Court Opinion

ID: 9953666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 16:09:35.22994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:40.057440
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. 194A23

                                 Filed 22 March 2024

IN THE MATTER OF: A.H.

      Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of

the Court of Appeals, 289 N.C. App. 501 (2023), reversing orders entered on 20 and

24 May 2022 by Judge Thomas B. Langan in District Court, Stokes County. Heard in

the Supreme Court on 20 February 2024.

      Anné C. Wright for petitioner-appellant Stokes County Department of Social
      Services.

      James N. Freeman Jr. for appellant Guardian ad Litem.

      Mercedes O. Chut for respondent-appellee father.

      PER CURIAM.

      Justice RIGGS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

As to the trial court’s adjudication of neglect, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

reversed for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion.

      As to the trial court’s adjudication of dependency, the remaining members of

the Court are equally divided, with three members voting to affirm and three

members voting to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the

decision of the Court of Appeals as to dependency is left undisturbed and stands

without precedential value. See Batson v. Coastal Res. Comm’n, 385 N.C. 328 (2023)

                                          -1-
                                     IN RE A.H.

                                  Opinion of the Court

(per curiam) (affirming by an equally divided vote a Court of Appeals decision without

precedential value). This matter is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further

remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

      AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

                                          -2-
         Justice EARLS dissenting.

         North Carolina’s general statutes set out seven criteria for determining that a

child is a neglected juvenile. N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15) (2023). This Court’s cases

establish that there must be “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” of neglect to

support an adjudication that a child is neglected. See In re K.N., 373 N.C. 274, 278

(2020). The criteria for determining neglect are intended by the General Assembly

“[t]o provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes

and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the

unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.” N.C.G.S.

§ 7B-100(4) (2023). But those criteria are not intended to empower trial courts to

punish a parent they consider uncooperative or to remove a child from a home based

on the court’s own views of good parenting.

         Several of the trial court’s findings of fact in this case were not supported by

clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The remaining factual findings centered on a

single incident and the interactions of the juvenile’s parent and her caregiver with

social workers. Those remaining findings do not support the adjudication that the

child in this case was neglected by her father. I would affirm the decision of the Court

of Appeals reversing the trial court’s adjudication order and resulting disposition

order.

                              I.   Factual Background

                                            -3-
                                         IN RE A.H.

                                     Earls, J., dissenting.

       This is respondent-father’s appeal from an adjudication order dated 20 May

2022 and a disposition order dated 24 May 2022 adjudicating his daughter A.H.

(Aerin)1 neglected and dependent and placing Aerin in the custody of petitioner,

Stokes County Department of Social Services (DSS). Aerin was born on 12 April 2012

and was nine years old at the time of the 4 October 2021 incident that led to the

orders appealed here. Aerin’s biological mother relinquished her parental rights on

15 December 2021 and is not a party to this appeal.

       The record indicates that on 27 May 2021, a temporary custody order giving

custody of Aerin to respondent-father was entered by the Forsyth County District

Court when Aerin was residing with her mother in Forsyth County. The findings

supporting that order detail unfit living conditions that Aerin was subjected to in her

mother’s home. The trial court on that date found

              that with [respondent-father] the minor child has her own
              room, a quiet and safe living environment; that to provide
              the same for the minor child, [her father] rented and moved
              into a second apartment across the street from [his
              wife/Aerin’s stepmother] and his six other children; that
              the minor child’s home, hygiene, clothing are all suitable
              and safe and [DSS caseworker] has seen and has no
              concerns with the same; that the minor child is presently
              remote learning in third grade, has an IEP and is doing
              well; that [her father and stepmother] are aware of and
              taking care of the minor child’s medical and dental care
              and the minor child does not have any significant health
              issues.

       1 A pseudonym used to protect the privacy and identity of the minor child and for ease

of reading. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).

                                              -4-
                                          IN RE A.H.

                                      Earls, J., dissenting.

        The Forsyth County order also provided that respondent-father, who was the

plaintiff in that case, “shall have legal and primary physical custody of the minor

child, pending review of this matter before the undersigned on December 15, 2021.”

At the time this order was entered, respondent-father was living in Mt. Airy, North

Carolina. However, before the Forsyth County court could review the temporary

custody order, DSS became involved with the family due to an incident on 4 October

2021.

        On 4 October 2021, Aerin was living with her father, stepmother, and her

stepmother’s four other children in Stokes County and attending King Elementary

School. That day Aerin rode the school bus home with two of the other children in the

home, and all three of them were met at the bus stop by respondent-father driving a

truck with a work trailer attached. While still in the truck, respondent-father

received a telephone call from Aerin’s teacher, who mentioned that the family was

now all living together in their new house.2 When the call ended, respondent-father

        2 This account is taken from the trial court’s findings of fact based on Aerin’s
testimony. In Finding of Fact 38 the trial court states that it finds Aerin’s testimony credible
and “adopts the events and chronology set out” in her testimony as the court’s findings.
Respondent-father gave a different account of the telephone call and the conversation with
his daughter in his testimony, but, as the majority in the Court of Appeals noted, the trial
court’s findings appeared to credit respondent-father’s testimony at some points despite also
making a finding that “[t]he court does not find [respondent-father] to be credible.” The
challenge this creates for appellate review is why, as we recently explained, “the better
practice always will be to make specific, express findings in the written order about what the
trial court determined the facts to be, rather than referencing evidence in the record and
stating that the referenced evidence is credible” or, as in this case, not credible. In re H.B.,
384 N.C. 484, 490–91 (2023).

                                               -5-
                                       IN RE A.H.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting.

“told [Aerin] he was tired of her telling other people their business. He stated to

[Aerin] that he was going to whoop her.”

      At this point Aerin got out of the truck and started walking away. Respondent-

father told her to get back into the truck but she refused. He followed her in the truck

but could not keep up with her because he could not maneuver the truck in the

neighborhood’s cul-de-sacs. Respondent-father then got out of his truck, again

ordered Aerin to get in the truck, and started chasing her. Aerin began running and

darted into the road, where she was nearly hit by a dump truck that honked at her.

There was conflicting testimony about what respondent-father saw and why he

turned around and got back into his truck. The trial court’s uncontested finding was

that “[t]he black man turned and walked away before the child was directly in front

of the dump truck.”

      A neighbor, also returning home from picking up children from school, was

directly behind the dump truck and saw Aerin run into the road. He followed Aerin

walking down the road for approximately 200–300 feet until he pulled off the road

into the parking lot of a business. He found that Aerin was “hysterical, crying and

screaming” and initially too upset to speak. Eventually when he calmed her down,

she said she was afraid of her father and that he would beat her. The neighbor called

law enforcement and waited with Aerin until they arrived.

      It appears that the trial court credited respondent-father’s testimony in finding

                                            -6-
                                       IN RE A.H.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting.

that he drove from the scene of the incident and took the other two children in the

truck to a convenience store. The trial court found that

             there was a substantial risk to the juvenile of serious
             physical injury, when the father turned around, walked
             away, and left the child on a busy roadway on 10/4/2021.
             [Respondent-father] did not provide proper care of his
             child, when he left her running into a busy roadway . . . .

      Aerin’s stepmother admitted in her testimony that she did not cooperate with

the DSS caseworker who came to the home the afternoon of 4 October 2021. The trial

court found that “[n]o respondent was able to make a proper plan for [Aerin] on

10/4/2021. Her father . . . left and did not return to the scene. [Her stepmother] did

not offer to make a plan for the child . . . .” Less than 24 hours after the incident, DSS

filed a juvenile petition alleging that Aerin was an abused, neglected, and dependent

juvenile.

                             II.   Proceedings Below

      The DSS petition was heard at the 23 February 2022 session of Stokes County

Juvenile Court at which time the trial court took evidence and heard arguments of

counsel for all parties. The trial court ultimately concluded that Aerin was neglected

and dependent and dismissed the allegation of abuse. Respondent-father appealed,

challenging several of the trial court’s findings as unsupported by the evidence and

inadequate to support the conclusion that Aerin was neglected or dependent. See In

re A.H., 289 N.C. App. 501, 502, 505 (2023).

      Both the majority and the dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals agreed

                                            -7-
                                      IN RE A.H.

                                  Earls, J., dissenting.

that the trial court’s Findings of Fact 33, 39 through 42, 44, and 45 are unsupported

by the evidence. Id. at 505, 511. They further agreed that the remaining findings of

fact are proper and supported by the evidence. Id. The dissenting judge disagreed

with the majority on the question of whether the remaining findings of fact were

sufficient to support the trial court’s ultimate conclusions that Aerin was a neglected

and dependent juvenile. Id. at 510, 524.

      Because the decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the finding of

dependency is left undisturbed by this Court’s decision, the only issue here is

whether, disregarding the unsupported findings, the findings of fact by the trial court

that were supported by competent evidence are adequate to support the finding of

neglect. See In re A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. 45, 53 (2023) (explaining that in an appeal from

a neglect adjudication, a reviewing court examines “whether the trial court’s

conclusions of law are supported by adequate findings and whether those findings, in

turn, are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence”) (citing In re E.H.P.,

372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019)); see also In re A.C., 378 N.C. 377, 394 (2021) (discussing

that when a finding lacks sufficient evidentiary support, it must be disregarded and

the court must determine whether the remaining findings support the trial court’s

adjudication).

      III.   Findings of Fact Supporting the Conclusion of Neglect

      The Court of Appeals majority applied the correct standard of review in this

case. Findings supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence are conclusive and

                                           -8-
                                        IN RE A.H.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting.

binding on appeal, even when there is contrary evidence in the record. In re A.E., 379

N.C. 177, 184 (2021). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re C.B.C., 373 N.C.

16, 19 (2019). We therefore review de novo whether the trial court’s legal conclusion

that Aerin was a neglected juvenile is supported by the remaining findings of fact.

      This is distinct from the contention in the Court of Appeals dissent that our

task is to “consider the totality of the evidence to determine whether the trial court’s

findings sufficiently support its ultimate conclusion that [Aerin] is a neglected

juvenile.” In re A.H., 289 N.C. App. at 519 (Flood, J., dissenting) (alteration in

original) (quoting In re F.S., 268 N.C. App. 34, 43 (2019)). This Court’s precedents

hold that appellate courts may not reweigh the underlying evidence to make factual

assessments that are not made by the trial court. See In re C.C.G., 380 N.C. 23, 33

(2022) (citing In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11 (2019)). The language in In re F.S. relied

upon by the dissent below is not based on any applicable precedent from this Court

and implies a “totality of the evidence” standard of review that we have not previously

applied in these circumstances. See, e.g., In re H.B., 384 N.C. 484, 492–93 (2023)

(stating that the trial court is “the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be given

to the evidence” (quoting In re N.P., 374 N.C. 61, 65 (2020))). We review the evidence

to determine if the trial court’s findings of fact are supported, but we do not make or

rely on our own findings of fact.

      Under the law of this state, a neglected juvenile is one:

             [W]hose parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker does any

                                             -9-
                                      IN RE A.H.

                                  Earls, J., dissenting.

             of the following:

             a. Does not provide proper care, supervision, or discipline.

             b. Has abandoned the juvenile, except where that juvenile
             is a safely surrendered infant as defined in this
             Subchapter.

             c. Has not provided or arranged for the provision of
             necessary medical or remedial care.

             d. Or whose parent, guardian, or custodian has refused to
             follow the recommendations of the Juvenile and Family
             Team made pursuant to Article 27A of this Chapter.

             e. Creates or allows to be created a living environment that
             is injurious to the juvenile’s welfare.

             f. Has participated or attempted to participate in the
             unlawful transfer of custody of the juvenile under G.S.14-
             321.2.

             g. Has placed the juvenile for care or adoption in violation
             of law.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(15).

      Remembering that the purpose of this section is simultaneously to provide

services to protect juveniles, to respect the right to family autonomy and to prevent

the “unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents,”

N.C.G.S. § 7B-100(3), (4), it is axiomatic that neglect is something more than a single

act of bad judgment by a parent or caregiver that results in no significant harm to a

child. See In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. 279, 283 (2003). Under our cases interpreting this

statute, a finding that a juvenile is neglected requires that the “conduct at issue

constituted either severe or dangerous conduct or a pattern of conduct either causing

                                          -10-
                                      IN RE A.H.

                                  Earls, J., dissenting.

injury or potentially causing injury to the juvenile.” Id. That precedent remains good

law. And for good reason. As this Court explained, to hold that every act of negligence

constitutes neglect

             would subject every misstep by a care giver to the full
             impact of subchapter I of chapter 7B of the North Carolina
             General Statutes, resulting in mandatory investigations,
             and the potential for petitions for removal of the child or
             children from their family for custodial purposes, and/or
             ultimate termination of parental rights.

In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 283 (cleaned up).

      While a single act of negligence severe enough to cause significant harm to a

child and indicative of the likelihood that future harm would result can constitute

neglect, it is not the case that any “treatment of a child which falls below the

normative standards imposed upon parents by our society” is sufficient to justify a

finding that the child is neglected. See In re V.M., 273 N.C. App. 294, 297 (2020).

      Both In re Stumbo and In re V.M. involve children who arguably were subjected

to negligent parenting, just as Aerin arguably was on 4 October 2021, but who were

not neglected juveniles within the meaning of the statute. In In re Stumbo, a two-

year-old child was reportedly playing naked and unsupervised in the driveway of his

home. In re Stumbo, 357 N.C. at 280. When social workers came to the home to

investigate the report, the parents were uncooperative. Id. In interpreting the

statutory definition of neglect, this Court explained that

             It is obvious from this definition and the cases applying it

                                          -11-
                                       IN RE A.H.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting.

              that the circumstances constituting neglect involve serious
              and substantial allegations. ‘Neglect’ is further linked with
              ‘abuse’ and ‘dependency,’ thereby reinforcing the
              legislative conclusion that these are conditions that pose a
              serious threat to a juvenile’s welfare.

Id. at 287.

      In In re V.M., cited by the dissent below, the Court of Appeals reversed a trial

court’s finding of neglect where a four-month-old child suffered acute alcohol

intoxication after being fed formula prepared with liquor that had been poured into

water bottles after a funeral. 273 N.C. App. at 295. Upon de novo review, the Court

of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s findings of fact did not support the legal

conclusion that the child was a neglected juvenile. Id.

      These and other cases make clear that isolated incidents of neglect, even if the

potential for serious injury is present, do not meet the statutory threshold for a

finding of neglect. See, e.g., In re H.P., 278 N.C. App. 195 (2021) (holding that findings

that a three-year-old child was running naked between parents’ homes and was

walking alone did not constitute a neglected juvenile).

      As the majority below correctly concluded after reviewing all the trial court’s

competent and supported findings of fact, this case presents a single incident in which

a nine-year-old child walked away from her father, refused to follow his directions to

return, and ran from him as he followed her in his truck with two other children.

When he could not effectively navigate the neighborhood streets, he got out of the

truck and pursued her on foot. Before Aerin crossed the busy road, he had already

                                           -12-
                                         IN RE A.H.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting.

turned around to return to the other two children. See In re A.H., 289 N.C. App. at

507. At this point he had a Sophie’s choice—he could expose the nine-year-old to

danger by allowing her to continue unsupervised as she ran away from him, or he

could expose the children in the truck to danger by leaving them alone to pursue the

nine-year-old. Perhaps in hindsight he made the wrong choice, but there is no

evidence that it was a neglectful one.

      The dissent below found support for the conclusion that Aerin was neglected

based on the finding that respondent-father “left the scene of the incident and did not

return nor inquire about his child.” As the majority explained, the trial court’s finding

here is simply devoid of sufficient information to establish neglect. Id. at 508–09.

There was no finding of fact regarding whether respondent-father knew who to

contact or how. As the majority below recounted:

             What evidence was introduced shows that [the DSS
             caseworker] received a report at 3:15 p.m., arrived at
             Newsome Road around 4:00 p.m., began her home
             inspection between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m., executed her
             verified petition before a magistrate later that evening, and
             filed the petition the following day. Again, the absence of
             evidence is not evidence, and DSS failed to meet its burden
             of introducing evidence proving Father’s failure to contact
             DSS after business hours on the 4th and on the morning of
             the 5th before the filing of the petition amounted to neglect,
             particularly when the only evidence that was introduced—
             credible or not—shows Father knew that his wife had
             already met with DSS and that Aerin was safe in DSS
             custody.

Id. at 509 (cleaned up).

                                            -13-
                                        IN RE A.H.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting.

       It is not our role to make findings of fact from the evidence. Just as we are

bound by the competent findings of fact that the trial court did make, we are forbidden

to infer factual findings that it did not.

       At the end of the day, the issue here is not whether we approve of respondent-

father’s parenting decisions on 4 October 2021. The question is whether the trial

court’s findings of fact that were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence

in the case are sufficient to meet the statutory criteria to find that a child is a

neglected juvenile. The findings of fact in this case do not rise to that level. This

Court’s failure to enforce the statute as written, and to follow our precedents,

frustrates the purposes of the General Assembly to protect family integrity, to provide

children with safety, continuity, and permanence, and to prevent the unnecessary

separation of children from their parents. The decision of the Court of Appeals should

be affirmed.

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