Court Opinion

ID: 9665856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:22.747479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:17.137191
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, J.
(dissenting). This nuisance action arises out of the drowning of Javier Garcia near the Holton Dam, located in defendant City of Jackson. In a previous opinion, this Court held that plaintiff’s claim was not barred by governmental immunity. Garcia v City of Jackson, 152 Mich App 254; 393 NW2d 599 (1986). The case is now on remand to this Court for reconsideration in light of Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988). While the Hadfield Court failed to produce a majority opinion binding on this Court, see Li v Wong (On Remand), 170 Mich App 256; 428 NW2d 36 (1988), Hadñeld nonetheless stands as persuasive authority. Contrary to the majority opinion, I interpret the Court’s remand order as an express directive to this Court to consider this case in light of the Hadñeld plurality views. Furthermore, I conclude that, under Hadñeld, plaintiffs’ nuisance claim is barred by governmental immunity.
Plaintiffs, in bringing a tort action against a governmental agency, bear the burden of pleading facts in their complaint which would justify a finding that recovery is not barred by the governmental immunity act. Hyde v University of Michigan Regents, 426 Mich 223, 261; 393 NW2d 847 (1986). This may be accomplished by stating a claim which fits into one of the four statutory exceptions included within the act, or by pleading facts which demonstrate that the tort occurred during the exercise or discharge of a nongovernmental or proprietary function. Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 621, n 34; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). In Hadñeld, all participating *378justices agreed that pleading in avoidance of immunity may also be accomplished by stating a claim which falls within the judicially created nuisance exception to governmental immunity, although they disagreed upon the scope of the nuisance exception. See generally 430 Mich 145 (opinion of Brickley, J., Riley, C.J., and Cavanagh, J., concurring), 430 Mich 204-205 (opinion of Boyle, J.), 430 Mich 209 (opinion of Levin, J.), and 430 Mich 213 (opinion of Archer, J.). In this case, having failed to plead a governmental activity falling within one of the statutory exceptions or which is proprietary or nongovernmental, plaintiffs must have pled a proper nuisance claim in order to survive summary disposition.
In Hadfield, supra, a plurality of the Court concluded that the scope of the nuisance exception to governmental immunity is limited to instances of "trespass-nuisance.” Trespass-nuisance is defined as "trespass or interference with the use or enjoyment of land caused by a physical intrusion that is set in motion by the government or its agents and resulting in personal or property damage.” 430 Mich 169 (opinion of Brickley, J.).
Plaintiffs in the instant case have clearly failed to plead trespass-nuisance. Plaintiffs’ claim is that defendant failed to erect a grating over the dam’s "box section” conduit opening, failed to provide proper warnings, and failed to implement safety regulations, which omissions created a structure dangerous to the public. Certainly, no trespass or intruding nuisance was pled. There is no allegation of physical invasion of private property, nor was there alleged interference with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ or plaintiffs’ decedent’s land.
Another Hadñeld plurality concluded that the scope of the nuisance exception to governmental *379immunity includes nuisances per se. See 430 Mich 207 (opinion of Boyle, J.), 430 Mich 209 (opinion of Levin, J.), and 430 Mich 213 (opinion of Archer, J.). Nuisance per se is defined as an activity or condition which constitutes a nuisance without regard to the care with which it is conducted or the circumstances under which it exists. See Bluemer v Saginaw Central Oil & Gas Service, Inc, 356 Mich 399, 411; 97 NW2d 90 (1959), cited at 430 Mich 207 (opinion of Boyle, J.). Nuisances per se do not arise out of negligent conduct, but from inherent danger even under the best of care. See 430 Mich 208 (opinion of Boyle, J.)
I agree with the concurrence to this Court’s previous opinion that plaintiffs have pled an intentional nuisance in fact, rather than a nuisance per se. 152 Mich App 273 (opinion of R. C. Kaufman, J.). In this case, the alleged nuisance is predicated on defendant’s want of care in maintaining the dam, not a claim that the structure was unreasonable by its very nature.
Because, under either Hadñeld plurality view, plaintiffs have failed to plead a nuisance falling within the nuisance exception to governmental immunity, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendant.