Court Opinion

ID: 9688495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:51:57.221118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:39.672786
License: Public Domain

BLOOD WORTH, Justice
(dissenting).
On original deliverance, I concurred in the result reached by the majority opinion (authored by Justice Jones). I now wish to change my vote and dissent for the following reason.
It is now clear to me that the only issue argued on this appeal by appellant is that governmental immunity was not available to the appellee in an action on implied contract. But, the majority have reversed this cause on another ground — holding that governmental immunity is not available as a defense in an action ex delicto.
Up to this day, this Court has always followed the rule that assignments of error not substantially argued, or not argued at all, in brief are deemed waived. See e. g., Lowery v. Stinson, 291 Ala. 415, 282 So.2d 244 (1973); Runge v. Mercantile Credit Corp., 285 Ala. 183, 230 So.2d 240 (1970); Renfroe v. Weaver, 285 Ala. 1, 228 So.2d 764 (1969); Appeal and Error ^1078(1), Vol. 2A, Alabama Digest; Supreme Court Rule 9, Revised Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court.
In this case only three relevant sentences (quoted from appellant’s brief) appear in the majority opinion on rehearing to justify consideration of the issue of tort immunity, viz:
“ * * * The time is at hand to clarify the air and to once and for all re*622move the fallacy of governmental immunity. There is no reason or logic for us to be bound by the theory that the King can do no wrong when we do not have Kings. The theory of governmental immunity has out lived usefulness two hundred years.”
In my judgment these statements constitute nothing more than mere opinions. Surely, they cannot be construed to be substantial arguments that the court erred in granting summary judgment because governmental immunity from tort ought to be abolished. No assignment of error is referred to. No authority is cited.
Under our cases, appellant’s argument is insufficient. Melton v. Jackson, 284 Ala. 253, 224 So.2d 611 (1969).
I therefore dissent as I would grant the rehearing and affirm the cause.