Court Opinion

ID: 9808780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:50:42.935593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:33.174387
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
concurs in the result upon the ground that the contract of the relief department of the defendant company is invalid because it is in violation of both the Federal and State statutes which have been passed for the protection of the employees of railroad companies. It is so held because a violation of the State statute, in Barden v. R. R., 152 N. C., 318, and no reason has been shown, in my judgment, to overrule the able and well-considered opinion of the Court in that case which was written by Mr. Justice Maiming.
The Fellow-servant Act of North Carolina of 1897, now Rev., 2646, giving employees of railroads an action for wrongful death or personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant or a fellow-servant or from defective machinery, ways, or appliances of a railroad company, provides: “Any contract or agreement, expressed or implied, made by any employee of such company to waive the benefit of this section shall be null and void.”
*67•Every employee of the defendant company is required to join this “relief department,” and the contract which he signs upon entering its relief department contains this provision: “I also agree that in consideration of the amounts paid by the said company for the maintenance of the said relief department, and the guarantee by the said company of the payment of said benefits, the acceptance by me of benefits for injury shall operate as a release and satisfaction of all claims against said company and all other-companies associated therewith in the administration of the relief department, for damages arising from or growing out of said injury.”
This contract made prior to the injury is invalid because in violation of the express terms of the statute. It is also without consideration, for the evidence in this case does not show that the defendant in fact contributed any money to the department or for its maintenance. It appears from the rules and regulations that said relief department is a bureau of the defendant and that its rules and regulations are prescribed by the defendant. Also, that under those rules and regulations the defendant has sole control of the department and of its money; that the rules and regulations can be changed by the defendant without the consent of the members of the department, and cannot be changed without the consent of the defendant. It was admitted in the argument here and is a well-known fact that no employee of the defendant can remain in its service unless he is a member of this department. The so-called relief department was not established until after the enactment of the act of 1897, called the Fellow-servant Act.
From the above condensed statement of the evidence, it is clear that the sole object of the relief department is for the relief of the railroad company by requiring the employees of that company to raise by a forced contribution out of their salaries and wages a fund out of which all damages for personal injuries or wrongful death caused to employees by the negligence of the defendant shall be paid.
It is public policy as declared by statute that, in case of injury or death resulting to an employee from the negligence of a railroad company or of a fellow-servant, such loss shall fall *68upon tb© company whose negligence caused it; and thus the stockholders will see that their officers and agents take proper steps to prevent such negligence and to safeguard by proper care the lives and limbs of its employees. This safeguard is entirely swept away by this device of a relief department whereby the employees are compulsorily required to raise out of their own meager wages a fund of $9 to $45 per annum from each employee, amounting in the aggregate to many hundreds of thousands of dollars annually, out of which fund the damages for the injuries and deaths which may be inflicted upon them by the negligence of the railroad company shall be paid. The defendant is the only railroad company in this State which has resorted to this device.
If, after an injury has been inflicted, there is a fair and free settlement made between the injured party and the company for the damages sustained by the negligence of the corporation, which damages are paid out of the funds of the company, it would be upheld by the courts. But such arrangement needs no previous agreement as is here required to be signed by each employee of the defendant company. Nor should such a settlement be made out of funds raised by involuntary contributions exacted by the company out of the wages of its employees. Nor is it a valid contract to impose upon plaintiff the loss of all he has paid in if he elects to sue or if he leaves the service.
The so-called relief department is also in violation of the Federal Employer’s Liability Act of 22 April, 1908. That stattfte, after giving employees of any railroad company an action for injury caused by the negligence of any railroad company or of fellow-servants, or by reason of any defects in appliances, machinery, etc., provides:
“Sec. 5. Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself, from any liability created by this act, shall to that extent be void.”
The debates in both houses of Congress over the enactment of this section, as preserved in the Congressional Record, show that the object of this section was to prohibit these Relief Departments which had sprung up in the several States immediately *69after tbe passage of State “Employers’ Liability” acts, and wbicb acts bad been beld valid by courts wbicb, to say tbe least, were not unfriendly to these great aggregations of capital. Tbe labor associations of tbe country were powerful enough to have their rights presented in tbe debates in Congress and to secure tbe enactment of tbe above section for their protection. If tbe above section does not have that effect tbe mind of man cannot conceive a form of words wbicb will have that- effect.
In a very recent case, decided by tbe United States Supreme Court, 30 October, 1911, R. R. v. United States, it was beld that when tbe railroad company was operating a railroad which was “a part of a through highway over wbicb traffic was continually being moved from one State to another,” hauled over a part of its road five cars, tbe couplers of wbicb were defective, two of tbe cars being used at tbe time in moving interstate traffic and tbe other three in moving intrastate traffic, though tbe use of tbe last three was not in connection with any car or cars used in interstate commerce, yet, tbe Federal liability statute applied to said three ears, and tbe defendant was liable to tbe penalty for not having automatic couplers thereon, because tbe act applies “on any railroad engaged in interstate commerce.” If above decision is controlling, certainly the relief department of tbe defendant is forbidden by tbe Federal statute. While tbe three cars in tbe above case were not directly in use in interstate commerce, every employee of the defendant company- is more or less connected in some way every day and hour with tbe transportation of through freight or passengers by this company wbicb is “engaged in interstate commerce.” ”