Court Opinion

ID: 9399160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 07:09:43.091173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.188335
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00317-CV
                              __________________

        IN RE DAKOTA DIRECTIONAL DRILLING, INC.,
 DAKOTA UTILITY CONTRACTORS, INC., AND DAVID LUKE FOUSE

__________________________________________________________________

                           Original Proceeding
           284th District Court of Montgomery County, Texas
                    Trial Cause No. 20-01-00732-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      An order was issued on December 23, 2021, dismissing Trial Cause Number

20-01-00732-CV. Almost five months later, on May 20, 2022, the trial court

declared that the dismissal order was ineffective and that the case remained pending

as an active case on the court’s docket. Three of the trial court defendants sought

mandamus relief in this Court. They argue the December 2021 order is a final order

for the purposes of determining when the trial court’s plenary power expired and

that the May 2022 order is void. The trial court plaintiffs argue the December order

was interlocutory and that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this proceeding because

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the mandamus petition is a collateral attack lodged against a valid order the trial

court issued in May 2022. We conclude we possess mandamus jurisdiction over this

proceeding, that the December 2021 order finally disposed of the entire case, that

the trial court possessed the jurisdictional power to issue the December 2021 order

and caused the order to issue, that the trial court’s plenary power over the case

expired before the trial court issued the May 2022 order, and that the May 2022 order

is void. Accordingly, we conditionally grant mandamus relief.

                                     Background

      In January 2020, Kevin Josey and Kimberly Josey (“Josey”) filed a personal

injury suit against David Luke Fouse (“Fouse”), Dakota Directional Drilling, Inc.,

Dakota Underground Contractors, Inc., and Dakota Utility Contractors (“the Dakota

Defendants”) for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Josey

alleged that Fouse, while operating a motor vehicle owned by one or more of the

other defendants and in the scope of his employment with one or more of the other

defendants, failed to control the vehicle and crashed into the rear of the vehicle

driven by Kevin Josey. The Dakota Defendants filed answers. In September 2020,

the trial court signed a docket control order (“DCO”) that set a July 6, 2021 trial date

and required a joint notice filing, as follows:

      JOINT NOTICE FILING:                  14 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL
      All parties will file a SINGLE Joint Notice with the Court, answering:
            (1) Are you ready for trial?
            (2) What is the estimated length of time for trial?
                                           2
              (3) Do you need a Pre-Trial conference and, if so, why?
              – The Court will take up pre-trial motions in the hour prior to
      trial. You should request a Pre-Trial conference only if you need more
      time than that.
              (4) Are there any pending motions? If so, what are they and when
      were they filed?
              (5) Are there any special needs or accommodations for the
      presentation of the case, including any issues related to the availability
      of counsel and witnesses?

      If there is a disagreement among the parties as to any of these five items,
      the Joint Notice will state the positions of each of the parties.

      ANY PARTY WHO FAILS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
      DRAFTING PROCESS WILL BE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS,
      INCLUDING DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION
      AND A FINDING OF ABANDONMENT OF CLAIMS OR
      DEFENSES PURSUANT TO TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL
      PROCEDURE 165 AND 165a.
      – If any party does not participate with the Joint Notice, the party or
      parties filing the Joint Notice shall identify who did not participate.

      IF A JOINT NOTICE IS NOT TIMELY FILED, THE COURT
      WILL PRESUME THAT THE PARTIES HAVE NO FURTHER
      INTEREST IN PURSUING OR DEFENDING THIS MATTER
      AND THE COURT WILL DISPOSE OF THIS SUIT BY
      DISMISSAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION AND A FINDING
      OF ABANDONMENT OF CLAIMS OR DEFENSES PURSUANT
      TO TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 165 AND 165a.

      In April 2021, Josey filed a motion for continuance. The trial court granted

the motion for continuance in a written order and signed a new docket control order

with a January 3, 2022 trial date and a joint notice filing due 14 days before trial.

The court coordinator notified counsel by email that the trial court had granted the

motion for continuance and issued a new docket control order.

                                          3
      In October 2021, Dakota Directional Drilling, Inc. and Dakota Utility

Contractors, Inc. filed a motion for continuance and requested a new docket control

order. The trial court granted the motion for continuance in a written order. On

October 22, 2021, the trial court issued a new docket control order that set a May 2,

2022 trial date and required a joint notice filing 14 days before trial. The District

Clerk notified Fouse that the trial court had signed the orders but the mandamus

record does not show that the other parties were notified that the trial court had

signed an order granting a continuance and issued a new docket control order. The

Dakota Defendants submitted their pre-trial filings on December 21, 2021.

      On December 23, 2021, the trial court signed an Order of Dismissal of Failure

to File Joint Notice, as follows:

            On the 23rd day of December, 2021 came on the Court’s pre-trial
      review of the above-styled and numbered case. After being duly
      ordered under the Court’s Docket Control Order, the Parties failed to
      timely file the required Joint Notice Filing. The Court has previously
      noticed the Parties that failure to file the Joint Notice Filing may result
      in dismissal without further notice to the Parties.

             The Court, having considered the failure of the Parties to timely
      file the Joint Notice Filing and how heavily the Court relies upon the
      Joint Notice Filing in setting its dockets and trying its cases, finds that
      this case should be dismissed for want of prosecution.

            IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
      DECREED that the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed and
      same is hereby removed from the docket of this Court.

            The Parties are hereby notified that upon filing a Motion to
      Reinstate the Movant must contact the Court via email to
                                          4
      amber.park@mctx.org to advise that such Motion has been filed. Any
      such Motion must be set on the Court’s Submission Docket. The
      Movant is responsible for setting with the Court, filing and serving the
      Notice of Submission of the Motion to Reinstate.

      The parties’ lawyers received copies of the dismissal order. On December 28,

2021, Josey’s lawyer sent an email to a court employee, as follows:

             We received the Order of Dismissal for Failure to file Joint
      Notice from your office. However, the new docket control order which
      was signed on October 22, 2021 by Judge Bays shows the Joint Notice
      is not due until April 18, 2022. I have attached a copy of the new docket
      control order for reference. Please correct this matter and notify all
      parties that this case will remain on the Court’s Docket.

      In April 2022, Josey filed another motion for continuance. In response,

Dakota Directional Drilling, Inc. and Dakota Utility Contractors, Inc. argued that the

trial court’s plenary power over the case expired in January 2022, and the trial court

lacked the authority to reinstate the case. The trial court held a hearing in which the

attorneys discussed documents in the court’s file but no testimony or other evidence

was offered or admitted. The trial court explained:

             The date that we had on the calendar for you that was continued
      did not come off of our calendar, our trial calendar, which then
      prompted the – our court’s administrator to look to see about whether
      joint notices had been filed 14 days before the first day of the two-week
      docket. Y’all had not filed one for the December dock- -- or I guess it
      was, like, January 2nd or something. But anyway, whenever y’all’s
      original trial setting was, y’all hadn’t filed one. Well, no surprise
      because your trial had been continued, but she didn’t know that. So she
      sent out a DWOP notice, or let me be precise. She sent out a dismissal,
      and your case was actually dismissed back on December 23rd of 2021.

                                          5
             The reason that matters is because I’m – I’m flush out of plenary
      jurisdiction, and I can’t do a thing to revive this case.

      At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court noted that it was too late to

correct the dismissal and Josey would have to re-file the lawsuit. Three days later

Josey filed a Motion to Reconvene Status Conference. In the motion Josey asked the

trial court to retain the case on the docket. In response, Dakota Directional Drilling,

Inc. and Dakota Utility Contractors, Inc. argued the trial court had lost plenary power

and no longer possessed the authority to reinstate the case.

      On May 6, 2022, Josey filed a motion to declare the dismissal order

ineffective. In this motion Josey asserted that on December 28, 2021, their counsel

emailed a court employee in a communication they argued should be considered as

a motion to reinstate the case. They argued the dismissal order as interlocutory

because it was not signed after a formal presentation of evidence, did not state that

“all relief not granted is denied”, the new docket control order had removed the

technical administrative requirements, and the defendants had outstanding claims for

costs. They argued the trial court erroneously dismissed the case in its year-end

DWOP docket because a superseding docket control order did not require action

before the dismissal date.

      The Dakota Defendants responded to Josey’s motion by arguing that the

dismissal order on its face disposed of the case and required the filing of a motion to

reinstate within 30 days to extend the trial court’s plenary power beyond 30 days
                                          6
from the dismissal date. They asserted that the motion for a continuance had not

been granted and on December 20, 2021, they submitted their pre-trial filings.

      On May 19, 2022, Josey filed a motion to reinstate the case. In this motion

Josey asserted that four days after the trial court signed the order and immediately

upon receiving notice that the order had been signed, their counsel submitted an

email that informed the trial court through a person designated to receive

communications that the order had been entered in error because the effective docket

control order did not require a joint notice filing on December 21, 2021. The

following day they filed a reply to the Dakota Defendants’ response. In that reply

Josey accused the Dakota Defendants of trying to mislead the court by making a

facially false statement that the order granting the motion for continuance and the

docket control order had not issued.

      On May 20, 2022, the trial court signed an order declaring the dismissal order

ineffective, as follows:

        The Court has considered Plaintiffs’ Motion to Declare Dismissal
      Order Ineffective and to Declare Continuing Pendency of Cause. After
      considering the motion before the Court, it is the opinion of the Court
      that the Motion should be granted. IT IS THEREFORE
             DECLARED, that the dismissal order signed on December 23,
      2021 was signed in error as the result of a clerical/ministerial error of
      the court, and it is therefore ORDERED to be INEFFECTIVE. THE
      COURT FURTHER
             FINDS that the Docket Control Order signed on April 14, 2021
      was superseded by the Docket Control Order signed on October 22,
      2021, with the superseding order therefore being the controlling Docket
      Control Order on December 23, 2021, at the time the dismissal order
                                         7
      was signed. The October 22, 2021, Docket Control Order, on December
      23, 2021, had no requirement for the filing of a Joint Notice Filing until
      April 18, 2022. That deadline was in fact met by Plaintiffs on April 18,
      2022.
      The Court therefore DECLARES this case to remain pending in the
      Court, and an active case on the Court’s docket.

      After declaring the dismissal order to have been ineffective, the trial court

denied the motion for summary judgment of Dakota Underground Contractors, Inc.

The trial court set the case for trial then reset the trial date to November 28, 2022.

Fouse filed his original answer on September 16, 2022. On September 28, 2022, the

four defendants filed a joint plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court stayed the trial

until this mandamus proceeding concludes.

                                  Standard of Review

      To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court

abused its discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential

Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). “Mandamus is

proper if a trial court issues an order beyond its jurisdiction.” In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,

35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding). A relator has no adequate

remedy at law when the trial court sets aside a judgment after its plenary power

expired. In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).

                        Is the Dismissal Order Interlocutory?

      Josey argues the December 2021 dismissal order was an explicitly

interlocutory order properly set aside by the judge’s May 2022 clarifying order. They
                                            8
argue the interlocutory nature of the trial court’s dismissal order is revealed by

examining the Dakota Defendants’ pleadings and a motion for summary judgment.

The original answer filed by Dakota Directional Drilling, Inc. and Dakota Utility

Contractors, Inc., invoked their right to a reduction of any dollar verdict which might

be rendered in the cause by credit for payments made by other persons or entities,

and their amended answer on file in December 2021 pleaded their entitlement to a

dollar-for-dollar offset as an affirmative defense and asked that they be awarded

costs. Dakota Underground Contractors, Inc. asked the trial court to render a take-

nothing judgment and assess costs against the plaintiffs in its original answer, and it

filed a motion for no-evidence summary judgment. On November 20, 2020, the trial

court set the motion for summary judgment for submission on January 22, 2021.

      Josey argues Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa supports their position that the

dismissal order was interlocutory. See 299 S.W.3d 92, 94-97 (Tex. 2009). In

Unifund, the defendant debtor filed a motion to impose sanctions on the plaintiff

creditor under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code for its failure to

make reasonable inquiry after it had knowledge of the debtor’s bankruptcy

discharge. Id. at 94. The creditor nonsuited its claims against the debtor. The trial

court signed an “ORDER OF DISMISSAL” that stated, “the above styled and

numbered cause be and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.” Several months later

the trial court signed “ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS AND FINAL

                                          9
JUDGMENT” that specified it was a final order intended by the court and the parties

to be final and appealable. Id. at 96-97. On direct appeal, the creditor argued the

sanctions order had been signed after the trial court’s plenary power expired. Id. at

95. Noting that the dismissal order did not mention the debtor’s pending motion for

sanctions, the Supreme Court rejected the creditor’s argument that the sanctions

order was void. Id. at 97.

      Here, the trial court did not find that its December 2022 order had been

interlocutory. The trial court found the order was ineffective because the order was

signed in error as the result of a clerical or ministerial error of the court. A judgment

is final if “it actually disposes of every pending claim and party” or “it clearly and

unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Lehmann

v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205 (Tex. 2001). The plain language of the

December 2021 order stated, “the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed

and same is hereby removed from the docket of this Court.” This language, which

followed a finding that the parties had failed to file a joint notice, clearly and

unequivocally dismissed the entire case, not just Josey’s claims against Dakota

Directional Drilling and Dakota Utility Contractors. In its order, the trial court also

instructed the parties regarding the action required for the trial court to reinstate the

case. The order may lack a basis in law, but “[e]rror is not the same as ambiguity.”

                                           10
In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding). We conclude

the dismissal order operated as a final judgment.

                           Is the Dismissal Order Void?

      Josey argues the December 2021 dismissal order is void because “no

procedural requirements upon which to ground a valid judicial act occurred.” They

claim the order is invalid because “it issued from pure fabrication and dropped out

of the sky without any judicial action by the trial court.” They argue the trial court

did not reinstate the case in May 2022, but issued a clarifying order because it

“recognized that without any further clarifying order, the order of December 23,

2021, might be construed by the parties to be something other than a random,

arbitrary, and capricious computer-generated document[.]”

      A judgment is void only when the court rendering judgment had no

jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to

enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d

362, 363 (Tex. 1985). All errors other than jurisdictional deficiencies render the

judgment merely voidable. Id. If the court had the authority to adjudicate a case, and

the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, and the court did

not act outside its capacity as a court, the judgment is not void. Reiss v. Reiss, 118

S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2003). A dismissal for want of prosecution, even one that

was erroneously dismissed with prejudice, is merely voidable. El Paso Pipe and

                                         11
Supply Co. v. Mountain States Leasing, Inc., 617 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. 1981). A

challenge to such a judgment must be timely made by direct attack, such as an appeal

or a bill of review. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 271 (Tex. 2012).

      The trial court ruled that the December 2021 order was ineffective because it

was based on an erroneous premise that the parties had failed to timely meet their

Joint Notice Filing requirement. “But only errors made in entering a judgment are

clerical; an error in rendition is judicial.” In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 249 (Tex.

2010) (original proceeding). “[E]rrors in rendered and entered judgments are not

clerical merely because they are based upon or grow out of clerical errors.” Finlay

v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968) (original proceeding). For instance, when

an attorney mistakenly inserts finality language in an order granting a motion for

partial summary judgment, the mistakenly inserted provision becomes a part of the

court’s judgment and therefore is a judicial error. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 829.

      In the May 2022 order, the trial court declared that the December 2021

dismissal order “was signed in error as the result of a clerical/ministerial error of the

court[.]” The trial court found that the April 2021 docket control order had been

superseded by the October 2021 docket control order, which set a new deadline for

the Joint Notice Filing. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, which are

supported by the record, but we review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusions.

In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S.W.3d 80, 86 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). “A trial

                                           12
court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the

facts.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

Whether a trial court pronounced judgment and the terms of that pronouncement are

questions of fact but whether an error in a judgment is clerical or judicial is a

question of law. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986). Whether

errors in a judgment are judicial or clerical is a question of law. Finlay, 435 S.W.2d

at 138.

      A judgment may be rendered orally or in writing. Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d

289, 291 (Tex. 1953), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285

S.W.2d 184, 264 (Tex. 1955). In Knox, the District Clerk prepared memoranda of

dismissal on the docket sheets for 182 cases. Knox, 257 S.W.2d at 292. The trial

court signed the docket sheets over the course of several days, then asked the clerk

if any of the cases were still active and should not be dismissed. Id. The clerk

identified two cases, including the Knox case, which were removed from the stack

and laid aside not to be dismissed before the trial court delivered the stack to the

clerk. Id. The trial court signed a blanket order dismissing for want of prosecution a

list of 181 cases that were identified by trial court cause number and the names of

the parties. Id. at 291. The District Clerk mistakenly included the Knox case on the

list of cases on the blanket order of dismissal. Id. The Supreme Court held that the

signed instrument was a memorial of what had occurred with the docket sheets and

                                         13
the inclusion of the Knox case was a clerical error in the entry of judgment and not

a judicial error in the rendition of judgment. Id. at 293. The Court reasoned that

      when the judge satisfied himself that there was no further reason for
      withholding judgment in the 180 cases and delivered the signed written
      memoranda of dismissal in such cases to the clerk for such further
      clerical action as was necessary to the recordation thereof he had
      rendered judgment in such cases just as effectively as if he had made
      an oral pronouncement of dismissal in each case separately in open
      court. On the other hand, when the judge pulled the docket sheets of
      cases out of the stack and laid them aside ‘not to be dismissed’ before
      the stack was delivered to the clerk, he terminated the possibility that
      the delivery of the sheets in those two cases would constitute the
      rendition of judgment therein just as effectively as if he had run a line
      through the entries on such sheets.

Id. at 292-93.

      In Universal Underwriters Insurance Company v. Ferguson, the trial court

dismissed a list of cases for want of prosecution, including Stedman’s lawsuit against

Universal Underwriters. See 471 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. 1971) (orig. proceeding).

More than thirty days after the trial court dismissed Stedman’s case, the trial court

signed an order purporting to reinstate the case on the court’s docket because the

trial court clerk had mistakenly mailed the dismissal docket notice to the defendant’s

lawyer and failed to mail a copy to the plaintiff’s lawyer. Id. The Supreme Court

conditionally granted mandamus relief. Id. at 31. Distinguishing Knox, the Court

noted that Stedman’s case had been included in the judgment rendered. Id. at 30.

Although the trial court would not have dismissed the case if it had known the true

                                         14
facts, dismissing the case was a judicial act that was not subject to correction after

the thirty day period specified in Rule 329b expired. Id. at 30.

      This case is distinguishable from Knox for the same reason that case was

distinguished in Universal Underwriters. In Knox, the trial court determined as a

factual matter that he has not rendered judgment dismissing the Knox case for want

of prosecution. See 257 S.W.2d at 291. Here, the trial court found it did dismiss the

case, but that it did so under a mistaken belief that the parties had missed the deadline

for their Joint Notice Filing. That mistaken belief did not deprive the trial court of

the authority to adjudicate the case, to exercise jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter, or to act as a court.

      Josey also argues the judgment is void because the court acted in a manner

inconsistent with due process. The trial court possessed inherent authority to dismiss

the case. Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.

1999). Post-dismissal procedure may provide an adequate means of attacking an

erroneous dismissal for want of prosecution. See Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134

S.W.3d 845, 852 (Tex. 2004). Josey received notice that the dismissal order had been

signed and had an opportunity to file a motion to reinstate, a direct appeal, a

restricted appeal, or a bill of review. We conclude Josey failed to establish that the

December 2021 order is void on due process grounds.

                                           15
               Did the Trial Court Act After Plenary Power Expired?

      Relators argue the trial court lost its plenary power in January 2022, and its

subsequent orders, including the May 2022 order, are void. We agree. The trial court

had jurisdictional power over the case on the date the trial court signed the December

2021 dismissal order. Consequently, whether the order was void or voidable, in May

2022 a bill of review was the exclusive remedy through which the trial court could

grant relief. See Middleton v. Murff, 689 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1985) (op. on reh’g).

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by signing the May 2022 order

because on that date its plenary power over the case had already expired.

                                      Conclusion

      We conclude the trial court clearly abused its discretion by declaring the

dismissal order void after its plenary power expired and Relators lack an adequate

remedy at law. See Daredia, 317 S.W.3d at 250. We are confident that the trial court

will vacate its orders signed after January 24, 2022, including the May 20, 2022

order declaring the order of dismissal ineffective. The writ shall issue only if the trial

court fails to comply.

      PETITION CONDITIONALLY GRANTED.

                                                              PER CURIAM

Submitted on May 31, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 1, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
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