Court Opinion

ID: 9571472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:02.750784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:27.836098
License: Public Domain

*812Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in all of the majority opinion except Division 4, to which I respectfully dissent.
Appellant has sought to introduce evidence of his offer to plead guilty to all offenses charged, with the maximum sentence imposed on each charge and the sentences running consecutively, on the condition that the State not seek the death penalty. As to the admissibility of testimony concerning that offer the majority opinion states as follows:
If the defendant wishes to inform the jury that he offered to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence, the state reasonably and properly may argue that nothing less than a death sentence is appropriate and ask why the defendant did not simply plead unconditionally and allow the jury to impose sentence. [Cit.] In short, we do not agree that the state would be handicapped in its response, or that it would be unfair to the state to allow the defendant to present evidence of his conditional offer to plead guilty. We see no reason to bar the defendant from presenting this evidence if he elects to do so.
While the issue of the admissibility of appellant’s offer of a conditional plea is a matter of first impression for this court, the issue of testimony concerning plea negotiations in general is not a matter of first impression. In Davis v. State, 255 Ga. 598 (24) (340 SE2d 869) (1986), this court said:
[An offered plea of guilty] is neither mitigating nor aggravating, i.e., it does not relate to the defendant’s character, prior record, or to the circumstances of the offense; therefore, it is correctly excluded as irrelevant. OCGA § 17-10-30 (b); Wilson v. State, 250 Ga. 630, 639 (300 SE2d 640), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 865 (1983). The fact that a defendant has withdrawn a guilty plea would be inadmissible against him. Similarly, the fact that the state had withdrawn its offer should be inadmissible. A contrary rule would deter or preclude plea bargaining by the state to the detriment of other defendants.
Whenever this court has been called upon in the past to consider the issue of guilty plea evidence, it has taken a position inconsistent with the approach taken by the majority in this case. Thomas v. State, 248 Ga. 247 (11) (282 SE2d 316) (1981); Davis v. State, supra.
An obvious reason for not allowing a defendant to offer evidence of an offered guilty plea is the prohibition against the State offering evidence concerning the possibility of parole.
*813Decided February 18, 1993
Reconsideration denied March 4, 1993.
No attorney at law in a criminal case shall argue to or in the presence of the jury that a defendant, if convicted, may not be required to suffer the full penalty imposed by the court or jury because pardon, parole, or clemency of any nature may be granted. . . .
OCGA § 17-8-76 (a). See also Quick v. State, 256 Ga. 780 (353 SE2d 497) (1987); McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259, 266-267 (98 SE2d 564) (1957).
It is axiomatic that in the trial of a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the State to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. And in the sentencing stage of a death penalty case, the burden is on the State to prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in the presentation of evidence, we seek to provide equal opportunities to the parties to present evidence supporting their claims and we allow them to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence in their argument to the jury. Since we have a blanket prohibition against the introduction of evidence concerning parole, it would seem to be incongruous to allow a defendant to offer evidence as to his attempted guilty plea without at the same time allowing the State an opportunity to fully explain why the plea was refused.
A danger which is readily apparent but is not mentioned by the majority opinion is the possibility that the availability of the plea offer as evidence in mitigation will force some attorneys to recommend that their clients offer pleas of guilty just to establish evidence of the offer to be introduced at the sentencing stage. Such a strategy may have a chilling effect on the lawyer’s ability to present a vigorous defense during the guilt-innocence phase for fear that the jury will take punitive action in the sentencing phase once it is discovered that the defense which was offered in the guilt-innocence stage was lacking in sincerity.
The goal of the majority opinion is very laudable in that it seeks to allow a defendant to acknowledge responsibility for his criminal act before the jury determines a sentence. Unfortunately, this laudable goal may quickly degenerate into just another trial tactic, a sword with two edges which turns too easily in the hand. Because I fear that the holding in Division 4 of the majority opinion will cause more harm than good, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins this dissent.
*814Summer & Summer, Daniel A. Summer, for appellant.
C. Andrew Fuller, District Attorney, Leonard C. Parks, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.