Court Opinion

ID: 9898985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 17:05:24.61905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:00.152114
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

                        DENNIS ALLEN TAYLOR,
                              Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-2291

                           [November 15, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Scott Suskauer, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2020-CF-
010025A.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Christine C. Geraghty,
Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke R. Napodano,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

CONNER, J.

    A jury found the appellant guilty of sexual battery (physical force),
domestic battery by strangulation, and harassing a witness, victim, or
informant. After being sentenced on the charges, the appellant filed a
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion asserting errors in
the scoring of several Ohio convictions on the sentencing scoresheet. The
trial court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part,
declining to resentence the appellant.

   On appeal, the appellant does not contest his convictions; instead, he
appeals the sentences imposed, raising two issues: (1) two Ohio
convictions were improperly scored on his scoresheet, and (2) a sentencing
multiplier for a sex crime committed in front of a child was improperly
applied because the information did not allege a child was present. On
the second issue, the appellant relies on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99 (2013), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
   We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the second issue without
discussion. We affirm as to the first issue and explain our reasons.

   The two Ohio convictions were for aggravated robbery and possession
of controlled substances. In his reply brief, the appellant concedes the
Ohio conviction for possession of controlled substances was properly
scored. That leaves the issue of the scoring for the Ohio aggravated
robbery conviction.

   The record reflects that, prior to sentencing, the State, through
discovery, provided the appellant with certified copies of his Ohio
convictions. The appellant did not challenge the scoring of the Ohio
convictions in his sentencing memorandum or at sentencing. The
appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion did not seek proof of the elements of
the Ohio aggravated robbery conviction to show the conviction was
properly scored.

    We agree with the appellant that “only the elements of the out-of-state
crime . . . should be considered in determining whether the conviction is
analogous to a Florida statute for the purpose of calculating points for a
sentencing guidelines scoresheet.” Dautel v. State, 658 So. 2d 88, 91 (Fla.
1995). When the scoring of an out-of-state conviction is contested, the
trial court may consider the out-of-state judgment entered, and if
necessary, the charging document, to determine the elements of the out-
of-state conviction for comparison with a Florida offense for scoring. See
Knarich v. State, 866 So. 2d 165, 169 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (concluding the
trial court may consider the charging instruments and the judgments to
determine if the elements of an out-of-state conviction are analogous to a
pertinent Florida statute).

   Thus, when the appellant contested the proper scoring of an out-of-
state conviction on the ground that the points on the scoresheet were not
analogous to the Florida crime used for the scoring, the appellant was
entitled to seek an evidentiary hearing, requiring the State to provide
competent evidence in support of its scoring of the appellant’s prior record.
See Sanders v. State, 333 So. 3d 235, 235-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022) (“Having
challenged multiple prior convictions included on his scoresheet in his
amended rule 3.800(b) motion, [the appellant] correctly argues that the
State was required to introduce competent evidence in support of its
scoring of [the appellant’s] prior record and failed to do so.”). But the
appellant did not seek an evidentiary hearing, either below or on appeal,
during which the State would have filed certified copies of the Ohio
aggravated robbery conviction to support the scoring of that conviction by
comparing the elements of the Ohio conviction (based on the charging

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document or written judgment) with a Florida crime. Instead, below and
on appeal, the appellant traveled on legal arguments discussing the
various elements of robbery offenses in Ohio and Florida, referring to
statutes only.

   We are not persuaded by the appellant’s arguments on appeal that the
Ohio aggravated robbery charge was improperly scored because the
elements of the crime are not analogous to the Florida crime for which the
points were scored. Instead, we agree with the State’s arguments on
appeal. In short, we conclude that, both below and on appeal, the
appellant failed to show the trial court erred at sentencing by considering
a scoresheet with the allegedly erroneous points for the Ohio aggravated
robbery conviction.

    Even if we agreed with the appellant that the Ohio aggravated robbery
conviction was improperly scored, we determine the error was harmless.
Having reviewed the sentencing proceeding, we determine the trial court
would have imposed the same sentences even with the appellant’s
requested correction for the Ohio aggravated robbery conviction. See
Green v. State, 293 So. 3d 23, 24 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (“When a scoresheet
error is raised on direct appeal via a rule 3.800(b) motion, courts must
apply the ‘would-have-been-imposed’ test to determine whether a
scoresheet error warrants resentencing.” (quoting Ray v. State, 987 So. 2d
155, 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008))). In pronouncing the sentences, the trial
court placed little reliance on the scoresheet. The trial court noted the
appellant “comes in with a relatively minimal record and no prior offenses
involving sex offenses.” However, the trial court, in explaining the
sentences imposed, focused on two things: (1) the outrageousness of the
appellant’s brutal attack on the victim while she was incapacitated and
unable to fight back; and (2) the outrageousness of the brutal attack and
sexual battery of the victim in the presence of their minor child. We are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court would have
imposed the same sentences regardless of whether the scoresheet was
corrected as the appellant argues on appeal. Thus, we alternatively affirm
the trial court’s rulings regarding the Ohio aggravated robbery conviction
and points assessed for that conviction. See State v. Anderson, 905 So. 2d
111, 118 (Fla. 2005) (stating the would-have-been-imposed test is no
different from the DiGuilio 1 harmless error test).

1 See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986) (defining harmful error

as error about which an appellate court cannot say “beyond a reasonable doubt
… did not contribute to the verdict”).

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    We affirm the trial court’s rulings on the appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2)
motion, as well as the appellant’s sentences, and remand for the trial court
to enter a corrected scoresheet as ordered in the trial court’s partial grant
of the appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion.

   Affirmed and remanded.

GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                            *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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