Court Opinion

ID: 9571728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:40.369023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:51.813725
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, Judge,
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision to remand for resentencing without instructing the trial court to impose the presumptive sentence because the rule established by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840 (Minn.1985), is clear. “If no reasons for departure are stated on the record at the *750time of sentencing, no departure will be allowed.” Id. at 844.
The majority concedes that no reasons for departure were stated on the record at the time of sentencing and that no departure report was filed. The majority concludes, however, that the rule stated in Williams should not be interpreted literally where the record clearly indicates that the trial court originally intended to depart.
I do not agree that the record clearly indicates that the trial court originally intended to depart. At the sentencing hearing the trial court made clear only that it was considering a departure.
I think Mr. Garrett should be aware that I am considering the statutory maximum sentence in this case. I guess I am open to hearing your arguments and I am prepared to receive any written objections you have. I think that this is a particularly aggravated case and I am looking for the appropriate parts of the guideline commentary that relate to the grounds that the Court may look to for the departure for this type of sentence. But I guess Mr. Garrett ought to know that I have that in mind. I haven’t made a decision yet, but I am prepared to go ahead if that is what you want. I am also prepared to give you ample time to prepare a defense — written and/or oral.
(Emphasis added.)
After stating that no sentencing decision had been made, the trial court heard arguments from the state and defense counsel and, without further explanation, imposed a sentence that was more than a double durational departure. The only thing in the record that clearly indicates the trial court intended to depart is the fact that the sentence imposed was a departure.
Even if the trial court’s comments can be interpreted as expressing an intention to depart, the comments include no reasons for the intention to depart. The sentencing guidelines require the trial court to do more than express merely an intention to depart.
When departing from the presumptive sentence, a judge must provide written reasons which specify the substantial and compelling nature of the circumstances, and which demonstrate why the sentence selected in the departure is more appropriate, reasonable, or equitable than the presumptive sentence.
Minn.Sent. Guidelines II.D.
While it is entirely possible the trial court intended to adopt some or all of the factors cited by the state in its departure memorandum, this court can only speculate about what conclusions the trial court reached after hearing the arguments of counsel.
The majority opinion cites State v. Thieman, 439 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.1989), in support of its conclusion that it is sufficient that the trial court expressed an intention to depart without stating reasons for the departure. I find no support for this conclusion in Thieman. In Thieman, the trial court mistakenly imposed what it thought was the presumptive sentence. Upon learning that the actual presumptive sentence was shorter than the sentence that had been imposed, the defendant moved for a reduction of the sentence. Instead of reducing the sentence, the trial court stated reasons for departing and reimposed the original sentence.
The supreme court reversed and imposed the presumptive sentence stating:
Because no reasons for departure were stated on the record at the time of sentencing, no subsequent departure is allowed under this court’s rule in Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (1985).
At the time of sentencing, both attorneys and the trial judge assumed that the presumptive sentence for attempted second-degree murder would be given. All three were under the impression that the presumptive sentence was 108 months when, in fact, it was 60 months. It is impossible to predict what the court would have done had it known then that the presumptive guideline sentence was 60 months. We do know that the court intended to issue the presumptive sentence, and to allow it now to amend *751retroactively its reasons and depart from the guidelines is contrary to Williams.
Thieman, 439 N.W.2d at 7.
The supreme court did not impose the presumptive sentence in Thieman because it determined that the trial court intended to impose the presumptive sentence. The presumptive sentence was imposed because no reasons for departure were stated on the record at the time of sentencing.
Because no reasons for departure were stated on the record at the time of sentencing, I would follow the rule in Williams and remand with instructions to impose the presumptive sentence. Any exceptions from the rule in Williams should be articulated by the supreme court.