Court Opinion

ID: 9764898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:43:06.765517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:39.086656
License: Public Domain

OPINION
FONES, Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
I concur in Section II of the Opinion and in the result mandated by that Section.
I do not agree that the history of preliminary hearings in England and America, the Tennessee statutes, McKeldin, Hale, or the combination thereof, require or justify this Court in mandating for the first time in our judicial history that a magistrate can only bind a defendant to the action of the grand jury upon evidence that would be legally competent and admissible at the trial of the case.
I do not agree with the action of the Court in conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the criminal courts of this State to provide defendant with a review of the scope of a preliminary hearing, the admissibility of evidence therein and the weight of the evidence adduced on the issue of probable cause. Regardless of its outcome, the grand jury determines who must face trial on the merit of charges, not the magistrate. A magistrate’s decision that there is probable cause does not assure further prosecution; a decision that there is no probable cause does not preclude further prosecution. State v. D’Anna, 506 S.W.2d 200 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973). The magistrate’s judgment will not forestall the prosecution of a single defendant indicted by Tennessee grand juries. In Tennessee, a defendant cannot be brought to trial except upon an indictment by the grand jury. Tenn.Const. Art. I, § 14; Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-301.
Waugh’s “Motion To Dismiss Warrant,” the vehicle used to appeal the magistrate’s ruling to the Criminal Court of Shelby County, asserts that he was denied the right of “confrontation and examination of witnesses,” citing McKeldin v. State, supra, as authority. I do not read McKeldin as guaranteeing to defendant the right of confrontation of witnesses. The United States Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), expressly said, with respect to confrontation and cross-examination,
“[tjhese adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment.” 420 U.S. at 120, 95 S.Ct. at 866.
The significance of history and the current state of the law in America to me is that good hearsay1 has always been, and continues to be sufficient to support a finding of probable cause by a magistrate at a preliminary hearing in the federal system and virtually every state in the union that has a preliminary hearing.
I.
No direct authority has been cited by the majority to justify its departure from stare decisis and require legally admissible evidence at a preliminary hearing. They do not assert that the phrase “upon the whole evidence,” that has been in our statutory *662law since 1858, now requires the elimination of hearsay evidence as a basis for finding probable cause. Yet that statutory phrase, blended with Myers v. Commonwealth, supra, Maestas v. District Court, supra, McKeldin v. State, supra, and Hale v. State, supra, has produced what is to me an unwarranted result, futile and meaningless to its intended beneficiaries, disruptive of the prosecutorial process and potentially oppressive to the victims of crime.
Seemingly persuasive and relevant quotes from Myers v. Commonwealth, supra, have been urged upon us in the briefs on behalf of Waugh and his common cause amicus curiae, the Shelby County Public Defender’s Office.
The factual situation in Myers was different than in the instant case. The defendant was charged with rape, assault with a dangerous weapon, and breaking and entering. At the probable cause hearing, the only witness presented by the prosecution was the victim. After the direct examination was completed, defense counsel began his cross-examination by asking the victim about her belief in witchcraft, whereupon the magistrate announced that he had heard enough to find probable cause. Defendant insisted upon completing his cross-examination, and informed the court that he was prepared to present evidence of a psychiatric examination revealing a neurosis that affected the veracity of the victim’s statements, hospital tests performed the morning after the alleged rape, and other evidence supporting his defense of a consent sual sexual relationship. The magistrate denied his request and terminated the hearing. Thus the question presented was, as expressed by the Massachusetts court, “whether the judge’s finding of probable cause before the petitioner had an opportunity to complete cross-examination of the complaining witness and to present relevant testimony and witnesses in his own behalf violated the petitioner’s ‘substantive rights.’ ” 298 N.E.2d at 821-22.
Neither the admissibility of hearsay evidence nor the necessity for legally admissible evidence to support a probable cause finding was in issue in Myers. I agree that it would be erroneous and unthinkable that a Tennessee magistrate would refuse to allow a defendant to present affirmative defenses at a preliminary hearing or to cross-examine such witnesses as the prosecution elects to present. It would unnecessarily prolong this opinion to analyze in detail the differences between the Massachusetts statutes and ours with respect to preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings. Suffice it to say there are significant differences.
After examining the Massachusetts statutes, the Myers court concluded that the “preliminary hearing’s primary function is to screen out at this early but critical stage of the criminal process those cases that should not go to trial . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 298 N.E.2d at 822. That is not the primary function of the preliminary hearing in Tennessee. The only purpose of a Tennessee preliminary hearing is to determine Whether there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the offense charged and to fix the amount of bail in bailable offenses. State v. D’Anna, supra; State v. Hudson, 487 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn.Crim.App.1972). As previously stated, it is the grand jury, not the magistrate, that makes the final determination of who is to be held for trial.
Historically, Tennessee has relied upon the grand jury as the impartial body to stand between the prosecutor and the citizen, protecting him or her from being put to trial on groundless charges. Whether or not every grand jury performs that function in every case is not an issue before this Court. One of the amicus curiae briefs has attempted to put before us facts about the action of Shelby County grand juries in general, and specifically actions of the Shelby County grand jury on a particular day in September, 1977, when it is surmised that “assembly-line justice” was dispensed. Such facts could only be presented to us in a bill of exceptions and it is a gross impropriety that they should be urged upon us in an amicus curiae brief. Those facts, if true to the extent that magistrates should be *663given the power to make the final decision on probable cause to go to trial on the merits of charges, are policy matters that address themselves to constitutional and legislative reform. They are beyond the power of this Court to adjudicate in the present state of the Tennessee Constitution, statutory law and judicial decisions.
I acknowledge the accuracy of the majority’s statement that the Tennessee preliminary hearing also serves to determine whether there is evidence sufficient to justify the continued detention of the defendant pending the action of the grand jury. I agree that defendant is entitled to cross-examine and to present witnesses to establish that charges are unfounded. It seems significant to observe here that, in those cases where the charges may be unfounded, the prosecution’s decision to limit the number of witnesses and scope of its proof would increase the defendant’s chances of being at least temporarily released on a finding of no probable cause and perhaps the defendant might demonstrate to the district attorney that further prosecution was not warranted. A demand for confrontation of all witnesses as was made in this case is both legally and practically untenable. As a practical matter, the expectation of overcoming the prosecution’s evidence by cross-examination alone, and thereby gaining release and convincing the district attorney that the charges are unfounded, is little short of a flight of fantasy. The true reason for the hard push to require the prosecution to produce all of its witnesses is for the purpose of discovery. It is noteworthy that this defendant’s first action at the preliminary hearing was a demand that the State be compelled to produce all of the witnesses. Since this Court handed down the decision in McKeldin, it seems that “every lawyer worth his salt” has attempted that tactic.
As precedent, in my view, McKeldin stands for the principle that the Tennessee preliminary hearing is a “pretrial type of arraignment where certain rights may be sacrificed or lost.” (Emphasis added.) 516 S.W.2d at 85. Factually, a constructive fraud had been practiced on McKeldin by providing him with an impostor posing as a lawyer. We held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have the guiding hand of counsel at a preliminary hearing. We did not have before us any semblance of an issue involving the scope of a preliminary hearing, its function as a discovery device, the admissibility of hearsay evidence, or the quality or quantity of evidence upon which to base a finding of probable cause. In my opinion, our “critical stage” holding in McKeldin was based more upon what might happen at a preliminary hearing than what must happen there. Parenthetically, we have the unique situation in Tennessee that the complete denial of a preliminary hearing does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights, but the failure to provide an indigent defendant with counsel at a preliminary hearing does violate his constitutional rights. See McKeldin v. State, supra.
A defendant without the guiding hand of counsel might waive important constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and might not be effective in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses or in the presentation of a defense. Perhaps the most critical of all decisions for a defendant at a preliminary hearing is whether or not to present any affirmative evidence of innocence lest the hearing be turned into a discovery device for the prosecution.
With respect to discovery, McKeldin’s observations must be classified as dicta. While it may have been relevant to note that a defendant should have a lawyer who would exploit such opportunities as may be available at a preliminary hearing, the additional comment that failure to “learn the precise details of the prosecution’s case” or failure to engage in a “fishing expedition” were unfortunate, and have erroneously, in my view, led defense counsel to perceive those strategic objectives as vested rights at a preliminary hearing. My brethren have expanded McKeldin in that direction today. I regard that expansion as an unwarranted interpretation of the case and, for my part, totally reject it.
*664The majority relies upon Hale v. State, supra. I do not regard Hale as having any precedential value whatever. The first sentence of the Hale order dismisses the case for mootness. All that is said thereafter is obiter dictum and is not binding on the Court under the doctrine of stare decisis. Only the points in judgment arising in a particular case before the Court are precedents for future decisions. Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Service, Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); State, ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 127 Tenn. 292, 154 S.W. 1151 (1912). The statement in Hale that “the usual rules of evidence are applicable to preliminary hearings” is ipsi dixit. 548 S.W.2d at 878.
There is not a word in the preliminary hearing statutes that can be relied upon to support that statement. The only appellate court opinion that has directly considered the question of whether hearsay evidence may support a probable cause finding at a preliminary hearing is Gammon v. State, 506 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973). While it is not clear from the opinion whether the magistrate’s finding of probable cause was based wholly on hearsay or only partly, it is clear that the decision sanctions the use of hearsay to establish probable cause. The Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that, regardless of the outcome of the preliminary hearing, the grand jury could indict defendant upon hearsay evidence, citing Parton v. State, 2 Tenn.Crim.App. 626, 455 S.W.2d 645 (1970).
The majority also places reliance upon the Colorado case of Maestas v. District Court, supra. First, the Colorado court reiterated the prevailing rule in that state that the preliminary hearing is not a mini-trial and the rules of evidence may be tempered in accordance with the sound discretion of the magistrate, and that “[hjearsay evidence, and other evidence, which would be incompetent if offered at the time of trial, may well be the bulk of the evidence at the preliminary hearing,” citing Kuypers v. District Court of Colorado, 188 Colo. 332, 534 P.2d 1204 (1975), and People v. Quinn, 183 Colo. 245, 516 P.2d 420 (1973). 541 P.2d at 891.
However, the Court said that where, as in the instant case, the prosecution uses secondhand hearsay as the sole basis for probable cause,
“the historical function of the preliminary hearing is vitiated — that being to place before the judge evidence which establishes that probable cause exists to prove that the defendant did commit the crime charged. Cf. United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940, 87 S.Ct. 975, 17 L.Ed.2d 872 (1967), but dismissed as improvidently granted, 389 U.S. 80, 88 S.Ct. 253, 19 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967). By our holding here, we seek fair play and substantial justice at the preliminary hearing.” 541 P.2d at 892.
Immediately following the above quote, the Colorado court reaffirmed its prior holding in People v. Quinn, supra, that hearsay evidence is admissible at a preliminary hearing,
“but we admonish the courts to beware of the excessive use of hearsay in the presentation of government cases. The inordinate use of hearsay, as in the present case, foils the protective defense against unwarranted prosecutions that preliminary hearings are designed to afford to the innocent. Cf. United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1966).” 541 P.2d at 892.
Parenthetically, it is significant to note that Umans and three other cases from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon by the Colorado Court factually involved approved grand jury proceedings, not disapproved preliminary hearing proceedings.
Although Quinn was reaffirmed, it was also modified by the following admonition.
“We do not require that the prosecution produce all, or even the best, witnesses at a preliminary hearing. But the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing must have some semblance of a factual foundation and must show probable cause, (citation omitted.) The process is best served when at least one witness is called whose direct perception of the *665criminal episode is subject to evaluation by the judge at the preliminary hearing. Establishing probable cause on the basis of hearsay alone should only be resorted to when the testimony of a perceiving witness is unavailable or when ‘it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge.’ (citations omitted.)” 541 P.2d at 892.
In Parton v. State, supra, our Court of Criminal Appeals, speaking through presiding Judge Walker, expressed a somewhat similar admonition in deploring the grand jury indictment of Parton by the sole testimony of an assistant district attorney testifying from notes taken of the testimony of witnesses who appeared before a prior grand jury that returned a no true bill.
“Although we think that the grand jury should require the production of the most satisfactory and convincing evidence which the case permits, we hold that an indictment may not be abated because it is founded on hearsay evidence. The legality and sufficiency of evidence heard by the grand jury is not subject to review by this court.
“A wide range must necessarily be given to investigations by a grand jury and it is not limited to the consideration of that which would be admissible on the trial of the cause. We do not encourage prosecutors and grand juries, however, to rely on hearsay testimony when direct testimony is available or when it is not demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge. The grand jury may, in respect to all offenses, send for witnesses and make investigation when they, or any one of them, suspect a law violation. Excessive use of hearsay in the presentation of cases to grand juries tends to destroy the historical function of grand juries in the protection of the innocent from unwarranted prosecution.” 455 S.W.2d at 648.
The Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon Burton v. State, 214 Tenn. 9, 377 S.W.2d 900 (1964), for its holding that an indictment may not be abated although founded on hearsay evidence. In Burton, this Court relied on Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956), which continues to be the controlling law with regard to indictments based upon hearsay evidence.
In Costello, Mr. Justice Black had this to say with respect to grand jury indictments based on hearsay:
“If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment.” 76 S.Ct. at 408-409.
Those same observations may validly be made with respect to the preliminary hearing challenge presented in this case.
It is worthy of mention that in the federal criminal justice system, where substantially all of the new precedents expanding defendant’s rights and remedies have originated, a finding of probable cause at the preliminary examination before a magistrate “may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 5.1(a). Relevant excerpts from the Committee Notes to Rule 5.1 follow:
“A grand jury indictment may properly be based upon hearsay evidence. (Citing Costello v. United States, supra.) This being so, there is practical advantage in making the evidentiary requirements for the preliminary examination as flexible as they are for the grand jury.
[[Image here]]
“It has been urged that the rules of evidence at the preliminary examination should be those applicable at the trial because the purpose of the preliminary examination should be, not to review the propriety of the arrest or prior detention, but rather to determine whether there is *666evidence sufficient to justify subjecting the defendant to the expense and inconvenience of trial, (citations omitted.) The rule rejects this view for reasons largely of administrative necessity and the efficient administration of justice. The Congress has decided that a preliminary examination shall not be required when there is a grand jury indictment (18 U.S.C. § 3060). Increasing the procedural and evidentiary requirements applicable to the preliminary examination will therefore add to the administrative pressure to avoid the preliminary examination.” 8 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 5.1.-01[2], at 5.1-3 — 5.1-4 (2d ed. 1977).
Thus the federal system has rejected the legally admissible evidence standard at preliminary hearings and authorized hearsay in whole or part because of the practical advantage of having the same rules of evidence applicable to the preliminary hearing that are applicable to the later grand jury proceedings, and for reasons of “administrative necessity.”
Increasing evidentiary requirements at a preliminary hearing and providing an avenue of appeal therefrom will undoubtedly impose substantial additional burdens upon our overloaded criminal justice system. Federal magistrates are in a better position to absorb the impact of turning a preliminary hearing into a mini-trial than are the magistrates in Tennessee.
In my view, neither the statutes nor the case law requires a different rule in Tennessee. It is clearly meaningless (except for discovery objectives, not a legally sanctioned purpose of a preliminary hearing) to a defendant to impose stringent evidentiary rules at a preliminary hearing when probable cause may be established wholly on hearsay at a subsequent grand jury proceeding.
On January 26, 1976, I concurred in recommending the Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Legislature. Rule 5.1 of the proposed rules provides that probable cause, “shall be based upon evidence which may not be inadmissible hearsay except documentary proof of ownership and written reports of expert witnesses.” Based upon my intervening research and observations in this case, Hale, and a number of other cases presented to me and other members of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals, I now entertain grave doubts with respect to the wisdom of the above-quoted portion of the rule. However, I see a substantial difference between this Court’s departing by judicial .decision from longstanding precedent and imposing a new standard of proof for the preliminary hearing, a creature of statute, and joint action by this Court and the Legislature in adopting Rule 5.1 as a part of comprehensive rules that include mutual discovery rights of defendants and the State outside of a preliminary hearing, plus restraining committee comment with respect to preliminary hearings.
The Law Revision Commission’s recommendation may well be the better rule. It is as follows:
“The finding that an offense has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it shall be based upon evidence, which may be hearsay in whole or in part, if there is a substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished.” Tenn.L.Rev’n.Comm’n., Tenn.Code Crim. Proc. § 40-906(b) (Prop. Final Draft, Nov. 1973).
I am also persuaded that the Colorado rule, allowing hearsay plus one perceiving witness, if available, would be preferable to the present proposed Rule 5.1.
II.
The majority implicitly admits there is no authority or precedent for a review of the magistrate’s action by criminal court judges upon mere motion of the defendant. The majority opinion says that the “whole tenor and implication of our criminal code” places a defendant and his case under the jurisdiction of the State Criminal Courts, apparently from the moment of arrest. The statutes *667cited are addressed to the magistrate and all save one are codified in Chapter 11, and deal with the commitment of the defendant (§ 40-1117), the form of the commitment (§ 40-1118), bail (§ 40-1119), binding material witnesses (§ 40-1122), and the form of the bond of witnesses (§ 40-1123). The last two statutes cited in Chapter 11 instruct the magistrate to return all the documents in the case to the State court where the defendant and the witnesses are bound to appear, and provides a penalty for failure to do so. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-1128, 40-1129. Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-1707 instructs the grand jury what to endorse on an indictment in which they do not concur.
I do not agree that any of those statutes, or their “whole tenor or implication” supports the holding that “the circuit or criminal court thus acquiring jurisdiction of the case and the person of the defendant pursuant to the magistrate’s commitment has jurisdiction to consider and determine a motion to dismiss the commitment order, as was done in this case.”
The simple fact is that neither our Constitution nor our statutes provide any appellate review of any kind or character of the non-final action of a magistrate at a preliminary hearing, and this Court is totally lacking in authority to confer appellate jurisdiction on ourselves or any other court. McKeldin came through the appellate process in the usual way; after conviction in the trial court, defendant appealed asserting as one of several errors the denial of a constitutional right that allegedly was prejudicial.
The tragedy of the majority’s unprecedented action, to me, is the practical futility of it as clearly demonstrated by the result in the case at bar. Waugh must now face a trial on the merits, because it was impracticable for him to obtain action on his plea in abatement within the thirty-day limitation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-1131, although his plea was promptly filed. That is a fate that will befall many defendants who seek to avail themselves of this Court’s new largess. Those who beat the time limitation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-1131 and obtain a favorable review of adverse treatment by a magistrate must still await the action of a grand jury for the final determination of probable cause to go to trial.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals for the reasons stated herein.

. Hearsay that meets the standard recommended by the Tennessee Law Revision Commission, § 40-906(b), proposed final draft November, 1973, quoted hereinafter.