Court Opinion

ID: 9606390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:28.032702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:22.499950
License: Public Domain

Justice MITCHELL
concurring in result.
I concur in the view that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for psychiatric assistance in the preparation of his defense. Therefore, I also concur in the holding that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
I disagree, however, with the view that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for the appointment of a fingerprint expert to assist him in the preparation of his defense. I believe the Court’s decision on that issue will require appoint*348ment of fingerprint experts to assist defendants in almost all cases in which fingerprint evidence is introduced by the State. Certainly, it will require the appointment of fingerprint experts in all cases where the State relies upon fingerprint evidence and there were no eyewitnesses to the crime charged.
It is rather clear in this case that the defendant failed to carry his burden under N.C.G.S. § 7A-454 to show a reasonable likelihood that the appointment of a fingerprint expert would materially assist him in the preparation of his defense or that without such help he would not receive a fair trial. See generally State v. Corbett, 307 N.C. 169, 297 S.E. 2d 553 (1982). As a result, the Court rightly focuses its attention on the issue of whether the appointment of a fingerprint expert was required in this case under the holding of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 L.Ed. 2d 53 (1985). Ake dealt with the requirement that a defendant be provided psychiatric assistance when his sanity was likely to be a significant factor in his defense. 470 U.S. at 82, 84 L.Ed. 2d at 60. Indeed, Ake’s entire defense was insanity. The issue of sanity is one about which experts can and frequently do disagree, even though all experts in the field have received years of intensive and highly specialized and demanding training. It was easy in Ake for the Supreme Court to conclude that Ake could not properly prepare his defense without the assistance of an expert in the field of psychiatry.
The type of “expertise” involved in taking and analyzing fingerprints is a far cry from that employed by psychiatrists or many of the other expert witnesses who appear before courts. Indeed, this Court has held that fingerprints taken or “lifted” by a non-expert from the scene of a crime or from the defendant are admissible in evidence. State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E. 2d 348 (1975).
The taking and analysis of fingerprints is largely a mechanical function, although admittedly one which requires some training and experience. Basically, the analysis of fingerprints involves comparing the latent print taken from the scene of the crime with a known print of the defendant to determine whether there are points of similarity. Once a given number of points of similarity are observed, the expert draws the conclusion that the two prints were made by the same person.
*349It has been my experience that all of the steps involved in fingerprint analysis can be readily demonstrated to a jury in such a manner that the jurors are able to determine for themselves whether the points of similarity are in fact similar. Likewise, the jurors are as capable as the expert of counting the number of points of similarity. There simply is nothing so mysterious or difficult about fingerprint analysis and comparison as to prevent the ordinary lay juror from determining whether the procedure has been performed correctly and the expert has reached the right conclusion, once the technique is explained and pointed out to the juror. For this reason, a defendant can properly defend himself against such evidence — if in fact he will ever be able to defend himself — by the simple expedient of thorough cross-examination of the State’s fingerprint witness. See State v. Corbett, 307 N.C. 169, 297 S.E. 2d 553.
In the present case, the victim was unable to identify the defendant. However, several neighbors saw the defendant near the victim’s house at about the time the crime was committed. Also, the defendant confessed to the crime, and this confession was admitted at trial. Although it is possible that the confession might be rejected at the new trial to which we today decide the defendant is entitled, that fact situation is not before us in considering the trial court’s ruling on the motion for a fingerprint expert. Given the facts of this case as it appeared before the trial court, I simply do not believe that the defendant presented any reason to believe that the veracity of the State’s fingerprint evidence was “likely to be a significant factor” in his defense within the meaning of that phrase as used in Ake. Cf. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, n.1, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 236, n.1 (1985) (denial of fingerprint and ballistics experts not deprivation of due process where the defendant “offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial . . . .”)
With the foregoing exception, I concur in the reasoning of the Court. I concur in the result reached.
Justice Meyer joins in this concurring opinion.