Court Opinion

ID: 9931032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 13:15:05.908163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:56.924157
License: Public Domain

PRESENT: All the Justices

DWAYNE LAMONT SAMPLE, JR.
                                                                OPINION BY
v. Record No. 220445                                      JUSTICE THOMAS P. MANN
                                                              FEBRUARY 8, 2024
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                       FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

       Dwayne Lamont Sample, Jr. was found guilty of attempted robbery. Sample assigns

error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress an out-of-court identification and the

subsequent in-court identification as well as his motion to strike. In this appeal, we consider

whether the single photo showup, from which the victim identified Sample, was impermissibly

suggestive, and even if it were, whether it was nonetheless constitutionally reliable under the

totality of the circumstances. We also consider whether the evidence presented was sufficient to

convict Sample of attempted robbery. For the following reasons, we agree with the trial court

and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

                                         BACKGROUND

       At approximately 10:00 p.m. on September 17, 2019, a man wearing a bandana attempted

to rob Mark Angiulli at gunpoint outside of a warehouse garage. Angiulli and his son were

loading granite onto a trailer when the man approached Angiulli from the left side. While

standing 15 to 20 feet away from Angiulli, the man pointed a gun back and forth between

Angiulli and his son and said, “Give me your wallet. Give me your f***ing wallet.” He then

“came right up” within two to three feet of Angiulli while pointing the gun directly in his face

the entire time. Angiulli noticed the gun’s small barrel and quickly realized the gun was likely a

BB gun. Angiulli yelled out to his son that it was a BB gun, and as he grabbed the gun away

from the assailant, both men hit the ground. The gun dropped and the man fled the scene.
        Angiulli called 911 less than five minutes after the incident, and an officer equipped with

a body-worn camera arrived on scene five to ten minutes after the 911 call. Angiulli told the

officer the man was wearing a black hoodie, black jeans, black ballcap, black and white tennis

shoes, and a black or dark blue bandana. Angiulli described the man as a “skinny white kid,”

about 20 years old or in his early twenties with big brown eyes and dark short hair. He estimated

the man was about his height, 5’10”, and weighed around 150 pounds. Angiulli and his son

indicated to the officer the direction of the assailant’s flight.

        The officer then described to Angiulli several people who lived in that location, including

Sample who is “mixed, so he looks almost Hispanic, cause he’s not a white guy.” Angiulli then

responded, “this guy’s face was awfully pale though, you know, he didn’t look mixed to me, he

looked pure white.” Throughout the conversation with the officer, Angiulli repeated the same

description multiple times.

        The officer left the scene to search for someone matching Angiulli’s description. He

suspected Sample, with whom he had prior encounters, because of Sample’s “very distinctive

eyes,” his build, and the direction of the man’s escape. The officer asked dispatch to send

Sample’s photograph to the officer’s cell phone, and he returned to the scene 15 minutes later.1

The officer showed Angiulli a booking photo of Sample on his phone and said, “I have a picture

of somebody that I was thinking about, but I don’t know if—you said you just saw their eyes.”

After seeing the photo, Angiulli immediately said, “Yep.” The officer clarified, “That’s him?”

and Angiulli repeated, “Yep.” The officer then asked again, “But you think that’s definitely

him?” Angiulli replied, “Yeah—those big brown eyes, yep . . . he’s light-complected like that.”

“Yeah, kind of like pale-ish?” the officer asked, and Angiulli replied, “Yeah. Yep.” The officer

        1
            The length of time is calculated based on the body-worn camera time stamps.

                                                    2
collected the gun and the magazine left behind at the scene as well as buccal swabs from

Angiulli and his son. Sample was charged with attempted robbery and subsequently arrested.

       Sample filed a motion to suppress all evidence of any pretrial identification and any

subsequent in-court identification. Sample argued that the manner in which the officer showed

Angiulli his photograph was impermissibly suggestive, rendering the identification unreliable in

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

       At the suppression hearing, Angiulli testified that even though it was nighttime, and a

streetlight was out of service, the warehouse LED lights sufficiently illuminated the area where

the incident occurred. He testified he was “looking back and forth” between the man and the gun

and repeating to himself, “Remember him. Remember the gun.” Angiulli also testified that the

man who attempted to rob him wore dark clothing and a dark bandana. He recalled describing

the man to the officer as “Caucasian with very dark eyes and eyebrows,” “lighter skinned,” and

of “thin build, about 150 to 170 pounds . . . wearing a black hoodie, a black hat, black skinny

jeans and Van[s]-looking shoes, like white soles and black tops.” Angiulli reiterated he noticed

the man “had real dark, sunken eyes; real dark eyebrows with distinct marks on them . . . and

almost black pupils.” Angiulli declared he had no question when he saw the photograph of

Sample that he was the man who attempted to rob him. Angiulli then identified Sample in court.

Angiulli stated he “will never forget those eyes directly above the barrel of the weapon.”

Angiulli also identified the gun and the magazine as the ones Sample used that night.

       On cross examination, Angiulli stated he owned several guns and during the robbery he

was able to determine within a few seconds that Sample was using a BB gun. He came to this

conclusion based on the opening of the barrel in comparison to the size of the gun. Angiulli

clarified that the man was in front of him for five to ten seconds before Angiulli wrestled him to

                                                 3
the ground. Angiulli asserted he had no doubt in his mind that if Sample did not look like the

person who robbed him, he would speak up.

        The officer then testified about the encounter. The officer stated that after Angiulli gave

him the description of the assailant and the direction in which the man ran, he thought of Sample

due to previous encounters with him. On cross examination, the officer testified he relied on the

exigency of the circumstances as a justification for the single photo showup. Based on his

training, he explained that a single photo showup is permitted when the victim of a crime gives a

“vivid description” of the suspect and can identify the suspect within a reasonable amount of

time.

        The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that the photographic identification

was not unduly suggestive. It observed that Angiulli “was able to focus” and within “a matter of

seconds” determined that the gun pointed at him was a BB gun. Angiulli saw “something about

the assailant’s eyes that were very distinctive.” When commenting on the body-worn camera

footage, the trial court noted that its “understanding of the evidence is that the assailant was

facing the lights and facing the garage opening.” The trial court also stressed that Angiulli

immediately identified Sample upon seeing his photograph. The case proceeded to a bench trial,

and the trial court incorporated the transcript from the suppression hearing as part of the record.

        At trial, the Commonwealth called two expert witnesses in addition to the incorporated

evidence. A forensic scientist specializing in DNA analysis, Dr. Thonensen, testified that

Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA mixture profile found on the

receiver of the BB gun, while both Angiulli and his son were eliminated. Dr. Greenspoon, a

forensic molecular biologist specializing in DNA analysis and statistics conducted probabilistic

modeling. Dr. Greenspoon testified Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA

                                                  4
mixture profile obtained from the gun’s trigger and grip area. Dr. Greenspoon elaborated that a

match between the swab of the trigger and the grip area of the BB gun and Sample is two trillion

times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated African American person, 39

billion times more probable than a coincidental match to a Caucasian person, and 35 billion

times more probable than a coincidental match to an unrelated Hispanic person.

       The Commonwealth then rested, and Sample moved to strike the Commonwealth’s

evidence, arguing that Angiulli’s identification was unreliable, and the DNA evidence could

have been a result of secondary transfer. The trial court denied the motion to strike, and the

renewed motion to strike after Sample presented no evidence. The trial court ultimately found

Sample guilty of attempted robbery. It also found that Angiulli’s description of Sample as

“Caucasian” was not unreasonable considering Sample is “light-skinned” and was wearing dark

clothes during the incident. Lastly, the trial court noted that Sample could not be eliminated as a

contributor of the DNA mixture found on the gun and there was no evidence of secondary

transfer. Sample appealed his conviction.

       In a divided decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by

unpublished opinion. Sample v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0161-21-1, 2022 Va. App. LEXIS

265, at *17-18 (Va. Ct. App. June 28, 2022). The Court of Appeals, relying on the factors set out

in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972), found that the factors weighed in favor of finding

Angiulli’s out-of-court identification reliable. Sample, 2022 Va. App. LEXIS 265, at *11-12.

The court also found the evidence sufficient to convict Sample based on the DNA found on the

gun and Angiulli’s out-of-court and in-court identifications. Id. at *15-16. The dissent

“[w]eigh[ed] the Biggers factors against the corrupting influence of the officer’s suggestive

identification procedure, [and] concluded that the officer’s unduly suggestive identification

                                                 5
procedure created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at *23. Sample

timely noted his appeal to this Court.

                                           ANALYSIS

                                I. OUT OF COURT IDENTIFICATION

       “When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court considers

the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and will accord the

Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible from that evidence.”

Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 279 (2012). The appellant “has the burden of showing

that even when the evidence is reviewed in that light, denying the motion to suppress was

reversible error.” Id. While “[w]e give deference to the factual findings of the trial court,”

Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517, 522 (2010), “[w]e review de novo the trial court’s

application of the law to the particular facts of the case.” Branham, 283 Va. at 279.

                             A. Suggestiveness of the Photo Showup

       Viewing the evidence in this light, we turn to whether the single photo showup violated

Sample’s due process rights. Sample contends that the trial court should have suppressed

Angiulli’s out-of-court identification and prohibited future in-court identifications because the

single photo showup, combined with the officer’s comments, was unduly suggestive and created

a likelihood of misidentification. Sample argues that the officer’s comment, “I have a picture of

someone that I was thinking about” was suggestive in nature and led Angiulli to believe the

officer knew Sample was the man who attempted to rob Angiulli. We disagree.

       When analyzing the constitutionality of an out-of-court identification, we must first

determine whether the procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.

“[D]ue process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an identification

                                                 6
procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228,

238-39 (2012) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107 (1977) and Biggers, 409 U.S. at

198)) (emphasis added). Because Sample’s argument focuses solely on the suggestiveness of the

procedure, we need not address whether it was unnecessary. While single photo showups

generally should be viewed with suspicion, we must consider the specific facts in the case before

us to determine whether the single photo showup was unduly suggestive. See, e.g., Drewry v.

Commonwealth, 213 Va. 186, 190 (1972). “It is not enough that the procedure ‘may have in

some respects fallen short of the ideal.’” Sexton v. Beaudreaux, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 2555,

2559 (2018) (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385-86 (1968)). An identification

procedure becomes impermissibly suggestive only when it rises to a level of suggestiveness that

undermines the identification’s reliability. Id.

       An identification procedure may be impermissibly suggestive when an officer’s

comments indicate law enforcement has “other evidence that one of the persons pictured

committed the crime.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383. The

procedure may also be prohibitively suggestive when it makes the identification “virtually

inevitable.” See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). The Supreme Court of the

United States addressed “virtually inevitable” identifications in Foster and found an

identification virtually inevitable when the defendant was the only subject to appear repeatedly

in different lineups. Id. The Court held that this procedure equated to law enforcement

effectively telling the witness, “This is the man.” Id.

       However, a comment indicating that a law enforcement officer believes the assailant is in

one of the pictures does not make the identification virtually inevitable and thus impermissibly

suggestive. Drewry, 213 Va. at 190. In Drewry, during a photographic lineup, the officer

                                                   7
expressed his belief that “the assailant was among those pictured.” Id. Holding that the

procedure was not impermissibly suggestive, this Court reasoned that the necessary and

unavoidable implication of showing a witness photographs of possible assailants is that law

enforcement believe the “guilty party” might be in one of them. Id.

       Here, the officer’s comment was not suggestive and was, in fact, more equivocal than the

belief expressed in Drewry that the assailant was among those pictured. Here, the officer

commented, “I have a picture of somebody that I was thinking about, but I don’t know if—you

said you just saw their eyes.” The comment was merely an expression of what a photographic

identification unavoidably implies–that the officer believed the assailant might be pictured–not

that “this is the man” who did it. Unlike the practice criticized in Simmons, the officer in this

case did not suggest to Angiulli that there was some other evidence establishing Sample as the

culprit. The officer’s comment acknowledged that he was unsure about his suspicion of Sample

and had only provided the photograph of Sample because the officer believed Sample roughly

matched the description given by Angiulli.

       In sum, the officer’s comments did not create circumstances which induced Angiulli to

inevitably identify Sample. The officer’s comments here cannot be said to be impermissibly

suggestive and were “at most, harmless in [their] effect.” See Drewry, 213 Va. at 190. We agree

with the trial court that the single photo showup of Sample, including the officer’s comment, “I

have a picture of somebody that I was thinking about,” did not run afoul of Sample’s due process

protections and that the out-of-court identification was constitutionally reliable.

       Accordingly, due process does not require any further finding of the identification’s

reliability because it was not procured by impermissibly suggestive methods. Walker v.

Commonwealth, 302 Va. __, __ (2023) (citing Perry, 565 U.S. at 248). Even still, while an

                                                  8
identification procedure may be arguably suggestive, it still does not inevitably result in its

suppression without further consideration. Perry, 565 U.S. at 239. An out-of-court

identification procured through an impermissibly suggestive procedure is constitutionally

acceptable so long as it is reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Biggers, 409 U.S. at

199. “Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of [an] identification.”

Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. To determine the identification’s reliability, due process requires

courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the “procedure was so impermissibly

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”

Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199.

                                        B. Biggers Factors 2

       The Supreme Court of the United States has identified five factors in evaluating the

likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the

time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior

description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the

confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409

U.S. at 199. At oral argument and in his brief, Sample conceded factors four and five weigh in

favor of finding Angiulli’s identification reliable. Oral Argument Audio 02:08 to 02:19

(November 1, 2023). We find that under the totality of the circumstances, all five factors weigh

in favor of the reliability determination.

       2
          While we do not find the identification procedure used in this case was impermissibly
suggestive, we still review the Biggers factors here to emphasize that, even had we found a
constitutional problem with the process used, the identification was nonetheless constitutionally
sound.

                                                  9
            1. Opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime.

        The record demonstrates that Angiulli had an adequate opportunity to view his assailant.

Sample argues that the encounter was very brief and occurred at night with no streetlights. This

Court analyzed the first factor in Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 248-49 (1992). There,

this Court found that the victim had a sufficient opportunity to view her assailant when she saw

him on a bike path 30 and 50 feet away, and then made eye contact with him while passing each

other less than two feet apart at nighttime. Id.

        Here, the man who attempted to rob Angiulli first stood 15 to 20 feet away from him and

then approached Angiulli while pointing the gun in his face. Angiulli testified that he faced the

man for about five to ten seconds at arm’s length before he decided to wrestle him to the ground,

affording himself enough opportunity to look at the man’s eyes. As seen on footage from the

body worn camera, the warehouse’s garage door was open and interior LED lights illuminated

the area of the incident. A streetlight diagonal to the warehouse was also lit. We give deference

to the trial court’s finding of fact that the area was well lit and bright enough for Angiulli to

observe the man clearly. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of finding Angiulli’s identification

reliable.

                                      2. Witness’ degree of attention.

        The record reflects that Angiulli paid close attention to the assailant throughout the

attempted robbery. When addressing this factor, the Supreme Court in Biggers found that the

witness was a victim of a prolonged rape where she spent a “considerable period of time” with

her assailant. 409 U.S. at 200-01. The Court reasoned that she was not a “casual observer,”

given that her description of the assailant was “more than ordinarily thorough,” and weighed this

factor in favor of reliability. Id.

                                                    10
        Here, despite the gravity of having a gun pointed at him, Angiulli paid enough attention

to recognize the weapon as a BB gun and remembered the distinctive eyes of the man attempting

to rob him. While under stress, Angiulli managed to repeatedly tell himself, “Remember the

man. Remember the gun.” He testified that he was concentrating on the man and the gun so

attentively that he noticed the barrel’s disproportionately small circumference relative to the size

of the gun and within seconds determined that it was a BB gun. He was also able to notice the

man’s distinctive eyes and confidently stated that he would never forget them. Lastly, Angiulli

described the man’s clothing in great detail, and estimated his height, weight, and age. It is clear

that Angiulli’s attention to both the gun and Sample’s appearance was “more than ordinarily

thorough” and that he was not merely a casual observer in this situation. Thus, this factor weighs

in favor of finding reliability.

                           3. Accuracy of the witness’ prior description.

        The record shows Angiulli provided a detailed and accurate description of Sample to the

officer. This Court examined this factor in McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 233 (1984),

and found that a description consisting of clothing and shoes that matched the defendant was

sufficient for this factor to weigh in favor of reliability. Sample argues that Angiulli’s

description was inconsistent with Sample’s “physical characteristics” because Angiulli described

him as Caucasian while Sample is of mixed race. We are unpersuaded.

        Deference is given to the trial court’s observations, and it was not unreasonable, on these

facts, for Angiulli to describe Sample as Caucasian. Angiulli also estimated the man to be about

5’10” tall, 150 to 160 pounds and emphasized the man’s big brown eyes, brown hair, and how

pale he looked. This estimated height, weight, and age all matched Sample’s features. Angiulli

repeated this comprehensive description multiple times throughout his conversation with the

                                                 11
officer. The description never changed and remained the same during the suppression hearing.

We find that this factor weighs in favor of finding the identification reliable.

              4. Level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation.

        Angiulli testified he was certain the man in the photograph was the same man who

attempted to rob him, and the record amply demonstrates this certainty. Compare Delong v.

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 357, 367 (1987) (finding identification reliable because “[t]he level of

certainty [the witness] demonstrated at the time of confrontation leaves no doubt that she was

utterly convinced . . . when . . . her exclamation was, ‘My God, that's the car, and My God, that's

him.’”), with Curtis v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 28, 32 (1990) (finding identification not

reliable because of “[t]he victim’s inability to identify the appellant when first presented with his

photograph” and the court’s inability to verify the accuracy of the description).

        When Angiulli pointed the officer in the direction the man ran, the officer described a

person of mixed race living there. Instead of subscribing to that idea, Angiulli pushed back and

confidently told the officer, the man “did not look mixed” to him. However, when the officer

showed Sample’s photograph to Angiulli less than an hour after the incident, Angiulli

immediately said “Yep,” and confirmed it was the man who tried to rob him. Even upon

questioning by the officer, Angiulli expressed no doubt when identifying Sample as his assailant.

Angiulli confidently repeated three times that Sample, the person in the photograph, was the man

who tried to rob him, despite how adamant he was before viewing the photograph that the man

did not appear to him to be of mixed race. Therefore, we agree with Sample’s concession that

this factor weighs in favor of reliability.

                                                 12
                   5. Length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

       This factor is also conceded by Sample and our own review is consistent with Sample’s

concession. The time that elapsed between the attempted robbery and the identification was

between 45 minutes to an hour. Based upon the facts of this case, the certainty of the victim’s

identification, and all of the other facts and circumstances described herein, the length of time

between the crime and the confrontation is a nominal consideration, and, under any

circumstances, weighs in favor of concluding that the identification was reliable.

       Whether our analysis centers upon the likelihood of misidentification and impermissible

suggestiveness or the Biggers factors, the result is the same: the victim’s identification of Sample

was constitutionally valid and not violative of his due process rights and protections.

                                 II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       Sample also assigned error to the trial court’s denial of his motion to strike based upon

the sufficiency of the evidence. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he

judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly

wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)

(alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such

cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration

in original) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant

question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016)

(quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). Additionally, in evaluating the

sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing

                                                  13
party below, the Commonwealth, and grant it the benefit of all fairly deducible inferences.”

Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 609 (2004).

       Sample argues in his second assignment of error that Angiulli’s identification and the

DNA evidence were insufficient to find Sample guilty of attempted robbery beyond a reasonable

doubt. He contends that even if the trial court properly denied his motion to suppress, it should

have nonetheless found Angiulli’s identification at trial not reliable beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Preliminarily, we note that an identification analysis does not address the sufficiency of

the evidence. Rather, that analysis focuses upon due process considerations. Certainly, if there

are no due process concerns, the trier of fact may consider the evidence, but that is a very

different thing than evaluating the identification within a sufficiency matrix. Motions to strike,

on the other hand, “deal with the sufficiency rather than the admissibility of evidence.”

Woodson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288 (1970). Moving to the sufficiency of the evidence

analysis, this Court gives deference to the trier of fact’s finding of witnesses’ credibility and

“will not seek to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses where their evidence is not inherently

incredible.” See Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 486 (2018). Because Angiulli’s

identifications did not present due process concerns and were admissible into evidence at trial,

we give deference to the trial court’s finding that both identifications were credible and cannot

say that no rational trier of fact could find them credible.

       Additionally, Sample asserts that the existence of other contributors for the DNA found

on the gun and the possibility of secondary transfer are consistent with Sample’s theory of

innocence. At trial, the factfinder “determines which reasonable inferences should be drawn

from the evidence, and whether to reject as unreasonable the hypotheses of innocence advanced

by a defendant.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 464 (2017). However, the question is

                                                  14
not whether there is some evidence to support the accused’s hypotheses of innocence, but rather

“whether a reasonable [factfinder], upon consideration of all the evidence, could have rejected

[the accused’s] theories.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003). While the

Commonwealth must prove that the accused committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it

has to do so by excluding every reasonable hypothesis of innocence flowing “‘from the evidence

itself, and not from the imagination of defendant’s counsel.’” Tyler v. Commonwealth, 254 Va.

162, 166 (1997) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 148 (1977)).

       Here, the trial court considered and rejected the DNA secondary transfer theory because

Sample did not present any evidence that would support it. Indeed, the record is devoid of any

evidence that would explain how Sample’s DNA could be found on the BB gun through means

other than Sample himself. In contrast, the trial court heard the testimony of two forensic

scientists asserting that Sample could not be eliminated as a contributor to the DNA mixture

profile found in three places: on the receiver, trigger, and grip area of the BB gun. The trial court

found this expert testimony credible. In addition to the DNA evidence and the eye-witness

identifications, Sample lived in the path of the assailant’s flight. Therefore, viewing the totality

of this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we cannot say that no rational

trier of fact could have found Sample guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We find the evidence

was sufficient to sustain Sample’s conviction.

                                          CONCLUSION

       Because the trial court did not err by denying Sample’s motion to suppress Angiulli’s

identification of Sample arising from a single photo showup or in denying his motion to strike

the evidence for a lack of evidentiary sufficiency, we affirm Sample’s conviction for attempted

robbery.

                                                 15
     Affirmed.

16