Court Opinion

ID: 9849643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:31.780504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.498999
License: Public Domain

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
As a result of the government’s fatally flawed interpretation of § 1151(b), Osserit-ta Robinson will be removed from the United States, in spite of her full compliance with the INA, simply because the petition filed on her behalf by her deceased husband is stuck in the government’s bureaucracy. The government argues, and the majority agrees, that both the plain language of the statute and deference to their implementation of this provision dictate this result. I disagree for three reasons. First, I believe the plain language leads to a contrary result. Second, even were this definition ambiguous, I *368would not defer to the government’s interpretation. Third, I do not think that Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) even applies. I will discuss these reasons in inverse order.
In Chevron the Court ruled that when Congress explicitly or implicitly delegates authority to an executive agency to develop regulations and practices to fill the interstices in the law, the courts must defer to them. The Court held that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” (Quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)). In Chevron Congress had failed to define a term. The EPA promulgated detailed regulations and national standards defining the term at issue. The Court held that because the regulatory scheme was “technical and complex,” the agency “considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involve[d] reconciling conflicting policies,” courts must defer to the technical expertise of the agency. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
Here Congress provided us with a definition of “immediate relative” and had no reason to delegate, explicitly or implicitly, any further authority to the executive department to further tweak the definition. The words and phrases at issue are not technical. The agency has no relevant expertise to more fully define them for us. There is no legislative history to suggest there existed any controversy which Congress referred to the agency to resolve. The only reasonable inference to draw is that Congress did not intend to delegate any authority to the agency on this issue at all. As a result it is for the court to use our standard, time-honored means of statutory construction. The mere fact that the panel is divided on how to read the definition at issue is no reason to call upon Chevron to bail us out.
Even were this a Chevron matter, I would not defer to the government’s interpretation. The government stated that, historically, it has interpreted § 1151(b)(2)(A)® and the term “spouse” to exclude aliens like Robinson from the grant of an immediate relative classification. To me, the government’s argument is an attempt to use Chevron to defend an errant interpretation of the statute primarily because the same error has been made for a number of years. Moreover, even the government’s claim of consistency does not withstand scrutiny. I would consider it an abdication of my judicial obligation to construe and apply the statute, and a denial of Robinson’s right-of-access to the courts, to defer to departmental interpretations that are as unfounded as this.
The government, and the majority, refer to Matter of Varela 13 I. & N. Dec. 453 (BIA 1970), as primary evidence of its persistent approach to this statute. Yet, I am persuaded by the analysis of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit that Varela was invalidated because it was deemed extra-jurisdictional. Freeman v. Robinson, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.2006). I simply do not regard Varela as carrying any weight.
Moreover, the government’s reference to a 1938 INS amendment to a regulation is not on point. This amendment states that the issuance of a visa will be withheld and approval of a petition may be revoked “if it is ascertained that the petitioner ... has died.” 3 Fed.Reg. 263 (1938). The amendment refers to the government’s general authority to revoke an approved I-130 petition or withhold the grant of a visa. Neither of these actions deal with the topic at hand, which is whether the government *369has authority to terminate a properly filed 1-130 petition that is still pending, based only upon the death of the petitioner. Additionally, the regulation refers generically to petitioners rather than “spouse.” The government’s use of the 1938 amendment as evidence of a consistent interpretation of § 1151(b)(b)(2)(A)(i) is specious.
With regard to the plain meaning of the statute, I disagree with the majority’s definition of “spouse.” The government argues and the majority contends that the terms “surviving spouse” or “former spouse” are distinct from the common understanding of the word “spouse.” The majority attempts to bolster its position by, among other things, emphasizing Congress’ use of the phrase “was the spouse” in § 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i). Yet, we need look no further than the language used later in the same sentence to appreciate the inconsistency that this restrictive definition creates.
In the case of an alien who was the spouse of a citizen of the United States for at least 2 years at the time of the citizen’s death and was not legally separated from the citizen at the time of the citizen’s death, the alien (and each child of the alien) shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection, to remain an immediate relative after the date of the citizen’s death but only if the spouse files a petition under section 1 154(a)(l)(A)(ii) of this title within 2 years after such date and only until the date the spouse remarries. (Emphasis added).
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). Similarly, in discussing which foreign nationals may self-petition after the death of a husband or wife who was a citizen or legal permanent resident of the United States, the statute states:
For purposes of subclause (I), an alien described in this subclause is an alien ... (CC) who was a bona fide spouse of a United States citizen within the past 2 years and — (aaa) whose spouse died within the past 2 years.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(i)(II). In both sections of this statute, the word “spouse” is used without any qualifying terms such as “former” or “surviving.”
It is obvious to me that Congress used “spouse” to refer to a continuing marital bond between the deceased petitioner and a surviving husband or wife. Therefore, the majority’s interpretation fails to meet one of the principal rules of statutory construction, which is to give terms consistent meaning. In light of this, I cannot accept the government’s narrow definition of “spouse.” As the statute plainly reads, “spouse” is an inclusive term that includes aliens such as Robinson who survive the death of their petitioning husband or wife.
I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s reliance upon the present tense verbs that appear in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b), a provision that focuses upon the government’s “[investigation; consultation; approval; [and] authorization to grant preference status.” (Emphasis added.) Although the majority masterfully reviews the immediate relative petitioning process, its opinion exposes a fundamental confusion between an 1-130 petition, which is filed to request an alien’s classification as an immediate relative, and an 1-485 petition, which is filed to request the grant of an alien’s change of status. By extracting a sentence from § 1154(b), the majority opinion succeeds only in raising the question of whether the petitioning spouse must be alive during the investigation of the 1-485 petition for change of status, a question that is not at issue here. I view the discussion of § 1154(b) as irrelevant. This appeal focuses only upon Robinson’s classification as an immediate relative, not her change of status.
Regarding the majority’s structural interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 115 1(b)(2)(A)(i), I *370do not agree that the second sentence clearly modifies the first sentence. To the contrary, I submit that the only reasonable way to understand these two sentences is if they are read as independent. The District Court correctly found that the first sentence lists spouse, without any qualifying terms, as one type of relationship that enables an alien to be given an immediate relative classification. The second sentence refers to scenarios in which the petitioning spouse has died, but it concludes by saying that an alien in this circumstance can be classified as an immediate relative “but only if the spouse files a petition under section 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) of this title within 2 years after such date and only until the date the spouse remarries.” The statute does not mandate the termination of 1130 petitions upon the death of a petitioner, and even the regulations make it clear that a pending or approved 1-130 eliminates the need for the filing of a self-petition.10 Therefore, the only person to whom this second sentence in § 1151 (b) (2) (A) (i) can refer is an alien who is not the beneficiary of a pending or approved 1-130 at the time of the death of the petitioner.
To me, applying this two-year marital requirement to even those who have already filed an 1-130 implicitly presumes to be invalid the marriage of those who are wed less than two years before the petitioning spouse dies. This is inconsistent with the statute. As a result, after reviewing both the language and the structure of section 1151 (b)(2)(A)(i) it is clear to me that the two sentences are to be read as describing two distinct tracks for an alien spouse to obtain an immediate relative classification: petition by a living spouse, or self-petitioning.
I also oppose granting the government an expanded scope of authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1155.11 The government argued that since § 1155 already gives it power to revoke the acceptance of an 1-130 petition upon the death of the petitioner, it implicitly already has the power to terminate pending 1-130 petitions upon the death of the petitioner. In my view, this interpretation of § 1155 is seriously flawed.
As the government would certainly concede, the plain language of § 1155 does not provide governmental authority to terminate pending 1-130 petitions. Its authority is limited to revoking approved petitions. Moreover, upon examining the regulations that implement § 1155, it is clear to me that the government’s interpretation of § 1155 and § 1151 (b) (2) (A) (i) results in an arbitrary outcome that defies both reason and equity. The statutory interpretation argued by the government and approved by the majority will not only summarily terminate Robinson’s properly *371filed 1-130 petition, it will also create a regulatory crevice into which Robinson will be dropped.
Under the regulations, the government has discretion to both withhold automatic revocation of an approved 1-130 petition, and to refrain from denying a visa in cases where humanitarian concerns justify such relief. 8 C.F.R. 205.1(a)(3)(i)(c)(2).12 The problem created in the majority’s interpretation of § 1151(b) and § 1155 is that it denies Robinson’s opportunity for discretionary relief, even though she would have qualified for it but for the delays of the government in approving Robinson’s I-130. The practical effect of the majority’s opinion is not only that Robinson’s 1-130 will be terminated because of the government’s dilatory action — or inaction — on her husband’s petition, but also that she will be removed from the country, since no other relief is available to her under the INA.13 The District Court was correct in stating that “the fortuity of the citizen spouse’s untimely death is too arbitrary and random a circumstance to serve as a basis for denying the petition.” Robinson v. Cher-toff, 2007 WL 1412284, *4 (D.N.J.).
Finally, it is inconceivable to me that Congress intended an alien’s status to be contingent upon the amount of time that the executive department takes to process a timely and proper petition — a factor completely outside of the control of the alien. This interpretation creates an arbitrary, irrational and inequitable outcome in which approvable petitions will be treated differently depending solely upon when the government grants the approval. Nor do I believe that Congress intended to sanction the disregard that the department has shown towards persons like Osseritta Robinson. She has committed no crime. She is innocent of any misbehavior. She is a grieving widow and the lone parent of the Robinsons’ U.S. citizen child. This same department whose delay or inaction forecloses Osseritta Robinson’s chance of becoming an American, now so diligently pursues the avenues of her expulsion. It contends that the statute is ambiguous and then urges upon us the least reasonable and least humane alternative. My view, wholly in the margin, is that it is untoward of this nation of immigrants, we who have passed through the portals of citizenship, to coldly and impassively slam the door behind us on innocent aspirants who dream to follow.
Because I read the plain language and structure of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) as enabling Robinson to be classified as an immediate relative, I dissent.

. "A currently valid visa petition previously approved to classify the beneficiary as an immediate relative as the spouse of a United States citizen must be regarded, upon the death of the petitioner, as having been approved as a Form 1-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant for classification under paragraph (b) of this section, if, on the date of the petitioner’s death, the beneficiary satisfies the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section. If the petitioner dies before the petition is approved, but, on the date of the petitioner’s death, the beneficiary satisfies the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, then the petition shall be adjudicated as if it had been filed as a Form 1-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er) or Special Immigrant under paragraph (b) of this section.” 8 C.F.R. 204.2(i)(l)(iv).

. "The Secretary of Homeland Security may, at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause, revoke the approval of any petition approved by him under section 1154 of this title. Such revocation shall be effective as of the date of approval of any such petition.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1155.

. "The approval of a petition or self-petition made under section 204 of the Act and in accordance with part 204 of this chapter is revoked as of the date of approval: ... Upon the death of the petitioner, unless: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determines, as a matter of discretion exercised for humanitarian reasons in light of the facts of a particular appeal, that it is inappropriate to revoke the approval of the petition. USCIS may make this determination only if the principal beneficiary of the visa petition asks for reinstatement of the approval of the petition and establishes that a person related to the principal beneficiary in one of the ways described in section 213A(£)(5)(B) of the Act is willing and able to file an affidavit of support under 8 CFR part 213a as a substitute sponsor.” 8 C.F.R. 205.1 (a)(3)(i)(c)(2).

. I am aware that Robinson can seek from Congress a private bill to prevent her removal, but this extraordinary relief is outside of the scope of the INA. Our task in interpreting statutes is to remain within the four corners of the statute and regulations to ascertain whether a particular interpretation yields unreasonable or arbitrary results.