Court Opinion

ID: 9965873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 17:09:27.388008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:49.437949
License: Public Domain

J-S04014-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 GARRY CORE, ADMINISTRATOR OF           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 THE ESTATE OF AUDREY BRANCH            :        PENNSYLVANIA
 CORE                                   :
                                        :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 NELSON BRANCH AND WYNEESHA             :   No. 1299 EDA 2023
 BRANCH                                 :
                                        :
                   Appellants           :

             Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 6, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 220102259

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                                FILED MAY 3, 2024

     Appellants    Nelson   Branch   (“Nelson”)   and    Wyneesha    Branch

(“Wyneesha”) appeal from the judgment entered against Nelson and in favor

of Garry Core (“Garry”), in his capacity as administrator of the estate of

Audrey Branch Core (“the decedent”), ejecting Nelson from the real property

located at 2209 South Bucknell Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (“the

property”). We affirm.

     The trial court provided the following background as to this matter:

           The decedent . . . passed away intestate on September 20,
     2021. She was survived by her husband, [Garry], and her two
     adult daughters: Wyneesha . . . and Alexis Young. . . . [Garry]
     was granted letters of administration by the Register of Wills in
     Delaware County, where he resides.          The entirety of the
     decedent’s estate consisted of the . . . property. The decedent
     purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale in 2013, after the
J-S04014-24

     decedent’s sister died intestate with the property in foreclosure.
     [Wyneesha] and her children were living in the property at that
     time. In 2018, the decedent’s brother [Nelson] moved in and has
     remained in the property ever since.

            On November 3, 2021, [about six weeks after the decedent
     died, Garry], through his attorney, sent [Nelson] a demand letter
     for possession of [the property] within seven . . . days. [Nelson]
     did not respond to this letter and failed to deliver possession of
     the property. . . . [Garry] filed a complaint in ejectment, wherein
     [he] demanded “immediate possession of the [p]roperty, and that
     defendant should immediately end his unlawful possession and
     vacate the same.” [Nelson thereafter filed an answer with new
     matter, and Garry responded.] On May 27, 2022, [Wyneesha]
     filed a petition to intervene, which was granted by the [trial court.
     Garry did not seek leave to amend the complaint to name
     Wyneesha as an additional defendant.] N[o] party filed a motion
     for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for summary judgment.

            On March 30, 2023, this court conducted a one-day non-
     jury trial. [Garry] testified first, stating that he and the decedent
     had been married more than [forty] years when she passed away
     and that they resided together in Yeadon, Pennsylvania. He stated
     that the decedent was the administrator of her sister’s estate in
     2013 and that she purchased the property, which had been her
     sister’s residence, as part of a sheriff’s sale in order to keep it for
     her daughter [Wyneesha], who had recently separated from her
     husband. [Garry] testified that [Wyneesha] and her children
     moved into the property in 2013 and lived there until 2018 or
     2019 when they moved in with [Wyneesha]’s boyfriend in Dover,
     Delaware. [Garry] stated that at the time of his wife’s death, the
     only residents at the property that he was aware of were [Nelson]
     and [Nelson]’s wife.

           ....

            . . . [Garry also] stated that there were outstanding bills
     and back taxes to be paid on the property and that he had incurred
     out-of-pocket expenses in his role as administrator that needed to
     be reimbursed. He stated that he wanted to sell the property “to
     settle up with everything with the debts, whatever debts we have,
     split the proceeds accordingly and move on.”

Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

                                      -2-
J-S04014-24

      At trial, Nelson attested that he had been living in the property for

approximately five years. He indicated that he had entered into a written

lease agreement with the decedent but was unable to produce the writing into

evidence. Contrary to Garry’s testimony, Nelson claimed that Wyneesha and

her two children continue to live with him there and that Wyneesha acts as

his caretaker eight hours a day. He acknowledged paying monthly rent of

$800 to the decedent prior to her death, but said that he refused to pay rent

to Garry thereafter because he did not like the way Garry treated the decedent

during their marriage.    Instead, Nelson made rental payments directly to

Wyneesha.

      Wyneesha also testified, stating that she and her two younger children

have lived in the property consistently since 2010 or 2011, before it was

purchased by the decedent. However, Wyneesha conceded that her children

were currently attending school full time in Delaware five days a week and

residing with her boyfriend in Delaware throughout each school week. She

also said that she splits the utility costs of the property with Nelson and that

she made a payment for property taxes of $900, which she believed was for

year 2023.

      Appellants’ attorney averred during closing argument that, inter alia,

Garry was precluded from taking possession of the property because he failed

to abide by certain licensing and certificate requirements pursuant to the

Philadelphia Code applicable to landowners who rent their properties. Counsel

                                     -3-
J-S04014-24

for Garry contended that, as administrator of the decedent’s estate, he is

mandated by law to sell the property at a favorable price so that he can

distribute the proceeds to the heirs, and that Nelson’s occupation was

detrimentally affecting that process.

       At the conclusion of trial, the court found in favor of Garry with respect

to the ejectment claim.        The docket entry reflecting the verdict states as

follows: “Finding in favor of [Garry] and against [Appellants] pursuant to [§]

3311 of Title 20, Decedents, Estates, and Fiduciaries.        [Appellants] shall

cooperate with [Garry] on a reasonable basis in providing access to the

[property] for showing to prospective purchasers.” Docket Entry 14, 3/31/23

(capitalization altered).

       Appellants timely filed a joint post-trial motion, which the court denied

without a hearing. They then filed a timely single notice of appeal before the

court’s verdict was subsequently reduced to judgment.1 Both Appellants and

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellants present two issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court commit an error of law in holding that the
       Rental License and Certificate of Rental Suitability requirements
       of the Philadelphia Code did not apply to [Garry]’s ejectment
       action where the exception. . . under the Philadelphia Code only
____________________________________________

1 Although Appellants purported to appeal from the trial court’s April 28, 2023

order denying their post-trial motions, an appeal is properly taken from the
entry of judgment, which occurred on June 6, 2023. Thus, our jurisdiction is
proper.    See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).

                                           -4-
J-S04014-24

       apply where the owner resides in the same house as the family
       member and [Nelson] was a tenant who was not a member of the
       [Garry]’s family pursuant to Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(d)?

       2. Did the trial court commit an error of law in holding that
       ejectment, and not partition, was the appropriate action against
       [Wyneesha] where she was a 25% owner of the subject property,
       and was not claiming adverse possession or ouster?

Appellants’ brief at 2 (cleaned up).2

       Our standard of review of an ejectment action is “limited to a

determination of whether the [court] committed an error of law or an abuse

of discretion.”    In re Estate of Bowman, 797 A.2d 973, 976 (Pa.Super.

2002) (cleaned up).

       Appellants first contend that ejectment was improper as to Nelson

because Garry, as an “owner” of the property, failed to obtain a required rental

license and certificate of rental suitability pursuant to the Philadelphia Code.

See Appellants’ brief at 10-18.          This claim requires us to review the trial

court’s interpretation of a statute, and this inquiry is a pure question of law

over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 234 A.3d 523, 533 n.9 (Pa.

2020).

       It is well settled that “[t]he object of all interpretation and construction

of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General

Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “The plain language of the statute is the

____________________________________________

2 We note with displeasure that Garry did not file a brief with this Court.

                                           -5-
J-S04014-24

best indicator of the legislature’s intent. To ascertain the plain meaning, we

consider the operative statutory language in context and give words and

phrases   their   common    and   approved    usage.”      Commonwealth        v.

Chesapeake Energy Corp., 247 A.3d 934, 942 (Pa. 2021). These rules of

statutory interpretation have been applied to consideration of provisions

within the Philadelphia Code.     See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. City of

Philadelphia Tax Review Bd. Ex rel. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.,

132 A.3d 946, 952 (Pa. 2015).

      Appellants’ argument concerns Chapter 9-3900 of the Philadelphia

Code, relating to Property Licenses and Owner Accountability. This Court has

summarized the relevant provisions as follows:

      Subsection 9-3902(1)(a) (“Rental Licenses”) requires the owner
      of any dwelling “let for occupancy [to] obtain a rental license. No
      person shall collect rent with respect to any property that is
      required to be licensed . . . unless a valid rental license has been
      issued for the property.” Phila. Code § 9-3902(1)(a). Subsection
      9-3903(1)(a) (“Certificate of Rental Suitability”) also requires a
      landlord to provide a tenant with a certificate of rental suitability,
      which is obtained from the Department of Licenses and
      Inspection, as well as a copy of the Philadelphia Partners for Good
      Housing Handbook. Phila. Code § 9-3903(1)(a).

      Of particular importance is Code [§] 9-3901(4)(e), which
      provides:

            Non-compliance. Any owner who fails to obtain a rental
            license as required by § 9-3902, or to comply with § 9-3903
            regarding a Certificate of Rental Suitability, or whose rental
            license has been suspended, shall be denied the right to
            recover possession of the premises or to collect rent
            during or for the period of noncompliance or during or for
            the period of license suspension. In any action for eviction

                                      -6-
J-S04014-24

              or collection of rent, the owner shall attach a copy of the
              license.

Frempong v. Phillips, 301 A.3d 935, 2023 WL 4234426, at *3 (Pa.Super.

2023) (non-precedential decision) (emphasis added).3

       An “owner” is defined broadly to include any person “having a legal or

equitable interest in the property” or “otherwise having control of the

property,” and includes administrators of an estate.            Phila. Code § 9-

3901(5)(k). As heirs, Garry, Wyneesha, and Alexis Young all gained a legal

interest in the property upon the decedent’s passing. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 301(b)

(“Legal title to all real estate of a decedent shall pass at his death to his heirs

or devisees, subject, however, to all the powers granted to the personal

representative by this code and lawfully by the will and to all orders of the

court”). Accordingly, they are all owners of the property and would therefore

normally be subject to the rental license and certificate of rental suitability

requirements.

       However, the code provides an exception to these obligations when the

occupying tenant is a family member of the owner. See Phila. Code § 9-

3902(1)(b)(.1) (stating that “[a] rental license is not required for any dwelling

unit that is occupied by the owner or a member of the owner’s family”); see

____________________________________________

3 In that case, this Court considered these provisions of the Philadelphia Code

in the context of an action in ejectment, like here, as opposed to a
landlord/tenant complaint filed in the Philadelphia Municipal Court. See
Frempong v. Phillips, 301 A.3d 935, 2023 WL 4234426 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision).

                                           -7-
J-S04014-24

also Phila. Code § 9-3903(1)(b) (“The provisions of [this subsection] shall not

apply with respect to any rental to a tenant who is a member of the owner’s

family.”).

      Appellants contend that, as administrator of the decedent’s estate,

Garry was the sole “owner” of the property, as the term is used in this chapter.

See Appellants’ brief at 10-11. They argue that since it was undisputed at

trial that Garry did not have either a rental license or certificate of rental

suitability, he cannot obtain possession of the property, whether through an

ejectment action or otherwise. Id. at 15 (citing Frempong v. Richardson,

209 A.3d 1001, 1010 (Pa.Super. 2019)). Appellants further assert that the

family member exception does not apply here because, in their interpretation,

it only operates when the “owner” also lives in the property with the family

member, and that Garry has never resided on the property. See Appellants’

brief at 15.

      Upon review, we disagree with Appellants that the exception relating to

family members does not apply. Critically, by focusing exclusively on Garry,

Appellants neglect to consider Wyneesha’s ownership interest and familial

relationship to Nelson. Assuming arguendo that an owner must reside with

the family member to satisfy the relevant exception, as Appellants suggest,

that condition was fulfilled here by Appellants’ own evidence. Both Appellants

testified    that   Wyneesha   resided    in   the   property   continuously   from

approximately 2010 to the date of the hearing, and that Nelson moved in

                                         -8-
J-S04014-24

several years before the decedent’s death. See, e.g., N.T. Trial, 3/30/23, at

63, 92, 99.    Indeed, Wyneesha claimed that she continues to be paid to

provide daily care for Nelson at the property. Id. at 103. Further, as iterated

above, based upon both her legal interest in and control over the property,

Wyneesha was an “owner” of the property for purposes of the code provisions

in question.   See Phila. Code § 9-3901(5)(k).         Therefore, even under

Appellants’ own interpretation of the Philadelphia Code, the family member

exception applied, and the decedent’s estate was not precluded from seeking

possession based upon a lack of compliance with Chapter 9-3900 of the

Philadelphia Code. The trial court thus did not err in finding in favor of Garry

and against Nelson as to the complaint in ejectment.

      In their remaining issue, Appellants argue that Wyneesha could not be

ejected from the property because she had a 25% ownership interest therein.

See Appellants’ brief at 18. They articulate that under the intestacy statute,

Wyneesha now owns the property with Garry and Alexis Young “as co-tenants

in common” in light of the decedent’s death. Id. at 20. Appellants believe

that based on this, Garry could not properly seek to eject Wyneesha, but

rather should have filed an action for partition. Id. at 21.

      In rejecting this contention, the trial court aptly highlighted that

Wyneesha had not been ejected from the property, since the complaint in

ejectment only named Nelson as a defendant.          See Trial Court Opinion,

9/6/23, at 9. Indeed, the court stated as follows:

                                     -9-
J-S04014-24

       Regardless of whether [Wyneesha] resided in the property as she
       claimed, this court correctly found that based upon [20 Pa.C.S.
       §] 3311, [Garry], as administrator and personal representative of
       the estate, had the right to sell the property to settle its debts and
       then distribute the proceeds proportionately between the heirs.
       Therefore, this court properly granted [Garry]’s ejectment action
       to remove [Nelson] from the property so [Garry] could move
       forward with his duties as administrator.

Id. at 9-10 (cleaned up, emphasis added).

       Our review of the record confirms the trial court’s statements.          The

underlying complaint asserted a single ejectment count against Nelson and

was not amended after Wyneesha intervened. The court therefore did not

have the authority to eject Wyneesha and did not purport to do so.4

       Since Appellants have not convinced us that the court improperly found

in favor of Garry with respect to his ejectment claim against Nelson, we have

no cause to disturb its judgment.

       Judgment affirmed.

Date: 5/3/2024

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellants aver that the verdict reflected in the docket applied

to Wyneesha because it included the plural word “Defendants” in reference to
the court’s finding in favor of Garry, we reiterate that the record is clear that
the only defendant named in the underlying action was Nelson.

                                          - 10 -