Court Opinion

ID: 9678501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:21:22.369973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:05.044125
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
As the majority opinion is written, it has narrow application, that is, the insurance policy clause which is the subject of this action was not clearly written. Since there was an ambiguity in the meaning, it was interpreted against the interests of the company.
There is some language in the majority opinion which I believe to be dicta and with which I disagree as to its application to the law in Wisconsin. That language is:
“While the accident must arise out of the ‘ownership, maintenance or use’ of the uninsured vehicle, the insured is covered regardless of the activity in which he is engaged at the time of the accident, be it driving a car, bicycling or walking. What the insured is doing when he is injured is irrelevant to his coverage so long as the injury is caused by an uninsured motorist.” (Footnote omitted.)
That statement suggests only one requirement for coverage and that is, the insured being injured by an uninsured motorist who is legally liable to the insured as a *379result of the accident. However, the fact that the loss must arise out of the “ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle” means the insured vehicle, not the uninsured vehicle.
This statutory requirement for uninsured motorist protection to accompany a liability automobile policy does not create an accident policy protecting the insured, no matter what his activity. His injuries must be caused by a legally liable uninsured motorist while the insured is engaged in an activity related to his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. That is the coverage required by sec. 632.32 (4), Stats. If the company wishes to be competitive in the marketplace, it may grant greater coverage; however, it is not required to do so.
In this case, the company was obviously concerned with the insured policyholder’s employment, a Milwaukee police officer. It, therefore, excluded all of his coverage, including uninsured motorist coverage, for times when he was involved in the “use” or “occupancy” while in an automobile not owned by him and used or occupied by him “in connection with his employment, occupation, or profession.”
While in his employment as a police officer and either using or occupying a police vehicle, the dangers and extraordinary hazards are not only to third persons, but, in addition, to himself in the police vehicle. The company, therefore, excluded coverage to him for his possible liability to others in the use of the police vehicle and to uninsured motorist and medical payments protection for him while he used or occupied the “non-owned” police vehicle.
The exclusion in the policy reads:
“Exclusion of non-owned emergency type automobiles. The insurance afforded under any of the Parts of this policy for the operation of or damage to non-owned automobiles shall not apply to such automobiles while used or occupied by
*380VIDMAR, ROBERT
in connection with his employment, occupation, or profession.”
This was a legal and legitimate exclusion which applied only to Robert Vidmar, the police officer, while working. It did not limit him otherwise, nor did it limit any of the defined insureds in the policy, i.e., members of his household.
The language of the exclusion in this policy has a clear meaning and only one meaning when the words irrelevant to this case are eliminated from consideration. Those words are “or damage to.” They must be ignored in interpreting the application of the clause to uninsured motorist coverage which applies only to personal injury sustained, not damage (physical) to a vehicle. This clause was written to apply to “any of the Parts of this policy” and that obviously was the reason for inclusion of the words “or damage to” which would be applicable to property damage coverages. When considering only the relevant words of the exclusion to the facts of this case, it is clear and unambiguous that the uninsured motorist coverage was not extended to Robert Vidmar under his automobile liability policy for the operation of a non-owned automobile (emergency-type vehicle) while such automobile was used or occupied by him in connection with his employment, occupation or profession.
The majority acknowledges that such a limiting coverage is legally permissible when it states:
“The insurer may, subject to the statutory requirements set forth in sec. 632.32, Stats., limit the scope of coverage, but as the drafter of the policy, it must use clear language when doing so.”
In this case, the majority rules the limitation of coverage was not clearly stated, although permissible. I disagree and believe the limitation was clearly stated.
*381I would reverse the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice WILLIAM G. Callow joins in this dissent.