Court Opinion

ID: 9701420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:19:22.975967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:23.671997
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
HARRELL, J.,
in which RAKER and BATTAGLIA, JJ., join.
I respectfully dissent. Although I fully agree with the Majority’s analysis and disposition of the parties’ exceptions, (Maj. op. 514-553), I conclude that Mr. Harris should be disbarred, as recommended by the Attorney Grievance Commission.
Prior to the present case, Respondent’s disciplinary record as an attorney revealed the following:
(1) a six-month suspension on 6 November 2001 for conduct relating to two clients leading to violations of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence in representation), 1.4(a) (communication with clients), 1.16(a)(2) (terminating representation), 3.2 (expediting litigation), and 8.4(d) (misconduct prejudicial to the *558administration of justice). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 366 Md. 376, 784 A.2d 516 (2001);
(2) a reprimand by consent of this Court on 10 June 1999 relating to Respondent’s violation of MRPC 1.3 and 1.4 concerning Respondent’s failure to file suit on behalf of his client within the statute of limitations;
(3) a reprimand on 9 April 1996 for Respondent’s “neglect of a client’s legal matter and his failure to substantively communicate” with the client. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, Misc. Docket (Subtitle BV), September Term, 1993 (unreported); and
(4) a six month suspension on 30 July 1987 for various disciplinary violations, including “neglect [ ][of| a legal matter” and “failfure] to represent his client zealously.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 310 Md. 197, 528 A.2d 895 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1062, 108 S.Ct. 1020, 98 L.Ed.2d 985 (1988).
Echoing through the above four grievance matters and the instant proceeding are recurring professional sins relating to competence and diligence. I am persuaded by this record that Mr. Harris does not “get it,” i.e., the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct.
Respondent imagines Petitioner desires “to do away with” him because he has been an “aggressive lawyer” for his clients over his 42 years at the Bar, which persona “may have rubbed some people the -wrong way.”1,2 Harris implies that we should consider in fashioning a sanction in this matter that he has had a “very low incidence of sanctionable conduct” in light of the estimated “20,000 negligence cases” handled by him during his career.3 One may surmise, however, from the absence *559of a recommendation for sanction in his paper filings with the Court, that Respondent believes no sanction should flow from the misconduct found to have occurred in this matter.
Harris’ arguments notwithstanding, we typically consider a non-exclusive list of factors in arriving at the appropriate sanction in such cases:
[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
Harris, 366 Md. at 406, 784 A.2d at 533 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001) (other citations omitted)). Harris does not fare well in an analysis of these criteria in the present case. Although many of the factors are inapplicable on this record, most of the remaining relevant ones work against Respondent. He has a substantial prior disciplinary record.4 Respondent, unlike in his 2001 case, offers here no mitigating considerations based on his personal circumstances, nor did the hearing judge find that any existed.5 Although Respondent seeks to turn his many years at the Bar to his benefit in this case, such fact also cuts against him in that he cannot find refuge in urging that his misconduct was occasioned by inexperience. To the contrary, he clearly should have known better. Re*560morse or rehabilitation do not seem to be concepts embraced by Respondent because his attitude permits only the notions that someone is out to get him and that, because he has handled as many cases as he has, his bouts of misconduct should be tolerated as the “very low incidence” that inferentially will occur in such a volume practice. I, for one, cannot subscribe to those values.
We do no service in protection of the public interest by treating tenderly lawyers in our State who urge acceptance of a certain amount of chronic misconduct in the areas of competence and diligence by virtue of the volume and type of cases they accept. Our proper role is to demonstrate to the members of the legal profession the type of conduct which will not be tolerated regardless of the nature or size of one’s law practice. Harris, 366 Md. at 405, 784 A.2d at 532-33 (citations omitted). We do that best by disbarring Mr. Harris in recognition of his lifetime of underachievement with regard to the professional rules of conduct.
Judges RAKER and BATTAGLIA have authorized me to state that they join in this Dissent.

. Respondent’s Response To "Petitioner’s Exceptions And Recommen- • dation For Sanctions,” pages 4-5.

. Respondent fails to suggest who within the Commission’s apparatus is Inspector Javert to his Jean Valjean.

. Respondent’s Response To "Petitioner’s Exceptions And Recommendation For Sanctions,” page 5, n. 1.

. Petitioner points out that there is some overlap of the time periods of the misconduct in the 2001 action (misconduct occurred in 1997-98) and the present case (misconduct occurred in 1992-95 and 1997-99).

. In Harris, 366 Md. at 387, 784 A.2d at 522, the hearing judge found, as facts, that Harris was preoccupied during May June of 1998 with the death of his mother and mother-in-law. This, the judge found, related to Harris' neglect of his professional responsibilities at that time. As noted, supra, no similar findings were made in the present case.