Court Opinion

ID: 14423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-25 06:35:28+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:56.057411
License: Public Domain

CORRECTED

                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                          FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                        ________________________

                              No. 97-60604
                            Summary Calendar
                        ________________________

     JOHNNY K. BROWN,

                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,

     versus

     TOWER LOAN OF MISSISSIPPI, INC. ,

                                   Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                 Southern District of Mississippi
                          (5:96-CV-73BrS)
_________________________________________________________________
                           March 17, 1998
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     The appellant, Johnny K. Brown, appeals from an adverse

summary judgment dismissing his claim of age discrimination

brought pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34         After a de novo review of

the summary judgment record, we affirm.

     Brown was terminated from his employment with Tower Loan of

Mississippi, Inc., five weeks after he was hired.            He was forty-

     *
         Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
five (45) years old both at the time he was hired and at the time

he was terminated.   Brown attempts to overcome the legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons advanced for his discharge with a

claim of pretext based upon a stray remark (“you just can’t teach

old dogs new tricks”) made by a supervisor who was not involved

in the decision to terminate him and after the decision to

terminate Brown had been made.   That stray remark is woefully

inadequate to create an issue of fact with respect to the

appellee’s articulated non-discriminatory reasons for discharging

Brown.   See Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th

Cir. 1993).   For essentially this reason and as further explained

in the Memorandum Opinion and Order of the district court, dated

July 30, 1997, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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