Court Opinion

ID: 9845455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:22:26.868158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.472919
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
Although I agree with the majority that appellant’s conviction and sentence must be affirmed, I do so for completely different reasons than those expressed in the majority opinion. First, my review of the record convinces me that the trial court erred in failing to suppress statements made by appellant which were, according to my view, obtained in violation of his Miranda rights.1 Even so, and for reasons that I will later explain, I cannot conclude that the admission of those statements prejudiced him. With respect to the inordinately severe sentence imposed on appellant, I concur with the majority only because the applicable law gives me no alternative. In concurring, I reiterate the position I took in Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107, 1113 (1981), concerning the need for this court to review the sentencing aspect of criminal proceedings more carefully.
THE MIRANDA QUESTION
I have no quarrel with the conclusion reached by the majority concerning the propriety of the admissibility of appellant’s initial statement to the authorities. When appellant Daniel entered the police chief’s office and informed him that he was responsible for the accidental death of Helen Bunning, Mr. Daniel thereby made a volun*181tary statement which implicated him in the crime. As noted by the majority, such admissions fall outside of the proscriptions of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), and are admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
My dispute with the majority focuses on their affirmance of the trial court’s decision to admit appellant’s later declarations to the police in the statement-taking process. In the majority view, these utterances became admissible because they were obtained after appellant had knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights as these rights are guaranteed by the 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution. I disagree with this conclusion because the challenged statements were, in my judgment, obtained in violation of appellant’s rights as identified by Miranda v. Arizona, supra, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Dryden v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 483 (1975).
In support of my position in this respect, it is necessary for me to clarify and enlarge upon the statement of the facts surrounding the taking of appellant’s statement. I do this because I believe the majority opinion fails to capture all of the relevant facts — fails to capture the flavor and the tenor of the conversations that took place— fails to perceive accurately what Mr. Daniel in fact said to the police. The result is that the reader of the majority opinion is given an inexact impression as to what really transpired at the police station.
The majority suggests that appellant first spoke to the Rock Springs Police Department and implicated himself in the death of the victim — which is true. Then, upon realizing that probable cause for an arrest existed, the Chief read to the appellant his Miranda rights and all conversation ceased until two other officers arrived in order to begin the tape-recorded interview. It is then suggested that appellant was again read and explained his Miranda rights and given the opportunity to waive those rights, which he did voluntarily, and, presumably, with a full understanding of the consequences of the waivers. This synopsis of the facts describes a suspect willing and ready to talk after proper guidance and assistance are given by the police in explaining the constitutional rights which he is entitled to assert or waive and which rights he does in fact waive with a full understanding of the consequences.
My review of the record, however, convinces me that the picture painted in the majority opinion glosses over several important details that poignantly suggest a situation involving a suspect who asserts his right to counsel only to be later persuaded otherwise — i.e., argued out of it by the police officers involved. This is what occurred at the police station before the appellant gave his statement to the officers.
On September 19, 1980, appellant voluntarily went to the office of Police Chief Russell Hawk of the Rock Springs Police Department in order to turn himself in for the incident which resulted in Helen Running’s death. Chief Hawk was informed by his secretary that an individual wanted to speak to him about the Bunning case, whereupon Mr. Daniel, together with his wife and children, was admitted to the Chief’s office. Upon entering, Daniel said that he was responsible for the “accident” that occurred at the college. The Chief requested a clarification, after which it became clear that appellant was referring to the Bunning homicide. As the majority note, appellant confessed responsibility for the victim’s death while at the same time claiming it was an accident. At this juncture, Chief Hawk gave appellant the Miranda warning. Immediately thereafter, Daniel said that he would “probably like to have an attorney present." (Emphasis added.) This demand or request was absolutely ignored except that the Chief then ordered two officers to produce a tape recorder so that the interview could be recorded. Thus — contrary to the majority’s view — appellant demanded an attorney or assistance of counsel before the taped interview began. This sequence of events is confirmed at the beginning of the taped portion:
*182“CHIEF HAWK:
“Yes — about 2:15 and told me that you were responsible for the accident to the woman. I asked you to clarify what accident, and you said, ‘Where the woman was killed with the knife.’ Is that correct?
“MR. DANIEL:
“Accidentally.
“CHIEF HAWK:
“Well, yes. That you were the only person that was involved and responsible for that?
“MR. DANIEL:
“Yes, sir.
“CHIEF HAWK:
“I advised you of your legal rights and at that point you told me that you’d probably like to have an attorney present.” (Emphasis added.)
Following this colloquy, appellant stated to Chief Hawk, “if it’s necessary, because I just don’t want to be taken advantage of or anything like that,” and he received the following response from Chief Hawk:
“CHIEF HAWK:
“Well, it’s not necessary, and like I’ve told you, if you do waive your rights of having an attorney present, and I’ve told your wife the same thing, that we would be willing to discuss — and let you just tell your story as to what happened. If you are saying it’s an accident, an attorney will tell you that’s a self-serving declaration. It’s — but again, if you want to, you know, sit down, you’ve got to have your attorney here present if you’re going to make a statement. I would tell you at this time, that with what information you’ve given us, it will be necessary for us to take you into custody, whether you make the statement or not.” (Emphasis added.)
The above sequence of events convinces me that rather than assisting appellant, the Chief of Police, along with the other officers, continually pressed appellant to waive the right to counsel for whose services he had earlier expressed a need. In short, the police talked him out of it. This is substantiated by the following interchange which occurred after one of the officers had read appellant his rights:
“CHIEF HAWK:
“Now, you have answered ‘Yes, sir,’ to all of these questions. Okay, would you ask—
“POLICE OFFICER:
“Okay, what I would like to do now is ask for a waiver.
“CHIEF HAWK:
“In other words, the waiver being that you have read this statement. So, would you read it again now that you have answered all the questions with Mr. Grymes reading it?
“POLICE OFFICER:
“If you would just read that waiver and if you have any questions about it. “MR. DANIEL:
“May I still — if I can’t afford a lawyer — may I still be appointed a lawyer ? “CHIEF HAWK:
“Well, we wouldn’t talk to you at the point that you want to have an attorney. We would discuss it with you now. You do have the right to have representation now, not only at this time, but later on in the thing. That’s just if you want an attorney, we’re not going to talk to you right now. We are just going to put you in the bucket and shut things down.” (Emphasis added.)
Here, even when appellant inquired once again concerning his right to appointed counsel, the question was ignored and the chief went through a dissertation of rights which appellant obviously did not understand. Shortly after this, appellant waived his rights after he was assured by the officers that a waiver would not prejudice him.2
*183In my opinion, the facts outlined above lead to the conclusion that appellant asserted his right to counsel and only later waived that right at police insistence. This, according to my views, constituted a violation of the appellant’s constitutional rights under the authorities discussed below.
As the majority opinion ably notes, the cornerstone authority for questions concerning the admissibility of confessions resulting from police interrogation is Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In that opinion the United States Supreme Court set out the procedures which the police are required to follow before an individual can be subject to custodial interrogation. In describing the holding of the case, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the court, stated:
“Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process th&t he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.” (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Later in the opinion the Court further clarified the holding by stating:
“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual *184must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.” (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627.
The Court also made it clear that in deciding the case they were only reiterating those rights guaranteed to an individual under the 5th and 6th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
We had an opportunity to discuss and apply the Miranda rationale to Art. 1, § 11 of the Wyoming Constitution in Dryden v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 483 (1975). In that case, the accused had twice informed interrogating officers of his desire to obtain counsel, which requests were ignored. Specifically, on the day of his arrest the suspect had informed the arresting officer that “ T will get a lawyer when I get into town’ ” and on the following day he stated “ T think I should have an attorney.’ ” Id. at 487-488. In response, we not only held that the challenged confessions should have been suppressed because appellant had received improper warnings, but we also held that, under Miranda, all interrogation should have ceased until counsel had been provided for appellant since he had effectively informed the officers that he desired a lawyer. In discussing this latter aspect of the case we said:
“Without engaging in the exercise in semantics indulged in by the county sheriff, we think it is established that at the earliest possible and appropriate time the defendant indicated his desire to have the assistance and advice of counsel. Instead of then proceeding to determine whether defendant was in a financial position to obtain such counsel or would require the appointment of an attorney, the county authorities ignored the statement and proceeded with continued interrogation that resulted in highly damaging admissions by the defendant. Having again been advised of defendant’s desire for counsel on the 18th the sheriff chose to interpret the defendant’s remarks as not being a request for counsel and did nothing except to inform the county attorney thereof. The county attorney likewise turned a deaf ear to the request and did nothing about it until after obtaining the information he wanted when he told defendant he thought he needed an attorney and would do something about it. . It was only following this conversation, and even though defendant had been brought before a justice of the peace on another charge on the 19th, that the county attorney on the 23rd caused complaint and warrant for arrest to be filed and on the 24th brought the defendant before a justice of the peace as required by Rule 5(a), W.R.Cr.P.
“We hold that this failure to respond to repeated statements of the defendant that he desired counsel was a violation of defendant’s constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda.” 535 P.2d at 492.
In Dryden, we relied upon the previously quoted language from Miranda, supra, in determining that appellant’s constitutional rights were violated since Miranda unequivocally required all questioning to cease once appellant asserted his right to counsel.
Not long after the Miranda opinion, the United States Supreme Court considered a case in which the petitioner challenged the admission of his confession because he believed, under Miranda, his rights had been violated. In Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969), the accused had stated during a portion of his interrogation that “I think I had better get a lawyer before I talk anymore.” In rejecting his claim, the Court found that, since petitioner had been tried before the Miranda case had been decided, the holding of that case could not be applied retroactively so petitioner’s claim was only considered in light of the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). However, in dicta, the Court noted that under Miranda their decision might have been different:
“Petitioner argues that his statement about getting a lawyer was sufficient to *185bring Escobedo into play and that the police should immediately have stopped the questioning and obtained counsel for him. We might agree were Miranda applicable to this case, for in Miranda this court held that ‘[i]f ... [a suspect] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.’ 384 U.S., at 444-445 [86 S.Ct. at 1612], But Miranda does not apply to this case.” (Emphasis added.) 394 U.S. at 738, 89 S.Ct. at 1424.
In its 1975 decision in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that no violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights occurred where petitioner had asserted his right to remain silent during an initial interrogation regarding some robberies and that wish had been honored, but he had later implicated himself in an unrelated murder after being questioned by a different police officer who had fully advised him of his rights a second time. It was important to the majority, in that case, that some four hours had elapsed between the first and second interviews, and also that the second questioning session involved a crime that was unrelated to the first. In distinguishing the case from other situations violative of Miranda, the Court stated:
“This is not a case, therefore, where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind.” 423 U.S. at 105-106, 96 S.Ct. at 327.
If Michigan v. Mosley, supra, caused any confusion as to what the police can do after a suspect invokes one of the rights recognized in Miranda, the United States Supreme Court recently removed any doubts, in Edwards v. Arizona, supra. There the justices were faced with a challenge to the admissibility of statements made by the petitioner after he had first invoked his right to counsel3 and had then, after insistence by several officers, implicated himself in the same crime concerning which he had previously refused to discuss. After the first assertion of his desire for counsel, petitioner had been placed in a cell. Later, several detectives had come and requested to interview Edwards. Edwards told the guard he did not desire to speak but the guard responded that he had to. At that point petitioner was taken to the room where the detectives were waiting and, after being read his Miranda rights, he gave an inculpatory statement. The Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that petitioner’s constitutional right to silence was violated by the second interrogation and all statements derived therefrom should have been suppressed. In so holding, the Court stated:
“Second, although we have held that after initially being advised of his Miranda rights, the accused may himself validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation, see North Carolina v. Butler, supra, [441 U.S. 369] at 372-376 [99 S.Ct. 1755, at 1756-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 286], the Court has strongly indicated that additional safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and we now hold that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
“Miranda itself indicated that the assertion of the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, ‘the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ 384 U.S., at 474 [86 S.Ct. at 1627]. Our later *186cases have not abandoned that view. In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 [96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313] (1975), the Court noted that Miranda had distinguished between the procedural safeguards triggered by a request to remain silent and a request for an attorney and had required that interrogation cease until an attorney was present only if the individual stated that he wanted counsel. 423 U.S., at 104, n. 10 [96 S.Ct., at 326, n. 10]; see also id., at 109-111 [96 S.Ct., at 329-330] (White, J., concurring). In Fare v. Michael C., supra [442 U.S. 707] at 719 [99 S.Ct. 2560, at 2568, 61 L.Ed.2d 197], the Court referred to Miranda’s ‘rigid rule that an accused’s request for an attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all interrogation cease.’ And just last Term, in a case where a suspect in custody had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, the Court again referred to the ‘undisputed right’ under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation ‘until he had consulted with a lawyer.’ Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298 [100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688, 64 L.Ed.2d 297] (1980). We reconfirm these views and, to lend them substance, emphasize that it is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterro-gate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” (Emphasis added.) 451 U.S. at 484 — 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1884.
The import of the holding in Edwards is that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, the police are required to cease all efforts at interrogation, and any further discussion between the two can only occur when counsel is provided or when the accused himself is the initiator of further conversation.
Thus, for me, the only question presented in this case concerns whether or not the appellant did in fact and in law actually assert his right to have counsel present during the initial conversation with the Chief of Police. If he did, it is clear from the above authorities that his statement was taken in violation of his constitutional right to silence because at the time the right to counsel was invoked, the officers did not cease the interrogation nor was any further conversation initiated by appellant himself. If such is the case, the question of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver never arises. As the following discussion will show, I can only conclude that, in and under the circumstances then and there existing in the offices of the Chief of Police, appellant’s statement that he “would probably like to have an attorney present,” was sufficient to inform the police of his desire to have an attorney and that all questioning should have stopped. The failure of the police to cease interrogation required the district court to suppress appellant’s later statement. It was error not to do so.
Of course, the question of whether appellant actually invoked his right to counsel depends on an interpretation of the previously quoted language from Miranda v. Arizona, supra:
“If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
This question is one that has been dealt with comprehensively by other courts.
For example, in People v. Harris, 191 Colo. 234, 552 P.2d 10 (1976) the accused inquired, “When can I get a lawyer?” and the police responded that he could get one on Monday since it was a Saturday when the defendant was being questioned. In holding that the subsequent statement made by appellant was taken in violation of his Miranda rights, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
“The defendant made a request for an attorney, and the police officers were thereby placed on notice that the defendant intended to exercise his constitutional rights. Admittedly, the demand was not in the most sophisticated or legally proper form, but it was adequate. At that point, all interrogation should have ceased until an attorney was made available to the *187accused. The fact that the accused did not ‘demand’ an attorney does not persuade us that he was not exercising his rights.” 552 P.2d at 12.
Likewise, in State v. Nicholson, 19 Or.App. 226, 527 P.2d 140 (1974), the court cited with approval earlier case law 4 holding that when accused says, “ ‘Maybe I should see an attorney, or I should talk with an attorney,’ ” this is a sufficient express request invoking the right to have counsel present before questioning. In that opinion, the court further stated that Miranda does not allow inquiry into the accused’s reason for requesting counsel but rather clearly mandates that questioning stop until an attorney is present. Id. 527 P.2d at 142. Finally, the court noted:
“The defendant is not required to make repeated requests for counsel; one is sufficient.” 527 P.2d at 143.
Similarly, in People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323, 450 P.2d 580 (1969), the California Supreme Court asserted that even where an accused makes an indirect indication that he desires the presence of counsel, such a statement requires an immediate cessation of any questioning.5 For similar statements of the rule see: Giacomazzi v. State, Alaska, 633 P.2d 218, 221 (1981) (no particular form of words are necessary for an accused to invoke his right to counsel); U. S. v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681, 683 (1981) (statement “ ‘maybe it would be good to have a lawyer’ ” was sufficient to invoke right to counsel); People v. Stroh, 48 N.Y.2d 1000, 425 N.Y.S.2d 548, 401 N.E.2d 906 (1980) (statement that accused wanted to talk to “a priest or an attorney” was sufficient to invoke right to counsel); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 407 A.2d 365 (1979) (statement by accused “ ‘he thought he had better talk to an attorney’ ” was sufficient to invoke right to counsel); People v. Lewis, 47 Mich.App. 450, 209 N.W.2d 450 (1973) (inquiry by accused as to possibility of getting an attorney was sufficient to invoke right).6
The above-quoted cases clearly stand for the proposition that it is not necessary for an accused to state outright, “I want an attorney,” in order for the right to have counsel present to be invoked. Rather, they stand for the well-considered rule that where an accused gives the police any indication, “in any manner,” that he desires an attorney all questioning or inquiry on their part must be terminated, and, under Edwards v. Arizona, supra, questioning cannot resume until counsel is provided or the accused himself instigates further contact.
Applying the rule I have just discussed to the facts of this case, I can reach but one conclusion, which is that appellant did in fact and law invoke his right to counsel when he stated he would “probably want to have counsel present.” At this point it was incumbent upon the police to cease all contact with appellant until he was provided a lawyer. Since they did not cease contact but, instead, undertook to convince Daniel that he did not need a lawyer and that a waiver would not prejudice his rights, the statement subsequently obtained was procured in violation of Daniel’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to suppress that statement.
As I have indicated above, I am nevertheless convinced that the admission of appellant’s statement did not prejudice him or affect the outcome of his trial since the jury convicted Mr. Daniel of the crime to which he had originally confessed — that being causing the accidental death of Helen Bun-ning. The statement was merely a more detailed version of his confession which was consistent with his previous story that the victim’s death occurred by accident. The *188added details did nothing to affect the outcome of his trial. People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555 (1965). For this reason alone I concur in the result reached by the majority.
THE SENTENCING ASPECT
Likewise, I concur in the result reached by the majority with respect to the sentencing aspect of appellant’s case, but, in the same breath, reiterate the position I expressed in Scheikofsky v. State, supra, with regard to the need for this court to develop standards against which trial-court sentencing may be tested.
In Scheikofsky, I urged the adoption of appropriate sentence-review standards that would be compatible with the sentencing purposes expressed in Art. 1, § 15 of the Wyoming Constitution. By way of reiteration, this constitutional provision says:
“The penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention.”
Under this mandate, I said in Scheikofsky, and I am of the opinion still, that our past history of refusing to review á sentence falling within statutory parameters is not in the best interests of the citizenry of Wyoming.
Today’s trend in the law encourages appellate courts to take a more enlightened stance with regard to the sentencing of criminal offenders. Conceding that sentencing authority lies within the discretion of a trial court, this important aspect in the judicial process should not thereby be placed beyond the pale of appellate scrutiny. State v. Messer, Iowa, 306 N.W.2d 731 (1981); State v. Jones, La., 398 So.2d 1049 (1981); People v. Watkins, Colo., 613 P.2d 633 (1980); State v. Dillon, 100 Idaho 723, 604 P.2d 737 (1979). Sentencing inquiry and review should be guided by the reasonable standards adopted in State v. Chaney, Alaska, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (1970), which standards I set out in my concurring opinion in Scheikofsky v. State, supra.
I feel compelled to italicize my position on this subject because, in the case at bar, the appellant’s sentence for his conviction of negligent homicide is severe indeed. Even the State in its brief admits that the 19-year-minimum sentence imposed by the trial judge is some 12 years longer than any minimum sentence imposed for involuntary manslaughter in any recent case in Wyoming. I agree with the majority that we cannot and should not demand uniformity, but it is also true that the purpose of criminal sentencing in this state is to aid in the defendant’s rehabilitation and to help society in attaining its goal of crime prevention and deterrence. I wonder whether the sentence imposed in this case is specifically calculated to accomplish these purposes. Until my brothers on the court join me in a meaningful inquiry into the concepts that I have expressed, appellate sentencing standards will not be adopted. In the meantime, I must concur in the majority opinion since under our past authority the sentence in this case clearly falls within the statutory parameters set by the legislature — and this is the only standard that this court now recognizes.
Until the time when we develop meaningful standards against which to test the exercise of sentencing discretion, I will be forced to remain in the position of having to concur in opinions where the court holds that discretion has not been abused as long as sentencing falls within statutory parameters.
I therefore concur — but reluctantly.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).

. This clear misstatement was recited by the interrogating officer as follows: “Okay, that— you don’t, by signing this waiver, you don’t waive your rights." (Emphasis added.) In my opinion, this statement alone must preclude any finding that appellant had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Thus, notwithstanding my conclusions that the police violated appellant’s rights by failing to cease questioning after he had “asked” for a lawyer, I am *183also convinced that the State also failed to prove that he knowingly and intelligently waived that right. In Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1883, the Court stated the rule as follows:
“It is reasonably clear under our cases that waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends in each case ‘upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461, 1466] (1938).”
See also: U. S. v. Hinckley, D.C.Cir., 672 F.2d 115. Given this rule, I cannot see how anyone can conclude that the appellant knowingly and intelligently relinquished any rights especially after being told by the police that by signing the waiver form he would not be waiving his rights.

. Petitioner had stated during initial interview: “I want an attorney before making a deal.”

.See: State v. Ayers, 16 Or.App. 300, 518 P.2d 190 (1974).

.In People v. Enriquez, 19 Cal.3d 221, 137 Cal.Rptr. 171, 561 P.2d 261, 262 (1977) the court cited the Ireland case and reiterated that, under it and the rules of Miranda, not only must questioning cease but also the police cannot make further attempts to extract a waiver once the right to counsel is invoked.

.For similar statements confirming the rule see: White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978); U. S. v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974).