Court Opinion

ID: 9662403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:08:26.777168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.307080
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissent). The majority goes too far. It is not reasonable to extend the employer’s responsibility to the point of infinity and to open wide the door to abuse.
While it has been found reasonable to toll the statute until the employee has or should have knowledge of the injury, it is not reasonable to continue tolling the limit until the employee finally consults an attorney who makes a judgment that the injury may come within the act.
Although the Workmen’s Compensation Act requires that notice be given within three months of *372the "happening” of the injury, this Court has held that the time limit is tolled until the employee has or should have knowledge of the disability.1 (Plaintiff knew of the ultimate disability within two and one-half months of the original incident.)
Thus, it is clear that the act’s notice provision has been subject to other than literal interpretation. The reason for this is said to be a balancing of interests between employer and employee — the employer needs protection from stale claims while the employee should not be required to give notice until he knows that he has an injury.
The employer’s responsibility is heightened by the Jordon and Finch decisions, fn 1. In maintaining a reasonable balance between employer and employee, it is not appropriate to extend the employer’s responsibility indefinitely while so diminishing the employee’s responsibility. The majority opens a dangerous hole in the act’s notice provision. While the instant case involved a delay of approximately 1 year, there is no reason why a plaintiff in the next case could not wait 5, 10 or 20 years before finally seeing an attorney and suddenly "realizing” that his injury may be connected to his work.
The imposition of responsibility upon the employee for reporting known injuries is not an overwhelming burden. Even accepting the formula of the majority, it seems that plaintiff had enough facts available to determine that his disability may have been work-related. On February 1, 1966, plaintiffs feet hurt following a full day of work, and he soaked them in the evening. This continued for several days, with the pain increasing and *373blisters appearing. Plaintiffs doctor lanced a blister and prescribed antibiotics. After returning to work for a few days, plaintiff discontinued working due to intense pain in his feet. He was admitted to a hospital in April and the amputation occurred on April 19, 1966. All of these events took place within approximately two and one-half months— from foot pain and blisters in early February to an amputation in April. Plaintiff remains fully employed by defendant.
Certainly the employee would then have the burden of taking the initiative to report the injury within the time limit. All statutes of limitations have this effect. Today, workmen’s compensation is a fact of general knowledge, and the employee can reasonably be expected to report any injuries from the point where knowledge of injury arises.
The Court of Appeals correctly distinguished the instant facts from the unique occupational disease rationale used in Tillotson v Penn-Dixie Cement Corp, 47 Mich App 427; 209 NW2d 611 (1973), and Brown v Revere Copper & Brass Corp, 42 Mich App 143; 201 NW2d 326 (1972). The cases are inapposite.
Here, plaintiff sustained a recognizable injury which he now claims resulted from work-related activities. The amputation followed in rapid succession to the blisters and pain experienced at work. Plaintiff returned to work wearing a prosthesis and continues to receive full wages.
This is appropriately treated as a single injury occurring at work and not prolonged debilitating occupational disease. Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to realize the possible relation of his injury to work.
I would not extend defendant’s liability infinite*374ly, sans notice of injury, and contrary to controlling. legislation and common law.
Swainson, J. W. Fitzgerald, and Lindemer, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Jordon v Michigan Malleable Iron Co, 363 Mich 256; 109 NW2d 832 (1961); Finch v Ford Motor Co, 321 Mich 469; 32 NW2d 712 (1948).