Court Opinion

ID: 9865685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:25:39.899098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:18.656799
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION ROE REHEARING.
In a motion for rehearing counsel earnestly contends that the court reconsider its holding in the second division of the opinion. In an academic discussion of the phrase “turpentine gum” it is (a) contended the words are meaningless and do not legally describe any kind of property, and (b) that such description is too general and vague.
As to the first contention see 11 Michie’s Ga. Dig. 839, viz.: “ ‘Words generally bear their usual and common signification, but technical words, or words of art, or used in a particular trade or business, will be construed, generally, to be used in reference to this particular meaning.’ Strickland v. Stiles, 107 Ga. 308, 33 S. E. Rep. 85; Rose v. State, 107 Ga. 697, 33 S. E. Rep. 439; Savannah Ocean Steamship Co. v. Way, 90 Ga. 747, 17 S. E. Rep. 57; Featherston v. Rounsaville, 73 Ga. 617; Bailey v. State, 65 Ga. 410; Williams v. State, 61 Ga. 417; Cook v. Walker, 15 Ga. 463; Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195; Battle v. Shivers, 39 Ga. 405; Kelly v. Stephens, 39 Ga. 466; Chapman v. Woodruff, 34 Ga. 91; Hale v. Burton, Dud., 105; Blocker v. Boswell, 109 Ga. 230, 34 S. E. Rep. 289.” The word “turpentine” in the coastal plain regions of this *828State lias such a usual and common significance that when used as a descriptive preface to another word or words it has not only a provincial but a general meaning. In this section of our country we know of “the turpentine farm,” “the turpentine quarters,” “the turpentine place,” “the turpentine still,” “the turpentine man,” “the turpentine negro,” “the turpentine hand,” “the turpentine lease,” “the turpentine timber,” “the. turpentine barrels,” “the turpentine industry,” “the turpentine tree” (which in that section is known as the pine tree), and finally, the “turpentine gum,” which exudes from the pine tree on incision of the tree, and is caught in “a turpentine cup” or a “turpentine box,” and which gum, after being distilled by a “turpentine stiller,” is known as “turpentine spirits.” In that locality we do not -have the turpentine trees known to other countries, particularly Canada, Australia, and certain parts of Europe.
As to the second contention it will be noted from the allegations that the defendant stole turpentine gum, but the indictment does not stop with such general allegation but, as pointed out in the original opinion, the indictment goes further and alleges the number of barrels, the aggregate weight, and that said gum was sold to a particular person in a particular town, on or about a certain date. This description is quite different from that which was involved in Bright v. State, 10 Ga. App. 17 (supra) where the defendant was charged with stealing “100 pounds of seed cotton,” and that in Mathis v. State, 27 Ga. App. 229 (107 S. E. 629), in which the defendant was charged with stealing “two and one-half gallons of syrup.” We are of the opinion that if the cotton or the syrup had been further designated as that which had been sold to a particular person on an approximate or particular date it would have been sufficiently particularized. The allegation would thus have sufficiently described the article so as to make it similar to the required description in a compound larceny. One may be charged with the sale of an article to a particular person and such will not bar prosecution for a sale, within the statute of limitation, to a separate and distinct person. See Reynolds v. State, 114 Ga. 265 (40 S. E. 234); Craig v. State, 108 Ga. 776 (33 S. E. 653).
Therefore, on further consideration of the question presented as to the sufficiency of the description in the instant case, a rehearing is denied.