Court Opinion

ID: 9787387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:33.506972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.523127
License: Public Domain

Judge RULAND
specially concurring.
I concur with the result reached in Parts I and II of the majority opinion. However, I write separately on Part I of the opinion because of my concern that the adoption of § 16-12-102(1), C .R.S.2000, undermines the fundamental concept which prompted the General Assembly to re-create this court in 1970. See Colo. Sess. Laws 1969, ch. 106 at 265; see also Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct 4A (encouraging judges to comment on changes to improve the legal system). That concept was to resolve appeals from final judgments in an effort to end litigation.
Specifically, the court was reconstituted because of the substantial backlog in the supreme court resulting from significantly increased filing of appeals in both civil and criminal cases. See Tanksley v. Warden State Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir.1970)(noting that intermediate court established in Colorado to address the back*641log); Report to the Colorado General Assembly: "Intermediate Court of Appeals for Colorado," Colorado Legislative Council Research Publication No. 138 (Nov.1968). The court's jurisdiction was generally limited by the General Assembly to appeals from final judgments because that was and continues to be a critical need in the judicial system. See Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970)(dis-cussing review in the two appellate courts).
Over time the membership of the court has been increased, as has the court's jurisdiction, to keep pace with the litigation explosion. Indeed, the jurisdiction has now been expanded to include a significant number of administrative and other types of cases where judicial review of a final decision is appropriate. See § 18-4-102, C.R.S8.2000; cf Colo. Sess. Laws 1969, ch. 106 at 265. However, the requirement that a final judgment or final agency order must be entered has been maintained except in a few areas such as the Governmental Immunity Act. See § 24-10-108, C.R.98.2000.
Now the prosecution has been granted the privilege to appeal orders that have no semblance of finality. Section 16-12-102(1), C©.R.S.2000. In this case two felony charges were still pending against defendant when the notice of appeal was filed.
Accordingly, in a court in which the annual filings have been as high has 2647 in one fiscal year, certain of the court's resources must be utilized to decide an issue that has little impact, if any, on the criminal justice system or probably even in this case. See FY 2000 Annual Report of the Colorado Judicial Branch pt. II (Oct. 30, 2000); see also J. Casebolt, Procedures and Policies of the Colorado Court of Appeals, 24 Colo. Law. 2105 (1995). These resources could well be used to address appeals in other areas where the General Assembly has mandated that appeals take priority. See, e.g., Child Welfare Appellate Workgroup, Report to the General Assembly (Jan.1998); see also § 8-43-307, C.R.S.2000 (granting certain priority to appeals in workers' compensation cases).
Conversely, the prosecution has suffered no significant prejudice. The trial court applied the correct legal test in its ruling. The only disagreement is whether the court abused its discretion in the application of that test.
evidence to support those allegations. In addition, the dismissed charges against defendant can be refiled if appropriate and thorough investigation reveals any additional Further, were any significant abuse of the trial court's discretion apparent in its ruling, appellate review could be requested in the supreme court pursuant to CAR. 21. See People v. District Court, 898 P.2d 1058 (Colo.1995)(addressing propriety of review for prosceution under C.A.R. 21 when other appellate remedies are inadequate because of double jeopardy considerations).
The prejudice to defendant is apparent. The delay in resolving the pending charges against him is significant. Indeed, he cannot even demand a trial date within six months under the speedy trial statute while the appeal is pending. See People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo.1997).
Given all of these considerations, one would hope that the General Assembly will reconsider this issue with the goal of eliminating the need and thus the resources required to decide prosecution appeals with such little impact or consequence.