Court Opinion

ID: 9373621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:15.093774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.683901
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JERMAINE ANTHONY LEWIS,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DA-0752-16-0347-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: June 28, 2022
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Gale R. Thames, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Yvette K. Bradley, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his alleged constructive suspension appeal for lack of jurisdiction . For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for re view and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
     with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant is employed as a Carrier Technician by the agency. Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 16 at 28.     On November 4, 2015, he filed an appeal
     claiming that the agency failed to restore him to duty after his physician cleared
     him to return to work with restrictions.    Lewis v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB
     Docket No. DA-0353-16-0073-I-1, Initial Decision (July 11, 2016).             The
     administrative judge issued a decision that dismissed the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation
     that his absence was the result of a compensable injury.         Id.   During the
     processing of that appeal, the appellant alleged that the agency improperly placed
     him in a nonduty, nonpay status, and the administrative judge docketed those
     allegations in the present appeal. IAF, Tab 1.
¶3        The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order, advising the
     appellant that his claim that the agency improperly placed him in a nonduty,
     nonpay status may establish a constructive suspension appealable to the Board
     under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512(2) and 7513(d). IAF, Tab 3 at 3-4. She explained that an
     employee’s continued absence constitutes a constructive suspension when an
     involuntary absence occurs at the agency’s direction or when the following
     conditions are met: (1) an employee, who had been absent from work due t o
     medical restrictions, requests work within those restrictions; (2) the agency is
     bound by an agency policy, regulation, or contractual provision to offer available
     light-duty work to the employee; and (3) the agency fails to offer the employee
     any available light-duty work.    Id. at 3 (citing Hahn v. U.S. Postal Service,
     86 M.S.P.R. 139, ¶ 6 (2000)).     She further explained that, once an employee
     makes a nonfrivolous allegation that he was able to work within certain
     restrictions, that he communicated his willingness to work, and that the agency
                                                                                       3

     prevented him from returning to work, the burden then shift s to the agency to
     show either that there was no work available within the employee’s restrictions or
     that it offered such work to the employee, and he declined it. Id. In the order,
     the administrative judge instructed the appellant to file evidence and argument in
     support of his claim.    Id. at 4.    The appellant replied, arguing, among other
     things, that the agency refused to allow him to return to work with
     accommodation beginning in April 2013, despite his repeated requests.         IAF,
     Tabs 5, 8, 15, 17. He also submitted medical documentation dated 2012 through
     2015, and provided both signed and unsigned statements on his behalf.         IAF,
     Tabs 7, 10-11, 14, 18.
¶4        In an initial decision issued without holding the requested hearing, the
     administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. IAF, Tabs 1,
     19, Initial Decision (ID) at 2.      She found that the appellant failed to raise a
     nonfrivolous allegation that he was able to return to work to perform his normal
     duties and that, as a result, his absence beginning April 10, 2013, did not
     constitute a constructive suspension. ID at 5-7. The appellant has filed a petition
     for review, and the agency has filed a response in opposition . Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3.
¶5        Prior to the issuance of the initial decision, the Board clarified its
     jurisprudence regarding constructive suspension claims , such as alleged here, in
     Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397 (2013). In particular, the Board
     noted that it has recognized several fact patterns that may give rise to an
     involuntary constructive suspension and it therefore rejected as misleading the
     statement in a line of Board cases (including Hahn on which the administrative
     judge relied) that constructive suspensions arise in only two situations. Bean,
     120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 n.4; ID at 3. Instead, the Board held that, assuming the
     jurisdictional requirements of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 are otherwise met, proof of the
     following by preponderant evidence is sufficient to establish jurisdiction over a
     constructive suspension claim: (1) the employee lacked a meaningful choice in
                                                                                         4

     the matter; and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the
     employee of that choice. Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8; see Romero v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 606, ¶ 8 (2014) (applying the jurisdictional standard set
     forth in Bean); see also Rosario-Fabregas v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
     833 F.3d 1342, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board’s standard for
     establishing jurisdiction in constructive suspension cases, as set forth in Romero,
     is appropriate). If the appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction,
     then he is entitled to a jurisdictional hearing. Barrand v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 112 M.S.P.R. 210, ¶ 8 (2009).           A nonfrivolous allegation of Board
     jurisdiction is an allegation of fact that, if proven, could establish that the Board
     has jurisdiction over the matter at issue.          Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service,
     60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).
¶6         An appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to
     establish an appealable jurisdictional issue. Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection
     Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, the administrative judge did
     not inform the appellant of the proper jurisdictional standard.        IAF, Tab 3.
     Further, neither the agency’s pleadings nor the initial decision properly placed the
     appellant on notice of how to establish jurisdiction over his appeal. ID; IAF,
     Tab 16; cf. Easterling v. U.S. Postal Service, 110 M.S.P.R. 41, ¶ 11 (2008)
     (finding that an administrative judge’s failure to provide an appellant with proper
     Burgess notice can be cured if the agency’s pleadings contain the notice that was
     lacking or if the initial decision puts the appellant on notice of what he must do to
     establish    jurisdiction,   thus   affording   him the   opportunity to   meet   his
     jurisdictional burden on review).
¶7         Moreover, the appellant made the following allegations in sworn statements
     below:      he has a service-connected medical disability of which the agency is
     aware; the agency previously approved leave for his serious medical condition
     under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993; one of his medical conditions
     has been exacerbated as a direct result of his managers’ creation of a hostile work
                                                                                          5

     environment; he recovered sufficiently to return to work with accommodation; he
     informed the agency of his desire to return to work and his request for
     accommodation; he submitted medical documentation supporting his requests; the
     agency failed to reasonably accommodate him; the agency refused to accept or
     consider his medical documentation; the agency did not seek to have him
     evaluated by one of its doctors to clarify its questions concerning his medical
     conditions; and the agency refused to meaningfully engage in the interactive
     process. 2 IAF, Tabs 5, 8, 15, 17. In addition, the appellant submitted the sworn
     statement of his union representative that supports many of his assertions,
     including those concerning the appellant’s medical documentation and the
     agency’s involvement in the interactive process. IAF, Tab 14 at 7. We find that
     the appellant’s allegations, if proven, could establish that he lacked a meaningful
     choice in the matter and that it was the agency’s improper actions that deprived
     him of that choice.     See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8.           The jurisdictional
     prerequisites of chapter 75 otherwise appear to be satisfied because the appellant
     is a preference-eligible U.S. Postal Service employee with 1 year of current
     continuous service and his absence lasted for more than 14 days. IAF, Tabs 1, 5,
     15, 17; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(B)(ii), 7512(2). Therefore, we find that the
     appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that he was subjected to an
     appealable constructive suspension under the clarified standard set forth in Bean.
¶8         Accordingly, we remand this appeal for a jurisdictional hearing to afford the
     appellant an opportunity to prove jurisdiction over his constructive suspension
     claim after providing him with clear notice of the elements and burdens of proo f

     2
       The appellant claims that he submitted medical documentation to the agency showing
     that he has recovered sufficiently to return to work with accommodation and that his
     “medical professionals could not have stated it any clearer ‘[the appellant] is able to
     perform the duties of his job with accommodations.’” IAF, Tab 17 at 4 (quoting alleged
     medical professionals). However, we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that
     the appellant failed to submit below any medical documentation to prove that he indeed
     was cleared to work or what restrictions his physicians had imposed. ID at 6.
     Therefore, the appellant must submit this medical documentation on remand.
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of such a claim. See Bean, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 14 (remanding a constructive
suspension appeal for a jurisdictional hearing) ; Sage v. Department of the Army,
108 M.S.P.R. 398, ¶¶ 7, 9 (2008) (remanding a constructive suspension appeal for
proper Burgess notice under the former jurisdictional standard).

                                     ORDER
     For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                         Jennifer Everling
                                         Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.