Court Opinion

ID: 9941290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:07.32375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.539854
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2023-CA-0093-MR

RUSSELL M. COLEMAN,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON BEHALF
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF                              APPELLANT
KENTUCKY

           APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 22-CI-00560

CORNEAGEN, INC.; ADAM
MATHER, INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; AURION BIOTECH,
INC.; EDWARD HOLLAND, M.D.;
ERIC FRIEDLANDER, SECRETARY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND
KENTUCKY CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GENERAL                                             APPELLEES

                         OPINION
                        AFFIRMING

                        ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Daniel Cameron, Attorney General on behalf of the

Commonwealth of Kentucky, (Attorney General) brings this appeal from a

December 28, 2022, Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court granting

summary judgment that declared Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 311.1939

unconstitutional as violative of Kentucky Constitution Sections 2, 3, 59, and 60.1

We affirm.

              The sole issue presented in this appeal is the constitutionality of KRS

311.1939. On July 15, 2022, CorneaGen, Inc., Aurion Biotech, Inc., and Edward

Holland, M.D. (collectively referred to as plaintiffs) filed a Verified Complaint for

Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief and for Declaratory Judgment in the

Franklin Circuit Court. Therein, it was alleged that KRS 311.1939 was amended

effective June 9, 2021, and that the amended version of KRS 311.1939 was

violative of Sections 2, 3, 59, and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution:

                     1.    Plaintiff, CorneaGen, Inc., is a Delaware
              corporation with its principal office at 1200 6th Avenue,
              Suite 300, Seattle, Washington 98101-1128. It is the
              world’s largest provider of corneal tissue for transplant
              and provides high-quality donor tissue and superior
              processing services and devices that have transformed
              how ophthalmologists treat and care for people impacted
              by corneal disease.

1
  Daniel Cameron was succeeded as Attorney General of Kentucky by Russell M. Coleman
effective January 1, 2024. Attorney General Coleman has been substituted as the real party in
interest.

                                              -2-
       2.     Plaintiff, Aurion Biotech, Inc., is a Delaware
corporation with its principal office at 701 Pike Street,
Suite 2225, Seattle, Washington 98101. It specializes in
advanced cell therapy and utilizes proprietary processes
to treat patients with corneal endothelial disease.

       3.     Plaintiff, Edward Holland, M.D., a resident
of Boone County, Kentucky, is a pioneering
ophthalmologist practicing in Kentucky. He is also the
Director of Cornea Services at the Cincinnati Eye
Institute and a Professor of Ophthalmology at the
University of Cincinnati.

      ....

       13. CorneaGen has its origins as a non-profit
eye bank that was founded in Seattle in 1969. However,
by 2016, it became clear that the mission of eliminating
corneal blindness by 2040 could not be achieved without
investor capital. For that reason, CorneaGen was spun
out of the non-profit eye bank and changed its tax status
to for-profit.

      ....

      17. In 2018, CorneaGen introduced the pre-
loaded, pre-stamped tissue in the Geuder Glass Cannula,
which is an innovative tissue delivery system used for
Descemet’s Membrane Endothelial Keratoplasty
(“DMEK”).

       18. In 2018, CorneaGen began processing
Nano-Thin Descemet Stripping Automated Endothelial
Keratoplasty (“DSAEK”) tissue. This is currently the
thinnest DSAEK available at 50 microns or less. This
processing has greatly improved corneal transplant
outcomes for surgeons and patients and is the preferred
tissue of Dr. Holland.

                            -3-
      19. In 2018, CorneaGen became the exclusive
U.S. distributor of INTACS Corneal Implants, a device to
improve vision in patients with keratoconus, which is a
condition causing blurred vision and sensitivity to light
and glare and can be quite painful.

       20. In 2019, CorneaGen began offering
VisionGraft, a premier sterile tissue, which is used to
treat patients with Glaucoma.

      21. In 2022, CorneaGen launched the
EndoSerter-PL, which is a very innovative delivery
system for tissue used in DSAEK surgery and the only
FDA-approved system available.

       22. CorneaGen also offers Keratolimbal
allograft tissue for use in Limbal Stem Cell
transplantations. Very few eye banks offer this type of
tissue which is used to treat severe corneal blindness.

       23. Aurion Biotech, Inc., is a for-profit company
that spun off from CorneaGen in April 2022.

      ....

       25. Aurion’s focus is curing patients with
Corneal Endothelial Disease, a sight-threatening and
debilitating condition affecting millions of people
throughout the world.

      ....

      29. Using its patented technology, Aurion
extracts healthy endothelial cells from a mature donor
cornea supplied by CorneaGen and propagates it in a
proprietary solution.

      30. Once the donor endothelial cells are
extracted and propagated, the cells undergo a series of

                            -4-
culturing passages. Cultured cells are preserved in an
injectable solution.

      31. The injectable solution of endothelial cells
allows ophthalmologists to perform corneal transplants
more efficiently and reduces patient recovery time.

      ....

      34. Aurion is also working toward FDA
approval for corneal endothelial cell treatments.
Currently, there are no FDA-approved corneal
endothelial cell treatments available.

      ....

      36. Aurion will commence clinical trials under
an FDA investigational new drug (IND) application to
support FDA approval of corneal endothelial cell
treatment.

      ....

      51. In 2021, Dr. Woodford Van Meter, Medical
Director of The Eye Bank of Kentucky, convinced the
Kentucky General Assembly to pass Senate Bill 12
(hereinafter “SB 12”) for the purpose of preventing
CorneaGen from providing any corneal tissue to any
ophthalmologists or patients in Kentucky.

      ....

       53. KRS 311.1939(2) irrationally prohibits a
for-profit entity from engaging directly or indirectly in
the procurement, transfer, or distribution of any eye
tissue, while permitting for-profit entities to procure,
transfer, and distribute all other human tissue (e.g., skin,
bone, heart valves, ligaments, etc.). These other human
tissues have been handled by for-profit entities for over
20 years.

                             -5-
      ....

     61. But, CorneaGen and Aurion do not sell
human tissue and have no intent to ever do so.

      62. In fact, KRS 311.1939, prior to being
amended by SB 12, already made it illegal for any person
to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ or tissue for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation.

      63. Likewise, 42 [United States Code
[(U.S.C.)]§ 274e, which was enacted long before SB 12,
makes it illegal under federal law for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ or tissue for valuable consideration for use
in human transplantation.

      ....

       65. Just like all non-profit eye banks and many
other organizations involved in human tissue
transplantation, CorneaGen is reimbursed for the costs of
screening, processing, preparing, or distributing tissue for
transplant. Such fees are not payment for the tissue itself
and are explicitly permitted by 42 U.S.C.§ 274e.

      ....

      89. The plain language of KRS 311.1939(4)
prohibits any for-profit entity from charging a fee for the
removal, processing, preservation, quality control,
storage, transportation, implantation, or disposal of any
human organ or tissue in Kentucky.

      ....

      93. CorneaGen provided tissue to
ophthalmologists in Kentucky prior to the enactment of
SB 12. CorneaGen would be currently providing tissue

                            -6-
to ophthalmologists in Kentucky if SB 12 had not made it
illegal for CorneaGen to do so.

       94. Likewise, Aurion is barred by SB 12 from
providing endothelial cells to patients and
ophthalmologists who need them in Kentucky. Aurion
would provide cells to ophthalmologists under an open
FDA IND application to support clinical trials in
Kentucky if SB 12 had not made it illegal for Aurion to
do so.

      95. Dr. Holland is an ophthalmologist who
specializes in treating patients with cornea problems. He
performs over 2,000 ophthalmic surgeries annually,
including over 200 corneal transplants each year. He
regularly performs corneal transplants in Northern
Kentucky.

      ....

      106. Prior to the enactment of SB 12, Dr. Holland
regularly used CorneaGen tissue for corneal tissue
transplants that he performed on patients in Kentucky.

      107. Dr. Holland’s other source for corneal tissue
has been the Lions Gift of Sight (formerly known as the
Minnesota Lions Eye Bank) at the University of
Minnesota.

       108. However, CorneaGen, and now Aurion as
well, offer specialized corneal tissue that the Lions Gift
of Sight does not provide.

      109. In Dr. Holland’s experience, The Eye Bank
of Kentucky has been unable to provide the type, quality,
and quantity of tissue that Dr. Holland needs for his
patients in Kentucky.
      110. As a result of SB 12, Dr. Holland has not
been able to perform all of the procedures needed by his
patients in Kentucky since SB 12 became effective.

                            -7-
       111. Due to Dr. Holland’s inability to access
tissue from CorneaGen in Kentucky, many of Dr.
Holland’s patients’ vision has worsened. As a result of
their worsened vision, these patients are unable to
perform many of the activities of everyday life such as
driving a vehicle. Additionally, these patients are at risk
of incidental harm, such as falls, because of their poor
vision.

      ....

        113. Furthermore, Dr. Holland is planning a
clinical trial at St. Elizabeth Healthcare in Edgewood,
Kentucky, which is scheduled to start in the fourth
quarter of 2022. This unique, groundbreaking clinical
trial involves cultured endothelial cells.

       114. For the clinical trial, Dr. Holland will need
large quantities of cultured endothelial cells, which
Aurion can provide as an FDA IND.

       115. Aurion is a for-profit company and cannot
provide Dr. Holland with the cells necessary for his
clinical trial because of KRS 311.1939(2).

       116. Neither the Lions Gift of Sight Eye Bank
nor any other non-profit eye bank can provide the type of
cells that are needed for the clinical trial.

       117. If Dr. Holland is unable to obtain corneal
endothelial cells from Aurion for his clinical trial, his
clinical trial will have to be postponed indefinitely, and
the trial will not occur in Kentucky.

      ....

      121. Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky
Constitution prohibit special legislation.

      ....

                            -8-
       125. As amended, KRS 311.1939(2) singles out
for-profit entities for discriminatory treatment: “A for-
profit entity shall not engage, directly or indirectly, in the
procurement, transfer, or distribution of any human eye,
cornea, eye tissue, corneal tissue, or portions of eyes.”

      ....

       128. Thus, KRS 311.1939 is Special Legislation
in violation of Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky
Constitution.

      ....

        130. Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution
provides that: “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the
lives, liberty and property of freemen exists nowhere in a
republic, not even in the largest majority.”

      131. There are no legitimate, reasonable public
purposes for prohibiting for-profit entities from the
procurement, transfer, or distribution of human eye tissue
in Kentucky.

      132. There are no legitimate, reasonable public
purposes for prohibiting CorneaGen and Aurion from
providing corneal tissue and cells to ophthalmologists in
Kentucky.

      133. There are no legitimate, reasonable public
purposes for prohibiting Dr. Holland from deciding
which eye banks to utilize for his corneal
transplantations. Prior to SB 12, the choice of which eye
bank to use was always left to the discretion of the
surgeon utilizing the tissue.
      134. Thus, KRS 311.1939 violates Section 2 of
the Kentucky Constitution.

      ....

                             -9-
                   136. Section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution
             provides that all men are created equal.

                    ....

                   138. KRS 311.1939 irrationally discriminates
             against CorneaGen and Aurion based upon tax status.

                    139. In addition, KRS 311.1939(2) irrationally
             treats for-profit entities that process corneal tissue and
             cells differently than for-profit entities that process other
             human tissue.

                    140. There are no legitimate, rational reasons for
             treating CorneaGen and Aurion differently than all other
             similarly situated entities in Kentucky.

                   141. In addition, KRS 311.1939(4) has been
             applied discriminatorily against CorneaGen and Aurion
             in Kentucky.

                  142. Thus, KRS 311.1939 violates Section 3 of the
             Kentucky Constitution.

Verified Complaint at 2-6, 8-10, 14-20 (footnote omitted).

             On August 16, 2022, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment.

They argued that KRS 311.1939 solely and particularly applied to CorneaGen, Inc.

(CorneaGen) and Aurion Biotech, Inc. (Aurion), and for this reason, KRS

311.1939 constituted special legislation violative of Sections 59 and 60 of the

Kentucky Constitution. Plaintiffs also maintained that KRS 311.1939 treats for-

profit entities and nonprofit entities differently and that no legitimate government

interests existed to justify the disparate treatment. As a result, plaintiffs believed

                                          -10-
that KRS 311.1939 violated the equal protection guarantee of Section 3 of the

Kentucky Constitution. Plaintiffs further asserted that KRS 311.1939 arbitrarily

criminalized a for-profit entity’s procurement and distribution of eye tissue in

violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution.

             The Attorney General filed a response. He argued that KRS 311.1939

was not special legislation as it only referred to for-profit entities rather than

specifically named for-profit entities. The Attorney General reasoned that the fact

that the law only applied to two entities in Kentucky upon passage in 2021 was not

a feature of the law, but rather a feature of market conditions in Kentucky at that

time. Additionally, the Attorney General maintained that the classification

between for-profit and nonprofit eye banks in KRS 311.1939 was based upon

legitimate governmental interests and did not violate the equal protection clause or

the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary power.

             The Eye Bank of Kentucky filed an amicus curiae brief. In its brief,

the Eye Bank stated that it was a nonprofit organization that coordinates “ocular

tissue donations, tissue recovery, and ocular distribution, and has worked in unison

with the Kentucky Organ Donor Affiliates.” Eye Bank Brief at 1. The Eye Bank

argued that KRS 311.1939 was constitutional and did not violate Sections 2, 3, 59,

or 60 of the Kentucky Constitution.

                                          -11-
              By Opinion and Order entered December 28, 2022, the circuit court

granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and held that KRS 311.1939 was

unconstitutional as violative of Sections 2, 3, 59, and 60 of the Kentucky

Constitution. This appeal follows.2

              To begin, summary judgment is proper where there exists no material

issue of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Steelvest,

Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). All facts

and inferences therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Id. And, if there are no factual issues, summary judgment looks only to

questions of law and we review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment

de novo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016).

              The Attorney General contends that the circuit court erred by

rendering summary judgment and declaring KRS 311.1939 unconstitutional. The

Attorney General initially points out that KRS 311.1939 enjoys a “strong

presumption” of constitutionality. Attorney General Brief at 9. Under Sections 59

and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution, the Attorney General maintains that a statute

is only considered special legislation if its language specifically refers by name to a

2
  Despite CorneaGen, Inc., Aurion Biotech, Inc, and Edward Holland’s assertion to the contrary,
Daniel Cameron, as Attorney General of Kentucky, could properly file the instant appeal from
the Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court declaring Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
311.1939 unconstitutional. KRS 418.075; KRS 15.020.

                                             -12-
particular individual, object, or locale. As KRS 311.1939 does not specifically

reference a person or entity, the Attorney General asserts that it does not violate the

prohibition against special legislation found in Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky

Constitution.

              The statute at issue, KRS 311.1939,3 reads:

              (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this
                section, a person shall not, for valuable consideration,
                knowingly purchase, sell, transfer, or offer to purchase,
                sell, or transfer a part for transplantation or therapy if
                removal of a part from an individual has occurred, is
                intended to occur, or after the individual’s death.

              (2) A for-profit entity shall not engage, directly or
                indirectly, in the procurement, transfer, or distribution
                of any human eye, cornea, eye tissue, corneal tissue, or
                portions of eyes.

              (3) A person who knowingly violates any of the
                provisions in this section shall be imprisoned in the
                penitentiary for not less than one (1) nor more than
                five (5) years or be fined not more than fifty thousand
                dollars ($50,000), or both.

              (4) A nonprofit entity may charge a reasonable amount
                for the removal, processing, preservation, quality
                control, storage, transportation, implantation, or
                disposal of a part.

              Under the plain and unambiguous language of KRS 311.1939, a for-

profit entity is barred from engaging “in the procurement, transfer, or distribution

3
 The version of KRS 311.1939 amended effective June 29, 2021, is at issue herein. The prior
version of KRS 311.1939 was amended effective July 15, 2010.

                                            -13-
of any human eye, cornea, eye tissue, corneal tissue, or portions of eyes.” Under

the previous version of KRS 311.1939, no differentiation existed between for-

profit and nonprofit entities, and for-profit entities, like nonprofit entities, could

engage in the “removal, processing, preservation, quality control, storage,

transportation, implantation, and disposal of a part [of an individual].” KRS

311.1939(2) (amended effective July 15, 2010).4

              The constitutional prohibition against special and local legislation is

found in Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 59 prohibits

special legislation in “cases where a general law can be made applicable[.]” And,

Section 60 provides that “[t]he General Assembly shall not indirectly enact any

special or local act by the repeal in part of a general act, or by exempting from the

operation of a general act any city, town, district or county[.]” The Kentucky

Supreme Court has recently held that a statute offends the constitutional

prohibition against special legislation if “the statute applies to a particular

individual, object, or locale.” Calloway County Sheriff’s Department v. Woodall,

607 S.W.3d 557, 573 (Ky. 2020).

              In its summary judgment declaring KRS 311.1939 unconstitutional as

special legislation, the Franklin Circuit Court reasoned:

4
 Under the prior version of KRS 311.1939(2), we note that only “a reasonable amount” could be
charged by a for-profit or nonprofit eye bank for its services. KRS 311.1939(2) (amended
effective July 15, 2010).

                                            -14-
Under the Calloway County test for Section 59, local or
special legislation, according to the well-known meaning
of the words, applies exclusively to particular places or
particular persons. Calloway County Sheriff’s
Department v. Woodall, 607 S.W.3d 557, 572 (2020).
The appropriate test is whether the statute applies to a
particular individual, object, or locale. Id. at 573. Here,
the statute applies to a particular individual (CorneaGen),
and to a particular object (corneal tissue transplants and
donation).

       In University of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker, the
General Assembly passed a bill providing scholarship
opportunities to Kentucky pharmacy students attending
an accredited four (4) year institution of higher education
with a main campus located in an Appalachian Regional
Commission county in the Commonwealth and become
certified pharmacists in the Commonwealth. [University
of Cumberlands v. Pennybacker,] 308 S.W.3d 668, 672
(Ky. 2010). After reading the statute in its entirety, it is
clear that the requirements to receive the scholarship
could only be met by students attending the University of
Cumberlands. Id. at 684. The Court held that the Bill
violated Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution because
“the sole institution which would fit that description is
[University of Cumberlands].” Id. at 683. The General
Assembly’s failure to treat equally all members of the
pharmacy student class was “precisely the type of special
privilege and favoritism that section 59 condemns.” Id.
at 685. While the Pennybacker court applied the
previous special legislation test under Schoo [v. Rose 270
S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954)], Calloway County held that the
Court reached the correct result because the statute
applied to a particular object. Calloway County Sheriff’s
Department, 607 S.W.3d at 573 n.19. While the
University of the Cumberlands was not explicitly named
in the legislation, the classification was drawn so
narrowly that it was the only institution that was eligible
under the bill. Likewise in this case, although
CorneaGen is not explicitly named in the bill, the

                            -15-
            classification is drawn in a manner that it is the only
            company that is prohibited from engaging in business
            under this legislation.

                   ....

                   It is undisputed that CorneaGen is the only for-
            profit entity in Kentucky in the business of selling and
            distributing eye tissue. There can be no doubt
            CorneaGen is specifically targeted under this statute.
            Defendants argue that the statute does not meet the
            Calloway County test for special legislation because it
            applies, at least theoretically, statewide to all for-profit
            entities, not CorneaGen in particular. This argument
            ignores the undisputed fact that CorneaGen is the only
            such entity in existence.

                   Moreover, the Calloway County case specifically
            affirmed the longstanding rule that legislation does not
            need to explicitly name the target of its discrimination in
            order to run afoul of the constitutional prohibition against
            special legislation. In Calloway County, the Court
            reaffirmed University of Cumberland v. Pennybacker,
            308 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. 2010), which struck down a
            classification that was so narrowly drawn it only applied
            to one university. Likewise, in this case, CorneaGen is
            not specifically named, and yet it is undisputed that it is
            the only entity to which the legislation applies. The
            Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the statute violates
            Sections 59 and 60 of the Kentucky Constitution because
            the record demonstrates that SB 12 applies only to a
            particular company, i.e., CorneaGen and its spinoff
            Aurion. Although the language of the statute contains no
            specific references to CorneaGen or Aurion, it’s clear,
            based on the circumstances around the passing of SB 12,
            that the legislative intent of the Bill was to keep
            CorneaGen from doing business in Kentucky[.]

Opinion and Order at 12-13, and 17.

                                         -16-
             Thus, relying upon Calloway County, 607 S.W.3d 557, the circuit

court determined that KRS 311.1939 constituted special legislation as it was so

narrowly drawn to only apply in practice to two particular entities (CorneaGen and

Aurion) and to only a particular object (corneal tissue). Conversely, the Attorney

General interprets Calloway County, 607 S.W.3d 557 more narrowly as

invalidating legislation only where a particular person, locale, or object is

specifically referenced by name in the legislation.

             Upon review of Calloway County, 607 S.W.3d 557, we acknowledge

that the test enunciated therein is susceptible to differing interpretations. However,

we agree with the circuit court’s analysis of Calloway County, 607 S.W.3d 557 and

view the Calloway County Court’s approval of the result reached in Pennybacker,

308 S.W.3d 668 as key to its holding. Accordingly, we reject the Attorney

General’s argument that a statute must specifically reference by name a person,

place, or object to constitute impermissible special legislation. As KRS 311.1939

clearly applies to only two particular entities (CorneaGen and Aurion) and to a

single particular object (corneal tissue), we conclude that KRS 311.1939

constitutes special legislation and violates Section 59 and 60 of the Kentucky

Constitution.

             We view the Attorney General’s remaining contentions of error as

moot or without merit.

                                         -17-
             In sum, we are of the opinion that the circuit court properly granted

summary judgment to appellees.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Franklin

Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES,
                                          CORNEAGEN, INC., AURION
Matthew F. Kuhn                           BIOTECH, INC., AND EDWARD
Solicitor General                         HOLLAND, M.D.:
Frankfort, Kentucky
                                          David M. Dirr
Alexander Y. Magera                       Mark D. Guilfoyle
Assistant Solicitor General               Covington, Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
                                          ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR                         APPELLEES, CORNEAGEN, INC.,
APPELLANT:                                AURION BIOTECH, INC., AND
                                          EDWARD HOLLAND, M.D.:
Sarah Christensen
Assistant Attorney General                David M. Dirr
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Covington, Kentucky

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF FOR THE
EYE BANK OF KENTUCKY:

Mickey T. Webster
Thomas E. Travis
Lexington, Kentucky

                                        -18-