Court Opinion

ID: 9409999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 06:00:24.54108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:54.636383
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     AUBREY BEASLEY,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-0752-17-0273-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: July 19, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Aubrey Beasley, Chicago, Illinois, pro se.

           Robert Vega, Esquire, Hines, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     mitigated the appellant’s removal to a 30-day suspension.            For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review . We AFFIRM the
     initial decision to the extent that it sustained the charge of inappropriate language

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     and found nexus. We REVERSE the administrative judge’s decision to mitigate
     the penalty and AFFIRM the agency’s removal action.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        At all times relevant to the present appeal, the appellant held the position of
     Practical Nurse at the Jesse Brown Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in
     Chicago, Illinois. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 5 at 8. The agency
     removed him based on the charges of inappropriate language (two specifications),
     conduct unbecoming (one specification), and inappropriate conduct towards a
     coworker (one specification).     IAF, Tab 5 at 8-19.      The charges related to
     behavior towards a female coworker in November 2015 and November 2016, and
     the resulting December 2016 investigation into the incidents. Id. at 17-18. 2
¶3        The appellant timely appealed his removal. IAF, Tab 1. After holding a
     hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision sustaining the charge
     and two specifications of inappropriate language. IAF, Tab 39, Initial Decision
     (ID) at 3-4.   Specification one of the inappropriate language charge in the
     proposed removal stated that, on November 30, 2016, while the appellant was in
     the breakroom with a male coworker, a female coworker called that individual on
     the telephone and the appellant “yelled out something along the lines of kill that
     bitch.” IAF, Tab 5 at 17. Specification two stated that, during a December 12,
     2016, meeting with management regarding the appellant’s alleged interpersonal
     conflicts with the female coworker, he admitted to calling the coworker a “bi tch”
     on one unspecified occasion after she had allegedly lied about him acting
     inappropriately towards her. Id. The administrative judge did not sustain the
     charges of conduct unbecoming and inappropriate conduct towards a coworker.
     ID at 4-7. The administrative judge found that, although the appellant seemingly

     2
       The removal became effective March 24, 2017, IAF, Tab 5 at 10, prior to the
     enactment of the Department of Veterans Affairs Accountability and Whistleblower
     Protection Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-41, 131 Stat. 862. Neither party has argued
     that that act has any bearing on this appeal.
                                                                                         3

     raised an affirmative defense of disability discrimination, he failed to respond to
     the affirmative defenses order or present any evidence into the record or during
     the hearing regarding this issue. ID at 7-8. Therefore, the administrative judge
     found that the appellant had failed to prove his affirmative defense by
     preponderant evidence. 3 ID at 8.
¶4        The administrative judge mitigated the penalty of removal to a 30 -day
     suspension. ID at 8-14. She did not grant deference to the agency’s penalty
     determination, in large part because she sustained only the “least serious” of the
     three charges. ID at 8-9. In determining that the agency’s penalty of removal
     exceeded the tolerable limits of reasonableness, the administrative judge focused
     on the context in which the appellant used the inappropriate language and the
     appellant’s past discipline, both of which the deciding official considered
     aggravating factors. ID at 9-14. The administrative judge issued an interim relief
     order, stating that, should either party file a petition for review, the agency must
     provide the appellant with interim relief in accordance with 5 U.S.C.
     § 7701(b)(2)(A), effect the appellant’s appointment to his former position of
     Practical Nurse, and provide the pay and benefits of that position while the
     petition for review was pending. ID at 15-16.
¶5        The agency has timely filed a petition for review asserting th at the
     appellant’s removal should be sustained. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 5-19, Tab 3.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The agency has substantially complied with the interim relief order.
¶6        When, as here, the appellant was the prevailing party in the initial decision
     and interim relief was ordered, a petition for review filed by the agency must be

     3
      A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
     person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                       4

     accompanied by a certification that it has complied with the interim relief order.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a).     On review, the agency submitted as evidence of
     compliance with the interim relief order a letter sent to the appellant instructing
     him to report to duty as a Practical Nurse on a date certain and informing him that
     it would provide him with pay, compensation, and benefits effective from the date
     of the initial decision, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(2), and replace his
     March 24, 2017 removal decision letter with documentation of a 30-day
     suspension in his personnel file no later than 20 days from the date of the letter.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 20.
¶7        Although the appellant thereafter “request[ed] enforcement” of the initial
     decision, arguing that the agency had thus far failed to provide him with back
     pay, he did not raise any allegations of noncompliance with the interim relief
     order. PFR File, Tab 4 at 3. The administrative judge ordered the agency to pay
     the appellant the appropriate amount of back pay no later than 60 calendar days
     after the initial decision became final, and the agency filed a timely petition for
     review of the initial decision, which has not become the final decision of the
     Board. ID at 14-15; PFR File, Tab 1. The interim relief order did not require the
     agency to provide the appellant with any back pay prior to the date of the initial
     decision. ID at 15-16. Therefore, we find that the agency provided sufficient
     evidence that it complied with the interim relief order.         See Archerda v.
     Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 13 (2014).

     The administrative judge erred in mitigating the penalty.
¶8        On review, the agency argues that the administrative judge erred in
     mitigating the agency-imposed penalty of removal to a 30-day suspension. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 12-15. We agree. The agency also asserts that the administrative
     judge erred in not sustaining the conduct unbecoming and inappropriate conduct
     towards a coworker charges.     Id. at 6-12.   The Board need not address these
     allegations of error because, as discussed below, we find that the charge and
     specifications the administrative judge sustained warrant the appellant’s removal.
                                                                                             5

      See Luciano v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 10 (2001), aff’d,
      30 F. App’x 973 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶9          When an agency proves fewer than all of its charges, the Board may not
      independently determine a reasonable penalty; it may mitigate to the maximum
      reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated in its final decision or
      during proceedings before the Board that it desires that a lesser penalty be
      imposed on fewer charges. Alaniz v. U.S. Postal Service, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 14
      (2005). The Board may impose the same penalty imposed by the agency if, after
      balancing the mitigating factors, it is the maximum reasonable penalty. Id. The
      Board’s function in reviewing an agency’s penalty selection is not to displace
      management’s responsibility but to determine whether management exercised its
      judgment within the tolerable limits of reasonableness.         Id. For the following
      reasons, we find that the record supports the reasonableness of the removal
      penalty.
¶10         During the hearing, the deciding official provided detailed testimony
      regarding his consideration of the relevant Douglas 4 factors in sustaining the
      appellant’s proposed removal. Hearing Transcript (HT) at 169-82, 206-16. The
      deciding official testified that he viewed as aggravating factors the appellant’s
      work in a healthcare setting with veterans, the high standard of conduct and
      behavior towards patients and other VA employees expected of an individual in
      the appellant’s position, and the notoriety of the offense in negatively affecting
      the trust of veterans and the public in the level of patient care at the VA . HT
      at 170-71, 175-76. Although the appellant had a good performance record, the
      deciding official testified that the appellant’s inability to get along with fellow
      workers outweighed his performance record in considering this Douglas factor.
      HT at 173, 196-97, 212-213; IAF, Tab 5 at 23-47. The deciding official testified

      4
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board set
      forth a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the penalty to be
      imposed for an act of misconduct.
                                                                                         6

      that he could not recall another case involving a removal penalty for an employee
      who engaged in the charged conduct at issue in the present appeal, and therefore
      he considered the consistency of the penalty a neutral factor. HT at 174, 215-16.
      As noted by the administrative judge in her penalty analysis, the deciding offici al
      testified that he viewed as neutral the impact of the charged misconduct on the
      appellant’s ability to perform his position. HT at 173-74; ID at 14. Regarding
      the effectiveness of an alternative penalty to deter such conduct in the future, the
      deciding official testified that lesser penalties in the appellant’s two prior
      disciplinary actions “had failed in the past” to deter his misconduct.            HT
      at 181-82.
¶11        We find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating or neutral
      factors in this case. In considering the context in which the improper language
      was used, the administrative judge correctly noted that the November 30, 2016
      incident occurred in a breakroom and, according to hearing testimony, while the
      appellant and the male coworker who received the telephone call from the female
      coworker were eating lunch. ID at 10; HT at 11-12, 39. However, the context of
      the telephone call over which the appellant shouted the abusive language towards
      the female coworker was a work-related telephone call regarding one of the
      patients on the floor on which the appellant and other employees worked. HT
      at 11-12, 39-42.   Moreover, the male coworker testified that the appellant’s
      statements were loud enough for everyone in the breakroom to hear and that he
      hung up the telephone because he did not want the female coworker to hear the
      appellant’s statements. HT at 42. Therefore, the coworker ended a telephone call
      about patient care because of the inappropriate language used by the appellant.
¶12        We disagree with the administrative judge that the interpersonal issues
      between the appellant and his female coworker were a mitigating factor in
      considering the context in which he used inappropriate language. As discussed
      by the administrative judge, prior to the November 30, 2016 incident, the female
      coworker had accused the appellant of touching her inappropriately. ID at 10.
                                                                                       7

      VA police investigated this allegation but found “no proof to substantiate” the
      complaint, and the agency did not charge the appellant with misconduct related to
      this alleged incident in the proposed removal.      IAF, Tab 5 at 17 -19, 58-72.
      Although the administrative judge noted that the female coworker had taken out a
      civil no-contact order against the appellant, she did not acknowledge that VA
      police advised the coworker to obtain the no-contact order and that it was in
      effect at the time of the November 30, 2016 incident, having been extended by a
      Cook County Circuit Court judge approximately 6 weeks prior. ID at 10; IAF,
      Tab 5 at 61-64.    Regardless of the outcome of any litigation or VA police
      investigation of the appellant, we find it serious that the appellant used
      inappropriate or abusive language towards or about the female coworker under
      these circumstances. Furthermore, the deciding official testified that he had taken
      the job tension and personal issues that the appellant discussed in his oral reply
      into consideration, but he weighed this against the safety and well-being of
      veteran patients and agency employees in the working enviro nment.             HT
      at 180-81.
¶13        The Board’s review of a prior disciplinary action challenged by an appellant
      is limited to determining whether the action is clearly erroneous, provided that
      the employee was informed of the action in writing, the action is a matter of
      record, and the employee was permitted to dispute the charges before a
      higher-level authority than the one that imposes the discipline.        Bolling v.
      Department of the Air Force, 9 M.S.P.R. 335, 339-40 (1981). A challenged prior
      action will be discounted as clearly erroneous if it leaves the Board with the
      definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 340.
¶14        The proposed removal identified two prior disciplinary actions, as follows:
      (1) an April 2014 three-day suspension, mitigated from a proposed 7-day
      suspension, for disrespectful conduct towards a coworker; and (2) a 7 -day
      suspension for bringing a child to work and creating a work slowdown.         IAF,
      Tab 5 at 18, 109-12, 114-17. During the prehearing conference, the appellant
                                                                                        8

      stated that he wished to challenge the merits of these prior suspensions. IAF,
      Tab 25 at 4-5. Therefore, the administrative judge ordered the agency to provide
      additional documentary evidence regarding the prior disciplinary actions.      Id.;
      IAF, Tab 30.      She found that, in each of the prior actions, the appellant was
      informed in writing, the actions were a matter of record, and the appellant had the
      opportunity to dispute the charges before a higher level of authority. ID at 12;
      see Bolling, 9 M.S.P.R. at 339-40.      The April 2014 suspension involved the
      appellant using obscene, abusive language towards a fellow healthcare
      professional in a work setting in front of patients and invading the coworker’s
      personal space. IAF, Tab 30 at 6-32. The administrative judge made no finding
      that the April 2014 three-day suspension was clearly erroneous, and, following
      our review of the record, we see no reason to make such a finding. ID at 12; IAF,
      Tab 30 at 6-32.
¶15        We disagree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant’s
      7-day suspension for bringing a child to work and creating a work slowdown was
      too harsh and should not have been considered as a second prior offense by the
      deciding official. ID at 11-14; IAF, Tab 30 at 33-81. The administrative judge
      stated that the appellant had testified that the rehabilitation floor on which he
      worked was short-staffed on the day in question and that the “charge nurse told
      him to stay.” ID at 12-13. However, a review of the hearing transcript reflects
      that the appellant testified only that the charge nurse “knew that [his] child was
      there.” HT at 189-90, 271-72. We note that the appellant stated in an interview
      with management shortly after the incident that the nursing supervisor knew
      “later in the day” that his daughter was on the ward.         IAF, Tab 30 at 36.
      Therefore, the record does not support the administrative judge’s conclusion that
      management somehow instructed the appellant to remain at work with his
      daughter on the ward.      ID at 13.   During the hearing, the deciding official
      testified that he had not been involved in the November 2015 suspension action,
      but he believed that a 7-day suspension for bringing a child to work in a VA
                                                                                        9

      hospital was a reasonable application of discipline. HT at 211-12. In particular,
      the deciding official contrasted an employee bringing his child into the medical
      ward with children allowed under the visitor policy. HT at 208. He testified that
      visitors are supervised by nursing staff to ensure that hand h ygiene and other
      disease precautions are followed in the controlled environment.     Id. Thus, the
      record does not support the administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency’s
      decision to discipline the appellant was clearly erroneous. ID at 12-14.
¶16        Further, the administrative judge’s opinion that a lesser penalty of a letter
      of warning, reprimand, or an admonishment would have sufficed does not mean
      the incident should not be considered as prior discipline. ID at 13. A letter of
      warning, reprimand or admonishment would constitute a prior offense and
      aggravating factor. See Richard v. Department of the Air Force, 43 M.S.P.R.
      303, 308 n.4, aff’d, 918 F.2d 185 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Mitchell v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 32 M.S.P.R. 362, 365 (1987) (finding that a prior written counseling may
      serve as an aggravating factor).
¶17        Finally, we disagree with the administrative judge that removal for an
      offense of inappropriate language is inconsistent with the agency’s table of
      penalties. ID at 14. As discussed above, the sustained charge at issue in the
      present appeal was the appellant’s third disciplinary offense overall and second
      particular offense for disrespectful conduct or inappropriate language towards or
      about a coworker within a period of less than 3 years. ID at 11; IAF, Tab 5 at 18.
      Regarding the calculation of prior offenses, the VA Handbook states as follows:
            Offenses need not be identical in order to support progressively more
            severe disciplinary/adverse action against an employee.           For
            example, an employee who has received an admonishment for
            AWOL can receive a reprimand for sleeping on duty, and possibly be
            suspended or removed for a third offense unrelated to the two
            previous infractions.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 154. The deciding official testified that he considered the charges
      at issue in the present appeal the appellant’s third disciplinary offense.    HT
                                                                                      10

      at 175. The agency’s table of penalties states that the penalty for a third offense
      of “[d]isrespectful, insulting, abusive, insolent or obscene language or conduct to
      or about supervisors, other employees, patients, or visitors” is removal.     IAF,
      Tab 5 at 159. The penalty for a second offense of such misconduct is a 14 -day
      suspension to removal. Id. Therefore, we find that the agency’s chosen penalty
      is also consistent with the table of penalties for the sustained charge.
¶18         Disrespectful conduct as manifested by the use of abusive language is
      unacceptable and not conducive to a stable working atmosphere; an agency,
      therefore, is entitled to expect employees to comport themselves in conformance
      with accepted standards. Wilson v. Department of Justice, 68 M.S.P.R. 303, 310
      (1995). Although the administrative judge considered the inappropriate language
      charge the “least serious of the three charges,” ID at 9, removal may be a
      reasonable penalty, even for relatively minor misconduct, when an employee has
      a record of prior discipline, Alaniz, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶ 16. The administrative
      judge noted that not all cases before the Board involving conduct similar to the
      appellant’s have resulted in removal. ID at 9-10. However, the cases cited by the
      administrative judge involved employees with either no prior disciplinary history
      or prior discipline for dissimilar conduct to that for which the agency removed the
      employee. ID at 10 (citing Sublette v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 82,
      89-90 (1995); Davis v. Department of Justice, 63 M.S.P.R. 360, 367-68 (1994);
      Sternberg v. Department of Defense, 52 M.S.P.R. 547, 559 (1992); Theisen v.
      Veterans Administration, 31 M.S.P.R. 277, 279-82 (1986); Kullenberg v. Veterans
      Administration, 21 M.S.P.R. 513, 518 (1984)). In contrast, the appellant had a
      prior disciplinary record, including a prior offense for disrespectful conduct
      towards a coworker.      IAF, Tab 5 at 109-12, 114-17.        Therefore, the record
      supports the reasonableness of the deciding official’s decision to sustain the
      penalty of removal. Id. at 10-13.
¶19         The appellant does not challenge, and we see no reason to disturb, the
      administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved the charge of inappropriate
                                                                                           11

      language with two specifications by preponderant evidence. PFR File , Tab 4 at 3;
      see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no
      reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions
      on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987); see also Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d
      1288, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board may overturn credibility
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).
      Similarly, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to present any evidence or argument regarding his affirmative
      defense of disability discrimination, which he does not challenge on review. PFR
      File, Tab 4 at 3; ID at 7-8.
¶20         We conclude that management’s chosen penalty of removal falls within the
      tolerable limits of reasonableness. See, e.g., Alaniz, 100 M.S.P.R. 105, ¶¶ 14-15;
      Wilson, 68 M.S.P.R. at 309-10 (sustaining a removal for disrespectful conduct
      and the use of insulting, abusive language); see also Lewis v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 80 M.S.P.R. 472, ¶¶ 7-10 (1998) (upholding removal for
      disrespectful conduct towards a supervisor in the presence of coworkers,
      particularly considering that the employee was previously disciplined for similar
      misconduct).    Accordingly, we reverse the administrative judge’s decision to
      mitigate the penalty and affirm the agency’s removal action.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

      5
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file withi n the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition f or review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
                                                                                   13

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.           See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
                                                                                14

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your

6
  The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
                                                                                     15

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       16

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.