Court Opinion

ID: 9916277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 17:01:52.275642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:56.058271
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                        ________________________

                        No. ACM 40290 (f rev)
                        ________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee
                                   v.
                       Keen A. FERNANDEZ
          Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                        ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                         Upon Further Review
                       Decided 9 January 2024
                        ________________________

Military Judge: Elijah F. Brown.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 28 January 2022 by GCM convened at
Hurlburt Field, Florida. Sentence entered by military judge on 16 March
2022: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 6 months, forfeiture of all
pay and allowances, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Spencer R. Nelson, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Major Mor-
gan R. Christie, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before JOHNSON, CADOTTE, and MASON, Appellate Military Judges.
Chief Judge JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which Sen-
ior Judge CADOTTE and Judge MASON joined.
                        ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                        ________________________
               United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

JOHNSON, Chief Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Appellant
guilty, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of wrongfully distributing child
pornography in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934.1 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a bad-
conduct discharge, confinement for six months, total forfeiture of pay and al-
lowances, reduction to the grade of E-1, and a reprimand. The convening au-
thority did not modify the sentence and he provided the adjudged reprimand.
   After Appellant’s record of trial was docketed with this court, the court dis-
covered a disc constituting one of the prosecution exhibits was cracked and
inoperable. Accordingly, this court returned the record of trial to the Chief
Trial Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, for correction of the record. United
States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290, 2022 CCA LEXIS 668, at *1–2 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. 17 Nov. 2022) (order).
    After correction and re-docketing, Appellant raised eight issues which we
have reordered and rephrased in part: (1) whether the military judge erred by
denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the military judge
should have recused himself; (3) whether the military judge erroneously ad-
mitted testimonial statements in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment;2 (4) whether the 18 U.S.C. § 922 firearm prohibition re-
flected on the Statement of Trial Results is unconstitutional, and whether this
court can review that question; (5) whether there was a presumptively unrea-
sonable post-trial delay under United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F.
2006), where a defective exhibit caused this court to remand and re-docket the
record of trial; (6) whether the military judge erred in denying Appellant’s mo-
tion to require a unanimous verdict; (7) whether Appellant is entitled to relief
because Air Force Office of Special Investigation (OSI) agents asked for his
phone passcode after he invoked his right to remain silent; and (8) whether the
Government was allowed to prefer a new charge and specification against Ap-
pellant after a preliminary hearing officer determined probable cause was lack-
ing for the original charge and specifications, which the convening authority
dismissed.3 We have carefully considered issues (6), (7), and (8), and find they
do not require discussion or relief. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356,

1 All references to the UCMJ, the Rules for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.), and the Military

Rules of Evidence (Mil. R. Evid.) are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2019 ed.).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

3 Appellant personally raises issues (7) and (8) pursuant to United States v. Grostefon,

12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).

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               United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

361 (C.M.A. 1987). As to the remaining issues, as described below we find no
error that materially prejudiced Appellant’s substantial rights, and we affirm
the findings and sentence.

                                 I. BACKGROUND
    Appellant was born in the Philippines and moved to the United States
when he was 13 years old. He joined the Air Force in January 2019, and his
first permanent duty station was Cannon Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico.
On 11 December 2019, Appellant sent two videos via Facebook Messenger to
an individual in the Philippines. Each video depicted an unidentified female
apparently under the age of 18 years engaged in sexually explicit conduct. As
a result, Facebook sent a report to the National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children (NCMEC), which in turn sent its own report to the New Mex-
ico Attorney General’s Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) unit. Both re-
ports identified Appellant as the sender of the videos and were accompanied
by copies of the videos. An analyst in the ICAC unit reviewed one of the videos
and confirmed it depicted apparent sexually explicit conduct involving a child.
Information in the NCMEC report indicated Appellant was an Air Force mem-
ber stationed at Cannon AFB; accordingly, the analyst referred the case to the
OSI.
    During their investigation, OSI agents obtained directly from Facebook ev-
idence of Appellant’s activity on Facebook Messenger, including copies of the
same two videos Facebook originally reported to NCMEC as well as records of
messages indicating Appellant distributed the two videos to another user. Ap-
pellant’s messages discussed the contents of the videos with the other user.
Among other comments, Appellant asked “isn’t it weird” that Appellant “like[d]
those videos :).”4

                                  II. DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Mistrial
   1. Additional Background
   During the Government’s case in chief, trial counsel called a pediatrician,
Dr. KG, to testify about the physical characteristics and likely age of the fe-
males depicted in the two videos Appellant distributed. During the direct ex-
amination, trial counsel played the two videos so that the military judge, wit-
ness, counsel, and court reporter could view them, but the spectators in the

4 These messages originally were written in Cebuano and later translated into English.

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               United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

courtroom could not. During cross-examination, the court reporter, Ms. N, ab-
ruptly withdrew from the courtroom. The military judge called a recess.
   When proceedings resumed one hour and 21 minutes later, trial counsel
announced that a replacement court reporter had been detailed.5 The military
judge described three conferences he held with counsel during the recess in
accordance with Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 802, which related to com-
munications during the recess between Ms. N and the military judge, and be-
tween the military judge and counsel. The military judge allowed trial defense
counsel to voir dire him. During the questioning, the military judge explained
in more detail his observations and understanding of what had occurred with
respect to Ms. N:
       The first time I noticed something was amiss was during the
       [D]efense’s cross-examination when suddenly [Ms. N] scooted
       her chair back, moved her hand up to her mouth and said, “I’m
       sorry, I can’t,” and at that point she stepped down from the court
       reporter box and then went into the judge’s chambers. So what I
       -- I put the court into recess, and my immediate concern was
       what was happening with Ms. [N] and whether she was having
       some kind of medical issue, medical emergency. Because she had
       motioned with her hand to her mouth it looked like she was feel-
       ing nauseous, as opposed to suffering from something like chest
       pains or something that might be indicative of some sort of car-
       diovascular issue. And so, if I remember correctly, once the court
       was in recess I walked into my judge’s chambers -- into the
       judge’s chambers. At that point Ms. [N] was not there in the
       chambers and I thought she must be somewhere else in the
       building, maybe in a restroom. But when I came back out to the
       bench to retrieve my laptop and some books and the witness,
       Dr. [KG], was still on the stand, he offered what I understood as
       some sort of assistance in case there was some sort of medical
       issues, and because, I understand he is a pediatrician, I under-
       stood that as an offer of some sort of medical assistance, should
       that be necessary. And I responded to Dr. [KG] as saying, “I
       think it’s nausea,” or something to do with nausea based on her
       motioning with her hand to her mouth. And so at that point I
       wasn’t sure why she was experiencing a feeling of nausea. . . . I

5 This replacement court reporter had served as court reporter for the arraignment and

motions hearing held three months earlier. On both occasions, he participated in the
proceedings via video-teleconference with the assistance of a paralegal present in the
courtroom.

                                          4
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

       thought, perhaps, maybe that is something that would happen
       here, she was ill, that the main question is[:] what impact would
       that have on these proceedings and whether we can continue or
       whether there would be a delay. When I returned -- I think at
       that point actually I said, “Counsel, could we have an [R.C.M.]
       802 [conference]?” I don’t remember if the counsel initiated that
       or if I said, “Counsel, let’s have an 802,” and we began to ap-
       proach the judge’s chamber. When I walked into the judge’s
       chamber I saw that Ms. [N] was exiting the adjacent bathroom
       that’s in the judge’s chamber, and seemed to be apologizing. And
       so I thought, since I didn’t know what her condition was, rather
       than have all of the parties crowd into the room I thought I
       would ask her what was happening, what was going on. And so
       I think I told the counsel to stand by. At that point I spoke with
       Ms. [N], and she was repeatedly apologizing, saying, “I’m sorry,
       I’m sorry. It’s just that the evidence that I saw had an unex-
       pected impact on me. I just felt ill.” I asked her if she had -- at
       some point I asked her, “Well, how long have you been a court
       reporter? Are you -- do you think you can continue, you know,
       serving as a court reporter in this case if you take some time?
       Maybe take a walk, get some fresh air,” and she indicated that
       she believed that she could if she had a break. And so that led
       me to believe that this was not a medical situation at all, it was
       her emotional reaction that she experienced to the evidence. At
       that point I asked counsel to come back into the [R.C.M.] 802
       [conference] and I explained what had just transpired.
As stated above, Ms. N did not return to the court-martial, and she was re-
placed as the court reporter. In response to additional questioning by trial de-
fense counsel, the military judge asserted he had “zero concerns about any im-
pact on [his] ability to impartially assess the evidence.” The military judge ex-
pressed surprise at Ms. N’s reaction, given her long experience as a court re-
porter and that “the subject that’s been charged in this case is commonly
charged in Air Force courts-martial.” The military judge stated he did not view
Ms. N’s reaction as “reflecting anything about the evidence itself,” that it im-
pacted him “not at all,” and that it did not “change [his] analysis of the evidence
whatsoever.” In response to questioning by trial counsel, the military judge
agreed that in judge-alone trials military judges are commonly called upon to
determine whether evidence is admissible, and to not consider inadmissible
evidence when determining guilt or innocence.
   Trial defense counsel then called Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) RS, who
was present in the courtroom observing the trial when Ms. N abruptly exited.
CMSgt RS testified regarding his observations:

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

       When the video first started showing I noticed the court reporter
       started to watch the video. A few seconds later she started look-
       ing away toward her left and to her right, and then moments
       later she started covering her face with a white paper, I think
       it’s an 8 x 11 white paper. And then suddenly she stood up and
       reached out to the judge and walked out.
CMSgt RS testified that “[a]s a spectator in the back,” he felt “like [Ms. N] saw
something disgusting, and it might influence the decision of the case.” How-
ever, he further testified that he “trust[ed] the judge” was “going to make the
right decision for the case,” and agreed that he had “confidence” in “this specific
judge.”
      The military judge then heard argument from counsel on an oral defense
motion for a mistrial. Trial defense counsel argued such a mistrial was war-
ranted due to the court reporter’s reaction to the evidence, “her unique position
. . . [,] how the public viewed her, and [ ] her interactions with” the military
judge, because “the perception of fairness has been impeded.” In response, trial
counsel cited case law to the effect that a mistrial is a “drastic remedy” to be
granted “only as a last resort to protect and guarantee a fair trial,” and empha-
sized that military judges are expected to evaluate admissible evidence with-
out considering irrelevant matters.
   After a recess, the military judge issued an oral ruling denying the De-
fense’s motion for a mistrial. After stating his findings of fact—which were
consistent with his voir dire and the testimony of CMSgt RS—and reciting the
applicable law, the military judge explained:
       I find that Ms. [N]’s displaying a visible reaction to evidence of-
       fered by the [G]overnment, her abruptly leaving the courtroom
       during the [D]efense’s cross-examination, and the military judge
       having a conversation with her following her departure, does not
       cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the proceedings, such
       that declaring a mistrial is manifestly necessary in the interests
       of justice. In reaching this finding I considered the forum of the
       court, which is military judge alone. Ms. [N]’s behavior had and
       will have no bearing whatsoever on the court’s evaluation on the
       evidence in this case. Additionally, the court has no concerns at
       all about its ability to disregard entirely what transpired with
       the court reporter. Since it is a judge[-]alone case I am confident
       I can and will disregard her behavior entirely.
The trial then resumed with the continued cross-examination of Dr. KG.

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

   2. Law
    “A military judge has discretion to ‘declare a mistrial when such action is
manifestly necessary in the interest of justice because of circumstances arising
during the proceedings which cast substantial doubt upon the fairness of the
proceedings.’” United States v. Coleman, 72 M.J. 184, 186 (C.A.A.F. 2013)
(quoting R.C.M. 915(a)). Mistrial is “‘a drastic remedy’ which should be used
only when necessary ‘to prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Har-
ris, 51 M.J. 191, 196 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting United States v. Garces, 32 M.J.
345, 349 (C.M.A. 1991)). “A military judge has a superior vantage point over
appellate courts in making this determination and thus gets ‘considerable lat-
itude in determining when to grant a mistrial.’ We will not reverse a military
judge’s determination unless there is ‘clear evidence of abuse of discretion.’”
United States v. Flores, 80 M.J. 501, 507 (C.A.A.F. 2020) (quoting United States
v. Diaz, 59 M.J. 79, 90 (C.A.A.F. 2003)).
       A military judge abuses his or her discretion when: (1) the mili-
       tary judge predicates a ruling on findings of fact that are not
       supported by the evidence of record; (2) the military judge uses
       incorrect legal principles; (3) the military judge applies correct
       legal principles to the facts in a way that is clearly unreasonable;
       or (4) the military judge fails to consider important facts.
United States v. Rudometkin, 82 M.J. 396, 401 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citations omit-
ted).
   A military judge is “presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear
evidence to the contrary.” United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F.
2007) (citation omitted).
   3. Analysis
    On appeal, Appellant asserts the military judge abused his discretion in
three ways when he denied the motion for a mistrial. First, Appellant contends
the military judge failed to “fully consider” that “he made himself a witness in
this case.” Second, Appellant argues the military judge “failed to analyze
whether he should have recused himself because he made himself a witness.”
Third, Appellant claims the military judge unreasonably applied the applicable
law to the facts because the military judge “did not explain why no ‘substantial
doubt’ would be cast upon the fairness of the proceedings even though [Appel-
lant] had chosen a [m]ilitary [j]udge[-]alone forum.” We address each point in
turn.
    We disagree with the premise of Appellant’s first point, that the military
judge became a witness. Appellant is correct that Mil. R. Evid. 605(a) prohibits
the presiding military judge from “testify[ing] as a witness at any proceeding
of that court-martial.” However, a military judge does not become a testifying

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

witness, and therefore disqualified, merely by answering voir dire questions
posed by counsel. See, e.g., R.C.M. 902(d)(2) (“Each party shall be permitted to
question the military judge and to present evidence regarding a possible
ground for disqualification before the military judge decides the matter.”);
United States v. King, No. ACM 39583, 2021 CCA LEXIS 415, at *30, 35 (A.F.
Ct. Crim. App. 16 Aug. 2021) (unpub. op.) (noting the military judge “permitted
the [d]efense an extensive opportunity to voir dire him” and did not abuse his
discretion by declining to recuse himself), aff’d on other grounds, 83 M.J. 115
(C.A.A.F. 2023). Moreover, military judges are charged with “exercis[ing] rea-
sonable control over the proceedings.” R.C.M. 801(a)(3). In this case, those pro-
ceedings were brought to an unexpected halt when the court reporter abruptly
left the courtroom. We find nothing untoward in the military judge calling a
recess and briefly investigating the cause of the disruption and the court re-
porter’s status—particularly where the military judge kept the parties in-
formed through multiple R.C.M. 802 conferences and the opportunity to voir
dire him. Ms. N herself was not a witness in the case, and the military judge
did not discuss evidentiary matters with her beyond a very brief reference to
what they had both already observed during the court-martial. In short, the
military judge did not depart from his role as the presiding judge, and he had
not become a “witness” that such a status should have factored into his analy-
sis of the motion for a mistrial.
    As to Appellant’s second point, because the military judge had not become
a “witness,” he had no cause to recuse himself on that basis, nor to factor such
a recusal into his mistrial analysis. Whether the military judge erred in failing
to recuse himself sua sponte is a distinct assignment of error we analyze below.
    Appellant’s third point—that the military judge failed to adequately ex-
plain his reasoning—is also unpersuasive. A “mistrial is an unusual and disfa-
vored remedy” to “be applied only as a last resort,” Diaz, 59 M.J. at 90 (citation
omitted), and the military judge’s determination that it was unnecessary is
entitled to considerable deference. In this case, the military judge made find-
ings of fact supported by the record, recited the applicable standards, and ex-
plained why Ms. N’s reaction would have no improper influence on the court
and why observers could be confident in the integrity of the proceedings. Ab-
sent evidence to the contrary, military judges are presumed to disregard inad-
missible and irrelevant matters during their deliberations. Nothing in the rec-
ord before us undermines the presumption the military judge could disregard
Ms. N’s reaction when deciding the merits of the case, or otherwise indicates
the military judge abused his discretion when he denied the mistrial motion.

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

B. Military Judge Disqualification
   1. Additional Background
   The relevant additional background is the same as that for the military
judge’s denial of the motion for a mistrial, Section II.A.1, supra.
   2. Law
    We review a military judge’s decision whether to recuse himself for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Sullivan, 74 M.J. 448, 454 (C.A.A.F. 2015)
(citations omitted). However, “[w]hen an appellant . . . does not raise the issue
of disqualification until appeal, we examine the claim under the plain error
standard of review.” United States v. Martinez, 70 M.J. 154, 157 (C.A.A.F.
2011) (citing United States v. Jones, 55 M.J. 317, 320 (C.A.A.F. 2001)). An ap-
pellant is entitled to relief for plain error “where (1) there was error, (2) the
error was plain and obvious, and (3) the error materially prejudiced a substan-
tial right of the accused.” United States v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2018)
(citation omitted).
    “An accused has a constitutional right to an impartial judge.” United States
v. Wright, 52 M.J. 136, 140 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citations omitted). Rule for Courts-
Martial 902(a) requires disqualification “in any proceeding in which th[e] mil-
itary judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Disqualification
pursuant to R.C.M. 902(a) is determined by applying an objective standard of
“whether a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would conclude
that the military judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Sulli-
van, 74 M.J. at 453 (citing United States v. Hasan, 71 M.J. 416, 418 (C.A.A.F.
2012)). In addition, R.C.M. 902(b)(3) provides a military judge shall disqualify
himself where he “has been or will be a witness in the same case.” See also
R.C.M. 902(b)(5)(C) (disqualifying a military judge who “[i]s to the military
judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding”).
    “There is a strong presumption that a judge is impartial, and a party seek-
ing to demonstrate bias must overcome a high hurdle . . . .” United States v.
Quintanilla, 56 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (citation omitted). “Although a mil-
itary judge is to ‘broadly construe’ the grounds for challenge, he should not
leave the case ‘unnecessarily.’” Sullivan, 74 M.J. at 454 (quoting R.C.M.
902(d)(1), Discussion).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant contends the military judge’s interactions with the court re-
porter, Ms. N, after she withdrew from the courtroom, and his subsequent voir
dire by counsel, made him a witness in the case and therefore disqualified him
under R.C.M. 902(b)(3). Because Appellant makes this argument for the first

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

time on appeal, we review for plain error. We find the military judge did not
plainly or obviously err by failing to recuse himself sua sponte.
    As noted above in relation to the mistrial motion, the Rules for Courts-
Martial indicate a military judge does not become a witness in the case merely
because counsel ask him questions through voir dire. Rule for Courts-Martial
902(d)(2) permits parties to question the military judge on an issue of possible
disqualification “before the military judge decides the matter,” which neces-
sarily implies the fact of voir dire does not per se disqualify a military judge.
(Emphasis added). Moreover, in this case the nature of the voir dire related to
the military judge’s role in exercising reasonable control over the court-martial
proceedings by briefly investigating the reason for Ms. N’s abrupt departure
from the courtroom. See R.C.M. 801(a)(3). The questioning did not directly re-
late to the substance of the offenses or factfinding related to presentencing pro-
ceedings. Allowing voir dire was an appropriate step to help ensure the parties
and public (and appellate courts) were fully informed as to whether there was
any cause to declare a mistrial or for the military judge to recuse himself. For
the reasons explained supra in relation to issue (1), we found the military judge
did not abuse his discretion by denying the mistrial motion; we are also satis-
fied the military judge did not plainly err by failing to recuse himself sua sponte
on the grounds that he had become a “witness” in the case or that his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.
C. Confrontation Clause
   1. Additional Background
    The Government’s first witness for findings was Ms. HR, a criminal analyst
who worked for the New Mexico Attorney General’s ICAC unit. Ms. HR ex-
plained her role was to receive “CyberTips” from NCMEC reporting possible
child exploitation. Ms. HR testified she received such a report from NCMEC
regarding Appellant. Trial counsel then presented Ms. HR with Prosecution
Exhibit 4 (PE 4), which Ms. HR agreed was “a fair and accurate representation
of the [document] portion of the CyberTip.”
   Trial counsel then offered PE 4 into evidence. The military judge asked trial
defense counsel whether there was any objection. The record reflects the fol-
lowing subsequent exchange:
       [Trial Defense Counsel]: I didn’t actually see the document from
       the copy that we have.
       [Military Judge]: Trial Counsel, could you please show a copy to
       defense counsel?
       [Trial counsel and [trial] defense counsel conferred.]
       [No objection from [D]efense.]

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             United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

(Third and fifth alteration in original). The military judge then admitted PE 4
while “not[ing] for the record that there appear[ed] to be a number of redac-
tions in the document.”
    Trial counsel then had Ms. HR review and comment on various portions of
PE 4. The exhibit consisted of 12 pages divided into four sections. Unredacted
portions of “Section A: Reported Information” contained information provided
by the “Electronic Service Provider” (Facebook) which reported the suspected
child pornography to NCMEC. This section contained significant details about
the “Suspect” (Appellant), including inter alia his name, phone number, date
of birth, email addresses, Facebook profile, and estimated location at the time
of the reported incident, as well as the name and certain personal information
of the “recipient of the reported content.” Section A further indicated Facebook
had uploaded three files to NCMEC associated with the reported incident, in-
cluding two video files of “child exploitation imagery,” one of which Facebook
personnel had viewed. “Section B: Automated Information Added by NCMEC
Systems,” is largely redacted, but a subsection labeled “Geo-Lookup (Suspect)”
identified three geographic areas—one in the Philippines and two in New Mex-
ico—as well as Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) associated with the incident. “Section C: Additional Information Pro-
vided by NCMEC” was also largely redacted, but provided the date NCMEC
processed the report, categorized the report as “Apparent Child Pornography
(Unconfirmed),” indicated NCMEC did not review the uploaded files, and
stated NCMEC had reported the matter to law enforcement. Finally, “Section
D: Law Enforcement Contact Information” provided contact information for
the New Mexico Attorney General’s office.
    Trial counsel then presented Ms. HR with Prosecution Exhibit 5 (PE 5), a
disc containing an electronic version of the NCMEC report and the three files
Facebook had uploaded with the report. After Ms. HR identified these as the
files she received from NCMEC, trial counsel offered PE 5 into evidence. Trial
defense counsel objected to admission of one of the video files on lack of au-
thentication grounds. After hearing argument from counsel, the military judge
overruled the objection. The two video files contained in PE 5 appear to depict
actual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
    Ms. HR further testified that after she received the NCMEC report, she
viewed one of the videos which depicted “a pubescent male engaged in sexual
acts with a prepubescent female” who appeared to be under the age of 18 years.
Ms. HR determined from Appellant’s Facebook profile that Appellant was an
Airman stationed at Cannon AFB. Therefore, she referred the case to the OSI.
   Subsequent prosecution findings witnesses included, inter alia, the case
agents for the OSI’s investigation of Appellant. The agents described investi-
gative steps the OSI took after Ms. HR referred the case to the Air Force. As a

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

result of these steps, the OSI obtained evidence regarding Appellant directly
from Facebook. This evidence included copies of the same two videos of appar-
ent child pornography that had been uploaded with the NCMEC report and
admitted as PE 5, as well as records of Facebook Messenger exchanges involv-
ing Appellant indicating he distributed the same two videos to a recipient in
the Philippines. The Government introduced these videos and messages at
trial as additional prosecution exhibits.
   2. Law
    “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “Testimo-
nial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where
the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004)
(footnote omitted).
    “[A] statement is testimonial if ‘made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.’” United States v. Sweeney, 70 M.J. 296, 301
(C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting United States v. Blazier, 68 M.J. 439, 442 (C.A.A.F.
2010)). “[M]achine-generated data and printouts are not statements and thus
not hearsay -- machines are not declarants -- and such data is therefore not
‘testimonial.’” United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (foot-
note and citations omitted). Chain of custody documents may also be non-tes-
timonial. United States v. Tearman, 72 M.J. 54, 59 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
    Whether a statement is testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment
is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Baas, 80 M.J. 114, 120
(C.A.A.F. 2020) (citation omitted). However, when an appellant did not object
to the admission of evidence at trial, we must determine whether the appellant
forfeited or waived the objection. United States v. Bench, 82 M.J. 388, 392
(C.A.A.F. 2022) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 580 (2023). “[F]orfei-
ture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” United States v.
Gladue, 67 M.J. 311, 313 (C.A.A.F. 2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 733 (1993)). Waiver occurs when an accused intentionally relin-
quishes or abandons a known right, but it may also occur by operation of law.
Bench, 82 M.J. at 392 (citation omitted). However, appellate courts apply a
presumption against finding waiver of constitutional rights. Id. (citation omit-
ted).
   We review forfeited issues for plain error. Jones, 78 M.J. at 44 (citation
omitted). “When a constitutional issue is reviewed for plain error, the prejudice
analysis considers whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                        12
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

   3. Analysis
   Appellant contends the military judge plainly erred by admitting PE 4 and
the “accompanying images” in PE 5 because PE 4 contained testimonial state-
ments in violation of the Confrontation Clause under Crawford. Appellant
therefore asks us to set aside the findings of guilty and the sentence. In re-
sponse, the Government contends: (1) Appellant waived his Confrontation
Clause objection; and (2) PE 4 contained only machine-generated data rather
than testimonial hearsay.
    We do not find waiver. We acknowledge PE 4 appears to have been redacted
to remove certain narrative portions, likely in an effort to remove objectionable
statements. We further acknowledge the record suggests PE 4 was offered in
the redacted form trial defense counsel anticipated. However, the record is not
clear that there was an affirmative, intentional relinquishment of Appellant’s
rights under the Confrontation Clause. It is possible the Defense only consid-
ered whether to object on hearsay or other non-constitutional grounds. In light
of the presumption against finding waiver of constitutional rights, we are not
persuaded the record “clearly established that there was an intentional relin-
quishment of a known right.” Sweeney, 70 M.J. at 303 (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted). Accordingly, we find Appellant forfeited the objection and we
review for plain error.
    The parties disagree as to whether PE 4 contained “testimonial statements”
for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. However, Appellant is not enti-
tled to relief if we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the asserted error did
not materially prejudice Appellant’s substantial rights. In the context of an
alleged constitutional error, that standard is met where we find “no reasonable
possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction.” United
States v. Tovarchavez, 78 M.J. 458, 460 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citation omitted).
    Assuming arguendo the military judge plainly erred by admitting PE 4, in
this case we find no reasonable possibility the asserted error influenced the
guilty finding. First, the exclusion of PE 4 would not have been fatal to the
admission of the two videos of apparent child pornography in PE 5 the Govern-
ment admitted through the testimony of Ms. HR. Those videos were not testi-
monial statements and therefore did not implicate the Confrontation Clause.
    More importantly, even if neither PE 4 nor PE 5 had been admitted, the
Government introduced equivalent evidence—and more—that the OSI ob-
tained directly from Facebook during its investigation. This included not only
the same two videos of apparent child pornography included in PE 5, admitted
as additional prosecution exhibits, but also records of Facebook messages
demonstrating Appellant intentionally distributed the videos to another indi-
vidual, and that he had viewed the videos before he sent them. Without PE 4

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              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

and PE 5, the strength of the Government’s proof that Appellant distributed
child pornography in violation of Article 134, UCMJ, would have been essen-
tially unchanged. Moreover, whether Appellant distributed the videos was not
a contested issue in this case; instead, the Defense suggested the Government
failed to prove the videos depicted actual minors, that Appellant knew the vid-
eos depicted actual minors, or that his conduct was service discrediting. Thus,
the data in PE 4 associating Appellant with the two videos played a negligible
role in overcoming the Defense’s chosen strategy.
   Because we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the admission of PE 4
and the “accompanying images” in PE 5 did not materially prejudice Appel-
lant’s substantial rights, Appellant is not entitled to relief.
D. Firearm Prohibition
   1. Additional Background
    The Statement of Trial Results (STR) and entry of judgment (EoJ) in the
instant case—signed by the military judge in accordance with R.C.M. 1101 and
R.C.M. 1111, respectively—have attached indorsements from the convening
authority’s staff judge advocate which recite, inter alia, “[t]he following crimi-
nal indexing is required . . . Firearm Prohibition Triggered Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922: Yes . . . .” The indorsements do not specify which subsections of 18
U.S.C. § 922 trigger the firearm prohibition in Appellant’s case.
   2. Law
    We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. United States v. Hale, 78 M.J.
268, 270 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (citing EV v. United States, 75 M.J. 331, 333 (C.A.A.F.
2016)). “The burden to establish jurisdiction rests with the party invoking the
court’s jurisdiction.” United States v. LaBella, 75 M.J. 52, 53 (C.A.A.F. 2015)
(citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
Statutory interpretation is also a question of law this court reviews de novo.
United States v. Buford, 77 M.J. 562, 564 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (citation
omitted). “Proper completion of post-trial processing is [also] a question of law
this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Valentin-Andino, 83 M.J. 537, 541
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2023) (citation omitted).
    “The [C]ourts of [C]riminal [A]ppeals [(CCAs)] are courts of limited juris-
diction, defined entirely by statute.” United States v. Arness, 74 M.J. 441, 442
(C.A.A.F. 2015) (citation omitted). This court’s authority to review the results
of Appellant’s court-martial is governed by Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866.
Article 66(d), UCMJ, provides that a CCA “may act only with respect to the
findings and sentence as entered into the record under [Article 60c, UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 860c].” 10 U.S.C. § 866(d).
   18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides, in part:

                                       14
               United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

       It shall be unlawful for any person[ ] who has been convicted in
       any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
       ceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
       commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
       ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
       been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
   In United States v. Lepore, this court held it lacked authority under a pre-
vious version of Article 66, UCMJ (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2016 ed.) (2016 MCM)), to direct correction of an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearms
prohibition annotated on a court-martial promulgating order. 81 M.J. 759, 763
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (en banc).
   3. Analysis
    Relying on N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022),
and United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023), cert. granted, 143
S. Ct. 2688 (2023), Appellant contends the Government cannot meet its burden
to demonstrate the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearm prohibition recited in the in-
dorsements to the STR and EoJ are “consistent with the nation’s historical tra-
dition of firearm regulation” and therefore lawful in accordance with the Sec-
ond Amendment.6 Appellant accordingly “requests this [c]ourt find the Gov-
ernment’s firearm prohibition is unconstitutional . . . .”7 However, we find this
court lacks statutory authority to decide the question.
    This court’s opinion in Lepore would appear to control resolution of the is-
sue. There we explained that Article 66(c), UCMJ (2016 MCM), “specifically
limit[ed] our authority such that we ‘may only act with respect to the findings
and sentence’ of a court-martial ‘as approved by the convening authority.’” Le-
pore, 81 M.J. at 762 (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 866(c)). We held that because the
allegedly erroneous 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearm prohibition annotation on the
promulgating order in that case was a collateral consequence of the conviction,
and “not a finding or part of the sentence, nor [a matter] subject to approval by
the convening authority,” it was beyond our statutory authority to correct. Id.
at 763 (citations omitted). As Appellant notes, Lepore was decided under a pre-
vious version of Article 66(c), UCMJ (2016 MCM), and the relevant restrictive
language has since moved to Article 66(d), UCMJ—in a slightly modified form
accounting for the advent of entry of judgment in accordance with Article 60c,
UCMJ. However, the limitation that the CCA “may act only with respect to the

6 U.S. CONST. amend. II.

7 Appellant additionally requests this court “order that the Government correct the

[STR] to reflect which subsection of [18 U.S.C.] § 922 it used to prohibit his firearm
possession.”

                                         15
               United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

findings and sentence” is unchanged. 10 U.S.C. § 866(d). The firearms prohibi-
tion remains a collateral consequence of the conviction, rather than an element
of the findings or sentence, and is therefore beyond our authority to review.
    Appellant contends the unpublished decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) in United States v. Lemire, 82 M.J. 263
(C.A.A.F. 2022) (mem.), contravenes Lepore, which Appellant urges us to over-
rule. The text of the CAAF’s decision in Lemire reads, in its entirety: “On con-
sideration of [the a]ppellant’s petition for grant of review of the decision of the
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals [ACCA], it is ordered that said
petition is granted, and the decision of the [ACCA] is affirmed.” Id. Appellant
focuses on the single footnote, which reads: “It is directed that the promulgat-
ing order be corrected to delete the requirement that [the a]ppellant register
as a sex offender.” Id. at 263 n*. Appellant argues that Lemire demonstrates:
(1) the CAAF has the power to order corrections to administrative errors in
promulgating orders; (2) the CAAF “believes that [CCAs] have the power to
address collateral consequences under Article 66[, UCMJ,] since it ‘directed’
the [ACCA] to fix—or have fixed—the erroneous requirement that Sergeant
Lemire register as a sex offender;” and (3) CCAs also must have the power to
address constitutional errors in promulgating orders even if they relate to col-
lateral consequences of the conviction.
   We are not persuaded. Even if we accept that the sex offender registration
requirement referred to in Lemire is analogous to the firearms prohibition in
Appellant’s case,8 we do not find that decision vitiates this court’s published
opinion in Lepore.
    First, the circumstances and reasoning behind the CAAF’s direction to cor-
rect the promulgating order are opaque. Neither the CAAF’s unpublished sum-
mary disposition nor the ACCA’s summary per curiam opinion provide infor-
mation about the circumstances of the case. See Lemire, 82 M.J. at 263; United
States v. Lemire, No. ARMY 20190129, 2021 CCA LEXIS 461 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. 13 Sep. 2021) (per curiam) (unpub. op.), aff’d, 82 M.J. 263 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
Accordingly, we cannot discern the rationale behind the CAAF-ordered correc-
tion—for example, whether the sex offender registration notation was a clerical
error, or whether some deeper legal principles and analysis were involved.
  Second, Appellant is incorrect when he asserts the CAAF “directed” the
ACCA “to fix—or have fixed” the promulgating order. The CAAF’s decision in

8 Cf. United States v. Miller, 63 M.J. 452, 457 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (describing sex offender

registration as a collateral consequence of conviction “separate and distinct from the
court-martial process”). But cf. United States v. Riley, 72 M.J. 115, 121 (C.A.A.F. 2013)
(“[W]e hold that in the context of a guilty plea inquiry, sex offender registration conse-
quences can no longer be deemed a collateral consequence of the plea.”).

                                           16
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

Lemire, quoted in its entirety above, does not direct the ACCA to do anything.
Notably, it affirms the ACCA’s decision without remanding the case to ACCA
for any purpose. Presumably its direction to correct the promulgating order
was directed to “an appropriate convening authority.” See R.C.M. 1114(b)(2)(B)
(2016 MCM). Accordingly, Lemire does not imply the CAAF believes the CCAs
have the authority to address alleged constitutional errors relating to collat-
eral consequences of a court-martial conviction annotated on promulgating or-
ders.
    Third, this court’s unanimous, en banc, published decision in Lepore re-
flects the consistent recent trend of this court’s opinions finding collateral con-
sequences of a court-martial are beyond our statutory authority to review. See
Lepore, 81 M.J. at 762 (citing cases in which this court found it lacked jurisdic-
tion “where appellants have sought relief for alleged deficiencies unrelated to
the legality or appropriateness of the court-martial findings or sentence” (cita-
tions omitted)). We do not find any aspect of Appellant’s case gives us cause to
revisit or overrule the decision in Lepore.
   Accordingly, we do not address the substance of Appellant’s argument that
the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) firearms restriction is unconstitutional in this case.
E. Post-Trial Delay
   1. Additional Background
   The military judge sentenced Appellant on 28 January 2022. Appellant’s
record of trial was initially docketed with this court on 10 June 2022. Appellant
subsequently moved for and, over the Government’s opposition, was granted
three enlargements of time in which to submit his assignments of error, until
7 December 2022.
    On 4 November 2022, Appellant moved to examine certain sealed material
in the original record of trial. As a result, this court discovered a disc consti-
tuting a sealed prosecution exhibit was cracked and inoperable. Accordingly,
on 17 November 2022, this court returned the record of trial to the Chief Trial
Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, for correction. The defective exhibit was re-
placed via a certificate of correction dated 15 December 2022, and the corrected
record was re-docketed with this court on 19 December 2022.
    Appellant thereafter requested and received an additional enlargement of
time before filing his assignments of error on 3 April 2023. The Government
requested and was granted one enlargement of time before filing its answer
brief on 2 June 2023. Appellant submitted a reply brief on 8 June 2023.
   2. Law
   “[C]onvicted servicemembers have a due process right to timely review and
appeal of courts-martial convictions.” United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129,

                                        17
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

135 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citations omitted). In Moreno, the CAAF established a
presumption of facially unreasonable delay “where the action of the convening
authority is not taken within 120 days of the completion of trial,” “where the
record of trial is not docketed by the [CCA] within thirty days of the convening
authority’s action,” or “where appellate review is not completed and a decision
is not rendered within eighteen months of docketing the case before the [CCA].”
Id. at 142. In United States v. Livak, 80 M.J. 631 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2020),
this court adapted the Moreno thresholds for facially unreasonable delay to the
new post-trial processing regime that went into effect in 2019. Specifically,
Livak established an aggregated 150-day standard for facially unreasonable
delay from sentencing to docketing with the CCA for cases referred to trial on
or after 1 January 2019. Id. at 633.
    Where there is a facially unreasonable delay, we examine the four factors
set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972): “(1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right to
timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice [to the appellant].” Moreno, 63 M.J.
at 135 (citations omitted). The CAAF identified three types of cognizable prej-
udice for purposes of an appellant’s due process right to timely post-trial re-
view: (1) oppressive incarceration; (2) “particularized” anxiety and concern
“that is distinguishable from the normal anxiety experienced by prisoners
awaiting an appellate decision;” and (3) impairment of the appellant’s grounds
for appeal or ability to present a defense at a rehearing. Id. at 138–40 (citations
omitted). Where there is no qualifying prejudice from the delay, there is no due
process violation unless the delay is so egregious as to “adversely affect the
public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.”
United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353, 362 (C.A.A.F. 2006). We review de novo
an appellant’s entitlement to relief for post-trial delay. Livak, 80 M.J. at 633
(citing Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135).
   3. Analysis
       a. Pre-Docketing Delay
    Appellant contends the 325 days which elapsed between his sentencing on
28 January 2022 and the re-docketing of the corrected record of trial on 19
December 2022 amounts to a facially unreasonable delay. Although Appel-
lant’s case was originally docketed with this court only 133 days after he was
sentenced—within the 150-day standard established by Livak—Appellant ar-
gues “[t]his [c]ourt should find that the Government fails to meet its Moreno
and Livak deadline if the [record] it submitted for docketing does not comport
with statutory and regulatory requirements.” Appellant contends that our fail-
ure to do so will “incentivize” the Government to, in effect, prioritize speed over
accuracy, increasing the likelihood that this court will need to remand the rec-
ord for correction and ultimately delaying our final decision in the case. Having

                                        18
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

asserted a facially unreasonable delay, Appellant does not provide a full anal-
ysis of the Barker factors or allege any specific prejudice. However, Appellant
implies this court should find a due process violation and requests we not ap-
prove the adjudged bad-conduct discharge.
    We decline to interpret Moreno and Livak in the manner Appellant sug-
gests. To do so would be contrary to the plain meaning of those opinions. In
Moreno, the CAAF stated the presumption of unreasonable delay applies
“where the record of trial is not docketed” by the CCA within the specified time
frame. 63 M.J. at 142. As applied by Livak, that timeframe is within 150 days
of sentencing. 80 M.J. at 633. In Appellant’s case, the record was docketed
within 150 days, and therefore the per se facially unreasonable sentencing-to-
docketing delay does not apply. Appellant does not direct our attention to any
ruling by the CAAF or this court holding that a subsequent remand by the CCA
to correct one or more errors in the record effectively extends or reopens the
period under consideration for facially unreasonable delay until the corrected
record is re-docketed, and we are aware of none. Cf. United States v. Gammage,
No. ACM S32731 (f rev), 2023 CCA LEXIS 528, at *5–6 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 15
Dec. 2023) (unpub. op.) (finding original docketing of record with CCA 55 days
after sentencing “categorically complied” with 150-day Livak standard for fa-
cially unreasonable delay despite subsequent remand due to incomplete record
of trial).
    On the other hand, neither the CAAF nor this court has held that the spe-
cific time standards in Moreno are the exclusive means by which an appellant
may demonstrate a facially unreasonable delay for due process purposes. See
United States v. Greer, No. ACM 39806 (f rev), 2022 CCA LEXIS 411, at *15
(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 18 Jul. 2022) (unpub. op.) (citing United States v. Swan-
son, No. ACM. 38827, 2016 CCA LEXIS 648, at *21 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 27
Oct. 2016) (unpub. op.)). Put another way, Moreno and Livak are a shield for
an appellant’s due process rights, not a sword for the Government to wield
against appellants. Accordingly, a facially unreasonable delay could poten-
tially have occurred between Appellant’s sentencing on 28 January 2022 and
initial docketing on 10 June 2022. However, Appellant has not alleged such a
delay, and we discern none from the record. Accordingly, we find no violation
of Appellant’s due process rights during the period prior to docketing.
    Recognizing our authority under Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d),
we have also considered whether relief for excessive post-trial delay is appro-
priate for delay between sentencing and docketing. See United States v. Tardif,
57 M.J. 219, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2002). After considering the factors enumerated in
United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736, 744 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015), aff’d, 75 M.J.
264 (C.A.A.F. 2016), we conclude no such relief is warranted.

                                       19
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

       b. Appellate Delay
    Next we consider whether Appellant is entitled to relief for post-docketing
delay—that is, any delay that occurred after initial docketing on 10 June 2022.
Over 18 months have elapsed since Appellant’s record of trial was originally
docketed. Assuming for purposes of our analysis that the November 2022 re-
mand and December 2022 re-docketing of the record did not “reset” the Moreno
timeline, there is a facially unreasonable delay in the appellate proceedings.
Accordingly, we have considered the Barker factors to assess whether Appel-
lant suffered a due process violation. However, because Appellant has suffered
no cognizable prejudice, we will find a due process violation only if delays were
so egregious as to affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of
the military justice system. See Toohey, 63 M.J. at 362.
    With respect to the length of the delay, although we assume for purposes
of our analysis it is facially unreasonable, we do not find it is egregious or
weighs heavily in Appellant’s favor. Appellate review has exceeded the Moreno
standard by less than one month.
    We similarly find the reasons for delay are not egregious. We have specifi-
cally considered the delays associated with the remand as part of our analysis.
In this case, the deficiency in the record was a damaged exhibit rather than a
missing one. The Government is required to include functional exhibits in the
record, but the fact that the exhibit was present rather than missing entirely
made the error less obvious. Moreover, the fact that it was a sealed exhibit
meant (a) it was not included in most copies of the record of trial, and (b) a very
limited number of people had authority to view or inspect the disc. Further-
more, it is unclear at what point in time the disc was damaged; it is possible
the Government had no practical opportunity to inspect the disc after it was
damaged. In addition, we note that once the record was remanded to the Chief
Trial Judge, it took approximately one month to accomplish the correction and
re-docket the record. As for other contributing reasons for delay, we note much
of the elapsed time is attributable to the time afforded Appellant to file his
assignments of error, augmented by several motions for enlargements of time.
Although the five-volume record of trial is not especially voluminous, we do not
find the reasons for delay, considered together, to undermine the public’s per-
ception of the fairness or integrity of the military justice system.
   Appellant has not made a demand for speedy appellate review. Although
Appellant’s assignment of errors asserted the delay between his sentencing
and the post-remand re-docketing was facially unreasonable, complaining
about a past delay is distinct from demanding speed at the present time. Ac-
cordingly, we find this factor weighs against finding a due process violation.

                                        20
              United States v. Fernandez, No. ACM 40290 (f rev)

   As stated above, Appellant asserts no qualifying particularized prejudice
from the delay, and we perceive none.
    For the foregoing reasons, we find the delay is not so egregious as to impugn
the fairness or integrity of the military justice system. Accordingly, we find no
violation of Appellant’s due process rights.
    Again mindful of our Article 66, UCMJ, authority to grant relief for appel-
late delay in the absence of a due process violation, we have considered
whether such relief is appropriate and find it is not. See Tardif, 57 M.J. at 225;
Gay, 74 M.J. at 742.

                               III. CONCLUSION
   The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles
59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the findings
and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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