Court Opinion

ID: 9369849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 19:02:15.816296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.598798
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 P. v. Duenas CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080225

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCN339701)

MAXIMILIANO DUEÑAS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Affirmed.
         Sheila O’Connor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Melissa A. Mandel and Joseph C. Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
         In 2015, Maximiliano Dueñas pled guilty to transportation of a
controlled substance and possession for sale of a controlled substance
exceeding four kilograms. Dueñas now appeals from a January 2022 order
denying his motion to vacate the judgment and withdraw his guilty plea

under Penal Code section 1473.7.1 He argues that: (1) the trial court erred
by deeming his motion untimely; (2) the trial court erred by finding
insufficient evidence to show that he did not meaningfully understand the
adverse immigration consequences of his plea; and (3) he sufficiently
demonstrated that he would have rejected the plea had he correctly
understood the resulting immigration consequences.
      We find no error in the trial court’s determination that Dueñas failed to
demonstrate that he did not meaningfully understand the adverse
immigration consequences of his plea. Accordingly, we affirm the order
without deciding his other arguments regarding the timeliness of his motion
or prejudice.
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In April 2015, the District Attorney for San Diego County filed an
information charging Dueñas with: (1) transportation of heroin (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); (2) possession for sale of heroin (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11351); (3) transportation of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11379, subd. (a)); and (4) possession for sale of methamphetamine (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11378). The information also alleged that the quantity of
heroin referred to in counts one and two exceeded one kilogram (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11370.4, subd. (a)(1)) and the quantity of methamphetamine
referred to in counts three and four exceeded four kilograms (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.4, subd. (b)(2)).
      In June 2015, Dueñas completed a plea form and agreed to plead guilty
to count three of the information. On the form, Dueñas admitted that he

1    Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
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“transported a controlled substance” and “it exceeded 4 kilograms by weight.”
The form included the signature of a sworn Spanish language interpreter
verifying that the interpreter “truly translated for the defendant the entire
contents of [the] form” and that Dueñas “indicated understanding of the
contents of [the] form” to the interpreter.
      The form devoted an entire page to the immigration consequences of
aggravated felonies, specifying “ANY CONVICTION OF A NON-CITIZEN
FOR AN ‘AGGRAVATED FELONY’ AS DEFINED UNDER 8 U.S.C.
1101(A)(43), WILL RESULT IN REMOVAL/DEPORTATION, EXCLUSION,
AND DENIAL OF NATURALIZATION.” This page of the form expressly
listed “TRANSPORTATION OF ANY CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE” as a
crime that constitutes an aggravated felony. Further, Dueñas indicated his
understanding of these immigration consequences on the form by personally
initialing a box next to the following statement:
         “I understand that if I am not a U.S. citizen, this plea of
         Guilty/No Contest may result in my removal/deportation,
         exclusion from admission to the U.S. and denial of
         naturalization. Additionally, if this plea is to an
         ‘Aggravated Felony’ listed on the back of this form, then I
         will be deported, excluded from admission to the U.S., and
         denied naturalization.”

      During his plea hearing on June 30, 2015, Dueñas testified, through an
interpreter, that he understood the contents of the plea form, that his
signature and initials on the plea form were authentic, and that he wished to
proceed with the guilty plea. Dueñas confirmed that he had not consumed
any drugs or alcohol in the previous 48 hours that would affect his ability to
understand what was happening in court. Dueñas also responded “yes” when
asked, “[d]o you understand that if you are not a U.S. citizen, this plea will

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result in removal, deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States
and denial of naturalization?”
      In September 2015, the trial court sentenced Dueñas to a negotiated
“split sentence” of five years in prison, followed by three years of mandatory
supervision.
      In June 2017, Dueñas was released from prison and transferred into
the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One
month later, he was deported to Mexico. Since the time of his deportation,
Dueñas has been living in Mexico. Likewise, at the time of his arrest in 2014,
Dueñas was living in Mexico and had a tourist visa to visit the United States.
There is no evidence in the record that Dueñas ever lived in the United
States.
      In July 2021, Dueñas filed a motion to vacate the judgment and
withdraw his guilty plea under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1). In this
motion, Dueñas argued that he was entitled to relief because, at the time of
his plea, he was unable to meaningfully understand the “actual or potential
adverse immigration consequences” of his conviction. The motion set forth
allegations that Dueñas’s original defense attorney, who negotiated the pleas
with the prosecutor, “did not advise [Dueñas] of the direct adverse
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to transportation of a
control[led] substance.” Dueñas alleged that if he had been properly made
aware of the possible implications of his plea to his immigration status, “he
would have rather taken the risk of going to trial.” He claimed that his plea,
submitted on the basis of an improper lack of understanding of its adverse
immigration consequences, was the product of prejudicial error, as
contemplated under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1).

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      The People filed an opposition to Dueñas’s motion. The People first
argued that Dueñas’s motion was untimely because it was not filed with
reasonable diligence pursuant to section 1473.7, subdivision (b)(2). Second,
the People asserted that Dueñas failed to meet his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that an error had occurred. For support, the
People cited Dueñas’s signed plea form, which contained initialed
affirmations by Dueñas that he understood the adverse immigration
consequences of his pleas, and his plea colloquy with the trial judge, during
which Dueñas was advised of the potential adverse immigration
consequences of his plea and confirmed under oath that he understood. The
People’s opposition noted that the only evidence to the contrary proffered by
Dueñas was his own “self-serving statement.” Finally, the People alleged
that Dueñas also failed to meet his burden to establish prejudice.
      The court held a hearing on Dueñas’s motion on January 31, 2022.
Dueñas testified on his own behalf. On direct examination, Dueñas
emphasized his ties to the United States, testifying that he has many family
members, including his wife, who primarily live in the United States.
According to Dueñas, he works remotely in his Tecate, Mexico home for a
Tijuana satellite office of an American-based company. Dueñas testified that
both his wife and son have U.S. citizenship. Regarding the circumstances of
his plea, Dueñas testified that his attorney at the time, Jose Garcia Badillo,
never spoke to him about deportation or how to fight his immigration case.
Dueñas further testified that Badillo, using an interpreter, read the plea form
to him hastily “like he wasn’t reading everything the way he should have.”
      On cross-examination, Dueñas admitted that his immigration status
was not a material factor in his decision to plead guilty while in jail,
testifying that “I was worried about how much time I would be locked up. I

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was afraid being in there. I couldn’t think about my immigration situation.”
More directly, Dueñas responded “no” when asked by the prosecutor, “[a]t the
time when you entered the plea, you weren’t thinking about the immigration
situation then, either, were you?”
      After Dueñas had finished testifying, the People called Badillo as a
witness. Badillo testified that in his practice as a criminal defense lawyer, he
typically determines a client’s immigration status and considers how the
charges may affect that status, and he recalled doing so for Dueñas. Badillo
discussed the immigration consequences of the charges with Dueñas and
made efforts to negotiate an “immigration-friendly plea” for him, but the
prosecutor was unwilling. According to Badillo, “[u]ltimately, Mr. Dueñas
believed it was not worth the risk of the potential heftier jail sentence and
decided to plea.” Badillo specifically talked to Dueñas about the line on the
plea form regarding immigration consequences and explained to him the page
on aggravated felonies subject to deportation. Badillo testified, “I’m sure we
had a discussion about [immigration consequences] when he signed the plea
agreement. We had been discussing it through the entirety of the case,
because that was an issue for him.” Badillo ultimately negotiated the split
sentence for Dueñas to avoid a lengthier prison term.
      On cross-examination, Badillo confirmed that in his practice as a
criminal defense attorney, he “routinely consult[s] with immigration
attorneys” and has received continuing legal education on immigration
consequences since 2001. He further testified: “This issue is very personal to
me. My parents were immigrants and did not become U.S. citizens until I
was in law school. I take it to heart, especially Latino people and
representing them, making sure they understand the process. That’s one of
the main reasons I became an attorney, to represent them.”

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      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally denied Dueñas’s
motion. As a procedural matter, the court found that the motion was not
timely filed as required by section 1473.7, subdivision (b)(2). On the merits,
the court found the testimony of Badillo “to be quite credible,” and
determined that “the efforts by Mr. Badillo were focused on the immigration
consequences, and he did everything that was possible to ty to work out a
deal that would allow [Dueñas] to stay here in the country.” By contrast, the
court stated, “I don’t find the testimony of Mr. Dueñas to be credible.”
Ultimately, the court found that Dueñas was “accurately informed of the
consequences of his plea with respect to immigration consequences” and ruled
that Dueñas failed to meet his burden on the merits of his motion.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Dueñas argues that the evidence establishes that he did not
meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his plea.
We disagree. There is ample evidence in the record to support the trial
court’s ruling that Dueñas understood the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea, including his initials and signature on the plea form, his
statements at the plea hearing, and the section 1473.7 testimony of Dueñas’s
original defense counsel. The trial court had an opportunity to hear and
observe the live testimony of both Dueñas and his original defense counsel at
the hearing, and we are not in a position to second-guess its credibility
determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the order on this ground without
addressing the issues of timeliness or prejudice.
      “[A]ppeals from section 1473.7 hearings are subject to independent
review.” (People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 755 (Alatorre), citing
People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 525 (Vivar).) “[A]n appellate court
exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the

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rule of law.” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 634.) “When courts
engage in independent review, they must give deference to the trial court’s
factual determinations if they are based on ‘the credibility of witnesses the
[superior court] heard and observed.’ ” (People v. Espinoza (Jan. 26, 2023,
S269647) __ Cal.5th __, __ [2023 Cal. LEXIS 254, at p. *10] (Espinoza),
quoting Vivar, at p. 527.)
      The relevant portions of section 1473.7 provide:
         “(a) A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file
         a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence for any of the
         following reasons:

         “(1) The conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to
         prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to
         meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly
         accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
         consequences of a conviction or sentence. A finding of legal
         invalidity may, but need not, include a finding of ineffective
         assistance of counsel. [¶] . . . [¶]

         “(e) When ruling on the motion:

         “(1) The court shall grant the motion to vacate the
         conviction or sentence if the moving party establishes, by a
         preponderance of the evidence, the existence of any of the
         grounds for relief specified in subdivision (a). . . .”

      Section 1473.7 offers “postconviction relief for noncitizens who pleaded
guilty to a crime without fully comprehending the immigration consequences
that might follow.” (Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 752, citing Stats.
2016, ch. 739 (Assem. Bill No. 813) § 1.) To receive relief under the statute,
“[t]he defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the
immigration consequences of his plea. Next, the defendant must show that
his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error.” (Espinoza, supra, [2023
Cal. LEXIS at p. *10].)

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      A defendant seeking to withdraw his plea based on inadequate
advisement of immigration consequences must corroborate such assertions
with “ ‘objective evidence.’ ” (Vivar, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 530; see also
People v. Cruz-Lopez (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 212, 223–224 [“An allegation that
trial counsel failed to properly advise a defendant is meaningless unless there
is objective corroborating evidence supporting appellant’s claimed failures.”];
People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 872 [“In a postconviction setting,
courts should not simply accept a defendant’s statement of regret regarding
the plea, courts should also ‘look to contemporaneous evidence to
substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.’ ”].)
      Dueñas contends that “[t]he record provides sufficient objective
evidence to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not
meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of pleading guilty.”
For support, he cites: (1) his declaration dated July 9, 2021; (2) his testimony
at his section 1473.7 hearing; (3) the testimony of Badillo at Dueñas’s section
1473.7 hearing; and (4) Dueñas’s “age and his inexperience with the United
States, the criminal justice system and the immigration proceedings” at the
time of his plea.
      We reject this argument. Dueñas’s reliance on his own declaration and
testimony is misplaced because the trial court found the contrary testimony
of defense attorney Badillo to be “quite credible” and Dueñas’s testimony not
credible. Badillo’s testimony that he advised Dueñas of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea was also corroborated by Dueñas’s initials and
signature on the plea form and his sworn statements at the plea hearing.
Because the trial court heard live testimony from both Dueñas and Badillo at
the section 1473.7 hearing, we must defer to its resolution of this factual
conflict. (Espinoza, supra, [2023 Cal. LEXIS at p. *10]; Vivar, supra, 11

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Cal.5th at p. 527; Alatorre, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) Moreover, the
issues Dueñas highlights regarding uncertainties in Badillo’s recollection
were for the trial court to weigh in making its credibility determination—
they do not make Badillo’s testimony so inherently improbable that we may
reject it on appeal. (See People v. Ennis (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 721, 725
[“inherently improbable” standard for rejecting testimony on appeal “means
that the challenged evidence is ‘unbelievable per se’ . . . , such that ‘the things
testified to would not seem possible’ ”].)
      Finally, Dueñas’s age and inexperience, although undoubtably
relevant, do not outweigh as a matter of law the substantial evidence that he
meaningfully understood the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
His plea form contained an initialed acknowledgement that he would be
subject to adverse immigration consequences as a result of his conviction, and
an interpreter verified his understanding. At his plea hearing, Dueñas
confirmed that he understood he would be subject to these adverse
immigration consequences. Badillo’s testimony reveals that immigration
discussions were part of his consultations with Dueñas throughout the
proceedings, including in connection with the guilty plea. Dueñas’s mere
status as a young Mexican national, inexperienced with criminal proceedings
and immigration policies in the United States, does not overcome the
numerous facts in the record establishing that his plea was duly informed
with respect to immigration consequences.

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                             DISPOSITION
     The January 31, 2022 order denying Dueñas’s section 1473.7 motion is
affirmed.

                                                          BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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