Court Opinion

ID: 9553296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:27:19.182964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:39.489843
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice
(concurring in the result).
Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I differ with the majority’s reasons for its conclusion. A search for the probable intent of the framers of Alaska’s Constitution had they anticipated Baker and Reynolds involves considerable speculation. If speculation is apposite here, then it is just as logical to conclude that the framers would have vested reapportionment in the legislature had they anticipated that effective judicial relief from a mal-apportioned legislature would be available to any citizen by virtue of the reapportionment decisions of the United States Supreme Court. For the reasons stated hereafter, I would have avoided any attempt to determine the intent of the Alaska Constitutional Convention in this situation.
Subsequent to Alaska’s admission to' statehood on January 3, 1959, the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr1 held that the apportionment of state legislatures was subject to review by courts on equal protection grounds. Two years after this landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court concluded that both houses of a bicameral legislature must,, under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, be apportioned substantially on an equal population basis. The Supreme Court further held that it was immaterial whether or not the electorate had the remedy of the initiative or had in fact adopted a malapportioned legislature by majority vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed.2d 506 (1964) ; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 84 S.Ct. 1418, 12 L.Ed.2d 568 (1964); Maryland Comm, for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 84 S.Ct. 1429, 12 L.Ed.2d 595 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 84 S.Ct. 1441, 12 L.Ed.2d 609 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964) ; Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 84 S.Ct. 1459, 12 L.Ed.2d 632 (1964). These decisions of the Supreme Court have been characterized “as one of the most far-reaching series of decisions in the history of American constitutionalism.” 2 In requiring equal population districts for both houses of a bicameral legislature, the Supreme Court articulated the constitutional standard in terms of “substantial equality of population among the various districts” 3 and “as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”4
*702Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s 'historic decisions in the reapportionment •cases, the Attorney General of the State of Alaska issued an opinion on August 17, 1964, advising the Governor that in his opinion the Governor had authority to reapportion the Senate. On August 18, 1964, the Governor issued a “Proclamation ■Concerning Reapportionment and Redistricting” which called the Advisory Re.apportionment Board created by Alaska •Constitution, article VI, section 8 into session. After holding publicized hearings throughout the state the Board submitted .a report to the Governor on December 10, 1964. Thereafter, on March 6, 1965, the Governor issued a second “Proclamation Concerning Reapportionment and Redistricting” which reconvened the Advisory Board for another publicized ninety days ■of hearings and study. On June 8, 1965, the Board submitted a second report to the Governor. Then on September 3, 1965, the Governor issued the now questioned “Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting” which was intended to govern the 1966 primary and general elections.
Review of the proposed reapportionment of the Senate under the Governor’s September 3, 1965, “Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting” demonstrates that the Senate would thereby be apportioned on the basis of substantially equal population districts in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause. Under the Governor’s plan the maximum population-variance ratio is 1.47 to 1 contrasted to existing gross malapportionment ratio of 18.7 to 1. The theoretical minimum percentage of Alaska’s population that could elect a majority of the Senate under the Governor’s plan is 50.3 per cent of the voters. Under the existing constitutional provisions pertaining to apportionment of Alaska’s Senate, 30.7 per cent of the voters reside in districts which theoretically may elect a majority in the Senate.
It is established that both federal and state courts may pass on the constitutionality of an apportionment scheme. In Maryland Comm, for Fair Representation v. Tawes,5 the Supreme Court of the United States stated “We applaud the willingness of state courts to assume jurisdiction and render decision in cases involving challenges to state legislative apportionment schemes.” 6 The issues pertaining to apportionment of Alaska’s Senate raised below and now raised on appeal are properly before this court for adjudication.
I am of the opinion that the superior court correctly held that the Alaska Senate is unconstitutionally apportioned under the Equal Protection Clause standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds and its companion reapportionment decisions. Whether the maximum population-variance ratio 7 or the theoretical minimum percentage of population which *703could elect a majority of the Alaska Senate 8 is used as the measure of representativeness, the conclusion is the same. The “frozen” apportionment of the Alaska Senate under our constitution has resulted in a grossly malapportioned Senate. The existing apportionment of the Alaska Senate provided for under our constitution fails to meet the Equal Protection Clause’s standards of “substantial equality of population among the various districts” or that of Senate election districts composed of “as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” In short, the right to vote of appellees, and all other persons similarly situated, for state senators is unconstitutionally impaired and diluted under the existing apportionment of the Alaska Senate. Therefore, article XIV, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution is unconstitutional.
The right to vote in question in this case is an individiual and personal right protected by the Equal Protection Clause. This was made clear in Reynolds,9 where the Supreme Court said:
A predominant consideration in determining whether a State’s legislative apportionment scheme constitutes an invidious discrimination violative of rights asserted under the Equal Protection Clause is that the rights allegedly impaired are individual and personal in nature. As stated by the Court in United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220, 227, 38 S.Ct. 269, 271, 62 L.Ed. 676 [680], ‘[t]he right to vote is personal * * *.’ While the result of a court decision in a state legislative apportionment controversy may be to require the restructuring of the geographical distribution of seats in a state legislature, the judicial focus must be concentrated upon ascertaining whether there has been any discrimination against certain of the-State’s citizens which constitutes an impermissible impairment of their constitutionally protected right to vote.
Under the reapportionment decisions of the United States Supreme Court to which. I have previously alluded, it is the function' of this court to assure adherence to the Equal Protection Clause. My view of the-manner in which this personal constitutional right of the electorate in the State-of Alaska is to be vindicated differs from: that held by the court below. Crucial to my conception of an apposite remedial vindication of this constitutionally protected right is that portion of Reynolds10 where,, in regard to the timing of an appropriate-remedy, the Supreme Court stated:
Remedial techniques in this new and developing area of the law will probably often differ with the circumstances of the-challenged apportionment and a variety of local conditions. It is enough to say-now that, once a State’s legislative apportionment scheme has teen found to be-unconstitutional, it would be the unusual’ case in which a court would be justified’ in not taking appropriate action to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid plan. However, under certain circumstances, such as where an impending election is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a legislative apportionment case, even though the existing apportionment scheme was found invalid. In awarding or withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should consider the *704proximity of a forthcoming election and the mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect to the timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a disruption of the election process which might result from requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements of the court’s decree. (Emphasis furnished.) 11
Inherent in the decision of this case is an element which had been aptly characterized by counsel for appellees as that of “balancing” — that is the weighing of the necessity for vindication of the individual’s constitutionally protected right to vote for a constitutionally apportioned legislature against the interest of affording the “proper political agencies” of the State the opportunity to reapportion the Alaska Senate prior to the adoption by the courts of any interim rcapportionment plan. In appellees’ view, the proper political agencies are either a constitutional convention or legislatively initiated amendment to Alaska’s Constitution providing for reapportionment of the Senate. In view of the total circumstances of this case and under my interpretation of Reynolds, I am of the opinion that the superior court erred in not adopting an interim reapportionment plan once the court found article XIV, section 2 unconstitutional. On the balance, I conclude that considerations compelling the taking of appropriate action to effectuate the right to vote involved here and “to insure that no further elections are conducted under the invalid” provisions of article XIV, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution are paramount.
A court must decide two questions when it fashions a remedy: (1) whether the next eleetion is so imminent that the court should not interfere in the election process at all, and (2) if it does decide to act, either before the election or after it, what remedy is then most appropriate. (Emphasis furnished.)
I reach this conclusion for the following reasons. First: I find lacking the “unusual case” which would justify the superior court’s refraining from undertaking appropriate action to insure that no further elections were conducted under article XIV, section 2’s unconstitutional apportionment plan. Admittedly when this case was before the superior court, the impending primary election was imminent.12 Yet the then existing circumstances in regard to the impending primary are perhaps unique in the history of apportionment litigation since Reynolds. This element of uniqueness is derived from the fact that subsequent to the issuance by the Governor of his September 3, 1965 “Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting” appellant had taken steps to carry out the Governor’s reapportionment plan and candidates had filed under this reapportionment plan. Whatever dislocation or interference in the State’s election machinery that has occurred is attributable to the superior court’s judgment which, on April 12, 1966 (for the first time in regard to the 1966 primary and general elections), brought into play the invalid apportionment scheme called for by article XIV, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution. In light of these circumstances, what I find lacking are relevant equitable principles which would justify departure from the implementation mandate of Reynolds in regard to the formulation of an appropriate judicial remedy.13
*705Secondly: On June IS, 1964, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in Reynolds and five companion cases. Since that time no action has been initiated by the Alaska legislature to reapportion the Senate by amendment to our constitution.14 In contrast, as I previously noted, the Governor of Alaska commenced steps on August 18, 1964, to reapportion the Senate. After statewide meetings and hearings, the Advisory Reapportionment Board furnished the Governor with two separate reports, all of which culminated in the presently contested September 3, 1965, “Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting.”
In light of these circumstances, any “balancing task” becomes less difficult. I do not find it unreasonable to give preference to the individual’s constitutionally protected right of equality to vote in light of the fact that the Governor with the Advisory Board has already had the opportunity to study the political implications of Senate reapportionment. The amended decree which I would fashion today still leaves available to appellees an effective right under article XIII to have the apportionment articles of the Alaska Constitution amended by either legislative initiative or constitutional convention. I cannot discern how this right to obtain constitutional amendment is made any less effective, or becomes diluted in any way, by the presence of a constitutionally apportioned legislature elected pursuant to an interim plan embodying the Governor’s reapportionment plan.
Thirdly: The conclusion I reach is based on the following additional considerations. As indicated earlier, it is now established by virtue of Scott v. Germano 15 and Maryland Comm, for Fair Representation v. Tawes16 that state courts have authority to formulate remedial interim reapportionment and redistricting plans. It has also been held in states where boards or commissions are vested with reapportionment authority that the courts will defer to such boards or commissions instead of to the legislature for the establishment of reapportionment plans.17 In states where the legislature is not vested with the function of reapportionment (i. e. where reapportionment of a “frozen house.” 18 can be accomplished only through constitutional amendment) courts, when necessary, have allowed such legislatures to enact reapportionment plans.19
*706These factors, in addition to those previously mentioned, have led me to conclude that an apposite judicial remedy in view of the unconstitutionality of article XIV, section 2 is the adoption by this court of the Governor’s reapportionment plan on interim basis. In my view it is unnecessary to decide the issue of whether the Governor possesses the power to reapportion the Alaska Senate on an interim basis. I would limit this court’s holding to the grounds that under the circumstances of this case the superior court should have, in formulating an appropriate remedjq adopted an interim reapportionment plan.
Despite any reservations I may entertain as to whether the goal of “fair and effective representation for all citizens” 20 will be realized through the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its reapportionment decisions, this court is bound to insure compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm paragraph number one of the superior court’s judgment which declared unconstitutional article XIV, section 2 of the Alaska Constitution. I would also affirm paragraph number three of the superior court’s judgment under which the superior court retained jurisdiction of the case to insure that “a valid constitutional amendment modifying the apportionment of the Alaska State Senate” is enacted and adopted by December 1, 1967.21 Further, I would set aside in its entirety paragraph number two of the superior court’s judgment and would amend paragraph number two to read as follows:
The court adopts as an interim plan of apportionment for the Alaska Senate the reapportionment plan provided for in the Governor’s September 3, 1965, “Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting.” The Secretary of State is to conduct the 1966 primary and general elections for the State Legislature pursuant to the interim reapportionment plan adopted herein.

. 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

. Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 209 (1964).

. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 537.

. Id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 536. Note: The Supreme Court added another test, namely a prohibition on “crazy quilts, completely lacking in rationality.” Reynolds v. Sims, at 568, 84 S.Ct. at 1385, 12 L.Ed.2d at 531. Compare this latter test with the superior court’s judgment where it is stated “that it dilutes their right to representation in the Alaska State Legislature on irrational bases.”

. Supra page 701, 377 U.S. at 674, 84 S.Ct. at 1439, 12 L.Ed.2d at 607.

. See also Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 85 S.Ct. 1525, 1527, 14 L.Ed.2d 477, 478 (1965), where in a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court said:
We believe that the District Court should have stayed its hand. The power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in such cases has been specifically encouraged.
Note: Subsequent to the superior court’s entry of judgment in this ease an action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. Plaintiffs in this federal action seek in part a declaration as to the unconstitutionality of the Alaska Const, art. XIV, § 2; an injunction against the superior court’s ordering of elections to be held pursuant to art. XIV, § 2; and request the District Court to adopt a provisional plan of apportionment for the Senate for purposes of the forthcoming 1966 primary and general elections.

.This ratio is obtained by comparing the largest to the smallest population per member of the legislative body in question.

.This theoretical minimum percentage is obtained by ranking the various Senate election districts from the smallest population per member to the largest and then accumulating from the smallest district upwards until the point is reached where a given percentage of the population has the power to elect a majority of the Senate.
Other measurement tests, such as percentage deviation from the ideal district, also demonstrate that the Alaska Senate is grossly malapportioned.

. Id. 377 U.S. at 561, 84 S.Ct. at 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d at 527.

. Id. 377 U.S. at 585, 84 S.Ct. at 1393, 12 L.Ed.2d at 541.

. In 79 Harv.L.Rev. 1228, 1266 (1966), it is stated:

. The filing deadline for the primary election is June 1, 1966.

. In reaching this conclusion I reject appellant’s contention that the reapportionment decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have established the year 1966 as the mandatory national deadline for reapportionment of a malap-portioned state legislature. I do not interpret the cases cited by appellant as establishing such a deadline but do construe Reynolds and the other cited authorities as requiring a more accelerated compliance than was imposed under the “with all deliberate speed” formula in the public school segregation cases.
*705My construction of Reynolds and subsequent Supreme Court decisions differs from that of appellees’ as to the timing of appropriate remedial techniques. Appel-lees argue that courts are permitted to fashion judicial remedies in malapportion-ed cases only in the instance where there is “sufficient time prior to the [next] election for the properly authorized political agencies to act so as to produce a valid plan, and those agencies fail to act.” I interpret Reynolds as imposing upon the courts the duty to fashion an appropriate judicial remedy, once malapportionment has been found, unless due to the im-mineney of the next election equitable considerations militate against judicial intervention.

. That is either by an amendment proposed by two-thirds of the legislature or by the calling of a constitutional convention. During the same period the legislature has taken no steps to attempt to reapportion the Senate on an interim basis.

.Supra note 6.

. Supra page 701. .

. Yaneey v. Faubus, 238 F.Supp. 290 (E. D.Ark.1965) ; In re Apportionment of Michigan State Legislature, 373 Mich. 250, 128 N.W.2d 722 (1964).

. As used in this opinion the term “frozen house” signifies a legislative body whose election districts are constitutionally prescribed and there is no requirement, or body vested with the authority, to reapportion periodically.

. Maryland Comm, for Fair Representation v. Tawes, supra page 701, at 377 U.S. at 675-676, 84 S.Ct. at 1439, 12 L. Ed.2d at 607; Buckley v. Hoff, 243 F. Supp. 873 (D.Vt.1965) ; Buckley v. Hoff, 234 F.Supp. 191 (D.Yt.1964), modified, Parsons v. Buckley, 379 U.S. 359, 85 S.Ct. 503, 13 L.Ed.2d 352 (1965) ; But-terworth v. Dempsey, 229 F.Supp. 754 (D.Conn.), aff’d sub nom. Pinney v. But-terworth, 378 U.S. 564, 84 S.Ct. 1918, 12 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1964).

. Reynolds v. Sims, supra page 701, at 377 U.S. 565-566, 84 S.Ct. at 1383, 12 L.Ed.2d at 529.

. In the event such an amendment is not adopted by December l;-1967, the superior court has retained jurisdiction to “enter such orders as are necessary to insure that the 1968 primary and general elections will proceed only under an apportionment plan which is consistent with the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.”