Court Opinion

ID: 9816516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 03:15:13.585686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:04.738346
License: Public Domain

ON APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
No. 4392. Decided July 25, 1950.
By THE COURT.
Applications for rehearing have been filed in this cause by both parties. Such applications are not appropriate under our present rules of practice. However, we given some attention to the matters urged in the applications.
Appellee urges that the Court failed to give proper consideration to the probative effect of the divorce decrees in the Bash and Mehl divorce cases. Giving full force and effect to these decrees they do not reach the infirmity in the proof upon which we predicated our opinion. They are probative of the fact that at the time the decrees were entered Bash and Mehl were residents of Franklin County and inferentially that somebody testified under oath to these facts. However, such proof does not establish that either Bash or Mehl so testified. The direct evidence of the testimony which the indictments alleged they had given failed to support the specific charges in the respective counts of the indictment. The State charged that Bash and Mehl had testified specifically. The proof was not forthcoming.
If the only question presented was whether or not Bash and Mehl were actually bona fide residents of Franklin County when the decrees were granted there would be no doubt of the sufficiency of the proof that they were not such residents.
The testimony of Mr. Romanoff was confirmatory of this fact but it did not tend to prove that Bash or Mehl specifically testified under oath in their divorce cases.
In the application of the appellant it is urged that we improperly concluded that the presence of the judge with the jury was before it had entered upon its secret deliberations, whereas the truth was that the incident occurred after the jury had entered upon its deliberations. The distinction in the facts, if well made, in our judgment, does not require any conclusion other or different than we heretofore have reached. We predicated our conclusion that the conduct *182of the trial judge did not justify a reversal, in the main, on the failure of the record to show that any prejudice had intervened to the rights of the appellant which showing was necessary to a reversal under the statute cited.
Both applications will be denied.
MILLER, PJ, HORNBECK ana WISEMAN, JJ, concur.