Court Opinion

ID: 9658512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:02:56.233536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:56.079946
License: Public Domain

Garfield, J.
(dissenting)— I. Code section 321.341, headed “Obedience to signal of train”, provides: “Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing and warning is given by automatic signal or crossing gates or a flagman or otherwise of the immediate approach of a tram, the driver of such vehicle shall stop * * (Emphasis added.)
There is no claim gates or a flagman were placed at the crossing. The railroad concedes its automatic signal device, consisting of flashing red lights and bell, was not in working order at the time of the collision. There is undisputed evidence it was not working the day before the collision. There is testimony, however, that a stop sign was facing vehicular traffic. This sign was stationary when the automatic signal device was not in working order. It then faced traffic wholly irrespective of the immediate approach of a train. It gave no other or different warning- when a train was immediately approaching than at any other time. In this respect it differed from the automatic signal, crossing gates and flagman — the three methods of warning of a train’s approach to which section 321.341 refers.
The majority evidently proceeds on the assumption it conclusively appears this stop sign was facing traffic when the collision occurred. However, the railroad’s requested jury instruction 7 left to the jury the question whether the stop sign was “in the stopped position facing oncoming traffic” at the *1236time of the collision. The railroad is thus in no position to contend, nor should this court hold, it conclusively appears the stop sign was facing motor vehicle traffic at the time in question.
The majority holds as a matter of law that plaintiffs driver violated section 321.341 on the theory this stop sign, which the railroad contends faced motor vehicle traffic continuously when the automatic signal device did not function, was a warning “otherwise of the immediate approach of a train.” The majority says: “At the time involved a train was approaching the crossing and notice was given, not by gates or a flagman but ‘otherwise’ of its immediate approach.” This shortly follows the statement in the opinion, “The stop sign may not have been appropriate when no train was near but it was quite appropriate when a train was practically upon the crossing.”
Thus, according to the majority, the stop sign was not an appropriate warning of the immediate approach of a train if there were none but if a train was immediately approaching, such a sign was an appropriate warning thereof. I think such a holding is unsound. Under it the warning depends not at all upon its nature but wholly upon the immediate approach of the train. Of course there can be no violation of the statute unless warning is given of the immediate approach of - a train.
Under the majority’s view a railroad need not place an automatic signal, crossing gates or a flagman at crossings more than ordinarily dangerous even though essential to the reasonable protection of travelers on the highway. All that is needed is a stationary stop sign. It would warn of the immediate approach of a train if there were one, otherwise not. I think the majority’s holding is contrary to many decisions of ours to the effect some warning signal of a train’s approach, other than the whistle or bell required by statute, may be required when the crossing is more than ordinarily dangerous. See Strom v. Des Moines & Central Iowa Ry. Co., 248 Iowa 1052, 1068, 1069, 82 N.W.2d 781, 790, 791, and citations; Plumb v. The Minneapolis and St. L. Ry. Co., 249 Iowa 1187, 1196, 1197, 91 N.W.2d 380, 386. See also Russell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 249 Iowa 664, 670, 671, 86 N.W.2d 843, 847, 848, cited by the majority.
If, as the majority holds, the stop sign (locked in place *1237for at least two days) was a sufficient warning of the immediate approach of a train so that Haynes violated section 321.341 by not stopping the truck, it is unlikely appellant would have opened its printed argument with the concession to which the majority refers: “there was a question for the jury as to whether or not the defendant was negligent in having its crossing signals in a nonoperating condition # *
II. The majority gives little if any weight to the conceded fact the flashing red lights and bell on the automatic signal device were not working at the time of the collision. Plaintiff’s driver was entitled to assume from this fact that no train was immediately approaching. He testified, “I was relying upon the lights and the car ahead of me. I looked at the track there as far as I could see, and after that started happening in front of me I couldn’t do much more looking.” Also, “I knew of the flashing light and bell system located at the crossing before the accident. I relied upon it to warn me of the approach of the train.” Not only does the majority disregard this testimony but it declares “he [plaintiff’s driver] knew such devices often fail.” There is nothing in the record to support such a statement.
"We have recently held the public has a right to rely upon the railroad to keep automatic signal devices in efficient working order and their “ ‘nonoperation was to assure the traveler that it was safe to cross.’ ” Russell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 249 Iowa 664, 671, 86 N.W.2d 843, 847, from which the majority quotes.
Crowley v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 204 Iowa 1385, 1393, 213 N.W. 403, 407, 53 A. L. R. 964, reversed a judgment for defendant pursuant to directed verdict on the ground of contributory negligence where defendant’s automatic signal bell and red light did not indicate approach of a train. We said, “The inactivity of the signaling device indicated that no train was approaching. Almost without exception, the authorities agree that the traveler has a right to rely to some extent on this fact; that it is a circumstance to be taken into account in determining whether he exercised due care.”
The annotation in 53 A. L. R. 973, 978 et seq., to the *1238Crowley opinion cites many precedents in support of tbe rule just quoted.
In Brose v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 185 Iowa 867, 870, 171 N.W. 149, 150, quoted from in tbe Crowley case, an electric signal gong at tbe crossing did not sound as tbe train approached. We stated: “Plaintiff knew of tbe automatic signaling device at tbe crossing, and was quite naturally induced, by its failure to work, to believe tbe crossing clear and free from danger. Tbe jury bad a right to take this fact into consideration, in deciding whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care in attempting to go upon tbe crossing, [citations] * * * Tbe question of contributory negligence was clearly for tbe jury.”
See also Lockridge v. Minneapolis & St. L, R. Co., 161 Iowa 74, 140 N.W. 834, Ann. Cas. 1916A 158, where tbe flagman failed to warn plaintiff of tbe approach of a train and we held the issue of freedom from contributory negligence was for tbe jury.
Applegate v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 334 Ill. App. 141, 155, 78 N.E.2d 793, 799, cited by defendant, states: “Where, as in tbe instant case, warning signals have failed at a railway crossing tbe Illinois courts as well as those in tbe majority of jurisdictions have held that tbe nonfunctioning of tbe signals is a factor to be considered by tbe jury in determining whether there was contributory negligence, since tbe purpose of tbe signal is not only to warn traffic of tbe approach of trains, but its nonoperation is to assure tbe traveler that it is safe to cross [citations].”
Mohr v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 7 Cir., 232 F.2d 869, 871, says: “Blinker warning signals which are not working also constitute an invitation to cross a railroad track with an implied assurance of safety from being struck by an approaching train.”
Tbe annotation in 99 A. L. R. 729, 733, supplementing tbe one in 53 A. L. R. 973 to our Crowley case, supra, states: “In tbe great majority of tbe recent cases, * * * it has been held that, while tbe failure of a signaling device at a railroad crossing to operate and warn of tbe approach of a train does not entirely relieve a traveler from bis duty to look and listen for an approaching train, nevertheless tbe traveler may rely to some extent on the apparent safety implied from tbe silence of tbe *1239signal, and such silence of the signal is a circumstance to be taken into consideration by the jury, along with other factors, on the issue of contributory negligence.”
To the same effect is 44 Am. Jur., Railroads, section 563.
75 C. J. S., Railroads, section 878, says: “It is also ordinarily a question for the jury whether the person injured * * * exercised proper care in attempting to cross in reliance on the fact that signaling devices at the crossing were not being operated * # *.” Brose v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., supra, 185 Iowa 867, 171 N.W. 149, and numerous other precedents are cited in support.
Neither the railroad nor the majority cites any authority for a holding that on evidence comparable to this a traveler is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Indeed the only precedent cited by the majority which holds the driver was so negligent is Darden v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 213 Iowa 583, 239 N.W. 531, where the facts are entirely different. In Dusold v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 162 Iowa 441, 449, 142 N.W. 213, 216, cited and quoted from by the majority, the issue of freedom from contributory negligence was held to be for the jury. Also in Strom v. Des Moines & Central Iowa Ry. Co., 248 Iowa 1052, 82 N.W.2d 781, and Lutz v. Davis, 195 Iowa 1049, 192 N.W. 15. The Dusold opinion states:
“It is true that a person approaching a railway crossing must be vigilant to discover the approach of trains and use reasonable care to avoid injury therefrom, but whether he has done so in a particular case is nearly always a question for the jury, and it depends on so many facts and circumstances and conditions that it is sometimes very difficult to say whether or not a party did, at a particular time, exercise that care. * * *. While a railroad crossing suggests danger, the absence of danger signals, the absence of that which usually and ordinarily exists, which suggests danger, may have the effect of lulling the mind into a sense of security. * * *.
“It is true that the absence of statutory signals does not relieve a party, attempting to cross a railway track, from the duty of vigilantly using all his senses to ascertain if there is danger in crossing, but this fact is proper to be considered by *1240the jury, with all the other facts, in determining whether or not he exercised reasonable care and caution for his own safety.”
III. The majority in effect discards testimony for plaintiff of the presence of gravel upon the roadway as the crossing was approached. Appellant’s requested jury instruction 6 conceded there was sufficient evidence that gravel was present on the highway near the crossing and left it to the jury to determine whether “there was sufficient gravel upon the surface of the highway to make it impossible to stop the truck before striking the Wheaton automobile and coming into collision with defendant’s train.”
The trial court embodied the substance of this sixth request in instruction 18 which recites there was evidence of gravel on the highway east of the railroad track which should be considered in determining whether plaintiff (driver) was guilty of contributory negligence. Appellant took no exception to instruction 18. It says in argument, “This claim [gravel] is barely supported by the Record and only by plaintiff himself and the driver.” Appellant is not in position to contend (and does not do so), nor should the majority hold, there is no evidence of gravel on the surface of the highway near the crossing which might properly be considered on the issue of freedom of plaintiff’s driver from contributory negligence.
In any event the majority’s discarding the testimony for plaintiff that there was gravel on the north side of the highway is a clear invasion of the province of the jury. Haynes testified in part:
“Relative to the pieces of gravel on the highway, they would run * * * from the size of a pea up to the size of a marble, something like that. It was all along the highway on the pavement and down along the edge of the pavement, just on one side. It was up to the railroad track and down to, oh, I expect, 100 feet from the railroad track, down to that first sign down there, about in there. * * * The gravel extended as much as 100, maybe 150 feet east of the track.”
Plaintiff himself arrived at the scene of collision only two hours after it occurred. He said, “I observed gravel there on the pavement. I would say it extended about 100 feet east of *1241the crossing on the pavement. Gravel is what we would call pea gravel, about the size of a pea * * It was river-bed gravel, not crushed limestone.” Plaintiff was not cross-examined on this testimony.
Frank Van Patten gave similar evidence. He said: “I observed the pavement in the vicinity immediately east of the crossing that night. There was gravel on the pavement. The reason I noticed it was * * * the wheels started spinning on the wrecker. * # * It was river gravel on the pavement. It runs from small to the size of marbles.”
It appears without dispute a side road led from the pavement near the railroad crossing to a sand and gravel pit near by.
The majority rejects the testimony of those three witnesses for plaintiff because defendant’s witness Wheaton testified, almost six years after the collision, he did not observe any gravel on the pavement, and Mrs. Wheaton said there was not any “as we came up there.” Mrs. Wheaton also testified, “I noticed the crossing signals at the crossing and didn’t notice whether or not they were working. * * * I don’t remember seeing the stop sign facing us * *
Plaintiff’s driver gave this testimony which the majority ignores:
“The next day I found rock and gravel on the highway. You could see that is what caused it to slide, not get traction. * * * Driving 35 or 40 miles an hour on a paved highway, not loaded, assuming there was no gravel on the highway, that the pavement was dry and smooth, I could stop that vehicle in 75 or 100 feet, something like that.
“Q. Why didn’t you stop before you struck the Wheaton ear? A. I would have if that gravel and stuff hadn’t been on the pavement.”
IV. The majority gives no consideration to the obstructions to view as the crossing was approached from the east. Haynes testified, “On the day of the accident there was lots of brush, trees and weeds and there is a high bank setting up alongside the railroad track there. There were a lot of young jack oaks along there. * * * They affected my view to the north. *1242I just couldn’t see a train coming if there was one.” There is other evidence of obstructions to view.
Kinney v. Larsen, 239 Iowa 494, 500, 31 N.W.2d 635, 638, cited by defendant, says of cases in which there was substantial evidence the view of the railroad track was obstructed “ ‘so as to render it impossible or difficult to learn of the approach of a train’ ” or evidence of diverting circumstances which would tend to throw a person off his guard: “In general we have held that where the view of the crossing is so obstructed or there are such diverting circumstances the question of contributory negligence is for the jury.”
The same statement appears in Strom v. Des Moines and Central Iowa Ry. Co., supra, 248 Iowa 1052, 1063, 82 N.W.2d 781, 787, cited by the majority.
I would affirm.
Thompson, J., joins in this dissent.