Court Opinion

ID: 9747997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:47:28.938116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:30.197317
License: Public Domain

CAPERTON, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. In reviewing the facts sub judice, it is apparent that the “tip” lacked the requisite predictive components to be controlled by Collins. However, at the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth argued that this tip was instead from an “identifiable informant,” or a “citizen informant,” and as such is controlled by Commonwealth v. Kelly, 180 S.W.3d 474 (Ky.2005), rather than an anonymous tipster case.6 Whether controlled by Kelly or *451based on the reasoning set forth in J.L., Sierra-Hemandez,7 Brown,8 and Brigno-ni-Ponce,9 infra, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
In Kelly, two callers who identified themselves as Waffle House employees, stated that a recent patron who appeared to be intoxicated was about to drive away. The individuals identified the location of the restaurant and described the suspect and his vehicle. When the officer arrived at the restaurant, two people whom the officer assumed were the employees who telephoned in the tip, were standing outside and pointing across the street to a car that matched the description given on the phone. The officer followed the car to a nearby hotel parking lot and performed a Terry stop. Kelly, 180 S.W.3d at 476. The Supreme Court concluded that because the tip came from a citizen informant as opposed to an anonymous tipster, the tip carried sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop. Id. at 477-79.
As noted in Kelly, citizen informants are tipsters who have face-to-face contact with the police or whose identity may be readily ascertained. Id. at 478. Tips from citizen informants “are generally competent to support a finding of reasonable suspicion (and in. some cases, probable cause) whereas the same tip from a truly anonymous source would likely not have supported such a finding.” Id. “What distinguishes a ‘citizen informant’ tip from other types of tips is the fact that such tipsters are almost always bystanders or eyewitness-victims of alleged criminal activity.” Id.
In determining that the tip was a citizen informant tip rather than an anonymous tip, in Kelly our Supreme Court stated that:
We find that the setting and circumstances of this case do not support a conclusion that the tip was truly “anonymous.” While the tipsters did not give their names, they (1) identified themselves as employees of the Waffle House restaurant; and (2) provided the location of the particular restaurant where they worked. This information alone raises a strong presumption that these informants could likely be located in the event that their tip was determined to be false or made for the purpose of harassment. However, in addition to the identifying information given , over the telephone, Officer Hastings reasonably believed that he had face-to-face contact with the actual tipsters when he pulled into the parking lot of the restaurant and observed two people (1) waiting outside for him; and (2) pointing toward a vehicle that had the same description as the one provided in the dispatch broadcast.... When all these facts are considered in their totality (including and especially the pre-detention investigation which verified most of the information given by the tipsters), it is clear to us that this tip was generated from identifiable informants as opposed to anonymous informants.
Id. at 477 (emphasis supplied).
Further, in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 1379, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered the question of whether an *452anonymous tip could, in and of itself, justify an investigatory stop. The Court decided it could not and stated:
If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain under the above-cited decisions that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams [Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)] and White [Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) ], the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 273,120 S.Ct. at 1380.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court in J.L. gave guidance as to the strictures imposed by the Fourth Amendment in other situations by stating that:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.
Id. at 273, 274, 120 S.Ct. at 1380. The obvious import of J.L. is to say that a truly anonymous tip is insufficient for guns and narcotics but, to the contrary, may justify an investigatory stop and frisk where general safety-of the public is concerned.
The requirements for verification of an anonymous tip as grounds for an investigatory stop appear less strict under the Fourth Amendment than those grounds necessary for a search. As stated in United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir.1978):
A greater showing of the reliability of an informant’s statement is necessary to support probable cause for a search than is needed to support the reasonable, or founded, suspicion which is a prerequisite for a valid stop. Compare Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), And Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) (probable cause for search), With United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), and United States v. Avalos-Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 974, 98 S.Ct. 532, 54 L.Ed.2d 466 (1977) (founded suspicion for stop). Although it is not certain how much less demanding the test of reliability is where only reasonable suspicion is required, the Supreme Court has said that “(s)ome tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147, 92 S.Ct. at 1924.
In the case sub judice, the officer verified the information given including location, description of the vehicle and occupants, and the license plate number. The officer arrived on scene and discovered exactly what the tipster said would be found. Moreover, the tipster further exhibited a basis of current knowledge when he reported that the Appellants’ car had almost hit another vehicle and that the tipster circled the gas pumps at the request of the 911 dispatcher to procure the license plate number of Appellants’ vehicle.10 Of pivotal importance were the ac*453tions of a man at the scene upon- the officer’s arrival. Upon the officer’s arrival, a man standing at the gas station pointed to a vehicle which the officer then verified was the same vehicle identified by the anonymous tip.
As in Kelly, the man’s presence at the scene created a strong presumption that he could likely be.located in the event that his identification of the vehicle was determined to be false or made for the purpose of harassment. Further, as in Kelly, the officer was face-to-face with a man that identified not just a vehicle, but a vehicle that matched the description of the suspicious vehicle sought by the officer. I believe that whether the man at the scene was either (1) the initial anonymous tipster or (2) an additional tipster, there was sufficient verification to support a finding of “reasonable suspicion” for the stop. If the initial anonymous tipster, then by presenting himself at the scene upon the officer’s arrival and directing the officer’s attention to the suspicious vehicle, he thereby identified himself as the tipster and attained the status of a citizen informant as in Kelly. If an additional tipster, then his actions at the scene of the alleged DUI corroborated the “tip” from the initial anonymous tipster and, by his presence both at the scene and face-to-face with the officer, gave the necessary indicia of reliability to the “tip” for the requisite probable cause to stop a suspected DUI driver.
Given the totality of the circumstances, I believe that this case presents either a “tip” by a citizen informant as in Kelly, or was suitably corroborated based on the facts sub judice, thereby lending sufficient indicia of reliability and giving Officer May reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory stop of Appellants’ vehicle, pursuant to a report of a DUI driver, under the reasoning set forth in J.L. (lessened Fourth Amendment protection where general safety of the public is concerned), and Sierrar-Hemandez (lessened showing of reliability of an informant’s statement is necessary to support a valid stop than probable cause for a search).
In reaching my decision, I take guidance from our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Brown, 250 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Ky.2008), wherein the Court asked: “[i]n examining this case as to the reasonableness of the officers’ actions, we must pause and ask ourselves this question. What should the officers have done differently?”11 When faced with the aforementioned information, Officer May had two options: one, to follow the vehicle, allowing a possible drunk driver back onto the roadway or, two, stop the vehicle. I agree with the trial court that Officer May’s decision to stop the Appellants’ vehicle was the only option that would thwart the potential danger of injury or death to innocent lives. The dangerous situation posed by Appellants’ proceeding back onto the roadway bears consideration.12
*454Given the situation presented in the case sub judice, Officer May pursued a logical course of action, i.e., immediately stopping a reported drunk driver. I would adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975),13 but limit our holding today to the facts sub judice based on the interest of the public in alleviating DUI drivers from our highways. This is certainly viewable as a governmental interest, and the minimal intrusion of a brief investigatory stop of a suspected DUI driver and the absence of a practical alternative to preventing a suspected DUI driver from returning to the highway and endangering innocent lives, are sufficient to sustain a brief investigatory stop limited in scope to the facts.14

. In the Commonwealth of Kentucky there are three types of interaction between police officers and citizens: consensual encounters, temporary detentions typically referred to as "Terry stops,” and arrests. Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ky.App. 2003). However, I note that at least one of our sister states has found four types of encounters between its citizens and the police: the voluntary encounters, investigatory stops, public safety stops, and arrests. The safety stop
[C]an be performed if the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts. Our Supreme Court has stated: "[A] civil or criminal infraction is not always essential to justify a vehicle stop. Safety reasons alone may justify the stop, if the safety reasons are based upon specific and articu-lable facts.... ”
Public safety stops fall under the police’s community caretaking function, which expands beyond the police’s role in investigating crime. Public safety stops are justified by the mobility of the automobile and the danger to the public. In analyzing the validity of a stop, the risks to the public that would occur if an immediate stop is not conducted must be weighed against the *451right of an individual to be free from such, stops. "[W]here the danger to the public is clear, urgent, and immediate, the equation must be weighted in favor of protecting the public and removing the danger.”
State v. McCaddon, 39 Kan.App.2d 839, 185 P.3d 309, (2008) (internal citations and emphasis omitted).

. U.S. v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.1978).

. Commonwealth v. Brown, 250 S.W.3d 631 (Ky.2008).

. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

. I believe that for a tipster to act at the request of a dispatcher to procure additional information supports the inference that the *453tipster is at the same location at the same time as the alleged offender. Such action itself carries indicia of reliability beyond that of a mere anonymous tipster, though likely not rising to the level of a citizen informant.

. I, note that the offense of DUI as set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189A.010 is essentially comprised of two elements: (1) operating a motor vehicle (2) at or above the legislatively determined intoxication limit (.08). In the case sub judice, the officer arriving at the scene clearly observed one element of the crime of DUI, i.e., operation of a motor vehicle. However, it is often impossible for an officer to determine whether the operator of a vehicle is at or above the legislatively determined limit of intoxication by merely observing the operator in a vehicle. Such a determination can only be made by the officer having direct contact with the suspect.

. Our sister states have responded to the danger of a possible drunk driver in varying ways. See State v. McCaddon, 39 Kan.App.2d 839, 185 P.3d 309, 313 (2008) ("The reliability of the tip and the ability to corroborate the tip must be balanced against the risk of harm *454to the public if the tip is not investigated.”). See also People v. Wells, 38 Cal.4th 1078, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810 (2006) (“a citizen's tip may itself create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary vehicle stop or detention, especially if the circumstances are deemed exigent by reason of possible reckless driving or similar threats to public safety....”) Id. at 813; and "an anonymous and uncorroborated tip regarding a possibly intoxicated highway driver afforded a police officer reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a temporary detention to investigate further_” Id. at 812. And
the tipster’s information regarding the van and its location was sufficiently precise, and its report of a motorist "weaving all over the roadway” demanded an immediate stop to protect both the driver and other motorists. The tip reported contemporaneous activity and its "innocent” details were fully corroborated within minutes of the report.
Id. at 816.
Similarly, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts permits an investigatory stop under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement for possible drunk drivers, given that the situation requires “immediate action for the protection of life and property of both the operator and the general public. Simply put, what else was the officer to do?” Commonwealth v. Davis, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 88, 823 N.E.2d 411, 413 (2005) (internal citations omitted). Massachusetts in so holding noted:
that driving under the influence of alcohol presents a grave danger to the public cannot be gainsaid .... the threat here [intoxicated driving] is immediate; it threatens serious physical injury; the threat is short-lived. ...; and the plaintiffs [the motoring public] have no chance to protect themselves ... [a] drunk driver let loose on the highways is a deadly menace, not only to the officer, but also to anyone sharing the highways with him.
Davis at 413-14 (internal citations omitted).

. While the corroboration sub judice may not rise to the level of that corroboration necessary in cases other than a suspected DUI driver, I would adopt the reasoning found in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), wherein the Court considered stop near the U.S. border and reasoned,
In this case as well, because of the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we hold that when an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.’ 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884.

. The suppression hearing dealt exclusively with the legality of the stop, the uniform citation completed by Officer May for Garcia, the driver, and states that upon approaching the vehicle Officer May could see an open bottle of Corona between the driver's legs, that Garcia struggled to put the car in park, and smelled strongly of alcohol. The Appellants exhibited signs of drunkenness including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unsteadiness on their feet. Garcia failed to complete the field sobriety test and an hour and a half after he was seen driving erratically, his blood alcohol content was .220. In the search inci*455dent to arrest the Appellants were discovered to possess a forged/false resident alien card.