Court Opinion

ID: 9409539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 16:09:26.751736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.307370
License: Public Domain

J-A23036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    IN RE: ESTATE OF ROBERT J.                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ROSEMEIER, DECEASED                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: LORRIEANN P.                    :
    ROSEMEIER                                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1502 MDA 2021

                Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2021
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Orphans’ Court at
                              No(s): 2019-00204

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED JULY 18, 2023

        I join the Majority’s holding to reverse the orphans’ court’s order to the

extent it denied Appellant’s request to remove Poorman as the Estate’s

personal representative.        However, while I also agree with the Majority’s

decision to affirm the part of the orphans’ court order denying Appellant’s

appeal from the decree admitting the 2015 Will to probate, I disagree with its

unnecessary determination that the collateral benefits doctrine applies in this

case. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

        The esteemed Majority set forth in detail the factual and procedural

history of this case, and I therefore need not repeat it at length here. See

Majority Memorandum at 2-15. It is sufficient to reiterate that in her first two

issues, Appellant argues that the 2015 Will should be invalidated based on

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A23036-22

allegations that Poorman exerted undue influence over Decedent. In holding

that the 2015 Will should not be set aside, the orphans’ court conducted a

threshold analysis pursuant to Estate of Clark, 334 A.2d 628 (Pa. 1975), to

determine if Appellant demonstrated a prima facie case of undue influence.

See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/25/21, at unnumbered 13-16. Specifically,

the court considered and found that Appellant sufficiently proved all three

required factors; namely, that (1) Poorman was in a confidential relationship

with Decedent; (2) Poorman received a substantial benefit under the 2015

Will; and (3) Decedent had a weakened intellect at or around the time the

2015 Will was executed. Id. The court nonetheless held that Poorman refuted

the charge of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence, and thus

denied Appellant’s challenge to the 2015 Will.          Id. at 16-17.      This

determination was based on the substantial, credible testimony from

Poorman, Jodun, and Hartman, all of whom testified that Decedent expressly

wished to disinherit his son, daughter-in-law, granddaughter, and Appellant.

Id.

      Critically, Appellant does not challenge the orphans’ court’s holding that

she proved a prima facie case of undue influence.       Indeed, she expressly

contends that the court “correctly found” that she did. Appellant’s brief at 19.

Consequently, there is no reason for this Court to examine any of the threshold

factors articulated in Estate of Clark, including whether Poorman received a

substantial benefit under the 2015 Will.    Nonetheless, the Majority spends

considerable effort in discussing and ruling upon the nature and extent of the

                                     -2-
J-A23036-22

benefit Poorman received. Specifically, citing In re Estate of LeVin, 615

A.2d 38 (Pa.Super. 1992), the Majority explicitly finds that under the facts

herein, the “free and complete power of discretion” afforded to Poorman

amounts to a collateral benefit. See Majority Memorandum at 20. Since this

issue is not before us, the “collateral benefits” discussion is unnecessary.

         Not only do I take issue with the Majority’s discussion and application of

Estate of LeVin because it is superfluous, but I also believe it to be

substantively unsound, as the facts in Estate of LeVin are distinguishable

from those of the instant matter. That case involved a will contest concerning

whether the executor and trustee appointed pursuant to the will, Meridian

Bank & Trust Company (“Meridian”), received a substantial benefit under the

will’s terms. The orphans’ court granted nonsuit in favor of Meridian, finding

that the challengers failed as a matter of law to prove that Meridian received

a substantial benefit under the contested will. See Estate of LeVin, supra

at 40.

         On appeal, we reversed, finding there was sufficient evidence showing

Meridian received a substantial benefit under the “collateral benefits” doctrine.

Following a discussion of the doctrine and review of several decisions from our

sister jurisdictions, we stated that “the will . . . vests Meridian with extensive

powers over the distribution and continuation of the trust in perpetuity which

smacks of undue influence.” Id. at 43. We noted in particular that Meridian

had the power to invest the decedent’s property without restriction. See id.

This included “purchasing common stock (up to 100%) in Meridian-titled

                                        -3-
J-A23036-22

investment entities . . . and to do all other acts in its judgment necessary or

desirable for the proper management, investment and distribution of

testatrix’s property.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Further, Meridian “was

authorized, without court order, to revise the terms of the trust, if such action

would best serve testatrix’s purpose.” Id. (cleaned up). Lastly, the trustee

had the “absolute discretion” to determine when and if the trust became

“impracticable to administer,” which would allow the trustee to distribute the

principal to organizations entitled to the income without a formal court

accounting. See id. Based on the powers granted above, coupled with the

ability to receive fees, we determined that Meridian was endowed with

“collateral benefits bringing it within the sphere of a substantial beneficiary.”

Id. at 44 (cleaned up).

      By contrast, in the matter sub judice, Poorman, as a trustee, is not

expressly permitted to purchase stock in entities in which he holds an

ownership interest.     Rather, the Limited Power of Appointment directs

Poorman to pay the trust estate only to any charitable organizations that he

deems appropriate.    See Last Will and Testament of Robert J. Rosemeier,

10/28/2015, at 2-3. Additionally, the 2015 Will does not authorize Poorman

to revise the terms of the trust on his own accord, nor does it permit him to

ascertain at his sole discretion that the trust is impracticable to administer,

                                      -4-
J-A23036-22

allowing him to distribute funds without a formal court accounting. 1 Simply

put, Poorman does not have the identical unfettered authority as the trustee

did in Estate of LeVin. Hence, I find the Majority’s reliance on LeVin to be

unwarranted.

       Appellant’s challenge in this appeal is to the finding of the orphans’ court

that Poorman proved the absence of undue influence by clear and convincing

evidence. See Appellant’s brief at 19. The Majority thoroughly and cogently

analyzed the arguments of the parties concerning this issue. See Majority

Memorandum at 16-23. I wholly agree with this component of the Majority’s

analysis, as well as its resolution of Appellant’s other issues, and join in

affirming the orphans’ court decision as to the 2015 Will on that basis.

       In conclusion, I agree with the Majority’s ultimate holdings, but do not

join in its finding that Poorman received a substantial benefit under the 2015

Will pursuant to the collateral benefits rule. That question is not before us,

and as such, I similarly would not rely on Estate of LeVin to support that

conclusion. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.

____________________________________________

1 I also note that the orphans’ court did not expressly make its ruling under
the paradigm of the collateral benefits rule and, accordingly, there may be
other salient facts supporting or negating a finding of collateral benefits that
are not properly before us.

                                           -5-