Court Opinion

ID: 9861813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:37:45.707374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:07.726831
License: Public Domain

*213Concurring Opinion
Hunter, C.J.
Although my position on the constitutionality of the criminal sexual psychopath statutes was made clear by my original vote in this case (see J. Jackson’s dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Haskett v. Marion County Criminal Court (1968), 250 Ind. 229, 234 N. E. 2d 636), I should like to go on record now as opposing its application, particularly under such facts as appear in this case, i.e. appellant’s objection and refusal to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Ind. Const., Art. 1, § 14, U. S. Const.; Amend. V, XIV.
Regardless of the characterization of the proceedings, appellant, if forced to testify, would subject himself to possible involuntary commitment. Before such an individual is deprived of his liberty he must be accorded, in my opinion, the basic and fundamental right against self-incrimination contemplated by our concept of due process of law. As was noted by Judge Jackson:
“Neither sound logic nor fundamental justice dictates that the constitutional protectives may be ignored in civil proceedings and must be followed in criminal proceedings. The end result under the Act is incarceration for an indeterminate period of time against one’s will. An individual exposed to a procedure that can result in his incarceration is entitled to his privilege against self-incrimination regardless of the euphemistic characterization of that procedure.” 234 N. E. 2d at 643.
That courts are beginning to realize that the substantial rights of an individual must be afforded when faced with the spectre of involuntary commitment was demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of In Re Gault (1967), 387 U. S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 cited by the majority. See also Miller v. Blalock (4th Cir. 1969), 411 F. 2d 548; Heryford v. Parker (10th Cir. 1968), 396 F. 2d 393. Whether all rights presently considered so basic to our concepts of ordered liberty in a criminal proceeding to have been incorpo*214rated under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause will eventually be likewise extended to a person facing involuntary commitment under other proceedings has not been decided, nor has this court taken such a position. See Bible v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 373, 254 N. E. 2d 319. Clearly the United States Supreme Court has not purported to so hold. In Re Gault, supra; Re Winship (1970), 397 U. S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368. I believe and I feel have demonstrated (Bible v. State, supra) that extreme caution must be exercised in this area if the various programs established for the purpose of committing individuals other than by the criminal process are to remain functional. However it offends my sense of justice to require an individual to. give evidence against himself where the end result will be possible involuntary commitment to an institution regardless of its nature. It is on this basis that I therefore concur with the majority opinion.