Court Opinion

ID: 9958118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 08:11:34.472502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:51.835550
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-24-00083-CR
     ___________________________

  JOSEPH KELLY DINGLER, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 1749454

 Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Joseph Kelly Dingler attempts to appeal from a yet-to-be-signed

order on his “Special Appearance And Plea To The Jurisdiction Petition For Pretrial

Writ of Habeas Corpus” (collectively, the Motion).1

       Dingler filed his notice of appeal pro se despite the fact that he has appointed

counsel. In his notice of appeal, Dingler states that the Motion has “sat idle” in the

trial court and that he “believes [the Motion] has been constructively denied by the

trial court.”

       On March 7, 2024, we notified Dingler and his appointed counsel of our

concern that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. We explained that in criminal cases,

our jurisdiction is generally limited to appeals from conviction judgments. See McKown

v. State, 915 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.) (per curiam).

We warned Dingler that unless he or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a

response by March 18, 2024, showing grounds for continuing the appeal, we could

dismiss it for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f), 44.3.

       1
        In a previous appeal arising from this same trial court cause number, Dingler
filed a document entitled “*SPECIAL APPEARANCE*: Notice of Appeal and Brief
on Appeal.” See Dingler v. State, No. 02-23-00233-CR, 2023 WL 7037611, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
We sent Dingler a jurisdiction letter in that appeal due to our concern that the trial
court had not entered any appealable orders. See id. After Dingler failed to identify
any appealable interlocutory orders in response to our jurisdiction letter in that appeal,
we dismissed it for want of jurisdiction. See id.

                                             2
      Dingler’s appointed counsel responded to our jurisdiction letter, noting that he

had “no knowledge” of Dingler’s notice of appeal until he had received our letter and

that Dingler’s case was still pending in the trial court. Although Dingler filed a pro se

response to our jurisdiction letter, that response does not show grounds for

continuing the appeal.2 Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f); State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2012) (“We conclude that, because there is no written order from which to

appeal, the court of appeals correctly held that it has no jurisdiction over the [S]tate’s

appeal, and we affirm the judgment of that court.”); Autrey v. State, No. 05-22-00180-

CR, 2022 WL 1448042, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“Although appellant filed a motion . . . , the trial court did

not sign and enter an appealable order. Therefore, appellant’s notice of appeal does

not confer jurisdiction upon this [c]ourt.”).

      2
        In his pro se response, Dingler requests additional time to fully respond to our
jurisdiction letter. However, because Dingler has appointed counsel, we do not
consider that request. See Camacho v. State, No. 02-12-00627-CR, 2013 WL 362777, at
*1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (stating that court would not consider pro se appellant’s request for
extension of time to respond to jurisdiction letter when appellant had appointed
counsel); see also Kenney v. State, No. 02-19-00313-CR, 2021 WL 832718, at *7 n.4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Mar. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“A defendant has no absolute right to hybrid representation, so courts may ignore
pro se motions filed by defendants with appointed counsel.”).

                                            3
                               /s/ Dana Womack

                               Dana Womack
                               Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 4, 2024

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