Court Opinion

ID: 9641181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:24:45.36957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:35.644974
License: Public Domain

David M. Glover, Judge. Appellant, William Pittman, was tried by a jury and found guilty of the offenses of first-degree terroristic threatening, third-degree domestic battery, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. For his sole point of appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence that was obtained from his truck. We affirm. Appellant was arrested on February 27, 2005, inside the apartment of his ex-wife, who had reported to police that she had been raped and held at knife-point in the apartment by appellant, that he had finally fallen aslefep in her apartment, and that she wanted them to come get him. The police arrived, arrested appellant, and removed him from the premises. The criminal information that was filed against appellant charged him with 1) first-degree terroristic threatening in that he allegedly threatened to kill his victim while pressing the blade of a knife into her right side; 2) first-degree false imprisonment in that he allegedly forcibly restrained her in her apartment and would not allow her to leave; 3) rape in that he allegedly engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will by holding a knife at her throat and threatening to kill her; 4) third-degree domestic battery in that he allegedly repeatedly hit and kicked her, causing minor injuries; 5) possession of a controlled substance; and 6) possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant’s vehicle was parked in front of the victim’s apartment. His name was not on the lease of any apartment in the complex. The officers decided to impound appellant’s vehicle because, as Sergeant Randall Gilbert testified at the suppression hearing, the nature of appellant’s offenses against his ex-wife were violent, appellant did not reside at the apartment complex, and Sergeant Gilbert did not want appellant to have any excuse to return to the apartment complex. During the inventory of the truck, the officers discovered what was later confirmed to be a rock of crack cocaine and a crack pipe. Rule 12.6(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: (b) A vehicle impounded in consequence of an arrest, or retained in official custody for other good cause, may be searched at such times and to such extent as is reasonably necessary for safekeeping of the vehicle and its contents. Appellant contends that there was no evidence in the instant case to support a finding that his vehicle needed safeguarding, that it posed a public-safety hazard, or that it contained any evidence related to the crimes with which he was charged. Consequently, he argues that it was not reasonably necessary for the officers to impound the vehicle and to conduct an inventory search for safekeeping of the contents, and that, therefore, the motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the vehicle should have been granted. We do not find appellant’s argument convincing. Rather, we find the rationale of Folly v. State, 28 Ark. App. 98, 771 S.W.2d 306 (1989) persuasive. In Folly, the appellant argued that the inventory search, which was conducted on a motel parking lot, was not justified because his vehicle was not abandoned in a place where it created a traffic hazard. We explained that the fact that a vehicle is legally parked does not necessarily negate the need to take the vehicle into protective custody. We quoted with approval from a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, United States v. Staller, 616 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1980), which explained that even though a vehicle was lawfully parked and presented no apparent hazard to public safety, cars parked overnight in a mall parking lot run an appreciable risk of vandalism or theft — a fact known to the officers in that case. Accordingly, the court determined that under those circumstances, taking custody of the car was a legitimate exercise of what the court termed the officer’s “community caretaking function.”  Here, the trial court determined that Sergeant Gilbert’s explanation for his decision to impound appellant’s vehicle was reasonable, and we agree. The violent nature of appellant’s attack on his ex-wife justified Gilbert’s desire to eliminate any justifiable reason for appellant to return to his ex-wife’s apartment complex. There was' no indication that Gilbert’s action was taken in bad faith. The unrefuted testimony of Sergeant Gilbert was that it was taken in accordance with standard police procedures. Consequently, we hold that Gilbert’s explanation represented “other good cause” under Rule 12.6(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, that his action constituted an exercise of the officer’s community caretaking function, and therefore that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from appellant’s truck. Marshall, Vaught, and Heffley, JJ., agree. Baker and Miller, JJ., dissent.