Court Opinion

ID: 9457399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:20:42.069964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:20.113745
License: Public Domain

GEWIN, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
Although I agree with much that has been said by my brothers in the majority opinion, I am unable to agree with all of their reasoning or with the result they reach. With complete deference and full respect for their well articulated views, I feel compelled to dissent in part.
While it may be presumptuous for this court to hold that adequate immunity is available to appellant Morgan under Mississippi law, I do not believe such a holding to be necessary under the issues presented. Moreover, nothing said in this dissent is meant to reflect unfavorably upon “the good hands of the courts of Mississippi.” Stated simply, it is my feeling that the State of Mississippi should not allow one court of the state, albeit a civil court acting in civil litigation to compel a citizen to testify and make disclosures and then permit another court of the same state judicial system to use such evidence or disclosures in a criminal prosecution. The record does not indicate to me that the state proposes to follow such a course of action. The protections of the Fifth Amendment are applicable in every state and in every court. Otherwise the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2,1 would be meaningless. If appellant Morgan is required to obey the Chancellor’s decree after vigorously asserting his Fifth Amendment rights, he should not then be subject to criminal prosecution based on such disclosures.
I would require appellant Morgan to obey the Chancellor’s decree, or suffer the consequences of disobeying the civil contempt order subject to full immunity as indicated. This is not to say that there is any restriction or limitation upon the appropriate court or courts of Mississippi to modify or set aside the decree under consideration. Conceivably, the Fifth Amendment questions now presented in this case in its present form could be eliminated or become less important if the Chancellor’s decree should be modified or set aside. In deciding that issue the state courts of Mississippi would pass upon questions of compelling state interest in the procedures of that state.
Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that there is any actual or real threat of a criminal prosecution by the State of Mississippi; but if such a prosecution does arise, Mr. Morgan should then be accorded complete immunity with respect to all evidence given and all disclosures made in obeying the Chancellor’s decree. There is not the slightest suggestion that any federal criminal statute is involved.
We do not know whether appellant Morgan has removed any property from the state subject to a judgment lien, with intent to defraud. See § 2250, Code of Mississippi of 1942, recompiled. The other Mississippi statute, § 2252, gives the debtor the option of avoiding a criminal prosecution by discharging the lien or paying to the holder of such lien the value of the property involved in the event the same is less than the amount of lien. Both statutes appear to be misdemeanors only.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that appellant Morgan was the moving influence in all of the transactions under consideration. Large sums of money are involved. He *1368made representations, promises and assurances in order to induce others to act. He profited from the transactions under consideration and asserted that he was well able to indemnify and protect those who were induced to act at his behest. Thus having induced, persuaded, promised and contracted to repay sums of money which he caused others to lose, he should be required now to face the day of judgment. He should not be permitted to nullify the Chancellor’s decree by suggesting an imaginary and elusive possibility of a criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor which he could surely and certainly escape by returning the property, if any, which may be subject to a judgment lien. In that sense he holds the key to the prison door. I gain the distinct impression that Mr. Morgan’s fear arises from the requirement of making the disclosures ordered rather than from the possibility of criminal prosecution for a relatively minor crime which does not appear to be imminent. Therefore I would require Mr. Morgan to obey the Chancellor’s decree in its present form, subject to the limitations herein expressed.2 3

. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” (emphasis added)

. See, e. g., Pennock v. West, 23 Pa.Dist. R. 1062, 43 Pa.Co.R. 16 (1914) ; Reese v. Baker, 98 Fla. 52, 123 So. 3, (Fla.1929) ; Annot. 106 A.L.R. 383 (1937).