Court Opinion

ID: 9963244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 20:01:02.519627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.878922
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                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-12468
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       DAVID TIMOTHY MOORE,
                                                  Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       GEORGIA BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLES,
       CHAIRMAN, STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES,
       VICE CHAIRMAN, STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND
       PAROLES,
       JACQUELINE BUNN,
       Esq., Member,
       DAVID HERRING, et al.
       Member,
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12468

                                                           Defendants-Appellees.

                               ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-01109-AT
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               David Timothy Moore, proceeding pro se, appeals the dis-
       trict court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for failure to
       state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Mr. Moore alleged in
       his complaint that Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), entitles him
       to “a meaningful and realistic opportunity to obtain release on pa-
       role based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” as a juve-
       nile offender, and argues that this claim is plausible.
               Because Mr. Moore’s complaint states a plausible claim for
       relief, we vacate and remand.
                                             I*

       * All the stated facts are taken from Mr. Moore’s complaint because, at the
       motion to dismiss stage, we are required to “accept the allegations in the com-
       plaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
       Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2021).
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       23-12468              Opinion of the Court                       3

              In 1987, when Mr. Moore was 17 years old, a Georgia jury
       convicted him of armed robbery, aggravated assault, aggravated
       battery, and aggravated assault with intent to rob. He was sen-
       tenced to life imprisonment for the armed robbery count plus 20
       years for each of the additional three counts. In May of 1988, the
       Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles notified Mr. Moore that he
       would be considered for parole in 1994. In May of 1989, Mr. Moore
       was involved in an “inmate disturbance,” during which Mr. Moore
       alleges twenty inmates “unprovokingly attacked” three inmates.
       Mr. Moore stabbed one of the attacking inmates and subsequently
       pled guilty to manslaughter in October of 1989 after being indicted
       for murder. Mr. Moore was sentenced to fifteen consecutive years
       for the manslaughter conviction. There was no change to Mr.
       Moore’s upcoming parole consideration for May of 1994.
              In June of 1994, following the May parole consideration, the
       Board denied parole based “on the circumstances and nature of the
       offense and multiple offenses.” In May of 2002, Mr. Moore was
       again denied parole based “on the circumstances and the nature of
       the offense.” In May of 2010, Mr. Moore was denied parole a third
       time due to the “severe nature of the offense.” In March of 2014,
       Mr. Moore was denied parole for a fourth time because of the “se-
       vere nature of the offense.” In April of 2018, the Board based Mr.
       Moore’s fifth denial of parole on “insufficient time served to date
       given the nature and circumstances of [his] offenses.” Most re-
       cently, in February of 2021, Mr. Moore was denied parole a sixth
       time, again because of “insufficient amount of time served to date
       given the nature and circumstances of [his] offense.” Both the
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12468

       penultimate and ultimate denials noted that Mr. Moore was “en-
       couraged to continue in [his] rehabilitative efforts so [he] will be
       properly prepared in the event a future consideration results in [ ]
       transition back into society.” Neither denial, however, provided
       any specifics about what rehabilitative steps Mr. Moore must take
       to have a meaningful chance at parole.
                                             II
               The sixth denial of parole prompted Mr. Moore’s complaint
       in this case, which he filed in March of 2023. In his complaint, Mr.
       Moore alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Board and
       its members in their individual and official capacities. Mr. Moore
       cited to O.C.G.A. §§ 42-9-40(a), 42-9-42(c) to show that Georgia law
       requires guidelines for determining parole action, “except [for]
       those serving life sentences.” This lack of guidelines, Mr. Moore
       asserts, violates his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amend-
       ment because juvenile offenders sentenced to life with the possibil-
       ity of parole deserve a chance to show they have matured. Specifi-
       cally, he contends there should be “criteria, standard(s), proce-
       dures(s) and/or guideline(s)” that make a distinction between ju-
       venile and adult offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, and
       which “afford [ ] a meaningful and realistic opportunity to obtain
       release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” 1

       1 Mr. Moore also argues that the district court erred in considering facts out-

       side the four corners of his complaint. Because we vacate and remand on other
       grounds, we do not reach this issue.
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       23-12468               Opinion of the Court                        5

               Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a court reviews a complaint in a
       civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from an officer or em-
       ployee of a governmental entity as soon as practicable. Pursuant to
       § 1915A, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
       (“R&R”) recommending that Mr. Moore’s complaint be dismissed
       for failure to state a claim.
              The R&R concluded that the Board was entitled to sover-
       eign immunity, but that Mr. Moore could bring claims for declara-
       tive and injunctive relief against the Board’s members. Regarding
       the merits, the R&R determined Mr. Moore failed to state an
       Eighth Amendment claim because the Board’s decision was
       “merely a disappointment,” rather than a decision that constituted
       cruel and unusual punishment. See Slakman v. Buckner, 434 F. App’x
       872, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Further, the R&R deter-
       mined that Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, does not apply to juvenile of-
       fenders who were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole
       and who, as adults, were also sentenced for voluntary manslaugh-
       ter. Additionally, the R&R explained Mr. Moore could not state a
       procedural due process claim because he had no liberty interest nor
       any constitutional right to parole, and the Board’s decision to deny
       Mr. Moore parole did not violate his substantive due process rights
       because the Board is allowed to deny parole based on the nature
       and circumstances of the offense. Finally, the R&R concluded that
       Mr. Moore failed to state an equal protection claim. He had not
       alleged sufficient information to show that those who did receive
       parole were similarly situated because he did not provide
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12468

       information regarding their criminal history, disciplinary record, or
       background.
              Mr. Moore filed objections to the R&R, arguing that Graham
       affords juvenile non-homicide offenders sentenced to life with the
       possibility of parole more process and requires parole proceedings
       to distinguish between juvenile and adult offenders. Mr. Moore
       made the crux of his claim clear when he posed the following ques-
       tion in his objections: “Have the Defendants created a system or
       procedure within their parole process that complies with the Su-
       preme Court’s directive and holding that states must provide juve-
       nile non-homicide offenders who are sentenced to life (not life-
       without-parole) some meaningful opportunity to obtain release
       based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation?”
             After receiving Mr. Moore’s objections, the district court
       adopted the R&R, noting that Graham did not say anything about
       the considerations the Board must make when determining
       whether to grant parole. It concluded that Graham stood only for
       the proposition that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a life-with-
       out-parole sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit
       homicide.”
               In determining that Mr. Moore “clearly has a ‘meaningful’
       shot” at parole, the district court referred to the appellate decision
       relating to Mr. Moore’s initial conviction. Both because the Board
       had considered Mr. Moore for parole six times and because Mr.
       Moore’s original crimes were “extremely violent and chilling,” the
       district court reasoned “there [wa]s nothing at all shocking or
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       23-12468                Opinion of the Court                            7

       outrageous” about the denials. Accordingly, Mr. Moore’s “argu-
       ment that he is somehow entitled to relief under Graham [wa]s
       simply wrong.” Finally, the district court ruled that Mr. Moore’s
       equal protection claim failed because Moore cannot credibly allege
       that there was not a rational basis for the board to deny him pa-
       role. 2
                                          III
               We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
       for failure to state a claim, “accept[ing] the allegations in the com-
       plaint as true and constru[ing] them in the light most favorable to
       the plaintiff.” Chua, 1 F.4th at 952. Though pro se pleadings must
       provide a factual basis for a claim, they are construed liberally and
       held to less stringent standards than those drafted by attorneys. See
       Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
               To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff
       must allege (1) a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or
       laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was commit-
       ted or caused by a person acting under the color of state law. See
       Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
              To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, a plaintiﬀ
       must allege suﬃcient facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausi-
       ble on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
       A complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions, and

       2 Because Mr. Moore disclaims any equal protection claim in his appeal, we
       do not address this part of the district court’s opinion.
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       8                        Opinion of the Court                    23-12468

       a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
       do.” Id. at 555 (quotation marks omitted). A plausible claim allows
       a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the claims.
       See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
               A complaint, of course, must allege more than a “sheer pos-
       sibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
       The factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a
       right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
       555. But the “plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability re-
       quirement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
                Mr. Moore alleges a violation of his constitutional rights
       based on a theory that appears to be an issue of first impression in
       our circuit. A district court “should be especially reluctant to dis-
       miss on the basis of the pleadings when the asserted theory of lia-
       bility is novel or even ‘extreme.’” 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
       R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (4th ed. 2024). See
       also Shull v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 313 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1963) (“It is
       perhaps ironic that the more extreme or even far-fetched is the as-
       serted theory of liability, the more important it is that the concep-
       tual legal theories be explored and assayed in the light of actual
       facts, not a pleader’s supposition.”).
              Significantly, there is emerging disagreement among district
       and circuit courts about what impact, if any, Graham has on the
       rights of life-sentenced juvenile offenders with respect to parole.
       Some district courts have concluded that there is a plausible claim
       that Graham affords juvenile offenders additional parole
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       23-12468               Opinion of the Court                          9

       protections under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, while
       others have definitively held that such offenders have definitive
       constitutional guarantees post-Graham. See, e.g., Greiman v. Hodges,
       79 F. Supp. 3d 933, 944 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (holding that “[c]onsider-
       ing the current procedural posture of the case, the Court agrees
       with Plaintiff that he has presented at least a plausible § 1983
       claim”); Swatzell v. Tenn. Bd. of Parole, No. 3:18-CV-01336, 2019 WL
       1533445, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 9, 2019) (granting the plaintiff a
       right to amend because, “[b]ased on this line of cases, [he] may be
       able to state a similar Eighth Amendment claim”). See also Hayden
       v. Keller, 134 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1010 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (“The court
       finds that the North Carolina parole process violates the Eighth
       Amendment as outlined in Graham.”); Flores v. Stanford, No. 18 CV
       2468 (VB), 2019 WL 4572703, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019) (hold-
       ing that “Graham, Miller, and Montgomery vest in juvenile offenders
       sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment an Eighth
       Amendment right that attaches to those offenders’ parole proceed-
       ings”). But two circuits, to an extent, have disagreed. See Brown v.
       Precythe, 46 F.4th 879, 886 (8th Cir. 2022) (declining to go so far as
       to “scrutinize in a civil rights action whether a State’s parole proce-
       dures afford ‘some meaningful opportunity’ for release of a juve-
       nile homicide offender,” but finding that the relevant parole system
       was in any event not violative); Bowling v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr.,
       920 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 2019) (determining that “the Supreme
       Court’s reflection on the relief provided by Miller and its lineage
       persuades us that the Eighth Amendment promises juvenile of-
       fenders no further protections than those that Appellant has
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-12468

        already received”). That some courts agree with Mr. Moore, while
        others do not, renders his claim at this stage—at the very least—
        plausible.
               Though we reach no ultimate conclusions as to the merits
        of Mr. Moore’s claim, we find it helpful to lay out the basis for the
        claim. In Graham, the Supreme Court held that “the Eighth Amend-
        ment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence
        on a juvenile nonhomicide offender.” 560 U.S. at 75. Though the
        Eighth Amendment “does not require the State to release that of-
        fender during his natural life,” it does require states to give such
        juvenile defendants “some meaningful opportunity to obtain re-
        lease based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id.
              Does Graham require any meaningful opportunity to
        demonstrate maturity in the parole setting for juvenile offenders?
        There are two possible constitutional rights that could require an
        affirmative answer to this question. Each is premised on the same
        “meaningful opportunity” language provided in Graham, though
        they manifest differently.
                First, the procedural component of the Eighth Amend-
        ment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment could be vio-
        lated if juvenile offenders never have a meaningful opportunity to
        demonstrate maturity as dictated by Graham. One district court ex-
        plained it this way: “If a juvenile offender’s life sentence, while os-
        tensibly labeled as one ‘with parole,’ is the functional equivalent of
        a life sentence without parole, then the State has denied that of-
        fender the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
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        23-12468               Opinion of the Court                         11

        demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ that the Eighth Amend-
        ment demands.” Hayden, 134 F. Supp. at 1009. But see Brown, 46
        F.4th at 886 (declining to find such a constitutional command, but
        holding that the system in question satisfied it regardless).
               Second, and relatedly, the meaningful opportunity decree
        from Graham could mandate additional process due only to juve-
        nile offenders. There is no substantive constitutional right to pa-
        role. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S.
        1, 7 (1979) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a con-
        victed person to be conditionally released before the expiration of
        a valid sentence.”). And Georgia’s parole system does not create a
        legitimate expectation of parole such that there is a liberty interest
        in parole that is subject to due process protections. See Jones v. Ray,
        279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001).
               In the parole context, however, Graham might require a de-
        lineated parole process, a distinction between how adult and juve-
        nile offenders are evaluated for parole, or a requirement that the
        age of an offender at the time of conviction be considered in parole
        proceedings. As one district court explained, regarding a similar
        case at the pleadings stage:
               [A]lthough Graham stops short of guaranteeing pa-
               role, it does provide the juvenile offender with sub-
               stantially more than a possibility of parole or a ‘mere
               hope’ of parole; it creates a categorical entitlement to
               ‘demonstrate maturity and reform,’ to show that ‘he
               is fit to rejoin society,’ and to have a ‘meaningful op-
               portunity for release.’
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                23-12468

        Greiman, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 945 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 79). But
        see Bowling, 920 F.3d at 199 (concluding that the juvenile offender
        was afforded no protections than already received).
                Here, as in Greiman, we do not read Mr. Moore’s complaint
        to claim mere disappointment with the denial of parole, but rather
        construe the complaint to allege a more fundamental concern with
        the procedural dearth in Georgia’s parole system. As noted, Geor-
        gia creates an exception to its requirement of parole guidelines for
        those sentenced to life, see O.C.G.A. §§ 42-9-40(a), 42-9-42(c), and
        Mr. Moore’s own history of parole denials suggests nominal expla-
        nations purportedly without any meaningful path for rehabilita-
        tion. Again, we pass no judgment on the merits of Mr. Moore’s
        claim—and need not do so—because “a well-pleaded complaint
        may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of
        those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and
        unlikely.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Mr. Moore may have an uphill
        battle, especially given his manslaughter conviction as an adult, but
        at this stage we assess only plausibility—not probability. And, here,
        it is plausible that additional process is due to provide Mr. Moore
        “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demon-
        strated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
                Because federal courts are divided on what additional pro-
        cess Graham affords juvenile offenders like Mr. Moore, he has plau-
        sibly stated a claim for relief in his complaint.
                                         V
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        23-12468             Opinion of the Court                     13

               Mr. Moore’s complaint plausibly alleges a violation of his
        constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We therefore vacate
        and remand for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.
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        23-12468               BRASHER, J., Dissenting                       1

        BRASHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
                After committing armed robbery and aggravated assault and
        battery as a juvenile, David Moore was sentenced to life in prison
        with the possibility of parole. He then committed manslaughter in
        prison. He brings a Section 1983 claim against the Georgia Parole
        Board for denying him parole in alleged violation of his Eighth
        Amendment rights under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). The
        district court dismissed the claim, but the majority reverses. I be-
        lieve the majority is mistaken. The language of Graham limits its
        holding to those persons sentenced to life without the possibility of
        parole. Because Moore was sentenced to life with the possibility of
        parole, his claim under Graham fails as a matter of law. Because I
        believe the district court should be affirmed, I must respectfully dis-
        sent.
                                          I.

              Only a few facts are relevant here. Moore was convicted as
        a juvenile for armed robbery and assault and battery. He was sen-
        tenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. He later com-
        mitted manslaughter in prison.
               Moore has been considered for parole eligibility and denied
        six times. Eventually, he filed this pro se Section 1983 lawsuit
        against the Georgia Parole Board for violating his Eighth Amend-
        ment rights under Graham by denying him parole. The Georgia Pa-
        role Board has not been especially fulsome in its reasoning for
        denying Moore parole. But Moore does not identify any policy or
        procedure that makes the Georgia parole process unusual in
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        2                      BRASHER, J., Dissenting               23-12468

        general or as applied to him. On this complaint, the problem
        Moore identifies is simply that he has been considered for parole
        and denied without a satisfactory explanation.
               As part of pre-service screening under the Prison Litigation
        Reform Act, the district court dismissed Moore’s lawsuit for failure
        to state a claim. This appeal followed.
                                          II.

               The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that a district
        court review “as soon as practicable” the complaint in a “civil ac-
        tion in which a prisoner seeks redress from a government entity”
        and “dismiss the complaint” if it “fails to state a claim upon which
        relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)&(b)(1). District courts
        have a duty to dismiss implausible claims “without regard to
        whether [the claim] is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a
        close but ultimately unavailing one.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
        319, 327 (1989).
               Moore grounds his Section 1983 claim in a violation of the
        Eighth Amendment. To plausibly state a claim for relief under 42
        U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege (1) a violation of a right se-
        cured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that
        the deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under
        the color of state law.” Majority Op. at 7–8 (citing Griffin v. City of
        Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)). The Eighth
        Amendment forbids the federal government from inflicting cruel
        and unusual punishments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It was
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        23-12468                BRASHER, J., Dissenting                        3

        incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
        ment’s Due Process Clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
        (1962).
               In Graham, the Supreme Court held that sentencing a juve-
        nile who did not commit murder to life without parole violates the
        Eighth Amendment. 560 U.S. at 82. On its own terms, Graham
        “concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without
        parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.” 560 U.S. at 63. The Su-
        preme Court later extended Graham to sentencing schemes which
        mandate life without parole for juveniles who murdered as well,
        though it did not forbid courts from imposing such a sentence at
        their discretion. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012).
                In my view, the language of Graham establishes that the dis-
        trict court correctly dismissed this claim. The Graham Court did not
        consider the appropriateness of “a particular defendant’s sentence”
        but rather “a sentencing practice itself”—sentencing nonhomicidal
        juveniles to life without parole. 560 U.S. at 61. It took a “categorical
        approach” to that sentencing practice, declaring it unconstitu-
        tional. Id. at 62. As part of its justification for reaching that conclu-
        sion, the Court explained that a state must provide a juvenile with
        a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” Id. at 75. And to ac-
        complish that result, the Court took the sentence of life without
        parole off the table for nonhomicide juvenile offenders.
             The majority says that “i t i s p l a u s i b l e t h a t a d -
        ditional process is due to provide Mr. Moore
        ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
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        4                      BRASHER, J., Dissenting               23-12468

        demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Maj. Op. at 13. No, it
        isn’t. In eliminating the sentence of life without parole, the Court
        did not hold—or even contemplate—that the Eighth Amendment
        would require that any person be granted parole or that a state pa-
        role board follow any particular process. In fact, the Court ex-
        pressly contemplated that some people, such as Moore, will remain
        in prison for their natural lives. The Court held that the “Eighth
        Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons con-
        victed of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will re-
        main behind bars for life.” Id. The Court explained that the Eighth
        Amendment merely “prohibit[s] States from making the judgment at
        the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”
        Id. (emphasis added).
                The Supreme Court has never extended Graham to inmates
        sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Neither have we.
        And such a holding would contravene Graham’s clear directive that
        it “concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without
        parole solely for a nonhomicide offense.” 560 U.S. at 63. Our sister
        circuits have likewise refused to extend the rule in Graham to in-
        mates sentenced to life or terms of years with the possibility of pa-
        role. See Brown v. Precythe, 46 F.4th 879, 886 (8th Cir. 2022) (en
        banc); see also Bowling v. Dir., Virginia Dep’t of Corr., 920 F.3d 192,
        198 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Sparks, 941 F.3d 748, 754 (5th
        Cir. 2019); cf. Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2012) (re-
        fusing to extend Graham “beyond its plain language” to consecu-
        tive, fixed term sentences which are the “functional equivalent of
        life without parole”).
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        23-12468               BRASHER, J., Dissenting                       5

                Despite reversing the district court for dismissing Moore’s
        complaint, the majority does not now purport to extend Graham to
        those sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. See Majority
        Op. at 9–10. Instead, the majority opinion says that some district
        courts are divided on Graham’s applicability to those sentenced to
        life with the possibility of parole and, on that basis, concludes that
        this claim deserves to pass through Prison Litigation Reform Act
        screening. See id. For my part, I don’t think the existence of a disa-
        greement among district courts is a sufficient basis to reverse a dis-
        trict court. But, more importantly, this disposition seems limited to
        the facts here—where a district court has dismissed a pro se com-
        plaint without requiring a response from the defendants and at
        least some judges believe the claim deserves encouragement
        through Prison Litigation Reform Act screening. If this issue were
        appealed with briefing by both sides, we could give this legal ques-
        tion a more fulsome appellate treatment and, I suspect, reach a dif-
        ferent result.
               In any event, I agree with the district court that Moore’s sen-
        tence is consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Moore was sen-
        tenced to life with the possibility of parole, not life without parole.
        And he has been in the past, and continues to be, eligible for parole.
        Certainly, he has been denied parole. But the Eighth Amendment
        does not guarantee him parole or a particular process to assess pa-
        role.
USCA11 Case: 23-12468      Document: 8-1        Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 19 of 19

        6                      BRASHER, J., Dissenting               23-12468

                                         III.

               Because Moore has failed to state a plausible claim for relief,
        I think we are required to affirm. So I must respectfully dissent.