Court Opinion

ID: 9538604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:38:11.892944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:00.050710
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s affirmance of the superior court’s grant of a directed verdict against Zeilinger as to her claim that the separation agreement should be set aside because she signed it while under economic duress.1
The court correctly concludes that a directed verdict against Zeilinger would have been inappropriate as to the first two elements of economic duress: an involuntary acceptance of terms provided by another; and that the circumstances permitted no other alternative but to execute the release. My difference with the court’s opinion centers on its conclusion that Zeilinger’s proof failed to raise a jury issue as to the third element of economic duress. More particularly, that the circumstances were the result of coercive acts on the part of SAPC. Helstrom v. North Slope Borough, 797 P.2d 1192, 1197 (Alaska 1990).
This third element of economic duress consists of two prongs: coercive acts on the part of the other party (SAPC) and a causal link between the coercive acts and the circumstances of economic duress. As to this third element, the court notes that it is to be liberally construed but nevertheless holds that: “Even thus construed, however, no ‘coercive act’ is present in Zeilinger’s case.” In support of this conclusion the court reasons in part that Zeilinger’s discharge was not intended to, nor did it in fact, coerce her into signing the release. “What did induce Zeilinger to release her claims were her burdensome financial circumstances.”
In regard to this latter question Zeilinger argues in part that:
(1) Sandra’s financial obligations were based in part on assurances by SAPC management that North Slope employees should not expect any reductions in force; in part upon temporary and unavoidable financial problems;
(2) the company added Zeilinger to a legitimate reduction in force in an attempt to terminate her without utilizing the progressive discipline steps to which she was entitled; there was never any intent to reduce the clerical force or eliminate Zeilinger’s position;
(3) the supervisor who added Zeilinger to the RIF list was well aware of her financial difficulties; he added her to the RIF list to avoid the progressive discipline policy.2
*660I think a jury could reasonably conclude that SAPC’s threatened deprivation of income did contribute to Zeilinger’s economic distress. Although it is correct to say that Zeilinger incurred her financial obligations on her own, here a jury could reasonably find that it was not her financial obligations alone that caused her to execute the separation agreement. Rather, a jury could reasonably determine that the imminent deprivation of her income, which would arguably have an immediate and catastrophic effect on her financial situation, played a direct causal role in her decision to agree to and execute the separation agreement.3

. I am in agreement with the court’s disposition of the remaining issues in this appeal.

. Review of the record indicates evidentiary support for these assertions.

. Implicit is my further conclusion that the act which deprived Zeilinger of her income — more particularly her termination, was wrongful and that Zeilinger's evidence on the point is sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict.