Court Opinion

ID: 9408035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 15:00:46.550811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.327787
License: Public Domain

20-3843
   Gurung v. Garland
                                                                                     BIA
                                                                                 Segal, IJ
                                                                 A206 230 745/206 233 007

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                             SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
   Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of July, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
              JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
              MYRNA PÉREZ,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   ASHMIT GURUNG, PREITY GURUNG,
           Petitioners,

                   v.                                          20-3843
                                                               NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
              Respondent.
   _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER:                     Stuart Altman, Law Office of Stuart Altman,
                                    New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                    General; Jessica E. Burns, Senior Litigation
                                    Counsel; Nelle M. Seymour, Trial Attorney,
                                    Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                    States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                    DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioners Ashmit Gurung and Preity Gurung, natives and citizens of

Nepal, seek review of an October 23, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming an August

20, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied their applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). In re Ashmit Gurung, Preity Gurung, Nos. A206 230 745 & 206

233 007 (B.I.A. Oct. 23, 2020); aff’g Nos. A206 230 745 & 206 233 007 (Immig. Ct. N.

Y. City Aug. 20, 2018). They also move to supplement the record. We assume

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

      Because the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion, we

review the IJ’s decision as the final agency determination.       See Shunfu Li v.

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Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The applicable standards of review are

well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of

fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018)

(reviewing adverse credibility determination “under the substantial evidence

standard”).   We deny the petition because substantial evidence supports the

agency’s adverse credibility determination.

      “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . , without regard

to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the

applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”       8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia

Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

                                          3
      Here, the IJ reasonably relied on inconsistencies (among others) regarding

whether Petitioners reported Ms. Gurung’s alleged kidnapping to the police, Ms.

Gurung’s failure to mention the alleged kidnapping during her credible fear

interview despite discussing other related issues, and whether both Petitioners’

fathers fled Nepal together.        1    See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).        These

inconsistencies, which concern the alleged harm at the heart of Petitioners’ claims,

provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See Likai

Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency

might preclude [a noncitizen] from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him

credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”);

Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that

“a material inconsistency in an aspect of [the] story that served as an example of

1
  The agency did not err in relying on the record of Ms. Gurung’s credible fear interview.
See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that IJ may consider
statements in a credible fear interview “[w]here the record of a credible fear interview
displays the hallmarks of reliability”). Although not a transcript, the interview was
memorialized in a typed document that listed the questions asked and Ms. Gurung’s
responses. The interview was conducted with the aid of a Nepali interpreter. The record
of the interview reveals that the interviewing officer explained the purpose of the
interview and the fact that Ms. Gurung could seek clarification at any point and that she
was asked questions designed to elicit her asylum claim. Ms. Gurung’s responses do
not reflect difficulty understanding the questions. Accordingly, the record of the
interview was sufficiently reliable to merit consideration. Id. at 726.
                                            4
the very persecution from which [the Petitioner] sought asylum . . . afforded

substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility finding.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Further, the agency was not required to accept Ms.

Gurung’s explanation that she confused two incidents because her explanation

introduced additional inconsistency with Mr. Gurung’s testimony. See Majidi v.

Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a

plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).          The adverse

credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and

CAT relief because all three forms of relief are based on the same discredited

factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

      Petitioners’ remaining argument lacks merit. They did not exhaust their

due process claim—that the IJ should have admitted the record of Mr. Gurung’s

credible fear interview—because they did not mention that issue in their brief to

the BIA or object at the hearing. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480 F.3d 104,

122–23 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that issues not raised before the agency generally

will not be considered here).    We deny the motion to supplement the record

                                         5
because our review is limited to the record that was before the agency and the

grounds the agency gave for its decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (“[T]he

court of appeals shall decide the petition only on the administrative record on

which the order of removal is based”); Lin Zhong, 480 F.3d at 117 (explaining that

“a denial of immigration relief stands or falls on the reasons given by the IJ or BIA”

(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

      For the foregoing reasons, the motion to supplement the record and the

petition for review are DENIED. Any other motions and applications are

DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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