Court Opinion

ID: 9541788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:28:39.22257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:45.150779
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
The Redmons, in petitioning for rehearing, assert that Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644, 570 P.2d 1334 (1977), precludes any award of attorney’s fees. Concededly, a majority of the Court in that case did hold that, the vendors having terminated the contract, they could not obtain attorney’s fees under a provision of the contract which they had so terminated. Our earlier opinion discussed but distinguished Ellis, making it unnecessary that we respond to tjie Redmons’ contention that Ayotte and Ellis cannot both stand. We believe our distinction earlier made was sufficient.
The Redmons premise their petition on this hypothesis:
The primary question before the trial court was whether or not there had been a valid rescission of the contract by the Ayottes. The question was not whether the court should after trial rescind the contract or leave the contract in effect.
At the insistence of the Redmons, we have re-examined the Ayotte complaint. Nowhere therein is any statement or allegation raising the contention that the Ay-ottes had declared a rescission of the contract, and were in court seeking an adjudication of the validity of their having done so. On the contrary, their complaint alleged that the Redmons’ noncompliance with contractual provisions to construct a roadway and be able to furnish clear and merchantable fee simple title were breaches of the contract — because of which the Ayottes prayed for judgment allowing rescission of the contract and awarding restitution of all payments made on the contract. Alternatively, if not granted rescission, the prayer of the complaint asked for monetary damages for breach of the contractual provision to timely have constructed the roadway.
Clearly, then, the Ayottes’ complaint recognized the continuing existence of the contract, alleged material breaches claimed to be grounds for rescission with concurrent restitution, and attorney’s fees under the contractual provision.
The Redmons’ petition and brief refers to a letter from the Ayottes’ attorney of which it is said “gave notice that if the roadway was not constructed within 30 days of October 4, 1982, that plaintiffs *729would rescind the contract.” This letter is on file, Exhibit 19, and also found as an exhibit to the Ayotte reply to the Redmons’ counterclaim. The letter, however, is somewhat differently worded:
I have advised my clients to withhold any further monthly payments due under the above described Contract of Sale of Real Property until such time as the roadway to be known as Pleasant View Drive has been constructed to County specifications and has been approved and accepted by the County with their covenant to maintain this road as a County road, and further until such time as you are able to establish that in the event my clients should prepay the Contract of Sale that you can, in fact, deliver a fee simple unencumbered title to Lot 4 in Block 1 of Pleasant View Estates to them at this time.
At such time as you are able to comply with the requests set forth herein, my clients will tender to you all unpaid monthly payments. If you cannot comply with our requests as herein set forth within a reasonable period of time, which we feel would be thirty (30) days from the date of this letter, I have advised my clients to commence suit against you to rescind the above described Contract of Sale of Real Property. If my clients should prevail in such suit, you would be required to return to them their down-payment of $2,880.00, and to reimburse them for their monthly payments made during the life of this Contract of Sale at the rate of $116.00 per month. R., Vol. 3, p. 54 (emphasis added).
The bench remarks of the trial court after the case was wholly submitted demonstrate its understanding that the action was brought to obtain an equitable rescission, and that he was granting exactly that relief:
I am not going to award interest, however, because I feel that they did have use of the premises. And the manner in which their complaint was drafted, that is, a suit for rescission, it appears to me that they were in effect reserving the right to use the premises if they chose to during that interim period. And I would offset equitably interest against what a fair use value of the premises would be during that period of time. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 382 (emphasis added).
The final judgment itself contains the Court’s language decreeing the rescission of the contract as of that date of the judgment — May 18, 1984.
The Petition for Rehearing is denied; the remittitur will issue forthwith.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, BAKES and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.