Court Opinion

ID: 9563485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:40:16.467742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:52.462237
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree that the nine motion-to-dismiss appellants fail to state a claim under 42 *478U.S.C. § 1981, for the reasons stated in Part III.A. of the Court’s opinion. Also, in my view, the district court properly entered summary judgment as to Jeff McKinney, for the reasons stated in the second paragraph of Part III.B. of the Court’s opinion.
As for the three remaining summary-judgment plaintiffs, I join the dissenting opinion, which follows more closely Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476-77, 479-80, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 163 L.Ed.2d 1069 (2006); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994); and, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-172, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976). This Court correctly states the law in Green v. Dillard’s, Inc., 483 F.3d 533, 537-40 (8th Cir.2007), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 1120, 169 L.Ed.2d 949 (2008). This Court in Green cites favorably Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 101 (1st Cir.2002), which, in my view, summarizes the controlling principles here:
In a society in which shoplifting and vandalism are rife, merchants have a legitimate interest in observing customers’ movements. So long as watchfulness neither crosses the line into harassment nor impairs a shopper’s ability to make and complete purchases, it is not actionable under section 1981.... In other words, the challenged surveillance must have some negative effect on the shopper’s ability to contract with the store in order to engage the'gears of section 1981.
I believe that, taking all the facts detailed in the other two opinions in the light most favorably to Gregory and the Turners, a reasonable jury could conclude that Dillard’s active surveillance crossed the line into harassment and impaired their ability to make purchases.
As for the claims of Gregory and the Turners under the public accommodations provisions of the Missouri Human Rights Act, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment. See Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 494 F.3d 694, 710-12 (8th Cir.2007) (vacated and rehearing en bane granted); Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Prods., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Mo. banc 1995); cf. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 209.150.2 (visually, aurally, or physically disabled have right to full and equal treatment in “places of public accommodation,” which are examples of “places to which the general public is invited.”)
Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.