Court Opinion

ID: 9700189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:15:27.199983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:02.921717
License: Public Domain

OPINION
JONES, Chief Justice.
Appellant husband brought this equitable action seeking to set aside a conveyance to his wife, the appellee, of *408his interest in their jointly held residence. The basis of appellant’s claim is that the real estate was conveyed under circumstances which give rise to a constructive trust. At the close of appellant’s case the chancellor entered a compulsory nonsuit. Appellant’s motion to take off the nonsuit was denied,1 2*and this appeal followed.2
A judgment of nonsuit is properly entered if “the plaintiff shall have given no such evidence as in law is sufficient to maintain the action. . . .” Act of March 11, 1875, P.L. .6, § 1, as amended, 12 P.S. § 645 (Supp.1975); see Pa.R.C.P. 1512.
“It is hornbook law that a judgment of nonsuit can be entered only in clear cases and plaintiff must be given the benefit of all evidence favorable to him together with all reasonable inferences of fact arising therefrom, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in his favor [citations omitted].”
Flagiello v. Crilly, 409 Pa. 389, 390-91, 187 A.2d 289, 290 (1963). See Tolbert v. Gillette, 438 Pa. 63, 260 A.2d 463 (1970), and the cases cited therein. The issue before us is whether under this standard appellant presented at trial sufficient facts to make a prima facie showing that his wife took the property interest in question as a constructive trustee for her husband. Finding that a non-suit was improperly granted under this standard, we must reverse and remand for a complete trial.
The parties were married on January 20, 1950, and are still lawfully married. They later purchased the property in question, subject to a mortgage, taking title in joint names as tenants by the entireties. On January 3, 1972, the mortgage debt was satisfied and on January 26, 1972, appellant executed a deed to his wife of his un*409divided one-half interest in the property for a recited consideration of $1.00.3 The opinion of the chancellor in support of his order refusing to take off the nonsuit accurately summarizes appellant’s account of the circumstances surrounding his signing of the deed:
“The plaintiff received no money to sign the deed and no promises were made by the defendant if he would sign the property over to her. There was no agreement or understanding between the parties that the title to the property was to be transferred to the defendant. According to the plaintiff he was asked by his wife to come uptown to the lawyer’s office to sign the papers the lawyer had.
The plaintiff went into the lawyer’s office and the secretary had two papers on the desk facing him and told him, ‘This is for the new deed. You sign here and here.’ The plaintiff signed believing he was getting a new deed after paying off the mortgage. The plaintiff had not consulted an attorney and signed the deed without reading it because he trusted his wife and never questioned anything she did.
The record is clear that the defendant used no subterfuge or fraud to persuade the defendant [sic] to sign the deed and nothing was done to prevent the plaintiff from reading what he signed. No questions were asked by the plaintiff and he was not misled in any way by the defendant or the lawyer’s secretary.”
First, appellant has not urged, nor are we permitted to grant relief on the basis of mistake. Dilli*410plaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974). While it is unfortunate if the appellant signed the deed without realizing its consequences, he was under no coercion to do so. Appellant’s only “mistake” appears to be in not being prudent enough to read the deed before signing it. As we have stated, “If a party, who can read, will not read a deed put before him for execution . . . he is guilty of supine negligence, which ... is not the subject of protection, either in equity or at law.” O’Reilly v. Reading Trust Co., 262 Pa. 337, 343-344, 105 A. 542, 544 (1918); Waslee v. Rossman, 231 Pa. 219, 231, 80 A. 643, 647 (1911); Greenfield’s Estate, 14 Pa. 489, 496 (1850); see also General Refrigerator and Stove Fixture Co. v. Fry, 393 Pa. 15, 141 A.2d 836 (1958). The integrity of signed documents must be respected especially in land transactions in order for there to be certainty in the law. We cannot rescind conveyances merely because one party later claims that he did not understand what he was signing when there was nothing to prevent him from merely reading the deed to discover its contents.
Appellant does contend that the chancellor applied the wrong burden of proof to these facts because he relied upon our decision in Lapayowker v. Lincoln College Preparatory School, 386 Pa. 167, 125 A.2d 451 (1956), in which we held that “[w]hen a husband purchases real or personal property with his own funds and transfers such property to his wife without consideration, there is a factual presumption that a gift was intended . . . .” 368 Pa. at 171, 125 A.2d at 454. However, the chancellor also cited Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 129, 224 A.2d 164, 169 (1966), which states that if a husband obtains his wife’s property without adequate consideration, there is a rebuttable presumption of trust in her favor unless the husband can show affirmatively that he took no undue advantage of her. Appellant argues that this difference in treatment *411between spouses violates the Equality of Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.4 Appellant’s argument is answered by our recent decision in Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 528, 347 A.2d 477, 480 (1975), in which we held that in order to avoid an unconstitutional presumption in this situation “anytime either a husband or wife contributes towards the purchase of entireties property their contribution is presumed to be a gift to the other.” 5 Thus, since Butler abolished the one-sided presumption of Shapiro and extended the presumption of Lapayowker to wives also, it appears that appellant has no basis to complain. The chancellor did apply the correct presumption under our new rule, and thus there was no constitutional violation.
Appellant further contends that under these circumstances he is entitled to the imposition of a constructive trust in his favor. The imposition of a constructive trust is an equitable remedy designed to prevent unjust enrichment. See Restatement of Restitution § 160 (1937); A. W. Scott, Trusts §§ 462, 462.1 (3d ed. 1967). A constructive trust arises “[w]here a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. .” Restatement of Restitution § 160 (1937); Truver v. Kennedy, 425 Pa. 294, 305, 229 A.2d 468, 474 (1967); Chambers v. Chambers, 406 Pa. 50, 54, 176 A.2d 673, 675 (1962); Gray v. Leibert, 357 Pa. 130, 135, 53 A.2d 132, 135 (1947); A. W. Scott, Trusts § 462.1 at 3415 (3d ed. 1967). A transferee is under such an equitable duty to reconvey property to the transferor if the transfer was induced by fraud, duress, undue influence, *412or mistake, or if the transfer was the result of an abuse of a confidential relationship. Chambers v. Chambers, 406 Pa. at 54, 176 A.2d at 675.
In the case at bar, there was no proof of fraud, duress, or undue influence by the appellee. Appellant asserts, however, that the chancellor erred in not finding a confidential relationship between himself and his wife which would have imposed upon her an obligation to disclose material facts. Under our case law, the marital relationship is not confidential as a matter of law. It is a question of fact and arises when one party places confidence in the other with a resulting superiority and influence on the other side. Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 530, 347 A.2d 477, 481 (1975); Stewart v. Hooks, 372 Pa. 542, 547-48, 94 A.2d 756, 758-59 (1953); see generally Truver v. Kennedy, 425 Pa. 294, 305-07, 229 A.2d 468, 474 (1967). The chancellor recognized this principle and specifically stated in his opinion that he found no proof of a confidential relationship between the parties. The basis of this finding was the evidence of marital discord which the parties had been experiencing for some time. However, taking all the evidence favorable to the appellant and all reasonable inferences in his favor, the imposition of a nonsuit was inappropriate. The appellant had introduced evidence that the parties had been married for twenty years and that appellee handled the financial affairs of the marriage. Further, in his opinion, the chancellor stated that appellant “signed the deed without reading it because he trusted his wife.” (Emphasis added.) In view of these contradictions and the state of the record, it would be far better to hear the defense so that an appellate court may have the benefit of findings of fact and conclusions of law by the chancellor which have been considered by the court en banc. Schwartz v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 411 Pa. 530, 192 A.2d 371 (1963); Shechter v. Shechter, 366 Pa. 30, 76 A.2d 753 (1950). *413This is not a “clear” case where the imposition of a non-suit is warranted.
Decree of chancellor reversed and case remanded to court below for a new trial. Each party to bear own costs.
POMEROY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
ROBERTS, J., concurs in the result.
MANDERINO, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

. It does not appear that appellant’s motion to take off the non-suit was passed upon by a court en banc. See Act of March 11, 1875, P.L. 6, § 1, os amended, 12 P.S. § 645 (Supp.1975).

. Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 202(4), 17 P.S. § 211.202(4) (Supp.1975).

. Either husband or wife may convey his interest in entireties property to the other. Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 984, § 1, 69 P.S. § 541.
Appellant is not suing to destroy the entireties estate and vest exclusive interest in himself. This he could not do during the duration of the marriage. Backus v. Backus, 464 Pa. 380, 384 n. 3, 346 A.2d 790, 792 n. 3 (1975); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 136, 224 A.2d 164, 173 (1966). Rather, the imposition of a constructive trust under these circumstances would in effect return the property to its prior entireties status.

. Pa.Const. Art. I, § 28 (adopted May 18,1971).

. While Butler concerned a contribution to an entireties property, we see no reason to limit its holding to gifts of that nature. See generally Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 133-34, 224 A.2d 164, 171 (1966).