Court Opinion

ID: 9905693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 21:03:15.282358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:50.477408
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 Sandoval v. City of Beverly Hills CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 EMMANUEL SANDOVAL,                                                     B319382
                                                                        (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                      Super. Ct. No. BC708428)

           v.

 CITY OF BEVERLY HILLS et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Harry Jay Ford III, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Gary S. Casselman, Gary S. Casselman and
Danielle L. Casselman, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Richards, Watson & Gershon, Jennifer Petrusis, Ginetta L.
Giovinco, Garen N. Bostanian, and Stephen D. Lee, for
Defendants and Respondents.
       Plaintiff and appellant Emmanuel Sandoval appeals from
judgment after the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants and respondents, City of Beverly Hills and
Beverly Hills Police Department Officers Andrew Myers, Michael
Downs, and Stephanie Nguyen-Lieu (collectively, defendants) on
causes of action for false imprisonment, negligence, and violation
of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1) (the Bane
Act). The trial court granted summary judgment after finding
the undisputed facts established probable cause to arrest
Sandoval under Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f)
(hereinafter section 647(f)) for being intoxicated in public and
unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others.
       On appeal, Sandoval contends a triable issue of fact exists
on the legality of his arrest and whether defendants had probable
cause to arrest him for public intoxication. We affirm.

        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     The Complaint
       In the operative first amended complaint (FAC), Sandoval
alleged that around 8:00 p.m. on November 11, 2017, he was
crossing the street near a marked crosswalk in the City of
Beverly Hills when he was struck by a car. The FAC alleged that
Officers Myers, Downs, Nguyen-Lieu, and other officers
responded to the scene to investigate, and after some
investigation, the individual defendants placed Sandoval under
arrest without having probable cause.
       The FAC asserted three causes of action against defendants
for (1) false imprisonment; (2) violation of the Bane Act based on
Sandoval’s right to be free from unreasonable seizure; and (3)
negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and as to Officers

                                 2
Myers, Downs, and Nguyen-Lieu, negligent performance of
duties.1

2.    The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication2
      Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative, summary adjudication. In relevant part, defendants
argued they were entitled to judgment on all three causes of
action because the undisputed facts established probable cause to
arrest Sandoval under section 647(f). Defendants attached
declarations from Officers Myers, Downs, Nguyen-Lieu, and
others, a recording and verified transcript of the officers’
investigation and arrest of Sandoval, and various excerpts of
deposition testimony.
      The undisputed evidence establishes the following sequence
of events. Goldberg testified he was driving his car toward an
intersection approximately 60-to-70 feet away when a person
suddenly ran into the street and into his car. After the
pedestrian-vehicle collision, Goldberg pulled his car over, got out,
and noticed his side mirror was missing. A man Goldberg later
identified as Sandoval ran over and accused Goldberg of hitting
him with a car. Goldberg testified that Sandoval had a “chaotic
way of talking” and appeared to be “under the influence of
something.” Goldberg or his female companion called the police.

1     The FAC asserted an additional cause of action for negligence
against the driver of the car, David Goldberg, who is not a party to this
appeal.

2       We recite the factual background from evidence admitted by the
trial court. We do not consider any evidence excluded by the trial
court, as the court’s evidentiary rulings remain unchallenged on
appeal.

                                    3
       Officer Downs testified he and Officers Nguyen-Lieu,
Myers, and two other officers responded to a 911 call involving
Goldberg, Sandoval, and another person later identified as
Princeton Legree.3 Officers Downs and Nguyen-Lieu testified the
call from dispatch indicated a man possibly under the influence of
alcohol or drugs had run into the streets hitting cars.
       Officer Downs verified the accuracy of a transcript of audio-
video footage of the officers’ investigation and arrest of Sandoval.
As provided in the transcript, Officer Downs initially contacted
Sandoval and asked whether Sandoval was listening to him.
Officer Downs stated, “Hello? Can you hear me? Is there a
reason why you’re not paying attention?” After agreeing to be
searched by Officer Downs, Sandoval declined to stand up and
stated, “I got hit.” Officer Downs replied, “You were walking
when I got here. Stand up and face the fence.” Officer Downs
also asked Sandoval if he was “having trouble listening” and told
Sandoval to “[s]top flexing.”
       Officers asked Sandoval if he required medical assistance,
to which Sandoval exclaimed, “Obviously I can fucking walk it
off. Like, look at my fucking track field shit.”4 When asked the
same question twice more, Sandoval responded, “Look at my
fucking track field shit. I could walk it off,” and “Look at my
track field shit. I can walk it off.” He then proclaimed, “So this is
what happens when you get hit by a car.” Officer Downs
responded, “This is what happens when you’re drunk in public;

3     Legree is a named plaintiff but is not a party to this appeal.

4     Officer Myers testified that “one of the [p]laintiffs displayed
evidence of intoxication in that he had rapid, slurred speech and he
delayed in responding to officers’ questions or requests . . . .”

                                   4
have you had anything to drink tonight?” Sandoval did not
respond.
      Officer Downs told Sandoval to stop pulling away, asked if
he could “stand on [his] own,” and told Sandoval he appeared to
be “wobbling back and forth.” Another officer asked Sandoval
again if he was drinking. The officer stated, “[W]hat am I
smelling right now? Is that alcohol? What were you drinking?”
Sandoval did not answer the question, and instead stated, “If I
walked . . . [¶] through a street and like if someone hits me . . . [¶]
is that bad?” To determine if Sandoval had been drinking, Officer
Downs directed Sandoval to follow the tip of a pen with his eyes
and not move his head. Sandoval did not follow directions and
moved his head.
      Officer Downs then spoke with Sandoval’s friend, Legree,
who stated both he and Sandoval previously consumed two beers
and two drinks consisting of vodka alone (vodkas). During
Legree’s interview, Sandoval interjected and shouted, “I got the
fucking track [inaudible] I was literally --.”
      Officer Nguyen-Lieu observed Sandoval and Legree during
the investigation and could hear them speak with her colleagues.
Sandoval appeared “belligerent” to Officer Nguyen-Lieu. After
speaking with other officers, Officer Nguyen-Lieu decided to
arrest Sandoval and Legree for public intoxication. After telling
both men they were being placed under arrest for public
intoxication, Officer Downs handcuffed both men and assisted
Officer Nguyen-Lieu in placing them in police cars.
      As depicted in the 20-minute audio-video recording of the
investigation and arrest, Sandoval made abrupt exclamations
(including incoherent statements) and refused to answer
questions about his consumption of alcohol. In his own

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deposition, Sandoval admitted he had consumed several drinks
about an hour before the collision.

3.     Sandoval’s Opposition
       Sandoval opposed defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, arguing in relevant part the evidence was insufficient
to establish probable cause for his arrest. In support, Sandoval
attached his own declaration and declarations from Legree and
their trial counsel, Gary S. Casselman.
       Sandoval testified he “consumed alcoholic beverages with
and without food” over the course of several hours on
November 11, 2017. He and Legree had “sushi and drinks”
between 4:00 and 5:30 p.m. They returned to his residence
around 6:30 p.m. and drank “several beers” in the next 60 to 90
minutes. They left around 7:30 to 8:00 p.m. to go for a walk.
Sandoval said he felt “mild effects of the alcohol [he had]
consumed, some of which had worn off.” On the way back to his
residence, Sandoval saw Legree walking ahead of him as he
“began to cross East toward [his] home, slightly before the
marked crosswalk. . . . [¶] Suddenly, [Sandoval] was struck on
[his] right leg by a small” car driven by Goldberg. Sandoval
acknowledged he “complained a lot” during the police
investigation but testified he was upset he had been treated “like
a suspect instead of an accident victim.” Sandoval and Legree
testified they were able to stand, walk, and converse without
assistance. Sandoval denied falling down, swaying or staggering,
and being unable to care for himself.
       Sandoval also filed evidentiary objections to defendants’
evidence. Most of Sandoval’s evidentiary objections were lodged
against statements appearing in defendant’s separate statement

                                6
of facts. The objections were not numbered consecutively and did
not quote or set forth the objectionable statement(s) or material.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) In addition to these
objections, Sandoval listed objections to the declarations of
Officers Nguyen-Lieu and Myers. Although the objections
generally identified the paragraph numbers to which Sandoval
objected, they did not quote or set forth the objectionable
statements appearing in either declaration.

4.    The Order Granting Summary Judgment
      Following a hearing on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment/adjudication,5 the court issued an order granting
defendants’ motion for summary judgment, disregarding all of
Sandoval’s evidentiary objections to defendants’ separate
statement, and overruling all of his objections to statements
identified in the declarations of Officers Nguyen-Lieu and Myers.
Sandoval does not challenge any of these evidentiary rulings on
appeal.6
      In granting the motion for summary judgment, the court
found the following facts undisputed: (1) Before the pedestrian-
vehicle collision, Sandoval consumed two beers and two vodkas;
(2) Sandoval either ran into Goldberg’s car or was unaware of the
car and was struck by it in the street; (3) Sandoval exhibited
belligerent behaviors and (4) made repeated nonsensical
statements; and (5) Sandoval had difficulty following Officer

5     The appellate record does not include a reporter’s transcript
from the hearing.

6     In addition, the court excluded statements appearing in
Casselman’s declaration regarding defendants’ alleged spoliation of
evidence. Sandoval does not challenge this evidentiary ruling.

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Downs’s pen with his eyes. These facts, known to all individual
defendants at the time of Sandoval’s arrest, would cause a person
of reasonable caution to suspect he was intoxicated in public and
incapable of caring for his own safety or the safety of others
within the meaning of section 647(f). Following entry of
judgment for defendants, Sandoval timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION
      Sandoval contends there are triable issues of fact
concerning whether defendants possessed probable cause to effect
a lawful arrest. We conclude the undisputed facts known to
defendants established probable cause to arrest Sandoval for
public intoxication, thereby negating an essential element of all
three causes of action against defendants.

1.     Standard of Review
       A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when
“all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and decide
independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party. (Hartford Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286;
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618.)
       When defendants move for summary judgment, they bear
the initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to show the
plaintiff cannot prove one or more elements of their causes of
action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 879, 889; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25

                                 8
Cal.4th 826, 843.) If the defendants meet this initial burden, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to “make an independent showing by
a proper declaration or by reference to a deposition or another
discovery product that there is sufficient proof of the matters
alleged to raise a triable question of fact . . . . [Citations.]” (Wiz
Technology, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1,
10–11.) The plaintiff may not rely on claims, theories, or self-
serving declarations unsupported by admissible evidence. (Id. at
p. 11; King v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th
426, 433.)
       As the pleadings frame the relevant issues for purposes of
summary judgment (see Wassmann v. South Orange County
Community College Dist. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 825, 851), we first
address the requisite elements of each cause of action before
turning to the merits of defendants’ motion.

2.     False Imprisonment, Negligence, and Violation of the
       Bane Act
       The FAC asserted causes of action against defendants for
false imprisonment, negligence, and violation of the Bane Act.
“The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are:
(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2)
without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of
time . . . .” (Easton v. Sutter Coast Hospital (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 485, 496; see Moore v. City & County of San
Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 735 [“since an arrest involves
detention or restraint, false arrest always involves an
imprisonment, and a suit for false imprisonment automatically
embraces the wrongful arrest; and two separate torts are not
involved”].)

                                  9
       To state a viable claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show
the “‘“defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that
duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the
resulting injury. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Collins v. County of
San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1048–1049 (Collins).)
       The Bane Act provides for liability for the interference or
attempted interference with a person’s constitutional rights “by
threat, intimidation, or coercion.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).)
To plead a cause of action under the Bane Act, the plaintiff must
show “(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with
a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the
interference or attempted interference was by threats,
intimidation or coercion.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 41, 67 (Allen).)
       In the factual context of an arrest, all three causes of action
require an unlawful seizure, that is, a seizure unsupported by
reasonable or probable cause. (See Collins, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1049 [negligence]; Bender v. County of Los Angeles (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 968, 978 [Bane Act] (Bender); Wilson v. County
of Los Angeles (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 308, 315 [false arrest and
imprisonment] (Wilson), disapproved on another ground in
Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 579.)

3.    The Undisputed Evidence Establishes Probable
      Cause to Arrest
      The trial court in this case found undisputed evidence
demonstrating probable cause to arrest Sandoval for public
intoxication. We agree with the trial court.
      Although peace officers are not granted governmental
immunity for false arrest and imprisonment, they are

                                 10
individually immune from civil liability if acting within the scope
of their authority. They act within the scope of their authority if
the “arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the
arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.”
(Pen. Code, § 847, subd. (b); see id., § 836.5, subd. (b); O’Toole v.
Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 511 (O’Toole).) A
peace officer “may arrest a person without a warrant whenever
the officer . . . has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a misdemeanor in the presence of the
officer . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 836.5, subd. (a).)
       “‘“In conformity with the rule at common law, a
warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that
a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”’ [Citation.]”
(Levin v. United Air Lines, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1002,
1017 (Levin).) Probable cause to arrest arises whenever the facts
known to the arresting officer “would lead a reasonable person to
have a strong suspicion of the arrestee’s guilt. (People v. Mower
(2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 473.)” (O’Toole, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at
p. 511; accord, Levin, supra, at p. 1018.) As this is an objective
standard, whenever the facts “known to an officer are sufficient
to constitute probable cause to arrest, the possibility of an
innocent explanation does not vitiate probable cause and does not
render an arrest unlawful.” (Johnson v. Lewis (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 443, 453 (Johnson).)
       The existence of circumstances offered to justify an arrest
is generally a question of fact “while the sufficiency of those
circumstances to actually justify the arrest is a ‘question of law.’”
(Schmidlin v. City of Palo Alto (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 728, 777.)
However, when the facts are “admitted or beyond controversy,”

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the existence of facts giving rise to reasonable or probable cause
shall be determined by the court. (Aitken v. White (1949) 93
Cal.App.2d 134, 141; accord, Levin, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1018.)
       In support of their motion for summary judgment,
defendants argued the undisputed facts established probable
cause for them to believe Sandoval was publicly intoxicated
within the meaning of section 647(f). Under this statute, “[a]n
officer has probable cause to place a person under arrest . . .
when the individual is intoxicated and in a public place, and the
totality of circumstances demonstrates that he is unable to
exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others.”
(Baranchik v. Fizulich (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1210, 1218
(Baranchik); accord, People v. Lively (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364,
1368–1369.)
       The following facts in this case are undisputed. In addition
to other officers employed by the City of Beverley Hills, Officers
Nguyen-Lieu, Myers, and Downs responded to the site of the
pedestrian-vehicle collision involving Sandoval after they
received a 911 dispatch describing a man possibly under the
influence running in the street. When contacted by Officers
Downs and Myers—and as observed by Officer Nguyen-Lieu—
Sandoval exhibited behaviors consistent with intoxication. He
smelled of alcohol and had trouble listening and following
directions; he made several unprompted and incoherent
proclamations; he cursed repeatedly and refused to respond to
questions about consuming alcohol and running into the street;
and he failed to follow directions in an exercise to gauge whether
he was intoxicated. Sandoval informed officers he had been hit
by a car while walking on the street, and it was confirmed

                                12
Sandoval had previously consumed alcohol (two beers and two
vodkas) before the collision.
       These facts establish probable cause to suspect Sandoval
was under the influence of alcohol in a public place and, having
already placed himself in danger by walking into the street
without ensuring safe passage, remained unable to exercise care
for the safety of himself or others. (Accord, Baranchik, supra, 10
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1218–1219 [appellant smelled of alcohol, had
slurred speech, and matched description of a participant who had
previously engaged in bar fight]; Washburn v. Fagan (9th Cir.
2009) 331 Fed.Appx. 490, 492 [appellant intoxicated in public and
“was in the way of oncoming traffic after the light changed and
before he returned to the median area”].) Sandoval was arrested
not because he was simply intoxicated but because he engaged in
“conduct that posed a safety hazard” to himself and others.
(People v. Kellogg (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 593, 602.)
       Sandoval’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
Sandoval first contends that “statements given to officers about
events not committed in the officers’ presence were not legally to
be considered as probable cause in Sandoval’s misdemeanor
arrest.” This argument “is contrary to common sense and the
purpose of section 647[(f)], for if it were a proper construction, the
statute would punish one for how and where he was first
observed without regard for what he did previous or subsequent
thereto.” (People v. Olson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 592, 596 (Olson).)
It is well-settled law enforcement may properly rely on
information gleaned from dispatch (People v. Hogan (1969) 71
Cal.2d 888, 891) and statements from private citizens who
witnessed a criminal act (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263,
269).

                                 13
       Citing a concurring opinion from a Supreme Court decision
in Powell v. Texas (1968) 392 U.S. 514, Sandoval also contends
section 647(f) requires an “intoxication level” amounting to
“disabling helplessness.” (Citing id. at p. 554, fn. 5 (conc. opn. of
White, J.) [“I do not question the power of the State to remove a
helplessly intoxicated person from a public street, although
against his will, and to hold him until he has regained his
powers”].) Sandoval furnishes no case, and we are aware of none,
requiring proof of a heightened or serious level of intoxication.7
We decline Sandoval’s suggested interpretation and adhere to the
plain language of section 647(f), which requires a person to be
“under the influence of intoxicating liquor” and, as relevant here,
in a condition unable to “exercise care for his or her own safety or
the safety of others.”
       Finally, Sandoval contends there is a “clear conflict in the
evidence” as to his intoxication and ability to care for himself or
others. In this regard, he concedes he exhibited belligerent
behavior during the police investigation but asserts there are
plausible reasons for it, such as injury or indignation.
       Even construing the evidence in Sandoval’s favor, we
discern no triable issue of fact. Sandoval’s own declaration
demonstrates he crossed a residential street outside a marked

7      The cases on which Sandoval relies do not address a requisite
level of intoxication under section 647(f). (E.g., Carcamo v. Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Dept. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 608, 616–618
[section 647(f) preempted municipal ordinance]; Lively, supra, 10
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1372–1373 [“the totality of circumstances must be
considered in determining whether the intoxicated person can exercise
care for his or her own safety or the safety of others”]; Olson, supra, 18
Cal.App.3d at pp. 597–598 [defendant found passed out, and when
awake, she staggered while walking and failed several “balance and
coordination tests”].)

                                   14
crosswalk while admittedly feeling the effects of alcohol. As his
counsel at oral argument acknowledged, Sandoval provided no
evidence demonstrating the care he exercised when entering the
roadway at night with oncoming traffic. (See Butte Fire Cases
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169, fn. 10 [we have “‘no duty to
search the record for evidence’” favoring appellants who challenge
rulings on summary judgment]; Sharabianlou v. Karp (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1133, 1149 [“we will not scour the record on our own
in search of supporting evidence”].) Sandoval does not deny
making incoherent statements or refusing to answer questions
about running into the street and what he had been drinking.
That Sandoval’s behavior could have resulted from matters
unrelated to his intoxication did not vitiate the officers’
determination of probable cause. (Accord, Johnson, supra, 120
Cal.App.4th at p. 453 [affirming summary judgment despite
plaintiff’s “innocent explanation” for her behavior]; see also
Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 36 [“We have made
clear that the kinds and degree of proof . . . necessary for a
conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest”].)
       At a minimum, the evidence known to the officers at the
time of Sandoval’s arrest, including Sandoval’s own testimony,
provided probable cause to believe he was intoxicated in public,
and having walked or run into traffic without exercising care for
himself or others, he remained unable to do so. Thus, the trial
court properly sustained defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on all three causes of action against defendants for
false imprisonment, negligence, and violation of the Bane Act.

                               15
(Collins, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 1049; Bender, supra, 217
Cal.App.4th at p. 978; Wilson, supra, 21 Cal.App.3d at p. 315.)8

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their
costs on appeal.

                                              MORI, J.
      We concur:

             CURREY, P. J.

             ZUKIN, J.

8       Consistent with prior decisions on the issue, we also uphold the
trial court’s finding Sandoval failed to support his cause of action for
violation of the Bane Act with evidence of “coercion independent” from
his arrest. (Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
947, 959; Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pp. 66–67.)

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