Court Opinion

ID: 9758924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:56:10.546268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:31.195726
License: Public Domain

YATES, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion, but I write separately only to address the impact on this case of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Jimenez v. State, 32 S.W.3d 233 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). As the majority opinion notes, the Jimenez Court does not discuss the issue of whether the trial court errs when it gives an unobject-ed-to, yet inapplicable, instruction about good-conduct time. Id. at 239 (McCormick, P.J., concurring). It only discusses what standard of harm to apply when such an instruction is given. As a result, Jimenez offers little to our current analysis.
With few exceptions, a harm analysis should follow a determination that error exists. A determination that a trial court did not err makes moot a discussion of harm. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals finds the issue of error to be moot only after proceeding with a harm *27analysis. In doing so, the Court of Criminal Appeals contends that the “issue of unresolved conflicts among the courts of appeals [regarding whether this type of jury instruction is error] is far from pressing, [because] no defendant in any district has been awarded a new trial because of [such a jury charge].” Id. at n. 23. This Machiavellian reasoning is troubling. In its wake, the courts of appeals are now abundantly prepared to apply the correct harm standard, but are without guidance as to whether we should. Until we are told otherwise, we are bound by our prior opinions, holding that the jury charge before us is not erroneous.