Court Opinion

ID: 9679813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:08:41.752082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.535230
License: Public Domain

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.
I concur with the result of the majority opinion but write separately to suggest other factors that trial courts should consider when determining if good cause has been pleaded such that an evidentiary hearing should be granted on a motion to set aside a default judgment.
Husband complains that his wife misled him about the need to hire a separate attorney. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon occurrence in dissolutions. Similar factual scenarios appear in other cases and, although this Court has not spoken on this particular issue, some notable trends do appear in the court of appeals. While perpetuating a fraud on an opposing party in litigation is not to be condoned, Husband must plead facts that show that he was free from fault, neglect, or inattention to the summons and petition that he was served. See In re Marriage of Macomb, 169 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Mo.App. 2005).
*646In the present case, the pleadings recite facts that entitle Husband to a hearing. There, he may be able to show that the circumstances surrounding these facts establish good cause. The trial court’s judgment and Wife’s petition both indicate that the parties cohabitated during the period leading up to the default judgment hearing. That fact is undisputed.
Courts have at times treated a husband and wife who were cohabitating at the time of the dissolution differently from a non-cohabitating couple. In Saloma v. Saloma-Orozco, 788 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Mo.App.1990), the court addressed a default judgment where the husband and wife continued to live together. Similarly, in that case the husband alleged that the wife had misled him into believing that she did not intend to proceed with the dissolution action. Id. at 801. In affirming the setting aside of the default judgment, the court highlighted the cohabitation, stating that “the relationship of confidence between a wife and husband may justify the latter’s reliance on the wife’s representations.” Id. at 801; see also Macomb, 169 S.W.3d at 194 (noting that the key fact in Saloma was a “relationship of confidence” through cohabitation and stating that in other circumstances a trial court acts properly when finding reliance on an adverse party’s statements is reckless).1
In contrast, in Crain v. Crain, 19 S.W.3d 170 (Mo.App.2000), the court found that the husband did not have good cause in neglecting to respond to a petition for dissolution. In Crain, the husband complained that he had spoken with his wife once a week, yet she never had informed him that she intended to proceed with the dissolution or that a hearing was scheduled; on the other hand, the wife never had told him affirmatively that she did not intend to proceed.2 Id. at 172-73. In addition to these facts, it appeared that the husband and wife were living apart. The court addressed what constitutes good cause, noting that good cause is not present when the movant’s conduct was intentional or reckless so as to impede the judicial process. Id. at 174. The court then rejected the husband’s challenge, stating, “Husband’s argument ignores the clear warnings contained in the summons and attempts to impose the burden on the adverse party to protect himself from his own negligence in failing to preserve his rights.” Id. at 175.
In this case, remand for an evidentiary hearing is proper because Husband might be able to demonstrate that he had good cause in failing to answer the petition timely because he was in a relationship of confidence. An evidentiary hearing might reveal whether, in context, Husband was reckless in relying on Wife’s statements during this time. Notably, in non-domestic cases, it would be a mistake to condone reliance on an adverse party’s statements of the nature alleged here.

. In addition to a relationship of confidence, other factors relevant to good cause that weigh in favor of granting an evidentiary hearing may include the presence of a child custody dispute or the rapidity with which a complaining party files a motion. E.g., Bothe v. Bothe, 266 S.W.3d 321, 325-26 (Mo.App.2008) (default judgment reversed when child custody a central issue and complaining party moved immediately to set it aside).

. Reviewing the relevant statutes and case law, Crain affirmed the longstanding rule that the husband, as a defaulting party, was not entitled to notice subsequent to the summons. Id. at 174. Notably, in the present case, Husband was served personally with a summons that clearly notified him that failure to file a responsive pleading within 30 days may result in a default judgment.