Court Opinion

ID: 9840077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 05:07:51.613697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:34.345795
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                      UNPUBLISHED
In re HILL/KEARNEY/WATSON, Minors.                                    September 14, 2023

                                                                      No. 363920
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                      Family Division
                                                                      LC No. 2016-521897-NA

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and O’BRIEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor children, DKJ and JLW. On appeal, respondent argues, among other things, that the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) failed to make reasonable efforts at family
reunification because its efforts did not reasonably accommodate respondent’s intellectual
disability. We agree. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental
rights, and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises from an original petition in which petitioner requested that the trial court
take jurisdiction over the minor children and terminate respondent’s parental rights. The children
were living with their respective fathers at the time, none of whom were named as respondents.

        The petition alleged that (1) respondent was homeless, (2) she had two other children
currently in guardianships and had her parental rights to another child recently terminated in Ohio,
(3) she had a lengthy history with Children’s Protective Services (CPS) but failed to participate in
and benefit from ordered services, and (4) she abandoned DKJ and JLW. The petition also
acknowledged that respondent “suffers from an intellectual disability . . . .”

        A referee authorized the petition, and the trial court ordered the children to be placed under
petitioner’s care and supervision (though released to their respective fathers), with respondent
having supervised visitation.

        Eventually, a combined adjudication trial and termination hearing was held before a
referee. During the hearing, CPS investigator Tamika Lovejoy testified that respondent was

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“[c]ognitively impaired,” which was why a guardian ad litem (GAL) was appointed to assist her
during the proceedings. Lovejoy testified that other services offered to respondent included
“[p]arenting skills, housing, therapy services,” and counseling. Lovejoy explained, however, that
respondent was terminated from these services “for lack of participation.” When asked whether
respondent “received specialized services to address her cognitive impairments,” Lovejoy
responded “[y]es” and said that respondent “was offered mental health treatment,” and was
“provided with housing treatment, individual therapy, parenting classes, [and] things to help with
her income . . . .” When pressed about how those services differed from typical services, Lovejoy
said that, here, the DHHS “offered [respondent] help for her to apply to different housing, help
with applications, things she didn’t appear to do herself or understand to do herself and she
declined those things.” When asked what other services the DHHS offered to respondent that were
tailored to reasonably address respondent’s intellectual disability, Lovejoy said that she “had
limited contact” with respondent and believed that those questions could be better answered by
“the foster care worker” because “she has been on the case a little longer.”

       The foster care worker, Unika Simmons, was later asked what “specialized services”
respondent received “recognizing that she has cognitive impairments,” and Simmons testified that
respondent “was offered individual therapy, substance abuse therapy, parenting classes,” and “a
Section 8 referral for housing.” Simmons, like Lovejoy, also testified that she “offered to assist
[respondent] with applications, if she needed the printed information,” but respondent refused.
When pressed about what “special services” were offered to respondent that were not typically
offered to persons without an intellectual disability, Simmons testified that “there were no
additional services provided.”

        During closing arguments, respondent’s counsel stressed that the DHHS had not made
reasonable efforts, highlighting Simmons’ testimony that no specialized services were offered to
respondent. In its ruling from the bench, the referee found that (1) the DHHS provided reasonable
efforts “consistently with [In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79; 893 NW2d 637 (2017)],” (2) petitioner
had established grounds for jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2, and (3) petitioner had established
grounds for termination under MCL 712a.19b(3). The order signed and entered by the trial court
following the hearing stated, “The Department has made efforts to provide [respondent] with
services she could receive a [sic] benefit from,” and checked a box indicating that reasonable
efforts were made.

        Later, a separate best-interests hearing was held. No additional testimony related to the
DHHS’s reunification efforts was taken at this hearing, but during closing arguments, respondent’s
counsel again emphasized that the DHHS had not made reasonable efforts because it had failed to
reasonably accommodate respondent’s intellectual disability. The trial court, however, rejected
this argument, found that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in DKJ and JLW’s best
interests, and terminated respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “We review the trial court’s findings regarding reasonable efforts for clear error.” In re
Smith, 324 Mich App 28, 43; 919 NW2d 427 (2018). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although
there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011).

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                                         III. ANALYSIS

       “Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except those
involving aggravated circumstances under MCL 712A.19a(2).” In re Rippy, 330 Mich App 350,
355; 948 NW2d 131 (2019).1

       In In re Hicks/Brown, our Supreme Court addressed how the DHHS’s mandate to provide
reasonable efforts dovetails with its responsibility to accommodate disabilities as required by the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq. The Court explained that the ADA
required public entities like the DHHS to make reasonable accommodations in their policies and
procedures to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, and thus:

               Absent reasonable modifications to the services or programs offered to a
       disabled parent, the [DHHS] has failed in its duty under the ADA to reasonably
       accommodate a disability. In turn, the [DHHS] has failed in its duty under the
       Probate Code to offer services designed to facilitate the child’s return to his or her
       home, see MCL 712A.18f(3)(d), and has, therefore, failed in its duty to make
       reasonable efforts at reunification under MCL 712A.19a(2). As a result, we
       conclude that efforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code
       if the [DHHS] has failed to modify its standard procedures in ways that are
       reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the ADA. [In re
       Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 86.]

        Applying that holding to this case, we conclude that the DHHS failed to provide specific
services to accommodate respondent’s intellectual disability, and thus failed in its duty to make
reasonable efforts at reunification under MCL 712A.19a(2). Both Lovejoy and Simmons testified
that the only specific service offered to respondent to accommodate her intellectual disability was
that they offered to help respondent fill out housing applications, which respondent declined. Even
had respondent accepted, however, it is unclear how this is a modification to the DHHS’s standard
procedures geared towards reasonably accommodating respondent’s disability under the ADA.
Further, while the trial court appointed respondent a GAL, it appears that the GAL’s role was
limited to assisting respondent in understanding the proceedings—nothing in the record suggests
that the GAL assisted respondent in understanding the services being offered, how to engage in
those services, or how to benefit from those services.

        Petitioner highlights that this is not respondent’s first interaction with CPS and the DHHS,
and asserts that she has a long history of being offered services and failing to engage in them.
However, considering the services previously offered to respondent, it is unclear how the DHHS
modified its standard procedures in ways that were reasonably necessary to accommodate
respondent’s intellectual disability under the ADA. See id. (explaining that “efforts at
reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if the [DHHS] has failed to modify its
standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to accommodate a disability under the

1
  Neither the trial court nor petitioner ever contended that this case involved aggravating
circumstances such that reasonable efforts were not required.

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ADA”). More importantly, on the record now before us, particularly considering the testimony of
Simmons and Lovejoy, it is clear that the DHHS did not modify its procedures to reasonably
accommodate respondent’s disability with respect to this most recent request for termination.

        The children’s GAL also filed a brief on appeal, in which the GAL noted, “It is concerning
that [the] DHHS did not offer respondent specialized services if she was truly impaired,” but noted
that “the record is devoid of information pertaining to the extent of respondent’s impairment.”
This is not a basis to conclude that the DHHS’s efforts were reasonable, however. The DHHS
knew that respondent had an intellectual disability from the beginning of these termination
proceedings because it said as much in its original petition. “Once the Department knew of the
disability, its affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts at reunification meant that it could not
be passive in its approach as far as the provision of accommodations is concerned.” Id. at 87-88.
That “the record is devoid of information pertaining to the extent of respondent’s impairment” is
a result of the DHHS’s passive approach to accommodating respondent’s disability. Stated
otherwise, it is indicative of the DHHS’s lack of reasonable efforts.

         Accordingly, we are definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake
when it found that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify respondent and the children
because “efforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code unless the [DHHS]
modifies its services as reasonably necessary to accommodate a parent’s disability.” Id. at 90.
“And termination is improper without a finding of reasonable efforts.” Id. We therefore vacate
the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

       Vacated and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

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