Court Opinion

ID: 9380770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 14:04:37.719886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.402525
License: Public Domain

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

               MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
                        (Memorandum Web Opinion)

                                  SCROGGINS V. MOSBRUCKER

  NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
 AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

                              SKYLER L. SCROGGINS, APPELLANT,
                                               V.

                             MELISSA K. MOSBRUCKER, APPELLEE.

                            Filed March 21, 2023.    No. A-22-282.

       Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: DUANE C. DOUGHERTY, Judge.
Affirmed.
       George T. Babcock, of Law Offices of Evelyn N. Babcock, for appellant.
       Joan Watke, of Watke, Polk & Sena, L.L.O., for appellee.

       PIRTLE, Chief Judge, and MOORE and WELCH, Judges.
       MOORE, Judge.
                                       INTRODUCTION
        Skyler L. Scroggins filed an action in the district court for Douglas County to establish
paternity, custody, parenting time, and child support. A few months after the commencement of
the proceedings, the child moved with her mother, Melissa K. Mosbrucker, to Washington and
then to Idaho where she has remained. After an evidentiary hearing the court found that while it
had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA),
Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and Idaho was a more appropriate forum. The court later
dismissed the case on its own motion after Mosbrucker produced evidence that she had filed an
adoption petition in Idaho. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and its dismissal of Scroggins’ complaint,
we affirm.

                                              -1-
                                    STATEMENT OF FACTS
        Mosbrucker gave birth to a child in July 2016 in Missouri. Mosbrucker lived in Nebraska
with the child from August 2016 until July 2019 when the child moved with Mosbrucker and
Mosbrucker’s husband to Washington for the husband’s professional advancement. The child,
Mosbrucker, and Mosbrucker’s husband then moved to Idaho in February 2020 for a job
opportunity for Mosbrucker. The child has since remained in Idaho.
        Both parties concede through various pleadings that Scroggins is the biological father of
the child. However, the district court did not make a determination regarding the relief sought in
Scroggins’ complaint. Much of the procedural history of the present case involves Scroggins’
multiple attempts to serve Mosbrucker with his complaint and whether the district court had
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
Initial Complaint and Service Attempts.
        On April 18, 2019, Scroggins filed a complaint for paternity, custody, parenting time, and
child support. Scroggins alleged that Mosbrucker had filed a petition for adoption in April 2018 in
Douglas County Court where she had made “judicial admissions” that Scroggins was the biological
father of their minor daughter. Mosbrucker’s petition sought an adoption of the child by her
husband and was later dismissed. In his complaint, Scroggins requested that the district court order
genetic testing for the purpose of establishing paternity, make a finding of paternity, grant
Scroggins custody, and make a child support determination. Scroggins also sought that the matter
be heard by the same Douglas County Court judge who had been assigned Mosbrucker’s adoption
petition.
        On April 30, 2019, the district court entered an order denying Scroggins’ request that the
particular county court judge be appointed to hear his complaint. The district court further found
that the matter was to remain under the jurisdiction of the Douglas County District Court.
        On July 10, 2019, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at the
address of an apartment in Omaha, Nebraska. A service record filed on July 17 reflects three
unsuccessful attempts to serve Mosbrucker on July 12, 16, and 17.
        On August 23, 2019, Scroggins filed a motion for alternative service, noting the multiple
service attempts on Mosbrucker at her Omaha address and requesting that the district court allow
service by mail and by leaving a copy of the summons at Mosbrucker’s address. On August 26,
the district court entered an order granting Scroggins’ motion for alternative service. On August
28, Scroggins filed a praecipe for alternative service in accordance with the district court’s order.
A proof of mailing was filed on August 30 and a service record filed on September 3 reflects that
a service processor posted a copy of the summons on Mosbrucker’s apartment door.
        On November 27, 2019, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at
an Idaho address. A service record filed on January 23, 2020, reflects two unsuccessful attempts
to serve Mosbrucker on December 10 and 13, 2019.
        On March 3, 2020, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at a
Washington address. A service record filed on May 22 reflects three unsuccessful attempts to serve
Mosbrucker on May 7 and twice on May 13.

                                                -2-
        On July 24, 2020, Scroggins filed a praecipe for personal service on Mosbrucker at another
Idaho address. A service record filed on August 6 reflects that Mosbrucker was personally served
on July 30.
        On August 13, 2020, Mosbrucker filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that because service
did not occur within 6 months from the filing of the complaint as required by Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-217 (Cum. Supp. 2022), Scroggins’ complaint should be dismissed. A hearing on the matter
was held on September 8.
        In an order entered on September 17, 2020, the district court denied Mosbrucker’s motion
to dismiss. The court found that Scroggins attempted service at Mosbrucker’s last known address
in Omaha and Mosbrucker actually resided at that address at the time of the attempted service.
Scroggins then obtained appropriate substitute and constructive service. Thus, the court concluded
that the alternative service was proper and timely.
UCCJEA Jurisdiction and Forum Analysis.
        On December 3, 2020, Scroggins filed several motions including a motion for genetic
testing, motion for temporary visitation and support, motion for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, and motion for an UCCJEA order finding Nebraska to be the home state of the child.
        On August 4, 2021, Mosbrucker filed a motion to dismiss. The motion noted that her
adoption petition was not actually dismissed until August 9, 2019, after Scroggins had filed his
complaint. Because Scroggins’ complaint was filed while the adoption petition was still before the
county court, Mosbrucker alleged that pursuant to the Nebraska Court Rules of Pleading in Civil
Cases the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the matter
and the complaint should be dismissed.
        Mosbrucker also alleged in her motion to dismiss that under the UCCJEA, Idaho was the
home state of the child because the child had moved out of Nebraska with Mosbrucker in the
summer of 2019. A hearing on the matter was held on September 7, 2021.
        In an order entered on October 15, 2021, the district court denied Mosbrucker’s motion to
dismiss. The court found that the date of service of the initial complaint was completed on August
30, 2019; approximately 21 days after the formal dismissal of the adoption petition. Thus, while
the district court may not have had subject matter jurisdiction over the child on the date the
complaint was filed, the court obtained jurisdiction on the date that the adoption petition was
dismissed and also had jurisdiction on the date of service. The court additionally found that
Nebraska was the home state of the child under the UCCJEA at the time the adoption petition was
dismissed, as the child had only been removed from Nebraska for a total of 19 days prior to the
date of service. However, the court also noted that the child had been absent from Nebraska for
over 2 years and there could exist the question as to whether or not Nebraska was an inconvenient
forum under the UCCJEA or is still the home state.
        On October 28, 2021, Mosbrucker filed a motion regarding the UCCJEA which requested
that the district court find Nebraska to be an inconvenient forum, and alleged that Idaho was the
home state of the child. An evidentiary hearing on the matter was held on February 9, 2022. Both
Mosbrucker and Scroggins provided testimony which will be referenced as necessary in our
analysis.

                                                -3-
        In an order filed on March 3, 2022, the district court first found that when Scroggins’ initial
complaint was filed in April 2019, the child resided in the State of Nebraska. Thus for purposes of
the UCCJEA, “on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,” the court found Nebraska to
be the home state of the child. The court then analyzed the relevant statutory factors and concluded
that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum and that the State of Idaho would be a more appropriate
forum. The court ordered the proceeding to be stayed on the condition that another child custody
proceeding be promptly commenced within 60 days from the date of the order in the State of Idaho.
        On March 23, 2022, the district court filed an order dismissing the matter on its own
motion. The court noted that it had received a file stamped copy of a complaint for judgment of
adoption filed by Mosbrucker in the State of Idaho. In accordance with its March 3 order, the court
found that the matter was to be dismissed without prejudice.
        Scroggins appeals.
                                   ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
         Scroggins assigns, reordered, that the district court erred in (1) interpreting the UCCJEA
to allow forum non conveniens to trump home state jurisdiction for the purposes of making an
initial custody determination and finding Nebraska to be an inconvenient forum; (2) failing to
apply the doctrine of jurisdictional priority; (3) refusing to require Mosbrucker’s husband to
testify; and (4) failing to appoint a particular Douglas County Court judge to hear the case.
Scroggins also assigns that the district court committed plain error in failing to recognize him as
the child’s legal father as a consequence of paternity acknowledgements.
                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
        The question whether jurisdiction should be exercised under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed
by an appellate court de novo on the record for abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship of S.T., 300
Neb. 72, 912 N.W.2d 262 (2018).
                                            ANALYSIS
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
        Before we address Scroggins’ assignments of errors, we first determine whether the district
court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
        Jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding is governed exclusively by the UCCJEA.
Wolter v. Fortuna, 27 Neb. App. 166, 928 N.W.2d 416 (2019). “Child custody proceeding” is
defined under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1227(4) (Reissue 2016) of the UCCJEA as a proceeding in
which legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue and includes
a proceeding for paternity in which the issue of custody or visitation may appear. Id. The present
case is governed by the UCCJEA, as Scroggins’ initial complaint sought to establish paternity as
well as an order regarding custody of the child. See Wolter v. Fortuna, supra.
        Having decided that the UCCJEA applies, we must now determine whether the district
court properly found that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding. In considering
whether jurisdiction exists under the UCCJEA, a jurisdictional question that does not involve a
factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law, which requires an appellate

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court to reach a conclusion independent from the trial court. Id. Statutory interpretation is a
question of law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. Id.
         For a state to exercise jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, it must either be the home
state as defined by the UCCJEA or fall under limited exceptions to the home state requirement
specified by the act. Id. Generally speaking, § 43-1238(a)(1) grants jurisdiction to the home state
of the child and § 43-1238(a)(2) through (4) sets out the exceptions under which a court will have
jurisdiction, even if it is not in the child’s home state. The UCCJEA defines “[h]ome state” as “the
state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive
months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” § 43-1227(7). As
used in the UCCJEA, “[c]ommencement” of a proceeding means “the filing of the first pleading
in a proceeding.” § 43-1227(5).
         In the present case, Nebraska was the child’s home state. Mosbrucker testified at the
evidentiary hearing that the child had lived in Nebraska from August 2016 to July 2019. The first
pleading in this proceeding was Scroggins’ complaint for paternity, which he filed in April 2019.
Because the child lived in Nebraska for well over six consecutive months before the filing of the
complaint for paternity, the district court properly found that Nebraska had subject matter
jurisdiction over the proceeding under § 43-1238(a)(1).
Inconvenient Forum.
         Scroggins assigns that the district court erred by interpreting the UCCJEA as allowing
forum non conveniens to trump home state jurisdiction when making an initial custody
determination. Scroggins argues that because Nebraska was the child’s home state at the
commencement of the proceeding, the district court was under no obligation to consider whether
Idaho was a more convenient forum.
         A court of this state which has jurisdiction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1244(a) (Reissue
2016) of the UCCJEA to make a child custody determination may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction at any time if it determines that it is an “inconvenient forum under the circumstances
and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” See § 43-1244(a). As a general rule,
a decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA for the reason of an inconvenient
forum is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. Watson v. Watson, 272 Neb. 647, 724 N.W.2d
24 (2006). Clearly, the statute allows a court which is the home state of the child to, at any time,
decline to exercise jurisdiction on the basis that it is an inconvenient forum. We reject Scroggins’
argument in this regard.
         Scroggins also argues that the district court erred in finding Nebraska to be an inconvenient
forum. Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of this state shall consider
whether it is appropriate for a court of another state to exercise jurisdiction. § 43-1244(b). For this
purpose, the court shall allow the parties to submit information and shall consider all relevant
factors, including:
                 (1) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
         and which state could best protect the parties and the child;
                 (2) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
                 (3) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that would
         assume jurisdiction;
                 (4) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;

                                                 -5-
                (5) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction;
                (6) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending litigation,
       including testimony of the child;
                (7) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
       procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
                (8) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the pending
       litigation.

See § 43-1244(b).
         Pursuant to § 43-1244(b), the district court held an evidentiary hearing on February 9, 2022,
where both Mosbrucker and Scroggins testified. In the court’s March 3 order, it made explicit
findings regarding the factors considered in § 43-1244(b)(1)-(8).
         Regarding the first factor, the district court found no evidence of domestic violence
between the parties. Considering the second factor, the length of time the child has resided outside
this state, the court noted Mosbrucker’s testimony that the child was permanently removed from
Nebraska in July 2019. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, the child was 5 years old and had
remained outside of Nebraska for 2 years and 7 months. The court found that period to be a
“significant and extensive period of time.”
         In considering the third factor, the distance between the court in this state and the court in
the state that would assume jurisdiction, the district court observed that Scroggins had never
himself resided in Nebraska. The court noted that the distance between Missouri, where Scroggins
resides, and Nebraska as compared to Missouri and Idaho is greatly different. However, the court
concluded that the additional distance between Missouri and Idaho was not an “insurmountable
barrier” for Scroggins to be able to pursue a paternity complaint in Idaho should the case be moved.
         The district court did not make any findings regarding the fourth factor, the relative
financial circumstances of the parties. We note that at the evidentiary hearing Mosbrucker testified
that her annual income is $76,000 and Scroggins listed his annual income as $21,600 in his poverty
affidavit.
         The district court determined that the fifth factor, any agreement of the parties as to which
state should assume jurisdiction, was not applicable to the matter.
         The district court found the sixth factor, the nature and location of the evidence required to
resolve the pending litigation, to be a factor of “great weight . . .” The court observed that should
a custody trial be held in Nebraska, there would exist no witnesses or other evidence relevant in
making a custody determination within the state. According to the court, the witnesses relevant to
a custody determination would include current teachers, medical providers, Mosbrucker’s family,
friends, and colleagues who reside in Idaho, the child’s friends and the parents of those friends,
and to some degree the child herself. Further, the court noted that all evidence pertaining to the
child’s daily life, including her activities and routines, would all be within the State of Idaho.
         Mosbrucker testified that she is married and through her marriage has two additional
children who are younger than the child at issue in this case. The district court found that
Mosbrucker’s husband’s employment information within the State of Idaho as well as evidence
concerning the relationships between the child and her two younger half-siblings would be relevant
to a custody determination. Again, this evidence would be within the State of Idaho.

                                                 -6-
         Neither Mosbrucker nor Scroggins have any family residing in Omaha, Nebraska.
Mosbrucker did briefly testify that her husband’s family resides in Nebraska, but did not state
whether her in-laws have any significant involvement in the child’s life.
         The seventh factor considered by the district court was the ability of the court of each state
to decide the issue expeditiously and the procedures necessary to present the evidence. The court
found that due to all relevant evidence existing in Idaho, a court in the State of Idaho would more
expeditiously handle the custody matter, which would benefit the child. The court also noted that
it was given no evidence regarding any procedural distinctions between the Nebraska and Idaho
courts regarding the presentation of evidence at trial.
         The district court found the eighth and final factor, the familiarity of the court of each state
with the facts and issues in the pending litigation, related directly to the sixth factor discussed
above. The court found that the Idaho courts would be more familiar with the environment the
child has been raised in for the past several years.
         Based on the foregoing evidence that was presented at the evidentiary hearing, we conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Nebraska is an inconvenient
forum and that the State of Idaho is a more appropriate forum. The court properly considered the
relevant factors under § 43-1244(b).
         Scroggins also argues that the Idaho adoption petition filed by Mosbrucker is not a custody
proceeding under the UCCJEA. Scroggins correctly notes that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1228 (Reissue
2016), states that the UCCJEA “does not govern an adoption proceeding. . .”
         However, Scroggins concedes that Mosbrucker’s petition also requests that the Idaho court
terminate Scroggins’ parental rights to the child. Section 43-1227 states that a child custody
proceeding under the UCCJEA includes, “a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse,
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic
violence,” in which the issues of legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with respect to a
child is an issue. See § 43-1227 (emphasis added). The termination of Scroggins’ parental rights
would directly implicate his ability to seek custody or visitation of the child. Thus, we find the
relief requested in Mosbrucker’s adoption petition incorporates a child custody proceeding under
the UCCJEA. This assignment of error fails.
Doctrine of Jurisdictional Priority.
        Scroggins next assigns that the district court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of
jurisdictional priority. Scroggins argues that the district court “surrendered its priority jurisdiction
for the adjudication of custody to an Idaho court for the adjudication of an adoption.” Brief for
appellant at 31.
        Under the doctrine of jurisdictional priority, when different state courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction over the same subject matter, basic principles of judicial administration
require that the first court to acquire jurisdiction should retain it to the exclusion of another court.
Brinkman v. Brinkman, 302 Neb. 315, 923 N.W.2d 380 (2019). In Brinkman, the Nebraska
Supreme Court determined that the county court had jurisdictional priority over the probate matter
at issue, as opposed to the district court in a declaratory judgment action concerning the same
issue. Thus, this doctrine was applied to two courts in the same state and did not involve a
jurisdictional question between two states.

                                                  -7-
         Scroggins cites to Jesse B. v. Tylee H., 293 Neb. 973, 883 N.W.2d 1 (2016) for the
proposition that the doctrine of jurisdictional priority should apply to cases under the UCCJEA.
We disagree. In Jesse B., the Nebraska Supreme Court did not address the UCCJEA. Rather, it
determined that the district court erred in failing to give full faith and credit to Ohio’s determination
of the appellant’s paternity, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1406 (Reissue 2016). The court
further found that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appellant’s constitutional
challenges to Nebraska’s adoption statutes under the jurisdictional priority doctrine, rather than
the county court in the adoption proceeding, since the district court was the first court to exercise
jurisdiction. The case therefore contemplated the doctrine of jurisdictional priority between two
courts of the same state rather than two courts of different states.
         Moreover, a review of our appellate case law reveals no cases where the doctrine of
jurisdictional priority has been applied to the UCCJEA. As such, the district court did not err in
failing to apply the doctrine of jurisdictional priority. This assignment of error fails.
Lack of Testimony by Mosbrucker’s Husband.
         Scroggins assigns that the district court erred in refusing to require Mosbrucker’s husband
to testify at the evidentiary hearing although he was present in the courtroom.
         At the start of the evidentiary hearing, Scroggins indicated that he planned to call both
Mosbrucker’s husband and the husband’s father, who were present at the hearing, as witnesses.
Mosbrucker responded that both men had not been subpoenaed and so should be free to leave the
hearing. Scroggins then asked the district court for an order directing the men to remain in the
building so that they could be called as witnesses. The district court responded, “I don’t have a
subpoena, so I’m not going to order them to stay here. If they desire to leave, I guess that’s up to
them if that’s how we want to do this.”
         Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103(1)(b) (Reissue 2016), Neb. Evid. R. 103(1)(b), error
may not be predicated upon a ruling which excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party
is affected, and the substance of the evidence was made known to the judge by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. State v. Schreiner, 276 Neb. 393,
754 N.W.2d 742 (2008). So, to predicate error upon a ruling of the court refusing to permit a
witness to testify, or to answer a specific question, the record must show an offer to prove the facts
sought to be elicited. Id. The offer need not be a detailed recitation of the excluded testimony, but
simply enough to provide the general nature of the testimony so that an appellate court can properly
review its effect. Birkel v. Hassebrook Farm Serv., 219 Neb. 286, 363 N.W.2d 148 (1985).
         During the evidentiary hearing, Scroggins made no offer of proof concerning the proposed
testimony to be elicited from Mosbrucker’s husband. Though Scroggins now argues that
Mosbrucker’s husband was a critical witness, on the record presented on appeal, we are unable to
ascertain why Scroggins wanted to call the husband, what testimony he could possibly have
provided concerning the child, or how not being allowed to call him could have prejudiced
Scroggins’ complaint. This assignment of error fails.

                                                  -8-
Denying Appointment of County Court Judge.
       Scroggins assigns that the district court erred by refusing to appoint a particular Douglas
County Court judge who had previously heard Mosbrucker’s April 2018 petition for adoption.
Scroggins’ 2019 complaint for paternity specifically requested the judge be assigned to the case.
       Scroggins relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2740 (Reissue 2016), which provides in part:
                (2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, in domestic relations
       matters, a party shall file his or her petition or complaint and all other court filings with the
       clerk of the district court. The party shall state in the petition or complaint whether such
       party requests that the proceeding be heard by a county court judge or by a district court
       judge. If the party requests the case be heard by a county court judge, the county court
       judge assigned to hear cases in the county in which the matter is filed at the time of the
       hearing is deemed appointed by the district court and the consent of the county court judge
       is not required. Such proceeding is considered a district court proceeding, even if heard by
       a county court judge, and an order or judgment of the county court in a domestic relations
       matter has the force and effect of a district court judgment. The testimony in a domestic
       relations matter heard before a county court judge shall be preserved as provided in section
       25-2732.
                (3) In addition to the jurisdiction provided for paternity or custody determinations
       under subsection (2) of this section, a county court or separate juvenile court which already
       has jurisdiction over the child whose paternity or custody is to be determined has
       jurisdiction over such paternity or custody determination.

        Scroggins argues that because Mosbrucker’s adoption petition concerning the child was
already pending before the county court at the time he filed his paternity complaint, the county
court judge who presided over the adoption proceedings should have heard his custody action
under § 25-2740. However, the statute does not allow a litigant to request a particular county court
judge as Mosbrucker did here. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Scoggins’ request that
a particular Douglas County Court judge be assigned to the case. This assignment of error fails.
Recognition as Legal Father.
        Finally, Scroggins assigns that the district court committed plain error in failing to
recognize him as the child’s legal father as a consequence of an acknowledgement. Scroggins
asserts that his April 2019 verified complaint for paternity should be considered an
acknowledgement of paternity, and that Mosbrucker also signed notarized acknowledgments of
paternity as part of her Nebraska adoption action. He argues that these acknowledgments operate
as a legal finding and he should be recognized as the child’s father as a matter of law.
         Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it
uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process.
Steffy v. Steffy, 287 Neb. 529, 843 N.W.2d 655 (2014).
        Scroggins is correct that the establishment of paternity by acknowledgment is the
equivalent to the establishment of paternity by judicial proceeding. See Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 281
Neb. 979, 800 N.W.2d 249 (2011). However, the district court never reached a final determination
regarding custody, parenting time, and support as the court ultimately found that Nebraska was

                                                 -9-
not a convenient forum for these proceedings and declined to exercise its jurisdiction. Scroggins
is able to assert that he is the child’s legal father in the Idaho proceedings which have been initiated
by Mosbrucker. Therefore, we find that no plain error has occurred.
                                           CONCLUSION
       We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Nebraska to be an
inconvenient forum and in dismissing Scroggins’ complaint. Having considered and rejected
Scroggins’ other assignments of error, the order of the district court is affirmed.
                                                                                         AFFIRMED.

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