Court Opinion

ID: 9951432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-16 06:16:03.596851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:40:15.308554
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed March 14, 2024

                                               In The

            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                           __________

            Nos. 11-22-00188-CR, 11-22-00189-CR, 11-22-00190-CR,
                              & 11-22-00191-CR
                                 __________

                      ANDREW WILLIAM COX, Appellant
                                                   V.
                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                       On Appeal from the 91st District Court
                              Eastland County, Texas
                Trial Court Cause Nos. 25520, 25521, 25522, & 25524

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
        Appellant, Andrew Cox, was indicted in four separate cause numbers for
(1) continuous sexual abuse of a child and indecency with a child by contact against
Jane Doe and (2) sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact
against Jane Doe II. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02, 21.11, 22.011 (West
                         0F

        1
         The second-degree felony offenses, the sexual-assault-of-a-child offense and the indecency-with-
a-child offenses, were enhanced to a first-degree felony punishment range because of a prior, final felony
conviction. See id. § 12.42(b) (West 2019).
Supp. 2023). The offenses were consolidated for trial. The jury found Appellant
guilty of all four offenses and assessed his punishment at imprisonment in the
Correctional Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for
twenty-five years for each of the indecency-by-contact offenses, fifty years for the
sexual-assault-of-a-child offense, and fifty years for the continuous-sexual-abuse-
of-a-child offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s
verdicts and ordered that the sentences be served concurrently.
        Appellant raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting an audio recording of a conversation between the
victims, their mother, and their mother’s niece over his hearsay objection. Second,
he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting a witness to testify
regarding the “statistical frequency of under reporting [sic] of sexual assault.” Third,
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by including the prior version of the parole
instruction in Article 37.07, Section 4(a), which contained language on “good
conduct” time, in its punishment charges. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
                                Factual and Procedural History
        Appellant abused Jane Doe and Jane Doe II 2 (the victims) over a period of
                                                                1F

approximately three years.
        A. The Sexual Abuse
        Appellant and B.H., the victims’ mother, started seeing each other in 2012.
They moved to Ranger together around 2013 and married a few years later. B.H.
had four children: two daughters, Jane Doe and Jane Doe II, and two younger sons.

        2
         Pseudonyms are used for the children, their mother, and an outcry witness throughout the opinion
to protect their identities.

                                                       2
       Jane Doe II testified about the first time Appellant touched her
inappropriately. 3 2F   Appellant came into Jane Doe II’s bedroom while she was
sleeping, placed his hand above her clothes on her stomach, then he moved his hand
under her shirt and up to her chest. Jane Doe II tried moving away to see if Appellant
would leave her alone, but he continued touching her until she told him to stop. After
the first incident, Jane Doe II promptly went to B.H.’s bedroom and told her what
happened. Jane Doe II also testified that B.H. told Appellant that “he can’t do that”
and that “he [could not] be in [Jane Doe II’s] [bed]room while [she] was sleeping.” 4                        3F

One or two months later, Appellant resumed entering her bedroom and touching Jane
Doe II, and he would raise her shirt and take pictures of her. Jane Doe II stopped
telling B.H. about the incidents after the third encounter, believing Appellant’s
actions had been “swept under the rug.”
       In 2017, when B.H. started a job that required her to leave the house before
Appellant and Jane Doe II had moved into a bedroom by herself, Appellant’s
behavior escalated. When Appellant went into Jane Doe II’s bedroom, he would
shake her “to see if [she] was awake or asleep[,]” put his hand under her shirt, and
take off her clothes. Appellant’s behavior became more frequent as well: he began
to go into her bedroom to touch her once or twice a week, which progressed until he
did so every morning and night. Jane Doe II tried and failed to keep Appellant out
of her bedroom by locking the door—a lock that Appellant removed—and by
moving furniture in front of the door to try to barricade it; neither stopped Appellant.

       3
        Jane Doe II was eighteen years old at the time of trial and “eleven or twelve” years old when
Appellant first touched her inappropriately.
       4
        B.H. testified that Jane Doe II initially told her that “[Appellant] just put his hand on her stomach.”

                                                          3
        After a few months, Appellant’s behavior again escalated. Appellant would
perform oral sex on Jane Doe II and would restrain her while inserting his fingers
into her vagina. Jane Doe II testified that, on one occasion, Appellant positioned
himself on top of Jane Doe II and attempted to have sex with her. She yelled at
Appellant, forced him off of her, and cowered in the corner on her mattress;
Appellant then put his clothes back on and “ran out the door” of the bedroom.
        Jane Doe, 5 Jane Doe II’s younger sister, testified that Appellant also began to
                    4F

abuse her in 2017 by entering her bedroom, waking her up, and touching her stomach
and chest in the same manner described by Jane Doe II. From 2017 until May 2019,
Appellant would touch Jane Doe’s breasts and/or her genital area on a daily basis.
By May 2019, Appellant’s behavior had escalated, and he penetrated Jane Doe’s
genitals with his finger almost every day.
        Appellant also engaged in other inappropriate behavior. Jane Doe II would
wake up with the lights on, her shirt pulled up, and Appellant taking pictures of her.
When Appellant confronted Jane Doe II about her watching pornography, he told
her that it was “okay because [he] watch[ed] the same thing,” but that, if she would
“keep [his] secrets,” then he would keep hers. Appellant monitored the house
through a comprehensive system of cameras—some known, some hidden. Initially,
he installed the cameras when Jane Doe and Jane Doe II were on vacation.
Appellant had a phone app that allowed him to view a live feed from the cameras;
B.H. initially did not have the app on her phone. Appellant also installed secret
cameras in the victims’ bedrooms that were hidden inside light fixtures that he had
made.

        5
         Jane Doe was eleven at the time the abuse began (she was sixteen years old at time of trial).
                                                         4
       B. Outcries and Subsequent Audio Recording
       On the evening of May 3, 2019, B.H. took Jane Doe and Jane Doe II to visit
her niece, K.L., and help with K.L.’s infant son. When K.L. and Jane Doe II were
alone, K.L. asked Jane Doe II if Appellant had ever done anything inappropriate to
her, and Jane Doe II “instinctively started crying.” K.L. testified that “[i]t was
almost as if she was waiting on somebody to ask that question.” Jane Doe II told
K.L. about Appellant’s sexual abuse. The two of them went into the nursery and
Jane Doe II recounted Appellant’s actions directly to B.H. Having overheard this
conversation from another room, Jane Doe came into the nursery and told them about
Appellant sexually abusing her also.                B.H. returned home alone, questioned
Appellant, and asked to see his laptop, phone, and Instagram account. B.H. testified
that Appellant said she was “wasting [her] time” and wouldn’t find anything, and he
denied “intentionally do[ing] anything inappropriate.” 6 B.H. then drove back to
                                                                    5F

K.L.’s house and, calling them out to her car, asked Jane Doe and Jane Doe II further
questions about Appellant’s actions while recording the conversation. Appellant
was subsequently arrested, indicted, and convicted of the offenses he committed
against Jane Doe and Jane Doe II.
                   The Trial Court’s Admission of the Audio Recording
       In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted, over his hearsay objection, the audio recording of the conversation
between Jane Doe, Jane Doe II, K.L., and B.H. The State responds that the recording
fell within hearsay exceptions and was cumulative of other testimony at trial.

       6
         B.H. stated that she was not “tech-savvy.” She mentioned that Appellant would usually help her
navigate or operate technology. As a result, B.H.’s review of Appellant’s devices was largely guided by
Appellant himself.

                                                      5
      A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
      We review a trial court’s ruling on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We will
uphold the trial court’s decision unless it lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 153–54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
We will uphold an evidentiary ruling on appeal if it is correct on any theory of law
that finds support in the record. Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670–71 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015,
no pet.).
      Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at trial, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d);
see Sandoval v. State, 409 S.W.3d 259, 281 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by statute or the Rules of Evidence.
TEX. R. EVID. 802; see Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 281. The proponent of hearsay has
the burden to establish an applicable exception. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571,
578–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).
      B. Analysis: The Hearsay Objection
      The recording, a four-way conversation between Jane Doe II, Jane Doe, K.L.,
and B.H, occurred on May 3, 2019, the day of the outcries of Jane Doe and Jane
Doe II. When B.H. returned to K.L.’s house after confronting Appellant, she called
K.L., Jane Doe, and Jane Doe II out to her car and recorded their subsequent
conversation on her cell phone. The State sought to admit the recording over trial
counsel’s hearsay objection—the State claimed that the statements on the recording
were present sense impressions, excited utterances, or then-existing mental,

                                               6
emotional or physical conditions. 7 See TEX. R. EVID. 803(1)–(3). The trial court,
                                           6F

noting that all the participants on the call were present for direct and cross-
examination, overruled the objection.
                1. The Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception Inapplicable
        An excited utterance is a “statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2); Salazar, 38 S.W.3d at 154; see Sandoval, 409
S.W.3d at 284. The reaction to the startling event should be quick enough to avoid
the possibility of fabrication. Templeton v. State, 629 S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2021, no pet.) (citing McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008)). The spontaneous nature of the statement is the main factor to be
considered when a court determines the admissibility of an excited utterance.
Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863, 875 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (citing
Tezeno v. State, 484 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)). The declarant must
have made the statement before the excitement that is caused by the startling event
or condition has abated. Sandoval, 409 S.W.3d at 284. This is so because the excited
utterance exception is based on an assumption that the person making the statement
is not then capable of the kind of reflection that would enable her to fabricate the
information about which she testifies. Apolinar v. State, 155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005).
        In McCarty, the court laid out three conditions for a trial court to consider
when it determines the admissibility of a hearsay statement under the excited
utterance exception:

        7
         The State did not argue that B.H. was the outcry witness, nor did it allege that the statements in
the audio recording met the hearsay exception in Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
See CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072, § 2(b) (West Supp. 2023).
                                                         7
             (1) the “exciting event” should be startling enough to evoke a
             truly spontaneous reaction from the declarant; (2) the reaction to
             the startling event should be quick enough to avoid the possibility
             of fabrication; and (3) the resulting statement should be sufficiently
             “related to” the startling event, to ensure the reliability and
             trustworthiness of that statement.
McCarty, 257 S.W.3d at 241.
        Here, Jane Doe and Jane Doe II recalled abuse that had occurred anywhere
from months to years ago, 8 and their statements were not spontaneous enough to
                                 7F

avoid the possibility of fabrication as required by McCarty. See Tienda, 479 S.W.3d
at 877–78. Jane Doe testified that her abuse continued until her outcry; Jane Doe II
did not say if or when Appellant’s sexual abuse stopped but recalled in the recording
that Appellant had abused her during the “beginning . . . towards the middle” of
2018. Even if we assume that Appellant had sexually abused both of the victims
within the last few days before the statements on the recording were made, the
victims spent at least thirty minutes talking with B.H. and K.L. during their outcries,
and more time passed as B.H. confronted Appellant, returned to K.L.’s home, and
began questioning the victims in her car. Moreover, Jane Doe and Jane Doe II
answered most of B.H.’s questions directly and calmly, and some of their responses
were preceded by pauses in the conversation.
        This and other courts have contemplated the excited utterance exception in
similar circumstances and found the exception to be inapplicable to the declarant’s
statements. See Tienda, 479 S.W.3d at 878 (declarant gave statements in response
to law enforcement questioning regarding sexual abuse that occurred days or months
before the interview, statement was given away from scene, and many answers were

        8
         On appeal, Appellant focuses on the inadmissibility of the statements made by Jane Doe and Jane
Doe II on the recording, rather than the statements made by B.H. and K.L. Therefore, we will confine our
analysis to the statements made by Jane Doe and Jane Doe II.
                                                        8
preceded by relatively long pauses); Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (Eleven–year–old victim’s report of sexual abuse to
police officer did not constitute an excited utterance because, although testimony
established that the victim was crying and “very upset” during the description of
sexual abuse, there was “no evidence that . . . [her] emotional state was due to the
stress of excitement caused by some startling event or condition.”); Harvey v. State,
123 S.W.3d 623, 631 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d) (boyfriend’s
questioning of victim about her assault six years ago about the paternity of victim’s
child was not a startling event).
             2. The Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception Inapplicable
      A statement is a present sense impression and falls under the exception to the
rule against hearsay if it “describ[es] or explain[s] an event or condition, made while
or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(1). “The
rationale for [this] exception stems from the statement’s contemporaneity, not its
spontaneity.” Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). If
the declarant had time to reflect upon the event or the conditions he observed, the
event or conditions are not contemporaneous for purposes of this exception.
Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
      The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the statement must have
been made “before any thoughts of litigation have crystallized” and “without any
reflection, thought process, or motive to fabricate or exaggerate.” Id. at 379. Here,
Jane Doe and Jane Doe II’s statements were not made “while or immediately after”
they perceived the events described on the recording. Therefore, the statements did
not constitute present sense impressions as contemplated by Rule 803(1).

                                              9
             3. The Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition
             Hearsay Exception Inapplicable.
      A hearsay statement may be admitted if it is a statement of the declarant’s
“then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory,
or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health).” TEX. R.
EVID. 803(3). “Texas courts have held that the type of statement contemplated by
[Rule 803(3)] includes a statement that on its face expresses or exemplifies the
declarant’s state of mind—such as fear, hate, love, and pain.” Garcia v. State, 246
S.W.3d 121, 132 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. ref’d). But “a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed” is subject to exclusion
as hearsay. TEX. R. EVID. 803(3); see Delapaz v. State, 228 S.W.3d 183, 207 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2007, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, statements of memory to prove a fact
remembered do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(3).
See TEX. R. EVID. 803(3); Glover v. State, 102 S.W.3d 754, 762–63 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d) (mother’s testimony as to her underage daughter’s out-
of-court statements about sex with defendant not admissible under Rule 803(3) as
purpose of evidence was to prove facts remembered).
      Jane Doe’s and Jane Doe II’s statements regarding Appellant’s sexual abuse
focused on past facts or conditions and did not relate to their then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical conditions. Instead, such statements were of memories and
beliefs to prove the facts remembered or believed and do not fit within the hearsay
exception in Rule 803(3).
      We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted an
unredacted recording of Jane Doe and Jane Doe II’s statements because the
statements were permeated with inadmissible hearsay. Our inquiry, however, does

                                            10
not end there. We must next determine whether Appellant was harmed by the trial
court’s ruling.
      C. Harm Analysis: No Substantial or Injurious Effect or Influence
      The admission of hearsay over a proper objection is nonconstitutional error.
Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 861 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d);
Broderick v. State, 35 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). As
such, we must disregard the error unless it affected Appellant’s substantial rights.
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018). A substantial right is affected if the error had a substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d
29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). One’s substantial rights are not affected by the
erroneous admission of evidence if, after examining the record as a whole, we have
fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect.
Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When we assess the
likelihood that the error adversely influenced the jury, we consider the entire record,
including (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in
connection with other evidence, (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict,
(3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating the defendant’s guilt,
and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Gonzalez, 544
S.W.3d at 373; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56; Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Llamas v. State, 12 S.W.3d 469, 471 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000).
      The State argues that the recording was cumulative of the victims’ testimony
at trial, and therefore its admission was harmless. See Tienda, 479 S.W.3d at 881;
Lozano v. State, 359 S.W.3d 790, 823–24 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d).
Texas courts have repeatedly held that testimony about and recordings of a child’s
                                             11
statements concerning a sexual offense, though hearsay, are harmless when, as here,
other unobjected-to evidence was admitted during the trial and proves the same facts.
See Land v. State, 291 S.W.3d 23, 28–31 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d)
(admission of a recording of a child’s interview given was erroneous but harmless
when cumulative of the victim’s properly admitted live testimony); Jensen v. State,
66 S.W.3d 528, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (op. on
reh’g) (where child’s “live testimony did not differ substantially from the facts
revealed in the videotape,” admission of videotape was harmless); Matz v. State, 21
S.W.3d 911, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d) (videotape was
cumulative of a child’s properly admitted testimony on the same issue and therefore
not harmful error); see also Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 898 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994).
      We first consider the character of the alleged error and how it might be
considered in connection with other evidence. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. We
note that the victims, in the recording, each shared additional events that they did
not testify about at trial. For example, Jane Doe stated in the recording that
Appellant tried to make her touch his penis. Jane Doe II stated that Appellant told
her that nobody would believe her. Both of the victims stated that Appellant told
them he would “make their lives a living hell” if they told anybody. K.L. told B.H.
that Appellant had come into her bedroom once while naked, touching himself, and
that Appellant had told K.L. on several occasions that he would make sure her kids
were taken away from her if she mentioned any of the abuse against her. However,
Jane Doe’s, Jane Doe II’s, and K.L.’s testimony otherwise largely resembled their
in-court testimony, and while their descriptions given in the recording of the events
provided more detail than their trial testimony, the recording provided essentially
the same facts. The additional statements referenced above were only a small part
                                            12
of the recording. The recording was a seventeen-minute conversation between
declarants who were all in attendance and subject to cross-examination at trial.
Accordingly, we believe this factor weighs only slightly in favor of a finding of
harm.
        Second, we consider the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict.
Statements of sexually related bad acts and misconduct involving children are
inherently inflammatory. Id.; Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). However, the inadmissible statements were no more serious than
similar evidence of assaults that were properly admitted at trial. See Dies v. State,
649 S.W.3d 273, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, pet. ref’d) (noting in a Rule 403
balancing test that the inflammatory nature of a child’s sexual abuse was diminished
by comparable testimony). We cannot say that the victims’ statements misled or
inflamed the jury’s passions beyond that existing from the properly admitted
evidence. The recorded statements contained similar details and accusations to their
trial testimony. Based on the facts of this case, the recorded statements of the
victims’ sexual assaults were neither misleading nor inflammatory. Therefore, this
factor weighs against a finding of harm.
        Third, we consider the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating
the defendant’s guilt. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. The evidence of Appellant’s
guilt was strong. We initially note that Appellant does not contend that the evidence
was insufficient to find him guilty of any of the charged offenses. At trial, the
victims testified extensively about Appellant’s abuse over the years, his escalating
behavior, and his attempts to hide the abuse. The jury rejected Appellant’s defensive
theory that the victims were not credible. Strong circumstantial evidence pointed to
his guilt as well. The network of cameras that Appellant was responsible for
maintaining, the secret cameras placed directly in the victims’ rooms, Appellant’s
                                             13
insistence (after their discovery) that the phones only recorded audio—despite the
camera holes drilled into the hiding spots and the “glitch[ed]” picture B.H. saw on
Appellant’s phone—all indicated that Appellant hid inappropriate behavior from the
rest of his family. Accordingly, without the admission of the recording, the
testimony and other admitted evidence culminated in a strong case of Appellant’s
guilt. This factor weighs against a finding of harm.
      Finally, we consider whether the State emphasized the complained-of error.
Id. Beyond introducing the recording in the first place, the State did not emphasize
its content. It did not repeat the noncumulative events discussed or revisit the
recording after its introduction. This factor also weighs against a finding of harm.
      Therefore, we find it unlikely that, without the recording, the jury would have
been inclined to reject Jane Doe’s and Jane Doe II’s testimony of sexual abuse but
then change its mind once it heard the recording. See Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d
858, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Woods v. State, No.
02-17-00367-CR, 2018 WL 5289461, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25,
2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that erroneous
admission of forensic interview where in child described abuse with more detail was
harmless); Todd v. State, No. 02-12-00114-CR, 2013 WL 1457735, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Apr. 11, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same)). Moreover, all of the persons in the recording were witnesses
at trial, and Appellant had the opportunity to cross-examine them regarding the
circumstances surrounding the recording and its content.
      After reviewing the entire record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the
erroneous admission of the recording did not influence the jury or had but a slight
effect. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. We conclude that the trial court’s error in
admitting the recording did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence the
                                             14
jury’s verdict; therefore, the error did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights and
such error must be disregarded. See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); Matz v. State, 21
S.W.3d 911, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d); see also TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(b).
      We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
                                   Expert Testimony
      In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in permitting a witness, Chief David Hullum of the Eastland Police Department, to
testify regarding the “statistical frequency of under reporting [sic] of sexual assault.”
For this issue, Appellant argues that the trial court “failed to properly assess the
reliability of [Chief] Hullum’s testimony” and therefore erred “in allowing the
opinions [Chief] Hullum expressed, solely on the basis [of] his experience and
training . . . in the investigation of sexual assault cases.” With regard to the
preservation of this issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel’s stated objection—
“speculation”—addressed the reliability of Chief Hullum’s testimony, “even if not
expressly stated.” We conclude that Appellant failed to preserve error on this issue
for appeal.
      A. Admission of Expert Testimony
      Lay witness opinion testimony is governed by Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of
Evidence, while expert witness opinion testimony is governed by Rules 702 through
705. TEX. R. EVID. 701, 702–05. “Rule 701 covers the more traditional witness—
one who ‘witnessed’ or participated in the events about which he or she is
testifying—while Rule 702 allows for a witness who was brought in as an expert to
testify.” Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see TEX. R.
EVID. 701, 702. “When a witness who is capable of being qualified as an expert
                                              15
testifies regarding events which he or she personally perceived, the evidence may be
admissible as both Rule 701 opinion testimony and Rule 702 expert testimony.”
Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 536. “A witness may qualify to give testimony both under
Rule 702—because of his or her superior experiential capacity—and under Rule 701,
if the witness’s testimony and opinion are based upon firsthand knowledge.” Id.;
see TEX. R. EVID. 701, 702. Expert testimony is permitted by those who are qualified
by training and experience, and their opinions may be based on facts or data that the
expert has been made aware of, reviewed, or personally observed.                                 TEX. R.
EVID. 702, 703. “Experts are given ‘wide latitude’ in selecting their foundational
sources.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A party can
challenge the expert’s qualifications, the relevance of the opinion, and the reliability
of the opinion, 9 and an expert opinion is unreliable if it is only “subjective belief or
                  8F

unsupported speculation.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993).
        The trial court functions as a gatekeeper to determine the reliability, relevance,
and admissibility of evidence. Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 136 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).      Because the Rule 702 inquiry is case-specific and fact-intensive, the
reliability determination of expert testimony is flexible, and it is the trial court as
gatekeeper that must determine how to assess the reliability of particular testimony.
Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 426 (citing Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134). The standard of review
of a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, including
expert testimony, is an abuse of discretion and we must uphold it’s ruling if it was
within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 427 (citing Weatherred v. State,
15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).

        9
         Appellant did not argue at trial that Chief Hullum lacked expert qualifications or that his opinion
was irrelevant.
                                                         16
      B. Chief Hullum’s Testimony
      Chief Hullum described his specialized knowledge, training and experience.
At the time of trial, Chief Hullum was the Chief of Police for the city of Eastland.
He had served in that capacity for six and one-half years. He testified that he worked
in the following law enforcement positions (in reverse chronological order): criminal
investigator with the 91st Criminal Judicial District Attorney over the drug task
force; Texas Ranger assigned to Eastland, Stephens, Callahan, and Shackleford
counties; investigator in the special crimes unit for the Texas Department of Public
Safety (DPS) (ten years); trooper for the DPS (four and one-half years); patrol
captain at the Gregg County Sheriff’s Office (two years); border patrol (two years);
narcotics officer at the Gregg County Sheriff’s Department (two years).           His
employment history began in 1978. While serving as an investigator for DPS and
as a Texas Ranger he developed “expertise regarding sexual abuse of children
cases.” He testified that, conservatively, he has investigated over 200 cases that
involve the sexual abuse of children. While stationed in Bryan, Texas as an
investigator with the DPS, he received training in various forms of investigation
including child abuse, sexual assault, and sex crimes in general. These cases were a
large part of his caseload in the nine counties that he “was responsible for.” Because
of his experience, when he became a Texas Ranger, he was frequently called and
consulted about cases that involved child abuse and sexual assault.
      Chief Hullum, without objection, testified about his specialized training and
experience regarding common traits among child sex offenders.            He testified
regarding his instruction on offender mindsets and opportunity. Chief Hullum
testified that he had investigated or participated in the investigation of many cases
involving sexual abuse of adults and children.

                                             17
      On direct examination, Chief Hullum was asked five questions regarding
persons that underreport sex crimes:
             [THE STATE]: When you’re dealing with people who have
      been victimized by sex crimes, is it common or uncommon for the
      majority of those victims to report those crimes? Well, let me ask this:
      Is there -- have you -- have you come up with a [sic] knowledge through
      your training and experience as to the percentage of women who report
      when they have been victimized?
             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m going to object, that’s speculation.
      That would require beyond a specialized -- we’d have to have some sort
      of survey. I mean, that’s a question I don’t think that could be answered
      in a way that would be meaningful to a jury, most certainly. And that’s
      -- putting a percentage on it, that’s kind of taking away --
            THE COURT: Please rephrase your question.
            [THE STATE]: Based upon your training and experience and
      the cases that you’ve dealt with, and that what you have studied
      yourself, do you have an idea as to how many people -- women report
      percentage of crimes?
            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m still objecting as to speculation on
      a percentage without that specialized -- they’re asking for, like, a
      percentage.
            THE COURT: Overruled.
            [CHIEF HULLUM]: Thirty-five percent is what is claimed for
      the nonreports. I believe, based on training and experience, that that
      number is a lot higher.
            [THE STATE]:         What about children?         Are children’s
      percentages greater or lower?
            [CHIEF HULLUM]: They’re greater.
            [THE STATE]: Okay. So women are 35 percent, children is
      going to be more than 35 percent?
            [CHIEF HULLUM]: Yes, ma’am.

                                            18
            [THE STATE]: And do you have an opinion as to whether or
      not that would be -- the percentage for children would be higher or
      lower than what is anticipated by you?
             [CHIEF HULLUM]: I think it’s higher.
In the testimony above, the subject of the first two questions by the State, objected
to by Appellant, is women. But in the three following questions and their
accompanying answers, the subject changes to children or to include children, to
which no objection was made.
      C. The Requirement to Renew Objection or Risk Waiver
      To preserve error on appeal, a party must make a timely request, objection, or
motion “with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.”
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). The objection at trial must correspond with the issue
on appeal. Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In this
regard, “[a]n objection stating one legal basis may not be used to support a different
legal theory on appeal.” Edwards v. State, 97 S.W.3d 279, 287 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Dominguez v. State, 474 S.W.3d 688, 700
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.); Crider v. State, No. 11-16-00302-CR, 2018
WL 1547217, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 30, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Tobar v. State, No. 14-15-00011-CR, 2016 WL
2975568, at *5 n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 19, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
      “[A] specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity
to remove the objection or supply other testimony.” Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d
515, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); see TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). With regard to
expert testimony, a specific objection regarding expert testimony must detail the
particular deficiency in the expert’s qualifications or the reliability of the expert’s

                                             19
opinions. See Chisum v. State, 988 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998,
pet. ref’d) (Counsel objected to the expert’s opinions but did not specify any
particular deficiency in her qualifications or her reliability; no specific complaint
about relevancy or reliability of scientific evidence was preserved for appellate
review.).
      Importantly, “with two exceptions, the law in Texas requires a party to
continue to object each time inadmissible evidence is offered. The two exceptions
require counsel to either (1) obtain a running objection, or (2) request a hearing
outside the presence of the jury.” Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (citations omitted). The two exceptions are inapplicable here because
neither a running objection nor a hearing outside the presence of the jury was
requested by Appellant.
      Appellant failed to preserve any issue for appeal regarding the testimony at
issue given by Chief Hullum. Appellant objected to the State’s question regarding
the percentage of women who report sexual crimes committed against them. Aside
from his speculation objection, Appellant’s complaints to the trial court did not detail
the particular deficiency of which he complains on appeal. The phrase “we’d have
to have some sort of survey” and “[t]hat would require beyond a specialized”
(without completing the sentence) at most might challenge the existence of an
underlying report or survey or Chief Hullum’s specialized knowledge as to the
subject of the first and second questions: the percentage of women who report crimes
against them.
      Unlike these initial questions however, the State’s next three inquiries differ
in subject and substance. They inquire as to “nonreports[,]” and ask about Chief
Hullum’s belief about the percentage of children who do not report the sexual crimes
committed against them. Appellant did not object to Chief Hullum’s response or to
                                              20
the State’s three questions addressing whether the percentage of “nonreports” for
sexual crimes against children are higher or lower than the percentage for women.
Further, as stated, no running objection was requested or granted, nor did Appellant
request a hearing outside the presence of the jury in accordance with Martinez. See
98 S.W.3d at 193. Accordingly, no objections were ever made as to Chief Hullum’s
testimony regarding the percentage of children not reporting the sexual crimes
committed against them. But even if we impute Appellant’s unrenewed objection
regarding women to the State’s questions regarding female children, no claim of
error by the trial court has been preserved. Appellant’s failure to renew his objection
when the State asked Chief Hullum to compare the percentages of women and
children waives error, if any, in the trial court’s decision to overrule Appellant’s
objections to the former questions as to percent of women reporting or failing to
report the sexual crimes committed against them. See Addington v. State, No. 14-
18-00178-CR, 2020 WL 634427, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 11,
2020, no pet.) (plurality mem. op., not designated for publication) (even if, arguendo,
the trial court improperly overruled the speculation objection, the error would be
harmless because the appellant failed to renew the objection on a subsequent
question).
      D. The Bases of Chief Hullum’s Expert Testimony
      Even assuming that Appellant’s objections preserved his complaint on appeal,
Chief Hullum did not vouch for the accuracy nor adopt the thirty-five percent range
that he recalled and of which Appellant complains; rather, his testimony was that,
based on his personal experience, the percentage of “nonreports” of sexual assault is
higher. No objection was raised to that testimony. Chief Hullum’s testimony
addressed events, and the underreporting of sexual abuse by women and children
that he personally perceived and that were based on his experience and training. As
                                             21
such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Chief Hullum’s
testimony under Rules 701 and 702. See Osbourn, 92 S.W.3d at 536; see also
TEX. R. EVID. 701, 702.
        Moreover, on appeal, Appellant argues that the foundation of Chief Hullum’s
opinion was insufficient in that it was “based, as here, on his experience and training
and the ‘cases he’s dealt with.’” Experience, training, and “cases he’s dealt with”
are proper bases for expert testimony. See TEX. R. EVID. 702, 703. In this regard,
Chief Hullum founded his opinion, not on subjective belief or speculation, but on
extensive specialized training and experience, which is fully detailed in the record.
He received training in various forms of investigation, both general and specific to
sexual crimes. Chief Hullum estimated that he had investigated at least two hundred
child sexual abuse cases. 10 While qualification and reliability are separate inquiries,
                              9F

they overlap in the present case. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 134 (quoting Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (In some cases, “the relevant reliability
concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.”). Chief Hullum’s
qualifications—that is, his personal training and experience properly served as bases
of his opinion.
        Appellant does not claim that Chief Hullum was not an expert in the handling,
treatment, and investigation of child abuse cases. Chief Hullum did not rely solely
on his qualification, but rather, he explained how he arrived at his conclusions. In
five pages of his transcribed testimony, he discusses that he had personally observed

        10
          The qualifications of Chief Hullum (now Judge Hullum) have twice survived scrutiny from the
Court of Criminal Appeals. Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 667–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (affirming
then-Ranger Hullum’s expert testimony on grooming); see Teczar v. State, No. 11-09-00183-CR, 2011 WL
1743756, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 15, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(affirming then-Ranger Hullum’s qualifications to testify in the field of child sexual abuse, including
reasons why a child might delay in reporting sexual abuse).

                                                       22
reasons that cause children to delay in reporting abuse, such as a lack of maturity,
education, or life experiences, and the fact that children may be reluctant to approach
“a complete stranger” about their abuse. See Barnes v. State, 165 S.W.3d 75, 83
(Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (Witness testified that over a period of twenty
years she had examined hundreds of children who were suspected of being
physically or sexually abused; that in her experience, it was not unusual for children
to delay their outcry; opinion asked and objected to on the psychological or social
reasons for a child to delay her outcry, but instead the witness stated what she had
observed during the course of her career. “Even if the question is construed as
calling for an opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
[the witness] was qualified by her experience to answer it.”). Further Chief Hullum’s
testimony would assist the jury in understanding why children may delay reporting
sexual abuse. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 130–31 (relying on TEX. R. EVID. 104(a),
401, 402, and 702, and quoting Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006)); Barnes, 165 S.W.3d at 83. Thus, even if we were to conclude that
Appellant properly preserved his objections, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in overruling them.
      Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
       Inclusion of “Good Conduct” Language in the Punishment Charges
      In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by including a
prior version of the parole law instruction in Article 37.07, Section 4(a), which
contained “good conduct” time language, in its punishment charges. He contends
this error caused Appellant egregious harm because it is impossible to determine
whether the jury properly followed the instructions.

                                             23
        A. Applicable Law
        The Texas Legislature amended Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 37.07, Section 4(a)–(c) in 2019. Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch.
260, § 3, 2019 Tex. Gen Laws 446, 446–48 (codified at CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07,
§ 4(a)–(c)). The amendments apply to any defendant sentenced after September 1,
2019. See id. at 448; Lewis v. State, No. 09-21-00082-CR, 2021 WL 6129129, at *8
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Appellant was sentenced on June 3, 2022, making the revised language
of Article 37.07, Section 4(a) the language that should have been included in the
punishment charges with respect to the indecency-with-a-child convictions and the
sexual-assault conviction. 11     10F

        Section 4(a) states in relevant part that the trial court shall instruct the jury
during the punishment phase as follows:
        The length of time for which a defendant is imprisoned may be reduced
        by the award of parole.

        Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a
        term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole
        until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or
        30 years, whichever is less. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of
        less than four years, the defendant must serve at least two years before
        the defendant is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not
        guarantee that parole will be granted.

        It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law might be applied
        to this defendant if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the

        11
          We note that Article 37.07, Section 4(a) does not apply to Appellant’s conviction for continuous
sexual abuse of a young child. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.145(a)(2) (West Supp. 2023) (providing
that an inmate convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a young child “is not eligible for release on parole”).
The trial court properly did not include a parole law instruction consistent with Section 4(a) in its
punishment charge for the continuous-sexual-abuse-of-a-child conviction.

                                                         24
      application of that law will depend on decisions made by parole
      authorities.

      You may consider the existence of the parole law. You are not to
      consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this
      particular defendant.

CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West Supp. 2023). There is no reference to “good
conduct time” in the current version of Article 37.07, Section 4(a). The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals has indicated that the legislature chooses language for a reason
and that not utilizing statutorily mandated language is a violation of the law. See
Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When a trial court errs
in not using the proper language, and the defendant does not object, we will not
reverse unless the record shows egregious harm to the defendant. Lewis, 2021 WL
6129129, at *9 (citing Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). Under the
Almanza egregious harm standard, the record must show the defendant suffered
actual—not theoretical—harm from the charge error. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 174.
“Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect the very basis of the case,
deprive the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defensive theory.” Lewis,
2021 WL 6129129, at *9 (quoting Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 750 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
      Appellate courts examine four factors to determine whether an appellant was
egregiously harmed by an erroneous jury instruction. “When assessing harm based
on the particular facts of the case, we consider (A) the entire jury charge; (B) ‘the
state of the evidence[,] including contested issues and the weight of the probative
evidence’; (C) the parties’ arguments; and (D) all other relevant information in the
record.” Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834, 840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also

                                              25
Ritchey v. State, No. 11-20-00035-CR, 2022 WL 3649433, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Addison v. State, No. 05-18-01263-CR, 2020 WL 4251068, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas, July 24, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
        B. No Egregious Harm
        The State concedes that the trial court erred by providing an incorrect parole
law instruction to the jury, and we agree that it was improper. Appellant did not
object to the punishment charges at trial; therefore, the charge error is reviewed for
egregious harm using the Almanza factors. See Hooper v. State, 255 S.W.3d 262,
270 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. ref’d). Only those charge errors that result in
egregious harm will be reversed. Addison, 2020 WL 4251068, at *4. We do not
find egregious harm here for the reasons that follow. 12            11F

        First, we consider whether the charge itself mitigates against the finding of
egregious harm. See id. There is a rebuttable presumption that a jury will follow
any curative instructions given by the trial court. Lewis, 2021 WL 6129129, at *9.
Here, the punishment charge deviated from the statutory language:
        Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a
        term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration
        imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities
        may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good
        behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and

        12
          This type of error does not usually result in egregious harm. See Ritchey, 2022 WL 3649433, at
*6 n.2 (reaching the same result as we do here and citing multiple recent cases from sister courts of appeals
addressing the same issue and reaching the same result, including West v. State, No. 10-20-00087-CR, 2022
WL 1105645, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco April 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Jackson v. State, No. 03-20-00085-CR, 2022 WL 257451, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 28, 2022, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Lewis, 2021 WL 6129129, at *10; Holiness v. State, No.
06-21-00038-CR, 2021 WL 4483519, at *9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 1, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Addison, 2020 WL 4251068, at *5; and Guerra v. State, No. 06-19-00239-CR,
2020 WL 3634390, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 6, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication)).
                                                          26
      attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison
      authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time
      earned by the prisoner.
      It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will
      be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.

      Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a
      term of imprisonment, the defendant will not become eligible for parole
      until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence imposed or
      30 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct
      time the defendant may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of
      less than four years, the defendant must serve at least two years before
      the defendant is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not
      guarantee that parole will be granted.
      It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct
      time might be applied to this defendant if sentenced to a term of
      imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on
      decisions made by prison and parole authorities.

      You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct
      time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good
      conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular
      defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole law
      may be applied to this particular defendant.

(Emphasis added). Despite the addition of the good conduct time language, the
punishment charges included mitigating instructions that prohibited the jury from
considering parole.
      It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct
      time might be applied to this defendant. . . .
      However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time
      may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are
      not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to
      this particular defendant.

                                            27
The mitigating language that was included in the punishment charges communicated
to the jury that the jurors could accurately predict how good conduct time might
affect Appellant or how to calculate the impact of future good conduct. Accordingly,
the jury was instructed not to consider during their deliberations the extent to which
good conduct would determine actual jail time. The jury is presumed to have
followed curative instructions unless there is contrary evidence.
        Appellant concedes that courts have held that giving the “outdated” parole
instruction is harmless if the trial court, as here, also instructs the jury not to consider
parole law as it applies to the defendant. This court has carefully addressed these
issues recently. See Alaniz v. State, 648 S.W.3d 657, 662–64 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2022, no pet.) and Arevalo v. State, 675 S.W.3d 833, 858–61 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, no pet.) Nevertheless, citing the dissent from Keady v. State, Appellant argues
that jurors would be better equipped to avoid misapplying parole laws if the jurors
are made to understand the reason why they cannot discuss parole. 687 S.W.2d 757,
762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Clinton, J. dissenting) (urging courts to provide a
reason and stating that the “most practical reason” is that no one can predict if or
when an inmate will be released on parole). However, the curative instruction here
does provide the reason for the jurors—it informs the jury that it cannot be accurately
predicted how the parole law would be applied to Appellant because the application
of that law depends of the decisions of the parole authorities. 13 The first factor
                                                                                  12F

weighs against concluding that Appellant was egregiously harmed by the erroneous
instruction.
        Second, we consider the state of the evidence. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 841–
44. We have already weighed the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction

         This reason aligns with Justice Clinton’s dissent, which emphasizes that “no one in this State can
        13

predict when an inmate will be released on parole.” Keady, 687 S.W.2d at 762 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
                                                        28
in addressing Appellant’s first issue, and we rely on it here. Nothing in the record
indicates that the jury was unreasonable in their finding of guilt or punishment. The
second factor does not weigh in favor of concluding Appellant was egregiously
harmed by the erroneous instruction.
      Third, we consider the argument of counsel and any emphasis on the
possibility of parole—or good conduct time—to the jury. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at
844. In closing arguments during the punishment phase, Appellant’s counsel first
mentioned parole laws. Referencing Appellant’s conviction for continuous sexual
abuse of a child, he told the jury that the absence of a parole provision on this
conviction meant that he would serve the sentence “day for day.” The State agreed
that the sentence for continuous sexual abuse would be served “day for day,” but
otherwise did not mention the parole law. Neither party emphasized parole laws
beyond clarifying Appellant’s ineligibility for parole on the continuous-sexual-
abuse conviction. Thus, the third factor weighs against concluding that Appellant
was egregiously harmed by the erroneous instruction.
      Fourth, we consider, from the record as a whole, any other relevant
information. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 844–45. During deliberations, the trial court
received a note from the jury that said, “Are terms served as 1 cumulative sentence
or 4 consecutive terms?” When there is a jury note inquiring about parole or good
conduct time, courts are more prone to find egregious harm. Hooper, 255 S.W.3d
at 272. The jury note, however, did not mention parole or good conduct time; rather,
it questioned whether the recommended sentences would be served concurrently or
cumulatively. See Ritchey, 2022 WL 3649433, at *5. There is nothing in the record
indicating that the jury considered the application of good conduct time when it
assessed Appellant’s sentences. See Holiness, 2021 WL 4483519, at *8.

                                            29
         Further, Appellant’s fifty-year sentence for the continuous-sexual-abuse
conviction weighs against a finding of egregious harm. As both parties made clear
in their closing arguments, Appellant’s conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a
child made him ineligible for parole. After thirty minutes of deliberation, the jury
assessed Appellant’s punishment on all four convictions. On his conviction for
continuous sexual abuse of a child, the jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at fifty
years—which the jury understood would be served “day for day.” No other
conviction resulted in a longer term of imprisonment. With their verdict, the jury
made it clear they intended Appellant to serve fifty years without the possibility of
parole. The fourth factor weighs against concluding that Appellant was egregiously
harmed by the erroneous instruction.
         Because all four factors weigh against concluding that Appellant was
egregiously harmed by the erroneous instruction, we overrule Appellant’s third
issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
         We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE

March 14, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

                                               30