Court Opinion

ID: 9750948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:51:05.459445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:29.612368
License: Public Domain

WHITE, P. J.
I dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, the sole dispute between North Bay Schools Insurance Authority (North Bay) and Industrial Indemnity Company *1749and California Insurance Company (Insurers) is the meaning of the word “riot,” which is undefined in the insurance policy. The rules of interpretation of insurance contracts are settled. “Words used in an insurance policy are to be interpreted according to the plain meaning which a layman would ordinarily attach to them. Courts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.
“On the other hand, any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer and ... if semantically permissible, the contract will be given such construction as will fairly achieve its object of providing indemnity for the loss to which the insurance relates. The purpose of this canon of construction is to protect the insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage in a situation in which the insurer-draftsman controls the language of the policy. Its effect differs, depending on whether the language to be construed is found in a clause providing coverage or in one limiting coverage. Whereas coverage clauses are interpreted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the insured, exclusionary clauses are interpreted narrowly against the insurer. [A]n insurer cannot escape its basic duty to insure by means of an exclusionary clause that is unclear. As we have declared time and again, any exception to the performance of the basic underlying obligation must be so stated as clearly to apprise the insured of its effect; thus, the burden rests upon the insurer to phrase exceptions and exclusions in clear and unmistakable language.” (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 807-808 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764], quotations and citations omitted; see also Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gibson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 176, 180-181 [259 Cal.Rptr. 206].) However, these rules of construction are inapplicable if a provision is unambiguous or is authorized by the Insurance Code. (Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 584, 590 [278 Cal.Rptr. 52].)
An ambiguity exists when the written language of an instrument is susceptible of two or more interpretations. (Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 211 [70 Cal.Rptr. 561, 444 P.2d 353].) My colleagues claim neither party argues the term “riot” is ambiguous, and the term as understood by the layman is unambiguous. I totally disagree.
There are as many as 14 definitions of the word “riot” in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language.1 Although the majority of these definitions are inapplicable to the facts in this case, I find three definitions *1750which provide possible interpretations of the contract language: “1. a noisy, violent public disorder caused by a group or crowd of persons, ... 2. Law. a disturbance of the public peace by three or more persons acting together in a disrupting and tumultuous manner in carrying out their private purposes. 3. violent or wild disorder or confusion.” (The Random House Diet., op. cit. supra.) Each of these definitions provides a somewhat different set of circumstances. While two of the definitions require the event to occur in public, the third does not. Thus, the word “riot” is capable of being understood in two or more possible ways and is ambiguous.
Both North Bay and the Insurers rely on Penal Code section 404* 2 to define the word “riot,” although they arrive at different interpretations. However, the mere fact that the Legislature has defined a term for one purpose does not shelter that word from the normal rules of interpretation. Penal Code section 404 defines “riot” for the purpose of criminal law; the statute was not intended for construing insurance contracts. Here, the language is that of the insurer, not of the Legislature, and the normal rules of interpretation apply. (See Interinsurance Exchange v. Marquez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 652, 656 [172 Cal.Rptr. 263].)
It is for this reason I reject the Insurers’ authorities from other jurisdictions. (See Spring Garden Ins. Co. v. Imperial Tobacco Co. (1909) 132 Ky. 7 [116 S.W. 234]; International Wire Works v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (1939) 230 Wis. 72 [283 N.W. 292]; Walter v. Northern Ins. Co. (1938) 370 Ill. 283 [18 N.E.2d. 906,121 A.L.R. 244]; Salem Mfg. Co. v. First American Fire Ins. Co. (9th Cir. 1940) 111 F.2d 797; Kent Ins. Co. v. Glades Liquors, Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1982) 418 So.2d 1101; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. War Eagle Coal Co. (4th Cir. 1924) 295 F. 663; Providence Washington Insurance Company v. Lynn (1st Cir. 1974) 492 F.2d 979.) In each of these cases the court looked to either a state statute or the common law, which defined “riot” for the purpose of criminal law. While the criminal definition of “riot” provides a possible interpretation of the disputed term, there are other definitions for “riot” which do not constitute criminal conduct.
*1751I also question the majority’s position that the definition of “riot” necessarily connotes activity that is done in public and before witnesses, and that it does not include conduct that is surreptitious. The unfortunate events which occurred in Los Angeles in April of this year highlight my concerns. If, for example, two Los Angeles retail stores have the same insurance policy as the one in this case, is only that store which is torched and looted before witnesses covered under the policy? Would any damage caused by an act of vandalism or arson during the three-night period be uncovered?
My view that the term “riot” is ambiguous is further supported by the fact that, according to language in the insurance policy, single losses occurring during a 72-hour period include “riot” and “riot attending a strike or civil commotion.” If the term “riot” was unambiguous, there would be no need for this redundancy. The majority’s distinction between “riot” and “riot attending a strike or civil commotion” is contradicted by the policy. Windstorms, hail, riots and riots attending a strike or civil commotion are all contemplated as prolonged disturbances which may occur for more than 72 hours.
In conclusion, I would hold the term “riot” is ambiguous and this ambiguity must be resolved against the insurers. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.

The noun “riot” is defined as follows: “1. a noisy, violent public disorder caused by a group or crowd of persons, as by a group fighting in a tavern or a crowd protesting against another group, a government policy, etc., in the streets. 2. Law. a disturbance of the public *1750peace by three or more persons acting together in a disrupting and tumultuous manner in carrying out their private purposes. 3. violent or wild disorder or confusion. 4. loose, wanton living; profligacy. 5. unrestrained revelry. 6. an unbridled outbreak, as of emotions, passions, etc. 7. a brilliant display: a riot of color. 8. Informal, something or someone hilariously funny: He was a riot at the party. 9. run riot, a. to act without control or restraint: The neighbors let their children run riot. b. to grow luxuriantly or abundantly: Crab grass is running riot in our lawn.” (The Random House Dict. (1973) pp. 1235-1236, italics in original.)

Penal Code section 404, subdivision (a) states: “Any use of force or violence, disturbing the public peace, or any threat to use such force or violence, if accompanied by immediate power of execution, by two or more persons acting together, and without authority of law, is a riot.”