Court Opinion

ID: 9728937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:19:25.409108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:53.152227
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. In this case, a “pro. per.” and incarcerated defendant is denied his day in court and thereby loses the opportunity, among other things, to present what is, if true, probably a meritorious motion to dismiss the action against him. I have no serious quarrel with the majority’s articulation of the general principles of law which apply to motions to vacate default judgments. But I do disagree with the majority’s conclusion the trial judge abused her discretion in granting the motion to set aside the default judgment and would affirm that order.
The majority first concludes the trial court abused its discretion in vacating the default judgment on grounds of extrinsic fraud. The record allegedly reflects plaintiff did not “rely” on defendant’s representations that he would consider the answer filed by defendant’s mother a sufficient answer and would not seek a default judgment against defendant for failing to file an answer. The majority infers this absence of reliance from the fact defendant applied for an extension of time to answer. The majority then dismisses the alternative ground for vacating the default judgment—defendant’s “extrinsic mistake” (or excusable neglect) in failing to file his answer within the 30-day extension period. The majority concedes the jail authorities made it impossible for defendant to complete and file his answer during the final five days of that thirty-day period. However, it is argued his failure to complete and file his answer in the preceding 24 days demonstrates defendant was guilty of inexcusable neglect.
I respectfully disagree with both positions. The California Supreme Court has reminded us recently how reluctant we should be, as appellate courts, to reverse a trial court which has acted to vacate a default judgment. “It is the policy of the law to favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits. Appellate courts are much more disposed to affirm an order when the result is to compel a trial on the merits than when the default judgment is allowed to stand. [Citation omitted.] Therefore, when a party in default moves promptly[1] to seek relief, very slight evidence is required to justify a trial *297court’s order setting aside a default. [Citation omitted] . . . The trial court’s order granting relief was within its sound discretion and, in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion, should not be disturbed. [Citation omitted.]” (Shamblin v. Brattain, supra, 44 Cal.3d 474, 478, italics added.)
In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in inferring defendant was “lulled into a state of false security” about whether plaintiff would seek a default judgment against him should he fail to file a timely answer. True, one could reasonably infer from the fact he filed an application for an extension to file an answer that he had not relied on plaintiff’s acknowledgement the answer filed by defendant’s mother would suffice. On the other hand, one also could reasonably infer he was lulled into thinking defendant would not seek a default judgment for any failure to file a further answer and sought an extension merely to determine whether he wanted to file a different or more refined answer than his mother had. Remember plaintiff’s counsel not only stated he considered defendant had already answered the complaint, he promised not to seek a default judgment for failure to file an answer. And he did so not once but twice, the second time after respondent had indicated he was seeking an extension of time to file an answer.
From what plaintiff’s counsel said not once but twice, defendant could well have considered he already had a viable answer on file in the case, one that would foreclose the possibility of a default judgment. With that worry behind him, he nevertheless applied for an extension of time not for the purpose of filing the answer in the case but to consider filing another answer.
Thus, the application for an extension of time is entirely consistent with a finding defendant was lulled into a state of false security about the necessity of actually filing the answer for which defendant had requested the extension of time. Default would not be allowed against a defendant who had lodged a sufficient answer, then requested an extension to file an amended answer but for whatever reason failed to file that amended pleading within the time allotted. Nor should it be allowed against this defendant who had every reason to believe he already had an answer on file which his opponent guaranteed him would protect him against default and thus who had every reason to believe he would not risk the consequence of default if it proved undesirable or impossible for whatever reason to come up with a better pleading during the extension period. The reason respondent gave for hav*298ing sought the time extension—as a precaution—actually supports rather than undercuts the inference he relied on appellant’s guarantee to protect him against default but wanted time to consider filing a better answer. Would not most lawyers and most pro. per. litigants be suspicious about the potency of their pleadings if the other side told them: “What was filed on your behalf already is good enough for us?” So would it not be logical despite relying on the other side’s promise they would not seek a default nevertheless to ask for an extension of time “just as a precaution” in order to have an opportunity to see if it was possible to come up with a better answer to their complaint.
This is a reasonable inference and one which supports the trial court’s decision to vacate the default judgment. Accordingly, it likewise supports the conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion and its judgment should be affirmed. For, as the California Supreme Court has again reminded us recently, “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. [Citations omitted.]” (Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 478-479, italics added.)
Even assuming “extrinsic fraud” were not present in this case, it poses a clear—indeed an extreme—example of “extrinsic mistake.” Here the defendant was taken away from his law books and his legal research and indeed told he could not pass out or receive written materials some five days before his answer was due. What the majority opinion in effect holds is that it is “inexcusable ” for a party whom the court has expressly given 30 days to file a pleading to fail to file that pleading within 24 days. The defendant here happens to have been an incarcerated pro. per. litigant. But I cannot help wondering how many answers are filed during the 25th through 30th days by even large, sophisticated law firms. To put it another way, assume five days before their answers were due, lawyers in this state were suddenly locked out of their offices and told it was too late to file. What percentage do you imagine would find themselves to have engaged in “inexcusably neglectful” conduct, according to the majority’s definition, and to have exposed their clients to default judgment, because they had not yet filed their answers? Would it be out of line to expect 50 percent? 60 percent? More?
Even accepting the highly improbable proposition only a handful of lawyers ever wait until the last few days before the due date to file their pleadings, that would hardly make it “inexcusable” for an individual lawyer or a pro. per. party to take that long to do so. The fact the defendant here did not actually file a final, refined draft by the 24th day (out of the 30 the court expressly allowed) in no sense suggests he was not moving in a *299reasonably diligent fashion toward a timely filing of this pleading. It takes time to research and write an answer. By the 24th day a lawyer or pro. per. litigant may still be in the last stages of research or the early phases of drafting yet be well on his way toward completing the final version in ample time to file it on or before the 30th day.
Since I reject the majority’s definition of what constitutes “inexcusable” behavior in preparing and filing a pleading due within 30 days, I have no trouble concluding defendant did not behave “inexcusably” in failing to complete and file his answer within 24 days. Moreover, the record reflects the prison authorities took away entirely his ability to complete and file the answer during the final five days. It is difficult to imagine a more definitive and justifiable excuse for not having filed within those five days. Accordingly, I find defendant’s failure to timely file his answer was the product of “extrinsic mistake” as that term is defined in the cases cited in the majority opinion. This supplies a second independent and sufficient ground for the trial court’s decision to vacate the default judgment.
It is not essential defendants establish they possess a valid defense before they will be granted relief from a default judgment. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile noting this defendant presents allegations which, if true, would be sufficient to dismiss this complaint on the merits were his motion to vacate to be granted. As the majority opinion concedes, defendant claims, at least, that plaintiff did not comply with Business and Professions Code section 6201 by supplying him with a written notice he was entitled to arbitrate this fee dispute. If true, this failure alone would provide grounds for outright dismissal of plaintiff’s action. Thus, to take away the opportunity to defend against this case on the merits could well work a real injustice on this defendant, assuming once again the truth of his allegations.
The dangers of deciding this sort of claim without reaching the merits is highlighted by this case. For, if Maxwell’s allegations are true, the majority opinion may reward a lawyer plaintiff who first failed to notify a pro se defendant of his right to arbitration, then told him a further answer was not required and promised he would not seek a default judgment for failing to answer in a timely fashion, then entered a default a few days after the answer was due. At oral argument plaintiff contended he had complied with Business and Professions Code section 6201 and had the documentation to prove it. That may well be the case. But this is precisely why we have trials—to get to the truth and to decide disputes on the merits.
*300For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting the motion to vacate the default judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 15, 1988, and respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 18, 1989.

Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474 [243 Cal.Rptr. 902, 749 P.2d 339] involved a timely filed Code of Civil Procedure section 473 motion. In the instant case appellant was a week late in filing his motion for relief from default under section 473. Yet there was ample evidence the trial court could have credited which demonstrated appellant had prepared this motion well within the statutory period. The only reason he did not file it on time was because of restrictions imposed on him by jail authorities. Thus, the motion was as “prompt” as it could be. Surely the policy behind Shamblin does not lose its force under these circum*297stances, especially considering the trial court was hearing appellant’s motion in what is denominated an equitable proceeding.