Court Opinion

ID: 9840660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 18:00:37.984122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:57.110715
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-10931        Document: 00516900285            Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/19/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                       September 19, 2023
                                       No. 21-10931
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk
   Kassan Khalid Morgan,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                           versus

   Dana Richards, Correctional Officer; Kimberly
   Satterfield, Correctional Officer; Kevin Darden,
   Correctional Officer; Rick Brewster, Correctional
   Officer; Melissa Stengel; Christopher Arias,
   Correctional Officer; Frankie L. Haynes, Law
   Librarian; Hazelle M. Davis, Correctional Officer V;
   Kenneth Madison, Jr.; Robert Wainscott; James
   Tapscott; Adam Salvador; Joseph Boyle,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

             Appeal from the United States United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 7:12-CV-34

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. Rule 47.5.4
Case: 21-10931      Document: 00516900285          Page: 2     Date Filed: 09/19/2023

          Kassan Khalid Morgan, Texas prisoner #1306656, challenges the
   district court’s denial of his motions for appointment of counsel in his § 1983
   action. A district court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent civil-
   rights plaintiff unless the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” The
   district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that this case did not
   present such circumstances. We AFFIRM.
                                           I
          Kassan Khalid Morgan filed a § 1983 action against various prison
   officials. Morgan alleged that after he filed a lawsuit against other prison
   officials, the defendants retaliated against him by turning off the water in his
   cell, denying him food and access to courts, using excessive and unnecessary
   force, instituting false disciplinary charges, and conspiring against him.
          Morgan filed two motions for appointment of counsel. He claimed
   that he had been kept in Administrative Segregation for 23 hours a day,
   impairing his ability to access legal materials, and that he suffers from a
   mental impairment which “substantially limits and significantly restricts his
   ability to perform major life activities.” The district court denied Morgan’s
   first motion for counsel and dismissed his complaint as frivolous before ruling
   on the second. On appeal, we vacated the district court’s dismissal of several
   of Morgan’s claims and remanded for further proceedings. Morgan v.
   Richards, 725 F. App’x 270, 273 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). But we affirmed
   the district court’s denial of Morgan’s motion for appointment of counsel.
   Id.
          On remand, Morgan filed an additional motion for appointment of
   counsel, which the district court denied. The district court then granted in
   part and denied in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
   After the case was set for a jury trial, Morgan again filed yet another motion
   for appointment of counsel. He contended that his limited education and
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                                      No. 21-10931

   mental impairments rendered him unable to conduct a trial, cross-examine
   witnesses, arrange exhibits, or file pretrial motions. Again, the district court
   denied Morgan’s motion. A jury trial was conducted, and the jury returned a
   defense verdict on all claims.
          Morgan’s sole contention on appeal is that the district court abused
   its discretion in denying him appointment of counsel. Morgan argues that he
   lacked the ability to effectively litigate because he has an I.Q. of 84, a fourth-
   grade education, limited access to the law library, and a mental illness for
   which he takes medication. He says he needed an attorney to help with
   discovery and to effectively cross-examine witnesses and present evidence at
   trial. He attributes his limited success at the pretrial stage to “jailhouse
   lawyers” who were not allowed to represent him at trial. Finally, Morgan
   asserts that he is a covered person under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
   that denying him appointed counsel violated his right to reasonable
   accommodations under that Act.
                                          II
          An order denying a request for appointed counsel is reviewed for
   abuse of discretion. Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). “A court
   ‘abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law
   or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.’” Hall v. Louisiana,
   884 F.3d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396
   F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005)).
                                          III
          We previously affirmed the denial of Morgan’s first motion for
   appointment of counsel. Morgan, 725 F. App’x at 273. To the extent Morgan
   challenges that denial, the law-of-the-case doctrine forecloses revisiting it.
   See United States v. Matthews, 312 F.3d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 2002). Morgan’s
   argument that the denial of his motion violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation

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   Act is equally unavailing. That statute, by its terms, does not apply to the
   federal judiciary. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)–(b).
          That leaves Morgan’s argument that the district court abused its
   discretion by denying the two motions for appointment of counsel that he
   filed after remand from our court. A civil rights plaintiff has no right to the
   automatic appointment of counsel. Cupit, 835 F.2d at 86. And a district court
   is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff in a civil rights
   action unless the case presents “exceptional circumstances.” Ulmer v.
   Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Although there is no
   comprehensive definition of what constitutes “exceptional circumstances,”
   a district court should consider several factors when determining whether to
   appoint counsel. Id. at 213. These factors include:
          (1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) the petitioner’s
          ability adequately to present and investigate his case; (3) the
          presence of evidence which largely consists of conflicting
          testimony so as to require skill in presentation of evidence and
          in cross-examination; and (4) the likelihood that appointment
          will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the defendants by
          ‘shortening the trial and assisting in just determination.’
   Parker v. Carpenter, 978 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Murphy v.
   Kellar, 950 F.2d 290, 293 n.14 (5th Cir. 1992)).
          Here, the district court denied Morgan’s motions in two nearly
   identical boilerplate orders that were also nearly identical to the order
   denying Morgan’s pre-remand motion for appointment of counsel. In these
   orders, the district court recited the relevant factors and held that Morgan
   “failed to establish exceptional circumstances which would warrant
   appointment of counsel in this case.” According to the court, the case did
   not present complex issues of fact and law. And citing Morgan’s complaint
   and filings, the court said that Morgan “adequately presented the operative

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   facts,” adding that he had an average “command of the English language”
   and “understanding of court procedures.” The court also noted that
   appointment of counsel was unlikely to shorten the length of trial or “assist
   in a just resolution of the complaint.”
          We have indicated that appointment of counsel may be required at
   later stages of litigation even if it was not appropriate at the motions stage.
   See Payne v. Parnell, 246 F. App’x 884, 890 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
   (holding denial of appointment of counsel was not abuse of discretion at the
   summary judgment stage because “concerns about effective cross-
   examination have not yet been implicated,” but “express[ing] no opinion
   regarding whether on remand Payne should have counsel appointed to assist
   him in further pursuing his § 1983 claim”); Parker, 978 F.2d at 193 (directing
   appointment of counsel “[i]f Appellant’s claims survive preliminary
   exploration”). Thus, instead of issuing boilerplate orders denying Morgan’s
   motions at different stages of litigation, the district court should have
   considered the facts anew at each stage, especially the trial stage.
          However, on this record, we cannot say that the district court abused
   its discretion in denying Morgan’s motions for appointment of counsel. First,
   the district court is correct that there is nothing particularly complex about
   the case. It involves an alleged single incident of excessive force and
   retaliation where the facts, although disputed, were within Morgan’s
   personal knowledge. See Feist v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm’rs Court, 778 F.2d 250,
   253 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding in a conditions-of-confinement case brought by
   pretrial detainee that the appointment of counsel is not warranted in
   “straight-forward fact-intensive case”); Van Guilder v. LeBlanc Group, 180
   F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (holding that district court did not
   abuse its discretion in denying state prisoner’s motion for appointment of
   counsel because prisoner’s § 1983 excessive force claim was not legally or
   factually complicated).

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          Second, while Morgan’s arguments regarding his low I.Q., lack of
   education, and mental illness are compelling, the totality of Morgan’s district
   court filings, as well as his briefs to this court, demonstrate an ability to
   adequately present and investigate the case. Morgan attributes his adequate
   filings to “jailhouse lawyers” who were unable to assist him at trial and
   asserts that his limited education and mental impairment rendered him
   unable to adequately litigate the case at trial. But the transcript from the
   hearing on Morgan’s motion for a preliminary injunction shows that he was
   able to perform adequately in a hearing setting. He recounted his version of
   the events, examined a favorable witness, attacked the defendants’ versions
   through cross-examination, and overcame defense objections. This suggests
   that he would have been able to perform similarly at trial. Of course, Morgan
   faced an uphill battle at trial in investigating the officials and policies at the
   facility where he was incarcerated. But we have held that the district court
   did not abuse its discretion by denying appointment of counsel in similar
   circumstances. See Lewis v. Brengesty, 385 F. App’x 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2010)
   (per curiam); Williams v. Martin, 570 F. App’x 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2014) (per
   curiam).
          The third factor admittedly weighs in favor of appointment of
   counsel—given the nature of the case, conflicting testimony between
   Morgan and the prison officials likely made up a majority of the evidence at
   trial. But the fourth factor weighs against Morgan as the district court did not
   see any reason, nor do we, that appointment of counsel would have shortened
   the length of trial.
          Again, on this record, with all but one factor weighing against the
   appointment of counsel, we cannot say that this case constitutes an
   “exceptional circumstance” in which the district court abused its discretion.
   Of course, we do not decide whether we would have granted Morgan’s
   motions for appointment of counsel ourselves nor whether we would have

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                                    No. 21-10931

   weighed the factors differently than the district court. And we do not
   condone the district court’s repeated use of the same boilerplate reasons in
   its orders rejecting Morgan’s motions at different stages of litigation.
   However, the district court recited the correct factors and weighed them. It
   did not base its decision on an erroneous view of the law or the facts. And our
   independent analysis of these factors does not show an abuse of discretion.
          AFFIRMED.

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