Court Opinion

ID: 9838379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 13:05:13.473308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:01.380063
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: September 6, 2023

                          S23A0454. SCOTT v. THE STATE.

        PINSON, Justice.

        Appellant Diontye Scott was convicted of malice murder and

other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Veal.1

        1 The crimes occurred on October 3, 2017. On January 5, 2018, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Scott for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of
felony murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4), two counts of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon (Counts 5 and 6), two counts of possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony (Counts 7 and 11), four counts of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 12, 13, 14, and 15), possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute (Count 8), speeding (Count 9), and
driving with a suspended license (Count 10). Counts 8, 11, and 15 were
dismissed prior to trial. Scott’s girlfriend, Dedryna Thornton, was also indicted
for tampering with the evidence. Scott was tried separately by a jury from
August 20 to 21, 2019. The jury found Scott guilty of all counts. Scott was
sentenced to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole on Count 1,
20 years on Count 6 to run consecutive to Count 1, 12 months on Count 9 to
run concurrent to Count 1 and commuted to time served, 12 months on Count
10 to run concurrent to Count 1 and commuted to time served, and 15 years on
Count 13 to run consecutive to Count 6. The remaining counts were merged or
vacated by operation of law. Scott filed a motion for new trial, which he
amended through new counsel on September 2, 2021. Following a hearing, the
court denied the motion for new trial on July 16, 2022. Scott filed a timely
notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the term of this court beginning in
April 2023 and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
On appeal, Scott contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to (1) request an instruction limiting the jury’s

consideration of the stipulations to Scott’s prior felony convictions

as proof of his status as a convicted felon; (2) request an instruction

limiting the jury’s consideration of Scott’s prior felony convictions to

only impeachment; and (3) object to the State’s closing argument,

which allegedly misstated the burden of proof. He also argues that

(4) these errors, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial, see

Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II) n.1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 23 (4) (838

SE2d 808) (2020). But Scott’s ineffective-assistance claims have no

merit. Trial counsel did not act unreasonably by not requesting a

limiting instruction regarding Scott’s prior convictions proving his

convicted-felon status and not requesting an instruction to limit

consideration of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes, so

his counsel’s performance was not deficient. And Scott was not

prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to object to the State’s closing

argument. Even assuming that his counsel erred by failing to object

                                   2
to the State’s closing argument, Scott failed to show more than one

error, so we need not assess any cumulative prejudice. So we affirm

his convictions.

     1. On October 3, 2017, Scott shot and killed Veal in the second

floor breezeway of the Garden Inn motel, then shot and injured

Veal’s girlfriend, Caitlin Payne. The evidence at trial showed the

following.

     Shashirekha Shetty owned and ran the Garden Inn motel,

which served both short-term and long-term guests. As of September

2017, Scott and his girlfriend, Dedryna Thornton, had been staying

at the Garden Inn for about three to four months. 2 Scott testified

that the Garden Inn “was like New Jack City,” 3 and he “started

selling beer, liquor, weed” from their room, claiming, “I literally[]

ran this hotel.” Thornton also sold food from their room. Shetty

     2 Scott testified that they had been staying at the Garden Inn for seven

or eight months, while Shetty and Thornton testified that the stay was three
or four months.
      3 New Jack City is a 1991 movie “about a rising drug lord in New York

City during the crack cocaine epidemic.” Johnson v. State, 355 Ga. App. 683,
683 n.3 (845 SE2d 419) (2020).
                                     3
increased their room rates because she wanted them to leave due to

the heavy traffic in and out of the room. Veal and Payne also lived

at the Garden Inn as of September 2017. Scott and Thornton knew

Veal and Payne.

     On September 26, three unknown men entered Scott and

Thornton’s room, robbed them, and shot Thornton in the leg. After

the shooting, Shetty told Scott and Thornton to move out, and they

did. Three or four days later, Scott and Thornton came by the motel

to watch the surveillance videos of the shooting. After watching the

videos, Scott testified, he “knew who it was.” He told law

enforcement at the time that Veal was one of the three men; at trial,

he testified that he lied when he gave that statement, and that Veal

was not one of the three men. The surveillance video of the robbery

and a surveillance video of Scott and Thornton watching the video

of the robbery were played for the jury.

     At some point after moving out of the Garden Inn, Thornton

asked Shetty if she could stay at the motel for a few days, and Shetty

agreed. Thornton and Scott returned to the motel on October 3 and

                                  4
checked into room 310, which Thornton requested and which was

close to Veal’s original room. Veal and Payne originally stayed in

room 308, but moved to a nicer room, room 202, on October 3 to

celebrate Payne’s birthday.

     That evening, Scott saw Veal on the second floor breezeway

and went over to talk to him. The confrontation was captured on

surveillance videos and played for the jury. Several minutes into the

confrontation, Payne opened her room door and stood in the

doorframe listening and smoking a cigarette. Thornton saw Scott

and Veal speaking and went to the breezeway. Thornton testified

that Scott asked, “You sent them men on me?” and Veal responded,

“I would never hurt sis,” referring to Thornton. Thornton testified

that she tried to get Scott to leave “because I didn’t want him to do

anything crazy,” and she saw that he had a gun in his hand. Payne

testified that Veal said “on his kids, he didn’t do it.”

     A few minutes later, Payne tried to move toward Veal. The

surveillance video showed that Payne squeezed in between Scott and

Veal to hand something to Veal. Payne testified that she handed

                                    5
Veal a lighter. When Payne retreated, Veal was leaning back against

the railing of the breezeway, and briefly put his hands up, with his

palms open. The conversation between Veal and Scott continued for

another minute and a half. Scott then pulled out his gun and shot

Veal in the chest. Payne ran to where Veal collapsed, and Scott

turned and shot Payne in the back.

     Scott testified that he confronted Veal to ask for an apology for

the September 26 robbery and shooting. He asked Veal why Veal

robbed him, and Veal said, “I ain’t got nothing to do with that.” Scott

then confronted Veal with a text message a friend had shown him,

which had led Scott to believe that Veal orchestrated the robbery

and shooting of Thornton. Scott testified that when he told Veal

about the text message, Veal “froze,” and that Thornton was “in a

rage” and “cussing [Veal] out.” 4 Veal then turned his back on Scott,

     4  While the surveillance videos do not have audio, one video of the
confrontation shows Thornton standing close to Veal and saying something
while gesticulating with her hands. But Thornton testified that she was just
trying to get Scott to leave and that she did not “ha[ve] a choice word” with
Veal. Thornton testified on behalf of the State as part of an immunity deal
whereby the State would not use her testimony at Scott’s trial against her
during her own trial for tampering with the evidence related to the shootings.
                                      6
which Scott believed was “really, really, really disrespectful.” When

Payne went to approach Veal, Scott testified that he asked her to

stop three times, but she walked past him and handed something to

Veal, which Scott said “put [him] in defense mode.” Scott testified

that he believed a gun could have been concealed in Payne’s closed

hand (although he did not actually see a gun). He said that he shot

Payne because “I knew what she’s capable of. This ain’t no—this is

no ordinary female. These people rob people together.”

     After the shooting, Scott and Thornton went to Scott’s car and

drove away from the motel. While traveling on the highway, a

College Park police officer detected that Scott was driving 93 miles

per hour in a 65 mile-per-hour zone. While the officer was trying to

pull over Scott’s vehicle, the vehicle slowed down and objects,

including small baggies with “a very strong odor of marijuana” and

a black gun, were thrown out of the windows. Once the vehicle was

pulled over, the officer ran a search of Scott’s driver’s license and

found that it was suspended. The next day, officers searched the

highway and found a black gun and several 9mm bullets. The gun

                                 7
was determined to be the same gun that fired the 9mm bullets found

at the crime scene.

     2.   Scott   contends   that    his   trial   counsel   provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective

assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel’s

performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered

prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To prove deficiency, he

must show that his lawyer “performed his duties in an objectively

unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances and in the light

of prevailing professional norms,” which is “no easy showing, as the

law recognizes a strong presumption that counsel performed

reasonably.” Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 182-183 (2) (787 SE2d 221)

(2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). To show prejudice, a

defendant must show “that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been

different.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d

2022). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

                                 8
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694

(III) (B). If a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one part

of the Strickland test, we need not address the other part. See

Washington, 313 Ga. at 773 (3).

     (a) Scott first contends that his counsel should have requested

an instruction allowing the jury to consider his stipulations to prior

convictions only for the limited purpose of proving his status as a

convicted felon.

     Before trial, the State and defense counsel agreed to stipulate

to Scott’s prior felony convictions for purposes of proving Scott’s

convicted-felon status for the felon-in-possession counts. The

stipulations were read to the jury at the close of the State’s case and

given to the jury in an exhibit. They read:

     1) To meet its burden in Counts 12 and 14 of this
     indictment, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
     doubt that the Defendant was previously convicted of a
     felony. The Defendant has stipulated to this fact and no
     further proof is necessary by the State solely as to that
     element of those counts.

     2) To meet its burden in Count 13 of this indictment, the
     State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

                                   9
     Defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving
     the possession of a firearm. The Defendant has (also)
     stipulated to this fact and no further proof is necessary by
     the State solely as to that element of that count.

During the jury charge, the court instructed the jury:

     The parties have entered into a stipulation that has been
     approved by the court and made a part of the record as
     State’s exhibit 49. When parties stipulate facts, this is in
     the nature of evidence. You must take that fact or those
     facts as a given without the necessity of further proof.

     Scott contends that because there was no limiting instruction,

the jury likely considered his prior felony convictions when

determining his guilt as to all counts. In his view, it was therefore

unreasonable for trial counsel not to request a limiting instruction.

     Trial counsel did not act unreasonably in declining to seek such

an instruction. “The decision of criminal defense counsel not to

request limiting instructions is presumed to be strategic.” Jones v.

State, 280 Ga. 205, 207 (2) (b) (625 SE2d 1) (2005). While defense

counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that he did not

have a strategic reason for failing to request an instruction, “[i]f a

reasonable lawyer might have done what the actual lawyer did—

                                 10
whether for the same reasons given by the actual lawyer or different

reasons entirely—the actual lawyer cannot be said to have

performed in an objectively unreasonable way.” Shaw v. State, 292

Ga. 871, 875 (3) (a) n.7 (742 SE2d 707) (2013). Here, the stipulations

read to the jury did not obviously call for a limiting instruction: they

contained language that communicated the stipulations applied to

the felon-in-possession counts, and they did not refer to any other

counts. Further, a limiting instruction could have drawn more

attention to Scott’s prior convictions and underscored for the jury

that he had a criminal record. So not asking for a limiting

instruction was not objectively unreasonable, and counsel was not

deficient for failing to request one. See Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213,

220 (5) (c) (675 SE2d 1) (2009) (“Where trial counsel testifies that he

chose not to seek a limiting instruction because he did not wish to

                                   11
draw attention to the prior convictions, the omission was trial

strategy and not evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel.”).

     (b) Scott also contends that his counsel should have requested

an instruction allowing the jury to consider his prior convictions only

for impeachment purposes.

     Although the parties had stipulated to Scott’s status as a

convicted felon, the jury ultimately heard the statutory names and

case numbers of some of his past convictions during the cross-

examination of Scott. While cross-examining Scott, the prosecutor

asked questions about the robbery of his room and his response to

it. Scott denied that cocaine or crack were in his room when he was

robbed, and he agreed that he was trying to “paint” Veal as the “bad

guy” and that he had said he knew what Veal and Payne were

“capable of.” This brief colloquy followed:

     [PROSECUTOR]: But isn’t it true that you’ve been
     convicted of trafficking in cocaine in case number
     09SC86853?
     [SCOTT]: Yes, ma’am.
     ...
     [PROSECUTOR]: And isn’t it also true that you’ve been
     convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,

                                  12
     false imprisonment, possession of a firearm during the
     commission of a felony, and possession of a firearm by a
     convicted felon?
     [SCOTT]: Yes, ma’am.

Scott’s certified convictions, which were referenced in the colloquy,

were then admitted as exhibits; the court required the convictions

to be redacted and did not allow the State to ask questions about the

circumstances of the convictions. There was no further argument,

discussion, or questioning about the convictions. Scott contends that

without a limiting instruction, the jury likely used the prior

convictions as substantive evidence or evidence of his general

character and propensity.

     Scott has failed to establish that trial counsel rendered

deficient performance by failing to request an instruction limiting

the jury’s consideration of his prior convictions to impeachment.

Counsel testified at the motion-for-new-trial hearing that Scott’s

“prior convictions at the time to me were not paramount as far as

him telling his story and explaining why he did what he thought he

had to do.” And, since requesting a limiting instruction might have

                                 13
drawn further jury attention to Scott’s prior convictions, see

Phillips, 285 Ga. at 220 (5) (c), counsel’s choice to not request such

an instruction could have been objectively reasonable and strategic,

even though counsel did not testify to actually relying on a strategic

reason for not making the request, see Shaw, 292 Ga. at 875 (3) (a)

n.7; Mohamud v. State, 297 Ga. 532, 533-534 (2) (a) (773 SE2d 755)

(2015) (explaining that, since “hindsight has no place in an

assessment of the performance of trial counsel,” counsel’s trial

decision may still have been reasonable even though he testified

that, in hindsight, he had no strategic reason for that decision

(citation and punctuation omitted)). This is particularly true when,

as here, the jury does not hear any details about the convictions

other than the statutory names and case numbers. Cf. Jimmerson v.

State, 289 Ga. 364, 368 (2) (c) (711 SE2d 660) (2011) (holding that

trial counsel’s decision not to poll the jury or request a cautionary

instruction regarding the trial court’s statement alluding to the

defendant’s involvement in recent courthouse shootings “constituted

reasonable   trial   strategy   and    does   not   evidence   deficient

                                  14
performance” because counsel “would not have wanted to draw extra

attention to the issue”). Given the limited nature of the prosecutor’s

inquiry into Scott’s criminal history and the risk that a limiting

instruction could draw undue attention to that history, it was not

objectively unreasonable for trial counsel not to request a limiting

instruction.

     (c) Scott further contends that his counsel should have objected

to the State’s closing argument about the burden of proof. During

the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor spoke at some length

about the State’s burden to prove Scott’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. The prosecutor said, “The law also says that it’s not to a

mathematical certainty. It’s not that you have to say, well I’m about

90 percent sure. Is that good enough? No. That’s not what the law

requires.” Later, the prosecutor explained that the presumption of

innocence is “only there until you all believe that it has been over

come [sic] by the evidence. And that’s something that’s personal to

you. So if it was during the first further-away surveillance video

with Ms. Shetty, then that’s sufficient. If you think that’s sufficient,

                                  15
then that’s sufficient.” Finally, the prosecutor explained, “and once

you believe that the defendant did it, it’s gone. Once you believe that

the defendant is guilty, then that is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I’ll repeat that again. Once you believe that the defendant is guilty,

that is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

     Scott argues that these statements from the State explained

the burden of proof in a way that suggested that the jury should vote

to convict him if they personally considered him to be guilty, which

effectively reduced the State’s burden of proof. In support, he relies

on Debelbot v. State, 308 Ga. 165 (839 SE2d 513) (2020), in which we

held that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a

prosecutor’s “obviously wrong” description of reasonable doubt

during closing argument.

     Even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by

failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements about reasonable

doubt, Scott has not established prejudice. As we have explained in

decisions after Debelbot, that case involved a specific set of

circumstances that made the prosecutor’s comments about

                                  16
reasonable doubt “uniquely” prejudicial, Debelbot, 308 Ga. at 168: It

was already a “close question” whether the “underwhelming” and

“almost entirely circumstantial” evidence was legally sufficient, id.

That evidence was unusual in that it showed that the two

defendants had “essentially equal opportunities—and no one else

had any opportunity at all—to inflict” the fatal injuries, so “the

logical probability that either [defendant] inflicted the fatal trauma

would be 50 percent.” Id. at 169. And, given that peculiarity, the

prosecutor’s suggestion that the jury could convict a defendant even

if it was less than 51 percent sure about the defendants’ guilt was

“uniquely harmful,” id. at 168-169. Finally, the trial court’s

instruction in Debelbot that the State is not required to prove its

case to “a mathematical certainty,” a phrase which the State

repeated twice, “may well have been understood by the jury not as

correcting the State’s error, but as reinforcing it.” Debelbot v. State,

305 Ga. 534, 543-544 (2) (826 SE2d 129) (2019).

     Absent those unique circumstances, defendants seeking to

establish prejudice from a prosecutor’s comments that do not

                                  17
accurately characterize reasonable doubt cannot simply rest on

Debelbot. See Warren v. State, 314 Ga. 598, 602-603 (2) (a) (878 SE2d

438) (2022) (in rejecting ineffective-assistance claim based on

closing-argument comments about reasonable doubt, contrasting

those comments and strong evidence of guilt with “uniquely

harmful” remarks and “underwhelming” evidence in Debelbot);

Draughn v. State, 311 Ga. 378, 383 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 8) (2021)

(similar). Instead, a defendant asserting an ineffective-assistance

claim like the one here must show how a prosecutor’s particular

mischaracterization of reasonable doubt likely affected how a jury

weighed the evidence of his guilt under the circumstances of his case

(and in doing so, show how objecting to the comments would have

created a reasonable probability of a different outcome).

     Scott has not done that here. The prosecutor’s comments here

were certainly “inadvisable,” Draughn, 311 Ga. at 383 (2) (b) n.5,

and not an accurate characterization of reasonable doubt. Cf.

Debelbot, 308 Ga. at 169 n.9 (“We admonish lawyers not to confuse

jurors by attempting to quantify a standard of proof that is not

                                 18
susceptible of quantification.”). But unlike in Debelbot, Scott offers

no basis in particular evidence to think that the prosecutor’s

comments would have affected the outcome of his trial, and as we

explained above, the evidence of Scott’s guilt was strong. Nor was

the jury likely to follow the prosecutor’s guidance on this issue: the

prosecutor told the jury several times that her arguments were not

instructions on the law and that the trial court would instruct the

jury on the law, and the trial court in fact instructed the jury

“accurately and at length” on the burden of proof, the presumption

of innocence, and reasonable doubt. In short, as in our other recent

cases where a defendant has advanced a Debelbot-based theory of

prejudice, “any error in the State’s characterization of reasonable

doubt was considerably less blatant than the error in Debelbot and

— unlike in Debelbot — was cured by the trial court’s instructions

to the jury.” Draughn, 311 Ga. at 383 (2) (b). See Warren, 314 Ga. at

603 (2) (a).

     3. Scott contends that, taken together, the effects of his

counsel’s errors resulted in cumulative prejudice that deprived Scott

                                 19
of a fair trial.5 Because we have assumed deficiency in only one

instance and Scott has failed to establish any other instance of

deficiency, we need not assess cumulative prejudice. See Scott v.

State, 309 Ga. 764, 771 (3) (d) (848 SE2d 448) (2020) (“Assessing

cumulative prejudice is necessary only when multiple errors have

been shown . . . .”). So his claims of ineffective assistance fail.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

      5 Scott relies on Lane, 308 Ga. 10, but Lane “announced a new rule
regarding the cumulative effect of a combination of certain trial court errors
and deficiencies of counsel.” Woods v. State, 312 Ga. 405, 410 (III) (1) n.7 (862
SE2d 526) (2021) (emphasis in original). Scott alleges errors only by his trial
counsel, and not by the trial court. Still, assessing “the cumulative effect of
multiple deficiencies on the part of his trial counsel . . . has long been part of
the Strickland analysis” that governs claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Id. See Schofield, 281 Ga. at 811 (II) n.1.
                                       20