Court Opinion

ID: 9738657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:59:59.17012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.669709
License: Public Domain

Brodkey, J.,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority of the division in this court. Not only do I feel that it has applied incorrect legal principles concerning Nebraska statutory provisions, but I feel the result is highly inequitable.
I start my discussion with a consideration of the scope of review by this court applicable to this case. This action was initiated as an equity action and prayed for equitable relief, as does also the counterclaim. The rule is well established that: “Actions in equity, on appeal to this court, are triable de novo in conformity with section 25-1925, R. S. 1943, subject, however, to the condition that when the evidence on material questions of fact is in irreconcilable conflict this court will, in determining the weight of the evidence, consider the fact that the trial court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.” Sopcich v. Tangeman, 153 Neb. 506, 510-11, 45 N.W.2d 478, 481-82 (1951). See, also, Tilden v. Beckmann, 203 Neb. 293, 278 N.W.2d 581 (1979).
*184The record evidences that conflicting testimony was adduced with regard to whether interest was payable under the January 4, 1966, contract. The attorney who drafted both of the agreements, and the deed, had no independent recollection of the transaction. Irene Lovelace testified that at the time the second contract was executed she could not remember any discussion regarding interest or payment in regard to the sale of the land. Clifford Lovelace’s testimony is conflicting with regard to whether or not he was present at the execution of the second contract, and he offered no testimony with regard to the payment of interest under the terms of the contract. Only the defendant, Raymond Stern, testified that at the signing of the January 4, 1966, contract, Irene Lovelace stated that no interest was to be charged on the sale of the land. Keeping in mind the aforementioned standard of review, we conclude that the evidence is conflicting, and that the conclusion of the trial court, to wit, that the parties intended that interest should be paid, must be given deference by this court.
Under the facts of this case, I believe that Stern is liable as a matter of law for the payment of interest on the unpaid purchase price. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue 1978) provided, in pertinent part: “On money due on any instrument in writing, . . . interest shall be allowed at the rate of six per cent per annum.” It is a general rule that contracting parties are presumed to contract in reference to existing law and that all applicable and valid statutes existing at the time a contract is made, become a part of the contract and must be read into it. McWilliams v. Griffin, 132 Neb. 753, 273 N.W. 209 (1937).
This court has also had the opportunity to examine and rule upon a situation very similar to that presented in this action. Hornstein v. Cifuno, 86 Neb. 103, 125 N.W. 136 (1910), involved an action which was instituted to foreclose a real estate mortgage given as security for a note wherein the rate of interest to be *185charged was left blank. The provision in question read as follows: “Value received with interest at the rate of_per cent, per annum from_until paid.” In finding that the note drew interest at the legal rate from the date of the decree, the court stated: “As is shown by the copy of the note above set out, the blanks for the statement of the rate of interest and the date from which the interest would run were not filled in at the time of the execution of the note, and the legal effect would be the same as if there had been nothing written or printed after the word ‘interest’, and the reading of the note would be to pay ‘interest until paid.’ This would cause the debt to draw interest at the legal rate of 7 per cent, per annum from the date of the note. [Citations omitted.]” Id. at 104, 125 N.W. at 136. See, also, Praest v. Quesner, 113 Neb. 485, 203 N.W. 549 (1925); Traudt v. Nebraska P. P. Dist., 197 Neb. 765, 251 N.W. 2d 148 (1977).
In his concurring opinion, Windrum, District Judge, would have us overrule our previously announced law as set forth in the foregoing cases, which has been the law of this state for over 40 years. I see no reason for doing so and would be opposed to his suggestion that we do so in this case. The rule stated in Hornstein v. Cifuno, supra, is clearly the general rule in this country, and should be adhered to. See 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury §68 (1969).
The majority opinion argues and would have us conclude that it was not intended that interest be paid by the defendant under the contract dated January 4, 1966. In support of this proposition, the majority argues that a tax provision inserted by the parties is in conflict with the preprinted tax provision and that its position in the contract, between the payment provision and the preprinted interest clause, creates ambiguity so as to open the contract to parol evidence on the issue of whether interest is payable under the contract. I find this argument untenable. The rule is well settled that where part of a contract is written or typed and *186part is printed, and the typed parts appear to be inconsistent with the preprinted provisions, the typed provisions prevail. First Nat. Bank v. Greenlee, 102 Neb. 180, 166 N.W. 559 (1918). The rationale for this rule is that the typed words are the immediate language and terms selected by the parties themselves for the expression of their meaning. This rule, however, is resorted to only from necessity when the typed clauses and the printed clauses cannot be reconciled. When the typed and printed parts may be reconciled by reasonable construction, that construction must be given effect, because it cannot be assumed that the parties intended to insert ineffective provisions. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §271 (1964). I am of the opinion that the tax provision inserted by the parties in the January 4,1966, contract is a clear expression of their respective obligations thereunder, and the terms do not create “irreconcilable” conflict so as to make the contract ambiguous as to the payment of interest. I cannot agree with the argument that the location of the tax provision, or the punctuation used, creates ambiguity within the contract terms. While punctuation in a contract may be resorted to in order to solve an ambiguity, punctuation or the absence thereof, cannot of itself create ambiguity. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contracts §279 (1964).
We must also bear in mind the general rule that: “Absent any stipulation to the contrary, the purchaser has a right to possession or the rents and profits of the land and the vendor a right to interest on the unpaid purchase price. The' fruits of possession and the interest are mutually exclusive — there is no right upon the part of either to have both.” Bembridge v. Miller, 235 Or. 396, 408, 385 P. 2d 172, 178 (1963) (emphasis supplied). See, also, McCleneghan v. Powell, 105 Neb. 306, 180 N.W. 576 (1920). The trial court found from the evidence that the parties intended interest to be included in the contract. I agree, and would find that Stern should be obligated to pay interest at the legal rate of 6 percent on the unpaid balance of the contract.