Court Opinion

ID: 9386250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 19:03:25.159149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.503510
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/11/23 In re Cristela M. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 In re CRISTELA M., a Person                                   B321968
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                     (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                    Super. Ct. No.
                                                               20CCJP03749B)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 CRISTELA R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gabriela Shapiro, Juvenile Court Referee.
Affirmed.
      Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Cristela R.
      Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              ____________________________________

                         INTRODUCTION

      Cristela R. appeals from a juvenile court order under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her
parental rights to her daughter, Cristela M. (Cristela).1
Cristela R. argues the juvenile court erred in ruling the
parental-benefit exception under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not apply. We affirm.

        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        A.   The Juvenile Court Sustains a Petition and Places
             Cristela with the Father of Her Half-brother
       Cristela R. has three children: Edgar, Cristela, and
Vanessa. Edgar’s father is Edgar M. (Edgar Sr.). Cristela R. was
living with Edgar Sr. when Cristela was conceived, but Cristela’s
biological father is Juan G., who is also the father of Vanessa.
This appeal concerns only Cristela.
       On July 14, 2020 the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services filed a petition alleging jurisdiction
over Edgar, Cristela, and Vanessa under section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), based on life-threatening,

1       Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

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non-accidental injuries Vanessa suffered in the home and on the
history of domestic violence between Cristela R. and Juan. The
petition also sought jurisdiction over Vanessa under section 300,
subdivision (e). At the time the Department filed the petition,
Edgar was 13 years old and lived primarily with Edgar Sr., who
shared custody of Edgar with Cristela R. Cristela, who was 18
months old, and Vanessa, who was six months old, lived with
Cristela R. and Juan. For the first seven to eight months of
Cristela’s life, Edgar Sr. visited Cristela regularly because he
believed (incorrectly, it turned out) she was his biological
daughter.
       The juvenile court detained all three children and released
Edgar to Edgar Sr., with monitored visitation for Cristela R.
Edgar Sr. expressed interest in having Cristela placed with him
as well, and on July 24, 2020 the Department moved Cristela
from a foster placement to Edgar Sr.’s home. Vanessa remained
hospitalized under a medical hold because of her extensive
injuries.
       On May 10, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the counts
relating to Cristela as alleged under section 300, subdivisions (a)
and (j), and dismissed the counts alleged under section 300,
subdivision (b). At a disposition hearing on October 27, 2021 the
juvenile court declared Cristela a dependent child of the court,
removed her from her parents’ custody, and denied family
reunification services under section 361.5. The court also
declared Edgar a dependent child of the court, released him to
Edgar Sr., and terminated jurisdiction over Edgar with a custody
and visitation order granting Cristela R. monitored visits.

                                 3
      B.     Cristela Remains Placed with Edgar Sr., and
             Cristela R. Visits Cristela Regularly
       Cristela R. consistently visited Cristela and Edgar once a
week for four hours. Cristela’s maternal grandmother Liliana
monitored the visits, which included playing at a park, painting,
and “other fun activities.” During visits Cristela R. changed
Cristela’s diapers, fed her, played with her, and allowed her to
rest when she became tired. Cristela R. said she felt “she
create[d] memories with [Cristela] at every single visit.” A case
social worker observed Cristela tended “to gravitate to [Liliana]
when she has a need” and interacted more with Liliana than with
Cristela R. Liliana told a case social worker that Cristela sought
comfort from whoever was closest to her. The case social worker
reported that Cristela appeared to see Liliana “more as a mother
figure” and Cristela R. as “more of a friend, aunt, or other
relative.”
       Cristela R. said she sometimes found it “difficult to drop off
[Cristela], as [Cristela] does not like to see her leave.” Liliana
reported that Cristela sometimes seemed “emotional” at the end
of visits with her mother, as if she might not be ready for the
visits to end, but that she was no longer emotional by the time
she arrived at Edgar Sr.’s house. Liliana said Cristela did not cry
when Cristela returned to Edgar Sr.’s home, and instead
appeared “happy to return to the home.” A case social worker
also reported that Cristela did not “show any emotions such as
crying” and easily transitioned from being with Cristela R. and
Liliana to Edgar Sr.
       Edgar Sr. said he never observed Cristela “sad or crying”
after visits with Cristela R. Instead, when Cristela returned
home she ran to Edgar Sr., hugged him, and said “she missed

                                  4
him.” Edgar Sr. stated that Cristela never said she missed her
mother, that she asked more about Liliana, and that she
appeared to have a stronger bond with Liliana than Cristela R.
On one occasion Cristela R. brought Edgar and Cristela home
from a visit two hours early. Edgar told his father that he and
Cristela R. disagreed about where to eat. Edgar Sr. said
Cristela R. asked him to reduce her hours of visitation. A case
social worker reported that Cristela R. was “reactive and
oppositional” and did not use the parenting skills she may have
learned to resolve the disagreement with Edgar.
       Edgar Sr. also reported that the only clothing or other
necessities Cristela R. ever brought Cristela was a single pair of
shoes and that Cristela R. never inquired about Cristela’s
medical appointments. In February 2022 Edgar Sr. asked a case
social worker to have Cristela assessed for “attachment issues”
because Cristela was calling women other than Cristela R.
“mommy.” Edgar Sr. said Cristela called her mother “Cristela”
for a long time but transitioned to calling her “‘Mommy Cristela.’”
Edgar Sr. said Cristela called him “daddy” and did not call any
other men “daddy.”
       A case social worker reported that Edgar Sr. generally met
Cristela’s “physical, emotional, medical, and educational needs.”
The social worker also reported that Cristela had a strong
attachment to Edgar Sr. and was comfortable in his care and that
Cristela had a “strong bond” with her brother Edgar and with
Edgar Sr.’s family, including Edgar Sr.’s mother, whom Cristela
called “‘mama Coco.’” The Department reported that Cristela
thrived “with her prospective adoptive parent and his family, who
continue to provide her with a safe and stable environment and
home life.”

                                 5
      C.      The Juvenile Court Terminates Cristela R.’s Parental
              Rights to Cristela, and Cristela R. Appeals
       At the June 30, 2022 selection and implementation hearing
under section 366.26, counsel for the Department and counsel for
Cristela asked the juvenile court to terminate Cristela R.’s
parental rights and to find Cristela was likely to be adopted.
Counsel for Cristela R. argued the parental-benefit exception
applied because Cristela R. visited regularly with Cristela,
Cristela had an “excellent relationship” with Cristela R., and
terminating parental rights would be detrimental to Cristela.
Specifically, counsel for Cristela R. argued severing the
relationship among Cristela R., Cristela, and Edgar would be
detrimental to Cristela. For example, counsel stated, Cristela R.
testified Cristela might have “mommy issues” if the court
terminated Cristela R.’s parental rights because it would be
difficult for Cristela R. to tell Edgar not to let Cristela see him
leave with Cristela R. for visits. Counsel for Cristela R.
suggested legal guardianship would provide Cristela the
permanence she needed and would “keep her relationship on
equal footing with her brother Edgar.”
       The juvenile court ruled that Cristela was likely to be
adopted and that the parental-benefit exception did not apply.2
The court acknowledged that Cristela R. regularly visited with
Cristela and “spen[t] some good time” with her, but found that

2     The juvenile court also denied Cristela R.’s petition under
section 388 seeking to change the court’s prior order denying
reunification services. Cristela R.’s notice of appeal states she is
appealing from the court’s order denying her section 388 petition,
but she does not address that order or suggest any basis for
reversing it.

                                 6
“the consistency, stability, and relationships that Cristela has in
the home with [Edgar Sr.] outweigh the benefit of the
relationship between Cristela and [Cristela R.].” The court
considered the consistency and duration of Cristela’s placement
with Edgar Sr., the nature of Cristela R.’s relationship with
Cristela, the potential for “an ongoing fight for custody of
Cristela,” and the effect terminating Cristela R.’s parental rights
would have on Liliana’s relationship with Cristela. The court
also considered the unusual circumstance that Cristela R. would
continue to visit Edgar, who lived with Cristela. The court said
“no one really addressed that” issue except for Cristela R.’s
“wondering today under oath what’s going to happen when she
goes to visit Edgar.” The court stated it could not “require or
order” the relationship between Cristela and Cristela R. to
continue after terminating Cristela R.’s parental rights, but the
court “beseech[ed]” Edgar Sr. and his mother “to find a way to
have [Cristela R. and Liliana] continue to be a part of Cristela’s
life, to be able to see her, to be able to visit with her, and to not
exclude her.”
        Cristela R. timely appealed. She argues the juvenile court
abused its discretion in ruling the parental-benefit exception did
not apply. That argument lacks merit.

                           DISCUSSION

      A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      The purpose of a hearing under section 366.26 is “‘to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child’” after the juvenile
court has terminated reunification services. (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.); see In re D.M. (2021)

                                  7
71 Cal.App.5th 261, 268.) If the court determines “the child is
likely to be adopted,” the court must “terminate parental rights to
allow for adoption.” (Caden C., at p. 630; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) “But if the parent shows that termination would be
detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated
reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and
select another permanent plan.” (Caden C., at pp. 630-631; see
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), (4)(A).) One of those reasons, the
parental-benefit exception, requires the parent to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) “the parent has regularly
visited with the child,” (2) “the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship,” and (3) “terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., at
p. 629; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); D.M., at p. 268.)
       “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; see In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1151.) To establish the second
element, “the parent must show that the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of
attachment implying that the child would benefit from continuing
the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636; see
In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 852.) The Department
concedes Cristela R. proved the first two elements.
       “Concerning the third element—whether ‘termination
would be detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the
court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to
sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because
terminating parental rights eliminates any legal basis for the

                                 8
parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume
that terminating parental rights terminates the
relationship. [Citations.] What courts need to determine,
therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633; see In re A.L., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151.)
       The Supreme Court in Caden C. explained that
“understanding the harm associated with severing the
relationship is a subtle enterprise.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 634.) In each case, “the court acts in the child’s best interest
in a specific way: it decides whether the harm of severing the
relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a
new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural
parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial,
positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the
benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the
child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.]
That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts
to perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home
outweigh ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of
[a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the
parent?]’” (Id. at p. 633.) “In many cases, ‘the strength and
quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will substantially
determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship,
which must be weighed against the benefits of a new adoptive
home. [Citation.] A child would benefit from continuing a strong,
positive, and affirming relationship, and it would be destabilizing
to lose that relationship.” (Id. at p. 634.) “When the relationship

                                  9
with a parent is so important to the child that the security and
stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination
would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial
relationship with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633-634; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
       In considering the third element, the “court makes the
assessment by weighing the harm of losing the relationship
against the benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home. And
so, the ultimate decision . . . is discretionary and properly
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 640; see In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 206.)

      B.       The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
               Ruling the Benefits of Adoption Outweighed the
               Detriment of Terminating Cristela R.’s Parental
               Rights
        Cristela R. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion
in finding the benefits of adoption for Cristela outweighed the
detriment of losing her relationship with her mother. She
contends Cristela “would be confused by [her] Mother continuing
to visit with Edgar, but not with her.” And Cristela R. argues
that, if the court did not terminate her relationship with Cristela,
Cristela would “never have to try to understand why [her] Mother
is still Edgar’s mother” but not hers. Cristela R. argues having to
“come to terms” with this situation “could only be detrimental” to
Cristela.
        It is possible Cristela could experience some confusion if
she saw Cristela R. visiting Edgar but not her or if Edgar Sr.
refused to allow Cristela to visit with Cristela R. when she came
to visit Edgar (if Edgar Sr. took that position, which he never

                                10
has). Confusion, however, is not detriment, and Cristela R. did
not introduce any evidence on the issue of detriment, other than
her concern about Cristela’s potential confusion. Cristela R.’s
speculation that Cristela might be confused and that her
confusion would cause sufficient detriment to overcome the
benefits of adoption was not evidence. (See Friends of Lagoon
Valley v. City of Vacaville (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 807, 834, fn. 13
[“speculation does not establish an abuse of discretion”]; cf. In re
Travis J. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 187, 204 [juvenile court “abused
its discretion” by basing its order “on nothing more than
speculation”]; see also In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046
[inferences based on speculation or conjecture are not substantial
evidence].)
       Moreover, the juvenile court, when it weighed the benefits
of adoption against terminating Cristela’s parental rights,
recognized Edgar’s ongoing relationship with Cristela R. was a
“unique situation” and considered the possibility Cristela would
experience some confusion. The court acknowledged that Edgar
and Cristela live in the same house and that Cristela R. “is going
to continue to see Edgar and have visits with him.” The juvenile
court even encouraged Edgar Sr. to allow Cristela R. to visit with
Cristela when she visited Edgar, presumably to avoid the kind of
potential consequences Cristela R. identified. The juvenile court,
however, concluded ending Cristela’s relationship with her
mother, despite the benefits of that relationship, would not harm
Cristela “to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security
of a new, adoptive home” with Edgar Sr. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) The court stated that Cristela turned to
her grandmother, not Cristela R., “for validation and to help her”
and that all the evidence, other than Cristela R.’s testimony,

                                11
suggested Cristela was not emotionally attached to Cristela R.
Having made the “subtle, case-specific inquiry” required by
Caden C., the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (See id. at
p. 633.)
       Citing In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200,
Cristela R. argues making Cristela the “‘odd child out’” in
Edgar Sr.’s home would be detrimental to Cristela. Jerome D. is
distinguishable. The court in Jerome D. held the juvenile court
abused its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights
over her nine-year-old son who was “the stepchild or ‘the odd
child out’” in his stepfather’s home, had lived with his mother for
six-and-a-half years, and expressed a desire to live with his
mother again. (Id. at p. 1206.) A psychologist testified that the
child and his mother “shared a ‘strong and well[-]developed’
parent-child relationship and a ‘close attachment’ approaching a
primary bond” and that the child would “grieve and could
experience emotional and behavioral difficulties” if the court
severed his relationship with his mother. (Id. at pp. 1207-1208.)
There was no such evidence here. By the time of the section
366.26 hearing, Cristela had lived with Edgar Sr. for more than
half of her three and a half years, had a strong bond with him,
and was thriving in his care. Cristela R. introduced no evidence,
such as expert testimony or a bonding study, to show severing
Cristela’s relationship with her mother would have any
detrimental effect. (See In re M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 68
[“A bonding study can be relevant at a hearing under section
366.26 to the question of whether the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception should prevent the termination of parental
rights.”], review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276099; In re S.R. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 864, 869 [same].)

                                12
       Cristela R. also argues that “there is no evidence that
Cristela will gain any more stability from being adopted by
[Edgar Sr.] than she would by him becoming her legal guardian”
and that there was no evidence Edgar Sr. “will suddenly refuse to
care for Cristela if he cannot adopt her.” The juvenile court,
however, stated making Edgar Sr. Cristela’s legal guardian could
lead to custody issues that would be destabilizing for Cristela.
Moreover, it was Cristela R.’s burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that terminating her relationship
with Cristela would harm Cristela to such an extent that the
detriment outweighed the benefits of adoption. Cristela R. did
not submit any evidence legal guardianship would be as or more
stable than adoption.
       Finally, Cristela R. suggests the juvenile court erred in
relying “on a promise” from Edgar Sr. (who was not present at
the section 366.26 hearing) “there will be a future relationship
between the child and the parent in analyzing the beneficial
parent-child relationship exception.” As stated, Caden C.
requires the court to “assume that terminating parental rights
terminates the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633.) Thus, in determining whether to terminate parental
rights, the court may not consider “the prospective adoptive
parents’ willingness to allow the children to have continued
contact with mother.” (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102,
128; accord, In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) And the
juvenile court followed the law. While “beseech[ing]” Edgar Sr. to
continue to include Cristela R. and Liliana in Cristela’s life, the
court acknowledged that it was “without any power or
jurisdiction” to order continued visitation and that “[n]o one is
going to be able to expect [continued visitation] because of a

                                13
termination order.” Thus, the court did not err by considering
Edgar Sr.’s willingness to allow Cristela R. to visit with Cristela
or by attempting to extract a promise from him to do so. Instead,
the court terminated Cristela R.’s parental rights despite
knowing continued visits might not occur.

                         DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed.

                                     SEGAL, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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