Court Opinion

ID: 9626955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:29:16.7518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:37.406343
License: Public Domain

LUSK, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court declaring Roger Paul Murphy, a minor child, to be “a dependent ward of the Clackamas County Juvenile Court.” The proceeding was commenced by a petition filed by Perry 0. Belmont on December 26, *5161958, with, the Juvenile Department of the Circuit Court for Clackamas County, alleging that Roger Murphy, a minor, is a dependent child in that he is. “without parental care.” On January 15, 1959, the court entered an order declaring the minor to be “a temporary dependent ward of the Clackamas County Juvenile Court,” and ordering that he be “placed under the temporary care, custody and supervision of the Clackamas County Juvenile Counselor pending further investigation and until further order of the court.” On January 21, 1959, Otto E. Black, the appellant, filed a motion for an order vacating the order of January 15, 1959, on the ground that it was entered without any notice or opportunity to be heard by the said Otto E. Black, and deprived him of said child without due process of law. An affidavit in support of the motion, executed by Black, stated in substance that on April 4, 1956, he had married Theda Murphy, the mother of Roger; that prior to their marriage he had covenanted with Theda Murphy to provide for the support of Roger, who was then six years of age, and whose father had died in April, 1953; that on November 5, 1957, the affiant’s wife was killed in an automobile accident, and ever since then as well as before he had faithfully kept his promise to provide for the boy “in the same manner as if said boy were my own flesh and blood.”
No order was ever entered upon this motion, but on January 23, 1959, citation was issued to Royda Cole and Lee Cole, a half-sister and brother-in-law of Roger, and with whom the boy was living at the time, to appear and show cause why he should not be declared a dependent child. On February 4, 1959, a hearing was held at which Otto E. Black and Perry 0. Belmont appeared and were represented by counsel, *517and the State of Oregon was represented by a deputy district attorney for Clackamas County.
In the meantime, Perry 0. Belmont, who was a brother of the minor’s father, had filed a petition to be appointed guardian of the person and estate of Roger, and' Otto E. Black had filed a petition that he be appointed such guardian. Royda Cole joined in the latter petition, and in the alternative asked that if it should be denied she herself be appointed guardian.①
All these matters were considered by the court at the hearing. At its conclusion, the judge rendered an oral opinion in which he stated that he felt that the boy needed the court’s supervision to assure that he was properly cared for, although he did not mean to infer that he had been improperly cared for up to that point. The judge repeated, “I find no fault with the manner in which the child is being cared for at this point,” but he thought that “the youngster this age needs the security and affection of a home in which a close relative is supervising, particularly a youngster who has gone through the traumatic experiences that he has had, the loss of both parents.” The court denied the petitions for appointment of a guardian of the person of the minor, but appointed Mrs. Cole guardian of his estate and directed that until further order of the court the boy should remain in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Cole as agents of the court. As above stated, this appeal is from the order adjudging Roger Paul to be a dependent child. The guardianship matter is not before us.
*518The only appearance in this court is by brief on behalf of Otto E. Black, Royda Cole and the other relatives above referred to. The district attorney of Clackamas County has advised the clerk of this court by letter that his office “has no interest in this matter, and does not intend to file a brief.” Why he has lost his interest does not appear.
In 1956, Otto E. Black married the widowed mother of the minor, Roger Paul Murphy, who was then six years of age. Mrs. Black was killed in an automobile accident in November, 1957, and ever since then Black has acted as the boy’s father. He is a bus driver for the Greyhound Lines and, being unable on account of his occupation to maintain a home for the boy, arranged for him to live in the home of Mrs. Royda Cole, Roger’s married half-sister. Each month, Black receives from the United States government for Roger’s benefit a Social Security payment, the amount of which at first was $73.00, and was later increased to $78.90. Of this, he has been paying $50.00 a month to Mrs. Cole for keeping Roger in her home, and the balance he has expended, according to his testimony, for other necessaries for the boy, such as clothes and medical and dental expenses.
There is no suggestion in the record that Roger has not been properly cared for in a good home. Obviously, the trial judge so determined, for he ordered the boy to be left there. All the testimony on the subject demonstrates the existence of a strong bond of affection between Roger and his stepfather. There was no attempt to show anything to the contrary. Mr. Black spends all the time with Roger that his employment will permit. Mrs. Cole, who is the mother of two children, testified: ■
“He loves Ed and Ed loves him. He has *519accepted Ed as his father júst the same as I accepted my step-dad as my real father. To me it’s very plain to see. I know it isn’t for other people, but Roger loves Ed more than anything and he has the feeling that Ed married Mama because he loved her, but he also married Mama because he loved Roger. He would never have married her if he didn’t want to have Roger, too, because he knew, of course, that Roger was part of the family and he has accepted the fact and Roger has accepted the fact, and Roger loves him very much, and it would hurt him very, very deeply if he should ever have to be taken away from Ed. # * *
There is not only no direct contradiction of this testimony, but there is nothing in the entire record which gives any reason for questioning it.
Mr. Black is 34 years old. He has been a bus driver for Greyhound Lines for 8y2 years. In 1957 his wages were $5,600.00; for 1958, he thought that they would be between $4,800.00 and $5,000.00.
It was brought out in the testimony that Black is a divorced man and has a daughter by his former wife, who has remarried and now lives in Yakima, Washington, and that at the time of the hearing he was apparently delinquent .three months in the payment of support money to his former wife as ordered by the court. It was also shown that he had kept no track of his expenditures of the Social Security money over and above the $50.00 a month which he paid to Mrs. Cole. Further, there was some evidence that he was considering at one time moving to California, but he testified, and we have no reason to disbelieve him, that he had abandoned that idea.
In our judgment, Mr. Black’s delinquencies in not fully complying with the court’s order for the support of his daughter by his former marriage and his *520failure to keep account of Ms expenditures of the Social Security moneys are not, in view of all the evidence, sufficiently grave faults to justify holding that Roger is not receiving parental care. He testified generally that the amounts expended exceeded the receipts. And we need not decide whether the court would be warranted in interfering if it had been established that Black was about to take the boy to another jurisdiction. We should suppose that, unless it appeared that such a move constituted an immediate threat to the boy’s welfare, the statute could not be properly invoked to prevent the exercise of the right of a citizen of this country to move from one place to another. But we pass the question, as we think that the evidence shows that Black intends to remain in this state.
The measure of the court’s authority in this ldnd of a case is to be found in the statute. State v. Young, 180 Or 187, 194, 174 P2d 189. The procedure, and the extent of the court’s jurisdiction, are set forth in ORS 419.102 and 419.502 to 419.522. CMld dependency is defined in ORS 419.102. It includes “persons of either sex under the age of 18 years” who “have not parental care or guardianship.” This is the only part of the statute applicable to this case, because want of “parental care” is the only respect in which the petition of Perry O. Belmont alleges that Roger Paul Murphy is a dependent child. We observe in passing, however, that there is no evidence that he is a dependent child within any other definition of the term contained in the statute. The entire section is set out in the margin.②
*521It is obvious that the legislature did not intend that children without parents or guardians should be declared dependent for that reason alone, for the statute impliedly recognizes that children in the care and custody of others than their parents or guardians are not to be deemed dependent unless the particular conditions set forth are found to exist, as, for example, the case of a child “whose home by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, or depravity on the part of parents, guardians, or other persons in whose care they may be, is an unfit place for such children.” (Italics added.) This court has recognized that within the meaning of this statute “parental care” may be provided by persons who are not parents or guardians, and that children receiving such care are not dependent. State v. Young, supra, 180 Or at 194; In re Schein, 156 Or 661, 665, 69 P2d 293.
 The “parental care” of which the statute speaks is the kind of care to be expected of a good father and mother. Without attempting a comprehensive definition, it may be said that the phrase includes, of course, providing for the material needs of their children in accordance with the family’s station in *522life, seeing to it that they receive at least a minimum of schooling, and, by example and proper measures of discipline, so ordering their lives that they may grow up to become good citizens and useful members of society. Certainly, the statute was not intended to authorize a court to interfere with an established family relationship, in all respects wholesome and beneficial, simply because it might be thought that a child’s welfare would be better served by giving the custody and control of it to some one else. Bryant et al v. Brown, 151 Miss 398, 118 So 184, 60 ALR 1325.
In our opinion, the statute may properly be invoked only in cases where the child needs the protection of the state as parens patriae, and this always with due regard to the constitutional precept thus stated in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 69 LEd 1070, 45 SCt 571, 39 ALR 468:
“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” (268 US at 535.)
In this case, we think that Mr. Black is properly to be regarded as the parent of Roger.
The word “parent”, as used in many statutes, is not construed to include a stepfather or stepmother. In re Bishop, 26 F2d 148, 149; In re Remske, 160 NYSup 715, 716; State ex rel Sheedy v. District Court, 66 Mont 427, 213 P 802, 804; Niosi v. Aiello, 69 A2d 57, 61; Boudreaux v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 78 SW2d 641, 643; Marshall v. Macon Lumber Co., 103 Ga 725, 30 SE 571, 572; State v. Barger, 14 Ohio App 127. As stated by Judge Nordbye in Miller v. United States, 123 P2d 715, 717 (CCA 8th): “A stepfather *523does not merely by * * * such relationship stand in loco parentis to the stepchild. * * * The assumption of the relationship is a question of intention.” Where, however, the relationship has been assumed, the courts have held a step-parent to be a parent within the meaning of the word as used in a policy of insurance (Sov. Gamp W.O.W. v. Cole, 124 Miss 299, 86 So 802; Jones v. Mangan, 151 Wisc 215, 138 NW 618; Golden v. United States, 91 FSup 950); a compensation act (Faber v. Industrial Com., 352 Ill 115, 185 NE 255); a statute providing that a parent may discipline his child (Snowden v. State, 12 Tex App 105); and even a statute defining a crime (Miller v. United States, supra). See, also, Furgeson v. Jones, 17 Or 204, 214, 20 P 842, 11 AmStRep 808, 3 LRA 620.
Closely in point is State ex rel Williams v. Juvenile Court, 163 Minn 312, 204 NW 21, where the question was whether a nine-year-old girl should be adjudged a dependent. There a stepmother had, as the court said, “voluntarily and definitely placed herself in loco parentis” to a child whose father was serving an indeterminate prison sentence in another state. The court found that she had assumed the duties of motherhood as fully with respect to the little girl as to her own children, and that she was trying to keep the family intact pending the father’s return to them. The opinion proceeded:
“It is needless to say that it would be a cruel and inadvisable thing for government to thwart such an endeavor by seizing and making a state ward of this girl, a half-sister to the other children of the family. That is not the intent of the law, and is just the sort of government invasion of the family circle intended to be prevented by the pro*524viso of section 11, c. 397, G. L. 1917 (section 8646, G. S. 1923), which reads as follows:
“ ‘Provided, however, that in no case shall a dependent child he taken from his parents without their consent unless, after diligent effort has been made to avoid such separation, the same shall be found needful in order to prevent serious detriment to the welfare of such child.’
“Without now discussing when or under what circumstances a stepmother may be considered, for any purpose, a parent of her stepchild, we hold, without hesitation, that in this case the stepmother is a parent within the meaning of this proviso. It is a bar to this proceeding, for there is no suggestion that its success is ‘needful in order to prevent serious detriment to the welfare’ of the child.”
The evidence in this case shows that from the time of his marriage to the mother of Roger, Mr. Black has assumed and maintained the relationship of a father to the boy, and that he has been guilty of no misconduct or neglect which would justify a holding that he has forfeited his rights as a father. The benefit to the minor from their mutual affection and companionship is not something lightly to be cast aside. The statute under which this proceeding was brought does not, in the circumstances of this case, authorize the court’s action, and the order appealed from must, therefore, be reversed.

 Several relatives of the minor child on his mother’s side filed pleadings in which they joined in the petition of Otto E. Black to be appointed guardian, and objected to the appointment of Perry Belmont. These parties all filed an acceptance of service of notice of appeal and a joinder in the appeal. Whether they are proper parties here need not be determined.

 419.102. (1) “Child dependency” is defined as follows:
(a) Persons of either sex under the age of 18 years, who for any *521reason are destitute, homeless, or abandoned; or are dependent upon the public for support; or have not parental care or guardianship; or who are found begging or gathering alms; or are found living with any vicious or disreputable persons; or whose home by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, or depravity on the part of parents, guardians, or other persons in whose care they may be is an unfit place for such children; any persons trader 14 years of age who are found peddling or selling any article, except as permitted under special child labor regulations; or persons under 14 years of age who are found playing musical instruments upon the streets to induce the giving of gratuities, or who accompany or are used in aid of adult persons in so doing, shall be classed as dependent children.
(b) Persons of either sex under 18 years of age whose parents or guardians neglect or willfully fail to provide for them; or allow them to have vicious associates, or to visit vicious places; or fail to exercise proper parental discipline and control over them are classed as neglected children.
(2) Courts and other public officers shall labor with the parents or guardians of such children, and if possible induce them to perform their neglected duties. Subsequent to suitable efforts to compel the parents or guardians to rectify said neglect, and in event of the failure of such efforts, neglected children shall be classed as dependents.