Court Opinion

ID: 9883051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:36:04.949671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:19.321537
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Harlan
dissenting.
By the treaty of 1880-1881, with China, the Government of .the United States agreed to exert all its power to devise measures for the protection, against ill treatment at the hands .of other persons, of Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other class, permanently or temporarily residing, at the time, in this country, and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions to which the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation are entitled, by treaty, to enjoy here. It would seem from the decision in this case, that if Chinamen, having a right, under the treaty, to remain in our country, are forcibly driven from their places of bfisiness, the Government of the United States is without power, in its own courts, to protect them against such violence, or to punish those who, in this way, subject them to ill treatment. If this be-so, as to Chinamen lawfully in the United States, it must be equally true as to the citizens or subjects of every other foreign nation, residing or doing business here under the sanction of treaties with their respective governments.
I do not think that such is the present state of the law, 'and must dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court.
It is conceded in the opinion of the court to be within the constitutional power of Congress to provide — as by § 5508 of *695the Revised Statutes it has doné — that “ if two ok more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by .the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or: if two or more persons go in disguise on..the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined,” &c. It is also conceded that, in ■ the-meaning of that section, a treaty between this Government and a foreign nation is a “ law ” of the United States ;■ and that the wrongs done by Baldwin and others to the subjects of the Emperor of China, named in the warrant, prevented the free exercise and enjoyment of rights and’ privileges secured to those aliens.by the treaty between .the United States and. China. I concur in these views,, but am unable to assent to the proposition that the offence charged is not embraced by the foregoing section or by any other valid enactment of Congress.
My brethren hold that § 5508 describes only wrongs done to a “ citizen; ” in other words, that Congress did not intend, by that section, to protect the free exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the ■ United States, except where citizens are concerned. This, it seems to me, is an interpretation "of the statute which its language neither demands nor justifies. Observe, that the subject with which Congress was dealing was the protection of “ any right or privilege” secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. There» is, perhaps, plausiblé ground for holding that the first clause of § 5508 embraces only a conspiracy directed against a “ citizen.” But the succeeding clause describes two other and distinct offences, namely, the going of two or more persons “ in disguise on the highway,” and the going of two or more persons “ on the premises of another ” — that is, upon the premises of another person — with intent, in either case, to prevent or hinder the free exércise or enjoyment by such person of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States. The use of the word *696“another,” instead of “citizen,” in the latter clause, shows that, in respect of rights and privileges so secured, Congress had in mind the protection of persons, whether citizens or not. In this view, the statute is not unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the first section of which recognizes as well rights appertaining to citizenship as rights belonging to persons. Baldwin and others, according to the statements in the warrant, certainly did go “ on the premises of another,” with the intent; to interfere with rights which the court concede are secured by treaty, and, therefore, by the supreme law of the land. Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536, 540; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. In my judgment the case is within both the letter and spirit of the statute. It is, however, excepted by the court from its operation by imputing to Congress the purpose of withholding national protection from those who do not happen to enjoy the privileges of American citizenship, — a purpose inconsistent with the obligations which the nation has assumed by treaties with other countries. I cannot think it possible that Congress, while providing for the punishment of two or more persons, who go* on the premises of a citizen, with intent to prevent his free exer'cise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, purposely refrained from providing for the punishment of the same persons going on the premises of one, not a citizen, with intent to prevent the enjoyment by the latter of rights secured by the same Constitution and laws.
The rule of -interpretation which the court lays down, if applied in other cases, will lead to strange results. Ve have statutes which give “ to every person who is the head of a family, or who has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is- a citizen of the United States, or who has filed his declaration of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization laws,” &c., Kev. Stat. §§ 2289, 2290, and 2291, the right, for purposes’ of a homestead, and under certain conditions, to enter unappropriated public lands. The party making the entry, or, if he be dead, his widow, &c., will be entitled ultimately to receive a patent, provided he resides upon and cultivates the land fór a certain length of time, and provided, in *697the .case of the foreigner, he shall have become a citizen of the United States prior to his application for a patent. Now, suppose that an entry is made, under the homestead statute, by a citizen, and a similar entry is made at the same time,, in the same locality, by one who has only filed his declaration of intention to become a'citizen. During the period-of residence upon and cultivation of the lands both of the parties so making entries are, we will suppose, forcibly driven from the land by a lawless band of persons, with the intent to prevent them from perfecting their respective rights to a patent. In' the case of the citizen thus wronged, .we held in United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, that he may invoke the protection given- by § 5508, and in that way have the wrong-doers punished in a court of the United States as therein prescribed. But in the case of the person who has only declared his intention to become a citizen, the wrong-doers cannot be reached by indictment in a court of the United States, because, under the decision in this case, that section only furnishes protection to citizens.
It is said — though I believe no such suggestion is made by the court — that the words “if two or more persons go in disguise -on the highway, or on^.the premises of another,” apply only when the offenders are “ in disguise.” I cannot suppose that Congress intended to make a distinction between wrongdoers going in disguise “ on the premises of another,” for the purpose of interfering with rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and wrong-doers Avho openly and Avithout masks enter upon the same premises with a like unlawful purpose. . It intended, rather, to guard the homes of all persons against invasion by combinations of lawless men, who seek, by entering those homes, to prevent the iree exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or laAvs of the United States. If the clause had read, “if tAVO or more persons go on the highway in disguise, or on the premises of another,” it Avould never ocqur to any one that the Avords x“ on the premises of another ” were qualified by the Avords “ in disguise.” The free exercise of personal rights secured by the United States should not be made to depend upon the trifling circum’stance that the *698■words “in disguise” precede,-rather than follow, the words “ on the highway.” ..
In my judgment the going of two or more persons, whether openly or iir disguise, on the premises of another, whether the . latter bé a citizen or not,' with intent to prevent hi§ free exercise or enjoyment of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, was made by § 5508 an offence, against the United States.
I feel obliged also to express my non-concurrence in so much of the opinion of the court as holds that Congress is without power under the Constitution to make it — as by § 5519 of the Eevised Statutes it is made — an. offence against the United States for two or more persons, in any state, “ to conspire, or go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any state . ■ . . from giving or securing to all persons within such state . . . the equal protection of the laws.”
It is not necessary, in this case, to inquire what is the full scope of that clause of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment, ' which provides that “ no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal’ protection of the laws.” It is sufficient to say, that that provision does something more than prescribe the duty and limit the power of the states. Taken in connection with the fifth section, conferring upon Congress power to enforce the Amendment by appropriate leg-. islation, that provision is equivalent to a declaration, in affirmative language, that every person within the jurisdiction of a state has a right to the equal protection of the laws; just as the prohibition in the Thirteenth Amendment, against the existence of slavery, operated not only to annul state laws upholding that institution, but to establish “universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States,” and to invest every individual person within their jurisdiction with the right of freedom, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 20; and just as the prohibition in the Fifteenth Amendment, against *699the denial or abridgment of the right of citizens of the United States to vote, on" account of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude, operated to invest such citizens with “a new constitutional right,” which “comes from the United States,” namely, “ exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214.
In the Civil Rights Cases, p. 23, above cited, it was held that Congress, under its express power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, could, so far as necessary or proper, enact legislation, “ direct and primary, operating upon the acts- of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not,” for the' purpose of eradicating “ all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude.” And since, in the matter of voting, the exemption of citizens from discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude is a right which •“ comes from the United States,” and is “ granted or secured by the United States,” United States v. Cruikshank above cited, can it be doubted that Congress, under its express power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, by appropriate legislation, could make it an offence, against the United States for two or more persons to conspire to deny or abridge the citizen’s right to vote, on account of his race or color ? Is there any recognized exception to the general rule that Congress may, by appropriate legislation, secure and protect rights: derived from or guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States 1 Believing that these questions must be answered in the negatjVe, I am unable to perceive any constitutional objection to § 5519; certainly, none of such a serious character as to justify this court in holding that Congress, by enacting it, has transcended its powers. If the United States is powerless to secure the equal protection of the laws to persons within the jurisdiction of a state, until the state, by hostile legislation, or by the action of her judicial authorities, shall have denied such protection, and can even then interfere only through the courts of the Union in suits involving either the validity of such state *700legislation, of the action of the state authorities, it is difficult to understand why Congress was invested with power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; for, without such' power of legislation, the courts of the Union are competent to- annul any state laws or reverse any action- of state judicial officers, which deny -the equal protection of the laws to any particular person or class of persons. Indeed, since the organization of the government, there has existed a remedy in the courts of the Union for any denial, in a state court, of rights, privileges, or immunities derived from the United States. It seems to me that the main purpose.of giving Congress power to enforce, by legislation, the provisions of the Amendment was, that the rights therein granted or guaranteed might be guarded and protected against lawless combinations of individuals, acting without the direct sanction of the state. The denial by the state of the equal protection of the laws to persons within its jurisdiction may arise as well from the failure or inability of the-state authorities to give that protection, as from unfriendly enactments. If Congress, upon looking over the whole ground, determined that an effectual and appropriate mode to secure such protection was to proceed directly against combinations of individuals, who sought, by conspiracy or by. violent means, to defeat the enjoyment of' tne right given by the Constitution, I do not see upon what ground the courts can question the validity of legislation to that end.
There is another view of this question which seems to be important. In United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76, and again in this case, the court has sustained the power of Congress to enact § 55.08, which, among other things, makes it an offence against the United States for two or more persons to “go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,” with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Now, it is difficult to understand why, if Congress can do this, it may not make it ah offence for the same persons (§ 5519) to “go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, for the purpose *701of depriving, directly or indirectly, any person or class of. persons, of the equal protection of the laws.” The only possible answer to this suggestion is to say that “ the equal protection of the laws ” is not a right or privilege secured by the Constitution of the United States. But that, it seenis to me, cannot be said,, without doing violence to the language of that instrument, and defeating the intention with which thé people adopted it.
It was long since announced by this court that “ Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any mteans which áre in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution.” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358. And in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 361, 421, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, .said: “ The sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respeet to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into' execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it. in the manner most beneficial to the people.” In view of these settled doctrines of constitutional. law, I am unwilling to say that it is not appropriate legislation for the enforcement of the right, given by the Constitution, to the equal protection of the laws, for Congress to make it an offence against the United States, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for two or more persons in any state to conspire, or go in disguise on the highway, or go on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving him of the equal protection of the laws.