Court Opinion

ID: 9693569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:50:25.265053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.508821
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I am forced to disagree with the majority in two respects. First, as I have previously stated, I do not believe the standard articulated in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) adequately protects a defendant’s right to a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the community. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 461 Pa. 289, 298-300, 336 A.2d 290, 294-296 (1975) (Nix, J., dissenting). Second, I am of the view that the trial judge was in error in ruling that appellant’s three prior convictions could be used for impeachment purposes in the event that appellant testified in his own behalf at his trial.
I.
Appellant was a member of the Black race charged with raping a white woman. The case against appellant was premised entirely on the testimony of the victim. The panel from which the petit jury was selected consisted of thirty-seven (37) persons, five of whom were Black. Appellant’s counsel objected to the panel on the ground that it was not reasonably representative of the community. His request for a new panel was denied.
During the selection process the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all of the prospective Black jurors. The prosecutor did not use the allotted peremptory challenges to excuse any the prospective white jurors. Again, appellant’s counsel objected. That objection was on the grounds the Commonwealth was using its peremptory challenges to exclude all available members of the Black race from serving on the jury. The objection was overruled. Today, the majority relies upon the sanctity of peremptory challenges and the rationale of Swain v. Alabama, supra, to support its affirmance of the trial court’s rulings.
In Swain a majority of the United States Supreme Court, considering an equal protection claim based upon a prosecu*42tor’s use of peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from a petit jury, concluded:
In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor’s reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State’s challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjected to examination by allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because they were Negroes. Id. 380 U.S. at 222, 85 S.Ct. at 837.
The Swain majority held that the presumption that the challenges are being exercised “to obtain a fair and impartial jury” is only overcome when:
. .. the prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries, the Fourteenth Amendment claim takes on added significance. Cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. In these circumstances, giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted. If the State has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome. Such proof might support a reasonable inference that Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the *43administration of justice enjoyed by the white population. These ends the peremptory challenge is not designed to facilitate or justify.
Id. at 223-24, 85 S.Ct. at 837-38.
It is clear that the Swain majority viewed the equal protection claim as the right of members of the Black race to participate in the administration of justice in a given jurisdiction. It ignored the possibility that a state might use the peremptory challenge to select a biased jury, to enhance the probability of conviction. The Swain approach failed to recognize in a large majority of cases there is no compelling reason to exclude members of a particular race or ethnic group. It also fails to offer any protection in those factual situations, such as presented here, where racial overtones are present and may well influence the outcome.1
Is justice to sit supinely by and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is available? Is justice only obtainable after repeated injustices are demonstrated? Is there any justification within the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy that permits the use of a presumption to hide the existence of an obvious fact?
Commonwealth v. Martin, supra 461 Pa. at 299, 336 A.2d at 295 (Nix, J. dissenting).
Even accepting the Swain view that the equal protection clause focuses upon the prevention of a deliberate exclusion of the “distinctive class” from participation in the administration of justice, see e. g. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), that holding provides no basis for concluding that instant appellant’s right to a fair trial before a petit jury selected from a fair cross section of the community was not infringed upon. In addition to the equal protection provisions in both the federal2 and state constitutions,3 which are designed to provide equality among *44the various segments of our pluralistic society, there are also the constitutional mandates which assure all defendants a fundamentally fair adjucative process.4 The integrity of that process may not be tainted by extraneous considerations such as race or religion.5 I am satisfied the Supreme Court of the United States did not intend to suggest in Swain that the formulae articulated therein was to be employed as the single prophylactic to insulate against all of these concerns.6
We attempted to articulate the weaknesses of the Swain approach in our dissent in Martin, supra :
The glaring weakness in the Swain rationale is that it fails to offer any solution where the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is made on a selected basis. In Northern communities systematic exclusion of an entire racial group from juries is rarely seen. More frequently, the problem arises in cases where the facts give rise to racial overtones and where an objective and unbiased jury is most needed. Swain provides no protection against this type of abuse. To the contrary, it facilitates its perpetuation.
... It is, however, abundantly clear that both the Federal and the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the accused the right of trial by his peers. U.S.Const., Amend. VI; Pa.Const., Art. 11, § 9. It would seem incumbent *45upon this Court to interpret our constitutional provision in such a manner that it meets the kind of injustices which are prevalent within this jurisdiction.
Commonwealth v. Martin, supra 461 Pa. at 299-300, 336 A.2d at 294-296 (Nix, J. dissenting).7
It must be emphasized that the objective sought to be obtained by the inclusion of members of the “distinctive class” is not that those individuals are assumed to be partial to a fellow member of that group, but rather that their inclusion will tend to eliminate any bias against those of that class, that in their absence may otherwise influence the decision. Moreover, the inclusion of members of the “distinctive class” on the petit jury, or at least the prohibition of a deliberate attempt to prevent their service, provides a perception of fairness in the proceedings. To argue, as the majority attempts to do, that the unfettered exercise of the peremptory challenge fosters the perception of impartiality by deliberate exclusion (in a cause where the racial overtones are obvious) is unrealistic and hypocritical. The closeness of the factual issues presented in this particular case was demonstrated by the difficulty the jury experienced in reaching a judgment. It is unfortunate that the legitimacy of the proceedings was allowed to be tainted by the misguided belief in the sanctity of an unbridled and arbitrary right to exclude prospective jurors who have otherwise demonstrated their competency to serve as impartial jurors. The ultimate objective in jury selection should be the impanelling of an impartial trier of fact. Commonwealth v. England, 474 Pa. 1, 375 A.2d 1292 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 466 Pa. 245, 352 A.2d 40 (1976); Commonwealth v. Segers, 460 Pa. 149, 331 A.2d 462 (1975); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 456 Pa. 265, 318 A.2d 737 (1974); Bentivoglio v. Ralston, 447 Pa. 24, 288 A.2d 745 (1972); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552, vacated 392 U.S. 647, 88 *46S.Ct. 2277, 20 L.Ed.2d 1344, appeal after remand, 449 Pa. 33, 296 A.2d 554, cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986, 93 S.Ct. 2269, 36 L.Ed.2d 963 (1967). The use of an unrealistic presumption to undermine this purpose is unconscionable and gives credence to those who seek to discredit our system of jurisprudence.8
II.
I also must express my disagreement with the trial court’s decision to permit the introduction of appellant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Appellant had no alibi evidence, but merely sought the opportunity to deny the victim’s allegations. The trial court ruled that if appellant merely denied the allegations, the prior convictions could be used to impeach his testimony. Further, the trial court ruled, “if he testifies differently, or other things come out, I could always change any ruling, depending on what I hear said by your client on the stand.” As a result of this ruling, appellant elected not to testify in his own behalf. Thus, the jury was called upon to decide the case with only the evidence offered by the Commonwealth.
First, the majority attempts to disparage a simple denial of guilt and suggests that a defense of alibi or consent may warrant greater consideration. This premise is without any logical or legal foundation. It is obvious that even a simple denial of guilt is much more persuasive when the accused is afforded the opportunity of taking the stand and asserting that position rather than relying upon his plea of not guilty to frame the issue. In Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978) we attempted to accommodate the fundamental right of the accused to testify as a witness on his own behalf, U.S.Const., Amend. V and VI, Pa.Const., art. I, § 9, Commonwealth v. Thompson, 444 Pa. 312, 281 A.2d 856 (1971) and the right of the state to impeach his testimo*47ny. To achieve that balance this Court suggested the following criteria:
In making the determination as to the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, the trial court should consider: 1) the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the defendant-witness; 4 2) the likelihood, in view of the nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater tendency to smear the character of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime for which he stands charged, rather than provide a legitimate reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; 3) the age and circumstances of the defendant; 4) the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to this evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of other witnesses through which its version of the events surrounding the incident can be presented; and 5) the existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant’s credibility.
Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33 at 39-40, 393 A.2d 364 at 367 (1978).
The footnote contained in the above quote reads as follows:
(4) Here the age of the prior conviction should be considered. Also the nature of the prior offense must be taken into account (e.g. a larceny accomplished by stealth or misrepresentation bears more directly upon veracity than a taking by force, thus the argument for admission is stronger for the former than the latter).
Commonwealth v. Roots, supra, 482 Pa. at 39 n. 4, 393 A.2d at 367 n. 4 (1978).
I cannot agree with the analysis set forth in the Commonwealth’s brief, which is incorporated virtually verbatim by the majority opinion, to justify the trial court’s ruling to permit the evidence of the prior offenses. It is true that prior convictions for theft and robbery have a sufficient relationship to the veracity of the defendant-witness to satisfy the first consideration of the Roots test. I would also agree that the third consideration would not dictate the *48exclusion of the testimony since appellant had reached legal age at the time the alleged act was committed. My disagreement results from a consideration of the other three factors, which on balance, force the conclusion that appellant should not have been denied the opportunity to confront the jury and assert his denial.
Here the issue was whether appellant had committed a sexual attack upon the complaining witness. The prosecution’s case depended solely upon the testimony and the identification of the alleged victim. Had appellant been free to offer his denial subject to cross-examination by the prosecution, without reference to the prior convictions, the jury would have had before it the accused and could have made their judgment based upon the appearance of both the victim and appellant on the witness stand. The traditional standards for assessing credibility would have provided the basis for the judgment.
It again must be emphasized that the question of guilt or innocence in this case was an extremely close one. Under such circumstances, the failure of the defendant to take the stand in his own behalf cannot be dismissed as having no significance. There also can be very little question of the legitimacy of the defense’s concern as to the prospects of having prior convictions of robbery and theft made known to this jury. It would appear that the instant situation presents a clear example of a situation where the introduction of the prior record would have a greater tendency to smear the character of the defendant than that testimony would serve to assist the jury in assessing credibility. Thus, the second criteria articulated in Roots appears to argue against the ruling made by the trial court.
A consideration of the fourth criteria also supports the conclusion that the trial court’s ruling was in error. When we weigh the prosecution’s need for the introduction of the prior offenses against the availability of other evidence which the defense may have yhad to present its case, it appears that the scales must also be tipped in favor of the defense. In this case, the Commonwealth had available the *49victim of the crime who was an eyewitness and could supply all of the details to support the Commonwealth’s version of the event. There was no reliance upon circumstantial proof. The defense, on the other hand, did not have other available means to refute the Commonwealth’s testimony. As noted by the majority, there was no alibi testimony. Under the facts of the case only the perpetrator and the victim were present. To conclude as the majority does that the failure of the defense to assert an affirmative defense such as alibi or consent reduces the defense’s need for testimony from the defendant is absurd. Unquestionably, the defendant’s assertion before the jury of a denial would have been critical to his position.
Finally, the fifth criteria also dictates that the evidence of the prior convictions should not have been permitted in the event of the testimony of the defendant. Had the defendant taken the stand in his own behalf, his credibility could have been tested by cross-examination. I believe that that would have been sufficient. It must be realized the only means of testing the credibility of the victim available to the defense was the defense’s right of cross-examination. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to understand why the prosecution should be afforded more.
For the above stated reasons, I dissent.

. The closeness of the factual issues presented in this trial was reflected in the two full days of deliberation that were required before the jury finally reached the verdict of guilt.

. U.S.Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.

. P.S.Const. art. Ill, § 32.

. Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 406 A.2d 1011 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977); Commonwealth v. Hoss, 469 Pa. 195, 364 A.2d 1335 (1976).

. United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934, 100 S.Ct. 1328, 63 L.Ed.2d 770 (C.A.Pa., 1979); Commonwealth v. Christian, 480 Pa. 131, 389 A.2d 545 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Pa. 164, 383 A.2d 874 (1978); Commonwealth v. Futch, 469 Pa. 422, 336 A.2d 246 (1976).

. The systematic exclusion of any “distinctive” group in the community from participation in the administration of justice is a real concern, see e. g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) and requires attention. This fact does not force the conclusion that the “fair-cross-section violation” is limited to a pattern of such violations. Constitutional protections must be as viable in individual cases as it is where a pattern of discrimination is demonstrated.

. Since my dissent in Martin, there have been at least two jurisdictions that have addressed the issue and have adopted the approach suggested. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1978); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979).

. To all objective observers, it seems our prior decisions have encouraged prosecutors to use peremptory challenges to arrange the racial balance of juries to their benefit. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. James, 246 Pa.Super. 251, 371 A.2d 957 (1977) (all 22 Blacks were excluded from a jury chosen from a panel of 79 — eight (8) for cause and fourteen (14) by use of peremptory challenge).