Court Opinion

ID: 9467574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:51:54.139505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:25.001094
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge
(Concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in all of Judge Van Graafeiland’s carefully considered and well-reasoned opinion except that portion upholding the district court’s placement of defendant Monge on probation for periods beyond the seven-year term imposed upon him as a youth offender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c).1 In my view the court was precluded by 18 U.S.C. § 5017(d)2 from placing Monge on probation for the additional periods totalling five years beyond the seven-year term.
The district court was clearly authorized by § 5010(c) to impose a seven-year prison term on Monge. Indeed Judge Nickerson could pursuant to § 5010(c) have imposed concurrent terms upon Monge as a youth offender of up to 20 years on Counts 2 and 3, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In the alternative, the district court could pursuant to § 50233 have suspended the imposition or execution of sentence and placed Monge as a youth offender on probation. However, once the district court chose to impose a prison sentence on Monge, the sentence became subject to the terms of § 5017(d), which provides that a youth offender “shall be discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.” (Emphasis supplied).
As Judge Van Graafeiland correctly notes, the imposition of probation under Counts 2 and 3 for terms extending beyond the seven-year sentence imposed on Monge as a youth offender under Count 1 was not strictly a “sentence” of the defendant. However, it clearly placed a “condition” on the discharge of Monge upon expiration of the maximum sentence (seven years) imposed on him as a youth offender under Count 1. The probation terms therefore violated § 5017(d).
I would vacate the probation terms imposed on Monge on Counts 2 and 3 and remand the case for sentencing on these two counts. Upon such a remand Monge would face the risk that Judge Nickerson, upon learning that he was powerless to impose probation consecutively to the discharge of Monge as a youth offender, might decide that he was justified under the circumstances in imposing prison terms on these counts exceeding the seven-year period imposed on Count 1. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1968).

. Section 5010(c) provides:
“(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the Commission as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.”

. Section 5017(d) provides:
“(d) A youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expiration of the term imposed by the court. He may be discharged unconditionally at the expiration of not less than one year from the date of his conditional release. He shall be discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, computed uninterruptedly from the date of conviction.”

. Section 5023(a) provides:
“(a) Nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence and place a youth offender on probation or be construed in any wise to amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of chapter 231 of this title or the Act of June 25, 1910 (ch. 433, 36 Stat. 864), as amended (ch. 1, title 24, of the D. of C. Code), both relative to probation.”