Court Opinion

ID: 9671043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:29:58.961299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.903705
License: Public Domain

M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.
(concurring). I am in agreement with the majority’s conclusion that the "moral turpitude” standard is too restrictive and unreasonable. Based upon the facts of this case, I also Concur in the result arrived at by the majority opinion.
I concur separately, however, because I am persuaded that the majority’s conclusion that "an employee who is discharged for just cause is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits” is too broad. Although the majority’s subsequent limitation of the definition of "just cause” narrows the standard somewhat, I suggest an approach that involves a two-prong analysis: (1) was there just cause for the employee’s dismissal, and (2) was there just cause (per the majority’s definition of "just cause”) for the employer’s refusal to pay benefits? Such an analysis is necessary because just cause to dismiss an employee does not necessarily result in just cause to deny the employee workers’ compensation benefits._