Court Opinion

ID: 9855097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:26.955526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.128564
License: Public Domain

*298Adams, J.
(concurring). In People v. Hertz Driveurself Stations, Inc. (1953), 338 Mich 139, this Court held that the purpose of PA 1933, No 254, was “to promote safety and conserve the use of highways of the State and, therefore, to supervise, regulate and control the use of such highways by motor carriers of passengers or property for hire upon and over such highways.” (Emphasis by the Court, p 145.) The Court concluded that the title was insufficient to cover a 1945 amendment  to the act that attempted to reach the business of owners of vehicles who were not carriers or transporters of property but who leased their vehicles to third parties over whom the lessors exercised no control whatsoever.
If the present case were one of first impression, in view of the broad sweep of the language of the first clause of the title to Act 254—“An act to promote safety upon and conserve the use of the public highways of the State;”—I would not construe the scope of the title as narrowly as the Court did in People v. Hertz, supra. Since this Court has held that the act confers jurisdiction on the public service commission only as to regulation of vehicles for hire, it must now be held that the act does not confer upon the public service commission any power or authority to carry out or enforce the provisions of PA 1937, No 314, under which the inspector was proceeding in his encounter with defendant.
I cannot agree, however, that the provision in PA 1933, No 254—“The inspectors so appointed by the commission shall have all the powers conferred upon peace officers by the general laws of this state”—is constitutionally infirm so that a public service commission inspector is not, and never was, a “peace officer” as that term has been generally defined. *299This Court noted in People v. Bissonette (1950), 327 Mich 349: “By statute, many officers have been granted certain powers, within the purview of their respective duties, which can be said to be some part of the general powers of a peace officer.” (p 354.) In Bissonette, numerous examples of such restricted powers are given (pp 354, 355). In this case the inspector was endeavoring to enforce the provisions of an act other than PA 1933, No 254, which made him a peace officer and which delineates the scope of his authority to act in such capacity. "While not necessary to our decision here, it would appear to me that the inspector was a peace officer for the purpose of carrying out his duties under PA 1933, No 254, and that the title of that act is adequate— enforcement being a necessary part of the object of the act—to embrace the provisions of the act as to inspectors and as to their powers as peace officers.
I concur in reversal of the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the reasons above given.