Court Opinion

ID: 9715548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:08:28.391048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:35.744980
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
dissenting, was at least in *135agreement that the grandmother could (and he thought, in fact did) voluntarily consent to the search. He stated:
"Mrs. Leath’s voluntary consent was sufficient to validate the search since she owned the house which was searched and the rifle that was taken. It should also be noted that the rifle was not found in petitioner’s private room, nor in any part of the house assigned to him, but in the kitchen behind the door.” 391 US 543, 556, fn 4.
And in Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; 89 S Ct 1420; 22 L Ed 2d 684 (1969), the Supreme Court discussed the joint right to use. Here the Court held that evidence seized from petitioner’s duffel bag was admissible even though consent to search the duffel bag had been given by his cousin Rawls. Justice Marshall stated:
"This duffel bag was being used jointly by petitioner and his cousin Rawls and it had been left in Rawls’ home. * * * Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its search. * * * Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside.” 394 US 731, 740.23
The case at bar does not involve coercion. The wife had freely consented the day before to a search of the house. The two officers who returned on October 12 behaved with perfect courtesy. They did not intimidate the wife into allowing another *136exploratory search. Rather, they politely asked for two specific items which had been seen the day before and informed the wife where they could be found.
In the instant case the wife was a joint owner of the house to be searched, a joint occupant as well as a joint owner of the bedroom where the objects seized were to be found and the checks were from a jointly handled checking account in the wife’s name alone. Thus, it could be said that defendant "assumed the risk” that his wife would turn over the particular items.24 Certainly under the rule in Frazier and the dicta in Bumper the wife could give consent to search, or as actually happened herself pick up and hand over the checks. The *137notebook the wife picked up was in the same bedroom and its delivery was covered by the rule in Frazier and all of the dicta in Bumper except that in the case of the notebook, it is not as clear as in the case of the checks that the notebook was jointly controlled. There is some evidence tending in that direction, and none tending toward exclusive control by the defendant. In any event the rule in Frazier does not require that the object searched for be jointly owned. In the dicta in Bumper it was merely observed that the object searched for was owned by the householder giving consent, obviously strengthening the case but not necessarily making it critical.
The defendant relies on three Michigan Court of Appeals cases to support his position that his wife could not consent to the second seizure. In People v Overall, 7 Mich App 153; 151 NW2d 225 (1967), the Court of Appeals ruled that the grandmother of the defendant who owned the premises where defendant resided could not authorize a search of the bedroom in that home occupied by the defendant. The Court held that the gun barrel seized was not admissible in evidence.
The facts of Overall are clearly distinguishable from the instant case in that there the room was exclusively occupied by defendant in Overall, whereas in the instant case there was joint occupancy. Likewise in Overall there is no question of joint ownership of the objects searched for and seized.
In People v Smith, 19 Mich App 359; 172 NW2d 902 (1969), the investigating officers went to the home of the defendant looking for him, were admitted by his brother, also a resident of the apartment, and testified that the brother voluntarily showed them through the apartment, produced a *138spent shell from a wastebasket, and on the second, visit a few hours later, asked for and received a box of unused shells. Both the spent and unused shells were admitted into evidence. The Court per Justice Levin, then a Court of Appeals Judge, in a well reasoned opinion held that the consent was invalid and the seized evidence inadmissible. Then Judge Levin analyzed the totality of the situation relying on such factors as 1) the brother was not informed of the purpose of the search; 2) the brother was not advised that he could refuse to permit a search; 3) the coercive atmosphere in which the search took place; 4) the fact that the apartment was defendant’s and that he paid the rent and was supporting his brother; and 5) the consent given was not a knowing, freely-given, voluntary consent.
Our case is quite different from Smith on the facts. First, the wife had seen the consent signed by the defendant giving permission for a general exploratory search. Since her husband had been jailed on a charge of murder, she knew that the search’s purpose would be to find any evidence which might implicate him in the murder. She also had been present at the search the day before. The atmosphere of the seizure was free from coercion and took place in a house which was half-owned by the wife. There is no evidence that she did not consent freely, knowingly and voluntarily to the search on the previous day.
In People v Flowers, 23 Mich App 523; 179 NW2d 56 (1970), the Court of Appeals dealt with parental consent to the search of their 17-year-old son’s room. The father was advised of the purpose of the search (to find narcotics). There was no coercion, and consent was given. Narcotics were found in the son’s bedroom. The son was being supported by the father. The Court found that *139though the consent was valid in that there was no coercion and that it was freely and voluntarily given, the father had no personal right to give the consent as he was merely an outsider.
Flowers is distinguishable from the instant case in the same way as Overall. A private rather than a shared room was searched. The defendant’s property rather than jointly owned property was the object of the search.
Therefore, based on the totality of facts and circumstances, on balance we conclude that the wife could and did consent to get the two items requested by the police and deliver these items to them. She had knowledge from the previous day what the purpose of the search was. She was not coerced in any way. She knew that her husband had signed a waiver. We think her consent was freely, knowingly and voluntarily given. She had joint use and control of the house which extended to the bedroom where the items were found. Further there is no evidence that defendant exercised exclusive control or possession over those items seized on October 12. For a similar conclusion see Carlton v State, 111 Fla 777; 149 So 767 (1933); State v Cairo, 74 RI 377; 60 A2d 841 (1948); People v Shambley, 4 Ill 2d 38; 122 NE2d 172 (1954); and Embry v State, 46 Wis 2d 151; 174 NW2d 521 (1970).25
*140C. Conclusion as to Search and Seizure
The evidence seized on October 11 and on October 12 was admissible.
V. SUMMARY
There was no denial of the right to speedy trial. The introduction of evidence of previous acts to establish intent was not error, nor was it error by the trial court to fail to give a limiting instruction as to this evidence when none was requested. Last, the evidence seized on October 11 and 12 was admissible. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and T. E. Brennan, and Swainson, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.

*141
APPENDIX A

[ ] indicate appellate action

1967

10/11 Defendant arrested and incarcerated without bail.
10/18 Defendant petitioned for counsel as indigent—hearing thereon.
10/27 Further hearing on petition for counsel as indigent.
11/16 Preliminary examination with special counsel appointed therefor. Bound over to stand trial for murder.
12/26 Further hearing on petition for counsel as indigent.

1968

1/9 Trial court held defendant not entitled to counsel as indigent.
1/12 Order on above.
1/18 Counsel appointed to appeal i/12 order denying counsel.
C Ap 2/10 [Counsel filed application for leave to appeal.]
C Ap 3/29 [Leave granted; also leave to Prosecuting Attorneys Association to intervene amicus.]
[Order cutting time for briefs in half.]
[Because Court of Appeals rules against oral argument before October term appellant and prosecutor filed stipulation waiving oral argument.]
C Ap 7/1 [Defendant’s appeal counsel filed brief and motion to advance citing incarceration.]
*142[Prosecutor and Prosecuting Attorneys Association agreed.]
C Ap 7/10 [Court of Appeals denied motion to advance.]
7/24 Prosecutor answered speedy trial motion.
8/19 Prosecutor’s answer to speedy trial motion served on defendant.
C Ap 11/13 [Court of Appeals took petition for counsel under advisement.]

1969

4/10 Defendant’s speedy trial motion filed 6/20/68 heard 294 days after filing.
4/16 Defendant’s speedy trial motion denied.
C Ap 4/23 [Court of Appeals ruled trial court had erred in refusing trial counsel 161 days after case taken under advisement and 297 days after filing motion and stipulation to advance.]
4/25 Trial judge on receipt of Court of Appeals Opinion assigned counsel and gave option for trial in May or August. Assigned counsel opted for latter.
6/19 Defendant’s assigned trial counsel moved to quash for denial of speedy trial.
8/18 Trial Court denied motion to quash.
9/19 Defendant moved for immediate trial and case set for October.
10/15 Defendant moved for continuance after trial court granted the Prosecution’s motion to endorse additional witnesses on the information.
10/17 Trial Court grants continuance.

*143
1970

1/20 Case comes to trial 27 months after defendant’s arrest.
1/30 Defendant convicted of murder in the first degree.

 The United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971) was again faced with the wife waiver problem, but never reached the issue as they held that there had been no search and seizure within the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Coolidge also involved two searches. During the first the husband in the presence of the wife produced three guns. Later to different officers the wife showed four of her husband’s guns without being asked to do so as Mrs. Chism had been in our case.

 In Stoner, the United States Supreme Court stated that Fourth Amendment rights were "not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of apparent authority” nor by " 'subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law ** * * ” 376 US 483, 488. In Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294, 304; 87 S Ct 1642; 18 L Ed 2d 782 (1967), the Court in discussing the Fourth Amendment stated:
"We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.”
A different thread of reasoning, "assuming the risk” as stated in Frazier was followed in the earlier cases of Lopez v United States, 373 US 427, 439; 83 S Ct 1381; 10 L Ed 2d 462 (1963) and Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293; 87 S a 408; 17 L Ed 2d 374 (1966). As the Court stated in Hoffa:
"Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” 385 US 293, 302.
And in the dissenting opinion in Lopez, as to the matter of misplaced trust, it was said, "It is the kind of risk we necessarily assume * * * .” 373 US 427, 465.
This line of reasoning in Hoffa and Lopez "remained unaffected by Katz." United States v White, 401 US 745, 749; 91 S Ct 1122; 28 L Ed 2d 453 (1971). That is, the theory of a justifiable reliance of privacy, in Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), did not preclude situations in which a person relinquished his right of privacy by "assuming the risk” that someone else he had confided in, either in keeping secrets or sharing property, would divulge the secret or property to someone else.

 In Carlton, the police went to defendant’s house to further their investigation. Defendant was at home and consented to the search of the house. Defendant was then taken to jail. On the next day the police returned to the home and with the consent of and in the presence of defendant’s wife, made a second search. The Florida Supreme Court held that, "[pjiecing the whole procedure together,” there was no violation of defendant’s search and seizure right. The Court relied on the defendant’s consent, the conduct of the police, and the presence and consent of the wife. The Court found that this set of circumstances was not controlled by the general rule that a wife cannot consent to a search of premises owned by her husband without his permission.
*140Our case is even stronger since the wife was a joint owner and user of the house.
In Cairo, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered the wife consent problem. Here, the wife was a joint owner of the two-family dwelling along with the defendant husband. She gave police her consent to search the home. A search of the cellar, used in common by both families, revealed a bag of tools used in the break-in of the store and three faucets similar to those taken from the store. In upholding this search and seizure, the Court stated the wife could consent in her own right as a joint owner and occupant of the premises. Further, the Court relied on the fact that the evidence was seized in a portion of the house over which defendant did not have exclusive use and control.
In Shambley, defendant was convicted of assaulting his wife with a deadly weapon (i.e., a gun). The assault took place in the home jointly owned by defendant and his wife. After defendant’s arrest, the wife gave her consent for the officers to search the house for the gun. It was found in the garage. The Court held this evidence admissible following the rule that where two' persons have equal rights to the use or occupation of premises, either may give consent to a search and the evidence thus disclosed can be used against either. Again, the wife was acting in her own right and the evidence was found in a part of the house used by both defendant and his wife.
In Embry the two defendants had embarked together on a forgery adventure. The Court upheld evidence found in a search of a car and trailer rented by one of the defendants in furtherance of the scheme. This defendant consented to the search. The Court held the evidence admissible against both defendants as they were acting together in this forgery venture and thus had equal rights to use of the car and trailer.