Court Opinion

ID: 9906702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 22:03:31.335788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:24.493007
License: Public Domain

NOTICE               2023 IL App (4th) 220933-U
 This Order was filed under
                                                                                 FILED
                                         NO. 4-22-0933                       December 4, 2023
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
                                                                                Carla Bender
 not precedent except in the
                                 IN THE APPELLATE COURT                     4th District Appellate
 limited circumstances allowed                                                    Court, IL
 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                          OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

RIKHAV VASANWALA, M.D.,                                     )      Appeal from the
               Plaintiff-Appellant,                         )      Circuit Court of
               v.                                           )      Sangamon County
THE DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION                     )      No. 22MR403
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND                          )
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION and CECILIA                         )      Honorable
ABUNDIS, in Her Official Capacity as Director of the        )      Robin L. Schmidt,
Division of Professional Regulation,                        )      Judge Presiding.
               Defendants-Appellees.                        )

                PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Steigmann and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER
¶1     Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court properly dismissed
             plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no
             final administrative decision for the court to review.

¶2              Plaintiff, Rikhav Vasanwala, M.D., appeals from the circuit court’s judgment,

dismissing his complaint for administrative review against defendants, the Division of

Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation

(Department) and Cecilia Abundis, in her official capacity as Director of the Division of

Professional Regulation (Director). On appeal, plaintiff argues he was denied due process when

the Director temporarily suspended his medical license without a hearing under section 37(d) of

the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Medical Act) (225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022)). He further
contends the Director’s order temporarily suspending his medical license pending further

proceedings was a final administrative decision, and the court erroneously dismissed his

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4             On September 13, 2022, the Department filed an administrative complaint,

alleging discipline of plaintiff’s Illinois medical license was appropriate under section 22 of the

Medical Act (225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2022)) after he was arrested for “(i) Rape, a class Y felony,

and (ii) Video Voyeurism, a class D Felony,” in Benton County, Arkansas. The Department also

simultaneously filed a petition to temporarily suspend plaintiff’s medical license pending a

formal hearing on its complaint.

¶5             The Department’s filings alleged the following. On January 31, 2022, while at his

residence in Arkansas, plaintiff videotaped himself performing multiple acts of oral, anal, and

vaginal penetration against “AV.” Because “she was unconscious” and “her body was limp,”

plaintiff “had to manually spread AV’s legs apart,” remove her clothing, and “move [her] body

into different positions as he was performing sexual acts on her.” On February 17, 2022, plaintiff

obtained his Illinois medical license. On February 23, 2022, plaintiff was arrested in Arkansas

after “AV reported [the] aforementioned sexual assault,” and plaintiff stipulated that probable

cause existed for both the rape and voyeurism charges.

¶6             The Department supported its allegations with an affidavit from Dr. Shami Goyal,

the Department’s chief medical coordinator, who reviewed the information obtained by the

Department, as well as various documents from the criminal matter in Arkansas. Dr. Goyal also

watched the video of plaintiff molesting “AV” while she was unconscious and opined “that the

continued practice of medicine by [plaintiff] presents an immediate danger to the safety of the

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public in *** Illinois.” The Director thereafter found the public interest, safety, and welfare

imperatively required emergency action to prevent plaintiff’s continued practice of medicine, “in

that [plaintiff]’s actions constitute[d] an immediate danger to the public.” The Director

temporarily suspended plaintiff’s Illinois license pending a formal hearing on the complaint,

which was scheduled in nine days.

¶7             On September 21, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the hearing’s purpose “to

the issue of whether [plaintiff] constitutes an immediate danger to the public to justify the

summary suspension.” The formal administrative hearing on the Department’s complaint against

plaintiff was held the next day. At the hearing, plaintiff asserted he had not been given an

opportunity to argue whether the requirements for a temporary suspension were met, and “it

[made] logical sense that the hearing would not be on the complaint, but would be on whether

the temporary suspension is proper.” After reviewing the relevant provisions under Title 68 of

the Illinois Administrative Code (68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110), covering the Department’s rules of

practice in administrative hearings, and the Medical Act, the administrative law judge (ALJ)

denied plaintiff’s motion. In doing so, the ALJ noted she lacked a legal basis to grant plaintiff’s

motion because there existed no authority which would allow her to review the Director’s

finding or limit the hearing.

¶8             On September 26, 2022, plaintiff filed the instant complaint for administrative

review. In his complaint, plaintiff asserted, among other things, defendants “violated [his]

procedural rights by refusing to grant him a hearing on the Temporary Suspension Order and

refusing to grant him any right to contest the Temporary Suspension Order in any way.” Plaintiff

further noted the temporary suspension of his medical license would “stay in place until there is a

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final decision on the [Department’s] Complaint in this case,” which, plaintiff complained, “could

take months or even up to a year.”

¶9             On October 3, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint

under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1)

(West 2022)). The motion asserted the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address

plaintiff’s complaint because (1) the order temporarily suspending plaintiff’s medical license was

not a final administrative decision and (2) plaintiff had failed to exhaust all of his available

administrative remedies. In so arguing, defendants highlighted plaintiff’s own admission

administrative proceedings were ongoing. Defendants explained the General Assembly adopted

the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2022)) as the exclusive method

for reviewing final administrative decisions under the Medical Act. Defendants also pointed out,

under section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law, the term “administrative decision” was

defined as “any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a

particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates

the proceedings before the administrative agency.” 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2022).

¶ 10           In response, plaintiff argued “there [were] no remaining administrative procedures

that exist as to the suspension” because defendants “refused to allow [him] any opportunity to

contest the suspension.” Plaintiff also claimed although “the term of the [temporary] suspension

[would] end upon a decision on the Administrative Complaint,” the decision would not “review

or reverse the suspension currently in effect.” Thus, according to plaintiff, the order temporarily

suspending his medical license was a final administrative decision because it was “an order of an

administrative agency” which affected his legal rights and privileges as a physician and disposed

of all proceedings to contest the suspension.

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¶ 11           Following a hearing on October 4, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order

dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the order

temporarily suspending plaintiff’s medical license because it was not a final administrative

decision.

¶ 12           This appeal followed.

¶ 13                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14           On appeal, plaintiff argues he was denied due process when the Director

temporarily suspended his medical license without a hearing under section 37(d) of the Medical

Act (225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022)). He further contends the order temporarily suspending his

medical license pending a formal hearing on the Department’s complaint was a “final

administrative decision,” and the circuit court erroneously dismissed his complaint for

administrative review for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants assert the court properly

dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Civil Code, which provides for

the dismissal of a claim where “the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the

action.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2022). This court reviews dismissals under section 2-619

de novo. Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 24, 210 N.E.3d 1184.

¶ 15           In cases involving review of an administrative decision, circuit courts exercise

“special statutory jurisdiction.” Ameren Transmission Co. of Illinois v. Hutchings, 2018 IL

122973, ¶ 13, 120 N.E.3d 998. When the governing statute adopts the Administrative Review

Law, “a circuit court may not redress a party’s grievance through any other type of action”

(Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 40, 181 N.E.3d 736), and a party seeking to invoke that

jurisdiction must “comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute.” Ameren

Transmission Co. of Illinois, 2018 IL 122973, ¶ 13. The Medical Act adopts the Administrative

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Review Law and provides, “All final administrative decisions of the Department are subject to

judicial review.” 225 ILCS 60/41 (West 2022). “Under the Administrative Review Law, courts

may only judicially review an administrative decision that both (1) ‘affects the legal rights,

duties or privileges of parties,’ and (2) ‘terminates the proceedings before the administrative

agency.’ ” Sherman West Court v. Arnold, 407 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750, 944 N.E.2d 467, 469

(2011) (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2008)). If those procedures are not followed, the circuit

court lacks jurisdiction. Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 34,

21 N.E.3d 368.

¶ 16           When a complaint is filed under section 22 of the Medical Act, the Department is

responsible for investigating the actions of a licensee. 225 ILCS 60/36(a) (West 2022).

Typically, the Department must notify the licensee of any charges as well as the time and place

for a hearing on the charges at least 30 days prior to the date set for the hearing before taking any

disciplinary action. 225 ILCS 60/36(b) (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.170(a) (2019). At

the time and place determined in the notice, the ALJ “shall proceed to hear the charges,” and the

licensee “shall be accorded ample opportunity to present *** such statements, testimony,

evidence and argument as may be pertinent to the charges or to any defense thereto.” 225 ILCS

60/37(a) (West 2022).

¶ 17           However, the Director, with the authority delegated by the Secretary of the

Department, may temporarily suspend a licensee’s medical license without a hearing if the

Director finds, based on the evidence possessed, that the licensee’s continued medical practice

presents an immediate danger to the public. 225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code

1110.10 (2019). This depends on the temporary suspension being sought simultaneously with the

institution of proceedings for a hearing under section 37 of the Medical Act. 225 ILCS 60/37(d)

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(West 2022). In the event the Director temporarily suspends a licensee’s medical license, the

disciplinary proceedings are accelerated, and a hearing on the charges against the licensee must

be held within 15 days of the temporary suspension taking effect. 225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West

2022); Sharma v. Division of Professional Regulation of Financial & Professional Regulation,

2023 IL App (3d) 220095, ¶ 23, 219 N.E.3d 707 (concluding the 15-day hearing requirement

following a temporary suspension relates to the underlying complaint).

¶ 18           After the hearing, the ALJ must submit a written report to the Illinois State

Medical Board (Medical Board) containing his or her findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

any disciplinary recommendation with respect to the allegations contained in the complaint. 225

ILCS 60/35 (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code. 1110.240(a)-(b) (2019). Upon receipt of the ALJ’s

report, the Medical Board must submit its own conclusions and recommendations to the

Director. 225 ILCS 60/35 (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.240(c) (2019). Once the Medical

Board submits its findings to the Director, the parties are sent a copy of the report and are given

an opportunity to request a rehearing. 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.240(c) (2019). When the time to

file a motion for rehearing expires, the Director may adopt the recommendations of the Medical

Board and enter a decision. 225 ILCS 60/40(b) (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.240(f)

(2019).

¶ 19           In light of these principles, the record clearly establishes the order temporarily

suspending plaintiff’s medical license was not a final administrative decision and not subject to

judicial review because it did not terminate the proceedings before the Department. Simply

calling it a “final administrative decision” does not make it functionally so. See Marsh v. Illinois

Racing Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 491, 689 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (1997) (“An apple calling itself an

orange remains an apple.”). The fact remains plaintiff admitted in his complaint that there had

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been no “final decision *** in this case,” and he received a hearing on the charges against him

nine days after the Director temporarily suspended his license—the only hearing to which he was

entitled. 225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022); see Sharma, 2023 IL App (3d) 220095, ¶ 23.

Moreover, the record is bereft of any written findings of fact, conclusions of law, or disciplinary

recommendation by either the ALJ or Medical Board. 225 ILCS 60/35 (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm.

Code 1110.240(a)-(c) (2019). And, at the time the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint

for administrative review, no decision had been entered by the Director adopting or rejecting the

recommendation of the Medical Board. 225 ILCS 60/40(b) (West 2022); 68 Ill. Adm. Code

1110.240(f) (2019).

¶ 20           Accordingly, because there was no final administrative decision for the circuit

court to review, the court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. See

Sherman West Court, 407 Ill. App. 3d at 750. Having affirmed the court’s decision on this basis,

we need not determine if the Director’s decision to temporarily suspend plaintiff’s medical

license without a hearing violated plaintiff’s due process rights as plaintiff contends.

¶ 21                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22           For all these reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 23           Affirmed.

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