Court Opinion

ID: 9960829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 14:04:46.883055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:55.004840
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

     ZAHAV REFI LLC; ZAHAV FLORIDA, LLC; ZAHAV REFI II LLC;
     SP POOL 7 ZAHAV FL LLC; BOG TWELVE ZAHAV FL LLC; and
                  POOL7 ZAHAV FLORIDA, LLC,

                               Appellants,

                                    v.

              WHITE HAWK ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.,

                                Appellee.

                            No. 2D2023-0072

                             April 17, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Melissa M. Polo,
Judge.

Dwayne A. Robinson of Kozyak Tropin & Throckmorton LLP, Miami, for
Appellants.

Matthew D. Wolf of Ivanov & Wolf, PLLC, Tampa, for Appellee.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

     Presented in this appeal is a challenge to an arbitrator's final award
of specific performance and the circuit court's order approving the
arbitrator's final award. These two component parts yield a singular
challenge as to the circuit court's final judgment in favor of White Hawk
Asset Management, Inc., approving the arbitration award compelling
Zahav Refi LLC, et al., to perform in accordance with the parties' contract
to purchase real property.
     Because we conclude that the Appellants (collectively Zahav) have
failed to establish a basis to set aside the final judgment, we affirm.
                               I. Background
     On March 11, 2021, the parties entered into a contract (the
Purchase Agreement) for twenty-seven residential rental properties in
and around Tampa and St. Petersburg. Zahav was to sell the properties
to White Hawk for $3.26 million. The Purchase Agreement stated that
the parties would close within sixty days from the date of the agreement.
In paragraph 25, the Purchase Agreement included a single sentence
which read, "Time is of the essence of this Agreement." The Purchase
Agreement also provided for a thirty-day inspection period and for a
closing date extension of up to thirty days if White Hawk paid an
additional $25,000, nonrefundable deposit. If a controversy arose with
respect to the subject matter of the Purchase Agreement, the parties
agreed to settle the controversy by final, binding arbitration.
     A controversy arose when the transaction did not close within the
sixty-day period provided. Initially, after White Hawk exercised its option
to extend the closing by thirty days in exchange for $25,000, the parties
agreed to amend/extend the contract. And after inspections, the parties
agreed to amend the contract again by eliminating certain properties
from the Purchase Agreement, adjusting the purchase price to
$3,108,786, and extending the closing date to June 9, 2021. However,
when Zahav declined a third closing date extension, White Hawk
petitioned the circuit court for judicial relief to enforce the mandatory,

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binding arbitration provision. The circuit court granted the petition, and
the parties proceeded to arbitration.
     During arbitration, White Hawk contended that Zahav breached the
contract by failing to disclose a lien on one property and by failing to
provide clear and marketable title as to all properties, which caused a
delay in closing. White Hawk sought specific performance of the
contract. White Hawk prevailed on its claims, and on May 13, 2022, the
arbitrator issued a final award of specific performance and directed the
parties to close the transaction "expeditiously." Following the award,
Zahav moved for clarification of the term "expeditiously." Zahav argued
that at the time of its motion, the final award had been issued over thirty
days ago and requested the arbitrator clarify that "expeditiously" did not
extend beyond thirty days from the final award. The arbitrator denied
the motion, reasoning that the "authority of the arbitrator did not extend
to writing a number of days into the agreement between the parties."
     White Hawk later moved to modify the award in the circuit court,
arguing that it was still unable to close on the properties and requested
further clarification of the term "expeditiously." On September 7, 2022,
the court denied the motion to modify and stated that "the award was
issued on May 13th. 'Expeditious' has already expired." Shortly
thereafter, however, White Hawk moved to confirm the final arbitration
award. At the hearing on White Hawk's amended motion to confirm the
award, Zahav argued that the arbitration award directing the parties to
close "expeditiously" did not permit White Hawk to close after 132 days of
the award. Ultimately, the circuit court entered an order granting the
motion for confirmation and a final judgment in conformity with the final
award—granting White Hawk specific performance and ordering the
parties to "close the transaction expeditiously."

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      Zahav argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in entering a
final judgment which awarded White Hawk a closing date beyond the
time frame agreed upon in the Purchase Agreement.
                               II. Discussion
      "A very high degree of conclusiveness attaches to an arbitration
award." EIG Servs., Inc. v. One Call Med., Inc., 348 So. 3d 682, 686 (Fla.
1st DCA 2022) (quoting Deen v. Oster, 814 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2001)). As such, we review a final judgment confirming an
arbitration award for abuse of discretion. Nucci v. Storm Football
Partners, 82 So. 3d 180, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). However, issues of law
are reviewed de novo. Lopez v. Avatar Prop. & Cas. Ins., 313 So. 3d 230,
236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021).
      Initially, two statutes inform our decision. First, for purposes of
this appeal, section 682.015(1), Florida Statutes (2020), provides that a
petition for judicial review of an arbitrator's award "must be made to the
court and heard in the manner provided by law or rule of court for
making and hearing motions." Section 682.15, the second statutory
provision, demands that when the circuit court enters an order, as was
done here, confirming the arbitration award, "the court shall enter a
judgment in conformity" with the arbitration award. Here, the circuit
court acted in conformity with this provision.
      We begin by noting that section 682.12 provides that "[a]fter a
party to an arbitration proceeding receives notice of an award, the party
may make a motion to the court for an order confirming the award at
which time the court shall issue a confirming order unless the award is
modified[,] . . . corrected[,] . . . or vacated." (Emphasis added.) As
indicated by the discretionary language, a motion to confirm is not
mandatory. This is because "the arbitration award becomes final once

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the arbitrator releases his findings." Cap. Factors, Inc. v. Alba Rent-A-
Car, Inc., 965 So. 2d 1178, 1182-83 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Centurion
Air Cargo, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1286
(S.D. Fla. 2004)). And when an award is final, the parties are required to
abide by it. See id. at 1182; Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171,
176 (2d Cir. 1984) ("An unconfirmed award is a contract right that may
be used as the basis for a cause of action."); OJ Com., LLC v. Amazon
Servs., LLC, No. 20-cv-20218, 2020 WL 7264273, n.9 (S.D. Fla. 2020)
("Parties are not free to simply ignore an arbitration award.").
     Generally, a party has ninety days from the date of the award to
seek vacation, modification, or correction of the award. See §§ 682.13,
.14. However, as held by the Florida Supreme Court in Meade v.
Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 423 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1982), time
limitations under Florida's arbitration code for seeking vacation or
modification of an arbitration award are applicable only to issues
submitted to an arbitration panel. Thus, an issue not raised in
arbitration could be raised as a defense at a confirmation hearing. But
absent a basis to vacate, modify, or correct, or the presentation of an
issue to the circuit court which had not been submitted to arbitration,
the circuit court must confirm the arbitration award. See Nucci, 82 So.
3d at 183 (citing Schnurmacher Holding, Inc., 542 So. 2d 1327, 1328 (Fla.
1989)); Hinshaw v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 935 So. 2d 86, 86-87 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2006) ("Given the absence of a timely challenge to the arbitration
award or presentation of a viable issue to the trial court which had not
been submitted to arbitration, the trial court was correct in confirming
the arbitration award and entering final judgment in favor of Wachovia."
(citing Meade, 423 So. 2d at 908)). And pursuant to section 682.15(1),
"[u]pon granting an order confirming . . . an award, the court shall enter

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a judgment in conformity" with the award. Therefore, if a court enters an
order confirming an arbitration award, it is then required to enter a
judgment in conformity with such award.
      Zahav argues on appeal that the circuit court should have set aside
the arbitrator's award. Section 682.13 sets forth substantive and
procedural requirements that must be met in order to vacate an
arbitration award.
      Among the bases to obtain a vacatur of the award, subsection (1)
demands the following:
      a.   a demonstration that the award was "procured by
      corruption, fraud, or other undue means,"
      b.   a demonstration that the arbitrator was not neutral and
      demonstrated evident partiality, or
      c.   a showing that the "arbitrator exceeded" its permitted
      powers.
      Our supreme court has observed that
      the finality and enforceable nature of an arbitration award is a
      characteristic of arbitration that distinguishes it from other
      forms of alternative dispute resolution. To allow judicial review
      of the merits of an arbitration award for any reasons other
      than those stated in section 682.13(1) would undermine the
      purpose of settling disputes through arbitration.
Visiting Nurse Ass'n of Fla., Inc. v. Jupiter Med. Ctr., Inc., 154 So. 3d
1115, 1135 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Schnurmacher Holding, Inc., 542 So. 2d
at 1329). Consistent with this policy, the supreme court noted, "[W]e
have previously held that section 682.13(1) sets forth the only grounds
upon which an award of an arbitrator may be vacated." Id. at 1134.
Following Visiting Nurse, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in
finding that Zahav failed to establish the existence of any of the factors
identified in section 682.13(1).

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      Both on appeal and before the circuit court, Zahav contends that
this court's opinion in Arvilla Motel, Inc. v. Shriver, 889 So. 2d 887 (Fla.
2d DCA 2004), is binding and controlling. We disagree. Initially, we
observe that Arvilla Motel was a 2005 opinion of this court and predates
by almost a decade the supreme court's opinion in Visiting Nurse. Next,
Arvilla Motel is not a case involving arbitration. Rather, "Shriver sued
Arvilla for specific performance," and "[a]fter a nonjury trial, the court
concluded that Arvilla had either waived or modified the 'time is of the
essence' clause and ordered specific performance of the contract." Id. at
890. Thus, the challenge in Arvilla Motel was to a final judgment entered
after a nonjury trial where the trial court was the finder of fact and not,
as in Visiting Nurse, where the challenge on appeal was a judgment
approving an arbitrator's award. Nowhere in Arvilla Motel is there a
mention or discussion of section 682.13(1). We conclude that Arvilla
Motel is not controlling and does not provide a basis to invalidate the
final judgment approving the arbitrator's award.1

      1 Contracts are permitted to impose limitations on both parties

relating to the recovery of damages. "It is well settled 'that parties to a
contract may agree to limit their respective remedies and that those
remedies need not be the same.' " Redington Grand, LLP v. Level 10
Props., LLC, 22 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (citing Ocean Dunes
of Hutchinson Island Dev. Corp. v. Colangelo, 463 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla.
4th DCA 1985)).
      Accordingly, the relief of specific enforcement of a contract "may be
granted if it is first established that the contract is valid and
enforceable." DiMauro v. Martin, 359 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023)
(quoting Free v. Free, 936 So. 2d 699, 702 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)).
      When evaluating a claim asserting that a contract is void because
the contract is not mutual, it is prudent to recall there is a difference
between mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedy. "Mutuality of
obligation is sometimes confused with mutuality of remedy. Obligation
pertains to the consideration while remedy pertains to the means of
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                               III. Conclusion
      Because the record before us does not contain a valid basis to
vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration award, we conclude that the
circuit court was required to confirm the award and enter a judgment in
conformity with the award. Thus, the arbitration award and the final
judgment are affirmed in all respects.
      Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

enforcement. Mutual obligation is essential, but the means of
enforcement may differ without necessarily affecting the reciprocal
obligations of the parties." Bacon v. Kerr, 139 So. 2d 166, 169 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1962).
      In this appeal, the validity of the parties' contract is not at issue.
Further, paragraph 14 initially required delivery of the property to the
buyer. Additionally, paragraph 15 provides to the buyer a remedy should
there be a breach "if Seller fails or refuses to transfer title to the
Property," and that remedy is to "demand and receive specific
performance of this Purchase Agreement."
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