Court Opinion

ID: 9365036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 21:02:35.446199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:42.873844
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/20/23
            CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                         B315921

    Plaintiff and Respondent,       (Los Angeles County
                                    Super. Ct. No. NA072648)
       v.

BENJAMIN GONZALEZ et al.,

    Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court for the County
of Los Angeles, Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Affirmed.
      Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Benjamin Gonzalez.
      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Gilbert Gomez.
      Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Gerson Bazan.

*    Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1100 and
8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication except for
Discussion Part A.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                     I.    INTRODUCTION

     Defendants Benjamin Gonzalez, Gilbert Gomez, and
Gerson Bazan appeal from the trial court’s denial of their Penal
Code section 1172.6 1 petitions for resentencing on their first
degree murder convictions. 2 Gonzalez contends the court
erroneously denied his petition at the prima facie stage without
issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). Gomez
contends the court erred in denying his petition without reducing
his first degree murder conviction to second degree murder
because the court did not find he satisfied the elements of
deliberate and premeditated first degree murder. Gerson and
Gonzalez join Gomez’s contention. We affirm.

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated. Defendants filed their petitions
pursuant to former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the
Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 with no
change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to the
statute by its current section number only.

2     The jury also convicted Spencer Bazan, Gerson Bazan’s
brother, of first degree murder. We will refer to Spencer, who is
not a party to this appeal, and Gerson Bazan by their first names
to avoid confusion.

                                 2
               II.   FACTUAL BACKGROUND

     The following factual background is from a prior
nonpublished opinion from a different panel of this division,
People v. Gonzalez (Feb. 10, 2010, B211559) [nonpub. opn.]) 3:
       “On November 20, 2006, 14-year-old Geovonie Taylor was
living with his cousins, Michael and Norman Cox, who were 16
and 18 years old. After school that day, Taylor met the Cox
brothers at a friend’s house. It was nighttime when they left the
friend’s house and decided to walk home. None of them was
armed. They walked down Anaheim Street and began to turn
down Gundry Avenue, near a construction site. There were three
Hispanic males across the street, along with two Hispanic
females. Taylor heard the males call out repeatedly, ‘Eastside
Longos,’ ‘fuck [racial slur],’ ‘F Insane,’ 4 and ‘F 20.’ Taylor knew
that Eastside Longos, the 20’s, and Insane were all gangs. He
understood them to be making gang threats. Taylor was wearing
his school uniform, which included a burgundy colored shirt.

3     On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the prior
nonpublished opinion as well as the underlying trial record in
that appeal. We also take judicial notice of the subsequent
nonpublished opinion in this case, People v. Gonzalez
(Nov. 30, 2020, B300650).) Accordingly, we deny as moot
Gonzalez’s request for judicial notice of the prior opinion and
certain portions of the trial record.

4     “Detective Malcolm Evans of the City of Long Beach Police
Department testified that ‘Baby Insane is a clique of the Insane
Crips criminal street gang.’ The gang is reputed to be violent.

                                 3
Norman wore red and blue sweat pants, a black long-sleeved
shirt, and a red and white baseball cap with ‘Big Baby’ on it. 5
       “Taylor and the Cox brothers continued to walk, but they
could not continue down Anaheim because their path was blocked
by the construction site gates—so they turned left onto Gundry.
As they did so, the Hispanic males ran across the street toward
them, calling out gang names, ‘F [racial slur]’ and ‘Eastside
Longos.’ There appeared to be five males in all. The Hispanic
males asked where they were from, which Taylor understood as
asking for their gang affiliation. 6 Neither Taylor nor the Cox
brothers responded. In the meantime, the Hispanic males
surrounded them as they tried to back away. One of the Hispanic
males approached them, while making a gang threat; another
reached for something from his back, near his hip. Norman
pushed Taylor and Michael back and faced the Hispanic males,
who surrounded him.
      “One of the Hispanic males ran up to Norman and ‘socked
him in the head.’ Norman tried to escape, but slipped and fell.
While Norman was on the ground, the Hispanic males repeatedly
kicked and punched Norman all over his body. Norman curled up
and tried to fend off the blows. Taylor was too afraid to help his
cousin. When another of the male Hispanics approached, Taylor
and Michael said they ‘did not bang,’ and they were left alone.

5      “Members of Baby Insane typically have ‘BIG,’ ‘BABY,’ or
‘B’ on their red hats.

6     “Detective Evans testified that the question ‘where are you
from’ can mean a challenge to identify one’s gang affiliation or a
challenge to fight.

                                4
Taylor heard Norman say, ‘Please don’t stab me.’ There were
four Hispanic males around Norman at the time. Although
Taylor did not see any of the attackers holding a weapon, he saw
one of them making stabbing motions at the time Norman cried
out. Norman did not fight back; he was not armed. The Hispanic
males ran away when Taylor yelled and ran toward them.
       “Taylor saw Norman was bleeding from his mouth, so he
ran to the park where a dance was going on and asked for help.
The paramedics and police arrived approximately 15 minutes
later. Norman had suffered eight stab wounds, including a fatal
wound to the left side of his chest that penetrated the lung.
Other wounds appeared to be defensive in nature. The stabbing
instrument that was used had one blunt edge and one sharp
edge. It could not be determined whether there were multiple
instruments used. At trial, Taylor identified Gonzalez and
Gerson as attackers. From a photographic six-pack lineup,
Taylor identified Gonzalez as the one who stomped on Norman
and punched his ribs. At the preliminary hearing, Taylor
identified Gonzalez, along with Spencer and Gerson. He was not
sure about his identification of Gomez.
       “Seleta Castillo lived on Hoffman Avenue, a block away
from Gundry. That night, she was walking home from work
along Gundry. At the intersection of Gundry and Anaheim, she
saw four or five male Hispanics, which included defendants, and
two female Hispanics across the street. She had previously seen
defendants in the neighborhood and in her apartment complex,
and she had also seen the two females holding hands with
Gonzalez and Gerson. As Castillo walked home, she saw some
African-American males walking down Anaheim. Defendants
called out their gang affiliation and told the African-Americans

                               5
they were not supposed to be there—it was not their ‘turf.’ They
repeatedly demanded to know what the African-Americans were
doing in their neighborhood. Gonzalez called out, ‘[racial slur].’
The African-Americans did not respond.
      “Defendants approached the African-Americans, who were
turning down Gundry. Norman said, ‘I don’t want no problems’
and put his hands up. There was nothing in his hands.
Defendants surrounded him and passed a weapon amongst
themselves. Defendants began to strike and kick Norman. They
continued to beat Norman after he had fallen to the ground.
Afterwards, they ran away to Hoffman Avenue. Castillo walked
past defendants during the course of the attack. At no time
during the incident did the African-Americans say anything
hostile or antagonistic to defendants.
      “Castillo went home, but was too frightened to call the
police. Defendants had seen her and knew where she lived. She
feared that she or her family would be in danger if she did. When
the police subsequently contacted her at work, she identified
Gonzalez by name and identified all four defendants’
photographs. After the incident, Castillo saw Gonzalez’s sister on
the bus, who mumbled something to her in a threatening manner
and said she would ‘get’ Castillo’s daughter. 7 That made Castillo
afraid to testify. She received financial assistance from Los
Angeles County to help her move to a different neighborhood.
      “Officer Vuong Nguyen of the City of Long Beach Police
Department was on patrol in Long Beach at 9:00 p.m. He and his
partner responded to a stabbing incident on Gundry and

7     “The trial court instructed the jury that Castillo’s
testimony was being offered solely as to Gonzalez.

                                 6
Anaheim. He found Norman on the ground, bleeding. The area
was fairly well illuminated by streetlights. There was a red hat
lying next to Norman’s body.
       “Eva Ramirez was Gonzalez’s girlfriend at the time of the
incident. Gonzalez told her that he was a member of ‘NKS,’ but
Ramirez was not sure whether it was a street gang. Spencer told
her that he was a member of the Eastside Longos. Ramirez was
afraid to testify because of ‘the consequences,’ which included
risk to the safety of her family. She was also acquainted with the
other three defendants for some months. As such, she knew
Gerson’s girlfriend, Nancy Ascencio, who lived with the Bazan
brothers on Hoffman.
       “Ramirez saw the stabbing incident. That morning, she,
Ascencio, and another female visited Spencer. Toward the end of
the day, Gomez and Gonzalez joined them. It was dark outside
when they all left together to go to the nearby park. They walked
back on Gundry. A young female Ramirez did not know came up
and spoke with Gomez. A young male named Marcos joined them
too; Gerson was not present. Three African-Americans were
walking across the street from them. She heard them say
something. At some point, she heard someone twice yell, ‘This is
Insane Crips,’ which she understood as a gang challenge. She
looked over and saw an African-American male wearing a red
hat, which she believed was a gang color. Gonzalez, Gomez,
Spencer, and Marcos ran across the street to confront the
African-Americans. She heard one of them swear at the African-
Americans; she also heard one of them say Eastside Longos.
Gonzalez, Gomez, and Spencer fought one of the African-
Americans. Ramirez did not see them use any weapon. Marcos
did not take part; he was standing with the two African-

                                7
Americans who were not fighting. Gonzalez, Gomez, and Spencer
ran back across the street, leaving the victim on the ground,
before running back to the apartment complex on Hoffman.
      “A few weeks after the incident, Gonzalez told Ramirez that
the victim had died and whichever one of them was first arrested
‘would take the blame.’ 8 Gonzalez telephoned her from jail after
his arrest. In the conversation, Gonzalez told Ramirez to say
that she was with him at his house at the time of the incident
and to arrange an alibi with his sister Andrea. 9 Gonzalez got a
‘Long Beach’ tattoo on his forehead while in custody. She knew
Gonzalez by the nickname ‘Ceenoe’; Gomez by ‘Muneco’; Spencer
by ‘Minor’; and Gerson by ‘Sonick.’
      “Marcos Robles, 15 years old at the time of the incident,
was acquainted with Gonzalez and Gomez. Robles testified
pursuant to an agreement immunizing him from prosecution. He
was present at the stabbing scene. He ran away with a group of
ten persons toward Hoffman. He denied telling the police that he
saw defendants running across the street and joined them. An
audiotape of his interview with police was played to the jury. He
was afraid of testifying against defendants because he feared
violent retribution.
      “In February 2007, Kwanna Childress received a letter in
the mail. The envelope indicated that it was sent by Gerson and
addressed to ‘Elizabeth Nancy’ on Hoffman Avenue. Childress
opened the envelope without looking at the address, however,

8     “This testimony was admitted solely against Gonzalez.

9    “Ramirez later received a threatening message on her
‘Myspace’ page from Andrea.

                                8
assuming it was addressed to her. The evidence concerning the
letter was admitted solely as to Gerson. One line in the letter
stated, ‘Remember you are also a suspect in the murder on
Gundry.’ It was signed by ‘Sonick’ with the letter ‘c’ crossed out.
She took the letter to the police. Detective Daniel Mendoza
testified that the letter contained the word ‘Longeros,’ which is a
reference to the Eastside Longos. It also contained the letters
‘M.D.S.,’ which members of that gang used to refer to their sect as
the ‘Malditos.’ There was also a reference to someone called
‘Massive,’ who was a member of the Eastside Longos.
       “Spanish language interpreter Alfred Calderon translated
portions of the letter, which referred to Ascencio as a ‘bitch’ and a
‘whore.’ The writer was angry with her because she had
disobeyed his request to stay away from ‘every Longero,
especially from the M.D.S.’ It also contained a threat that
‘Massive’ would ‘fuck [her] up.’ The letter went on to say that ‘the
Big Homey’ said he needed the money owed by ‘G Strap’ and
‘Acid’ by March 14 ‘because of the business they were doing.’ He
advised her not to leave her house ‘because if the police get [her],
that’s all on [her].’ She must ‘stay away from everyone’ because
the Eastside ‘Longos got the green light.’
       “Detective Malcolm Evans testified that defendants lived in
apartments on Hoffman, close to each other and the murder
scene. Detective Evans interviewed Spencer on the day of his
arrest. After advising Spencer of his Miranda rights, 10 Spencer
waived those rights and agreed to speak to the detective.
Initially, Spencer denied any knowledge of Norman’s stabbing.
The audiotape of the interview was played to the jury, subject to

10    “Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

                                 9
the instruction that the evidence was admissible solely against
Spencer. In his statement, Spencer admitted stabbing the victim,
but explained that he did it in self-defense. One of the African-
American males first approached Spencer and made a gang
challenge. When Spencer said he was ‘from Longo,’ the African-
Americans made more threats. The ‘main guy’—apparently,
Norman—ran at Spencer and knocked him down. Spencer saw
the others begin to run toward him. Fortuitously at the moment
Spencer fell, he found a screwdriver lying on the ground, which
he used repeatedly to stab his victim. Detective Evans
participated in a search of the Bazan residence. Two
screwdrivers and a knife were found in his bedroom.
      “Officer Miguel Rosales testified that Gonzalez had
admitted being a member of a ‘tag banger crew’ called ‘NKS,’ or
‘Nip Killing Squad.’ His gang moniker was ‘C-Note.’ Officer
Rosales understood that Gonzalez had subsequently been
‘jumped into’ the Eastside Longos, which was a full-fledged
criminal street gang. Gomez had admitted to membership in the
Eastside Longos. Both Spencer and Gerson had admitted being
members of the Eastside Longos. The stabbing scene was inside
Eastside Longos territory. Baby Insane, a violent clique of the
Insane Crip gang, claim all of Long Beach as their territory and
are enemies of the Eastside Longos. The hat worn by Norman is
consistent with Baby Insane membership. 11

11     “Detective Carlos Grimaldo testified that Gomez admitted
Eastside Longo membership, as did Spencer. If a person yells
out, ‘This is Baby Insane’ in the streets, it is likely to be meant as
a gang challenge.

                                 10
       “Detective Hector Gutierrez was the prosecution’s gang
expert. He was familiar with the Eastside Longos gang, having
investigated it for 18 years. At the time of Norman’s murder, the
gang numbered approximately 1100 members. The location of
the stabbing was within territory claimed by Eastside Longo. He
testified as to predicate crimes committed by other Eastside
Longos. ‘M.D.S.’ or ‘Malditos’ was an Eastside Longo clique. The
Eastside Longos are in conflict with African-Americans. Violent
confrontations with African-Americans are likely to be fatal due
to the Eastside Longos’ ‘mindset.’ Within the Eastside Longos, it
is understood that a member will enhance his reputation in the
gang by committing increasingly violent crimes. Eastside Longo
members will tend to be armed in their own territory because
rival gangs claim portions of territory within that claimed by the
Eastside Longos.
       “Gerson is also a self-admitted Eastside Longo, with a
gang-related tattoo on his arm. He also has the letters ‘SUR’
tattooed on his chest, which is significant for prison purposes
because northern and southern California gang members are
enemies in prison. Gerson’s gang moniker is ‘Sonick.’ Most
Hispanic gangs are related to the Mexican Mafia, which is a
prison gang. The phrase ‘green light’ means that ‘it is open
season on your gang because you’re not obeying by the Mexican
Mafia rules.’ 12 Spencer is a self-admitted Eastside Longo with
the monikers ‘Minor’ and ‘Crow.’ Gomez is a self-admitted
Eastside Longo, with the moniker ‘Little Muneco.’ Gonzalez is
also a self-admitted Eastside Longo, who was previously
associated with NKS, which is a tagging crew.

12    “This testimony was admitted only as to Gerson.

                                11
       “As to Gerson’s letter to Ascencio, Detective Gutierrez
opined that it was signed with his gang moniker and referred to
‘Massive,’ who was also a member of that gang. The letter also
uses the term ‘Longero,’ which means Eastside Longo. An
Eastside Longo member will typically cross out the letter ‘c,’ as
was done in ‘Sonick’s’ signature, because ‘c’ stands for the gang’s
rivals, the Crips. Eastside Longos are hostile towards African-
Americans and Asian-Americans because those ethnic groups
comprise the membership of Crip gangs.
       “After listening to a hypothetical set of facts consistent with
the prosecution case, Detective Gutierrez opined that Norman’s
stabbing would have been committed to benefit the Eastside
Longos. The Eastside Longos ‘have problems with African-
Americans.’ The Eastside Longos often commit violent crimes,
and their reputation within the gang is enhanced by doing so.
Further, commission of violent offenses serves as a warning to
rivals and to community members. The former will be less likely
to attack Eastside Longos and the latter will be less likely to
report Eastside Longos for committing crimes. Within the gang’s
culture, it is understood that those who ‘snitch’ against gang
members will suffer violent retribution. Civilians, as well as
gang members, understand this. As a result, many witnesses are
afraid to testify against gang members, which inures to the
benefit of the gang, allowing its members to commit crimes with
impunity.
       “If an African-American male wearing a red cap with ‘Big
Baby’ on it yelled out ‘This is Baby Insane,’ it would be
understood as a gang challenge from a gang with a reputation for
violence.

                                 12
“Defense Case
      “Gonzalez rested without presenting any evidence.
      “Gomez called Detective Evans, who testified that when
Gomez was arrested in May 2007, he had 12 paycheck stubs in
his possession, dating from November 19, 2006, through
May 6, 2007.
      “Gerson called his mother, Maria De Los Angeles Lozano,
who testified that her two sons lived with her in an apartment on
Hoffman Avenue at the time of the incident. Marta Monzon was
the building manager. Lozano arrived at her apartment from
work at 4:30 p.m. and fell asleep until approximately 8:30 p.m.
At that time, Monzon unlocked the apartment door for Gerson
and his girlfriend, Ascencio. Neither Gerson nor Ascencio left the
apartment that night. On cross-examination, Lozano testified
that she awoke to see Gerson and Ascencio. After that, Lozano
went to Spencer’s bedroom and fell asleep until 11:30 p.m.
Lozano would not have known whether they left the apartment in
the meantime.
      “Monzon testified that she was on duty on an evening
around the time of the incident. Gerson and Ascencio asked for a
key to the Bazan apartment because his mother did not answer
the door. Monzon gave Gerson the key and saw him and Ascencio
go upstairs toward the Bazan apartment. It was approximately
6:30 p.m. From Monzon’s apartment, she could see persons
entering the apartment building. At approximately 8:30 p.m.,
Gerson returned the key to Monzon. She went to sleep at 9:30 or
10:00 p.m.
      “Gerson testified that on the day of the stabbing incident
Ascencio stopped by to see him, and he told her they were going
to a party that night. However, their ride did not show up, so

                               13
they went back to the Bazan apartment. It was approximately
8:00 p.m. He knocked on the door, but there was no answer. He
did not have the apartment key, so he got a key from Monzon.
He opened the door for himself and Ascencio and found his
mother asleep. Within approximately 30 minutes, he went
downstairs and returned the key to Monzon. He went back to the
apartment and went to bed and slept there until the following
day. He did not participate in an attack of an African-American
male.
       “While in custody following his arrest, Gerson corresponded
with Ascencio. He did not author the letter referenced by
Childress. ‘Sonick’ is not his nickname. Gerson is not associated
with the Eastside Longos. His tattoos are not gang-related.
       “Ascencio generally corroborated Gerson’s testimony
concerning the events of November 20, 2006. They spent the
evening and night in the Bazan apartment and did not go outside
to the location of the stabbing incident. She did not see the other
defendants that night. The letter referenced by Childress was
not in Gerson’s writing.
       “Spencer called Officer Bernardo Brajas who had responded
to the stabbing incident and interviewed Taylor. Taylor did not
tell the officer that prior to the stabbing, he was coming from a
residence near 10th and Alamitos, as he had done at trial.”
(People v. Gonzalez, supra, B211559.)

            III.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A jury convicted defendants of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and found true the allegation that the murder was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,

                                14
subd. (b)). 13 The trial court sentenced Gomez and Gerson to 25
years to life in state prison and Gonzalez to 50 years to life in
state prison under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, 1170.12). With
modifications not relevant to this appeal, a prior panel of this
court affirmed defendants’ convictions. (People v. Gonzalez,
supra, B211559.)
      In January 2019, defendants filed petitions for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. 14 The trial court
appointed counsel for defendants and ordered the District
Attorney to file responses to the petitions. The District Attorney
filed an opposition to the petitions, arguing, in part, that Senate
Bill No. 1437, former section 1170.95’s enacting legislation,
impermissibly amended two California voter initiatives
(Propositions 7 and 115) and violated the California Constitution
insofar as it purported to vacate final judgments in criminal
cases. The court agreed with the District Attorney’s arguments
and denied the petitions. Defendants appealed, the Attorney
General conceded the court erred, and we reversed and remanded
the matter for further proceedings consistent with our opinion
and section 1172.6. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, B300650.)

13    The jury also convicted Spencer of first degree murder and
found true the gang allegation and the allegation that he
personally used a knife in the commission of the crime (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).

14    Gerson filed a form petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Finding that the crux of that petition concerned “‘Senate Bill
[No.] 1437, Petition for Resentencing, P.C. [1172.6],’” the trial
court treated the petition as a petition for resentencing. (People
v. Gonzalez (Nov. 30, 2020, B300650) [nonpub. opn.].)

                                15
      On remand, the trial court held a hearing on October 20,
2021, on defendants’ petitions for resentencing. After hearing the
parties’ arguments for and against finding defendants guilty of
murder and considering the evidence adduced at trial, the court
found defendants guilty of murder as direct aiders and abettors
and denied defendants’ petitions for resentencing.

                       IV.   DISCUSSION

A.    Section 1172.6, Subdivision (d)(3) Evidentiary Hearing

       Gonzalez contends the trial court erred and violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to procedural due process
when it denied his petition for resentencing at the prima facie
stage without issuing an order to show cause and holding an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3). We disagree.

      1.    Background

       At the October 20, 2021, hearing, the trial court stated, “So
I set the hearing because I find that there is sufficient showing by
the defense to go forward with the hearing.” The court then
asked counsel for each party whether he or she had anything to
add and specifically asked the prosecutor why it should not grant
defendants’ petitions for resentencing.
       The prosecutor summarized the evidence adduced at trial
that she believed showed the defendants guilty of murder under
still valid theories of guilt: conspiracy to commit murder, direct
perpetrators, direct aiding and abetting, and implied malice.

                                16
       Gonzalez’s counsel stated that the facts were not in dispute,
but that it was not persuasive to argue those facts established a
conspiracy when that theory was not charged or litigated at trial.
Counsel limited his argument, stating he would join Gerson’s
argument.
       Gomez’s counsel argued the facts were in dispute. He
contended that Castillo’s testimony did not support the appellate
court’s conclusion that she testified defendants passed a weapon
among themselves. Counsel argued it was the prosecution’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez aided and
abetted the stabbing—that burden was to prove guilt at that
hearing and not to show guilt was established at the prior trial
because the law had changed—and the prosecution failed to meet
its burden.
       Gerson’s attorney first focused on the prosecutor’s
arguments at trial, noting that the prosecutor had argued that
Spencer was the killer and Gerson was guilty under the natural
and probable consequences theory of guilt and not as a
conspirator. He then argued that the trial court was not
permitted to consider factual assertions in the appellate court
opinion as evidence and that the facts in the reporter’s transcript
should control. Counsel explained, “We are having a court trial
right now, because the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable
doubt, and you are sitting as the juror. A jury and juror.”
Finally, counsel recited the evidence submitted at trial and
argued that evidence did not support a murder finding against
his client.
       The trial court, which had served as the court for
defendants’ trial, stated its view of the evidence. It concluded the
evidence showed that defendants chased down, surrounded, and

                                17
beat Norman—thereby preventing him from escaping or
defending himself—so Spencer could stab him. Thus, the court
concluded, defendants were major participants and direct aiders
and abettors. Accordingly, it denied defendants’ petitions for
resentencing.

      2.    Analysis

       Section 1172.6 “creates a procedure for convicted murderers
who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957.) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to
show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) Within 60 days of issuance of
the order to show cause, the trial court shall hold an evidentiary
hearing “to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief.”
(Id., subds. (d)(1) & (d)(3).)
       “[T]he burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder
or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.
The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the
Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence
previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law, including witness testimony,
stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. The court
may also consider the procedural history of the case recited in
any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was
admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless

                                18
the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer
new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       As the Attorney General concedes, the trial court did not
expressly issue an order to show cause. Nevertheless, the court
held the evidentiary hearing section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
requires. The court explained at the outset of the October 20,
2021, hearing that it had set the hearing because defendants had
made a sufficient showing to hold a hearing—i.e., that defendants
had made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c) and (d)(1) & (3).) It then asked whether any
party had anything to add. Then, it asked the prosecutor why it
should not grant defendants section 1172.6 relief. It thus put the
prosecution to its section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) burden of
proof—at a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) hearing, the
prosecution has the burden of proof to show a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor responded by
discussing the trial evidence she believed showed defendants
were guilty of murder under a still valid theory of guilt.
       Likewise, defense counsel participated in the hearing as if
it was a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing,
arguing the trial evidence did not support a guilty finding.
Moreover, when Gomez’s counsel argued it was the prosecution’s
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomez aided and
abetted the stabbing, Gonzalez’s counsel did not object and seek
clarification about the nature of the hearing. When Gerson’s
counsel also contended the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)
beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied at the hearing,
Gonzalez’s counsel again remained silent.

                               19
       Finally, the trial court’s ruling demonstrates that it
conducted a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary
hearing. At the hearing’s conclusion, it stated, “the court finds
that [defendants] are major participants and they are direct
abettor and abettor [sic.]. They prevented the escape and
prevented the person from defending themselves.” (Italics
added.) (See People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 745 [a
trial court is to act as an independent factfinder in determining
beyond a reasonable doubt whether a defendant is guilty of
murder under a still valid theory of murder].)

B.    Failure to Reduce Defendants’ First Degree Murder
      Convictions to Second Degree Murder

       Gomez contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition without reducing his first degree murder conviction to
second degree murder because the court did not find he satisfied
the elements of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder.
Gerson and Gonzalez join Gomez’s contention. The court did not
err.

      1.    Standard of Review

      We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. (People
v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) In determining the
“Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose,” we
“begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning.” (Ibid., internal citations and quotation
marks omitted.) “If the plain language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and we need not embark on

                                 20
judicial construction. [Citations.] If the statutory language
contains no ambiguity, the Legislature is presumed to have
meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs.
[Citations.]” (People v. Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244.)

      2.    Analysis

       Defendants do not argue the prosecution failed to meet its
burden of proving they are guilty of murder beyond a reasonable
doubt and thus the trial court erred in denying their petitions.
Instead, they argue that even when the prosecution proves a
defendant is guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, section
1172.6 nevertheless requires a trial court to reduce a first degree
murder conviction to second degree murder if it did not find the
defendant committed the murder with deliberation and
premeditation. We disagree. Section 1172.6’s plain language
does not contain a mechanism for a trial court to reduce a first
degree murder conviction to second degree murder.
       Under section 1172.6, if the prosecution meets its burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant “is guilty of
murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,” then the
defendant is not entitled to relief and the trial court must deny
the defendant’s petition for resentencing. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) If,
however, “the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the
prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached
to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.) If the defendant
is entitled to relief and the murder was charged generically, then

                                21
the “conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or
underlying felony for resentencing purposes.” (Id., subd. (e).)
      Accordingly, under section 1172.6, a trial court has two
options in adjudicating a resentencing petition: Deny the petition
and leave in place the murder conviction or grant the petition
and vacate the murder conviction and resentence the defendant
on the remaining charges or target offense or underlying felony.
Reducing a first degree murder conviction to second degree
murder is not an option under section 1172.6. 15

15    Because we hold that section 1172.6 does not permit
reducing a first degree murder conviction to second degree
murder, we do not reach the Attorney General’s contentions that
defendants forfeited this issue or that the trial court found
defendants acted with intent to kill as well as deliberation and
premeditation.

                                22
                      V.    DISPOSITION

     The orders are affirmed.

                                     KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             MOOR, J.

                                23