Court Opinion

ID: 9819726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:32:33.366243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.694746
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McBRIDE, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm petitioner’s conviction, I do not agree that the trial court erred in dismissing this petition. In this case, petitioner entitled his pro se pleading a “Motion to Vacate Unconstitutional and Void Judgments.” Although he cited to section 2 — 1401, he alleged that his two natural life sentences were unconstitutional under Apprendi because the sentences were imposed based upon a finding of exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior. His petition in substance did not challenge the factual basis for the judgment of his convictions, but instead claimed he was unconstitutionally sentenced. Because his “Motion to Vacate” was in substance a post-conviction petition, the trial court had the authority to and in fact did treat it as a postconviction petition when it was summarily dismissed. People v. Gandy, 327 Ill. App. 3d 112, 139 (1992); People v. Johnson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446-48 (2004). The transcript of proceedings further reflect that the trial judge considered petitioner’s pleading as a postconviction petition and his findings on the record show that the trial judge was dismissing petitioner’s “petition” because it did not “state any grounds for relief.” During the court proceedings on April 17, 2003, the trial judge specifically stated that petitioner’s “post-conviction petition” was under advisement. On April 22, 2003, the judge said in open court on the record that a written order will be filed “dismissing his petition.” The half-sheet, which is the certified entry of all the trial court’s orders prepared by the clerk’s office, indicates that the “post-conviction petition” was denied on April 22, 2003. In his written order, the trial judge indicated that the petition sought relief from judgment pursuant to section 2 — 1401. The trial judge then described the nature and the law governing such petitions. The trial judge also said that the claims were procedurally barred, that petitioner’s sentence was not void, and that the petition was untimely under section 2 — 1401. However, the trial judge also cited to a supreme court decision interpreting postconviction proceedings, specifically, People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 427, 686 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1997), and held that the petitioner’s claims were barred by the doctrines of res judicata and waiver. Thus, it is clear from the record of court proceedings and the written order that the trial judge considered this pleading for what it was, a postconviction petition. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial judge’s dismissal. I do agree with the majority’s conclusion that the instant petition cannot state any grounds for relief under Apprendi. As pointed out by the trial judge on the record during the court proceedings, the petitioner was sentenced to mandatory life in prison, not because of a finding that the murders were exceptionally brutal and heinous, but because petitioner was found guilty of murdering two people. Therefore, I specially concur in the decision today for the reasons stated above.