Court Opinion

ID: 9553802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:35:24.275522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:17.164818
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.*
(dissenting) — I concur generally in Judge Wicks’ dissent, and would add the following:
The primary question in this case is a constitutional one. Initiatives, including initiative 282, are subject to the same scrutiny and limitations as any other enactment, and have at times been declared unconstitutional. See State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 P. 92 (1916); Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933); Gilman v. State Tax Comm'n 32 Wn.2d 480, 202 P.2d 443 (1949); Ford v. Logan, 79 Wn.2d 147, 483 P.2d 1247 (1971).
The appropriation bill, chapter 137, first extraordinary session, passed by the state Senate and House of Representatives, and signed by the Governor April 24, 1973, substantially embodied the recommendations of the duly and legally appointed state committee on salaries created by statute. RCW 43.03.027-.047. See State ex rel. Helm v. Kramer, 82 Wn.2d 307, 510 P.2d 1110 (1973), for personnel of the committee. This committee was created and acted before the convening of the legislature that passed chapter 137, including section 110, against which initiative 282 was directed. The measure contained the usual emergency clause found in budget bills, providing for the support and orderly functioning of state government.
If there is a conflict between the constitutional power *484specifically vested in the duly elected state legislature, pursuant to amendment 20 of the state constitution, and the nebulous reservation of power claimed by the proponents of initiative 282, within the framework, background and history of this case (and there is: amendment 7, article 2, section 1(a) and (b) state constitution), the latter must give way to the former; the latter being an unconstitutional attempt, under the guise of an initiative, to deprive the constitutional legislature of its specific constitutional power, by a tortuous interpretation and application of parts of amendment 7. Kramer has held this cannot be done by referendum. Does greater constitutional power repose in the approach by initiative?
My answer is no. It is an attempt to do the same thing. Where will it end? It should end here. We should hold that the specificity of the constitutional power vested in the duly elected legislature clearly outweighs, and is paramount, in this case, under any interpretation of the law, to the power claimed reserved under the initiative provisions of the state constitution.
To vacillate and procrastinate at this stage is to invite chaos and confusion. The majority seems willing to take that chance. I do not think we should.
That uncertainty exists in the minds of the court majority is reflected in a quotation from their opinion:
We reject the contention . . . that appropriate constitutional provisions do not apply to initiatives. To do otherwise would be a recognition that we have an initiative process “governed by men and not by law.” Nothing in this opinion is to be interpreted as opening a Pandora’s box, releasing a runaway, uncontrolled initiative process.
In my opinion that is just what the majority is doing, notwithstanding the disclaimer. The latent fear or possibility implied in the foregoing quotation has become a reality, and an invitation to do likewise in reference to any act of the legislature pertaining to the budget, even though the latter in many instances is predicated upon the recommendation, through the Governor, of a statutorily appointed *485state committee on salaries. It means that through an initiative, the whole or any part of a given budget dealing with salaries can be amended or nullified. This will result in the breakdown of the entire legislative system, an end surely not contemplated or intended by those who desire to maintain the orderly, albeit, sometimes slow, processes of the law.
To use the power of the initiative process in that way, in my opinion, is unconstitutional, and should not be sanctioned by this court in this case.
I dissent.

 Justice Kelly is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38).