Court Opinion

ID: 9479753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:28:17.163489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:15.805098
License: Public Domain

MAGILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the judgment and parts I, II, and IV of the majority’s opinion. I write separately because I believe the officers who detained White in the St. Louis Lambert International Airport had a reasonable, ar-ticulable suspicion that White was engaged in ongoing or imminent criminal activity. The majority errs: 1) in failing to accord sufficient deference to the experience of the two Drug Enforcement Agents who detained White; 2) in primarily focusing on each drug profile characteristic and behavioral factor individually, with little atten*1420tion to how, when viewed together, they created a reasonable suspicion that White was engaged in the trafficking of narcotics; and 3) in concluding that the warrant lacked probable cause.1
I.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that courts should treat the judgment of experienced officers with a considerable amount of deference. Because of their expertise, these officers are “able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (experienced officer able to draw “inferences and make[] deductions — inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person”); accord United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 480 (D.C.Cir.1989) (dictum) (reliance by experienced agent on methods and patterns of certain lawbreakers must be taken into account in determining whether officers had reasonable suspicion to detain). Justice Powell, concurring in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), underscored the nature of the deference to which experienced officers are entitled. “Among the circumstances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion are the agent’s knowledge of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics of persons engaged in such illegal practices.” Id. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 1882. Therefore, viewing the facts from the standpoint of an experienced officer, reasonable suspicion might exist where it would not exist if the same facts were viewed from the standpoint of an untrained observer.
Officer Larry Fox (Officer Fox) and Officer Larry Coulson (Officer Coulson) are police officers with the St. Louis County Police Department. At the time of White’s detention, both were assigned to the drug interdiction programs at Lambert Airport as Special Agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration. Officer Fox had served on the police force for sixteen years. Officer Coulson had been assigned to the airport interdiction effort for eight years. Both officers had been personally involved in the seizure of narcotics on previous occasions from the same Monday morning flight on which White was a passenger.2 By itself, neither Officer Fox’s nor Officer Coulson’s expertise is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion from facts which could not possibly create such a suspicion. However, their expertise is a factor which in a close case, such as this,3 should lead the court to hold that they had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal conduct.
II.
The majority also errs in dismissing the drug profile characteristics and other behavior factors individually with little attention to their cumulative effect. In so doing, the majority gives insufficient weight to the possibility that taken together these factors, although individually consistent with innocent behavior, might amount to reasonable suspicion. Instead, the majority in only one sentence summarily states that it has considered the circumstances as a whole in holding the officers lacked a “reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the detention of White or his luggage.” Even before the majority announced its holding, however, it had already rejected many of the factors, finding them to be consistent with innocent behavior. For example, the majority dismisses nervousness as a factor in part because there are “certain plausible explanations besides narcot*1421ics traffic to account for White’s behavior.” 4 Furthermore, the majority dismisses as consistent with innocent activity and therefore “[unjpersuasive” factors such as one’s position as the last or almost the last passenger to deplane, one’s status as a person traveling alone, one’s possession of a carry-on bag, and one’s failure to consult with a computer monitor or an airline representative regarding connecting flights.
Even if every factor relied upon by these experienced officers was consistent with innocent activity, it is inappropriate to dismiss them as being unable to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. The Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow, - U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989),5 held that even if every factor an officer relies upon is consistent with innocent activity, “taken together they may amount to reasonable suspicion.” Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1586. For example, in Sokolow, each factor relied upon could have been (and in one case was) innocent. By the time the officers detained the defendant in Sokolow, they knew that (1) he paid cash ($2,100) for two airline tickets from a roll of twenty dollar bills; (2) he traveled under a name which did not correspond with the name under which his telephone was listed;6 (3) his original destination was a source for drugs; (4) he stayed in that city for only twenty hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his luggage. Each of these factors is consistent with innocent behavior. The Court did not dismiss each factor, however, because considered as a whole they established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 1583, 1586-87.
The same issue confronts this court. Each factor by itself may be consistent with innocent activity but taken as a whole, although it is a close case, the factors established reasonable suspicion for the experienced officers to detain White. In this case, the officers at the time of the detention were aware of the following factors: (1) White traveled from a source city (Los Angeles) to a use city (St. Louis);7 (2) he purchased a one-way ticket; (3) he paid cash for his ticket (under $500); (4) he was either the last to deplane or was near the end of the crowd; (5) he was traveling alone; (6) he was holding a small carry-on bag tightly under his arm with both hands;8 (7) he arrived on an early morning flight when security is usually diminished; (8) he arrived on a Monday morning flight on which other drug arrests had been made; (9) he did not stop to talk with TWA agents or check any monitors for a connecting flight to somewhere other than a use city but instead went straight to the baggage area;9 (10) he appeared nervous in the airport “repeatedly stopping and looking around” on his way to the baggage claim area; (11) he appeared agitated and anxious for his baggage to come, nervously tapping his foot and wringing his hands; (12) when approached by both officers he appeared nervous and when asked for his driver’s license, he trembled so much that *1422he could barely retrieve his license from his wallet.
The factors relied on by the officers in White are no less incriminating than the factors in Sokolow.10 Taken individually, each factor may well be consistent with innocent activity; however, taken as a whole and viewed from the standpoint of experienced officers who had on two prior occasions arrested individuals for drug trafficking on that flight, it cannot be said that the officers’ conclusion that a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed to detain White and his luggage was in error.
The majority primarily relies on the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam). In that case, however, the Court only considered the four factors upon which the appellate court relied. Id. at 440-41, 100 S.Ct. at 2754. There are six additional factors present in this case. First, White appeared nervous in the airport terminal even before approached by the officers. Reid did not. Second, after the officers approached White his hands trembled so violently he could barely take his driver’s license out of his wallet. There is no such physical evidence of nervousness mentioned in Reid. Third, the flight on which White arrived had been the source of drug trafficking in the immediate past. There is no such evidence mentioned in Reid. Fourth, when deplaning, White held on to his shoulder bag tightly in a manner different from all the other passengers with shoulder bags. Tr. 66. Reid did not. Fifth, White traveled alone, unlike the petitioner in Reid who traveled with a companion. Sixth, White was either the last to deplane or was near the end of the crowd. There is no such evidence mentioned in Reid.11
Although this is a close case, viewing the facts through the eyes of Officers Coulson and Fox who have had over twenty-four years of experience between them and who are familiar with the early morning Monday flight, drug interdiction efforts and the Lambert Airport, I believe that a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity existed to detain White and his luggage.
III.
Although the detention- of White and his luggage was legal, I must still determine whether the search of his carry-on bag was valid. I would hold that the warrant itself was valid and not reach the good faith issue. In his affidavit, Officer Fox informed the Magistrate of all the activities both officers observed on the morning of March 14, 1988 before detaining White. In addition to these observations, they informed the Magistrate of the positive reaction of their German Shepherd dog, which had been assigned to the Lambert Airport drug interdiction program for two years, when exposed to White’s carry-on bag. The positive canine sniff when combined with the officers’ observations prior to White’s detention, was sufficient to turn the reasonable suspicion into probable cause. Therefore, the warrant and subsequent search pursuant thereto was valid. See United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 160, 161 (1st Cir.1987) (canine sniff turned reasonable suspicion into probable cause); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 471, 483 (D.C.Cir.1989) (dictum) (probable cause existed to search and seize bags when positive dog sniff combined with computer information that defendant departed from source city and traveled to use city, made reservation day before departing, pur*1423chased his ticket within a few minutes of departure, purchased a one-way ticket with cash, and left a call back number in the source city).
I would affirm.

.Because I find that the Terry stop was valid, I need not reach the issue decided by the majority today that the Leon good faith exception can cure the taint of illegally obtained evidence when that evidence is used to obtain a warrant. Nevertheless, I do find the majority’s extension of the Leon doctrine to be persuasive. See United States v. Thorton, 746 F.2d 39, 48-49 (D.C. Cir.1984); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-68 (2d Cir.1985). But see United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 788-90 (9th Cir. 1987).

. White has not challenged the experience and skill of either officer.

. Even the majority agrees that this is a "close case.”

. The majority quotes Officer Coulson’s testimony that individuals might be nervous in airports because of the safety risks associated with flying, because of scheduling delays and other reasons. However, it is unlikely a passenger would be concerned about an airline crash when he has already landed at his destination. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that there were any scheduling delays.

. The only mention of Sokolow by the majority is Justice Marshall’s dissent attacking reliance on drug profile characteristics as a general rule. This position was clearly rejected by the majority of justices on the Supreme Court. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1586-87.

. Sokolow did not attempt to conceal his name when purchasing his ticket. His name did not correspond with the telephone number he provided because the number was listed under his roommate's name.

. Factors 1-5 and 7 are characteristics of flight travel that drug enforcement officials look for when conducting surveillance. Tr. 12, 18 (July 8, 1988). All subsequent references to the transcript are from July 8, 1988.

. The previous seizures that Officers Fox and Coulson have made on the Monday morning flight on which White traveled involved large quantities of cocaine carried in carry-on bags. Tr. 12-13.

. White avoided the TWA personnel by "cutting through the seating area and heading down the concourse toward the departure area.” Tr. 14.

. Although two factors in Sokolow are not present in this case and there is no evidence here concerning a third present in Sokolow, at least eight factors in the case at bar were not present in Sokolow. While it is not sufficient to merely count the number of factors present to determine if a reasonable suspicion to detain exists, the large number of factors present here combined with the fact that they are included as relevant characteristics drug enforcement officials look for when conducting surveillance, is enough to establish reasonable suspicion when the observer is an experienced officer.

. The fact that the petitioner in Reid had no additional luggage while White had one piece of checked luggage does not alter the conclusion that the officers in White had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity given the larger pool of information available to the officers in White when compared to Reid.