Court Opinion

ID: 9770221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:54:54.962123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:15.838384
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority but I disagree with the analysis employed in addressing several points.
Appellant’s first point of error is that the trial court erred in failing to submit the question of awarding interest on maintenance and cure to the jury. Although several causes of action were asserted by appellant-plaintiff, including Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, the only one on which he recovered was for maintenance and cure, a traditional admiralty remedy afforded to seamen injured in the service of the vessel regardless of its seaworthiness.
The majority is in error when it states on page 4 and 5 of the opinion: “Therefore, no damage award was made under the general maritime law, and appellant’s recovery of damages was based solely upon the Jones Act.” In fact, the sole recovery was for maintenance and cure, a maritime remedy. I do agree that the question of entitlement to interest on maintenance and cure is one of fact under the federal maritime system, thus requiring some evidence to justify submitting it to the jury.
Cross-Appellant’s first cross-point of error contends the vessel is not a proper party to the action because there was no service of process on the vessel, that being a requisite for in rem jurisdiction to attach. The majority views the point as disputing the propriety of in rem jurisdiction in state courts, and holds that state courts *242have no in rem maritime jurisdiction, in rem being exclusively a matter for the federal courts.
While the conclusion the majority reaches, that the federal courts may have maritime in rem jurisdiction to the complete exclusion of the state courts, may be correct, that conclusion is not supported by the cases cited by the majority nor was the question briefed by either party. The two cited cases are: Durden v. Exxon Corp., 803 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir.1986), and T.N.T. Marine Serv., Inc. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d 585, 587 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 847, 104 S.Ct. 151, 78 L.Ed.2d 141 (1983). In each ease the plaintiff brought an action sounding in two jurisdictional bases for the Federal District Court: diversity of citizenship and maritime. Each jurisdictional base gives rise to different procedures and laws. On the diversity side the applicable substantive law is the law of the state and one is entitled to trial by jury. When one sues on the admiralty side, the federal substantive maritime law prevails and there is no traditional right to a jury in maritime cases. The Fifth Circuit held' in both cited cases that when the plaintiff chooses to sue a vessel in rem, the exclusive jurisdiction is maritime and not diversity. In neither case was the question whether a state court had jurisdiction over a vessel.
In the absence of a point of error before us challenging whether a state court may exercise in rem jurisdiction over a vessel and appropriate briefing, I am reluctant to so hold. I therefore do not join the majority in its conclusion that a Texas court may not exercise in rem jurisdiction over a vessel under the maritime law.