Court Opinion

ID: 9514665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:01.02923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.842476
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 23.] I dissent on issue two.
[¶ 24.] The trial court determined the original 180-day period for trial expired on December 14, 1996. However, due to the delay caused by Stepner’s change of counsel, forty-eight days were excluded from November 19, 1996 (the date original counsel announced his intention to withdraw) through January 6, 1997 (the date of appointment of Stepner’s current counsel). Thus, the expiration date for the 180-day period became January 31, 1997. Since Stepner was not brought to trial by January 31,1997, the trial court dismissed the charges for violation of the 180-day rule.
[¶ 25.] At the outset, the exclusion of the forty-eight days was appropriate, since a change of counsel constitutes good cause for delay under SDCL 23A-44-5.1(4)(f). See State v. Webb, 539 N.W.2d 92, 95 (S.D.1995) (holding the period of delay from the time of attorney’s motion to withdraw until time when alternate counsel is retained is to be excluded from 180-day computation).5 However, State contends it was entitled to addi*910tional exclusions based upon Stepner’s waiver of the 180-day rule during the hearing on November 20, 1996.
[¶ 26.] “It is settled that a defendant may waive the 180-day rule, but this Court has held that ‘[t]he burden is on the state to show any waiver was the product of an informed and voluntary decision.’ ” State v. Bahm, 494 N.W.2d 177, 178 (S.D.1992) (quoting State v. Martin, 493 N.W.2d 223, 226 (S.D.1992); State v. Beynon, 484 N.W.2d 898, 902 (S.D.1992)). Thus, the question becomes whether Stepner’s open-ended waiver of his statutory right to a speedy trial was an informed and voluntary decision.
[¶ 27.] Pennsylvania, a state whose 180-day precedents this Court has consistently followed,6 has held that to make an “informed” waiver of the right to a speedy trial, defendant must be given advice as to the duration of his forfeiture of the right. Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 338 Pa.Super. 615, 488 A.2d 63, 66 (1985). In McLaughlin, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
[Although [defendant] was advised of his right to a speedy trial, he was never advised as to the duration of his forfeit of this right. In other words, the lower court’s on record colloquy did not cure [defendant’s] defective waiver. We hold that [defendant] did not make an informed waiver and that, therefore, the waiver was not valid.
488 A.2d at 66 (citing Commonwealth v. Guldin, 502 Pa. 66, 463 A.2d 1011 (1983); Commonwealth v. Zabala, 310 Pa.Super. 301, 456 A.2d 622 (1983)). See also Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400, 383 A.2d 1268, 1271 (1978) (continuances should only be granted for specified time periods in order to avoid a problem in calculating 180-day violations). Consistent with the approach of the Pennsylvania courts, this Court has previously condemned determinations of good cause for enlargement of the 180-day period that are left open-ended. In State v. Kerkhove, 423 N.W.2d 160, 164 (S.D.1988), this Court urged trial courts that, in excluding time from the 180-day period, they should, “avoid the ‘carte blanche’ type permission giving the state, [e.g.], ‘the time necessary to dispose of all criminal charges and related issues including trial.’ ”
[¶ 28.] The trial court failed to advise Step-ner as to the duration of his forfeiture regarding his statutory rights to a speedy trial. Based on the foregoing, it is clear that such failure resulted in an uninformed and consequently invalid waiver of the 180-day rule.7 *911At a minimum, Stepner should have been informed that, if he intended to proceed with a change of counsel, the case would be continued until such time as his replacement counsel indicated readiness to proceed and that such time would be excluded from calculation of the 180-day period. See McLaughlin, 488 A.2d at 65. Provided with such a warning, Stepner could then have made an informed decision as to whether to retain his original counsel and proceed immediately to trial or to change counsel and wait for his new attorney to prepare for the case. Instead, Stepner was merely informed of his 180-day right to a trial and that a change of counsel would require waiver, but with no specificity as to an end date of such a waiver.
[¶ 29.] Once Stepner has met his burden of establishing the passage of 180 days between the date of appearance and date of trial, the burden shifts to the State to establish good cause for the delay. State v. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d 67, 71 (S.D.1988). At the formal hearing on Stepner’s motion for change of counsel, the trial court discussed the necessity of rescheduling the trial and indicated the possibility of holding the trial as early as February 1997. However, the State objected to the February trial date, stating:
I think, you know, my dilemma with my tax season, unfortunately January is pretty well filled up, I have a trial coming up in early January, and then after that I have a — I’m going to be gone, tentatively gone, for a week. So I’m shot in January. And February is just impossible for me. March is going to be just about the soonest, which is still tough for me but I think I can manage. March or April. Either sometime in the middle of March or late April, that is what I would request^]
[¶ 30.] Does the fact that the prosecution objected in light of inconvenient scheduling constitute good cause? See State v. Kordonowy, 523 N.W.2d 556, 558 (S.D.1994) (mere congestion in magistrate court docket does not establish good cause); Cooper, 421 N.W.2d at 71 (delay attributable to court scheduling problems did not constitute good cause). I would hold it does not. Are we requiring different standards as to what establishes good cause depending on which party requests it? Again, I reply we should not.
[¶ 31.] I would, once again, follow the lead of the Pennsylvania Courts and reject the concept of open-ended waivers of the 180-day rule. I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of charges for violation of the 180-day rule.

. Actually, in this case, the State gained even more benefit than it was entitled to under Webb. Webb allows only the time from an attorney's motion to withdraw until his replacement to be excluded from the 180-day calculation. In this case that was only forty-one days. Here, the trial court allowed the forty-eight days from the attorney’s announcement of his intention to file a motion to withdraw to the date of .his replacement to be excluded.

. See Martin, 493 N.W.2d at 226 (in Beynon, Court looked to Pennsylvania for guidance concerning 180-day rule); Beynon, 484 N.W.2d at 902 (“We have previously looked to Pennsylvania case law for guidance regarding the 180-day rule.”). See also State v. Cross, 468 N.W.2d 419, 420 (S.D.1991); State v. Tiedeman, 433 N.W.2d 237, 239 (S.D.1988).

. A review of the trial court’s findings, which show defendant was present at the hearing regarding his attorney’s motion for withdrawal, reveals findings which are clearly not in error based on this record. See the trial court’s following findings:
7. November 18, 1996, later changed to November 20, 1996, had been set as the date for the Court to accept the guilty pleas of Byron and Paula Stepner (who is Byron's wife, who was charged with committing the same offenses as Byron, who hereinafter will be referred to as Paula).
8. Neither Byron nor Paula pled guilty at the November 20, 1996, hearing. The issue of Mr. James’ withdrawal as counsel for Byron was not finally decided at that hearing, but other issues were discussed, such as the issue of the 180-day prosecution rule, as codified at SDCL 23A-44-5.1. That issue was discussed even though Mr. James previously had informed the prosecuting attorney and presumably the Court that he desired to withdraw as Byron's attorney.
9. By the time of the November 20, 1996, hearing, Mr. James was representing Byron only in a technical sense and for all practical purposes Byron was unrepresented at that hearing.
10. At the November 20, 1996, hearing, the Court simply explained to Byron that he had a right to have his case heard within 180 days and asked Byron if he understood what she was saying. Byron replied that he so understood. The court then asked Byron if he agreed to waive his right to a speedy trial. Byron replied: "Yes, ma’am, I do.”
11. There is nothing in the record showing that the consequences of Byron’s waiver of the I 80-day prosecution rule were ever explained to him, and there is nothing in the record showing that Byron was advised of just how much time the waiver encompassed.
12. Byron did not make an informed and voluntary decision with regard to his statement to the Court that yes, he agreed to waive his right to trial within 180 days, pursuant to SDCL 23A-44-5.1.