Court Opinion

ID: 9739210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:36.483391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.714365
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
This Court holds that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the mother need not pay child support to the father. Whereupon, the issue was reversed and remanded for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law to determine the amount of child support each parent owes. For the rationale expressed therein on that point of law and holding, I concur. I do, however, take one notable exception to the following paragraph:
We observe, however, that the factors allowing deviation from the child support guidelines include: “[t]he income of a *197subsequent spouse or contribution of a third party to the income or expenses of that parent but only if the application of the schedule works a financial hardship on either parent[.]” SDCL 25-7-6.10(1) (emphasis added). Thus, father’s receipt of the Social Security Disability Benefits on behalf of the children may appropriately be taken into consideration by the trial court as a factor for deviation from the guidelines. Any such deviation, however, must be based on entry of the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law showing the basis for a finding of an inequity which works a financial hardship on mother. See, Bruning, supra.
Via these words, we seemingly direct the trial court to focus and decide the case on SDCL 25-7-6.10(1). Certainly this subsection could be applicable, but I do not believe it is wise to single out this subsection when 25-7-6.1 through 25-7-6.17 could also be determinative. All aspects of child support are open to examination. Brandriet v. Larson, 442 N.W.2d 455 (S.D.1989). Remember, at this time the settled record does not contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. For now, the settled record is the sole evidence of the trial court’s proceedings. Pearson v. Adams, 279 N.W.2d 674 (S.D.1979). Let us not cross the bridge of third party contributions before we come to it.
We have held that this Court will not tamper with modification decisions unless the circuit court has acted in a manner which amounts to an abuse of discretion; “a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” State, Fall River County v. Dryden, 409 N.W.2d 648, 651 (S.D.1987); Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D.1981). By including the blocked paragraph above, this Court, is tampering with a modification before the findings of fact have been made.
Here, the majority opinion is substituting its findings before the trial court enters any. This Court may not substitute its judgment of factual questions for that of the trial court unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Mash v. Cutler, 488 N.W.2d 642, 645 (S.D.1992); Northern Farm Supply, Inc. v. Sprecher, 307 N.W.2d 870 (S.D.1981). We are not free to disturb the lower court’s findings unless it is satisfied that they are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence. Mash at 646; Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, P.A., 262 N.W.2d 508, 512 (S.D.1978).
One conclusory fact, of which we do know, determined in the initial divorce proceeding, is the formula for child support: Father’s Social Security checks plus mother’s contribution.* Until the trial court supplies the findings of fact and conclusions of law to this Court, we should not dictate which laws are to be used (different facts may require application of different laws). Certainly, the trial court of its own accord may utilize SDCL 25-7-6.10(1). If we find for the father today, yet supply this paragraph, we essentially give to one hand and take from the other.
Essentially, this paragraph, which I have isolated above, is conceptually oxymoronic to the entirety of the opinion. Said paragraph skews our holding. It foists upon the trial court what its decision is to be. Rather, he has the right, as a trial court, to consider the equities of the parties. Perched in Pierre, we cannot be a swami in Aberdeen.
Therefore, I must dissent to the use of the above paragraph.

 When the mother had custody of both children, the father’s child support contribution came solely from his Social Security Disability Benefits. Logic dictates that the mother contributed the remaining support whether it be financial or simply the roof over their heads. Should the mother be exonerated totally from child support? It appears to me mother is angling to contribute nothing to child support. That is precisely why the trial court should be given some equitable rope to make a decision.