Court Opinion

ID: 9558523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:11:21.645973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:21.374683
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
with whom CONNOR, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I agree with the court’s conclusion that the phrase “prior to . trial,” in Criminal Rule 45(f), requires that a motion for dismissal in a jury trial made pursuant to the rule be filed prior to the selection of the jury. However, I disagree with the court’s holding that since appellant Joseph James failed to file his motion to dismiss for noncompliance with Rule 45 until after voir dire had been commenced, he waived his rights under Rule 45(f).1
In my view the case does not lend itself to disposition bottomed upon a waiver rationale. Rather, I think there exists ample justification for resort to the relaxation and dispensation provisions found in Criminal *301Rule 53.2 The record shows that James’ attorney did not realize the actual date of James’ arrest until after voir dire had actually commenced,3 and thus could not accurately compute whether the 120 days had run under Rule 45. Further, there is no indication in the record that the motion to dismiss for noncompliance by the state with the speedy trial requirement of Criminal Rule 45 was intentionally delayed until after voir dire had commenced.4 Given these circumstances I think James has demonstrated just cause for noncompliance with Criminal Rule 45(f) and therefore has presented an appropriate instance for invocation of Criminal Rule 53.5 Thus I conclude that James did not waive any of his rights under Criminal Rule 45 and therefore would reach the merits of the Criminal Rule 45 issue in the case at bar.6

. Criminal Rule 45(f) reads:
Waiver. Failure of a defendant represented by counsel to move for dismissal of the charges under these rules prior to plea of guilty or trial shall constitute waiver of his rights under this rule.

. Criminal Rule 53 reads:
These rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice. They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be manifest to the court that a strict adherence to them will work injustice.

. After his arrest, James made a deal with the state to become an informant for reduced bail. Since he was an informant, the Public Defender Agency refused to represent him after release because of a conflict of interest. The Agency did not know he had been arrested. When James subsequently stopped assisting the state (his bail remained), the Public Defender Agency said it would represent him, once he was arrested or indicted. At this point it still was not realized that James had already been arrested.
Counsel for James admits that he “goofed because there’s indication on the police report that an arrest occurred on September 15th, and [he] simply overlooked it.” Subsequent references by James to his “arrest” were assumed to mean an arrest following indictment.

. Additionally, I am of the view that the case presents an appropriate occasion for relaxation of the requirement of Criminal Rule 45(f), because prior to this decision there was no clarification defining precisely when the trial begins for purposes of this rule.

. I note that Criminal Rule 45 does not require the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by the state’s failure to bring him to trial within’ the stipulated period. Under the terms of Criminal Rule 45(g), if the defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, the court, on proper motion, must dismiss the charge with prejudice regardless of whether the defendant has shown actual prejudice.

. Rule 45(g) provides: “If the defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as extended by excluded periods, the court upon motion of the defendant shall dismiss the charge with prejudice.” Invocation of a waiver rationale has obviously placed this sanction beyond James’ reach.