Court Opinion

ID: 9864616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:26:09.24455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:52.785147
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
This cause is pending upon petition for rehearing. Before making formal disposition of the petition we deem it advisable to correct certain inaccuracies and misstatements and to meet arguments contained in it. It is said that appellant’s “offer of reconciliation did not come too late. In this we have attacked and now attack the finding paragraph four ...” The finding thus alluded to was the finding that appellant deserted respondent on December 26, 1909. No semblance of an attack has heretofore been made upon that finding and we correctly stated in our opinion that the finding was “neither quoted nor mentioned in the brief of either party.” The attack now made in the petition for rehearing comes too late, but we nevertheless shall pay some attention to it. Appellant says that the parties to the cause did not finally separate until December 26, 1911, and that there is no evidence to show a final separation, much, less-a desertion, on December 26,1909. This point is made after a quotation of a statement which, strangely enough, appears in respondent’s brief, and which was not overlooked by us in the preparation of our opinion. Respondent says in her brief that the parties “continued to live together until, as appellant testifies, ... ‘I left the 27th day of March, 1911,’ and ‘I left home the 26th day of December, 1911,’ ” etc., and, in truth, there is a statement to that effect in the record testimony of appellant. However, the insertion of the year as 1911 occurred either through an error of the stenographic reporter who was at the trial or through á slip of appellant’s tongue. This is so apparent from the entire record in the cause that we did not deem the circumstance worthy of mention in the opinion. That the statement of the year as 1911 is a palpable error appears from the following, as well as from many other matters in the record: The son of the parties testified: “Q. You remember the time that your father left home on December 26, 1911 or 1912— A. December 26, 1909, yes, sir.” Not only does this interruption of counsel show, but the entire tenor of the examination of the witness shows, that he was testifying concerning the final separation of his father and
*32mother. Appellant himself testified: “Q. . . . before you came to California where did you live? A. In Chicago. . . . Q. And when did you leave Chicago? A. I left the 27th day of March, 1911. Q. When did you separate from your wife? A. I separated from my wife in—the 26th day of December, 1909. ... Q. And did you write to your wife after coming out here? A. Yes, sir. Q. How long had you been here; about what date was it . . . that you wrote the first letter? ... A. About May or June, 1911.” Appellant on December 20, 1911, six days before his counsel now contends the final separation occurred, wrote respondent the letter upon which appellant bases his charge of desertion as of January 1, 1912. The letter is set out in the record, is quoted in full in appellant’s brief and likewise in his petition for rehearing. It was postmarked, as shown in the petition for rehearing, as well as in the other places in which it appears, “Bell—Dec. 20, 1911—Cal.” The letter begins, “As it is now about 2 years sins we have seen each other,” etc. We need go no, further in discussing the present point of appellant. So far as the factor of time is concerned, the trial court could have made no finding other than that appellant deserted respondent on December 26, 1909.
Appellant insists that “there can be no justification for the court is finding that the letter offering reconciliation was ambiguous, for three reasons.” The reasons assigned are, first, that the letter of December 20, 1911, containing the offer, was on its face unambiguous; second, that there was no testimony that respondent did not understand the letter, and, third, that respondent testified that her only reason for not accepting the offer was that she did not think it was made in good faith and that she believed appellant had left her without cause. This point we shall now consider at some length, as we decided it in our opinion by the mere statement at its close that the finding in question must stand for the reason that it was made on conflicting evidence. That the disposition thus made of the question was correct will be shown by a reference to a few circumstances disclosed by the record. In the first place, the court’s finding was not alone that the offer was ambiguous, but that “the letters of invitation so written by the plaintiff were so ambiguous and contained so many expressed conditions,” etc. Next, we state some features of the evidence. The letter of December *3320, 1911, was written to respondent and to the son of the parties as joint addressees. It contained, in part, these statements: “ . . . i for my part am willing to forgive all you wronged me, and we will forget all the old truble. ... it is hard to have everything taken from me Home and Family when i am getting old and need you most. . . . My Son George, . . . bee good to your Mother, and help straighten her up—and if there is anything that I can do, please write me I am sending $10 by mail.” Judging from the phraseology of its finding the trial court looked to other letters which passed between the parties as an aid in determining in what light respondent viewed the letter of December 20, 1911, which was evidently delivered to her in due course of mail not far from January 1, 1912, the date of the desertion alleged against her. The consideration of the other letters for such a purpose was surely proper, especially as they were received without objection, and we follow the same course, it being understood that we refer to but a few of the missives which were written by appellant to his wife, many of which, indeed, were not preserved and do not appear in the record. In a letter of February 2, 1915, it is said: “Dear Minnie I love you and always did but the Devil stebbed in between and robbed your heart away from me, i stayed long and waited to se if I ever should get piece, but it onley got wuree. So Wife get rigthsainness pray to our Savior, that you have forgotten read does words carefully and think them over.” In a long letter of date December 15, 1919, appellant wrote in a joint missive to his wife and son: “ ... if you sometime want to make an trip to Los you are both welcome . . . ” In a letter undated as to year, but, judging from its context, written to respondent as late as 1919 or 1920 and perhaps as late as 1921, it is said, “ecsept my indvetetion and come to live with me and be happy, but you must sureley keep pease with me no more like when I was with you, it was hard blow to me to be acused for wath I never dare think for . . . but ve forget all in the past.” The punctuation and spelling in all the letters was very bad, the former often making it difficult for us to apprehend the meaning of the writer. Some such examples will be found in the excerpts above made. As to spelling we select the following instances, among many others, in addition to what is above set forth: Adtorny, altaugh, bierdday, tiered, doce, *34adtencion, glatt, simpaty, fruight, omameltel and pictuare. Considering now another matter, it is to be observed that the parties are both Danes. Two of the letters from appellant to respondent, in fact, were written in the Danish language. The trial judge had respondent before him and thus had the opportunity to determine what knowledge of the English language was possessed by her and what ability she had to master letters written in such wretched English as are those now before us. In addition to all these circumstances, respondent gave testimony to the following effect concerning the letters: “Q. In no letter or card or communication of any sort that you had from him did he offer to provide money for your trip out here? A. No, sir, not once.” In response to a line of questions concerning her testimony in a cause in Chicago to the effect that appellant had not asked her to return to him, respondent concluded: “Well, he hasn’t asked me, only for a visit.” She testified later: “Q. . . . .Now, you never wrote any letters to him at all? A. No, sir. Q. You could write both English and Danish, couldn’t you? A. Well, I could write Danish, anyway.”  The condition of the record being thus exhibited, we are not to determine whether we should have made the same finding which was made by the trial court, but whether the finding actually made was based upon evidence in which there was a substantial conflict. Upon this score we are satisfied with the conclusion reached in our original opinion.
It is said in the petition for rehearing that “An examination of the answer herein discloses that it was in no sense a cross-complaint.” Counsel would have done well to examine the cross-complaint, for a pleading of that character, separate and aside from the answer appears in the record. The pleading is headed ‘ ‘ Cross-Complaint for Maintenance ’ ’ seems upon a cursory examination to state a cause of action, and closes with a prayer for a division of community property and for a permanent .allowance for support and maintenance. Not only does, a cross-complaint appear in the record, but there is also there shown an “Answer to Cross-Complaint” which is signed by appellant’s counsel upon this appeal, the writer of the present petition for rehearing.
Rehearing denied.