Court Opinion

ID: 9531103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:07:31.183962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:20.846158
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. By focusing on an activity that the claimant, Jacqui Walls, was engaged in prior to the activity that caused her accident, the majority opinion *971ignores the possibility that a claimant who steps out of the course of her employment can return to it. The majority opinion also fails to take into account several important public policies.
In order for Walls to recover worker’s compensation benefits, she must have been injured by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). The words “in the course of” refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm’n, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948). The requirement that the accident arise in the course of the employment is satisfied if it occurs “within the period of employment, at a place or area where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is engaged in an activity at least incidental to his employment.” Black v. McDonald’s of Layton, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987). The Black court went on to state that an “activity will be considered incidental to the employee’s employment if it advances, directly or indirectly, [her] employer’s interests.” Id.
It is clear from the cases cited in the majority opinion that the majority views Walls’ injury causing activity as the socializing Walls was engaged in immediately after her shift ended. The majority opinion cites cases for the proposition that claimants, who are injured while socializing after work, are outside the course of their employment. If Walls was injured while merely socializing, I would readily concur in the majority opinion. The majority, however, seems to ignore the fact that Walls was no longer socializing with her friends when she was injured. Walls had crossed over to the employee’s side of the bar where she worked. She was in the back room attempting to ready a keg after discovering that one had become empty. The characterization of Walls receiving an injury while socializing or engaged in personal recreation after work is incorrect and the cases cited by the majority to that effect are inapplicable.
The majority opinion cites the case of Black v. McDonald’s of Layton, 733 P.2d 154, 156-57 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) and a four-factor test used by Black, as beneficial to determining whether Walls’ injury stemmed from an “employment related recreational activity.” The four-factor test used by the Black court was set forth by Professor Arthur Larson in his treatise on worker’s compensation for determining whether company athletic team situations should be covered. See Black, 733 P.2d at 156; 1A Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 22.24 (1993). The test was applied in Black to determine whether the claimant, a McDonald’s employee injured on his way to a McDonald’s league softball game, was in the course of his employment. Neither Walls’ attempt to ready the keg nor her prior socializing are activities analogous to the company team situation addressed in Black or the cases cited by Larson.
The case of Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980), cited by the majority for the proposition that the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is determinative of whether the activity is within the course of employment, is also inapplicable.. Martin-son dealt with the special problem of how to cover claimants injured in occupations such as salespeople, where “social pleasures or diversions [can] be combined with the performance of duty, or indeed enhance it.” Martinson, 606 P.2d at 258. The predominant motivation test is helpful in determining whether a claimant, injured while wooing a potential client over dinner, should be compensated. Walls was injured as an off-duty bartender attempting to ready a keg. There was no question whether this activity was a social pleasure. This was not a Martinson-type activity and the Martinson test does not apply.
The case of Maintenance Management, Inc. v. Tinkle, 40 Colo.App. 80, 570 P.2d 840 (1977) is illustrative of how the case before us should be characterized. In Maintenance, the claimant worked his regular 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. shift, after which he went to visit his mother. Id. 570 P.2d at 842. On his way home, he went back to his place of work and was injured. Id. His *972return was neither acquiesced in nor directed by his employer. Id. The precise issue in the case was “whether an accident arises out of and in the course of employment when it occurs while an employee, without express authority but with the intent of acting for the benefit of the employer, has returned to his place of work after hours.” Id. The court inferred by the claimant’s statement that he wanted to “check something on the way home,” that the claimant’s action was intended to benefit the employer. Id. at 843. Accordingly, the court found that the claimant was in the course of his employment and affirmed the compensation award. Id. Likewise, our focus should be on the activity at the time of the injury, and not on a previous activity-1
The majority opinion appears to base its determination that Walls’ injury was sustained during an activity outside the course of her employment on the time and circumstances under which the accident occurred. The majority opinion relies in part on the fact that Wall’s shift “ended some five to six hours prior to the incident in question.” The opinion cites cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that injuries sustained after a shift is over are not within the course of employment. Our own supreme court has unequivocally stated, however, that an accident occurring after work does not necessarily mean a claimant cannot recover worker’s compensation benefits. J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 661 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah 1983). Although in J & W, the court ultimately denied the claimant compensation, the court set forth the rationale for allowing compensation to a claimant for a post-shift injury. The court stated that the real question was not whether the employee was strictly performing work duties but whether the accident happened as a result of the employee engaging in an activity that could be reasonably expected of an employee in connection with those duties. Id. Under this test, although Walls’ injury occurred after her shift was over, it occurred while she was readying a keg that she discovered had become empty. A bartender “helping out” at the bar where she works, when she thinks it's necessary, is an activity that could be reasonably expected.
The majority opinion also relies on the fact that because no one instructed Walls to ready the keg, she was without authority to do so and was thus a mere patron at the bar. This reliance suggests that the only time a claimant can be within the course of employment is when she is specifically told to do something. The idea that workers should do no more than what they are told, even if it may benefit their employer, is bad policy and unsupported by Utah ease law. The “circumstances” prong of the course of employment test is not dependent upon whether the claimant was engaged in an activity that she was specifically told or authorized to do. The circumstances prong of the test is met if the activity is “at least incidental to [her] employment,” which the Utah Supreme Court determined was activity directly or indirectly benefiting the employer. Black v. McDonald’s of Layton, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987); See Maintenance, 570 P.2d at 843 (claimant held to be in the course of his employment while injured in an activity intended to benefit employer even though activity was without express authority and occurred after hours); See also Page v. Green, 686 S.W.2d 528 (Mo.Ct.App.1985) (“[o]ther jurisdictions reflect a similar tendency to allow recovery if the employee was hurt during activity of bene*973fit to the employer”). It is not clear from the record whether readying a keg was one of Walls’ duties or what the procedure was for readying a keg at Uncle Bart’s Tavern. However, even if readying a keg was not her specific duty, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically stated that an activity “outside an employee’s regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer’s interests ... is in the course of employment.” 2 State Tax Comm’n v. Industrial Comm’n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah 1984).
In summary, Walls’ injury occurred during the term of her employment. Injuries sustained after work are not automatically outside the course of employment if they are reasonably expected in connection with a claimant’s duties. See J &W, 661 P.2d at 950. Walls, as a bartender noticing that a keg had become empty, could reasonably be expected to step behind the bar and attempt to help out. The back room of the bar where Walls worked was clearly a place that she may reasonably be expected to be. Walls was preparing a keg after one became empty during the business hours of the bar where she was employed. Her injury was sustained during an activity that was of direct benefit to her employer and therefor, incidental to her employment. See Black v. McDonald’s of Layton, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, Walls was injured during the course of her employment.
Walls was also injured from an activity “arising out of” her employment. The words “arising out of” refer to the origin or cause of the injury. M & K Corporation v. Industrial Comm’n, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948). To meet the “arising out of” component of the test for compensation, most courts require a showing “that the injury was caused by an increased risk to which claimant, as distinct from the general public, was subjected by his employment.” 1 Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 6.00 (1993). A substantial number of courts have modified this requirement to “accept a showing merely that the risk, even if common to the public, was actually a risk of this employment.” Id.3 Utah appears to apply the “increased-risk” test. See e.g. Fred Meyer v. Industrial Comm’n, 800 P.2d 825, 830 (Utah App.1990) (work place increased the risk that employee would be injured); Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm’n, 800 P.2d 330, 336 (Utah App.1990) (legal cause satisfied because the employment increased the risk of injury to which that worker was otherwise subject to in nonemployment life).
The petitioner testified that she went into the back room of the bar where cold kegs were kept in an old refrigerator. When she opened the door, a keg slid out and crushed her foot. The risk of a beer keg falling on a bar employee’s foot is certainly an increased risk that the employee would not otherwise be subject to outside of work. The fact that petitioner knew where to find the keg and presumed to go and ready it suggests that but for her employment, she would not have been subjected to the additional risk. Accordingly, the petitioner’s injury arose out of her employment and she should be granted compensation under the statute.
This case presents some important policy issues that are not addressed by the majority opinion. First, when applying the governing worker’s compensation statute to the facts of a particular case, the application must be made in accordance with statute’s purpose. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah *9741980). The purpose of the statute is to alleviate the financial hardship on individual employees and those dependent upon them by spreading the cost of an injury throughout the industry that employs the worker. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 1020, 1022 (Utah 1961); Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885, 888 (Utah 1945). “Compensation is therefore allowed without reference to negligence, risk inherent in the tasks, or the conduct of other workmen.” Ortega, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d at 888. To further the purpose of the act, any doubt concerning the right of compensation should be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990); J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 661 P.2d 949, 951 (Utah 1983); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah 1981); McPhie v. Industrial Comm’n, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); Long v. Western States Refining Co., 14 Utah 2d 398, 384 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1963); M & K, 112 Utah at 490, 189 P.2d at 134 (1949). The majority opinion has not afforded Walls the benefit of any existing doubt.
Second, it is sound policy to encourage a strong esprit de corps among Utah’s work force. The modern rule on helping a co-employee with his or her work “brings within the course of employment any activity undertaken in good faith by one employee to assist a coemployee in the latter’s performance of his work.” 1A Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 27.11 (1993) (footnote omitted). The fact that the assistance is rendered after a claimant’s regular working hours is immaterial. Id. “The reason for this holding is simple: it would be contrary not only to human nature but to the employer’s best interests to forbid employees to help each other on pain of losing compensation benefits for any injuries thereby sustained.” Id. at § 27.12. Of course, Walls, a conscientious employee, upon noticing that a keg had become empty in the bar where she worked, would try to help out by readying a new one. The majority opinion would inhibit this behavior, not encourage it.
Lastly, another basis upon which the majority relies for holding Walls’ activity outside the course of her employment was that she was without apparent authority, that is, no one with authority asked for her assistance. The third prong of the course of employment test allows for injury sustained while “the employee is carrying on the work which he is called upon to perform or doing some act incidental thereto,” with incidental defined as directly or indirectly beneficial to the employer. Black v. McDonald’s of Layton, 733 P.2d 154, 156 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). This prong is purposely disjunctive. It would be bad policy to interpret our workers compensation laws in a way that suggests the work force should do only what they are told, even if doing something they are not called upon to do would benefit the employer.
Walls was outside the course of her employment while she was shooting pool and socializing. She stepped back into the course of that employment, however, when she ceased socializing and went back across the bar to engage in an activity of benefit to her employer. She was injured during that activity and according to statutory law, case law, and prevailing public policy, she should be compensated.

. The majority opinion states that looking at the activity engaged in by the claimant when he or she is injured would lead to incongruous results. The majority opinion gives the example of an employee, who at the request of his employer remains at his work place and is injured while preparing himself a snack. The majority opinion surmises that the claimant would not be covered because at the moment of injury, the claimant was not doing anything for the employer’s benefit. If an employer requests an employee to remain at work and the employee prepares a snack there instead of going out for food, the employee is benefiting the employer by staying. In Askren v. Industrial Comm’n, 15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 1964), the supreme court held that an injury sustained in the company cafeteria, where the claimant was permitted but not required to eat was within the course of employment because it was "obvious that the cafeteria offered some advantages both to employer and employees.”

. The A.L.J. found that Walls’ motivation for staying at the bar could not be considered a good faith intention to further her employer’s work. However, it cannot be said that her motivation for attempting to ready the keg was not for her employer’s benefit.

. Some courts also apply the "positional-risk” test. 1 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.00 (1993). This test is primarily used when "the only connection of the employment with the injury is that its obligations placed the employee in the particular place at the particular time when he was injured by some neutral force, meaning by ‘neutral’ neither personal to the claimant nor distinctly associated with the employment.” 1 Arthur Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 6.50 (1993). The accident in the case before us was distinctly associated with the employment, rendering the positional-risk test inapplicable.