Court Opinion

ID: 9766157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:35:13.378069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.903691
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
Upon review, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that appellant is prohibited from rebutting the presumption of paternity under the facts of this ease. Rather, I am convinced, in light of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 701 A.2d 176 (1997), that the presumption of paternity does not apply presently.
In resolving the paternity question, the lower court questioned whether the presumption of paternity should continue to be applied in Pennsylvania in light of societal changes and advances in paternity testing. Nevertheless, the court correctly applied the law as it existed at the time. See, e.g., Paulshock v. Bonomo, 443 Pa.Super. 409, 661 A.2d 1386 (1995), allocatur denied 544 Pa. *415669, 677 A.2d 840 (1996); Miscovich v. Miscovich, 465 Pa.Super. 487, 688 A.2d 726 (1997).
However, I am convinced that, on September 17, 1997, our Supreme Court dramatically altered the situations in which the courts of this Commonwealth are required to apply the presumption that a child born during a marriage is the issue of the husband. Our high court stated:
It remains to consider how one knows whether the presumption applies in any given case. Traditionally, the answer to this question has been that the presumption applies if the child was conceived or born during the marriage. We now question the wisdom of this application of the presumption because the nature of male-female relationships appears to have changed dramatically since the presumption was created. There was a time when divorce was relatively uncommon and marriages tended to remain intact. Applying the presumption whenever the child was conceived or born during the marriage, therefore, tended to promote the policy behind the presumption: the preservation of marriages. Today, however, separation, divorce, and children born during marriage to third party fathers is relatively common, and it is considerably less apparent that application of the presumption to all cases in which the child was conceived or born during the marriage is fair. Accordingly, consistent with the ever-present guiding principle of our law, eessante ratione legis eessat et ipsa lex,1 we hold that the presumption of paternity applies in any case where the policies which underlie the presumption, stated above, would be advanced by its application, and in other cases, it does not apply.
Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180-181 (Footnote added).
In light of the facts of these consolidated appeals, I believe that the presumption of paternity does not apply. Herein, Robert and Carol admitted that the bonds of their marriage were, at least, ready to break at the time of the child’s conception and birth. Carol admitted to having an extramarital affair at the time of conception. She was so convinced that Robert was not the father of her child that she requested Robert to submit to a paternity test. Robert and Carol separated in October of 1995, immediately after learning that Robert was not the biological father of the child, albeit approximately thirteen months after the birth of the child. Consequently, I find that the policy behind the presumption of paternity, i.e., preservation of the family, would not be advanced by its application in these cases. Cf., Brinkley, supra.
The majority seems to suggest that the presumption of paternity continues to apply in all cases where the child is conceived or born during wedlock. I would place no limitation upon those situations where the presumption might not apply, except for that expressly stated in Brinkley, supra, i.e., the presumption of paternity continues to apply only where the policies which underlie the presumption would be advanced by its application. In other words, we must view the particular facts of each case to determine whether the presumption of paternity should apply, without blind application of the presumption simply because the child was born during the marriage. Herein, there is little dispute that the policy behind the presumption — “preservation of marriages” — is not furthered by applying the presumption.2
Moreover, application of the presumption of paternity when the child is born during the marriage does not necessarily serve to preserve the marital bond. Given the societal and scientific changes recognized in Brinkley, supra, application of the presumption of paternity to a “presumptive” father who suspects that his pregnant wife is not carrying his child might, at least, encourage *416him to separate before the child is born, so that later, upon the child’s birth, he is not precluded by application of a legal fiction from contesting paternity, thereby obligating him to support a child not of his own blood.
While I do not think that the presumption of paternity applies in the present case in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Brinkley, supra, I comment further to question whether the presumption of paternity should continue to be applied in any future cases. In light of the social and scientific changes in our modern society, the presumption appears archaic. No longer does a child born out-of-wedlock suffer the social (and economic) stigma of illegitimacy. Neither does divorce carry the social stigma it once did. Significantly, recent advances in blood testing can identify with a certainty the biological father of a child. I do not believe all parties concerned, including the child, should be prevented from knowing the identity of the true biological father, a fact which the mother often knows without blood testing, but which she may conceal, and, more importantly, a fact which has such significant psychological and economic impact upon all involved. The presumption of paternity should be abandoned in favor of the more flexible approach set forth in Justice Nigro’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 182-183, wherein he states:
Abandoning the strict use of [the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel] would allow our courts to examine the situation presented, to compel blood testing if the appropriate showing is made, and to weigh the competing factors in order to reach a just result in each ease. Given the realities of marriage, separation, and divorce today, I believe a flexible, case-by-case approach to paternity issues, acknowledging and benefiting from the relative certainty of blood testing, is simply more preferable than a system characterized by the strict application of overarching and outdated legal fictions that can lead, as the Majority admits, to unfair results.
Id., 701 A.2d at 183.
In sum, I find that the presumption of paternity does not apply in this case, and I would remand this case for further action by the court below. First, the lower court would determine whether the doctrine of es-toppel prevents Carol and Robert from asserting a paternity claim against Gregory. See Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 181; Jones v. Trojak, 535 Pa. 95, 105-106, 634 A.2d 201, 206 (1993) (“Only when the doctrine of estop-pel does not apply will the mother be permitted to proceed with a paternity claim against a putative father with the aid of a blood test”). If Carol and Robert are not estopped from denying paternity, then the court would direct the parties, including Gregory, to submit to blood testing for paternity and would proceed in these support actions.

. Cess ante ratione legis eessat et ipsa lex translated is: The reason of law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.

. I certainly recognize, as does the majority, that the methods for rebutting the presumption of paternity continues to relate to biology, i.e., there was no access or the presumptive father was impotent. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 181 n. 9. However, unlike the majority, I do not believe that the facts of this case warrant application of the presumption to preclude Robert from proving the child is not biologically his.