Court Opinion

ID: 9895162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-05 07:10:44.248048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:24.357725
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and Memorandum Opinion filed October
31, 2023.

                                      In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-22-00724-CV

  WAYNE DOLCEFINO AND DOLCEFINO COMMUNICATIONS, LLC
   D/B/A DOLCEFINO CONSULTING AND HAMZA ALI, Appellants
                                        V.

 AZHAR M. CHAUDHARY; AZHAR M. CHAUDHARY LAW FIRM, PC,
                       Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 458th District Court
                            Fort Bend County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 22-DCV-292633

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      While a fee dispute between an attorney and client remained ongoing, the
client contacted a media consultant to report his version of the representation,
purportedly to warn the Houston-area immigrant population.

      Three events followed: (1) The media consultant released a YouTube video
about the attorney, featuring excerpts of various statements by the client about the
attorney, narrated by the media consultant, (2) the client and media consultant or
his representatives contacted other past clients of the attorney to whom both made
statements about the client’s case with the attorney and their own cases handled by
the attorney, and (3) the client and the media consultant separately confronted the
attorney at his children’s bus stop and made various statements to the attorney in
front of other parents and children.

      As result, the attorney filed a lawsuit against the client and media consultant,
including among others, claims for defamation, assault, and civil conspiracy. Both
defendants filed motions to dismiss under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act
(TCPA) Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.001 et seq. This is an appeal from an
order denying their two motions to dismiss. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Appellant Hamzah Ali (“Ali”) is an immigrant from Dubai, living with his
family in Houston, aspiring for U.S. citizenship. Appellee Azhar Chaudhary is an
attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Texas who owns his firm, appellee
Azhar Chaudhary Law Firm, P.C., (collectively “Chaudhary” or Appellees).
Among other areas of law, Chaudhary practices immigration law and represented
Ali and his family for a short period of time pursuant to an oral contract.

      After roughly 8 months, Ali terminated the representation and requested
Chaudhary refund the fee already paid, an amount which exceeded $800,000.
When Chaudhary refused, Ali filed a grievance complaint against Chaudhary with
the State Bar of Texas, which was dismissed, and a lawsuit over the fees, which
remains pending. Ali also contacted appellants Wayne Dolcefino and Dolcefino
Consulting LLC (collectively “Dolcefino” or Appellants), a self-described media
consultant and media consulting business.

      Three series of events followed: (1) Ali (with his comments concerning
                                          2
Chaudhary’s representation) was featured on Facebook and YouTube in a video
produced and published by the Dolcefino Appellants on April 12, 2021, titled
“Would You Hire This Lawyer?”, (“The Video”); (2) Dolcefino and Ali separately
contacted a total of at least three different former clients of Chaudhary’s (the
“Client Communications”) about Chaudhary’s representation; and (3) two
instances when first Ali, then a week later when Dolcefino, approached Chaudhary
at his childrens’ bus stop and made various statements (“The Bus Stop Incidents”).

       These events prompted Chaudhary to file a lawsuit against Ali and
Dolcefino for civil conspiracy, statutory libel, libel per se, invasion of privacy,
slander per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with
current business relations, tortious interference with prospective business relations,
business disparagement, negligence, and assault.

       Ali and Dolcefino each filed their own TCPA motions. In Ali’s motion, he
moved to dismiss solely the defamation claims asserted against him, while
Dolcefino appellants’ motion targeted all claims asserted against them.               Prior to
the hearing on their motions, Chaudhary filed a response with affidavits and
evidence responsive to the motions. Neither Ali nor Dolcefino filed any evidence
with the trial court in advance of the hearing, and at the hearing the trial court
orally denied the motion. 1

       Both Ali and Dolcefino appealed.

                                II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

       1
         The record contains no written order granting or denying either motion. Accordingly,
this matter became appealable when the order was subsequently denied by operation of law. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.008(a); see also Simmons v. Taylor, No. 14-20-00843-CV,
2022 WL 1498090, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 12, 2022, no pet.) (“By not
signing a written order, we hold that the trial judge did not rule on the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, which means that the motion was overruled by operation of law, and that we have
appellate jurisdiction under Section 27.008(a).”).

                                              3
      The TCPA aims to protect citizens from retaliatory lawsuits that seek to
silence or intimidate them on matters of public concern. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d
579, 586 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding); see generally Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem
Code Ann. §§ 27.001–.011. The purpose of the statute is to identify and summarily
dispose of legal actions designed only to chill First Amendment rights, not to
dismiss meritorious lawsuits. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann. § 27.002; In re
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589; Saks & Co. v. Li, 653 S.W.3d 306, 309 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

      The trial court must dismiss the action if the moving party shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legal action is based on or is in response to
the movant’s exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right
of association, or an act described in section 27.010(b). Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Ann. § 27.003(a), 005(b). Notwithstanding, the court may not dismiss such a
legal action (i.e., a claim shown to fall within the scope of the TCPA) if the non-
movant can establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each
essential element of the claim. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.005(c).
If the non-movant meets that burden, the court must still dismiss the claim if the
movant “establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on which the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. § 27.005(d); Montelongo v.
Abrea, 622 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Tex. 2021). The evidence the trial court considers in
determining whether a legal action should be dismissed under the TCPA includes
the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 27.006(a); see also Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (noting
that the trial court is obligated to consider the plaintiff’s pleadings regardless of
whether they are offered into evidence).

      Whether the TCPA applies to a particular claim is an issue of statutory

                                           4
interpretation that we review de novo. See Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680
(Tex. 2018). When construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give
effect to the Legislature’s intent. Id. We construe the TCPA liberally to effectuate
its purpose and intent fully. See Adams v. Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547
S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. 2018).

A. Did Ali and Dolcefino show by a preponderance of the evidence that any
legal action is based on or is in response to the movant’s exercise of the right
of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association, or an act
described in the catchall provision at section 27.010(b)?

      Both Ali and Dolcefino assert in their TCPA motions that Chaudhary’s
claims fell within the scope of the TCPA as based on or in response to their
“exercise of the right of free speech,” a phrase statutorily defined to mean “a
communication made in connection with a matter of public concern.” See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001(3). The latter phrase, a “matter of public
concern”, means “a statement or activity regarding”:

      (A) a public official, public figure, or other person who has drawn
      substantial public attention due to the person’s official acts, fame,
      notoriety, or celebrity;
      (B) a matter of political, social, or other interest to the community; or
      (C) a subject of concern to the public.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 27.001.

      Despite some uncertainty and some all-out confusion as to the statute’s
meaning, in recent years the courts have come to mark important conceptual
distinctions and recognize common scenarios relevant to this definition that
implicate the scope of the TCPA. The supreme court continues to emphasize a
private-public distinction:

      “[t]he phrase ‘matter of public concern’ commonly refers to matters
      ‘of political, social, or other concern to the community,’ and a subject

                                          5
       of general interest and of value and concern to the public, as opposed
       to purely private matters.”
Creative Oil & Gas, LLC v. Lona Hills Ranch, LLC, 591 S.W.3d 127, 135 (Tex.
2019) (quoting Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2017)) (emphasis
added); see also McLane Champions, LLC v. Houston Baseball Partners LLC, 671
S.W.3d 907, 917 (Tex. 2023) (explaining the statutory text’s “temporal anchor”
requiring a communication’s relevant connection “to a public audience at the time
it was made”). Moreover, for example, statements related to a physician’s
“professional competence and fitness to practice medicine” is “a subject matter that
has consistently been recognized by Texas courts as a matter of public concern.”
Rockman v. Ob Hospitalist Grp., Inc., No. 01-21-00383-CV, 2023 WL 3311548, at
*12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 9, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing
Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. 2015)).

       We resolve the first step of the analysis in large part by reference to the
pleadings,2 to determine if in fact the allegations are based on or in response to
their “exercise of the right of free speech.” Each of the claims Chaudhary asserts
in his Petition is supported by factual allegations of one of the three events: The
Video, the Client Communications, or the Bus Stop Incident.

1. Allegations about the Video
       Chaudhary’s live petition provides, among others, the following allegations
about the Video:

       Defendants published a libelous video and accompanying written
       commentary, which is derogatory, defamatory, and circulates wholly
       false material against the Plaintiffs in an electronic media

       2
         Although the statute permits courts to consider matters other than the pleadings “in
determining whether a legal action is subject to. . .[the TCPA]” and we have done so, today our
conclusion about of whether the scope of the lawsuit falls within the scope of the act rests on the
unamended, live pleadings. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.006.

                                                6
(online/internet) blog entitled the “Dolcefino Report” on Facebook
and YouTube. Defendants had actual knowledge that the “Dolcefino
Report” blog, including the libelous video against the Plaintiffs and
accompanying written commentary, was published, and distributed in
Fort Bend County via Facebook and YouTube platforms.
                               ...
The article published by the Defendants stated that Mr. Chaudhary
was taking advantage of Hamza and his family by charging them for
excessive legal work and defrauding them during their immigration
proceedings. In or around April 12th, 2021, Defendants via the World
Wide Web on the YouTube and Facebook platforms made the
following oral and written statements implying that: (1) Mr.
Chaudhary scammed Hamzah Ali; (2) Mr. Chaudhary had swindled
Hamzah Ali’s money from him; (3) that Mr. Chaudhary was not to be
trusted; (4) that Mr. Chaudhary was a bad lawyer; (5) that Mr.
Chaudhary took full advantage of Mr. Ali’s family’s fear and
desperation; (6) that Mr. Chaudhary was scamming the Houston
immigrant community; (7) that Mr. Chaudhary was a sham; (8) that
Mr. Chaudhary did not have the level of education he has claims to
have obtained; (9) that Mr. Chaudhary made claims on his business
websites that were false; (10); that Mr. Chaudhary is attempting to
blackmail or scare Hamzah Ali; (11) that Mr. Chaudhary did not
perform any legal work for Hamzah Ali; (12) that Mr. Chaudhary lied
on a filed court pleading in an associated legal claim between Hamzah
Ali and Mr. Chaudhary; (13) and that Mr. Chaudhary is under
investigation by the State Bar of Texas.
                               ...
Ali and Dolcefino contributed to the publication of the known false
and shameful defamation in the Dolcefino Consulting Blog in an
attempt to defame and create injury to Plaintiffs.
                               ...
All of these statements in the video either directly state, or create, the
false connotation that Mr. Chaudhary is an untrustworthy lawyer, has
lied about his education, lies to clients about their cases or legal work,
lies to clients about how much he charges in legal work, is generally a
scammer, is professionally scamming people in their legal affairs, is
incompetent to perform simple math, makes promises to clients that
never come true, uses the legal system to his advantage to scare or
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      intimidate people, and generally that he should not be associated with
      as a person or if in need of legal work
      The petition further alleges that at the time of filing the Facebook video had
“eighty-six reactions from Facebook users”, “shared thirty-one times by Facebook
users” and in both instances alleges “some of which are from persons living in the
greater Houston area”. The YouTube video was alleged to have 1,795 views, 22
likes, and seven comments.

      Even if spurred by a single attorney-client relationship between Chaudhary
and Ali, the alleged communications—publicly posted on social media video
statements about an attorney’s professionalism and ability to practice made to such
large audience, and one which could reasonably include potential future clients—
relates to a matter of public concern. See generally Bedford v. Spassoff, 520
S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (applying TCPA to defamation claim
relating to comments made on Facebook); see also Whitelock v. Stewart, 661
S.W.3d 583, 596 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. filed); see also Thang Bui v.
Dangelas, No. 01-18-01146-CV, 2019 WL 5151410, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2019, pet. denied); Melton v. Hah, No. 09-22-00418-CV, 2023
WL 5122497, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 10, 2023, no pet. h.).

      To the extent the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motions was based a
finding that these allegations were not “based on or in response to their exercise of
the right of free speech”, such finding would have been error.

2. Allegations about the Client Communications
      The petition provides, among others, the following allegations about the
Client Communications:

      Since this publication, the Defendants have started a witchhunt of Mr.
      Chaudhary in an attempt to ruin him and his law firm. Dolcefino has
      contacted all of Mr. Chaudhary’s current and former clients insisting
                                         8
      that they watch the defamatory video, that they file bar complaints
      against Mr. Chaudhary, and impersonating an officer of the court,
      trying to convince Mr. Chaudhary’s clients that they have a legal
      cause of action against Mr. Chaudhary for not handling their cases
      professionally.
                                        ...
      Hamza [Ali] has contacted Mr. Chaudhary’s friends, former clients,
      colleagues, and community members and spread lies, against him
      concerning his ability to perform legal services.
As compared to the allegations about the Video, the allegations about the Client
Communications target a significantly smaller audience, individual clients.
However, the allegation that Ali and Dolcefino requested former clients to file bar
complaints against Chaudhary, colors the communication that might otherwise
appear to deal with the private attorney-client relationships between Ali and
Chaudhary or Chaudhary and his former clients into a matter of a public scope.
See Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 2017).

      To the extent the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motions was based a
finding that these allegations were not “based on or in response to their exercise of
the right of free speech”, such finding would have been error.

3. Allegations about the Bus Stop Incidents

      The petition provides, among others, the following allegations about the Bus
Stop Incidents:

      On the morning of September 10, 2021, Hamza Ali came to Mr.
      Chaudhary’s local bus stop where fifteen to twenty other people,
      school children and their parents, congregated waiting for their school
      bus. Hamza Ali threatened Mr. Chaudhary’s life, the lives of Mr.
      Chaudhary’s children, yelled obscenities that could plainly be heard
      by all people present, and. . .

             “You are is scamming the Houston Immigrant Community”;

                                         9
             “You are a sham”;
             “You don’t have an attorney license”.
                                        ...

      On or about September 17, 2021 Defendant, Dolcefino, showed up at
      Mr. Chaudhary’s local bus stop while in the presence of fifteen to
      twenty school children and their parents, including Mr. Chaudhary’s
      own children. . . Dolcefino started yelling and harassing Mr.
      Chaudhary and his family with false allegations of defrauding clients,
      trying to hide his legal mistakes, and being a malfeasant person that is
      constantly in trouble with the law with numerous lawsuits alleged
      against him.
      Just as statements of a physician’s competence to practice medicine is a
matter of public concern, so too are statements of a lawyer’s competence to
practice law. See, e.g., Melton v. Hah, No. 09-22-00418-CV, 2023 WL 5122497, at
*5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 10, 2023, no pet. h.) (posting about negative
experience about a cosmetic medical practice a public concern); see Chehab v.
Huttenbach, No. 11-20-00180-CV, 2022 WL 2165532, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland
June 16, 2022, no pet.) (lawyers competence).

      To the extent the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motions was based a
finding that the Bus Stop Allegations were not “based on or in response to their
exercise of the right of free speech”, such finding would have been error.

B. Did Chaudhary establish by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case
for each essential element of his claims against Ali and Dolcefino?

      We next review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary established
by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of his
claims against Ali and Dolcefino. In addition to the pleadings, we consider the
evidence supplied by Chaudhary in response to the motion. Chaudhary provided
his own declaration and declarations from three former clients, which together with
his pleadings provides his prima facie evidence:
                                         10
                          Evidence concerning the Video

      The Video is narrated by Dolcefino and features interviews with Ali, who
can be seen and heard at times. The video begins by introducing Ali and describes
Ali’s business and internet presence. In the Video, Dolcefino describes the 2017
executive order issued by Donald Trump that limits entry into the United States of
individuals from certain countries, including Yemen. In an interview, Ali describes
his fear that he would be deported to Yemen under the executive order. To this
Dolcefino narrates: “And that’s why Hamzah Ali came to Dolcefino Consulting, to
expose the lawyer Ali says took full advantage of the family’s fear, their
desperation. He wants you all to take a good look. The lawyer’s name is Azhar
Chaudhary.”

      The Video then shows Ali stating: “This is not about the money for me. This
is about going after him. This is making sure that he doesn’t do this to anybody
else. This is making sure that he doesn’t scam the Houston immigrant community
any more than he already has.”

      Ali recounts that Chaudhary told Ali the family’s green card process was
complete, but the family waited for their green cards to no avail. Ali next states “I
really think the man is a sham, in all honesty.”

      Dolcefino recounts his investigation of Chaudhary. He encourages the
viewer to “Google his name.” By doing this, and following up, Dolcefino exposes
what would likely be Chaudhary’s “Linked In” page, as inaccurately indicating a
current affiliation with the Supreme Court Institute at the Georgetown School of
Law. While presenting the image of an email, Dolcefino states, “But the director
of that institute tells us, quote, Mr. Chaudhary has no affiliation with the Supreme
Court Institute, and I do not know him.” The video then presents video footage of
encountering a physical address listed on Google that was no longer current for

                                          11
Chaudhary.

      Dolcefino then appears on the video to arrive at a concluding thought: that
Chaudhary’s response to Ali’s claims falls in line with some other attorneys
Dolcefino has investigated who take the approach “dirty up the victim,” citing
Chaudhary’s pleadings in the Fee Suit describing all the work Ali hired Chaudhary
to perform—Ali “wanted Chaudhary to end his practice altogether, the whole
thing, and be his family lawyer full time. Then came the buzz words meant likely
to scare Hamza[h] Ali off. Money laundering, RICO, the United States Patriot
Act.” Dolcefino insinuates that Chaudhary lied in his responsive pleadings to
Chaudhary’s Fee Suit about the scope of the representation for which he was hired
and instead is using as scare tactics valid legal concerns Ali raised with Chaudhary.

      Dolcefino states Chaudhary did “his own lawyer math to try to justify” the
fee Ali paid him.

      The gist of the video Dolcefino posted was Chaudhary is a dishonest lawyer
and a “sham.”

                           The Client Communications

      Dolcefino contacted at least two of Chaudhary’s past clients, and Ali
contacted another.

      Ike Umar, a gaming and lending professional, and a 12-year client of
Chaudhary’s provided a declaration on the subject of Ali’s communications with
him. Umar’s declaration states that shortly after the Video was published, Ali
posted it on Umar’s Facebook’s page. Umar did not take kindly to this and told
Ali not to share the Video, blocked Ali from his Facebook page, and told Ali that it
was “childish”. The next day, Ali personally called Umar by telephone and told
him that Chaudhary did not have a law license and that he was not really an

                                         12
attorney. Ali stated that “Chaudhary had ‘scammed him’ out of $800,000 and that
[Umar] should not be affiliated with him.” Later in November 2021, Umar states
that Ali approached him at a fundraiser, and before a group of other people “in a
volume loud enough for those around [him] to hear” spoke: “Be careful about
Chaudhary, he is not an attorney.” Umar set forth in his declaration that “[a]s a
result of the video posted by Ali, [Umar] has not given Mr. Chaudhary any
additional legal work to handle for him, but had Ali not posted the video or called
[Umar, Umar] would have continued to use Chaudhary’s firm.”

      Dolcefino contacted Satish Varma, who had been a client of Chaudhary, and
said that Dolcefino told him that he was investigating a case Chaudhary had
handled for Varma, and that Chaudhary had “messed up” that particular case.
According to Varma, Varma told Dolcefino he was incorrect—that in fact Varma
had “won the case and [Varma] got what [he] wanted from it.” Varma notes that
Dolcefino made no mention during this call about fraud on the immigration
community. As a result of Dolcefino’s call with Varma, Varma “stopped giving
Chaudhary all [his] cases,” believing that if Chaudhary was “being investigated
that the allegations against him must be true.” In fact, Varma sent a new case to a
different attorney rather than Chaudhary following the contact with Dolcefino.

      Another client, Zafar Jaral, an electrical engineer and small business owner,
provide a declaration.    Jaral was called by Dolcefino’s representative who
identified himself as Nicholas Kacal, and who claimed to be an attorney. Jaral
states that Kacal told him that Chaudhary “screwed” up his case that was otherwise
a good case.    Jaral states that Kacal told him that he had investigated other
Chaudhary-client cases and discovered “similar mishandling of cases.”            Jaral
declaration states that he later discovered Kacal was not a licensed attorney at the
time he had spoke with Kacal, in late March of 2021.

                                        13
      Jaral stated that Dolcefino later called him personally and told Jaral one of
his cases with Chaudhary was not dismissed on the merits but “as a result of late
handling by my lawyer” and that Dolcefino would review cases he believed were
mishandled by Chaudhary and make a report to the State Bar and the media.

                               The Bus Stop Incidents
      In his declaration, Chaudhary provides testimony that tracks his allegations
of the two bus stop incidents, as set out in Part II.A.3, above.

                           PRIMA FACIE CASE ANALYSIS

      The motion to dismiss stage is not a battle of evidence; it is the clearing of
an initial hurdle. USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC, 669 S.W.3d 195, 205
(Tex. 2023). The Act does not select plaintiffs certain to succeed; it screens out
plaintiffs certain to fail—those who cannot support their claims with clear and
specific evidence. Id.

      Prima facie means “at first sight,” and under the Act, is the “minimum
quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of
fact is true.” S&S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, 564 S.W.3d 843, 847
(Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 590 (Tex. 2015)). Evidence is
“clear and specific” if it provides enough detail to show the factual basis for the
claim. In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590-91. Such evidence need not be conclusive,
uncontroverted, or found credible. Id.; USA Lending Group, Inc. v. Winstead PC,
669 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. 2023).

1. Invasion of Privacy by Appropriation (Count 4)
      We first review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary met his
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of his claim of invasion
of privacy through misappropriation.

                                          14
      Elements of a misappropriation claim are: (1) the defendant appropriated the
plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated with it, and not in an incidental
manner or for a newsworthy purpose; (2) the plaintiff can be identified from the
publication; and (3) there was some advantage or benefit to the defendant. Watson
v. Talia Heights, LLC, 566 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2018, no pet.).

      As Chaudhary has alleged, the record makes clear that the Video
conspicuously features Chaudhary’s headshot with synchronous audio to “take a
good look”. For expediency, we presume, without deciding, that the purpose for
use of this image was not incidental and was not for a newsworthy purpose.
Based upon that presumption and our review of the record, while we acknowledge
that Chaudhary’s headshot, his name and likeness may well have a particular
value, we cannot find that Chaudhary provided any allegation or proof as to its
value. Upon our review of the record, we cannot find any proof showing that
either Ali or Dolcefino appropriated the Chaudhary’s headshot (or any other
image, his name or likeness) to take advantage of any value with which it was
associated. See, e.g., United Locating Services, LLC v. Fobbs, 619 S.W.3d 863,
872–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (explaining that plaintiffs
failed to show the value associated with their names and concluding they failed to
establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for the first essential
element of their Name Appropriation Claims”).

      Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in its implicit finding that
Chaudhary met his burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of
his invasion of privacy claim by misappropriation against Dolcefino.

2. Defamation claims (Counts 2, 3, 5, 6, and 10)

      We next review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary met his

                                          15
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of his defamation
claims. Chaudhary alleged Statutory Libel, Libel Per Se, Business Disparagement,
two counts of Slander Per Se and Negligence (the “Defamation Claims”), and
submitted evidence in support of these claims in his response to the TCPA
motions.

      Statutory Libel (as asserted in Count 2) is defined as “a defamation
expressed in written or other graphic form . . . that tends to injure a living person’s
reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or
financial injury or to impeach any person’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation
or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby expose the person to public
hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001.
To prove a prima facie case for statutory defamation requires the plaintiff establish
the following elements: (1) the defendant published a false statement; (2) that was
defamatory concerning the plaintiff; (3) with the requisite degree of fault
concerning the statement’s truth; and (4) damages, unless the statement constitutes
defamation per se. Mem’l Hermann Health Sys. v. Gomez, 649 S.W.3d 415, 423
(Tex. 2022).

      Defamation per se (or libel per se as asserted in Count 3) occurs when a
statement (specifically, for libel per se, one expressed in written or other graphic
form) is so obviously detrimental to one’s good name that a jury may presume
general damages, such as for loss of reputation or for mental anguish. See Dallas
Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 624 (Tex. 2018). This presumption
enables the plaintiff to recover nominal damages without proof of any specific loss.
Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 886. A statement constitutes defamation per se “if it injures a
person in h[is] office, profession, or occupation.” Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d
59, 62 (Tex. 2013). The proper inquiry is whether “a defamatory statement accuses

                                          16
a professional of lacking a peculiar or unique skill that is necessary for the proper
conduct of the profession.” Id. at 67.

      Similarly, business disparagement (asserted in Count 10) requires that (1)
the defendant publish false and disparaging information; (2) with malice; (3)
without privilege; (4) that resulted in special damages to the plaintiff. Newspaper
Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 87 (Tex.
App—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Business disparagement differs from
defamation only in the interest protected: a defamation claim protects personal
reputation while a business disparagement claim protects economic interests. Id.

      “In a defamation case that implicates the TCPA, pleadings and evidence that
establishes the facts of when, where, and what was said, the defamatory nature of
the statements, and how they damaged the plaintiff should be sufficient to resist a
TCPA motion to dismiss.” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 591. The TCPA does not require
that Chaudhary produce evidence that each and every alleged statement is
defamatory to meet his burden under the TCPA; rather, Chaudhary must establish
“a prima facie case for each essential element” of his defamation claims against Ali
and Dolcefino. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.005(c). Stone v. Melillo, No. 14-
18-00971-CV, 2020 WL 6143126, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 20,
2020, no pet.).

a. Verifiable statements of fact and evidence of their falsity

      A statement, even a statement of opinion, is actionable in defamation if it
expressly or impliedly asserts facts that are objectively verifiable. Tatum, 554
S.W.3d at 639; Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 579 (Tex. 2002) (distinguishing
between fact and opinion). To determine whether a statement is one of fact, a court
must look at the entire context in which the statement was made. Scripps NP
Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 795 (Tex. 2019). Statements about a
                                         17
professional’s performance are susceptible to verification. Stone v. Melillo, No.
14-18-00971-CV, 2020 WL 6143126, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct.
20, 2020, no pet.) (statements that doctor botched surgery and performed
unnecessary surgery were not statements of opinion but objectively verifiable false
statements of fact).      Chaudhary’s defamation claims are premised on the
statements made in the Video, the Client Communications, and the Bus Stop
Incidents. Chaudhary responded and sought to contradict the statements by proof
of his and other relevant witness testimony.

      Statements at issue concerning the Video, as related to Chaudhary’s claims
for statutory libel (Count 2), libel per se (Count 3), and business disparagement
(Count 10), include the following (1 through 4):

   1. Ali stating his purpose for making public statements: “This is making sure
      that he doesn’t do this to anybody else. This is making sure that he doesn’t
      scam the Houston immigrant community any more than he already has”
      and Ali stating “I really think this [Chaudhary] is a sham, in all honesty.”

   These statements express that Chaudhary scammed Ali specifically, or
otherwise misrepresented himself to Ali specifically, are susceptible to verification.
See Id. In his affidavit, Chaudhary provided some evidence of the falsity of these
statements: specifically, that he was and is a licensed attorney in good standing,
that he had a contract to represent Ali, and albeit an oral contract, that under it the
terms of the work were clear and that there was no scam involved. Chaudhary
further testified that he worked more than 1700 hours for Ali at a rate of $500 per
hour, resulting in billings that would have equaled more than the amount he
ultimately charged Ali in his retainer. The record contains prima facie proof of the
falsity of these statements. See id.

   2. Dolcefino narrating, including a part of a text chain with Ali, where
      Chaudhary told Ali that “this is it, it’s done” as having been in reference to

                                          18
       green cards which were impliedly not “done” or obtained by Chaudhary at
       the time. Ali states that he and his family subsequently waited every day to
       find the green cards in the mail.

   These statements are susceptible to verification. See Id. Chaudhary provided
testimony of the implicit falsity the publication, explaining that it had omitted vital
parts of Chaudhary’s and Ali’s communications—that Chaudhary informed Ali his
work and travel authorization were approved and Ali responded inquiring what the
next steps were, indicating Ali knew the process was not complete. Thus
Chaudhary provided some evidence of the falsity by explaining the context and
omitted parts of his communications with Ali which illustrates a basis for Ali to
have known that Chaudhary’s statement that “this is it, it’s done” did not mean that
Chaudhary secured green cards for Ali and his family.

   3. Dolcefino narrating and confirming Ali’s statements that Chaudhary “took
      full advantage of [Ali’s] family’s fear, their desperation” about being
      deported to Yemen, refers to Ali as the “victim”, and that Chaudhary
      charged $835,000 for what he “promised would be expedited green cards
      and a path to citizenship within days”, and implying by these statements that
      this was Chaudhary’s basis of securing his representation of Ali and
      justifying the cost of his services.

   These statements are susceptible to verification. See id. Chaudhary testified
that these statements were false, that his services under his agreement with Ali
involved more than obtaining green cards, that Ali knew obtaining green cards
would be an arduous process. Chaudhary testified that he was introduced to Ali by
a third party and that Ali already had an immigration lawyer but Ali wanted a
lawyer that could handle more than immigration matters. Because Chaudhary’s
contradicting statements were not rebutted, the record contains prima facie proof of
their falsity. See id.

                                          19
   4. Dolcefino narrating and producing video stating Chaudhary is not just a
      “lawyer who has bad results” but also misrepresents his credentials, his
      education and public presence.

   The implicit statement taken in context is that Chaudhary is a lawyer who
always or usually has bad results and lies, and is thus susceptible to verification.
See id. Chaudhary sought to challenge the veracity by his testimony that he is a
lawyer in good standing and has been practicing for many years. The affidavits of
his three clients also demonstrate their satisfaction with his result.      Because
Chaudhary’s contradicting statements were not rebutted, the record contains prima
facie proof of their falsity. See id.

       The statements at issue concerning the Client Communications, related to
Chaudhary’s Slander Per Se and Business Disparagement, though not specifically
enumerated under a particular count in Chaudhary’s petition, but factually alleged
in the Petition, and alleged without objection in his response to appellants’ TCPA
motions, include statements made by Ali, Dolcefino, and Dolcefino’s
representative Nick Kacal to Zafar Jaral, Ike Umar, and Satish Varma.

   5. Kacal followed by Dolcefino made calls to Jaral and made statements
      about Chaudhary in those calls that Jaral had a good case that
      Chaudhary had “screwed up”. Dolcefino specifically told Jaral that
      his case was dismissed “not on the merits but because of late handling
      by [Chaudhary].”
   Cacal and Dolcefino’s statements are susceptible to verification. See id. Jaral’s
testified that he was satisfied with Dolcefino’s representation, and that Chaudhary
handled his case appropriately. Because these contradicting statements were not
rebutted, the record contains prima facie proof of their falsity. See id.

   6. Ali made statements about Chaudhary to Ike Umar: First, when Ali
      tagged Umar in the Video posted on Facebook, second when, by
      phone, Ali told Umar to be careful of Chaudhary, that Chaudhary was
      a fraud, that Chaudhary did not have a law license, that Chaudhary
                                          20
      was not an attorney, and that Chaudhary had “scammed” Ali out of
      $800,000.00. Third, when Ali ran into Umar at a fundraiser, Ali told
      Umar and those nearby “you should be careful about Chaudhary, he is
      not an attorney.”
      Ali’s statements about Chaudhary to Ike Umar are susceptible to
verification. See id. Chaudhary testified that he is an attorney eligible to practice
law in Texas, that he is not a fraud and that he did not scam Ali. Because Ali did
not rebut these statements, the record contains prima facie proof of their falsity.
See id.

   7. Dolcefino made statements about Chaudhary to Satish Varma by
      saying Chaudhary messed up Varma’s case. In that case involving
      church governance, Mr. Varma prevailed and was very happy with the
      result.
   Dolcefino’s statements about Chaudhary to Satish Varma are susceptible to
verification. See id. Varma testifies and supplies proof that he won the case
Dolcefino referred to. As Ali did not rebut these statements, the record contains
prima facie proof of their falsity. See id.

      The statements at issue concerning the Bus Stop, as related to Chaudhary’s
claims for slander per se (Counts 5 and 6), and business disparagement (Count 10),
include but are not limited to the following (8 through 9):

   8. Ali stating to Chaudhary loudly enough for other’s to hear: “You are
      scamming the Houston Immigrant Community”; “You are a sham.”
      And “You don’t have an attorney license.”
      Ali’s statements about Chaudhary to the Bus Stop audience are susceptible
to verification. See id. Chaudhary testified that he is an attorney eligible to
practice law in Texas, that Ali’s allegations are false, that he is not a fraud and that
he did not scam Ali. As Ali did not rebut these statements, the record contains
prima facie proof of their falsity. See id.

   9. Dolcefino stating to Chaudhary loudly enough for other parents and children
                                              21
      at bus stop to hear him state that Chaudhary is defrauding clients,
      concealing malpractice from clients, and that he is a malfeasant person.
      Dolcefino’s statements about Chaudhary to the Bus Stop audience are
susceptible to verification. See id. Chaudhary testified that he is an attorney
eligible to practice law in Texas, that Dolcefino’s allegations are false, that he is
not a fraud and that he did not scam Ali. As Ali did not rebut these statements, the
record contains prima facie proof of their falsity. See id.

      In sum, Chaudhary’s affidavit and attached evidence, along with the
affidavit of his clients, denying Ali and Dolcefino’s allegations satisfies his burden
with respect to the falsity element at this preliminary stage. See id.; see also
Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 455 S.W.3d 844, 854, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (plaintiff's affidavit denying co-defendant's allegations
suffices as evidence of falsity in context of TCPA motion to dismiss); see also
Williams v. Ramey, No. 14-21-00158-CV, 2022 WL 2517118, at *6 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] July 7, 2022, pet. dism’d).

b. Defamatory nature of the statements

      A statement is defamatory if it “tends to injure a living person’s reputation
and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or financial
injury or to impeach any person’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.” Tatum,
554 S.W.3d at 637–38 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 73.001).

      “[A] plaintiff can bring a claim for defamation when discrete facts, literally
or substantially true, are published in such a way that they create a substantially
false and defamatory impression by omitting material facts or juxtaposing facts in
a misleading way.” Id. at 627. The primary inquiry in determining whether a
publication is defamatory is whether the words used “are reasonably capable of a
defamatory meaning.” Musser v. Smith Protective Servs., Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653,

                                          22
655 (Tex. 1987). In answering this question, the “inquiry is objective, not
subjective.” New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Tex. 2004). It
requires a court to construe a publication “based upon how a person of ordinary
intelligence would perceive it.” Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 629 (emphasis omitted); see
also Stone, 2020 WL 6143126, at *9–10 (“A person of ordinary intelligence would
perceive the flyer and sign statements to negatively affect the reputation of Melillo
in his profession.”).

      The TCPA does not require a plaintiff to produce evidence that each and
every statement in a publication is defamatory to meet its burden, or to prove its
cause of action at a trial on the merits. Stone, 2020 WL 6143126, at *6.

      The evidence supplied in the record establishes the Video to be defamatory.
The premise of the video is that Chaudhary is a “sham.” At the outset, the Video’s
purpose is clear, with Ali stating: “This is about going after” Chaudhary. Dolcefino
further reports Chaudhary accepted thousands of dollars for legal services he said
he completed but did not; lied on the internet about his credentials; lied about
where is office is located; misrepresented the stature and success of his firm on the
firm’s website; lied about the scope of the representation for which he was hired;
and did not earn the fee he was paid for legal work completed for Ali.             A
reasonable person viewing the Video would construe it as injuring Chaudhary’s
reputation and impeaching his honesty and integrity. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 637;
see also id. at 627 (a person can be liable for defamation if his statements are true
but made in an improper context). Indeed, the gist of the Video is that Chaudhary
is a dishonest lawyer.

      The record also provides sufficient clear and specific evidence that the
Video is defamatory per se. A statement is defamatory per se when it is “so
obviously harmful that general damages, such as mental anguish and loss of

                                         23
reputation, are presumed.” Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 596. A statement that injures one
in his profession or a statement that “ascribes to another conduct, characteristics or
a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for the proper conduct of his
lawful business, trade or profession, or of his public or private office, whether
honorary or for profit” is defamatory per se. Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 66–67
(citation omitted). “Truthfulness is peculiarly valuable to one’s status in the legal
profession, and especially with respect to the legitimacy of a lawyer’s or a law
firm’s legal fees.” Chehab v. Huttenbach, No. 11-20-00180-CV, 2022 WL
2165532, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 16, 2022, no pet.).

      Moreover, the communications in the Video constitute defamation per se. In
the Video, Ali calls Chaudhary a “sham,” states that he “scam[s]” his clients, and
Dolcefino calls into question Chaudhary honesty with regard to fees, and generally
casts doubt on his honesty as a lawyer. Because honesty is a required quality of a
lawyer, especially with regard his legal fees, the Video and the Ali and Docefino’s
communications within it constitute defamation per se. See Chehab, 2022 WL
2165532, at *7.

      There was sufficient evidence that the Client Communications and the
communications in the Bus Stop Incidents were defamatory and defamatory per se.
The gravamen of the Client communications were that Chaudhary is a fraud, does
not have a law license, mishandled various cases, and scammed Ali. The gravamen
of the communications in the Bus Stop Incidents were that Chaudhary is a sham,
does not have a law license, is scamming the immigrant community, is “defrauding
clients, concealing malpractice from [his] clients, and being a malfeasant person.”
All these communications not only injure Chaudhary’s reputation but also go
directly to his fitness to practice law—Chaudhary’s profession.

c. Requisite Intent

                                         24
      When the plaintiff is a private figure like Chaudhary, the relevant inquiry is
whether the defendant acted negligently in making the defamatory statements.
Tatum, 554 S.W.3d at 634. This means the plaintiff must establish the defendant
knew or should have known the defamatory statement was false. Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d at 593.

      As discussed above, the gist of the Video is that Chaudhary is a dishonest
lawyer, inflates his fee, and is a “sham.” Ali acted negligently as to the truth of the
statements they made within the Video to support this gist. For example,
Appellants suggest Chaudhary lied about the scope of the representation for which
he was hired and did not earn the fee he was paid for legal work completed for Ali.
But Chaudhary testifies he was hired and paid to work for Ali and his family
concerning more than applying for green cards. And Chaudhary testifies he was
paid up front at Ali’s behest. Ali acted at least with negligence in suggesting
Chaudhary was hired only to help him get a green card and did not earn the fee he
was paid because Ali is the party with whom Chaudhary agreed as to the services
and the fee, including its structure. Additionally, Ali and Dolcefino suggest
Chaudhary lied to Ali about the status of his green card application. Ali acted with
negligence regarding the truth of this statement, as Chaudhary provided
correspondence from Ali demonstrating Ali knew that only work and travel
authorization was received and the process was indeed not complete. Ali’s degree
of fault in making the defamatory statements at issue cannot be ignored when Ali’s
intention in being featured on the Video is clear from the start: “This is going
after” Chaudhary.

      Moreover, Ali was negligent with regard to the Client Communications and
the communications he made in the Bus Stop Incident that Chaudhary is a sham, a
fraud, a scammer, and lacks a law license. Indeed, a lawyer’s standing in the state

                                          25
of Texas is publicly available on the internet, and Ali should have known his
comments claiming Chaudhary is not a lawyer were false. Ali should have known
his comments that Chaudhary is a fraud and a scammer were false for the same
reason he should have known the communications in the Video were false: Ali is
the one with whom Chaudhary contracted in this case, and Ali knew the terms of
the work for which he hired Chaudhary.

      Dolcefino claims for the first time on appeal that that he is a media
defendant, and for this reason Chaudhary must prove actual malice to establish his
defamation claims. Even presuming without deciding that the actual malice
standard applies, the evidence in record for the TCPA motion is prima facie
evidence that Dolcefino acted with actual malice. Actual malice involves the
making of a statement with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of
whether it is true. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 571 (Tex. 1989). “‘Reckless
disregard’ is defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for proof of
which the plaintiff must present ‘sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that
the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.’”
Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).

      “[A]ctual malice may be inferred if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
defamatory statement had no basis in fact, was fabricated by the defendant, or was
the product of her imagination.” Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022
WL 17173526, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.); see also
Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 596 (“Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove
persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant[or] is the
product of his imagination[.]” (citation omitted)).

      The record on the TCPA hearing provides prima facie support for the
allegation that Dolcefino acted with negligence and actual malice with regard to

                                          26
the Client Communications and with regard to the Bus Stop Incident which he
perpetrated. Chaudhary through his affidavit and his client’s affidavits, presuming
their truth, demonstrated that one or more statements with respect to each incident
had no basis in fact, whether being clearly fabricated or imagined by Ali, or
otherwise patently untrue. Dolcefino’s Client Communications included that
Chaudhary mishandled various cases. There can be no basis in fact for such a claim
when the clients actually told Dolcefino the case had been won or that they were
pleased with the services. Dolcefino did not offer any evidence, generally, or
specifically of mishandling by Chaudhary. Dolcefino’s communications in the Bus
Stop Incident were that Chaudhary is defrauding his clients, concealing
malpractice from his clients, and is a malfeasant person. But there is no basis in
fact for any of these claims, either. Indeed, Dolcefino’s only possible support for
the claim that Chaudhary is defrauding his clients is from Ali, who, as discussed
above, shared a wholly false account regarding the scope of the work Chaudhary
was to perform. And there is no support in the record that Chaudhary conceals
malpractice from his clients—not even the Video attempts to establish that
Chaudhary has committed malpractice.

      Finally, Dolcefino acted with negligence and actual malice with regard to
the Video because, again, the only possible support for the Video’s gist that
Chaudhary is a dishonest lawyer and a “sham” comes from Ali who, unlike
Chaudhary, has not sworn under penalty of perjury that his account of the events at
issue are true and correct.    Chaudhary through his affidavit and his client’s
affidavits, and the various factual omissions from Ali and Chaudhary’s
communication that stifle a complete truthful report provide sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the Dolcefino entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication’s statements that Chaudhary is a dishonest lawyer and a “sham”.

                                        27
d.    Damages

      To prove an action for defamation, the plaintiff must prove either (1) that
general damages are presumed because of the nature of the defamatory statement
or (2) that the defendant’s publication of the statement proximately caused the
plaintiff’s damages. Brady, 515 S.W.3d at 886.

      A plaintiff’s damages may be presumed if he establishes the defendant’s
statement is defamatory per se and either that the defendant published the
statement with actual malice or that the statement involves a private plaintiff and a
private concern. Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65-66. General damages are recoverable
in an action for defamation. Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 94
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism’d). In a libel or slander action, general
damages are noneconomic damages that do not require the plaintiff to prove that it
suffered a pecuniary loss. See Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65–66. General damages
include compensation for injury to character or reputation, injury to feelings,
mental anguish, and similar wrongs. Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 604.

      All the statements at issue constitute defamation per se because they tend to
injure Chaudhary in his profession as a lawyer. Statements that injure a person in
their office, profession, or occupation are defamatory per se. See Bedford v.
Spassoff, 520 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. 2017); Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 64. The
Video, Client Communications, and Bus Stop Incidents all are injurious to
Chaudhary’s profession. Even presuming the events did not constitute defamation
per se, we note that Chaudhary established general damages. Chaudhary testified
as to “intense anxiety,” constant fear for his life and for his family, “bouts of deep
depression and a sense of helplessness.” Varma and Umar, testified that they have
declined to give Chaudhary further business as a result of Appellants’ defamation.
Hancock, 400 S.W.3d at 65 (permitting recovery of “economic damages such as

                                         28
for lost income” in defamation case).

      Because the record shows that Chaudhary provided clear and specific
evidence (i.e. his declaration, the declarations of former clients, and supporting
documents) establishing a prima facie case for all the elements of his defamation
claims, we overrule Ali and Dolcefino’s challenge to the trial court’s implicit
finding that Chaudhary carried his burden with respect to these claims.

3. Tortious Interference with Current and Prospective Business Relations
(Counts 8 and 9)

      We next review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary met his
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of his tortious
interference of a current and prospective business relation claims. To prevail on a
claim for tortious interference with current business relations, the plaintiff must
establish:

      (1) The existence of a contract;
      (2) the defendant willfully and intentionally committed acts that were
      calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business;
      (3) the party had actual knowledge of the existence of the contract and
      of the plaintiffs interest in it, or knowledge of facts and circumstances
      that would lead a reasonable person to believe in their existence;
      (4) the defendant’s acts were the proximate cause of the harm; and
      (5) actual damage and loss to the plaintiff.
Washington Square Financial v. RSL Funding, 418 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). To prevail on a claim for tortious
interference with prospective business relations, the plaintiff must establish that:

      (1) there was a reasonable probability the plaintiff would have entered
      into a business relationship with a third person;
      (2) the defendant intentionally interfered with that relationship;
      (3) the defendant’s conduct was independently tortious or unlawful;

                                          29
      (4) the interference proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and
      (5) the plaintiff suffered actual damage or loss.
Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apt. Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 923 (Tex. 2013).
Chaudhary contends that the Client Communications constitute tortious
interference both with existing contracts and with prospective relations. While we
agree that the evidence in the record established a prima facie case for tortious
interference of prospective business relationships, we do not find clear and specific
proof of interference with current business relationships. In the absence of any
clear and specific proof in the record of any identifiable existing contract or
specific ongoing representation between Chaudhary and any of the clients at the
time of the tortious conduct, Chaudhary lacks prima facie proof of the first element
of an interference with any current contract.

  Valid ongoing business relationship with reasonable probability of a contract

      Satish Varma, Ike Umar, and Zafar Jaral all testified they are clients of
Chaudhary, establishing Chaudhary had ongoing relationships with each, who
frequently provided him business and describe contractual relationships (for legal
representation) in the past. Additionally, Satish Varma and Ike Umar testified they
had legal work they could have engaged Chaudhary to help them with but declined
to do so as a result of the Client Communications. Upon this unrebutted proof,
Chaudhary presented clear and specific prima facie evidence of the first element
that he was reasonably likely to enter future contracts with Satish Varma and Ike
Umar but for the Client Communications.

              Intentional interference with the business relationship

      All three clients testified that Ali, Dolcefino, or an employee of Dolcefino
reached out to them and informed them of negative information about Chaudhary.
(e.g., Varma testifies Dolcefino contacted him to tell him Chaudhary “messed up”

                                         30
a prior case; Umar testifies Ali contacted him multiple times, showed him the
Video, and told him Chaudhary is a fraud; Jaral testifies an employee of Dolcefino
contacted him and told him Chaudhary mishandles cases and that he should contact
a different firm or could be assisted in filing a complaint to the State Bar). These
communications constitute intentional interference with existing and prospective
relations. Ali and Dolcefino knew these individuals were existing clients of
Chaudhary’s—as they called them specifically based on that relationship and
intended their communications to affect these clients’ decisions to engage
Chaudhary in the future.

                    Independently tortious or unlawful conduct

      The evidence of the Client Communications demonstrated that they were
independently tortious or unlawful. As discussed in the previous section, the Client
Communications themselves constitute defamation per se. The communications
are false statements with no basis in fact that tend to injure Chaudhary in the
conduct of his profession.

    Interference proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury and damages suffered

      Chaudhary’s affidavit and the affidavits of Varma and Umar provide proof
that the Client Communications caused Chaudhary damage—the loss of specific
additional legal work that they would have directed to Chaudhary absent the
interfering, defamatory conduct. Both Varma and Umar testified under penalty of
perjury they have declined to refer Chaudhary additional legal work as a result of
the Client Communications.

      The unrebutted declarations of Varma, Umar, and Jaral are clear and specific
evidence establishing a prima facie case for each element of Chaudhary’s tortious
interference with prospective business claims. We sustain Ali and Dolcefino’s

                                        31
complaint to the extent they complain that the trial court implicitly denied their
motion based on Chaudhary satisfying his burden with respect to claims for
tortious interference of any or current contractual business relationship based on an
identifiable existing contract (Count 8), but otherwise overrule the complaint as to
prospective business relationships (Count 9).

5. Assault (Count 11) and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count 7)

      We next review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary met his
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of his intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim against Ali and Dolcefino. We note however
that Chaudhary has alleged an assault claim exclusively against Ali in connection
with the First Bus Stop incident. Though the parties have addressed the assault
claim on appeal, because Ali did not seek to dismiss this claim in his TCPA motion
and because Dolcefino (who lodged a more global TCPA attack) was not
implicated by the claim in Chaudry’s pleading, not within the scope of the court’s
order, and thus we need not review the assault claims.

      And though Dolcefino, having been loosely implicated in Chaudhary’s
pleadings for intentional infliction of emotion distress, challenged the claim in the
trial court and now prompts our review of the trial court’s ruling on those claims,
Chaudhary only provided specific allegations and evidence to support that tort
against Ali—which happens to be the same allegations and evidence used to
support Chaudhary’s assault claims against Ali, i.e., the first Bus Stop Incident.
Relatedly, we note, that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
available only in those situations in which severe emotional distress is the intended
consequence or primary risk of the actor's conduct. Standard Fruit & Vegetable
Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.1998). Where emotional distress is solely
derivative of or incidental to the intended or most likely consequence of the actor’s

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conduct, recovery for such distress must be had, if at all, under some other tort
doctrine. Id.

      The elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are:
(1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress; (3) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; and
(4) the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s extreme emotional distress.
Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 2017); Kroger Tex. L.P. v. Suberu,
216 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex. 2006). Physical threats paired with vulgar or obscene
language can rise to the level of extreme and outrageous. See Tiller v. McLure, 121
S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2003).

      Chaudhary established the elements of his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim as it relates to Ali’s threats in the Bus Stop Incident perpetrated by
Ali. Chaudhary testified in his declaration (which remains unchallenged) that Ali
came to Chaudhary’s local bus stop where Chaudhary and his children were
present and threatened: “I am coming after you”; “I am going to kill you”; I am
going to kill you[r] children”; “you Mo….fu…r.” Nothing in the record reasonably
disputes the logical inference that that these statements by Ali were made
intentionally.

      Although language alone will rarely meet the high bar for what constitutes
“extreme and outrageous” conduct, we are satisfied that Chaudhary’s unrebutted
testimony of Ali’s mortal threats of harm to Chaudhary and his children in the
presence of his children, other children and their parents, paired with the obscene
language, reaches at least the minimum threshold of “extreme and outrageous”
conduct. See Tiller, 121 S.W.3d at 714. Likewise, Chaudhary testifies in his
declaration that as a result, he suffered damages, including emotional distress and
fear for himself and his family, depression anxiety and hopelessness, which for

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purpose of the TCPA arguably satisfies the minimum threshold on his damage
element for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See LaCoure v. LaCoure,
820 S.W.2d 228, 234 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied); see also Walters,
699 S.W.2d at 945 (plaintiff ill, disoriented, upset, nervous, and angry); Service
Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Greenhalgh, 771 S.W.2d 688, 693 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989),
rev’d on other grounds, 787 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1990) (extreme embarrassment);
Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989) (insomnia,
nervousness, and paranoia).

      Accordingly, the challenge to trial court’s implicit finding that Chuadhary’s
presented a prima facia case of IIED is overruled only to the extent Chaudhary’s
intentional infliction of emotion distress claims are based on the factual theory tied
to First Bus Stop Incident. Chuadhary’s provided no other allegations or evidence
to support a claim based on any other factual theory raised in his pleadings.
Moreover, because the live pleadings could be read to include a claim against
Dolcefino for IIED and Chaudhary did not provide any prima facie evidence to
support such a claim, we sustain Dolcefino’s challenge to the court’s implicit
denial of the motion to the extent the claim was asserted against Dolcefino as well
as to Ali based on any factual theory other than the First Bus Stop Incident.

7. Civil Conspiracy

      We next review the trial court’s implicit finding that Chaudhary met his
burden of establishing a prima facie case for each element of his civil conspiracy
claim. The elements of a civil conspiracy claim are: (1) two or more persons; (2)
with an object to be accomplished; (3) have a meeting of the minds on the object or
course of action; (4) commit one or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) proximately
cause damages to the plaintiff. Operation Rescue—Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of
Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Tex. 1998). The agreement may be

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proved by evidence of a course of conduct from which a tacit agreement to act in
concert may be inferred. See Wackman v. Rubsamen, 602 F.3d 391, 409 (5th Cir.
2010).

      Appellants’ only arguments that Chaudhary has failed to establish his
conspiracy claim is that Chaudhary has failed to establish any other tort against
them. Indeed, some courts have concluded that when a defendant brings a TCPA
motion seeking to dismiss a derivative claim of either “civil conspiracy” or “aiding
and abetting,” the court need only analyze the issue of whether the underlying tort
upon which those claims rely survives the motion. Whitelock v. Stewart, 661
S.W.3d 583, 607 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. filed). This would be the end of
the analysis, because as shown above, Chaudhary established his defamation
claims against Dolcefino and Ali alike. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Starx Inv.
Holdings, Inc., No. 03-20-00613-CV, 2021 WL 4927417, at *11 (Tex. App.—
Austin Oct. 22, 2021, pet. dism'd) (mem. op.); Whitelock v. Stewart, 661 S.W.3d
583, 607 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. filed). However, in our case Dolcefino
has raised arguments concerning his liability for Ali’s statements. Therefore we
continue the analysis.

      The record establishes that Ali and Dolcefino conspired to defame
Chaudhary, as their meeting of the minds to accomplish this unlawful purpose can
be inferred from their course of conduct. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 589
(permitting circumstantial evidence in TCPA motion practice). First, the two
appear on the Video, and together they assert that Chaudhary is a dishonest lawyer
and a sham. Second, both Dolcefino and Ali perpetrated the Bus Stop Incidents and
communicated similar messages: that Chaudhary is a sham and not a real lawyer.
Third, both Dolcefino and Ali reached out to Chaudhary’s current clients to spread
the same message: that Chaudhary is a subpar lawyer and has mishandled cases.

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We find it unique and significant that with respect to each of the three factual basis
of unlawful conduct alleged by Chaudhary, that Chaudhary provided clear and
specific evidence that both Ali and Dolcefino participated.      The direct evidence
taken with the circumstantial evidence permitted the trial court to infer the
conspiracy to defame, and it was not error to deny the Motions on the conspiracy
claim. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss
those two claims. See Whitelock v. Stewart, 661 S.W.3d 583, 607 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2023, pet. filed) (finding the trial court did not err in denying civil conspiracy
claims).

      The Video and the unrebutted declarations of Chaudhary’s former clients are
clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case for each element of
Chaudhary’s conspiracy claim. Accordingly, we overrule appellants’ complaint to
the trial court’s implicit finding Chaudhary provided clear and specific evidence
establishing a prima facie case for each element of his civil conspiracy claim.

C. No affirmative defense
      Once Chaudhary satisfied his burden on his claims, the burden shifted back
to the Ali and Dolcefino to prove each essential element of any valid defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. City of Dall. v. Ahrens, No. 10-19-00137-CV, 2022
WL 554350, at *11 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 23, 2022, no pet.). In considering the
affirmative defenses, courts apply a “standard of review that is essentially
equivalent to a motion for summary judgment on an affirmative defense.” Batra v.
Covenant Health Sys., 562 S.W.3d 696, 708 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2018, pet.
denied). Only on appeal does Dolcefino attempt to raise a truth defense and fair
comment privilege defense. Dolcefino asserted no privileges or defenses in the
lower court, and yet even if he did assert what he attempts to raise on appeal, the
record is clear that neither Ali nor Dolcefino provided any evidence or valid

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argument as a matter of law in support of these defenses.

      Accordingly, we sustain the trial court’s implicit finding that, for all claims
for which Chaudhary provided clear and specific evidence of each element of his
prima facie case, Ali and Dolcefino failed to rebut such a showing under section
27.003(d). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. 27.003(d).

                                 III. CONCLUSION

      We reverse the trial court’s denial of the TCPA motion to the extent it
concluded that Chaudhary established with clear and specific evidence prima facia
proof of his invasion of privacy claims against both Ali and Dolcefino (Count 4),
his intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Dolcefino (Part of
Count 7), his intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Ali based
on factual theories other than the First Bus Stop Incident (Part of Count 7), and his
tortious interference claims against both Ali and Dolcefino based on any alleged
current contract (Count 8). We otherwise affirm the trial court’s denial of Ali and
Dolcefino’s respective TCPA motions concerning Chaudry’s remaining claims,
specifically Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, part of Count 7 and Counts 9 and 10.

                                       /s/    Randy Wilson
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Hassan, and Wilson.

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