Court Opinion

ID: 9394415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 11:07:39.474372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.036137
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued May 9, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00720-CV
                            ———————————
                   ARTIS CHARLES HARRELL, Appellant
                                        V.
                     JEROME GODINICH, JR., Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 190th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 2018-30856

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant Artis Charles Harrell, acting pro se, sued the attorney who

represented him in a criminal proceeding, alleging legal malpractice and breach of

fiduciary duty. The trial court dismissed Harrell’s claims under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 91a. Because Harrell failed to preserve error, he waived his issues on

appeal, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                   BACKGROUND

      Harrell was charged with aggravated robbery in 2004. Jerome Godinich, Jr.

was appointed to represent Harrell in several pretrial hearings to suppress evidence.

Harrell was convicted and is currently incarcerated. Godinich’s conduct in the

suppression hearings forms the basis for Harrell’s complaints. Harrell alleges that

Godinich concealed documents relating to the criminal charge, failed to investigate

the facts of the case, ignored Harrell’s instructions, failed to raise affirmative

defenses, gave Harrell erroneous legal advice, withheld exculpatory evidence, and

refused to give Harrell his client file.

      Based on these complaints, Harrell sued Godinich for attorney negligence—

also termed legal malpractice—and breach of fiduciary duty. Godinich moved to

dismiss Harrell’s claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a as having no basis

in law or fact. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss, and about a

week later, signed a final, appealable judgment granting the motion to dismiss and

dismissing all of Harrell’s claims. Harrell now appeals.

                                     DISCUSSION

      In two issues, Harrell contends the trial court erred in dismissing his claims

under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure when that rule does not apply

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to inmate litigation, and he contends Godinich waived any challenges to Harrell’s

claims on appeal by not contesting Harrell’s unsworn declaration.

                                  Error Preservation

      For error to be preserved for appellate review, the record must show that a

party made the request or complaint to the trial court in a timely manner, and that

the trial court either ruled on the request or refused to do so. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

The request or complaint must make the trial court aware of the alleged error so that

the trial court has the opportunity to correct the problem before appeal. Burbage v.

Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 257 (Tex. 2014); see also Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v.

Montgomery County, 365 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing

reasons for error-preservation requirements). A party should not be allowed to ignore

an error at trial and then surprise his opponent on appeal by raising a complaint for

the first time. Mansions in the Forest, 365 S.W.3d at 317. When a party fails to

preserve error in the trial court, the issue is waived, and we may not consider that

issue on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lenk,

361 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex. 2012).

      Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must

comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. See Wheeler v. Green, 157

S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (“[P]ro se litigants are not exempt from

the rules of procedure.”); Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85

                                           3
(Tex. 1978) (“There cannot be two sets of procedural rules, one for litigants with

counsel and the other for litigants representing themselves.”). Like any attorney, a

pro se litigant may waive an issue on appeal by failing to raise the issue in the trial

court. E.g., Johnson v. Tex. Serenity Acad., Inc., No. 01-14-00438-CV, 2015 WL

1135947, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 27, 2015, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (declining to consider issue on appeal that pro se appellants had not raised in

trial court); Richardson v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 01-10-00931-CV,

2012 WL 1249476, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 12, 2012, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (declining to consider issue on appeal that pro se appellant untimely

raised after close of trial).

A.     Dismissal under Rule 91a

       In his first issue, Harrell argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his

claims under Rule 91a.

       Rule 91a allows dismissal of a cause of action that has “no basis in law or

fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations,

taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them do not entitle

the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action has no basis in fact if no

reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” Id. With certain exceptions, a

court may not consider evidence in ruling on the Rule 91a motion. TEX. R. CIV.

P. 91a.6. Rule 91a does not apply to inmate litigation, which is any “case governed

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by Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

91a.1. We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a 91a motion. See In re Farmers

Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding).

      Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs litigation

by an inmate—a person housed in a correctional facility—in which the inmate files

an affidavit or unsworn declaration of inability to pay costs. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE §§ 14.001(3), 14.002(a). A court may dismiss without a hearing a claim under

Chapter 14 that is “frivolous or malicious,” considering whether the “claim has no

arguable basis in law or in fact,” among other factors. Id. § 14.003(a), (b)(2);

Jefferson v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch Hosp. at Galveston, No. 01-09-00062-CV,

2010 WL 987727, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 18, 2010, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). “A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory.” Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2008, no pet.). We generally review dismissal of a claim under Chapter 14

for abuse of discretion, but the question of whether a claim has no arguable basis in

law or fact is a legal question that we review de novo. See DeHorney v. Talley, 630

S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.).

      Harrell asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his claim under Rule 91a

because that rule does not apply to Chapter 14 litigation. He is correct both in that

Chapter 14 governs his case and that Rule 91a expressly does not apply to cases

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governed by Chapter 14. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 14.002(a); TEX. R.

CIV. P. 91a.1. However, the record does not show that Harrell ever raised this

argument before the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). In his response to

Godinich’s motion to dismiss, he discussed the issue of when Godinich became

involved in the underlying criminal case but did not mention Chapter 14 or argue

that dismissal under Rule 91a would be improper. In his motion for new trial, he

argued the trial court erred in dismissing his claim for breach of fiduciary duty

because the Peeler doctrine1 does not bar fiduciary-duty claims, but he did not

mention Chapter 14 or argue that dismissal under Rule 91a was improper. Because

Harrell did not raise this issue in the trial court and preserve error for appeal, the

issue is waived.2 See id.; Lenk, 361 S.W.3d at 604; see also In re Interest of A.S.M.,

1
      See Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497–98 (Tex. 1995) (convicted
      criminal defendant cannot sue representing attorney for legal malpractice without
      first establishing defendant has been exonerated because otherwise defendant’s own
      conduct is sole cause of indictment and conviction).
2
      While we cannot decide an issue that is not properly presented to us for review, we
      note that both Rule 91a and Chapter 14 authorize dismissal of claims having no
      basis in law, and both such dismissals would be reviewed de novo. Further, a claim
      for legal malpractice based on the attorney’s representation of a defendant in a
      criminal matter has no basis in law when the defendant has not been exonerated
      because the Peeler doctrine forecloses such claims. See Stallworth v. Ayers, 510
      S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (affirming
      dismissal under Rule 91a of defendant’s legal malpractice claims against attorney
      who represented him in criminal proceeding because defendant had not been
      exonerated and therefore, under Peeler doctrine, his claim had no basis in law).
      Even improperly pled fiduciary-duty claims—claims that are properly characterized
      as legal malpractice claims because they do not allege self-dealing but allege
      substandard legal representation—are barred by the Peeler doctrine. See id. at 191,
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650 S.W.3d 85, 89–92 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (concluding, based on

record, appellant did not show rendition of improper judgment where trial court

granted Rule 91a motion to dismiss in case under Family Code even though Rule

91a does not apply to Family Code cases). Therefore, we overrule Harrell’s first

issue.

B.       Contesting Unsworn Declaration

         Next, Harrell argues that because Godinich did not seek dismissal under

Chapter 14 and challenge his unsworn declarations, Godinich has waived any

challenges to Harrell’s claims.

         For this argument, Harrell relies on Equitable General Insurance Co. of Texas

v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1984). In that case, the trial court conditioned the

granting of Yates’s motion for new trial on his payment of $500 in attorney’s fees

to opposing counsel. Yates, 684 S.W.2d at 670. Even though Yates filed an

unchallenged affidavit of inability to pay costs, the trial court denied the motion for

new trial and entered final judgment against Yates. Id. On appeal, in light of Texas

Rule of Civil Procedure 145, the Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in

imposing a mandatory condition on a litigant who undisputedly was unable to pay

         194 (disregarding criminal defendant’s characterization of claim as breach of
         fiduciary duty and recognizing that claim was for “bad legal advice or improper
         representation,” which is legal-malpractice claim, and affirming dismissal of that
         claim under Rule 91a based on Peeler doctrine).
                                             7
court costs and attorney’s fees. Id. at 671; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 145 (payment of court

costs not required by litigant who properly files statement of inability to afford

payment of court costs). Here, the trial court dismissed Harrell’s claim under Rule

91a for having no basis in law or fact, not because of Harrell’s inability to pay costs.

Yates is inapplicable.3

      But again, the record does not show that Harrell ever raised this argument

before the trial court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Therefore, error was not preserved,

and the issue is waived. See id.; Lenk, 361 S.W.3d at 604. We overrule Harrell’s

second issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Harrell has waived his appellate issues by not preserving error. Therefore, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

                                                Gordon Goodman
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Kelly and Goodman.

3
      Further, the Supreme Court in Yates reversed the trial court’s judgment and
      remanded the case for a new trial on the merits. Yates, 684 S.W.2d at 671 (affirming
      court of appeals decision); Yates v. Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. of Tex., 672 S.W.2d 822,
      824 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984), aff’d, 684 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1984)
      (reversing trial court’s judgment and remanding for new trial). The Supreme Court
      did not rule, as Harrell suggests, that the opposing party’s claims were waived for
      failing to challenge the affidavit of inability to pay costs.
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