Court Opinion

ID: 9952783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 19:03:21.722644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:29.081258
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Salih CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081891

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCE413415)

SEYIDXAN SALIH,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel G. Lamborn, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
         Rachel Varnell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Steve Oetting, Assistant Attorney General, and
Evan Stele, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         Seyidxan Salih appeals from a judgment imposed after a jury convicted
him of inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on his wife
(Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a))1 and misdemeanor violation of a protective
order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). We reject Salih’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel but agree that the trial court violated section 654 by imposing
concurrent sentences. Accordingly, we modify the judgment by staying the
misdemeanor sentence on count two and affirm the judgment as so modified.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. Domestic Violence Restraining Order
      In March 2022, the San Diego Superior Court issued a domestic
violence restraining order preventing Salih from having any contact with his
wife A.H. or coming within 100 yards of her. Salih was personally served
with the order while in court and in the presence of a judicial officer.
      B. 911 Call
      At 2:18 a.m. on June 21, 2022, A.H. called 911 from a Motel 6 in
El Cajon to report that Salih had just attacked her and she needed medical
assistance. When asked what happened, she initially told the dispatcher, “I
can’t talk right now ma’am, just please, I’m very shooken up.” A.H. was
panting and groaning on the call. She reported that Salih had attacked her,
broken her phone, and “busted [her] mouth” by assaulting her with his hand
in the parking lot. She said she blacked out from the blow, her tooth was
loose, and she thought there was blood coming out of her ear. She reported
that Salih drove off in a black car. An audiotape of the 911 call was played
for the jury at trial.
      C. A.H.’s Statements to Police
      Officer W. responded to the call and arrived at the motel at 2:25 or
2:26 a.m. A.H. was “shaken up” and had a swollen upper lip, bloody gums
and lower lip, loose tooth, and a swollen lump on her forehead and the side of

1     Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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her face. After the paramedics determined that her ear was not bleeding,
A.H. explained she believed she had touched her mouth and then her ear.
       A.H. reported that she and Salih were separated after three years of
marriage. The incident occurred after she called Salih from her new phone to
make arrangements for him to return an old phone of hers that was in his
possession. When Salih met her at the motel, he walked up and immediately
assaulted her with a closed fist between five and ten times. She briefly
blacked out and saw stars, fell to the ground, then saw Salih run back to his
car.
       Officer W. found a necklace on the ground in the area where the assault
had occurred. A.H. also handed him another similar piece of jewelry and said
both belonged to Salih. She did not explain where the second piece of jewelry
came from.
       An ambulance arrived and took A.H. to the hospital. A.H. did not
testify at trial.
       D. The Surveillance Video
       The police recovered a surveillance video from the Motel 6. The video
showed A.H. standing outside the Motel 6 lobby at 2:16 a.m. A man walked
up with a cigarette in his left hand and punched her in the face with his right
fist before A.H. fell back. They were both out of view of the camera for about
10 seconds. While they were out of view, a black car backed up towards them
and stopped in the parking lot. The man then walked back into view of the
camera and got into the passenger side of the black car, which drove away.
The video was played for the jury at trial.
       Officer W. located a photograph of Salih in a records system and
identified him in court. The assailant in the Motel 6 surveillance video
appeared to be the same person.

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      E. Criminal Proceedings
      The People charged Salih with inflicting corporal injury resulting in a
traumatic condition on a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and violating a
protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1)). As to both counts, the
information alleged the victim was a person defined in Family Code section
6211. It also alleged that Salih had previously been convicted of violating
Penal Code section 273.5 within seven years of the charged offenses.
      A jury convicted Salih on both counts and found true the allegations
under Family Code section 6211. Salih admitted his prior conviction under
Penal Code section 273.5.
      The trial court sentenced Salih to five years in prison. The court
imposed the midterm of four years for count one, a concurrent term of 364
days for count two, and a consecutive one-year term for a separate assault
conviction after revocation of probation in another case.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
      Salih first argues that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to object to the admission of A.H.’s statements to the police
on the grounds that they constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his
right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree.
      To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to
the defendant. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211 (Scott);
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688 (Strickland).)

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      It is “particularly difficult to establish ineffective assistance of counsel
on direct appeal, where we are limited to evaluating the appellate record. If
the record does not shed light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the
challenged manner, we must reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was
asked for and failed to provide a satisfactory explanation, or there simply can
be no satisfactory explanation.” (Scott, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1212.)
      “The decision whether to object to the admission of evidence is
‘inherently tactical,’ and a failure to object will rarely reflect deficient
performance by counsel.” (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1335;
see also People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 540 [“An attorney may choose
not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes
ineffectiveness of counsel.”].) This is so “even when there was a basis for
objection.” (People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 403.)
      Even assuming a valid basis for objection, Salih has not established
any deficient performance based on his counsel’s failure to object to A.H.’s
statements to the police. The record is silent as to defense counsel’s reasons
for failing to object, and this is not one of those rare instances in which there
could be no conceivable tactical purpose. On the contrary, the record shows
that defense counsel herself relied on A.H.’s statements to the police in
attempting to raise doubts about A.H.’s credibility. Specifically, in closing
argument, defense counsel cited A.H.’s statements to the police that (1) A.H.
was the one who called Salih to make arrangements for him to return her old
phone to her at a motel in the middle of the night—which defense counsel
relied on to suggest that A.H. was not telling the full story about the incident;
and (2) the two pieces of jewelry recovered from the scene belonged to Salih—

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which defense counsel relied on to suggest that A.H. may have yanked the

jewelry off him and there may have been a scuffle.2
      We cannot second-guess defense counsel’s tactical decision to make use
of this evidence in Salih’s defense, especially given the absence of any other
defense evidence. The case against Salih was otherwise overwhelming,
including A.H.’s account of the assault in her 911 call immediately after the
incident, the surveillance video corroborating A.H.’s account and showing
Salih assaulting her, the physical injuries A.H. sustained, and the stipulation
regarding the domestic violence protective order. Defense counsel may have
decided to make the best of a bad situation by attempting to use some of
A.H.’s statements to the police to cast doubt on her version of events and at
least raise a reasonable doubt. This would have been a rational tactical
reason for not objecting to the admissibility of these statements. Thus, Salih
cannot demonstrate deficient performance on this record. (See People v.
Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1052 [reviewing court will find ineffective
assistance of counsel “only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that
counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission” (internal
quotation marks omitted)].)

2     Defense counsel referred to these facts several times in her closing
argument. She also returned to them at the end of her closing argument as
follows: “I ask you to think about the evidence we do have. The fact that she
brought him there that night. She called him at 2:00 in the morning or
whatever time it was that she stepped outside of that hotel knowingly, and
she wasn’t concerned. She wanted her phone. She wanted her other phone
back. Why? Maybe she wanted to see him and talk about something.
Something transpired before he jumped out. . . . [¶] She said, ‘Come here,’
and he did. Whatever transpired between the two of them, there was clearly
an incident, but what transpired? Did she grab his chain and he jerked his
head or her head during the scuffle? She fell and hit her face. I don’t know
and neither do you, and that is why you have to find him not guilty.”

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      Likewise, Salih has not established the prejudice element of his
ineffective assistance claim. The assault was caught on video and reported
immediately. There was no dispute that Salih was the assailant depicted on
the video. The video alone established that Salih “willfully inflict[ed]
corporal injury” on A.H. (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and her injuries easily met the
statutory definition of a “traumatic condition.” (§ 273.5, subd. (d) [defining
“traumatic condition” as “a condition of the body, such as a wound, or
external or internal injury . . ., whether of a minor or serious nature, caused
by a physical force”].) The video and 911 call also established that Salih
committed a willful and knowing violation of the protective order by
deliberately having contact with A.H. and coming within 100 yards of her.
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1).) On this record, there is no reasonable probability the
jury would have reached a different result without the admission of A.H.’s
statements to the police. Even assuming any deficient performance by
defense counsel, it did not cause prejudice “in the sense that it ‘so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ ” (People v. Kipp (2001)
26 Cal.4th 1100, 1123, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686.)
                                        II
      Salih next argues that the trial court violated section 654 by imposing a
364-day concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor violation of a protective
order in count two. We agree.
      Section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for an “act or omission” that
is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. This restriction
applies not only to a single act or omission, but also an indivisible “course of
conduct” violating multiple provisions. (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th
1203, 1207–1209.) Whether a course of conduct is divisible for purposes of

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section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the defendant. (People v.
Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 680 (Fuentes).) If multiple offenses were
incident to a single objective, the defendant may be punished for no more
than one. (Ibid.) However, a course of conduct divisible in time, though
directed to only one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and
punishment, particularly when the offenses are temporally separated in such
a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and renew his intent
before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public
security or policy already undertaken. (People v. Andra (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 638, 640.)
      When section 654 applies, it “does not allow any multiple punishment,
including either concurrent or consecutive sentences.” (People v. Deloza
(1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 592.) If punishment for multiple offenses is prohibited
by section 654, the court must impose sentence for one of the offenses and
stay sentence on the others. (Id. at pp. 591–592.)
      If the facts are undisputed, the application of section 654 raises a
question of law subject to de novo review. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2
Cal.5th 307, 312.) We review any express or implied factual findings
underlying the trial court’s ruling for substantial evidence. (People v. Brents
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
      Salih contends that section 654 bars the imposition of concurrent
sentences for counts one and two because the infliction of corporal injury in
count one (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) was based on the same physical act of punching
A.H. as the violation of protective order in count two (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). In
response, however, the People assert substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implied finding that these counts were divisible in time because Salih
violated the protective order by talking to A.H. on the phone before the

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assault. In reply, Salih argues that: (1) the prosecutor did not argue this
theory at trial and only argued that Salih violated the protective order by
assaulting A.H.; and (2) the phone call theory is not supported by the
evidence.
      We reject Salih’s first argument against this theory of divisible acts. In
applying section 654, the trial court was not constrained by the prosecutor’s
theories or the jury’s verdict. In the absence of some circumstance foreclosing
its sentencing discretion, a court may base its decision under section 654 on
any facts in evidence, even those that may not have been the basis for the
verdict. (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340.) If supported
by the evidence, therefore, the trial court was not foreclosed from relying on
the theory that Salih violated section 166, subdivision (c)(1) by talking to
A.H. on the phone before he came over to the motel and assaulted her.
      We agree with Salih, however, that the trial record does not support
the theory he violated section 166, subdivision (c)(1) by talking to A.H. on the
phone. Section 166, subdivision (c)(1) requires a “willful and knowing”
violation of a protective order. According to the trial evidence, A.H. said that
she called Salih from her new phone to get her old phone back. There was no
evidence that Salih knew it was A.H. calling when he answered. Because
they were separated, and A.H. was calling from a new phone, she may have
had a new number that was unknown to Salih. In fact, A.H. was unable to
provide her own cell number when asked on the 911 call. On this record,
therefore, there is no substantial evidence that Salih willfully and knowingly
violated the protective order by answering the call when A.H. called him from
her new phone. (See People v. Brenn (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 166, 181
[“Certainly, we can envision circumstances in which the person protected by
an order seeks out the defendant and the defendant neither intends, nor does

                                        9
anything, to facilitate contact with that person, yet contact still occurs. But
such contact, being neither willful nor knowing on the part of the defendant,

would not be a violation of the statute.”].)3
      Yet the evidence still does not compel a finding that these two counts
were based on the same act. Salih willfully violated the protective order as
soon as he knowingly came within 100 yards of A.H. Even if Salih had pulled
up to the motel and then immediately driven away without committing the
assault, he would still have been guilty of violating section 166, subdivision
(c)(1). Thus, the real question before us is not whether the two counts were
based on the same act, but whether they were part of an indivisible course of
conduct incident to a single objective. (Fuentes, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
p. 680.)
      The People do not suggest that Salih had any objective for showing up
at the motel in violation of the protective order other than to assault A.H.
According to the evidence, Salih walked up to A.H. and immediately
assaulted her, then got back into his car and left promptly after the assault.
There is no evidence that Salih did or intended to do anything other than
assault A.H. Because there is no substantial evidence of a separate criminal
objective or intent for the two crimes, we conclude that the concurrent
sentences violated section 654.

3      The probation report contains a different version of what A.H.
purportedly told the police. In this version, Salih was supposed to drop A.H.’s
phone off in the motel lobby, but the phone was not there when she went to
retrieve it. Salih then called her and told her he would be bringing the
phone. Because the People do not rely on the probation report, and this
version of events is not supported by the trial evidence, we decline to consider
it in resolving the section 654 issue. Even if we did, however, we would still
conclude that the phone call was incidental to the objective of the assault.
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       Salih argues that this sentencing error should be remedied by staying
the 364-day concurrent sentence for count two. He does not contend that the
matter should be remanded for the trial court to choose which sentence to
stay. (See People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 379 [“section 654 now
provides the trial court with discretion to impose and execute the sentence of
either term, which could result in the trial court imposing and executing the
shorter sentence rather than the longer sentence”].) We take this as a tacit
concession that the record clearly indicates the trial court would not have
stayed the sentence for count one and executed only the misdemeanor

sentence for count two. We agree with this assessment.4 Accordingly, we
will modify Salih’s sentence to stay the 364-day concurrent sentence on count
two.

4      Salih had an extensive criminal record, including ten prior
misdemeanors and seven felonies. These included violating a prior
restraining order protecting a different victim, assaults on two other
girlfriends, and another assault on a male victim who was dating one of
Salih’s ex-girlfriends. One of the prior assaults involved Salih repeatedly
hitting a girlfriend in the face and causing injuries similar to those suffered
by A.H. Salih also had another prior conviction for assaulting A.H. in June
2021, and there were police reports of several other assaults on A.H. that did
not result in a conviction. Salih had served two prior prison terms, violated
probation and parole multiple times, and was on parole at the time of the
current offenses. The trial court could have imposed the low term for count
one but instead imposed the four-year midterm, which was the maximum
permissible term because no aggravating circumstances were alleged,
admitted, or adjudicated. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
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                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified to stay the concurrent sentence on count two
under section 654. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract
of judgment to reflect this modification and forward it to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                              BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

DATO, J.

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