Court Opinion

ID: 9387971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 15:08:04.733425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:16.548481
License: Public Domain

[J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                   MIDDLE DISTRICT

    THE MARCELLUS SHALE COALITION,               :   No. 69 MAP 2021
                                                 :
                       Appellee                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                 :   Commonwealth Court at No. 573
                                                 :   MD 2016 dated August 12, 2021.
                v.                               :
                                                 :   ARGUED: September 15, 2022
                                                 :
    DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL                  :
    PROTECTION OF THE                            :
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :
    AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY BOARD              :
    OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF                       :
    PENNSYLVANIA,                                :
                                                 :
                       Appellants                :

                                    DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY                                                 DECIDED: April 19, 2023
         Pursuant to the Oil and Gas Act of 2012, 1 known as Act 13, the Department of

Environmental Protection (the “Department”) and the Environmental Quality Board (the

“Board”) (collectively, the “Agencies”) promulgated rules regulating the development of

unconventional oil and gas wells. See 25 Pa. Code §§ 78a.1-78a.314. The Marcellus

Shale Coalition (“MSC”) filed a complaint with the Commonwealth Court, in its original

jurisdiction, challenging, inter alia, the validity of Section 79a.15(f) and (g) along with

certain definitions in Section 78a.1. MSC asserted the Agencies exceeded their statutory

authority in promulgating those specific regulations and, by doing so, created an entirely

new pre-permitting process without statutory authority. After MSC filed an Application for

1   Act of Feb. 14, 2012, P.L. 87, No. 13 (as amended 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2301-3505).
Summary Relief, the Commonwealth Court performed a statutory construction analysis

of Act 13 and the regulations at issue and determined that, while the Agencies had

statutory authority to promulgate regulations to implement Act 13, they lacked statutory

authority to promulgate the challenged regulations and that those regulations were void

and unenforceable. The Lead Opinion finds the lower court erred in its determination and

holds the Agencies were within their authority in promulgating the challenged regulations

and that those regulations are reasonable.         I respectfully disagree.     I find the

Commonwealth Court correctly determined the Agencies exceeded their authority in

promulgating the challenged regulations. In addition, I find that the requirements related

to “species of special concern” identified on a PNDI 2 receipt violate the Documents Law

and are, therefore, void and unenforceable outside of any questions of statutory authority.

As such, I dissent.
                                   Statutory Authority
         I agree with the Lead Opinion that the Agencies clearly have authority to

promulgate regulations pursuant to Act 13. See 58 Pa.C.S. § 3274 (“The Environmental

Quality Board shall promulgate regulations to implement this chapter.”). The role of the

Court in this case is not to determine whether the General Assembly gave the Agencies

authority to promulgate regulations to implement Act 13 generally, but rather to determine

if the Agencies had the authority to promulgate the specific regulations challenged by

MSC. In answering that question, the Lead Opinion apparently relies on the broad grant

of rulemaking authority in Section 3274 to determine that the Agencies had such authority

as long as the General Assembly has not specifically and explicitly restricted them from

promulgating a specific rule. See Lead Opinion at 26 (“In the absence of other statutory

language, the broad grant within Section 3274 may serve as the enabling statute,

2   See Footnote 4, infra.

                             [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
arguably lessening the need to closely scrutinize what effect Section 3215 has within the

broader legislative scheme.”); id. at 27 (“The consequent question is whether Section

3215 operates as any limitation on the Agencies’ powers to add ‘public resources’ other

than those specified in subsection (c)”); id. at 28 (“That neither Section 3215 nor any other

statutory provision explicitly binds the Agencies to a ‘floor’ invariably means that the

Agencies were permitted to go farther.”). In my view, however, the Lead Opinion has the

question backwards. The Court must not ask if anything in an enabling statute restricts

an agency from promulgating certain regulations, but rather if anything in the enabling

statute permits an agency to promulgate the challenged regulations.

       “Commonwealth agencies have no inherent power to make law or otherwise bind

the public or regulated entities. Rather, an administrative agency may do so only in the

fashion authorized by the General assembly[.]” Nw. Youth Servs. v. Commonwealth,

Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 66 A.3d 301, 210 (Pa. 2013). Reliance on general rule making

authority would provide an agency with almost unlimited and unrestricted authority to

promulgate rules even remotely related to the purpose of the statute. In the Lead

Opinion’s view this vast authority can only be restricted if the General Assembly explicitly

bars an agency from promulgating a specific rule. This proposition runs counter to the

idea that the General Assembly’s “delegation of [] rulemaking power [] must be ‘clear and

unmistakable’ as a ‘doubtful power does not exist.’” Eagle Environmental II, L.P. v.

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Environmental Protection, 884 A.2d 867, 878 (Pa. 2005)

(quoting Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission. 422 A.2d 487, 490 (Pa.

1980)). An agency only has authority to promulgate rules that the General Assembly

specifically gives them the authority to promulgate, and general rulemaking authority does

not grant an agency authority to promulgate any rule that is remotely related to an

                            [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3
enabling statute unless the statute explicitly bars a specific rule. Authority beyond general

rulemaking authority must be present.

       The Lead Opinion states that this Commonwealth follows the approach set out by

the United States Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.

837 (1984), “which asks at the outset whether the General Assembly ‘has directly spoken

to the precise question at issue. If the intent…is clear, that is the end of the matter, for

the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent[.]’” Lead Opinion at 25 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.). Outside of the

general rulemaking authority in Section 3274, however, the Lead Opinion only cites one

section of Act 13 in support of the Agencies’ authority to promulgate any of the challenged

regulations, Section 3215(e) for the Agencies’ authority to define “public resources.” Id.

at 26 (citing 58 Pa.C.S. § 3215(e)). Section 3215(e) states:

       (e) Regulation criteria. – The Environmental Quality Board shall
       develop by regulation criteria:

              (1) For the department to utilize for conditioning a well
                  permit based on its impact to the public resources
                  identified under subsection (c) and for ensuring
                  optimal development of oil and gas resources and
                  respecting property rights of oil and gas owners.

              (2) For appeal to the Environmental Hearing Board of
                  a permit containing conditions imposed by the
                  department. The regulations shall also provide that
                  the department has the burden of proving that the
                  conditions were necessary to protect against a
                  probable harmful impact of the public resources.

58 Pa.C.S. § 3215(e). According to the Lead Opinion, the presence of Section 3215(e)

“requires the Agencies to develop specific regulatory criteria concerning ‘the public

resources identified under subsection (c)[.]’” Lead Opinion at 27 (quoting 58 Pa.C.S. §

                            [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 4
3215(e)).   By its clear language, however, Section 3215 does not grant the Board

authority to define “public resources” as it is used in Section 3215(c) or to add additional

resources to those listed. 3 The Lead Opinion does not cite any authority beyond the

general rulemaking authority that authorizes the Agencies to promulgate the other

challenged regulations. As Act 13 does not specifically and explicitly authorize the

Agencies to promulgate the challenged regulations, it cannot be said, in my view, that the

General Assembly has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467

U.S. at 842-43.

        In light of the lack of explicit authorization, the question remains whether the

General Assembly, through anything in Act 13, authorized the Agencies to promulgate

the challenged regulations.     In answering this question, the Commonwealth Court

conducted a thorough statutory construction analysis, including the application of the

doctrine of ejusdem generis, 4 and determined that Act 13 did not authorize the Agencies

to promulgate any of the challenged regulations. Marcellus Shale Coalition v. Department

of Environmental Protection, 193 A.3d 447, 469-85 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“MSC”).

Specifically, the lower court determined that “[b]y defining ‘other critical communities’ to

include ‘species of special concern,’” the Agencies “expand[ed] on the list of public

resources identified in Section 3215(c)” and did not track the statute. Id. at 476. As to

“common areas of a school’s property” and “playground,” the panel determined they “do

3 The Lead Opinion appears to recognize Section 3215(e) does not provide the Agencies
any express authority to add additional resources as it states “[t]he consequent question
is whether Section 3215 operates as any limitation on the Agencies’ powers to add ‘public
resources’ other than those specified in subsection(c).” LeadOpinion at 27.
4 Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind or class”) “where specific
terms setting forth enumeration of particular classes of persons or things following general
terms, the general words will be construed as applicable only to person or things of the
same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Department of Environmental
Protection v. Cumberland Coal Resources, LP, 102 A.3d 962, 976 (Pa. 2014).

                            [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5
not share the same attributes as the other public resources identified in the statute” and

their inclusion in the regulatory definition of public resources was void and unenforceable.

Id. at 481-82. Based on that holding, the Commonwealth Court determined that the

regulations definition of “public resources agency,” to the extent it includes owners of such

recreational areas, fails by extension. Id. at 485. I concur with the Commonwealth Court’s

analysis, including its employment of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the Lead

Opinion rejects, see Lead Opinion at 33-37, and therefore would adopt the

Commonwealth Court’s conclusions invalidating the challenged regulations.

                                Use of the PNDI Receipt 5

        In addition to finding the Agencies lacked statutory authority to promulgate all of

the challenged regulations, the Commonwealth Court also determined that the

“requirements related to ‘species of special concern’ identified on a PNDI receipt violate[d]

the Documents Law because they create a binding norm through a changing PNDI

database that is not populated through notice and comment procedures.” Id. at 477. The

Lead Opinion disagrees and holds that the lower court erred by concluding the regulatory

definition of “other critical communities” violates the Documents Law. Lead Opinion at

45.

         The regulations define “other critical communities” as

5 PNDI stands for the Pennsylvania Natural Diversity Inventory and is defined by the
regulations as “[t]he Pennsylvania Natural Heritage Program’s database containing data
identifying and describing this Commonwealth’s ecological information, including plant
and animal species classified as threatened and endangered as well as other critical
communities provided by the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, the
Fish and Boat Commission, the Game Commission and the United States Fish and
Wildlife Services. The database informs the online environmental tool. The database
contains only those known occurrences of threatened and endangered species and other
critical communities, and is a component of the Pennsylvania Conservation Explorer.” 25
Pa.Code § 75a.1. The Code defines a PNDI receipt as “[t]he results generated by the
[PNDI] Review Tool containing information regarding threatened and endangered species
and other critical communities.” Id.

                            [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 6
              Other Critical Communities –

                     (i) Species of special concern identified on a PNDI
                     receipt including plant or animal species:

                            (A) In a proposed status categorized as
                            proposed endangered, proposed threatened,
                            proposed rare or candidate

                            (B) That are classified as rare or tentatively
                            undetermined

                     (ii) The term does not include threatened and
                     endangered species.
25 Pa. Code § 78a.1. The Documents Law requires an agency to give “public notice of

its intention to promulgate, amend or repeal any administrative regulations” and must

review and consider any comments submitted.          45 P.S. § 1201; 1202.       The PNDI

database contains resources that have not gone through this notice and comment

process. Commonwealth Court Preliminary Injunction Hearing, 10/25/16, N.T. at 153. As

the Commonwealth Court explained, “[t]he provisions tied to the PNDI receipt effectively

allow third parties to make changes to the regulation without meeting the requirement of

formal rulemaking. Indeed, species of special concern are placed in the PNDI database

and designated as such by the jurisdictional agencies, that is, the agencies with ‘statutory

authority to protect those species,’ including DCNR, the Game Commission, the Fish and

Boat Commission, and the Pennsylvania field office of the United States Fish and Wildlife

Service.” MSC, 93 A.3d at 473 (citing N.T. at 153-54).

        The Agencies argue the Commonwealth Court erred because, while the outcome

of the PNDI receipt is unique to each individual site, utilization of the PNDI process to

identify public resources is a requirement that was established through valid legislative

rulemaking.   Appellant’s Brief at 45.    They further argue the Commonwealth Court

confused the changing outcomes of the PNDI receipt with the process of utilizing the

PNDI database. Id. at 46. For its part, the Lead Opinion observes that the Department

                            [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 7
of Conservation and Natural Resources ("DCNR") is statutorily required to maintain an

ecological survey of this Commonwealth, which DCNR accomplishes by, inter alia,

maintaining      the   PNDI   database.    Lead   Opinion    at   43-44   (citing   71   P.S.

§ 1340.305(a)(10)). The Lead Opinion further argues that the Agencies gave public

notice of the inclusion of the use of the PNDI receipt in the definition of “other critical

communities” and did not change the manner in which the process works. Id. at 45. In

the Lead Opinion’s view it is the fact that “the basis for the statutorily mandated database

does not” change that is determinative in holding the employment of the PNDI receipt

does not violate the Documents Law, even though it recognizes that the results may vary

over time. Id.

        The Agencies’ argument stems from a misunderstanding of why the

Commonwealth Court found utilization of the PNDI receipt violated the Documents Law.

The PNDI process itself is not what evades formal rulemaking. Rather, it is the inclusion

in the database of resources that have not gone through formal notice and comment

rulemaking. The inclusion of these resources within the Agencies’ definition of “other

critical communities” violates the Documents Law.        The Lead Opinion’s position is

similarly flawed. Contrary to the Lead Opinion’s position, DCNR’s statutory obligations

are irrelevant to the Agencies’ requirement to comply with the Documents Law. The

inclusion of the PNDI database itself is not the issue. It is the fact that, as the Lead

Opinion observes, the results of the PNDI receipt may vary over time without going

through the formal rulemaking process that causes the regulation to violate the

Documents Law. It permits third parties to add to the regulations without going through

the proper rulemaking process. Therefore, even if the Agencies had the statutory authority

to define “critical communities” as they did, the employment of the PNDI receipt results in

the definition render the regulation void and unenforceable.

                              [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 8
      For the above reasons, I would affirm the Commonwealth Court’s grant, in part, of

MSC’s Application for Summary Relief. In my view, the Agencies exceeded their statutory

authority in promulgating the challenged regulations and the employment of the PNDI

receipt violates the Documents Law irrespective of the Agencies’ statutory authority.

Since the Lead Opinion holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

                           [J-55-2022] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 9