Court Opinion

ID: 9792391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:28:47.915933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.556925
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that part of the majority opinion relating to the award of attorney’s fees and that part relating to the inapplicability of the home-rule constitutional amendment to this matter.
*905I disagree with the majority opinion in its conclusion that the water and sewer connection fees and the fees in lieu of parklands dedication were proper.
WATER AND SEWER CONNECTION FEES
From a common-sense or practical standpoint there must be something wrong with a situation in which the people1 in an area being annexed to the city can be made to pay all, or a disproportionate part, of the capital cost of a water and sewer system for the city. The majority opinion creates this situation since there is absolutely nothing in the record to reflect the relationship of the amount of such fees with any aspect of the annexed area. The sewer connection fee for single-family dwellings, multiple-family units, condominiums, etc., is set at $750.00 “per living unit.” The water connection fee for standard three-quarter-inch pipe is set at $1,000.00 “for each living unit.” The $750.00 and $1,000.00 figures seem to have been plucked out of thin air. There was no evidence to reflect the manner in which these figures came into existence. There was no evidence to support the reasonableness of them. They could just as easily have been $7,500.00 per living unit for a sewer connection and $10,000.00 for each living unit for a water connection — or $75,-000.00 for sewer and $100,000.00 for water. Under the majority opinion, such would be proper. As said, common sense and practicality would dictate that such is not proper.
Somewhere in the scheme of this situation, we must set guidelines of reasonableness, or fairness, or uniformity. We cannot say that once a charge is called a “fee,” it will have no perimeters, or fairness, or uniformity. The legal restrictions on charges called “rates” or “assessments” are a result of the necessity for uniformity, fairness and practicality. This brings the conclusion that (1) the reasonableness and uniformity of the charge must be addressed in considering the issue, and (2) the extent and nature of the authority to levy the charge— be it called a “fee,” an “assessment,” or a “rate” — must also be addressed for the same purpose.
The majority opinion purports to not address the reasonableness of the charge, stating in footnote 1 that:
“The briefs and the positions expressed at oral argument reflect that appellant is not challenging the reasonableness of the amount of the charges and is only concerned with the power of the City of Rawlins to adopt them.”
There are two things wrong with this statement: One, it is only partially accurate, and two, it is internally inconsistent.
Although it is true that appellant said in oral argument that he was not contesting the reasonableness of the charge, the argument itself did do so. And his brief argued the lack of uniformity and reasonableness of the charges at length. Appellant worded the second issue on appeal in part:2
“2. Did the Trial Court err in finding that the water and sewer connection fees * * * were * * * proportionate to the burden put upon the facilities of the City by Appellant’s apartment complex?” (Emphasis added.)
The complaint sought a declaration, among other things, that the charges were “not proportionate to the benefits received by” appellant. This fact was recited in appellant’s brief. He further noted in his brief that the fees were protested by his agent, Mrs. Bricker, on the grounds:
“ * * * First, that the tap fees were excessive and unrelated to the costs actually incurred by the City of Rawlins; and second, that no recognition was given and no commensurate reduction in the tap fees charged was afforded as a result of the fact that Appellant’s project as a multi-unit complex, requiring but one actual tap for each 24 units and that other communities have conducted studies that *906have revealed that apartments burden the water and sewer systems but a fraction of the amount that single family units burden those facilities. As a result of such readily available statistical information, Ms. Bricker noted that other communities, such as Cheyenne and Gllette [sic], charge a lesser tap fee or development fee for water and sewer fee extension for each apartment than for each single family housing unit.”
In arguing the nature of the fee, appellant continually refers in his brief to the necessity for proportionate application of the money to be received. He points to the statutory recognition of the propriety of proportionate assessment in § 15-7-512(a):
“Any city or town may make special assessments for the construction of sewers and water mains. The assessments shall be made on all lots and pieces of ground to the center of the block, or if the sewers or water mains are constructed in an alley, then on all lots and pieces of ground to the nearest street or avenue on each side of the alley, extending along the street, avenue or alley, the distance of the improvement, according to the area of the lots or pieces of ground without regard to the buildings or improvements. The amount to be paid by each property owner [holder] shall be determined by dividing the expenses of the construction of the proposed sewer or water main among all of the property holders for the benefit of whose property the sewer or water main is to be constructed .... The amount to be assessed against each property holder shall be in proportion to the number of square feet [* * *] assessed for the expenses of the construction. (Emphasis added.)”
Appellant also noted in his brief that he did not make claims on the City for refund of the entire amount paid under protest for water and sewer connection charges and that:
“ * * * He had, in the past in other communities, paid more modest tap fees without protest. Those tap fees, connection fees or development fees were not only less than incurred in Rawlins, but were also graduated in such a way that multifamily housing units were charged a declining rate, recognizing that multi-family units put a lesser burden upon the city’s facilities than do single family residences. The City did not respond to Appellant’s claim for partial refund and the lawsuit resulted. * * * ”
It cannot be said that appellant is not challenging the reasonableness of the charge.
The evidence in this case relative to the foundation for the amount charged for water and sewer connection fees reflected that the water and sewer system in Rawlins in 1977 was not only inadequate but was of great age and little worth; that plans were made to reconstitute the system; that a great portion of the plans have been brought to accomplishment; that the financing (approximately $32 million for water system and $17½ million for sewer system — not including grants) was through bond issues and loans; that a per-person cost was obtained by dividing a present population figure of. 12,000 for money already expended together with a future population figure of 20,000 for future expenditures into the cost figures; that the capacity of the development was 306.24 persons; and that 306.24 multiplied by the per-person cost amounts to between $500,000.00 and $700,000.00 as appellant’s share.
After presenting the foregoing (60 to 65 percent of the entire trial testimony), it was never tied in in any manner with the ordinance charge of $1,000.00 for water and $750.00 for sewer. These latter charges totaled about $178,000.00 for the development. The foundation for the figures was never evidenced.
Of course, effort to allocate costs per person pursuant to the extensive testimony contains many flaws: Speculation as to future population; allowance for cost of money; failure to recognize depreciation and appreciation of plant; failure to recognize proportionate use of the system; failure to restrict amount of debt attributable to connection charges to that not to be paid for by *907all users in the future, etc., e.g. if the system would become operative the day before the development went on it, a connection charge of approximately $178,000.00 would be unreasonable as compared to no charge at all if it became operative the day after the development went on it. Both the development and the other City units would receive equal benefits and should bear equal costs. Likewise if the system collapsed from use the day after the development went on it, the connection charge would be unreasonable. The reasonable charge on population basis must be computed by considering the factors of depreciation, etc., as noted.
Furthermore, the 1977 bond issue is subject to payment from general revenue, and the other bond issues are subject to payment from user charges and connection fees.
Most of the cases cited in the majority opinion and from which quotations are taken refer to the necessity for connection charges to be fair and reasonable.3 “Fair” is “non-discriminatory.”
“Fair. Having the qualities of impartiality and honesty; free from prejudice, favoritism and self-interest. Just; equitable; even-handed; equal, as between conflicting interests.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979), p. 535.
The testimony and computations presented at trial were never tied into the allocation of $1,000.00 and $750.00 charges “per living unit.”4 To allow such to be done does extend the powers of municipal corporations far beyond the intention as expressed in the constitution and statutes. It seems incongruous that municipalities be restricted by law with regard to “taxes,” “assessments” and “rates,” only to be given a free reign to impose connection charges in any amount without consideration of the reasonableness, fairness or discriminatory nature of them.
“ * * * [A]n assessment according to legal intendment is ‘A valuation made by authorized persons according to their discretion. It is a valuation of the property of those who are to pay the tax, for the purpose of fixing the proportion which each man must pay.’ * * * ” Union Pacific Railway v. Donnell an, 2 Wyo. 478, 488 (1882).
“(a) The board shall fix the rates for water, sanitary sewer services * * *. The rates shall secure an income sufficient to:
“(i) Pay the interest charges and principal payments on all bonds issued to pay the purchase price, construction cost, extensions and enlargements of the respective systems as they are due.” Section 15-7-407(a), W.S.1977.
“ * * * A public utility is entitled to charge and receive for its product or service such rates, and such only, as áre just and reasonable.
“The term ‘rate’ as used in connection with public utilities signifies a charge to the public for a service open to all and on the same terms; * * * measured by a specified unit or standard. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) 73 C.J.S. Public Utilities, § 13, p. 1008.
“ ‘It is a principle universally declared and admitted that municipal corporations can levy no taxes, general or special, upon the inhabitants or their property, unless the power be plainly and unmistakably conferred. * * * ’ ” Town Council of Hudson v. Board of Commissioner Fremont County, 37 Wyo. 160, 164, 259 P. 1051, 1052 (1927), quoting from 4 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 1377.
And see § 15-7-512(a), W.S.1977, supra.
Called by whatever name it be, a tax, assessment, rate, fee, or charge, it cannot be proper unless it is fair, reasonable, and *908non-discriminatory. It must be based on some formula designed to these ends. On their faces, the $1,000.00 water connection charge and the $750.00 sewer connection charge do not meet these requirements.
PARKLANDS DEDICATION FEE
I have no quarrel with the general philosophy expressed in the majority opinion relative to the desirability for a city to insure proper dedication by a developer for park-lands area within a development. It may even be desirable to provide for a cash payment to a parklands-use fund in lieu of such dedication where the parklands area is already sufficient without the dedication. However, I do not find express or implied powers for a Wyoming city to mandate a cash payment in lieu of parklands dedication in connection with approval of a subdivision plat.
It must be recognized that my concern is not addressed to annexation, or zoning, or planning requirements.5 These factors are not in this case. The land for the development has already been annexed and rezoned without any parklands requirement. It was only when the City directed it to be subdivided that the parklands requirement was introduced.
Section 15-1-415, W.S.1977, provides:
“(a) The owner of any land within or contiguous to any city or town may subdivide the land into lots, blocks, streets, avenues and alleys and other grounds under the name of .... addition to the city (town) of .... An accurate map or plat shall be made designating the subdivided land and particularly describing the lots, blocks, streets, avenues and alleys and other grounds of the addition. The lots must be designated by numbers, and the streets, avenues and other grounds by name or numbers.
“(b) The plat shall:
“(i) Be acknowledged before some officer authorized to acknowledge deeds;
“(ii) Have appended a survey made by some competent surveyor with a certificate that he has accurately surveyed the addition, and that the parts thereof are accurately staked off and marked.
“(c) When the map or plat is made out, acknowledged, certified and approved by the governing body, it shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk. When filed it is equivalent to a deed in fee simple to the city or town from the owner, of all streets, avenues, alleys, public squares, parks and commons and of that portion of the land set apart for public and city use, or dedicated to charitable, religious or educational purposes. All additions thus laid out are a part of the city or town for all purposes, and the inhabitants of the addition are entitled to all the rights and privileges and subject to all the laws, ordinances, rules and regulations of the city or town.
“(d) The governing body, by ordinance, may compel the owner of any addition to lay out streets, avenues and alleys to correspond in width and direction and be continuations of the streets, ways and alleys in the city or town or other additions thereto. No addition is valid unless the terms and conditions of the ordinance are complied with and the plat submitted and approved by the governing body.” (Emphasis added.)
Certainly, this section gives to a city the implied power to require reasonable dedication of parklands in connection with subdividing, but it would be stretching reason to find authorization in it to extract a cash payment in lieu of dedication. See quota*909tion in majority opinion from Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of City of Danbury, 160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880, 885 (1970). The majority opinion notes that other cases cited therein are premised on construction of statutes, but the opinion comments “we are of the opinion that the lack of a specific statutory provision in this case is not determinative.” I do not agree. I believe it is determinative, and that it becomes judicial legislation to stretch general language authorizing regulation and operation of parklands to include authority to extract a cash fee in lieu of dedication in a subdivision plat.

. The developer is charged with paying the fee, but, of course, economic facts of life result in the cost being passed on to the people who will occupy the development.

. The issue as worded by appellant is quoted in full in the majority opinion.

. In all but one of these cases, the connection charges amounted to only a few hundred dollars. They usually reflected the approximate amount to be paid for labor and materials necessary to make the connection.

. A “living unit” could have one person, two persons, three persons, four persons, etc. “Population” does not correlate with “living units.”

. In their brief, appellees point to § 15-1-501 et seq., W.S.1977, to indicate legislative authorization for the action here taken by them. Such sections concern establishment of a planning commission and resulting procedures. Appellees specifically point to § 15-1-510, W.S.1977, to support their contention. That section provides for establishment of a master street plan and for regulations governing subdivisions of land, which regulations the governing body “may adopt * * * after a public hearing thereon.” There is nothing in the record to reflect use by appellees of the powers granted by these sections.