Court Opinion

ID: 9847280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:04.446832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:05.538755
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority fails to cite convincing caselaw or policy justifications to support its holding that a misdemeanant’s federal speedy trial rights attach upon the filing of a complaint even though no arrest has yet occurred. The United States Supreme Court has never extended speedy trial rights to prearrest delays and our own court has held that the filing of a criminal complaint does not trigger the federal speedy trial guarantee. (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203].) The majority’s attempt to distinguish Hannon is unsuccessful and its attempt to link the filing of a misdemeanor complaint with the policies underlying the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment are either misguided or based on unsupported speculation.
*271The Sixth Amendment states that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) Our task therefore is to decide when a misdemeanor suspect becomes an “accused” for purposes of the speedy trial clause. In a passage applicable to the present case, the United States Supreme Court explained the interests protected by the speedy trial provision: “The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is . . . not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time; that interest is protected primarily by the Due Process Clause and by statutes of limitations. The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” (United States v. MacDonald (1982) 456 U.S. 1, 8 [71 L.Ed.2d 696, 704, 102 S.Ct. 1497].)
MacDonald establishes that not all criminal accusations automatically trigger the protections of the speedy trial provision. The only ones so affected are those that present a realistic possibility of (1) pretrial incarceration, (2) anxiety to the accused, or (3) public scorn arising from widespread knowledge of the charges. All three interests are clearly implicated if a suspect is arrested and charged with a felony or a misdemeanor. Therefore, arrest of a suspect, providing he is subsequently charged, will always trigger the federal speedy trial provision. But the high court has never extended speedy trial rights to an accused before that court prior to his arrest,1 and United States v. Marion, supra, 404 U.S. 307, 320-322 [30 L.Ed.2d 468, 478-480], indicates that the court is not convinced that speedy trial rights should ever attach before a suspect is arrested.
In Marion the court stated, “[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. [¶] Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the period prior to arrest. Until this event occurs, a citizen suffers no restraints on his liberty *272and is not the subject of public accusation: his situation does not compare with that of a defendant who had been arrested and held to answer. Passage of time, whether before or after arrest, may impair memories, cause evidence to be lost, deprive the defendant of witnesses, and otherwise interfere with his ability to defend himself. But this possibility of prejudice at trial is not itself sufficient reason to wrench the Sixth Amendment from its proper context.” (Id., at pp. 320-322, italics added, fns. omitted.)2
Moore v. Arizona, supra, 414 U.S. 25, 27 [38 L.Ed.2d 183, 186], similarly implies that prearrest delays may be outside the purview of the federal speedy trial guarantee. There, the court reiterated the disabilities caused by “[i]nordinate delay”3 and observed that “ ‘they are inevitably present in every case to some extent, for every defendant will either be incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject to substantial restrictions on his liberty. ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid., italics added; see also Barker v. Wingo, supra, 407 U.S. 514, 532-533 and fn. 33 [33 L.Ed.2d 101, 118-119].)
Although the court in Marion concluded that the speedy trial rights of the defendants in that case attached upon their indictment {Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 313 [30 L.Ed.2d at p. 474]), the defendants were apparently indicted and arrested on the same day. Furthermore, Marion’s holding cannot be read in isolation from the court’s clear refusal to extend speedy trial rights to the prearrest period. Even, assuming arguendo, that issuance of an indictment prior to arrest may trigger the federal speedy trial provision,4 the majority is unjustified in extending speedy trial rights to a suspect upon the date a complaint is filed. An indictment, of course, follows a determination by a neutral factfinder (i.e., a grand jury) that there is probable cause *273to believe a suspect has committed a crime.5 A complaint, on the other hand, may be filed merely on the information and belief of an interested party (e.g., a policeman or the district attorney). Given the different origins of these two kinds of pleading, as well as the disparity in the severity of the crimes involved, it is evident that the typical grand jury indictment will normally have a greater impact on the accused and the public than the filing of the typical misdemeanor complaint.
Indeed, we recognized the difference between a complaint and an indictment for speedy trial purposes in our decision in People v. Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d 588, when we revised our interpretation of the Sixth Amendment originally stated in Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 734 [91 Cal.Rptr. 578, 478 P.2d 10]. In Jones, without distinguishing between misdemeanors and felonies, we held that a suspect’s federal and state speedy trial rights attach upon the “filing of a complaint or other charge.” (Jones, at p. 739.) However, seven years later, in Hannon, we reinterpreted the federal speedy trial clause, stating, “In contrast to the conclusion we reached in Jones, . . . the language used by the Supreme Court in delineating the scope of protection afforded by the federal charter was more limited than that which we adopted in Jones: ‘[I]t is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. ’ ([Citing Marion, supra, 404 U.S.] at p. 320, italics added.) Insofar as the filing of an indictment or information is concerned the Supreme Court’s holding is coextensive with our decision in Jones .... On the other hand, ... we conclude that the Supreme Court intended by its use of the foregoing phrase to hold that the filing of a complaint is by itself insufficient to trigger the protection of the right to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution.” (Hannon, supra, at pp. 605-606, italics in original.)
That we made no distinction between felony and misdemeanor complaints in our Hannon analysis is evidenced by our later remark that the “United States Supreme Court has apparently concluded that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to a speedy trial does not extend to the prearrest stage when the sole accusation against an individual consists of the filing of a criminal complaint.” (Id., at p. 608, italics added.) A misdemeanor complaint is equally a criminal complaint.
*274The majority nonetheless attempts to confine Hannon’’s holding to felony complaints.6 It notes that felony complaints are not “accusatory pleadings”; they only give a magistrate jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary hearing to determine if there is probable cause to bind a defendant over for trial. A misdemeanor complaint, on the other hand, gives a municipal court judge jurisdiction to try the case. Granting this jurisdictional distinction between felony and misdemeanor complaints, the majority fails to show how it is relevant to the policies underlying the speedy trial clause. The weakness of the majority’s approach is demonstrated by its reliance on State v. Gee (1984) 298 Md. 565 [471 A.2d 712],
In Gee, the Maryland Supreme Court relied on Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689 [32 L.Ed.2d 411, 92 S.Ct. 1877], to determine when a suspect’s speedy trial rights attach. (See Gee, supra, 471 A.2d at pp. 715-716.) Kirby, however, analyzed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and has no bearing on when the right to speedy trial attaches. The United States Supreme Court made this distinction abundantly clear only last term when it reversed the Ninth Circuit for using speedy trial analysis to determine when the right to counsel attaches. (United States v. Gouveia (1984) 467 U.S. 180, 190 [81 L.Ed.2d 146, 155, 104 S.Ct. 2292].) The high court expressly declared that the speedy trial guarantee need not attach at the same time as the right to counsel, because they “protect different interests.” (Ibid.)
Apparently the majority believes a suspect is “accused” to a greater extent upon the filing of a misdemeanor complaint because of its jurisdictional function. But to define an “accused” for speedy trial purposes, one must look to the interests protected by that right. For example, courts have held that issuance of a sealed indictment cannot invoke the speedy trial rights of the person indicted. (United States v. Watson (2d Cir. 1979) 599 F.2d 1149; United States v. Hay (10th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 990.) As stated in Watson, “Because neither the indicted defendant nor the public has notice of the charges, such an indictment does not bring about ‘the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee’ [citation], namely, public obloquy and anxiety to the accused.” (599 F.2d 1149, 1156, fn. 5.) In a similar vein, I fail to see why delays following a misdemeanor complaint filing would cause any greater cognizable harm than delays following a felony complaint filing.
In summary, the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions not only do not support the majority’s holding, but our own decision in People v. *275Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d 588, directly contradicts it. Furthermore, neither the majority’s research nor my own discloses any case after Marion, supra, 404 U.S. 307, that invokes a defendant’s federal speedy trial rights upon the filing of a complaint prior to arrest, information, or indictment. (See ante, p. 256.)7
In addition to the lack of supporting case authority, the majority also fails to link successfully its result with the interests protected by the speedy trial provision. The majority first notes that a delay such as occurred in the present case will likely cause witnesses to disappear, memories to fade, and evidence to vanish. (Ante, p. 251.) It bears emphasis here that these consequences will inevitably result from any long delay, including a precomplaint delay, and they are as likely to benefit defendant as to prejudice him. Perhaps for this reason, the United States Supreme Court has clearly held that such consequences are a concern of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendment. (MacDonald, supra, 456 U.S. at p. 8.) To state a due process claim, a defendant must prove actual prejudice, which the majority concedes defendant has been unable to do in the present case.
Next, the majority speculates that a delay following the filing of a misdemeanor complaint may disrupt the accused’s life “by affecting his credit rating, job applications, admission to schools and other activities in which background checks are routine.” (Ante, p. 261.) Other than observing that misdemeanor complaint filings may be published, the majority does not indicate how widespread public knowledge may come about. One would suppose that, absent arrest, the typical misdemeanor complaint filing, of which thousands throughout the state occur daily, would be a rather unnewsworthy event.8 Furthermore, although some employers and schools may routinely check misdemeanor filings, the majority provides no estimate of how prevalent this practice may be. Most significantly, the majority fails to explain why this parade of horribles follows from the filing of a misdemeanor complaint, but not a felony complaint.9
*276In conclusion, the majority’s position is unsupported by the relevant caselaw, and its invocation of the interests protected by the federal speedy trial right rests only on surmise. I remain unconvinced there is any federal constitutional basis for extending speedy trial rights to the “prearrest stage when the sole accusation against an individual consists of the filing of a criminal complaint.” (Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 608.)
I would deny the peremptory writ.
Kaus, J.,* concurred.
The application of petitioner and the petition of real party in interest for a rehearing were denied December 19, 1985, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Lucas, J., was of the opinion that the petition of real party in interest should be granted.

See, for example, United States v. MacDonald, supra, 456 U.S. 1, United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783 [52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct. 2044], Moore v. Arizona (1973) 414 U.S. 25 [38 L.Ed.2d 183, 94 S.Ct. 188], Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 [33 L.Ed.2d 101, 92 S.Ct. 2182], and United States v. Marion (1972) 404 U.S. 307 [30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455]. Even the dissenting opinions of the high court have argued for applying speedy trial protection for prearrest delays only when the suspect is aware of the investigation, a situation that does not exist in the present case. (See, e.g., MacDonald, supra, at pp. 12-21 [71 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-712] [dis. opn. by Marshall, J.]; Lovasco, supra, at pp. 797-800 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 763-765] [dis. opn. by Stevens, J.].)

There is other evidence in Marion that the court considered only postarrest delays as relevant to speedy trial claims. As an example of a legislative interpretation of the speedy trial right, the court cited Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 48(b) (28 U.S.C.) which “authorizes dismissal of an indictment, information, or complaint ‘[i]f there is unnecessary delay ... in bringing a defendant to trial . . . .’ The rule clearly is limited to post-arrest situations.” (Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 319 [30 L.Ed.2d at p. 478], italics added.) This is the only passage in Marion that specifically mentions a complaint.

The court commented that delay following arrest, “ ‘wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may “seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and . . . may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).’” (414 U.S. at p. 27 [38 L.Ed.2d at p. 186].)

Several federal appellate courts have held that speedy trial rights are triggered by indictment, information, or arrest, whichever occurs first. (See, e.g., United States v. Milhim (5th Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 522, 525; United States v. Gonzales (11th Cir. 1982) 671 F.2d 441, 444, cert. den. Gonzales-Hernandez v. United States, 456 U.S. 994 [73 L.Ed.2d 1291, 102 S.Ct. 2279]; United States v. Cordova (9th Cir. 1976) 537 F.2d 1073, 1075, cert. den. 528 U.S. 960 [50 L.Ed.2d 327, 97 S.Ct. 385].) The United States Supreme Court, however, has never so held.

An information also follows a probable cause determination by a neutral factfinder (i.e., a magistrate), but this can only occur after the suspect has been arrested or concedes jurisdiction. (Pen. Code, § 738.)

Interestingly, the majority cites Jones, supra, as applicable to misdemeanors. (Ante, p. 248.) Yet, it insists that Hannon, which expressly reinterpreted Jones, applies only to felonies.

Although three of the cases cited do specifically mention a complaint as triggering the federal speedy trial guarantee, they do so only in dicta and without analysis. When read in context, the cases support only the proposition that the federal guarantee does not extend to delays prior to arrest, indictment, or information. (See People v. Velasquez (Colo. 1982) 641 P.2d 943; Commonwealth v. Conant (1981) 12 Mass.App. 287 [423 N.E.2d 1035]; People v. Nichols (1978) 60 Ill.App.3d 919 [18 Ill.Dec. 330, 377 N.E.2d 815].)

According to the 1985 Annual Report of the Judicial Council of California, table A-30, at page 215, there were 717,974 nontraffic misdemeanor and infraction filings in California in the fiscal year 1983-1984. The total excludes felonies reduced to misdemeanors.

One might argue that it is unfair to postpone possible punishment for years while the suspect leads a blameless life. First, argument ignores the possibility that the suspect might be more than happy to postpone punishment. Second, the defendant in the present case was arrested after he passed out from an overindulgence of PCP; we are not presented with the hypothetical defendant who shows no need for rehabilitation.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.