Court Opinion

ID: 9898505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:09.648847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:46.924897
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Personal Restraint
 of                                                No. 83667-6-I

 DAVID HALL,                                       DIVISION ONE

                               Petitioner.         UNPUBLISHED OPINION

       COBURN, J. — Petitioner David Hall seeks review of a disciplinary order finding

statements he made to a Department of Corrections (DOC) officer threatening and

intimidating. He contends that no evidence supports the findings because he did not

make true threats and was merely expressing his frustration having his work as a porter

criticized. However, it is relevant only that the speaker intentionally and knowingly

communicated the threat, not that he intended or was able to carry out the threat. We

deny his personal restraint petition.

                                             FACTS

       In October 2021, prison inmate Hall had a job as a porter in the medical unit.

While Hall was working, corrections officer Rojo-Dominguez spoke to Hall regarding

some concerns about Hall completing his daily porter duties. During the exchange,

     Citations and pincites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
83667-6-I/2

according to Hall, the officer said “things like, ‘Well, I’ll just put you in handcuffs,’ ‘Well,

I’ll just throw you in the hole.’” Hall told the officer, “I’ve been down for a long-time man,

I’m tired of being judged when there’s nothing to judge.” He continued, “I’m a high-

ranking gang member man, well was a high-ranking gang member like I demand and

get the respect that’s why when I come in the unit they say was up. People think that

little orange button is going to protect them trust and believe I’ll be faster than that

button if needed to.” 1

       The officer informed Hall that he understood Hall’s frustration, but how Hall

responded was “no manner of dealing with his anger.” The officer reported that Hall

understood and replied, “I just don’t like being accused of something that’s not

happening, but I’m cool.”

       The officer alleged Hall committed two serious infractions: (1) “Threatening

another with bodily harm or with any offense against any person or property” under

WAC 137-25-030(1) (Category B, Level 3, 506) (Violation 506); and (2) “Using physical

force, intimidation, or coercion against any person” under WAC 137-25-030 (Category

C, Level 1, 663) (Violation 663).

       At Hall’s disciplinary hearing, he explained the officer understood Hall spoke out

of frustration. The hearing officer asked Hall, “So are you saying that you did make

those statements [that Rojo-Dominguez reported]?” Hall responded,

       Well, I did make those statements. But that people think that the little
       orange button is going – I didn’t say that. But the gist of bringing the
       orange button up, it was made in to [Rojo-Dominguez’s] response, but it
       was just empty frustration, not directed towards or not directed against any
       person.

       1
          Because the hearing officer relied on the officer’s infraction report and not the officer’s
live testimony, we rely on the direct quotes from the officer’s report rather than the transcription
of the hearing officer reading Hall’s report.
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Hall said he used a poor choice of words, but that it was never his motive or intention to

threaten or use intimidation toward anyone. Hall said he was explaining to the officer

how Hall gives respect and how “being falsely accused is like provoking.” The officer

did not testify at the hearing.

       The hearing officer found Hall guilty of both infractions and sanctioned Hall with

30 days cell confinement, two months’ loss of monthly packages, and 40 hours of extra

duty. Hall appealed the decision to the superintendent, who affirmed the decision. Hall

then filed this personal restraint petition.

                                        DISCUSSION

       We will only reverse prison discipline decisions when petitioners show that they

are being unlawfully restrained. RAP 16.4(a)-(c); In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168

Wn.2d 204, 212-13, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). Under RAP 16.4, a prisoner is under

“restraint” if the petitioner is confined, and the “restraint” is unlawful only if the conditions

or manner of the “restraint” violated the Constitution or the laws of Washington, or other

grounds exist to challenge the legality of the restraint. RAP 16.4(b); RAP 16.4(c)(6)-(7).

Hall is under restraint because he was given 30 days confinement.

       Petitioners seeking relief from prison discipline where no prior judicial review has

been afforded are not required to show actual and substantial prejudice or a miscarriage

of justice. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 214. We will reverse a prison disciplinary decision

only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the petitioner a

fundamentally fair proceeding. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215 (citing In re Pers. Restraint

of Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984)). This is a heightened

standard based on the particular type of executive action we are asked to review.

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Prison discipline cases are significantly different from other administrative proceedings

that can result in the loss of liberty. Id. Arbitrary and capricious actions have been

defined as willful and unreasoning actions, without consideration and in disregard of

facts and circumstances. “Where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary

and capricious even though one may believe an erroneous conclusion has been

reached.” Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d at 296. Prisoners are entitled to minimum due

process protections. Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215. There has to be at least “some

evidence” to affirm the discipline. Id. at 216 (citing Reismiller, 101 Wn.2d at 295).

       Hall asserts that both infractions implicate his First Amendment right to free

speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I. A prisoner retains those First Amendment rights that

are consistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives

of the corrections system. In re Pers. Restraint of Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. 273, 281, 63

P.3d 800 (2003) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Lab. Union Inc., 433 U.S.

119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977)). Hall does not claim that Violations

506 and 663 themselves violate the First Amendment. Instead, he argues his

statements were not true threats.

       True threats are not protected by the First Amendment. Parmelee, 115 Wn. App.

at 288. True threats are “statement[s] made in a context or under such circumstances

in which a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted as

a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon, or to take the life of

another.” 2 Id. (citing State v. Knowles, 91 Wn. App. 367, 373, 957 P.2d 797 (1998)). “It

       2 Hall also cites DOC’s definition of the term “threatening behavior” in its policy

handbook: “[i]ncludes, but is not limited to, direct or implied behavior which a reasonable person
under the circumstances would perceive as a possible threat to bodily harm or was threatening
in fact to that person.” Policy Glossary: Terms Starting with T, DOC,
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is relevant only that the speaker intentionally and knowingly communicated the threat,

not that he intended or was able to carry out the threat.” Id. Thus, Hall’s argument that

he was not motivated or intended to threaten anyone is of no matter. He did not dispute

that he said the words reported by the officer constituting the threatening and

intimidating statements.

       Hall also contends that because the officer understood that Hall spoke out of

frustration, the circumstances were such that a reasonable person could not foresee

that Hall’s statements would be understood as serious expression of intention to inflict

bodily harm. However, understanding why Hall made the statements after the

statements were made does not change the lens with which the statements were

viewed. Hall makes multiple arguments: (1) he did not direct his statements at anyone;

(2) nothing in the record explains what the orange button is; and (3) he is being

punished for simply identifying himself as a high-ranking gang member.

       The hearing officer found Hall’s statements were intimidating and threatened

bodily harm. “It is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of the hearing officer.

Indeed, ‘a detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers.’”

Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. at 288-89 (quoting State v. Baker, 28 Wn. App. 423, 425, 623

P.2d 1172 (1981)). Hall did not simply speak about his history of being a high-ranking

gang member. 3 He did so while explaining he still commands much respect in prison

https://www.doc.wa.gov/information/policies/glossary.aspx?show=T [https://perma.cc/9FKB-
9LNQ].

       3 Hall also suggests that the officer, the hearing examiner, and the assistant

superintendent who rejected Hall’s appeal may have unconsciously judged his statements
because of stereotypes about gang members and Black people. Hall cites to a news article
reporting that 20 percent of people imprisoned in Washington are gang members. John McCoy,
Washington State’s Prison Policies Serve No One, CROSSCUT (Apr. 15, 2019),
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and the officer should know that “[p]eople think that little orange button is going to

protect them trust and believe [he will] be faster than that button if [he] needed to.” This

statement was in the context of the officer threatening to handcuff or put Hall in “the

hole.” Though the record does not include an explicit explanation of the “orange

button,” neither the officer, Hall, or the hearing officer expressed any confusion as to

Hall’s reference to the orange button. Moreover, Hall’s reference to the orange button

as something people rely on “to protect them” suggests it is a method to call for help.

Viewed in the prison context, a reasonable person would foresee that the statements

would be taken as a serious expression of an implied threat. In fact, it is evident Rojo-

Dominguez construed them as such because he charged Hall with making a threat and

intimidation. See Parmelee, 115 Wn. App. at 288-89 (observing that by charging an

inmate, the corrections officer construed an inmate’s statement as an implied threat

despite the inmate’s later alternative explanation). Hall explaining that he made the

statements out of frustration or that he was “cool” after he made the statements does

not explain away the objectively perceived threat at the time the relevant statements

were made.

       Hall additionally argues that both infractions required him to direct his statements

“against any person,” which he did not do. But Hall himself explained that the

statements were made in the context of a conversation between himself and the officer.

       Hall’s statements were not protected by the First Amendment. DOC did present

https://crosscut.com/2019/04/washington-states-prison-policies-serve-no-one
[https://perma.cc/K5JP-M3W2]. He argues that “[i]f mentioning gang membership is a threat all
by itself, a large number of people can hardly talk about their lives without making threatening
statements.” We need not consider a circumstance where someone was disciplined for only
mentioning gang membership because that is not what happened here.
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some evidence supporting the infractions. Thus, Hall has failed to demonstrate that his

discipline was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny a fundamentally fair proceeding.

Accordingly, we deny his personal restraint petition.

WE CONCUR:

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