Court Opinion

ID: 9683196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:24:19.74033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.170207
License: Public Domain

RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The court correctly states that only a showing of extrinsic fraud will entitle a litigant to bill of review relief. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (1950). Extrinsic fraud is fraud that is collateral to the matter tried and does not pertain to an issue which was, or could have been, litigated in the original action. Crouch v. McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94, 97 (1940); Raney v. Mack, 504 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Civ.App. —Texarkana 1973, no writ). In the instant case, a significant issue in the original action was how much Montgomery should be paid when the trust was terminated. Having the benefit of advice from her counsel, an experienced certified public accountant, and a geologist solicited to ascertain mineral interest values, Montgomery agreed to a figure of $350,000. The trial court rendered judgment accordingly. Clearly, the fraud of which Montgomery now complains — the failure of the trustees to disclose a mineral lease — pertains to the issue of how much Montgomery should have been paid when the trust was terminated. This issue was before the court in the original action. Thus, the fraud alleged by Montgomery is not extrinsic fraud, and she is not entitled to bill of review relief.
I do not believe that the authorities cited in the court’s opinion establish the iron-clad rule that the concealment of a material fact by a fiduciary constitutes extrinsic fraud as a matter of law. In my view, this rule is inconsistent with the definition of extrinsic fraud set forth in the previous opinions of this court and militates against the policy of the finality of judgments. ■
*315I would affirm the judgments of the courts below.