Court Opinion

ID: 9883309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:40:00.89444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:22.611044
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting:
Appellants were tried at August 3, 1968 Session of Columbus Superior Court for their alleged contemptuous violation on July 8, 1968 of the specific provisions of a restraining order.
The alleged contempt was not committed in the presence of the court. There was no disruption of or interference with any court session or proceeding. Nor does the alleged contempt involve continuous or repetitive conduct in violation of the court’s order. The hearing was to determine whether appellants were guilty of terminated past conduct constituting a wilful violation of the court’s order; and, if so, what punishment should be imposed. The appeal presents this question: Did the court err in refusing appellants’ request for a jury trial as to whether in fact appellants were guilty of the conduct alleged to constitute a wilful violation of the court’s order?
I accept with full approval the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Duncan (391 U.S. 145) and in Bloom (391 U.S. 194). However, these decisions do not apply to criminal prosecutions or to criminal contempt proceedings in State courts involving “petty offenses” which, as defined in the federal statute and decisions, are offenses punishable by a maximum fine of five hundred dollars or by a maximum prison sentence of six months or both. Since Chapter CLXXVII, Public Laws 1868-9, now codified as N.C. G.S. 5-4, provides that criminal contempt is punishable “by fine not to exceed two hundred and fiftjr dollars, or by imprisonment not to exceed thirty days, or both, in the discretion of the court,” decision herein is not affected by Duncan and Bloom.
In Bloom, Mr. Justice White stated: “Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” He quotes with approval this excerpt from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610, 58 L. ed. 1115, 1120, 34 S. Ct. 693, 695, viz: “'These contempts are infractions of the law, visited with punishment as such. If such acts are not *513criminal, we are in error as to the most fundamental characteristic of- crimes as that word has been understood in English speech.’' The majority hold the present proceeding is for criminal contempt. I agree.
In prior decisions, this Court has held whether an accused person has committed acts alleged to constitute wilful contempt of a court order is determinable by the court rather than by a jury. The right to a jury trial has been denied without reference to whether the alleged contempt was committed in the presence of the court or disrupted court sessions or proceedings or otherwise disturbed the conduct of the court’s business. In respect of an accused person’s right to a jury trial, no distinction has been drawn between contemptuous conduct in the presence of the court and alleged contemptuous conduct occurring beyond the presence and observation of the court.
The contemptuous conduct involved in State v. Yancy, 4 N.C. 133, consisted of an assault “committed in view of the court.” With reference to this factual situation, Taylor, C.J., said: “The punishment, in such cases, must be immediate, or it would be ineffectual, as it is designed to suppress an outrage which impedes the business of the court.”
Contemptuous conduct involved in State v. Woodfin, 27 N.C. 199, consisted of “fighting in the yard of the courthouse, before.the courthouse door, and in the presence of the court.” With reference to this factual situation, Ruffin, C.J., said: “The power to commit or fine for contempt is essential to the existence of every court. Business cannot be conducted unless the court can suppress disturbances, and the only means of doing that is by immediate punishment. A breach of the peace in facie curia is a direct disturbance and a palpable contempt of the authority of the court. It is a case that does not admit of delay, and the court would be without dignity that did not punish it promptly and without trial.”
The contemptuous conduct involved in Baker v. Cordon, 86 N.C. 116, consisted of the continuing violation by the defendant of a court order which restrained him from engaging in a competitive business in violation of his covenant obligation. No interference with or disturbance of any business of the court was involved. The court’s factual determinations were based on evidence rather than upon observation. Upon the court’s factual findings, the defendant was adjudged in contempt for violation of the court’s order and sentenced to imprisonment for ten days. This Court, holding untenable the defendant’s contention that he was entitled to a jury trial as to the controverted facts, found “No error.”
*514In Baker v. Cordon, supra, Smith, C.J., for the Court, said: “The proceeding by attachment for violating an order of the Court made in furtherance of a pending action is necessarily summary and prompt, and to be effectual it must be so. The Judge determines the facts and adjudges the contempt, and while he may avail himself of a jury and have their verdict upon a disputed and doubtful matter of fact, it is in his discretion to do so or not. State v. Yancey, 4 N.C. 133; State v. Woodfin, 27 N.C. 199; Moye v. Cogdell, 66 N.C. 403; Crow v. State, 24 Texas 12.”
The factual situations in Yancy and in Woodfin are set forth above. Contempt proceedings were not involved in Moye v. Cogdell, 66 N.C. 403.
In subsequent contempt cases in which there was no interference with or disturbance of the court and in which the factual determinations were made on the basis of evidence rather than observation, the opinions repeat in substance the statement in Baker v. Cordon, supra, that “(t)he Judge determines the facts and adjudges the contempt.” In re Deaton, 105 N.C. 59, 11 S.E. 244; In re Gorham, 129 N.C. 481, 40 S.E. 311; Manufacturing Co. v. Arnold, 228 N.C. 375, 45 S.E. 2d 577. Whether the alleged contemners were entitled to a jury trial was not raised on the appeals in Deaton, Gorham and Arnold. In Deaton, the opinion cites Baker v. Cordon, supra, and quotes the portion of the opinion set forth above. In Gorham, the opinion cites Baker and Deaton. In Arnold, the opinion cites Gorham. In Baker, primary reliance was placed upon Yancy and Woodfin, which involved contempts in the presence of the court and then and there directly interfering with the conduct of its business. The only reasons assigned as a basis for the rule are those set forth in the Yancy, Woodfin and Baker cases. Obviously, these reasons do not apply to the factual situation here considered.
The real question for decision is whether appellants were entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right under the provisions of Article I, Section 13, of the Constitution of North Carolina, which provides: “No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful persons in open court. The Legislature may, however, provide other means of trial, for petty misdemeanors, with the right of appeal.”
Although this constitutional provision, on which appellants’ principal contention is based, is quoted in the first paragraph of the majority opinion, there is no further reference thereto or discussion thereof. Nor do I find .any prior decision involving contempt proceedings in which this provision of the North Carolina Constitution *515is considered with relation to a person’s right to jury trial when charged with criminal contempt. Hence, the question would seem to be open for consideration at this time.
Under Article I, Section 13, the General Assembly may provide “other means of trial, for petty misdemeanors, with the right of appeal.” (My italics.) Referring to this portion of Article I, Section 13, Merrimon, J. (later C.J.), in State v. Crook, 91 N.C. 536, 539-540, said: “This plainly implies that, ‘as to petty misdemeanors,’ a method of trial other than by jury in the ordinary methods may be provided by the legislature, if the right of appeal be allowed — that is, the right to appeal to a court where trial by jury may be had.” In State v. Pulliam, 184 N.C. 681, 114 S.E. 394, Walker, J., for the Court, said: “The offense here, of course, is a petty misdemeanor, but this Court has held that the expression used in the Constitution ‘with right of appeal’ confers upon the defendant, when the appeal is taken, the right of trial by jury in the Superior Court. . . .”
“Petty misdemeanors,” within the meaning of Article I, Section 13, include offenses for which (as for criminal contempt) the punishment may not exceed a fine of two hundred and fifty dollars or imprisonment for thirty days or both. State v. Lytle, 138 N.C. 738, 51 S.E. 66; State v. Hyman, 164 N.C. 411, 79 S.E. 284. In Lytle, Clark C.J., said: “The object of the statute creating the police court is to relieve the Superior Courts of petty business, to relieve the taxpayers, and defendants, also, of heavy costs, and to give a speedy trial, lightening jail expenses, and dispensing often with long imprisonment or detention till a term of court comes around with its jury and judge. There is no harm done, since an appeal always lies open to a convicted defendant to the Superior Court, where he has the right of trial by jury; whereas to the acquitted defendant or to one who takes no exception to his punishment, there is a relief from unnecessary delay and costs as well as diminution of court expenses to the public.”
In State v. Pasley, 180 N.C. 695, 104 S.E. 533, the defendant was charged in a criminal action before a justice of the peace with going or entering upon the lands of another, without a license therefor, after having been forbidden to do so, a violation of the statute now codified as G.S. 14-134, a criminal offense then punishable by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days. The defendant was found guilty by the justice of the peace who entered judgment taxing the defendant with the costs. The defendant appealed. In the superior court, the parties negotiated for a settlement of the controversy. However, final agreement *516was not reached on account of the defendant's refusal to pay the costs. Thereupon the court, against the consent of the defendant and without allowing the defendant a jury trial, affirmed the judgment of the justice of the peace as to the costs. This Court set the judgment aside and ordered “a new trial by jury.” Walker, J., for the Court, said: “Article I, section 13, of the Constitution says: ‘With right of appeal.’ And this Court has held in the case of S. v. Brittain, 143 N.C. 668, that when a defendant asserts his right of appeal, and the case comes up in the Superior Court, the defendant’s right of trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is preserved to him. It makes no difference what the real issue is, so that the charge involves the commission of a crime for which he can be punished and made to pay the costs.” Accord: State v. Pulliam, supra.
Our decisions establish that Article I, Section 13, confers upon every person accused of having committed a criminal offense, even though it be a petty misdemeanor, the right to trial by jury either in the inferior court (State v. Ham, 83 N.C. 590) or in the superior court upon original trial or trial de novo upon defendant’s appeal from an inferior court. State v. Tate, 169 N.C. 373, 85 S.E. 383; State v. Thomas, 236 N.C. 454, 460, 73 S.E. 2d 283, 287; State v. Norman, 237 N.C. 205, 212, 74 S.E. 2d 602, 608. I perceive no reason why a person accused of terminated past conduct (neither in the presence of the court nor interfering with the functioning of the court) constituting criminal contempt is not equally entitled to the right of trial by jury. Where guilt for past conduct and punishment therefor are involved, I find no sound basis for applying different rules simply because guilt is related to the violation of a court order rather than to the violation of a State statute or municipal ordinance. Hence, I reach the conclusion that appellants were entitled to a trial by jury in respect of all controverted material facts relating to their alleged guilt of criminal contempt.
The views herein expressed are in substantial accord with those stated by Sheran, J., for the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Peterson v. Peterson, 153 N.W. 2d 825 (1967).
ShaRP, J., joins in dissenting opinion.