Court Opinion

ID: 9381320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 18:00:57.59622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.678004
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50163      Document: 00516684966         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/22/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                  No. 22-50163
                                Summary Calendar                             FILED
                                ____________                            March 22, 2023
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
   Jerry Wanzer,                                                             Clerk

                                                            Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Phonso J. Rayford, Senior Warden, John B. Connally Unit, sued in
   their individual and official capacity; John A. Marcum, Asst. Warden,
   John B. Connally Unit, sued in their individual and official capacity; Frank
   Stengel; Veolia North America; Gary Wagner, Water
   Treatment Plant Superintendent, sued in their individual and official capacity;
   Kelly L. Kotzur, Food Kitchen Captain, John B. Connally Unit, sued in
   their individual and official capacity; Kathy S. Akin, Food Kitchen
   Captain, John B Connally Unit, sued in their individual and official capacity;
   Debra Gloor, Senior Practice Manager, John D. Connally Unit, In Her
   Individual and Official Capacities; Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division; Owen
   Murray, UTMB Director, In His Individual and Official Capacities;
   Brian Wong, M.D., In His Individual and Official Capacities; Sylvia
   Peterson, Law Library Supervisor, John B. Connally Unit, sued in their
   individual and official capacity; Roberto Alexandre, Captain, John D.
   Connally Unit, In His Individual and Official Capacities; FNU Wolf, Lt.,
   John B. Connally Unit, sued in their individual and official capacity; Dixie
   Rojas, Lieutenant, John D. Connally Unit, In Her Individual and Offical
   Capacities; Pauline Dancy, Lt., John B. Connally Unit, sued in their
   individual and official capacity; Sierra Woleslagle, Lieutenant, John
   D. Connally Unit, In Her Individual and Official Capacities,

                                                          Defendants—Appellees.
Case: 22-50163         Document: 00516684966             Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/22/2023

                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 5:20-CV-779
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Jerry Wanzer, Texas prisoner # 00855976, moves for leave to proceed
   in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his
   pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. We deny his motion and dismiss his
   appeal.
          A prisoner who, like Wanzer, has previously filed at least three civil
   actions and appeals that were dismissed as frivolous may only proceed IFP
   before this court if he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”
   28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).          Our court previously determined that Wanzer’s
   “allegations warrant a determination that he is under imminent danger of
   serious physical injury,” and we remanded his case to the district court for
   further proceedings. Wanzer v. Rayford, 832 F. App’x 319, 320 (2020) (per
   curiam). On remand, the district court dismissed his complaint. Wanzer
   timely filed a notice of appeal and sought leave from the district court to
   proceed IFP on appeal. The district court denied Wanzer’s application to
   proceed IFP, certifying that Wanzer’s appeal was not taken in good faith
   because he “failed to set forth any viable argument.” See 28 U.S.C.
   § 1915(a)(3) (“An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court
   certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.”).
          Wanzer now moves in this court to proceed IFP, effectively
   challenging the district court’s certification that his appeal is not taken in

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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Case: 22-50163      Document: 00516684966           Page: 3     Date Filed: 03/22/2023

                                     No. 22-50163

   good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 201–02 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
   Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Where “a district court certified that an appeal
   was not taken in good faith [because] the underlying claims of the IFP
   plaintiff were entirely frivolous and had no possibility of success,” “[t]he
   merits of the suit [are] . . . inextricably intertwined with the certification
   decision.” Baugh, 117 F.3d at 201–02.
          This court reviews de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim under
   28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1), applying the same standard as
   when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6). DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 2011).
   Dismissal is appropriate where a complaint does not “contain sufficient
   factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
   v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough
   to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all
   the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly,
   550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and footnote omitted). “[E]ven for pro se
   plaintiffs . . . conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as
   factual conclusions will not suffice to state a claim for relief.” Coleman v.
   Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858 F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted).
          Wanzer fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in
   determining that his claims as to Sylvia Peterson and Dr. Brian Wong were
   barred by the statute of limitations. Wanzer’s pleadings and the district
   court’s summary judgment order in a prior civil action reveal that Wanzer
   was aware of the basis of his claims against both Peterson and Dr. Wong more
   than two years before he filed the instant complaint. See Tex. Civ. Prac.
   & Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (setting out two-year statute of limitations);

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   Stringer v. Town of Jonesboro, 986 F.3d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 2021) (stating that
   § 1983 claims accrue and the limitations period begins to run when the
   plaintiff becomes aware of the facts underlying the claim). Further, under
   Texas law, his appeals of post-judgment motions filed in his prior federal
   lawsuit did not toll the limitations period. See Holmes v. Tex. A & M Univ.,
   145 F.3d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 542
   (1989) (explaining that state tolling law applies in § 1983 suits if it is not
   inconsistent with federal law or policy).
          Wanzer also failed to state a claim that prison officials demonstrated
   deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. To the extent Wanzer
   alleged that Debra Gloor failed to investigate or adjudicate his medical
   grievances properly, a prisoner has no federally protected liberty interest in
   “having [] grievances resolved to his satisfaction.” See Geiger v. Jowers, 404
   F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, as the district court determined,
   Wanzer’s allegations that Gloor allowed medical staff to disregard his serious
   medical needs were conclusory. See Coleman, 858 F.3d at 309. Likewise,
   Wanzer’s disagreements with medical professionals who determined that he
   did not need treatment or surgery and with Gloor’s related assessments were
   insufficient to sustain his deliberate indifference claim. See Domino v. Tex.
   Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Regarding Wanzer’s claim that his meals were comprised mostly of
   sandwiches, such that prison officials deprived him of food with adequate
   nutritional value, his allegations failed to state a claim that he was denied “the
   minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504,
   507 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As for
   his access to courts claim, Wanzer failed sufficiently to allege that the
   confiscation of his legal materials frustrated or impeded a nonfrivolous legal
   claim. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–53 (1996); see also DeMarco v.
   Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2019). Wanzer also failed to state a

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                                     No. 22-50163

   claim that prison officials retaliated against him by confiscating his legal
   materials. DeMarco, 914 F.3d at 388. His pleadings and exhibits demonstrate
   that officials have confiscated documents from Wanzer due to his failure to
   follow prison policy for storing property. Moreover, his allegations of a
   retaliatory motive are speculative. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; DeMarco,
   914 F.3d at 388.
          Wanzer has failed sufficiently to brief, and has thus abandoned,
   challenges to the district court’s other rulings. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d
   222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Because Wanzer’s appeal does not involve
   “legal points arguable on their merits,” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220
   (5th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), his motion to
   proceed IFP is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous, see
   Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; see also 5th Cir. R. 42.2.
          The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as an additional strike
   against Wanzer under § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388
   (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575
   U.S. 532, 536–37 (2015). Wanzer is REMINDED that he remains subject
   to the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) bar and WARNED that any future frivolous or
   repetitive filings in this court or any court subject to this court’s jurisdiction
   may subject him to additional strikes or monetary sanctions, as will the failure
   to withdraw any pending matters that are frivolous, repetitive, or otherwise
   abusive.

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