Court Opinion

ID: 9495820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:11:03.578225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:12.918901
License: Public Domain

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This circuit has never addressed the question of whether our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness is consistent with the principles concerning the admission of scientific or technical evidence enunciated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). That question, which is finally squarely before the court, must be answered in the negative. For this reason, the district court should have given Prince-Oyibo the opportunity to demonstrate that his proffered polygraph evidence was admissible under Daubert. Because, on the record before the court, the exclusion of Prince-Oyibo’s proffered polygraph evidence was not harmless error, I am constrained to conclude that Prince-Oyibo’s 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded. to the district court with instructions to conduct a proper Daubert inquiry. If, on remand, the district court concludes that Prince-Oyibo’s proffered polygraph evidence is inadmissible, the district court would be free to reinstate the conviction.
I
The first seminal case addressing the admissibility of polygraph evidence was Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). In Frye, the trial court refused to admit the results of a systolic blood pressure test (a crude precursor to the polygraph test), which the defendant sought to introduce in his murder trial. Id. at 1014. The issue before the Frye court was whether the results of the systolic blood pressure test should have been admitted into evidence. Id. The Frye court used a “general acceptance” standard in order to determine the admissibility of scientific or technical evidence in the context of the science of polygraphy. Id. at 1014. The general acceptance standard required the proponent of the evidence to show that the science was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community from which it emerged. Id. According to the Frye Court,
£j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. Because the systolic blood pressure test had “not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testi*503mony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made,’’evidence of its results was ruled inadmissible. Id.
Frye became the seminal polygraph case and, consequently, over the next five decades, virtually every state and federal court prohibited the admission of polygraph evidence. See generally James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. Ill. L.Rev. 363, 366—70 (analyzing Frye and its progeny). In this circuit, post -Frye and pre-Daubert, we concluded in numerous cases that the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness was per se inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1128, 1134 (4th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 974 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that evidence “of a plea agreement containing a provision that the government’s witness has agreed to take a polygraph test to verify trial testimony constitutes impermissible bolstering of the witness’s credibility”); United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1444 (4th Cir.1986) (holding that “evidence that the accused or a witness has taken a polygraph test is inadmissible”); United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 238 (4th Cir.1984) (holding that stipulated admission of polygraph test results was, “at most, harmless error”); but see United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 186 (4th Cir.1981) (holding that district court has broad discretion to admit polygraph evidence).1
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that scientific expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence2 if the expert’s testimony is *504based on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Daubert expressly rejected the Frye “general acceptance”standard, holding that the Frye standard was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Dau-bert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. In its stead, the Supreme Court outlined a flexible inquiry driven primarily by Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 702. After discussing the thrust of the federal rules, as reflected in Rules 401 and 402, the Court noted that nothing in Rule 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, makes general acceptance an absolute prerequisite to admissibility. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588, 113 S.Ct. 2786. What Rule 702 does require, the Court held, is that the district court make initial determinations that the proffered evidence possesses sufficient evidentiary reliability to be admissible as scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge and that the proffered evidence is relevant in the sense that it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95, 113 S.Ct. 2786. With regard to the reliability and relevance determinations, the Court emphasized a number of factors, including: (1) whether the theory can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its known or potential error rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Id. at 592-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Court also emphasized that a district court evaluating the admission of expert testimony under Rule 702 should also consider other applicable rules of evidence, including Rule 403, which authorizes the exclusion of relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The emphasis behind these suggested guidelines was that the district court had a “gatekeeping role”that was to ensure the reliability and relevancy of the information being offered. Id. at 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786. This gatekeeping role was designed to give sufficient discretion to the district court in order to avoid problems for the trier of fact. Id.
Without question, our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness is inconsistent with the flexible inquiry assigned to the district court by Daubert; indeed, the majority even impliedly recognizes this fact. Ante at 499 (“At the very least, by reserving the reliability assessment to the district courts, Daubert throws into doubt the viability of our per se rule that the results of an accused’s or a witness’s polygraph test are inadmissible to bolster or undermine credibility.”). To be sure, Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence recognize the gatekeeper role of the district court, which is for the specific purpose of screening evidence under Dau-bert and the Federal Rules of Evidence. A per se rule of exclusion does not allow the district court to perform its proper function under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Simply put, the proponent of polygraph evidence should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the relevance and the reliability of the evidence before a decision on admissibility is made.
Consistent’with this analysis, numerous courts have recognized that a per se rule *505banning the admission of polygraph evidence is inconsistent with Daubert. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that Dau-bert overruled its per se rule excluding all unstipulated polygraph evidence offered in civil and criminal trials); United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that its per se rule against the admission of polygraph evidence in federal court not viable in light of Daubert); see also United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 638-41 (7th Cir.2001) (noting that a district court’s decision on the admissibility of polygraph results deserves considerable deference, and will be reversed only when the district court has abused its discretion); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1531-37 (11th Cir.1989) (rejecting per se rule). The rationale behind these decisions is obvious and was best stated by the Fifth Circuit in Posado:
[W]e do not now hold that polygraph examinations are scientifically valid or that they will always assist the trier of fact, in this or any other individual case. We merely remove the obstacle of the per se rule against admissibility, which was based on antiquated concepts about the technical ability of the polygraph and legal precepts that have been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court.
57 F.3d at 434.3
The majority in this case feels compelled to reject Daubert because, in the majority’s view, “our post -Daubert precedents fore-close our abandonment ... of this Circuit’s per se rule.” Ante at 501. However, an examination of these precedents leads inexorably to the conclusion that this court has not addressed, let alone answered, the question of whether our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness is consistent with the principles concerning the admission of scientific or technical evidence set forth in Daubert.
In United States v. Toth, 1996 WL 426865 (4th Cir.1996), one of Toth’s code-fendants entered into a plea agreement, which was conditioned on the codefend-ant’s successful completion of a polygraph examination. Id. at *4. At Toth’s trial, the codefendant testified for the government, but the government had earlier argued in its opening statement that some of the codefendant’s testimony favorable to Toth should not be believed. Toth sought to introduce evidence concerning the code-fendant’s successful completion of the polygraph examination, but the district court excluded the evidence “under Fourth Circuit precedenf’and Rule 403. Toth, 1996 WL 426865, at *4.
On appeal, we noted that the “rule in this Circuif’is “that evidence that an accused or a witness has taken a polygraph test is inadmissible.” Id. We also recognized that our relevant circuit precedent was decided before Daubert and that the Posado court observed that, due to the change in the law effected by Daubert, en banc consideration was not necessary to overturn the Fifth Circuit’s per se rule against admissibility of polygraph evidence. Toth, 1996 WL 426865, at *4. We also suggested that “we might be inclined to agree with the Fifth Circuit in an appropriate case,’’but opined that it was “not necessary to reach that issue in Toth’s case,” because the district court acted within its discretion in excluding the proffered polygraph evidence under Rule 403. Toth, 1996 WL 426865, at *4. Thus, the *506Toth case was not decided on the basis of the per se rule, but rather on the basis that, even if the Daubert standard applied, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the proffered polygraph evidence was inadmissible under Rule 403. Toth, 1996 WL 426865, at *5.
A year later, in United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir.1997), the defendant argued that the district court erred when it refused to allow him to cross-examine a cooperating coconspirator about the polygraph examination she had failed and that he should have been allowed to mention the failed polygraph examination to the jury. Id. at 197. Again, we recognized the per se rule and found that the rule was “binding”on the court. Id. However, in a footnote, we expressly declined to reach the question of whether our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness was consistent with Daubert. Sanchez, 118 F.3d at 197 n. 3.
A little over two years later, in United States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376 (4th Cir.1999), the defendant argued that the district court erred when it refused to admit the defendant’s polygraph evidence at trial. Id. at 387. In upholding the district court’s decision on appeal, we rejected the defendant’s argument on the basis that we were bound by our circuit’s per se rule “absent contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court decision.” Id. at 388. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that we were declining to address the question of whether our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness was consistent with Daubert because the defendant did not advance that argument. Ruhe, 191 F.3d at 388 n. 9.
The above discussion makes it abundantly clear that this court has never addressed, let alone answered, the question of whether -our per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness is consistent with the principles set forth in Daubert. With the issue now squarely before the court, one must conclude, for the reasons set forth above, that our per se rule is not consistent with the principles concerning the admission of scientific or technical evidence outlined in Daubert. Moreover, en banc consideration is not necessary to reach this result because a panel of this court is not at liberty to ignore clear and unequivocal Supreme Court precedent. Ruhe, 191 F.3d at 388 (“[A]s a simple panel, we are bound by prior precedent from other panels in this circuit absent contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court decision.”); Posa-do, 57 F.3d at 433 (“Because no panel has squarely addressed the issue of polygraph admissibility since Daubert, en banc consideration is not required for this decision.”).
The only remaining question concerns harmless error under Rule 52(a). A district court’s evidentiary error is harmless if one can conclude, “ ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ ” United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 698 (4th Cir.1986) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In this case, as the majority acknowledges, ante at 500-501, the categorical exclusion of the polygraph evidence indicating that Prince-Oyibo was telling the truth when he stated that he did not know his visa was fraudulent was relevant and material to whether Prince-Oyibo committed an 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) violation. Under such circumstances, I am unable to conclude with fair assurance that *507the judgment in this case was not substantially swayed by the potentially erroneous exclusion of Prince-Oyibo’s polygraph evidence. Urbanik, 801 F.2d at 698. Accordingly, the error in this case is not harmless.
II
In summary, the district court should have given Prince-Oyibo the opportunity to demonstrate that his proffered polygraph evidence was admissible under Dau-bert. Because, on the record before the court, the exclusion of Prince-Oyibo’s proffered polygraph evidence was not harmless error, Prince-Oyibo’s 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the district court with instructions to conduct a proper Dau-bert inquiry. If, on remand, the district court concludes that Prince-Oyibo’s proffered polygraph evidence is inadmissible under the principles enunciated in Dau-bert, the district court would be free to reinstate the conviction.

. As noted by the majority, ante at 497-498 n. 2, our per se rule only applies to the admission of polygraph evidence offered to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness. Cf. A & S Council Oil Co., 947 F.2d at 1133 (holding that, where the government offered expert testimony on the credibility of a key government witness and the district court refused to permit cross-examination of the expert concerning the results of a polygraph test taken by the witness, the polygraph test results should have been admitted as an attack on the expert's opinion, although not as a direct attack on the credibility of the witness). Aside from A & S Council Oil Co., this court, other courts, and the government have expressed approval of the use of polygraph tests in other situations. See, e.g., United States v. Music, 2002 WL 31387536, at *1-3 (4th Cir.2002) (unpublished) (upholding imposition of condition of supervised release requiring defendant convicted of possessing child pornography to participate in mental health program that could include polygraph testing); United States v. Queen, 2001 WL 882955, at *1 (4th Cir.2001) (unpublished) (holding that the government’s reliance, in failing to move for downward departure for substantial assistance, on the results of a polygraph examination, which indicated that defendant lied about distributing drugs while released on bond, did not amount to an unconstitutional motive, even though such results would have been inadmissible at trial and, thus, the district court did not err in refusing to compel the government to file a substantial assistance motion); Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, Texas, 883 F.2d 400, 405-06 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that magistrates may consider polygraph evidence when determining whether probable cause to issue an arrest warrant exists); United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1326 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that "[ijmpeachment evidence includes the results of a polygraph test”for purposes of the Brady rule). Not surprisingly, at oral argument, the government acknowledged that it frequently uses and heavily relies upon polygraph tests in a wide variety of situations, including when deciding on whether to make a substantial assistance motion on behalf of a criminal defendant to reduce his sentence; nevertheless, the government stressed the need for a per se rule banning the admission of polygraph evidence to bolster or undermine the credibility of a witness.

. Under Rule 702, a qualified expert witness may testily "in the form of an opinion or *504otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702.

. Of note, the Posado court also concluded that, because of the change in the law affected by Daubert, an banc consideration was not necessary to overturn that circuit’s per se rule against admissibility of polygraph evidence. Posado, 57 F.3d at 433.