Court Opinion

ID: 9578261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:28.34965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:25.567950
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Justice,
dissenting. It appears to me that the majority opinion prefers to rely upon what Professor Blake said in 73 Harvard Law Review rather than the clear logic and reasoning in the binding precedent of this court in Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620 (128 SE 891). In my opinion, the court in that case clearly applied the "blue-pencil” doctrine as stated in Headnote 4 when it said: "The contract between the parties purported to restrict the covenantors, not only from manufacturing and selling brick within the stipulated territory, but also from manufacturing and selling 'other clay products.’ The auditor found that the contract 'with reference to other clay products’ was unreasonable and invalid. No exception was filed to this finding. The defendant in error in the cross-bill of exceptions contends that the contract is indivisible, and that since this portion is invalid the whole contract falls. Held, that the contract is divisible, and the finding that the portion with 'reference to other clay products’ is unenforceable does not affect the validity of the contract with reference to the manufacture and sale of brick.”
As Justice Gilbert, speaking for the court in that case, said, "It would appear, therefore, that it was not so much the effect of the three-hundred-mile radius that the defendants sought to avoid, as it was to avoid in toto their obligation not to compete.” P. 634.
*319So it is under the facts of the case sub judice we are not concerned with the broad territorial limits of the contract but merely whether the defendant should have been allowed to compete in the restricted three-county area. There can be no question but that the language "or in any territorial area a franchise has been granted by Rita” is overly broad and would not be enforced against the defendant were he attempting to compete in any area outside the specifically stated three-county area.
The contract here contains a severability clause and this court should not declare the entire agreement to be illegal merely because one part of the agreement is overly broad with regard to geographic limits. The only portion of the noncompetition clause which the plaintiff seeks to enforce is that covered by the three-county area. It is conceded that such a territorial restriction is valid. To carry out the true intention of the parties, this portion of the agreement, being clear and unequivocal, should be enforced. The additional language "or in any territorial area in which a franchise has been granted by Rita” is clearly repugnant to Georgia law and could not be enforced. Such language should be severed, as the agreement provides, and the valid portion enforced. That was what was done by this court in Hood v. Legg, 160 Ga. 620, supra. Justice and fair play requires us to do it here. See Aladdin, Inc. v. Krasnoff, 214 Ga. 519 (105 SE2d 730) and Kessler v, Puritan Chemical Co., 213 Ga. 845 (102 SE2d 495) where this doctrine has been recently applied by this court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Mobley and Presiding Justice Grice concur in this dissent.