Court Opinion

ID: 9889235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 00:00:25.586554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:13.532811
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10171          Document: 00516923466             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/06/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                            Fifth Circuit
                                       ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                       October 6, 2023
                                         No. 23-10171
                                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                         Clerk

   Lonnie Kade Welsh,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                              versus

   Unknown Male Shift Supervisor,

                                                 Defendant—Appellee.
                       ______________________________

                       Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Northern District of Texas
                                 USDC No. 5:19-CV-255
                       ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

           Lonnie Welsh—a convicted sexually violent predator—filed a com-
   plaint seeking money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations
   of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.1 In his com-

           _____________________
           *
               This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
           1
             Welsh also sued many other defendants for various events that allegedly occurred
   when he was confined as a pretrial detainee at Lubbock County Detention Center. Those
   other claims are not relevant for purposes of this appeal—the district court dismissed them
   under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and we affirmed. See Welsh v. Lubbock County, 70 F.4th
Case: 23-10171         Document: 00516923466              Page: 2       Date Filed: 10/06/2023

                                          No. 23-10171

   plaint and questionnaire responses, Welsh generally alleged that a male shift
   supervisor—whom Welsh identified as “Sergeant K. Young”—placed him
   in solitary confinement without a hearing to punish him based on his status
   as a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). At the time of the alleged incident,
   Lubbock County Detention Center (“LCDC”) did employ a correctional
   officer named K. Young. But “K.” stands for Katherine, who most definitely
   is not the complained-of male shift supervisor. Welsh agreed: After learning
   of Young’s full name, Welsh clarified that the defendant was an “unknown
   male officer.”
           The district court granted Welsh’s motion for limited discovery to
   identify the unnamed defendant. It first ordered Welsh to submit a physical
   description of the officer,2 after which it directed the Lubbock County Sheriff
   to identify any officers matching that description who were working around
   the time of the incident or, if no officer could be identified, to produce photo-
   graphs of officers fitting that description who were working around the same
   time and may have spoken with Welsh. The Sheriff complied and produced
   photographs of three officers.3
           But Welsh maintains that the unnamed defendant is not among those
   pictured. Speculating that the Sheriff “withheld” the picture of the un-
   named defendant, Welsh demanded that the district court expand the scope
   of discovery to include a photo of every individual who worked at LCDC dur-
   ing the incident. On December 12, 2022, district court denied that request

           _____________________
   869 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam).
           2
            Welsh described the officer as a white male with brown hair, no visible scars, and
   a peach and slightly tan complexion, between 5’7” and 5’10” in height, and in his mid-30s
   to 40s.
           3
           The Sheriff, as part of his response, advised that he was unable to identify the real
   defendant based on Welsh’s description.

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                                           No. 23-10171

   and dismissed, without prejudice, Welsh’s claim against the unnamed defen-
   dant for failure to effect timely service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Welsh filed
   a motion for reconsideration on January 10, 2023, which the court denied on
   February 19, 2023. His notice of appeal was filed on February 15, 2023. He
   appeals the (1) dismissal of the unnamed defendant for failing to effect ser-
   vice, (2) denial of additional discovery, and (3) denial of his Federal Rule of
   Civil Procedure 59(e) motion.
           As a threshold matter, we address jurisdiction. United States v.
   Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2021). In a civil case, the timely filing
   of a notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived or
   forfeited. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007); Hamer v. Neighborhood
   Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017). This court “must examine the
   basis of its jurisdiction, on its own motion, if necessary.” Mosley v. Cozby,
   813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987).
           A Rule 59(e) motion must be timely filed to toll the deadline for filing
   a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). The district court en-
   tered final judgment on December 12, 2022. But Welsh’s Rule 59(e) motion
   was not filed until January 10, 2023—29 days after entry of judgment. That
   is one day too late.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b) (“no later than 28 days after
   the entry of judgment”). And because Welsh’s motion for reconsideration
   was untimely, the 30-day period to file a notice of appeal began running the
   day after entry of judgment on December 12. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
   Because Welsh filed his notice of appeal 65 days after judgment, we lack
   jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
           We also note that Welsh “bears the burden of establishing this court’s

           _____________________
           4
              That the district court considered and denied Welsh’s Rule 59(e) motion does
   not alter our jurisdictional analysis. Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1989).

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                                          No. 23-10171

   appellate jurisdiction over this appeal.” Thibodeaux v. Vamos Oil & Gas Co.,
   487 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp.,
   207 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2000)). Yet, in his briefing, Welsh does not assert
   that this court has jurisdiction.5 See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(4)(A)–(D)
   (“The appellant’s brief must contain . . . a jurisdictional statement, including
   . . . the basis for the court of appeals’ jurisdiction.”). And while we do “lib-
   erally construe the briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent standards
   to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel, pro se
   parties must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of
   Rule 28.” Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995).
           For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal for want of
   jurisdiction.

           _____________________
           5
             Welsh never claims any exception applies to render his Rule 59(e) motion timely.
   Regardless, none seems to apply. Although a panel applied the prison mailbox rule to civilly
   confined litigants, Brown v. Taylor, 829 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2016), that holding does not bind
   this case, see id. at 368–69 (applying law of the case doctrine). It is therefore unnecessary
   to remand for the limited purpose of making factual findings about Welsh’s ability to file
   pleadings at the time he filed his Rule 59(e) motion.

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