Court Opinion

ID: 9891680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:02:50.069513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:08.731538
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1651    Document: 13     Page: 1   Filed: 10/19/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                 GABRIEL DONNELLY,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2023-1651
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:23-cv-00247-EHM, Judge Edward H. Meyers.
                  ______________________

                Decided: October 19, 2023
                 ______________________

    GABRIEL DONNELLY, Wasilla, AK, pro se.

     AUGUSTUS JEFFREY GOLDEN, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

  Before STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1651    Document: 13      Page: 2    Filed: 10/19/2023

 2                                            DONNELLY v. US

 PER CURIAM.
     Gabriel Donnelly appeals the final decision of the
 United States Court of Federal Claims dismissing sua
 sponte his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
 pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims (RCFC). See Donnelly v. United States,
 164 Fed. Cl. 603, 604 (2023). We affirm because the trial
 court correctly concluded that it lacks subject matter juris-
 diction over Mr. Donnelly’s claims.
                        BACKGROUND
     On February 17, 2023, the United States Court of Fed-
 eral Claims received Mr. Donnelly’s pro se complaint.
 J.A. 1 10–13 (Complaint). The Complaint primarily alleges
 that Alaska officials—namely Mr. Donnelly’s public de-
 fender, the district attorney, and the judge—are currently
 violating Mr. Donnelly’s constitutional rights in a state
 criminal matter pending before Alaska’s Third Judicial
 District Court in Palmer, Alaska. See id.
     The Complaint asserts that the Court of Federal
 Claims has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C.
 § 1491), the Treaty of Cession (Russ.–U.S., Mar. 30, 1867,
 15 Stat. 539), Mr. Donnelly’s Fifth Amendment rights set
 forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966),
 the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161), and a “breach of
 contract” under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). J.A. 10.
     The trial court dismissed Mr. Donnelly’s Complaint
 against the United States after it concluded it lacked sub-
 ject matter jurisdiction over criminal matters and actions
 against parties other than the United States. See Don-
 nelly, 164 Fed. Cl. at 604–06. The trial court also ad-
 dressed Mr. Donnelly’s breach of contract claim and found

     1    “J.A.” refers to the appendix that the United States
 filed concurrently with its informal brief.
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 DONNELLY v. US                                              3

 that “Donnelly’s contract allegations are frivolous” since
 “there is not a single allegation that a federal official ever
 communicated with Donnelly or agreed to anything.” Id.
 at 605–06.
     On appeal, Mr. Donnelly argues that the trial court
 erred when dismissing his complaint by failing to consider
 the Tucker Act, the Treaty of Cession, an Alaskan state
 statute, 2 and his Fifth Amendment rights as set forth in
 Miranda. We have jurisdiction to review this final decision
 under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                         DISCUSSION
     We review the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal of a
 complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
 M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d
 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must establish ju-
 risdiction because under Rule 12(h)(3), “[i]f the court deter-
 mines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
 the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3). And
 while we construe pro se filings like Mr. Donnelly’s liber-
 ally, that does not alleviate Mr. Donnelly’s burden to estab-
 lish subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
 evidence. M. Maropakis Carpentry, 609 F.3d at 1327; see
 Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
     The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited juris-
 diction, meaning it can hear only certain types of legal
 claims. And “th[at] jurisdictional reach of the Court of Fed-
 eral Claims is set forth in the Tucker Act.” Rick’s Mush-
 room Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343

     2   In his request for relief Mr. Donnelly cites an Alas-
 kan statute regarding a limited waiver of sovereign im-
 munity by the State of Alaska. See Alaska Stat. Ann.
 § 09.50.250 (West); J.A. 13.
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 4                                            DONNELLY v. US

 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Tucker Act states in relevant part
 that:
     [t]he . . . Court of Federal Claims shall have juris-
     diction to render judgment upon any claim against
     the United States founded either upon the Consti-
     tution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
     an executive department, or upon any express or
     implied contract with the United States, or for liq-
     uidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
     sounding in tort.
 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added). Crucially, the
 Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute; it does not create a
 substantive cause of action. Rick’s Mushroom Serv.,
 521 F.3d at 1343 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S.
 392, 398 (1976)). Therefore, to establish subject matter ju-
 risdiction, a “plaintiff must look beyond the Tucker Act to
 identify a substantive source of law that creates the right
 to recovery of money damages against the United States.”
 Id. (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216
 (1983)). In other words, the Court of Federal Claims has
 jurisdiction where a plaintiff makes a claim for money
 damages based on a “money-mandating source” of substan-
 tive law and makes “a nonfrivolous allegation that it is
 within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under the
 money-mandating source.” Jan’s Helicopter Serv., Inc.
 v. F.A.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
     Mr. Donnelly fails to establish subject matter jurisdic-
 tion under the Tucker Act because (1) the Complaint seeks
 relief from an underlying criminal matter; (2) the Com-
 plaint contains allegations exclusively against parties
 other than the United States; and (3) the Complaint fails
 to plausibly link the allegations to a money-mandating
 source of substantive law to fall within the subject-matter
 jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. We address
 each deficiency in turn.
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 DONNELLY v. US                                                 5

     First, the Court of Federal Claims correctly concluded
 that it has no jurisdiction over criminal matters and there-
 fore must dismiss Mr. Donnelly’s claims related to that
 matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491; Joshua v. United States,
 17 F.3d 378, 379–80 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sanders v. United
 States, 252 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In addition to
 the fact that Mr. Donnelly’s Complaint is generally related
 to his criminal prosecution, Mr. Donnelly specifically re-
 quests that the trial court “[d]ismiss [his] criminal case
 with extreme prejudice.” J.A. 10–13; see Reply Br. 3–5.
 Thus, it is clear Mr. Donnelly seeks review of his underly-
 ing criminal case. However, the Court of Federal Claims
 does not have the authority to review any of the judgments
 of the Alaska state and federal courts with respect to his
 criminal case or grant the relief requested. See Joshua,
 17 F.3d at 379; Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916,
 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential). As such, Mr. Don-
 nelly’s request for relief does not fall within the trial court’s
 jurisdiction.
      Second, we turn to the Complaint’s exclusive identifi-
 cation of state officials responsible for committing alleged
 harms. This is fatal to Mr. Donnelly’s assertion of subject
 matter jurisdiction because the trial court lacks jurisdic-
 tion to hear claims against any party other than the United
 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). “Because the United
 States is the only ‘proper defendant’ at the Court of Federal
 Claims, the trial court ‘lacks jurisdiction over states, state
 officials, and state agencies.’” Sheakley v. United States,
 No. 2023-1115, 2023 WL 5125183, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 2023)
 (nonprecedential) (quoting Lawton v. United States, 621 F.
 App’x 671, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential)). Alt-
 hough Mr. Donnelly’s Complaint names the United States
 as Defendant, the Complaint only sets forth allegations im-
 plicating “Alaska State Troopers” the “3rd Judicial District
 Court,” the “Judge” assigned to Mr. Donnelly’s case, the
 “Palmer District Attorney Office,” and Mr. Donnelly’s
 “Palmer Public Defender”—all officials of Alaska, not the
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 6                                             DONNELLY v. US

 United States. See J.A. 12; Reply Br. 3–5. The Complaint
 does not allege a single fact to support any claim against
 the United States. See J.A. 10–13; see also Reply Br. 1–5.
 Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Mr. Donnelly’s
 Complaint.
     Last, we address the Complaint’s failure to plausibly
 link the allegations to a money-mandating source of sub-
 stantive law within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
 trial court. As an initial matter, the Complaint states
 claims under various amendments of the United States
 Constitution (Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Amend-
 ments), the Treaty of Cession, the Speedy Trial Act, a
 “breach of contract,” and an Alaskan state statute.
 J.A. 10–13. However, only the “breach of contract” allega-
 tion could even conceivably be a claim that might be proper
 before the trial court. 3 See Fisher v. United States,

     3   The cited Constitutional amendments are not
 money-mandating sources of substantive law. See Elkins
 v. United States, 229 Ct. Cl. 607, 608 (1981) (per curiam)
 (“[E]xcept for the taking clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment,
 the other amendments do not require the United States to
 pay money for their alleged violation.”). And Mr. Don-
 nelly’s Complaint neither invokes the Takings Clause of
 the Fifth Amendment nor pleads facts to support a Takings
 Clause claim. J.A. 10–13. Likewise, the “Treaty of Ces-
 sion” does not appear to be a money-mandating source and
 Mr. Donnelly fails to establish jurisdiction by showing how
 the Treaty of Cession is a money-mandating source or indi-
 cating how he is within the class of plaintiffs that could re-
 cover under the act. See id. Additionally, the cited Alaskan
 state statute provides a cause of action against the state of
 Alaska in Alaska state court. See Alaska Stat. Ann.
 § 09.50.250 (West). The Court of Federal Claims, however,
 does not have jurisdiction over state law claims. Souders
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 DONNELLY v. US                                             7

 402 F.3d 1167, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he absence of a
 money-mandating source [is] fatal to the court’s jurisdic-
 tion under the Tucker Act.”). Still, this claim fails because
 Mr. Donnelly does not plead any facts to support such a
 claim. See generally Columbus Reg’l Hosp. v. United
 States, 990 F.3d 1330, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (explaining
 that the Court of Federal Claims may dismiss frivolous al-
 legations of breach of contract with the government). As
 the trial court correctly found, a contract between Mr. Don-
 nelly and the United States does not plausibly exist be-
 cause the Complaint does not contain “a single allegation
 that a federal official ever communicated with Donnelly or
 agreed to anything.” Donnelly, 164 Fed. Cl. at 606. Dis-
 missal of Mr. Donnelly’s Complaint remains proper.
                        CONCLUSION
    We have considered Mr. Donnelly’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. For the reasons above,
 we affirm.
                        AFFIRMED

 v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir.
 2007) (“Claims founded on state law are . . . outside the
 scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
 Claims.”). Thus, Mr. Donnelly fails to meet his jurisdic-
 tional requirement for these other claims.