Court Opinion

ID: 9906375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:02:23.616266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:18.695584
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/1/23 P. v. Whicker CA2/5

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B325848

       Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. MA058071)
       v.

 STACEY JEROME WHICKER,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Dismissed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              _________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       In 2015, defendant Stacey Jerome Whicker was sentenced
to a lengthy third-strike prison term stemming from a series of
altercations with his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s brother. On
appeal, we modified the judgment to correct various sentencing
errors. Five years later, the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court of certain errors in
defendant’s modified sentence. In accordance with CDCR’s
advice, the court resentenced defendant to a slightly shorter
prison term. In his appeal from that judgment, defendant again
raised various sentencing errors. We modified the judgment to
correct the errors, affirmed the judgment as modified, and
remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to prepare
a new abstract of judgment reflecting the modified sentence.
       On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court violated
his right to be present for resentencing, that it failed to apply the
full resentencing rule, and that his attorney provided
constitutionally-deficient representation by failing to object. The
People contend, and we agree, that on remand, the trial court did
not resentence defendant at all. It was this court that modified
the judgment, and as such, there is no new “post-remand” trial
court judgment from which defendant can appeal. As we lack
jurisdiction over this matter, the appeal is dismissed. (See
Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126 (Jennings)
[reviewing courts have an independent duty to raise the issue
when a doubt exists about their own jurisdiction].)

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                          BACKGROUND1
       After a violent argument with his girlfriend and her
brother, defendant forced his girlfriend into a car and drove off.
When Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department deputies caught up, they
discovered several bags of cocaine and cocaine base in the car, as
well as $3,000 in cash.
       Defendant was convicted by jury of assault with a firearm
(Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 1 & 2); false imprisonment
by violence (id., § 236; count 3); misdemeanor battery (id., § 243,
subd. (e)(1); count 4); possession of a firearm by a felon (id.,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 5); possession for sale of cocaine
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5; count 6); and possession for sale
of cocaine base (id., § 11351.5; count 7).2 The jury also found
defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Defendant admitted suffering four prior convictions, three of
which constituted both strike priors (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12) and serious-felony priors (§ 667, subd. (a)), and two of
which constituted prison priors (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). The
court imposed a determinate term of 4 years, 8 months and a
consecutive, indeterminate term of 101 years to life, for a total
prison sentence of 105 years, 8 months to life.
       Following defendant’s initial appeal, we modified the
judgment to correct several sentencing errors and affirmed as
modified. (People v. Whicker (Aug. 7, 2015, B255716) [nonpub.

1     Most of the evidence presented at trial is irrelevant to
defendant’s claims on appeal; we address only that evidence
necessary to resolve the appeal and otherwise to provide context.

2       All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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opn.].) We struck two of the serious-felony priors (§ 667,
subd. (a)) because they were not separately brought and tried,
thereby reducing the indeterminate sentence to 81 years to life,
but increased the determinate sentence to 5 years, 4 months to
correct an arithmetical error as to count 6. As modified,
defendant’s total prison sentence was 86 years, 4 months to life.
       In 2020, CDCR notified the trial court that the determinate
portion of the sentence was still incorrect because the court had
used the wrong sentencing triad for count 7 and had failed to
specify a principal count. In response, the court resentenced
defendant to the same indeterminate term of 81 years to life but
increased defendant’s determinate sentence to 11 years,
4 months, for a total prison term of 92 years, 4 months to life.
       When the case again came before us on defendant’s second
appeal, defendant argued the trial court erred by not striking the
enhancement for his prison prior, which had become invalid due
to an intervening change in the law (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The
People conceded, and we agreed, that defendant was entitled to
the benefit of the new law. We also observed that CDCR was
mistaken about the purported error it identified in the sentence
for count 7.
       By unpublished opinion, we modified the judgment to
correct the errors and affirmed as modified. (People v. Whicker
(Sep. 17, 2021, B307526) [nonpub. opn.] (Whicker II).) We
reduced defendant’s determinate term to 9 years, 4 months and
reduced the indeterminate term to 80 years to life, for a total
prison sentence of 89 years, 4 months to life. (Id. at pp. 9–10.)
As we discuss in more detail below, our disposition of the second
appeal was to remand with directions to the trial court to prepare
a new abstract of judgment reflecting the modified judgment and

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to send a certified copy of the new abstract to CDCR. (Ibid.) In
all other respects, we affirmed. (Ibid.)
       Upon remand, at an in-person hearing, the trial court made
the changes to the judgment that we directed in the disposition.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                           DISCUSSION
1.     Proceedings on Remand
       Our disposition in Whicker II stated: “The judgment is
modified as follows: (1) as to count 7, possession of cocaine base,
defendant’s sentence is modified from 8 years (4 years doubled) to
6 years (3 years doubled); and (2) as to count 1, assault with a
firearm, the one-year prior prison term under section 667.5,
subdivision (b) is stricken. The trial court is directed to prepare a
new abstract of judgment reflecting these changes. The clerk
shall forward the new abstract to [CDCR]. As modified, the
judgment is affirmed.” (Whicker II, supra, at pp. 9–10.)
       On September 27, 2022, upon remand, the trial court held a
hearing at which counsel for defendant and counsel for the
prosecution were present. Defendant was not. The trial court
asked defense counsel: “Do you waive your client’s appearance
for this resentencing consistent with the appellate court
remittitur?” Defense counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor, if it is
in his favor.” The court said, “It is.”
       The court continued: “And I do have a remittitur that was
issued July 28th, 2022 . . . so the court’s intent would be to
resentence the defendant consistent with this remittitur. There’s
law changes, and per the 7/28/2022 remittitur, judgment is
modified.
       “As to count 7, possession of cocaine base, his sentencing
will be modified from eight years times two to six years times two

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because of the law change. So it will be mid-term of three years
doubled for a total of six years rather than initial eight years.
And as to count 1, the court will strike the defendant’s prior
prison term, which is [a] 667.5(b) prior. And all other terms
remain in full force and effect.
        “It will be nun[c] pro tunc back on the original date of
resentencing. So now the total will be 39 years, 4 months plus 50
to life. And I think that’s all we need to do. The clerk to forward
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections.”
        Counsel for both parties thanked the court, and the hearing
concluded.
2.      The Trial Court Did Not Enter an Appealable
        Judgment or Order
        In California, the right to appeal is statutory. (People v.
Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 [“The right to appeal is
statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s
judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made
appealable by statute”].) The existence of an appealable
judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.
(Jennings, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 126.) Section 1237 sets forth the
situations under which a criminal defendant may appeal.3 The

3      Section 1237 provides: “An appeal may be taken by the
defendant: [¶] (a) From a final judgment of conviction except as
provided in Section 1237.1 and Section 1237.5. A sentence, an
order granting probation, or the commitment of a defendant for
insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a defendant as a
mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a
defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to
be a final judgment within the meaning of this section. Upon

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statute authorizes appeals from “final judgments[,] those orders
deemed by statute to be final judgments,” and any “order made
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”
(People v. Mazurette (2001) 24 Cal.4th 789, 792 (Mazurette);
§ 1237, subds. (a) & (b).)
       A newly imposed sentence following resentencing
constitutes an appealable “final judgment of conviction.” (People
v. Arias (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 213, 219–221.) But not all
proceedings on remand trigger the right to appeal. The rule
remains that absent a judgment, a judgment substitute, or a
qualifying postjudgment order, a defendant cannot appeal.
(Mazurette, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 792–793.)
       Defendant contends that the proceedings below must be
understood as a resentencing hearing resulting in a new
appealable judgment. We disagree. Our disposition did not
authorize resentencing, a point understood by the trial court
despite the court’s initial reference to the remand proceeding as a
“resentencing.”4
       Inviting counsel to attend a hearing for the purposes of
observing changes the court was making to the abstract of
judgment did not covert the appearance into a formal
resentencing hearing. Instead, the court’s statement that its
“intent would be to resentence the defendant consistent with this

appeal from a final judgment the court may review any order
denying a motion for a new trial. [¶] (b) From any order made
after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”

4     At the hearing, defendant’s sentence was before the trial
court but only in its ministerial capacity to give effect to this
court’s disposition.

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remittitur . . . and per the 7/28/2022 remittitur, judgment is
modified” must be understood to refer to modifying the previous
resentencing as reflected in the abstract of judgment, not the
judgment itself, as that was the only course of action authorized
“per the 7/28/2022 remittitur.” The court’s explanation that that
modification would “be nun[c] pro tunc back on the original date
of sentencing” is consistent with this interpretation. In other
words, the court’s statements suggest it was appropriately
complying with the directions contained in the remittitur. (See
People v. Dutra (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1366 [trial court’s
jurisdiction upon remand limited to carrying out directions
contained in remittitur].)
       Because the trial court did not resentence defendant, there
is no appealable judgment or order in this case. And because
there is no judgment or order from which defendant may properly
appeal, we lack jurisdiction over this matter.

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                      DISPOSITION
    The appeal is dismissed.

                             RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

             BAKER, J.

             MOOR, J.

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