Court Opinion

ID: 9663451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:39:29.757611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:51.163482
License: Public Domain

Gillis, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s orders granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition and defendants’ motion to limit plaintiff’s damages. We affirm.
Plaintiff began to work for defendants in November, 1964. Plaintiff worked continuously until November, 1975, when he was injured on the job. *677Plaintiff returned to work in February, 1976. Plaintiff claimed that he was laid off on March 15, 1976, because he was told that there was insufficient work. Plaintiff decided to undergo elective surgery which was necessitated by his November, 1975, injury. Plaintiff was unable to return to work until July, 1976. At that time, plaintiff was told that there was still no work for him. Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim against defendant Practical Development Company. Plaintiff’s claim was settled by a redemption agreement which provided:
RELEASE AND WAIVER OF SENIORITY
Whereas Lenzie Nunley has filed a claim under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for injury alleged to have resulted from his/her employment, and whereas the employer, General Growth Management Co. a/k/a Practical Development Co., has denied liability, the undersigned, Lenzie Nunley, in consideration of a settlement of the claim through redemption proceedings with the Workmen’s Compensation Department, does hereby voluntarily quit his/her employment with General Growth Management Co. a/k/a Practical Development Co. waives any and all seniority rights he/ she may have and releases any claim he/she may have for re-employment based on such seniority rights.
On November 7, 1977, plaintiff signed the release.
From November 15, 1976, until July 26, 1977, plaintiff worked for Ben Lee Iron & Metal. On July 27, 1977, plaintiff began working for Ford Motor Company. Plaintiff was laid off in July, 1979. Thereafter, plaintiff worked on "odd jobs.” On January 25, 1980, plaintiff filed suit against defendant Practical Home Builders, Inc., alleging that he worked for that defendant and that that *678defendant had violated the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., by laying him off and by failing to call him back to work despite his seniority because of his race. As an affirmative defense, defendant Practical Home Builders, Inc., claimed that plaintiff was not its employee.
On February 14, 1983, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint, adding Practical Development Company and Practical Management Company as defendants and alleging that each of the defendants operated out of the same address and had identical officers and directors. Plaintiff also added a second count, alleging that defendants violated the fair employment practices act, MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq., which was repealed by the Civil Rights Act in 1977. Defendants moved to strike plaintiff’s first amended complaint because it added new parties after the statute of limitations had expired. Plaintiff responded that defendants were engaged in a continuing tort and that they all employed plaintiff.
Defendants moved for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s complaint was filed after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiff again claimed that defendants’ action constituted continuing violations of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff further alleged that service of process on defendant Practical Home Builders, Inc., tolled the statute of limitations as to the other defendants and that defendant Practical Home Builders, Inc., owned defendant Practical Development Company. On September 24, 1985, the trial court denied defendants’ motion.
On August 15, 1985, defendants filed a motion to limit plaintiff’s damages from the day plaintiff was laid off until July 28, 1977, the day he began to *679work for Ford Motor Company at higher wages than he would have received working for defendants, or until November 7, 1977, the day plaintiff signed the release stating that he had voluntarily quit. Plaintiff responded that he should not be permanently barred from recovering lost wages because he had worked for Ford Motor Company for two years. Plaintiff further argued that, while he should be able to assert what he refers to as the equitable doctrine of entity enterprise liability, which was outlined in Pfaffenberger v Pavilion Restaurant Co, 352 Mich 1, 6; 88 NW2d 488 (1958), to demonstrate that all three defendants were actually one for purposes of discriminating against him, he should also be allowed to argue that defendants should be treated as separate corporations for the purpose of determining to which defendant the release applied. Finally, plaintiff argued that the release waived plaintiff’s seniority rights and any workers’ compensation claims arising therefrom, but did not waive any other claims, including the specfic race discrimination claims filed by him. On September 24, 1985, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to limit plaintiff’s damages from March 15, 1976, to July 28, 1977, but granted defendants’ motion to limit plaintiff’s damages from March 15, 1976, to November 7, 1977, the date plaintiff signed the release stating he voluntarily quit.
Plaintiff filed an application for leave to appeal the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to limit damages and defendants filed a late application for leave to appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition on the basis of the statute of limitations. This Court denied leave to appeal and denied plaintiff’s motion for rehearing on its denial of plaintiff’s request for leave to appeal.
*680Defendants then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), claiming that plaintiffs suit was barred by the release he signed in regards to his workers’ compensation claim. Plaintiff responded that the release signed by him dealt with his voluntary termination with defendant Practical Development Company, waiver of his seniority rights, and release of any claim for reemployment based on such seniority rights. Plaintiff argued that his release did not apply to any other claims or to any other defendants. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff appealed the order granting summary disposition as well as the order limiting plaintiffs damages.
Plaintiff first claims that this case is distinguishable from Beardslee v Michigan Claim Services, Inc, 103 Mich App 480; 302 NW2d 896 (1981), lv den 412 Mich 872 (1981), where the release signed by the plaintiff as part of a workers’ compensation redemption, which forever released and discharged defendants from "any and all . . . causes of action ... of whatsoever kind and nature,” was held to bar the plaintiff’s subsequent noncompensation-related cause of action. While we agree with plaintiff that the language in the present release is not as broad as it was in Beardslee, we nonetheless agree that the release’s language is broad enough to bar plaintiff’s specific claims.
In Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 122 Mich App 411; 332 NW2d 498 (1983), the plaintiff redeemed her workers’ compensation claim and signed a release in which she voluntarily quit her employment with the defendant and waived any and all seniority rights she may have had. The plaintiff subsequently filed a sexual discrimination claim under the Civil Rights Act. While reversing and remanding on different grounds, this Court noted *681that the plaintiff may have waived some of her claims against the defendant by executing the release.
In Hill v Terminix International, Inc, 617 F Supp 1030, 1031 (ED Mich, 1985), the plaintiff signed a "Release and Waiver of Seniority” providing:
[I]n consideration of a settlement of this [workers’ compensation] claim through redemption proceedings with the Bureau of Worker’s Disability Compensation, does hereby voluntary quit his employment with the [sic] terminix international, waives any and all seniority rights he may have and releases any claim he may have to re-employment based upon such seniority rights.
The court held that the language of the release was broad enough to bar the plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim because it indicated that the plaintiff had voluntarily quit and waived any and all seniority rights. Subsequently, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to allege a violation of the Civil Rights Act but, then, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim because it was barred by the release executed by him.
A redemption agreement settling a workers’ compensation claim would not necessarily bar a subsequent civil rights claim. However, like the court in Hill, supra, we hold that the release executed by plaintiff is sufficiently broad to bar the specific claims set forth in his complaint. Plaintiff’s claim that he was laid off because of race is barred because the release specifically acknowledges that plaintiff "voluntarily quit his/her employment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff’s claim that defendant recalled white employees with less seniority is barred because the release waived "any and all *682seniority rights he/she may have and release[d] any claim he/she may have for reemployment based on such seniority rights.”
Plaintiff further claims the trial court erred when it allowed the release to apply to all defendants rather than to only defendant Practical Development Company. In this case, plaintiff sought the benefit of what he refers to as the equitable doctrine of entity enterprise liability to hold all three defendants liable for race discrimination. Having done so, we agree with defendants that plaintiff cannot now resurrect the separate corporate entities when to do so would work to his benefit. See, e.g., Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co, 421 Mich 641, 652; 364 NW2d 670 (1984).
Affirmed.
H. R. Gage, J., concurred.