Court Opinion

ID: 9865139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:25:04.488932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:33.582318
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Otto Bock
dissenting.
I regret my inability to concur in the majority opinion. Evidence as to cash market value was important to determine the value of the land taken from the owner. At least three of his witnesses were not qualified, as appears from the record, to give such testimony. One of them was held not competent by the rulings of the trial court, but later, over objections by the city, was permitted, figuratively speaking, to reenter by the back door and give such testimony. The other two were truck drivers, who had done some hauling for the owner, and they also were not qualified under the rule laid down in Butsch v. Smith, 40 Colo. 64, 90 Pac. 61, in that their opinions were not derived from an adequate knowledge of the present value of the land in question. None of the cases cited in the majority opinion in support of this testimony involved cash market value in an eminent domain proceeding. It is doubtful whether they have any relevancy to the issues here. Timely objection was made to all of this evidence. It does not clearly appear that no prejudice resulted (Loloff v. Sterling, 31 Colo. 102, 71 Pac. 1113); in fact,, it would appear otherwise. Under these circumstances, reversal is necessary. Wassenich v. Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 Pac. 533, is not relevant to the facts here. In that case the owner contended that he was entitled to the highest value that he might be able to obtain in the future by waiting for a better market which would result from a greater demand for such property, or waiting for a customer who would pay on the basis of the most advantageous use to which it could reasonably be applied. This, we held, was not the law, and we made the statement appearing on page 466, as follows: “In determining the present cash value the most., advantageous use to which the property may rea*165sonably be applied may be considered. Any reasonable future use to which the land may be adapted or applied by men of ordinary prudence and judgment may be considered in so far only as it may assist the jury in arriving at the present market value. .The owner is entitled to have considered the most advantageous use in the future to which the land may be reasonably applied, not with the view of allowing him for speculative or prospective damages or values, but only as such evidence may bear upon or affect or assist in arriving at the present market value.” There is no contention here of any different future use of the land in question.
In Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Commissioners, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P. (2d) 283, our concern was over the petitioner’s attempt to show benefits to the residue of the land, and the case has no relevancy to the facts here.
In my opinion, error was committed by the trial court in excluding evidence of certain sales made in the immediate vicinity of the land in question. It is asserted that this evidence was inadmissible because at the time of the sales it was common knowledge that the land would be condemned, and that the offers were made shortly prior to the institution of the suit in the instant proceeding. This is a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction. The general rule is stated in 43 L.R.A. 986, as follows: “It is the general rule that evidence of what the condemning party has paid for other land by private treaty is not admissible whether the lands are similar or not.”
It may be conceded that this general rule, which has been in effect for a long time in some states, is followed by the courts of a majority of the others. There is, however, a respectable minority that have not adopted the rule. Moreover, the offered evidence did not partake of the nature of a “private treaty.” “The fundamental basis upon which all rules of evidence must rest — if they are to rest upon reason — is their adaptation to the successful development of the truth.” Funk v. United States, 290 *166U.S. 371, 54 Sup. Ct. 212, 78 L. Ed. 379. In Curley v. Jersey City, 83 N.J.L. 760, 85 Atl. 197, in rejecting the general rule, the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals has this to say (p. 762): “In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, we are unable to see, as a general rule, why private sales to parties having the right to condemn, do not come quite as near representing in their results true market value as do such sales made between parties neither of whom have this power. It is easy enough to imagine special circumstances, falling in such class, where the result in the price obtained is, because of such special circumstances, so clearly abnormal as to destroy the similarity which must exist in order that the evidence shall be admissible. In other cases where the special circumstances are not of sufficient importance to produce this result, they may, nevertheless, affect the weight of the evidence, and be used for that purpose before a jury. This is so whether the purchaser is or is not a party having the power to condemn.”
The test whether such evidence is admissible or not is, Was it a voluntary sale, not induced by coercion or duress? This may be ascertained by the trial court in a preliminary hearing, before such evidence is submitted to a jury. If the court determines that the sale was voluntary, the evidence should be admitted; if not, it should be rejected. The application of such exception to the general rule will, in my opinion, result more nearly in the ascertainment of the correct present cash market value. In the instant case the city offered to introduce evidence, which was rejected by the court, that these sales of land immediately contiguous to the property in question were voluntary, the offers of sale originating with the owners of the property, and not with the city. In fact, it was the only testimony available to establish, from actual sales in the immediate vicinity, the present cash market value.
*167In my opinion, the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded, with directions to grant a new trial.
Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck and Mr. Justice Burke concur in this dissent.