Court Opinion

ID: 9525084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:59:48.419716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:52.360754
License: Public Domain

J. M. Graves, Jr., J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in the result and with the reasoning of the majority as to all issues adjudicated other than the issue of the admissibility of the blood type evidence. As to this latter issue, I respectfully dissent. The holdings in People v Horton, 99 Mich App 40, 50-51; 297 NW2d 857 (1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds 410 Mich 865 (1980), and People v Camon, 110 Mich App 474, 480; 313 NW2d 322 (1981), are accurate and preferable statements of the law as to the admissibility of blood type evidence. The potential "unfair prejudice” of admitting such evidence is so minuscule that any probative value the evidence might have would almost invariably outweigh the minute prejudice which might result. Thus, such evidence is generally admissible pursuant to MRE 401 and would seldom, if ever, be barred because of the "unfair prejudice” provision of MRE 403. Finally, MRE 403 provides that the trial judge "may” exclude evidence if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, the decision of the trial judge to admit or exclude relevant evidence is discretionary. The exercise of the court’s discretion in admitting evi*221dence should not be overturned unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. People v O’Brien, 113 Mich App 183, 203; 317 NW2d 570 (1982); People v Strickland, 78 Mich App 40, 54; 259 NW2d 232 (1977). "Abuse of discretion” has been defined in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), and, in criminal cases, in People v Charles O Williams, 386 Mich 565, 573; 194 NW2d 337 (1972). Regardless of which test is employed, there is nothing on the record to suggest that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the blood type evidence.