Court Opinion

ID: 9910306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:01:47.470786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:29.968073
License: Public Domain

REL: December 15, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CL-2023-0272
                                   _________________________

                                                    P.R.

                                                      v.

            Houston County Department of Human Resources

                        Appeal from Houston Juvenile Court
                                   (JU-19-169.03)

EDWARDS, Judge.

        In December 2022, the Houston County Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") filed in the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile

court") a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of P.R. ("the

mother") to T.C. "(the child"). After a trial held on April 20, 2023, the
CL-2023-0272

juvenile court entered a judgment terminating the mother's parental

rights. She timely appealed that judgment to this court.

     The grounds warranting a termination of parental rights are set

forth in § 12-15-319, Ala. Code 1975, a part of the Alabama Juvenile

Justice Act ("the AJJA"), § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Section 12-

15-319(a) provides, in pertinent part:

     "If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence,
     competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parent[]
     of a child [is] unable or unwilling to discharge [his or her]
     responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or
     condition of the parent[] renders [him or her] unable to
     properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition
     is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it may
     terminate the parental rights of the parent[]. In a hearing on
     a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall
     consider the best interests of the child. In determining
     whether or not the parent[] [is] unable or unwilling to
     discharge [his or her] responsibilities to and for the child and
     to terminate the parental rights, the juvenile court shall
     consider the following factors including, but not limited to, the
     following:

                 "….

                "(2) Emotional illness, mental illness, or
           mental deficiency of the parent, or excessive use of
           alcohol or controlled substances, of a duration or
           nature as to render the parent unable to care for
           the needs of the child.

                                    2
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               "....

               "(7) That reasonable efforts by the
         Department of Human Resources or licensed
         public or private child care agencies leading
         toward the rehabilitation of the parent[] have
         failed.

               "....

               "(9) Failure by the parent[] to provide for the
         material needs of the child or to pay a reasonable
         portion of support of the child where the parent is
         able to do so.

               "(10) Failure by the parent[] to maintain
         regular visits with the child in accordance with a
         plan devised by the Department of Human
         Resources, or any public or licensed private child
         care agency, and agreed to by the parent.

                "(11) Failure by the parent[] to maintain
         consistent contact or communication with the
         child.

               "(12) Lack of effort by the parent to adjust his
         or her circumstances to meet the needs of the child
         in accordance with agreements reached, including
         agreements reached with local departments of
         human resources or licensed child-placing
         agencies, in an administrative review or a judicial
         review.

              "(13) The existence of any significant
         emotional ties that have developed between the
         child and his or her current foster parent or
                                3
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           parents, with additional consideration given to the
           following factors:

                       "a. The length of time that the
                 child has lived in a stable and
                 satisfactory environment.

                        "b. Whether severing the ties
                 between the child and his or her
                 current foster parent or parents is
                 contrary to the best interest of the
                 child.

                       "c. Whether the juvenile court
                 has found at least one other ground for
                 termination of parental rights."

In addition to determining whether a child is dependent and whether

grounds exist under § 12-15-319 to support a termination of parental

rights, a juvenile court must also "properly consider and reject all viable

alternatives to a termination of parental rights." B.M. v. State, 895 So.

2d 319, 331 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).

     Although a juvenile court's factual findings in a judgment

terminating parental rights based on evidence presented ore tenus are

presumed correct, K.P. v. Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 43 So. 3d

602, 605 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010), "[t]his court does not reweigh the evidence

but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile
                                   4
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court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found

to be clear and convincing." K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 653 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2016). That is, this court

     " 'must ... look through ["the prism of the substantive
     evidentiary burden," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
     U.S. 242, 254 (1986),] to determine whether there was
     substantial evidence before the trial court to support a factual
     finding, based upon the trial court's weighing of the evidence,
     that would "produce in the mind [of the trial court] a firm
     conviction as to each element of the claim and a high
     probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." ' "

K.S.B., 219 So. 3d at 653 (quoting Ex parte McInish, 47 So. 3d 767, 778

(Ala. 2008), quoting in turn Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-81(c)).

     Our review of the record reveals the following facts. Torrie Nelson,

a DHR employee, testified that she had been the mother's caseworker

from December 2018 until October 2020 and that DHR's involvement

with the mother had begun when DHR received a report indicating that

the mother was using illegal substances in the presence of her four

children. Nelson said that, after investigating the report, DHR found the

mother "indicated" for "chemical endangerment." See Ala. Code 1975, §

26-14-8(a)(1). She explained that, in December 2018, the mother entered

into a safety plan with DHR, pursuant to which the child was placed in
                                  5
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the care of N.B., a maternal great-aunt; Nelson testified that, in January

2020, the child was placed with "another maternal great-aunt, another

family member, relatives of the child," who had apparently secured a

provisional foster-care license. 1 Nelson then testified that, on March 8,

2020, the juvenile court awarded custody of the child to the mother's

great-grandmother, F.R. ("the maternal great-great grandmother").

     According to Nelson, in October 2018, the mother participated in an

individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting at which she agreed to

submit to a substance-abuse assessment and to random drug testing.

Nelson said that, at a January 2019 ISP meeting, the mother agreed to

continue to submit to random drug tests, to complete a substance-abuse

assessment and to follow the recommendations resulting from that

assessment, and to undergo a parenting assessment. Although Nelson

     1Nelson did not initially provide the names of the relatives with

whom the child was placed. However, when she was later asked the
names of the previous custodians of the child under the safety plan, she
replied with only one name -- N.B. In fact, during further questioning,
Nelson appeared to indicate that the child had had only two previous
placements or custodians -- the maternal great-great grandmother and
N.B. -- despite her initial testimony indicating that the child had had two
different relative placements before the juvenile court awarded custody
to the maternal great-great grandmother.
                                      6
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testified that the mother had complied with services "for a while," she

said that the mother had not attended most of the random drug tests that

Nelson had requested.

     Nelson described the mother as uncooperative and her behavior as

unpredictable. Nelson said that, at times, she had believed that she had

developed a rapport with the mother, resulting in the mother's

cooperation but that, at other times, the mother's behavior had been

erratic. She explained that she had witnessed the mother threatening

other DHR personnel and having outbursts at ISP meetings. In addition,

Nelson testified that a March 2020 ISP meeting had to be suspended

because of the aggressive behavior of the mother's boyfriend, P.G.

According to Nelson, she and a supervisor had discussed P.G.'s behavior

with the mother, and, in response, the mother had stated that she no

longer desired to participate in DHR's services. As a result, Nelson

explained, the mother had not participated in services offered through

DHR through at least October 2020, when Nelson ceased to be the

mother's caseworker. Nelson testified that, in October 2020, DHR had

assumed custody of the child after the maternal great-great grandmother

                                   7
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permitted the child to have unsupervised contact with the mother in

violation of the safety plan. The record contains a shelter-care order

entered in case number JU-19-169.02 on October 16, 2020; that order

reflects that the child's custodian at that time was the maternal great-

great grandmother.    The record also contains the dependency order

entered by the juvenile court in case number JU-19-169.02 in February

2022 that found the child dependent as to the mother and the maternal

great-great grandmother and transferred custody of the child from the

maternal great-great grandmother to DHR.

     Nelson testified that her concerns during her tenure as caseworker

for the mother included the mother's potential continuing use of illegal

substances. Although Nelson said that the mother had admitted only to

using marijuana, Nelson indicated that the mother's erratic conduct had

led to her concern that the mother had been abusing various illegal

substances. Nelson further testified that the mother had admitted that

her relationship with P.G. included acts of domestic violence. Nelson said

that the mother's admission of domestic violence had raised concerns

about the mother's stability and protective capacity. In addition, Nelson

                                    8
CL-2023-0272

explained that other concerns that she had had regarding the mother

included the mother's history with DHR, the number of "indicated"

findings relating to the mother, and the mother's lack of cooperation with

DHR.

     Nelson testified that, as far as she could recall, she had not been

provided with a list of potential relative resources by the mother. She

said that, if she had received such a list, she would have assessed those

relatives for potential placement; however, she indicated that she had no

recollection of having done so. She testified that an "Accurint" search

was conducted by another caseworker and that it had not yielded any

potential resources that she could recall. She also testified that the fact

that the maternal great-great grandmother had violated the safety plan

by allowing the mother to have unsupervised contact with the child

indicated a lack of protective capacity on the maternal great-great

grandmother's part and precluded her from further consideration as a

relative resource. Nelson never stated the reason that the child had been

removed from the physical custody of the maternal great-aunt or the

other "relative" that had assumed placement of the child.

                                    9
CL-2023-0272

     Rae Bryan testified that she had served as a DHR supervisor over

the mother's case throughout the entire period that it had been active

and that she had also served as a caseworker for the mother's case

between June 2021 and November 2021 and again beginning in February

2022 until November 2022. She explained that her concerns regarding

the mother were that "the parent lacked parenting and the lack of

behavioral control and also [that she] lacked parenting knowledge and

skills and motivation that affect the child's safety as well." She testified

that the child, who was 5 years old at the time of the trial, had been in

the custody of DHR and in foster care for a total of 30 months.

     According to Bryan, the mother had attended several ISP meetings

between October 2020 and June 2021 but had not completed any of the

services that she had agreed to complete. Bryan specifically testified that

the mother had not managed to rehabilitate herself to achieve

reunification because the mother had not "[taken] advantage of services

that [DHR had] offered, [had not] controll[ed] her behavior, and lack[ed]

protective and parental capacities."     Bryan did not expound on the

mother's lack of protective or parental capacities. She testified that, like

                                    10
CL-2023-0272

Nelson, she had observed the mother's difficult behavior. She explained

that she had witnessed the mother's becoming irate when she was asked

to submit to a drug test. Bryan described the mother as having become

very upset and said that a security guard had had to escort the mother

from the building.

     Bryan said that she had observed visits between the mother and

the child and that the mother had usually spent most of the visits

concerned with her two other children, whom she was also visiting. She

said that the mother would typically spend some time with the child at

the conclusion of a visit but, she said, during most of the visit the child

had interacted with a cellular telephone or a video game.      Bryan also

testified that the mother had not been permitted to visit with the child

after December 23, 2021, because she had been banned from the DHR

office "due to safety risks for the children" and that the mother had not

thereafter requested that she be allowed to visit with the child.

     Bryan indicated that she had not been able to contact the mother

to invite her to the February 2022 ISP meeting. She said that she had

driven to the mother's address on two occasions and had not found

                                    11
CL-2023-0272

anyone at home either time. Bryan said that, because she had not found

anyone at the mother's residence, she had not mailed an invitation to the

February 2022 ISP meeting to that address. She testified that she had

made telephone calls to the mother and that she had not received an

answer or a return call. She said that the mother had not contacted DHR

at all after February 11, 2022.

     Bryan further testified that she had performed an Accurint search

for potential relative resources. When asked if the search had identified

any other relatives of the mother, Bryan did not answer the question.

Instead, when asked if that search had yielded any potential relative

resources, Bryan testified that "the only other relative that contacted us

was an aunt out of Texas." According to Bryan, the Texas relative had

indicated interest but had failed to complete and return necessary

paperwork to institute a home study pursuant to the Interstate Compact

for the Placement of Children ("ICPC"), Ala. Code 1975, § 44-2-20 et seq.

     The mother admitted that she had had a drug problem in 2018 and

2019 when she "was stressed out and … was going through a lot from

[DHR] stepping into [her] life." She testified, however, that she had quit

                                   12
CL-2023-0272

using drugs in 2020. Although she admitted that she and P.G. had gotten

into arguments, she denied that they ever "fought each other" and denied

having ever told Nelson that she or P.G. had engaged in domestic violence

during their relationship.

     The mother also admitted that she had a criminal history.

Although she said that she had been arrested in 2018 for trespassing, she

indicated that she did not recall the underlying facts leading to that

arrest. She said that she had pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in

July 2022, that she had been sentenced to serve 24 months' incarceration,

that her sentence had been suspended, and that she had been placed on

probation. She further admitted that she had violated her probation and

that she had been required to serve her 24-month sentence in the

Houston County Community Corrections Center. In addition, the mother

testified that she had been arrested and charged with making a

terroristic threat against DHR; she said that she had pleaded guilty to a

lesser charge of harassment in October 2022. The mother explained that

her plea of guilty in October 2022 resolved both the terroristic-threat

charge and the 2018 trespassing charge. Finally, the mother admitted

                                   13
CL-2023-0272

that she had been arrested in October 2022 on a charge of possession of

a controlled substance when she was found to be in possession of

methamphetamine during a traffic stop. The record contains November

2022 orders entered by the Houston Circuit Court revoking the mother's

probation and ordering her to serve the remainder of her 24-month

sentence in Houston County Community Corrections.

     Although she admitted that she "sometimes didn't cooperate with

DHR" and that she had not been compliant with services during the first

two years of DHR's involvement, the mother said that she had been

taking "drug classes" and that she was compliant with SpectraCare

counseling, which is presumably counseling that was required by

Houston County Community Corrections. She denied having made any

threats toward DHR personnel. She said that she had shown "a lot of

emotion by crying and frustration." She admitted, however, that she had

pleaded guilty to the harassment charge arising from DHR's accusation

that she had threatened DHR personnel.

     The mother indicated that she had provided DHR with a list of

relatives. She testified that, in her opinion, DHR had not contacted those

                                   14
CL-2023-0272

relatives because, she said, the relatives kept calling her and asking

whether she had spoken with her social worker. She also indicated that

certain relatives had attempted to intervene in the termination-of-

parental-rights action. In fact, the record reflects that seven persons --

the maternal great-great grandmother, L.W., A.B., C.T., C.H., J.K., and

C.M. -- filed pro se motions to intervene.     The motions filed by the

maternal great-great grandmother, L.W., A.B., C.T., C.H., and J.K. were

all handwritten and stated, generally, that each potential intervenor was

willing and able to assume placement and/or custody of the child. C.T. is

an aunt of the mother; L.W. described herself as the child's cousin; A.B.

explained that she was the child's maternal second cousin and stated that

she loved the child "like her own"; C.H. stated that the child was very

familiar with her; and J.K. stated that she had tried contacting "you

guys," which, presumably, was a reference to DHR, "over and over." The

motion filed by C.M. was typewritten, identified her as the child's

biological aunt, and stated that she had "a sustained, substantial and

sincere interest in the welfare of the child." DHR filed no response to any

of the motions to intervene. The juvenile court denied each of the seven

                                    15
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motions to intervene without elaboration within a week after each was

filed.

         The mother admitted that, on the advice of her criminal attorney,

she had not maintained contact with DHR for several months after DHR

swore out the warrant alleging that the mother had made a terroristic

threat. She said that, after she had resolved that criminal charge by

pleading guilty to harassment in October 2022, she had attempted to

contact DHR. She said that her telephone calls were never answered and

that she had not received any response to voicemails that she had left for

her caseworkers. She admitted that, because she was incarcerated at the

Houston County Community Corrections Center, she had not been living

at the residence at the address that DHR had for her. However, she said

that she still received her mail at that address.

         The mother opined that she would soon be released from Houston

County Community Corrections because she was in compliance with the

requirements of that program. She testified that she had two jobs, but

she later indicated that she had only one job. Although she testified that

she could live with an unnamed aunt after her release, she said that she

                                     16
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was making efforts to secure her own residence and that she might, in

fact, be able to secure that residence before she was released.        She

explained that she had received an income-tax refund of either $11,000

or $15,000 and that that refund had been seized and used to satisfy her

child-support obligation.

     On appeal, the mother first challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the conclusion that she was, as of the time of the

trial, unable or unwilling to perform her responsibilities as parent of the

child. Secondly, the mother argues that the juvenile court could not have

concluded that no viable alternative to the termination of her parental

rights existed because DHR had not established that it had investigated

and rejected all the mother's relatives. We find the mother's second

argument dispositive of this appeal.

     DHR is required to investigate potential relative resources to

determine whether there exists a viable alternative to the termination of

a parent's parental rights. See Ex parte J.R., 896 So. 2d 416, 428 (Ala.

2004).

           "With regard to the possibility of placing a child with a
     relative as an alternative to the termination of a parent's
                                  17
CL-2023-0272

     parental rights, this court has held that ' " 'DHR must present
     "evidence of recent attempts to locate viable alternatives in
     order to establish that termination of parental rights is the
     least dramatic alternative." ' " ' J.F.S. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of
     Hum. Res., 38 So. 3d 75, 78 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (quoting C.T.
     v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 8 So. 3d 984, 987 (Ala.
     Civ. App. 2008), quoting in turn V.M. v. State Dep't of Hum.
     Res., 710 So. 2d 915, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998), quoting in turn
     Bowman v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 534 So. 2d 304, 306 (Ala.
     Civ. App. 1988)) (emphasis omitted). See also V.M. v. State
     Dep't of Hum. Res., 710 So. 2d 915 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)
     (same). DHR, and not a possible relative custodian, has the
     burden of initiating an investigation into the suitability of a
     possible relative placement for a child. D.S.S. v. Clay Cnty.
     Dep't of Hum. Res., 755 So. 2d 584, 591 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)."

A.R.H.B. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2022-0541, Dec.

16, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

     Certainly, a potential resource may not be viable for many reasons,

including lacking a relationship with the child at issue, medical issues,

lack of financial ability, conduct, or a lack of protective capacity. See,

e.g., C.P. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 203 So. 3d 1261, 1268

(Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (determining that juvenile court could have rejected

a paternal grandmother as a suitable custodian because she had enabled

the father's behavior and had medical issues); B.D.S. v. Calhoun Cnty.

Dep't of Hum. Res., 881 So. 2d 1042, 1055 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)

                                    18
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(determining that a juvenile court could have rejected certain relatives

because of the lack of financial ability to assume custody of a sibling

group and another relative because of evidence indicating that the

children had witnessed domestic violence in that relative's home). In

addition, the juvenile court may consider whether a particular relative

placement will serve the best interest of the child. See D.F.H. v. State

Dep't of Hum. Res., 51 So. 3d 1081, 1091 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010)

(determining that a juvenile court could properly reject relatives as

placement alternatives when the children did not desire to be placed with

those relatives and threatened to run away if placed in their home).

However, the record must contain evidence supporting the basis for the

rejection of a potential relative resource.

     In addition, a juvenile court may reject a potential relative resource

if the permanency plan for the child is adoption by current foster parents

and if the relative "did not attempt to care for the child or obtain custody

of the child within four months of the child being removed from the

custody of the parents or placed in foster care, if the removal was known

to the relative." Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-319(c)(1). We have recently

                                     19
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explained that § 12-15-319(c) does not "alleviate[] DHR's burden of

locating and investigating possible relative resources for a child."

A.R.H.B., ___ So. 3d at ___. Of course, the record must contain evidence

to support the juvenile court's application of § 12-15-319(c). Id.

     DHR asserts that it established that its personnel had failed to

locate potential relatives and also contends that the juvenile court's

denial of the several motions to intervene supports the juvenile court's

conclusion that no viable alternative to the termination of the mother's

parental rights existed.   The record in the present case contains only

minimal information regarding DHR's attempts to locate potential

relative placements for the child. Although Nelson explained that the

maternal great-great grandmother's failure to abide by the safety plan

prevented her consideration as a permanent relative resource, Nelson

could not recall whether she had been provided a list of potential relatives

or, if she had, whether she had assessed any other persons as potential

placements, as was her usual practice. Bryan indicated that she had

performed a search for potential relatives of the mother, but she never

answered the question regarding what that search yielded.            Neither

                                    20
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caseworker could recall the names of any potential relatives other than

the maternal great-aunt and the maternal great-great grandmother and

neither caseworker testified that any of the relatives who attempted to

intervene, other than the maternal great-great grandmother, were

unsuitable. In fact, neither Nelson nor Bryan indicated that they were

aware of the existence of any of the potential intervenors, except for the

maternal great-great grandmother. In addition, DHR did not file any

responses to the motions to intervene. The juvenile court did not hold a

hearing on any of the motions to intervene, so it could not have

determined whether those relatives had made attempts to contact DHR

or to offer to care for the child at any point during the pendency of the

underlying dependency action or when any of those relatives learned

about the child's removal from the custody of the mother. Given Nelson's

equivocal testimony regarding whether the mother provided the names

of relatives to DHR, Bryan's failure to affirmatively testify regarding the

results of the Accurint search when questioned about it, the mother's

testimony that she had provided a list of relatives to DHR, the mother's

testimony that DHR had not contacted those relatives, and the fact that

                                    21
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six additional persons moved to intervene in the termination-of-parental-

rights action, the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that DHR

performed its duty to investigate potential relative resources or to

support the juvenile court's conclusion that no viable alternatives to the

termination of the mother's parental rights existed.

     Accordingly, because DHR failed to present evidence to support a

conclusion that DHR properly investigated viable alternatives to the

termination of the mother's parental rights, we reverse the juvenile

court's judgment. See A.R.H.B., ___ So. 3d at ___.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

     Thompson, P.J., dissents, with opinion.

                                   22
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THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, dissenting.

     I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to reverse the

judgment of the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")

terminating the parental rights of P.R. ("the mother") to T.C. ("the child").

     Our supreme court and this court have repeatedly held that an

appellate court will not reverse a trial court on a ground neither

presented to the trial court nor argued by the appellant on appeal as a

basis for reversal. Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala.

1992); see also Kids Klub, Inc. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 874 So. 2d

1075 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)(explaining that this court will not reverse on

a ground not argued on appeal); and Morris v. Padgett, 890 So. 2d 157

(Ala. Civ. App. 2004)(observing that this court will not create a legal

argument for the parties). Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., provides that

an appellate argument must contain supporting authority for the

grounds upon which an appellant seeks reversal of a judgment. See also

S.B. v. Saint James Sch., 959 So. 2d 72, 89 (Ala. 2006) (stating that

general propositions of law are not considered "supporting authority" for

purposes of Rule 28).

                                     23
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     The majority reverses the juvenile court's judgment in favor of the

Houston County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") "because

DHR failed to present evidence to support a conclusion that DHR

properly investigated viable alternatives to the termination of the

mother's parental rights." ___ So. 3d at ___. The mother, however, did

not present this argument in the juvenile court or on appeal.

     In the juvenile court, the mother did not file any pleadings or argue

at the final hearing that DHR did not adequately investigate viable

alternatives to the termination of her parental rights. Consequently, I do

not believe that the mother sufficiently apprised the juvenile court of the

reason upon which the majority bases its reversal. See Ex parte Works,

640 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (Ala. 1994)(recognizing that the purpose of

objections at trial is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to

correct an alleged error before a judgment is issued). In her brief on

appeal, the mother cites general propositions of law addressing family

integrity and the need to explore less drastic measures and to examine

viable alternatives to termination of a parent's parental rights. She then

offers two paragraphs in support of her contention that "a viable

                                    24
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alternative did in fact exist." She references her testimony that relatives

are available, the motions to intervene filed by seven relatives two

months before the final hearing, the lack of evidence explaining the

juvenile court's reason for denying the motions to intervene, and the

testimony of Torrie Nelson, a DHR caseworker, who stated that she could

not recall specific facts about possible relatives other than two relatives

who were part of an earlier safety plan. I cannot conclude that the

mother's general statement in her appellate brief that "DHR … failed to

assess all of those individuals" without citation to any law establishing

that DHR has a duty to investigate potential relative resources

adequately presents a legal argument supporting reversal of the juvenile

court's judgment.

           " ' "It is not the function of the appellate courts to
           develop, research, and support an appellant's
           arguments." ' Knight v. Knight, 214 So. 3d 1207,
           1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016)(quoting M.F. v. W.W.,
           144 So. 3d 366, 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)).
           Furthermore,

                 " '[i]n the absence of an argument
                 supported by legal authority, an
                 alleged error of law committed by a
                 trial court is considered "essentially
                 unchallenged on appeal." [Walden v.
                                   25
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                 Hutchinson, 987 So. 2d 1109, 1120
                 (Ala. 2007)]. An appellant waives the
                 right to appellate review of a ruling on
                 a question of law when the appellant
                 fails to cite any legal authority on that
                 point as required by Rule 28(a)(10),
                 Ala. R. App. P. Slack v. Stream, 988 So.
                 2d 516, 533-34 (Ala. 2008). This court
                 cannot cure that deficiency by creating
                 legal arguments for the appellant, see
                 Spradlin v. Spradlin, 601 So. 2d 76, 78-
                 79 (Ala. 1992), because it is not the
                 function of this court to perform an
                 appellant's legal research. City of
                 Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv.
                 Co., 722 So. 2d 747, 752 (Ala. 1998).'

     "State v. Pressley, 100 So. 3d 1058, 1070-71 (Ala. Civ. App.
     2012)(Moore, J., dissenting)."

Watkins v. Lee, 227 So. 3d 84, 90 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017)

     Accordingly, because the mother did not argue in the juvenile court

and, in my opinion, the mother does not adequately argue on appeal the

reason upon which the majority reverses the juvenile court's judgment, I

am not inclined to reverse the juvenile court's judgment for the reason

set forth by the majority.

     Moreover, even if I agreed that consideration of this ground was

proper, I conclude that any error created by not requiring DHR to

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CL-2023-0272

investigate the mother's proposed relative placements was harmless. In

my   opinion,    sufficient   evidence     supports   the   juvenile   court's

determination that termination of the mother's parental rights was in

the best interest of the child.

      A parent's attempt at reunification should be accomplished in a

timely manner. Talladega Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. v. M.E.P., 975 So. 2d

370, 374 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)(explaining that "there is a point at which

the child's need for permanency and stability will overcome the parent's

rights to rehabilitation by [the Department of Human Resources]").

Generally, a parent's rehabilitation should be accomplished within 12

months of the removal of the child or children from the home. M.A.J. v.

S.F., 994 So. 2d 280, 291 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)(stating that, "when [the

Department      of   Human        Resources]   timely   exerts    reasonable

rehabilitation and reunification efforts, the parents generally shall have

12 months from the date the child enters foster care to prove that their

conduct, condition, or circumstances have improved so that reunification

may be promptly achieved").

                                      27
CL-2023-0272

     In this case, the record includes clear and convincing evidence that

the mother had not meaningfully cooperated with DHR by adjusting her

circumstances to meet the needs of the child. DHR became involved with

the mother and the child after receiving a report indicating that the

mother was using illegal substances in the child's presence. After an

investigation, the mother was "indicated" for "chemical endangerment."

The child has been out of the mother's care since 2018 and in DHR's

custody for 30 months. During that time the mother has not participated

consistently in DHR services, which included drug testing, and, most

significantly, had been arrested and convicted for possession of an illegal

substance within eight months of the final hearing. The juvenile court

could have considered the mother's failure to rehabilitate herself within

that typical 12-month period and her recent arrest and conviction for

possession of an illegal substance to be evidence indicating that the

mother would not, in the foreseeable future, be free from the conduct or

condition that resulted in the child's removal from the home. Thus, the

juvenile court had sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that the

mother had not adjusted her circumstances to meet the needs of the child

                                    28
CL-2023-0272

and that her conduct or condition was unlikely to change in the

foreseeable future. 2 See M.W. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 773

So. 2d 484, 487 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000)("At some point, however, the child's

need for permanency and stability must overcome the parent's good-faith

but unsuccessful attempts to become a suitable parent.").

     Additionally, although "a juvenile court cannot terminate parental

rights when a viable alternative exists," see K.R.S. v. DeKalb Cnty. Dep't

of Hum. Res., 236 So. 3d 910, 914 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017), the existence of

a relative as a potentially viable placement alternative does not, in and

of itself, prevent the juvenile court from terminating the mother's

parental rights. For example, § 12-15-319(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

           "The juvenile court is not required to consider a relative
     to be a candidate for legal guardian of the child in a
     proceeding for termination of parental rights if both of the
     following circumstances exist:

     2In general, courts disfavor leaving a child in foster care indefinitely

while a parent continues to make attempts at reunification. D.V. v.
Colbert Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 121 So. 3d 370, 380-81 (Ala. Civ. App.
2012). The mother has not argued that any exception to that general rule
should apply under the facts of this case, and the record contains no
evidence that the mother's condition would improve in the foreseeable
future.
                                  29
CL-2023-0272

                 "(1) The relative did not attempt to care for
           the child or obtain custody of the child within four
           months of the child being removed from the
           custody of the parents or placed in foster care, if
           the removal was known to the relative.

                "(2) The goal of the current permanency plan
           formulated by the Department of Human
           Resources is adoption by the current foster
           parents."

Before the legislature's adoption of § 12-15-319(c) in 2020, this court in

B.S. v. Cullman County Department of Human Resources, 865 So. 2d

1188, 1197 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), held that the last-minute identification

of a possible relative resource "was not sufficient" to establish "a truly

viable alternative to the termination of the mother's parental rights." See

also C.T. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 8 So. 3d 984, 989 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2008).    Therefore, the mere existence of a potential relative

placement does not necessarily preclude the juvenile court from

terminating a parent's parental rights.

     Although the juvenile court was not precluded from considering the

relatives that moved to intervene as alternative relative placements, the

record supports the juvenile court's conclusion that none of these

relatives were a viable alternative to termination of the mother's
                                30
CL-2023-0272

parental rights. As the majority recognizes, approximately two months

before the final hearing, seven relatives moved to intervene. The record

does not indicate that any of these individuals, who moved to intervene,

had been unaware until recently that the child had been removed from

P.R.'s custody and placed in foster care, that they had contacted DHR

about becoming a relative placement, or that they had a relationship with

the child. The child was born in 2017. At the time of the final hearing,

the child had been in DHR's custody for 30 months and had resided in

the foster parents' home for the past 25 months. B.M., the foster mother,

testified that the child was thriving in her home and that she and her

husband planned on adopting the child. The mother, on the other hand,

had not visited the child in the past seven months and, at the time of the

hearing, was serving a community-corrections sentence. Given that the

reason for DHR's involvement with the mother was a consequence of the

mother's drug use, that she was recently convicted for possession of an

illegal substance, and that she exhibited other conduct indicating that

reunification with the child was not a foreseeable likelihood, the juvenile

court could have concluded that even if a relative placement existed, the

                                    31
CL-2023-0272

relative placement was not in the best interest of the child because the

child needed permanency. Accordingly, the juvenile court could have

concluded that these possible relative resources for the child did not

constitute the advancement of a viable alternative to the termination of

her parental rights.

     Because I conclude from my review of the record that sufficient

evidence was presented to support the juvenile court's decision that the

child was dependent, i.e., that the statutory grounds set forth in § 12-15-

319, Ala. Code 1975, were met, and that no viable alternative to

termination of the mother's parental rights existed, I would affirm the

juvenile court's judgment. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

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