Court Opinion

ID: 9615255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:33:22.058168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:44.006358
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge
(dissenting).
When all is said and done, the majority recognizes that this is a case of statutory construction. I dissent because I disagree with the majority’s construction of the statutes Gardiner was accused of violating.
In construing a statute, the primary focus should be on the statutory text, the words employed by the Legislature to express its intent, because “the best indication of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language.” Berube v. Fashion Centr, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). Thus, “[wjhere statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to its plain language.” Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988); see also Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989).
However, rather than taking the statutory text as its starting point, the majority begins by dusting off what it admits is an obsolete common law defense in order to kill an already dead letter, noting along the way the evils of self-help. Whatever those evils may be, they are not the point. The real issue in this case is whether the Legislature intended Gardiner’s conduct to be a criminal offense. The majority roams far afield from what the Legislature clearly said, perhaps because the Legislature quite plainly intended a result different from that which the majority strains to accomplish.
SECTION 76-5-102.4
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1990) escalates the penalty for assault, ordinarily a class B misdemeanor, to a class A misdemeanor when the defendant has “assault[ed] a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer.” By the plain meaning of these words, the Legislature did not intend them to encompass a, peace officer performing clearly illegal activity, such as the illegal search and the unnecessary use of force in this case.1 However, the majority concludes that an illegal search is within the scope of a peace officer’s authority. Cf. State ex rel. Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972). It seems highly implausible that the Legislature considered peace officers to have authority to do illegal acts.
I also do not believe that the Legislature intended to subvert the fourth amendment by including within the “scope of [a peace officer’s] authority” the power to perform clearly unreasonable searches. The right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,, against unreasonable searches” means more than simply the right to exclude at trial illegally obtained *580evidence. The fourth amendment was intended as a limitation on governmental power.2 The exclusion of evidence is merely one of the means for effecting that limitation. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). By concluding that performing a clearly illegal search was within the scope of Officer Hatzidakis’s authority, the majority severely undermines the right to be secure from unreasonable searches. Instead of undermining the Constitution, the majority should follow the statute’s plain meaning, which is in harmony with the Constitution. See Chris & Dick’s Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm’n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990).
The only support the majority offers in explaining away the scope-of-authority wording of section 76-5-102.4 is United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir.1967), which upheld the conviction of a bystander who resisted an arrest that the jury found to be lawful as a citizen’s arrest under New York law. Heliczer’s dicta criticizing the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest within the scope of a peace officer’s authority are an extremely weak basis for explaining away the plain meaning of the Utah statute increasing the penalty for assault only if the victim is “a peace officer acting within the scope of his authority.” Obiter remarks from another jurisdiction in another factual context are no basis to interpret “[ujnambiguous language in [a] statute ... so as to contradict its plain meaning.” Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 502 (Utah 1990); Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988).
Thus, the majority contradicts the plain meaning of the Utah statute by including within the “scope of [a peace officer’s] authority” the power to conduct illegal searches in violation of the fourth amendment.
SECTION 76-8-305
Gardiner was also convicted of interfering with a lawful arrest in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1990), which provides:
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or another and interferes with such arrest or detention by use of force or by use of any weapon.
The State recognizes that the principal difficulty in applying this section to Gard-iner is the phrase requiring “knowledge that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of [the defendant] or another.” Gardiner argues that his arrest was not lawful, and the State essentially conceded that point in oral argument and asked us to avoid considering the lawfulness of the arrest. Nevertheless, the majority proceeds to affirm Gardiner’s conviction under this section without ever confronting the question whether Gardiner knew that Officer Hatzidakis was “seeking to effect a lawful arrest.” Gardiner's position has been that the arrest was not lawful; in his mind, he was resisting an unlawful arrest, an act which section 76-8-305 does not penalize. Since the State concedes this point, it has not established a violation of section 76-8-305, and Gard-iner’s conviction under that section should be reversed. See Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (reversing a conviction for interfering with an arrest by an officer exceeding the duties of his office).
CONCLUSION
I would hold that the officer was not acting “within the scope of his authority” for purposes of section 76-5-102.4 and would accordingly reverse Gardiner’s conviction under that section. I would also *581reverse his conviction under section 76-8-305 because, as the State concedes, Gard-iner was not knowingly interfering with a peace officer “seeking to effect a lawful arrest.” Since the State fails to establish a prima facie case under either statute, I see no need to consider defenses that could apply.
Finally, and with hindsight, I agree with the majority’s comment that the Court of Appeals should have published its opinion in this case. In my view, publication of appellate opinions serves essentially two important purposes: It records and disseminates the development of the common law,3 and it enables the public to monitor the quality of appellate judicial service.4 However, some cases coming before a court hearing appeals as of right do not present issues that could enhance the development of the common law, and publication of the greater part of an Appellate Court’s decisions provides an adequate sampling of Judicial performance. If a particular case has negligible value as precedent, the parties are better served by dispensing with publication and the greater delay it necessitates.
HOWE, Associate C.J., does not participate herein.
BENCH, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

. Gardiner argues that the search in this case was unlawful. The State does not refute that argument, and the majority notes "its acceptance of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Officer Hatzidakis's search of the building was illegal.” Accepting the facts as stated by the majority, it seems strikingly obvious that the search in this case violated the fourth amendment.

. Drawing from their experience under British colonial rule, the framers sought to ensure that general warrants and writs of assistance would have no place in the new government. See State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 740-42 (Utah Ct. App.1991) (explaining development of the exclusionary rule); Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 1365, 1369 (1983).

. M. Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 4-5 (1988).

. K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 81 (rev. ed. 1950).