Court Opinion

ID: 9710071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:26.088325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.951509
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting).
I have a basic difference with the majority in those false check cases in which a defendant fraudulently induces an innocent agent to part with a principal’s money. The court holds that such a defendant does not violate the false check statute if the principal knows or has imputed knowledge that the defendant does not have funds on deposit to cover the check, even though the agent in question is unaware of that fact. In my opinion, the crime is complete when the defrauded agent hands over the principal’s money. The principal is not suing the defendant civilly; the State is prosecuting the defendant for committing a fraud, and commit a fraud the defendant did. The object of the false check statute is to deter fraud.
Furthermore, contributory negligence is no defense to fraud. As stated in 32 American Jurisprudence 2d False Pretenses § 53 at 208:
Generally, the guilt of one charged with obtaining money or property by false pretenses does not depend on whether the victim could, with reasonable diligence or ordinary prudence, have ascertained that the representations were false. In other words, one who has made false representations cannot excuse himself by saying that if the victim was sharp, diligent, and astute, he could have detected the fraud by using means of detection available to him.
See also 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 37 at 863.
Defendant Mullin drew the check in question on the Peoples Bank, which is the principal in this set of facts. Presumably the court would affirm the present conviction had defendant cashed that check at, say, the First National Bank. Then the commission by defendant of all three elements would admittedly appear: (1) perpetrating fraud (including deception), (2) obtaining money, and (3) knowingly having no funds or arrangement with the Peoples Bank to cover the check.
But defendant cashed the check at the Peoples Bank, or more specifically, at its branch office. The teller Dorothy Uttley who waited on defendant testified that he told her he had an account with the Peoples Bank and worked in the vicinity, that she would not normally ask a person presenting his own check whether he had sufficient funds in his account to cover the check and would not inquire of the main bank unless she had reason to think the person was lying, that she would not have cashed the check had she known defendant did not have funds in his account to cover it, and that she assumed he did have such funds. In fact, defendant only deposited $23.05 in the account altogether, his balance in the account at any one time never exceeded $10, he had nothing in the account at the time of this transaction, and this check was for $45. In my opinion, the crime was complete when defendant got the money from Dorothy Uttley, as the jury found, although the cashier of the bank knew that defendant did not have funds in his account. Had Dorothy Uttley known defendant did not have funds in his account, or had defendant presented the check to the cashier who had such knowledge, we would have a different case.
*310The rule the majority announces will have far-reaching effects in false check and false pretense cases involving agents. No matter how offensively a person defrauds an agent out of a principal’s funds or property, the crime will not be committed if the principal has knowledge or if knowledge is imputed to him, despite the defrauded agent’s ignorance of the facts. The rule will not only apply to agents of banks in false check cases but also to agents of other organizations in false pretense cases, if someone else in the organization knows the facts. The rule will drive a large hole in the false check and false pretense statutes in cases involving frauds on agents.
I cannot subscribe to such a rule. It is contrary to the object of the false check statute, § 713.3, and the false pretense statute, § 713.1. It is not required by the language of those statutes, and no amendment to either statute is necessary. I would therefore affirm.