Court Opinion

ID: 9556043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:03:59.396337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:09.376578
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/15/23 P. v. Kieta CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079138

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF2105166)

 KIONNE KIETA,                                                           OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.

         Michelle T. LiVecchi-Raufi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher P. Beesley and

Britton B. Lacy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
          Kionne Kieta was charged with felony robbery and misdemeanor destruction of

property and admitted an enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon. Kieta

requested mental health diversion, and the trial court granted it for the misdemeanor but

denied it as to the felony. Kieta subsequently pled guilty to the charges. On appeal,

Kieta argues the court’s decision to deny him mental health diversion for the felony

robbery charge was an abuse of discretion. Due to newly enacted changes in the law, we

conditionally reverse the conviction and remand to allow the trial court to reconsider

Kieta’s request for mental health diversion.

                                       BACKGROUND

          In November 2021 Kieta ordered a bicyclist to dismount while brandishing a

pocketknife.1 Kieta stabbed both tires of the bicycle and removed the cellphone attached

to the handlebars. He started walking away, but then returned and took the bicyclist’s

jacket.

          The Riverside County District Attorney charged Kieta with felony robbery (Pen.

Code, § 211)2 and misdemeanor destruction of property (§ 594, subd. (a)). They also

alleged Kieta personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the

robbery (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), that the robbery was a serious and violent felony

          1 Because Kieta’s plea was the sole factual basis for his convictions, we have
taken the facts regarding the underlying crime from Kieta’s Prima Facie Showing of His
Eligibility and Suitability for Mental Health Diversion.

          2 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.

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(§§ 1192.7, subd. (c), 667.5, subd. (c)), and that Kieta was on probation at the time of the

offenses.

       Superior Court Judge Gail A. O’Rane found Kieta was eligible for pretrial

diversion for mental health reasons. Superior Court Judge Emma C. Smith then found

Kieta unsuitable for mental health diversion for the felony offense, but suitable for the

misdemeanor offense. The court explained that it was “frightened, not just for the public,

but also for [Kieta] because had certain people been there with law enforcement or

otherwise at the scene of this incident, and watched what transpired, [he] could really,

really have been hurt.” The court further stated, “this is a terrifying experience for all

people involved . . . [b]ecause if someone didn’t know [Kieta was] sick, right, [he] could

easily have been taken down for this.” It also expressed concern that just two months

before this robbery Kieta was convicted of assault upon the person of another by any

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.

       Kieta then pled guilty to both charges and admitted the enhancement. The court

granted probation according to Kieta’s plea agreement. Kieta timely appealed his

judgment. In doing so he requested a certificate of probable cause, which the trial court

granted.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Kieta argues the trial court erred by refusing to grant mental health diversion

because the two judges involved in assessing his request for mental health diversion

made several contradictory findings. Specifically, Kieta argues it was error to determine

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he was not a threat to the public for purposes of his eligibility for mental health diversion,

but that he was a danger to the public for purposes of his suitability. He also argues it

was inconsistent to grant mental health diversion as to one charge, deny it as to the other,

and ultimately grant probation. We conclude that recent changes in the law compel

remand to allow the trial court to reconsider Kieta’s request in light of those changes.

       “Section 1001.36 authorizes a pretrial diversion program for defendants with

qualifying mental disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626.) “[A] trial

court may grant pretrial diversion if it finds all of the following: (1) the defendant suffers

from a qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder played a significant role in the

commission of the charged offense; (3) the defendant’s symptoms will respond to mental

health treatment; (4) the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her speedy

trial right; (5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment; and (6) the defendant will

not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.”

(Id. at pp. 626-627; § 1001.36 subds. (b)(1)-(2), (c)(1)-(4).)

       Prior to January 1, 2023, all six of these criteria determined a defendant’s

eligibility for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b); People v. Whitmill

(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149.) While all six of these criteria are still required (with

some modifications), as of January 1, 2023, the first two now determine a defendant’s

eligibility for mental health diversion, while the last four determine a defendant’s

suitability. (§ 1001.36, subds. (b), (c).)

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       We requested supplemental briefing from the parties to determine whether this

change in the law compelled remand. Both parties agree the change in the law is

retroactive to Kieta, and we agree with the parties. (People v. Williams (2021) 63

Cal.App.5th 990, 995 [holding section 1101.36 “applies retroactively to all cases in

which the judgment is not yet final”].) The only remaining question is whether this

change could provide him any relief, including remand for reconsideration.

       We conclude it does. Judge Smith decided Kieta was not suitable for diversion

without reference to any of the criteria courts must now use to assess suitability.

Moreover, Judge O’Rane had previously concluded Kieta met nearly identical criteria.

Therefore, Kieta’s eligibility and suitability were not assessed under the framework

which should apply to him, and given Judge O’Rane’s previous findings, it is reasonably

probable he would have obtained a more favorable outcome had Judge Smith been

required to use that framework.

       This is further supported by the fact that Judge Smith found Kieta unsuitable for

diversion in large part due to the danger she felt he posed to himself and others. Because

the old version of the law did not provide any guidance for what constituted suitability,

Judge Smith’s decision on Kieta’s dangerousness was not bounded. Under the new

version, in order to be suitable for diversion a defendant must not “pose an unreasonable

risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)

Thus, under the new version of the law there is both a clear indication that dangerousness

is a proper consideration under suitability and a fairly high bar for what constitutes an

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unreasonable risk of danger. Under section 1170.18, an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to

public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent

felony within the meaning of . . . Section 667[, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)].” (§ 1170.18,

subd. (c).) “The violent felonies encompassed in this definition ‘are known as “super

strikes” and include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault

with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and

any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment.’ [Citation.] They

also include sexually violent offenses and sexual offenses committed against minors

under the age of 14.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449-450.) “By

requiring an assessment of whether the defendant ‘will commit a new violent felony’

within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv), a trial court necessarily

must find the defendant is ‘likely to commit a super-strike offense.’ [Citation.] Thus, the

risk of danger is narrowly confined to the likelihood the defendant will commit a limited

subset of violent felonies.” (Id. at p. 450.) In short, there is a “high standard applicable

to a finding of ‘dangerousness’ under sections 1001.36 and 1170.18.” (Id. at p. 451.)

Given this high bar, it is reasonably probable that Kieta would have received a more

favorable outcome if Judge Smith had been expressly required to apply this much higher

standard for dangerousness, as the court will be required to do on remand.

       Finally, Kieta is correct that there is at least tension between Judge O’Rane’s

eligibility finding that Kieta was not an unreasonable risk of danger to the public, and

Judge Smith’s finding of unsuitability for felony diversion because he did pose a risk of

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danger to the public. These findings would not be flatly in conflict if Judge Smith were

properly using different criteria for the suitability determination than Judge O’Rane did

for the eligibility one. Kieta has not argued that a contradiction requires an outright

reversal, and, as we are remanding anyway, we do not address further whether the rulings

of the two judges would be in conflict absent the change in the law. Under the current

law, the factors that are applicable to eligibility and suitability are defined.

                                        DISPOSITION

       We conditionally reverse the judgment. We remand with directions to determine

whether Kieta is eligible and suitable for mental health diversion. If the trial court

determines that Kieta qualifies for diversion under section 1001.36, then the court may

grant diversion. If Kieta successfully completes diversion, then the trial court shall

dismiss the charges. However, if the court determines that Kieta is ineligible or

unsuitable for diversion, otherwise declines to grant him diversion, or Kieta does not

successfully complete diversion, then his convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                  RAPHAEL
                                                                                            J.
We concur:

McKINSTER
                 Acting P. J.

MILLER
                            J.

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