Court Opinion

ID: 9929436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 17:03:59.510513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:11.810836
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Feb 02 2024, 8:45 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Thomas F. Bedsole                                          John P. Higgins
Maggie L. Smith                                            Michael J. Blinn
Todd D. Small                                              Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Willow Haven on 106th Street,                              February 2, 2024
LLC,                                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant,                                       22A-PL-2931
                                                           Appeal from the Hamilton
        v.                                                 Superior Court
                                                           The Honorable Matthew C.
Hari Nagireddy and Saranya                                 Kincaid, Special Judge
Nagireddy,                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Plaintiffs.                                      29D02-2207-PL-5323

                           Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                Judge Foley concurs.
                    Judge Weissmann dissents with separate opinion.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                           Page 1 of 24
      Case Summary 1
[1]   Hari and Saranya Nagireddy filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief seeking a

      declaratory judgment and preliminary and permanent injunctions against

      Willow Haven on 106th Street, LLC (Willow Haven) to stop Willow Haven

      from building a residential structure (the Home) to house up to ten elderly

      persons suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or other forms of dementia. The

      Home, already partially constructed, is located in the City of Carmel (the City)

      in an area zoned for single-family housing, on a lot next to where the

      Nagireddys reside. Willow Haven moved to dismiss the Nagireddys’ complaint

      for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which motion the trial court

      denied. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Nagireddys’ request for

      a preliminary injunction against Willow Haven, thereby enjoining Willow

      Haven from completing construction of the Home. In this interlocutory appeal,

      Willow Haven presents several issues for review, which we consolidate and

      restate as:

              1. Were the Nagireddys required to exhaust administrative
              remedies before pursuing judicial review?

              2. Did the trial court err in granting a preliminary injunction in
              favor of the Nagireddys?

      1
        We held oral argument in Indianapolis on December 14, 2023. We commend counsel for both parties on
      the quality of their written and oral advocacy.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                       Page 2 of 24
[2]   We affirm.

      Foundational Legal Principles
[3]   “America’s growing elderly population has created a tremendous demand for

      elderly housing and related social services.” WILLIAM H. GROGAN, The

      Tension Between Local Zoning and the Development of Elderly Housing, 33 SUFFOLK

      U. L. REV. 317, 317 (2000). This is especially true for an estimated twenty to

      forty percent of elderly who suffer from dementia and Alzheimer’s. LISA

      BRODOFF, Planning for Alzheimer’s Disease, 17 ELDER L.J. 239, 240 (2010).

      These individuals particularly benefit from living in neighborhood-based,

      single-family group homes rather than nursing homes or assisted living

      facilities. Such group homes provide a small, family-like setting that is not only

      desirable, but also medically beneficial to persons suffering from dementia or

      Alzheimer’s. To that end, there are federal and state laws that protect these

      individuals in the realm of housing services.

[4]   First, there is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which was enacted

      “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of

      discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).

      In the statute itself, Congress noted that “historically, society has tended to

      isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities” and that such discrimination

      continues to be “a serious and pervasive social problem” in areas such as

      housing. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3). A “primary obstacle” to residential

      group home living is the “not in my backyard” reactions of neighbors who

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024       Page 3 of 24
      oppose group homes. See Appellant’s Brief at 16 (citing DISABILITIES AND THE

      LAW § 7:13; GRAHAM, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Evolution of “Family” in

      Local Zoning Ordinances, 9 TOURO L. REV. 699, 722 (1993)).

[5]   With the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and as amended in 1988 by the Fair

      Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), Congress declared its intent to encourage

      and protect the rights of persons with disabilities to choose to live in

      neighborhoods that best serve their disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.

      Congress enacted the FHA to prohibit housing discrimination against

      individuals based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §

      3601, et seq. In 1988, the FHA was amended to expand the right to fair housing

      to handicapped 2 persons with mental or physical disabilities. The FHAA also

      defined discrimination as including the “refusal to make reasonable

      accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such

      accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to

      use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) and (3)(B) (emphasis

      supplied).

[6]   At the State level, Indiana has faithfully implemented the mandates of the

      federal statutes for the benefit of the disabled and mentally ill in the realm of

      housing. The General Assembly declared “void as against the public policy of

      the state,” restrictions or conditions that purport to exclude the use of property

      2
       “Handicap” is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of such
      person’s major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                            Page 4 of 24
      “as a residential facility for individuals with a developmental disability or

      individuals with a mental illness” because the facility is a business, is occupied

      by individuals who are not related, or “for any other reason.” Ind. Code § 12-

      28-4-10(b). The General Assembly also declared that “[a] zoning ordinance . . .

      may not exclude a residential facility for individuals with a mental illness from

      a residential area solely because the residential facility is a business or because

      the individuals residing in the residential facility are not related.” I.C. § 12-28-

      4-7(a). Indiana has also enacted laws particularly for the benefit of elderly

      suffering from Alzheimer’s or other forms of dementia. See I.C. 12-10 and I.C.

      12-10-5.5. Specifically, Indiana provides different ways to care for elderly with

      Alzheimer’s and dementia disabilities—licensed group homes called

      “residential facilities for individuals with mental illness” under I.C. § 12-28-4,

      and, more recently, as discussed below, “housing with services establishments”

      that are dedicated specifically to providing care to those with Alzheimer’s and

      dementia under Ind. Code § 12-10-5.5. The City incorporated federal and state

      law mandates into its Unified Development Ordinance (UDO), which is the

      City’s comprehensive zoning ordinance.

      Facts & Procedural History
[7]   In December 2020, Willow Haven applied for a permit to build the Home at

      2080 West 106th Street, 3 which parcel is located in a district zoned S1, Single

      3
          This lot is located near the 15th hole of the Crooked Stick Golf Course.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024           Page 5 of 24
      Family Residential, under the UDO.4 Willow Haven describes the Home as a

      residential group home for elderly individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s or

      other forms of dementia. 5 The Home is to house up to ten residents with each

      resident having their own private bedroom and bath and all residents sharing

      the kitchen, dining, and living space. The Home is to function as a single

      housekeeping unit and emulate a family setting, with all meals prepared,

      served, and consumed by the residents together as a family unit and with the

      residents spending time together, engaging in activities and entertainment. The

      residents are to have twenty-four-hour assistance that will be provided by two

      dementia-certified caregivers and an operations manager.

[8]   Under Willow Haven’s plans, the Home will not provide any medical care or

      have medical professionals on staff, will not require other licensed caregivers to

      be on hand, and will have a higher staff-to-resident ratio than a nursing home.

      Willow Haven holds no licenses from any state or federal agencies and

      expressly states that it has no intention of obtaining any licenses. On August

      16, 2021, the City approved Willow Haven’s residential building permit

      request, and Willow Haven began construction of the Home.

      4
        Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1109(c) provides that “[i]f a person files a complete application” for a permit, then the
      application is “governed for at least three (3) years after the person applies for the permit by the statutes,
      ordinances, rules, development standards, and regulations in effect and applicable to the property when the
      application is filed.” Thus, the version of the UDO effective at that time applies. The parties do not dispute
      this.
      5
       In its marketing materials Willow Haven refers to the Home as a “premier boutique memory care home.”
      Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 234.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                               Page 6 of 24
[9]    The Nagireddys’ home is located directly adjacent to the lot on which the

       Home is being built. On May 23, 2022, the Nagireddys contacted the City and

       requested information pertaining to issuance of the building permit to Willow

       Haven. The City provided the requested information the same day. On June

       21, 2022, the Nagireddys, by counsel, wrote to the City and expressed their

       belief that construction of the Home with its intended use as an “unlicensed

       assisted living facility” violated the UDO. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 76. The

       Nagireddys did not claim that the physical structure of the home violated the

       UDO; 6 rather, the Nagireddys claimed that the intended use required Willow

       Haven to obtain a variance from the Carmel Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA),

       which it did not do. They demanded that the City issue an order to stop

       construction of the Home.

[10]   The City refused to issue a stop-work order, explaining to the Nagireddys that

       Mike Hollibaugh, the Director of the Department of Community Services (the

       Director), had previously made a determination for a separate, but nearly

       identical proposed construction project 7 that elderly individuals with

       Alzheimer’s or dementia are a protected class and “therefore eligible to reside in

       a Group Home without first obtaining a variance.” Id. at 80. The City found

       the Director’s determination to be consistent with the UDO’s definition of

       6
           There is no dispute that the physical structure of the Home complies with the UDO.
       7
        The other proposed construction project for which the Director had made a determination as to compliance
       with the UDO was for a group home for ten frail elderly individuals with Alzheimer’s or dementia.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                         Page 7 of 24
       single-family dwelling, I.C. Chap. 12-28-4, the FHA, the ADA, and 7th Circuit

       case law.

[11]   Consistent with the Director’s previous determination, the City, through its

       attorney, informed the Nagireddys that the UDO’s definitions for group home

       and family “could not preclude Willow Haven from constructing a home for

       frail elderly individuals with dementia and/or Alzheimer’s” as such preclusion

       “may have violated both state and federal law.” Id. The City stood by the

       Director’s determination that no variance was required prior to issuing a

       building permit to Willow Haven.

[12]   On July 19, 2022, the Nagireddys filed with the trial court a complaint for

       declaratory and injunctive relief against Willow Haven, the City, and several

       entities associated with the City. The Nagireddys maintain that only licensed

       group homes are permitted under the UDO and thus, because the Home is not

       licensed, it violates the UDO. All defendants moved to dismiss the Nagireddys’

       complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Nagireddys then

       voluntarily dismissed the City and all other defendants associated with the City

       but continued to pursue the action against Willow Haven. Following a hearing,

       the trial court denied Willow Haven’s motion to dismiss.

[13]   A preliminary injunction hearing was held November 1, 2022. By agreement,

       both parties tendered pre-hearing briefs and documentary evidence in support of

       their respective positions. There were no witnesses or live testimony at the

       November 1 hearing; only legal arguments were presented to the court.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024    Page 8 of 24
       Thereafter, both parties tendered findings of fact and conclusions of law. On

       November 9, 2022, the trial court signed the Nagireddys’ proposed findings and

       conclusions, adopting them verbatim, 8 and thereby enjoined Willow Haven

       from proceeding with construction of the Home. In so doing, the trial court

       preliminarily resolved in the Nagireddys’ favor disputes concerning (1) whether

       the Nagireddys were required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to

       pursuing judicial review, and (2) whether the Home qualified as a “group

       home” and could therefore be considered a single-family home under the

       applicable zoning ordinance. Willow Haven filed the instant interlocutory

       appeal.

       Discussion & Decision
       1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

[14]   Generally, if an administrative remedy is available, it must be pursued before

       the claimant is allowed access to the courts. T.W. Thom Const., Inc. v. City of

       Jeffersonville, 721 N.E.2d 319, 322 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The failure to exhaust

       administrative remedies deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction.

       Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Id. Willow Haven argues that

       the Nagireddys were not entitled to a preliminary injunction because they failed

       8
         We have stated before that “the practice of accepting verbatim a party’s proposed findings weakens our
       confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.”
       Moeder v. Salin Bank & Trust Co., 27 N.E.3d 1089, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Nevertheless, we also recognize
       that “it is not uncommon or per se improper for a trial court to enter findings that are verbatim reproductions
       of submissions by the prevailing party.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                               Page 9 of 24
       to timely pursue administrative means to challenge the issuance of the building

       permit.

[15]   The exclusive means for judicial review of zoning decisions “made by a board

       of zoning appeals, legislative body, plan commission, preservation commission,

       or zoning administrator” is set out in I.C. § 36-7-4-1600, -1601. One of the

       requirements that must be met prior to initiating judicial review of a zoning

       decision is that the individual(s) seeking judicial review have exhausted all

       administrative remedies “within the board whose zoning decision is being

       challenged.” I.C. § 36-7-4-1604(a). If the person fails to object to a zoning

       decision or timely petition for review of a zoning decision, the person waives

       their right to judicial review. I.C. § 36-7-4-1604(b). Willow Haven maintains

       that the Nagireddys failed to timely file a petition for review 9 with the BZA and

       thus, they waived judicial review of the City’s issuance of the building permit to

       Willow Haven for the Home.

[16]   The Nagireddys assert that they had no notice of the issuance of the permit and

       thus no opportunity to appeal to the BZA within statutory time constraints or

       constraints set out in the UDO. Under such circumstances, they argue that they

       were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and can properly pursue

       9
         “A petition for review is timely only if the petition for review is filed not later than thirty (30) days after the
       date of the zoning decision that is the subject of the petition for judicial review.” I.C. § 36-7-4-1605. This
       thirty-day period does not, as Willow Haven suggests, run from the day the Nagireddys learned that the
       building permit had been issued. The statute clearly states that a petition for review must be filed within
       thirty days of the zoning decision being reviewed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                                   Page 10 of 24
       injunctive relief with the court. In support of their argument, they direct us to

       Bixler v. LaGrange County Bldg. Dept., 730 N.E.2d 818, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[17]   In Bixler, the LaGrange County Building Department granted an improvement

       location permit to landowners to place a manufactured home on their lot. The

       Bixlers, owners of an adjoining lot, filed a complaint with the trial court to

       obtain a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction preventing the

       placement of the manufactured home arguing that it could only be located in a

       mobile home park under applicable zoning classifications. The trial court

       dismissed the Bixlers’ complaint finding that they had failed to exhaust their

       administrative remedies.

[18]   On appeal, the Bixler court stated “with regard to the issuance of building

       permits, the exhaustion prerequisite historically has been restricted only to

       permit applicants, who are directly affected by a public official’s decision to issue,

       condition or deny building permits.” 730 N.E.2d at 820 (emphasis added).

       The Bixler court noted that this rule was established long ago in Fidelity Trust Co.

       v. Downing, 68 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. 1946), wherein the Fidelity court rejected an

       argument that the party seeking to enjoin erection of a building on grounds that

       its construction violated local zoning provisions had to first exhaust

       administrative remedies. As the Fidelity Court explained, because the objecting

       parties were not parties to the building permit and thus, not directly affected,

       they could not be required to exhaust administrative remedies. The Court’s

       rationale was that “[t]o hold otherwise would be to hold that every property

       owner in any particular district would be compelled to take notice of every

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024        Page 11 of 24
       action” of an administrative official or board charged with enforcement of the

       ordinance. 68 N.E.2d at 791; see also Laws v. Lee, 471 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1984) (following Fidelity and holding that neighboring property owners

       were not responsible for monitoring the issuance of improvement location

       permits for which they had not applied and thus, they were not required to

       exhaust administrative remedies prior to challenging the issuance of such with

       the courts). The Bixler court followed the precedent set in Fidelity (and Laws)

       and held that because the law did not hold the Bixlers responsible for

       monitoring the issuance of building permits for which they did not apply, they

       were not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking injunctive

       relief from the trial court. 10

[19]   The Nagireddys are in the same position as the Bixlers (and the complainants in

       Fidelity and Laws). They are adjoining landowners who are not responsible for

       monitoring the issuance of building permits for which they have not applied.

       Here, they had no notice of the issuance of the building permit until after it was

       too late to appeal such issuance to the BZA. Under these circumstances, the

       Nagireddys were not required to exhaust administrative remedies with the BZA

       before pursuing declaratory and injunctive relief with the trial court.

       10
         The Bixler court did note that if a person has knowledge of the issuance of a permit, they may initiate an
       appeal to the zoning board, but are not required to do so. 730 N.E.2d at 821 (citing Stout v. Mercer, 312
       N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)) (emphasis supplied).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                              Page 12 of 24
       2. Preliminary Injunction

[20]   An injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only with

       caution. Rennaker v. Gleason, 913 N.E.2d 723, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The

       grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests within the sound discretion of

       the trial court, and our review is limited to whether there was a clear abuse of

       that discretion.” Duke Energy of Ind., LLC v. City of Franklin, 69 N.E.3d 471, 481-

       82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). When granting a preliminary injunction, a trial court

       is required to enter special findings and conclusions thereon. Ind. Trial Rules

       52, 65(D). When considering whether a trial court’s grant of a preliminary

       injunction constitutes an abuse of discretion, this court determines whether the

       evidence supports the trial court’s special findings of fact and whether the

       findings support the judgment. Hannum Wagle & Cline Eng’g, Inc. v. Am.

       Consulting, Inc., 64 N.E.3d 863, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). An abuse of

       discretion can occur under various circumstances, including when the trial

       court misinterprets the law. See Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ind. 1990).

       We will reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it is clearly erroneous, and

       a judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a

       firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Hannum, 64 N.E.3d at 874.

[21]   To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of showing

       by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the movant’s remedies at law are

       inadequate, thus causing irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive

       action; (2) the movant has at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial by

       establishing a prima facie case; (3) threatened injury to the movant outweighs

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024     Page 13 of 24
       the potential harm to the nonmoving party resulting from the granting of an

       injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by the granting of

       the injunction. Apple Glen Crossing, LLC v. Trademark Retail, Inc., 784 N.E.2d

       484, 487 (Ind. 2003). “Failure to prove any one of these requires denying the

       injunction.” Leone v. Commissioner, Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 933 N.E.2d

       1244, 1248 (Ind. 2010).

[22]   Willow Haven’s primary challenge to the trial court’s issuance of the

       preliminary injunction is the court’s determination that the Nagireddys

       established that they have a reasonable likelihood of success at trial. As we

       explain below, we agree with the trial court’s assessment of the Nagireddys’

       claim.

[23]   Under the UDO, an S1 zoning district is classified as a residential environment

       that permits single-family dwellings. Exhibits Vol. 1 at 41. The UDO defines a

       “single-family dwelling” as including “a Group Home for the mentally ill”

       pursuant to I.C. § 12-28-4-7 and “a Group Home for not more than ten (10)

       developmentally disabled individuals which is established under a program

       authorized by IC 12-11-1.1-1(e)(1) or IC 12-11-1. l-1(e)(2).” Exhibits Vol. 2 at 126

       (italics in original). In turn, a “group home” is defined by the UDO as:

                1. A residential structure (licensed under IC 12-17.4) in which
                care is provided on a twenty-four (24) hour basis for not more
                than ten (10) children; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024        Page 14 of 24
                2. A facility (licensed under IC 12-28-4) that provides residential
                services for developmentally disabled individuals in a program
                described in IC 12-11-1.1-1(e)(1) or IC 12-11-1.1-1(e)(2); or

                3. A facility (licensed under IC 12-28-4) that provides residential
                services for mentally ill individuals in a program described in IC
                12-22-2-3.

       Id. at 130 (italics in original; bolding supplied). “Family” is defined in the

       UDO as “one or more persons living as a single housekeeping unit.” Id. at 127.

[24]   Clearly, the Home does not fall within the UDO’s black-letter definition of

       group home as it is not a licensed facility of any kind. Seemingly

       acknowledging such, Willow Haven maintains that the Home is a statutorily

       authorized housing with services establishment that, although not licensed,

       qualifies as a group home under the UDO. Effective July 1, 2021, 11 the

       legislature created the housing with services establishment within the statutory

       scheme specifically directed at individuals in need of Alzheimer’s and dementia

       special care. To qualify as a housing with services establishment, the home

       must:

                1. provide “sleeping accommodations to at least five (5)
                residents;” and

       11
         This is after Willow Haven applied for its building permit but before the City issued the permit for
       construction of the Home.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                             Page 15 of 24
                2. offer or provide

                         a. “at least one (1) regularly scheduled health related
                         service” defined as “home health services . . ., attendant
                         and personal care services, professional nursing services,
                         and the central storage and distribution of medications”;
                         or

                         b. “at least two (2) regularly scheduled supportive
                         services,” defined as “help with personal laundry, handling
                         or assisting with personal funds of the residents, or
                         arranging for medical services, health related services, or
                         social services”

                “whether offered or provided directly by the establishment or by
                another person arranged for by the establishment.”

       I.C. § 12-10-5.5-2.5; I.C. § 12-10-15-3(a), -2, -6. There is no registration or

       licensing requirement for a housing with services establishment. 12 Willow

       Haven maintains that a housing with services establishment is merely an

       unlicensed group home and that the City properly followed the Director’s

       determination that the Home qualified as a group home under the UDO.

[25]   The Nagireddys argue that because the Home does not fit within the UDO’s

       definition of group home, Willow Haven was required to obtain a variance.

       Under the UDO, a variance is “[a] modification of the specific requirements of

       12
         The statute creating the housing with services establishment expressly provides that such is not “[a] group
       home licensed under IC 31-27 or IC 12-28-4.” I.C. § 12-10-15-3(b)(3).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                             Page 16 of 24
       the [UDO] granted by the [BZA] in accordance with the terms of the [UDO].”

       Exhibits Vol. 2 at 146. In other words, a variance is used where modification

       from the literal enforcement of the provisions of the UDO is sought. Pursuant

       to Section 9.15 of the UDO, an applicant must submit a variance application to

       the Director, who is charged with “review[ing] the materials solely for the

       purpose of determining whether the application is complete, is in technical

       compliance with all applicable ordinances, laws and regulations.” Id. at 109.

       The Director then forwards the variance request to the BZA, and the variance

       application is placed on the BZA’s agenda for notice and a public hearing in

       accordance with the BZA’s procedural rules. In this regard, we agree with the

       Nagireddys that the Director’s role in the context of the variance process is

       administrative, not substantive. The Director does not have the authority to

       issue a variance decision or otherwise permit any sort of departure from the

       UDO.

[26]   Despite the fact that the Home does not fall within the UDO’s definition of

       group home, Willow Haven did not seek a variance for its proposed use of the

       Home. In approving Willow Haven’s building permit, the City stood behind

       the Director’s determination that the Home could be built in an S1 district

       without a variance. In this vein, the Director essentially made a unilateral

       variance determination contrary to the authority granted him. A variance

       determination is solely within the province of the BZA and such determination

       is made by the BZA through procedures that require notice and a public

       hearing. Even assuming the Home is a statutorily authorized housing with

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024    Page 17 of 24
       services establishment, whether such is a permitted use in an S1 district or the

       result of a reasonable accommodation under federal law is a matter to be

       addressed and decided by the BZA. The Director’s determination in this regard

       is not binding. In short, the Nagireddys have established a prima facie case that

       the Home is not a permitted use under the UDO as it is not a licensed group

       home. Whether federal and state law mandate that a variance be granted, or a

       reasonable accommodation be made, is a matter to be determined by the BZA.

[27]   Turning now to the remaining elements of a preliminary injunction, with

       respect to the first element, Willow Haven argues that the Nagireddys did not

       show that they will suffer irreparable harm because their claimed loss of value

       to their property is purely financial and therefore, insufficient to warrant

       equitable relief. See PrimeCare Home Health v. Angels of Mercy Home Health Care,

       LLC, 824, 376, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that “[l]oss incurred that is

       essentially financial is usually insufficient to warrant the grant of equitable

       relief). Willow Haven also argues that the balance of harm tips in favor of the

       elderly who suffer from Alzheimer’s or dementia as they will be denied their

       right to live in a residential area.

[28]   In finding in favor of the Nagireddys, the trial court determined that they were

       not required to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of harms was in

       their favor because Willow Haven’s intended use for the Home violates the

       UDO and is therefore unlawful. See L.E. Servs., Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n of

       Ind., 646 N.E.2d 334, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that because the sale of

       out-of-state lottery tickets violated the State constitution and statutes and was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024      Page 18 of 24
       therefore unlawful, the plaintiff was not required to make a showing of

       irreparable harm or a balance of the hardship in his favor). The trial court’s

       conclusion in this regard is not erroneous.

[29]   Finally, Willow Haven argues that the public interest will be disserved by the

       issuance of an injunction because elderly who suffer from Alzheimer’s or

       dementia will be denied their right to live in a residential area. The Nagireddys

       maintain that this is not a “not in my back yard” situation. They do not dispute

       that public policy and the UDO permit certain licensed group homes for

       individuals with mental illness to be constructed in an S1 zoning district; they

       simply contend that the unlicensed group home that Willow Haven intends to

       operate is not one of them. The trial court concluded that enforcing the UDO

       as it is written and enjoining further construction of the Home serves the public

       interest. We agree. The UDO states that an impermissible use is a public

       nuisance. Willow Haven’s intended use for the Home is not a permitted use

       under the express language of the UDO. Under the circumstances presented,

       imposition of a preliminary injunction best serves the public interest.

[30]   In summary, the Nagireddys were not required to exhaust administrative

       remedies before pursuing injunctive relief with the trial court, and the trial court

       did not abuse its discretion in entering a preliminary injunction in favor of the

       Nagireddys, thereby enjoining Willow Haven from completing construction of

       the Home.

[31]   Judgment affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024      Page 19 of 24
Foley, J., concurs.

Weissmann, J., dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024   Page 20 of 24
       Weissmann, Judge, dissenting.

[32]   I agree with the City of Carmel (Carmel) that Willow Haven’s establishment

       could be built in a residential zone without a variance. In my view, the

       majority’s contrary conclusion has two flaws:

                  1. Because Carmel adopted its UDO three years before the legislature

                  added this category of group homes, it is of no moment that the UDO

                  fails to reference them.

                  2. The majority’s definition of group home risks illogical application by

                  allowing residential zoning for licensed group homes but requiring

                  variances for unlicensed group homes which closely emulate traditional

                  family environments.

       The UDO Predates Adoption of Housing with Services Establishments

[33]   The UDO’s failure to include housing with services establishments for

       Alzheimer’s and dementia special care within its definition of group homes

       does not mean they are excluded. Rather, the group home definition section of

       the UDO is merely a reflection of the law in effect in 2018 when the UDO was

       adopted. 13 The UDO incorporated three general categories of group homes in

       existence at that time: (1) homes for children; (2) homes for people with

       13
            The UDO was adopted on October 16, 2017, and became effective on January 1, 2018. UDO § 1.32.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                       Page 21 of 24
       developmental disabilities; and (3) homes for people experiencing mental

       illness. Exhs. Vol. II, p. 130.

[34]   A few years after the UDO definition took effect, the legislature added another

       category of group homes for residents who need Alzheimer’s and dementia

       special care. Ind. Code §§ 12-10-5.5-1, -2.5, -3, -4, -5 (as amended by 2021 Ind.

       Legis. Serv. P.L. 48-2021, effective July 1, 2021). 14 This new type of group

       home does not need the license required of the other three types of group homes

       noted in the UDO’s group home definition but is still subject to State

       regulation. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 12-10-5.5 et seq.

[35]   Because the UDO is an intrinsically evolving document, it allowed for these

       types of changes in the law without requiring an ordinance revision. For

       instance, to ensure its continual compliance with state law, the UDO

       automatically incorporates statutory changes. UDO § 1.15 (“Whenever Indiana

       Code (sic) cited in the Unified Development Ordinance has been amended or

       superseded, the Unified Development Ordinance shall be deemed amended in

       reference to the new or revised code.”). The evolving nature of the UDO is also

       reflected in its express acknowledgment that it must give way to higher

       14
         The legislature does not include Alzheimer’s Disease or dementia within its definition of mental illness in
       Title 12. See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 12-7-2-130, -117.6 (defining mental illness as “psychiatric disorder”). This is
       presumably because medical experts largely agree Alzheimer’s Disease, which is the most common cause of
       dementia, is more properly classified as a progressive neurodegenerative disease or a brain disorder. See
       generally Alzheimer’s Disease, Mayo Clinic (Aug. 30, 2023), https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
       conditions/alzheimers-disease/symptoms-causes/syc-20350447.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024                                Page 22 of 24
          standards imposed by state and federal law. UDO § 1.09(B)(2)(b) (“Whenever a

          provision of any State or federal code or regulation or other City ordinance or

          regulation imposes a greater restriction or a higher standard than is required by

          the [UDO], the provision of the State or federal code or regulation or other City

          ordinance or regulation shall apply.”)

[36]      Here, Carmel reviewed Willow Haven’s application within the overall

          framework of the UDO, as influenced by the Fair Housing Act, the ADA, and

          Indiana’s laws as supplemented by the legislation creating new group homes for

          Alzheimer’s and dementia care. Carmel concluded that the UDO treated all

          group homes for persons with disabilities in the same way the UDO treated

          single-family dwellings. App. Vol. II, pp. 81-82. Indeed, Willow Haven is the

          second housing with services group home permitted as part of Carmel’s S1

          zoning. App. Vol. II, pp. 81- 85. Given all these factors, I would find Carmel

          properly included Willow Haven within residential zoning absent a variance.

       Reliance Only on the UDO’s Definition Section Risks Illogical Results

[37]      Interpretation of ordinances is a question of law that we review de novo and to

          which we apply the rules of statutory construction. Noblesville, Ind., Bd. of Zoning

          Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC, 217 N.E.3d 510, 513-14 (Ind. 2023). As

          always, the first step is to determine whether an ambiguity exists. Id. By now, it

          is evident that the majority and I read the UDO differently. Thus, the UDO is

          “open to judicial construction.” Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind.

          Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-2931 | February 2, 2024      Page 23 of 24
       2015). Crucial here is the desire to avoid interpretations that “bring about an

       unjust or absurd result.” Id. I fear the majority’s decision does precisely that.

[38]   Interpreting the UDO’s group home definition to exclude unlicensed housing

       with services establishments for Alzheimer’s and dementia special care—when

       it already allows for licensed establishments—is illogical. As planned, Willow

       Haven’s group home will have two dementia-certified caretakers on site at all

       times to help residents with their daily activities. Each resident will have their

       own bedroom and bathroom but share a common living room and kitchen.

       Groceries will be provided, and a chef will cook the meals, which will be shared

       family-style. Residents will participate in housekeeping chores as their

       conditions allow.

[39]   In sum, although Willow Haven’s establishment closely resembles a residential

       family home, under the majority’s interpretation of the UDO, Willow Haven

       must obtain a variance. A licensed group home for persons with developmental

       disabilities at the same site would not. This disparity is illogical, and I cannot

       conclude that the UDO intended this result.

[40]   Carmel interpreted its UDO to allow Willow Haven’s construction within its S1

       zoning. Because this interpretation is correct, I would reverse and remand for

       the trial court to vacate the preliminary injunction.

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