Court Opinion

ID: 9833406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:41:17.072025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.385535
License: Public Domain

' On Rehearing.
Counsel for appellant Weimer strenuously insists that there was a total absence of proof of practically all the circumstances related in our opinion on original hearing as a basis for the conclusion reached that Morrison, as Weimer’s agent, had authority to make the contract with plaintiffs upon which their suit was based. We have carefully examined the record, and find that both Morrison .and *670Judge Cecil Smith, representing the Texas Ranger Producing & Refining Company, testified that the casing which Morrison purchased and furnished to plaintiffs for the well in controversy, amounting to the sum of $3,921.75, was later charged to that company. Hence we were in error in stating in our original opinion, in effect, that the casing was furnished to plaintiffs with no expectation on the part of Morrison or Weimer of reimbursement therefor from the Texas Ranger Producing & Refining Company, and our said former statement to the contrary is now withdrawn.
But the testimony of Morrison himself, aside from that of other witnesses, further shows that said casing was in fact furnished to plaintiffs by Morrison, and that he did so after first advising with Weimer and getting his consent thereto.
It is true, as stated by counsel for appellant Weimer, that no witness testified that “oil in the ground is in its nature fugitive and likely to pass from one lease to a well on an adjoining lease,” as recited in the opinion; but the courts take judicial notice of that fact, as is well settled by the authorities1. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717, L. R. A. 1917E, 989.
The testimony of Weimer and Morrison that the latter had no authority from the former to enter into the contract upon which the suit was based was mere conclusions of' those witnesses, which were conclusively refuted by the other circumstances appearing in the statement of facts and recited in our opinion showing such agency.
The rule that agency cannot be established merely by testimony showing the declarations of the supposed agent has no application here, because the agency of Morrison was admitted, and his authority as such agent, which was the pivotal issue, was not sought to be established by proof of his declarations, but of his acts in the general manr agement and'conduct of the business, all with the knowledge and acquiescence of Weimer. Through inadvertence it was stated in said opinion that the Texas Ranger Producing & Refining Company by plea over sought a recovery against Weimer for any recovery against it by plaintiff. To the contrary, Weimer, by cross-action, sought a recovery over against his codefendants for any amount that plaintiff might recover against him, upon allegations that, in the sale of the lease to him, they represented and warranted that there were then on said lease 11 fully completed wells, for which all costs of drilling work thereon had been paid; that he (Weimer) relied upon said representations, and was induced thereby to purchase the lease; and, further, that it was then and there agreed that said property should be delivered to him free and clear of all debts, liens, and claims against the same.
There was neither pleading nor proof by appellant, the Texas Ranger Producing & Refining Company, or its receiver, that that company repudiated its drilling contract with plaintiffs, Prince & Prince, and notified them of such repudiation, before they drilled the well in controversy. Hence there is no merit in the contention now urged by those appellants for the first time that the measure of plaintiffs’ damage as against them would not be the contract price for drilling the well, but would be the profits which they would have lost if they had not drilled it, as showa by the very authorities cited by appellants, some of which are: Greenwall Theatrical Circuit Co. v. Markowitz, 97 Tex. 479, 79 S. W. 1069, 65 L. R. A. 302; Ollesheimer v. Foley, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 252, 95 S. W. 688; Richards v. Manitowoc, etc., Co., 140 Wis. 85, 121 N. W. 937, 133 Am. St. Rep. 1063; 13 Corpus Juris, § 731, p. 655, and other decisions there cited. If appellant company had repudiated their drilling contract, and so notified plaintiffs before they drilled the well, then those authorities would have sustained their contention now urged.
The fact that, according to the testimony of plaintiffs, they would not have drilled the well but for the promise of Weimer to pay for it, for the reason that they were uncertain of being able to collect from the ranger company, did not preclude them from holding that company liable according to its contract. From a holding otherwise, it would follow that the principal on a promissory note would escape liability thereon to the payee, if it could be shown that the latter would not have made the loan in the absence of the signature of a surety who executed it also.
With the foregoing corrections of recitals in our original opinion, the motions of all appellants are overruled.