Court Opinion

ID: 9857532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:05:54.075688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:01.873332
License: Public Domain

Justice LONG,
concurring.
As used in the insanity defense, the word “wrong” has both legal and moral connotations. See State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 201 (1846). Generally, those connotations are coextensive. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 609-10, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990) (“In the vast majority of cases, if the defendant was capable of understanding that he was acting contrary to law, he would also have sufficient capacity to understand that he was acting contrary to the morals of society.”). Occasionally, however, the notions of legality and morality may diverge, as in the case of a defendant who knows his acts are unlawful but lacks the ability to comprehend that they are morally wrong. Id. at 611, 569 A.2d 1314. Thus, for example, an insane delusion in the nature of a command hallucination has been recognized as bearing on the issue of a defendant’s capacity to understand the moral wrongness of his conduct. Ibid. (citing People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (1915)). To the contrary, a defendant’s personal moral code is not the equivalent of an insane delusion that could give rise to the operation of the legal-moral distinction. State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279, 293, 168 A.2d 401, cert, denied, 368 U.S. 880, 82 S.Ct. 130, 7 L.Ed.2d 80 (1961). In respect of all of the foregoing principles, I am in complete accord with the majority’s view.
I part company from my colleagues insofar as their opinion can be read to suggest that a trial judge should instruct the jury regarding the moral-legal dichotomy only when the evidence adduced falls into the “narrowest category” of a deific or similar command. Ante at 251, 979 A.2d 324. To be sure, such commands *259implicate the question of moral culpability. However, in my view, there should be no limitation on the type of command hallucination that would trigger an explanation of moral as opposed to legal responsibility. Given the vagaries and idiosyncrasies of mental disease, a mentally ill defendant should have the opportunity to establish that he, in fact, experienced a delusional command hallucination that rendered him incapable of knowing that what he was doing was morally wrong, regardless of the nature of the delusion.
For me, it makes no difference whether the mentally ill defendant claims he was commanded to kill by God, the President, the Pope, or a rock star. The issue is one for the jury, which must decide whether, laboring under his particular mental defect, the defendant had sufficient understanding to have enabled him to comprehend that his act was morally wrong. Thus, I would make no distinction between the types of command hallucinations that would trigger a Worlock charge, but would focus the jury instead on the defendant’s mental disease and on the question of what effect the hallucination had, regardless of its nature, on his ability to comprehend the morality of his act.
Thus, in any case in which the defendant claims that, as a result of an insane delusion, he did not have the capacity to tell that his acts were wrong, I would hold that the jury should be instructed in accordance with Worlock, without regard to the nature of the claimed command hallucination. Under that paradigm, it should fall to a properly instructed jury to decide, without interference from the trial judge, whether, in light of the defendant’s mental disease or defect, an insane delusion rendered him incapable of knowing his act was morally wrong. I would modify the model jury instruction on insanity accordingly. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Insanity (October 1988).
Despite my view of the rule that should apply going forward, I am satisfied that in this case the absence of a Worlock charge did not affect the outcome or deny defendant a fair trial. I therefore concur in the result reached by the Court.
*260Justice ALBIN joins in this opinion.
For affirmance—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS—7.
Opposed—None.