Court Opinion

ID: 9778450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:05:01.470289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:09.259191
License: Public Domain

DALLY, Judge,
concurring.
The prosecuting attorney should have been aware of our prior opinion in this case, McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), and of the need to either secure the necessary witness or to reindict. Moreover, when the prosecuting attorney did recognize his untenable position, he did not seek a continuance or attempt to lay a predicate for the admission of the witness’ testimony at the original trial. See Raley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Galvan v. State, 461 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). Under the circumstances, I must agree that there was no manifest necessity to dismiss the April 7, 1975, proceeding. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1962); Pizano v. State, 20 Tex.App. 139 (1886).
I write separately to emphasize that while a dismissal due to the absence of a prosecution witness is subject to strict scrutiny when determining whether a subsequent prosecution is barred by jeopardy, there is no mandatory rule; each case must turn on its own facts. In Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), the United States Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Black, spoke as follows:
“We are urged to apply the Cornero [v. United States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931)] interpretation of the ‘urgent necessity’ rule here. We are asked to adopt the Cornero rule under which petitioner contends the absence of witnesses can never justify discontinuance of a trial. Such a rigid formula is inconsistent with the guiding principles of the [United States v.] Perez [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824)] decision to which we adhere. Those principles command courts in considering whether a trial should be terminated without judgment to take ‘all circumstances into account’ and thereby forbid the mechanical application of an abstract formula. The value of the Perez principles thus lies in their capacity for informed application under widely different circumstances without injury to defendants or to the public interest.” 336 U.S. at 691, 69 S.Ct. at 838.
Also, not only had the jury been sworn but the appellant had entered his plea and evidence had been received when the State’s, motion to dismiss was granted. Under the holding of this Court prior to Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), jeopardy had attached. Ochoa v. State, 492 S.W.2d 576 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Rameriz v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 352 S.W.2d 131 (1961).
I concur in the reversal of the judgment.