Court Opinion

ID: 9572331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:54.725766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:30.591140
License: Public Domain

Taylor, P.J.
Plaintiffs union and union officers appeal as of right the Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants. Plaintiffs challenge the trial court’s ruling that the executive branch of the government of the City of Detroit may properly refuse to expend monies appropriated by the city council for a particular use. Defendants cross appeal, contending that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit in the first instance. We affirm.
The operative facts are not in dispute. After defendant mayor submitted his written proposal for the city’s budget for fiscal year 1989-90, the city council amended the budget, including an addition of $750,000 for a new fire department squad. Upon returning the budget to the mayor for his reconsideration, the mayor vetoed $500,000 of the $750,000 appropriated for a new fire squad. A majority vote of the council (8-1) overrode the mayoral veto and reinstated the entire $750,000 *131appropriation. However, the mayor never used the appropriation.1
Plaintiffs, who represent the city’s fire fighters, sought a writ of mandamus compelling defendants to spend the money. Both sides moved for summary disposition. The trial court ruled that plaintiffs did in fact have standing. However, the trial court granted defendants summary disposition on the ground that the mayor need not confer with the city council in deciding not to expend appropriated monies, and therefore declined to issue a writ of mandamus.
The first issue, of course, is whether plaintiffs had standing to bring suit in the first instance. After reviewing this question de novo, Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991), we hold that plaintiffs did not have standing.
Standing is a legal term denoting the existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy. However, evidence that a party will engage in full and vigorous advocacy, standing alone, is insufficient to establish standing. House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 554; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). No one may rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court "unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.” Bowie v Arder, 441 Mich 23, 42-43; 490 NW2d 568 (1992). To have standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a legally protected interest that is in jeopardy of being adversely affected, and must allege a sufficient personal stake *132in the outcome of the dispute to ensure that the controversy sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversarial setting that is capable of judicial resolution. Trout Unlimited v City of White Cloud, 195 Mich App 343, 348; 489 NW2d 188 (1992). Generally, a plaintiff shows such a personal stake in a lawsuit by demonstrating that he has been injured or represents someone who has been injured, id.; Kaminskas v Detroit, 68 Mich App 499; 243 NW2d 25 (1976), and also that his substantial interest will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large, House Speaker, supra, p 554.
In the present case, defendants do not argue that they have standing because of their status as city employees or taxpayers. Rather, they argue that they have standing because they (or their members) risk physical and emotional injury because there is an insufficient number of fire fighters, a situation that expenditure of the appropriation would have alleviated. We conclude that plaintiffs have suffered damages no different than the public at large. We are aware that plaintiffs’ expert testified that plaintiffs’ fire fighters are more likely to be injured unless more fire fighters are hired. However, this rather obvious statement of probabilities does not constitute a real or concrete injury separating them from the general public.
This increased likelihood of physical injury is not unlike the general public’s increased likelihood of physical injury due to the lack of fire fighters. That is, it is more likely that a fire fighter who fights two hundred fires annually will be hurt than the same fire fighter who fights one hundred fires annually if only because that fire fighter is more often put at risk. But people occupying buildings that catch on fire are more likely to be injured when there are fewer fire fighters available to put *133out the fires. Both segments of society are at greater risk when there is a dearth of fire fighters.
Private individuals and organizations do not have standing to redress grievances on behalf of the public. Nevertheless, in seeking to enforce the city charter and code, plaintiffs seek to enforce that which is intended to promote responsible budgeting and to avoid deficit spending. In this regard, the intended effects of the city charter and code are identical to those of the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act (ubaa), MCL 141.421 et seq.; MSA 5.3228(21) et seq., under which this Court has previously held that those challenging the mayor’s actions had no standing to sue. Rayford v Detroit, 132 Mich App 248, 257; 347 NW2d 210 (1984). Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs have no standing to sue under the city charter and code, which may be read in harmony with the ubaa. Detroit City Council v Stecher, 430 Mich 74, 89-90; 421 NW2d 544 (1988).
We agree, however, with the trial court’s conclusion that the mayor was not required to spend the money appropriated for hiring additional fire fighters.2 An appropriation is not a mandate to spend. Under the ubaa, "appropriation” is defined as an authorization, not a requirement, to incur obligations and to expend public funds. MCL 441.422a(3); MSA 5.3228(22a)(3).3 Under both the ubaa and the city charter, the mayor has a duty to operate the city within a balanced budget, and must control *134spending so as to avoid a budget deficit.4 Were plaintiffs permitted to successfully challenge the mayor’s discretionary decision to simply not spend, the mayor would be unable to prevent the deficit spending that is proscribed by law, a law that he is charged with upholding.
We note specifically that the facts of this case are distinguishable from those of Stecher, supra, because the appropriation in question was neither altered nor was it the subject of a transfer. Therefore, the formal procedures set forth in the ubaa5 and the city charter do not come into play. Stecher, supra, p 77.
Although the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendants was legally correct as far as it went, the issue whether the mayor had a clear legal duty to spend should not have been given plenary consideration because plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Thus, although in granting defendants summary disposition the trial court properly declined to issue the writ of mandamus sought by plaintiffs, the proper result was reached for, at least in part, the wrong reason. However, because the correct result was reached, we will not disturb the result on appeal. Paul v Bogle, 193 Mich App 479, 492; 484 NW2d 728 (1992).
Affirmed.
Brennan, J., concurred.

 We will address the issues presented, although they are now moot, because they are of public significance and are likely to reoccur. In re Ford, 187 Mich App 452, 454; 468 NW2d 260 (1991).

 It is noteworthy that the mayor did not spend this money on anything else or transfer it to any other program; he simply did not spend it.

 This Court has held that the Governor has no power to decline to spend despite the language of Const 1963, art 5, § 20, which says that no appropriation is a mandate to spend. International Union v Michigan, 194 Mich App 489, 500-501; 491 NW2d 855 (1992). However, that case is confined to its facts, which included a statute specifically directing the expenditure of earmarked money for the purpose of providing specific services. Id., p 501. That mandate to spend is limited to those narrowly drawn facts.

 See § 15(2) of the ubaa, MCL 141.435(2); MSA 5.3228(35)(2) and § 8-204 of the city charter. Note also that under § 14(1) of the ubaa, MCL 141.434(1); MSA 5.3228(34)(1), the mayor is required to control expenditures under the budget and the general appropriations act. Under § 5-102 of the city charter, the mayor has the exclusive executive and administrative authority for the implementation of programs, services, and activities of city government.

 See § 17 of the ubaa, MCL 141.437; MSA 5.3228(37).