Court Opinion

ID: 9774849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:35:29.063891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:16.829031
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
The original opinion in this cause, prepared by Commissioner Davis, is correct.
Probable cause was stated in the affidavit for the search warrant. The majority does not discuss why it holds that such an arrest is based on a false pretext. This is apparently so because there is no evidence to support such a holding. The writer has always been under the impression that the appellate courts should not act as the fact finder instead of the jury or the trial judge. The trial judge had sufficient evidence before him to conclude that the officers had the right to arrest appellant for operating a motor vehicle with defective brake lights. But now a majority of this Court would be the trier of this fact, unseating the trial judge, and hold that the officers are not worthy of belief. The dismissal of the traffic cause does not add or detract anything from the right to arrest. When there is enough evidence to convict for a felony offense, why should the State waste the time and expense in prosecuting one for a misdemeanor traffic offense? The right to arrest is determined from the facts as they exist at the time of the apprehension, not at the time the prosecutors decide to prosecute or dismiss a case. There was sufficient probable cause for the arrest of the appellant and the search of the camper. The officers had been informed by a reliable informer that appellant was selling or attempting to sell obscene films. When they arrested him they saw him tear pages out of a notebook and try to eat them. The pages that he tore out had addresses of arcades, adult movie houses and theaters throughout the State. The information provided by the informer was borne out by this evidence. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, is in point.
In the instant case the informant gave Officer Waggoner a detailed description of appellant as well as his location. Each detail of the tip was corroborated by Officer Waggoner. Thus, this case is controlled by *769Draper v. United States, supra, and the cases that have followed it.1
In United States v. Nieto, 510 F.2d 1118 (5th Cir. 1975), the Fifth Circuit Court wrote:
“. . . Information from a reliable informant that is corroborated by other matters within the participating officer’s knowledge can constitute sufficient probable cause to justify an arrest or search. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); United States v. Summerville, 477 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1973). And this court has also held that ‘probable cause . . . can rest upon the collective knowledge of the police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest,’ when there is ‘some degree of communication between the two.’ Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct. 82, 27 L.Ed.2d 76 (1970).”
An officer testified that appellant was under arrest for a traffic violation and for investigation for possession of obscene literature at the time. Appellant’s counsel stated: “We will agree that he was under arrest for a traffic violation.” Officers further related that appellant had a German Shepherd dog in the camper and that they had to unlock it to take the dog out so they could take it to the dog pound. When the officers opened the camper they could see the films.
From the above it can be seen that the officers had a right to arrest appellant for a traffic violation. When they opened the camper they could see films. They had probable cause even without a warrant to search.
The majority relies upon a case by the Supreme Court of the United States to reverse this conviction. The same majority relied upon Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, to reverse the case of White v. State, 521 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Later the Supreme Court held that Chambers v. Maroney authorized the search, contrary to the holding by the majority of this Court in White.
There is no reason to go further than the Supreme Court of the United States and reverse convictions on the grounds of illegal searches. See the dissenting opinions in the appeal to this Court in White v. State, supra.
The judgment should be affirmed.

. Rangel v. State, 444 S.W.2d 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Almendarez v. State, 460 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Garcia v. State, 459 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Lucky v. State, 471 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Mottu v. State, 472 S.W.2d 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Harris v. State, 486 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Dickhaut v. State, 493 S.W.2d 223 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Jordan v. State, 504 S.W.2d 490 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Houston v. State, 506 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Hull v. State, 510 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Rivas v. State, 506 S.W.2d 233 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Buitron v. State, 519 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Keeble v. State, 506 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).