Court Opinion

ID: 9383059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:15:43.385673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.364082
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0105
                               Filed March 29, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF B.D.,
Minor Child,

A.D., Mother,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Scott Strait,

District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights AFFIRMED.

      Daniel J. McGinn of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, Council Bluffs, for

appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Roberta J. Megel of the Public Defender’s Office, Council Bluffs, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

       The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents of B.D.

(born in 2011). Only the mother appeals. Our review is de novo. In re Z.K., 973

N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings,

but we are not bound by them. Id.

       Although the mother mixes in references to numerous other issues, she

presents only one issue in the manner required by our rules of appellate procedure.

See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (requiring a petition on appeal to substantially

comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401); .1401–Form 5 (requiring issues to be identified

and presented separately). She contends the State failed to make reasonable

efforts toward reunification.

       While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “[t]he State must

show reasonable efforts [toward reunification] as part of its ultimate proof that the

child cannot be safely returned to the [custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924

N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first alteration in original). The mother contends

such efforts were not made. The problem with the mother’s contention—besides

not identifying any efforts that should have been made that weren’t—is that raising

reasonable-efforts challenges to us on appeal, or even to the juvenile court at the

termination hearing, is too late. See In re E.H., No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). “If a parent has a complaint regarding

services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when the case

permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.”            In re C.H., 652

N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). Further, the complaint must be made to the juvenile

court, as voicing a complaint to services providers is insufficient. Id. “[I]f a parent
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fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and

may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” Id. The mother points to

no place in the record where she challenged the reasonableness of the efforts at

removal, when the case permanency plan was entered, or at later review hearings.

And we find no such challenges following our independent review of the record. In

fact, the record shows that the juvenile court made repeated findings throughout

the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) case that reasonable efforts

toward reunification were made, and the mother made no challenge to those

findings. We find the mother has waived her reasonable-efforts challenge.

      As previously noted, the mother did not properly identify, present, and

develop any other issues, but she did sprinkle references to other issues

throughout her petition on appeal. By failing to properly identify, present, and

develop those issues, the mother has waived them. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d

489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all-encompassing argument is insufficient to

identify error in cases of de novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876

(1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and

then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such

arguments.”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa

1974) (“To reach the merits of this case would require us to assume a partisan role

and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse

to assume.”).

      Due to her waiver of them, we have no obligation to review the other issues

the mother mentions. Nevertheless, we note that we have conducted a de novo

review of the record and reach the following conclusions. The State established a
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statutory ground for termination. Although the juvenile court terminated on multiple

grounds, we focus on the ground found in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2022).

See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the juvenile court

terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the

juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.”).

Termination under section 232.116(1)(f) requires proof that (1) the child is four

years old or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a CINA; (3) the child has

been removed from the parent’s custody for at least twelve of the previous

eighteen months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at

the time of the termination hearing.

       The mother admitted the first three elements in her testimony. As to the

fourth element, the evidence is overwhelming that the child cannot be returned to

the mother’s custody. The underlying CINA case started due to the mother’s use

of methamphetamine while caring for the child. Over the ensuing eighteen months

leading up to the termination hearing, the mother missed five of twenty-three

requested drugs tests. See In re R.A., No. 21-0746, 2021 WL 4891011, at *1 (Iowa

Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (collecting cases noting missed tests are presumed

positive for illegal substances). Of the eighteen times she submitted to testing,

she tested positive for methamphetamine sixteen times. She quit or was kicked

out of treatment twice, and she admitted last using methamphetamine the month

before the termination hearing. She also showed a remarkable lack of awareness

of the harm her methamphetamine addiction posed to the child, repeatedly

testifying that her use posed no danger to the child.            See In re K.S.,

No. 21-1755,2022 WL 951034, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (finding a
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parent’s ongoing use of methamphetamine and lack of awareness of how such

use affects the child supports termination under section 232.116(1)(f) because the

child cannot be returned to the parent). Statutory grounds for termination were

met.

       We also conclude that termination is in the child’s best interests. The

mother’s consistent use of methamphetamine and lack of awareness of how her

use negatively affects the child supports finding that termination is in the child’s

best interests. See id. (finding termination in the child’s best interests when the

mother is unaware of how her methamphetamine use affects the child).

Additionally, the child is thriving in his placement with fictive kin. The host family

wants to adopt the child, and the child is in favor of the adoption. See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2) (providing that the willingness of a foster family to adopt and the

child’s integration into the foster family as considerations in assessing whether

termination is in the child’s best interests). Termination is in the child’s best

interests.

       We have also considered whether the mother should be given additional

time to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the

juvenile court to consider alternative permanency options under section 232.104 if

the court chooses to not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b)

(providing a permanency option of granting a parent an additional six months to

work toward reunification). In order to grant an extension, we must be able to

“enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which

comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from

the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”
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Id. § 232.104(2)(b). We conclude no such extension should be granted. After

eighteen months of services while the child was placed elsewhere, the mother is

no closer to being in a position to resume custody of the child than she was when

the child was first removed. Therefore, we are unable to discern any expected

changes that would enable us to determine that the child could be returned to the

mother’s care six months in the future.

      In conclusion, the mother waived her reasonable-efforts challenge, and we

find ample evidence supporting the decision to terminate her parental rights.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      AFFIRMED.