Court Opinion

ID: 9689589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:40:52.665035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:09.930572
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on two of the issues presented: The reinstatement of alimony payments and the award to plaintiff of $500 in attorney fees.
In my view, the trial court erred in reinstating the alimony payments. It is significant that the referee, who personally observed the parties and heard the presentation of the evidence, recommended that "the Defendant be relieved of the obligation to pay any past or future alimony as the Plaintiff is earning enough to support herself at this time”. The circuit court, however, reinstated alimony payments of $50 a week, contrary to the referee’s recommendation, without benefit of any first-hand knowledge of the parties, and without the presentation of any additional evidence. The majority, in passing on this issue, states that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to recognize defendant’s defense of laches as a total bar to plaintiff’s claim for alimony. I cannot agree.
Under GCR 1963, 517.1, an appellate court will *499set aside the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury when such findings are clearly erroneous. "[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976). The testimony adduced at the referee’s hearing indicated that while the plaintiffs assets total $114,000, the defendant’s net worth is only one-half of a joint $5,000 equity in a home. In addition, the parties’ earnings between 1971 and 1975 were only several thousand dollars apart. I think this disparity in financial resources is sufficient to warrant the termination of defendant’s obligation to pay alimony. See, Anno: Wife’s possession of independent means as affecting her rights to alimony pendente lite, 60 ALR3d 728. In light of these findings and in the absence of any additional judicial hearing, I am left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. I would, therefore, reverse on this issue.
The second point on which I depart from the majority holding is the question of attorney fees. The original divorce judgment required the defendant to pay the award of attorney fees directly to the plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Carl Helman. No evidence, other than the testimony of the plaintiff, was ever presented establishing that the plaintiff had actually paid Mr. Helman’s fees. On the other hand, defendant had a copy of a letter indicating that he had sent payment to Mr. Helman in 1967. The defendant asserts that this letter was unavailable at the time of the hearing, but that he did attempt to present it to the trial court following the referee’s hearing and prior to that court’s final order.
*500I do not accept the majority’s conclusion that this evidence came too late and that it was proper for the lower court to refuse to consider it. The reason relied upon by the majority, that the late submission of evidence would deprive the plaintiif of the opportunity to rebut it, is not persuasive in the present case. Here, the testimony of the plaintiff at the referee’s hearing indicated that there was no rebutting evidence; plaintiff presented neither a receipt for the payment nor an assignment of Mr. Helman’s right to collect the $500. Thus, there is no way that the introduction of this letter could have prejudiced the plaintiff.
Therefore, I would remand this case to the trial court to resolve the attorney fee issue and vacate that part of its order reinstating alimony payments.