Court Opinion

ID: 9846926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:50:41.616537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:57.300963
License: Public Domain

PORTER, Justice,
with whom Mc-QUADE, Justice, concurs (dissenting).
Appellant attempted to establish the amount of his damages by an hypothetical question addressed to the witness, Ira E. High, a real estate agent. This hypothetical question in slightly different form and wording was propounded to the witness at least five times. Objections to all of such questions were sustained or the answer of the witness stricken. While all of such hypothetical questions were clearly incompetent as not containing a description of the property to be evaluated except the one question which we will hereinafter quote and discuss, all of such hypothetical questions were predicated upon the wrong theory of proof of damages. The one hypothetical question which the court permitted over objection to be answered, reads as follows :
“Mr. High, let’s assume in this case, Mr. High, the record shows here that the plaintiff here, Mr. Bancroft, on or about March 1, 1933 bought the Grand Hotel in Boise City, Idaho, at which time he took over the unused portion of the lease to1 the premises, the premises being located on the southeast corner of 11th and Main Street in Boise City, Idaho, and that hotel was 54 rooms, based upon the representation that the gross monthly income of that hotel was $2400.00 a month and that the net income was a thousand dollars a month, when as a matter of fact for the last year, the year of 1952, the year before the transaction occurred the gross income of that hotel was $24,486.53 with an expense of $18,813.31 and with *70a net return of $5,673.22, I would like your opinion as to the difference in value of the $27,500.00 and what in your judgment should be the value based on those figures.”
In an attempt to' overcome objections to such question, appellant added the following :
“(By Mr. Reddoch) Now I’ll add to that question to give you an adequate description of the property involved, the business known as the Grand Hotel, to wit, all furniture, fixtures, equipment, supplies, fuel on hand owned by said parties and used by them in connection with the operation of that certain hotel business conducted at what is known as the Grand Hotel in Boise, Ada County, Idaho, together with the rights of the use of the name Grand Hotel and leasehold interest in and to that certain building situated in Boise City, Ada County, Idaho, located on the corner of the intersection of 11th and Main Street in Ada County, State of Idaho known as the Smith Building. Now giving you the value of that property and the date was March 1, 1953, now will you tell this jury the difference in the value in your judgment of the property that was bought at $27,500.00 on a representation of a gross monthly income of $2400.00 per month and a gross net income of a thousand dollars a month, when as a matter of fact for the previous year 1952 the gross income was $24,486.53, the gross expenses was $18,813.31, and the net income was $5,673.22?”
Over objection the witness was permitted to answer such question, the answer being as follows:
“Well, I would like to> answer to my own way, and then if they want to ask me a question, I’ll explain it. I would say that the property was sold for $27,-000.00, or whatever the figure was, on the representation it earned a thousand dollars a month, and it earned around 5600 a year instead of a thousand a month, it would be about 45 per cent of what the actual value of the hotel would be worth. I’m not referring to the real estate; I’m referring to the stuff that was sold, the leasehold, furniture and fixtures and so forth.”
The answer of the witness on motion was stricken by the court as not responsive.
The evidence does not disclose that the witness High ever saw the personal property involved. The question is defective in that it does not contain a description of the kind and'character of the furniture or of its age and condition of repair, or of the amount of -fuel on hand. It is evident this hypothetical question and the answer thereto were predicated upon the wrong theory of the measure of damages. In the presentation of his entire case, appellant took the position that the measure of damages was *71the difference between the represented $1,-000 per month net income and the actual $5,673.22 net annual income, to be applied to the purchase price on a percentage basis. While the actual net income of income producing property is an element of the value of such property, a difference between the represented and actual net income cannot be used on a percentage basis and applied to the purchase price to show the amount of damages.
The trial court, in ruling upon the hypothetical questions, in effect, suggested to appellant the proper proof of damages, at one point saying, “Yes, if counsel will ask what he believes the value was on that date and include in there the property conveyed with it, I’ll allow him to answer the question.” Appellant did not act upon such suggestion. The trial court did not err in sustaining objections to the hypothetical questions propounded nor in striking the answer of the witness, Ira E. High to the hypothetical question permitted to be answered.
The appellant was permitted to testify as follows:
“What is your opinion, Mr. Bancroft, as to the value of the property when you took it over ? A. Considering the business it was doing when I took it over, it was worth 15 or $16,000.00 only.”
Respondents concede the testimony of the owner of the property as to its value is competent evidence. However, the weight of such testimony and its probative value may be trifling. Beech v. American Surety Co., 56 Idaho 159, 51 P.2d 213; United States v. 3969.59 Acres of Land, D.C., 56 F.Supp. 831, at page 837; Asebez v. Bliss, 178 Cal. 137, 172 P. 595; 20. Am.Jur., Evidence, Section 892, page 751; Hellstrom v. First Guaranty Bank of Bismarck, 54 N.D. 165, 209 N.W. 212, 45 A.L.R. 1487.
The question of counsel and the answer of appellant as to the value of the property were predicated upon preceding questions and answers and in accordance with appellant’s theory that the difference between the represented net income and the actual net income from the property was to be applied percentagewise to the purchase price in determining the value of the property at the time of the sale. As we have heretofore pointed out this theory is incorrect and consequently the answer of appellant as to the value of the property is based upon a false premise and has no probative value.
The evidence as to damages being insufficient to go to the jury, any alleged errors of the trial court in ruling upon the admissibility of evidence tending to prove fraud become immaterial and need not be considered.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the motion for nonsuit and entering the judgment of dismissal upon the ground that the evidence was wholly insufficient to show the amount of damages, if any, to appellant. *72The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.