Court Opinion

ID: 9947200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-03 15:09:56.54293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:11.483573
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                           ══════════
                            No. 22-0242
                           ══════════

                          Eve Lynn Baker,
                              Petitioner,

                                   v.

                          Terry Lee Bizzle,
                             Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                    Argued September 13, 2023

      JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

     JUSTICE LEHRMANN filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Busby and Justice Young joined.

      JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice
Hecht and Justice Blacklock joined.

      The issue in this divorce proceeding is whether the trial court
rendered judgment in an email sent only to the parties’ lawyers. The
court of appeals held that it did not, and we affirm. “Generally, a
judgment is rendered when the [court’s] decision is officially announced
orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or otherwise
announced publicly.”1 A written or oral ruling shared only with the
parties or their counsel in a nonpublic forum is not a public
announcement of the court’s decision and, therefore, does not constitute
a rendition of judgment.
                              I. Background
       After nearly twenty years of marriage, Eve Lynn Baker (Wife)
and Terry Lee Bizzle (Husband) filed cross-petitions for divorce.
Because no children were born of the marriage, the divorce action was
limited to (1) termination of the marital relationship and (2) division of
the marital estate. Each spouse alleged fault and no-fault grounds for
divorce, and both sought a disproportionate share of community
property.
       The divorce action was tried to the bench on September 17, 2019.
Following the close of evidence, the trial court informed the parties that
a same-day ruling would not be possible and that the court would “e-mail
the parties with the decision” at the end of the following week, at the
earliest. The parties were initially excused, but at their request, the
court orally rendered judgment in open court that “[t]he parties are
divorced” “as of today” and “entry of the final decree of divorce will be
ministerial in nature.”      The court’s oral pronouncement did not,
however, include the grounds on which divorce was granted or purport
to divide the marital estate.2

       1 Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002).

       2 See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 6.001–.007 (authorizing courts to dissolve a

marriage on satisfaction of statutory requirements), 7.001 (requiring a decree
of divorce to include a just-and-right division of the parties’ estate).

                                      2
       On October 4, the court sent the following email to the parties’
attorneys:

 Baker/Bizzle divorce ruling
 Granted on the ground of insupportability.

     1) Neither party proved by clear and convincing evidence their claims for
         reimbursement.
     2) H cashed out and used his two retirements without proving how much, if
         any, was separate.
     3) W awarded the CD in the amount of $7,745[.]
     4) Using wife’s Exhibit 1, I believe the only items on the list that are not agreed
         to were those highlighted on a copy for the court. Those disputed items
         are awarded to W.
     5) Each party keeps the motor vehicles in their possession and any debt
         thereon.
     6) The TN house and its contents with any debts or liens thereon to H. House
         valued at $98,000[.]
     7) The TX house with all contents except those specifically awarded to H.
         House valued at $217,000. Second mortgage of approximately $35,000
         debt to wife.
     8) The wife’s $12,500 school loan is community debt; awarded to W.
     9) H awarded all items listed on H Ex. 3 entitled H’s “Requested items from
         Carrollton Residence”, except the Maytag washer & dryer.
     10) Each party pays their own attorney’s fees, and their own credit card debt,
         and any lien or other debt encumbering any item they were awarded.

 [Wife’s counsel] to prepare the Decree. If I have missed something, please visit
 between yourselves and designate one of you to send an email to me. Please do
 not send separate emails.

 Thank you for your courtesy,
 Judge Barnes

The court did not copy the court clerk on this email or otherwise submit
it to the clerk for filing or entry in the record.

                                           3
       The email did not state a deadline for tendering the written
decree, but two months of ostensible inaction prompted the trial court to
twice warn the parties that the case would be dismissed for want of
prosecution if the decree was not submitted by a certain date. Shortly
after the second dismissal notice, Wife passed away on or about
December 19, 2019.
       A week later, Wife’s counsel submitted a fourteen-page final
divorce decree accompanied by a motion to sign. Husband responded
with a plea in abatement and motion to dismiss, urging that Wife’s death
had mooted the proceedings and divested the trial court of
subject-matter jurisdiction before the court rendered judgment
disposing of all contested issues. In support of abatement and dismissal,
Husband asserted that (1) a cause of action for divorce does not survive
if either spouse dies before rendition of judgment because divorce is
“purely personal to the parties”;3 (2) the trial court did not render a full

       3 See Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d

780, 784 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a cause of action that is “personal in nature
typically does not survive” the death of either party); Jones v. Jones, 97 S.W.2d
949, 951 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1936) (describing a divorce action as “purely
personal to those parties”); see also Whatley v. Bacon, 649 S.W.2d 297, 299
(Tex. 1983) (after a party’s death, “a divorce action and its incidental inquiries
of property rights and child custody” is abated and must be dismissed);
Garrison v. Tex. Com. Bank, 560 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“It is well settled that a cause of action for a
divorce is purely personal and that the cause of action for a divorce terminates
on the death of either spouse prior to the rendition of a judgment granting a
divorce. A judgment to be final must dispose of all issues and parties in the
case.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. TEX. R. CIV. P. 150 (a cause of action that
survives “may proceed to judgment” and need not be abated or dismissed if a
party dies before the court’s decision or a verdict “is rendered”).

                                          4
and complete disposition of the divorce action before Wife died; and
(3) on her death, Wife ceased to have any interest in the divorce action.4
       The central dispute was whether the trial court had rendered
judgment fully resolving the divorce action before Wife died. Husband
argued that the trial court had not, so signing the proposed divorce
decree would be an untimely, and therefore void, rendition of judgment.
Wife’s counsel characterized the proposed decree as a “ministerial”
memorialization of decisions the court had rendered on September 17
and October 4, which collectively disposed of all claims and finalized the
divorce action before Wife’s death. The trial court ultimately signed a
modified version of Wife’s proposed final decree, declaring the parties
divorced on insupportability grounds and dividing the marital estate.
       The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment that the
postmortem divorce decree was void for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction because the trial court had not rendered judgment
completely resolving the divorce action before Wife died.5 In dismissing
the case, the appellate court determined that neither the September 17
oral pronouncement nor the October 4 email “either standing alone or in

       4  On death, a deceased spouse’s separate property and undivided
one-half interest in the community estate vest immediately in the decedent’s
devisees or heirs at law, even as to jointly owned property. See TEX. EST. CODE
§§ 101.001–.002; Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.—Corpus
Christi 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Upon the death of [wife], her property passed
immediately to her heirs at law and/or the beneficiaries of her Will as the case
might be.”); see also TEX. EST. CODE § 201.003(c) (describing a deceased
spouse’s interest in the community estate as an “undivided one-half interest”).
       5 ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 123216, at *7-8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan.

13, 2022). Resolving the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, the court did not
reach Husband’s complaints about the property division. Id. at *7.

                                       5
combination” rendered a full, complete, and final rendition of judgment
disposing of the divorce action before Wife’s death.6         In addition to
holding that the September 17 oral pronouncement was merely
interlocutory,7 the court agreed with Husband that the language in the
October 4 email did not express a present—as opposed to future—intent
to render a full, final, and complete judgment.8 Among other things, the
court found it notable that the email’s “ten brief rulings” expressly
“allowed for the possibility of further rulings and clarifications” if the
trial court had “missed something.”9         The opinion also referenced
authority requiring a written rendition to be filed with the clerk, but the
trial court’s failure to file the email was not central to the court’s
analysis or disposition.10
       On petition for review, Wife challenges the court of appeals’
construction of the October 4 email and asserts that the marriage was
dissolved when the trial court fully adjudicated the divorce action in
either the October 4 email or through the combined force of the
September 17 and October 4 rulings.11 In addition to urging the email’s

       6 Id. at *7-8.

       7 Id. at *3-4 (observing that neither the grounds for divorce nor the

property division were delivered orally in open court and that the trial court
had “orally reserved ruling on all property issues until a later date”).
       8 Id. at *7.

       9 Id.

       10 Id. at *6.

       11  Wife does not dispute that the trial court’s September 17 oral
pronouncement was interlocutory because the property division remained open
at that time. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001; Ex parte Scott, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313

                                      6
linguistic and substantive sufficiency to effectuate a present, full, and
complete rendition of judgment, the petition contends that the trial
court publicly announced its October 4 decision by emailing it to the
attorneys of record, who then “acknowledged it.” Further, or in the
alternative, the petition contends that Husband’s filing of the October 4
email as an exhibit to a post-judgment motion was a public
announcement of the court’s decision that “related back” to the date of
the email.
                                II. Discussion
       The issue presented is narrow: does the trial court’s October 4
email qualify as a rendition of judgment?
       Reducing a decision to final judgment has three phases:
(1) rendition; (2) signing; and (3) entry.12 Rendition and signing are
judicial acts that can, but need not, occur at the same time.13 Entry, on

(Tex. 1939) (construing section 7.001’s predecessor as mandating division of
property in a divorce decree); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Home Transp. Co., 654
S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex. 1983) (observing that a judgment is final only when it
disposes of all issues before it and settles the controversy between the parties);
Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 315-16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983,
writ dism’d) (holding that oral rendition of judgment terminating the marital
relationship was “interlocutory” because it did not include a division of the
marital estate).
       12 Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1978) (“The day a

judge signs an order is frequently, perhaps usually, after the time the
judgment is rendered and surely it is before the judgment is entered.”); see
Coleman v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912); Henry v. Cullum Co., 891
S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, writ denied).
       13 Burrell, 570 S.W.2d at 384 (“Judges render judgment; clerks enter

them on the minutes. The entry of a judgment is the clerk’s record in the
minutes of the court. ‘Entered’ is synonymous with neither ‘Signed’ nor

                                        7
the other hand, is a clerical act undertaken by the clerk of the court.14
A judgment’s “rendition” is “the judicial act by which the court settles
and declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue.”15
Rendition of judgment requires a present act, either by spoken word or
signed memorandum, that decides the issues on which the ruling is
made.16     If the judge’s words only indicate an intention to render
judgment in the future or to provide guidelines for drafting a judgment,
the pronouncement cannot be considered a present rendition of
judgment.17

‘Rendered.’” (internal citations omitted)); Henry, 891 S.W.2d at 792
(distinguishing rendition from judicial signing and clerical entry).
        Although judgment can be rendered orally or in writing, certain
deadlines—like plenary jurisdiction and the deadline for appealing—run from
the date a final judgment is signed. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a; TEX. R. APP. P.
26.1; Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. 1982) (noting that
procedural rules providing that appellate steps run from the day the judge
signs a judgment, decision, or order “were adopted for the purpose of making
more definite the time from which an appeal had to be perfected”). But while
the date of signing is critical to a trial or appellate court’s jurisdiction, signing
does not establish a judgment’s effective date for all purposes. See TEX. R. CIV.
P. 306a; see also, e.g., In re R.A.H., 130 S.W.3d 68, 70 (Tex. 2004) (noting that
the “effective date” of a judgment acknowledging or adjudicating fatherhood is
the date the judgment was rendered (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.609(b))).
       14 Supra note 13.

       15 Coleman, 151 S.W. at 1041.

       16 Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. 1976).

       17 Id.; see S&A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1995) (trial

court’s comments on the record approved a settlement but did not render
judgment because the words spoken stated a future intent to render a “full,
final, and complete” judgment only by signing the judgment); Mixon v. Moye,
860 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (holding that the
trial court’s letter was not a rendition of judgment because “it only indicate[d]

                                         8
       Words reflecting the judge’s present declaration of a decision are
necessary, but not sufficient, to effect the rendition of a judgment.
“Generally, a judgment is rendered when the decision is officially
announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed with the clerk, or
otherwise announced publicly.”18 For writings, courts have held that a
letter to counsel could constitute a pronouncement of judgment if the
letter (1) uses language reflecting a present intent to render judgment,
(2) provides sufficient detail to state the court’s decision on the matters
at issue, and (3) is filed with the clerk of court.19 Other cases seemingly

the court’s intention to render judgment in a certain way and set[] out
guidelines by which counsel [were] to draw a judgment”).
       18 Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002).

       19  See, e.g., Gregory v. Foster, 35 S.W.3d 255, 256-57 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2000, no pet.); see also Genesis Producing Co. v. Smith Big Oil
Corp., 454 S.W.3d 655, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)
(email might have rendered judgment except it was never filed with the clerk
or otherwise publicly announced and was followed by a written order signed
and filed with the clerk); Key Energy Servs. v. Shelby Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 428
S.W.3d 133, 144-45 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, pet. denied) (a letter to counsel
may constitute pronouncement of judgment “if it is in sufficient detail to state
the court’s decision on all the matters at issue and filed with the clerk,” but the
court’s letter to counsel met neither standard); Mixon, 860 S.W.2d at 210
(unfiled letter to counsel with one short paragraph of general guidance for
preparing an order is not a rendition of judgment); Abarca v. Roadstar Corp.
of Am., 647 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1982, no
writ) (holding a letter to the parties filed with the clerk was a rendition of
judgment); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ) (letter to counsel was not a rendition because it was not
filed with the clerk and the “very general” provisions, including failure to state
which party was granted a divorce, indicated the judge’s intent that the letter
be guidance for a written judgment, not a rendition).

                                        9
hold, or at least suggest, that letter rulings may suffice even if they are
shared only with the parties or their counsel.20
       In terms of the vehicle, we see little difference between a written
memorandum of law and a written letter or email ruling. If a judgment
may be rendered in the former as our cases have long held, it can just as
surely be rendered in the latter. The form of writing is not important;
the critical inquiries concern the court’s use of language indicating a
present intent to render a full, final, and complete decision and whether
the court officially announced that decision publicly.21 The issue here is
not whether an email or letter to counsel is the kind of writing by which
a judge may render a decision but (1) whether the October 4 email
substantively did so and (2) whether a private communication
constitutes a public announcement.
       In concluding that the October 4 email did not amount to a
rendition of judgment, the court of appeals found the email’s language

       20 See Estes v. Carlton, 708 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding that the trial court’s unfiled letter to the
attorneys transmitting a signed, but unfiled, judgment was a rendition of
judgment); Ortiz v. O.J. Beck & Sons, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 860, 865 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) (holding that judgment was rendered by
letter filed with the clerk but stating, more broadly, that “a decision announced
by letter from the court to the parties when no announcement is made in open
court or any memorandum filed with the clerk, would constitute rendition”);
see also Rhima v. White, 829 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992,
writ denied) (citing Estes for the proposition that an unfiled letter ruling can
constitute a rendition of judgment); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Exxon, 663 S.W.2d 858,
863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983) (citing Ortiz in holding that a trial
court decision was “publicly announced” both through an initialed docket entry
and an ex parte letter to the movant), rev’d on other grounds, 678 S.W.2d 944
(Tex. 1984).
       21 See supra notes 19 and 20.

                                       10
insufficient and further mentioned, but did not hang its hat on, the
communiqué’s private transmission.22 Without deciding whether the
October 4 email was substantively sufficient as a present, complete, and
final decision, we find the email fatally deficient as a rendition of
judgment because there was no judicial action to publicly announce the
court’s decision on the matters at issue.
       It is undisputed that the trial court did not orally announce, in
open court, its decision on the issues addressed in the October 4 email.
Nor is it alleged that the court delivered the email to the clerk of the
court for filing, entry, or inclusion in the public record or took any
actions reasonably calculated to effectuate such delivery.             Wife
nonetheless asserts that the court’s decision was “otherwise announced
publicly” in either of two ways: (1) disclosure to counsel of record, who
“acknowledged it”; or (2) by attachment to Husband’s post-judgment
motion to reconsider and vacate the final divorce decree. We disagree
on both counts.
       Public announcement does not refer to judicial actions that only
give notice to the parties or their counsel; it requires judicial action
intended to make the decision accessible to the general public. This
conclusion comports with the long-articulated requirement that an oral
pronouncement of judgment be made in open court—rather than
privately—or, if made in a memorandum of law, that the court deliver
that writing to the clerk of the court, in his or her official capacity, for

       22 ___ S.W.3d ___, 2022 WL 123216, at *5, *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Jan. 13, 2022).

                                    11
filing in the public record.23 Although “filing” is not the only way a
document can be made public, the commonality between these
well-settled methods of rendition is official action by the court
reasonably calculated to make the decision accessible to the general
public.24 This is no happenstance.
       The public generally has a right to access judicial proceedings
except for those rare cases in which competing rights or interests
outweigh the public’s interest.25 This right, which “is a fundamental
element of the rule of law,”26 is recognized under the common law,27

       23 See, e.g., Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell, 450 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex.

1970); Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. 1953), overruled on other
grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Tex. 1955); Coleman
v. Zapp, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1912).
       24 See Knox, 257 S.W.2d at 292 (the court’s delivery of the official
decision to the court clerk imposes a duty on the clerk to enter it “forthwith”).
       25 HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 267 n.10 (Tex.

2021) (noting that “[p]ublic access to courtrooms themselves is protected by the
First Amendment, but like the common-law right of access to records and
documents, this right of access is not absolute” and is “subject to reasonable
limitations imposed to protect countervailing interests, such as the
preservation of trade secrets” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at
263-64 (“The public’s right of access to judicial proceedings is a fundamental
element of the rule of law because monitor[ing] the exercise of judicial
authority helps maintain[] the integrity and legitimacy of an independent
Judicial Branch.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted));
see, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.003(b) (allowing the court in a contested suit
affecting the parent–child relationship to “limit attendance at the hearing to
only those persons who have a direct interest in the suit or in the work of the
court”).
       26 HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263 (quoting Le v. Exeter Fin. Corp., 990

F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)).
       27 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“[T]he

courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public

                                       12
constitutionally guaranteed,28 and incorporated into our procedural
rules requiring court proceedings and court records to be open to the
public.29 In that vein, and particularly germane here, Rule 76a(1) of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[n]o court order or opinion
issued in the adjudication of a [civil] case may be sealed.” If the court
need not make a writing announcing its adjudication available to the
general public, that adjudication would effectively be sealed contrary to
the rule.30 To the extent some cases can be read as holding that a private
communication can constitute a rendition of judgment, we disapprove
them.31
       We also reject the notion that Husband’s attachment of the trial
court’s email to his post-judgment filing satisfies the requirement of a
public announcement. That filing certainly had the effect of making the
email part of the public record when it otherwise would not have been
and in doing so made it accessible to the general public. But rendition

records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” (footnote
omitted)).
       28 HouseCanary, 622 S.W.3d at 263-64; see TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13 (“All

courts shall be open[.]”).
       29 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 21d(f), 76a, 500.10(e); see also TEX. R. JUD.

ADMIN. 12, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE, tit. 2, subtit. F app. (public access to
judicial records).
       30 Although “documents filed in an action originally arising under the

Family Code” are excluded from the definition of “court records” for purposes
of Rule 76a(1)’s standard for sealing court records, Rule 76a(1) is categorical in
prohibiting the sealing of any “order or opinion issued in the adjudication of a
[civil] case.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1), (2)(a)(3). Discrete exceptions may exist
under other law, but no one has argued that the trial court’s decision in this
case may or must be made privately.
       31 See supra note 20.

                                        13
is an official judicial act, not something that can be accomplished by the
parties’ unilateral or concerted actions in filing a writing or spreading
the word. Aside from the necessity of judicial action as a legal matter,
allowing only the trial court’s actions to effectuate a rendition
encourages communication between the court and counsel while helping
to create a more certain line between mere guidance for drafting the
judgment and an official rendition of judgment.32
       Because the trial court did not announce its October 4 decision
publicly—whether by oral pronouncement, filing, or otherwise—the
court’s email did not constitute a rendition of judgment, and Wife’s
subsequent death divested the trial court of jurisdiction to thereafter
render judgment.33
                              III. Conclusion
       Public pronouncement of the trial court’s decision is not a mere
formalism but, rather, an official judicial action affording the decision
legal significance. Because the trial court did not render judgment in
the privately communicated October 4 email, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to render judgment in the postmortem final divorce decree.

       32 See United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627, 637 (Tex.

2023) (“We should strive throughout the law for easily administrable
bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with confidence and applied
by judges with predictability.”).
       33 Although the divorce proceedings were not concluded on the merits,

neither the property dispute nor Wife’s community interest goes away; it just
goes somewhere else. That is, Wife’s property interests in the marital estate
must now be divided and distributed according to Texas probate law rather
than in the divorce action. See TEX. EST. CODE §§ 101.001–.002.

                                      14
Though our analysis differs from the court of appeals, we affirm its
dismissal judgment.34

                                          John P. Devine
                                          Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: March 1, 2024

      34 This opinion should not be construed as commenting on the unargued

issues addressed in Justice Lehrmann’s concurring opinion. See Pike v. Tex.
EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 782 (Tex. 2020) (observing that courts serve
as neutral arbiters of the issues the parties have framed for decision rather
than as advocates who decide cases on unargued points).

                                     15