Court Opinion

ID: 9398511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:01:43.241376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.098934
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MAY 31 2023

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

JENIFER LYNN LUCHSINGER,                         No. 22-55599
                  Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No. 5:21-cv-00705-DFM
    v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner             MEMORANDUM*
of Social Security,
                  Defendant-Appellee.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Central District of California
                 Douglas F. McCormick, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
                         Argued and Submitted March 9, 2023
                                Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY,** District
Judge.

         Jenifer Luchsinger applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. An

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied her application. Luchsinger sought

judicial review in the district court, which upheld the ALJ’s decision. We have

jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the underlying

*
  This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
   The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy III, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
ALJ decision for legal error and lack of substantial evidence. Lambert v. Saul, 980

F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2020). We reverse and remand.

      The ALJ found that Luchsinger had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

that would allow her to perform “sedentary work,” as defined in the applicable

regulations, but with certain additional restrictions. One of those restrictions

addressed Luchsinger’s ability to follow instructions, and the ALJ found only that

she could “understand, remember and carry out simple instructions.” Based on this

RFC and the testimony provided by a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ identified

three occupations as to which jobs existed “in significant numbers in the national

economy” and that Luchsinger could perform—namely, “[t]elephone order clerk,”

“[c]harge account clerk,” and “[a]ddresser clerk.” The Government conceded in

the district court and on appeal that the occupation of “addresser clerk” is obsolete.

Accordingly, we may sustain the ALJ’s decision only if substantial evidence

supports the determination that Luchsinger could perform work as a “telephone

order clerk” or “charge account clerk.” Benton ex rel. Benton v. Barnhart, 331

F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003).

      The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) lists several of the capacities

required to perform particular positions, including the level of “reasoning” ability.

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed. 1991),

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOT02A. The

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“reasoning” levels range from a “Level 1,” which is the least demanding, to a

“Level 6,” which requires a high level of abstract reasoning ability. The DOT

states that the occupations of “telephone order clerk” and “charge account clerk”

both require reasoning ability at “Level 3.” As defined in the DOT, the primary

distinction between reasoning Level 2 (which is insufficient for these two jobs) and

reasoning Level 3 (which is sufficient) concerns the complexity of instructions that

a claimant must be able to understand. Reasoning Level 2 requires that the

claimant be able to “carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions,”

whereas Reasoning Level 3 requires that the claimant be able to “carry out

instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form.” Id. app. C,

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/oalj/PUBLIC/DOT/REFERENCES/DOTAPPC

(emphasis added). Because reasoning Level 3 omits any adjective modifying the

term “instructions,” it clearly lacks Level 2’s express limitation to “detailed but

uninvolved” instructions. Level 3 also requires an ability to follow

“diagrammatic” instructions, and not merely “written or oral instructions.”

      As noted, the DOT states that the two occupations at issue here both require

a reasoning ability that corresponds to Level 3. Because reasoning Level 3, unlike

reasoning Level 2, is not limited to “uninvolved” instructions, the DOT

descriptions indicate that the two relevant occupations require an ability to work

with more complex instructions and not just “uninvolved” ones. That creates an

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obvious conflict with Luchsinger’s RFC, which includes only the capacity to

“understand, remember and carry out simple instructions” (emphasis added). Cf.

Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “there is an

apparent conflict between the residual functional capacity to perform simple,

repetitive tasks, and the demands of Level 3 Reasoning”). That obvious conflict

triggers an obligation on the part of the ALJ to ask the VE “to reconcile the

conflict” before the ALJ may “rely[] on the expert to decide if the claimant is

disabled.” Lamear v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201, 1205 (9th Cir. 2017). Indeed, “an

ALJ is required to investigate and resolve any apparent conflict between the VE’s

testimony and the DOT, regardless of whether a claimant raises the conflict before

the agency.” Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2018).

      Where, as here, there is an unresolved conflict between the VE’s testimony

about the jobs the claimant could perform, given her RFC, and the DOT’s

descriptions of those jobs, a remand to the agency is generally warranted,

Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (9th Cir. 2007), unless we can

determine that the error was harmless, Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1042–

43 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government argues that any error is harmless, but we

disagree. At best, we are presented with a “mixed record,” because the various

items of evidence to which the Government points—most of which do not directly

address the key issue about Luchsinger’s ability to follow instructions—are ones

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that reasonable persons might weigh differently. Zavalin, 778 F.3d at 848. “We

therefore conclude that the ALJ’s failure to reconcile the apparent conflict is not

harmless.” Id.

      We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand to that court with

instructions to remand the matter to the agency for proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

      REVERSED and REMANDED.

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