Court Opinion

ID: 9811154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:11:22.799737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:25.771258
License: Public Domain

Stacy, C. J.,
concurring specially: The intent of the testator, as gathered from the language used by him, is to govern in the interpretation of his will, unless contrary to some rule of law or at variance with public policy. Heyer v. Bulluck, 210 N. C., 321, 186 S. E., 357.
One rule of law is, that technical terms are to be given their legal significance, unless it appear from the will itself that they were used in some other permissible sense. Goode v. Hearne, 180 N. C., 475, 105 S. E., 5; May v. Lewis, 132 N. C., 115, 43 S. E., 550. Another is, that a restraint on alienation, though for a limited time, annexed to a devise in fee, is void. Williams v. McPherson, 216 N. C., 565, 5 S. E. (2d), 830; Douglass v. Stevens, 214 N. C., 688, 200 S. E., 366; Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C., 460, 48 S. E., 758. Still another, that where real estate is devised in fee simple, a subsequent clause in the will disposing of the remainder or what is left of the property after the death of the devisee is not to defeat the devise, nor limit it to a life estate. Heefner v. Thornton, 216 N. C., 702, 6 S. E. (2d), 506; Barco v. Owens, 212 N. C., 30, 192 S. E., 862. And still another, that the law favors the fee construction. Lineberger v. Phillips, 198 N. C., 661, 153 S. E., 118.
For example, in Bank v. Dortch, 186 N. C., 510, 120 S. E., 60, a devise to James Maynard of one-third of testator’s Reedy Creek land, “his lifetime only, and then to his bodily heirs,” was held to be a fee under the rule in Shelley’s case, notwithstanding the express limitation, “his lifetime only.” The subsequent use of technical terms was held to overcome the prior limitation. And in Douglass v. Stevens, supra, a restraint on alienation, though clearly intended by the testator, was disregarded as repugnant to the original devise. And further, in Barbee v. Thompson, 194 N. C., 411, 139 S. E., 838, an indefinite devise was held to be a devise in fee.
So, here, if we give to the words “in fee simple” their legal significance, the devise is to Chas. L. Barnes in fee simple with an attempted restraint on the use, which attempted restraint is to be disregarded as void. Barco v. Owens, supra.
No case has been found to support a different interpretation. Indeed, it is provided by C. S., 4162, that when real estate is devised to any person, the same shall be held and construed a devise in fee simple, unless such devise shall, in plain and express language show, or it shall *258be plainly intended by the will, or some part thereof, that the testator intended to convey an estate of less dignity. Jolley v. Humphries, 204 N. C., 672, 167 S. E., 417.
When a testator uses the words “in fee simple” he is supposed to know what they mean. At least, we cannot assume that he was ignorant of their meaning. He used them to express his intent. Leathers v. Gray, 101 N. C., 162, 7 S. E., 657. It is not to be overlooked that in the quest for the intent of the testator, it is “not the intention that may have existed in his mind, if at variance with the obvious meaning of the words used, but that which is expressed by the language he has employed.” McIver v. McKinney, 184 N. C., 393, 114 S. E., 399. See, also, Hodges v. Stewart, post, 290.
It appears, however, that Rettie J. Barnes predeceased her husband. Hence, the reciprocal devise to her lapsed, C. S., 4166, not being applicable, Farnell v. Dongan, 207 N. C., 611, 178 S. E., 77; Beach v. Gladstone, ibid., 876, 178 S. E., 546, and Lillian L. Coats takes the property under Item 4 of her father’s will. Perhaps it should be noted that this view of the case was not considered in the court below and the parties have not been heard in respect thereof.
BaeNhill and WiNBOENE, JJ\, join in this opinion.