Court Opinion

ID: 9566001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:31:41.808591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:31.141296
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
dissenting.
Section 13-702(G) clearly states that class 6 undesignated criminal offenses shall be treated as felonies “for all purposes.” As the majority concedes, the language of the statute provides for no exceptions. Yet, despite acknowledging this fact, the majority nonetheless deems the statute inapplicable to disciplinary eases. Because I do not agree with this determination, I respectfully dissent.
Although the trial court refrained from designating the offenses to which respondent pleaded guilty until after he completed his probation, § 13-702(G) requires his convictions to be treated as felonies for purposes of determining an appropriate sanction under our disciplinary rules. Discipline is therefore not only warranted but also required in this case. See rule 57(a), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court (stating that a lawyer “shall be disciplined as the facts warrant upon conviction of ... any felony”). The majority believes, however, that because respondent’s offenses ultimately were designated as mis*404demeanors and expunged under A.R.S. § 13-907, disciplining Mm would be especially unjust and needlessly severe. I disagree.
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s underlying conduct cannot be the basis for discipline, In re Morris indicates that a 6-month retroactive suspension would be appropriate in this case. See Morris, 164 Ariz. 391, 793 P.2d 544 (1990). In Morris, the respondent pleaded guilty to a federal felony offense—ostensibly to avoid the expense of trial. Although both the Committee and the Commission determined that the respondent’s underlying conduct did not violate any etMcal rule, tMs court imposed a 6-month retroactive suspension based solely on the respondent’s felony conviction as required under rule 57(a), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court. The majority recognizes that the circumstances of Morris are “remarkably similar” to those of this case. But, because respondent’s felony convictions no longer exist, the majority apparently feels compelled to dismiss the complaint against him.
The expungement of respondent’s felony convictions, however, cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Nor can it provide a defense to disciplinary proceedings. In re Couser, 122 Ariz. 500, 501, 596 P.2d 26, 27 (1979). In departing from tMs principle, the majority not oMy loses sight of the fact that respondent imtially pleaded guilty to 12 counts of facilitation of money laundering—each a class 6 felony—but also places a premium on delay. And, although bar counsel admittedly contributed to the delay surrounding this case by agreeing to postpone the disciplinary proceedings, such delay should be neither encouraged nor rewarded by this court. I believe that today’s decision will have the unfortunate result of doing just that.