Court Opinion

ID: 9808218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:30:40.182573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:07.920140
License: Public Domain

Si-iephekd, J.,
dissenting: The defendant was indicted in two counts for distinct offences. It is conceded that the Court erred in refusing to give the defendant’s prayer for instruction to the effect that the testimony w*as insufficient to sustain a conviction on the first count. There was a general verdict of guilty, and it is, I think, improperly held by the Court that the defendant must lose the benefit of her exception because she did not request the Court to require a separate finding upon each count. This, it seems to me, is a novelty in the criminal practice of this State, and so opposed to the general principles controlling criminal trials that I am constrained to enter my dissent I concur in nearly all of the general propositions laid down in the opinion of the Court, but deny that they have any application to the case before us. It is undoubtedly true that where there is a general verdict of guilty, and some of the counts are defective, the law presumes that the conviction was upon the good counts; but this is held only upon motions in arrest of judgment, in which it is assumed that there was evidence upon the good counts, and that no error was committed on the trial.
It is also conceded that where there are defective counts, and evidence is offered as to the good, count only, it will be presumed that the verdict was upon the good counts, and a general verdict will be sustained on a motion for a new trial. State v. Long, 7 Jones, 24. In none of the cases cited in the opinion was it decided that a general verdict will be sustained upon a motion for a neiu trial, where it appears that *745the Court has erroneously instructed the jury, or where there is not sufficient testimony to sustain a conviction upon all of the counts, and especially upon all of the good ones. ■The error of the Court consists, I think, in a failure to observe this fundamental distinction. The jury may have believed only the testimony bearing upon the count which was the subject of the erroneous charge,'and yet we are called upon to assume that they acted only upon testimony relating to the second count. This, as I have remarked, is something new in the criminal practice in North Carolina, and is, in my opinion, not only unsupported by reason or authority, but is directly opposed to the rulings of this Court.
It has generally been understood that when a defendant makes his objection to testimony, or presents his prayer for instruction in apt time, he has done all that can reasonably be required of him, and that it is the duty of the Court to conduct the trial to a proper conclusion. In lieu of this plain and well-settled practice, it is now proposed to make it the duty of the defendant to interfere and assist the Court in extricating itself from an erroneous ruling, upon the penalty of losing the benefit of his.exceptions.
Sympathizing, as I do, with the policy of trying cases upon their merits, and relieving the administration of the criminal law of many useless refinements and technicalities, I fail to see what evil is to be remedied or good accomplished by the present ruling of the Court. In this case the Judge erred; the defendant excepted, and having this express notice that the objection was to be insisted upon, the Solicitor failed to nol. pros, the first count or to ask for a separate verdict, and the Court failed to direct such a verdict, although it might have done so ex mero rnotu. Where is the public exigency that requires the defendant to act in such a case instead of the Court, which has committed the error? I know of no authority in support of such a complete reversal of the position of the State and the defendant in a criminal *746prosecution. It is, clearly,, not found in the opinion of the Court. Nearly all of the numerous authorities cited therein relate only to the general principle which I have conceded, and there are but five cases which seem to be relied upon in support of the particular question here presented. State v. Smiley, 101 N. C., 709, only decides that upon a motion in arrest of judgment a general verdict will be sustained if “ either count be good.” This, as we have seen, is conceded, and it is plain that the case has no bearing upon the question under consideration. Equally inapplicable is State v. Allen, 103 N. C, 433. In that case there was no error in the rulings of the Court, and the only point decided was that a general verdict would be sustained in an indictment for larceny and receiving. The only case which I think at all approaches the point is State v. Stroud, 95 N. C., 626. An examination of that case will disclose that there was no exception whatever to the admission of testimony, and the Court held that there was no error in any of the rulings of the Judge. Plow, then, can such a case be regarded as authority upon a question which can qnly arise where there has been some erroneous ruling on the part of the Court? What was said, therefore, by the learned' Justice who delivered the opinion can only be regarded as a dictum; and as the two counts were based upon the same transaction, and the evidence was applicable to both, it is not very clear that the remarks of the Justice furnish sufficient ground to warrant the inference which is sought to be drawn from them. It cannot be seriously contended that the case decided the point which we are considering. In Hudson v. State, 1 Blackford’s R., 319, the indictment contained two counts, “one charging Hudson with shooting an Indian, the other with aiding and assisting another man in stabbing him.” Phe Court held that “evidence of the aid and assistance charged in the second count was sufficient to support the charge of shooting set out in the first count,” and *747a general verdict of guilty was sustained. How a case in which there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding upon both counts is authority in one where there is only sufficient evidence to sustain a finding upon one count I am unable to understand. This is all that the case decides, and it does not, therefore, apply to the question under discussion.
I now come to the remaining case, which is State v. Basserman, 54 Conn., 92, in which it was said that it is the duty of the defendant in a case like ours to ask for a separate verdict upon each count. These remarks, like those in Stroud’s case, were unnecessary, as the Court expressly decided that the testimony in question was not only competent, but had not been objected to. Thus it is seen that there are only these two dicta (one of which is not at all clear) to be found in all of the cases cited, which tend to sustain the decision of the Court. It is not a little strange, if the position is correct, that no direct authority, cither from the text-books or the reports, can be found in its support, and yet it is proposed, in the absence of any exigency requiring it, to overrule an express decision of this Court, and work a very great change in an important particular in the conduct of jury trials in criminal cases. The decision of the Court in State v. McCauless, 9 Ired., 375, is directly in point. Indeed, the case is precisely like ours in every respect. Peakson, J., for the Court, says: “We think his Honor erred in the instruction given. It is insisted that, the defendants being properly convicted upon the second count, that will sustain the judgment, notwithstanding the error in the charge in reference to the first count. It is true, when one count in an indictment is defective, and another count good, and there is a general verdict, a motion in arrest cannot be sustained, for the good count warrants the judgment, and, although the punishment is discretionary, the judgment is presumed to have been given upon the good count. In this case both counts were good. There was error in the instruc*748tion given in one of the counts, by reason whereof the defendants were improperly convicted upon that count, and are entitled to a venire de novo.”
In State v. Williams, 9 Ired., 150, the same principle is affirmed by Puffin, C. J. Eight of the counts were defective, and it was contended that, as to these, there was error in the charge, and that there should be a new trial, there having been a general verdict. The Court said: “For it is argued the case is not within the rule that there may be judgment on an indictment containing defective counts if there be a good one, because that proceeds on the ground that there ivas evidence to authorize a conviction on each and all of the counts, whereas here the jury were told, it is said, that they might convict upon all, if they thought the prisoner was guilty upon any one. If that be true, there ought to be a venire de novo, certainly; for, unquestionably, the eight counts are bad, in which a taking without conveying, and a conveying, without a taking, are respectively charged.” The Court sustained the conviction only because it appeared that the trial Judge bad, in his charge, “explicitly put these counts (the defective ones) out of the case.” The irresistible inference to be drawn from the opinion is, that if tln-se counts had not been put out of the case, the general verdict would not have been Mistained.
I prefer to stand by the decisions of these distinguished jurists, especially as they seem to be in accord with the true spirit of the practice governing the administration of the criminal law, and there is no advantage, in any respect,, to be gained by departing from them.
No harm can come to the State by the existing practice, as it is always, as I have said, in the power of the Court to direct separate findings upon each count, or for the Solicitor to not. pros, the count upon which the’e has been an erroneous ruling.