individual arbitrations—smacks of retaliation and
interference with both federal and state statutory rights. See
generally Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1002–04 (9th
18           DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

Cir. 1999) (“The FLSA’s anti-retaliation clause is designed
to ensure that employees are not compelled to risk their jobs
in order to assert their wage and hour rights under the Act.”);
Cal. Lab. Code § 98.6(a) (forbidding retaliation against
employee for making “a written or oral complaint that he or
she is owed unpaid wages”).
    Moreover, the release agreement presented to employees
said signing would waive “all claims (except those under the
FLSA),” giving the misleading impression that FLSA claims
(often pursued through collective action) would remain
available. As the district court found, “despite the Release
Agreement’s statement that the FLSA claims were not
waived,” it “does not explain that putative class members
were forfeiting their right to bring the FLSA claims asserted
in the pending suit if they signed the Employment
Agreement.” The interaction between the agreements was
unexplained and confusing.
    The district court also paid attention to the timing of
messages, to how the different messages presented
inconsistent and thus confusing information, and to missing
content that could have helped employees better evaluate
their options. In contrast, in Gulf Oil, the Supreme Court
vacated a communication restriction where the district court
had “failed to provide any record useful for appellate
review.” 452 U.S. at 102. The Court required that
restrictions be imposed only after “attention to whether the
restraint is justified by a likelihood of serious abuses.” Id. at
104. The district court paid such attention here.
    Gulf Oil added that such a restriction must provide “the
narrowest possible relief which would protect the respective
parties.” 452 U.S. at 102. The resulting order should be
“carefully drawn … limit[ing] speech as little as possible.”
             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.                19

Id. The district court’s first order restricted communications
“with putative class members regarding the subject matter of
this litigation.” Better Mortgage responded by arguing that
the broad restriction was unconstitutional. It asked that the
restraint be narrowed to “permit Better [Mortgage] to discuss
wage and hour matters (as opposed to this lawsuit
specifically) with employees and obtain factual information
to defend itself in this litigation.”
    By this phrasing, Better Mortgage showed that it
intended to continue communicating with current employees
in ways related to this lawsuit. Perhaps Better Mortgage
planned to discuss “wage and hour matters” without
mentioning the lawsuit to employees, but its intent was to
use the planned communications to assist its defense. The
district court acted within its discretion in finding that
narrowing the restriction as requested would have allowed
Better Mortgage to circumvent the order and that the request
to narrow the restriction should be denied, “[g]iven the
Defendant’s history of misleading and coercive
communications[.]”
     Under the court’s restriction on communication, Better
Mortgage remains free to communicate about the lawsuit
and issues central to it. But it needs to communicate in
writing, and it needs prior court approval, which is
reasonable here. Given Better Mortgage’s record in this
lawsuit, including both the misleading and coercive
communications in October 2020, and its desire to continue
communicating with potential class members to help build
its defense in this lawsuit, the district court tailored its order
appropriately and did not abuse its discretion.
20          DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

IV. Nullification of Agreements
    We now turn from the communication restriction to the
portion of the district court’s first order, issued May 17,
2022, nullifying new employment agreements and release
agreements signed in response to the employer’s
communications that the court found to have been
misleading and coercive.
    This appellate challenge raises a question that has arisen
in a number of district courts in this circuit: when can a
district court void a settlement or opt-out agreement obtained
through misleading or coercive communications? See, e.g.,
Kirby v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, LLC, No. 5:19-cv-
00833-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 4639493, at *3–7 (C.D. Cal.
May 1, 2020) (holding settlement agreements voidable
because they were obtained using misleading
communications; requiring distribution of corrective notice);
McKee v. Audible, Inc., No. CV 17-1941-GW(Ex), 2018 WL
2422582, at *11–12 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018) (finding
agreements null and void to extent they would limit class
participation in current action because agreements had been
obtained through misleading tactics); Balasanyan v.
Nordstrom, Inc., Nos. 11-cv-2609-JM-WMC, 10-cv-2671-
JM-WMC, 2012 WL 760566, *1–4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2012)
(invalidating arbitration agreements as to putative class
members because they were obtained by misleading
communications); Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day Franchise, Inc.,
270 F.R.D. 509, 518–19 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declining to issue
total ban on communications between defendant and
employees but invalidating opt-out forms obtained using
coercion); County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., No. C
05-03740 WHA, 2010 WL 2724512, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. July
8, 2010) (finding letter to putative class from defendant was
misleading because of omitted information about case;
             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.               21

problem remedied by nullifying agreements but not
requiring corrective communication). We approved a similar
order nullifying class opt-outs obtained by coercion in Wang
v. Chinese Daily News, Inc., 623 F.3d 743, 757 (9th Cir.
2010), vacated on other grounds, 565 U.S. 801 (2011), but
that issue arose in Wang only in an appeal from a final
judgment.
    This challenge also echoes issues decided by other
circuits. Those circuits have reasoned, consistent with the
relevant portion of Wang, that district courts have the power
to remedy misleading and coercive communications used to
obtain agreements from prospective plaintiffs that affect
their participation in the pending lawsuit. See Fox v.
Saginaw County, 35 F.4th 1042, 1045, 1048–50 (6th Cir.
2022) (affirming nullification of agreements with class
members reached using misleading communications after
class certification); Degidio v. Crazy Horse Saloon & Rest.
Inc., 880 F.3d 135, 144 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial of
enforcement for arbitration agreements obtained by
misleading information); see also Hoffman-La Roche, 493
U.S. at 172 (noting possibility that improper
communications would give rise to “the need to cancel
consents obtained in an improper manner”); Billingsley v.
Citi Trends, Inc., 560 Fed. App’x 914, 920–24 (11th Cir.
2014) (non-precedential) (affirming denial of enforceability
of arbitration agreements obtained through coercion and
collecting district court decisions taking similar corrective
action).
    At oral argument we questioned whether the district
court had the power to issue the nullification order in the first
instance since the court appears to have attempted to
adjudicate, at least temporarily, the rights and obligations of
prospective plaintiffs who were not yet before the court in
22            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

the form of an approved class or by filing consent forms to
join the collective FLSA action. 6
    We recognize the potential benefit of providing guidance
to district courts in this circuit on these questions, but we
may not do so unless we have appellate jurisdiction over the
issue in this appeal. We do not have it here.
    The fact that we have appellate jurisdiction over the
restriction on future communications to prospective
plaintiffs does not mean that we also have jurisdiction over
the nullification of agreements already signed. Just because
part of the order being timely appealed is reviewable in an
interlocutory appeal as injunctive in nature does not mean
that every issue addressed in the same order may (or must)
be appealed now. See De Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio,
695 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Mindful of the restraint
that we must exercise in determining the scope of our
pendent jurisdiction, we conclude that no other issue the
Defendants raise in this interlocutory appeal is ‘inextricably
intertwined with’ or ‘necessary to ensure meaningful
review’ of the preliminary injunction decision.”). We lack
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the nullification of
agreements because the issue is raised in an interlocutory

6
  It is unclear how many people whose agreements were invalidated in
the order were properly before the district court. The record indicates
that at least two people signed the new employment agreement and, prior
to the order invalidating the agreements, signed consent forms to be
represented by Dominguez’s counsel and join this litigation. Those
individuals submitted affidavits indicating that they worked for Better
Mortgage prior to the rollout of the new agreements and continued their
employment after the new agreements, meaning they must have signed
the mandatory employment agreement. For many others who filed
consent forms, it is unclear whether they signed the agreements at issue
or instead terminated their employment with Better Mortgage.
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.            23

appeal and does not fit any exception that would allow for
review now.
    Better Mortgage argues that we have such jurisdiction
because the district court’s nullification of agreements is
“inextricably intertwined” with the communication
restriction or because reviewing the nullification is
necessary to ensure meaningful review of the
communication restriction. Both issues involve the same
facts and analysis of whether Better Mortgage’s
communications were misleading and/or coercive.
    Even if we were tempted to charge ahead with that
theory, our precedents establish that more is required for
pendent appellate jurisdiction than just having separate
issues rest on common facts. E.g., United States v. Decinces,
808 F.3d 785, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2015) (declining to find
pendent appellate jurisdiction over issues beyond scope of
proper interlocutory appeal). We have exercised pendent
appellate jurisdiction over issues that are “inextricably
intertwined” with proper issues for an interlocutory appeal,
but that is a demanding standard. See, e.g., Streit v. County
of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
denial of motion to dismiss and denial of summary judgment
inextricably intertwined). We may find an additional issue
to be inextricably intertwined only if “we must decide the
pendent issue in order to review the claims properly raised
on interlocutory appeal … [or] resolution of the issue
properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily resolves
the pendent issue.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271,
1285 (9th Cir. 2000); see also id. at 1284 (explaining that
question of whether issues are inextricably intertwined is
interpreted “very narrowly”).
24           DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

    Neither condition is satisfied here. Our decision to
affirm the communication restriction here does not resolve
whether the nullification of agreements was also proper.
There is substantial overlap, both factual and legal, but the
outcome of one does not necessarily control the outcome of
the other. It is at least theoretically possible that prior
misleading and coercive communications could justify a
forward-looking communication restriction without
necessarily nullifying agreements already signed.
    As a final point on jurisdiction, we decline Better
Mortgage’s request to treat its appeal as in part a petition for
a writ of mandamus. The district court’s order saying that
agreements were being nullified does not amount to an
extraordinary situation that could justify the “drastic”
remedy of mandamus. See generally Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Aguilar v. Walgreen Co., 47 F.4th
1115, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 2022) (in wage-and-hour lawsuit,
dismissing interlocutory appeal of district court order
nullifying opt-outs obtained by counsel seeking to pursue
parallel lawsuit; also denying writ of mandamus as
alternative route to immediate review). Better Mortgage also
has not shown that it has a clear right to relief, that the
nullification order is now causing it irreparable harm, or that
a later appeal after final judgment would not be sufficient to
address the issue. See, e.g., Aguilar, 47 F.4th at 1123
(identifying factors applicable to petition for writ of
mandamus). The district court has already indicated that the
issue could be addressed later, at least with respect to
payments made under the release agreements.
    For these reasons, we AFFIRM the communication
restriction imposed by the district court in its orders of May
17 and July 21, 2022. We DISMISS for lack of appellate
jurisdiction defendant’s challenge to the portion of the
             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              25

district court’s order of May 17 nullifying new employment
and release agreements signed by prospective plaintiffs in
this case in the wake of defendant’s October 2020
communications.

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part:

    I concur in Parts II and III(A) of the court’s opinion,
which concludes that we have appellate jurisdiction over the
district court’s order requiring Defendant-Appellant Better
Mortgage Corporation to obtain prior court approval before
engaging in certain communications with potential class
members in this putative class action. As to the merits of
Defendant’s challenges to that order, I would vacate that
order and remand for further consideration, and I therefore
dissent from the majority’s contrary disposition. Lastly, I
agree with the majority’s ultimate conclusion that we lack
appellate jurisdiction over the further portions of the district
court’s orders nullifying certain agreements between
Defendant and some of its employees. See Opin. at 6.
Accordingly, I concur in part, concur in the judgment in part,
and dissent in part.
                               I
    With the following observations, I concur in the court’s
analysis, in Part III(A) of the opinion, that we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    The sort of interlocutory order at issue here—which
imposes a prior restraint requiring court approval before a
defendant may communicate with the members of the
putative plaintiff class—goes beyond mere case
26          DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

management and is in the nature of an injunction “designed
to accord or protect some or all of the substantive relief
sought by a complaint in more than temporary fashion.” In
re Lorillard Tobacco Co., 370 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added) (simplified); cf. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988) (“An
order by a federal court that relates only to the conduct or
progress of litigation before that court ordinarily is not
considered an injunction and therefore is not appealable
under § 1292(a)(1).”). As such, that prior restraint is
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). See
Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 523 F.3d 1091,
1096–98 (9th Cir. 2008) (asserting jurisdiction, under
§ 1292(a)(1), over a prior restraint precluding the defendant
from engaging in settlement discussions involving related
litigation); Great Rivers Co-op. of Southeastern Iowa v.
Farmland Industries, Inc., 59 F.3d 764, 765–66 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that an order that prohibited the defendant
from “making any statement that might be understood as
counseling potential class plaintiffs to opt out of the class,
and requiring the defendant to print in its newsletter a
statement from plaintiffs regarding their litigation” was “in
the nature of an injunction” and appealable under
§ 1292(a)(1)); cf. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 321–
23 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (asserting jurisdiction, under
§ 1292(a)(1), over an order requiring the defendant to
include certain compelled statements in its own
communications).
    However, in determining the scope of the “order” that is
thus appealable, we must similarly be guided by the
substance of the order, and not its form. Thus, the mere fact
that other issues are resolved in the same “order”—i.e., the
same court document that contains the injunctive order—
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              27

does not suffice to bring them within the scope of the appeal
authorized by § 1292(a)(1). See Puente Arizona v. Arpaio,
821 F.3d 1098, 1102–03, 1108–10 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
that, even though the district court denied a “Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss” in “the same order” in which it granted a
preliminary injunction, the motion to dismiss ruling was not
reviewable on the § 1292(a)(1) appeal of the preliminary
injunction); cf. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S.
199, 204–05 (1996) (holding that, under the differently
worded provisions of § 1292(b), the entirety of the “order”
that is certified for interlocutory appeal is reviewable on the
ensuing appeal, including even portions of the order that do
not involve the certified question that supports interlocutory
jurisdiction).     Rather, our pendent jurisdiction under
§ 1292(a)(1) extends only to those other rulings, in the same
or a different document, that resolve an issue that “is
‘inextricably intertwined’ with or ‘necessary to ensure
meaningful review of’ the injunction.” Puente Arizona, 821
F.3d at 1109 (citations omitted).
    Here, only the district court’s prior restraint on
Defendant’s ability to communicate is in the nature of an
injunction and therefore independently immediately
appealable. The additional order that Defendant distribute a
court-approved “corrective” notice informing putative class
members about the lawsuit and explaining the court’s rulings
(including its ruling invalidating certain agreements) is not
itself immediately appealable, either under § 1292(a)(1) or
the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See Aguilar v. Walgreen,
47 F.4th 1115, 1121–22 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2022). Likewise, the
district court’s further order invalidating the challenged
28             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

agreements is not, by itself, immediately appealable as an
injunction or as a collateral order. 1
                                    II
    I next address the merits of Defendant’s challenge to the
prior restraint order before deciding whether I think we also
have pendent jurisdiction over the order invalidating the
agreements in question.
    The prior restraint order was based on the district court’s
conclusion that Defendant had engaged in coercive and
misleading communications with putative class members
who were current employees of Defendant. Although the
majority contends that the district court “carefully parsed”
Defendant’s communications, see Opin. at 17, most of the
district court’s conclusions were either unsupported or
overstated. In my view, only two aspects of Defendant’s
communications raised the sorts of concerns that might
conceivably justify a restriction on communication with
putative class members under Gulf Oil.
     First, Defendant immediately sent—only to underwriters
(whose employment classification is at issue in this
litigation)—a new and mandatory “Employment
Agreement” that included an arbitration agreement that
would effectively preclude those employees’ participation in
this class action or FLSA collective action. Defendant
makes a substantial argument that, as an incident of
conducting its business operations, it was entitled to revise

1
  In its opening brief in this court, Defendant does not challenge the order
to provide corrective notice, but it does insist that the order invalidating
the agreements falls within the scope of this court’s pendent jurisdiction
over the § 1292(a)(1) appeal of the prior restraint order. I address the
latter issue below. See infra section III.
             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              29

the terms of its employment agreements with at-will
employees to include arbitration provisions that are allowed
by federal and state law. However, the problem with this
argument in the present circumstances is that Defendant
selectively implemented this policy by targeting it, at least in
the first instance, only at the employees who were the subject
of this lawsuit. Defendant points out that, three months later,
it began rolling out the same revised Employment
Agreement for all other current and newly hired employees,
but that delayed additional action only serves to underscore
the targeted nature of Defendant’s rushed efforts to thwart
this suit as soon as it was filed. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that this sort of targeted
and coercive communication made “for the purpose of
undermining a class action” is sufficiently abusive to warrant
invocation of the court’s power to regulate communications
with putative class members under Gulf Oil. See Fox v.
Saginaw County, 35 F.4th 1042, 1050 n.3 (6th Cir. 2022).
    Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Defendant’s proposed                  “Release
Agreement,” which was sent to the same employees,
contained “contradictory and confusing statements.”
Specifically, while acknowledging that a “good faith
dispute” existed over whether signing employees were owed
wages and other compensation, the Release Agreement also
included language stating that such employees affirmatively
“acknowledge[d] that [they had] been paid all wages owed
[to them].” As the district court noted, the latter statement,
which seemingly contradicted the acknowledgement of a
good-faith dispute as to whether any wages were owed, was
wholly unnecessary to the release of the claims covered in
the Release Agreement.          Moreover, this affirmative
representation might conceivably impair, as a practical
30           DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

matter, employees’ ability to successfully assert the FLSA
claims that were not covered by the Release Agreement.
    By contrast, the district court’s remaining objections to
Defendant’s communications were insubstantial. The
district court objected to the fact that the Employment
Agreement “did not contain any reference to Plaintiff’s suit,
did not attach Plaintiff’s complaint, or provide Plaintiff’s
counsel’s name and contact information.” But it would be
odd to include such lawsuit-specific information in a generic
employment agreement, and that information was separately
provided with the Release Agreement, which was sent at the
same time as the Employment Agreement (but in a separate
email). The district court speculated that an employee
nonetheless might read and execute the Employment
Agreement without reviewing the Release Agreement, but
the court did not make sufficient factual findings to support
that surmise. The district court found only that “at least one
underwriter reviewed and signed the Employment
Agreement prior to reviewing the Release Agreement,” but
Defendant produced objective computer-log evidence
showing that the employee in question opened and viewed
the Release Agreement first. Defendant also presented
uncontested evidence that that employee left Defendant’s
employ two days later. Thus, the district court’s sole finding
on this score was clearly erroneous.
    The district court also noted that the link that the Release
Agreement provided to Plaintiff’s counsel’s website was not
operative after October 23, 2020 (a few days after the
agreements were sent by email), but it can hardly be thought
“misleading” for Defendant to have relied on what was then
a working link to its opposing counsel’s own website.
Moreover, even after October 23, the link landed on that
website’s “general case summary page” concerning the
            DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              31

lawsuit. The court also faulted the fact that the Release
Agreement used statutory terminology such as “failure to
provide meal and rest periods,” but it is hard to see how such
language can be said to be coercive, abusive, or misleading.
Nor was it misleading to say that employees could consult
counsel before signing the agreements and that, if they did
so, it would be at their own expense. Further, the fact that
Defendant did not affirmatively undertake to estimate how
the settlement offer in the Release Agreement might
“compare to the value of [a putative class member’s] claims”
does not make its communications abusive or misleading so
as to justify communication restrictions under Gulf Oil.
    Given that only a few of the points identified by the
district court had any validity, I would vacate the prior
restraint order and remand to the district court for it to re-
evaluate the propriety of imposing such an onerous
restriction. Under Gulf Oil, such restrictions must be
“carefully drawn” to “limit[] speech as little as possible” in
light of the specific abuses that have been identified. See
452 U.S. at 102. Because the district court misapprehended
the scope of the “potential abuses,” id., it should be required
to re-examine the matter and to determine whether a more
narrowly drawn limitation would be more appropriate.
Indeed, the sweeping breadth of the prior restraint imposed
here—which pointedly does extend to discussing “wage and
hour matters” with current employees—seems excessive.
                             III
    The only remaining question is whether the conclusions
I have set forth above would warrant our taking the
additional step of formally vacating the district court’s order
invalidating the Employment Agreement and the Release
Agreement.
32          DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

    As noted earlier, the order invalidating those agreements
is not itself immediately appealable, and we have
jurisdiction over that order only to the extent that it falls
within our pendent jurisdiction over the prior restraint order.
Our pendent jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal over an
injunction under § 1292(a)(1) is limited to those issues that
are “‘inextricably intertwined’ with or ‘necessary to ensure
meaningful review of’” that injunction—i.e., the prior
restraint order. See Puente Arizona, 821 F.3d at 1109
(citations omitted). This test is met only if (1) the issues
raised by the two orders are “so intertwined that we must
decide the pendent issue in order to review the claims
properly raised on interlocutory appeal” or (2) “resolution of
the issue properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily
resolves the pendent issue.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d
1271, 1285 (9th Cir. 2000).
    The first test is inapplicable, because, as the above
analysis shows, the appeal of the prior restraint order can be
fully resolved without having to take the additional step of
deciding whether the challenged agreements should be
invalidated. The invalidation of the agreements and the prior
restraint order were two distinct remedies that the court
imposed based on its assessment of the same underlying
predicate conduct concerning Defendant’s communications.
To resolve the appeal over the prior restraint order, all that
needs to be considered is that underlying conduct and the
prior restraint remedy. The asserted “pendent” issue of
whether the additional remedy of invalidation of the
agreements should have been imposed is not one that “we
must decide . . . in order to review the claims properly raised
on interlocutory appeal.” Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1285
(emphasis added).
             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.              33

    The second test presents a closer question. As I have
explained, the district court’s evaluation of Defendant’s
predicate conduct was flawed, and that defect might be
thought to likewise vitiate the district court’s invalidation of
the agreements. But the test is whether the resolution of the
“issue[s] properly raised on interlocutory appeal necessarily
resolves the pendent issue,” id., and that is not the case here.
Whether the district court’s partially correct analysis of
Defendant’s predicate conduct would or would not support
continued invalidation of the agreements requires
consideration of further issues and is not automatically
resolved by the disposition of the prior restraint appeal. Cf.
Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, because reversal of denial of qualified
immunity to the defendants necessarily vitiated the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on liability to the
plaintiff, the latter order was within our pendent jurisdiction
over the interlocutory appeal concerning qualified
immunity). Moreover, one of the major issues presented by
the attempted pendent appeal here is the propriety of the
district court’s invalidation of agreements signed by persons
who, at the time of that decision, were neither parties to the
action nor yet formally represented in the action as absent
class members. No such issue is presented by the appeal of
the prior restraint order itself. In sum, the fact that the
attempted appeal of the agreement-invalidation order
requires consideration of additional issues beyond those
necessary to resolve the prior restraint appeal means that it
is not within our pendent jurisdiction. And that is
particularly true given that “[w]e have consistently
interpreted” our “inextricably intertwined” pendent
34             DOMINGUEZ V. BETTER MORTGAGE CORP.

jurisdiction “very narrowly.” Cunningham, 229 F.3d. at
1284. 2
                          *        *        *
   For the foregoing reasons, I concur in part, concur in the
judgment in part, and dissent in part.

2
  Finally, on my view of the case, mandamus would be inappropriate.
Although on this appeal we do not have the power ourselves to declare
that the order invalidating the agreements must be reconsidered, any
appellate ruling vacating the prior restraint order would have binding
precedential effect that could be the subject of further motions practice
in the district court that might afford Defendant appropriate relief. And
to the extent that any absent class member whose agreements were
voided were to later succeed in obtaining relief as an absent class
member in this action, Defendant could challenge the invalidation of the
agreements in an appeal from the final judgment.