Court Opinion

ID: 9901289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 16:16:13.964494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.049958
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Fulton, Friedman and Chaney
              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              BARRY EUGENE LEWIS
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1285-22-1                                   JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
                                                                               NOVEMBER 21, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                             Stephen J. Telfeyan, Judge

                              Michelle C.F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney (Virginia Indigent
                              Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              Suzanne Seidel Richmond, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Barry Eugene Lewis appeals the circuit court’s judgment revoking his previously

              suspended sentence and imposing a sentence of “time served” in jail, 39 days.1 Lewis argues

              that the circuit court erred in finding that he violated a special condition of his probation and

              ruling that his probation violation was not a technical violation under Code § 19.2-306.1. Lewis

              also contends that the circuit court erred in sentencing him to more than 14 days in jail, beyond

              the maximum sentence allowed for a second technical violation under Code § 19.2-306.1(C).

              For the following reasons, this Court reverses the circuit court’s judgment, vacates the revocation

              sentencing order, and remands for resentencing in accordance with Code § 19.2-306.1(C).

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       The circuit court’s revocation order did not specify the number of days Lewis had
              served. Lewis contends that he had served 39 days, whereas the Commonwealth maintains that
              he had served “approximately 40 days.”
                                         BACKGROUND

                                       A. Prior Proceedings

       In October 2016, Lewis pleaded guilty to larceny, third or subsequent offense. In

October 2017, the circuit court sentenced him to incarceration for 3 years, with 2 years and 11

months suspended. The suspended sentence was conditioned on Lewis’s compliance with

supervised probation “for an indeterminate period.” The sentencing order further directed, in

relevant part, that Lewis “shall complete any substance abuse screening, assessment, testing, and

treatment as directed by the Department of Corrections as part of the defendant’s sentence.”

       In March 2020, Lewis’s probation officer filed a major violation report alleging that he

had violated his probation by (1) failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions “to report

to and complete substance abuse treatment at the New Life Center in Virginia Beach,” and (2)

testing positive for cocaine seven times. The circuit court issued a capias in March 2020, and

Lewis was arrested two years later, in April 2022.

       At the probation revocation hearing in April 2022, the circuit court amended the

probation violation report to also allege that Lewis “absconded for 2 years [and] 1 month.”

Lewis pleaded guilty to all three of the alleged probation violations. The circuit court imposed a

sentence of 2 years and 11 months, and suspended 2 years, 10 months, and 17 days, leaving 14

days of active incarceration. This sentence was “suspended on the same conditions as contained

in the previous sentencing order,” with additional “special conditions” requiring Lewis to enroll

in and complete a substance abuse treatment program and to submit to urine screens at least

twice a month. The revocation sentencing order further provided: “Upon a first positive urine

screen for illegal substances, or upon a first admission of use of illegal substances, or upon a first

unexcused absence from a scheduled urine screen or color code, the Probation Officer shall issue

a violation immediately.”

                                                 -2-
                            B. Lewis’s Second Probation Revocation

       On June 2, 2022, Lewis’s probation officer filed a major violation report alleging that

Lewis had violated a special condition of probation by testing positive for cocaine at his first

urine screen in May 2022. Lewis was arrested on the capias for the alleged probation violation

in June 2022.

       At Lewis’s second probation revocation hearing on July 19, 2022, Lewis pleaded “[n]ot

guilty” to the alleged violation of a “special condition” of his probation. Lewis’s probation

officer, Karly Hopkins (P.O. Hopkins), testified that three urine screens provided by Lewis tested

positive for cocaine. On cross-examination, P.O. Hopkins testified that Lewis submitted to both

required drug screens in May 2022 and another drug screen before his arrest on June 17, 2022.

P.O. Hopkins further testified that in preparing the sentencing guidelines, she did not classify

Lewis’s probation violation as a second technical violation—with a maximum sentence of 14

days of active incarceration—because it violated a special condition imposed in the sentencing

order. Lewis argued that the relevant special condition in the sentencing order required him to

“submit to urine screens a minimum of twice per month” and he complied with this special

condition. Lewis further argued that under Code § 19.2-306.1, his cocaine use was a technical

violation—failure to refrain from using controlled substances. Lewis contended that the circuit

court should dismiss the charge of violating a “special condition” of probation. The circuit court

initially agreed that the prior sentencing order did not include a special condition requiring Lewis

to refrain from using cocaine. But the circuit court took Lewis’s arguments under advisement

and continued the matter for a week.

       At the probation revocation hearing on July 26, 2022, the Commonwealth argued that

dismissal was not an appropriate remedy if the court determined that Lewis’s drug use did not

violate a special condition of probation. Rather, the Commonwealth argued that the sentencing

                                                -3-
guidelines should just be adjusted to show a maximum sentence of 14 days. The circuit court

stated on the record that it interpreted the special conditions stated in its prior revocation order to

include refraining from using illegal substances. Upon finding Lewis in violation of this special

condition, the circuit court imposed the suspended sentence of 2 years, 10 months, and 17 days

and “re-suspend[ed] all of it except for time served.” This appeal followed.

                                             ANALYSIS

        Lewis argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding him in violation of a “special

condition” of his probation and imposing a sentence of more than 14 days of active incarceration,

the maximum allowable sentence for a second technical violation of probation. See Code

§ 19.2-306.1(C). On appellate review of the circuit court’s revocation of a defendant’s probation

and suspended sentence, “[t]he evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535

(2013). “[T]he trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a

clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86

(1991)). This Court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo, id., but we give deference to

the circuit court’s interpretation of its own orders, if reasonable, see Hodgins v. Commonwealth, 61

Va. App. 102, 108 (2012); Roe v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 453, 457-58 (2006). “We apply an

abuse of discretion standard in determining whether the circuit court’s interpretation of its order is

reasonable.” Roe, 271 Va. at 458.

        When the circuit court ruled that Lewis’s cocaine use was punishable as a violation of a

special condition of probation rather than a technical violation, this Court had yet to issue its opinion

in Delaune v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 372 (2023).2 In Delaune, this Court held that a

        2
        The parties also filed their briefs in this appeal before this Court issued its opinion in
Delaune. After filing his reply brief, Lewis supplemented his pleadings with a letter noting that
Delaune is controlling authority in this appeal.
                                                 -4-
probationer’s failure to refrain from using controlled substances is, by definition, a technical

probation violation under Code § 19.2-306.1(A)—even if the circuit court’s sentencing order

labeled such conduct a violation of a “special condition.”3 Id. at 383; see also Code

§ 19.2-306.1(A) (“‘[T]echnical violation’ means a violation based on the probationer’s failure to . . .

(vii) refrain from the use, possession, or distribution of controlled substances or related

paraphernalia.” (emphasis added)). Thus, in light of Delaune as controlling precedent, this Court

holds that the circuit court erred in ruling that Lewis’s cocaine use was not a technical violation of

probation.4 Because Lewis had only one prior probation revocation sentencing for a technical

violation, we agree with Lewis that the circuit court erred in sentencing him to active incarceration

for more than 14 days, the statutory maximum sentence for a second technical violation.5 See Code

§ 19.2-306.1(C) (“The court shall not impose a sentence of a term of active incarceration upon a

first technical violation . . . [and] the court may impose not more than 14 days of active

incarceration for a second technical violation.”). Since the circuit court lacked the power to impose

a sentence in excess of the statutory limit under Code § 19.2-306.1(C), we must reverse the circuit

        3
         The official sentencing revocation report (SRR) form used by P.O. Hopkins to calculate
Lewis’s sentencing guidelines appears to be a source of confusion because the SRR form appears
to erroneously treat all violations of “special conditions” of probation as non-technical
violations.
        4
         Because this Court concludes that Lewis’s cocaine use is, by definition, a technical
violation of probation under Code § 19.2-306.1(A), it is unnecessary to consider whether Lewis’s
cocaine use is a “special condition” of probation under the circuit court’s prior revocation
sentencing order.
        5
          “Multiple technical violations . . . considered at the same revocation hearing shall not be
considered separate technical violations for the purposes of sentencing pursuant to this section.”
Code § 19.2-306.1(A). Therefore, Lewis’s multiple positive tests for cocaine count as a single
technical violation of probation for purposes of sentencing under Code § 19.2-306.1. Similarly, the
three technical violations in Lewis’s first probation revocation proceeding count collectively as
Lewis’s first technical violation of probation.
                                                  -5-
court’s judgment. See Delaune, 76 Va. App. at 383; Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 221

(2009).

                                            CONCLUSION

          The circuit court erred in imposing a sentence of active incarceration that exceeded the

statutory maximum sentence for a second technical probation violation under Code § 19.2-306.1(C).

Therefore, this Court reverses the circuit court’s judgment, vacates the revocation sentencing order,

and remands for resentencing in accordance with Code § 19.2-306.1.

                                                                     Reversed, vacated, and remanded.

                                                  -6-