Court Opinion

ID: 9429748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:47.395349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.295984
License: Public Domain

Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 474, ¶ 6, makes it a federal crime to use pictures of money for any purpose whatsoever, even in the absence of an unlawful intent, and without regard to whether such pictures, or the materials used to make them, might be employed fraudulently. Recognizing that this flat ban sweeps within it a substantial amount of legitimate expression posing virtually no risk of counterfeiting, Congress enacted 18 U. S. C. § 504, which exempts from the ban illustrations of the currency “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums,” provided such illustrations meet certain restrictions as to form and preparation.
*660In my view, these two statutes as currently written work together to effect a significant abridgment of expression. And, given the extensive and detailed criminal regulation of counterfeiting found in other parts of Title 18, the two provisions only marginally serve the Government’s concededly highly important interest in preserving the integrity of the currency. The Court today does not expressly reject either of these conclusions. Indeed, eight Justices recognize that Congress’ obvious and exclusive intent — to permit only those illustrations of currency with “philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes” and to ban all others — simply cannot constitutionally be achieved through the legislatively chosen means. Ante, at 648-649. Nevertheless, Justice White, joined in the judgment on this point by Justice Stevens, concludes that “neither §474 nor §504 is unconstitutional on its face or as applied to Time.” Ante, at 659.
The key to this paradoxical result lies in the fact that somewhere between the beginning and the end of his opinion, Justice White stops reviewing the statutes enacted by Congress and begins assessing a statutory scheme of his own creation. After identifying separate “purposes” and “publications” conditions for obtaining the §504 exemption and, correctly in my view, invalidating the former, Justice White proceeds as though the two requirements were written in the disjunctive. He assumes that Congress would have wanted to exempt illustrations satisfying either condition and therefore feels authorized to leave one in force while invalidating the other. Accordingly, Justice White proposes simply to excise certain offending words from the integrated clause in which they appear and leaves the rest of the statutory language in place — confident that the revised version of the statute “sufficiently accommodates Time’s First Amendment interests,” ante, at 648, while effectuating “the policies Congress sought to advance,” ante, at 653.
*661I certainly agree with the principle that we should construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions, so long as our interpretation remains consistent with Congress’ objectives. But, in my view, Justice White’s limiting construction of the statutory scheme at issue here neither remains faithful to congressional intent nor rids the legislation of constitutional difficulties. The statutory scheme left in force after Justice White’s “remarkable feat of judicial surgery,” Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 351 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result), would ban illustrations of currency by all “nonpublishers,” even for the kinds of purposes Congress plainly intended to allow, but permit identical illustrations by all “publishers,” without regard to the purposes of their illustrations and even if the nature of their media poses a relatively greater risk of counterfeiting. Such a reconstructed scheme bears no relationship to the language, history, or purpose of the statutes as enacted. And, despite the removal of the “purposes” requirement, the revised statutes remain unconstitutional on their face.
I
Because the Court decides that §§474 and 504 are constitutional as applied to Time, it may be useful to review in somewhat more detail precisely how these provisions have been applied to appellee. For many years, Time’s various magazines have used pictures of United States currency to illustrate articles concerning political, economic, and sports events. As appellee explains, these pictures have depicted bills “significantly enlarged or reduced in size, discolored or otherwise altered in appearance, shown only in part, and/or substantially obscured by printed legends or overlaid objects.” Brief for Appellee 3. In addition, each picture “appeared on only one side of a page,” and that page was of the glossy paper used in the production of appellee’s magazines. Ibid. See 539 F. Supp. 1371, 1377-1379 (SDNY 1982).
*662Beginning as early as 1965, Time was warned by agents of the Secret Service that such illustrations violated the ban on currency reproductions imposed by §474 and were not exempt under § 504. App. 29. In the ensuing years, Secret Service agents offered Time several different interpretations of the statutory requirements. At various points, Time was informed (a) that it could print only black and white likenesses of currency of a specified size and only for “numismatic, educational, historical or newsworthy” purposes, id., at 27; (b) that it could never print any photograph of currency in any color or size, because § 504(1) exempts only “illustrations,” ibid.; and (c) that it could only print likenesses accompanied by “numismatic, educational, historical or newsworthy” information about the particular Federal Reserve Note illustrated, id., at 27-28, and could not use likenesses for “decorative or eye-catching purposes,” id., at 33.
Relying on these varying constructions of the statutes, Secret Service agents informed Time that it violated federal law when it used partial and distorted likenesses of currency to illustrate articles concerning, among other things, inflation, the effect of economics on an election campaign, a conference on international monetary policy, corporate bribery, and the financial difficulties faced by a “cash-rich” corporation. Id., at 29-34. On several occasions, advance warnings and “slap[s] on the wrist,” id., at 34, from the Secret Service led Time’s editors to withdraw covers that had been prepared and to substitute illustrations which, in their judgment, were “not nearly as effective in communicating the thought intended to be conveyed as the illustration banned by the Secret Service.” Id., at 30.
In May 1981, a Secret Service agent informed Time’s legal department that the cover of an issue of Sports Illustrated that had appeared three months earlier violated the counterfeiting statute. The supposedly offending cover, illustrating an article concerning a bribery scandal in amateur basketball, included color reproductions of portions of $100 bills, one-third of actual size, pouring into a basketball hoop. The *663agent told Time that the Secret Service would seize all materials used in preparation of the cover, asked for the names and addresses of all individuals or companies involved in its production, and requested an interview with a member of Time’s management. Ten days later, Time brought this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Government’s enforcement or threat of enforcement of §§474 and 504 against Time.
r — H HH
The linchpin of Justice White’s opinion is his view that the words in § 504(1) limiting the exemption to illustrations of currency “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes,” can be excised from the phrase in which they appear while leaving in force the language that remains, notably the requirement that exempted illustrations appear in certain “publications,” that is, “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” See ante, at 649, 652. Justice White acknowledges that, after invalidating the “purposes” requirement, he should decide whether what is left consists of “ ‘unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be unconstitutional.’ ” Ante, at 652 (quoting El Paso & Northeastern R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87, 96 (1909)). But, although he explains why he finds the “publications” requirement “unobjectionable,” at least in the context of this case, ante, at 650-652, he never explains why the language setting out that condition is “separable” from the rest of the sentence in which it appears.1
*664In my view, the language of the statute Justice White would leave in force is neither “separable” nor “unobjectionable.” Despite his recognition that severability depends “largely” on congressional intent, ante, at 653,2 his deletion of *665a few words from an indivisible phrase in § 504 would work a dramatic change in the scope of the scheme contemplated by Congress. As a result of this exercise in legislative draftsmanship, all members of the ill-defined class of “publishers” meeting the other requirements of §504 would be exempt from the §474 ban, regardless of the purposes their illustrations may serve or the risk their illustrations may pose of endangering the currency. Conversely, all “nonpublishers” would be subject to the §474 ban, even when pursuing the same legitimate purposes through illustrations that pose a similar, or even smaller, threat of counterfeiting. I do not believe this limiting construction of the statutory scheme can be supported by (A) the language and structure of § 504 or (B) its legislative history and purposes. And, as I shall show in Part III, the substantial abridgment of free expression imposed by these statutes, even as Justice White would revise them, renders the remaining language far from constitutionally “unobj ectionable. ”
A
As relevant here, the version of § 504 passed by Congress exempts from the criminal prohibition against using pictures of the currency
*666“(1) the printing, publishing, or importation, or the making or importation of the necessary plates for such printing or publishing, of illustrations of—
“(C) any . . . obligation or other security of the United States, . . .
“for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums (but not for advertising purposes, except illustrations of stamps and paper money in philatelic or numismatic advertising of legitimate numismatists and dealers in stamps or publishers of or dealers in philatelic or numismatic articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums).” 18 U. S. C. §504(1) (emphasis added).
The plain language of §504(1) extends the availability of the exemption from the § 474 ban to those illustrations serving the specified enumerated purposes and to no others. Although the statute also requires such illustrations to appear in certain media, the “purposes” and “publications” restrictions are not written in the disjunctive. They are instead linked by the word “in,” indicating that neither is a sufficient condition for claiming the protection of the statute; the only illustrations that are permitted are those that both serve the specified purposes and appear “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” By its terms, therefore, the list of media is a qualification that narrows the scope of the exemption, rather than an independent and severable basis for obtaining permission to use illustrations of the currency.3
*667Justice White initially recognizes that the “purposes” and “publications” restrictions act together to limit the scope of the exemption. See ante, at 645-646. Yet, in concluding that Congress would exempt even those “publications” that do not serve the designated “purposes,” see ante, at 649, Justice White proceeds as though the two requirements were written in the disjunctive. Only by reading the statute as permitting illustrations that meet either the “purpose” or the “publication” requirement can one conclude that Congress would have wanted the exemption to be available to parties satisfying one condition but not the other.
As far as I am aware, this is the first time that Members of the Court have sought to sever selected words from a single integrated statutory phrase and to transform a modifying clause into a provision that can operate independently.4 To be sure, Congress could easily have placed the “purpose” and “publication” requirements in separate subsections and connected them with the word “or”; in that event, one might plausibly conclude that one can operate as a basis for exemption without the other.5 The fact is, however, that Congress *668did not enact the statute in that form, and there is no indication that it intended the statute to operate as though it had. By using the qualifying connective “in” — rather than “or in” — Congress must have intended an exemption only for those illustrations “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums” that serve the listed purposes — and not for any picture that could be said to appear in the designated media. In short, the very language with which Congress joined the “purposes” and “publications” requirements refutes Justice White’s conclusion that they are severable.6
B
Notwithstanding the statute’s clearly expressed goal of exempting only illustrations with “philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes,” Justice White expresses his confidence that “the policies Congress *669sought to advance by enacting § 504 can be effectuated” even though that standard is unenforceable. Ante, at 653. He never explains, however, how congressional policies might be advanced with the “purposes” language deleted and the “publications” requirement left in force. Indeed, he never indicates just what function he believes the list of publications in the statute was intended to serve. We cannot, however, properly conclude that the “publications” requirement can be left “standing alone,” ante, at 649-650, without considering how that requirement relates to the overall objectives of the statutory scheme. A review of the history and purposes of the statutory scheme provides no support for the conclusion that Congress would want to extend special protection to all illustrations in “publications” and to ban the pictures of “nonpublishers,” without regard to whether either group’s illustrations serve “philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes.”
(1)
Consistent with the plain language of § 504, the statute’s legislative history confirms that it was originally adopted, and later amended, in order to exempt from the otherwise comprehensive ban on likenesses of the currency only those illustrations that serve the specific purposes Congress deemed worthy of special protection. At the outset, it is crucial to recall the breadth of Congress’ total ban on all illustrations of the currency, a prohibition that was hurriedly adopted as part of comprehensive emergency legislation designed to fund the Civil War, see ante, at 643-644, and n. 1, and that has been reenacted with little explanation and only minor changes in wording in every subsequent revision and codification of the Federal Criminal Code. See Brief for Appellee 6-8.
Beginning nearly 60 years after the broad prohibition was first enacted, Congress grew concerned that the prohibition swept within it a number of legitimate activities posing little threat of counterfeiting. Accordingly, in a succession of *670enactments, Congress fashioned certain exceptions for specific activities it found worthy of special protection. It began with stamp collecting, an activity whose importance to those who drafted and amended § 504 is still evident in the structure of the current version. The crucial language in the present statute first came into the criminal code in 1923 with “[a]n Act to allow the printing and publishing of illustrations of foreign postage and revenue stamps from defaced plates.” Ch. 218, 42 Stat. 1437. As its statement of purpose indicates, that statute was passed in recognition of the fact that “[t]here are a great many stamp collectors in this country, and [the statute's] purpose was to permit them to issue and gather together defaced stamps and print them for the benefit usually of children.” 64 Cong. Rec. 4976 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Cummins). Although Congress achieved this aim by protecting certain kinds of publications, the language it employed makes it crystal clear that it intended to exempt only publications serving the specified purpose of stamp collecting. Thus, the statute allowed illustrations only “in philatelic or historical articles, books, journals, albums, or the circulars of legitimate publishers or dealers in [designated] stamps, books, journals, albums or circulars,” ch. 218, 42 Stat. 1437 (emphasis added), plainly indicating that the listed publications could carry the permitted illustrations only if they were of a “philatelic or historical” nature. Accordingly, an exemption for activities with the specified purpose was the exclusive object of the legislation and was intended to qualify its scope.
In 1937, the statute was amended to extend its protection to undefaced foreign stamps and to allow the Treasury Department to regulate exempted uses, ch. 10, 52 Stat. 6. See S. Rep. No. 1159, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1937). The new version, now entitled “an act [t]o permit the printing of black- and-white illustrations of United States and foreign postage stamps for philatelic purposes,” ch. 10, 52 Stat. 6, carried forward the original restriction to publications concerned with *671stamp collecting and slightly enlarged the group of publications so protected. In a stylistic clarification that highlights the centrality of the “purposes” requirement, the 1937 amendment also introduced the sentence structure that remains in the statute today: Whereas the 1923 statute exempted only illustrations in “philatelic or historical books, journals, albums or circulars,” the 1938 revision permitted illustrations “for philatelic purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums . . . Ibid, (emphasis added). This modification, which established the basic form of the current provision, extended the exemption to the five types of publications listed, but only if they used the illustrations for “philatelic purposes.” Congress thereby indicated its unmistakable intention that the “purpose” requirement would continue to play the central role in the availability of the exemption.7
The exemption was amended again in 1958 in order to extend its protection to illustrations of United States obligations other than stamps and to expand the range of specified purposes for which such illustrations could be used. Pub. L. 85-921, 72 Stat. 1771. This revision retained the sentence structure of the 1938 statute, including its list of permissible media. And, as before, the legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the “purposes” restriction to continue to act as a central and indispensable qualification on the scope of the exemption. For instance, the Committee Reports say nothing about specially favored “publications” when they explain that the purpose of the bill, as relevant here, is to “[pjermit black and white illustrations of United States and foreign paper money and other obligations and securities *672for educational, historical, and newsworthy purposes.” H. R. Rep. No. 1709, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1958); S. Rep. No. 2446, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1958) (emphasis added). See also H. R. Rep. No. 1709, at 7; S. Rep. No. 2446, at 8. Nor do the Reports indicate any special solicitude for “publications” when they state that the bill is meant to codify the Treasury Department’s practice of permitting “exceptions to [§ 474] by granting special permission to use illustrations of United States bonds and paper money for numismatic, historical, and educational purposes.” H. R. Rep. No. 1709, at 3; S. Rep. No. 2446, at 5 (emphasis added).8 Indeed, the only illuminating reference in the Reports to the “publications” requirement,9 indicates that it was intended simply to ensure that illustrations for the permitted purposes not take the form of ‘facsimiles in the likeness of paper money or other obligations,” H. R. Rep. No. 1709, at 4; S. Rep. No. 2446, at 6 (emphasis added). In light of the fact that existing law already controlled the use and possession of facsim*673iles for illegitimate purposes,10 that reference only strengthens the conclusion that the sole objective of §504 was to permit illustrations for purposes Congress considered worthwhile.11
Given this history, it is clear that the central objective of §504 — its very essence — was to exempt only illustrations “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes.” Having concluded that this objective cannot constitutionally be achieved through the legislatively chosen means, Justice White therefore errs in simply deleting the crucial statutory language and using the words that remain as the raw materials for a new statute of his own making.
*674(2)
In light of the history and obvious objective of the statute, an independent “publications” requirement standing alone makes little sense. As appellants now seem to acknowledge,12 the most plausible explanation for the requirement that illustrations serving the listed purposes appear “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums” is that Congress thereby intended to provide further elaboration as to the general sorts of activities it wished to allow while seeking to ensure that the exemption not be used to justify the creation of likenesses so physically similar to genuine currency that they could be used fraudulently. Appellants therefore suggest that the “purpose” and “forum” language work together to establish a single standard for exemption that is “descriptive and illustrative, rather than prescriptive and mandatory.” Brief for Appellants 28. They thus read the entire phrase that Justice White would split in two as limiting the exemption’s availability to legitimate “publications,” broadly understood, as distinguished from potentially deceptive “facsimiles.”
*675This interpretation ascribes far more rationality to Congress than would any suggestion that, in order to obtain the benefit of the exemption, an illustration must literally “appear in one of the enumerated publications,” cf., ante, at 651, n. 8. It is difficult to imagine why Congress would have considered only pictures “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums” — as distinct from those on, say, leaflets or posters — sufficiently important or legitimate to warrant a special exemption from the § 474 ban.13 Nor could the apparent arbitrariness of a special exemption for just the listed “publications” be justified by reference to Congress’ desire to minimize the risk of counterfeiting. Although a limitation to the expressly listed media might exclude “facsimiles,” there are numerous other media for expression not found in the statutory list that do not come close to resembling slips of paper in the shape and consistency of Federal Reserve Notes. It could hardly be contended, for example, that depictions of the currency on billboards, placards, or barnyard doors pose a greater threat of counterfeiting than identical illustrations in “articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” And, finally, although a restrictive reading of the “publications” requirement might arguably serve Congress’ undoubted wish “to relieve the Treasury Department of the burden of processing numerous requests for special permission to use photographic reproductions of currency,” ante, at 653, mere “administrative convenience,” independent of any substantive objective, was plainly not the primary legislative goal. To the contrary, the legislative history of §504 confirms that Congress’ substantive objective in enacting a *676specific exemption from the §474 ban was to grant special permission for illustrations serving specified purposes, and not to permit illustrations in certain publications simply because such an exemption would be easy to administer.14
*677Accordingly, I agree with appellants that the list of publications cannot sensibly reflect a congressional intention to confer special status on the particular media listed. Instead, those words are best read as operating in necessary conjunction with the “purposes” requirement to provide enforcement authorities with general guidance as to the particular kinds of “legitimate” activities Congress meant to protect while permitting those authorities to exclude uses in media whose form or appearance present too serious a risk of fraud. On this construction, however, the two requirements are so completely intertwined as to be plainly inseverable; they constitute a single statutory provision which operates as an integrated whole. They therefore “must stand or fall as a unit.” Cf. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 83 (1976).
Ill
A court’s obligation to leave separable parts of a statute in force is consistent with its general duty to give statutes constructions that avoid constitutional difficulties. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). Accordingly, in order to uphold a portion of an unconstitutional statute, a court must determine not only whether the legislature would have wanted that part to remain in effect, but also whether “what is left” is itself constitutional. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 108-109 (1976). For the reasons I have set out in Part II, I cannot agree that Congress would have retained §504 as presently written without the “purposes” requirement. Even if I am wrong, however, and Justice White’s limiting construction of the statutory scheme is faithful to congressional intent, I would still reject that interpretation. In my view, the statutory scheme, even *678without the “purposes” requirement, remains unconstitutional on its face.
Because the First Amendment interests at stake in this ease are denigrated by the Government, Brief for Appellants 20, and all but ignored by Justice White, it becomes necessary to emphasize their nature and importance. The adage that “one picture is worth a thousand words” reflects the common-sense understanding that illustrations are an extremely important form of expression for which there is no genuine substitute.15 And, as a cursory examination of the magazine covers at issue in this case vividly demonstrates, the image of money in particular is an especially evocative and powerful way of communicating ideas about matters of public concern, ranging from economics to politics to sports. See 539 F. Supp., at 1383. Contrary to appellants’ contention, Brief for Appellants 20, a statute that substantially abridges a uniquely valuable form of expression of this kind cannot be defended on the ground that, in appellants’ judgment, the speaker can express the same ideas in some other way.16
*679Even as Justice White would revise it, the statutory-scheme at issue here works just such a substantial abridgment of speech for significant numbers of individuals who might wish to use illustrations of the currency for perfectly legitimate reasons and in ways that pose no serious risk of counterfeiting. Depending on which of two interpretations of the “publications” requirement is adopted, such illustrations are either (A) allowed, if at all, only when licensed by Secret Service agents enforcing an utterly standardless statutory definition of “illustrative” uses or (B) completely prohibited because they do not literally appear “in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” Cf. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 963, n. 11 (1984).
A
An independent “publications” requirement has not, until today, been understood as the critical element in the statutory scheme even by the Government. See supra, at 674-677.17 We therefore have little basis on which to determine *680precisely what kinds of illustrations it permits and what kinds it prohibits. Yet Justice White refuses to consider the scope of the statutory language he would sustain because of his confidence that those words will in no event pose problems for appellee. Ante, at 649.18 But, given appellee’s over-breadth challenge, we cannot avoid engaging in an assessment of the statute's reach and, therefore, of its possible vagueness. As the Court reaffirmed just last Term, “we have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 358-359, n. 8 (1983). See also Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494, 495, 498-499 (1982). It is difficult to understand how Justice White, having rejected the Government’s interpretation of the statute, can so easily “assume that the legitimate reach of §504 ‘dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications’ to nonpublishers,” ante, at 651-652, without providing some explanation as to just what a “nonpublisher” may be. In order to evaluate Time’s claim that “the statute is unconstitu*681tional in a substantial portion of the cases to which it applies,” ante, at 650, we must consider how it applies to other cases— even if its application to appellee may be clear.19
As I have noted, supra, at 672-673, appellants’ interpretation of the statute licenses the Treasury Department to determine, on a necessarily ad hoc basis, whether a given picture appears in a medium of which the statutory list is “illustrative” or whether, instead, its medium looks too much like the kind of “facsimiles” prohibited by other parts of the statutory scheme. This construction might enable many people using pictures of the currency for legitimate purposes to avoid criminal liability, but it creates precisely the sorts of constitutional infirmities that have led the Court to invalidate the “purposes” requirement. As read by appellants, the “publications” requirement vests in Secret Service agents, monitoring the enormous variety of uses to which pictures of the currency can be put, virtually unconstrained authority to decide whether a given illustration imposes criminal liability on its author or not. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 358-361.20 Such unguided discretion inevitably poses a serious risk of government discrimination on the basis of content or subject matter. Cf. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938). See ante, at 648-649 (“Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment”). See generally Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, *682425 U. S. 610 (1976). And because §474, ¶6, unlike the other counterfeiting provisions in Title 18, imposes criminal liability without any showing of unlawful intent, construing §504 to exempt only those uses deemed legitimate by enforcement authorities would render the statutory scheme “little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.’” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 395 (1979) (quoting United States v. Ragen, 314 U. S. 513, 524 (1942)).
Accordingly, if, as appellants suggest, the “publications” requirement is only “descriptive and illustrative” of the kinds of uses Congress intended to permit and its precise meaning must be left to case-by-case judgments by Secret Service agents, people “whose First Amendment rights are abridged by [§ 474, ¶ 6, will] have traded a direct prohibition on their activity for a licensing scheme that, if it is available to them at all, is available only at the unguided discretion of the [Secret Service].” Cf. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S., at 964, n. 12. On that interpretation, the statutory scheme upheld today is unconstitutional on its face “because it [is] apparent that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.” City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 797 (1984) (footnote omitted). See also Kolender v. Lawson, supra, at 358-359, n. 8.21
*683B
Insofar as his opinion'reveals, however, Justice White appears to assume that the list of media is not “illustrative” as appellants suggest, but rather strictly limited to “articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” See ante, at 649, n. 5, 650, and nn. 6 and 7. Assuming, arguendo, that so construed the list of media is sufficiently definite to prevent arbitrary enforcement,22 it presumably excludes illustrations of the currency — without regard to size, color, or capacity to deceive — on such items as placards, billboards, pamphlets, bumper stickers, leaflets, posters, artist’s canvasses, and signs. Unlike Justice White, I have little trouble concluding that, by imposing criminal liability on persons making such illustrations without any showing of unlawful intent, the prohibition created by the “publications” requirement renders this penal scheme “‘susceptible of sweeping and improper application.’” Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 816 (1975) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963)). As appellee notes:
“[E]qually banned by the statute are a Polaroid snapshot of a child proudly displaying his grandparent’s birthday gift of a $20 bill; a green, six-foot enlargement of the portrait of George Washington on a $1 bill, used as theatrical scenery by a high school drama club; a copy of the legend, ‘In God We Trust’, on the leaflets distributed by those who oppose Federal aid to finance abortions; and a three-foot by five-foot placard bearing an artist’s rendering of a ‘shrinking’ dollar bill, borne by a striking worker *684to epitomize his demand for higher wages in a period of inflation.” Brief for Appellee 5-6.
I do not, of course, suggest that each of the people making and displaying these sorts of depictions will be deterred from doing so by potential enforcement of the broad statutory scheme upheld today. I have no doubt, however, that substantial numbers of them will be, particularly if advised by lawyers aware of today’s decision. Cf. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 217 (1975).23 To take a single example, a poster artist with a reasonably competent attorney would certainly think twice before risking his resources on the kind of political protest attempted by the defendant in Wagner v. Simon, 412 F. Supp. 426 (WD Mo.), aff’d, 534 F. 2d 833 (CA8 1976). See n. 20, supra. Justice White brushes this prospect aside with the statement that “one arguably unconstitutional application of the statute does not prove that it is substantially overbroad, particularly in light of the numerous instances in which the requirement will easily be met.” Ante, at 651, n. 7 (emphasis added). But this remark misses the entire point of the overbreadth doctrine. Our willingness to entertain overbreadth challenges is based, not on concern with past applications of an unconstitutional statute to completed conduct, but rather on the recognition that “persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application *685to protected expression.” Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 521 (1972) (emphasis added).24
By imposing criminal liability without fault on those who use pictures of money for any purpose whatsoever unless the pictures appear in “publications,” the statutory scheme at issue here plainly amounts to “a direct and substantial limitation on protected activity that cannot be sustained unless it serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest” of the Government. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 636 (1980). The governmental interests putatively served by the scheme — the detection and prevention of counterfeiting — are, of course, substantial. But the many other criminal provisions aimed at counterfeiting, *686together with the various exceptions to the § 474, ¶ 6, ban, demonstrate that those interests “are only peripherally promoted” by the provisions at issue here and “could be sufficiently served by measures less destructive of First Amendment interests.” Ibid.
The strongest evidence that the important Government interest in preventing counterfeiting may be served by means less restrictive of free expression than those upheld today can be found in the numerous other provisions of Title 18 designed to serve that end.25 Appellants contend that § § 474, ¶ 6, and 504 add an essential additional weapon to this extensive enforcement arsenal. Although they have not been entirely consistent on the point, see n. 12, swpra, appellants currently advance two ways in which these provisions enable *687“the Secret Service to operate more effectively in tracing and identifying the source of counterfeit bills,” Brief for Appellants 21. First, they contend that the ban on illustrations prevents the creation of “facsimiles” that, however innocent their purpose, could be passed off as genuine pieces of currency. See id., at 34-35. It is, however, difficult to believe that the distorted and discolored pictures of portions of the currency that Time has placed on its covers have a serious capacity to deceive. Moreover, the “publications” requirement, if construed in a way to avoid potentially arbitrary enforcement, works to prohibit illustrations in numerous media — such as billboards, placards, posters, and walls — that are a far cry from “facsimiles” and that, indeed, bear less of a physical resemblance to actual money than pictures in “publications” might.
Second, appellants claim that, without §§ 474, ¶ 6, and 504, “counterfeiters would more readily be able to conceal their criminal conduct by associating with legitimate print shops, thereby availing themselves of an instant alibi for manufacturing and possessing currency negatives.” Id., at 21 (footnote omitted). But this argument is hard to take seriously, especially in light of the construction of the statutory scheme advanced by Justice White. For one thing, the plates and negatives manufactured by appellee for its covers are capable of producing only replicas of the distorted and discolored pictures of portions of currency for which they were made. See 539 F. Supp., at 1387; App. 76; n. 27, infra. And producing such plates hardly enhances the capacity or opportunity of those with access to legitimate printing facilities to produce other plates more useful in counterfeiting. Moreover, if the object of the ban is to minimize the counterfeiting possibilities created by the activities of legitimate printshops, that object is, to put it mildly, ill-served by a statute that prohibits only illustrations created by “nonpublishers.” Finally, in an age of easy access to high-quality printing, ranging from *688the office copying machine to the sophisticated photo-offset equipment of printers for hire, the notion that a would-be counterfeiter would use the plates created for appellee's magazine covers — instead of copying actual pieces of currency — strains credibility.
The degree to which a statutory ban on a form of expression substantially furthers legitimate state interests may often be assessed by consideration of its exceptions.26 As originally enacted, and as Justice White would reinterpret it, the statutory scheme at issue here is riddled with arbitrary distinctions between lawful and unlawful activities that undermine appellants’ claim that the scheme substantially furthers the Government's legitimate interests. Pictures appearing in the broad, but undefined, class of “nonpubli-cations” are prohibited without regard to their manner of production, size, shape, color, composition, or capacity to deceive anyone. But pictures manfactured by “publishers,” whose facilities would presumably be more useful to counterfeiters, see Brief for Appellants 21-22, as well as color slides of actual pieces of currency, §504(2), are permitted. Likenesses appearing on newsprint or quality paper stock may be allowed, but apparently not those made of wood, plastic, or cardboard. A picture of a small portion of currency painted orange and appearing on a protest sign is prohibited, while a “publisher” may manufacture an enlarged negative which can be used to print the front of a dollar bill in its natural black and white.27
*689In sum, if the “publications” requirement has sufficiently definite content to prevent its arbitrary enforcement, the statutory scheme upheld today is fatally overbroad. The *690extensive and detailed provisions regulating counterfeiting in other parts of Title 18 as well as the numerous eccentric exceptions to the statutes at issue here demonstrate that the flat ban imposed by these penal provisions on a wide variety of expression posing no conceivable danger of counterfeiting is far “‘greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.’” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U. S. 20, 32 (1984) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974)).

>

As appellants acknowledge, the statutory scheme sustained today “regulates the manner in which publishers *691may depict an item every person sees every day.” Brief for Appellants 33, n. 24. As enacted by Congress, this regulation took the form of prohibiting any such depictions unless they were “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes.” In an admirable effort to sustain this scheme, Justice Stevens “construes” that language so that it means essentially nothing: Notwithstanding the “purposes” requirement he purports to uphold, any likeness of the currency is permissible unless it is used for counterfeiting. Justice White, in contrast, acknowledging that the “purposes” language cannot be “saved,” offers a new statute that would limit the activities of publishers, whose technical capacity to engage in actual counterfeiting is thereby diminished not one whit, and that would completely ban illustrations by “nonpublishers,” who presumably have no such capacity in the first place. The scheme Congress adopted is plainly unconstitutional; the alternative pieces of legislation proposed by Justice White and Justice Stevens bear little resemblance to the statutes Congress passed.
I do not doubt that a statute can be written that would both satisfy the requirements of the First Amendment and effectively advance the legitimate and important ends Congress sought to achieve in §§474, ¶6, and 504. Today’s efforts to draft such a statute have, however, confirmed the wisdom of leaving that task to the Legislative Branch.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 In response to this opinion, Justice White denies that he has severed the “publications” requirement from the “purposes” requirement or that he needs to do so in order to reach his result. Ante, at 649-650, n. 6,652, n. 9. But a court must obviously determine the scope of a statutory standard under review before evaluating its constitutionality. From the outset óf this litigation, both parties and the District Court have read § 504 as establishing a single, unified exemption from the ban against currency illustrations and have assumed, correctly in my view, that each requirement in the statute is a necessary condition for obtaining that exemption. After *664correctly striking down the “purposes” requirement, ante, at 649, Justice White states that the “publications” requirement “standing alone” may not be challenged here, ante, at 649-650. Necessarily, therefore, Justice White believes that the “publications” requirement can “stand alone” without the “purposes” requirement.
Because of his construction of the “purposes” language, Justice Stevens does not reach the question whether the rest of the statute can remain in force without that requirement, consistent with congressional intent. On that issue, the Court is equally divided. Compare ante, at 652-656 (opinion of White, J.), with post, at 691-692 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1 join Part II-A of Justice White’s opinion because I find Justice Stevens’ interpretation of the “purposes” requirement impossible to square with either the plain language of the statute or its legislative history. For instance, if, as Justice Stevens suggests, post, at 698-699, § 504 is meant to exempt any illustration in which money is not used for counterfeiting purposes, it is difficult to see why Congress prohibited the use of currency for advertising purposes. And, as I detail below, the history of the statute demonstrates that it was initially enacted, and later amended, in order to exempt from the ban on likenesses of the currency only those illustrations that serve the specific purposes Congress listed. See infra, at 668-673. Justice Stevens, largely ignoring the text of the statute and its history, seems to treat the “purposes” language as though it adds nothing to the “publications” requirement. I believe he thereby carries the principle of construing statutes in order to save them from constitutional attack “ ‘to the point of perverting the purpose of [the] statute . . .’ [and] judicially rewriting it.” Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500, 515 (1964) (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 211 (1961)). Moreover, he leaves the precise meaning of the statutory words he interprets far from clear. Thus, his “attempt to ‘construe’ the statute and to probe its recesses for some core of constitutionality . . . injectfs] an element of vagueness into the statute’s scope and application. . . .” Aptheker, supra, at 516.

 In fact, contrary to Justice White’s implication, severability is exclusively a question of legislative intent. See, e. g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S. 747, 769, n. 24 (1982). And, like the general rule of construing *665statutes to avoid constitutional questions from which it derives, ibid., the doctrine of severability “does not . . . license a court to usurp the policymaking and legislative functions of duly elected representatives.” Cf. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U. S. 728, 741 (1984). Instead, courts addressing questions of severability should be guided by Chief Justice Taft’s admonition “that amendment may not be substituted for construction, and that a court may not exercise legislative functions to save [a] law from conflict with constitutional limitation.” Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500, 518 (1926). See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U. S. 76, 89-91 (1979); id., at 94-96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 508-511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Welsh v. United States, 398 U. S. 333, 354 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, supra, at 515; Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933).

 Congressional Committees reporting recent amendments to § 504 have also described each of its requirements as necessary conditions for obtaining the protection of the exemption. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1213, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2 (1968) (permitted illustrations must “meet the following three conditions” including “purposes” and “publications” restrictions); id., at 4 (must “comply with all of the following conditions”); id., at 6 (“must be for philatelic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes, *667must appear in certain publications, and must not be used for advertising purposes”).

 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 83 (1976) (two sentences in one section of statute “must stand or fall as a unit” since they “are inextricably bound together”). See Philbrook v. Glodgett 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975) (“‘In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy’ ”); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642, 650 (1974) (“When ‘interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature’ ”); Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 11 (1962) (“a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole Act”).

 Cf. EEOC v. Allstate Insurance Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224 (SD Miss. 1983) (concerning severability of separately denominated legislative veto provision from remainder of statute), appeal dism’d, 467 U. S. 1232 (1984). *668See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 335 (1936) (opinion of Cardozo, J.) (“confirmatory token [of severability] is the formal division of the statute into ‘Parts’ separately numbered”); George Hyman Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 582 F. 2d 834, 840, n. 10 (CA4 1978) (“[n]ormally, use of a disjunctive indicates alternatives and requires that they be treated separately unless such a construction renders the provision repugnant to the Act”).

 There are several other indications in the language and structure of the statute that the “purposes” language imposes an inextricable limitation on the availability of the § 504(1) exemption and that the restrictions as to media were not intended to establish an independent and severable exemption for “publications.” First, the entire phrase bisected by Justice White is followed by a parenthetical clause setting out a further elaboration of the types of purposes permitted. Thus, both the beginning and the end of the sentence in which the list of fora appears concern permitted purposes. Second, when prohibiting illustrations for advertising purposes, the statute exempts advertising related to stamp and coin collecting by using the phrase “in philatelic or numismatic articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums” — confirming that the listed purposes act as inseparable limitations on the enumerated media. Third, § 504(2) expressly exempts movies and slides without regard to their purpose unless they are converted into prints, in which case the “purposes” requirements of § 504(1) apply. Deletion of the “purposes” language would render meaningless this express distinction between the two parts of the statute.

 In 1948, as part of a general codification of the criminal laws, the exemption, with only “[m]inor changes in phraseology” not relevant here, H. R. Rep. No. 152, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., A40 (1945), was given its current section number and a shorter title, “Printing stamps for PHILATELIC PURPOSES.” 62 Stat. 713.

 The Committee Reports refer to regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department to enforce the existing exemption for illustrations with “philatelic purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums.” H. R. Rep. No. 1709, at 2; S. Rep. No. 2446, at 4. Not surprisingly, there is nothing in the cited regulations suggesting a special effort to prevent illustrations in “nonpublications,” much less to define such a classification. See 31 CFR §402.1 (1959) (granting permission “to make, hold and dispose of black and white reproductions of canceled United States internal revenue stamps: Provided, That such reproductions are made, held and disposed of as part of and in connection with the making, holding, and disposition, for lawful purposes, of the reproductions of the documents to which such stamps are attached”); §405.1 (permitting illustrations of war bonds “for publicity purposes” without restriction as to forum).

 It is true, as Justice White notes, ante, at 651, and n. 6, that the examples given by the Committees of people who might wish to use illustrations of money for legitimate purposes — textbook and newspaper publishers, collectors of paper money, and historians — could all be said to involve “publications.” There is no indication in the legislative history, however, that these examples were meant to be exclusive.

 Independent of the provisions at issue here, several other parts of the extensive statutory scheme designed to prevent counterfeiting control the possession of items which, by virtue of their size, shape, or consistency, look like pieces of currency. For instance, § 474, ¶ 5, the provision immediately preceding the one invoked against appellee, imposes criminal liability on anyone who “has in his possession or custody . . . any obligation or other security made or executed, in whole or in part, after the similitude of any obligation or other security issued under the authority of the United States, with intent to sell or otherwise use the same . . . .” In United States v. Turner, 586 F. 2d 395, 397-399 (CA5 1978), the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction, under § 474, ¶ 5, of an individual who possessed a number of one-sided photocopies of dollar bills of a kind that had been used successfully to defraud change machines. See also §474, ¶4; United States v. Dixon, 588 F. 2d 90, 91-92 (CA4 1978); Koran v. United States, 408 F. 2d 1321 (CA5 1969); Webb v. United States, 216 F. 2d 151 (CA6 1954).

 In 1968, the exemption was amended so as to permit colored illustrations of stamps. Pub. L. 90-353, 82 Stat. 240. Although the Committee Reports explaining this amendment referred to the “publications” requirement, they continued to describe satisfaction of the “purposes” requirement as a necessary condition for obtaining the statutory exemption. See H. R. Rep. No. 1213, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2, 4, 5, 6 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1206, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-2, 4, 5, 7 (1968). See n. 2, supra.
The statute was amended again in 1970 in order to include postage meter stamps within its protections. Pub. L. 91-448, 84 Stat. 921. See H. R. Rep. No. 91-640, p. 1 (1969).

 The Government’s construction of the statutory scheme it enforces has hardly been a model of consistency. As noted above, the Secret Service has adopted at least three different interpretations of the exemption during the years it has overseen the work of Time’s editors and art directors. See supra, at 662. And even over the course of this litigation, appellants have frequently shifted their position. In the District Court, they seemed to depart from a construction of § 504 published in a Department of Treasury pamphlet but left its precise reading of the statute extremely unclear. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 26, n. In their jurisdictional statement in this Court, appellants appeared to disavow the Treasury Department’s published construction of the exemption. Juris. Statement 15, n. 9. And, finally, sometime between the filing of the jurisdictional statement and briefing on the merits, the Treasury Department itself abandoned its most recent interpretation of § 504 and amended its pamphlet, which now apparently conforms to the position the Government has taken in this Court. See Brief for Appellants 28, n. 18.

 If §504 permitted illustrations only in the enumerated publications on the theory that — without regard to their potential use in counterfeiting relative to unlisted media — the specified media are the only places in which “legitimate” illustrations will appear, it would, of course, rest on a distinction among otherwise identical communications according to an utterly undefined and unjustified Government selection of preferred speakers. Cf. Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). *677legitimate activities is achieved without increasing the risk of counterfeiting. Without that central objective, those administrative safeguards ■cannot meaningfully be wrenched from the section and turned into ends in and of themselves.

 The same flaw undermines Justice White’s conclusion that the color and size requirements of § 504 could stay in force consistent with congressional intent even if, contrary to his conclusion, ante, at 651-652, the “publications” requirement is unconstitutionally overbroad. See ante, at 652-653. In support of this hypothesis, Justice White states that “[tjhere is no indication that Congress believed that the purpose requirement either significantly eased the Treasury Department’s burden or was necessary to prevent the exception from being used as a means of circumventing the counterfeiting laws.” Ante, at 654-655. But this argument only defeats a straw man. The “purposes” requirement was obviously not meant to make the exemption easier to administer or to prevent its abuse. It was, instead, the substantive reason for enacting the exemption in the first place. If the only function of § 504 was to “ease the administrative burden without undermining the Government’s efforts to prevent counterfeiting,” ante, at 654, no list of permissible purposes would have been necessary or even desirable. Congress could have written a statute far easier to administer by simply exempting all illustrations satisfying the color and size requirements — in effect, substantially repealing the § 474, ¶ 6, ban. The fact that it did not do so demonstrates that its intention was far more limited than to exempt any illustration that is administratively convenient to identify. Contrary to the premise of Justice White’s severability discussion, the language, legislative history, purpose, and administrative construction of § 504 from its beginnings in the 1920’s to amendments in 1969 demonstrate unequivocally that the whole point of this exemption from the longstanding flat ban was to permit illustrations with the specified purposes and no others.
There is also a rather significant linguistic obstacle to Justice White’s view. The statute imposes the color and size restrictions on “[ijllustra-tions permitted by the foregoing provisions of this section.” With both the “purposes” and the “publications” requirements deleted, the “foregoing provisions” permit, as relevant here, “the printing . . . of. . . any ... obligation or other security of the United States” — that is, they permit everything prohibited by § 4.74,, ¶ 6. The sentence limiting the exemption to illustrations “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, historical, or newsworthy purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums” is therefore clearly the heart of the exemption, and the remaining provisions are meant only to ensure that the central objective of permitting certain specified

 Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U. S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 505-514 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931). In describing the expressive value of symbols like that at issue here, it is difficult, as is so often the case, to improve upon Justice Jackson’s eloquence:
“Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their following to a flag or banner, a color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones. ... A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn.” West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 632-633 (1943).

 E. g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 812 (1984); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 180-184 *679(1983); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 501-502, 516 (1981) (plurality opinion); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 78 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id., at 79 (Powell, J., concurring); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U. S. 85, 93 (1977); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 556-558 (1975); Spence v. Washington, supra, at 411, n. 4; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939).
Aside from the fact that the Government simply has no business second-guessing editorial judgments .as to the communicative value of illustrations, cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), appellants have made no effort to contest the sworn affidavits of appellee’s editors and art directors that illustrations of the currency constitute a unique and irreplaceable means of communicating many ideas at the heart of First Amendment protections. See, e. g., App. 75, 84, 89-90, 96-97, 102-103.

 Indeed, appellants claim that neither the “purpose” nor the “publications” requirements of § 504 “have ever served as a basis for enforcement of the statute.” Juris. Statement 13. (With respect to the “purposes” requirement, the appellants’ contention is contradicted by Time’s undisputed affidavits, App. 27-28, and the findings of the District Court, 539 F. Supp., at 1377-1379).

 Justice White’s rejection of Time’s vagueness challenge, like his statement that “we may assume that the legitimate reach of § 504 'dwarfs its arguably impermissible applications’ to nonpublishers,” ante, at 651-652, neglects the fact that the “publications” requirement — which the Government disclaims ever using — has only become central to the statutory scheme by virtue of his severability conclusion. As a result, we have no way of gauging the meaning of that provision either with respect to its “arguably impermissible applications” or as it may be applied to Time, Inc.’s various activities, which undoubtedly include the use of illustrations of its covers in billboards, posters, or other “nonpublications.” Justice White’s conclusions on these points rest on assumptions of fact as to issues that, until now, appellee has had no reason to address because neither the parties nor the District Court anticipated the surprising suggestion that we excise the first part of the sentence in which the “publications” requirement appears and leave the rest standing. At a minimum, therefore, the case should be remanded to give appellee an opportunity to demonstrate how the newly independent “publications” requirement might apply to itself or others. Cf. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352, 369-371 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).

 See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S. 947, 954-959 (1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 798-799; New York v. Ferber, 458 U. S., at 772-774; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620, 634-639 (1980); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615-618 (1973).

 See Wagner v. Simon, 412 F. Supp. 426 (WD Mo.), aff’d, 534 F. 2d 833 (CA8 1976) (upholding confiscation by Secret Service agents of 3-foot long political protest poster depicting bill made to appear as a “$30 Inflationary Note” with picture of President Nixon at center); Washington Post, Nov. 17, 1983, p. B1 (reporting that Secret Service agents ordered municipal lottery board to stop using advertising posters that depict $1,000 bills).

 See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 97-98 (1940) (“It is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion. One who might have had a license for the asking may therefore call into question the whole scheme of licensing when he is prosecuted for failure to procure it”); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451-452 (1938) (“We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive which induced its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship”); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370 (1931) (“A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of [the] opportunity [for free politi*683cal discussion] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment”). See generally Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 (1979).

 There is, however, much truth in the District Court’s observation that “[t]he definition of a journal, newspaper or album is anyone’s game to play.” 539 F. Supp., at 1390. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 703-705, and n. 40 (1972).

 See Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U. S., at 967-968 (“Where, as here, a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity, and where the defect in the statute is that the means chosen to accomplish the State’s objectives are too imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack” (footnote omitted)); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 800, n. 19 (“where the statute unquestionably attaches sanctions to protected conduct, the likelihood that the statute will deter that conduct is ordinarily sufficiently great to justify an overbreadth attack”).

 See also Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., supra, at 964-968; City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, supra, at 798-799; Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S., at 634; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216-217 (1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U. S. 809, 815-817 (1975); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S., at 612.
The passage in the text that I have quoted from Time’s brief, supra, at 683-684, setting out examples of potential applications of the statutory-scheme to protected conduct, belies Justice White’s statement that the Wagner ease is “the only concrete example brought to our attention by Time.” Ante, at 651, n. 8. Furthermore, as the very portion of Time’s brief cited by Justice White demonstrates, appellee did not in fact contend below that “it had standing to challenge the publication requirement because of the overbreadth doctrine.” Ante, at 652, n. 8 (emphasis supplied). See Brief for Appellee 41, n. 29 (“One of Time’s major assertions has been and remains that § 504 continues § 474, f6’s proscription of considerably more expression than is necessary to prevent counterfeiting”). Instead, Time argued that § 504 as a whole — which until today’s decision was understood by no one to have severable “purposes” and “publications” requirements — was overbroad. See 539 F. Supp., at 1377. The precise factual basis for Time’s overbreadth argument is, in any event, beside the point. Given the argument, we are obliged to determine as a matter of law whether the statute is “ ‘susceptible of sweeping and improper application.’” Bigelow v. Virginia, supra, at 816 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 433 (1963)). See generally Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., supra.

 Wholly apart from the statutes at issue here, it remains a crime to forge, counterfeit, or alter any United States obligation with intent to defraud, § 471; to pass, utter, publish, or sell (or attempt to do so), or to import, possess, or conceal a forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation with intent to defraud, § 472; to buy, sell, exchange, transfer, receive, or deliver any forged, counterfeited, or altered obligation with the intent that the same be passed, published, or used as true and genuine, § 473; to possess, with intent to forge or counterfeit, a plate, stone, or other thing (including photographic negatives) which resemble plates used to make currency, §474, ¶ 4; to possess, take, sell, or make an impression from any tool, implement, instrument, or thing used for printing or making other tools or things used for printing obligations of the United States, §§ 475, 476; to place or connect together, with intent to defraud, different parts of two or more notes, bills, or other instruments issued by the United States so as to produce one instrument, § 484; and to make, use, or pass any “thing similar in size and shape” to United States currency in order to “procure anything of value” from any machine or other device designed to receive or be operated by lawful currency, § 491. See also § 474, ¶¶ 1, 2, 3, 5, 7 (other provisions regulating possession and use of materials employed in counterfeiting); § 492 (providing for forfeiture of “articles, devices, and other things made, possessed, or used in violation” of other provisions as well as of “any material or apparatus used or fitted or intended to be used” in counterfeiting “found in the possession of any person without authority from the Secretary of Treasury”).

 See, e. g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S., at 636; Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S., at 514 (plurality opinion); Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U. S., at 72-77.

 Because I believe that the “purposes” and “publications” language in §504(1) is inseparable from the statute’s various conditions intended to ensure that exempted illustrations do not too closely resemble actual currency, see n. 14, supra, I need not consider whether the color and size limitations could constitutionally form part of a more carefully crafted statutory scheme and I therefore express no view on the constitutionality vel non of those requirements. The Court’s decision to uphold the color *689restriction in the context of this statutory scheme, however, suffers from two serious flaws that should not pass without comment.
First, Justice White upholds the statute’s apparently irrational distinction between black and white pictures and those appearing in, say, pink or orange on the basis of what may be the weakest conceivable kind of legislative history. A statement by a party to this litigation submitted to Congress three days after that party had filed its notice of appeal in this Court and concerning legislation that has not been reported out of committee, much less passed by either House of Congress. See App. D to Juris. Statement (transmitting to House Subcommittee statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Treasury on H. R. 4275). There is no indication whatsoever in the legislative history of the statute actually passed by Congress that color prints were excluded because they require more negatives to produce, thereby “increasing] a counterfeiter’s access,” ante, at 657, to materials that can be used illegitimately. Instead, it seems obvious that the color restriction was intended to minimize the possibility that permitted illustrations could be passed off as the genuine article. See, e. g., 64 Cong. Rec. 4976 (1923) (remarks of Sen. Cummins) (“Mark you, these stamps are to be printed in black and white, not in color, and they are to be defaced, so that they can not possibly be used again”).
Second, the post hoc justification offered by appellants for the color restriction in the statute as now written cannot satisfy the requirement that “viewpoint neutral” regulations abridging speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve substantial governmental interests. See, e. g., City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S., at 808; Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, ante, at 293-294; Brown v. Glines, 444 U. S. 348, 354-355 (1980); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U. S. 396, 413 (1974); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U. S., at 217-218; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968); id., at 388 (Harlan, J., concurring). Appellants have made no effort to controvert appellee’s claim, based on uncontested affidavits accepted by the District Court, that “[w]hatever the practices of professional counterfeiters might be, all of Time’s four color separations of currency contain every obscuring feature and distortion of the ultimate picture, and thus are useless to the counterfeiter.” Brief for Appellee 44 (footnote omitted). See 539 F. Supp., at 1387, and n. 19. See generally H. Simon, Color in Reproduction 59-65 (1980). These distortions demonstrate that, contrary to Justice Stevens’ assertion, post, at 700-701, Time does wish to use “illustrations *690of the currency which plainly appear spurious.” Justice Stevens’ “patient” counterfeiter — trimming numerals, enlarging negatives, and airbrushing borderlines, post, at 701, n. 5 — would obviously be far better off making photocopies of actual dollar bills than somehow trying to counterfeit money from the negatives used to produce the distorted pictures appearing in appellee’s magazines. And, in light of the requirement in § 504(l)(iii) that “the negatives and plates used in making the [permitted] illustrations shall be destroyed after their final use in accordance with this section,” it is difficult to see how the Government’s interest in preventing access to multiple negatives is further advanced by the color requirement.
Perhaps most significantly, however, the Government does not prohibit color printing generally; therefore, allowing a printer to produce plates that can print only distorted pictures of portions of the currency cannot possibly provide him or his employees with an additional “alibi” for creating plates that can produce realistic facsimiles of currency. Nothing in the statutory scheme upheld today diminishes the ability of a printer with unlawful intentions to create such plates. See 127 Cong. Rec. 17624-17625 (1981) (remarks of Rep. McClory) (Section 504 “was enacted at a time when quality publishing was the domain of comparatively few highly skilled professionals. . . . Quality publishing is [today] by and large in color and no longer an elite technology. With its skills in such wide circulation, a restriction against color reproduction is a burden only on the legitimate, law-abiding printer”). Conversely, the legitimate and compelling Government interest at stake in this case — prevention of the manufacture of illustrations that might plausibly be used for counterfeiting — is fully served by the numerous provisions of Title 18 that make it a crime to make or pass materials that really look like currency. See nn. 10, 25, supra.