Court Opinion

ID: 9734587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:37.739562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.756418
License: Public Domain

*172WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Under the more lenient “fair and just” standard applicable to a presentencing motion to withdraw guilty plea, in my opinion, the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion. Leave to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing should be allowed freely, “ ‘if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’ ” Gooding v. United States, 529 A.2d 301, 306 (D.C.1987) (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). Here, factors for allowing withdrawal weighed strongly in appellant’s favor (i.e., assertion of legal innocence, early request for withdrawal, and lack of prejudice to the government). See Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, 191 (D.C.1995) (citing Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1992) (other citations omitted)). Appellant asserted his innocence both before and after the plea, and he advanced a cognizable defense. Specifically, he contended that he was not at the scene of the crime, and there was evidence that the victims had failed to identify him. Unknown to the trial court at the time of the plea, appellant had taken two drugs, dilantin and phenobarbital, a narcotic, which he contended, affected his ability to think. The trial court found specifically that withdrawal of the plea would not prejudice the government. On these facts, which are set forth more fully in the majority opinion, the “fair and just” standard was met, in my view.
Where the trial court erred in its analysis, in my opinion, was in deciding the merits of the defense advanced by appellant. In resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed before sentencing, the “ ‘court should not attempt to decide the merits of the proffered defense, thus determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.’ ” Gooding, supra, 529 A.2d at 306 (quoting Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 272 F.2d 499, 502 (1959)). I must disagree with the majority that this court’s decision in Austin v. United States, 356 A.2d 648, 649 (D.C.1976) requires us to hold to the contrary. On this issue, we are bound to follow the decision in Gearhart, which holds that the court should not resolve the merits of the defense in deciding the motion. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) (Decisions of the D.C. Circuit rendered before February 1, 1971, “constitute the case law of the District of Columbia”).
The trial court also faded to evaluate the strength of the government’s proffer. The weakness of the government’s proffer tends toward allowing withdrawal of the guilty plea. Gooding, supra 529 A.2d at 306. Here, the government acknowledged in its proffer that there would be conflicting testimony about who actually shot the victim. As the majority points out, the trial court also made no explicit findings concerning the competence of counsel, a critical consideration in the analysis. Id. at 307. Given these omissions in the evaluation of appellant’s request, the error in the treatment of appellant’s assertion of a defense, the absence of prejudice to the government, and the other factors favoring withdrawal, I can only conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.