Court Opinion

ID: 9902515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:18:13.87968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:52.724642
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                   STATE OF FLORIDA
                    _____________________________

                          Case No. 5D23-118
                 LT Case No. 16-2021-MM-14027-AXXX
                    _____________________________

JASON HASSAN BAXTER,

     Appellant,

     v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

     Appellee.
                    _____________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Duval County.
Julie K. Taylor, Judge.

Charlie Cofer, Public Defender, and Elizabeth Hogan Webb, Assistant
Public Defender, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina Piotrowski, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                           October 27, 2023

MACIVER, J.

      Jason Baxter appeals a judgment and sentence for one count
of possession of drug paraphernalia after he entered a nolo
contendere plea and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his
dispositive motion to suppress. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(1)(A). On appeal,
Baxter argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion
because he was detained without reasonable suspicion and
subjected to an unlawful search and seizure. Specifically, Baxter
makes two arguments regarding his detention and the subsequent
seizure of his person and search of his vehicle. First, he argues that
he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the arresting
officer approached his vehicle after activating his emergency
lights. At that point, he argues, the officer did not have the
necessary reasonable suspicion required to involuntarily detain
him. Next, he argues that after the initial investigatory detention,
his seizure was based on the “plain smell” doctrine that as a matter
of law should no longer be sufficient to establish probable cause.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                                Facts

       According to testimony and video evidence, on August 16,
2021, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Officer T.W. Accra with the
Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office (JSO) saw Baxter pull into the parking
lot of a closed CVS drugstore. Accra drove by the property and
decided to come back around to both check on Baxter’s well-being
and to ensure no property crimes were being committed. Accra
pulled into the parking lot and stopped his marked JSO vehicle
near Baxter’s parked car without blocking Baxter’s ability to drive
away. Accra activated his emergency lights before exiting his
vehicle and approaching Baxter. Accra testified that he was
wearing his class C uniform, which consists of tactical gear,
tactical vest, black T-shirt, and black cargo pants. He testified that
he activated his emergency lights so that other officers would more
readily know where he was and, because he was not in a
traditional police uniform, so others would more readily recognize
him as a police officer before he approached.

      As Accra got out of his vehicle and walked over to the
passenger side of Baxter’s car, Baxter had already rolled down his
passenger-side front window. Accra testified that he immediately
smelled what seemed to be fresh marijuana. Accra also testified
that before approaching the vehicle he saw Baxter make some sort
of movement towards the backseat and place something there.
Accra identified himself, asked Baxter how he was doing, and
informed Baxter that the reason he made contact with him was
because he was parked outside of a closed business. Baxter did not
ask if he was detained or if he was free to leave. Instead, Baxter

                                     2
responded, “Oh I’m actually just about to leave, I was waiting for
my friend to get from the gym, I just got off work.” Accra asked
Baxter if he had a driver’s license on him and Baxter gave him his
license.

       When Accra asked, “So how far out is your friend?” the
defendant pointed in a direction, hesitated, and said, “Towards
uhm. Towards. I’m trying to think. (pause) My friend Thomas.
He’s at the gym. He’s at the Baileys. I’m waitin’ for him. He lives
in Arlington. Over on Townsend. Townsend, yes. In apartments
on Townsend. . . . I know you’re probably like he’s makin’ up a
story . . . I’m actually waitin’ for him, ‘cause I live on the Southside
as you can see.” The officer then asked, “Why are you waiting for
him here out of curiosity?” Baxter responded, “I just had to pull
over to make sure my tire was straight. I just got back in the car,
that’s all. . . . I’m about to leave actually.” The officer then asked,
“Well if you was waitin’ for him, and he’s not here, why you leavin’
all of the sudden?” Baxter responded, “I’m not waiting for him to
get here, I told you I pulled over to check my tire. . . . I’m about to
go to his house now.” At that point, the officer says, “Well just
stand by, I’m gonna check everything out, and we’ll go from there.”

       Accra returned to his patrol car to check Baxter’s
information. While at his vehicle, Accra can be heard on his body
camera recording saying (presumably to another officer) to “stay
[present] with him at the driver door, I smell fresh marijuana – big
blue bag in the back.” A moment later, presumably to an additional
officer, Accra can be heard saying that Baxter’s “story is kind of
doodoo” and that he smelled fresh marijuana “not even burned –
and he has a huge backpack that I saw him put back there when I
first pulled up.” As Accra finished this statement, he was exiting
his vehicle to return to Baxter. Another officer can be seen
standing at the door of Baxter’s vehicle. There is no evidence in the
record concerning any interaction between that officer and Baxter
prior to Accra’s return to the vehicle.

      As Accra approached, the other officer directed Baxter to
step out of the vehicle and can be heard on Accra’s body camera
recording asking Baxter if he has a medical marijuana card.
Baxter responded no. Baxter was asked if he smokes marijuana
and he responded no. He was asked if he smokes hemp products

                                      3
but cannot be heard responding because of crosstalk. The officer
told Baxter that he was going to be detained for a minute, that he
“has weed all over [him],” and that they could smell marijuana
either fresh or burnt from outside the vehicle. Baxter was
handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. After
unsuccessfully seeking permission to search Baxter’s vehicle, the
officers proceeded with an involuntary search of the vehicle and
informed Baxter that it was based upon the probable cause that
they obtained from the smell coming from his vehicle.

      Based upon items recovered during the search, Baxter was
arrested and ultimately charged with misdemeanor possession of
less than twenty grams of marijuana, and possession of drug
paraphernalia (also a misdemeanor). Baxter filed a motion to
suppress, arguing that the marijuana and paraphernalia were
discovered based upon a detention without reasonable suspicion
and a subsequent illegal search. At the hearing on the motion the
only witness testimony was from Officer Accra. The State and
Baxter stipulated to the introduction of Accra’s body-camera video
into evidence. The trial court denied the motion and Baxter
entered a plea of nolo contendere to the paraphernalia charge. The
state entered a nolle prosequi for the marijuana charge. At the
time of the plea there was a finding made on the record that the
motion to suppress was dispositive.1 Baxter appeals the order
denying his motion to suppress.

                        Standard of Review

       In State v. Willis, 276 So. 3d 448 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019), this
court explained the standard of review that we apply in this case,
as follows:

      We review a suppression order to determine whether
      competent, substantial evidence supports the trial
      court’s findings of historical fact. State v. Roman, 983

      1 While Baxter initially entered the plea without reserving

the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, the court
granted a subsequent motion to vacate and set aside the plea—
specifically for the purpose of appealing the denial of the motion to
suppress.
                                    4
      So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). “It has also been
      observed, however, that to the extent a ruling is based
      on an audio recording, ‘the trial court is in no better
      position to evaluate such evidence than the appellate
      court, which may review the tape for facts legally
      sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling.’ ” Bailey v.
      State, 31 So. 3d 809, 812 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing
      Dooley v. State, 743 So. 2d 65, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)).
      We review that evidence and any inferences from it in
      favor of supporting the trial court’s ruling. Pagan v.
      State, 830 So. 2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002). We must
      “independently review mixed questions of law and fact
      that ultimately determine constitutional issues.”
      Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 866 (Fla. 2006).
      The trial court’s application of law to the facts in a
      finding as to reasonable suspicion, or the lack thereof,
      is subject to de novo review. State v. Cruse, 121 So. 3d
      91, 95 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (citing Ornelas v. United
      States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed.
      2d 911 (1996)).

Id. at 451–52.

                          Initial Detention

       Baxter’s initial argument is that when Accra activated his
emergency lights, the interaction became an investigatory
detention. He argues that because Accra had not yet established
sufficient grounds to reasonably suspect criminal activity, the
detention was unlawful, in violation of Baxter’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
Baxter’s argument fails as follows.

      “[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter
constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances
surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police
conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the
person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter.” Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439
(1991). Importantly, a person’s belief that they are not free to

                                      5
terminate the encounter must be based on a show of force or
authority by the police.

      Baxter’s argument that the activation of police lights
elevated the interaction from a consensual interaction to a
detention has been conclusively rejected by the Florida Supreme
Court. In G.M. v. State, the Court recognized that the “United
States Supreme Court has not receded from the longstanding
principle that per se rules are inappropriate in the context of
Fourth Amendment seizure analyses.” 19 So. 3d 973, 979 (Fla.
2009). It expressly rejected “the absolute and inflexible proposition
that activation of police lights alone always constitutes a seizure.”
Id. Instead holding that, “the activation of police lights is one
important factor to be considered in a totality-based analysis as to
whether a seizure has occurred.” Id.

      Here, there is nothing in the record indicating any
heightened show of force or authority on the part of Accra that
would have made a reasonable person feel that they could not
terminate the encounter. There is no indication that Accra entered
the lot aggressively. He did not park in a manner that blocked
Baxter from leaving. He did not shine his vehicle spotlight on
Baxter. When he exited his vehicle, Accra casually approached the
passenger side of Baxter’s car. He was cordial, identifying himself
and asking Baxter how he was doing. He then informed Baxter the
reason he was making contact was because Baxter was parked
outside of a closed building. Baxter did not decline to interact with
Accra,2 but instead voluntarily offered him the explanation that he
was just about to leave and was waiting for a friend. At this point
Accra asked for Baxter’s identification. The Supreme Court has
made clear “that even when officers have no basis for suspecting a
particular individual,” it is lawful to ask an individual questions
and examine their identification, “as long as the police do not
convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.

      2 We do not suggest that a person must affirmatively decline

an officer’s requests or attempt to terminate the encounter before
a seizure can occur. We only recognize an absence of actions that
would clearly establish that a detention had occurred.
                                     6
      Because Baxter does not assert and the record does not
provide any basis other than the activation of emergency lights to
establish that he was detained during this initial interaction, we
reject his argument that he was detained without reasonable
suspicion.

       Indeed, by the point where the interaction arguably does
become a detention, the record shows enough factual basis to
establish objective reasonable suspicion. “In determining whether
an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances.” Grayson v. State, 212
So. 3d 481, 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (quoting Parker v. State, 18
So. 3d 555, 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)). The record makes clear that
Accra initially saw Baxter pulling into the parking lot of a closed
location. Accra took a moment to turn around and head back to the
lot and saw that Baxter had backed into a parking spot. Accra saw
Baxter place something into the back seat when he saw law
enforcement approach. Accra smelled what he believed to be
marijuana in Baxter’s vehicle. Baxter gave what Accra thought to
be a dubious explanation about why he was in the parking lot—
initially saying he was meeting a friend.

             The Continued Investigation and Search

       Baxter’s second argument is that his continued detention
and seizure and the subsequent search were unlawful because the
search was based solely on the odor that Accra believed to be
marijuana. Baxter’s argument develops from the concurrence of
Judge Bilbrey in Hatcher v. State. 342 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA
2022). The concurrence lays out the case for receding from what is
generally known as the plain smell doctrine—that is, that the
smell of cannabis is itself sufficient to establish probable cause.
See, e.g., State v. Williams, 967 So. 2d 941, 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
Essentially, because of changes to both federal and state laws that
legalized the use of hemp—the odor of which is indistinguishable
from marijuana—the potentially lawful explanation for “plain
smell,” the concurrence argues, cannot provide a basis for probable
cause. Unanswered in the analysis are several open and relevant
questions. Is plain smell still sufficient for reasonable suspicion
(the Hatcher concurrence seems to suggest not)? Is plain smell
with the additional fact that one is in a public place sufficient to

                                     7
establish reasonable suspicion? Is plain smell while in a motor
vehicle more suspicious? Sufficiently so for probable cause? The
Second District answered these questions in Owens v. State. 317
So. 3d 1218, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). Owens holds that plain smell
is still probable cause, notwithstanding the legalization of hemp,
which, absent an interdistrict conflict, is the binding law for all
circuit courts in Florida. Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla.
1992). Baxter asks us to decline to adopt that opinion and hold that
plain smell is no longer probable cause or reasonable suspicion
justifying a Fourth Amendment intrusion.

       We need not and indeed cannot reach that issue. While the
recent changes in the law might, as suggested by Judge Bilbrey’s
thoughtful concurrence in Hatcher, eliminate the previous doctrine
that plain smell alone is sufficient to establish probable cause, that
case is not before us. Contrary to Baxter’s assertions, the detention
and subsequent search were not authorized by plain smell alone.

       The facts that established reasonable suspicion for Baxter’s
initial detention have been enumerated in the discussion above.
Baxter would have us parse all these facts separately, and where
any fact does not by itself justify a detention (i.e., where there is a
potential lawful explanation), exclude it from our analysis—thus,
whittling away the facts that contribute to the whole situation so
as to proceed on plain smell alone. That approach is simply not
consistent with a totality of the circumstances analysis. The
Supreme Court instructs:

      Any one of these factors is not by itself proof of any
      illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent
      travel. But we think taken together they amount to
      reasonable     suspicion.    We    said    in Reid    v.
      Georgia, “there could, of course, be circumstances in
      which wholly lawful conduct might justify the
      suspicion      that      criminal      activity    was
      afoot.” Indeed, Terry itself involved “a series of
      acts, each of them perhaps innocent” if viewed
      separately, “but which taken together warranted
      further investigation.” We noted in Gates, that
      “innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis
      for a showing of probable cause,” and that “[i]n making

                                      8
      a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry
      is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or
      ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to
      particular types of noncriminal acts.” That principle
      applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion
      inquiry.

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (internal citations
omitted).

      Here, officers had already observed Baxter pulling in and
parking at a closed business; that he gave inconsistent answers
about his activity; that he claimed to be checking his tire while he
was backed into a space; that he placed his backpack into the
backseat as soon as he saw law enforcement; and, that he smelled
of marijuana through the open window of the car. After his initial
detention, the record shows that Baxter was asked about and
denied being a user of marijuana or having a medical marijuana
card. He also denied smoking in response to being asked whether
he smoked hemp. Additionally, officers observed loose marijuana
(“shake”) on Baxter. Taken together, these facts, developed over
the course of their brief investigation, provided the officers with
the probable cause to search Baxter’s vehicle. In a different
scenario, where a search is conducted truly on plain smell alone,
the outcome might be different. But based upon the facts in the
record of the case before us, we affirm the denial of Baxter’s motion
to suppress.

WALLIS, J., concurs, with opinion.
KILBANE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, with
opinion.

                     _____________________________

      Not final until disposition of any timely and
      authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
      9.331.
                  _____________________________

                                    9
                                             Case No. 5D23-0118
                           LT Case No. 16-2021-MM-014027-AXXX

WALLIS, J., concurring.

        I fully concur with Judge MacIver’s majority opinion in this
case. I write additionally to address two points. First, after having
conducted a detailed review of the officer’s bodycam video footage,
it is clear to me that Baxter presented two inconsistent stories to
Officer Accra, neither of which was consistent with what the officer
observed at the scene. Baxter gave Accra conflicting statements
about why he was at the location, first stating that he was waiting
for a friend but was just about to leave. Upon further questioning
about that scenario, Baxter struggled to provide details to Accra
and spontaneously stated, “I know you’re probably like he’s makin’
up a story.” Then Baxter changed his story, stating, “I just had to
pull over to make sure my tire was straight. I just got back in the
car, that’s all.” Neither of Baxter’s explanations comported with
Accra’s observations. Accra testified that he observed Baxter
pulling into the parking lot of a closed business, so he turned
around, pulled into the parking lot, and approached Baxter’s car.
Taking that scenario in the light most favorable to the decision,
Baxter would not have had time to wait for a friend in the parking
lot, or even get out of his car, check his tire, and get back into his
car before Officer Accra arrived on scene. Baxter’s inconsistent
responses contributed to the totality of circumstances giving
Officer Accra a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Baxter was
in possession of illegal marijuana and was attempting to hide that
fact from the officer. Consequently I believe that Accra was
authorized to temporarily detain Baxter for further investigation.

      Second, I write to highlight a concern created by the
enactment of the “State hemp program” in section 581.217, Florida
Statutes (2019), the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention Control Act definition of cannabis in section 893.02(3),
Florida Statutes (2021), and current caselaw, including Owens v.
State, 317 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021), Judge Bilbrey’s
concurring opinion in Hatcher v. State, 342 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2022), and Judge Kilbane’s dissent in this case. I believe
these developments have created confusion about whether officers
in Florida still have reasonable suspicion to detain and probable

                                 10
cause to conduct a search based solely on what has been commonly
known as the plain smell doctrine. Therefore, I believe that a
question has arisen regarding the applicability of the plain smell
doctrine in certain circumstances and that law enforcement
officers in this state need guidance and instruction on the matter
so that they can perform their job while insuring an individual
citizen’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, I believe the following
question is one of great public importance:

    DOES THE PLAIN SMELL DOCTRINE STILL APPLY
    SUCH THAT SMELLING CANNABIS IS ITSELF
    SUFFICIENT   TO   ESTABLISH   REASONABLE
    SUSPICION AND PROBABLE CAUSE?

                                 11
                                             Case No. 5D23-0118
                           LT Case No. 16-2021-MM-014027-AXXX

KILBANE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

     I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Baxter was not
seized as soon as Officer Accra (“Accra”) activated his emergency
lights.    However, the majority finds that Accra developed
reasonable suspicion based on a totality of the circumstances that
could have only included: Baxter being parked in front of a closed
business, placing a backpack in the backseat, giving “inconsistent”
answers, and the smell of fresh marijuana. Without the smell of
fresh marijuana, there is little doubt that the remaining
circumstances would be insufficient to provide a basis for
reasonable suspicion. The degree of suspicion that attaches to
these behaviors under the facts of this case is just too insignificant.
So, the question becomes whether the addition of the smell of fresh
marijuana into that analysis is sufficient under the totality of the
circumstances to give rise to reasonable suspicion? I submit that
it is not. Because it is not, the majority’s finding of reasonable
suspicion based on these circumstances is in fact a continued
reliance on the “plain smell” doctrine. However, state and federal
law surrounding marijuana has changed significantly since the
“plain smell” doctrine became an exception to the warrant
requirement, and as a result, I believe its underpinnings are no
longer sound. Here, because the only meaningful factor in Baxter’s
detention was the smell of fresh marijuana, I respectfully dissent.

     All citizens have the right to be free from unreasonable seizure
guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.
Furthermore, “[t]he protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures afforded by the Florida Constitution must be
construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.” Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188, 195 (Fla. 2010) (citing
Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.).

   To justify an investigatory stop, a law enforcement officer
must develop reasonable suspicion to believe that a person has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. State v.

                                  12
Allen, 994 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); § 901.151(2), Fla.
Stat. (2021). “Therefore, ‘an investigatory stop requires a well-
founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere suspicion
is not enough to support a stop.’” McMaster v. State, 780 So. 2d
1026, 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (quoting Popple v. State, 626 So.
2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993)). The threshold to establish reasonable
suspicion is not absolute nor is it “readily, or even usefully, reduced
to a neat set of legal rules.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)). It
must “be assessed based on ‘the totality of the circumstances—the
whole picture,’ and ‘from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer.’” State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 426
(Fla. 2014) (citation omitted) (first quoting United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
277 (2002); and then quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 696 (1996); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277)). Moreover, it has been
recognized that “‘[i]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the
basis’ for reasonable suspicion.” Id. (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at
10). Thus, the “relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct
is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to
particular types of noncriminal acts.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243–44, n.13). The reasonableness of
an officer’s suspicion also “depends on a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.” Id. at 428 (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)).

     Here, the entirety of the facts that could possibly comprise the
majority’s totality of the circumstances analysis, i.e., the facts of
the encounter before Baxter was unquestionably seized, are as
follows. At approximately 10:30 p.m., Accra observed Baxter
pulling into the parking lot of a closed CVS. After making a U-
turn and returning to the CVS to find Baxter backed into a parking
space, Accra parked catty-corner to Baxter with his emergency
lights on and approached Baxter at his open passenger side
window. Accra’s stated purposes for stopping were to (1) check on
Baxter from a well-being standpoint; and (2) make sure a burglary
was not in progress. He was not responding to any calls for
assistance and there is no indication this was a high crime area.
When Accra pulled into the parking lot and exited his patrol car,
it became apparent that Baxter was alert and aware of Accra’s

                                  13
presence as he greeted Accra through his open window. When
Accra approached Baxter’s vehicle, he smelled the odor or aroma
of fresh marijuana.

     After Accra told Baxter he was “making contact” with him
because he was parked near a closed business, Baxter explained
that he was just about to leave and that he was waiting for a friend
“to get from the gym.” Accra asked why Baxter pulled off in the
CVS parking lot, to which Baxter responded that he needed to
check his tire. Accra then inquired why he was in a hurry to leave
if he was waiting for a friend. Baxter explained that he was not
waiting for his friend to arrive at the parking lot; rather, he was
leaving to go to his friend’s house. In response to Baxter saying,
“I’m about to go to [my friend’s] house now,” Accra instructed
Baxter to stand by so that he could check everything out, which he
did without incident.       Throughout this interaction, Baxter
answered all of Accra’s questions and complied with every
direction. When Accra returned from his patrol car, Baxter was
asked to step out of his vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the
backseat of Accra’s patrol car.1 Three officers searched the vehicle
and found marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

     At the suppression hearing, Accra testified that his criminal
investigation began the minute the smell of fresh marijuana hit
his nose. He further testified that he observed Baxter reach into
the back seat before he approached the vehicle.2 The trial court,

    1   The majority discusses Baxter’s inconsistent answers to
questions regarding medical marijuana and hemp and Accra’s
observations regarding “shake” on Baxter’s leg. However, these
factors came after Baxter was asked to step out of his vehicle.
Nothing that occurs from the point when Baxter was asked to step
out of his vehicle can be considered in determining whether Accra
had the requisite reasonable suspicion. See Popple, 626 So. 2d at
188.
    2    Notwithstanding the majority’s position, there is no
indication in the record that Baxter saw Accra approaching when
he placed the backpack in the back seat. While it cannot be seen
on the bodycam video, Accra testified that he approached and
observed Baxter make “an overt to the back of the vehicle to place
                                14
relying on existing precedent, denied Baxter’s motion to suppress
because Accra established reasonable suspicion when he detected
the odor of marijuana as soon as Baxter rolled down his window.
Although the trial court only relied on the smell of marijuana in
its ruling, the standard of review permits an appellate court to
independently review “mixed questions of law and fact that
ultimately determine constitutional issues.” State v. Betz, 815 So.
2d 627, 634 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598,
608 (Fla. 2001)). As such, an appellate court is not bound by the
trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion based solely on the
smell of marijuana and applies a totality of the circumstances
analysis. See State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 117 (Fla. 2004) (stating
that “the totality of the circumstances controls in cases involving
the Fourth Amendment”).

     Looking at the facts here, unless the smell of marijuana
remains determinative or is otherwise a “super factor” in
establishing reasonable suspicion, the other factors present in this
case do not come close to what has been previously considered
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Price v.
State, 120 So. 3d 198, 202 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (finding that officers
lacked reasonable suspicion where they observed the defendant
“walking out of a pharmacy with a white bag and ‘mannerisms’ of
head and arm movements of passengers in a vehicle”); Baker v.
State, 754 So. 2d 154, 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (“The fact that [the
defendant] was parked late at night near a closed business does

something there.” According to his testimony, this took place
before Baxter “wound down his windows” to speak with him. At
this point in time, Accra had not announced his presence, there is
no testimony or bodycam video evidence to support that Baxter
was alerted to police presence, and Accra did not describe this
action as an attempt to conceal. See Hunter v. State, 32 So. 3d 170,
174–75 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (explaining that the act of rummaging
in one’s pockets is not suggestive of criminal conduct and that
“[t]he officers did not describe this activity as an act of
concealment, because the officers had not announced their
presence before they observed this conduct”).           Under the
circumstances, Baxter placing a backpack in the backseat is
equally consistent with the actions of a person who is preparing to
drive away.
                                 15
not establish grounds for a Terry stop.”); Jaudon v. State, 749 So.
2d 548, 549–50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (finding that evidence should
have been suppressed where officers stopped the defendant in a
parking lot to “dispel their suspicions about his conduct”); Jordan
v. State, 707 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (finding that law
enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendant where his pickup truck was parked in a dark area next
to a closed business that had been burglarized in the past); Smith
v. State, 592 So. 2d 1206, 1207–08 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (finding that
evidence should have been suppressed where deputies stopped the
appellant because “he made a quick movement and it appeared to
the deputies that the appellant was attempting to conceal
something”).3 While innocent conduct may be considered in a
totality of the circumstances analysis, the relevant inquiry
examines “the degree of suspicion that attaches.” See Sokolow, 490
U.S. at 10. Based on the record, little suspicion if any can be
attached to the circumstances other than the smell of marijuana.

     Without supporting authority, the majority finds that the
facts here are sufficient for reasonable suspicion, thereby avoiding
the ultimate issue. However, an examination of all the relevant
facts reveals that the smell of marijuana is the only circumstance

    3  Moreover, “law enforcement actions that might otherwise
violate the Fourth Amendment can be found lawful when they
occur in connection with an officer’s ‘community caretaking
functions, totally devoid from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.’” Taylor v. State, 326 So. 3d 115, 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021)
(quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
“However, once a police officer’s concern for the welfare of the
person has been satisfied, a continued detention is not permissible
unless the police officer has reasonable suspicion that the person
has committed or is committing a crime.” Daniels v. State, 346 So.
3d 705, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022). Upon the initial encounter, Baxter
was clearly alert and not in need of any assistance from Accra, and
by Accra’s own admission, the exercise of his community care
taking function was not devoid of detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.    Therefore, community caretaking cannot save the
majority’s analysis here.
                                16
that could have formed the basis of Accra’s investigation and
Baxter’s detention. Because the degree of suspicion attached to
Baxter’s other noncriminal conduct does not give rise to a
reasonable, well-founded suspicion of criminal activity, the issue
must turn on whether, in light of the dramatic changes to both
Florida and federal law regarding hemp, the smell of what is
believed to be marijuana alone continues to provide reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory detention. See Fleeman v. Case, 342
So. 2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1976) (explaining that a court does not
ordinarily reach a constitutional question unless “the principle
contention of the parties and the rulings of the trial courts below
are predicated on this constitutional issue”); see also Menendez v.
W. Gables Rehab. Hosp., LLC, 123 So. 3d 1178, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA
2013) (“[I]f it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to
decide more.” (quoting PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d
786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring))). Just as it
would be improper for me to exceed my role and decide an issue
beyond what is necessary, the inverse is equally true: failure to
reach an issue properly before me is a failure to fulfill my
constitutional role.

     Applying a totality of the circumstances analysis to the case
at hand is only necessary because of the substantive and
substantial changes to both Florida and federal law, which call into
question the continued viability of the “plain smell” doctrine. In
years past, the smell of marijuana alone was all that was required.
See, e.g., State v. Hill, 54 So. 3d 530, 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011); State
v. Reed, 712 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Harvey v. State,
653 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); State v. T.T., 594 So. 2d 839,
840 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); State v. Jarrett, 530 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1988); State v. Wells, 516 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
This was appropriate because “[t]he mere possession of marijuana
[was] illegal,” Wells, 516 So. 2d at 75; its odor was “very
distinctive,” T.T., 594 So. 2d at 840; and “evidence in the plain
smell may be detected without a warrant.” Nelson v. State, 867 So.
2d 534, 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). However, in December 2018,
federal law changed to exclude hemp from the definition of
marijuana. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B) (2018). In July 2019, the
Florida Legislature followed suit and enacted the “State hemp
program.”       § 581.217, Fla. Stat. (2019).            Under section
581.217(2)(b),      Florida     Statutes    (2021),     “[h]emp-derived

                                  17
cannabinoids, including, but not limited to, cannabidiol, are not
controlled substances or adulterants.” The Legislature also
amended the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act to exclude hemp and medical marijuana from the
definition of “cannabis.” § 893.02(3), Fla. Stat.

     Importantly, the smell of hemp and marijuana cannot be
distinguished. See Hatcher v. State, 342 So. 3d 807, 811 n.3 (Fla.
1st DCA 2022) (“There was undisputed testimony at the
suppression hearing that hemp and marijuana are
indistinguishable by sight or smell.”); Owens v. State, 317 So. 3d
1218, 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021) (recognizing that a person may
have a legitimate explanation for the smell of fresh marijuana,
“such as where the individual has a lawful prescription for it, or
that the substance is, in fact, hemp”); see also DEP’T OF AGRIC. &
CONSUMER SERVS., HEMP AND CBD INFORMATION [FLORIDA] FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT 15,4 (“Hemp and illegal cannabis can look, feel,
and smell the same, and both substances can be smoked.
Currently, there is no known way to distinguish Hemp and illegal
cannabis based on plain view or plain odor alone.”); Cynthia A.
Sherwood et al., Even Dogs Can’t Smell the Difference: The Death
of “Plain Smell,” As Hemp Is Legalized, 55 Tenn. B.J. 14, 15 (Dec.
2019) (explaining that legal hemp and illegal marijuana smell the
same whether unburned or burned). This means that a law
enforcement officer who smells an odor or aroma of marijuana can
no longer immediately know whether it is emanating from legal
hemp, legal medical marijuana, or illegal marijuana. As a result,
the basic tenet behind courts’ adoption of the “plain smell” doctrine
no longer applies to the smell of marijuana. See Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (“If, however, the police lack
probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband
without conducting some further search of the object—i.e., if ‘its
incriminating character [is not] immediately apparent,’—the
plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure.” (alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d
738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006) (‘“The plain smell doctrine,’ in turn, ‘is
simply a logical extension of the plain view’ doctrine.’”).

    4  https://ccmedia.fdacs.gov/content/download/94417/file/hem
p-and-cbd-information-for-law-enforcement.pdf (last visited Sept.
29, 2023).
                                 18
     Because the smell of marijuana alone no longer immediately
indicates the presence of contraband, we must again think about
how the smell of marijuana will be weighed in the Fourth
Amendment analysis. At most, the plain smell of marijuana by
itself presents an ambiguity. While the presence of ambiguous
behavior can authorize further investigation, suspicion stemming
from such ambiguity must still be reasonable and cannot in and of
itself constitute reasonable suspicion. See Teamer, 151 So. 3d at
427 (citing Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186).5 As such, the smell of
marijuana remains a relevant factor to consider under the totality
of the circumstances. See State v. Francisco Perez, 239 A.3d 975,
985 (N.H. 2020) (holding that the odor of marijuana remains a
relevant factor that can be considered among the totality of the
circumstances “in determining whether reasonable, articulable
suspicion of criminal activity exists” in light of changes to state
law). However, under the facts of this case and when applying the
smell of marijuana as a factor in a totality of the circumstances
analysis, it is difficult to reach the conclusion that Accra’s
suspicions and Baxter’s detention were reasonable. In fact, other
than the potential crime of unlawful possession of marijuana,
Accra had no suspicion that Baxter was engaged in any other
criminal activity.

    5     The Teamer court found that despite a potentially
ambiguous situation, the single noncriminal factor involving a
discrepancy between the vehicle registration and the color of the
vehicle did not provide a basis for reasonable suspicion. Id. at 427–
28. Much like the color discrepancy in Teamer, the smell of
marijuana here “is not ‘inherently suspicious’ or ‘unusual’ enough
or so ‘out of the ordinary’ as to provide an officer with a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.” See id. There are various lawful
explanations for why Baxter or his vehicle smelled like marijuana.
As the Teamer court explained, “[t]he law allows officers to draw
rational inferences, but to find reasonable suspicion based on this
single noncriminal factor would be to license investigatory stops
on nothing more than an officer’s hunch.” Id. at 428; see also
Kilburn v. State, 297 So. 3d 671, 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (“A
potentially lawful activity cannot be the sole basis for a detention.
If this were allowed, the Fourth Amendment would be
eviscerated.”).
                                 19
     From his initial contact until Baxter was instructed to step
out of the vehicle, Accra did not develop any indication that Baxter
was unlawfully in possession of marijuana, which was the only
crime Accra suspected. Notably, while Baxter was still in his
vehicle, he asked no questions related to the smell or whether
Baxter had a medical marijuana card. Accra also did not probe
Baxter about the backpack or the fact that he moved it to the back
seat. Instead, Accra’s singular focus was on where Baxter was
coming from and why he pulled into the parking lot. However, at
no point did Baxter claim to be waiting for his friend to arrive at
the parking lot, which is what Accra appeared to misunderstand.
See United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 971 (11th Cir. 2003)
(requiring more than “innocuous characteristics of nervousness”
and “a habit of repeating questions” to give rise to reasonable
suspicion). In fact, Baxter maintained from the beginning of the
encounter until he was detained that he was about to leave. Based
on Accra’s misunderstanding, he believed Baxter’s story was
“doodoo.” It cannot be said that an objectively reasonable officer
would have seen Baxter’s story as inconsistent or contradictory.
See Teamer, 151 So. 3d at 426 (instructing courts to look at the
whole picture and from the perspective of an objectively reasonable
officer); see also Perkins, 348 F.3d at 968, 971 (finding that officer
lacked reasonable suspicion based on defendant’s “behavior in
response to his questions; and his hunch that [defendant] was
being untruthful about his destination” where answers did not
contradict in any way). Accordingly, Accra was acting on a “mere
hunch” that Baxter was violating the law at the time of the
detention. See Wallace v. State, 8 So. 3d 492, 494 (Fla. 5th DCA
2009) (“Although not precisely delineated, the minimal level of
justification for an investigatory stop has been described as
something more than a ‘mere hunch.’ A ‘mere hunch’ is simply a
suspicion based on bare intuition.” (citation omitted) (quoting
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274)); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 662–63 (1979) (“Were the individual subject to unfettered
governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the
security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously
circumscribed.”).6

    6 It is also worth noting that even though Baxter was in a
parked vehicle, the smell of marijuana alone would not be
                                 20
     As acknowledged by each of the opinions in this case, the
changes to the law surrounding marijuana have been sweeping.
Despite these changes, the Second District Court recently held
that “regardless of whether the smell of marijuana is
indistinguishable from that of hemp, the smell of marijuana
emanating from a vehicle continues to provide probable cause for
a warrantless search of the vehicle.” Owens, 317 So. 3d at 1220.7
Nevertheless, significant statutory revisions warrant both
recognition and proper application by the courts. See Crews v.
State, 183 So. 3d 329, 335 (Fla. 2015) (“When a statute is amended
in some material way, courts presume that the legislature
intended the amendment to have substantive effect.”). Here, the
only relevant factor leading to Accra’s suspicion was the smell of
fresh marijuana, therefore the constitutional question presented
must be addressed.

    Because the smell of marijuana alone cannot immediately be
known to be contraband thereby constituting reasonable suspicion,
and the totality of the circumstances here do not otherwise give

sufficient to begin a DUI investigation. Cf. Santiago v. State, 133
So. 3d 1159, 1166 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“This court and others have
required more than the odor of alcohol to establish reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop.”).
    7   Although I disagree with the stated holding in Owens, I
agree with the court’s analysis in finding probable cause under the
totality of the circumstance. As the court explained:

    [T]he officer was responding to a complaint of reckless
    and erratic driving; and Owens’ odd and erratic responses
    to the officer’s attempts to communicate with him,
    coupled with the smell, caused the officer to reasonably
    conclude that Owens should not be “behind the wheel of
    a vehicle.” Thus, the circumstances supported the
    officer’s conclusion that he had probable cause to detain
    Owens and to search his vehicle.

Id. at 1219. None of these identified factors are present in this
case.
                                21
rise to reasonable suspicion, I would reverse the judgment and
sentence and certify conflict with the stated holding in Owens.

                              22