Court Opinion

ID: 9714362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:35:58.899991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.464435
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in reversal). Justice Moody’s extensive research amply supports his conclusion that there is a common-law presumption in favor of public trials which is not affected by a defendant’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. We would, however, rest disposition on other grounds.
In Detroit Free Press v Macomb Circuit Judge1 this Court held that § 1420 of the Revised Judicature Act2 entitles the public to attend the sittings *394of every court, so that "mere agreement of parties to a suit is insufficient” to warrant closure.3 The only question presented in the instant case not addressed in or disposed of by Macomb Circuit Judge is whether a corollary to the defendant’s Sixth-Amendment right to a public trial is an implied constitutional right to a private criminal trial.4
It appears from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia,5 holding that the public has a First-Amendment right to attend criminal trials,6 that the issue not addressed in Macomb Circuit Judge has been decided. Opinions for four justices,7 citing Gannett Co, Inc v DePasquale,8 state that the Sixth Amendment does not give a defendant an implied right to a private trial; the opinions for three other justices necessarily imply as much, but without explicit reliance on Gannett.9
The instant case thus is controlled by RJA, § 1420, Macomb Circuit Judge, and by the absence of a Sixth-Amendment right to a private trial. In *395light of the Richmond Newspapers decision, however, we should also recognize the First Amendment in the disposition of this case.10
The public’s First-Amendment right to attend criminal trials is not absolute.* 11 It is sufficiently strong, however, that it has been said that closure may be ordered only after the trial judge has made a finding that "closure is required to protect the defendant’s superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires closure”.12 Such a finding must, of course, rest on substantial evidence, developed at an evidentiary hearing.
No such finding was made in this case; the order of closure was therefore improper.
Although we agreed to decide this case in order to give guidance for future cases,13 we should not attempt in this case to define the circumstances in which a defendant’s right to a fair trial will be violated unless closure is ordered, beyond noting that a finding that closure is necessary to protect the defendant’s right implies that alternatives to closure have been explored and found inadequate.14 *396Nor would it be proper to attempt to catalogue the "other overriding considerations” not based on the right to a fair trial which would justify restriction of the public’s constitutional right to attend. The determination whether particular findings adequately support a closure order should be made in the context of a case in which, after an evidentiary hearing, findings thought by the trial judge to be sufficient and adequately supported by the record have been made.15
I agree that the trial court erred and concur in reversal. No costs, a public question.
Coleman, C.J., concurred with Levin, J.

 Detroit Free Press v Macomb Circuit Judge, 405 Mich 544; 275 NW2d 482 (1979).

 MCL 600.1420; MSA 27A.1420.

 Detroit Free Press v Macomb Circuit Judge, supra, p 547.

 The facts of the instant case are similar to those in Macomb Circuit Judge, and, as in that case, closure was ordered in this case on the basis of "mere agreement of [the] parties”, without recognition of the public’s right to attend trials.

 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, 448 US 555; 100 S Ct 2814; 65 L Ed 2d 973 (1980).

 Although there was no opinion of the Court, seven of the eight participating Justices agreed that the First Amendment protects the public’s right of access to criminal trials.

 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, supra, p 580 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); p 598, fn 1 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

 Gannett Co, Inc v DePasquale, 443 US 368; 99 S Ct 2898; 61 L Ed 2d 608 (1979).

 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, supra, p 597 (opinion of Brennan, J., to the effect that "public access is an indispensable element of the trial process itself” such that closure may not be ordered merely on the basis of the defendant’s request, even if agreed to by the prosecutor), and p 603 (opinion of Blackmun, J., to the effect that the Sixth Amendment itself gives the public a right of access).

 The trial which led to this appeal has been completed, so, as applied to these precise facts, the issue is moot. We address the question because it is one which might otherwise evade review. The purpose of our review thus is to provide guidance for the future. Although the First-Amendment issue may not have been fully presented to this Court, the Richmond Newspapers holding will be binding in all future cases in which closure requests are made, and should therefore be recognized.

 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, supra, p 581, fn 18 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); p 598 (opinion of Brennan, J.); p 600 (opinion of Stewart, J.); Detroit Free Press v Macomb Circuit Judge, supra, pp 546-547.

 Richmond Newspapers, Inc v Virginia, supra, pp 564, 581: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.” (opinion of Burger, C.J.).

 See fn 10, supra.

 Applying his analysis to the Richmond Newspapers facts, Chief Justice Burger said:
"Despite the fact that this was the fourth trial of the accused, the *396trial judge made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need to ensure fairness; * * * there exist in the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness. * * * There was no suggestion that any problems with witnesses could not have been dealt with by their exclusion from the courtroom or their sequestration during the trial. * * * Nor is there anything to indicate that sequestration of the jurors would not have guarded against their being subjected to any improper information. All of the alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but none of the factors relied on here was beyond the realm of the manageable. Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.” Id., pp 580-581. See, also, id., p 600 (opinion of Stewart, J.).

 In Richmond Newspapers, as in the instant case, the trial judge made no finding that an overriding interest justified closure, and this made it unnecessary to decide what findings would present a sufficient cause for closure. "We have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public”, id., p 581, fn 18 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); "[w]hat countervailing interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now, for the statute at stake here authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judge and parties”, id., p 598 (opinion of Brennan, J.).