Court Opinion

ID: 9698606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:55:47.145545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.181646
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the term “statement,” as used in former Maryland Rule 741, now *87Maryland Rule 4-263, does not apply to an oral statement made by a defendant to an undercover State agent during the course of a crime.
The plain language of Rule 741 does not limit the defendant’s discovery right to only those statements made to a State agent after a crime. The “background of Md.R. 741,” which the majority relies upon in reading this limitation into the rule, does not support the majority’s result. The 1977 revision of the rule was intended to liberalize the scope of discoverable statements. Carr v. State, 284 Md. 455, 397 A.2d 606 (1979). There is no indication in any of the reports, correspondence or minutes of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, or its Criminal Rules Subcommittee, of an intent that Rule 741 embody the decision of the Court of Special Appeals in Blake v. State, 15 Md.App. 674, 292 A.2d 780, cert. denied, 266 Md. 734 (1972). There is no indication that the Rules Committee was even aware of Blake when it recommended Rule 741 to this Court. I can state with a fair degree of certainty that this Court, sitting in its rule-making capacity, did not consider Blake when adopting the rule. The history behind Rule 741 clearly shows that the only intended restriction on the discoverability of oral statements was limiting discovery to those statements made to a State agent. See White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 481 A.2d 201 (1984). The majority, in reading into the rule a limitation that the statement be made after the criminal transaction, not only goes beyond the plain language of the rule, but ignores the rule’s history.
Moreover, the out-of-state authority cited by the majority contradicts its holding. The majority cites two rules which are similar to Rule 741: the former federal rule and the former New York rule. Both were interpreted to include oral statements, such as the one in the present case, within the ambit of a defendant’s discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Crisona, 416 F.2d 107 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 961, 90 S.Ct. 993, 25 L.Ed.2d 253 (1970); People v. Zacchi, 69 Misc.2d 785, 331 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1972). The majori*88ty offers no explanation for ignoring these interpretations of similar rules. The majority does point out that, subsequent to the interpretations of the similar rules, the jurisdictions involved enacted more restrictive rules. This, however, only serves to show that the majority is approaching the issue backwards, by implying the limiting language where it does not exist, and then inviting future rule-making to delete the limitation if desired.
It may well be desirable to limit the discoverability of oral statements made by a defendant to a State agent by restricting discovery to those statements made after the crime, or to a known State agent, or both. But any change in the rule should be made by this Court in its rule-making capacity and not in its adjudicatory capacity. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.