Court Opinion

ID: 9543400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:14.227747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:18.170570
License: Public Domain

BUSSEY, Judge,
concurring in part/dissenting in part:
I agree that the determination as to appellant’s guilt must be affirmed. However, I also believe that the sentence of death is well supported by the record, and would affirm.
The purpose of the notification requirement in 21 O.S.1981, § 701.10 is to eliminate any element of surprise when the death penalty is sought. Johnson v. State, 665 P.2d 815, 819 (Okl.Cr.1982). So long as the defendant is able to prepare his defense, his assignment that notice was insufficient is without merit. Banks v. State, 701 P.2d 418, 426-427 (Okl.Cr.1985). My collegues on this Court have chosen to modify the sentence in this case because the State failed to provide a “[ ]complete list of witnesses [or] a precis of the evidence that would be presented through the witnesses who would be called,” or due to the State’s failure to provide a “concise summary of the ‘evidence’ to be relied upon.” I simply cannot agree that the record shows a failure to list the witnesses, and cannot find that the presentation of evidence by the State resulted in unfair surprise to the defense. Nor can I join in the language that there must be a “precis of the evidence” or a “concise summary.” Our cases in the past have, in general language, required that the State provide “a summary of the evidence intended to support the alleged aggravating circumstances.” See Green v. State, 713 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Okl.Cr.1985); Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273, 285 (Okl.Cr.1986). I would not extend the requirement to require any more than a general summary.
The record in this case does indeed contain an order of the trial judge directing the prosecutor to “Endorse Names of Witnesses and to separately state whether these witnesses will be called in the State’s case in chief or during the punishment phase of [appellant’s] trial, if neces-sary_” However, the record also discloses that the prosecutor in fact complied with that order by filing a notice of witnesses to be called. The language of that notice is as follows:
Comes now the State of Oklahoma, Plaintiff herein, and provides the following list of all witnesses which the State anticipates calling as a witness or possibly using as a witness in the cases in chief or in the second stage of the trial. Not included are any possible rebutal witnesses.”
(Emphasis added).
The notice then proceeds to list several witnesses, including the two officers whose testimony is here callenged. At the end of the notice is a list of persons who would be called exclusively as second stage witnesses.
The trial court’s order did not direct that a list of witnesses for the first stage should be prepared, and that a list of witnesses for the second stage be prepared separately. Rather, it required that all witnesses be endorsed and that the prosecutor state in which stage each witness would be called. There was no failure to comply.
As to the content of the testimony given, the question is not how the evidence used was disclosed to the defendant, but whether its admission resulted in unfair surprise. Johnson, supra; and Banks, supra. The record reflects, and is nowhere controverted, that defense counsel interviewed one officer in his own office. The other testified extensively at preliminary hearing, disclosing everything to which he testified in the sentencing proceeding. The testimony at preliminary hearing was elicited by questions from defense counsel, not the prosecutor. In the case of Walker v. State, 723 P.2d 273 (Okl.Cr.1986), we held that although no written notice of evidence to be offered in aggravation was submitted as contemplated by the statute, a conversation between defense counsel and the prosecutor which relayed the challenged information rendered the assignment meritless. So, too, must the assignment fail in this *1248case. Defense counsel was clearly aware of this evidence and could not have been surprised.
Next, the question of sufficiency of the evidence to support the aggravating circumstance of knowingly creating a great risk of death to more than one person must be addressed. Appellant correctly points out that the prosecutor never formally offered evidence from the first stage for admission in the second stage. Instruction number 11, Which quoted the language of OUJI-CR 442, informed the jury that “you are authorized to consider only the evidence received here in open court presented by the State and the defendant during the sentencing phase of this proceeding.” However, I feel it necessary to take this opportunity to express my concern that OUJI-CR 442 does not accurately reflect the law in this State.
Restricting the jury’s consideration of evidence to that which is received after the guilty verdict is reached imposes a requirement not contained in the statutes or cases in this State. It is worthy of note that six of the eight aggravating circumstances listed in 21 O.S.1981, § 701.12 may require that circumstances of the murder itself be considered.1 The sentencing proceeding required by statute is not a new and separate trial; rather, it is but one stage of a single trial. If the sentencing jury were not to be aware of the evidence presented during the guilt stage, then Section 701.10 certainly would not mandate that the same jury must be used in both stages. To instruct the jury that it may not consider first stage evidence unless once again received after the guilt stage is completed defies common sense and flies in the face of what appears to be clear legislative intent. It is also contrary to decisions of this Court. See, Stout v. State, 693 P.2d 617, 627-628 (Okl. Cr.1984). The instruction contained at OUJI-CR 442 ought to be modified in every capital sentencing proceeding.
Testimony at trial amply supported the aggravating circumstances that (1) there was a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society, and (2) appellant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. The sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Accordingly, the death sentence ought to be affirmed. I would so hold, and must therefore respectfully dissent.

.21 O.S.1981, § 701.12 provides the following circumstances which require a consideration of the facts of the case in chief:

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2. The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person;
3. The person committed the murder for remuneration * * *;
4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel;
5. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution;
6. The murder was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of a felony;
8. The victim of the murder was a peace officer.

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