Court Opinion

ID: 9624674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:13:10.03555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:52.387921
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J., Concurring.
I do not accept as accurate the implications in the statement of the majority opinion that the specific factual allegations as to breach of fiduciary duty do not “reveal such a defect in the plaintiff’s title as would prevent him from stating a cause of action to quiet title in general terms.” The applicable rule is that where plaintiff’s right to have title quieted is based on fraud (or, here, facts which have the effect of fraud because they make the execution sale subject to attack), plaintiff must allege the facts from which the right to relief affirmatively appears. (See Thompson v. Moore (1937), 8 Cal.2d 367, 372-373 [65 P.2d 800, 109 A.L.R. 1027] ; Maison v. Puntenney (1931), 212 Cal. 134, 137-138 [298 P. 33] ; Burris v. Adams (1892), 96 Cal. 664, 667 [31 P. 565].) The complaint here avers facts sufficient to meet that rule.
*24Neither do I concur in the broad statement of the majority opinion that “The alleged gross inadequacy of the price paid at the execution sale . . . strongly suggests a cause for relief and calls for a construction of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff.” .It seems to me that this approaches saying that a plaintiff who alleges that he is damaged in the sum of $100,000, without more, may state a cause of action to quiet title for fraud, while one who alleges only that he is damaged in the sum of $100 may not. It is text hook law that “Fraud is never presumed. Whenever it constitutes an element of a cause of action or of a defense that is of an affirmative nature the facts must be alleged. One against whom charges of fraud are made is entitled to specific averments of the acts of which he is accused, so that he may admit or deny them and thus present real issues.” (See 23 Cal.Jur.2d 156-157, § 64, and cases cited.) This rule applies particularly to quiet title actions. (Strong v. Strong (1943), 22 Cal.2d 540, 545-546 [8] [140 P.2d 386].)
The pertinent rule appears to be that mere inadequacy of price is not ground for invalidating an execution sale hut where the inadequacy, is. great that fact may have strong significance, in that a slight additional showing of unfairness or irregularity will authorize and support relief. (Odell v. Cox (1907), 151 Cal. 70, 74-75 [90 P. 194]; Darden v. Reese (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d 904, 908 [200 P.2d 81] ; Eccleston v. Gale (1932), 122 Cal.App. 688, 689-690 [10 P.2d 1032] ; Baar v. Smith (1929), 97 Cal.App. 398, 402 [275 P. 861].)
Inasmuch as the pleading in the case at bar meets the tests above delineated, I concur in the judgment.