Court Opinion

ID: 9844658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:06:20.061971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.709066
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
McFADDEN, Chief Justice.
This cause was reheard upon respondents’ petition. Spear, J., who was appointed *147to fill the vacancy created by resignation of Knudson, J., participated in the cause on rehearing. In the order granting rehearing the parties were requested to re-argue the case and also were particularly requested to submit authorities on the issue of whether a trial court, after notice of appeal from a judgment has been taken, may thereafter consider a timely motion to amend or make additional findings of fact.
It is the contention of respondents that timely motion filed by them pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(b), to amend or make additional findings of fact may be considered and acted upon by the trial court notwithstanding that an appeal had already been taken by appellants, and hence that this court should not have considered the amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment appealed from, but should only have considered the second amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment.
The record reflects that a memorandum decision was rendered by the trial court on August 20, 1963, wherein the respondents’ counsel were requested to prepare and submit appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. Various extensions of time were authorized within which to submit objections to these findings, conclusions and judgment. Thereafter another memorandum decision was entered on February 28, 1964, denying respondents’ objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and decree, and appellants’ counsel was requested to prepare amendments to the findings, conclusions and decree previously submitted. A third memorandum decision was entered on June 19, 1964, after a hearing was held on the appellants’ motion for approval of amended findings of fact, amended conclusions of law, and amended decree and judgment, and therein appellants’ counsel were requested to prepare and submit another order amending the findings and conclusions, and also submit the judgment. On June 29, amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree were signed and entered. On July 1, 1964, by filing and serving notice of appeal accompanied with cost and supersedeas bond, appellants perfected an appeal from parts of the judgment entered. On July 9, respondents filed their motion to amend the findings of fact, for additional findings, and to vacate the judgment. Thereafter on July 20, 1964, a hearing was had on respondents’ motion to amend the findings of fact and for additional findings and to vacate the judgment. On August 6, 1964, second amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and amended judgment and decree were entered, from which judgment appellants again appealed by filing and serving notice of appeal, with cost and supersedeas bonds.
The general rule is that upon an appeal being perfected the trial court is divested of jurisdiction of the cause;1 having lost jurisdiction pending an appeal the lower court may not allow amendments; 2 and *148it is error to enter a substituted and supplemental decree after appeal is taken.3
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See: Publisher’s Note, page III, I.R.C.P. In adopting these rules, however, this court did not adopt any of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals from the United States District Courts to the United States Supreme Court, (Fed. Rule 72,) or rules governing appeals from the United States District Courts to the Circuit Courts. (Federal Rules 73(a-g), 74, 75(a-o), and 76). I.R.C.P. 72 pertains to appeals to district court. The designation of I.R.C.P. 73(a-g), 74, 75(a-o), and 76, is that these sections are “Reserved”. See pg. 408, I.R.C.P.
The right to appeal, procedures involved, time for appeals, etc., are presently governed by I.C. Title 13, Chs. 1 and 2. It is of interest to note that Title 13, Ch. 1 and all of Ch. 2, (except T.C. § 13-222), were first enacted in 1881, as §§ 639-661 of C.C.P. 1881, having been amended at various times by the legislature. I.C. § 13-222 was enacted S.L.1943, Ch. 89 § 1. Idaho Const. Art. 5 § 13, provides:
“The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without conflict with this Constitution.” (Emphasis added.)
At the time of the adoption of the constitution, a complete system of appeals was a part of the law of this state. The right to appeal, time for taking appeals, and requirements for appeal have always been considered as within area reserved by the constitution to the legislature for change or modification. Weiser Irr. Dist. v. Middle Valley, etc., Co., 28 Idaho 548, 552, 155 P. 484.
Under the provisions of I.C. § 13-208, when an appeal to this court is perfected, “it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from, or upon the matters embraced therein * * *.” The effect of perfecting an appeal is to divest the district court of further jurisdiction in the cause as to matters embraced in the judgment or order appealed from, although not as to matters ancillary or supplementary thereto. This transfer of jurisdiction from the district court to the Supreme Court is recognized by I.R.C.P. 60(a) which provides:
“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its owy initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may he corrected before the appeal is docketed in the Stipreme Court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may he so corrected with leave of the Supreme Court." (Emphasis added.)
The previous opinion by this court is confirmed; the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance therewith.
Costs to appellants.
TAYLOR, SMITH and SPEAR, JJ., and MARTIN, D. J., concur.

. Brookshier v. Hyatt, 91 Idaho 305, 420 P.2d 788; Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937); State v. McCarrell, 80 Ariz. 240, 295 P.2d 1086 (1956); Associated Lumber & Box Co. v. Superior Court in and for Calaveras County, 79 Cal.App.2d 577, 180 P.2d 389 (1947); King v. Lank, 5 Terry 189, 44 Del. 189, 61 A.2d 402 (1948); Horn v. Horn, 73 So.2d 905 (Fla.1954); Marrifield v. Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co., 238 Ill. 526, 87 N.E. 379 (1909); Tucker v. Heaverlo, 249 Iowa 197, 86 N.W.2d 353 (1957); Tiller v. Elfenbein, 205 Md. 14, 106 A.2d 42 (1954); Bock v. Sauk Center Grocery Co., 100 Minn. 71, 110 N.W. 257, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 1054 (1907); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 219 Miss. 720, 69 So.2d 844 (1954); State v. Ashworth, 346 Mo. 869, 143 S.W.2d 279 (1940); Benolken v. Miracle, 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 667 (1954); State v. Jackson, 228 Or. 371, 365 P.2d 294, 89 A.L.R.2d 1225 (1961); Smith v. Kimball, 76 Utah 350, 289 P. 588, 70 A.L.R. 101 (1930); Dwight v. Hazlett, 107 W.Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877, 66 A.L.R. 102 (1929); Lerner v. Superior Court in and for San Mateo County, 38 Cal.2d 676, 242 P.2d 321 (1952).

. Cranston v. Stanfield, 123 Or. 314, 261 P. 52 (1927); Good v. Board of Sup’rs, 140 Va. 399, 125 S.E. 321 (1924); Pure Oil Co. v. O’Brien, 106 W.Va. 10, 144 S.E. 564 (1928).

. State ex rel. Woodbury County Anti-Saloon League v. McGraw, 191 Iowa 1090, 183 N.W. 593 (1921).