Court Opinion

ID: 9438747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:00:34.732504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:53.667548
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     ROBERT LANCE MILLER,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-14-0757-I-5

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: August 2, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ralph B. Pinskey, Esquire, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           James Vietti and Lundi McCarthy Shafiei, Washington, D.C., for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal for failure to meet medical qualifications. Generally, we
     grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial
     decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous a pplication
     of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affec ted the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as
     expressly MODIFIED as to the charge analysis, the appellant’s disability
     discrimination defenses, and the appellant’s restoration claim, we AFFIRM the
     initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was an AD-0083-07 Police Officer for the agency’s Pentagon
     Force Protection Agency (PFPA), stationed at the Raven Rock Mountain Complex
     in Adams County, Pennsylvania. Miller v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket
     No. PH-0752-14-0757-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 18, Tab 5 at 20.
     The duties of a PFPA Police Officer are arduous and hazardous, and the position
     is subject to Office of Personnel Management (OPM)-approved medical standards
     under 5 C.F.R. § 339.202. IAF, Tab 5 at 10-25, Tab 7 at 146-68.
¶3         On November 2, 2011, while performing a physical fitness test at work, the
     appellant suffered a meniscal tear in his left knee. IAF, Tab 7 at 10, 45. On
     December 29, 2011, the appellant underwent surgery, and on January 11, 2012, he
     returned to full-time limited duty.      Id.   The appellant’s treating physician,
     Dr. Gregory Hanks, released him to return to work without restrictions , effective
     February 1, 2012.      Id. at 14.     The appellant subsequently underwent a
     return-to-duty examination through work, and on March 5, 2012, he was
                                                                                            3

     medically cleared to return to full duty. Id. at 16. On May 2, 2012, the appellant
     took and passed without incident the same physical fitness test that had caused hi s
     knee injury back in November 2011. Miller v. Department of Defense, MSPB
     Docket No. PH-0752-14-0757-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 33 at 4.
¶4         Meanwhile, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) ruled
     the appellant’s condition compensable, and he received continuation of pay and
     wage loss compensation for his absences through his January 11, 2012 return to
     work. I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 4-17, 25-33, 61. On June 25, 2012, the appellant, at the
     behest of his attorney, was examined by another orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Arthur
     Becan. IAF, Tab 7 at 22. The appellant complained of pain, instability, and
     occasional swelling and locking of his left knee, as well as difficulty performing
     ordinary tasks, standing, walking, and running for extended periods. Id. at 23.
     After a physical examination, Dr. Becan opined that the appellant had a 13%
     impairment to the lower left extremity as a result of his November 2, 2011 injury,
     and that the appellant had reached maximum medical improvement. Id. at 24-27.
     With this medical evaluation as support, the appellant submitted a claim to
     OWCP for a schedule award. I-2 AF, Tab 29 at 78; Hearing Transcript (HT)
     at 180-81 (testimony of the appellant). 2
¶5         While reviewing the appellant’s schedule award claim, O WCP perceived
     some discrepancies in his file, and it reached out to the agency for clarification.
     I-2 AF, Tab 29 at 88. In doing so, OWCP advised the agency that Dr. Becan’s
     evaluation seemed to contradict the appellant’s previous return to full duty, an d
     noted that the information in his report indicated that the appellant “may have
     significant issues with his knee that could affect his job performance.” I -2 AF,

     2
       In several places, the hearing transcript contains the phrase “schedule of work.” HT
     at 95, 98, 100, 102, 111, 140, 180-81 (testimony of the appellant), 271 (testimony of the
     Medical Review Board Chair). In context, it appears to us that there was an error in the
     transcription, and that “schedule of work” should read “schedule award” wherever it
     appears.
                                                                                        4

     Tab 29 at 88. Nevertheless, on October 9, 2012, OWCP granted the appellant a
     schedule award based on a 13% permanent partial impairment and notified the
     agency of the award. I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 39-41; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 8106-8107.
¶6        Also on October 9, 2012, the agency determined, based on Dr. Becan’s
     evaluation, that the appellant was unable to perform the full range of his essential
     job duties. It placed him in a “Medically Not Cleared status” and scheduled a
     return-to-duty examination for October 26, 2012.       IAF, Tab 7 at 29; I-2 AF,
     Tab 29 at 89-91, 98. The examination was conducted by Dr. Mary Ann Hollman,
     the PFPA Medical Advisor. IAF, Tab 7 at 30. Dr. Hollman noted a misalignment
     of the joint, clicking and instability, muscle atrophy, reduced motor strength, and
     a painful and asymmetric gait. Id. at 6. Based on the physical examination and
     the appellant’s reported history, she found that he did not meet medical
     standards. 3 Id. at 30. The agency placed the appellant in a light duty assignment.
     I-2 AF, Tab 30 at 7-9. The appellant’s case was then submitted to the PFPA
     Medical Review Board for a final decision. IAF, Tab 7 at 40. On January 15,
     2013, the Medical Review Board issued its final decision, notifying the appellant
     that he failed to meet the PFPA musculoskeletal system sta ndards, that he was
     unable to safely and effectively perform his duties, that his condition was not
     correctable within a reasonable time period, and that there was no basis for
     waiving the standards. Id. at 40-41.
¶7        Subsequently, OWCP referred the appellant’s case for a second opinion
     examination, to get clarification on whether the appellant’s November 2, 2011
     knee injury still required active treatment, whether the appellant was capable of
     performing in his Police Officer position, and whether there were a ny

     3
       The day before the agency-conducted return to duty examination, the appellant was
     examined by Dr. Hanks, who recommended that the appellant return to duty without
     restrictions. IAF, Tab 7 at 31. The appellant provided the agency with a generic form
     to this effect, but he did not provide the agency with Dr. Hanks’s examination notes.
     Id. at 6.
                                                                                           5

     non-industrial injuries noted since the date of the compensable injury. IAF, Tab 7
     at 42. The examination was conducted on March 26, 2013 by another orthopedic
     surgeon, Dr. Robert Draper, who found the appellant’s knee to be stable and
     flexible, and the overall examination to be “quite benign.”              Id. at 44-48.
     Although he diagnosed the appellant with mild osteoarthritis in his left knee,
     Dr. Draper concluded that no additional treatment was required and that the
     appellant could return to full duty. 4 Id. at 47-49.
¶8           The appellant forwarded Dr. Draper’s report to the Medical Review Board,
     which reconsidered his case but, on May 7, 2013, reaffirmed its prior decision
     that the appellant failed to meet the PFPA musculoskeletal system standards.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 38. After unsuccessful efforts to place the appellant in another
     position within his medical restrictions, on September 11, 2013, the agency
     proposed his removal for “Failure to Meet Medical Standards,” based on the
     January 15, 2013 decision of the Medical Review Board.            IAF, Tab 5 at 4-7,
     Tab 7 at 40-41. After the appellant responded to the proposal, both orally and in
     writing, on May 13, 2014, the agency issued a decision removing him effective
     May 17, 2014.       IAF, Tab 4 at 18-25.      Around the time of his removal, the
     appellant filed a notice of recurrence with OWCP. I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 63-71. On
     June 6, 2014, OWCP acknowledged receipt of the appellant’s notice and
     requested more information. Id. at 82-86. The appellant failed to provide all of
     the information that OWCP requested, and on July 24, 2014, OWCP denied his
     claim for recurrence. 5 Id. at 87-91.

     4
       After receiving Dr. Draper’s report, OWCP proposed to terminate the appellant’s
     workers’ compensation benefits on the basis that the appellant was no longer suffering
     from a work-related injury. I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 58-59. However, OWCP rescinded its
     proposal, and the record does not reveal what exactly became of the appellant’s original
     claim. Id. at 60.
     5
         The record does not reveal whether the appellant appealed OWCP’s determination.
                                                                                        6

¶9         The appellant filed a Board appeal, contesting the merits of the action and
      raising affirmative defenses of disability discrimination (status -based and failure
      to accommodate) and denial of due process.         IAF, Tab 1 at 4, 6; Miller v.
      Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0757-I-4, Appeal File
      (I-4 AF), Tab 29 at 1-8, Tab 31 at 3-9; Miller v. Department of Defense, MSPB
      Docket No. PH-0752-14-0757-I-5, Appeal File (I-5 AF), Tab 5 at 3-11. He also
      argued that the agency violated his restoration rights under 5 C.F.R. part 353.
      I-4 AF, Tab 29 at 8-9.
¶10        After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming
      the appellant’s removal.   I-5 AF, Tab 7, Initial Decision (ID).     Weighing the
      conflicting medical evidence in light of the agency’s standards, he sustained the
      charge. ID at 7-13. The administrative judge further found that the appellant
      failed to prove his affirmative defenses or his restoration claim, and that the
      removal penalty was reasonable under the circumstances. ID at 14-26.
¶11        The appellant has filed a petition for review, contesting the merits of the
      charge and renewing his affirmative defenses of denial of due process and
      disability discrimination (failure to accommodate). Petition for Review (PFR)
      File, Tab 1 at 6-29. The appellant requests, in the alternative, that the appeal be
      remanded for the administrative judge to take additional evidence on whether the
      condition that caused him not to meet the PFPA medical standards was
      compensable. Id. at 29-31. The agency has responded to the petition for review,
      and the appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response , as well as a motion
      for leave to file additional evidence related to his restoration claim . PFR File,
      Tabs 3, 6.

                                         ANALYSIS
      The charge is sustained.
¶12        In an appeal of an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75, the agency
      bears the burden of proving by preponderant evidence that its action was taken
                                                                                            7

      for such cause as would promote the efficiency of the service.             MacDonald v.
      Department of the Navy, 4 M.S.P.R. 403, 404 (1980); 5 C.F.R.§ 1201.56(b)(1)(ii).
      To meet this burden, the agency must prove its charge, establish a nexus between
      the charge and the efficiency of the service, and demonstrate that the penalty
      imposed was reasonable. Pope v. U.S. Postal Service, 114 F.3d 1144, 1147 (Fed.
      Cir. 1997). However, even if the agency carries this burden, the action may not
      be sustained if the appellant shows that it was taken in violation of his right to
      due   process   or   was     based   on     disability   discrimination.      5   U.S.C.
      §§ 2302(b)(1)(D), 7701(c)(2)(B); Stephen v. Department of the Air Force,
      47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681 (1991); see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).
¶13         In this case, the agency charged the appellant with failing to meet the
      PFPA’s OPM-approved medical standards. IAF, Tab 5 at 4. Specifically, the
      agency alleged that the appellant did not meet the PFPA musculoskeletal system
      standards. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 7 at 40. The PFPA medical standards are, for the
      most part, not precisely quantifiable, and the particular medical conditions
      discussed therein are generally not described as automatically disqualifying. IAF,
      Tab 7 at 150-68. Rather, the medical standards exist to aid the PFPA Medical
      Advisor in making objective determinations, on a case-by-case basis, as to an
      individual’s ability to perform the full range of his essential duties without undue
      risk to himself or others.    Id. at 147.     Importantly, the medical standards are
      subject to clinical interpretation by the Medical Advisor, in light of her
      knowledge of the job requirements and environmental conditions in which the
      individual must work. Id. The musculoskeletal standards themselves provide that
      any condition that adversely affects an individual’s movement, agility, flexibility,
      strength, dexterity, or coordination, or his ability to accelerate, decelerate, or
      change directions efficiently, will require additional screening.           IAF, Tab 7
      at 161. This includes arthritis, if there is limited joint motion or pain. Id.
¶14         In finding that the appellant failed to meet the agency’s medical standards,
      the administrative judge applied the legal standard set forth in 5 C.F.R.
                                                                                        8

      § 339.206, which provides that “a history of a particular medical problem may
      result in medical disqualification only if the condition at issue is itself
      disqualifying, recurrence cannot be medically ruled out, and the duties of the
      position are such that a recurrence would pose a reasonable probability of
      substantial harm.” After weighing the available medical evidence in light of the
      appellant’s job duties and the nature of the Police Officer position, the
      administrative judge found that the agency proved its charge. ID at   6-13.
¶15        On petition for review, the appellant argues that the agency failed to prove
      the charge under 5 C.F.R. § 339.206.      He disputes the administrative judge’s
      analysis, arguing that the agency failed to prove that his medical condition is
      itself disqualifying or that recurrence cannot be ru led out.    PFR File, Tab 1
      at 12-21. However, while this appeal was pending on petition for revie w, the
      Board issued a precedential decision clarifying that the standard set forth in
      5 C.F.R. § 339.206 only applies when an employee was removed “solely on the
      basis of medical history,” as opposed to a current medical condition. Haas v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 10-15.               The Board
      explained that a removal is based solely on medical history if the only basis for
      concluding that the employee is medically unable to perform the core duties of
      his position is the fact that his medical records reflect that, at some time in the
      past, he was classified as having, was examined for, or was treated for the
      medical condition or impairment in question. Id., ¶ 12.
¶16        The appellant in this case was not removed based on his medical history.
      Rather, he was removed based on physical difficulties that he was curr ently
      experiencing due to several interrelated, ongoing, and progressively worsening
      knee problems in both knees. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 7 at 4 -6, 40. In particular, it
      is undisputed that the appellant had been suffering from osteoarthritis
      (degenerative joint disease) in his knees long before his November 2, 2011 injury.
      Miller v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-14-0757-I-3,
      Appeal File (I-3 AF), Tab 4 at 19, 23, 28, 32, 34, 36-40, 44; I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 55,
                                                                                         9

      126-27, 260, 262. When an individual is diagnosed with a medical condition such
      as this one, which is by its nature permanent or progressive in severity, it will be
      assumed to continue to exist after the date of diagnosis absent rebuttal evidence
      to the contrary.   Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 17 (quoting Pyles v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 45 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). There is no such evidence
      in this case. To the contrary, the medical evidence shows that the appellant’s
      osteoarthritis has continued to worsen over time. I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 125-27.
¶17        Because the appellant’s removal was not based solely on his medical
      history, the charge should not be analyzed under standard set forth in 5 C.F.R.
      § 339.206. Rather, to prove its charge the agency must establish either a nexus
      between the appellant’s medical condition and observed deficiencies in his
      performance or conduct, or a high probability, given the nature of the work
      involved, that his condition may result in injury to himself or oth ers.       Haas,
      2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 15. Although the administrative judge applied what we have
      now determined to be the incorrect standard to the agency’s charge, we find that
      remand is unnecessary because the record is fully developed on the relevant
      issues. See id, ¶ 20 (citing Forte v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 124,
      ¶ 27 (2016)).
¶18        The agency in this case does not appear to argue that the appellant exhibited
      any actual performance or conduct deficiencies related to his knee condition or
      otherwise, and we see no evidence in the record that would support such a
      finding. Instead, the agency argues that, given the nature and duties of the Police
      Officer position, there was a high probability that the appellant’s knee condition
      could result in injury to himself or others. I-5 AF, Tab 6 at 6-7. We agree.
¶19        The medical evidence in this case consists of examination notes and clinical
      findings made by the four physicians discussed above: Dr. Hanks (the appellant’s
      treating physician and orthopedic surgeon), Dr. Becan (the orthopedic surgeon
      who examined the appellant in support of his application for a schedule award),
      Dr. Hollman (the agency’s Medical Advisor), and Dr. Draper (the orthopedic
                                                                                       10

      surgeon who conducted the second opinion examination for OWCP).             To the
      extent that the findings and opinions of these four physicians differ, we asses s
      their probative value based on “such factors as whether the opinion was based on
      a medical examination, whether the opinion provides a reasoned explanation for
      its findings as distinct from mere conclusory assertions, the qualifications of the
      expert rendering the opinion, and the extent and duration of the expert’s
      familiarity with the treatment of the [appellant’s] condition.” Chavez v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 6 M.S.P.R. 404, 417 (1981).             We agree with the
      administrative judge that the clinical findings of Doctors Hanks, Becan, and
      Hollman are largely consistent and convey that the appellant was suffering
      significant impairment in his knees, particularly the left one.     ID at 12; IAF,
      Tab 7 at 6, 23-27, I-3 AF, Tab 4 at 19-25, 28-34. Dr. Draper’s assessment was
      the outlier; he found the appellant’s knee condition to be unremarkable, and he
      found no indication for further treatment or diagno sis. IAF, Tab 7 at 47-48.
¶20        Although we find no basis to question Dr. Draper’s qualifications, we agree
      with the administrative judge that his opinion is entitled to less weight than those
      of the other three physicians. ID at 11-13. Not only was Dr. Draper’s assessment
      inconsistent with the assessments of the other three physicians, but unlike
      Dr. Hanks, Dr. Draper formed his opinion after only a single examination. See
      Tan-Gatue v. Office of Personnel Management, 90 M.S.P.R. 116, ¶ 11 (2001)
      (observing that medical conclusions based on a long familiarity with a patient are
      of greater weight than those based on a brief association or single examination),
      aff’d per curiam, 52 F. App’x 511 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Furthermore, both Dr. Hanks
      and Dr. Hollman were highly critical of Dr. Draper’s report, and it appeared to
      them that his assessment was based on an incomplete examination and incomplete
      review of the appellant’s medical history. I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 153-58, 291-97.
      Dr. Draper’s report is inconsistent with the subjective complaints that the
      appellant made to both Dr. Hanks and Dr. Becan about pain in his knees, locking
                                                                                         11

      and buckling, and difficulty performing many ordinary functions that involve
      stresses on the knee. IAF, Tab 7 at 23, 26; I-3 AF, Tab 4 at 19, 23, 28, 30, 32.
¶21         We also agree with the administrative judge that, notwithstanding the value
      of his clinical findings, Dr. Hanks’s opinion that the appellant could return to full
      duty merits little weight.   ID at 12-13.   As the administrative judge correctly
      found, Dr. Hanks was never notified of the PFPA Police Officer medical
      standards, he had never seen the appellant’s position description, he was
      unfamiliar with the appellant’s specific job duties and work environment, and he
      based his return-to-duty recommendation entirely on the appellant’s own
      description of those duties and the appellant’s subjective assessment of whether
      he could perform them. ID at 12; I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 68-72, 74, 99-101. We also
      observe that, as the appellant’s treating physician, it was not Dr. Hanks’s job to
      promote the efficiency of the Civil Service; rather, his job was to promote the
      health of the appellant.
¶22         Dr. Hanks’s willingness to allow the appellant to return to duty “with no
      restrictions and see how things go” may have been sound medical advice, but it
      says little about the appellant’s reliability in an emergency situation, which wa s
      the agency’s specific concern. IAF, Tab 4 at 19-20, Tab 5 at 4-5; I-2 AF, Tab 4
      at 23; HT at 237-38, 253, 284-85 (testimony of the Medical Review Board Chair).
      In contrast to this recommendation, Dr. Hanks repeatedly advised the appellant
      that he may need to seek an occupational change because of his progressively
      worsening knee condition. Id. at 30, 33. For these reasons, we credit the findings
      of the Medical Review Board, which was not only thoroughly briefed by
      Dr. Hollman on the appellant’s medical condition, but was also familiar with the
      Police Officer position and the PFPA musculoskeletal standards.         IAF, Tab 7
      at 4-7, 40; HT at 194-96, 211-14 (testimony of the Medical Review Board Chair).
¶23         Although the appellant’s actual experience of his job may have involved
      relatively low levels of physical exertion, we agree with the administrative judge
      that the PFPA physical and medical standards are in place to ensure that Police
                                                                                        12

      Officers are able to protect life and property in rare emergency situations
      regardless of whether such exertions might be required during a typical day on
      the job. ID at 11; I-5 AF, Tab 6 at 7; HT at 20-27, (testimony of the Pentagon
      Police Site Supervisor), 237-38, 283 (testimony of the Medical Review Board
      Chair).   For these reasons, we find that the agency has established a high
      probability that, given the responsibility of a PFPA Police Officer to put forth
      maximum physical exertion in an emergency situation, the appellant’s knee
      condition may result in injury to himself or others. We accordingly affirm, as
      modified to apply the reasoning above, the administrative judge’s determination
      that the agency proved its charge of failure to meet medical standards .

      The appellant did not prove his affirmative defenses of disability dis crimination.
¶24        As stated above, the appellant raised affirmative defenses of disability
      discrimination under both reasonable accommodation and status -based theories.
      I-4 AF, Tab 31 at 3-9. In his initial decision, the administrative judge found that
      the appellant failed to prove his disability discrimination claims because he failed
      to show that he is an individual with a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
      § 12102(1) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). ID at 14-22. We disagree, and we find
      that the appellant has shown that he is disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)
      and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i), because his knee condition substantially limits
      him in one or more major life activities. Specifically, Dr. Becan’s June 25, 2012
      medical report documents that the appellant’s knee pain causes him difficulty
      with, among other things, walking, ordinary household chores, and basic
      self-care, such as washing and dressing. IAF, Tab 7 at 23. The appellant does
      not deny reporting these problems to Dr. Becan in June 2012, the agency does not
      contest the accuracy of the report, and the record shows that the appellant’s knee
      condition has been deteriorating since then.     HT at 104-08 (testimony of the
      appellant); I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 125-27. Although not every impairment constitutes
      a “disability” within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
      an impairment need not prevent or significantly or severely restrict the individual
                                                                                          13

      from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially
      limiting.     29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).    Rather, an impairment constitutes a
      disability if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major
      life activity as compared to most people in the general population.         The term
      “substantially limits” must be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage,
      to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.                   29 C.F.R.
      § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). It is not meant to be a demanding standard, and should not
      require extensive analysis. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (iii). In light of the broad
      meaning of the term “disability,” we find that the appellant’s knee condition
      easily meets the definition because it substantially limits him in the major life
      activities of walking, self-care, and operation of the musculoskeletal system. See
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of major life
      activities). For these reasons, we agree with the appellant that his knee condition
      is disabling under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i). PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 22-24.
¶25            Nevertheless, in order to prevail on a disability discrimination claim under
      either a status-based or reasonable accommodation theory, an appellant must
      show not only that he is disabled, but also that he is a “qualified” individual with
      a disability, i.e., that he can perform the essential functions of the position that he
      holds or desires with or without reasonable accommodation. Haas, 2022 MSPB
      36, ¶¶ 28-29; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). We find it undisputed that one of the
      essential functions of PFPA Police Officer, as set forth in the position
      description, is “to take decisive and immediate action in emergency situa tions
      such as riots, demonstrations, terrorist attacks and hostage situations. ”        IAF,
      Tab 5 at 20. For the reasons explained above, we find that the appellant’s knee
      condition precludes him from performing such emergency duties at a satisfactory
      level.     We see no obvious accommodation that the agency could provide the
      appellant that would allow him to perform these functions, and the appellant has
      not proffered any suggestions in this regard. We therefore find that the appellant
                                                                                      14

      is not a qualified individual with a disability with respect to the PFPA Police
      Officer position.
¶26         In the absence of a reasonable accommodation that would allow an
      employee to perform the essential functions of his current position, an agency
      may offer reassignment to a vacant funded position at or below the appellant’s
      current grade level as an accommodation of last resort.        Angel v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 122 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 9 (2015). On petition for review,
      the appellant argues, correctly, that the agency failed to conduct an adequate
      search for vacant funded positions to which he might be reassigned. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 25-29. Specifically, it appears that the agency restricted its search to
      vacant funded positions within the PFPA, rather than considering all available
      Department of Defense positions, as it should have done. I-2 AF, Tab 30 at 42,
      46; HT at 51 (testimony of testimony of the Pentagon Police Site Supervisor); see
      Sanchez v. Department of Energy, 117 M.S.P.R. 155, ¶ 18 (2011). Nevertheless,
      regardless of whether the agency conducted an adequate search for a position to
      which the appellant could be reassigned before removing him, the appellant still
      bears the ultimate burden of proving that there was a position the agency would
      have found and could have assigned him to if it had looked.        Jackson v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 46, 53-54 (1998). The appellant has made no such
      showing here and has therefore not shown that he was a qualified individual with
      respect to any vacant funded position to which he could have been reassigned.
      See Clemens v. Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 17 (2014). Because
      the appellant has not shown that he is a qualified individual with a disability, we
      find that he has not proven either his reasonable accommodation or status-based
      disability discrimination claims. See Haas, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 30-31.

      The appellant did not prove his due process affirmative defense.
¶27         An agency’s failure to provide a tenured public employee with an
      opportunity to present a response, either in person or in writing, to an appealable
      agency action that deprives him of his property right in his emplo yment
                                                                                      15

      constitutes an abridgement of his constitutional right to minimum due process of
      law, i.e., prior notice and an opportunity to respond.        Cleveland Board of
      Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). The reply opportunity may
      not be an empty formality, and the deciding official should have authority to take
      or recommend agency action based on the reply.        Diehl v. Department of the
      Army, 118 M.S.P.R. 344, ¶ 12 (2012). In other words, to the extent that there are
      viable alternatives to a proposed adverse action, due process requires that th e
      employee be afforded an opportunity to invoke the discretion of a deciding
      official with the authority to select such alternatives. See Buelna v. Department
      of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 28 (2014).
¶28        In this case, the appellant argued that the agency violated his due process
      rights because the deciding official lacked the authority to overturn the Medical
      Review Board’s determination that he failed to meet PFPA medical standards.
      I-5 AF, Tab 5 at 3-4. However, the administrative judge found that the deciding
      official’s role was not limited to rubberstamping th e proposal and that the
      deciding official had the authority not to sustain the charge or to take other
      measures alternative to removal. ID at 21-22.
¶29        On petition for review, the appellant disagrees with the administrative
      judge’s analysis, reiterating that the deciding official lacked the authority to
      overturn the Medical Review Board’s determination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 10 -12.
      However, even if the deciding official lacked authority to overturn the decision of
      the Medical Review Board and substitute his own finding that the appellant was
      medically qualified, we find that this does not equate to a violation of due
      process. Rather, we find that this situation is analogous to a removal for failure
      to maintain a security clearance.     A deciding official’s lac k of authority to
      overturn a clearance determination does not mean that due process requirement s
      have not been met because due process does not demand that the deciding official
      consider alternatives that are prohibited, impracticable, or outside managemen t’s
      purview. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262, ¶ 27. Nor does due process require that the
                                                                                       16

      deciding official have the unfettered discretion to take any action he believes is
      appropriate.    Putnam v. Department of Homeland Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 532,
      ¶ 12 (2014). To the extent that there may be viable alternatives to a proposed
      action, an employee has a due process right to invoke the discretion of a deciding
      official with the authority to select such alternatives. Buelna, 121 M.S.P.R. 262,
      ¶ 28.    For the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the deciding official in this case had such authority and
      that the appellant had a full and fair opportunity to invoke his discretion on the
      matter, ID at 22.
¶30           The appellant also argues that the agency denied him due process b y failing
      to identify the specific medical diagnosis underlying the Medical Review Board’s
      determination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-10. However, this argument is not properly
      before the Board because the appellant has raised it for the first time on petition
      for review without showing that it is based on evidence previously unavaila ble
      despite his due diligence. See Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
      245, ¶ 6 (2016).     In any event, it appears that this newly raised due process
      argument is based on the legal standard set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 339.206, which, as
      explained above, does not apply in this case.

      We decline to disturb the administrative judge’s nexus and penalty findings.
¶31           The appellant does not directly challenge the administrative judge’s nexus
      determination, and for the reasons explained in the initial decision, we agree that
      the agency has shown the requisite nexus between its charge and the efficiency of
      the service.    ID at 24; see Lara v. Mine Safety and Health Administration,
      10 M.S.P.R. 554, 556 (1982) (finding a nexus between the appellant’s loss of an
      eye and the performance of his duties as a mine inspector because an agency
      “need not wait for the appellant to cause injury to himself or others because of his
      vision limitation, as long as the likelihood of such an event is reasonably
      foreseeable”). Nor does the appellant directly contest the administrative judge’s
      finding that the removal penalty was reasonable under the circumstances, and we
                                                                                           17

      see no reason to disturb that finding on review.       ID at 24 -26; see D’Leo v.
      Department of the Navy, 53 M.S.P.R. 44, 51 (1992) (finding that removal for
      physical inability to perform promotes the efficiency of the service).

      We decline to remand the appeal for the submission of additional medical
      evidence.
¶32        On petition for review, the appellant argues that the evidence is equivocal
      on whether his removal was based on a compensable injury, and to the extent that
      it was, he has restoration rights under 5 C.F.R. part 353, subpart C. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 29-31. After the record on review closed, the appellant filed a motion
      for leave to submit additional evidence on the issue, in the form of a letter from
      Dr. Hanks supporting his assertion that his failure to meet medical standards was
      due, at least in part, to chondromalacia patellae, a condition that OWCP had
      previously accepted as compensable in connection with the appellant’s wage loss
      compensation award. PFR File, Tab 7; I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 16.
¶33        We agree with the appellant that the record evidence is not entirel y clear on
      whether his failure to meet medical standards, and subsequent removal, was due
      to a work-related injury, a non-work related condition, or both. Although the
      administrative judge found that the appellant’s failure to meet medical standards
      was due to his congenital osteoarthritis and not to any compensable injury, we
      find that the evidence on this point is not so straightforward.          ID at 23.   In
      particular, we acknowledge the undisputed deposition testimony of Dr. Hanks,
      who opined that the appellant’s November 2, 2011 meniscal tear may have caused
      his preexisting and previously undiagnosed osteoarthritis to become symptomatic.
      I-4 AF, Tab 23 at 75-77. Although OWCP found that the appellant failed to show
      that his removal was attributable to a recurrence of his compensable injury for
      purposes of wage loss compensation, I-2 AF, Tab 28 at 87-88, this may not
      necessarily preclude the Board from finding that the appellant’s removal was
      “substantially related to” his compensable injury for purposes of restoration, see
      Ruppert v. U.S. Postal Service, 8 M.S.P.R. 593, 595 (1981) (holding that an
                                                                                             18

      employee is entitled to restoration rights when his separation from service either
      resulted from or was substantially related to a compensable injury).
¶34         Nevertheless, to the extent that the appellant is attempting to claim a denial
      of restoration as a partially recovered individual for the period postdating his
      removal, we find nothing in the record to indicate that he made a request for
      restoration during this time period. 6         See Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service,
      2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 12 (setting forth the jurisdictional elements of a restoration
      appeal for a partially recovered individual, including that appellant make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that the agency denied his request for restoration). We
      therefore find that, regardless of whether the appellant’s removal was
      substantially related to his compensable injury, the Board would lack jurisdiction
      over any potential restoration claim in the context of the instant appeal.            See
      Wright v. U.S. Postal Service, 62 M.S.P.R. 122, 126 (1994) (“[T]he agency never
      denied the appellant restoration because the appellant never directly reque sted
      it.”), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table). For this reason, we decline to
      remand the appeal for further adjudication, and we deny the appellant’s motion to
      submit additional evidence on review.
¶35         To the extent that the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      removal was not substantially related to his compensable injury, we vacate that
      finding and dismiss the appellant’s restoration claim for lack of jurisdiction on
      the alternative ground that the appellant failed to make a nonfrivo lous allegation
      that the agency denied his request for restoration. If, in the future, the appellant
      requests restoration and the agency denies it, our findings here will not preclude
      him from filing a new restoration appeal at that time and introducing a dditional

      6
        Even if the appellant otherwise meets the definition of “physicall y disqualified” under
      5 C.F.R. § 353.102, more than 1 year passed between the date of his most recent OWCP
      award and the date of his removal, so it would appear that he would have the res toration
      rights of a partially recovered individual. See Mendenhall v. U.S. Postal Service,
      74 M.S.P.R. 430, 436-37 (1997); 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(c).
                                                                                     19

evidence concerning the relationship between his compensable injury and his
removal.   However, we do not purport to make any finding at this time on
whether the appellant would be able to establish jurisdiction over a future
restoration appeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h) (“The Board shall not issue advisory
opinions.”).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        20

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                21

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                     22

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2 302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases wi th the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              23

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.