Court Opinion

ID: 9907262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 00:06:28.035147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:16.515314
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Evans v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2023-Ohio-4299.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                              JUDGES:
ANTOINETTE EVANS                                      :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
                                                      :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                        Plaintiff-Appellant           :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
                                                      :
-vs-                                                  :
                                                      :       Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023
DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT                             :
OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES                            :
                                                      :       NUNC PRO TUNC O P I N I O N
                     Defendant-Appellee

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                  Appeal from the Delaware County Court of
                                                          Common Pleas, Case No. CVF 09 0491

JUDGMENT:                                                 Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                   December 4, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant                                   For Defendant-Appellee

THOMAS CONDIT                                             BARTHOLOMEW T. FREEZE
P.O. Box 12700                                            GENEVIEVE M. HOFFMAN
Cincinnati, OH 45212                                      JOSEPH G. BOGDEWIECZ
                                                          Capitol Square Office Building
                                                          65 East State Street, Suite 800
DAVE YOST                                                 Columbus, OH 43215
Attorney General
By: DAVID E. LEFTON                                       PATRICK J. SCHMITZ
Unemployment Compensation Unit                            SANDRA R. MCINTOSH
30 East Broad Street, 26th Floor                          SCOTT SCRIVEN, LLP
Columbus, OH 43215                                        250 E. Broad St. Suite 900
                                                          Columbus, OH 43215
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                                 2

Gwin, P.J.

        {¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant Antoinette Evans [“Evans”] appeals the March 9, 2023

Opinion entered by the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the

decision of the State of Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission

(“Commission”) which declined to review a hearing officer's determination that Evans's

employer had just cause to terminate her employment, and disallowing her application for

unemployment compensation benefits.

                                       Facts and Procedural History

        {¶2}    In 2008, Evans joined the Olentangy Local School District ("District") as a

"Cafeteria/Study Hall Aide" at Olentangy Liberty High School] ("Liberty"). 1R. at 159-160;

2R. at 8831. Evans received an Employee Handbook or access to an online copy when

she was hired. 1R. at 167.

        {¶3}    Evans would daily converse with her students about a wide range of

topics, some school-related and some not. Topics would include schools, jobs, the

wrestling team, global events, and whatever students might bring up that day. 2R. at

695-696. According to the District, Evans's responsibilities were to: (1) exhibit

professional behavior;          (2) ensure        student safety; (3) observe and report

inappropriate student behavior; (4) engage the public with tact and diplomacy; (5)

interact positively with staff, students, and parents; (6) promote good public

relations; and (7) serve as a positive role model for students. 2R. at 446.

        1 For clarity, the telephone hearing held before the Commission and the record of this case will be

referred to as, “__R.__,” signifying the volume and the page number.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  3

       {¶4}   The District employs a progressive disciplinary policy. 1R. at 170. During

Evans's employment, the District disciplined her on four separate occasions, the last

of which led to her alleged constructive discharge that is the subject of this appeal.

2R. at 442.

        Evans's discipline for her off-duty Facebook posts and comments - April 2019

                                      and September 2020

       {¶5}   The District first disciplined Evans in April 2019 for several of her comments

and posts on Facebook. 2R. at 445; 447. One post depicted the actor Jussie Smollett with

a statement that "Jesse [sic] Smollett swearing on his mother. Folks he will have judgment

day. His black privilege and star quality will not help him when he goes before God!" 2R.

at 521. Evans also shared a picture of a transgender couple with a caption that the

individuals in the photo are the gender of their biological sex, and commented, "She's a

he" on a story concerning a transgender female wrestler. 2R. at 519; 522. Finally, Evans

posted a picture of several members of Congress referred to as “the Squad” with the

caption “We are being TAKEN OVER from WITHIN!!!!               What’s it gonna [sic] take

America?!" 2R. at 520.

       {¶6}   When Evans made these comments and posts, her Facebook profile was

publicly available and identified her as a District employee. 2R. at 445-446. On or around

April 1, 2019, the District received 10-15 complaints about Evans's Facebook posts from

parents, Liberty alumni, and members of the public. 2R. at 515. Multiple students also

visited guidance counselors to discuss the posts, and at least three teachers told

administrators that the posts were a major topic amongst the Liberty student body. 2R. at

515.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                    4

       {¶7}   On April 2, 2019 - the day after the District became aware of the posts -

Liberty Principal Michael Stamer ("Principal Stamer") placed Evans on paid leave. 2R. at

515. Soon after, on April 4, 2019, Evans and representatives from the District met to

discuss the incident, and the next day, the District suspended Evans for four days without

pay and required her to complete professional training. 2R. at 445 447. In a letter to her

announcing its decision, the District explained that Evans's posts "attracted negative

publicity because they contradicted [the District's] mission as a public school district to

'facilitate maximum learning for every student.'" (Emphasis in original) 2R. at 445-446.

Additionally, the District determined that Evans's posts raised questions about her ability

to "credibly enforce Board policies ... that require employees to report incidents of bullying

or harassment, hold students accountable for acceptable technology use, and ensure the

care and protection of all students." 2R. at 446. Finally, the District warned Evans that -

because her conduct concerned the fundamental expectations of her job - she could face

disciplinary action up to and including termination for exhibiting unprofessional conduct in

the future. 2R. at 447. On April 9, 2019, Evans signed the suspension letter and

acknowledged that she understood it. 2R. at 447. The training included training on the

Professional Code of Conduct for Educators. 1R. 164.

       {¶8}   Evans faced discipline again in September 2020 for commenting on another

user's Facebook post that said, "If your students know your political affiliation you have

failed as a teacher. Teachers are there to help students think for themselves not like you

[,]" with, "Tell that to the English Department!" 1R. at 170; 2R. at 483-484, 498. Although

Evans’s profile was no longer publicly available, she removed her comment shortly after

a Liberty English teacher questioned the intent behind Evans's remark. 2R. at 483. When
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                                5

asked about the incident, Evans claimed that her comment was not directed toward

anyone at Liberty but toward the English Department at her daughter’s former college.

2R. at 483. The District, however, did not find this explanation credible because the post

did not mention Evans’s daughter, or her college. 2R. at 483. Further, the District noted

that Evans’s daughter had graduated from college more than eight years ago. Id.2 Evans

was given a "Documented Warning” after it had determined that Evans’s comment

“reflected poor professional judgment and/or violated” the District’s social media policy

and the Licensure Code of Professional Conduct for Ohio Educators. 2R. at 483.

                Discipline for in-school remarks – October 2020 and April 7, 2021

       {¶9}    On October 14, 2020, Evans had a conversation with a student "M.S."

Evans started that conversation by mentioning the experience of a Black student who had

recently transferred to Liberty and whom Evans thought “hated" her new school. 2R. at

472.

       {¶10} M.S. explained that the other student had transferred from a more diverse

school, seemingly as an explanation for that student's challenges at Liberty. 2R. at 472.

Evans downplayed this and recounted that she had experienced discrimination as a child

because, as an Italian-American in that era, Evans "wasn't considered white." 2R. at 472.

Evans also said that during certain parts of America's past, Italian Americans had it worse

than Black Americans and were lynched more often. 2R. at 472. At some point in the

conversation, M.S. mentioned that she was Black, and Evans asked, "Oh, you consider

yourself that?" 2R. at 472. When M.S. confirmed her identity, Evans responded, “For the

last two years I thought you were Indian because you’re always studying." 2R. at 472. In

       2 Evans’s corrected the District that her daughter had graduated four years, not eight, years prior

to Evans’s comments. 2R. at 487.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                     6

a previous conversation, Evans asked M.S. if her parents had been born in America. 2R.

at 472.

       {¶11} When M.S. shared her experiences as a Black student who had

encountered race-related bias and discrimination at Liberty, Evans began to cry because

she could not believe that other Liberty students would behave in such a way. 2R. at 472.

Evans remained upset, and M.S. spent the last five minutes of the class period comforting

her. 2R. at 472.

       {¶12} The District held an investigatory meeting on November 16, 2020. 2R. at

470. In place of formal discipline, the District required Evans to attend individualized

training to - according to the District's November 17, 2020 disciplinary letter to Evans -

"assist [her] with appropriate interactions with diverse students in the district." 2R. at 470.

       {¶13} Up to this point, the District provided Evans with training, in lieu of

termination, in the following areas: implicit bias, building a safe and supportive school

environment, separate trainings on the professional use of social media, microaggression

and restorative education and separate trainings involving the Code of Professional

Responsibility for Educators3. 1R. at 163-164.

       {¶14} The final disciplinary incident occurred during a morning study hall on April

7, 2021. 1R. at 160; 2R. at 528. While Evans cleaned partitions that were used to limit the

spread of COVID-19, she said to a student, "Can you believe the coronavirus came from

China and that China is making money from sales of PPE to the United States?"

(hereinafter referred to as "COVID comment") 1R. at 160; 2R. at 545, 883. A student of

Chinese descent who was sitting nearby overheard the comment and left the study hall

       3 April 4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2020. 1R. at 164.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                    7

out of frustration and anger. 1R. at 182; 2R. at 545; 546. That student reported the incident

to an assistant principal and received support from a guidance counselor. 2R. at 546. The

student reported that the student felt offended, hurt, attacked and overall anger. 1R. at

179.

       {¶15} On the evening of April 7, 2021, Principal Stamer told Evans not to report

to work the next day. 2R. at 883. On April 8, 2021, the District placed Evans on paid

administrative leave and scheduled an investigatory meeting for April 14, 2021 ("April

14th Meeting"), but the District did not inform Evans why she was placed on leave. 1R. at

205; 2R. at 542; 883. During the April 14th Meeting, Evans was accompanied by Gary

Yashko ("Yashko"), who was a friend and real estate attorney. 2R. at 542. In attendance

on behalf of the District were Assistant Director of Human Resources Jennifer Iceman

("Iceman"); Principal Stamer, a Liberty assistant principal, and an attorney for the District.

(1R. at 161; 2R. at 542.) Iceman ran the meeting, the purpose of which was to collect

information regarding the April 7, 2021 incident. 1R. at 162; 2R. at 883.

       {¶16} Iceman asked Evans if she remembered having a conversation with the

student, the content of the conversation, whether Evans had been provided training

regarding implicit bias and cultural responsiveness, microaggressions and the code of

professional responsibility. 1R. at 162-163.

       {¶17} At first, Evans stated that she could not recall the incident. 1R. at 163. Evans

eventually did admit to making the comment. 1R. at 208. Iceman asked Evans if she saw

how her comments could be considered offensive. Evans responded, “yes, I can see

that.” 1R. at 164. When asked if she could see how her comments could make a student

of Asian descent feel uncomfortable, Evans responded, “I’m not sure.” Evans
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                               8

acknowledged that she had reviewed the professional code of conduct during her three

previous disciplinary proceedings. 1R. at 164. When asked what her interpretation of her

obligation with regard to her students was in light of her training, Evans responded “I

understand what I’m supposed to do and I didn’t do what I was supposed to do.” 1R. at

164. When asked if she considered her COVID comment to be in violation of the Code of

Professional Conduct, Evans stated that she saw her comment as an economic

statement. Id. Evans commented that “I sometimes make mistakes, I didn’t do it

deliberately, do anything on purpose.” 1R. at 165. When asked what the administration

could do to help her, Evans replied, “I don’t’ know what to say.” Id.

       {¶18} The District did not allow Evans to present evidence or call witnesses. 1R.

at 161-165; 2R. at 883. Evans and Attorney Yashko were provided time to speak at the

end of the meeting. 2R. at 852; 861.

       {¶19} At the conclusion of the hearing the matter was taken under advisement.

1R. at 165. Evans was informed that she would be informed of the decision of the Board

at a later time. Id. She remained on paid administrative leave. Id. at 165-166.

       {¶20} The following day, on April 15, 2021, the District called Attorney Yashko to

inform him that the District's representatives would recommend that the Board of

Education terminate Evans's employment. 2R. at 883-884. The District also told Attorney

Yashko that Evans had the option to resign before the formal termination process began.

2R. at 165-166, 716-718. On April 16, 2021, Evans resigned in a letter stating: "In lieu

of termination, I hereby resign my position ...at Olentangy Liberty High School effective

as of the end of my current contract for the 2020/2021 school year." 2R. at 443; 884. The
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                                 9

Board of Education accepted Evans's resignation on April 22, 2021, and Evans's last day

as a District employee was May 27, 2021. 2R. at 884.

                                   Denial of Unemployment Benefits

         {¶21} Evans filed her Application for Determination of Benefit Rights on January

23, 2022, which was initially denied. 2R. at 882. Evans appealed that denial, and on

March 23, 2022, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS") issued a

Redetermination denying Evans's application, finding that she had been discharged with

just cause. 2R. at 882. On April 12, 2022, Evans appealed to the Unemployment

Compensation Review Commission ("UCRC"). 2R. at 882. Hearing Officer Delores

Evans4 ("Hearing Officer) held a telephone hearing on June 10, June 28, and July 21,

2022. 2R. at 882.

         {¶22} During the UCRC hearing, Evans testified, “would I say it [the COVID

statement] to an Asian student, probably not. But this kid was a white kid who I actually

had a good relationship with. I just didn’t think anything of it.” 1R. at 209. Evans explained

her reasons for resigning in lieu of termination,

                Well, I thought that if I resigned that that would give me the ability to

         work in other school districts. So, I had because my retirement… well, I can

         just go and uh, you know I can substitute…in another school district ….

1R. at 212. Evans attempted to rescind her resignation six weeks later because, “I didn’t

realize that was of no value” referring to her resignation and her ability to find work in a

4 Nothing in the record suggests that Hearing Officer Delores Evans is related to Appellant Antoinette
Evans.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  10

different school district. 1R. at 212; 2R. at 865-866. She further testified that she was

informed that “basically what happened is illegal.” Id.

       {¶23} Attorney Yashko testified at the UCRC hearing that he informed Evans that

she did not have to resign, instead she could opt for a full Loudermill hearing. 2T. at 720.

Iceman testified that if she had not opted to resign, Evans would have received a

Loudermill hearing. 2R. at 860. A Loudermill hearing was not scheduled in Evans’ case

because the District received her resignation letter. Id.

       {¶24} Evans called K.H. and J. K. parents from OLSD to testify at Evans' UCRC

hearing about their objections to leftist politics, perverse sexuality, and other offensive

topics in OLSD classrooms, hallways, and curricula.

       {¶25} On July 29, 2022, the Hearing Officer concluded that Evans left her position

under disqualifying conditions and that the District had just cause to discharge her, which

precluded unemployment compensation (hereinafter, "Decision"). 2R. at 885. On August

24, 2022, UCRC denied Evans's request for further review of the Decision. 2R. at 933.

       {¶26} On September 21, 2022, Evans filed an appeal to the Delaware County

Court of Common Pleas.

       {¶27} In her appeal, Evans maintained that she was constructively discharged due

to disciplinary action that violated her constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. Judgment Entry Affirming the Decision of

the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission, filed Mar 9, 2023 at 7 [hereinafter

“Judgment Entry”]. Specifically, she identified five assignments of error in the Decision:

(1) her COVID comment was constitutionally protected speech on a matter of public

concern; (2) the District employed policies and an "unwritten (and unknowable) speech
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 11

code" that represent unconstitutional content and viewpoint discrimination; (3) the District

arbitrarily enforced its policies against her and other conservatives, contra the Fourteenth

Amendment's Equal Protection Clause;(4) the District's policies were unconstitutionally

vague; and (5) she did not receive the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment before the District coerced her resignation.

Id. at 7-8.

                                    The trial judge’s decision

       {¶28} Concerning Evans’s First Amendment claims and whether Evans's COVID

comment is constitutionally protected, the trial judge after carefully reviewing the federal

standards concerning protected speech and the facts presented during the UCRC hearing

concluded, “On the whole, these facts demonstrate that Evans spoke as a private citizen.”

Judgment Entry at 11.

       {¶29} The trial judge next concluded,

              Undoubtedly, COVID has been a matter of public concern since at

       least March 2020, and it continues to make headlines even now. Similarly,

       COVID's origin and China's role in the pandemic featured prominently in the

       public discourse throughout that period. Under the test outlined in Pickering,

       it is immaterial whether Evans's COVID comment was true, inappropriate,

       or controversial. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387, 107 S.Ct.

       2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). Thus, because Evans spoke as a private

       citizen on a matter of public concern, her COVID comment is entitled to at

       least some First Amendment protections.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 12

Judgment Entry at 12 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). The trial judge then

considered the balancing test described in Pickering v. Bd. of Edn. of Twp. High School

Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The trial judge

first concluded,

              Evans's COVID comment was "couched in terms of political debate,"

       as COVID and China's role in the pandemic have featured as hot-button

       political issues. Likewise, Evans lacked specialized knowledge on those

       topics, and her comment did not expose the District's or Liberty's inner

       workings. The fact that COVID's origin and any financial impact on China

       from the international response to the virus's spread were entirely unrelated

       to Evans's employment duties diminishes any public interest in her speech.

              All told, I find that the public's limited interest means that Evans's

       speech does not fall into the "highest rung" of protected speech under the

       First Amendment.

Judgment Entry at 14. The trial judge proceeded next to,

              Analyze the District's interest, as an employer, "in promoting the

       efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."

       Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Toward this end, I may consider Evans's past

       conduct to place her speech in context. Kirkland u. City of Maryville, Tenn.,

       54 F.4th 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 152).

       {¶30} To gauge the District's interest in promoting efficiency, the trial judge noted

“there are four ‘pertinent considerations,’ which call for an assessment of the degree to

which Evans's speech: (1) impaired harmony among co-workers or discipline by
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 13

superiors; (2) interfered with close working relationships that require personal loyalty and

confidence; (3) impeded her job performance or interfered with the District's regular

operation; and (4) undermined the District's mission. Rankin [v. McPherson], 483 U.S.

[378, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987)] at 388.” Judgment Entry at 14. The trial

judge found that Evans’s conduct became a frequent source of tension within the high

school, with teachers reporting that her behavior was "all that students are talking

about" on at least one occasion. 2R. at 515. Further, from April 2019 through April

2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple students to report her conduct and prompted

more than a dozen parents, teachers, and Liberty alumni to file complaints with the

District. Judgment Entry at 15. The trial judge found that the first consideration-which

calls for him to weigh any disruption to harmony among co-workers and any impact

on workplace discipline - supports the District. Id.

       {¶31} Next, the trial judge analyzed whether Evans's speech interfered with

close working relationships and whether it hindered her job performance or the

District's operations. Id. The trial judge concluded,

              Evans's comment hurt her relationship with her students. In her

       position, Evans had the fundamental obligation to be a positive role

       model. And more importantly, she was tasked with the care of minors, a

       relationship where trust is paramount. The extent to which Evans damaged

       her relationship w i t h her students is demonstrated by the fact that her

       conduct caused at least two students to report her behavior to the

       school and one to request a transfer out of Evans's classroom.

Judgment Entry at 16. The trial judge concluded, “that the impact on working relationships
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                   14

is a significant interest that weighs in the District's favor.”

       {¶32} The trial judge found Evans's speech did affect her job performance and the

District's operations. “Beyond serving as a positive role model, Evans's responsibilities

were to: (1) exhibit professional behavior; (2) ensure student safety; (3) observe and

report inappropriate student behavior; (4) engage the public with tact and diplomacy; (5)

interact positively with staff, students, and parents; and (6) promote good public relations.”

2R. at 446. Judgment Entry at 16. The trial judge noted that Evans's pattern of

inappropriate behavior points to an inability on her part to learn from her mistakes or

to change her behavior to meet her employer's needs and expectations. Id.

       {¶33} Next, the trial judge considered the effect of Evans's conduct on the

District's mission, and found Evans, on multiple occasions, undermined the District's

mission to "facilitate maximum learning for every student.” Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).

On balance, the trial judge found that the District's interest in promoting the efficiency of

its services outweighs Evans's First Amendment interests in making her COVID

comment. Id. at 18. The trial judge concluded, “the District did not violate Evans's First

Amendment right to speak on a matter of public concern.” Id. at 19.

       {¶34} Concerning Evans’s arguments on content and view point discrimination

under the First Amendment, the trial judge found, “Evans admitted that the District did not

tell employees or students that they could not discuss COVID, effectively dispelling her

claim that the District discriminated based on the content of her comment. 2R. at 687.

Likewise, the Hearing Officer's findings demonstrate that the District's actions were not

taken simply to avoid the ‘discomfort and unpleasantness’ that accompany an unpopular

viewpoint, but instead in response to the disruption that Evans's comment caused. As
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  15

already discussed, Evans's COVID comment materially and substantially disrupted

Liberty's learning environment. I, therefore, conclude that the District did not engage in

unconstitutional content or viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.”

Judgement Entry at 19.

       {¶35} Concerning Evans’s Fourteenth Amendment claims the trial judge found

that the District's policies, on their face, do not target any suspect classifications; Evans

does not allege that she is a member of a class that would warrant heightened scrutiny;

Evans has provided little evidence beyond bare assertions that the District selectively

enforced its policies to target conservatives; and the record in fact indicates that the

District enforced its policies against a "liberal" teacher for improper social media use and

discussions in the classroom. See 2R. at 838-842. The trial judge found that “the District

did not target a suspect class when it enforced its policies.” Id. at 21-22.

       {¶36} Further, “The United States Supreme Court's holding in Engquist v. Oregon

Department of Agriculture explicitly excluded the ‘class-of-one’ theory from public-

employment cases. 553 U.S. 591, 607, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008) (‘the

class-of-one theory of equal protection has no application in the public employment

context’). Nothing Evans puts forward detracts from that observation or Engquist's

applicability to her case.” Judgment Entry at 24.

       {¶37} Finally, the trial judge found Evans's vagueness challenge fails because the

District's policies and her training on those policies, provided sufficient notice that her

COVID comment would lead to discipline. Id. at 26. The trial judge found Evans’s

arguments “concerning and unwritten (and unknowable) speech code" to be
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                            16

unpersuasive because she did not identify this supposed speech code or provide

evidence that it exists. Id.

       {¶38} The trial judge found Evans’s claim that she was coerced to resign was not

supported by the record. The judge pointed to the fact that she was accompanied at the

meeting by Attorney Gary Yashko. Attorney Yashko received the District's call that it

would recommend termination. Attorney Yashko even helped Evans draft her letter of

resignation. 2R. at 716. Further, Attorney Yashko told Evans that, had she requested a

hearing to call her own witnesses and present evidence before an impartial adjudicator,

she would have had such an opportunity. 2R. at 720, 884. Judgment Entry at 28-29.

       {¶39} The trial judge affirmed the UCRC's determination. Id. at 30. On March 9,

2023, the trial judge issued a 30-page decision finding that the UCRC's determination

was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                    Assignments of Error

       {¶40} Evans raises one Assignment of Error,

       {¶41} “I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE UCRC'S

DETERMINATION THAT APPELLEE OLENTANGY LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT

HAD TERMINATED APPELLANTS' EMPLOYMENT FOR CAUSE.”

                               Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶42} In an appeal from a decision of the court of common pleas affirming the

UCRC’s decision, reviewing courts do not use the standard of review provided for by in

R.C. 119.12 concerning appeals from orders or decisions of administrative agencies.

Brooks v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-414, 2009-

Ohio-817, ¶9; Parrett v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Review Comm’n,
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                17

4th Dist. Pickaway No. 16CA15, 2017-Ohio-2778, ¶13. In Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of

Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17–18, 482 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1985), the Ohio Supreme Court

held that reviewing courts may reverse “just cause” determinations “if they are unlawful,

unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.” The court noted that while

appellate courts are not permitted to make factual findings or to determine the credibility

of witnesses, they do have the duty to determine whether the board’s decision is

supported by the evidence in the record. Id. at 18, 482 N.E.2d at 590; Tzangas, Plakas &

Mannos, 73 Ohio St.3d 694, 696, 1995-Ohio-206, 653 N.E.2d 1207. This duty is shared

by all reviewing courts, from the first level of review in the common pleas court, through

the final appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court. Id.; See also, Struthers v. Morell, 164 Ohio

App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-6594, 843 N.E.2d 1231 (7th Dist.), ¶14; Marlatt v. Ohio Dept. of

Job and Family Services, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 22 CA 000022, 2023-Ohio-630, ¶13.

The Court further cautioned,

              To apply the same standard at each appellate level does not result

       in a de novo review standard. As this court stated in Irvine, “[t]he fact that

       reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the

       reversal of the board’s decision.” Irvine at 18, 19 OBR at 15, 482 N.E.2d at

       590. The board’s role as factfinder is intact; a reviewing court may reverse

       the board’s determination only if it is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the

       manifest weight of the evidence.

Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos, 73 Ohio St.3d at 697, 1995-Ohio-206, 653 N.E.2d 1207.

                                        Manifest weight

       {¶43} In Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012–Ohio–2179, 972 N.E.2d
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                    18

517, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified the standard of review appellate courts should

apply when assessing the manifest weight of the evidence in a civil case. SST Bearing

Corp. v. Twin City Fan Companies, Ltd., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C110611, 2012–Ohio–

2490, ¶ 16. The Ohio Supreme Court held the standard of review for manifest weight of

the evidence for criminal cases stated in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997), is also applicable in civil cases. Eastley, at ¶ 17–19, 972 N.E.2d 517.

              Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater

       amount of credible evidence, offered in a [hearing], to support one side of

       the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [finder of fact] that

       the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on

       weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater amount of

       credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be established before them.

       Weight is not a question of mathematics, but depends on its effect in

       inducing belief.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s, supra, at 1594.

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997).

       {¶44} Recently, the Ohio Supreme Court again addressed the appropriate

standard for reviewing courts to employ when conducting a manifest weight of the

evidence review. In State v. Jordan, Slip Op. No. 2023-Ohio-3800, the Court reiterated

that the standard set forth in State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997), is appropriate,

              [W]hen an appellate court reviews whether a judgment is against the

       manifest weight of the evidence, the court looks at the entire record and

       “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 19

       credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

       evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

       miscarriage of justice that the [decision] must be reversed, and a new

       [hearing] ordered.’” [Thompkins] at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v.

       Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist. 1983). Sitting

       as the “thirteenth juror,” the court of appeals considers whether the

       evidence should be believed and may overturn a [decision] if it disagrees

       with the trier of fact’s conclusion. See id.

Jordan, ¶17. “In a civil case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance

of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each

element (sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of

persuasion (weight).” Eastley, at ¶ 19.

       {¶45} However, this standard of review must be modified slightly when reviewing

an appeal from a decision rendered by the UCRC because the Ohio Supreme Court has

repeatedly told us that appellate courts are not permitted to determine the credibility of

witnesses in those cases. Simon v. Lake Geauga Printing, 69 Ohio St.2d 41, 44, 430

N.E.2d 468(1982); Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. Of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17-18, 482

N.E.2d 587(1985); Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d

694, 696, 653 N.E.2d 1207(1985); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 129

Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶20.

       {¶46} We further note that we are required to focus on the decision of the

commission, rather than that of the trial court. Irvine v. State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev.,

19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587 (1985), ¶18; Huth v. Director, Ohio Dept. of Job
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                             20

and Family Services, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2014 AP 03 0011, 2014-Ohio-5408;

Perkins v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-900, 2019-

Ohio-2538, 2019 WL 2605225, ¶ 11, citing Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 6th Dist. No. L-07-

1260, 2008-Ohio-1958, 2008 WL 1837254, ¶ 12; Meinerding v. Coldwater Exempted

Village School Dist. Bd. of Education, 3rd Dist. No. 10-19-06, 2019-Ohio-3611, 143

N.E.3d 1147, ¶ 18.

                                Unemployment Compensation

      {¶47} Unemployment compensation provides temporary income to workers who

lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Irvine v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. Of Rev.,

19 Ohio St.3d 15,17, 482 N.E.2d 587. For example, discharge due to layoff, plant closure

or work slowdown. See, Irvine at 17, quoting Leach v. Republic Steel Corp., 176 Ohio St.

221, 223, 27 O.O.2d 122, 199 N.E.2d 3 (1964); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 22. However, not all

workers are eligible for unemployment benefits. For example, workers who were fired with

just cause cannot receive benefits. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a); Marlett v. Ohio Department of

Jobs and Family Services, 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 22CA00022, 2023-Ohio-630, ¶14.

      {¶48} For purposes of unemployment compensation, the focus is on whether the

employee is unemployed through no fault of their own. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a) provides:

             (D) * * * [N]o individual may * * * be paid benefits * * *:

             (2) For the duration of the individual’s unemployment if the director

      finds that:

             (a) The individual quit his work without just cause or has been

      discharged for just cause in connection with the individual’s work, * * *.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 21

Emphasis added. “Thus, fault is essential to the unique chemistry of a just cause

termination.” Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73 Ohio St.3d at

697–698, 653 N.E.2d 1207; Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio St.3d

332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶23. Fault, however, is not limited to willful or

heedless disregard of a duty or a violation of an employer's instructions. Williams, 129

Ohio St.3d 332 at ¶ 24, citing Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 73

Ohio St.3d at 698. Fault may arise from willful or heedless disregard of a duty, a violation

of an employer's instructions, or unsuitability for a position. Williams at ¶ 24; Moore v.

Ohio Unemp. Comp. Rev. Comm., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-756, 2012-Ohio-1424, ¶

21. The critical issue is whether the employee’s actions demonstrate an unreasonable

disregard for an employer’s best interest. Janovsky v. Ohio Bureau of Employment

Services, 108 Ohio App.3d 690, 694 671 N.E.2d 611 (2nd Dist. 1996); Peterson v.

Director, 4th Dist. Ross No. 03CA2738, 2004-Ohio-2030, ¶38; Kiikka v. Administrator,

Bureau of Employment Services, 21 Ohio App.3d 168, 169, 486 N.E.2d 1233 (8th Dist.

1985); Gregg v. SBC Ameritech, 10th Dist. No. 03AP–429, 2004–Ohio–1061, ¶39; Quartz

Scientific, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. Of Unemp. Comp., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-0090, 2013-

Ohio-1100, ¶5.

       {¶49} This does not mean that an employee’s behavior must consist of

misconduct, but it does require some degree of fault on the part of the employee. Quartz,

¶15, citing Sellers v. Bd. of Rev., 1 Ohio App.3d 161, 164, 440 N.E.2d 550 (10th Dist.

1981). In Cassaro v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 3rd Dist. Crawford No. 3-16-08,

2016-Ohio-7643, the court agreed noting,

              Likewise, “courts have repeatedly held that a discharge is considered
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                22

       for just cause when an employee’s conduct demonstrates some degree of

       fault, such as behavior that displays an unreasonable disregard for his

       employer’s best interests.” Markovich v. Employers Unity, Inc., 9th Dist.

       Summit No. 21826, 2004–Ohio–4193, ¶ 8, citing Tzangas, Plakas &

       Mannos, 73 Ohio St.3d 694, at paragraph two of the syllabus, Kiikka at

       paragraph two of the syllabus, and Sellers v. Bd. of Rev., 1 Ohio App.3d

       161 (10th Dist. 1981), paragraph two of the syllabus.

Id. at ¶16.

                                     Liberal Construction

       {¶50} R.C. 4141.46 requires that the sections of R.C. Chapter 4141 “shall be

liberally construed.” R.C. 4141.46 does not say the Unemployment Compensation Act

shall be liberally construed in favor of or against either party. Bernard v. Unemp. Comp.

Rev. Comm., 136 Ohio St.3d 264, 994 N.E.2d 427, ¶11.

              The Commission is not required to find in favor of coverage except

       when ineligibility for coverage is shown to a moral certainty. The

       Commission is charged only to resolve any material doubt in favor of

       coverage, and in so doing it must rely on the facts presented and is not

       bound by any particular nomenclature which parties adopt, or fail to.

Ashwell v. Ohio Dept. of Jobs and Family Services, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20522,

2005-Ohio-1928, ¶79. “Although unemployment compensation statutes are to be liberally

construed, neither the agency nor the trial court has a duty to construe facts more

favorably to either party. Dailey v. Admr. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Services, 8th Dist. No. 52633,

1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 5607, 1987 WL 5642.” Burns v. Director, Ohio Dept. of Job and
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                              23

Family Services, 11th Dist. Nos. 2004-T-0071, 2004-T-0072, 2005-Ohio-6290, ¶47;

Accord, Shephard v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Services, 166 Ohio App.3d 747, 2006-

Ohio-2313, 853 N.E.2d 335 (8th Dist.), ¶20.

       {¶51} The “liberal construction” requirement of R.C. 4141.46 means that the

Unemployment Compensation Act should be construed to promote the “humane purpose”

of enabling unfortunate employees who become unemployed through no fault of their own

“to subsist on a reasonably decent level…” Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d

69, 71, 525 N.E.2d 1386(1988); Williams v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 129 Ohio

St.3d 332, 2011-Ohio-2897, 951 N.E.2d 1031, ¶ 22. In other words, we can liberally

construe the Act to provide unemployment benefits to employees who are unemployed

through no fault or misconduct on their part. Williams at ¶23 (“Fault on the employee’s

part separates him from the Act’s intent and the Act’s protection.”).

       {¶52} Thus, this Court must determine if the Review Commission's finding that

Evans was terminated with just cause was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the

manifest weight of the evidence. In other words, the issue is whether Evans has the right

to unemployment compensation benefits because the District terminated her employment

without just cause as defined within the unemployment context. Case W. Res. Univ. v.

Statt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97159, 2012-Ohio-1055, ¶ 13.

            Issue for Appellate review: Whether the UCRC's decision is unlawful,

              unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                             Coercion and lack of a hearing

       {¶53} Evans first contends that she was coerced into resigning. [Appellant’s brief

at 18-19]. She further contends that the district terminated her employment without
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 24

affording her a hearing. [Appellant’s brief at 20-21].

       {¶54} In her decision, the Hearing Officer noted, “an employee who resigns in

anticipation of being discharged must be judged by the same criteria as if the discharge

had actually taken place. In such a case, the employee has just cause to quit employment

only if the employer does not have just cause to discharge the employee.” UCRC Decision

July 29, 2022 at 5, 2R. 882. In other words, the Hearing Officer reviewed the claim as if

Evans had been fired. Thus, the Hearing Officer utilized the correct standard. In the case

at bar, the focus is on whether the District had just cause to terminate Evans’s

employment.

        The record contains competent, credible evidence that Evans resigned in lieu of

                             requesting a Loudermill hearing

       {¶55} In Ohio, a state-employed teacher or aide possesses a property interest in

continued employment. See R.C. 124.11 and 3319.081. Before the state may deprive an

employee of that interest, the Due Process Clause requires certain procedural

safeguards, an example being a Loudermill hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). As the Loudermill

Court noted in the pre-deprivation due process hearing, “The tenured public employee is

entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the

employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Arnett v.

Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 170–171, 94 S.Ct., at 1652–1653 (opinion of Powell, J.); id., at

195–196, 94 S.Ct., at 1664–1665 (opinion of White, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.,

at 581, 95 S.Ct., at 740. To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an

unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 25

employee.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487,

1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). See also, Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp., AFSCME, AFL-

CIO v. Lakewood City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 68 Ohio St.3d 175, 177, 624 N.E.2d 1043,

1045 (1994) (discussing pre and post deprivation hearing requirements).

       {¶56} The record establishes that at the April 14, 2021 investigatory meeting,

Evans was given notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the District’s

evidence, and at the end of the hearing an opportunity for her and Attorney Yashko to

speak in order to present her side of the story. 1R. at 162-165; 2R. at 528; 852; 861.

Evans admitted that she was permitted to speak at the meeting. 2T. at 683. The record

further establishes that Evans was accompanied at the meeting by Attorney Gary Yashko.

1R. at 206; 2R. at 709.

       {¶57} Attorney Yashko received the District's call that it would recommend

termination. Attorney Yashko helped Evans draft her letter of resignation. 2R. at 716.

Further, Attorney Yashko told Evans that, if she requested a hearing to call her own

witnesses and present evidence before an impartial adjudicator, the District would give

her that opportunity, in the event she chose not to resign. 2R. at 720, 884. Evans testified

that when she submitted her letter of resignation, she had hopes of attaining employment

in a different school district. 1R. at 212.

       {¶58} Iceman testified that Attorney Yashko was informed the District was going

to move forward with termination of Evans’s employment; however, Evans would be given

the option to resign if she wanted too. 1R. at 166. Iceman testified that Evans submitted

a letter of resignation dated April 16, 2021. Id. Iceman testified that Evans’s resignation

was accepted on April 22, 2021. 1R. at 16. Iceman testified that if she had not opted to
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                26

resign, Evans would have received a Loudermill hearing. 2R. at 860. A Loudermill hearing

was not scheduled in Evans’ case because the District received her resignation letter. Id.

      {¶59} We find the record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the

Hearing Officer’s finding that “[Evans] would have been given a proper due process

hearing prior to being formally discharged, but she was offered the option of resigning.

On April 16, 2021, [Evans] submitted her resignation, effective at the end of the 2020-

2021 school year. On April 22, 2021, the Board accepted [Evans’s] resignation effective

May 27, 2021.” UCRC Decision at 5.

      {¶60} The record contains no evidence that Evans was unaware that she could

request a Loudermill hearing instead of resigning. The record contains no evidence that

Evans asked for a Loudermill hearing, or that the District would have denied her such a

hearing had she requested one in lieu of resigning. There is nothing in the record to

suggest the Hearing Officer improperly placed the burden of proof on Evans.

      {¶61} Upon review of the entire record, weighing the evidence and all reasonable

inferences as a thirteenth juror, we cannot reach the conclusion that the hearing officer

lost her way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. We find that the UCRC’s

decision that the District did not violate Evans' procedural due process rights by

terminating her without a hearing is not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

          The record contains competent credible evidence that the District had “just

                               cause” to discharge Evans

      {¶62} The Hearing Officer found that Evans,
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                27

            [H]ad a prior history of counseling, specialized training, and discipline

     after making disparaging public social media posts, asking inappropriate

     questions about a student’s parent’s’ nationality, and making racially-

     charged and insensitive comments to a Black student. Although [Evans]

     asserted that she had no intention of harming anyone through her posts or

     commentary, she appears to be either unable or unwilling to fully

     comprehend the significant impact of her conduct on students and the

     broader community, the disruption to a positive school environment, and the

     effect on the school’s public image. The investigation team found [Evans]

     to be untrainable due to her inability to adapt to the societal changes around

     her (specifically at OLHS).

                                              ***

            [Evans] acknowledged, in hindsight, that she should not have made

     her October 2020 comments or her April 7, 2021 statement. [Evans]

     received training and counseling in 2019 and 2020 but nevertheless

     continued to voice her opinions without regard to her role and the

     employer’s immense task and precarious position. [Evans] did not exhibit

     professionalism, sound judgment, or promote good public relations, and her

     conduct clearly displayed that she could not be trained to act in the

     employer’s best interest. Based on the above, the Hearing Officer has

     determined that the employer had just cause to discharge [Evans]. [Evans’s

     misconduct was contrary to the employer’s best interests and represents

     fault that will serve to suspend her unemployment compensation benefits.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                28

       Accordingly, [Evans] quit her employment with the Olentangy Local Board

       of Education without just cause when presented with an inevitable

       discharge.

UCRC Decision at 5-6.

       {¶63} The District employs a progressive disciplinary policy. 1R. at 170. The

record established that with respect to Evans’s previous disciplinary actions, the district

chose to support Evans through additional training so that she could maintain her

employment. 1R. at 173-174. Iceman testified that the decision to terminate Evans’s

employment was the “end of a …sequential…number of disciplines…for violating the

strict policy, a final warning that was [from] a discipline from March of 2019…and

continued unprofessionalism.” 1R. at 168-169. Iceman testified that this was Evans’s

fourth incident in two years. Id. at 170.

                    Progressive disciplinary policy and past disciplinary actions

       {¶64} It has been observed that “[p]rogressive disciplinary systems create

expectations on which employees rely,” and “[f]airness requires an employee not be

subject to more severe discipline than that provided for by company policy.” Mullen v.

O.B.E.S., 8th Dist. No. 49891 (Jan. 16, 1986). Ohio appellate courts have “generally

concluded that where a company bypasses its progressive disciplinary system and

terminates an employee, that employee’s discharge is without cause for unemployment

compensation purposes.” Peterson v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 4th Dist.

03CA2738, 2004–Ohio–2030, ¶ 20. See also Apex Paper Box Co. v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of

Employment Serv., 8th Dist. No. 77423 (May 11, 2000) (“an employer’s failure to follow

the disciplinary procedure set out in the work rules does not constitute just cause for
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                29

termination”); Pickett v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 55 Ohio App.3d 68, 70 (8th Dist.

1989) (Despite employer’s contention that employee could be discharged summarily

because he had previously been discharged, “there is nothing in the record to justify

ignoring the progressive discipline requirement”); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Cogar, 8th

Dist. No. 48704 (June 13, 1985) (Unemployment Compensation Board of Review could

reasonably have concluded that employer’s bypass of progressive disciplinary system

was too severe under the facts, and therefore, the discharge of employee was without

just cause); Peterson v. Director, 4th Dist. No. 03CA2738, 2004-Ohio-2030, 2004 WL

869373, ¶ 20, citing In re Claim of Frazee, 10th Dist. No. 84AP284 (Dec. 13, 1984); See

also, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., 65 Ohio App.3d 548, 584

N.E.2d 1245(3rd Dist. 1989); Ohio Assn. Pub. School Emp. V. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

Services, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12-AP-81, 2012-Ohio-6210, ¶21; Coles v. United Parcel

Service, 7th Dist. Mahoning No 12 MA 22, 2013-Ohio-1428, ¶20. Thus, prior disciplinary

actions involving the employee are relevant in considering whether the employer followed

its own progressive disciplinary policy. Additionally, we can find evidence that an

employer followed its progressive disciplinary policy to support a finding of “just cause.”

Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. Of Emp. Serv., 65 Ohio App.3d 548, 584 N.E.2d

1245(3rd Dist. 1989).

       {¶65} In this respect, when the employer bases a decision to terminate an

employee’s employment on a history of disciplinary violations, the hearing officer can

consider the employee’s previous disciplinary record. Ogburn v. Administrator, Ohio Bur.

Of Employment Services, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 97 CA 242, 1998 WL 775027(Nov. 2,

1998) at *5 (“Case law discussing just cause also supports the propriety of the board’s
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                30

consideration of appellant’s previous disciplinary record.”); Chardon Local School District

Board of Ed. V. Keller, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2013-G-3159, ¶26 (“Further, it was not

reasonable for the Hearing Officer to limit the just cause determination to this particular

incident, as the Board’s decision to terminate Yowell relied upon his prior disciplinary

infractions, as evidenced by the termination letter.”); City of Dublin v. Clark, 10th Dist.

Franklin Nos. 05AP-431; 05AP-450, 2005-Ohio-5926, ¶30 (“[Clark] was given several

written and verbal warnings that he was falling short in job productivity, and Hammersmith

had several counseling discussions with Clark about his work.”); Crisp v. Scioto

Residential Services, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2918, 2004-Ohio-6349, ¶25 (“Here, the

hearing officer could reasonably have concluded that the disciplinary actions before

October 2001 were relevant to the offense at issue because they involved similar

infractions.”).

       {¶66} The record demonstrates that Evans received training on November 23,

2020, December 2, 2020 and December 9, 2020 on microaggression and restorative

education. 1R. at 163; 2R. at 480. Evans further received trainings on the professional

use of social media; trainings on the Code of Professional Conduct for Educators on April

4, 2019, September 4, 2019 and August 21, 2022, and training on implicit bias and

building a safe and supportive school environment. 1R. at 163-164; 2R. at 480. These

training sessions all took place before Evans made her April 7, 2021 COVID comments.

       {¶67} The April 5, 2019 letter regarding Evans’s “Unpaid suspension, Directives

and Final Warning” clearly informed Evans that her “insensitive comments” contradicted

the District’s mission statement and created “considerable disruption” to the District’s

operations. The letter clearly informed Evans of her “essential functions” as an employee.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                   31

Evans was also advised that concerns were raised by “several students, parents and/or

other members of the public.” 2R. at 445.

       {¶68} From April 2019 through April 2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple

students to report her conduct and prompted more than a dozen parents, teachers, and

Liberty alumni to file complaints with the District. Judgment Entry at 15. Upon our own

independent review of the record, we find that the record contains competent, credible

evidence that demonstrates Evans's comment hurt her relationship with her students and

the parents. 1T. at 172-73; 174; 175; 187; 2R. at 472-474; 515.

       {¶69} The record supports that Evans was informed as early as 2019 that her

insensitive comments were contradictory to the District’s mission statement and “created

considerable disruption to our operation.” 2R. at 446. (Apr. 5, 2019 letter to Evans from

Todd R. Meyer, Chief Operations Officer regarding the Apr. 4, 2019 pre-disciplinary

hearing). (Evans signed this letter on April 9, 2019. 2R. at 447). In response to a question

during the investigatory hearing, Evans stated that she was not familiar with the

Professional Code of Conduct for Educators. 2R. at 511.

       {¶70} In a letter dated September 29, 2020, Evans was informed that her

comment with respect to “Tell that to the English Department,” demonstrated a repeated

and persistent pattern of poor judgment. 2R. at 483. Evans was further informed that her

comments have compromised her ability to work with staff, created a negative influence

for students and violated a position of trust as a positive role model for students. Id. Evans

was directed “to refrain from engaging in any other unprofessional or unethical behavior

or violations of Board policies. If you do not follow these directives, you will face further

disciplinary action up to and including termination.” Id. (Emphasis added).
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 32

       {¶71} Evans had multiple disciplinary incidents, disrupting the high school’s

operation and its learning environment each time. Because of this, the Hearing Officer

found that Evans "appear[ed] to be either unable or unwilling to fully comprehend the

significant impact of her conduct on students and the broader community, the disruption

to a positive school environment, and the effect on the school's public image." UCRC

Decision at 5.

       {¶72} Evans admitted that she understood “what I am suppose to do and I didn’t

do what I was suppose to do.” 1R. at 164. She further admitted that she was advised April

2, 2019 and September 29, 2020 that any future violations of school policy would result

in discipline up to and including termination of employment. 1R. at 169; 2R. at 445; 682.

       {¶73} This was Evans's fourth infraction in two years. And yet, as observed by the

Hearing Officer, Evans "continued to voice her opinions" “without regard to her role [,] and

. . . her conduct clearly displayed that she could not be trained to act in the employer's

best interests." 2R. at 884-885.

       {¶74} The record contains competent, credible evidence that the COVID comment

was not an isolated incident upon which the District based its decision to terminate

Evans’s employment. The record clearly establishes that her discharge was the result of

a history of repeated disciplinary infractions, each of which created considerable

disruption to the District’s operation. The record establishes that from April 2019 through

April 2021, Evans's conduct caused multiple students to report her conduct and prompted

more than a dozen parents, teachers, and Liberty alumni to file complaints with the

District. The record contains competent, credible evidence that the District provided

Evans with notice of the problems caused for students, parents and members of the public
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                 33

each time she made a disparaging public social media post, asked inappropriate

questions, and made racially-charged and insensitive comments. The District continued

to employ Evans while working with her to address those problem areas by providing her

with training and instruction.

       {¶75} Thus, the record contains competent, credible evidence supporting the

hearing officer’s finding that Evans did not exhibit professionalism, sound judgment, or

promote good public relations, and her conduct clearly displayed that she could not be

trained to act in the employer’s best interest.

       {¶76} The record establishes that the fault for Evans’s discharge lies with her

inability to learn from the numerous training sessions that the District provided to her, as

well as the previous disciplinary hearings in which she was involved, to simply keep her

inappropriate comments out of the school environment. The record contains competent,

credible evidence that in spite of repeated warnings, Evans appears to be either unable

or unwilling to fully comprehend the significant impact of her conduct on students and the

broader community, the disruption to a positive school environment, the effect on the

school’s public image, and that it was not in the best interest of the District. The record

supports that Evans’s conduct after repeated warnings, training, and previous disciplinary

hearings evidences an unreasonable disregard for her employer’s best interests.

       {¶77} Upon our independent review of the entire record, weighing the evidence

and all reasonable inferences as a thirteenth juror, we cannot reach the conclusion that

the hearing officer lost her way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. We

conclude that the UCRC’s decision in this case that Evans misconduct was contrary to

the employer’s best interests and represents fault that will serve to suspend her
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  34

unemployment compensation benefits, and that Evans quit her employment without just

cause when presented with an inevitable discharge, was neither unlawful, unreasonable,

nor against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                      Wrongful termination

       {¶78} Although Evans raised only a single assignment of error, in her brief she

raises sub-issues that assert, in essence, that the District fired her for engaging in

protected activity, i.e., free speech. Therefore, Evans suggests that the finding by the

Hearing Officer that she quit without just cause or her employment was terminated by the

District with just cause is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶79} An unfair firing is not the same thing as an illegal firing. Situations which

may give rise to a wrongful termination claim can include when an employee is fired for a

discriminatory reason, such as age, race or sex; when an employee is fired in retaliation

to complaints about harassment or whistle-blowing, and where an employee is fired for

exercising their protected rights. If an employee is fired for engaging in protected activity

and through no fault of their own, the situation may give rise to a wrongful termination

claim in addition to unemployment compensation benefits.

              It is important to distinguish between just cause for discharge in the

       context of unemployment compensation and in other contexts. An employer

       may justifiably discharge an employee without incurring liability for wrongful

       discharge, but that same employee may be entitled to unemployment

       compensation benefits. See Adams v. Harding Machine Co., 56 Ohio

       App.3d 150, 155, 565 N.E.2d 858 (3d Dist. 1989). This is so because just

       cause, under the Unemployment Compensation Act, is predicated upon
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                             35

      employee fault. Tzangas, 73 Ohio St.3d at 698, 653 N.E.2d 1207; Adams,

      56 Ohio App.3d at 155, 565 N.E.2d 858. We are, therefore, unconcerned

      with the motivation or correctness of the decision to discharge. Friedman v.

      Physicians and Surgeons Ambulance Serv., 9th Dist. No. 10287, 1982 WL

      2867 (Jan. 6, 1982). The Act protects those employees who cannot control

      the situation that leads to their separation from employment. See Tzangas,

      73 Ohio St.3d at 697, 653 N.E.2d 1207.

Durgan v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 110 Ohio App.3d 545, 549–550, 674 N.E.2d 1208 (9th

Dist. 1996); Clucas v. RT80 Express, Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA009989, 2012-Ohio-

1259, ¶5; Peterson v. Director, Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Services, 4th Dist. Ross No.

03CA2738, 2004-Ohio-2030, ¶17.

      {¶80} As we have already explained, Evans’s employment was not terminated

based upon the content of her COVID statement; rather the termination of her

employment was based upon multiple disciplinary violations evidencing an unreasonable

disregard for her employers’ best interests. Accordingly, we find Evans’s First

Amendment and Equal protection arguments fail to establish that the Hearing Officer’s

decision was unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidenced.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                  36

       {¶81} The March 9, 2023 judgment entry of the Delaware County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J., and

Wise, J., concur;

King, J., dissents
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                37

King, J. dissents

       {¶ 82} I would reverse the determination of the UCRC because I conclude Evans's

COVID "microaggression" does not represent just cause sufficient to deny benefits. The

majority of the panel concludes otherwise; therefore, I dissent.

       {¶ 83} To begin, I disagree that the burden of proof rests on any claimant. The

current formulation of the statute states, "No person shall impose upon the claimant or

the employer any burden of proof as is required in a court of law." R.C. 4141.281(C)(2).

As our colleagues in the Seventh District recognized, this statutory change supersedes

prior case law. Struthers v. Morell, 164 Ohio App.3d 709, 2005-Ohio-6594, 843 N.E.2d

1231, ¶ 12 (7th Dist.).    Under this proper formulation, we cannot uphold a UCRC

determination under the notion that a claimant failed to carry the burden of proof. In my

view, this error in formulation was present in the trial court's opinion, and then repeated

in the majority's opinion. See, Trial Court's March 9, 2023 Judgment Entry at page 10.

       {¶ 84} The purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide financial

assistance to individuals who have lost their employment through no fault of their own,

i.e., without just cause. See Salzl v. Gibson Greeting Cards, Inc., 61 Ohio St.2d 35, 39,

399 N.E.2d 76 (1980). In order to accomplish this purpose, we are directed to liberally

interpret certain statutes. R.C. 4141.46. In this context, both the Third and Seventh

Districts have concluded that the legislative intent is to presume that employees are

entitled to receive benefits. Tomlinson v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services,

3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-02, 2009-Ohio-3414, ¶ 6; Abate v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel

Corp., 126 Ohio App.3d 742, 748-749, 711 N.E.2d 299 (7th Dist.1998). The Second,

Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Districts arrived at a similar conclusion as well. Bates v.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  38

Airborne Express, Inc., 186 Ohio App.3d 506, 2010-Ohio-741, 928 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 9 (2d

Dist.); Schivelbein v. Riverside Mercy Hospital, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1208, 2012-

Ohio-3991, ¶ 13; Shephard v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 166 Ohio

App.3d 747, 753, 2006-Ohio-2313, 853 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.); Niskala v. Director,

Ohio Department of Job & Family Services, 9th Dist. Medina No. 10CA0086-M, 2011-

Ohio-5705, ¶ 9; Bennett v. Department of Job and Family Services, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 11AP-1029, 2012-Ohio-2327, ¶ 6. It also appears the Twelfth District reached the

same conclusion.

       {¶ 85} Before the Twelfth District, the UCRC argued that this presumption in favor

of awarding benefits was improper, but the court of appeals rejected the argument.

Harmon v. Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-

08-105, 2022-Ohio-1142, ¶ 31-32. Our colleagues' determinations are further bolstered

by the subsequent Supreme Court of Ohio case holding courts are no longer required to

defer to administrative agency interpretations. TWISM Enterprises, L.L.C. v. State Board

of Registration for Professional Engineers & Surveyors, --- N.E.3d ---, 2022-Ohio-4677, ¶

3.

       {¶ 86} For the sake of statewide consistency, I would follow the overwhelming

majority of our sister appellate courts and begin with the proposition a claimant is entitled

to receive benefits. In this light, under R.C. 4141.281(C)(2), the hearing officer must

ensure that evidence at hand is sufficient to overcome the presumption a claimant is

entitled to receive benefits before denying benefits. As it relates here, the hearing officer

was required under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2) to determine if the submitted evidence sufficiently

demonstrated that Evans was terminated for just cause.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                    39

       {¶ 87} I agree with the majority that the hearing officer correctly reviewed the

alleged inevitable discharge under the standard of whether the employer had just cause

to terminate employment. But I do not agree the evidence before the hearing officer was

sufficient to demonstrate just cause and thus rightly deny Evans benefits.

       {¶ 88} Whether a claimant's conduct rises to the level of just cause is not subject

to a bright line rule, instead it must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Irvine v. State

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 17, 482 N.E.2d 587

(1985). Although, the Supreme Court did provide some rough guidance by stating: "

'Traditionally, just cause, in the statutory sense, is that which, to an ordinarily intelligent

person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.' " Id., quoting Peyton

v. Sun T.V., 44 Ohio App.2d 10, 12, 335 N.E.2d 751 (10th Dist.1975).

       {¶ 89} Moreover, there is a distinction between the conduct that may warrant

dismissal and "the further degree of misconduct or fault required on the part of the

employee to justify a denial of unemployment benefits."               James v. Ohio State

Unemployment Review Commission, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-976, 2009-Ohio-5120,

¶ 12. In other words, an employer may have the right to discharge an employee for certain

conduct, but that does not automatically equate to just cause under R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)

to deny that employee benefits. In that regard, it is entirely possible Evans would fail to

win a wrongful discharge claim, yet be entitled to receive benefits. As I explain below, it

is unnecessary to directly reach the constitutional issues raised, although I view it

presents a much more significant obstacle to the denial of benefits than stated by the

majority.
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                    40

       {¶ 90} The proximate conduct at issue here is Evans's overheard COVID

comment: "Can you believe the coronavirus came from China and that China is making

money from the sales of PPE to the United States?" The school district's concern was

not so much that this statement was made, but rather its impact on a particular student

who was of Asian descent and became upset after hearing this comment. Indeed, the

school district's brief referred to the statement itself as an "Anti-Asian microaggression."

While the facts surrounding the origin of COVID-19 continue to be hotly debated, the

statement itself lacks the sort of racially charged slurs, opinions, statements, or distasteful

"joking" that usually precede an employee's discharge.

       {¶ 91} In my view, whatever legal authority an employer has to punish a

microaggression with termination, a microaggression will usually fall well short of

demonstrating sufficient just cause to overcome a worker's presumption to unemployment

benefits. In support of the UCRC's decision, the school district gestures at the broadly

worded statement of principles adopted by the school district, and that Evans violated

those rules. Again, violations of those laudable aspirations might well support lawful

discharge, but not necessarily the denial of unemployment benefits. Ordinarily, the UCRC

reviews the violation of company rules that are far more objective, such as being ready

for work at the assigned start time, using internet for only business purposes, procedures

for use of sick time, and so on. The workplace rules at issue here approach the "be a

good employee and support company objectives" level of specificity that is, in my view,

insufficient to support a finding of just cause for violating a company rule.

       {¶ 92} As I read the record, Evans has been repeatedly disciplined and on

November 17, 2020, she was placed on something roughly equivalent to a last chance
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                                  41

agreement. We can assume without deciding that on November 17, 2020, just cause

existed to terminate her. But the school district decided to proceed otherwise. If the

conduct at issue here were truly actionable, then her prior conduct would be relevant and

would certainly support the UCRC's finding. But the school district gave her another

chance, which it cannot now take back. Because the single microaggression is not either

a violation of workplace rules or independent evidence of her unsuitability for her position,

the prior discipline is of no import.

       {¶ 93} Finally, I believe much of the discussion by the trial court and majority is

unnecessary. With regard to Evan's claimed constitutional violations of equal protection

and procedural due process, I fail to see how either is relevant to whether Evans's

microaggression was sufficient just cause to support the UCRC's denial of her

unemployment benefits. Those may well be independent claims related to wrongful

discharge she can raise in another forum, but, as explained above, we do a disservice to

the purpose and structure of the Unemployment Compensation Act to interject those here.

       {¶ 94} Regarding the free speech claims, I agree the UCRC has to ensure that any

denial of unemployment benefits comports with the United States Constitution. See, e.g.,

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). But the

trial court's analysis expressly placed the burden on Evans to prove a first amendment

violation. This was an error under R.C. 4141.281(C)(2). The factors examined by the

federal district court in Brandenburg v. Housing Authority of Irvine, 253 F.3d 891, 897 (6th

Cir.2001), placed the burden on the former employee because the employee as plaintiff

had the burden of proof. That is not the case here. Thus, this illustrates the danger of
Delaware County, Case No. 23 CAE 04 0023                                               42

conflating standards relevant to wrongful discharge cases with the standard of just cause

under the unemployment compensation system.

      {¶ 95} Further, whenever the UCRC has to assure itself it is behaving

constitutionally in denying benefits, it should proceed cautiously in applying federal

precedent. As illustrated above, the framework in which those cases arise are often

remarkably different. Moreover, as discussed by Judge Murphy in Bennett v. Metropolitan

Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee, 977 F.3d 530, 547 (6th

Cir.2020) (Murphy, J., concurring), the "state-as-the-employer" free speech law revolves

around "two incomparable values—a public employee's interest in speaking about politics

and a public employer's interest in its efficient operations." If the balancing in federal

court is a delicate affair with the benefit of discovery and the adversarial nature of

litigation, then the UCRC should be circumspect in denying benefits under any framework

driven by "two incompatible values."

      {¶ 96} Thus, in my view, in many circumstances, with the difficulty in assessing

this area of the law coupled with the presumption of awarding benefits, the discharged

worker should receive benefits and thus avoid consideration of this perilous doctrine

altogether. It follows then that I am not nearly as convinced as the trial court and the

majority about a conclusion to deny benefits premised on the lack of merits of the free

speech claim here. I would conclude the UCRC's determination of just cause was

unreasonable and thus believe it should be reversed on that ground.