Court Opinion

ID: 9516363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:41:19.843217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:12.955892
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in result with separate opinion.
I agree with the majority's view that the trial court's grant of Crabb's motion to suppress must be reversed. However, I write separately to advance the notion that the smell of ether emanating from the apartment-regardless of the presence of the child-was enough to justify the officers warrantless entry and subsequent search of the premises. '
As I observed in my dissent in Holder v. State:
[The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is whether an individual has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. Shultz v. State, 742 N.E.2d 961, 964 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). At least one commentator has observed that 'when the police come onto private property to conduct an investigation or for some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches), observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment! 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.8(f), at 506-08 (3d ed.1996). Moreover, what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in. his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984).
A well-known exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to enter a home when it is believed that evidence may be destroyed or removed before a warrant is obtained. State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The officers must have a *1072reasonable belief that there are people within the premises who are destroying or about to destroy the evidence. Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ind.1994). In such a case, the nature of the evidence must be evanescent, and the officers must fear its imminent destruction. Id. Yet another exception to the warrant requirement arises when the risk of bodily harm or death is present, or when it is necessary to come to the aid of an individual who is in need. VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. Put another way, [tlhe need to preserve or protect life justifies what would otherwise be illegal if exigency or emergency did not exist" Vanzo v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1061, 1064 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).
824 N.E.2d 364, 370-71 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (Baker, J. dissenting).4
As the majority so aptly notes here, the production and use of methamphetamine have plagued our communities, and our law enforcement agencies are inundated with constant challenges related to methamphetamine. See op. at 1071. That said, and given the cireumstances of this case, I must agree with the State's contention that the smell of ether outside the apartment constituted exigent cireumstances sufficient to permit the warrantless entry of Crabb's residence. The presence of a child in the apartment certainly is an important factor, but I decline to accept the notion that the officers could not have entered the residence "but for" the presence of the youngster. Hence, I vote to reverse the trial court's grant of the motion to suppress.

. Our Supreme Court granted transfer in this case on April 28, 2005, although a written opinion has yet to be issued. See Holder v. State, 831 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.2005). In the previous appeal decided by this court, the majority declared that "[blecause the State failed to meet its burden to prove that [the officer's] actions were reasonable when he positioned himself to smell the odor [of ether] emanating from the basement window, it failed to demonstrate that the officer's actions comported with [Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution]. Accordingly, the evidence obtained from the search should have been suppressed." Holder, 824 N.E.2d at 368.