Court Opinion

ID: 9780907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 07:00:48.818725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:29.416400
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ANGEL D. NIEVES,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        NY-0752-17-0240-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: August 29, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Lawrence Berger, Esquire, Glen Cove, New York, for the appellant.

           Michael Huber, Esquire, Brooklyn, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal on due process grounds.             For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for rev iew, REVERSE the
     administrative judge’s finding of a due process violation, and REMAND the case

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     to the New York Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed by the agency as a GS-6 Police Officer
     stationed at Fort Hamilton, New York. Nieves v. Department of the Army, MSPB
     Docket No. NY-0752-17-0240-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 16 at 12. In
     February 2017, the agency proposed his removal for Conduct Unbecoming a
     Police Officer after he was arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated.
     IAF, Tab 19 at 7-10. Among other things, the proposal notice stated that the
     appellant had been suspended for 30 calendar days in September 2014 for
     Conduct Unbecoming a Police Officer and Failure to Follow a Written Directive .
     Id. at 9.      The misconduct underlying that suspension involved the appellant’s
     arrest for slashing the tires of a soldier stationed at Fort Hamilton and then, after
     being issued a letter barring him from the base, violating the bar letter. IAF,
     Tab 20 at 11-12, Tab 21 at 4-6. The 2014 decision letter noted that the appellant
     admitted to consuming alcohol at the time he allegedly slashed the soldier’s tires
     and that he had thereafter successfully completed an alcohol treatment program.
     IAF, Tab 20 at 6.
¶3         In his written reply to the deciding official in this case, the appellant
     discussed his prior suspension and argued that that he would be willing to seek
     additional treatment to ensure that he would not abuse alcohol in the future. IAF,
     Tab 26 at 14-22. According to the deciding official’s memorandum documenting
     the appellant’s oral reply, the appellant also raised these issues at that meeting.
     Id. at 9-10.
¶4         The deciding official removed the appellant, IAF, Tab 17 at 4-13, and this
     appeal followed, IAF, Tab 1.       At the hearing requested by the appellant, the
     deciding official testified that in the course of reviewing this case he spoke with
     the proposing official about the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation. Nieves v.
                                                                                               3

     Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. NY-0752-17-0240-I-2, Appeal File
     (I-2 AF), Tab 18, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the deciding
     official).   He explained that, during this discussion he referred to a previous
     incident mentioned in the proposal notice and that the proposing official
     confirmed his suspicion that the appellant lacked rehabilitative potential. HCD
     (testimony of the deciding official).       He also testified that he could not recall
     whether he previously disclosed this conversation to either the appellant or his
     representative. HCD (testimony of the deciding official).
¶5         In her initial decision, the administrative judge concluded that the deciding
     official’s hearing testimony established that he had violated the appellant’s due
     process rights by engaging in an ex parte communication with the proposing
     official about the appellant’s rehabilitative potential.        I -2 AF, Tab 19, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 4-7.      She therefore reversed the removal.          ID at 6-7.     The
     administrative judge did not discuss the merits of the agency action , the existence
     of a nexus, or the reasonableness of the penalty.
¶6         The agency filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative judge
     erred in finding that it failed to provide the appellant with minimum due process
     in removing him. 2 Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The appellant filed a
     response opposing the petition. PFR File, Tab 5.
¶7         Thereafter, the Office of the Clerk of the Board issued a notice to the
     parties that clarified that, although the administrative judge had placed the burden
     of proving that it provided the appellant with minimum due process on the
     agency, a claim that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights by

     2
       In her initial decision, the administrative judge ordered the agency to provide the
     appellant with interim relief if either party filed a petition for review. ID at 8. With its
     petition for review, the agency provides a certification that it had requested its servicing
     human resources processing center to take the actions necessary to provide in terim
     relief. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. The appellant does not contest the agency’s provision of
     interim relief, and thus we need not discuss this matter further. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116.
                                                                                      4

     engaging in ex parte communications is an affirmative defense for which the
     appellant bears the burden of proof. PFR File, Tab 6. The notice informed the
     appellant how he could establish that his due process rights were violated or that
     the agency committed harmful procedural error, and provided him an opportunity
     to submit additional evidence and argument. Id. at 2-3. The appellant responded
     to the notice, reasserting that the agency violated his due process rights. PFR
     File, Tab 7. Despite being afforded an opportunity to reply to the appellant’s
     submission, the agency did not do so. PFR File, Tab 6 at 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶8        When, as here, a public employee has a property interest in his continued
     employment, the Government cannot deprive him of that interest without due
     process. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
     Due process requires, at a minimum, that an employee being deprived of his
     property interest be given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and
     in a meaningful manner.’”     Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)
     (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); Buelna v. Department
     of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 16 (2014).          Generally, a tenured
     Federal employee is entitled to “notice of the charges against him, an explanation
     of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story”
     prior to the deprivation of his property right in continued employment.
     Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 17.                These
     predecisional proceedings “need not definitely resolve the propriety of the
     [penalty]” but are only “an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially,
     a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
     charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action .”
     Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
¶9        In interpreting the Supreme Court’s precedent, our reviewing court, the
     U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) , held in Ward v.
                                                                                         5

      U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Stone v.
      Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
      1999), that a deciding official violates an employee’s due process rights when he
      relies upon new and material ex parte information as a basis for his decisions on
      the merits of a proposed charge or the penalty to be imposed.         See Mathis v.
      Department of State, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 6 (2015). An employee’s due process
      right to notice extends to both ex parte information provided to a deciding official
      and information known personally to the deciding official, if the information was
      considered in reaching the decision and not previously disclosed to the appellant.
      Id.   But not all ex parte communications rise to the level of due process
      violations. Id. Rather, only ex parte communications that introduce new and
      material information to the deciding official are constitutionally infirm. Id.
¶10         In Stone, the Federal Circuit identified the following factors to be used in
      determining if ex parte information is new and material: (1) whether the ex parte
      information introduced is cumulative, as opposed to new, information;
      (2) whether the employee knew of the information and had a chance to respond to
      it; and (3) whether the communication was of the type likely to result in undue
      pressure on the deciding official to rule in a particular manner. Stone, 179 F.3d
      at 1377; Mathis, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 7. Ultimately, the Board must determine
      whether the ex parte communication is so substantial and so likely to cause
      prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation
      of property under such circumstances.         Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377; Mathis,
      122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 7.
¶11         An appellant’s claim that an agency violated his due process rights by
      engaging in ex parte communications is an affirmative defense.           Helman v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 856 F.3d 920, 937 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that
      a claim that an appellant’s due process rights were violated is an affirmative
      defense). The Board’s regulations provide that the appellant bears the burden of
      proving   his   affirmative   defenses   by   preponderant   evidence.      5 C.F.R.
                                                                                         6

      § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C); see Hulett v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 54,
      ¶¶ 10-11 (2013) (assigning the appellant the burden of proof regarding his
      affirmative defense of a due process violation). Thus, the administrative judge
      erred by assigning the agency the burden of proving that it provided the appellant
      with minimum due process.       As discussed below, after properly placing the
      burden of proof, we find that the appellant failed to establish that his due process
      rights were violated.

      The record demonstrates that the purported ex parte communication introduced
      cumulative, as opposed to new, information.
¶12        Regarding the first Stone factor, whether the information was new or
      cumulative, the Board has explained that a deciding official does not violate an
      employee’s due process rights when he considers issues raised by an employee in
      his response to the proposed adverse action and then rejects those arguments in
      reaching a decision. Mathis, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 9; Grimes v. Department of
      Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 36, ¶ 13 (2014) (citing Wilson v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 120 M.S.P.R. 686, ¶ 11 (2014), aff'd, 595 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir.
      2015)); see 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(g)(1) (stating that, in rendering a decision on a
      proposed adverse action, the agency will consider the reasons specified in the
      notice and any answer of the employee or her representative, or both, made to a
      designated official). Moreover, a deciding official does not violate an employee’s
      due process rights by initiating an ex parte communication that only confirms or
      clarifies information already contained in the record. Mathis, 122 M.S.P.R. 507,
      ¶ 10 (citing Blank v. Department of the Army, 247 F.3d 1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir.
      2001).   On the other hand, information from an ex parte discussion may be
      considered new and material if it constitutes a significant departure fr om evidence
      already in the record and the deciding official considers it in reaching a decision.
      Id., ¶ 11 (citing Young v. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
      706 F.3d 1372, 1375-78 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
                                                                                            7

¶13        Here, as noted previously, the proposal notice outlined the appellant’s prior
      disciplinary record.    IAF, Tab 19 at 9.       Significantly, in concluding that
      discussion, the proposing official wrote that he saw “little to no potential for
      rehabilitation.” Id. In addition, the appellant received a copy of the proposal and
      decision notices from his prior suspension. Id. at 16. Furthermore, in his written
      and oral replies to the instant proposed removal, the appellant addre ssed his prior
      suspension, argued that a less severe sanction would suffice in this case, and
      stated that he would be willing to seek additional treatment to prevent further
      alcohol abuse. IAF, Tab 26 at 9-10, 19, 21.
¶14        The deciding official testified that he spoke with the proposing official
      about the appellant’s potential for rehabilitation, noting the appellant’s prior
      suspension, and that the proposing official confirmed the deciding official’s
      suspicion that the appellant lacked rehabilitative potential . HCD (testimony of
      the deciding official). The administrative judge found that the record was unclear
      as to what, “precisely,” the proposing official said , and that the agency failed to
      proffer evidence indicating that the proposing official “only reite rated”
      information contained in the proposal notice. ID at 5-6. She concluded that the
      record supported a finding that the information the proposing official provided to
      the deciding official was new because “[i]f [the proposing official’s] additional
      information was merely cumulative, there is no reason that it would have been the
      sole factor that resolved [the deciding official’s] remaining skepticism.” ID at 6.
¶15        The administrative judge’s analysis was flawed. First, to the extent that the
      record is unclear as to what the proposing official told the deciding official, the
      lack of clarity weighs against a finding of a due process violation, as it is the
      appellant’s burden to prove that a violation occurred, not the agency’s burden to
      prove the absence of a violation.     5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C); see Hulett,
      120 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶¶ 10-11 (assigning the appellant the burden of proof regarding
      his affirmative defense of a due process violation).      Second, contrary to the
      administrative judge’s finding that the proposing official’s communication was
                                                                                                 8

      “the sole factor that resolved [the deciding official’s] remaining skepticism,” ID
      at 6, the deciding official testified that, although the proposing official’s
      confirmation of his own suspicion that the appellant lacked rehabilitative
      potential was an important factor in leading him to conclude that the appellant
      lacked rehabilitative potential, “it was not the sole factor,” HCD (testimony of the
      deciding official). The administrative judge gave no indication that she found the
      deciding official’s testimony not credible. 3 Accordingly, her finding on this issue
      appears to stem from an erroneous view of the deciding official’s testimony.
¶16         The only evidence in the record about the communication between the
      deciding official and the proposing official comes from the deciding official’s
      hearing testimony.       As noted above, he indicated that he talked with the
      proposing official about the appellant’s prior misconduct and the proposing
      official reiterated that the appellant lacked rehabilitative potential.                HCD
      (testimony of the deciding official). As also noted previously, the proposal notice
      set forth the appellant’s prior discipline and specifically stated that the proposing
      official saw “little to no potential for rehabilitation.” IAF, Tab 19 at 9.
¶17         Thus, in appropriately applying the correct burden of proof for this
      affirmative defense, we find that the appellant did not show that the deciding
      official did anything more than confirm or clarify information already in the
      record and disclosed to the appellant. IAF, Tab 19 at 9, 16; see Blank, 247 F.3d
      at 1229. Nor did the appellant show that the proposing official revealed new
      information to the deciding official.

      3
        The deciding official also testified that the proposing official ’s view of the appellant’s
      rehabilitative potential was a consideration among others and that he took it into
      consideration. HCD (testimony of the deciding official). None of these statements
      supports the administrative judge’s conclusion.
                                                                                              9

      The appellant failed to prove that he was unaware of the ex parte communication
      and had no chance to respond to it.
¶18          Regarding the second Stone factor, whether the employee knew of the
      information and had a chance to respond to it, the Federal Circuit has found that
      information raised in an ex parte interview with the deciding official before he
      rendered his decision “more than satisfie[d] the second Stone factor considering
      that [the appellant] neither learned of the ex parte communication, nor had an
      opportunity to respond to it before the deciding official.”           Young, 706 F.3d
      at 1377. Here, the record is unclear regarding whether the appellant learned of
      the ex parte communication before providing his response to the deciding official.
¶19          At the hearing, the appellant’s representative asked the deciding official
      whether he had the conversation with the proposing official about the appell ant’s
      rehabilitative potential after the appellant had received the proposal and he had
      given his reply. HCD (testimony of the deciding official). The deciding official
      indicated that he could not recall if the conversation occurred before or after he
      received the proposal notice from the proposing official. HCD (testimony of the
      deciding official). The appellant’s representative also asked the deciding official
      whether he had any recollection of disclosing the conversation with the proposing
      official to either the appellant or his representative.        HCD (testimony of the
      deciding official). The deciding official replied that he did not recall, but noted
      that he had a meeting with the appellant and his representative during which they
      “discussed a number of things.” HCD (testimony of the deciding official). This
      is all of the evidence on this issue as the appellant did not testify about whether
      he was informed of the deciding official’s conversation with th e proposing
      official. 4   Accordingly, based on the record evidence, the appellant failed to

      4
        On review, the appellant asserts that at the hearing the deciding official affirmed that
      he never informed the appellant about his conversation with the proposing official prior
      to removing him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. We have reviewed the hearing testimony and
      find that the deciding official did not make such an explicit statement.
                                                                                             10

      establish that he was not informed about the deciding official’s conversation with
      the proposing official about his rehabilitative potential. 5

      The appellant failed to show that the ex parte communication was “so substantial
      and so likely to cause prejudice that no employee can fairly be required to be
      subjected to a deprivation of property under such circumstances.”
¶20         Regarding the third Stone factor, whether the communication was of the
      type likely to result in undue pressure on the deciding official to rule in a
      particular manner, the court has recognized that “the lack of such undue pressure
      may be less relevant to determining when the ex parte communications deprived
      the employee of due process where . . . the [d]eciding [o]fficial admits that the ex
      parte communications influenced his penalty determination,” making the
      “materiality of the ex parte communications . . . self-evident from the [d]eciding
      [o]fficial’s admission.” Ward, 634 F.3d at 1280 n.2. Here, the deciding official
      testified that the proposing official’s confirmation of his own suspicion that the
      appellant lacked rehabilitative potential was an “important factor” in his
      determination, but not the “sole factor.”          HCD (testimony of the deciding
      official). Because the communication was of some significance, but not the “sole
      factor” in the deciding official’s decision-making process, we find that this factor
      slightly weighs in the appellant’s favor.
¶21         As explained previously, in considering whether an appellant has
      established a due process violation, the Board must determine whether the ex
      parte communication is so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that no
      employee can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation of property under
      such circumstances. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377; Mathis, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 7.
      Weighing all the Stone factors, and particularly noting the first factor regarding
      whether the ex parte information was new or cumulative, we find that the

      5
        That the appellant’s representative seemed to have learned about the conversation for
      the first time at the hearing while questioning the deciding official is not evidence. Cf.
      Felton v. Department of the Air Force, 106 M.S.P.R. 198, ¶ 7 (2007) (same).
                                                                                       11

      appellant has failed to meet his burden. See Blank, 247 F.3d at 1229 (finding that
      when a deciding official initiates an ex parte communication that only confirms or
      clarifies information already disclosed to the appellant, the re is no due process
      violation); cf. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1376-77 (indicating that an ex parte
      communication to the deciding official does not violate an employee’s due
      process rights if the employee is given notice of and an opportunity to respond to
      the information communicated).

      The appellant failed to prove that the agency committed a harmful procedural
      error, and we therefore remand this appeal so that the administrative judge may
      adjudicate the merits of the agency’s case in the first instance .
¶22        If an appellant fails to prove that a deciding official’s ex parte
      communications violated his due process rights, the Board must consider whet her
      the agency committed harmful procedural error.          Putnam v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532, ¶ 10 (2014). A harmful error is an error
      by the agency in the application of its procedures that is likely to have caused the
      agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the
      absence or cure of the error. Ronso v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 391,
      ¶ 14 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).     The agency’s “procedures” include those
      required by statute, rule, or regulation, Jones v. Department of the Treasury,
      93 M.S.P.R. 494, ¶ 10 (2003), and also encompass the binding provisions of
      applicable collective bargaining agreements, Pleasant v. Department of Housing
      and Urban Development, 98 M.S.P.R. 602, ¶ 8 (2005).           It is the appellant’s
      burden to prove the existence of a harmful error by preponderant evidence.
      5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.4(r), 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C), (c)(1).
¶23        Despite being provided the opportunity to do so, the appellant put forward
      no argument or evidence that the agency committed harmful procedural error.
      PFR File, Tabs 6-7.    We nevertheless considered whether the agency violated
      procedures requiring that, in arriving at its decision, it only consider the reasons
      specified in the proposal notice and any reply provided by the employee . See
                                                                                             12

      5 U.S.C. § 7513(b); 5 C.F.R. § 752.404(g). For the reasons discussed above, we
      find that the appellant failed to prove that the deciding official based his decision,
      even in part, on reasons not specified in the proposal notice or discussed in the
      appellant’s response. Nor has the appellant established that any purported error
      was likely to have caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one
      it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error. 6 Accordingly, we find
      that the appellant failed to establish that the agency committed harmful
      procedural error.
¶24         The administrative judge did not make findings of fact regarding whether
      the agency proved that the appellant committed the charged m isconduct,
      established a nexus between the misconduct and the efficiency of the service, or
      demonstrated the reasonableness of the imposed penalty. As the hearing officer,
      the administrative judge is in the best position to make any necessary factual
      findings and detailed credibility assessments.       See Mastrullo v. Department of
      Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 27 (2015). We therefore remand this appeal to the
      administrative judge to resolve these issues in the first instance.

      6
        Although the deciding official testified that the proposing official ’s communication to
      him was an important factor in his determination that the appellant lacked rehabilitative
      potential, he noted that it was not the sole factor. HCD (testimony of the deciding
      official). Considering the appellant’s position as a police officer and the fact that he
      was arrested for driving while intoxicated—in addition to his previous misconduct also
      involving alcohol abuse—we find it unlikely that the deciding official would have
      mitigated the penalty in the absence of the proposing official ’s communication. IAF,
      Tab 17 at 4-9.
                                                                                        13

                                           ORDER
¶25        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the New York Field
      Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order, including
      the holding of a supplemental hearing regarding the merits of the agency action
      and the reasonableness of the penalty.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                               Jennifer Everling
                                               Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.