Court Opinion

ID: 9948769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:32.323044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:50.061112
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Shaker Hts. v Jones, 2024-Ohio-830.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

CITY OF SHAKER HEIGHTS,                           :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 112988
                v.                                :

ISSAC JONES,                                      :

                Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

                   Civil Appeal from the Shaker Heights Municipal Court
                                   Case No. 23TRC00027

                                            Appearances:

                C. Randolph Keller, City of Shaker Heights Chief
                Prosecutor, for appellee.

                Issac Jones, pro se.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

                 This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to

App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow an

appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision. E.g., Univ. Hts. v.

Johanan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110887, 2022-Ohio-2578, ¶ 1; State v. Trone, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108952 and 108966, 2020-Ohio-384, ¶ 1; citing State v. Priest,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100614, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1; see also App.R. 11.1(E).

              Defendant-appellant Issac Jones appeals the municipal court’s order

dismissing his appeal of an administrative license suspension entered by the Ohio

Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.   Factual Background and Procedural History

              On February 8, 2023, Shaker Heights police arrested Jones for

allegedly operating a vehicle (1) while under the influence of alcohol and (2) without

exercising reasonable and ordinary control over the vehicle, in violation of Shaker

Heights Codified Ordinances 1133.01(a)(1)(A) and 1131.34(a). After being informed

that his license would be administratively suspended if he refused to take a chemical

test for alcohol after his arrest, Jones refused the chemical test.

              On February 15, 2023, Jones made his initial appearance in Shaker

Heights Municipal Court and pleaded not guilty. On March 15, 2023, the BMV

issued a notice to Jones informing him that his driver’s license had been

administratively suspended for refusing to take a chemical test for alcohol on

February 8.

              On June 20, 2023, Jones filed a document in his criminal case in the

municipal court that was styled as a “motion for termination of ALS suspension.”

The municipal court construed the motion as an appeal of the BMV’s administrative

license suspension. On June 22, 2023, the municipal court dismissed the appeal,
reasoning that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the appeal was

not timely filed.

              Jones appealed the municipal court’s dismissal order, raising the

following assignments of error for review:

      First Assignment of Error: [T]he trial court failed to vacate the ALS
      because the arresting officer incorrectly filled out the BMV 2255 form.

      Second Assignment of Error: [T]he trial court failed to vacate the ALS
      when the officer failed to comply with the mandatory requirements
      established by R.C. 4511.192.

      Third Assignment of Error: [T]he trial court failed to vacate the ALS
      because the state violated the Due Process rights of the Defendant,
      when the Defendant was unable to appeal the ALS at the initial court
      appearance due to no suspension being implemented.

      Fourth Assignment of Error: [T]he trial court failed to vacate the ALS
      by not filing the form with the BMV within the 48-hour time frame
      stipulated by R.C. 4511.192(D)(1)(d) and (E).

II. Law and Analysis

             Jones contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his ALS appeal

because, he says, he presented numerous meritorious arguments for vacating the

ALS. The state responds that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jones’s

challenge to the ALS and, further, contends that his assignments of error are

substantively meritless. We do not reach the substance of Jones’s arguments in this

accelerated case because we conclude, at the outset, that Jones failed to comply with

the statutory deadline for filing an ALS appeal. The trial court’s dismissal order can

be affirmed on that basis alone.
             A person, by exercising physical control of a vehicle, gives implied

consent under Ohio law to undergo chemical testing for alcohol and controlled

substances if the person is arrested for operating a vehicle while under the influence

of alcohol or drugs. See R.C. 4511.191(A)(2). Having given this consent, if a person

then refuses to undergo a designated chemical test upon arrest, the person’s driver’s

license is subject to an administrative suspension. See R.C. 4511.191(B). This

administrative license suspension — the “ALS” — is subject to appeal as provided in

R.C. 4511.197. R.C. 4511.191(B)(1).

             That statute provides, in relevant part, that a person “may appeal the

suspension at the person’s initial appearance on the charge resulting from the arrest

or within the period ending thirty days after the person’s initial appearance on that

charge, in the court in which the person will appear on that charge.”            R.C.

4511.197(A). Jones failed to appeal the ALS at his initial appearance or in the thirty

days following the initial appearance.         While he complains that various

circumstances excuse his delay, including that the officer allegedly did not transmit

the suspension form to the BMV in a timely manner and that the BMV sent a notice

to him only after his initial appearance, we need not dwell on these allegations

because Jones’s appeal was untimely even if we were to start the clock when he

received the BMV’s notice in March. Even after receiving this notice, Jones waited

three months to file his appeal.

              This court and others have routinely affirmed the dismissal of ALS

appeals when the person appealing failed to comply with the statutory deadline for
instituting the appeal in the trial court. E.g., Westlake v. Pesta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 92150, 2009-Ohio-4713, ¶ 5, 11; State v. Derov, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA

189, 2009-Ohio-4810, ¶ 14; cf. State v. J.P., 9th Dist. Medina No. 19CA0039-M,

2020-Ohio-1188, ¶ 6 (vacating an order terminating an ALS when the person

appealing had filed an untimely appeal). Jones failed to file a timely appeal of the

administrative license suspension imposed on him, and he waited three months

after receiving the BMV’s mailed notice of his suspension before attempting to

appeal it. It cannot be said that the trial court’s dismissal was erroneous or a denial

of due process under these circumstances.          We, therefore, overrule Jones’s

assignments of error.

               Judgment affirmed.

         It is ordered that the appellee recover from the appellant the costs herein

taxed.

         It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Shaker Heights Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.

         A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR