Court Opinion

ID: 9759654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:24:05.016683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:14:41.823088
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Watkins, J.:
I would sustain the objections of the appellants to the jurisdiction of Dauphin County to try the offense charged in the indictment.
The testimony in this case establishes that the acts alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, to wit, the alleged false slips and the illegal dumping, the payments to inspectors and any and all acts, connected with construction of the Northeast extension of the Pennsylvania Turnpike took place either in Lackawanna County or near the border of Lackawanna and Luzerne Counties. The slips issued *485pursuant to the slushing carried out by Rogers Construction Company were made in Lackawanna County and that one of a number of slips, which were prepared at the same time, were sent to the representatives of Manu-Mine, the supervisor of the project, which maintained its office in Dupont, Luzerne County. The Turnpike Commission, likewise, maintained an office in Dupont, Luzerne County and any slips which came into the possession of Manu-Mine and the Turnpike Commission came into their possession in Luzerne County.
Estimates were prepared by the Rogers Construction Company in Lackawanna, County and were submitted to the Turnpike Commission office at Dupont, Luzerne County. The estimates were approved by duly authorized agents of the Turnpike Commission in Luzerne County. All of the above had to be completed in Luzerne County and from that point the appellants had nothing further to do with the procedure of payment.
The majority rely on the authority of the opinion in Com. v. Prep, 186 Pa. Superior Ct. 442, 142 A. 2d 460 (1958). I believe this to be an unfortunate opinion and represents sheer judicial legislation, but at least in that case the false weight slips were submitted to the Department of Highways in Harrisburg for audit. However, I do not believe any overt act of conspiracy was committed by the defendant in the Prep case or by the appellants in this case, in Dauphin County. The extension of the Prep decision to this case most certainly establishes the doctrine that in any case involving an agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth, where a conspiracy is charged, venue will lie in Dauphin County.
The locus of a crime is always in issue, for a court has no jurisdiction of the offense unless committed in *486the county where tried. Com. v. Tarsnane, 170 Pa. Superior Ct. 265, 85. A. 2d. 606 (1952). . In, Com. v. Mezick, 147 Pa. Superior C.t, 410, 413, 24 A. 2d. 762; 764, we said: “But it is well settled .that prosecution for criminal conspiracy may be brought in .the county where the unlawful combination or confederation was formed, or in any county where an overt .act was committed by any of the conspirators in furtherance of that unlawful combination or confederacy... . . An overt act is distinguished from that which rests merely in intention or design; and as used in the law .of- conspiracy it means an act done in furtherance of- the object of the conspiracy.”
In order to sustain jurisdiction of this offense the majority of this Court has invented the fiction that because the appellants had knowledge. that checks in payment would come from Harrisburg- and- said checks in fact were mailed from Harrisburg, even though payment was made in Lackawanna County,- this knowledge constitutes an overt act by the conspirators in furtherance of the object of conspiracy. It certainly amounts to a contention that their act in presenting periodic estimates in Dupont was an overt act in Dauphin County. I believe nothing could be further from the intent of the act or its application as set forth in the case above cited. See also-: Com. v. Schmunk, 22 Pa. Superior Ct. 348, affirmed 207 Pa. 554, 56 A. 1088 (1904).
The burden of work in the Dauphin County Court, because of Commonwealth cases, has been constantly a source of discussion by the legislature. Yet, the position taken by the Dauphin County court here, by the use of judicial legislation. under the guise of reading legislative intent into the Act, reaches out to increase its jurisdiction in criminal cases where the locus of the crime is in other counties.
*487It might he added, too, that Dauphin County, being the site of the State Capitol and the place where thousands of state employes live and work, is particularly susceptible to political rumors and propaganda. Bo much so, that a defendant to a charge involving politics or the government, where the incidents of the accusation have been the subject of a barrage of publicity, is at a distinct disadvantage. It is even doubtful, in such an atmosphere of prior trial by newspaper, radio and television, if a fair trial is possible, and his conviction is a foregone conclusion.
The historic rivalry between town and gown in a university area where a natural prejudice exists against the students and the town people can be compared to a similar prejudice existing between the “taxpayers” or the “people” of a State Capitol area and “job-holders”, or “politicians”.
With this realistic problem in mind, certainly rather than stretch the meaning of the legislature to increase the jurisdiction of Dauphin County in criminal cases the Act should be strictly construed so that the defendant may have the right to a jury from the vicinage of the locus of the crime.
It is also important to note the realistic problem that may confront an innocent citizen accused of crime, and he is innocent until proven guilty, if the jurisdiction is extended by the fiction suggested in the majority opinion. The defendant is then placed at a great disadvantage. He must obtain bail and do all the other necessary things that confront one accused of crime in a place far away from his home; obtain counsel in Dauphin County which may be in addition to his own local counsel and add greatly to his expenses; bear the added cost of transportation, although this is not the problem it might have been years ago; and obtain accommodations for himself and his witnesses *488whenever his and their presence are necessary. His prior good reputation in his own community has no value in the strange jurisdiction, so that, his character testimony, which the law says is substantive, loses its force because the character witnesses necessarily come from the home area. Most important of all, his guilt and ultimate freedom will be determined by a jury drawn from an alien vicinage.
The Commonwealth is not at such a disadvantage. The machinery of prosecution is operating all the time in the district attorneys’ offices in the counties of the Commonwealth. It certainly should not matter to the Commonwealth where the case is tried and there is no good reason, even that of expediency, to try the case other than in the county of the situs of the crime. We should take judicial notice of the facts that some of the defendants were arrested and indicted for the same offense in Lackawanna County, entered pleas of nolo contendere and are still awaiting sentence in that County.
The reluctance of this Court to set aside a conviction, which on the basis of the record, is perhaps warranted, nonetheless, produces a result based on expediency; unsettles the existing law, and adds to the confusion among practising lawyers, as well as making difficult the determination of the law by the courts below. The doctrine of stare decisis is a time honored and worthy principle that should not be lightly cast aside. This is most certainly true, where as here, there is redress readily available against the mischief complained of by a procedure in the proper jurisdiction.