Court Opinion

ID: 9394519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 17:07:27.239262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.625603
License: Public Domain

J-A26002-22

                                   2023 PA Super 82

    MARCELO AITA                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 510 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2019-00981

    MARCELO AITA                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NCB MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.              :   No. 615 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 21, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
                                2019-00981

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

DISSENTING OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                          FILED MAY 15, 2023

        In this cross-appeal, NCB argues that Aita could not institute an action

for liquidated damages once he was paid because, at that time, he was no

longer someone to whom any wages were payable. The Majority rejects this

argument as “not in accord with the statutory scheme or its legislative

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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purpose.” Majority at 10. Since I conclude that under the plain language of

the statute, a plaintiff must be due wages at the time of filing a suit pursuant

to the WPCL in order to sustain an action seeking either unpaid wages or

unpaid wages plus liquidated damages, I respectfully dissent.

      The crux of the parties’ dispute and my disagreement with the Majority

concerns the statutory interpretation of the WPCL. This Court’s standard of

review for issues involving statutory interpretation is well-settled:

      When the question is one of statutory interpretation, our scope of
      review is plenary and the standard of review is de novo. Under
      the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, our paramount
      interpretative task is to give effect to the intent of our General
      Assembly in enacting the particular legislation under review. We
      are mindful that the object of all statutory interpretation is to
      ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly
      and the best indication of the legislature’s intent is
      the plain language of the statute. When the words of a statute
      are clear and unambiguous, we may not go beyond the plain
      meaning of the language of the statute under the pretext of
      pursuing its spirit. [O]nly when the words of the statute are
      ambiguous should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent
      of the General Assembly[.]

In re D.M.W., 102 A.3d 492, 494 (Pa.Super. 2014) (cleaned up). A term is

ambiguous if, “when read in context with the overall statutory framework in

which it appears, [it] has at least two reasonable interpretations[.]” Snyder

Bros., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 198 A.3d 1056, 1073 (Pa.

2018) (citation omitted).    Crucially, “[i]t is axiomatic that in determining

legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in

conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire

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statute.”   Penn Jersey Advance, Inc. v. Grim, 962 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa.

2009) (cleaned up).

       As is the case in any appeal concerning statutory interpretation, I begin

with the plain language of the statute.1 The pertinent section, § 260.9a, was

added to the WPCL in 1977 to address civil remedies and penalties. It provides

as follows:2

       (a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or
       party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute actions
       provided under this act.

       (b) Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to whom
       any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid wages and
       liquidated damages may be maintained in any court of competent
       jurisdiction, by such labor organization, party to whom any type
       of wages is payable or any one or more employees for and in
       behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly
       situated, or such employee or employees may designate an agent
____________________________________________

1 The Majority begins its analysis with, and places much stock in, the intent
behind the WPCL. See Majority at 6. However, it is axiomatic that the proper
starting point is the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., Koken v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 893 A.2d 70, 81 (Pa. 2006) (“Generally, the best
indication of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute. Thus, it is
well settled that when the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they
are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” (cleaned
up)). Were I to reach the intent behind the WPCL, however, I would echo this
Court’s prior agreement with the following observation of the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals: “This court has also attempted to review the legislative
history of the [WPCL] to further determine the purposes underlying the law.
Unfortunately, there are no substantive remarks included in the history of this
law which would instruct this court.” Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24
A.3d 875, 954 n.25 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Barnhart v. Compugraphic
Corp., 936 F.2d 131, 134 n.5 (3d Cir.1991)).

2The WPCL uses only one “e” at the end of the word employee throughout its
provisions. I modify the text in my discussion to employ the more common
spelling.

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     or representative to maintain such action or on behalf of all
     employees similarly situated.        Any such employee, labor
     organization, party, or his representative shall have the power to
     settle or adjust his claim for unpaid wages.

     (c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization or
     party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the
     alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an
     employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless the
     claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the employer or
     former employer of such claim by certified mail. If the employer
     or former employer fails to pay the claim or make satisfactory
     explanation to the secretary of his failure to do so within ten days
     after receipt of such certified notification, thereafter, the employer
     or former employer shall be liable for a penalty of ten percent
     (10%) of that portion of the claim found to be justly due. A good
     faith dispute or contest as to the amount of wages due or the good
     faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim shall be
     deemed a satisfactory explanation for nonpayment of such
     amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or counter-claim. The
     secretary shall have a cause of action against the employer or
     former employer for recovery of such penalty and the same may
     be included in any subsequent action by the secretary on said
     wage claim or may be exercised separately after adjustment of
     such wage claim without court action.

     (d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this act, the
     Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the employer to post
     bond or security to secure payment of the entire claim of the
     employee with credit in the amount of any good faith assertion of
     a right of set-off or counter-claim. Such bond or security shall be
     posted in the court where the civil action is brought. The request
     for bond or security shall be signed by the secretary and shall
     provide that such bond or security in the amount stated shall be
     posted within 30 days of service thereof on the employer. If such
     bond or security is not posted within the 30-day period, the
     employer will be deemed to have admitted his liability and
     execution may immediately ensue.

     (e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not been paid
     and that such unpaid wages constitute an enforceable claim, the
     secretary shall, upon the request of the employee, labor
     organization or party to whom any type of wages is payable, take
     an assignment in trust, from the requesting party of such claim

                                     -4-
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     for wages without being bound by any of the technical rules
     respecting the validity of any such assignments and may bring any
     legal action necessary to collect such claim, subject to the right
     by the employer to set-off or counter-claim against the assigning
     party. Upon any such assignment, the secretary shall have the
     power to settle and adjust any such claim to the same extent as
     might the assigning party.

     (f) The court in any action brought under this section shall, in
     addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
     allow costs for reasonable attorneys’ fees of any nature to be paid
     by the defendant.

     (g) No administrative proceedings or legal action shall be
     instituted under the provisions of this act for the collection of
     unpaid wages or liquidated damages more than three years after
     the day on which such wages were due and payable as provided
     in sections 3 and 5.

43 P.S. § 260.9a (footnote omitted). With respect to liquidated damages, the

WPCL further provides in § 260.10 as follows:

     Where wages remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the regularly
     scheduled payday, or, in the case where no regularly scheduled
     payday is applicable, for sixty days beyond the filing by the
     employee of a proper claim or for sixty days beyond the date of
     the agreement, award or other act making wages payable, . . .
     and no good faith contest or dispute of any wage claim including
     the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim exists
     accounting for such non-payment, the employee shall be entitled
     to claim, in addition, as liquidated damages an amount equal to
     twenty-five percent (25%) of the total amount of wages due, or
     five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.

43 P.S. § 260.10 (emphasis added).

     In applying this statutory scheme to the facts at hand, both parties rely

on this Court’s decision in Yablonski v. Keevican Weiss Bauerle & Hirsch

LLC, 197 A.3d 1234 (Pa.Super. 2018). NCB argues that Yablonski “confirms

that liquidated damages due to an employee are based on the amount of

                                     -5-
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wages that are owed when the plaintiff is forced to resort to the courts to

recover that which he previously earned.” NCB’s brief at 25. On the other

hand, Aita contends that Yablonski stands for the proposition that once the

violation of the WPCL has occurred, later correction by the employer does not

extinguish the claim for liquidated damages.” Aita’s brief at 7.

      The learned Majority does not address Yablonski. I, on the other hand,

find it instructive.   In Yablonski, this Court considered, inter alia, the

appropriate amount of liquidated damages where the employer, KWBH, made

partial payments towards the wages that were payable to Yablonski after the

WPCL suit was initiated. KWBH argued that “the trial court erred by awarding

liquidated damages based upon the amount claimed in the amended complaint

because after Yablonski filed the amended complaint, KWBH and Yablonski

entered into a settlement agreement reducing the amount of claimed wages.”

Yablonski, supra at 1241. In other words, KWBH contended that § 260.10

requires that liquidated damages be calculated based upon the amount due,

and since some of the amount due had been paid following initiation of the

suit, the liquidated damages should only be based upon the amount still owed.

Id.

      This Court disagreed with KWBH’s argument:

      [B]ecause the WPCL provides for liquidated damages when wages
      remain unpaid thirty days past payday, paying the May-August
      2016 wages in December 2016 did not eliminate KWBH’s liability
      pursuant to [§] 260.10. KWBH’s argument ignores the trial
      court’s explicit finding that at the time Yablonski filed his
      amended complaint, KWBH owed Yablonski all of the

                                     -6-
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       wages he claimed, plus interest. The only reason Yablonski
       was not awarded $63,949.91 at trial was because KWBH had
       already paid him $7,336.13 prior to trial, but that payment does
       not change the fact that $63,949.91 of wages plus interest were
       overdue pursuant to [§] 260.10. Therefore, the trial court did not
       err in awarding Yablonski 25% of $63,949.61 as liquidated
       damages.

Id. at 1242 (citation omitted). Thus, we affirmed the trial court’s award of

liquidated damages for the amount claimed in the complaint because

Yablonski was owed those wages, plus interest, at the time he filed the

complaint. Later payment did not extinguish his entitlement to that relief.

       Here, Aita was not owed any wages at the time he filed his complaint.

Indeed, because Aita had already been paid, with interest, at the time he

initiated the instant suit, he solely sought liquidated damages under the WPCL.

The Majority finds that liquidated damages comprise a separate claim apart

from unpaid wages based upon § 260.9a(g), which provides as follows: “No

administrative proceedings or legal action shall be instituted under the

provisions of this act for the collection of unpaid wages or liquidated damages

more than three years after the day on which such wages were due and

payable as provided in sections 3 and 5.”3       43 P.S. § 260.9a(g) (footnote

omitted). I disagree.

____________________________________________

3 The Majority places great weight on the ordinary usage of “or” to support its
conclusion. See Majority at 12. While I believe that reading the WPCL as a
whole provides sufficient clarity on this issue, I note that, if it did not,
ambiguity may arise when “or” is used to separate nouns in a sentence
involving prohibition. See Kenneth A. Adams & Alan S. Kaye, Revisiting the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Reading all sections of the WPCL together, our courts have interpreted

the provisions for civil remedies and liquidated damages such that “the

statute’s liquidated damages provision is available to only a subset of

those prevailing plaintiffs who can also prove that they are entitled to

damages as a result of an employer having no good faith defense to wages

remaining unpaid for a set amount of time under the statute.” Andrews v.

Cross Atl. Cap. Partners, Inc., 158 A.3d 123, 136 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en

banc) (emphasis added). As this Court has explained,

       The WPCL is not only a vehicle for recovery of unpaid wages;
       it also provides for damages in the event an employer withholds
       compensation in the absence of good faith. 43 P.S. § 260.10.
       Thus, for instance, if an employer withholds wages based on a
       dispute with the employee that would result in a set-off, the
       employer’s reliance on the set-off must be held in good-
       faith. Id. Otherwise, the employee is entitled to additional,
       liquidated damages pursuant to the statute[.]

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 574 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(emphases added).

       Thus, in context, § 260.9a(g) merely provides that, beyond the statute

of limitations period provided, (1) proceedings shall not be instituted for

unpaid wages withheld in good faith, and (2) proceedings shall not be

instituted for unpaid wages withheld in the absence of good faith and the

commensurate additional liquidated damages. It does not support a separate

____________________________________________

Ambiguity of "And" and "Or" in Legal Drafting, 80 St. John’s L. Rev. 1167,
1184 (2006).

                                           -8-
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cause of action solely for liquidated damages. Indeed, based upon the plain

language of the statute and this Court’s interpretation thereof, to be entitled

to liquidated damages, a plaintiff must first be eligible to file an action

pursuant to the WPCL.4

       In determining whether Aita was eligible to file an action under the

WPCL, I again begin with the plain language of the statute. Section 260.9a(a)

provides that actions may be filed under the WPCL by any employee “to whom

any type of wages is payable[.]” 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a). Our courts have not

interpreted “payable” in the WPCL context and our legislature chose not to

include a definition for “payable” within the definitions section of the WPCL.

See 43 P.S. § 260.2a.        As observed by the Majority, Black’s Law Dictionary

defines “payable” as “(Of a sum of money or a negotiable instrument) that is

to be paid. . . . An amount may be payable without being due. Debts are

commonly payable long before they fall due.”           PAYABLE, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

       The Majority posits that “‘payable’ denotes ‘when’ something should be

paid.” Majority at 10 (citation omitted). Based upon this premise, the Majority

____________________________________________

4 While not binding, it bears mentioning that the Department of Labor and
Industry has interpreted the WPCL in the same fashion, namely, as providing
that “[a]ny employee or group of employees, labor organization or party to
whom any type of wages is payable may take legal action to recover wages
due plus liquidated damages.” Summary of the WPCL, Department of Labor
and     Industry,    https://www.dli.pa.gov/Individuals/Labor-Management-
Relations/llc/Documents/llc-2.pdf (emphasis added).

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concludes that “‘to whom any type of wages is payable’ means that an

employee’s wages are payable on his or her regular payday, i.e., once the

statutory grace period has expired, and an action can be maintained for

liquidated damages thereafter.” Id. at 10-11. Indeed, the Majority states,

without citation to any authority, that liquidated damages are available

“regardless of whether they are paid before an action under the WPCL is

filed[.]” Id. at 7.

      I cannot agree. Had the legislature intended this interpretation, it could

have written § 260.9a(a) in the past tense, to provide for an action to be

available to any party to whom any type of wages were payable or “had been

payable.” Instead, the legislature chose to write it in the present tense: “Any

employee . . . or party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute

actions provided under this act.” 43 P.S. § 260.9a(a) (emphasis added).

      Moreover, the term “payable” must be read in conjunction with the

remainder of the act, which makes it clear that actions may be brought only

when wages remain unpaid as demonstrated by the following pertinent

subsections:

      (a) Any employee or group of employees, labor organization or
      party to whom any type of wages is payable may institute
      actions provided under this act.

      (b) Actions by an employee, labor organization, or party to
      whom any type of wages is payable to recover unpaid
      wages and liquidated damages may be maintained in any
      court of competent jurisdiction, by such labor organization,
      party to whom any type of wages is payable or any one or more
      employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other

                                    - 10 -
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     employees similarly situated, or such employee or employees may
     designate an agent or representative to maintain such action or
     on behalf of all employees similarly situated. Any such employee,
     labor organization, party, or his representative shall have the
     power to settle or adjust his claim for unpaid wages.

     (c) The employee or group of employees, labor organization or
     party to whom any type of wages is payable may, in the
     alternative, inform the secretary of the wage claim against an
     employer or former employer, and the secretary shall, unless the
     claim appears to be frivolous, immediately notify the employer or
     former employer of such claim by certified mail. If the employer
     or former employer fails to pay the claim or make
     satisfactory explanation to the secretary of his failure to do
     so within ten days after receipt of such certified notification,
     thereafter, the employer or former employer shall be liable for a
     penalty of ten percent (10%) of that portion of the claim found to
     be justly due. A good faith dispute or contest as to the amount of
     wages due or the good faith assertion of a right of set-off or
     counter-claim shall be deemed a satisfactory explanation for
     nonpayment of such amount in dispute or claimed as a set-off or
     counter-claim. The secretary shall have a cause of action against
     the employer or former employer for recovery of such penalty and
     the same may be included in any subsequent action by the
     secretary on said wage claim or may be exercised separately after
     adjustment of such wage claim without court action.

     (d) In any civil action brought under the provisions of this act, the
     Secretary of Labor and Industry may require the employer to
     post bond or security to secure payment of the entire claim
     of the employee with credit in the amount of any good faith
     assertion of a right of set-off or counter-claim. Such bond or
     security shall be posted in the court where the civil action is
     brought. The request for bond or security shall be signed by the
     secretary and shall provide that such bond or security in the
     amount stated shall be posted within 30 days of service thereof
     on the employer. If such bond or security is not posted within the
     30-day period, the employer will be deemed to have admitted his
     liability and execution may immediately ensue.

     (e) If the secretary determines that wages due have not
     been paid and that such unpaid wages constitute an
     enforceable claim, the secretary shall, upon the request of the
     employee, labor organization or party to whom any type of wages

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       is payable, take an assignment in trust, from the requesting party
       of such claim for wages without being bound by any of the
       technical rules respecting the validity of any such assignments and
       may bring any legal action necessary to collect such claim,
       subject to the right by the employer to set-off or counter-claim
       against the assigning party. Upon any such assignment, the
       secretary shall have the power to settle and adjust any such claim
       to the same extent as might the assigning party.

43 P.S. § 260.9a (emphases added).

       If the WPCL, which has not been amended since 1977, meant to provide

a mechanism for setting forth claims whenever an employee is paid late, it

would stand to reason that such a case would have made its way to our

appellate courts before now. The Majority does not cite any such case, and

my research has revealed none. The passage of nearly fifty years without the

occurrence of any instance where an employee instituted a WPCL action in

our courts after being paid all outstanding late wages suggests the WPCL was

not intended to operate in this fashion and need not do so in order to

accomplish its goals.5

____________________________________________

5  I note that my research revealed two federal cases of limited value. One
case apparently proceeded to trial in federal court based upon a WPCL claim
for liquidated damages where the “[d]efendants had fully paid the claimed
back wages by the time this case was filed, leaving only the propriety of
liquidated damages at issue.” Bair v. Purcell, No. 1:04-CV-1357 (M.D.Pa.
Aug. 17, 2010) (memorandum disposing of plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’
fees). I note that “[w]e are not bound by federal district court opinions
interpreting Pennsylvania law, but may use them for guidance where their
analysis is sound.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Am. Water Co.,
850 A.2d 701, 705 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Indeed, outside
of this sentence, the court does not discuss the propriety of pursuing solely a
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Indeed, this Court has held that “the WPCL is intended to provide a

vehicle for successful plaintiffs to be compensated for unpaid back wages

____________________________________________

liquidated damages claim under the WPCL when no wages are due, and thus
there is no pertinent analysis, sound or otherwise. Accordingly, this case
provides zero guidance on the issue presently before this Court.

      The other case of minimal persuasive value is a recent federal decision
addressing whether a plaintiff was barred from adding a WPCL claim to a
lawsuit after the parties had reached a settlement agreement regarding the
underlying breach of contract claim, which included the defendant satisfying
the unpaid back wages. Despite the back wages being satisfied before the
complaint was amended to add the WPCL claims, the court noted that at that
time, plaintiff “was still owed additional salary continuation payments by [the
defendant] such that he was undoubtedly a ‘party to whom any type of wages
is payable.’ Hence, the statute authorizes him to bring an action to ‘recover
unpaid wages and liquidated damages.’” Viancourt v. Paragon Wholesale
Foods Corp., No. CV 20-628 (W.D.Pa. Mar. 31, 2023) (cleaned up). In its
discussion, the court found the plaintiff was not barred from asserting its WPCL
claim for liquidated damages because the defendant did not cite any authority
that a plaintiff can waive a WPCL claim by settling the underlying breach of
contract claim, nor did it present evidence that the parties intended for the
settlement to preclude a WPCL claim, and WPCL claims may not be waived by
private agreement. See id.

       In its discussion, the Viancourt court noted that the plaintiff cited Bair,
supra in support of his ability to amend the petition to raise a WPCL claim
after having been paid for the back wages. This mere mention of Bair did not
impact the court’s holding in the least bit. Rather, the court held that the
WPCL claim for liquidated damages was not barred because the plaintiff was
authorized to bring a WPCL action as he was still owed other types of wages,
and the settlement regarding the back wages did not bar pursuing a WPCL
claim for liquidated damages pertaining to those back wages. In other words,
the plaintiff was due wages at the time he filed the suit and he could therefore
pursue liquidated damages. Insofar as Viancourt holds any persuasive hold
over this Court, it aligns with my interpretation that a plaintiff must first be
eligible to file an action under the WPCL before seeking liquidated damages.

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based upon an existing contractual obligation[.]” Andrews, supra at 136;

see also Ely v. Susquehanna Aquacultures, Inc., 130 A.3d 6, 13

(Pa.Super. 2015) (“[T]he primary goal of the WPCL is to make whole again

employees whose wages were wrongfully withheld by their employers.”

(cleaned up)); Braun, supra at 897 (“The WPCL is a statute permitting

employees to recover unpaid wages.” (citation omitted)); Belcufine v. Aloe,

112 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The WPCL arms Pennsylvania employees

with a statutory vehicle for the collection of unpaid wages and benefits and

provides for penalties to be imposed for non-compliance.”).

      Ascribing to the statutory language of § 260.9a(a) its plain and ordinary

meaning, I find the legislature’s intent is clear and unambiguous.          An

employee may file an action under the WPCL if there are any type of wages

payable to him, that is, any type of wages that are “to be paid” to him. See

PAYABLE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Stated yet another way,

an employee may file an action under the WPCL if there are any type of wages

that are outstanding at the time a suit is initiated.

      However, if no suit has yet been initiated and an employer pays the

outstanding wages, at that point there are no longer any wages to be paid,

such that the employee is no longer one “to whom any type of wages is

payable[.]”   43 P.S. § 260.9a(a).     Indeed, under such circumstances the

employee has been made whole and, thus, no longer needs to resort to the

courts to obtain full payment. See Andrews, supra at 136 (noting that “the

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WPCL is intended to provide a vehicle for successful plaintiffs to be

compensated for unpaid back wages based upon an existing contractual

obligation”). Phrased simply, wages are not payable if they have already been

paid.

        I maintain that my interpretation is consistent with the WPCL’s purpose

while not expanding the scope of the WPCL beyond the relief explicitly

provided. As noted by the Majority, the WPCL requires employers to pay their

employees on time. If an employer fails to do that, an employee may file an

action under the WPCL and, if the employer withheld wages without good

reason, the employee may seek liquidated damages to cover those

unexpected losses incurred as a result of the late payment.

        Additionally, the employee will be able to recover attorneys’ fees so that

the award of their unpaid wages will not be immediately lost in paying for the

attorney who brought the claim to obtain those unpaid wages. This mandatory

entitlement to attorneys’ fees is the mechanism by which our legislature

sought to ensure that such employees, i.e., those who have to resort to the

courts in order to be paid, are made whole again. See Grimm v. Universal

Med. Servs., Inc., 156 A.3d 1282, 1290 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]he primary

goal of the WPCL is to make whole again employees whose wages were

wrongfully withheld by their employers.          Consequently, to ensure that

employees who are successful in their actions against an employer are made

whole again, the statute mandates an award of attorneys’ fees in addition to

                                      - 15 -
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any judgment awarded to a plaintiff.” (cleaned up)); id. at 1291 n.9 (“The

award [of attorneys’ fees] clearly supports the purpose of the WPCL; namely,

permitting [the employee] to collect the severance payment which he was

owed without causing him to incur the costs associated with the collection.”

(cleaned up)).   In addition, those employees whose wages were withheld

without a good-faith reason may seek liquidated damages, regardless of

whether the employer pays the wages due after the filing of the WPCL

complaint.

     Indeed, the mandatory nature of attorneys’ fees in this context further

supports my interpretation of the term “payable”:

     After considering § 260.9a(f) in the context of the entire statute,
     keeping in mind the statute’s purpose of protecting employees and
     the remedial relief it seeks to provide, we conclude that the
     legislature intended a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees for a
     plaintiff who prevails on a claim pursued under the Act. This
     interpretation is consistent with the general import of the statute,
     and goes to the very essence of its goal of making an employee
     whole again. Otherwise, employees who are unjustly deprived of
     their wages by their employers may be deterred from filing suit
     because of burdensome legal costs. Similarly, employees who do
     file suit and are successful would be subjected to payment of a
     substantial part of their award (which represents earned
     compensation) as attorneys’ fees. This would clearly undermine
     the intent of the statute; because employees who are unable to
     retain their wages will not be made whole. Without an award of
     attorneys’ fees the end result would be only a partial recovery
     under the statute. Therefore, under the WPCL, an employee who
     has prevailed on a claim for past wages due, is entitled to
     attorneys’ fees as a matter of entitlement.

Oberneder v. Link Computer Corp., 674 A.2d 720, 722 (Pa.Super. 1996)

(cleaned up, emphasis added).

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J-A26002-22

      Accordingly, I would conclude that under the plain language of the

statute, a plaintiff must be due wages at the time of filing a suit pursuant to

the WPCL in order to sustain such an action seeking either unpaid wages or

unpaid wages plus liquidated damages. If the legislature had intended for the

WPCL to provide a cause of action for any time an employee was paid in an

untimely manner, it could have done so. However, it did not choose language

that did so, and it is beyond our purview to look past the plain the language

of the statute to expand the scope of the WPCL to provide for such a cause of

action.

      Consequently, insofar as the court granted Aita’s motion for summary

judgment and denied NCB’s motion for summary judgment based on this

expansion of the scope of the WPCL, I believe it erred. Since it is undisputed

that no wages were payable to Aita at the time he filed the instant suit under

the WPCL, I would conclude as a matter of law he was not entitled to relief

under the WPCL, and the trial court should have then granted NCB’s motion

for summary judgment and denied Aita’s motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand for the

court to enter judgment in favor of NCB and against Aita on the WPCL claim.

In light of this disposition, I would not reach NCB’s remaining claims on appeal

nor the issue raised in Aita’s cross-appeal.

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