Court Opinion

ID: 9790023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:45:18.691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.792499
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
dissenting:
As I view the evidence in this case, the plaintiff made *291out a prima facie case; hence, the trial court committed error in entering an order of dismissal on defendant’s motion therefor at the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence. I believe there was evidence from which the jury could infer negligence, and certainly the circumstances presented a case in which the court should have said res ipsa loquitur.
Four important facts appear from the record: (1) the Loop-O-Plane was under the management and control of the defendant through its servant; (2) the plaintiff was a passive passenger in the Loop-O-Plane; (3) there was testimony to the effect that the strap which extended over the hips and lay over the lap of the plaintiff was not tightly drawn; (4) the evidence reveals that the iron bar to which the plaintiff manually clung was wrested from her hands.
Drawing every favorable inference from the evidence, as must be done in the event of a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, it is not improbable that the strap permitted some play of the body, and that the movement of the Loop-O-Plane may have caused this play of the body to bring about the wresting of the hand bar from plaintiff’s grasp. It is a fair inference that the mechanism in which she was riding was by the defendant swung with such force and speed as to overcome her strength and ability to retain her grasp of the bar. Certainly the jury could properly infer this from the evidence presented.
That the plaintiff lost her hold on the hand bar is undisputed. If the jury could not properly infer that she lost her grip on the hand bar because of the movement of her body, resulting from the play of the body because of a loose strap, then it would seem that this hand bar, under ordinary circumstances and in the usual use of the machine, would not be wrested from a patron’s hands. In such event, res ipsa loquitur, and it would be incumbent upon the defendant to exonerate itself from liability by showing that the occurrence of the loss of *292the grip on the hand bar was due to no fault of the defendant.
It may be true that the defendant is not an insurer, but its patrons have the right to presume that they will not be injured while passengers in the Loop-O-Plane, and that the defendant will do all that human care, vigilance and foresight could reasonably require, consistent with the purpose of the operation of the mechanism, in order to protect those seated in it. Denver Consolidated Electric Co. v. Lawrence, 31 Colo. 301, 73 Pac. 39.
“The proprietor is not an insurer of the safety of his patrons, nor is he bound to protect them against such obvious risks as are necessarily incidental to the particular amusement device, but he must use reasonable care and diligence to see that the device is properly constructed, and is maintained in a fit condition for the purposes for which it is used, and is managed by agents of competent skill with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under like circumstances and in a like situation. [Citing cases.]
“So, where the mechanical contrivance was shown to have been constructed, maintained, and managed by the appellant and his agents, and the patron had paid the fare, and, after an assurance of its safety, but without any knowledge of its operation, had placed herself in the contrivance under the exclusive care and. control of these agents, and while this relation continued, an accident occurred to her that, in the ordinary course of things, was such as does not happen if those who have the construction, maintenance, or management use reasonable care and diligence, the occurrence of the accident was sufficient to carry the case to the jury for the determination of whether the accident arose from want of reasonable care.” Carlin v. Smith, 148 Md. 524, 130 Atl. 340. See Coaster Amusement Co. v. Smith, 141 Fla. 845, 194 So. 336; O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336, 89 N.E. 1005, 134 Am. S. R. 331, 26 L.R.A.N.S. *2931054, 17 Ann. Cas. 407; Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corporation, 173 Minn. 331, 217 N.W. 374.
The plaintiff entrusted herself to the care of the defendant. Once in the Loop-O-Plane she was no longer a free agent; she had no control over her movements, except to endeavor to hang onto the bar. The defendant was in complete charge of this instrumentality; it and it alone caused the mechanism to swing back and forth and to revolve; it and it alone caused the Loop-O-Plane to change its course and speed and determined whether the movement should cease or continue.
Plaintiff on entering the amusement device was whole. After the ride she had a broken back. She did not enter the machine to be injured, and yet injured she is. The defendant acted with design and intent in the operation of the machine, and its actions caused plaintiff to release the bar and to be injured. Plaintiff knows nothing as to why she could not retain her grasp of the bar; defendant should know, and under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be required to prove lack of negligence on its part.
Considering the circumstances, we believe the following language from the case of Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P. (2d) 88, is appropriately analagous:
“In this case the administration of the wave treatment was under the control and management of the defendants; the plaintiff was merely the passive recipient of the treatment. Shortly after the treatment she sustained a loss of hair which in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if defendants had used due care. From this evidence arose a presumption of negligence (making for plaintiff a prima facie case), a device which takes the place of evidence. The trial court properly said of the circumstances, res ipsa loquitur, and required the defendants to prove exculpation from their presumed negligence.”
I would now discuss assumption of risk. Plaintiff at most assumed the risks ordinarily attendant upon riding *294in the Loop-O-Plane. Untoward conditions or incidents would not generally call into play the doctrine of assumption of risk; they could not be deemed to be within the contemplation of the parties. Inferences of ordinariness or unusualness of the circumstances to which plaintiff was subjected were for the fact-finder to draw. The case being in such posture, assumption of risk, if a factor, was a problem for resolution by the jury. Whyte v. Idora Park Co., 29 Calif. App. 342, 155 Pac. 1018.
My conviction that the trial court erred requires this dissent.
Mr. Justice Hall joins in this dissenting opinion.