Court Opinion

ID: 9632472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:16:00.555602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:16.982733
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately only to point out the fundamentally unfair effect of former article 42.12, section 5(b) that, in my opinion, amounts to a denial of due process.1 The statute provides no limits on the trial court’s authority to adjudicate a person who has been placed on deferred adjudication community supervision.2 The State is required to offer no proof, and there is no requirement that a person violate a condition of community supervision before the trial court revokes community supervision and adjudicates guilt.3 Although a defendant is entitled to a hearing, the hearing is limited to a determination by the court of *585whether to proceed to adjudication.4 There is no requirement that the hearing include evidence of a violation of a condition of community supervision, and there is no possibility of appealing the trial court’s determination.5 A statute such as former article 42.12, section 5(b) permits the very type of open-ended, unfettered discretion condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia,6
In the case now before this court, it is clear that the trial court revoked Appellant’s community supervision and adjudicated his guilt even though the State did not prove the violation alleged in the petition to adjudicate. This court recognizes the absence of grounds to support revocation and adjudication, yet we are forced to sit idly by and tacitly approve the clear denial of due process allowed by the former statute.

. As the majority points out, this section was amended effective June 15, 2007. All citations to the statute in this concurring opinion will be to the former statute.

. See TexGode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon 2006) (former version).

. See id.

. Id.

. See id.

. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).