Court Opinion

ID: 9526436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:17:17.520178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:51.042836
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE UNVERZAGT, dissenting: I concur in the judgment of the majority on all issues except the decision to remand the cause for calculation of the minimum award of child support. The majority decides that the recent amendment to section 505(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 40, par. 505(a)), which took effect on September 12, 1984, during the pendency of this appeal, requires that the cause be remanded for a redetermination of the appropriate amount of child support the respondent must pay subsequent to that date. Section 505(a), as amended, provides that in cases involving child support alone, the court shall make the initial determination of the minimum amount of support based upon the number of children and a stated percentage of the net income of the responsible parent. A similar provision governs the initial award of child support and maintenance in cases involving both items. New section 505(a) governs cases in which the trial court is making an initial determination of child support or an initial award of child support and maintenance, not, as occurred here, the termination of maintenance and the modification of child support. Secondly, even if section 505(a) were to apply to the facts of this case, remanding for a new hearing is particularly inappropriate, because the trial court correctly applied the existing law. I submit that this is not a case in which the amendment in question evinces an intent on the legislature’s part to clarify the original legislative purpose of the prior version of section 505(a). (Cf. Krug-Etheridge v. Krug (1982), 111 Ill. App. 3d 780, 783.) The majority is remanding the cause for a new determination of child support in accordance with a statutory test that did not come into effect until months after the trial court rendered its judgment. Such an application of the statute defies common sense and is not warranted here. See In re Marriage of Olson (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 432, 442. Furthermore, a cursory review of the evidence will reveal that the trial court’s determination of dollar amounts is very close to what can be achieved by another hearing. I do not think litigants should be burdened with the costs and expenses of a hearing the majority now requires where no good can be accomplished.