Court Opinion

ID: 9637348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:04:11.516657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.516058
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
I agree that Claim 4 is invalid. I do not agree that Claim 2 is valid.
1. The specifications begin with the statement, “This invention relates to poly iodized derivatives of the hydroxy diphenyl carboxylic acids and a process for preparing the same."1 But, significantly, the claim itself is solely for a product without regard to the process by which it is made; it contains no reference of any sort, direct or indirect, to the specifications.
Although there are statements in some decisions to the effect that a claim for a product may be valid, entirely apart from the process by which it is made, most of those statements, on careful examination of the opinions, turn out to be dicta. 2 The case most frequently cited to sustain such a product claim is Maurer v. Dickerson, 3 Cir., 113 F. 870. The court there said (page 874) that a patent for 'a product, no matter by what process produced, can be valid. But that statement was dictum. For the court (page 874) said that the evidence showed that the product could not be made “in any other way than by the process recited”; that (page 876) the article sold by defendant was the same as that specified in the patent claim; and that therefore (page 877) infringement was sufficiently shown “even if the claim were held to be limited * * * to the product when mad'e with the materials and by the process described in the specification.” In support of the dictum in the Maurer case, the court cited Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U. S. 586, 24 L.Ed. 235. But, in the Merrill case, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was limited to the process, and did not pass on the validity of a claim for the product alone. The Maurer case also cited Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 19 L.Ed. 566; there the court sustained what might appear to be a product claim, but that claim (page 795) referred to “the new manufacture” ; and in Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanizing Co., 93 U. S. 496, 23 L.Ed. 952, a claim thus worded was held so to incorporate the specifications that it was a claim merely for a product made by the process described in the specifications; see also Goodyear Dental Vulcanizing Co. v. Davis, 102 U. S. 222, 26 L.Ed. 149.3 In Binney & Smith Co. v. United Carbon Co., 4 Cir., 125 F.2d 255, 258, the court, citing cases, said that unquestionably there could be a valid claim for a product alone regardless of the process; but that decision was reversed in United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith, 317 U. S. 228, 63 S. Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed. 232, where grave doubts are cast upon any such doctrine. See also General Electric Co. v. Wabash Corp., 304 U. S. 364, 373-374, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402; Musher Foundation Co. v. Alba Trading Co., 2 Cir., 150 F.2d 885, 889. 4
A claim for a mere product, regardless of the process for producing it, is, I think, virtually a claim to what has sometimes been described as a “principle” or “idea,” *435he'ld not to be patentable. 5 It is indeed something of a paradox, but, nevertheless, doubtless wise, that our patent law gives no reward to the discoverers of scientific principles,6 while it protects the discoveries and inventions of lesser minds, who find new, original and useful applications of such principles. 7 No Prometheus is welcome in the Patent Office. 8 Particularly in the field of chemistry, it would seem most unlikely that Congress intended that blanket claims to mere products should be held valid. 9 If the statutory provision authorizing the issuance of a patent for a “composition of matter” were interpreted to validate such claims, then that statutory provision might well be unconstitutional, since it would authorize the creation of monopolies which “would discourage arts and manufactures.”10 It is of interest that, for many years, Germany has not granted patents for chemical products; that the patent here was taken from German patents ; and that those patents were for process, not product, claims, since they read: “Procedures for the production of, etc.,” and “Methods of carrying out the procedure, etc.”
For the foregoing reasons I think Claim 2 is invalid, being on its face, as my colleagues concede, “nothing but a chemical formula.”
2. The specifications say: “The invention may be illustrated by the following
examples without, however, being limited by them,” and then proceed to give what my colleagues describe as “eight specific examples of ways to practice the invention,” i. e., methods or processes for making the products described in'the claims. My colleagues state (and correctly) that the evidence at the trial showed that “compliance with the instructions in Example 4 in the specifications by a skilled chemist produced the identical product of Claim 2.” My colleagues also say that that claim is to be read on the specifications. The precise position of my colleagues is not entirely clear. They may mean that the claim is to be interpreted as if it read as do the German patents, i. e., as if it were restricted to a product produced by the process described in Example 4 or any reasonably similar equivalent. That is not the position taken by plaintiff in the trial court or in this court; indeed, I think it could scarcely so assert in the light of the language of the specifications as to not being limited by the examples given. If, however, plaintiff were to take that position, I would question its tenability. For recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that it is extremely doubtful whether a broad claim which, standing by itself, would be invalid, can be saved by limiting it through reading into it the specifications, where as here nothing in the claim in any way refers to the specifications.11 Accordingly, I doubt *436whether we can read into Claim 2 anything found in the specifications so as to validate it by limiting the claim to a product made by a process described in the specifications. 12
But I understand that what my colleagues really mean is this: As the specifications, by disclosing one specific practical method, show that the product described in Claim 2 can practically be made, plaintiff has a valid patent to that product, no matter how it is made — whether according to Example 4 or any other process now known or which may hereafter be devised; and that is the position taken by plaintiff. With that position I disagree, for reasons stated above.
3. If the claim could be and were validated by narrowing it to one for the product when made according to a method described in the specifications, then defendants should win for lack of proof of infringement. True, defendants’ counsel at the trial admitted that, if the claim was valid, defendants had infringed it. But as, at the trial, plaintiff took the position that Claim 2 was for the product regardless of any process for producing it, defendants’ admission should not be construed as meaning more than that their product was identical with plaintiffs. No proof whatever was made or offered that defendants used plaintiff’s process or any reasonably similar equivalent. Absent such proof, where a patent is for- a product resulting from a specific process or its equivalents infringement does not exist.13 If this court were to reject plaintiff’s interpretation of the claim (i. e., as a claim to a product as such) and to interpret it for the first time on appeal as one to a product resulting from a specific process, then the court should not change the character of defendants’ concession, i. e., treat it as an admission that the defendants used plaintiff’s process to manufacture the product. In that event we should hold that the patent has not been infringed. If, however, there were thought to be any doubt as to the scope of the defendants’ admission, then we should, at most, remand for further evidence, “to the end that injustice may not be done.” 14

 Emphasis added.

 Typical is Hide-ite Leather Co. v. Fiber Products Co., 1 Cir., 226 F. 34, 36.

 But see Dunn-Wire-Cut Lug Brick Co. v. Toronto Fire Clay Co., 6 Cir., 259 F. 258, 261.

 Cf. Steinfur Patents Corp. v. Wm. Beyer, Inc., 2 Cir., 62 F.2d 238, 241; Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 2 Cir., 77 F.2d 274, 277.

 LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 174-176, 14 L.Ed. 367; LeRoy v. Tatham, 22 How. 132. 16 L.Ed. 366; O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 112-114, 14 L.Ed. 601; Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. 531, 577, 17 L.Ed. 650; De Forest Radio Co. v. General Elec. Co., 283 U.S. 664, 684, 685, 51 S.Ct. 563, 75 L.Ed. 1339 ; Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 961; cf. Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 2 Cir., 77 F. 2d 274, 279; Fowler v. City of New York, 2 Cir., 121 F. 747, 748; Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 2 Cir., 160 F. 467, 469, 24 L.R.A.,N.S., 685. But see Dennis v. Pitner, 7 Cir., 106 F.2d 142.

 See cases cited in the preceding footnote.
Promise of financial reward is usually not necessary to stimulate the minds of scientific geniuses; Kaempfert, Invention and Society (1930) 19, 23-24, 33; Douglas, The Reality of Non-Commercial Incentives, in The Trend of Economics (1924) 153; Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 2 Cir., 128 F.2d 632, 642.

 Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 961, 963.

 Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 2 Cir., 145 F.2d 961.

 Cf. De Lore v. St. Louis Lithophone Co., 8 Cir., 26 F.2d 864, 868; Western Willite Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 8 Cir., 16 F.2d 446, 450; Libby-Owens-Ford Co. v. Celanese Corp., 6 Cir., 135 F.2d 138, 145; Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 385, 48 S.Ct. 380, 72 L.Ed. 610; Kalle & Co. v. Mulatzo Co., 6 Cir., 109 F.2d 321 ; American Chemical Paint Co. v. Firestone etc. Co., 6 Cir., 117 F.2d 927; Metals Recovery Co. v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 9 Cir., 31 F.2d 100, 103; cf. United Carbon Co. v. Binney Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232-233, 63 S.Ct. 65, 87 L.Ed. 232.

 LeRoy v. Tatham, supra; O'Reilly v. Morse, supra; United Carbon Co. v. Binney Co., 317 U.S. 228, 63 S.Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed. 232; Muncie Gear Works v. Outboard Co., 315 U.S. 759, 62 S.Ct. 865, 86 L.Ed. 1171.

 General Electric Co. v. Wabash, supra, 304 U.S. 364 at pages 373-374, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 LEd. 1402; United Carbon Co. v. Binney Co., 317 U.S. 228, *436234-235, 63 S.Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed. 232; cf. Altoona Theatres v. Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 487, 55 S.Ct. 455, 79 L.Ed. 1005; McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 160 U.S. 110, 116, 16 S.Ct. 240, 40 L.Ed. 358. But see Mitchell v. Tilgham, 19 Wall. 287, 391, 22 L.Ed. 125; Downes v. Teter-Heany Development Co., 3 Cir., 150 F. 122, 123; Pickhardt v. Packard, C.C.N.Y. 22 F. 530, 531-532; Western States Machine Co. v. Hepworth Co., 2 Cir., 147 F.2d 345, 349; R. M. Hollingshead Co. v. Bassick Mfg. Co., 6 Cir., 73 F.2d 543, 548.
In Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., Inc., 2 Cir., 150 F.2d 885, 889, this court, in discussing General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Co., supra, considered only the portion of that opinion found on page 373 of 304 U.S. 364, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402 and neglected the remarks on page 374 of 304 U.S. 364, 58. S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402 and the casos there cited; and it gave no heed to the reference to the General Electric case in the United Carbon Co. case, supra, 317 U.S. 228, at page 235, 63 S.Ct. 165, 87 L.Ed. 232.

 A patent for a product resulting from a process may be highly desirable to prevent competition by those who use the process in other countries to make the product which they import into this country. Cf. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Co., 304 U.S. 364, 374, 58 S.Ct. 899, 82 L.Ed. 1402; Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., supra, 77 F.2d 274 at page 279; Musber Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., Inc., supra, 150 F.2d 885, at page 889.

 See, e.g., Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293, 313, 4 S.Ct. 455, 28 L.Ed. 433; Plummer v. Sargent, 120 U.S. 442, 450, 7 S.Ct. 640, 30 L.Ed. 737; Hide-ite Leather Co. v. Fiber Products Co., 1 Cir., 226 F. 34; Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 268, 14 L.Ed. 683; Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. 531, 572, 17 L.Ed. 650; Westinghouse v. Boyden Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 569, 18 S.Ct. 707, 42 L.Ed. 1136; Swan Carburetor Co. v. Chrysler Corporation, 6 Cir., 130 F.2d 391, 393; Flowers v. Magor Car Corporation, 3 Cir., 65 F.2d 657, 658; Flowers v. Austin-Warren Co., 7 Cir., 149 F.2d 955, 958.

 Benz v. Celeste Fur Dyeing & Dressing Corp., 2 Cir., 136 F.2d 845, 848; Nachmann Spring-Filled Corp. v. Kay Mfg. Co., 2 Cir., 139 F.2d 781, 787; Zalkind v. Scheinman, 2 Cir., 139 F.2d 895, 904; United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 184 U.S. 416, 423, 424, 22 S.Ct. 428, 46 L.Ed. 619; Estho v. Lear, 7 Pet. 130, 8 L.Ed. 632; Armstrong v. Lear, 8 Pet. 52, 74, 8 L.Ed. 863; Security Mortgage Co. v. Powers, 278 U.S. 149, 159, 160, 49 S.Ct. 84, 73 L.Ed. 236; Pfeil v. Jamison, 3 Cir., 245 F. 119; Wyant v. Caldwell, 4 Cir., 67 F.2d 374; Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Columbus, 6 Cir., 55 F.2d 56, 58.