Court Opinion

ID: 9774383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:18:06.566136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:07.288590
License: Public Domain

FENNER, Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in affirming the judgment of the trial court, I write separately to clarify what I believe Missouri law requires with regard to the extent of the written finding entered by a trial judge who deviates from the presumed child support amount in Form 14, in accordance with Rule 88.01.
Judge Lowenstein cites to Harding v. Harding, 826 S.W.2d 404 (Mo.App.1992), noting that Harding states that when deviating from Form 14, the trial court must include the actual numbers used in calculating the non-Form 14 child support, as well as the factors which made the Form 14 amount inappropriate. Harding does so hold, but not in regard to an issue actually litigated in the case.
For purpose of consideration here, the issue presented in Harding was “whether the Rule 88.01 ‘presumptive figure’ may be rebutted by the custodial parent’s testimony of lower actual monthly expenses, and if so, is the custodial parent then locked into the figure testified to in court?” Id. at 406. In Harding, the court held that the trial court was not “locked into” the monthly expense testified to in court by the custodial parent. Id. at 407. However, the court held that where the presumed amount under Form 14 was $300 greater than the testimony presented at trial as to actual need, it was an abuse of discretion to award the Form 14 amount without citing factors in support thereof. Id. at 407. The court then stated as follows:
This is not at odds with Rule 88.01. As Rule 88.01 states, a court must enter a written or specific finding on the record that the Form 14 amount is unjust or inappropriate. When a custodial parent offers evidence rebutting the Form 14 presumption, the trial court must enter a written finding, whether requested or not, which includes the actual numbers used in calculating the non-Form 14 child support, as well as the factors which made the Form 14 amount inappropriate.
Id. at 407.
It is well established that a case is only authority for what it actually decides. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Goodson, 365 Mo. 260, 281 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1955). Where a statement in an opinion concerns an issue not litigated in the case, the statement is dictum and is not proper authority to support a contention in a subsequent case. In re Incorporation of City of River Bend, 530 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Mo.App.1975). Stated another way, “[a] judicial opinion should be read in the light of the facts pertinent to that particular case and it is improper to give permanent and controlling effect to casual statements outside the scope of the real inquiry of the case.” Union Electric Co. v. Platte-Clay Electric Coop., Inc., 814 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Mo.App.1991).
The language of Harding cited by Judge Lowenstein is dictum. The extent of find-*796mgs required to deviate from Form 14 was not at issue in Harding, and the statement of the court that the written finding must include the actual numbers used in calculating non-Form 14 support, as well as the factors which made the Form 14 amount inappropriate, was gratuitous to the issue as stated and addressed by the court.
Rule 88.01 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
It is sufficient in a particular ease to rebut the presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to Civil Procedure Form No. 14 is correct if the court or administrative agency enters in the case a written finding or a specific finding on the record that the amount so calculated, after consideration of all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate.
Rules of the Supreme Court are interpreted by the same principles used in construction of statutes. Adams v. Boring, 826 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo.App.1992). The primary rule of statutory construction requires a court to ascertain the intent of the legislature by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not proper for a court to forage among the rules of statutory construction to look for or impose another meaning. Matter of Estate of Thomas, 743 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo. banc 1988). Additionally, the legislature is presumed to know the state of the law at the time a statute is enacted. Adams v. Boring, 826 S.W.2d at 870.
Judge Hanna does not find Harding to be controlling, but he appears to interpret Rule 88.01 to require that the trial court make findings of the factors considered when deviating from the presumed amount under Form 14. I do not believe that Rule 88.01 requires findings of fact in regard to the factors considered. As written, Rule 88.01 merely requires the court to state for the record that the Form 14 amount is unjust or inappropriate, upon the court considering all relevant factors. If the Supreme Court had intended to require the court to make specific findings of the factors considered and the actual numbers used in calculating non-Form 14 support, rather than merely stating that it had considered all relevant factors, it- could have so stated in the rule.
Judge Lowenstein also cites to Michel v. Michel, 834 S.W.2d 773, 779 (Mo.App.1992), and Clare v. Clare, 853 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.App.1993), as supporting the language in Harding that speaks to the need for a trial court to give actual numbers used as well as the factors that cause a trial court to find child support calculated in accordance with Form 14 inappropriate. I find these cases distinguishable from the case at bar. In both Michel and Clare, the trial court failed to make a finding on the record “that the presumed amount was, after considering all relevant factors, unjust or inappropriate.” Michel, 834 S.W.2d at 779; Clare, 853 S.W.2d at 415. Such a finding was made in the case at bar.
Additionally, in Michel there were several Forms 14 entered in the record and the trial court made no indication of which form it relied upon. Michel, 834 S.W.2d at 779. Likewise, in Clare there were two Forms 14 and the trial court did not indicate the information upon which it relied. Clare, 853 S.W.2d at 415. This was not an issue in the case at bar. Here, the Form 14 calculation which the court deemed unjust is clear from the record.
Research reveals two cases where the trial court deviated from the Form 14 presumed support without providing explanation other than that the Form 14 amount, after considering all relevant factors, was unjust or inappropriate. Allard v. Allard, 856 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Mo.App.1993); Vehlewald v. Vehlewald, 853 S.W.2d 944, 951 (Mo.App.1993). In both Allard and Vehlewald, the appellate court found that the record supported the finding of the trial court and affirmed.
Research further reveals four cases where the appellate court remanded for the trial court to either enter support in accordance with Form 14 or make a finding that considering all relevant factors, the presumed amount was either unjust or inappropriate. Tuning v. Tuning, 841 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Mo.App.1992); K.R.W. by A.C.S. v. D.B.W., 830 *797S.W.2d 38, 41 (Mo.App.1992); Beeman v. Beeman, 816 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo.App.1991); and Campbell v. Campbell, 811 S.W.2d 504, 506-07 (Mo.App.1991). In none of these four cases was the trial court instructed to provide any explanation beyond finding the presumed amount unjust or inappropriate in the event that support was ordered other than as presumed under Form 14.
Additionally, in considering the application of Rule 88.01, the following cases have noted the need for the trial court to make a finding on the record that the amount calculated pursuant to Form 14, after considering all relevant factors, is unjust or inappropriate: In re Marriage of Short, 847 S.W.2d 158, 164-65 (Mo.App.1993); In re Marriage of Garrison, 846 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo.App.1993); Watkins v. Watkins, 839 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo.App.1992); Kieninger v. Kieninger, 836 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Mo.App.1992); Umphenour v. Umphenour, 831 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Mo.App.1992); Kessinger v. Kessinger, 829 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Mo.App.1992); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 828 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo.App.1992); Wagner v. Wagner, 823 S.W.2d 523, 526 (Mo.App.1992); In re Marriage of Waggoner, 818 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo.App.1991); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 817 S.W.2d 937, 939-40 (Mo.App.1991); Mistler v. Mistler, 816 S.W.2d 241, 254 (Mo.App.1991); Rothfuss v. Whalen, 812 S.W.2d 232, 237 (Mo.App.1991); and Allen v. Allen, 811 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Mo.App.1991). None of these cases required an explanation of the reasons the court found the Form 14 amount unjust or inappropriate although in some of the cases explanations were given by the trial court. Additionally, none of these cases required the trial court to recite the figures that the court relied on in deviating from the Form 14 amount.
In one of the most recent cases to address the application of Rule 88.01, Vehlewald v. Vehlewald, 853 S.W.2d 944, the court specifically noted that although the use of the Form 14 is mandatory, wide discretion is nonetheless vested in the trial court with respect to child support, and that discretion is expressly retained under section 452.340, RSMo Supp. 1992. Id. at 951 (citing Rothfuss v. Whalen, 812 S.W.2d at 237). Rule 88.01 is not intended to remove all discretion from the trial court nor does it require that the trial court make findings beyond the plain language of' the rule.
Other than as discussed herein, I concur with Judge Lowenstein. Furthermore, for the reasons stated herein, to the extent that Judge Lowenstein declines to enforce the strict language of Harding, I concur.