Court Opinion

ID: 9393462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 15:00:34.213478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.546166
License: Public Domain

20-2463
    Montalvo-Marin v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                               Segal, IJ
                                                                           A206 733 719

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER
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         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
    United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 10th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
             JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
             STEVEN J. MENASHI,
             BETH ROBINSON,
                  Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________

    YINMI ROLANDO MONTALVO-MARIN,
             Petitioner,

                     v.                                          20-2463
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
             Respondent.
    _________________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                   Usman B. Ahmad, Long
                                      Island City, NY.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian M. Boynton, Acting
                                      Assistant Attorney General; Kohsei
                                      Ugumori, Senior Litigation
                                 Counsel; David Kim, Trial
                                 Attorney, Office of Immigration
                                 Litigation, United States
                                 Department of Justice, Washington,
                                 DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

    Petitioner Yinmi Rolando Montalvo-Marin, a native and

citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of a July 6, 2020,

decision of the BIA affirming a July 2, 2018, decision of an

Immigration    Judge    (“IJ”)    denying     asylum,   withholding   of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”).     In re Yinmi Rolando Montalvo-Marin, No. A206 733

719 (B.I.A. July 6, 2020), aff’g No. A206 733 719 (Immig. Ct.

N.Y. City July 2, 2018).         We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.

See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528

(2d Cir. 2006).     The applicable standards of review are well

established.       “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

conclusive     unless   any    reasonable      adjudicator   would    be

compelled     to    conclude       to   the     contrary.”    8 U.S.C.

                                    2
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, “we review the agency’s decision for

substantial      evidence     and    must    defer   to   the    factfinder’s

findings based on such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . . By

contrast, we review legal conclusions de novo.” Singh v.

Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

       Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination

that Montalvo-Marin failed to establish a nexus between the

harm he suffered and fears in El Salvador and an imputed anti-

gang political opinion, or that Salvadoran officials would

likely acquiesce in his torture by gang members.

     A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal

       To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of

removal, an applicant “must establish that race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion was or will be at least one central reason

for       persecuting          the          applicant.”             8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca

v.    Garland,   52   F.4th    103,    105–06     (2d     Cir.   2022).   To

demonstrate that persecution (past or prospective) bears a

nexus to an applicant’s political opinion, “[t]he applicant

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must . . . show, through direct or circumstantial evidence,

that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

applicant’s political beliefs,” rather than merely from the

persecutor’s own opinion.       Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426

F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005).          A political opinion “must

involve some support for or disagreement with the belief

system,   policies,   or   practices   of   a   government   and   its

instrumentalities, an entity that seeks to directly influence

laws, regulations, or policy, an organization that aims to

overthrow the government, or a group that plays some other

similar role in society.”       Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson, 989

F.3d 190, 199–200 (2d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).              “The

persecution may also be on account of an opinion imputed to

the applicant by the persecutor, regardless of whether or not

this imputation is accurate.”        Hernandez-Chacon v. Barr, 948

F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2020).

    The   agency   reasonably    concluded      that   Montalvo-Marin

failed to establish that the harm he suffered and fears was

on account of his political opinion, real or imputed.                He

testified that gang members demanded money from him and that

he was attacked to “settle . . . debts” after he resisted

those efforts.     He did not testify that he had expressed a

                                 4
disagreement with the gang’s belief system, policies, or

practices or that the gang members accused him of such

opinion.

      Accordingly, the agency did not err in finding that, as

Montalvo-Marin testified, the gang targeted him solely based

on its members’ interests in accumulating wealth, which is

not a protected ground.           See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),

1231(b)(3)(A); see also Zelaya-Moreno, 989 F.3d at 196–200;

Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545 (requiring applicant to show

nexus to political opinion “through direct or circumstantial

evidence”); Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313–14

(2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “random violence” and “general

crime conditions” are not grounds for asylum).                 His failure

to establish a nexus between the harm he suffered and fears

and   a   protected     ground     was    dispositive    of    asylum   and

withholding     of     removal.       See     8 U.S.C.   §§ 1101(a)(42),

1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A).

  B. CAT Relief

      Unlike asylum and withholding of removal, CAT does not

require    a   nexus    to   a    protected    ground.        See   8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c), 1208.17(a).          An applicant for CAT relief must

show that he would “more likely than not” be tortured by or

                                      5
with the acquiescence of government officials.                      8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18(a)(1).             “[T]orture requires only that

government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an

act   and     thereafter    breach   their     legal     responsibility     to

prevent it.”      Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir.

2004); Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 592 (2d

Cir. 2021).       Under the “more likely than not” standard, an

applicant “must establish that there is greater than a fifty

percent chance” of occurrence.             Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft, 320

F.3d 130, 144 n.20 (2d Cir. 2003).

      The IJ acknowledged that El Salvador is                    plagued    by

rampant gang activity and that some officials collude with

gang members, but the IJ nevertheless reasonably concluded

that Montalvo-Marin had not established that acquiescence was

likely given evidence that officials were attempting to crack

down on gang activity, had imprisoned gang members from his

neighborhood,      and     had   responded    to   his    aunt’s    call   for

assistance and disrupted the attack he suffered.                    “[W]here,

as    here,    . . .   evidence,     specifically,       State     Department

Country     Reports,     supports    the    agency’s     finding    that   the

Salvadoran government is aggressively trying to combat gang

violence,      even    through    armed     confrontations,        we   cannot

                                      6
conclude that the agency was compelled to find it likely that,

if   [Montalvo-Marin]   were   removed   to   El   Salvador,   that

country’s officials would acquiesce in his torture by gang

members.”   Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th at 593.

     For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

                               FOR THE COURT:
                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                               Clerk of Court

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