Court Opinion

ID: 9587659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:54.199768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:57.859027
License: Public Domain

ZLAKET, Justice,
dissenting.
I am unable to concur in the majority’s resolution of this matter. Moreover, because I am reluctant to extend the significant length of this opinion, my remarks will be brief.
Respondent’s “failure to acknowledge” the wrongful nature of his conduct, a finding affirmed by the majority as an aggravating factor, appears to have originated in large part from the aggressive defense advanced by his attorneys. I fear that today’s opinion sends an erroneous message to those facing *82the disciplinary process—that if they dare to challenge the charges against them, the consequences may be more severe than if they simply confess wrongdoing and pray for mercy. There is something demoralizing and destructive in such a message, something that violates the very spirit upon which our legal system is premised. Here, although some of respondent’s arguments are weak, I do not find them to be spurious or contemptuous. Neither do I believe he should be penalized for taking an aggressive stance before the committee, the commission, or this court.
Respondent’s failure to return the executed satisfaction of judgment, while exceedingly poor practice, is hardly the heinous offense portrayed by the majority. The finding that this conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice” strikes me as a considerable overstatement. It is also significant that neither the hearing committee nor the disciplinary commission made such a finding.
I agree that the use of respondent’s “substantial experience in the practice of law” as an aggravating factor was inappropriate here.17 I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s claim that it gives no weight to this factor, and submit instead that its analysis has quite the opposite effect. Respondent had no prior disciplinary record over many years of practice, which should weigh in his favor. In re Mulhall, 159 Ariz. 528, 768 P.2d 1173 (1989). But in using the mitigating effect of those discipline-free years to “offset” the “substantial practice” aggravating factor, the majority effectively accords equal weight to both. Such an approach makes little sense to me. The net effect is to cancel out whatever mitigation respondent’s “unblemished” disciplinary record might otherwise have provided, leaving him with no credit for it at all. This is clearly not the same as eliminating the “substantial experience” factor from the equation altogether, which is what I believe should have been done.
The method here does not appear to be any different from that utilized by the commission and the committee, both of which found and presumably weighed these aggravating and mitigating factors against one another. Perhaps that explains why, despite its claim of having eliminated the weight given to this particular aggravating factor, the majority finds no cause to consider a modification of the recommended discipline.
Respondent had a conflict of interest that he either failed to recognize or chose to ignore. His conduct was improper, and I do not dispute that he should be disciplined. In my judgment, however, a suspension of six months and one day,18 followed by a supervised probationary period and mandatory participation in the state bar’s law office management assistance program (LOMAP), ought to be sufficient. I would also remand this matter to the State Bar for a determination as to whether respondent did, in fact, voluntarily remove himself from the practice of law as he claims. If so, I would be inclined to give him credit for that time against any sanction imposed. The purpose of discipline, or so we like to say, is to protect the public rather than to punish the lawyer.19 Nothing in the record suggests that respondent presents a continuing threat to the welfare of his clients, the justice system, or the public in general. Thus, credit for voluntary removal would be appropriate here.
On a final note, I believe the majority misunderstands respondent’s legal argument regarding this court’s authority. As I read the briefs, he questions our right to assess costs and expenses in disciplinary proceedings. He does not challenge our general power to govern the practice of law or to regulate the legal profession in this state. Thus, while I agree with the majority’s reso*83lution of the issue, I find its expansive discussion of our “power” unwarranted.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The application of this "aggravator” is always somewhat troublesome but, as the opinion suggests, any detailed discussion of its use must await another day. See fn. 4, supra.

. Such a term would require respondent to reapply for admission to practice. See Rules 71, 72, Sup.Ct.R.

. In re Coffey, 171 Ariz. 544, 832 P.2d 197 (1992); In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 791 P.2d 1037 (1990); In re Nulle, 127 Ariz. 299, 620 P.2d 214 (1980).