Court Opinion

ID: 9861296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:52:28.191158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:04.442921
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justice
(concurring specially).
Although I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority, I do not agree our decision should rest on a federal constitutional conflict. I therefore concur only in the result.
The majority correctly points out the respondent judges urge two grounds to sustain the validity of their appointment to office. First, they say a reasonable and proper interpretation of the Iowa Constitution supports them. Secondly, they claim any other result would violate the equal protection clause under the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The majority bases its decision on the second ground and asserts it is therefore unnecessary to reach the first. I would reverse this process. I say the appointments should be validated on the first ground and that the second should not be considered.
The particular constitutional provision at issue is repeated here for convenience:
“Judges of the Supreme Court and district court shall receive salaries from the state, shall be members of the bar of the state, and shall have such other qualifications as may be prescribed by law. Judges of the Supreme Court and District Court shall be ineligible to any other office of the state while serving on said court and for two years thereafter, except that District Judges shall be eligible to the office of Supreme Court Judge. Other judicial officers shall be selected in such manner and shall have such tenure, compensation and other qualification as may be fixed by law * * (Iowa Constitution, Art. V, § 18.)
Three of the five persons appointed to the newly-created court of appeals were then district judges. Petitioner challenges their right to qualify because of the constitutional provision just set out. He is joined in this contention by the Attorney General, who intervened in the cause.
Both the petitioner and the intervenor concede the result for which they argue is absurd and was unintended by the constitu*275tional amendment in question. Yet they say that result is unavoidable because of the clear, explicit and unambiguous language of the amendment.
The majority rests its case partially on the conclusion an absurd result must necessarily offend against the 14th Amendment equal protection clause. This suggests the Federal Constitution will not tolerate absurdity, but that we are impotent to avoid similar consequences under our own Constitution. I reject that view. This problem may — and should — be resolved under our Constitution. We need not wring our hands in despair and look elsewhere for succor. Any other conclusion is itself absurd.
Before discussing why I say we should not give the constitutional language the literal interpretation petitioner and interve-nor urge, I briefly relate the background facts. When the constitutional amendment in question was adopted in 1962, Iowa was served by only one appellate court — the Supreme Court. There was no court of appeals, and none was then contemplated. Under facts submitted by affidavit (which are not challenged by petitioner or interve-nor), it is clear the purpose of the 1962 amendment was to remove judges from the political fray by limiting their state service to the judiciary, either as trial or appellate judges. This was accomplished by specifying they could serve only in the two judicial positions then existing. (For present purposes I disregard lesser judicial positions.) Both petitioner and intervenor concede, either explicitly or tacitly, that the intent was not to limit the service of district judges within the judicial department. They admit, too, either expressly or tacitly, that the result for which they so vigorously contend creates a strange and inexplicable anomaly.
Must we, then, adopt the literal language which defeats the purpose of the amendment? That, of course, is the ultimate decision to be made.
Constitutional provisions are construed under the same general principles which govern statutory construction, with due regard for the different purposes they serve. Unlike statutes, constitutions set out broad general principles. A constitution is a living and vital instrument. Its very purpose is to endure for a long time and to meet conditions neither contemplated nor foreseeable at the time of its adoption. Bechtel v. City of Des Moines, et al., 225 N.W.2d 326, 332 (Iowa 1975).
The polestar of all interpretation is the intention with which the instrument is drawn. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 16 at p. 72 (1956); 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 64 at 239 (1964). Of equal importance is a determination of the purpose to be served. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 65 at 241 (1964). Sometimes the literal language must be disregarded because it does violence to the meaning and intent of the enactment.
In 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 76 at 258 (1964), the principle is stated this way:
“In accordance with the basic rules that language in a constitution is to be deemed to have been used therein in its ordinary sense, and that a constitution is to be liberally construed, the principle has been developed that in framing a constitution, words are employed in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather, than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions, and ordinarily words in an instrument like the United States Constitution do not have a narrow, contracted meaning, but are presumed to have been used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies. Where words are used which have both a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. Stated differently, the rule is that no forced, unnatural, narrow, or technical construction should ever be placed upon the language of a constitution. * * * ”
A number of courts have considered problems like that which this case raises.
*276In State ex rel. Dalton v. Dearing, 364 Mo. 475, 263 S.W.2d 381, 386 (1954), the Missouri Supreme Court refused to invalidate a gubernatorial appointment to a metropolitan transportation commission made 67 days after the time fixed in the Constitution.
In reaching this conclusion the court said, quoting in part from an earlier Missouri case, State ex rel. City of Carthage v. Hackmann, 287 Mo. 184, 229 S.W. 1078, 1080 (1921):
“Another general rule of importance in determining the true meaning and scope of constitutional or statutory provisions is the intent and purpose of the lawmakers. U* * *
“There are certain well-understood rules laid down by the courts for the construction of constitutional provisions, and they are the same as those governing legislative enactments. It was said [in a prior case] in discussing the general rules of construction of constitutional provisions that the organic law is subject to the same general rules of construction as other laws, due regard being had to the broader objects and scope of the former, as a charter of popular government. The intent of such an instrument is the prime object to be attained in construing it. “In 12 Corpus Juris, 700, [16 C.J.S.2d § 16 at Constitutional Law 73-74], it is said: The court, therefore, should constantly keep in mind the objects sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
“And also in 12 Corpus Juris, 702, [16 C.J.S.-§ 18 at Constitutional Law 80], it is said: If a literal interpretation of the language used in a constitutional provision would give it an effect in contravention of the real purpose and intent of the instrument as deduced from a consideration of all its parts, such intent must prevail over the literal meaning.”
In Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 623-624 (2d Cir. 1944) the late Judge Learned Hand, in a concurring opinion, said:
“ * * * There is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally * * * As nearly as we can, we must put ourselves in the place of those who uttered the words, and try to define how they would have dealt with the unforeseen situation; and, although their words are by far the most decisive evidence of what they would have done, they are by no means final.”
In Re Opinion of the Justices, 252 Ala. 194, 41 So.2d 559, 563 (1959). The court, in substituting the word “and” for the word “or,” said:
“It is familiar law in the interpretation of statutes, constitutional amendments and other writings, that the intent of such writing is the substance and the verbiage is mere form, and courts are at liberty in ascertaining the intent to hold that the disjunctive conjunction ‘or’, and the conjunctive conjunction ‘and’, sometimes carelessly used, are interchangeable, to discover the intent of the writing.”
An Arizona case, Board of Supervisors v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1936), while refusing to depart from the literal language of a constitutional amendment, had this interesting comment:
“It is only where there is no doubt as to the intention of those who frame an amendment or statute that a court may modify, alter or supply words that will ‘obviate any repugnancy to or inconsistence with such intention,’ and by so doing permit ‘particular provisions’ to be read or construed otherwise than ‘according to the literal meaning.’ ”
In Schaefer v. Thomson, et al., 240 F.Supp. 247, 252 (D.C.Wy.1964), the court was confronted with a Wyoming statute dealing with reapportionment which a number of citizens claimed violated the provisions of the Wyoming Constitution.
At the time suit was brought, a literal compliance with that provision would have resulted in a legislature substantially in excess of 300 members. In discussing this the court said:
“However, it is obvious that the Wyoming Constitutional Convention which agreed upon a state constitution intended *277that the legislative bodies should be comparatively small. It could not have envisioned such an absurd result as would be brought about if the state senate is constituted with each county as a senatorial election district and the county with the least population fixing as near as may be the minimum unit for district representation. While the wisdom or policy of constitutional provisions are not to be questioned, still courts are not required to act in a manner which brings about such palpable absurdities. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 18; 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 76.”
The Illinois Supreme Court refused to follow the literal constitutional language in Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327, 123 N.E. 566, 569 (1919) when that course would have led to unintended consequences. The court said:
“[I]t is argued that the language of the Constitution, and the law itself, is not obscure or uncertain, but is definite and unambiguous and leaves no room for construction. * * * This is literally true, but it is perfectly clear that it is not the meaning of the Constitution that the law did not, therefore, receive a constitutional majority; for such meaning involves the absurdity of holding that the framers of that instrument, and the people in adopting it, intended to prohibit the creation of a debt * * * unless the proposition for its creation should receive at an election a greater vote than all the electors were entitled to cast * * * A constitutional provision must be construed like a statute with reference to the object to be accomplished, and when the real purpose is apparent the language must be construed so as to carry the purpose into effect. * * * Not the letter of the law only, its mere words, but its spirit and object, must be taken into consideration, and when a particular intent to effect a specific purpose is manifest, respect must be paid to that intent. When the words of a statute, followed literally lead to an absurd consequence, there is sufficient reason to depart from the language.”
Somewhat analogous to the present case is In Re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 223 N.C. 845, 28 S.E.2d 567, 570-571 (1944), which involved a North Carolina constitutional provision prohibiting a person from holding two offices of trust or profit at the same time. The comptroller of the State Board of Education asked a leave of absence so that he could accept a temporary captaincy in the United States Army. The direct question was whether the applicant would have to give up his State position in order to become a member of the Armed Forces. It was conceded that the acceptance of a second office forbidden by this constitutional provision would operate ipso facto to vacate the first office. The only question was whether under these circumstances captaincy in the Armed Forces constituted accepting a second office.
The court held it did not and in doing so made several significant statements including the following:
“Certainly the spirit of the Constitution would envisage [no such result]. ‘The meaning of a Constitution is to be found, not in a slavish adherence to the letter, which sometimes killeth, but in the discovery of its spirit, which giveth life.’ * * * If nee(j ke; letter gives way to promote the equity of the spirit. An inhibition or prohibition usually extends no farther than the reason on which it is founded. * * *”
Later in that opinion the court said:
“A constitution should not receive a technical construction, as if it were an ordinary instrument or statute. It should be interpreted so as to carry out the general principles of the government, and not defeat them.”
For other general statements lending substantial support to my view see State v. School District No. 1 of Fergus County, 136 Mont. 453, 348 P.2d 797, 801, 78 A.L.R.2d 1012 (1960); State v. Toberman, 363 Mo. 245, 250 S.W.2d 701, 705 (1952) (an en banc); Board of County Commissioners v. McCulloh, 52 N.M. 210, 195 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1948); Mahood v. City and County of Den*278ver, 118 Colo. 338, 195 P.2d 379, 380 (1948); Flaska v. State, 51 N.M. 13, 177 P.2d 174, 176, 180 (1946); Bailey v. Abbington, 201 Ark. 1072, 148 S.W.2d 176, 178-180 (1941); Clark v. Boyce, 20 Ariz. 544, 185 P. 136, 140 (1919).
Nor is Iowa without language which gives some indication of what our conclusion should be. In Ex Parte Samuel Pritz, 9 Iowa 30, 32 (1858), this court stated:
“In the interpretation of the Constitution * * * we are to ascertain the meaning by getting at the intention of those making the instrument.
“What thought was in the minds of those making the Constitution — [w]hat was their intention, is the great leading rule of construction.”
In Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 718, 113 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1962) we said:
“It is proper in our determination to consider the intention of the framers of the provision as the language used, the object to be attained, or the evil to be remedied, and the circumstances at the time of the adoption indicate.”
In Cedar Memorial Park Cemetery Association v. Personnel Associates, Inc., 178 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Iowa 1970), this court said that in interpreting statutes our obligation is “to seek out the intention of the legislature and to avoid placing upon statutory language a strained, impractical, or absurd construction.” See also Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 442, 443 (Iowa 1968).
In a recent case, Pitcher v. Lakes Amusement Co., 236 N.W.2d 333, 335-336 (Iowa 1975), we were considering an attack on Article I, § 9 of the Iowa Constitution involving the right to trial by jury. In reaching the conclusion that a statute which authorized a jury of less than 12 did not offend against that provision of the Constitution we said:
“Time has increasingly demonstrated it was illogical to freeze forever our conception of a jury trial. * * *
“* * * Constitutions must have enough flexibility so as to be interpreted in accordance with the public interest. This means they must meet and be applied to new and changing conditions.”
I am convinced the case now before us meets all the criteria set out in the foregoing cases to a marked degree.
No matter which standard we turn to— the “intent of the instrument; ” or “the objects sought to be accomplished; ” or the compulsion to avoid “palpable absurdities; ” or the necessity of meeting “new and changing conditions; ” or the rule that “a prohibition usually extends no farther than the reason on which it is founded” — this case is a classic illustration that it is sometimes folly to insist literal language must be followed to the exclusion of all else.
I am not unmindful of the strong language used in cases like Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Company, 175 Iowa 245, 270-273, 154 N.W. 1037, 1047 (1915). I do not say a court should place upon a constitutional provision (or upon a statutory enactment) a construction to suit its own ends or to achieve what it considers desirable. I say only that if a result reached by pointless adherence to words alone is indefensible beyond all doubt, it need not be upheld.
I recognize this is not to be undertaken lightly. In Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 261 Iowa 1309, 1315, 158 N.W.2d 170, 174 (1968), we considered the judicial correction of legislative errors this way:
“The specter of abuses resulting from a judiciary too quick to intervene for the correction of legislative ambiguities, mistakes, errors and omissions is too obvious to require extended discussion. The evils resulting therefrom would be far greater than those which such action was designed to prevent.”
Failure to give true effect to the constitutional intent in this case would present a judiciary too slow, rather than too quick, to intervene.
In the Kruidenier v. McCulloch case reported at 258 Iowa 1121, 1131, 142 N.W.2d 355, 361 (1966), we said this court is the final arbiter of what the Iowa Constitution means. We must, and should, accord the *279provisions of that instrument a meaning which gives life and substance to its objects and purposes. Instead the petitioner and intervenor ask the court to thwart what they concede to be the intention of the disputed amendment.
Frequently courts are said to reach absurd results when they themselves regard their conclusions as sound and logical. Ironically, the court is now importuned to deliberately reach an absurd result.
For me, at least, that argument includes its own denial. I would hold the 1962 Constitutional Amendment does not prohibit the appointment of district judges to the office of judge of the court of appeals.
For the reasons stated, I concur only in the result reached by the majority of the court.
MASON and HARRIS, JJ., join this special concurrence.