Court Opinion

ID: 9707188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:04:44.047297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.895051
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the Court’s disposition of this matter. I write separately to express my views with respect to attorney discipline.
*370I dissented from the Court’s imposition of a suspension in In re Infinito, 94 N.J. 50 (1983), because I could not find a satisfactory basis to distinguish that case from In re Hughes, 90 N.J. 32 (1982), in which the Court disbarred an attorney for conviction of a crime of dishonesty.
I believed at the time In re Infinito, supra, was decided that the Court should have a consistent principle that would require disbarment of attorneys convicted of crimes of the first or second degree, or crimes involving acts of dishonesty. See R. 1:20-6 (calling for automatic temporary suspension of attorneys convicted of serious crimes, which are defined as crimes of the first or second degree or those involving dishonesty).
I rejoined the majority in In re Verdiramo, 96 N.J. 183 (1984), because I believed the Court had stated a new principle of law, applicable to cases arising after that date, that conviction of serious crimes, especially those involving dishonesty, would almost invariably warrant disbarment. This case arises before In re Verdiramo because the criminal offenses occurred in 1981. I would not apply Verdiramo retroactively, and thus agree that because of the prior inconsistency of our precedent, a suspension is justified.
For suspension — Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 6.
Opposed — None.