Court Opinion

ID: 9723428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:14:29.806281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:33.675519
License: Public Domain

CRONE, Judge,
concurring.
I reluctantly agree with the majority’s reliance on Sharp and its interpretation of Indiana Code Section 85-38-2-3(g) in reversing the trial court’s sentencing order. The legislature knows how to give trial courts options when it comes to probation. For example, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-2.3(a) states, “As a condition of probation, the court may require a person to do a combination of the following....” The legislature could have used similar language in Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(g) with respect to probation revocation, but it did not do so. I also note that the legislature has not amended that statute in response to Sharp, which was decided in November 2004.
I write separately to observe that our supreme court’s opinion in Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936 (Ind.2004), which was issued subsequent to Sharp, emphasizes the importance of flexibility in probation proceedings. When Stephens was .decided, Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(g)(3) stated that a trial court “may ... order execution of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Id. at 941. A panel of this Court interpreted that provision to mean that “when a trial court revokes probation, it is required to order the defendant to serve the entire sentence originally suspended.” Id. at 938. Our supreme court disagreed, stating that “[t]he Court of Appeals interpretation requires changing ‘may’ to ‘must’ and modifying ‘sentence’ with the adjective ‘entire.’” Id. at941.
The court went on to say,
As to the Legislature’s intent here, we have previously observed that probation serves the humane purposes of avoiding incarceration and of permitting the offender to meet the offender’s financial obligations. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind.1999). In making this observation, we also pointed out that for probation to be a viable option for Indiana judges, judges must have the ability to move with alacrity to protect public safety when adjudicated offenders violate the conditions of their sentences. Id. The statutory scheme, it seems to us, reflects the Legislature’s intent that trial courts have the flexibility both to use and to terminate probation when appropriate. To be more explicit, the statutory scheme seems to us to be sufficiently flexible to permit a trial court to order the same amount of executed time following a probation violation whether or not it actually revokes probation. ■
Id. at 941-42. The court ultimately held that “a trial court has the statutory au*674thority to order executed time following revocation of probation that is less than the length of the sentence originally suspended, so long as, when combined with the executed time previously ordered, the total sentence is not less than the statutory minimum.” Id. at 942.4
While Stephens arguably provides some justification for interpreting Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(g) more broadly, we must follow the plain language of the statute and leave any amendments to the legislature. It is my view that such amendments would be beneficial and in keeping with our supreme court’s stated preference for flexibility in probation proceedings. When a person is alleged to have violated one or more conditions of probation, whether six months or six years after originally being sentenced, the trial court is in a much better position than it was initially to assess the person’s rehabilitative needs and responsiveness to the conditions of probation. So long as the duration of the total sentence is not increased, I fail to see how limiting the options available upon revoking probation serves any legitimate public purpose. Trial courts should be allowed to use any or all of the options listed in Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(g) to tailor a person’s probation to existing circumstances. If the person balks at the trial court’s probation conditions, then he or she may always elect to serve the balance of the suspended sentence. After all, “[probation is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right.” Taylor v. State, 820 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied.

. The legislature subsequently amended Indiana Code Section 35 — 38—2—3(g)(3) consistent with our supreme court’s holding in Stephens. See Ind.Code § 35-38-2-3(g)(3) (stating that trial court "may ... order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.”).