Court Opinion

ID: 9552167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:05:38.73206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:42.354638
License: Public Domain

Justice QUINN
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part I of the majority opinion and in the majority’s remand for a new trial *792for reasons stated in Part II. I dissent, however, from Part III of the majority opinion, which holds that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the defendant’s theory of defense.
The crime of assault in the second degree against a peace officer requires that the person committing the offense “knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer ... engaged in the performance of his duties.” Section 18-3-203(l)(f), C.R.S. (1996 Cum.Supp.).
Here, there was evidence that the defendant, shortly before his physical confrontation with the deputy sheriff, had suffered a severe epileptic seizure in his home. The defendant had been foaming at the mouth and was convulsing. The paramedic who responded to the emergency call testified that a seizure is like a “chaotic firing of electricity” into the brain and that during the period immediately following a seizure the patient often is uncooperative, belligerent, and confused. Hence, there was ample evidence to support the defendant’s theory that he did not have the requisite culpable mental state during his physical confrontation with the deputy sheriff — that is, he did not know nor should he have reasonably known that he was assaulting a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties.
The defendant tendered a theory of defense instruction that stated, in substance, that his conduct was the involuntary result of the epileptic seizure and its aftermath. The trial court rejected the tendered instruction apparently because the court believed that it was merely a restatement of the culpability elements of assault in the second degree upon a peace officer.
Although the trial court was not obliged to accept the defendant’s tendered instruction, it was incumbent on the court to work with defense counsel in fashioning a proper theory-of-the-case instruction. The court’s instruction on the statutory definition of “knowingly” and the essential elements of the crime of second degree assault on a peace officer was not an adequate substitute for the defendant’s theory of defense. Those instructions did not adequately advise the jury of the significance of the epileptic seizure on the defendant’s criminal responsibility. Further explanation was required in this case.
In People v. Nunez, 841 P.2d 261 (Colo.1992), our supreme court affirmed the reversal of an aggravated robbery and crime of violence conviction because of the trial court’s failure to prepare a proper theory-of-the-case instruction on the defendant’s theory of alibi. The supreme court stated:
In Colorado, an instruction embodying a defendant’s theory of the case must be given by the trial court if the record contains any evidence to support the theo-ry_ The rationale underlying the general rule is the belief that it is for the jury and not the court to determine the truth of the defendant’s theory.... As a result, a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction embodying his theory of the case even if the only supporting evidence is highly improbable testimony by the defendant. ...
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Jury instructions that merely set forth the elements of the offense and the burden of proof, without more, do not encompass a theory of defense. A trial court has an affirmative obligation to cooperate with counsel to either correct an alibi theory of the ease instruction or to incorporate the substance of such an instruction in one drafted by the court.
People v. Nunez, supra, 841 P.2d at 264-66 (emphasis in original).
Nunez is controlling in the case before us. The trial court had the responsibility to fashion an instruction which essentially told the jury that it is the defendant’s contention that he suffered an epileptic seizure shortly before his physical confrontation with the deputy sheriff; that due to the seizure and its aftereffects, the defendant did not know nor should he have reasonably known that the deputy sheriff was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties; and that if the jury so finds or otherwise has a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant’s culpable mental state at the time of his physical confrontation with the deputy sheriff, the jury *793should find the defendant not guilty. The failure of the trial court to submit an appropriate theory of defense to the jury constitutes reversible error and requires a new trial.