Court Opinion

ID: 9392621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 18:00:38.10457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:47.144170
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40591         Document: 00516740033             Page: 1      Date Filed: 05/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                      May 5, 2023
                                       No. 22-40591                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                     Summary Calendar                                  Clerk
                                     ____________

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Steven Dewayne Wilson,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                  No. 4:18-CR-219-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Following a jury trial, Stephen Dewayne Wilson was convicted of
   possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and was
   sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment. On appeal, he raises numerous
   challenges to the validity of his conviction.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40591      Document: 00516740033          Page: 2    Date Filed: 05/05/2023

                                    No. 22-40591

          First, Wilson asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion
   to suppress, arguing that the search warrant lacked the particularity required
   by the Fourth Amendment because it described the property to be searched
   with the wrong postal address. He urges that the good-faith exception to the
   exclusionary rule does not apply because the officers could not objectively
   rely in good faith on a warrant with the wrong address, particularly as there
   was a mailbox nearby indicating the correct address.
          On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, this court reviews
   the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the ultimate
   constitutionality of the actions by law enforcement de novo. United States
   v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.), modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383
   (5th Cir. 2010). A district court’s ruling on a suppression motion should be
   upheld “if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United
   States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
          This court engages in a two-step inquiry when reviewing a district
   court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress when a search warrant is
   involved. United States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1999). First,
   this court determines whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary
   rule, announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applies.
   Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407. If so, no further analysis is conducted, and the
   district court’s denial of the motion to suppress will be affirmed. Id. If not,
   the court proceeds to the second step, “ensur[ing] that the magistrate had a
   substantial basis for . . . concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. (second
   alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          Here, Wilson’s challenge to the correctness of the address listed in
   the warrant implicates, at best, a technical error. See, e.g., United States
   v. Benavides, 854 F.2d 701, 701–02 (5th Cir. 1988). Even assuming that the

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                                     No. 22-40591

   address listed in the warrant was incorrect, there was no evidence of bad faith
   on the executing officers’ part. And, as the district court observed, the
   executing officers objectively believed the warrant to be valid, were familiar
   with the property, had a long history of responding to 911 calls at that location
   (including as recently as the previous evening), exhibited no confusion as to
   the property to be searched, and searched only the camper, two pickup
   trucks, and two trailers identified in the search warrant. The good faith
   exception therefore applies, and the district court’s denial of the motion must
   be upheld. See United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1990); see
   also Cherna, 184 F.3d at 407; Michelletti, 13 F.3d at 841.
          Next, Wilson argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct
   the jury on the defense of justification. To prevail on such a defense, the
   defendant must show (1) he “was under an unlawful and present, imminent,
   and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
   apprehension of death or serious body injury”; (2) he “had not recklessly or
   negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he
   would be forced to choose the criminal conduct”; (3) he “had no reasonable
   legal alternative to violating the law”—that is, no chance “to refuse to do the
   criminal act and . . . to avoid the threatened harm”; and (4) “a direct causal
   relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the criminal action taken
   and the avoidance of the threatened harm.” United States v. Posada-Rios, 158
   F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). “The defendant must also prove
   a fifth element: that he possessed the firearm only during the time of
   danger.” United States v. Penn, 969 F.3d 450, 455 (5th Cir. 2020).
          This court reviews de novo a district court’s refusal to provide an
   instruction on a defense that, if believed, would preclude a guilty verdict. Id.
   A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a defense “only if he presents
   sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Id. (internal
   quotation and citation omitted). He “must produce evidence to sustain a

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   finding on each element of the defense before it may be presented to the
   jury.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). In determining whether
   the defendant has made this threshold showing, this court reviews the
   evidence and inferences to be taken therefrom in the light most favorable to
   the defendant. Id.
          In the felon-in-possession context, courts construe the justification
   defense “‘very narrowly’ and limit its application to the ‘rarest of
   occasions.’” Id. This court has explained that the defense is generally
   unavailable unless the defendant “did nothing more than disarm someone in
   the heat of a dangerous moment,” and possessed a gun only briefly to prevent
   injury to himself or someone else. Id. (internal quotation and citation
   omitted).
          Even when construed most favorably to Wilson, the evidence,
   including his own testimony, does not establish the rare, exigent
   circumstances necessary to support the justification defense. See id.; see also
   United States v. Panter, 688 F.2d 268, 269, 270–72 (5th Cir. 1982). The
   evidence instead showed that Wilson never complained to police that he was
   in fear for his life or that he needed the weapon to defend himself against
   threats from his purported accoster, and there was nothing to show that, at
   the time he obtained the rifle, the alleged accoster was actively threatening
   him with likely death or bodily injury such that he had an immediate need to
   arm himself. To the contrary, Wilson was nowhere near the alleged attacker
   when he acquired the rifle. The evidence fails to show that the rifle was
   necessary to prevent immediate injury to himself or someone else at the time
   he possessed it and thus did not support any “present, imminent, or
   impending threat,” for purposes of the defense of justification. Posada-Rios,
   158 F.3d at 874; see also Penn, 969 F.3d at 455; Panter, 688 F.2d at 270–72.

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          Furthermore, the justification defense would insulate Wilson only for
   possession during the time of the alleged endangerment. See Penn, 969 F.3d
   at 455. “Possession either before the danger or for any significant period after
   it remains a violation.”     Panter, 688 F.2d at 272.      The trial evidence
   established that he possessed the rifle for, at a minimum, several hours
   following his allegedly threatening encounter. Wilson therefore fails to
   demonstrate the permissible limited duration of possession for purposes of
   establishing the defense. See id.; United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 118
   (5th Cir. 1986). The district court thus did not err in refusing Wilson’s
   requested jury instruction. See Penn, 969 F.3d at 455; Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d
   at 874; Panter, 688 F.2d at 270–72.
          Relatedly, Wilson asserts that the district court erred in excluding the
   testimony of John Blackwell, a bank vice president, to the effect that, several
   weeks after his arrest, checks were forged on his account. Wilson contends
   that the testimony would have corroborated his testimony that his camper
   had been burglarized, was probative of his fear at the time of the incident, and
   would have supported a justification defense.          Wilson’s conclusional
   assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the district court did not abuse its
   discretion in determining that Blackwell’s proposed testimony about check
   forgeries was not relevant either to defeat the elements of a § 922(g) offense
   or to establish a justification defense given that the forgeries postdated the
   firearms offense by several weeks and had no bearing on whether Wilson
   faced an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury at the time he
   committed the offense. See Fed. R. Evid. 401; Fed. R. Evid. 402; see
   also United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 606 (5th Cir. 2013).
          For the first time on appeal, Wilson contends that the statute of
   conviction, § 922(g), is unconstitutional on its face because it does not have
   a substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus exceeds Congress’s
   authority under the Commerce Clause. However, as he concedes, this

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   argument is foreclosed by United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir.
   2013). See United States v. Perryman, 965 F.3d 424, 426 (5th Cir. 2020).
          Wilson additionally argues, also for the first time on appeal, that
   § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates the Second Amendment.
   Because he did not raise this argument in the district court, review is for plain
   error only. See United States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947, 950 (5th Cir. 1994). To
   demonstrate plain error, Wilson must show a forfeited error that is clear or
   obvious and that affects his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556
   U.S. 129, 135 (2009). An error is not clear or obvious where an issue is
   disputed or unresolved, or where there is an absence of controlling authority.
   See United States v. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 230–31 (5th Cir. 2009). In
   fact, “[e]ven where the argument requires only extending authoritative
   precedent, the failure of the district court [to do so] cannot be plain error.”
   Wallace v. Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 500 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
   and citation omitted). Because there is no binding precedent holding that
   § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional, Wilson is unable to demonstrate an error that
   is clear or obvious. See Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d at 230–31.
          The district court’s judgment is
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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