Court Opinion

ID: 9386954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 06:00:20.563224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:09.818117
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DANIEL P. DAVIS,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        PH-0752-17-0388-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: April 13, 2023
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Joseph J. Chester, Esquire, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Thao T. Pham, St. Louis, Missouri, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                          2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order regarding the collateral estoppel analysis, we AFFIRM the initial
     decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was the Postmaster of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.            Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 74. On September 15, 2015, he was arrested and
     charged with the following crimes under Pennsylvania law: (1) intimidation of
     witnesses or victims (four counts); (2) criminal coercion (four counts);
     (3) official oppression (four counts); and (4) obstructing the administration of law
     or other government function (one count). IAF, Tab 5 at 142-51. The charges
     alleged that the appellant threatened and/or intimidated subordinate employees
     who had observed him opening Express Mail packages in violati on of Federal law
     and agency regulations, and/or directed them not to report his actions and not to
     cooperate with law enforcement investigations of his actions. Id. at 137-38.
                                                                                            3

¶3           Effective November 27, 2015, the agency indefinitely suspended the
     appellant pending disposition of the charges. 3 IAF, Tab 5 at 122-26. Following a
     jury trial, on January 13, 2017, the appellant was convicted of three counts of
     witness intimidation, and one count of each of the other charges. Id. at 108-09.
     The appellant appealed his conviction. Id. at 64.
¶4           On March 23, 2017, the agency issued a notice proposing to remove the
     appellant for improper conduct. IAF, Tab 5 at 62-72. The charge was supported
     by five specifications, which alleged, respectively, as follows: (1) the appellant
     was found guilty of several criminal offenses; (2) the appellant opened multiple
     Express Mail packages without authorization at post offices in the Pittsburgh
     area; (3) the appellant consumed alcohol and gambled at a local ca sino on
     multiple occasions during duty hours; (4) the appellant borrowed thousands of
     dollars from a subordinate; and (5) the appellant recorded a meeting without the
     consent of the other participants. Id. at 62-66.
¶5           After the appellant responded to the proposal, IAF, Tab 5 at 53-60, the
     deciding official sustained the first four specifications and the charge, and found
     that removal was appropriate. Id. at 32-38. The agency removed the appellant
     effective June 23, 2017. Id. at 36.
¶6           The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging his removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     He raised affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error, laches, violations of
     law, and disparate treatment discrimination based on his ethnicity.            Id. at 5;
     Tab 32 at 3, 6. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial
     decision that affirmed the appellant’s removal.        IAF, Tab 37, Initial Decision
     (ID).    The administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge by
     preponderant evidence, ID at 2-10, that there is a nexus between the charge and
     the efficiency of the service, ID at 16-17, and that the penalty of removal is

     3
       The appellant filed a separate appeal challenging his indefinite su spension. See Davis
     v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-16-0127-I-1, Initial Appeal File,
     Tab 5 at 50.
                                                                                               4

     reasonable. ID at 15-17. The administrative judge also found that the appellant
     failed to prove any of his affirmative defenses. 4 ID at 10-15.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1.    The agency has filed a response in opposition to the petition.
     PFR File, Tab 3.

                                            ANALYSIS
     The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge by
     preponderant evidence.
            Specification 1: Criminal Conduct
¶8         In sustaining this specification, the administrative judge applied the Board’s
     standards for collateral estoppel 5 to find that the appellant was precluded from
     arguing that he did not engage in the criminal conduct described in this
     specification, i.e., the conduct underlying his state court conviction . ID at 3. The
     appellant challenges this finding on review, arguing that the administrative judge
     could not rely on his conviction to sustain this specification because the
     conviction was not final, as he had appealed it to the Superior Court of
     Pennsylvania. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.
¶9         For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the administrative judge
     that the appellant’s conviction is sufficient proof of this specification. We find,
     however, that the administrative judge mistakenly relied on the Board’s standards
     for collateral estoppel in sustaining this specification. IAF, Tab 32 at 2; ID at 3.

     4
       The appellant does not offer any specific argument on review challenging the
     administrative judge’s findings regarding his claims of violations of law, laches, and
     harmful procedural error. Therefore, we do not address these findings further.
     5
       Under these standards, a party is barred from re-litigating an issue that was previously
     litigated if: (1) the issue is identical to that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue
     was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) the determination on the issue in the prior
     action was necessary to the resulting judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue
     preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
     action, either as a party to the earlier action or one whose interests were otherwise fully
     represented in that action. McNeil v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 146, ¶ 15
     (2005).
                                                                                         5

      When, as here, an appellant is found guilty of a crime under state law, the Board
      will apply that state’s collateral estoppel standards to determine the preclusive
      effect of the conviction.   See Graybill v. U.S. Postal Service, 782 F.2d 1567,
      1571-73 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (applying Maryland state law on collateral estoppel in
      determining the preclusive effect of the appellant’s conviction in Maryland state
      court); Mosby v. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 114 M.S.P.R.
      674, ¶¶ 5-6 (2010) (applying District of Columbia collateral estoppel standards).
      Accordingly, the administrative judge should have applied Pennsylvania law to
      determine whether collateral estoppel applies.
¶10         Under Pennsylvania law, the application of collateral estoppel to issues
      raised in a prior criminal proceeding is appropriate if: (1) the issue decided in the
      prior adjudication was identical to the one presented in the later action ; (2) there
      was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel
      is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudicatio n; and
      (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to
      litigate the issue in question in a prior action. Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872,
      874 (Pa. 1996).
¶11         The first, third, and fourth criteria for applying collateral estoppel under
      Pennsylvania law are essentially the same as the Board’s collateral estoppel
      standards, and we agree with the administrative judge that these standards are
      satisfied here. ID at 3. The issue in the criminal proceeding, i.e., whether the
      appellant committed the misconduct described in specification one, is identical to
      the issue presented in this appeal; the appellant was a party to the criminal
      proceeding; and the appellant was represented by counsel in that proceeding and
      thus had a full and fair opportunity to present his case.
¶12         We further find that the remaining criterion for applying collateral estoppel
      in this appeal—a final judgment on the merits in the prior criminal proceeding—
      also has been satisfied. Under Pennsylvania law, a judgment is deemed final for
      purposes of collateral estoppel unless or until it is reversed on appeal. Shaffer,
                                                                                          6

      673 A.2d. at 874-75. Thus, contrary to the appellant’s contention, the fact that he
      appealed his conviction does not preclude the application of collateral estoppel.
      Because Pennsylvania’s collateral estoppel standards have been met in this case,
      we agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant is precluded
      from re-litigating the issue of whether he committed the misconduct described in
      this specification and that, therefore, the agency proved this specification.    ID
      at 3.

              Specification 2: Opening Express Mail Packages
¶13           As previously noted, the second specification of the charge alleged that the
      appellant opened Express Mail packages in various post offices throughout the
      Pittsburgh area without authorization.     IAF, Tab 5 at 64.     In addressing this
      specification, the administrative judge noted that the appellant admitted that he
      opened Express Mail packages but contended that, as Postmaster of Pittsburgh, he
      was authorized to do so to interdict contraband in the mail system. ID at 7. The
      administrative judge further noted that, in support of this claim, the appellant
      testified that, in 2012, a postal inspector (PI) opened a drug package in front of
      the appellant, who was then the Postmaster of Toledo, Ohio, and directly
      authorized and trained the appellant to open packages containing drugs. Id.
¶14           During his testimony, as summarized in the initial decision, the PI refuted
      the appellant’s claims that he had opened a drug package in front of the appellant
      and had trained and authorized him to open packages. Id. The PI further testified
      that he never trained or authorized anyone else to open packages, as no one has
      authority to open packages absent a warrant or exigent circumstances. I D at 7-8.
¶15           The administrative judge recognized that there was conflicting testimony
      between the appellant and the PI regarding the central issue of whether the
      appellant was authorized to open Express Mail packages. ID at 8. Applying the
      factors for resolving credibility issues set forth in Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), the administrative judge credited the PI’s
      testimony over the appellant’s conflicting testimony.      Id.   The administrative
                                                                                          7

      judge found that the PI testified in a straightforward and forthright manner, that
      his testimony on the issue of the circumstances in which mail can be opened was
      consistent with that of an agent from the agency’s Office of Inspector General,
      and that the PI had no motive to fabricate his testimony as it appears that he has
      nothing to gain from the appellant’s removal and there is no evidence that he
      harbors any animus for the appellant. Id.
¶16         By contrast, the administrative judge found the appellant’s version of events
      inherently implausible. ID at 9. In particular, the administrative judge found
      that, even if the appellant had been involved in drug interdiction operations
      during his tenure as Toledo Postmaster, he did not adequately explain why he
      contended he could continue in that capacity as Pittsburgh Postmaster, given that
      he was not working in drug interdiction in that position. Id. The administrative
      judge found it unfathomable that the appellant would take it upon himself to open
      mail without express permission from the Pittsburgh branch of the age ncy’s
      Postal Inspection Service or his supervisors in Pittsburgh. Id.
¶17         The appellant argues on review that, in sustaining this specification, the
      administrative judge did not give proper weight to the PI’s testimony that the
      appellant was trained to open packages, or to his testimony that corroborated the
      appellant’s testimony regarding training, authorization, and “myriad instances of
      past practice.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 8.
¶18         We do not agree with the appellant’s characterization of the PI’s testimony.
      As explained above, the PI testified that he did not train or authorize the appellant
      to open Express Mail packages, and the administrative judge credited the PI’s
      testimony. ID at 7-8. To the extent that the appellant claims on review that the
      PI trained and authorized him to open Express Mail packages, this argument is
      essentially mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained findings
      and credibility determinations and, as such, provides no basis to disturb the initial
      decision.   See Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
                                                                                          8

      judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences,     and   made   reasoned   conclusions   on   issues   of   credibility).
      Accordingly, we find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings that
      the agency proved specification 2 of the charge.

            Specification 3: Gambling and Drinking on Duty
            Specification 4: Borrowing Money from a Subordinate
¶19        It is undisputed that the appellant engaged in the misconduct described in
      specifications 3 and 4. Therefore, we find that the administrative judge properly
      sustained these specifications and the charge. ID at 9-10.

      The appellant failed to prove his affirmative defense of disparate treatment
      discrimination based on his ethnicity.
¶20        The appellant also reiterates his affirmative defense of discrim ination based
      on ethnicity.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.    For the reasons explained in the initial
      decision, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to prove
      this defense.     Because we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to show that any prohibited consideration was a motivating factor
      in the agency’s action, we need not resolve the issue of whether the appellant
      proved that discrimination or retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the agency’s
      decisions. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 20-22, 29-33.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved nexus.
¶21        On review, the appellant reasserts his argument below that the agency could
      not establish a nexus between the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of t he
      service because his administrative duties were “non-public” and there was no
      “competently proven media disclosure.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 8; IAF, Tab 35 at 6.
      The administrative judge properly rejected this argument in the initial decision ,
      finding that it strains credulity to argue that the appellant could reasonably
      perform the duties of his Postmaster position and advance the agency mission
      after having been found guilty of criminal coercion, intimidating witnesses, and
                                                                                            9

      official oppression against postal employees. ID at 16. The administrative judge
      also correctly found that the sustained charge of opening mail without proper
      authorization goes squarely to the agency’s mission, as does borrowing money
      from a subordinate employee. Id. We discern no reason to disturb this finding.

      The administrative judge correctly found that removal is a reasonable penalty.
¶22         The appellant also challenges the penalty in his petition for review. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 8-9. He argues that the agency erred by failing to apply progressive
      discipline and that the deciding official disregarded several Douglas factors in
      deciding to remove him. 6 Id. at 8. He further contends that the administrative
      judge failed to properly apply the Douglas factors in finding that removal was a
      reasonable penalty. Id. at 8-9.
¶23         When, as here, the agency’s charge is sustained, the Board will review the
      agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered all the
      relevant factors and exercised management discretion within tolerable limits of
      reasonableness. Wiley v. U.S. Postal Service, 102 M.S.P.R. 535, ¶ 14 (2006),
      aff’d per curiam, 218 F. App’x 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).                 In making this
      determination, the Board must give due weight to the agency’s primary discretion
      in maintaining employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the Board’s
      function is not to displace management’s responsibility, but to ensure that
      managerial judgment has been properly exercised.         Miles v. Department of the
      Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 316, ¶ 12 (2006). The Board will modify a penalty only
      when it finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that it clearly
      exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in determining the penalty. Adam v. U.S.

      6
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
      articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the
      appropriate penalty for an act of misconduct. These so -called Douglas factors include
      the nature and seriousness of the offense and its relation to the employee’s duties; the
      employee’s past disciplinary record; the employee’s past work record, including length
      of service and performance on the job; and the effect of the offense upon supervisors’
      confidence in the employee’s ability to perform his assigned duties. Id.
                                                                                       10

      Postal Service, 96 M.S.P.R. 492, ¶ 5 (2004), aff’d, 137 F. App’x 352 (Fed. Cir.
      2005).
¶24            The decision letter and the deciding official’s hearing testimony, as
      summarized in the initial decision, demonstrate that he considered the relevant
      Douglas factors in making his penalty determination, including the nature and
      seriousness of the offense and the appellant’s job level. IAF, Tab 5 at 34-36; ID
      at 15-17. The deciding official found that the appellant’s misconduct was serious
      and that, as an executive, the appellant was held to a higher standard. IAF, Tab 5
      at 34.     The deciding official also considered the notoriety of the appellant’s
      misconduct, noting that his conviction was publicized on multiple news outlets
      throughout the region. Id. at 35. The deciding official considered the appellant’s
      lengthy service, the absence of prior discipline, his military record, and his past
      acceptable performance as mitigating factors, but found that they were
      insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of his misconduct. IAF, Tab 5 at 34-36.
¶25            In assessing the reasonableness of the penalty, the administrative judge
      found that the deciding official considered all relevant factors in determining that
      removal was an appropriate penalty. ID at 17. Recognizing that the Board must
      accord proper deference to the agency’s primary discretion in managing its
      workforce, we see no reason to disturb this finding.     See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R.
      at 306. We also agree with the administrative judge that the agency’s decision to
      forego the use of progressive discipline in this case is appropriate due to the
      egregiousness of the appellant’s misconduct. ID at 17. Thus, we find that the
      administrative judge properly sustained the appellant’s removal.
                                                                                     11

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the ap propriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

7
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       12

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim    of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
                                                                                13

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     14

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.