Court Opinion

ID: 9744780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:16:01.707822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.668342
License: Public Domain

*480Concurring Opinion
White, J.
I concur in the court’s opinion because I agree that from the appellate viewpoint the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. But I regret the majority’s failure to address the trial judge’s question whether, from his viewpoint as the thirteenth juror, the evidence is sufficient.
In overruling Wilson’s motion to correct errors the trial court filed a memorandum which said, in part:
“Had I been the sole trier of fact, I would have acquitted on the sole issue of identity. However, it would have been a ‘not proven’, beyond a reasonable doubt, conclusion. Yet, I believed him guilty by a preponderance of the evidence.
“I let the verdict stand because I thought the jury’s wisdom and its responsibility should not be set aside unless I believed the defendant innocent. . . .”
His memorandum also notes that “[t]he decisions do not define the quantum of proof or lack thereof which should govern the trial judge in passing upon the proof after a jury verdict of guilty.” He invites us to speak to the problem.
It is true that virtually all of the recent Indiana cases which discuss the judge’s power and duty with respect to requests for new trials on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are civil cases. And these provide little or no guidance as to “the quantum of proof or lack thereof which should govern the trial judge” even in civil cases. However, the leading case of Bailey v. Kain (1963), 135 Ind. App. 657, 666, 192 N.E.2d 486, 490, observes:
“. . . that the duties evolving upon the trial judge when invoked by consideration of a motion for a new trial do in fact and law constitute him a thirteenth juror. Our case law in Indiana re the duty and responsibility of the trial court in .such instances is paralleled by the case law governing the federal trial courts and in analogous situations the federal trial judge sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’.4
The three federal cases cited are criminal cases. In the first,
*481United States v. Parelius (D. Hawaii, 1949), 83 F.Supp. 617, 618, the trial judge opined that: “If the judge sits as a thirteenth juror, as some authorities hold, then a verdict in which he could not concur should not stand if it is properly moved against.”
In the second, United States y. Robinson (D.D.C. 1947), 71 F. Supp. 9, 14, Judge Alexander Holtzoif reviewed many federal authorities preliminary to concluding that although there was a prima facie case against Robinson the testimony of his alleged accomplices that he was not involved “far outweighs the somewhat dubious and conjectural evidence against him,” and ordered a new trial. Obviously, Judge Holtzoff found the evidence of Robinson’s guilt much less convincing that Judge Jacobs found the evidence of Wilson’s identity as the perpetrator of the robbery. Consequently Robinson does not stand for the proposition that a trial judge should grant a new trial if he is convinced of guilt by a preponderance of evidence but not beyond a reasonable doubt. However, it does cite and quote with apparent approval from many cases including the following :
“. . . Judge Denison, in Bain v. United States, 6 Cir., 262 F. 664, 666, made the following succinct comment:
“ ‘It is, of course, within the discretion of a trial judge to grant a new trial, if he thinks that, in a civil case, the jury disregarded the preponderance of the evidence, or that, in a criminal case, the evidence lacks that degree of persuasiveness without which there should be no conviction; * * *.’ ” (71 F.Supp. at 12.)
Robinson also quotes from Applebaum v. United States (7th Cir. 1921), 274 F. 43-46, which is the third federal criminal case cited in Bailey v. Kain, supra. Although Applebaum provides no direct answer to Judge Jacob’s question it does state “that the trial judge, as well as the jurors, should attentively consider and weigh the evidence as it is being introduced, because in that respect he is sitting as the thirteenth juror”. Read in connection with its prior statement that “in a criminal case [the judge instructs the jurors] that they cannot find *482the defendant guilty unless on consideration find the presumption of innocence and weighing all the evidence they find that guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt”, it implies that the. thirteenth juror should follow his own instruction as to reasonable doubt.
But in Applebaum, and in every other pertinent federal appellate opinion I have read, stress is laid on the proposition that the trial judge’s duties and powers are discretionary and not reviewable by any appellate court. As Applebaum puts it:
“If a defendant asks that a verdict be set aside because it is not supported by the required weight of evidence, his •motion is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. In order properly to exercise that discretion it is manifest that the trial judge, as well as the jurors, should attentively consider and weigh the evidence as it is being introduced, because in that respect he is sitting as the thirteenth juror. It is the exclusive and unassignable function of the trial judge to grant or refuse a new trial in cases of conflicting evidence.
“If, a new trial having been denied, a defendant prosecutes a writ of error, he is availing himself of a grace granted by the lawmakers. Day in court, confrontation of witnesses, trial by jury, and all other elements of due process of law are provided in the trial court, and Congress was not compelled by the Constitution to provide for any review. The review that is allowed is limited to questions of law arising at the trial, such as sufficiency of pleadings, admissibility of evidence, and instructions to the jurors. It is also well established that the question whether every material allegation of a pleading is supported by evidence may, by proper motions, rulings, and exceptions, be made a question of law arising at the trial. But the review of that question of law is the exercise of a function that should not be confused with the nontransferable function of the trial judge in acting as the thirteenth juror.” (274 F. at 46.)
The Indiana criminal cases touching the question are in accord. Deal v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 354, 360, 39 N.E. 930; Barry v. State (1918), 187 Ind. 49, 50, 118 N.E. 309; Lowery v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 316, 322, 147 N.E. 151, 148 N.E. 197; Partlow v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 207, 214, 166 N.E. 651. So are the early Indiana civil cases, as I understand them, *483particularly Christy v. Holmes (1877), 57 Ind. 314, which Bailey v. Kain (1963), 135 Ind. App. 657, 669, 192 N.E.2d 486, cites as “[t]he landmark case in Indiana respecting the duties of the trial courts and appellate courts”. (See the pertinent paragraphs of Christy v. Holmes, supra, which are quoted in their entirety in both Bailey v. Kain, supra [135 Ind. App. at 669] and Memorial Hospital v. Scott [1973], 261 Ind. 27, 33, 300 N.E.2d 50, 54.) However, Bailey v. Kain, supra, and later civil cases, including Memorial Hospital v. Scott, supra, which holds that “an appellate court cannot assume the responsibility of weighing conflicting evidence in reviewing the trial judge’s action on a motion for new trial” (261 Ind. at 33) hold that:
“The sole duty of an appellate court is to examine the record to see if:
(a) The trial court abused its j udicial discretion;. ■
(b) A flagrant injustice has been done the appellant; or
(c) A very strong case- for relief from, the trial court’s ordering a new trial has been made by the appellant.”
(261 Ind. at 33.)
But I find no Indiana case, civil or criminal, in which an appellate court has ever expressly held that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting or denying a new trial on a determination that a verdict was or was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
I conclude that the trial judge, sitting as the thirteenth juror, should have granted Wilson a new trial because he thought, stated in the words of Bain, supra, “the evidence lacks that degree of persuasiveness without which there should be no conviction” (71 F.Supp. at 12). But, it is also my conclusion that we have no right to direct him to do so. However, I see no reason why we should not remand the case to him so that, if he now finds it advisable, he may reconsider his ruling.
Note. — Reported at 360 N.E.2d 1010.-

. 2 Villanova Law Review 323; U.S. v. Parelius (1949), 83 F.Supp. 617; United States v. Robinson (1947), 71 F.Supp. 9; Applebaum v. United States (1921), 274 F. 43-46.