Court Opinion

ID: 9664407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:18:30.160443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:06.093812
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith, joined by Justice Walker,
dissenting.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The dissenting opinion filed herein on July 11, 1956 is withdrawn, and the following dissent is substituted therefor:
On further consideration of this case, I am still convinced that, considered in any such sense as would defeat the operative effect of the deed, there is no evidence to sustain the finding of the jury that C. H. Medlin did not intend to convey the land in question to his children.
To defeat the operative effect of a deed which the grantor has caused to be recorded, it must be shown that the recording was induced by fraud, accident, or mistake, or that it was for some purpose other than to convey title to the named grantee. McCartney v. McCartney, 93 Texas 359, 55 S.W. 310; Koppelmann v. Koppelmann, 94 Texas 40, 57 S.W. 570. No such showing was made in this case. The type of evidence to which the majority refers is relevant on the issue of whether C. H. Medlin caused the deed to his children to be recorded and it was specifically so held in Ford v. Hackel, 124 Texas 402, 77 S.W. 2d 1043, but it was not relevant on the issue of whether C. H. Medlin intended the deed to operate as a conveyance of title to his children.
I am of the opinion that there is evidence, under the rule of Ford v. Hackel, supra, that C. H. Medlin did not cause the deed to his children to be recorded, but that whether he did or did not do so was a fact issue; that the burden was on petitioner to request the submission of an issue inquiring whether C. H. Medlin caused the deed to be recorded, and that having failed to do so *72petitioner waived such ground of recovery. Rule 279, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. I further contend that there is no evidence to support the jury finding that C. H. Medlin did not intend to convey the land to his children, and that judgment for petitioner cannot rightfully be rested on a conclusion that the evidence would support an answer, favorable to petitioner, to an unsub-mitted issue.
If we were at liberty to assume from the jury’s answer to the submitted issue that it would also have answered, on the same evidence, that C. H. Medlin did not cause the deed to be recorded, we could disregard the submitted issue and the jury’s answer thereto as immaterial. But we cannot indulge that assumption. Both issues are ultimate issues. A finding, supported by evidence meeting the test of Ford v. Hackel, supra, that C. H. Medlin did not cause the deed to be recorded would render immaterial any issue of his intention, but a finding that he caused it to be recorded would entitle petitioner to no relief or recovery in the absence of a further finding, supported by a type of evidence not in this record, that he did not intend the deed to operate as a conveyance. The latter possibility demonstrates, I think, that the submitted issue cannot be considered as embracing the issue of whether C. H. Medlin caused the deed to be recorded.
It seems obvious that this case was tried on an erroneous theory and was submitted on an improper issue. I would therefore be inclined to remand the case for retrial, as we did in Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Texas 273, 239 S.W. 2d 792, and Eaton v. R. B. George Investments, 152 Texas 523, 260 S.W. 2d 587, if that course were open to this Court under the Rules. That course is not open to us. This Court may remand the cause to the trial court under Rule 505, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, because it was tried on an erroneous theory, only when it has reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals on some other ground or when error is assigned in this Court to the failure of the Court of Civil Appeals to remand under Rule 434. Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Texas 273, 239 S.W. 2d 792, 798. We are not at liberty to reverse an errorless judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Chevalier v. Lanes. Inc., 147 Texas 106, 213 S.W. 2d 530, 535, 6 A.L.R. 2d 1045; Scott v. Walker, 141 Texas 181, 170 S.W. 2d 718, 722.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed.
*73Associate Justice Walker joins in this dissent.
Opinion delivered February 6, 1957.
Second motion for rehearing overruled, March 27, 1957.