Court Opinion

ID: 9604713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:25:52.611162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:23.547029
License: Public Domain

Justice EXUM
dissenting.
The majority, disturbed about the result in this case, suggests that defendant might get relief from the Executive Branch. Because of a serious legal error in the trial, prejudicial to defendant, but not really dealt with in the majority opinion, I see no need to defer the matter to the Governor. This Court should recognize the error and order a new trial on the basis of it.
Defendant was charged in two indictments with two different rapes of his niece, Sherry Knight. The first indictment alleged that a rape occurred on 24 March 1978. The second indictment alleged that a second rape occurred on 28 July 1978.
Easter in 1978 fell on March 26. The prosecuting witness, Sherry Knight, testified unequivocally that the March incident took place “the Friday before Easter last year.” Thus she testified in accord with the indictment that the date of the March incident was March 24. She also tied the incident to the time that defendant, to whom she referred as “Uncle Mark,” picked her up to go get her Easter dress. She said that on this occasion he took her back to his home where, being alone, they engaged in sexual intercourse. About “five or ten minutes later” defendant’s wife, to whom Sherry referred as “Aunt Linda,” came in and the three of them “went and got my E aster dress.” Sherry was less clear as to the date of the July incident. She testified, in essence, that it happened sometime during the summer of 1978. During cross-examination when defendant was trying to elicit from Sherry the date of the July incident the district attorney stated before the jury that, in fact, he had picked out the date of 28 July and inserted it in the indictment. The witness, herself, according to the district attorney, did not arrive at that date. Sherry did not report these incidents until March 1979. She admitted that she “used to have a problem about lying, but it was before anything like this ever happened. I don’t know who I lied to, or what I lied about. I remember I used to lie ... .”
Defendant testified in his own behalf and offered corroborating witnesses. He denied being with the prosecuting witness on the *603dates alleged in the indictments. With regard to the dates of J uly 26, 27 and 28 defendant’s testimony tended to show that he, a gospel singer, was out of the state engaged in recording sessions in South Carolina. With regard to the March incident defendant’s evidence tended to show as follows: On Tuesday, March 14, defendant and his wife picked up Sherry at her home and took her to Sears where they bought her an Easter dress as they had done the year before. After the purchase they returned Sherry to her home. On Friday, March 17, defendant and his wife again picked up Sherry at her home and took her back to defendant’s home where she spent the weekend. Sherry slept in another bedroom with a friend of the Summitts on Friday and Saturday nights. Defendant was never alone with Sherry in his home during this weekend.
On this state of the evidence the trial judge instructed the jury regarding the July incident that the state “must be held to July 27, July 28, or July 29,1978 —” He gave no such limiting instructions with regard to the March incident, saying only that the jury would have to find that the March rape occurred “on or about March 24.” Defendant was acquitted in the July case but convicted in the March case.
The Court of Appeals found no error in this instruction on the ground that defendant had offered an alibi defense for July 28 but not for March 24. The trial judge, reasoned the Court of Appeals, was not required to limit the jury’s consideration to the date of March 24.
It is true that defendant did not attempt to establish where he was on March 24. He testified, in effect, that he was not with the prosecuting witness on that date and had never been with her at any time alone. Nevertheless because defendant admitted being with the prosecuting witness on several dates in March close to March 24, this date to me looms as crucial in the case based upon the March incident as does the date of July 28 in the case based upon that incident.
The prosecuting witness testified unequivocally that the rape occurred on March 24. She also tied the incident to the time defendant picked her up for the purpose of going to get her Easter dress. Defendant admitted being with the prosecuting witness when he bought her Easter dress but said that this was on Tuesday, March 14. He also admitted being with the prosecuting witness on March 17 through 21, the weekend she spent in defendant’s home. At all *604these times, according to defendant’s testimony, someone other than the prosecuting witness and defendant was always present. Defendant and the prosecuting witness were never alone. Under the judge’s instructions, however, the jury was permitted to consider whether the rape was committed on dates other than March 24. Left to roam in the month of March for possible dates upon which the rape might have occurred, the jury might well have seized upon the dates on which defendant admitted being with the prosecuting witness. This is particularly likely since the prosecuting witness tied the rape incident to the date when defendant bought her her new dress. By permitting the jury to consider these dates after defendant’s evidence was in, the trial judge undermined defendant’s legitimate reliance on the date alleged in the bill of indictment and testified to by the prosecuting witness, and thus ensnared defendant in his own defense. In other words, had the state’s evidence indicated uncertainty as to the exact date, defendant would have been on notice that the state was not relying on March 24 but that it was relying on some date at or about that time. Defendant might well have chosen not to testify at all, because to do so truthfully he would have to admit that he was with the victim although he did not rape her at or about the time the state contended the rape occurred. When the indictment alleged and the state’s evidence proved the date of the offense to have been March 24, defendant, in reliance thereon, chose to testify as he did: that he never raped her and was with her only on days other than the one alleged by the state and testified to by the alleged victim. By then permitting the jury to consider these other days, the trial court permitted, in effect, the jury to convict the defendant upon a theory which was not alleged in the bill of indictment and not supported by the state’s evidence, but which was supported in part at least by defendant’s own testimony.
Thus, in this case defendant, in considering what defense, if any, he could offer, was entitled to rely on the March 24 date. His testimony as to several March meetings with the prosecuting witness would not have been damaging to his defense but for the later instruction of the trial judge. Given that the defendant based his defense not only upon the fact that he did not rape the prosecuting witness, but also upon the fact that he was not even with her on the date alleged, the trial judge should have required the jury to find that defendant committed the act alleged, if at all, on March 24. Had he done so the jury would have been free to utilize all the *605defendant’s testimony against him; but the jury would then have had to decide whether defendant committed the act on the date alleged. By in effect allowing the jury to select other dates as the date of the crime, the trial court allowed defendant’s evidence, evidence which would have been helpful given a proper instruction, to be utilized to convict him.
It may be argued that the state offered some evidence that the rape occurred earlier than March 24 in the form of Sherry Knight’s testimony that it happened on the day defendant took her to buy her Easter dress. All the state’s evidence, however, is that this day was March 24, the Friday before Easter. It is only the defendant’s testimony combined with that of Sherry Knight which could support a date for the rape other than March 24. The argument only serves to heighten the fact that the court’s instructions regarding the March incident served to entrap defendant with his own defense.
I do not mean to suggest that a defendant is denied a fair trial whenever his own testimony so implicates him in the offense that it likely leads to his conviction. Every defendant takes that risk when he chooses to testify in his own behalf. My point is that a defendant should be able to decide whether to testify at all and what defense, if any, he should offer in reliance on what the state has alleged and tried to prove with regard to the date, time and nature of the offense. When a defendant does so rely and offers his defense accordingly, the trial judge ought not then instruct the jury so as to permit a conviction which is both at variance with the state’s case and supported only by defendant’s own defense. To do so, in my view, denies defendant the rudiments of due process.
I think this principle is supported by State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E. 2d 396 (1961), a case also involving the sexual abuse of minors. Defendants there, just as defendant here, relied on the time fixed in the bill of indictment in preparing for trial. At trial they relied on the state’s evidence in putting up their own defense. It is true that in Whittemore, the defense was alibi. Here, strictly speaking, the defense was not alibi with regard to the March incident. Nevertheless defendant’s reliance on the date of March 24 as being the date of the alleged crime was equally as strong as the defendants’ similar reliance in Whittemore. Defendants in Whittemore were given a new trial because the state in rebuttal offered evidence of offenses committed on other dates and the trial court instructed the jury that they could consider dates other than that charged in the bill of indictment. The Court said, *606255 N.C. at 592, 122 S.E. 2d at 403:
“True the time named in a bill of indictment is not usually an essential ingredient of the crime charged, and the State may prove that it was in fact committed on some other date. G.S. 15-155; S. v. Bryant, 228 N.C. 641, 46 S.E. 2d 847; S. v. Baxley, 223 N.C. 210, 25 S.E. 2d 621; S. v. Trippe, 222 N.C. 600, 24 S.E. 2d 340. But this salutary rule, preventing a defendant who does not rely on time as a defense from using a discrepancy between the time named in the bill and the time shown by the evidence for the State, cannot be used to ensnare a defendant and thereby deprive him of an opportunity to adequately present his defense. The State did not contend that there was confusion as to the time named in the bill of indictment. It insisted the date named was in fact the true date; but when defendants’ evidence, if believed, would establish their innocence, it then contended the jury could, nevertheless, convict for the subsequent asserted wrongful acts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Just as in Whittemore the state here does not contend that there was confusion as to the time named in the bill; indeed its evidence unequivocally supports the date alleged and no other. Also as in Whittemore, the state, through the trial judge’s jury instructions, is permitted to rely on other dates after defendant’s evidence has come in.
Had the trial judge not expressly limited the jury’s consideration to three particular dates with regard to the July incident his charge regarding the March incident, standing alone, may have been free from error. His words, “on or about March 24” may then have been taken by the jury as meaning that date or the dates immediately preceding or following. Since in the July case he did limit the jury’s consideration to the date charged in the indictment and the dates immediately preceding and following but did not so limit it with regard to the March incident, the jury undoubtedly felt that they could consider other dates in March.
This error in the instructions denied defendant a fair trial in keeping with the dictates of due process. State v. Whittemore, supra. I, therefore, vote for a new trial.
Justice COPELAND joins in this dissent.