Court Opinion

ID: 9734015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:22:53.030925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.116200
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two reasons:
1. the arrest was lawful, and
2. the search warrant was validly issued.
Thus, the evidence obtained was admissible.
*1137A. The Arrest
1. The Occupants Had No Expectation of Privacy When They Opened the Door.
The arrest without warrant was valid. It was made upon probable cause at a time when the hotel room occupants had no further expectation of privacy, i.e., when they voluntarily opened the hotel room door preparatory to leaving. United States v. Santana, (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300. Arrests without warrants under such circumstances are valid, even when the door is opened in response to a police knock. United States v. Botero, (9th Cir.1978) 589 F.2d 430, cert. den'd. 441 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2162, 60 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1979); People v. Burns, (Colo.1980) 200 Colo. 387, 615 P.2d 686. Here the police did not even knock, the door was opened voluntarily by the occupants. There was no need to wait until they reached the hallway. Reaching the threshold was enough.
2. The Hotel Room Was a "Place of Business" Not a "Home".
Further, under the uncontroverted facts of this case, Mr. Mowrer's hotel room was his place of business, not his transient home at the time the arrests were made. The evidence clearly demonstrates Mr. Mowrer came from Westminster, California, to Indianapolis for the sole and only purpose of transacting business, albeit illegal, in his Indianapolis hotel room with Mr. Burger of Jasper, Indiana, namely, the sale of illicit drugs. That was why he rented the hotel room. Its use for sleeping and eating was merely ancillary to that purpose.
While it could logically be argued the room was a "home" entitled to Fourth Amendment protection so long as it was used for eating and sleeping, such argument fails when the character of its use changed. The officers who had the room under surveillance waited until Mowrer left the room and returned with two other men two minutes later. It was reasonable for them to assume the sale would then be made based upon the information then available to them. Entry and arrest at that time would have been justified and lawful, but these officers chose to wait to be absolutely certain the transaction, in the vernacular, had "gone down." At the time these arrests were made, without question the hotel room was a place of business, not a home.
The facts of this case are on all fours with those of U.S, v. Blalock, (9 Cir.1978) 578 F.2d 245. There, as here the arrests were lawful because they were (a) based upon probable cause, and (b) consummated upon business premises during business hours. None of the hotel cases cited by the majority deal with hotel rooms rented for the purpose of transacting business. They deal with the primary use thereof as temporary "homes" to which the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment obviously applied.
Also because the arrests were made on "business" premises, they were lawful. The evidence thereby obtained was admissible.
B. The Hotel Room Search Was Lawful Because the Affidavit Contained Statements Constituting Probable Cause.
Our standard of review in Fourth Amendment matters is basically the same as in other cases we review on appeal. We may not weigh the evidence, nor determine the credibility of witnesses. Our inquiry is limited to the narrow question of whether a sufficient showing of probable cause was made so as to justify the magistrate's issuance of the search warrant involved. For our guidance when reviewing these matters, the United States Supreme Court laid out the following judicial benchmarks:
[We do not retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1062 [18 L.Ed.2d 62] (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United *1138States v. Ventresea, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745 [13 L.Ed.2d 684] (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270-271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735-736 [4 L.Ed.2d 697] (1960).
Spinelli v. United States, (1969) 393 U.S. 410, 419, 420, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 591, 21 L.Ed.2d 637.
While conclusory statements cannot establish probable cause, either information supplied by a reliable informant or independently corroborated information where no showing of the informant's reliability appears may supply the probable cause necessary for the issuance of such a warrant.
It is unquestioned the affidavit shows substantially all the information given the police by the informants was independently verified. Before the arrest was made the police first checked hotels near the Indianapolis airport and airline passenger manifests, but did not find the name "Jerry Moyer". When one of the informants later advised the last name was spelled "Mowrer", the police found he was registered at the Hyatt Regency. At that point the police had independently determined their informants' information was reliable in these particulars:
(a) Jerry Mowrer
(b) from Westminster,
(c) California,
(d) was registered at a "plush hotel" (the Hyatt Regency),
(e) in Indianapolis, and he
(£) had arrived on March 3rd, and extended his stay to
(g) March 5th.
Having independently verified the reliability of that much of their information, the police and the magistrate could reasonably assume the balance of it was accurate, and thus, the informants were reliable. Verification of that information provided the substantial basis necessary to give credence to the informants' "tips". United States v. Harris, (1971) 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli, supra.
The officers' observations of "white powder" on the money, table and suitcases further butressed probable cause. These observations were available in determining probable cause because the arrests were lawful.
The magistrate reasonably could and did find probable cause to issue the search warrant based upon the facts contained in the affidavit before him, the text of which is fully set out in the majority opinion.
Giving the magistrate's decision great deference, as we are required to do on appeal, I would affirm the trial court.