Court Opinion

ID: 9584789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:42.113069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:59.086422
License: Public Domain

Stolz, Judge,
concurring specially in dissent. Until fairly recently, there were three areas of general immunity from tort liability in our law: governmental immunity, charitable immunity, and parental immunity. Each of these doctrines originally came to us through the common law. Governmental immunity was later incorporated into our statutory law, the other two doctrines rest exclusively on court decisions— judge made law. Each doctrine was founded on public policy, i.e., "it would be unconscionable to allow a subject to sue the sovereign” — "We mustn’t allow the assets of a charity to be depleted” — -"For child to sue parent would destroy the tranquility of the family.”
Our laws are rules regulating the relationship between the members of our society. Laws are changed periodically as society changes and in recent years we have observed most significant changes in our society. As a result of this change in society, the General Assembly enacted Code Ann. §56-2437 (1, 2) (Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 673) and substan*734tially modified the doctrine of governmental immunity. In 1961, this court, engaging in what the majority would hold to be "judicial legislation,” substantially modified the doctrine of charitable immunity in Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664 (123 SE2d 16). In Cox, our court specifically recognized that the doctrine of charitable immunity was established in our law (p. 671), but went on to modify that doctrine. The rule expressed in Cox was subsequently approved by a unanimous decision of our Supreme Court. Morehouse College v. Russell, 219 Ga. 717 (135 SE2d 432). Far from being an encroachment on the legislative domain, this was our court’s recognition that the doctrine of total charitable immunity had lost its relevance in our society. Indeed, it is basic to our system of jurisprudence that judicial decisions are constantly reviewed by the courts. It strains judicial credibility to hold that cases of first impression can be changed only through statutory law.
The majority opinion on rehearing re-emphasizes the rule of stare decisis to the point where judicial decisions are irrevocably cast in a mold — never to be modified or changed. Fortunately, this court has never allowed itself to be so cast. Obviously, if the majority view of stare decisis had prevailed, the decision in Cox could not have been reached. At the risk of seeming inconsistent, I would observe that the decision in Cox affords ample basis for this court to change the doctrine of parental immunity under the rule of stare decisis.
Perhaps in our zeal to expound our philosophy we have overlooked how basically simple this case really is. From the facts as outlined in the majority opinion it is readily perceived that there is no effort by the unemancipated child (plaintiff) to sue his mother. The suit was brought only against the defendant Mrs. Eschen, who in turn brought a third-party action against the plaintiff’s mother for contribution. The two issues, liability and contribution, can be severed for trial purposes. Code Ann. § 81A-114 (a) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 627; 1969, p. 979). "(1) Where the tortious act does not involve moral turpitude, contribution among *735several trespassers may be enforced just as if they had been jointly sued. (2) If judgment is entered jointly against several trespassers, and is paid off by one, the others shall be liable to him for contribution.” Code Ann. § 105-2012 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 433). Thus it is clear that the defendant has a statutory right to seek contribution in the manner she is attempting. There is no action by the unemancipated child (plaintiff) against his mother. There is no activity by the child which could remotely be construed to "adversely affect the domestic tranquility.” Here, the action against the parent is by the defendant, a stranger to the household and an adversary in the litigation. No filial or consanguineal relationship exists. Further, the defendant (third-party plaintiff) in seeking contribution is exercising a specific right granted by statute. Should the statutory public policy of allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors yield to the antiquated, anachronistic doctrine of parental immunity? I think not.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Bell and Judge Deen concur in this dissent.