Court Opinion

ID: 9642815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:09:47.363486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:55:43.592634
License: Public Domain

RONNIE L. WHITE, Judge.
I.
The City of St. Louis (City) appeals the judgment of the circuit court awarding damages to Kimberly Hodges after her mother died of injuries from a car accident caused by a City police officer. Hodges filed a cross-appeal challenging the constitutionality of the statutory limitation on damages payable by a public entity. The Court holds that the officer is an agent of the City for purposes of vicarious liability and the limitation on damages is constitutional. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
II.
Ann Martin was injured in March 2003 after her car was hit in an intersection by a police car driven by Officer Willie Walker traveling without lights or sirens in the wrong direction down a one-way street perpendicular to Martin’s route. Martin filed a personal injury suit against Walker, the City, and the Board of Police Commissioners (Board). Martin died in January 2005. Her daughter, Hodges, became the substitute plaintiff and amended the petition to allege wrongful death.
Hodges settled with Walker and the Board.1 The City asserted the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court overruled the motion, and the parties proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Hodges and awarded damages of $1.2 million.2 The court reduced the judgment to $335,118 — the statutory limitation on damages payable by a public entity under section 537.600.1G).3
Hodges objected to the limitation and moved to set aside the judgment.4 The City moved for judgment not withstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court overruled all motions, and the parties appealed. The City claims that it cannot be -vicariously liable for Walker’s negligence because police officers are agents of the Board, not the City. Hodges challenges the constitutionality of the limitation on damages.
III.
This Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a state statute.5 The standard of review for constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo.6 The standard of review of the trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV and directed verdict is the same; the Court must determine whether the plaintiff made *280a submissible case.7 The Court takes the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving the prevailing party all reasonable inferences from the verdict and disregarding the unfavorable evidence.8 Where the issue is a question of law, the Court reviews the trial court’s conclusions de novo.9
IV.
Section 537.600.1(1) contains an express waiver of sovereign immunity for compensatory damages actions against public entities with respect to: “(1) Injuries directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles or motorized vehicles within the course of their employment.”
As a general rule, the negligent conduct of a police officer in the operation of a motor vehicle while on duty states a claim for vicarious liability against the city that the officer serves.10 However, the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City are unique in that their officers are employed by boards of police commissioners, not the cities. The City contends, therefore, that Officer Walker is not an agent of the City for purposes of vicarious liability; only Walker’s actual employer, the Board, is responsible for his negligence. Ms. Hodges asserts that Walker is a dual agent of the state and the City as a matter of statutory law and at common law.

Agency Relationship Created by Statute

Referring to the cities of St. Louis and Kansas City, section 84.330 states:
The members of the police force of the cities covered by sections 84.010 to 84.340, organized and appointed by the police commissioners of said cities, are hereby declared to be officers of the said cities, under the charter and ordinances thereof, and also to be officers of the state of Missouri, and shall be so deemed and taken in all courts having jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of this state or the ordinances of said cities, (emphasis added)
This Court confirmed the statute’s creation of a dual agency relationship over a century ago in Carrington v. City of St. Louis.11 There, the City was held liable for a dangerous condition created by an officer on City premises. The statute has not changed substantially since that time. Then, the Court stated:
“It is plain, from these provisions of the law, that the police force constitutes a department of the city government. While these officers are state officers for some purposes, they are also city officers. They are none the less city officers because, for reasons deemed best by the legislature, they are under the control of the commissioners, and not the assembly. We see that by express law they are made city officers ... We conclude that as to the act in question [the city police officer] was the officer and agent of the city ...”12 (emphasis added)
The City argues that Carrington has been eroded by subsequent holdings and should not be followed. Specifically, in *281Carrington, the Court suggested that “the police force is a department of the city government,” but subsequent cases cited by the City clarify that the Board is a state agency.13 The City fails to articulate how the Board’s relation to the state negates Officer Walker’s relation to the city he serves. The central holding of Car-rington remains authoritative and is reinforced by State ex rel. Wander v. Kimmel,14 where this Court clearly recognized that a police officer is an agent of both the state and the city.
[A] member of such police force (like other agents) may be called on to act in a dual capacity and in a dual relation; and that is made his precise standing in the quoted statute which makes him both an officer of the city and the state. It says so in so many words, and there can be no two ways about it. Those cases, then, dealing with him from the angle of his state capacity and relation, militate not at all against his having a city relation and being a city officer also. Moreover, the city pays him for his services, and this case no little illustrates the truth of the authenticated and venerable saying: “The ox knoweth his master’s crib.”15 (emphasis added)
In fight of Section 84.330 as previously interpreted by this Court in Carrington and Wander, the Court holds that Officer Walker is an agent of the City as a matter of law.16 If the legislature wants a different result, it can amend section 84.330. Statutory agency being dispositive, the Court need not consider whether Ms. Hodges presented sufficient evidence to make a submissible case to establish common law agency.17

Limitation on Damages

Hodges contends that the statutory cap on damages payable by a public entity for the negligence of a public employee violates the equal protection clause of the Missouri Constitution18 because it bars full recovery of actual economic damages, whereas a similar cap protecting private defendants allows full recovery.19
Section 537.610.2 states:
The liability of the state and its public entities on claims within the scope of sections 537.600 to 537.650, [sic] shall *282not exceed ... three hundred thousand dollars for any one person in a single accident or occurrence.
The statute further provides for an annual adjustment based upon economic data supplied by the federal government. There is no dispute, that the applicable limit in this case is $335,118.
This Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 537.610 in Richardson v. State Highway and Transportation Commission20 and Fisher v. State Highway Commission.21 In Richardson, the Court explained, “the General Assembly has a rational basis to fear that full monetary responsibility for tort claims entails the risk of insolvency or intolerable tax burdens.”22 In respect for the principle of stare decisis, the Court declines to revisit the issue. The statute is constitutional.
•V.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
WOLFF, C.J., LAURA DENVIR STITH, TEITELMAN and RUSSELL, JJ., concur; PRICE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed: LIMBAUGH, J., concurs in opinion of PRICE, J.

. Each co-defendant paid the statutory maximum of $335,118, for a total of $670,236.

. After off-setting this amount by the $670,236 collected from Walker and the board, the City's liability without the cap would have been $549,764.

. All references are to RSMo 2000.

. Hodges had proven actual economic damages of $486,816.31.

. Mo. Const, art. V, sec. 3.

. Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 578 (Mo. banc 2006).

. Maldonado v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, L.L.C., 154 S.W.3d 303, 307 (Mo.App.2003).

. Nemani v. St. Louis University, 33 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Mo. banc 2000).

. Jungerman v. City of Raytown, 925 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 1996).

. Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286 (Mo.App.1983).

. 89 Mo. 208, 1 S.W. 240, 241-242 (1886).

. Carrington at 241-242.

. Smith v. State, 152 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. banc 2005); State ex rel. Sayad v. Zych, 642 S.W.2d 907 (Mo. banc 1982); and State ex rel. Sanders v. Cervantes, 480 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. banc 1972).

. 256 Mo. 611, 165 S.W. 1067 (1914).

. Id. at 1072-1073. Today, as in 1914, the City pays its police officers for their service.

. The dissent challenges the Court’s reliance on Carrington and Wander because neither case involved respondeat superior liability. It views Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485 (1932), as more directly on point, but Pearson also does not involve respondeat superior liability. The Pearson excerpt quoted by the dissent originates from an annotated legal encyclopedia referencing a New Hampshire case from 1895 that was overturned in 1905. While Pearson itself remains good law, the case was decided on the basis of the Court’s nuisance analysis. Its brief reference to state board control was not only of dubious origin but also was incidental and unnecessary to the holding. Pearson does not disturb or even discuss Carrington or Wander, nor does it examine the implications of section 84.330.

. The dissent explains that common law re-spondeat superior liability is based on control of the servant by the master and that chapter 84 places primary control of the police in the hands of the board. The majority does not disagree. But the common law analysis is unnecessary, indeed superseded, by virtue of the dual agency created in section 84.330.

. Mo. Const, art. I, sec. 2.

. Section 538.210 limits a private defendant’s liability for non-economic damages but allows full recovery of actual economic losses.

. 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc 1993),

. 948 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. banc 1997).

. Richardson at 879.