Court Opinion

ID: 9906546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 15:05:50.83248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:12.026953
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2226-21

SIMON COULL,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EISNER AMPER and
HUBERT KLEIN,

     Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________

                   Argued November 6, 2023 – Decided December 4, 2023

                   Before Judges Marczyk and Chase.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division,
                   Hudson County, Docket No. L-3671-21.

                   Simon Coull, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

                   Charles William Mondora argued the cause for
                   respondents (Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford PC,
                   attorneys; Charles William Mondora, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff Simon Coull appeals pro se from the trial court's December 17,

2021 order granting defendants EisnerAmper LLP ("EisnerAmper"), Hubert

Klein ("Klein"), and Charles Weinstein's ("Weinstein") motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff further appeals the court's February 18, 2022 order denying his motion

for reconsideration. Based on our review of the record and the controlling legal

principles, we affirm.

                                        I.

      Plaintiff and his ex-wife entered into a marital settlement agreement

("MSA") in October 2011, requiring plaintiff to pay child and spousal support,

and the court entered a judgment of divorce in January 2012. In 2014, plaintiff

moved to reduce his child and spousal support obligations. Plaintiff's ex-wife

retained defendants' accounting firm to serve as experts and to perform an

income and cash-flow analysis in relation to plaintiff's motion. Klein generated

reports addressing these issues.

      Plaintiff retained his own accounting expert who prepared reports on his

behalf. On December 22, 2015, plaintiff and his ex-wife entered into a consent

order resolving plaintiff's 2014 motion. 1 The December 22, 2015 order was

1
  Plaintiff alleges in his statement of facts that "the day before the tr[ia]l [he]
found out a senior partner for[] the defendant[s] had contacted [his] then [-]

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drafted by plaintiff's then-attorney, Jamie K. Von Ellen, 2 and executed by both

parties and their attorneys.      The December 22, 2015 order specifically

recognized that the parties were "unable to agree to [p]laintiff's income but were

willing to agree to the support amounts" set forth in the order.

      In April 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants EisnerAmper

and Klein.3 Plaintiff alleged accountant malpractice, fraud, breach of fiduciary

duty, gross negligence, and other claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the

complaint in July 2021 for improper service and failure to state a claim. The

court heard oral argument and dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice for

improper service and failure to state a claim.

      In September 2021, plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint to cure the

defects leading to the dismissal of his first complaint but instead filed a new

attorney asking her to settle the case before tr[ia]l and to get [him] to accept the
offer . . . ." He further states he "refused and realized that something was going
on behind the scenes he had not been [privy] to." He then alleges that when he
refused to settle, his then-attorney threatened him by stating "listen I can do all
sorts of bad things to you" and claims he recorded this conversation.
2
  Plaintiff's claims against his former attorney are the subject of a separate
appeal. Coull v. Von Ellen, No. A-3858-21.
3
  Prior to filing the civil claim, plaintiff moved in October 2020, for "declaratory
relief," seeking to join Klein and Von Ellen as defendants in the family matter.
The family judge denied plaintiff's application.

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complaint under a different docket number. This time, in addition to defendants

Klein and EisnerAmper, he sued Weinstein. The new complaint alleged many

of the same claims, including accountant "malpractice," the "New Jersey

2A:53A-25 accountant liability act," "privity," "fraud," "Restatement of

[T]ort[s] 552," and "Fiduciary duty."

      Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's second complaint in October 2021

based on the statute of limitations, improper service, and failure to state a claim.

Defendants argued the statute of limitations for malpractice claims is six years .

However, the claim was time-barred because plaintiff filed this new complaint

under a new docket number on September 15, 2021, which was more than six

years after Klein generated his last report on July 16, 2015.

      Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion, arguing, with respect to the statute

of limitations, that "[t]he date of accrual of loss is when the loss occurred which

would be when the contract [4] came into effect which . . . is December 22[,]

2015."

      Following oral argument, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint with

prejudice on December 17, 2021. Regarding plaintiff's claim that there was

4
   When plaintiff says "contract" he is referring to the December 22, 2015
consent order arising out of the family matter.
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malpractice, the court stated, "[t]his is the same argument that this court has

reviewed in the past motion and decided . . . it was the ex-wife . . . who sought

the services and therefore the duty was owed to the ex-wife as opposed to the

plaintiff here." As to the statute of limitations, the court found plaintiff's claim

time-barred because the clock starts "when the reports were generated . . . not

when [plaintiff] entered into . . . the [consent] [a]greement with the ex-wife."

Additionally, the court addressed the question of whether defendants had

litigation immunity.      The judge found there was immunity for defendants

because "they made their reports in the course of litigation as part of the judicial

proceedings. . . . And that's because . . . this immunity privilege [has] a strong

public policy to [allow] experts [to] speak freely and rightfully without fear of

litigation."

      In January 2022, plaintiff then moved for reconsideration and for leave to

amend his complaint. The court denied both motions on February 18, 2022. The

court concluded plaintiff:

               did not provide any new arguments nor has he provided
               any information that shows that this [c]ourt has erred in
               dismissing the complaint. Rather, movant merely
               reemphasizes the arguments that he previously
               made. . . . Further, the request to amend is denied on
               procedural as well as substantive reasons.
               Procedurally, [plaintiff] failed to provide the [c]ourt
               with a proposed amended complaint, which is in

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            violation of [Rule] 4:9-1. Substantively, [plaintiff]
            does not demonstrate why the amendment should be
            granted given that this [c]ourt has determined . . .
            defendants did not owe a duty to plaintiff Coull.

This appeal followed.

                                        II.

      We use a de novo standard to review the dismissal of a complaint for

failure to state a claim. Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo,

Hyman and Stahl, P.C., 237 N.J. 91, 108 (2019). We apply the same standard

under Rule 4:6-2(e) that governed the motion judge and look to "the legal

sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Printing Mart-

Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989). We are limited to

reviewing "the pleadings themselves." Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 562 (2010).

"'At this preliminary stage of the litigation the [judge] is not concerned with the

ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint ,' and the

plaintiff is 'entitled to every reasonable inference of fact.'" Dimitrakopoulos,

237 N.J. at 107 (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746). However, "if the

complaint states no claim that supports relief, and discovery will not give rise

to such a claim, the action should be dismissed." Ibid.

      "Motions for reconsideration are governed by Rule 4:49-2, which provides

. . . the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the

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sound discretion of the trial court." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging

Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015).            "Reconsideration

should be used only where '1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based upon

a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious . . . the [c]ourt either

did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent

evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div.

1990)). Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court's decision on a motion for

reconsideration unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Ibid.

      Plaintiff advances several arguments in support of his appeal: the statute

of limitations is tolled under the extraordinary circumstance doctrine;

defendants owed plaintiff a duty under the Accountants Liability Act, N.J.S.A.

2A:53A-25; defendants supplied reports with the knowledge that they were

inaccurate contrary to Restatement of Torts § 552; fraud was pled with sufficient

specificity in plaintiff's complaint under New Jersey's liberal pleading

standards; and the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint based on

litigation immunity.

      We confine our discussion to the issue of litigation immunity as the court

properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint pursuant to that doctrine. The thrust of

plaintiff's argument regarding the litigation immunity issue is that his complaint

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is based on Klein's preparation of a report "and not any testimony presented in

court," and, therefore, the privilege is not applicable. We are unpersuaded by

plaintiff's arguments.

      "It is well-settled that a witness in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding

enjoys an absolute immunity from civil suit for his words and actions relevant

to the judicial proceedings." Durand Equip. Co., Inc. v. Superior Carbon Prods.,

Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 581, 583 (App. Div. 1991). "This absolute immunity is

afforded even if 'the words are written or spoken maliciously, without any

justification or excuse, and from personal ill will or anger against the party

. . . .'" Id. at 583-84 (quoting DeVivo v. Ascher, 228 N.J. Super. 453, 457 (App.

Div. 1988)).

      Furthermore, the immunity "is not limited to what a person may say under

oath while on the witness stand. It extends to statements or communications in

connection with a judicial proceeding." Id. at 584 (quoting DeVivo, 228 N.J.

Super. at 457). "The absolute immunity granted to witnesses is not designed to

benefit the dishonest witness but to further the broad public interest in having

witnesses who are unafraid to testify fully and openly." Id. at 585.

      In Commercial Insurance Co. of Newark v. Steiger, 395 N.J. Super. 109

(App. Div. 2007), we concluded that an expert—who provided a report in

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                                        8
support of a claim for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits—was immune from

liability pursuant to the absolute litigation privilege.      The UM insurance

company sued the expert for material misrepresentation regarding his report. Id.

at 113-14. The expert opined a phantom vehicle was a contributing cause of the

accident, and we determined that the report was "clearly pertinent and relevant

to the litigation" and therefore was "immune from liability pursuant to the

litigation privilege." Id. at 119.

      The litigation privilege is implicated in this matter. Klein's report was

clearly prepared for the purposes of the underlying litigation. The privilege

"extends to statements or communications in connection with a judicial

proceeding." Durand, 248 N.J. Super. at 584 (quoting DeVivo, 228 N.J. Super.

at 457). Klein's report falls squarely within the privilege. Accordingly, the trial

court properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

       To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's

remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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