Court Opinion

ID: 9901896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:00:51.854569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.231246
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                       FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       NOV 22 2023

                                FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                  MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

YESENIA ELIZABETH FLORES-MEJIA,                   No. 22-765
                  Petitioner,                     Agency No. A 206-709-775
    v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                      MEMORANDUM*
General,
                  Respondent.

                       On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                           Board of Immigration Appeals
                                 Submitted May 19, 2023**
                                    Phoenix, Arizona

Before: NGUYEN, COLLINS, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

         Yesenia Elizabeth Flores-Mejia petitions for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals upholding an order of an Immigration Judge

denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s legal conclusions

de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. See Davila v. Barr, 968

*
  This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
   The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the latter standard, the “administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the

petition for review.

      1. Assuming arguendo that the threats that Flores-Mejia received in

Honduras, which were unaccompanied by any actual violence against her, rise to

the level of persecution, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the

agency’s alternative determination that Flores-Mejia failed to show that the

Honduran government is unable or unwilling to protect her. See Velasquez-Gaspar

v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that claims for asylum and

withholding of removal both require a showing that the country of origin is either

unable or unwilling to protect the petitioner from the alleged persecution).

      In contending that she met her burden of proof on this issue, Flores-Mejia’s

brief in this court points to her testimony concerning a confrontation that she

witnessed, while she was at a fair, between her alleged persecutor (“Daniel”) and a

local Honduran police officer. Flores-Mejia testified that, after Daniel went around

a street closure sign at the fair, a police officer stopped him and Daniel then

“started insulting the officer.” According to Flores-Mejia, the officer ultimately

“just put his head down and left.” The agency rejected this argument, concluding

that Flores-Mejia’s contention that the officer simply capitulated to gang

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intimidation was “based on conjecture.” Substantial evidence supports the

agency’s conclusion. Flores-Mejia acknowledged that she was somewhat far from

where the confrontation took place, although she stated that she could hear “when

they were screaming, when [Daniel] was insulting him.” The agency permissibly

construed this testimony as failing to establish that Flores-Mejia had heard what

the officer said to Daniel, and it therefore properly concluded that the record did

not exclude the “myriad” of other possible reasons why the officer walked away.

      Flores-Mejia also points to evidence that gang members threatened other

people in the community, but that evidence of gang activity likewise does not

compel the conclusion that the police were unwilling or unable to protect her.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). The agency also considered the evidence of country

conditions in Honduras and permissibly concluded that this evidence showed that

the Honduran government had taken some steps to combat gang violence as well as

violence against women. On this record, substantial evidence supports the

agency’s determination that Flores-Mejia had not carried her burden to establish

her eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.

      2. To obtain relief under the Convention Against Torture, a petitioner must

show that she will be tortured “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or

acquiescence of a public official.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Assuming arguendo

that Flores-Mejia has identified a harm that could constitute torture, we conclude

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that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Flores-Mejia failed

to show that any such torture would be conducted by, or with the acquiescence of,

the Honduran government. As discussed above, the agency permissibly concluded

that Flores-Mejia had not established that the Honduran government was unable or

unwilling to protect her from her alleged persecutor or from gang violence

generally. See B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 845 (9th Cir. 2022). Accordingly,

the agency’s conclusion that she would not be tortured by, or with the

acquiescence of, the Honduran government is supported by substantial evidence.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

      PETITION DENIED.

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