Court Opinion

ID: 9953196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 16:14:29.950727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:45.188593
License: Public Domain

J-A23003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  ERIC & JULIE LEWIS                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellants              :
                                               :
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL WARREN MUNDA &                       :   No. 180 MDA 2023
  MELISSA STEVENSON                            :

            Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 13, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at
                          No(s): 2021-951 CP

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                             FILED: MARCH 21, 2024

       Plaintiffs Eric    Lewis (Eric) and Julie      Lewis (Julie) (collectively,

Appellants), appeal from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of

Susquehanna County, finding that Defendants Michael Munda and Melissa

Stevenson1 (collectively, Appellees), owe Appellants $2,215.00 jointly-and-

severally, and additionally, that Stevenson owes Appellants $21,550.00 for

which Munda is not jointly-and-severally liable.        Upon careful review, we

vacate and remand for correction of the damages owed and the entry of

judgment in favor of Appellants and against Appellees for $2,215.00 owed

jointly-and-severally by Appellees, and for $19,350.00 for which Stevenson is

solely liable.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Stevenson did not defend this action.
J-A23003-23

       This matter arises from a tenant-landlord dispute. The trial court recited

its findings of fact as follows:

       [Appellants] own a rental property at 870 Brush Road, Montrose,
       Pennsylvania [(Property)]. [Appellees] entered into a residential
       lease agreement for [the P]roperty with the lease term of 12
       months[,] running from May 1, 2018[,] through April 30, 2019[,]
       with a monthly rental fee of $2,000[.00].

       At the inception of the lease, [Appellees] deposited $4,000[.00]
       with [Appellants] to cover the security deposit ($2,000[.00]) and
       the last month’s rent ($2,000[.00]).          [] Munda [] never
       permanently resided at the residence but entered into the lease
       with his [then-]girlfriend, [] Stevenson[], to assist her in finding
       a home.

       Munda would occasionally stay at the [P]roperty[,] but it was not
       his personal residence. The initial lease period expired on April
       30, 2019[,] but Stevenson continued to reside [there]. The
       parties never entered into a new lease agreement. Pursuant to
       the terms of the written lease, the parties then began a month-
       to-month lease agreement subject to the same terms of the 2018
       written lease agreement.

       Munda[’s] and Stevenson’s relationship ended in October 2019[,]
       and Munda ceased staying at the leased premises. Under the
       terms of the lease agreement, Munda and Stevenson were jointly
       and severally liable for the rental payments. Despite the end of
       the relationship [between Appellees,] and Munda no longer
       staying at the residence, Munda continued to pay the rental
       payments for Stevenson through February 2020. Neither Munda
       nor Stevenson paid the March 2020 or April 2020[2] monthly rent.

       On April 9, 2020, [] Eric [] notified Munda by text message that
       rent was delinquent for March and April 2020. [That same day,]
       Munda responded by text message, noting that he had already
____________________________________________

2 The April 2020 rent was paid to Appellants at the outset of the agreement in

2018, when the Appellees deposited the “last month’s rent.” And, although
the last month of the original lease term was April 2019—at which point the
lease converted to month-to-month—the parties appear to have agreed to
Appellants’ retention of that rent payment through April 2020, and for it to be
applied for Appellees’ rent owed for April 2020.

                                           -2-
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       told [Eric, sometime in December 2019,] that he would not be
       renewing the lease and that [Eric] should contact Stevenson to
       see if she wanted to renew the lease. Munda suggested that there
       was only rent due for March as the “last month’s rent” (April 2020)
       had been paid at the inception of the lease agreement. Munda’s
       communication made clear that Munda was providing notice that
       he was terminating the lease agreement.

       [Eric] responded by noting that if Stevenson wanted to stay, she
       would need to sign a new lease agreement. Thereafter, on May
       1, 2020, Munda tendered a $2,000[.00] check to [Eric], which
       initially did not clear, but did clear at a later date. Rather than
       applying this check to the back rent for either March 2020 or April
       2020, [P]laintiffs applied Munda’s check to [the] rent for May
       2020. [Appellants] incurred a $15.00 fee as a result of Munda’s
       check not initially clearing.

       On May 11, 2020, [Eric] sent Munda a text message notifying him
       that no new lease agreement had been signed and the prior lease
       agreement was now in a month-to-month tenancy.             Munda
       reiterated that he believed that the lease had expired on May 1[,
       2020].[3] On June 22, 2020, [Eric] sent Stevenson a proposed
       new lease agreement for her alone and agreed that the monthly
       rental payment would be reduced for July 2020 to $1,000[.00] per
       month and thereafter return to the prior amount of $2,000[.00]
       per month.

       On June 25, 2020, Stevenson notified [Eric] by text message that
       she no longer wanted Munda included in their conversations and
       that she wanted to communicate with [Eric] privately so that
       Stevenson []could handle [her “]own affairs.”

____________________________________________

3 The parties appear to have been under the mutual mistaken belief that the

lease converted to a month-to-month lease in May 2020. The record supports
the trial court’s finding that the lease converted to month-to-month in May
2019, as there was only one 12-month term provided for under the terms of
the lease. See Residential Lease Agreement, undated, at ¶ 2. Further, the
record supports the trial court’s finding that Munda’s notice of termination was
effective May 31, 2020, and Munda was released for June 2020 and beyond.
See Amended Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/23, at 8 n.7.

                                           -3-
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       Pursuant to this proposed new lease agreement,[4] Stevenson paid
       and [Eric] accepted the sum of $1,000[.00] for the July 2020 rent.
       Consistent with the unsigned lease agreement between Stevenson
       and [Appellants], Stevenson paid [Appellants] $2,000[.00] in rent
       in August 2020, September 2020[,] October 2020, November
       2020[,] and April 2021. Stevenson failed to pay the $2,000
       month[ly rent payment] for June 2020, December 2020, January
       2021, February 2021, March 2021, May 2021, June 2021, July
       2021[,] and August 2021. Stevenson also failed to maintain the
       [P]roperty in the summer of 2021[,] requiring [P]laintiffs to pay a
       third party[,] expending $450.00 in lawn maintenance.

       The lease agreement provided for a $100[.00] late fee for any late
       payments. Because 10 payments were never made, and are
       therefore late, there are currently $1,000[.00] in late fees due to
       [P]laintiffs.[5] Stevenson [] vacated the [P]roperty by September
       2021. [Appellants] discovered extensive damage inside the
       residence[,] which exceeded[6] the amount of the security deposit
       of $2,000.00. The total amount of rental payments that have not
       been made total $20,000[.00].

Amended Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/23, at 1-5 (citations, footnotes, and

paragraph numbers omitted).

       On January 13, 2022, Appellants filed a complaint in this matter and the

parties initially proceeded to arbitration, after which an award was entered for
____________________________________________

4 Despite couching its findings in terms of the parties acting pursuant to, and

consistent with, the proposed new lease agreement, the trial court expressly
found that there was no new lease between the parties, and that, instead,
after May 31, 2020, Stevenson was a holdover tenant under the original lease.
See Amended Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/23, at 8-9.

5 Despite this factual finding, we observe that the trial court identified 11 late

fees owed (March 2020, May 2020, June 2020, December 2020, January 2021
through March 2021, and May 2021 through August 2021), amounting to
$1100 in late fees, and the trial court further acknowledged that no late fee
was owed for April 2020, as that payment was made at the inception of the
lease and credited as “last month’s rent.”

6 There is no claim relating to the alleged damages or the security deposit on

appeal.

                                           -4-
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Appellants. An appeal was taken from the arbitration award, and the trial

court conducted a de novo bench trial on November 7, 2022. The trial court

issued an order on November 15, 2022, finding that Munda and Stevenson

were jointly-and-severally liable for $215.00, and that Stevenson was also

solely liable for $21,450.00. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration on

November 22, 2022, which the court granted. On January 26, 2023, the trial

court heard oral argument on the motion for reconsideration, and, on that

same day, issued a revised order, finding Munda and Stevenson jointly-and-

severally liable for $2,215.00, with Stevenson also solely liable for

$21,550.00. Appellants timely filed this appeal.7 Appellants and the trial court

have complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in [interpreting] the parties’ lease
          agreement to permit notice by electronic communication when
          the parties’ lease made no reference to electronic
          communications and was otherwise unambiguous as to the
          requirements the parties agreed upon to effectuate proper
          notice under the lease agreement?

       2. Whether the trial court erred in finding [] Munda could
          unilaterally terminate the parties’ lease agreement based upon
          the language of the parties’ lease agreement?

____________________________________________

7 Our initial review of the trial court docket revealed that no judgment had

been appropriately entered. We issued an order on March 8, 2023, directing
Appellants to praecipe the trial court prothonotary to enter judgment on the
decision of the trial court based upon Brown v. Philadelphia Coll. Of
Osteopathic Med., 760 A.2d 863, 865 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2000) (reiterating
appeal properly lies from judgment entered). Appellants filed a certified copy
of the trial court docket on March 17, 2023, showing that judgment was
properly entered on the verdict on March 13, 2023.

                                           -5-
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       3. Whether the trial court erred in finding [] Munda jointly-and-
          severally liable with [] Stevenson for only a portion of the
          outstanding damages where the parties’ lease agreement
          contained a joint-and-several liability clause, renewal clause,
          [and] integration clause, amongst other clauses, and where no
          new lease was entered into to terminate the existing lease?

Appellants’ Brief, at 5 (reordered for ease of disposition).

       In Appellants’ first issue,8 they claim that the trial court erred in finding

that Munda was permitted to terminate the lease via text message to Eric

because the lease did not expressly permit electronic communications or

electronic termination. Specifically, Appellants argue that, in sending any text

message to Eric, Munda did not satisfy the requirements of the relevant notice

provision of the lease—paragraph 27—which provides the following:

       27. NOTICES. All notices and communication under this Lease
       shall be in writing and shall be deemed to be properly given when
       delivered personally or sent by certified mail, return receipt
       requested, to Tenant at the address of Premises, or to the
       Landlord as described above at the address first written above or
       to such address either party may specify in writing to the other.

       Residential Lease Agreement, undated, a ¶ 27. Appellants’ urge that

the plain meaning and syntax of the contract provides that notices may only

be: (1) in writing and (2) delivered to Appellants at their personal address as

set forth in the lease. Appellants are not entitled to relief on this first issue.

____________________________________________

8 Appellants combine the three issues raised in this appeal into only two
subparts in the argument section of their brief, in violation of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).

                                           -6-
J-A23003-23

      A lease is a contract that is controlled by principles of contract law. Pa.

Envt’l. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 255 A.3d 289, 304 (Pa. 2021). Our

standard of review regarding contract interpretation is well-established:

      Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court is
      not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of
      review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent
      necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the appellate
      court may review the entire record in making its decision.
      However, we are bound by the trial court’s credibility
      determinations.

Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928, 933 (Pa. Super 2020) (citation omitted).

Also, we are not limited by a trial court’s rationale, and we may affirm its

decision on any basis. See Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1033

(Pa. Super. 2002).

      The paramount goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain and
      give effect to the parties’ intent. To accomplish this goal, each
      and every part of the contract must be taken into consideration
      and given effect, if possible, and the intention of the parties must
      be ascertained from the entire instrument.

Tuthill v. Tuthill, 763 A.2d 417, 419 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).

Also, our Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that parties to an

agreement have the right to make their own contract and “it is not the function

of the Court to rewrite it[] or give it a construction in conflict with the accepted

and plain meaning of the language used.” Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White,

302 A.2d 347, 351 (Pa. 1973) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Pennsylvania Courts interpret a contract first by looking to its plain

meaning to give effect to the intent of the parties:

                                       -7-
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      [T]he intent of the parties to a written contract is to be regarded
      as being embodied in the writing itself, and when the words are
      clear and unambiguous[,] the intent is to be discovered only from
      the express language of the agreement. . . . [W]hen a written
      contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined
      by its contents alone. It speaks for itself and a meaning cannot
      be given to it other than that expressed. Where the intention of
      the parties is clear, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids or
      evidence. Hence, where language is clear and unambiguous, the
      focus of interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as
      manifestly expressed, rather than as, perhaps, silently intended.

Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      However, if the contract terms are ambiguous, the Court may receive

extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.       Tuthill, 763 A.2d at 420.

Nevertheless, a contract is not ambiguous merely because parties do not

agree on the proper construction, nor is there any ambiguity “if the court can

determine its meaning without any guide other than a knowledge of the simple

facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its meaning

depends[.]” Krizovensky v. Krizovensky, 624 A.2d 638, 642 (Pa. Super.

1993) (citation omitted).

      Pennsylvania courts presume that parties choose contract language

specifically and carefully:

      [The] court does not assume that contractual language is chosen
      carelessly, nor does it assume that the parties were ignorant of
      the meaning of the language they employed[.] . . . [B]efore a
      court will interpret a provision . . . in a contract in such a way as
      to lead to an absurdity or make the . . . contract ineffective to
      accomplish its purpose, it will endeavor to find an interpretation
      [that] will effectuate the reasonable result intended.

                                      -8-
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Binswanger of Pa., Inc. v. TSG Real Estate LLC, 217 A.3d 256, 262 (Pa.

2019) (citations, quotations marks, and brackets omitted).

      As to the issue of ambiguity, we have previously explained that a

contract provision is ambiguous if, and only if:

      it is reasonably susceptible to different constructions and capable
      of being understood in more than one sense. Where a provision
      of a contract is ambiguous, it is to be construed against the drafter
      of the agreement. Further, when an ambiguity exists, parol
      evidence is admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the
      ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is patent,
      created by the language of the instrument, or latent, created by
      extrinsic or collateral circumstances.

Enter. Bank v. Frazier Family L.P., 168 A.3d 262, 265 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations, quotations marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted); see also

Krizovensky, 624 A.2d at 642 (“A contract will be found to be ambiguous[]

if, and only if, it is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions

and is capable of being understood in more senses than one and is obscure in

meaning through indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning.”).

      Unambiguous contracts are interpreted by the court as a matter of law,

whereas ambiguous contracts are interpreted by the fact finder. Family v.

Pennenergy Res., LLC, 276 A.3d 729, 737 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      Here, although we agree with Appellants that there is no ambiguity in

the lease, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that Munda satisfied

the plain meaning notice requirements of paragraph 27 of the lease agreement

                                      -9-
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when sending a termination notice via text message in April 2020. 9        See

Residential Lease Agreement, undated, at ¶ 27. Indeed, Munda sent a text

message, which is a “writing,” to Eric, which plainly satisfies the requirement

that the written notice be “delivered personally.”     Id.   The “address first

written above” mentioned in paragraph 27 relates only to the option to mail

notices and does not plainly relate to the other option of personal delivery,

which may be effectuated anywhere by the plain terms of the lease. At trial,

Eric confirmed his receipt of Munda’s text message terminating the lease, and

____________________________________________

9 The trial court found that the notice provision of the lease agreement did not

apply to Munda’s text communication, and found, in the alternative, that even
if it did apply, Munda’s text message was in writing, personally
received, and acknowledged by Eric. See Amended Trial Court Opinion,
1/26/23, at 6 n.4. We conclude that the notice provision is applicable to
Munda’s April 9, 2020 termination communication insofar as the text message
qualifies as a “communication under th[e] Lease,” see Residential Lease
Agreement, undated, at ¶ 27, and especially because paragraph 2 of the lease
agreement provides:

       2. TERM. The term of this Lease will be for: twelve months
       commencing on May 1, 2018 and ending on April 30, 2019 unless
       sooner terminated according to the provisions hereof. Upon
       expiration, said Lease will renew automatically month to month
       until terminated by either party on thirty days written
       notice.

Residential Lease Agreement, undated, at ¶ 2 (emphasis added). The trial
court determined that Munda and Eric’s text messages in April 2020 created
an agreement to terminate the month-to-month tenancy effective May 31,
2020, which is consistent with the terms of the lease and the record in this
matter. Indeed, paragraph 2 of the lease required 30 days’ written notice,
see id., and the parties’ text messages support the trial court’s finding that
the agreement was for Munda to be released from the month-to-month
tenancy at the end of May 2020.

                                          - 10 -
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acknowledged he replied to Munda’s response that same day. See N.T. Trial,

11/7/22, at 11. It is of no moment that the notice provision of the lease, or

any other provision thereof, fails to explicitly mention or permit the possibility

of termination through electronic means because Munda’s text message was

in writing and delivered personally to Eric, satisfying the plain meaning

requirements of the lease.10 See Steuart, 444 A.2d at 661. Further, we

observe that the lease agreement does not specifically require a form of notice

for termination, or define “electronic notices,” or limit or prohibit the use of a

text message for providing notice. Munda’s April 9, 2020 text message to Eric

plainly satisfies the requirement that the notice of termination be a writing

personally delivered, and, therefore, Appellants are entitled to no relief on

their first issue.

       In Appellants’ second issue, they argue that the trial court erred because

it permitted Munda to unilaterally terminate the lease agreement. Specifically,

Appellants claim that this case presents a matter of first impression for the

appellate courts of this Commonwealth and urge that we adopt the “Kentucky

____________________________________________

10 Although never physically entered into evidence, Munda testified that he
also hand delivered a letter to Eric at his home to terminate the lease on May
1, 2020. See N.T. Trial, 11/7/22, at 41 (“Q: Did you ultimately go to [Eric’s]
house? A: Yes. [] I went to his house that night with my wife[—]I had gotten
remarried [] December of [20]19[—]to explain to [Eric] that I haven’t been
with [Stevenson], I’m not with [Stevenson], I’d like to not be on the lease
going forward. If he wants to renew the lease[,] I’m no longer going to be on
it. [S]o I also brought him a letter because in his lease[,] he []
indicated it had to be a letter [] to break[ the] lease.”) (emphasis
added).

                                          - 11 -
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Rule” as the correct statement of Pennsylvania law under these circumstances,

where a jointly-and-severally liable co-tenant attempts to unilaterally

terminate their residential lease when their co-tenant remains in possession

of the leased land. See Appellants’ Brief, at 11-12, citing Caudill v. Acton,

175 S.W. 3d 617, 618 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). Further, Appellants claim that the

appropriate remedy here should be between Appellees via a separate cause

of action for the right of contribution. Appellants argue that the joint-and-

several liability provision of the lease governs here and provides the security

sought by Appellants when they initially signed the lease. See Residential

Lease Agreement, undated, at ¶ 30. Appellants are entitled to no relief on

this issue.

       Instantly, although perhaps a question of first impression on the narrow

factual issue presented, we think it useful to reframe this question to one of

whether one co-lessee may unilaterally holdover and continue to subject the

other co-lessee to liability in perpetuity. We agree with the decision of the

trial court and find the issue is answered by reference to existing Pennsylvania

caselaw.11 See Willis-Winchester Co. v. Clay, 143 A. 227, 229 (Pa. 1928)

(“A tenant in common cannot ordinarily make a lease binding on his

cotenants[.]”). Indeed, it has long been the law of this Commonwealth that
____________________________________________

11 Although we may look outside the jurisdiction for legal authority, and the

parties and trial court have cited to case law from our sister courts, that
authority is only persuasive and not mandatory.         See Sternlicht v.
Sternlicht, 822 A.2d 732, 742 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted)
(“While the pronouncements of courts in sister states may be persuasive
authority, those pronouncements are not binding on this Court.”).

                                          - 12 -
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where parties have shared rights with respect to land, one may not bind the

other without authorization. See McKinley v. Peters, 3 A. 27, 28 (Pa. 1886).

And, although this pronouncement of law has previously been decided from

the perspective of co-landowners or co-lessors, it is equally applicable here,

where co-lessees disagree on how to exercise their shared rights. See also

Dible v. Davis, 52 Pa. Super. 18, 22 (Pa. Super. 1912) (“[O]ne of two

cotenants cannot, without the knowledge or assent of the other, bind the latter

to an extension of the term, an increase in the rent or other like obligation.”).

Were it otherwise, one co-lessee who wishes to remain in possession could

essentially hold the other co-lessee hostage—despite the other co-lessee

vacating the premises and giving proper notice to the lessor—by the simple

expedient of remaining in possession during a holdover. In essence, the co-

lessee in possession could refuse to pay under the terms of the lease and

obtain a perpetual lease, subject only to the lessor’s right to bring an action

in ejectment, and, despite giving proper notice of termination to the lessor

and vacating the premises, the co-lessee who is out of possession could

remain liable for their co-lessee’s holdover in perpetuity. Indeed, this result

would also be inconsistent with longstanding Pennsylvania agency law. See

First Nat’l Bank v. St. John’s Church, 146 A. 102, 104 (Pa. 1929) (“A

principal can ratify the unauthorized act of an agent only when he has

knowledge thereof.”); McCullough’s Petition, 119 A. 585, 586 (Pa. 1923)

(“[O]ne tenant[-]in[-]common has no power to bind his cotenant by an

agreement to lease their land.”); Caveny v. Curtis, 101 A. 853, 854 (Pa.

                                     - 13 -
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1917) (“Under ordinary circumstances neither tenant-in-common can bind the

estate or person of the other by any act in relation to the common property,

not previously authorized or subsequently ratified, for cotenants do not

sustain the relation of principal and agent to each other, nor are they partners

. . .   A contract by one tenant-in-common in relation to the whole

estate being voidable at the election of his cotenants not joining in

said contract.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added);

Bernstein v. Colletris, 99 Pa. Super. 484, 488 (Pa. Super. 1930) (“Proof of

a joint owner’s own declarations cannot establish his authority as agent for all

the owners.”). Here, there is no agency or partnership relationship between

Appellees, and Stevenson could not, without Munda’s knowledge or assent,

bind him to an extension of the term, an increase in the rent, or other like

obligation.12

        In Appellants’ final issue, they argue that the court erred in determining

Munda was jointly-and-severally liable for only a portion of the damages

sought. They are entitled to no relief.

        Here, at the outset, we have already held above that Munda was

permitted to terminate the lease unilaterally under these circumstances and

did so properly according to the terms of the lease requiring the termination

notice be in writing and delivered personally to Appellants. The trial court
____________________________________________

12 To Appellants’ concern about the perceived reliability of joint-and-several

liability clauses in this Commonwealth considering our disposition, we reiterate
that, pursuant to the terms of the lease, the protections of joint-and-several
liability are afforded to Appellants up to the point that the contract terminated.

                                          - 14 -
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found that Munda conceded he was responsible under the original lease

through May 31, 2020. See Amended Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/23, at 8 n.7.

Munda has not challenged that determination and it is supported by the

record. Therefore, we agree that Munda was no longer bound by the joint-

and-several liability clause for any holdover occurring after May 31, 2020—

the effective date of Munda’s notice of termination.

       As to liability for missed payments occurring after May 31, 2020, the

trial court found that Stevenson was solely liable as the only holdover tenant:

       [Eric] and Stevenson engaged in negotiations for a new lease
       agreement.       As a result of these negotiations, [Eric] sent
       Stevenson a new lease agreement and encouraged Munda and
       Stevenson to work out how the previous monies placed in escrow
       would be utilized, i.e. whether the security deposit and the last
       month[’s] rent would be applied to back rent or carried over to
       the new lease. Stevenson requested that [Eric] contact her
       directly so she could “handle her own affairs.” Pursuant to those
       direct negotiations between [Eric] and Stevenson[, in] which
       Munda was not a participant, [Eric] accepted a reduced rental
       payment in July 2020 for $1,000.00 rather than [the] $2,000.00
       provided in the original lease[,] but noted that the written lease
       would require $2,000[.00] a month. Stevenson never signed the
       new lease[13] and, as such, she remained a holdover tenant under
       the terms of the prior lease. Thus, any rental payments due after
       May 31, 2020[,] were the responsibility of Stevenson as the
       holdover tenant—not Munda as he had vacated the premises and
       notified [Eric] that he was not seeking renewal.

____________________________________________

13 But see Moudy v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 121 A.2d 881, 882

(Pa. 1956) (“Although a formal contract is to be thereafter executed, if the
terms have been agreed upon[,] legal obligations may arise[.]”). Here, the
trial court’s finding that Stevenson held over instead of agreeing to a new
contract is equally supported by the record.

                                          - 15 -
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Amended Trial Court Opinion, 1/26/23, at 8-9 (citations and brackets

omitted).

     We agree with the trial court. The record supports that, after May 31,

2020, Stevenson was the sole holdover tenant, and solely liable to Appellants

because Munda, on April 9, 2020, properly provided his notice of termination

to be effective at the end of May 2020. Further, Stevenson could not bind

Munda to an extension of the lease without his consent. Although we affirm

the trial court’s disposition of this matter, our review reveals a minor

calculation error that requires us to vacate the trial court’s judgment and

remand for correction.

     The trial court correctly calculated that Appellees were jointly-and-

severally liable for the missed March 2020 payment, the late fee incurred for

that month and for May 2020, and the $15.00 bounced check fee for May

2020, all totaling $2,215.00. However, the judgment of the trial court must

be corrected as to the amount for which Stevenson is solely liable to

Appellants.

     Stevenson missed rent payments for which she was solely liable for the

months June 2020, December 2020, January 2021 through March 2021, and

May 2021 through August 2021.        This amounts to 9 months of missed

payments for a total of $18,000.00. The lease agreement provided for a 5%

($100.00 per month) late fee for any late payments, which amounts to an

additional $900.00. Stevenson also failed to maintain the Property in June

and July of 2021 when she was solely liable, requiring Appellants to incur

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J-A23003-23

$450.00 in expenses. Therefore, the total for which Stevenson is solely liable

is $19,350.00.

      Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions to the trial court to

enter judgment in favor of Appellants and against Appellees for $2,215.00

owed jointly-and-severally by Appellees, and for $19,350.00 for which

Stevenson is solely liable. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2024

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