Court Opinion

ID: 9781568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:52:06.345362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:28.149696
License: Public Domain

*562Chief Justice TOAL.
Respectfully, I dissent. Although I agree with the majority that the circuit court judge improperly considered facts outside the pleadings, I would nevertheless affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of this case because, in my assessment, the allegations in the complaint do not entitle Appellant to relief under any legal theory.
The majority found Appellant stated a prima facie case that Act 189 is unconstitutional because the act improperly singles out the Charleston County School District without a rational basis for doing so. In my opinion, unless there is a conflict between the special and the general law, the question of whether there is a logical basis for invoking a special law need not be reached.
The South Carolina Constitution prohibits the enactment of special or local laws “where a general law can be made applicable,” S.C. Const. Art. Ill, § 34(IX), but permits the General Assembly to enact “special provisions in general laws.” Id. § 34(X). This Court is deferential to the General Assembly when determining the constitutionality of a local law and will not declare that law unconstitutional “unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt,” Med. Soc’y of S.C. v. Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 279, 513 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1999), or “there has been a clear and palpable abuse of legislative discretion.” Sirrine v. State, 132 S.C. 241, 248, 128 S.E. 172, 174 (1925), overruled on other grounds, McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985). As the majority rightly points out, this Court affords the General Assembly even greater deference when evaluating local laws involving school matters. See McElveen v. Stokes, 240 S.C. 1, 10, 124 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1962). When local legislation involves public education, the constitutional restriction on the enactment of local laws must be viewed in light of the General Assembly’s Article XI duty to “provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State.... ” S.C. Const, art. XI, section 3; McElveen, 240 S.C. at 10, 124 S.E.2d at 596. Accordingly, this Court has traditionally sustained local laws relating to the state’s public education system, Bradley v. Cherokee Sch. Dist., 322 S.C. 181, 470 S.E.2d 570 (1996); *563Smythe v. Stroman, 251 S.C. 277, 289, 162 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1968); Moseley v. Welch, 209 S.C. 19, 33, 39 S.E.2d 133, 140 (1946); Walker v. Bennett, 125 S.C. 389, 118 S.E. 779 (1923), unless the Court finds the special law to be in direct conflict with the general law such that the two cannot operate simultaneously, Smythe v. Stroman, 251 S.C. 277, 289,162 S.E.2d 168, 173 (1968); Kearse v. Lancaster, 172 S.C. 59, 61, 172 S.E. 767, 768 (1934), or if the Court finds, through a rational basis analysis, that a general law could be made applicable, Horry County v. Horry County Higher Educ. Com’n, 306 S.C. 416, 418, 412 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1991).
Based on the allegations contained in the School District’s complaint, I see no legal theory under which the School District could prevail. In my opinion, rather than conflicting with the Charter Schools Act, Act 189 merely operates within its framework. In its complaint, the School District alleges that Section 5(A) of Act 189 conflicts with section 59-40-140(D)6 of the South Carolina Code. Section 5(A) of Act 189 reads:
The Charleston County School District may not deny a charter school, charter school teacher, or charter school student anything that is otherwise available to a public school, public school teacher, or public school student including, but not limited to, the provisions in subsection (B).
Section 59-40-140(E) states that services provided by the local school district, “including, but not limited to, food services, custodial services, maintenance, curriculum, media services, libraries, and warehousing are subject to negotiation between a charter school and the sponsor or local school district.” S.C.Code Ann. § 59-40-140(E) (Supp.2010). On its face, I do not believe that subsection 5(A) of Act 189 conflicts with section 59-40-140(E). The general law requires that the school district open all of its services to negotiation with a charter school, while Act 189 states simply that the School District may not deny anything otherwise available to a public school. To me, these provisions work in conjunction.
*564The School District additionally alleges that subsection (B)(1) of Act 189 conflicts with sections 59-40-140(J) and 59-40-170 of the South Carolina Code. Subsection (B)(1) of Act 189 reads: “The local school district of a charter school in Charleston County may not charge rent to a charter school that was converted from an existing public school,” Section 59-40-140(J) states that “[cjharter schools may acquire by gift, devise, purchase, lease, sublease, installment purchase agreement, land contract, option, or by any other means, and hold and own in its own name buildings or other property for school purposes and interests in it which are necessary or convenient to fulfill its purposes.”
I read subsection (B)(1) of Act 189 to mean that the School District may not charge rent to charter schools housed in the School District’s facilities by virtue of the fact they were formerly public schools. This provision is unrelated to section 59-40-140(J), which provides a listing of methods by which a charter school may acquire property. The two provisions can operate simultaneously, as a Charleston county charter school may remain in their buildings rent-free under the local law, but may also acquire property for use under any of the enumerated means of section 59-40-140(J).
I also disagree with the School District’s claim that subsection (B)(1) of Act 189 conflicts with section 59^40-170 of the South Carolina Code. Rather, I believe subsection (B)(1) rests neatly within its prescription. Section 59-40-170 requires the Department of Education to provide charter schools, upon request, a list of vacant and unused portions of buildings owned by school districts, and if a school district decides to sell or lease one of these buildings, a charter school “must be given the first refusal to purchase or lease the building under the same or better terms and conditions as it would be offered to the public.” S.C.Code Ann. § 59-40-170 (Supp.2010) (emphasis supplied). First, this provision refers to a charter school’s acquisition of new property, and I believe subsection 5(A) of Act 189 allows a charter school that was converted to a public school to remain in the facility rent-free. But even if subsection 5(A) is not interpreted as narrowly, and it requires the School District to provide additional facilities to converted charter schools, the general law provides two options to school districts they may either give first right of refusal under (1) *565the same terms, or (2) better terms. Subsection 5(A) of Act 189 simply requires the School District supply its facilities to converted charter schools under better terms than the general public. Again, on its face, I do not see that Act 189 conflicts with any provision of the general law. Therefore, I would affirm the circuit court’s dismissal of this case because I do not believe the School District’s claim can prevail under any legal theory.

. After a 2006 revision to the Charter Schools Act, this is now section 59-40-140(E) (Supp.2010). For clarity, I refer to the most current rendering of the provision.