Court Opinion

ID: 9949696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 14:08:32.91468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:44.842763
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

                                                         SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                         APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                         DOCKET NO. A-0968-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EDWARD LOCKE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Submitted February 27, 2024 – Decided March 12, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 94-01-0235.

                   Edward Locke, appellant pro se.

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E.
                   Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      This is pro se defendant Edward Locke's appeal from his fifth petition for

post-conviction relief (PCR), 1 which was dismissed on May 28, 2020. We

affirm.

      On December 8, 1993, defendant pushed his way into the Newark

apartment of a couple in their eighties. He asked them for money and repeatedly

beat both. He took two gold watches from their apartment. After hearing loud

noises, a downstairs neighbor alerted security, who responded and arrived at the

apartment door as defendant was walking out. When security tried to hold him,

he fled on foot but was apprehended nearby. He had blood on his hands and

boots and had the two gold watches in his possession. One of the two victims

was treated for her injuries and released from the hospital; the other underwent

two surgeries for bleeding in his brain as a result of defendant kicking him in

the head.   Later that month, the victim died in the hospital after further

complications.

      After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felony murder, aggravated

manslaughter, aggravated assault, second-degree burglary, and two counts of

first-degree robbery; he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with thirty

1
  Defendant captions the matter as an appeal from an order denying a motion
for habeas corpus. PCR is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas
corpus.
                                                                           A-0968-22
                                       2
years of parole ineligibility for the felony murder conviction. In 1997, the

convictions were upheld on direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied

certification.

      Defendant has filed four previous petitions for PCR based on ineffective

assistance of counsel. All were denied and affirmed on appeal. The Supreme

Court again denied certification on each. In 2012, defendant filed a motion for

a new trial, which was denied, affirmed on appeal, and denied certification by

the Supreme Court. On February 14, 2019, defendant filed a fifth petition for

PCR, which was dismissed as untimely on May 28, 2020.

      This appeal followed.

      Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal, which are taken from

his pro se brief:

             I. THERE[ IS] BLATANT DISREGARD OF THE
             RULES WHICH IN SPIRIT, IF NOT IN LETTER,
             REQUIRE A FACTUAL AND LEGAL REPLY TO
             EVERY ISSUE RAISED BY APPELLANT.

             II. HABEAS CORPUS IS AN AVAILABLE
             REMEDY IN THE INSTANT SITUATION AND
             THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE ESSEX COUNTY
             COURT DENYING THE WRIT WITHOUT
             HEARING WAS NOT CORRECT.

             III.  PROSECUTORS OCCUPY A UNIQUE
             POSITION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
             AND THAT THEIR PRIMARY DUTY IS NOT TO

                                                                         A-0968-22
                                      3
OBTAIN CONVICTIONS BUT TO SEE THAT
JUSTICE IS DONE.

IV. NEW JERSEY COURTS HAVE ADDRESSED
THE ISSUE OF NET OPINIONS. THERE MUST BE
A FACTUAL AND SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR AN
EXPERT'S OPINION.

V. THE PURPOSE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IS TO
"CONTRIBUTE     MATERIALLY     TO   THE
ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH."

VI.   THE FACTS AND THE LAW ARE
DIFFERENT[.] ONE IS A DRUG[.] THE OTHER IS
A HEART-ATTACK.

VII. THE CASE AT ISSUE HERE, INCLUDES THE
LANGUAGE RELEVANT TO THIS APPEAL: A
VICTIM OF AN [ASSAULT] IS IN A WEAKENED
CONDITION OR SUFFERS FROM A DISEASE.

VIII. PURSUANT TO 21C.F.R.201.57(G) (1989) [OF
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION]
BLACK BOX WARNING REVEALS SERIOUS
INJURY AND DEATH.

IX.  CREDIBLE PROOF IS WANTING THAT
DEATH WAS DUE TO FACTORS IN RELATED TO
THE COUMADIN DESCRIBED IN DEFENDANT
APPEAL.

X. THERE[ IS] A DEPRIVATION OF DEFENDANT
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT "RIGHT NOT TO BE
DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW, OR MORE SPECIFICALLY, AS
THE RESULT OF NEW EVIDENCE MATERIAL TO
THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL."

                                                 A-0968-22
                      4
            XI. THE DEFENDANT HAS MET THE REQUIRED
            STANDARD     FOR   NEWLY    DISCOVERED
            EVIDENCE BECAUSE ISSUES BY THE WARNING
            WERE NOT ADDRESSED RESULT IN A
            MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE.

            XII. THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED
            TESTIMONY BE OFFERED ORALLY AND
            SUMMONS WITNESSES AND REQUIRE ANY
            PERSONS TO PRODUCE DOCUMENTS RECORDS
            OR OTHER WRITINGS.

      We have carefully reviewed the record, and—in light of applicable law—

we conclude these arguments lack merit. Defendant's fifth petition was properly

dismissed as untimely. Rule 3:22-4(b) provides that "[a] second or subsequent

petition for [PCR] shall be dismissed unless: (1) it is timely under [Rule] 3:22-

12(a)(2)." In pertinent part, Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) provides:

            Notwithstanding any other provision in this rule, no
            second or subsequent petition shall be filed more than
            one year after the latest of:

                        ....

                  (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the
                  relief sought was discovered, if that factual
                  predicate could not have been discovered earlier
                  through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or

                  (C) the date of the denial of the first or
                  subsequent application for [PCR] where
                  ineffective assistance of counsel that represented
                  the defendant on the first or subsequent
                  application for [PCR] is being alleged.

                                                                           A-0968-22
                                       5
      "Neither the parties nor the court may . . . enlarge the time specified by

. . . [Rule] 3:22-12 . . . ." R. 1:3-4(c); see R. 3:22-12; see also In re Rosenthal,

118 N.J. 454, 458 (1990); State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div.

2018).

      Defendant's fourth petition was denied on October 16, 2017. He filed his

fifth petition on February 14, 2019—well beyond the one-year time period

mandated by the rule.       Moreover, the fifth petition reasserts arguments

previously decided by this court in prior PCRs and, therefore, barred by Rule

3:22-5. Defendant's appeal is once again based on the assertion that Coumadin,

a blood thinner taken by the deceased victim, was responsible for his death,

rather than the actions of defendant. We have previously rejected this argument

as lacking merit.

      To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we

are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

                                                                              A-0968-22
                                         6