Court Opinion

ID: 9778526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:11:18.70218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:11.291898
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
Appellee, Earl Martin, has filed a lengthy motion for a rehearing. We think our original opinion is clear, well supported by the record and properly disposes of the matters presented. However, there may be a need for some clarification.
In his motion for rehearing appel-lee has lost sight of the general rule so often announced by our courts to the effect that technical rules of practice and procedure are of little importance in determining issues concerning the custody of a child. The welfare and best interest of the child are the paramount questions to be determined. Cook v. Gregg, Tex.Civ.App., 226 S.W.2d 146 (writ refused); Conley v. St. Jacques, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 1238 (writ dismissed).
From the language used by us in our original opinion, it must be presumed that *355we, in effect, held and found that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the custody of the child, Robert Scott Martin, divided between its parents, just as such must have been presumed and, in effect, held in the Byrd case, the Dunn case, the Immel case and other cases cited by us in our opinion. However, in response to charges made by appellee in his motion for rehearing, we here clarify, if need be, our original opinion by specifically stating that such was, in effect, so held in our original opinion and we now expressly reiterate that, under the record before us, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the custody of the said child divided between its parents. We further find and hold, as we did, in effect, in our original opinion, that the overwhelming weight of the evidence conclusively shows that it would not be for the best interest of this child to so divide its custody and to thereby require it to change homes twice each year and to live a portion of each year under the dominating influence of one family and the other portion of each year in another home and under the control and supervision of another family. To require such would constitute a continuous flustration of the child’s mind and have a tendency to destroy the wholesome environments in which a child such as this one ought to live. In our opinion such a divided custody as the trial court authorized would, if complied with, have the effect of disturbing and confusing the life of the child to such an extent that it would be injurious and harmful to its best interest and constitute an extreme disturbance in the peaceful and orderly home life and education, which are essential in the life of a growing child and essential to building good citizenship.
We are aware of the rule that gives the trial court broad discretionary powers in a child custody hearing. But such a rule only authorizes a trial court to use such discretionary powers but it should never abuse them. The supreme court long ago laid down the rule that such a “discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one”. State ex rel. Wood v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901, 903. That case has since been consistently cited and the said rule there announced many times approved by our Texas courts. This court recently approved the said rule in the cases of Kershman v. Kershman, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 809, and Cass v. Cass, Tex.Civ.App., 193 S.W.2d 279.
In the case at bar the trial court entered an order to award part-time custody of the child to appellee, Earl Martin, who resided with his present wife in the State of Kansas and who testified that he would take the child to Kansas if it be awarded to him. Ordinarily courts do not award the custody of a minor child to a nonresident of this State. Dickson v.' McLaughlin, Tex.Civ.App., 69 S.W.2d 209. But in the instant case such an award was made for part time by the trial court and the same was done without restricting the child’s residence to Texas, which the court had authority to do. White v. Lobstein, Tex.Civ.App., 246 S.W.2d 953, and other authorities there cited. The domicile of the child, even when awarded for only part time to its father as was done here by the trial court, would be the same as that of its father ■ (in the State of Kansas) during the period of time he had its custody since such custody carries with it domicile and domestic status. Mills v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 906. The trial court’s award of divided custody would not only cause this child to be “hawked • about from one parent to the other”, as stated by Judge Alexander in the Martin case [132 S.W.2d 428], and thus subject it to conflicting influences of two separate homes and under the supervision and direction of two separate parents with the results previously herein stated, but such divided custody would also cause the child to be “hawked about” between two separate states with separate and distinct legal jurisdiction over the child by separate states every time there would be a change of custody, thus probably making this innocent child of tender, years a victim of further controversial conflicts and court. battles that would continue to broaden the breach between its parents with a net result of “permanent injury to the child without any substantial benefit to the parents” as further stated by Judge Alexander in the Martin case.
*356Appellee admitted that while the child was in its mother’s custody it was properly disciplined, well trained, healthy, vigorous and well cared for under the supervision of its mother and her parents and that he had never objected to the child staying in the home of its maternal grandparents. Ap-pellee., himself, was indirectly responsible for the placing of the child in the home of its maternal grandparents. .The divorce decree of the Wheeler County District Court shows, in effect, that the original home of the child was disrupted when it was only seven months old. because of the fault of appellee, whose conduct deprived the child of the privilege of growing, up and being trained under the joint direction and supervision of both of its parents living under the same roof, as a result of which the child was awarded to its mother who had no other place to take it but to the home of her parents. According to the record before us this was not appellee’s first experience in participating in the disruption of his own home. He and his first wife..had a, like experience when another child of ¡'tender years of his was also denied the privilege of being reared by .the joint efforts of its parents under the same roof. The record further reveals that for some reason 'appellee has since consistently paid much more for the support of. his first child than he ever has for this child, although the Wheeler County District Court left appellee’s support of- this child largely .to his own discretion.
An adult person's future conduct may well be measured by’ his recent deliberate past conduct as it may be" related to the same or a similar situation. With this in view, may we again review briefly appellee’s deliberate and premeditated-conduct with reference to his attitude toward the best interest of this child. By the time the child here in question became well adjusted in a different home and was being well trained by a Christian mother with admitted visitation privileges, both in writing and orally given, accorded the father, he further" admittedly registered himself and his present wife under an assumed name in a public lodging place near the home of the child, its mother and maternal grandparents, and stayed' there five days without divulging his identity to anybody. During that time1 he spied on the child and the outlay for a period of five days, seeking an opportunity to “snatch the child” and drive away with it. Late in the afternoon on the fifth day he found such opportunity and executed his admitted premeditated plans. For a period of four years previous to taking- the child, he had seen it only two or three times and then only for a brief period while his present wife, who was with him throughout the execution of his plans, had never seen the child. Without notice to anybody and without justification, according to thé record before us, appellee and his wife, while both of t-hem being practically strangers to this child of tender years, took it from this good home where it had adjusted itself and was being properly trained and cared for and, in order to evade the “detectives” and “tracers”, they drove over eight or ten southern states for a period óf thre'e months without contacting the child’s mother or advising her anything about the child, except for ■ sending her a “night letter”- from Wichita, Kansas, the first night "after1 taking the child telling her that it -was all right. When appellee did return with the child, it addressed its mother by her given name “Caroline”, whereas it had always called her “mama” before being taken away and upon its return it conducted itself rudely otherwise and differently from its former training under the supervision of its mother. Upon returning to Texas he refused to let the mother have her child and Ife't her visit it only in the presence of others. He selected the forum for hearing the case and, according to the record and our judicial knowledge of distances, he for some reason instituted this proceeding in a strange court, some 100 miles or more from where any of the parties had ever resided, seeking full custody of the child, or, in the alternative, its custody for at lea.st ten months out of each year.
-We may likewise take judicial knowledge of the fdct that the forum selected by appellee for the hearing of this action is one that was' created in recent years, not for the use and benefit of people *357generally regardless of domicile but only for the use and benefit of Potter County citizens, who as local taxpayers bear the expense exclusively of -its operation; a forum which presumably was already so busy with a congested docket that the party litigants in this action waited and were held in suspense for a period of more than 13 months after the trial was conducted before the trial court rendered and announced its judgment, whereas a child custody action should be heard and disposed of with reasonable dispatch.
By his conduct appellee disrupted the quiet, orderly life this child had.been living and doubtless gave the child impressions in its early life that it will never forget, but we believe that the process of sound reasoning and the record here reflect that such was a detriment to the child and it must have thereafter taken time to restore its quiet, normal life of satisfactory living.
The trial court found there .existed animosity against appellee by, the maternal grandparents and R. W. Anderson. None was .found to exist before appellee abducted the child and there was no evidence that such then existed. If animosity existed against appellee by any of the child’s relatives, it is reasonable to presume that such was provoked by appellee himself. Appellee’s unjustified conduct in taking this child as he did was enough to arouse the most earnest sensibilities of all law abiding citizens who knew about it and to bring condemnation upon him by most, if not all, such citizens. Such conduct by appellee broadened the existing breach between the parents of the child to its detriment., How;ever, the record reveals that the parent's were getting along unusually well under the previous conditions and circumstances until the occurrence of this very unfortunate incident precipitated solely by appellee.
In his motion for rehearing appellee has sought to challenge several statements made by this court in its original opinion, .copying excerpts of such in his motion. A careful re-examination of the record reveals that all of these excerpts quoted from our original opinion are not only supported by the record, but they are all supported either by appellee’s pleadings, his admissions made as a witness or by evidence he introduced himself or by all three. His efforts now to discredit any such statements made by us in our original opinion are wholly inconsistent with that part of the record he made himself. ■ •
For all of the reasons stated it is our- opinion that the trial court committed a grievous error in that part of its judgment reversed by. us in our original opinion and its judgment is therefore reviewable by this court. While appellee seems to -contend that we are prohibited from doing anything other than affirming the trial court’s judgment, we believe it is our duty, after a careful examination of the-record, to reverse that part of its judgment that is wrong, as we view - the matter, and enter .what we believe to be a correct judgment in the cause, as we are required to do under such circumstances áccording to the provisions of Rule 434, Texas ■ Rules of Civil Procedure. Thát we have done and- we think the record and the law governing-such support our actions- in the matter, notwithstanding appellee’s contentions to the contrary. Appellee’s said motion for rehearing is' therefore overruled.