Court Opinion

ID: 9628416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:20:02.886919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:01.025578
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the decision of the majority-
I.C. § 31-4404 grants to a board of county commissioners optional means of “providing funds to acquire sites, facilities, operate and/or maintain solid waste disposal systems.” These optional means are:
(1) Levy a tax of not to exceed two (2) mills on the assessed value of property within the county, provided that property located w ithin the corporate limits of any city that is operating and maintaining a solid waste disposal site shall not be levied against for the purposes of the county solid waste disposal system; or,
(2) Collect fees from the users of the solid waste disposal facilities; or,
(3) Finance the solid waste disposal facilities from current revenues; or,
(4) Receive and expend moneys from any other source;
(5) Establish solid waste collection systems where necessary or desirable and provide a method for collection of service fees, among which shall be certification of a special assessment on the property served;
(6) Use any combination of subsections (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section.
The county chose to fund its solid waste disposal system by imposing “an annual solid waste disposal fee.” Arguably, this fee might be characterized as a fee from users of the solid waste disposal facilities under I.C. § 31-4404(2) or a service fee under I.C. § 31-4404(5).
I am unable to accept the characterization of the annual solid waste disposal fee as a fee- jrom “users” under I.C. § 31-4404(2). The Tee is charged regardless of whether any solid waste is collected. The ordinance does not require the occu*681pants of residential units to use the solid waste disposal system operated by the county. Therefore, I am unable to construe them to be users. The fee is imposed whether they use the system or not.
I am also unable to accept the characterization of the annual solid waste disposal fee as a “service fee” under I.C. § 31-4404(5). Again, since the ordinance does not require the use of the system, no service is being provided to those who do not choose to use the system.
This case is distinguishable from Schmidt v. Village of Kimberly, 74 Idaho 48, 256 P.2d 515 (1953). In Schmidt this Court upheld an ordinance that required owners, tenants or occupants of any property located in the city to connect with the city’s sewer system and to cease the use of other means of disposal. Here, not only did the county’s ordinance not require use of the county’s solid waste disposal system, but also there was no requirement that solid waste could not be disposed of through other means.
My view that the annual solid waste disposal fee is not really a fee, either for users or for service, as authorized under I.C. § 31-4404 is supported by this Court’s recent decision in Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988). There, we said: “In a general sense a fee is a charge for a direct public service rendered to the particular consumer, while a tax is a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs.” Id. at 505, 768 P.2d at 768. Here, there is no direct public service rendered to a particular consumer. The annual solid waste disposal fee is nothing more than a forced contribution by the public at large to meet public needs. Such a contribution in the form of a tax is one of the optional funding means granted to the county under I.C. § 31-4404(1). The county chose to impose a tax, but to call it a fee.
I would reverse the decision of the district court.