Court Opinion

ID: 9706164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:33:10.380811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.830881
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
concurring:
In Commonwealth v. Ferrari, 376 Pa.Super. 307, 545 A.2d 1372 (1988), this author opined for the majority that:
In Commonwealth v. Costello, [301 Pa.Super. 537, 448 A.2d 38 (1982)] this Court stated:
We hold, therefore, that the Commonwealth failed to show the existence of ‘exceptional circumstances’ that would constitute ‘good cause’ under Rule 231, as amended. Where no preliminary hearing has been held and there exist none of the recognized exceptions to the holding of a preliminary hearing, the proper remedy is to quash the information. Commonwealth v. Brabham, 225 Pa.Super. 331, 309 A.2d 824 (1972).
In view of our disposition of the Rule 231 question, we do not need to reach the other issues raised by appellant in this appeal.
The judgment of sentence is reversed, appellant’s conviction is vacated, the information is quashed and appellant is discharged.
448 A.2d at 41. Appellant seeks identical relief.
Succinctly, we find that despite the holding in Costello, not every denial or abridgement of an accused’s right to a preliminary hearing warrants reversal and discharge following an otherwise fair trial and conviction. In Commonwealth v. Emmett, 274 Pa.Super. 23, 417 A.2d 1232 (1979), this Court declined to grant a defendant discharge following his conviction where the violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 231 was technical and the defendant had not demonstrated any prejudice arising from the violation. *474Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Ruza, 511 Pa. 59, 511 A.2d 808 (1986), our Supreme Court held that it was unnecessary to decide whether “good cause” to proceed under Pa.R.Crim.P. 231(a) had been established, as any error in that regard would be deemed harmless in that the pre-trial hearing conducted in that case provided procedural protections equivalent to a preliminary hearing.
Similarly, this Court has held on several occasions that the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing stage will not require post-conviction relief unless actual prejudice is shown to have arisen from the denial of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Bennie, 352 Pa.Super. 558, 508 A.2d 1211 (1986); Commonwealth v. Bastone, 321 Pa.Super. 232, 467 A.2d 1339 (1983); Commonwealth v. Rines, 247 Pa.Super. 429, 372 A.2d 901 (1977). Indeed, the requirement that a defendant must show both error and prejudice to warrant relief is the general rule in criminal appeals. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Revtai, 516 Pa. 53, 532 A.2d 1 (1987) (violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 130(d) does not require relief in absence of actual prejudice arising from the violation); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987) (error by prior counsel does not require relief in absence of actual prejudice arising from the error).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that appellant herein must demonstrate prejudice arising from, the violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 231(a) before reversal of his convictions and discharge would be required or appropriate.
545 A.2d at 1379-80. (Emphasis added).
Here, there was no demonstration of prejudice. Any suggestion in Costello that relief will be granted in absence of prejudice is a dead letter with no precedential or persuasive authority.
I join the majority Opinion.