Court Opinion

ID: 8633921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-24 19:42:03.580286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:55:51.972753
License: Public Domain

TANEY, Circuit Justice.
In order to understand the points which arise in this case, it is necessary to state the facts somewhat in detail. Talbot Jones, of the city of Baltimore, died in the year 1834, having first duly made his last will and testament, and appointed his sons, Samuel Jones and Andrew D. Jones, his executors, to whom letters testamentary were granted in the same year. The testator died possessed of a large amount of property of different kinds, and owned, at the time of his death, two hundred and eighty-two shares of stock in the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of Baltimore, standing in his name on the books of the bank. The dividends upon this stock is the matter of dispute.
The testator, by his will, bequeathed it, in trust for the complainant, during her life, in the following words: “I order and direct that my executors hereinafter named, or the survivor or acting one of them, shall receive *1046the dividends, from time to time declared and made payable on my stock in the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of Baltimore, in trust, that the said dividends shall be paid over or remitted by my executors, or the survivor or acting one of them, to my sister, Maria Lowry, now or lately of Dublin, in Ireland, during her natural life, and after her decease, to her daughter Mary Lowry, should she survive her mother, during the lifetime of the said Mary.”
And in the succeeding clause of the will, this stock, together with other property, and also the general residue of his estate, is bequeathed to Samuel Jones and Andrew D. Jones and the survivor of them, and the ‘‘heirs, executors and administrators of such survivor, in trust for sundry persons named in the will, in certain proportions therein mentioned,” subject to the devise of the dividends (on the stock) to his sister and daughter as aforesaid.
In 1S39, upon a bill filed in the chancery court of the state by some of the parties interested, for the partition of the property bequeathed in the last-mentioned clause of the will, a decree was passed directing, among other things, that Samuel Jones and Andrew D. Jones should hold these two hundred and eighty-two shares of stock, in trust to pay the dividends to Maria Lowry, during her life, and after her death to be divided as mentioned in the decree: Mary Lowry, the daughter, died before the devise was made.
In this proceeding. Maria Lowry, the complainant, was made a defendant, and the bill taken pro eonfesso against her, upon publication in the usual form; but process was never served upon her; nor did she appear or answer; nor had she any interest whatever in the suit. By the decree, William B. Korman, Josiah Jones, and Emily J. Albert, are entitled to this stock upon the death of Mrs. Lowry; and on that account, it has been supposed to be advisable to make them parties in the ease before the court.
After the death of Talbot Jones, Samuel Jones carried on business, on his individual account, in the name of Talbot Jones & Co.; and the transactions in the name of Talbot Jones & Co., mentioned in these proceedings, are the transactions of Samuel Jones, on his own individual account.
The stock in question continued to stand on books of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank in the name of Talbot Jones, until 4th May, 1842. when it was transferred to the Merchants’ Bank by Samuel Jones; the other executor not joining in the transfer. This transfer, it appears, was made as security for a loan obtained by Samuel Jones from the Merchants’ Bank, on his own private account. under his mercantile style and name of Talbot Jones & Co., and the money being afterwards paid, the stock was transferred to him by the bank, under the same name and style, on the 17th June in the same year; and on the 20th of the same mouth, transferred by him as Talbot Jones & Co. to himself and Andrew D. Jones, as executors of Talbot Jones. On the 20th of August following, Samuel Jones, signing his name as acting executor, again transferred this stock to the Merchants’ Bank, which continued to hold it as a pledge for sundry loans of money made, from time to time, to Talbot Jones & Co., until the 11th of December, 1840, when it was transferred to a broker, and sold to pay a note which fell due on the 4th of that month, and had been protested for non-payment.
Talbot Jones & Co., that is to say, Samuel Jones, stopped payment in September, 1840, and in January, 1847, petitioned for the benefit of the insolvent laws of this state; it is admitted on all hands, that he is utterly insolvent, and unable to pay any part of the dividends due to the complainant. After the last transfer to the Merchants' Bank, the dividends were either paid to its orders in favor of Talbot Jones & Co., or were drawn by the bank and paid over to him. with the exception of the last dividend, which fell due before the stock was sold. This is yet in the hands of the bank, except the sum of thirty-nine dollars and forty-eight cents which has been paid out of it for taxes on the stock. Notwithstanding the transfer of the stock in 1842, the amount of the dividends were regularly paid over to the complainant by the executors, until November. 1S45; but the dividend declared at that time has not been paid to her, nor any of those subsequently. She had no notice of the transfer of the stock until October, 1S4G, after the last of the loans above mentioned had been made by the Merchants’ Bank; and on the 3d of December following (the day before the note became due), she gave the bank notice of her claim.
When the stock was first transferred by Samuel Jones to the Merchants’ Bank, a certificate was issued by the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, in the following words:
“Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of Baltimore.
“No. 707. May 4, 1S42.
“This is to certify that the Merchants’ Bank of Baltimore is entitled to two hundred and eighty-two shares in the capital stock of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank of Baltimore, on each of which thirty dollars have been paid, but which have since been reduced by the act of assembly to twenty dollars a share. Transferable at the bank only, personally or by attorney.
“Trueman Cross. Cashier.
“2S2 shares.”
This certificate was delivered by Samuel Jones to the Merchants’ Bank, when he obtained the first loan, and was re-delivered to him when the money was paid and the stock transferred to Talbot Jones & Co.; a similar certificate was again issued by the Commercial and Farmers' Bank, when the second *1047transfer was made to the Merchants’ Bank, and was retained by it, until the stock was transferred to the broker to be sold, as here-inbefore mentioned.
This is a summary statement of the facts, so far as they are material to the decision of the case. It is very clear, that the money due to the complainant has been grossly misapplied; and the question is, whether she is entitled to relief against the hanks, or either of them. Samuel Jones is undoubtedly liable; hut as he is admitted to be insolvent, she can obtain no redress from him.
As concerns the Merchants’ Bank, we see no ground upon which it can be liable beyond the amount of dividends remaining in its hands. It does not appear that the bank, when it accepted the pledge of this stock, •or when it made its loans, had any reason to suppose that the stock had ever been held by Talbot Jones, or that it was transferred to the bank by Samuel Jones, as one of his executors. In order to obtain the loan upon the pledge of this stock, Samuel Jones did nothing more than produce the certificate of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, showing that the two hundred and eighty-two shares of stock had been transferred to the Merchants’ Bank; but the certificate did not shown by whom it had been transferred, nor to whom it had previously belonged; and according to the usual course of business,. the presumption was that it belonged to Samuel Jones himself. The Merchants’ Bank appears to have acted under this impression; for when the first loan was paid, and the lien of the bank thereby released, it transferred the stock to him individually, by the name of Talbot Jones & Co., and not to the executors of Talbot Jones.
It is very true, that the instrument of transfer upon the books of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank showed it to have been made by Samuel Jones, in his character of executor; and in general, a party must be presumed to have notice of everything that appears upon the face of the instrument under which he claims title. But a transfer of stock cannot, in this respect, be likened to an ordinary conveyance of real or personal property. The instrument transferring the title is not delivered to the party; the law requires it to be written on the books of the bank in which the stock is held; the party to whom it is transferred rarely, if ever, sees the entry, and relies altogether upon the certificate of the proper officer of the bank, stating that he is entitled to so many shares, that is to say, so many shares have been transferred to him by one who had a lawful right to make the transfer.
The case of Davis v. Bank of England, 2 Bing. 393, is a strong one on this head. The three per cent, consolidated annuities created by the English government, were made payable at the Bank of England, and transferable at the bank, in the manner pointed out by law; a large amount of these annuities, which belonged to the plaintiff in that ease, and stood in his name, were transferred under a forged power of attorney; the property did not pass by this transfer. Yet the court held, that subsequent bona fide purchasers from the fraudulent transferree, whose name had been registered in the books of the bank as the owner, were entitled to recover from the bank the amount of dividends falling due on these annuities, although the bank was also liable to the true owner of the stock, whose name had been forged.
In this case, indeed, the executor had a legal capacity to make the transfer, and the legal title to the stock passed to the Merchants’ Bank; and as it paid a valuable consideration, and had no notice, actual or constructive, of any violation of trust, upon which the transfer could be impeached in equity, it had a right to sell the stock for the payment of the note for which it was pledged, and to make the purchasers a valid title. A different rule would render the right of every purchaser of stock in a bank insecure or liable to doubt, and greatly impair its value, and would, moreover, seriously disturb the usages of trade and the established order of business in relation to this subject, in a manner highly injurious to the community; for purchasers always rely on the certificate of the bank in which it is held, as conclusive evidence of the ownership. Most commonly, the purchase is made through a broker, and the buyer does not know who is the seller or who makes the transfer; the certificate of the bank tells him that he is entitled to so many shares, and he pays his money upon receiving the certificate, without further inquiry. It would be unjust and inequitable, to charge the stock in his hands with any equitable incumbrance or trust, however created, which was not known to him at the time he paid his money.
As respects the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, the claim of the complainant rests upon different grounds. By the charter of the bank (like that of every other bank incorporated by a law of this state) the stock is transferable at the bank only, and according to such rules as shall be established by the president and directors. It cannot, therefore, be transferred without the supervision of the officer designated for that purpose by the bank. The corporation is thus made the custodian of the shares of stock, and clothed with power sufficient to protect the rights of every one interested, from unauthorized transfers; it is a trust placed in the hands of the corporation for the protection of individual interests, and like every other trustee, it is bound to execute the trust with proper diligence and care, and is responsible for any injury sustained by its negligence or misconduct. Upon this principle, the bank was held liable for an improper transfer of its stock, in the case of Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank v. Wayman, decided in the court *1048of appeals of this state, at December term, 1847 [5 Gill, 336]; and the case of Davis v. Bank of England, hereinbefore referred to, where government stocks were made transferable on the books of the bank, was decided upon the same ground. As the corporation appoints the officers before whom the transfers must be made, it is responsible for their acts, and must answer for their negligence or defaults, whenever the rights of a third person are concerned. Hodges v. Planters’ Bank of Prince George’s Co., 7 Gill & J. 306, 310.
Undoubtedly, the mere act of permitting this stock to be transferred by one of the executors, furnishes no ground for complaint against the bank, although it turns out that this executor was, by the act of transfer, converting the property to his own use; for an executor may sell or raise money on the property of the deceased, in the regular execution of his duty; and the party dealing with him is not bound to inquire into his object, nor liable for his misapplication of the money. Such is the doctrine of the English courts, and would seem to have been the law of this state, prior to the act of assembly of December session, 1843 (chapter 3u4); and the transaction now before us took place before that act went into operation. But it is equally clear, that if a party dealing with an executor, has, at the time, reasonable ground for believing that he intends to misapply the money, or is, in the very transaction, applying it to his own private use, the party so dealing is responsible to the persons injured. The cases upon this subject are numerous, and it would be tedious to refer to them particularly; they are for the most part collected and commented on in the cases of McLeod v. Drummond, 17 Ves. 152, and of Field v. Schieffelin, 7 Johns. Ch. 150.
It is very true, that in the case before us, the pledge of stock was not made to .the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, nor did it loan the money to the executor. But a party is not made liable because he pays or advances money for property of the deceased; but because, by doing so, when he has reasonable ground for believing that the executor means to misapply it, he knowingly assists him in committing a breach of his trust. In this case, the rights of stockholders. and of persons interested in its stock, were placed by law under the guardianship and protection of the bank, so far as concerned the transfers on their books; the stock could not be transferred, could not be come the legal property of another person, without the permission of the proper officers of the corporation. Union Bank v. Laird, 2 Wheat. [15 U. S.] 393. And if these officers, at the time of the transfer, had reason to believe that the executor, by the act of transfer, was converting this stock to his own use. in violation of his duty, then the bank, by permitting the transfer knowingly, enabled the executor to commit a breach of his trust, and upon principles of justice and equity, is as fully liable as if it had shared in the profits of the transaction. The object of the executor could not have been accomplished without the co-operation of the bank in permitting the transfer to be made on its books.
The question then is, had the bank at the time of the transfer, actual or constructive notice that the executor was abusing his trust, and applying this stock to his own use? The bank, by its answer, denies that it knew anything of the contents of Talbot Jones’s will, or of the bequest to the complainant; and there is no proof of actual notice; but it did know that this stock was the property of Talbot Jones at the time of his death, for it so stood upon its own books; and as the transfer was made by Samuel Jones, as his executor, the bank must, of course, have known that Talbot Jones left a will. Although it may not have had actual notice of the contents of the will, yet as it was dealing with an executor in his character as such, the law implies notice; this is the doctrine in the English court of chancery. 4 Madd. 190. And the rale appears to stand upon still firmer ground in this state; for now it is settled, that every person has constructive notice of a deed for real or personal property, where it is duly registered according to law; in England, the weight of authority is perhaps to the contrary. Now, in Maryland, every will of real or personal property is required to be recorded; and if third persons are bound, at their peril, to take notice of a registered deed, when there is nothing to lead them to inquiry, the obligation must be still stronger upon one who is dealing with an executor concerning the assets, of the deceased;' for his character of executor, of itself, gives actual notice that there is a will open to inspection upon the public records.
The bank, therefore, was bound to take notice of the will when this transfer was proposed to be made by one of the executors; and is chargeable to the same extent as if it had actually read it. It was negligence in the bank not to examine it; and if it was ignorant of the contents of the will and of the specific bequest of this stock, it was its own fault. It must be dealt with in this case, as if it had possessed actual knowledge that the stock in question was specifically bequeathed by the testator, and was not by the will to be transferred, or in any manner disposed of, by the executors, during the lifetime of the complainant: and that it was the duty of the bank, during that time, to pay the dividends to them in trust for the complainant.
Undoubtedly, this stock, although thus specifically bequeathed, was yet liable to be sold, if necessary, for the payment of the debts of the testator; and if the bank did not know, or had no reasonable ground for *1049supposing, that the executor was misapplying the assets, it would not be responsible, notwithstanding its implied knowledge of the will. But when the second transfer (under which the stock was finally -sold) was made to the Merchants’ Bank, the circumstances then within the knowledge of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank, were abundantly sufficient to satisfy any reasonable mind, that Samuel Jones was using this stock for his private purposes. This transfer took place on the 20th of August, 1842; the bank at that time knew that Talbot Jones had been dead eight years; that he died rich; and that the time had long before elapsed within which the law of Maryland requires an estate to be settled up by an executor or administrator. It appeared by their own'transfer books that, on the 4th of May preceding, the same stock had been transferred by Samuel Jones to the same bank (the other executor although he resided in town, not being a party to the transfer); that on the 17th of June, in the same year, it was re-transferred by the Merchants’ Bank to Samuel Jones in his individual right, under the name of Talbot Jones & Co., and by him restored to the estate of the testator, a few days afterwards, by a transfer to himself and the other executor. And when, after these transactions, all appearing on the books of the bank, he came again, without his co-executor, to transfer it a second time to the Merchants’ Bank, could the officers of the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank doubt the purposes for which this second transfer was made? Familiar as they must have been with the usual course of business in the banks, and the usage of loaning money upon hypothecation of stock, could they have failed to see that Samuel Jones was misapplying the assets of the testator, and pledging this stock for his own individual" benefit?
Indeed, the bank, in its answer, does not deny it, but on the contrary, impliedly admits it; for the answer states that, if the president had known that the transfer was about to be made by Samuel Jones, he would have prevented it. Now, the bank is equally chargeable for the neglect or omission of duty by the officer to whom it had committed the superintendence of the transfers of stock, as it is for the neglect or omissions of its president; and such officer was also equally chargeable with implied notice of the will of Talbot Jones, and equally bound to refuse the transfer when he saw that Samuel Jones was using this stock in violation of his trust as executor. And if the circumstances above mentioned were not sufficient to satisfy the bank officer, beyond all reasonable doubt, that he was so using them, yet they were certainly sufficient to create strong presumptions against him, and to make it the duty of the officer to inquire before he allowed the transfer to be made. If he neglected to make the inquiry, when the fact could have been so easily ascertained, and either from negligence or design, without inquiry, enabled the executor to convert the stock to his own use, the bank is responsible for this negligence.
There is another circumstance also, which ought, of itself, to have created strong doubts in the mind of the transfer officer of the bank. By the act of assembly of Maryland of 1798 (section 3) it is in the power of the executor to procure an order of sale from the orphans’ court, whenever a sale shall be necessary. It is true, that in the case of Allender v. Riston, 2 Gill & J. 86, the opinion of the court would seem to have been that, notwithstanding this act of assembly, an assignment by an executor, for his own debt, would be valid against the creditors of the estate, unless there was collusion with the executor. But the case was not decided on that point; nor does the opinion of the court apply to an assignment of property specifically bequeathed; nor was that point in the case, or raised in the argument. However that question shall be ultimately decided, it may, we think, be safely asserted that, in practice, under this law, there has been no instance in Maryland, since its passage, in which an executor, acting fairly and bona fide, has undertaken to sell or pledge personal property, specifically bequeathed, without a previous order from the orphans’ court. And the proposition of Samuel Jones, one of two executors (the other executor not uniting in the transfer), to transfer this stock, so long after the death of a wealthy testator, without first obtaining an order from the court to justify him, must have satisfied any man of common experience in business that he was grossly abusing his trust. In South Carolina, under a law very similar in its provisions, it has been decided that the sale cf such property by an executor is void, unless made by the authority of the court. 4 Desaus. Eq. 522. And we think there are strong reasons to support this decision.
The cases referred to in relation to transfers of government stocks by the Bank of England do not .apply to this case. They are collected in 1 Daniell, Ch. Prac. 139. and they all turn upon the meaning and policy of the acts of parliament by which the management of the public stocks and annuities was given to the Bank of England. It is-with reference to the duties imposed by these acts of parliament, that the court say, that the Bank of England is not bound to take notice of a trust affecting public stock standing on its books, and must look only to the legal estate. But this opinion cannot influence the decision of this ease; because-the privileges and obligations of the bank must be determined by its own charter, differing widely in its terms and its object from-the English acts of parliament. Certainly, none of the English acts convey the idea that, upon general principles of law. a bank is not bound to notice a trust of its own *1050stock, and must look only to the legal estate; for a bank or any other corporation is bound by the same obligations, moral and legal (when the rights of third parties are concerned), that apply to the case of an individual, unless it is explicitly exempted by law. If an individual who confederates with an executor, and assists him in defrauding his cestui que trust, is liable to the party injured, there can be no reason why a bank which knowingly enables an executor to convert the property of the cestui que trust to his own private use, should not be equally responsible. The difficulties to which the Bank of England would be subjected, if bound to take notice of the trusts in the government stocks, and which are strongly stated by the chancellor in the case of Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. 58, are altogether inapplicable here; for, putting aside the immense difference in amount and character between the government stocks of England and the stock of this bank, a chancery suit can never be necessary in this state for the protection of the bank, where stock bequeathed in trust is required to be sold for the payment of debts; because, under the act of 1798, an order for the sale, by the orphans’ court, which could at any time be obtained in a summary way, without delay and without expense, would protect the bank from all responsibility, and occasion no delay or embarrassment in the payment of debts.
The case then is this: The will of the testator, in effect, directed that this stock should not be sold or transferred during the lifetime of the complainant, and the dividends, during that time, should be received by his executors arid paid over to the complainant. One of these executors proposes to transfer this stock, in order to raise money on it for his private purposes; and the officers of the bank, knowing the purpose for which it was transferred, or with circumstances before them sufficient to create a strong presumption that such was the intention of the executor, and therefore, sufficient to put them on inquiry, permit the transfer and certify that the transferree is entitled to the s»ck. Relying on this certificate, the Merchants’ Bank was induced to loan its money upon it, and having no knowledge that it ever belonged to Talbot Jones, or had been transferred by his executor, the stock cannot be followed in its hands, or the hands of those to whom it afterwards sold it, and charged with the trust created by the will. The executor is insolvent, and there is, therefore, no effectual remedy against him. Ought the loss to be borne by the complainant, who has committed no fault and been guilty of no negligence, or by the Commercial and Fanners’ Bank?
The established principles of equity seem to require that the loss should be borne by the party by whose negligence or misconduct it was occasioned. The bank not only enabled the executor to perpetrate the wrong by permitting the transfer, but co-operated in it, by certifying that the title of trans-ferree was good; justice, therefore, requires that it should bear the loss.
The only remaining question is, the nature of the relief to be administered by the court. In order to do substantial justice, it is evident, that the decree must be directly against the bank, as Samuel Jones is admitted to be utterly insolvent.
The complainant’s claim is for dividends only; she has no property in the stock, which belongs to the defendants. William B. Norman, Josiali Jones and Emily J. Albert, in certain proportions, who will be entitled to the dividends after the death of the complainant. l'et, if there were no difficulty on the score of'jurisdiction, the court would, according to the practice of courts of chancery, proceed to dispose of the whole matter in dispute, and decree as to the stock, and the balance in hand in the Merchants’ Bank, as well as the dividends. But the jurisdiction of this court is founded upon the fact that the complainant is an alien; it has no jurisdiction in the controversies between the defendants, as they all reside in Maryland. Undoubtedly, if the case of the complainant could not be disposed of, and relief administered to her. without deciding upon the rights of all the parties before the court, we should necessarily dispose of the whole matter. and decree as to the stock, as well as the dividends. But the rights of the complainant may be adjusted, without interfering with the right of the claimants of the stock, or with the balance arising from its sale, which yet remains in the hands of the Merchants’ Bank; for it is immaterial to the complainant, whether the stock be replaced or not. All that she has a right to demand is, that the amount of dividends on two hundred and eighty-two shares of stock, which she has lost by the negligence or thé misconduct of the officers of the bank, shall be paid to her, as if the stock had never been transferred. The jurisdiction, therefore, to decree in the controversy as to the stock, cannot, we think, be maintained.
We have said nothing of the decree of the chancery court of Maryland, which has been filed in the case; neither of the banks were parties to the proceedings in that case, nor do they appear to have had notice of it; neither was the complainant a necessary party; she had no interest in the property to be divided; it was not proposed to change or modify, in any respect, the trust in her favor; and the decree passed by the court leaves her interests precisely where they stood before.
In regard to the stock itself, the decree for partition has, in a material respect, changed the character of the trust; for the two executors, instead of holding it, in undivided portions, for the cestuis que trust named in the will, hold under the decree, as trustees for those to whom it has been specially as*1051signed in severalty. And it may be doubted, whether this circumstance does not form an additional objection to the jurisdiction of this court in regard to the stock; and whether Samuel Jones and Andrew D. Jones ought not to be considered as trustees, appointed in that respect by the court of chancery, to hold this stock in trust for eestuis que trust named in the decree, and therefore, responsible for their conduct to that court rather than to a court of the United States. It is, however, not necessary to examine this question, because it does not affect the dividends bequeathed to the complainant, and certainly, can form no objection to the jurisdiction in her case.
It appears from the evidence, that the stock sold for more than enough to pay the note for which it was hypothecated; and that, besides the surplus arising from this sale, one of the semi-annual dividends upon these two hundred and eighty-two shares remains in the hands of the Merchants’ Bank, deducting therefrom the amount paid by the bank for taxes on this stock; the amount of the dividend remaining in the hands of the Merchants’ Bank, subject to the deduction aforesaid, belongs in equity to the complainant, and for that amount she is entitled to a decree against the Merchants’ Bank. For the residue of the dividends due to her, and remaining unpaid, the Commercial and Farmers’ Bank must answer.
The case must be referred to a master, to state an account according to this opinion, preparatory to a final decree.