Court Opinion

ID: 9529971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:56.521022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.932795
License: Public Domain

Judge TURSI
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
A reviewing court can conclude that a trial court abused its discretion only if the trial court’s ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Hock v. New York Life Insurance Co., 876 P.2d 1242 (Colo.1994). Here, the majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing cross-examination of an expert witness which tended to show the bias, prejudice, or partiality of the witness. However, in my view, that conclusion is without support in the record.
To understand the basis of my dissent, it is necessary first to recognize what this case is not about. It is not about two stockholders or two policy holders in an ordinary stock or mutual liability insurance company. It is about probable bias, prejudice, or partiality as demonstrated by the evidence of the relationship between the defendant’s expert and the defendant as members in a self-insured trust, a closed, group of select Colorado dentists.
Approximately two weeks before trial, defendant moved in limine pursuant to CRE 411 that plaintiff be prohibited from cross-examining his expert concerning possible bias because of their common membership in the insurance trust.
CRE 411 reads:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This 'rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
The motion was submitted on depositions and affidavits. The trial court ruled that plaintiff could not introduce insurance to establish negligence, but the evidence of insurance could be introduced if relevant to bias or prejudice of the witness. Contrary to the majority, I perceive no abuse of discretion in that ruling and, hence, no reversible error.
As it appears from the record provided, a select group of Colorado dentists, rejecting the major malpractice insurance carriers and the malpractice insurance available through the Colorado Dental Association, have chosen instead jointly to self-insure each other under the umbrella of a trust. Defendant and his expert witness were members of that trust.
It is undisputed that, in case of a verdict against any member of the trust, the reserves derived from the premiums paid by this limited number of members are depleted pro tanto, and, in cases of verdicts ranging beyond the reserves, all members are required to absorb a proportionate part of the resulting economic burden.
Hence, the matter at issue here concerns, in essence, a select group of dentists, who *169have chosen individually and jointly, to go “naked” of traditional malpractice insurance and, instead, to rely on their trust membership as a means of providing liability protection. See 3 R. Long, Law of Liability Insurance § 12-118, et seq. (1st ed.1999).
At trial, defendant’s expert testified that he and six others had created the trust and that he had sat on the board during its first four years. The record discloses no changes in the trust since his services to it and he admitted that he “is still pretty intimate” with the details of the trust. When asked if he and defendant were insured by the same trust, he replied: “Thankfully so, yes.” He said the purpose of the trust was to avoid the restraint of trade problems that arise with dental association insurance plans. He further testified that the purpose was to keep good quality dentists in the trust. Thus, dentists, otherwise licensed in Colorado, who could not be denied coverage by traditional insurance companies, could at the discretion of the trust be denied membership.
The expert also testified that, even before he met the defendant, he assumed that he was a “high quality” dentist because of his membership in the trust; that money for payment of malpractice settlements against members are paid out of the trust; and that, if needed, such settlements would result in a rise in premiums charged to all members.
In making the ruling at issue, not only did the trial court have the plain language of CRE 411 before it, but it had guidance from this court in Evans v. Colorado Permanente Medical Group, P.C., 902 P.2d 867 (Colo.App.1995). In Evans, we held it was within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow cross-examination of defendant’s expert physician witness regarding his position on the board of directors of a physicians’ insurance company. I am at a loss to understand the majority’s reliance on facts in Evans, less probative of the tendency for bias then the facts here, to reject its application in this matter.
Citing CRE 411, the Evans court held that the fact that the expert had sat on a board of a physicians’ malpractice insurance company at the time of trial had some tendency to make it more probable that the expert was biased. The court found sufficient evidence to create a tendency of bias and partiality from the fact that the expert witness was on the board of directors of an malpractice insurance company even though the defendant doctors were insured by a different company. Clearly under the facts here the reasonable probability for bias, prejudice, and partiality is more direct and less attenuated than in Evans.
CRE 411 when read in its entirety makes a strong case for affirmance of the trial court. The right to cross-examine for bias and prejudice is properly preserved by the Rule. See also People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9 (Colo.1984)(bias may include partiality).
I am not persuaded that the majority correctly applies the majority rule to cases such as the one at issue here. See J. Galbreath, Annotation, Propriety & Prejudicial Effect of Trial Counsel’s Reference or Suggestion in Medical Malpractice Case That Defendant is Insured; 71 A.L.R.4th 1025 (the exclusionary rule falls if there is evidence tending to establish bias, prejudice, or partiality, and even if error is assumed, the verdict will not be vacated absent a showing that the damages were excessive). See Ede v. Atrium South OB-GYN, Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365 (1994)(a mutual common ownership case in which the court emphasized the equal importance of the second sentence of Ohio’s counterpart to CRE 411 and warned against the tendency some courts have to a “Pavlovian” response at the mention of insurance). See also Safeco Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 101 N.M. 148, 679 P.2d 816 (1984).
Colorado courts have not been phobic concerning mention of insurance before jury panels in malpractice cases. See Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112 Colo. 337, 149 P.2d 809 (1944); Bolles v. Kinton, 83 Colo. 147, 263 P. 26 (1928). A recent survey of potential jurors revealed that 91.0% believed that lawsuits have been a cause of increased costs of insurance and 89.3% believed that lawsuits have been a cause of the increased costs of medical care. See Aronson, Rovella, Van Voris, Jurors: A Biased Independent Lot, vol._, page _ (1988). Thus, as competent *170counsel knows, the introduction of insurance into a malpractice case is, at best, a two-edged sword. Here, the choice was made because of the need to show bias, prejudice, or partiality.
The defendant’s contention that the mere mention of insurance is so highly prejudicial that a new trial is mandated is belied by the fact that he does not challenge the amount of the verdict as excessive because of the alleged introduction of commonality of evidence. See Langford v. Kosterlitz, 107 Cal.App. 175, 290 P. 80 (1930). See also J. Galbreath, supra.
Further, I do not believe that it behooves appellate courts to try to micromanage cases remanded to the trial courts. Therefore, I am reluctant to address the alleged errors claimed by defendant which may not arise on a retrial and are admittedly not reversible error.
Nevertheless, because I believe that the admonishment in Part II of the majority opinion is an unwarranted invasion of the discretion of the trial court and that if followed, may lead to reversible error, I comment briefly. The threshold question in application of CRE 408 is whether the statements were made in settlement negotiations. There is not one scintilla of evidence that, at the time of plaintiffs angry confrontation with the defendant and his response, the settlement negotiations had been initiated. Therefore CRE 408 is not applicable here. See Scott Co. v. MK-Ferguson Co., 832 P.2d 1000 (Colo.App.1991).
Accordingly, in my view the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing the cross-examination of defendant’s expert witness concerning the insurance trust, and thus, I would affirm.