Court Opinion

ID: 9442752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:58:29.020697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:13.117002
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I am somewhat troubled because, although the judge sustained an- objection to the question, “Now, Mr. Schiller, isn’t it a fact that on or about March 3, 1948 you received from Mrs. Estelle G. Anderson the sum of $500 in currency in return for which you agreed to procure and did •procure an apartment in Manhattan for her •in violation of Section 965 of the Penal Law of the State of New York making it a crime to do that?,” the subsequent questions which the judge permitted to be .answered as to accepting money, etc., in the light of the former question, plainly suggested to the jury that the defendant had •committed other crimes when he had not in fact been convicted. Nevertheless I think we may properly avoid reversing since the answer showed that the defendant’s motive or intention was not innocent when 'he accepted money from his codefendants. 2 Wigmore (1940 ed.) §§ 302, 343. The issue of the defendant’s intention was •plainly relevant since his defense in part rested on his contention that the money had been offered to him and taken by him as a loan.
My colleagues, however, have based their .affirmance on the additional ground that the question was proper by way of impeachment of defendant, as a witness. To that extent, I am not prepared to concur. 'True, it is commonly said that an accused who takes the stand may be impeached, like any other witness, by eliciting testimony from him on cross-examination as to his prior acts of misconduct, 3 Wig-more, §§ 889-890. Wigmore, however, •qualifies this broad statement in two respects: (1) Where (as here) the accused has not raised the issue of his general good moral character, then by taking the stand he places in issue his credibility only, and the prosecution, by way of impeachment, may attack his character for veracity only. See 3 Wigmore, §§ 891(1), 925. (2) Cross-examination as to his past acts of misconduct may prejudice the defendant qua accused in the eyes of the jury to an extent which far outweighs any value it may have as evidence on the issue of his credibility as a witness. For that reason, Wigmore suggests that such impeachment should be limited more strictly in favor of the accused than in the case of the ordinary witness. See 3 Wigmore, §§ 983(4), 987. Cf. 8 Wigmore, § 2277 (4); Gideon v. United States, 8 Cir., 52 F.2d 427, 429-430; Ellis v. District of Columbia, 45 App.D.C. 384, 388.
Since, under Federal Rules Criminal Procedure Rule 26, 18 U.S.C.A. we are not obliged to follow state decisions on matters of evidence unless we believe that they correctly reflect “the principles of the common law * * * in the light of reason and experience,” I think we should adopt Wigmore’s suggestion. While the permissible scope of such questioning is largely within the discretion of the trial judge, I do not believe that the prosecution, on the sole pretext of attacking credibility, may fairly use an objectionable question to suggest the past acts of the accused were criminal when he has not been convicted for those past acts. Instructions by the trial judge to disregard the offending question and to consider past misconduct solely on the issue of the accused’s credibility as a witness are as likely to enhance as to diminish the jury’s general impression that the defendant is a poor sort who should be convicted for other acts if not for the crime charged. Cf. United States v. Grayson, 2 Cir., 166 F.2d 863, 870-871, concurring opinion, and cases cited therein at page 871, note 4; United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 2 Cir., 155 F.2d 631, 655—656, dissenting opinion.