Court Opinion

ID: 9791967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:12.627828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.845831
License: Public Domain

GRABER, P. J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. Although I agree with the lead opinion’s analysis of the other issues, I would reverse and remand for a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to give defendant’s requested instruction defining “enterprise.” Unlike the majority, I believe that the requested instruction correctly states the law and that its absence may have affected the verdict.
To prove that defendant had violated ORS 166.720(3), the state had to prove both that he was employed by or associated with an enterprise and that he participated in that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. ORICO is directed against organized criminal activity; some connection with an organization is necessary to turn a series of standard crimes into an ORICO violation. See Frohnmayer, Arnold and Hamilton, “RICO: Oregon’s Message to Organized Crime,” 18 Will L Rev 1, 2-3 (1982). Under ORS 166.720(3), the enterprise is the entity through which a defendant conducts a pattern of racketeering activity. If there is no enterprise, there can be no unlawful racketeering. The meaning of enterprise, therefore, is central to ORS 166.720(3).
Despite its importance, the definition of “enterprise” in ORS 166.715(2) is incomplete.1 It is not enough, as the state *509asserts, to say simply that certain individuals and groups are “include[d].” Taken by itself, the statutory definition would permit the conviction, under ORICO, of an individual who simply committed a series of related crimes; it would, as defendant argues, make ORICO into a recidivist statute. That was not the legislature’s purpose when it adopted ORICO. Rather, it intended to focus on “groups of people [who] through division of labor, specialization, diversification, complexity of organization, and the accumulation of capital, turn crime into an ongoing business.” United States v. Elliott, 571 F2d 880, 884 (5th Cir), cert den 439 US 953 (1978), quoted in Frohnmayer, Arnold and Hamilton, supra, 18 Will L Rev at 2 (1982). The legislature wanted to make sure that it had included every kind of enterprise within the definition, not that it had fully defined the underlying concept of enterprise.
Because the statutory definition is incomplete, we should look to other sources, beginning with ordinary usage, to complete the meaning of the term. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 757 (1976), defines “enterprise” as “a unit of economic organization or activity (as a factory, a farm, a mine); esp : a business organization : FIRM, COMPANY.”* 2 A necessary aspect of the organizations described is that they have structures independent of the people who operate them.
If we use the dictionary definition to complete the definition of enterprise in ORS 166.715(2), any organization, *510licit or illicit, formally created or informal, may be an enterprise. An individual who acts through some structure that is separate from the individual in his or her personal capacity may be an enterprise. There must, however, be an organization. That conclusion is consistent with cases under the federal RICO Act3 that hold that a sole proprietorship may be an enterprise, at least if it has employees, and that the proprietor may associate with the proprietorship in conducting a pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Benny, 786 F2d 1410, 1414-16 (9th Cir), cert den 479 US 1017 (1986).
Instead of giving any of defendant’s requested instructions, the court simply read the statutory definition of enterprise, ORS 166.715(2), and the pertinent part of the indictment. Defendant assigns as error the trial court’s failure to give this additional instruction:
“To prove an ‘enterprise’ under the statute, the State must prove an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and that the various associates of the enterprise functioned as a continuing unit.”
Defendant derived that instruction from United States v. Turkette, 452 US 576, 583, 101 S Ct 2524, 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981):
“In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an ‘enterprise’ and the connected ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’ The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. * * * The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. * * * The ‘enterprise’ is not the ‘pattern of racketeering activity’; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains *511a separate element which must be proved by the Government.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Supreme Court’s discussion in United States v. Turkette, supra, of the role of those elements in the federal RICO Act correctly describes their role under ORICO, aside from the “nexus to an enterprise” requirement for a pattern of racketeering under ORICO. The proposed instruction correctly states the law in this case, in which the indictment charged that the enterprise was “an association between and among the defendant individually and as the ‘Circle Bar “D” and Beach Loop Horse Rental,’ and [six named individuals], and others unknown to the Grand Jury.” The lead opinion’s error in this case begins with the assertion that “[t]he issue is what constitutes an enterprise under ORICO when the alleged enterprise is carried on by an individual.” 100 Or App at 503. Defendant is an individual, but the enterprise that was charged is not an individual. We need not decide whether the requested instruction would be proper in a true “sole proprietorship” case.
The lead opinion’s error continues with the assertion that “[t]he proffered instruction would erroneously have told the jury that the associates must have continued to function as a unit, i.e., that each associate has to be involved in some manner with each predicate offense.” 100 Or App at 506. The proposed instruction states the requirement that the “various associates of the enterprise function[] as a continuing unit.” (Emphasis supplied.) That wording correctly suggests that different associates can come and go if the structure operates as a continuing unit.
The requested instruction was not only a correct statement of the law, it also was necessary to a full and accurate understanding of what the state had to prove. For that reason, the court erred in refusing to give it. There was evidence to support a conviction under the correct statement of the law, so I agree with the majority that the court did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal.4 However, the evidence might have led the jury to have a reasonable doubt about *512whether there was an enterprise or whether defendant had simply committed a series of crimes with the wholly ad hoc assistance of a varying collection of individuals. The failure to give the instruction, therefore, was not harmless.
I dissent.

 In contrast, the definition of “[p]attern of racketeering activity” states what the phrase “means” and is complete. See Computer Concepts, Inc. v. Brandt, 98 Or App 618, 630-32, 780 P2d 249 (1989). The definition of “enterprise” in 18 USC § 1961(4) is, like the ORICO definition, incomplete. See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F2d 647, 663 n 9 (8th Cir), cert den 459 US 1040 (1982). The state contends that United States v. Hewes, 729 F2d 1302, 1316-17 (11th Cir 1984), cert den 469 US 1110 (1985), approved *509an instruction that only gave the statutory definition and described the indictment. In that case, the defendant’s requested additional instruction was incorrect, because it proposed to tell the jury that every defendant must be associated with the enterprise throughout its life. Moreover, the court wrote that “it would be preferable for trial courts to flesh out the bare words of the statute” and noted: “We express no opinion as to whether merely repeating the statutory definition is legally sufficient.” 729 F2d at 1316 and 1316 n 16.

 ORS 165.075(3) defines “enterprise” for the purpose of the business fraud statutes as
“any private entity of one or more persons, corporate or otherwise, engaged in business, commercial, professional, charitable, political, industrial or organized fraternal activity.”
That definition, unlike the one in ORS 166,715(2), states what the word means, not what it includes. It is complete in itself. Although it does not directly apply to ORICO, it, like the dictionary definition, treats an enterprise as something that is engaged in organized activity and that has independent structure and activity. Those are characteristics of enterprises in general; the prohibition in ORS 166.720(3) on conducting a pattern of racketeering activity through an enterprise assumes them. Those characteristics, therefore, are part of the ORICO definition of “enterprise.”

 ORICO is modeled after the federal RICO Act, and we have held that federal cases are helpful in construing it. State v. Blossom, 88 Or App 75, 78-79, 744 P2d 281 (1987), rev den 305 Or 22 (1988). Although there are differences between the acts that require us to use federal cases with some care, it is surprising that the lead opinion does not mention federal analyses of the issue that it decides. The lead opinion does not give any weight to the fact that the instruction in question comes directly from a United States Supreme Court opinion and would clearly be correct under federal RICO.

 The state correctly points out, and the majority and I agree, that the same evidence may prove more than one element of the ORICO violation. See, e.g., United States v. Mazzei, 700 F2d 85 (2d Cir), cert den 461 US 945 (1983).