Court Opinion

ID: 9748139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:53:13.930662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:44.917251
License: Public Domain

NANCY STEFFEN RAHMEYER,
Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In the context of this case, I would find that when Appellant invoked his right to remain silent in this drug trafficking case, it was a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and. Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution to use the information of his employment status as obtained on the booking form against him at trial. Furthermore, I would conclude that the admission of employment information was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The privilege against self-incrimination has been described as: “a precious right [ ] ... fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle,” “one of our Nation’s most cherished principles,” a “hallmark of our democracy,” and an “essential mainstay of our adversary system.” Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 457-60, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As eloquently stated by Chief Justice Warren:
[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government — state or federal — must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a “fair state-individual balance,” to require the government “to shoulder the entire load,” to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
Id. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (internal citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court has a tradition of according the privilege a liberal construction. Id. at 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602. In keeping with this venerable tradition, claimed violations of an accused’s privilege against self-incrimination merit rigorous scrutiny.
It is clear that before interrogating a suspect in custody, police officers must advise him of his right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him, that he has a right to an attorney, and an attorney will be provided for him in the event he cannot afford one. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Absent a knowing and voluntary waiver oí these rights, a *880suspect’s responses are inadmissible against him in later criminal proceedings. Id. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Miranda’s protections are only triggered when a suspect is in custody and is interrogated, that is, “subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 508 (Mo. banc 2004).
In Innis, the U.S. Supreme Court sought to clarify the definition of interrogation under Miranda,
“[Ijnterrogation” ... refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.... A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682.
In determining whether the information sought by a booking officer falls within the benign category of permissible booking questions or an unconstitutional interrogation, i.e., whether the question is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response, courts have reviewed a variety of different factors. In rendering a decision in the present case, I would look to these cases and conduct a “totality of the circumstances” review.
A protracted analysis is not necessary for this dissenting opinion; however, to convict Appellant of trafficking in the second degree, the State was required to prove that Appellant knowingly “pos-sesse[d] or ha[d] under his control ... more than thirty kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing marijuana.” Section 195.223.71; State v. Carson, 941 S.W.2d 518, 523 (Mo. banc 1997) (“[Kjnowledge must be the mental state for trafficking in the second degree”). “The closer the connection between the crime in question and the information sought, the stronger the inference that the [police officer] should have known that [the] inquiry was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Hughes v. State, 346 Md. 80, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (1997); see also U.S. v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391-92 (8th Cir.1985) (ruling that a booking question is subject to scrutiny if it is “directly relevant to the substantive offense charged.”). “[W]here a purportedly routine booking question provides some proof of an element of the crime for which the suspect is arrested, the booking question exception will be less likely to apply.” Hughes, 695 A.2d at 140.
Appellant’s unemployment permits a reasonable inference that he supported himself by transporting drugs across the country. This inference supports the scienter element of the State’s case. Despite Respondent’s insistence in its brief that “[w]hether or not Appellant was employed did not make it more or less likely that he was guilty of the charged offense,” the Prosecutor certainly seized upon this correlation numerous times during her closing argument:
*881Klinedinst may be a driver, but it’s [Appellant] who’s controlling the car. The unemployed [Appellant2]. Tells the police he’s unemployed.
[[Image here]]
[Appellant’s] unemployed.
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Doesn’t sound so much like a vacation as it does like a job. [Appellant’s] making a run.
[[Image here]]
$550, the unemployed [Appellant] has in his hand. And he has bought or he is transporting $100,000 worth of dope in his car. That’s not a vacation, that’s a job. That’s what [Appellant] is doing.
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This unemployed fellow [Appellant] whose [sic] buying this car.
Simply because the employment status question was asked of every person detained in the Greene County Jail does not purge the question of a Constitutional violation.3 Simply putting a question on a standardized booking form and asking it of every suspect arrested does not shield it from Constitutional scrutiny. Respondent attempts to legitimize the employment question by claiming such a question satisfies an “administrative requirement” imposed by the Greene County Jail; however, it fails to specifically identify what legitimate end that “administrative requirement” satisfies. The employment status question is clearly distinguishable from the other booking questions Deputy Horn asked: name, social security number, date of birth, gender, hair color, eye color, weight, and ethnicity. It is clear how such questions appear to legitimately “aid [] the police in maintaining records which properly identify those arrested.” Jordan, 506 S.W.2d at 83. In contrast, I do not see, and Respondent has not demonstrated, how knowing a suspect’s employment status is related to the police’s administrative concerns of record keeping and identification of those arrested. The very fact that the State used Appellant’s response that he was unemployed to prove an element of its case at trial casts suspicion on Respondent’s “administrative use” argument.
It is fundamentally unjust for Appellant to be told he has the right to remain silent, to allow Appellant to assert that right, to insist that Appellant give routine identification information for “booking” purposes, and then use that information against him to prove an element of the State’s case at trial. I would conclude that when Appellant invoked his right to remain silent in this drug trafficking case, it was a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution to use the information of his employment status as obtained on the booking form against him at trial.
The determination that the evidence of Appellant’s employment status was admitted in eiTor does not end the inquiry. “A properly-preserved federal constitutional error in a criminal trial does not require reversal and remand for a new trial if the reviewing court determines that the error *882was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Lopez, 128 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Mo. App. S.D.2004) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). The State carries the burden of proving that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. This Court must decide whether the “ ‘erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all the evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different conclusion but for the erroneously admitted evidence.’” State v. Barriner, 34 S.W.3d 139, 150 (Mo. banc 2000) (quoting State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 592 (Mo. banc 1997)).
I cannot say that the trial court’s error in admitting Deputy Horn’s testimony regarding Appellant’s employment status obtained during booking was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the evidence presented as to the quantity and value of the marijuana found in Appellant’s car, which was being driven by Mr. Klinedinst, there was not “plenty” of remaining evidence.
With all due respect to the majority’s analysis, I am skeptical of the evidence it cites as overwhelming proof of Appellant’s complicity in a trafficking scheme. The majority states as one sign of “truly damning evidence” that the officers in the present case did not discover any drugs or drug paraphernalia in the passenger compartment of the car or on the passengers themselves. I do not understand how that fact supplies the element of knowledge to Appellant. Additionally, I do not give such a sinister interpretation of a single key in the ignition (without a key ring or other keys) and empty bottles and food wrappers on the floor of the car. Courts in this state have recognized the presence of food wrappers as part of a normal cross country trip. State v. Woolfolk, 3 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo.App. W.D.1999) (noting that the presence of food wrappers in cars is common in this “era of carry-out dining and cannot serve to separate the suspicious from the innocent traveler”); State v. Smith, 926 S.W.2d 689, 693-94 (Mo.App. S.D.1996) (concluding that the presence of junk food wrappers, water jug and map in car did not create basis for suspicion of criminal activity). Similarly, the “knee jerk” conclusion that Appellant was sweaty and nervous because he was guilty, departs from Missouri precedent. State v. Barks, 128 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Mo. banc 2004) (discussing that an officer’s perception that driver appears nervous does not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable suspicion to justify detaining driver for further inquiry); Woolfolk, 3 S.W.3d at 829 (ruling that “[njervousness alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion, although, together with other factors, it can be relevant in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists under the totality of the circumstances.”); State v. Richmond, 133 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Mo.App. S.D.2004) (concluding that defendant’s nervousness, food containers and an atlas in the passenger compartment, and the defendant’s claim he was traveling from Los Angeles to Michigan, did not support the officer’s belief that criminal activity was afoot). Finally, Corporal Johnson’s suspicion of Appellant’s and Mr. Klinedinst’s stories because they were too similar, leads me to question whether travelers in this state are doomed regardless of what they say, in that the State repeatedly cites motorists’ inconsistent stories as a cause for concern. See State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 405-07 (Mo. banc 1990) (upholding the warrant-less search of automobile when the officer grew suspicious of its occupants when, inter alia, the passengers in the car told conflicting stories); State v. Joyce, 885 S.W.2d 751, 753-57 (Mo.App. S.D.1994) *883(concluding that the law enforcement officer was justified in asking for consent to search automobile when, among other things, the passengers told inconsistent stories about their destination).
To be clear, I would not hold that police officers cannot ask legitimate booking questions of a suspect in custody. Rather, I believe that the procedural requirements dictated by Miranda are more than a meaningless formality. When a suspect asserts his constitutionally-protected right to remain silent, it should not be without effect. Accordingly, I would conclude Appellant asserted his right to remain silent, and an officer asked, in the context of his booking, a question, which deviates from those questions dearly necessary to legitimately aid the police in maintaining records which properly identify those arrested; therefore, a fundamental privilege was violated. I would further find that the admission enabled the Prosecutor to refer to Appellant’s employment status five times in the context of her argument that Appellant had to know the marijuana was in the car. Because Appellant’s employment status weighed heavily as proof that he knowingly transported the drugs, the error was not harmless. Appellant’s response to the booking questions should not have been admitted at trial to be used against him as an essential element of the crime. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. All references to statutes are to RSMo 2000, unless otherwise specified.

. The Prosecutor actually referred to Mr. Kli-nedinst here, however, it is clear from the context of the argument that she intended to refer to Appellant.

. In determining the applicability of Miranda, Missouri courts have considered whether a question was part of a police department’s routine booking procedure as one factor in its overall analysis. State v. Jordan, 506 S.W.2d 74, 83 (Mo.App.St.L.D.1974); State v. Isaiah, 874 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Mo.App. W.D.1994). I do not dispute that the routine nature of a question is a legitimate factor to consider, however, it is not controlling.