Court Opinion

ID: 9772695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:26:43.13309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:47.041138
License: Public Domain

OPINION OVERRULING MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, Bright & Company, et al. (Bright) contend we erred in concluding that the perpetual free royalty interest reserved in the Rio Grande deed was not subject to the rule. In addition to other challenges previously raised, Bright claims we concluded the interest was valid simply by determining that it was created out of a possibility of reverter, without regard to when the interest actually vested. We disagree.
Bright is correct in stating that even if an interest is carved out of a possibility of reverter, its validity must still be determined by asking whether the vesting of the interest is contingent upon an event which may not occur within the time allowed by the rule against perpetuities. Indeed, we stated as much in our original opinion in discussing the general principals of possibilities of reverter. Nevertheless, our agreement with Bright as to the appropriate analysis does not change our conclusion that the interest reserved in the deed was presently vested at the time of the conveyance, with only possession and enjoyment delayed until some uncertain time in the future. Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex.1991); see also Jupiter Oil Co. v. Snow, 819 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex.1991).
We are also again unpersuaded that Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.1982), is outcome-determinative of the deed in question. Bright asserts that in Peveto, “the grant violated the Rule because the future royalty could not become effective until the determinable royalty expired,” and is similar to and interpretive of our deed. Bright’s interpretation misconstrues the Supreme Court’s holding. In Peveto, the Supreme Court stated that because the specific language used in the deed prevented the grant from becoming effective until some uncertain future event, the instrument violated the Rule. It was not construing the validity of some potentially contingent interest contained within a presently effective grant, it was construing the validity of the grant itself.
In the conveyance made by the Hammans, the language relating to the reservation states that “there is hereby reserved to Grantors ... one-half (½) of all royalties ... and, in event of the termination ... a perpetual non-participating free royalty inter-est_” (emphasis added.) Both royalties are reserved to the grantors in one sentence, and the only verb used indicates a present reservation. There is no language conditioning the effectiveness of the reservation upon an uncertain future event.
As stated in Luckel, and aptly quoted by Bright, “Since the deed makes a present conveyance of the possibility of reverter, there is no violation of the rule against per-petuities. In particular, the deed did not condition the effectiveness of the grant on the expiration of the Coe lease.” Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d at 464. (citations omitted.) (emphasis added.) Because we remain convinced that, at the time of the conveyance, the deed made a presently vested reservation of a portion of the possibility of reverter, we overrule Bright’s motion for rehearing. Likewise, we have considered each of the motions for rehearing filed by the respective parties and overrule each party’s motion.