Court Opinion

ID: 9475498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:29:03.007119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:44.981073
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The critical evidence in the prosecution’s case against Ferlin Dorian for the sexual assault of his daughter, Roxanne Dorian, consisted of testimony provided by Monica Whiting, Roxanne’s foster mother. This testimony did not, however, exhibit that indicia of reliability necessary for its admissibility under the sixth amendment’s confrontation clause.
I.
I begin by addressing the issue of whether the error under the confrontation clause was preserved. Even in the absence of a timely and specific objection by the appellant Ferlin Dorian, the record plainly demonstrates that the confrontation clause issue was before the court at the time of trial.
First, the district judge specifically noted the existence of a confrontation clause problem were the Government to call Monica Whiting to the stand and not call Roxanne. At the onset of the Government’s offer of proof concerning Monica Whiting’s testimony, the judge stated, “Do you understand we have a potential problem with the confrontation clause * * * they [the defense] won’t be able to cross-examine the child if the only evidence offered was that of a questioner.” (Tr. 93-94).
Second, the manner in which the appellant’s counsel objected to Monica’s testimony on hearsay grounds put the Government on notice that the basis of his objection was the testimony’s lack of trustworthiness. Under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), lack of trustworthiness is also a ground for a hearsay objection under the confrontation clause. The objection and its accompanying dialogue were as follows:
MR. ELLINGSON [appellant’s attorney]: Your Honor, I guess I’m wondering in light of the fact that she [Roxanne Dorian] testified, this indicates the Court made a decision on the admission of the hearsay evidence?
THE COURT: Yes. I rule that the offer of proof, that is, the testimony offered during the offer of proof is admissible under 803[24],
MR. ELLINGSON: If I could, I’d like to state an objection to the admission of this evidence that it does not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule on the *1448grounds that the Government has made no showing that it has an equivalence of trustworthiness as shown as indicative of the other hearsay exceptions.
THE COURT: Yes. You may put that on the record.
MR. ELLINGSON: I would like to have a continuing objection to her testimony on that basis.
THE COURT: You can have that objection.
(Tr. 142).
With the focus on “trustworthiness”, the failure of Ferlin Dorian’s counsel to make a specific and timely objection on confrontation grounds does not bar our addressing the confrontation issue. “Objections”, one court has stated, “caution the opposing party to prevent error and avoid misconduct and alert the court to take corrective action.” United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 925, 66 L.Ed.2d 843 (1981). In the context of the admission of hearsay in a criminal trial, an objection on confrontation clause grounds alerts the government to the need of presenting proof of the declarant’s unavailability. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 847 (3d Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 779, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985). Where only a hearsay objection has been made, the government often will not establish the declarant’s unavailability. Thus, in these situations, it will not do for the appellant to shift the grounds of objection to the confrontation clause where unavailability of the declarant must be shown by the government to overcome the confrontation clause objection. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. Unavailability of the declarant is irrelevant to the introduction of evidence under most exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including Fed.R.Evid. 803(24).
The proceedings of the trial demonstrate that here the Government prepared itself for a confrontation clause objection. The Government established Roxanne’s unavailability by placing her on the stand and demonstrating that her testimony was essentially meaningless.
The two eases cited by the majority to support non-reviewability of the confrontation issue, unless raised in the trial court, United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir.1985) and United States v. McDaniel, 773 F.2d 242 (8th Cir.1985), are thus inapplicable to the present case. In Helmel, the court held that since the government was not alerted to the necessity of establishing the identity of the declarant and his unavailability at trial, a consequence of the appellant only objecting to the evidence on hearsay grounds, the court was barred from reviewing the confrontation clause issue on appeal. 769 F.2d at 1317. The court in McDaniel stated the same reason for its refusal to review the confrontation clause issue raised by the district court’s admission of a co-conspirator’s statement pursuant to a hearsay exception. 773 F.2d at 245. Because, as noted above, the Government established the declarant’s (Roxanne’s) unavailability at trial, it is in no way prejudiced by our review of the confrontation clause issue.
That the appellant’s counsel failed to mention the Constitution in his objection is of no moment. The tests for the admissibility of hearsay testimony under the confrontation clause and the residual hearsay exception are nearly identical. Under both the Constitution and Rule 803(24), the question is whether the out-of-court statements are sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to hazard their admission without an opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that while the test for admissibility under each are distinguishable, “hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values”, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1933, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), and “stem from the same roots”, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 91 S.Ct. 210, 218, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970). See also United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.1979) (Rule 803(24) provides a useful set of criteria for weighing the admissi*1449bility of evidence under both the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule).
Finally, the Government in its brief does not contend that the defendant failed to preserve the confrontation issue. Rather, consistent with its presentation of the evidence in the district court, the Government addresses the merits of the confrontation clause issue. I observe that the majority also addresses the issue, even while contending the constitutional question is a non-issue.
Accordingly, the crucial issue for resolution on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in permitting Monica Whiting to relate her hearsay version of what information Roxanne, age five, conveyed to her. Whether the court’s ruling constituted a confrontation clause violation is properly before us, just as much so as the question of its correctness under the Federal Rules of Evidence. I deem it only necessary, however, to discuss the issue in terms of the sixth amendment.
II.
In addressing confrontation clause values, courts must draw a line between hearsay testimony that violates the Constitution and hearsay testimony that preserves the accused’s sixth amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Because the testimony of Monica Whiting, while honestly and sincerely given, carried with it such aspects of unreliability, it does not pass constitutional muster ünder Ohio v. Roberts.1
I observe the following bearing on the “indicia of reliability” displayed by Monica Whiting’s testimony.
First, Monica Whiting cannot be considered an objective observer. Between Roxanne and Monica existed a strong foster mother-daughter relationship although Roxanne had been living as a member of the Whiting household for less than a month at the time of Roxanne’s interviews. Despite this bond, it was Monica who conducted the interviews of Roxanne which sought, as their purpose, to learn whether Ferlin Dorian had sexually abused his daughter. The relationship between Monica and Roxanne may have influenced Roxanne to relate statements to please, or which she thought might please, Monica, regardless of Monica’s sincere desire to obtain truthful information.
Second, because Monica, to whom Roxanne first gave her version of the assult, was not at the time a qualified social worker and possessed minimal experience interviewing children, her efforts to elicit the facts of the incident from Roxanne cannot be considered a reliable interrogation. At trial, Monica testified that subsequent to her first interview with Roxanne, but before the July 10, 1985 interview, she attended one lecture on the interviewing of children given by a State Social Services agent. (Tr. 160, 166). Monica conceded that her instruction with regard to the use of anatomical dolls, which she used to facilitate her interviews with Roxanne, was “limited”. (Tr. 168). She also stated that she had never before been involved in this type of interviewing. (Tr. 162). Monica’s lack of qualifications and experience in child interviewing detracts from the reliability of the story she obtained from Roxanne.
Third, Roxanne was interviewed amidst what appears to have been considerable suggestiveness by Monica, Priscilla Horn-by, the Supervisor for the South Dakota Department of Social Services and Penny Virchow, an on-call child protection worker in the same state agency. In her initial interview, Roxanne was asked whether her father touched her while her mother was gone. (Tr. 194). In a later interview, she was asked whether her father touches her *1450any place on her body and whether that touch hurts or scares her. (Tr. 195-96). At still another interview, Roxanne was asked by a social worker, “Is this a scary place that your dad touched you?” (Tr. 208). She was also asked if her father ever put anything between her legs. (Tr. 209). Moreover, many of the questions put to Roxanne were asked through the manipulation of anatomically correct dolls. While I would not go so far as to hold, as the appellant urges, that the mere use of anatomically correct dolls is per se suggestive, the record of Roxanne’s interviews indicates that the use of these dolls to question a very young child adduces a relatively high degree of suggestiveness.
Fourth, Roxanne’s own statements, as related by Monica, are too inconsistent to be afforded any significant amount of reliability. During the interview of June 17, 1985, Roxanne indicated that her father did not touch her any place on her body to scare her except her chest. (Tr. 196). During the interview conducted on June 19, 1985, Roxanne indicated that her father had never put anything between her legs. (Tr. 209). During her June 24, 1985 interview, Roxanne indicated that her father had placed his finger in the opening between her legs. (Tr. 182). Finally, during the course of an interview conducted on July 10, 1985, Roxanne told Monica Whiting that her father had put his “boy thing” in the “hole” between her legs. (Tr. 155).
In an effort to explain these inconsistencies at trial, the Government called an expert witness to testify that contradictions in a child’s statements do not necessarily indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Children, testified this expert, will often contradict themselves in their desire to tell an adult about something scary that has happened to them without being punished for what they believe is their wrongful involvement in the incident. As a child receives assurances that he will not be punished and will instead be believed, the expert testified that he will gradually tell an adult the real truth of what occurred. (Tr. 260-63). The Government’s expert spoke only of children in general, however, and not of Roxanne in particular. Thus we have no idea whether these behavioral assumptions even apply to Roxanne. The expert did not and could not testify whether Roxanne’s statements were true or false. Moreover, the very need for an expert witness to testify to the credibility of children’s stories told in an inconsistent manner demonstrates the unreliability of the declaration here offered in evidence.
Finally, the medical evidence presented during the trial does not support Monica’s testimony. In her June 17, 1985 examination of Roxanne, Dr. Melanie Webb found the entrance to Roxanne’s vagina inflamed and the tissue on the hymenal ring surrounding Roxanne’s vagina torn. Dr. Webb testified, however, that, based only on this evidence, it was impossible to conclude that Roxanne had been raped. The redness, Dr. Webb stated, could have been caused by poor hygiene, and the vaginal tear, a result of the penetration of any object, by horseback riding or a fall. (Tr. 56-58). She further stated that the tear could have occurred anywhere from a year to five or six days prior to the June 17, 1985 examination. (Tr. 55). The Government claimed that the sexual abuse, if any, occurred between May 28 and June 15, 1985. (Tr. 220). Thus the medical testimony could not corroborate the declarations of Roxanne as repeated by Monica’s testimony.
III.
In upholding the district court’s admission of Monica Whiting’s testimony, the majority cites several cases in which this court approved the admissibility of hearsay testimony repeating statements of young children because the statements were accompanied by substantial guarantees of trustworthiness. See United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981). In each of these cases, however, the admitted testimony displayed a degree *1451of trustworthiness missing from Monica Whiting’s testimony.
In Cree, as in the present case, testimony concerning statements made by a four-year-old child abuse victim were admitted into evidence under the residual hearsay exception. In contrast to the present ease, however, the child’s statements implicating his custodian and her boyfriend in physically abusing himself and his brother were made to a qualified clinical social worker. Cree, 778 F.2d at 476. Furthermore, there seems to have been no danger that this social worker influenced the child to make the statements he did, there being no evidence that the child was at all dependent upon this social worker emotionally. Moreover, the child’s statements in Cree were direct, unambiguous and related verbally. Id. This is to be compared with Roxanne’s inconsistent statements, mostly communicated through the use of anatomical dolls or nods and shakes of her head.
The child’s allegations of physical abuse in Cree were also corroborated by decisive medical evidence and the testimony of other witnesses. Corroboration has been held an “indicium of reliability” in confrontation clause analysis. Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.1985). Basing their statements on the observations they made during separate physical examinations of the two children, three physicians testified that the children were victims of child abuse. Cree, 778 F.2d at 476. The child’s statements to the social worker were also substantiated by similar comments made by the child to school officials and to an examining physician, also alleging his abuse was caused by his custodian. Id. Here, by contrast, there exists no medical evidence or testimony by other witnesses that corroborates the truth of the statements Roxanne made to Monica.
In Renville, this court upheld the admission of the hearsay testimony of a deputy sheriff under the residual hearsay exception. The hearsay concerned statements made to the deputy sheriff by a young teenage sexual abuse victim. The court held that “significant indicia of reliability” supported the testimony’s admissibility, despite the declarant’s testimony at trial that she had lied to the deputy sheriff. Renville, 779 F.2d at 440. Of greatest importance to the court’s decision, and not found in the present case, was the declarant’s subjection, in Renville, to full and effective cross-examination. During the course of this cross-examination, the declarant even admitted making the controverted statements to the deputy sheriff. Id. Also contrasting the present case, the declarations at issue in Renville were made by the young victim to a deputy sheriff acting in the scope of his duties. Id. at 441.
Finally, the girl’s statements to the deputy sheriff in Renville were corroborated by numerous state and medical personnel to whom the girl had made identical statements at different times and in different settings. Id. at 440-41. The Renville court upheld, under the hearsay exception admitting statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, Rule 803(24), the admission of an examining physician’s testimony concerning statements, made to him by the victim, in which the victim identified her abuser. The corroboration that the victim’s statements to the doctor lent to the deputy sheriff’s testimony significantly added to its reliability.
In the third case, Iron Shell, this court upheld the admission, under the hearsay rule for excited utterances, of a police officer’s testimony pertaining to statements made to him by a nine-year-old sexual abuse victim. Contrasting the timing of Roxanne’s interviews, occurring anywhere from one to four weeks after the alleged sexual assault, the girl in Iron Shell described the events to the officer between forty-five minutes and an hour and a quarter subsequent to their occurrence. 633 F.2d at 77. The officer testified that, at the time of the interview, the girl was still noticeably shaken by some terrifying event. Id. at 85. Also, unlike the manner in which Roxanne was interviewed, where she was asked leading and possibly suggestive questions, the officer in Iron Shell asked the girl only “what happened?” Id. *1452at 86. Finally, as in Renville, the girl’s identical account of the assault given to an examining physician to which the physician testified at trial (and which was admitted by the trial court under Rule 803(24)) substantially corroborated the police officer’s testimony.
IV.
We here deal with a constitutional admonition that an accused possesses the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In determining whether the proffered testimony carries with it sufficient indicia of reliability to qualify for admissibility, the courts must draw a realistic line. Here, the inconsistent statements — drawn from a young child after repeated questioning and without the aid of corroborating statements elsewhere in the record — must fall on the side of inadmissibility. Were it otherwise, the important constitutional guarantee would be made empty of meaning.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial without the inadmissible testimony of Monica Whiting.

. I do not discuss whether, under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), hearsay under Rule 803(24) is judged to fall outside established hearsay exceptions and thus to require "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” or whether it must exhibit sufficient "indicia of reliability” where the hearsay exception is determined "firmly rooted”. Monica Whiting’s testimony lacks the necessary predicate of reliability necessary to comply with either standard.