Court Opinion

ID: 9929284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 08:16:04.332059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:39.090960
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               ________________
                               NO. 09-21-00304-CR
                               ________________

                 MARIO LAVELL COCKERHAM, Appellant

                                          V.

                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________________________________________________

                    On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
                           Liberty County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. CR26494
________________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Mario Lavell Cockerham appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion

for post-conviction forensic DNA testing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts.

64.01-.05. In two issues, Cockerham challenges the trial court’s order, arguing that

he correctly identified the items needing to be tested in his motion, and that his

affidavit was sufficient to support his motion. We affirm the trial court’s order.

                                          1
                              Procedural Background

          In August 2018, Cockerham, acting pro se, filed a motion requesting DNA

testing under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01. In his motion for DNA testing, Cockerham stated that

in 2009, a jury found him guilty of capital murder, resulting in an automatic sentence

of life without the possibility of parole.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(8).

Cockerham argues that although the evidence in his case was previously subjected

to DNA testing, there are new testing techniques that were unavailable in 2009.

These new techniques test DNA derived from skin cells. Cockerham contends that

if the new test had been available, he would not have been convicted if exculpatory

results had been obtained. Specifically, Cockerham states that since his trial, “‘[n]ew

[t]echnology’ and ‘[n]ew DNA [d]etermination’ were developed to discern a DNA

[p]rofile[] produced by [s]kin [c]ells[,]” noting that the forensic expert and DNA

analyst at his trial, did not “sift the items for ‘SKIN CELLS[,]’ as said technology

to discern and analyze ‘SKIN CELLS’ [was] not developed at the time of Petitioner’s

trial.”

       Cockerham was found guilty of the capital murder of his infant daughter.
          1

See Cockerham v. State, No. 09-09-00180-CR, 2010 WL 3041169 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Aug. 4, 2010, pet. ref’d).
                                     2
      According to Cockerham, the 2009 DNA test report showed that the DNA of

only one person, the mother of the infant, was present on three specific items,

excluding Cockerham’s DNA on each item. He challenges the State’s use of a dog

scent lineup based on skin cells found on these three individual objects. He states

that at trial, it was suggested that a person loses “50 to 70 [m]illion [s]kin [c]ells a

day,” and that three dogs identified Cockerham’s skin cells on three items during a

“[d]og [s]cent [l]ine [u]p[,]” including a “house cell phone,” papers from a wallet,

and the deceased infant’s onesie. He asserts this identification is “[j]unk [s]cience[,]”

and cites to a Texas Monthly article from May 2010, to support his claims that a dog

scent lineup identification based on skin cells is “Junk Voo Doo Science[.]”

      Without a hearing, the trial court denied Cockerham’s motion, finding that

Cockerham “fails to identify and/or specify what DNA evidence, if any, needs to be

tested, and fails to include a proper affidavit stating how further DNA testing would

exonerate the defendant.” The trial court did not issue any Findings of Fact or

Conclusions of Law. Cockerham timely filed this appeal.

                                       Analysis

      In his two issues on appeal, Cockerham argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his motion for forensic DNA testing. The State maintains that

the trial court could have reasonably found that Cockerham’s motion failed to meet

the preconditions required by Article 64. According to the State, Cockerham’s

                                           3
motion fails to state what evidence he seeks to have retested and fails to attach the

required affidavit. See Dinkins v. State, 84 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

      Under Article 64, a convicted person may file a motion in the convicting court

for DNA testing of evidence that has a reasonable likelihood of containing biological

material. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(a-1). The motion must include the

convicted person’s sworn affidavit and include statements of fact in support of the

motion. Id. The motion may request DNA testing of evidence that is the basis of the

challenged conviction even if the evidence was previously subjected to DNA testing,

because newer testing techniques provide a reasonable likelihood of results that are

more accurate and probative. Id. art. 64.01(b)(2)(A).

      The convicting court may order DNA testing only if it finds that: (1) the

evidence still exists, is in a condition making DNA testing possible, and has been

subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been altered; (2)

there is a reasonable likelihood that the evidence contains biological material

suitable for DNA testing; (3) identity was an issue in the case; (4) the convicted

person established by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been

convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing and that his

request for testing is not made to unreasonably delay the sentence or the

administration of justice. Id. art. 64.03(a); Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363-64

                                           4
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Dohnal v. State, 540 S.W.3d 651, 655 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2018, pet. ref’d).

      When reviewing the trial court’s chapter 64 rulings, we employ a bifurcated

standard. See Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d 759, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Rivera v.

State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling

on a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, we give almost total deference to the

trial court’s findings of historical fact and to the trial court’s application-of-law-to-

fact issues that turn on witness credibility and demeanor, but we consider de novo

all other issues applying law to fact. Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011). Under this standard, we review whether the claimed DNA

evidence exists and is in a condition to be tested with deference to the trial court’s

finding. Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 59. Our de novo review includes whether the convicted

person has established by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have

been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing. Id.;

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A).

      A convicted person is not entitled to post-conviction DNA testing unless he

shows that there is a greater than 50% chance that he would not have been convicted

had any exculpatory results generated by the proposed testing been available at the

time of his trial. Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282, 286-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

The term “exculpatory results” has been construed to mean only results that exclude

                                           5
the convicted person as being a donor of the material. Id. at 287. We must assume

that the results of the post-conviction DNA testing would prove favorable to

Cockerham. See Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A

favorable DNA test result must be the sort of evidence that would affirmatively cast

doubt on the validity of the conviction; otherwise, the DNA testing would simply

“‘muddy the waters.’” Larson v. State, 488 S.W.3d 413, 417 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 892). If retesting would not show

by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant would not have been

convicted, then there is no reason for the trial court to order the DNA testing. Prible

v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466, 469-70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

       Cockerham asserts his motion and affidavit are sufficient to require the trial

court to grant DNA testing. Article 64.01(a) requires that an affidavit contain

statements of fact in support of the motion. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(a-

1). However, the statute does not specify what facts must be included. Id. The Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed what is required as factual support for

motions for DNA testing. See Smith, 165 S.W.3d at 362-65; Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at

642.

       In Dinkins v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Dinkins did not

meet the requirements of Article 64.01(a) because he did not provide statements of

fact in support of his motion. Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642; Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

                                          6
Ann. art. 64.01(a). Dinkins’s motion and expert report were unclear as to what

evidence Dinkins wanted tested and the expert’s report did not specifically address

whether previous DNA testing techniques could provide probative results. See

Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(b)(2)(A), (B)(ii).

Although Dinkins’s expert made general statements of fact about the type of DNA

testing that was available at the time of Dinkins’s trial, this was not enough to

support Dinkins’s motion for DNA testing. Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642. The court

required more specific information, which neither Dinkins nor his expert provided.

Id. Thus, the court held that the convicting court did not erroneously deny his request

for DNA testing. Id. at 643.

      In Smith v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held Smith established

by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted if

exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing. See Smith, 165 S.W.3d

at 365. Smith’s motion for DNA testing accompanied an affidavit in which he swore

he was not guilty of the offense for which he was convicted, and that the State had

evidence that would establish he was innocent of the alleged offense. See id. at 362.

The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Smith’s plea of actual innocence in

his pro se motion amounted to an assertion that there is at least a 51% chance he

would not have been convicted. Id. at 365. The court stated that arguably Smith

should have included other factual information in support of his assertion, but

                                          7
because the trial court took judicial notice of the trial record, those facts could be

found in the record. Id. Therefore, the trial court had enough evidence to determine

by a preponderance of the evidence that Smith would not have been convicted if the

DNA results were favorable. Id. Because Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) was the only part of

Chapter 64 in dispute in Smith, the motion met the requirements of Chapter 64 and

Smith was entitled to DNA testing. Id.

      Here, Cockerham’s motion fails to meet the requirements of Article 64.01 that

would require new DNA testing. First, although Cockerham provided an affidavit in

support of his motion for DNA testing by incorporating his allegations into his

affidavit by reference, the sworn affidavit simply makes general claims that the

foregoing motion “is true and correct to the best of Relator’s belief and knowledge.”

Unlike the Smith case, here there is no indication that the trial court took judicial

notice of Cockerham’s trial record or that the court considered the record in deciding

on Cockerham’s motion. Thus, there are not enough facts to determine by a

preponderance of the evidence that Cockerham would not have been convicted if

exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A); Smith, 165 S.W.3d at 364-65.

      Second, Cockerham’s case resembles Dinkins’s because, like Dinkins,

Cockerham did not identify what items he wanted tested, other than to name the

three items used in the dog sniff test upon which there was not sufficient DNA

                                          8
material found to support DNA testing. Cockerham similarly has not provided any

specific information about how present methods of DNA testing could be used to

exonerate him. Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642. Additionally, although Cockerham

identifies the three items he wants retested, he fails to show that the evidence he

seeks to have retested still exists, is in a condition to be retested, and has been

subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been altered. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A); Dohnal, 540 S.W.3d at 655;

Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642. Nor does the record show that Cockerham asked the trial

court to conduct an inquiry regarding the existence of the evidence. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.02(a) (requiring the trial court to provide notice to the State

and allowing the trial court to proceed regardless of whether the State delivers the

evidence or submits a response explaining why it cannot deliver the evidence);

Shannon v. State, 116 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Sepeda v.

State, 301 S.W.3d 372, 374-75 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d). Because

Cockerham failed to meet the preconditions to obtain post-conviction DNA testing,

the trial court did not err by denying Cockerham’s motion. See Tex. Code Crim.

Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(A); Dinkins, 84 S.W.3d at 642; Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at 59.

Cockerham’s pleadings provided no factual information, other than these assertions,

to support his motion. See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(a-1) (“The

motion must be accompanied by an affidavit, sworn to by the convicted person,

                                           9
containing statements of fact in support of the motion.”). Because Cockerham did

not supply enough facts to support his motion, he did not satisfy the requirements of

Article 64.01(a-1). See id. Thus, Cockerham’s motion and affidavit are not sufficient

to require the trial court to grant DNA testing.

      Even if we concede, which we do not, that this constituted a valid petition

under Chapter 64, there was no new DNA evidence identified to be tested. In spite

of the “dog-sniff” evidence presented at trial, the jury relied upon eye-witness

testimony and circumstantial evidence to convict Cockerham. See Prible, 245

S.W.3d at 470 (“Evidence of [] another person’s DNA in addition to Appellant’s is

not exculpatory evidence in this case due to the additional evidence presented at the

trial. Thus, even if the evidence [were] retested and determined to contain another

person’s DNA in addition to Appellant’s DNA, it would not establish by [a]

preponderance of the evidence that Appellant would not have been convicted if the

jury had heard that DNA from a third-party was present.”).

      A court may not grant a post-conviction motion for DNA testing unless the

movant has satisfied all the Chapter 64 requirements. See Wilson v. State, 185

S.W.3d 481, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). On the record before us, we conclude that

the trial court did not err by denying Cockerham’s motion for post-conviction

forensic DNA testing. See id. at 486; see also Prible, 245 S.W.3d at 470. We overrule

his two issues on appeal and affirm the order of the trial court.

                                          10
      AFFIRMED.

                                               JAY WRIGHT
                                                  Justice

Submitted on May 5, 2023
Opinion Delivered January 31, 2024
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

                                      11