Court Opinion

ID: 9696820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:59:24.668499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.859473
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur and take this opportunity to point out that the majority’s interpretation *422of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code1 (MPC) as barring J. Kevan Busik’s and Julia Kimberly Busik’s (Bu-siks) challenge is the only practical result here.
The Busiks contend, however, that they should not be estopped from challenging condition number four2 because they did not become aware that they could not meet the condition until after the expiration of the thirty-day appeal period set forth in section 1002-A of the MPC.3 Although acknowledging their initial acceptance of condition number four, the Busiks reason that, once they became aware that they could not meet the condition and informed Solebury Township (Township) of this fact, condition number four became unacceptable to the Busiks. Thus, the Busiks argue, the Township must be deemed to have rejected the Busiks’ final plan. According to the Busiks, because the Township’s decision did not specify the reasons for rejection of the final plan as required by section 508(2) of the MPC,4 section 508(3) of the MPC5 requires that the Busiks’ final plan be deemed approved without the now unacceptable condition.
Accepting the Busiks’ argument and permitting developers to challenge the contents of approved preliminary plans after the thirty-day appeal period has run would wreak havoc on the preliminary and final plan approval process provided for by section 508 of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10508. Were this court to permit such untimely appeals, courts likely would be besieged with similar appeals by developers who experience subsequent difficulty, financial or otherwise, in meeting conditions that they accepted during the preliminary plan approval process or who simply change their minds after agreeing to a condition. Allowing such challenges would render preliminary plan approval meaningless.6
In practice, the preliminary plan approval process is frequently a process of contract negotiation between a developer and a municipality. In accepting a condition, a developer likely obtains a quid pro quo from the municipality, which quid pro quo may or may not be reflected in the ap*423proved preliminary or final plans.7 Once the thirty-day period to appeal from conditions imposed by the preliminary plan approval expires, the approved preliminary plan, including the conditions accepted by the developer, is essentially a binding contract between the municipality and the developer.8
Under the doctrine of impossibility of performance9 applicable to the construction of contracts, if, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable through no fault of his or her own, the parties may waive the difficulties or terminate the agreement, ending all contractual obligations. West v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A.2d 427 (1954).
Here, there is no question that the Bu-siks accepted the condition that they “shall enter into a license agreement with Michael and Barbara DeLaszlo ... upon terms and conditions mutually agreeable to both, to provide for a license of ingress and egress and regress over and through” the DeLaszlos’ property. (Majority op. at 418 n. 1.) (Emphasis added.) It is “undisputed” that the Busiks “attempted to negotiate” with the DeLaszlos “in good faith.” (Majority op. at 421.) Yet, despite their good faith efforts, the Busiks were unable to enter into a mutually agreeable license agreement with the DeLaszlos in order to satisfy that condition. Arguably, then, the Busiks’ performance of their obligations under the contract with the Township became impossible.
However, even assuming that the doctrine of impossibility applied to the Busiks’ contract with the Township, the Township’s refusal to waive condition number four would, at most, entitle the Busiks to dissolution or discharge of their contract; they would not be entitled to have the contract enforced without the bargained-for condition. Alternatively, the Busiks might have renegotiated their contract with the Township, perhaps giving the Township an additional quid pro quo in return for the Township’s omitting condition number four. Or, the Busiks could have filed a new preliminary plan without condition number 4 and negotiated anew for the Township’s plan approval.
*424Viewed in this light, the majority’s holding not only comports with the MPC but produces an eminently fair result because it places the Busiks in no worse a position than if we had applied basic contract principles.

. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202.

. Although the majority and trial court discuss only condition number four, I note that, in the land use appeal filed in the trial court, the Busiks also asked that condition number one be eliminated from the final plan approval. (R.R. at 11a para, h, 12a, 19a.) Condition number one requires that the Busiks abandon an easement across the lands of another neighbor's property and also requires that Michael and Barbara DeLaszlo (DeLasz-los) join in and approve the Busiks’ agreement to abandon that easement. (R.R. at 19a-20a.) The Busiks allege that, because they were unable to reach an agreement with the DeLaszlos regarding condition number four, they “believe” that "the DeLaszlos will refuse to execute [the] abandonment of easement agreements...” referenced in condition number one. (R.R. at 1 la para, h.)

. 53 P.S. § 11002-A.

. 53 P.S. § 10508(2).

. 53 P.S. § 10508(3).

. The Busiks also argue that the Township's failure to enact a provision under section 503(9) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10503(9), requiring an applicant to expressly accept or reject conditions, estops the Township “from asserting that the final approval is a separate action-" (Busiks' brief at 8.) Section 503(9) provides that a municipality’s subdivision and land development ordinance may include
[provisions for the approval of a plat, whether preliminary or final, subject to conditions acceptable to the applicant and a procedure for the applicant's acceptance or rejection of any conditions which may be imposed, including a provision that approval of a plat shall be rescinded automatically upon the applicant’s failure to accept or reject such conditions within such time limit as may be established by the governing ordinance.
53 P.S. § 10503(9). This section of the MPC, however, is of no help to the Busiks because, even if the Township’s ordinance included such a provision, the Busiks accepted condition number four at the preliminary plan approval stage, and the Township's approval of the Busiks’ preliminary plan with that condition number was an appealable decision.

.For instance, a developer may agree to a condition in return for quick subdivision approval. See, e.g., Bonner v. Upper Makefield Township, 142 Pa.Cmwlth. 205, 210, 597 A.2d 196, 199 (1991). Here, it appears that, in return for the ten conditions accepted by the Busiks, the Township granted the Busiks the following:
a) A waiver from the width and paving requirements for the driveways which will serve the subdivision. The driveways serving the subdivision shall have a 10’ wide cartway (with appropriate pull-off areas) with a 6” crushed stone sub-base[;]
b) A waiver from the right-of-way requirements for the driveways serving the subdivision to permit the right-of-way shown on the plan;
c) [A] waiver from the provision of the Municipalities Planing [sic] Code which provides that any change in the Zoning or Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance which is adverse to the Subdivision shall not affect the subdivision so that the time period during which no adverse change in the Zoning ordinance and the Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance shall adversely affect the development is extended from five years to ten years.
(R.R. at 17a.)

. Indeed, the MPC provides that, once a preliminary plan is approved, the applicant generally is entitled to final approval in accordance with the terms of the approved preliminary plan. See section 508(4)(i), 53 , P.S. § 10508(4)(i).

. "Impossibility of performance” means "not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, or loss involved." West v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 282, 106 A.2d 427, 432 (1954). "Impossibility of performance,” however, does not include mere inconvenience even though it may work a hardship. International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1201, AFL-CIO v. Board of Education of School District of Philadelphia, 500 Pa. 474, 457 A.2d 1269 (1983). Nor does it include a party’s financial inability to perform. Luber v. Luber, 418 Pa.Super. 542, 614 A.2d 771 (1992), appeal denied, 535 Pa. 636, 631 A.2d 1008 (1993).