Court Opinion

ID: 9406515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 20:13:54.135214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:30.997161
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 61

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2022AP652

COMPLETE TITLE:        In re the termination of parental rights to
                       A.G., a person under the age of 18:

                       State of Wisconsin,
                                 Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       A. G.,
                                 Respondent-Appellant.

                          REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                          Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 511,979 N.W.2d 822
                                     (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         June 30, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         January 17, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Milwaukee
   JUDGE:              Ellen R. Brostrom

JUSTICES:
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court,
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J.,
joined.   DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

ATTORNEYS:

       For the petitioner-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by John T. Chisolm, district attorney, and Katie Gutowski,
assistant district attorney. There was an oral argument by Katie
Gutowski, assistant district attorney.
    For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public defender. There was
an oral argument by Christopher D. Sobic, assistant state public
defender.

    Guardian       ad   litem   briefs         were   filed   by   Courtney    L.A.
Roelandts    and    The     Legal    Aid       Society   of    Milwaukee,     Inc.,
Milwaukee.    There       was   an   oral       argument      by   Courtney   L.A.
Roelandts.

                                           2
                                                                        2023 WI 61
                                                                NOTICE
                                                  This opinion is subject to further
                                                  editing and modification.   The final
                                                  version will appear in the bound
                                                  volume of the official reports.
No.    2022AP652
(L.C. No.   2021CV1469)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                            :              IN SUPREME COURT

In re the termination of parental rights to
A.G., a person under the age of 18:

                                                                     FILED
State of Wisconsin,
                                                                JUN 30, 2023
            Petitioner-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                 Samuel A. Christensen
      v.                                                        Clerk of Supreme Court

A. G.,

            Respondent-Appellant.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court,
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., joined.
HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAROFSKY, J.,
joined.   DALLET, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY, J., joined.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                Reversed.

      ¶1    REBECCA       GRASSL   BRADLEY,   J.       The     State      filed      a

petition to terminate the parental rights of A.G. under Wis.

Stat. § 48.415 (2019–20), alleging A.G.'s biological daughter
remained a child in continuing need of protection or services
                                                                      No.      2022AP652

(continuing       CHIPS)    and      A.G.'s      failure    to     assume      parental

responsibility for his daughter.                  This appeal concerns whether

A.G. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest

to   one   of   those    two   grounds      in    the   termination       of   parental

rights (TPR) petition.            A.G. argues he did not understand the

circuit court at disposition would have to decide whether to

terminate his parental rights.1                  He further argues the circuit

court erroneously indicated the State would have to prove at

disposition that "termination was in . . . [the child]'s best

interest" by "clear and convincing" evidence.                      The State, A.G.

claims, has no such burden; therefore, A.G. asserts he pled no

contest under the belief that his odds of a favorable outcome

were higher than they legally should have been.

      ¶2    The     circuit       court    denied       A.G.'s     plea     withdrawal

motion.     The    court     of   appeals       reversed   that    decision      in   an

unpublished       opinion      and    ordered       the    cause    remanded       with

directions to allow A.G. to withdraw his plea.                       State v. A.G.

(A.G. II), No. 2022AP652, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App.
July 12, 2022).         The State and the guardian ad litem (GAL) each

filed a petition for review.              We granted both petitions.

      ¶3    We hold A.G. knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

pled no contest.           During the plea colloquy, the circuit court

told A.G., "[t]he second half of the case is where the [c]ourt

      1The Honorable Mark A. Sanders presided over the initial
appearance in the case, but the Honorable Ellen R. Brostrom
presided over the plea colloquy and was the judge who denied
A.G.'s plea withdrawal motion.      Both judges serve on the
Milwaukee County Circuit Court.

                                            2
                                                                No.     2022AP652

decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact terminate

your parental rights."          At the initial appearance ten months

before the colloquy, the court had already informed A.G. of

potential dispositional outcomes:

       One thing I could decide is that termination of
       parental rights can [sic] best for the kids that are
       involved.   If I make that decision, that ends all
       legal relationship between that parent and that child.
       As far as the law is concerned, that parent and that
       child become complete strangers to each other.      But
       that's not the only potential outcome.       There are
       other   potential    outcomes   that   don't    involve
       termination of parental rights.
Assuming the colloquy was defective, A.G. had previously been

notified that at disposition the court may or may not terminate

his    parental    rights.      Additionally,     the   court     conducted     a

contested dispositional hearing the day after the colloquy, and

A.G.'s    testimony     shows   he   sought    reunification      rather      than

termination of his parental rights.              After the court held an

evidentiary hearing on A.G.'s plea withdrawal motion, the court

found    A.G.     had   demonstrated   an     understanding     of    potential

dispositions through his testimony at the dispositional hearing.
That finding is not clearly erroneous and must be accepted.

Other parts of the record confirm the validity of A.G.'s plea.

Consequently, we must reject A.G.'s first argument under the

applicable standard of review.         See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100,

¶19,     293    Wis. 2d 594,     716   N.W.2d 906       (citing       State     v.

Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶16, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891).

                                       3
                                                                            No.      2022AP652

       ¶4        Regarding    A.G.'s      second       argument,    he    is    correct     to

note that Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) (2021–22)2 does not place a

burden      of    proof     on     the    State;       however,     the    circuit      court

actually held the State to the clear and convincing standard at

disposition and reiterated at multiple points that the State

satisfied this standard.                  Accordingly, the court did exactly

what A.G. claims the court told him it would do.                                    Placing a

burden on the State benefitted A.G. and did not affect A.G.'s

ability to weigh the pros and cons of entering this particular

no contest plea.             If A.G. thought a favorable outcome was more

likely because the State had to meet a clear and convincing

standard, the State actually did meet that standard.                                The court

of    appeals      erred     in    permitting         A.G.   to    withdraw       his   plea;

therefore, we reverse its decision.

                                     I.       BACKGROUND

       ¶5        The State's TPR petition sought to sever the parent-

child relationship between A.G. and his daughter.                               Toward the

top   of    the     first    page,       in   bold     lettering,    the    TPR      petition
states:      "Petition for Termination of Parental Rights[.]"                              The

TPR petition continues, "[t]he petitioner seeks termination of

parental         rights    of . . . [A.G.]"              Toward     the    end,      the   TPR

petition reads, "[b]ased on the foregoing, . . . [A.G.] is not

fit to be a parent to the above-named child.                        Upon consideration

of    the   entire        record    in    this       case,   termination       of    parental

       Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to
       2

the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021–22 version.

                                                 4
                                                                       No.     2022AP652

rights is warranted. . . .           The best interest of the child will

be   served     by     termination    of       the   parental      rights      of    the

parent[.]"

     ¶6       For context, the State alleged, among other things,

that A.G. and the child's mother were addicted to heroin and the

child "tested positive for drugs" at birth.                          After spending

approximately one month in the neonatal intensive care unit of

the hospital where she was born, A.G.'s daughter was removed

from her parents, both of whom later pled no contest to the

allegations in the State's petition alleging their daughter was

a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS).                      Filed eight

months after the circuit court entered its CHIPS order, the

State's TPR petition alleged the child's parents failed to meet

the conditions ordered by the circuit court for the return of

their daughter.        Among other contentions, the State claimed A.G.

did not seek treatment and "no call[ed], no show[ed]" multiple

drug screenings.         Based on the allegations, the State claimed

two independent grounds for TPR:

             continuing CHIPS; and

             failure to assume parental responsibility.
See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2), (6) (2019–20).                A.G. was represented

by counsel at the hearings discussed below.

     ¶7       At an adjourned initial appearance, the circuit court

explained     the    nature     of   TPR   proceedings        in     detail.        Most

relevantly,      the    court    informed       A.G.   that     if    grounds       were
established, the court would proceed to the disposition phase.

                                           5
                                                            No.   2022AP652

The court explained it would hold a "contested dispositional

hearing" at which:

    [W]hat we focus on is not whether there's a reason
    anymore, but what's [sic] we focus on instead is
    what's best for the kids that are involved in the
    case.   Not what's best for anybody else.  Not what's
    best for any of the lawyers or social workers.    Not
    what's best for the foster parents.   Not what's best
    for parents, but what's best for the kids that are
    involved in the case.

    . . . .

    If I make that unfitness finding, then we go on to the
    second part of the proceedings. That's that contested
    dispositional hearing. There we focus on what is best
    for the kids that are involved. So everybody gets to
    put on testimony and evidence and argue to me what
    they think is best for the kids that are involved.
    The State puts on testimony and evidence and tells me
    what they think is best.    The . . . [GAL] can put on
    testimony and evidence and tell me what she thinks is
    best. Parents can do exactly the same thing. Parents
    have the right to put on testimony and evidence and to
    subpoena witnesses and to testify or remain silent
    themselves.   Parents also have the right to confront
    any witness that testifies on behalf of any other
    party.   Parents have the right to argue to me what
    they think is best for the kids that are involved.

    . . . . I then decide what outcome is best for the
    kids that are involved.   One thing I could decide is
    that termination of parental rights can [sic] best for
    the kids that are involved. If I make that decision,
    that ends all legal relationship between that parent
    and that child. As far as the law is concerned, that
    parent and that child become complete strangers to
    each other.      But that's not the only potential
    outcome.    There are other potential outcomes that
    don't involve termination of parental rights.
At multiple points during this appearance, the court paused to

inquire   whether   A.G.   understood   the   court's   explanation,   and
A.G. responded he did.

                                   6
                                                                    No.     2022AP652

    ¶8    At   a     later   hearing,        A.G.   pled   no    contest     to   the

continuing   CHIPS    ground,      and   the    failure     to   assume     parental

responsibility ground was dismissed.                During the plea colloquy

between A.G. and the circuit court, A.G. stated he was 26 years

old, had an 11th-grade education, could read and write English,

and had no mental illness or cognitive issues that would limit

his ability to understand the colloquy.                  A.G. denied taking any

drugs (other than a prescribed medication that did not "alter[]"

his mind) or drinking alcohol within the preceding 12 hours.                      He

also confirmed he read the TPR petition, understood the State's

allegations,   and     was   not    promised        or   paid    anything    as    an

inducement to plea.

    ¶9    The part of the plea colloquy giving rise to appellate

proceedings went as follows:

    Q. You understand that you do have the right to have a
       trial for this first half of the case, whether or
       not there is a legal reason to terminate your
       parental rights?

    A. I do.

    Q. And that could be a trial to the judge or a trial
       to a jury. Do you understand that?

    A. I do.

    Q. If it were a jury it would be a 12 person jury and
       10 out of 12 would have to agree in order to reach
       a decision. Do you understand that?

    A. I do understand.

    Q. And at that trial you would have a whole bunch of
       rights and I'm just going to list them. You would
       have the right to force the State to prove the

                                         7
                                                                  No.     2022AP652

          grounds by clear, convincing, and                 satisfactory
          evidence to a reasonable certainty.

          You would have the right to cross-examination of
          your witnesses; the right to introduce evidence;
          the right to compel witnesses to come to court and
          testify for you; the right to testify yourself or
          remain silent, knowing, though, that silence be
          [sic] used against you in this kind of case.    Do
          you understand you would have all of these trial
          rights?

    A. I do.

    Q. And do you understand that by pleading no contest
       you're giving those rights up?

    A. I do.

    Q. Now, you understand that's just the first half of
       the case? The second half of the case is where the
       [c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest
       to in fact terminate your parental rights. Do you
       understand that distinction?

    A. I understand.

    Q. You understand you're not giving up your right to
       fight about that second half, which is what we're
       going to do today. Do you understand that?

    A. Yes, I do.

    Q. You'll have all those same trial rights today for
       that second half. Do you understand that?

    A. Yes.
    ¶10    A.G.'s   arguments    arise      from    portions     of     this    plea

colloquy he considers defective.             In particular, the circuit

court   stated,   "[t]he    second   half   of     this   case   is     where    the

[c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact

terminate your parental rights."             The court asked, "[d]o you
understand that[?]"        A.G. responded "[y]es," but he now asserts

                                      8
                                                                          No.   2022AP652

"the court did not inform him of the potential dispositions he

faced if he entered a no contest plea."                 Specifically, he claims

the   court       did    not   make   clear     that   it    had    two    options      at

disposition:        grant the TPR petition or dismiss it.                   His second

argument stems from the court explaining that during the grounds

phase, A.G. "would have the right to force the State to prove

the grounds by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence to a

reasonable certainty."             The court later stated, "[y]ou'll have

all those same trial rights today for that second half."                              A.G.

argues the later statement implied the State would have a burden

of proof that termination of his parental rights would be in the

child's best interest at the disposition phase because that was

one   of    the     "trial     rights"    identified    by    the    court      for   the

grounds phase.

      ¶11     The       circuit   court   proceeded     to   ask    other       standard

questions, confirming A.G. had spoken with his counsel about the

plea.      The court then asked if A.G. had any questions, to which

A.G. responded, "[n]o, I do not."                  A.G. also said he did not
need more time to think about his decision, and he and his

counsel both stated that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent.            After this lengthy colloquy, the court accepted

A.G.'s no contest plea.

      ¶12     The next day, at disposition, A.G. testified in favor

of reunification and continuation of the CHIPS case rather than

termination.            Specifically, he testified, "[m]y goal in this

case is to get myself better and have my daughter returned to
the household."
                                            9
                                                                                     No.     2022AP652

       ¶13     The circuit court concluded that termination of A.G.'s

parental rights was in the child's best interest.                                      Twice, the

court    referred       to        the   clear     and       convincing          standard.               In

summarizing the testimony of the family case manager, the court

characterized the testimony as "clear, convincing, satisfactory

evidence to a reasonable certainty."                          Moments later, the court

reiterated "[t]hat's clear, convincing, satisfactory evidence to

a reasonable degree of certainty more or less.                                     I don't think

there's case law that assigns a particular percentage to that

standard,      and     I'm    not       either."        Continuing,            the     court          said

"[the]       testimony        was       excellent. . . .                 [The       family            case

manager]'s incredibly honest, and incredibly insightful."                                               At

some    points,       the    court       used    language         indicative          of     a    lower

standard,      e.g.,        "in    balance,       I    do    have       to    find         that       this

termination is in the best interest of . . . [the child]."

       ¶14     Post    disposition,             A.G.    filed       a        motion        for        plea

withdrawal,       which       the       circuit       court       denied        without          taking

evidence.       The court reasoned A.G. did not identify a defect in
the     plea    colloquy          and    therefore          was     not       entitled           to     an

evidentiary hearing.               To the extent the colloquy did not convey

potential       dispositions,            the      court       determined             the     lengthy

discussion of potential dispositions at the adjourned initial

appearance satisfied any requirement.                             Additionally, the court

noted it "actually did use a clear and convincing standard when

it    assessed    whether          it    thought       it   was     in       the   child's            best

interest to terminate the parental rights."

                                                10
                                                                               No.     2022AP652

      ¶15    A.G.       appealed.          The    court     of    appeals      reversed       the

circuit court's decision and ordered the cause remanded with

directions        to    hold     an    evidentiary        hearing.        State      v.     A.G.,

No. 2021AP1476, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15,

2022).       The       court     of    appeals        concluded    that    "A.G.      was     not

advised of the potential dispositions at the plea hearing" and

had "alleged he did not understand the potential dispositions,"

so he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.                             Id., ¶12.           The

court did not reconcile its conclusion with the circuit court's

statement during the plea colloquy that "[t]he second half of

this case is where the [c]ourt decides is it in the child's best

interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."                                 The court

of   appeals      also     concluded        the       circuit    court    needed      to     take

evidence     regarding         A.G.'s       second       argument.        Id.,       ¶16.      It

concluded the circuit court erred in suggesting A.G. would "have

all those same trial rights today for that second half" because

"[t]here     is    not     a    burden      of    proof    placed    on     the      State"    at

disposition.            Id., ¶17 (citing Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) (2019–
20)).       The    court       of     appeals     never    considered       how      the    State

actually     satisfying          the      clear    and    convincing      standard          might

affect the analysis.

      ¶16    On        remand,      the    circuit       court    held    an      evidentiary

hearing.      A.G. did not appear.3                    The hearing proceeded and the

court reviewed the record.                      In a written decision, the court

      3The State and the GAL argue A.G. should have been held in
default for not appearing.    We need not and therefore do not
address this issue.

                                                 11
                                                                                No.     2022AP652

denied the motion, first noting A.G. had been informed during

the plea colloquy that "at the disposition, the [c]ourt simply

decides if it is in the child's best interest to terminate."                                   It

also noted A.G. "had previously been informed of the potential

outcomes" at the adjourned initial appearance.                           Importantly, the

court found A.G.'s testimony at the dispositional hearing showed

he   "understood"      the      potential         dispositions.           The     court       also

reasoned, "[t]hroughout the disposition, the [c]ourt appears to

have applied both the preponderance and the clear and convincing

standards."            Accordingly,              it     reasoned,       A.G.          "was    not

prejudiced[.]"

       ¶17     A.G. appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the

circuit      court's      decision,         ordering       the    cause     remanded          with

directions       to   allow      A.G.       to    withdraw       his    plea.         A.G.     II,

No. 2022AP652, ¶1.             In the court of appeals' view, the State

lacked evidence establishing the validity of the plea.                                        Id.,

¶25.

                               II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
       ¶18     This   court      generally            considers    precedent          regarding

plea     withdrawal       in     the    context          of   criminal      cases        to    be

persuasive authority regarding TPR proceedings.                                 See Waukesha

County    v.     Steven    H.,       2000    WI 28,      ¶42,     233   Wis. 2d 344,           607

N.W.2d 607 (citation omitted), modified on other grounds by St.

Croix. Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs. v. Michael D., 2016

WI 35, ¶¶3–4, 368 Wis. 2d 710, 880 N.W.2d 107.                              In a criminal

case,     this    court     accepts         the       circuit     court's       findings       of
historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.                                Brown, 293
                                                 12
                                                                    No.    2022AP652

Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).                       It

then independently determines whether those facts demonstrate

that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.                       Brown,

293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).

That same standard of review applies in this case.                      See Steven

H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42.

                                  III.    ANALYSIS

       ¶19   A.G.   argues   he    did    not     knowingly,    voluntarily,     and

intelligently plead no contest as required by well-established

precedent.      See Kenosha Cnty. Dep't Health Servs. v. Jodie W.,

2006 WI 93, ¶24, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845 (citing State

v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986)).                          "A

parent's interest in the parent-child relationship and in the

care, custody, and management of his . . . child is recognized

as a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment [to the United States Constitution]."                    Steven V. v.

Kelly H., 2004 WI 47, ¶22, 271 Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (citing

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).                     A parent who
enters a no contest plea waives several important procedural

rights meant to safeguard this liberty interest, which is why

such a plea must satisfy the aforementioned standard.                     See Brown

Cnty    Dep't   Hum.   Servs.      v.    Brenda    B.,   2011   WI 6,     ¶34,   331

Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730 (citing Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530,

¶25).

       ¶20   This court has established a burden-shifting scheme

for TPR plea withdrawals.           First, a parent must demonstrate the
circuit court failed to conduct the plea colloquy in accordance
                                          13
                                                                            No.    2022AP652

with Wis. Stat. § 48.422 or failed to satisfy another mandatory

duty.     Id., ¶36 (citing Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).                              The

parent    must    also    allege     he    "did       not    know   or    understand      the

information      that     should    have       been    provided[.]"          Id.   (citing

Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).                     If the parent satisfies his

burden,    the    circuit    court        is    generally      required      to    hold    an

evidentiary hearing.           See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 (citing

Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).                       The State must demonstrate by

clear     and    convincing        evidence          that    the    plea    was    entered

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently despite the defective

colloquy.4       Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶36 (citing Steven H.,

233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42).             While a plea's validity is based on the

parent's understanding at the time the plea was entered, events

before and after the plea can inform a court's analysis.                                  See

State     v.    Finley,     2016     WI    63,        ¶44,    370    Wis. 2d 402,         882

N.W.2d 761; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274–75.

     ¶21       We assume A.G. satisfied his burden.                      First, the court

of appeals determined A.G. demonstrated the plea colloquy was
defective; therefore, it ordered the circuit court to hold an

evidentiary hearing.          Second, the circuit court acknowledged it

imposed a burden of proof at disposition——even though no such

burden exists.          We therefore consider whether the State proved

     4 The GAL argues the circuit court should be allowed to look
at the full record in determining whether a parent has made a
"prima facie case" for plea withdrawal. We do not address this
issue because an evidentiary hearing was held in this case.

                                               14
                                                                   No.    2022AP652

by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s plea was validly

entered.

     ¶22    Notwithstanding      our         assumption,      we   nevertheless

examine the plea colloquy because A.G. grounds his arguments in

potential errors during it.        Understanding whether the record as

a   whole   refutes     his    arguments        requires     scrutinizing      the

colloquy.

     ¶23    Wisconsin   Stat.     § 48.422(7)(a)           provides:       "Before

accepting an admission of the alleged facts in a [TPR] petition,

the [circuit] court shall:        (a)        Address the parties present and

determine    that     the     admission        is   made     voluntarily      with

understanding of the nature of the acts alleged in the petition

and the potential dispositions."             We assume a no contest plea is

"an admission of the alleged facts[.]"              § 48.422(7).         A.G. does

not argue the court failed to determine that he understood the

acts alleged in the petition——he argues the court failed to

inform him of potential dispositions.                 Although this statute

requires a circuit court to "determine" that a no contest plea
is entered "with understanding" of "the potential dispositions,"

it does not require specific words be used.                   The statute also

does not mention a burden of proof at disposition; however, the

court of appeals has held:

     [I]n order for the court's explanation of potential
     dispositions to be meaningful to the parent, the
     parent must be informed of the statutory standard the
     court will apply at the second stage.    That is, the
     court must inform the parent that "[t]he best
     interests of the child shall be the prevailing factor

                                        15
                                                                                   No.    2022AP652

          considered   by             the      court        in        determining         the
          disposition[.]"
Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Therese S., 2008 WI App

159, ¶16, 314 Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122 (quoting Wis. Stat.

§ 48.426(2) (2005–06)) (second modification in the original).

     A.    A.G. Understood His Parental Rights Could Be Terminated.

          ¶24    In    this     case,    the    circuit       court        seemingly      informed

A.G.       of    potential       dispositions          as     required        by    Wis.       Stat.

§ 48.422(7)(a).               During the plea colloquy, the circuit court

explicitly explained "[t]he second half of the case is where the

[c]ourt decides is it in the child's best interest to in fact

terminate your parental rights."                       Essentially, A.G. contends the

colloquy was defective because the court did not specify that

"[t]he second half of the case is where the [c]ourt decides is

it    in    the       child's    best       interest     to      in    fact   terminate         your

parental rights or not."                    The omission of "or not," A.G. claims,

makes the court's statement "somewhat ambiguous" by failing to

explicitly         say    the    court       must     make    an      "either/or"        decision:

either          terminate       the     parental       rights         or    dismiss      the     TPR
petition.         A.G. claims he may have mistakenly believed the court

at     disposition            could     order       something          between      terminating

parental rights and dismissing the petition.

          ¶25    At    oral     argument,       A.G.'s        counsel       clarified       A.G.'s

position regarding the content of the plea colloquy on potential

dispositions:

          THE COURT:                  Which disposition did the court not
                                      review?

                                                 16
                                                  No.   2022AP652

A.G.'s COUNSEL:    . . . [S]o at the plea hearing in
                  this case, what the court said to
                  A.G. is that during the disposition
                  phase "the [c]ourt decides is it in
                  the child's best interest to in fact
                  terminate your parental rights."   I
                  don't believe that statement conveys
                  the potential dispositions in a TPR
                  case. That statement does not convey
                  to the parent that the court has two
                  options.     And those options are
                  basically all or nothing. Either the
                  court terminates the parent's right
                  or the court dismisses the petition.
                  And the court did not specifically
                  tell A.G. that those were the only
                  two options that it had under the
                  statute.

THE COURT:        This feels like magic words to
                  me. . . .    It   feels    like   you're
                  asking circuit court judges to say
                  magic words, to thread a needle with
                  a really small eye. . . .        I just
                  feel like your argument really has a
                  lot of like, if the court doesn't say
                  these exact words, then there's no
                  way   the  parent    could    understand
                  what's happening . . . .

A.G.'s COUNSEL:   . . . .   [W]hat the court said here
                  left            it            somewhat
                  ambiguous. . . .   [A] parent hearing
                  what the court said here could think
                  that potentially there's some middle
                  ground disposition where the court
                  hears all the testimony and evidence
                  at disposition and the court makes a
                  decision to just hold this open for a
                  length   of    time    to   let    the
                  parent . . . get their life back on
                  track.

. . . .

THE COURT:        So what do you want us to do about
                  it? . . . . In an opinion, what are
                  you asking us to say?   That courts

                           17
                                                                     No.     2022AP652

                               must list out, "I'm going to decide
                               (1) whether  your  rights   will  be
                               terminated; or (2) whether they will
                               not be?"

       A.G.'s COUNSEL:         I believe there's cases interpreting
                               the options that the court has
                               indicating that a court has to tell a
                               parent that it has to make one of two
                               decisions in the case, terminate or
                               dismiss the petition.

       . . . .

       THE COURT:              [I]f the court says, "there are two
                               potential dispositions, grant the
                               petition to terminate your parental
                               rights or not grant your petition to
                               terminate parental rights," that's
                               not sufficient?

       A.G.'s COUNSEL:         No, I think that seems sufficient
                               because its putting the case into the
                               two options[.]
       ¶26   A.G.'s argument seems to be anchored in a misreading

of Oneida County Department of Social Services v. Therese S.,

314 Wis. 2d 493.         In that case, the court of appeals held, "a

court must inform the parent that at the second step of the

process, the court will hear evidence related to the disposition

and then will either terminate the parent's rights or dismiss

the    petition    if    the   evidence      does   not   warrant    termination."

Id.,     ¶16.      In    reply,      the    State      references    Brown    County

Department of Human Services v. Brenda B., 331 Wis. 2d 310.                        In

that case, while discussing Therese S., this court held "the

parent    must    be    informed     of    the   two   independent    dispositions

available to the circuit court.                  That is, the court may decide
between      dismissing        the   petition       and   terminating        parental

                                           18
                                                                            No.    2022AP652

rights."          Id., ¶56.        A.G. argues the colloquy was defective

because the circuit court did not precisely inform him of the

two "independent dispositions."                  See id.

      ¶27     A.G. places far too much weight on a single sentence

from Therese S., and he does not address Brenda B at all.                                 In

Brenda      B.,    the   circuit        court    used     the    language    A.G.    would

require of all circuit courts, specifically, "I can either grant

the petition to terminate your parental rights or dismiss the

petition to terminate your parental rights."                          Id., ¶12.          This

court deemed that statement sufficient, distinguishing it from

an insufficient explanation in Therese S., in which the circuit

court said, "[you're] admitting the grounds for termination but

still leaving open the question as to what's gonna happen, the

disposition. . . .            [I]t      hasn't     been    decided    yet     what   we're

going to do.          Your termination is not actually entered today.

We   have    more    work   to     do    to     decide    what   to   do."        Id.,    ¶54

(quoting Therese S., 314 Wis. 2d 493, ¶14).                       The circuit court's

statement in A.G.'s case is more like the sufficient statement
from Brenda B. because it informed A.G. that at disposition the

court may decide to terminate A.G.'s parental rights, or, by

negative implication, may decide not to terminate his rights.

"[I]s it in the child's best interest to in fact terminate your

parental rights" strongly implies a binary, yes/no, either/or

decision.         The court described the dispositional options for

A.G. with greater clarity than in Therese S., in which that

court       rather       vaguely        communicated        that      an     unspecified
disposition would be forthcoming after additional work.
                                              19
                                                                           No.     2022AP652

       ¶28   In Brenda B., this court emphasized that a circuit

court   need    not       "inform       parents   in    detail      of    all    potential

outcomes" because that requirement would be "unduly burdensome"

and potentially "confuse or mislead rather than . . . inform."

Id.,    ¶¶55–56      (quoting       Therese       S.,    314     Wis. 2d 493,           ¶17).

Although this court said "the parent must be informed of the two

independent dispositions available to the circuit court," this

court never suggested that a failure to state the potential

dispositions         in      explicit         either/or          terminology            would

automatically       render     a    plea     colloquy     defective.             Id.,    ¶56.

Imposing such a requirement would conflict with our longstanding

rejection of requiring circuit courts to utter "magic words" to

satisfy statutory commands.

       ¶29   "Magic words" is a colloquial phrase in legal parlance

describing a party's request to prioritize form over substance.

This court strongly disfavors magic words.                       See, e.g., State v.

Lepsch,      2017     WI 27,       ¶36,     374   Wis. 2d 98,            892    N.W.2d 682

(rejecting in the context of a circuit court inquiring about
juror     bias);      State        v.     Wantland,     2014        WI 58,       ¶33,     355

Wis. 2d 135,        848    N.W.2d 810        (rejecting        in    the       context    of

withdrawing consent under the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution).              In Brenda B., this court rejected the

parent's argument that the plea colloquy was defective for not

explicitly informing the parent that the parent was waiving a

"constitutional" right:                 "the [circuit] court need not explain

that the right to parent is a constitutional right.                                What is
important     is    that    the     parent    understands        the     import     of    the
                                             20
                                                                             No.      2022AP652

rights   at    stake      rather      than     the    source     from    which     they    are

derived."          331   Wis. 2d 310,         ¶46.      In    this    case,     the    record

confirms A.G. understood the "stake[s]."

    ¶30       Based on the foregoing, we doubt the plea colloquy was

defective      for       not    explicitly          explaining     the    two      potential

dispositions.            We    need    not,    however,       make    that    call.        The

procedural posture of this case allows for a narrower holding.

The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing and found A.G.

understood potential dispositions based on his testimony at the

dispositional hearing, which was conducted the day after the

plea colloquy.            The court's finding is not clearly erroneous;

therefore, we accept it as true.                       See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594,

¶19 (citing Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶16).                          Additionally, the

court noted the thorough overview of TPR proceedings the court

had provided at the adjourned initial appearance predating the

plea colloquy.           During the colloquy, both A.G. and his counsel

represented        to    the    court        that    A.G.    was     entering      the    plea

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
    ¶31       Although not relied upon by the circuit court, during

the plea colloquy A.G. confirmed he read the TPR petition, which

made exceedingly clear that his parental rights were at stake.

In State v. Taylor, a criminal defendant was told he faced a

potential six-year term of imprisonment if he pled, when in fact

he faced a total of eight years.                       2013 WI 34, ¶¶2, 38–39, 347

Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.                  He was sentenced to six years after

pleading      no    contest.          Id.,    ¶3.      This    court     held,     "on    this
record, a failure to discuss the additional two-year repeater
                                               21
                                                                               No.    2022AP652

penalty      enhancer      at    the   plea        hearing       is    an    insubstantial

defect."       Id., ¶34.           The court emphasized, "[t]he record is

replete" with evidence that the defendant "was aware" of the

potential term of imprisonment, largely based on a complaint

filed on May 8, 2009, which the defendant said he read and

understood during the plea colloquy on August 23, 2010.                                     Id.,

¶¶35–39.      This court reasoned, "[t]o conclude that Taylor was

not aware of the maximum eight-year term of imprisonment, we

would have to assume . . . .                 that Taylor misrepresented to the

court     that      he     had     received,        read,        and     understood         the

complaint[.]"        Id., ¶39.         We presume A.G. answered truthfully

when    he   said    he     read     the    TPR     petition,          which    is     titled:

"Petition for Termination of Parental Rights[.]"

       ¶32   Additionally, A.G. confirmed during the plea colloquy

that he had spoken with his counsel about the plea.                                  The court

then asked if A.G. had any questions, to which A.G. responded,

"[n]o, I do not."           A.G. also denied needing more time to think

about his decision.             In his concurrence in Taylor, Justice David
T.     Prosser      noted,       "[t]here      is       a     very      high       likelihood

that . . . [the            defendant]'s           attorney . . . explained                  the

meaning      of    eight     years     of     imprisonment[.]"                 Taylor,       347

Wis. 2d 30, ¶83 n.5 (Prosser, J., concurring).                          Similarly, it is

improbable        A.G.'s    counsel        neglected        to   tell       A.G.     that   his

parental rights could be terminated.                         We reject A.G.'s first

argument     because       the     record     as    a       whole,     before        the    plea

                                             22
                                                       No.   2022AP652

colloquy,   during   the   colloquy,   and   after,   confirms   A.G.

understood the potential dispositions when he entered his plea.5

     5 The point the concurrence tries to make is unclear,
considering its analysis of A.G.'s first argument mirrors our
own. We "assume" A.G. made a prima facie case. Supra, ¶21. So
does the concurrence but it "add[s]" a "caveat":               "[t]he
briefing on this point was not especially helpful.          With the
benefit of fuller assistance from the parties, it may be that
our hands are tied in some way." See Concurrence, ¶¶42, 43 n.1.
We then state the issue as follows:      "whether the State proved
by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s plea was validly
entered."    Supra, ¶21.    The concurrence introduces the issue
using   nearly    identical   language:       "whether    the   State
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."      Concurrence, ¶42.     Both
opinions express skepticism that an error occurred in the
colloquy. Compare supra, ¶30 ("[W]e doubt the plea colloquy was
defective for not explicitly explaining the two potential
dispositions."), with concurrence, ¶43 n.1 ("[O]n both issues,
the evidence of a facial deficiency in the plea colloquy was
weak at best[.]").     Both opinions examine the full record and
determine A.G.'s first issue is without merit. See concurrence,
¶44 ("The lead opinion recites additional evidence from the
record both before and after the plea that I agree may be
considered.    This evidence erases any doubt that the potential
dispositions were sufficiently communicated, and by implication,
sufficiently    understood,   when  A.G.    entered    his   plea.").
Inexplicably, the concurrence rationalizes its unwillingness to
join this opinion's analysis on the first issue by complaining
about "inconsistencies" it never identifies.

     The concurring justices disserve the people of Wisconsin by
blocking a clean precedential decision on A.G.'s first argument
without cause.   Arguments analogous to A.G.'s are recurring in
Wisconsin; our guidance in this important area of law is needed.
See generally State v. S.S., Nos. 2022AP1179 & 2022AP1180,
unpublished slip op., ¶19 (June 7, 2023) ("Relying on Therese
S., S.S. asserts that the circuit court's colloquy must convey
to the parent that there are only two legal outcomes at a
dispositional hearing:     termination of parental rights or
dismissal of the TPR petitions.").     Not a single justice who
refuses to join any portion of this opinion even attempts to
point out any flaw in our analysis of A.G.'s first argument;
nevertheless, only one justice joins it.    See dissent, ¶55 ("I
focus solely on A.G.'s second argument[.]").      "[I]t is this
                                 23
                                                      No.   2022AP652

 B.   Assuming A.G.'s Reading of the Plea Colloquy Is Reasonable,
      the Burden of Proof Error Was an Insubstantial Defect.
      ¶33   We also reject A.G.'s second argument regarding the

burden of proof at the dispositional hearing.6    As a preliminary

court's function to develop and clarify the law." State ex rel.
Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis. 2d 429, 436, 424 N.W.2d 385
(Wis. 1988) (citations omitted).    "Part of our obligation as
supreme court justices is to take complicated legal issues and
decide them in a way that simplifies and explains them." State
v. Branter, 2020 WI 21, ¶42, 390 Wis. 2d 494, 939 N.W.2d 546
(Roggensack, C.J., concurring).      The concurrence does not
fulfill this obligation.    If a justice deprives the public of
clear precedent, a straightforward, coherent explanation of why
is warranted.     Doing so not only serves the public but
facilitates a resolution of any disagreements for the purpose of
establishing clear precedent. We do not sit as seven courts of
one but as one court of seven (or in this case six). See, e.g.,
Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha, 2022 WI 57, ¶3,
403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263.
      6The concurrence contradicts itself in analyzing A.G.'s
second argument.    First, the concurrence says:     "Procedurally,
the question before us concerns step two:        whether the State
demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the plea was
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. This is because the court
of appeals previously determined A.G. made the prima facie
showing and was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing."
Concurrence,   ¶42   (citing   State   v.   A.G.,   No. 2021AP1476,
unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022)). Next,
the concurrence asserts, "A.G.'s argument rests on the premise
that   the   most  reasonable    reading . . . [of   the   colloquy
transcript] is that the circuit court communicated a clear and
convincing evidence burden of proof would apply at the
disposition. But the circuit court never said that." Id., ¶47.
If the circuit court "never said that," then A.G. did not make a
prima facie case.      Although on the first issue we express
skepticism as to whether A.G. made a prima facie case, we do not
resolve the issue because there is no need to do so.
Considering the record as a whole avoids the inconsistencies
undermining the analysis set forth in the concurrence, which
confusingly    considers    "step    two"    notwithstanding    the
concurrence's implication that A.G. never made a prima facie
case. Additionally, the concurrence cites no authority for the
proposition that A.G.'s reading needs to be "the most
reasonable." Finally, A.G.'s reading of the colloquy, in light
                                24
                                                                     No.     2022AP652

matter, A.G. correctly argues Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) does not

impose a burden on the State to prove that termination is in the

child's best interests.7             The statute provides only that "[t]he

best       interests   of   the     child   shall    be   the   prevailing    factor

considered by the court in determining the disposition of all

proceedings       under     this    subchapter."          § 48.426(2).       We   are

unaware of any Wisconsin decision analyzing whether the evidence

regarding the best interests of the child must meet a particular

burden.         See    State   v.    L.J.,       Nos. 2017AP1225,   2017AP1226      &

2017AP1227, unpublished slip op. ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2018)

of the entire record, appears pretty reasonable considering the
circuit court referenced the clear and convincing standard at
disposition and later acknowledged it in fact applied that
standard.

       The dissent claims "[t]his is a debatable conclusion."
       7

Dissent, ¶58 n.3.    It cites three foreign state supreme court
decisions, one of which merely noted, "the clear and convincing
standard might be constitutionally mandated" at disposition.
See B.T.B. v. V.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 838 n.11 (Utah 2020)
(emphasis added).     The dissent also quotes a South Dakota
Supreme Court decision, which misquoted a United States Supreme
Court decision, Santosky v. Kramer, as follows:       "The trial
court must find by 'clear and convincing evidence that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the
child.'"     In re D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185, 188 (S.D. 1984)
(attributing the quote to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982); citing In re S.L., 349 N.W.2d 428 (S.D. 1984); In re
S.H., 323 N.W.2d 851 (S.D. 1982)).    That quote does not appear
in Santosky.     The South Dakota decision placed two other
decisions in the string citation, but neither of those decisions
contain the quote either. The dissent also cites a nearly two-
decade old student-authored law review comment.     See Brian C.
Hill, Comment, The State's Burden of Proof at the Best Interests
Stage of a Termination of Parental Rights, 2004 U. Chi. Legal
Forum 557, 576–84.    A Westlaw search reveals this comment has
never been cited in a legal opinion.

                                            25
                                                               No.   2022AP652

("L.J. identifies no case in which a determination of the best

interests of the child has been analyzed in terms of whether the

burden   of     proof   has   been   satisfied. . . .    The    legislature

imposed no burden of proof in the statute, and the determination

of the child's best interests does not turn              on distinctions

between levels of proof.").          The "polestar" at a dispositional

hearing is simply the best interests of the child.                Brenda B.,

331 Wis. 2d 310, ¶33 (quoting Sheboygan Cnty. Dep't of Health &

Hum. Servs. v. Julie A.B., 2002 WI 95, ¶30, 255 Wis. 2d 170, 648

N.W.2d 402).

      ¶34     Regardless, A.G.'s second argument fails under Taylor,

347 Wis. 2d 30 (majority op.).             Although this court emphasized

the defendant knew, based on the record, that he faced eight

years, it also emphasized, "in any event, . . . [the defendant]

was verbally informed by the court at the plea hearing of the

sentence        that     he      actually       received. . . .         [The]

sentence . . . did not exceed the six-year term of imprisonment

that the court, at the plea hearing, specifically informed him
that he could receive."        Id., ¶¶39, 42; see also id., ¶28 ("[A]t

the plea hearing, the circuit court verbally informed . . . [the

defendant] of the six-year term of imprisonment to which he was

ultimately sentenced.         As a result, . . . [the defendant]'s plea

was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and it

was   not   a   violation     of . . . [the    defendant]'s    due   process

rights to deny his motion to withdraw his no contest plea.");

id., ¶52 ("[T]he circuit court informed . . . [the defendant]
that he could receive a maximum term of imprisonment of six
                                      26
                                                                            No.     2022AP652

years. . . .           [The    defendant]    received          a    six-year       term    of

imprisonment.           In other words, . . . [the defendant] received a

sentence that he was verbally informed he could receive.").

       ¶35     In Taylor, quoting an earlier decision of this court,

this court explained that "[r]equiring an evidentiary hearing

for every small deviation from the circuit court's duties during

a plea colloquy is simply not necessary for the protection of a

defendant's constitutional rights."                Id., ¶33 (quoting State v.

Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶32, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64).                                   As

noted     in     that     earlier     decision,        not     every       "insubstantial

defect[]"——i.e., technical legal error——renders a plea invalid.

Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶32.

       ¶36     Like the defendant in Taylor, A.G. received what the

circuit court told him he would receive; the State was held to a

burden of proof the law does not require, but the State met that

burden.        At disposition, the court explicitly referenced the

clear and convincing standard.                In denying the motion for plea

withdrawal without an evidentiary hearing, the court explained,
"[t]he [c]ourt actually did use a clear and convincing standard

when it assessed whether it thought it was in the child's best

interest       to      terminate     the    parental         rights."           After     the

evidentiary hearing, the court noted in its written decision

that    it     seems    to    have   held   the   State       to    both    a     clear   and

convincing       and     a    preponderance       of     the       evidence       standard.

Regardless, the court emphasized the State satisfied the higher

clear and convincing standard, as expressed in the dispositional
hearing transcript.             The mere fact the court also stated "in
                                            27
                                                                        No.     2022AP652

balance" termination was in the best interests of the child does

not   show    the    court    applied    a    burden      lower      than     clear   and

convincing evidence.          A.G. was not inhibited from weighing the

pros and cons of entering this particular no contest plea by

being told the State would have to satisfy a particular burden

of proof because the State was actually held to and did satisfy

that burden.8

      ¶37    Our    holding   regarding       the   burden      of    proof    argument

presupposes       that   events   subsequent        to    the   plea    colloquy      can

illuminate whether a plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently.        In State v. Finley, this court explained the

State     "bore    the   burden   of    proving,     by    clear      and   convincing

      8The dissent complains we are "importing a harmless error
standard[.]"   Dissent, ¶70.    Not so.    Although the dissent
mischaracterizes our holding as "A.G. did not know the statutory
standard that applies at the dispositional phase," id., we
actually hold he did know the standard this particular circuit
court would apply——because the court applied the standard it
said it would.    Accordingly, as in Taylor, the error did not
render the plea unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary. 2013
WI 34, ¶¶41–42, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482.      A harmless
error analysis would instead consider whether and to what extent
the information provided at the plea colloquy caused A.G. to
enter a plea he would not otherwise have entered. Cf. State v.
Barnes, 2023 WI 45, ¶29, __ Wis. 2d __, 990 N.W.2d 759.    We do
not hold that A.G. would surely have entered a no contest plea
regardless of the information he received during the plea
colloquy.

     Due process is not a game of gotcha to be sprung on the
State.    A.G. benefitted from the circuit court holding his
opponent, the State, to a burden of proof the law did not
require the State to meet. A.G. claims he considered this when
weighing the pros and cons of pleading.      To permit him to
withdraw his plea at this stage would make a mockery of a very
serious TPR proceeding.

                                         28
                                                                               No.     2022AP652

evidence,"        that        a    criminal      defendant        "knew       the    potential

punishment he faced . . . at the time of the plea acceptance."

370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶44 (emphasis added).                      Our holding in this case

is consistent with Finley.                   A.G. claims he knew, at the time of

the plea acceptance, the State would be required to satisfy the

clear and convincing standard.                    The State was then held to that

standard even though it did not apply.                            The error could have

been consequential, but it became insubstantial when the circuit

court       actually     held       the   State      to   the    clear      and     convincing

standard.         Given this subsequent development, A.G.'s knowledge

at the time of the plea permitted him to accurately weigh the

pros       and   cons    of       entering    this    specific        plea.         However   he

calculated the odds of a favorable outcome at disposition, to

the extent his calculation depended on the State being held to

the clear and convincing standard, he calculated correctly.                                   Had

the    State      not    satisfied        this    burden        and   the     circuit    court

nonetheless terminated A.G.'s parental rights, we might have a

different case.9

       The dissent contends this court in Finley held Taylor has
       9

no relevance as applied to cases in which an evidentiary hearing
was held.    Dissent, ¶67.   A fair reading of Finley does not
support the dissent's assertion.

     In Finley, a criminal defendant was told the maximum
statutory punishment was lower than it actually was and then
sentenced to more time than he was told he would face. 2016 WI
63, ¶10, 370 Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761.   The question facing
this court was one of remedy:     the State argued the sentence
should be commuted, but the defendant sought plea withdrawal.
Id., ¶¶9–10.   After an evidentiary hearing, the State conceded
the defendant "did not know the potential punishment he faced
                                               29
                                                                    No.   2022AP652

                               IV.     CONCLUSION

      ¶38     We    hold   that      A.G.       knowingly,   voluntarily,      and

intelligently pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground for

terminating his parental rights.                 The circuit court found A.G.

demonstrated he understood potential dispositions                    through his

testimony at the dispositional hearing, which was conducted one

day after the plea colloquy.               Based on the record, the court's

findings      are   not    clearly     erroneous.        Although     the   court

mistakenly imposed a clear and convincing evidentiary burden on

the   State    in   determining      whether     terminating   A.G.'s     parental

rights was in the child's best interests, the court actually

held the State to that burden and concluded it was met.                        The

court's     mistake   therefore      was    an    insubstantial   defect.      The

court of appeals erred in permitting A.G. to withdraw his plea.

when he entered his plea."      Id., ¶85.   This court held the
defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. Id., ¶95.

     Although this court in Finley noted that "no evidentiary
hearing was needed" in Taylor, it did not suggest Taylor has no
bearing on a case in which one has been held. See id., ¶84. If
Finley does stand for the proposition the dissent suggests, it
is simply wrong.      See id., ¶153 (Ziegler, J., dissenting)
("There is a principle present in . . . Taylor——namely, that
incorrect or insufficient knowledge about an aspect of a plea
does not necessarily invalidate the entire plea[.]").

     In this case, an evidentiary hearing was held, in which the
circuit court reiterated that it actually applied the clear and
convincing standard, which has facilitated our review. The mere
fact that one was held, however, does not render the defect
somehow more serious; rather, the record of the evidentiary
hearing demonstrates why the defect was insubstantial.

                                           30
                                              No.   2022AP652

    By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed.

                           31
                                                                               No.   2022AP652.bh

      ¶39    BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.                (concurring).                A.G. argues that

the no-contest plea he entered in his termination of parental

rights      (TPR)     proceeding       was         not     knowing,          voluntary,      and

intelligent for two independent reasons.                         First, he asserts the

circuit court failed to advise him of the possible dispositions

that it could enter after accepting his plea.                                   Second, A.G.

contends     the    circuit      court    failed          to    explain        the    statutory

standard it was required to apply at the dispositional phase of

the TPR proceeding.         Neither argument wins the day.

      ¶40    Contested TPR proceedings involve a two-step process:

(1) a fact-finding hearing to determine if "grounds exist for

the termination of parental rights," and (2) the dispositional

hearing where the circuit court determines whether the rights

should in fact be terminated.                See Wis. Stat. §§ 48.424, 48.427.

Here, A.G. pled no-contest that grounds existed to terminate his

parental rights.          On appeal, he contends that his plea at the

grounds phase was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent based

on   what    he    was    told   (or     not       told)       about    the     dispositional
hearing.

      ¶41    We     analyze      whether           A.G.    can     withdraw          his    plea

utilizing a two-step process.                      Waukesha County v. Steven H.,

2000 WI 28, ¶42, 233 Wis. 2d 344, 607 N.W.2d 607, modified on

other grounds by St. Croix Cnty. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.

v.   Michael        D.,   2016    WI 35,           ¶¶3-4,       368         Wis. 2d 170,     880

N.W.2d 107.        First, the parent "must make a prima facie showing

that the circuit court violated its mandatory duties and he must
allege      that    in    fact    he     did       not     know        or     understand     the

                                               1
                                                                  No.   2022AP652.bh

information that should have been provided at the" hearing.                       Id.

This   prima      facie   showing    will   generally    focus     on    the     plea

colloquy itself to determine whether certain requirements were

not followed.         See State v. Clark, 2022 WI 21, ¶¶13-16, 401

Wis. 2d 344, 972 N.W.2d 533 (explaining the defendant's burden).

Second, if the defendant makes this showing, the burden shifts

to the State to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that even given the facial deficiencies, the parent's plea was

knowing,      voluntary,      and     intelligent.           Steven       H.,     233

Wis. 2d 344, ¶42.         This usually involves the consideration of

additional evidence at a hearing.             State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41,

¶47,   317    Wis. 2d 161,     765    N.W.2d 794.       At   this       stage,    the

circuit court considers all new evidence along with "the entire

record"      to   ascertain    if    the    parent's    plea      was     knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent.          Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344, ¶42.

       ¶42   Procedurally,     the    question   before      us   concerns       step

two:      whether the State demonstrated by clear and convincing

evidence that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
This is because the court of appeals previously determined A.G.

made the prima facie showing and was therefore entitled to an

evidentiary hearing.          State v. A.G. (A.G. I), No. 2021AP1476,

unpublished slip op., ¶21 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022).                          The

State did not challenge this decision, and the case was remanded

back to the circuit court for a hearing.                That's when the case

transformed into something of a unicorn.             A.G. did not appear at

the scheduled evidentiary hearing, so neither his testimony nor
any other testimony was introduced.              Instead, the State moved

                                        2
                                                                     No.    2022AP652.bh

into evidence all the transcripts in the case and relied on the

transcripts alone to argue that it had proven A.G.'s plea was

knowing,        voluntary,      and   intelligent.            The    circuit      court

concluded       the   State   satisfied       its   burden,    but    the    court    of

appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to permit A.G.

to withdraw his plea.            State v. A.G. (A.G. II), No. 2022AP652,

unpublished slip op., ¶25 (Wis. Ct. App. July 12, 2022).                              We

granted review of this second appeal.

       ¶43      Our review involves an examination of substantially

the same transcript evidence that the court of appeals had when

it concluded A.G. made the initial prima facie case.                            But at

this stage, we must independently determine whether the plea was

knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.                  Hoppe, 317 Wis. 2d 161,

¶45.       Thus, even though the court of appeals may have had much

of the same evidence available to it when it determined A.G.

made a prima facie case, our standard of review suggests we can

come       to   a   different    legal    conclusion     when        conducting      our

independent analysis under step two.1

       I add one caveat to this conclusion, however.
       1                                                  The
briefing on this point was not especially helpful.   With the
benefit of fuller assistance from the parties, it may be that
our hands are tied in some way.

     The dissent seems to think so when it employs a law-of-the-
case rationale to A.G.'s second argument.    But on both issues,
the evidence of a facial deficiency in the plea colloquy was
weak at best, and the broader plea withdrawal claim even weaker
when the full spectrum of evidence in a stage two analysis is
considered.   Given our standard of review, I don't understand
why the conclusion that A.G. made a prima facie case——reached by
a lower court in a different appeal focusing primarily on the
plea colloquy alone——should transform into a binding conclusion
for a higher court considering more evidence and conducting an
independent review of whether the State met its burden.
                                          3
                                                                         No.   2022AP652.bh

       ¶44    Turning     to   this     analysis,        A.G.   first     contends      the

circuit court failed to advise him of the possible dispositions

of the proceeding consistent with Wis. Stat.                           § 48.422.         See

§ 48.422(7)(a) (providing the circuit court must "determine that

the      admission      is      made      voluntarily           with      understanding

of . . . the potential dispositions").                    And to enter a knowing,

voluntary, and intelligent plea the defendant must be informed

that the court can either dismiss the petition or terminate

parental rights.        See Brown Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Brenda

B., 2011 WI 6, ¶56, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730; see also

Wis. Stat. § 48.427(2), (3).              As I read the record, the circuit

court did so when it said that during the dispositional phase,

it would decide if it was "in the child's best interest to in

fact   terminate     [A.G.'s]         parental     rights."        The    lead    opinion

recites      additional      evidence     from     the    record    both       before   and

after the plea that I agree may be considered.                           This evidence

erases       any   doubt       that     the       potential      dispositions           were

sufficiently       communicated,         and      by   implication,        sufficiently
understood, when A.G. entered his plea.                    Accordingly, I conclude

the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s

plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent with respect to the

possible dispositions of the TPR proceeding.

     The lead opinion is equally unclear.   While it seems to
agree we can come to an independent conclusion on A.G.'s first
argument, it criticizes this opinion for applying the same
analytical approach to A.G.'s second argument.      Given the
inconsistencies in the lead opinion and the potential for
confusion, I do not join its analysis.

                                              4
                                                                    No.    2022AP652.bh

      ¶45       A.G. also argues the circuit court failed to explain

the     statutory     standard     it    was    required     to     apply     to     the

dispositional phase.          Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422 does not directly

require     disclosure      of   this    standard   when     the    circuit        court

accepts     a    no-contest      plea.     However,   a    published        court     of

appeals decision states that "the parent must be informed of the

statutory standard the court will apply at the second stage" "in

order for the court's explanation of potential dispositions to

be meaningful."           Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Therese

S.,   2008      WI App 159,      ¶16,    314   Wis. 2d 493,       762     N.W.2d 122.

Wisconsin Stat. § 48.426 states that the standard is the "best

interests of the child"; no burden of proof is specified.

      ¶46       A.G.'s argument on this point relies on a strained

reading of the record.            The circuit court explained during the

plea colloquy for the grounds phase that A.G. would be giving up

a variety of trial rights, including "the right to force the

state     to      prove    the    grounds      by   clear,        convincing,        and

satisfactory evidence to a reasonable certainty."                         The circuit
court later communicated that during the dispositional phase,

the court would determine whether it is "in the child's best

interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."                       And in the

dispositional phase, A.G. would still have his trial rights.                          In

other words, A.G. was not giving up his trial rights in the

dispositional phase by pleading in the grounds phase.

      ¶47       A.G.'s argument rests on the premise that the most

reasonable reading of this exchange is that the circuit court
communicated a clear and convincing evidence burden of proof

                                           5
                                                                        No.   2022AP652.bh

would apply at the dispositional phase.                     But the circuit court

never said that.        The circuit court merely said that standard

applied "to prove the grounds."                   When it pivoted to explaining

the   dispositional       phase,        the       circuit      court    followed      the

statutory language and explained that it would render a decision

based on the best interests of the child.                        Sure, the circuit

court could have been a bit more precise.                      But the record shows

A.G. was informed ten months before entering his plea that in

the second phase of the TPR proceeding, the focus shifted to

what was in the child's best interest.                         Thus, reviewing the

record    independently    and     as    a       whole,   in   the     face   of   A.G.'s

argument    that   he   was   incorrectly           informed      of    the    statutory

standard governing the dispositional hearing, the State met its

burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that A.G.'s

plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.2

      ¶48   For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

      ¶49   I am authorized to state that Justice JILL J. KAROFSKY

joins this concurrence.

      2The lead opinion concludes the same, but rests its
conclusion in part on the basis that the circuit court held the
State to the clear and convincing standard during the
dispositional phase. Like the dissent, I do not understand why
that would be relevant to whether the State proved that A.G.'s
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.

                                             6
                                                                          No.    2022AP652.rfd

       ¶50    REBECCA        FRANK      DALLET,         J.    (dissenting).                 The

Constitution requires that pleas be knowingly, intelligently,

and voluntarily entered.                  State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246,

257,    389   N.W.2d 12           (1986).      Accordingly,          when       we    evaluate

whether a plea met that constitutional standard, we must focus

on what the person entering the plea knew "at the time of the

plea acceptance."            See State v. Finley, 2016 WI 63, ¶44, 370

Wis. 2d 402, 882 N.W.2d 761.                   The lead opinion fails at this

basic   task,       focusing       instead     on   what     A.G.       knew    many    months

before entering his plea and on what happened after.                              Worse yet,

if the lead opinion's approach were adopted, it would upset our

well-settled approach to plea-withdrawal claims in the process.

Because I conclude that A.G. is entitled to withdraw his plea, I

respectfully dissent.

                                               I

       ¶51    The    State        petitioned       to   terminate        A.G.'s       parental

rights to his daughter.                Termination of parental rights (TPR)

cases    implicate         parents'       fundamental        right       to     raise    their
children, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), and

are    thus   "among        the    most     consequential          of    judicial        acts,"

involving     "'the        awesome    authority         of   the     State       to     destroy

permanently          all      legal         recognition         of        the         parental

relationship.'"            Steven V. v. Kelley H., 2004 WI 47, ¶21, 271

Wis. 2d 1, 678 N.W.2d 856 (quoting Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S.,

2001 WI 110, ¶20, 246 Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768).                                     For that
reason, numerous statutory and constitutional protections apply

in TPR cases.
                                               1
                                                                      No.    2022AP652.rfd

       ¶52      These protections apply at each of the two phases of a

TPR case.        The first or "grounds" phase concerns whether one or

more of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights

enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 48.415(1)-(10) exist.                            See Kenosha

Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodie W., 2006 WI 93, ¶10 n.10,

293    Wis. 2d 530,           716    N.W.2d 845.           At     this      phase,    the

Constitution requires "fundamentally fair procedures," including

a hearing and proof by the State1 of the grounds for termination

by clear and convincing evidence.                    Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748,

753-54.      The second or "dispositional" phase concerns "whether

it    is   in    the    child's      best    interest      to    terminate      parental

rights."        Jodie W., 293 Wis. 2d 530, ¶10 n.10.                  At this phase,

"[t]he parent has the right to present evidence and be heard,"

and   if     "'the     evidence      does   not     warrant     the   termination       of

parental     rights,'"        then   the    court    may   dismiss       the   petition.

Evelyn       C.R.,      246     Wis. 2d 1,          ¶23    (quoting         Wis.     Stat.

§ 48.427(2)).

                                             A

       ¶53      In this case, A.G. pleaded no contest at the grounds

phase,     effectively        conceding     the   State's       allegation     that    his

daughter was a child in need of protection or services (CHIPS)——

one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights.

See Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2).                 This was a meaningful concession,

since it meant A.G. was giving up his constitutional right to

       Counties may also file TPR petitions, but for simplicity I
       1

will refer to the petitioner as the State throughout this
opinion.

                                             2
                                                                          No.    2022AP652.rfd

hold the State to its burden of proving that he was an unfit

parent by clear and convincing evidence.                         See Evelyn C.R., 246

Wis. 2d 1,       ¶22    (explaining       that       at    the   grounds         phase    "the

parent's rights are paramount").                    To ensure that he understood

the important rights he was waiving, the circuit court conducted

a    colloquy     before    accepting         A.G.'s       plea.         See     Wis.    Stat.

§ 48.422(7);      see     also    Brown       Cnty.     Dep't    of      Human    Servs.    v.

Brenda B., 2011 WI 6, ¶34, 331 Wis. 2d 310, 795 N.W.2d 730 ("A

parent   who     chooses    to        enter   a    no     contest      plea     during   [the

grounds] phase is giving up valuable protections and must have

knowledge of the rights being waived by making the plea.").

       ¶54   During that colloquy, the circuit court explained what

it called A.G.'s "trial rights" during the grounds phase.                                Those

included the right to a trial before the court or a jury to

determine       whether    grounds       to       terminate      his     parental       rights

existed.     At that trial, the circuit court said "[A.G.] would

have a whole bunch of rights," including:                           (1) "the right to

force the State to prove the grounds by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence to a reasonable certainty;" (2) "the right

of   cross-examination           of    your    witnesses;"         (3)    "the     right    to

introduce evidence;" (4) "the right to compel witnesses to come

to court and testify;" and (5) "the right to testify . . . or

remain   silent,       knowing,        though,      that    silence       be     [sic]   used

against you in this kind of case."                    After A.G. confirmed that he

understood those "trial rights," the circuit court then told

A.G. about the dispositional phase:                       "[t]he second half of the
case is where the [c]ourt decides is it in the child's best

                                              3
                                                                       No.    2022AP652.rfd

interest to in fact terminate your parental rights."                              At that

phase, the circuit court said, A.G. would have "all those same

trial rights."

       ¶55    A.G.    argues     that       there    were     two    defects     in   this

colloquy.       First, he asserts that the circuit court did not

inform him of the two potential outcomes of the dispositional

phase——granting the petition and terminating his parental rights

or dismissing the petition.2                 See § 48.422(7)(a) (requiring the

circuit court, before entering a plea, to ensure it is made

"with      understanding    of    .     .     .   the    potential    dispositions").

Second, A.G. contends that at the time of his plea, the circuit

court did not inform him of the correct statutory standard that

applies at the dispositional phase.                      See Oneida Cnty. Dep't of

Soc.       Servs.    v.   Therese       S.,       2008   WI    App    159,     ¶16,    314

Wis. 2d 493, 762 N.W.2d 122 (holding that before accepting a no-

contest plea to grounds, the circuit court "must inform the

parent that '[t]he best interests of the child shall be the

prevailing factor considered by the court in determining the
disposition.'" (quoting Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2))).                            According to

       If the circuit court terminates parental rights, it "may
       2

exercise   several    alternatives   for   designating   custody,
guardianship, and care of the child."            Brenda B., 331
Wis. 2d 310, ¶52.      Nevertheless, the availability of those
alternatives depends on the circuit court first determining that
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the
child.    Id.    Accordingly, the circuit court complies with
§ 48.422(7)(a)'s    directive    to   address    "the   potential
dispositions" so long as it identifies      "the two independent
dispositions available to the circuit court. That is, the court
may decide between dismissing the petition and terminating
parental rights." Id., ¶56.

                                              4
                                                                          No.    2022AP652.rfd

A.G.,     the    correct       statutory       standard         that   applies       at     the

dispositional phase is simply the best interests of the child,

and "Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2) . . . does not set a burden of proof

level."        During the plea colloquy, however, the circuit court

indicated that the State would have the burden of proving by

clear and convincing evidence at the dispositional phase that

termination of his parental rights was in his daughter's best

interest.        As a result, A.G. contends that his plea was not

knowingly,       intelligently,         and    voluntarily        entered.          I     focus

solely on A.G.'s second argument because it is dispositive.

                                               B

    ¶56        To understand why A.G. should be permitted to withdraw

his plea on this basis, it is first necessary to review the

legal framework for plea-withdrawal claims and the procedural

history of this case.             State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 274-

75, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) provides the framework for evaluating

whether A.G. is entitled to withdraw his plea.                                  See Waukesha

County    v.    Steven    H.,    2000    WI        28,   ¶42,   233    Wis. 2d 344,         607
N.W.2d 607, modified on other grounds by St. Croix Cnty. Dep't

of Health & Human Servs. v. Michael D., 2016 WI 35, ¶¶3-4, 368

Wis. 2d 170, 880 N.W.2d 107.                  Bangert and our subsequent plea-

withdrawal cases set forth a two-step approach.                           First, a plea-

withdrawal       motion    "is    reviewed          by    the    court"     to     determine

whether it "establishes a prima facie violation of . . . court-

mandated       duties    and    makes    the       requisite     allegations,"          namely
that "the defendant did not know or understand the information

that should have been provided at the plea hearing."                                State v.
                                               5
                                                                                No.    2022AP652.rfd

Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶¶39-40, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906.

If    the    motion        clears    that       hurdle,        the     second         step    is     an

evidentiary hearing "at which the state is given an opportunity

to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's

plea    was     knowing,          intelligent,           and    voluntary             despite      the

identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy."                            Id., ¶40

       ¶57    When     A.G.       moved    to    withdraw        his    plea,         the    circuit

court initially denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing

because it "actually did use a clear and convincing standard

when it assessed whether it thought it was in the child's best

interest to terminate the parental rights."                            In other words, the

circuit court concluded that A.G.'s motion did not satisfy the

first    step    of        Bangert——making           a   prima       facie      case        for    plea

withdrawal——because            even       if    A.G.       wasn't       told          the    correct

statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase, the

circuit       court        ultimately       applied        the       clear-and-convincing-

evidence standard that it said it would.

       ¶58    The court of appeals reversed, holding that A.G. was
not informed of the correct statutory standard that applies at

the    dispositional          phase       because        "contrary         to    the        [circuit]

court's statement, at the dispositional hearing, the 'same trial

rights' do not apply.               There is not a burden of proof placed on

the State."           State v. A.G., No. 2021AP1476, unpublished slip

op., ¶17 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2022) (emphasis added).                                          Thus,

the court of appeals held that the correct statutory standard

that    applies       at    the     dispositional         phase       is     simply         the    best

                                                 6
                                                                No.    2022AP652.rfd

interests of the child, with no burden on any party.3                      See id.

Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that A.G.'s motion

made a prima facie case for plea withdrawal and that he was

entitled    to   an   evidentiary     hearing   on     remand     to     determine

whether    his   plea   was    knowing,     intelligent,     and        voluntary,

despite    the   information    he   received   regarding        the     statutory

standard that applies at the dispositional phase.                Id., ¶22.

    ¶59     Before    discussing     what   happened    at   the       evidentiary

hearing, it is important to emphasize that the State did not

appeal from this decision by the court of appeals.                    And for that

    3  This is a debatable conclusion. To be sure, Wis. Stat. §
48.426(2) does not contain a burden of proof. It merely states
that "[t]he best interests of the child shall be the prevailing
factor considered by the court in determining the disposition."
Id. That being said, the State is the petitioner in this case.
As such, the State must——at a minimum——produce some evidence of
the best interests of the child at the dispositional phase.
Otherwise, the petition would have to be denied.        Moreover,
given the weighty constitutional rights at play in TPR cases,
other courts have held that the Constitution requires proof that
termination is in the child's best interest by a preponderance
of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence.    See Kent K.
v. Bobby M., 110 P.3d 1013, 1021-22 (Ariz. 2005) (holding that
due process requires proof of the child's best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence); In re D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185, 188
(S.D. 1984) (stating that "[t]he trial court must find by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is
in the best interests of the child" (quoting another source));
see also In re B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 838 n.11 (Utah 2020)
(explaining that, in the context of the best-interest-of-the-
child inquiry, "the clear and convincing standard might be
constitutionally mandated"); Brian C. Hill, Comment, The State's
Burden of Proof at the Best Interests Stage of a Termination of
Parental Rights, 2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 557, 576-84 (arguing that
the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court in Santosky, requires proof of the best interests
of the child by clear and convincing evidence). Nevertheless, as
discussed below, the question of whether there is a burden of
proof at the dispositional phase is not before us.

                                       7
                                                                   No.    2022AP652.rfd

reason,      the   court   of    appeals'        conclusion     that     the   correct

statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase is

the best interests of the child with no burden on any party is

the law of the case.            The law of the case is "a 'longstanding

rule' that requires courts to adhere to an appellate court's

ruling on a legal issue 'in all subsequent proceedings in the

trial court or on later appeal.'"                 State v. Jensen, 2021 WI 27,

¶13, 396 Wis. 2d 196, 957 N.W.2d 244 (quoting State v. Stuart,

2003 WI 73,        ¶23, 262 Wis. 2d 620, 664 N.W.2d 82).                       Although

there are exceptions to the law of the case, none of them apply

here.4       Accordingly,       we   need       not   decide    what     the    correct

statutory standard is at the dispositional phase; instead, we

must adhere to the court of appeals' holding that the standard

is the best interests of the child with no burden on any party.

And   that    means   that      to   determine        whether    A.G.'s     plea   was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, we have to evaluate whether

the State proved by clear and convincing evidence at the Bangert

hearing that, at the time he entered his plea, A.G. knew that
standard.

      4Those exceptions apply when "'a controlling authority has
since made a contrary decision of law' on the same issue," "when
the evidence at a subsequent trial is 'substantially different'
than that at the initial trial; and when following the law of
the case would result in a 'manifest injustice.'"     Jensen, 396
Wis. 2d 196, ¶13, n.8 (quoting Stuart, 262 Wis. 2d 620, ¶24).

     Because the court of appeals' conclusion that there is no
burden of proof on the State at the dispositional phase is the
law of the case, I do not address the guardian ad litem's
argument that the court should hold that the burden is clear and
convincing evidence.

                                            8
                                                                        No.    2022AP652.rfd

       ¶60    A.G.    did    not    appear    at    the    Bangert     hearing        and    no

witnesses were called to testify.                   Instead, the State relied on

the transcript of A.G.'s plea hearing, as well as transcripts of

prior and subsequent hearings in the case.                        See Steven H., 233

Wis. 2d 344, ¶42 (explaining that at a Bangert hearing "a court

may examine the entire record, not merely one proceeding, and

look at the totality of the circumstances to determine" whether

the plea was constitutionally sufficient).                      The sole question is

whether       this   evidence       clearly       and    convincingly         demonstrates

that,    at    the    time   he     entered       his   plea,   A.G.    knew        that    the

statutory standard that would apply at the dispositional phase

was the best interests of the child with no burden on any party.

       ¶61     The plea colloquy indicates that he did not.                           During

that colloquy, the circuit court described a different standard.

The court explained that A.G.'s "trial rights" at the grounds

phase included "the right to force the State to prove grounds by

clear,    convincing,        and     satisfactory       evidence     to   a     reasonable

certainty."          And then the circuit court said that A.G. would
have "those same trial rights" at the dispositional phase.                                   In

other words, the circuit court told A.G. that the State would

have to prove the best interests of the child by clear and

convincing evidence.               But that is not the statutory standard

that    applies      at   the      dispositional        phase   under     the       court    of

appeals' prior ruling in this case.                     Thus, A.G.'s plea colloquy

was defective.

       ¶62     The remaining evidence falls far short of showing, let
alone    clearly      and    convincingly,          that   A.G.    knew       the    correct

                                              9
                                                                       No.     2022AP652.rfd

statutory standard that would apply at the dispositional phase

despite the defective plea colloquy.                Indeed, the only evidence

that even suggests that A.G. knew the correct standard is a

transcript of a hearing ten months before his plea.                                  At that

hearing,       the   circuit    court   explained        that       the   dispositional

phase "focus[es] on what outcome is best for the kids that are

involved,"      and that "everybody gets to put on testimony and

evidence and argue to [the court] what they think is best for

the kids that are involved," before the circuit court made the

ultimate determination of "what outcome is best for the kids."

This    ten-month-old       transcript       describes        the   best-interest-of-

the-child standard and does not reference a burden of proof on

any party.

       ¶63     Given that A.G. received conflicting information at

these    two    hearings,      the   State    failed     to    prove      by    clear    and

convincing evidence that, at the time he entered his plea, A.G.

knew the statutory standard that applies at the dispositional

phase.        To conclude otherwise would be absurd, since we would
have to assume that A.G. ignored or disregarded the information

he received from the circuit court during the plea colloquy in

favor    of    different    information       he   was    told       once      ten    months

earlier.       Additionally, common sense tells us that people forget

                                         10
                                                             No.    2022AP652.rfd

things they were told ten months earlier.5                That is especially

true when a non-lawyer is advised about the details of legal

proceedings he is facing and with which he is likely unfamiliar.

For these reasons, the State failed to prove that A.G. knew the

statutory standard that applies at the dispositional phase, and

he is therefore entitled to withdraw his plea.               See Finley, 370

Wis. 2d 402, ¶95 (explaining that when the State fails to meet

its burden of proof at a Bangert hearing, the movant is entitled

to withdraw his plea).

                                        C

    ¶64    The lead opinion tries to justify a different result

by relying on our decision in State v. Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30.

In that case, a criminal defendant was told during his plea

hearing that he could be sentenced to a maximum of six years of

imprisonment.      Id.,    ¶16.        In   fact,   the   maximum     potential

sentence   was   eight    years   of   imprisonment.        Id.      After   the

defendant was sentenced to the six years of imprisonment, he

    5  For this reason, I similarly question the lead opinion's
reliance on this same ten-month-old transcript (and related
factual findings by the circuit court) in rejecting A.G.'s
alternative argument that he is entitled to withdraw his plea
because the circuit court failed to advise him of the potential
dispositions.   See lead op., ¶30.    Additionally, much of the
other evidence the lead opinion cites in support of that
conclusion is also suspect. For example, what A.G. knew the day
after he entered his plea is at best a weak indication of what
he knew when that plea was entered since people can learn new
things from day to day.      See id.    And the lead opinion's
speculation about what A.G.'s counsel might have told him before
entering his plea is just that——speculation.      See id., ¶32.
There is no evidence in the record about what A.G.'s counsel did
or did not tell A.G.

                                       11
                                                                            No.   2022AP652.rfd

moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he did not know

the maximum potential sentence.                         Id.,    ¶18.       The defendant's

motion was denied without an evidentiary hearing.                             Id., ¶20.       We

affirmed,    explaining         that        an     evidentiary         hearing         was   not

required because the record was "replete with evidence" that the

defendant, in fact, knew the maximum sentence he faced at the

time he entered his plea.               See id., ¶¶35-39.                  In doing so, we

emphasized       that    we    were     not        engaging      in    a     harmless-error

analysis,    instead       reiterating           that    "the    focus      is    on    whether

the . . . plea          was    entered           knowingly,        intelligently,            and

voluntarily" in spite of any claimed error.                        Id., ¶41 n.11.

    ¶65     According to the lead opinion, A.G. is not entitled

withdraw his plea because, "[l]ike the defendant in Taylor, [he]

received what the circuit court told him he would receive."

Lead op., ¶35.          That is because, as mentioned previously, the

circuit    court    said      that    it    applied       the     clear-and-convincing-

evidence standard at the dispositional phase.                           For this reason,
the lead opinion concludes that "A.G. was not inhibited from

weighing    the    pros       and    cons    of     entering       this      particular       no

contest plea by being told the State would have to satisfy a

particular burden of proof because the State was actually held

to and did satisfy that burden."                   Id.

    ¶66     There       are   several       problems       with    the      lead    opinion's

reliance    on     Taylor,      and    with        its    analysis         more    generally.

First, Taylor was evaluating a different question than the one
we are addressing in this case.                     Taylor concerned only whether

                                              12
                                                                            No.   2022AP652.rfd

the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the

first    step       of     Bangert's      two-part       plea-withdrawal           framework.

Taylor,      347     Wis. 2d 30,       ¶42.       At    that    step,       the   court    must

determine         only   whether     the   defendant's          motion      makes    a    prima

facie showing of that the plea colloquy was defective and that

he "did not, in fact, know or understand the information that

should have been been provided during the plea colloquy."                                  Id.,

¶32.     If the defendant's motion makes that showing, the next

step    is    an    evidentiary      hearing       at    which       "the   State    has    the

burden       to    prove     by   clear    and     convincing         evidence      that    the

defendant's plea, despite the inadequacy of the plea colloquy,

was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."                       Id.

       ¶67        In this case, unlike in Taylor, the court of appeals

has already determined that A.G.'s motion made the prima facie

case entitling him to an evidentiary hearing, and remanded for

an evidentiary hearing.                A.G., No. 2021AP1476, at ¶22.                     And as

explained previously, that decision was not appealed and the

court    of       appeals'    conclusion      is       thus    the    law    of    the    case.
Accordingly, the only question before us is whether the State

met its burden at the evidentiary hearing of proving by clear

and     convincing          evidence       that        A.G.'s     plea       was     knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary.                Thus, Taylor's rule simply does not

apply    to       A.G.'s     case.      Indeed,        we     distinguished        Taylor    on

precisely these grounds in State v. Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402.                                 In

that case, we explained that Taylor does not apply when, as

here, an evidentiary hearing was held on the plea-withdrawal
motion.       Finley, 370 Wis. 2d 402, ¶¶82-85.

                                              13
                                                                     No.    2022AP652.rfd

       ¶68     Second, even if Taylor did apply, the lead opinion

mischaracterizes its conclusion.                   Contrary to the lead opinion's

assertions, Taylor did not conclude that whenever a defendant

"receive[s] what the circuit court told him he would receive,"

he is not entitled to withdraw his plea.                        See lead op., ¶35.

Instead,       we   held   that     the      plea   in   that   case     "was   entered

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily [because] the record

makes clear that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that

could be imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing

of the penalty that he received."                    Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶8;

see     also     Finley,      370     Wis. 2d 402,       ¶79    (describing      Taylor

similarly).         Thus, the reason the defendant in Taylor wasn't

entitled to withdraw his plea was because "the . . . record

revealed that the defendant knew the potential punishment he

faced    if     convicted"——not        because      he   received    a   sentence    the

circuit        court   told     him     he     could     receive.          Finley,   370

Wis. 2d 402, ¶87.          This conclusion is in keeping with our other

plea    withdrawal      cases,      which      likewise    focus    on     whether   the
defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based

on the information he knew at the time he entered the plea.                          See

id., ¶44.

       ¶69     The lead opinion, by contrast, looks only to events

that occurred after A.G. entered his plea.                          To be sure, the

State may rely on evidence from after a plea is entered to show

that the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.                               See

Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶32; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 269, 283.
But that evidence still must demonstrate what A.G. knew at the

                                              14
                                                                              No.    2022AP652.rfd

time he entered his plea.                    And here, the fact that the circuit

court    held      the     State      to     a    heightened         burden     of     proof      at

disposition        tells       us    nothing       about      what    A.G.     knew       when    he

entered his plea.               Moreover, unlike in Taylor, where the plea

questionnaire/waiver of rights form, information, and criminal

complaint       all      demonstrated         what      the    defendant       knew       when    he

entered his plea, here we have none of that.                                 See Taylor, 347

Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶35-38.                 On the contrary, we have a description

given once ten months before his plea that, under the law of the

case, is correct.              And we have a different one given the day he

entered      the    plea.           This     is   far       from    clear     and    convincing

evidence     that       A.G.     knew      the    correct      statutory       standard         that

applies at the dispositional phase.

       ¶70    Finally, although the lead opinion denies it, it is

importing     a     harmless         error    standard        into    the     plea-withdrawal

context.      See lead op., ¶36 n.8.                   That is the upshot of the lead

opinion's          claims        that        "[t]he         error      could        have        been

consequential,           but    it    became      insubstantial         when        the    circuit
court    actually         held      the    State       to    the    clear     and    convincing

standard,"        and    that       A.G.    "benefitted        from    the     circuit       court

holding . . .           the State[] to a burden of proof the law did not

require [it] to meet."                Id., ¶¶36 n.8, 37.              In essence, the lead

opinion      is    conceding         that     A.G.      did    not    know     the     statutory

standard that applies at the dispositional phase, but arguing

that    there      was    no     harm      because      the    State    was     held       to    the

standard of proof the circuit court said it would apply.                                         The
only reason we would care whether the circuit court did what it

                                                  15
                                                                            No.     2022AP652.rfd

said it would do, or whether someone benefitted from an error,

is if we are evaluating whether they were harmed by that error.

Yet, as Taylor said, our plea-withdrawal cases "clearly d[o] not

engage in a harmless error analysis."                      347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶41.

       ¶71    Nevertheless, the lead opinion claims that it isn't

doing a harmless-error analysis, since it does not "consider

whether and to what extent the information provided at the plea

colloquy caused A.G. to enter a plea he would not otherwise have

entered."       Id., ¶36 n.8 (citing State v. Barnes, 2023 WI 45,

¶29, ___ Wis. 2d ____, 990 N.W.2d 759).                        Doing that, in the lead

opinion's      view,        would       be     evaluating      whether        an    error     was

harmless.      See id.        But that is exactly what the lead opinion is

doing.       It repeatedly asserts that A.G. "was not inhibited from

weighing      the    pros     and       cons     of   entering       this     particular       no

contest      plea"     by    the     information         he    received        in     the    plea

colloquy,      and    that     his       "knowledge      at    the     time    of     the    plea

permitted him to accurately weigh the pros and cons of entering

this specific plea."               See id. ¶¶36-37.              Thus, the lead opinion
is    in   fact      "consider[ing]            whether     and    to    what        extent     the

information         provided       at    the     plea    colloquy"       affected           A.G.'s

decision to plead no contest.                   See id., ¶36 n.8.

       ¶72    This approach, if taken seriously, would allow courts

to    substitute      their     own          speculation      about    whether        someone's

"knowledge at the time of plea permitted him to accurately weigh

the    pros     and     cons        of       entering      this      specific        plea"     or

"benefitted" from an error for the clear and convincing evidence
of what he actually knew that our cases require.                                  Compare lead

                                                 16
                                                                      No.    2022AP652.rfd

op.,    ¶¶36     n.8,       37,    with      Finley,        370   Wis. 2d 402,       ¶95.

Thankfully, because the lead opinion fails to garner four votes,

that approach is not our law.                 Because we should keep the focus

in   evaluating       a    plea-withdrawal        motion     where   it     belongs——"on

whether the . . . plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily"      in       spite   of   any       claimed    error——I       respectfully

dissent.     See Taylor, 370 Wis. 2d 30, ¶41 n.11

       ¶73   I   am       authorized    to    state    that       Justice    ANN   WALSH

BRADLEY joins this opinion.

                                             17
    No.   2022AP652.rfd

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