Court Opinion

ID: 9778867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:24:05.177951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:14.860142
License: Public Domain

J. Seaborn Holt, Justice (dissenting). I think this case should be affirmed for the reason that as I read the record, there was ample substantial evidence to support ihe findings and judgment of the trial court. A jury having been waived, we must give to those findings and judgment the same force and effect that we give to the verdict of a jury, therefore, when we find some substantial evidence to support the findings and judgment of the trial court viewed in the light most favorable to appellee (here), we must affirm. In this case there was testimony in the record that appellant at the time he purchased the truck in question was an active, well developed, industrious young man and would easily pass for one of the age of 22 years. Mr. Turner King testified that appellant told him, at the time lie made the contract, that he was 22 years old and wanted the truck for farming purposes. Appellant testified that he had made his own living since he was about 15 years of age and according to his own testimony, and that of his father, he had been employed and working for more than three years. In fact, he had traveled with his father into many states worldng with him on contracts. He testified he quit school in 1951. Appellant’s father testified that his son worked down in Texas, and he took his son with him, that they then went to Louisiana, next to Ohio, to Pennsylvania and from there to South Carolina. On these trips they sometimes used a bus or other times his father’s pick-up truck. Appellant told the seller of the truck at the time the contract was made that he wanted the truck in his business and for farming purposes, and delivered a pleasure car, which he had previously without assistance purchased, and owned, to the dealer as part payment on the truck. It seems to me that the above testimony alone is substantial and sufficient to show that the truck that appellant bought was necessary in his farming and contractural work, was bought for these purposes, and, therefore, that the judgment was correct. Of strong significance is the fact that appellant, who owned a pleasure automobile, would trade it in on the purchase price of a truck unless he felt the necessity for a truck to use in farming, his business, and undertakings. In the very recent case of Sykes v. Dickerson, 216 Ark. 116, 224 S. W. 2d 360, we held that -whether a truck was a necessary, such as would make a minor’s contract valid, must be determined by the particular facts in each ease. We there said: “The remaining contention is that an automobile truck purchased by a minor for the purpose of use in making a living for himself is a necessaxy, so that the minor would be liable for it. This contention would in Arkansas today have to be based on the Uniform Sales Act, § 2, Ark. Stats. (1947) § 68-1402, which provides: ‘Where necessaries are sold to an infant ... he must pay a reasonable price therefor. Necessaries in this section means goods suitable to the condition in life of such infant . . . and to Ms actual requirements at the time of delivery.’ . . . “The closest Arkansas case on its facts is Haynie v. Dicus, 210 Ark. 1092, 199 S. W. 2d 954, where a minor had purchased a ‘milk route’ and truck. The decision there was that whether these items were necessaries was a question of fact and the finding in the lower court, that under the circumstances they were ‘necessaries,’ was sustained. . . . “ ‘Whether the nature of a contract is such that it can, under any circumstances, be regarded as a contract for necessaries, is a question of law; but if the court decides that under some circumstances such a contract might be for necessaries, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury whether it was so in the particular case. ’ Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1936) § 241. There have been some intimations by legal writers that automotive vehicles purchased for business purposes would never be deemed necessaries where an infant is concerned. Compare 43 C. J. S. 190, 192. We do not so hold. Cases cited in support of that generalization have usually reached the result by reason of the peculiar facts in the individual case, or because of express findings of fact by jury or trial judge that a car was not a necessary for a particular infant.” Obviously, justice, common honesty and decency require all to pay their just obligations. Courts should therefore exhaust every means available to force slackers, including minors, to honor their contracts. Our lawmakers evidently came to this conclusion by enacting Act 337 in the 1953 Session. As I view the facts here, as pointed out above, we should declare this minor’s contract good because he bought a necessary. I would affirm.