Court Opinion

ID: 9430394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:39.005434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.339505
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
Simcha Goldman invokes this Court’s protection of his First Amendment right to fulfill one of the traditional religious obligations of a male Orthodox Jew — to cover his head before an omnipresent God. The Court’s response to Gold*514man’s request is to abdicate its role as principal expositor of the Constitution and protector of individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsupported assertions of military necessity. I dissent.
I
In ruling that the paramount interests of the Air Force override Dr. Goldman’s free exercise claim, the Court overlooks the sincere and serious nature of his constitutional claim. It suggests that the desirability of certain dress regulations, rather than a First Amendment right, is at issue. The Court declares that in selecting dress regulations, “military officials .. . are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment.” Ante, at 509. If Dr. Goldman wanted to wear a hat to keep his head warm or to cover a bald spot I would join the majority. Mere personal preferences in dress are not constitutionally protected. The First Amendment, however, restrains the Government’s ability to prevent an Orthodox Jewish serviceman from, or punish him for, wearing a yarmulke.1
The Court also attempts, unsuccessfully, to minimize the burden that was placed on Dr. Goldman’s rights. The fact that “the regulations do not permit the wearing of... a yarmulke,” does not simply render military life for observant Orthodox Jews “objectionable.” Ibid. It sets up an almost absolute bar to the fulfillment of a religious duty. Dr. Goldman spent most of his time in uniform indoors, where the dress code forbade him even to cover his head with his service cap. Consequently, he was asked to violate the tenets of his faith virtually every minute of every workday.
I — I h-H
A
Dr. Goldman has asserted a substantial First Amendment claim, which is entitled to meaningful review by this Court. *515The Court, however, evades its responsibility by eliminating, in all but name only, judicial review of military regulations that interfere with the fundamental constitutional rights of service personnel.
Our cases have acknowledged that in order to protect our treasured liberties, the military must be able to command service members to sacrifice a great many of the individual freedoms they enjoyed in the civilian community and to endure certain limitations on the freedoms they retain. See, e. g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-357 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 848 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743-744, 751 (1974). Notwithstanding this acknowledgment, we have steadfastly maintained that “ ‘our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.’” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 304 (1983) (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 181, 188 (1962)); see also, Glines, supra, at 354. And, while we have hesitated, due to our lack of expertise concerning military affairs and our respect for the delegated authority of a coordinate branch, to strike down restrictions on individual liberties which could reasonably be justified as necessary to the military’s vital function, see, e. g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U. S. 57, 66-67 (1981) (citing eases), we have never abdicated our obligation of judicial review. See, e. g., id., at 67.
Today the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment rights a subrational-basis standard — absolute, uncritical “deference to the professional judgment of military authorities.” Ante, at 507. If a branch of the military declares one of its rules sufficiently important to outweigh a service person’s constitutional rights, it seems that the Court will accept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be.
*516A deferential standard of review, however, need not, and should not, mean that the Court must credit arguments that defy common sense. When a military service burdens the free exercise rights of its members in the name of necessity, it must provide, as an initial matter and at a minimum, a credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely to interfere with the proffered military interest.2 Unabashed ipse dixit cannot outweigh a constitutional right.
In the present case, the Air Force asserts that its interests in discipline and uniformity would be undermined by an exception to the dress code permitting observant male Orthodox Jews to wear yarmulkes. The Court simply restates these assertions without offering any explanation how the exception Dr. Goldman requests reasonably could interfere with the Air Force’s interests. Had the Court given actual consideration to Goldman’s claim, it would have been compelled to decide in his favor.
B
1
The Government maintains in its brief that discipline is jeopardized whenever exceptions to military regulations are granted. Service personnel must be trained to obey even the most arbitrary command reflexively. Non-Jewish personnel will perceive the wearing of a yarmulke by an Orthodox Jew as an unauthorized departure from the rules and will begin to question the principle of unswerving obedience. Thus shall our fighting forces slip down the treacherous slope *517toward unkempt appearance, anarchy, and, ultimately, defeat at the hands of our enemies.
The contention that the discipline of the Armed Forces will be subverted if Orthodox Jews are allowed to wear yarmulkes with their uniforms surpasses belief. It lacks support in the record of this case, and the Air Force offers no basis for it as a general proposition. While the perilous slope permits the services arbitrarily to refuse exceptions requested to satisfy mere personal preferences, before the Air Force may burden free exercise rights it must advance, at the very least, a rational reason for doing so.
Furthermore, the Air Force cannot logically defend the content of its rule by insisting that discipline depends upon absolute adherence to whatever rule is established. If, as General Usher admitted at trial, App. 52, the dress code codified religious exemptions from the “no-headgear-indoors” regulation, then the wearing of a yarmulke would be sanctioned by the code and could not be considered an unauthorized deviation from the rules.
2
The Government also argues that the services have an important interest in uniform dress, because such dress establishes the preeminence of group identity, thus fostering esprit de corps and loyalty to the service that transcends individual bonds. In its brief, the Government characterizes the yarmulke as an assertion of individuality and as a badge of religious and ethnic identity, strongly suggesting that, as such, it could drive a wedge of divisiveness between members of the services.
First, the purported interests of the Air Force in complete uniformity of dress and in elimination of individuality or visible identification with any group other than itself are belied by the service’s own regulations. The dress code expressly abjures the need for total uniformity:
*518“(1) The American public and its elected representatives draw certain conclusions on military effectiveness based on what they see; that is, the image the Air Force presents. The image must instill public confidence and leave no doubt that the service member lives by a common standard and responds to military order and discipline.
“(2) Appearance in uniform is an important part of this image. . . . Neither the Air Force nor the public expects absolute uniformity of appearance. Each member has the right, within limits, to express individuality through his or her appearance. However, the image of a disciplined service member who can be relied on to do his or her job excludes the extreme, the unusual, and the fad.” AFR 35-10, ¶¶ 1-12a(1) and (2) (1978).3
It cannot be seriously contended that a serviceman in a yarmulke presents so extreme, so unusual, or so faddish an image that public confidence in his ability to perform his duties will be destroyed. Under the Air Force’s own standards, then, Dr. Goldman should have and could have been granted an exception to wear his yarmulke.
The dress code also allows men to wear up to three rings and one identification bracelet of “neat and conservative,” but nonuniform, design. AFR 35-10, ¶ 1—12b(1)(b) (1978). This jewelry is apparently permitted even if, as is often the case with rings, it associates the wearer with a denominational school or a religious or secular fraternal organization. If these emblems of religious, social, and ethnic identity are not deemed to be unacceptably divisive, the Air Force cannot rationally justify its bar against yarmulkes on that basis.
Moreover, the services allow, and rightly so, other manifestations of religious diversity. It is clear to all service personnel that some members attend Jewish services, some *519Christian, some Islamic, and some yet other religious services. Barracks mates see Mormons wearing temple garments, Orthodox Jews wearing tzitzit, and Catholics wearing crosses and scapulars. That they come from different faiths and ethnic backgrounds is not a secret that can or should be kept from them.
I find totally implausible the suggestion that the overarching group identity of the Air Force would be threatened if Orthodox Jews were allowed to wear yarmulkes with their uniforms. To the contrary, a yarmulke worn with a United States military uniform is an eloquent reminder that the shared and proud identity of United States serviceman embraces and unites religious and ethnic pluralism.
Finally, the Air Force argues that while Dr. Goldman describes his yarmulke as an “unobtrusive” addition to his uniform, obtrusiveness is a purely relative, standardless judgment. The Government notes that while a yarmulke might not seem obtrusive to a Jew, neither does a turban to a Sikh, a saffron robe to a Satchidananda Ashram-Integral Yogi, nor dreadlocks to a Rastafarian. If the Court were to require the Air Force to permit yarmulkes, the service must also allow all of these other forms of dress and grooming.
The Government dangles before the Court a classic parade of horribles, the specter of a brightly-colored, “rag-tag band of soldiers.” Brief for Respondents 20. Although turbans, saffron robes, and dreadlocks are not before us in this case and must each be evaluated against the reasons a service branch offers for prohibiting personnel from wearing them while in uniform, a reviewing court could legitimately give deference to dress and grooming rules that have a reasoned basis in, for example, functional utility, health and safety considerations, and the goal of a polished, professional appearance.4 AFR 35-10, ¶¶1-12a and 1-12a(1) (1978) *520(identifying neatness, cleanliness, safety, and military image as the four elements of the dress code’s “high standard of dress and personal appearance”). It is the lack of any reasoned basis for prohibiting yarmulkes that is so striking here.
Furthermore, contrary to its intimations, the Air Force has available to it a familiar standard for determining whether a particular style of yarmulke is consistent with a polished, professional military appearance — the “neat and conservative” standard by which the service judges jewelry. AFR 35-10, ¶ l-12b(1)(b) (1978). No rational reason exists why yarmulkes cannot be judged by the same criterion. Indeed, at argument Dr. Goldman declared himself willing to wear whatever style and color yarmulke the Air Force believes best comports with its uniform. Tr. 18.
3
Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 (June 18, 1985) grants commanding officers the discretion to permit service personnel to wear religious items and apparel that are not visible with the uniform, such as crosses, temple garments, and scapulars. Justice Stevens favors this “visibility test” because he believes that it does not involve the Air Force in drawing distinctions among faiths. Ante, at 512-513. He rejects functional utility, health, and safety considerations, and similar grounds as criteria for religious exceptions to the dress code, because he fears that these standards will allow some servicepersons to satisfy their religious dress and grooming obligations, while preventing others from fulfilling theirs. Ibid. But, the visible/not visible standard has that same effect. Furthermore, it restricts the free exercise rights of a larger number of servicepersons. The visibility test permits only individuals whose outer garments and grooming are indistinguishable from those of mainstream Christians to fulfill their religious duties. In my view, the *521Constitution requires the selection of criteria that permit the greatest possible number of persons to practice their faiths freely.
Implicit in Justice Stevens’ concurrence, and in the Government’s arguments, is what might be characterized as a fairness concern. It would be unfair to allow Orthodox Jews to wear yarmulkes, while prohibiting members of other minority faiths with visible dress and grooming requirements from wearing their saffron robes, dreadlocks, turbans, and so forth. While I appreciate and share this concern for the feelings and the free exercise rights of members of these other faiths, I am baffled by this formulation of the problem. What puzzles me is the implication that a neutral standard that could result in the disparate treatment of Orthodox Jews and, for example, Sikhs is more troublesome or unfair than the existing neutral standard that does result in the different treatment of Christians, on the one hand, and Orthodox Jews and Sikhs on the other. Both standards are constitutionally suspect; before either can be sustained, it must be shown to be a narrowly tailored means of promoting important military interests.
I am also perplexed by the related notion that for purposes of constitutional analysis religious faiths may be divided into two categories — those with visible dress and grooming requirements and those without. This dual category approach seems to incorporate an assumption that fairness, the First Amendment, and, perhaps, equal protection, require all faiths belonging to the same category to be treated alike, but permit a faith in one category to be treated differently from a faith belonging to the other category. The practical effect of this categorization is that, under the guise of neutrality and evenhandedness, majority religions are favored over distinctive minority faiths. This dual category analysis is fundamentally flawed and leads to a result that the First Amendment was intended to prevent. Under the Constitution there is only one relevant category — all faiths. Bur*522dens placed on the free exercise rights of members of one faith must be justified independently of burdens placed on the rights of members of another religion. It is not enough to say that Jews cannot wear yarmulkes simply because Ras-tafarians might not be able to wear dreadlocks.
Unless the visible/not visible standard for evaluating requests for religious exceptions to the dress code promotes a significant military interest, it is constitutionally impermissible. Justice Stevens believes that this standard advances an interest in the “uniform treatment” of all religions. Ante, at 512. As I have shown, that uniformity is illusory, unless uniformity means uniformly accommodating majority religious practices and uniformly rejecting distinctive minority practices. But, more directly, Government agencies are not free to define their own interests in uniform treatment of different faiths. That function has been assigned to the First Amendment. The First Amendment requires that burdens on free exercise rights be justified by independent and important interests that promote the function of the agency. See, e. g., United States v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 257-258 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). The only independent military interest furthered by the visibility standard is uniformity of dress. And, that interest, as I demonstrated in Part II-B (2), supra, does not support a prohibition against yarmulkes.
The Air Force has failed utterly to furnish a credible explanation why an exception to the dress code permitting Orthodox Jews to wear neat and conservative yarmulkes while in uniform is likely to interfere with its interest in discipline and uniformity. We cannot “distort the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem expedient. ” Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 244 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Under any meaningful level of judicial review, Simcha Goldman should prevail.
*523r — i I — I I — I
Through our Bill of Rights, we pledged ourselves to attain a level of human freedom and dignity that had no parallel in history. Our constitutional commitment to religious freedom and to acceptance of religious pluralism is one of our greatest achievements in that noble endeavor. Almost 200 years after the First Amendment was drafted, tolerance and respect for all religions still set us apart from most other countries and draws to our shores refugees from religious persecution from around the world.
Guardianship of this precious liberty is not the exclusive domain of federal courts. It is the responsibility as well of the States and of the other branches of the Federal Government. Our military services have a distinguished record of providing for many of the religious needs of their personnel. But that they have satisfied much of their constitutional obligation does not remove their actions from judicial scrutiny. Our Nation has preserved freedom of religion, not through trusting to the good faith of individual agencies of government alone, but through the constitutionally mandated vigilant oversight and checking authority of the judiciary.
It is not the province of the federal courts to second-guess the professional judgments of the military services, but we are bound by the Constitution to assure ourselves that there exists a rational foundation for assertions of military necessity when they interfere with the free exercise of religion. “The concept of military necessity is seductively broad,” Glines, 444 U. S., at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and military decisionmakers themselves are as likely to succumb to its allure as are the courts and the general public. Definitions of necessity are influenced by decisionmakers’ experiences and values. As a consequence, in pluralistic societies such as ours, institutions dominated by a majority are inevitably, if inadvertently, insensitive to the needs and values of minorities when these needs and values differ from those *524of the majority. The military, with its strong ethic of conformity and unquestioning obedience, may be particularly impervious to minority needs and values. A critical function of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is to protect the rights of members of minority religions against quiet erosion by majoritarian social institutions that dismiss minority beliefs and practices as unimportant, because unfamiliar. It is the constitutional role of this Court to ensure that this purpose of the First Amendment be realized.
The Court and the military services5 have presented patriotic Orthodox Jews with a painful dilemma — the choice between fulfilling a religious obligation and serving their country. Should the draft be reinstated, compulsion will replace choice. Although the pain the services inflict on Orthodox Jewish servicemen is clearly the result of insensitivity rather than design, it is unworthy of our military because it is unnecessary. The Court and the military have refused these servicemen their constitutional rights; we must hope that Congress will correct this wrong.

 The yarmulke worn by Dr. Goldman was a dark-colored skullcap measuring approximately 572 inches in diameter. Brief for Petitioner 3.

 I continue to believe that Government restraints on First Amendment rights, including limitations placed on military personnel, may be justified only upon showing a compelling state interest which is precisely furthered by a narrowly tailored regulation. See, e. g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 367 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). I think that any special needs of the military can be accommodated in the compelling-interest prong of the test. My point here is simply that even under a more deferential test Dr. Goldman should prevail.

 The 1978 and 1980 editions of AFR 35-10 governed, sequentially, the Air Force dress code during Dr. Goldman’s period of service. The two editions are substantially identical in all respects relevant to this case.

 For example, the Air Force could no doubt justify regulations ordering troops to wear uniforms, prohibiting garments that could become entan*520gled in machinery, and requiring hair to be worn short so that it may not be grabbed in combat and may be kept louse-free in field conditions.

 I refer to all of the military services rather than just to the Air Force because, as the Government emphasizes in its brief, Brief for Respondents 20, n. 11, all of the uniformed services have dress and appearance regulations comparable to AFR 35-10, and the Court's decision in this ease will apply to all the services. Furthermore, all Military Departments are subject to the recent Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 (June 18, 1985) which deals with the accommodation of religious practices. This Directive does not provide for the type of exception sought by Dr. Goldman. ■