Court Opinion

ID: 9947426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 20:03:18.38271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.765755
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24 P. v. Coulter CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                2d Crim. No. B332417
                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 2006040297)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Ventura County)

 v.

 JACK HENRY COULTER,

      Defendant and Appellant.

             Jack Henry Coulter appeals the order of the trial
court denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 We appointed counsel to represent
appellant on appeal. After an examination of the record, counsel
filed an opening brief raising no issues and requesting that we
follow the procedures set forth in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14
Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Appellant filed his own supplemental
brief, in propria persona. We affirm.

         1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                         Procedural Background
              In 2007, appellant was convicted by guilty plea of the
first degree murder of Jose Pirir (§ 187, subd. (a)), two counts of
attempted second degree robbery (§§ 644/211), and two counts of
assault with a firearm. (§ 245, subd. (a)(2).) At his plea hearing,
appellant admitted that he, “committed the crime of murder in
violation of . . . section 187, a felony, and that you did willfully
and unlawfully with malice aforethought murder Juan Pirir . . . .”
He further admitted that, “during the commission of this first
degree murder [he] personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm, specifically a handgun, within the meaning of . . . section
12022.53(d).” Appellant also admitted that he committed the
attempted robberies and the assaults, and that he personally
used a firearm in committing each offense. Appellant agreed that
the police reports and probation report provided the factual basis
for his plea. He was sentenced to the agreed-upon term of 50
years to life.
              Appellant challenged his guilty plea, contending the
trial court erred when it accepted the police reports and
probation report as the factual basis for the plea because the
probation report had not been prepared at the time of his plea.
We affirmed, holding that, “in accepting a guilty plea, a trial
court, with the express or implied consent of the defendant, may
put the issue of a factual basis for the plea over to the sentencing
hearing.” (People v. Coulter (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1119.)
In summarizing the procedural history of appellant’s case, we
noted, “The probation report states that appellant was arrested
after he shot and killed Juan Pirir during an attempted robbery.”
(Id. at p. 1120.)

                                 2
             In December 2022, appellant filed a section 1172.6
form petition for resentencing. After appointing counsel to
represent appellant and considering briefs submitted by both the
prosecution and the defense, the trial court denied the petition.
It found appellant “is ineligible for relief as a matter of law as the
actual killer based upon findings of conviction.” The trial court’s
written minute order explained, “Due to the absence of
information in the record of conviction establishing someone else
as the actual killer, combined with [appellant’s] admission to
personally and intentionally discharging a firearm that caused
death to the murder victim, and the appellate opinion indicating
the basis of [appellant’s] conviction was as the actual killer, the
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to . . . section 1172.6
is respectfully denied.”
                              Discussion
             Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable
issues in an appeal that is not from the first appeal after
conviction, appellant is not entitled to our independent review of
the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, or
its federal counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 226.) However, he is entitled
to appellate consideration of any contentions raised in his
supplemental brief. (Id. at p. 232.)
             Appellant’s supplemental brief contains no formal
legal argument. He states that he believes he was
“oversentenced [sic] and the first counsel I was appointed back in
2006 did not represent me properly, and convinced me to take a

                                  3
deal which really was no deal at all.” Neither point provides a
basis for resentencing under section 1172.6.2
             To be eligible for resentencing, appellant must
establish that he pled guilty in lieu of a trial at which he could
have been convicted of murder on a now-invalid theory.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2).) But appellant was charged with murder
as the actual killer, not on any theory of imputed malice. At his
plea hearing, appellant, who was the only person charged with
these offenses, expressly admitted that he committed murder by
personally and intentionally discharging a firearm. Because he
was the actual killer, appellant is ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971;
People v. Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1029-1030 [petition
properly denied at prima facie stage where petitioner expressly
admitted at plea hearing to personally shooting and killing two
people].)
                              Disposition
             The order denying appellant’s petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6 is affirmed.

      2  We note that the amended felony complaint filed against
appellant alleged the special circumstance that he committed the
murder while engaged in the commission and attempted
commission of a robbery. Had this allegation been proven true at
trial, appellant would have been eligible for a sentence of death
or life in prison without the possibility of parole. (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(A).) His guilty plea avoided both.

                                 4
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                  YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              5
                    Derek D. Malan, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

            Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

           No appearance by Respondent.