Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:25:05.72421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:55.345760
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1194

                                 ALFREDO A. KOLSTER,

                                     Petitioner,

                                          v.

                       IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,

                                     Respondent.

                                 ____________________

                          PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
                          THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                                Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                       _____________

                                 ____________________

            Lee   Gelernt  and  Richard   L.  Iandoli,  with  whom  Iandoli  &
            _____________       _____________________               __________
        Associates,  Lucas   Guttentag,  Letitia  Volpp,  and  American  Civil
        __________   _________________   ______________        _______________
        Liberties Union were on brief for petitioner.
        _______________
            Linda S. Wendlandt, with whom Frank W.  Hunger, Assistant Attorney
            __________________            ________________
        General,  Civil Division,  Michael  P. Lindemann,  Assistant Director,
                                   _____________________
        Office of Immigration Litigation, and Lisa Arnold, Attorney, Office of
                                              ___________
        Immigration Litigation, were on brief for respondent.
                                 ____________________
                                   December 4, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.   This  case requires  us to
                      LYNCH,  Circuit Judge.
                              _____________

            determine whether  section  440(a) of  the Antiterrorism  and

            Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  (AEDPA),  enacted  after this

            petition was filed, applies here.  Alfredo Kolster, an  alien

            under deportation order,  argues that if it does apply, it is

            unconstitutional.  Section 440(a)  of AEDPA, which was signed

            into  law on  April 24,  1996, prohibits  judicial  review of

            deportation orders issued  against aliens who have  committed

            certain types  of crimes.  Kolster had previously pled guilty

            to such a crime.

                      In a petition filed with this court on February 28,

            1996, Kolster seeks review of  a Board of Immigration Appeals

            (BIA)  decision  that  he  is  ineligible,  under  the  BIA's

            interpretation of the Immigration  and Nationality Act (INA),

            for discretionary  relief from  deportation.  He  argues that

            the BIA erroneously interpreted  the statute to require seven

            years  of  lawful  permanent  residence by  the  alien  to be

            eligible for the relief  from deportation afforded by section

            212(c) of the INA.  

                      The  Immigration  and Naturalization  Service (INS)

            has moved to dismiss this action, arguing that section 440(a)

            of  AEDPA  operates  immediately  to  divest  this  court  of

            jurisdiction  to  hear this  petition  for  review.   Kolster

            responds that section 440(a) does not apply to  cases pending

            on  the date of AEDPA's  enactment, and that,  if the statute

                                         -2-
                                          2

            applies, its  preclusion of judicial review  violates the Due

            Process Clause and Article III of the Constitution.

                      We  find   that  section  440(a)   does  apply   to

            petitions, like Kolster's, which were pending on the date  of

            AEDPA's enactment.  Because at least the habeas corpus review

            provided  by the  Constitution  remains  available to  aliens

            covered by section  440(a), we find  that the prohibition  of

            judicial  review  in  section  440(a)  does  not  offend  the

            Constitution.  Accordingly, we dismiss Kolster's petition for

            review under the Immigration and Nationality  Act for lack of

            jurisdiction.

                                          I.

                      Alfredo  Kolster,  a   Venezuelan  citizen,   first

            entered  the United States in  1980 to attend  high school in

            New  York.   He remained  in the  United States  through high

            school and college,  earning a B.S. from Boston University in

            September, 1988.   During this  time, Kolster had  a F-1,  or

            foreign student, visa.

                      On  September  11, 1988,  after  a  brief visit  to

            Venezuela, Kolster  re-entered the United States  as a member

            of the  immediate family of  an employee of  an international

            organization.  His mother  worked for the Pan-American Health

            Organization.   On August 24,  1989, Kolster became  a lawful

            permanent  resident of the United States.  From 1989 to 1991,

                                         -3-
                                          3

            Kolster  lived in the Boston area and worked at various sales

            jobs.

                      In 1991,  Kolster was indicted in  federal court in

            Massachusetts for conspiracy  to possess cocaine  with intent

            to distribute.   He later  pled guilty and  was sentenced  to

            twenty-four  months'  imprisonment.    The  sentencing  judge

            recommended  that Kolster  not be  deported upon  his release

            from custody.

                      Nonetheless,  while  Kolster was  incarcerated, the

            INS  ordered him to show cause why he should not be deported.

            The  INS  charged that  Kolster  was  deportable pursuant  to

            section 241(a)(2)(B)(i)  of the INA, which  applies to aliens

            convicted of  controlled substance offenses, and  pursuant to

            section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), which applies to  aliens convicted

            of aggravated felonies.  See 8 U.S.C.   1251 (a).
                                     ___

                      On  April 5, 1994, Kolster  had a hearing before an

            Immigration  Judge.    At  that  hearing,  Kolster,   through

            counsel, conceded deportability on the grounds charged by the

            INS.    However, he also requested  a continuance in order to

            apply  for a waiver of deportation pursuant to section 212(c)

            of  the INA.  Section  212(c) gives the  Attorney General the

            discretionary authority to  waive the exclusion of  otherwise

            excludable aliens,  see 8  U.S.C.   1182(c).1  A longstanding
                                ___

                                
            ____________________

            1.  Section 212(c) of the  INA, 8 U.S.C.   1182(c),  prior to
            amendment by AEDPA, read in relevant part:

                                         -4-
                                          4

            interpretation of that section extends the Attorney General's

            discretion to otherwise deportable aliens.  See, e.g., Joseph
                                                        __________ ______

            v. INS, 909 F.2d 605, 606 n.1 (1st Cir. 1990).
               ___

                      The Immigration Judge  found "based on  [Kolster's]

            admission,  his concession of  deportability through counsel,

            and the documentary evidence of record that deportability has

            been  established  by   clear,  convincing  and   unequivocal

            evidence."   As to  Kolster's request for  a continuance, the

            Immigration Judge  found that Kolster did  not have statutory

            eligibility   for  section   212(c)  relief,   and  therefore

            pretermitted his  application for  a  waiver of  deportation.

            Accordingly, she ordered Kolster deported to Venezuela.

                      On January 30, 1996, the BIA affirmed the order  of

            deportation.  The Board agreed with the decision to pretermit

            Kolster's  application  for a  section 212(c)  waiver because

            Kolster  had "not  been a  lawful permanent  resident  of the

            United States for seven years as is required."

                      Kolster filed a petition for review with this court

            on February  28, 1996.   At  that time,  8 U.S.C.    1105a(a)

                                
            ____________________

                      Aliens  lawfully  admitted for  permanent
                      residence .  . .  who are returning  to a
                      lawful  unrelinquished domicile  of seven
                      consecutive years, may be admitted in the
                      discretion of the Attorney General.

                                         -5-
                                          5

            provided for judicial review of final orders of deportation.2

            Kolster argued that the BIA has erred in interpreting section

            212(c)'s requirement of seven years of "lawful unrelinquished

            domicile"  to   mean  seven  years  of     "lawful  permanent

            residence."  Kolster  points  to  a  circuit  split  on  this

            statutory  issue, noting  that  some courts  of appeals  have

            rejected the BIA's construction of section 212(c).  See, e.g,
                                                                _________

            Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
            ___    ___

                      On April 24, 1996, while this petition was pending,

            President  Clinton  signed  into  law  the  Antiterrorism and

            Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-

            132, 110 Stat. 1214.   Section 440(a) of AEDPA,  which amends

            Section  106(a)(10)  of  the  INA, 8  U.S.C.     1105(a)(10),

            provides:

                      Any final order of deportation against an
                      alien  who  is  deportable  by  reason of
                      having    committed    [certain   crimes,
                      including    aggravated   felonies    and
                      controlled substance  offenses] shall not
                      be subject to review by any court.

            On June  10, 1996, the INS moved to dismiss this petition for

            review, arguing that, in light of section 440(a),  this court

                                
            ____________________

            2.  8  U.S.C.     1105a(a)   provided  that  the   procedures
            described  therein "shall apply to, and shall be the sole and
            exclusive  procedure for,  the judicial  review of  all final
            orders of  deportation heretofore or  hereafter made  against
            aliens within the United States."

                                         -6-
                                          6

            lacked  subject  matter  jurisdiction  to  hear  this  case.3

            Kolster  responds that  AEDPA does  not specify  an effective

            date  for section  440(a),  and that  statutes are  generally

            presumed not  to have  retroactive effect.   Additionally, he

            contends that preclusion of  judicial review violates the Due

            Process Clause and Article III.

                                     II.

            A. Section 440(a)'s Applicability to Pending Petitions
               ___________________________________________________

                      The Supreme  Court's  decision in  Landgraf v.  USI
                                                         ________     ___

            Film Products, 114 S.  Ct. 1483 (1994), provides  a framework
            _____________

            for  determining whether a statute should be applied to cases

            pending  at the  time  of enactment.    This is  initially  a

            question  of  legislative  intent,     not  a  constitutional

            question.  First, the  court must look at the  statutory text

            and  determine  whether it  "manifests  an  intent" that  the

            statute should be applied to pending cases.  Id. at 1492.  If
                                                         ___

            the  court  determines  that  Congress  did  not   "expressly

                                
            ____________________

            3.  The INS originally also  argued that this petition sought
            relief --  a waiver  of deportation  under section  212(c) --
            which petitioner was no longer eligible  to receive.  Section
            440(d)  of AEDPA amends section  212(c) so that  it no longer
            applies  to aliens  who are  deportable  by reason  of having
            committed  certain  crimes,  including  controlled  substance
            offenses and  aggravated felonies.   The Attorney  General is
            currently  considering whether  to  apply  section 440(d)  to
            section 212(c) applications filed before April 24, 1996.  See
                                                                      ___
            In  re Soriano,  Order  of the  Attorney  General (Sept.  12,
            ______________
            1996),  vacating  Int. Dec.  No.  3289  (BIA June  27,  1996,
                    ________
            amended July 18, 1996).  Because we find  that the court does
            not  have jurisdiction to hear this petition, we do not reach
            the  question of  whether section  440(d) applies  to pending
            applications.   

                                         -7-
                                          7

            prescribe[] the statute's  proper reach," the court  presumes

            that Congress acts  consistently with  a series  of "judicial

            default rules."   Id. at 1505.  In applying  these rules, the
                              ___

            court must:

                      determine whether the  new statute  would
                      have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it
                      would  impair  rights  a party  possessed
                      when   he   acted,  increase   a  party's
                      liability for past conduct, or impose new
                      duties   with  respect   to  transactions
                      already completed.

            Id.  For jurisdictional statutes, the presumption is in favor
            ___

            of  immediate application,  because  "[a]pplication of  a new

            jurisdictional  rule usually 'takes away no substantive right

            but  simply changes the tribunal  that is to  hear the case'"

            and because  "jurisdictional statutes 'speak to  the power of

            the court rather  than to  the rights or  obligations of  the

            parties.'"   Id. at 1502  (quoting Hallowell v.  Commons, 239
                         ___                   _________     _______

            U.S. 506,  508  (1916)  and Republic  Nat'l  Bank  v.  United
                                        _____________________      ______

            States, 113 S. Ct. 554, 565 (1992)(Thomas, J., concurring)).
            ______

                      The  first  inquiry is  thus  whether Congress  has

            expressed a clear intent as to whether section 440(a) applies

            to cases  pending  on the  date of  enactment.   There is  no

            explicit textual  reference to an effective  date for section

            440(a).  Effective dates are provided for some other sections

            of the  AEDPA, including section 440(e),  which adds offenses

            to the INA definition of "aggravated felony."  See 8 U.S.C.  
                                                           ___

            1101  note.    However,  those  sections  are  "unrelated  to

                                         -8-
                                          8

            jurisdiction, [and] are too  far removed from judicial review

            under 8 U.S.C.    1105a(a)  to impute an  effective date  for

            section 440(a)."  Duldulao v. INS,  90 F.3d 396, 398 n.2 (9th
                              ________    ___

            Cir.  1996).   Accordingly,  we  find that  Congress  has not

            expressly   addressed   the   issue   of   section   440(a)'s

            applicability to pending cases.

                      The next inquiry under  the "judicial default rule"

            approach  to  determining  congressional  intent  is  whether

            440(a) has a retroactive effect upon petitioner's substantive

            rights,  duties,  or obligations.   Landgraf,  114 S.  Ct. at
                                                ________

            1505.    If  it  does  not,  then  we  apply  the  rule  that

            jurisdictional  statutes apply to pending cases.  Id.  If the
                                                              ___

            statute would  have such retroactive effects, it  will not be

            applied, "absent  clear congressional intent favoring  such a

            result."  Id.  
                      ___

                      Kolster   argues   that   Landgraf   assumes   that
                                                ________

            jurisdictional statutes only effect  a change in the tribunal

            that will hear the case, and that the presumption in favor of

            immediate  application  is  therefore  inapposite  where  the

            statute's  effect  is to  deprive a  party  of access  to any

            judicial review at all.   It is true that  Landgraf speaks of
                                                       ________

            jurisdictional  statutes as  usually "'simply  chang[ing] the

            tribunal that is to hear the case.'"  Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at
                                                  ________

            1502 (quoting Hallowell, 239 U.S. at 508).  
                          _________

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      However, as the INS points out, Landgraf's explicit
                                                      ________

            reliance on Hallowell is instructive here.  In Hallowell, the
                        _________                          _________

            Supreme Court approved the application  to pending cases of a

            statute  that  deprived   the  federal  district   courts  of

            jurisdiction over  certain Indian probate disputes and vested

            "final  and conclusive"  authority  in the  Secretary of  the

            Interior.  239 U.S.  at 508.  Section 440(a)  similarly vests

            final  authority  in  an  administrative tribunal,  the  BIA.

            Landgraf's  citation to Hallowell  makes us  doubtful, absent
            ________                _________

            more guidance  from the Supreme Court,  that a jurisdictional

            change  from  an  Article  III  court  to  an  administrative

            decisionmaker, in itself, affects the retroactivity analysis,

            whatever its effect on  the ultimate constitutional analysis.

            See Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 29 (2nd Cir. 1996).
            ___ ______________    ___

                      Our  inquiry  must  therefore  focus on  the  facts

            concerning   whether   Kolster's   substantive    rights   or

            obligations or duties have been changed by the deprivation of

            judicial review.  Kolster  suggests that his guilty plea  and

            concession of  deportability were  made with the  expectation

            that  he  could   apply  for  a  section  212(c)   waiver  of

            deportation.

                      The  Seventh  Circuit gave  credence,  on different

            facts, to  a similar argument  in Reyes-Hernandez v.  INS, 89
                                              _______________     ___

            F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.  1996).  There, the BIA  had affirmed

            the denial  of petitioner's  application  for section  212(c)

                                         -10-
                                          10

            relief,  and  the petitioner  sought  judicial  review.   The

            Seventh   Circuit  found   that,  when   petitioner  conceded

            deportability, he knew that, if the immigration judge and the

            BIA  turned down  his request for  section 212(c)  relief, he

            "could  have a  go at"  judicial  review.   Id.  at 492.  Had
                                                        ___

            petitioner known  that judicial  review would  be foreclosed,

            "he might have  contested deportability."  Id.  The immediate
                                                       ___

            application of section 440(a) would thus "attach  a new legal

            consequence to the concession" of deportability.  Id. at 492-
                                                              ___

            93.    Accordingly, the  Seventh  Circuit  held that  section

            440(a)  did not  apply to  cases  in which  deportability was

            conceded  prior to  AEDPA's  enactment,  "provided  that  the

            applicant for discretionary relief would have had at least  a

            colorable defense to deportability."  Id.
                                                  ___

                      In contrast  to the Seventh Circuit,  it is unclear

            to  us  that deportability,  which  is  a largely  mechanical

            determination based  on facts which may  often be objectively

            ascertained, would realistically  be conceded because  of the

            availability of discretionary relief or of judicial review of

            the denial of such relief.  See Hincapie-Nieto, 92 F.3d at 30
                                        ___ ______________

            ("It  is  far  more  likely that  deportability  is  conceded

            because there is no conceivable defense available.").  In any

            case, here the Immigration Judge explicitly based her finding

            of  deportability on  the  documentary evidence  of Kolster's

            drug  offense  conviction,  as  well as  on  his  concession.

                                         -11-
                                          11

            Tellingly,  Kolster  does not  argue that  he  in fact  had a

            colorable defense to deportability. 

                      As to his guilty  plea, we have no reason  to think

            it  was induced  by  reliance on  discretionary relief  under

            section 212(c).   By Kolster's own  calculations, his "lawful

            domicile"  for section  212(c)  purposes only  dates back  to

            September  11, 1988.  Thus,  even under the interpretation of

            section  212(c) that he urges,  as of September  2, 1992, the

            date  of his guilty plea, Kolster had only accrued four years

            of  lawful domicile.  He  was, as a  result, three years away

            from being  eligible for section 212(c)  relief, rendering it

            highly unlikely  that his guilty  plea was predicated  on the

            availability of such relief.

                      Moreover, this  court  and others  have  previously

            found that aliens do not have a cognizable  reliance interest

            in  the availability of  discretionary section 212(c) relief.

            See,  e.g., Scheidemann v. INS,  83 F.3d 1517,  1523 (3d Cir.
            ___   ____  ___________    ___

            1996); Campos v. INS,  16 F.3d 118 (6th Cir.  1994); Barreiro
                   ______    ___                                 ________

            v. INS, 989 F.2d 62 (1st Cir. 1993).  At issue in those cases
               ___

            was  an amendment to section 212(c) which made aliens who had

            served at  least five  years' imprisonment for  an aggravated

            felony  ineligible  for  discretionary  relief.    See,  e.g,
                                                               ___   ___

            Barreiro, 989 F.2d at 62.  In Barreiro, this court found that
            ________                      ________

            the  amendment's application  to prisoners  whose convictions

            and  prison terms predated its  enactment did not violate the

                                         -12-
                                          12

            presumption  against  retroactivity.     Id.  at  64.    "The
                                                     ___

            presumption  against a retroactive  interpretation is to give

            fair warning so that a party may avoid consequences.  This is

            scarcely a situation calling for any such warning."  Id. 
                                                                 ___

                      Similar logic  applies here.  As  the Third Circuit

            said in Schiedemann,  petitioner's "conduct clearly subjected
                    ___________

            him to deportation  as well as criminal sanctions,  and . . .

            [section] 212(c), as it then existed, offered relief from the

            former  only at  the  unfettered discretion  of the  Attorney

            General  .  . .  ."    Schiedemann, 83  F.3d  at  1523.   The
                                   ___________

            availability of purely  discretionary relief does  not create

            substantive rights  in otherwise deportable  criminal aliens,

            nor  does the  availability of judicial  review of  denial of

            that discretionary relief.

                      We   find   that   Kolster's  substantive   rights,

            liabilities, and duties are not retroactively impaired by the

            preclusion of judicial review.  We note that five of  the six

            other  circuit courts  to consider  this question  have found

            that section 440(a) applies upon enactment.  See Salazar-Haro
                                                         ___ ____________

            v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92
               ___                              ______________    ___

            F.3d 27 (2d Cir.  1996); Qasguargis v. INS, 91  F.3d 788 (6th
                                     __________    ___

            Cir. 1996); Duldulao  v. INS,  90 F.3d 396  (9th Cir.  1996);
                        ________     ___

            Mendez-Rosas   v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996).  We hold,
            ____________      ___

            under the  "judicial default  rules" that are  articulated in

            Landgraf  and which  provide a  guide to  legislative intent,
            ________

                                         -13-
                                          13

            that  section  440(a)'s deprivation  of jurisdiction  to this

            court is effective upon enactment.

            B. The Constitutional Challenge to Section 440(a)
            _________________________________________________

                      Kolster contends that  section 440(a)'s  preclusion

            of judicial  review of final  orders of deportation  based on

            commission of  certain crimes  violates both the  Due Process

            Clause and the principles of separation of powers embodied in

            Article III.  Kolster argues that deportation deprives him of

            a  constitutionally protected liberty  interest, and that the

            Due  Process Clause  thus  guarantees him  certain procedural

            protections,  including  judicial   review.     Additionally,

            Kolster argues that section  440(a), by giving "the Executive

            Branch the power to act as legal arbiter of its own conduct,"

            prevents the judiciary from  fulfilling its Article III "role

            as a 'check' on the actions of the two other branches."

                      The INS responds that  section 440(a) is "clearly a

            constitutional exercise of  Congress' well-established  power

            to provide or  withhold jurisdiction from statutorily-created

            courts,  as  well  as  its  plenary  power  over  matters  of

            immigration and naturalization."  Because we consider this to

            be  a  serious  question,  this  court  requested  additional

            briefing on whether habeas corpus review remains available to

            aliens who  are covered by  section 440(a)'s bar  on judicial

            review.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      The question of section  440(a)'s constitutionality

            is  not wholly  resolved  by reference  to Congress'  plenary

            power over matters concerning immigration.   While it is true

            that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of

            Congress more complete,"   Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.  292, 305
                                       ____    ______

            (1996)(citation  omitted), the  Supreme Court  has also  said

            that:

                      once  an  alien  gains  admission  to our
                      country  and begins  to develop  the ties
                      that  go  with  permanent  residence  his
                      constitutional       status       changes
                      accordingly.  Our  cases have  frequently
                      suggested  that  a  continuously  present
                      alien  is entitled to a fair hearing when
                      threatened    with    deportation,   and,
                      although  we have  only rarely  held that
                      the procedures provided by  the executive
                      were  inadequate,  we developed  the rule
                      that  a  continuously  present  permanent
                      resident alien has a right to due process
                      in such a situation. 

            Landon  v.  Plasencia,  459   U.S.  21,  32   (1982)(internal
            ______      _________

            citations omitted).  Given this recognition that continuously

            present  aliens, like  Kolster, do  have some  constitutional

            status,   our   analysis  of   whether  judicial   review  is

            constitutionally required  here cannot turn on  the fact that

            section 440(a) only affects  the rights of such aliens.   See
                                                                      ___

            Salazar-Haro, 95 F.3d at 311.
            ____________

                      The  constitutional   question  at  the   heart  of

            Kolster's  claim  may  be  stated  as  follows:    Where  the

            consequences  of  the  decision  are  the  deportation  of  a

            continuously  present  alien,  may  Congress,  by  precluding

                                         -15-
                                          15

            judicial  review  of final  deportation  orders,  place final

            authority  over a  question of  law --  here, the  meaning of

            section 212(c)'s  phrase "lawful unrelinquished  domicile" --

            in  the hands of an  administrative body (i.e.,  the BIA), or

            does   the  Constitution  require   an  independent  judicial

            determination of questions of law, or at least of whether the

            agency's determination  was a reasonable construction  of the

            statute?   See Fallon et  al., Hart &  Wechsler's The Federal
                       ___                 ______________________________

            Courts  and  The  Federal   System  397-98  (4th  ed.  1996);
            __________________________________

            Monaghan, Marbury and the  Administrative State, 83 Colum. L.
                      _____________________________________

            Rev. 1,  28-34  (1983);  cf.  Chevron  USA  Inc.  v.  Natural
                                     __   __________________      _______

            Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  Were
            _________________________

            no other avenues of judicial review available to aliens  like

            petitioner,  we  would be  required  to  resolve that  thorny

            question here.

                      However,  the INS has  agreed that,  although AEDPA

            has repealed the previous statutory authorization for  habeas

            review of  final  deportation  orders  contained  in  section

            106(a)(10)  of the INA, any habeas review that is required by

            the Constitution  remains available.4  Kolster  contends that

            the  repeal of  the specific  INA habeas  provision does  not

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The  INS's precise position is that such constitutionally
            compelled habeas review, or its equivalent, remains, and that
            we need not here  determine "whether the jurisdictional basis
            for 'constitutional  habeas'  review of  a deportation  order
            would be 28 U.S.C.   2241, section 1651, or a 'free standing'
            Constitutional  authorization."    For  present  purposes, we
            describe the alternatives as "habeas review."

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                                          16

            impair  the ability of the  federal courts to  grant writs of

            habeas corpus under the general habeas provision, 28 U.S.C.  

            2241, and  that such habeas review  would encompass questions

            of law  like the  one  Kolster raises  here.   Cf. Felker  v.
                                                           ___ ______

            Turpin,  116 S.  Ct.  2333, 2339  (1996)  (declining to  find
            ______

            jurisdictional repeal by implication).

                      Because the  INS acknowledges that some  avenue for

            judicial   review   remains   available   to   address   core

            constitutional  and  jurisdictional  concerns, we  find  that

            section 440(a)'s  repeal of our jurisdiction  to review final

            deportation orders does not raise a constitutional issue.  As

            the nature  and scope  of habeas  review available  to aliens

            like Kolster  is not properly before  us at this  time, we do

            not reach  those questions.   See Hincapie-Nieto, 92  F.2d at
                                          ___ ______________

            31.

                      Accordingly, the petition  for review is  dismissed

            for lack of jurisdiction.

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