Court Opinion

ID: 9727041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:16.394779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.066476
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE REINHARD, specially concurring: While I concur with much of the majority’s analysis and in the result reached, I do not agree with the reliance placed by the majority on the fornication statute to justify an expression of public policy as it may relate to the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act). Rather, I would rely on the legislative debate at the time of the enactment of the Act in order to ascertain the legislative intent behind the relevant portion of the Act at issue here. Where, as here, a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, it becomes proper to examine sources other than its language for evidence of legislative intent. {In re Marriage of Logston (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 266, 279.) Debates on the floor of the General Assembly will be examined in this regard to ascertain the legislative intent underlying specific legislation. (Morel v. Coronet Insurance Co. (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 18, 24.) Statements made by members of the General Assembly in legislative debate assist in revealing the legislative intent behind a statute when examined in the context of the debate in its entirety. Morel, 117 Ill. 2d at 24. During the House debate on Senate Bill 1377, later enacted as the Illinois Human Rights Act (Pub. Act 81 — 1216, eff. July 1, 1980), Representative Harry Leinenweber questioned the House sponsor of the bill, Representative James Reilly, in pertinent part, as follows: “Leinenweber: ‘All right. The Bill also provides, among other things, that considering someone’s marital status would be an illegal act of discrimination. Is that correct?’ Reilly: ‘Yes.’ Leinenweber: ‘All right, and that...and, as I understand it, marital status is a...is defined as married, single, or divorced. Is that correct?’ Reilly: ‘Yes.’ Leinenweber: ‘Would that include two unmarried adults, female and male, living together, or two unmarried males, or two unmarried females, who are homosexuals, living together?’ Reilly: ‘No, it has nothing to do with that at all.’ Leinenweber: ‘Well, why would that be excluded from the definition of marital status of married, single, or divorced?’ Reilly: ‘Probably why it would be excluded, that is those people are not married, or unmarried, or anything else. It’s defined as the legal status of being married, or not married, or divorced, widowed, whatever. The people you’re talking about simply don’t fall into that category at all.’ ” 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 25, 1979, at 82-83. I believe that the above-quoted discussion clearly shows that the term “marital status” as set forth in section 1 — 103(Q) and defined in section 1 — 103(J) of the Act does not include the relationship of unmarried persons living together. Consequently, plaintiffs are not protected under the Act, and the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed.