Court Opinion

ID: 9590345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:54:03.717504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:44.632015
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 1 of the majority opinion because I believe that the statutory scheme requiring the accountability of fiduciaries prohibits or severely restricts the appointment as trustee of persons who are not immediately and directly subject to the judicial processes of this state.
1. I agree with the majority in several aspects, as follows:
(a) that OCGA § 53-13-8 is not applicable to this case, as it works the disqualification of a trustee who has “removed beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state. . .,” removal being, of course, a matter distinct from the initial appointment of a non-resident as trustee;
(b) that Caldwell v. Hill, 179 Ga. 417, 426 (2) (176 SE 381) (1934), does not resolve the issue in this case, as it holds only that the above code section was inapplicable to the appointment of a non-resi*682dent trustee; and
(c) that the common law did not prohibit the appointment of non-resident trustees, and the Restatement of the Law would authorize it. (Opinion, n. 1, p. 680.)
2. But we do not deal here with a common law situation. The General Assembly, over many years, has created protection for beneficiaries that prohibit or severely limit non-resident fiduciaries. Examples are:
(a) A non-resident may not be appointed executor or co-executor1 without posting a bond in double the amount of the estate, with the added requirement that the sureties on the bond be residents of Georgia. OCGA § 53-6-22 (a).
(b) A non-resident appointed as executor may not qualify, even though relieved by the will of posting bond, without the express approval of the probate judge, and “within his discretion.” OCGA § 53-6-22 (b).
(c) A non-resident may not be appointed administrator2 unless such person has “equal or greater interest than resident heirs, or of sole interest of any estate. . .” and unless the non-resident shall post a bond (with sureties who are residents of Georgia) in double the amount of the estate. OCGA § 53-6-23.
(d) A trustee who has “removed beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of this state” is disqualified. OCGA § 53-13-8.
3. A theme of great importance — immediate accountability of fiduciaries — underlies each of these statutory restraints. Consider:
(a) Fiduciaries of trusts or estates created in Georgia and supervised by the courts of Georgia state must be fully amenable to the judicial processes and criminal sanctions of Georgia.
(b) Beneficiaries of trusts and estates in Georgia must be able to enforce their rights through the courts of Georgia.
(c) Courts of Georgia that appoint (or approve the appointment of) fiduciaries of estates in Georgia must be empowered to enforce their orders through the judicial and executive powers of the State of Georgia.
4. In the light of this recurring statutory theme of accountability, we should not sanction the appointment of a trustee who is beyond *683the reach of the courts of Georgia.3 The results of such a sanction would include:
Decided November 10, 1988.
Moreton Rolleston, Jr., for appellant.
Rogers & Hardin, C. B. Rogers, Louis Levenson, Mark A. Thompson, for appellees.
(a) consigning the rights of beneficiaries to the courts of other states, whose laws and practices may be foreign to our own;
(b) requiring beneficiaries of Georgia estates to invoke the powers of at least two court systems — that of Georgia and of the domicile of the foreign trustee — with the possibility of removal, on grounds of diversity of citizenship, to the federal system; and
(c) according to foreign trustees the right to select a forum other than the courts of Georgia.
5. We have here the opportunity to strengthen the protection that the law casts about beneficiaries. That is consistent with centuries of legal history, commencing with the earliest chancellors, who “became keeper of the king’s conscience .... the general guardian of all infants . . . and [had] the general superintendence of all charitable uses in the kingdom.” 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *47-8 (Jones, ed. 1915). We have, also, the authority to do so.4
There are compelling reasons to eliminate the manifold perils of non-resident trustees. For the contrary proposition, I know of no good reason.

 The majority aptly notes the distinction between appointing a trustee known to the settlor to be a non-resident, and the removal of a resident trustee beyond the jurisdiction of the Georgia courts. (Opinion, n. 1, p. 680.) But note that the same knowledge exists on the part of the testator naming a non-resident executor — which may only be accomplished within these statutory constraints.

 Again, the heirs may agree upon and request the appointment of a non-resident administrator, knowing their choice to be a non-resident. Yet the law will not permit it, except in these narrow circumstances.

 I do not struggle here with whether or not a non-resident trustee might be subject to in personam jurisdiction under the Georgia Long Arm Statute, OCGA § 9-10-91 et seq. At the very least, that is yet another barrier to be overcome in enforcing the rights of beneficiaries. Further, if it is possible to ground jurisdiction upon a situs of property in Georgia, that ground easily may be eliminated by transfer of realty and removal of the res.

 It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes “in pari materia,” are construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative intendment and give effect thereto. It is simply the duty of this court in interpreting the statutes now under consideration to look diligently for the intention of the legislature, keeping in view at all times the old law, the evil, and the remedy. [OCGA § 1-3-1 (a)].
Ryan v. Commissioners of Chatham County, 203 Ga. 730, 731-2 (48 SE2d 86) (1948).