Court Opinion

ID: 9894645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-02 17:03:51.56025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:25.576774
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                 LAURENCE LEE LAWRENCE, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0584
                              FILED 11-02-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2020-116408-001
             The Honorable Scott Sebastian Minder, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Michael O’Toole
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Cory Engle
Counsel for Appellant
                          STATE v. LAWRENCE
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1           Laurence Lee Lawrence appeals from his convictions and
sentences for second-degree burglary, kidnapping, attempt to commit
sexual assault, and sexual assault, arguing the superior court improperly
denied his motion for mistrial. We affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2           We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
defendant’s convictions. State v. Thompson, 252 Ariz. 279, 287 n.3 (2022).

¶3             In August 1991, Amanda1 awoke to a knock at the front door
of her Chandler home. Upon opening the door, Lawrence pushed his way
in, placed Amanda in a chokehold, and held a gun to her head. He took
Amanda upstairs to the main bedroom, where her five-year-old son was
sleeping, tied her hands with video game cords, and sexually assaulted her.
Lawrence then tied up her ankles and rummaged through different rooms
of the house before finding and stealing a small amount of cash. Before he
left the house, he pulled the telephone off the bedroom wall and threatened
to kill Amanda and her family if she called the police.

¶4            After Lawrence left, Amanda untied her ankles and awoke
her son to help her call 911. First responders arrived, untied Amanda’s
hands, and took her to the hospital. A doctor and nurse collected samples
from Amanda for a sexual assault kit, including vaginal swabs and a
vaginal aspirate. The doctor and nurse placed each sample in an envelope
with a timestamp, Amanda’s name, and their signatures. The doctor and
case agent signed the sexual assault examination report. Before leaving the
hospital, the case agent collected as evidence the sexual assault kit,
Amanda’s robe, a towel found in the bedroom, and a tape of Amanda’s 911
call.

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the victim’s identity.   See Ariz. R. Crim. P.
31.10(f).

                                     2
                          STATE v. LAWRENCE
                           Decision of the Court

¶5             That same day, the case agent impounded the evidence at the
Chandler Police Department, storing the sexual assault kit in the
department’s evidence freezer with a property receipt. At the case agent’s
request, the police department’s evidence technician delivered the sexual
assault kit, robe, and towel to the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”)
laboratory to “check for semen” and “for different hairs.”

¶6           In October 1991, the case agent withdrew his testing request
after no suspect was identified. The evidence technician retrieved the
evidence from DPS in January 1992 and returned it to the Chandler Police
Department.

¶7             The evidence remained at the police department until 2014,
when another agent re-opened Amanda’s case. DNA technology had
significantly advanced, and the agent re-submitted the sexual assault kit to
the DPS laboratory. Testing revealed that the DNA on the vaginal swabs
and vaginal aspirate matched Amanda’s DNA profile in the agency’s index
system, and spermatozoa on the swabs and aspirate matched Lawrence’s
DNA profile.

¶8             In August 2020, a grand jury indicted Lawrence for burglary
in the first degree (count 1), aggravated assault (count 2), kidnapping
(counts 3 and 4), attempt to commit sexual assault (count 6), sexual assault
(counts 5, 7, and 8), and aggravated assault (count 9). Lawrence pled not
guilty to all charges.

¶9            Before trial, Lawrence moved to preclude the DNA evidence
from the sexual assault kit and any testimony related to it. Lawrence
argued that the State could not establish a chain of custody as the property
receipts did not indicate who impounded the kit or where it was stored
after DPS returned it to the police in 1992. Lawrence also argued the kit’s
samples were improperly sealed and therefore the State could not show the
samples were in the same condition as when originally collected.

¶10          The State argued the evidence showed a “very clear chain of
custody” as the technician’s name appeared on the receipt for the DPS
testing request, indicating she retrieved the kit from DPS in January 1992
and took it back to the department. The State asserted the paperwork
confirmed the kit was exclusively in the possession of DPS or the Chandler
Police Department since 1991. And, the State argued, Lawrence presented
no evidence that the kit had been tampered with.

¶11          After oral argument, the superior court denied Lawrence’s
motion, finding “no credible evidence exists to suggest that the samples had

                                     3
                           STATE v. LAWRENCE
                            Decision of the Court

been tampered with,” and the “evidence from the Kit’s samples were either
in the possession of the Chandler Police Department or the DPS crime lab
since August of 1991.” The court also noted chain of custody concerns
usually affect only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See State
v. Morales, 170 Ariz. 360, 365 (App. 1991).

¶12            On the fifth day of the 11-day jury trial, Lawrence informed
the court that the State had just disclosed new chain of custody records from
the police department’s evidence technician. He sought to preclude the
“highly prejudicial” records because they refuted his opening statement
claim that the DNA evidence lacked a proper chain of custody. The State’s
counsel agreed not to introduce the new records, but argued sufficient
foundation supported admitting the kit samples.

¶13           On the seventh day of trial, Lawrence orally moved for a
mistrial based on the “cumulative effect of multiple developments during
the trial.” Among other things, Lawrence argued the late-disclosed chain
of custody documents damaged his counsel’s credibility with the jury
because he had asserted in opening statements that such records did not
exist. The court denied Lawrence’s motion, finding that “[a]lthough the
State was obligated to disclose the records, the State had diligently
searched, was unaware of them until the [evidence technician’s] interview,
and was genuinely surprised that the records were available.” The court
acknowledged the parties’ stipulation to preclude the records from use at
trial, and “because the discovery of documents affected Mr. Lawrence’s
defense, the State renewed its prior plea offer to Mr. Lawrence and gave
him a week to consider it.” The court reasoned that a mistrial was
unwarranted as “any prejudice can be cured by other, less dramatic means,
such as preclusion of evidence, jury instructions, and the like, to the extent
doing so is even necessary.”

¶14           At the close of trial, the jury acquitted Lawrence of the
aggravated assault counts but found him guilty of the lesser included
offense of second-degree burglary (count 1), kidnapping (counts 3 and 4),
attempted sexual assault (count 6), and sexual assault (counts 5 and 8). The
jury also found aggravating circumstances for his convictions. The court
sentenced Lawrence to concurrent terms of imprisonment on counts 3, 4, 5,
6 and 8, the longest of which is 18 years’, consecutive to a term of eight
years’ imprisonment on count 1.

¶15           Lawrence timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).

                                       4
                           STATE v. LAWRENCE
                            Decision of the Court

                                DISCUSSION

¶16            Lawrence contends the superior court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial. He argues preclusion was an inadequate remedy
because the late-disclosed chain of custody records went to the heart of his
defense and undermined his credibility with the jury. Lawrence also argues
that Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 15.1 requires the State
disclose all chain of custody documentation before trial. See Ariz. R. Crim.
P. 15.1(b)(3) (“[T]he State must make available to the defendant . . . all
existing original and supplemental reports prepared by a law enforcement
agency in connection with the charged offense.”).

¶17           The State argues precluding the evidence properly remedied
any late disclosure, and even without the new records, the court had found
sufficient chain of custody supported admitting the DNA evidence in its
resolution of pre-trial motions.

¶18            “Mistrial is an extraordinary remedy for trial error ‘and
should be granted only when it appears that justice will be thwarted unless
the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” State v. Payne, 233 Ariz.
484, 504, ¶ 61 (2013) (quoting State v. Speer, 221 Ariz. 449, 462, ¶ 72 (2009)).
The superior court is in the best position to determine the appropriate
remedy for the mid-trial disclosure based on its assessment of the
atmosphere of the trial. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 598 (1993). We will not
disturb the court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial based on evidentiary
concerns absent an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also State v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz.
200, 201, ¶¶ 6–7 (App. 2013).

¶19           Lawrence’s argument for mistrial rests on his contention that
the evidence damaged defense counsel’s credibility with the jury. But the
court addressed this issue in its minute entry, noting the parties’ agreement
to preclude the records from use at trial and the State’s renewed plea offer.
See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.8(d) (stating that reopening a plea offer can avoid
the need for additional sanctions from late disclosure of evidence). The
State complied with the parties’ preclusion agreement—while defense
counsel claimed in his opening statements that the kit “sat somewhere”
from January 1992 to October 2014, and “[t]here is no record of it, no chain
of custody from that time,” the State did not argue otherwise.

¶20           The court also noted that “[a]lthough the State was obligated
to disclose the records, the State had diligently searched, was unaware of
them until the [evidence technician’s] interview, and was genuinely
surprised that the records were available.” The court concluded the records

                                       5
                           STATE v. LAWRENCE
                            Decision of the Court

“supported the State’s position . . . and the State would have benefitted from
their disclosure, not their concealment.”

¶21            Before declaring a mistrial, a superior court “must evaluate
the situation and decide if some remedy short of mistrial will cure the
error.” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 262 (App. 1983). Here, the court
properly exercised its broad discretion in determining the appropriate
remedy for the late disclosure. See State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 304, ¶ 32
(2000) (the superior court “is in the best position to determine whether the
evidence will actually affect the outcome of the trial”). Nothing in the
record suggests that the untimely disclosure required the “most dramatic
remedy” of a mistrial. Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 262. Lawrence has not shown
that justice will be thwarted without the declaration of a mistrial. See Payne,
233 Ariz. at 504, ¶ 61. The court did not abuse its discretion.

                               CONCLUSION

¶22           We affirm Lawrence’s convictions and sentences.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: TM

                                         6