Court Opinion

ID: 9940572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:11:53.076971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:02.495795
License: Public Domain

J-S44016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: N.T., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.S.                              :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1684 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0001317-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2024

       Appellant A.S., a non-parental caregiver, appeals from the order

determining that Appellant was a perpetrator of child abuse as it relates to

N.T. (Child). Appellant argues that the trial court erred in its determination

and contends that he rebutted the presumption of child abuse. We affirm.

       By way of background, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services

(DHS) filed an application for emergency protective custody on December 24,

2021, and a dependency petition on December 30, 2021. The trial court held

evidentiary hearings on December 6, 2022, and February 21, 2023. On June

2, 2023, the trial court concluded that DHS had met its burden in establishing

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44016-23

that Appellant was a perpetrator of child abuse.1 Specifically, the trial court

determined that Child was under Appellant’s care for a period of time after

November 18, 2021, and made the following findings:

       [Child] suffered an injury that would not normally be sustained
       but for the acts or omissions of the parent or responsible person.
       To rebut the presumption, the parent or responsible person must
       present evidence demonstrating that they did not inflict the abuse,
       potentially by testifying that they gave full responsibility to
       someone else for whom they had no reason to fear of perhaps that
       the injuries were accident rather than abuse.

       The record clearly establishes that in the week leading up to
       [Mother] reporting [Child] having symptoms, [Child] was in the
       care of multiple people, including [Appellant and D.S.], who has
       not been named in this case as a perpetrator and [M]other.

       Mother testified that she lef – that [Child] was left with [D.S.] on
       November 27, 202[1] and with [Appellant] from November 29,
       202[1] through December 3, 202[1].

N.T. Hr’g, 6/2/23, at 12-13.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the mandates

of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court filed

an order adopting its on-the-record findings from the June 2, 2023 hearing.

See Trial Ct. Rule 1925(a) Order, 8/21/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated).2

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1 The trial court also determined that Child’s mother, N.R. (Mother), was a
perpetrator of child abuse. N.T. Hr’g, 6/2/23, at 6. Mother is not a party to
the instant appeal.

2 We emphasize that our standards of review require deference to the trial
court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations and that, generally, this
requires the filing of an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). See In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (noting that “there are
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it entered
       an order finding aggravated circumstances and child abuse as to
       [Appellant] upon insufficient and unconvincing evidence where
       [Appellant] rebutted the presumption that [Appellant] was the
       perpetrator of child abuse?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some formatting altered).3

       In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues that he “rebutted the

presumption that he is the perpetrator of abuse because he did not have

access to [] Child during the period when [] Child was injured.” Id. at 21.

Specifically, Appellant claims that although Dr. Phillip Scribano4 testified that

Child’s injuries occurred sometime before November 27, Child was not in

Appellant’s care until November 29, so “[b]y the time [] Child arrived at

[Appellant’s] home[, Child] was already injured.” Id. Appellant maintains

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clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in
[dependency and termination of parental rights] cases” and acknowledging
that “unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-
specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing
the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous
other hearings regarding the child and parents” (citations omitted)); see also
In re S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021) (emphasizing that “[w]hen
a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive case . . . the appellate court
should not search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court”).

3 Neither DHS nor Child’s guardian ad litem/legal counsel filed appellate briefs

in this matter.

4 Dr. Scribano is the section chief for the Center for Child Protection and Health

at the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, as well as a professor of pediatrics
at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perelman School of Medicine. N.T. Hr’g,
12/6/22, at 9. The trial court accepted Dr. Scribano as an expert. Id. at 8.

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that he has rebutted the evidentiary presumption which established him as

the responsible person who perpetrated child abuse based on the clear,

unequivocal and convincing testimony of Dr. Scribano concerning the time

frame when the injuries to Child were inflicted. Accordingly, Appellant asserts

that “[DHS] has not clearly and convincingly proven its case that [Appellant]

is the perpetrator of child abuse.” Id. at 21.

      In dependency cases, we “accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record” and we

review the determinations for an abuse of discretion. In re L.Z., 111 A.3d

1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted). The trial court may determine that

person is “the perpetrator of child abuse” as part of a dependency

adjudication. Id. at 1176.

      In In re C.B., 264 A.3d 761 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc), an en banc

panel of this Court summarized the applicable law for a finding of child abuse:

      The requisite standard of proof for a finding of child abuse
      pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. §] 6303(b.1) of the [Child Protective
      Services Law (CPSL), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388] is clear and
      convincing evidence. A petitioning party must demonstrate the
      existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing evidence
      standard applicable to most dependency determinations. Clear
      and convincing evidence is evidence that is so clear, direct,
      weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to
      a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise
      facts in issue.

C.B., 264 A.3d at 770 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

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       In the instant case, Appellant does not dispute that Child was the victim

of child abuse as defined by the CPSL.5 See Appellant’s Brief at 15. Rather,

Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to establish that he was

the perpetrator of the abuse.

       In determining whether a parent or caregiver is a perpetrator of child

abuse, the C.B. Court summarized the applicable law:

       As part of a dependency adjudication, a court may find a parent
       or caregiver to be the perpetrator of child abuse as defined by the
       CPSL. Section 6381 of the CPSL, which governs evidence in court
       proceedings, states that in addition to the rules of evidence
       relating to juvenile matters, the rules of evidence in this section
       shall govern in child abuse proceedings in court. Specifically,
       section 6381(d) provides for an attenuated standard of evidence
       in making a legal determination as to the abuser in child abuse
       cases where a child has suffered serious physical injury as would
       ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts
       or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the
       welfare of the child.

                                       *       *   *

       Section 6381(d) of the CPSL . . . establishes a rebuttable,
       evidentiary presumption when a child sustains abuse not
       ordinarily suffered absent acts or omissions of a parent or other
       responsible party. Under such circumstances, the fact of abuse
       suffices to establish prima facie evidence of abuse by the parent
       or person responsible.

       To aid the Juvenile Court in determining whether a child has been
       abused, the Legislature deemed it wise and necessary to establish
       a different evidentiary standard for finding child abuse by a parent
       or person responsible for the child’s care, one in contrast to the
       overall standard for determining dependency under the Act.

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5 The CPSL defines child abuse as, inter alia, “intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly . . . [c]ausing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or
failure to act[.]” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1).

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      This lessened standard of establishing abuse by the caretakers
      under section 6381(d), coupled with the clear and convincing
      evidence necessary to find dependency, has been imposed by the
      Legislature as the standard which the Juvenile Court must apply
      in deciding abuse cases. Prima facie evidence is not the standard
      that establishes the child has been abused, which must be
      established by clear and convincing evidence; it is the standard
      by which the court determines whom the abuser would be in a
      given case. . . .

                                    *    *    *

      Under section 6381(d), a parent or other responsible caregiver
      may rebut the prima facie presumption with evidence:

            demonstrating that the parent or responsible person did not
            inflict the abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave
            responsibility for the child to another person about whom
            they had no reason to fear or perhaps that the injuries were
            accidental rather than abusive. The evaluation of the
            validity of the presumption would then rest with the trial
            court evaluating the credibility of the prima facie evidence
            presented by DHS and the rebuttal of the parent or
            responsible person.

                                    *    *    *

      Under section 6381 of the CPSL, a petitioning party is not required
      to establish that the parent or caregiver perpetrated the abuse
      intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. Rather, in section 6381
      cases, the fact of abuse suffices to establish prima facie evidence
      of abuse by the parent or person responsible, permitting
      petitioners to prove their case with only the physical evidence of
      injuries that would not ordinarily be sustained but for the action
      or inaction of the parents or responsible persons and the
      implausible statements of the parents and responsible persons.

C.B., 264 A.3d at 770-73 (citations and footnote omitted and formatting

altered).

      In the instant case, the trial court reached the following conclusion:

      [Appellant] has not rebutted the presumption of abuse because
      he failed to present any evidence to do so. [Appellant], as counsel

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       correctly pointed out, was not required to testify, but he needed
       to rely on evidence to rebut the testimony. In doing so, he relies
       upon Dr. Scribano’s testimony to rebut the presumption.

       [The trial court] finds that Dr. Scribano’s testimony does not rebut
       the presumption.

                                       *       *   *

       Dr. Scribano did not give clear and convincing testimony as to the
       time frame of [Child’s] injuries. And what’s clear is that it could
       have happened in the several weeks leading up to when [Child]
       started presenting with symptoms.

       What the documentation and the evidence in this case established
       is that in the weeks leading up to [Child] first presenting with
       symptoms, [Child] was both in the care of [Appellant], because
       the testimony was clear, that on November 18th of 2021, [Child]
       was with [Appellant].

       In fact, [Child] fell off a couch at that point in time, and the
       testimony as reported by [Sharron Burke6] is that [Appellant]
       indicated he had [Child] for a few days after that incident of
       November 18, 202[1], and that it is unclear based on the evidence
       that came through, from Dr. Scribano when this injury occurred.

       Therefore, without any testimony by [Appellant] himself to explain
       what happened when [Child] was in his possession, his reliance
       simply on the doctor’s testimony and that of Ms. [Burke] and on
       this time line does not rebut the presumption, as there is not clear
       and convincing evidence as to when the injuries were sustained,
       but is clearly established that [Child] in the weeks leading up to
       the injuries that were reported was in the care of three different
       people, and for these reasons, I find that the child abuse exists in
       this case under this presumption as to [M]other and [Appellant].

N.T. Hr’g, 6/2/22, at 14-15, 17-19.

       Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174. As noted by the trial court, there

____________________________________________

6 Ms. Burke is an intake social worker for DHS.        N.T. Hr’g, 2/21/23, at 5.

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was no evidence to rebut the presumption that Appellant was the perpetrator

of abuse.

       At the hearing, Dr. Scribano testified that Mother notified Child’s primary

care provider of a “change in [Child’s] behavior[,]” including a decrease in

feeding, decrease in alertness, and decrease in activity on November 27,

2021. N.T. Hr’g, 12/6/22, at 27-28.7 However, Dr. Scribano stated that due

to the nature of Child’s injuries, there is no “precise science” to determining

the age of the injuries and exactly when the injuries occurred. Id. at 65. On

this record, it is clear, based on witness testimony that Child was in Appellant’s

care on November 18, before the onset of Child’s symptoms on November

27, as well as November 29, and December 1-3, after her symptoms became

evident.    See N.T. Hr’g, 12/6/22, at 17-18, 29, 36 (reflecting Ms. Burke’s

testimony that Mother left Child with Appellant on November 18, 2021, and

that although Child fell off a couch at Appellant’s house and bumped her head,

Mother reported that Child was “okay” after that incident).8

       Although Appellant contacted Mother to report that Child was defecating

excessively on November 29, 2021,9 there is no indication that Appellant

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7 Dr. Scribano further testified that the November 27, 2021 onset of symptoms

is based on the assumption of accurate reporting by Mother. See id. at 66.

8 Ms. Burke testified that Appellant told her that he promptly notified Mother

of the incident and sent video of Child taken after the incident in which Child
was actively playing and laughing. See id. at 36.

9 See id. at 26-27, 30.

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sought medical care for Child on that date or after Child returned to his care

on December 1, 2021.

      For these reasons, we conclude that the there is sufficient competent

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions that Appellant failed to rebut

the Section 6381(d) presumption. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it determined that Appellant was the perpetrator of child

abuse. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s order.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 2/14/2024

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