Court Opinion

ID: 9352597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 00:00:27.376363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:50.030613
License: Public Domain

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                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 22-4007

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        DARYL LEE GODETTE, JR.,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

                                                No. 22-4011

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        DARYL LEE GODETTE, JR.,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Greenville and Elizabeth City. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (4:19-cr-00082-D-1;
        2:10-cr-00015-D-2)

        Submitted: October 11, 2022                                     Decided: January 6, 2023

        Before KING, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
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        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Paul K. Sun, Jr., Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Lisa H.
        Miller, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Thomas E. Booth, Appellate Section, Criminal
        Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Michael
        F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Lucy P. Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        PER CURIAM:

               Daryl Lee Godette, Jr. appeals his convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin,

        21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). On

        appeal, Godette attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Godette

        also raises various issues relating to the reasonableness of his sentence. For the reasons that

        follow, we affirm.

                                                       I.

               In 2018, while on supervised release following his imprisonment for a prior drug

        conviction, Godette began selling heroin to Bobbie Jean Hoover for her own use and for

        resale to other users in Havelock, North Carolina. In July 2019, a confidential informant

        (“CI”) advised the Havelock Police Department that Hoover was selling him drugs. On

        several occasions in July 2019, the Havelock Police Department directed the CI to buy

        heroin from Hoover under police supervision.

               On July 17, the CI wore an audio/video recording device as part of a controlled buy.

        The Havelock Police gave the CI $220 for the purchase of one gram of fentanyl. Several

        law enforcement officers were detailed to a surveillance team to monitor the transaction.

        After picking Hoover up at a restaurant, the CI dropped her off a few blocks away near an

        apartment complex. A few minutes later, police officers observed Hoover walking out of

        the apartment complex. The surveillance team briefly lost track of Hoover but later saw

        her at a gas station nearby.

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               The surveillance team witnessed Godette arrive at the gas station in a silver Toyota

        Camry. 1 They also observed Hoover enter the Camry. After Hoover exited, the CI picked

        her up. The CI told the police that he used the $220 to buy .97 grams of heroin. At trial,

        Hoover testified that she gave Godette the $220 and he gave her heroin to sell to the CI.

               On July 22, the Havelock police set up another controlled buy. The CI picked up

        Hoover and dropped her off at a location to obtain the heroin. At roughly the same time, a

        surveillance team, located at an apartment complex at 105B Kim Avenue, observed

        Godette exit an apartment from that same complex and get into the same silver Camry.

        Godette then met up with Hoover and dropped her off at the controlled buy location. The

        CI arrived at the location and paid $370 for 3.5 grams of heroin. The purchase was recorded

        on an audio/video device. Hoover testified at trial that she received the heroin from

        Godette.

               On July 25, the CI picked up Hoover at her residence and drove her to a location

        near the 105B Kim Avenue apartment complex. A surveillance team witnessed Godette

        arrive at the location, use a key to enter the apartment, open the blinds and then exit the

        apartment shortly thereafter. Godette entered his vehicle and met up with Hoover. Godette

        dropped Hoover off at the buy location. The CI paid Hoover $470 for 3.5 grams of heroin.

        At trial, Hoover testified that she received the heroin from Godette.

               1
                The Camry was registered to Godette’s live-in girlfriend, Kimberly Nolan. The
        address on the registration, as well as Godette’s address, was on Foxhall Avenue.

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               On July 31, the surveillance team saw Godette drive to the Kim Avenue apartment

        complex while Hoover was being picked up by the CI. Godette entered the apartment,

        opened the blinds, exited several minutes later, drove to a parking lot and entered a dark

        Toyota driven by a woman. Later, in exchange for $700, Godette gave Hoover seven grams

        of heroin to sell to the CI. Afterwards, Godette and the woman returned to the Kim Avenue

        apartment. Godette and the woman entered the apartment for a short time, exited and drove

        back to the same parking lot. Godette then got out of the Toyota, entered his vehicle, and

        drove to his residence on Foxhall Avenue.

               On August 1, the surveillance team observed Godette drive to the Kim Avenue

        apartment, enter with a key, open the blinds, exit about 10 minutes later and drive to a local

        restaurant to meet Hoover. Around 90 minutes later, Godette returned to the Kim Avenue

        apartment, entered it and opened the blinds.

               The following day, law enforcement obtained search warrants for Godette’s

        residence on Foxhall Avenue and the Kim Avenue apartment. Prior to executing the search

        warrants, Havelock police officers observed Godette arrive at the Kim Avenue apartment.

        He entered the apartment, opened the door with a key and opened the blinds. A few minutes

        later, Godette came out of the apartment and got into his vehicle. Several Havelock police

        officers drove into the apartment complex’s parking lot and activated their blue lights. The

        officers exited their vehicles with guns drawn. One officer approached the driver’s side

        window and yelled at Godette. Godette then backed up into Kim Avenue. As he came to a

        stop, a police officer caught up with the car, beat on the window and yelled at Godette.

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        Godette drove off, striking one of the police officers with the vehicle’s mirror. Ultimately,

        other law enforcement officers managed to stop and arrest Godette.

               A search of Godette’s vehicle revealed multiple utility bills addressed to Godette’s

        girlfriend Nolan at the Foxhall address. In addition, the officers seized Godette’s wallet

        which contained over $2,000 dollars, $560 of which was used during the controlled buys.

               Inside the Kim Avenue apartment, the officers seized gloves, cutting agents, scales,

        a blender, a mask, 88.14 grams of heroin in a Quaker Oats container, 320.6 grams of heroin

        in a stuffed animal from a bedroom and 846 grams of heroin in a trunk from the upstairs

        bedroom closet. The apartment did not appear to be occupied. There was little furniture

        and no washer or dryer despite hookups for those appliances. The upstairs bedroom had

        two dressers, a bed frame against the wall, a disassembled bed or deflated air mattress on

        the floor and mail addressed to Nolan. Nothing of evidentiary value was obtained at the

        Foxhall Avenue address.

               Godette was indicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); four counts of distributing heroin (Counts 2-5); and one count of

        possession with intent to distribute one kilogram of heroin, all in violation of 21

        U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count 6). His case went to trial where the jury found Godette guilty on

        all counts. Also, on a special verdict form, the jury attributed 1 kilogram or more of heroin

        as to Counts 1 and 6.

               Later, the district court sentenced Godette to concurrent terms of 360 months of

        imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. In addition, because he was on supervised

        release for a previous conviction when he committed these crimes, the district court

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        revoked Godette’s term of supervised release from that previous conviction and imposed a

        57-month sentence consecutive to the 360-month sentence from the current crimes.

               On appeal, Godette contends that (1) the government failed to present sufficient

        evidence showing that he constructively possessed the heroin stored at the Kim Avenue

        address for purposes of his convictions for Counts 1 and 6; (2) the district court erred in

        admitting undisclosed law enforcement expert testimony; (3) his 360-month sentence was

        procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and (4) his consecutive 57-month revocation

        sentence was plainly unreasonable. 2

                                                     II.

               We begin with Godette’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his

        convictions under Counts 1 and 6. We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de

        novo. See United States v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007). In doing so, “our role

        is limited to considering whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view most

        favorable to the Government, to support” the conviction. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d

        1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In determining

        whether the evidence is substantial, we ask whether “a reasonable finder of fact could

        accept [the evidence] as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s

        guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)

        (en banc). Importantly, we do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses

               2
                   We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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        but assume that the jury resolved any discrepancies in favor of the government. United

        States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998).

               Section 841(a) provides, in relevant part, that “it shall be unlawful for any person

        knowingly or intentionally— (1) to . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled

        substance . . . . ” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). “[P]ossession may be actual or constructive, and it

        may be sole or joint.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation

        omitted). Here, the government proceeded under a constructive possession theory with

        respect to the heroin at issue in Counts 1 and 6. Constructive possession requires

        “ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which

        the contraband was concealed” and “knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United

        States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352, 358 (4th Cir. 2010). It may be established by direct or

        circumstantial evidence, and the “fact finder may properly consider the totality of the

        circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest and his alleged possession.” Id.

               But dominion and control cannot be established by mere proximity to the

        contraband, by mere presence on the property where the contraband is found or by mere

        association with the person who does control the contraband. United States v. Brown, 3

        F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 878 (4th Cir. 1992).

        And “[i]n joint occupancy cases, there must be some additional nexus linking the defendant

        to the contraband.” United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation

        omitted).

               Godette relies on our decision in United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226 (2015), to

        support his argument that the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a

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        reasonable doubt. He contends Blue compels the conclusion that no reasonable juror could

        find that he possessed the heroin found at the Kim Avenue apartment.

               In Blue, the police observed the defendant enter an apartment building empty-

        handed and exit the building roughly five minutes later holding a sandwich-sized, cloudy

        white, plastic container. Id. at 229. The police did not see the defendant enter any specific

        apartment in the building. Id. They followed the defendant and saw him involved in what

        they suspected was a narcotics transaction. Id. The police arrested the defendant later that

        day, and, in searching him, found a key to an apartment in the building the police saw the

        defendant enter earlier that day. Id. at 230. The police then secured a search warrant for the

        apartment. Upon executing the search warrant, they found 108.6 grams of heroin, two

        scales with heroin residue and numerous empty sandwich bags hidden in a footstool in a

        bedroom in the apartment. Id. The police found no evidence linking the defendant to the

        apartment in their search, no evidence linking him to the contents of the footstool and no

        evidence linking him to either the person found in the apartment or the person named on

        mail found in the apartment. Id. As a result, we held that this evidence was insufficient to

        establish constructive possession of the heroin found in the apartment. In so holding, we

        highlighted the fact that the government only presented evidence that the defendant had

        been to the apartment on one occasion and had only been inside for five minutes. Id. at

        233. In addition, there was no evidence showing that the defendant resided in or leased the

        apartment, kept any of his belonging there or had dominion or control over the residence

        based on his association with its occupants. Id. at 233–34. The only evidence presented to

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        establish constructive possession was that the defendant had a key to the apartment. Id. at

        234.

               But this case is distinguishable from Blue. Here, there is ample evidence from which

        a jury could conclude that Godette both knew about the heroin at the Kim Avenue

        apartment and had constructive possession of it. First, Hoover testified that she had sexual

        relations with Godette at the apartment on at least two occasions. Second, the apartment

        was leased to Godette’s girlfriend, who lived with him on Foxhall Avenue. Also, the police

        officers found utility bills for the apartment in the vehicle Godette was driving when he

        was arrested. Finally, multiple law enforcement officers testified that they witnessed

        Godette, on multiple occasions, arrive at the apartment and use a key to retrieve heroin to

        give to Hoover to sell to the CI. These facts distinguish this case from Blue and provide

        sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Godette constructively possessed the

        heroin seized at the Kim Avenue apartment. Thus, we reject Godette’s argument that the

        evidence at trial was insufficient to support this conviction for Counts 1 and 6.

                                                     III.

               Godette next argues that the district court erred in admitting into evidence

        undisclosed law enforcement expert testimony. Typically, we review evidentiary rulings

        for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010).

        But because Godette failed to object to the testimony below, we review for plain error. To

        establish plain error, Godette must show (1) that an error occurred, (2) the error was plain;

        and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Collins, 982 F.3d 236,

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        241 (4th Cir. 2020). “Even where the first three requirements of plain error are met, the

        decision to correct the error is left to the discretion of the court of appeals ‘and the court

        should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity

        or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 883 (4th

        Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).

               Godette asserts that the district court plainly erred in permitting certain law

        enforcement testimony because the government failed to identify those individuals as

        experts as required under Rule 16(a)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

        According to Godette, the government violated this provision when it “elicited opinion

        testimony from multiple law enforcement officers based on their ‘experience’ or ‘training’”

        without giving prior notice that it intended to do so. 3 Op. Br. 34. The specific testimony

        complained of relates to the law enforcement officers providing the jury with a “‘general

        picture of drug investigations.’” Op. Br. 19.

               Rule 16(a)(1)(G) provides that “[a]t the defendant’s request, the government must

        disclose to the defendant, in writing, [a written summary] of any testimony that the

        government intends to use at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703 and 705 during

        its case-in-chief . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G). But Rule 16(a)(1)(G) only applies to

        expert testimony admitted under Rules 702, 703 and 705. It does not apply to lay testimony

        admitted under Rule 701. Under Rule 701, a lay witness may offer an opinion that is

        “rationally based on [his] perception.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). “[I]f a witness’s firsthand

               3
                   The law enforcement officers were not qualified as experts.

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        observations are common enough and require applying only a limited amount of expertise,

        they may fairly come in under Rule 701 as lay testimony.” United States v. Smith, 962 F.3d

        755, 767 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). And “experience-derived police testimony

        concerning criminals’ typical modi operandi during a drug transaction may qualify as lay

        opinion under Rule 701.” Id. (cleaned up) (collecting cases).

               The officers’ testimony about the general picture of drug transactions falls within

        the type of testimony permitted under Rule 701. Thus, the district court did not plainly err

        in permitting this testimony. Moreover, even assuming plain error, the government

        presented extensive evidence of Godette’s role in the drug transactions that underlie his

        convictions. Against such evidence, Godette has not shown that permitting testimony about

        the general picture of drug transactions affected his substantial rights.

                                                     IV.

               Finally, Godette argues that his 360-month sentence stemming from his convictions

        was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. And he contends that his 57-month

        revocation sentence consecutive to his 360-month sentence was plainly unreasonable.

               We “review[] all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside

        the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

        Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). And we review the district

        court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. Morehouse, 34 F.4th 381, 387 (4th

        Cir. 2022). In evaluating procedural reasonableness, we must determine “whether the

        district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the

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        [Sentencing] Guidelines range, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, or

        failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204,

        212 (4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 687 (2020). “If [this court] finds no significant

        procedural error, it then considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.”

        United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 141

        S. Ct. 382 (2020). In doing so, we consider “the totality of the circumstances to see whether

        the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied

        the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 176. We presume that a sentence within or below

        a defendant’s advisory Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.

        Gutierrez, 963 F.3d 320, 344 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1431 (2021). This

        “presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when

        measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

                                                           A.

               Godette first challenges the district court’s application of a two-level enhancement

        for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled

        substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). To determine whether a defendant “maintained” a

        premises, a court should consider “(A) whether the defendant held a possessory interest in

        (e.g., owned or rented) the premises and (B) the extent to which the defendant controlled

        access to, or activities at, the premises.” § 2D1.1 cmt. n.17. “Manufacturing or distributing

        a controlled substance need not be the sole purpose for which the premises was maintained,

        but must be one of the defendant’s primary or principal uses for the premises, rather than

        one of the defendant’s incidental or collateral uses[.]” Id. “Maintaining” a premises

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        encompasses storing a controlled substance “for the purpose of distribution.” Id. The

        sentencing court should consider “how frequently the premises was used by the defendant

        for manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance and how frequently the premises

        was used by the defendant for lawful purposes.” Id.

               The district court found that the drug-premise enhancement was supported by

        “overwhelming trial evidence.” J.A. 684. “The Kim Avenue apartment . . . was a classic

        trap house . . . [I]t’s clear that this is the whole point of the apartment, the evidence

        associated with the law enforcement observations of how Godette stored his heroin there,

        stored the [drug paraphernalia] . . . .” J.A. 684–85. The district court also gave great weight

        to Hoover’s testimony at trial concerning Godette’s access to and use of the apartment.

               These findings are not clearly erroneous and are sufficient to support the application

        of the enhancement. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the premises

        enhancement.

                                                           B.

               Godette next argues that his 360-month sentence is substantively unreasonable

        because it is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing and that the

        district court failed to explain why it rejected his argument for a downward variance. We

        disagree. Since his sentence was within the Guidelines range—in fact, at the bottom of that

        range—it is presumptively reasonable. Gutierrez, 963 F.3d at 344. And the district court

        thoroughly addressed each of the § 3553(a) factors. In that analysis, the district court

        considered Godette’s recidivism (including the fact that he was on supervised release for

        another conviction when he committed these offenses), the high volume of drugs involved

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        in the crimes, the fact that Godette struck a police officer with his vehicle as he attempted

        to avoid arrest and that he had physically abused Hoover in connection with his drug

        activity. Thus, we conclude that, when measured against the § 3553(a) factors, Godette’s

        within-Guidelines range sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

               And regarding the request for a downward variance, the court explained that

        granting it in this case would be “disrespectful to the law. And one of the [§] 3553(a) factors

        is that I’m to impose a sentence that will promote respect for the law.” J.A. 703. We find

        no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Godette’s motion for a downward

        variance.

                                                           C.

               Finally, Godette challenges his 57-month sentence for violating the condition of his

        supervised release for his previous conviction that he not engage in new criminal conduct.

        He claims the 360-month sentence was sufficient to carry out the purposes of criminal

        sentencing.

               A sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release that falls within the range

        authorized by statute is reviewable only if it is “plainly unreasonable.” 18

        U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4). The reasonableness of a revocation sentence is reviewed for abuse

        of discretion. United States v. Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642–43 (4th Cir. 1995). Only if we find

        a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether the sentence “is plainly so,

        relying on the definition of plain used in our plain error analysis—that is, clear or obvious.”

        United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). “If a revocation

        sentence—even an unreasonable one—is not ‘plainly unreasonable,’ we will affirm it.” Id.

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               Godette’s Guidelines range was 46 to 57 months, based on a grade A violation and

        a criminal history category of V. Thus, his 57-month sentence was within his Guidelines

        range. Also, it fell below the 60-month statutory maximum for the offense. After reviewing

        the record, we conclude Godette’s revocation sentence was not unreasonable. Thus, we

        find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s revocation sentence.

                                                     V.

               For these reasons, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                     AFFIRMED

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