Court Opinion

ID: 9476817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:06:13.336782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:31.518591
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Because I believe that Zimmerlee was denied due process, I would reverse the district court’s denial of Zimmerlee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The majority correctly states that under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), due process requirements are satisfied if prisoners subject to disciplinary action receive “advance written notice of the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Due process also allows prisoners to call witnesses in their defense when this practice does not threaten “institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979. In reviewing prison hearing officers’ decisions, we are required to determine whether they are supported by “some evidence.” Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987).
I believe Zimmerlee was denied due process in three respects. First, he was not given fair notice of the claimed disciplinary violation. All he was told was that he was accused of smuggling contraband into the prison sometime between February 13, 1984, and July 23, 1984. I do not believe that knowing that the alleged violation oc*189curred at some point during a six month period provides a prisoner with the “chance to marshall the facts in his defense” that is the basis for the notice requirement. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564, 94 S.Ct. at 2978. Thus, I submit that we are compelled to hold that, as a facial matter, the notice provided Zimmerlee was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. It is possible that a more specific statement of the dates of the alleged violations would give away the identity of the informant. However, neither the district court nor this court has been provided with any evidence that would justify the nonspecificity of the notice given to Zimmerlee. Because the notice provided Zimmerlee was insufficient on its face, I would hold that it was the Oregon Attorney General’s burden to bring before the district court (at least for in camera inspection) evidence that would explain the gross lack of specificity in the notice. The Attorney General has not carried this burden. Therefore, I believe we are compelled to hold that a due process violation has occurred.
The second deficiency in the process accorded to Zimmerlee is that he was not given the opportunity to examine the prosecution witness or to call defense witnesses. Zimmerlee was not allowed to ask questions of the informant either personally or in writing. Again, while this decision by the hearing officer might have been justified by prison security concerns, neither the district court nor this panel have been provided with any information supporting any possible justification. Zimmerlee also asked that he be allowed to call various witnesses, both prisoners and nonprisoners, to testify about his behavior and general character. The hearing officer asked Zimmerlee if those individuals were questioned, “what would their answers be?” Zimmerlee responded, “Well, their answers would be the truth.” The hearing officer asked, “And basically what would be the truth?” Zimmerlee answered, “That I’m not involved in nothin’, there’s nothin’ to be involved in.” The hearing officer then stated, “Okay, then those questions don’t need to be posed to those people, ‘cause you’ve already answered them.” ER 67-68. As Zimmerlee’s brief points out, under the hearing officer’s reasoning, a prisoner who denied his guilt would never be allowed to bring in witnesses to corroborate his denial. In addition to having no apparent legally cognizable reason for denying Zimmerlee an opportunity to call these witnesses, the hearing officer provided no correctional or security-related reason for this denial. Therefore, I would hold that the denial of Zimmerlee’s request to call witnesses constitutes a due process violation.
The third basis on which I would hold that Zimmerlee was denied due process is that the hearing officer’s determination of Zimmerlee’s guilt was not supported by “some evidence.” The hearing officer’s decision was based solely on the statement of a single informant. Without the substance of the informant’s statement in the record, there is no evidence in support of the hearing officer’s determination of guilt. The district court and this court have not been provided with a transcript or other document indicating the substance of the informant’s statement. While the record contains some evidence that the informant had been reliable in the past and had passed a polygraph test, these indicators of reliability have no value unless they are considered in relation to the substance of the informant’s statement. Without knowing the identity of the informant or the substance of the informant’s statement, I believe that the district court and this court are unable to determine whether there exists “some evidence” in support of the hearing officer’s determination that Zimmerlee was guilty. In other words, we are asked to operate in the dark. For the reasons set forth above, I would reverse the district court’s order denying Zimmerlee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.