Court Opinion

ID: 9538316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:34:44.763004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:44.102003
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — In its case against the defendants, the State made the serendipitous discovery that certain conversations between the defendants and a federal undercover agent had been recorded by federal agents. It is conceded that the recording was made in accordance with federal law. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1976). The majority, however, holds the state privacy act (RCW 9.73) applicable and that the recordings must be suppressed. I disagree.
The state act applies to matters intercepted or recorded by "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the state of Washington, its agencies, and political subdivisions". RCW 9.73.030(1). Even though neither the United *550States government nor its agents are mentioned in the statutory list, the majority concludes that the legislature intended the statute to apply to them. To reach this result, the majority says at pages 537-38:
This principle [expressio unius est exclusio alterius], however, is not applicable in the present case because federal agents are, in fact, included within one of the general classes listed in the statute. The privacy act provides that it is applicable to "any individual." RCW 9.73.030(1). Interpreting this phrase, as we must, in accordance with its ordinary meaning (see In re Lehman, 93 Wn.2d 25, 27, 604 P.2d 948 (1980)), we conclude the legislature intended the statute to apply to all individuals, including federal agents.
Moreover, as we have repeatedly cautioned, the maxim of express mention and implicit exclusion "'is to be used only as a means of ascertaining the legislative intent where it is doubtful, and not as a means of defeating the apparent intent of the legislature.'" DeGrief v. Seattle, 50 Wn.2d 1, 12, 297 P.2d 940 (1956); State ex rel. Becker v. Wiley, 16 Wn.2d 340, 350-51, 133 P.2d 507 (1943); State ex rel. Spokane United Rys. v. Department of Pub. Serv., 191 Wash. 595, 598, 71 P.2d 661 (1937). The legislature's employment of the term "any individual" evinces an intention to render the statutory requirements broadly applicable to all individuals who might conceivably record a conversation. The maxim of express mention and implicit exclusion cannot be rigidly applied to exclude federal agents and thereby defeat the intent of the legislature.
The majority claims too much and strips any vitality from the listing made in the statute. Since persons rather than abstract entities must in fact record or intercept any communication, under the analysis of the majority only the word "individual" would be needed in RCW 9.73.030(1). The inclusion of the other categories indicates the legislature obviously had something else in mind. We must give effect to all the language of the statute. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). Nothing indicates the "apparent intent" of the legislature was to use the term "individual" as a catchall. Rather, it is reasonable to infer *551legislative intent was to cover persons acting as individuals, members of a partnership, agents of a corporation, or associations, or in the employ of the State of Washington, its agencies or political subdivisions. The federal government is not included in this list.
To determine legislative intent is difficult at best; but I believe here there is no question of what the legislative intent was not. By no process of reasoning or logic, given the list of RCW 9.73.030(1), can it be shown that "individual" refers to agents of the federal government or that it was so intended to refer. The majority seems to recognize this and does not try to persuade — it simply concludes.
For reasons known to itself, the legislature plainly and unambiguously did not include recordings or interceptions by the federal government or its agents within the ban of the privacy statute. The wisdom of this action is not for the courts to determine. State v. Wanrow, supra at 232. Indeed, it could be argued that, since the legislature was aware of the statute allowing valid federal wiretaps to be used in state courts (18 U.S.C. § 2517(3) (1976)), it deliberately left out any provision as to federal officers. The decision by the legislature should be honored; the recordings should be admitted. See Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wn.2d 25, 548 P.2d 541 (1976).
I dissent.
Stafford and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied November 18, 1980.