Court Opinion

ID: 9752830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:36:28.408394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:22.958411
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view the majority’s opinion today ignores the waiver doctrine and disregards the Commonwealth’s interest in the finality of its criminal judgments.
Undeniably, the right to appeal a conviction is sacred. Still, this hallowed right must compete with the Commonwealth’s interest in the legitimacy and credibility of its criminal judgments. The right to appeal therefore must be tailored to accommodate the public’s concern with a judgment’s finality.
In contemplation of these competing interests, our Post Conviction Hearing Act1 precludes a criminal defendant from obtaining collateral relief where the issues raised either have been waived or finally litigated. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544; Commonwealth v. Silvis, 307 Pa.Super. 75, 452 A.2d 1045 (1982); Commonwealth v. Harper, 292 Pa.Super. 192, 436 A.2d 1217 (1981). Moreover, those rulings or issues potentially cognizable on appeal, are presumptively treated as waived if a defendant fails to raise them on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Silvis, supra; Commonwealth v. Harper, supra.
I am wholly unpersuaded by appellant’s efforts to rebut the presumption of waiver. There is no doubt that appellant did not file an appeal to his convictions in a timely fashion. In his PCHA petition, filed nearly twenty years after the convictions, appellant seeks the collateral relief of the right to appeal nunc pro tunc. In order to rebut the presumption of waiver of appeal right, appellant suggests that his failure to appeal and any waiver engendered thereby, was not knowing and intelligent... Specifically, appellant claims that he was not informed of his appellate rights, and *303also, that his counsel was ineffective in failing twenty years ago to pursue an appeal on appellant’s behalf.
The majority today remands this case for an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the truth of appellant’s allegations. I quarrel with this disposition, for I do not think a remand is necessary in the present circumstance. Generally, a PCHA hearing is unnecessary if it is determined that the claims set forth in the petition are unsupportable by the record and frivolous. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9549; Commonwealth v. Box, 305 Pa.Super. 81, 451 A.2d 252 (1982); Commonwealth v. Sherard, 290 Pa.Super. 58, 434 A.2d 128 (1981). I am convinced that appellant’s claims in rebuttal of the presumption of waiver are totally without merit.
A lapse of time in filing a PCHA petition is a factor to be considered in assessing its merit. Commonwealth v. Courts, 315 Pa.Super. 124, 461 A.2d 828 (1983); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 306 Pa.Super. 516, 452 A.2d 844 (1983). “Thus, a lengthy, unexplained delay in raising an issue will buttress the presumption of knowing and understanding waiver; conversely the immediate attempt to gain review of alleged error at the earliest possible time would have the opposite effect. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 495 Pa. 26, 432 A.2d 182 (1981).” Commonwealth v. Hairston, 323 Pa.Super. 449, 470 A.2d 1004 (1984) (Cirillo, J., dissenting).
In this case appellant waited more than nineteen years to file his PCHA petition. In light of this inordinate protraction of filing, appellant’s explanation is flimsy, if not unbelievable. Certainly appellant, through at least a twenty year exposure to our criminal justice system, was aware that the right to appeal is not perpetual. See Commonwealth ex rel. Scoleri v. Myers, 423 Pa. 558, 225 A.2d 540 (1969) (knowledge of appellate rights imputed to defendant) Cf. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 309 Pa.Super. 214, 455 A.2d 126 (1983). If it is true that appellant was not informed of his right to appeal, and it is true that counsel did not pursue an appeal after being requested by appellant to do so, why has appellant remained silent for almost two *304decades? In these circumstances, appellant’s “prolonged silence becomes deafening.” Commonwealth v. Courts, 315 Pa.Super. at 134, 461 A.2d at 833.
In short, it is inconceivable to me that appellant could now claim that he has not waived his right to collateral relief when there has not been so much as a murmur from him since 1962. If the waiver doctrine is to have force, and if the concept of judgment finality means anything, we should not lightly lend our imprimatur to appellant’s frivolous claims, by remanding for an evidentiary hearing.2 I am convinced beyond any doubt that appellant has waived his right to appeal. The PCHA court correctly dismissed appellant’s petition without a hearing. A remand in this case would be a supreme waste of time.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq.

. Also, an evidentiary hearing would be of no practical benefit. Twenty years have passed and memories have faded. The transcripts of trial proceedings are no longer in the record. It is doubtful that the relevant facts could be reconstructed at this late date.