Court Opinion

ID: 9636452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:29:26.368665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:46.130722
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. The majority reverses the trial court’s order suppressing evidence in this case because it finds no constitutional impediment to town listers coming onto private property and inspecting the exterior of homes without advance notice or the consent of the property owners. According to the majority, the conduct of listers in inspecting private homes is not constrained by the Fourth Amendment and thus does not implicate constitutional privacy rights. Hence, the majority declines even *435to consider “whether the listers acted reasonably or lawfully in entering the [homeowners’] property without [their] express consent.”
I believe that this holding is inconsistent with controlling United States Supreme Court case law, and that it undermines the right of privacy established under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution.1 In my view, our system of property tax appraisal does not, and cannot, require us to relinquish our constitutional rights of privacy. We can, and must, preserve those rights and, at the same time, establish reasonable guidelines for the assessment of real property. Accordingly, I dissent.
Without question, the actions of the listers would have been unconstitutional had this Court found their actions to be subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. The listers were inspecting a neighboring property when they noticed what they believed to be a new addition built onto the home of Peter Tripp and Cindy Schofner. They decided to investigate. After finding nobody home, they went onto the property uninvited and without advance warning to measure the addition. One of the listers then proceeded to circumnavigate the home “to see if there had been any more additions.” There is no dispute that; in doing so, the lister entered a private area of the home — the curtilage — that was excluded from public view and that was entitled to the same privacy protections as the home itself.2 Thus, this is not a situation where the lister was in an area open to the public when she observed the incriminating evidence. Cf. State v. Ryea, 153 Vt. 451, 453-54, 571 A.2d 674, 675 (1990) (driveway or walkway within curtilage that serves as entryway to home is only semi-private area). According to the *436majority, however, none of this matters because town listers are simply not answerable to constitutional restraints.
This pronouncement is significant enough, but the scope of the majority’s opinion appears to be even more far-reaching. Apparently, any government inspectors performing their duties have free reign to examine our homes unhindered by constitutional constraints, so long as they are not engaged in law enforcement activities arising from suspicion of specific criminal or regulatory violations. Under this analysis, the timing or manner of the intrusion is inconsequential and beyond redress because the reasonableness of the search is of no import.
Today’s decision diminishes the privacy rights of all Vermonters, particularly those who have neither committed nor been suspected of having committed a crime. Indeed, only in rare instances will inspections lead to criminal proceedings. I am concerned mostly for the vast majority of Vermonters who are willing to be subjected to reasonable administrative inspections but “do desire protection from officious administrators who insist upon carrying out their duties without due regard for the resident’s convenience, privacy, and dignity.” See 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 10.1(g), at 397 (3d ed. 1996).
In the majority’s view, Vermonters may not look to the United States Constitution for such protection. Nor is there any protection under existing statutory law. While the Legislature instructs listers to “make such personal examination of the property which they are required to appraise as will enable them to appraise it at its fair market value,” 32 V.S.A. § 4041, there is no statute giving listers the right to enter onto private property,3 let alone one that circumscribes the manner, timing, or scope of any such examination.
The way to solve this problem is not to ignore it or deny that it exists, as the majority has done, but rather to recognize the privacy interests at stake and recommend a solution that will protect those interests while allowing listers to fulfill their duty to examine private property. I would hold that the Fourth Amendment does apply to the activities of town listers in examining private property. I would further hold that the privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are violated when listers are given unbridled discretion to inspect private property without consent or, alternatively, compliance with reasonable statutory standards concerning advance notice and the timing, manner and scope of the listers’ activities.
I. Government Action
As the United Supreme Court has recognized in “countless decisions,” the fundamental and overriding purpose of the Fourth Amendment “ ‘is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’ ” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). The Fourth Amendment is a *437constraint upon government only, however, and therefore does not apply to limit illegal searches by private individuals. See LaFave, supra, § 1.8, at 217. According to the majority, listers are not engaged in law enforcement activities, i.e., investigating regulatory violations or criminal wrongdoing, and thus are to be considered private persons immune from the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.
That analysis does not hold up. The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the Fourth Amendment’s strictures impose restraints, not only upon police, but also upon governmental action in general. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335. Thus, the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the activities of civil governmental authorities such as public school officials, id. at 333, building inspectors, Camara, 387 U.S. at 528, health and safety inspectors, Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978), and firefighters, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978). The reasoning behind these decisions is simple: the fundamental interest to be protected — individual privacy — suffers irrespective of the source of the governmental intrusion. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 335. As the Supreme Court has stated time and time again, “it would be ‘anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.’” Id. (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 530). The critical issue is not whether the government employee is acting in a law enforcement capacity investigating criminal wrongdoing, but rather whether the employee is on a government mission.
Thus, the Fourth Amendment extends to administrative inspections, most of which are made in the course of periodic or area inspection programs, and not in response to specific complaints. LaFave, supra, § 10.1, at 368. As noted, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that the privacy rights established in the Fourth Amendment depend upon whether the search was part of a criminal investigation that might lead to prosecution. Id. at 371-72 (in Camara, Supreme Court overruled earlier decision suggesting that Fourth Amendment was limited to searches stemming from criminal investigations that might lead to prosecution). “It is a perversion of the exclusionary rule to conclude that the Fourth Amendment should protect most against the conviction of criminals.” Id. at 377. The fundamental and overriding purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individual privacy, and the individual’s interest in privacy does not fluctuate with the intent of the intruding government officials. Id. at 377-78.
In the past, a number of courts concluded, as the majority does today, that the activities of governmental employees “carrying out of public functions which do not strictly speaking fall within the realm of law enforcement” are not covered by the Fourth Amendment. LaFave, supra, § 1.8(d), at 253-54. But after the Supreme Court’s decision in T.L.O., it is plain that “these cases are wrongly decided.” Id. at 254. Although the “reasoning in T.L.O. leaves room for the argument, accepted in United States v. Attson [900 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1990], that there are still some governmental employees whose activities do not constitute Fourth Amendment ‘searches and seizures,’ ” id. at 255, neither Attson nor any of the other cases relied upon by the majority demonstrate that such a conclusion is warranted in this appeal.
- The cases relied upon by the majority stand principally for the proposition, not relevant here, that the Fourth Amendment does not constrain the activities of persons acting in an essentially private capacity merely because they happen to be government employees. In each of those cases, which are discussed below, the government employee was not on a *438government mission, but rather was acting in essentially a private capacity.
In contrast, here it is undisputed that the town listers are government officials who were performing their governmental duties when they inspected defendants’ home. Without question, their conduct had an “investigatory or administrative purpose designed to elicit a benefit for the government,” Attson, 900 F.2d at 1430, that is, to aid the municipal government in assessing property taxes, one of the most basic and powerful functions of government.4 Their aim was plainly to benefit the Town of Walden and to protect taxpayers collectively by assuring that defendants were being assessed based upon the full value of their home. Unlike the government employees in the cases discussed below, the listers were, not acting merely as private persons who happened to be government employees. Rather, they were inspecting property in their capacity as government agents. Thus, under the controlling precedent, their activities are subject to the Fourth Amendment, as well they should be.
Attson, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ease upon which the majority relies heavily, does not support a contrary view. In that case, the defendant, who had been involved in an automobile accident, was taken to a hospital, where he consented to a blood sample for medical purposes only. Eventually, the hospital released the results of the sample pursuant to a grand jury subpoena, and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the trial court erred by not suppressing the sample, which had been taken by a doctor employed by the federal government. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Fourth Amendment regulated only conduct “designed to elicit a benefit for the government in an investigatory or, more broadly, an administrative capacity” and “cannot be triggered simply because a person is acting on behalf of the government.” Attson, 900 F.2d at 1429.
Citing the trial court’s finding that the doctor had taken a sample of the defendant’s blood purely for medical reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that the doctor’s “mere status as a governmental employee” was not enough to trigger application of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1433-34. Because the doctor was acting in the same capacity as any private physician and was not “motivated by some sort of investigatory or administrative purpose designed to elicit a benefit for the government,” id. at 1430, the Fourth Amendment did not apply. Of course, as noted above, the opposite is true in our case. Rather than acting as private persons, the listers were performing their official duties to benefit the Town of Walden.
The other cases relied upon by the majority sound a similar theme. In State v. Ellingsworth, 966 P.2d 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), a workers’ compensation adjuster employed by a quasi-govemment corporation obtained and examined the defendant’s medical records while reviewing her claim for benefits. Eventually, the defendant was prosecuted for insurance fraud after a workers’ compensation investigator forwarded the defendant’s case history to the attorney general’s office pursuant to a statute requiring insurance agents to release information related to suspected fraud. The defendant argued that the use of her medical records in the criminal trial violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The ap*439pellate court rejected this argument, holding that the Fourth Amendment did. not apply because the adjuster “was acting like any other private insurer” in reviewing the defendant’s claim for benefits to protect its own interests unrelated to law enforcement. Id. at 1225.
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Cote, 444 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), a meter reader working for a municipally-owned, public-regulated utility was checking a gas meter in the basement of an apartment building when he noticed an illegal, unmetered gas hook-up, which he reported to police. At his larceny trial, the apartment owner argued that the evidence observed by the public utility employee should be suppressed. The court rejected this argument, ruling that neither “mere employment by an arm of government” nor the “mere fact of State regulation” implicates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1285-86. The court emphasized that the meter reader had a legal right to be on the premises pursuant to a statute that made “no distinction between employees of publicly owned and privately owned utilities,” and that furthered only the “proprietary functions of utility companies without regard to their public or private ownership.” Id. at 1286. Thus, as in Attson and Ellingsworth, the government employee was acting in essentially a private capacity and was not motivated by some sort of investigatory or administrative purpose designed to benefit the government.
The same can be said of the “government actor” in People v. McKendrick, 468 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). That case concerned a city ordinance that gave the city the right to enter upon any unfenced private property to cut down overgrown weeds, as. long as advance warnings and notices were given. When the defendant failed to respond to the notices, grass cutters hired by the city entered the defendant’s property to cut down overgrown weeds. Once there, the grass cutters discovered marijuana plants and informed police. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the Fourth Amendment applied, concluding that there was no “state action” because the grass cutters were not on the property to aid the municipality for any investigative purposes. Id. at 911.
State v. Smith, 763 P.2d 632 (Kan. 1988), cited by LaFave, supra, § 1.8(d), at 258-59, is another case in which the Fourth Amendment was not applied to private conduct engaged in by a government employee. There, a state park employee was performing trash removal duties when he heard a hissing sound and entered a cabin to determine its source. He found a leaking hose and turned off the water, but in the process noticed several bags of marijuana. He notified police, and the lessees of the cabin were prosecuted. At trial, in response to defendants’ motion to suppress, the court determined that the Fourth Amendment did not apply because the park employee’s “actions were tantamount to those of a private citizen with no different status than that of an employee of an independent privately owned trash service.” Id. at 637-38 (park employee was acting as “good neighbor” and not for any purpose connected with his employment).
After reviewing the relevant United States Supreme Court case law, the court in Smith found one “common thread” in those cases:
In every case [in which the Supreme Court has held the Fourth Amendment to be applicable], the search has been conducted or sought by government “officials” or “agents” as a part of their regular duties of employment and were conducted within the scope of that employment. No case has been cited by counsel, and our research has found none, in which the sole basis for invoking the Fourth Amendment protections *440was the mere fact that the person who discovered the incriminating evidence happened to be a government employee as opposed to a private citizen. In every case the search or proposed search has furthered the government’s objectives as they relate to the duties of the government employee.
Id. at 637. Plainly, under this analysis, the listers’ actions in the instant case are subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints on government action.
In short, the cases relied upon by the majority do not support its analysis. The majority purports to be “[flollowing the decisions from other states,” but cites no cases to support its specific holding that the listers’ inspection was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the only case directly on point — State v. Vonhof, 751 P.2d 1221 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) — explicitly rejects the position taken by the majority. There, a tax appraiser working for the county entered the defendants’ property, uninvited, to measure the dimensions of a new porch addition. Upon approaching an outbuilding, he smelled marijuana, left the premises, and contacted police. Like the majority in the instant case, the trial court concluded that the visit by the tax appraiser was not a search under the Fourth Amendment because the appraiser was not acting with law enforcement authority. The appellate court rejected this reasoning, ruling that the tax appraiser was acting as a government official, and not as a private citizen, and that it was not essential that he have law enforcement authority. Id. at 1224.5
The court concluded, however, that there was no unconstitutional search because a statute ejqjressly authorized the tax appraiser to examine property “at any reasonable time,”6 and, under the factors enumerated in a prior decision, the search was not unreasonable. Id. at 1224-25. Thus, Vonhof provides no support for the majority’s view that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to listers inspecting private property. ’
II. Reasonableness
I would hold that property tax inspections performed without advance notice or consent, and without being circumscribed in any manner by statutory law, are unreasonable.7 The Supreme Court *441has recognized that in determining the validity of a search, reasonableness is the “ultimate standard.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 539. The reasonableness of a search is determined by “balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Id. at 536-37. The greater the need for the search, the more willing we are to tolerate intrusiveness; when there is virtually no need for the search, then no intrusion is warranted. This is the appropriate standard for administrative searches, including inspections by tax appraisers, which are not aimed at investigating suspicion of criminal activity. Cf. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 568, 496 A.2d 442, 446 (1985) (constitutionality of DUI roadblock depends upon reasonableness of seizure, as determined by weighing public interest in seizure against degree of intrusion into personal privacy).
In this case, then, we should balance the listers’ need to conduct their inspections without advance notice, consent, or statutory constraints against the invasion of individual privacy resulting from such inspections. The right of Vermonters to be secure from governmental invasions of their homes is of vital interest, of course. As was the case here, listers often examine private areas within the curtilage of the home that are entitled to the same constitutional protections as the home itself. On the other hand, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that towns have a vital interest in being able to inspect real property on an emergency basis without obtaining consent, providing advance notice, or abiding by a statute that circumscribes the manner and timing of the inspections.8
There is no question that town listers need to be able to inspect private property to fulfill the government’s duty to assure that property is assessed fairly. Rather, the probative question is whether listers need to have, or should have, unfettered discretion to inspect private property at any time without advance notice, without the consent of the homeowner or occupant, and without being subject to any statutory or constitutional constraints. I say no. As was the case in Camara, the homeowner or occupant has “no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector ... is acting under proper authorization.” 387 U.S. at 532. The homeowner or occupant “may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that the law generally allows . . . inspectors to gain entry.” Id. “The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field.” Id.
III. Solution
We do not have to strip Vermonters of their constitutional rights to have a workable, convenient real property assessment system. It is possible in the realm of administrative inspections to develop procedures for safeguarding individual rights without impeding impor*442tant government functions. Here are two possible solutions.
First, if town listers are to be given the authority to inspect homes without the owners’ or occupants’ consent, then there must be a statutory scheme that defines and regulates their right to entry by circumscribing the purpose, scope, manner, and timing of the inspections, and by providing reasonable advance notice. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (holding that, as structured, program requiring home visitation by caseworker as condition for welfare benefits did not violate Fourth Amendment, given numerous statutory safeguards, including advance notice); 24 V.S.A. § 5003(c)(7) (allowing municipalities to adopt ordinance providing that housing code enforcement officers “may enter, examine and survey all dwellings and dwelling premises at any reasonable time between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. and that the inspection shall be made so as to cause the least amount of inconvenience to the owner or occupant, consistent with the efficient performance of the duties of the enforcing officer”).
Such a statute would benefit listers by definitively establishing the scope of their right to enter onto and inspect real property. The principal purpose of the statute would be to protect the privacy rights of all Vermonters, not just the very few who might take the opportunity to avoid detection for criminal activities. Indeed, perhaps the most important privacy interest of the vast majority of people willing to subject their property to inspection is not having the inspector witness conditions wholly unconnected to criminal or regulatory violations but nonetheless embarrassing to them. See LaFave, supra, § 10.1(g), at 397.
Second, with or without statutory constraints, listers may also obtain consent for inspections. Notice of the intrusion would be appreciated, and, as a practical matter, few persons would refuse entry for such a purpose. See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 316; Camara, 387 U.S. at 539; LaFave, supra, § 10.1(c), at 381. Refusal to consent to an inspection would be particularly futile in the context of real property inspections because the homeowner could not effectively challenge an assessment in light of the refusal. See Kruse v. Town of Westford, 145 Vt. 368, 372-73, 488 A.2d 770, 773 (1985) (taxpayer must overcome presumption of-validity of town assessment and retains burden of proving that property is overtaxed). As noted in the memorandum from the Division of Property Valuation and Review cited earlier, property owners will have to consent to inspection or else be content with their assessment.9 In fact, if taxpayers appealing assessments to town boards of civil authority refuse to submit to an inspection of their property following notification, their appeal is deemed withdrawn. 32 V.S.A. § 4404(c) (“If, after notice, the appellant refuses to allow an inspection of the property as required under this subsection, including the interior and exterior of any structure *443on the property, the appeal shall be deemed withdrawn.”).
Because I believe that giving unfettered discretion to government officials to inspect private property without any legal restraints on their conduct violates our basic constitutional right to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusions into our private lives, I would affirm the trial court’s decision granting defendants’ motion to suppress. The warrant used to search defendants’ home was based solely on statements that the lister made to state police. In my view, those statements relayed knowledge gained in violation of defendants’ constitutional rights, and thus must be expunged from the affidavits supporting the warrant. See State v. Morris, 165 Vt. at 126, 680 A.2d at 100. Without the lister’s statements, the warrant would be unsupported, see State v. Moran, 141 Vt. 10, 16, 444 A.2d 879, 882 (1982), and any evidence seized from execution of the warrant would have to be suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 452-53, 450 A.2d 336, 349 (1982).

As noted by the majority, defendants have failed to brief whether they are entitled to greater protection under Article 11. I do not, therefore, address whether Article 11 has a broader scope under the circumstances presented here. I note, however, that privacy concerns are at the heart of Article 11, see State v. Morris, 165 Vt. 111, 120, 680 A.2d 90, 96 (1996) (“the core value of privacy is the quintessence of Article 11”), and that we have often extended Article 11 privacy rights beyond that established under the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 125, 680 A.2d at 100 (declining to follow under Article 11 Supreme Court’s decision allowing warrantless search of trash placed in bags at curbside for collection); State v. Savva, 159 Vt. 75, 79, 87-88, 616 A.2d 774, 776, 781 (1991) (declining to follow under Article 11 Supreme Court’s expanded automobile exception to warrant requirement); State v. Oakes, 157 Vt. 171, 183-84, 598 A.2d 119, 126 (1991) (declining to adopt federal good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1, 7, 587 A.2d 988, 992 (1991) (rejecting Supreme Court’s open-fields doctrine); State v. Berard, 154 Vt. 306, 310, 576 A.2d 118, 120 (1990) (rejecting federal analysis on searches of prison inmates); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 489, 536 A.2d 902, 908 (1987) (rejecting federal seareh-andseizure standing analysis).

 “The curtilage is an area outside the physical confines of a house into which the ‘privacies of life’ may extend,, and which receives the same constitutional protection from unreasonable searches and seizures as the home itself.” State v. Rogers, 161 Vt. 236, 241, 638 A.2d 569, 572 (1993) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (for purposes of Fourth Amendment, curtilage has been considered part of home itself because it is area to which intimate activities associated with sanctity of home extend)).

 The fact that the majority has refused to suppress criminal evidence uncovered as the result of the listers’ inspection of defendants’ property does not resolve the issue most pressing to town listers — do they have the right to inspect private property without providing advance notice to, or obtaining consent from, the property owners? That is the question that listers posed to an attorney for the Division of Property Valuation and Review. Because of the posture in which this case is presented, that question is not before the Court. Nonetheless, at present, the authority of listers to enter private property without consent is not established by statute, and is, therefore, questionable.

 The information collected by the listers determines the amount of property tax levied, which if unpaid can lead to civil forfeiture or penalties. See generally 32 V.S.A. §§ 4601-5295 (assessment and collection of taxes). The role of the .lister is as much a part of government’s taxation power as the sheriff who might return to the property to collect delinquent taxes. See 32 V.S.A § 5139.

 The Washington Supreme Court later recognized this ruling, citing Vonhof for the proposition that an inspection by a tax appraiser implicates constitutional privacy rights. See In re Maxfield, 945 P.2d 196, 198-99 (Wash. 1997).

 The existence of a statute circumscribing the conduct of tax inspectors distinguishes Vonhof from the instant case, but I do not mean to suggest that a statute with language as vague as the Washington statute would suffice to erase constitutional concerns.

 I fail to grasp the point of the majority’s assertion that I have transformed the issue contested by the parties —whether there was an unlawful search because of the lack of a warrant ■ — • into a novel issue — whether lister inspections are reasonable absent a statute circumscribing them. The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion to suppress. In reaching its ruling, the trial court considered first, whether the listers’ conduct triggered the Fourth Amendment’s protection against governmental intrusions, and second, after deciding that it did, whether the particular search in this instance was reasonable. Those are precisely the issues I examine in my dissent. I would hold that the Fourth Amendment was triggered, and that the search was not reasonable, given the lack of a statute circumscribing the listers’ conduct. Because of the nature of the governmental conduct here, the warrant requirement is *441not really relevant. But the question of the reasonableness of the search remains. The majority does not consider this question because it holds that the Fourth Amendment is not even implicated. I disagree with this holding, however, and thus address the question of reasonableness. Toward that end, I consider the question of whether there is a statute circumscribing lister inspections.

 The only evidence in the record on this point is a memorandum from an attorney for the Division of Property Valuation and Review advising Vermont boards of listers in the wake of the district court’s decision in this case. The memorandum recommends that listers obtain consent and, failing that, appraise property based upon curbside inspections, review of available aerial photography, inventory forms, or calls to builders, neighbors, and real estate agents.

 In the rare instances when consent to inspection is refused and the town believes that an inspection is necessary, a statute addressing lister inspections could allow towns to obtain a search warrant. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 535-39 (administrative search warrants may be based on general facts completely distinct from type of facts required to obtain search warrants pursuant to criminal investigation); cf. 24 V.S.A. § 5003(c)(8) (allowing municipalities to adopt ordinance with provision for obtaining search warrant if entry for administrative inspection under housing code is refused; noting that probable cause for warrant need not be based on specific knowledge of particular dwelling, but rather may be based on passage of time between inspections, nature of dwelling, condition of area, or need to determine if there has been compliance with previous order).