Court Opinion

ID: 9782688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:05:03.198235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:07.760003
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
concurring in result with separate opinion.
Although I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s motion to dismiss, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis. Whereas the majority embarks on a lengthy constitutional evaluation, I would declare SOS’s appeal to be moot. Regardless of the outcome, it is clear that no effective relief can be rendered to the parties. See Indiana High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Durham, 748 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Elm-hurst has closed its doors, its former students and teachers have transferred to other schools, and most of the equipment has been redeployed elsewhere. Moreover, FWCS asserts that due to its collective bargaining agreement, teachers could bid for a position at a re-opened Elmhurst, and as result, the facility, if forced to reopen, would probably be completely different.
In its opinion, the majority develops a constitutional analysis of the Education Clause and the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause based on a very limited fact-situation. The record clearly reflects that the majority bases its evaluation on the assertions listed in SOS’s complaint; no discovery has been conducted, the summary judgment stage has not even been reached. While I do not dismiss the potential public interest involved here, I would prefer to embark on a constitutional analysis after more facts are known and *252the precedent created by the case would be more valuable. See Juskulski v. State, 206 Ind. 503, 190 N.E. 423, 426 (1934) (A precedent must be considered in light of the circumstances of the cause to which it was addressed).