Court Opinion

ID: 9862446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:10:41.273718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:34.068578
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Lybrook, J.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I conclude that the trial court was in error in restricting the cross-examination of the State’s witness. Since there was ample evidence shown by two other witnesses, I further conclude that the error was harmless.
After Goebel testified for the State the defendant had every right to cross-examine him completely as to his relationship with the State. The fact that he was under a suspended sentence should not have been kept from the jury, particularly when considered with both his past record and the pending charge. This combination strongly suggests the possibility that the suspension of his sentence might have been revoked, if he had not testified favorably to the State’s case. The jury should have had access to this information in weighing Goebel’s credibility.
In 98 C.J.S. Witnesses §545 (1957), it is stated:
“. . . A witness is interested to such an extent as will affect his credibility where he expects or hopes for leniency or immunity from punishment for a crime in return for the giving of his testimony . . .”
It is generally conceded that any fact tending to impair the
*475credibility of a witness by showing his interest is á material matter regarding which cross-examination is a right and not a mere privilege, and a denial of cross-examination upon such material matter is reversible error. Acker v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 466, 158 N.E.2d 790. In Bryant v. State (1954), 233 Ind. 274, 118 N.E.2d 894, the court specifically held that an offer of leniency in punishment affects a witness’ credibility and makes the intent and motive of the witness a legitimate subject of inquiry. In Walker v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 258, 191 N.E.2d 488, our Supreme Court held that where the cross-examination of the prosecuting witness was-unduly limited by the trial court, this amounted to an abuse of discretion resulting -in the reversal of the cause. Similarly it has been held that a conviction should be reversed where the trial co.urt refused to permit cross-examination of a State’s witness concerning the fact that a reward had been offered for the conviction of the crime. Bewley v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 652, 220 N.E.2d 612.
Perhaps it has been best said by our Supreme Court in Sears v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 561, 282 N.E.2d 807, where in speaking of the latitude of cross-examination, the court said:
“.. , The right to vigorous cross-examination is fundamental to our adversary process, and wide latitude is allowed both sides in a dispute to ask pointed and' relevant questions on cross-examination in an attempt to undermine the opposition’s case. Thus, any doubt as to the legitimacy of a question on cross-examination should be resolved in favor of the questioner.”
In the case at bar I fail to see any legal excuse supporting the court’s exclusion of cross-examination, notwithstanding' the trial court’s wide discretion. However, in my opinion this discretion was abused. What we have said above will not affect the defendant’s rights because of ample evidence from other sources. My concern is not for the disposition of the present case; but I am considerably apprehensive about the next one, if such a restrictive trend were to continue.
Note. — Reported at 360 N.E.2d 1006.