Court Opinion

ID: 9698613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:55:51.090119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.196636
License: Public Domain

*399DONIELSON, Judge
(dissenting).
As the facts in this case are not in dispute, this court may determine as a matter of law whether or not Bruegge’s conduct in this case constituted misconduct. Harlan v. Iowa Dept. of Job Service, 350 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Iowa 1984). Upon a review of the record and relevant case law, I would conclude Bruegge was discharged for misconduct, and unemployment benefits were appropriately denied in this matter.
Bruegge was discharged for accumulating a driving record which caused his employer’s insurance company to determine he was uninsurable. While the final act which precipitated this determination was in fact an accident, this is not decisive in this case. Bruegge was not discharged because of that single accident, but because a series of accidents and traffic violations rendered him uninsurable. Insurability was a prerequisite for Bruegge’s job. One’s status as “insurable” is necessarily derived from an examination of the numerous incidents that comprise a person’s driving record. The issue of insurability encompasses several acts which must be examined together. It is this type of aggregate review which sets this case apart from the typical misconduct case in which a single incident is analyzed to determine if it constitutes an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests.
In examining Bruegge’s record, it is apparent his convictions for speeding and squealing tires were volitional acts. He cannot, and does not, claim these were not deliberate acts. A review of the totality of Bruegge’s driving record reveals sufficient willfulness, deliberateness, and culpability to conclude Bruegge’s “uninsurable” status amounted to misconduct. To acquire two convictions (speeding and squealing tires) after the commencement of his employment, evinces an intentional and substantial disregard of his employer’s interests.
The majority attempts to distinguish Cook by arguing there is no evidence Bruegge was guilty of any willful violations of the traffic laws after it was made known to him his driving record was of concern to his employer. The opinion in Cook does not reflect that Cook committed any traffic offenses after his employer urged him not to get any more citations, yet the Iowa Supreme Court found his uninsurability constituted misconduct.
Even if Bruegge had not been apprised earlier of the need to remain “insurable,” this is a duty he should reasonably have expected to adhere to even without specific notice. A duty not to accumulate traffic tickets, which will impair a driver’s insura-bility, is imposed upon those whose job duties include driving their employer’s vehicles. Byrd v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 469 N.E.2d 463 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). When driving a vehicle is a regular part of an employee’s job, he should be aware, without being specifically informed by his employer, that his continued insura-bility is a prerequisite to employment.
The only way in which Cook is distinguishable from the ease at hand is Cook involved a series of traffic violations, all of which were apparently volitional. In contrast, the case now before this court involves three volitional acts and two accidents. I would not find this distinction to be persuasive. At issue is whether Bruegge’s uninsurable status constitutes misconduct. As long as some of the acts which contributed to Bruegge’s uninsura-bility are deliberate and volitional acts, I would find Cook is applicable and Bruegge’s conduct in this matter constitutes misconduct.