Court Opinion

ID: 9565278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:18:16.068123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:31.421285
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
There are questions for the jury to resolve, created by the testimony of Mozelle’s sister Odell taken in deposition, which the superior court erroneously refused to consider on the ground the pertinent statements were inadmissible hearsay. The court applied correct principles regarding summary judgment but incorrect rules of evidence in relation thereto, and it also construed the “time” language of OCGA § 7-1-813 (a) too narrowly. The effect of these errors undermines the validity of the summary judgment.
OCGA § 7-1-813 creates a right of survivorship in a joint account, thereby, giving certain legal results to a contractual arrangement between a depositor and a financial institution. One is that it constitutes part of the statutory scheme to provide a shield for the bank, which is protected from liability if it pays the total proceeds to the survivor. OCGA §§ 7-1-816; 7-1-817. Agnor discusses this aspect as one of the two, in “Joint Bank Accounts: A Different Form of Joint Tenancy,” 17 Ga. St. B. J. 184 (1981). We are not here concerned with that relationship between the creator and the depository.
The other result of OCGA § 7-1-813 controls the interests of the parties to the account, leaving ownership open to resort to an eviden-tiary procedure rather than automatically creating a right of survivor-ship as a matter of law. That is to say, the right of survivorship is not conclusive but is only presumptive. As specified in the statute and recognized in Collins v. Collins, 176 Ga. App. 79 (335 SE2d 307) (1985), the presumption may be overcome by “clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the account is created.” That evidence could be expressly included in the terms of the contract, of course, but as shown here and testified to by the depository’s employee, Mozelle did not manifest such intention when the actual transaction was negotiated. See in this connection OCGA § 7-1-813 (e).
Since it is only a presumptive right, that does not end this matter. And so the court below did go farther, but within narrowly drawn constraints which proved fatal to its legal conclusion.
One of the reasons the superior court refused to consider Odell’s testimony was that it did not relate to intention expressed when she accompanied Mozelle to the credit union and that she was not in fact present on other occasions at the credit union. From a reading of the superior court order, it considered “at the time” to refer only to that *141narrowly subscribed event transpiring at the credit union office, whereas I believe it is more properly construed to include the circumstances surrounding the transaction as well.
The objective is to ascertain and enforce the intention of the depositor. Where that intention is conveyed not to the depository’s employee, who is a stranger, but rather to a more likely confidant somewhat contemporaneously with the actual transaction, it is evidenced within the scope “at the time.”
Surrounding circumstances will often shed light on the real significance and meaning of isolated events. Intentions are traditionally recognized as provable by consideration of the person’s words, conduct, demeanor, motive and all other circumstances connected with the act focused on. See, e.g., OCGA § 16-2-6 which, while governing criminal trials, states a principle of general law.
Moreover, the cases construing this Multiple-Party Accounts Act demonstrate that evidence of circumstances surrounding the actual formal transaction are relevant to the ascertainment of the creator’s intent. See, e.g., Collins, supra; Lastinger v. Johnson, 148 Ga. App. 453 (251 SE2d 369) (1978).
The other reason the court excluded Odell’s testimony was that since the employee was also present when Odell was, her testimony did not meet the no-other-person requirement of Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Davis, 226 Ga. 221 (173 SE2d 691) (1970) for permitting a decedent’s hearsay.
However, Odell testified at length concerning the reason Mozelle made the accounts joint, it being for convenience, as the two of them had discussed on several occasions before it was done. There was no evidence whatsoever that anyone else was present during these conversations.
The superior court was satisfied that the trustworthiness requirement of Chrysler was met, as Odell had no interest in the money.
Another impediment in the exclusion of the evidence is that a significant amount of Odell’s testimony regarding intent is not hearsay in the first place. She stated that she was very close to her sister and had been with her a good bit of the time since Mozelle’s husband contracted cancer and died in 1981 and right up until Mozelle’s own death in 1984. According to Odell, she assisted Mozelle with her financial affairs and advised her to add her daughter Bobbie’s name to the accounts because the two sisters traveled a lot together and something might happen that would necessitate the money’s withdrawal, and also, that if joint, Bobbie could get the money quickly after Mozelle’s death and share it equally with her brother without having the delay of probate. Odell knew intimately the relationship which Mozelle had with each of her children and what she did with respect to her will.
*142Thus, what Odell told Mozelle, what understanding Odell had and passed on to Mozelle of what the legal and anticipated consequences of this arrangement would be, and what Mozelle did as a result, would not be hearsay and would be relevant to the question of Mozelle’s intention. What Odell did not realize, and did not tell Mozelle, was that there was a possibility that Bobbie would not be compelled to share the proceeds of the accounts equally with her brother if she did not voluntarily honor her mother’s desire as expressed both within and outside the will, because Bobbie would have legal title. This evidence is not hearsay.
Even the hearsay, that is, Mozelle’s statements regarding her intention that the two children share equally in the money, would be admissible under the Chrysler rule. The two prerequisites for the exception to the hearsay rule as it applies to a deceased’s statements, i.e., necessity and a circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness, are satisfied here and would thus the statements be admissible before a jury.
That being the case, the superior court erred in excluding it from consideration. When added to the total picture, it is entitled also to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from it, in favor of the non-moving party. Davis v. Dickson, 232 Ga. 338, 339 (206 SE2d 473) (1974). All the evidence must be construed most strongly against the movant. Ga. Health Care v. Loeb, 151 Ga. App. 350 (1) (259 SE2d 734) (1979). It is not surprising that a clear, written manifestation of intent was not expressed, or that there was some misunderstanding of consequences. The law in Georgia on the subject of multiple party accounts has itself been unsettled and unclear, see Link, “Probate and Administration of Small Estates in Georgia: Some Proposals for Reform,” 6 Ga. L. Rev. 74, 80 (1971), and the statute now at issue had been passed just in 1976. It was in this total milieu that Mozelle acted.
This court concludes that there is not “clear and convincing evidence” that Bobbie was not to have the total beneficial interest, but that is first up to the jury, which will see and hear and observe the witnesses. Defendant has not established that she is entitled to prevail as a matter of law under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), as there is a genuine issue of material fact made by plaintiff’s competent evidence and the rules governing it, which favor the respondent, whose right to a trial is at stake.
I would reverse.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Pope join in this dissent.
*143Decided May 11, 1987
Rehearing denied June 1, 1987
Gary Walker, David N. Soloway, for appellant.
Robert E. Flournoy II, for appellee.