Court Opinion

ID: 9930213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:04:24.540832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:22.357989
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
         FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 9, 2024              Decided February 6, 2024

                         No. 23-3228

                UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                        APPELLEE

                              v.

                     DONALD J. TRUMP,
                       APPELLANT

        Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the District of Columbia
                   (No. 1:23-cr-00257-1)

    D. John Sauer argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs were John F. Lauro, Gregory M. Singer, Emil
Bove, William O. Scharf, and Michael E. Talent.

    Paul M. Dorsey, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae
Paul M. Dorsey in support of appellant.

   Victor Williams, pro se, was on the brief for amicus curiae
Law Professor Victor Williams in support of appellant.

    James I. Pearce, Assistant Special Counsel, U.S.
Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief were J. P. Cooney, Deputy Special Counsel,
                              2
Michael R. Dreeben and Raymond N. Hulser, Counselors to the
Special Counsel, John M. Pellettieri and Cecil W.
VanDevender, Assistant Special Counsels, and Molly Gaston
and Thomas P. Windom, Senior Assistant Special Counsels.

    Richard D. Bernstein was on the brief for amici curiae
Former Officials in Five Republican Administrations, et al. in
support of appellee.

    Fred Wertheimer, Matthew A. Seligman, Seth P. Waxman,
Colleen M. Campbell, Nathaniel W. Reisinger, David M.
Levine, and Kyle T. Edwards were on the brief for amici curiae
Former Government Officials and Constitutional Lawyers in
support of appellee.

     R. Stanton Jones and Andrew T. Tutt were on the brief for
amicus curiae American Oversight in support of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction.

    Gene C. Schaerr and Justin A. Miller were on the brief for
amici curiae Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and
Law Professors Steven G. Calabresi and Gary S. Lawson in
support of neither party.

    Before: HENDERSON, CHILDS and PAN, Circuit Judges.

    Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

     PER CURIAM: Donald J. Trump was elected the 45th
President of the United States on November 8, 2016. He was
sworn into office at noon on January 20, 2017, and served until
his term expired at noon on January 20, 2021. At that moment,
President Trump became former President Trump and his
successor, Joseph R. Biden, became President and began his
own four-year term. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Although this
                                3
sequence is set by the Constitution, id. amend. XX, it did not
proceed peacefully. Indeed, from election day 2020 forward,
the government alleges that President Trump denied that he had
lost his bid for a second term and challenged the election results
through litigation, pressure on state and federal officers, the
organization of an alternate slate of electors and other means.
His alleged interference in the constitutionally prescribed
sequence culminated with a Washington, D.C., rally held on
January 6, 2021, the day set by the Electoral Count Act, 3
U.S.C. § 15(a), for the Congress to meet in joint session to
certify the election results. The rally headlined by President
Trump resulted in a march of thousands to the Capitol and the
violent breach of the Capitol Building. The breach delayed the
congressional proceedings for several hours and it was not until
the early morning of January 7th that the 2020 presidential
election results were certified, naming Joseph R. Biden as the
soon-to-be 46th President.

     Since then, hundreds of people who breached the Capitol
on January 6, 2021, have been prosecuted and imprisoned.
And on August 1, 2023, in Washington, D.C., former President
Trump was charged in a four-count Indictment as a result of his
actions challenging the election results and interfering with the
sequence set forth in the Constitution for the transfer of power
from one President to the next. Former President Trump
moved to dismiss the Indictment and the district court denied
his motion. Today, we affirm the denial. For the purpose of
this criminal case, former President Trump has become citizen
Trump, with all of the defenses of any other criminal defendant.
But any executive immunity that may have protected him while
he served as President no longer protects him against this
prosecution.
                                4
                      I. BACKGROUND

     Former President Trump did not concede the 2020 election
and, in the ensuing months, he and his supporters made
numerous attempts to challenge the results. Many of their
attempts were allegedly criminal.1 A District of Columbia
federal grand jury indicted former President Trump on four
criminal counts arising from the steps he allegedly took to
change the outcome of the election: (1) conspiracy to defraud
the United States by overturning the election results, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) conspiracy to obstruct an
official proceeding — i.e., the Congress’s certification of the
electoral vote — in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k); (3)
obstruction of, and attempt to obstruct, the certification of the
electoral vote, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 2; and
(4) conspiracy against the rights of one or more persons to vote
and to have their votes counted, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241.
At this stage of the prosecution, we assume that the allegations
set forth in the Indictment are true. United States v. Ballestas,
795 F.3d 138, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2015). We emphasize that
whether the Indictment’s allegations are supported by evidence
sufficient to sustain convictions must be determined at a later
stage of the prosecution.

     The Indictment alleges that former President Trump
understood that he had lost the election and that the election
results were legitimate but that he nevertheless was
“determined to remain in power.” Indictment ¶ 2. He then
conspired with others to cast doubt on the election’s outcome
and contrived to have himself declared the winner. The

    1
       Former President Trump’s campaign and his supporters also
unsuccessfully challenged the election results in several state and
federal courts.
                                5
Indictment charges that he and his co-conspirators allegedly
advanced their goal through five primary means:

     First, they “used knowingly false claims of election fraud”
to attempt to persuade state legislators and election officials to
change each state’s electoral votes in former President Trump’s
favor. Indictment ¶ 10(a). For example, he and his allies
falsely declared “that more than ten thousand dead voters had
voted in Georgia”; “that there had been 205,000 more votes
than voters in Pennsylvania”; “that more than 30,000 non-
citizens had voted in Arizona”; and “that voting machines . . .
had switched votes from [Trump] to Biden.” Id. at ¶ 12.

     Second, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators
“organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted
states . . . attempting to mimic the procedures that the
legitimate electors were supposed to follow.” Indictment
¶ 10(b). They “then caused these fraudulent electors to
transmit their false certificates to the Vice President and other
government officials to be counted at the certification
proceeding on January 6.” Id.

     Third, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators
pressed officials at the Department of Justice “to conduct sham
election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted
states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had
identified significant concerns that may have impacted the
election outcome.” Indictment ¶ 10(c).

     Fourth, then-President Trump and his co-conspirators
attempted to convince then-Vice President Mike Pence to “use
his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to
fraudulently alter the election results.” Indictment
¶ 10(d). When the Vice President rebuffed them, he stirred his
base of supporters to increase pressure on the Vice President.
See id. at ¶¶ 10(d), 96, 100. Ultimately, on the morning of
                                 6
January 6, 2021, he held a rally in Washington D.C. where he
“repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered
supporters” and “directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the
certification proceeding and exert pressure on the Vice
President to take the fraudulent actions he had previously
refused.” Id. at ¶¶ 10(d), 90(c).

     Fifth, and finally, from the January 6 rally, thousands of
his supporters — “including individuals who had traveled to
Washington and to the Capitol at [his] direction” — swarmed
the United States Capitol, causing “violence and chaos” that
required the Congress to temporarily halt the election-
certification proceeding. Indictment ¶¶ 107, 119, 121. At that
point, he and his co-conspirators “exploited the disruption by
redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and
convince Members of Congress to further delay the
certification.” Id. at ¶ 10(e).

     Then-President Trump’s efforts to overturn the election
results were unsuccessful and the Congress certified the
Electoral College vote in favor of President-Elect Biden.
Indictment ¶ 123. On January 11, 2021, nine days before
President-Elect Biden’s inauguration, the House of
Representatives adopted an impeachment resolution charging
then-President Trump with “Incitement of Insurrection.” H.R.
Res. 24, 117th Cong. (2021).               The single article of
impeachment alleged that he had violated “his constitutional
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the United
States . . . [and] his constitutional duty to take care that the laws
be faithfully executed . . . by inciting violence against the
Government of the United States.” Id. at 2. The impeachment
resolution asserted that “President Trump repeatedly issued
false statements asserting that the Presidential election results
were the product of widespread fraud and should not be
accepted by the American people or certified by State or
                                7
Federal officials,” id. at 2–3; that his statements on the morning
of January 6 “encouraged — and foreseeably resulted in —
lawless action at the Capitol,” id. at 3; and that he attempted to
“subvert and obstruct the certification of the results of the 2020
Presidential election” by other means, including by threatening
a Georgia state official into manipulating the results, id. at 3–
4.

     Importantly, by the time the United States Senate
conducted a trial on the article of impeachment, he had become
former President Trump. At the close of the trial, on February
13, 2021, fifty-seven Senators voted to convict him and forty-
three voted to acquit him. See 167 CONG. REC. S733 (daily ed.
Feb. 13, 2021). Because two-thirds of the Senate did not vote
for conviction, he was acquitted on the article of
impeachment. See id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.

     On November 18, 2022, the U.S. Attorney General
appointed John L. Smith as Special Counsel to investigate
“efforts to interfere with the lawful transition of power
following the 2020 presidential election or the certification of
the Electoral College vote.”2 A Washington, D.C., grand jury
returned the instant four-count Indictment against former
President Trump on August 1, 2023, and on August 28, 2023,
the district court set a trial date of March 4, 2024.

    Former President Trump filed four motions to dismiss the
Indictment, relying on: (1) presidential immunity; (2)
constitutional provisions, including the Impeachment
Judgment Clause and principles stemming from the Double

    2
       Off. of the Att’y Gen., “Appointment of John L. Smith as
Special Counsel,” Order No. 5559-2022 (Nov. 18, 2022).
                                 8
Jeopardy Clause; (3) statutory grounds; and (4) allegations of
selective and vindictive prosecution.

     On December 1, 2023, the district court issued a written
opinion denying the two motions that are based on presidential
immunity and the two constitutional provisions. In relevant
part, the district court rejected Trump’s claim of executive
immunity from criminal prosecution, holding that “[f]ormer
Presidents enjoy no special conditions on their federal criminal
liability.” United States v. Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL
8359833, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2023). It concluded that “[t]he
Constitution’s text, structure, and history do not support” the
existence of such an immunity, id., and that it “would betray
the public interest” to grant a former President “a categorical
exemption from criminal liability” for allegedly “attempting to
usurp the reins of government.” Id. at *12. It also held that
“neither traditional double jeopardy principles nor the
Impeachment Judgment Clause provide that a prosecution
following impeachment acquittal violates double jeopardy.”
Id. at *18.3

     Former President Trump filed an interlocutory appeal of
the district court’s presidential immunity and double-jeopardy
holdings.      On December 13, 2023, we granted the

    3
       Former President Trump does not challenge the district court’s
other holdings at this stage: (1) that “the First Amendment does not
protect speech that is used as an instrument of a crime, and
consequently the indictment — which charges [Trump] with, among
other things, making statements in furtherance of a crime — does not
violate [Trump]’s First Amendment rights,” Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d
---, 2023 WL 8359833, at *15, and (2) that the Indictment does not
violate Due Process because Trump “had fair notice that his conduct
might be unlawful,” id. at *22.
                                 9
government’s motion to expedite the appeal, and oral argument
was held on January 9, 2024.

                      II. JURISDICTION

     Although both parties agree that the Court has jurisdiction
over former President Trump’s appeal, amicus curiae
American Oversight raises a threshold question about our
collateral-order jurisdiction. In every case, “we must assure
ourselves of our jurisdiction.” In re Brewer, 863 F.3d 861, 868
(D.C. Cir. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which grants us
jurisdiction over “final decisions of the district courts,” id., “we
ordinarily do not have jurisdiction to hear a defendant’s appeal
in a criminal case prior to conviction and sentencing,” United
States v. Andrews, 146 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
collateral-order doctrine, however, treats as final and thus
allows us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over “a small class
of [interlocutory] decisions that conclusively determine the
disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action, and are effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Citizens for
Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 532 F.3d
860, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). The district court’s
denial of former President Trump’s immunity defense
unquestionably satisfies the first two requirements and thus we
focus our analysis on the third: whether the denial of immunity
is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.

    District court orders rejecting claims of civil immunity are
quintessential examples of collateral orders. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741–43 (1982) (executive immunity
from civil liability); Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F.4th 1, 12
(D.C. Cir. 2023) (same). But in Midland Asphalt Corp. v.
United States, the Supreme Court counseled that the collateral-
                              10
order doctrine is interpreted “with the utmost strictness in
criminal cases.” 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989) (cleaned up).

     The Midland Asphalt Court emphasized that criminal
collateral orders that are based on “[a] right not to be tried”
must “rest[] upon an explicit statutory or constitutional
guarantee that trial will not occur” — singling out the Double
Jeopardy Clause and the Speech or Debate Clause. 489 U.S. at
801 (emphasis added). Former President Trump does not raise
a straightforward claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause but
instead relies on the Impeachment Judgment Clause and what
he calls “double jeopardy principles.” Appellant’s Br. 54 n.7.
The double-jeopardy “principle[]” he relies on is a negative
implication drawn from the Impeachment Judgment Clause.
See id. at 8, 12, 46–47. Thus, he does not invoke our
jurisdiction based on the explicit grant of immunity found in
the Double Jeopardy Clause.

     Nevertheless, we can exercise jurisdiction for two reasons.
First, Midland Asphalt is distinguishable and does not require
immunity to derive from an explicit textual source. Second,
the theories of immunity former President Trump asserts are
sufficient to satisfy Midland Asphalt under Circuit precedent.

        A. DISTINGUISHING MIDLAND ASPHALT

      Midland Asphalt dealt with the third prong of the
collateral-order test in the context of criminal defendants who
argued they were entitled to immediately appeal the denial of
their motion to dismiss an indictment because the government
had violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)’s
requirement of grand jury secrecy. 489 U.S. at 796. The
Supreme Court held that an order is “effectively unreviewable”
on appeal “only where the order at issue involves ‘an asserted
right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed
if it were not vindicated before trial.’” Id. at 799 (quoting
                                11
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978)). The
Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the denial of the
motion satisfied the third prong. It explained that “[i]t is true
that deprivation of the right not to be tried satisfies the Coopers
& Lybrand requirement of being ‘effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment,’” but held that the defendants
had not asserted a right against trial in “the sense relevant for
purposes of the exception to the final judgment rule.” Id. at
801–02 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
468 (1978) (“To come within the [collateral-order doctrine],
the order must conclusively determine the disputed question,
resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits
of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment.”)).

     The reason the defendants’ argument failed, the Midland
Asphalt Court held, was that it overlooked the “crucial
distinction between a right not to be tried and a right whose
remedy requires the dismissal of charges.” 489 U.S. at 801
(quotation omitted). “A right not to be tried in the sense
relevant to the [collateral-order doctrine] rests upon an explicit
statutory or constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur —
as in the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . or the Speech or Debate
Clause.” Id. By contrast, Rule 6(e)(2) did not “give[] rise to a
right not to stand trial” but instead merely created a right to
secret grand jury proceedings, the violation of which could be
remedied through the indictment’s dismissal. Id. at 802.

     American Oversight’s argument hinges on the Court’s use
of the adjective “explicit” — a word that appears only once in
the Midland Asphalt opinion. The Court has repeatedly (and
recently) cautioned against “read[ing] too much into too little,”
reminding us that “‘[t]he language of an opinion is not always
to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a
statute.’” Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356,
                               12
373 (2023) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
341 (1979)). Instead, opinions “must be read with a careful eye
to context” and the “particular work” that quoted language
performs within an opinion. Id. at 374; see also Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 141 S. Ct. 1951, 1968
(2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“[T]his Court [has]
often said it is a mistake to parse terms in a judicial opinion
with the kind of punctilious exactitude due statutory
language.”).

     The Supreme Court itself has hinted, although not squarely
held, that Midland Asphalt’s language should not be read
literally. In Digital Equipment, the Court quoted the relevant
sentence from Midland Asphalt and characterized it as a
“suggest[ion].” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc.,
511 U.S. 863, 874 (1994) (“Only such an ‘explicit statutory or
constitutional guarantee that trial will not occur,’ we suggested,
could be grounds for an immediate appeal of right under
§ 1291.” (internal citation to Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801,
omitted)). The Court then weighed the argument that Midland
Asphalt’s comment is dictum because the Court allows
interlocutory review of other implied immunities, including
qualified immunity. Id. at 875 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511 (1985)). The Court did not concede the point,
however, as it pointed out that Midland Asphalt is a criminal
case and Mitchell is a civil case, but it allowed that “even if
Mitchell could not be squared fully with the literal words of the
Midland Asphalt sentence . . . that would be only because the
qualified immunity right is inexplicit, not because it lacks a
good pedigree in public law.” Id. It then noted “the insight
that explicitness may not be needed for jurisdiction consistent
                                13
with § 1291.”4 Id. The Court ultimately chose to reject the
petitioner’s argument on a different basis, see id. at 877, so it
did not squarely resolve how to interpret Midland Asphalt. But
a fair reading contemplates that there are exceptions to Midland
Asphalt’s broad statement. See id. at 875. Other courts have
held to that effect. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d
205, 217 n.9 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (reading Digital
Equipment to hold that qualified immunity’s “good pedigree in
public law . . . more than makes up for its implicitness”
(cleaned up)); McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 630 F.3d
1288, 1296 n.2 (10th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Digital
Equipment’s “good pedigree in public law” comment as a
“binding” reconciliation of Midland Asphalt with the
immediate appealability of some implicit immunities).

     There is good reason not to read Midland Asphalt literally
here. Read in context, the Court’s use of “explicit” was simply
to contrast a right against trial and a right that entitles the
defendant to the dismissal of charges. The latter can be
vindicated through appeal after a final judgment, but the former
cannot. The Court was not addressing an issue as to which it
was necessary to distinguish between explicit and implied
rights against trial; instead, it addressed the defendants’
assertion that the violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure entitled them to immediate review. See Midland
Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 802 (Rule 6(e) contained “no hint” of a
right against trial). Thus, “explicit” did not perform any
“particular work” within the opinion, see Nat’l Pork
Producers, 598 U.S. at 374, meaning it would be a mistake to
make a doctrinal mountain out of a verbal molehill. See Al

    4
      Elsewhere, Digital Equipment refers to rights “originating in
the Constitution or statutes.” 511 U.S. at 879. Its broader
formulation comfortably encompasses implicit as well as explicit
immunities.
                                  14
Shimari, 679 F.3d at 246 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (calling
Midland Asphalt’s sentence “dictum” and a “lonely line”).

     Nor was the question presented in Midland Asphalt
anything like the one before us. Procedural rules are worlds
different from a former President’s asserted immunity from
federal criminal liability. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the President is sui generis. In the civil
context, the Court has held that the denial of the President’s
assertion of absolute immunity is immediately appealable “[i]n
light of the special solicitude due to claims alleging a
threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under
the separation of powers.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743. And
in United States v. Nixon, the Court waived the typical
requirement that the President risk contempt before appealing
because it would be “unseemly” to require the President to do
so “merely to trigger the procedural mechanism for review of
the ruling.” 418 U.S. 683, 691–92 (1974). It would be equally
“unseemly” for us to require that former President Trump first
be tried in order to secure review of his immunity claim after
final judgment. When the Court instructs us to read its opinions
“with a careful eye to context,” see Nat’l Pork Producers, 598
U.S. at 374, it authorizes us to consider the “special solicitude”
due a former President, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 743.

     One final reason not to overread a single adjective in
Midland Asphalt is that there is no apparent reason to treat an
implicit constitutional immunity from trial differently from an
explicit one for interlocutory review.5 Midland Asphalt

     5
        By contrast, the Supreme Court has explained why a right
against trial must ordinarily be “statutory or constitutional” in nature
to fall within the collateral-order doctrine. Midland Asphalt, 489
U.S. at 801. Whether a right can be effectively reviewed after final
judgment “simply cannot be answered without a judgment about the
                                 15
certainly did not provide one. The ultimate source of our
appellate jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which extends to the
“final decision[]” of the district court. There is no basis in the
statutory text to treat the denial of an explicit immunity as final
but the denial of an implicit immunity as non-final. In both
cases, the “deprivation of the right not to be tried” would be
“effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”
Midland Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 800–01 (quotation omitted).
Whether explicit or implicit in the Constitution, the right not to
stand trial must be “vindicated before trial” or not at all. Id. at
799 (quotation omitted).

                   B. CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

    Our Circuit precedent has taken a broad view of Midland
Asphalt, consistently holding that the denial of a right not to
stand trial is immediately appealable if the right is similar or
analogous to one provided in the Constitution. Both of former
President Trump’s asserted sources of immunity — separation
of powers and double jeopardy principles — fit within this
window of appealability. See Appellant’s Br. 2–3 (listing
“Statement of the Issues”).

    Our caselaw includes United States v. Rose, a civil case in
which we held that Congressman Rose’s standalone separation
of powers immunity was reviewable under § 1291 because it
served the same function as a claim of Speech or Debate Clause
immunity. 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Congressman Rose

value of the interests that would be lost through rigorous application
of a final judgment requirement.” Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 878–
79. But there is no need for courts to make that judgment call
“[w]hen a policy is embodied in a constitutional or statutory
provision,” thus leaving “little room for the judiciary to gainsay its
importance.” Id. at 879 (cleaned up).
                               16
argued that he had immunity from the DOJ’s suit against him
because “the action was barred by the Speech or Debate
Clause” and, separately, because “the separation of powers
doctrine barred the DOJ from suing him” when a congressional
committee had already investigated him. Id. at 185. We held
that the latter claim falls within the collateral-order doctrine,
“recogniz[ing] claims of immunity based on the separation of
powers doctrine as an additional exception to the general rule
against interlocutory appeals.” Id. Granted, we acknowledged
that the separation of powers doctrine “does not provide as
precise a protection as the Speech or Debate Clause,” but we
focused on the “equivalent reasons for vindicating in advance
of trial whatever protection it affords.” Id. at 186 (quotation
omitted).

     We confirmed Rose’s applicability in the criminal context
in United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239 (D.C. Cir.
1995). There, former Senator Durenberger sought to dismiss
an indictment, arguing based on separation of powers that the
district court was powerless to decide whether he had violated
the Senate’s rules, a prerequisite of its assessment of the
criminal charges against him. See id. at 1241; U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”). He thus “claim[ed] that, as a former
member of the Senate, he cannot be held to answer criminal
charges when his liability depends on judicial usurpation of the
Senate’s exclusive right to formulate its internal rules.”
Durenberger, 48 F.3d at 1242. We held that this “colorable”
argument was sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction under
Rose. Id. Notably, the constitutional text invoked in
Durenberger can hardly be said to create an “explicit” right not
to stand trial. As we explained in a subsequent case, both Rose
and Durenberger rest on the rationale that the “separation-of-
powers doctrine conferred . . . an analogous and comparable
                               17
privilege” to the Speech or Debate Clause. United States v.
Cisneros, 169 F.3d 763, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

     Following the Supreme Court’s lead, see Abney v. United
States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (denial of motion to dismiss
indictment on double jeopardy grounds is immediately
appealable), we have also allowed interlocutory review by
analogizing to the explicit constitutional immunity in the
Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. Trabelsi, we
exercised interlocutory appellate jurisdiction of the defendant’s
invocation of a treaty’s non bis in idem provision, which
“mirror[ed] the Constitution’s prohibition of double jeopardy.”
28 F.4th 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
345 (2022).       The treaty provision’s similarity to the
constitutional guarantee, we held, was enough to bring the
appeal within the scope of Abney.

     Former President Trump’s two arguments can be
analogized to explicit constitutional immunities, which is all
that Durenberger and Trabelsi require. His separation of
powers argument does not explicitly draw on the Speech or
Debate Clause but neither did the argument in Durenberger.
The immunity for official acts former President Trump asserts
is “closely akin to a claim of Speech or Debate Clause
immunity,” Cisneros, 169 F.3d at 770, making it immediately
appealable because “there are equivalent reasons for
vindicating [it] in advance of trial,” Rose, 28 F.3d at 186
(quotation omitted). Likewise, the defense argues that the
Impeachment Judgment Clause “incorporates a Double
Jeopardy principle.” Appellant’s Br. 46. We found a similar
line of reasoning convincing in Trabelsi. If a treaty provision
that “mirrors” the Double Jeopardy Clause falls within the
collateral-order doctrine, so does a constitutional clause that
(purportedly) attaches jeopardy to a Senate’s impeachment
acquittal. Both of former President Trump’s arguments are at
                               18
least analogous enough to the Speech or Debate Clause or the
Double Jeopardy Clause to fit within our precedent.

     Nor will exercising jurisdiction here put us in conflict with
other circuits, as American Oversight suggests. See Am.
Oversight Br. 9. The chief cases on which American Oversight
relies are readily distinguishable because in each the asserted
right against trial was not grounded solely in either the
Constitution or a statute. See United States v. Joseph, 26 F.4th
528, 534 (1st Cir. 2022) (a state judge’s immunity depended
“solely on the common law”); United States v. Macchia, 41
F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1994) (addressing “an alleged agreement
with the United States Attorney” to provide the defendant with
immunity); United States v. Wampler, 624 F.3d 1330, 1337 &
n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (involving “an executory plea agreement
between a company and the government” that excluded the
defendants).

    Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to
reach the merits of former President Trump’s appeal.

               III. EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY

     For all immunity doctrines, “the burden is on the official
claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement.” Dennis v.
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). Former President Trump
claims absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for all
“official acts” undertaken as President, a category, he contends,
that includes all of the conduct alleged in the Indictment.

    The question of whether a former President enjoys
absolute immunity from federal criminal liability is one of first
impression. See Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 5 (noting the
unresolved question of “whether or when a President might be
immune from criminal prosecution”). The Supreme Court has
consistently held that even a sitting President is not immune
                              19
from responding to criminal subpoenas issued by state and
federal prosecutors. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2431
(2020); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706; United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 30, 33–34 (C.C. Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.). In the civil
context, the Supreme Court has explained that a former
President is absolutely immune from civil liability for his
official acts, defined to include any conduct falling within the
“‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 756. Both sitting and former Presidents remain
civilly liable for private conduct. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 686, 694–95 (1997); Blassingame, 87 F.4th at 12–14.
When considering the issue of Presidential immunity, the
Supreme Court has been careful to note that its holdings on
civil liability do not carry over to criminal prosecutions. See
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37 (explaining the “lesser public
interest in actions for civil damages than, for example, in
criminal prosecutions”); cf. Clinton, 520 U.S. at 704 n.39
(noting special considerations at issue in criminal cases).

     Former President Trump’s claimed immunity would have
us extend the framework for Presidential civil immunity to
criminal cases and decide for the first time that a former
President is categorically immune from federal criminal
prosecution for any act conceivably within the outer perimeter
of his executive responsibility. He advances three grounds for
establishing this expansive immunity for former Presidents:
(1) Article III courts lack the power to review the President’s
official acts under the separation of powers doctrine; (2)
functional policy considerations rooted in the separation of
powers require immunity to avoid intruding on Executive
Branch functions; and (3) the Impeachment Judgment Clause
does not permit the criminal prosecution of a former President
in the absence of the Congress impeaching and convicting him.
                               20
     Our analysis is “guided by the Constitution, federal
statutes, and history,” as well as “concerns of public policy.”
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747. Relying on these sources, we
reject all three potential bases for immunity both as a
categorical defense to federal criminal prosecutions of former
Presidents and as applied to this case in particular.

        A. SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE

     The President of the United States “occupies a unique
position in the constitutional scheme.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
749; see Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2034
(2020) (“The President is the only person who alone composes
a branch of government.”). Under the separation of powers
established in the Constitution, the President is vested with
“executive Power,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1, which entails
the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” id.
§ 3, and “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost
discretion and sensitivity,” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 750. The
President’s constitutional role exists alongside the Congress’s
duty to make the laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, and the
Judiciary’s duty to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

     “It is settled law that the separation-of-powers doctrine
does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the President of
the United States.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 753–54; see also
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706 (separation of powers doctrine cannot
“sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances”).
Nevertheless, former President Trump argues that the
constitutional structure of separated powers means that
“neither a federal nor a state prosecutor, nor a state or federal
court, may sit in judgment over a President’s official acts,
which are vested in the Presidency alone.” Appellant’s Br. 10.
                               21
He relies on Marbury’s oft-quoted statement that a President’s
official acts “can never be examinable by the courts.” Id.
(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166); see also Reply
Br. 6.

     Former President Trump misreads Marbury and its
progeny. Properly understood, the separation of powers
doctrine may immunize lawful discretionary acts but does not
bar the federal criminal prosecution of a former President for
every official act.

     Marbury distinguished between two kinds of official acts:
discretionary and ministerial. As to the first category, Chief
Justice Marshall recognized that “the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience.”
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165–66. When the President or
his appointed officers exercise discretionary authority, “[t]he
subjects are political” and “the decision of the executive is
conclusive.” Id. at 166. Their discretionary acts, therefore,
“can never be examinable by the courts.” Id. “But,” Chief
Justice Marshall continued, “when the legislature proceeds to
impose on that officer other duties; when he is directed
peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of
individuals are dependent on the performance of those acts; he
is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested
rights of others.” Id. (emphases added). Under these
circumstances, an executive officer acts as a “ministerial
officer . . . compellable to do his duty, and if he refuses, is
liable to indictment.” Id. at 150; see id. at 149–50 (“It is not
consistent with the policy of our political institutions, or the
manners of the citizens of the United States, that any
ministerial officer having public duties to perform, should be
                              22
above the compulsion of law in the exercise of those duties.”).
Based on these principles, Chief Justice Marshall concluded
that, although discretionary acts are “only politically
examinable,” the judiciary has the power to hear cases “where
a specific duty is assigned by law.” Id. at 166. Marbury thus
makes clear that Article III courts may review certain kinds of
official acts — including those that are legal in nature.

     The cases following Marbury confirm that we may review
the President’s actions when he is bound by law, including by
federal criminal statutes. In Little v. Barreme, the Supreme
Court concluded that the President’s order to a subordinate
officer to seize American ships traveling to or from French
ports violated the Nonintercourse Act precisely because the
Congress had acted to constrain the Executive’s discretion. 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177–79 (1804). Chief Justice Marshall
observed that the President may have had the discretionary
authority to order the seizure absent legislation but had no
discretion to violate the Act. Id. at 177–78. Similarly, in
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, the Supreme Court
reviewed the official acts of the postmaster general, the
President’s subordinate officer who derived his authority from
the Executive Branch, because the civil case involved the
violation of a statutory requirement. 37 U.S. 524, 612–13
(1838). To find a statutory violation unreviewable, the Court
held, “would be clothing the President with a power entirely to
control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the
administration of justice.” Id. at 613.

    Then, in Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court
considered whether the State of Mississippi could sue President
Andrew Johnson to enjoin him from enforcing the
Reconstruction Acts, which the State alleged were
unconstitutional. 71 U.S. 475, 497–98 (1866). The Court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction,
                               23
relying on Marbury, Kendall and the distinction between “mere
ministerial dut[ies]” in which “nothing was left to discretion”
and “purely executive and political” duties involving the
President’s discretion. Id. at 498–99; see also Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. 19, 31–32 (1827) (no judicial power to review
President exercising his “discretionary power” conferred by
statute). In holding that it could not enjoin the President from
using his discretion, the Court nevertheless affirmed the role of
the Judiciary in checking the other two branches of
government: “The Congress is the legislative department of
the government; the President is the executive department.
Neither can be restrained in its action by the judicial
department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in
proper cases, subject to its cognizance.” Mississippi, 71 U.S.
at 500.

     The Supreme Court exercised its cognizance over
Presidential action to dramatic effect in 1952, when it held that
President Harry Truman’s executive order seizing control of
most of the country’s steel mills exceeded his constitutional
and statutory authority and was therefore invalid. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587–89 (1952). The
Congress had not legislated to authorize President Truman’s
seizure and in fact had “refused to adopt th[e seizure] method
of settling labor disputes.” Id. at 586. President Truman could
lawfully act only to execute the Congress’s laws or to carry out
his constitutional duties as the Executive; and he lacked
authority from either source to seize the steel mills. Id. at 587–
89. As Justice Jackson explained, the Court’s holding
invalidating the executive order was proper because “[w]hen
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” Id.
at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). Based on Youngstown and
Marbury, the Supreme Court in Clinton easily concluded that
“when the President takes official action, the Court has the
                              24
authority to determine whether he has acted within the law.”
Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703.

     Objection may be made that Marbury and its progeny
exercised jurisdiction only over subordinate officers, not the
President himself. The writ in Marbury was brought against
the Secretary of State; in Little against a commander of a ship
of war; in Kendall against the postmaster general; in
Youngstown against the Secretary of Commerce. But as the
Supreme Court has unequivocally explained:

       No man in this country is so high that he is
       above the law. No officer of the law may set
       that law at defiance with impunity. All the
       officers of the government, from the highest to
       the lowest, are creatures of the law and are
       bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power
       in our system of government, and every man
       who by accepting office participates in its
       functions is only the more strongly bound to
       submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
       limitations which it imposes upon the exercise
       of the authority which it gives.

United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882). “That principle
applies, of course, to a President.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2432
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

     Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the
judiciary’s power to “direct appropriate process to the
President himself.” Clinton, 520 U.S. at 705. The President
does not enjoy absolute immunity from criminal subpoenas
issued by state and federal prosecutors and may be compelled
by the courts to respond. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33–34; Nixon, 418
U.S. at 713–14; Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2431. We have “200 years
of precedent establishing that Presidents, and their official
                                25
communications, are subject to judicial process, even when the
President is under investigation.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2427
(citations omitted); see also Clinton, 520 U.S. at 703–05
(recounting history of sitting Presidents complying with court
orders to provide testimony and other evidence).

     The separation of powers doctrine, as expounded in
Marbury and its progeny, necessarily permits the Judiciary to
oversee the federal criminal prosecution of a former President
for his official acts because the fact of the prosecution means
that the former President has allegedly acted in defiance of the
Congress’s laws. Although certain discretionary actions may
be insulated from judicial review, the structure of the
Constitution mandates that the President is “amenable to the
laws for his conduct” and “cannot at his discretion” violate
them. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. Here, former
President Trump’s actions allegedly violated generally
applicable criminal laws, meaning those acts were not properly
within the scope of his lawful discretion; accordingly, Marbury
and its progeny provide him no structural immunity from the
charges in the Indictment.

     Our conclusion that the separation of powers doctrine does
not immunize former Presidents from federal criminal liability
is reinforced by the analogous immunity doctrines for
legislators and judges. Legislators and judges are absolutely
immune from civil suits for any official conduct, and legislators
have an explicit constitutional immunity from criminal
prosecution arising from the Speech or Debate Clause.
Nevertheless, legislators and judges can be criminally
prosecuted under generally applicable laws for their official
acts consistent with the separation of powers doctrine.

    Legislators have explicit constitutional immunity from
criminal or civil liability “for what they do or say in legislative
                               26
proceedings” under the Speech or Debate Clause. Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 6, cl. 1. But outside of constitutionally protected legislative
conduct, members of the Congress perform a wide range of
“acts in their official capacity” that are not “legislative in
nature” and so can subject them to criminal liability. Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); see id. at 626 (Speech
or Debate Clause “does not privilege either Senator or aide to
violate an otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or
implementing legislative acts”). In United States v. Johnson, a
Congressman was criminally charged with conspiring to
pressure the Department of Justice to dismiss pending
indictments of a loan company and its officers on mail fraud
charges. 383 U.S. 169, 171 (1966). The Supreme Court held
that the prosecution could not include evidence related to a
speech made by Johnson on the House floor because of his
constitutional immunity but, the Court made clear, Johnson
could be retried on the same count “wholly purged of elements
offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause.” Id. at 185.
Although his unprotected conduct constituted an official act
under Fitzgerald (communicating with the Executive Branch),
see id. at 172, it was constrained by and subject to “criminal
statute[s] of general application.” Id. at 185.

     Judges are similarly liable to the criminal laws for their
official acts. A notable example is Ex parte Commonwealth of
Virginia, in which the Supreme Court applied Marbury’s
discretionary/ministerial distinction to affirm the criminal
indictment of a judge based on an official act. 100 U.S. 339
(1879). A county judge was indicted in federal court for
violating a federal statute that prohibited discriminating on the
basis of race in jury selection. Id. at 340, 344. The Supreme
Court began by observing the principle that officers are bound
to follow the law: “We do not perceive how holding an office
under a State, and claiming to act for the State, can relieve the
                                  27
holder from obligation to obey the Constitution of the United
States, or take away the power of Congress to punish his
disobedience.” Id. at 348. The Court then addressed the
judge’s argument that the Court lacked the authority to punish
a state judge for “his official acts.” Id. Its response was
twofold. First, the Court described juror selection as “merely
a ministerial act, as much so as the act of a sheriff holding an
execution, in determining upon what piece of property he will
make a levy, or the act of a roadmaster in selecting laborers to
work upon the roads.” Id. The Court then explained that even
if juror selection is considered a “judicial act,” the judge had a
legal duty to obey the criminal laws:

         But if the selection of jurors could be considered
         in any case a judicial act, can the act charged
         against the petitioner be considered such when
         he acted outside of his authority and in direct
         violation of the spirit of the State statute? That
         statute gave him no authority, when selecting
         jurors, from whom a panel might be drawn for
         a circuit court, to exclude all colored men
         merely because they were colored. Such an
         exclusion was not left within the limits of his
         discretion. It is idle, therefore, to say that the
         act of Congress is unconstitutional because it
         inflicts penalties upon State judges for their
         judicial action. It does no such thing.

Id. at 348–49 (emphasis added).6

     6
        The Court’s reference to “the State statute” is to the Virginia
law charging the county judge with the duty to select jurors in the
circuit and county courts. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 340.
                               28
     More recent case law on the judicial immunity doctrine
affirms that judges are not immune from criminal liability for
their official acts. O’Shea v. Littleton confirmed the holding of
Ex parte Virginia in dismissing a civil rights action for
equitable relief brought against a county magistrate and
associate judge of a county circuit. 414 U.S. 488, 490–91, 503
(1974). The Supreme Court concluded that the requested
injunction was not the only available remedy because both
judges remained answerable to the federal criminal laws:

       [W]e have never held that the performance of
       the duties of judicial, legislative, or executive
       officers, requires or contemplates the
       immunization of otherwise criminal deprivation
       of constitutional rights. On the contrary, the
       judicially fashioned doctrine of official
       immunity does not reach ‘so far as to immunize
       criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of
       Congress . . . .’

Id. at 503 (citation to Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, omitted;
quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 627). Similarly, in Dennis v.
Sparks, the Court affirmed judicial immunity from civil money
damages in the context of bribery allegations but explained that
judges “are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other
citizens.” 449 U.S. at 31. Crucially, the judge in Dennis
retained civil immunity because “the challenged conduct” —
allegedly issuing an injunction corruptly after accepting bribes
as part of a conspiracy — was “an official judicial act within
his statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed.” Id. at 29. The
scope of civil judicial immunity thus aligns with civil
Presidential immunity under Fitzgerald, but a judge has no
criminal immunity for the same “official act.” See also Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) (“Even judges, cloaked
with absolute civil immunity for centuries, could be punished
                                 29
criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional
rights . . . .”); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372
(1980) (“[T]he cases in this Court which have recognized an
immunity from civil suit for state officials have presumed the
existence of federal criminal liability as a restraining factor on
the conduct of state officials.”).7

     When considering the criminal prosecutions of judges,
other circuits have repeatedly rejected judicial criminal
immunity for official acts, largely in the context of bribery
prosecutions. See United States v. Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842,
845 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984);
United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 709–11 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983); United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1143–44 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1987). Former
President Trump argues that bribery allegations were not
considered “judicial acts” at common law, Appellant’s Br. 21,
but his sources do not support his conclusion. He is correct that

    7
         In his brief, former President Trump contends otherwise,
primarily relying on two words in a single line of dictum from
Spalding v. Vilas to urge that judges are immune from criminal
prosecution for their official acts. Appellant’s Br. 19. Spalding was
a civil case in which the Supreme Court quoted an opinion of the
Supreme Court of New York: “The doctrine which holds a judge
exempt from a civil suit or indictment for any act done or omitted to
be done by him, sitting as judge, has a deep root in the common law.”
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 494 (1896) (quoting Yates v.
Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810)) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court did not analyze the scope of judicial criminal
immunity itself and the quoted New York language is flatly
incompatible with the Supreme Court case law addressed supra. We
do not consider Spalding’s dictum binding on the question of judicial
criminal immunity.
                               30
Blackstone and other early common law sources expressly
contemplated the criminal prosecution of judges on bribery
charges. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139;
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 43 (1979). But this shows
only that judicial immunity did not stretch to shield judges from
generally applicable criminal laws, not that bribery was ever
considered a nonofficial act. And as explained supra, the
Supreme Court emphasized the official nature of the bribery
allegations in Dennis while reinforcing the judge’s criminal
liability.

     We therefore conclude that Article III courts may hear the
charges alleged in the Indictment under the separation of
powers doctrine, as explained in Marbury and its progeny and
applied in the analogous contexts of legislative and judicial
immunity. The Indictment charges that former President
Trump violated criminal laws of general applicability. Acting
against laws enacted by the Congress, he exercised power that
was at its “lowest ebb.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson,
J., concurring). Former President Trump lacked any lawful
discretionary authority to defy federal criminal law and he is
answerable in court for his conduct.

      B. FUNCTIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

     Even though it is proper under Marbury and its progeny
for an Article III court to hear criminal charges brought against
a former President, we “necessarily” must “weigh[] concerns
of public policy, especially as illuminated by our history and
the structure of our government,” including our “constitutional
heritage and structure.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 747–48; see id.
at 748 (our historical analysis merges with public policy
analysis “[b]ecause the Presidency did not exist through most
of the development of common law”); Clinton, 520 U.S. at 694
(courts apply “a functional approach” in determining the scope
                               31
of official immunity). “This inquiry involves policies and
principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the
President’s office in a system structured to achieve effective
government under a constitutionally mandated separation of
powers.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 748. Our analysis entails
“balanc[ing] the constitutional weight of the interest to be
served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch.” Id. at 754.

     We note at the outset that our analysis is specific to the
case before us, in which a former President has been indicted
on federal criminal charges arising from his alleged conspiracy
to overturn federal election results and unlawfully overstay his
Presidential term.8 We consider the policy concerns at issue in
this case in two respects. First, we assess possible intrusions
on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch and the
countervailing interests to be served as those concerns apply to
former President Trump’s claim that former Presidents are
categorically immune from federal prosecution. We conclude
that the interest in criminal accountability, held by both the
public and the Executive Branch, outweighs the potential risks
of chilling Presidential action and permitting vexatious
litigation. Second, we examine the additional interests raised
by the nature of the charges in the Indictment: The Executive
Branch’s interest in upholding Presidential elections and
vesting power in a new President under the Constitution and
the voters’ interest in democratically selecting their President.
We find these interests compel the conclusion that former
President Trump is not immune from prosecution under the
Indictment.

    8
       We do not address policy considerations implicated in the
prosecution of a sitting President or in a state prosecution of a
President, sitting or former.
                                32
         1.   CATEGORICAL IMMUNITY DEFENSE

     Former President Trump argues that criminal liability for
former Presidents risks chilling Presidential action while in
office and opening the floodgates to meritless and harassing
prosecution. These risks do not overcome “the public interest
in fair and accurate judicial proceedings,” which “is at its
height in the criminal setting.” Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424.

      Former President Trump first asserts that the prospect of
potential post-Presidency criminal liability would inhibit a
sitting President’s ability to act “fearlessly and impartially,”
citing the “especially sensitive duties” of the President and the
need for “bold and unhesitating action.” Appellant’s Br. 21–
22 (quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 745–46). But “[t]he chance
that now and then there may be found some timid soul who will
take counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive power
is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice.”
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933). In Clark, the
Supreme Court dismissed the threat of a chilling effect, holding
that jurors could be subject to criminal prosecution for conduct
during their jury service and explaining that a “juror of integrity
and reasonable firmness will not fear to speak his mind if the
confidences of debate are barred to the ears of mere
impertinence or malice.” Id. Rather, the Court observed, “[h]e
will not expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his
conduct in the event that there is evidence reflecting upon his
honor.” Id. The Court reinforced the point in United States v.
Nixon, holding that it could not “conclude that [Presidential]
advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks
by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the
possibility that such conversations will be called for in the
context of a criminal prosecution.” 418 U.S. at 712. So too
here. We cannot presume that a President will be unduly
cowed by the prospect of post-Presidency criminal liability any
                              33
more than a juror would be influenced by the prospect of post-
deliberation criminal liability, or an executive aide would be
quieted by the prospect of the disclosure of communications in
a criminal prosecution.

     Moreover, past Presidents have understood themselves to
be subject to impeachment and criminal liability, at least under
certain circumstances, so the possibility of chilling executive
action is already in effect. Even former President Trump
concedes that criminal prosecution of a former President is
expressly authorized by the Impeachment Judgment Clause
after impeachment and conviction. E.g., Oral Arg. Tr. 13:25–
14:9. We presume that every President is aware of the
Impeachment Judgment Clause and knows that he is “liable
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment,
according to Law,” at least after impeachment and conviction.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.

     Additionally, recent historical evidence suggests that
former Presidents, including President Trump, have not
believed themselves to be wholly immune from criminal
liability for official acts during their Presidency. President
Gerald Ford issued a full pardon to former President Richard
Nixon, which both former Presidents evidently believed was
necessary to avoid Nixon’s post-resignation indictment. See,
e.g., President Gerald R. Ford’s Proclamation 4311, Granting
a Pardon to Richard Nixon, Ford Presidential Library (Sept. 8,
1974); Statement by Former President Richard Nixon 1, Ford
Presidential Library (Sept. 8, 1974). Before leaving office,
President Bill Clinton agreed to a five-year suspension of his
law license and a $25,000 fine in exchange for Independent
Counsel Robert Ray’s agreement not to file criminal charges
against him. See John F. Harris & Bill Miller, In a Deal,
Clinton Avoids Indictment, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2001),
https://perma.cc/MMR9-GDTL.            And during President
                                34
Trump’s 2021 impeachment proceedings for incitement of
insurrection, his counsel argued that instead of post-Presidency
impeachment, the appropriate vehicle for “investigation,
prosecution, and punishment” is “the article III courts,” as
“[w]e have a judicial process” and “an investigative process . . .
to which no former officeholder is immune.” 167 CONG. REC.
S607 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2021); see also id. at S693 (daily ed.
Feb. 12, 2021) (“[T]he text of the Constitution . . . makes very
clear that a former President is subject to criminal sanction after
his Presidency for any illegal acts he commits.”). In light of
the express mention of “Indictment” in the Impeachment
Judgment Clause and recent historical evidence of former
Presidents acting on the apparent understanding that they are
subject to prosecution even in the absence of conviction by the
Senate, the risk of criminal liability chilling Presidential action
appears to be low.

     Instead of inhibiting the President’s lawful discretionary
action, the prospect of federal criminal liability might serve as
a structural benefit to deter possible abuses of power and
criminal behavior. “Where an official could be expected to
know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate . . . .”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). As the district
court observed: “Every President will face difficult decisions;
whether to intentionally commit a federal crime should not be
one of them.” Trump, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 8359833,
at *9.

     Former President Trump next urges that a lack of criminal
immunity will subject future Presidents to politically motivated
prosecutions as soon as they leave office. In the civil context,
the Supreme Court found official-act Presidential immunity
necessary in part to avoid “subject[ing] the President to trial on
virtually every allegation that an action was unlawful, or was
                               35
taken for a forbidden purpose.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756;
see id. at 753 (“In view of the visibility of his office and the
effect of his actions on countless people, the President would
be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages.”).
But the decision to initiate a federal prosecution is committed
to the prosecutorial discretion of the Executive Branch.
Prosecutors have ethical obligations not to initiate unfounded
prosecutions and “courts presume that they . . . properly
discharge[] their official duties.” United States v. Armstrong,
517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chem.
Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). There are additional
safeguards in place to prevent baseless indictments, including
the right to be charged by a grand jury upon a finding of
probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kaley v. United States,
571 U.S. 320, 328 (2014). “[G]rand juries are prohibited from
engaging in ‘arbitrary fishing expeditions’ and initiating
investigations ‘out of malice or an intent to harass.’” Vance,
140 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting United States v. R. Enters., Inc.,
498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991)). Additionally, former President
Trump’s “predictive judgment” of a torrent of politically
motivated prosecutions “finds little support in either history or
the relatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this
particular case,” see Clinton, 520 U.S. at 702, as former
President Trump acknowledges that this is the first time since
the Founding that a former President has been federally
indicted. Weighing these factors, we conclude that the risk that
former Presidents will be unduly harassed by meritless federal
criminal prosecutions appears slight.

     On the other side of the scale, we must consider “the
constitutional weight of the interest to be served” by allowing
the prosecution of a former President to proceed. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 754. The public has a fundamental interest in the
enforcement of criminal laws. Vance, 140 S. Ct. at 2424.
“[O]ur historic commitment to the rule of law . . . is nowhere
                                36
more profoundly manifest than in our view that ‘the twofold
aim (of criminal justice) is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.’” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708–09 (quoting Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). As the Nixon Court
explained, wholly immunizing the President from the criminal
justice process would disturb “the primary constitutional duty
of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions” to
such an extent that it would undermine the separation of powers
by “plainly conflict[ing] with the function of the courts under
Art. III.” Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.

     There is also a profound Article II interest in the
enforcement of federal criminal laws. The President has a
constitutionally mandated duty to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. As part of this
duty, the President is responsible for investigating and
prosecuting criminal violations. See Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially
executive function.”); see also In re Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263,
1272 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Investigation and prosecution of
federal crimes is one of the most important and essential
functions       within     [the     President’s]     constitutional
responsibility.”); Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce,
786 F.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The power to decide
when to investigate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core of
the Executive’s duty to see to the faithful execution of the
laws . . . .”). Beyond simply making explicit that a President
must enforce the law, the Take Care Clause plays a central role
in “signify[ing] . . . the principle that ours is a government of
laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if
under rules.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 646 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). It would be a striking paradox if the President,
who alone is vested with the constitutional duty to “take Care
                               37
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” were the sole officer
capable of defying those laws with impunity.

     The federal prosecution of a former President fits the case
“[w]hen judicial action is needed to serve broad public
interests” in order to “vindicate the public interest in an
ongoing criminal prosecution.” Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.
The risks of chilling Presidential action or permitting meritless,
harassing prosecutions are unlikely, unsupported by history
and “too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice.”
See Clark, 289 U.S. at 16. We therefore conclude that
functional policy considerations rooted in the structure of our
government do not immunize former Presidents from federal
criminal prosecution.

        2.   IMMUNITY FROM THE INDICTMENT’S
                     CHARGES

     In addition to the generally applicable concerns discussed
supra, the allegations of the Indictment implicate the Article II
interests in vesting authority in a new President and the
citizenry’s interest in democratically selecting its President.

     The Indictment alleges that the assertedly “official”
actions at issue here were undertaken by former President
Trump in furtherance of a conspiracy to unlawfully overstay
his term as President and to displace his duly elected successor.
See Indictment ¶¶ 2, 10. That alleged conduct violated the
constitutionally established design for determining the results
of the Presidential election as well as the Electoral Count Act
of 1887, neither of which establishes a role for the President in
counting and certifying the Electoral College votes. U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; id. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15,
amended by 136 Stat. 4459, 5238 (2022); see Indictment ¶¶ 9–
10. The alleged conduct also violated Article II’s mandate that
a President “hold his Office during the Term of four Years.”
                               38
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. The Twentieth Amendment
reinforces the discrete nature of a presidential term, explicitly
providing that “[t]he terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January . . .; and the terms
of their successors shall then begin.” U.S. CONST. amend. XX,
§ 1. Upon “the expiration of the time for which he is elected,”
a former president “returns to the mass of the people again” and
the power of the Executive Branch vests in the newly elected
President. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1
(“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”) (emphasis added).

     The President, of course, also has a duty under the Take
Care Clause to faithfully enforce the laws. This duty
encompasses following the legal procedures for determining
election results and ensuring that executive power vests in the
new President at the constitutionally appointed time. To the
extent former President Trump maintains that the post-2020
election litigation that his campaign and supporters
unsuccessfully pursued implemented his Take Care duty, he is
in error. See infra n.14. Former President Trump’s alleged
conduct conflicts with his constitutional mandate to enforce the
laws governing the process of electing the new President.

     The public has a strong interest in the foundational
principle of our government that the will of the people, as
expressed in the Electoral College vote, determines who will
serve as President. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The Electors
shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for
President and Vice-President. . . . The person having the
greatest number of votes for President, shall be the
President.”); Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2328
(2020) (“Early in our history, States decided to tie electors to
the presidential choices of [citizens].”). The Supreme Court
recently noted that “the Framers made the President the most
                                39
democratic and politically accountable official in
Government,” the only one who (along with the Vice
President) is “elected by the entire Nation.” Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020).
“To justify and check” the President’s “unique [authority] in
our constitutional structure,” Article II “render[s] the President
directly accountable to the people through regular elections.”
Id. As James Madison put it, “[a] dependence on the people is,
no doubt, the primary control on the government.” The
Federalist No. 51, at 253 (James Madison) (Coventry House
Publishing, 2015)9; see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 731 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Founders . . . established a single Chief
Executive accountable to the people” so that “the blame [could]
be assigned to someone who can be punished.”). Thus, the
quadrennial Presidential election is a crucial check on
executive power because a President who adopts unpopular
policies or violates the law can be voted out of office.

     Former President Trump’s alleged efforts to remain in
power despite losing the 2020 election were, if proven, an
unprecedented assault on the structure of our government. He
allegedly injected himself into a process in which the President
has no role — the counting and certifying of the Electoral
College votes — thereby undermining constitutionally
established procedures and the will of the Congress. To
immunize former President Trump’s actions would “further . . .
aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so
relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense of
Congress.” Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted). As Justice Jackson warned:

    9
      Federalist No. 51 is “generally attributed to Madison” but is
“sometimes attributed to ‘Hamilton or Madison.’” INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 950 (1983).
                              40
       Executive power has the advantage of
       concentration in a single head in whose choice
       the whole Nation has a part, making him the
       focus of public hopes and expectations. In
       drama, magnitude and finality his decisions so
       far overshadow any others that almost alone he
       fills the public eye and ear. No other personality
       in public life can begin to compete with him in
       access to the public mind through modern
       methods of communications. By his prestige as
       head of state and his influence upon public
       opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are
       supposed to check and balance his power which
       often cancels their effectiveness.

Id. at 653–54 (Jackson, J., concurring).

     We cannot accept former President Trump’s claim that a
President has unbounded authority to commit crimes that
would neutralize the most fundamental check on executive
power — the recognition and implementation of election
results. Nor can we sanction his apparent contention that the
Executive has carte blanche to violate the rights of individual
citizens to vote and to have their votes count.

                          *    *    *

     At bottom, former President Trump’s stance would
collapse our system of separated powers by placing the
President beyond the reach of all three Branches. Presidential
immunity against federal indictment would mean that, as to the
President, the Congress could not legislate, the Executive could
not prosecute and the Judiciary could not review. We cannot
accept that the office of the Presidency places its former
occupants above the law for all time thereafter. Careful
evaluation of these concerns leads us to conclude that there is
                              41
no functional justification for immunizing former Presidents
from federal prosecution in general or for immunizing former
President Trump from the specific charges in the Indictment.
In so holding, we act, “not in derogation of the separation of
powers, but to maintain their proper balance.” See Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 754.

     C. THE IMPEACHMENT JUDGMENT CLAUSE

     The strongest evidence against former President Trump’s
claim of immunity is found in the words of the Constitution.
The Impeachment Judgment Clause provides that “[j]udgment
in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy
any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States:
but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. That language limits the
consequences of impeachment to removal and disqualification
from office, but explicitly preserves the option of criminal
prosecution of an impeached official “according to Law.”

     Former President Trump agrees that the Impeachment
Judgment Clause contemplates and permits the prosecution of
a former President on criminal charges — he argues only that
such a former President first must be impeached by the House
and “convicted” by the Senate. Appellant’s Br. 12–14, 31. In
other words, he asserts that, under the Clause, a former
President enjoys immunity for any criminal acts committed
while in office unless he is first impeached and convicted by
the Congress. Under that theory, he claims that he is immune
from prosecution because he was impeached and acquitted. By
taking that position, former President Trump potentially
narrows the parties’ dispute to whether he may face criminal
charges in this case consistent with the Impeachment Judgment
                               42
Clause: If the Clause requires an impeachment conviction first,
he may not be prosecuted; but if it contains no such
requirement, the Clause presents no impediment to his
prosecution.

     Former President Trump also implicitly concedes that
there is no absolute bar to prosecuting assertedly “official”
actions. He argues elsewhere in his brief that his impeachment
on the charge of inciting insurrection was based on conduct that
was the “same and closely related” to the “official acts”
charged in the Indictment. Appellant’s Br. 46 (“President
Trump was impeached and acquitted by the Senate for the same
and closely related conduct to that alleged in the indictment.”
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 42 (“[A]ll five types of conduct
alleged in the indictment constitute official acts.”). And he
agrees that if he had been convicted by the Senate in that
impeachment trial, he would not be immune from prosecution
for the “official acts” at issue here. See id. at 31. Thus, he
concedes that a President can be prosecuted for broadly defined
“official acts,” such as the ones alleged in the Indictment, under
some circumstances, i.e., following an impeachment
conviction.

     The Impeachment Judgment Clause is focused solely on
those who are convicted by the Senate following impeachment
by the House. The first part of the Clause limits the penalties
that can be imposed based on an impeachment conviction:
“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. The second part makes
clear that the limited consequences of impeachment do not
immunize convicted officers from criminal prosecution:
“[T]he Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
                               43
to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.” Id.

     In former President Trump’s view, however, the word
“convicted” in the second phrase implicitly bestows immunity
on Presidents who are not convicted, based on a negative
implication. He asserts that the Impeachment Judgment Clause
“presupposes” that a President is not criminally liable absent a
conviction in the Senate. Appellant’s Br. 12. Other courts have
rejected this “tortured” interpretation of the Impeachment
Judgment Clause, which previously has been advanced to
support claims of judicial immunity. See Claiborne, 727 F.2d
at 846 (“According to Claiborne, this language means that a
federal judge cannot be indicted and tried in an Article III court
unless he has been removed from office by the impeachment
process. Both Isaacs and Hastings rejected this tortured
interpretation . . . .” (cleaned up)); Hastings, 681 F.2d at 710;
Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1142 (The Impeachment Judgment Clause
“does not mean that a judge may not be indicted and tried
without impeachment first.”). Moreover, former President
Trump’s interpretation runs counter to the text, structure and
purpose of the Impeachment Judgment Clause. See N.L.R.B. v.
SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 302 (2017) (“The force of any
negative implication . . . depends on context,” and “applies
only when circumstances support a sensible inference that the
term left out must have been meant to be excluded.” (cleaned
up)); Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Azar, 891 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (“Finding the negative implication of a statute is a
context-specific exercise.”).

    To begin, former President Trump’s reliance on a negative
implication is an immediate red flag: The Framers knew how
to explicitly grant criminal immunity in the Constitution, as
they did to legislators in the Speech or Debate Clause. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Yet they chose not to include a similar
                                44
provision granting immunity to the President. See Vance, 140
S. Ct. at 2434 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The text of the
Constitution explicitly addresses the privileges of some federal
officials, but it does not afford the President absolute
immunity.”). The Impeachment Judgment Clause merely
states that “the Party convicted” shall nevertheless be subject
to criminal prosecution. The text says nothing about non-
convicted officials. Former President Trump’s reading rests on
a logical fallacy: Stating that “if the President is convicted, he
can be prosecuted,” does not necessarily mean that “if the
President is not convicted, he cannot be prosecuted.” See, e.g.,
N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 589 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining “the fallacy of the inverse (otherwise
known as denying the antecedent): the incorrect assumption
that if P implies Q, then not-P implies not-Q”).

     Another important clue is the Clause’s use of the word
“nevertheless,” as in “the Party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added). The
meaning of “neverthele’ss,” according to a contemporaneous
18th century dictionary, is “[n]otwithsta’nding that,” which in
turn means “[w]ithout hindrance or obstruction from.” 2
Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 200,
216 (1773). The Impeachment Judgment Clause contains no
words that limit criminal liability — and, to the contrary, it uses
“nevertheless” to ensure that liability will not be limited (i.e.,
“hindered or obstructed”), even after an official is impeached,
convicted and removed from office.

    The text of the Impeachment Judgment Clause reflects its
purpose: To allocate responsibility between the Legislative
and Executive branches for holding impeached officers
accountable for misconduct. In 18th-century Great Britain,
impeachment could result in “capital punishment . . . fine and
ransom[,] or imprisonment.” 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on
                                45
the Constitution of the United States § 782; see also Whether a
Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same
Offenses for Which He was Impeached by the House and
Acquitted by the Senate, 24 Op. O.L.C. 110, 120 (2000)
(hereinafter, “OLC Double Jeopardy Memo”) (noting that
impeachment in Britain could have resulted “in a wide array of
criminal penalties, including fines, imprisonment, and even
execution”). The Framers chose to withhold such broad power
from the Senate, specifying instead that the Senate could
impose “only political, not ordinary criminal, punishments.”
OLC Double Jeopardy Memo at 124; see also Tench Coxe, An
American Citizen, Independent Gazetteer (Philadelphia), Sept.
28, 1787 (The Senate “can only, by conviction on
impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous
officer . . . .” (emphasis in original)). That approach naturally
“raise[d] the question whether the other punishments the
founding generation was accustomed to seeing” in British
impeachment proceedings “could be imposed at all under the
new American government.” OLC Double Jeopardy Memo at
126. The Framers wished to make clear that a President would
“still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
course of law.” The Federalist No. 65, at 321 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Coventry House Publishing, 2015); Coxe, An
American Citizen (“[T]he punishment of [a dangerous officer]
as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law
to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and
precautions . . . .” (emphasis in original)). They therefore
added the provision that “the Party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punishment, according to Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
As the Office of Legal Counsel noted, that “second part makes
clear that the restriction on sanctions in the first part was not a
prohibition on further punishments; rather, those punishments
would still be available but simply not to the [Senate].” OLC
Double Jeopardy Memo at 126–27. In short, then, the Framers
                                 46
intended impeached officials to face criminal liability
“according to Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.

     To counter the historical evidence that explains the
purpose of the Impeachment Judgment Clause, former
President Trump turns to one sentence written by Alexander
Hamilton in the Federalist 69: “The President of the United
States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon
conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or
misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of
law.” The Federalist No. 69, at 337 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Coventry House Publishing, 2015). He focuses on the word
“afterwards” and suggests that a President is not “liable to
prosecution and punishment” until “after[]” he has been
impeached and convicted by the Senate. See Appellant’s Br.
14–15. But we think the more significant word in Hamilton’s
statement is “liable,” which means “subject to.” Liable, 1 John
Ash, New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language
(1795). Hamilton specifies that a President would be subject
to impeachment, trial, conviction and removal from office; and
“afterwards” would be subject to prosecution and punishment,
without regard to the verdict in the impeachment proceeding.10
Moreover, in the very next sentence of the same essay,
Hamilton stresses that the President must be unlike the “king
of Great Britain,” who was “sacred and inviolable.” The

     10
        Former President Trump also cites to Hamilton’s statement
in Federalist 77 that the President is “at all times liable to
impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any
other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution
in the common course of law.” The Federalist No. 77, at 378–79
(Alexander Hamilton) (Coventry House Publishing, 2015) (emphasis
added). This argument is similarly unavailing based on Federalist
77’s analogous use of “liable.”
                               47
Federalist No. 69, at 337–38. It strains credulity that Hamilton
would have endorsed a reading of the Impeachment Judgment
Clause that shields Presidents from all criminal accountability
unless they are first impeached and convicted by the Congress.

      Other historical evidence further supports our conclusion.
For example, many founding-era sources state that an
impeached-and-acquitted official may face criminal indictment
and trial. Edmund Pendleton, President of the Virginia
Ratifying Convention, noted that Senate “obstruction” of an
impeachment charge would not allow an official to escape
accountability because the people “may yet resort to the Courts
of Justice, as an Acquital [sic] would not bar that remedy.” 10
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution 1773 (Merrill Jensen et al, eds. 1976) (Letter from
Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, Oct. 8, 1787).
Similarly, James Wilson — a member of the Constitutional
Convention committee that drafted the Impeachment Judgment
Clause — argued as follows: “Though [Senators] may not be
convicted on impeachment before the Senate, they may be tried
by their country; and if their criminality is established, the law
will punish. A grand jury may present, a petit jury may convict,
and the judges will pronounce the punishment.” See 2 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution
492 (Merrill Jensen et al, eds. 1976); see also 9 Annals of Cong.
2475 (1798) (statement of Rep. Dana) (“[W]hether a person
tried under an impeachment be found guilty or acquitted, he is
still liable to a prosecution at common law.”).

     In drafting the Impeachment Judgment Clause, to the
extent that the Framers contemplated whether impeachment
would have a preclusive effect on future criminal charges, the
available evidence suggests that their intent was to ensure that
a subsequent prosecution would not be barred. See OLC
Double Jeopardy Memo at 122 (noting limited scope of
                                  48
discussion at the Constitutional Convention and ratifying
conventions regarding the Impeachment Judgment Clause).
Joseph Story explained that the Impeachment Judgment Clause
removed doubt that “a second trial for the same offence could
be had, either after an acquittal, or a conviction in the court of
impeachments.” 2 Story, Commentaries § 780; id. § 781
(noting the Constitution “has wisely subjected the party to trial
in the common criminal tribunals, for the purpose of receiving
such punishment, as ordinarily belongs to the offence”). Story
explained that without a criminal trial “the grossest official
offenders might escape without any substantial punishment,
even for crimes, which would subject their fellow citizens to
capital punishment.” Id. § 780.11

    Finally, the practical consequences of former President
Trump’s interpretation demonstrate its implausibility. The
Impeachment Judgment Clause applies not just to Presidents
but also to the “Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Thus, his reading
would prohibit the Executive Branch from prosecuting current
and former civil officers for crimes committed while in office,

     11
         Former President Trump points to some historical evidence
that he considers countervailing. He notes that some state
constitutions explicitly provided for the criminal prosecution of a
party acquitted on impeachment charges, arguing that silence on that
point therefore should be inferred as precluding prosecution. But
some early state constitutions also expressly granted criminal
immunity to the state’s chief executive, so interpreting silence is not
so simple. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Prosecuting and
Punishing Our Presidents, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 55, 69–70 (2021) (citing
1776 Virginia and Delaware constitutions). Any limited, indirect
historical clues must be weighed against the compelling textual,
structural and historical evidence that the Founders did not intend the
Impeachment Judgment Clause to bar the criminal prosecution of an
official who was impeached and acquitted (or not impeached at all).
                                 49
unless the Congress first impeached and convicted them. No
court has previously imposed such an irrational “impeachment
first” constraint on the criminal prosecution of federal officials.
See, e.g., Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1144 (“[W]e are convinced that a
federal judge is subject to indictment and trial before
impeachment . . . .”).12 Even if there is an atextual basis for
treating Presidents differently from subordinate government
officials, as former President Trump suggests, his proposed
interpretation still would leave a President free to commit all
manner of crimes with impunity, so long as he is not impeached
and convicted. Former President Trump’s interpretation also
would permit the commission of crimes not readily categorized
as impeachable (i.e., as “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors”) and, if thirty Senators are correct, crimes
not discovered until after a President leaves office. See U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 4; see also, e.g., 167 CONG. REC. S736 (daily
ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Senate Minority Leader
McConnell) (“We have no power to convict and disqualify a
former office holder who is now a private citizen.”).13 All of

    12
        Indeed, history reveals examples of prosecutions preceding
impeachments. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226–27
(1993) (defendant judge criminally prosecuted and then impeached);
Hastings v. United States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C. 1989)
(same); Amenability of the President, Vice President and other Civil
Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office, Op.
O.L.C. 4 (1973) (observing that, as of 1973, only 12 impeachments
had occurred, but “presumably scores, if not hundreds, of officers of
the United States have been subject to criminal proceedings for
offenses for which they could have been impeached”).
    13
          See also statements of Senators Barrasso, Blunt, Braun,
Capito, Cornyn, Cramer, Crapo, Daines, Ernst, Fischer, Grassley,
Hoeven, Hyde-Smith, Inhofe, Kennedy, Lankford, Lee, Lummis,
Moran, Portman, Risch, Rounds, Rubio, Shelby, Sullivan, Thune,
Tillis, Tuberville and Wicker.
                                   50
this leads us to conclude that, under the best reading of the
Impeachment Judgment Clause, a former President may be
criminally prosecuted in federal court, without any requirement
that he first be impeached and convicted for the same
conduct.14

          IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRINCIPLES

    Former President Trump alternatively argues that the
Impeachment Judgment Clause and “principles of double
jeopardy” bar his prosecution because he was impeached by the

     14
          Because we conclude that former President Trump is not
entitled to categorical immunity from criminal liability for assertedly
“official” acts, it is unnecessary to explore whether executive
immunity, if it applied here, would encompass his expansive
definition of “official acts.” Nevertheless, we observe that his
position appears to conflict with our recent decision in Blassingame,
87 F.4th at 1. According to the former President, any actions he took
in his role as President should be considered “official,” including all
the conduct alleged in the Indictment. Appellant’s Br. 41–42. But
in Blassingame, taking the plaintiff’s allegations as true, we held that
a President’s “actions constituting re-election campaign activity” are
not “official” and can form the basis for civil liability. 87 F.4th at
17. In other words, if a President who is running for re-election acts
“as office-seeker, not office-holder,” he is not immune even from
civil suits. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). Because the President has
no official role in the certification of the Electoral College vote,
much of the misconduct alleged in the Indictment reasonably can be
viewed as that of an office-seeker — including allegedly organizing
alternative slates of electors and attempting to pressure the Vice
President and Members of the Congress to accept those electors in
the certification proceeding. It is thus doubtful that “all five types of
conduct alleged in the indictment constitute official acts.”
Appellant’s Br. 42.
                              51
House of Representatives for the same or closely related
conduct but acquitted by the Senate. We disagree.

     As we have discussed, supra Part III.C, the Impeachment
Judgment Clause addresses only convicted parties; it does not
address the consequences of a Senate acquittal. For the reasons
already stated, the Clause’s provision that “the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law” does not bar the
prosecution of an official who, like former President Trump,
was acquitted rather than “convicted” in an impeachment
proceeding; nor does it bar the prosecution of an official who
was never impeached in the first place. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3,
cl. 7. The Clause simply does not speak to such matters. But
the weight of historical authority indicates that the Framers
intended for public officials to face ordinary criminal
prosecution as well as impeachment. Supra Part III.C.

     To the extent former President Trump relies on “double
jeopardy principles” beyond the text of the Impeachment
Judgment Clause, those principles cut against him. The Double
Jeopardy Clause provides: “No person shall . . . be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. It has been interpreted to prohibit
“imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)
(citation omitted). Under precedent interpreting the Double
Jeopardy Clause, former President Trump’s impeachment
acquittal does not bar his subsequent criminal prosecution for
two reasons: (1) An impeachment does not result in criminal
punishments; and (2) the Indictment does not charge the same
offense as the single count in the Impeachment Resolution.
                                52
         A. IMPEACHMENT IS NOT “CRIMINAL”

     Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a defendant is not “put
in jeopardy of life or limb,” U.S. CONST. amend. V, when faced
with any penalty “that could, in common parlance, be described
as punishment”; instead, double jeopardy guards only against
“imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same
offense.” Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 (cleaned up). Although
double jeopardy applies only to criminal punishments,
impeachment imposes political punishments.

     Impeachment is a political process that is instigated and
overseen by the Congress. See 2 Story, Commentaries § 784
(“There is wisdom, and sound policy, and intrinsic justice in
this separation of the offence, at least so far, as the jurisdiction
and trial are concerned, into its proper elements, bringing the
political part under the power of the political department of the
government . . . .” (emphasis added)); 9 Annals of Cong. 2475
(1798) (statement of Rep. Dana) (“The process in cases of
impeachment, in this country, is distinct from either civil or
criminal — it is a political process, having in view the
preservation of the Government of the Union.”). It is a tool
entrusted to elected officials and “designed to enable Congress
to protect the nation against officers who have demonstrated
that they are unfit to carry out important public
responsibilities.” OLC Double Jeopardy Memo at 130; see The
Federalist No. 66, at 324 (Alexander Hamilton) (Coventry
House Publishing, 2015) (“[T]he powers relating to
impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential check in
the hands of [Congress] upon the encroachments of the
executive.”); Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“The founding generation understood
impeachment as a check on Presidential abuses.”). The
consequences imposed by an impeachment conviction —
removal from office and disqualification from future service,
                               53
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7. — are intended to hold officials
politically accountable, while leaving criminal accountability
to the Judicial Branch.

     As a result of the political nature of impeachment
proceedings, impeachment acquittals are often unrelated to
factual innocence. See The Federalist No. 65, at 319 (In an
impeachment proceeding, “there will always be the greatest
danger that the decision will be regulated more by the
comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations
of innocence or guilt.”). Former President Trump’s acquittal
in his impeachment trial on the charge of inciting insurrection
makes this point. The forty-three Senators who voted to acquit
him relied on a variety of concerns, many of which had nothing
to do with whether he committed the charged offense. Those
Senators cited jurisdictional reasons, see, e.g., 167 CONG. REC.
S736 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 2021) (statement of Senate Minority
Leader McConnell) (“We have no power to convict and
disqualify a former office holder who is now a private
citizen.”); process-based reasons, see, e.g., Press Release, Sen.
Todd Young, Senator Young Statement on Impeachment Trial
(Feb. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/26Z8-XYTT (“Simply put,
the U.S. House of Representatives conducted a rushed and
incomplete process for this snap impeachment.”); and political
reasons, see, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Ron Johnson, Johnson
Statement on Impeachment Trial of Former President Trump
(Feb. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/L4EZ-7C77 (“The
Democrats’ vindictive and divisive political impeachment is
over. While there are still many questions that remain
unanswered, I do know neither the Capitol breach nor this trial
should have ever occurred. Hopefully, true healing can now
begin.”). Indeed, at least thirty Senators who voted to acquit
relied at least in part on a belief that the Senate lacked the
power to convict a former President. See supra n.13.
                                54
     Criminal prosecutions, by contrast, are aimed at
“penaliz[ing] individuals for their criminal misdeeds . . . by
taking away their life, liberty, or property.” OLC Double
Jeopardy Memo at 130; see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 361–62 (1997) (identifying “retribution [and] deterrence”
as “the two primary objectives of criminal punishment”). The
consequences of a criminal conviction are predicated on a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995); and such consequences can
be severe, including asset forfeiture, incarceration and even
death, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 982, 3581, 3591. Criminal
prosecutions are overseen by the judiciary, which enforces
stringent procedural protections that reflect the gravity of the
potential ramifications for the defendant. See Nixon, 418 U.S.
at 707 (describing “the primary constitutional duty of the
Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions”). The
Double Jeopardy Clause is one such procedural protection,
ensuring that a criminal defendant is not forced to face
prosecution twice for the same offense.

    In light of the very different procedures and purposes
associated with impeachment proceedings as compared to
criminal proceedings, former President Trump’s reliance on the
Double Jeopardy Clause is misplaced. Impeachment is not a
criminal process and cannot result in criminal punishment.15

    15
        When determining whether a punishment labeled “civil” by
the Congress is criminal for double-jeopardy purposes, courts apply
a multi-factored test. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168–69 (1963). Because former President Trump does not
contend impeachment threatens criminal punishment, and because
we think the political nature of impeachment makes that clear, we
need not address those factors. Cf. OLC Double Jeopardy Memo at
139–48 (concluding, under the Mendoza-Martinez test, that removal
                                55
He does not seriously contend otherwise; and he does not
explain why he believes that impeachment can implicate
“double jeopardy principles” when it does not involve criminal
punishment.

                    B. BLOCKBURGER TEST

    Even if we assume that an impeachment trial is criminal
under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the crimes alleged in the
Indictment differ from the offense for which President Trump
was impeached. In determining whether two charges are the
“same” for double-jeopardy purposes, courts apply “the same-
elements test” (also known as the “Blockburger test”): If “each
offense contains an element not contained in the other,” the
offenses are different. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688,
696 (1993) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932)) (cleaned up). If the charges at issue are not the
“same offense” under that test, double jeopardy does not bar
prosecution. Id. at 696–97.

     Under the Blockburger test, none of the four offenses
alleged in the Indictment is the same as the sole offense charged
in the article of impeachment. The indicted criminal counts
include conspiracy to defraud the United States under 18
U.S.C. § 371; conspiracy to obstruct and obstructing an official
proceeding under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), (k); and conspiracy
to deprive one or more individuals of the right to vote under 18
U.S.C. § 241. See Indictment ¶¶ 6, 126, 128, 130. By contrast,
the article of impeachment charged former President Trump
with incitement of insurrection. See H.R. Res. 24, 117th Cong.
(2021). Each of the indicted charges requires proof of an
element other than those required for incitement. And the

and disqualification are not criminal punishments implicating double
jeopardy).
                              56
offense of incitement of insurrection requires proof of
incitement — an element that is distinct from those associated
with each of the crimes of indictment. In other words, the
charges are not the same under a straightforward application of
the Blockburger test.

      Former President Trump does not dispute this analysis and
instead contends that, rather than applying the Blockburger
test, a subsequent criminal prosecution cannot be based on “the
same or closely related conduct” as an unsuccessful
impeachment. Appellant’s Br. 52. But that argument is
foreclosed by case law: “The ‘same-conduct’ rule . . . is wholly
inconsistent with . . . Supreme Court precedent and with the
clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy.” Dixon,
509 U.S. at 704; see also Hudson, 522 U.S. at 107 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause
is not implicated simply because a criminal charge involves
essentially the same conduct for which a defendant has
previously been punished.” (cleaned up)).

     Thus, well-established law interpreting the Double
Jeopardy Clause undermines rather than supports former
President Trump’s argument that he may not be prosecuted.
Perhaps recognizing that normal double-jeopardy rules
disfavor his position, he claims that the Impeachment
Judgment Clause incorporates “double jeopardy principles”
that are distinct from the Double Jeopardy Clause. See
Appellant’s Br. 54 n.7. But if the “double jeopardy principles”
he invokes are unmoored from the Double Jeopardy Clause, we
are unable to discern what the principles are or how to apply
them. He thus fails to establish that his Senate acquittal bars
his criminal prosecution.

                          *    *   *
                                  57
     We have balanced former President Trump’s asserted
interests in executive immunity against the vital public interests
that favor allowing this prosecution to proceed. We conclude
that “[c]oncerns of public policy, especially as illuminated by
our history and the structure of our government” compel the
rejection of his claim of immunity in this case. See Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. at 747–48. We also have considered his contention
that he is entitled to categorical immunity from criminal
liability for any assertedly “official” action that he took as
President — a contention that is unsupported by precedent,
history or the text and structure of the Constitution. Finally,
we are unpersuaded by his argument that this prosecution is
barred by “double jeopardy principles.” Accordingly, the order
of the district court is AFFIRMED.16

                                                          So ordered.

     16
         Amici former Attorney General Edwin Meese III and others
argue that the appointment of Special Counsel Smith is invalid
because (1) no statute authorizes the position Smith occupies and (2)
the Special Counsel is a principal officer who must be nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause). On appeal from a collateral order,
we generally lack jurisdiction to consider issues that do not
independently satisfy the collateral order doctrine unless we can
exercise pendent jurisdiction over the issue. See Abney, 431 U.S. at
663; Azima v. RAK Inv. Auth., 926 F.3d 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Because the Appointments Clause issue was neither presented to nor
decided by the district court, there is no order on the issue that could
even arguably constitute a collateral order for us to review.
Additionally, the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would be improper
here, assuming without deciding that pendent jurisdiction is ever
available in criminal appeals. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 663; Gilda
Marx, Inc. v. Wildwood Exercise, Inc., 85 F.3d 675, 679 (D.C. Cir.
1996).