Court Opinion

ID: 9547016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:40:07.326901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:12.434247
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I do not share the views of any of my colleagues as expressed in the majority opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Day or the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Moore, and feel that it is proper for me to briefly outline my views.
We have before us for consideration the petition of one Harold Stein, who appears for himself and for “all other persons similarly situate.” In his petition Stein sets forth facts upon which he predicates his claim for relief from this Court. For himself and his fellow citizens he prays, in substance, that this Court:
1. Convene the General Assembly for the purpose of reapportionment.
2. Require the Governor to convene the General Assembly for such purpose.
3. Prohibit the Secretary of State from “permitting the conduct of elections or certifying to office any person as elected to the General Assembly until there be such reapportionment * * *.”
4. Prohibit the State Treasurer from paying to any member of the General Assembly of any of the emoluments of his office until there be reapportionment as provided by the Constitution of Colorado.
There is no prayer for general relief or any relief other than that above specified.
Having read the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, I conclude that my associates, who subscribe thereto, all concede that for this Court to grant any of the relief requested would be an invasion of the powers of the executive or the legislative branches of the government and beyond the powers delegated to the judiciary. I entertained and expressed those views when the *411petition was first presented and cast my vote to then deny the petition. Passage of time, reading of voluminous briefs, listening to elaborate and intriguing arguments and studying the aforementioned opinions serves only to bolster my original conviction that the rule to show cause should never have been granted and that the petition should now be dismissed.
I find nothing in the majority opinion indicating that in 1963 or at any other time are any of the four members of this Court who share in that opinion going to grant any of the relief requested by Mr. Stein. If my analysis is correct, then it would seem that orderly procedure dictates that Stein’s petition be dismissed now.
Implicit in the statement in the majority opinion, “reserving final judgment herein on all issues ***,’’ is a suggestion, warning, or veiled threat that if the Governor, the General Assembly, the Secretary of State, and the State Treasurer do not meet the demands of Mr. Stein prior to June 1963, they will hear further from this Court. I am of the opinion that those parties are entitled to go about the performance of their constitutional and statutory duties, answerable only to the people and their own consciences, untrammeled by threats or warnings from this Court, no matter how hollow or impotent they may be.
•Both Mr. Chief Justice Day and Mr. Justice Moore point out that, under our rules of civil procedure, we may grant relief other than that sought or warranted by the petition. I do not subscribe to that construction of the rules as applicable to class actions.
Here, we have Stein coming into court and asking for certain relief for himself and 1,800,000 other citizens. Possibly the other 1,800,000 desire the same relief as Stein and are happy to have him go forth as their Sir Galahad to bring about the desired results. Their silence here is their consent. These 1,800,000 citizens may well be held accountable for, and bound by, Stein’s failure to procure the relief demanded — none can be held ac*412countable for Stein’s returning from the bargain counter with: (1) delay from the majority; (2) elections at large from the minority. None bargained for such result. Neither Stein nor any of his 1,800,000 fellow citizens have had their day in court on either question. No one has suggested that relief (if such it may be called) of the nature granted by the majority or recommended by the minority be visited on 1,800,000 citizens who appear in court seeking relief entirely foreign to that granted or recommended.
Clearly, the People have not entrusted to the judiciary any powers or duties pertaining to reapportionment. They placed their trust in the General Assembly and not elsewhere. The People have the reapportionment for which they bargained — that provided by the Assembly, good, bad, or indifferent, or even none in the event of its failure to act. They are getting exactly that for which the Constitution provides. To thrust upon the people any form of reapportionment other than that for which they bargained does violence to their constitutional rights.
It is probably true that the People are not getting the reapportionment which they anticipated getting or hoped for, but they are getting legislative reapportionment and that is what is provided for in the Constitution.
Steps have already been taken by the People through proposed initiated measures looking toward other and different reapportionment. As I view it, such is the only method available to divest the General Assembly of its present powers and to relieve it of its present duties with respect to reapportionment.
Certainly the People have never evinced any desire to have the judiciary take over. All members of this court recognize this fact; however, Justice Moore skirts the problem by stating that: “The judiciary has inherent power to ‘fashion relief’ necessary to prevent violations of constitutional rights.” With that statement I am in complete disagreement.
*413I am fully persuaded that this court is a branch of the government vested with enumerated powers only. Powers not granted to the legislature, the executive or the judiciary are reserved to the People. That to me is elementary and fundamental. I for one lay claim to no inherent powers. Not too long ago a President of the United States, presented with a troublesome problem, as are we, concluded that he possessed inherent powers which provided the desired solution. The judiciary promptly and thoroughly rejected his assumption or exercise of such authority as being foreign to our system of government, a government predicated on the delegation of powers by the People, and retention by the People of powers not delegated.
The powers and duties of the Supreme Court are limited, well defined by the Constitution and enabling legislation. I find nothing therein remotely suggesting that this court has the power to step in and fill the breach occasioned by the failure of the executive or legislative branches of the government to perform their constitutional duties. The remedy rests in the hands of the People.
The petition should be dismissed.