Court Opinion

ID: 9551723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:09.789094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:26.932369
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot subscribe to the holding by the majority that the publication by defendant’s newspaper of a false statement that defendant told officers that “she *313and her husband are separated and in the process of getting a divorce,” when such was not a fact, does not “tend to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence,” in which such a person is held or “excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings or opinions against them.”
On the contrary, I am of the opinion that even though such a result may no longer be justifiable, the publication of such a false report still has such a result in actual fact because at least a substantial segment of society today still views divorce with disfavor. I am also of the opinion that most married men and women today, if made the subject of the publication of such a false report, would subscribe to such a view. Thus, under somewhat similar facts the court observed in Gersten v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 52 NJ Super 152, 145 A2d 56, 58 (1958):
“Reputation is a fragile flower. A breath of unfounded scandal is often sufficient to wither it. * * * Many may forget the details of the incident, but nevertheless long remember that there was once something derogatory in the press about an individual.”
See also Prosser, Law of Torts 740-41 (4th ed 1971). The majority has cited no authority directly to the contrary.
I also dissent from the opinion by the majority because it does not decide the primary issue presented for decision in this ease — whether defendant newspaper was protected from liability arising from the publication from such a false statement by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. A necessary incident to that issue is the question whether the recent decision by the Supreme Court of *314the United States in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 US 29, 91 S Ct 1811, 29 L ed 2d 296 (June 7, 1971), requires such a holding in this ease or whether that decision must be distinguished for the reason, among others, that the State of Oregon has adopted a “retro-action” statute (ORS 30.160) and that in this case defendant apparently refused plaintiff’s request for publication of a retraction in accordance with the terms of that statute. (See 403 US at 47).
For these reasons I most respectfully dissent.
Bryson, J., joins in this dissent.