Court Opinion

ID: 9851744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:54.869301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.388256
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the circuit court. In so doing I am well aware of the rule requiring an affirmance when the findings of the referee are concurred in by the trial judge unless the findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, or based on an error of law. In my view the controlling facts in this case are either undisputed, or proved to the exclusion of all other reasonable inferences, or proved by the clear preponderance of the evidence.
*245The defendant, Grant R. Allen, owed the plaintiff, C. M. McDaniel, some $50,000.00. An action was commenced against him in February 1971, for the purpose of reducing the claim ,to judgment. Attorney Robert N. Daniel, Jr., filed an answer to the complaint. The matter was set for a jury trial at a term of court commencing June 21, 1971, in Greenville, before Judge Frank Eppes. When the case was called for trial on June 22, Mr. Daniel advised the trial judge that he was withdrawing from the case, whereupon the judge set the case for June 28. On this date Mr. Daniel announced that he was officially withdrawing from the case and advised the judge that Attorney Robert Otter, of Anderson, would represent the defendant. Mr. Otter declined to represent the defendant and the defendant appeared -in court on June 30 without counsel, stating that he waived a jury trial; that he owed the money and that he had no defense. The judge entered up judgment for a total $52,973.43 by his order dated July 1. This judgment was transferred to the Anderson County Clerk of Court on July 6, 1971.
On June 24, while McDaniel was attempting to get his claim reduced to judgment, the defendants, Ada F.. Allen and-Grant R. Allen, went to the office of Attorney Richard Otter, who had serviced their income tax returns over the years. A deed was executed whereby Grant R. Allen conveyed his one-half interest in the real estate involved in this action, appraised at $35,000.00, to his wife, Ada F. Allen, for the sum of $2,500.00, and she paid him that amount by check. The deed was immediately recorded in the office of the Clerk of Court for Anderson County.
It is the contention of Ada F. Allen that her actions were not for the purpose of defrauding McDaniel, but solely for the purpose of protecting her own interests. It is the testimony of Attorney Otter that he (by reason of having assisted them with their income taxes) knew of their financial situations and that, based on his knowledge of their affairs, he valued the husband’s interest in the property at $2,500.00. *246At the same "time, he admitted that he had never seen the property. The husband and the wife, and their attorney, thereby undertook to adjust their own equities.
At the time this deed was made, three persons were interested in the property involved: (1) Grant R. Allen, (2) Ada F. Allen, and (3) C. M. McDaniel. McDaniel was striving to finalize his judgment so as to perfect his lien.
Grant R. Allen did not testify in the case, and it can hardly be seriously argued that he did not act in an effort to de,fraud his creditor. Fie converted his claimed interest in the real estate to cash and has obviously dissipated the money. The money is not now available to either Ada F. Allen or to McDaniel.
Ada F. Allen was well aware of the fact that her husband was one step ahead of his creditor. Although she equivocates about the matter and denies knowledge of court procedures, she admitted:
“Q. Then your answer is, that the purpose of making this deed and recording it; was to keep that judgment from coming in?
“A.. Well, at that particular time I suppose so. But, I had wanted it long before that, I felt that it should be in my name all the time.”
We have held that a deed should be set aside where the transfer is made by the grantor with actual intent to defraud his creditors where the intent is imputable to the grantee, even though there is a valuable consideration. It must be conceded that a valuable consideration, two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00') was paid". In my view, it is inescapable that the grantor had intent to defraud McDaniel and that his intent was imputable to his wife, the grantee. Accordingly the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
It would appear from the record that after this matter was heard by the master in equity and his report was filed, exceptions were taken to that report. Upon a hearing of the exceptions ' by the circuit judge, apparently he indicated *247some concern with the fact that the grantee, through her actions, had assisted the grantor in converting real estate to cash and, by so doing, made it possible for the grantor to dissipate the consideration paid. Thereafter, counsel for the grantee suggested to' the court by letter that:
“[A]s a fair and equitable solution to this matter that my client be required to pay to the Petitioner the sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars, plus interest from the date of the conveyance, or, in the alternative, if you feel that Sam Jones was a qualified realtor and accept his Thirty Five Thousand ($35,000.00) Dollar appraisal that my client pay to 'the Petitioner Three Thousand One Hundred Forty ($3,140.00) Dollars, plus interest from the date of the conveyance.”
The trial judge confirmed the report of the master, refusing to set the deed aside, but took counsel’s suggestion and decreed that “the Defendant, Ada F. Allen, should be required to pay over Three Thousand One Hundred Forty ($3,140.00) Dollars, plus interest thereon from the date of the conveyance to the Plaintiff [McDaniel] in full and final settlement of any claim that the Plaintiff has against such Defendant.” The court thereby attempted to readjust the equities.
The only issue before the court was whether there was a fraudulent conveyance which should be set aside.
The offer to pay McDaniel is, I think, a tacit admission that the intent of Grant R. Allen to defraud, was imputable to Ada F. Allen. As pointed out in the majority opinion, she was entitled to protect her own interest, but she was not entitled to do so at the expense of another who has a valid claim against the property. The direction that the grantee pay to McDaniel the sum of $3,140.00 compromises the claim of McDaniel, without giving him an opportunity to be heard on the issue.
If Ada F. Allen, the grantee, has a valid claim against this property, she should establish the same in a proceeding *248wherein McDaniel is her adversary, and wherein the issues are properly before the court. I would hold that the plaintiff has proved his case by the clear prepondérance of the evidence, and that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and the deed set aside.
Ness, J., concurs.