Court Opinion

ID: 9394753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 14:01:26.204518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.525526
License: Public Domain

22-817
   Lopez v. White Plains Hosp.

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                             SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE
A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 16th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
              SUSAN L. CARNEY,
              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
              WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   VALERIA LOPEZ,

                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                     v.                                            No. 22-817

   WHITE PLAINS HOSPITAL, DEAN AKBAR,
   individually, CINDY GANUNG, individually,
   DIANE WOOLLEY, individually, DANIEL
   KEARNEY, individually,

                    Defendants-Appellees.
   ___________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant:                        Steven Fingerhut, Stefanie Shmil,
                                                Phillips & Associates, Attorneys
                                                at Law, PLLC, New York, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees:                       Marianne Monroy, Harpreet
                                                Kaur, Garfunkel Wild, P.C., Great
                                                Neck, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Valeria Lopez appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of her former employer, the White Plains Hospital (“Hospital”), and

others, on her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y.

Exec. Law § 290 et seq.      On appeal, Lopez challenges the district court’s

determination that she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). We review a district court’s

grant of summary judgment de novo, see Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 157–

58 (2d Cir. 2021), and will affirm when there is “no genuine dispute as to any

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a).   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal.

      In considering Lopez’s retaliation claims, we employ the familiar McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework, which applies equally to Title VII and

NYSHRL claims. See Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013). To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lopez must demonstrate that (1) she

engaged in a protected activity; (2) her exercise of that right was known to the

Hospital; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) there was a

causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment

action. See Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010). If Lopez makes out

this prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Hospital to articulate “a legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason for its actions.” Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d

223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014). If the Hospital carries its burden, Lopez must then prove

that the reasons it offered were a pretext for retaliation. See Zann Kwan v. Andalex

Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 2013).

      Although the district court determined that Lopez proffered sufficient

evidence to make a prima facie case as to the first three elements of her retaliation

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claim, it concluded that she failed to establish a causal connection between her

internal discrimination complaint and her termination. We agree.

       Here, the testimonial evidence uniformly shows that the decision to fire

Lopez was made before she filed her internal complaint on January 11, 2019. Dean

Akbar, Lopez’s supervisor, testified that he made his “final decision” to fire Lopez

on January 8. J. App’x at 188. Later that day, Akbar communicated his plan to

Diane Woolley, the Hospital’s Chief Human Resources Officer, who testified that

they agreed on a plan to terminate Lopez at her next check-in meeting with Akbar

on January 17. 1 Cindy Ganung and Daniel Kearney, the Hospital’s Directors of

Human Resources, corroborated Woolley’s testimony, averring that, on January

10, Akbar told them that he and Woolley had agreed on a plan to fire Lopez. See

id. at 440 (“Akbar stated that [Lopez’s] attitude solidified his decision to terminate

her employment with the approval of the Chief of Human Resources, Ms. Diane

Woolley, given on January 8, 2019.”); id. at 448 (“Akbar informed me that after

speaking with [Lopez] on January 8, 2019, he met with Ms. Woolley later in the

day and she approved [Lopez’s] termination.”). Based on this record, it is clear

1 While Akbar had planned on terminating Lopez on January 17, he subsequently decided to
terminate her on January 15 after she called in sick that day, since “there was no point to having
[Lopez] report to work for one additional day, which would not have benefited either [Lopez] or
[the Hospital].” J. App’x at 425.

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that the decision to fire Lopez predated her filing an internal complaint.

Accordingly, Lopez cannot show that she would not have been fired “in the

absence of the retaliatory motive.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801

F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stephan v. W.

Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 450 F. App’x 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding no causal

connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action where,

as here, the employee had submitted her internal complaint after the decision to

terminate her was made).

      But even assuming that Lopez could make out a prima facie case of

retaliation, the Hospital has offered non-retaliatory reasons for her termination –

reasons that Lopez has not shown to be pretextual.         Akbar testified that his

decision to fire Lopez was based on her poor job performance and inability to take

criticism or be supervised. On these points, Lopez herself admitted that she was

struggling in her role and not adjusting well. See, e.g., J. App’x at 61 (admitting

that Akbar expressed concerns that she spoke as if her “opinion was the only

opinion that mattered”); id. at 77 (admitting that, when presenting at orientation,

“it was probably inappropriate” to invite only women to use the restroom during

a programming break); id. at 79 (admitting that she presented on a topic without

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the required “certification”). And when Akbar sought to provide Lopez with

feedback, she repeatedly pushed back. See, e.g., id. at 62 (admonishing Akbar that

she would have better received the type of feedback he was giving her if “there

was a relationship there”); id. at 81 (objecting to feedback on the ground that it was

not being delivered by someone who was in the room and who had taken offense

to her gender-based comment); id. at 81–82 (complaining that Akbar was making

a “big deal” out of an “innocuous” issue). These were the reasons relied upon by

Akbar and Woolley when they reached the decision to fire Lopez on January 8,

2019.    Because Lopez has not shown that the Hospital’s performance and

behavioral concerns were a pretext for retaliation, such as by demonstrating that

the proffered explanations were implausible, inconsistent, or contradictory, Lopez

has also failed to satisfy her burden at step three of the McDonnell Douglas test.

See Zann Kwan, 737 F.3d at 846; Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59,

70–71 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that employee’s record of lack of “collegiality” and

“poor judgment” were legitimate, non-retaliatory bases for employer’s adverse

employment decision).

        Lopez makes much of the fact that an internal document prepared by Akbar

memorializing the decision to fire her was created on January 14 – three days after

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she filed her internal complaint. But the fact that the document was created after

Lopez had filed her internal complaint does not raise a genuine dispute as to when

the decision to fire Lopez was made. To the contrary, the text of the document

corroborates the deposition testimony and affirmations of Akbar, Woolley,

Ganung, and Kearney, who each stated that the decision to fire Lopez predated

her filing of the internal complaint. See J. App’x at 397 (“On January 10th around

6pm I spoke to both [Ganung and Kearney] to explain that [Lopez] isn’t a good fit

and that I wanted to terminate her probation. We agreed that I would terminate

her probation at our [two-]month check-in scheduled for Thursday January,

17th.”). Lopez has thus failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether the legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons the Hospital offered to justify her

termination decision were pretextual.

      We have considered Lopez’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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