Court Opinion

ID: 9376763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:02:26.339343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.066450
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/3/23 In re Flores CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    In re ANTHONY FLORES on Habeas Corpus.                                                     C092887

                                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 19HC00539)

         In 2011, petitioner Anthony Flores was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon
and two counts of evading a peace officer. He was sentenced to 16 years four months in
prison. “In 2016, voters approved Proposition 57, the ‘Public Safety and Rehabilitation
Act of 2016.’ Proposition 57 amended the California Constitution to grant early parole
consideration to persons convicted of a nonviolent felony offense. (Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 32, subd. (a)(1).)[1] It also authorized the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
([Department]) to adopt regulations in furtherance of its guarantee of early parole

1       All further references in this opinion to section 32 and its subdivisions are to
article I, section 32 of the California Constitution.

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consideration. (Id., subd. (b).) Acting pursuant to this authority, [the Department] issued
regulations governing early parole consideration for persons serving a determinate
sentence for a nonviolent felony offense. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 2449.1, 2449.3-
2449.7, 3490-3493 (hereafter, the parole regulations).)” (In re Kavanaugh (2021)
61 Cal.App.5th 320, 334, fns. omitted.)
       In 2019, the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) considered petitioner for
Proposition 57 parole but found him unsuitable. In the parole consideration proceeding,
the Board allowed petitioner to submit a written statement explaining why he should be
granted parole. The Board explained “[t]his [wa]s a ‘paper review’ process” and “[t]here
w[ould] not be a hearing for [petitioner] or others to attend.” (Boldface omitted.)
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. Pertinent to this
appeal, the trial court granted petitioner and another former prisoner, Larry Bailey,
habeas corpus relief after finding federal and state procedural due process principles and
equal protection entitled them to a live parole suitability hearing under Proposition 57.
The trial court further ordered the Department to, within 60 days of the finality of the
decision, promulgate new parole regulations to reflect an eligible inmate’s right to an in-
person hearing on parole suitability under Proposition 57. The Department appeals.
       The trial court’s order in this appeal was the subject of our opinion in In re Bailey
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 837, review denied July 13, 2022, S274205. In that case, we
considered “whether determinately sentenced nonviolent prisoners eligible for parole
consideration under Proposition 57 are constitutionally entitled to an in-person hearing.”
(Id. at p. 842.) We answered the question in the negative and concluded “Proposition 57
neither requires nor impliedly incorporates an in-person hearing requirement, and the
Department acted within its delegated authority under section 32, subdivision (b) when it
adopted the parole regulations at issue in [that and] this appeal. We further conclude[d]
the absence of an in-person hearing does not violate equal protection principles, nor does
it violate a prisoner’s right to procedural due process.” (Ibid.) In reaching the foregoing

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conclusions, we agreed with and found no merit in Bailey’s attack on Kavanaugh, in
which the appellate court concluded the parole regulations were consistent with section
32’s “guarantee of parole consideration and do not violate prisoners’ procedural due
process rights.” (In re Kavanaugh, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.)
       The Department asks us to follow Bailey and Kavanaugh and reverse the trial
court’s order because (1) “nothing in Proposition 57’s text sets forth procedures on how
the state is to provide nonviolent parole consideration to eligible inmates”; (2) the trial
court “erred in concluding that the parole process for nonviolent, determinately sentenced
offenders violates due process”; and (3) the trial court “erroneously determined that
[petitioner] was entitled to an in-person parole hearing on equal protection grounds.”
Petitioner argues this appeal “offers the court the opportunity to reconsider the flawed
reasoning in Kavanaugh and protect Proposition 57 parole applicants’ fundamental due
process rights.” In other words, petitioner challenges the Kavanaugh court’s procedural
due process analysis.
       We decline to reconsider our position in Bailey, in which we agreed with the
Kavanaugh court’s procedural due process analysis. (In re Bailey, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 857-864.) We thus reverse the trial court’s order.

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                                    DISPOSITION
     The order granting petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed.

                                               /s/
                                               ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, J.

/s/
EARL, J.

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