Court Opinion

ID: 9939791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 19:09:13.135783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:57.673977
License: Public Domain

J-A21008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COLLEEN DOUGHERTY                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES HENDERSON AND KATE                     :
  HARTIGAN                                     :
                                               :   No. 2859 EDA 2022
                       Appellant               :

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 26, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 220201941

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2024

       Appellants James Henderson and Kate Hartigan appeal from the order

denying Appellants’ petition to open and their separate petition to strike a

default judgment in favor of Appellee Colleen Dougherty entered by the

Philadelphia Municipal Court.1 Appellants argue that the trial court erred when

it denied Appellants’ petitions. We affirm.
____________________________________________

1 On March 27, 2023, this Court ordered Appellants to show cause why the

appeal should not be quashed. See Order, 3/27/23. The order noted that
Appellants filed their petition to open and the petition to strike the default
judgment separately in violation of Pa.R.C.P. 206.1(b), and this Court further
noted that filing one appeal from separate orders is highly discouraged and
may lead to quashal. See id. (citing Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d
111, 112-13 (Pa. Super. 2007) (reiterating that Pennsylvania courts
disapprove of filing a single appeal from multiple orders); General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 263 A.2d 448, 452-53 (Pa. 1970)
(holding that one appeal from separate judgments is discouraged)).
Appellants filed a timely response to the show cause order and asserted that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A21008-23

       The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

Trial Ct. Op., 2/27/23, at 1-2.        The trial court summarized the procedural

history of this matter as follows:

       The uncontested docket entries reflect that on February 18, 2022,
       [Appellee] filed a timely appeal of a judgment that had been
       entered by the Municipal Court to the Court of Common Pleas for
____________________________________________

although Pa.R.C.P. 206.1(b) states that the grounds for relief to open or strike
a default judgment must be raised in a single petition, Pennsylvania Courts
have held that a party may seek to strike a void judgment at any time. See
Resp. to Order, 3/30/23, at 1 (citing Mother’s Restaurant Inc. v.
Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327, 337 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Appellants also
asserted that while filing a single notice of appeal from separate orders is
disfavored, courts of this Commonwealth have opted not to quash where the
issues raised in the orders are substantially the same, the appellee raised no
objection to the single notice of appeal, and the time to file a separate appeal
had expired. See id. (citing C.M.K., 932 A.2d at 112-13; Commonwealth
v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 476 (Pa. 2021)). For the reasons set forth in
Appellants’ response, we decline to find waiver or quash. Specifically, because
a party may seek to strike a void judgment at any time, we decline to find
that Appellants waived their claim that the judgment should be stricken. See
Mother’s Restaurant, 861 A.2d at 337. Further, the trial court’s October
12, 2023 and October 26, 2023 orders both involve Appellants’ failure to
respond and the default judgment, Appellee did not object to the single
appeal, and the time for filing separate appeals has expired. See Young, 265
A.3d at 468. Although Appellants’ combined appeal presents a procedural
irregularity, we decline to quash the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 (providing
that the “[f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but it is subject
to such action as the appellate court deems appropriate”) (subsequently
amended eff. May 18, 2023); Young, 265 A.3d at 477 (stating that “where a
timely appeal is erroneously filed . . . Rule 902 permits the appellate court, in
its discretion, to allow correction of the error, where appropriate” (footnote
omitted)). Here, “we opt to exercise our discretion to overlook [Appellants’]
procedural misstep, deem done what should have been done, and treat this
matter as a consolidated appeal of the two orders[.]” Frierson v. Love, 538
MDA 2022, 2022 WL 16754068, at *1, n.1 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 8, 2022)
(unpublished mem.); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-
precedential memoranda decision of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019,
may be cited for persuasive value).

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     the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. Pursuant to Philadelphia
     County’s local procedural rules, Appellee, by and through her
     counsel, Mark Copolous, Esquire, had retained Legal-Ease
     services, to facilitate proper service of the notice of appeal. The
     filed affidavit of service demonstrates that on March 10, 2022, the
     appointed process server, Jodi L. Broder of Legal-Ease, had visited
     Appellants’ address of record, . . . and personally handed
     Appellant Kate Hartigan with the physical copy of the notice of the
     appeal. As [Appellant] Ms. Hartigan resides in the same residence
     as Appellant James Henderson, she also accepted service on his
     behalf. Appellants aver that at some point after receiving the
     notice of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas, they had
     voluntarily discontinued the services of their prior counsel, who
     had represented them in the lower Municipal Court proceedings.

     Additionally, Appellee’s civil complaint was duly filed on March 18,
     2022 along with an affidavit of service, demonstrating that
     Appellants had been served a copy of the complaint via Priority
     One (1) day U.S. mail with next day expected delivery again to
     Appellants’ address of record. Contrary to what is unequivocally
     and statutorily required, Appellants did not file any answer to the
     complaint. Instead, on April 11, 2022, Appellants jointly filed a
     pro se motion for additional time to respond to complaint, which
     requested additional time to file an answer as [Appellants] were
     still seeking new counsel.

     As referenced within their pleadings, Appellants contacted
     Appellee’s counsel by phone following their acknowledged receipt
     of the complaint to seek an agreement for extension of time to file
     an answer. This request was refused by Appellee . . . and her
     counsel of record Mark Copolous, Esquire. Neither consented to
     any request for an extension of time. To the contrary, . . .
     Appellee by and though her counsel responded by serving
     Appellants with the ten-day notice of praecipe to enter judgment
     by default that same day.

     In due course, eleven (11) days after serving the ten-day notice
     of praecipe to enter judgement by default, Appellee filed a
     praecipe to enter default judgment, which the Office of Judicial
     Records for the Court of Common Pleas for the First Judicial
     District of Pennsylvania had properly accepted and docketed on
     April 22, 2022. Four (4) days later, on April 26, 2022, Joseph
     Russo, Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of Appellants,
     and filed an untimely answer to the complaint on May 13, 2022.

                                     -3-
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      On September 2, 2022, this court formally denied Appellants’
      outstanding pro se motion for additional time to file an answer.
      Fourteen (14) days later, on September 16, 2022, Appellants filed
      a counseled petition to open default judgment, which had been
      assigned to this court on October 11, 2022. Following review of
      the Appellants’ petition and Appellee’s oppositional response, this
      court denied the petition to open default judgment on October 12,
      2022.

      Subsequently, on October 19, 2022 and on October 20, 2022
      respectively, Appellants separately filed a counselled petition to
      strike the default judgment and a counselled motion for
      reconsideration of this court’s order denying Appellants’ petition
      to open default judgment. This Court denied both the petition to
      strike the default judgment[] and the motion for reconsideration
      on October 26, 2022.

Trial Ct. Op. at 1-3 (formatting altered and footnote omitted).

      On November 9, 2022, Appellants filed a timely single notice of appeal

challenging the order denying Appellants’ petition to open default judgment

and the order denying Appellants’ motion to strike default judgment. Both

the trial court and Appellants complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues, which we have

reordered as follows:

      1. Did the trial court err in failing to grant Appellants’ petition to
         strike the default judgment where Appellants met the
         standards needed to strike said default judgment?

      2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in failing to grant
         Appellants’ petition to open the default judgment where
         Appellants met the standards needed to open said default
         judgment?

Appellants’ Brief at 6 (formatting altered).

                                       -4-
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      “A petition to open a default judgment and a petition to strike a default

judgment seek distinct remedies and are generally not interchangeable.”

Green Acres Rehab. and Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1270

(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      A petition to open a default judgment is an appeal to the equitable
      powers of the court. The decision to grant or deny a petition to
      open a default judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial
      court, and we will not overturn that decision absent a manifest
      abuse of discretion or error of law.

Id. (citation omitted).

      Ordinarily, if a petition to open a judgment is to be successful, it
      must meet the following test: (1) the petition to open must be
      promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or file a timely answer
      must be excused; and (3) the party seeking to open the judgment
      must show a meritorious defense. . . . In making this
      determination, a court can consider facts not before it at the time
      the judgment was entered.

Id. (citations omitted). This test is conjunctive and “if a petition to open a

default judgment fails to fulfill any one prong of the three-prong test, then the

petition must be denied.” Roy by and through Roy v. Rue, 273 A.3d 1174,

1188-89 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

      Further, “where the party seeking to open a judgment asserts that

service was improper, a court must address this issue first before considering

any other factors.”   Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 700

A.2d 915, 919 (Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). “If valid service has not been

made, then the judgment should be opened because the court has no

                                      -5-
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jurisdiction over the defendant and is without power to enter a judgment

against him or her.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Conversely, “[a] petition to strike a judgment is a common law

proceeding which operates as a demurrer to the record.” Green Acres, 113

A.3d at 1267 (citation omitted).

      A petition to strike a judgment may be granted only for a fatal
      defect or irregularity appearing on the face of the record. [A]
      petition to strike is not a chance to review the merits of the
      allegations of a complaint. Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at
      defects that affect the validity of the judgment and that entitle the
      petitioner, as a matter of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the face
      of the record denies the prothonotary the authority to enter
      judgment.      When a prothonotary enters judgment without
      authority, that judgment is void ab initio. When deciding if there
      are fatal defects on the face of the record for the purposes of a
      petition to strike a [default] judgment, a court may only look at
      what was in the record when the judgment was entered.

Grady v. Nelson, 286 A.3d 259, 264 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted),

appeal denied, --- A.3d ---, 59 MAL 2023, 2023 WL 6631544 (Pa. filed Oct.

12, 2023).

      One of the fundamental objectives of the Rules of Civil Procedure
      is to ensure that litigants receive proper notice of all proceedings.
      The duty to make proper service begins with service of original
      process. This duty continues throughout all stages of the case.
      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 440 provides, “Copies of all
      legal papers other than original process filed in an action or served
      upon any party to an action shall be served upon every other party
      to the action.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 440(a)(1). When there is no attorney
      of record for the defendant, “service shall be made by handing a
      copy to the party or by mailing a copy to or leaving a copy for the
      party at the address endorsed on an appearance or prior pleading
      or the residence or place of business of the party, or by
      transmitting a copy by facsimile[.]” Id. [440(a)(2)(i).]

                                      -6-
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Id. at 264-65 (some citations and footnote omitted). “[W]here a fatal defect

or irregularity is apparent from the face of the record, the prothonotary will

be held to have lacked the authority to enter [a] default judgment and the

default judgment will be considered void.” Id. at 264 (citation omitted). “A

litigant may seek to strike a void judgment at any time.”          Id. (citation

omitted); see also Mother’s Restaurant, 861 A.2d at 337.

                              Petition to Strike

      In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court should have

stricken the default judgment because there are two fatal defects on the face

of the record. Appellants’ Brief at 30-33. Appellants argue that Appellee failed

to properly serve Appellants with the complaint. See id. at 31-33. Further,

Appellants assert that the trial court erred in denying the petition to strike

because Appellants’ motion for an extension of time to file an answer remained

pending before the trial court. Id. at 33.

      The trial court addressed Appellants’ petition to strike as follows:

      Appellants’ initial justification for striking the default judgment
      because service of the complaint by mail had been improper, . . .
      lacked legal merit. Appellants claim that the complaint, which
      they admit to receiving well before any default judgment had even
      been noticed let alone entered, should have been physically
      served upon them in reliance upon Pennsylvania Rule of Civil
      Procedure 402.       Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 402,
      however, simply references the manner [in] which “original
      process,” of legally initiating documents may be served. Because
      this case had stemmed from a Municipal Court Appeal, service of
      “original process” pursuant to Rule 402 had applied to the notice
      of appeal from the Municipal Court decision as the legally initiating
      document. See City of Philadelphia v. Silverman, 497 A.2d
      689, 692 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 1995) (finding [the a]ppellant in [a]

                                      -7-
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       Municipal [Court] appeal did not need to serve complaint in
       accordance with the rule for original process which preceded
       Pa.R.C.P. 400 et seq.).

       Further, Philadelphia Local Rule 1001(a)(1), which pertains to
       appeals of Landlord-Tenant money judgments like this case,
       directs the Court of Common Pleas for the First Judicial District of
       Pennsylvania to conduct the appeal de novo in accordance with
       the Rules of Civil Procedure that would be applicable if the action
       being appealed was initially commenced in the Court of Common
       Pleas. See Phila. Civ. Rule 1001. The Philadelphia Rules further
       recite that the plaintiff shall serve the notice of appeal according
       to Pa.R.C.P. [400.1](a), which outlines the manner of service of
       original process in Philadelphia County. See Phila. Civ. Rule
       1001(d).[2]

       These combined county procedural rules consistently contemplate
       that the notice of appeal is the operative legal document that
       initiates the legal proceedings. Therefore, service of the notice of
       appeal is governed by Pa.R.C.P. 402, which pertains to original
       process, and service of the complaint is dictated by Pa.R.C.P. 440,
       which applies to service of other legal documents. Such procedure
       is precedented and is comparable to initiating legal action by writ
       of summons as opposed to a complaint. Service of the writ of
       summons must be served in compliance with Rule 402, while
       service of the complaint is governed by Rule 440. Clymire v.
       McKivitz, 504 A.2d 937 (Pa. Super. 1986).

       The manner of service of original process as governed by
       Pa.R.C.P. 402(a), narrates in relevant part, that original process
       may be served (1) by handing a copy to the defendant; or (2) by
       handing a copy . . . at the residence of the defendant to an adult
       member of the family with whom he resides . . . [.]” See Pa.R.C.P.
____________________________________________

2 The version of Philadelphia Rule of Civil Procedure 1001 in effect at the
relevant times provided, in relevant part, as follows: “(d) Service. The Notice
of Appeal shall be served on the appellee as provided by the rules applicable
to service of original process in Philadelphia County, as set forth in
Pa.R.C.P. No. 400.1.” Phila. Civ. R. 1001(d) (emphasis added) (subsequently
amended eff. Apr. 3, 2023). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400.1(a)
states: “In an action commenced in the First Judicial District, original process
may be served . . . within the county by the sheriff or a competent adult[.]”
Pa.R.C.P. 400.1(a)(1).

                                           -8-
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       402. Pa.R.C.P. 440 authorizes service by mail, with service
       completed the day of mailing. See Pa.R.C.P. 440. Here, the
       uncontested docketed record reflected that Appellant Kate
       Hartigan had been physically handed the notice of appeal by the
       process server, and that she had personally accepted service on
       behalf of her co-resident and joint petitioner, Appellant James
       Henderson. After due service of this “original process,” Appellee
       physically mailed Appellants a copy of the complaint in compliance
       with Rule 440. Since service had been proper, the Civil Division
       of the Court of Common Pleas for the First District of Pennsylvania
       possessed jurisdiction to enter the default judgment. Moreover,
       Appellants had acknowledged receipt of those documents well
       before any default judgment had been noticed.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8.

       After review, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion by the

trial court in denying Appellants’ petition to strike the default judgment due

to improper service.        See Grady, 286 A.3d at 264-65.      The trial court

concluded that because this case was initiated in Municipal Court, the

requirements for service of original process pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 402 applied

to Appellee’s service of the notice of appeal. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8; City of

Philadelphia v. Silverman, 497 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (stating

that “[a]n appeal to the court of common pleas from a Municipal Court

judgment does not institute a new cause of action. There is thus no need to

reobtain personal jurisdiction over the parties by service of process, as such

process has already been conferred by a recognized tribunal.”);3 see also

Phila.Civ.R. 1001(d).
____________________________________________

3 Although this Court is not bound by Commonwealth Court decisions, we may

cite to them as persuasive authority. See Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d
1083, 1089 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

                                           -9-
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       Here, the filing that originated and initiated the matter in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas was Appellee’s notice of appeal

from Municipal Court.       The record reflects that Appellee personally served

Appellants the notice of appeal pursuant to the Rules for service of original

process in Philadelphia County.4          See Aff. of Service, 3/11/22.   Appellee

subsequently served Appellants with the complaint, which contained a notice

to defend as required by Pa.R.C.P. 1018.1, through Priority Mail pursuant to

Pa.R.C.P. 440(a). See Aff. of Service, 3/18/22; Pa.R.C.P. 440(a)-(b).

       The trial court aptly explained that Appellee personally served the notice

of appeal pursuant to the rules applicable to service of original process, which

was the filing initiating the action in the Court of Common Pleas, and it was

not then necessary for Appellee to additionally and subsequently personally

serve the complaint in an appeal from Municipal Court. See Trial Ct. Op. at

8.   Appellants point to no authority that requires this duplicative personal

service whereas here, the responding party was personally served with the

notice of appeal and on notice of the proceedings pursuant to Pennsylvania

and Philadelphia Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 400.1(a), 402(a);

Phila.Civ.R. 1001(d). On this record, we discern no defect in service. See

Grady, 286 A.3d at 264.

       Further, Appellants assert that there was a motion pending when the

default judgment was entered. Appellants’ Brief at 33. As noted, Appellants

____________________________________________

4 See Phila.Civ.R. 1001(d).

                                          - 10 -
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filed a pro se motion for additional time to respond to Appellee’s complaint on

April 11, 2022. However, this motion was filed after the twenty-day period in

which Appellants were to respond to Appellee’s complaint and on the same

day that Appellee provided Appellants notice of her intent to enter default

judgment. Default judgement was then entered on April 22, 2022. Although

counsel for Appellants asked counsel for Appellee for an extension of time to

file an answer to the complaint, this request was refused by Appellants. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 2.

      As noted by the trial court, Appellants cite no authority to support their

claim that the mere filing of motion for additional time to respond to the

complaint tolled the Prothonotary’s authority to enter a duly executed and

noticed default judgment. Further, we note that Appellants fail to cite support

for their claim that the motion for additional time to respond to the complaint

precluded Appellee from pursuing the default judgment.          The trial court

stated: “If the mere act of requesting additional time to file an answer could

prevent the Prothonotary from entering a default judgement, then the

defendant would . . . always have additional time to file [an] answer. This

would defeat any need for judicial review of their request.”      See id. at 9

(formatting altered). We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. The mere

filing of a motion for additional time does not toll the time in which a party

must respond to a complaint nor preclude the entry of the default judgment.

On this record, we discern no error on the face of the record that supports

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Appellants’ claim that the default judgment should be stricken. See Grady,

286 A.3d at 264.

                             Petition to Open

     In their second issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in

denying their petition to open the default judgment. Appellants’ Brief at 15-

16. Appellants assert that they have satisfied the requirements to open a

default judgment and claim that they filed the petition to open promptly after

the default judgment was entered, they had a reasonable excuse for the

default, and they possessed a meritorious defense. See id. at 17-29.

     The trial court addressed this issue as follows:

     When a party seeks to oven the judgment by asserting improper
     service, the trial court must address the method of service before
     considering other factors.

     Appellants acknowledged that they had been duly served with the
     required legal documents well before any request for a notice of
     default had been filed. Moreover, this service claim is already
     addressed in the preceding paragraphs of this instant opinion.
     Ironically, Appellants’ pleadings demonstrated that they had
     reached out to Appellee’s counsel of record by telephone in
     response to receipt of the complaint to seek Appellee’s agreement
     for an extension of time to file their overdue answer after they
     terminated the legal services of their first attorney and while they
     sought new counsel. Appellants . . . had not filed their . . .
     counselled petition to open the judgment in a timely manner and
     had offered zero reasonable excuse[s] for the entry of default
     judgment. Therefore, this court . . . equitably exercised its
     discretion in denying [Appellants’] petition to open default
     judgment.

     Notably, one hundred and fifty-three (153) days had passed after
     docketed entry of the default judgment and the filing of their
     petition seeking opening of the subject judgment. This period of
     unjustified delay . . . failed the promptness test. Whether a
     defendant timely filed their petition depends on: . . . the length of

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       the delay between notice of the default judgement and the filing
       of the petition [to open,] and . . . the reason for the delay.

       While there is no set amount of time before the petition is
       untimely, precedent indicates that petitions filed within thirty (30)
       days of the default are often deemed to be timely.[5]

       On the other hand, appellate courts have held that a petitioner
       had not promptly filed a petition to open default judgment within
       one month after receiving notice of the entry of the default
       judgment. See McCoy v. Pub. Acceptance Cor[p]. 305 A.2d
       698, 700 (Pa. 1973) (finding a delay of seventeen (17) days is not
       prompt); B.C.Y. Inc. Equip. Leasing Assocs. v. Bukovisch,
       390 A.2d 276 (Pa. Super. 1978) (finding a delay of twenty-one
       (21) days is not prompt); Flynn v. Am. W. Airlines, 742 A.2d
       695, 698 (Pa. Super. 1999) (finding a delay of twenty-four (24)
       days is not prompt).

       Appellants do not contest that they had received notice of the
       default judgment on April 22, 2022, and . . . waited until
       September 16, 2022 to file the counselled petition to open default
       judgment. Instead, Appellants again rely upon their singularly
       stated reason for the late filing which was that they had been
       waiting for the court to rule on their pro se filed petition for
       extension of time to respond to the complaint. Appellants had
       blatantly ignored the notices that had informed them that a
       default judgment would be entered within the set time frame.
       They also disregarded the entry of the default judgment. Again,
       the mere filing of a request for time extension did not toll
       Appellants’ responsibilities to answer the complaint nor did it toll
       their responsibilities to respond to the subsequent notices.[fn4]

____________________________________________

5 See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for Pennsylvania Hous. Fin. Agency v.
Watters, 163 A.3d 1019, 1028-29 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that
Pennsylvania courts have found that a petition to open a default judgment
was prompt where the delay was less than one month); see also Duckson
v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 620 A.2d 1206 (Pa. Super. 1993) (finding that one
day is timely); Alba v. Urology Assocs. of Kingston, 598 A.2d 57 (Pa.
Super. 1991) (finding that fourteen days is timely); Fink v. General
Accident Ins. Co., 594 A.2d 345 (Pa. Super. 1991) (finding that five days is
timely).

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        [fn4] By proffering this excuse, Appellants admit that they . .

        . purposefully waited to file their petition to open default
        judgment.

     Pennsylvania case law is clear that the timeliness of the petition
     is dependent on the date they received notice of the judgement,
     not upon the status of any outstanding motions. Ruczynski v.
     Jesray Const. Corp., 457 Pa. 510, 512, 326 A.2d 326, 328
     (1974) [(stating that “[t]imeliness is measured from the date that
     notice is received of the entry of the default judgment.” (citations
     omitted))]. Appellants were perfectly capable of filing their
     petition while waiting for a ruling on their motion. Instead, they
     voluntarily chose to delay proceedings by unjustifiably waiting to
     file their petition.

     Appellants also failed to offer any reasonable excuse or
     explanation for their failure to file a timely responsive pleading.
     Appellee provided Appellants proper notice of her intent to seek a
     default judgement. Appellants were aware that they had been
     required to file their answer within ten (10) days of that notice.
     Appellants’ argument that they did not file an answer as they were
     seeking counsel does not entitle them to relief, as the lack of
     counsel does not alleviate a party from following the rules of civil
     procedure. First Union Mortg. Corp. v. Frempong, 744 A.2d
     327, 333 (Pa. Super. 1999) [(stating “a pro se litigant is granted
     the same rights, privileges and considerations as those accorded
     a party represented by counsel; however, pro se status does not
     entitle a party to any particular advantage because of his or her
     lack of legal training.” (citation omitted))].

     Furthermore, the docket reflects that Joseph Russo, Esquire had
     entered his appearance for Appellants on April 26, 2022, which .
     . . undercut the proffered lack of counsel as the asserted basis for
     the request for additional time. Mr. Russo, presumably aware of
     the judgment that had been filed against his clients, waited
     another seventeen (17) days to file an answer. Appellants have
     provided no explanation for this additional delay. See McFarland
     v. Whitham, 544 A.2d 929, 931 (Pa. 1988) (finding defendant
     did not demonstrate reasonable excuse for their failure to respond
     to the complaint in a timely fashion “where defendant has
     demonstrated a dilatory attitude, and where counsel has
     unjustifiably failed to comprehend the applicable time limits.”).

     As Appellants did not meet the first two requirements to open
     default judgment, there is no need to determine whether they had

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       raised a meritorious defense.[6] Nevertheless, the defenses that
       had been raised by Appellants in this case may not satisfy this
       requirement. Understandably, the meritorious defense prong is
       set at a low bar, as the petitioner need only to raise a defense that
       if proven at trial would entitle them to relief. [See Scalla v. KWS,
       Inc., 240 A.3d 131, 145 (Pa. Super. 2020)]. However, under
       Scalla[,] the Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held that the
       proposed defenses must be raised with some particularity. [Id.]
       More than a mere denial of wrongdoing must be alleged. [Id. at
       144-45]. Under this standard, Appellants’ proposed defense, that
       since “they won in municipal court” one must assume future
       success in the Court of Common Pleas, lacked the particularity
       necessary to satisfy the meritorious defense requirement. Id.
       This [c]ourt notes that Appellants’ answer raised additional
       defenses including that the civil action had been barred by res
       judicata or the statute of limitations. While raising these defenses
       might otherwise satisfy the meritorious defense prong, these
       defenses had been blatantly inapplicable to the current matter.

       As Appellants failed to satisfy at least two, if not three, of the
       requirements that the petitioner must prove to open a default
       judgment, this court . . . acted well within its discretion to deny
       Appellants’ petition to open [default] judgment.

Trial Ct. Op., 9-13 (formatting altered and some citations omitted).

       After review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Appellants’ petition to open the default judgment.        See Green

Acres, 113 A.3d at 1270. As set forth above, in order to successfully petition

the trial court to open the default judgment, Appellants were required to

satisfy a three-pronged test: 1) the petition to open must be promptly filed;

____________________________________________

6 See Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 986 A.2d 171, 178 (Pa. Super.
2009) (affirming the trial court’s denial of petition to open, even though the
trial court did not address the meritorious defense prong of the test, because
even if the appellant could establish a meritorious defense, the trial court
properly denied petition to open the default judgment since the appellant
failed to satisfy the first and second prongs of test).

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2) the petitioner must have a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely

response; 3) and the petitioner must have a meritorious defense. See Green

Acres, 113 A.3d at 1270.

      Here, Appellants did not file their petition to open promptly. As stated,

the default judgment was entered on April 22, 2022, and Appellants did not

file a petition to open until September 16, 2022. Accordingly, we agree with

the trial court that Appellants failed to satisfy the first prong. See id. Further,

Appellants failed to provide a reasonable excuse for waiting until September

16, 2022 to file their petition to open default judgment.          In their brief,

Appellants claim they were waiting for the trial court to rule on their pro se

motion for additional time to respond to the complaint. See Appellants’ Brief

at 25. Appellants disregarded notice that Appellee intended to praecipe for

the entry of default judgment and failed to act in a timely fashion even after

the entry of the default judgment. As noted above, the mere filing of a motion

requesting additional time did not toll any time period. Therefore, we conclude

that Appellants also failed to satisfy the second prong. See Green Acres,

113 A.3d at 1270.

      Regarding the third prong of the three-pronged test from Green Acres,

the obligation to present a meritorious defense, we need not address it further

because we agree with the trial court that Appellants failed to meet first two

prongs of the test. See Roy, 273 A.3d at 1188-89 (explaining that if the

petition to open a default judgment fails to fulfill any one prong of the three-

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J-A21008-23

prong test, the petition must be denied). Accordingly, the trial court properly

denied Appellants’ petition to open. See id.

      On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion or commit an error of law when it denied Appellants’ petition to the

open or strike the default judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

order.

      Orders affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/12/2024

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