Court Opinion

ID: 9946767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:15:28.038094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:22.846029
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 23, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0515-MR

RAMON DEJESUS AYALA                                                    APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 21-CR-00673

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Ramon Ayala, Appellant, pleaded guilty to various amended

felony charges, reserving his right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his motion

to suppress evidence. We affirm.

                                 BACKGROUND

             On June 23, 2021, Trooper Richard Ellis was assigned to enforce

traffic and speeding. However, he also worked on the Greater Hardin County
Narcotics Task Force. Trooper Ellis parked his cruiser on South Wilson Road in

Radcliffe, which was near the Brooks Market. While there, Detective Michael

Berry informed Trooper Ellis that Appellant had purchased what he believed to be

a glass pipe at Brooks Market.

             Appellant left the market alone in his vehicle. Trooper Ellis, on his

own initiative, followed. Using radar, Trooper Ellis determined Appellant was

speeding. When Appellant pulled his vehicle into a residential driveway to pick up

his girlfriend, Trooper Ellis pulled in behind Appellant and activated his lights.

             Trooper Ellis smelled marijuana when he approached Appellant’s

vehicle. He told Appellant he pulled him over for speeding. Appellant falsely

identified himself, furnishing Trooper Ellis with a paper copy of a faked Kentucky

RealID with Appellant’s picture and the false name he gave the officer. Appellant

put his hand into his left pocket, and Trooper Ellis instructed Appellant to remove

his hand; Appellant refused. Trooper Ellis then tried to open the door of the

vehicle, and Appellant shut the door with his right hand. Trooper Ellis eventually

got Appellant out of the vehicle, and arrested him for menacing. Appellant then

removed his hand from his pocket, revealing a plastic baggie of marijuana.

Trooper Ellis then searched Appellant’s vehicle.

             As the Commonwealth notes, no testimony of record reveals what

Trooper Ellis discovered when he searched Appellant’s vehicle. However, a grand

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jury indicted Appellant for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance,

possession of marijuana, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession

of drug paraphernalia, identity theft, and being a first-degree persistent felony

offender. The firearm possession charge enhanced Appellant’s trafficking and

drug possession charges.

             Appellant filed a motion to suppress, challenging the traffic stop. The

circuit court held a suppression hearing, where both Trooper Ellis and Appellant

testified. The circuit court denied the suppression motion. Appellant then entered

a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of

his motion. Appellant now so appeals.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court

considers a trial court’s findings of fact to be “conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence.” Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009)

(citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d

911 (1996)). “Substantial evidence is ‘that which, when taken alone or in light of

all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the mind of

a reasonable person.’” Hunter v. Mena, 302 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Ky. App. 2010)

(citing Bowling v. Nat’l Res. & Env’t Prot. Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Ky.

App. 1994)). However, appellate courts conduct a de novo review of the trial

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court’s application of law to its factual findings. Commonwealth v. Jones, 217

S.W.3d 190, 193 (Ky. 2006) (citing Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8

(Ky. 1998)).

                                          ANALYSIS

               Appellant argues two grounds for reversal. First, he argues that the

stop was not a legitimate traffic stop and that, if it was, Trooper Ellis lacked an

articulable basis to initiate the stop.

               In our view, it does not matter that Trooper Ellis activated his lights

and initiated his encounter with Appellant after Appellant voluntarily parked his

car in the driveway. The relevant inquiry is whether Appellant was “seized”

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. “[I]n order to determine whether a

particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the

circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct

would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to

decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Florida v.

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991)).

Because Trooper Ellis parked his cruiser behind Appellant, activated his lights, and

then approached Appellant to inform him he had been stopped for speeding, no

reasonable person in Appellant’s position would feel free to terminate the

encounter.

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             Therefore, Appellant was seized and thus the constitutional

protections of the Fourth Amendment are implicated. “The Fourth Amendment

applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief

detention short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S.

873, 878, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1975) (citing Davis v.

Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1969); Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). No matter

whether the encounter between Trooper Ellis and Appellant was treated as a traffic

stop or otherwise, the encounter constituted a temporary detention and thus

Trooper Ellis simply needed reasonable suspicion of illegal activity in order to

engage Appellant.

             “There are three types of interaction[s] between police and citizens:

consensual encounters, temporary detentions generally referred to as Terry stops,

and arrests.” Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ky. 2003)

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868). “[A] brief investigative stop [and]

detention . . . short of a traditional arrest based on reasonable suspicion does not

violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868).

“Traffic stops are similar to Terry stops and must be supported by articulable,

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Baker v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d

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633, 634 (Ky. App. 2015) (citing Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 108

(Ky. 2011)).

               Detaining officers have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a

stop where they “have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the

particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.

411, 417-18, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981) (citations omitted).

However, “the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for

probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the

evidence standard[.]” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S. Ct. 744,

751, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109

S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989)).

               Trooper Ellis plainly had a reasonable suspicion to justify engaging

Appellant – using radar, Trooper Ellis observed Appellant traveling over the speed

limit. Appellant argues that the traffic violation was a pretext for the police to stop

Appellant based on suspected illegal drug activity. Not only does the

Commonwealth decline to dispute this, it argues it is perfectly permissible for the

police to conduct a pretextual stop, so long as the officer has an articulable basis to

believe a traffic violation occurred. We agree. The Supreme Court has squarely

rejected the argument “that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops

depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren v.

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United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996). For

these reasons, the circuit court did not err when it denied Appellant’s suppression

motion as to Trooper Ellis initiating the encounter with Appellant – whether the

encounter was a traffic stop or not.

             Second, Appellant challenges the warrantless search of his vehicle.

Generally, warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated

exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.

Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted). The police may conduct a warrantless

search of an automobile “if their search is supported by probable cause.”

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L. Ed. 2d

619 (1991). Such circumstances were present here. This exception extends to

containers inside an automobile, not only the cabin of the vehicle. Id. at 574, 111

S. Ct. at 1988. The Supreme Court articulated the common-sense basis for this

exception nearly one hundred years ago in Carroll v. United States:

             [T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
             and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been
             construed, practically since the beginning of the
             government, as recognizing a necessary difference
             between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other
             structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
             readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat,
             wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
             practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be

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             quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
             the warrant must be sought.

267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).

             The smell of marijuana coming from a vehicle provides law

enforcement with the requisite probable cause to search the vehicle without a

warrant. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 776-77 (Ky. App. 2006).

Trooper Ellis testified that he plainly smelled marijuana as he approached

Appellant’s vehicle, which furnished him with probable cause to search it without

a warrant. Because Trooper Ellis had the probable cause he needed to search

Appellant’s vehicle without a warrant, the circuit court committed no error in

denying Appellant’s motion on this point.

                                 CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, we affirm Appellant’s March 22, 2022

conditional guilty plea.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Douglas E. Miller                          Daniel Cameron
 Radcliff, Kentucky                         Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Melissa A. Pile
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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