Court Opinion

ID: 9680547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:33:31.701768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.202392
License: Public Domain

*861NYE, Justice
(dissenting).
C. P. Rosson, Jr., appellee, hereinafter called Rosson, ordered a new cotton picking machine from Mathis Equipment Company, hereinafter called Mathis. Mathis brought suit for the purchase price and Rosson defended on the basis that the machine delivered was not a new machine.
Farmer Rosson was a substantial farmer, farming over eight hundred acres of land near Taft, Texas, where he lived. He owned a cotton gin and grain elevator. He had purchased a new cotton picking machine in 1961 from Mathis which proved to be satisfactory. In 1962, Rosson had four hundred bales of cotton that had to be picked from his farms. After the cotton season was under way Rosson decided he needed another new machine so on or about August 3, 1962, he phoned Mathis and ordered a new International Harvester cotton picking machine. On Saturday, August 11th, Mathis delivered the machine. That day, or a day or two later, Rosson signed a “Retail Order for New Farm Equipment” and a “Delivery Report”. The “Retail Order for New Farm Equipment” which was the contract in question was never executed by Mathis although the contract stated “this order is subject to the written acceptance of the dealer to which it is addressed * * The machine was never paid for by Rosson although the contract called for a cash sale. The written contract began: “I (Rosson) hereby order from you, subject to all terms, conditions and agreements contained herein * * One of the terms, conditions or agreements contained in the contract was “ * * * After delivery all of the equipment shall be held and used at the Purchaser’s risk and expense, but title with right of repossession for default is reserved to the Seller until the full purchase price has been paid in cash.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The machine had a series of breakdowns during the approximate two weeks that Rosson used the machine. At least one was a major breakdown which came three or four days after he received the machine. These breakdowns included a broken cam shaft, overheating of the engine to the point of boiling water, a replaced heat gauge and sending unit, a “knock in the machine”, overheating of rear drum caused by a bend bar or alignment and excessive wear on cam rollers and bushing to the extent of steel shavings being present. This last breakdown was so serious that a Mathis mechanic stated that the machine would have to be greased every two hours in order to finish the cotton season or the machine would have to be hauled in and torn apart to find out all the trouble. After Rosson had used the machine under these conditions, and after the mechanic had told him what he would have to do to finish the season, Rosson said that he didn’t want to fool with it and he told the Mathis mechanic to take it in. The machine was never used again by Rosson.
Beginning with the first breakdown and continuing for some two months until the latter part of October, 1962, Mathis and Rosson carried on a series of negotiations. Mathis tried to get Rosson to pay for the machine. Rosson kept giving Mathis excuses for not paying. Rosson finally stated he would not accept the machine unless the written warranty covering the entire machine, as contained in the contract, was extended to cover the 1963 cotton season and that the machine should be repainted and polished. Mathis tried to meet the offer but was unable to get International Harvester Company, their manufacturer, to extend the warranty except on a few specific parts. They agreed to paint and polish the machine. Sometime during the negotiations Rosson discovered that the machine was a 1961 model, some fourteen months old and finally refused to accept and pay for the machine unless the written warranty was extended. Negotiations broke down and Mathis picked up the machine and took it back to their place of business.
Mathis then brought suit in the nature of a sworn account, amending their plead*862ing during the course of the trial, alleging that Rosson ordered a certain model cotton picking machine; that he executed such purchase order and agreed to pay $16,-400.00 cash for the machine; that Mathis delivered such machine and Rosson accepted it; and that Mathis is therefore entitled to recover the purchase price plus interest. Rosson filed an answer in the nature of a general and sworn denial ; plead that he ordered a new machine; that he understood and believed that the machine delivered was a new 1962 model although the same was a 1961 model; that the $16,400.00 purchase price was based on the condition that the machine was a 1962 International Harvester cotton picker; that the contract was never fully consummated; that the law implies a warranty that the machine is fit for the purpose for which it is sold; that the machine was not as it was represented to be by Mathis; that there was a total failure of consideration ; and finally praying that Mathis take nothing by its suit.
This case was tried on several theories. There was no objection urged by either side attempting to limit or restrict the various theories of the plaintiff’s case or the defenses of Rosson. Only two issues were submitted to the jury. No kindred or other issues were requested by either party and no objections were made of the issues or charge that was submitted to the jury. The record itself discloses the actual theory upon which the law suit was tried, and it is best expressed in the questions and answers elicited by the attorney for appellant Mathis, on cross examination of Rosson: “Q. Is it your position in this law suit, basically, that you ordered a new International Harvester, Diesel Hi Drum 2-Row Cotton Picker, and that you did not receive that which you ordered; namely, such a machine? A. That is correct. Q. But instead, you received something different from what you ordered? A. I received an old machine. I didn’t get a new ■machine. Q.' All right. And your position, then, before this Jury and this Judge, is that you got an old machine ? A. That’s correct. Q. And that’s why you are taking the position that you should not have to pay for the machine? A. That’s right. Q. And if the machine were a new machine, then, you would not take that position? A. That’s correct.” (Emphasis supplied)
The case was given to the jury to answer two issues : “SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1: Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the machine in question was a new machine at the time of its delivery to defendant?” The jury answered: “No”. “By the term ‘new machine’ is meant a machine' in condition as when first manufactured, not worn or defaced by use in any degree.” In the second issue the jury found that the machine was not wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton.
Mathis filed a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and a motion for new trial. The trial judge heard all the evidence and argument of counsel, overruled both of Mathis’ motions and entered judgment for Rosson that plaintiff take nothing. The trial court found in effect that special issue number one was the controlling issue and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings. I agree. The judgment is correct based on the theory the case was tried and the evidence received.
Appellant Mathis predicates its appeal on the contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the findings of the jury in respect to special issue number one, or in the alternative, that special issue number one should be disregarded because the evidence conclusively established in the trial together with the finding of the jury in answer to special issue number two, establishes as a matter of law, a completed sale.
I would like to review the sufficiency of the evidence, first. The trial judge heard all the evidence, and observed the witnesses, overruled' appellant’s motions for new trial and judgment non obstante vere-dicto. The trial judge defined “new machine” as being “ * * * a machine in the *863condition it was when first manufactured and not worn or defaced by use in any degree.” (Emphasis supplied) The reviewing court must consider the evidence in its entirety to determine whether the evidence is strong enough factually to support the jury’s verdict. It is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact hut it is the power of the trial judge and the Court of Civil Appeals to set aside the jury’s findings and award a new trial. If the evidence shows conflict upon any material issue the Court of Civil Appeals can sustain the verdict and affirm the judgment; or if in their opinion the verdict was against such a preponderance of the evidence as to justify such action it can set aside and remand a case for new trial. If the Court of Civil Appeals reverses and renders a cause, on the ground that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence, this becomes a law question in which the reviewing court may reverse, on the facts only, when ordinary minds can arrive at no other conclusion from the evidence. See 30 T.L.R. 803. The rule is settled in this state that the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the jury on conflicting evidence where there is some evidence to support their verdict, unless the verdict is so overwhelmingly against it as to shock the conscience or show clearly that the conclusion was wrong or was the result of passion, prejudice or improper motive. I believe the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s findings, that the machine was not new.
It is undisputed that the machine in question was fourteen months old; that it had been stored in a lean-to shed, open on three sides and exposed to the elements for over a year; and that during that year the machine had never been serviced. The appellant in effect, admits that the machine was not in the condition as when first manufactured, and that it was defaced or worn, by admitting that the machine needed to be repainted, at least partially. The appellee Rosson who was very familiar with cotton picking machines and who had purchased a new machine one year before, testified positively that it was an “old machine” and that it was “not a new machine”. This alone would be a conflict in the testimony from which the jury should decide. Under cross examination by Mathis’ attorney, Rosson testified: “Q. Now, when that happened did that sort of crystallize in your mind the thought, ‘This must be a used machine’? A. Well, the first time that I got the opinion or the idea it might be a used machine was when the boy that I had running the machine came in and asked me if it was a new machine, and I said ‘Yes, I guess it is. I bought one from them fellows last year and it was a new one’. And he said, ‘Well, I don’t know, it doesn’t look like a new machine to me’.”
Mr. Rosson, testifying about the cam track, which by reasonable deduction should not have had an old break if the machine was new, said: “The Cam track is made out of cast, and the new break was bright and the old break was dull, and it was a new break leading off from the old break. Q. In your opinion, therefore, was the break of this Cam track partially an old break? A. It was.”
It was undisputed that Rosson had constant trouble with the machine. It would be logical for the jury to consider: that these breakdowns were unusual for a new machine; that a supposedly new $16,400.00 cotton picking machine had the general appearance of an old or used machine; that the machine had defective or worn parts; and that the machine ran so hot that it boiled water out of the radiator.
Rosson stated that he never had a cotton picker that required lubrication every two hours in order to keep it running. Yet Mathis’ mechanic told Rosson that the machine would have to be lubricated such in order to finish the cotton picking season. The printed warranty in the purchase order agreement stated that the obligation of the company under the warranty was limited to a period of “six months after first *864used by the original purchaser or 1500 hours of use, whichever occurred first”. This makes the age of the machine material, or the warranty would not have been limited to six months’ time from when it was first used. If time or age of the machine was not material the warranty would have stated that it was to be extended for a period of 1500 hours of use. In this connection concerning the materiality of the age of the machine, Mr. West, a mechanic all his life and superintendent of the gin and grain elevator, was questioned: “Q. If you leave a piston-type engine, such as the one which operates a cotton picker of that type, sitting up for a period, say, of twelve or fourteen months without any maintenance, do you know what the effects would be on the engine ? A. Well, it could freeze up, but the motor was running as far as that’s concerned. But I do know it’s not good on any kind of an engine to sit it up without running it periodically.” West further testified that International •Harvester’s representative and Murff, General Manager from Mathis, said that they were going to have to take the machine over to the shop and tear into it to find what was wrong with it.
I believe, although there was conflicting testimony concerning the condition of the machine, the jury was warranted in finding that the machine was not in the condition as when first manufactured; that it was defaced or worn by use in some degree. Appellate courts cannot substitute their judgment for that of jury upon disputed fact issues. Heckathorn v. Tate, 355 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Civ.App.1962). Where jury and trial judge under conflicting evidence, resolve controlling issues of fact in plaintiff’s favor, on defendant’s appeal findings of the trial and jury are conclusive insofar as facts found affect the case irrespective of whether the Court of Civil Appeals would have decided the issue in the same manner. Texas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. McLemore, 225 S.W.2d 1007 (Tex.Civ.App.1949, wr. ref. n. r. e.) If there is any evidence to support findings in the verdict they are usually regarded as conclusive on the appellate court, especially where the verdict has been approved by the trial judge. Woodard v. Tatum, 277 S.W.2d 943 (Tex.Civ.App.1955). Whether or not we can say or find that a machine which begins to deteriorate the instant it is finally and completely manufactured, is, as a matter of law, a new machine and is the same as when first manufactured when faced with a direct evidence as set forth herein invades the province of the jury.
The parties without complaint imposed on the jury the duty to find from the preponderance of the evidence whether the machine in question was new or not. Was this issue submitted as a condition of sale, a misrepresentation or a breach of contract ? The trial court and the parties must have rightly thought that this issue was material, or it would not have been submitted or objections would have been made. The trial court impliedly found, in support of its judgment, that such issue as found by the jury was the ultimate and controlling issue in this case. Appellant says that we must ignore special issue number one; that the finding of the jury in answer to special issue number two (that the machine was not wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton) establishes as a matter of law a completed sale. There was no issue as to the intent of the parties. The machine was never paid for. The purchase order was never signed by Mathis. Negotiations continued after delivery of the machine and there was no issue submitted as to whether or not Rosson accepted the machine after he knew the machine was not new. In fact, the record discloses that after Rosson discovered that the machine was some fourteen months old he rejected it. See Freeman v. Davis, 363 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Civ.App.1962, wr. ref. n. r. e.). The contract provided for a cash sales price of $16,400.00 and it set out that “if cash payment with order is made by check, cashing or depositing the same shall not be considered as acceptance of this order.” The contract provided *865further that title is reserved in the seller until the purchase price is paid. Mathis never intended to part company with the title to this machine until it was fully paid for. There was no evidence in the record prior to the rejection of the offer by Rosson that Mathis parted with title to the machine upon its delivery to Rosson. No bill of sale was executed. No certificate of title was delivered and no chattel mortgage or notes were prepared.
A cash sale is one in which the contract calls for payment of the price in cash when the contract is made or the goods are delivered. Until payment is made or waived a contract for cash sale remains executory and title does not pass even though the goods are delivered. Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. Texas State Trust Co., 101 Tex. 94, 104 S.W. 1040 (1907), and Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Hartman, 129 S.W. 179 (Tex.Civ.App.1910) (See 37A Tex.Jur. § 124, p. 280). In 37A Tex.Jur § 195, Sales, the author says:
“When the contract of sale is that the goods sold shall be paid for with cash, or notes executed by the vendee or a third person, the sale is on condition that the payment be made, and, that until this is done, the title to the goods remain in the vendor, notwithstanding they may have come into possession of the vendee, unless it appears they were delivered to the purchaser with intent to waive the condition of payment. This rule is controlling and is based upon the view that where by their contract, the parties have either expressly or impliedly made payment a condition precedent to the passage of title, delivery is not consummation of the transaction, and that the sale remains executory until the agreed payment is actually made.”
As a general rule, title to property does not pass as long as any condition precedent in accordance with the terms of any agreement remains to be performed. Until such act or condition is performed or waived, the property does not pass. 77 C.J.S. Sales § 250; Deahl v. Thomas, 224 S.W.2d 293 (Tex.Civ.App.1949, wr.ref. n. r. e.)
There was no indication that Mathis ever waived the condition as to the payment of the machine in order to pass title. Until this condition be met or waived, there could never be a completed sale.
There was considerable evidence that the sale was never completed by the continued negotiations between the parties after the machine was delivered. The machine broke down three days after delivery and there was a series of breakdowns which continued for two weeks. During this time Mathis was trying to get Rosson to accept the machine. Assuming, without deciding, that a question of fact was raised as to whether or not Rosson accepted the machine or the parties intended to re-negotiate the original contract, and such issues were not submitted to the jury or requested, should it not be regarded that the trial court found in favor of the appellee? Rule 279, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Dee v. Parish, 160 Tex. 171, 327 S.W.2d 449 (1959).
The appellant Mathis did not request the trial court to file any written findings on any omitted kindred issues to special issue number two, that the machine was not wholly worthless for the purpose of picking cotton, before the judgment was rendered. If a ground of recovery is wholly ignored or neglected and no issue is submitted or requested thereon, it will be held to have been waived and no recovery can be based thereon. If however, the grounds of defense consist of more than one element and the court submits some of the elements but omits others and there is no objection to the failure to submit them, the party will be placed in the position of having agreed to have waived a jury trial on the unsubmitted elements and it will be presumed that the trial court found on such unsubmitted elements in such manner as to support the judgment. Therefore, all omitted kindred issues should be deemed as *866found by the court in such manner as to support the judgment. Wichita Falls & Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 135 S.W.2d 79 (1940) ; Rule 270, T.R.C.P.; 4 Tex.Jur.2d § 810, p. 342; 20 T.L.R. 38; 29 T.L.R. 537 and cases cited therein. Dee v. Parish, supra.
Some of the evidence of the subsequent negotiations was as follows: Mr. Murff, General Manager of Mathis, testified concerning a conversation between the company representative, Mr. Evans (Zone Manager for International Harvester), Mr. Rosson and himself. Mr. Murff: “A. * * * going back to his gin office (Ros-son’s), we sat down and Mr. Evans wanted me to tell him about what a complete paint job would cost. I told him that it would run about one hundred and eighty dollars on a cotton picker of that nature. Q. Now, Mr. Rosson was present while this— he was present — . A. He was present. Q. Go ahead. A. ■ — and Mr. Rosson says, T don’t feel like Mathis Equipment Company should have to stand the cost of this paint job; I feel like International Harvester should.’ And Mr. Evans said that he would stand a third, at the time, and I said that I would stand another third if Mr. Rosson would stand a third, and we would completely paint the machine if that would make him happy. Q. What was the reaction of Mr. Rosson to that suggestion? A. Mr. Rosson didn’t agree with that, sir. He thought that International should stand the whole thing.” Cross examination of Mr. Rosson: “Q. * * * Yes, but I forgot to ask you one thing about it. Wasn’t it proposed in that conversation that Murff (Mathis) would pay a third of the painting, and that the company (International Harvester) would pay a third, and that they wanted you (Rosson) to pay a third, and you said nothing doing, that you didn’t feel that you ought to share any of the expense of its being painted? A. I told them the only way I would keep the machine at all was that if they would improve the appearance of it, repair it and give me a warranty on the machine, not specific parts. Q. And was there a conversation like I indicated where — . A. Yes, they wanted me to pay for part of cleaning * * * supposedly a new machine — . Q. And you turned that down ? A. I did.” (Emphasis supplied)
Cross examination of Mr. Jouffray (Sales Manager of Mathis): “Q. Now, Mr. Jouffray, isn’t it a fact that in these numerous conversations and conferences and everything else that you had, that it was Mr. Rosson’s attitude that T don’t want to accept that machine because all of the difficulty I had with it, but if you will get me a direct guarantee from International Harvester on the machine itself, and on its parts, that, then, I will accept the machine’ ? That was his attitude, wasn’t it? A. Actually, I had only one conversation with Mr. Rosson about getting a company representative down to talk to him about the machine. The rest of the conversations were between he and Mr. Murff.” Further questioning of Mr. Jouffray concerning certain written letters to Rosson about what the company would do, Mr. Jouffray answered : “These were letters written to substantiate agreements arrived between Mr. Murff and the company representative and Mr. Rosson. Q. All right. In other words, these were letters to substantiate, as you say, agreements that were arrived at subsequent to the delivery of the machine-, that’s correct, is it not? A. After delivery of the machine, yes sir.” (Emphasis supplied)
On cross-examination, Mr. R. N. West, superintendent of Rosson’s gin and elevator, testified as follows: “Q. Now, tell the jury what you told Mr. Murff (General Manager of Mathis) — your best memory. A. Well, let’s see, I told him the guarantee that we got from the company — well, actually from Mathis Equipment Company, the letter was, that it wasn’t the guarantee he wanted. He (Rosson) wanted a guarantee on the whole machine for another year, and he wasn’t going to take it. That’s what I told him.”
*867On cross examination of Mr. Rosson concerning the deal: “Q. Well, isn’t it a fact that the deal you had with Murff was cash on delivery? A. All right. If I’d a payed him in cash for it that afternoon, I would be up here suing him instead of y’all suing me. That’s the only difference.”
Under the general rules covering the right of rescission and cancellation, a buyer may rescind a sales contract that was entered into through a mutual mistake of fact as well as under the theory that he received nothing of value. Edwards v. Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co., 54 Tex.Civ.App., 334, 118 S.W. 572 (1909 Wr. Ref.). Quoting from 37A Tex.Jur. § 310. “In the event that the seller breaches his sales contract by failing or refusing to perform a material part of it, the buyer may consider the transaction at an end and refuse to proceed with performance of his own part. Thus when the seller has delivered goods that do not correspond to the contract specifications in respect of kind, quality, quantity or other material matter, the buyer is under no obligation to accept them; he may reject them in toto and refuse to pay for them. * * * ” Thus where a seller delivers a machine that differs materially from the one ordered, and also fails to perform according to the warranty there is both a breach of contract and a breach of warranty. See St. Mary’s Oil Engine Co. v. Alien-Morrow Co., 20 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Civ.App.1929). This could account for the two issues submitted by the court to the jury. A buyer to avail himself of his right of rescission of the sales contract must proceed with due promptness to give notice to the seller that the contract is being rescinded and to return or offer to return to the seller all of the goods that have been received. 37A Tex.Jur. § 312, p. 643. Ros-son notified Mathis within two weeks after the machine broke that he did not wish to keep the machine. He rejected the machine in toto within two months after it was delivered. There was no kindred issue submitted as to the promptness of the buyer’s duty to give notice to the seller and I would therefore uphold the implied findings of the trial court that such notice was sufficient.
The cases cited by the majority can be distinguished on the facts. In the cases cited in their opinion, title passed, the contract in question was completed, and the cases were decided on the theory of a breach of warranty as to the degree of fitness of the article or quality or agreement to rescind a fully completed sale. In this case Rosson did not receive that which he ordered, namely, a new machine. A new 1962 machine, not worn or defaced, was as material to Farmer Rosson as the type of machine described, or as material as any other aspect of the contract. The jury found that Rosson did not receive such a machine. When a vendor sells an article by a particular description it is a condition precedent to his right of action of the thing which he offers to deliver or has delivered, that it should answer the description. If this condition be not performed, the purchaser is entitled to reject the article, or if he has paid for it, he may recover the price. Markham Warehouse & Elevator Co. v. Plotner & Stoddard, 140 S.W. 356. (Tex.Civ.App.1911). Here plaintiff brought suit to recover the contract price of five thousand pounds of twine amounting to $550. The evidence established that a certain brand of twine was delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff and that it was not of the grade and quality covered by the contract. The twine was received by the defendant under the belief that it was what they had ordered. As soon as it was discovered by the defendant that the twine was not of the grade and quality ordered by them they refused to accept it and notified the plaintiff that they would hold it subject to his orders. The court held that seller had bound itself to deliver a satisfactory type of twine and the delivery of that kind of twine was a condition precedent to the buyer’s liability. In the case of Dalton Adding Mach. Sales Co. v. Valley Motor Co., Inc., 299 S.W. 928 (Tex.Civ.App.1927) the court states: “It *868is a well-settled rule of the law of sales that a buyer cannot be compelled to accept and pay for something which he has not agreed to buy. * * * If the thing tendered be not what he agreed to buy, he may reject it, even though it is like the thing he bought.” In the case of Moore v. Hendricks, 290 S.W.2d 758, (Tex.Civ.App.1956) the court quotes out of 77 C.J.S. Sales § 183, p. 920, as follows: “There must be a substantial compliance with the agreement of the parties as to the quality or condition of the goods sold, and if there is a material departure from the requirement of the contract the buyer is not bound to accept the goods.”
I would affirm the trial court.