Court Opinion

ID: 9583836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:30.641803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:15.401991
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Case No. 71066. As to Case No. 70936, I agree with subdivision (a) regarding the 15% penalty but I have a procedural difference when it comes to subdivision (b) regarding attorney fees.
Since there is no evidence, this case differs procedurally from Overman v. All Cities Transfer Co., 176 Ga. App. 436 (336 SE2d 341) (1985). There we remanded for findings based on application of the correct legal principles relating to the standard for recovery of attorney fees. But application here would result as a matter of law in no recovery because of a fatal dearth of evidence presented. As I understand OCGA § 34-9-105 (d), however, there is room for the superior court to exercise discretion as to whether to recommit to the board for additional evidence or itself enter a proper judgment reversing the award because on the present record the board’s findings are not supported by the evidence since it is insufficient. OCGA § 34-9-105 (c) *337(4). The word “may” is used in subsection (d): the superior court “may recommit... for further hearing” or it “may enter the proper judgment upon the findings [of the board]. ...” The superior court is instructed to decide which of these two avenues to take based upon a consideration of what “the nature of the case may demand.”
Decided December 5, 1985
Rehearing denied December 19, 1985
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, James P. Googe, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Marion O. Gordon, First Assis*338tant Attorney General, Wayne Yancey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan L. Rutherford, Assistant Attorney General, Tash J. Van Dora, Richard G. Farnsworth, John M. Williams, Special Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
*337The leading case on the subject is Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 191 Ga. 143, 144 (11 SE2d 661) (1940). “The statute . . . plainly and unambiguously vests in the superior court, ‘upon the setting aside’ of the decision appealed from, discretion to ‘recommit the controversy’ to the Industrial Board for such further proceedings as the court may specifically direct.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 144. The Court refers to “the power” to remand a case to the board for the purpose of hearing additional evidence. I do not take this to mean that the superior court is obligated to do so. See also Ga. Power Co. v. Crutchfield, 125 Ga. App. 488, 489 (3) (188 SE2d 140) (1972) (“This judgment of reversal is not to be construed as precluding the trial court from exercising its discretion to recommit the award to the State Board of Workers’ Compensation to hear additional evidence . . . .”); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Snyder, 126 Ga. App. 31, 35 (6) (189 SE2d 919) (1972) (“if the award were unsupported by competent evidence in the record, the matter could be remanded to the board for hearing further evidence. . . .” [Emphasis supplied.]); Chambers v. Powell, 126 Ga. App. 393, 395 (190 SE2d 823) (1972). This power could include consideration of whether claimant exercised ordinary diligence in presenting evidence. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, supra. Reopening the evidence before the board after the claimant has had full opportunity to present proper proof in support of attorney fees further delays the process, results in piecemeal litigation, and rewards lack of diligence. At least since the 1980 case of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 156 Ga. App. 576, 577 (2) (275 SE2d 152) (1980), it has been abundantly clear what kind of evidence was necessary. Concerns about unnecessary litigation costs and delay as well as the involvement of several levels of judicial scrutiny, all of which could easily have been avoided, could and should be taken into account. Nevertheless, there is a choice, and the choice is the superior court’s, not ours.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.
*338Elaine W. Whitehurst, Robert D. Ingram, for appellee.