Court Opinion

ID: 9477344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:21:01.35963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:49.843856
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s legal conclusions in two respects. First, I disagree with the finding that the Committee has demonstrated the “particularized need” necessary to obtain the grand jury transcripts and materials it desires. Second, I disagree with the interpretation given to the term “investigative officer” as that term is found in the Electronic Surveillance Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (1982) (Title III). The seriousness of this matter, its historical uniqueness and its policy implications compel me, in this dissent, to focus on these two prongs of the majority opinion. At the outset, however, I wish to emphasize that my dissent is not an expression of *1055the propriety or impropriety of this, or any other, impeachment. Rather, such a decision rests exclusively with the respective members of the House and Senate.
I.
Our discussion pertaining to the release of grand jury materials in In re Request for Access to Grand Jury Materials, Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Miami), 833 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir.1987) (Hastings I), can be summarized as follows. In determining whether such materials are to be released, the court examines whether the movant, i.e., the Committee, has demonstrated a particularized need pursuant to Fed.R. Crim.P. 6(e). Second, the court examines the interests underlying the traditional principle of grand jury secrecy and determines whether those interests are applicable to the relevant disclosure. Third, assuming such interests are applicable, the court, using its discretion, balances the countervailing principles. In this case, however, the demonstration of a particularized need by the Committee which would outweigh the principle of grand jury secrecy has not been made.
In Hastings I, in finding that the Committee had made a showing of particularized need, we stated:
The Committee has asserted a particularized need sufficient to warrant disclosure.... The Committee has asserted an interest in conducting a full and fair impeachment inquiry. The Committee’s need for grand jury material, which may contain the freshest recollections of some of the key witnesses to the events being investigated by the grand jury, is particularly compelling in this inquiry, since the events which are the subject of the impeachment inquiry took place almost seven years ago.
Hastings I, 833 F.2d at 1442 (emphasis added). The majority finds that Judge Hastings’s attempts to distinguish the present situation from the earlier case “are unpersuasive.” I disagree. Unlike the pri- or grand jury investigation, this grand jury investigation began and ended in 1986 without returning an indictment against Judge Hastings. Further, while the Committee argues that the testimony presented to the grand jury is the “best evidence,” i.e., it contains the witnesses’ freshest recollections, the Committee has not proven this contention by exploring any alternative in which it might obtain the same evidence. Only two people testified before the 1986 grand jury; Steven Clark, the Mayor of Dade County and Chris Mazzella, an FBI agent. No attempts have been made to subpoena or take testimony from either of these witnesses; thus, the Committee is seeking only the most convenient way to gain access to the materials and testimony it desires. In my judgment, that is a perilous short cut and one that I find objectionable.
Pursuant to the principle of secrecy which underlies grand jury proceedings, and which is applicable here1, the Committee should be required to exhaust all reasonable alternatives in which it might gain *1056the information it desires prior to the time it seeks to obtain the actual grand jury transcripts and materials. Thus, I would require the Committee to interview, or at least make an attempt to interview, the two witnesses who testified before the grand jury, then, after such interviews, based upon the results, make its claim for the actual grand jury materials.
In advocating such a requirement, I only ask that the Committee exhaust the means to gain the information it desires which are reasonable and which can be undertaken expeditiously. I am cognizant of the timetable under which the Committee labors, but pursuant to the balance of the above-mentioned interests and policies, I feel that this is the best answer to a serious problem.
In dissenting, I incorporate, as did the majority, our discussion on this matter as found in Hastings I. I reach a different conclusion than the majority based upon the differences in the two factual situations and in my reluctance to prematurely penetrate the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Unlike the grand jury in Hastings I which terminated its inquiry in 1981 after returning an indictment against Hastings which resulted in a trial, the 1986 grand jury had only two witnesses who testified before it, did not return an indictment and thus, public disclosure of the evidence presented to it has been minimal due to the fact that there was no trial. This evidence may be available to the Committee from the two witnesses who testified before the grand jury only for the asking. It seems to me that such steps, however small, should be taken prior to the time the cloak of grand jury secrecy is penetrated. As we stated in Hastings I with regard to the burden of proof placed upon the Committee:
[Ajfter the grand jury's functions are ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it_ However, a lessening of the burden is not an elimination of [it] The Committee must assert a particularized need for the grand jury records.
Hastings I, 833 F.2d at 1442 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Thus, in light of the fact that the grand jury proceeding is less than two years old and the Committee knows the identity of the only two witnesses who testified before it and could easily subpoena them, the Committee has not met its burden of demonstrating a particularized need.
II.
With regard to the Committee's request for the electronic surveillance materials, I first emphasize that I agree with the majority on the standing issue. Since Judge Hastings appeared before the district court and was allowed to be heard, a de facto type of standing was conferred upon him. As such, it is unnecessary, as the majority points out, to decide this question. After this point, however, I am unable to go further down the road with the majority. I therefore dissent from the remainder of the majority’s legal conclusions and interpretations.
The majority first finds that the Committee has established “good cause,” as required by Title III, to obtain the electronic surveillance materials. Although the majority holds that it need not decide whether the terms good cause and particularized need are synonymous, it concludes that the reasons behind its finding of particularized need in the grand jury context support its finding of good cause in the Title III statutory setting. Thus, for the reasons stated in my discussion relating to particularized *1057need, I would hold that the Committee, as of now, has not met the good cause standard.
The majority also holds that the Committee is the proper party to receive the electronic surveillance materials because it falls within the definition of “investigative officer.” An investigative or law enforcement officer is entitled to receive such materials as are at issue, pursuant to certain conditions, from other investigative or law enforcement officials. In my opinion, the Committee in no way meets this definition. This definition, as found in 18 U.S.C. Section 2510(7), provides:
“Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States or of a State of political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses; ....
18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (1982).
It is quite certain that this provision, when written, was not contemplated as being used in an impeachment setting where it might be interpreted as including members of a House Committee within its definition of investigative officers. Rather, this statute was written to include FBI agents, local and state police officers as investigative officials and, as such, to promote cooperation and uniformity in the national and local law enforcement networks. Such coverage is a far cry from a House Committee involved in an impeachment investigation of a federal judge. Indeed, it is admirable to attempt to construe this provision as covering such legislative officials when such officials, i.e., members of the House Committee, are not clothed with any of the traditional indicia found on those individuals who truly fall within this definition, i.e., federal agents and state police officers. As such, I hold the view that to allow the House Committee to fall within this definition is to interpret the statute in a way in which Congress never intended and in a way in which it should not be construed.
While we must defer to Congress as it carries out its constitutional duties regarding impeachment, we, as members of the judiciary, must not shirk nor abdicate our own constitutional responsibilities. The more difficult the case, the greater care we must exercise to ensure that we do not cut corners in reaching our decision. This case is one which demands the greatest of care in insisting on a specific showing of a particularized need for the grand jury testimony-
judge Hastings is a member of the judiciary who has long been acquitted, by a jury of his peers, of any criminal wrong-doing. An investigation into his conduct by the 1986 grand jury did not produce an indictment. Although such facts are not dispositive, they nonetheless emphasize the need for the judicial branch to proceed with great caution with respect to sanctioning the production of secret grand jury testimony in pursuit of a generalized inquiry. Such should be disgorged only upon a specific showing of particularized need and this, in my judgment, has not been shown.
For the above reasons, I would deny the Committee’s request for the grand jury and electronic surveillance materials. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority indicates that the concerns of grand jury secrecy are not implicated in this appeal. This is presumably because the 1986 grand jury investigation has terminated. I disagree with this conclusion for the reasons set forth in our opinion in Hastings I. See 833 F.2d at 1441. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958), the premier case in this area, the Court set forth the following reasons as supporting the principle of grand jury secrecy:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosure of persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [the] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Id. at 681 n. 6, 78 S.Ct. at 986 n. 6 (emphasis added). In Hastings I, only the fourth consideration was deemed to be affected by the disclosure of the grand jury materials to the Committee. That same consideration is also affected by the current disclosure. As we stated in Hastings I:
[p]ersons who testified before the grand jury did so with the expectation that their testimony would remain secret. Additionally, per*1056sons called upon to testify before future grand juries will also consider the likelihood that their testimony may one day be disclosed to outside parties. Persons who are not persuaded that their testimony, or even the fact that they testified, will remain secret may be deterred from testifying.
Hastings I, 833 F.2d at 1441 (emphasis added). Steven Clark, the Mayor of Dade County, is a direct beneficiary of such a rule of secrecy. Without such protection, Mayor Clark might not have revealed any information to the grand jury, and, his testimony certainly comprises a big part of the materials requested by the Committee.
Further, in this situation, the first part of the fifth consideration would also be implicated. Hastings was not indicted and no trial resulted from the 1986 grand jury’s investigation. As such, public disclosure of those proceedings has been minimal.