Court Opinion

ID: 9897217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:46.944731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:40.014770
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                         Jun 22 2023, 12:19 pm

                                                                CLERK
                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                 and Tax Court

                     IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court
         Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-13

                Matthew Hayko,
                       Appellant

                          –v–

                State of Indiana,
                        Appellee

     Argued: March 2, 2023 | Decided: June 22, 2023

         Appeal from the Spencer Circuit Court
                 No. 74C01-1902-F3-58
              The Honorable Jon A. Dartt

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                   No. 21A-CR-2407

            Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
   Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Rush, Chief Justice.

   Who and what to believe are matters of personal choice. These choices
are deeply consequential in a jury trial, but they belong exclusively to each
juror. Yet, our rules of evidence provide parties with several ways to
influence a juror’s credibility assessment. Indiana Evidence Rule 608(a),
for example, allows parties to cut to the credibility core by eliciting a
witness’s opinion regarding another witness’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness.

    This case implicates an issue of first impression under Rule 608(a): what
is required to establish the proper foundation for a witness’s opinion
testimony? At trial, a defendant accused of molesting his minor daughter
sought to admit opinions from three of his family members regarding the
victim’s untruthful character. The trial court excluded the proffered
testimony for lack of foundation, which the defendant contends was
reversible error.

   We first clarify that the evidentiary foundation required to admit
opinion testimony is less demanding than that required to admit
reputation testimony. To lay a proper foundation for opinion testimony
under Rule 608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion
is both rationally based on their personal knowledge and would be
helpful to the trier of fact. We hold the trial court erred in excluding the
opinion testimony here, as the court relied on foundation considerations
relevant only to reputation testimony. But we then hold the error was
harmless and, thus, affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
   Matthew Hayko and L.D. are parents to three daughters from their
previous relationship, including V1, who was born in November 2006.
After the couple separated, Hayko exercised visitation with V1 and her
two sisters every other weekend during the school year. During a visit in
February 2018, Hayko and his wife hosted another couple for dinner at
their home, and they played a couple games together. While playing
cards, Hayko—who had consumed around four to ten beers—rubbed V1’s

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023         Page 2 of 16
back. V1 asked Hayko to continue rubbing her back once the game was
over, which he did as he tucked her into bed and lay down beside her.

   In bed, Hayko put his hand under V1’s bra and rubbed her breast
“[s]kin to skin.” He then put his hand under V1’s underwear, inserted his
finger into her vagina two or three times, and kissed her face and neck.
Hayko eventually stopped touching V1 and left the room, but he returned
within a few minutes and fell asleep in her bed. When they woke up the
next morning, Hayko had his arm on V1’s shoulder, realized he had fallen
asleep, and noted it was “awkward.” He apologized to V1 and asked her
not to tell anyone about what happened, assuring her that it wouldn’t
happen again.

   About a year later, Hayko took his daughters out to eat where V1
became “uncomfortable” while observing Hayko with his arm around her
younger sister “the whole dinner.” After returning to L.D.’s home that
evening, V1 “started crying” and informed her mother that Hayko had
previously touched her inappropriately. L.D. subsequently brought V1 to
their local child advocacy center where she underwent a forensic
interview.

   The following day, Hayko agreed to speak with law enforcement about
V1’s allegations. During that interview, Hayko told a detective he “had
been drinking all day” and “was wasted” on the night of the incident. He
remembered “waking up the next morning” in V1’s bed with his “arm
around her, cuddling her, kind of like I would if it was my wife,” which
was “awkward.” He also recalled asking V1 to “keep this between us.”
Though Hayko did not remember fondling or touching V1, he declined to
tell the detective that V1 “is a liar.” And he acknowledged “if this did
happen, you know, and I don’t recall because I was drinking, wasted, or
whatever” that “this would be an isolated incident.”

   The State subsequently charged Hayko with one count of Level 1 felony
child molestation, one count of Level 3 felony child molestation, one count
of Level 4 felony child molestation, and one count of Level 4 felony incest.
Before trial, Hayko notified the State he intended to call three relatives as
witnesses to testify about their opinion of V1’s character for
untruthfulness. The State objected, contending the witnesses lacked

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023         Page 3 of 16
“adequate knowledge of the victim’s character” and that they had “no
recent contact or familiarity with the victim.” After holding a hearing on
the matter, the trial court issued an order requiring Hayko to make an
offer of proof outside the jury’s presence to demonstrate that the
“character witnesses can meet the foundation requirement of having an
adequate basis to give an opinion as to the alleged victim’s truthfulness or
untruthfulness.”

   During that offer of proof at trial, Hayko elicited the opinions of his
father (V1’s paternal grandfather), his stepmother (V1’s paternal step-
grandmother), and his sister (V1’s paternal aunt). Each testified they had
known V1 since she was born, had spent time around her at various
family gatherings throughout the years, had personally interacted with
her and observed her interactions with others, and had last seen her
shortly before she made the allegations. Based on their respective
experiences, each witness opined that V1 had a dishonest character.

   The trial court excluded their testimony, concluding that Hayko had
not established a proper foundation. In reaching its conclusion, the court
reasoned that the three witnesses were “too insular” of a group and their
contacts with V1 were “not sufficient to justify an opinion about the
child’s reputation for truthfulness.” Hayko objected, asserting the
witnesses were “not there to talk about [V1’s] reputation in the
community,” and that he established an adequate foundation for the
witnesses to offer their opinions of V1’s character based on their “personal
observations” and “interactions” with the child. The trial court overruled
the objection, reiterating it did not find “sufficient contacts” for the
witnesses “to be able to form and express those opinions.”

   Also, during trial, V1 testified about the allegations; Hayko testified
and denied touching V1 inappropriately; Hayko introduced messages he
exchanged with L.D. in which the parents discussed V1’s behavioral
problems and her proclivity to lie and manipulate; and the State
introduced Hayko’s interview with law enforcement. The jury ultimately
found Hayko guilty of Level 4 felony child molesting and not guilty of the
remaining three counts. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence
of eight years, with two of those years suspended to probation.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023         Page 4 of 16
   Hayko appealed and raised several issues, including whether the trial
court erred by denying his request for the three witnesses to testify as to
their opinion of V1’s untruthfulness. A divided Court of Appeals’ panel
found this issue dispositive and reversed, with the majority concluding
that the court erred by excluding the opinion testimony and that the error
was not harmless. Hayko v. State, 196 N.E.3d 259, 268 (Ind. 2022). Judge
Tavitas dissented, believing the trial court acted within its discretion in
excluding the testimony. Id. at 274 (Tavitas, J., dissenting).

   The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court
of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 1

Standard of Review
   Hayko argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
vouching testimony, by permitting the State to condition the jury on V1’s
credibility during voir dire, and by excluding his proffered opinion

1 We summarily affirm the part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that held the trial court did
not err by admitting into evidence Hayko’s statements to police. See App. R. 58(A)(2). And we
briefly address two arguments Hayko raises related to his sentence, which the panel did not
reach. He argues the trial court abused its discretion by identifying an improper aggravating
circumstance. However, even if we agreed, he would not be entitled to relief. The trial court
identified two other aggravating circumstances—Hayko abusing his position of trust with V1
and his criminal history—that Hayko does not challenge and that support the sentence
imposed. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, 714 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 1999) (“A single aggravating
circumstance may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence.”). Hayko also argues his
sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). We disagree. Our Rule 7(B) authority is
reserved “for exceptional cases,” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019), and we exercise
that authority to “leaven the outliers,” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). This
is not an exceptional case, as Hayko has failed to produce compelling evidence showing that
the nature of his offense or his character renders his slightly enhanced sentence an outlier.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023                             Page 5 of 16
testimony. Because we find the first two arguments lack merit, 2 our
review is limited to whether the trial court committed reversible error by
excluding Hayko’s opinion testimony.

   We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion, which occurs when the court misinterprets the law. See Smith v.
Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 151 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ind. 2020); Snow v.
State, 77 N.E.3d 173, 177 (Ind. 2017). Though Hayko contends the court’s
exclusion here denied him his constitutional right to present a defense, the
fact that the trial court may have erred in excluding evidence does not
transform that error into one of constitutional dimension. See Hastings v.
State, 58 N.E.3d 919, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). And Hayko’s alleged error is
not one of constitutional dimension because he was able to exercise his
right to present his defense—attacking V1’s credibility—by presenting the
jury with other, significant impeachment evidence. Thus, even if the court
abused its discretion in excluding Hayko’s opinion testimony, we review
whether this non-constitutional error was harmless such that its “probable
impact in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as
not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” App. R. 66(A).

Discussion and Decision
   Indiana Evidence Rule 608(a) allows a party to attack a witness’s
credibility in two distinct ways: (1) through “testimony about the

2The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayko’s objection, under Evidence
Rule 704(b), when V1’s forensic interviewer answered “no” after the State asked her whether
“delayed disclosure [is] necessarily a sign of deception.” Rule 704(b), in relevant part,
prohibits a witness from testifying that another “witness has testified truthfully.” Ind.
Evidence Rule 704(b). The forensic interviewer’s answer did not relate to the truth or falsity of
V1’s allegations; it was merely an observation rooted in her experience regarding the behavior
of child victims generally. Cf. Ward v. State, 203 N.E.3d 524, 532 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The trial
court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Hayko’s objections during voir dire, as the
State’s questioning did not condition the jury on V1’s credibility. Rather, the State’s questions
were properly aimed at discerning whether a prospective juror had any opinion, belief, or
bias about children and their credibility, or whether they had any experiences that would
impact their ability to evaluate a child’s testimony concerning allegations of molestation. Cf.
Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ind. 1981).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023                            Page 6 of 16
witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness”; or (2) through “testimony in the form of an opinion
about” the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Ind.
Evidence Rule 608(a) (emphasis added). However, “evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness
has been attacked.” Id. Though this limitation does not apply when a
party introduces evidence of a witness’s untruthful character, that
evidence must be supported by a proper foundation before being
admitted.

   We have clarified the foundational requirements for admitting
reputation testimony, Bowles v. State, 737 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ind. 2000), but
we have not done the same for admitting opinion testimony until now. To
lay a proper foundation for the admission of opinion testimony under
Rule 608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion is
rationally based on their personal knowledge and that the opinion would
be helpful to the trier of fact. We hold that Hayko satisfied these
requirements, and the trial court erred in excluding his proffered opinion
testimony by relying on foundation considerations relevant only to
reputation testimony. We then hold, considering all the evidence before
the jury, that Hayko has not shown the court’s error would have impacted
a reasonable, average jury to such an extent that it undermines our
confidence in the verdict. We therefore affirm.

I. The trial court erred in excluding the opinion
   testimony.
   Like experts, lay witnesses are permitted to offer their opinions on a
variety of relevant matters. Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind.
2018). Still, “whether a witness is qualified to give an opinion” is a matter
left to the trial court’s discretion. Kent v. State, 675 N.E.2d 332, 338 (Ind.
1996). So too is whether the witness’s testimony is supported by a proper
foundation. Hill v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1332, 1336 (Ind. 1984). We first clarify
the foundational requirements for admitting opinion testimony under
Rule 608(a) and then determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it excluded the opinion testimony of Hayko’s witnesses.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023           Page 7 of 16
   A. The proponent establishes a proper foundation for
      opinion testimony under Rule 608(a) by demonstrating
      that the witness’s opinion is both rationally based on
      their personal knowledge and would be helpful to the
      trier of fact.

   When a witness testifies at trial, their credibility is subject to
impeachment—that is, it may be attacked. See Evid. R. 404(a)(3), 607, 608,
609, 616. One impeachment mechanism, Rule 608(a), allows a party to
attack a witness’s credibility through reputation or opinion testimony.
Evid. R. 608(a). But the two are not equivalent. While reputation
testimony reflects the consensus of many close to and familiar with a
witness’s character, see Norton v. State, 785 N.E.2d 625, 631–32 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), opinion testimony reflects the judgment of a single
individual. To be sure, not just anyone can offer their opinion about a
witness’s untruthful character. The question then is what a proponent
must show to establish that a witness can reliably offer an opinion
regarding another’s character for truthfulness under Rule 608(a).

   In answering this question, we find two evidentiary rules instructive.
The first is Rule 602, which provides that a “witness may testify to a
matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Evid. R. 602. And the
second is Rule 701, which limits a lay witness’s testimony in the form of
an opinion to one that is both “rationally based on the witness’s
perception” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or to a determination of a fact in issue.” Evid. R. 701. Informed
by these relevant constraints, an opinion on another’s character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness under Rule 608(a) must stem from the
testifying witness’s personal knowledge of that character. And because a
witness offering such an opinion is not testifying as an expert, their
personal knowledge must be the rational product of the witness’s own
perception—such as interactions or observations—and also be helpful to
the trier of fact. Cf. In re A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.
denied; Dunn v. State, 919 N.E.2d 609, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied;

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023              Page 8 of 16
Tolliver v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied;
Prewitt v. State, 819 N.E.2d 393, 413–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

  Yet, the State argues more should be required, contending a proponent
must also show the “opinion is based on sufficient and recent contact”
with the witness whose credibility is being attacked. Hayko disagrees,
noting the vast majority of jurisdictions do not impose these requirements
and emphasizes that cross-examination allows parties to expose such
deficiencies with the witness’s opinion. We share Hayko’s perspective.

   Most jurisdictions—federal and state alike—do not require a proponent
to establish sufficient and recent contacts in laying a foundation for
opinion testimony about a witness’s character. Indeed, such a showing is
not required under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a), which is identical to
our rule. See, e.g., United States v. McMurray, 20 F.3d 831, 834 (8th Cir.
1994); United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1382 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Lollar, 606 F.2d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 1979). And most states
interpreting their analogous evidentiary rules have reached the same
conclusion. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 186 N.J. 286, 895 A.2d
405, 419–20 (2006); State v. Carsner, 126 Idaho 911, 894 P.2d 144, 150 (1995);
State v. Dutton, 896 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Tenn. 1995); Honey v. People, 713 P.2d
1300, 1302–03 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); State v. Hernandez, 184 N.C. App. 344,
646 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2007). These courts aptly recognize the distinction
between reputation evidence and opinion evidence—particularly that the
foundational requirements for the latter are less stringent than those for
the former.

   But, as the State observes, not all states embrace a minimal
foundational standard for the admission of opinion testimony. For
instance, Oregon and Maryland require a proponent to also establish
frequent and recent contact between the character witness and the
principal witness. Devincentz v. State, 460 Md. 518, 191 A.3d 373, 390–91
(2018); State v. Paniagua, 286 Or. App. 284, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (2014).

   We decline to embrace this minority approach for several reasons, the
first being that it fails to distinguish between the nature of reputation and
opinion evidence, as each serves a distinct purpose. For reputation
evidence, a showing of sufficient acquaintance makes sense “to ensure

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023              Page 9 of 16
that the testimony adequately reflects the community’s assessment.”
Watson, 669 F.2d at 1382. But opinion evidence is “a personal assessment
of character,” and thus, the witness is not relating community feelings;
they are simply providing their own “impression of an individual’s
character for truthfulness.” Id.

   Additionally, while parties may take issue with the credibility of a
witness’s opinion when it is rooted in remote experiences, these concerns
can be adequately addressed during cross-examination. That is, parties
may expose any remote-contact concerns in an opinion witness’s
testimony and thereby provide the factfinder with additional evidence
from which to make the ultimate credibility determination. Further, there
is no objective reason why a witness’s opinion premised on less-recent
interactions is inherently unreliable. Likewise, there is no objective way to
determine when a witness’s interactions are too remote or infrequent.

   Finally, establishing a proper foundation for opinion testimony does
not require its admission. Indeed, the trial court can still exclude the
testimony under other evidentiary rules. For example, courts retain
discretion—based on the facts and issues in a particular case—to assess
the evidence’s probative value and determine whether it is substantially
outweighed by one of Rule 403’s dangers. See, e.g., United States v. Turning
Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 734–35 (8th Cir. 2004); State v. Tetreault, 31 A.3d 777,
782–83 (R.I. 2011); see also State v. Wood, 194 W. Va. 525, 460 S.E.2d 771, 774
(1995) (explaining that, in addition to Rule 403, trial courts may exclude
opinion testimony under Rules 402 and 611).

   To reiterate—based on Rules 602 and 701 and informed by the
approach taken in a majority of jurisdictions—we hold that, to lay a
proper foundation for the admission of opinion testimony under Rule
608(a), the proponent must establish that the witness’s opinion is both
rationally based on their personal knowledge and would be helpful to the
trier of fact. Yet, even when foundation is established, the trial court
retains discretion to exclude the evidence based on other rules of
evidence. We now apply these principles to assess the court’s decision to
exclude the opinion testimony here.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023           Page 10 of 16
   B. The opinion testimony was supported by a proper
      foundation.
   At trial, Hayko sought to introduce three opinion witnesses: his father
(V1’s paternal grandfather), his stepmother (V1’s paternal step-
grandmother), and his sister (V1’s paternal aunt). During an offer of proof,
Hayko elicited testimony from these witnesses to establish a foundation
for their opinions. Each witness testified they had known V1 since she was
born, had been around her multiple times a year at family gatherings, had
directly communicated with her and personally observed her interactions
with others, and had last seen her not long before the allegations. Based
on those experiences, V1’s paternal grandfather opined that V1 has a
“[d]ishonest” character, and her paternal step-grandmother similarly
testified that V1 is “very dishonest.” She based her opinion on witnessing
V1 lie to Hayko after hitting another child and after taking a toy from
another child. Likewise, V1’s paternal aunt opined that VI is “a very
dishonest child.” She explained that she started to notice V1’s dishonest
character when her personality began to develop as a toddler and
recounted witnessing V1 lie.

   The above testimony established a proper foundation for each witness’s
opinion of V1’s character for untruthfulness. Their opinions were
rationally based on their personal knowledge, specifically their own
observations of and interactions with V1, which occurred on multiple
occasions. And those opinions would be helpful to the jury because V1’s
credibility was central to the charges against Hayko. Although we have
for the first time clarified and applied the requirements for laying a proper
foundation for opinion testimony under Rule 608(a), the trial court here
nonetheless erred—albeit understandably—in excluding the evidence.

   The trial court erred because its decision was based exclusively on
considerations related to establishing a foundation for reputation
testimony. Indeed, the court concluded the witnesses were “too insular”
and their contacts with V1 were “not sufficient to justify an opinion about
the child’s reputation for truthfulness.” The court further reasoned the
witnesses’ testimony was not sufficiently reliable “because it would be
based off the same set of biases.” But whether the witnesses were too

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023        Page 11 of 16
insular or lacked sufficient contacts with V1 does not negate that their
opinions were rationally based on their personal knowledge or that they
would have been helpful to the jury. Additionally, though the trial court
suggested it addressed whether a foundation had been laid under Rule
608(a) in its entirety, the court did not distinguish between reputation and
opinion testimony. And there is no basis in the record for us to conclude
the court relied on a different evidentiary rule to exclude the evidence.

   Simply put, the trial court’s conflation of reputation and opinion
testimony—a misinterpretation of the law—resulted in the erroneous
exclusion of Hayko’s opinion testimony for lack of foundation. We now
determine whether that error requires reversal.

II. Exclusion of the opinion testimony was harmless
    error.
   A trial court’s error in excluding evidence does not require reversal if
the error was harmless. For non-constitutional errors, like the one here,
our harmless-error analysis is found in Appellate Rule 66(A):

      No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
      omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for
      granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact,
      in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as
      not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

App. R. 66(A). Though neither party cited this rule in their briefing on this
issue, their omissions illustrate a larger, confusing trend in Indiana
caselaw. We thus rectify that confusion today.

    In the two-plus decades since Rule 66(A)’s adoption, its application in
our appellate courts has been far from consistent. See Edward W. Najam,
Jr. & Jonathan B. Warner, Indiana’s Probable-Impact Test for Reversible Error,
55 Ind. L. Rev. 27, 35–50 (2022). Much of the inconsistency stems from
caselaw reviewing whether an error is harmless under Trial Rule 61. Rule
61 instructs an evidentiary error is not grounds for “reversal on appeal

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023            Page 12 of 16
unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice” and directs courts to “disregard any error or defect in
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
Ind. Trial Rule 61 (punctuation omitted). The similarities between Trial
Rule 61 and Appellate Rule 66(A) have produced discrepancies about
which rule governs appellate review of non-constitutional errors and how
the rule should be applied.

  Appellate Rule 66(A), not Trial Rule 61, defines reversible error for our
appellate courts. 3 When an appellate court must determine whether a non-
constitutional error is harmless, Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact test”
controls. Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the burden of
demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the case, the error’s
probable impact undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceeding
below. See Mason v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1233, 1236–37 (Ind. 1997); Najam &
Warner, supra at 50–51. Importantly, this is not a review for the sufficiency
of the remaining evidence; it is a review of what was presented to the trier
of fact compared to what should have been presented. And when
conducting that review, we consider the likely impact of the improperly
admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all
the evidence in the case. See Tunstall v. Manning, 124 N.E.3d 1193, 1200
(Ind. 2019). Ultimately, the error’s probable impact is sufficiently minor
when—considering the entire record—our confidence in the outcome is
not undermined.

   Here, Hayko argues the error denied him the opportunity to impeach
V1’s credibility, which was vital to his defense. To be sure, credibility is
often a central issue in child molestation cases, so impeachment evidence
plays a pivotal role for the defense. See, e.g., Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169,
1179 (Ind. 2011). And, as indicated in Section I, Hayko should have been

3Judge Najam and Jon Warner aptly recognize the “on appeal” language in Trial Rule 61
“simply recognizes that, on occasion, Indiana’s trial courts also engage in a manner of
appellate review, such as when they engage in judicial review of state or local government
agency decisions. But a trial court’s judicial review differs from an appellate court’s review of
reversible error.” Najam & Warner, supra at 50.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023                           Page 13 of 16
permitted to attack V1’s credibility with the opinion testimony of his three
witnesses. But we must consider all the evidence before the jury to
determine whether the excluded evidence would have impacted a
reasonable, average jury to such an extent that we lack confidence in the
verdict. Because we remain confident in the verdict despite the trial
court’s error, the error was harmless.

  In reaching this conclusion, we initially observe that Hayko
presupposes the opinion testimony carried a probative value favorable to
him. Yet, as revealed in the offer of proof, each witness was a member of
Hayko’s immediate family, so the potential for bias loomed. Moreover,
during cross-examination, the State extracted the basis for the witnesses’
opinions, which included recounting stories of V1, as a young child, lying
about both stealing a toy and getting into an altercation with another
child. It is not, however, uncommon for young children who steal toys or
hit others to lie to avoid consequences for these acts. So, while it’s possible
that a reasonable, average jury would have found the witnesses’ opinions
undermined V1’s credibility, it’s also possible the opinions would have
had little to no effect. Accordingly, it is not readily apparent a reasonable,
average jury would have weighed the witnesses’ opinions of V1’s
character for untruthfulness in a manner favorable to Hayko.

   That said, if the excluded testimony was the only evidence attacking
V1’s credibility, our confidence in the verdict would wane considerably.
But the record reveals Hayko impeached V1’s credibility through other
evidence. For example, he told the jury that V1 was “manipulative,
vindictive” and that he “knew she was a liar.” He also admitted into
evidence text messages between himself and V1’s mother about V1’s
untruthful character. In one message, V1’s mother advised Hayko to join
her in keeping “a log of all of [V1’s] incidents” because “[i]t’s too hard . . .
to remember all the episodes she has” and that if she didn’t see
“improvement” in V1’s behavior, she would “look into a counselor for
her.” In another message, V1’s mother told Hayko that V1 was “learning
how to manipulate” people and that, in light of her “manipulative”
behavior, “[y]ou can’t believe everything that comes out of her mouth.”

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023            Page 14 of 16
   The jury also had the opportunity to directly assess V1’s allegations and
credibility through her own testimony. Specifically, she told the jury
Hayko “put his hand under [her] bra and started rubbing [her] breast.”
She also said Hayko touched underneath her underwear and “put his
finger inside” her vagina two or three times while kissing her, recalling
that Hayko made a “low groan noise” during this time. And when they
awoke the next morning, she stated that Hayko apologized to her,
instructed her not to “tell anyone” what happened, and assured her “it
won’t happen again.” The jury then listened as Hayko’s attorney
questioned V1’s allegations and her credibility during cross-examination.

    Further confirming the error does not undermine our confidence in the
verdict is the fact that the jury heard Hayko provide inconsistent answers
when questioned about V1’s allegations. In his pre-trial interview, the jury
listened as Hayko explained he was “wasted” the night he fell asleep in
V1’s bed and remembered waking up next to her the following morning
“cuddling, you know, laying close to her, like, as if she was my wife.” He
admitted telling V1 to “keep this between us.” Then, after the detective
explained to Hayko the nature of V1’s allegations, he asked, “Do you
know what that sounds like? It sounds like, okay, been drinking, you
wasn’t realizing what you was doing, and then at some point you do
realize. Does that make sense?” Hayko responded, “Yeah, it does.” While
Hayko denied touching V1 in the ways alleged, he also stated, “[I]f this
did happen, you know, and I don’t recall because I was drinking, wasted,
or whatever,” it “would be an isolated incident.” When questioned at trial,
however, Hayko provided a different version of events. For example, he
testified that he was “not wasted” on the night of the incident and that he
could “recall everything” that happened. Thus, a reasonable, average jury
would find that just as V1’s credibility was at issue, so too was Hayko’s.

   Ultimately, we recognize that impeachment evidence can have a
profound effect in child molestation cases, as they often turn on credibility
determinations. But the erroneous exclusion of some impeachment
evidence will not necessarily undermine our confidence in the jury’s
verdict. This case is one such example. Hayko has not shown, considering
all the evidence before the jury, that the excluded opinion testimony

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-13 | June 22, 2023         Page 15 of 16
would have impacted a reasonable, average jury to such an extent that
undermines our confidence in the verdict. The error is therefore harmless.

Conclusion
   Hayko laid a proper foundation to admit his proffered opinion
testimony, and the trial court erred in excluding that evidence for lack of
foundation. But because we conclude the error was harmless, we affirm.

Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Matthew J. McGovern
Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Angela Sanchez
Chief Counsel for Appeals

George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

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