Court Opinion

ID: 9675533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:56:41.898063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:35.298355
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
WOODLEY, Judge.
Appellant complains that his bill of exception relating to the excusing of the juror Ed Broadnax should not have been disposed of solely on the question of whether there was racial discrimination and whether or not he was in position to complain of discrimination against jurors of the colored race.
The bill of exception will be reconsidered in the light of appellant’s contention: “In this case the State did not exercise its challenge, and the Court’s action in excusing the prospective juror without cause was in violation of the Articles above cited (Arts. 612 et seq. V.A.C.C.P.), and, in effect, gave the State sixteen peremptory challenges.”
*215The bill of exception certifies that the prospective juror, Ed Broadnax, was examined and found to be qualified; that before exercising its right of challenge the state requested the court to excuse Broadnax (“he being a colored man”) ; that at the time Broadnax was examined the state had exercised 13 peremptory challenges and that the court excused Broadnax over appellant’s objection.
The bill further certifies that at the time Broadnax was excused eleven jurors had been sworn and had he not been excused appellant, who had only one peremptory challenge left, would have accepted Broadnax.
The bill further shows that there were 46 remaining veniremen available.
The state was entitled to challenge 15 jurors without assigning any reason therefor. Arts. 614 and 615 V.A.C.C.P.
Thirteen such peremptory challenges had been used before Broadnax was excused at the state’s request.
The appellant had no vested right to have Juror Broadnax, and the state had the statutory right to peremptorily excuse 15 veniremen. This is so because the state and an accused have a right to reject but never have a right to select any particular juror. McMurrin v. State, 156 Texas Cr. Rep. 434, 238 S.W. 2d 632 (cert. denied 72 Sup. Ct. 115; 342 U.S. 874; 96 L. Ed. 657) and Ross v. State, 157 Texas Cr. Rep. 371, 246 S.W. 2d 884 (cert. denied 72 Sup. Ct. 1067; 343 U.S. 969; 96 L. Ed. 1365).
There is nothing in the bill of exception or in the record to show that after Broadnax was excused the state used another peremptory challenge.
In the absence of a showing that the state used fifteen challenges in addition to having Broadnax excused in effect allowed the state to use sixteen peremptory challenges in violation of Art. 615 V.A.C.C.P.
Our attention is directed to that portion of Bill of Exception No. 11 wherein it reads: “That in the opinion of the witness, the operation in 1949 was a success, and that the defendant had been completely sterile ever since.
“That none of the foregoing testimony was controverted or *216rebutted in the slightest degree; that it was a scientific impossibility that the defendant could have deposited live spermatazoa in the vagina of the prosecutrix as was found on examination by the witness Dr. Smith; that the verdict of the jury was based entirely upon bias and prejudice and was without support in the evidence.”
We do not interpret this as a certification of the trial judge that the verdict was not supported by the evidence but was based upon bias and prejudice. On the other hand, it appears that the language quoted was a part of appellant’s contention “that there was no evidence of probative value upon which the jury could base a conviction.”
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.