Court Opinion

ID: 9487257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:11:58.24538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:10.221164
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
With respect to Armstrong’s Title VII claims, I have concluded for somewhat different reasons that the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Flowers Hospital should be affirmed. My review of the record persuades me that Armstrong has not established either differential treatment or disparate impact. Armstrong has pointed to several policies of the hospital to support an argument in that the Hospital makes accommodation for risks comparable to the risks Armstrong, as a pregnant woman, faces in treating AIDS patients. Several of the policies to which Armstrong points do make accommodations for pregnant women. However, such policies could not constitute evidence of discrimination on account of pregnancy because those policies benefit pregnant employees. In other words, it cannot be discrimination on account of pregnancy to make accommodations for some risks faced by pregnant women, but not all. The only other policy which Armstrong suggests is comparable is the policy that employees with open lesions are not required to attend AIDS patients. However, my examination of this summary judgment record reveals that Armstrong has faded to create a material factual issue as to whether the risk which she faces is comparable to the risk faced by an employee with open lesions. Thus, Armstrong has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, either as to differential treatment or as to disparate impact. I also agree with Judge Conway that the law does not require preferential treatment.