Court Opinion

ID: 9763168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:38:01.917686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:39.783332
License: Public Domain

WOODARD, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although the legislature may have intended to change some of the principles regarding covenants not to compete as expressed recently by the Supreme Court in DeSantis, Hill, Bergman, and Martin, § 15.50(2) still provides that a covenant not to compete is enforceable to the extent that it “contains reasonable limitations ... that do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.” While the Supreme Court was criticized by the Court of Appeals in Bland for abolishing sound common law principles, the Supreme Court still must be looked to for the ultimate interpretation of the common law in Texas, as well as the intent of the legislature. The Supreme Court did interpret § 15.50(2), in a limited but relevant manner, in the DeSantis case, its facts being similar in part to the case at hand. DeSantis at 685 states, *353“[t]he agreement not to compete in this case is no more enforceable under Sections 15.50 and 15.51 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code than it would be under the above-stated common law principles governing such agreements.” In this case, as in the DeSantis case, there was a question as to whether the promisor used confidential information obtained in the employment of the promisee to compete. Staf-feldt testified that he did not use any information acquired from PTA to carry on his business. He had been an attorney involved in real estate transactions and knew of the tax business before his employment. He developed his own method of solicitation, which was different than used by PTA, by the use of the tax rolls and the city directory to determine the owner of property with a tax evaluation of over $500,000.00. He contacted these owners with an offer of his services. Although he did not use any PTA customer list, his method of business did generate the business of eleven former PTA customers. This method of operation would be available to anyone who wished to utilize it, and there were eleven entities in the same business that he knew of.
PTA produced a witness who stated he knew Staffeldt when he worked for PTA. He stated Staffeldt asked for his business with his new company, but the witness had stayed with PTA. Another PTA witness testified that his company had been a customer of PTA through the negotiation of his predecessor manager, that there had been a dispute between his company and PTA and that Staffeldt had asked for the company’s tax resolution business. In this case, as in the DeSantis case, there is a paucity of evidence that the promisor was able to appropriate for his own use any business goodwill that he developed for the promisee, and therefore no need is shown to protect the goodwill of the promisee.
The trial court has great discretion in granting or denying a temporary injunction, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Hartwell’s Office World, Inc. v. Systex Corporation, 598 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In reviewing the order denying the temporary injunction, we must draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. The applicant has the burden of offering some evidence which establishes a probable right of recovery; he must show more than a mere possibility of injury. Id. An abuse of discretion of the trial court exists only when the record reflects that the findings of the trial court necessary to sustain its order are not supported by some evidence of a substantial and probative character. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ dism’d w.o.j.). Because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed, we must uphold the trial court’s decision if it was based on any legal theory that is supported by the evidence. Id.
The question of reasonableness of non-competition covenants’ restrictions is a question of law. DeSantis; Wabash Life Insurance Company v. Garner, 732 F.Supp. 692 (N.D.Tex.1989). In this case, there are fact issues as to some of the acts underlying what may be construed to be reasonable or unreasonable limitations. Because there is some probative evidence supporting an unreasonable limitation under some of the principles extolled in the DeSantis case, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the temporary injunction.