Court Opinion

ID: 9913530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 00:12:56.408933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:18.127672
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

                               PEOPLE OF GUAM,
                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                              v.

                                 RINEXT RIOSEN,
                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                          Supreme Court Case No. CRA22-009
                          Superior Court Case No. CF0298-19

                                         OPINION

                               Cite as: 2023 Guam 23

                        Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
                        Argued and submitted on August 11, 2023
                                    Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant:                 Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee:
Peter C. Perez, Esq.                               Marianne Woloschuk, Esq.
Law Office of Peter C. Perez                       Assistant Attorney General
DNA Bldg.                                          Office of the Attorney General
238 Archbishop Flores St., Ste.802                 Prosecution Division
Hagåtña, GU 96910                                  590 S. Marine Corps Dr.
                                                   Tamuning, GU 96913
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                               Page 2 of 18

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice;
and KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.

MARAMAN, J.:

[1]     This is an appeal from a jury verdict convicting Defendant-Appellant Rinext Riosen of

three counts of First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC I”) and three corresponding

Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations for engaging in sexual penetration or intercourse with a

victim under the age of fourteen.1 This case began when V.F., the twelve-year-old daughter of

Riosen’s then partner, was discovered to be pregnant and claimed Riosen was the father. Although

Riosen was accused of continuous and repeated criminal sexual conduct that began when V.F. was

six years old, the People charged him with only three counts of CSC I—one count for when V.F.

became pregnant at eleven years old, one count when she was ten, and one count when she was

nine.

[2]     Riosen’s appeal first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his three CSC I

convictions. He makes a novel challenge to the sufficiency of certain DNA evidence underlying

one conviction where V.F. has also accused Riosen’s brother of sexual abuse. His other arguments

focus on the sufficiency of V.F.’s testimony at trial to support the two remaining CSC I

convictions. He also argues the sentencing enhancement for the Vulnerable Victim Special

Allegation violates double jeopardy.

[3]     We affirm.

//

//

        1
            Riosen was also convicted of three counts of Second Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (“CSC II”), which
the trial court temporarily suspended “for purposes of sentencing and any appeal.” Record on Appeal (“RA”), tab 134
at 3 (Judgment, Aug. 29, 2022).
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                    Page 3 of 18

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

[4]     V.F.’s mother was in a relationship with Riosen, who moved in with them when V.F. was

a young child. There are allegations that Riosen began sexually abusing V.F. when she was six

years old. From that time, Riosen is alleged to have repeatedly sexually abused her on an almost

continuous basis. At some point, Riosen’s brother Rimpas Riosen (“Rimpas”) also began living

in their shared household. There are allegations that Rimpas also repeatedly abused V.F. sexually,

and there was a warrant out for his arrest on CSC charges at the time of Riosen’s trial.

[5]     Around the time of V.F.’s twelfth birthday, she began showing signs of pregnancy. In May

2019, V.F. saw a school nurse who, upon performing an examination, suspected she was pregnant.

The school promptly called the police, and both V.F. and the school nurse were interviewed. V.F.

told the police that she was “raped” by Riosen, and that’s “how [she] got pregnant.” Transcript

(“Tr.”) at 60 (Jury Trial – Day 2, Dec. 22, 2021).

[6]     Two months later, V.F. gave birth to a child, M.G.F. Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

subsequently took custody of M.G.F, and the Family Court ordered a paternity test to identify

M.G.F.’s biological father. M.G.F. was adopted by V.F.’s foster family.

[7]     Two charges were brought against Riosen; relevant to this appeal is his indictment on

Charge One for three counts of CSC I, each enhanced with a Special Allegation of a Vulnerable

Victim. Charge Two, which is not at issue in this appeal, indicted Riosen on three counts of CSC

II, also with Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations.

[8]     V.F. testified at trial. On direct examination when asked, “How did you get pregnant with

[M.G.F]?”, V.F. replied, “I got raped. . . . By Rinext Riosen.” Tr. at 54 (Jury Trial – Day 2). After

eliciting testimony that V.F. was being abused by Riosen, Rimpas, and others, the People asked

how she knew that Riosen caused her pregnancy. V.F. responded, “Because he did it many times.”
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                  Page 4 of 18

Id. at 55. The People clarified, asking, “Was he raping you more than one time in 2018?”, to which

V.F. replied, “Yes.” Id.

[9]     Much of the appellate briefs and oral argument focused on V.F.’s testimony, especially her

use of the word “rape.” Although the parties disagree about the context in which the word was

used and the inferences that can be drawn from it, the record shows V.F. also testified that she did

“have sex” with Riosen:

                Q       Did you have sex with him after you were pregnant?

                A       No.

               Q       Okay. How about the year before that in 2017, when you were about
        ten years old?

                A       Yes (spoken softly).

                Q       I can’t hear you, sorry.

                A       Yes (in louder voice).

                Q       Okay. Was it more than one time or one time?

                A       More than one time.

                Q       What about the year before that, 2016, when you were nine?

                A       Yes.

Id. at 55–56.

[10]    The prosecution then seems to have switched to a new line of questioning, asking when

Riosen “started doing things” to V.F. Id. at 56. She responded, “He started when I was six-and-

a-half.” Id. After some clarification, the prosecution then asked, “Did it start off with – with sex

things, or was it other stuff?”, to which V.F. replied, “Um, other stuff.” Id.

[11]    Mokihana Kahele, the CPS social worker assigned to V.F.’s case, testified as well. She

unambiguously stated, “I recall her disclosing that she was sexually abused since she was six years
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                                   Page 5 of 18

old.” Tr. at 51 (Jury Trial – Day 1, Dec. 21, 2021). When asked “did she say when the, I guess

penetration, started?”, she responded, “Six years old.” Id. (emphasis added). When asked to

elaborate, Ms. Kahele stated that “[V.F.] was very descriptive about the sexual encounters with

Mr. Rinext Riosen . . . .” Id.2

[12]     As part of their case-in-chief, the People also called an expert witness, Dr. Eric O’Neill, to

testify about the paternity of M.G.F. Dr. O’Neill evaluated the genetic profiles of Riosen and

M.G.F., authoring a report outlining the estimated probabilities of Riosen’s paternity.                            He

concluded that “[Rinext] Riosen is most likely the . . . biological father of this child. The likelihood

is eighteen million times more likely that he is the biological father of the child than a random man

in the population.” Tr. at 16 (Jury Trial – Day 2). When told that the question was not whether a

random man in the population was the father, but how much more likely it was that the Defendant

was the father rather than his brother Rimpas, Dr. O’Neill testified that he couldn’t rule out Rimpas

“completely.” Id. at 18.

[13]     Dr. O’Neill also admitted on cross-examination that he was only “able to get a small Chuuk

frequency database of fifty-four samples put together from our larger database. The database is

much smaller than the number of what we would normally use, normally two hundred, and these

Chuuk frequencies therefore have a larger sampling error than one from a larger data set.” Id. at

25.3 Despite this, Dr. O’Neill stated that even without Rimpas’s DNA profile,4 the allegations

         2
           Although this testimony might raise hearsay issues, it was not objected to at trial and is not challenged on
appeal; as such, it can be properly considered in a sufficiency challenge. See People v. Camacho, 2016 Guam 37 ¶
45 (“[E]rroneously admitted evidence is properly considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.”); see
also People v. Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17 ¶ 23 (affirming sufficiency of evidence on testimony that raised hearsay
issues but was not objected to, was heard by the jury, and is part of the record).
         3
          Dr. O’Neill’s original report was authored under the incorrect assumption that Riosen was of Cherokee
descent. Tr. at 24 (Jury Trial – Day 2, Dec. 22, 2021).
         4
           No sample was obtained from Rimpas, presumably because he had been effectively avoiding his active
arrest warrant.
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                    Page 6 of 18

against him did “not much” change his opinion about Riosen’s paternity. Id. at 18. He stated there

was a “perfect match” across the 21 genetic markers he compared between Riosen and M.G.F.,

and that although there was a non-zero chance of an uncle matching every marker, “ninety-nine

percent of the time would you see . . . [a]t least one mismatch between the child and the uncle.”

Id. at 18–19.

[14]    The jury found Riosen guilty on all charges. He received a sentence of 25 years of

imprisonment for each CSC I conviction and 5 years for each Special Allegation, ordered to run

consecutively for a total of 90 years. Riosen timely appealed.

                                          II. JURISDICTION

[15]    We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment of conviction under 48 U.S.C.A.

§ 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 118-23 (2023)); 7 GCA §§ 3107 and 3108(a) (2005);

and 8 GCA §§ 130.10 and 130.15(a) (2005).

                                   III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[16]    “When a defendant raises the sufficiency of the evidence by a motion for judgment of

acquittal, the court reviews the trial court’s denial of the motion de novo.” People v. Pinaula, 2023

Guam 2 ¶ 58 (citing People v. Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 9). “Our review of evidentiary sufficiency is

de novo, but it is ‘highly deferential’ to the findings of the trier of fact.” People v. Rachulap, 2022

Guam 9 ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Song, 2021 Guam 14 ¶ 18). “‘[W]e review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the People and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime[] beyond a reasonable doubt,’ affording to the People ‘the

strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom.’” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Wia, 2020 Guam 17 ¶ 35). “We measure
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                  Page 7 of 18

only the ‘existence or non-existence of evidence, not its weight.’” Id. (quoting People v. Martin,

2018 Guam 7 ¶ 23).

[17]    “Alleged violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution are reviewed de novo.” People v. McKinney, 2018 Guam 10 ¶ 9. A double jeopardy

claim requires us to discern legislative intent under the applicable charging statutes, which we

review de novo. People v. Reselap, 2022 Guam 2 ¶¶ 13–14.

                                          IV. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[18]    American law rests on this bedrock: A criminal defendant has the right to acquittal if the

prosecution fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his guilt on every element of the charged

crime. See People v. Perry, 2009 Guam 4 ¶ 33. Once a guilty verdict is rendered, the defendant’s

prior presumption of innocence is replaced with a presumption of guilt. People v. Moses, 2022

Guam 17 ¶ 17; People v. George, 2012 Guam 22 ¶ 50 (per curiam). Courts do not assess witness

credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or weigh evidence; these roles are solely within the

domain of the jury. People v. Acosta, 2022 Guam 11 ¶ 49; People v. Song, 2012 Guam 21 ¶ 29.

        1. Riosen’s conviction on Charge One, Count One is supported by sufficient
           evidence, and his paternity is irrelevant

[19]    Riosen claims there is insufficient evidence on the element of sexual penetration to support

his conviction on Count One of CSC I because “V.F. did not testify to sexual penetration or sexual

intercourse” but rather to unspecified “rapes.” Appellant’s Br. at 17–18 (Jan. 24, 2023). He also

contends that “[w]hile there was evidence of pregnancy and delivery of a child,” because the

evidence permitted two possible conclusions about paternity, the jury was required to conclude

that Riosen was not the father of M.G.F. Id. at 21.
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                  Page 8 of 18

[20]    “A sufficiency of the evidence analysis evaluates whether there is enough direct or

circumstantial evidence presented so reasonable inferences may be drawn supporting each element

of the crime charged.” Pinaula, 2023 Guam 2 ¶ 62 (emphasis added). “[E]vidence sufficient to

support a guilty verdict may be entirely circumstantial, and the factfinder is free to choose among

reasonable interpretations of the evidence.” People v. Perez, 2021 Guam 18 ¶ 28 (alteration in

original) (quoting United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 85 (1st Cir. 2008)).

[21]    The element of sexual penetration is defined as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio,

anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any

object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not

required.” 9 GCA § 25.10(a)(10) (2005). It is well settled that “the testimony of a sexual assault

victim does not need to be corroborated, and a victim’s testimony alone can support a criminal

sexual conduct conviction.” People v. Bosi, 2022 Guam 15 ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Perez, 2015

Guam 10 ¶ 36). “While evidence of sexual penetration must be present, there are no magic words

that need to be stated at trial. The element of penetration may be inferred based on the totality of

evidence.” People v. Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11 ¶ 19 (emphasis added). “Although specificity when

testifying is always preferable, a general description of the events does not necessarily defeat any

possibility that penetration occurred. It is not reasonable to expect a fourteen-year-old victim to

speak as knowledgeably about her anatomical structure as an adult.” People v. Mendiola, 2014

Guam 17 ¶ 22.

[22]    We reject Riosen’s argument because it recycles the same meritless proposition we have

rejected before—the victim was not required to say the magic words “penetration” or “intercourse”

at trial. See Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11 ¶ 19; Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17 ¶ 21; People v. Aguon, 2020

Guam 24 ¶ 17. “The term ‘rape’ is the common English word for the conduct charged in Guam
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                   Page 9 of 18

as ‘first-degree criminal sexual conduct.’” Moses, 2022 Guam 17 ¶ 60 (quoting People v. Torre,

68 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1995)). Although it is conceivable that a victim’s use of the word

“rape” may not establish penetration in every case, in the context of the rest of V.F.’s testimony,

it carries a strong implication that intercourse occurred. See Haney v. State, 242 S.E.2d 757, 757–

58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (“Although the appellant urges that the victim’s use of the word ‘rape’ did

not clearly establish penetration as required under [the statute], we hold that in the context of the

rest of her testimony the statement [he ‘laid me down on the back seat and raped me’] carried with

it a rather strong implication that intercourse had in fact occurred.”); see also Clay v. State, 518

S.W.2d 550, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (“We conclude that the prosecutrix’ testimony that

appellant was the ‘man that raped me’ was sufficient to prove penetration.”). But see State v.

Pember, No. 19AP-880, 2021-Ohio-2939, at ¶¶ 35–36 (observing penetration can be inferred from

victim’s testimony that “he raped me,” but such testimony fails to describe events with sufficient

clarity to establish offender’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt).

[23]    The first time V.F. used the word “rape” in her testimony was in response to the question

“How did you get pregnant with [M.G.F.]?”, to which she unambiguously stated, “I got raped.”

Tr. at 54 (Jury Trial – Day 2). The prosecution continued, “You said that Rinext was the one that

was raping you when you got pregnant. How do you know that?”, to which V.F. responded,

“Because he did it many times.” Id. at 55. There is no ambiguity in this testimony that V.F.’s use

of the word “rape” carries a strong implication of sexual intercourse—Riosen’s penis penetrating

V.F.’s vagina, sometimes with the emission of semen.

[24]    Riosen’s argument about paternity also lacks merit. The jury was not required to find

beyond a reasonable doubt that Riosen was the father of M.G.F. because causing pregnancy is

neither an element of CSC I nor a special allegation. Compare 9 GCA § 25.15 (as amended by
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                  Page 10 of 18

Guam Pub. L. 32-012:2 (Apr. 11, 2013)), and 9 GCA § 80.37.3 (added by P.L. 32-143:2 (Apr. 28,

2014)), with State v. Juarez-Garcia, No. 70643-8-I, 184 Wash. App. 1026, at *1 n.2 (2014)

(unpublished) (“A trial court may impose an exceptional sentence where a jury finds beyond a

reasonable doubt that ‘[t]he offense resulted in the pregnancy of a child victim of rape.’” (quoting

Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.94A.535(3)(i) (West 2013))). As a victim’s testimony need not be

corroborated, it is irrelevant whether V.F. is mistaken in her belief that her pregnancy was caused

by the multiple instances of sexual intercourse with Riosen she testified occurred in 2018. Even

if we accepted the unlikely proposition that Riosen is not the biological father of M.G.F., this does

not negate V.F.’s testimony that he engaged in penetrative sex with her multiple times in 2018.

[25]    Riosen was not on trial for fathering a child; with regards to Count One, he was tried and

convicted for committing sexual penetration against a child under the age of fourteen. As there is

sufficient evidence of sexual penetration on Count One, we affirm this conviction.

        2. The evidence adequately supports two additional acts of sexual penetration near
           the indictment’s dates

[26]    Riosen seems to argue that there is insufficient evidence he penetrated V.F. in 2016 or

2017. See Appellant’s Br. at 16. But time is not an essential element of CSC I. People v. Sablan,

2023 Guam 4 ¶ 51. Thus, “[p]roof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the

statute of limitations is sufficient.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Taitano, 2015

Guam 33 ¶ 16). “[T]he People need only demonstrate that the crime occurred on a date reasonably

near the one alleged in the indictment.” Taitano, 2015 Guam 33 ¶ 16. For Charge One, Counts

Two and Three, the prosecution needed to prove two “separate instances” of sexual penetration

that occurred reasonably near the dates alleged in the indictment. See People v. Callahan, 2022

Guam 13 ¶¶ 22–27 (holding there was sufficient evidence to support two counts of CSC I where

victim testified that vaginal penetration and oral sex occurred “multiple times” at “both houses”
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                                   Page 11 of 18

because “a reasonable jury could find there was at least one instance of vaginal penetration at the

house on Andersen Air Force Base and at the house in Yigo”); see also Martin, 2018 Guam 7 ¶¶

20–21 (requiring prosecution to prove “two distinct acts” of sexual penetration “separated in

time”).

[27]      The prosecution’s decision to charge Riosen with three counts that were each tied to the

age of V.F. seems to have been an attempt to bring multiple counts that could be proven as

“separate instances” where the defendant was accused of years of continuing and repeated criminal

sexual conduct.5 This strategy was consistent with our holding in People v. Callahan that in cases

of repeat sexual abuse of a child, a “separate instance” of penetration can be shown by tying each

count to a salient fact in the victim’s life. See 2022 Guam 13 ¶ 26; see also People v. Campbell,

2006 Guam 14 ¶ 27 (“[A] conviction may be upheld as long as the child victim is able to testify as

to a general time period and, more importantly, the specific sexual acts which occurred . . . .”);

State v. Hodgdon, 2017 ME 122, ¶ 20, 164 A.3d 959, 964-65 (holding that because some counts

required jury to find certain offenses “occurred before the victim’s fourteenth birthday” and others

occurred after, “the dates in the indictment together with her birthday provide clear guideposts

upon which the jury could assess the evidence presented, despite the victim’s testimony that the

sexual acts occurred over a long period of time”); State v. Bershon, 983 N.W.2d 490, 499 (Neb.

          5
            We recognize that a single count of CSC I may seem unsatisfactory when a defendant is accused of years
of constant abuse; serial abusers should not be afforded a defense that because their conduct was so pervasive, it is
too difficult to prove any specific act of penetration. However, we also emphasize that “a prosecutor has a duty ‘to
charge only those offenses she believes she can prove beyond a reasonable doubt.’” People v. Lopez, 462 P.3d 499,
512 (Cal. 2020). We echo the admonition of the Utah Court of Appeals:
                   We recognize that testifying about a sexual assault is traumatic for the victim. But the
          State has the burden of “proving by evidence every essential element” of the charged crime. We
          urge prosecutors to adduce specific testimony regarding each and every element of such crimes to
          ensure that a jury’s guilty verdict rests not on speculation but on clear evidence sufficient to find
          beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime charged. Cf. People v. Paz, 217
          Cal. Rptr. 3d 212, 223 (Ct. App. 2017) (“We caution prosecutors not to use vague, euphemistic
          language and to ask follow-up questions where necessary.”).
State v. Patterson, 2017 UT App 194, ¶ 12 n.2, 407 P.3d 1002 (first and second citations omitted).
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                 Page 12 of 18

2023) (“[Defendant] highlights inconsistencies in [the victim]’s testimony. He notes that she gave

different definitions of what she considered ‘a lot’ and that on cross-examination, when she was

asked specific questions as to whether an incident occurred in each year from 2006 through 2017,

she responded that she did not remember. We acknowledge these inconsistencies in [the victim]’s

testimony, but as set forth above, [she] testified that the sexual conduct occurred ‘throughout the

years from 2006 to 2018’ and that ‘it happened every year.’ Thus, there was evidence from which

the jury could find that sexual conduct occurred in each year from 2006 through 2018, and any

inconsistency goes to the credibility of [the victim]’s testimony.”).

[28]    We turn now to whether there was sufficient evidence of two separate instances of sexual

penetration that occurred reasonably near the dates alleged in the indictment to sustain Riosen’s

convictions on Counts Two and Three. When ruling on a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, this court is “concerned with the mere existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its

weight.” Perez, 2021 Guam 18 ¶ 28. It is the jury’s role “to draw reasonable inferences from

basic facts to ultimate facts,” People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 70 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)), and as such, “[j]urors may make reasonable inferences, apply common

sense, and consider matters of common knowledge,” Perez, 2021 Guam 18 ¶ 28.

[29]    Our sufficiency-of-the-evidence test is derived from the United States Supreme Court’s

landmark decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). People v. Cruz, 1998 Guam 18 ¶

9 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “Jackson . . . establishes a two-step inquiry for considering a

challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. First, a reviewing court must

consider the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” United

States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “Jackson

leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                   Page 13 of 18

trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’”

Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

[30]    This deferential standard does not permit appellate courts to engage in “fine-grained factual

parsing” because it “unduly impinge[s] on the jury’s role as factfinder.” Id. An appellate court

“may not usurp the role of the finder of fact by considering how it would have resolved the

conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial.” Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164.

“Rather, when ‘faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences’ a

reviewing court ‘must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the

trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that

resolution.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326); see also, e.g., Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069,

1078 (Ind. 2015) (“It is not within the purview of this Court to reverse the jury’s verdict simply

because a ‘more reasonable’ inference could be made. Rather, the fact that a conflicting inference

can be made is controlling.” (footnote and citation omitted)).

[31]    “Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the

reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed, is adequate to allow ‘any

rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164 (alterations in original) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). As the Ninth

Circuit has articulated:

                 Because the government does not need to rebut all reasonable
        interpretations of the evidence that would establish the defendant’s innocence, or
        “rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” at the
        first step of Jackson, a reviewing court may not ask whether a finder of fact could
        have construed the evidence produced at trial to support acquittal. Only after we
        have construed all the evidence at trial in favor of the prosecution do we take the
        second step, and determine whether the evidence at trial, including any evidence of
        innocence, could allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the
        crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                 Page 14 of 18

Id. at 1164–65 (footnote and citations omitted).

[32]    A reading of V.F.’s testimony in a light most favorable to the prosecution is: (1) yes, V.F.

did have sex more than one time with Rinext Riosen in 2017, when she was ten years old, and (2)

yes, V.F. did have sex with Rinext Riosen in 2016, when she was nine. See Tr. at 55–56 (Jury

Trial – Day 2). The question then becomes whether it was reasonable to infer from the testimony

of “having sex” that “penetration” or “sexual intercourse” occurred. Other courts agree such an

inference is reasonable: “One can reasonably infer that to have sex, there is penetration of the

female sex organ.” Smith v. State, 60 S.W.3d 885, 890 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); see also People v.

Torres, 2015 IL App (1st) 132206-U, ¶ 25 (unpublished) (“The use of the word ‘sex’ to denote an

act of penetration is ubiquitous in common usage. The trial court could reasonably infer, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that when defendant stated that he wished to ‘have sex’ he meant he wished to

commit an act of penetration.”).

[33]    The unobjected-to testimony of Ms. Kahele clarifies whatever ambiguities Riosen claims

on appeal about the meaning of “it,” “he,” “sex things,” and “other stuff.” Appellant’s Br. at 16–

17. Based on the jury verdict, it must be assumed that the jury credited Kahele’s testimony that

V.F. “was very descriptive about the sexual encounters with Mr. Rinext Riosen” and that

“penetration started” when V.F. was six years old. Tr. at 51 (Jury Trial – Day 1); see Nevils, 598

F.3d at 1170 (stating that where jury was entitled to make credibility determination, court must

assume it did so in a way that supports their verdict).

[34]    The “logical leap” made by the jury in inferring sexual penetration from the totality of the

evidence was minimal. Cf. Perez, 2021 Guam 18 ¶ 31 (“[A] logical leap by the factfinders would

be based on ‘suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or

guess work.’” (quoting People v. Davis, 303 P.3d 1179, 1183 (Cal. 2013))). Application of
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                   Page 15 of 18

Jackson’s second step is straightforward. A rational trier of fact could find the element of sexual

penetration beyond a reasonable doubt because it is reasonable to infer that there was penetration

when Riosen had sex with V.F. many times in 2017. Under Callahan, this was a separate instance

of sexual penetration than the “rape” referred to in 2018. The record also supports a finding of a

third separate instance of sexual penetration because V.F. also testified to having sex with Riosen

in 2016, and a rational juror could have found penetration based on this testimony because of the

same reasonable inference. See People v. Wesen, 2022 Guam 18 ¶ 38 n.5 (“[The victim] testified

that [defendant] had sex with her at least once during each of the time frames charged in the

indictment . . . . As the ‘direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient

proof of any fact,’ [the victim]’s testimony about the charged acts was legally sufficient.”

(emphasis and internal citations omitted)).

[35]    We reject Riosen’s invitation to engage in “fine-grained factual parsing” of V.F.’s

testimony because it “unduly impinge[s] on the jury’s role as factfinder.” See Coleman, 566 U.S.

at 655. Review of the evidence in its entirety suggests that the jury did not act irrationally. See

Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17 ¶ 27. V.F.’s testimony, along with Ms. Kahele’s testimony, gave the

trier of fact a complete description of the years of abuse Riosen subjected V.F. to, including

“raping” her during each year alleged in the indictment. See id.; see also Wesen, 2022 Guam 18 ¶

38 n.5. Although V.F. did not explicitly testify that Riosen “penetrated” her, the jury may consider

all evidence to infer sexual penetration. See Mendiola, 2014 Guam 17 ¶ 27. There were no “magic

words” she needed to recite at trial. See id. ¶ 21 (quoting Enriquez, 2014 Guam 11 ¶ 19). Riosen’s

claim that the record lacks evidence showing sexual penetration is incorrect. See id. ¶ 28. “[T]he

record contains multiple testimonial statements from which, when viewed as a whole, a reasonable

inference of penetration may be drawn.” Id. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                  Page 16 of 18

People, a rational trier of fact could have found sexual penetration, an essential element of CSC I,

beyond a reasonable doubt.

[36]     Riosen’s convictions on Charge One, Counts Two and Three are affirmed.

B. Double Jeopardy

[37]     Riosen argues that the Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations attached to his CSC I

convictions under 9 GCA § 25.15 violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Appellant’s Br. at 22–25. He claims “the two statutes in effect punish the same offense. . . . based

upon sexual penetration and the victim’s age being below 14.” Appellant’s Br. at 24. Although

he acknowledges that the legislature may authorize multiple punishments, he claims “it is unclear

whether the legislature has expressly authorized multiple punishments under the relevant statutes.”

Id. He urges this court to apply the Blockburger same-elements test to vacate his convictions. Id.

at 23.

[38]     “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to Guam by the

Organic Act . . . , provides that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb.’” Reselap, 2022 Guam 2 ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Afaisen, 2016 Guam 31

¶ 12). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against successive criminal punishments for the same

crime. Id. (quoting People v. San Nicolas, 2001 Guam 4 ¶ 8). As the Ninth Circuit explains:

         [T]he Supreme Court made clear that the protection against multiple punishments
         for the same offense [does] not necessarily preclude cumulative punishments in a
         single prosecution. The key to determining whether multiple charges and
         punishments violate double jeopardy is legislative intent. When the legislature
         intends to impose multiple punishments, double jeopardy is not invoked.

Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1204 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S.

359, 366, 68–69 (1983)). When the legislature has specifically authorized cumulative punishment
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                                Page 17 of 18

under two statutes, it is unnecessary to ask whether those two statutes proscribed the same conduct

under the Blockburger test. People v. Torres, 2008 Guam 26 ¶ 40 (citing Hunter, 459 U.S. 359).

[39]    The sentencing enhancement Riosen challenges is found in 9 GCA § 80.37.3, which states:

“Whoever commits or attempts to commit upon a vulnerable victim, a violent felony as defined in

9 GCA, § 80.70 . . . shall, in addition to the sentence imposed for the commission of such felony,

be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years nor more than twenty-five years . . . .” 9 GCA

§ 80.37.3(a) (emphasis omitted). A vulnerable victim is defined to include “a child who is thirteen

years old or younger . . . .” 9 GCA § 80.37.3(c)(2). First degree criminal sexual conduct is listed

as a violent felony under 9 GCA § 80.70(a)(2)(F).6

[40]    Riosen argues that under the Fifth Amendment, he should not have received enhanced

punishment for committing CSC I against a child younger than thirteen when the underlying

felony, as charged against him, already included the age of the victim as an element of the offense.

See Appellant’s Br. at 21–25. The Guam Legislature could have explicitly excluded from the

reach of 9 GCA § 80.37.3 any of the seven circumstances that make sexual penetration CSC I, but

it chose not to do so. See People v. Moses, 2016 Guam 17 ¶ 14. We find the meaning of 9 GCA

§ 80.37.3 to be plain and clear on its face, applying to all those who commit CSC I against a child

victim younger than thirteen. The Legislature intended for the special allegation to apply, even

where the underlying felony included the victim’s age as an element. See id. “Since legislative

intent is not ambiguous here, there is no need to apply the Blockburger analysis.” Id. ¶ 16.

[41]    Riosen’s convictions for CSC I under 9 GCA § 25.15(a)(1) and for the Vulnerable Victim

Special Allegations under 9 GCA § 80.37.3 do not violate double jeopardy. See id. ¶ 15.

        6
            Although 9 GCA § 80.70(a)(2) defines “violent crime[s],” CSC I “is a felony in the first degree,” 9 GCA §
25.15(b).
People v. Riosen, 2023 Guam 23, Opinion                                                Page 18 of 18

                                          V. CONCLUSION

[42]    The Superior Court did not err when it denied Riosen’s motion for judgment of acquittal

because there was sufficient evidence of sexual penetration to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict on

each count of CSC I. And the Vulnerable Victim Special Allegations do not violate double

jeopardy. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

                    /s/                                               /s/
         F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO                              KATHERINE A. MARAMAN
             Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice

                                                  /s/
                                          ROBERT J. TORRES
                                             Chief Justice