Court Opinion

ID: 9529357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:07.908284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:44.830945
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Chief Justice,
concurring in judgment.
The court affirms today the trial court’s judgment which permanently enjoins the wholesaler, City Vending, from selling cigarettes within the State without a license. While I do not accede to the court’s pronouncement, I concur insofar as the court declares that the Oklahoma Tax Commission’s [Commission] order, which assessed a cigarette excise tax against the wholesaler and revoked its license, is not facially void for want of subject matter *103jurisdiction. I am writing separately (a) to give prominence to that part of the court’s opinion which discusses the consequences of our Dow Jones’1 teaching that an agency is powerless to pass on the constitutionality of a statute, and (b) to emphasize that an appeal directly from a final agency order is necessary to preserve the aggrieved party’s constitutional challenge left unresolved in the process of administrative adjudication.
I recede from the notion that the Commission order under scrutiny here is totally free offacial infirmity apparent from the agency proceedings. In my view an excessive exercise of taxing power may be inferred from even a casual inspection of these proceedings. This conclusion flows from the Commission’s undifferentiated procedural approach to taxing (at the wholesale transaction level) all cigarette sales to Indian tribes. The critical assessment in contest here may well have included some portion attributable to federally exempt intratribal sales. While the face of the Commission’s proceedings is far from simon-pure, the infirmity does not make the critical agency order facially void. At a maximum, the assessment in question might be viewed as partly excessive or improperly burdened by the possible inclusion of an unauthorized levy component. But even if the agency order could be perceived as an adjudication in excess of the Commission’s unquestionable power to levy a cigarette excise tax,2 its assessment in contest here is not facially invalid. It could hence stand impervious to collateral attack launched by the taxpayer in the district court action for injunctive relief.
I
FAILURE TO RAISE AN UNRESOLVED CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE BY APPEAL BROUGHT DIRECTLY FROM AN ADVERSE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKES THE AGENCY ORDER IMPERVIOUS TO A LATER COLLATERAL ATTACK ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
Dow Jones3 teaches that constitutional challenges lie outside the adjudicative competence of administrative agencies. Under pre-Dow Jones practice, it was clearly understood that on an agency’s failure to consider a constitutional challenge, the aggrieved party had to appeal lest the decision become final.4 Dow Jones does not *104disturb that time-honored rule of practice.
An agency's want of competence to resolve a constitutional attack does not enable a party aggrieved by its decision to delay the challenge past a timely appeal. One may not wait beyond an agency order’s finality to assert a claim of constitutional infirmity.
City Vending did not appeal from the Commission’s order; rather, it pressed the order’s constitutional infirmity as a defense against the district court injunction. Since the assessment in contest is not facially void5 City Vending’s failure timely to appeal makes that agency decision final and the interposed district court defense an impermissible collateral attack.
II
THE COMMISSION’S UNDIFFERENTIATED PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO TAXING CIGARETTES FOR SALE TO INDIAN TRIBES AT THE WHOLESALE TRANSACTION LEVEL IS AT BEST AN EXCESS RATHER THAN ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION
The administrative law judge’s findings show the contested assessment against City Vending to be for the sale of cigarettes at the wholesale transaction level to “Indians and/or Indian tribes” for “resale” and “consumption within the State” and for “failing to affix thereto cigarette excise tax stamps.” City Vending’s license was revoked for distributing cigarettes without the required tax stamp. It is apparent on the face of the Commission proceedings that its procedure did not distinguish between two distinct taxing categories — the ultimate sales to tribal and nontribal members. From this undifferentiated procedural approach one could infer an infirmity apparent upon the face of the proceedings. The Commission may have indeed exceeded its taxing power by including in the contested assessment transactions that qualify as federally exempt intratribal sales. But even if intratribal sales were in fact improperly taxed, their inclusion would not create a facial invalidity. The Commission’s exercise of such unauthorized power is, at most, an act in excess but not in the absence of its jurisdiction.
A.
The Distinction Between Excess and Absence of Jurisdiction
The law observes the distinction between excess and absence of jurisdiction over a given subject matter.6 In the latter circumstance, judicial power to act at all is simply wanting.7 For example, if a probate court whose authority is limited to wills and decedents’ estates should conduct a criminal trial, its jurisdiction to decide any issue in the case is, without a doubt, entirely absent. On the other hand, when the authority to deal with a subject does exist, the manner and extent of the power's exercise, even if patently excessive, will stand, absent of course a direct attack.8 If a court invested with general *105jurisdiction over criminal cases should find some act or omission to be a public offense when by law it clearly is not, or should sentence a defendant to eleven years of imprisonment when the maximum confinement prescribed by statute is only ten, the decision would be in excess but not in the absence o/the court’s jurisdiction.9
These examples serve to distinguish the absence of jurisdiction from its excess. Our concern in this case is with the consequences flowing from those terms. When a complete absence of jurisdiction appears on the face of the judgment roll (or from an inspection of its administrative counterpart — the “agency proceedings”),10 the court’s ruling is, of course, void and subject to vacation on direct or collateral attack.11 The tribunal’s decision is deemed void only when the face of the record reveals that at least one of the three elements of agency jurisdiction was absent, i.e., jurisdiction over the parties, jurisdiction over the subject matter or jurisdictional power to pronounce the particular decision that was rendered.12 In contrast, an excessive exercise of cognizance does not make the decision facially void and vulnerable to collateral attack.13 An agency order that is not facially void “is valid until set aside, and parties may be precluded from setting it aside by ... waiver, estoppel, or the passage of time.” 14 Jurisdiction is not wanting but merely exceeded when a statute is misinterpreted or adjudicative authority is exercised erroneously.15 If extrinsic evidence is needed to show the jurisdiction’s absence, the decision is not facially invalid.16 Firmly rooted in our jurisprudence,17 these distinctions are applied to agency decisions that fall under the adjudicative rubric.18
B.
The Tax Commission Has Cognizance Of Federal-Law Issues
State courts have the constitutionally invested authority over any federal-law claim *106or issue not expressly withheld from their jurisdiction by an act of Congress.19 Tribal sovereign immunity claims or defenses sought to be based on federal law must yield to this nation’s dual sovereignty scheme and its dual court system. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Graham;20 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.21 In Graham the Court held that a tribal sovereign immunity counterclaim, pressed in a state-court suit to enforce a tax assessment against an Indian tribe for cigarette sales and bingo receipts, is not removable to a federal court. It stands cognizable in a state court. Citizen Band teaches that tribal immunity deprives neither state administrative institutions of their power to tax tribal sales of goods (cigarettes) to nontribal members nor state courts of their authority to enforce the tax through “equitable remedies”. There, the Court notes that while the Tribe’s sovereign’immunity bars the state from pursuing its most effective direct remedy to collect the taxes (a lawsuit against the Tribe), alternative procedural avenues avail. Individual tribal members employed in the Indian smokeshops may not claim tribal immunity. States are hence free to collect from the wholesalers taxes on unstamped cigarettes supplied to tribal stores}22 Oklahoma’s own decisional law foreshadowed Citizen Band. It had held a Tribe’s immunity from taxes not to extend to tribal activities or transactions affecting nontri-bal members.23
While the federal government shares its tax immunity24 with the Indian tribes (for whose benefit the government holds reservation lands in trust),25 this immunity does not ipso facto extend to private entities doing business with the government.26 Under the now repudiated “intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine”,27 state government could not tax income that an individual directly derived from any contract with the federal government. Today, unless Congress has expressly or impliedly acted to preempt state taxation, “a State can im*107pose a nondiscriminatory tax on private parties with whom the United States or an Indian tribe does business, even though the financial burden of the tax may fall on the United States or tribe ”.28 Unless federal legislation were to preempt the levy, the rise of the new doctrine would make a lessee’s oil production from Indian land amenable to state taxation.29
Had City Vending pressed the Commission with its quest to reduce the assessment to exclude exempt sales and interposed — for reduction of the levy — sales in intratribal transactions to the ultimate consumer, the Commission not only would have had cognizance to entertain that federal-law defense, it would have been its duty to so do.
C.
An Agency-Crafted Rule Should Be Adopted For Tracking And Obtaining Credit For Exempt Intratribal Cigarette Sales

The Tax Payment

Under the statutory taxing regime then (and now) in force licensed wholesalers, jobbers and warehousemen are required to pay a cigarette excise tax on all cigarettes that come into their possession for use or consumption in the state. 68 O.S.1991 §§ 302,30 305(a).31 The tax levied “shall be paid [to the Tax Commission] only once on any cigarettes sold ... or consumed_” 68 O.S.1991 § 302.32 Payment of the excise tax is evidenced by stamps which must be affixed to the cigarette package before it is sold for further distribution. 68 O.S. 1991 §§ 302,33 305(a).34 The licensed wholesaler’s withdrawal of the cigarettes from storage for sale or distribution marks the taxable events 35 O.S.1991 § 305(a).36 A cigarette tax must be paid in advance on all cigarettes distributed to Indian tribes. Because the taxable event occurs before the cigarettes are either sold or distributed, the state’s collection process may easily result in an excessive payment. The nontribal wholesaler, when statutorily required to affix the stamps, is unable to ascertain in advance whether the ultimate consumer will be a tax-exempt tribal member or a nontribal purchaser.

The Tax Burden

The statutory scheme contemplates the tax incidence to be on the consumer. 68 *108O.S.1991 § 302.37 If the levy is paid by anyone else, the remittance is “considered an advance payment ” which is “added to the price of the cigarettes and recovered from the ultimate consumer or user.” 68 O.S.1991 § 302.38 The cigarette tax — initially paid by the wholesaler when stamps are bought from the Commission — is an “advance payment”. The wholesaler adds the tax to the price of the cigarettes supplied to the retailer. The impact of this “pass-through” system ultimately falls upon the consumer of stamped cigarettes. In making retail sales of cigarettes the retailer is required to “show the amount of [pass-through] tax [that has been] paid as evidenced by appropriate stamps on each package of cigarettes sold” and to collect the tax “from the user or consumer”. 68 O.S.1991 § 302.39 In short, by shifting the incidence of the levy onto the ultimate consumer, the assessment regime contemplates tax reimbursement to the wholesaler and retailer. The only instance where the tax burden cannot be passed on is when unstamped cigarettes in the licensed wholesaler’s possession are “lost, stolen or unaccounted for, in transit, storage or otherwise”. 68 O.S.1991 § 305(f).40 Section 305(f), which raises a presumption of use or consumption within the state, makes the wholesaler liable for taxes due on these cigarettes.

The Tax Exemption

By the then-effective statute, only two categories of sales are expressly exempted from tax — those to veteran hospitals or state-operated veteran homes and to the United States.41 There is simply no provision for wholesale-level exemption for sales made to Indian tribes. Transactions with the tribes are not per se exempt either by state or federal law; only cigarettes which ultimately reach the tribal consumer are exempt from the tax. The burden of proving intratribal sales and securing for them a tax credit or refund rests on the tax remitter (the cigarette wholesaler).

A Tax Credit Or Remittitur Procedure For Reimbursement of Cigarette Taxes Paid on Intratribal Cigarette Sales

Because an excessive payment potential is clearly built into the state’s undifferen*109tiated cigarette tax collection approach, a fair method should be established for tracking intratribal sales and for allowing either a credit for or a remittitur of tax paid on documented intratribal sales on which excise taxes have been paid. The legislature has amended the statutory regime to provide a more orderly procedure for documenting the federal-law exemption applicable to intratribal sales.42 Until those changes are effectuated, I would direct the Commission to adopt rules which provide (a) recordkeeping requirements that will enable a wholesaler to verify and document intratribal cigarette sales and (b) a mechanism which would allow wholesalers routinely to submit these intratribal sales records to the Commission for refund or credit.
D.
The Commission Clearly Has Cognizance To Assess A Cigarette Excise Tax Against A Nontribal Wholesaler Who, At The Wholesale Transaction Level, Sells Unstamped Cigarettes To Indian Tribes
Even though the cigarette tax paid by the wholesaler is a “pass-through” levy added to the price of the product sold to the retailer, this alone will not clothe a nontribal wholesaler with immunity from liability for payment on its transactions with Indian tribes. Our statutory scheme43 for collecting cigarette excise taxes is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma.44 There, the Court, citing City Vending of Muskogee v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n,45 gave its imprimatur to the state’s regime of collecting cigarette excise taxes by assessing wholesalers who supply unstamped cigarettes to tribal stores. The scenario in that case is nearly identical to this. The same parties and the same type of tax assessment (a cigarette excise tax) are implicated. While the other dealt with a different issue— federal-court jurisdiction over state tax liability issues under the Bankruptcy Code46 — the Court’s reference to City Vending clearly denotes its renewed approval of the statutory assessment process for collecting cigarette excise taxes from wholesalers who distribute unstamped cigarettes to Indian tribes.
CONCLUSION
A party adversely affected by an agency’s want of cognizance to entertain a constitutional attack must renew its challenge in an appeal directly from the agency order to preserve its fundamental-law objections. Once an administrative order that is not facially void becomes final, it is impervious to collateral attack even on constitutional grounds.
The Commission has the authority to assess cigarette taxes against the wholesalers. The agency also has the general power to adjudicate a taxpayer’s protest against the assessment, if the levy is indeed excessive because of improper inclusion of federally exempt intratribal sales. Failure of the tax authority’s order to show on its face that intratribal and non-tribal sales were properly segregated or segregable and hence treated distinctly neither makes an assessment facially infirm nor unveils an absence of jurisdiction on the face of the agency proceed*110ings. If the Commission did include in its contested assessment some amounts attributable to intratribal sales exempted from taxation by federal law, the exercise of its unauthorized power was, at most, an act in excess of jurisdiction. In short, the contested assessment is not facially tainted for want of cognizance.
Because the agency’s assessment is not facially void, but at most affected perhaps by an excessive exercise of taxing power,47 it is now too late judicially to disturb the challenged order in response to the taxpayer’s impermissible collateral attack.

. Dow Jones & Co. v. State ex rel. Tax Com'n, Okl., 787 P.2d 843 (1990).

. See 68 O.S.1991 §§ 302, 308(a), and 315, infra. Section 302 provides in pertinent part:
“There is hereby levied upon the sale, use, ... possession, or consumption of cigarettes within the State of Oklahoma a tax.... * * * Such tax shall be evidenced by stamps which shall be furnished by and purchased from the Tax Commission or by an impression ... by the use of a metering device when authorized by the Tax Commission ... and said stamps or impression shall be securely affixed to one end of each package in which cigarettes are contained or from which consumed.
The impact of the tax levied by the provisions of this article is hereby declared to be on the vendee, user, consumer, or possessor of cigarettes in this state, and, when said tax is paid by any other person, such payment shall be considered as an advance payment and shall thereafter be added to the price of the cigarettes and recovered from the ultimate consumer or user. * * * ” (Emphasis mine.)
The pertinent terms of § 308(a) are:
" * * * The Commission shall be responsible for the custody and sale of the stamps, and for the disposition of the proceeds thereof.
The pertinent terms of § 315 are:
"For the purpose of enabling the Oklahoma Tax Commission to determine the tax liability of a ... wholesale dealer ..., it shall have the right to inspect any premises where cigarettes are ... stored, [or] sold ... and to examine all of the records required herein to be kept_” (Emphasis added.)

. Supra note 1.

. In Conoco, Inc. v. State Dept. of Health, Etc., Okl., 651 P.2d 125 (1982), the aggrieved party failed to perfect a timely appeal from a final administrative order. It then resorted to the district court for a challenge to the validity of the rule on which the order was rested by invoking declaratory judgment jurisdiction under 75 O.S.1981 § 306. We there stated that "the time limits within which to appeal from an adverse decision are jurisdictional in nature and that if an appeal is brought untimely the court has no power to decide the case. This rule applies to judicial review of administrative actions to the same extent as it does to court judgments and decrees.” Id. at 128.

. For the concept of "facial invalidity" see infra Part 11(A).

. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-352, 20 L.Ed. 646, 651 (1872); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978).

. State v. Williams, 209 Wis. 541, 245 N.W. 663, 665 (1932).

. The manner and extent of an adjudicative authority's exercise are but two factors which are just as appropriate for a tribunal’s determination as any other issue in the proceeding. Bradley v. Fisher, supra note 6, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352, 20 L.Ed. at 651; State v. Williams, supra note 7 at 665.
The distinction between “excess” and "absence” of judicial jurisdiction is a common-law concept equally applicable to agency cognizance. If the Department of Public Safety were to press before itself, as an adjudicative agency, criminal charges for driving under the influence, the Department’s authority to proceed would, without a doubt, be found entirely wanting. On the other hand, its authority to revoke a driver’s license is statutorily present. The manner and extent of the latter power’s exercise would determine whether it was excessively applied. Similarly here, the Tax Commission, which is vested with general authority to correct, adjust or *105abate an erroneous audit, was acting within its cognizance, although its assessment might be condemned as excessive. 68 O.S.1991 § 221(b) and (e).

. See Bradley v. Fisher, supra note 6, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351, 20 L.Ed. at 651.

. For an application to agency process of the judgment roll teaching of the common law and of the distinction between excess and absence of cognizance, see Gulfstream Petroleum Corp. v. Layden, Okl., 632 P.2d 376, 378 (1981), where the court extended the concept of “facial invalidity" to an administrative order of the Corporation Commission. The Gulfstream teaching was followed in Kaneb Production Co. v. GHK Exploration Co., Okl., 769 P.2d 1388, 1392 (1989), and Mullins v. Ward, Okl., 712 P.2d 55, 59-60 (1985). The district court’s inquiry into the validity of Corporation Commission adjudicative orders stands confined to determining, from an inspection of the face of that agency’s proceedings (i.e., the application, the process by which the parties were notified and the Commission’s order), if the Commission meets the jurisdictional prerequisites. Mullins, supra at 59 n. 7; Gulf-stream, supra at 379.

. 12 O.S.1991 § 1038; Hough v. Hough, Okl., 772 P.2d 920, 921 (1989); Mayhue v. Mayhue, Okl., 706 P.2d 890, 895 (1985); Scoufos v. Fuller, Okl., 280 P.2d 720, 723 (1955).

. Gulfstream Petroleum Corp. v. Layden, Okl., supra note 10 at 378; Kaneb Production Co. v. GHK Exploration Co., supra note 10 at 1392; Mullins v. Ward, supra note 10 at 60.

. State v. Williams, supra note 7 at 665; People v. Ruiz, 217 Cal.App.3d 574, 265 Cal.Rptr. 886, 892 (Cal.App. 3 Dist.1990).

. People v. Ruiz, supra note 13 265 Cal.Rptr. at 892.

. Neither legal error nor excess of jurisdiction operates to render a judicial act facially void. Woodrow v. Ewing, Okl., 263 P.2d 167, 171 (1953). See abo Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.1988); Robrock v. Robrock, 105 Ohio App. 25, 5 O.O.2d 315, 151 N.E.2d 234, 239 (1956) (error in a ruling is not synonymous with a decision rendered either in the absence of or in excess of jurisdiction).

. Scoufos v. Fuller, supra note 11 at 721 (the court’s syllabus 2); Hough v. Hough, supra note 11 at 921.

. See Salaney v. Ferris, 201 Okl. 236, 204 P.2d 270, 273 (1949), where the court held that a judicial act in excess of jurisdiction is not facially invalid. This principle has been consistently followed in other cases. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dale, 201 Okl. 519, 207 P.2d 789, 789-790 (1949); Allison v. Howell, 204 Okl. 404, 230 P.2d 706, 709 (1951); State ex rel. Hunt v. Green, Okl., 508 P.2d 639, 642 (1973).

. See authorities cited supra note 10.

. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821-23, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 1568, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 (1990); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458-49, 110 S.Ct. 792, 795, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981); see also McLin v. Trimble, Okl., 795 P.2d 1035, 1045 (1990) (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting).

. 489 U.S. 838, 840-42, 109 S.Ct. 1519, 1521, 103 L.Ed.2d 924 (1989).

. 498 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 905, 912, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991).

. Oklahoma Tax Com’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, supra note 21, 498 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 912.

. State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, Okl., 711 P.2d 77, 92 (1985).

. Absent express congressional authorization, a state cannot tax the United States directly. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175, 109 S.Ct. 1698, 1707, 104 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989). Federal immunity from state taxation is based on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 6, cl. 2, U.S. Const. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 518 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 1364 n. 11, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 455, 98 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 55 L.Ed.2d 403 (1978).

. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 175-77, 109 S.Ct. at 1707; Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2402, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985).

. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 175-77, 109 S.Ct. at 1707.

. The intergovernmental tax immunity rule was based on the rationale that any tax on income a party received under a government contract was a tax on the contract and thus a tax "on" the government because it burdened the government’s power to enter into the contract. South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 24, 485 U.S. at 518, 108 S.Ct. at 1363-1364; Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 173-77, 109 S.Ct. at 1706-1707. The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity reached its zenith in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 42 S.Ct. 171, 66 L.Ed. 338 (1922), where the Court applied it to invalidate a state tax on income derived by a non-Indian lessee from the sale of his interest in oil produced on Indian land. In Cotton the Court observed that after Gillespie the doctrine "started a long path in decline and has now been ‘thoroughly repudiated’ by modern case law.” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 174, 109 S.Ct. at 1706, citing South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 24, 485 U.S. at 519-520, 108 S.Ct. at 1365.

. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 175, 109 S.Ct. at 1707 (emphasis mine); South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 24, 485 U.S. at 520-523, 108 S.Ct. at 1365-1367.

. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 175-77, 109 S.Ct. at 1707; South Carolina v. Baker, supra note 24, 485 U.S. at 518, 108 S.Ct. at 1364-1366. After Gillespie, supra note 27, was squarely overruled in Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386-387, 58 S.Ct. 623, 627-628, 82 L.Ed. 907 (1938), "oil and gas lessees operating on Indian reservations were subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as Congress, did not act affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes." Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, supra note 24, 490 U.S. at 173-75, 109 S.Ct. at 1706 (emphasis added). See also Apache Gas Products Corp. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, Okl., 509 P.2d 109, 114-115 (1973).

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2.

. The terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 305(a) provide in pertinent part:
"Every wholesaler ... doing business within this State and required to secure a license ... shall, upon withdrawal from storage, and before making any sale or distribution for consumption thereof, cause the same to have affixed thereto the stamp or stamps as required by this Article_” (Emphasis mine.)

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2.

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2.

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 305(a), see supra note 31.

. Section 305(c) provides that any consumer may purchase unstamped cigarettes directly from the wholesaler if, prior to the purchase, he secures a written license from the Tax Commission and posts a surety bond. After purchase, he must immediately buy stamps from the Commission and affix them to the cigarettes. In that instance, the taxable event occurs when the stamps are affixed to the cigarette packages.

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 305(a), see supra note 31.

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2.

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2, (emphasis mine).

. For the pertinent text of 68 O.S.1991 § 302, see supra note 2, (emphasis mine).

. The terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 305(f) are:
"(f) Any person, including distributing agents, wholesalers, jobbers, carriers, warehousemen, retailers and consumers, having possession of unstamped cigarettes in this State shall be liable for the tax on such cigarettes in case the same are lost, stolen or unaccounted for, in transit, storage or otherwise, and in such event a presumption shall exist for the purposes of taxation, that such cigarettes were used and consumed in Oklahoma.”

. The terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 321 are:
“All cigarettes sold to veterans hospitals and state operated domiciliary homes for veterans located in the State of Oklahoma, for distribution or sale to disabled ex-servicemen or disabled ex-servicewomen interned in, or inmates of, such hospitals, or residents of such homes, and all sales to the United States are hereby exempted from the stamp excise tax levied by this Article."
Section 321’s amendment in 1992 (Okl.Sess.L., Ch. — § 16, eff. Jan. 1, 1993) adds two additional exempted categories; the statute now provides:
“The following sales are hereby exempted from the stamp excise tax levied pursuant to the provisions of Section 301 et seq. of this title:
“1. All cigarettes sold to veterans hospitals and state operated domiciliary homes for veterans located in the State of Oklahoma, for distribution or sale to disabled ex-servicemen or disabled ex-servicewomen interned in, or inmates of, such hospitals, or residents of such homes;
2. All sales to the United States;
3. All sales to a federally recognized Indian tribe or nation which has entered into a compact with the State of Oklahoma pursuant to the provisions of subsection C of Section 1 of this act or to a licensee of such a tribe or nation, upon which the payment in lieu of taxes required by the compact has been paid; and
4. All sales to a federally recognized Indian tribe or nation or to a licensee of such a tribe or nation upon which the tax levied pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of this act has been paid.”
The 1992 amendment does not affect my analysis in this writing.

. The new statutory regime is effective January 1, 1993. 68 O.S.Supp.1992 §§ 301, 309, 321, 346-352, 401, 403.1, 413, 419, 424-429, 1355. Indian tribes who have entered into tax compacts with the State will be treated differently from those that have not. As to the latter category, licensed wholesalers will continue to purchase the cigarette tax stamp, affix it to the cigarette packages and pass the tax onto the Indian tribe and ultimately to the consumer. 68 O.S.Supp.1992 § 350. The Indian tribe may then receive a refund from the Commission for documented sales to its tribal members. 68 O.S.Supp.1992 § 426(b).

. See supra Part 11(C) for a discussion of the statutory taxing scheme.

. Oklahoma Tax Com'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma, supra note 21, 498 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 912.

. 898 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.1990).

. 11 U.S.C. 505.

. Gulfstream Petroleum Corp. v. Layden, supra note 10 at 378; Kaneb Production Co. v. GHK Exploration Co., supra note 10 at 1392; Mullins v. Ward, supra note 10 at 60. Because the common law’s facial invalidity limits now govern an agency’s exercise of adjudicative process, I would today, as I believe we must, hold that the distinction between excess and absence of jurisdiction protects administrative orders from impermissible collateral attacks with the very same force as it does judgments and orders of courts.