Court Opinion

ID: 9366348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 17:00:26.089284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.613775
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-1046
                        ___________________________

                                   Dennis Ryno

                                      Plaintiff - Appellant

                                         v.

  City of Waynesville; Waynesville Police Department; Daniel Cordova; Kevin
                       Hillman; John Meir; Victor Weir

                                    Defendants - Appellees
                                  ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                 for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield
                                  ____________

                         Submitted: November 17, 2022
                            Filed: January 26, 2023
                                ____________

Before COLLOTON, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

       At the end of a week-long stalking and harassment investigation, police
arrested Dennis Ryno after he drove down a dead-end street and backed into a
driveway next to the one where the truck belonging to his ex-girlfriend—who had a
full order of protection against him—was parked. The officers later searched Ryno’s
home and electronics pursuant to warrants based on affidavits containing
inaccuracies. Prosecutors charged Ryno with felony stalking and harassment under
Missouri law, but eventually dismissed the charges. Following these events, Ryno
brought a variety of state and federal claims against the City of Waynesville (the
City), the Waynesville Police Department (WPD), WPD Chief Daniel Cordova,
WPD Officer John Meir, WPD Officer Victor Weir, and Pulaski County Prosecutor
Kevin Hillman (collectively, Appellees). The district court1 dismissed most of
Ryno’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and later
granted the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Ryno’s remaining claims.
Ryno now appeals the grant of summary judgment. Having jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                        I.

       In August 2012, Ryno and Crystal Aynsley—Ryno’s romantic interest of over
four years—had an “out of control” argument at Aynsley’s apartment which
escalated to such a degree that the neighbors called the police. The next day,
Aynsley’s landlord caught Ryno lingering around the apartment complex, taking
pictures. She called the police. Officer Weir arrived on the scene to find Ryno
hiding behind some bushes near a dumpster. Officer Weir approached Ryno, who
told him that he was “keeping an eye on” Aynsley, as he feared that she was “making
a mistake” with a married soldier. Officer Weir proceeded to pat Ryno down,
discovering a digital voice recorder, binoculars, and a digital camera containing
pictures of Aynsley’s apartment and the soldier’s vehicle. Officer Weir then
informed Ryno that he was not permitted to return to the property.

       From August 2012 through the middle of 2013, Ryno repeatedly drove by and
lingered around Aynsley’s apartment complex. He would drive around places where
Aynsley was and watch her. He sent people to talk to Aynsley on his behalf.
Aynsley started keeping a journal in October 2012 documenting all her run-ins with
Ryno, and by May 2013, she had “almost filled [two] spiral notebooks.” Based in

      1
      The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.
                                  -2-
part on this journal, Aynsley received an ex parte order of protection against Ryno
in July 2013. Despite the order, Ryno persisted, and in November 2013, Pulaski
County prosecutors filed criminal charges against him for stalking and harassing
Aynsley.

       On February 27, 2014, while Ryno’s criminal case was pending, Aynsley
received a full order of protection against him, to remain effective until February 26,
2015. The order provided that Ryno was not to communicate with Aynsley, nor was
he to “molest, stalk, or disturb [her] peace.” Around the same time, Ryno filed for
his own order of protection against Aynsley, alleging that she was setting him up
and following him around to make it look like he was stalking her. Shortly
thereafter, in March 2014, Ryno pled guilty to harassment of Aynsley and received
a suspended sentence with two years of probation. Importantly, the judgment of the
Pulaski County Circuit Court—signed by Ryno—provided that, as a condition of his
probation, he must “submit to searches of person, place [and] residence at [the]
request of [a probation officer] or [law enforcement officer].” At all times relevant
to this case, Ryno was on probation and subject to this search condition.

       For approximately six months after Ryno’s guilty plea, all was quiet.
However, on September 29, 2014, Aynsley and a friend filed a report alleging that,
on September 25, 2014, they had seen Ryno in a nearby parking lot and that he had
then followed them to McDonald’s. On the same day, Aynsley’s landlord filed a
report alleging that, on both September 27th and 28th, she had seen “the gentleman
that my tenant, Crystal Aynsl[e]y had told me about” driving near and around
Aynsley’s apartment complex.

       Based on these reports, on October 5, 2014, WPD Officer Kyle Prock
prepared a probable cause statement alleging that Ryno had violated Aynsley’s order
of protection. However, no further action was taken at that time. Then, on October
18, 2014, Aynsley’s landlord provided another statement to the WPD alleging that
she had seen a man matching Ryno’s description drive slowly through the apartment

                                         -3-
complex’s parking lot that same day. Aware that Aynsley had an order of protection
against Ryno, WPD began a weeklong investigation of Ryno on October 23, 2014.

       All events occurred in Waynesville, Missouri. Waynesville is a small town,
consisting of a population of around 5,000 people. There are few purely
nonresidential streets, and one main road, Ichord Avenue, connects much of the
town. At the time of the investigation, Ryno lived in Plato, Missouri, approximately
34 miles away.2 Nonetheless, Ryno routinely traveled to Waynesville for innocuous
purposes. Often, he sat in his vehicle in the Price Cutter parking lot in the middle of
town, which allowed him to use public wi-fi. Indeed, during the investigation, the
officers knew this area to be Ryno’s usual parking spot. This parking lot sits along
Ichord Avenue.

       On October 23, Chief Cordova and Officer Weir saw Ryno parked in his usual
spot near the Price Cutter between 4:30 PM and 4:45 PM. Later that day, Chief
Cordova saw what he believed to be Ryno’s car drive by Aynsley’s apartment
complex. The next day, October 24th, Chief Cordova and Officer Meir saw what
they believed to be Ryno’s car drive slowly past Aynsley’s apartment complex.
Later, they observed Ryno and Aynsley separately at a gas station. The officers
could not say who arrived first, but Chief Cordova thought that Ryno was staring in
Aynsley’s direction. Toward the end of surveillance that day, the officers saw a
vehicle that they believed to be Ryno’s drive slowly past Aynsley’s apartment
complex again.

      The WPD paused surveillance for the weekend of October 25th and 26th.
Then on October 27th, Officer Weir surveilled Aynsley to see if Ryno would follow
her. He saw Ryno drive by on Ichord Avenue once while Aynsley was in the Price
Cutter and again while she was at a nearby restaurant. Officer Weir also saw Ryno

      2
        Although the distance is not in the record, we “may take judicial notice of a
fact for the first time on appeal,” Gustafson v. Cornelius Co., 724 F.2d 75, 79 (8th
Cir. 1983), including the distance between two places, Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v.
Robinson, 58 F. 723, 732 (8th Cir. 1893).
                                          -4-
drive near Aynsley’s apartment complex. On October 28th, Aynsley went to a
restaurant in the middle of town with her friend, Kevin Phillips. While they were
eating, Ryno drove by on Ichord Avenue at least four times. Finally, on October
30th, Aynsley told Chief Cordova that she had invited Phillips to join her for coffee.
Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then observed Aynsley as she drove to Phillips’s
house at 104 Summit Pass, parked her truck in the driveway, and headed to town
with Phillips in his car. Chief Cordova and Officer Meir waited in the parking lot
while Aynsley and Phillips went into the Price Cutter to get coffee. As they waited,
the Officers noted that Ryno was parked outside near his usual parking spot. After
a while, Ryno left.

      Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then drove to the area of Summit Pass. While
they were there, Ryno drove past them headed in the direction of Phillips’s house,
so they turned around to follow him. Summit Pass is a dead-end street. Ryno drove
to 104 Summit Pass, then put his car in reverse and backed into the driveway of 102
Summit Pass, the residence next door to Phillips’s house. Officer Meir pulled up
and blocked Ryno’s car in the driveway.

       Chief Cordova then approached Ryno and started asking him questions.
When Chief Cordova asked Ryno, “Do you have any friends down this street?”
Ryno stated, “I had a person who was following me earlier and I turned off and then
they went down this direction.” He further explained that his intention was merely
to use Summit Pass to turn around. Chief Cordova and Officer Meir then arrested
Ryno without a warrant for aggravated stalking and aggravated harassment. Officer
Weir had no personal involvement in the arrest.

      An inventory search of Ryno’s car following his arrest revealed the following:
a wig, hats, gloves, a camcorder, recording devices, a pair of binoculars, a police
scanner programmed to the Waynesville frequencies, rope, coveralls, surgical
gloves, rolls of black trash bags, a hatchet, a pickaxe, a shovel, a crowbar, clothes,
and personal hygiene items. A subsequent search of Ryno’s car revealed a laptop

                                         -5-
computer, an external hard drive, papers, and cameras.            These searches are
unchallenged on appeal.

      The day after Ryno’s arrest, Pulaski County prosecutors charged him with
felony stalking and harassment. A few days later, Officer Weir spoke with Ryno’s
brother and sister, Terry Ryno and Pamela Hutsell. Hutsell told Officer Weir that
Ryno “types, ya know, he types everything. He, he just, ya know, he keeps notes on
everything . . . .” Following this interview, Officer Weir applied for and obtained
warrants to search, among other things, Ryno’s home and computer. The affidavit
for Ryno’s home provided that:

      On 10/30/2014 Dennis Ryno was arrested for violation of an exparte
      and stalking after he followed Crystal Aynsley to Summit Pass. There
      is one way in and out of that area and he has no reason to be there
      especially since she had an order of protection against him. This arrest
      was the result of a three wing [sic] undercover operation wherein Mr.
      Ryno was observed stalking the victim repeatedly. During the
      inventory of his vehicle a computer, digital camera and notes were
      among some items seized. In the trunk of Ryno’s vehicle the following
      were located: rope, overalls, gloves (2 sizes), and shovel, hatchet, pick
      and trash bags. . . . Mr. Ryno is on probation after pleading guilty to
      Harassment of this same victim and a term and condition of his
      probation is that he is subject to searches of his residence at the request
      of law enforcement.

R. Doc. 67-1 at 7. The affidavit for Ryno’s computer states:

      At the time of his arrest, Waynesville Police had been conducting a
      surveillance operation of Mr. Ryno for multiple days. During the
      course of that investigation, Mr. Ryno was seen driving by the victim’s
      residence multiple times, following the victim multiple times, and
      sitting outside of business[es] where the victim was located on multiple
      times. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Ryno had multiple items with him
      that were suspicious. The items included a police scanner set to the
      Waynesville PD frequency, a camera, binoculars, recording devices,
      garbage bags, a shovel, a pick ax, a hatchet, coveralls, a change of

                                         -6-
      clothes, surgical gloves, rope, and soap. It should be noted that
      Mr. Ryno is on probation after pleading guilty to harassment of the
      same victim and a term and condition of his probation is that he is
      subject to searches at the request of law enforcement. . . . On
      11/02/2014 I spoke to Pamela Hutsell who is the sister of Dennis Ryno.
      She told me that Ryno always writes everything down and then types
      his information into the computer.

R. Doc. 67-1 at 23. Officer Meir and Chief Cordova reviewed and approved these
affidavits, the Circuit Court of Pulaski County issued the warrants, and the searches
were conducted. The searches yielded no additional incriminating evidence.
Prosecutors eventually dropped criminal charges against Ryno.

                                         II.

       In 2020, Ryno filed this action in Missouri state court, asserting a variety of
claims against the Appellees, including claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After
Appellees removed the suit to the district court, Ryno filed an amended complaint,
alleging claims of unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to cause false arrest,
unreasonable search, fabrication of evidence, excessive bail, abuse of process, and
negligent hiring, training, and supervision. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss
Ryno’s claims for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in
part, holding that Ryno’s state-law claims were barred by Missouri’s statute of
limitations, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.130. It then dismissed Ryno’s claims against the
City, WPD, and Prosecutor Hillman. After this ruling, only three claims remained:
Ryno’s § 1983 claims against Chief Cordova, Officer Meir, and Officer Weir for
unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to cause false arrest, and unreasonable search. On
appeal, Ryno does not challenge the dismissal of any of his other claims.

      Following discovery, the Appellees moved for summary judgment on Ryno’s
remaining claims. They argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity
because Ryno failed to show any Fourth Amendment violation, and even if he did,
it was not clearly established. The district court first addressed Ryno’s claim for

                                         -7-
unreasonable seizure. It held that the Appellees were entitled to summary judgment
on this claim because even though they arrested Ryno without a warrant, at the time
of his arrest, “the threshold of probable cause was met and exceeded due to the
allegations of multiple witnesses and the observations of [Officers] Cordova, Meir,
and Weir that Ryno’s conduct amounted to harassing, stalking, or disturbing
Aynsley’s peace.” Further, the district court reasoned, “Even if Ryno’s conduct did
not violate [Aynsley’s] Order of Protection, an arrest made pursuant to a mistaken
belief about applicability of such an order does not preclude a finding that the officer
had arguable probable cause to arrest.” Ultimately, the district court held that the
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on this claim because “the totality of
the circumstances known to [them] on October 30, 2014, gave them sufficient
probable cause to believe that a crime had been or was being committed.”

       Next, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees
on Ryno’s conspiracy-to-cause-false-arrest claim. It reasoned that such a claim
requires a plaintiff to “prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in
order to prevail,” and since Ryno could prove no underlying constitutional violation,
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment.

       Finally, the district court reached Ryno’s claims for unreasonable search of
his home and electronics. Ryno argued that these searches violated the Fourth
Amendment because of various “false statements” in the warrant affidavits, without
which the warrants never would have issued. After considering this argument and
evaluating the affidavits in light of the whole record, the district court concluded that
“the search warrants in this case were supported by probable cause based on the
warrant affidavit, despite its inaccuracies. If the inaccuracies were removed from
the warrant affidavit, probable cause still exists for the search of Ryno’s home and
electronics.” Thus, the district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment on this final claim as well.

       Ryno appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment. In his reply
brief, Ryno concedes that his unreasonable-seizure and conspiracy-to-cause-false-
                                          -8-
arrest claims do not involve Officer Weir. Additionally, Ryno clarified that his
appeal of the unreasonable search claim is limited to “the district court’s
determination about the computer and home searches.”

                                          III.

       “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp.,
798 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2015). “Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing
the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Libel v. Adventure Lands of Am., Inc., 482 F.3d 1028,
1033 (8th Cir. 2007). Importantly, the “mere existence of a factual dispute is
insufficient alone to bar summary judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome
determinative under prevailing law.” Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th
Cir. 1989).

       Initially, despite briefing from both parties on the issue of qualified immunity
below, the district court chose instead to address the merits of Ryno’s claims on
summary judgment. And although there is some equivocal language in the order, on
appeal the parties agree that the district court did not rule on qualified immunity.
Generally, “[w]hen the district court fails to rule on qualified immunity, we will
remand the case to the district court to decide the qualified-immunity question.”
Ferguson v. Short, 840 F.3d 508, 511 (8th Cir. 2016). However, we need not remand
the case where, as here, the issues presented on appeal are purely legal and the parties
briefed qualified immunity both before the district court and before us. See Hamner
v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1176 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding that whether “allegations
show a violation of a clearly established right is a purely legal issue that is amenable
to consideration for the first time on appeal” especially where the parties “have been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue”). Further, evaluating
Ryno’s claims under the qualified-immunity framework now furthers the policies
behind the doctrine, which include “resolving immunity questions at the earliest
                                          -9-
possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (quoting
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). Therefore, we will
address Ryno’s claims under the qualified immunity framework.

       To determine whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity, we
conduct a two-part inquiry: “(1) [whether] the facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to [Ryno], demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory
right; and (2) [whether] the right was clearly established at the time of the
deprivation.” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2012) (first and third
alterations in original) (citation omitted). A right is “clearly established” when its
contours are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what
he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
As the Supreme Court has reiterated, “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” City of Tahlequah
v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (per curiam) (quoting District of Columbia v.
Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018)). “We have the ‘discretion to decide which of
the two prongs of qualified-immunity analysis to tackle first.’” Lombardo v. City of
St. Louis, 38 F.4th 684, 690 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 735 (2011)). “If we conclude that the alleged facts do not violate a
constitutional right, then we need not address the second inquiry, and the
defendant[s] will be entitled to qualified immunity.” Groenewold v. Kelley, 888
F.3d 365, 371 (8th Cir. 2018).

                                         A.

      First, we address Ryno’s § 1983 claim for unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. We begin by analyzing the first prong of the qualified-
immunity test: whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Ryno,
demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional right. Jones, 675 F.3d at 1161.
However, we must “simultaneously view[] the facts from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene” given the probable cause standard. Royster v.
Nichols, 698 F.3d 681, 688 (8th Cir. 2012). The Fourth Amendment protects the
                                        -10-
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A warrantless arrest
violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is supported by probable cause.” Webster
v. Westlake, 41 F.4th 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2022). Officers have probable cause to
make a warrantless arrest “when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
arrest ‘are sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant has
committed or is committing an offense.’” Borgman v. Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523
(8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

       Here, at the time of Ryno’s arrest, at least Officers Weir and Meir were
partially familiar with the 2012-2013 background that culminated in Ryno’s
pleading guilty to a charge of harassing Aynsley. Further, all of the officers knew
about Aynsley’s order of protection against Ryno. Additionally, in late September
2014 and into the middle of October 2014, the WPD received several reports from
multiple witnesses about Ryno’s close proximity to Aynsley. During the weeklong
surveillance of Ryno, the officers saw him drive by Aynsley’s apartment complex
multiple times. They also saw Ryno sitting outside of businesses where Aynsley
was located multiple times.

       Finally, on October 30, 2014, Chief Cordova and Officer Meir observed Ryno
drive down Summit Pass—the dead-end street where Phillips lived at 104 Summit
Pass, and then slowly reverse down the street and back into 102 Summit Pass, the
driveway next to Phillips’s.

      The question that we must answer is whether, under these circumstances, a
reasonable officer would have believed Ryno had committed or was committing an
offense. Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010). The
2012-2013 background; the witness statements, see id. at 816-17 (“[O]fficers are
generally entitled to rely on the veracity of information supplied by the victim of a
crime . . . .”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); the officers’ observations of
Ryno driving by Aynsley’s apartment complex and presence in the same places as
Aynsley throughout the week of October 23-30; Ryno’s presence in the driveway
                                           -11-
adjacent to the driveway in which Aynsley was parked; and Ryno’s inability to
adequately explain why he was on Summit Pass convince us that a reasonable officer
would have believed Ryno had committed or was committing a violation of Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 455.085.2 (violating an order of protection), Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.090.1
(harassment), or Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225.2-3 (stalking). Accordingly, there was no
Fourth Amendment violation, and the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.

       Even if the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Ryno, Ryno’s right
to be free from unreasonable seizure was not clearly established under these facts.
In other words, the officers had arguable probable cause. “Although this Court’s
opinions do not always expressly state as much, the terms ‘probable cause’ and
‘arguable probable cause’ are not interchangeable, and each term serves a different
purpose within the qualified immunity analysis.” Brown v. City of St. Louis, 40
F.4th 895, 901 (8th Cir. 2022). While the issue of probable cause addresses the first,
constitutional-violation prong, “the issue of arguable probable cause is properly part
of the resolution of qualified immunity’s second prong, the clearly established
prong.” Id. “Arguable probable cause exists even where an officer mistakenly
arrests a suspect believing it is based in probable cause if the mistake is ‘objectively
reasonable.’” Borgman, 646 F.3d at 523.

       Here, at minimum, it was objectively reasonable for Chief Cordova and
Officer Meir to believe that Ryno had committed or was committing a violation of
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 455.085.2 (violating an order of protection), Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 565.090.1 (harassment), or Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.225.2-3 (stalking). Accordingly,
arguable probable cause exists, meaning that it was not clearly established that
arresting Ryno on these facts would violate his right to be free from unlawful seizure.
Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Ryno’s
unreasonable-seizure claim because Chief Cordova and Officer Meir are entitled to
qualified immunity.

                                         -12-
                                          B.

      We now move to Ryno’s § 1983 claim against Chief Cordova and Officer
Meir for conspiracy to cause false arrest or unreasonable seizure. A § 1983
conspiracy claim requires a claimant to show: “(1) that the defendant conspired with
others to deprive him of constitutional rights; (2) that at least one of the alleged co-
conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that
the overt act injured the plaintiff.” White v. McKinley, 519 F.3d 806, 814 (8th Cir.
2008). But a claimant cannot succeed on such a claim without first proving the
“deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.” Id. Because we conclude that
no unreasonable seizure occurred, see supra Section III.A., Chief Cordova and
Office Meir are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim as well.

                                          C.

       Finally, we address Ryno’s § 1983 claim for the unreasonable search of his
home and computer under the Fourth Amendment. We begin again by asking
whether Ryno can prove a constitutional violation. Ryno is correct in arguing that,
in certain circumstances, one may succeed in proving a Fourth Amendment violation
where he shows an officer’s “probable cause statement contained a ‘deliberate
falsehood’” or that the officer “acted with ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ when he
prepared it.” Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
And as Ryno further asserts, a warrant containing material omissions may vitiate the
warrant in certain circumstances. See United States v. Ketzeback, 358 F.3d 987,
990 (8th Cir. 2004). However, we need not address these issues because, at the time
of the searches of Ryno’s home and computer, he was subject to a probation
condition that he “submit to searches of person, place [and] residence at [the] request
of [a probation officer] or [law enforcement officer].”

     The Supreme Court has long held that a probationer has limited Fourth
Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy. See Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). Indeed, the “touchstone of the Fourth
                                         -13-
Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined ‘by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19
(2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)). Ryno’s “status
as a probationer subject to a search condition informs both sides of that balance.”
Id. at 119. After all, “[p]robation, like incarceration, is ‘a form of criminal sanction
imposed by a court upon an offender after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.’”
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citations omitted). “Just as other punishments for criminal
convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-
abiding citizens.” Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.

        Here, the Missouri “judge who sentenced [Ryno] to probation determined that
it was necessary to condition the probation on [Ryno’s] acceptance of the search
provision.” Id. Further, “[t]he probation order clearly expressed the search
condition and [Ryno] was unambiguously informed of it.” Id. Indeed, Ryno signed
the judgment establishing the search condition. “The probation condition thus
significantly diminished [Ryno’s] reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id. at 119-20.
In such a circumstance, the Fourth Amendment “requires no more than reasonable
suspicion to conduct a search of th[e] probationer’s house,” even without a warrant.
Id. at 121.

       We conclude that reasonable suspicion supported the search of Ryno’s house.
“Reasonable suspicion exists when, considering the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time, the officer has a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting wrongdoing.” United States v. Hamilton, 591 F.3d 1017, 1022 (8th
Cir. 2010). In the search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s home, Officer Wier
misrepresented two facts. First, he averred that, “[Ryno] followed Crystal Aynsley
to Summit Pass.” This did not happen. Second, he averred that “Ryno was observed
stalking the victim repeatedly.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Ryno, this is an overstatement as the officers only saw Ryno drive by Aynsley’s
                                         -14-
apartment complex multiple times and sit in public areas with her nearby. However,
the Constitution does not require “that every fact in the warrant affidavit is
necessarily correct,” but only “that the information put forth is believed or
appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
165 (1978). Moreover, Officer Weir truthfully averred that the officers saw Ryno
on Summit Pass, a dead-end street. Further, Officer Weir described the many
suspicious items discovered in Ryno’s car. Finally, Officer Weir brought the search
condition of Ryno’s probation to the court’s attention. Despite inaccuracies in the
search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s home, our analysis above, see supra Section
III.A., combined with what the officers found in Ryno’s car is sufficient for us to
determine that the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to search Ryno’s home,
as required by Knights.

       Finally, we turn to the search of Ryno’s computer. Where a probationer is
unambiguously aware of a broad search condition like Ryno’s, we have held that
searches of personal property are permissible, even absent suspicion. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kuhnel, 25 F.4th 559, 564 (8th Cir. 2022) (holding that search of
probationer’s vehicle pursuant to probationary search condition was “reasonable and
permissible even in the absence of suspicion”); see also United States v. Jackson,
866 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2017) (concluding that search of supervised
releasee’s cell phone was reasonable even absent suspicion when he was aware of
search condition and resided in residential reentry facility which prohibited cell
phones). However, we have never held that a probationary search condition
authorizes the search of a probationer’s personal property in any circumstances
absent suspicion. Given that the government may search a probationer’s home, an
area which lies “[a]t the very core” of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, Kyllo
v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001), based on nothing more than reasonable
suspicion—at least when he is subject to a search condition—the same standard is
more than sufficient to authorize the search of a lesser-protected area like a
computer. We thus assume without deciding that the reasonable suspicion standard
applies to the search of Ryno’s computer.

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       In the search-warrant affidavit for Ryno’s computer, there is only one slight
inaccuracy. Officer Weir averred that, during the Ryno surveillance, “Ryno was
seen driving by the victim’s residence multiple times, following the victim multiple
times, and sitting outside of business[es] where the victim was located on multiple
times.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ryno, technically, the
officers did not witness him following Aynsley. Ryno also takes issue with Officer
Weir’s statement that “I spoke to Pamela Hutsell who is the sister of Dennis Ryno.
She told me that Ryno always writes everything down and then types his information
into the computer.” However, we conclude that it is at least an accurate paraphrasing
of her statement, which the recording demonstrates was, “I know he types, ya know,
he types everything. He, he just, ya know he keeps notes on everything . . . .”

       Because there is only one minor inaccuracy in the otherwise thorough search-
warrant affidavit for Ryno’s computer, and the issuing judge found that there was
enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause, that judgment is entitled to
deference on appeal. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); see also
Franks, 438 U.S. at 164-65. Even if it were not, our analysis above, see supra Section
III.A., the items found in Ryno’s vehicle during the searches, and Hutsell’s statement
support a finding of at least reasonable suspicion. Thus, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on Ryno’s unreasonable-search claim because the
Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity.

                                          IV.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                      ______________________________

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