Court Opinion

ID: 9601780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:49:42.17906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:23.687251
License: Public Domain

ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
Bistline, Justice.
In petitioning for a rehearing the Rueths strenuously urge that the Court improperly required of them that they show that the ex parte unrecorded communications between the trial judge and the jury were harmless. That assignment has been given full consideration, and we remain of the opinion that the rule applied was the correct one in view of the factual situation of this particular case. Since the announcement of the opinions in this case the Supreme Court of the United States has had occasion to pass upon the same question. United Stated v. United States Gypsum Company, et al., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). At the request of the Court both parties have filed briefs addressing the relevancy and persuasion of that case to the one before us. The defendant, State of Idaho, has also taken advantage of the opportunity afforded it to fully respond to the contentions of the Rueths which were advanced in their petition for rehearing and supporting briefs. While not controlling, we find the language of the United States Supreme Court in the Gypsum case to be supportive of our earlier conclusion to follow and apply State v. Bland, supra, and briefly state the views of that court as to ex parte discussions or communications of judge and jury:
Any ex parte meeting or communication between the judge and the foreman of a deliberating jury is pregnant with possibilities for error. . . Unexpected questions or comments can generate unintended and misleading impressions of the judge’s subjective personal views which have no place in his instruction to the jury — all the more so when counsel are not present to challenge the statements. Second, any occasion which leads to communication with the whole jury panel through one juror inevitably risks innocent misstatements of the law and misinterpretations despite the undisputed good faith of the participants. Here, there developed a set of circumstances in which it can fairly be assumed that the foreman undertook to restate to his fellow jurors what he understood the judge to have implied regarding the resolution of the case in a definite verdict “one way or the other.” There is of course, no way to determine precisely what the foreman said when he returned to the jury room.
Finally, the absence of counsel from the meeting and the unavailability of a transcript or full report of the meeting aggravate the problems of having one juror serve as a conduit for communicating instructions to the whole panel. . Counsel were thus denied any opportunity to clear up the confusion regarding the judge’s direction to the foreman, which could readily have been accomplished by requesting that the whole jury be called into the courtroom for a clarifying instruction. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 2094, 45 L.Ed.2d 1; Fillippon v. Albion Vein State Co., 250 U.S. 76, 81, 39 S.Ct. 435, 436, 63 L.Ed. 853 (1919).
98 S.Ct. at 2885-2886.
As pointed out in the special concurrence of Justice Bakes, the Rueth jury was apparently of the thought that it needed some enlightenment as to the nature of the ownership which would remain with the Rueths after the assessment of damages. Obviously, the apparent confusion might have been absent had the trial judge instructed the jury as to the nature of the servitude or easement which the State had taken from the Rueths. Mr. Rueth testified that the “after” value of the property was but $15,-000, which he said might be obtainable from the salvage of the buildings. Mrs. Rueth testified to a similar figure, $15,000 to $18,-000 — also based on salvage. Mr. Rueth stated that the value of the property, including improvements, prior to its becoming “wet” in 1972 was $120,000 to $125,000. It is not inconceivable that the jury, in awarding compensation of $127,000, with due regard to the salvage testimony, concluded *215that the taking by the State was of the entire use of the property, thus raising the question in the mind of the jury as to ownership, leaving it to speculate, perhaps, that the awarding of compensation for such a complete taking would have the result of vesting the fee title in the State and leaving in doubt as to whom the salvage would belong. Given instruction No’. 2 informed the jury that it could find a taking if it determined that the State’s structure caused water to back up and stand upon Rueth’s lands, and that by virtue thereof the property, or some portion of it, was permanently damaged. Although the nature and extent of the easement or servitude was not covered in the instructions, the jury was further by given instructions Nos. 4 .and 5 instructed that if it found a taking, it would have to find valuations immediately before and immediately after the damage was inflicted, and that the measure of compensation for the taking of Rueth’s property was “the difference between the fair market value of plaintiffs’ property before the take and the fair market value of plaintiffs’ property immediately after the taking.” Somewhat contradictory, certain language in given instruction No. 4 also directed the jury in setting values to be concerned with, as “key dates,” the summer of 1971, before the backing up of water, and “the time of trial.”
Rueths argue, and the State concedes, that the State is not in a position to raise any challenge to the given instructions, having registered no objections as was then required by then fluctuating Rule 51 which, as made effective January 1, 1975, and hence governing this October of 1975 trial, required the making of objections, whereas the rule had formerly read otherwise (being again changed back to the pre-1975 version by order of the Court entered in July of 1976).
Nevertheless, an assignment of error made by the State, and not dealt with in the earlier opinion, was the failure of the trial court to grant the State’s motion for a bifurcation of the trial, with the trial court requested to determine whether there had been a taking and, if so, the nature thereof, leaving the issue of damages for trial to a jury. The Rueths, in seeking a rehearing, have rather heavily emphasized the Court’s failure to pass upon this assignment, pointing out that absent the resolution of this issue, a second trial of this case may result in a second appeal should the trial court again leave the resolution of the taking issue for jury determination, as the Rueths continue to contend to be the state of the law and as was done in the first trial. The Rueths admit that the issue has never been squarely before the Court, although they say that it was given indirect consideration in Mabe v. State, 83 Idaho 222, 360 P.2d 799 (1961), and again in Turcotte v. State, 84 Idaho 451, 373 P.2d 569 (1962). For other authority supportive of their position they cite the Oregon case of Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), which they urge upon us as a leading case.
In Mabe, contrary to Rueth’s reading of the case for the proposition that the cause there was remanded for a jury trial on the taking issue, the Court merely reversed a summary judgment dismissal of the action and directed its reinstatement. It is true, as Rueths say, that the introductory remarks of that opinion disclose that the action was in inverse condemnation, with the Mabes contending that their amended complaint and supporting affidavit set forth facts sufficient in law to entitle them to damages in some amount, with the further remarks of the Court that the Mabes as a corollary thereof asserted error in being denied a jury trial on the issue of the extent of access impairment and damages. The holding of the case was only that summary judgment had been improperly granted. Justice McFadden, who authored that opinion, also authored the later opinion in State ex rel. Flandro v. Seddon, 94 Idaho 940, 500 P.2d 841 (1972), a case heavily relied upon by the State, concerning which more will hereinafter be said. Mabe does not support the Rueths.
As to Turcotte, supra, Rueths state that the landowners, unsuccessful in their attempt for compensation in a jury trial, on *216appeal argued in this Court that the jury should not have been given the issue of whether there had been a taking, adding that this Court suggested in that case its approval of the submission of the taking issue to the jury, but also Rueths pointed out that this Court there noted that, in any event, appellants did not object to its submission and offered instructions as to what constitutes a “taking” of private property. There is bothersome language in Turcotte, and such case may very well have been the authority supplied to the trial court in this action which led to the denial of the motion for bifurcation. If so, any fault in denying the motion is attributable not to the trial judge, but to that language in Turcotte, supra, where the Court wrote:
Appellants argue that the question of whether there has been a taking is not a matter for jury determination. This contention is without merit. Appellants liken the question of whether there has been a “taking” to the proceedings in the normal condemnation action where the determination as to whether the proposed use is authorized by law and if the taking is necessary for such use are judicial questions. Although actions of this kind are based on the theory of inverse condemnation the issues are not identical with proceedings in eminent domain.
In determining the question of whether parties are entitled to a trial by jury, courts must look to the ultimate and entire relief sought. Johansen v. Looney, 30 Idaho 123, 163 P. 303; Cleland v. McLaurin, 40 Idaho 371, 232 P. 571; Cooper v. Wesco Builders, 76 Idaho 278, 281 P.2d 669. Therefore, in determining this contention the court must be guided by the averments of appellants’ complaint and the body or substance of the relief they are seeking. The relief here prayed for is damages.
84 Idaho at 455, 373 P.2d at 571.
In reviewing the Turcotte opinion we observe that the appellants there did not, as here, preserve the question for appeal, but as candidly pointed out by Rueths and as set forth in the opinion, “made no objection to the submission of the question of a taking to the jury,” and “submitted requested instructions as to what constituted a ‘taking’ of their property which were intended to guide the jury in determining such issue.” We rule today that that portion of Turcotte above set forth was not necessary to the decision of the case, and that the holding of that case was that appellants, making no objection, and on the contrary, acquiescing and participating in the submission of the taking issue to the jury, were in no position to complain on appeal.
In the present case, as mentioned, the State made a proper motion for bifurcation, asking the trial court to rule that the taking issue was a question for the court, not for the jury. On gaining an adverse ruling, the State cannot be faulted for thereafter submitting instructions which attempted to explain to a lay jury the factors which it would consider in trying to decide whether or not the State by its conduct had appropriated from the Rueths their property or some interest therein.
As was stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in Thornburg, supra, mentioned above as a case relied upon by Rueths:
The idea that must be expressed to the jury is that before the plaintiff may recover for a taking of his property he must show by the necessary proof that the activities of the government are unreasonably interfering with his use of his property, and in so substantial a way as to deprive him of the practical enjoyment of his land. This loss must then be translated factually by the jury into a reduction in the market value of the land.
376 P.2d at 110.
The Oregon court apparently recognized the difficulty attendant to submitting such an issue to a jury, saying that “In submitting to a jury a case such as we have before us, the trial court is confronted with the need to verbalize rules as abstract as any to be found in the law, but, a we have said before, the ingenuity of trial judges in formulating meaningful instructions to juries is usually equal to the task.” Id. at 110. To our mind, the rationale of that state*217ment fails to consider that trial courts in turn look to the attorneys for instructions, and complex questions of law, and mixed law and fact are then to be resolved by laymen, who in turn hopefully are capable of comprehending instructions on a subject which that Supreme Court had, at least at that time, not deigned to address.1 The Oregon Court stated that the Oregon constitution places the duty of resolving the taking issue upon the jury, but having read that state’s applicable constitutional provision,2 we fail to see, nor need we, how that Court arrived at the conclusion that the resolution of such a complex issue was a jury question.
The Rueths urge upon us that we observe a distinction between “ordinary condemnation actions,” and “inverse condemnation actions.” This we cannot do, other than to observe that the distinction, if such it may be truly called, is that the ordinary proceeding in eminent domain is instituted by the party claiming the right to exercise that power, whereas an inverse proceeding is instituted by a property owner who asserts that his property, or some interest therein, has been invaded or appropriated to the extent of a taking, but without due process of law, without payment of just compensation, and thus in violation of the Idaho Constitution.
In Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950) the Court stated tersely but accurately that that action, which sought damages for the permanent although intermittent flooding of the property owners’ lands, was in essence “a condemnation suit in reverse.” Id. at 177, 213 P.2d 911. The final paragraph of that opinion said this: “Because this is, in effect, a condemnation suit and the condemnor must bear all costs, costs are awarded [to] appellants.” Id. at 179, 213 P.2d at 917. It is clear that the Court there considered that what is now popularly called an action in inverse condemnation is nevertheless a proceeding in eminent domain and the only difference is the reversed alignment of the parties. The Court there noted that “Article 1, Section 14 of the Constitution of Idaho, is mandatory that private property may not be taken until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, is paid.” Id. at 177, 213 P.2d at 915. The Court there reiterated what an earlier Court had said in Bassett v. Swenson, 51 Idaho 256, 5 P.2d 722 (1931), that this constitutional provision is self-executing, that is, “ ‘No action of the Legislature further than providing the procedural machinery by which the right may be applied is necessary.’ ” Id., 70 Idaho at 177, 213 P.2d at 915. The import of that holding is clear. Both the right to condemn and the right of the condemnee to just compensation are granted, not by the legislature, but by the Constitution. The Court in Renninger, supra, repeated the holding from Bassett, supra, that “ ‘whether or not a right claimed under this provision of the Constitution is within the grant is held to be a judicial question to be determined by the courts’ ” Id. at 177, 213 P.2d at 915. In the ordinary situation the constitutional right to condemn is exercised by the party seeking to take private property. In the “reverse” situation the constitutional right to be paid just compensation is exercised by the property owner who brings the action, *218alleging that his property rights have been taken without payment.
Wherein Renninger went beyond any of the earlier cases was its holding that the constitutional provision guaranteeing to property owners the ascertainment and payment of just compensation before private property could be taken for a public use constituted a waiver of the State’s immunity from suit. Id. at 178, 213 P.2d 911. From that point the Court went on to hold that “if the State takes the property without condemning, the landowner, to give full force and effect to the provision of the Constitution as self-executing, must be entitled to sue therefor, * * * ” Id. at 178, 213 P.2d at 916. Many authorities from other states were cited for the foregoing proposition, of which Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942) we deem most significant. That case has remained a leading case in California jurisprudence.
In Rose the California Supreme Court used language surprisingly like that eleven years earlier used by the Idaho Court in Bassett. After stating the provision of Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution that “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner . . that court went on to say:
Since article I, section 14, therefore, is a restriction placed by the Constitution upon the State itself, and upon all of its agencies who derive from it their power of eminent domain, it cannot be said that the mere failure of the legislature to enact a statute allowing suit to be brought against the state entitles the state to disregard and violate that limitation. The logical inference is that said constitutional provision is intended to be self-enforcing.
123 P.2d at 510.
Not specifically mentioned in Renninger, but inferentially before that Court was another California Supreme Court case which followed Rose by a scant year, People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1942), in which case that court specifically observed that although there are two forms of action by which the property owner may obtain his guaranteed constitutional right of just compensation for the taking or damaging of his private property, “the result is the same in that in each the property owner receives compensation for invasion of his private right.” Id., 144 P.2d at 804. Applicable here, the court there stated:
In the one case the property owner assumes the burden of alleging and proving his property right and the infringement thereof, and the question whether his allegations in that behalf are sufficient may be determined on demurrer. In the other case the condemning authority, in commencing the proceeding, affirmatively alleges ownership in the defendants, the contemplated taking and severance, and seeks a determination by the court of issues confided by the law to the decision of the court and also seeks a determination by the jury, unless one be waived, of the compensation which should be paid to the property owner.
When the proceeding comes on for hearing all issues except the sole issue relating to compensation are to be tried by the court, and if the court does not make special findings on those issues its findings thereon are implicit in the verdict awarding compensation. Vallejo, etc., R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 556, 147 P. 238; City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber, etc., Co., supra, 171 Cal. 392, at page 397, 153 P. 705. In the Vallejo case, 169 Cal. at page 556, 147 P. at page 244, the court said: “A condemnation suit is a special proceeding. It is not included in the classes mentioned in section 592 [Code of Civil Procedure] in which a jury is required. That section is expressly made applicable to condemnation suits. Code Civ.Proc. § 1256. It follows that, except those relating to compensation, the issues of fact in a condemnation suit, are to be tried by the court, and that if the court submits them to a jury, it is nevertheless required to make findings either by adopting the ver*219diet thereon or by making findings in its own language.” In the Oakland case the point was urged that the question whether the parcels of land involved constituted one parcel within the meaning of section 1248 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be submitted to the jury for determination. The court said at page 397 of 171 Cal., at page 707 of 153 P.: “But neither the state nor any of its mandatories nor any other person or corporation exercising the power of eminent domain, is compelled to submit to the determination of a jury every question of fact. (Vallejo, etc., R. Co. v. Reed Orchard Co. [169 Cal. 545], 147 P. 238), and this question of fact (namely, whether or not, the probative facts being without controversy, the resultant fact establishes the existence of a parcel from which a portion is to be taken) is essentially a question of law for the determination of the court. It is only the ‘compensation,’ the ‘award,’ which our Constitution declares shall be found and fixed by a jury. All other questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, are to be tried as in many other jurisdictions they are tried, without reference to a jury. Const., art. I, § 14.” The law declared in these two cases has been followed in this state without deviation.
It was therefore within the province of the trial court and not the jury to pass upon the question whether under the facts presented, the defendants’ right of access will be substantially impaired. If it will be so impaired the extent of the impairment is for the jury to determine. This is but another way of saying that the trial court and not the jury must decide whether in the particular case there will be an actionable interference with the defendants’ right of access. This the trial court did when it ruled on the admission of evidence and in its instructions to the jury. (Emphasis added)
Id., at 804-806.
Fifteen years later the California Supreme Court in People v. Russell, 48 Cal.2d 189, 309 P.2d 10 (1957) cited Ricciardi, and affirmed its holding: “In an eminent domain proceeding the amount of compensation is to be determined by the jury. Const. Art. I, § 14. All other issues are to be tried by the court, and if it does not make special findings on those issues they are implicit in the verdict awarding compensation.” 309 P.2d at 14.
An examination of the file in Turcotte, supra, discloses that neither Ricciardi, supra, nor Rose, supra, were cited in the briefs of the parties. More than that, neither party cited any .authority for or against the proposition that only the assessment of compensation may properly be submitted to the jury in an eminent domain proceeding. Specifically, the State there did not contend that the appellant was incorrect in arguing that all issues other than compensation were to be resolved by the court, but argued instead that the appellant property owner had not presented that theory to the trial court in the first instance.3
In Flandro, supra, Justice McFadden authored a unanimous opinion which, other *220than for the unfortunate language in Turcotte, should have put to rest any thought that a jury will resolve any issue but that of just compensation:
An eminent domain proceeding is not an ordinary “civil” action wherein the factual issues are submitted to a jury for determination. Historically, eminent domain action was ex parte and inquisitorial in the common law and has not been regarded as a civil remedy. Nichols on Eminent Domain, §§ 1.1 — 1.44 (3d rev. ed.). The power of eminent domain arises as an incident to sovereignty of the state with this authority recognized by the state constitution. Idaho Const. art. 1, § 14; Portneuf Irrig. Co., Ltd. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046 (1909). The procedures for eminent domain actions have been established by the legislature. Idaho Code, Title 7, Ch. 7. Because eminent domain authority arises from an inherent sovereignty of the state to take property for its own use, such proceedings do not come within the scope of Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 7, pertaining to trial by jury. Portneuf Irrig. Co. v. Budge, supra. Although I.C. § 10-105 requires trial by jury of factual issues in enumerated classes of actions, no reference is made therein to eminent domain proceedings. Consequently in eminent domain proceedings the only issue for submission to a jury is the question of the value of the property sought to be taken or the amount of compensation for the taking. I.C. § 7-711. See People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944); People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal.2d 189, 309 P.2d 10 (1957). Other factual issues should be resolved by the trial court. (Emphasis added)
94 Idaho at 943, 500 P.2d at 844.
The California cases of Ricciardi, supra, Rose, supra, and Russell, supra, were followed by the California Supreme Court in Breidert v. Southern Pacific Company, 61 Cal.2d 659, 394 P.2d 719 (1964) in which inverse condemnation case,4 that court said:
The determination of whether such substantial impairment has been established must be reached as a matter of law. The extent of such impairment must be fixed as a matter of fact. The cases have consistently held that the trial court must rule, as a matter of law, whether the interference with access constitutes a substantial or unreasonable impairment. Thus in People v. Ricciardi, supra, 23 Cal.2d 390, 402-403, 144 P.2d 799, 805-806, we said: “It was * * * within the province of the trial court and not the jury to pass upon the question whether under the facts presented, the defendants’ right of access will be substantially impaired. If it will be so impaired the extent of the impairment is for the jury to determine. This is but another way of saying that the trial court and not the jury must decide whether in the particular case there will be an actionable interference with the defendants’ right of access.”
394 P.2d at 722.
In a Kansas case brought to our attention in the State’s brief, complaint on appeal was made to the trial court leaving for jury determination the question of a taking. The Supreme Court states its agreement with the following legal premise advanced by the property owner:
“ * * * that it was highly prejudicial and clearly error to let the jury decide if there had been a taking. If the appellants did not establish a taking of access rights, there should have been no question whatsoever for the jury to decide. As in any other condemnation case, whether there is a taking of a property right is a question of law, and must be decided by the court. * * * ”
Brock v. State Highway Commission, 195 Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934, 940 (Kan.1965). The Kansas court went on to say:
*221The appellee contended that it had the right under the police power to limit or control appellants’ access as it did. Whether or not a governmental agency has exceeded its police power and taken private property for public use is a question of law for the determination of the court under the existing facts and circumstances of the particular case. Not until the trial court determines that private property has been taken for public use is the question of the amount of damages ripe for the determination of a jury-.
In all condemnation cases the only question presented for the jury’s determination is the loss to the owner because of the property taken. The fact that there was a taking has been previously determined by the court.
An action to recover damages for the taking of private property for public use is in the nature of an inverse condemnation proceeding. The same rules of law apply to the determination of the right to damages and the measure of damages as in a condemnation proceeding.
Id., at 940.
Citing the early case of Stuart v. Colorado Eastern Ry. Co., 61 Colo. 58, 156 P. 152 (1916) the Colorado Supreme Court stated that:
[A]n inverse condemnation action is in the nature of a special statutory proceeding and is to be tried as if it were an eminent domain proceeding.
Ossman v. Mountain States Telephone & Tel. Co., 184 Colo. 360, 520 P.2d 738, 742 (1974).
The earlier Colorado case, Stuart, supra, a forerunner in the field, stated the proposition simply:
Whether, technically speaking, the defendant has a vested title now to the right of way before paying for it — in view of our Constitution, which provides that no title shall vest until payment has been made for the land taken — is immaterial in the present case. The pleadings and admissions disclose that the right of way has been taken without payment therefor by either the defendant or its predecessor, that it still retains the land, is using and refuses to pay for it, and the purpose and object of this action is to compel payment. The suit, though brought by the owner, under such circumstances is to compel or force condemnation. It is to be tried like a condemnation suit, and plaintiff will have the opening and closing. The taking and the necessity for the taking being admitted, the only issue remaining to be tried is the value of the land taken and 'the damages occasioned by the taking. The defenses that the cause of action accrued to another and the plea of the statute of limitations are res judicata under the pleadings and will not be considered by the court.'
The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the motion for judgment on the pleadings, to treat the case as an action brought by plaintiff to compel condemnation and payment under the laws of eminent domain,
(Emphasis added)
Stuart v. Colorado Eastern Ry. Co., 156 P. at 156.
A general statement of propositions of law attendant to procedures is found in the text Corpus Juris Secundum:
“ . . . the owner of property appropriated for a public purpose without compensation having been made may demand and recover the value of the property taken. Such an action is sometimes treated as a condemnation proceeding and is designated as a proceeding in reverse or inverse condemnation. The fact that the action is brought by the owner rather than the condemnor does not change its essential nature. The action is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition of the taking of property without just compensation.”
30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 399.
Citing the foregoing authority the Court in State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand and Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 468 P.2d 306 (1970), stated:
*222The state did not attempt to appropriate the leased tract until April 2, 1968 at which time the state advised the respondent that it could no longer mine gravel in the area of the new interstate highway. At this time the respondent had become the lessee of the mineral rights in tract C by assignment of the lease from the Nelsons. As owner of the leasehold interest at the time of the taking, the respondent was entitled to any award of damages for the appropriation.
Although no formal condemnation action was ever instituted against tract C, the respondent’s counterclaim for damages for the taking of the leasehold interest is in the nature of an inverse condemnation. In Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950), this court recognized the validity of an inverse condemnation action by which a property owner institutes an action against the state to recover just compensation for an appropriation of land when the state has taken an interest in land and refused to institute eminent domain proceedings to determine the amount of just compensation.
A cause of action for inverse condemnation arises at the time of actual interference by the condemnor with the owner’s right to use the property. 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 399 pp. 475-480. At the time of such interference in the present case, the respondent was the owner of the leasehold interest and was therefore the proper party to institute inverse condemnation proceedings which it did by means of the counterclaim interposed here. The appellant’s contention that the respondent is not entitled to damages for the condemnation of the leasehold because it was not the owner at the time of condemnation is, therefore, without merit.
Id., at 579, 468 P.2d at 311.
Here, then, is an Idaho case where the property owner’s inverse condemnation claim was filed as a counterclaim, and then tried as an eminent domain proceeding along with the main action which had been initiated by the State. It also appears that the Court there adhered to I.C. § 7-711 by submitting interrogatories to the jury in the proceeding initiated by the owner as well as in that commenced by the State.
Holding as we do that this cause be retried as a proceeding in eminent domain, we do not perceive that other issues raised on the appeal will cause any further problem, and hence need not be discussed.
Our holding today is simply to reaffirm what was said in Flandro, supra. An eminent domain proceeding is not an ordinary civil action. Art. I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution allows the right of eminent domain only where there has been the ascertainment and payment of just compensation, and the same constitutional provision provides the right in a property owner to initiate the eminent domain proceeding where he alleges that his private property has been taken without ascertainment of just compensation followed by payment. The eminent domain proceeding is founded in the constitution, and whether the proceeding is initiated by the party seeking to condemn, or by the property owner who claims his property or rights therein have been taken, it is not an ordinary civil proceeding. Hence in either case all issues, other than just compensation, are for resolution by the trial court.
In holding that only the issue of just compensation is properly resolved by a jury, we are not to be understood as saying that a bifurcated trial of issues is always necessary. Conceivably, in the interests of economy, and depending on the particular circumstances of each case, as may be unfolded in pre-trial discovery, or at pre-trial conference, the trial court may determine to impanel a jury and have all issues presented at one time. In any event, however, the trial court will make the determination of the taking issue which will be reflected, as in California, in instructions which advise the jury that there has been a taking, and the nature of the property right taken where the court concludes that the taking is less than the fee. Additionally, and as appears to be the practice in California, it is desirable that the trial court enter findings *223and conclusions pertinent to that issue, and pertinent to any issue other than that of just compensation. As is the case where a trial court in an ordinary civil action tried without a jury decides the case on its merits on a defendant’s motion for an involuntary dismissal at the close of plaintiff’s case, the court may properly express his ruling orally, and make findings and conclusions at a later and more convenient time — thus being able to continue the trial in instances where value testimony has not yet been offered, or to submit the matter of just compensation to the jury if the entire case is in before the court elects to rule on the taking issue.
We note that in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946), an inverse condemnation case appealed from the United States Court of Claims, the Supreme Court declined to pass upon the propriety of the amount of the award without proper findings from the Court of Claims as to the nature of the easement, saying that “An accurate description of the property taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 328, 329, 37 S.Ct. 385, 386, 61 L.Ed. 746 and cases cited.” 328 U.S. at 267, 66 S.Ct. at 1069.
In close cases, the trial courts may conclude it to be preferable to bifurcate the issues, with the court upon determining the taking issue then providing an accurate description of the property or right therein which has been taken. Such a procedure would save litigants the unnecessary expense of expert witness fees and trial time were all issues submitted in one trial and the taking issue then resolved adversely to the property owner.
Taking note that the jury in this case, to whose judgment the taking issue was submitted, albeit erroneously, found an invasion of the Rueths’ property rights by the actions of the State, with which the trial court of his own volition did not evidence any disagreement, and consistent with the holding that the only issue for jury resolution is that of just compensation, we do not award the State any costs on this appeal.
The petition for rehearing is denied and the cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consonant with this Court’s opinion. No costs allowed. Bassett v. Swenson, supra.
McFADDEN and BAKES, JJ., concur.
SHEPARD, C. J., and DONALDSON, J., would grant a rehearing and continue to adhere to the views expressed in the dissent.

. Counsel did not bring to our attention that Thornburg, supra, after retrial was appealed a second time and reversed a second time. It seems that trial judge’s ingenuity resulted in giving instructions on the taking issue which were too abstract. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Or. 69, 415 P.2d 750, 752.

. The Oregon Constitutional provision on eminent domain proceedings is similar to our own. Art. I, § 18 provides:
Private property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without just compensation; nor except in the case of the state, without such compensation first assessed and tendered; provided, that the use of all roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state and is declared a public use.
The Oregon Court’s holding may be based upon that provision of the constitution preserving the right of jury trial. Art. I, § 17 reads that “In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate.”

. Counsel for the property owner did at the close of the case move the trial court to rule as a matter of law that there had been a taking, and also submitted a requested instruction which, had it been given, would have told the jury that there had been a taking “as a matter of law, and that the only remaining question for you to determine is the amount of damages which should be paid to the plaintiffs for the part so taken and for damages to the remainder of their property.” The instruction was not given, and the trial court denied the motion for a ruling that there had been a taking without allowing any argument. On the appeal the State’s argument was that the property owners’ trial motion was not that the resolution of the taking issue was improper for the jury, but that the evidence showed no conflict, and the owner was as a matter of law therefore entitled to a directed verdict on liability, as is so in ordinary civil cases. The State there argued that if the owner contended that the resolution of the taking issue was for the court, and not the jury, “why did he not at least attempt to arrange for such trial to the court? Why did he not at least suggest that the question of taking should be set on the court’s calendar for a certain time and the question of damages to be tried to the jury sometime subsequent to the issue of law. . . The pre-trial conference is the logical place for raising that question. Appellant did not even intimate there that whether a taking had occurred should be tried to the court.”

. In footnote 1 the Breidert court stated:
“An inverse condemnation action is an eminent domain proceeding initiated by the property owner rather than the condemnor. The principles which affect the parties’ rights in an inverse condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent domain action. (See Rose v. State of California, supra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505; Bacich v. Board of Control, supra, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818.)”