Court Opinion

ID: 9964236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 15:01:01.599941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:15.350029
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14797    Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 04/29/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 20-14797
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MAXSONY COISSY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cr-60365-AHS-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-14797     Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 04/29/2024    Page: 2 of 4

       2                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14797

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              On February 12, 2020, Maxsony Coissy pleaded guilty to
       distributing fentanyl and heroin and to knowingly possessing a
       firearm as a convicted felon. Coissy appeals his sentence, arguing
       that the district court improperly calculated his base offense level
       and improperly sentenced him as a career offender under the
       Sentencing Guidelines. We disagree and affirm.
              After Coissy pleaded guilty to his crimes, the district court
       determined that he had committed at least two prior offenses that
       qualified as either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance
       offense” as defined by the Guidelines. Specifically, in 2003, Coissy
       was convicted for aggravated assault under Florida law—a “crime
       of violence.” And in 2018, Coissy was convicted under Florida law
       of possessing heroin with intent to sell—a “controlled substance
       offense.” The categorization of these two offenses as predicate
       offenses affected both Coissy’s base offense level under
       § 2K2.1(a)(1) and his career offender enhancement under § 4B1.1.
              On appeal, Coissy argues that neither of these is a predicate
       offense. First, he argues that a Florida conviction for aggravated
       assault is not a crime of violence under the Guidelines because it
       may be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. And second, he
       argues that his prior drug conviction is not a “controlled substance
       offense” under the Guidelines because the Florida offense does not
USCA11 Case: 20-14797      Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 04/29/2024     Page: 3 of 4

       20-14797               Opinion of the Court                         3

       require knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance.
       Both of these arguments are foreclosed by our precedent.
              In his supplemental briefing, Coissy acknowledges that this
       Court’s recent decision in Somers v. United States completely
       resolves the first issue on appeal. 66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023). He
       concedes that his Florida aggravated assault conviction qualifies as
       a crime of violence for the purposes of the Guidelines. We agree.
       In Somers, a panel of this Court determined that, because
       aggravated assault under Florida law requires a mens rea of at least
       knowing conduct, it qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed
       Career Criminal Act’s elements clause. Id. at 894. The reasoning
       in Somers applies equally to the elements clause in the Guidelines,
       given its “virtually identical” definition of “violent felony.” See
       United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1107 (11th Cir. 2019). We
       have no trouble concluding that Coissy’s conviction for aggravated
       assault under Florida law is a predicate violent offense for the
       purposes of the Guidelines.
              Coissy’s second argument is similarly foreclosed by our
       precedent—a fact he also acknowledges. In United States v. Smith,
       we determined that the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled
       substance offense” does not “require[] that a predicate state offense
       include[] an element of mens rea with respect to the illicit nature of
       the controlled substance.” 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014).
       Accordingly, Smith concluded that Fla. Stat. § 893.13—the same
       provision Coissy was convicted of violating—was a controlled
       substance offense for the purposes of the Guidelines. Id.
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       4                           Opinion of the Court                        20-14797

               Coissy suggests that this Court is not bound by Smith
       because that decision conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decisions
       in Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015), and McFadden v. United
       States, 576 U.S. 186 (2015). But we have since affirmed Smith’s
       holding, and we remain “bound by Smith unless and until it is
       overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the
       Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc.” United States v.
       Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242, 1254 (11th Cir. 2019). 1
              In sum, Coissy’s aggravated assault conviction is a “crime of
       violence,” and his conviction for possession of heroin with intent
       to deliver or sell is a “controlled substance offense.” The district
       court did not err by calculating Coissy’s base offense level under
       guideline 2K2.1(a)(1) or by classifying him as a career offender
       under guideline 4B1.1. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

       1 In his supplemental briefing, Coissy raises additional arguments about why

       his prior drug conviction is not a controlled substance offense. He argues that
       a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines is defined by federal
       law, and that his predicate offense does not qualify because Florida’s definition
       of “heroin” is broader than that under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
       We decline to entertain these new arguments that appear neither in Coissy’s
       initial nor reply brief. United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 2000).
       Even if we were to entertain them, however, Coissy’s arguments are
       foreclosed by this Court’s decision in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284,
       1294–1300 (11th Cir. 2024).