Court Opinion

ID: 9698893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:03:15.366692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:44.400813
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
In my view this matter is controlled by this court’s decision in Fox v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company, 314 Pa.Super. 559, 461 A.2d 299 (1983). In that case the facts as set forth by our court are as follows:
... Mrs. Phyllis Fox was in bed in a second floor bedroom at her residence in Red Hill, Pennsylvania. Mrs. Fox’ sixteen-year-old daughter and two of her daughter’s girlfriends were asleep in the ground floor living room. At about that time, a motor vehicle driven by James A. King, Jr. crashed into the side of the home and came to rest in the livingroom. Upon hearing the crash, which sounded to her like an explosion, Mrs. Fox, fearing for her children’s safety, immediately rose from the bed, started *224down the steps to the living room, tripped over debris which had been thrown on the steps by the crash, fell and was injured.
Under that factual situation our court concluded “We hold that the injury in this case arose out of the use of a motor vehicle and, therefore, Mrs. Fox was entitled to no-fault benefits.” 314 Pa.Super. at 565, 461 A.2d 299.
I see no functional difference between the factual situation in Fox and the factual situation in this case. Further, the Majority’s reference to Fox causes me to conclude that there is no distinction between the two and that Fox is not clearly inopposite as the Majority suggests. In Fox as in this case, the accidents in both cases caused the claimants to leave the safety of their bed and proceed to investigate the noise caused by the accident. It was this factor which began the movement of these people and caused their injury. Any attempt to distinguish the case is, in my judgment, straining. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer.