Court Opinion

ID: 9893426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 23:03:22.843866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:29.932466
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23 Smith v. Soderstrom CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 ANTHONY SMITH,

      Plaintiff and Appellant,                                         G061259

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01070766)

 RANDY SODERSTROM,                                                     OPINION

      Defendant and Respondent.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed. Request for Sanctions. Denied.
                   Anthony Smith, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
                   No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.
              Plaintiff Anthony Smith appeals from the trial court’s order granting
defendant Randy Soderstrom’s motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b) (section 473(b)) to vacate the default and default judgment entered
against him. For the reasons we explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the motion. We therefore affirm.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
              The appellate record is limited. It includes the register of actions, which
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identifies Anthony Smith and Tara Smith as plaintiffs, and Randy Soderstrom, Legal
Insights, Inc., Jeremy Healey, and Jason Voelker as defendants. It also shows the Smiths
filed a complaint in May 2019 and a first amended complaint in July 2019. According to
the issue conference statement the Smiths filed in the trial court (the Smiths’ pleadings
are not included in the appellate record), their lawsuit is based on the allegations “they
were victims of an ongoing scheme perpetrated by Soderstrom, and his company Legal
Insights, Inc. . . . to defraud them of thousands of dollars by false assurances and [by]
representing that Soderstrom was licensed in the practice of law.” The issue conference
statement states the Smiths’ first amended complaint contained claims against
Soderstrom for fraud, breach of contract, unfair competition, violation of the Consumer
Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), intentional infliction of emotional
distress, violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code § 52.1), and violation of
Business and Professions Code sections 6450–6456.
              In November 2019, Soderstrom filed a demurrer to the first amended
complaint and a motion to quash service of process. In February 2020, the trial court
denied the motion to quash, overruled the demurrer, and ordered Soderstrom to file an
answer to the first amended complaint “within 30 court days after service of notice of this
1
  We refer to Anthony and Tara Smith as “the Smiths” and Anthony Smith individually
by his first name for purposes of clarity; we intend no disrespect.

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ruling.” The court ordered “Counsel for Plaintiffs to give notice of these rulings.”
(Italics omitted.) Neither the Smiths nor their counsel served notice of the court’s rulings
on Soderstrom, and Soderstrom did not file an answer to the first amended complaint.
                Over one year later, the trial court observed the Smiths had not filed a
request for the clerk to enter Soderstrom’s default and had not yet served any of the three
other named defendants in the case. On April 30, 2021, the trial court issued an order to
show cause why the case should not be dismissed. After the Smiths filed a response to
the court’s order opposing dismissal of the case, the court took the order to show cause
off calendar.
                The register of actions shows on July 2, 2021, the Smiths filed a request for
entry of Soderstrom’s default and a statement of damages. In August 2021 and again in
October 2021, the Smiths filed a request the court enter default judgment against
Soderstrom.
                On October 6, 2021, judgment was entered against Soderstrom and in favor
of the Smiths: “GOOD CAUSE APPEARING from the Default ‘Pr[]ove-Up’ Package
submitted by Plaintiffs and the records and files in this case, the Court orders Judgment
as follows: [¶] The actions of Randy Soderstrom (‘Soderstrom’) doing business as Legal
Insights, Inc. is declared to constitute the unauthorized practice of law; [¶] Soderstrom is
enjoined from conducting any business with anyone in the State of California. [¶] The
complaint filed by Soderstrom with prison authorities against plaintiff Anthony Smith on
July 20, 2017, is declared to be false. [¶] Soderstrom is ordered to retract the false
complaint he filed with prison authorities [o]n July 20, 2017, against plaintiff Anthony
Smith. [¶] The personal assets of Soderstrom are to be frozen until such time as the
Court order[s] otherwise. [¶] Plaintiffs shall be awarded damages in the amount of
$39,000. [¶] Plaintiffs shall be awarded punitive damages in the amount of $100,000. [¶]
Plaintiffs shall be awarded costs in the amount of [$]1,174.36. [¶] Plaintiffs shall be

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awarded Attorney’s Fees in the amount of [$]22,600. [¶] In total, for monetary damages,
plaintiffs shall be awarded $162,774.36. [¶] IT IS SO ORDERED.”
              On November 16, 2021, Soderstrom filed a motion under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473 to set aside the default and the default judgment entered against
him and a proposed answer to the first amended complaint. In his motion, Soderstrom
argued: “This Motion is made pursuant to CCP § 473, et seq., and is based on the
grounds that Defendant was unable to respond or appear in court due to Plaintiff not
having properly served numerous documents in this case including, but limited to: trial
briefs, prove up package, notices from the Court, notice of entry of default, request for
amended entry of default and many others as will be shown herein. Furthermore,
Plaintiff filed a crucial brief in the wrong court, failed to re-file in this Court, provided no
notice and was sanctioned for failure to provide service and sanctioned again for filing a
‘frivolous’ complaint. Plaintiff has engaged in numerous end-run attempts to continue
filing this frivolous complaint despite having overwhelming evidence that Defendant
Soderstrom is not culpable of anything. Furthermore, Defendant was suffering with
COVID through part of these proceedings, being unable to respond even if he had been
properly served (which he was not), and the Court was closed nearly a year due to the
pandemic. Defendant was actively participating in this case up to and until the time that
Plaintiff’s counsel suggested he would be dropping the case, and had it not been for
Plaintiff’s counsel leading Defendant to believe this complaint would be dropped, and for
the fact that Plaintiff simply failed to serve numerous pleadings on Defendant, he would
have continued defending himself against these unfounded allegations.” (Italics omitted.)
              In his declaration filed in support of the motion, Soderstrom stated:
(1) during a February 2020 conversation, the Smiths’ counsel Joseph Elford informed
Soderstrom he intended to dismiss the complaint against Soderstrom and “would let
[Soderstrom] know otherwise”; (2) Soderstrom informed Elford of Soderstrom’s new
mailing address in Laguna Niguel and e-mail address; (3) Soderstrom had not received

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any communications, documents, or correspondence from the Smiths or Elford since late
2019; and (4) from March 2020 until June or July 2020, Soderstrom “was very sick with
COVID 19 and its after [e]ffects,” some of which still affect him.
              Soderstrom also filed the declaration of his personal assistant Carlos
Rodriguez in support of the motion. In his declaration, Rodriguez stated he had worked
for Soderstrom since 2017 and his duties have included receiving, processing, and
logging mail at Soderstrom’s mailing address in Laguna Niguel. Rodriguez stated he did
not recall ever seeing mail from the Smiths or Elford and further stated he reviewed the
incoming mail logs for 2019, 2020, and 2021 which did not show any mail had been
received from the Smiths or Elford.
              The Smiths filed opposition to the motion to set aside the default and
default judgment. They submitted Elford’s declaration; Elford denied having any
conversations with Soderstrom except for one in November 2019 in which Elford refused
Soderstrom’s request to dismiss the lawsuit. Elford also stated, throughout the litigation,
he properly served Soderstrom at his address of record in Las Vegas, Nevada.
              In reply, Soderstrom submitted another declaration in which he reiterated
he had a telephone conversation with Elford in February 2020 during which Elford said
he was considering “dropping this case” and that he would contact Soderstrom “before
going forward, if he chose to do so.” Soderstrom further stated he and Elford also
discussed possible settlement and Soderstrom gave Elford his new mailing address and e-
mail address. He stated he “temporarily deactivated” his original e-mail account “for
personal reasons not associated with this case.” Soderstrom reiterated he was sick with
COVID from February to June 2020.
              Soderstrom also filed a second declaration from Rodriguez in which
Rodriguez stated he witnessed Soderstrom’s February 2020 telephone call with Elford at
Soderstrom’s request. Rodriguez stated he heard Elford identify himself and state he was
probably going to dismiss the case. He heard the parties discuss settlement and

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Soderstrom give Elford his new mailing and e-mail addresses. Rodriguez stated
“[b]efore the end of the call, [he] heard Mr. Elford tell [Soderstrom] that he would call
him if he decided to go forward.”
              Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to vacate the default
and default judgment. In its minute order, the trial court stated, “most of the arguments
presented by [Soderstrom] do not support the request for relief.” The court explained:
“For example, [Soderstrom] asserts that events in 2020 impeded his ability to respond.
But [Soderstrom]’s deadline to Answer did not run until June 2021 (30 days after service
of notice of the 2/6/20 ruling). [Soderstrom] does not claim that there was any
impediment to responding by that time. [Soderstrom] also asserts that he did not receive
various filings because [the Smiths’] counsel served them to [Soderstrom]’s address of
record, rather than to a new address he had provided to [the Smiths’] counsel in early
2020. [The Smiths’] counsel denies that [Soderstrom] provided any such information in
early 2020 or thereafter. But in any event, until [Soderstrom] filed a Notice of Change of
Address on 11/15/21 . . . , service to his prior address of record was required. [Citation.]
[Soderstrom] also asserts that no Statement of Damages was timely served. But [the
Smiths] have shown that Statements of Damages were timely served on 4/8/21 to
[Soderstrom]’s then-address of record.”
              The court further explained: “However, [Soderstrom] has also asserted
that, based on a call he claims to have had with [the Smiths’] counsel in February 2020,
he had believed that [the Smiths] did not intend to pursue the case further, and [he] would
be contacted if that changed. . . . [The Smiths’] counsel unequivocally denies that any
such discussion occurred. . . . And [Soderstrom’s] own declaration seems inconsistent
with this claim, as he also asserts that he ‘received no communications, documents or
correspondence’ from [the Smiths] or their counsel ‘since late 2019.’ . . . But even if
[Soderstrom] just misunderstood a prior communication with [the Smiths’] counsel, ‘any
doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from

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default.’ [Citation.] The remedial relief offered by C.C.P. § 473 is ‘highly favored and is
liberally applied.’ [Citation.] Relief from default will therefore be granted here. [¶]
[Soderstrom] shall file and serve his Answer, which Answer shall be in substantially the
same form as that which he submitted with the Motion . . . within 5 court days.”
              Anthony appealed from the order vacating the default and the default
                              2
judgment against Soderstrom. (See County of Stanislaus v. Johnson (1996) 43
Cal.App.4th 832, 834 [an order vacating a default and default judgment pursuant to
section 473 is appealable as an order after final judgment].)

                                      DISCUSSION
                                             I.
              SECTION 473(b) AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
              Section 473(b) provides in relevant part: “The court may, upon any terms
as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be
accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein,
otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable
time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding
was taken. . . . No affidavit or declaration of merits shall be required of the moving
party.”
              We review an order granting relief under section 473(b) for an abuse of
discretion. (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 (Shamblin).) The abuse of
discretion standard of review “requires we defer to factual determinations made by the
trial court when the evidence is in conflict, whether the evidence consists of oral
2
  Tara Smith is not included on the notice of appeal and has not made an appearance in
this appeal.

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testimony or declarations.” (Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2014) 223
Cal.App.4th 1434, 1440–1441, citing Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 479.)
              “Because the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any doubts in
applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.’”
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.) “‘Therefore, a trial court order
denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits.’”
(Ibid.)
              The California Supreme Court explained: “It is the policy of the law to
favor, whenever possible, a hearing on the merits. Appellate courts are much more
disposed to affirm an order when the result is to compel a trial on the merits than when
the default judgment is allowed to stand. [Citation.] Therefore, when a party in default
moves promptly to seek relief, very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court’s
order setting aside a default.” (Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 478.)
                                             II.
          THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY GRANTING THE
                               MOTION TO VACATE
              Here, Soderstrom filed his motion to vacate the default and default
judgment within a reasonable time under section 473(b)—less than six weeks after the
default judgment was entered against him. As also required by section 473(b),
Soderstrom’s motion included a copy of his proposed answer.
              The issue presented therefore is limited to whether the trial court abused its
discretion by relieving Soderstrom from the default and default judgment taken against
him through his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” (§ 473(b).)
Here, the trial court granted the motion based on evidence Soderstrom “misunderstood a
prior communication with [the Smiths’] counsel” regarding whether the lawsuit was
going to move forward.

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              Soderstrom’s and Rodriguez’s declarations filed in support of the motion
stated, in February 2020, Elford told Soderstrom he was probably going to dismiss the
lawsuit and would call Soderstrom if instead he decided to move forward with it.
Soderstrom gave Elford his new mailing and e-mail addresses. In his declaration, filed in
opposition to the motion, Elford categorically denied he made such statements.
              Anthony contends the trial court’s order granting the motion constitutes an
abuse of discretion because the court believed Soderstrom, who Anthony characterizes as
“an evident liar and proven scam artist,” over the sworn declaration of Elford, an officer
of the court. But the trial court did not necessarily believe Soderstrom’s account over
Elford’s. (As explained in its minute order, the court rejected many of the grounds
Soderstrom asserted in the motion.) The court did not need to decide whether Elford
made the representations Soderstrom asserted he made because the court found the
evidence showed, at a minimum, Soderstrom mistakenly believed the lawsuit would be
dismissed unless Elford told him otherwise. We are bound by the trial court’s credibility
determinations. (See McPherson v. EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 243, 257 [“Testimony believed by the trial court ‘may be rejected only when
it is inherently improbable or incredible i.e., “‘unbelievable per se,’” physically
impossible or “‘wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds’”’”].) Nothing shows
Soderstrom having such a mistaken belief is unbelievable per se, physically impossible,
or wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.
              In his opening brief, Anthony argues Soderstrom’s evidence Elford told
him he would likely dismiss the case “belies logic” because Soderstrom asserted that
conversation occurred right after the Smiths defeated Soderstrom’s demurrer and motion
to quash. While the Smiths’ successful opposition to the demurrer and the motion to
quash might have made it less likely they would have chosen to dismiss their lawsuit at
that time, it does not render the evidence of Soderstrom’s understanding of the February
2020 conversation unbelievable per se. A party might consider dismissing a lawsuit for

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many reasons. Furthermore, the evidence showed Elford and Soderstrom also discussed
possible settlement during that conversation.
              Anthony argues Soderstrom “backtrack[ed] in his Reply and recant[ed] the
February 6, 2020 date in an effort to confuse the court . . . , but the fatal blow to
[Soderstrom]’s lie is his own statement of ‘after the Case Management Conference’” in
his moving papers. (Boldface omitted.) In both his initial moving papers and reply,
Soderstrom argued he spoke with Elford on the telephone on or about February 6, 2020.
In his moving papers, Soderstrom argued the conversation occurred “after the Case
Management Conference.” Soderstrom’s declarations generally state the conversation
occurred in February 2020. The court’s minute order, dated February 6, 2020, in which
the court ruled on the demurrer and the motion to strike, identifies the event type of the
day as “Case Management Conference.” Anthony has failed to show Soderstrom’s
arguments are so inherently contradictory as to be inherently unbelievable.
              Anthony argues the trial court erred “when it concluded there was a ‘doubt’
that . . . must be resolved in [Soderstrom]’s favor.” As discussed ante, under well-
established precedent, “‘any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of
the party seeking relief from default’” (Rappleyea v. Campbell, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 980), and “very slight evidence is required to justify a trial court’s order setting aside a
default” (Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 478).
              Anthony argues Soderstrom was not entitled to relief after he “willfully
absented himself from the proceedings” for 21 months. Anthony’s characterization is
misleading. The record shows in February 2020, the trial court ordered Soderstrom to
file an answer to the complaint within 30 days of service by the Smiths’ counsel of the
notice of rulings on the demurrer and motion to quash. Over 14 months later, in May
2021, the trial court found Soderstrom still had not been served with a notice of those
rulings. Consequently, pursuant to the court’s order, Soderstrom’s obligation to file an
answer had not been triggered during that period of time. The Smiths finally served

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Soderstrom with a notice of those rulings in May 2021. After Soderstrom failed to file an
answer within 30 days of being served with the notice of ruling, the Smiths successfully
sought entry of Soderstrom’s default in July 2021, and default judgment was entered in
early October—about four months, not 21 months, after the deadline passed for
Soderstrom to file an answer.
              Anthony argues the motion should not have been granted because, given
Soderstrom’s litigation experience, Soderstrom could have referenced the register of
actions to confirm whether the lawsuit had been dismissed. The trial court granted the
motion, however, on the ground of mistake, not excusable neglect. The record does not
show Soderstrom learned of his mistaken assumption until after default judgment had
been entered against him. Arguably, the Smiths’ lengthy delay in serving notice of the
court’s rulings supported Soderstrom’s mistaken but reasonable belief the Smiths had
abandoned their claims against him.
              McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, which Anthony cites in his
opening brief, is inapposite. In that case, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion for
relief from default judgment under section 473(b) after finding the defendants were not
credible and had knowingly failed to file a response to the complaint. (McClain v.
Kissler, supra, at p. 410.) Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations,
the appellate court concluded the trial court had not abused its discretion and affirmed the
order denying the motion to vacate. (Id. at pp. 404, 415.)
                                             III.
   THE SECOND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS AND PRIORITY MAIL TRACKING IS DENIED
              Anthony filed in this court a request for sanctions against Soderstrom and
an order requiring Soderstrom to utilize priority mail with tracking on the ground
Soderstrom failed to serve him with his request for an extension to file the respondent’s
brief. This court denied the request in its entirety because Soderstrom filed a proof of

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service showing, on October 24, 2022, Carlos Rodriguez served Anthony by mail with a
copy of the extension application.
              Anthony thereafter filed in this court a second request for sanctions against
Soderstrom and an order “directing [Soderstrom] to provide any and all filings by
[Soderstrom] to [Anthony] via Priority Mail with tracking.” In his request, Anthony
argues Soderstrom failed to serve him with a copy of his second request for an extension
to file the respondent’s brief (which this court granted) and a copy of the filed
respondent’s brief itself. As to the second request for an extension to file the
respondent’s brief, like the first request for an extension, Soderstrom filed a proof of
service showing Rodriguez mailed a copy of the second extension application to Anthony
on January 31, 2023.
              As to the respondent’s brief, Soderstrom attempted to file a respondent’s
brief, but it was rejected for filing. Anthony’s second request for sanctions and a priority
mail order, therefore, is denied.

                                       DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed. Because respondent did not file an
appellate brief no party shall recover costs.

                                                     MOTOIKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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