Court Opinion

ID: 9386234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 18:06:02.865112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:04.721506
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

                                          COURT OF APPEALS
                                      MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                      FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

  LARRY G. INFIELD, ET AL.                                 :   JUDGES:
                                                           :
                                                           :   Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
         Plaintiffs-Appellants                             :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                                           :   Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
  -vs-                                                     :
                                                           :   Case No. CT2022-0055
                                                           :
  WESTFIELD INSURANCE COMPANY                              :
                                                           :
                                                           :
         Defendant-Appellee                                :   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                      Appeal from the Muskingum County
                                                               Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
                                                               CC2021-0030

 JUDGMENT:                                                     AFFIRMED

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                       April 10, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

  For Plaintiffs-Appellants:                                   For Defendant-Appellee:

  MILES D. FRIES                                               CARI FUSCO EVANS
  320 Main St.                                                 3520 Whipple Ave., NW
  P.O. Box 190                                                 Canton, OH 44718
  Zanesville, OH 43702-0190
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

 Delaney, J.

            {¶1} Plaintiffs-Appellants Larry G. Infield, Lois Jean Infield, and Larry G. Infield,

 as Executor of the Estate of Bessie E. Infield, appeal the July 19, 2022 judgment entry of

 the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas.

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                  The Accident

            {¶2} On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant Larry G. Infield was driving a 2017

 Cadillac titled in the name of his wife, Plaintiff-Appellant Lois Jean Infield. Lois Jean Infield

 and Bessie Infield were passengers in the car. A motorist driving a 2002 Mazda went left-

 of-center, causing a collision with the Cadillac. Larry Infield and Lois Jean Infield suffered

 severe bodily injuries because of the accident. Bessie Infield was killed in the accident.

                                      Settlement with the Tortfeasor

            {¶3}   The Tortfeasor had state minimum insurance coverage in the amount of

 $25,000 per person and $50,000 per occurrence. The Infields accepted the Tortfeasor’s

 insurance limits in the amount of $50,000.

                        The Infields’ Personal Automobile Liability Policy

            {¶4} On December 9, 2019, Larry Infield and Lois Jean Infield were the named

 insureds under a personal automobile liability policy issued by Defendant-Appellee

 Westfield Insurance Company, effective from November 12, 2019 to November 21, 2020.

 The personal automobile liability coverage listed the Cadillac owned by Lois Jean Infield

 as     a     covered       auto.      The      personal   automobile   liability   policy   provided

 uninsured/underinsured coverage (hereinafter “UM/UIM coverage”) in the amount of

 $300,000 for each accident.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

                      The Infields’ Commercial Automobile Liability Policy

          {¶5}     Effective March 19, 2019 to March 19, 2020, Infield Farms, LLC, and Larry

 G. Infield were the named insureds under a Commercial Liability Policy No. CAG 4 181

 108 issued by Westfield Insurance Company. The Commercial Liability Policy provided

 commercial general liability coverage, commercial auto coverage, commercial umbrella

 coverage, and terrorism insurance coverage.

                                          Availability of Coverage

          {¶6} Westfield and the Infields do not dispute that the tortfeasor was an

 underinsured motorist. Westfield consented to the Infields’ acceptance of the tortfeasor’s

 insurance limits of $50,000.

          {¶7} Westfield offered and paid Larry Infield and Lois Infield the $300,000 limit

 of the UM/UIM coverage under the Personal Automobile Liability Policy. Westfield’s

 payment under the Personal Automobile Liability Policy was in exchange for a release of

 claims for coverage under that policy.

          {¶8} Westfield and the Infields disputed whether the Infields were entitled to

 UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy pursuant to the

 language of the policy. On February 8, 2021, the Infields filed a complaint for declaratory

 judgment against Westfield in the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas. The

 complaint raised four causes of action: declaratory judgment that the Infields were entitled

 to UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy; breach of

 contract, bad faith, and punitive damages. Westfield filed its answer on March 1, 2021.

          {¶9} On December 15, 2021, the parties filed a Stipulation of Facts to the

 accident, the availability of UM/UIM coverage under the Personal Automobile Liability
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

 Policy, and the existence of UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability

 Policy issued to Larry Infield and Infield Farms, LLC. Attached to the Stipulation was the

 Commercial Liability Policy issued by Westfield to Infield Farms, LLC, and Larry Infield.

                                    Motions for Summary Judgment

          {¶10} Westfield filed its motion for summary judgment on January 10, 2022,

 arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Infields were not entitled to

 UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy as a matter of law.

 On the date of the accident, Larry Infield was driving a Cadillac, where Lois Jean and

 Bessie Infield were passengers. Pursuant to the plain language of the Commercial

 Automobile Liability policy, the Cadillac was not a covered auto and therefore, the Infields

 were not eligible for UM/UIM coverage.

          {¶11} On March 14, 2022, the Infields filed a response to the motion for summary

 judgment and a cross-motion for summary judgment. In their motion, they argued that

 pursuant to the conflicting language of the Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page

 and the UM/UIM Endorsement within the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy, the

 policy should be interpreted against Westfield to permit UM/UIM coverage for Larry Infield

 and Bessie Infield as insureds.

          {¶12} Westfield filed a combined reply and response on March 29, 2022. In

 addition to supporting its interpretation of the UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial

 Automobile Liability Policy, Westfield contended that pursuant to the “anti-stacking”

 provisions of the policy, the Infields would only be eligible for $200,000 in coverage. As

 the Infields already received $300,000 in UM/UIM coverage pursuant to the Personal
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

 Automobile Liability policy and the highest policy limit is $500,000, the language of the

 policies limited the Infields’ recovery to $200,000.

          {¶13} Westfield filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental argument in support

 of its motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on April 1, 2022. In the

 supplemental motion, Westfield argued there was no genuine issue of material fact that

 it did not engage in bad faith when it interpreted the terms of the Commercial Automobile

 Liability Policy to deny UM/UIM coverage.

                                                    Judgment

          {¶14} On July 8, 2022, the trial court issued a summary judgment entry granting

 Westfield’s motion for summary judgment and denying the Infields’ cross-motion for

 summary judgment. The trial court filed a more detailed judgment entry, with the same

 ruling, on July 19, 2022.

          {¶15} It is from these judgments that the Infields now appeal.

                                         ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

          {¶16} The Infields raise one Assignment of Error:

          {¶17} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE TWO

 CONFLICTING PROVISIONS OF THE POLICY AGAINST APPELLEE, THE INSURER.”

                                                   ANALYSIS

                                             Standard of Review

          {¶18} The Infields’ sole Assignment of Error contends the trial court erred when it

 granted summary judgment in favor of Westfield to find that they were not entitled to

 UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          {¶19} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique

 opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v.

 The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). As such, this

 Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77

 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

          {¶20} Civ.R. 56 provides summary judgment may be granted only after the trial

 court determines: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2)

 the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and 3) it appears from the

 evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such

 evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary

 judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,

 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977).

          {¶21} It is well established that the party seeking summary judgment bears the

 burden of demonstrating no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting

 summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293, 662 N.E.2d

 264 (1996): “* * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving

 party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis

 for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence

 of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party's

 claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by

 making a conclusory assertion the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case.

 Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

 listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has no

 evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its

 initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving

 party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden

 outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial

 and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be

 entered against the nonmoving party.” The record on summary judgment must be viewed

 in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Williams v. First United Church of Christ,

 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974).

                        Interpretation of Automobile Insurance Contracts

          {¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated how automobile insurance contracts

 are to be interpreted:

          When confronted with an issue of contractual interpretation, the role of a

          court is to give effect to the intent of the parties to the agreement. Hamilton

          Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 86 Ohio St.3d 270, 273, 714 N.E.2d

          898 (1999), citing Employers’ Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Roehm, 99 Ohio St. 343,

          124 N.E. 223 (1919), syllabus. See, also, Section 28, Article II, Ohio

          Constitution. We examine the insurance contract as a whole and presume

          that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in the policy.

          Kelly v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130, 509 N.E.2d 411 (1987),

          paragraph one of the syllabus. We look to the plain and ordinary meaning

          of the language used in the policy unless another meaning is clearly

          apparent from the contents of the policy. Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241, 374 N.E.2d 146 (1978), paragraph two of the

          syllabus. When the language of a written contract is clear, a court may look

          no further than the writing itself to find the intent of the parties. Id. As a

          matter of law, a contract is unambiguous if it can be given a definite legal

          meaning. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motors, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423, 43 Tex.

          Sup. Ct. J. 647 (Tex. 2000).

          On the other hand, where a contract is ambiguous, a court may consider

          extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent. Shifrin v. Forest City

          Enterprises, Inc., 64 Ohio St.3d 635, 597 N.E.2d 499 (1992). A court,

          however, is not permitted to alter a lawful contract by imputing an intent

          contrary to that expressed by the parties. Id.; Blosser v. Enderlin, 113 Ohio

          St. 121, 148 N.E. 393 (1925), paragraph one of the syllabus (“there can be

          no intendment or implication inconsistent with the express terms [of a

          written contract]”).

          It is generally the role of the finder of fact to resolve ambiguity. See, e.g.,

          Davis v. Loopco Industries, Inc., 66 Ohio St.3d 64, 609 N.E.2d 144 (1993).

          However, where the written contract is standardized and between parties of

          unequal bargaining power, an ambiguity in the writing will be interpreted

          strictly against the drafter and in favor of the nondrafting party. Cent. Realty

          Co. v. Clutter, 62 Ohio St.2d 411, 413, 406 N.E.2d 515 (1980). In the

          insurance context, the insurer customarily drafts the contract. Thus, an

          ambiguity in an insurance contract is ordinarily interpreted against the
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          insurer and in favor of the insured. King v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 35 Ohio

          St.3d 208, 519 N.E.2d 1380 (1988), syllabus.

 Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256, ¶

 11-13. See also, Nationwide Mut. Fire. Ins. Co. v. Pusser, 160 Ohio St.3d 203, 2020-

 Ohio-2778, 155 N.E.3d 839, ¶ 8.

                      Terms of the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy

          {¶23} In this case, we examine different provisions of Commercial Automobile

 Liability Policy to determine if the Infields are entitled to UM/UIM coverage.1

                           The Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page

          {¶24} The Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page of the business auto

 coverage states in pertinent part as to UM/UIM coverage:

          ITEM ONE – NAME INSURED & MAILING ADDRESS

          INFIELD FARMS, LLC
          AND LARRY G. INFIELD

          ITEM TWO            SCHEDULE OF COVERAGES AND COVERED AUTOS

          Each of These Coverages Will Apply Only To Those “Autos” Shown as

          Covered “Autos”. “Autos” Are Shown As Covered “Autos” For A Particular

          Coverage By The Entry of One or More Of The Symbols From The Covered

          Auto Section Of The Business Auto Coverage Form Next To The Name Of

          The Coverage.

 1The language of the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy uses the term, “Business Auto Coverage” to
 refer to the automobile liability coverage provided under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy No.
 CAG 4 181 108, at issue in this appeal. In this Opinion, we use the terms, “Commercial Automobile
 Liability Policy” and “Business Auto Coverage” interchangeably to refer to the policy at issue.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

           COVERAGES             COVERED                            LIMIT                  PREMIUM
                                    AUTO              THE MOST WE WILL PAY FOR
                                 SYMBOLS              ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS
           Liability             07,08,09            Bodily Injury and Property Damage     $374
                                                     $500,000 Each Accident
           ***          ***                          ***                                   ***
           OH Uninsured 07                           $500,000 Each Accident                $52
           Motorists                                 This      endorsement      provides
                                                     Uninsured Motorists Coverage only
                                                     and all references to “underinsured
                                                     motor vehicles” do not apply.
           OH                    07                  $500,000 Each Accident                $110
           Underinsured                              This      endorsement      provides
           Motorists                                 Underinsured Motorists Coverage
                                                     only and all references to
                                                     “uninsured motor vehicles” do not
                                                     apply.

          ITEM THREE             SCHEDULE OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN

          The Insurance Afforded For Any One Automobile Is Only With Respect

          To Such And So Many Of The Coverages As Are Indicated In Item Two

          Unless A Specific Limit Or Deductible Is Indicated In This Schedule Of

          Automobiles.

           AUTO                ST               TER               YR         DESCRIPTION
           001                 OH              152                87         CHEVY/DUMP
           002                 OH              152                05         GOOSENECK
                                                                             TRAILER
           003                 OH              152                97         FORD PU
           004                 OH              152                01         MORITZ
                                                                             TAGALONG

                                    The Business Auto Coverage Form

          {¶25} The Business Auto Coverage Form CA 00 01 10 13 states:

          SECTION 1 – COVERED AUTOS
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          Item Two of the Declarations shows the “autos” that are covered “autos” for each

          of your coverages. The following numerical symbols describe the “autos” that may

          be covered “autos.” The symbols entered next to a coverage on the Declarations

          designate the only “autos” that are covered “autos”.

          A. Description of Covered Auto Designation Symbols

           Symbol         Description of Covered Auto Designation Symbols
             1    Any “Auto”
             2    Owned “Autos” Only               Only those “autos” you own (and
                                                   for Covered Autos Liability
                                                   Coverage any “trailers” you don’t
                                                   own while attached to power
                                                   units you own). This includes
                                                   those “autos” you acquire
                                                   ownership of after the policy
                                                   begins.
            ***   ***
             6    Owned “Autos” Subject to a       Only those “autos” you own that
                  Compulsory Uninsured Motorists because of the law in the state
                  Law                              where they are licensed or
                                                   principally garaged are required
                                                   to have and cannot reject
                                                   Uninsured Motorists Coverage. *
                                                   **
             7    Specifically Described “Autos”   Only those “autos” described in
                                                   Item Three of the Declarations
                                                   for which a premium charge is
                                                   shown (And for Covered Autos
                                                   Liability Coverage any “trailers”
                                                   you don’t own while attached to
                                                   any power unit described in Item
                                                   Three).
            ***   ***

          ***

          SECTION V – DEFINITIONS

          ***
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          G. “Insured” means any person or organization qualifying as an insured in

          the Who Is An Insured provision of the applicable coverage. Except with

          respect to the Limit of Insurance, the coverage afforded applies separately

          to each insured who is seeking coverage or against whom a claim or “suit”

          is brought.

            Ohio UM/UIM Coverage – Bodily Injury Endorsement (CA 21 33 08 17)

          {¶26} The business auto policy’s Ohio Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists

 Coverage – Bodily Injury Endorsement (CA 21 33 08 17) states as follows:

          For a covered “auto” licensed or principally garaged in, or “auto dealer

          operations” conducted in, Ohio, this endorsement modifies insurance

          provided under the following:

          ***

          BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM

          ***

          With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of

          the Coverage Form apply unless modified by this endorsement.

          A. Coverage

          1. We will pay all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as

          compensatory damages, from the owner or operator of an “uninsured motor

          vehicle” or “underinsured motor vehicle” because of “bodily injury” sustained

          by the “insured” and caused by an “accident.”

          ***

          B. Who Is An Insured
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          If the Named Insured is designated in the Declarations as:

          1. An individual, then the following are “insureds”:

                   a. The Named Insured and any “family members”.

                   b. Anyone else “occupying” a covered “auto” or a temporary

                   substitute for a covered “auto”. * * *

                   c. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of

                   “bodily injury” sustained by another “insured”.

          2. A partnership, limited liability company, corporation, or any other form of

          organization, then the following are “insureds”:

                   a. Anyone “occupying” a covered “auto” or a temporary substitute for

                   a covered “auto”. * * * However, no coverage is provided for anyone

                   occupying an “auto” which is not a covered auto for Uninsured

                   Motorists and/or Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this

                   Coverage Form.

                   b. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to recover because of

                   “bodily injury” sustained by another “insured.”

          C. Exclusions

          This insurance does not apply to:

          ***

          5. “Bodily Injury” sustained by:

                   a. An individual Named Insured while “occupying” or when struck by

                   any vehicle owned by that Named Insured that is not a covered “auto”
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

                   for Uninsured Motorists Coverage and/or Underinsured Motor [sic]

                   Coverage under this Coverage Form;

                   b. Any “family member” while “occupying” or when struck by any

                   vehicle owned by that “family member” that is not a covered “auto”

                   for Uninsured Motorists Coverage and/or Underinsured Motorists

                   Coverage under this Coverage Form; or

                   c. Any “family member” while “occupying” or when struck by any

                   vehicle owned by the Named Insured that is insured for Uninsured

                   Motorists Coverage and/or Underinsured Motorists Coverage on a

                   primary basis under any other Coverage Form or policy.

               Is There UM/UIM Coverage under the Commercial Auto Policy?

          {¶27} The Infields contend they are entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the

 Commercial Automobile Liability Policy due to the ambiguous language of the policy.

 They specifically argue that conflicts between the Business Auto Coverage Declarations

 Page and the UM/UIM Endorsement create internal ambiguity as to who is an insured,

 thereby entitling them to UM/UIM coverage when the terms of the policy are construed

 against Westfield and liberally in favor of the Infields.

          {¶28} Before we analyze whether the policy language is ambiguous, we first

 address where the policy is unambiguous that there is no UM/UIM coverage. The accident

 took place while Larry Infield was driving a Cadillac, which was titled in the name of Lois

 Jean Infield. Lois Jean Infield is the wife of Larry Infield. She was a passenger in the

 Cadillac at the time of the accident and sustained bodily injuries. The business auto

 coverage UM/UIM endorsement contains an “other owned auto” exclusion, which states:
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          This insurance does not apply to:

          ***

          5. “Bodily Injury” sustained by:

          ***

          b. Any “family member” while “occupying” or when struck by any vehicle

          owned by that “family member” that is not a covered “auto” for Uninsured

          Motorists Coverage and/or Underinsured Motorists Coverage under this

          Coverage Form;

          {¶29} Based on the plain language of the “other owned auto” exclusion, Lois Jean

 Infield is not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability

 Policy because when she sustained a bodily injury, she was a family member occupying

 a vehicle that she owned and not a covered auto under the business auto coverage.

          {¶30} The Infields argue that Larry Infield and Bessie Infield remain entitled to

 UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy based on conflicts

 between the Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page and the UM/UIM Endorsement.

 They contend the policy is ambiguous because the Business Auto Coverage Declarations

 Page identifies four vehicles covered under the business auto coverage but the UM/UIM

 Endorsement does not require an insured to be occupying a covered auto to recover

 UM/UIM benefits under the policy. Westfield contends the business auto coverage is

 unambiguous and the Infields are not entitled to UM/UIM coverage as a matter of law. It

 is Westfield’s position that UM/UIM coverage is available only when the insureds are

 operating or occupying a covered auto as defined by the Business Auto Coverage

 Declarations Page and Business Auto Coverage Form.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          {¶31} “Item Two – Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos” of the Business

 Auto Coverage Declarations Page lists the types of coverages, policy limits, premiums,

 and the symbol designating the automobile entitled to the applicable coverage. Item Two

 contains a statement that the listed coverages apply only to the autos shown as covered

 autos. As to UM/UIM coverage, Item Two designates Symbol 07 as covered autos. The

 Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page states that covered autos are defined by the

 entry of a symbol found in Section I of the Business Auto Coverage Form. Symbol 07 is

 defined as “specifically described autos” which are “only those autos described in Item

 Three of the Declarations for which a premium charge is shown.” Item Three lists the

 schedule of covered autos. Reasonable minds can only conclude that based on the

 Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page and the Business Auto Coverage Form,

 there is no factual dispute that the Cadillac involved in the accident is not a covered auto.

          {¶32} The Infields argue that while the Cadillac is not listed as a covered auto in

 the Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page, Larry Infield and Bessie Infield remain

 insureds entitled to UM/UIM coverage based on the definition of “Who Is An Insured”

 found in the UM/UIM Endorsement. The UM/UIM Endorsement defines an insured based

 on whether the policy was taken in the name of an individual or a limited liability company.

 In this case, the policy was taken in the name of an individual, Larry G. Infield, and a

 limited liability corporation, Infield Farms, LLC. In their argument that they are entitled to

 coverage, the Infields address only the individual definition of “Who Is An Insured,” not

 the limited liability corporation definition. The individual definition states:

          If the Named Insured is designated in the Declarations as:

          1. An individual, then the following are “insureds”:
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          a. The Named Insured and any “family members”.

          {¶33} The UM/UIM Endorsement definition of “Who Is An Insured” does not

 expressly state that the insured must be in a covered auto. The Infields contend the

 conflict between the Business Auto Coverage Declarations Page and the UM/UIM

 Endorsement creates an internal ambiguity as to whether the named insured and any

 family member, Larry Infield and Bessie Infield, must be occupying a covered auto at the

 time of the accident to be entitled to UM/UIM coverage. The Infields cite this Court to

 Batteiger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2nd Dist. Miami No. 2001 CA 37, 2002-Ohio-909, Westfield

 Ins. Co. v. Ellis, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0093, 2004-Ohio-4393, and Marra v.

 Nationwide Ins. Co., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05-MA-216, 2007-Ohio-356, in support of

 their argument as to the ambiguity of the language between the Declarations Page and

 the UM/UIM Endorsement. The Infields suggest that we follow this case law, which

 examined almost identical contract language to the Westfield Commercial Automobile

 Liability Policy in the present case. The cited cases found the insurance policies were

 ambiguous as to whether there was UM/UIM coverage, thereby reversing the trial courts’

 judgments that the plaintiffs were not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the business

 policies issued by the insurance companies. The cited case law was issued during the

 Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116 (1999)

 era and aftermath, which the Ohio Supreme Court ended with its decision in Westerfield

 Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256. Based on the

 Scott-Pontzer/Galatis history, we find we can only give the Infields’ cited case law

 persuasive value, not precedential.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          {¶34} We acknowledge the definition of “Who Is An Insured” found within the

 UM/UIM Endorsement does not plainly state the named insured or family member must

 be occupying a covered auto. Westfield directs this Court to consider the introductory

 language of the UM/UIM Endorsement. The UM/UIM Endorsement states at the

 beginning of the form:

          For a covered “auto” licensed or principally garaged in, or “auto dealer

          operations” conducted in, Ohio, this endorsement modifies insurance

          provided under the following:

          ***

          BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE FORM

          ***

          With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the provisions of

          the Coverage Form apply unless modified by this endorsement.

 The plain language of the UM/UIM Endorsement states that it modifies insurance

 provided under the Business Auto Coverage Form for covered autos. As discussed

 above, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Cadillac is not a covered auto

 under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy.

          {¶35} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:

          Insurance policies cannot be read in an overly circumscribed fashion.

          Gomolka [v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.], 70 Ohio St.2d [166] at 172, 436

          N.E.2d 1347. “One may not regard only the right hand which giveth, if the

          left hand also taketh away. The intention of the parties must be derived

          instead from the instrument as a whole, and not from detached or isolated
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

          parts thereof.” Id., citing Stickel v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 136 Ohio St. 49,

          53, 23 N.E.2d 839 (1939), and Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Schild, 69 Ohio St.

          136, 68 N.E. 706 (1903).

 Raudins v. Hobbs, 8th Dist. No. 106232, 2018-Ohio-2309, 104 N.E.3d 1040, 2018 WL

 3005351, ¶ 46 quoting Sauer v. Crews, 140 Ohio St.3d 314, 2014-Ohio-3655, 18 N.E.3d

 410, ¶ 13. If we were to consider the Infields’ argument as to the definition of “Who Is An

 Insured,” we could not give meaning to every provision of the UM/UIM Endorsement;

 thereby rendering meaningless the introductory limitation that the UM/UIM Endorsement

 only applies to covered autos, which are defined in the Business Auto Coverage

 Declarations Page and Business Auto Coverage Form. Reading the policy as a whole

 and in favor of the insured, we find no ambiguity as to “Who Is An Insured” within the

 UM/UIM Endorsement that it modifies the Business Auto Coverage as to covered autos.

          {¶36} There is no genuine issue of material fact that to be entitled to UM/UIM

 coverage under the Westfield Commercial Automobile Liability Policy, the named insured

 must be occupying a covered auto. At the time of the accident, Larry Infield and Bessie

 Infield were not occupying a covered auto under the terms of the Commercial Automobile

 Liability Policy. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Infields were not

 covered under the Commercial Automobile Liability Policy for UM/UIM benefits.

          {¶37} The Infields’ sole Assignment of Error is overruled.2

 2 The trial court’s July 19, 2022 judgment entry granted summary judgment in favor of Westfield on all the
 Infield’s causes of action, including bad faith. On appeal, the Infields only argued that the trial court erred
 when it found they were not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the Commercial Automobile Liability
 Policy. They did not raise their claim for bad faith as an Assignment of Error. Although Westfield argued in
 its brief that the trial court did not err as to bad faith, we do not address this issue in our Opinion because
 the Infields did not raise it as an Assignment of Error and have therefore waived the issue.
[Cite as Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199.]

                                                 CONCLUSION

          {¶38} The judgment of the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas is

 affirmed.

 By: Delaney, J.,

 Gwin, P.J. and

 King, J., concur.