Court Opinion

ID: 9797604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:25:14.85893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:24.094235
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that defendant failed adequately to preserve his objection to the trial court’s decision not to admit evidence about the victims’ violent characters. In my view, defendant’s offer of proof was sufficient and the trial court erred in excluding that evidence. I further conclude that the error was prejudicial and that defendant’s convictions for involuntary manslaughter, attempted murder, and assault should therefore be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Accordingly, I dissent.
There was evidence at trial from which the jury could find that defendant fired his weapon in self-defense or in defense of the members of his group. Defendant’s witnesses testified that, in their initial encounter with the group of which the victims were members, one of its members gestured as if he had a gun and also made threats that he would use a gun against defendant and the members of his group. Defendant testified that he saw what he believed to be a gun in Christy’s waistband.
Defendant asserted at trial that he fired the shots from his revolver in self-defense1 and in defense of his friends in an effort to stop the altercation between the two groups of *438people, because he feared that Deatherage or Christy might use guns against him and the members of his group. Before trial, the state sought to exclude evidence of alleged prior acts of violence by Deatherage and Gutzmann, both of which involved the threatened use of a gun. At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, the court ruled that that evidence would be excluded.
Defendant then sought to offer evidence of the reputation and violent character of Deatherage and of the two shooting victims, Christy and Gutzmann. The trial court excluded the evidence on the ground that defendant was not aware of the reputation and character of those people at the time of the incident. On appeal, defendant challenges the exclusion of the evidence of both prior specific acts of violent conduct and the violent reputation and character of Deatherage and the victims.
The admissibility of that evidence is governed by OEC 404, which provides, in relevant part:
“(1) Evidence of a person’s character or trait of character is admissible when it is an essential element of the charge, claim or defense.
“(2) Evidence of a person’s character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
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“(b) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused[.] * * *
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“(3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” (Emphasis added.)
It is not disputed that evidence of a person’s propensity or reputation for violence is character evidence under *439OEC 404. Defendant acknowledges that State v. Whitney-Biggs, 147 Or App 509, 526, 936 P2d 1047, rev den 326 Or 4 3 (1997), held that character evidence of the type that he sought to offer is not admissible under OEC 404(1) because he had no prior knowledge of the victims’ or Deatherage’s alleged violent character and no prior knowledge of the acts that he sought to offer as evidence of their character. He submits that Whitney-Biggs was wrongly decided and should be overruled. If I were writing for the majority, I would reject that argument and adhere to our holding in Whitney-Biggs. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that defendant’s evidence is inadmissible under OEC 404(1).
Defendant asserts that the character evidence is nonetheless admissible under OEC 404(2)(b), which permits a defendant to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the alleged crime for the purpose of proving that the victim acted in conformity with that character trait on a particular occasion. Defendant asserts that the evidence of the victims’ and Deatherage’s violent character is admissible under OEC 404(2)(b) to prove that defendant reasonably acted in self-defense in firing his weapon, because it would tend to establish that defendant reasonably feared that the victims and Deatherage were armed and about to use deadly force. It would further rebut the state’s evidence that the victims were not the initial aggressors in the incident.
I reject defendant’s contention that evidence concerning Deatherage’s propensity for violence is admissible under OEC 404(2)(b). That subsection refers specifically to the character of the victim of the crime. Defendant does not explain to us how Deatherage was a victim of the crime for which defendant contends that he acted in self-defense.
I reach a different conclusion, however, with regard to evidence of the two victims’ violent character and reputation, and here is where I part ways with the majority. Under OEC 404(2)(b), defendant was entitled to present evidence of Gutzmann’s and Christy’s character and reputation for violence. That evidence was indisputably relevant to defendant’s self-defense claim. The state concedes that *440“[a]rguably, the trial court could have admitted some reputation or opinion evidence about the victims’ characters for violence under OEC 404(2)(b) and OEC 405(1).” I further conclude that the proffered character evidence regarding Gutzmann and Christy was admissible under OEC 405, which provides the methods by which character evidence may be offered:
“(1) In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.” (Emphasis added.)
In his offer of proof, defense counsel described the testimony of six proposed witnesses: two police officers and four private citizens. Defense counsel explained that the two police officers were prepared to testify that they were of the opinion that Christy and Gutzmann were violent and had reputations for violence. Defense counsel also described the proposed opinion testimony of another witness, Carman, that Gutzmann was violent. Within the same offer of proof, defense counsel explained that the two police officers and two private citizens were prepared to give their opinions that Deatherage was violent; the two police officers would also testify that Deatherage had a reputation for violence.
I agree with the majority and the trial court that the evidence concerning Deatherage was inadmissible. However, the remaining evidence described by counsel was admissible under OEC 405(1). Contrary to the majority, I conclude that, although the offer of proof contained some evidence that was admissible and some that was not, the way in which counsel described the evidence in the offer of proof was sufficiently precise to permit the trial court to determine which evidence was admissible and which was not and to allow this court to review the correctness of those rulings. See State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455, 461, 800 P2d 277 (1990) (purpose of offer of proof is to ensure that the trial court can make an informed decision); State v. Affeld, 307 Or 125, 128, 764 P2d 220 (1988) (purpose of the offer of proof is to ensure that appellate courts are able to determine whether it was error to exclude evidence and whether any error was likely to have *441affected the result of the case). Accordingly, I would hold that defendant’s proffered evidence concerning Gutzmann’s and Christy’s violent character and reputation was admissible character trait evidence under OEC 404(2)(b) and OEC 405 and that the trial court erred in excluding it.
The majority is concerned that defendant’s failure to segregate each item of evidence as a separate offer of proof “deprived the trial court of the ability” to make an informed decision that the consideration of an offer of proof requires. 182 Or App at 435. Respectfully, it did not. Defendant’s various items of testimony, although made in a single offer of proof, were easily segregated and were not dependent on each other. The inadmissibility of one portion of the evidence did not taint the other evidence. Each witness’s testimony was precisely described, including whether the testimony would provide opinion or reputation evidence. In fact, in questioning defense counsel as to whether defendant was “aware of the character or reputation of any of the persons prior to the incident,” the court recognized that each piece of testimony was to be considered separately. (Emphasis added.) True, the offer of proof could have been cosmetically divided by listing each person’s testimony as to each victim’s character and reputation as a separate offer of proof, but there was no practical need for or consequence of such a degree of specificity.
My view is supported by our recent opinion in State v. Cunningham, 179 Or App 359, 40 P3d 1065 (2002). There, the defendant sought by motion in limine to exclude as hearsay the contents of the victim’s telephone conversations with her mother on the night of her murder as well as the victim’s written notes of conversations with the defendant on the same date. The trial court ruled that all of the evidence was admissible, under OEC 803(2), as statements made while the victim was under stress or excitement caused by an event or condition.
On the defendant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s ruling, the state argued that the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed, contending that, because the defendant moved in limine to exclude all of the hearsay statements, if *442any of the statements was admissible, they were all admissible. “The state posits that, because defendant did not make separate legal arguments in respect to each hearsay statement, ‘[h]e cannot complain that the trial court did not rule on them separately.’ ” Cunningham, 179 Or App at 371.
We discussed in Cunningham the Supreme Court’s case law relating to how objections to hearsay must be preserved for appeal. Specifically, we noted that “ ‘when evidence is offered as a whole and an objection is made to the evidence as a whole’ ” the trial court ordinarily will not be reversed on appeal for admitting the evidence if any portion of the offered evidence was properly admissible, despite the fact that the other portions would not have been admissible had proper objections been made to those portions of the proffered evidence. Id. at 373, quoting Sproul v. Fossi, 274 Or 749, 755, 548 P2d 970 (1976) (emphasis in original). But, as we reasoned in Cunningham, when the various items of evidence are of such a distinct nature that an objection to the evidence as a whole cannot reasonably be understood to be a single objection, but rather an objection to the various separate parts, then the various items of evidence should be separately analyzed even though the defendant sought to exclude the evidence through a single motion in limine.
In considering the evidence at issue in Cunningham, we said that the telephone conversations and the written note should be considered separately and, further, that the admissibility of each conversation should be analyzed separately:
“The two telephone conversations between the victim and her mother, which occurred almost an hour apart, cannot be viewed holistically * * *. The telephone calls not only were separated in time, but the victim’s demeanor differed in each telephone call. In fact, defense counsel noted in his argument on the motion in limine that the later telephone call, in particular, did not show the degree of excitement or agitation required of an excited utterance. We conclude that defendant’s objections to the two telephone calls to the victim’s mother must be treated as an objection to two separate items of hearsay evidence and analyzed accordingly.” 179 Or App at 373.
*443The issue in Cunningham concerned the correctness of the trial court’s ruling admitting evidence over the defendant’s objection. That is the flip side of the question presented here of the trial court’s exclusion of evidence offered by defendant. However, our analysis of both issues should reflect an application of the same principle: The party seeking to offer or to exclude evidence must create a record sufficient to enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence is admissible and to allow this court to review the correctness of that ruling. Applying that principle here, we should conclude that defendant’s offer of proof of the testimony of several witnesses should be regarded for preservation purposes as separate offers of proof to be separately analyzed by the trial court and by us.
Furthermore, in light of the trial court’s ruling that all character and reputation evidence was categorically excluded because defendant was not acquainted with either of the victims, it was arguably futile for defendant to have made a more specific offer of proof. See Olmstead, 310 Or at 461.
The majority nonetheless concludes, citing Pumpelly v. Reeves, 273 Or 808, 812, 543 P2d 682 (1975), that the trial court properly rejected the entire offer of proof because the offer contained both admissible and inadmissible evidence. Pumpelly applied the oft-cited rule that, if any portion of an offer of proof is inadmissible, then it is not error to exclude the entire offer of proof. The feature that distinguishes this case from Pumpelly and numerous other cases involving offers of proof containing both admissible and inadmissible evidence is that, here, the different components of the evidence were separately listed, and each stood on its own. The offer was not made as an all-or-nothing package. The trial court could easily have admitted any part of defendant’s list of witnesses and testimony, and the record indicates that the court understood that it was to consider each component of the offer of proof separately. In contrast, in Pumpelly, the evidence was offered as a unified bundle in proof of the plaintiff s lost earnings. Because one portion of the evidence was inadmissible, the entire offer of proof on lost earnings properly *444could be excluded.2 See also State v. Dugan, 177 Or App 545, 34 P3d 726 (2001) (offer of proof sought to admit three forms of character evidence in “undifferentiated fashion”); State v. Thomas, 149 Or App 557, 945 P2d 1056 (1997) (offer of proof related to testimony from a single witness that contained both admissible and inadmissible statements); State v. Howard, 49 Or App 391, 619 P2d 943 (1980) (same).
The majority is also concerned that defendant’s offer of proof did not identify the specific statutory subsections under which defendant sought to offer the disputed evidence.3 However, as I read the colloquy between the court and counsel concerning defendant’s final offer of proof, it is clear that neither the judge nor the parties were limiting their discussion to specific subsections of OEC 404. All subsections of the statute, including OEC 404(2)(b), had been discussed at some point in the trial. Although in the final discussion of his offer of proof defendant’s counsel did not identify OEC 404(2)(b) as a source of the court’s authority to admit the disputed evidence, neither the parties nor the court was referring to specific subsections at that point. OEC 404(2)(b) had, in fact, been identified earlier by the state as authority for the admissibility of evidence of a victim’s character. Accordingly, the court was not without notice that the admissibility of the evidence should be considered under OEC 404(2)(b). The majority assumes that, because the trial court did not apply the criteria for the admissibility of evidence under OEC 404(2)(b), i.e., it made an inquiry that arguably applies only to OEC 404(1), then the court must have *445been considering the admissibility of the evidence only under OEC 404(1) and not under OEC 404(2)(b). If that is true, the court nevertheless erred in light of the fact that the court had before it OEC 404(2)(b), under which it should have considered the admissibility of the evidence. Further, I' do not assume that the trial court must have been analyzing the case only under OEC 404(1); it is just as likely that the trial court thought that OEC 404(2)(b) also required defendant to be aware of each victim’s violent character and reputation for the evidence to be admissible. In short, on this record I do not read the trial court’s analysis to be limited to OEC 404(1); rather, I believe that the trial court considered the admissibility of the evidence under all of the subsections of the statute that the parties previously had cited.
I further reject the state’s contention that the trial court’s error in excluding the evidence was harmless. The Oregon Supreme Court has observed that a claim that a defendant acted in self-defense
“would be more readily believed concerning a violent and dangerous man than a peaceable and quiet one, and any mind searching for the truth and in doubt would naturally be affected by such evidence.” State v. Thompson, 49 Or 46, 49, 88 P 583 (1907).
Defendant’s claim of self-defense was predicated on evidence that he believed that members of the victims’ group had weapons and would use them against defendant and his friends. There was conflicting evidence about who initiated the altercation and its nature. Defendant testified that he thought the members of the victims’ group were going to shoot defendant and his friends or were going to beat them to a “living pulp.” He testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone but “pulled the trigger to stop the situation that was going way too far out of my control.” I cannot say that the jury would not have been more inclined to believe defendant’s version of the events if it had had before it evidence of each victim’s violent character and reputation. See State v. Hansen, 304 Or 169, 180, 743 P2d 157 (1987); State v. Griffin, 19 Or App 822, 833, 529 P2d 399 (1974). Accordingly, I would hold that the evidence could have affected the jury’s verdict and that the trial court’s error in excluding it was not harmless.

 ORS 161.209 provides:
“Except as provided in ORS 161.215 and 161.219, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person for self-defense or to defend a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force, and the person may use a degree of force which the person reasonably believes to be necessary for the purpose.”
ORS 161.219 provides limitations on the use of deadly force in self-defense:
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 161.209, a person is not justified in using deadly physical force upon another person unless the person reasonably believes that the other person is:
“(1) Committing or attempting to commit a felony involving the use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or
“(2) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary in a dwelling; or
“(3) Using or about to use unlawful deadly physical force against a person.”

 Furthermore, Pumpelly may have misapplied the rule on offers of proof that combine admissible and inadmissible evidence. The offer ofproof in Pumpelly could properly be viewed in either of two ways. From one perspective, all of the evidence in the offer of proof was admissible; the flaw in the offer was that it failed to include evidence on expenses, so the offer failed to meet the legal requirements necessary to establish lost profits. Alternatively, because net rather than gross income was the proper measure of damages for lost profits, evidence of net income should have been submitted in the offer of proof rather than evidence of gross income. The court in Pumpelly rejected the offer of proof because it failed to establish what it had to establish to make all of the evidence in the offer admissible. Pumpelly, 273 Or at 810-12. The court should have stopped at that point and not added, as an alternative basis for its decision, the point about admissible and inadmissible evidence, because the principle applied only if the court improperly rejected one of the two tenable ways to view the offer of proof.

 I note that the state does not assert that defendant’s arguments relating to OEC 404(2)(b) have not been preserved.