Court Opinion

ID: 9407583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 16:09:16.884535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.049091
License: Public Domain

J-S17043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    TREMAYNE SPILLMAN                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1298 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 5, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001255-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                            FILED: July 7, 2023

        Appellant, Tremayne Spillman, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial

convictions for persons not to possess firearms and receiving stolen property

(“RSP”).1 We affirm.

        The trial court opinion set forth some of the relevant facts of this case

as follows:

           On May 22, 2021, Pennsylvania State Troopers were
           dispatched to Adolph’s Tavern, Masontown, Fayette County
           for a report of a man brandishing a gun inside the bar.
           David Cogar testified that Appellant was at the bar that night
           with another man. Cogar, a bartender, approached the two
           men asking if they needed anything else when he heard a
           “clicking noise” as if a gun was ejecting the shell. Appellant
           pointed a gun at Cogar then spun around in his seat and
           pointed it at the Disc Jockey booth. An altercation ensued
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1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105; 3925, respectively.
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          between the Disc Jockey, Appellant and David Cogar which
          led to Appellant being disarmed. Cogar threw the firearm
          into a garbage can inside the bar where it was recovered by
          Troopers. Appellant was removed from the bar.

          Troopers located Appellant and detained him. Trooper Strini
          testified that Appellant was taken to the barracks and read
          his Miranda[2] rights.     When interviewed by Troopers
          Appellant told the Troopers that he possessed a gun on the
          night in question which he purchased from an individual
          named “Quami” who sold it to him for Two Hundred Dollars
          ($200.00). During his interview, Appellant said he knew
          that Quami was going to report the firearm as stolen, and
          that he knew he was a felon who is not allowed to possess
          firearms. When Troopers ran an eTrace on the firearm it
          was reported stolen on May 22, 2021.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 1/10/23, at 2-3) (record citations omitted).

Specifically, the eTrace revealed that someone reported the firearm stolen six

to eight hours prior to the incident at Adolph’s Tavern. The eTrace also listed

Zetta Nicholson as the firearm owner. Zetta Nicholson is Quami’s significant

other. Appellant claimed that Quami planned to report the firearm as stolen

two days after Appellant purchased it to collect insurance money.

        Procedurally:

          A jury trial began on June 6, 2022, with Appellant present,
          however Appellant left trial after opening statements and
          never returned nor could he be contacted.         The trial
          continued in his absence. The jury found Appellant guilty of
          one count of [persons not to possess firearms] and one
          count of [RSP]. Appellant was finally located on October 3,
          2022, and on October 5, 2022, Appellant was sentenced on
          his conviction of [persons not to possess firearms] to a
          period [of] incarceration not less than eighty-four (84)
          months nor more than 18 years. [The court imposed no
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2   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

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           further penalty on the RSP conviction].

(Id. at 1-2). Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on October 12,

2022.     On October 18, 2022, the court denied the post-sentence motion.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 31, 2022. On November

1, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of

errors complained on of appeal. Following the grant of an extension of time,

Appellant timely complied on December 8, 2022.

        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

           The evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction and
           sentence for [RSP].

           [Appellant] was denied a fair trial in absentia.

(Appellant’s Brief at 2).

        In his first issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth did not establish

the necessary mens rea for his RSP conviction. Specifically, Appellant avers

the Commonwealth failed to prove Appellant knew or had reason to know that

the firearm was stolen to establish the “guilty knowledge” element of the

crime. Appellant insists he purchased the gun from Quami for $200.00, two

days prior to the incident at Adolph’s Tavern. Appellant claims Quami told

him that Quami planned to report the gun as stolen two days later to receive

insurance money. Therefore, Appellant posits that at the time he purchased

the firearm, it was not stolen.       Appellant concludes the Commonwealth

presented insufficient evidence to sustain his RSP conviction, and this Court

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must reverse his conviction and vacate the judgment of sentence.3           We

disagree.

       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

          As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
          claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
          favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
          benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
          evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
          verdict when it establishes each material element of the
          crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
          beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
          Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
          certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
          resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
          and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
          fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

          The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
          wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that
          the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a
          crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where
          the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
          therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
          Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that
          of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
          accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
          demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s
          crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the Appellant’s
____________________________________________

3 Appellant also argues the court should have bifurcated the charges in this
case because the disclosure of Appellant’s prior conviction, which the
Commonwealth introduced relative to his persons not to possess firearms
charge, prejudiced the jury regarding his RSP charge. Nevertheless, Appellant
concedes that he did not file a motion for severance in the trial court (see
Appellant’s Brief at 10 n.7), and he raises this claim for the first time on
appeal. Consequently, this issue is waived, and we will give it no further
attention. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues not raised in trial court are
waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal).

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          convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

      The Crimes Code defines the offense of RSP, in relevant part, as follows:

          § 3925. Receiving Stolen Property

             (a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he
             intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable
             property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
             believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the
             property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to
             restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). “[T]o establish the mens rea element of the crime of

[RSP], the Commonwealth must prove that the accused possessed property

with ‘guilty knowledge,’ i.e., knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that

it has probably been stolen.” Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127,

1132-33 (Pa.Super. 2010). “A person ‘knows’ that goods are stolen if he is

‘aware’ of that fact.” Id. at 1132. Regarding the latter part of the test, “it is

clear that [the statute] is designed to criminalize situations where the

defendant does not know for certain that the goods are stolen, but

nevertheless has: (1) considered the possibility that the goods are stolen and

(2) concluded that the answer is at the very least, ‘probably.’” Id.

      The Commonwealth may establish a defendant’s “guilty knowledge” by

wholly circumstantial evidence. Id. “Often, intent cannot be proven directly

but must be inferred from examination of the facts and circumstances of the

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case.” Id. In evaluating “guilty knowledge,” this Court has explained:

         A permissible inference of guilty knowledge may be
         drawn from the unexplained possession of recently
         stolen goods without infringing upon an accused’s
         right of due process or his right against self-
         incrimination, as well as other circumstances, such as
         the accused’s conduct at the time of arrest.
         Nonetheless, the mere possession of stolen property is
         insufficient to prove guilty knowledge, and the
         Commonwealth must introduce other evidence, which can
         be either circumstantial or direct, that demonstrates that
         the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the
         property was stolen. This additional evidence can include
         the nature of the goods, the quantity of the goods involved,
         the lapse of time between possession and theft, and the
         ease with which the goods can be assimilated into trade
         channels. Further, whether the property has alterations
         indicative of being stolen can be used to establish guilty
         knowledge. Finally, even if the accused offers an
         explanation for his possession of stolen property, the
         trier of fact may consider the possession as
         unexplained       if   it   deems      the     explanation
         unsatisfactory.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1012-13 (Pa.Super. 2002))

(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).     “Any or all of the above

circumstances, and others not enumerated, taken sometimes alone and

sometimes in relation to each other, may give rise to the final necessary

inference that the [defendant] knew that the property possessed was stolen

property.”   Commonwealth v. Campbell, 334 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa.Super.

1975).

     Significantly, when the Commonwealth “establishes the recency of the

theft, we have upheld convictions for [RSP].” Commonwealth v. Robinson,

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128 A.3d 261, 268 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc).        “Whether possession is

recent, and how recent it is, are normally questions of fact for the trier of

fact.” Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468 A.2d 493, 497-98 (Pa.Super. 1983)

(en banc). “[W]hether possession of goods is unexplained is also a question

of fact.” Id. at 496.

      Instantly, Trooper Strini testified at trial that someone reported the

firearm stolen six to eight hours before police discovered Appellant in

possession of the firearm at Adolph’s Tavern. Thus, the record makes clear

Appellant was in possession of recently stolen goods at the time of his

apprehension. See Parker, supra. Trooper Strini further testified that Zetta

Nicholson was the owner of the firearm, and that Quami is Zetta Nicholson’s

significant other.

      Appellant attempted to explain his possession of the firearm by claiming

that he purchased it from Quami approximately two days earlier for $200.00,

and that Quami had planned to report the gun as stolen two days later to

obtain insurance money. Appellant did not inform the trooper about whether

Quami was in possession of the gun with the owner’s permission. Additionally,

no evidence adduced at trial corroborated Appellant’s version of events.

Under these circumstances, the jury heard Appellant’s explanation regarding

his possession of the firearm, and it was within the jury’s purview to reject

the explanation as unsatisfactory and to deem Appellant’s possession as

unexplained for purposes of considering his guilty knowledge. See id. Thus,

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the jury was free to draw a permissible inference of Appellant’s guilty

knowledge from his unexplained possession of recently stolen goods, and his

first issue on appeal merits no relief. Id.

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that several witness identifications

of Appellant that took place during trial were unfair and improper when

Appellant was absent from the courtroom.        Appellant admits that he was

present for jury selection, but he complains that the witnesses’ brief

observations of him during that time were insufficient to positively identify

Appellant for the jury.   Appellant claims that one of the Commonwealth’s

witnesses, David Cogar, identified Appellant from the bar on the night in

question and stated that Appellant has a “Spillman” tattoo, even though

Appellant insists he does not have the tattoo. Appellant also challenges the

Commonwealth’s presentation of Appellant’s driver’s license to the jury, from

which Trooper Strini identified Appellant.      Appellant maintains that the

Commonwealth presented no evidence to verify that the driver’s license

displayed for the jury accurately depicted Appellant.

      For these reasons, Appellant insists the court should have provided

additional jury instructions about the witness identifications in this case.

Specifically, Appellant claims the court should have cautioned the jury about

the reliability of the witnesses’ identification of Appellant given Appellant’s

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absence from trial.4 Appellant concedes that defense counsel did not seek

additional jury instructions regarding witness identification, but he suggests

that the court should have done so sua sponte. Under these circumstances,

Appellant concludes that this Court should vacate and remand for a new trial.

We disagree.

       Initially, we observe: “A defendant has an absolute right to be present

at his trial. It is a right, however, which may be waived. It may be waived

expressly,    or   waiver     may     be       implied   by   a   defendant’s   actions.”

Commonwealth v. Sullens, 533 Pa. 99, 102, 619 A.2d 1349, 1351 (1992).

“[W]hen a defendant is absent without cause at the time his trial is scheduled

to begin, he may be tried in absentia[.]” Id. at 104, 619 A.2d at 1352. See

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) (stating: “The defendant’s absence without cause at

the time scheduled for the start of trial or during trial shall not preclude

proceeding with the trial, including the return of the verdict and the imposition

of sentence”).

          Unless the defendant is prevented from attending the
          proceedings for reasons beyond his or her control, the
          defendant is expected to be present at all stages of trial. A
          defendant owes the court an affirmative duty to advise it if
          he or she will be absent. If a defendant has a valid reason
____________________________________________

4 Appellant cites to Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 378 Pa. 412, 106 A.2d 820
(1954).      “A Kloiber instruction informs the jury that an eyewitness
identification should be viewed with caution when either the witness did not
have an opportunity to view the defendant clearly, equivocated on the
identification of the defendant, or has had difficulty identifying the defendant
on prior occasions.” Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 332
(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 702, 78 A.3d 1091 (2013).

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           for failing to appear, for example, if he or she has a medical
           emergency or is called to leave because of a family
           emergency, then the defendant can alert the court
           personally or through counsel of the problem. When,
           however, the defendant leaves the trial abruptly, without an
           explanation to either his lawyer or the court, this may be
           regarded as an absence without cause.

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 551 Pa. 593, 600, 712 A.2d 735, 738 (1998)

(internal citations omitted).         Additionally, the failure to request a jury

instruction at the appropriate time of trial renders a complaint about the

court’s    failure   to   issue   the    instruction   waived   on   appeal.   See

Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 628-29, 887 A.2d 220, 222-23

(2005).

        Instantly, the trial court explained:

           Appellant was present for the jury selection process and
           opening statements. Then Appellant failed to return after
           lunch. The [c]ourt gave defense counsel time to contact
           Appellant with no avail. Clearly, Appellant had waived his
           right to be present at trial by voluntarily absenting himself
           after the beginning of his trial without cause.

           Appellant further argues that he was not afforded a fair trial
           in absentia. Specifically, Appellant raises two issues, (1)
           that the in-court identification by the witnesses was unfair
           and (2) that the judge improperly commented on the
           absence of the Appellant during the trial.[5]

           The crux of Appellant’s argument regarding in court
           identification is that “[t]rial unfairness exists if a defendant
           is identified at trial by a witness pointing to an empty chair
           due to [Appellant’s] absence from the trial.”

           However, Appellant, who was at liberty on bail, absconded
____________________________________________

5   Appellant has abandoned the latter argument on appeal.

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         from the trial and is now trying to benefit from his voluntary
         absence on appeal. The Commonwealth witnesses who
         were present for the beginning of the trial were able to
         identify Appellant from the beginning of the trial and their
         experience with him on the night in question. Trooper Strini
         was not present for the beginning of trial, so the
         Commonwealth presented him with a photocopy of
         Appellant’s driver license photo for identification. Therefore,
         with the benefit of two of the witnesses and the jury seeing
         Appellant before he absented himself the in-court
         identification was proper.

(Trial Court Opinion at 4-5). We agree with the court’s analysis.

      Here, Appellant told defense counsel that Appellant was leaving trial

after jury selection to locate a witness. Appellant failed to return. Defense

counsel said he was unable to contact Appellant because Appellant’s phone

was broken.    (See N.T. Trial, 6/6/22, at 13).     At the sentencing hearing,

Appellant stated: “I got scared, Your Honor.       I went to see my daughter.

There’s no excuse for me not coming back [to trial].”          (N.T. Sentencing

Hearing, 10/18/22, at 1). Under these circumstances, we agree with the court

that Appellant voluntarily waived his right to be present at trial. See Sullens,

supra.    Although Appellant now complains about the various in-court

identifications of Appellant, it was Appellant’s voluntary absence from trial that

caused the court to use other means for the witnesses to identify Appellant in

his absence.   Further, defense counsel posed no objection to any witness

identification of Appellant at trial. See Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d

560 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 694, 879 A.2d 781 (2005)

(explaining that to preserve claim for review, defendant must make timely

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and specific objection to introduction of challenged evidence at trial).

       Regarding Appellant’s request for a specific jury instruction, the trial

court explained:

          The [c]ourt requested proposed jury instructions from both
          sides. However, none were given. The [c]ourt asked
          Counsel if they had anything to add before the charge was
          given to the jury. Also, after charging the jury [the court]
          asked if Counsel had anything they wished to include before
          the jury was dismissed to deliberate. Neither counsel
          requested to include any additional jury instruction or
          objected to any of the standard jury instructions given.
          Therefore, the issue has been waived.

                                       *       *    *

          The [c]ourt utilized the Pennsylvania standard jury
          instructions regarding determining the credibility and
          reliability of witnesses who testify. Therefore, even if not
          waived, this issue is without merit.

(Trial Court Opinion at 7-8). We agree with the court’s analysis. Appellant’s

failure to request a specific jury instruction renders waived his complaint that

the court failed to issue such an instruction.6         See Pressley, supra.

Therefore, Appellant’s second issue on appeal merits no relief. Accordingly,

we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 Moreover, Trooper Strini testified that Appellant acknowledged possessing a
firearm on the night in question. (See N.T. Trial, 6/6/22, at 74-75). Thus,
there was other evidence adduced at trial aside from the witnesses’
identification of Appellant as the person who possessed the firearm in the bar
to establish Appellant’s possession of the firearm.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2023

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