Court Opinion

ID: 9946749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 14:01:23.634118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:35.152717
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                  Before
                       HOLIFIELD, GROSS, and DALY
                         Appellate Military Judges

                          _________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                                Appellee

                                       v.

                          Juan I. CAMPOS
                    Sergeant (E-5), U.S. Marine Corps
                                Appellant

                               No. 202200246

                          _________________________

                          Decided: 29 February 2024

     Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                             Military Judges:
                    Benjamin C. Robertson (arraignment)
                       Adam M. King (motions, trial)

   Sentence adjudged 7 July 2022 by a general court-martial convened at
   Camp Foster, Okinawa, Japan consisting of a military judge sitting
   alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1, confine-
   ment for seventy months, and a dishonorable discharge. 1

   1 Appellant received 120 days of confinement credit. Pursuant to the plea agree-

ment, the convening authority granted Appellant’s request to defer and then waive
automatic forfeitures for the benefit of his wife.
              United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Opinion of the Court

                               For Appellant:
               Captain Arthur L. Gaston, JAGC, USN (argued)

                             For Appellee:
      Lieutenant Commander James P. Wu Zhu, JAGC, USN (argued)
                 Major Mary C. Finnen, USMC (on brief)

   Chief Judge HOLIFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
   Judge GROSS and Judge DALY joined.

                           _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                           _________________________

HOLIFIELD, Chief Judge:
    A military judge convicted Appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of one specifi-
cation of damaging military property, one specification of drunkenly operating
a vehicle, one specification of drunk and disorderly conduct, one specification
of assaulting his spouse by strangulation, and two specifications of committing
a violent offense against his spouse, in violation of Articles 108, 113, 134, and
128b, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 2
    Appellant asserts three assignments of error: (1) Appellant was subjected
to illegal pretrial punishment in violation of Article 13, UCMJ; (2) Appellant’s
trial defense counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and seek credit
for the illegal pretrial punishment Appellant received, failing to discuss mate-
rial exculpatory evidence with Appellant or provide it to him to review before
entering his pleas, and failing to use the exculpatory evidence during his sen-
tencing case; and (3) the military judge abused his discretion by allowing the
victim impact statement to discuss other alleged, but uncharged, abuse in or-
der to describe “what type of person he is.” We find no prejudicial error and
affirm.

   2 10 U.S.C. §§ 908, 913, 934, 928b.

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                United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                              Opinion of the Court

                                I. BACKGROUND

    On 27 October 2019, shortly after marrying Appellant, Ms. Papa, 3 a Mexi-
can citizen who had never been to the United States, arrived at Marine Corps
Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni. A few months later, on or about 11 January 2020,
Appellant pulled Ms. Papa’s hair and pushed her against a wall in their home,
causing bruising to her back. In June 2020, Ms. Papa was crying because of
comments Appellant made about the couple’s relationship. In response, Appel-
lant told Ms. Papa, “[I]f you want to cry, cry somewhere else where I can’t hear
you,” and proceeded to hit her in the face, kick her in her shins, and pull her
hair. 4 When Ms. Papa reported this incident, Appellant’s command counseled
him and ordered him to take alcohol abuse classes.
    Almost two years later, on 8 March 2022, Appellant became extremely in-
toxicated after consuming approximately six drinks of whiskey mixed with
soda. Ms. Papa, aware of Appellant’s level of intoxication, attempted to avoid
contact with him by remaining upstairs in the couple’s home. At some point,
Appellant went upstairs, removed his shirt, and attempted to be affectionate
with Ms. Papa, who was lying in bed. When she declined his advances, Appel-
lant pushed Ms. Papa from the bed. This caused Appellant to fall to the floor,
likely due to his level of intoxication. While on the floor, Appellant grabbed Ms.
Papa by her hair. Ms. Papa then fled the bedroom, making it to the landing
before Appellant again forced her onto the floor, this time face down. Appellant
wrapped his legs around hers, placed the entire weight of his body on top of
her, and put his arm across her throat. Ms. Papa remained trapped in this
position for approximately three minutes while being unable to communicate
because her airway was blocked. The force of the strangulation caused numer-
ous blood vessels to rupture in Ms. Papa’s face.
    At some point during the strangulation, Appellant placed his hand around
Ms. Papa’s neck, with his fingers directly over her throat. Appellant also bit
Ms. Papa on the back of her neck, causing bite marks visible hours later. While
strangling Ms. Papa, Appellant repeatedly stated in Spanish, “ya vete mal-
dita.” 5 “Ya vete” translates as “go away,” while “maldita” can mean “various
different obscenities.” 6

   3 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,

are pseudonyms.
   4 Pros. Ex. 1 at 1.

   5 R. at 84, 159.

   6 Pros. Ex. 1. at 2.

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                  United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                                Opinion of the Court

    Eventually, Appellant released his grip enough to allow Ms. Papa to speak
and remind him that she was his wife. In response, Appellant asked, “Will you
forgive me if I let you go?” 7 When Ms. Papa agreed, Appellant released her and
she ran to a neighbor’s house. Upon seeing her neighbor, Ms. Papa stated, “[Ap-
pellant] tried to kill me!” 8 The neighbor immediately called the police, who soon
arrived on scene and found Appellant in the driver’s seat of his sports car. See-
ing the responding military policeman [MP], Appellant said “f*** you” and
drove away. 9
    Appellant proceeded to drive around a residential neighborhood on MCAS
Iwakuni at an excessive rate of speed before eventually attempting to overtake
a vehicle in the oncoming traffic lane. The result was Appellant crashing into
a perimeter fence. After crashing the vehicle, Appellant unsuccessfully tried to
scale the perimeter fence. He then screamed “f*** you,” “f*** you pigs,” and
“shoot b****, I told you to f***ing shoot” at the responding MPs. 10 He also
called a Hispanic MP a traitor for trying to take him into custody. Appellant is
Hispanic.
   The MPs ultimately tackled Appellant and took him to a Japanese hospital.
While receiving care, Appellant continued to yell obscenities at law enforce-
ment and medical personnel. At 0455 on 9 March 2022, approximately nine
hours after Appellant’s last drink, tests revealed that Appellant’s blood-alcohol
content was 0.045.
    On 19 May 2022, Appellant and his trial defense counsel signed and sub-
mitted a plea agreement under which Appellant would plead guilty to offenses
that occurred on the night of 8 March 2022, including: damaging the perimeter
fence, drunkenly operating his vehicle, drunk and disorderly conduct, stran-
gling Ms. Papa, and biting Ms. Papa’s neck. Additionally, Appellant agreed to
plead guilty to assaulting his wife by pulling her hair, striking her in the head,
and kicking her on the leg on divers occasions on or between 1 November 2019
and 7 June 2020. Appellant would plead not guilty to biting Ms. Papa on her
lip and chest during the same period. Appellant would also plead not guilty to
attempting to murder Ms. Papa by strangulation, attempting to wrongfully
leave the scene of an accident, using disrespectful language to a sentinel in the
exercise of duties, recklessly operating a vehicle, and communicating a
threat—all of which took place on 8 March 2022.

   7 Pros. Ex. 1. at 3.

   8 R. at 165.

   9 Pros. Ex. 1 at 3.

   10 Pros. Ex. 1 at 3; Pros. Ex. 9-10.

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                  United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                                Opinion of the Court

   Among the provisions of the signed plea agreement, Appellant specifically
agreed “to waive all motions except those that are non-waivable pursuant to
R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B) or otherwise.” 11 As for the Government, the agreement re-
quired the convening authority to limit Appellant’s total confinement to be-
tween 60 and 72 months and to withdraw and dismiss the language, charges,
and specifications to which Appellant pleaded not guilty. 12
    At his 6 July 2022 guilty plea colloquy, Appellant told the military judge
that on 8 March 2022 he “blacked out” “from the last time I remember having
a drink until I woke up at the Japanese hospital.” 13 He further stated: “I do not
remember what happened, but seeing the evidence and – I believe that I com-
mitted the offense.” 14 Hearing this, the military judge took a brief recess, dur-
ing which he learned that “[Appellant] was going to have a similar response to
all of the offenses to which [Appellant] has pleaded guilty to that occurred on
or about 8 March of 2022.” 15
    When the military judge later asked him to explain why he was guilty of
strangling his wife, Appellant responded, “I do not remember what happened,
sir.” 16 But Appellant explained that he read his wife’s statements; viewed pho-
tographs, an NCIS video, and crime scene documentation; and read the Provost
Marshal Office’s report of the incident.
    When asked if he was “satisfied that the reports and statements that [he]
received are true and correct,” Appellant responded, “Yes, sir.” 17 The military
judge went on to ask whether Appellant had any “reason to believe that the
victim or the witnesses would lie about what [Appellant] did on or about 8
March 2022?” 18 Appellant responded, “No, sir.” 19 The military judge further
asked Appellant whether he was “satisfied that [he] received all of the evidence

   11 Appellate Ex. III at 6.

   12 Under the terms of the plea agreement, all confinement would be served concur-

rently. Thus, the maximum total confinement was determined by the 60 to 72 month
range required for the strangulation charge. Without the strangulation, the minimum
and maximum confinement would have been 12 months.
   13 R. at 39-40, 68.

   14 R. at 48.

   15 Id.

   16 R. at 71.

   17 R. at 73.

   18 Id.

   19 Id.

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                  United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                                Opinion of the Court

in the possession of the prosecution pertaining to this offense, both favorable
and unfavorable”; whether he considered “all of the evidence”; and whether
after “considering all of the evidence and discussing the case with [his] defense
counsel, [Appellant believed he] committed the offense.” 20 To each of these in-
quiries, Appellant responded, “Yes, sir,” and further indicated he had no doubt
as to whether he strangled Ms. Papa. 21 A similar, thorough colloquy then oc-
curred regarding the 8 March 2022 specification of biting Ms. Papa.
    Later, when the military judge asked whether he remembered the domestic
violence that occurred on divers occasions between on or about 1 November
2019 and 7 June 2020, Appellant responded, “No, sir, I do not.” 22 After a short
recess, Appellant responded, “Yes, sir. I’m not too – I do not really remember,
like, the exact details, but I do remember the incidents.” 23 Upon hearing Ap-
pellant describe each instance of domestic violence, the military judge accepted
his plea as provident.
    Prior to the next day’s presentencing hearing, Ms. Papa submitted to the
trial court a written victim impact statement. 24 Trial defense counsel objected
to any statements concerning allegations of abusive conduct to which Appel-
lant had not pleaded guilty, including “yelling at [Ms. Papa] occasionally,”
“grab[bing] and pull[ing] on [her] arms,” “hav[ing] [her] immobilized against
the wall,” “tak[ing] [her] phone away,” and “cut[ting] the Internet off which
restricted [her] communication with anyone outside of [their] home.” 25 Trial
defense counsel argued these statements were irrelevant, improper, and out-
side the scope of victim impact statements allowed under Rule for Courts-Mar-
tial [R.C.M.] 1001(c). 26
    The military judge overruled this objection, finding the statement “provides
context for the Court . . . to understand the impact of the offenses for which the
[Appellant] is to be sentenced.” 27 The military judge further found that the ob-
jected-to portions of the statement addressed “a continuous course of conduct

   20 R. at 74-75.

   21 Id.

   22 R. at 99.

   23 R. at 103.

   24 Appellate Ex. VIII.

   25 R. at 185-87, 204.

   26 R. at 185-87.

   27 R. at 198.

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               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

regarding similar crimes” and that the statements addressed “[d]omestic vio-
lence, including physical and emotional intimidation and isolation against the
same victim . . . in the same general location in and around their residence”
over a “relatively close timeframe,” noting that Appellant and Ms. Papa “had
only lived together at this time since October 2019.” 28 As such, the military
judge allowed Ms. Papa to read her statement in its entirety, including: “I am
standing here telling all of you what type of person [Appellant] is and how he
impacted me. I want to ensure he never does this to anyone else when he is
released.” 29
   After also receiving evidence in aggravation, extenuation and mitigation,
the military judge sentenced Appellant to a reduction to E-1, confinement for
70 months, and a dishonorable discharge.
    On appeal, Appellant filed a Motion to Attach containing his sworn decla-
ration. In the declaration, Appellant states he was held in maximum security
for the first nine days of his pretrial confinement in the MCAS Iwakuni brig.
Appellant also maintains he was only allowed to leave his cell during the first
two days to exercise for twenty minutes in full shackles and to shower. For the
other seven days Appellant attests he was allowed to leave his cell for an hour.
He also claims that, while in maximum security, he was unable to have visitors
aside from a command representative, chaplain, and his trial defense counsel.
    At trial, when the military judge specifically asked whether Appellant had
“been punished in any way that would constitute illegal pre-trial punishment
under Article 13,” 30 both Appellant and his trial defense asserted that he had
not. Appellant now contends he “did not know what [the military judge] was
talking about” when this colloquy occurred. 31
    Appellant’s Motion to Attach also contained documents concerning a state-
ment Ms. Papa made to a Family Advocacy Program [FAP] counselor in June
2020. The documents indicate that Ms. Papa had previously “described inci-
dents of emotional abuse, reported physical bruises and bites to Law [sic] en-
forcement but denied such allegations while assessed with FAP.” 32 The coun-
selor’s summary further noted that Ms. Papa “expressed being worried about

   28 Id.

   29 R. at 208.

   30 R. at 145.

   31 Appellant’s Decl. at 1-2.

   32 Appellant’s Decl., Attachment 3.

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               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

impacting [Appellant’s] career.” 33 The Motion to Attach also included an Inci-
dent Determination Committee [IDC] report documenting that allegations of
adult physical maltreatment by Appellant against Ms. Papa were deemed to
“not meet criteria” for domestic violence. 34
    Although trial defense counsel received the FAP/IDC documents on 23 May
2022, Appellant maintains they were never discussed with him. Moreover, he
claims that, had he seen them, he would not have pleaded guilty to either the
2019-2020 or 2022 domestic violence charges.
   This Court ordered trial defense counsel to submit declarations regarding
Appellant’s allegations. We received the affidavits on 10 October 2023. Trial
defense counsel 1 [TDC1] states he visited Appellant at the Iwakuni brig “reg-
ularly” and maintains he “observed nothing that raised Article 13 concerns.” 35
His observations led him to think that brig staff were properly following rele-
vant regulations and he heard nothing from Appellant to make him think oth-
erwise. While TDC1 was able to secure Appellant’s transfer to the brig in Oki-
nawa, it was because that brig offered more resources and improved conditions.
    Trial defense counsel 2’s [TDC2] declaration similarly maintained Appel-
lant’s conditions did not constitute a violation of Article 13. Specifically, TDC2
stated that, given the serious nature of Appellant’s alleged crimes, the injuries
to Ms. Papa, and the fact she lived only a short distance from the brig, it was
reasonable and lawful for Appellant to be held under the brig’s most restrictive
procedures. And, as with TDC1, TDC2 noted Appellant never informed him of
the conditions he now claims in his declaration.
    As for the FAP report, neither trial defense counsel believed the evidence
to be material or exculpatory. TDC1 believed Appellant had the opportunity to
review the FAP report with TDC2 in Okinawa. He also believed the documents
were of little value but presented great risk, given other corroborating evi-
dence—including that the IDC separately determined another 2020 incident

   33 Id.

   34 Appellant’s Decl., Attachment 4. The IDC is “[a] multidisciplinary team of des-

ignated individuals working at the installation level, tasked with the evaluation of
reports of domestic and child abuse to the FAP to determine whether they meet the
relevant criteria for alleged domestic and child abuse for entry into the Service FAP
Central Registry of domestic and child abuse reports.” Chief of Naval Operations Instr.
1752.2C, Family Advocacy Program, App’x C-7 (20 May 2020). It is not clear from the
report what allegations the IDC considered in this instance.
   35 Trial Defense Counsel 1 Decl. at 1-2.

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              United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Opinion of the Court

involving Appellant “met criteria for spousal abuse.” 36 Accordingly, TDC1 be-
lieved introducing the FAP report “could have opened the door to rebuttal evi-
dence and contributed to a cycle-of-abuse narrative for the Government.” 37
     TDC2 similarly appraised the FAP report as non-exculpatory, as the abuse
occurred on multiple occasions. He also stated that Appellant was given and
reviewed all evidence provided by the Government. And TDC2 noted that Ap-
pellant would have known about the IDC’s negative finding regardless, as it
lifted a no-contact order and allowed Appellant to move back into his residence
with Ms. Papa.
   Additional facts necessary for our analysis are provided below.

                                 II. DISCUSSION

A. Appellant was not subjected to illegal pretrial punishment in viola-
tion of Article 13, UCMJ.
   Appellant argues the Government arbitrarily subjected him to unduly
harsh confinement conditions in violation of Article 13, UCMJ. Additionally,
Appellant asserts he did not waive the issue of pursuing confinement credit
when he responded negatively to the military judge’s question asking whether
he had experienced illegal pretrial confinement.

   1. Standard of Review and Law
    Whether an appellant has been subject to illegal pretrial confinement in
violation of Article 13, UCMJ, is a mixed question of law and fact. 38 An appel-
lant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to additional confinement
credit for a violation of Article 13—a question we review de novo. 39 Whether
an appellant has waived an issue is a question of law we review de novo. 40
“[W]here a military judge is faced with a pretrial agreement that contains an
Article 13 waiver, the judge should inquire into the circumstances of the pre-
trial confinement and the voluntariness of the waiver, and ensure that the ac-
cused understands the remedy to which he would be entitled.” 41 Absent plain

   36 Trial Defense Counsel 1 Decl. at 8.

   37 Trial Defense Counsel 1 Decl. at 9.

   38 United States v. Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

   39 Id.

   40 United States v. Ahern, 76 M.J. 194, 197 (C.A.A.F. 2017).

   41 United States v. McFadyen, 51 M.J. 289, 291 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

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                United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                              Opinion of the Court

error, however, failure to allege an Article 13 violation at trial waives the is-
sue. 42
   Article 13, UCMJ, provides:
       No person, while being held for trial, may be subjected to pun-
       ishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon the
       charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement
       imposed upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances
       require to insure his presence, but he may be subjected to minor
       punishment during that period for infractions of discipline.
    Article 13 prohibits two things: illegal pretrial punishment and illegal pre-
trial confinement. 43 Punitive intent is one significant factor when determining
whether an Article 13 violation has occurred. 44 If an accused or appellant can
demonstrate a violation of Article 13, then he or she is entitled to sentence
relief. 45 But, while “violations of service regulations prescribing pretrial con-
finement conditions provide a basis” for a discretionary grant of additional
credit, such violations “do not independently trigger a per se right to such
credit enforceable by the servicemember.” 46 Additional confinement credit is
appropriate where “confinement officials have knowingly and deliberately vio-
lated provisions of service regulations designed to protect the rights of pre-
sumptively innocent servicemembers.” 47

   2. Analysis
    While not required, it would have been helpful if the military judge had
engaged in a more detailed colloquy with Appellant regarding the plea agree-
ment’s Article 13 waiver, thereby establishing Appellant’s understanding of
the term. We have examined the conflicting descriptions of the conditions of
Appellant’s confinement contained in the various declarations before us. And,
finally, we note that Appellant did not allege an Article 13 violation at trial,
but now seeks to avoid waiver by framing the issue as a failure by his counsel
to explain the matter. However, we need resolve neither the question of waiver
nor the conflicting assessments of the confinement conditions. Even treating

   42 United States v. Inong, 58 M.J. 460, 465 (C.A.A.F. 2003).

   43 Id. at 463.

   44 Mosby, 56 M.J. at 310 (citations omitted).

   45 Id.

   46 United States v. Adcock, 65 M.J. 18, 25 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

   47 Id.

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                United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                              Opinion of the Court

the matter as not waived and accepting Appellant’s version of his treatment in
the Iwakuni brig, Appellant has failed to show that the conditions of his con-
finement were arbitrary or unduly rigorous under the circumstances.
    He was charged, inter alia, with repeatedly, violently assaulting his wife,
attempting to kill his wife, attempting to leave the scene of an accident, and
threatening to kill another Marine. Thus, it was not objectively unreasonable
for brig personnel to treat him as a “maximum custody” detainee “requiring
special custodial supervision because of the high probability of escape,” being
“potentially violent or dangerous, and whose escape would cause concern of a
threat to life, property, or national security.” 48 Although the relevant service
regulation requires even maximum custody detainees to “have the opportunity
to be outside of their cell for at least 2 hours daily,” this mandate can be over-
come if a detainee presents safety or security concerns. 49
    Appellant has failed to establish that the claimed conditions of his confine-
ment violated service regulations or were otherwise unduly harsh. Further-
more, he also has failed to show any punitive intent behind his pretrial con-
finement—and we decline to infer such intent from the circumstances pre-
sented. 50

B. Appellant’s trial defense counsel were not ineffective.
   Appellant asserts his trial defense counsel were ineffective for failing to: (1)
investigate and seek credit for the pretrial confinement conditions Appellant
received while at the Iwakuni brig; (2) discuss or provide him with exculpatory
evidence (the 2020 FAP report) before Appellant entered his pleas; and (3) use
that exculpatory evidence during sentencing.

    48 Dep’t of the Navy, Corrections Manual (SECNAV M-1640.1) para 4201.2.a (15

May 2019).
    49 Id. at para 4205.3.d.

    50 In his brief, Appellant cites to United States v. Evans, 55 M.J. 732 (N-M. Ct.

Crim. App. 2001) as an example of where this Court awarded additional confinement
credit based on similar conditions. But that case involved unreasonable, blind adher-
ence to a standard operating procedure tied, at least in part, to the potential length of
sentence faced, imposing conditions of maximum custody even after the appellant was
injured and confined to a wheelchair. That is not this case.

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                United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                              Opinion of the Court

    1. Standard of Review and Law
    We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. 51 To prevail
on such a claim, “an appellant must demonstrate both (1) that his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and (2) that this deficiency resulted in prejudice.” 52
The appellant bears the “burden of establishing the truth of factual matters
relevant to the claim.” 53 Only after an appellant has met his burden and has
demonstrated both deficiency and prejudice can we find in the appellant’s favor
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 54
    To establish deficiency, an appellant must first overcome “a strong pre-
sumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable pro-
fessional assistance.” 55 A military appellate court “will not second-guess the
strategic or tactical decisions made at trial by defense counsel.” 56 If an appel-
lant raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a challenge
against the trial strategy or tactics of the defense counsel, “the appellant must
show specific defects in counsel’s performance that were ‘unreasonable under
prevailing professional norms.’” 57 Strategic decisions to accept or forgo a poten-
tial benefit are not deficient when the decisions are objectively reasonable. 58
Furthermore, “it is not necessary to decide the issue of deficient performance
when it is apparent that the alleged deficiency has not caused prejudice.” 59
“When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on counsel’s fail-
ure to make a motion . . . an appellant must show that there is a reasonable

    51United States v. Mazza, 67 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2009); United States v.
Cooper, 80 M.J. 664, 672 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020).
    52 United States v. Green, 68 M.J. 360, 361-62 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (other citation omitted).
    53 Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 128 (C.A.A.F. 2008).

    54 United States v. Cooper, 80 M.J. 664, 672 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020).

    55 United States v. Scott, 81 M.J. 79, 84 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 489).
    56 United States v. Anderson, 55 M.J. 198, 202 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United

States v. Morgan, 37 M.J. 407, 410 (C.M.A. 1993)).
    57 Mazza, 67 M.J. at 475 (quoting United States v. Perez, 64 M.J. 239, 243 (C.A.A.F.

2006)) (cleaned up).
    58 United States v. Datavs, 71 M.J. 420, 424 (C.A.A.F. 2012).

    59 United States v. Bradley, 71 M.J. 13, 16 (C.A.A.F. 2012). See also, Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697. (“If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.”).

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               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

probability that such a motion would have been meritorious.” 60 Lastly, where
an appellant has pleaded guilty, he must “show specifically that there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” 61

   2. Analysis
       a. Failure to investigate conditions of pretrial confinement or seek addi-
   tional confinement credit was not deficient performance
    As discussed above, we find the conditions of Appellant’s pretrial confine-
ment at MCAS Iwakuni did not warrant confinement credit beyond the day-
for-day credit the military judge awarded. Since any motion for additional con-
finement credit would not have been meritorious, there could be no prejudice
and we need not decide whether his trial defense counsel were ineffective on
this point.
       b. Failure to discuss or provide Appellant with the 2020 FAP Report
   Appellant claims he never received or reviewed the FAP report. His trial
defense counsel dispute this. But we can decide the matter by assuming ar-
guendo that Appellant’s version is correct and that his counsel’s failure to dis-
cuss with him the 2020 FAP report constituted deficient performance, because
Appellant fails to prove prejudice. Given the strength of the Government’s ev-
idence, as well as Appellant’s own words and actions at his trial, we find no
reasonable probability that Appellant would have contested the most serious
charges to which he pleaded guilty had he only known of the FAP report.
    First, the evidentiary value of the FAP report is low. At best, it shows that
Ms. Papa, two years earlier, had recanted on a claim of domestic abuse. It does
nothing to counter the physical evidence of strangulation, Ms. Papa’s immedi-
ate, frantic report to her neighbor, or her excited utterance (“he tried to kill
me!”). 62 Each of these alone supports Ms. Papa’s description of the March 2022
assault; combined, they appear insurmountably strong.
    Second, arguably the greatest benefit Appellant received in entering into
his plea agreement was the withdrawal and dismissal of the attempted murder

   60 United States v. Jameson, 65 M.J. 160, 163-64 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

   61 United States v. Tippit, 65 M.J. 69, 76 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   62 R. at 165.

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              United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Opinion of the Court

charge. This effectively took a life sentence off the table. Given the strong cor-
roborative evidence of his March 2022 attack of Ms. Papa, the chance of Appel-
lant’s conviction of attempted murder was far from zero.
   Third, the theme of Appellant’s unsworn statement was apologizing to his
wife and conveying his wish that they might repair their relationship. At one
point, he even got down on his knees to address her in the courtroom, causing
the military judge to rebuke his counsel. Salvaging his marriage was clearly
Appellant’s main objective. Pleading not guilty and contesting the charges and
Ms. Papa’s testimony would have frustrated this aim.
   Fourth, the FAP report also contained information that could hurt Appel-
lant’s case. While the report indicates Ms. Papa reported “emotional abuse”
and “bruises and bites to Law [sic] enforcement but denied such allegations” to
the FAP counselor, it also provides a potential explanation of the denial: “Vic-
tim expressed being worried about impacting her spouse’s career.” 63
    It is inconceivable that these one or two sentences in 1900-plus pages of
discovery materials would have led Appellant to plead not guilty to the stran-
gulation specification in the face of the overwhelming physical evidence of his
misconduct on 8 March 2022. It is also simply not reasonable to believe that he
would have forgone the protections of his plea agreement and faced a potential
life sentence for attempted murder by pleading not guilty to the less serious,
2019-2020 misconduct alleged in the Additional Charge.
       c. Failure to use exculpatory evidence in sentencing
    Appellant’s trial defense counsel describe strategic reasons for not using
the FAP report, mainly, that the report’s value was low and the potential risks
it raised were high. This decision was objectively reasonable, whether as-
sessing its use for exculpatory purposes at a contested trial or for mitigation in
sentencing. Accordingly, we will not second-guess their decision.
    Specifically regarding use of the FAP report for sentencing following Ap-
pellant’s guilty plea, we fail to see how it would not have undermined Appel-
lant’s pleas to the 8 March 2022 domestic assaults. When the military judge
asked Appellant why he thought he was guilty of strangling and biting his wife,
Appellant explained that, due to his level of intoxication that night, he did not
remember what happened. However, Appellant believed he was guilty based
on having read his wife’s statement and being satisfied that the statement was
true and correct. He further denied that he had any reason to believe his wife

   63 Appellant’s Decl., Attachment 3.

                                         14
               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

would lie about what happened that night. Based on these and other responses,
the military judge accepted Appellant’s pleas.
    As Ms. Papa’s statements were key to Appellant’s belief that he was guilty
of the 8 March 2022 assaults, any effort to undermine her credibility by demon-
strating an earlier recantation of another assault claim would render Appel-
lant’s plea improvident. The prejudice Appellant complains of is a chimera.
    Accordingly, we find no merit in Appellant’s claim that he received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. We turn next to his claims regarding the military
judge’s ruling to admit Ms. Papa’s victim impact statement.
C. The military judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the vic-
tim impact statement.
    Appellant argues the military judge abused his discretion by allowing Ms.
Papa, through her unsworn victim impact statement, to discuss alleged abuse
of which Appellant was not convicted. Appellant further contends the military
judge committed plain error by allowing the victim impact statement to convey
that Appellant should be punished for the “type of person he is.”

   1. Standard of Review and Law
    “We review a military judge’s decision to allow a victim to present an un-
sworn victim impact statement for abuse of discretion.” 64 “The abuse of discre-
tion standard is a strict one, calling for more than a mere difference of opinion.
The challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful, clearly unreasonable, or
clearly erroneous.” 65
    Pursuant to R.C.M. 1001(c)(3), the contents of victim impact statements
may only include matters in mitigation and “victim impact,” which is defined
to include “any financial, social, psychological, or medical impact on the crime
victim directly relating to or arising from the offense of which the accused has
been found guilty.” 66 “A victim’s statement should not exceed what is permitted
under R.C.M. 1001(c)(3),” and “[u]pon objection by either party or sua sponte,

   64 United States v. Miller, 82 M.J. 788, 791 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (citing
United States v. Hamilton, 78 M.J. 335, 340 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (recognizing that victim
impact statements are not evidence but applying the same standard of review to their
admission)).
   65 United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   66 R.C.M. 1001(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

                                        15
               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

a military judge may stop or interrupt a victim’s statement that includes mat-
ters outside the scope of R.C.M. 1001(c)(3).” 67 “While the military judge is the
gatekeeper for unsworn victim statements, an accused nonetheless has a duty
to state the specific ground for objection in order to preserve a claim of error
on appeal.” 68
    “When determining whether an error substantially influenced a sentence,
this Court considers the following four factors: ‘(1) the strength of the Govern-
ment's case; (2) the strength of the defense case; (3) the materiality of the evi-
dence in question; and (4) the quality of the evidence in question.’” 69
    Furthermore, judges are “presumed to know the law and apply it cor-
rectly.” 70 Absent clear evidence to the contrary, we will assume the military
judge did not sentence Appellant on any improper basis. 71

   2. Analysis
    The phrase “directly relating to or arising from the same offense” in the
context of victim impact statements is not defined in R.C.M. 1001(c). It has,
however, been defined in relation to evidence in aggravation admitted under
R.C.M. 1001(b). Our superior Court has held that evidence of uncharged mis-
conduct offered in aggravation “is directly related to the conduct for which ap-
pellant was found guilty” where it shows “a continuous course of conduct in-
volving the same or similar crimes, the same victims, and a similar situs within
the military community, i.e., the servicemember's home.” 72 Part of the Court’s
rationale was that the evidence showed “the true impact of the charged of-
fenses on the [victims].” 73

   67 R.C.M. 1001(c)(5)(B), Discussion.

   68 United States v. Tyler, 81 M.J. 108, 113 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

   69 Hamilton, 78 M.J. at 343 (equating erroneous admission of an unsworn victim

impact statement to the erroneous admission of evidence in aggravation) (citing United
States v. Bowen, 76 M.J. 83, 89 (C.A.A.F. 2017)).
   70 United States v. Bridges, 66 M.J. 246, 248 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citation omitted).

   71 Id.

   72 United States v. Mullens, 29 M.J. 398, 400 (C.M.A. 1990); see also United States

v. Nourse, 55 M.J. 229, 232 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (“when uncharged misconduct is part of a
continuous course of conduct involving similar crimes and the same victims, it is en-
compassed within the language ‘directly relating to or resulting from the offenses of
which the accused has been found guilty’ under RCM 1001(b)(4).”).
   73 Nourse, 55 M.J. at 231.

                                          16
               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                             Opinion of the Court

    It only makes sense to apply this same definition to the victim impact state-
ment in this case. Under R.C.M. 1001(c), a crime victim “has the right to be
reasonably heard” concerning “any financial, social, psychological, or medical
impact on the crime victim directly relating to or arising from the offense of
which the accused has been found guilty.” This right would prove illusory if it
did not include the ability to describe circumstances necessary for the sentenc-
ing authority to understand the true impact of the crime on the victim.

    Here, the military judge said he considered the uncharged domestic abuse
as “a continuing course of conduct involving similar crimes” and that Ms.
Papa’s description of that abuse “provides context to the court . . . to under-
stand the impact of the offenses for which the accused is to be sentenced.” 74
But the military judge also emphasized that he was sentencing Appellant “only
for the offenses that he has been found guilty.” 75
    We find that the military judge’s decision to allow Ms. Papa to describe the
uncharged domestic abuse was reasonable. Therefore, there was no abuse of
discretion.
    After describing in detail (over four transcribed pages) Appellant’s specific
acts of abuse and how they affect her daily life, Ms. Papa concluded with: “I am
thankful I am alive, though, because I am standing here telling all of you what
type of person [Appellant] is.” 76 Appellant argues this broad comment was out-
side the scope of R.C.M. 1001(c). We disagree. If anything, this is no more than
an obvious, logical conclusion based on Ms. Papa’s entire impact statement and
the offenses to which Appellant pleaded guilty: that Appellant is someone who
physically abused and strangled his wife. Furthermore, we find that neither
Ms. Papa’s “type of person” comment nor her statement that she “want[ed] to
ensure [Appellant] never does this to anyone else when he is released,” consti-
tuted a request for a specific sentence or for more punishment than the evi-
dence merited. 77
     Even if we were to find that the military judge abused his discretion, we
conclude there was no prejudice. The Government’s sentencing case was
strong, including: Appellant’s statements made during his guilty plea; details
contained in the stipulation of fact; and the extent of the physical harm in-
flicted on his wife—extensive bruising, petechiae, the obvious bite mark—as

   74 R. at 198.

   75 R. at 199.

   76 R. at 208.

   77 Id.

                                       17
              United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Opinion of the Court

evidenced by photographs and witness testimony. In contrast, the Defense’s
sentencing evidence was relatively weak, consisting primarily of his record of
military service.
    Ms. Papa’s description of uncharged abuse was material in that it put the
impact of the domestic violence in context. Also, the quality of her victim im-
pact statement was high, specifically her description of the severe, lasting de-
bilitating effect of Appellant’s abuse. In contrast, however, the language of
which Appellant now objects—what “type of person he is”— is of relatively low
quality and low material impact. 78 We are confident it played no part in the
military judge’s sentencing decision.

   78 Id.

                                      18
              United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Opinion of the Court

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record, along with the briefs and argu-
ments of appellate counsel, we have determined that the findings and sentence
are correct in law and fact and that no error materially prejudicial to Appel-
lant’s substantial rights occurred. 79
    However, we note that the Entry of Judgment does not accurately reflect
the disposition of the charges. The Entry of Judgment incorrectly states that
the military judge found Appellant not guilty of those charges and specifica-
tions to which he pleaded not guilty. In fact, those charges and specifications
were withdrawn and dismissed prior to announcement of findings. Although
we find no prejudice, Appellant is entitled to have court-martial records that
correctly reflect the content of his proceeding. 80 In accordance with Rule for
Courts-Martial 1111(c)(2), we modify the Entry of Judgment and direct that it
be included in the record.
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                 FOR THE COURT:

                                 MARK K. JAMISON
                                 Clerk of Court

   79 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

   80 United States v. Crumpley, 49 M.J. 538, 539 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).

                                        19
     This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

UNITED STATES                                        NMCCA NO. 202200246

       v.                                                   ENTRY
                                                             OF
Juan I. CAMPOS                                            JUDGMENT
Sergeant (E-5)
U.S. Marine Corps                                    As Modified on Appeal
                  Accused
                                                        29 February 2024

    On 25 May 2022 and 7 July 2022, the Accused was tried at Camp Foster, Okinawa,
by a general court-martial, consisting of a military judge sitting alone. Military Judges
Benjamin C. Robertson and Adam M. King presided.

                                    FINDINGS

   The following are the Accused’s pleas and the Court’s findings to all offenses the
convening authority referred to trial:

Charge I:     Violation of Article 80, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
              10 U.S.C. § 880.
               Plea: Not Guilty
               Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

   Specification 1: Attempted murder on or about 8 March 2020.
                        Plea: Not Guilty.
                        Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

   Specification 2: Attempted fleeing the scene of an accident on or about
                    8 March 2020.
                        Plea: Not Guilty.
                        Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.
                United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                          Modified Entry of Judgment

Charge II:   Violation of Article 95a, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
             10 U.S.C. § 895a.
             Plea: Not Guilty.
             Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

   Specification:    Disrespect toward sentinel or lookout on or about 8
                     March 2022.
                     Plea: Not Guilty.
                     Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

Charge III: Violation of Article 108, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
            10 U.S.C. § 908.
             Plea: Guilty.
             Finding: Guilty.

   Specification:    Damaging military property on or about 8 March 2022.
                     Plea: Guilty.
                     Finding: Guilty.

Charge IV: Violation of Article 113, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
           10 U.S.C. § 913.
             Plea: Guilty.
             Finding: Guilty.

   Specification 1: Drunken operation of a vehicle on or about 8 March
                    2022.
                     Plea: Guilty.
                     Finding: Guilty.

   Specification 2: Reckless operation of a vehicle on or about 8 March
                    2022.
                     Plea: Not Guilty.
                     Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

Charge V:    Violation of Article 115, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
             10 U.S.C. § 915.
             Plea: Not Guilty.
             Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

                                        2
               United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                         Modified Entry of Judgment

   Specification:    Communicating a threat on or about 8 March 2022.
                     Plea: Not Guilty.
                     Finding: Withdrawn and dismissed.

Charge VI: Violation of Article 128b, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
           10 U.S.C. § 928b.
            Plea: Guilty.
            Finding: Guilty.

   Specification 1: Assaulting a spouse by strangulation on or about 8
                    March 2022.
                     Plea: Guilty.
                     Finding: Guilty.

   Specification 2: Commission of a violent offense against a spouse on or
                    about 8 March 2022.
                     Plea: Guilty.
                     Finding: Guilty.

Charge VII: Violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
            10 U.S.C. § 934.
            Plea: Guilty.
            Finding: Guilty.

   Specification:    Disorderly Conduct, Drunkeness on or about 98 March
                     2022.
                     Plea: Guilty.
                     Finding: Guilty.

Additional Charge:        Violation of Article 128b, Uniform Code of
                          Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 928b.
                          Plea: Guilty.
                          Finding: Guilty by exceptions.

   Specification:    Commission of a violent offense against a spouse on
                     divers occasions between on or about 1 November 2019
                     and 7 June 2020.
                     Plea: Guilty, excepting the words “and bite J.A.P.P. on the
                     lips and chest with the accused’s teeth.”
                     Finding: Guilty, excepting the words “and bite J.A.P.P. on the
                     lips and chest with the accused’s teeth.”

                                        3
                 United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                           Modified Entry of Judgment

                                  SENTENCE

    On 7 July 2022, a military judge sentenced the Accused to the following:
       Reduction to pay grade E-1.
       Confinement
          For the Specification Charge III:
             confinement for 2 months.
          For Specification 1 of Charge IV:
             confinement for 6 months.
          For Specification 1 of Charge VI:
             confinement for 70 months.
          For Specification 2 of Charge VI:
             confinement for 12 months.
          For the Specification of Charge VII:
             confinement for 4 months.
          For the Specification of the Additional Charge:
             confinement for 12 months.
          The terms of confinement will run concurrently.
       Confinement for a total of 70 months.
       A dishonorable discharge.
   The Accused shall be credited with 120 days of pretrial confinement.

                              DEFERMENT AND WAIVER
    On 1 June 2022, the accused requested the convening authority defer and waive
automatic forfeitures the accused is due during his enlistment, provided that the ac-
cused establish and maintain a dependent’s allotment in the total amount of the for-
feiture amount during the entire period of confinement. The convening authority
granted this request on 20 July 2022, with the deferral commencing 14 days after the
sentence was adjudged until the date of entry of judgment. All automatic forfeitures
shall be waived for a period of 6 months or the expiration of the accused’s term of
service, whichever is sooner, with the waiver commencing on the date of the entry of
judgment. All pay and allowances shall be paid to the accused’s wife.

                                         4
                  United States v. Campos, NMCCA No. 202200246
                            Modified Entry of Judgment

    On 15 June 2022, the accused requested the convening authority grant a seven-
month reduction to his confinement sentence and suspension of his adjudged reduc-
tion in rank for five months for the benefit of his wife. On 20 July 2022, the convening
authority denied each of these requests.

                                FOR THE COURT:

                                MARK K. JAMISON
                                Clerk of Court

                                           5