Court Opinion

ID: 9391546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-02 17:00:28.907766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.949824
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                               ____________

                                      No. 21-2135
                                     ____________

                             WILSON FLORES-JIMENEZ,

                                                      Petitioner

                                           v.

                               ATTORNEY GENERAL
                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                      On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                           (Agency No. A215-663-864)
                         Immigration Judge: Jason L. Pope

                               Argued on March 29, 2022

             Before: RESTREPO, ROTH and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: May 2, 2023)

Pina Cirillo                      (ARGUED)
Leena A. Khandwala
Rutgers University of Law
Immigrant Rights Clinic
123 Washington Street
4th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102

            Counsel for Petitioner
David Schor                       (ARGUED)
Christin N. Whitacre
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044

              Counsel for Respondent

                                      O P I N I ON *

ROTH, Circuit Judge:

       Wilson Flores Jimenez seeks review of a June 2, 2021, decision by the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA). Because the BIA, and the Immigration Judge (IJ) before it,

had properly considered all the relevant evidence and we cannot reweigh this evidence, we

will deny the petition for review.

                                                 I.

       Flores Jimenez is a citizen of the Dominican Republic. He entered the United

States in 1999 without being admitted or paroled by an immigration officer. In 2018, he

was arrested for criminal mischief, burglary, and contempt related to violation of a

domestic violence order. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) encountered him

at a correctional center and issued a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable under

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

                                             2
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). On January 7, 2020, Flores Jimenez appeared with counsel

before an IJ and requested a hearing to assess his mental competency.

       The IJ held a mental-competency hearing at which he explained the nature of the

proceedings to Flores Jimenez, who confirmed, in his own words, that he understood why

he was there. He also confirmed that he understood his right to retain counsel and to

present evidence. The IJ heard testimony from Dr. Mihaela Dranoff, who conducted

Flores Jimenez’s psychological evaluation, confirming that Flores Jimenez suffered from

acute stress disorder and suggested that his condition may have progressed to Post-

Traumatic Stress Disorder. At the conclusion of that hearing, the IJ found that Flores

Jimenez was competent to proceed. Alternatively, the IJ found that, even if he were not

mentally competent, sufficient safeguards existed because he was represented by an

attorney.

       At a June 17, 2020, hearing, Flores Jimenez explained that he intended to seek

asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the Convention Against Torture

(CAT), and cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents. He submitted

applications for that relief and protection on July 7, 2020.

       During his September 14, 2020, removal hearing, Flores Jimenez asserted that

changed circumstances excused his time-barred asylum application: his mental illness

had only recently emerged and resulted in his institutionalization. He testified in support

of his claims, discussed his birth abroad, his five daughters (three living in the United

States, two in Puerto Rico), and his 1999 arrival in the United States. Flores Jimenez also

testified that he may be kidnapped by someone who believes that he has wealth, that his

                                              3
family may believe he is a drug trafficker, and that someone may harm him because of

past problems stemming from political differences if returned to his country of origin.

He elaborated that, before 1999, certain family members, including his mother and uncle,

left the Dominican Republic due to political problems. However, both his mother and

uncle are dead, and he denied any personal political involvement in the Dominican

Republic.

         Flores Jimenez also testified that, during his teenage years in the mid-1990s, he

encountered the El Felar criminal gang. This gang was known for committing robberies

and selling drugs. He testified that the gang attacked him several times in its recruitment

attempt, so he fled to Santo Domingo, the country’s capital. Once he was in Santo

Domingo, he attended a festival in August 1998, during which he again encountered a

gang member, who cut his arm. The attacker spent months in prison as a result.

         In addition, Flores Jimenez discussed his criminal history in the United States,

confirming that he was arrested a dozen times for different crimes. He claimed that,

following his final arrest, he was committed to a psychiatric hospital for six months due

to stress, voices, and paranoia. In addition, he testified that he is “mainly . . . bisexual,” 1

has been in a same-sex intimate relationship for the last fourteen years, and had been in a

same-sex relationship in the Dominican Republic.

         The IJ denied his applications for relief and protection, and ordered his removal.

Flores Jimenez appealed, challenging the denial of asylum and related protection. Before

1
    AR at 264.
                                                4
the BIA, he contended that he had proven past persecution based on the gang’s

recruitment effort, as well as likely future persecution on account of his various asserted

protected characteristics. He also challenged the finding that he was sufficiently

competent to proceed and argued that DHS failed to show that he is removable as

charged. The BIA dismissed the appeal. Flores Jimenez petitioned for review.

                                                   II.

       The BIA exercised jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § § 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, which

grants it authority to review the decisions of IJs in removal cases. We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) because this case is a review of a final order of removal and

raises questions of law. When the BIA reviews the IJ’s decision and issues its own opinion,

we generally review only the BIA’s decision. 2           However, if the BIA’s decision

“substantially relies upon” the IJ’s decision, the court may review both the BIA’s and the

IJ’s decisions. 3 Because the BIA issued its own decision but affirmed and substantially

relied on the IJ’s reasoning, we may review both decisions. 4

                                            III.

       Flores Jimenez seeks review of several determinations by the BIA: the BIA’s

decision to sustain the IJ’s mental-competency determination, its finding that his asylum

application was untimely, its holding on past persecution on account of his membership

2
  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).
3
  Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 295–96 (3d Cir. 2008); see Patel v. Att’y Gen., 599
F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that this Court “look[s] to the decision of the IJ to
the extent that the BIA defers to, or adopts, the IJ’s reasoning”).
4
  See Patel, 599 F.3d at 297; Kaita, 522 F.3d at 295.
                                             5
in a particular social group (PSG), and its determination that he did not establish a well-

founded fear of future persecution. He further contends that the BIA erred with respect to

his imputed criminal and political opinion claims, as well as with respect to his CAT

claim. Finally, he asserts that the DHS’s reliance on Form I-213 was improper. Because

all these contentions lack merit, we will deny the petition for review.

                                        A. Mental Competence

       Flores Jimenez argues that the BIA improperly overlooked record evidence that he

was observably confused during his hearing and that all relevant evidence was not

reviewed in the finding of mental competency. He contends that the IJ and the BIA

disregarded his medical records from Trenton Psychiatric Hospital and Dr. Dranoff’s

psychological report. The medical records state that Flores Jimenez’s “source of

information was not reliable,” 5 and that his “paranoid delusions[…] prevented him from

participating in a sustained rational discussion regarding his legal circumstances.” 6

Flores Jimenez also argues that his own in-court testimony demonstrates his mental

incompetence and the IJ chose to ignore the multiple discrepancies in his testimony.

       Incompetence turns on whether a mental infirmity “prevent[s] [the non-citizen]

from meaningfully participating in [the] proceedings.” 7 Here, the BIA was not

5
  AR at 908.
6
  AR at 864.
7
  Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 480, 484 (BIA 2011) (explaining that competency
considerations include “whether [a non-citizen] has a rational and factual understanding of the
nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with [an] attorney or representative if there is
one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses”).
                                                 6
compelled to find a lack of competence despite evidence to the contrary as Flores

Jimenez explicitly confirmed his understanding and recited, in his own words, his rights

and articulated the reason for the proceedings. Further, as the IJ noted, Flores Jimenez

fully presented his case and appropriately and coherently answered questions, again

demonstrating his understanding of the facts.

           The BIA held that the IJ did not err in finding Flores Jimenez mentally competent

because the IJ had stated “‘[a]ll admitted evidence has been considered in its entirety,

regardless of whether specifically mentioned in the text of th[e] decision.” 8 Contrary to

Flores Jimenez’s arguments on appeal, the IJ specifically discussed Dr. Dranoff’s

testimony, noting that she reaffirmed her diagnosis of acute stress disorder from her

report. The IJ emphasized that, despite these diagnoses and Flores Jimenez’s history of

paranoid thoughts, he was “coherent, and responsive” at the hearing and demonstrated an

understanding of the proceedings. 9 The transcript of the competency hearing supports

these findings.

           Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusions regarding mental competency. 10

Although the BIA and IJ correctly attributed discrepancies in Flores Jimenez’s testimony

to mental illness, those discrepancies alone do not establish that he was not mentally

competent. 11 The IJ acknowledged Flores Jimenez suffered “periodic episodes of

8
    AR at 4 (citation omitted).
9
    AR at 199–200.
10
     Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen., 623 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010).
11
     Id.
                                                 7
decompensation” and “bouts of intense paranoia, fear and aggression.” 12 However, as the

IJ also explained, “‘[m]ental competency is not a static condition’; what matters is

respondent’s mental state at the time of the removal proceedings.” 13 At the time of the

hearing, the IJ found Flores Jimenez to be competent.

                                B. Timeliness of the Application

       Flores Jimenez next argues the BIA erred in denying his asylum application as

untimely. Asylum applications usually must be filed within one year of arrival in the

United States. 14 Flores Jimenez claimed that his mental illness qualified as a changed

circumstance warranting an exception to the one-year deadline. 15 He argues that the BIA

relied solely on a mischaracterization of fact in affirming the IJ’s conclusion that the

application was not filed within a reasonable period of time. The BIA stated that the

asylum application was filed in July 2020, more than two years after Flores Jimenez was

a patient in the Trenton Psychiatric Hospital “from about January 2018, to June or July

2018.” 16 However, Flores Jimenez is correct that the record shows that his in-patient stay

was from January 2019 to July 2019.

       Generally, we lack jurisdiction to review discretionary or factual determinations

regarding whether a non-citizen has established changed circumstances that would excuse

12
   AR at 95.
13
   Diop v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 70, 76 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N.
Dec. at 480).
14
   See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B).
15
   See id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
16
   AR at 5.
                                              8
the untimely filing of an asylum application. 17 However, if Flores Jimenez is correct that

the BIA’s reliance on an erroneous fact could be considered a due-process violation, a

claim over which this Court does have jurisdiction, 18 the question then becomes whether

the BIA’s error was harmless. 19

       Here, any error was harmless. The IJ and BIA determined that Flores Jimenez

would have known about the potential for his removal as a criminal deportee

commencing with his December 2017 arrest, continuing with his January 24, 2018,

incarceration, and on through his November 13, 2019, sentencing. Yet he did not file his

application for relief until July 2020. The IJ reasoned that Flores Jimenez should have

been aware of the prospect of removal, at the absolute latest, when the DHS began

detaining him in December 2019, well after his in-patient stay at Trenton Psychiatric

Hospital. The IJ also determined that his failure to file his application for seven months

thereafter was unreasonable. 20 The BIA agreed with that determination, reiterating that

his seven-month delay was not reasonable under the circumstances. Even accepting

Flores Jimenez’s premise that he did not appreciate his mental illness, which the record

shows began in 2017, until his hospitalization ended in July 2019, the delay in filing his

17
   See Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 635 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Kaita, 522
F.3d at 296.
18
   See Chen v. Att’y Gen., 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing its jurisdiction
to consider a claim when a discretionary decision involved “fact-finding which is flawed
by an error of law”).
19
   See Yuan v. Att'y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying harmless error on
immigration review “when it is highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome
of the case”).
20
  A delayed application due to changed circumstances must be filed “within a reasonable period
given those changed circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii) (quotation marks omitted).
                                              9
application from December 2019 to July 7, 2020 was unreasonable.

                                        C. Past Persecution

       Flores Jimenez next contests the IJ’s decision to deny a PSG for “Young

Dominican Males Who Resist Gang Recruitment and Oppose Gang Violence.” He

asserts that the IJ should have conducted an individualized analysis of his case. To make

out a prima facie case for asylum or withholding of removal, a non-citizen must show

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution “on account” of a statutorily protected

ground, including “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion.” 21 To be cognizable, a PSG must be “(1) composed of members who

share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially

distinct within the society in question.” 22

       Flores Jimenez challenges the BIA’s failure to recognize “Young Dominican

Males Who Resist Gang Recruitment and Oppose Gang Violence” as a cognizable PSG.

The IJ found that this proposed group lacked immutability, particularity, and social

distinction. The IJ explained that a person could stop resisting gang recruitment and cited

BIA precedent rejecting the very same claim as lacking particularity and social

distinction. In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA ruled that the characteristics of being young

and refusing recruitment are too amorphous and ill-defined to create a meaningful

benchmark to assess group membership because “people’s ideas of what those terms

21
   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157,
182 (3d Cir. 2003).
22
   S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I.
& N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014)).
                                               10
mean can vary.” 23 The same applies here. Our sister circuits have also rejected groups,

like Flores Jimenez’s proposed group, predicated on resistance to gang recruitment by

young people as too amorphous and thus not particular and as lacking social distinction. 24

         For these reasons, Flores Jimenez’s claims pertaining to being a “Young

Dominican Males Who Resist Gang Recruitment and Oppose Gang Violence” must fail.

                                         D. Future Persecution

         Flores Jimenez’s next contention is that the BIA erroneously held that he did not

establish a clear probability of future persecution on account of his membership in the

PSG “Dominicans with Severe and Persistent Mental Health Issues.” 25 He claims the

BIA ignored evidence when it concluded that he had not shown that he would be

involuntarily hospitalized, restrained, or secluded in the Dominican Republic.

         The BIA’s decision can be reversed only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable

factfinder would be compelled to conclude otherwise.” 26 Here, the evidence does not

compel the conclusion that Flores Jimenez will be persecuted based on his mental illness.

He argues that he was hospitalized in the United States due to paranoid delusions that

23
     24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584–85 (BIA 2008).
24
  See, e.g., Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 991–93 (10th Cir. 2015) (rejecting
“El Salvadoran males threatened and actively recruited by gangs, who resist joining
because they oppose the gangs”); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 24, 27 (1st
Cir. 2010) (rejecting “[Salvadoran] young women recruited by gang members who resist
such recruitment.”).
25
  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 591 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To qualify for
withholding of removal, a[] [non-citizen] must establish a ‘clear probability of persecution,’ i.e.,
that it is more likely than not that s/he would suffer persecution upon returning home.”).
26
  Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. Elias-
Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
                                                 11
went untreated for many years. He then asserts that it is not speculative to state that he

will be involuntarily hospitalized in the Dominican Republic, especially considering it is

a country with negligent mental-health services. However, this argument is entirely

speculative. The IJ found that given the lack of resources for mental health treatment in

the Dominican Republic, the more likely result is that Flores Jimenez will simply persist

without obtaining care, which, without more, is not persecution. 27

         Flores Jimenez also asserts that, although the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision that he

is a member of the PSG “Bisexual Males in Dominican Republic,” it erred by holding

that he did not demonstrate a clear probability of future persecution. Again, the record

evidence does not compel this conclusion. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that the

LGBTI community faces a “spectrum” of human rights abuses, from discrimination and

harassment to violence, but noted that Flores Jimenez had failed to demonstrate a clear

probability that he would be targeted for violence based on his bisexuality. 28

         Although “there is more than one way to view the record . . . [,]we are required to

uphold the decision of the Board when there is, as in this case, substantial evidence to

support it.” 29 Here, Flores Jimenez’s own evidence shows only that certain segments of

the LGBTI community may face varying likelihoods and degrees of abuse. For that

reason, the BIA was not compelled to find that, as a bisexual man, Flores Jimenez, more

27
   See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 499 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “[t]he lack of
access to mental health treatment alone . . . does not create a well-founded fear of
persecution”).
28
   AR at 6.
29
     Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att'y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 688 (3d Cir. 2015).
                                                12
likely than not, would suffer persecution.

       The BIA also did not err in affirming the denial of the remaining withholding

claims. The BIA properly concluded that the PSG “imputed Criminal/Drug traffickers”

is neither immutable nor particular. 30 Further, Flores Jimenez does not contest the

dispositive finding that the group is amorphous and not particular. Therefore, his

arguments with respect to imputed criminality must fail.

       Flores Jimenez’s arguments about his imputed political opinion claim also fail.

Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that he failed to establish that he would be

persecuted based on his family’s political affiliation from more than 20 years ago.

                                          E. CAT Claim

       Flores Jimenez next argues that the BIA and IJ improperly dismissed his CAT

claim, ignoring record evidence of his mental illness, his inability to relocate, the

Dominican Republic’s abysmal mental health treatment record, and the Dominican

government acquiescence to his abuse. To succeed on his CAT claim, Flores Jimenez

had to demonstrate that “it is more likely than not” that he would be tortured if removed

to the Dominican Republic. 31 Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the past

harm he suffered from the gang member, including a cut to his arm, did not rise to the

level of torture. 32 Further, the BIA properly affirmed the IJ’s determination that the

30
   See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 237–41, 244 (setting the requirements and
burdens of proof for proving a particular social group).
31
   Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174–75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2)).
32
   See Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 324–25 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding BIA did not err
in determining that petitioner, who was “severely beaten,” was not tortured).
                                              13
likelihood of future torture was based on a series of suppositions that were unsupported

by the record. 33 We do not reweigh evidence when the conclusions reached by the IJ and

BIA are supported by the record. 34

       The record also supports the conclusion that Flores Jimenez has not shown that it

is likely he will be involuntarily committed to the lone mental hospital in the country and

that he would be one of the few patients restrained in that hospital. The record does not

indicate that he would be targeted for torture by either the government or the public

because he would be perceived as a criminal or that the IJ failed to consider such a risk in

his analysis. It is also clear that the IJ properly considered the risk of torture stemming

from Flores Jimenez’s sexual identity. In fact, the IJ expressly considered the combined

risk from different sources, including criminals, corrupt police, the underfunded health

care system, as well as the mistreatment of the LGBTI community and those with mental

illness, and concluded that Flores Jimenez still presented a speculative claim. Because

the BIA and IJ considered all the relevant evidence, we will not reweigh the evidence to

reach the result that Flores Jimenez wants.

       Finally, Flores Jimenez’s argument that the BIA did not follow Myrie v. Attorney

General 35 also fails because he did not prove a sufficient likelihood of torture as a factual

matter. Thus, the BIA did not need to address whether Flores Jimenez’s speculative

33
   See In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917–18 (A.G. 2006) (holding that an alien
whose CAT claim is based on a “series of suppositions” must establish that each link in
that “hypothetical chain of events” is more likely than not to occur).
34
   Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
35
   855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017).
                                              14
claims satisfy the legal definition of torture. 36

                                  F. Reliance on DHS Form I-213

       Finally, Flores Jimenez disputes the DHS’s reliance on Form I-213 to establish his

alienage. In concluding that the DHS met its initial burden, the BIA properly relied on

Form I-213, which lists his birthplace as the Dominican Republic. Such a record bears

strong indicia of reliability. 37 Moreover, Flores Jimenez presented no evidence or

allegation to challenge the fact of his foreign birth, as memorialized in Form I-213. To

the contrary, he admitted the facts of his alienage and his entry without inspection in his

sworn asylum application. Likewise, he twice testified that he was born abroad. So,

even if there were error with the BIA’s reliance on Form I-213, his repeated sworn

statements that he was born abroad independently demonstrate his alienage. Therefore,

any error would be harmless.

                                                     IV.

       For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.

36
   See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (holding that the BIA is “not required
to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results [it]
reach[es].”).
37
   Bradley v. Att’y Gen., 603 F.3d 235, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (reiterating that agency action,
including an admission record under the Visa Waiver Program, is “entitled to a
presumption of regularity”) (citation omitted).
                                                15