Court Opinion

ID: 9601853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:50:16.804291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:37.627122
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
with whom COOKE, Judge, joins, dissenting.
Issuance of an injunction under the facts of this case is consistent with the classic *270purposes of injunctive relief: maintenance of public order and peace, and of the status quo, pending adjudication of legal rights.1
The federal district court’s memorandum order denying removal stated that the state’s complaint presented “only a cause of action for obstruction of a state highway under state law. Such a cause of action is within the jurisdiction of the state courts and not within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.” State of Alaska v. Heffle, No. F79-23 (D. Alaska, July 24, 1979). However, the court went on to explain:
The state courts do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate title, claim or rights to interests in property held in trust for Alaskan Natives. Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31, 33-34 (Alaska 1977); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 167 n. 59 (Alaska 1977). Cogo v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indians of Alaska, 465 F.Supp. 1286, 1290 (D. Alaska 1979); State of Alaska v. Agli, 472 F.Supp. 70 (D. Alaska, 1979). 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b). Any adjudication of title, claim, right or interests in an Alaska Native Allotment held in trust by the United States or a determination of compensation for inverse condemnation of a Native Allotment is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and must be determined in a- separate action in this court. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 [59 S.Ct. 292, 295] (1939). McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458 [27 S.Ct. 346, 51 L.Ed. 566] (1907). United States v. Clarke, 590 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1979). State of Alaska v. Agli, 472 F.Supp. 70 (D. Alaska 1979).

Id.

The majority opinion concludes, based on its reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976), that because state courts have no jurisdiction to adjudicate title to Native land, they also lack jurisdiction to enjoin obstruction of a highway over Native land. I disagree.
In prior cases we have construed § 1360 to preclude state court jurisdiction to grant the declaratory relief sought, on the grounds that it would necessarily implicate questions of title to trust property. Ollestead v. Native Village of Tyonek, 560 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938, 98 S.Ct. 426, 54 L.Ed.2d 297 (1977); Calista Corporation v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
However, an injunction differs from a declaratory judgment, in that ownership rights to property are not necessarily affected. Many courts have held in a variety of contexts that where title is in dispute and resolution of the dispute is pending in another forum, the court may grant a conditional injunction to preserve the status quo upon a prima facie showing of title or of present possession. The injunction is vacated if title is eventually determined adversely to the party in whose favor it runs.
In a ease closely analogous to the present case, Zimmerman v. McCurdy, 15 N.D. 79, 106 N.W. 125 (1906), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that where competing claims to federal land were pending before the Land Department, which had exclusive jurisdiction over the question of title, an injunction in state court was proper to maintain the status quo and to protect the occupying claimant’s possession against the other claimants’ attempts to take forcible possession, until their respective rights could be determined by the federal agency. The court stated:
The rightful claimant’s possession or right to possession will always be protected or enforced against a trespasser by the appropriate action in court when that can be done without deciding a controversy of which the Land Department has exclusive jurisdiction. [Citations omitted].
*271When, however, as in this ease, the opposing claimant’s rights are in litigation before the federal Land Office, and the courts have, therefore, no jurisdiction to decide which of the two opposing parties is the rightful claimant, the courts are not powerless to extend their aid to preserve the property and prevent destructive violence. The equity powers of the courts are sufficiently broad and elastic to do justice under such circumstances, without interfering with the jurisdiction of the federal Land Office officials to determine the ultimate rights of the claimant with respect tó the land in controversy. Inasmuch as the plaintiff is in possession, and is contesting in the proper tribunal the validity of defendant’s entry, upon which the latter’s right to take possession depends, it is clearly improper for defendant to violently dispossess plaintiff until the final result of the contest shall have disclosed which of the two have the better right.
Id. at 126.
In Mid-Continent Pipe Line Company v. Emerson, 396 P.2d 734 (Okla.1964), there was no question of the state court invading federal jurisdiction, but there was a question of whether an owner of a pipeline right-of-way could enjoin the owner of the servient estate from interfering with its possession, where title was unclear. Stressing that the plaintiff was not asking that its title be determined but asking only for an injunction, the court stated:
In the instant case Mid-Continent had been in peaceable possession of a portion of defendants’ land for nearly two and one-half years. It was the defendants who were out of possession and sought to regain possession ....
Whether defendants will be able to regain possession in a subsequent proceeding, or will be limited to an action in reverse condemnation, is not a decisive issue in this case and is not determined. We do hold that a threat of force and violence is not a proper remedy to obtain possession and such action should be enjoined.
Unless an injunction is granted in this case the damages to be sustained by plaintiff and those whom it serves will be substantial. Plaintiff’s possession should be maintained until the substantive and permanent rights of the parties may be determined by appropriate proceedings.
Id. at 736. Like the Zimmerman court, the court in Mid-Continent emphasized the fact of peaceable possession and the need to preserve the status quo.
Other authorities which hold that courts have jurisdiction to maintain the status quo until underlying questions of title, pending in a separate forum, are resolved are set forth in the margin.2
The injunction issued by the superior court should be modified to provide that it shall be of no force or effect in the event the B.I.A. does not confirm the right-of-way agreement. As so modified the injunction would be consistent with § 1360, as well as the policies underlying that statute. § 1360(a) provides state courts with jurisdiction to grant general equitable relief within “Indian country.” That jurisdictional grant is qualified only to the extent that “rights to possession or ownership” of trust lands are being adjudicated. As used in 1360(b), “possession” is properly read as essentially the equivalent of title, and not possession in the conditional sense at issue here. The right to possession has been the greatest ownership interest available to Native Americans with respect to much of their land, with legal title remaining in the *272federal government,3 and so § 1360(b) would have been ineffective to broadly protect Indian interests if only the term “ownership” had been used.
Although there is “sparse” evidence of the legislative intent behind § 1360,4 it is reasonably clear that the bar of state interference with Indian trust land embodied in § 1360(b) was considered necessary for the effective administration of federal Indian policy,5 and particularly for the preservation of Indian property.6 The injunction issued in this case, as modified, would not have the potential to frustrate these purposes.
Moreover, the district court’s decision in State of Alaska v. Heffle, No. F79-23 (D. Alaska, July 24, 1979), construed § 1360(b) as not precluding the injunctive relief sought by the state in this case. This decision by a federal court interpreting a federal statute, while not binding upon this court under the supremacy clause, is nonetheless persuasive authority. It also may be considered as establishing the law of the case. See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1970); 1B Moore’s Federal Practice § 0.404[6] 501, 502 (2d ed. 1980). And, while the law of the case doctrine permits departure from earlier rulings where clearly warranted, such rulings should in the great majority of cases be adhered to in order to impart a measure of order to litigation. This is especially true with respect to rulings as to which of two courts should hear a particular case; otherwise an unseemly, costly, and time consuming shuttling of cases between courts — the situation here — will result.
For these reasons the injunction issued by the superior court should be modified to be made conditional on the B.I.A.’s decision concerning the right-of-way agreement; as so modified the injunction should be affirmed.

. See Houck v. Kroger Co., 555 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Civ.App.1977); Chapple v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 131 S.E. 505, 506 (1926). See also Owens v. Texaco, Inc., 368 S.W.2d 780, 782-83 (Tex.Civ.App.1963) (“the last prior peaceable, exclusive possession of land will be upheld by the court so that the status quo may be protected until trial on the merits. Courts frown on self-help; to encourage the action on the part of defendants ... in this case is to encourage breaches of the peace, friction and bloodshed. [Citations omitted].”)

. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. McComas, 250 U.S. 387, 391, 39 S.Ct. 546, 547, 63 L.Ed. 1049, 1053 (1919); Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Hunter Baltimore Rye, Inc., 5 F.Supp. 888, 889 (S.D.N.Y.1933); Olive Land & Development Co. v. Olmstead, 103 F. 568, 580 (S.D.Cal.1900); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. Soderberg, 86 F. 49, 51 (N.D.Wash.1898); Ex Parte Finley, 20 So.2d 98, 100 (1944); Mobile B. Ry. Co. v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 190 Ala. 417, 67 So. 244, 245-46 (1914); Mengel & Bro. v. Norman, 144 La. 632, 81 So. 207 (1919); Smith v. Shiebeck, 180 Md. 412, 24 A.2d 795, 799 (1942); Rockaway Rolling Mill Corp. v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 101 N.J.Eq. 192, 137 A. 650, 652 (1927) aff’d, 103 N.J.Eq. 297, 143 A. 334, 335 (1928); Elliott v. Rich, 24 N.M. 52, 172 P. 194, 195 (1918).

. See, Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 75 S.Ct. 313, 317, 99 L.Ed. 314, 320 (1955); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 666 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 731, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977). See also, F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, at 411-12 (1942).

. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 2106, 48 L.Ed.2d 710, 715 (1976); Atkinson v. Haldane, supra at 165. As one commentator views it, “[m]ost likely, civil jurisdiction was an afterthought in a measure aimed primarily at bringing law and order to the reservations, added because it comported with the pro-assimilationist drift of federal policy, and because it was convenient and cheap.” Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.S.C. A.L.Rev. 535 at 543-44 (1975).

. See United States v. Humboldt Fir, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 292, 296 (N.D.Cal.1977); Cohen explains the rationale behind this policy:
The controlling principle which prevents a court, whether state or federal, from exercising any power or jurisdiction to adjudicate any matter involving the transfer of any right, title, or interest in or to restricted allotted Indian lands is that the United States in the exercise of its plenary and exclusive power over the Indians and their property may adopt such measures as it may deem necessary and proper for their welfare and protection and the state courts without legislative authority have no power or jurisdiction to interfere with or circumvent those measures.
F. Cohen, supra, at 381 (footnotes omitted).

. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d at 664; see also Comment, Indian Taxation: Underlying Policies and Present Problems, 59 Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1266-74 (1971); Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty & Economic Development, 49 N.D.L.R. 267, 283 (1973).