Court Opinion

ID: 9532844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:26.40189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.229016
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
with whom RUDMAN, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 11] I respectfully dissent. The divorce judgment contains language that specifically and unequivocally limits Ann Staples’ share of Mylon Staples’ pension benefits to fifty percent of what accrued to Mylon during the years of their marriage. The only evidence considered by the trial court in reaching its conclusion that Ann was to share in Mylon’s entire pension was the settlement agreement and the divorce judgment. In my view, no language in either document sufficiently contradicts the provision in the divorce judgment limiting Ann to fifty percent of “benefits accrued ... during the marriage” to create an ambiguity.
[¶ 12] Title 19-A M.R.S.A. section 953 vests the court with the power to divide marital property, which is defined as “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage ... and prior to a decree of legal separation.” 19-A M.R.S.A. § 953 (1998 & Supp.2000). A provision allowing a spouse to share in the pension benefits of the other spouse that do not accrue until after the marriage has ended amounts to a distribution of the other spouse’s nonmarital property. Such a provision is most unusual. If it is the intent of the court and the parties to provide for such an allocation, then the language used in the divorce judgment or settlement agreement to effectuate that intent would have to be much clearer and more specific than the provisions in this divorce judgment and settlement agreement.
[¶ 13] I would vacate the judgment and remand for the entry of a judgment providing that Ann’s share of Mylon’s pension benefits is limited to fifty percent of those benefits accrued during the marriage.