Court Opinion

ID: 9740222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:30:22.15858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.967010
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Despite the majority’s assertion that the clause-at-issue was drafted in “clear and unequivocal” terms, I am persuaded that this is not the case. It appears to me that the generalized language of the clause in question is not sufficient as to require indemnification for one’s own negligence.
A contract which provides indemnification for one’s own negligence is valid and enforceable in Indiana if it is “knowingly and willingly” made. State v. Thompson (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 198; Vernon Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Graham (1975), 166 Ind.App. 509, 336 N.E.2d 829. The provisions of such an agreement will be strictly construed. Because the assumption of indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence is an onerous burden for the indemnitor, the contract will not be held to provide indemnity unless so expressed in “clear and unequivocal” terms. State, supra; Norkus v. General Motors Corp. (S.D. Ind.1963), 218 F.Supp. 398, 399. The language of the indemnity provision must address itself to the subject of the negligence of the indemnitee. It must also show, by its terms, a clear and unequivocal intention that the indemnitee was intended to be indemnified against his own negligence. Indiana State Highway Commission v. Thomas (1976), 169 Ind.App. 13, 346 N.E.2d 252.
The key question, for me, is whether the terms, as set forth in Paragraph 8, clearly *1277and unequivocally manifest a commitment “knowingly and willingly” made by the Township to pay for the damages occasioned by any negligence of the City.
After a review of various cases which deal with indemnification for one’s own negligence, I am persuaded that Paragraph 8 is not an indemnification clause. Without a doubt, the language is clear and unequivocal as to the City’s intent to “be held harmless from any and all negligence, misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance resulting under its performance of this contract ...” There is, however, no language in this provision or any other provision which even suggests reimbursement or compensation for a loss. Nowhere is the Township required “to protect and indemnify,”1 “to be responsible for any damage,”2 to “indemnify and save harmless” 3 or even to “assume all responsibility for any injury or damage.”4 The provision contains no mention of indemnification of the City by the Township in the event of the City’s own negligence.5
I would conclude that Paragraph 8 does not clearly and unequivocally express an intent of both parties to indemnify the City for its own negligence. Because this provision is simply too vague to impose the “onerous burden” of indemnification upon the Township for any negligence on the part of the City, I would reverse the granting of the summary judgment.
Even if Paragraph 8 could, in any fashion» be construed as an indemnification clause, I judge its application to the facts-at-hand to be violative of public policy. It is against public policy for one involved in transactions affecting the public interest “to contract for indemnity against its own tort liability when it is performing either a public or a quasi public duty ...” LaFrenz v. Lake Cty. Fair Bd. (1977), 172 Ind.App. 389, 360 N.E.2d 605, 608. See also, The Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kent (1964), 136 Ind.App. 551, 198 N.E.2d 615.
My analysis of the record indicates that the fire department of the City of Valparaiso was engaged in the performance of a public, rather than a private, duty in its attempt to extinguish a fire in Center Township. According to the LaFrenz criteria for determining whether particular contracts are 'affected with the public interest, I am persuaded that this Fire Protection contract was indeed a contract “affected with the public interest.” LaFrenz, supra, 360 N.E.2d at 608, 609. A clause, exculpating a party charged with the performance of a public duty, from its own negligence in the performance of that duty, is violative of public policy. Prosser, Law of Torts § 68 at 442-444 (4th ed. 1971). I would not allow it to occur.
Fortunately, we are not without legislative guidance in this area. On June 7,1937, IC 1971, 17-4-20-1 was amended by the legislature to provide a mechanism whereby a township trustee was authorized to contract with any nearby city, which had and maintained adequate fire-fighting equipment, for fire protection of the township. See IC 1971, 17-4-20-1 et seq. Recovery on a tort theory for injuries arising out of the performance of such a contract was precluded by the enactment of IC 1971, 17-4-45-1. There, the legislature stated:
“Fire protection contracts — Tort liability. — In addition to any power for the execution of contracts by the trustee of any township with any city of the first class for fire protection service within *1278such township, power is hereby conferred upon all cities of the first class that have and maintain fire-fighting equipment for protection against fires, to execute contracts, by and through their proper authorities, with any other cities or towns, by and through their proper authorities, or with any person, firm, or corporation, interested in any property needing such fire protection, which property is located outside of the corporate boundaries of the city of the first class which has such aforesaid fire equipment; all upon such consideration and such terms and conditions, other than those expressed by this act [17-4-45-1], as may be so mutually agreed upon by the parties to any such contract: Provided, however, That no liability in tort of any kind under any such contract, or otherwise, shall attach to any city of the first class, or to any officials or employees thereof, so rendering, or agreeing to render, such service or using such equipment, arising out of any act or omission therein resulting in any injury, loss, or damage to any such contracting party, or to any one else.... ”
I note that IC 1971,17-4-45-1 is directed to the potential tort liability of a first-class city. According to IC 1971, 18-2-1-1, Valparaiso is a third-class city. If the legislature had intended to broaden the scope of this statute, then it certainly would have included other classes of cities in its formulation. It did not. IC 1971, 17-4-45-1 is limited to cities of the first class. We may not add something to a statute which the legislature has purposely omitted. Poyser v. Stangland (1952), 230 Ind. 685, 106 N.E.2d 390; Town of Schererville v. Vavrus (1979), Ind.App., 389 N.E.2d 346. I am persuaded, therefore, that to allow the City of Valparaiso to exculpate itself, by contract, from its own negligence in the performance of a public duty and then to seek indemnification is clearly impermissible. I would reverse the granting of the summary judgment.

. General Accident and Fire Assur. Corp. v. New Era Corp. (1966), 138 Ind.App. 349, 213 N.E.2d 329.

. Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Graham (1975), 166 Ind.App. 509, 336 N.E.2d 829.

. Indiana State Highway Commission v. Thomas (1976), 169 Ind.App. 13, 346 N.E.2d 252.

. State v. Thompson (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 198.

.The provision-at-issue appears to be exculpatory in nature. The distinction between an indemnification clause and an exculpatory clause was drawn by the Court in Weaver v. American Oil Company (1970), Ind.App., 261 N.E.2d 99 (reversed on other grounds) at 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144. See also, Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., supra, 336 N.E.2d at 831.