Court Opinion

ID: 9884896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:22:48.219831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:41.843918
License: Public Domain

*41BROWN (Gerald), P. J.
Dr. R. L. Siggers (Real Party in Interest) filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County (Respondent) on June 26, 1964, against La Mirada Community Hospital, a corporation, and a copartnership doing business under the same name (Petitioners) for breach of contract.
The corporation and the individual defendants comprising the copartnership demurred and moved for change of venue to Los Angeles County. The grounds for the motion were:
" That the co-partnership doing business under the fictitious firm name and style of La Mirada Community Hospital and Ralph C. Opperman, individually and doing business as La Mirada Community Hospital, are residents of Los Angeles County, that the defendant La Mirada Community Hospital is a corporation, and that said co-partnership, and said corporation, have their principal place of business in the County of Los Angeles and the contract referred to in plaintiff’s complaint was made and executed and is performable in the County of Los Angeles, State of California.”
Noteworthy is the lack of any statement respecting the residence of the individual defendants forming the copartnership, or a claim the action was not properly commenced in Orange County. Also noteworthy is the fact the residence and place of business grounds of the motion refer to the residence and place of business at the time of the motion rather than at the time the action was commenced.
In late January 1965, it was stipulated: “. . . that the Motion for Change of Venue . . . may be granted and that the case may be transferred to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles . . . .” On February 5, 1965, the Orange County Superior Court transferred the action to the Superior Court of Los Angeles County by a minute entry reciting: “Upon reading the Stipulation between the parties to the above entitled action that the venue thereof may be transferred ... It is ordered . . . the . . . action . . . is . . . transferred . . . upon the payment of the proper transfer fee.”
On July 6, 1966, petitioners moved in the Superior Court of Orange County to dismiss the action under Code of Civil Procedure, section 581b. The court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that some of the defendants resided in Orange County when suit was begun. Petitioners now seek a writ of mandate compelling dismissal of the action.
*42It is a long established rule that a motion for change of venue must satisfy two requirements: (1) It must be shown the action is proper in the county to which the movant seeks transfer; and (2) it must be shown the county in which the action was filed was improper under any applicable theory (Hearne v. De Young, 111 Cal. 373 [43 P. 1108]). The second requirement was not satisfied here.
California Constitution, article XII, section 16, specifies the proper county for commencement of actions against a corporation to be “the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or . . . breach occurs; or . . . the county [of the corporation’s] principal place of business. ...” This section does not apply to an unincorporated association, such as a partnership which, for the purpose of venue, is not a legal entity and does not have a place of residence. (Juneau etc. Corp. v. International Longshoremen’s etc. Union, 37 Cal.2d 760, 763 [235 P.2d 607].) A suit against a partnership is commenced properly in any county where any of the partners reside. (Juneau etc. Corp. v. International Longshoremen’s etc. Union, supra, 37 Cal.2d 760, 763; Cal-Rex Mach. Sales v. Valley Materials, 161 Cal.App.2d 504, 506 [326 P.2d 889].) Where a corporation and individuals as copartners are joined as defendants the action is commenced properly in the county in which any of the defendants is a resident. (McClung v. Watt, 190 Cal. 155, 158-159 [211 P. 17] ; Delno v. Market Street Ry. Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 489, 500 [147 P.2d 67] ; Aisbett v. Paradise Mt. Min. etc. Co., 21 Cal.App. 267, 269 [131 P. 330] ; see also Brady v. The Times-Mirror Co., 106 Cal. 56, 58 [39 P. 209], and cf. Dillman v. Superior Court, 205 Cal.App. 2d 769, 772 [23 Cal.Rptr. 498].)
In the case at bench, neither the motion nor the declaration in its support asserted that none of the individual partnership defendants resided in the County of Orange. Absent any such showing, the motion had no merit. (Monogram Co. v. Kingsley, 38 Cal.2d 28, 30-31 [237 P.2d 265] ; Goossen v. Clifton, 75 Cal.App.2d 44, 50 [170 P.2d 104].)  The burden is on the defendant moving for a change of venue to show the action was not brought in the proper county. (Pacific Bal Industries v. Northern Timber, Inc., 118 Cal.App.2d 815, 826 [259 P.2d 465].)  Where the action is against several defendants and the residence of some of them is shown to be outside the county in which it was *43commenced, e.g., the corporation in the case at bench, it is presumed the other defendants were residents of the county where the action was commenced. (Aisbett v. Paradise Mt. Min. etc. Co., supra, 21 Cal.App. 267, 268.)  As a consequence, even if the court granted the instant motion, and its order in doing so implied the existence of the grounds upon which the motion was based, it would not establish the action was not commenced in the proper county because of the failure of any showing that none of the individual partnership defendants resided in the County of Orange. The fact all of the defendants joined in the motion to transfer did not establish the action had not been commenced in the proper county, or that it should be transferred. (Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 35 Cal.2d 858, 860 [221 P.2d 939]; McClung v. Watt, supra, 190 Cal. 155, 159.)
Only one conclusion, therefore, can be made from the order transferring the action to Los Angeles County: It was not based on the grounds set out in the motion, but rather on the stipulation by the parties agreeing to the transfer. Stated another way, no determination was made by respondent on the question of venue, since the court made its order based on the stipulation.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 581b, states in part: “No action heretofore . . . commenced, where the same was not originally commenced in the proper court, and which has been ordered transferred to the proper court, shall be further prosecuted . . . until the fees and costs of the transfer thereof . . . have been paid, as provided in Section 399 of this code; and all such actions heretofore commenced must be dismissed by the court . . . where [such] costs and fees . . . have not been so paid for one year after entry of the order for transfer.” (Italics added.)
Section 581b applies only to situations where transfer fees “as provided by Section 399 of this code” have not been paid. Section 399 applies only in those instances where the order for change of venue is based on one of the grounds designated in Code of Civil Procedure, title 4, part 2 (§§ 392-401). An order for change of venue based on a stipulation that a transfer be made is not based on one of the grounds so designated. Likewise, an order changing venue upon grounds such as those specified in petitioner’s motion, as heretofore noted, is not based on any code designated ground.
*44Furthermore, by its language, section 581b applies only where the action was not originally commenced in the proper court. Upon the motion to dismiss the court decided to the contrary. The issue had not been determined previously and necessarily had to be determined at that time.
Petitioners contend California Constitution, article XII, section 16, supra, is controlling; that the real party in interest did not bring suit in the proper county, and for that reason the court must dismiss the case pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 581b.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 395, states in part:
“(1) In all other cases . . . the county in which the defendants or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action, is the proper county for the trial of the action.” (Italics added.)
Here there were many individual defendants, apart from the corporate defendant. Some of them were residents of Orange County when the action was commenced. That being true, the Superior Court of Orange County was a proper court in which to bring suit. (Dillman v. Superior Court, supra, 205 Cal.App.2d 769, 772.)
The order denying the motion to dismiss was proper.
Writ denied.
Coughlin, J., concurred.