Court Opinion

ID: 9889534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 17:01:56.977777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:41.655091
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUGLAS DANIEL CLARK,                       No. 21-99008

               Petitioner-Appellant,      D.C. No. 2:92-cv-
                                             06567-SB
 v.

RONALD BROOMFIELD, Acting                     OPINION
Warden, California State Prison at San
Quentin,

               Respondent-Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Central District of California
      Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

         Argued and Submitted September 19, 2023
                 San Francisco, California

                   Filed October 10, 2023

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Mark J. Bennett, and Lawrence
               VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

            Opinion by Judge Sidney R. Thomas
2                      CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

                          SUMMARY *

               Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Douglas
Clark’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging
his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts
of first-degree murder.
    The panel held that Clark’s pre-AEDPA October 1992
pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an
“actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits,
and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by
appointed counsel in April 1997.
    The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s
decision that Clark’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to
represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,
as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
    The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s
decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was
untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the
United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the
district court also properly held that the purported August
Faretta demand was equivocal.
   The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s
opinion holding that the trial court’s revocation of Clark’s
pro per status during trial did not violate Faretta was not

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                      3

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the United States
Supreme Court. The panel wrote that the state court’s
decision to consider Clark’s threat to “stand mute” before the
jury in light of the record as a whole was not an unreasonable
application of Faretta, which permits the termination of self-
representation when a defendant deliberately engages in
serious and obstructionist misconduct.
    The panel held that the district court properly concluded
that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that
Clark’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme
Court. Under California law, a “Marsden motion” is
typically based on a claim that the appointed counsel’s
representation has in some significant measure fallen below
the level required by the Sixth Amendment. The panel wrote
that Clark’s assertion that an irreconcilable conflict existed
with his lead counsel and that the trial court was required to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide whether the conflict
rose to a Sixth Amendment violation is foreclosed by Carter
v. Davis, 946 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2019). The panel noted that
Clark asserted only that his conflict with lead counsel
“guaranteed an inadequate defense presentation,” but neither
raised a claim of ineffective assistance nor identified a single
act of ineffectiveness. The panel explained that (1) Clark’s
request for a federal evidentiary hearing is precluded by
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011); (2) the request is
also precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) because Clark failed
to develop any additional facts at trial and solely raised the
claim on appeal; (3) Clark did not allege facts that, if proven
true, would entitle him to relief; and (4) because the Supreme
Court has never recognized a Sixth Amendment claim based
4                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

on an irreconcilable conflict in the absence of alleging
ineffectiveness, a hearing would be futile.

                        COUNSEL

Jack G. Cairl (argued), Law Offices of Jack G. Cairl, Los
Angeles, California; Michael S. Magnuson (argued), Law
Offices of Michael S. Magnuson, Whittier, California; for
Petitioner-Appellant.
Nathan Guttman (argued) and Xiomara Costello, Deputy
Attorneys General; Dana Muhammad Ali, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General; James W. Bilderback II, Senior
Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General; Rob M. Bonta, California
Attorney General; California Attorney General’s Office, Los
Angeles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

                        OPINION

S.R. THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

     Douglas Clark appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his
California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of
first-degree murder. On appeal, he contends that his rights
under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and his
right to substitute counsel under People v. Marsden, 465
P.2d 44 (Cal. 1970), were violated.
    The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
                    CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                     5

and 2253(a). We review a district court’s denial of a habeas
petition de novo. See Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982, 991
(9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.
                              I
    Clark was convicted in 1982 of the first-degree murders
of Cynthia Chandler, Gina Marano, Karen Jones, Exxie
Wilson, Marnette Comer, and Jane Doe 18. He was also
convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and
one count of attempted murder and mayhem as to Charlene
Andermann. The jury found true a multiple murder special
circumstance allegation and sentenced Clark to death. On
July 30, 1992, the California Supreme Court reversed
Clark’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and
affirmed Clark’s murder convictions and death sentence.
People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1992).
    The facts underlying the six murders, and the
investigations of them, are detailed in the California
Supreme Court’s decision in Clark, 833 P.2d at 570–78.
Therefore, we shall focus on the legal arguments that Clark
presents in his federal habeas appeal.
    On direct appeal before the California Supreme Court,
Clark claimed that the trial court violated his right of self-
representation and right to substitute counsel.           The
California Supreme Court denied those claims on the merits.
Clark subsequently filed numerous habeas petitions in the
California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court
denied the claims on procedural grounds and on the merits.
    On October 23, 1992, Clark filed a pro se document in
federal district court entitled “Writ of Habeas Corpus, from
a State Capital Trial and Appellate Process.” Clark
requested appointment of counsel to investigate potential
6                    CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

habeas claims, some of which he listed. At the end of the
filing, Clark did not make a request for habeas relief, but
only sought appointment of counsel. He signed the 1992
filing, but did not do so under penalty of perjury. The district
court docketed the filing as a request for counsel and stay of
execution.
    The court subsequently appointed two attorneys to
represent Clark and ordered nunc pro tunc that their
appointment was effective as of September 29, 1993. When
counsel filed the habeas petition on April 23, 1997, setting
forth twenty-seven claims for relief, they did not purport to
amend a prior filing.
    The district court then issued an order staying the case to
permit Clark to exhaust state remedies. After the California
Supreme Court summarily denied Clark’s petitions in 2003,
Clark’s attorneys filed the operative amended federal
petition on June 22, 2004, which asserted twenty-three
claims for relief.
    The district court then ordered the parties to brief the
applicability of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) to the habeas petition.
Following briefing, the court issued an order determining
that AEDPA applied and set a briefing schedule for merits
briefing.
    After merits review, the district court upheld the
California Supreme Court’s decision as reasonable within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court
concluded the state-court decision was objectively
reasonable in its denial of Clark’s claims as to (1) the denial
of his pretrial requests for self-representation, (2) the
revocation of Faretta status during trial, and (3) the denial
of his request for substitute counsel pursuant to Marsden.
                    CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                     7

The district court issued a certificate of appealability as to
Clark’s claims of Faretta and Marsden errors.
                              II
                              A
    AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions that were not
pending prior to April 24, 1996. An application for federal
habeas relief that was pending before AEDPA’s effective
date is not subject to AEDPA’s limitations. See Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114
F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), partially
overruled on other grounds, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d
383, 390 (9th Cir. 2012).
    After Lindh, the Supreme Court clarified that filings that
are not an “actual application” seeking an “adjudication on
the merits of the petitioner’s claims” do not constitute a
pending habeas petition subject to pre-AEDPA standards.
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207–08, 210 n.1
(2003). Garceau held that pre-application filings, such as a
request for appointment of counsel or a motion for stay of
execution, do not constitute an “actual application” that
seeks an “adjudication” of the claims “on the merits” are
subject to AEDPA. Id.
    To determine what constitutes “an actual application for
habeas relief” within the meaning of Garceau, 538 U.S. at
208, district courts may look to Rule 2 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases, which sets forth criteria that
the form of a habeas application must satisfy. Pursuant to
Rule 2(c), a § 2254 petition must:

       (1) specify all the grounds for relief available
       to the petitioner;
8                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

        (2) state the facts supporting each ground;
        (3) state the relief requested;
        (4) be printed, typewritten, or legibly
        handwritten; and
        (5) be signed under penalty of perjury by the
        petitioner or by a person authorized to sign it
        for the petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2242.

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts (effective Feb. 1, 1997, as amended to Jan. 5,
2023).
    A “failure to [sign and] verify the petition is a defect
that . . . the district court may, if it sees fit, disregard,” and
“[s]ummary dismissal is appropriate only where the
allegations in the petition are vague [or] conclusory or
palpably incredible, or patently frivolous or false.”
Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    In addition, “[c]onclusory allegations which are not
supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant
habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir.
1994); see Wacht v. Cardwell, 604 F.2d 1245, 1246–47 &
n.2 (9th Cir. 1979) (describing the “specificity requirement”
and recognizing that “[b]ald assertions and conclusory
allegations” are insufficient to state a federal habeas claim).
   Pro se habeas petitions are construed more liberally than
counseled petitions, see, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam); Peterson v. Lampert, 319
F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), but the petition
must still allege sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, see Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952,
958 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that despite the “liberal
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                      9

construction” afforded pro se pleadings, a pro se petitioner
“is not entitled to the benefit of every conceivable doubt”).
    Here, as we have discussed, Clark’s initial filing sought
appointment of counsel to investigate potential claims and
specifically disclaimed that his listing of potential issues for
counsel to investigate was complete, saying it would be
“silly” to do so. Clark did not “state the facts supporting
each ground.” See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; see
also James, 24 F.3d at 26. Except for requesting
appointment of counsel, Clark did not seek further relief. In
addition, Clark did not sign the document under penalty of
perjury or verify it. The district court docketed the filing as
a request for counsel and stay of execution.
    Thus, pursuant to Garceau, the October 1992 filing did
not constitute an “actual application” that sought
“adjudication” of the claims “on the merits.” Rather, like
Garceau, the relief sought was appointment of counsel and
stay of execution.
    Appointed counsel subsequently filed a habeas petition
on April 23, 1997 setting forth twenty-seven claims for
relief. The petition was not styled as an amended complaint
or amended habeas petition.
    Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the
prior filing by Clark was not an “actual application” that
sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied
to Clark’s operative habeas petition.
                               B
   Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief
only when the state-court decision was (1) “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
10                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id.
§ 2254(d)(2).
    A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts
controlling Supreme Court authority or “if the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision” of the Supreme Court but nevertheless
arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 406 (2000).         A state court’s decision is an
“unreasonable application” of federal law if it “identifies the
correct governing principle from [the Supreme] Court’s
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts
of the prisoner’s case.” Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,
974 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). An unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely
wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” White v. Woodall,
572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
    The Supreme Court has explained that “clearly
established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) “refers to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as
of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams,
529 U.S. at 412. Given a Supreme Court holding in one
context, circuit law cannot “bridge the gap” to reach a new
context, Glebe v. Frost, 574 U.S. 21, 24 (2014), even as a
“logical next step,” White, 572 U.S. at 427. But we may
“look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has already
held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by
Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S.
58, 64 (2013).
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    11

     In applying these standards on habeas review, we look
through unexplained state-court decisions and review the
“last reasoned decision” by the state court—here, the
California Supreme Court’s decision on direct appeal.
Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).
A summary denial is an adjudication on the merits and
entitled to deference. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 99 (2011); Ochoa v. Davis, 50 F.4th 865, 888 (9th Cir.
2022). Thus, the presumption that the unexplained state-
court decision adopted the same reasoning as the lower-court
decision can be rebutted by a showing that the unexplained
affirmance relied—or most likely relied—on different
grounds, “such as alternative grounds for affirmance that
were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious
in the record it reviewed.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,
1192 (2018).
                              III
    The district court correctly concluded that the California
Supreme Court’s determination that Clark’s Faretta rights
were not violated was not contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
    Under Faretta, a criminal defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to represent himself if he “knowingly and
intelligently” waives his right to counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 835. To knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to
counsel and assert the right to self-representation, a
defendant’s request must be timely. See Marshall v. Taylor,
395 F.3d 1058, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2005).
    The Faretta request must also be unequivocal. See
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. “If [a defendant] equivocates, he
is presumed to have requested the assistance of counsel.”
12                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). A
defendant’s expression of a preference for counsel over
representing himself may suggest that a request is equivocal.
See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 884 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a petitioner’s request for self-representation
was equivocal where his “requests for self-representation
were concessions that he really did not want to represent
himself, but that he felt the court and [defense counsel] were
forcing him to do so”). “Faretta does not require a trial
judge to permit ‘hybrid’ representation.” McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); see United States v.
Kienenberger, 13 F.3d 1354, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding
no abuse of discretion where the district court denied a
petitioner’s self-representation requests that “were always
accompanied by his insistence that the court appoint
‘advisory’ or ‘standby’ counsel”).
    Emotional or impulsive requests for self-representation
are also considered to be equivocal. See Hernandez, 203
F.3d at 622 n.11 (explaining that an “emotional outburst in
response to [a] judge’s ruling” is equivocal); Jackson v. Ylst,
921 F.2d 882, 888–89 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
“request for self-representation that is ‘a momentary caprice
or the result of thinking out loud,’” such as an “impulsive
response to the trial court’s denial of [a defendant’s] request
for substitute counsel,” is an equivocal request). In assessing
whether a request was unequivocal, courts should consider
the “whole record,” Walker v. Loggins, 608 F.2d 731, 734
(9th Cir. 1979), and must “indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver” of counsel, Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
    Faretta also made it clear that a constitutional “right of
self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom,” and therefore, “the trial judge may terminate
                    CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    13

self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages
in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” 422 U.S. at 834
n.46; see McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 173 (explaining that the
right of self-representation is contingent upon a defendant
being “able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and
courtroom protocol”).
                              A
    The California Supreme Court’s decision holding that
Clark’s pre-trial Faretta request in July 1982 was equivocal
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law, as determined by the United
States Supreme Court.
    At the July 26, 1982 hearing, Clark became upset when
the trial court denied his counsel’s discovery motions. In
response, Clark purported to dismiss his lead counsel, saying
“I’m thoroughly capable of handling this case.” Clark did
not purport to dismiss the other counsel appointed to
represent him, nor did he unequivocally demand self-
representation.
    Citing Faretta, the California Supreme Court held that
Clark “did not unequivocally assert his right to self-
representation” and “never expressed the desire to discharge
both his appointed attorneys and to proceed pro se.” Clark,
833 P.2d at 587 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
   This holding was objectively reasonable within the
meaning of § 2254(d).
    First, the record indicates that the remarks were part of
an emotional outburst by Clark in response to the partial loss
of the discovery motion. See Hernandez, 203 F.3d at 622
14                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

n.11 (explaining that an “emotional outburst in response to
[a] judge’s ruling” is equivocal).
    Second, Clark “never expressed his desire to discharge
both his appointed attorneys.” Clark, 833 P.2d at 587. By
attempting to dismiss one attorney and not the other, Clark
effectively sought hybrid representation.       Indeed, in
considering the whole record throughout the proceedings,
Walker, 608 F.2d at 734, Clark asked to represent himself
with the second attorney as co-counsel.
     Accordingly, the California Supreme Court did not
unreasonably conclude that Clark’s July 26 statements did
not clearly and unequivocally convey a request for self-
representation because neither Faretta nor any other
Supreme Court case law has addressed a situation where the
defendant sought to dismiss one of multiple attorneys. See
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 (“Faretta does not require a trial
judge to permit ‘hybrid’ representation . . . .”); White, 572
U.S. at 427 (explaining that “relief is available under
§ 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only
if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a
given set of facts that there could be no fairminded
disagreement on the question” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).
                               B
    The California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s
Faretta request in August 1982 was untimely was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the United States
Supreme Court.
    When Clark made his purported August Faretta demand,
the case had a “firm” setting for trial that day. The record
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                      15

supports the California Supreme Court’s conclusion that the
request was made, in effect, “on the eve of trial.” Clark, 833
P.2d at 588. The trial was postponed briefly to resolve
motions, but was considered “trailing,” meaning that it could
commence at any time.
    Although Faretta established a timing element, there is
no Supreme Court case “directly” establishing when a
request is timely. Marshall, 395 F.3d at 1060. “The only
Supreme Court decision to discuss the timeliness of a request
to proceed pro se is the Faretta decision itself.” Burton, 816
F.3d at 1141 (quoting Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261,
2654 (9th Cir. 1997). As we held in Marshall, “[n]o
Supreme Court case has directly addressed the timing of a
request for self-representation” and the Supreme Court has
not delineated the “precise contours” of Faretta’s timeliness
requirement. 395 F.3d at 1060–61.
    AEDPA requires preexisting Supreme Court authority
that “squarely addresses the issue” at hand and provides a
“clear answer” to it. Wright, 552 U.S. at 126. An
“indirect[]” ruling is insufficient. Marshall, 395 F.3d at
1060; see Carter v. Davis, 946 F.3d 489, 509 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“AEDPA requires more than pointing to implicit holdings
or dicta; it requires that the law be clearly established.”).
And there is no other Supreme Court case directly
addressing the timing element of a Faretta request.
    “In the absence of clear Supreme Court precedent
defining when a Faretta request becomes untimely,” a
California state court “[i]s free to determine that [issue]
under California’s Windham rule.” Marshall, 395 F.3d at
1062 (citing People v. Windham, 560 P.2d 1187 (Cal.
1977)). Because the Supreme Court has not held that the
actual start date of a trial is the lynchpin for the analysis, or
16                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

“squarely addressed” whether and in what circumstance the
prospect of a continuance affects the timing of a Faretta
request, the California Supreme Court’s decision not to
tether the analysis to the actual start date of the trial was not
unreasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d). Wright, 552
U.S. at 125.
    The district court also properly held that the purported
August Faretta demand was, in fact, equivocal. The record
supports this conclusion. Clark again only sought to
discharge one of his two attorneys and declared himself
“satisfied” with the other attorney. He sought co-counsel
status with his remaining attorney. Clark then referred to
his lead attorney as either his ex-counsel or current counsel,
“however the court decides,” but referred to the other
attorney as “fully qualified” and “fully competent” and
stated that he had the “utmost faith in her.” Thus, the record
supports the district court’s conclusion that the purported
August Faretta assertion was equivocal.
    In sum, the California Supreme Court’s decision that the
August request did not violate Faretta was not an objectively
unreasonable application of Faretta, and was not contrary to,
or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
                               IV
    The district court properly concluded that the California
Supreme Court’s opinion holding that revoking Clark’s pro
per status during trial did not violate Faretta was not
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law, as determined by the United States
Supreme Court.
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                     17

    At various times during the trial, Clark expressed his
dissatisfaction with his lead counsel and attempted to re-
assert his rights under Faretta, although in an equivocal
manner, requesting that his other attorney remain as his “co-
counsel.” Clark was ordered removed from the courtroom
after one outburst concerning his lawyer.
    On October 13, Clark renewed his request for self-
representation. The trial court advised him, “Since the time
you’ve come into this court, I’ve indicated to you that you
can go pro per, if you make a knowing[], intelligent waiver,
as required by Faretta; that upon your doing that, you will
receive no co-counsel, no assistance of counsel of any kind.”
Shortly thereafter, Clark stated, “I’m pro per at this time.
The attorneys are dismissed.”
    Before granting Clark’s Faretta motion, the trial court
warned Clark that it would not allow him to abuse the
privilege and would take the privilege away if he abused it.
Additionally, the trial judge advised Clark of his
constitutional rights; of the fact that if granted permission to
proceed in pro per, he was giving up his right to be
represented by a lawyer; and of his responsibilities as his
own counsel.
   The court specifically emphasized the warning about
misconduct, stating:

       This is the one I want you to hear. Hear it
       loud and clear:
       “I understand the right to act in pro per is not
       a license to abuse the dignity of the court. I
       understand that the court may terminate my
       right to self-representation in the event that I
       engage in serious misconduct and obstruct
18                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

        the conduct and progress of the trial. I
        understand that in the event that happens, I
        will have to be represented by a lawyer, who
        will then take over the case at whatever stage
        it may be in.”
        Do you understand that?

     Clark twice affirmed that he understood.
     Clark also signed a document acknowledging that,
among other things, the court might terminate his right to
self-representation in the event he engaged in serious
misconduct and obstructed the conduct and progress of the
trial. The judge then appointed his two attorneys as standby
counsel, to sit in the courtroom and observe, but not to assist
Clark. The court then again warned Clark, “If you abuse the
process of the court, the minute the court feels that you have
abused its process, your pro per privileges will be revoked
and [your attorneys] will step back in[.]” Clark said that he
understood. After the court found Clark’s waiver of counsel
to be knowing and intelligent, Clark said he had “no desire”
to be his own attorney but he was “forced to.”
    From October 13, 1982 until November 1, 1982, Clark
represented himself at trial and cross-examined 26
witnesses. On November 1, 1982, the trial court denied
Clark’s motions for appointment of a law clerk and to recuse
the district attorney’s office as “frivolous.” Clark became
upset. The judge then ordered the jury back into the
courtroom and asked Clark to proceed with his examination.
Clark, in front of the jury, then stated that he “stands mute
throughout the rest of the trial.” The trial court excused the
jury and determined Clark had renounced his pro per status
“[o]n the grounds that [Clark] decided to stand mute this
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    19

morning.” The trial was continued until the next day. When
it resumed on November 2, 1982, Clark agreed to defend
himself rather than stand mute, and the trial court granted his
motion to reinstate his pro per status and privileges. Clark
then resumed his cross-examination.
    From November 2, 1982 until December 6, 1982, Clark
continued to represent himself at trial. However, after a
series of outbursts and questioning that the trial court found
improper, and after accusing the judge of various acts of
misconduct, the trial court revoked his pro per status.
    On appeal to this Court, Clark challenges the temporary
revocation of his pro per status on November 1 in light of
his “stand mute” declaration.
    The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
November 1, 1982 revocation of Clark’s self-representation
after Clark threatened to “stand mute” in front of the jury.
The court held that Clark’s conduct during the proceedings
was “manipulative, obstructive and abusive,” id. at 597; see
id. at 638 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (referring to Clark as “an
obstreperous, manipulative defendant” and the trial as a
“judge’s nightmare”) and that Clark sought to create “as
much disruption as possible,” id. at 599 (majority opinion).
    In generally addressing Clark’s claims of trial-court
error, the California Supreme Court reasoned that “[a]ny
dispassionate reading of this record” reveals that Clark “was
playing games with the court on [the Faretta] issue.” Id. at
586 (citation omitted); see id. at 599 (“[Faretta] held
generally that a defendant may represent himself. It did not
establish a game in which defendant can engage in a series
of machinations, with one misstep by the court resulting in
reversal of an otherwise fair trial.”). In support of this
conclusion, the court underscored that Clark wrote a letter
20                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

during the proceedings in which he “boasted that he had
‘gone “Pro per” at least 3 times’ and had the ‘case so fraught
with controversial Judge’s rulings it will be an appeals court
NIGHTMARE, should it ever get so far.’” Id. at 581 n.3.
The court held that Clark had “attempted to manufacture
reversible error,” id. at 586 and explained that Clark’s
“actions presented the court with a ‘judgment call’ under
combat conditions upon which we may, and must, give
deference to the trial court,” id. at 600.
     The California Supreme Court held that the trial court
“justifiably viewed [Clark’s] statement, or threat, that he
would ‘stand mute’ not as a conscious decision to simply
force the prosecution to its proof, but as part of a deliberate
course of conduct designed to cause as much disruption as
possible.” Id. at 599. Accordingly, the court held that the
trial court properly temporarily revoked Clark’s pro per
status until he chose to resume representing himself. Id. at
598–99 (internal citation omitted).
    The California Supreme Court’s conclusion that Clark’s
Faretta right was not violated was not unreasonable, and the
record supports its determination that Clark engaged in a
“deliberate course of conduct designed to create as much
disruption as possible.” Clark, 833 P.2d at 599.
    Clark had threatened to “stand mute” as a tactic before
and had instructed his attorneys to “stand mute” as a protest.
When this tactic failed, Clark readily abandoned it. The
morning after the revocation, Clark apologized, said he had
changed his mind, and asked for reinstatement of his self-
representation. The state court did not unreasonably
determine that if Clark had genuinely wanted to “stand
mute,” he would have done so whether he was self-
represented or not. Rather, after a cooling-off period, Clark
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    21

abandoned his stand-mute stance, asked for                self-
representation, and affirmatively defended himself.
     On this record, the California Supreme Court’s holding
that Clark’s stand-mute stance and other tactics were
disingenuous was not unreasonable. See id. at 599–600
(holding that Faretta “did not establish a game in which a
defendant can engage in a series of machinations, with one
misstep by the court resulting in a reversal of an otherwise
fair trial,” or “a charade in which a defendant can continually
manipulate the proceedings in the hope of eventually
injecting reversible error into the case no matter how the
court rules”); Faretta, 522 U.S. at 834 n.46; McKaskle, 465
U.S. at 173.
    The state court’s decision to consider Clark’s stand-mute
statement in light of the record as a whole was not an
unreasonable application of Faretta, which permits the
termination of self-representation when a defendant
“deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
misconduct.” 522 U.S. at 834 n.46.
    In sum, the district court properly concluded that the
California Supreme Court decision was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law as determined
by the United States Supreme Court.
                              V
    The district court properly concluded that the California
Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Clark’s Marsden
rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,
as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
effective representation by counsel. See Strickland v.
22                    CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). However, a
defendant is not entitled to an appointed attorney of his
choice, see Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,
491 U.S. 617, 624 (1989), nor is he entitled to a “meaningful
relationship” with counsel, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13–
14 (1983).
    Under California law, a motion for the appointment of
substitute counsel, typically based on a claim “that appointed
counsel’s representation has in some significant measure
fallen below the level required by the Sixth Amendment,”
Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc), is called a “Marsden motion.” The “ultimate
constitutional question” upon review in federal court “is not
whether the trial court ‘abused its discretion,’” but whether
the denial of a Marsden motion “actually violated [the
petitioner’s] constitutional rights” because the conflict
“bec[a]me so great that it resulted in a total lack of
communication or other significant impediment that resulted
in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that
required by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1026.
     A defendant is “entitled to substitute counsel if an
‘irreconcilable conflict’ between a defendant and his counsel
prevents counsel from rendering effective assistance.”
Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th 904, 938 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Schell, 218 F.3d at 1025). A defendant is not
entitled to substitution of counsel, however, because of his
own refusal to cooperate with counsel due to a “dislike or
distrust” of counsel, Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1211
(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), or based on a conflict of his “own
making,” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026.
   “An irreconcilable conflict” claim has been recognized
“only where there is a complete breakdown in
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    23

communication between the attorney and client, and the
breakdown prevents effective assistance of counsel.”
Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886. “Disagreements over strategic[]
or tactical decisions do not rise to [the] level of a complete
breakdown in communication.” Carter, 946 F.3d at 507–08
(quoting Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886). Indeed, “a lawyer may
properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial
even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or even
explicit disapproval.” Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 n.8 (quoting
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)).
     “To determine whether a conflict rises to the level of
‘irreconcilable,’” this Court “looks to three factors: 1) the
extent of the conflict; 2) the adequacy of the inquiry by the
trial court; and 3) the timeliness of the motion for
substitution of counsel.” Stenson, 504 F.3d at 886 (citing
Moore, 159 F.3d at 1158–59). A trial court’s inquiry into
counsel’s performance on a motion to substitute counsel
should amount to “such necessary inquiry as might ease the
defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Garcia, 924 F.2d 925, 926 (9th Cir.
1991)). It should also provide a “sufficient basis for
reaching an informed decision” as to whether new counsel
should be appointed. Id. (quoting United States v.
McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1986)). The
Supreme Court “has never held that an irreconcilable
conflict with one’s attorney constitutes a per se denial of the
right to effective counsel.” Carter, 946 F.3d at 508.
    The California Supreme Court held that Clark’s
September 20, 1982 “diatribes” about his lead counsel did
not constitute a Marsden motion to discharge and substitute
counsel. Clark, 833 P.2d at 590. The court noted that Clark
did not seek to substitute counsel or complain about his other
24                   CLARK V. BROOMFIELD

attorney—who he thought was “doing a fine job”—but
sought only to discharge his lead counsel. Id.
    In this appeal, Clark does not claim that the trial court
was required to substitute counsel, nor does he identify an
act of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel or claim that
the trial court failed to conduct any hearing. Rather, as in his
state habeas claim, he asserts that an irreconcilable conflict
existed with his lead counsel and that the trial court was
required “to conduct an evidentiary hearing to decide
whether the conflict rose to a Sixth Amendment violation.”
That claim is foreclosed by our decision in Carter.
     On direct appeal in Carter, the California Supreme Court
denied the petitioner’s claim that “the trial court erred by
failing to adequately inquire into the conflict” and by failing
to appoint new counsel. 946 F.3d at 506–07. On federal
habeas review, we deferred to that ruling because the
Supreme Court “has never held that an irreconcilable
conflict with one’s attorney constitutes a per se denial of the
right to effective counsel.” Id. at 508.
    Here, Clark asserts only that his conflict with his lead
counsel “guaranteed an inadequate defense presentation,”
but he neither raises a claim of ineffective assistance nor
identifies a single act of ineffectiveness. Accordingly,
because Clark’s claim is precisely the kind of per se claim
rejected by Carter as ungrounded in any clearly established
Supreme Court authority, “[t]his proves fatal to [Clark’s]
claim.” Id.
    Clark’s request for a federal evidentiary hearing as to the
conflict also fails. First, an evidentiary hearing is precluded
by Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011), which
generally limits federal habeas review to the state-court
record. See Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 993–94
                     CLARK V. BROOMFIELD                    25

(9th Cir. 2013). Second, a hearing is precluded by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e) because Clark failed to develop any additional
facts at trial and solely raised the claim on appeal. See Deere
v. Cullen, 718 F.3d 1124, 1148 (9th Cir. 2013). Third, Clark
has not alleged facts that, if proven true, would entitle him
to relief. See Rich v. Calderon, 187 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (9th
Cir. 1999). Fourth, because the Supreme Court has never
recognized a Sixth Amendment claim based on an
irreconcilable conflict in the absence of resulting
ineffectiveness, a hearing would be futile. See Carter, 946
F.3d at 508. Thus, Clark’s substitute-counsel claim fails
under AEDPA review.
    Therefore, the district court properly concluded that
Clark’s Marsden rights were not violated, nor was the
California Supreme Court decision contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law
as determined by the United States Supreme Court.
                              VI
    In sum, the district court correctly concluded that the
California Supreme Court’s decision was not, in any respect,
contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law as determined by the United States
Supreme Court. We affirm the judgment of the district court
denying federal habeas relief.
   AFFIRMED.