Court Opinion

ID: 9514592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:36.859221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.129727
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice,
dissents on Issue 1.
[¶ 21.] The majority opinion is wrong on Issue 1 if it means to say that post-termination compensation includes the amount of money that Cotton earned during the time of her employment, but has not yet received. The contract compensation provision states, in part:
For all services rendered by the Lawyer during the term of this agreement she shall be paid one-half of all monies received from lawyer’s clients each month, reduced by sales tax and costs paid by each client.
(emphasis added). The phrase “during the term of this agreement” refers to when the services were rendered, not when the monies are received. Therefore, Cotton is clearly entitled to receive one-half of monies received by Manning from Cotton’s clients for services rendered by Cotton during the term of the agreement. Obviously, any services provided by Cotton to her clients during her employment entitles her to one-half of the money, subject to sales tax and costs, once it is received; whether the money is received during employment or months after the émployment is terminated is irrelevant.
[¶ 22.] Read correctly in this manner, the contract provision is unambiguous. Accordingly, what other “post-termination compensation” could Issue 1 be talking about? The entire discussion under Issue 1 is of no import because, in reality, there is no Issue 1. It is a non-issue. At any rate, the trial court’s granting of summary judgment on these issues was improper.
[¶ 23.] Incredibly, the amount of money that Cotton earned during her employment or the amount that the firm received from her clients is not even in this record and has not even been calculated yet. So, how can the trial court judge jump in the jury box and decide this case by summary judgment? How could the Justices let him get by with it? You tell me! I haven’t a clue!
[¶ 24.] Finally, I challenge the Issue 1 majority to attempt to reconcile their vote in this case with the unanimous opinion that was issued by this court on September 1, 1999. See Paint Brush v. Neu, 599 N.W.2d 384, 1999 SD 120. It was authored by Circuit Court Judge Warren Johnson, sitting for me as I was disqualified. It not only correctly overrules Janklow v. Viking Press, 459 N.W.2d 415 (S.D.1990) but correctly restates that “[t]he trial court is not to decide the issues of fact, just determine if any such issues exist.” Id. ¶ 31, 459 N.W.2d 415 (citing Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (S.D.1968)). They do. Reverse and Remand.
[¶25.] SABERS, Justice (on reassignment) writing the majority opinion on Issue 2, which holds genuine issues of material fact existed whether the employer breached the employment contract.
[¶ 26.] 2. The trial court erred when it determined as a matter of law that Cotton was not entitled to breach of contract damages as genuine issues of material fact existed.
[¶ 27.] Genuine issues of material fact exist whether Manning breached the employment contract by (1) failing to provide the appropriate work tools, and (2) *590failing to compensate Cotton in accordance with the employment contract. Wilson, 157 N.W.2d at 21.
[¶ 28.] Cotton says Manning failed to provide her with the appropriate work tools thereby breaching the employment contract. Apparently, Manning denies the failure and the breach. Whether she did or not is the question. In other words, whether she provided appropriate work tools or not is the issue of fact for the factfinder. Is this a genuine issue of material fact?
[¶ 29.] Is it genuine ? — Yes!
[¶ 30.] Is it material ? — Yes!
[¶ 31.] Therefore, summary judgment is improper. This is basic first year law school black letter law. Wilson, 157 N.W.2d at 21.
[¶ 32.] Additionally, if Manning breached the contract by failing to provide the appropriate work tools as Cotton claims, the measure of damages is set out in the contract. So, under any circumstances, the contract damages provision must be calculated. This has not been done yet and therefore, summary judgment is improper.
[¶ 33.] Cotton says that Manning failed to compensate her in accordance with the employment contract. Apparently, Manning again denies the failure and the breach. Whether she did or not is the question. In other words, whether she failed to compensate Cotton per the contract or not is the issue of fact for the fact finder.
[¶ 34.] Is it genuine ? — Yes!
[¶ 35.] Is it material ? — Yes!
Therefore, summary judgment is wholly improper. Wilson, 157 N.W.2d at 21.
[¶ 36.] We reverse and remand for trial the issue whether Manning breached the contract by failing to provide the appropriate work tools and by failing to compensate Cotton in accordance with the employment contract.
[¶ 37.] AMUNDSON, Justice, and CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, concur.
[¶ 38.] Being of the opinion that no genuine issues of material fact exist, MILLER, Chief Justice, and GILBERTSON, Justice, dissent.
[¶ 39.] CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, sitting for KONENKAMP, Justice, disqualified.
[¶ 40.] MILLER, Chief Justice (on reassignment), who would affirm the trial court on all issues, writes the majority opinion on Issue 3, which holds the trial court did not err in dismissing Manning’s counterclaim of barratry.
[¶ 41.] 3. The trial court did not err in dismissing Manning’s counterclaim.
[¶ 42.] Following the trial court’s granting of partial summary judgment in Manning’s favor, Cotton moved to dismiss Manning’s barratry claim, which included a request for costs, expenses, disbursements and attorney fees. She asserted that the trial court’s failure to dismiss the entire action established that her claim was not frivolous; therefore, the counterclaim was without merit. The trial court granted Cotton’s motion.
[¶ 43.] Manning claims that the trial court erred in dismissing her counterclaim for barratry,3 because the complaint was well pleaded. She also argues that the trial court’s failure to enter findings of fact or conclusions of law prevents her from properly arguing the ruling on appeal.4 We disagree.
*591[¶ 44.] We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in the same manner as we review a motion for summary judgment. Yankton Ethanol, Inc. v. Vironment, Inc., 1999 SD 42, ¶ 6, 592 N.W.2d 596, 598 (citing Steiner v. County of Marshall, 1997 SD 109 ¶ 16, 568 N.W.2d 627, 631 (citations omitted)). We must determine whether the “pleader [is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. Thus, we give no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions. Yankton Ethanol, 1999 SD 42, ¶ 6, 592 N.W.2d at 598 (citing Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103, ¶ 5, 567 N.W.2d 387, 390 (citation omitted)).
[¶ 45.] Manning’s counterclaim alleged that Cotton had “no reasonable basis to proceed with this lawsuit” and that her actions “raise to the level of barretry (sic) under South Dakota law.” However, we find that Manning could advance no facts that would support this claim and entitle her to relief. See Hansen v. South Dakota Dep’t of Transp., 1998 SD 109, ¶ 6, 584 N.W.2d 881, 883 (citing Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 416, 418 (S.D.1993) (citations omitted)). Therefore, we conclude that, because she is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, her counterclaim was properly dismissed.
[¶ 46.] Affirmed.
• [¶ 47.] SABERS, AMUNDSON, GILBERTSON, Justices, and CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, concur.
[¶ 48.] CALDWELL, Circuit Judge, sitting for KONENKAMP, Justice, disqualified.

. South Dakota's barratry statute, SDCL 20-9-6.1, provides as follows:
Barratry is the assertion of a frivolous or malicious claim or defense by a party in a civil action under Title 15. Barratry constitutes a cause of action which may be asserted by filing a pleading in the same civil action in which the claim of barratry arises or in a subsequent action. A claim of bar-ratry shall be determined in the same manner as any other substantive cause of action asserted in that civil action.

. Manning relies on our decision in Hartman v. Wood, 436 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1989), to sup*591port her claim. However, her reliance is misplaced. Hartman concerned a counterclaim brought under SDCL 15-17-35, a statute that is not at issue here. We cannot agree with her claim that Hartman "continues to be pertinent authority to the issues giving the dismissal of Manning’s counterclaim.”