Court Opinion

ID: 9489230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:09:36.471008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:24.515553
License: Public Domain

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
Although I am pleased to concur in the majority of the panel’s thorough opinion upholding these convictions and sentences, I must dissent on one point. I disagree with the panel majority that appellant Camacho’s conviction for illegal “use” of a firearm during the drug offense must be reversed for insufficient evidence. As the government acknowledges an instructional error that requires reversal and remand, I believe that *404was the appropriate disposition of this count of conviction.
The majority likens Camacho’s conduct to “mere possession” of a firearm, conduct which the Supreme Court found different from the active type of “use” contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Bailey v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). With due respect, I believe Bailey was addressing factually distinct cases in which defendants had been charged with “use” of firearms that were hidden under mattresses, located in locked trunks of cars, and were otherwise stored and out of reach. See, e.g., United States v. Andrade, 88 F.3d 729 (5th Cir.1996). Such possessions of firearms, the Court said, were not “active use” as was contemplated in section 924(c).
Unlike the situation in Bailey, Camacho was personally armed with his pistol and was on duty guarding the large-scale cocaine conspirators’ stash house when the officers arrived. As Camacho opened the door for them, one officer saw the bulge in his waistband underneath his shirt, suspected Camacho was armed, and reached to remove the pistol even as Camacho was himself reaching for it. Whether these acts constituted “brandishing” or “displaying” a firearm presented, in my view, a jury question. If the jury believed that Camacho was armed with a pistol immediately available to him as he guarded the stash house, he was actively using it within the meaning of section 924(c)(1).
The majority acknowledges that Camacho could have been indicted for “carrying” the firearm under section 924(c)(1), and I agree that would have been possible. Bailey does not, however, specify that carrying and using firearms are mutually exclusive comes within the same statutory provision; rather, it held that use could not be interpreted so broadly as to subsume completely the crime of illegal carrying. No such problem arises on the facts of this case.
I would hold that because Camacho was personally armed during the course of his conduct in furthering the drug offense, he made “use” of the firearm in his waistband. I respectfully dissent.