Court Opinion

ID: 9543041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:35.497568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:36.600282
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Neither the statutory law nor the parties’ agreement in this case warrants a continuation of alimony payments to wife-appellee following her remarriage.
The Divorce Code, at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) and (f) provides as follows:
(e) Modification and termination. — An order entered pursuant to this section is subject to further order of the court upon changed circumstances of either party of a substantial and continuing nature whereupon the order may be modified, suspended, terminated or reinstituted or a new order made. Any further order shall apply only to payments accruing subsequent to the petition for the *609requested relief. Remarriage of the party receiving alimony shall terminate the award of alimony.
(f) Status of agreement to pay alimony. — Whenever the court approves an agreement for the payment of alimony voluntarily entered into between the parties, the agreement shall constitute the order of the court and may be enforced as provided in section 3703 (relating to enforcement of arrearages).
Pursuant to these provisions, an order requiring the payment of alimony, whether entered pursuant to agreement of the parties or after an evidentiary hearing, is enforceable by any of the means provided by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3703, including attachment and contempt. An order awarding alimony, however, terminates upon remarriage of the party receiving alimony. Upon remarriage of the party receiving alimony, all vestiges of the prior marital relationship have come to an end and a new relationship, with all the rights and duties inherent therein, has begun.
I am in full agreement with the majority that the parties may contract for the payment of alimony or spousal support even after the party receiving such payments has remarried. Before an agreement for the payment of alimony can survive remarriage of the party receiving such payments, however, such an intent must appear clearly and unambiguously. An arrangement contrary to the policy clearly expressed and adopted by the legislature at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) should not readily be inferred from imprecise contract language. Where an agreement is silent with respect to whether payments of alimony shall survive the remarriage of the party receiving alimony, the law may assume that the parties intended to contract consistently with policy expressed by the legislature.
As a general rule, the interpretation of a written contract is a matter of law to be made by a court. Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 513 Pa. 192, 201, 519 A.2d 385, 390 (1986); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 304, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983); Kardibin v. Associated Hardware, 284 Pa.Super. 586, 595, *610426 A.2d 649, 654 (1981). In making such an interpretation, the court’s paramount concern must be to effectuate the intent of the parties. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. Manor Mines, Inc., 523 Pa. 112, 119, 565 A.2d 428, 432 (1989); Lower Frederick Township v. Clemmer, 518 Pa. 313, 329, 543 A.2d 502, 510 (1988); Warren v. Greenfield, 407 Pa.Super. 600, 606-607, 595 A.2d 1308, 1311 (1991). This intent is to be gleaned from the unambiguous words which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. As expressed in Marcinak v. Southeastern Greene School Dist., 375 Pa.Super. 486, 544 A.2d 1025 (1988):
The intent of the parties to a written contract is to be regarded as being embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are clear and unambiguous, the intent is to be discovered only from the express language of the agreement. Estate of Breyer, 475 Pa. 108, 379 A.2d 1305 (1977). When the words of the contract are unequivocal, it speaks for itself and a meaning cannot be given to it other than that expressed, and there is no need to refer to extrinsic aids or evidence to determine the intentions of the parties. East Crossroads Center, Inc. v. Mellon-Stuart Co., 416 Pa. 229, 205 A.2d 865 (1965).
Id., 375 Pa.Superior Ct. at 492, 544 A.2d at 1027-1028. See also: Walton v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 376 Pa.Super. 329, 339, 545 A.2d 1383, 1388 (1988); Vankirk v. Vankirk, 336 Pa.Super. 502, 505, 485 A.2d 1194, 1196 (1984). Moreover, a written instrument must be examined as a whole. Marcinak v. Southeastern Greene School Dist., supra 375 Pa.Super. at 491, 544 A.2d at 1027; Stern v. Vic Snyder, Inc., 325 Pa.Super. 423, 429, 473 A.2d 139, 142 (1984). Similarly, when the parties’ agreement involves several written instruments, they are to be construed together as a whole. International Milling Co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 380 Pa. 407, 417-418, 110 A.2d 186, 191 (1955).
In the instant case, the parties’ original agreement required husband to make weekly payments to wife in the amount of $791.00. With respect thereto, the parties specifically stated: “Of that which is to be paid to wife, fifty *611percent shall be deemed alimony and 50% shall be deemed child support and shall be paid to wife by husband until the youngest living child reaches the age of twenty-one, is emancipated or finishes college whichever occurs last.” By this language the parties identified the time when husband’s duty to pay child support should terminate and come to an end. However, there was nothing in the agreement expressing an intent that husband’s obligation to pay alimony was to end simultaneously with the termination of husband’s duty to pay child support. Presumably, therefore, payments of alimony were to continue so long as wife needed such payments to assist her in supporting herself. This need may have continued indefinitely for many years. It may have continued as long as she lived. The need clearly came to an end, however, when the wife remarried.
In Price v. Confair, 366 Pa. 538, 79 A.2d 224 (1951), the Supreme Court stated:
“[Contracts which do not fix a definite time for the duration of the relationship which they create are sometimes construed as providing for a reasonable time or some particular period inferred from the nature and circumstances of the undertaking. Illustrations are to be found in Weidman v. United Cigar Stores Co., 223 Pa. 160 [72 A. 377], Nolle v. Mutual Union Brewing Co., 264 Pa. 534 [108 A. 23], and Rossmassler v. Spielberger, 270 Pa. 30 [112 A. 876]; see also 4 Williston on Contracts (rev. ed.), section 1027A(3), p. 2852.”
Id. at 542-543, 79 A.2d at 226, quoting Slonaker v. P.G. Publishing Co., 338 Pa. 292, 296, 13 A.2d 48, 51 (1940). See also: Thomas v. Thomas Flexible Coupling Co., 353 Pa. 591, 597, 46 A.2d 212, 215 (1946); Straup v. Times Herald, 283 Pa.Super. 58, 68-69, 423 A.2d 713, 718-719 (1980). I would hold that under the circumstances of this case, a terminus of husband’s obligation to pay alimony to his former wife was intended by the parties to be the wife’s remarriage.
This interpretation is confirmed by the sentence in the parties’ agreement which follows the sentence requiring the *612payment of alimony. It is there provided that husband is “to provide Blue Cross and Blue Shield and major medical coverage ... during the period husband is obligated to pay support for wife and/or children.” This suggests that the parties differentiated between spousal support or alimony, on the one hand, and husband’s duty to provide child support, on the other. It negates any concept that alimony and child support were to be so linked together as to share the same terminus.
Husband’s contractual obligations to pay alimony and child support, the parties stipulated, were to be “embodied” in and become a part of a support order. Pursuant thereto, an agreed order was entered which “embodied” the agreement of the parties.
An action for divorce was subsequently commenced, and an amended order was made part of a decree in divorce entered on April 7, 1989. By this agreement, husband was also to provide wife with a leased automobile and related insurance and costs of maintenance “for as long as he is obligated to pay support.” This amended agreement did not purport to change the amount of alimony to be paid or the duration thereof. It merely spoke to the additional requirement of a leased vehicle “for as long as [husband] is obligated to pay support.”
A careful reading of the parties’ agreement suggests that they loosely equated alimony with spousal support and spoke interchangeably of the two. In doing so, however, they clearly distinguished alimony and/or spousal support from husband’s duty to provide child support. Although specifically defining the duration of child support, at no time or place in their agreement did the parties suggest expressly or by inference that husband’s duty to pay alimony was to continue after wife’s remarriage.
I would hold, therefore, that the appellant-husband’s obligation to pay alimony came to an end when his former wife remarried. I reach this result because of the clear expression of legislative intent found at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) and also because my interpretation of the parties’ agreement *613confirms that the parties did not contemplate a requirement in excess of that provided by statute. Specifically, the agreement contained no provision that husband should continue to pay alimony even after wife remarried. I would reject any rule which suggests that an agreement to pay alimony continues after remarriage of the party receiving alimony unless the parties expressly provide otherwise in their agreement. I would hold, rather, that agreements for alimony must be interpreted consistently with the terms of 23 Pa.C.S. § 3701(e) unless the parties specifically provide that alimony payments shall continue even after the party receiving alimony payments has remarried. The burden of proving an intent contrary to the policy pronounced by the legislature should be on the party so asserting.
I would also hold, pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement, that husband’s duty to provide wife with medical coverage and a leased vehicle came to an end when wife remarried. These obligations were to continue for as long as husband was required “to pay support.” The reference to husband’s duty to pay support, in my judgment, was intended to refer to husband’s obligation to pay spousal support or alimony. When the duty to pay alimony came to an end because of wife’s remarriage, husband’s obligation to provide wife with medical coverage and a leased vehicle also came to an end. Any other result appears to be so unreasonable and so punitive as to exceed any intent that I have been able to discern from the parties’ agreement.
Therefore, I dissent. I would reverse and vacate the order requiring appellant to pay continuing alimony.
DEL SOLE, J., joins.