Court Opinion

ID: 9411888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 14:05:56.062721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.539480
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JULY 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2021-CA-0212-MR

SHAWN FAULKNER                                                        APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE JEFFREY T. BURDETTE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 18-CR-00032

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND ECKERLE, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Shawn Faulkner (“Faulkner”) filed a motion seeking a

new trial, alleging he received ineffective assistance of counsel which induced him

to enter a guilty plea. He appeals the trial court’s order denying him relief. We

affirm the trial court.

                                      FACTS

              On February 5, 2018, Faulkner’s girlfriend, Kala Francisco, was shot

and killed. He was charged with her murder and was facing other charges, as
well.1 Following negotiations between the prosecution and Faulkner’s appointed

counsel, Faulkner entered a guilty plea to manslaughter in the first degree and

being a felon in possession of a handgun. He was sentenced to eighteen (18) years

in prison.

                During the entry of his plea, the trial court inquired whether he was

satisfied with his attorney’s representation. Faulkner indicated he was satisfied

with his counsel’s performance. He acknowledged that by entering a guilty plea he

was waiving certain rights, including the right to a jury trial and an appeal. He

acknowledged guilt of the offenses to which he was entering pleas of guilt. The

trial court found his plea to be voluntary, intelligent, and knowing.

                In December of 2019, Faulkner filed a pro se motion pursuant to RCr2

11.42. In the motion, he asked the trial court to put aside his guilty plea and grant

him a trial, alleging that his plea was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent.

He alleged that his attorney had misadvised him to enter a plea to a crime which he

did not commit and failed to raise defenses to the charges.

1
  Faulkner was indicted on charges of murder, possession of a handgun by a convicted felon,
receiving stolen property (firearm), tampering with physical evidence, and being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree.
2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                               -2-
             The trial court denied Faulkner an evidentiary hearing. The trial court

also denied relief on the motion, finding that Faulkner had not shown that his

counsel’s performance was deficient. Faulkner filed this appeal.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of an RCr 11.42 motion for

an abuse of that court’s discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545,

548 (Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion has been defined as being arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

             A trial court reviews an allegation of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel pursuant to the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under this highly deferential standard,

the court must apply a two-part analysis first identifying error and then any

resultant prejudice.

             First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
             performance was deficient. This requires showing that
             counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
             functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth
             Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
             deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
             requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as
             to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
             is reliable.

Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

                                          -3-
             [To show prejudice, t]he defendant must show there is a
             reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
             unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
             have been different. A reasonable probability is a
             probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
             outcome.

Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

                                    ANALYSIS

             Faulkner alleges that his appointed counsel was ineffective for failing

to advise him concerning a possible defense he may have had to the charge he was

facing, to wit, murder. He alleges that the defense of intoxication was available to

him, and counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty when such

defense was available. We disagree.

             The defense of intoxication is not a complete defense. Rather, it

simply reduces the culpability of the offender for the crime. Provided, that is, a

jury is convinced there has been shown evidence sufficient to support a finding that

the defendant was so intoxicated he was unaware of his actions.

             The defense of voluntary intoxication does not warrant
             an acquittal but reduces the offense from murder to
             second-degree manslaughter. Slaven v. Commonwealth,
             Ky., 962 S.W.2d 845, 856-57 (1997). However, “[i]n
             order to justify an instruction on [voluntary] intoxication,
             there must be evidence not only that the defendant was
             drunk, but that she was so drunk that she did not know
             what she was doing.” Springer v. Commonwealth, Ky.,
             998 S.W.2d 439, 451 (1999); see also Stanford, 793
             S.W.2d at 117-18.

                                         -4-
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 669 (Ky. 2003), as modified (Feb. 5,

2004).

                Even if there had been sufficient evidence to require the giving of an

instruction on voluntary intoxication, and a jury was convinced Faulkner was

intoxicated to the degree he was unaware of his actions that evening, it is not a

foregone conclusion that Faulkner’s sentence would have been less than the

eighteen (18) year sentence he received. Manslaughter in the second degree is a

Class C offense, meaning the sentence for that charge would have been between

five and ten years. KRS3 507.040(2); 532.020(1)(b). Murder, without an

aggravator as here,4 carries a maximum of a life sentence. KRS 532.030(1).

                Faulkner forgets that in exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth

dismissed several charges, charges he would still have faced if he had proceeded to

trial. Included in those charges was a first-degree persistent felony offender

charge. A finding of guilt on that charge would have increased the available

sentence. Thus, had a jury found Faulkner was intoxicated such that his culpability

was reduced, the available sentence would still have been increased to between ten

and twenty years. KRS 532.080(6)(b). Therefore, even if Faulkner had gone to

trial, received an intoxication instruction, convinced a jury to find he was

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

4
    KRS 532.025(2)(a).

                                           -5-
intoxicated to the degree that they could not find him guilty of the murder charge,

but instead of manslaughter in the second degree, he could still have received a

sentence of nineteen or twenty years, just on that charge alone, had the jury found

him guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. Thus, he was

not prejudiced in any way.

             Since he entered a guilty plea, Faulkner must show “that the deficient

performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the

errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not

have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial.” Sparks v.

Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Ky. App. 1986). The standard required

Faulkner to “allege facts that, if proven, would support a conclusion that the

decision to reject the plea bargain and go to trial would have been rational, e.g.,

valid defenses, a pending suppression motion that could undermine the

prosecution’s case, or the realistic potential for a lower sentence.” Stiger v.

Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Ky. 2012). He has not met this standard.

             Counsel was not ineffective for advising Faulkner that pleading guilty

and receiving a sentence of eighteen (18) years was advisable. Such is competent

assistance of counsel. Further, Faulkner cannot establish he was prejudiced by

pleading guilty because he received a lesser sentence than he could have received

                                          -6-
had he received what he claims he was denied by taking counsel’s advice and

entering the plea.

             As a PFO of either degree, had Stiger been convicted of
             even one first-degree robbery, he would have been
             subject to a minimum sentence of twenty years – the
             sentence he received under the plea bargain – and would
             also have been subject to the violent offender statute’s
             parole eligibility restrictions. It thus appears that Stiger’s
             chances of improving on his outcome by going to trial
             were not just exceedingly slim, but virtually non-existent.
             His chances of faring worse, on the other hand, were
             considerable. As noted, the Commonwealth had
             substantial evidence of seven class B felonies, several of
             which involved significant acts of violence. That
             evidence together with Stiger’s status as a repeat offender
             would have made for a high risk at trial of a sentence far
             above the twenty-year minimum. While it is true that
             even had things gone against Stiger at trial his parole
             ineligibility would have been extended, at most, from
             seventeen years to twenty, parole eligibility would not
             have been his only concern. Stiger was in his twenties at
             the time of his plea, so the difference between the
             twenty-year sentence offered to him and the much longer
             sentence (potentially seventy years or life) he would have
             risked at trial was very real. Because Stiger thus had
             little, if any, chance of improving his outcome at trial, but
             could easily have fared far worse, we are not persuaded
             that, had he been correctly advised about the parole
             consequences of his plea, there is a reasonable
             probability that he would have rejected the plea bargain
             and insisted upon a trial. It simply would not have been a
             “rational” choice under the circumstances.

Stiger, 381 S.W.3d at 237-38.

             We now review Faulkner’s allegation that the trial court erred in not

holding an evidentiary hearing.

                                          -7-
            A trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on an RCr
            11.42 motion “only when there is ‘a material issue of fact
            that cannot be determined on the face of the record.’”
            [Commonwealth v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 266, 228 (Ky.
            2014),] (quoting RCr 11.42(5) (other citation omitted)).
            A court may “summarily” deny “motions asserting
            claims refuted or otherwise resolved by the record.”
            Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 874 (Ky.
            2012). Also, no hearing is required if “the allegations,
            even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate [the]
            convictions.” Searight, 423 S.W.3d at 228 (internal
            quotation marks and citation omitted).

Fowler v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.3d 605, 609 (Ky. App. 2021).

            The record conclusively establishes that the plea was voluntary,

intelligent, and knowing, which Faulkner acknowledged during the colloquy. He

makes no allegation which requires the taking of evidence not before the court and

therefore there was no need for an evidentiary hearing.

                                 CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Lincoln

Circuit Court.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Shawn Faulkner, pro se                    Daniel Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky                    Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Mark D. Barry
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -8-