Court Opinion

ID: 9598458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:09:08.446725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:23.581090
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the holding that the judgment cannot stand, but I do not agree with all that is written.
1. First, the order denying defendant’s motion to recuse the trial judge was entered on March 3, 1995, after the defendant had filed a notice of the filing of his bankruptcy petition on March 2, and before the automatic stay was lifted on April 20. Thus the court did not have authority to enter the order when it did. 11 USC § 362 (a); Breeze v. Columbus Bank &c. Co., 214 Ga. App. 534 (448 SE2d 276) (1994). No reversible error occurred on this point, however, because there is no indication, and the parties do not suggest, that the court would have ruled otherwise after April 20.
2. Although the notice of appeal states only that it is from the order of June 30, 1995, granting default judgment as to liability and striking defendant Butler’s pleadings, the enumeration of error which challenges the earlier order of March 3 denying Butler’s motion to recuse is properly before us. OCGA § 5-6-34 (d). Direct appeal of this default judgment, which leaves pending the issue of the amount of damages, is permitted because the trial court invoked the finality provision of OCGA § 9-11-54 (b). Determination of finality under this latter section satisfies the finality requirement of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1). Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, 149 Ga. App. 284 (254 SE2d 401) (1979), aff’d Clarkson Power Flow v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300 (260 SE2d 9) (1979). Thus we have jurisdiction of this direct appeal, which is in a sense interlocutory.
3. Butler had filed the motion to recuse pro se on February 20. With its 13 exhibits, it constitutes 100 pages of the record. Defendant Butler’s affidavit is detailed, in eight pages. The contents of the motion, its timing, the proceeding for its disposition and the procedure for the case thereafter, are governed by USCR 25.
The time requirements for such a motion, set out in USCR 25.1, were not expressly ruled on by the court when it denied the motion on March 3. Thus it is assumed that the court determined the motion was timely. See USCR 25.3. Timeliness was not made an issue.
The court did rule, however, that the affidavit failed to meet the content requirements of USCR 25.2, in that it was “legally insufficient to warrant recusal.” This was based on its finding that defendant’s “allegations of a secret ‘oral order’ and withheld orders are *92merely conclusions and suppositions, not facts.” That is the question before us, because USCR 25.2 warns that “Allegations consisting of bare conclusions and opinions shall not be legally sufficient to support the motion or warrant further proceedings.” The uniform rule is very specific about what such a serious affidavit must contain, because it accuses the trial judge of personal bias or prejudice such as would “impede or prevent impartiality” in the action.
In his affidavit, defendant recites a number of instances of rulings which, in his view, “evidence a lack of impartiality,” but these were not subjected to the test in the ruling made by the trial court, and we do not review their sufficiency here. Whether they constitute merely complaints about adverse legal rulings which are within the court’s authority, as they seem to do or, on the other hand, are evidence of lack of impartiality, is a question to be addressed on remand. The affidavit must show facts which indicate “the judge’s personal (rather than judicial) bias.” Stevens v. Morris Communications Corp., 170 Ga. App. 612, 613 (317 SE2d 652) (1984). It cites United States v. Bray, 546 F2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976), as applicable because the Supreme Court had adopted the federal rule on motions to recuse in State v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700, 702 (1) (267 SE2d 207) (1980).
The federal rule, as construed in federal cases, has been institutionalized in Georgia with some modification in USCR 25. The essence is the same. Thus, “[t]o warrant disqualification of a trial judge the affidavit supporting the recusal motion ‘must give fair support to the charge of a bent of mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.’ Berger v. United States, 255 U. S. 22, 33-34 (41 SC 230, 65 LE 481) (1921).” Jones v. State, 247 Ga. 268, 271 (4) (275 SE2d 67) (1981). Although Jones preceded the adoption of the uniform rules, the test it took from the United States Supreme Court is in concert with the more explicit requirement of the Georgia recusal rule.
Affiant claims that the court’s ruling that his motion for partial summary judgment was too late in that all such motions were to be filed by October 30, 1994, indicates bias and prejudice because there was no order setting that deadline. The court did not state there was such an order, and indeed, there is none in the record. It was apparently plaintiffs’ counsel who erroneously represented that such an order existed. Instead, the court’s basis for denying the summary judgment motion because it was late, and its not reaching the merits, was that at the status conference the previous June (1994), “it was agreed by all parties that the anticipated Motion for Summary Judgment would be filed by October 30, 1994.” At the time of its ruling, the court did not have the letter of counsel who represented Butler at that pretrial conference, with respect to his recollection of what tran*93spired at that unrecorded conference some eight months earlier. Counsel's letter was filed shortly thereafter and said that October 30 was given as an estimate by the parties when the court asked for target dates for filing motions. He also recollected that the court had said it would not “ ‘hold our feet to the fire.’ ”
The court did have this letter (unsworn presumably because the former counsel submitted it as an officer of the court) when it ruled on defendant’s motion for recusal; in fact, a copy of it was also an exhibit submitted by defendant with his motion to recuse. It is evident that the court’s recollection differed. And in the order denying the motion to recuse for lack of legal sufficiency of defendant Butler’s affidavit, the court responded to his allegations of a secret oral order regarding the deadline for summary judgment motions by stating that “[i]n fact, there was ‘no extra-judicial, ex-parte communication between the Court and [plaintiffs’ attorney] nor is there any evidence to support this supposition by Mr. Butler.”
The problem is that this response constitutes evidence, not a legal ruling on whether defendant’s assertions consisted of fact and reasons for the belief of bias or prejudice or merely bare conclusions and opinions, as called for by USCR 25.2. “ ^Neither the truth of the [movant’s] allegations nor the good faith of the pleader may be questioned, regardless of the judge’s personal knowledge to the contrary. [Cits.] The test is whether, assuming the truth of the facts alleged, a reasonable person would conclude that a personal as distinguished from a judicial bias exists. [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Fleming, supra. The rule now expressly provides that the duty of the trial judge, when presented with a motion to recuse, is to simply “make a determination, assuming any of the facts alleged in the affidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted.” USCR 25.3. If so, then another judge “shall be assigned to hear the motion to recuse. The allegations of the motion shall stand denied automatically. The trial judge shall not otherwise oppose the motion.” Ibid. Nor may he “pass upon the truth of [the affidavit’s] statements.” Fleming, supra at 702.
The movant stated that he believed there was a “secret” or ex-parte oral order because there was no written order in the record setting the deadline for summary judgment motions at October 30, and the recollection of his attorney at the time of the status conference in June is that no such oral order or requirement or agreement had been made. Yet the court had refused to consider the merits of his summary judgment motion because it was filed after October 30, a date the court stated in its denial order “was agreed by all parties” at the status conference so that the summary judgment motion was not subject to the court’s November 8 order setting January 23, 1995, as the deadline for motions. Whether the judge or the defendant is mis*94taken about the results of the June status conference, and whether, if the judge is mistaken, his refusal to consider the summary judgment motion constitutes personal bias or prejudice either alone, or together with other facts alleged in the affidavit so as to constitute “a systematic pattern of prejudicial conduct” as contemplated by USCR 25.2, is for the factfinder to determine. USCR 25.6.
Decided June 7, 1996
Reconsideration denied July 5, 1996.
Jones, Copeland, Lefkowitz & Greer, Taylor W. Jones, Rebecca A. Copeland, for appellant.
Nall, Miller, Owens, Hocutt & Howard, Robert L. Goldstucker, Kelly E. Malone, for appellees.
Impartiality of the judge is the bedrock of fairness in our judicial system. Where it might reasonably be questioned, the judge should disqualify or be recused. Houston v. Cavanagh, 199 Ga. App. 387, 388 (405 SE2d 105) (1991). Even the appearance of the lack of impartiality, if based on a reasonable belief supported by fact, mandates that another judge try the case. USCR 25 implements the high standard of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and must be scrupulously adhered to.
Of course, it should not be lightly required, as it disrupts the administration of justice without cause. It is as much the duty of a judge not to grant the motion to recuse as it is to recuse when the motion is meritorious, a “well-settled rule” as noted in Fleming, supra at 702. The judge in this case has dealt with it for nearly three years, shepherding it in an orderly fashion to trial, which he set for the end of January 1995 and March at the latest, and exhibiting enormous patience with numerous discovery motions on both sides: motions to compel, motions for protective orders, motions for sanctions, all exhibiting unseemly and unprofessional rancor between and among the parties and counsel. It is past time for the case to be concluded.
The judgment granting default and striking defendant’s pleadings must be vacated, the order on the recusal motion must be vacated, and the case must be remanded with direction that another judge be assigned to rule on the recusal motion.