Court Opinion

ID: 9591068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:01:50.373574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:07.502864
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with Division 1 of the majority opinion, and with the affirmance of defendant’s conviction of trafficking in cocaine and of failing to obey a stop sign, I cannot join the majority in Division 2 or in the affirmance of defendant’s convictions for dispensing and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a recreation center and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The evidence is clear that defendant possessed cocaine and then discarded it within 1,000 feet of places identified by law enforcement officers as a public housing project and as a recreation center. However, the testimony of the officers concerning the identity of that real property does not provide probative evidence but was necessarily hearsay evidence lacking any probative value. Johnson v. State, 214 Ga. App. 77, 79 (2), 80-81 (447 SE2d 74). While the law enforcement officers in the case sub judice may have provided more specific information concerning their impressions as to the identity of the real property, this does not alter the basic character of the officers’ testimony. Hearsay does not cease to be such simply because there is more of it. There is no basis in law or fact for the majority’s conclusion that Johnson may be distinguished.
Nor was the identity of the real property established by any other source. As conceded by the majority, the map introduced into evidence did not provide evidence of the location or boundaries of the Code-designated properties and thus was deficient to provide prima facie evidence on this issue as allowed under OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (e). And finally, OCGA § 24-3-13 does not apply in this case since there was no evidence of the boundaries of the designated properties by proof of ancient tradition and reputation in the community. See McAfee v. Newberry, 144 Ga. 473, 474 (87 SE 392).
The State failed to provide any proof that the real property identified by the law enforcement officers is of the type designated in OCGA § 16-13-32.5 (a) and (b). Therefore, I would hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict as to *729the offense of dispensing and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a recreation center and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a housing project.
Decided June 6, 1997.
Before Judge Kreeger.
Patrick G. Longhi, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Ann B. Harris, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith and Judge Ruffin join in this- dissent.