Court Opinion

ID: 9909253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 20:02:30.96822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:23.482342
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Yin CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                       G061774
      Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                       (Super. Ct. No. 11CF2822)
           v.
                                                                       OPINION
 SARITH YIN,

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kimberly
Menninger, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
                   Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Donald
W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                          *                  *                  *
                                                             1
              The parties agree that changes to Penal Code section 186.22 enacted by
Assembly Bill No. 333 (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1-4, eff. Jan. 1, 2022 (AB 333)); see
People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467 (E.H.)) require reversal after a jury convicted
Sarith Yin of murder for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and also found certain gang
allegations to be true, including on related counts. The parties further agree that, on
remand, the prosecutor may retry Yin on the gang murder offense and all gang-related
allegations. We accept the parties’ stipulation to reverse and remand because Yin’s
murder conviction was vacated under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu) after
habeas review in this court, and thus the criminal proceedings against him were not yet
final at the time AB 333 took effect. Yin was therefore entitled to any benefit arising
from the statute (see In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada)) while the matter
was pending for retrial and resentencing after habeas relief. This period extended to and
included the trial court’s decision to reenter Yin’s murder conviction upon his guilty plea.
We therefore reverse the judgment which denied him the benefits of AB 333, and remand
for further proceedings, including retrial at the prosecutor’s election on all gang-related
allegations against Yin.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              In 2012, a jury convicted Yin of murder for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), active participation in
a criminal street gang (count 2; § 186.22, subd. (a)), and, as a felon, prohibited possession
of a firearm (count 3; former § 12021, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found two gang-related
enhancements applied to count 1, in particular that Yin vicariously discharged a firearm
causing death (§ 12022.53, subds.(d), (e)(1) [gang-benefit required]) and that he
committed the offense for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).

       1
              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
The jury also found the gang-benefit enhancement applied to his firearm possession in
count 3.
              In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found Yin suffered a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d),
(e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (b), (c)(1)). As pertinent here, the court sentenced Yin to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for the special circumstances gang murder
conviction in count 1, plus consecutive terms of 25 years to life for the gang-related
vicarious firearm discharge enhancement on that count and five years on the prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that the court found to be true.
              In 2013, this court affirmed Yin’s conviction on direct appeal. (People v.
Yin (July 17, 2013, G046831) [nonpub. opn.] (Yin I).)
              In 2018, Yin successfully challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding in this
court the trial court’s entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict. (People v. Yin (Feb. 28,
2019, G056336) [nonpub. opn.] (Yin II).) “The petition is granted. Yin’s first degree
murder conviction is vacated and, on remand, the prosecution may either accept a second
degree murder conviction or retry Yin for first degree murder with proper jury
instructions.” (Ibid.)
              On remand, as explained in respondent’s brief, “[t]he prosecution initially
elected to retry [Yin] for first-degree murder, and pretrial proceedings ensued,” but in
February 2021, “following various delays largely due to COVID 19—the prosecution
elected to accept a reduction to second-degree murder . . . .” At the prosecutor’s request,
the trial court dismissed the gang-murder special circumstance allegation.
              Yin pleaded guilty to the reduced charge but filed a motion to dismiss “all
the gang related charges and enhancements,” contending they “no longer have
evidentiary support” under current law with the enactment of AB 333. The trial court
denied the motion. The court concluded that “re-litigation of guilt is not warranted unless
the People had chosen to go forward on the first degree [murder charge].” Had the

                                              3
prosecutor done so, the court allowed “that [Assembly Bill No.] 333 might be working
because you didn’t have a final outcome, but by choosing the second degree murder
conviction as a remedy to the habeas grant[], the case was final. Nothing was disturbed.”
                 The trial court proceeded to resentencing, imposing an indeterminate term
consisting of 15 years to life for second degree murder and 25 years to life for the
vicarious firearm enhancement. The court stated, “the remaining sentences for the
remaining counts and enhancements all remain in full force and effect,” but granted the
prosecutor’s request to dismiss its prior strike finding (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) based on
“recent case law” holding that “the People at sentencing have the burden to prove that
that is valid still . . . .”

                                        DISCUSSION
                 “[W]hen a change in law reduces the punishment for a crime, defendants
with nonfinal judgments are entitled to those ‘ameliorative benefits.’” (E.H., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 478.) This principle, known as the Estrada “presumption” or
“retroactivity rule” (People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158 (Padilla)) applies both
to amendments to substantive crimes (e.g., People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018)
4 Cal.5th 299, 307-308) and equally “when an enhancement has been amended to
redefine to an appellant’s benefit the conduct subject to the enhancement.” (People v.
Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344 (Lopez).) Effective January 1, 2022, AB 333
modified section 186.22 in a manner that applies retroactively because it “increases the
threshold for” conviction of an offense under the gang statute and similarly for
imposition of a gang enhancement. (Lopez, at p. 344; accord, E.H., at pp. 477-478
[noting changes to what constitutes a gang’s “benefit” from an offense for an
enhancement to apply and to the requisite ‘“pattern of criminal gang activity”’ for a gang
offense].)

                                               4
              The Supreme Court recently explained that relief obtained on habeas corpus
may “interrupt[]” a judgment’s finality so that Estrada applies. (Padilla, supra,
13 Cal.5th 158, 164.) “A case is final when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has
ended [citation] and ‘the courts can no longer provide a remedy to a defendant on direct
review.’” (Id. at p. 161.) In Padilla, the high court held that when the Court of Appeal
vacated the defendant’s sentence on collateral review, “the trial court regained the
jurisdiction and duty to consider what punishment was appropriate for him, and Padilla
regained the right to appeal whatever new sentence was imposed.” (Id. at pp. 161-162.)
In other words, the judgment against the defendant “became nonfinal” and “remain[ed]
nonfinal . . . because the Court of Appeal ordered a second resentencing, from which the
Attorney General now appeals.” (Id. at p. 162.)
              Padilla applies “[w]hen a habeas corpus court vacates a prior judgment and
orders a new trial or new sentencing hearing” (italics added), in which case “the prior
judgment—now ineffective—can no longer be a final one.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 164; see also People v. Salgado (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 376, 380.) Respondent
makes no argument that the formerly final judgment after our direct review in Yin I
remained final when Yin gained habeas relief in Yin II for Chiu error—resulting in the
opportunity for a retrial at the prosecutor’s election. We perceive no reason on this
record why Padilla would not apply; indeed, the Attorney General concedes it does.
              The trial court’s conclusion that particular gang-related findings on gang
allegations against Yin remained intact notwithstanding the habeas outcome contravenes
the principle that the Estrada rule extends both to substantive offenses and
enhancements. (E.g., Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 344.) While the court seems to
have reasoned that the gang allegations regained finality once the prosecutor declined “to
go forward on the first degree” murder charge, that conclusion is inconsistent with the
fact that both Estrada and Padilla apply to resentencing hearings after habeas relief.

                                             5
                                     DISPOSITION
              The judgment is reversed; Yin’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including retrial of the
gang allegations against Yin at the prosecutor’s discretion.

                                                 GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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