Court Opinion

ID: 9474553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:01:19.015722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:10.535047
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent because I do not believe we should decide the statute of limitations issue arguably presented by this case on the basis of a record such as this one.
Francis Dougherty, Sr., proceeding pro se, filed this action seeking correction of his naval discharge records in the district court on a form complaint designed for employment discrimination civil rights actions brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Not only was the form complaint completely inapposite, but the allegations made and the measures of relief sought by Dougherty were largely unintelligible and inappropriate.
As deciphered, Dougherty's allegations were that, “My medical naval records show discrimination and prejudice when they say I was discharged for limited intellectual assets and functional instability with reference to two brothers being in mental institution and one brother on trial for carnal *503abuse.” (5a.) The complaint further charged that defendant “United States Navy Board for Correction of Naval Record denied me twice.” (6a.) The complaint left unclear whether Dougherty was appealing his 1957 discharge from the Navy on the grounds of “unsuitability” or whether he was challenging the recent action of the BCNR denying his March, 1983 petition to modify his discharge records1 to reflect a discharge for a nervous disorder allegedly caused by his treatment during basic training.
On October 19, 1984, an attorney began to represent Dougherty and filed an appearance in this case. However, despite the presence of counsel, no amendment of the complaint was sought in order to clarify the theory or theories underlying this action. Apparently sua sponte, the district court, in its opinion from the bench, stated that, “[i]n accordance with positions stated in the brief by counsel now representing plaintiff, the court deems the complaint amended so as to waive all claims for monetary relief, to assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and to name the United States as a party-defendant.”2 (37a.) However, the bare bones record discloses that at no time did either Dougherty or his counsel ever file a motion to amend the complaint, nor did counsel ever seek to develop an appropriate record which could support an identifiable theory.
The district court proceeded to treat the case as an appeal under § 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, the district court did not distinguish between review of the Navy’s action discharging Dougherty for unsuitability in 1957 and review of the BCNR’s actions in 1983 and 1984 which denied Dougherty s petition to amend his discharge to show that he was discharged for medical reasons. The district court went on to decide that Dougherty’s cause of action accrued in March, 1957, and that his “Title VII” complaint filed December 1, 1983 was not timely filed within the six year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2401.
It would appear that the district court understandably interpreted Dougherty’s suit as an appeal from Dougherty’s original discharge rather than from the decision of the BCNR. I add the qualification “understandably” because, as I have observed, not only was the complaint filed by Dougherty virtually incomprehensible, but the record available to the district court could have been of little assistance to the court in identifying particular issues and legal theories. Certainly, little assistance was given to the court in this respect by Dougherty’s counsel after he had appeared in this cause. In my view, counsel should have moved to amend the complaint and to develop the record in accordance with the theories which he proposed could afford Dougherty relief. I do not regard it as the function of the district court to be all things to all parties. It is surely not the obligation of the court to restructure a plaintiff’s complaint and to act for a plaintiff when the plaintiff has counsel to present and advocate his cause.
Here, the district court, referring to the same complaint to which we have been referred, i.e. a complaint which Dougherty had filed pro se before he was represented, was obviously obliged to speculate on what it was that Dougherty was seeking, the events that gave rise to the relief which *504Dougherty was claiming, and the merits, if any, of Dougherty’s claims.3
I emphasize that it was the plaintiff who had the burden of developing a suitable record both for district court disposition and appellate review of that disposition. I would have expected that if Dougherty, limited as he was by appearing pro se, had not developed an adequate record, his counsel, when he commenced representation of Dougherty, would have recognized that fact and would have taken steps to refine the pleadings and record so that the district court judge would be in a position to recognize and rule upon the appropriate issues. I am agreeably surprised that the district court could make the sense that it did out of the materials which it was obliged to interpret.4
Were it not for the fact that the pleadings in this case are so very poor that, while they defy analysis, they nevertheless hint at causes of action for which relief might be accorded, I would be inclined to affirm the district court outright. Certainly, I could not justify reversing and remanding a judgment of the district court where the district court, after struggling through a “record” such as the one we have before us, reached a plausible result based on its interpretation of the issue presented. However, I think the better solution in this case is not to affirm.
Even though I am reluctant to remand a case such as this one, where the district court has extended itself, as it has, in attempting to make order out of chaos, I think better practice suggests that the case be remanded. I would remand, however, not just for a consideration of the principles discussed in Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir.1985), but for a consideration of the entire case. It seems to me that plaintiff’s counsel should start anew with the filing of an amended complaint, which can then be followed by those pleadings and proceedings appropriate in federal court actions. Plaintiff’s counsel should then proceed as he should have proceeded when he first entered the case. There is little question in my mind that once the record has been properly developed as it should have been, and the issues identified and delineated, the district court will be able to arrive at an appropriate disposition. Thus, rather than restricting the district court on remand merely to a consideration of the instruction afforded by Geyen, as the majority has, I would instruct the district court to start from scratch. Obviously, in doing so, it will be the district court’s discretion that will guide the proceedings.
If, after the district court’s disposition, appellate review is sought, it is my hope that the presentation of appellate papers will comply with and conform to our local rules and the federal rules of appellate procedure. Certainly, that has not been the case on this appeal, and because those rules have not been followed, our task has been made far more arduous and time-consuming than it should have been.
*505I respectfully dissent from the limited remand decreed by the majority.

. In 1982, Dougherty had applied to the BCNR to have his discharge upgraded from a discharge for unsuitability to an honorable discharge. He made no mention at that time of any disability, let alone the disability which is the subject of his present claim. Furthermore, it is apparent that if Dougherty did incur the claimed disability, it would have manifested itself prior to his 1957 discharge. Yet Dougherty nonetheless acknowledged at the time of his discharge that he had no claim for disability. At discharge, Dougherty signed a form stating that, "I certify that I have been informed of and understand the provisions of BUMED INSTRUCTIONS 6120.6.” Those instructions explained Dougherty’s right to request disability evaluation, and warned that failure to do so would preclude him from receiving disability benefits in the future.

. The complaint filed by Dougherty was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

. The district court, through its own efforts, sought to obtain information with respect to Dougherty’s claim by staying proceedings in the case and remanding the matter to the BCNR for reconsideration of Dougherty’s request for a change in his Navy discharge records. Thereafter, the district court reactivated Dougherty’s case when additional information was received from, and a final decision rendered by, the BCNR. While these various papers were acquired by the district court through its own initiative, Dougherty's counsel at no time furnished the relevant BCNR documents to us in his Appendix. Rather, the Appendix on appeal included materials which do not appear in the record and did not include materials which do appear in the record. In order to understand the purport of these papers, it became necessary for me to review the entire district court record, a task which would not have been necessary if counsel had performed his functions with professional responsibility. See United States v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108, 114 (3d Cir.1977).

. While I agree with my brethren that the pleadings were confusing and difficult to interpret, it is apparent from the court’s remand that, despite its assertion to the contrary, the district court was not able to discern the proper issue. Had the pleadings and record been restructured as I suggest they should have been, there is no question but that the district court would have been in a position to recognize and rule on all the issues presented. Thus, I do not agree with the majority that the statute of limitations issue was properly presented to the district court. See majority opinion, at 499 n. 1.