Court Opinion

ID: 9794342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:04:15.047942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:39.041719
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The president of plaintiff corporation repeatedly admitted that the agreement of the parties was of an oral nature. Plaintiff in its reply to defendant’s amended answer stated:
“That afterward on or about the 28th day of October, 1955, the parties hereto orally agreed to compromise said written order and agreement * * *. That on the 28th day of October, 1955, in pursuance of said oral compromise agreement, the defendant paid the difference of Two Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-seven Dollars and Ten Cents (2267.10) and accepted and said Pontiac automobile was then and there delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff in full settlement and satisfaction for said used truck.”
The plaintiff in its answer to the defendant’s cross petition includes the identical language above quoted.
Plaintiff’s requested instruction No. 2 was :
“Gentlemen of the jury, you are instructed that a written contract may be altered by an executed oral agreement.”
In its requested instruction No. 4 plaintiff again uses the language from its reply and answer hereinabove quoted.
Apparently, plaintiff’s president was not sure as to the terms of the oral agreement. When asked if he finally got the truck (for the purpose of delivering same to defendant), he answered:
“Yes sir. All this controversy over a car or truck deal, we couldn’t quite make up our minds and I placed an order for a truck, and did receive it, and had it in stock for quite some little time.”
In Coston v. Adams, 203 Okl. 605, 224 P.2d 955, 961, we said:
“ * * * it was not error to overrule plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict in their favor, the new contract being oral; the facts were in dispute ; the language used and the meaning to be given it, were questions of fact for the jury. The construction of words used is for the court, where an oral contract is distinct in its terms, but where an oral contract is to be gathered from talks between the parties, and especially from talks on more than one occasion, as in this case, the question as to what the contract was, if controverted, must usually be tried by the jury as a question of fact. Hammond Coal Co. v. Lewis, 248 Mass. 499, 143 N.E. 309, and cases therein cited.”
I think that there was evidence from which the jury could properly find that the agreement of the parties was partly oral *210and partly written, and that the provisions and meaning thereof were controverted and for the jury to interpret.
Plaintiff does not even claim that the conditional sales contract constituted a reduction of the oral agreement to writing. The conditional sales contract does not mention or refer to the order for the new truck. It does not identify the $1,500 trade-in allowance. Parol evidence was admissible to show why $1,500 was allowed for a trade-in and what, if anything, was allowed defendant for the International truck which was traded in on the new truck in the first deal.
In Pray v. Kidd Williams Drilling Corporation, Okl., 352 P.2d 380, 384, this court said:
“In Yeager v. Jackson, 1933, 162 Okl. 207, 19 P.2d 970, defendant was allowed to introduce parol evidence that a written realty purchase contract was not to become effective unless the seller should give possession by a certain date. The written contract did not contain any provision for transfer of possession to the buyer. In Gamble v. Riley, 39 Okl. 363, 135 P. 390, we held that parol evidence was admissible to show that the written subscription agreement did not constitute the whole contract and was not to become binding until the happening of a certain contingency.”
From an examination of the entire record, I am of the opinion that the cause was properly submitted to the jury for a determination from the evidence of the intent of the parties and as to what agreement they actually made.
In the case of Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Wood, 168 Okl. 274, 32 P.2d 882, and others therein cited, this court has held that the error of a faulty instruction could not be complained of unless it was claimed that the damages were excessive and a correct requested instruction submitted.
The plaintiff has not assigned as error that the damages were excessive. It did not submit a requested instruction on this point. I think plaintiff may not now be heard to complain of the instruction given as to the measure of damages or of the trial court’s failure to give an instruction plaintiff now deems correct.
There inheres in the verdict and judgment of the trial court a finding that both of the parties fully understood that it was the purpose of defendant to use the new truck to haul cattle; that plaintiff as a reasonable person should have contemplated that if the new truck were not delivered, defendant might sustain some loss as a result of operating two trucks rather than three. I think there is sufficient evidence to reasonably sustain such findings.
Plaintiff did not contest defendant’s testimony that he lost five to six hundred dollars each month he was without the International or a new truck.
In Consolidated Pipe Line Co. v. British American Oil Co., 163 Okl. 171, 21 P.2d 762, 769, we said:
“The general rule is stated in 55 C.J. at page 1175, par. 1158, in the following language: ‘In view of the general rule that the buyer is entitled to recover the actual loss he has sustained by reason of the breach of the contract, the buyer is entitled to recover any special damages he has suffered which are the proximate and natural result of the failure to deliver, and which may reasonably be considered as within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract, by reason of a knowledge of the special facts and circumstances from which such special damages would arise.”
The issues were tried to the jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment in the favor of defendant in the sum of $300.00, which to my notion is sustained by the evidence.
For the reasons above stated, I respectfully dissent.