Court Opinion

ID: 9948752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:02.417525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:49.550709
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Braucher, 2024-Ohio-811.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                      JUDGES:
                                                   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P. J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                         Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
                                                   Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs-
                                                   Case No. 2023 CA 00038
MICHAEL PATRIC BRAUCHER

        Defendant-Appellant                        OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                        Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
                                                Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 02547

JUDGMENT:                                       Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         March 7, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant

KYLE L. STONE                                   D. COLEMAN BOND
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY                            116 Cleveland Avenue, NW
LISA A. NEMES                                   Suite 600
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR                            Canton, Ohio 44702
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510
Canton, Ohio 44701-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 00038                                                     2

Wise, J.

        {¶1}   Michael Patric Braucher, defendant-appellant, appeals from a judgment of

the Stark County Common Pleas Court convicting him of aggravated possession of drugs.

He presents one assignment of error asserting that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we overrule the assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgment and his conviction and sentence.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        {¶2}   On January 5, 2023, appellant, Michael Patrick Braucher, was indicted on

one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(b) [F3]

and one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a)

[F5].

        {¶3}   He pleaded not guilty at his arraignment and filed a motion to suppress.

The trial court conducted the suppression hearing on March 9, 2023.

        {¶4}   One witness testified for the state, Sergeant Anthony Crabtree of the

Massillon Police Department. He testified that on November 14, 2022, while working road

patrol on the midnight shift, he saw a vehicle with an extremely loud muffler accelerating

down Lake Avenue, Massillon, Stark County, Ohio.

        {¶5}   Sergeant Crabtree followed the vehicle in his cruiser heading eastbound on

Lake Avenue approaching Wales Road. The vehicle approached the traffic signal at the

intersection of Lake Road and Wales Road. The light was red and the vehicle did not

make a complete stop behind the stop bar; the front tires of the vehicle were well past the

stop bar – the solid white bar on the roadway pavement. Sergeant Crabtree activated the
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                   3

overhead lights on his cruiser to make a traffic stop. He had with him in his cruiser K9

Officer Luiz. The vehicle finally stopped after turning on Rotch Avenue.

       {¶6}   Sergeant Crabtree initially ran the license plate number on the vehicle

through dispatch and it came through as belonging to a 2016 silver Honda registered to

a female. The vehicle he stopped was a white Toyota. Sergeant Crabtree saw more than

one occupant in the vehicle. He got out of his cruiser and went to the passenger-side

window. His body camera and cruiser dash-cam video were activated. He knocked on

the window and asked the driver to roll the window down. When he was told the window

would not roll down, he asked permission to open the front passenger door. He was given

permission to open the door and observed a male driver, later identified as appellant

Braucher, and a female passenger in the front passenger seat.

       {¶7}   Sergeant Crabtree testified that he introduced himself and told the

occupants why he stopped the vehicle – an extremely loud muffler and failure to make a

complete stop behind the stop bar at the traffic light.

       {¶8}   Sergeant Crabtree testified that he asked for identification from the

occupants; the female passenger provided it and Braucher did not, saying his

identification was in a folder at home, not in his vehicle. Sergeant Crabtree then asked

Braucher his name and he responded, “Michael Braucher”.

       {¶9}   At that point, Sergeant Crabtree became alarmed for his safety when he

saw a shell casing on the floor of the vehicle and multiple torches, one between

Braucher’s legs. Sergeant Crabtree testified that the torches, in his training and

experience, are often used to ingest narcotics, especially methamphetamine. He called

for backup.
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                      4

         {¶10} Backup arrived and Braucher was asked to step out of his vehicle. Braucher

was checked for any illegal firearms on his person and Sergeant Crabtree found none.

He asked Braucher to step over to his cruiser to talk with him. Sergeant Crabtree

explained the “red flags” he was concerned with; no identification, and a shell casing on

the floor of the vehicle. Braucher told the Sergeant there was nothing “illegal” in the

vehicle and that everything in the vehicle belonged to him.

         {¶11} Seeing some “red flags”, Sergeant Crabtree told Braucher that he had a K9

officer with him and would have the K9 perform a drug sniff test on the outside of the

vehicle. The female passenger was removed from the vehicle and K9 Officer Luiz and

Sergeant Crabtree walked the perimeter of the vehicle. K9 Officer Luiz alerted to the odor

of narcotics at the front passenger door. Meanwhile, another police officer ran a CJIS or

OHLEG search for the social security number given by Braucher. It came back with no

outstanding warrants or prior record.

         {¶12} A search was performed on the interior of the vehicle including the glove

compartment. Several drug paraphernalia items were found including a digital scale, a

baggie containing suspected drugs, a methamphetamine bong and meth pipe. The glove

box also contained a .357 handgun, holster and Braucher’s identification.

         {¶13} Sergeant Crabtree testified he read Braucher his Miranda1 rights and

arrested him on suspicion of drug activity. In all, twelve to fourteen minutes elapsed from

the initial stop to the discovery of drugs.

         {¶14} The suspected methamphetamine was sent to the crime laboratory for

testing and came back positive for over eight grams of methamphetamine.

1   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                        5

         {¶15} The state rested its case with the admission of state’s exhibits 1 and 2, the

dash-cam video and body-cam video.

         {¶16} The trial court noted that it would be overruling the motion to suppress and

would put its findings in writing. On March 13, 2023, it entered a judgment entry overruling

the motion to suppress with three specific findings. First, it found that the stop of the

vehicle Braucher was driving was justified by the traffic violations that Sergeant Crabtree

observed. Second, it found that the time that passed between the K9 Officer detecting

the drugs and the initial stop was reasonable. Third, it found that probable cause existed

for the subsequent search of the vehicle and the glove box where methamphetamine was

found.

         {¶17} On March 15, 2023, Braucher returned to the trial court for a change of plea

hearing. Braucher entered a plea of “no contest” to the offenses of aggravated possession

of drugs [F-3] and aggravated possession of drugs, [F-5]. He also signed a Crim. Rule

11(C) form which contained his written plea of “no contest” along with the potential

sentences for such a plea.       The trial court accepted his plea of “no contest” and

incorporated the evidence that was submitted by the state at the suppression hearing.

The trial court then found Braucher “guilty” of the crimes of aggravated possession of

drugs [F3] and aggravated possession of drugs [F5].

         {¶18} Braucher was sentenced to a period of three years of community control

with monitoring by Intensive Supervised Probation, Judgment Entry March 22, 2023.

         {¶19} Braucher filed an appeal setting forth the following assignment of error:
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                      6

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

       {¶20} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO

SUPPRESS       THEREBY      VIOLATING      HIS    RIGHT     TO     BE   SECURE      FROM

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES UNDER THE FOURTH AND

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND

ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”

                                 LAW AND ANALYSIS

       {¶21} In his sole assignment of error, Braucher contends that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress. He maintains the traffic stop was unconstitutional and

not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion because there was no traffic

violation when his vehicle was halfway across the stop bar at the traffic light, and the

arresting officer cited the wrong code section in his citation. Braucher also contends that

the loud muffler was a pretext for the stop because it was not loud enough to prevent

conversations as evidenced by the body camera entered as an exhibit. Braucher also

claims the duration of the stop was excessive, was unreasonable and led to an illegal

seizure. We disagree and affirm the findings of the trial court.

                                   Standard of Review

       {¶22} “Normally, appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed

question of law and fact.” State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10

N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797

N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                      7

       {¶23} As the Ohio Supreme Court explained:

              When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the

       role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual

       questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.       Consequently, an

       appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact, if they are

       supported by competent, credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true,

       the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference

       to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable

       legal standard.

       {¶24} (Citations omitted). Burnside at ¶8.

       {¶25} Because the facts in this case are not in dispute, we independently review

the trial court’s conclusion that appellant’s motion to suppress should be denied because

Sergeant Crabtree had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Braucher’s vehicle

and extend the stop for a K9 sniff.

                            Unreasonable search and seizure

       {¶26} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio

Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v.

Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. “This

constitutional guarantee is protected by the exclusionary rule, which mandates the

exclusion at trial of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search and seizure.” Id.

       {¶27} Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specific and well-

established exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                       8

L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). “Once a defendant demonstrates that he or she was subjected to a

warrantless search or seizure, the burden shifts to the state to establish that the

warrantless search or seizure was constitutionally permissible.” State v. Roberts, 110

Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 98. In this case, Sergeant Crabtree

of the Massillon Police Department initiated a traffic stop without a warrant.

                             Constitutionality of the Traffic Stop

       {¶28} A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure

under the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct.

1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1966). Thus, a traffic stop must comply with the Fourth

Amendment’s requirement of general reasonableness based on a totality of the

circumstances. Id. at 810.

       {¶29} “... [I]f an officer’s decision to stop a motorist for a criminal violation,

including a traffic violation, is prompted by a reasonable and articulable suspicion

considering all the circumstances, then the stop is constitutionally valid.” State v. Mays,

119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 8. Even if the officer has an

ulterior motive, a traffic stop is valid if the action complained of was permissible. Dayton

v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12, 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996); State v. Martin, 5th Dist.,

Stark No. 2018CA00119, 2019-Ohio-4934, ¶ 19.

       {¶30} In this case, Sergeant Crabtree testified that he was drawn to the Braucher

vehicle by the loud muffler noise. When he followed the vehicle, he observed that

Braucher did not stop behind the stop bar at the traffic light at the intersection of Lake

Avenue and Wales Road. The trial court noted that the dash camera and body-cam video

supported the Sergeant’s credibility. The loud muffler could be heard on the video and
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                          9

approximately half of the vehicle was past the stop bar before coming to a complete stop.

Judgment Entry, March 13, 2023 at 1.

       {¶31} With regard to the stop bar violation, appellant makes two arguments. One,

he argues that this Court has not established a “bright line test” on stop bar violations.

This Court has held that a stop bar violation is a legitimate reason for an officer to stop a

vehicle under facts similar to the case here. In State v. Goss, 5th Dist., Ashland No. 16

COA 023, 2017-Ohio-161, (J. Delaney dissent), this Court approved a stop where the

officer observed the appellant’s pick-up truck with its engine compartment beyond the

stop line and the rear wheels of his vehicle behind it, such that appellant’s “driver door

was on top of the stop bar.” Id. at ¶ 2. Similarly here, Sergeant Crabtree testified and the

trial court found that “approximately half of the vehicle is past the stop bar prior to the car

coming to a stop.” Finding the holding in Goss applicable, we reject appellant’s argument.

       {¶32} Second, appellant argues that Sergeant Crabtree issued a citation to

Braucher under the wrong code section number and therefore the stop bar violation was

not a legitimate reason to stop him. Braucher was cited for a stop bar violation under

R.C. 4511.43(A) [stop bar violation at a stop sign] instead of a violation under R.C.

4511.13(C) [stop bar violation at a traffic light]. This Court has held that a police officer’s

objectively reasonable belief that a traffic violation has occurred, including reasonable

mistakes of law, can constitute reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. State v.

Martin, supra, ¶ 20 (“It is well established that an officer’s reasonable articulable suspicion

does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct has

satisfied the elements of the offense.”); State v. Mays, supra, ¶ 17 (“An officer is not
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                       10

required to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime

might have a legal defense to the charge.”)

       {¶33} So, too, the language in both R.C. 4511.43(A) [“shall stop at a clearly

marked stop line”] and R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a) [“shall stop at a clearly marked stop line”]

are essentially the same. Therefore, appellant was not prejudiced by Sergeant Crabtree’s

citation section error. The penalty was the same and the elements are essentially the

same – a stop bar violation. State v. Deacey, 2nd Dist., Montgomery No. 27408, 2017-

Ohio-8102, ¶ 25 (holding that trial court’s amendment of stop bar violation at stop sign to

stop bar violation at traffic light was not error because both were violations for failure to

stop at a clearly marked stop bar).

       {¶34} In short, the evidence here is the same whether Braucher stopped at a red

light or a stop sign. The issue was whether Braucher’s vehicle or part of it stopped before

or after a stop bar. So, too, there was an additional reason to stop Braucher’s vehicle –

the loud muffler which was hanging off the back of the vehicle. We affirm the trial court’s

holding and find that Sergeant Crabtree had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic

stop and the initial traffic stop was constitutional.

                                 Duration of the Traffic Stop

       {¶35} Appellant next argues that the delay between the initial traffic stop and the

K9 sniff by K9 Officer Luiz was unreasonably prolonged. Sergeant Crabtree testified that

the time between the traffic stop and canine officer’s hit on the drugs in the glove box was

between twelve and fourteen minutes. The trial court rejected appellant’s argument

finding that the delay was not unreasonable, given that the police were still attempting to
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                           11

identify the defendant. Judgment Entry, March 13, 2023 at 2. We agree and affirm the

trial court’s holding.

       {¶36} During a legitimate traffic stop, a request for identification from a driver and

any passengers, followed by a computer check of that information, does not constitute an

unreasonable search and seizure, so long as the traffic stop is not extended in duration

beyond the time reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. “Typically, such inquiries

involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015).

       {¶37} “The detention of a stopped driver may continue beyond [the normal] time

frame when additional facts are encountered that give rise to a reasonable, articulable

suspicion of criminal activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.” State v. Isles,

5th Dist., Stark No. 2019 CA 00121, 2020-Ohio-3061, ¶ 19, quoting State v. Batchili, 113

Ohio St.3d 403, 865 N.E.2d 1282, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 15.

       {¶38} Finally, “a canine walk around of a vehicle that occurs during a lawful stop

and does not extend beyond the period necessary to effectuate the stop and issue a

citation does not violate an individual’s constitutional rights.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing Illinois v.

Cabales, 543 U.S. 405, 409, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). “... If a trained

narcotics dog alerts to the odor of drugs from a lawfully detained vehicle, an officer has

probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband.” Id. at ¶ 19 (Citations omitted.) State

v. Whitman, 184 Ohio App.3d 733, 2009-Ohio-5647, 922 N.E.2d 294 (5th Dist.), ¶ 10.

       {¶39} In this case, Sergeant Crabtree testified and his body camera corroborated

that Braucher claimed he did not have his identification and it was in a file folder because
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                       12

he was trying to dispose of his vehicles. Later, after K9 Officer Luiz detected narcotics in

the glove box, his identification was found along with a firearm and methamphetamine.

Appellant’s failure to provide his identification prolonged his detention.

       {¶40} When Sergeant Crabtree observed a shell casing on the floor of the vehicle,

a license plate that attached to a silver Honda instead of the white Toyota Braucher was

driving, and torches typically used for drugs, he testified that this presented to him a “red

flag” that required further investigation. He had K9 Officer Luiz with him in his cruiser and

during the open-air canine sniff, Luiz alerted to the presence of narcotics in the area of

the glove box.

       {¶41} In all, from the time of the stop to the canine hit on the drugs, Sergeant

Crabtree testified that twelve to fourteen minutes elapsed. The relevant question is

“whether the dog sniff adds to the stop.” State v. Perkins, 5th Dist., Richland No. 19CA38,

2019-Ohio-4328 ¶ 32, appeal not allowed, 158 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2020-Ohio-518, 139

N.E.3d 926.

       {¶42} We find that the stop was not prolonged any further than necessary given

the “totality of the circumstances.” In State v. Williams, 12th Dist., Clinton No. CA2009-

08-014, 2010-Ohio-1523, ¶¶ 18-19, the Court explained:

              The officer may detain the vehicle for a period of time reasonably

       necessary to confirm or dispel [the officer’s] suspicions of criminal activity.

       Once the officer is satisfied that no criminal activity has occurred, then the

       vehicle’s occupants must be released.

              In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look

       at the totality of the circumstances. The totality of the circumstances
Stark County, Case No. 2023 CA 0038                                                      13

       approach allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized

       training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative

       information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.

       {¶43} (Citations omitted)

       {¶44} We affirm the decision of the trial court and find that the length of the stop

was appellant’s own doing. He told Sergeant Crabtree that he had no identification which

delayed the officer’s investigation. K9 Officer Luiz was in the Sergeant’s cruiser and there

was no delay in waiting for a K9 to conduct the canine sniff. We conclude the duration of

the stop was constitutional.

                                      CONCLUSION

       {¶45} The trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress. We

overrule the sole assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

       {¶46} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of

Stark County, Ohio is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Delaney, P. J., and

Gwin, J., concur.

JWW/kt 0304