Court Opinion

ID: 9545615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:16:20.372364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:12.896357
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled, pursuant to OEC 403, that the *309probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. A trial court abuses its discretion if it is exercised to an end not justified by and clearly against the evidence and reason. Casciato v. Oregon Liquor Control Corn., 181 Or 707, 715-17, 185 P2d 246 (1947). OEC 403 requires that a trial judge consider four factors in determining whether the probative value of evidence exceeds its prejudicial nature: (1) the need for the evidence; (2) the certainty of the evidence; (3) the relative strength or weakness of the evidence; and (4) its inflammatory effect on the jury. State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 557-58, 725 P2d 312 (1986).
The trial court found that defendant’s pre-polygraph test statement was voluntary. The state offered to “sanitize” it by deleting any reference to the fact that the interviewer was a polygraph operator and that the statement was taken preparatory to a polygraph examination. The state needed the evidence, because defendant’s pre-polygraph examination statement was inconsistent with his initial statement. Defendant injected the prospect of prejudice by asserting that he was required to elicit the circumstances surrounding the statement in order to show the jury that his statement was involuntary. How bringing out that the interviewer was a polygraph operator, as well as a police officer, or that the statement was made in anticipation of a polygraph examination would show that that the statement was involuntary is not apparent. Defendant was not under arrest or charged. He volunteered to take the polygraph examination, believing that, if he passed it, no charges would be filed. The interview and the test occurred ten days after he had given an initial statement. Before making the statement to the polygraph operator, he was given Miranda warnings and signed a written waiver. Any resulting prejudice to defendant would come from his own examination, not from the evidence proffered by the state.
In deciding whether to offer evidence, a party must always weigh whether the prejudice to his case is outweighed by the value to his case. The state should not and cannot be prevented from offering clearly admissible evidence with substantial probative value because a defendant wishes to impeach his own confession with possibly inadmissible evidence that, at best, has only speculative probative value. See State v. Benton, 92 Or App 685, 689, 759 P2d 332, rev den 307 Or 101 (1988). In an adversarial system, a party should not be *310restrained from offering admissible evidence simply because the other party is placed on the “horns of a dilemma” as to how to refute that evidence. On the factors in State v. Johns, supra, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding defendant’s statement.
I dissent.