Court Opinion

ID: 9757724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:56:58.312117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:43.633121
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
The principal opinion holds that Mar-giotta’s wrongful discharge claim fails because the regulations cited do not proscribe the specific conduct Margiotta reported to his superiors. Such specificity is not required. What is required is that the regulation express a clear and important public policy. The regulations *349in this case express a clear and important public policy requiring hospitals to take steps to ensure patient safety. Procedures that result in patients being dropped off tables unquestionably involve matters included in the hospital’s regulatory obligation to provide a safe environment for its patients. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo.App.1985), the court held that the public policy exception to at-will employment “provides that an at-will employee who has been discharged by an employer in violation of a clear mandate of public policy has a cause of action against the employer for wrongful discharge.” The clear mandate of public policy finds its source “in the letter and purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme ...” Kirk v. Mercy Hosp. Tri-County, 851 S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo.App.1993)(quoting Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871). There is nothing in this longstanding formulation of the wrongful discharge action requiring a plaintiff to identify a regulation specifically proscribing the reported conduct. To the contrary, the cases recognize that a wrongful discharge action can be based on reported conduct that is prohibited by not only the “letter” of the law but also by the “purpose” of the law. This formulation of the wrongful discharge action recognizes the reality that many valid statutes or regulations provide general guidelines designed to regulate the unpredictable and nearly infinite array of specific fact patterns that fit within the regulatory purpose of the law. By requiring a plaintiff to identify a regulation that specifically proscribes the reported conduct, the principal opinion eliminates wrongful discharge actions based on conduct that, while not specifically proscribed by a regulation, is nonetheless clearly contrary to the purpose of the regulation. In these cases, the general statute or regulation, and therefore the definition of “public policy,” becomes clear when applied to the facts of a particular case.
The principal opinion avoids this conclusion by relying in large part on Lay v. St. Louis Helicopter Airways, Inc., 869 S.W.2d 173 (Mo.App.1993), to conclude that the regulation in this case is “too vague” and that Margiotta’s claim fails because he does not identify a regulation specifically proscribing the conduct at issue. Lay did not hold that the regulations at issue in that case were “too vague” to support a wrongful discharge action. Instead, Lay held that the pilot could not state a claim for wrongful discharge because the regulation did not (1) specifically prohibit the employer from discharging the pilot and (2) did not subject the pilot to criminal sanctions if he engaged in the activity required by the employer. Id. Neither of these conclusions is valid.
Lay cited no authority for this requirement that the regulation underlying a wrongful discharge action specifically must prohibit the employer from discharging the employee. If the regulation must prohibit the employer from discharging the employee, there would be no need for a common law wrongful discharge action because the employee’s “remedy would flow from any such alleged violation” of the regulation. Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 620.
Similarly, there is no requirement that the regulation must subject the employee to criminal sanctions. Instead, as stated in Boyle, the regulation must express a clear mandate of public policy. While criminal sanctions are one means of enforcing public policy, public policy also can be enforced through mechanisms such as civil fines, injunctions or disciplinary action against a professional license. See, e.g., Kirk, 851 S.W.2d at 621 (failure to comply *350with nursing regulations exposed nurse to professional license discipline). The rationale in Lay is inconsistent with the purpose of the wrongful discharge cause of action and should not be followed.
In this case, the federal and state regulations cited by Margiotta set forth a clear mandate that hospitals adopt procedures to ensure their patients’ safety. These general safety concerns are illustrated specifically by Margiotta’s allegation that unsafe patient transfer practices caused a patient to be dropped off a table. There is no dispute that dropping patients poses a threat to patient safety. The importance of these regulations is magnified because many patients must rely entirely on the hospital employees to ensure that their right to basic personal safety and sustenance is met. An unconscious or incapacitated patient may be in no position to assert his or her right to safety or even recognize that safety has been compromised. Margiotta reported violations of safety regulations that constitute clear mandates of public policy. He should be given an opportunity to prove his case to a jury. I would reverse the grant of summary judgment to the defendants in this case.