Court Opinion

ID: 9953840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:11:52.830536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.737980
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Brock, 2024-Ohio-1036.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                      : CASE NO. 22CA38 & 22CA39

        v.                                       :

RASHEED BROCK,                                   : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                     :

_________________________________________________________________

                                            APPEARANCES:

Christopher Bazeley, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant1.

Anna Villarreal, Chillicothe Law Director, and Jason M. Miller,
Assistant Law Director, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.
___________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM MUNICIPAL COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:3-15-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Chillicothe Municipal Court

judgment of conviction and sentence.                  Rasheed Brock, defendant

below and appellant herein, assigns five errors for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “BROCK’S CONVICTION FOR HAVING FICTITIOUS
                 PLATES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
                 EVIDENCE.”

        1
        Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               2

            SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE ELEMENTS OF
            THE OFFENSE OF FICTITIOUS PLATES IS ERRONEOUS
            AS A MATTER OF LAW.”

            THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “THE FINDING THAT BROCK WAS IMPAIRED WHILE
            DRIVING IS SUPPORTED BY INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”

            FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “BROCK’S CONVICTION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY IS
            NOT SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE OR
            LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”

            FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

            “BROCK’S CONVICTION FOR DRIVING WITHOUT AN
            OPERATOR’S LICENSE IS SUPPORTED BY INSUFFICIENT
            EVIDENCE.”

     {¶2}   On June 15, 2021, Victoria Bartlett observed a gold

Chevrolet Impala driving erratically and called 911.   After

appellant eluded Chillicothe Police Officer Adam Steele for several

blocks, Steele eventually stopped appellant for multiple

violations.

     {¶3}   In Case No. 22CA38, the complaint charged appellant with

(1) operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol

or a drug of abuse in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), a first-

degree misdemeanor, (2) driving without a license in violation of

R.C. 4510.12, an unclassified misdemeanor, (3) fictitious

registration in violation of R.C. 4549.08, a fourth-degree
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                3

misdemeanor, and (4) driving left of center in violation of R.C.

4511.29, a minor misdemeanor.

     {¶4}   In Case No. 22CA39, the complaint charged appellant with

(1) failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer

in violation of R.C. 2921.331, a first-degree misdemeanor, and (2)

possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C), a

fourth-degree misdemeanor.

     {¶5}   At trial, Victoria Bartlett testified that around 6:00

p.m. on June 15, 2021, she and her husband observed someone in an

Impala throw “something large out the window. * * * Like, it was

huge.   Like, I had to go around it.”   Barlett and her husband also

observed the vehicle drive erratically, “sometimes going off the

roadway,” “sometimes going into the other lane almost hitting

several vehicles.”    Bartlett called 911 while her husband

photographed the license plate.

     {¶6}   Officer Steele testified that he responded to a dispatch

regarding a reckless driver and, after he began to follow appellant

and make his own observations, he activated his overhead lights.

Appellant, however, continued to drive another block and a half.

At that time, Steele activated his audible siren and appellant

drove another quarter of a mile before he stopped.    Steele

testified that he observed appellant drive left of center

“completely over” the line and moved “from left to right inside the
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                  4

vehicle, making furtive movements * * * that could either be

attempting to hide contraband or something of that nature.”     Also

during the pursuit, appellant drove approximately 10 miles per hour

in a 25-mile-per-hour zone.    Steele estimated that with activated

lights he drove “several blocks, seven to eight blocks and around

the corner.”    When appellant exited his vehicle, “[h]is clothes

were disheveled,” and he “was unsteady on his feet when I was

talking to him.”    Steele advised appellant of his Miranda Rights

and observed appellant’s pupils:

     His eyes were pinpoint, constricted, not reactive to the
     light. It was daylight during that time. And once he was
     advised of his rights, he stated that he understood. And
     I asked him why it took him so long to pull over.     He
     stated that he was doing a pill.

     {¶7}   Officer Steele described appellant’s speech as “slow and

slurred * * * difficult to understand,” and noted that appellant

said he had been “snorting a perc (Percocet).”    Steele was familiar

with appellant and believed appellant “was under the influence of

some kind of narcotic.”    Video and audio from Steele’s body camera

recorded appellant’s statement that he had been “snorting a f*cking

pill.”

     {¶8}   Officer Steele testified that he placed appellant “under

arrest for OVI and put him in the back of my cruiser for failure to

comply.”    As appellant entered the back of Steele’s cruiser, he

said, “I did one perc but one perc ain’t going to do sh*t to me.”
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                 5

Steele checked appellant’s information that “showed that he did not

have a valid license through the State of Ohio nor any other state

for that matter.”    In addition, Steele checked appellant’s license

plate with the LEADS database and discovered it registered to a

gray Dodge, not the Impala.

     {¶9}   During Officer Steele’s inventory search, he discovered

inside the driver’s door a plastic straw that contained white

residue.    Steele knew from his training and experience that straws

are “commonly used to snort illicit narcotics.”     Further, Steele

found a glass pipe with burn marks and residue, which, he knew from

experience, is associated with the “use of illicit narcotics,

specifically methamphetamine.”

     {¶10} At the police station Officer Steele invited appellant to

participate in field sobriety and chemical tests.     Appellant,

however, refused and replied, “f*ck no.”    As Steele read appellant

the BMV 2255 form regarding the consequences for an OVI chemical

test refusal, appellant’s speech and mannerisms became slower and

he appeared “a lot more lethargic” at the jail.     Steele also

explained that, even if appellant had a legitimate prescription for

Percocet, the jury could nevertheless find him guilty of OVI.

     {¶11} After hearing the evidence adduced at trial, the jury

found appellant guilty of OVI, fictitious plates, failure to

comply, and the possession of drug paraphernalia.     After a bench
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               6

trial, the trial court found appellant guilty of no operator’s

license and driving left of center.   The trial court sentenced

appellant to serve 120 days in jail for the OVI and for the failure

to comply, to be served concurrently, and pay the court costs on

the remaining charges.   This appeal followed and this court

consolidated the two appeals on February 16, 2023.

                         Standard of Review

     {¶12} As a threshold matter, because appellant challenges both

the sufficiency of the evidence and the manifest weight of the

evidence, we initially address both standards of review.

     {¶13} A claim of insufficient evidence invokes a due process

concern and raises the question whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law.   State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997),

syllabus; State v. Blevins, 2019-Ohio-2744, 140 N.E.3d 27, ¶ 18

(4th Dist.).   When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an

appellate court’s inquiry focuses primarily on the adequacy of the

evidence; that is, whether the evidence, if believed, could

reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at syllabus.   The standard of review is whether, after viewing

the probative evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found all the essential elements of the offense
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                7

beyond a reasonable doubt.     E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 273, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991).

     {¶14} Furthermore, under the sufficiency of the evidence

standard a reviewing court does not assess “whether the state’s

evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence

against a defendant would support a conviction.”     State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997) (Cook, J.,

concurring).     Therefore, when reviewing a sufficiency of the

evidence claim, an appellate court must construe the evidence in a

light most favorable to the prosecution.     See, e.g., State v. Hill,

75 Ohio St.3d 195, 205, 661 N.E.2d 1068 (1996); State v. Grant, 67

Ohio St.3d 465, 477, 620 N.E.2d 50 (1993).     A reviewing court will

not overturn a conviction on a sufficiency of the evidence claim

unless reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion the trier of

fact did.    State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 162, 749 N.E.2d

226 (2001); State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484, 739 N.E.2d 749

(2001).

     {¶15} “Although a court of appeals may determine that a

judgment of a trial court is sustained by sufficient evidence,

that court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is

against the weight of the evidence.”     Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

at 387.     “The question to be answered when a manifest weight
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                8

issue is raised is whether ‘there is substantial evidence upon

which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements

have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’”    State v. Leonard,

104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 81, quoting

State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193–194, 702 N.E.2d 866

(1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio St.2d 169, 383 N.E.2d 132

(1978), syllabus.   A court that considers a manifest weight

challenge must “‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of

witnesses.’”   State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493,

108 N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 208, quoting State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d

261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 328.   However, the reviewing

court must bear in mind that credibility generally is

an issue for the trier of fact to resolve.   State v. Issa, 93

Ohio St.3d 49, 67, 752 N.E.2d 904 (2001); State v. Murphy, 4th

Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31.   “‘Because the

trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is particularly

competent to decide “whether, and to what extent, to credit the

testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford substantial

deference to its determinations of credibility.’”   Barberton v.

Jenney, 126 Ohio St.3d 5, 2010-Ohio-2420, 929 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 20,

quoting State v. Konya, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21434, 2006-

Ohio-6312, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Lawson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                9

16288, 1997 WL 476684 (Aug. 22, 1997).

    {¶16} Thus, an appellate court will generally defer to the

trier of fact on issues of evidence weight and credibility, as long

as a rational basis exists in the record for the fact-finder’s

determination.   State v. Picklesimer, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA9,

2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24; accord State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No.

07CA2948, 2007- Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (“We will not intercede as long as

the trier of fact has some factual and rational basis for its

determination of credibility and weight.”).    Accordingly, if the

prosecution presented substantial credible evidence upon which the

trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the essential elements of the offense had been established,

the judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.    E.g., Eley.   Accord Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio

St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th

ed.1990) (a judgment is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence when “‘“the greater amount of credible evidence”’”

supports it).

    {¶17} Consequently, when a court reviews a manifest weight of

the evidence claim, a court may reverse a judgment of conviction

only if it appears that the fact-finder, when it resolved the

conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and created such a
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               10

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.’”   Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at

387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d

717 (1st Dist.1983); accord McKelton at ¶ 328.   Finally, a

reviewing court should find a conviction against the manifest

weight of the evidence only in the “‘exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’”   Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175, 485

N.E.2d 717; accord State v. Clinton, 153 Ohio St.3d 422, 2017-Ohio-

9423, 108 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 166; State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479,

483, 721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).

                                 I.

    {¶18} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts that

sufficient evidence does not support his fictitious plates

conviction.   In particular, appellant contends that the state

failed to produce evidence that appellant had knowledge of, or

reason to suspect, that the license plate he displayed on his

vehicle came from another vehicle.

    {¶19} R.C. 4549.08 sets forth the essential elements of use of

unauthorized plates:

    (A) No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle upon
    the public roads and highways in this state if it displays
    a license plate or a distinctive number or identification
    mark that meets any of the following criteria:
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                              11

    (1) Is fictitious;

    (2) Is a counterfeit or an unlawfully made copy of any
    distinctive number or identification mark;

    (3) Belongs to another motor vehicle, provided that this
    section does not apply to a motor vehicle that is operated
    on the public roads and highways in this state when the
    motor vehicle displays license plates that originally were
    issued for a motor vehicle that previously was owned by
    the same person who owns the motor vehicle that is operated
    on the public roads and highways in this state, during the
    thirty-day period described in division (A)(4) of section
    4503.12 of the Revised Code.

    (B) A person who fails to comply with the transfer of a
    registration provisions of section 4503.12 of the Revised
    Code and is charged with a violation of that section shall
    not be charged with a violation of this section.

    (C) Whoever violates division (A)(1),(2), or (3) of this
    section is guilty of operating a motor vehicle bearing an
    invalid license plate or identification mark, a misdemeanor
    of the fourth degree on a first offense and a misdemeanor
    of the third degree on each subsequent offense.

    {¶20} However, R.C. 4549.08 does not set forth a culpable

mental state, and therefore indicates a purpose to impose strict

liability.   In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 107, 2010-Ohio-

6301, 942 N.E.2d 347, the Supreme Court of Ohio observed:

    [A] separate mental state need not be specified for every
    element of an offense. And although the general rule for
    criminal liability requires a culpable mental state, a
    guilty intent is not necessary for every offense. State
    v. Morello (1959), 169 Ohio St. 213, 8 O.O.2d 192, 158
    N.E.2d 525.   Offenses without any culpable mental state
    are strict-liability offenses, and they impose liability
    for simply doing a prohibited act. In this type of case,
    ignorance of a fact or an element of the offense is not a
    defense. See State v. Kelly (1896), 54 Ohio St. 166, 43
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               12

     N.E. 163.

Johnson at ¶ 17.

     {¶21} Because strict liability for an offense is the exception

to the rule, the General Assembly set forth in R.C. 2901.21(B) a

test that indicates whether an offense is a strict liability

offense:

     “When the section defining an offense does not specify any
     degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to
     impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described
     in the section, then culpability is not required for a
     person to be guilty of the offense.      When the section
     neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a
     purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is
     sufficient culpability to commit the offense.” (Emphasis
     added.)

     {¶22} Here, we believe that the language of R.C. 4549.08

suggests that the General Assembly intended to impose strict

criminal liability.     As noted previously, the statute does not

specify a culpable mental state.     “Statutes and ordinances enacted

for the purpose of promoting the safety, health or well-being of

the public are generally meant to be enforced under a strict

liability standard.” Columbus v. Shirkey, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

08AP-752, 2009-Ohio-1329, ¶ 30.     In fact, traffic offenses and

motor vehicle laws are areas that the United States Supreme Court

lists as being amenable to the imposition of strict liability.

United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 262, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                13

L.Ed. 288 (1952). Ohio courts have held likewise, even for much

more serious traffic offenses such as driving under the influence.

See State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198, 199, 490 N.E.2d 574 (1986).

See, also, State v. Bentz, 2 Ohio App.3d 352, 442 N.E.2d 90 (1st

Dist. 1981).   But see, State v. Besler, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

120390, 2013-Ohio-1284, ¶ 9 (nothing in plain language of R.C.

4549.08 indicates purpose to impose strict liability); see also

State v. Frazier, 7th Dist. No. 01CA65, 2003-Ohio-1216, ¶ 14–19.

     {¶23} In the case sub judice, we believe the evidence adduced

at trial supported appellant’s fictitious plate conviction pursuant

to R.C. 4549.08.   Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first

assignment of error.

                                 II.

     {¶24} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that

the jury instruction regarding the elements of the offense of

fictitious plates is erroneous as a matter of law.   In particular,

appellant argues that the trial court misadvised the jury of the

recklessness element of the fictitious plates charge.

     {¶25} During jury instructions, when defining the elements of

R.C. 4549.08, the trial court stated:

     1) That on or about the 15th Day of June 2021, in
     Chillicothe, Ross County, Ohio; (2) The Defendant; (3)
     Recklessly operated or drove a motor vehicle upon the
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               14

    public roads and highways of Ohio; (4) The motor vehicle
    displayed a license plate; and (5) The license plate
    belonged to another motor vehicle that was issued for the
    same person who owned the motor vehicle in this case and
    that person failed to apply to transfer the registration
    within thirty days of the date of transfer of the
    registration.

    {¶26} Appellant argues that the instruction that required them

to find that appellant drove recklessly on public roads misled the

jury.

    {¶27} “A criminal defendant has the right to expect that the

trial court will give complete jury instructions on all issues

raised by the evidence.”   State v. Howard, 4th Dist. Ross No.

07CA2948, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 26.   “[A] trial court should give a

proposed jury instruction if it is a correct statement of the law

and is applicable to the facts of the particular case.”      Id.,

citing Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575

N.E.2d 828 (1991).

    {¶28} When reviewing errors in a jury instruction, a trial

court must consider a jury charge as a whole.   State v. Huish,

2023-Ohio-365, 208 N.E.3d 270, ¶ 54 (10th Dist.), citing Cromer v.

Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron, 142 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-

229, 29 N.E.3d 921, ¶ 35-36.   However, “[a]n unnecessary,

ambiguous, or even affirmatively erroneous portion of a jury charge

does not inevitably constitute reversible error.”   Id.   When a jury
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                 15

instruction incorrectly states the law, a reviewing court applies a

mixed de novo and abuse of discretion standard of review, examining

the jury charge as a whole and determining “whether the jury charge

probably misled the jury in a matter materially affecting the

complaining party's substantial rights.”     Id.

     {¶29} Appellee points out that appellant failed to object to

the jury charge at trial.     An appellant who fails to object as

Crim.R. 30(A)5 requires “is precluded from claiming error in the

instructions to the jury unless the instructions constitute plain

error under Crim.R. 52(B).”     State v. McCown, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-

153, 2006-Ohio-6040, ¶ 36.    Crim.R. 52 states, “[p]lain errors or

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

were not brought to the attention of the court.”     Here, counsel for

appellant failed to object to the alleged issue in the jury

instructions before the trial court.     Thus, we examine the claimed

error under a plain error analysis.

     {¶30} The Supreme Court of Ohio has found that an erroneous

jury instruction does not meet the plain error threshold unless, “

‘but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have

been otherwise.’ ” McCown at ¶ 38, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio

St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus;

State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 2004-Ohio-7007, 824 N.E.2d

504, ¶ 56, citing State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 444 N.E.2d
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                16

1332 (1983), syllabus.

     {¶31} In State v. White, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17739, 2000 WL

799762 (June 23, 2000), language in a jury instruction did not

track the domestic violence statute.     The court concluded that the

defendant did not demonstrate any confusion that stemmed from the

slight rewording of the charge in the complaint and the jury

instruction.   Further, the court noted that it did not see how the

trial’s result would have been otherwise if the statute had been

tracked word-for-word.    Consequently, in the absence of such a

determination, the court could not find plain error.     Id. at 3,

citing Underwood, supra, at the syllabus.

     {¶32} In State v. Hayes, 4th Dist. Adams No. 17CA1056, 2019-

Ohio-257, a grand jury returned an indictment that charged the

defendant with 92 counts of unauthorized use of OHLELG and 17

counts of unauthorized use of LEADS.     On appeal, the defendant

argued that trial counsel should have requested an affirmative

defense instruction.     This court concluded that no reasonable

probability existed that the outcome of the trial would have been

different if the court had given a R.C. 2913.03(C)(2) affirmative

defense instruction.     Id. at ¶ 63.   See also State v. Miller, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-990166, 2000 WL 216632 (Feb.25, 2000)(no plain

error when trial court omitted part of reasonable doubt

instruction), State v. Douthit, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-910394, C-
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                17

910395, 1992 WL 180875 (July 29, 1992)(no plain error when trial

court made erroneous references to defendant's burden of proof in

closing argument and in initial jury instructions because outcome

would not have been different), State v. Reeves, 12th Dist.

Clermont No. CA2020-01-001, 2020-Ohio-5565, ¶ 16 (no plain error

when trial court failed to instruct jury on abandonment in theft

trial because outcome would not have been different), State v.

Curtis, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022CA00036, 2023-Ohio-1652, ¶ 34-35

(charge did not mislead jury in matter materially affecting

defendant’s substantial rights when jury charge did not correctly

state Ohio law on complicity), Huish, supra at ¶ 59 (conviction

upheld when written instructions inadvertently stated “find the not

defendant guilty” instead of “find the defendant not guilty.”)

    {¶33} In the case sub judice, we recognize that the trial court

inserted a reckless driving requirement into the fictitious plates

jury instruction.   However, we cannot say that the error affected

appellant’s substantial rights and impacted the trial’s outcome.

Long, supra.   Here, the court’s instruction did not increase the

likelihood of a guilty verdict, but instead added another element

that arguably decreases the potential for a guilty verdict.   Thus,

we believe that appellant failed to demonstrate that, but for the

incorrect jury instruction, the trial would have had a different

outcome.
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                 18

     {¶34} Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s second assignment of

error.

                                III.

     {¶35} In his third assignment of error, appellant asserts that

sufficient evidence does not support his conviction for operating a

motor vehicle while impaired.

     {¶36} The state charged appellant with OVI in violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(a).   Pursuant to the statute, “[n]o person shall

operate any vehicle ... within this state, if, at the time of the

operation * * * [t]he person is under the influence of alcohol, a

drug of abuse, or a combination of them.”    R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).”

Appellant contends that the evidence adduced at trial failed to

prove that he had been impaired at the time he drove the vehicle.

     {¶37} We point out that this particular section of the statute

does not require evidence of a specific blood, breath, or urine

alcohol concentration to prove impairment.    Instead, this section

requires the state to establish that a defendant operated a vehicle

“when his faculties where appreciably impaired * * *.”    State v.

Smith, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05 MA 219, 2007-Ohio-3182, ¶ 76,

quoting State v. Crites, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 99-518-CA, 2000 WL

1781450 (Nov.30, 2000).   “As such, the defendant's behavior is the

primary consideration.”   Id.

     {¶38} In State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2953, 2008-
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                19

Ohio-1744, an officer testified that the defendant appeared

disoriented, confused, slurred his speech, and smelled of an

alcoholic beverage at the crash scene.   Id. at ¶ 26.   This court

concluded that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.      Id.

at ¶ 18.   See also State v. May, 2018-Ohio-1510, 111 N.E.3d 48 (8th

Dist.) (evidence sufficient to show defendant driving under

influence when   physiological factors like glassy or bloodshot

eyes, slurred speech, and confused appearance demonstrated impaired

physical and mental ability to drive), State v. Gladman, 2d Dist.

Darke No. 2013 CA 99, 2014-Ohio-2554, (odor of alcohol, bloodshot,

glassy eyes, slurred speech, difficulty walking demonstrated

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a)), State v. May, 2011-Ohio-6637,

970 N.E.2d 1029 (7th Dist)(defendant’s glassy eyes, slow and

slurred speech, stumbling gait and refusal to take field sobriety

supported R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) conviction), State v. Iloba, 9th

Dist. Wayne No. 20AP0030, 2021-Ohio-3700, ¶ 17 (“both reasonable

suspicion and probable cause can be demonstrated with reference to

physiological factors that tend to indicate impairment, such as an

odor of alcohol on a suspect's person, bloodshot or glassy eyes,

slurred speech, or a confused manner.”), State v. Homan, 89 Ohio

St.3d 421, 732 N.E.2d 952 (2000)(defendant's erratic driving, red

and glassy eyes, the smell of alcohol on her breath, and admission

to consuming alcoholic beverages, amply supported decision to
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                 20

arrest, even where no field sobriety tests were performed or where

the results were suppressed).

    {¶39} In the case at bar, appellant refused both field sobriety

and chemical tests.     However, an eye witness and Officer Steele

testified that appellant drove erratically.     Moreover, appellant

eluded Steele for several blocks, appellant’s clothing appeared

“dissheveled,” appellant appeared “unsteady on his feet,” exhibited

speech “slow and slurred * * * difficult to understand,” pupils

“constricted,” and stated he had been, “snorting a Perc

(Percocet).”

    {¶40} After our review of the evidence adduced at trial, we

conclude that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence at trial,

if believed, to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt for a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).     Here, when viewed

in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found all essential elements beyond a reasonable

doubt.

    {¶41} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s third assignment of error.

                                   IV.

    {¶42} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant asserts that

insufficient evidence supports his conviction for failure to comply

and his conviction is also against the manifest weight of the
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                21

evidence.   Specifically, appellant asserts that the state must

produce some evidence to show that he attempted to flee or evade

police officers to support a conviction.

     {¶43} In this assignment of error, appellant challenges both

the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.    As noted above, the

issue of whether the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence at

trial to sustain a conviction is a question of law.    R.C.

2921.331(B) required the state to prove that appellant operated his

vehicle “so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after

receiving a visible or audible signal from a police officer to

bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop.”

     {¶44} We begin with appellant’s sufficiency argument.    A

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence tests “whether, when

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements

of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”    State v. Hunter,

131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 118, quoting

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus.

     {¶45} Appellant maintains that the evidence adduced at trial

failed to show that he willfully eluded or fled from Officer

Steele.   Appellant contends that, if appellant intended to flee and

evade police, he “did an exceptionally bad job of it,” and points
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                22

to the fact that “he drove slowly at about 10 miles per hour -

fifteen miles per hour below the speed limit,” and “never exceeded

20 miles per hour.”     Finally, appellant argues that no evidence

exists to show that he did anything to avoid contact with Officer

Steele once he came to a stop.

    {¶46} In State v. Butler, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21870, 2004-

Ohio-5164, the court affirmed the defendant’s fleeing and eluding

conviction when the defendant engaged in a low-speed chase,

traveled at approximately 25 m.p.h., and used appropriate signals.

Id. at ¶ 3.   See also State v. Rupp, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2001–

06–135, 2002-Ohio-1600 (“slow-speed chase” conviction for failure

to comply with order or signal of police officer not against

manifest weight of evidence), State v. Elijah, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 18034, 2000 WL 968781 (July 14, 2000) (evidence supported

failure to comply when defendant failed to stop for cruiser’s

lights and sirens during a five-minute low-speed chase), State v.

Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97676, 2012-Ohio- 3811 (failure to

comply upheld when chase short and slow, but evidence established

defendant did not stop or pull over after police activated siren

and lights, traveled approximately five blocks, drove over posted

speed limit and through several stop signs).

    {¶47} The evidence adduced in Butler and the foregoing cases
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                23

bear great similarity to the evidence adduced in the case sub

judice.   Thus, even though appellant drove slowly and did not

exceed 20 miles per hour, his failure to stop when the officer

activated his siren and lights constituted a violation of R.C.

2921.331(B).   Thus, we conclude that the prosecution adduced

sufficient evidence at trial to support a guilty verdict for

failing to comply in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B).

     {¶48} Appellant also contends that his conviction for failure

to comply is against the manifest weight of the evidence.    As noted

above, in a manifest weight review, we must “weigh the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the

witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice.”    Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

     {¶49} In the case at bar, when we weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences from Officer Steele’s testimony, we cannot

conclude that the trier of fact lost its way.   Although appellant

drove slowly during his flight from Officer Steele, the fact

remains that appellant drove approximately seven or eight blocks

before he stopped his vehicle after Steele activated his lights and

siren.    Thus, appellant’s behavior may be reasonably understood as

an attempt to evade law enforcement.    See Scott, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                  24

No. 97676, 2012-Ohio-3811 (although chase “may not have been long”

and defendant “not traveling at a high rate of speed,” evidence

established defendant did not stop or pull over to the right after

the police activated their siren and lights).     Here, the evidence

adduced at trial showed that appellant drove another block and a

half after Officer Steele activated his overhead lights, and

another quarter of a mile after Officer Steele activated his

audible siren.   Thus, in view of the foregoing, we conclude that

appellant’s conviction for failure to comply is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

     {¶50} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s fourth assignment of error.

                                   V.

     {¶51} In his final assignment of error, appellant asserts that

insufficient evidence supports his conviction for driving without

an operator’s license.

     {¶52} R.C. 4510.12 sets forth the offense of operating a motor

vehicle without a valid license.    R.C. 4510.12(C)(1) and (2)

provide that if the trier of fact finds that the offender “never

has held a valid driver’s license * * * issued by this state or any

other jurisdiction * * * the offense is an unclassified

misdemeanor.”    R.C. 4510.12(C)(1).    In contrast, if the offender’s

license has expired, the offense is a minor misdemeanor.     R.C.
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                25

4510.12(C)(2).

     {¶53} In the case sub judice, the trial court found appellant

guilty of driving without an operator’s license, after a bench

trial conducted simultaneously with his other charges, and

sentenced him to pay court costs.   However, appellant contends that

the trial court failed to make a finding that appellant has never

held a driver’s license as required by R.C. 4510.12(C)(1) to

qualify the offense as an unclassified misdemeanor.   Appellant

argues that although Officer Steele testified that appellant did

not have a valid license at the time of the offense, he did not

specify whether appellant ever had a license, or that he had one,

but his license expired or had been suspended.   However, because

appellant did not object at trial, we must conduct a plain error

review of this issue.

     {¶54} R.C. 4510.12(B) allows non-certified copies of LEADS

records or BMV records to be submitted as prima facie evidence of

the fact that an individual did not have a valid driver’s license

at the time of an alleged R.C. 4510.12(A)(1) violation.   Further,

R.C. 4510.12(B) provides that “[t]he person charged with a

violation of division (A)(1) or (2) of this section may offer

evidence to rebut this prima-facie evidence.”    We find no LEADS or

BMV records in the record or evidence that appellant rebutted the

charge. The traffic ticket is marked “No OL” and cites R.C.
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                                 26

4510.12, but does not specify (C)(1) or (C)(2).    Officer Steele

testified at trial that he checked appellant’s record “and it

showed that he did not have a valid license through the State of

Ohio nor any other state for that matter.”    While the testimony

could arguably be viewed that appellant “never” had a license, the

testimony sufficiently established that appellant did not have a

valid license as per R.C. 4510.12(C)(1) to support an unclassified

misdemeanor.   We also recognize that appellant offered no evidence

to the contrary.   See e.g., State v. Deacey, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 27308, 2017-Ohio-8102.    Here appellant did not appear to

dispute at trial that he had no valid license on June 15, 2021.

See State v. Thomas, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 89, 2009-Ohio-

2652, ¶, State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1214, 2019-

Ohio-4613 (upheld R.C. 4510.12 conviction even though traffic

ticket did not include degree of misdemeanor or indicate whether

defendant had prior offenses).    Consequently, after our review we

believe that the state adduced sufficient evidence to support

appellant’s conviction for violating R.C. 4510.12.    Therefore, we

overrule appellant’s final assignment of error.

    {¶55} Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

                             JUDGMENT ENTRY
ROSS, 22CA38 & 22CA39                                               27

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed.   Appellant shall
pay the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Chillicothe Municipal Court to carry this judgment
into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail has
been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to
allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or
the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule
II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal
prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the
date of such dismissal.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

    BY:_____________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                         NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.