Court Opinion

ID: 9429322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:26:26.257629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:18.827731
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting.
The Court today holds that administrative agencies may not inspect grand jury materials unless the “primary purpose *484of disclosure” is “to assist in preparation or conduct of a judicial proceeding . . . Ante, at 480. This holding is not compelled by either the language or history of Rule 6(e), and it ignores the vital public interest in effective law enforcement in noncriminal cases. I therefore dissent.
Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a district court may in its discretion order disclosure of grand jury materials “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) It is evident from the language of the Rule that disclosure prior to the actual filing of a complaint was contemplated by the Congress. Disclosure “in connection with a judicial proceeding” encompasses those situations where a suit is pending or about to be filed. The words “preliminarily to” necessarily refer to judicial proceedings not yet in existence, where, for example, a claim is under study. The Court’s interpretation of this language effectively reads the words “preliminarily to” out of the Rule. The Court interprets the Rule to apply only to cases where the “actual use” of the materials sought is to prepare for or conduct litigation. Ante, at 480. If this were indeed Congress’ intent, then it would have sufficed to allow disclosure “in connection with judicial proceedings” without the added words permitting disclosure “preliminarily to” judicial proceedings. As the Court now interprets the Rule, disclosure prior to the filing of a complaint will only rarely be permitted.
It is unclear from the legislative history exactly what Congress intended the phrase “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding” to mean with respect to disclosure to administrative agencies. That phrase has been unchanged since the original Rule 6 was adopted in 1946. The 1946 Advisory Committee Notes explained that the Rules codified the traditional doctrine of grand jury secrecy. 18 U. S. C. App., p. 1411. The two cases cited by the 1946 Notes as examples of the traditional practice involved mo*485tions for disclosure — which were denied — in connection with an existing judicial proceeding, and not in connection with an administrative investigation or hearing. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F. 2d 394 (CA6 1940); United States v. American Medical Assn., 26 F. Supp. 429 (DC 1939). In short, it does not appear that Congress in 1946 intended by these words “to resolve the tension between administrative agencies’ need for information and grand juries’ need for secrecy.” See Note, Facilitating Administrative Agency Access to Grand Jury Material, 91 Yale L. J. 1614, 1620-1625 (1982).
The legislative history to the 1977 amendments to Rule 6(e) offers somewhat more guidance to Congress’ intent with respect to disclosure to administrative agencies. Those amendments carried over unchanged the “preliminarily to or in connection with” language of the 1946 Rule. The amendments were primarily concerned with spelling out to whom and under what conditions Government attorneys in the Department of Justice could disclose grand jury materials to other Government personnel who were assisting in the criminal investigation. The Senate Report on the amendments stated that the amendments were intended to balance the need for prosecutors to have the assistance of other Government personnel against the fear that such indirect agency access “will lead to misuse of the grand jury to enforce noncriminal Federal laws . . . .” S. Rep. No. 95-354, p. 8 (1977). However, the Report specifically stated that in balancing these interests:
“[T]here is ... no intent to preclude the use of grand jury-developed evidence for civil law enforcement purposes. On the contrary, there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a criminal investigation. . . .” Ibid, (emphasis added).
This language plainly states the two conflicting policies with which Congress was concerned: to promote effective enforce*486ment of civil claims by allowing agencies access to grand jury material for civil purposes, and to prevent the abuse of the grand jury as a tool for civil discovery.
The Senate Report concluded that “the Committee believes and intends that the basis for a court’s refusal to issue an order under paragraph (C) to enable the government to disclose grand jury information in a non-criminal proceeding should be no more restrictive than is the case today under prevailing court decisions.” Ibid, (footnote omitted). This reference to Rule 6(e)(3)(C) suggests that Congress understood that the conflicting policies of the Rule would be balanced by the district courts in weighing a motion for disclosure under the “preliminarily to or in connection with judicial proceedings” provision.
One of the two cases cited by the Senate Report as evidence of “prevailing court decisions” was Robert Hawthorne, Inc. v. Director of Internal Revenue, 406 F. Supp. 1098, 1126 (ED Pa. 1976). In Robert Hawthorne, Internal Revenue Service agents assisted federal prosecutors investigating possible criminal tax violations via a grand jury. The District Court held that this assistance was proper, and also held that upon termination of the grand jury investigation, the IRS’s “future use of the materials to which it had access will follow as though there had been no access.” Id., at 1129. In such a case, the IRS could petition “for disclosure under the second sentence of Rule 6(e) permitting disclosure upon order of court preliminary to or in connection with a judicial proceeding.” Id., at 1129, n. 62. The Robert Hawthorne court assumed that a motion for disclosure would be proper; it did not suggest that such a motion would be premature if the agency was not yet preparing for or conducting litigation.
The House debates on the 1977 amendments also suggest that Congress understood the Rule to permit disclosure to agencies prior to the onset of litigation. Representative Charles Wiggins stated that although a Government agent *487assisting the prosecutor is “not free to share [grand jury] information within the agency which directly employs him,” once a violation of civil laws is uncovered, the agency could seek disclosure pursuant to a court order:
“There will come a time when a grand jury uncovers violations of civil laws, or State or local laws. It then becomes the duty of the attorney for the Government, if he or some other attorney for the Government cannot act on that information, to turn it over to the appropriate governmental agency so that such agency can do its duty. However, the attorney for the Government may do this only after successfully seeking an order of the court.” 123 Cong. Rec. 25196 (1977) (emphasis added).
Representative Wiggins did not say that disclosure would be improper if the agency were not already planning litigation. Rather, the thrust of his remarks is that disclosure would be proper to enable an agency to determine whether to conduct an investigation or bring a civil complaint. Of course, to seek successfully an order from the court, the agency would have to show that its need for the materials outweighed the interest in grand jury secrecy. Illinois v. Abbott & Associates, 460 U. S. 557, 567-568, n. 15 (1983); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211 (1979); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U. S. 677 (1958).
In reviewing the legislative history, it is apparent, as is often the case, that Congress did not focus directly on the precise issue presented here. Rather, the legislative history primarily “reflects a concern . . . with the policies underlying the rule — the prevention of grand jury abuse and the facilitation of civil law enforcement.” Note, Federal Agency Access to Grand Jury Transcripts under Rule 6(e), 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1665, 1674-1675 (1982). Given the absence of clear statutory language or statements of legislative intent, I would be guided by the policies with which the Congress was concerned.
*488In focusing on the “actual use” of the grand jury materials, the Court attempts in a crude and rigid way to reconcile the conflicting policies at issue. I believe a better balance is struck by holding that the threshold test for disclosure under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) is satisfied so long as there is a possibility that the agency’s action, should it ultimately act, would be subject to judicial review. In this respect, it makes no difference whether the judicial review would be de novo, as here, or more limited; nor does it matter that the party adversely affected by agency action might choose to forgo judicial review. This kind of broad interpretation of the language “preliminarily to ... a judicial proceeding” clearly enlarges the potential for aiding civil law enforcement. If this standard is met — as it often would be — the questions for the court would be whether the prosecutor has shown that the grand jury has not been used primarily for civil discovery purposes, and whether the agency’s need for the materials outweighs the need for grand jury secrecy. This approach focuses attention on the key policies with which Congress was concerned in 1946 and again in 1977, and permits the courts to reconcile the competing interests on a case-by-case basis. See id., at 1680-1689. The result will be to enhance civil law enforcement interests while reducing the risk of abuse.
The Court is proceeding on an assumption that Government agencies, with the assistance of prosecutors, will subvert the grand jury into a tool of civil discovery whenever possible. Accordingly, the Court erects a rigid barrier restricting agency access on the theory that this will remove the incentive for abuse. The fundamental flaw in this analysis is the idea that abuse of the grand jury is a common phenomenon, which, of course, it is not. Few cases of grand jury abuse have ever been reported, and even fewer since this Court made clear in United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., supra, at 683, that the Government’s use of “criminal procedures to elicit evidence in a civil case .. . would be flout*489ing the policy of the law.” Moreover, the tremendous pressure on Government prosecutors to investigate the federal crimes in their jurisdictions — crimes which today are both more numerous and complex than ever before — reduces the likelihood that prosecutors will be swayed from their primary tasks or violate professional ethical standards at the behest of agency personnel. Finally, there is no reason to think that the courts are incapable of policing such occasional abuses as might occur. On the contrary, the reported cases show the sensitivity of the courts to the risks of grand jury abuse, and their readiness to act to ensure the integrity of the grand jury. See, e. g., In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F. 2d 263 (CA7 1956); United States v. Doe, 341 F. Supp. 1350 (SDNY 1972); Cohen v. Commissioner, 42 TCM 312, 321 (1981).
In its battle against a largely phantom, “strawman” threat, the Court fails to account for the substantial costs its rule will impose on the public. In investigating complex financial crimes, federal prosecutors often seek assistance from such agencies as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the IRS. Agency personnel may devote countless thousands of lawyer hours assisting in the investigation of a criminal case. See, e. g., Brief for United States in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., O. T. 1982, No. 81-1032, p. 39, n. 37. To force the agencies to duplicate these investigations is not only a waste of resources; the result may be that some meritorious administrative actions will never be brought. See United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., ante, at 470, and n. 13 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). I cannot believe that Congress intended or would approve such a result.
Applying these principles, I would reverse and remand. The IRS sought release of the grand jury information to determine whether to audit respondent. There was clearly a possibility that the IRS would take action that would be subject to judicial review. Indeed, on these facts it was almost certain that the IRS would assert a deficiency against re*490spondent, who could then choose to pay it or contest it in court. Accordingly, I would hold that the disclosure was sought “preliminarily to” a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i), and remand for determination whether the Government had shown sufficient need for the materials and that it had conducted the grand jury investigation in good faith.