Court Opinion

ID: 9886473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 16:10:57.102169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:49.871735
License: Public Domain

J-S30042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRUCE A. COOPER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 340 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 20, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0438741-1984

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 6, 2023

       Bruce A. Cooper (“Cooper”) appeals pro se from the order dismissing

his ninth petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We

affirm.

       On March 13, 1984, Cooper went to Renee Blake’s (“Blake”) house to

rob her and Joseph Daniels (“Daniels”) as part of a drug-related dispute.

Cooper entered the home and dragged Daniels into the kitchen at knife point.

Blake fled from the house and obtained help; upon returning, she saw Cooper

fleeing the house and found Daniels inside, bleeding to death from a stab

wound. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007 (Pa. Super.

2008) (unpublished memorandum).

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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       In 1985, a jury found Cooper guilty of second-degree murder, robbery,

and possessing an instrument of crime. In 1987, Cooper received a sentence

of life imprisonment. Cooper was represented at trial by Adam O. Renfroe,

Esquire. This Court dismissed his direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied

Cooper’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 16, 1987.              See

Commonwealth v. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007.

       Cooper filed a series of unsuccessful petitions for collateral relief under

both the Post Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”)2 and the PCRA. In his sixth

PCRA petition, Cooper asserted that he had a newly discovered fact that

constituted an exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements,3 i.e., that

Attorney Renfroe was addicted to alcohol and controlled substances at the

time of trial. This Court found that Cooper’s allegations concerning Attorney

Renfroe failed to establish a newly discovered fact satisfying the time-bar

exception. See id.

       In March 2021, Cooper filed the instant pro se PCRA petition asserting

government interference regarding his claim concerning Attorney Renfroe,4

and an amended petition in March 2022. In December 2022, the PCRA court

issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, to which

____________________________________________

2 The PCHA was modified in part, repealed in part, and renamed the PCRA by

the Act of April 13, 1988.

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

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Cooper did not file a response. The court did not order Cooper to file a Rule

1925(b) statement and he did not do so.

      On appeal, Cooper presents the following issues for our review:

      [1.]    Whether the cumulative effects of the Commonwealth’s
      concealment of after trial material evidence of trial counsel’s
      fitness and mental health and drug addiction constitute
      interference?

      [2.] Whether [Cooper] would more likely than not have received
      a different ruling with the [undisclosed] evidence or in its absence,
      received a fair appellate review?

      [3.] Whether an actual duty existed for after discovered evidence
      to be made known to [Cooper] by the Commonwealth?

      [4.] Whether the judgment against [Cooper] is questionable
      under the 1985-1985 representation of Attorney Adam O.
      Renfroe?

Cooper’s Brief at Ab.

      Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

             We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in
      the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it
      is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

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      A judgment of sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking

the review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Cooper’s judgment of sentence

became final on March 15, 1988, ninety days after the December 16, 1987

denial of his petition for Pennsylvania Supreme Court review when his time

for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired.       See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3); see also U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. Cooper had until March 15,

1989 to file the instant PCRA petition, but did not do so until March 2021.

Thus, Cooper’s petition is facially untimely under the PCRA, precluding review

of the merits of the issues raised in the petition, absent a time-bar exception.

See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

      Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition if the

petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions set forth under

section 9545(b)(1), which provides:

      (b) Time for filing petition.—

      (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
      subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
      judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
      petitioner proves that:

          (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
          interference by government officials with the presentation of
          the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
          Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
          States;

          (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown

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         to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
         exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
         Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided
         in this section and has been held by that court to apply
         retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these

exceptions must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have

been presented,” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2), which require the petitioner to

plead and prove the exercise of due diligence in obtaining the information.

See Commonwealth v. Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2019).

The government interference exception applies when “the failure to raise the

claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with

the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id.

      Cooper claims that the Commonwealth knowingly concealed information

concerning Attorney Renfroe’s drug addiction.     The PCRA court stated that

Cooper failed to identify any interference by government officials or explain

how the alleged interference prevented him from filing a timely petition. It

accordingly dismissed the petition. See PCRA Court Opinion, 1/20/23, at 2

(unnumbered).

      Cooper   cannot   successfully   invoke   the   government   interference

exception because he has known for decades about Renfroe’s substance

abuse. Cf. Cooper, No. 3140 EDA 2007) (unpublished memorandum at 6)

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(rejecting Cooper’s claim that Renfroe’s drug addiction was a newly-

discovered fact where Cooper asserted that fact in a February 1999 PCRA

petition). See also PCRA Court Opinion, 1/20/23, at 2 n.3 (noting that Cooper

has asserted ineffective assistance of prior counsel concerning Renfroe’s drug

addiction since 1999).   Cooper cannot satisfy the government interference

exception or show that he timely asserted his claim with the exercise of due

diligence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (b)(2); Bankhead, 217 A.3d at

1248. Because Cooper did not establish a valid time-bar exception, the PCRA

court properly determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider his

petition.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/6/2023

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