Court Opinion

ID: 9697996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:39:08.738426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.634796
License: Public Domain

*243Kelly, J.
{dissenting). In this case, the police violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. US Const, Am IV. Their decision to forgo the steps of knocking and announcing their presence was not reasonable. Yet, the majority holds that the exclusionary rule does not apply, relying on People v Stevens, 460 Mich 626; 597 NW2d 53 (1999).
I dissent because Stevens was wrongly decided. It held that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the “knock and announce” reasonableness provisions of the Fourth Amendment. I opined in Stevens, and I continue to believe, that the majority’s decision in that case flies in the face of binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, the Stevens holding ignores the constitutional consequences of ruling that the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce statute. MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6). Therefore, in this case, because I am bound to follow the precedent of the United States Supreme Court, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
i
I offer the following analysis of the issues involved here.
The introduction into evidence of materials seized and observations made during an unlawful search is prohibited by the exclusionary rule. Weeks v United States, 232 US 383; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), overruled on other grounds in Elkins v United States, 364 US 206; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960); Silverman v United States, 365 US 505; 81 S Ct 679; 5 *244L Ed 2d 734 (1961). The rule also prohibits the introduction of materials and testimony that are the products or indirect results of an illegal search, the so-called “fruits of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471, 488; 83 S Ct 407; 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963).
The exclusionary rule originated in three decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the turn of the twentieth century: Weeks v United States, supra, Adams v New York, 192 US 585; 24 S Ct 372; 48 L Ed 575 (1904), and Boyd v United States, 116 US 616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886). The United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [US Const, Am IV.]
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 9; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968); People v Faucett, 442 Mich 153, 157-158; 499 NW2d 764 (1993).
The federal constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures have been extended to state proceedings through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); People v Nash, 418 Mich 196, 211; 341 NW2d 439 (1983); People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 448, n 15; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). Under the circumstances of this case, art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Con*245stitution must be construed as providing the same protections as its federal counterpart. See People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 270-271; 475 NW2d 16 (1991), and People v Collins, 438 Mich 8, 25; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).1
In Richards v Wisconsin,2 the United States Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding that the common-law knock-and-announce requirement is incorporated into the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 385, citing Wilson v Arkansas, 514 US 927, 934; 115 S Ct 1914; 131 L Ed 2d 976 (1995):
Given the longstanding common-law endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer’s entry into a dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.
Accordingly, in the absence of circumstances justifying noncompliance with the knock-and-announce mandate, a violation of the mandate gives rise to the exclusionary rule. Richards v Wisconsin, supra;3 Wil*246son v Arkansas, supra; Miller v United States, 357 US 301; 78 S Ct 1190; 2 L Ed 2d 1332 (1958).
Thus, the Fourth Amendment must be applied under a standard of reasonableness. Ker v California, 374 US 23; 83 S Ct 1623; 10 L Ed 2d 726 (1963). “[I]n some circumstances an officer’s unannounced entry into a home [notwithstanding a valid search warrant] might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Wilson, supra at 934. “The purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution.” Colorado v Connelly, 479 US 157, 166; 107 S Ct 515; 93 L Ed 2d 473 (1986).
The Michigan Supreme Court majority in Stevens held that the inevitable discovery exception excuses compliance with the constitutional requirement that officers knock and announce their presence before executing a search warrant. This holding forecloses any possibility of conducting a reasonableness inquiry to determine whether the Fourth Amendment was violated, and ultimately, whether the exclusionary rule applies.
Since the majority’s holding is clearly inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court precedent of Richards and Wilson, I cannot follow it.
n
The Supreme Court majority in Stevens also erroneously held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of Michigan’s knock-and-announce stat*247ute. The Michigan Legislature codified the knock-and-announce concept in MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6):
The officer to whom a warrant is directed, or any person assisting him, may break any outer or inner door or window of a house or building, or anything therein, in order to execute the warrant, if after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance, or when necessary to liberate himself or any person assisting him in execution of the warrant.
Since the knock-and-announce concept is an element of the reasonableness prong of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule should apply when the failure to knock and announce results in an unreasonable search. See Ker v California, supra at 32; see also People v Polidori, 190 Mich App 673; 476 NW2d 482 (1991).4
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the appropriate remedy for violations of the knock-and-announce rule in the context of the execution of a valid search warrant. However, various federal circuit courts and state courts have treated it. *248For example, in United States v Marts,5 the Eighth Circuit rejected the government’s good-faith defense, under United States v Leon, 468 US 897; 104 S Ct 3405; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984). It held that the only appropriate remedy in that case was exclusion of the evidence:
The Leon decision does not extend to the instant case, where there is no indication that the officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable. Rather, there was a clear violation of the knock-and-announce rule, without the presence of exigent circumstances. The Fourth Amendment limitations are designed to deter precisely this kind of conduct. The incentive for officers to operate within those limitations in the future is provided by our application of the exclusionary rule. [Id. at 1219.]
Similarly, in United States v Bates,6 our Sixth Circuit held that, unless exigent circumstances exist, the failure of state law enforcement officials to knock and announce their presence will render evidence seized inadmissible.7
*249The United States Supreme Court has applied the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained following an unlawful arrest. It predicated the exclusion on arresting officers’ failure to comply with the knock-and-announce rule. In Miller v United States, supra, the Court explained that, although it was mindful of society’s reliance on law enforcement agencies to achieve law and order,
insistence on observance by law officers of traditional fair procedural requirements is, from the long point of view, best calculated to contribute to that end. However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness. The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. . . . Every householder, the good and the bad, the guilty and the innocent, is entitled to the protection designed to secure the common interest against unlawful invasion of the house. [Id. at 313.]
Even though the exclusionary rule applies to Fourth Amendment violations, the states also have the authority, when necessary, to exclude evidence when statutory requirements have not been observed. Mallory v United States, 354 US 449; 77 S Ct 1356; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957); Navarro v United States, 400 F2d 315 (CA 5, 1968). In formulating Michigan’s knock- and-announce statute, the Legislature included a nominal penalty, MCL 780.657; MSA 28.1259(7). The law *250made it a misdemeanor for anyone to exceed his authority or exercise it with unnecessary severity in the course of executing a warrant. It did not, however, provide for suppression of the evidence when officers fail to knock and announce their presence.
However, our analysis cannot stop there. We are not free to turn a blind eye to constitutional violations. Considering the determinations in Marts, Leon, Ramirez, Mallory, Miller, Ker, Moore, Bates, Wilson, and Richards, the exclusionary rule provides another significant remedy when the knock-and-announce statute is violated. See Ker, supra, People v Polidori, supra, and People v Asher, 203 Mich App 621, 624, n 1; 513 NW2d 144 (1994).
I find it unfortunate that the majority in Stevens chose to ignore the mandates of our United States Supreme Court, and I cannot, in good faith, follow Stevens’ divergent path.
Being that the majority refuses to discuss whether knock-and-announce principles were violated here, I offer the following analysis of the issue presented:
The police maintained that exigent circumstances existed to justify noncompliance with the knock-and-announce statute. However, only two facts were presented to support the officers’ decision. An occupant of the house was known to carry a weapon, and an occupant may have seen that police were approaching the house to raid it. These reasons are not sufficient to justify the actions of the officers.
A suspicion that an occupant of a house is known to carry a weapon should certainly heighten officers’ concern for their safety, but it does not constitute an exigent circumstance. No evidence in this case indicates that the person had a history of violence. Here, *251as in Stevens, the majority’s decision jeopardizes the sanctity of a person’s home, as well as a person’s freedom from unannounced searches.
Have we reached the point where anyone, for example a former police officer possessing a concealed weapon permit, can be subjected to an unannounced police raid in his home? Heretofore, ownership, possession, or a license to carry a weapon has not been enough to create an exigent circumstance unless coupled with a demonstrated propensity for violence involving weapons.
The approach taken by the federal courts in this type of case is illustrated by United States v Bates.8 There, the sixth circuit squarely addressed whether known firearms constitute an exigency for purposes of the knock-and-announce rule. The court explained:
The presence of a weapon creates an exigent circumstance, provided the government is able to prove they possessed information that the suspect was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent. Evidence that firearms are within a residence, by itself, is not sufficient to create an exigency to officers when executing a warrant. However, threats to an officer’s safety, a criminal record reflecting violent tendencies, or a verified reputation of a suspect’s violent nature can be enough to provide law enforcement officers with justification to forego the necessity of knocking and announcing their presence.[9]
The court concluded:
In the instant case, we find nothing in the record indicating anyone inside the Apartment was dangerously armed and prone to violence. While the officers had been informed *252by Boddie there was a handgun inside the Apartment, Bod-die never told the officers that the Defendants were violent and likely to use a weapon if confronted by law enforcement personnel. In addition, there is no evidence showing the Defendants had a criminal history of violence or a reputation indicating they were likely to be violent. None of the Defendants had a criminal record for violent crimes and none of the Defendants had threatened violence against any law enforcement official who attempted to interfere with their drug selling business. Thus, there was no reasonable basis for the Narcotics Unit to claim they were faced with a situation where their safety was placed in jeopardy due to the presence of a handgun in the apartment.[10]
Similarly, the facts of the instant case furnish no evidence that someone in the dwelling was “dangerously armed and prone to violence.”11 The officers were told only that one of the possible occupants was known to carry a shotgun. This information is insufficient to create an exigency justifying a no-knock entry.12
*253The second justification for the no-knock entry in this case is that the occupants had “effective notice” of the police presence before the police entered the house. In Richards, there was a clear factual finding by the magistrate that the defendant opened the door, observed a police officer, and then quickly shut the door. In the present case, an officer testified that he saw somebody peering through the window at the police as they approached the house. This is not enough to create exigent circumstances.13 Again, unlike Richards, here there was no finding by the trial court that the destruction of the items sought in the search warrant was threatened.14
The warrant was executed at 7:28 P.M. Officer Brooks, a member of the Emergency Services Team, testified that the officers “were silhouetted. It was dark out but streets [sic] lights were silhouetted in back of us, more or less spotlighting our movement.” The officer opined that anyone at that distance would have clearly identified the officers as police officers.
In Richards, the occupant of the hotel room looked directly at the uniformed police officer from a distance of approximately two feet through a partially opened door. Clearly he saw the officer. However, in this case, the officers, presumably not dressed in highly visible uniforms, approached the house in the *254evening, illuminated from behind by streetlights. It is unexplained how Officer Brooks knew that the occupant who peered through the window identified the figures as police, when the streetlights silhouetted, but did not illuminate, them.
The state bears a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that justifies an exception to traditional Fourth Amendment requirements.15 It has fallen short of its burden in this case. The circumstances present here are those in a great many cases involving a narcotics raid. The United States Supreme Court has unanimously rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.
On the basis of the foregoing, I would hold that the violation of the knock-and-announce statute constituted an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. No facts were advanced that justified noncompliance with the statute. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals ruling and hold that the exclusionary rule applies and that the evidence should have been excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v United States, supra.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Const 1963, art 1, § 11 provides:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.

 520 US 385; 117 S Ct 1416; 137 L Ed 2d 615 (1997).

 The exclusionary rule applies when the principles of knock and announce are violated, unless the police establish the reasonableness of noncompliance. They must show that evidence might have been *246destroyed, lives endangered, or that compliance would have been a useless gesture. Id. at 393-394.

 [W]hen the method of entry violates the knock-and-announce statute, the exclusionary rule may come into play if the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness is also offended. Because the primary purpose of the constitutional guarantee is to prevent unreasonable invasions, if a police officer has reasonable cause to enter a dwelling to make an arrest, his entry and search are not unreasonable. If the police officers have a basis to conclude that evidence will be destroyed or lives will be endangered by delay, strict compliance with the statute may be excused. Similarly, if events indicate that compliance with the statutory requirements would be a useless gesture, the requirement that the police officers wait for admission may also be excused. [Id. at 677 (citations omitted).]

 986 F2d 1216 (CA 8, 1993). This case, like many federal cases, analyzed police officers’ actions within the context of 18 USC 3109, rather than the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court resolved any apparent conflict between the “knock and announce” requirement in § 3109 and that of the Fourth Amendment in United States v Ramirez, 523 US 65; 118 S Ct 992; 140 L Ed 2d 191 (1998). It held that § 3109 was merely a codification of the common law, and that the decisions in Wilson, 514 US 927, and Richards, 520 US 385, serve as guideposts for analysis under either provision. likewise, MCL 780.656; MSA 28.1259(6) is a codification of the common law.

 84 F3d 790, 795 (CA 6, 1996).

 See also United States v Moore, 91 F3d 96 (CA 10, 1996) (affirming the district court’s suppression of the evidence where the police violated the knock-and-announce rule); United States v Becker, 23 F3d 1537 (CA 9, 1994) (holding that evidence obtained during execution of a search warrant should be suppressed because of the officers’ failure to knock and announce where no exigent circumstances were present); United States v Knapp, 1 F3d 1026, 1030 (CA 10, 1993), citing United States v Ruminer, *249786 F2d 381, 383 (CA 10, 1986) (holding that “[e]vidence seized must be suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful search” if the officers failed to comply with the knock-and-announce statute).

 Supra at 794.

 Id. at 795 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

 Id. at 796.

 Id.

 Several jurisdictions have continued to adhere to this rationale when applying the Richards decision. An example is found in Kornegay v Cottingham, 120 F3d 392, 398 (CA 3, 1997). There, the fact that a shooting occurred and the murder weapon was not recovered did not establish that the suspect was in possession of it. The court held that “ ‘officers must have more than a mere hunch or suspicion before an exigency can excuse the necessity for knocking and announcing their presence . . . ” No exigency was found in United States v Dupras, 980 F Supp 344, 347-348 (D Mont, 1997). There, the application for a search warrant consisted mostly of generalities regarding the habits of drug manufacturers and distributors. One previous violent criminal act was alleged in the application, a conviction based on a domestic dispute. In State v Russell, 1998 WL 357546 (Ohio App, 1998), the presence of a weapon alone was found generally insufficient to justify an officer’s fear for his safety. The officer must have facts establishing that the suspect was armed and likely to use a weapon or become violent. In Wynn v State, 117 Md App 133, 163; 699 A2d 512 (1997), the court held that a reasonable belief that firearms may *253have been within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to justify excusing the knock-and-announce requirement.

 See United States v Beck, 662 F2d 527, 530 (CA 8, 1981). In that case, the fact that an officer saw a face in the window that disappeared from sight was an “essentially neutral” observation and did not constitute exigent circumstances.

 See United States v Hidalgo, 747 F Supp 818, 831 (D Mass, 1990), where drugs were not immediately accessible to any occupant of the apartment and were not easily destroyable; thus, there was no exigency.

 Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 US 740, 749-750; 104 S Ct 2091; 80 L Ed 2d 732 (1984).