Court Opinion

ID: 9956264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:10:59.357098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.467424
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: P.H., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: P.H., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1275 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 3, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Juvenile Division at
                         No(s): 089-ADOPT-2022,
                          CP-21-DP-0000187-2017

  IN THE INTERESTED OF: P.H., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: P.H., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1278 MDA 2023

              Appeal from the Decree Entered August 21, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans' Court at
                         No(s): 089-ADOPT-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: APRIL 1, 2024

       P.H. (Mother) appeals the decree entered by the Cumberland County

Orphans’ Court, which granted the petition filed by the local Children Youth

Services Agency (the Agency) to involuntarily terminate her rights to her 5-

year-old daughter, P.H. (the Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).1         Separately, Mother appeals the decision to

change    the    permanency       goal   of    the   dependency   proceedings   from

reunification to adoption. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f). After careful review,

we affirm the termination decree and dismiss the goal change appeal as moot.

       The history of this case depicts Mother’s mental health struggles, and

the juvenile court’s efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. The Child

was born in October 2017. At that time, the Agency was already involved with

the family. The Child’s older sister was the subject of ongoing dependency

proceedings, due to concerns about Mother’s mental health and lack of stable

housing. When the subject Child was born, the Agency received a report that

Mother was presenting “as paranoid and suspicious, and failed to provide any

information to the hospital staff.” See Trial Court Opinion, 10/27/23, at 2

(citation to the record omitted).          In December 2017, the juvenile court

adjudicated the Child dependent, but the court kept the Child in Mother’s care.

The Child’s first permanency review hearing was in May 2018, the same day

that the court terminated Mother’s rights to the older sister.

       As to the subject Child’s dependency case, Mother’s service plan goals

were to maintain safe and stable housing, obtain a parenting assessment,

participate in any recommended services, and to obtain ongoing mental health

treatment.      During much of the dependency proceedings, Mother lived in

various hotels and moved frequently until she obtained a government-
____________________________________________

1 E.T. (Father) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights.

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subsidized apartment which she maintained for the last two years. However,

Mother’s struggles with mental health continued.

      In May 2018, Dr. Kasey Sheinvold stated that Mother had a paranoid

personality disorder; she “has kind of a pervasive and enduring kind of

mistrust of the world around [her] and a very cynical view of the world.” Id.

at 5 (citation to the record omitted). Dr. Sheinvold’s concern was that Mother

“is not going to be able to teach this Child to be kind of warm and open to

new experience or kind of trust that the world is a safe place. So, in that long

run, that can have a very negative impact on a child’s ability to have healthy

ideas about what a relationship is supposed to be or how to solve problems or

resolve conflict because of – our parents are our earliest kind of role models

for those sorts of things.” Id.

      In August 2018, Mother obtained a parenting assessment through

Alternative Behavior Consultants (“ABC”), which recommended services, but

in December 2018, Mother stopped participating. In January 2019, Mother

did not appear at the permanency review hearing, but the court observed:

         The court is fully supportive of Mother’s being able to keep
         [the Child] in her care. The court understands her struggles
         with her mental health issues, particularly her paranoid
         personality disorder diagnosis. The court does not want to
         see her make the same mistakes she made with regard to
         the older child by refusing to cooperate, feeling that
         everybody is against her. The court would have a comfort
         level ending dependency in this matter so long as Mother
         continues to cooperate with the caseworker, ABC, her
         attorney, and her mental health counselor. The court will
         not hold her failure to appear in court against her as long as
         she cooperates with those individuals.

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Id. at 6 (citations to the record omitted) (style adjusted).

      The dependency case proceeded this way over the next 18 months.

Mother retained custody of the Child, but the case was still court-active.

Mother’s refusal to work with the service providers meant that the Agency and

the juvenile court still had concern for the Child’s wellbeing. In August 2019,

the court appointed the Child a new guardian ad litem (GAL) in the hopes that

Mother would be more trustful and cooperative. By February 2020, the court

determined: “It has been painfully obvious to this court for years that Mother

needs counseling to address her paranoia.” Id. at 8.

      In July 2020, in a final effort to accommodate Mother and give her a

fresh start, the presiding juvenile court judge (the Honorable Edward Guido,

P.J.) recused himself. Mother had accused the judge of “having a great deal

of fun watching her suffering during [the sister’s] termination of rights

hearing,” and that the judge was “humiliating” and “taunting” her; Mother

accused the judge of having the “audacity” to expect Mother to appear at

ongoing dependency hearings regarding the Child after the judge terminated

Mother’s rights to the sister. See T.C.O. at 3 (citations to the record omitted).

The judge concluded that because of his history with Mother, her mental

health status, and her perception of his motives, Mother would not make

progress on her mental health while he was involved. Id.

      The Child’s dependency case was transferred to the Honorable

Christylee Peck. Notwithstanding the change of judge, the court continued to

accommodate Mother in the hope that Mother would eventually address her

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mental health issues. The court described this period of time as one “marked

by the court, GAL, counsel for all parties, the Agency, and the CASA [(court

appointed special advocate)] attempting to delicately interact with Mother,

merely lay eyes on the Child while in her care, and/or encourage Mother to

obtain the services recommended to her for parenting and mental health

without pushing Mother to retreat or cut off contact from those listed above

to the extent that the court could not be certain of the Child’s welfare.” Id.

(style adjusted)

      After July 2020, the court excused Mother from attending the

permanency review hearing; it was arranged that Mother would wait outside

of the courthouse while someone else brought the Child inside to be seen by

the court. Mother was distrustful of the court, but she had been relatively

high functioning. So long as the Child’s safety was accounted for, the court

was content to let counsel represent Mother in her absence.

      In October 2020, Mother contacted ABC and requested to be evaluated

for parenting services. ABC told Mother that “it would be helpful” if she knew

where Mother was living, “and it would show that [Mother] was committed to

the process.” Id. at 10. This triggered an angry response from Mother, who

then refused to engage with ABC.

      In January 2021, the court received a letter from Mother explaining why

she was reluctant to participate in the proceedings, namely that the court had

ignored her cooperation with the Agency and her prior efforts to reunify with

the Child’s sibling. The court also admitted a psychiatric evaluation of Mother,

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which indicated: that Mother was having difficulty getting through the day due

to rituals consistent with obsessive compulsive disorder; that Mother

expressed fears of driving and using public restrooms; and that she

experienced hallucinations.

      Over the next several months, Mother continued to resist court

oversight, but she had started taking her medication again and her mental

health improved. In August 2021, the court heard from the GAL that the Child

– then nearly 4 years old – appeared happy and healthy, and Mother was on

a waiting list for housing.

      But in October 2021, the GAL reported that Mother was backsliding. The

cause was Mother’s frustration with the caseworker – specifically, about the

Agency’s resistance to arranging visits between the maternal grandparents

and the Child. The GAL tried to assure Mother that the caseworker was trying

to make a genuine effort with Mother, and that Mother had made significant

strides. Mother responded by writing the GAL a hostile letter, at the end of

which Mother said:

         I will never set foot in that courtroom, so don’t hold your
         breath. If that judge is waiting for me to participate in
         person before she’ll end dependency, then I need to move
         to another state that will be more reasonable and realize
         there is not even a case here.

Id. at 14 (citations to the record omitted).

      The juvenile court ordered Mother to appear at the next court hearing

in person and to allow visits between the GAL and the Child. The court further

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ordered the Agency to set up visits between the Child and the maternal

grandparents, obtain a therapist for the Child, and enroll the Child in the Head

Start program. Mother did not come to the ensuing hearing. Mother sent a

letter asking the court to excuse her appearance, in part, because she had

appeared before the magistrate the day prior (regarding an altercation with

her neighbor) and she was still recovering from the experience. The court,

frustrated with Mother’s apparent ability to attend other court proceedings,

ordered her to come to the next permanency review hearing.

      At that January 2022 permanency hearing, the presiding judge met

Mother for the first time. Mother had yet to complete mental health or enroll

the Child in Head Start.     Mother went to the parenting assessment, but

evidently told the service provider that it was too late for the Agency to provide

services and that she did not want to participate. Id. at 15-16.

      Mother’s limited participation in her mental health and parenting goal

finally came to a head in February 2022. The juvenile court had learned:

Mother did not attend any medication management appointments with her

psychiatrist since October 2021; she was discharged from outpatient

counseling in December 2021; she deleted her email and would not answer

phones calls; she had rescheduled the Child’s March 2022 cardiology

appointment against medical advice; she was not answering her attorney’s

attempts to contact her; and the Child was not enrolled in Head Start. On

February 18, 2022, the juvenile court gave the Agency approval to remove

the Child and place her in foster care.

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       The juvenile court held a permanency review hearing in March 2022.

Mother had restarted mental health services, though she was not yet

scheduled to see the psychiatrist. The court explained to Mother that she

needed to receive a psychiatric evaluation, whereupon Mother said “that is not

happening” and stormed out of the courtroom. Id. at 17. The court further

ordered Mother to obtain a parenting assessment at ABC and continue with

medication management.            In May 2022, the Agency requested that the

juvenile court make a finding of “aggravated circumstances” on the basis that

Mother’s rights had been previously terminated as to the Child’s sister. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (defining “aggravating circumstances” as a circumstance

where: “(5) The parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily

terminated with respect to a child of the parent.”). The court eventually found

aggravated circumstances but did not relieve the Agency of its obligation to

make efforts toward reunification.2

       From March 2022 until October 2022, Mother had twice-weekly visits

with the Child at ABC. Mother requested a different ABC employee supervise

the visits. Mother was accommodated, but the change meant that the visits

had to decrease to once per week, due to scheduling availability.

____________________________________________

2 The Juvenile Act provides, if the child is dependent, and the court determines

that aggravated circumstances exist, then “the court shall determine whether
or not reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removing the
child from the home or to preserve and reunify the family shall be made or
continue to be made….” See 42 PA.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1)

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      At the January 2023 review hearing, the court learned that Mother had

again stopped her mental health treatment for approximately three months

but that she had re-entered treatment. The court also learned that Mother

blocked the Agency’s phone calls and did not respond to the parenting

evaluation sent to her by mail. However, Mother indicated to her attorney

that she would work on the parenting recommendations.

      Mother had obtained a parenting assessment from ABC in September

2022, which recommended an intensive program of no less than six months.

Parenting services with ABC did not begin until February 2023. The immediate

goal was to prepare for home sessions and set expectations, which

necessitated Mother completing assignments, or “homework.” Mother did not

complete the assignments; still, ABC informed Mother at the end of the fifth

session that the Child would be coming to Mother’s home for a visit the

following week. This caused Mother to become agitated. Mother sent a series

of emails, which included her list of conditions, which ABC would not

accommodate. Mother then told ABC that she did not want to work with them

anymore and that she wanted to have visits at the Agency’s office.

      In May 2023, the Agency petitioned to terminate Mother’s rights and

change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption.               Shortly

thereafter, Mother alleged that the Child told her that the foster father touched

“her private area,” and that the Child described the foster father’s private

parts. Following the report, the foster father voluntarily moved out of the

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home for three weeks, so that the Agency did not have to remove the Child

pending the investigation. The report was eventually deemed unfounded.

       In June 2023, Mother sent an email to the foster mother (and others,

including Mother’s attorney and Agency caseworker) wherein she called foster

father a child molester and a pedophile; Mother also called the foster parents

“murderers on top of pedophiles;” alluding to the death of foster parents’ son,

who, in 2021, passed away due to complications from COVID-19 and a pre-

existing brain defect. Id. at 22.

       In July 2023, the foster parents withdrew from fostering the Child,

because they feared for their safety; they had reported seeing a vehicle

outside of their home that looked like Mother’s. However, visits still occurred

between the Child and the foster family, and ultimately the foster family said

that they wanted the Child to be part of their family forever. For her part, the

Child competently testified that she wanted to be adopted by the foster family,

although she enjoyed spending time with Mother, who she refers to by her

first name.3

       The court presided over the consolidated goal change and termination

hearing on August 16, and 18, 2023. The court determined that the causes of

the Child’s placement – namely, Mother’s untreated mental health issues –

____________________________________________

3 Following her removal in February 2022, the Child had initially been placed

in a different foster home. She has resided with her current foster home since
January 2023. We further note that, at the termination hearing, the Child was
appointed separate counsel under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2313(a), notwithstanding the
fact the Child’s best interests and legal interests did not conflict.

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still existed. The court subsequently terminated Mother’s rights pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b); and the court changed the permanency goal

to adoption.   Mother timely filed this appeal, wherein she presents the

following five issues, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:

         1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and
            abused its discretion when it found that Mother's parental
            rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
            2511(a)(8) as the Agency did not provide sufficient
            evidence at the hearing on the Agency’s petition for
            termination of Mother's parental rights to establish that
            the conditions which led to the removal of the child from
            Mother's care and placement of the child in foster care
            continue to exist and termination of parental rights would
            best serve the needs and welfare of the child?

         2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and
            abused its discretion when it found that the Child's
            permanency goal of reunification was neither appropriate
            not feasible, and ordered a goal change to adoption, thus
            contravening 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ 6351(f)?

         3. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and
            abused its discretion in changing the goal from
            reunification to adoption when the conditions which led
            to removal/placement of the child no longer existed or
            were substantially eliminated, thus contravening 42
            Pa.C.S.A.§ 6351(f)?

         4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and
            abused its discretion determining the best interests of
            the child would be served by changing the goal to
            adoption when Appellant had met or was meeting all her
            permanency plan goals, and was ready, willing, and able
            to parent the child and provide for her needs, thus
            contravening 42 Pa.C.S.A.§ 6351(f)?

         5. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and
            abused its discretion in determining that there was
            minimal compliance with the permanency plan and that
            there were continued concerns about Mother's mental
            health when the only mental health professional who

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            testified at the hearing provided testimony that Mother
            was progressing with her mental health treatment?

Mother’s Brief at 5-6 (style adjusted).

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

         The standard of review in termination of parental rights
         cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
         and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
         supported by the record. If the factual findings are
         supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
         court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
         decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
         upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
         partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
         decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
         the record would support a different result. We have
         previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
         often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
         multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate court should not search the record

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

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      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-62 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      We need only agree with the lower court as to any one subsection of

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm the court’s

decree. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc); see

also C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. Instantly, the court terminated Mother’s rights

under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Those subsections provide:

         (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

                                      […]

                  (8) The child has been removed from the care of
                  the parent by the court or under a voluntary

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                 agreement with an agency, 12 months or more
                 have elapsed from the date of removal or
                 placement, the conditions which led to the removal
                 or placement of the child continue to exist and
                 termination of parental rights would best serve the
                 needs and welfare of the child.

                                       […]

        (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
        rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
        developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
        of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
        solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
        inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
        medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
        With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
        (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
        the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
        are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
        filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

     In her first appellate issue, Mother argues the orphans’ erred when it

determined that the Agency provided sufficient evidence to establish

termination under Section 2511(a)(8).          This subsection contains three

elements, which we discuss in turn.

     First, Section 2511(a)(8) sets forth a twelve-month timeframe for a

parent to remedy the conditions that led to the child’s removal by the court.

See In re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Instantly, Mother does

not dispute that the first element of the analysis has been met. The orphans’

court terminated Mother’s rights approximately 18 months after the Child was

removed in February 2022.

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     Second, once the court establishes the twelve-month timeframe, the

court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child’s

removal continue to exist. The relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the

conditions that led to removal have been remedied. In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5,

11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) does not

include an evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the

conditions that led to the removal of the child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d

434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017). This Court has acknowledged:

          [T]he application of Section (a)(8) may seem harsh when
          the parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the
          problems that had led to removal of her children. By
          allowing for termination when the conditions that led to
          removal continue to exist after a year, the statute implicitly
          recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance
          while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary
          to assume parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and
          will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for
          permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress
          and hope for the future.

In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 989, 997 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting I.J., 972 A.2d at

11-12).

     On this point, Mother argues that the reasons given for the Child’s

removal no longer existed at the time of the termination hearing.          Mother

maintains that she achieved stable housing and that she consistently attended

and participated in the recommended mental health treatment.                 See

generally Mother’s Brief at 37-40.

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       While housing was an objective during the dependency case, we note

that Mother maintained an apartment for two years.4 The court determined

that, to the extent that Mother’s housing was a cause for the Child’s removal,

this condition had been remedied. See T.C.O., infra. But there could be no

question that the primary cause of the Child’s removal was Mother’s untreated

mental health issues and the impact those issues had on Mother’s ability to

parent.

       In a thorough Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Peck detailed extensively the

basis for concluding that this condition – Mother’s untreated mental health

issues – led to the Child’s removal and continued to exist at the time of the

termination proceeding:

          The Child was removed from Mother’s care after four years
          of dependency, in February 2022, when Mother went off the
          radar, deleted her e-mail, no one could get in contact with
          her, and the court learned she had not been to a medication
          management appointment or to counseling in months, all of
          which was on the heels of threatening to leave the
          Commonwealth and other erratic behavior, including
          sending disparaging e-mails to the GAL and caseworker in
          response to the GAL attempting to encourage and support
          Mother. Mother was not engaged in parenting services, and
          she was not engaged with mental health services at all at
          that time. These circumstances prompting removal of the
          Child from Mother’s care did not, however, occur in a
          vacuum. At every turn, this court gave Mother more leeway
          in declining to participate in court proceedings or the family
          service plan goals than the court had ever given a parent in
          a dependency action. Mother did not appear in court for
____________________________________________

4 It should be noted, however, that the appropriateness of the home was
questioned. Mother had covered the windows with blankets or towels, and
she was living out of boxes.

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       three years and only intermittently brought the child to be
       seen by the court via third-party-transport until the court
       specifically ordered Mother to appear given that she was
       appearing for other, unrelated court proceedings and was
       evidently simply choosing not to come to court where the
       court was attempting to ensure the best interests of her
       Child.

       For the year-and-a-half when Mother was not appearing for
       proceedings before Judge Guido, he was persistently issuing
       orders expressly telling Mother he did not want to take the
       Child from her care, and indicating more than once that he
       was considering terminating dependency if she would
       cooperate with the Agency, her counsel, and her mental
       health counselor. She did not, and instead maintained that
       Judge Guido felt nothing but joy at humiliating and taunting
       her. Judge Guido replaced the GAL, removed the CASA, and
       finally recused himself, all in an effort to give Mother a fresh
       start and encourage her to feel comfortable in engaging in
       services and meeting her service plan goals.

       Thereafter, Mother would engage with service providers or
       the GAL or the court, briefly, until she perceived someone
       to be "against her" or, frankly, when someone told her
       something she did not want to hear. In other respects, she
       would make just enough of an effort to begin to meet a
       service plan goal to avoid removal of the Child but, in the
       same review period, would cut off the GAL from seeing the
       Child or block communications from the Agency. She went
       to ABC in October 2020 to obtain a parenting assessment,
       but when Ms. Sweger asked for her address, Mother accused
       her of trying to take her child and she terminated the
       session. She sent bizarre messages to the GAL and
       caseworker, saying the court should not hold our breath for
       her to appear in court.       In January 2022, the court
       accommodated her request to avoid ABC for parenting
       services and use a provider of her choice, but she ultimately
       declined participation upon her first meeting with that
       provider. Mother obtained a parenting assessment from
       ABC at the end of 2022, but shortly thereafter voluntarily
       decreased her visit time with the Child because of perceived
       slights by the visit-supervisor, who was "too pushy." The
       court appointed Mother different counsel because of
       perceived conflicts Mother had with her first attorney, with
       whom she was refusing communication. The court noted

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       that past counsel was conveying to Mother that this court
       said it needed her to attend court hearings for us to meet
       her and discuss what was needed of her. This court needed
       to make sure Mother could function in a public setting.
       Mother began parenting services again, finally, in February
       2023, but ceased working with ABC at all after five sessions,
       again due to perceived slights or mistreatment from the
       provider, and after sending ABC a list of conditions under
       which she would agree to work with them. In the meantime,
       Mother called in a ChildLine report that the Child was being
       sexually abused in her foster placement and sent a letter to
       the foster parents calling them pedophiles and murderers.

       The court recognizes that Mother was in a partial
       hospitalization program at the time of the termination and
       had been in same since January of this year. The issue
       remains that Mother’s erratic behavior and unwillingness to
       work with others, obviously due to her mental health
       conditions, continued during that period and for months
       after she had been immersed in the program, and at times
       increased in severity. She was in the mental health program
       when she refused parenting services, unless ABC was willing
       to provide services with exactly the person she wanted,
       when she wanted, and how she wanted. She was also in
       treatment when she reported the foster family for sexually
       abusing the Child when, by all accounts and following
       investigation, the accusation was untrue, and then
       suggested they murdered their own son who had passed
       away tragically. The court must note, finally, that it was not
       encouraged by the testimony of the director of Mother’s
       mental health program. Merakey[, the service provider,]
       did not have a release from Mother to exchange information
       with the Agency until just two months prior to the
       termination hearing (and after the termination petition had
       been filed), and Ms. Mobray’s view of Mother’s messages to
       the foster family, namely finding the e-mails comparable
       with people who "rant[] on Facebook," indicates to us that
       the providers at the program are not aware of the
       seriousness of Mother’s history or the history of this case.

       The court echoes the concerns of Ms. Sweger that Mother
       has not been able to handle or appropriately interact with
       other people under circumstances where each person
       associated with this case has consistently attempted to
       delicately interact with Mother, always careful not to push

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         too hard or too far or say anything that might cause Mother
         to drop off the radar once again or cut off contact with the
         Child. If Mother would fully commit to the parenting
         program, for example, such tiptoeing would not occur, and
         she would be [] able to participate and engage and hear
         instruction and prompting she has, never to date, been able
         to hear without storming out, quitting the program, or
         cutting off contact. It was not our hope that this case would
         turn out the way it did. For nearly six years the court
         waited, tiptoed, and deferred to Mother’s comfort level in
         engaging in services and in the court proceedings. We are
         six years into this case and Mother has yet to meaningfully
         engage, let alone complete, the parenting services
         recommended to her, in part [] due to concern for Mother’s
         paranoia resulting in Mother’s inability to care for the Child’s
         emotional needs.

                                      ***

         From our long involvement with this case, it is apparent that
         Mother’s mental health conditions, although at times more
         treated and at other times not, continue, to her and the
         Child’s detriment, just as they did from the start. The court
         recognizes that Mother attained stable housing and at least
         has received some services for her mental health. Sadly, it
         appears the most Mother is able to do is the above, which
         may provide shelter for her and keep her from harming
         herself and keep her partially functioning in society. She
         cannot, or has not, progressed in her mental health to such
         a level that the court can say it is safe for the Child’s well-
         being to be in her care.

T.C.O. at 26-31 (emphasis original) (style adjusted) (citations to the record

omitted).

      These findings are supported by the record, and thus we conclude the

orphans’ court did not err or abuse its discretion when it concluded that the

conditions, which led to the Child’s placement, continued to exist at the time

of termination.

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      The third and final element of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis requires

the court to assess whether the termination would best serve the needs and

welfare of the Child.   Although technically distinct, we have held that the

“needs and welfare” element under Section 2511(a)(8) dovetails with the

analysis required by Section 2511(b); both require consideration of

“intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability” and both require

the court to discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond. See I.J.,

972 A.2d at 12 (citing In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006) and

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)). Still, the

focus of the “needs and welfare” analysis vis-à-vis Section 2511(a)(8) remains

on the parent. See C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 261-62.

      On this point, Mother’s primary argument is that the court erred,

because there was no evidence that Mother’s personality disorder would inflict

substantial physical or mental harm on the Child. See Mother’s Brief at 39.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court addressed the Child’s needs

and welfare under Section 2511(a)(8) contemporaneously with its analysis

under Section 2511(b). Mother does not challenge the court’s determination

under Section 2511(b), nor does she take issue with the court’s consolidated

analysis.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court explained why termination would

best serve the Child’s needs and welfare – specifically, how Mother’s untreated

mental health concerns adversely affected the Child:

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         The Child was about to begin kindergarten at the time of the
         termination and goal change hearings. She is currently
         diagnosed with "disruptive, impulsive-control and conduct
         disorder," is under consideration for an anxiety disorder
         diagnosis, and is enrolled in play therapy.

                                       […]

         When the Child competently testified in May 2023 for
         purposes of the termination and goal-change petitions, she
         understood the nature of adoption and she said she enjoys
         living with her foster family and she wishes to be adopted
         by them, though she reported she enjoys visiting with her
         mother, whom she called by Mother’s first name. The Child
         visits with her biological sister about once a month and
         enjoys those visits; her foster family has developed a
         positive relationship with the Child’s sister’s adoptive family.
         The Child’s case manager, Addie Bitzer, said that the Child
         has fit in very well in her foster family, and very much
         enjoys having a big sister and a little sister in the foster
         family. Ms. Bitzer said the Child has a strong emotional
         connection with her foster parents, goes to them for comfort
         and love, needs constant reassurance from them that they
         love her and are going to be there for her, and calls them
         "mommy" and "daddy." Each time this court has met with
         the Child, she has appeared to us to be markedly more
         intelligent, observant, and vocal about her thoughts and
         desires than is typical of her age.

T.C.O. 23, 24-25 (citations to the record omitted) (style adjusted).

      The orphans’ court explained further:

         The Child had been out of Mother’s care for over a year and
         a half at the time of the termination hearing. She had been
         with her foster family for eight months, with brief
         interruption by Mother’s attempt to sabotage the placement.
         The Child’s counsel said at the hearing that the Child reports
         to her that she wants to be adopted by her foster family and
         that she did not want to live with her Mother anymore.
         Counsel said she believes the Child to be tired of court
         involvement and of all the case participants having been
         part of her life since birth. The Child’s foster mother,
         opining on behaviors following visits with Mother, said that

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       the Child sometimes "will say that she doesn’t have a family,
       but that she wants a family." This is difficult evidence to
       hear, as our delay to not make this decision sooner out of
       the hope of Mother’s improvement (i.e. ordering reasonable
       efforts to continue) has caused suffering to the Child.

       The court is cognizant that Mother loves the Child, and that
       Mother kept the Child physically well. The court notes,
       however, that Mother’s paranoia of and pushing against the
       assistance of those around her have several times been
       demonstratively adverse to the Child’s best interests. In
       addition to attempting to disrupt the Child’s stability in her
       foster home via the ChildLine report and accusatory letter
       to the foster family, Mother refused to open the door when
       the Agency appeared to remove the Child from her custody
       in February 2022; a deputy with the Cumberland County
       Sheriff’s Office had to intervene and even then, Mother
       refused to send the Child with any coat or shoes in the
       middle of winter, which resulted in the deputy giving the
       Child his jacket. The removal of the Child from the home
       could have been made less traumatic with Mother’s
       attention to the Child’s best interests in the moment.

       The court is convinced that the Child’s best interests do not
       lie in waiting for Mother to show stability in mental health
       and commitment to parenting the Child safely and in
       attending to the Child’s emotional needs and welfare, or
       demonstrate willingness to hear and work with those who
       have persistently and delicately attempted to keep the Child
       with Mother. As the court noted herein, the court did not
       wish for the case to go this way. The court is sympathetic
       to Mother’s feelings that the court made up its mind a long
       time ago to take her child from her. The court doesn’t doubt
       that Mother actually believes that. Such is of course not the
       case, as the court tediously laid out our efforts herein, and
       the court laments that Mother’s distrust of those trying to
       help her continues. Over the life of this case, one significant
       concern for the Child being in Mother’s care is that this very
       special Child will [] distrust the world around her as was the
       case with Child’s older sister. The court notes, for example,
       that there was testimony that the Child reported while in
       foster care that her Mother closed all the blinds to the
       windows in their house and that she was not allowed to look
       out the windows. The Child, meanwhile, desperately needs
       permanency and has for a long time. She knows more about

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         the circumstances of her placement than a child her age
         should, and she very much deserves to know now where she
         will remain.

Id. at 32-34 (citations to the record omitted) (style adjusted).

      Taken together, we conclude that these findings constitute a sufficient

basis for the court to find that termination would best serve the Child’s needs

and welfare under Section 2511(a)(8). And upon our review, we conclude

that the evidentiary record supports these findings. In reaching this decision,

we reiterate that this Court is not in a position to make close calls. See also

S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 1124. It is not our rule to scour the record for contrary

conclusions or to substitute our judgment for that of the lower court, whose

understanding of the case and the parties appearing before it is “longitudinal.”

See id.; In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). For these reasons, we

conclude that that the orphans’ court did not err when it determined that the

Agency proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was

warranted under Section 2511(a)(8). Mother’s first issue merits no relief.

      Mother’s remaining issues pertain to the lower court’s decision to change

the permanency goal from reunification to adoption. This Court has held that

a termination of parental rights decree, once affirmed, renders moot any

challenge to the dependency court’s decision to change the goal of the

permanency review hearing. See D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super.

2020) (holding that an issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue

the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect) (citing In

re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002)) see also In re Adoption of

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A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding that a decision to affirm

the orphans’ court’s termination decree necessarily renders moot the

dependency court’s decision to change a child’s goal to adoption). Therefore,

we do not address Mother’s appeal from the goal change order.5

       Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed as moot.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2024

____________________________________________

5 Although we do not address the goal change decision, we note that the court

did not relieve the Agency of its obligation to provide reunification services,
notwithstanding the finding of aggravating circumstances. We commend this
decision.

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