Court Opinion

ID: 9383801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 09:10:17.493571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.067690
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-22-00054-CR

PASQUAL LUNA,
                                                            Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                            Appellee

                           From the 21st District Court
                             Burleson County, Texas
                              Trial Court No. 15,737

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       A jury found Appellant Pasqual Luna guilty of the felony offense of driving while

intoxicated (DWI), with two prior convictions for DWI. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

49.09(a-b).   The jury found the enhancement allegations alleging two prior felony

convictions to be true and assessed Luna’s punishment at forty years’ in the penitentiary.

The trial court sentenced Luna accordingly. In two issues, Luna argues that the evidence
is insufficient to support the prior DWI enhancements alleged in the indictment. We

affirm.

                                 Procedural and Factual History

          On September 14, 2018, Luna was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The State

subsequently charged Luna with DWI and alleged that Luna had two prior DWI

convictions—one on March 26, 1996 and the second on March 23, 2004. 1 At trial, the State

offered, without objection, and the trial court admitted exhibits to prove up the two prior

DWI convictions. The State also elicited testimony from two witnesses explaining the

exhibits.

                                        Standard of Review

          The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review for

sufficiency issues as follows:

                 When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
          consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
          favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
          essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
          Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State,
          514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the
          appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
          resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
          reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
          319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our

1The indictment specifically charged, “And it is further presented that prior to the commission of the
charged offense . . ., on the 26th day of March, A.D. 1996, in cause number 13,803 in the County Court of
Burleson County, Texas, the defendant was convicted of an offense relating to the operating of a motor
vehicle while intoxicated; and on the 23rd day of March, A.D. 2004, in cause number 16,855 in the County
Court of Burleson County, Texas, the defendant was convicted of an offense relating to the operating of a
motor vehicle while intoxicated. . . .”

Luna v. State                                                                                     Page 2
        judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
        (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not
        engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the
        cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although
        juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are
        permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each
        inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507
        S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99
        S.Ct. 2781); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App.
        2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
        from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.
        Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because
        the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the
        witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323
        S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial
        evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
        sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
        incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey
        v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at
        13.
                We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
        to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as
        defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v.
        State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
        correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
        the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof
        or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately
        describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
        also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law
        as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the
        offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
        S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

                                         Authority

        To support a finding of true to an allegation of a prior DWI, “the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is
Luna v. State                                                                            Page 3
linked to that conviction.” Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

There is no specific method of proof that is required to prove these two elements. Id. The

State may introduce evidence to prove the prior conviction through testimony or

documentary proof. Id. at 922. Evidence that the defendant’s name is the same as the one

on the prior conviction is not alone sufficient to prove the defendant is the same person

previously convicted. Williams v. State, 946 S.W.2d 886, 895 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no

pet.). Evidence with personal identification information, such as a driver’s license

number, social security number, and date of birth can be sufficient evidence, in

conjunction with a prior judgment, to link a prior conviction to the defendant. See, e.g.,

Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 924-25. The trier of fact will look at the totality of the evidence

admitted in determining if the prior conviction exists and if the defendant was the person

convicted. Id. at 923. If these two elements can be found beyond a reasonable doubt, then

the evidence used is necessarily sufficient to prove a prior conviction. Id.

                                        Issue One

        In his first issue, Luna challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

finding of the first prior DWI conviction from March 1996. Luna argues that the State

failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Luna is linked to the March 1996

conviction. We disagree.

        The State admitted multiple exhibits that contained Luna’s personal identification

information. State’s Exhibit 10 includes documents related to the March 1996 conviction,

Luna v. State                                                                       Page 4
which included the final judgment, along with documents that reflect Luna’s date of

birth, social security number, driver’s license number, and a brief physical description.

State’s Exhibits 11, 13, 14, 15, and 20 also contain many of the same personal identifiers.

Notably, the personal identifiers in State’s Exhibit 10 match those in Defendant’s Exhibits

1 and 3. Defendant’s Exhibit 1 even includes a photocopy of Luna’s driver’s license. At

no point during trial did Luna argue that the personal identifiers or physical descriptions

in those exhibits were false. In addition, Luna’s signature is included throughout these

exhibits. A jury’s comparison of handwriting is sufficient to establish the handwriting of

a witness if the witness does not deny his signature under oath. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO.

ANN. art. 38.27.

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude

that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Luna was convicted of the March

1996 DWI. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a). We overrule Luna’s first issue.

                                         Issue Two

        In his second issue, Luna challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the

finding of the second prior DWI conviction from March 2004. Specifically, Luna argues

that the March 2004 conviction was not a final judgment. We disagree.

        The State admitted into evidence, with no objection, State’s Exhibit 20 that contains

two documents related to the March 2004 conviction. The State contends that the first

document is a memorandum and that the second document, entitled “JUDGMENT AND

Luna v. State                                                                          Page 5
SENTENCE,” is a final judgment.         The “JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE” contains

language that adjudicates Luna’s guilt, assesses his punishment, suspends imposition of

sentence, and places him on community supervision. However, Luna argues that the

memorandum is a reflection of the trial court’s oral pronouncement that Luna be placed

on deferred adjudication/community supervision.

        Luna’s argument fails because the jury is responsible for resolving any conflicts in

the evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. Here, the jury determined that

the “JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE” document proved that the alleged prior conviction

from March 2004 was true.

        The record supports the jury’s determination.           The “JUDGMENT AND

SENTENCE” for the March 2004 DWI is similar to the “JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE”

for the March 1996 DWI. Testimony from the District Attorney and the Deputy Clerk,

who were present at the time of Luna’s March 2004 sentencing, supports the existence of

the March 2004 conviction. The District Attorney testified that he never offered deferred

adjudication for a DWI in 2004; instead, Luna had accepted a plea bargain offer. The

Deputy Clerk testified that she heard the trial court judge find Luna guilty. Additionally,

the State offered, without objection, and the Trial Court admitted, a Criminal Docket

sheet from March 2004. The docket sheet characterized the Memorandum as an “order”

and not a “judgment.” Luna argues that he understood the March 2004 sentence to be a

deferred adjudication. However, Luna’s testimony in this regard occurred at a pre-trial

Luna v. State                                                                         Page 6
hearing outside the jury’s presence. There was, therefore, no evidence before the jury

that refuted the validity of the 2004 Judgment and Sentence as a final judgment.

        When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we look at all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781; Villa, 514 S.W.3d

at 232 (emphasis added). To the extent that the evidence conflicts, we defer to the jury’s

resolution of such inconsistencies. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 859 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2010, pet. ref’d). From

the evidence before it, the jury could reasonably find true the alleged prior conviction

from March 2004. We overrule Luna’s second issue.

                                         Conclusion

        Having overruled both of Luna’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                   MATT JOHNSON
                                                   Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion issued and filed March 29, 2023
Do not publish
[CRPM]

Luna v. State                                                                           Page 7