Court Opinion

ID: 9412088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 20:03:59.301413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.226283
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 Alford v. County of Los Angeles CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION EIGHT

JAY ALFORD,                                                       B317180

     Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. VS028361)
          v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

     Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.

          Jay Alford, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

     Peterson, Bradford, Burkwitz, Gregorio, Burkwitz & Su
and Avi Burkwitz for Defendant and Respondent.

                               __________________________
                               SUMMARY
       Plaintiff Jay Alford filed a grievance after the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (county or
department) placed his name on the Child Abuse Central Index.
After a grievance hearing, the county decided no modification
should be made to the previously substantiated allegations of
child abuse by plaintiff, resulting in his name remaining on the
Child Abuse Central Index.
       Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1094.5, seeking to overturn the decision
to keep his name on the Child Abuse Central Index. The trial
court initially granted summary judgment for the county on the
ground the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. We
found the statute of limitations did not bar the petition and
reversed the judgment. (Alford v. County of Los Angeles (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 742.) When the case returned to the trial court,
the court again denied plaintiff’s petition.
       We affirm the judgment.
                                 FACTS
       Plaintiff and his former wife, who have an acrimonious
relationship, shared custody of their 15-year-old son, J.A., who
lived with plaintiff most of the time.
       On March 18, 2014, J.A. called his mother, asking her to
pick him up immediately because of plaintiff’s physical abuse the
previous day. J.A. and his mother went to the Norwalk station of
the county sheriff’s department. J.A. reported that plaintiff had
gotten upset because J.A. had failed a test. J.A. told the deputy
that plaintiff blindfolded him, punched him, kicked him and
choked him. He said he fell to the floor and pleaded with
plaintiff, “Just don’t kill me Dad.” When plaintiff left the
residence on March 18, J.A. took the opportunity to flee and call
his mother. The incident report states the reporting officer

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(Deputy Redondo) observed bruising on J.A.’s chest, upper back
and forearms, and the officer photographed the injuries.
       Officers went to plaintiff’s home, but he was not there.
Plaintiff was arrested and booked when he went to the Norwalk
station a few hours later to report his son was missing. Plaintiff
refused to make any statements regarding his son.
       On March 24, 2014, the department received a report on
the incident from Deputy Redondo, alleging general neglect and
physical abuse of J.A. by plaintiff.
       J.A. sought a temporary restraining order, and the court
held a hearing on April 11, 2014. J.A.’s mother had also
requested orders in the parents’ dissolution action, with a
hearing scheduled for June 13, 2014. At the April 11 hearing, the
court found the issues to be primarily about visitation and
custody, and on its own motion reset the June 13 hearing for
April 29, 2014. The court granted plaintiff visitation on the
weekend of April 18, ordering no physical discipline of J.A.
Mother did not comply with the order. A safety plan the
department finalized that same day (April 11) provided J.A. was
to live with his mother and have no contact with plaintiff until
the department’s investigation was completed.
       On April 30, 2014, J.A. signed a declaration describing the
physical abuse and the related circumstances. His adult sister
wrote an undated letter to support a permanent restraining order
for J.A. against plaintiff, stating she too had experienced physical
abuse inflicted by plaintiff.
       On May 21, 2014, after a hearing, the superior court issued
a restraining order preventing plaintiff from contacting J.A. and
requiring him to stay at least 100 yards away from J.A. for the
next two years.
       Meanwhile, on March 28, 2014, child social worker (CSW)
Callistus Amajoyi began an investigation for the department.

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Among other things, he interviewed plaintiff (who stated J.A.’s
mother was fabricating the allegations to get custody); mother;
and J.A.’s adult sister (who told him plaintiff had anger problems
and physically abused her for years until she moved in with her
mother). On May 21, 2014, the department concluded the
allegations of general neglect, physical abuse and emotional
abuse were substantiated.
      Plaintiff does not dispute that his son went to the police
station and made the statements to the police. Plaintiff also does
not dispute that “[J.A.] had some scratches on him.” His position
is that J.A. lied to the police “because of the mother” and lied to
the social worker.
      The district attorney did not file criminal charges against
plaintiff. The record does not reflect when that decision was
made.
      On June 19, 2014, plaintiff requested a grievance hearing,
seeking review of the submission of his name to the Child Abuse
Central Index, contending the alleged abuse did not occur.
      On July 3, 2014, the department told plaintiff his request
could not be processed because the matter “is being adjudicated
in Criminal Court,” but if the matter were dismissed by the court,
plaintiff could then request a hearing. (A hearing “shall be
denied when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined
that suspected child abuse or neglect has occurred, or when the
allegation of child abuse or neglect resulting in the referral to the
[Child Abuse Central Index] is pending before the court.” (Pen.
Code, § 11169, subd. (e).))
      Several months later, on November 13, 2014, plaintiff
raised the department’s denial of a hearing again in a phone
conversation with Michael Watrobski, the author of the July 3,
2014 denial letter. This was followed by correspondence in
December 2014 between plaintiff and various supervisory

                                  4
personnel. The department told plaintiff that he should provide
proof that the criminal charges were dropped, not filed or
dismissed, upon receipt of which a grievance hearing would be
held. Finally, in January 2015, the department secured
information that the district attorney would not be filing a
criminal charge.
       The grievance hearing occurred on August 25, 2015.
Numerous exhibits offered by the parties were entered into
evidence without objection, including Mr. Amajoyi’s investigative
narrative; the sheriff’s incident report; affidavits from J.A., his
mother and plaintiff; the restraining order; and other documents
offered by plaintiff, all listed in the grievance officer’s decision.
       Mr. Amajoyi, the social worker who conducted the
investigation and prepared the investigative report, did not
appear at the hearing. (The Child Abuse Central Index grievance
procedures in the record state that “[t]he county employee(s) who
conducted the investigation that is the subject of the grievance
hearing shall be present at the hearing if that person is employed
by the county and is available to participate in the grievance
hearing.” Instead, supervising CSW Veronica Jimenez testified
about Mr. Amajoyi’s report. The record does not reflect why
Mr. Amajoyi was unavailable. (Plaintiff asserts his
unavailability “was the action of the Department when they
terminated his employment.”))
       At the hearing, plaintiff complained about his inability to
question Mr. Amajoyi about inconsistencies in his report. These
inconsistencies included statements about whether Mr. Amajoyi’s
visits to J.A.’s mother’s home were announced or unannounced;
plaintiff’s assertion that Mr. Amajoyi stated he came to plaintiff’s
home, while plaintiff said he did not; Mr. Amajoyi’s statement
that J.A.’s mother gave him a copy of a restraining order filed in
court on March 19, 2014 (when no order had yet been issued),

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and the like. The grievance officer told plaintiff that both she
and the witness (Veronica Jimenez) agreed, “there are
inconsistencies. We cannot say that what happened happened
because he’s [Mr. Amajoyi’s] not here. We’re gonna give you all of
that, absolutely.”
       On October 2, 2015, the grievance review officer issued her
decision, recommending “that there be no modification of the
original substantiated allegations of physical and emotional
abuse.” The director of the department adopted the decision on
October 9, 2015.
       On February 17, 2016, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
administrative mandamus to compel the county to set aside its
decision. As explained at the outset, after we held that the
statute of limitations did not bar the claim, the trial court denied
plaintiff’s petition on the merits.
       Judgment was entered denying plaintiff’s petition on
October 21, 2021. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     The Legal Principles
       In a case involving the validity of an administrative
decision, “[t]he inquiry . . . shall extend to the questions whether
the [county] has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction;
whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is established
if the [county] has not proceeded in the manner required by law,
the order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the
findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5, subd. (b).) “Where it is claimed that the findings are
not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is
authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on
the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court

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determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of
the evidence. . . .” (Id., subd. (c).)
       The parties do not dispute that in its review of the county’s
findings, the trial court was required to exercise its independent
judgment on the evidence. In doing so, the trial court “must
afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the
administrative findings, and the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court
that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)
We review the trial court’s determination using the substantial
evidence test. (Id. at p. 824.)
2.     This Case
       Plaintiff offers several arguments on appeal from the
judgment denying his petition. None has merit.
       a.     The “excess of jurisdiction” claim
       Plaintiff’s first contention is that the county acted in excess
of jurisdiction because it did not provide a grievance hearing
within 60 days of his initial request on June 19, 2014, as provided
under the county’s policies. We disagree.
       As we have already observed, a hearing must be denied if
an allegation of child abuse is pending before a court. (Pen. Code,
§ 11169, subd. (e).) The question whether a criminal case was
pending was not resolved until January 2015. Moreover, even if
that delay were the county’s responsibility, plaintiff did in fact
receive a grievance hearing on August 25, 2015. (Plaintiff waived
the time limits for that hearing.) And, as the trial court stated,
plaintiff has not identified any prejudice to him resulting from
the failure to hold the grievance hearing earlier.

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       Plaintiff also contends the denial of his initial request for a
hearing deprived him of a fair trial, causing his “inability to
cross[-]examine and rebut the evidence.” For the reasons just
discussed (and further discussed, post), this claim fails as well.
       b.    The bias claim
       Plaintiff next contends the grievance officer was biased
because her “boss” was Mr. Watrobski, who denied plaintiff’s
June 19, 2014 request for a grievance hearing. (When plaintiff
questioned the grievance officer about the denial of his initial
request for a hearing, the officer stated, “I’m thinking my boss
probably looked at this, saw there was something pending, and
asked you to provide some kind of evidence that said it wasn’t
pending.”) The trial court found “there has been no sufficient
argument or evidence presented to indicate that [the grievance
officer] was biased again [plaintiff] in any way.” Our review of
the record confirms that assessment.
       c.    The claim of denial of a fair trial
       Plaintiff contends he was denied a fair trial because he
could not confront and cross-examine the social worker,
Mr. Amajoyi, about the discrepancies in his investigative report.
The trial court agreed there were “many unexplained
discrepancies and inconsistencies contained throughout the
investigative record,” but found those inconsistencies “do not
warrant a reversal of the County’s decision. The weight of the
evidence supports the conclusion that [plaintiff] committed the
actions addressed in [Penal Code provisions on child abuse and
corporal punishment] against [J.A.]. Importantly, [J.A.] made
multiple separate statements to different people stating that he
was physically and emotionally abused by [plaintiff].” The court
also cited the letter from plaintiff’s adult daughter (in connection

                                  8
with the restraining order) “corroborating [J.A.’s] depiction of
physical and emotional abuse in [plaintiff’s] home.”
       The trial court also pointed out, as to the fair trial issue,
that at the grievance hearing, all of plaintiff’s evidentiary
documents were considered; plaintiff testified; and he proffered
testimony from his sister, his longtime roommate, and his
fiancée. The trial court further found that Mr. Amajoyi’s
investigative narrative was entered into evidence at the
grievance hearing without objection, so that the county’s decision
relied on admissible evidence notwithstanding Mr. Amajoyi’s
inability to appear.
       We agree with the trial court’s conclusion plaintiff received
a fair trial despite his inability to cross-examine Mr. Amajoyi
about the discrepancies in his report. The discrepancies or
inconsistencies are not relevant to the point at issue: whether
plaintiff committed the abuse that J.A. reported to his mother, to
Mr. Amajoyi, to another social worker in Riverside County, and
to Deputy Redondo. Plaintiff contends J.A. is lying, but he offers
no explanation for the bruises observed and photographed by the
deputy at the sheriff’s station. As the grievance officer stated,
“When asked how [J.A.] could have suffered those injuries,
[plaintiff] stated that he did not know.”
       Plaintiff challenges the trial court’s statement that there
was no showing the grievance officer refused to admit any of
plaintiff’s documents into evidence. He claims he did make a
showing, and that 10 pages of one of his exhibits is not in the
administrative record. Plaintiff does not identify the contents of
those pages or make any argument about their relevance, so this
claim fails.

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       In a related argument, plaintiff contends Mr. Amajoyi’s
report should not have been admitted in evidence because it is
hearsay and, without cross-examination, was inherently
unreliable. As stated earlier, plaintiff made no objection to
admission of the report at the hearing. (See Clary v. City of
Crescent City (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 274, 302 [“hearsay evidence
is not per se inadmissible in administrative proceedings (see,
e.g., Gov. Code, § 11513, subd. (d)), and [the plaintiff] waived any
objection to its use of such evidence by failing to object”]; Gov.
Code, § 11513, subd. (c) [“The hearing need not be conducted
according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses,
except as hereinafter provided. Any relevant evidence shall be
admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons
are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs,
regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule
which might make improper the admission of the evidence over
objection in civil actions.”]; id., subd. (d) [“Hearsay evidence may
be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other
evidence but over timely objection shall not be sufficient in itself
to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection
in civil actions.”].)
       Plaintiff contends he objected to the report at the hearing
and before the hearing. His citations to the record for the claim
he objected before the hearing do not in any way support his
claim. He claims to have objected by virtue of his assertions at
the hearing that no one could answer his questions about the
discrepancies in the report. That does not suffice as an objection
to admission of the report.
       Further, the Amajoyi report was not the only evidence
presented. Other evidence to which plaintiff did not object

                                 10
included the police report, the two-year permanent restraining
order, and J.A.’s affidavit describing the abuse. And, as already
discussed, plaintiff identified no discrepancies in the Amajoyi
report that are relevant to the fundamental issue, and so has
shown no prejudice.
       d.      The weight of the evidence
       Plaintiff argues the grievance officer’s findings were not
supported by the weight of the evidence. The trial court
concluded otherwise: “Notwithstanding [plaintiff’s] arguments to
the contrary, the Court finds that the Grievance Officer’s
Decision is supported by substantiated evidence of [plaintiff’s]
willful physical and emotional abuse. Specifically, [J.A.]
disclosed specific acts of physical and emotional abuse by
[plaintiff]; [the county] submitted documentary evidence of
[J.A.’s] injuries to his torso, which were consistent with [J.A.’s]
depiction of the injuries; and [plaintiff’s] minor son and adult
daughter both disclosed that they had been victims of ongoing
physical and emotional abuse at the hands of [plaintiff].” To this,
plaintiff repeatedly claims only that the court “does not construe
the information correctly.” The record, however, supports the
trial court’s findings.
       Plaintiff then contends the trial court did not have all the
necessary evidence, and erred when it denied his request in
March 2021 to augment the administrative record. We find no
error.
       In cases where the court exercises its independent
judgment on the evidence, the court may admit evidence at the
hearing on the writ, “[w]here the court finds that there is
relevant evidence that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
could not have been produced or that was improperly excluded at

                                11
the hearing before [the county].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5,
subd. (e).)
      Plaintiff asked to augment the record with 40 additional
exhibits, including the audio recording and transcript of the
grievance hearing. The trial court granted the request as to the
audio recording and transcript, and denied it as to the other
documents. (The transcript was already in the administrative
record; the court later gave plaintiff leave to file a transcript of
the audio recording on pleading paper.) As to the other
documents, the court stated plaintiff “failed to show that the
evidence could not have been produced in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, or that it was improperly excluded at the
administrative hearing.”
      On appeal, plaintiff identifies as evidence he could not have
produced at the hearing only “the follow up question asked by
Grievance Review Officer after the grievance hearing,” in the
form of e-mails between plaintiff and the grievance officer. He
does not tell us how these communications are relevant, or how
their omission from the administrative record is in any way
prejudicial to him.
      In short, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion that the weight of the evidence showed plaintiff
engaged in acts of physical and emotional abuse against J.A.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on
appeal.

                               GRIMES, J.
      WE CONCUR:
                        STRATTON, P. J.          WILEY, J.

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