Court Opinion

ID: 9894377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 16:10:37.545992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:28.653184
License: Public Domain

J-S37041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA

                                         :

              v.                         :

                                         :

                                         :

 LAMONT DRAINE, JR.                      :

                                         :

                   Appellant             :   No. 82 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 23, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0007384-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                        FILED NOVEMBER 1, 2023

     Appellant, Lamont Draine, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered on November 23, 2021, following a stipulated bench trial conviction

for firearms not to be carried without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2).

We vacate and remand.

     The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

     Officer Dylan Glenn (“Officer Glenn”) and Officer Charles Waters
     (“Officer Waters”) [] are patrolmen with Chester Township Police
     Department. On November 21, 2019 at 12:46 a.m.[,] the officers
     were on patrol. Both officers were parked at the intersection of
     11th Street and Engel Street. Officer Glenn was in his marked
     police vehicle, which was parked, facing east. Officer Waters was
     in his marked police vehicle, which was parked, facing west. The
     officers were talking to each other.
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     Officer Glenn testified that, during the span of his then two (2)
     year employment as a patrolman in Chester Township, he had
     made approximately fifteen (15) arrests in the general area
     surrounding the intersection of 11th Street and Engel Street. He
     further testified that he was familiar with other officers making
     arrests in this area and believed, based upon his experience, that
     more crimes are committed in this general area than other areas
     within Chester Township. Officer Glenn testified further that more
     calls for police occur during the nighttime hours than the daytime
     hours.

     While the officers were talking to each other, they observed two
     men, later identified as Appellant [] and Mr. Lawrence Cook
     (“Cook”), walking east on 11th Street in the middle of the roadway.
     The two men continued to walk in the middle of the roadway as
     they approached the intersection and did not make any effort to
     walk on the sidewalk or the shoulder of the road, even though
     there was a sidewalk and shoulder available. By walking in the
     middle of the roadway, the two men were in violation of a Motor
     Vehicle Code provision which prohibits pedestrian travel on a
     roadway when a sidewalk is available. See [] 75 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 3544(a) (relating to mandatory use of a sidewalk).

     Officer Glenn and Officer Waters made contact with [Appellant]
     and Cook, as they approached the intersection of 11th Street and
     Townsend Street. The officers identified themselves as [] police
     officers, asked the men for identification, and informed them as
     to why they were detained. The men responded by identifying
     themselves and informing the officers that they did not
     understand the reason for the detention.

     The officers informed them that they were being detained because
     they were walking in the middle of the street when a sidewalk was
     available for use. The men responded by arguing with the officers
     and insisting that there was no sidewalk available for them. The
     officers indicated to the available sidewalk and told them that even
     if there is no sidewalk available, they were still required to travel
     on the shoulder of the road and not in the middle of the road, in
     order to be compliant with the law.

     Officer Waters asked [Appellant] if he had any objects on his
     person that could potentially hurt Officer Waters. [Appellant]
     responded by informing the officers that he had a firearm. The
     [o]fficers then asked [Appellant] for the specific location of the
     firearm and [Appellant] responded that it was in his backpack.

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      The officers then patted down both men and recovered the firearm
      from [Appellant’s] backpack. After recovering the firearm, Officer
      Glenn returned to his vehicle and ran the information [obtained]
      from both men “through multiple databases … to find their correct
      identity [and to check for] warrants … and to locate a valid permit
      to carry [a firearm] for [Appellant].” After checking various
      databases, [Officer Glenn] determined that [Appellant] did not
      have a valid license to carry a concealed weapon.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2022, at *2-4 (unpaginated).

      Procedurally, the case progressed as follows:

      On November 21, 2019, [Appellant] was arrested and charged
      with (1) Count I – violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(2),
      [f]irearms not to be carried without a license; (2) Count II –
      violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3544(a), [m]andatory use of a
      sidewalk. On August 11, 2020, [Appellant] filed an [o]mnibus
      [p]retrial [m]otion for [r]elief, which contained a request for
      suppression of evidence. On September 1, 2020, [the trial c]ourt
      held a hearing relative to [Appellant’s] request for suppression of
      the evidence. On November 12, 2020, [the trial c]ourt entered
      an [o]rder which denied [Appellant’s] request for suppression. On
      September 7, 2021, a stipulated non-jury trial was held after
      which [Appellant] was found guilty of the [firearm] charge[.1] On
      November 23, 2021, [Appellant] was sentenced to 72 hours to
      [six] months of incarceration with [one] year of concurrent
      probation.

Id. at *1-2 (unpaginated). This timely appeal resulted.2

1 At trial, the Commonwealth did not pursue the mandatory use of a sidewalk
charge. See N.T., 9/2/2021, at 8; see also Appellant’s Brief at 7.

2 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on December 17, 2021. On
December 21, 2021, the trial court entered an order directing Appellant to file
a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). Appellant complied on January 10, 2022. The trial court issued an
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 3, 2022. In its opinion,
the trial court initially determined that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement
“set[ting] forth nineteen (19) allegations of error” was “hardly concise and
[was] replete with redundancy.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/2022, at *5

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      On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

      Whether [Appellant] was lawfully stopped by the police officers?

      Whether the officer’s conduct, subsequent to the stop, in
      questioning [Appellant] and seizing the firearm inside his
      backpack, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in
      violation of his constitutional rights?

      Whether [] the firearm and Appellant’s statements should have
      been suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree where the police
      illegally prolonged a routine traffic stop without reasonable
      suspicion to conduct an[] unrelated investigation into whether
      Appellant was legally allowed to carry a firearm?

      Whether [] the tr[ia]l court erred in finding [Appellant] guilty of
      carrying a firearm without a license, when the Commonwealth []
      dismissed the underlying traffic [] violation, [] 75 [Pa.C.S.A.
      § 3544(a),] mandatory use of an available sidewalk, prior to trial
      and finding any requisite probable cause for [a] stop and search[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers

omitted).

(unpaginated). The trial court consolidated Appellant’s allegations into two
issues:

      1. Whether [Appellant] was lawfully stopped by police officers[?]

      2. Whether the officers’ conduct, subsequent to the stop, in
         questioning [Appellant] and seizing the firearm inside his
         backpack, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in
         violation of his constitutional rights[?]

Id. at *6 (unpaginated). The Commonwealth argues that Appellant waived
his issues because his concise statement failed to comply with Rule 1925(b).
See Commonwealth’s Brief at 6 n.1. We disagree with this argument since
the trial court distilled Appellant’s issues into distinct claims, showing that
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) concise statement did not obscure the arguments
Appellant wished to raise on appeal.

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     Our Supreme Court previously determined the standard of review

governing an order denying a motion to suppress:

     Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
     a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
     suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record
     and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
     correct.   Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
     suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
     Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
     remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
     a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are
     supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may
     reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where
     [ ] the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns
     on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
     conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it
     is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
     to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial] court []
     below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

     Regarding police searches and seizures, this Court has opined:

     The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
     Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the
     right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
     and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures. To
     secure the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable search
     and seizure, courts in Pennsylvania require law enforcement
     officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to justify
     their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions
     compromise individual liberty. Because interactions between law
     enforcement and the general citizenry are widely varied, search
     and seizure law looks at how the interaction is classified and if a
     detention has occurred.

     The law recognizes three distinct levels of interaction between
     police officers and citizens: (1) a mere encounter; (2) an

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      investigative detention, often described as a Terry stop, see
      Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (3) a custodial detention.

      A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
      between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
      by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
      it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond and therefore
      need not be justified by any level of police suspicion.

      In contrast, an investigative detention carries an official
      compulsion to stop and respond. Since this interaction has
      elements of official compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of
      unlawful activity.[3]

      Finally, a custodial detention occurs when the nature, duration and
      conditions of an investigative detention become so coercive as to
      be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.
      This level of interaction requires that the police have probable
      cause to believe that the person so detained has committed or is
      committing a crime.

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 289 A.3d 1078, 1086–1087 (Pa. Super.

2023) (some internal citations omitted).

3   Our Supreme Court has held:

      A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
      investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the individual
      is engaging in criminal conduct. This standard, less stringent than
      probable cause, is commonly known as reasonable suspicion. In
      order to determine whether the police officer had reasonable
      suspicion, the totality of the circumstances must be considered.
      In making this determination, we must give due weight to the
      specific reasonable inferences the police officer is entitled to draw
      from the facts in light of his experience. Also, the totality of the
      circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of
      only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather,
      even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may
      warrant further investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004) (internal
citations, quotations, ellipses omitted).

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      This Court has recognized that “routine constitutional analysis requires

courts to utilize facts gathered during each escalating phase of a police

investigation in determining whether police acted properly as the interaction

between police and citizen proceeded towards an arrest.” Commonwealth

v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1258–1259 (Pa. Super. 2008). “[W]e have said

repeatedly that [courts] must look at the totality of the circumstances of each

case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective

basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. at 1258, citing United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).       “A totality-of-the-circumstances approach

allows the court to consider all facts at the officer's disposal and does not

require the court to disregard those adduced during a valid interdiction[.]” Id.

      With a recitation of the foregoing legal precepts, we now apply those

principles to the facts of this case, as established at the suppression hearing,

and by looking at each individual phase of the police investigation to determine

whether police conduct conformed to law as the interaction proceeded towards

conclusion. Here, Officers Glenn and Waters initially stopped Appellant for

walking in a roadway when there was an available sidewalk. Section 3544 of

the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part:

      (a) Mandatory use of available sidewalk.--Where a sidewalk
      is provided and its use is practicable, it is unlawful for any
      pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway.

      (b) Absence of sidewalk.--Where a sidewalk is not available,
      any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall walk only
      on a shoulder as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway.

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      (c) Absence of sidewalk and shoulder.--Where neither a
      sidewalk nor a shoulder is available, any pedestrian walking along
      and upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an outside
      edge of the roadway and, if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only
      on the left side of the roadway.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3544(a)-(c).

      “[T]his Court [has] held that a police officer must have probable cause

to support a [] stop where the officer's investigation subsequent to the stop

serves no investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected Vehicle Code

violation.”   Commonwealth v. Venable, 200 A.3d 490, 498 (Pa. Super.

2018)   (internal   citation,   quotations   and   original   brackets   omitted).

Furthermore, we recently observed:

      Any technical traffic violation (supported by probable cause)
      legitimizes a stop, even if it is merely a pretext for some other
      investigation. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
      (1996). “During a traffic stop, the officer may ask the detainee a
      moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try
      to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's
      suspicions.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1020
      (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
      “[I]f there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation ... additional
      suspicion may arise before the initial stop's purpose has been
      fulfilled, then, detention may be permissible to investigate the
      new suspicions.” Id. (citation omitted). This further detention
      must be supported by reasonable suspicion[.]

Commonwealth v. Burger, 2023 WL 4348334, at *5 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(unpublished memorandum).4

4   See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

                                       -8-
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      Officer Glenn testified that, while sitting in his marked police car, he saw

Appellant walking with Cook “[i]n the middle of the roadway” on 11th Street

in Chester Township despite the availability of a sidewalk. N.T., 9/1/2020, at

18-19. Officer Glenn believed Appellant to be in violation of Section 3544.

Id. at 20 (Officer Dylan Glenn testified that he stopped Appellant for “the

violation of walking in the street when a sidewalk is provided.”). Officer Glenn

agreed that Appellant was walking in a normal manner and that he did not

observe or suspect any criminal activity (aside from walking in the street).

Id. at 32-34, 37.    Officer Glenn “turn[ed] some bright lights on, li[t] up the

area, [and] called [the two men] over. Id. at 24. Appellant asked why he

was being stopped.     Id. at 40.   Officer Glenn asked for identification and

explained the reason for the stop. Id. at 20. More specifically, Officer Glenn

replied, “You’re walking in the middle of the street.” Id. According to Officer

Glenn, in response, Appellant and Cook “tried to argue that there was not a

sidewalk available for them.”    Id.   Officer Glenn showed the two men the

sidewalk that was available to them and further “advised them at that point

that if there’s no sidewalk available, they need to walk on the shoulder of the

roadway.” Id. Officer Waters testified similarly about the initial stop. Id. at

60-67.

      Based upon our review, we conclude that the officer’s observations

established probable cause to believe that Appellant was not in compliance

with the Vehicle Code, thereby justifying initiation of the stop. As such, the

trial court correctly determined that, under Section 3544, the officers had

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probable cause to stop Appellant for walking in the middle of street when a

sidewalk was available for pedestrian travel.        See Trial Court Opinion,

2/3/2022, at *9-10 (unpaginated).

      The officers then proceeded to conduct a protective frisk of Appellant to

determine if he were armed and dangerous. Police are permitted to conduct

“a limited search for weapons where an officer is justified in believing that the

individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is

armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.” Commonwealth

v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 933 (Pa. 2019), citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968).

      [A] “stop and frisk” [i]s constitutionally permissible if two
      conditions are met. First, the investigatory stop must be lawful.
      That requirement is met in an on-the-street encounter, Terry
      determined, when the police officer reasonably suspects that the
      person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal
      offense. Second, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police
      officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed
      and dangerous.

Hicks, 208 A.3d at 933, citing Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-327

(2009) (emphasis omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Clinton, 905 A.2d

1026, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2006) (officer's inquiry regarding presence of weapons

during lawful traffic stop reasonably furthered interest in officer safety and

constituted tolerable, minimal intrusion), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 71 (Pa.

2007).    A suspect may also voluntarily consent to a police search.        See

Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).

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         In this case, before patting Appellant down for officer safety, Officer

Glenn’s partner, Officer Waters, asked Appellant if he “had anything that was

going to hurt” the officers. Id. at 22. Appellant volunteered that he had a

firearm in his backpack. Id.      Without incident, “Officer Waters removed the

backpack off of [Appellant’s] shoulders and retrieved a firearm that was in a

brown holster.” Id. at 23.     The firearm was then secured in a police vehicle.

Id. at 24.     When asked again about the purpose of his subsequent database

investigation, Officer Glenn responded it was “[t]o identify the subjects, make

sure no one had any wants or warrants, and then confirm a possible concealed

carry permit for [Appellant].”     Id. at 26.   Officer Glenn “returned to [his]

vehicle and started running both subjects through multiple databases just to

find their correct identities, wants, or warrants, and then [] once all that was

finished, [he] tried to locate a valid permit to carry [a firearm] for [Appellant]”

but to no avail. Id. Officer Glenn further testified that if Appellant had a valid

firearm license and did not have any warrants, “[t]he firearm would have been

returned safely to [Appellant], and they probably would have been sent on

their way, possibly got a citation in the mail” for “walking in the street.” Id.

at 27.

         Here, the trial court determined:

         The interaction occurred at 12:46 a.m. in an area known generally
         by the officers to be in an area of higher crime than other areas
         within the municipality. [Appellant] and Cook were arguing with
         the officers and [Appellant] was known to be in possession of a
         gun. An examination based upon the totality of the circumstances
         warrants the conclusion that the officers reasonably suspected
         [Appellant] to be armed and dangerous.

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        The actions of the officers in securing the weapon and conducting
        a frisk for weapons were appropriately based upon that reasonable
        suspicion. Based upon the foregoing, [the trial court] denied
        [Appellant’s] request for suppression.

Id. at *14 (unpaginated). Again, we agree with the trial court’s determination

that the police were justified in making an initial stop and in conducting a

protective frisk for their safety, especially in light of Appellant’s voluntary

consent.     The trial court, however, erroneously ended its analysis after

determining that the police had grounds to conduct a protective frisk (which

we agree that they did, given Appellant’s consent) without examining whether

the police possessed reasonable suspicion to support a subsequent detention

undertaken to ascertain Appellant’s firearms licensure status (which, based

upon Hicks and Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021)

we find that they lacked).     Furthermore, as discussed later, we disagree with

the trial court’s factual finding that the officers knew Appellant was in

possession of a firearm when he briefly argued with them about the initial

stop.

        With guidance from the United States Supreme Court, this Court has

determined that courts are required to consider whether police unlawfully

prolonged an initial traffic-related detention:

        The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context
        is determined by the seizure's “mission”—to address the traffic
        violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety
        concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the
        stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that
        purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to
        the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
        completed.

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     A traffic stop “can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
     time reasonably required to complete the mission” of issuing a
     warning ticket.... An officer, in other words, may conduct certain
     unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But ... he
     may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the
     reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
     individual.

     Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer's
     mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to stop.” Typically,
     such inquiries involve checking [identification and] determining
     whether there are outstanding warrants[.] These checks serve
     the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring
     [roadway safety.]

Malloy, 257 A.3d at 149–150, citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.

348, 354 (2015) (original brackets omitted).5

5 Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, this Court

recognized that a constitutionally valid initial stop did not automatically
support all subsequent police intrusions during the encounter. In Kemp, we
said:

     In [Strickler, supra], our Supreme Court analyzed under what
     circumstances a police interdiction can evolve into a mere
     encounter following a traffic stop when police continue to question
     the person after the reason for the traffic stop has concluded. The
     Supreme Court in Strickler ruled that after police finish
     processing a traffic infraction, the determination of whether a
     continuing interdiction constitutes a mere encounter or a
     constitutional seizure centers upon whether an individual would
     objectively believe that he was free to end the encounter and
     refuse a request to answer questions.

     Our Supreme Court adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances
     approach. It delineated a non-exclusive list of factors to be used
     in making this assessment. Those factors include 1) the presence
     or absence of police excesses; 2) whether there was physical
     contact; 3) whether police directed the citizen's movements; 4)
     police demeanor and manner of expression; 5) the location and
     time of the interdiction; 6) the content of the questions and
     statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial

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     We are also mindful:

     [The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently found] no justification
     for the notion that a police officer may infer criminal activity
     merely from an individual's possession of a concealed firearm in
     public. […It] is not a criminal offense for a license holder [] to
     carry a concealed firearm in public. Although the carrying of a
     concealed firearm is unlawful for a person statutorily prohibited
     from firearm ownership or for a person not licensed to do so, see
     18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105-06, there is no way to ascertain an
     individual's licensing status, or status as a prohibited person,
     merely by his outward appearance. As a matter of law and
     common sense, a police officer observing an unknown individual
     can no more identify whether that individual has a license in his
     wallet than discern whether he is a criminal. Unless a police officer
     has prior knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted to
     carry a concealed firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting
     reasonable suspicion that a firearm is being used or intended to
     be used in a criminal manner, there simply is no justification for
     the conclusion that the mere possession of a firearm, where it
     lawfully may be carried, is alone suggestive of criminal activity.

Hicks, 208 A.3d at 936–937.

     This Court has further recognized that when a firearm is secured by

police without incident during a protective frisk, but before requesting

documentation that the firearm is lawfully in the person’s possession, the

     investigative detention, including its degree of coerciveness; 8)
     the degree to which the transition between the traffic
     stop/investigative detention and the subsequent encounter can be
     viewed as seamless, ... thus suggesting to a citizen that his
     movements may remain subject to police restraint; and 9)
     whether there was an express admonition to the effect that the
     citizen-subject is free to depart, which is a potent, objective
     factor. Our Supreme Court also observed that when an individual
     has been subjected to a valid detention but police continue to
     engage the person in conversation, the person is less likely to
     reasonably believe that he is actually free to leave the scene.

Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1253 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

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prolonged detention to determine whether that person has a license to carry

a firearm is illegal, unless supported by something more than the mere

possession of a firearm. In Malloy, this Court examined Hicks. Malloy was

a passenger in a car that did not display a license plate. After a police officer

initiated a traffic stop, he asked Malloy for identification and if he had a

firearm.   When Malloy responded that he had a firearm, the officer asked

Malloy to exit the vehicle so he could secure the firearm for his safety before

continuing with the investigation.   See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 145-146. The

officer then “proceeded to run checks” on Malloy “over the next 15 to 20

minutes” to determine whether Malloy had a license to carry a firearm. Id. at

146. We opined:

      [Police] secured [Malloy’s] firearm without incident before
      requesting that [Malloy] produce documentation that the firearm
      was lawfully in his possession. [Police] seizure of the firearm
      essentially eliminated any immediate risk the weapon posed to
      law enforcement personnel [and] bystanders, [] for the duration
      of the stop and transformed the officer's pursuit of [Malloy’s]
      firearms credentials into an inquiry exclusively aimed at collecting
      evidence of collateral wrongdoing. Put differently, once [police]
      secured the firearm, [Malloy’s] legal authority to own or possess
      a gun clearly bore no discernible relationship to individual safety
      or security within the context of the traffic stop. Under these
      circumstances, where seizure of a firearm has substantially
      diminished the risk to officers and others who may be present
      during a lawful [] detention, we see no reason why the Fourth
      Amendment, in the absence of independent justification,
      suspicion, or cause, should tolerate even a 10- to 15-minute
      extension of a routine traffic stop for the investigation of a
      secondary criminal matter. Hence, the request challenged in this
      case does not fall within the category of actions the police may
      undertake during a lawful traffic stop based solely on concerns for
      safety and security and without independent justification or cause.

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     We have rejected [the officer’s] investigation into [Malloy’s]
     authority to carry a firearm as an inquiry incidental to the traffic
     stop and we have excluded [the officer’s investigative] efforts as
     a permissible precaution the police may take during a lawful traffic
     stop without independent cause.

Malloy, 257 A.3d at 153 (internal citation omitted).

     More specifically, in Malloy, this Court concluded:

     [The police] did not investigate [Malloy’s] firearms licensure
     status because he was a passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle;
     instead, [the police] commenced the challenged detention and
     investigation when [the officer] learned that [Malloy] was carrying
     a firearm. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion that [the police
     officer] was “in the midst of” a lawful investigative detention when
     [the officer] asked for [Malloy’s] firearms credentials, [Malloy’s]
     removal from the vehicle, [] was not “investigative” in nature but
     permitted, without cause, as a precautionary measure to ensure
     safety during a valid vehicle stop.           Hence, the relevant,
     antecedent investigative detention of [Malloy] (and the one
     challenged in the context of this appeal) is the detention which
     commenced when [the officer] restrained [Malloy’s] liberty to
     ascertain his authority to carry a firearm. This conclusion aligns
     with the rationale advanced in Hicks, which deemed any
     encounter undertaken to investigate an individual's firearms
     licensure status as a request for information that a citizen cannot
     ignore and, as such, an investigative detention governed by the
     Fourth Amendment. See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 927-928.

                          *           *           *

     [The police officer] commenced an investigative detention when
     he asked for documentation establishing [Malloy’s] right to carry
     a firearm. At that time, the only information within [the officer’s]
     possession was that [Malloy] had a firearm holstered on his right
     hip. Under Hicks, that information was insufficient as a matter of
     law to establish reasonable suspicion.

Id. at 155 (footnote omitted).

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      Here, upon review of the record, the testimony shows that there was a

legitimate, valid stop for failing to use a sidewalk. A minor argument about

whether there was a sidewalk available ensued before the officers became

aware that Appellant was in possession of a firearm.            Thereafter, police

inquired about dangerous items in Appellant’s possession.               Appellant

immediately responded that he had a firearm in his possession and consented

to a search of his backpack.    The police secured the firearm and detained

Appellant to determine if he had a valid license to carry it.

      Accordingly, we initially conclude that the trial court’s conclusion that

“[Appellant] and Cook were arguing with the officers and [Appellant] was

known to be in possession of a gun” is flawed for two reasons. See Trial Court

Opinion, 2/3/2022, at *12.       First, the trial court’s factual determination

misrepresents the timing of the officers’ knowledge of the firearm, as they did

not suspect that Appellant was carrying a firearm until Appellant volunteered

the information and the minor dispute about the reason for the stop had

already concluded. Even the officer said that the earlier confrontation was so

minor that he would have returned the firearm to Appellant if he had a valid

permit to carry it.    Second, the frisk for weapons was not based upon a

reasonable suspicion that Appellant was armed and dangerous when Appellant

consented to the search. Compare Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 287

A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2022) (wherein police had reasonable suspicion to frisk

Cunningham where there was an odor of marijuana and Cunningham and his

associate assumed aggressive postures towards the officers, including efforts

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to evade detention and enforcement of the officers).         As such, the initial

confrontation with police in this matter did not factor into the officers’ decision

to investigate further into whether Appellant had a valid permit to carry a

firearm.

      Additionally,   once   the   police   secured   Appellant’s   firearm,   they

“essentially eliminated any immediate risk the weapon posed[.]” Malloy, 257

A.3d at 153.      At this point, the information within the police officers’

knowledge was limited to the fact that Appellant had a firearm, they were in

a high crime area, and there was a minor dispute about the sidewalk. Thus,

there simply was no justification to continue to detain Appellant to determine

whether Appellant had a firearm license. The officers’ pursuit of Appellant’s

firearms credentials transformed into an inquiry exclusively aimed at collecting

evidence of collateral wrongdoing. See id. Moreover, the police could not

“infer criminal activity merely from [Appellant’s] possession of a concealed

firearm in public.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 936. Absent independent justification,

suspicion or cause, the police were not permitted to extend a valid pedestrian

stop to undertake the investigation of a secondary criminal matter.            See

Malloy, 257 A.3d at 153. Both Hicks and Malloy hold that detaining a citizen

to conduct a search for a firearm license is an investigative detention that

requires reasonable suspicion.      No evidence presented at the suppression

hearing reasonably supported the inference that Appellant’s possession of a

firearm constituted a violation of criminal law. Hicks, 208 A.3d at 937 (“Unless

a police officer has prior knowledge that a specific individual is not permitted

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to carry a concealed firearm, and absent articulable facts supporting

reasonable suspicion that a firearm is being used or intended to be used in a

criminal manner, there simply is no justification for the conclusion that the

mere possession of a firearm, where it lawfully may be carried, is alone

suggestive of criminal activity.”).

      Upon further review of the record, there appears to be no evidence that

the police had prior information that Appellant was not permitted to carry a

firearm, as Officer Glenn admitted that he searched computer databases in

order to investigate Appellant’s licensure status. See N.T., 9/1/2020, at 26;

compare Commonwealth v. Walton, 2022 WL 4100765, at *6 (Pa. Super.

2022) (unpublished memorandum) (upon discovery of a firearm during a

protective frisk Walton immediately and spontaneously admitted that he had

a felony conviction which disqualified him from possessing a firearm, giving

the police articulable facts which supported a reasonable suspicion that

Walton’s possession of the firearm was unlawful thereby justifying continued

detention for further inquiry); Commonwealth v. Smith, 2022 WL

16704701, *3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (holding that, because the officer testified

that he observed features of the firearm indicating that it was a “ghost gun,”

its “incriminating nature . . . was immediately apparent”). Moreover, in this

matter, Appellant did not evade the police, act nervous, display furtive

movements, or volunteer information suggesting that he was not permitted

to carry a firearm. See N.T., 9/1/2020, at 37-38 (Officer Glenn testified that

aside from witnessing Appellant walking in the middle of the street, he did not

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observe   any   other   criminal   activity);   compare   Commonwealth       v.

Townsend, 2021 WL 1761041 *1, *5 and *10 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(unpublished memorandum) (explaining that the appellant “kick[ed] the

firearm under the driver’s seat” and provided the officer with reasonable

suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity, thereby justifying the

investigative detention).   In fact, in this case, Appellant gave the police his

identification, volunteered that he had a firearm, and allowed them to retrieve

it from his backpack without incident. Finally, while there was testimony that

the pedestrian stop occurred in a high crime area at night and that the officers

were on patrol in the general area, the officers admitted that they were not

called to the area in response to an ongoing criminal investigation. See N.T.,

9/1/2020, at 8-16; see Commonwealth v. Anderson, 276 A.3d 282, 295

(Pa. Super. 2022) (explaining that a defendant’s presence “in a high crime

area” is a “factor that may be considered in determining whether a police

officer possess reasonable suspicion” but is only a “single factor” and not

dispositive). Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, we reject the trial court’s

suggestion that there was reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot

specifically related to the recovered firearm based upon the location in a high-

crime area at night and/or initial protestation from Appellant and Cook

regarding the reason for the pedestrian stop.

      Taken all together, Appellant’s mere possession of a firearm, without

more, was simply not enough to establish reasonable suspicion to continue to

detain Appellant further.    When the officers began to investigate whether

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Appellant was licensed to carry a firearm, they commenced an investigative

detention, separate and apart from the initial stop. At that moment, however,

the only information within Officer Glenn’s knowledge was that Appellant

possessed a gun. Thus, this investigation was undertaken without information

which suggested that Appellant’s possession of a firearm was unlawful; hence,

the investigation was initiated without the requisite reasonable suspicion

required under Hicks. Such action was a violation of Appellant’s constitutional

rights and, therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the investigation

should have been excluded at Appellant’s trial.6          See Hicks, supra.

Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this matter for

further proceedings.

      Order denying suppression reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated.

Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge Lazarus joins.

      Judge Bowes files a Dissenting Memorandum.

6 Our disposition of the suppression issues raised in the context of this appeal
focuses exclusively on whether law enforcement personnel complied with
constitutional requirements in performing search and seizure functions. Our
focus is on the propriety of the officers’ conduct, with an eye toward whether
evidence obtained by the police may later be introduced at a criminal
proceeding against Appellant.       Here, as discussed at length, we have
determined that the recovered firearm and licensure report must be
suppressed and, therefore, the Commonwealth may not present such
evidence at a subsequent trial. Our resolution of suppression issues, however,
offers no opinion about who holds a superior possessory interest in items
seized from suspects by the police. Obviously, firearms that are lawfully
possessed or owned may be returned, but matters of police policy do not
generally fall within the scope of appellate review of suppression rulings.

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Date: 11/01/2023

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