Court Opinion

ID: 9364298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 21:00:40.960629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:37.307444
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0035n.06

                                        Case No. 22-3045

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                           Jan 18, 2023
                                                      )
OSWALDO CHAVEZ-ACOSTA                                                  DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                      )
       Petitioner,                                    )
                                                      )        ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
v.                                                    )        FROM THE UNITED STATES
                                                      )        BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,                 )        APPEALS
       Respondent.                                    )
                                                      )                            OPINION
                                                      )

Before: COLE, NALBANDIAN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

       COLE, Circuit Judge. Oswaldo Chavez-Acosta seeks review of a final order from the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his combined motion to reopen and reconsider

his removal proceedings. Chavez-Acosta argues that his case should be reopened and remanded

to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for a competency hearing; and that his case should be reconsidered

because the IJ relied on two now-vacated decisions. Because the BIA and IJ did not abuse their

discretion in analyzing Chavez-Acosta’s credibility, and any potential reliance on vacated caselaw

is harmless error, we deny the petition for review.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

       Chavez-Acosta is a native and citizen of Mexico. He entered the United States on October

4, 2001. After living in the United States for over a decade without once leaving the country, the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Chavez-Acosta with a notice to appear on

October 16, 2012. DHS charged him as a noncitizen present in the United States without having
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

been admitted or paroled, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). He was arrested and released

on bond on the same day.

       Chavez-Acosta appeared before the IJ with counsel on June 19, 2013, at which point he

conceded his removability and also submitted his I-589 application for withholding of removal

and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The IJ held a merits hearing on

Chavez-Acosta’s claims for relief on February 25, 2020. Chavez-Acosta was represented by

counsel at the hearing, which took place with a translator as Spanish is Chavez-Acosta’s preferred

language.

A. Background

       The main facts for Chavez-Acosta’s application come from his I-589 form and his

testimony at his merits hearing, as he was the sole individual who testified at the hearing. He

began by testifying about his military service in Mexico, because his claims for relief rely on his

military service. Chavez-Acosta testified that he served in the Mexican military from when he

was 17 years old until he was 19 years old. During this time, he was a soldier without any specific

title or position, and when asked by his counsel if he received weapons training, he responded in

the affirmative. Chavez-Acosta testified that while in the military, the cartel—name unknown to

Chavez-Acosta—threatened him twice. Both times, four people tried to recruit him to the cartel

to assist with distributing drugs and killing people and threatened to kill him if he refused. Chavez-

Acosta said he did not report these threats to anyone in the military because there were many cartel

members in the military, nor to the police because the police work for the cartel. And he testified

that he knew others in the military who were similarly threatened, and that as of the merits hearing,

these individuals were dead. Two or three months after the second threat, Chavez-Acosta said he

                                                -2-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

left the military. After that, he was threatened once more by a different person who may have been

in another cartel, and then he entered the United States.

       Chavez-Acosta stated that since arriving in the United States, he has not been threatened

by any Mexican cartel. But he testified that his mother, who lives in Mexico, has been threatened

by cartel members, who told her to turn in Chavez-Acosta and that they would kill Chavez-Acosta

unless he returns and joins the cartel. His mother submitted a statement to the court, but did not

include any reference to threats she had received. Lastly, Chavez-Acosta testified that he was

scared that the cartel would target him again if he returned to Mexico, because his hometown is

small and because even if he were to live elsewhere in Mexico, “at the end they’re going to know

[he is] there.” (A.R. 184.) He has several brothers and sisters who currently live in Mexico, and

none have received any threats or been harmed. The government only asked Chavez-Acosta one

question, whether he had ever been physically harmed in Mexico, to which he responded that he

had not.

       The testimony above is at times in conflict with Chavez-Acosta’s written application form.

There, Chavez-Acosta wrote that the “Zetas gang” had been targeting individuals with “military

skills” for recruitment efforts, and that he had received two calls from them in 2011, after he came

to the United States, threatening that they would kill his family if he did not join the Zetas gang.

(A.R. 265.) He was consistent that his mother has been threatened by the gang while he has been

in the United States, and he further elaborated that he knows of two other military members from

his town who “disappeared” after refusing to join the Zetas. (Id.) He was also more specific about

his military service, writing that he was in the military from November 2000 until November 2001,

when he entered the United States. In the application, he more explicitly makes the point that he

believes he is being targeted by the Zetas for his military skills.

                                                 -3-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

B. Immigration Proceedings

       On the same date as the merits hearing, the IJ ruled on Chavez-Acosta’s application,

denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under CAT and granting him

voluntary departure upon payment of his bond. In so holding, the IJ first found that Chavez-Acosta

was not credible for four reasons: (1) his testimony was “vague and undetailed”; (2) his testimony

differed from his written application answers; (3) he did not provide “meaningful corroboration”

of either his military service or the threats; and (4) “the court finds the respondent’s testimony

implausible.” (A.R. 130–31.)

       Alternatively, the IJ held that even if it had found Chavez-Acosta credible, he would still

not be entitled to relief on either ground as he was unable to satisfy the requirements for his

applications. As to the withholding of removal application, the IJ identified his particular social

group (“PSG”) as “former military members who are recruited by gangs.” (A.R. 131.) The IJ held

that Chavez-Acosta was not entitled to withholding of removal based on this PSG because of the

lack of corroboration of Chavez-Acosta’s military service and because Chavez-Acosta had not

presented evidence to show that gangs recruited individuals from the military differently from how

gangs recruit other individuals. So, the IJ concluded, “the gang recruitment decisions of the Sixth

Circuit directly apply to this case and foreclose the relief.” (Id.) Additionally, the IJ found that

Chavez-Acosta had not submitted enough evidence to support the conclusion that he would face

harm if he returned to Mexico, which he was required to do because he had not shown past

persecution. As to protection under CAT, the IJ held that Chavez-Acosta was not entitled to relief

because he had not provided sufficient evidence to establish past harm nor that the Mexican

government—or the gangs, with the government’s consent—would torture him upon his return.

                                               -4-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

       Chavez-Acosta timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA dismissed the

appeal, finding that the adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous and affirming

the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal and protection under CAT for the reasons the IJ set forth.

       Chavez-Acosta did not appeal the BIA’s initial decision, but subsequently filed a timely

motion to reopen and reconsider with the BIA. Chavez-Acosta argued that the IJ’s adverse

credibility finding was improper because of incompetency caused by past head trauma affecting

his memory, the trauma of a knife attack by an ex-girlfriend, and his father’s recent passing—all

of which the IJ was unaware of at the time of its decision. To correct this flaw, Chavez-Acosta

asked for remand so the IJ could reassess Chavez-Acosta’s credibility in light of his mental state

and determine whether Chavez-Acosta required additional safeguards throughout the proceedings.

He also argued that the revocation of Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (“Matter of

A-B- I”), and Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019) (“Matter of L-E-A- II”), in their

entirety necessitated reconsideration of his claims, because the IJ had relied on the now revoked

caselaw in denying his withholding of removal claim.

       The BIA denied the motion to reopen and reconsider. Regarding Chavez-Acosta’s claim

on the adverse credibility finding, the BIA held that he had not submitted sufficient evidence to

show he was not competent to participate in the proceedings. The BIA then denied reconsideration

of the withholding of removal application because Chavez-Acosta had not proffered the necessary

evidence to meet all the requirements of the statute—regardless of his competency and the

revocation of Matter of A-B- I and Matter of L-E-A- II—and that the IJ and the BIA had not relied

on the revoked cases in making their decision. Chavez-Acosta timely filed a petition for review

to appeal the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen and reconsider.

                                               -5-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

                                           II. ANALYSIS

       We review denials of motions to reopen and motions to reconsider for abuse of discretion.

Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 2007). An abuse of discretion has occurred when

the “the BIA’s decision ‘was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against

a particular race or group.’” Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 960–61 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alizoti,

477 F.3d at 453).     Chavez-Acosta bears a “heavy burden” because the BIA holds “broad

discretion” when considering motions to reopen or reconsider. Alizoti, 477 F.3d at 451 (citing

I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)).

       Chavez-Acosta applied for both withholding of removal and protection under CAT. To

obtain withholding of removal, a noncitizen must show that their “life or freedom would be

threatened” in the country to which they are facing removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). The

noncitizen retains the burden of proving that his life or freedom would be endangered “on account

of” the alleged PSG. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b). Such endangerment can be shown by past persecution

or future threats to their life or safety. Id. § 208.16(b)(1)–(2). As to future threats, the individual

must provide evidence showing that they “would be singled out individually for such persecution,”

unless they are able to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of similarly situated

individuals. Id. § 208.16(b)(2)(i). If the IJ finds that the noncitizen can avoid the future threat by

relocating within the proposed country of removal, the noncitizen is ineligible for relief. Id.

§ 208.16(b)(2). And where the persecutor is not the government, the noncitizen bears “the burden

of establishing that it would not be reasonable for him or her to relocate[.]” Id. § 208.16(b)(3)(i).

To obtain protection under CAT, the noncitizen must show “it is more likely than not that

                                                 -6-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

he . . . would be tortured if removed.” Marouf v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 174, 179 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Shkulaku-Purballori v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2007)).

A. Competency

       Chavez-Acosta argues against the IJ’s adverse credibility finding on the basis of mental

incompetency, and claims that remand to the IJ is necessary for a competency hearing to assess

the level of safeguards needed to ensure due process throughout the immigration proceedings.

Particularly, within the asylum context, the BIA has signaled that the IJ “should, as a safeguard,

generally accept [the noncitizen’s] fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the applicant’s

perception of events” if there are competency issues affecting the reliability of the noncitizen’s

testimony. Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 609, 609–10 (BIA 2015).

       Noncitizens are entitled to due process under the Constitution in removal proceedings.

Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). That includes the right to a full and fair hearing. See

Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982). There is a presumption of competency in

immigration proceedings. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011). “Absent

indicia of mental incompetency, an Immigration Judge is under no obligation to analyze [a

noncitizen’s] competency.” Id. No statute or regulation provides the process through which an IJ

should assess the competency of a noncitizen, and so the BIA’s decision in Matter of M-A-M- sets

out the governing framework. Id. at 478.

       “[T]he test for determining whether [a noncitizen] is competent to participate in

immigration proceedings is whether he or she has a rational and factual understanding of the nature

and object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and

has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.” Id.

at 479. Indicia of incompetency “include a wide variety of observations,” such as “the inability to

                                               -7-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

understand and respond to questions, the inability to stay on topic, or a high level of distraction.”

Id. The record might reveal such indicia, including in “medical reports[,] . . . testimony from

medical health professionals,” and records from “other relevant sources, such as school

records . . . and affidavits or testimony from friends or family members” Id. at 479–80.

       Chavez-Acosta argues that the record reveals indicia of his incompetency—that his

testimony was “scattered and problematic”—which warrants a competency hearing. He raises

several points, with the most salient being that, after testifying he entered the United States in

2001, he insisted he was in the Mexican military from 2017 until 2019.                 Immediately

acknowledging the implausibility of this answer, the IJ asked Chavez-Acosta’s attorney to “try

that again” to get at the right answer, which is that he served from age 17 to 19. Chavez-Acosta

also cites generally to how he “struggled to remember details from his time in Mexico and at times

appeared not to understand the questions asked of him.” (Petitioner Br. 17.) He claims his

incompetence is due to his “trouble focusing” because of his father’s passing a week before the

hearing, memory loss from the physical and emotional trauma of a knife attack initiated by his ex-

girlfriend, and multiple head traumas. As corroborating evidence, Chavez-Acosta submitted his

father’s death certificate and a medical receipt from hospitalization due to one of his childhood

head traumas.

       The BIA denied the motion to reopen and remand the case for a competency hearing,

finding that Chavez-Acosta had “not submitted persuasive medical evidence or other

documentation indicating” his lack of competency to participate in the proceedings. (A.R. 4.) The

BIA further noted that Chavez-Acosta was represented by counsel during the hearing, who did not

raise concerns about Chavez-Acosta’s competency to the IJ or the BIA on direct appeal. In

addition to a lack of corroborating evidence, the BIA cited to an out of circuit case holding that

                                                -8-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

“[c]omplaints of poor memory, without evidence of an inability to understand the nature and object

of the proceedings, are insufficient to show mental incompetency.” (A.R. 4 (citing Salgado v.

Sessions, 889 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2018)).)

       Considering the transcript and the exhibits attached in the motion to reopen, the BIA found

no indicia that Chavez-Acosta was unable to understand the proceedings. This decision is properly

within the bounds of the BIA’s broad discretion: it was made with “a rational explanation,” it does

not “inexplicably depart[] from established policies,” and it does not “rest[] on an impermissible

basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Dieng, 947 F.3d at 960–

61 (quoting Alizoti, 477 F.3d at 453). As such, the BIA did not abuse its discretion, and we do not

disturb this holding.

       Chavez-Acosta argues that a recent Attorney General decision regarding the IJ’s

consideration of mental health in removal proceedings compels a different result. (Petitioner Br.

18–19 (citing Matter of B-Z-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 563 (A.G. 2022)).) But, as Chavez-Acosta

concedes, the context of that case—related to whether noncitizens with criminal convictions for

serious crimes constitute dangers to the community—is inapplicable to the instant case, where

Chavez-Acosta has never been convicted of a crime. See Matter of B-Z-R-, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 563,

565. This therefore does not alter our conclusion that the BIA did not abuse its discretion.

       It is worth noting that both the IJ and the BIA explicitly found that even if they presumed

Chavez-Acosta was credible, they still would have held that he did not properly demonstrate his

eligibility for withholding of removal or protection under CAT. See supra Part I.B. Chavez-

Acosta does not present new evidence regarding the eligibility requirements of protection, such as

why he would face harm even if he were to move to a different part of Mexico. So even if a

                                                 -9-
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

competency hearing theoretically led to a positive credibility determination, Chavez-Acosta still

would not be granted withholding of removal or protection under CAT.

       Ultimately, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chavez-Acosta’s motion to

reopen for a competency hearing, and we deny the petition for review on this ground.

B. Change in Law

       Chavez-Acosta also argues that a change in law regarding the PSG analysis requires

reconsideration of his case. In Matter of A-B- I, then-Attorney General Barr reversed BIA

precedent in holding that “[g]enerally, claims by [noncitizens] pertaining to . . . gang violence

perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. In

Matter of L-E-A- II, then-Attorney General Barr further elaborated upon the particularity

requirement of the PSG analysis and described how “[t]he fact that a criminal group—such as a

drug cartel, gang, or guerrilla force—targets a group of people does not, standing alone, transform

those people into a particular social group.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 582. Both decisions were vacated

by now-Attorney General Garland after the BIA’s decision but before Chavez-Acosta’s motion to

reconsider. Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307, 307 (A.G. 2021); Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I. & N.

Dec. 304, 304 (A.G. 2021).

       A motion to reconsider is used for “the correction of legal or factual errors that occurred in

the BIA’s original decision.” Mu Ju Li v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 8

U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)). One such legal error includes “a change of law.” Yeremin v. Holder,

738 F.3d 708, 718 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sunarto v. Mukasey, 306 F. App’x 957, 960 (6th Cir.

2019)); see Maraziegos-Morales v. Garland, Nos. 20-3777/4171, 2021 WL 3140322, at *5 (6th

Cir. July 26, 2021).

                                               - 10 -
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

        Accordingly, Chavez-Acosta contends that the IJ and BIA based their denial of his

withholding of removal application on the now-vacated caselaw, so reconsideration is warranted

post-vacatur, while the government argues that neither the IJ nor BIA relied on these cases. But

we need not parse the language of the administrative record to answer the complicated question of

whether or not the IJ and BIA relied on Matter of A-B- I and Matter of L-E-A- II in the original

rulings, because neither denied Chavez-Acosta’s withholding of removal application solely on

PSG grounds.

       Distinct from the PSG analysis, the IJ and BIA held that Chavez-Acosta did not provide

sufficient evidence to meet the other requirements of withholding of removal, including failure to

show that he was likelier than not to face harm upon his return to Mexico and that moving to

another area in Mexico would not save him from such future harm, and that he had not provided

sufficient corroboration of the past threats and his military service. Chavez-Acosta does not

provide contrary evidence today nor did he appeal that initial BIA decision. As the IJ and BIA did

not err in making those determinations, any potential reliance on the vacated PSG analysis caselaw

would at most amount to harmless error. See Japarkulova v. Holder, 615 F.3d 696, 701 (6th Cir.

2010) (“But even when the agency’s reasoning was inadequate, its decision may be upheld on the

basis of harmless error if the petitioner’s prospects are otherwise so weak that there is no ‘reason

to believe that . . . remand might lead to a different result.’” (quoting Shkabari v. Gonzales, 427

F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2005))). We thus deny the petition for review on the change-in-law

argument.

       Last, the caselaw discussed above refers solely to claims for asylum and withholding of

removal: it relates to PSGs, a requirement of eligibility for these forms of relief. As such, beyond

Chavez-Acosta’s general competency argument, he does not level additional arguments against

                                               - 11 -
Case No. 22-3045, Chavez-Acosta v. Garland

the BIA’s and IJ’s denial of his claim for protection under CAT, and so we uphold that denial, as

well.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we deny Chavez-Acosta’s petition for review.

                                             - 12 -