Court Opinion

ID: 9758411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:29:42.886998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:51.313343
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE,
concurring.
I join the Court’s mandate, and I agree with much of the reasoning in the Majority Opinion. As the Majority notes, to be valid, a jury waiver need not say anything about sentencing; sentencing is not relevant to the right being waived in this matter. Therefore, in my judgment, a criminal defendant should not be permitted to extricate himself from an otherwise valid jury trial waiver premised upon a sentencing issue unless he can prove that his jury waiver was part of an explicit agreement for a sentencing concession. Otherwise, the defendant should be bound by his jury waiver. Hopes and after-the-fact inferences should be irrelevant. Thus, the rule I would adopt would be narrower, and less subjective, than the “reliance” rule announced by the Majority. Because no such promise or inducement was made to secure appellee’s jury waiver here, the Majority correctly reverses the Superior Court.
With respect to the reliance rule that the Majority would adopt, I would also emphasize that counsel’s role is not passive. At the early stage of proceedings when a jury waiver colloquy occurs, defense counsel is better informed than the trial judge as to which, if any, statutory sentence enhancements might ultimately apply in his client’s particular case. Counsel should not be encouraged to sit silently by and *700thereby “plant” claims of error to be raised in the event the client is unhappy with his sentence.
Justice McCAFFERY joins this concurring opinion.