Court Opinion

ID: 9918808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 17:17:23.793956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:27.078503
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
House 2 Home, LLC,                     :
                Appellant              :
                                       :
             v.                        :     No. 1446 C.D. 2022
                                       :     Argued: November 6, 2023
Zoning Hearing Board of North          :
Coventry Township                      :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                             FILED: January 16, 2024

             House 2 Home, LLC (Landowner) appeals the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court) that affirmed a decision of the Zoning
Hearing Board of North Coventry Township (Zoning Board). Landowner contends
that the Zoning Board erred in holding that Landowner had to file a special exception
application to add an accessory retail use to the existing manufacturing and
processing use of its property. Landowner further contends that the trial court erred
in denying its motion to strike the Zoning Board’s brief, to disqualify counsel, and
for sanctions. Concluding that the North Coventry Township Zoning Ordinance
(Zoning Ordinance)1 permits a retail use as of right, when accessory to
manufacturing and processing, we reverse the trial court’s order that Landowner had
to seek a special exception. However, we affirm the trial court’s order denying
Landowner’s motion to strike the Zoning Board’s brief, to disqualify counsel, and
for sanctions.

1
  North Coventry Township, Pennsylvania, Zoning Ordinance No. 30 (1968), as amended,
available at https://ecode360.com/11562582#11562582 (last visited January 16, 2024).
                                   Background
            Landowner owns a 0.31-acre property located at 57 Schuylkill Avenue,
Pottstown (Property), which is in the I-2 Industrial District of North Coventry
Township (Township). Since 1964, the Property has been leased to tenants engaged
in manufacturing and processing, which predated the 1968 enactment of the Zoning
Ordinance. The Zoning Ordinance allows manufacturing in the I-2 District by
conditional use.
            In 2021, Landowner requested a determination from the Township’s
zoning officer that the Property’s use for manufacturing and processing constituted
a lawful nonconforming use. The zoning officer did not respond, but the Township’s
solicitor informed Landowner that the Township did not consider manufacturing to
be a lawful nonconforming use of the Property. On September 17, 2021, Landowner
filed an application appealing the zoning officer’s interpretation of the Zoning
Ordinance or, in the alternative, for a variance.     With its appeal, Landowner
submitted a “narrative in support of zoning appeal & application,” stating that the
Property has been improved with “an industrial building which has been used for
various purposes over a number of years, including manufacturing by multiple
tenants.” Reproduced Record at 68a (R.R. __). Specifically, Landowner sought “to
use the Property for manufacturing and processing (as those terms are defined by the
Township’s Zoning Ordinance), with on-site retail sales as an accessory use.” R.R.
69a (emphasis added).
            On February 10, 2022, the Zoning Board held a public hearing. The
Township was granted intervention to oppose Landowner’s appeal. No residents or
nearby property owners attended the proceedings or sought intervention.

                                         2
             Landowner presented the testimony of its owner, Joseph Swist. Swist
testified that in 2005, when Landowner purchased the Property, the building was
occupied by Evans Coolant and Diken Machine Shop, which were small
manufacturing businesses. Swist testified that prior to the enactment of the 1968
Zoning Ordinance, the Property was used to manufacture cups and candles and,
thereafter, for different manufacturing enterprises by various tenants. Affidavits
from the most recent tenants, Kay Designs, LLC and J&F Commercial Products,
were admitted into evidence. The affiants stated that they used the Property for the
design, manufacture, fabrication, warehousing, and distribution of various products.
Kay Designs also used the Property for retail sales of the signs it manufactured there.
Notes of Testimony, 2/10/2022, at 48; R.R. 154a. These tenants vacated the Property
in December of 2020.
             Swist testified that a prospective tenant proposed to use the Property to
manufacture and process beverages with a retail outlet on the premises. This
prospective tenant proposed to provide outdoor seating for patrons who purchased
beverages. The Township informed the prospective tenant that this use would be
unlawful, and Landowner lost the prospective tenant. Swist acknowledged that no
prior tenant had provided outdoor seating for the consumption of food or beverages.
             The Zoning Board found that Landowner established the existence of a
“pre-existing, nonconforming manufacturing/fabrication use” and that Landowner
could not be compelled to seek conditional use approval to use the Property for
“manufacturing or fabrication in the same or similar way it has been used since
1964.” Zoning Board Adjudication at 4, Conclusions of Law ¶¶4-5; R.R. 13a. The
Zoning Board denied Landowner’s alternative request for a variance as unnecessary.

                                          3
             The Zoning Board also held that Landowner could not use the Property
for any use other than “manufacturing and/or fabrication,” which antedated 1968.
Zoning Board Adjudication at 4; R.R. 13a. The Zoning Board determined that
             [Landowner] would need to seek a Special Exception for any
             desired expansion or any change of use, including retail sales,
             or, outdoor dining or beverage consumption. [Landowner] also
             has the option of seeking Conditional Use approval pursuant to
             the provisions of the Township Zoning Ordinance.

Zoning Board Adjudication at 4, Conclusion of Law ¶5; R.R. 13a (emphasis added).
             Landowner appealed to the trial court. It argued that the Zoning Board
erred in concluding that it had to pursue a special exception application in order to
engage in retail sales or to provide outdoor seating. It argued that these activities are
accessory to manufacturing and processing and, thus, authorized by right. The
Township did not intervene in Landowner’s appeal, but the Zoning Board did.
Landowner moved to strike the Zoning Board’s brief; to disqualify the Zoning
Board’s counsel; and for the imposition of sanctions.
             Landowner’s motion to disqualify was based on the claim that the
Zoning Board’s counsel, Jennifer Holsten Maddaloni, also served as “insurance
defense counsel” for the Township. R.R. 295a. When the Township did not timely
intervene in the trial court appeal, it attempted to remedy this failure by appointing
the Township’s existing counsel to defend the Zoning Board’s decision.
Landowner’s motion asserted that it violated due process to allow the same attorney
to represent the Zoning Board and the Township, which had opposed the Zoning
Board’s ultimate decision. Id. (citing Horn v. Hilltown Township, 337 A.2d 858 (Pa.
1975)).

                                           4
                                  Trial Court Decision
              By opinion and order dated November 21, 2022, the trial court affirmed
the Zoning Board’s adjudication. Although the Zoning Ordinance allows a retail use
accessory to a manufacturing and processing use, the trial court concluded that the
addition of a retail use would constitute “a change in use or expansion of a use,” for
which “further consideration under the Zoning Ordinance is required.” Trial Court
Op. at 7. A preexisting, nonconforming use creates a vested property right in the
owner of the property, including some expansion. However, Landowner’s proposal
was “in actuality not an expansion of the old use, but the addition of a new use.”
Trial Court Op. at 6-7 (quoting Whitpain Township Board of Supervisors v. Whitpain
Township Zoning Hearing Board, 550 A.2d 1355 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988)).
              By separate order issued on the same day, the trial court denied
Landowner’s motion to strike the Zoning Board’s brief, disqualify its counsel, and
impose sanctions. That the Zoning Board’s counsel, or her law firm, served as
insurance defense counsel for the Township did not disqualify counsel. In so
holding, the trial court distinguished the instant case from Horn, 337 A.2d 858, in
which the zoning board’s solicitor, who also represented the township, made
objections to the evidence offered by his opponent and then ruled on his own
objections.
              Landowner appealed to this Court.
                                          Appeal
              On appeal,2 Landowner raises four issues for our consideration, which
we combine into three for clarity. First, Landowner argues that the Zoning Board

2
  Where the trial court does not accept additional evidence, this Court determines on review
whether the zoning board committed an error of law or “a manifest abuse of discretion.” Valley
View Civic Association v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 462 A.2d 637, 639 (Pa. 1983).

                                              5
erred in categorizing the Property’s legal, nonconforming use as “manufacturing and
fabrication,” rather than “manufacturing and processing,” the terms used in the
Zoning Ordinance and in Landowner’s application. Second, Landowner argues that
the trial court erred in holding that a retail use, when accessory to a manufacturing
and processing use, requires a special exception or conditional use application.
Finally, Landowner argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to strike
the Zoning Board’s brief, to disqualify counsel, and for the imposition of sanctions.
Landowner asks this Court to vacate the trial court’s order and “reverse those
portions of the [Zoning] Board’s [d]ecision that impose ambiguous designation and
illegal restrictions upon the Property.” Landowner Brief at 13. We address these
issues seriatim.
                                         I.
             First, Landowner argues that the Zoning Board erred in categorizing the
Property’s legal, nonconforming use as “manufacturing and fabrication,” rather than
“manufacturing and processing.” The Zoning Ordinance states that “manufacturing
and processing” operations include:
             beverages, confections, and other food products (excluding meat
             and fish packing), tobacco products, drugs, cosmetics, clothing,
             light metal processes, plastics, ceramics, electrical devices and
             appliances, furniture, hardware, tools, dies, patterns, toys,
             jewelry, optical goods, time pieces, and scientific instruments.

ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-26.B(3)(a). While the term “manufacturing” is undefined
in the Zoning Ordinance, “processing” is defined as “[a] function involved in the
manufacturing of materials, goods or products in which they are not physically
changed except for packaging or sizing.” Id., §370-9.

                                         6
               By contrast, the term “fabrication” is not defined in the Zoning
Ordinance. By using an undefined term, Landowner argues, the Zoning Board
created a new category of use that divested Landowner “of predictable and consistent
application of zoning regulation and enforcement.” Landowner Brief at 4.
               The Zoning Board counters that “fabricating” falls under the term
“manufacturing,” which use is specifically delineated in the Zoning Ordinance.
Thus, the Zoning Board argues, it did not create a new category of use.
               Landowner has waived this issue by not raising it in its statement of
errors complained of on appeal.             Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b)(4)(vii) provides that “[i]ssues not included in the [s]tatement [of errors
complained of on appeal] and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”           PA. R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii).          See also City of
Philadelphia v. Lerner, 151 A.3d 1020, 1024 (Pa. 2016) (reaffirming the “well-
settled, bright-line rule” that “issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be
deemed waived” and holding that “[b]y failing to comply with Rule 1925(b), [the
appellant] waived the issue that he . . . request[ed] [the] Court to address”).
               Accordingly, we will not address Landowner’s first issue on the Zoning
Board’s use of the term “fabricating.”3

3
  The Zoning Board used the term “fabrication” loosely, as a synonym of “processing.” The
Zoning Board’s adjudication switched from the term “processing” to “fabrication” without any
explanation. In any event, the parties agree that “fabricating” falls under the term
“manufacturing.” Landowner Brief at 14; Zoning Board Brief at 6. See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fabricating (last visited January 16,
2024) (defining “fabricate” as “construct, manufacture; specifically: to construct from diverse and
usually standardized parts”). Likewise, “processing” is “[a] function involved in the
manufacturing of materials, goods or products in which they are not physically changed except for
packaging or sizing.” ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-9 (emphasis added).
        Where, as here, the clerical error made in the Zoning Board’s decision was not material,
the trial court’s failure to recognize or address the clerical error does not warrant vacating or

                                                7
                                              II.
              Landowner argues, next, that the trial court erred in holding that a retail
use, when accessory to the permitted use of manufacturing and processing, requires
a special exception application. The Zoning Board held that the Property’s use for
manufacturing and processing constitutes legal, nonconforming uses.                        Thus,
Landowner argues that it is entitled to any accessory use permitted under the Zoning
Ordinance, such as retail. Landowner Brief at 16 (citing ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-
26.B(4)). Further, the uncontroverted evidence presented to the Zoning Board
established that prior tenants engaged in manufacturing and processing that had
included a retail component. Landowner further argues that the Zoning Board erred
by placing a restriction upon outdoor dining or beverage consumption at the Property
by a beverage manufacturer. Landowner Brief at 18-19. A “retail store/trade” is
defined in the Zoning Ordinance as an establishment “engaged in selling goods or
merchandise to the general public for personal or household consumption and
rendering services incidental to the sale of such goods, such as, but not limited to
hardware store, pharmacy, magazine or book[]store, florist, or clothing store.”
ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-9 (emphasis added).4 Landowner contends that providing
seating for those who purchase beverages manufactured at the Property is a “service

reversing the trial court’s decision. Cf. Commonwealth v. Karangwa (Pa. Super., No. 591 WDA
2017, filed May 9, 2018) (unreported) (where the sentencing order erroneously listed criminal
offense as third-degree misdemeanor instead of summary offense, Superior Court vacated the trial
court’s order and remanded the case for limited purpose of correcting the clerical error).
4
 “Retail services” is defined as follows:
      Establishments providing services or entertainment, as opposed to products, to the
      general public, real estate and insurance, personal service establishments, motion
      pictures, amusement and recreation service, educational and social services,
      museums and galleries.
ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-9.

                                               8
incidental to the sale” of beverages and, thus, authorized. Bookstores and clothing
stores offer seating as an “incidental service” desired by customers, and there is no
reason that a retail beverage outlet cannot also offer seating.
             The Zoning Board counters that the right to natural expansion of a
nonconforming use is not unlimited.            Municipalities may impose reasonable
restrictions on the expansion of nonconforming uses. Zoning Board Brief at 3 (citing
Hunterstown Ruritan Club v. Straban Township Zoning Hearing Board, 143 A.3d
538, 546 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)). Landowner offered no details about the proposed
sale of beverages with outdoor seating that addressed parking, number of employees,
hours of operation, or number of tables. These matters were pertinent because the
Zoning Board needed this information to evaluate whether a retail sale of beverages
constituted a change or mere expansion of the nonconforming manufacturing use.
Based on the limited evidence presented, the Zoning Board’s order was necessary to
clarify that Landowner did not have unfettered ability to put the Property to a future
use that would constitute a change to the prior nonconforming use.
             The Zoning Board also contends that while the Zoning Ordinance
permits a retail use accessory to manufacturing and processing, it also imposes
limitations on the accessory use. Landowner presented no evidence that a future
tenant would comply with said limitations. In any event, seating would change the
nonconforming manufacturing use because neither retail nor outdoor seating existed
on the Property at the time the Zoning Ordinance was enacted in 1968.
             We start with a review of the relevant provisions of the Zoning
Ordinance. Section 370-26.B(4) states:
             Accessory uses. Uses on the same lot, customarily incidental to
             any of the foregoing uses, and subject to the provisions of §370-
             36, shall be permitted. In addition, the following accessory use

                                           9
             shall be permitted in conjunction with manufacturing and
             processing uses:
                   (a) Retail outlet for sale of goods produced on the
                   property, provided that the area devoted to such sale of
                   goods does not exceed 20% of the gross floor area of the
                   building and that all other applicable provisions of this
                   chapter are met by both the permitted use and the
                   associated retail activity.

ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-26.B(4) (emphasis added). In turn, Section 370-36, titled
“Accessory use,” lists a variety of uses that are permitted when incidental and
subordinate to agricultural, residential, commercial, and industrial uses. ZONING
ORDINANCE, §370-36. It also states that certain accessory uses require a conditional
use or special exception approval. For instance, a personal use airport “may be
allowed as a use accessory to agriculture in the RC [Resource Conservation] District
and the RR [Rural Residential] District” but “must be approved through the
conditional use process described in §370-138.”         ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-
36.A(7)(g). Likewise, a helistop “may be allowed as an accessory use in the I-1 and
I-2 Industrial districts or as an accessory use to a hospital” and “must be approved
through the special exception process described in §370-149.” ZONING ORDINANCE,
§370-36.C(5)(d).
             By contrast, the Zoning Ordinance states a “retail outlet for sale of
goods produced on the property” is accessory to manufacturing and processing and
“shall be permitted.” ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-26.B(4)(a) (emphasis added). The
Zoning Ordinance does not state that every retail accessory use requires a conditional
use or special exception application.
             Where “the legislature includes specific language in one section of a
statute and excludes it from another, it should not be implied where excluded.” West
Penn Allegheny Health System v. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error

                                         10
Fund, 11 A.3d 598, 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “[T]he rules of statutory construction
are applied to zoning ordinances with equal force and effect.” Metal Green Inc. v.
City of Philadelphia, 266 A.3d 495, 507 (Pa. 2021).
             The Zoning Board contends that the Zoning Ordinance requires a
special exception for any change or expansion of a nonconforming manufacturing
use. Section 370-121 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
             A. Expansion. The nonconforming use of a building or of a lot
             shall not be expanded so as to use other portions of the building
             or lot and a nonconforming building housing a nonconforming
             or permitted use shall not be expanded or structurally altered,
             except insofar as is permitted by law to assure the structural
             safety of the building; unless the Zoning Hearing Board shall, by
             special exception as hereinafter provided, authorize the
             expansion of such use or building. The Zoning Hearing Board,
             upon proper application, may grant such special exception,
             provided that:
                   (1) It is clear that such expansion is not materially
                   detrimental to the character of the surrounding area or to
                   the interest of the municipality.
                   (2) The area devoted to the nonconforming use shall not
                   be increased more than once during the life of the use. In
                   addition, the area devoted to the nonconforming use shall
                   not be increased more than 50% above its original size.
                   (3) Any expansion of the building or of a lot having a
                   nonconforming use shall conform to all applicable area
                   and bulk regulations of the district in which it is situated
                   and to all regulations applicable to such a use in the district
                   or districts.
                   (4) Any expansion of a nonconforming use must meet the
                   off-street parking and buffering requirements of Article
                   XI, herein.
             B. Change of use.
                   (1) A nonconforming use may be changed to another
                   nonconforming use by the grant of a special exception

                                          11
                   only upon determination by the Zoning Hearing Board,
                   after public hearing, that the proposed new use will be
                   similar to or less detrimental to its neighborhood and
                   abutting properties than is the use it is to replace. In
                   evaluating relative detriment, the Zoning Hearing Board
                   shall take into consideration, among other things: potential
                   traffic generation; nuisance characteristics such as
                   emission of noise, dust, odor, glare and smoke; fire
                   hazards; and hours and manner of operation.
                   (2) Once changed to a conforming use, no structure or land
                   shall be permitted to revert to a nonconforming use.

ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-121.
             A municipality has every right to impose reasonable restrictions upon
the lawful expansion of a nonconforming use. See Hunterstown Ruritan Club, 143
A.3d at 546. However, Landowner was not seeking to “expand” or “change” the
manufacturing and processing uses. Rather, Landowner’s application to the Zoning
Board stated that it was seeking “to use the Property for manufacturing and
processing (as those terms are defined by the Township’s Zoning Ordinance), with
on-site retail sales as an accessory use.” R.R. 69a (emphasis added). Adding an
accessory use permitted as of right under the Zoning Ordinance does not, in itself,
constitute an expansion of or change to the principal use. This is because an
accessory use is “of a nature customarily incidental and subordinate to, the principal
use[.]” ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-9 (emphasis added). See also McQuillin, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25:154 (3d ed. 2023) (accessory use is not in
the nature of a variance from, or exception to the permitted primary use; generally,
an owner seeking to engage in an accessory use need not apply for a special
exception so long as the accessory use is incidental to a permitted principal use).
             More to the point, a use accessory to a nonconforming use has the same
vested right to continue as is afforded to the main use. In Hempfield Township v.

                                         12
Hapchuk, 620 A.2d 668 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993), we held that an amendment to a zoning
ordinance could not bar the placement of sewage sludge on property continuously
used for agricultural purposes because this activity constituted an ancillary
agricultural use. By contrast, in Arter v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment,
916 A.2d 1222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), we held that the property owner was not entitled
to develop a funeral home and crematory on the grounds of an existing cemetery as
an accessory use. We reasoned that a funeral home and crematory were neither
secondary nor subordinate to a cemetery use but, instead, constituted new primary
uses.
             The Zoning Board contends that because Landowner did not provide
details about the potential retail sales of beverages manufactured on the Property, it
was compelled to order Landowner to seek a conditional use application for any
accessory retail use. However, it is the express terms of the Zoning Ordinance that
determine whether a special exception or conditional use application is needed for a
particular use.   The Zoning Ordinance authorizes the Township to initiate
enforcement proceedings when “a violation of any provisions of this Zoning Chapter
occurs.” ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-129.B. Should the Township discover that on-
site retail sales are no longer accessory to a manufacturing and processing use of the
Property in violation of Section 370-26.B(4) of the Zoning Ordinance, it may initiate
an enforcement proceeding under Section 370-129.B. The Township, however, is
not allowed to impose restrictions upon a use permitted by right absent a firm
foundation in the text of the Zoning Ordinance.
             The trial court erred. It held that a retail use was permitted by right as
accessory to manufacturing and processing but then added, impermissibly, the
requirement that a retail accessory use required a special exception or conditional

                                         13
use application. The Zoning Ordinance does not contain such a requirement for a
retail accessory use, as it does for some accessory uses, such as a helistop. Further,
simply providing outdoor seating for beverage consumption is a “service” incidental
to retail sale of beverages manufactured on the Property. Service incidental to a
retail use, such as providing seats, is included in the “retail store/trade” definition.
ZONING ORDINANCE, §370-9. Landowner’s accessory retail use cannot exceed what
is allowed under the Zoning Ordinance. Should it do so, the Township can respond.
                                             III.
              Finally, Landowner argues that the trial court erred in denying its
motion to strike the Zoning Board’s brief, to disqualify counsel, and for sanctions.
The Township did not intervene in Landowner’s appeal to the trial court but, rather,
appointed Attorney Maddaloni to defend the decision of the Zoning Board, and her
firm, Holsten Associates P.C., served as insurance defense counsel for the Township.
Landowner contends that in doing so, the Township circumvented the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 1004-A of the Pennsylvania Municipalities
Planning Code.5 This, Landowner contends, is “procedurally and substantively
improper.” Landowner Brief at 23. The trial court denied Landowner’s motion just
six days later, before Maddaloni filed a response, and without explanation.

5
  Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, added by the Act of December 21, 1988, P.L. 1329,
53 P.S. §11004-A. It states:
        Within the 30 days first following the filing of a land use appeal, if the appeal is
        from a board or agency of a municipality, the municipality and any owner or tenant
        of property directly involved in the action appealed from may intervene as of course
        by filing a notice of intervention, accompanied by proof of service of the same,
        upon each appellant or each appellant’s counsel of record. All other intervention
        shall be governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id.

                                              14
             The Zoning Board responds that neither its counsel nor her firm has
represented the Township in this case or any other action. The trial court correctly
distinguished the instant case from Horn, 337 A.2d 858, because counsel did not
represent the Township and the Zoning Board at the same time. The Zoning Board
denied that its counsel or her firm ever served as insurance defense counsel for the
Township, or that the Township appointed counsel to the Zoning Board. Rather, the
Zoning Board contends, counsel was retained to represent the Board and reports to
the Board, not the Township.
             Landowner’s motion essentially asserted a conflict of interest. Before
this Court, the Zoning Board asserts that counsel and her firm did not represent the
Township, which Landowner disputes. This, however, does not warrant a remand
of the matter to the trial court for a factual finding.
             The trial court correctly distinguished the instant case from Horn, 337
A.2d 858. In that case, the Supreme Court held that where at a zoning board hearing,
the same solicitor represented both the zoning hearing board and the township,
which was opposed to the landowner’s land use application, the representation
violated landowner’s due process rights. In other words, one cannot serve as both
the advocate and adjudicator. By contrast, here, Landowner’s motion did not make
such allegations; rather, the motion acknowledged that at the Zoning Board hearing,
the Zoning Board’s solicitor was Kenneth Picardi of the firm Yergey Daylor, and
the Township’s counsel was Eric Brown of the firm Siana Law. R.R. 293a.
Landowner’s motion took issue with Attorney Maddaloni, who represented the
Zoning Board before the trial court. However, at that point, the Zoning Board’s
interest aligned with the Township; both opposed Landowner’s proposed retail use

                                            15
as accessory by right to manufacturing and processing. In short, Landowner’s
motion did not make a case on either a conflict of interest or due process violation.
                                     Conclusion
             We conclude that Landowner waived its first issue that the Zoning
Board created a new category of use, i.e., “fabrication,” without authority. We
conclude, and hold, that the trial court erred in holding that a retail use accessory to
the lawful, nonconforming manufacturing and processing use required a special
exception or conditional use approval. The Zoning Ordinance does not impose such
a requirement. For this reason, we reverse the trial court’s order affirming the
Zoning Board’s decision. We conclude, however, that the trial court properly denied
Landowner’s motion to strike the Zoning Board’s brief, to disqualify counsel, and
for sanctions because the motion did not make a case for a due process violation or
conflict of interest. As such, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Landowner’s
motion to strike brief, to disqualify counsel, and for sanctions.

                            _________________________________________________________
                            MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this case.

                                          16
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
House 2 Home, LLC,                  :
                Appellant           :
                                    :
            v.                      :      No. 1446 C.D. 2022
                                    :
Zoning Hearing Board of North       :
Coventry Township                   :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 16th day of January, 2024, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County in the above-captioned matter, dated November
21, 2022, affirming the Zoning Hearing Board of North Coventry Township’s
decision, is REVERSED. The Court of Common Pleas of Chester County’s order
dated November 21, 2022, denying House 2 Home, LLC’s motion to strike the
Zoning Hearing Board of North Coventry Township’s brief, to disqualify counsel,
and for sanctions, is AFFIRMED.

                         _________________________________________________________
                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita