Court Opinion

ID: 9882296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 18:00:38.027194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:59.016745
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40116         Document: 00516921192             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/05/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                 October 5, 2023
                                        No. 23-40116
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   Benjamin Robert Fuhr,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   City of Sherman, Texas,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:21-CV-549
                      ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Benjamin Robert Fuhr (“Fuhr”) appeals the district court’s summary
   judgment in favor of the City of Sherman, Texas (“the City”). Because Fuhr
   fails to establish that the City’s proffered reasons for hiring Ty Coleman, and
   not promoting him, for the position of Animal Services Manager were merely
   pretextual, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40116      Document: 00516921192           Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                     No. 23-40116

             I.      FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Fuhr, a white male, was an animal control officer for the Sherman
   Animal Shelter. In the Spring of 2019, the position of Animal Services
   Manager came open. At the same time, the City was looking to hire someone
   for the position of Animal Services Supervisor, a mid-level supervisory
   position. On April 25, 2019, Fuhr applied for both positions. The City
   appointed a three-member committee to interview qualified applicants and
   make hiring decisions for the open positions. Three internal candidates—
   Fuhr, Matt Harmon, and David Ulch, all of whom are white males—and one
   external candidate—Ty Coleman, a Black male—were interviewed for the
   Animal Services Manager position.
          The committee utilized a scoresheet, comprised of a standard set of
   fifteen interview questions, and five other criteria to evaluate each candidate.
   Each member of the committee assigned a score to each candidate in
   reference to each question and criteria. Coleman received an average score
   of 91 out of 100, Fuhr and Ulch each received average scores of 82 out of 100,
   and Harmon received an average score of 65 out of 100. Coleman also
   received the highest scores in several additional criteria. At the time of his
   application, Coleman had approximately 8 ½ years of relevant work
   experience, including three years of experience in a supervisory role.
   Ultimately, the committee unanimously decided to hire Coleman.
          Fuhr filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
   Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in November 2019, following the
   hiring of Coleman. After receiving his right to sue letter from the EEOC,
   Fuhr filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas alleging that the City’s failure
   to promote him was because of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil
   Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and Chapter 21 of the Texas

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Case: 23-40116      Document: 00516921192           Page: 3   Date Filed: 10/05/2023

                                     No. 23-40116

   Labor Code. 1 Following the district court’s dismissal of Fuhr’s state law
   claim, the City moved for summary judgment on his remaining Title VII
   claim, which the district court granted. Fuhr timely appealed.
                        II.     Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v.
   Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is
   appropriate when a party fails to “make a showing sufficient to establish the
   existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
   will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
   322 (1986). The court should grant summary judgment when “there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                               III. Discussion
          Fuhr argues that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion
   for summary judgment because he provided sufficient evidence through
   which a properly instructed jury could have reasonably concluded that the
   City’s proffered reasons for hiring Coleman, instead of promoting Fuhr, for
   the Animal Services Manager position, were racially motivated. We are
   unpersuaded.
          A. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination
          In accordance with a Title VII racial employment discrimination
   claim, the complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case.
   McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 802 (1973). To establish a prima

          _____________________
          1
           TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 201.001, et seq., also known as the Texas
   Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”).

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                                     No. 23-40116

   facie case of discrimination based on his race, Fuhr must establish that “(1)
   he was not promoted, (2) he was qualified for the position he sought, (3) he
   fell within a protected class at the time of the failure to promote, and (4) the
   defendant either gave the promotion to someone outside of that protected
   class or otherwise failed to promote the plaintiff because of his race.” Autry
   v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 704 F.3d 344, 346–347 (5th Cir. 2013); see also
   Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 339 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Stroy
   v. Gibson on behalf of Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 896 F.3d 693, 698 (5th Cir.
   2018)). If Fuhr successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden would
   then shift to the City to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
   failing to promote Fuhr. Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 425
   (5th Cir. 2000); see, e.g., Saketkoo v. Admins. of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th
   990, 1000 (5th Cir. 2022) (“If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then
   the employer has the burden of production to provide ‘a legitimate, non-
   discriminatory reason’ for the adverse employment action.”). Upon doing
   so, the burden would then shift back to Fuhr to prove, by a preponderance of
   the evidence, that the proffered reason was mere pretext for racial
   discrimination. Byers, 209 F.3d at 425.
          Although there is no dispute that Fuhr satisfied the first three
   elements of his prima facie case, the parties disagree on the fourth.
   Nevertheless, the district court determined that Fuhr established a prima
   facie case of discrimination because “(1) there is no dispute that he was not
   promoted to the Animal Services Department Manager role, (2) the City
   does not contest that [Fuhr] was qualified for the position, (3) Fuhr’s white
   skin color is his protected class, and (4) a non-white individual—a [B]lack
   man—was given the position instead.” Fuhr v. City of Sherman, Texas, No.
   4:21-CV-549-SDJ, 2023 WL 1765914 at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2023). This
   court agrees.

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                                     No. 23-40116

          B. The Veracity of the City’s Proffered Reasons and Evidence of Pretext
          Because Fuhr established a prima facie case of racial discrimination,
   the City becomes tasked with providing a legitimate and nondiscriminatory
   reason for hiring Coleman instead of promoting Fuhr. See Autry, 704 F.3d at
   347. The City easily meets its burden. The City’s many reasons for its hiring
   decision include Coleman receiving the highest overall score based on
   interviews, having over eight years of experience in animal services, and
   being the only candidate with management and supervisory experience. Fuhr
   is thus required to establish that the proffered reasons from the City to hire
   Coleman and not promote him were merely pretextual. See McDonnell, 411
   U.S. at 804; see also Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (“If the employer has articulated [some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
   for the employee’s rejection], then the plaintiff must show that the stated
   reason ‘was in fact pretext.’” (quoting McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804)). He fails
   to do so.
          This court has repeatedly held that “differences in qualifications
   between job candidates are generally not probative evidence of
   discrimination unless those differences are so favorable to the plaintiff that
   there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that
   the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.” Deines v.
   Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999); see
   also Roberson-King v. La. Workforce Comm’n, Off. of Workforce Dev., 904 F.3d
   377, 381 (5th Cir. 2018). Whether Fuhr’s credentials qualify him for the
   position of Animal Services Manager is not dispositive in this case. Rather,
   Fuhr must establish that he was clearly better qualified than Coleman. Deines,
   164 F.3d at 279. He has not and, likewise, cannot.
          “A plaintiff may also establish pretext ‘by showing that the
   employer’s proffered explanation is false or ‘unworthy of credence.’”

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                                     No. 23-40116

   Roberson-King, 904 F.3d at 381. Fuhr attempts to demonstrate evidence of
   pretext through several additional means, including (1) statements made by
   members of the committee; (2) the hiring of Harmon for the position of
   Animal Services Supervisor; (3) Fuhr’s belief that the ideas he presented to
   the committee were met with indifference; (4) a prior lawsuit against the City
   regarding its failure to promote minorities; and (5) Coleman’s age. Fuhr’s
   assertions are insufficient to show pretext. Fuhr cannot establish pretext
   based on a committee member stating that Coleman was “the first African
   American to hold the director position” as this statement does not indicate
   that the committee discriminated against white applicants simply because it
   recognized the accomplishment of a Black applicant. Additionally, the hiring
   of another white candidate for an entirely separate position, Animal Services
   Supervisor, is irrelevant to whether the City’s proffered reasons regarding
   the committee’s hiring rationale for the Animal Services Manager position
   were pretextual. Lastly, Fuhr’s assertions, that (1) the committee’s
   perceived indifference to his presented ideas and (2) a prior lawsuit fueled its
   decision to hire Coleman for the position, amount to nothing more than
   speculation that does not substantiate a finding of pretext. See Britt v. Grocers
   Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1441, 1451 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that speculation and
   belief are insufficient to create a fact issue regarding pretext). Finally, noting
   Coleman’s age at the time of the hiring, 22 years old, is of no moment in this
   case as a claim for racial discrimination is distinct from a claim for age
   discrimination. See e.g., Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir.
   2001) (showing that establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination is
   distinct from establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination).
          Consequently, given the lack of competent summary judgment
   evidence, Fuhr is unable to establish that the City’s proffered reasons for
   hiring Coleman, and not promoting him, for the position of Animal Services
   Manager were merely pretextual. See McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804.

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                                    No. 23-40116

   Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in granting the City’s
   motion for summary judgment. See Hudson v. Lincare, Inc., 58 F.4th 222, 228
   (5th Cir. 2023); United States v. Lawrence, 276 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 2001).
                              IV.    Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.

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