Court Opinion

ID: 9584304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:38.946413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:29.927656
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
Appellant State Treasurer presents two questions of first impression for this Court. First, whether the Public School Employees Retirement Act, MCL 38.1301 et seq.; MSA 15.893(111) et seq., nonassignment provision, which protects a public employee’s pension from legal process, has priority over the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, MCL 800.401 et seq.; MSA 28.1701 et seq., reimbursement provision that specifically includes “pension benefits” as “assets” that may be subject to a prisoner’s statutory obligation to reimburse the state for his incarceration costs.1
The Court of Appeals found that the pension act’s nonassignment provision prevailed over the reimbursement act’s reimbursement provision and that the pension funds at issue were insulated from creditors even after dispensation to the fund recipient.
We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that the reimbursement act has priority over the pension act in that the nonassignment provision does not insulate a public school employee’s pension from the reimbursement provision.
*411i
On April 10, 1991, codefendant Jon Schuster was sentenced to two and one-half to fifteen years in prison, following his February 14, 1991, conviction of criminal sexual conduct.2 Plaintiff brought this action under the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, seeking reimbursement for the costs of incarcerating Schuster in a state correctional facility. Those costs totaled approximately $22,000 for the first sixteen months of incarceration, and would continue to accrue during the remainder of Schuster’s incarceration.
The state claimed the only potential source of reimbursement, or “asset” as defined by the reimbursement act,3 was Schuster’s retirement allowance. Schuster was receiving in excess of $2,000 a month from his pension. The monthly pension checks were sent to Schuster’s home address and were deposited in a bank account that was held jointly by Schuster and his wife under a power of attorney arrangement.
Pursuant to the reimbursement act, the state sought to obtain ninety percent of the deposited pension.4 Schuster attacked the legality of the state’s action, claiming that the pension funds in question were entirely protected from collection by legal process under the nonassignment provision of the pension act.
The circuit court judge held that Schuster’s pension was an asset subject to the reimbursement scheme and could, therefore, be considered in evaluating *412Schuster’s ability to reimburse the state for the costs of his incarceration, even though Schuster’s pension was, in fact, his only asset. The circuit court further found that the state could attach these pension payments after they were paid to Schuster. Upon motion, the circuit court conducted two days of hearings5 regarding Schuster’s “assets” and his legal and moral obligations to his wife and dependents. On April 23, 1993, the judge ordered Schuster to pay fifty percent, rather than the petitioned ninety percent, of his pension monies, or $1,000 a month, to the state pursuant to the reimbursement act.6 The court entered a final order to that effect on August 11, 1993, and later denied defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s order and opinion, and held that the nonassignment provisions of the pension act had priority over the reimbursement act. The Court of Appeals further held that the pension funds continued to be shielded from creditors even after payments were made to the fund beneficiary, in this case Schuster’s wife.
*413We granted leave to appeal to decide whether the reimbursement act subjects Schuster’s pension to reimbursement for the costs of his incarceration despite the pension act’s nonassignment provision.
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Resolution of this matter requires this Court to examine an apparent conflict between two legislative enactments.
The State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act provision at issue was originally enacted in 1935 as part of the Prison Reimbursement Act. The basic purpose of the act was to ensure that prisoners shoulder the burdensome cost of their incarceration, to the extent possible, rather than law-abiding taxpayers. In 1984, the act was amended and renamed the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, with the same intent to “provide procedures for securing reimbursement to the state of the expenses incurred by the state for the cost of care of certain prisoners in state correctional facilities . . . .”7 As amended, the reimbursement act contained the following sweeping definition of a prisoner’s “assets” subject to the act:
(a) “Assets” means property, tangible or intangible, real or personal, belonging to or due a prisoner or former pris*414oner including income or payments to such prisoner from social security, worker’s compensation, veteran’s compensation, pension benefits, previously earned salary or wages, bonuses, annuities, retirement benefits, or from any other source whatsoever, but does not include any of the following:
(i) The homestead of the prisoner up to $50,000.00 in value.
(ii) Money received by the prisoner from the state as settlement of a claim against the department from the prisoner.
(iii) A money judgment received by the prisoner from the state as a result of a civil action in which the department was named defendant and found to be liable.
(iv) Money saved by the prisoner from wages and bonuses paid the prisoner while he or she was confined to a state correctional facility. [MCL 800.401a; MSA 28.1701(1) (emphasis added).]
According to the plain language above, the Legislature, in 1984, decided to subject all pension payments to the reimbursement scheme specifically, and without exception. Moreover, the Legislature declined to include pension payments in the list of express statutory exceptions to the reimbursement act, which was revised by 1996 PA 286. MCL 800.401a(a)(i), (ii); MSA 28.1701(l)(a)(i), (ii). Nonetheless, Schuster claims that his pension payments are not subject to the reimbursement act. Indeed, he maintains that the nonassignment provision of the pension act has priority.
The Public School Employees Retirement Act was created in 1945 to establish and govern the pensions of public school employees.8 Such pensions are *415expressly insulated from creditor attack through “legal process” by the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a retirement allowance, an optional benefit, or any other benefit accrued or accruing to a person under this act, the reserves created by this act, and the money, investments, or income of those reserves are exempt from state, county, municipal, or other local tax and are not subject to execution, garnishment, attachment, the operation of bankruptcy or insolvency laws, or other process of law. The right to a retirement allowance, an optional benefit, or any other benefit accrued or accruing to a person under this act is unassignable, except as specifically provided in this act. [MCL 38.1346(1); MSA 15.893(156)(1) (emphasis added).]
In 1991, the Legislature amended this provision to specifically subject pension payments to alimony, child support orders, and eligible domestic relations orders.9 The Legislature has not, however, expressly subjected pensions to the reimbursement provisions.
Given this apparent conflict between the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act and the Public School Employees Retirement Act, this Court is asked to resolve the relative priority of the two enactments and whether the reimbursement act subjects Schuster’s pension payments to reimbursement for incarceration costs, regardless of their source.
The Court of Appeals resolved this conflict in favor of the pension act, finding Schuster’s pension payments were entirely insulated from creditors and the reimbursement provision.10 The Court awarded the pension act priority status because it found, as *416between the two statutes, that it was the more specific and was the most recently amended. We find this reasoning to be unpersuasive in this case. An application of the argument that priority rests with the most recently enacted or amended statute would, in this case, belittle the veiy serious inquiry into legislative intent that this task demands. As both statutes have been revised several times without reference to the other, reliance on the statutory construction rule that the most recent amendment controls would ultimately result in inconsistent determinations of relative priority over time.
Moreover, any inquiry into relative recency of amendments should include only pertinent or relevant amendments. In this case, both statutes have been revised several times and for reasons unrelated to the issues at hand. If our inquiry, however, is limited to relevant statutory changes, it would appear that the reimbursement act controls as the most recently amended with regard to the provisions at issue. While the act’s predecessor, the Prison Reimbursement Act, was originally enacted in 1935, ten years before the pension act, the Legislature significantly revised the reimbursement act in 1984 PA 282, and for the first time specifically included all pensions as “assets” subject to the act. The reimbursement act was more recently amended by 1996 PA 286, which revisited and reduced the list of exceptions from its otherwise broad definition of “assets.” The pension act, on the other hand, was initially enacted after the reimbursement act, but its most applicable revisions were made by 1985 PA 34-41, and 1991 PA 47. Neither of these revisions, however, specifically addressed the reimbursement act’s inclusion of all pensions in its defini*417tion of “assets” subject to the act. Accordingly, we find that the reimbursement act was the most recently revised regarding the specific provisions at issue. The pension act would then serve as the general rule of excusing pensions from “legal process,” and the reimbursement act would be an exception to that general rule. The Court of Appeals determination that the pension act controls because it is the most recently revised is flawed because it ignores the above analysis.
We also reject their cursory conclusion that the pension act controls because it is more specific. Such reasoning effectively nullifies the reimbursement language in the reimbursement act, which specifically includes all pensions, without exception, as assets. This Court has stated:
Statutes in pari materia are those which relate to the same person or thing, or the same class of persons or things, or which have a common purpose. It is the rule that in construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although enacted at different times, and containing no reference one to the other. [Detroit v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 374 Mich 543, 558; 132 NW2d 660 (1965) (citations omitted).]
We find that the pension act’s nonassignment provision and the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act are in pari materia because both enactments address pensions. However, this Court has refused to apply rules that the more specific statute controls where such “strict construction . . . would defeat the main purpose of other statutes relating to *418the same subject.” Id. at 560, citing Rathbun v Michigan, 284 Mich 521; 280 NW 35 (1938). In this case, we refuse to adopt the Court of Appeals construction of the statutory provisions at issue because it effectively nullifies the express language in the reimbursement act and, consequently, defeats the main purpose of that statute.
The reimbursement act specifically, and without exception as to source, includes pension payments in the definition of “assets,” and, therefore, subjects all pension payments to its reimbursement scheme. The Legislature did not add pension payments to the amended list of exceptions to the act’s otherwise sweeping reimbursement provisions. Moreover, the plain and broad language of the reimbursement provisions at issue indicates a legislative intent to shift the burden of incarceration expenses to prisoners and from the taxpayers whenever possible. This primary intent is effectively ignored, and certainly frustrated, by the Court of Appeals holding that the pension act’s general protection of pension payments from “legal process” has priority over the reimbursement act.
For these reasons, we find the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals to be flawed. Moreover, we are unprepared, absent clear language evidencing such legislative intent, to allow Schuster to avoid his statutory obligations under the reimbursement act when all other non-pension act pension payments are subject to the reimbursement act. A contrary conclusion, without clear legislative intent, would nullify the plain language in the reimbursement act and be manifestly unfair to Michigan taxpayers and to the other prisoners required to reimburse the state for their incarceration expenses.
*419We note that this holding does not hinder the primary legislative purpose behind the pension provisions. The nonassignment provisions were designed to insulate retirement benefits from creditors. However, the state, when considering pension payments according to the reimbursement act, is not a “creditor,” nor is the relationship between a prisoner and the state a typical debtor-creditor relationship. State Treasurer v Sheko, 218 Mich App 185, 189; 553 NW2d 654 (1996), citing Auditor General v Hall, 300 Mich 215, 221; 1 NW2d 516 (1942), and Auditor General v Olezniczak, 302 Mich 336, 350; 4 NW2d 679 (1942). Rather, a prisoner is an obligor because of his statutory, not voluntary or personal, obligation to reimburse the state under the reimbursement act for his incarceration expenses. Because of the unique relationship between prisoner and state, as obligor and obligee, respectively, a reimbursement action is not clearly the type of “other legal process” from which the pension act shields its pension payments. Therefore, our determination regarding relative priority gives greater effect to the language employed in both statutory provisions at issue without rendering any relevant provision surplusage or nugatory. See Baker v General Motors Corp, 409 Mich 639, 665; 297 NW2d 387 (1980).
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on the issue of relative priority between the statutes at issue. We hold that the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act’s provisions prevail because of their plain language, which squarely address the very question before this Court — the relationship between a prisoner’s statutory duty to reim*420burse the state for his incarceration expenses, and pension payments.
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Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals reversal of the circuit court and reinstate the final circuit court order in this case.
Mallett, C.J., and Brickley, Boyle, and Taylor, JJ., concurred with Weaver, J.

 Given our conclusion that the reimbursement act prevails over the pension act, we do not find it necessary to address the second issue raised on appeal regarding whether the nonassignment provision protects pension funds even after such funds are paid to the pension fund recipient or beneficiary. Our decision not to address this second issue should not imply our approval of the Court of Appeals holding or analysis regarding protection of disbursements after receipt.

 MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).

 MCL 800.401a; MSA 28.1701(1).

 MCL 800.403; MSA 28.1703.

 MCL 800.404(5); MSA 28.1704(5) mandates that the court
shall take into consideration any legal obligation of the defendant to support a spouse, minor children, or other dependents and any moral obligation to support dependents to whom the defendant is providing or has in fact provided support.
In aptly fulfilling this statutory requirement, the circuit judge decided there was no reason to subject Schuster’s wife to “any greater hardship as a result of her husband’s actions than is necessary” and found “she should not be forced to lower her standard of living or be impoverished as a result.”

 Pursuant to MCL 800.403; MSA 28.1703, the state may seek up to ninety percent of the prisoners’ "assets” in satisfaction of their incarceration costs.

 MCL 800.401; MSA 28.1701. The act further directs:
At the time of the hearing on the complaint and order, if it appears that the prisoner has any assets which ought to be subjected to the claim of the state under this act, the court shall issue an order requiring any person, corporation, or other legal entity possessed or having custody of those assets to appropriate and apply those assets or a portion thereof toward reimbursing the state as provided for under this act. [MCL 800.404(3); MSA 28.1704(3).]

 1945 PA 136.

 1991 PA 47. MCL 38.1346(4), (6); MSA 15.893(156)(4), (6).

 215 Mich App 347; 547 NW2d 332 (1996).