Court Opinion

ID: 9576224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:22:01.01968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:46.519049
License: Public Domain

Birdsong, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with my brothers; however, the decision of the Supreme Court in responding to our certified question poses a troublesome question.
The Supreme Court in Combs v. Adair Mortgage Co., 245 Ga. 296 (264 SE2d 226), citing Chambers v. Citizens &c. Nat. Bank, 242 *435Ga. 498, 502 (249 SE2d 214) and Western &c. R. Co. v. Evans, 96 Ga. 481, 486 (23 SE 494) stated at p. 296: “ ‘A party testifying in his own behalf has no right to be intentionally or deliberately self-contradictory; and if he is so, the courts are fully justified in taking against him that version of his testimony which is most unfavorable to him.’ ” Where did such statement as quoted by the Supreme Court in Combs v. Adair Mortgage Co., supra, have its genesis?
In Western &c. R. Co. v. Evans, supra, the Supreme Court in stating its ratio decindi in its headnote did not include the words “intentional” or “deliberate.” The headnote as it appears states the generally accepted rule and it is quoted herein verbatim: “The testimony of the plaintiff, who was the sole witness in his own behalf as to circumstances under which he was injured, making at best a very weak and doubtful case, it being as a whole utterly inconsistent with itself and self-contradictory as to the most vitally important facts, and one version of it showing clearly that he was not entitled to recover, and the defendant’s evidence, which was perfectly consistent with this version, establishing a complete defense, the verdict in the plaintiff’s favor was unwarranted, and the ends of justice require a new trial.”
On the last page of the Evans decision, the following appears, “But a party testifying in his own favor has no right to be intentionally or deliberately self-contradictory; and if he is so, the courts are fully justified in taking against him that version of his testimony which is most unfavorable to him.” Evans, supra, p. 486. In my opinion, the use of the words “intentionally or deliberately” are unnecessary and constitute dicta.
Originating from these few words in the Evans case we apparently have developed two somewhat parallel but inconsistent legal theories stated as: (1) “[T]he testimony of a party offering himself as a witness in his own behalf is to be construed most strongly against him when it is contradictory, vague, or equivocal.” Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 386 (162 SE2d 375); Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288, 290 (149 SE2d 708); Applegarth Supply Co. v. Schaffer, 130 Ga. App. 353, 356 (203 SE2d 277); Haley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 258 (202 SE2d 838); Johnson v. Curenton, 127 Ga. App. 687, 690 (195 SE2d 279); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 126 Ga. App. 857, 864 (191 SE2d 887); Fuels, Inc. v. Rutland, 123 Ga. App. 23,26 (179 SE2d 290); McKnight v. Guffin, 118 Ga. App. 168 (162 SE2d 743); Dykes v. Hammock, 116 Ga. App. 389 (157 SE2d 524). All of the above cited cases cite Evans, supra but conspicuously omit the references to intentional and deliberate. (2) In the other line, “ ‘(A) party testifying in his own favor has no right to be *436intentionally or deliberately self-contradictory; and if he is so, the courts are fully justified in taking against him that version of his testimony which is most unfavorable to him.’ ” Chambers v. Citizens &c. Nat. Bank, 242 Ga. 498, 502 (249 SE2d 214); Feltman v. National Bank of Ga., 146 Ga. App. 434, 438 (246 SE2d 447); Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 520 (167 SE2d 697). The above three cases simply quote Evans, supra, by rote. A reading of these two lines of cases elicits the following question: Must the party’s self-contradictory, vague or equivocal statement be intentional and deliberate before the statement can be used against him? I think not. A statement that is vague, self-contradictory, or equivocal remains vague, self-contradictory, or equivocal whether or not. made in - tentionally or deliberately. Like an admission, it may be explained but it remains. Thus, a court may take the statement in its most unfavorable light without weighing whether it was intentionally or deliberately made. Whether or not a statement is made deliberately or intentionally is a question of fact. Juries decide questions of fact. The inclusion of the question of whether a statement is deliberate or intentional would preclude the use of summary judgment.
The majority of cases by this court and the Supreme Court hold that self-contradictory, vague and equivocal statements, regardless of whether they are intentional or deliberate, should be construed most strongly against the party making them. This is the rule that I believe should be applied in summary judgment cases.