Court Opinion

ID: 9777985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:29:31.179751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:02.917077
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s disposition of the State’s grounds of error. I would hold that the analysis underlying this Court’s opinion in Fortenberry v. State, 579 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) is worthy of affirmation. Specifically, I would hold that trial court erred by refusing to modify the charge to the jury as requested by appellant and that the error inuring to appellant because of the court’s error was not harmless.
In order to set forth my analysis of the issues presented, a brief recitation of the facts, as presented by the Court of Appeals, is appropriate:
“[The evidence] showed that the robbery of [Paul] Joehlin was committed by appellant and his accomplices, Beverly Glock, Michael Keane, and Michael Kaiser. Glock, a neighbor of Joehlin, often cleaned Joehlin’s apartment and contrived to do that act as part of the robbery scheme. Approximately twenty minutes later, the other accomplices pretended to be looking for her, and once inside his apartment, Michael Keane knocked Joehlin to the ground while the others robbed him.
“Michael Keane and the appellant then caused the gruesome death of Joehlin by hitting him with a bottle, repeatedly stabbing him with a knife, and puncturing him with a meat fork. All of the accomplices were charged with capital murder. Kaiser became a State’s witness against the appellant in exchange for a guilty plea on aggravated robbery.”
Id. at 435.
Michael Kaiser was an accomplice witness as a matter of law since he admitted to being one of the parties primarily responsible for the victim's death during the robbery. Harris v. State, 645 S.W.2d 447 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Kerns v. State, 550 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Hendricks v. State, 508 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
“The witness MICHAEL VINCENT KAISER, is an accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict the Defendant upon his testimony unless you first believe that his testimony is true and shows that the Defendant is guilty as charged, and then you cannot convict the Defendant upon said testimony unless you further believe that there is other testimony in the case, outside of the evidence of the said MICHAEL VINCENT KAISER, tending to connect the Defendant with the offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the Defendant with its commission, and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him.
An accomplice, as the term is here used, means any person connected with the crime charged.”
The wording of this charge tracks the suggested charge, “Where the Witness is an Accomplice Witness as a Matter of Law,” suggested charge presented in Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice, Rev.Ed.1985, P. McClung, p. 226. We will refer to such a charge as the “usual” *203charge given pursuant to Art. 38.14, supra, when an accomplice witness is involved.
In Fortenberry, supra, the defendant was charged with capital murder under Y.T.C.A. Pen.Code, § 19.03(a)(1).1 An accomplice witness testified against the defendant, and the trial court gave the jury the usual instruction that it could not convict the defendant unless it found evidence other than that of the accomplice witness which tended to connect the defendant with the offense committed. The defendant objected to the accomplice witness instruction, pointing out that the charge did not direct the requirement of corroboration to the specific elements that rendered the offense a capital crime. The trial court overruled the objection.
In considering the defendant’s contentions, we stated that although the usual charge given as required by Art. 38.14, supra, was in many cases sufficient, certain offenses required a more specific charge. For example, the offense of receiving and concealing stolen goods requires a charge indicating that the accomplice witness’ testimony must be corroborated both as to the commission of the theft, and receipt of the goods by the accused with the knowledge that they were stolen. We added that the charge should state that the “very basis” of the offense charged must be corroborated, id. at 485, and concluded:
“In capital murder under Sec. 19.03(a)(1), the very heart of the offense is that the victim was a peace officer (or fireman) who was acting in the discharge of an official duty, and that the accused knew the victim was a peace officer (or fireman). Appellant specifically objected that the accomplice witness instruction failed to direct the jury to the requirements of the law that ... [the accomplice witness’] testimony must be corroborated as to the facts that make this a death penalty case. The trial court committed reversible error when it overruled those objections.”
Id. at 486.
In a later case, County v. State, 668 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), this Court cited Fortenberry, supra, for the proposition that:
“... the jury must be instructed, upon the defendant’s request, that the accomplice witness’ testimony must be corroborated as to the specific elements that make the offense a capital crime. Failure to so instruct the jury constitutes reversible error.” County, supra at 710.
In its brief, the State contends that the analysis underlying the decision in Fortenberry, supra, is flawed. First, there is no statutory requirement in Art. 38.14, V.A.C. C.P. that a particular element or group of elements be corroborated. Second, nothing should distinguish capital murder from any other offense with a central element, so as to require a different jury charge on accomplice witness testimony corroboration.
In order to examine the holding in For-tenberry, supra, a discussion of the law concerning corroboration of accomplice witness testimony in general is helpful. Article 38.14, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.
The testimony of an accomplice witness is considered unreliable, and should be carefully scrutinized “not only because of any interest he or she might have, but because her or his testimony is evidence from a corrupt source.” Paulus v. State, 633 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), and cases cited therein at 843. See also Eckert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); and Almazan v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 145 S.W.2d 576 (App.1940).
*204As required by Art. 38.14, supra, accomplice witness testimony must be corroborated with evidence tending to connect the accused to the offense committed. The corroborative testimony need not directly link the defendant to the crime. In Edwards v. State, 427 S.W.2d 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1968), at 632, quoting from Minor v. State, 299 S.W.422 (Tex.Cr.App.1927), we stated:
“The law forbidding a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice does not demand that there be direct evidence pointing to the accused as the offender, but merely requires that there be ‘other evidence tending to connect the defendant with [the] offense committed.’ ”
See also Moron v. State, 702 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Richardson v. State, 700 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Castaneda v. State, 682 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), and cases cited therein at 537; Brown v. State, 672 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Eckert, supra. Also, the accomplice witness need not be corroborated in all of his testimony. Id.
Certainly, if an accomplice witness testifies at trial, then the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the corroboration required. In many cases, a general jury charge on accomplice witness testimony, such as the charge given in the case at bar, will be sufficient to instruct the jury on how it must consider the evidence. Where some crimes are concerned, however, the usual charge is not sufficient.
When a defendant has been charged with receiving and concealing stolen property, the accomplice thief’s testimony must be corroborated as to the theft and the receiving by the accused from the thief, with the knowledge that the property was stolen. This proposition comes from a long line of cases, ostensibly beginning with Johnson v. State, 42 Tex.Cr.R. 440, 60 S.W. 667 (App.1901). See also Hanks v. State, 55 Tex.Cr.R. 405, 117 S.W. 149 (App.1909); Bloch v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 193 S.W. 303 (App.1917); Poon v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 522, 48 S.W.2d 307 (App.1932); Colley v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 34, 143 S.W.2d 597 (App.1940); Kosel v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 257, 144 S.W.2d 543 (App.1940); Sanders v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 526, 164 S.W.2d 685 (App.1942); Johnson v. State, 144 Tex.Cr.R. 496, 164 S.W.2d 702 (App.1942); Hall v. State, 373 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
In Johnson, 164 S.W.2d 702, supra, the rationale for this rule was stated:
“[A general accomplice witness] charge is insufficient in a case of receiving and concealing stolen property, when the two essential elements of that offense, that is, the theft of the property and the receipt thereof by the accused, are shown by the testimony of the accomplice.” 2
The usual general jury charge on accomplice witness corroboration is also not appropriate for persons tried for criminal solicitation under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 15.-03. In Richardson, supra, we stated:
“Reading Penal Code, Sec. 15.03(b) in conjunction with Art. 38.14, the corroboration in criminal solicitation cases must link the defendant to the crime at two separate stages. According to the language of 15.03(b) the evidence must be ‘corroborative of both the solicitation itself and the actor’s intent that the other person act on the solicitation.’ ”
Id. at 594.
Caselaw arising under the old seduction statute, Penal Code Arts. 1447 and 1448, (1911), codified as V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Art. 505 (Vernon 1948) (repealed by Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 991, ch. 399 § 3(a), eff. Jan. 1, 1974),3 also created an exception to *205the rule that the general accomplice witness charge was sufficient. In those cases, the trial court was required to instruct the jury that the female witness had to be corroborated as to the promise of marriage and the illicit intercourse. Slaughter v. State, 86 Tex.Cr.R. 527, 218 S.W. 767 (App.1920), and cases cited therein at 768.
The rationale for the requirement of a more specific jury charge was stated in Slaughter, supra, as follows:
“The law of seduction does not proceed upon the idea that the alleged seduced female is a particeps criminis, but regards her more in the light of a victim who has been overreached, seduced, and debauched by and through deceptive wiles and promises of the seducer and one who would not have surrendered her virtue but for such deception. This aids the legal presumption of chastity. But the fact remaining that she is no longer a chaste woman, and as being one who has fallen, without reference to the means used, she having consented, imputes to her that want of moral stamina which would prevent her from being governed by revenge or resorting to any means by which her social condition would or could be bettered. The law regards the danger in which any man might be placed, though entirely innocent, if the same weight and credit be given to the testimony of a woman of that kind as to one whose moral character had not been corrupted to such extent as to cause her to part with her virtue. Hence the law requires corroboration as a protection against her wiles, interests, or revenge or other motive. ” [emphasis added]
Id. at 769 quoting from Nash v. State, 61 Tex.Cr.R. 259, 287, 134 S.W. 709, 723. The Court concluded that “There must be additional evidence probative of the offense, and therefore of those acts of the defendant constituting it, namely, the act of intercourse and inducing the intercourse by promise of marriage.” Id. at 770. Absent such a charge, reversible error arose. See also Cerda v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 390, 181 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Cr.App.1944) and Brewer v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 213, 246 S.W. 663 (Tex.Cr.App.1923).
From the preceding cases, it is apparent that some offenses require an accomplice witness corroboration charge to include reference to the “basic elements” of the offense in order to comply with the “offense committed” language of Art. 38.14, supra. The basis for this rule involves the particular type of offense being tried.
In most offenses, the general accomplice witness rule is sufficient. In others, as previously demonstrated, the jury must be instructed that the testimony of the accomplice witness must be corroborated as to the “very heart of the offense,” Fortenberry, supra, or “the two essential elements,” Johnson, supra. The concept of this occasional exception to the general rule was tacitly approved by the Legislature when they decided that the offense of criminal solicitation also merited “dual” corroboration. Richardson, supra.
As times change, the list of crimes that demand corroboration for the gravamen of the offense may change. Such is the nature of the law. Just as the mores of the day in 1920 required special protection for the accused against a female witness’4 “wiles, interests, or revenge or other motive,” Slaughter, supra, I would find that the rationale in Fortenberry, as it applies to capital murder cases has not been affected by any change in mores in the six years since its rendition. The majority should hold that accomplice witness testimony must be corroborated, in a capital murder case, as to the element that elevates the potential punishment to death. This is so, not just because of any contemporary distrust of certain testimony (as seems to have been the case in the past with this Court and the Legislature), but also because of the caution this society rightfully continues to exercise when the State seeks *206to exact the ultimate punishment — a life for a life.
I would hold, therefore, that in the context of a capital murder crime, when the accomplice witness rule demands corroboration tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed, the term “offense committed” necessitates corroboration of the very element that elevates the crime to capital status, as well as corroboration for the underlying offense that would be demanded absent this elevating fact.
Thus, upon proper request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the accomplice witness testimony must be corroborated as to both the murder and the act raising the murder to capital offense status: reversible error will arise if the trial court fails to do so. Although not stated in the same manner, this proposition was the basic holding in Fortenberry, supra. I believe that there is no sound reason to depart from this interpretation, nor discontinue its application.
For clarity’s sake, cases such as Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) and Sheffield v. State, 371 S.W.2d 49 (Tex.Cr.App.1963) which hold that the accomplice need not be corroborated as to every element of the offense should be mentioned. As previously discussed, the evi-' dence corroborating the accomplice witness testimony need not directly link the accused with commission of the offense, or of itself be sufficient to establish guilt. Article 38.14, supra, merely requires that the corroboration evidence tend to connect the accused with commission of the offense. Were my views, here expressed, empraced by the majority, the majority would not be required to modify in any way the rules relating to sufficiency of corroboration.
In its brief, the State argues that:
“An attempt to identify ‘the very basis’ of a penal offense presupposes that some elements of an offense are more important than others, at least from a standpoint of sufficiency of evidence. That flies in the face of the most fundamental evidentiary rule of all: the State must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
As previously stated, my views in no way affect the law concerning evidence sufficiency. See Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). With regard to the State’s burden, upholding the rule in Fortenberry, supra, would not affect the requirement that sufficient proof be introduced on every element of an offense. Moreover, Art. 38.14, supra, does not require, nor would we need to affix any requirement, that the accomplice be corroborated as to every element of the offense. I would, however, construe the term “offense committed” to refer to the material elements comprising the basis or gravamen of the offense in a capital murder case.
Having reaffirmed the holding and analysis in Fortenberry, supra, the majority should find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred by refusing to modify the charge as suggested by appellant. Moreover, this Court’s decision in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) would require that we review the record to determine whether the trial court’s refusal to grant the requested charge was “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant.” Id. at 171. My review of the record reveals that the omission of the proper jury instruction on the rule of accomplice witness corroboration was not harmless. I would find that the Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in reversing the conviction, and overrule the State’s first ground for review.
In its second ground of review, the State contends that appellant’s objection to the jury charge was not sufficiently specific to preserve the error for appeal. The State’s brief includes the following testimony, which was offered at trial:
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: But further, also, the Defense has requested that the accomplice charge that exist [sic] does not apply the law to the facts in that it does not set forth the material elements of the offense and the mention that such material elements must be corroborated and that goes to each offense, of capital *207murder, murder, aggravated robbery, robbery and aggravated assault. That’s it.
“THE COURT: You want it tailored as a charge as the law of parties would be?
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: No. I just want the accomplice charge.
“THE COURT: Give me a requested charge.
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don’t have one.
“THE COURT: If you give me something to look at I would understand perhaps what you request.
If you have a written charge that I can look at and understand more fully what you are requesting, I would be happy to do so.
Do you have any objection to the law on parties, on accomplices as the Court has it defined?
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: The only thing I have an objection to there is the fact that — let me reverse my objections. That might help.
That the accomplice charge as presently stated does not apply the law to the facts in that it does not specifically name the elements of the offense as applied within the law of accomplices and does not specifically mention that such elements must be corroborated.
“THE COURT: I still don’t understand.
“DEFENSE COUNSEL: As the accomplice charge is presently stated, it does not apply the law to the facts in that it does not mention or specifically set forth the elements of the offense, i.e., capital murder, and then mention that such elements must, in fact, be corroborated.
“THE COURT: How would you want me to change or add onto the law on accomplices as I have already defined it?

“DEFENSE COUNSEL: For example, after putting intending, after the words Michael Vincent Kaiser in the charge, where it says, ‘tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed, ’ I think it has to say that tending the defendant with, first, that a robbery was, in fact, committed or attempted to be committed, and secondly, that a murder of one Paul Joehlin was committed or along those lines. That’s what I’m talking about.

And then the requirement that such elements of the offense must be, in fact, be corroborated. That’s my essential objection.
“THE COURT: Overruled, denied, whatever.” [emphasis added]
This objection was sufficiently specific to apprise the trial court of the nature of appellant’s objection. Error was therefore adequately preserved. The State’s second ground of review should be overruled.
Since the majority fails to address the presented issues in this manner, I respectfully dissent.
CLINTON and CAMPBELL, JJ., join in this opinion.

. "A person commits an offense if he commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(a)(1) of this code and:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman;_”

. It is important to note that Art. 38.14, supra, is a verbatim repetition of the statutory accomplice witness corroboration rule that has been in effect since 1856. See Art. 718, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. 1925, and Art. 653, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1856.

. This section of the 1911 Penal Code provided: "If any person, by promise to marry, shall seduce an unmarried female trader the age of twenty-five years, and shall have carnal knowledge of such female, he shall be punished ...”.

. The antiquated mores of that time also dictated that a female witness in such a case be referred to as a "prosecutrix." See Allen v. State, 700 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), concurring opinion by Judge Miller.