Court Opinion

ID: 9741614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:59:24.507038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.745627
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I think this case should go back to the trial judge’s successor to determine the issue of comparative negligence by the various beneficiaries under the rule announced in Hierta v General Motors Corp *341(Supplemental Opinion), 148 Mich App 796; 384 NW2d 792 (1986). With respect to all other issues, I concur in the results reached by the majority. That is, I disagree with part I, but agree with parts n through IV.
Before closing arguments, there was a discussion regarding the propriety of giving a comparative negligence jury instruction with respect to Adrian’s parents. While it is true that plaintiffs’ counsel was leery about the effect of such an instruction, it is not correct, I think, to charge the plaintiffs with a waiver of the claims of the other beneficiaries of the estate thereby permitting them to be charged offsets for which there clearly could be no predicate arising out of the siblings’ conduct. The jury awarded damages of $1,095,000 for the total loss of all the family members. The jury was instructed to find comparative negligence on the part of only the decedent and the other injured child. It should be clear to any reader of the record that the eight-year-old, Lauren Dedes, was probably not comparatively negligent and the ten-year-old decedent may have been slightly comparatively negligent. The siblings of the deceased child could not have been comparatively negligent and that includes the other injured child as well as Jessica and Michael. Obviously the great weight of the eighty-five percent comparative negligence was laid on the shoulders of the parents. It should be sorted out and adjusted appropriately in the trial court and if that is not possible, a new trial with respect to the issue of comparative negligence only should be granted. In other words, I believe the trial court erred in determining that the sum total of comparative negligence^) assessed by the jury should redound against *342each family member, i.e., should be combined and used to offset the entire verdict. In response to the motion to determine comparative negligence, the trial court ruled that the “combined percentage negligence of any member of the estate reduces all damages awardable under the Wrongful Death Act.” In Byrne v Schneider’s Iron & Metal, Inc, 190 Mich App 176; 475 NW2d 854 (1991), this Court held that the comparative negligence of a parent may not be imputed to and offset against the recovery attributable to a child. This Court further held that
the trial court did not err in submitting to the jury the issue of the parents’ comparative negligence in relation to their recovery for loss of services, society, and companionship. [Id. at 189].
Here the allocations of comparative negligence against the damages all but subsumes the verdict.1 Plaintiffs in their brief on appeal argue the eighty-five percent comparative negligence could be distributed among the various claimants by assigning 42-1/2 percent to the mother, 42-1/2 percent to the father, and nothing to the siblings, thus resulting in a net verdict of $839,000. This presumes that each of the five beneficiaries received an equal share. In another scenario, the siblings could be limited to ten percent each of the damages awarded, resulting in a lower recovery of $692,672 in damages. Plaintiffs do not present a scenario under which each of the parents could have been determined to be eighty-five percent negligent with respect to his or her claim because that would *343result in offsets of one hundred seventy percent with respect to all five discrete claims. No comparative negligence could be assigned to any of the siblings, including Lauren, whom the jury exonerated with respect to her own claim; thus, the clash focuses on the three weights on one side of the scale: the child Adrian; her mother, Jean; and the father, Michael. Are they one lump, two, or three? The majority concludes that the plaintiffs waived this overwhelming issue. That is not correct. During consideration of the jury instructions, defendants first proposed a jury instruction regarding the comparative negligence of the parents. The plaintiffs proposed a jury instruction addressing the comparative negligence of the individual children. Plaintiffs’ counsel would have preferred to avoid the defendants’ instruction, but the court stated:
I think this is an appropriate instruction. It’s not covered by the regular instructions. Do you want to discuss that? Do you know which one I’m talking about?
Mr. Domol [plaintiffs’ counsel]: I don’t have a copy of those specials [requests?].
The Court: In determining the parents claim[s?] for loss of services, society and companionship, you may reduce the recovery by the amount of the parents’ comparative negligence. I can’t see anything against it. It isn’t covered in the standard.
Mr. Domol. It wasn’t pled that way, and it wasn’t tried that way and the instructions of the form that’s been done doesn’t even address that.
The Court: You have a comparative form, don’t you, on the estate.
Mr. Domol: We have a comparative as to the individual[s?].
*344The trial court determined that it would instruct the jury with regard to the parents’ potential comparative negligence. The following exchange then occurred on the record:
Mr. Domol: I’m a little puzzled, I guess, if the court is going to give the instruction that [defendants] requested in regard to the comparative part of the parts . . .
The Court: Um-hum
Mr. Domol: . . . and give it a broad sweeping overall application to the estate . . .
The Court: Um-hum.
Mr. Domol: And there are claims in the estate that aren’t necessarily the parents.
The Court: Oh, but the instruction that I thought I saw was limited to when you’re talking about their loss of service to society . . .
Mr. Domol: But on the . . .
The Court: . . . you may reduce the recovery by the amount of the parents1’1 comparative negligence.
Ms. Neal [defendants’ attorney]: That goes to damages, your Honor, in the wrongful death action.
Mr. Domol: It may go to the damages in the wrongful death action as to the parents1’' individual damages, if I understand the Court’s position, but it wouldn’t — why should it affect the siblings claims, is my question.
The Court: Well, what we do as we live in this ideal world that we think the jury is going to consider the parents1’' claim, the siblings1’' complaint and we’re going to consider all of that. Well, what we’re saying is when you’re considering the parents, then think in terms of what their negligence — how that produced [sic] and to that extent, that’s the law of the state and I think it’s appropriate to give.
Mr. Domol: And again, I’d point out that was not the way this case — was not an issue in the openings. There was not an issue during the course of the pretrial of this case. I’m frankly surprised that it becomes an issue at this point.
*345Ms. Neal: We have been talking about this jury instructions [sic] from the first day of trial.
The Court: Yeah but we — that wasn’t there. Let me think about that during the closings and don’t argue the instructions. We [sic-you?] can argue comparative and I’ll think about it.
This issue was not addressed again before the jury retired to deliberate. The special jury verdict form, which was approved by plaintiffs, did not direct the jurors to apportion relative fault among the claimants if and when they reached a verdict.
In advancing the motion to apportion, it was plaintiffs’ position, based on off-the-record discussions with the jurors after trial, that the jury had found Adrian’s parents to be comparatively negligent but did not believe that either Adrian or her siblings were negligent. That because of the dictates of the special verdict form, the jury could not and did not apportion comparative negligence against each claimant of the estate. The trial court did not revisit its preargument iryunction that you “can argue comparative and I’ll think about it,” it merely subliminally concluded that Byrne, supra, was wrongly decided. Never did the court rule that plaintiffs had waived the issue. Even learned trial judges make mistakes. Under the circumstances and in fairness to the claimants who were not negligent, I believe that this matter should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial solely on the issue of comparative negligence, Hierta, supra at 798, unless the parties are able to convince the trial judge’s successor of an appropriate allocation of the comparative negligence.

 There seems to be some confusion with respect to whether the verdict was $1,035,000, in which event the award would be $155,250, or $1,095,000, in which event it would be $164,250.