Court Opinion

ID: 9926824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 18:08:44.074828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:40.306815
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Fluellen v. Miller, 2024-Ohio-265.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Zanteea Fluellen,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                                        No. 23AP-472
v.                                                   :               (C.P.C. No. 23CV-4026)

Mark S. Miller, et al.,                              :           (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

                 Defendants-Appellees.               :

                                               D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on January 25, 2024

                 On brief: Zanteea Fluellen, pro se.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Zanteea Fluellen, appeals, pro se, from the July 11, 2023
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her complaint against
defendants-appellees, Mark S. Miller, Bethel Barker, Ken Barker, and K&B Investments of
Grove City, LLC pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The controversy arose out of the parties’
landlord-tenant relationship. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse, in part, and remand
this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        {¶ 2} On June 6, 2023, Ms. Fluellen initiated a civil action in the lower court
seeking damages and declaratory relief from appellees—identified as the owners,
managers, and/or operators of the townhouse in which Ms. Fluellen resided. (See June 6,
2023 Compl. at ¶ 1-2.) In her complaint, Ms. Fluellen alleged that after she made numerous
complaints about the condition of her premises—namely “frequent plumbing issues”—to
appellees, her monthly rent amount increased multiple times (from $685 to $780, then to
$955) over an unspecified timeframe. (Compl. at ¶ 4-6.) And after receiving notice that
No. 23AP-472                                                                                2

appellees would be increasing her monthly rent amount to $1,350, Ms. Fluellen alleged she
had no choice but to move out. (See Compl. at ¶ 6.) Ms. Fluellen also claimed that after she
moved out, appellees retained her deposit “even though [she] left the premises in the
similar form as when she first occupied the premises.” (Compl. at ¶ 7.)
       {¶ 3} In addition to claiming the rent increases were retaliatory (Compl. at ¶ 6),
Ms. Fluellen alleged in her complaint that Bethel Barker promised that her initial monthly
rent amount ($685) “would be consistent with no drastic increases” (Compl. at ¶ 3). Thus,
she also asserted breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims against appellees
individually and/or under a vicarious liability theory. (See Compl. at ¶ 1, 9.)
       {¶ 4} On June 12, 2023, appellees moved to dismiss Ms. Fluellen’s complaint under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Fluellen
did not file any written response to that motion.
       {¶ 5} The trial court issued an entry granting appellees’ motion to dismiss on
July 11, 2023. Ms. Fluellen timely appealed from that judgment and asserts the following
two assignments of error for our review:

              [I.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
              COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT ENSURING
              THAT [MS. FLUELLEN] HAD RECEIVED APPELLEE[]S[’]
              MOTION TO DISMISS, AND BY NOT GIVING [HER] AN
              OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP HER ARGUMENT VIA
              DISCOVERY.

              [II.] THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
              COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT USING THE
              PROPER STANDARDS FOR RETALIATION, BREACH OF
              CONTRACT, AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS IT APPLIES
              TO LANDLORD/TENANT LAWS.

II. ANALYSIS
       A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review for Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Dismissal
       {¶ 6} A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is a procedural test of a civil complaint’s sufficiency. Cool v.
Frenchko, 10th Dist. No. 21AP-4, 2022-Ohio-3747, ¶ 13, quoting Morrow v. Reminger &
Reminger Co. LPA, 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Dismissal of a
complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate “only if it appears beyond a doubt that
No. 23AP-472                                                                                 3

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling the plaintiff to recovery.” Bullard v.
McDonald’s, 10th Dist. No. 20AP-374, 2021-Ohio-1505, ¶ 11. In determining whether
dismissal is appropriate, the trial court “must presume all factual allegations contained in
the complaint to be true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”
Id. “The court need not, however, accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal
propositions advanced in the complaint.” Id.
       {¶ 7} We review a trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo. State
ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State, 146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 12, citing
Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, ¶ 5. When reviewing
the sufficiency of a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we are mindful that Civ.R. 8(A)
provides for notice pleading, which requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the party is entitled to relief, and * * * a demand for judgment for the relief to
which the party claims to be entitled.”            Accordingly, “[a] judgment granting a
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss may be affirmed only when there is no set of facts under
which the nonmoving party could recover.” Dunlop v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.,
10th Dist. No. 16AP-550, 2017-Ohio-5531, ¶ 10, citing O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants
Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242 (1975), syllabus.

       B. First Assignment of Error
       {¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Ms. Fluellen claims the trial court
prematurely ruled on appellees’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, she contends she should
have been given a “valid opportunity” to respond to appellees’ motion and a chance to prove
her claims through discovery before the trial court issued its judgment. We disagree.
       {¶ 9} Civ.R. 6(C)(1) establishes a 14-day period for a nonmoving party to respond
to all motions except those brought under Civ.R. 56. And, it is well-established that “trial
courts have inherent authority to manage their own dockets and the cases before them.”
(Citations omitted.) Lupo v. Columbus, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-1063, 2014-Ohio-2792, ¶ 20.
As such, the trial court was permitted to rule on appellees’ motion to dismiss at any point
after Ms. Fluellen’s 14-day response period expired on June 26, 2023. After that date
passed, the trial court had no obligation to wait for her response. The trial court issued its
decision on July 11, 2023, in clear accordance with that rule.
No. 23AP-472                                                                                   4

       {¶ 10} Ms. Fluellen also maintains that she did not receive a copy of appellees’
motion because the clerk’s office failed to record the change of address notice she
purportedly mailed to the clerk. (Brief of Appellant at 5.) While not explicitly argued in her
brief, we infer that she intends to contend that such failure deprived her of due process
because she did not receive appellees’ motion to dismiss and thus was prevented from
responding to it. This argument is not well-taken.
       {¶ 11} Although Ms. Fluellen insists she mailed the clerk’s office written notice of
her new address, the record before us does not contain the written notice she allegedly sent.
Our review is limited to the record of the proceedings at trial; thus, we cannot rely on factual
assertions outside the record to review the trial court’s ruling on appellees’ motion to
dismiss. See Freeh v. Hill, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-377, 2014-Ohio-3929, ¶ 19, quoting Colley
v. Colley, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-333, 2009-Ohio-6776, ¶ 12, quoting Morgan v. Eads, 104
Ohio St.3d 142, 2004-Ohio-6110, ¶ 13, citing App.R. 9 and 12(A)(1)(b).
       {¶ 12} In any event, appellees’ counsel—not the clerk’s office—was responsible for
sending a copy of the motion to Ms. Fluellen. See Civ.R. 5(A). The certificate of service
states that a copy of appellees’ motion to dismiss was sent to Ms. Fluellen via regular U.S.
mail at her Sawbury address on June 12, 2023. (See June 12, 2023 Mot. to Dismiss at 5.)
And, we note the address in that certificate of service is identical to the address Ms. Fluellen
provided in the complaint she filed on June 6, 2023. Under Civ.R. 5(B)(2)(c), a document
is properly served when it is “mail[ed] to the person’s last known address by United States
mail, in which event service is complete upon mailing.” Ms. Fluellen does not claim she
notified appellees’ counsel of her new address at any point during the six-day period
between the filing of her complaint and the mailing of appellees’ motion. Thus, we do not
find Ms. Fluellen’s due process argument compelling.
       {¶ 13} Finally, Ms. Fluellen argues it was error for the trial court to rule on appellees’
motion to dismiss before the parties had engaged in discovery. (Brief of Appellant at 5.)
But, she misunderstands the precise function of Civ.R. 12(B)(6). A motion to dismiss under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6), as explained above, is directed solely at the pleadings. See, e.g., Assn. for
Defense of Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger, 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 117 (1989); Hughes
v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-94, 2015-Ohio-5119, ¶ 10-12. “It is
axiomatic that discovery under the Civil Rules is generally outside the scope of the
No. 23AP-472                                                                                                     5

pleadings.” Winkle v. Southdown, Inc., 2d Dist. No. 92-CA-107, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
4295, *13 (Sept. 3, 1993), citing Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 44 Ohio St.3d 124 (1989).
Thus, when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), discovery documents
and evidence not contained in the pleadings are generally irrelevant to the trial court’s
determination of whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 We reject Ms. Fluellen’s contention otherwise.
        {¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, we do not find any reason to conclude the trial court
prematurely ruled on appellees’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Ms. Fluellen’s first
assignment of error is overruled.

        C. Second Assignment of Error
        {¶ 15} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Fluellen contends the trial court erred
in granting appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion and dismissing all claims alleged in her
complaint. Specifically, Ms. Fluellen posits that the trial court failed to use “the proper
standards for retaliation, breach of contract, and promissory estoppel as it applies to
landlord/tenant laws.” (Brief of Appellant at 5.) Her contention is not well-taken as it
relates to the promissory estoppel and breach of contract causes of action. However, we do
find merit in her argument regarding the trial court’s analysis of the retaliation claim.

        1. Breach of Contract Claim
        {¶ 16} To establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must show the existence
of a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and damage or loss to
the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St.3d
453, 2018-Ohio-15, ¶ 41. In support of her breach-of-contract claim, however, Ms. Fluellen
did not allege the existence of a contract; rather, she merely stated that her complaint
“involves breach of contract and/or promissory estoppel.” (Compl. at ¶ 1.) Nor did she

1 The purpose of discovery is not to permit one party to conduct a “fishing expedition” for evidence to support

their claim. See Winkle at *14-15. One exception is the limited discovery allowable under the “action for
discovery” created by R.C. 2317.48. See Poulos at 127. In Poulos, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
discovery sought under R.C. 2317.48 is limited “solely to interrogatories specifically concerning the facts
necessary to the complaint or answer.” Id. The court characterized the action for prefiling discovery as
occupying a “small niche between an unacceptable ‘fishing expedition’ and a short and plain statement of a
complaint or defense filed pursuant to the Civil Rules.” Id. But, in this case, Ms. Fluellen did not seek discovery
under R.C. 2317.48 and fails to show any legal authority to support her contention that she was entitled to full
discovery under the Civil Rules before the trial court could rule on appellees’ Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to
dismiss.
No. 23AP-472                                                                                6

particularly allege what conduct she claims by appellees constituted a breach. As such, we
find that Ms. Fluellen did not allege the necessary elements to sustain a breach of contract
claim in her complaint.
        {¶ 17} Furthermore, Ms. Fluellen did not comply with the procedural requirements
for asserting such claim. Civ.R. 10(D)(1) requires the party asserting a breach of contract
claim to attach a copy of the written instrument(s) at issue to the complaint. True, the rule
also permits a claimant to assert a breach of contract claim without attaching the
controlling agreement if “the reason for the omission” is stated in the pleading.
Civ.R. 10(D)(1). But, Ms. Fluellen failed to do either in this case.
        {¶ 18} Significantly, too, Ms. Fluellen does not support her contention on appeal
that the trial court erred in dismissing her breach of contract claim with a legal argument
supported by citations to legal authority. It remains unclear from both her complaint and
merit brief precisely how she believes appellees’ actions form the basis of a viable breach of
contract claim. Ms. Fluellen asserts she was “lawfully entitled” to the return of her deposit,
but she does not cite to the legal authority on which that assertion is based. (See Brief of
Appellant at 8.) Although she cites to one case for support—“Ruble v. M&L Properties,
Ltd.[,] 2010-Ohio-6353”—that case name does not match the citation she provides. (Brief
of Appellant at 8.) In the absence of any indication of the deciding court, holding, or pin
cite on which Ms. Fluellen intends to rely, we are unable to guess about the case she
intended to cite. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring an appellant to support all assignments of
error with “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each
assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions,
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant
relies”).
        {¶ 19} For all of these reasons, we must affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Ms.
Fluellen’s breach of contract claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

        2. Promissory Estoppel Claim
        {¶ 20} At the outset, we note that Ms. Fluellen does not make any legal arguments
or cite to any legal authority to support her contention on appeal that the trial court erred
in dismissing her promissory estoppel claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), as is required by App.R.
No. 23AP-472                                                                                7

16(A)(7) and 12(A)(2). In any event, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss
that claim.
       {¶ 21} In the absence of a signed written agreement, a party may recover under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel for harm incurred by a fraudulent oral promise or breach
of an oral agreement. See, e.g., Olympic Holding Co., L.L.C. v. ACE Ltd., 122 Ohio St.3d
89, 2009-Ohio-2057, ¶ 39-40. The elements of a claim for promissory estoppel are: (1) a
clear and unambiguous promise; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made;
(3) the reliance must be reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party relying on the
promise must have been injured by the reliance. See Malempati v. Indep. Inpatient
Physicians, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-565, 2013-Ohio-3543, ¶ 25, quoting Holt Co. v. Ohio
Mach. Co., 10th Dist. No. 06AP-911, 2007-Ohio-5557, ¶ 30.
       {¶ 22} In her complaint, Ms. Fluellen alleges Bethel Barker promised that her initial
monthly rent amount of $685 “would be consistent with no drastic increases.” (Compl. at
¶ 3.) Arguably, this promise is ambiguous, as the meaning of “drastic increase” is unclear.
But even if this were clear and unambiguous, Ms. Fluellen does not explicitly state in her
complaint that she relied on that promise, that her reliance was reasonable and foreseeable,
or how she was injured by the reliance. And, while Ms. Fluellen’s reliance could be inferred
based on her decision to continue renting from appellees, we do not find sufficient facts in
her complaint from which Ms. Fluellen’s reasonable and foreseeable reliance or injury by
the reliance can be deduced.
       {¶ 23} For instance, although Ms. Fluellen generally alleged that appellees, Mark S.
Miller, Bethel Barker, Ken Barker, and K&B Investments of Grove City, LLC
“owned/operated/managed” the townhouse she rented (Compl. at ¶ 2), her complaint does
not explain who Bethel Barker is, what authority (if any) he had to make any such promise,
to whom she remitted her monthly rent payments, or who had the authority to increase her
rent amount. Nor does her complaint contain any allegations as to when she began renting
from appellees, when Bethel Barker’s promise was made, when any of the rent increases at
issue occurred, when she moved out, or how she was injured by her reliance on Bethel
Barker’s promise. In the absence of a written contract or any allegation in her complaint as
to the terms of her rental agreement(s)—oral or written—there are simply no facts from
which we could extrapolate all necessary elements of a promissory estoppel claim.
No. 23AP-472                                                                                  8

       {¶ 24} For all of the above reasons, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of that claim.

       3. Claim for Retaliatory Action by Landlord
       {¶ 25} Ms. Fluellen’s primary argument in support of her second assignment of
error is that the trial court erred when it evaluated the retaliation claim brought pursuant
to R.C. 5321.02. For the following reasons, we agree.
       {¶ 26} R.C. 5321.02(A) prohibits a landlord from, among other things, increasing a
tenant’s rent because:

              (1) The tenant has complained to an appropriate governmental
                  agency of a violation of a building, housing, health, or safety
                  code that is applicable to the premises, and the violation
                  materially affects health and safety;

              (2) The tenant has complained to the landlord of any violation
                  of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code;

              (3) The tenant joined with other tenants for the purpose of
                  negotiating or dealing collectively with the landlord on any
                  of the terms and conditions of a rental agreement.

       {¶ 27} Although the trial court acknowledged all three categories of conduct
protected by the statute, it only found that Ms. Fluellen’s complaint failed to allege any facts
that would support a claim for retaliation under R.C. 5321.02(A)(1) (complaint to
government entity) and R.C. 5321.02(A)(3) (collective action with other tenants).
(Compare July 11, 2023 Entry at 3, with Entry at 5.) The trial court made no determination,
however, about whether the allegations set forth in Ms. Fluellen’s complaint would support
a claim for retaliation under R.C. 5321.02(A)(2). (See Entry at 5.) For this reason, we
conclude the trial court erred. And, on review of the complaint, we cannot say this error
was harmless.
       {¶ 28} R.C. 5321.04 sets forth the obligations Ohio law imposes upon landlords.
That statute requires landlords to do all of the following:

              (1) Comply with the requirements of all applicable building,
              housing, health, and safety codes that materially affect health
              and safety;

              (2) Make all repairs and do whatever is reasonably necessary to
              put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition;
No. 23AP-472                                                                    9

           (3) Keep all common areas of the premises in a safe and
           sanitary condition;

           (4) Maintain in good and safe working order and condition all
           electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and air
           conditioning fixtures and appliances, and elevators, supplied
           or required to be supplied by the landlord;

           (5) When the landlord is a party to any rental agreements that
           cover four or more dwelling units in the same structure,
           provide and maintain appropriate receptacles for the removal
           of ashes, garbage, rubbish, and other waste incidental to the
           occupancy of a dwelling unit, and arrange for their removal;

           (6) Supply running water, reasonable amounts of hot water,
           and reasonable heat at all times, except where the building that
           includes the dwelling unit is not required by law to be equipped
           for that purpose, or the dwelling unit is so constructed that heat
           or hot water is generated by an installation within the exclusive
           control of the tenant and supplied by a direct public utility
           connection;

           (7) Not abuse the right of access conferred by division (B) of
           section 5321.05 of the Revised Code;

           (8) Except in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable to
           do so, give the tenant reasonable notice of the landlord’s intent
           to enter and enter only at reasonable times. Twenty-four hours
           is presumed to be a reasonable notice in the absence of
           evidence to the contrary.

           (9) Promptly commence an action under Chapter 1923. of the
           Revised Code, after complying with division (C) of section
           5321.17 of the Revised Code, to remove a tenant from particular
           residential premises, if the tenant fails to vacate the premises
           within three days after the giving of the notice required by that
           division and if the landlord has actual knowledge of or has
           reasonable cause to believe that the tenant, any person in the
           tenant’s household, or any person on the premises with the
           consent of the tenant previously has or presently is engaged in
           a violation as described in division (A)(6)(a)(i) of section
           1923.02 of the Revised Code, whether or not the tenant or other
           person has been charged with, has pleaded guilty to or been
           convicted of, or has been determined to be a delinquent child
           for an act that, if committed by an adult, would be a violation
           as described in that division. Such actual knowledge or
No. 23AP-472                                                                               10

                reasonable cause to believe shall be determined in accordance
                with that division.

                (10) Comply with the rights of tenants under the
                Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 117 Stat. 2835, 50 U.S.C. App.
                501.

R.C. 5321.04(A).

       {¶ 29} In her complaint, Ms. Fluellen alleged that her rent was increased because
she complained to her landlord “about problems at the premises, especially frequent
plumbing issues.” (Compl. at ¶ 2, 4-6.) Her plumbing-related complaints undoubtedly
implicate at least one—if not more—“violation(s) of section 5321.04 of the Revised Code.”
See R.C. 5321.04(A)(2) (requiring a landlord “[m]ake all repairs and do whatever is
reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition”);
R.C. 5321.04(A)(4) (requiring a landlord to “[m]aintain in good and safe working order and
condition all * * * plumbing * * * fixtures and appliances, * * * supplied or required to be
supplied by the landlord”); R.C. 5321.04(A)(6) (requiring a landlord to “[s]upply running
water [and] reasonable amounts of hot water * * * at all times,” unless not required by law).
       {¶ 30} Based on the foregoing, we find that Ms. Fluellen’s complaint quite plainly
contained factual allegations which, if true and not subject to any viable defenses, would
support a claim for retaliation under R.C. 5321.02(A)(2). Because the trial court did not
consider the sufficiency of Ms. Fluellen’s retaliation claim under R.C. 5321.02(A)(2), we
thus conclude the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Fluellen’s complaint failed to state a
claim for retaliation under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and dismissing the entire action.
       {¶ 31} We note that Ms. Fluellen does not challenge on appeal the propriety of the
trial court’s rulings on her request for declaratory relief and punitive damages. (See Entry
at 5.) Because the trial court did not address the viability of these remedies in the context
of analyzing the sufficiency of Ms. Fluellen’s claim for retaliation under R.C. 5321.02(A)(2),
we decline to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, we must remand this matter to the
trial court for further review and proceedings consistent with this decision. Should the trial
court determine on remand that Ms. Fluellen’s complaint contains sufficient allegations to
support her retaliation claim, then the availability of such remedies must be reconsidered
and resolved.
No. 23AP-472                                                                             11

       {¶ 32} For these reasons, we sustain, in part, and overrule, in part, Ms. Fluellen’s
second assignment of error.

III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 33} Having overruled Ms. Fluellen’s first assignment of error but sustained, in
part, her second assignment of error, we reverse the July 11, 2023 judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
                                                                  Judgment reversed;
                                                      cause remanded with instructions.

                      BEATTY BLUNT and JAMISON, JJ., concur.