Court Opinion

ID: 9408208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 19:08:51.772951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.738391
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. T.,                               :
                  Petitioner         :
                                     :
     v.                              : No. 94 M.D. 2022
                                     :
The Pennsylvania State Police of the :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
                  Respondent         : Submitted: March 24, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE CEISLER                                     FILED: July 11, 2023

         Before this Court are the Preliminary Objections filed by the Pennsylvania State
Police (PSP) to M.T.’s First Amended Petition for Review for Declaratory Judgment
and a Writ of Mandamus (Amended Petition), seeking to dismiss the Amended Petition
under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(a)(4) for failure to state a legally sufficient claim for relief. In
his Amended Petition, M.T. challenges PSP’s imposition of a lifetime sex offender
registration requirement based on his prior conviction for sex offenses in the State of
Utah on numerous grounds. For the reasons that follow, we sustain PSP’s Preliminary
Objections and dismiss the Amended Petition.

                                       Background
         On June 17, 2014, following a jury trial, M.T. was convicted in Utah of eight
counts of sexual exploitation of a minor under former Utah Code § 76-5a-3(1)(a). Am.
Pet. ¶¶ 3-4; see M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. B. The Utah conviction was based
on M.T.’s possession of child pornography, for which he was arrested in February
2011. See M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. B.1 Three months after M.T.’s arrest, but
before his conviction, the Utah legislature renumbered Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the
Utah Code as Section 76-5b-201.2 See PSP Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs., Ex. B.
       M.T.’s criminal “conviction implicated sex offender registration requirements in
Utah.” Am. Pet. ¶ 5. M.T. avers that he subsequently moved to Pennsylvania, after
which PSP informed him that he was subject to a 10-year sex offender registration
requirement. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. However, on April 22, 2021, PSP notified M.T. that he would
be subject to lifetime registration, allegedly without any explanation for the change in
registration. Id. ¶ 9.3

       1
           The Utah Court of Appeals set forth the details of M.T.’s criminal case as follows:

       In February 2011, Deputy O’Hara of the Utah County Sheriff’s Office located an IP
       address in Utah County that had shared a number of known child pornography files.
       He learned that the IP address was assigned to a Brigham Young University (BYU)
       student living in university housing. Deputy O’Hara obtained a search warrant for the
       apartment and went with six to eight other officers, including officers from the BYU
       Police Department, to execute the warrant.

M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. B. When the officers executed the search warrant at M.T.’s
apartment, which M.T. shared with his wife, he “initially claimed to have accidentally downloaded
pornography and to have immediately deleted the file-sharing software.” Id. Following the officers’
search of M.T.’s computer, “[M.T.] was charged with ten counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, a
second-degree felony. . . At trial, defense counsel obtained a directed verdict on two of the ten counts
of sexual exploitation of a minor, and [M.T.] was ultimately convicted of the remaining eight counts.”
Id.

       2
         Section 76-5b-201(2) of the Utah Code provides: “An actor commits sexual exploitation of
a minor when the actor knowingly possesses or intentionally views child pornography.” Utah Code
§ 76-5b-201(2) (West 2023). Section 76-5b-201(3) of the Utah Code provides that the offense of
sexual exploitation of a minor is a second-degree felony. Id. § 76-5b-201(3) (West 2023); see M.T.
Answer to Prelim. Objs., Ex. A.

       3
        M.T. does not aver when he moved to Pennsylvania, asserting only that he had been in
Pennsylvania “for several years” when PSP changed his registration period from 10 years to lifetime.
M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 10.

                                                   2
      On September 14, 2022, M.T. filed his Amended Petition in this Court’s original
jurisdiction, seeking a declaration “that [he] is subject to a registration period of 10
years pursuant to [Section 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA II),] 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A)[,] as a matter of law”
and a writ of mandamus compelling PSP to change his registration period to [10] years
. . . .” Id. ¶ 35. M.T. also seeks a declaration that “as applied to [him], [Section 9799.56
of SORNA II,] 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.56[,] violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” and “that the reclassification
at issue ran afoul of [his] reliance expectations, his right to reputation and due process
and was an illegal modification of his criminal justice sentence.” Id.
      On September 15, 2022, PSP filed its Preliminary Objections in the nature of a
demurrer to the Amended Petition. Specifically, PSP asserts that M.T. was convicted
of sex offenses in Utah that, under Utah law, require lifetime registration as a sex
offender. Thus, PSP asserts that M.T. is likewise subject to lifetime registration in
Pennsylvania under Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii) of SORNA II, 42 Pa. C.S. §
9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii). PSP further contends that M.T.’s constitutional claims are
foreclosed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.
Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2020).
      On October 2, 2022, M.T. filed an Answer to the Preliminary Objections,
asserting that because the criminal statute under which he was convicted, former Utah
Code § 76-5a-3(1)(a), is no longer in effect, Utah law does not impose a reporting
obligation for a conviction under that statute. M.T. asserts that he should instead be
subject to a 10-year registration requirement, because his Utah conviction is similar to
the Pennsylvania offense of possession of child pornography under Section 6312 of the

                                             3
Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312,4 which carries a 10-year registration requirement.
Thus, M.T. asserts that, under Section 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A) of SORNA II, 42 Pa. C.S. §
9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A), he is subject to a 10-year registration period. In the alternative,
M.T. asserts that PSP’s increase of his registration period from 10 years to lifetime
violated the equal protection clause, his right to reputation, and the prohibition of ex
post facto laws.
       Both parties have also filed briefs with this Court in support of their respective
positions.5
                                              Analysis
                             1. Applicable Registration Period
       PSP first asserts that the Amended Petition fails to state a legally sufficient claim
because M.T.’s lifetime registration obligation under SORNA II is based on his Utah
conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, which requires lifetime registration in
Utah. In response, M.T. asserts that the statute of conviction, former Utah Code § 76-
5a-3(1)(a), has been “repeal[ed]” and, as a result, Utah’s sex offender registration law
does not impose a registration requirement on a person convicted under former Section

       4
         Section 6312(d) of the Crimes Code states: “Any person who intentionally views or
knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape,
computer depiction or other material depicting a child under the age of 18 years engaging in a
prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act commits an offense.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312(d).

       5
         In ruling on preliminary objections, this Court must “accept as true all well-pleaded material
allegations in the petition for review and any reasonable inferences that [it] may draw from the
averments.” Highley v. Dep’t of Transp., 195 A.3d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). However, we
are “not bound by legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations,
or expressions of opinion encompassed in the petition for review.” Id. This Court should sustain
preliminary objections only where “the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot succeed on his
claim.” Id. at 1083. “[W]here any doubt exists as to whether the preliminary objections should be
sustained, the doubt must be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.” Pa. State
Lodge, Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Dep’t of Conservation & Nat. Res., 909 A.2d 413, 416 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2006), aff’d, 924 A.2d 1203 (Pa. 2007).

                                                  4
76-5a-3(1)(a). M.T. Answer to Prelim Objs. ¶ 11. Thus, M.T. contends that because
Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) is “no longer on the books,” PSP must impose the registration
period applicable to the equivalent criminal offense under Pennsylvania law, which is
10 years. Id. ¶ 10. We disagree.
      Subchapter I of SORNA II governs the continued registration of sex offenders
who were convicted of a sex offense committed between April 22, 1996, and December
20, 2012, and whose period of registration had not expired at the time of SORNA II’s
enactment in 2018. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.52(1) and 9799.54(a)(4). Section
9799.56(b) of Subchapter I applies to individuals, such as M.T., who were “convicted
or sentenced by a court . . . in jurisdictions outside this Commonwealth.” Id. §
9799.56(b). In particular, Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) provides in relevant part:

      [I]f the individual has been convicted or sentenced by a court . . . for an
      offense listed in [S]ection 9799.55(a) or an equivalent offense, the
      individual shall be, notwithstanding [S]ection 9799.53, considered an
      offender and subject to registration under this subchapter. The individual
      shall also be subject to the provisions of this [S]ection and [S]ections
      9799.60 and 9799.63(c)(2). The individual shall be subject to this
      subchapter for a period of 10 years or for a period of time equal to the
      time for which the individual was required to register in the other
      jurisdiction . . . , whichever is greater, less any credit due to the individual
      as a result of prior compliance with registration requirements.

Id. § 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) (emphasis added). The list of offenses in Section 9799.55(a)
of Subchapter I includes “18 Pa. C.S. § 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children),”
which criminalizes the possession of child pornography and carries a 10-year
registration obligation. Id. § 9799.55(a)(1)(i)(A); see id. § 9799.55(a)(3) (stating that
the 10-year registration period applies to individuals who reside in Pennsylvania but

                                             5
“who have been convicted of offenses similar to the crimes” listed in Section
9799.55(a)(1) and (2) in another state).6
       Pursuant to Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) of Subchapter I, we must look to Utah law
to determine whether the registration obligations for the equivalent offenses in Utah
and Pennsylvania differ. M.T. was convicted in Utah of sexual exploitation of a minor
under former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code, renumbered as Section 76-5b-
201. Under Utah law, a conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor requires lifetime
registration. See Utah Code § 77-41-105(3)(c)(1) (West 2023) (“An offender convicted
as an adult of an offense listed in Section 77-41-106 shall, for the offender’s lifetime,
register each year . . . .”) (emphasis added); Utah Code § 77-41-106(11) (West 2023)
(identifying Utah Code § 76-5b-201, sexual exploitation of a minor, as an offense
subject to lifetime registration).             Pennsylvania law, however, imposes a 10-year
registration period for the equivalent offense of sexual abuse of children. Therefore,
under Section 9799.56(b)(4)(iii) of Subchapter I, M.T. is subject to Utah’s longer
registration period, which is lifetime registration.7

       6
          The list of offenses in Section 9799.55(a) also includes “18 Pa. C.S. § 6320 (relating to
sexual exploitation of children),” which likewise carries a 10-year registration obligation. However,
the parties do not dispute that, despite its title, Section 6312 of the Crimes Code is the equivalent
Pennsylvania offense in this case.

       7
           As this Court recently explained:

       Pennsylvania extends full faith and credit to out-of-state [sex offender] registration
       schemes. See 42 Pa.[ ]C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4) (someone who is convicted in “another
       state” but resides, is employed, or is a student in the Commonwealth, and is required
       to register under a sexual offender statute of that state where he was convicted, shall
       register within three business days of arrival in the Commonwealth). When the
       Commonwealth considers whether an individual convicted in another state must
       register as a sex offender, the Commonwealth follows the state of conviction’s
       registration requirements.

Rivera v. Pa. State Police, 255 A.3d 677, 683 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (emphasis added).

                                                    6
      Furthermore, PSP asserts that M.T. is also required to register for life under
Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) of Subchapter I, which provides in relevant part:

      If the individual has been . . . determined under the laws of the other
      jurisdiction . . . to be subject to active notification and lifetime registration
      . . . on the basis of a statute . . . requiring active notification and lifetime
      registration based solely on the offense for which the individual was
      convicted, sentenced or court martialed, the individual shall,
      notwithstanding [S]ection 9799.53, be considered a sexually violent
      predator and subject to lifetime registration under [S]ection 9799.55(b).

42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.56(b)(4)(i) (emphasis added). Again, the Utah Code imposed a
lifetime registration obligation on M.T. based on his conviction for sexual exploitation
of a minor. Consequently, pursuant to Section 9799.56(b)(4)(i) of Subchapter I, M.T.
is “considered a sexually violent predator and subject to lifetime registration” in
Pennsylvania. Id. Therefore, we agree with PSP that under both subsections (i) and
(iii) of Section 9799.56(b)(4), M.T. is required to register for life in Pennsylvania.
      M.T.’s repeated assertion before this Court that the Utah offense of which he
was convicted was “repealed” and is “no longer on the books” is erroneous. See M.T.
Answer to Prelim. Objs., ¶¶ 10-11; M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 4-5,
10, 12. This Court’s research reveals that the offense of sexual exploitation of a minor
is still on the books in Utah; former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code was merely
“renumbered” as Section 76-5b-201 prior to M.T.’s 2014 conviction. See State v.
Roberts, 345 P.3d 1226, 1231 n.3 (Ut. 2015) (noting that “[i]n 2011, the [Utah]
Legislature renumbered [S]ection 76-5a-3 as [Section] 76-5b-201 and made minor
change to its substance”); see also PSP Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs., Ex. B (2022
West/Thomson Reuters printout showing that Section 76-5a-3 of the Utah Code was
“[r]enumbered as § 76-5b-201,” “eff[ective] May 10, 2011”); id., Ex. A (printout from
the Utah Department of Corrections Sex and Kidnap Offender Registry, dated March

                                             7
2, 2015, identifying M.T.’s offense as “76-5b-201 - SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
MINOR/2ND DEGREE FELONY”) (capitalization in original). Thus, contrary to
M.T.’s assertion, former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a) of the Utah Code was not repealed or
otherwise removed from the Utah Code.
       Accordingly, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection challenging M.T.’s failure
to state a claim that PSP imposed an incorrect registration period under Subchapter I
of SORNA II based on his Utah conviction.
                                    2. Constitutional Claims
       Next, PSP asserts that each of M.T.’s constitutional claims fail to state a legally
sufficient claim for relief. In response, M.T. maintains that PSP’s imposition of
lifetime registration on him violates his equal protection and reputational rights and is
contrary to the prohibition of ex post facto laws.
                                       A. Equal Protection
       M.T. asserts that the lifetime registration requirement imposed by Section
9799.56(b)(4) of Subchapter I, as applied to him, violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 In support of this
claim, M.T. asserts that he is being treated differently than similarly situated sex
offenders in Pennsylvania merely because he was convicted of possessing child
pornography in Utah. According to M.T., “there is no rational basis for making him
register for life merely because he was convicted in Utah when every single person
convicted of possessing child pornography in Pennsylvania is only required to register
for 10 years.” M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 7-8 (emphasis in original).
       Equal protection is the constitutional principle that “like persons in like
circumstances will be treated similarly” under the law. Doe v. Miller, 886 A.2d 310,

       8
          The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

                                                   8
315 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), aff’d, 901 A.2d 495 (Pa. 2006). Generally, “economic and
social legislation, including legislation creating classifications or categories among
criminal offenders, receives rational basis review.” Jackson v. Com., 143 A.3d 468,
474 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). In assessing whether a rational basis exists, “we must first
determine whether the challenged statute seeks to promote a legitimate state interest or
public value.” Id. at 476. We then examine whether the legislative classification “‘is
reasonably related to accomplishing that articulated state interest or interests.’” Id.
(quoting Doe, 886 A.2d at 316).
      Here, M.T. specifically invokes the “class of one” theory of equal protection, see
M.T. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 6, which our Court has explained as follows:

      The “class of one” theory . . . provides that a plaintiff states a claim for
      violation of the Equal Protection Clause when he “alleges that he has been
      intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that
      there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” A class of one
      claim alleges discrimination, not because of membership in a particular
      class (e.g., race or gender), but because of an official’s “ill will” or
      “spiteful effort” to harm him, or some other irrational reason. To allege
      an equal protection claim under a class of one theory, a plaintiff must show
      that “(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly
      situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no
      rational basis for the difference in treatment.”

Rivera v. Silbaugh, 240 A.3d 229, 241-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
      We conclude that M.T. has failed to sufficiently allege an equal protection
violation under the class of one theory. The basis for M.T.’s class of one equal
protection claim is that he is being treated differently than Pennsylvania offenders
convicted of possession of child pornography solely because he committed his offenses
in Utah. However, M.T. is not “similarly situated” to an offender who is required to

                                           9
register under Subchapter I based on a conviction for a Pennsylvania sex offense. The
relevant inquiry is whether M.T. is being treated differently than other sex offenders
who are required to register under Subchapter I based on an out-of-state conviction for
a triggering offense. M.T. does not allege that he is being treated differently than
similarly situated sex offenders whose registration obligations arose from out-of-state
convictions. See Com. v. Albert, 758 A.2d 1149,1151 (Pa. 2000) (“The essence of the
constitutional principle of equal protection under the law is that like persons in like
circumstances will be treated similarly.”) (emphasis added). Rather, under Section
9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii) of Subchapter I, M.T. is being treated in the same manner as
any other sex offender who is subject to lifetime registration based on a conviction in
a state that has more stringent registration requirements than Pennsylvania. M.T. also
does not allege that PSP intentionally singled him out for discriminatory treatment due
to spite or vindictiveness, as is required for a class of one equal protection claim. See
Rivera, 240 A.3d at 242.
      We further conclude that a rational basis exists for the difference in treatment of
out-of-state sex offenders similarly situated to M.T. The requirements of Section
9799.56(b)(4)(i) and (iii) of Subchapter I are reasonably related to the legitimate state
interest of promoting public safety and accountability, because they ensure that lifetime
sex offender registrants from other jurisdictions do not move to Pennsylvania to avoid
their registration obligations. See Albert, 758 A.2d at 1153 (recognizing that “courts
are free to hypothesize reasons why the legislature created the particular classification
at issue and if some reason for it exists, it cannot be struck down, even if the soundness
or wisdom in creating the distinction is questioned”) (emphasis added); Small v. Horn,
722 A.2d 664, 672 (Pa. 1998) (under a rational basis analysis, “the government need
not have articulated the purpose or rationale supporting its action; it is enough that

                                           10
some rationale ‘may conceivably . . . have been the purpose and policy of the relevant
governmental decisionmaker’”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Cornell
Narberth, LLC v. Borough of Narberth, 167 A.3d 228, 243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (“A
‘class of one’ claim, like any equal protection claim evaluated under rational basis
review, cannot succeed ‘if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.’”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Therefore, we conclude that M.T. fails to sufficiently allege a class of one equal
protection claim.
       Accordingly, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection challenging M.T’s failure
to state a claim that the lifetime registration requirement imposed by Section
9799.56(b)(4) of Subchapter I, as applied to him, violates the Equal Protection Clause.9
                                          B. Reputation
       Next, M.T. asserts that PSP’s imposition of lifetime registration under SORNA
II violates his right to reputation under the Pennsylvania Constitution.10 M.T. alleges

       9
          In his Amended Petition, M.T. also baldly asserts that “[t]o the extent that [he] is being
treated differently than citizens of . . . Pennsylvania, the actions of [PSP] have frustrated his . . .
constitutional right to travel.” Am. Pet. ¶ 32. This Court recently rejected a similar claim involving
sex offender reporting requirements based on an out-of-state conviction in M.S. v. Pennsylvania State
Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 98 M.D. 2021, filed Apr. 11, 2022), stating:

       Registrant is not prohibited from entering, residing, working or studying in
       Pennsylvania. Rather, under the former version of SORNA, Registrant was merely
       subject to the same reporting requirements that were imposed by the South Carolina
       court upon his guilty plea to the sexual offense that he perpetrated upon a minor there.

Id., slip op. at 9 n.9 (emphasis added). The same rationale applies here, as PSP imposed on M.T. the
same registration obligation that was imposed by the State of Utah based on his Utah conviction.

       Pursuant to our Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, we may cite unreported panel
decisions of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a).

                                                 11
that he was initially required to register for a 10-year period when he moved to
Pennsylvania. Am. Pet. ¶ 8. He contends that it was only after he had lived in
Pennsylvania “for several years” that the PSP decided “[f]or seemingly no good
reason” to reclassify him as a lifetime registrant, thereby violating his right to
reputation. M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 10-11.
       As explained earlier, M.T. was a lifetime sex offender registrant when he moved
from Utah to Pennsylvania. See Utah Code §§ 77-41-105(3)(c)(1) and 77-41-106(11);
PSP Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs., Ex. A. This Court has previously rejected a
reputational harm claim by a petitioner who asserted that the imposition of lifetime
registration under Subchapter I of SORNA II based on his out-of-state conviction
violated his reputational interests, where he was already subject to lifetime registration
in the state of conviction. See T.P.B. v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 339 M.D.
2018, filed Sept. 13, 2021), slip op. at 10 (holding that the petitioner failed to state a
claim that his reputation was harmed when he was subjected to lifetime registration
under SORNA II after he moved from Texas to Pennsylvania, because “SORNA II did
not subject [him] to increased registration requirements,” since he was also a lifetime
registrant in Texas), aff’d, 278 A.3d 843 (Pa. 2022).
       In his Amended Petition, M.T. alleges, without providing any details or
supporting documentation, that PSP increased his registration period from 10 years to
lifetime at some point after he moved to Pennsylvania. Am. Pet. ¶ 8. The crux of
M.T.’s reputation argument is that PSP has now “branded [him] with a scarlet letter”

       10
          Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “All men are born equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and
reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 1. Our Court has recognized
that “reputation is among the fundamental rights that cannot be abridged without compliance with
state constitutional standards of due process.” Taylor v. Pa. State Police, 132 A.3d 590, 605 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc).

                                                12
of a lifetime sex offender registrant, which will “frustrate his ability to seek, obtain and
maintain employment in his field of choice: higher education.” M.T. Suppl. Br. in
Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 9, 11; see M.T. Answer to Prelim. Objs. ¶ 16 (averring that
M.T. is “pursuing an academic career”). However, even accepting as true M.T.’s
allegation that PSP increased his registration to lifetime after his relocation to
Pennsylvania, M.T. fails to demonstrate that his present designation as a lifetime sex
offender registrant has harmed his reputation, since he was already designated a
lifetime registrant by the State of Utah before he moved to Pennsylvania, and he
continues to be listed on Utah’s sex offender registry. See PSP Br. in Support of Prelim.
Objs., Ex. A; see also T.P.B., slip op. at 10. Instead, M.T. reiterates that he was not
subject to lifetime registration in Utah because the statute of conviction is no longer on
the books, see M.T. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim Objs. at 9-10, a claim we have already
rejected.11
       Accordingly, we sustain PSP’s preliminary objection challenging M.T.’s failure
to state a claim that the imposition of lifetime registration under SORNA II violates his
right to reputation.
                                         C. Ex Post Facto
       Finally, M.T. asserts that PSP’s application of SORNA II to him violates the ex
post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, because his

       11
           Curiously, although M.T. maintains that he is not subject to lifetime registration in Utah, he
admits in his Amended Petition that his criminal conviction, which post-dated the renumbering of
Utah’s sexual exploitation of a minor statute, “implicated sex offender registration requirements in
Utah.” Am. Pet. ¶ 5. He also admits that “[p]rior to his departure from Utah . . . , [he] complied with
his [registration and notification] obligations . . . under Utah law . . . .” Id. ¶ 7.

                                                  13
lifetime registration requirement is based on a criminal statute that did not exist until
after his arrest.12 Specifically, he asserts:

       [PSP] is suggesting that this Court should look to Utah Code § 76-5b-201
       to determine [M.T.’s] registration obligations. However, that statute was
       not in effect until after [his] arrest. Moreover, [PSP] wants this Court to
       ignore the fact that (a) the statute of conviction is not on the books, (b) the
       [sex offender] registration statute in Utah does not reference the statute of
       conviction, and (c) pretend that [M.T.] was arrested and convicted of the
       new statute and impose the applicable consequences on him as a result.
       This course of action is a violation of the ex post facto clause and should
       not be permitted.

M.T. Suppl. Br. in Opp’n to Prelim. Objs. at 12. We reject this claim.
       As explained above, M.T.’s statute of conviction, former Section 76-5a-3(1)(a)
of the Utah Code, was not repealed, it was merely renumbered as Section 76-5b-201.
The Utah offense of sexual exploitation of a minor, which criminalizes the possession
of child pornography, still exists and was the basis of both M.T.’s conviction and his
lifetime registration obligation in Utah. See PSP Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs., Exs.
A & B. Because M.T. was already subject to lifetime registration in Utah based on his
conviction for sexual exploitation of a minor, PSP’s imposition of lifetime registration
in Pennsylvania based on that same conviction was not an ex post facto violation. See
Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-27 (holding that the registration requirements in Subchapter
I of SORNA II are non-punitive and, thus, retroactive application of those requirements
does not violate the constitutional proscription against ex post facto laws); see also J.B.

       12
            The prohibition of ex post facto laws is found in Article I, Section 9 of the United States
Constitution, which states: “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” U.S. Const.
art. I, § 9. Article I, Section 10 similarly provides: “No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10. Pennsylvania’s ex post facto provision appears in Article I,
Section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which states: “No ex post facto law, nor any law
impairing the obligation of contracts, or making irrevocable any grant of special privileges or
immunities, shall be passed.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 17.

                                                  14
v. Pa. State Police, 288 A.3d 946, 956 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (“While we appreciate that
[the p]etitioner would be displeased and possibly negatively affected in public and his
community by being placed on the sex offender registry at this point, we note our
Supreme Court has found sex offender registration to be non-punitive.”) (citing
Lacombe).13
                                           Conclusion
       Accordingly, because we conclude that M.T.’s Amended Petition fails to state a
legally sufficient claim for relief, we sustain PSP’s Preliminary Objections in the nature
of a demurrer and dismiss the Amended Petition.

                                               ____________________________
                                               ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

       13
           M.T. also alleges that PSP is “imposing registration obligations on [him] in violation of
Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528 (Pa. 2021).” Am. Pet. ¶ 26. However, this Court has held
that “[n]othing in Santana, which relates solely to SORNA I, negates the holding of Lacombe, which
relates to SORNA II.” T.J. v. Pa. State Police, 288 A.3d 934, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023); accord Cao
v. Pa. State Police, 280 A.3d 1107, 1112 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).

                                                15
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. T.,                               :
                  Petitioner         :
                                     :
     v.                              : No. 94 M.D. 2022
                                     :
The Pennsylvania State Police of the :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,        :
                  Respondent         :

                                    ORDER

         AND NOW, this 11th day of July, 2023, we hereby SUSTAIN the Preliminary
Objections filed by the Pennsylvania State Police to M.T.’s Amended Petition for
Review and DISMISS the Amended Petition for Review.

                                        ____________________________
                                        ELLEN CEISLER, Judge