Court Opinion

ID: 9494095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:29:15.300505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:13.163407
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The inquiry in this case is whether the Immigration Judge’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. In my opinion, it is not. The statements in Felicitas Ochave’s asylum application, combined with her credible testimony at the hearing, compel the opposite conclusion: that Feli-citas Ochave has established eligibility for asylum based on past persecution.1 Accordingly, I dissent.
An applicant who shows that she was persecuted “on account of’ imputed political opinion has stated a claim for asylum.2 As the majority correctly states, “imputed political opinion is a political opinion attributed to the applicant by his persecutors.” Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir.1997). A rape victim seeking to prove that she was attacked “on account of’ imputed political opinion “must present some evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the persecutor’s motive.” Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir.1996) (emphasis added).
The evidence presented by Felicitas in the declaration attached to her asylum application satisfies this standard.3 In her *870sworn statement, which the Immigration Judge found to be credible, Felicitas declared that:
I was raped in 1986 in the Philippines and both my daughter and I suffered tremendously as a result of this event. My daughter was also raped, at the same time.... My father was employed by the government in the year that the rape occurred. The two men who raped my daughter and I were members of the [NPA] guerrillas who were trying to overthrow the government. Because my father had the title “Municipal Counselor, ” my family was viewed as being reactionary in the Marxist eyes of the Communist guerrillas .... I think I might be found by the men who raped me and I fear that they might try to kill me for having divulged their awful secret to the world. The Philippine government has little or no control over the eommunist[ ] guerrillas who terrorize the people and the people have become a victim in the struggle for power.
(emphasis added).
The majority finds that the statement excerpted above fails to establish a nexus between the rape and Felicitas’s father’s political opinion. According to the majority, Felicitas’s declaration is insufficient because “[tjhere is no evidence to suggest that the rapists knew who Felicitas was— much less that they knew who her father was — at the time they raped her and her daughter.” This conclusion suggests that Felicitas could satisfy her burden of proof only by testifying that the rapists explicitly informed her — before, during, or after raping her — that she had been singled out because of her father’s political position. We have never held that an asylum applicant must satisfy this impossible evidentia-ry standard.
The majority also cites Felicitas’s testimony at the deportation hearing as providing an additional basis for rejecting her asylum claim. Specifically, the majority concludes that “Felicitas had an opportunity to explain the reasons for the rape in response to open-ended questions” at the hearing and failed to do so. This conclusion ignores two critical facts. First, Feli-citas’s testimony at the hearing — which the Immigration Judge found credible — corroborated the statements she ipade in her asylum application. Felicitas testified that she and her daughter were raped by guerrillas, and she explained that the rape occurred because “they wanted to have leadership in the region.” Felicitas also testified that she told her father, a government official, about the rape. The Immigration Judge, in stating the basis for his favorable credibility finding, observed that: (1) Felicitas’s testimony was “generally consistent with the information provided in her asylum application”; (2) Felicitas had been subjected to “extensive cross examination,” and (3) she “had a good recollection of dates and time-frames for various incidents.”
Second, the majority’s conclusion that Felicitas failed to give a sufficiently detailed explanation of the events surrounded her rape at the deportation hearing ignores the fact that the INS attorney and the Immigration Judge repeatedly prevented her from answering questions designed to elicit that information.
Counsel: How did you know these men [who raped you] were guerrillas?
INS Attorney: Objection, Your Honor. That’s a leading question
*871IJ: Objection sustained....
Counsel: Was any mention of your father made during the rape?....
INS Attorney: Objection, leading.
IJ: Do not answer the question. Strike the question, strike the answer and rephrase.
Counsel: Did you tell anyone about the rape?
IJ: Strike the question and strike the answer. It’s a leading question. Rephrase. ...
Counsel: Did you think that these two men [who raped you] were part of the guerrillas?
IJ: Strike the question. It’s a leading question. It’s a very critical question. Rephrase the question.
Counsel: Did you have any idea who these two men [who raped you] were?
IJ: Do not answer the question. It’s a leading question. I again caution counsel to rephrase. You’re putting words in the mouth of the respondent. Rephrase, please.
Counsel: If you know, did these men have any kind of affiliation with anyone?
INS Attorney: Objection. That’s leading as well, Your Honor.
IJ: Objection sustained.4
Counsel: When you say that other people were raped by the guerrillas, how did you know that?
INS Attorney: Objection. That’s misstating testimony, Your Honor.
IJ: Objection sustained. It is misleading testimony. Do not answer the question, ma’am.
The Immigration Judge’s multiple, sua sponte objections to Felicitas’s counsel’s open-ended questions as “leading” and his sustaining similar objections from the INS attorney effectively frustrated Felicitas’s ability “to present directly, or fully detail, her account supporting her claim for asylum.” Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 732 (9th Cir.2000); see also Chand, 222 F.3d at 1075 (“The Immigration Judge had a duty, shared with [the applicant], to ascertain the information relevant to the asylum claim and to aid in the development of the record.”).5
In this ease, the Immigration Judge reviewed Felicitas’s asylum application, *872which stated clearly the statutory basis for her claim. Indeed, he found Felicitas’s hearing testimony credible in part because it was “consistent with the information provided in her asylum application.” At the hearing, he had the opportunity to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine Felicitas to probe the assertions in her application regarding the nexus between her rape and her father’s political beliefs. The Immigration Judge did not take that opportunity. What is more, he blocked Felicitas’s counsel’s efforts to bring out crucial information in the application regarding the nexus between the rapes and the political position held by Felicitas’s father in the Philippine government. We have held that where an Immigration Judge fails to “elicit[ ] any testimony from [the applicant] demonstrating that the nature or basis for her testimony was questionable,” he cannot summarily dismiss her credible testimony as incomplete or speculative. Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2000).
While I think it is important to highlight the reasons behind any perceived gaps in Felicitas’s testimony at her hearing, I do not believe that those perceived gaps undermine the validity of her asylum claim. The statements in Felicitas’s asylum application, combined with her credible hearing testimony, establish that she was raped by guerrillas on account of her father’s political beliefs, which they imputed to her.
Because I think the record compels the conclusion that Felicitas suffered past persecution on account of imputed political opinion, I would reverse the decision of the Immigration Judge and find that Felicitas is eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum.

. “Eligibility for asylum may be based on past persecution alone.” Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir.1993) (citing Matter of Chen, Int. Dec. 3104 at 4 (BIA 1989)). Where the applicant can show she has in the past “suffered under atrocious forms of persecution,” the applicant is eligible for asylum even if "there is little likelihood of future persecution." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In such cases, the court need not reach "factual questions that relate to the political climate of [the native country] as it may impact the likelihood of future persecution” to grant the petition for asylum. Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 99 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir.1996).

. To establish eligibility for asylum based on past persecution, an applicant must show three things: (1) what happened to her rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was committed either by the government or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control; and (3) the persecution was “on account of” a statutorily protected ground. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2000). The record demonstrates that Felicitas has satisfied each of these requirements.
There is no question that rape inflicts suffering sufficient to support a finding of past persecution. Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 959 (citation omitted). Nor is there any question that the men who raped Felicitas were members of the New People's Army ("NPA”), a militant guerrilla group that the Philippine government was unable to control. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (“The New People's Army ('NPA') is a violent, revolutionary Communist group which actively opposes the Philippine government. The NPA has a well-documented history of political violence, including the murder of its opponents.”).
Because the majority does not dispute that Felicitas has met the first two elements of her asylum claim, I discuss only the third: whether Felicitas has established a nexus between the persecution she suffered and a statutorily protected ground.

.As the majority correctly notes, Felicitas's asylum application and attached supporting declaration, standing alone, are sufficient to establish that she is entitled to asylum based on past persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 240.49(c)(4)(iii). We have observed that "an [asylum] applicant need not testify on his or her own behalf ... and may rest on the application alone, subject to INS examination at the hearing.” Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). Indeed, we have held that credible asylum applications may be more probative than an applicant's testimony before the Immigration Judge. While "either the applicant or the government may desire additional oral testimony to bolster or dispute credibility,” the evaluation of an asylum claim is not limited to hearing testimony alone. Id. at 1181. “Given the difficulties many applicants face at their hearings, ranging from translation difficulties to the overwhelming anxiety of facing *870deportation, the asylum application sometimes represents an alien’s best case." Id. (citing Matter of Fefe, 20 I. & N. Dec. 116 (BIA 1989)) (emphasis added).

. THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IN MAKING SUA SPONTE OBJECTIONS AND SUSTAINING THE OBJECTIONS OF THE INS ATTORNEY, CHARACTERIZED COUNSEL’S QUESTIONS AS "LEADING." IN MY OPINION, THESE OBJECTIONS WERE NOT WELL-TAKEN. A LEADING QUESTION IS "[A] QUESTION THAT SUGGESTS THE ANSWER TO THE PERSON BEING INTERROGATED.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 897 (7th ed.1999). None of the questions that Felicitas was asked by her attorney were sufficiently specific or obvious as to "suggest the answer.”

. "[T]he role of the asylum adjudicator is to 'ensure that the applicant presents his case as fully as possible and with all available evidence.’ ” Jacinto, 208 F.3d at 732-33 (quoting the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the Refugee Convention ¶ 196). To fulfill this obligation, the Immigration Judge is empowered to "interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.” Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l)). Although the majority correctly concludes that we lack jurisdiction to review Felicitas's due process claim, it is worth noting that we have found a due process violation' where an Immigration Judge denied an applicant the opportunity to present relevant evidence regarding her asylum claim, because the Immigration Judge's action ensured that "information crucial to [her] future remain[ed] undisclosed.” Jacin-to, 208 F.3d at 733.