Court Opinion

ID: 9394929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 17:00:54.428547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.306013
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAY 16 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-10356

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.
                                                2:20-cr-00017-JAM-1
 v.                                             2:20-cr-00017-JAM

JEFF CARPOFF,
                                                MEMORANDUM *
                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted May 12, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT,*** District
Judge.

      Jeff Carpoff appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one

count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and one count of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
              The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for
the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). We affirm.

      Carpoff’s appellate waiver precludes us from reviewing his argument that

the district court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32(i)(1)(A). Carpoff agreed “to give up the right to appeal . . . the sentence

imposed” in his case and indicated that he understood that, unless the district court

imposed a sentence that exceeded the statutory maximum or the government

appealed the sentence, his appellate waiver “constitute[d] a complete waiver of all

appellate rights.” “[T]he language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal

on the grounds raised” because the waiver recognized only two narrow exceptions,

neither of which Carpoff argues applies to his Rule 32 argument. United States v.

Charles, 581 F.3d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Medina-

Carrasco, 815 F.3d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a defendant’s challenge

to a district judge’s procedural error in sentencing was barred by his waiver of his

rights to challenge “any aspect of [his] sentence—including the manner in which

the sentence is determined and any sentencing guideline determinations”). 1

      Carpoff relies upon United States v. Petty, 80 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir. 1996), but

      1
         A waiver must also be “knowingly and voluntarily made” to be
enforceable. Charles, 581 F.3d at 931 (quotation marks omitted). Here, the parties
do not dispute that Carpoff knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea
agreement containing the appellate waiver: During the plea colloquy, Carpoff
stated that he understood the plea agreement, and his attorney stated that he was
satisfied that Carpoff made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Rather, the parties’
dispute here centers on the scope of the appellate waiver.

                                          2
that case is distinguishable. In Petty, the scope of the appellate waiver was

ambiguous; here, by contrast, the scope is expressly broad. Id. at 1386-87. The

parties’ statements and conduct in Petty also weighed against a broad interpretation

of the ambiguous appellate waiver, whereas here, there is no such tension between

the parties’ actions and an understanding that they had agreed to a broad appellate

waiver. Id. at 1387.

      Moreover, even if the terms of Carpoff’s appellate waiver “were susceptible

to more than one interpretation, the plea colloquy here eliminated any ambiguity.”

Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d at 462. Together, the appellate waiver and plea

colloquy “were sufficient to ensure” that Carpoff “understood he was giving up the

right to challenge” any aspect of his sentence not explicitly excepted in the waiver,

including the procedures the district judge followed in issuing the sentence. Id.

      AFFIRMED.

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