Court Opinion

ID: 9685421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:37:01.07642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.765813
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
dissenting in part.
I certainly agree that there was ample probable cause to arrest defendant, Kenneth V. Beerbohm, and that his first assignment of error is therefore without merit. However, while the majority correctly cites the rules of statutory construction, it, in my judgment at least, misapplies them and therefore comes to the mistaken conclusion that Beerbohm refused to submit to chemical testing in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.08(4) (Cum. Supp. 1986), and thus erroneously rejects Beerbohm’s second assignment of error.
The precise statement of the question presented by Beerbohm’s second assignment of error is: What is the meaning of the word “may,” as used in the phrase “such person may choose whether the test shall be of his blood or urine,” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.09 (Reissue 1984)? In this instance, as Beerbohm correctly points out, the Legislature has provided clear guidance in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-802 (Reissue 1984), which reads in relevant part:
Unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature, rules for construction of the statutes of Nebraska hereafter shall be as follows:
(1) When the word may appears, permissive or discretionary action is presumed. When the word shall appears, mandatory or ministerial action is presumed.
The word “may” in a statute will generally be given its ordinary, permissive, and discretionary meaning unless it can be shown that the intent of the drafters would be defeated by application of that meaning. In re Application A-15738, 226 Neb. 146, 410 N.W.2d 101 (1987); State ex rel. Douglas v. Schroeder, 222 Neb. 473, 384 N.W.2d 626 (1986); Buhrmann v. Sellentin, 218 Neb. 288, 352 N.W.2d 907 (1984).
There is nothing in the present case to indicate that the intent of the Legislature would be defeated by construing the word *447“may” in the portion of § 39-669.09 cited in the majority opinion in its ordinary, permissive, and discretionary sense. In fact, the appearance of the word in close proximity with the word “shah” in § 39-669.09 leaves but one possible conclusion: that a licensee who must submit to either a blood or urine test under § 39-669.08(4) has discretionary power, granted by the Legislature in § 39-669.09, to select, or refrain from selecting, which of the two alternative test samples he or she will provide.
As noted by the majority, a refusal to submit to a chemical test occurs within the meaning of the implied consent law when the licensee, after being asked to submit to a test, so conducts himself or herself as to justify a reasonable person in the requesting officer’s position in believing that the licensee understood that he or she was being asked to submit to a test and manifested an unwillingness to take it.
Beerbohm’s actions manifested no unwillingness to take a test; he, in effect, said, “I’ll take any test you want to give me,” thereby leaving it to the officer to choose whatever test the officer found more convenient. To hold that under such a circumstance Beerbohm refused to take either a blood or urine test flies in the face of both logic and the relevant statutory language.
While I concede that the holding of the majority has the virtue of making the administration of §§ 39-669.08(4) and 39-669.09 easier, it does so at the expense of the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature and violates the very rules of statutory construction upon which the rationale of the majority opinion rests. If the Legislature did not mean what it said, it is within its province to change its words so as to say what it does mean. This court, however, possesses no license to invade the Legislature’s bailiwick, which is precisely what it has done.
Accordingly, I would reverse.