Court Opinion

ID: 9647053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:22:13.069208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:45.040109
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. Though I recognize an exception to the at-will doctrine for firings caused by filing a worker’s compensation claim, the exception should not govern the facts of this case where a claim had not been filed at the time Pam Baysinger was fired. Baysinger was terminated because, regrettably, she could no longer do the work due to a back injury. The result was harsh and arguably unfair, but that was the reason for her firing. The majority engages in complete speculation when it holds that her firing was tied to an “anticipated” worker’s compensation claim. As in the case of Mapco, Inc. v. Payne, 306 Ark. 198, 812 S.W.2d 483 (1991), there was no substantial evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, of motive or intent by Wal-Mart to violate the public policy of this state as set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107 (1987). By this decision and Mapco, however, this court, as a practical matter, has embraced a theory of strict liability when it comes to worker’s compensation claims and employee terminations, regardless of the extenuating circumstances. To uphold the public policy of this state is one thing. To find a violation of that public policy simply premised on the juxtaposition of two events — the filing of the claim and termination — goes too far. Some evidence of intent or motive to violate the state’s public policy must be shown. But the facts in this case also differ in a major respect from those in Mapco. Here, Baysinger’s firing preceded the filing of her claim. After she was terminated, Wal-Mart could in no way obstruct or impede her claim under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-107. She was completely free to pursue her claim or not. To hold that somehow the firing did obstruct her claim does not logically follow. The majority cites as sole authority for its conclusion a North Carolina case that a firing before a claim was filed amounted to retaliation by the employer. See Wright v. Fiber Industries, Inc., 299 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. App. 1983). Though I disagree with that holding for reasons already stated, I further note that the North Carolina statute setting out the state’s public policy is decidedly different from our own. The North Carolina statute creates a civil remedy and specifically prevents discharges and demotions because an employee has instituted or caused to be instituted a claim. N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 97-6.1 (1985). Our statute, on the other hand, is a criminal statute and speaks only of obstructing and impeding the filing of claims. To hold that Baysinger’s firing was in retaliation for some future claim she might file constitutes a conjectural leap I cannot make. The public policy exception is not appropriate for the facts of this case. I respectfully dissent. Hays, J., joins.