Court Opinion

ID: 9668975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:35:10.63782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:50.843808
License: Public Domain

COOPER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, not because the admission of the records of Cabell Huntington Hospital was an alleged “harmless error,” but because the alleged error in the introduction of those records was not preserved for appellate review. I strongly disagree with the majority’s analysis of KRE 902(8) and its unnecessary decision to overrule Young v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 670 (Ky.1998), which holds that out-of-state criminal (public) records are self-authenticating under KRE 902(8). Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under KRE 404(b)(1) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Ante, at 19.
*29I. MEDICAL RECORDS.
Appellant and the victim, M.A., were neighbors. On November 16, 2002, Appellant drove M.A. to Morehead, where M.A. obtained an Emergency Protective Order (EPO) against her husband. Later that night, Appellant and M.A. engaged in sexual intercourse at M.A.’s residence. M.A. testified that Appellant raped her. Appellant claims the intercourse was consensual (though he did not testify at trial). Two days later, M.A. met with her husband in Mt. Sterling and told him that Appellant had raped her. The two drove together to Cabell Huntington Hospital in Huntington, West Virginia, because M.A.’s husband was afraid he would be arrested for violating the EPO if they went to a hospital in Kentucky. It is the admission of the medical records pertaining to this emergency room visit that the majority concludes was “harmless error.”

A. If there was error, it was not harmless.

The emergency room report dictated by Dr. Bryan N. Chapman reflects that his examination revealed “[n]o evidence of trauma” of the genitalia and a “minimal eechymosis and tenderness just above the bilateral elbows.” The report also describes in detail M.A.’s version of the events, viz:
This pleasant and cooperative 89-year-old white female relates that this evening someone, whom she knows, watched her as she left the bathroom. When she got out of the bathroom, she states that he threw her on the bed and held her down against her will. Whereupon doing this, again she was resisting the whole time, he took her clothes off and inserted his erected penis into her vagina. She states that she continued to put up a resistance all along throughout all of this occurrence.
The emergency room records also contain a nurse’s note handwritten by Marsha Taylor, R.N., that M.A. “stated she had been raped by known assailant on Sat. 11-16-02.”
The only other evidence offered to prove that the intercourse was not consensual was M.A.’s own -testimony and a secretly tape-recorded conversation in which Appellant apologized to M.A. and her husband, promised never to hurt M.A. again, and asked them not to involve the law. However, Appellant did not admit during this conversation that he had raped M.A. Unlike the majority, I do not regard this ambiguous tape-recorded conversation as so damning as to render harmless the introduction of the medical records, which substantially bolstered M.A.’s claim of rape. “The relevant inquiry under the harmless error doctrine % whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Ky.1998) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). This is the same “harmless error” standard reaffirmed in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). “An error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, under Fahy, be conceived of as harmless.” Id. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct at 828. The medical records confirmed M.A.’s claim that she suffered braising as a result of her encounter with Appellant. They also contained a prior consistent statement made two days after the event. Obviously, this evidence “might have contributed to the conviction.”

B. If there was error, it was not preserved.

The majority opinion concludes that the hospital records were not properly authen*30ticated under either KRE 902(8) or KRE 902(11). However, when the records were offered into evidence, Appellant did not object on grounds of improper authentication (in fact, a review of the videotape of the trial reveals that defense counsel did not even examine the custodian’s certification/affidavit), but only objected on grounds that he was denied his right to confront the witnesses against him, specifically, his right to cross-examine the doctor and the nurse. The hearsay issue raised by Appellant is, of course, resolved by KRE 803(6), the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Since Appellant did not raise the authentication issue concerning which the majority finds error, it was not preserved. for appellate review. Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63, 75 (Ky.2000) (“Where a party specifies his grounds for an objection at trial, he cannot present a new theory of error on appeal.”); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (Ky.1998) (“Error is not preserved if the wrong reason is stated for the objection.”); Ruppee v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Ky.1991) (“A new theory of error cannot be presented on appeal.”).

C. A sworn certification satisfies the requirements of KRE 902(8).

The majority wrongly concludes that a certification of a records custodian sworn to before a notary public is insufficient to satisfy KRE 902(8). This conclusion is premised upon a hypertechnical distinction between jurats and certificates of acknowledgment. Ante, at 26. That erroneous conclusion will unjustifiably exclude many otherwise self-authenticating documents from the ambit of KRE 902(8). That is especially true of documents admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule, KRE 803(8), which does not require the same strict foundation requirements as the business records exception, KRE 803(6). See Prater v. Cabinet for Human Res., 954 S.W.2d 954, 957-58 (Ky.1997). The documents admitted in Young v. Commonwealth were out-of-state criminal records that qualified as public records and did not need to satisfy the more stringent requirements of KRE 902(11), which pertains only to business records. 968 S.W.2d at 674.
KRE 902(8) provides for self-authentication of “[djocuments accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed in the manner provided by law before a notary public or other officer authorized by law to take acknowledgments.” Professor Lawson notes that the Rule “is silent with respect to the specific contents of acknowledgments (requiring only that they be executed as provided by law).” Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 7.15[3], at 520 (4th ed. Lexis-Nexis 2003). KRS 423.130 is the source of substantive requirements for acknowledgments, requiring the person taking the acknowledgment to certify only that:
(1) The person acknowledging appeared before him and acknowledged he executed the instrument; and
(2) The person acknowledging was known to the person taking the acknowledgment or that the person taking the acknowledgment had satisfactory evidence that the person acknowledging was the person described in and who executed the instrument.
KRS 423.140, which governs the acceptance of certificates of acknowledgment performed outside of Kentucky, demonstrates that the term “acknowledgment” is intended to be an inclusive concept:
The form of a certificate of acknowledgment used by a person whose authority is recognized under KRS 423.110 shall be accepted in this state if:
(1) The certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or regulations of this state;
*31(2) The certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or regulations applicable in the place in which the acknowledgment is taken; or
(3) The certificate contains the words “acknowledged before me,” or their substantial equivalent.
(Emphasis added.) Rather than take a restrictive approach to the acceptance of out-of-state acknowledgments, the General Assembly provided three instances in which they must be accepted. This fact, as well as the “substantial equivalent” language of subsection (3), demonstrates that the Kentucky concept of an “acknowledgment” is not restricted to the technical definitions cited by the majority, but rather is governed by substance.
The majority cites Hub City Wholesale Electric, Inc. v. Mik-Beth Electrical Co., Ltd,., 621 S.W.2d 242 (Ky.App.1981), for the proposition that acknowledgments and jurats are distinct concepts. Ante, at 26. The distinction between an acknowledgment and a jurat is indeed significant where the law requires a sworn statement, i.e., a jurat, as was the case in Hub City, 621 S.W.2d at 243. Where the law requires only an acknowledgment, however, it is a distinction without a difference. Obviously, an affidavit is a higher form of authentication than an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgment consists of an oral declaration of the party executing the instrument and a written certificate attesting to the oral declaration. An acknowledgment does not constitute an “affidavit” because it does not purport to be a certification that the person acknowledging it swears to the truth of the matter set out. A requirement that a paper be “sworn to” contemplates the execution of an affidavit that the facts contained in it are true, and not an acknowledgment.
3 Am.Jur.2d Affidavits, § 2 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
KRE 902(8) is virtually identical to Federal Rule 902(8), substituting only the word “before” in place of the Federal Rule’s word “by.” Like Kentucky, most states that have adopted the federal rules have also adopted Rule 902(8). Every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue has held that foreign public records accompanied by a certification, such as the criminal records admitted in Young v. Commonwealth, are self-authenticating under Rule 902(8). E.g., Raley v. Parke, 945 F.2d 137, 141-42 n. 4 (6th Cir.1991) (certified copy of guilty plea form), rev’d on other grounds by Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); United States v. M’Biye, 655 F.2d 1240, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“[T]he Chang affidavit fits squarely within Rule 902(8) .... The Chang affidavit [attesting to the absence of a public record, Rule 803(10) ] was executed and sworn to before a notary public of the State of New York, in accordance with the law of the state.”); People v. Jenkins, 717 P.2d 994, 995 (Colo.Ct.App.1985) (foreign record of criminal conviction certified as true and correct by records custodian and acknowledged before notary); Giles v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 48, 56-57 (D.C.1988) (notarized chemist’s report of analysis of controlled substance); McLeod v. State, 56 S.W.3d 704, 709-10 (Tex.Ct.App.2001) (foreign abstract of record and fingerprint card regarding prior conviction certified by the custodian of the records and notarized by notary public). The majority opinion’s holding to the contrary will require custodians of out-of-state criminal records to appear in person at Kentucky trials whenever the Commonwealth wishes to seek sentence enhancement on the basis of a prior out-of-state conviction.
In addition, many courts have held that private and business records, as well as *32mere affidavits, are self-authenticating under Rule 902(8). E.g., Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Cont’l III. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 576 F.Supp. 991, 995-96 (N.D.Ill.1983) (affidavit of custodian of corporate records authenticating attached documents, including contract claimed to have been breached); In re Mezvinsky, 265 B.R. 681, 692 n. 19 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2001) (“While the Slosberg Appraisals are sworn and notarized and thus self-authenticating, Fed.R.Evid. 902(8), the Young Inventory is not authenticated by affidavit or deposition testimony.”); United States v. Woodard, 39 M.J. 1022, 1026 (A.C.M.R.1994) (affidavit describing child sexual offender treatment program); Barnes v. Barnes, 311 Ark. 287, 843 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1992) (notarized paternity test results); City of Westminster v. MOA, Inc., 867 P.2d 137, 141-42 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (report of investigation attached to sworn response to interrogatory), abrogated on other grounds by Mitchell v. Wilmore, 981 P.2d 172, 175 (Colo.1999); Lister v. NationsBank, 329 S.C. 133, 494 S.E.2d 449, 453 (Ct.App.1997) (affidavit of Aruban attorney explaining applicable law of Aruba).
Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick provide the clearest guidance on the admissibility of affidavits of authentication under FRE 902(8):
In addition to executing certificates of acknowledgment, notaries administer oaths and certify (by means of what is usually called a “jurat”) that a particular witness gave certain testimony or made a certain statement under oath, or that an affiant executed an affidavit under oath. Although FRE 902(8) specifically embraces only acknowledged documents, the responsibility of a notary at least to ascertain the identity of a witness or affiant, and correctly to certify that he “swore to” his testimony or statement, justifies treating sworn documents accompanied by the notary’s jurat as self-authenticating too. Of course, acknowledged documents are likely to have non-hearsay significance in a case, or to fit within the hearsay exceptions for property records or documents affecting property interests, while sworn statements may fall outside all the hearsay exceptions. But, if a sworn statement satisfies a hearsay exception or is offered for a nonhearsay use, the notary’s jurat should obviate the need for extrinsic evidence of authenticity.
5 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 546, at 199 (2d ed.1994).
For authentication purposes, there is no principled difference between a formal certificate of acknowledgment and a jurat verifying that an affiant swore to his own signed statement. Because KRE 902(8) requires only that acknowledgments be executed as provided by law, and because Kentucky law views acknowledgments with an eye toward substance over form, I would hold that an affiant’s own statement, signed, sworn, and accompanied by a jurat, passes muster as self-authenticating under KRE 902(8). Moreover, because of the lesser foundation requirements imposed by the Rules of Evidence upon parties seeking to introduce public records, Prater, 954 S.W.2d at 957-58, certified copies of out-of-state public records should be considered as self-authenticating under KRE 902(8). To hold otherwise would place an undue burden upon the Commonwealth in any case in which it seeks sentence enhancement based on a prior out-of-state conviction. Finally, I agree with the majority that application of KRE 902(8) to business records would render KRE 902(11) superfluous. If the custodian of the hospital records in this case had additionally sworn that the entries in the records were “made, at or near the time of the occurrence of *33the matters set forth, by (or from information transmitted by) a person with knowledge of those matters,” such, coupled with the statements already present in her affidavit, would have satisfied the foundational requirements of KRE 902(11). Since Appellant did not object to either the foundation for the business records or their authentication, that issue is not before us for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW OF KRE 404(b)(1) EVIDENCE.
In reviewing the admission of evidence of Appellant’s prior misdemeanor charge of terroristic threatening against M.A.’s husband (who filed the criminal complaint that led to the charge), the majority opinion states that “[w]e will not disturb a trial court’s decision to admit evidence absent an abuse of discretion.” Ante, at 19. That is only partially true with respect to evidence offered under KRE 404(b)(1) and is apt to mislead trial courts in future cases.
In Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882 (Ky.1994), we established a three-part test of admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, viz: (1) Is the evidence relevant? (2) Does it have probative value? (8) Is its probative value substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect? Id. at 889-91.
The “probative value” aspect of the Bell test relates to whether there is sufficient evidence that the “other crime, wrong, or act” actually occurred. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890. See also Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 400 (Ky.2004); Lawson, supra, § 2.25[3][e], at 130-31. It has nothing to do with the weight of the evidence, as suggested by the majority opinion, ante, at 19 (“The evidence had immense probative value because, if true, it showed that Appellant had a motive to rape [M.A.], and thus it tended to prove that he committed the crime.”). The “immensity” of the probative value pertains only to the KRE 403 analysis. Whether the “other crime, wrong, or act” actually occurred is a factual inquiry under KRE 104(a) and is properly reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard. United States v. Myers, 102 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir.1996).
The relevancy inquiry relates to whether the evidence is admissible for a “proper purpose” under KRE 404(b)(1), ie., some purpose other than to prove bad character or propensity. This is a mixed issue of fact and law. Whether the purpose for which the evidence is offered is a “proper purpose” is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Myers, 102 F.3d at 233. If the evidence falls within one of the “other purpose” exceptions expressly fisted in KRE 404(b)(1), i.e., motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or the absence of mistake or accident, the resolution is obvious. However, the fisted “other purpose” exceptions are illustrative, not exhaustive. For example, in Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 29-32, evidence strongly suggesting that the defendant had suborned perjury was admissible as evidence tending to prove “consciousness of guilt.” And in Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 450 (Ky.1999), evidence of the defendant’s voluntary participation in a three-person sexual encounter was relevant to rebut her claim that her husband had forced her to engage in such acts. Whether the evidence tends to prove a valid “other purpose” is a question of fact reviewed for “clear error.” St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 535 (Ky.2004).
Having determined that the other act actually occurred and that evidence of that act is admissible for a proper purpose, the trial court must then make a KRE 403 *34determination of whether the probative value of the evidence of the other act is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890. The resolution of that issue, which is essentially a balancing process, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999). English,