Court Opinion

ID: 9478789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:58:15.926379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:37.280671
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s holding, which follows the Fourth Circuit’s recent holding that Congress intended to apply the common law definition of burglary for purposes of implementing the sentence enhancement statute. See United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.1988). Although, like the majority, I am loath to create an unnecessary circuit split, using the common law definition creates so many practical and interpretive difficulties that I am persuaded that Congress did not intend it. Instead, Congress clearly expected to take a state burglary conviction as it finds it on a defendant’s rap sheet.
First, my survey of the laws of the fifty states and the District of Columbia indicates that only two states, Maryland and Virginia, retain all elements of the common law crime of burglary (and even these two states seem to use a definition of “nighttime” different from that used at common law). Thus, a burglary conviction in every jurisdiction except these two would require a federal court to conduct an inquiry into whether one or more of the elements has been satisfied. Not only is this procedure cumbersome, but it seems likely that if Congress had intended federal courts to follow the unusual procedure of investigating the factual circumstances of individual crimes for purposes of applying the sentence enhancement statute that it would have said so explicitly. In addition, I find it hard to believe that Congress would have included the term “burglary” in a federal statute merely to reach burglary convictions under the laws of Maryland and Virginia.
Second, the common law definition of burglary is so esoteric as to defy easy application, which suggests that Congress did not intend the federal courts to attempt to apply it. At common law, each element of the crime was elaborated in extreme detail, and most were defined so as to differentiate between types of action that seem practically indistinguishable, at least from the point of view of danger created. For example, an actual “breaking” was required — entry through an open door or window was insufficient, although coming down the chimney was considered breaking. Similarly, night was generally defined as the time during which there was enough daylight to discern a person’s face. Common law decisions likewise interpreted “dwelling-house” in an extremely particularized sense, including buildings within the “curtilage,” that is, nearby barns, stables, or dairy houses near, or within “bow-shot” of the main building. It seems unlikely that Congress contemplated that federal courts would attempt to reinstate these *531arcane distinctions between various types of offenses.
Theoretically, some of these difficulties might be avoided by using the catchall term “otherwise presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” to enhance the sentences of those convicted of a “burglary,” that does not fit the common law definition. However, this approach has two problems. First, it essentially reads the term “burglary” out of the statute, because the term will now only apply to an extremely small number of cases which fit all the convolutions of the common law definition. Second, I think this approach will still not reach the vast majority of state burglary statutes, under the categorical analysis correctly adopted by the court. Most state statutes include offenses that do not necessarily involve any serious risk of physical injury to another, because, like the statute at issue in this case, they punish the burglary of unoccupied structures. Even the common law definition of burglary does not require that the dwelling house be occupied at the time of the burglary. Thus, contrary to congressional purposes, crimes generally defined as burglary would not qualify for sentence enhancement, unless we read the catchall provision in a much broader sense than in the proposed opinion.
In my view, it seems more probable to assume that Congress meant the federal courts to examine only the language of the relevant state statutes and generally accept the state statutory definitions of burglary. This does not mean that the courts would accept as burglary for purposes of section 924 whatever definition the state chooses to give it. As the Supreme Court has noted, when borrowing state law, “specific aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide appropriate standards for federal law.” United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 596, 93 S.Ct. 2389, 2398, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (1973). Thus, for example, the fact that a state defined the offense of jaywalking as “burglary” would not satisfy the definition of burglary for purposes of section 924 if classifying such an offense as “burglary” was not Congress’ intent. Where the state statute deviates sufficiently from what Congress intended the courts might be forced to state that no conviction under the statute would count for section 924(e)(1) enhancement purposes. As a practical matter, the likelihood of such event is remote, the majority’s opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. In my view, none of the existing state statutory definitions of burglary fall into this category.
It is not at all surprising to me that California dignifies its citizen’s car as highly as one’s home. Indeed, in California one’s car may indeed be more sacrosanct than one’s dwelling. Congress could not possibly have meant to penalize the citizens of California for thinking that the contents of a locked car are entitled to as much protection from theft as the contents of an apartment.
For these reasons, I would affirm Judge Keller in his determination that the crime committed was a “burglary” and therefore a “violent felony” under the federal sentence enhancement statute.