Court Opinion

ID: 9403262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 19:04:06.964043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.986384
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/20/23 In re D.H. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

In re D.H. et al., Persons                                   2d Juv. No. B320188
Coming Under the Juvenile                                 (Super. Ct. No. 20JD-00133)
Court Law.                                                 (San Luis Obispo County)

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,

     Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JANE B. et al.,

     Defendants and Appellants.

      Jane B. (mother) and Jeremy H. (Jeremy) appeal from the
juvenile court’s order removing three children from their physical
custody. The order followed the court’s sustaining of a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 387 supplemental petition.1
Appellants join in each other’s appellate briefs. They contend the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order are
not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
                Factual and Procedural Background
       Appellants are the parents of D.H., who was born in 2014.
Mother is also the parent of Z.M., born in 2004, and B.B., born in
2008. Jeremy is not the father of Z.M. or B.B. C.M., the
presumed father of Z.M. and B.B., has not filed an appeal. All of
the children are female.
       In August 2020 a juvenile dependency petition was filed. It
alleged that the children came within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court because their parents had failed “to supervise or
protect the child[ren] adequately” and “to provide the child[ren]
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.”
Furthermore, the parents were unable “to provide regular care
for the child[ren] due to the parent[s]’ . . . mental illness . . . or
substance abuse.”
       According to the petition, on August 18, 2020, a social
worker and deputy sheriff visited the home where appellants
resided with the children. “The condition of the home posed
concern for the health and safety of the children. The home had
rat feces throughout the entire house, bugs on the inside of the
refrigerator, counters, and on the trash. There was trash and
chest height debris scattered throughout the entire home and on
the property outside. There were narrow paths to walk
throughout the home; however, the home had so much debris
that it was nearly impossible to determine the intended purpose

      Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the
      1

Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                  2
for each room. Some of the rooms were inaccessible due to the
debris and trash. The children presented with dirty skin and
clothing, including having an odor.”
        The petition continued, “There are . . . concerns about the
mental health of both parents [Jeremy and mother]. During
previous investigations, the parents have discussed being
diagnosed with various mental health concerns. In addition, the
parents refused to submit to a drug test during the current
investigation, causing concerns for possible substance abuse.”
        In December 2020 the juvenile court found true the
petition’s allegations. The court stated: “[T]here is a
preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, . . . the children were
living at the [parents’] home, that it was in pretty abysmal
condition. There were rat feces at the time of detention. There
was trash piled chest high. The children were in poor hygiene
. . . and this wasn’t the first time that this issue had been
reported. It's not something that came out of the blue. In fact,
those concerns have been there for a long time . . . . So there’s no
question I should take jurisdiction of the case and I will, and that
will be of all three kids.”
         The children were adjudged dependent children of the
juvenile court within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b).
The court placed the children “in family maintenance with
[mother] and Jeremy.” But it directed “that the place of [family
maintenance] is to be at Jeremy’s mother's [i.e., D.H.’s paternal
grandmother’s] house . . . until such time as the appropriate
health and land use authorities approve [appellants’] residence to
be habita[ble] and then the children can move back in at that
residence.”

                                 3
      In February 2021 the San Luis Obispo County Department
of Social Services (DSS) filed a supplemental petition pursuant to
section 387. This was the first of two section 387 petitions. The
present appeal involves only the second petition. Section 387,
subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n order changing or modifying a
previous order by removing a child from the physical custody of a
parent . . . and directing placement in a foster home . . . shall be
made only after noticed hearing upon a supplemental petition.”
      The first section 387 petition alleged: “[A]t the last Court
hearing on December 16, 2020,” mother had stated that “the
family home [appellants’ residence] would be ready for the
children to reside in within two weeks.” “On January 22, 2021,
the assigned social worker responded to the parent[s]’ home
unannounced as she had been unable to make contact with the
parents via telephone and text message. The home was found to
be cluttered with boxes, miscellaneous items piled high, broken
windows, and the outside of the home continues to be cluttered
and overwhelmed with items. The social worker was not allowed
entry into the home. [Jeremy] confirmed that [mother] and he
had been residing in the home since the last Court date, and were
only visiting the children every few days. [Jeremy] admitted that
he has been relying on [D.H.’s] paternal grandmother to meet the
children’s basic needs daily.” The petition requested that “the
children remain in the care of the paternal grandmother, and the
parents be offered Family Reunification services.”
      In March 2021 the juvenile court sustained the first section
387 petition. It found “that the prior disposition was ineffective
in family maintenance and that we need a different plan.” It
removed the children from appellants’ physical custody and
“place[d] them where they are right now, in the care of their

                                 4
grandmother.” It ordered that family reunification services be
provided to appellants.
       In September 2021 the juvenile court ordered the children
“placed, effective immediately, in the care and custody of”
appellants. It directed DSS to “provide family maintenance
services.” All of the parties agreed to this arrangement.
       On April 1, 2022, DSS filed a second section 387
supplemental petition. The petition alleged that the parents had
failed to provide the children “with adequate care due to concerns
regarding the parents’ mental health and possible substance
abuse issues.” Both parents failed to participate in random drug
testing. Jeremy tested positive for THC (tetrahydrocannabinol),
“the psychoactive element in marijuana or cannabis.” (People v.
Kidane (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 817, 823.) In addition, the parents
“failed to ensure [the children’s] regular[] and consistent
attendance at school.” The petition was orally amended to allege
that the parents did not provide “adequate dental care” for D.H.’s
“broken tooth.”
       DSS’s section 387 report, dated April 25, 2022, was
prepared by Valerie Amador, a social worker. The parties
stipulated “to the expertise of Valerie Amador as a social worker,
specifically in the field of family reunification.”
       According to Amador’s report, the children were living with
appellants. If the court decided to remove them from the
parental home, D.H.’s paternal grandmother “has agreed to take
placement of all three children.”
       The section 387 report emphasized the children’s school
absences and deficient academic performance: “The children have
not been attending school consistently and are grossly behind in
their schoolwork.” Z.M. “has l0 unexcused absences, 26 truancies

                                5
and 5 tardies. She currently has 1 D, 3 F’s, 1 B and 1 A in her
classes.” D.H. “has had 35 days of quarantine.”
       A note from B.B.’s school said, “As of Wednesday, March
30, 2022, [B.B.] has been absent from school for 57 days and
present for 77 days. This is equivalent to [B.B.] being present
57% of the days this school year.” “Of [B.B.’s] 57 absences, [only]
5 of them (3/22-3/28) were excused by a doctor’s note.” “[B.B.]
currently has 2 Bs, 1 C, 1 D, and 2 Fs with teachers excusing the
majority of assignments from when she was absent.”
       The section 387 report continued: “On March 29, 2022, the
mother became escalated when advised of the intent to file a
petition to remove the children. . . . The mother denied that the
children had any absences [from school]. When reminded that
the school . . . had asked Law Enforcement to do a welfare check
due to the number of absences the mother ‘exploded’ and stated
that was ‘bullshit’ . . . . The mother continued to yell, walking
away . . . and stating that [Amador] just wanted to take the
children away.”
       In an earlier status review report filed on February 14,
2022, Amador noted: “Since returning to the care of [appellants],
the children are reportedly sick all the time with different
symptoms. This was never an issue while the children were in
foster care [with the paternal grandmother]. [DSS] believes that
the children are healthy and that the parents exaggerate many
basic health issues.” “The mother has described the children as
at risk for autoimmune diseases but [DSS] has not received any
documentation to support this information. . . . The children have
been tested for COVID-19 several times throughout the review
period and have never tested positive.”

                                 6
       As to D.H.’s dental problem, the February 14, 2022 status
review report said: “[D.H.] has had a broken tooth for many
months. The parents finally got her into a dentist in January
2022. Her tooth needs to be removed. The parents report that
they do not want a regular dentist taking out her tooth. They
state that she needs a specialist who can do the procedure
properly and without causing trauma.” The section 387 report
stated, “[D.H.] had a dental appointment on April 14, 2022, and
was referred to a pediatric specialist.”
       At the hearing on the second section 387 petition, Amador
testified as follows: “The concern is [the parents] have not
followed through with their court-ordered case plan or with
meeting the children's basic needs throughout the past six
months.” “In this school year, [each of] the children [has] missed
30 to 60 days of school.”
       “As to [Z.M.], she is missing a lot of assignments.”
Although Z.M. will soon turn 18, she is not “on track to graduate
this year.” As of April 26, 2022, “[s]he has three Fs, two Ds, and
an A.”
       B.B. “had been exposed to her family who had COVID in
February [2022]. School was fine with her isolating for five days
and returning to school; however, the parents kept her home for
more than the five days and did not return her to school.”
       “The children are not going to be able to progress in school
if they are not attending regularly.” “The children had better
grades while they were residing with [the paternal
grandmother].”
       The school informed Amador that the children have “dirty
nails and unkempt hair.” Amador personally observed “[t]he

                                 7
same kind of thing. Just unwashed hair, unkempt nails. . . . Just
an uncleanliness, in general.”
       The children’s poor hygiene was a longstanding problem.
In October 2019 an unnamed person, designated as “the RP,”
reported to DSS that “[Z.M.] has very poor hygiene with soiled
hair, dirty skin, and dirty clothing that she wears for days at a
time. Other children and teachers are noticing, and it is
impacting her socially. The RP spoke with staff at . . . School,
and they indicated the same for the other children.”
       As to the parents’ participation in random drug testing,
Amador testified: “From April 4th [2022] to now [April 27, 2022],
mother has tested approximately seven times. Three of those
have been negative. Three have been positive for THC. And one
test result is currently pending.” “[Jeremy] went to Drug and
Alcohol on April 4th to test and tested positive for THC. He has
missed approximately four tests since then. He is also not calling
consistently to see if it is his day to test.”
       Amador said that, if the children were placed in the
paternal grandmother’s home, DSS “would offer [appellants] at
least three visits per week at the grandmother's home with
liberal phone contact.”
       Jeremy did not testify. Mother testified that she had
received a mental health diagnosis of “[b]ipolar disorder and
episodes of depression” along with “other specified trauma.” In
addition, she “suffer[ed] from fibromyalgia, as well as
endometriosis and PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder].”
According to the prior jurisdiction report filed on September 14,
2020, mother “shared that she [had been] diagnosed with . . .
Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social Anxiety, Agoraphobia, and
Borderline Personality Disorder.”

                                8
                        Juvenile Court’s Ruling
       The juvenile court struggled with the issues: “[T]his is an
incredibly difficult case, and I've been agonizing it over since I
started reading these reports. And the record will reflect that I
have read all the reports, all the exhibits. I have heard all the
testimony, and I struggled back and forth with this case.”
       The court found true the second section 387 petition’s
allegations. In addition, it found that the “previous disposition
has not been effective in the protection of the children.” The
court’s decision to remove the children from appellants’ physical
custody was based on the totality of the circumstances: “[E]ach of
these problems taken independently would not rise to a [section]
300 [dependency] petition. . . . I’ve seen many cases with dirty
houses. I’ve seen many cases where the parents have drug
issues. I’ve seen many cases where the kids are not in school.
I’ve seen cases where the kids are not getting adequate medical
information and medical and dental care. [¶] It’s a neglect
case. . . . There’s mental illness. There’s truancy. And there’s
lack of cooperation. And so the answer is that . . . all these things
taken together . . . rise to the level of removal, not any one of
them. [¶] And the kids are at risk. . . . And I know the kids don’t
want to leave their parents. And so the recommendation is to go
to [the paternal grandmother] until the end of school and then to
stay in family reunification. So family reunification is still
possible.”
       The court expressed concern that Jeremy was not
participating in random drug testing: “I am concerned that dad is
not testing. I don’t know whether that’s paranoia or drug use.
He is not cooperating. He needs to cooperate.”

                                 9
       The court also expressed concern about D.H.’s broken tooth:
“I don’t know what’s going on with [D.H.’s] tooth. It needs to be
resolved . . . . And it’s another one of those things that just adds
another layer to this case.”
       The court concluded by declaring: “And so I am going to
follow the recommendations of [DSS]. And I will state for the
record that all of these findings are made by clear and convincing
evidence . . . .”
                     DSS Has Not Shown that the
                   Issues Regarding Z.M. Are Moot
       Without citing supporting authority, DSS contends, “The
issues regarding Z.[M]. are moot, as she is now an adult.” DSS
offers no further explanation why the issues regarding Z.M. are
moot.
       It does not follow that these issues are moot merely because
Z.M. attained the age of majority during the appeal. In
December 2020 Z.M. was adjudged a dependent child of the
juvenile court. At that time, she was 16 years old. She will not
turn 21 until 2025. The juvenile court may retain jurisdiction
over her until her 21st birthday. (§ 303, subd. (a).) “[W]hen a
juvenile court has assumed jurisdiction over a person, the
person's 18th birthday does not divest the court of jurisdiction
and does not necessarily render moot an appeal from an order
entered in the dependency proceedings.” (In re David B. (2017)
12 Cal.App.5th 633, 651-652, disapproved on other grounds in In
re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 283; see In re Ruth M. (1991) 229
Cal.App.3d 475, 480, fn. 4 [“Ruth reached the age of 18 in
November 1990, during the pendency of this appeal. However, it
is necessary for this court to review the order as it affects the

                                10
rights of the parties as of the time it was made; the appeal is not
moot”].)
       On the other hand, “a parent cannot have ‘physical custody’
of a dependent child who has turned 18.” (In re K.L. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 632, 642.) Family Code section 7505, subdivision (c)
provides: “The authority of a parent ceases on . . . [t]he child
attaining the age of majority.”
       Irrespective of whether the appeal as to Z.M. is moot, we
have discretion to decide the issues pertaining to Z.M.: “Given the
short timeframes associated with dependency cases and the
potentially significant, if sometimes uncertain, consequences that
may flow from jurisdictional findings, consideration of the
overarching purposes of the dependency system may counsel in
favor of reviewing a parent's appeal despite its mootness.” (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 286-287.)
            Jurisdictional and Dispositional Phases of a
           Section 387 Supplemental Petition Proceeding
       “A section 387 supplemental petition is used to change the
placement of a dependent child from the physical custody of a
parent to a more restrictive level of court-ordered care.
[Citations.] In the jurisdictional phase of a section 387
proceeding, the court determines whether the factual allegations
of the supplemental petition are true and whether the previous
disposition has been ineffective in protecting the child. (§ 387,
subd. (b); [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 5.565(e)(1).) If the court
finds the allegations are true, it conducts a dispositional hearing
to determine whether removing custody is appropriate.
[Citations.] A section 387 petition need not allege any new
jurisdictional facts, or urge different or additional grounds for
dependency because a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction already

                                11
exists. [Citations.] The only fact necessary to modify a previous
placement is that the previous disposition has not been effective
in protecting the child.” (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154,
1161.)
                 Substantial Evidence Supports the
              Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Findings
       Appellants contend substantial evidence does not support
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, i.e., the findings that
the factual allegations of the section 387 petition are true and
that the previous disposition has not been effective in protecting
the children. “On appeal from an order making jurisdictional
findings, we must uphold the court’s findings unless, after
reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor of
the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support
of the judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to
support the findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” (In re
Veronica G. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 179, 185.) “Thus, in order to
succeed on appeal, [appellants] must demonstrate that there is
no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
court's [jurisdictional findings].” (In re K.B. (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 972, 979.) “Issues of fact and credibility are the
province of the juvenile court and we neither reweigh the
evidence nor exercise our independent judgment.” (In re Yolanda
L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)
        The petition alleged, “The previous disposition has not
been effective in the protection or rehabilitation of the child[ren].”
“The children . . . continue to be at risk and/or suffer serious
emotional harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of
the parent[s] to provide the children with adequate care due to

                                 12
concerns regarding the parents’ mental health and possible
substance abuse issues.” Both parents failed to participate in
random drug testing. Jeremy tested positive for THC. The
parents “failed to ensure [the children’s] regular[] and consistent
attendance at school and . . . failed to appropriately and
adequately address their educational needs.” The petition was
amended to also allege that the parents had failed “to get
adequate dental care” for D.H.’s “broken tooth.”
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that the petition’s allegations are true. Jeremy refused to
participate in random drug testing. The two tests he took were
positive for THC. “Prior to the filing of the [second section] 387
petition on April [1], 2022, [mother] had failed to follow through
with the 60 days of random drug testing that was ordered in
November 2021.” Upon the filing of the second section 387
petition, she began participating in random drug testing. But her
record was dismal – of the six tests she had taken in April 2022,
three were positive for THC.
       As to mother’s mental health, she admitted that she had
been diagnosed with various mental disorders. It is reasonable to
infer that serious mental health issues and substance abuse
contributed to the deplorable, chaotic condition of the parental
home in August 2020 and thereafter. The unhealthy home
environment posed a substantial danger to the children’s physical
and emotional well-being. “[E]vidence of past conduct may be
probative of current conditions.” (In re Yolanda L, supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 993.)
       In August 2020 a social worker and a deputy sheriff
inspected appellants’ home. Prior to the inspection, DSS received
a report that appellants “are hoarders, and that the outside of the

                                13
property is ‘a mess.’” At the time of the inspection, the home was
filthy and in extreme disarray. “Social Worker Webb observed
the entirety of the front yard to be completely covered with trash,
junk, and random items filled anywhere from knee height to
shoulder height. There was a narrow path that led from the front
yard to the front door of the home.” Upon entering the home,
Webb “observed chest high piles of trash and debris.” “All of the
rooms throughout the house were filled with trash and debris. It
was difficult to discern what each room was used for, because
they were so cluttered with trash and debris.” “Most of the rooms
. . . were inaccessible due to the excessive amounts of trash and
debris. The bathroom appeared to be unusable, other than the
toilet due to how much trash and random items were on the
counters.” “Throughout the home, flies and various bugs were
present; . . . Rat droppings were visible throughout the entire
home, but were especially present in the kitchen in which the
counters were covered with rat droppings.”
        Appellants “moved into [the] home two years” before Webb
inspected it in August 2020. The home was still in a state of
extreme disarray on January 22, 2021, when “the assigned social
worker responded to the . . . home unannounced as she had been
unable to make contact with the parents via telephone and text
message.” The “social worker noted that the home continues to
be cluttered with boxes and miscellaneous items stacked high,
broken windows, and [the] outside [of] the home continue[s] to be
cluttered and overwhelmed with items.” Appellants did not allow
the social worker to enter the home.
        The condition of the inside of the home had improved by
the time of the status review report filed on February 14, 2022,
but the outside remained in a state of disarray: “Upon arrival to

                                14
the home, the outside presents as very dirty, cluttered, and full of
trash. However, there is a clear walkway to the front door and
into the home. The inside of the home has clear pathways to each
room of the house and the exits are easily accessible.”
      The section 387 report said that on March 23, 2022,
approximately one month before the section 387 hearing, Deputy
Sheriff Lomeli told Amador that she and a school official had
gone “to the family’s home to speak to the parents and children,”
but “no one answered the door. Deputy Lomeli expressed concern
[to Amador] about the children’s absences [from school] and the
condition of the home. Deputy Lomeli reported that the neighbor
reported that he had not seen the children in weeks and that the
family did not have electricity.” (Italics added.)
      As to the education issue, without good cause and despite
the protests of school authorities and DSS, appellants engaged in
a pattern of not sending the children to school. The children had
numerous unexcused absences. The results were disastrous. The
children were unable to keep up with their school work and had
poor or failing grades. “Failing to attend school regularly not
only deprives the children of an education, but also of the social
interaction and ‘peer relationships necessary for normal growth
and development’ . . . . It is a very serious allegation and a
factual circumstance which needed immediate correction. . . .
The lack of education may well cause psychic or emotional or
financial or social harm.” (In re Janet T. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th
377, 388-389.)
      Amador personally observed the “uncleanliness” of the
children. The school complained that they had “dirty nails and
unkempt hair.”

                                15
         Finally, appellants procrastinated in attending to D.H.’s
dental needs. For months they delayed the extraction of her
broken tooth. As of April 27, 2022, when Amador testified at the
hearing on the second section 387 petition, the tooth had not yet
been extracted.
         “‘“The ultimate test [for substantial evidence] is whether it
is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in
light of the whole record.”. . .’” (In re Yolanda L., supra, 7
Cal.App.5th at p. 992.) Considering the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude the juvenile court reasonably
determined that the petition’s allegations were true and that “the
previous disposition [had] not been effective in the . . . protection
of the child[ren] . . . .” (§ 387, subd. (b).)
                    Substantial Evidence Supports the
                   Juvenile Court’s Dispositional Order
         Appellants claim that substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the
children from their physical custody. “The standard for removal
on a supplemental petition is the same as removal on an original
petition: the agency must show by ‘clear and convincing evidence
. . . [t]here is a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor’ if left
in parental custody ‘and there are no reasonable means by which
the minor's physical health can be protected without removing
the minor from [parental] physical custody.’ (§ 361, subd.
(c)(1); [citation].)” (Kimberly R. v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 1067, 1077.)
         “When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial

                                 16
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review,
the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the
trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9
Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.)
       “‘A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1)
parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2)
potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the
parent.’ [Citations.] It is not required that the parent be
dangerous or that the child have been harmed before removal is
appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the statute is on averting
harm to the child.’” (In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996.)
“‘“The court may consider a parent’s past conduct as well as
present circumstances. . . .”’” (In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
283, 292.)
       As required, we view the record in the light most favorable
to DSS. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section on the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, we conclude the record as
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that: (1)
appellants were “unable to provide proper care for the children
and that they would be at risk of harm if they remained in
[appellants’] custody” (In re D.D., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p.
996); and (2) there were not “any reasonable protective measures
and services that [could] be put into place to prevent the
[children’s] removal from the parent[s’] physical custody.” (In re
Maria R. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 48, 70, disapproved on other

                                17
grounds by In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 780-781.) DSS
carried its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence
that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the [children] if [they] were returned home, and there are no
reasonable means by which [their] physical health can be
protected without removing the [children] from the . . .
parent[s’] . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
                               Disposition
       As to the second section 378 supplemental petition filed on
April 1, 2022, the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and
dispositional order are affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                18
                   Margaret Johnson, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

                ______________________________

      Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, Jeremy H.

     Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, J.B.

     Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Ann Duggan, for
Respondent.