Court Opinion

ID: 9680874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:40:21.374771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.082149
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, dissenting. The rule governing motions to suppress evidence is Criminal Procedure Rule 16.2. Subsection (e) is applicable here. It provides: Determination. A motion to suppress evidence shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based was substantial, or if otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or of this state. In determining whether a violation is substantial the court shall consider all the circumstances, including: (i) the importance of the particular interest violated; (ii) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; (iii) the extent to which the violation was willful; (iv) the extent to which privacy was invaded; (v) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of these rules; (vi) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and (vii) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party’s ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceedings in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him. The trial court found no prejudice. No regard whatever is given to that finding by the majority. I cannot see how we can say the court was wrong. The address could not have been misleading. The Chief Deputy Tax Assessor of Pulaski County testified that there is only one Republic Lane in the county. The first of the violations said to be cumulative is a violation only when viewed hypertechnically. It certainly was not prejudicial. The statement of one witness that the officers arrived at the address at 5:00 a.m. is apparently taken by the majority to constitute an overwhelming preponderance of the evidence. Phillip Thomas, one of those arrested and charged with the thefts that were connected with the charges against Harris, said that he accompanied the officers on the search and that they went to the Harris house between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. Deputy Sheriff Stan Chase was positive that the search was after 6:00 a.m. He placed it in the same range of time that Thomas did. Sgt. Rocky Woods also said the search was initiated between 6:30 and 7:00 a.m. Deputy Sheriff Bill Watt put the time of arrival at the house as between 6:45 and 7:00 a.m. Appellant tried to say that the search started at 5:00 a.m., but he said that he looked at the clock when the officers were finished and he was run out of the bedroom and it was 6:20 a.m. He said that they had been there carrying stuff out for 15 or 20 minutes. Only by finding the first witness to be the only credible one can it be said that the rule against searches before 6:00 a.m. was violated. That is not a matter for this court to determine. The second error, said to be one of the cumulative ones, contributed nothing to the alleged centuries of abuse of which the majority claims some special knowledge. It was not an error at all. A receipt should have been given to Harris. But Deputy Sheriff Bill Watt testified that he made an inventory of the property taken at the Harris house and that he tagged the property. Another so-called error relates to the return. Neither the affidavit, search warrant nor the return are abstracted. Apparently, the majority relies upon the statement in the state’s brief that the return is not strictly in line with the statutory language. How was it not strictly in line? Is strict compliance with every guideline for issuance and execution of search warrants to be required? The quoted rule indicates quite the contrary, i.e., that substantial compliance is sufficient and that evidence is not to be suppressed because a hypercritical retrospective review from the judicial bench sees things that should have been done better. I submit that there is no basis whatever for saying that the trial judge erred in his ruling. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Harris joins in this opinion.