Court Opinion

ID: 9388595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 00:00:36.234243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.222975
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40312        Document: 00516720028             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/20/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                      No. 22-40312
                                                                                     April 20, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                    ____________                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   Rogelio Roel Bustinza,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Omar Lucio, Cameron County Sheriff; Sergeant A. Delgado,
   Jailer; Sergeant J. Ybarra, Jailer; D (CPL) Castillo, Jailer;
   Sergeant Rodriguez, Jailer; G. Santos, Jailer; Dean Garza,
   Medical Doctor; Sergeant Ayala, Jailer; Juan Moya, Jailer; Noe
   Santibanez, Jailer; Julie Pena, Nurse,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:19-CV-36
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Proceeding pro se, former Texas prisoner Rogelio Roel Bustinza filed
   a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40312      Document: 00516720028          Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/20/2023

                                    No. 22-40312

   Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Freedom of Information
   Act, alleging myriad claims against various defendants based on events that
   occurred during his time in custody in the Cameron County Jail (“CCJ”).
   He sued defendants in their individual and official capacities and sought both
   monetary damages and injunctive relief. Most of his claims were dismissed
   by the district court under Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court later granted
   summary judgment for the defendants with respect to his remaining claims.
   Liberally construing Bustinza’s pro se appeal, he challenges the district
   court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of his claims concerning religious freedom, access
   to the courts, and conditions of confinement, as well as the district court’s
   denial of additional discovery at summary judgment. Finding no error with
   the district court’s judgment, we AFFIRM.
          We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Magee v. Reed, 912
   F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d
   287, 291 (5th Cir. 2017)). We also review grants of summary judgment de
   novo. McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). Summary
   judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
   a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
          Bustinza challenges the dismissal of his claim that his religious
   freedom was violated because CCJ denied him meat-free meals during Lent.
   Individual-capacity claims are not supported by RLUIPA; as such, we only
   consider Bustinza’s official-capacity claim. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of
   Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Sossamon v. Texas, 563
   U.S. 277 (2011). Bustinza does not contest that his claim for injunctive relief
   is moot—he was transferred from CCJ and eventually released, and he makes
   no argument that he is at risk of returning. See Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d

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   660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) (RLUIPA claim is moot where “the possibility of
   transfer back . . . is too speculative”). And his claim for monetary damages
   fails because sovereign immunity bars such suits under RLUIPA. Sossamon,
   563 U.S. at 293. Accordingly, this claim was properly dismissed.
          Bustinza’s challenge to the dismissal of his court-access claim also
   fails. He summarily alleges that his constitutional right to access the courts
   was violated because CCJ did not provide him access to a law library. But he
   must also demonstrate “a relevant, actual injury stemming from the
   defendant’s unconstitutional conduct.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 769
   (5th Cir. 2009). In other words, “[t]he inmate must describe the underlying
   claim well enough to show that its ‘arguable nature . . . is more than hope.’”
   Id. (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002)). Here,
   Bustinza fails to allege how he was injured by the lack of access to a law
   library—at most, he claims that his ability to challenge his underlying
   conviction was hindered. But he fails to identify any legal issue that he would
   have brought in his criminal appeal, and this is fatal to his claim. Id.
          Bustinza also claims that his conditions of confinement at CCJ were
   unconstitutional. His most extreme allegations are that the cells were very
   cold, that one of three toilets of his cell block was broken for approximately
   one week and dripped human waste onto the floor, and that inmates were not
   provided gloves to clean toilets or disinfectant for hair clippers or nail cutters.
   To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Bustinza must plead facts
   establishing: (1) “that the deprivation alleged was sufficiently serious (i.e., an
   official’s act or omission must have resulted in the denial of ‘the minimal
   civilized measure of life’s necessities’),” and (2) “that the prison official
   possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Herman, 238 F.3d at 664
   (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). Bustinza does not
   allege sufficiently serious deprivations to establish a constitutional violation.
   We have previously held that allegations of “uncomfortable” temperatures,

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   without more, cannot support a finding that a plaintiff was subject to cruel
   and unusual punishment, Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1995),
   and that a toilet leaking for an insubstantial amount of time is not a
   constitutional violation, see Davies v. Fuselier, 252 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (per curiam) (unpublished). Moreover, Bustinza admits in his complaint
   that, while he did not receive his preferred cleaning materials, he received
   alternative supplies (a mop bucket and water) to disinfect his cell and the
   toilets. Taken as true, these allegations are insufficient to show an Eighth
   Amendment violation.
          Finally, Bustinza challenges the district court’s denial of his request
   for additional discovery. He sought discovery in relation to two retaliation
   claims that were dismissed by the district court at summary judgment.
   Specifically, he sought sworn statements from defendants, access to the
   docket to recover witness information, and video camera recordings from
   CCJ, which he alleges would show that defendants were lying to the court
   and that the alleged retaliation occurred. To support this request, Bustinza
   was required to specify how the “additional discovery [would] defeat the
   summary judgment motion.” King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
          As the district court recognized, Bustinza failed to explain how this
   evidence would create a material factual dispute to defeat summary
   judgment. His first retaliation claim for retaliatory assault was dismissed at
   summary judgment because he did not allege that he exercised a
   constitutional right, which is a necessary element for retaliation claims. See
   Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 252 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that, for a
   retaliation claim, a prisoner must prove that “he or she exercised a
   constitutional right”). Additional evidence cannot change this legal
   conclusion, which Bustinza does not dispute. And Bustinza’s second
   retaliation claim, which concerned a retaliatory shakedown, was dismissed
   because, inter alia, he presented no evidence of the grievances that allegedly

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                                   No. 22-40312

   precipitated the shakedown. The additional discovery would not uncover
   anything that would create a material factual dispute with respect to this
   issue. Defendants have already produced Bustinza’s entire prisoner file,
   which included any grievances and inmate request forms filed by him, and
   provided those records to Bustinza. Any further discovery in this case would
   have amounted to a fishing expedition, and the district court properly denied
   Bustinza’s request for additional discovery.
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

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