Court Opinion

ID: 2963847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:16:08.291023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:47.211944
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 94-1261

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                               PILAR BELARDO-QUI ONES,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                                 and Watson,* Judge.
                                              _____

                                _____________________

               Rafael F. Castro-Lang for appellant.
               _____________________
               Jos   A.  Quiles-Espinosa, Senior  Litigation  Counsel, with
               _________________________
          whom  Guillermo Gil,  Acting United  States Attorney,  and Nelson
                _____________                                        ______
          P rez-Sosa, Assistant  United States Attorney, were  on brief for
          __________
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  December 13, 1995
                                 ____________________
                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the United States  Court of International Trade, sitting by
          designation.

                    WATSON,  Senior Judge.   Appellant  has challenged  his
                    WATSON   Senior Judge
                             ____________

          conviction for conspiracy to import  marijuana in violation of 21

          USC     592 and 963.  Appellant claims  that it was error for the

          trial court to deny a motion for a bill of particulars, to deny a

          mistrial after prejudicial testimony, to allow hearsay  testimony

          linking a  telephone number used in the conspiracy to appellant's

          fish  market, to  deny  his Rule  29  motion for  acquittal,  and

          finally,  to increase his sentencing Guideline level for having a

          managerial  role  in  the  crime.   For  the  following  reasons,

          Appellant's claims are found to be without merit.

          Denial of the Bill of Particulars
          Denial of the Bill of Particulars

                    Appellant  was named  in Count  One of  the Indictment.

          That  count described a conspiracy that began on or about October

          26, 1991 with the object of importing marijuana from Colombia and

          ended  on November 6, 1991  when the conspirators  found out that

          the  boat for  which they had  been searching had  been seized by

          Venezuelan authorities.   Appellant was described  as joining the

          conspiracy on November  2, 1991, when,  in a meeting at  his fish

          store, he agreed  to supply the boat and crew  needed to meet the

          Colombian  boat at a point ten to  fifteen miles off the coast of

          St. Croix, U.S.  Virgin Islands.  Count I  of the indictment ends

          with an allegation that  one of the conspirators made  some calls

          on November 6, 1991, after which he announced  to the others that

          the  boat had  been seized  by Venezuelan  authorities.   He then

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          called St. Croix to have the others return to Puerto Rico.

                    Appellant  claims that  it was  error for  the District

          Court  to deny his  bill of  particulars asking  for the  date on

          which   the  Colombian   boat  was   seized  by   the  Venezuelan

          authorities.  According to  Appellant that information would have

          allowed him  to present a  defense that,  for him,  the crime  of

          conspiracy to  import marijuana had become  impossible to achieve

          because the boat was seized prior  to November 2, 1991, before he

          was alleged to have met with the other conspirators. 

                    According to Appellant,  the anticipated delivery  date

          of November 4th means that the boat had to leave Colombia four to

          five days  earlier,  in  which  case its  seizure  by  Venezuelan

          authorities had  to take  place before appellant's  first contact

          with the other conspirators at 5:00 P.M. on November 2d.

                    The government has defended  the denial of the bill  of

          particulars  on   the  grounds   that  the   indictment  provided

          sufficient  information, that  the  government did  not have  the

          seizure  information,  that it  provided  full  discovery in  any

          event, and  that if the  seizure did  indeed take place  prior to

          November 2d,  the conspirators would  most likely have  found out

          about  it quickly and would  not have continued  their efforts to

          meet the Colombian boat. The government suggests that the seizure

          took place  after  the rendezvous  failed.   The government  also

          asserts that the defendant  was not prejudiced by the lack of the

          information. 

                    To begin with, the  denial of a bill of  particulars is

                                         -3-

          reversible error only  if it is a clear  abuse of discretion that

          causes  actual prejudice  to  a  defendant's substantial  rights.

          United States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d  36, 40 (1st Cir. 1991).  This
          _____________    _______

          indictment  contained  more  than  enough  information  to  allow

          defendant to prepare his defense.  In fact, it is prolix compared

          to the indictment under discussion in United States v. Paiva, 892
                                                _____________    _____

          F.2d 148  (1st Cir. 1989), which did not contain any precise time

          period for  the conspiracy and did  not even specify the  date on

          which the defendant joined it.  Nevertheless this Court held that

          the temporal  specifications of  "early  1983" and  "the fall  of

          1983"  were sufficient  to  allow the  preparation  of a  defense

          without a bill of  particulars.  A fortiori the  temporal details
                                           __________

          in  this indictment  were sufficient  to allow  the  defendant to

          present  a defense that the  conspiracy had ended  before he came

          into  the picture.   It  is noteworthy that  the record  shows no

          attempt  by defendant  to pursue  alternative means  of obtaining

          information about the date of the boat seizure. 

                    Even  if we  go  past the  correctness  of denying  the

          elaboration  of   an  adequate  indictment,   there  is   another

          insurmountable obstacle to the  request for information about the

          date of seizure.

                    Denial of this bill  of particulars as to the  time and

          location  of  the  seizure could  not  possibly  be  an abuse  of

          discretion  because it could not be the  basis of a legal defense

          to the  charge of  conspiracy.   It  has been  held  that "...  a

          culpable  conspiracy  may  exist  even  though,  because  of  the

                                         -4-

          misapprehension  of the  conspirators  as to  certain facts,  the

          substantive  crime which is the  object of the  conspiracy may be

          impossible  to commit." United States v. Waldron, 590 F.2d 33, 34
                                  _____________    _______

          (1st Cir. 1979).  In that case the conspirators thought that they

          were  working to import and  sell valuable stolen  paintings.  In

          reality, the only painting they delivered to Boston was a forgery

          worth  less than  the $5000  minimum of  the provision  making it

          unlawful to knowingly sell stolen goods.

                    Appellant's   argument  resembles   the  one   made  by

          appellants in United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120 (1st Cir. 1987)
                        _____________    ____

          that  because the  persons who  were to  import the  cocaine were

          agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] the importation could

          never  actually  occur.   The  court  rejected  "...  the  faulty

          assumption that  an expressed conspiratorial objective is negated

          by  its factual impossibility."  818 F.2d at 126.  Here appellant

          joined  in  a  conspiracy  and  performed an  essential  role  in

          obtaining  a boat and crew needed  to accomplish the crime.  Even

          if intervening events had made the accomplishment of the criminal

          purpose impossible all the elements of a criminal conspiracy were

          present.   There  is no  basis for  making a  distinction between

          those  who  start  a  conspiracy  that  is  impossible  from  the

          beginning  and  one who  joins in  a  conspiracy that  has become

          impossible due to intervening events unknown to the conspirators.

                    Appellant  has  cited three  cases for  the proposition

          that  a  conspiracy ends  when  its purpose  is  thwarted, United
                                                                     ______

          States v.  Roshko, 969 F.2d 1, 8 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
          ______     ______                                _____________

                                         -5-

          Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1989); and Krulewitch v.  United
          _______                                     __________     ______

          States, 336 U.S. 440,  443-44 (1949).  This proposition  can only
          ______

          be true if the conduct of the conspirators  is no longer directed

          towards accomplishment of the  goal of the conspiracy, impossible

          or not.   In the cases cited  by appellant it  was held that  the

          conspiracy  had ended either because its goal had been reached or

          because the conspirators had given up.  There was no continuation

          of acts designed to further the conspiracy.

                    In United States  v. Roshko,   969 F.2d 1,  8 (2d  Cir.
                       _____________     ______

          1992), appellant's conspiracy was held to have ended successfully

          when he obtained a  green card by means of  a sham marriage to  a

          first  "wife."  The government, seeking  to justify indicting him

          after the five year statute of limitations had run on that crime,

          had argued that the conspiracy continued through the later points

          in  time when  he divorced  that first  wife and  married another

          woman.  The court held that it was the obtaining of  a green card

          that  was  the  object  of  the  conspiracy  and  the  conspiracy

          terminated when that was accomplished.

                    In  United States v. Serrano,  870 F.2d 1,  8 (1st Cir.
                        _____________    _______

          1989)  and Krulewitch  v.  United States,  336  U.S. 440,  443-44
                     __________      _____________

          (1949) the  issue of  the duration of  a conspiracy arose  in the

          context  of whether  statements  should have  been admitted  into

          evidence against defendants under  the coconspirator exception to

          the  hearsay   rule.    The  statements  in  question  were  held

          inadmissible because they  were made long  after the collapse  of

          the conspiracy  in the case of  Serrano and after the  end of the
                                          _______

                                         -6-

          conspiracy, successful or not, in Krulewitch. 
                                            __________

                    It  is  apparent that  these  cases  do not  support  a

          proposition that conspiracies  end because of impossibility  when

          the conspirators  are continuing to actively  pursue the original

          criminal goal.

          Denial of the Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal
          Denial of the Rule 29 Motion for Acquittal

                    At trial the defendant's argument  in favor of his Rule

          29  motion  was  that the  evidence,  viewed  in  the light  most

          favorable  to the  government, showed  only that  he was  doing a

          favor for friends and  lacked criminal intent.  The  record makes

          it plain that there  was more than enough  evidence from which  a

          rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

          that  the  Appellant  was  engaged  in  a  conspiracy  to  import

          marijuana and had the active role  of supplying the boat and crew

          needed to import the marijuana.  Having asserted specific grounds

          for that motion, other grounds such as the impossibility argument

          discussed above cannot be raised on appeal.  See United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1357 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,  115 S.
          _____                                       _____ ______

          Ct. 1188 (1994).  In any event, that line of argument would be to

          no avail in light of the conclusion reached above that an unknown

          impossibility does not end a conspiracy. 

          Denial of a mistrial for prejudicial testimony
          Denial of a mistrial for prejudicial testimony

                                         -7-

                    During  cross  examination  about  his  past  crimes  a

          prosecution witness,  Sergio Monteagudo, was asked  where a prior

          drug  crime had  occurred.   He replied  "Your client  can recall

          because  I gave him 1,000 dollars at that time."  Defendant moved

          for a  mistrial.  The court denied the motion and gave a curative

          instruction to the jury. 

                    This  was  certainly an  inappropriate  and potentially

          prejudicial answer.  However, within the context of the events at

          the trial  it was not likely to  affect the outcome and interfere

          with the jury's ability to make an impartial determination of the

          facts.  The factors leading to this  conclusion are those set out

          in United States v.  Manning, 23 F.3d  570, 574 (1st Cir.  1994),
             _____________     _______

          the severity of  the cause, the  surrounding context, the  likely

          effect  of  a  curative  instruction,  and  the strength  of  the

          evidence against the defendant.   In this case all  these factors

          militated  against  a  mistrial.   Although  the  summary of  the

          offensive  testimony above gives it a certain clarity, it was not

          as clear in the actual  sequence of testimony.  There  it appears

          that counsel for defendant  was probing about a drug  crime prior

          to the one  on trial and could not  elicit an exact date  for it.

          Then  he  asked  "where  did  this  happen?"  and   the  response

          implicating his client  was given.   Although the implication  is

          that the payment to  defendant was connected to that  prior crime

          it  is   not  a  clear  or  graphic  description  of  defendant's

          involvement. 

                    In any event, the trial judge immediately gave the jury

                                         -8-

          a thorough and forceful curative instruction.  There is no reason

          to believe that  this episode interfered with  the jury's ability

          to  reach an impartial verdict.  When this is considered together

          with the strong evidence of appellant's guilt developed elsewhere

          at  trial it  is plain  that the  trial judge  did not  abuse her

          discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

          Admission  of hearsay  testimony as  to  location of  a telephone
          Admission  of hearsay  testimony as  to  location of  a telephone

          number
          number

                    The  government wanted to  connect Appellant, the owner

          of  El  Relincho  fish  market,  to  telephone  calls  made  from

          telephone  number 863-3318 in Fajardo,  Puerto Rico, to the hotel

          in  St. Croix that  was being used  by the  conspirators who were

          searching for the Colombian  boat.  To that end  Jos  A. Morales,

          the  DEA case  agent  for  this case  was  asked  whether he  had

          determined the  number of El  Relincho fish market.   He gave the

          number 863-3318.  Later, on cross examination, it was brought out

          that  in the telephone company records that number is listed only

          as being  invoiced to a Julia Amparo  G mez at a General Delivery

          address in Puerto Rural, Puerto Rico.  On redirect examination no

          connection was made between  that person and the Appellant  or El

          Relincho fish  market.   Over  a hearsay  objection, Morales  was

          allowed to testify that on two occasions he had called the number

          in question and had been told by  a person on the other end  that

          he had reached El Relincho fish market. 

                                         -9-

                    The  linking of  the telephone  number in  question and

          Appellant's fish market was  first made in testimony to  which no

          objection  was made.   The  admission of  that testimony  was not

          plain  error.  The later  testimony, based on  what the agent was

          told  when he dialed  that number,  was inadmissible  hearsay and

          should not have been allowed in evidence.  The  admission of that

          testimony  was  harmless  error.   In  neither  instance was  the

          evidence concerning  the telephone  number important in  light of

          the abundance  of other  evidence linking  the Appellant  and his

          fishmarket to  the activity  of the conspiracy.   This is  not an

          instance where the  error would cause a  "miscarriage of justice"

          or  cause the  "fundamental  fairness or  basic integrity  of the

          proceedings" to be skewed  in a major respect.  See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1995).
             ______

          Imposition of an increase in Sentencing Guideline level
          Imposition of an increase in Sentencing Guideline level

                    Appellant argues that he came  into the conspiracy at a

          late stage and did not have a true managerial role.  Accordingly,

          he asserts  that it was error for the sentencing Judge to make an

          upward  adjustment of 3 points in his guideline level.  Appellant

          argues that he should have received a  2 point decrease for being

          a minor participant in the conspiracy.

                    This  contention has no merit.  There is no clear error

          in  the   sentencing  judge's  imposition  of   an  increase  for

          managerial   participation.    The   recruiting,  supplying,  and

                                         -10-

          instructing of those who  are to perform an essential  mission of

          picking up marijuana at sea  plainly indicates a managerial role.

          It  has been held that "'[e]fforts  to marshall other individuals

          for the purpose of executing the crime' are enough to demonstrate

          sufficient control  over  a participant  for  the purposes  of   

          3B1.1."   United  States  v. Sax,  39 F.3d  1380 (7th  Cir. 1994)
                    ______________     ___

          (quoting  United  States v.  Carson, 9  F.3d  576, 585  (7th Cir.
                    ______________     ______

          1993).   Accordingly,  it was  not  erroneous for  the sentencing

          judge to make  an upward adjustment of 3 points  under   3B1.1 of

          the Sentencing  Guidelines. See United States v.  Vargas, 16 F.3d
                                          _____________     ______

          155, 160 (7th Cir. 1994).

                    Affirmed.
                    ________

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