Court Opinion

ID: 9734776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:45:36.832503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.180795
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Although the majority opinion reaches a sensible result on policy grounds, I do not believe it is justified given the unambiguous language of MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161), the "like benefits” provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
The question of whether the City of Detroit’s charter provides for "like benefits” turns on the construction to be given the following provision:
"Whenever any member of the police department shall become sick or shall be disabled in the performance of his duties, his salary and medical, surgical and hospital expenses during the time of such disabilities may become a charge upon the police fund and he may be paid such salary and expenses at the discretion of the commissioner, who shall inquire into the circumstances, and if satisfied that the charge upon said fund is correct and reasonable, may certify the same to be paid from the police fund.” Detroit Charter, 1918, title 4, ch 21, § 18.1
The majority holds that the word "may” as used in the charter means "shall”. I agree with the majority that in particular peculiar circumstances use of the word "may”, which ordinarily connotes discretion, may be permissibly construed as imposing a mandatory duty. I disagree, however, that this is an appropriate case for doing so.
*66Preliminarily, I note that we are not primarily concerned with the construction of a statute in this case but, rather, a charter.2 Amendment of an existing city charter requires the approval of the electorate. MCL 117.21; MSA 5.2100. As such, the general rule that the intention of the Legislature is the touchstone for construing statutes has no applicability to this controversy. It is, of course, impossible for us to determine what the richly diverse Detroit electorate intended by enactment of the charter provision in question except insofar as this intention is expressed in the language used.
The majority finds that the charter provision provides discretion only on the "issues of whether a particular disability was duty related and whether a particular charge was correct and reasonable”. I believe the structure of the provision cuts against this conclusion. The provision states that a police officer disabled during the course of duty "may become a charge” and "may be paid upon the police fund”, not shall become a charge if various conditions precedent are met. The provision further provides that the commissioner "shall” investigate the circumstances of the disability and determine if the charge is "correct and reasonable”. If so, the commissioner "may certify the same to be paid from the police fund”. Again, the charter does not provide that the commissioner shall certify the charge if it determines the disability was duty-related and the charge correct and reasonable. The usages of the terms "shall” and "may” in the provision, taken in context, gives me reason to believe that whoever drafted the *67provision believed that the words would be construed in accordance with the normal mandatory-discretionary dichotomy.
I believe the Michigan cases cited by the majority, involving the construction of "may” as "shall”, are all distinguishable and are hot compelling authority for the proposition that the "may” under consideration here means "shall”. In McBrian v Grand Rapids, 56 Mich 95; 22 NW 206 (1885), the Supreme Court held that a statutory provision stating that the lowest responsible bidder "may” be selected had to be construed as "shall” if any of the bids were to be accepted. It is easy for me to see why "may” was used in the statute instead of "shall”. The contracting board was not required to take the lowest bid in all circumstances, which would have been implied by the use of the term "shall”, because the board was empowered to reject all of the bids submitted. Although Smith v City Comm of Grand Rapids, 281 Mich 235; 274 NW 776 (1937), noted that sometimes "may” will be construed as "shall”, the statute under consideration there used the word "shall” and the defendant was arguing for a discretionary construction of the term. In Burns v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 88 Mich App 663; 279 NW2d 43 (1979), one panel of this Court found that the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius required a finding that "may” as used in the statute meant "shall”. In the subject case, I do not believe that application of any of the rules of statutory construction cuts in favor of treating the "may” in the Detroit charter provision as a "shall”. I see nothing in the structure of the provision in dispute which persuades me that the use of "may” was meant to connote a mandatory duty.
I also dissent from the dicta in the majority *68opinion that, had the collective-bargaining agreement between the Detroit Police Officers Association and the city provided for mandatory benefits for duty-related disabilities, the charter provision could then be construed as providing "like benefits”. The majority correctly notes that a collective-bargaining agreement prevails over conflicting provisions of a home-rule city’s charter. Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674, 677; 246 NW2d 831 (1976), Central Michigan University Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan University, 404 Mich 268, 279; 273 NW2d 21 (1978). However, where such a conflict exists and the collective-bargaining agreement provides for mandatory benefits, it is not obvious to me that these should be considered "like benefits” within the meaning of MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). Such mandatory benefits are perhaps more properly characterized as being in spite of the charter rather than because of it. I remain to be convinced that the majority’s position is correct on this point.
Finally, I specifically note that no attack was made in this case on the constitutionality of MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161). In other cases involving this provision, various equal protection challenges to the scheme have been lodged. At present, I do not know how I would resolve these constitutional challenges. I simply note the issue because I do not want to be understood to have impliedly ruled on them by this opinion.
I would reverse and remand to the WCAB for consideration of the other issues previously raised regarding Kment’s entitlement to receive a penalty for late payment under MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161).

 The present Detroit charter provides that this provision of the 1918 charter shall remain in effect as before until changed by ordinance. Detroit Charter, 1974, § 13-108.

 The Supreme Court has already concluded that for charter benefits to be "like benefits” within the meaning of MCL 418.161; MSA 17.237(161), the charter must extend a specific, enforceable right to the benefits on behalf of the injured policeman or fireman. Cichecki v Hamtramck, 382 Mich 428; 170 NW2d 58 (1969).