Court Opinion

ID: 2963978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:18:23.372301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:53.699541
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1933

                       INGRID A. M. FRANCIS AND ROBERT FRANCIS,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                           DAVID GOODMAN AND KAREN DUNNETT,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________
                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
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                               and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
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                                 ____________________

             Loretta M. Smith, with whom Charles A. Goglia, Jr. and William E.
             ________________            ______________________     __________
        Ryckman, Jr. were on brief for appellants.
        ____________
             Hilary B. Miller for appellees.
             ________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                    August 1, 1996

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.  Following our remand for findings
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          of fact and conclusions of law, see Francis v. Goodman, 81 F.3d 5
                                          ___ _______    _______

          (1st  Cir.  1996),   the  district  court  found  that  Rose  had

          established  the  predicate for  diversity jurisdiction  under 28

          U.S.C.    1332(a)(1) (1994),  id. at 6-7.   As  its determination
                                        ___

          that  Rose intended  to  remain  a New  York  domiciliary is  not

          clearly  erroneous, Lundquist v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc.,
                              _________    _______________________________

          946  F.2d 8, 11  (1st Cir.  1991), we  affirm the  district court

          judgment. 

                    The district  court considered the  appropriate factors

          in determining  Rose's domiciliary intent.   See Bank  One, Tex.,
                                                       ___ ________________

          N.A.  v.  Montle,  964  F.2d  48, 50  (1st  Cir.  1992)  (listing
          ____      ______

          factors),  opinion after remand,  974 F.2d  220 (1st  Cir. 1992).
                     _______ _____ ______

          Although Rose owned a home, practiced law, and lived on Nantucket

          for a number of years, he owned a home in New York (where he kept

          his most valuable  possessions), retained his bar  membership and

          driver's license in New York, and maintained the bulk of his bank

          and investment accounts, filed tax returns, and continued to vote

          in New  York by  absentee ballot, see  id. (voter  registration a
                                            ___  ___

          "weighty" factor).   The district court thus  possessed diversity

          jurisdiction.   See Anderson v.  City of Bessemer City,  470 U.S.
                          ___ ________     _____________________

          564, 574  (1985) ("Where there  are two permissible views  of the

          evidence,  the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly

          erroneous.").  

                    In 1984,  Francis and  her son  inherited a  commercial

          property on Main  Street, Nantucket.  She met Rose in August 1985

                                          2

          and an intimate relationship developed.  Rose obtained a Benetton

          clothing  franchise in  late  1985, and  asked Francis  if Rose's

          company, Nanben  Corporation ("Nanben"),  could operate  a retail

          store at Francis' Main Street location.  Individually represented

          by retained  counsel, the parties  negotiated and entered  into a

          lease on March  6, 1986.  During this  time, Francis began living

          with Rose.  She worked with him at the store as well.

                    In November 1989, Nanben failed to pay the monthly rent

          due Francis.  Rose explained that he owed Benetton for spring and

          summer inventory.  In April  1990, with Nanben four months behind

          in its rent, Francis told Rose:  "You owe me a lot of money here,

          and  I  want to  do something.    Should I  do something?"   Rose

          responded, "No,  you don't have to do anything.   Trust me.  Just

          have patience.   You will get paid."   Despite similar assurances

          from  Rose,  Nanben  continued to  lag  behind  in rent  payments

          through April 1991.  

                    In  late June  1991, Francis  and  Rose stopped  living

          together but remained  friends.  Rose  had handled various  legal

          matters  for Francis during  their intimate relationship,  but in

          June 1992 Francis again consulted the attorney who had negotiated

          the  store  lease, and  decided  to initiate  a  summary eviction

          action against  Nanben.   Nanben  promptly sought  refuge in  the

          bankruptcy  court,  and  although  Francis  eventually   regained

          possession  of the  store, she  was unable  to collect  a $92,898

          judgment  for  unpaid  rent and  costs,  which  precipitated this

          diversity  action charging Rose  with malpractice for  failing to

                                          3

          advise Francis to seek  independent representation regarding  the

          unpaid store rent.

                                          4

                    The  action  was  tried   before  the  district   court

          (Lindsay, J.), without a jury.   Following the case in chief, the

          district  court ruled  that  Francis  had  never  established  an

          attorney-client  relationship  with  Rose.    The  court  entered

          judgment for Rose under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) ("If during a trial

          without a jury a party  has been fully heard on an issue  and the

          court finds against the  party on that issue, the court may enter

          judgment as a  matter of law against that party with respect to a

          claim . . . that cannot under the controlling law be maintained .

          . . without  a favorable finding on that issue. . . .").  Francis

          appealed. 

                    All  agree that Massachusetts  law governs  the Francis

          malpractice claim.   See  One Nat'l Bank  v. Antonellis,  80 F.3d
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          606, 608  (1st Cir. 1996) (court ordinarily applies governing law

          agreed upon by parties).  As a  general rule, an  attorney cannot

          be found liable  for malpractice absent a  breach of duty to  the

          client.  DeVaux v. American Home Assur. Co., 444 N.E.2d 355,  357
                   ______    ________________________

          (Mass. 1983).   Nor is  it sufficient to  show that an  attorney-

          client  relationship existed as  to an unrelated  matter; rather,

          the  plaintiff  must  prove that  the  relationship  existed with

          respect to  the act  or omission  which forms  the basis  for the

          malpractice claim.    Symmons v.  O'Keeffe, 644  N.E.2d 631,  639
                                _______     ________

          (Mass. 1995); Robertson v. Gaston Snow & Ely Bartlett, 536 N.E.2d
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          344, 348-49  (Mass.) (prior  representation insufficient),  cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 493 U.S. 894 (1989).  
          ______

                    Absent an express agreement to provide  legal services,

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          an attorney-client relationship may be implied when "(1) a person
                                                 _______

          seeks advice  or assistance from  an attorney, (2) the  advice or

          assistance  sought  pertains  to matters  within  the  attorney's

          professional  competence,  and  (3)  the  attorney  expressly  or
                                     ___       ___  ________

          impliedly agrees to give or  actually gives the desired advice or
          _________ ______ __ ____ __  ________ _____ ___ _______ ______ __

          assistance."     DeVaux,  444  N.E.2d  at  357  (emphasis  added)
          __________       ______

          (quotation omitted).  In appropriate cases, the third element may

          be  established  by  proving  that the  attorney  knew  that  the

          plaintiff  reasonably relied  on the  attorney  to provide  legal

          services,  but did nothing  to prevent the  detrimental reliance.

          Sheinkopf v. Stone, 927 F.2d 1259, 1264-68 (1st Cir. 1991).1
          _________    _____

                    We find no  clear error.  Francis never  told Rose that

          she wanted legal  advice with respect to the store  rent, nor did

          Rose bill her  for such legal advice.  See Symmons, 644 N.E.2d at
                                                 ___ _______

          639.  At trial, Francis conceded that Rose was merely a tenant at

          the time she spoke with him concerning the unpaid store rent.  On

          the  other hand,  she testified  that  she thought  Rose was  her
                                                     _______

          attorney when she asked him during the same conversation  whether

          she  should  "do  something"  about  the store  rent.    But  see
                                                                   ___  ___

          Sheinkopf, 927  F.2d at  1265 (requiring  more than  "subjective,
          _________

          unspoken  belief" that  person  is  acting  in  legal  capacity).

                              
          ____________________

               1Whether an attorney-client relationship exists presents  an
          issue  of fact  under Massachusetts  law.   Page v.  Frazier, 445
                                                      ____     _______
          N.E.2d 148, 152  (Mass. 1983).   Thus,  Francis must  demonstrate
          clear  error in  the district  court  finding that  there was  no
          attorney-client  relationship.  See  Fed. R. Civ.  P. 52 advisory
                                          ___
          committee's  note to  1991  Amendment  (mandating  "clear  error"
          review of  factual findings);   Atlantic Track  & Turnout  Co. v.
                                          ______________________________
          Perini Corp., 989 F.2d 541, 543 (1st Cir. 1993) (same).  
          ____________

                                          6

          Moreover, Francis testified:  "I believed that [Rose]  would give

          me good advice since we were an item."  

                    On this  record, we  cannot disturb  the well-supported

          district  court finding  that Rose  had  no reason  to know  that

          Francis  was seeking  legal advice  from  him, as  opposed to  an

          appraisal of his company's  financial ability, as her  tenant, to

          pay the store rent, and that the trust Francis placed in Rose was

          due, in  large part, to  their intimate relationship.   Thus, the

          district  court correctly concluded that the failure to establish

          an  attorney-client relationship with  respect to the  store rent

          foreclosed Francis' malpractice  claim.  See Symmons,  644 N.E.2d
                                                   ___ _______

          at 639; DeVaux, 444 N.E.2d at 357.
                  ______

                    Affirmed.  The parties shall bear their own costs.
                    ________   _______________________________________

                    SO ORDERED.
                    SO ORDERED.
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