Court Opinion

ID: 9747581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:22:04.15558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.753199
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. A domicile once acquired is presumed to continue. Dixon v. Dixon, D.C. App., 190 A.2d 652 (1963); Shilkret v. Helvering, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 138 F.2d 925 (1943). Here, the trial court concluded, in essence, that the evidence did not establish an intent, to remain in Japan permanently or indefinitely. See Shilkret v. Helvering, *1331supra at 180, 138 F.2d 925. Though the place of residence is generally taken to be the domicile, I think the evidence adequately supports the trial court’s finding that, on this record, there was no change of domicile from the District of Columbia to Japan. Because this case involves essentially whether there was this change of domicile, I view District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 62 S.Ct. 303, 86 L.Ed. 329 (1941), relied upon by the majority as factually distinguishable and not controlling.1
I see no adequate reason to overturn the trial court’s conclusion on appellant’s domicile.

. I also do not agree that our decisions in Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, D.C.App., 296 A.2d 431 (1972), and Alves v. Alves, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 111 (1970), are compelling authority here. The factual situations in those cases are so dissimilar to this case as to render them inapplicable.