Court Opinion

ID: 9770905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:24:49.273233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:22.116672
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant earnestly and forcefully contends that Sheriff Hillin by his conduct in this case rendered himself an accessory to the crime committed by the appellant in that, since he did not report the offer to bribe to the grand jury of the county for nearly two years after it occurred, he thereby gave aid in order that the appellant might avoid arrest, as denounced by Article 77, V.A.P.C. The question thus presented is not without difficulty and will require a more detailed discussion of his activities.
Hillin was the sheriff-elect at the time when the offer was made. He had been out of office for some time and was necessarily endeavoring to acquaint himself, in advance of again as*161suming the office, with what laws were being violated in the county and who was violating them. He testified that he “had been out of the sheriff’s office four years and wanted to get on the inside, and I think I pretty well got on the inside by Mr. Aaron’s talking to me.” At their first meeting the appellant told Hillin that he had just delivered a load of whiskey to P. D. Alston, who was a resident of his county. At their second meeting the appellant told Hillin that he wanted to make arrangements for Alston, Louis Flowers and Eddie Montgomery to bootleg in the county. On January 1, 1951, the day Hillin took the office as sheriff, he therefore knew the following: (1) That the appellant had offered to bribe him, and (2) That three named individuals were actively engaged in bootlegging or were contemplating entering that business.
The offer to bribe case rested upon his testimony alone, and any peace officer will recognize his reluctance to proceed without further corroborating evidence. Appellant had told him the names of citizens of'his county with whom he intended to do business. If he were able to prove that appellant actually did business with them, this would in a small measure corroborate his own testimony on appellant’s trial. We have concluded that in a case such as this the sheriff had the right to delay the initiation of prosecution for a reasonable time in order to ferret out corroboration of his own testimony, if he could.
Let us examine Sheriff Hillin’s conduct further. If he had wanted to aid the appellant to avoid arrest and trial, he would have remained completely silent about the entire transaction. Did he do this? The record shows that he talked to Mr. Elliott, his deputy, about the offer to bribe early in 1951; he talked to the county attorney, “during the first part of that year” and then again in 1952; he talked to Judge Blair, his district judge, “sometime along, kind of the first of the year”; he talked to Travis Shelton, his district attorney, possibly in 1951 and then again in 1952; he talked to Leon Bowman, the superintendent and another Texas Liquor Control Board man in March of 1951; he talked to Sheriff Kimbell at Dickens and finally presented the case to the grand jury in November, 1952.
This does not appear to us to be the conduct of one who is aiding another to escape arrest and punishment.
We could not hold that Hillin was an accomplice witness unless we were satisfied that facts showed that Hillin’s relation*162ship to the appellant would render him accountable to the law as an accessory to the crime which the appellant had committed. We do not think the facts justify such a finding.
Appellant asks that we re-examine the voir dire examination of the jurors who served at his trial and hold that the trial court erred in not granting his motion for change of venue irrespective of when the same was filed. We have read the entire testimony of all twelve jurors and remain convinced that we disposed of the question of venue properly in our original opinion. If we held that a change of venue should have been granted in this case, it would be tantamount to holding that the venue must be changed in all cases where the local sheriff is the state’s principal witness. The veniremen all knew the sheriff and did not know the appellant, but this fact does not necessarily mean that the appellant did not secure a fair trial. The fact that the jury at one juncture inquired of the court if they might suspend any sentence which might be imposed upon the appellant indicates to us that he did receive a fair trial. Appellant did not receive a suspended sentence in this case because he refused to ask for one.
Remaining convinced that we properly disposed of this case originally, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.