Court Opinion

ID: 9838163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 15:01:26.563142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:58.978414
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                        ___________________________

                                No. 22-3020
                        ___________________________

                            United States of America

                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

                                        v.

                             Bradley Clayton Walker

                                   Defendant - Appellant
                                 ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                  for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                 ____________

                            Submitted: April 10, 2023
                            Filed: September 5, 2023
                                 ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, MELLOY and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
                              ____________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

      Defendant Bradley Clayton Walker shot a man in the chest and led police on
a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood before his eventual capture.
When arrested he possessed a pistol, ammunition, and bags containing
methamphetamine and fentanyl. One of the bags appeared to have been opened
using teeth, and officers observed Walker becoming lethargic and losing
consciousness. Officers administered two doses of Naloxone to revive him before
transporting him to a hospital. Walker eventually pleaded guilty to possessing a
firearm as a previously convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The
district court determined Walker was an armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e), and also determined his extensive and violent criminal history merited an
above-Guidelines-range sentence. The district court ultimately varied from a
Guidelines range of 188–235 months and imposed a sentence of 300 months’
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.

       Walker raises several issues on appeal. First, he challenges the application of
§ 924(e) arguing it was error for the court rather than a jury to assess whether his
prior convictions occurred on different “occasions.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). He
concedes this argument is foreclosed by our precedent and raises the argument
merely as a matter of issue preservation. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 43
F.4th 892, 896 (8th Cir. 2022). In any event, it is unclear whether preservation
matters in this instance as clearly uncontested facts show his predicate felonies were
months and years apart.

      He also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his overall sentence. We
find no abuse of the district court’s substantial discretion. See United States v. Cruz,
38 F.4th 729, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2022). The district court thoughtfully explained its
decision to impose the 300-month sentence considering only relevant factors and
overlooking no important factors. Id. Walker’s extended criminal history included
substantial violence. In this regard, we note that in one instance he shot a victim in
the head. Walker’s criminal history placed him well within Category VI, even
without consideration of § 924(e). The district court understandably and permissibly
weighed dangerousness heavily in this case.

       Finally, Walker challenges two aspects of the conditions of his supervised
release as set forth in the written judgment and committal order. He argues the
written conditions are not consistent with the oral pronouncement of sentence made
by the district court. He argues the district court did not orally advise him that the
thirteen standard conditions of supervised release as listed in USSG § 5D1.3(c) were

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being imposed. He also argues that a third special condition that stated, “You must
disclose your substance abuse history to prescribing physicians and allow the
probation office to verify disclosure,” was not made part of the oral pronouncement
at sentencing.

       Walker argues correctly that the sentence imposed—the sentence defining the
requirements he must satisfy while on supervised release and which our court
actually reviews—is the sentence pronounced orally in court rather than on the later
written form. See United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Where
an oral sentence and the written judgment conflict, the oral sentence controls.”
(quoting United States v. Glass, 720 F.2d 21, 22 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983))); see also United
States v. Tramp, 30 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir.1994) (“The oral pronouncement by
the sentencing court is the judgment of the court.”). Pronouncement of sentence
affords the defendant an opportunity to object, raise concerns and challenges as to
the sentence, and seek tailored conditions of supervised release limited to what is
“reasonably necessary” to meet sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. 3583(d)(2).

       In this case the district court went through a very thoughtful analysis of the
sentence to be imposed, including addressing specific issues raised by both the
defendant and family members who had written letters to the court. The court then
discussed two special conditions of supervised release tailored to the defendant’s
specific personal and offense characteristics. We have no doubt that the failure to
specifically address the standard conditions of supervised release and the third
special condition which relates to the two special conditions that were orally
pronounced was a matter of mere oversight. As a practical matter, it would be
virtually impossible to supervise a defendant or verify compliance with the two
special conditions that were orally pronounced without at least some of the standard
conditions of supervised release being imposed.

      Given what we are certain was a mere oversight, we will vacate that portion
of the judgment and commitment order imposing the standard conditions of
supervised release and the third special condition and remand to the district court for

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a resentencing, limited to the standard conditions and third special condition. The
district court shall determine in the first instance whether any standard conditions of
supervised release, as well as the third special condition, are consistent with and
necessarily included within the scope of the express conditions as pronounced at the
initial sentencing. The defendant will have the opportunity to object to any of the
conditions that he feels should not be imposed upon him. Any standard conditions
of supervised release or the third special condition which may be reimposed as part
of any oral pronouncement may then be incorporated into an amended and
reconciled judgment and commitment order. In all other respects the sentence is
affirmed.

     Accordingly, the sentence imposed in this case is vacated and the case is
remanded for a resentencing consistent with this opinion.
                      ______________________________

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