Court Opinion

ID: 9963494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:09:35.461918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:50.446705
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Catherine D. Iskra,                            :
                      Petitioner               :
                                               :
               v.                              :
                                               :
                                               :
Aussie Pet Mobile Bux-Mont                     :
(Workers’ Compensation Appeal                  :
Board),                                        :   No. 503 C.D. 2021
                  Respondent                   :   Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                FILED: April 25, 2024

               Catherine D. Iskra (Claimant)1 petitions this Court for review of the
Workers’ Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) April 22, 2021 order
affirming WC Judge (WCJ) Robert Benischeck’s (WCJ Benischeck) decision that
granted Claimant’s petition for reinstatement of total disability benefits
(Reinstatement Petition) as of June 20, 2017, and denied Claimant’s petition for
review of medical treatment and/or billing (Review Medical Petition) concerning
her medical marijuana costs. Claimant presents two issues for this Court’s review:
(1) whether Protz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Derry Area School
District), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (Protz II), should be given full retroactivity and
the now unconstitutional impairment rating evaluation (IRE) provisions deemed

      1
          Claimant’s name was previously Catherine Patterson.
void ab initio;2 and (2) whether Aussie Pet Mobile Bux-Mont (Employer) is required
to reimburse Claimant for her medical marijuana costs. After review, this Court
vacates and remands, in part, and reverses, in part.
              On January 3, 2008, Claimant suffered a work injury when a van door
closed on her left hand. Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP)
accepting liability for an injury in the nature of a left-hand contusion. On November
4, 2009, WCJ Joseph McManus amended the NCP injury description to include a
contusion to the left hand that caused complex regional pain syndrome, and
determined that Scott Rosenthal, D.O.’s services were for treatment of the work
injury. On July 7, 2014, WCJ Karen Wertheimer reduced Claimant’s WC benefits
to partial disability as of November 1, 2012, based on Lucian Bednarz, M.D.’s IRE.
              On June 10, 2019, Claimant filed the Review Medical Petition. On
June 27, 2019, Employer filed an answer thereto. On October 14, 2019, Claimant
filed the Reinstatement Petition. Employer filed an answer thereto on that same date.
WCJ Benischeck held hearings on June 28, August 28, and October 10, 2019, and
January 9, April 2, and May 14, 2020. On July 31, 2020, WCJ Benischeck granted,
in part, the Review Medical Petition, directing Employer to pay for Claimant’s
ketamine treatment, her January 2019 cervical computed axial tomography (CAT)
scan, and her March 2019 electromyography. However, WCJ Benischeck ruled that
Employer was not obligated to pay or reimburse Claimant for her medical marijuana
costs. WCJ Benischeck also granted the Reinstatement Petition as of June 20, 2017.

       2
         In Protz II, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found portions of the former IRE provisions,
contained in former Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended,
added by the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, formerly, 77 P.S. § 511.2, repealed by the Act of
October 24, 2017, P.L. 714, No. 111, violated the non-delegation clause of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.

                                               2
Claimant appealed to the Board. On April 22, 2021, the Board affirmed WCJ
Benischeck’s decision. Claimant appealed to this Court.3
              Claimant first argues that Protz II should be given full retroactivity and
the now unconstitutional IRE provisions should be deemed void ab initio; thus, her
Reinstatement Petition should be granted as of November 1, 2012, the date her
disability was first modified. Specifically, Claimant contends that because our
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Protz II did not express that the decision should be
given prospective application, the general rule of retroactivity should apply. The
seminal case that addressed this argument is Whitfield v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board (Tenant Health System Hahnemann LLC), 188 A.3d 599 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2018) (en banc), wherein this Court opined:

              [T]he issue is not purely a question of retroactivity. We
              previously explained:
                   A retroactive law has been defined as one which
                   relates back to and gives a previous transaction a
                   legal effect different from that which it had under
                   the law in effect when it transpired. A law is given
                   retroactive effect when it is used to impose new
                   legal burdens on a past transaction or
                   occurrence.
              Dep’t of Lab[.] [&] Indus., Bureau of Emp[.] Sec. v. Pa.
              Eng’g Corp., . . . 421 A.2d 521, 523 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980)
              (emphasis added; [] citations omitted); see also Passarello
              v. Grumbine, . . . 87 A.3d 285, 307 ([Pa.] 2014) (requiring
              a decision to announce a new rule of law before it can be
              given retroactive effect); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865
              A.2d 761 . . . ([Pa.] 2004) (explaining a court decision is
              considered “new” for purposes of retroactivity if it

       3
         “[This Court’s] review is limited to determining whether the WCJ’s findings of fact were
supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether
constitutional rights were violated.” DiLaqua v. City of Phila. Fire Dep’t (Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd.), 268 A.3d 1, 4 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Bristol Borough v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Burnett), 206 A.3d 585, 595 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).

                                               3
              imposes a new obligation on the parties). Our decision
              today does not impose any new legal consequences based
              upon a past transaction. Simply because Protz II is being
              applied to a case that arose from a work injury and a
              change in disability status that predates it does not mean it
              operates retroactively. Warren v. Folk, 886 A.2d 305, 308
              (Pa. Super. 2005). It would be retroactive if it related back
              and gave a prior transaction a legal effect different from
              that which it had under the law in effect at the time. Id.
              This decision does not alter [the c]laimant’s past status.
              Rather, it gives effect to the [c]laimant’s status as it existed
              at the time she filed her reinstatement petition, which was
              filed within the statutory timeframe for filing such
              petitions.

Whitfield, 188 A.3d at 616-17; see also Weidenhammer v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal
Bd. (Albright Coll.), 232 A.3d 986, 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (“[T]he ruling in Protz
II was not intended to be given a fully retroactive effect, without regard to the statute
of repose in Section 413(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 772.”); Rose Corp. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Espada), 238 A.3d 551, 564 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (“[T]he Board’s
conclusion that [the c]laimant was entitled to reinstatement of total disability
benefits as of the date [the c]laimant filed the [p]etition [for reinstatement] is
consistent with Act 111,[4] the WC Act,[5] and precedent.”).
              Claimant also contends that the now unconstitutional IRE provisions
should be deemed void ab initio because they encroached on injured workers’
liberties and reasonable remedy rights; thus, any injured worker previously placed
in partial disability status through an IRE must be made whole by restoration to total
disability status.

       4
         The Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, repealed former Section 306(a.2) of the WC Act
and added Section 306(a.3) to the WC Act, 77 P.S. § 511.3, which amended the WC Act’s IRE
provisions.
       5
         Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2701-2710.

                                              4
             This Court addressed this issue in Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation
Appeal Board (Consol Pennsylvania Coal Co. LLC), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021), wherein it stated:

             In Warren, the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained that
             it, and our Supreme Court, had considered the issue of
             retroactivity in terms of whether the statute in question
             affects vested rights and determined that
                  [w]here no vested right or contractual obligation is
                  involved, an act is not retroactively construed
                  when applied to a condition existing on its
                  effective date even though the condition results
                  from events prior to that date . . . . A “vested right”
                  is one that “so completely and definitely belongs
                  to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken
                  away without the person’s consent.”
             Id. at 308. While [the c]laimant . . . argues that [s]he has
             a right to benefits as calculated at the time of injury, there
             are reasonable expectations under the [WC] Act that
             benefits may change. We acknowledge that a claimant
             retains a certain right to [WC] benefits until such time as
             [s]he is found to be ineligible for them. However,
             claimants . . . did not automatically lose anything by the
             enactment of Act 111. Act 111 simply provided
             employers with the means to change a claimant’s
             disability status from total to partial by providing the
             requisite medical evidence that the claimant has a whole[-
             ]body impairment of less than 35%, after receiving 104
             weeks of [Temporary Total Disability (]TTD[)] benefits.

Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1179.
             “In summary, th[is] Court has repeatedly declined to give full
retroactive effect to Protz [II] in circumstances, such as this, where the claimant was
not actively litigating the change in her disability status at the time Protz [II] was
decided.” Mastrone v. City of Phila. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.) (Pa. Cmwlth.

                                           5
No. 1387 C.D. 2021, filed July 11, 2023), slip op. at 5.6 “Consistent with this
precedent, [a c]laimant’s disability status [is] properly reinstated to TTD as of the
date she filed her reinstatement petition.” Id.; see also White v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 237 A.3d 1225, 1231 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (“[The
c]laimant here is entitled to reinstatement as of the date of her reinstatement petition,
not the effective date of the change in her disability status from total to partial.”);
Hutchinson v. Annville Twp. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 260 A.3d 360, 365 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2020) (“[The c]laimant was entitled to reinstatement only as of the date of
[her] reinstatement petition . . . , not as of the [] modification date.”). Accordingly,
Claimant is entitled to reinstatement of her total disability benefits as of the date she
filed her Reinstatement Petition, not her modification date.
               However, here, based on Employer’s stipulation, WCJ Benischeck
granted the Reinstatement Petition as of June 20, 2017, the date our Supreme Court
decided Protz II. The Board explained:

               Claimant filed her Reinstatement Petition on October 14,
               2019.      That would be the correct date of
               reinstatement. . . . [Employer] stipulated to reinstatement
               as of the date of Protz [II] - June 20, 2017. While
               [Employer], in [its] brief, ask[ed] [the Board] to amend the
               determination to reflect the correct date as per Whitfield,
               [Employer] did not file an appeal.
               Further, Whitfield was decided on June 6, 2018[,] and
               [Employer] made that stipulation on April 2, 2020. For
               those reasons, [the Board] decline[s] to disturb [] WCJ[]
               [Benischeck’s] determination.

Reproduced Record at 49a.

       6
          An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited
“for its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
                                                6
               While the Board is correct that Employer did not appeal from WCJ
Benischeck’s decision granting the Reinstatement Petition as of June 20, 2017,
Claimant did. Notwithstanding that Claimant’s argument was that she was entitled
to have her Reinstatement Petition granted as of November 1, 2012, she nevertheless
appealed from the effective date of the reinstatement of her TTD benefits. While
this Court agrees with Claimant that WCJ Benischeck erred by reinstating her TTD
benefits as of June 20, 2017, based on the above, it cannot conclude that the proper
date is November 1, 2012. Accordingly, this Court is constrained to vacate the
portion of the Board’s order affirming WCJ Benischeck’s decision granting
Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition, effective June 20, 2017, and remand this matter
to the Board to remand to WCJ Benischeck to grant the Reinstatement Petition as of
October 14, 2019, the date Claimant filed her Reinstatement Petition.
               Claimant next argues that Employer should be required to reimburse
Claimant for her medical marijuana costs because the medical need for the treatment
has been established and she has been medically certified to use medical marijuana.
Employer rejoins that WCJ Benischeck and the Board correctly interpreted the
federal Controlled Substances Act (Federal Drug Act)7 and the Medical Marijuana
Act (MMA)8 in their holdings that employers/WC carriers cannot be obligated to
pay for medical marijuana, which remains a forbidden, Schedule I drug under federal
law, as such an obligation would subject an employer/WC carrier to prosecution
under federal law.
               Relative to WCJ Benischeck’s ruling that the MMA prevents an insurer
from being obligated to pay for medical marijuana, Section 2102 of the MMA
provides: “Nothing in [the MMA] shall be construed to require an insurer or a health

      7
          21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971.
      8
          Act of April 17, 2016, P.L. 84, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110.

                                               7
plan, whether paid for by Commonwealth funds or private funds, to provide
coverage for medical marijuana.” 35 P.S. § 10231.2102.
            Initially,

            [w]hen terms are not defined, we turn to the rules of
            statutory construction, which are applicable to statutes and
            ordinances alike, for guidance. Kohl v. New Sewickley
            [Twp.] Zoning Hearing [Bd.], 108 A.3d 961, 968 (Pa.
            Cmwlth. 2015). “The interpretation of a statute . . .
            presents this Court with a pure question of law, which is
            generally subject to plenary review.” Id.
            The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to
            determine the intent of the enacting legislation. Section
            1921 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972 (Statutory
            Construction Act), 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. A statute’s plain
            language generally provides the best indication of
            legislative intent, and, therefore, statutory construction.
            Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. [Pa.] Dept[’t] of
            Corr[.], . . . 243 A.3d 19, 32 ([Pa.] 2020). “Words and
            phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar
            and according to their common and approved usage.”
            Section 1903 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.
            § 1903. “Also, where a court needs to define an undefined
            term, it may consult dictionary definitions for guidance.”
            THW [Grp.], LLC v. Zoning [Bd.] of Adjustment, 86 A.3d
            330, 336 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Appel v. GWC Warranty Corp. (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 291 A.3d 927, 933
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (quoting Sheppleman v. City of Chester Aggregated Pension
Fund, 271 A.3d 938, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)).
            The Appel Court addressed the meaning of Section 2102 of the MMA:

            While a plain reading of the statute does not require an
            insurer to provide coverage, it does not prohibit an insurer
            from covering it either. Specifically, Section 2102 of the
            MMA does not prohibit an insurer or health plan from
            reimbursing payment for medical marijuana. Further,
            “there is no statutory language which prohibits insurers
            from reimbursing claimants who lawfully use medical
            marijuana to treat an accepted work injury when such

                                         8
            treatment is medically reasonable and necessary.” Fegley,
            as Executrix of the Est. of Sheetz v. Firestone Tire &
            Rubber (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 291 A.3d 940, 952
            (Pa. Cmwlth. . . . 2023). “This Court has consistently held
            that courts may not supply words omitted by the
            legislature as a means of interpreting a statute. This
            Court’s duty to interpret statutes does not include the right
            to add words or provisions that the legislature has left out.”
            McCloskey v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 219 A.3d 692, 702
            n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Rogele, Inc. v. Workers’
            Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mattson), 969 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa.
            Cmwlth. 2009) (citations omitted)).
Appel, 291 A.3d at 933.
            In Fegley, this Court explained:
            Section 2103 of the MMA, entitled Protections for Patients
            and Caregivers, provides in subsection (a) that no
            individual “shall be . . . denied any right or privilege . . .
            solely for lawful use of medical marijuana.” 35 P.S. §
            10231.2103(a) (bold and italic emphasis added). Section
            301(a) of the WC Act mandates: “Every employer shall be
            liable for compensation for personal injury to, . . . each
            employe, by an injury in the course of his employment,
            and such compensation shall be paid in all cases by the
            employer,” 77 P.S. § 431 (emphasis added), and Section
            306(f.1)(1)(i) of the WC Act requires: “The employer
            shall provide payment in accordance with this section for
            reasonable surgical and medical services, . . . medicines
            and supplies, as and when needed.” 77 P.S. § 531(1)(i)
            (emphasis added). The MMA specifically mandates that
            no medical marijuana patients be denied any rights for
            lawful use of medical marijuana and the WC Act provides
            employees a statutory right to WC medical expenses that
            are reasonable and necessary to treat a work injury;
            therefore, if this Court was to agree with [the e]mployer,
            it would be removing those express protections from the
            MMA and the WC Act.
            The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]e
            presume that when enacting legislation, the General
            Assembly is aware of the existing law.” In Re Est. of
            Easterday, . . . 209 A.3d 331, 341-42 ([Pa.] 2019). Thus,
            herein we presume, as we must, that the General Assembly

                                          9
                   was aware of the WC Act’s mandate that employers pay
                   for employees’ reasonable and necessary medical
                   treatment of work injuries when it authorized medical
                   marijuana as a medical treatment. See Easterday. The
                   MMA in no manner alters these preexisting employment
                   rights and obligations. In fact, in the MMA’s policy
                   declaration, the General Assembly expressly declared:
                   “Scientific evidence suggests that medical marijuana is
                   one potential therapy that may mitigate suffering in some
                   patients and also enhance quality of life.” [Section 102
                   of the MMA,] 35 P.S. § 10231.102 (emphasis added).
                   Further, the MMA defines a serious medical condition as
                   including “[s]evere chronic or intractable pain of
                   neuropathic origin or severe chronic or intractable pain.”
                   [Section 103(16) of the MMA,] 35 P.S. § 10231.103(16).
                   Intractable pain is defined as “[c]hronic pain which is
                   difficult or impossible to manage with standard
                   interventions.” Medical Dictionary, 2009;[9] see also
                   McGraw-Hill Concise Dictionary of Modern Medicine,
                   2002[10] (“[P]ain that does not respond to appropriate doses
                   of opioid analgesics.”). Thus, the General Assembly
                   explicitly intended Commonwealth residents suffering
                   from intractable pain to have the benefit of this therapy,
                   and at the same time chose not to limit claimants from
                   receiving their statutory rights.

Fegley, 291 A.3d 951-52 (underline emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

                   The Fegley Court expounded:
                   “Moreover, we presume the General Assembly did not
                   intend a result that is ‘absurd, unreasonable, or impossible
                   to execute.’” MERSCORP, Inc. v. Del. Cnty., . . . 207 A.3d
                   855, 861 ([Pa.] 2019) (quoting In re Concord Twp. Voters,
                   . . . 119 A.3d 335, 341-42 ([Pa.] 2015)). Given the General
                   Assembly’s clear declaration and intention in enacting the
                   MMA, and the MMA’s unambiguous statutory language,
                   it is free from doubt that the medical marijuana system the
                   General Assembly created for the well-being and safety of

         9
              https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/intractable+pain (last visited Apr. 24,
2024).
         10
              https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/intractable+pain (last visited Apr. 24,
2024).

                                                   10
            patients, including claimants, was intended for them to
            have access to the latest medical treatments. Any other
            interpretation would lead to an unintended, absurd
            result.[FN]18 See MERSCORP.
                [FN]18
                        Accepting [the e]mployer’s argument
                presumes the General Assembly intentionally
                carved out a special class of employees who are
                prescribed medical marijuana for their work-
                related injuries, but unlike other injured employees
                are not paid for treatment of their work-related
                injuries.
Fegley, 291 A.3d at 952.
            The Fegley Court ruled:
            Interpreting the MMA as [the e]mployer suggests - to
            prohibit [insurers] from reimbursing claimants who
            lawfully use medical marijuana to treat their work-related
            injuries - would also undermine the General Assembly’s
            express intent to provide Commonwealth citizens who are
            patients “access to medical marijuana which balances the
            need of patients to have access to the latest treatments with
            the need to promote patient safety[.]” 35 P.S. §
            10231.102(3)(i) (all emphasis added). [The e]mployer’s
            interpretation is clearly contrary to the Statutory
            Construction Act’s declaration that “[t]he object of all
            interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain
            and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1
            Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). Accordingly, this Court rules that
            coverage is different and distinct from reimbursement and
            while the plain language of Section 2102 of the MMA
            states that insurers cannot be required to provide coverage
            for medical marijuana, there is no statutory language
            which prohibits insurers from reimbursing claimants
            who lawfully use medical marijuana to treat an
            accepted work injury when such treatment is
            medically reasonable and necessary.

                                         11
Fegley, 291 A.3d at 952 (bold emphasis added). Accordingly, the Board erred in
affirming WCJ Benischeck’s ruling that Section 2102 of the MMA bars Employer
from reimbursing Claimant’s medical marijuana costs.
              Relative to WCJ Benischeck’s determination that employers/WC
carriers cannot be obligated to pay for medical marijuana because such an obligation
would subject an employer/WC carrier to prosecution under federal law, the Fegley
Court held:

              Section 2103 of the MMA mandates: “Nothing in [the
              MMA] shall require an employer to commit any act that
              would put the employer or any person acting on its behalf[,
              i.e., insurers,] in violation of [f]ederal law.” 35 P.S. §
              10231.2103. Section 841(a) of the Federal Drug Act
              provides that “it shall be unlawful for any person
              knowingly or intentionally -- [] to manufacture, distribute,
              or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
              distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance[.]” 21
              U.S.C. § 841(a). Because reimbursing [the c]laimant for
              his out-of-pocket expenses for his lawful use of medical
              marijuana as a reasonable and necessary treatment for his
              work injury would not require [the e]mployer[] [] “to
              manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent
              to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
              substance,” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), [the e]mployer[] [] would
              not violate the Federal Drug Act, or be at risk of facing
              federal prosecution by doing so. See also Appel . . . , 291
              A.3d [at] 935 (Pa. Cmwlth. . . . 2023) (“[S]ince [the
              e]mployer is not prescribing marijuana, but rather
              reimbursing [the c]laimant for his lawful use thereof, [the
              e]mployer is not in violation of the Federal Drug Act.”).

Fegley, 291 A.3d at 953.        Accordingly, the Board erred by affirming WCJ
Benischeck’s ruling that paying or reimbursing Claimant for her medical marijuana
costs would subject an employer/WC carrier to prosecution under federal law.
              For all of the above reasons, the portion of the Board’s order affirming
WCJ Benischeck’s decision that granted Claimant’s Reinstatement Petition as of
June 20, 2019, is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the Board consistent with
                                          12
this Court’s Opinion. The portion of the Board’s order affirming WCJ Benischeck’s
decision that denied Claimant’s Review Medical Petition concerning her use of
medical marijuana is reversed.

                                     _________________________________
                                     ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                       13
             IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Catherine D. Iskra,                          :
                      Petitioner             :
                                             :
             v.                              :
                                             :
                                             :
Aussie Pet Mobile Bux-Mont                   :
(Workers’ Compensation Appeal                :
Board),                                      :   No. 503 C.D. 2021
                  Respondent                 :

                                     ORDER

             AND NOW, this 25th day of April, 2024, the portion of the Workers’
Compensation (WC) Appeal Board’s (Board) April 22, 2021 order affirming WC
Judge (WCJ) Robert Benischeck’s (WCJ Benischeck) decision that granted
Claimant’s petition for reinstatement of total disability benefits as of June 20, 2017,
is VACATED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Board to remand to WCJ
Benischeck to grant the Reinstatement Petition as of October 14, 2019. The portion
of the Board’s April 22, 2021 order affirming WCJ Benischeck’s decision that
denied Claimant’s petition for review of medical treatment and/or billing concerning
her use of medical marijuana is REVERSED.
             Jurisdiction is relinquished.

                                        _________________________________
                                        ANNE E. COVEY, Judge