Court Opinion

ID: 9749377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:40:48.04356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:47.555235
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the decision finding trial error which requires the granting of a new trial. However, I would go further and would cause judgment n.o.v. to be entered in favor of *518Loblaws. There is in the record of this case no evidence that the store was guilty of negligence which contributed to Luanne Miller’s fall.
On July 19, 1984, Miller slipped and fell because of water which had fallen on the floor of a Loblaws grocery store while an ice machine on the store premises was being stocked by Edinger Super Ice Service. To recover for injuries sustained in the fall she commenced an action against Peter J. Schmitt & Co., t/d/b/a Loblaws (Loblaws), and Edward and Mary Edinger, t/d/b/a Edinger Super Ice Service (Edinger), an independent contractor who regularly delivered packages of ice and placed them in a self-service machine. The action was tried before a jury which found that the plaintiff had sustained damages in the amount of thirty-five thousand ($35,000) dollars and apportioned causal negligence as follows: plaintiff—25%; Loblaws—45%; and Edinger—30%. Post-trial motions were denied, delay damages were added, and a judgment was entered against Loblaws in the amount of nineteen thousand, thirty-five and 13/ioo ($19,035.13) dollars and against Edinger in the amount of twelve thousand, two hundred sixty-six and Vioo ($12,266.01) dollars.
The evidence established that the plaintiff-appellee had slipped and fallen because of water which was present on the floor in front of a self-service ice machine. The only evidence concerning the source of the water was that it had fallen to the floor moments before the accident while Edward Edinger was restocking the machine with plastic bags of ice cubes. Edinger testified that he had transferred ice from a refrigerated truck to an open mesh cart which he had wheeled to the ice machine in the front part of the store. After emptying the cart, Edinger had returned to the receiving area of the store to get a second load of ice. It was during this period that the plaintiff encountered water on the floor and fell.
The law in Pennsylvania regarding a landowner’s liability to business invitees is stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343, as follows:
*519A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
In Moultrey v. Great A & P Tea Co., 281 Pa.Super. 525, 422 A.2d 593 (1980), the court applied this principle in a case in which a customer had fallen on fruit lying in the produce aisle of a grocery store. The court described the plaintiffs burden of proof under § 343 as follows:
The principle of law from which this rule of the Restatement was derived is that a possessor of land is not an insurer of the safety of those on his premises. E.g., Martino [v. Great A & P Tea Co.], 419 Pa. [229] at 233, 213 A.2d [608] at 610; Winkler v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. [641] at 646, 359 A.2d [440] at 442. As such, the mere existence of a harmful condition in a public place of business, or the mere happening of an accident due to such a condition is neither, in and of itself, evidence of a breach of the proprietor’s duty of care to his invitees, nor raises a presumption of negligence. E.g., Amon v. Shemaka, 419 Pa. 314, 317, 214 A.2d 238, 239 (1965); Calhoun v. Jersey Shore Hosp., 250 Pa.Super. 567, 571, 378 A.2d 1294, 1296 (1977); Jones v. Sanitary Mkt. Co., 185 Pa.Super. 163, 165-66, 137 A.2d 859, 860-61 (1958). Therefore, in order to impose liability on a possessor of land, the invitee must present other evidence which tends to prove that the possessor deviated in some particular [sic] from his duty of reasonable care under the existing circumstances. Logically, the invitees case-in-chief must consist of evidence which tends to prove either that the proprietor knew, or in the exercise of reasonable *520care ought to have known, of the existence of the harm-causing condition. See, e.g., Martino, 419 Pa. at 233, 213 A.2d at 610; Katz v. John Wanamaker, Inc., 381 Pa. 477, 482, 112 A.2d 65, 67 (1955); Markman v. Fred P. Bell Stores Co., 285 Pa. 378, 382, 132 A. 178, 180 (1926); McMillan v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. [248] at 254-59, 367 A.2d [1106] at 1109-11; Winkler v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 240 Pa.Super. at 646, 359 A.2d at 442; Borsa v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 207 Pa.Super. 63, 68, 215 A.2d 289, 292 (1965); Jones v. Sanitary Mkt. Co., 185 Pa.Super. at 166-76, 137 A.2d at 861.
In construing this portion of the Restatement, Pennsylvania courts have uniformly held that if the harmful transitory condition is traceable to the possessor or his agent’s acts, (that is, a condition created by the possessor or those under his authority), then the plaintiff need not prove any notice in order to hold the possessor accountable for the resulting harm. See, e.g., Penn v. Isaly Dairy Co., 413 Pa. 548, 198 A.2d 322, 324 (1964); Finney v. G.C. Murphy Co., 406 Pa. 555, 178 A.2d 719 (1962). In a related context, where the condition is one which the owner knows has frequently recurred, the jury may properly find that the owner had actual notice of the condition, thereby obviating additional proof by the invitee that the owner had constructive notice of it. See, e.g., Borsa v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 207 Pa.Super. at 68, 215 A.2d at 292; Clark v. Glosser Bros. Dept. Stores, 156 Pa.Super. 193, 39 A.2d 733 (1944). Where, however, the evidence indicates that the transitory condition is traceable to persons other than those for whom the owner is, strictly speaking, ordinarily accountable, the jury may not consider the owner’s ultimate liability in the absence of other evidence which tends to prove that the owner had actual notice of the condition or that the condition existed for such a length of time that in the exercise of reasonable care the owner should have known of it. E.g., Katz v. John Wanamaker, Inc., 381 *521Pa. at 482, 112 A.2d at 67-68; Parker v. McCrory Stores, 376 Pa. 122, 101 A.2d 377 (1954); Sheridan v. Horn & Hardart, 366 Pa. 485, 77 A.2d 362 (1951); Borsa v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 207 Pa.Super. at 68, 215 A.2d at 292; Potter v. Glosser Bros. Dept. Stores, 146 Pa.Super. 129, 130-31, 22 A.2d 28, 29 (1941).
Id., 281 Pa.Superior Ct. at 529-531, 422 A.2d at 595-596 (emphasis added).
The record in the instant case contains no evidence that Loblaws knew or should have known that water was on the floor in front of the ice machine. The water had been allowed to fall to the floor by Edinger, who was not an employee of Loblaws but an independent contractor for whose conduct Loblaws was not accountable. The hazard created by the water, moreover, had not been in existence for such a period of time that Loblaws, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the condition and corrected it. Indeed, Edinger was still engaged in stocking the ice machine when the fall occurred. There also was no evidence that water had ever accumulated on the floor on prior occasions when Edinger had delivered bags of ice to the store and placed them in the vending machine. Rather, the testimony showed that during the several years in which Edinger had been stocking the machine, there never had been a problem with water on the floor. Thus, it cannot be said that the presence of water was a frequently recurring condition.
Negligence on the part of a grocery store cannot be established by showing the mere presence of water or refuse on the floor, for such a condition may arise temporarily in any grocery store even though the proprietor has exercised the utmost care. Moultrey v. Great A & P Tea Co., supra. I would conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs failure to prove that appellant had actual or constructive notice of the water precluded a finding of negligence under § 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Appellees argue that it was a hot summer day and that Loblaws should have anticipated (1) that ice would melt and (2) that water would leak from the plastic bags in which the *522ice had been packaged by Edinger. They argue, therefore, that a jury could find Loblaws negligent pursuant to Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section provides as follows:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
The limited scope of this principle, however, is acknowledged by the language of comment f as follows:
f. Duty to police premises. Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor’s safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur. He may, however, know or have reason to know, from past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual. If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 344 comment f.
Loblaws was not under a duty to police its premises against unexpected acts by Edinger. The evidence was that a similar condition had never occurred during prior years in which Edinger had been making deliveries of ice to the *523store. There was no contrary evidence. Thus, there is no evidentiary support for a finding that Edinger, on this occasion, was likely to create a dangerous condition by allowing water to leak or drip from the packages of ice which he was transporting to the ice machine. Without any reason to believe that such a condition might be created, Loblaws had no duty to give warning in advance that such a condition might be present. A grocery store’s liability to a customer under this section of the Restatement is not established by showing that ordinary ambient conditions might cause ice to melt. The fact that it was a hot day did not alone require the store to anticipate that Edinger’s delivery of packages of ice would cause a condition dangerous to other invitees. Compare: Moran v. Valley Forge Drive-In Theater, Inc., 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968) (theater liable for injuries caused by inherently dangerous delinquent acts of third persons where evidence showed history of delinquent acts on the premises); Glass v. Freeman, 430 Pa. 21, 240 A.2d 825 (1968) (property owner liable where it was foreseeable that unsupervised young child at construction site would act to cause injury); Smith v. Lit Brothers, 174 Pa.Super. 102, 100 A.2d 390 (1953) (department store liable for injuries to customer where store failed to inspect, discover and remedy unsafe procedure by independent contractor engaged in inherently dangerous demolition work). Section 344 of the Restatement should not be construed to impose upon grocery store Owners the duty of anticipating every possible hazard which may arise on their premises by virtue of acts committed by third persons. Only where the store owner has failed to exercise reasonable care to protect his invitees against conduct which, from past experience, he should have anticipated will liability arise. A self-service grocery store hosts a steady stream of customers, many of whom may, at one time or another, accidentally create a potential hazard by dropping, dripping or spilling something on the floor. To require a grocery store to provide supervision of every third person who might create such a hazard would in effect make the store *524the insurer of its customers’ safety. This is not and never has been the law.
Comment c to Section 344 of the Restatement, upon which the trial court relied, describes a store owner’s duty to exercise reasonable care to supervise the activities of independent contractors. This duty of supervision was not present under the facts of the instant case. The duty described in comment c would have had application if Edinger had never before delivered ice and on a hot day Loblaws had made no effort to ascertain whether proper precautions were being taken to protect against melting and spillage. Here, however, Loblaws was familiar with Edinger’s procedures, and these procedures had proved entirely safe in the past. The law did not require strict supervision under these circumstances.
I would reverse the judgment entered in the trial court, and grant judgment n.o.v. in favor of the appellant.