Court Opinion

ID: 9732362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:18:00.659106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:26.528157
License: Public Domain

Danhof, J.,
(dissenting). The opinion of the majority is predicated upon the assumption that there was in fact a search in this particular case. It is with this assumption rather than the opinion that I disagree.
The trial judge said when he denied the motion for a new trial:
“Although there was some conflict, partly as a result of defendant’s brother changing some of his previous statement to the police, the great weight of the evidence indicated that there was no unlawful search or seizure in this case.
“Unlike the cases cited by defendant’s counsel, when the police here went to defendant’s apartment to talk to defendant, defendant’s teen-age brother opened the door, invited them into the apartment, and in answer to their questions about defendant, got the exhibits and gave them to the police, took a receipt for them.
“It is the opinion of this court both at the trial and now that the evidence which is on the record in this case, shows no search and seizure of defendant’s premises in his absence, but a voluntary offer of the shells to the police by defendant’s brother, who was in sole charge of the apartment and the premises at the time and apparently was trying to cooperate in establishing the innocence of the defendant of this offense or of any offense. (Emphasis supplied.)
“That the shells were later found to be material, circumstantial evidence in the case, did not make their original acquisition illegal or require that they be suppressed, in the opinion of this court, even if a timely motion to that effect had been presented in advance of trial.”
*377The record discloses a conflict in testimony between the police officers and defendant’s brother, Willie Cassell. And, since Willie Cassell repeatedly admitted on the witness stand that he had lied to the police in earlier statements it was for the trial judge to determine the question of credibility, and he made this determination in favor of the police officers. I cannot say that upon this record that such determination was clearly erroneous.
This Court follows the “plain view” rule that where an officer sees the evidence in open or plain view without the necessity of a search, the evidence is admissible as no search has occurred, People v. Kuntze (1963), 371 Mich 419; People v. McDonald (1968), 13 Mich App 226.
The case of Davis v. United States (CA9, 1964), 327 F2d 301, is factually similar to the instant case. Davis’ eight-year-old daughter admitted two customs agents and two policemen to his home. One of the agents observed a wastebasket in plain view containing what the agent recognized as marihuana. The court said, pp 304, 305:
“It is obvious from its denial of defendant’s motion to suppress that the trier of the fact credited the testimony of the officers that they had gone to defendant’s home solely for the purpose of talking to him — and not for the purpose or intent of entering and searching the premises or arresting him, without a warrant. Likewise, it is certain that he believed the officers’ testimony as to the manner of entry into the house and that the intent of the officers at the instant of entry was still but to attempt to talk to the defendant. * * *
“This case is distinguished from all of the cases referred to by appellant, by the entirely peaceful and invited entry into the home, with no search or intent to search in the minds of the officers upon entry. However, once legally inside the room, the *378officers were not required to remain blind to tbe obvious. Tbe fact that a wastebasket containing marihuana was in their plain sight within five feet of the door at the time that they entered and that another wastebasket containing marihuana was in plain sight in the bathroom at that time was uncontradicted by the defendant when he testified on the motion to suppress. ‘It is well established that it is not a search to observe what is open and patent either in daylight or in artificial light.’ (Citations omitted.) As was said by Judge Holtzoff, (citations omitted) ‘if, without a search and without an unlawful entry into the premises, a contraband article * * * is seen in the premises, the police are not required to close their eyes and need not walk out and leave the article where they saw it.’ ”
While it is true that the agents and the police officers in the Davis Case, supra, went to defendant’s house in the daytime and not at night, I do not find that this factual difference should be controlling. There is nothing to indicate that the officers conducted themselves in anything other than a lawful manner. To imply, as it is done by the majority, otherwise is unfair.
In State v. Brant (1967), 260 Iowa 758 (150 NW 2d 621) the court held that where the defendant consented to officers entering his hotel room and one officer picked up defendant’s coat and saw a gun sticking out of the inside pocket there was no search and the officer could properly seize that which was readily observable.1
This case might also be considered as one in which if there was a search it was by the defendant’s brother as a private citizen who then handed *379the particular items in question to the police, and thus, there was no search by police officers.* 12
Either way I cannot find upon this record that a search was conducted by the police officers so as to preclude the introduction into evidence of the spent shell or the unused shells. I would affirm.

 See also article entitled “Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure” in Wash U L Quarterly 12, 18-20 (1967).

 People v. Helmus (1966), 50 Misc. 2d 47 (269 NYS2d 613) [defendant’s wife gave his gun to police]; Gutridge v. Maryland (1964), 236 Md 514 (204 A2d 557) [defendant’s wife opened Ms looker and handed narcoties therein to police]; Lucas v. Texas (Tex, 1963), 368 SW2d 605, reh. den. (1963) [defendant’s landlord found plastic masks while cheeking commodes and gave masks to police].