Court Opinion

ID: 9628208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:12:19.294501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:59.905480
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Judge,
dissents:
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.).
That statute states in pertinent part: “An individual separated from a job for the reasons enumerated in this subsection (5) shall have his benefits reduced . The determination of whether or not a separation from employment shall'result in a reduced award . . . shall be the responsibility of the division. The following reasons, along with other pertinent factors, shall be considered in determining the direct and proximate cause of the separation . . . (emphasis added)
The statute then goes on to list 23 reasons for separation.
Petitioner contends that this statute allows his benefits to be reduced only if it is found that he was terminated for one of the specified reasons. The respondents contend, on the other hand, and the majority agrees, that the reference in subsection (5) to “other pertinent factors” and the preamble to the Colorado Employment Security Act, § 8-73-108(1), C.R.S. 1973, when considered together evidence a legislative intent to confer discretion on the Division to reduce benefits without citing a particular reason listed in subsection (5) so long as the general intent of the Act is followed.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, I note that prior to October 1,1977, § 8-73-108(7), C.R.S. 1973, gave the Division discretion to award full or reduced benefits under circumstances not specifically covered elsewhere in the Act. However, with the repeal of this subsection and the revision of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum. Supp.), to specify that “[a]n individual separated from a job for the reasons enumerated in this subsection (5) shall have his benefits reduced . . .”,1 would construe *1121the statute now to mean that a reduction of benefits may be effected only for a reason specifically set forth in subsection (5). I do not interpret the word “factors” to mean “reasons” in the context of this statute. Where, as here, the language of the statute is free from ambiguity, effect must be given to the statute as written. Diamond Industries v. Claimants in re Death of Crouse, 41 Colo.App. 541, 589 P.2d 1383 (1978).
I would rule that the Commission’s order should be set aside and the cause remanded for additional findings as to whether petitioner was terminated for one of the reasons set forth in § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Cum.Supp.).