Court Opinion

ID: 9428024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:35.800442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:11.219070
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
This might be viewed as “one of those cases that occasionally appears in the procedural area where it is more important that it be decided (in order to dispel existing conflict. ..) than that it be decided correctly.” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S. 750, 766 (1979) (concurring opinion). But I cannot concur in the result the Court reaches today. For reasons set out below, I believe that the Court’s decision neither is correct as a matter of statutory construction, nor does it dispel the existing decisional conflict, see ante, at 814-815, n. 16, in an acceptable fashion. I would affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals that, in a deferral State, a Title VII complaint is timely filed with the EEOC if it is “filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” § 706 (e), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e).
*827I
The Court finds its interpretation of the interplay between §§ 706 (c) and (e) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-5 (c) and (e), to be based upon a “rather straightforward reading of the statute.” Ante, at 818. That finding is cast into some doubt when one carefully considers the language, structure, and purpose of § 706. Moreover, the relevant legislative history leaves no room whatsoever for doubt that the Court’s perception of Congress’ intent is erroneous.
The rule the Court adopts today requires a Title VII complainant residing in a deferral State to file a charge of employment discrimination within 240 days of the allegedly unlawful act, in order to be certain that his complaint is timely. Yet the numeral “240” nowhere appears in Title VII. It seems a bit odd that Congress, in enacting “a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers initiate the process,” Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U. S. 522, 527 (1972); see ante, at 816, n. 19, would create a filing rule that a complainant could not locate by reading any single statutory provision. One commentator has observed:
“A case of employment discrimination may require a party to refer to the United States Code for the first and only time in his life. An intelligent, but isolated reading of section 706 (e) could easily lead one to believe that 300 days is the time limitation for filing an initial claim with the EEOC. A complainant should not be penalized for Congressional ambiguity, or because he does not possess the reading ability of one trained in statutory interpretation. This indeed is the level of skill required to find the ‘hidden’ 240-day limitation advocated by the district court in Silver.” Comment, 55 Notre Dame Law. 396, 410 (1980).
Of course, as was stated just the other day, “[o]ur compass is not to read a statute to reach what we perceive ... is a ‘sensible result.’ ” Bifulco v. United States, ante, at 401 *828(concurring opinion); yet, where alternative meanings of Congress’ words are plausible, we should not close our eyes to those alternatives through a strong-armed invocation of the plain-meaning rule. I believe that an alternative to the Court’s interpretation of the interplay between §§ 706 (c) and (e) does exist, and that Congress intended to adopt that alternative.
The Court of Appeals in this case viewed § 706 (e), standing alone, as stating the filing requirements for one who wishes to institute a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC. It concluded that “the requirement in § 706 (c) that no charge be 'filed’ before the deferral period ends simply means that the EEOC may not process a Title VII complaint until sixty days after it has been referred to a state agency.” 602 F. 2d 1083, 1088 (1979) (emphasis supplied) . The dual meaning that the Court of Appeals gave to the word “filed” might seem strained at first blush, but that court’s interpretation is supported by the structure of Title VII. Reading the word “filed” to mean two different things in the two subsections avoids an interpretation of the statute that requires a lay person to determine the time requirements for filing a complaint through reference to two separate provisions. Moreover, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the meaning of the word “filed” in § 706 (c) in no way detracts from Congress’ purpose in enacting that subsection— to prevent the EEOC from taking action on a discrimination complaint until the relevant state agencies have had an opportunity to resolve the employee’s dispute with his employer. See ante, at 821. Given these considerations, I am not willing to reject the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute out of hand.
Furthermore, examination of Title VII’s legislative history leads me to conclude that Congress, in 1972, adopted the interpretation of the statute that the Court of Appeals was later to espouse. In examining this legislative history, it is important to note that the EEOC, the agency charged by *829Congress with administering Title VII, has always treated as timely a charge filed within the 300-day period specified in § 706 (e), without regard to the 60-day deferral period specified in § 706 (c). See 29 CFR § 1601.12 (b)(1)(v)(A) (1977); 29 CFR § 1601.13 (a) (1979). Aside from the fact that the EEOC’s consistent interpretation of the filing requirements is “ ‘entitled to great deference' ” Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U. S., at 761, quoting from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 434 (1971), that interpretation was approved by Congress expressly when it re-enacted the forerunners to the present §§ 706 (c) and (e) in 1972. Under such circumstances, this Court is bound to accept the agency’s interpretation.1
In 1971, the pertinent House and Senate Committees both reported bills to amend Title VII that would have deleted the “no charge shall be filed” language from § 706 (c), and substituted in its place a provision that “the Commission shall take no action with respect to the investigation of such charge” until the deferral period had expired. See S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 56 (1971); H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 43 (1971).2 Had either of these bills been enacted, the Court *830of Appeals’ interpretation of Title VII’s filing requirements could not be questioned. The proposed amendments to § 706 (c) generated no controversy during the debates in either House. For reasons completely unrelated to the question presented here, however, the House of Representatives adopted a substitute bill that made no change in the language of § 706 (c). See Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Subcommittee on Labor), pp. 326-332 (1972).3 The Senate, on the other hand, retained the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare’s amendment to the forerunner of § 706 (c). See 118 Cong. Rec. 4945 (1972); Legislative History, p. 1781.
The Conference Committee did not adopt the Senate bill’s version of § 706 (c), but its explanation for failing to do so is clear and is critical to an understanding of the effect of the 1972 amendments on the question presented here. The Conference Committee stated:
“The Senate amendment contained two provisions allowing the Commission to defer to state and local equal employment opportunity agencies. It deleted the language of existing law providing that no charge may be filed during the 60-day period allowed for the deferral and substituted a provision prohibiting the Commission from acting on such a charge until the expiration of the 60-day period. The House bill made no change in existing law. The Senate receded with an amendment that *831would re-state the existing law on the deferral of charges to state agencies. The conferees left existing law intact with the understanding that the decision in Love v. Pullman [Co., 404] U. S. [522 (1972)] interpreting the existing law to allow the Commission to receive a charge (but not act on it) during such deferral period is controlling.” S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, p. 17 (1972); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 92-899, p. 17 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
In addition, a section-by-section analysis prepared by Senators Williams and Javits, and presented to both Houses along with the Conference Report, contained the following explanation of re-enacted § 706 (c):
“No change . . . was deemed necessary in view of the recent Supreme Court decision of Love v. Pullman Co.... which approved the present EEOC deferral procedures as fully in compliance with the intent of the Act. That case held that the EEOC may receive and defer a charge to a State agency on behalf of a complainant and begin to process the charge in the EEOC upon lapse of the 60-day deferral period, even though the language provides that no charge can be filed under § 706 (a) by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law. Similarly, the recent circuit court decision in Vigil v. AT & T, [455] F. 2d [1222] . . . (10th Cir. 1972), which provided that in order to protect the aggrieved person’s right to file with the EEOC within the time periods specified in sections 706 (c) and (d), a charge filed with a State or local agency may also be filed with the EEOC during the 60-day deferral period, is unthin the intent of this Act.” 118 Cong. Rec. 7167 (1972) (Senate); id., at 7564 (House) (emphasis supplied) 4
*832In the face of these indicia of Congress’ intent, the Court states blithely that “our literal reading of the word 'filed’ in § 706 is fully supported by the Love opinion.” Ante, at 823. But even setting aside its questionable dismissal of the Williams-Javits section-by-section analysis, see n. 4, supra, the Court here obviously errs in interpreting the Conference Report itself. The relevant inquiry is not what this Court actually held in Love, as the Court seems to think, but what the Conference Committee, writing some six weeks after Love, thought that the Court held. The passage, quoted above, from the Conference Report makes it clear that the conferees believed the import of the Love decision was that the proposed Senate amendment to § 706 (c) was totally unnecessary. Congress thus believed this Court to have held that existing law permitted the EEOC to treat as timely those charges filed in a deferral State within 300 days, without regard to the “no charge may be filed” language of § 706 (c), and intended that that interpretation should continue to be considered “controlling.”
The Court concludes that Congress in 1972 “expressly rejected the language that would have mandated the exact *833result that respondent urges.” Ante, at 824. But a fair analysis of the legislative history demonstrates that Congress re-enacted §§ 706 (c) and (e) with an expectation that those provisions, as re-enacted, would be interpreted to mandate the result that had long been accepted by the EEOC. The Court’s decision today not only ignores Congress’ avowed intent but it also is inconsistent with our past opinions recognizing that “[w]hen a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation, and this Court is bound thereby.” United States v. Sheffield Board of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 134 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U. S. 405, 414, n. 8 (1975) (construing 1972 amendments to Title VII).
II
Despite the Court’s failure to give effect to the obvious intent of Congress in enacting the 1972 amendments, one might be tempted to go along with the rule it creates today if that rule had at least the advantage of creating a fixed and settled procedure for the filing of a Title YII complaint. But measured by the standard of practicality and ease of administration, I find the Court’s rule sadly wanting.
Contemplate for a moment the plight of the local EEOC officer charged with responsibility for explaining the Court’s rule to a prospective Title VII complainant in one of the Nation’s 42 deferral States.5 The prospective complainant informs the officer that he was fired from his job nine months ago, and now has reason to believe that his discharge was motivated by racial discrimination. He wants to know whether he still may file a timely charge with the EEOC. Under the Court’s rule, the EEOC officer will not be able to *834answer the concerned employee with anything more than an equivocal “maybe.” He must reply (paraphrasing the words of the Court, ante, at 822): “It depends on whether you invoke your rights early enough to allow the 60-day deferral period to expire within 300 days.” In other words, if the hypothetical complainant files his charge 270 days after his discharge, and the EEOC refers the charge to the relevant state agency immediately, and that agency terminates its proceedings within 30 days, the federal charge will have been timely filed. But if the state agency does not terminate its proceedings for a year (perhaps due to backlog or, ironically, because the complaint has merit), then the EEOC cannot consider the charge to have been filed until 330 days have elapsed, and the complainant will be unable to invoke his federally protected rights.
The foregoing example demonstrates that the rule the Court adopts today serves only to add more complexity to the already complex procedural provisions of Title VII. To be sure, an employee will be able to guarantee timely filing by bringing a complaint to the attention of the EEOC within 240 days (a time limitation that nowhere appears in the text of the statute), but if that employee files his charge between day 240 and day 300, he must await further developments.6 This “wait and see” rule seems out of place in the context of a federal statute designed to vindicate workers’ rights to be free from invidious discrimination in the workplace. Moreover, the Court’s rule will no doubt result in future complications that the courts or Congress will have to disentangle.
One wonders whether the Court has anticipated the prob*835lems that may arise from the indeterminancy of the “240-day maybe” rule it announces. Will complainants in deferral States be permitted to seek artifically speedy terminations of state proceedings in order to preserve their federal rights? Will employers be permitted to oppose such early terminations of state proceedings? Will state and local agencies be permitted to adopt a practice of terminating proceedings immediately whenever a complainant referred to them by the EEOC needs prompt action in order to preserve his federal remedies? These unanswered questions lead me to conclude that the Court’s “rather straightforward reading” of § 706 may indeed lead to “absurd or futile results,” despite the Court’s conclusion to the contrary. Ante, at 818. The possible problems that I pose, of course, would cause me less concern were it clear that they result from the scheme that Congress intended to enact. But for the reasons stated in Part I, supra, I believe that Congress clearly did not intend to enact the Court’s “240-day maybe” rule for judging the timeliness of a charge filed with the EEOC.
It remains for Congress to restrike “the balance,” ante, at 826, it plainly intended to set when it re-enacted §§ 706 (c) and (e) in 1972. I dissent from the Court’s adoption of a rule that both alters that balance and, at the same time, serves no useful end.

 It seems significant that the Court today “adopts,” ante, at 814, n. 16, the decision in Moore v. Sunbeam Corp., 459 E. 2d 811 (CA7 1972), the initial opinion in which was filed prior to the passage of the 1972 reenactment of §§706 (c) and (e). See id., at 830 (order on petition for rehearing). In Moore, the Seventh Circuit stated that the legislative history of the 1972 re-enactment was not relevant to a proper interpretation of Title VII's filing requirements, as they were enacted in 1964. Ibid. Today, this Court goes a step further in failing to give that legislative history appropriate weight in interpreting the 1972 re-enactment.

 The Senate Committee on Labor and Welfare explained the need for an amendment to the forerunner of §706 (c) in the following terms: “The only change in the present law is to delete the phrase ‘no charge may be filed’ with the Commission by an aggrieved person in [a deferral] State or locality. The present statute is somewhat ambiguous respecting Commission action on charges filed prior to resort to the State or local agency. The new language clarifies the present statute by permitting the *830charge to be filed but prohibiting the Commission from taking action with respect thereto until the prescribed period has elapsed.” S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 36 (1971).

 There is absolutely no support in the reports of the House debates for the Court’s implication, ante, at 822-823, that the House expressly considered the desirability of effecting a change in the forerunner to § 706 (c) and purposefully rejected the amendment that had been proposed by its Committee on Education and Labor.

 The Court fails to credit the Williams-Javits section-by-section analysis as an authoritative interpretation of the 1972 re-enactment of §706, *832primarily because it fails to recognize the Conference Committee’s intent that the re-enacted section be interpreted differently from the Court’s perception of what would constitute “a sound interpretation of the 1964 enactment.” Ante, at 823. It is the legislative history of the 1972 amendments that is of primary relevance here, and the compilation of that history prepared by the Subcommittee on Labor for use of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare (cited throughout the Court’s opinion), endorses the Williams-Javits section-by-section analysis as “a more detailed explanation of all the provisions of the bill as viewed by the sponsors and legislative leaders.” Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by the Subcommittee on Labor), p. xv, n. 3 (1972). The analysis of re-enacted § 706 presented to the House by Representative Dent, discussed by the Court, ante, at 816, n. 19, on the other hand, does not purport to speak for the views of the sponsors and managers of the 1972 amendments. See 118 Cong. Rec. 7569 (1972).

 The EEOC in its current regulations, 29 CFR § 1601.74 (a) (1979), lists 42 statewide deferral agencies, in addition to deferral agencies for the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and a substantial number of municipalities and counties.

 The Court asserts that the prospective complainant will not be prejudiced unfairly by the adoption of its “240-day maybe” rule because “a lay person would be more apt to regard the general obligation of filing within 180 days as the standard of diligence he must satisfy.” Ante, at 825. The Court’s conclusion that the plain meaning of § 706 (e), standing alone, is that a charge must be filed within 180 days in a deferral State is myopic, at best.