Court Opinion

ID: 9541636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:27:18.945368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:14.498764
License: Public Domain

Hennessey, J.
(concurring). I have considered with particular concern the defendant’s argument that the trial judge revealed to the jury partiality in favor of the Commonwealth, as shown by the judge’s questioning of *732witnesses and his charge to the jury.1 I conclude that there is no ground for reversal, but in .my view the question is a close one.
The defendant argues, with some measure of persuasiveness based on this record, that the number and nature of questions addressed by the judge to the witnesses reflected his belief in the credibility of the complaining witness and his disbelief of the defendant’s testimony. The judge need not be mute; he is more than a referee. Justice may require that he ask questions at times. However, the primary principle in jury trials is that he must use this power with restraint. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling.’” Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 470 (1933).
The defendant further argues that the judge also revealed his partiality in his charge to the jury, in the way he marshalled and discussed the evidence in the case. Our decisions have consistently upheld the action of trial judges in putting before the jury possible conclusions warranted by the evidence in language that is comprehensively strong rather than hesitatingly barren or ineffective. Cahalane v. Poust, 333 Mass. 689, 692-693 (1956). We have also said that where, as can be fairly said of the instant case, there are strong reasons for believing that one or some aspects of the case should be emphasized, a charge embodying such emphasis will be sustained even though going to the verge of propriety. See Commonwealth v. McDonald, 264 Mass. 324, 335 (1928). On the other hand, we have also said, in *733holding that a charge was improper, that “[a] careful study of the entire charge constrains us to the belief that the jury must have perceived the attitude, the bent of the mind of the judge, and that in all human probability they entered upon their final deliberations in a state of mind which was biased and interested.” Federal Natl. Bank v. O’Keefe, 267 Mass. 75, 83 (1929). The guiding principle must be even-handedness.
In commenting that this case went to the limit of the judge’s privileges, I appreciate that we are here discussing matters which more often than not require decision by the judge without opportunity for deliberation. I appreciate, too, that the most conscientious judge, one who is not content to leave vital questions unasked and not content to deliver a sterile charge, is perhaps most likely to come close to exceeding his powers in these areas.

 In particular the defendant points to (1) the trial judge’s extensive questioning 'of him as to “flight” the morning following the rape, the answers to said questions being given added emphasis by the judge’s charge; (2) certain of the judge’s statements made during the questioning of other witnesses including the complainant; and (3) the judge’s summarizing of evidence in his charge which the defendant argues tended to be slanted in favor of the Commonwealth.