Court Opinion

ID: 9954198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:17.262064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.933935
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Whitehurst CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                    B327288

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA024364)
         v.

RICHARD WHITEHURST,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shellie L. Samuels, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
      Rudolph J. Alejo, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Yun K. Lee, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 1992, a jury convicted appellant Richard Whitehurst of
three counts of first degree murder, two counts of second degree
robbery, and one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder. He now appeals from the denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 He
contends the trial court erred by denying his petition at the
prima facie stage of review because the jury instructions and
findings upon which the court relied do not foreclose relief as a
matter of law. We agree. We accordingly reverse and remand
with directions to issue an order to show cause and proceed in
accordance with section 1172.6.
                           BACKRGOUND
I.      Factual Background
       The underlying facts presented at trial are discussed in
detail in this court’s prior nonpublished opinion, People v.
Whitehurst (Nov. 16, 1994, B071419). We summarize them here
to provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We otherwise do
not rely on this factual background in resolving the issues
presented in this appeal. ( See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       The crimes at issue involved four victims and two separate
incidents. The first incident involved the June 21, 1989 robbery
and murder of Timothy Ellerson and the attempted murder of
Dwayne Haley. On several occasions prior to that date, Haley
and Ellerson had purchased drugs from appellant at Geraldine’s,
a nightclub appellant managed. Codefendant Robert Crenshaw
worked at the club as a security guard. On June 21, 1989, Haley
and Ellerson arrived at Geraldine’s intending to purchase drugs

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
from appellant. Appellant said they would have to go to the
seller. At appellant’s suggestion, he and Ellerson left in
appellant’s white Nissan 300 ZX; Ellerson took with him $15,500
in a gym bag. Haley remained at the club.
       When Ellerson did not return, Haley attempted to page
him. Shortly thereafter, Crenshaw entered the club and told
Haley that “Tim [Ellerson] and Rich [Whitehurst] said for me to
come and get you, bring you around the corner because things
took longer than they thought.” Haley and Crenshaw left in
Haley’s car. Crenshaw directed them to a residential area and
told Haley to park in front of a particular house. Crenshaw told
Haley to wait and left the vehicle. While he waited, Haley saw a
white Nissan 300 ZX pass a number of times through a nearby
intersection. Crenshaw returned, drew a gun, and “stuck it to the
window” of Haley’s car.
       Haley sped off as Crenshaw fired several shots and hit him.
The white Nissan cut in front of Haley and attempted to block his
escape. Haley saw that appellant was driving the Nissan. Haley
escaped and was later treated at the hospital for his wounds.
Later that night, police found Ellerson’s body lying in the street.
He had been shot three times. Police did not recover the gym
bag.
       Crenshaw testified at trial and denied shooting at Haley.
He claimed he had never seen Haley before the prosecution of the
case. Appellant did not testify, but presented evidence to suggest
that Ellerson had been shot by unrelated individuals who had
been arrested on the night of the murder.
       The second incident involved the murders of Tracy Bolton
and Derrick Turner on August 13, 1990. The bulk of the
prosecution’s evidence was provided by an accomplice, Melvin

                                 3
Lester. In early August 1990, Oakland drug dealers Bolton and
Turner came to Los Angeles to buy cocaine. They knew Lester
from prior dealings; he brought the pair to Geraldine’s and
introduced them to appellant. At that time, Bolton and Turner
did not complete the purchase.
      On August 13, 1990, Bolton and Turner returned to Los
Angeles and again accompanied Lester to Geraldine’s. Appellant
offered to arrange a transaction. Later that evening, Crenshaw
arrived at the club. After the club had closed, Lester saw
appellant and Dominique Titus, a second club security guard,
force Bolton and Turner at gunpoint into the back of the club.
Lester recognized the gun as Crenshaw’s .45 automatic.
Crenshaw told Lester not to say anything.
      Appellant retrieved a gym bag Bolton and Turner had
placed in the trunk of Lester’s car and then signaled to Crenshaw
that he had not found the object of his search. After Lester heard
someone being “roughed up” in the back of the club, Crenshaw
emerged with bundles of money, said “there’s more than that,”
and returned to the back of the club. Appellant began to separate
the bundles. Shortly thereafter, Titus came out, displayed more
bundles of money, and said they would have to tie up Bolton and
Turner.
      Later, Lester went to the back of the club and saw Turner
and Bolton on the floor, bound and gagged. Lester told Crenshaw
that Bolton was having an asthma attack. Crenshaw replied, “So
what. . . . He’s going to die anyway.” Bolton and Turner were
then placed in the trunk of Crenshaw’s car. They were bound
and gagged but still alive. Crenshaw drove away, followed by
Titus in one car and appellant and Lester in appellant’s car.
After the three cars stopped in a parking lot, Crenshaw removed

                                4
Bolton and Turner from his trunk and placed them on the
ground. Appellant returned Crenshaw’s .45 gun to him and said,
“Hurry up and do it. Hurry up and get it over [sic] so we can get
out of here.” Appellant and Lester left in appellant’s car, stopped
at a nearby curb, and began to talk. Lester heard a shot and told
appellant, who smiled, nodded, turned up the volume on the
radio, and drove away. As they drove away, Lester heard more
shots.
       Police discovered the victims’ bodies in the parking lot.
Several days later, Lester told Crenshaw he thought Bolton and
Turner might still be alive. Crenshaw replied, “I killed them
mother-fuckers.”
       At trial, Crenshaw denied any involvement with the
murders. Appellant did not testify but presented an alibi
defense.
II.    Procedural History
       A.    Conviction and Sentence
       In 1992, an amended information charged appellant and
Crenshaw with the robbery (§ 211) and murder (§ 187) of
Timothy Ellerson, the robbery and murders of Tracy Bolton and
Derrick Turner, and the attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder of Dwayne Haley. The amended
information further alleged multiple murder and robbery-murder
special circumstances. (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(3), (a)(17).)
       At the joint trial, the court instructed the jury on two
theories of liability for the murders: willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, using the then-current version of CALJIC
No. 8.20; and first degree felony murder, using then-current
versions of CALJIC No. 8.21 and 8.27. It also instructed the jury
on conspiracy principles using then-current CALJIC Nos. 6.10.5

                                 5
and 6.11, the latter of which included the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The court used then-current CALJIC No.
8.80 to instruct on the special circumstance allegation as to the
three murders: “If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was either the actual killer, a co-conspirator, or an
aider and abettor, but you are unable to decide which, then you
must also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant with
the intent to kill participated as a co-conspirator with or aided
and abetted an actor in commission of the murder in the first
degree, in order to find the special circumstance to be true. On
the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the
defendant intended to kill a human being in order to find the
special circumstance to be true.”
       The jury found appellant guilty of all charges: three counts
of first degree murder, two counts of second degree robbery, and
one count of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated
murder. The verdict forms did not specify the theory or theories
on which the jury convicted him. The jury also found the special
circumstances allegations true, again without clarifying the basis
for its decision. After a penalty phase trial, the jury selected life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the three
murders.
       On September 25, 1992, the court sentenced appellant to
two consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole, and two concurrent terms of the same. The
court imposed and stayed two midterm sentences of three years
for the robberies pursuant to section 654. A different panel of
this court affirmed appellant’s convictions on direct appeal.

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       B.    Petition for Resentencing
       On January 27, 2022, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95.2 He checked the
boxes indicating that he was prosecuted for murder and
attempted murder under felony murder or natural and probable
consequences theories, he was convicted of murder, and could not
now be convicted of that crime under the relevant amendments to
the law. He also checked the box requesting that the court
appoint counsel to represent him. The trial court appointed
counsel for appellant.
       The People filed a response, arguing that the jury’s true
finding on the robbery-murder special circumstances precluded
relief as a matter of law. Specifically, the People contended that
based on CALJIC No. 8.80, “the only way for the jury to find true
any of the alleged special circumstances was to find unanimously
either [appellant] was the actual killer or was an aider and
abettor who acted with the intent to kill.”
       Appellant filed a reply. He argued that the jury’s true
finding on the special circumstances allegations did not
disqualify him from resentencing, as that finding was made prior
to the Supreme Court decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61
Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 clarifying
when a defendant acts as a major participant with reckless

2     Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)

                                7
indifference to human life.3 He attached as exhibits copies of the
relevant jury instructions from his trial.
       At the December 1, 2022 hearing on the petition, the court
noted that the parties had not provided transcripts of the trial
and thus the court had to rely on the facts as laid out in the prior
appellate opinion. The court expressed uncertainty as to whether
it could rely on the facts from a prior opinion. Defense counsel
objected that “at this stage of the proceedings the court is not to
do any fact finding,” and asserted that the court could only
consider the prior appellate opinion for the procedural history of
the case.
       The People argued that in order to find the special
circumstance allegation true, the jury must have found that
appellant was the actual killer or had the intent to kill, and
therefore appellant was not eligible for relief as a matter of law.
The court agreed, stating that “the finding necessary for the
special circumstance would automatically make [appellant]
ineligible for this type of hearing because they have to find intent
to kill, and they obviously did.” The court accordingly denied the
petition, finding that “the jury instruction is very clear he had to

3      Appellant did not raise below the argument regarding
CALJIC No. 8.80 that he now makes on appeal. He has therefore
forfeited this argument. (See People v. Schell (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 437, 444.) However, the Attorney General did not
argue forfeiture. Moreover, because the question whether
appellant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law is a purely legal question, and “to avert any claim of
inadequate assistance of counsel” (People v. Watson (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 474, 483), we exercise our discretion to address his
argument on the merits.

                                 8
have had the intent, and I think I can say this based on the fact
that it was clear that he had intent to kill based on the facts.”
       Appellant timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
petition because he made a prima facie case for relief. He argues
that CALJIC No. 8.80, the jury instruction on the robbery-
murder special circumstance, was ambiguous as to whether he
had to have the intent to kill if he acted as an aider and abettor
to the murders. As such, he contends that the jury’s true finding
on the special circumstance did not render him ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. Respondent does not dispute the
ambiguity of the instruction. Instead, respondent argues the
prosecutor’s closing argument during trial explained that an
intent to kill was required and therefore sufficiently supported
the trial court’s finding that appellant is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. We agree with appellant that the record of
conviction does not establish that the jury necessarily found that
he was the actual killer or had an intent to kill. As such, the trial
court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage.
I.     Legal Principles
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 was
enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1.)

                                  9
Senate Bill No. 775, effective January 1, 2022, modified the law,
now codified at section 1172.6, to “expand the authorization to
allow a person who was convicted of murder under any theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . to apply to have their
sentence vacated and be resentenced.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
       If a petitioner seeking relief under section 1172.6 makes a
prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief, the trial
court is required to issue an order to show cause for an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
887, 891, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) In assessing eligibility at the
prima facie stage, the court “‘“takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.”’” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis). If the petition is facially sufficient
and the petitioner has requested counsel, the court must appoint
counsel for him or her, obtain briefing, and determine if the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. (Id. at p. 963;
§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause. If the court declines to make an
order to show cause, it shall provide a statement fully setting
forth its reasons for doing so.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The court
may not engage in factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or exercise of discretion at this stage, though it may make
credibility determinations adverse to the petitioner if the record
contains facts refuting the allegations of the petition. The court
properly denies the petition if the petitioner is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.)

                                  10
The bar for this prima facie showing was “‘intentionally and
correctly set very low.’” (Id. at p. 972.)
       Where a trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition based
on the failure to make a prima facie case for relief, our review is
de novo. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14
II.    Analysis
       The Supreme Court has held that a specific jury finding
that a defendant had the intent to kill “is generally preclusive in
section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it ‘ordinarily establish[es] a
defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill [No.]
1437 and thus preclude[s] the defendant from making a prima
facie case for relief.’” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
453–454, quoting People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 710
(Strong).) The trial court here denied appellant’s petition on this
basis, finding that the jury’s true finding on the felony-murder
special circumstance necessarily meant that the jury found
appellant harbored an intent to kill. But appellant contends that
the instruction given, CALJIC No. 8.80, was not preclusive
because the instruction was ambiguous as to whether the jury
had to find that an intent to kill.
       In People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99 (Letner),
our Supreme Court agreed that CALJIC No. 8.80 was ambiguous.
The court explained: “[T]he flaw in this instruction . . . is that it
failed to instruct the jury explicitly that, under then existing law,
an aider and abettor must have had the intent that the victim be
killed in order for the special circumstance allegation to be true.
[Citation.] The jury was told that if it determined one of the
defendants was the actual killer, intent to kill was not required,
and that if it could not decide whether one of the defendants was
the actual killer or an aider and abettor, it must find intent to kill

                                 11
in order to make a true finding. The jury, however, was not
informed what was required in the event the jury determined
that a particular defendant was an aider and abettor. The
omission of this third alternative made the instruction
ambiguous.” (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 180-181, fn. omitted.)
       Thus, the trial court’s finding below that the jury
instructions clearly required an intent to kill was in error.4
Based on the ambiguous instruction alone, we cannot conclude as
a matter of law that the jury’s special circumstance true findings
were necessarily predicated on a finding appellant was an aider
and abettor with an intent to kill the victims. Notably, it was the
prosecution’s theory that Crenshaw, not appellant, was the
actual killer of at least two of the victims, Bolton and Turner.
Thus, it is likely that the jury convicted appellant of their
murders based on a finding that he was an aider or abettor or a
co-conspirator and therefore potentially had to squarely contend
with the ambiguity in CALJIC No. 8.80.
       Respondent acknowledges the instructional ambiguity, but
argues that the error was harmless. In Letner, a direct appeal,
the court found the instructional error harmless because the
prosecutor correctly told the jury during closing argument that
an intent to kill was required and also “argued exclusively that
the evidence demonstrated that both defendants had the intent to
kill” the victim. (Letner, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 182.) Thus, the
court concluded, “based upon our review of the record, that there

4     We note that the trial court did not appear to consider
Letner in reaching this conclusion, presumably because neither
pay cited it below.

                                12
is no reasonable likelihood the jury misunderstood or misapplied
this instruction.” (Ibid.)
       Applying this standard, respondent contends that the
instructional ambiguity was harmless, because the prosecution
argued exclusively that both appellant and Crenshaw intended to
kill the victims. In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the
jury that a true finding on the special circumstance allegation
meant that “the nonshooter in these incidents also harbored an
intent to kill. But we know. . . from the planned, premeditated
nature of these crimes, that both of these defendants [Whitehurst
and Crenshaw], they both had had [sic] intent to kill with each of
these three victims.”5 However, the prosecutor also argued that
the jury could find first degree murder by finding that appellant
acted with the intent to kill under a felony-murder theory in the
commission of the robberies, or as a co-conspirator under a
natural and probable consequences theory.
       We are not persuaded that the Letner court’s analysis of
instructional error harmlessness on direct appeal is applicable to
the prima facie inquiry in the section 1172.6 context.6 Instead,
“[t]he ultimate question before us is whether ‘“the record,

5      We grant respondent’s unopposed request for judicial notice
of the transcript of the prosecution’s closing argument at
appellant’s trial.
6      At least two published cases have applied the “no
reasonable likelihood” standard in making the section 1172.6
prima facie determination, although neither case affirmed the
denial of a petition based on the prosecution’s closing arguments
alone. (See People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1256
[finding no error based on analysis of jury instructions as a
whole]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 107 [reversing
and remanding for evidentiary hearing].)

                               13
including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the [section 1172.6] petition.”’’” (People v.
Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269, quoting Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Only “[i]f the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief” may the trial court dismiss the petition. (Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 708.)
       Bearing in mind the low bar for a petitioner at the prima
face stage, we conclude that the prosecutor’s closing arguments
here were insufficient to conclusively establish appellant’s
ineligibility as a matter of law. Courts “‘presume that jurors
treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the law by a judge,
and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate
in an attempt to persuade.’ (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629,
663, fn. 8.) ‘[P]rosecutorial commentary should not be given
undue weight in analyzing how a reasonable jury understood . . .
instructions. Juries are warned in advance that counsel’s
remarks are mere argument, missteps can be challenged when
they occur, and juries generally understand that counsel’s
assertions are the “statements of advocates.” Thus, argument
should “not be judged as having the same force as an instruction
from the court.”’” (People v. Cortez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 101, 131.)
       Here, given the ambiguity of CALJIC 8.80, which none of
the other instructions clarified, we cannot say that the
prosecutor’s closing arguments alone establish as a matter of law
that the jury could not have convicted appellant for murder
without finding an intent to kill. Accordingly, we must remand
the case to the trial court to issue an order to show cause under
section 1172.6, subdivision (c) and hold an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). At the evidentiary

                                14
hearing, the trial court will not be compelled to credit appellant's
allegations. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 971 [court should
not reject petitioner's factual allegations on credibility grounds
“‘without first conducting an evidentiary hearing’”].) We express
no opinion regarding appellant’s ultimate entitlement to relief.
                           DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant's section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to issue an order
to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether appellant is entitled to section 1172.6 relief.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

MORI, J.

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