Court Opinion

ID: 9912872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-25 08:09:09.000642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:24.741686
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued December 21, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00487-CR
                            ———————————
                        CASSIUS COLLINS, Appellant
                                        V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 337th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 1598532

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant Cassius Collins of the first-degree felony offense

of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 30.02(a)(3), (d). Collins argued the affirmative defense of insanity, but the

jury rejected the defense. See id. § 8.01(a). The trial court sentenced Collins to
twenty years’ imprisonment. See id. § 12.32(a). In a single issue on appeal, Collins

challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s rejection of

his insanity defense.1 We affirm.

                                      Background

      In the early morning of July 18, 2018, the complainant Angela Lara was home

alone with her twelve-year-old daughter, the youngest of Lara’s two daughters. Lara

was lying awake in her first-floor bedroom, and her daughter was asleep in a

bedroom upstairs. Lara heard her dog begin barking, so she got up to check on him.

As she walked from her bedroom into the living room, Lara saw “a tall, slim person

who had a hoodie on”—later determined to be Collins—approaching her. Lara did

not recognize the intruder in the dark house. She yelled to her daughter to call 911,

hoping to scare the intruder away.

      Lara backed away from Collins into her bedroom when Collins attacked her.

He hit her several times before she felt blood running down her shoulder and realized

she was being stabbed. Collins also bit off part of Lara’s right ear. Lara fought back,

1
      Collins mentions both factual and legal insufficiency in the “Issue Presented”
      section of his appellate brief, but he argues only that the evidence was factually
      insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of the insanity defense. Moreover, Collins
      requests that this Court reverse and remand for a new trial, which Collins
      acknowledges is the remedy in a criminal case for reversal based on factual
      insufficiency of the evidence. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 672 (Tex.
      Crim. App. 2013). Therefore, we construe Collins’ appellate brief as challenging
      only the factual sufficiency of the evidence.

                                             2
knocking a tooth out of Collins’ mouth. Lara eventually yelled again for her daughter

to call the police, provoking Collins to flee. Lara went upstairs to her daughter’s

bedroom and awoke her, and her daughter called 911. Lara was taken to the hospital

where she was treated for severe injuries, including at least twelve stab wounds and

collapsed lungs. Doctors were unable to reattach her ear. But Lara survived.

      La Porte Police Department Sergeant Matt Davidson was immediately

assigned to investigate the offense. Davidson met Lara at the hospital within hours

of the offense. Lara initially suspected that the attacker was an ex-boyfriend of her

older daughter, but this person was quickly cleared as a suspect. Davidson next went

to Lara’s house and found what he described as “a very horrific scene of a very

vicious and brutal attack.” In Lara’s bedroom, where most of the assault occurred,

police found a lot of blood, part of Lara’s ear, and the tooth Lara had unknowingly

knocked out of Collins’ mouth. There were no signs of forced entry, but the back

door had a doggy door in it, and there was blood on the door. Police recovered a

video recording from a surveillance camera on a neighboring house showing a

person dressed in dark clothing and a hoodie walking past the yard. The trial court

admitted this video recording and photographs of Lara’s house and Lara’s and

Collins’ injuries.

      Upon finding the tooth, Davidson called Lara at the hospital and asked

whether she was missing a tooth. She was not. Lara told Davidson that she thought

                                         3
Collins might be the attacker. Collins and Lara’s oldest daughter have a child, who

is Lara’s granddaughter.2

      Police found Collins nearby on the same day as the offense. Collins had been

staying with James Godfrey and his family, who lived near Lara. When Davidson

met Collins at the Godfreys’ house, Davidson saw fresh wounds on Collins’ left

bicep. Collins was also missing a tooth, and the gap was “actively bleeding.” Police

arrested Collins. During a search of the Godfreys’ house, police found blood smears

and a smoking pipe on the sink of a bathroom used by Collins and the Godfreys’

daughter.

      Davidson testified that during the transport to jail, Collins admitted that he

committed the offense because Lara let someone else hold Collins’ daughter before

Collins did. But Collins refused to say where he had hidden the knife used to stab

Lara, saying it was enough that police had Collins himself. Collins made several odd

statements that led Davidson to conclude that Collins had some sort of mental issue

or was good at faking it. For example, Collins said he buried the knife as sacrifice to

his spiritual growth. And when Davidson attempted to read the Miranda warnings,

Collins asked whether they contained hidden text that would affect him in the next

2
      The record is unclear why Lara suspected Collins. There was some evidence that
      Lara may have assisted her daughter in seeking child support from Collins. Lara’s
      participation in the child support proceeding may have been introduced as a
      potential motive for the crime.

                                          4
life. Davidson emphasized, however, that he believed Collins knew right from

wrong.

      A Harris County grand jury indicted Collins for the first-degree felony offense

of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 30.02(a)(3), (d). Collins was found competent to stand trial, and he filed a

notice of intent to raise the insanity defense. See id. § 8.01(a) (“It is an affirmative

defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result

of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was wrong.”).

      While awaiting trial, Collins was interviewed by two forensic psychologists,

Dr. David Genac and Dr. Cassandra Hayes, each of whom provided expert witness

testimony at trial for the State and the defense, respectively.3 Collins told both

experts that before the offense, he hallucinated that unknown males told him they

planned to rape his daughter. He intended to go to Lara’s house to kill the men and

save his daughter. But he recalled a slightly different hallucination to each expert.

He told his expert that he had been having similar hallucinations for nearly a month

before the offense, but on the night of the offense, a voice said, “We’re on our way

over there to do this right now.” He told the State’s expert that he had one

3
      Both experts’ reports were also admitted at trial.

                                            5
hallucination during which he heard Lara say that “your daughter is going to get

raped this evening and I will make sure of it.”

      He described the offense itself differently to the experts as well. To his expert

witness, Collins recalled that he wore a hoodie to Lara’s house because he did not

want to be recognized by the people whom he believed were harming his daughter,

and he took a knife to protect her. When he arrived at Lara’s house, he sat outside

for some time “[t]rying to use all [his] deductive reasoning to see if they were inside

the house” and looking for lights or movement inside the house. He entered Lara’s

house by reaching through the doggy door, unlocking the back door, and opening

the door. Once Collins was inside, Lara’s dog ran away from him, and then he saw

Lara and she screamed. He did not recognize Lara, but he believed she intended to

harm his daughter, so he ran at and attacked her. He remembered stabbing her and

biting off her ear, and he remembered Lara kicking him and calling him “a devil.”

He remained quiet because he was scared and he knew it was wrong to enter her

house without permission, but he believed he needed to do so to save his daughter

from danger. After the assault, he ran out of Lara’s house because he knew he had

hurt someone, although he believed he hurt someone who was harming his daughter.

      When he returned to the Godfreys’ house, Collins showered off the blood. He

knew he needed to mend the wound on his bicep, but he did not want to ask the

                                          6
Godfreys for help because he did not want them knowing what he had done. When

police arrived at the Godfreys’ house, Collins knew why he was being arrested.

      To the State’s expert, however, Collins remembered significantly fewer

details. For example, he denied wearing a hoodie, and the expert believed Collins

was intentionally refusing to admit the information. Collins also told the State’s

expert that he blacked out during the walk to Lara’s house and came to once he

arrived back at the Godfreys’ house. He denied having blood on him after the offense

or even committing the crime, and he said that when he was arrested, he thought, “I

hope I didn’t do that.” He also denied reporting to the police that his daughter was

in any danger even though he believed at the time of the interview that his daughter

was still in danger. He also said he knew that killing was wrong.

      At trial, several lay witnesses testified about Collins’ mental state. Collins’

mother, Kristen Collins (“Kristen”),4 testified that Collins began exhibiting odd

behavior as a five- or six-year-old child when he was caught playing with his urine

and feces.5 His behavior progressively worsened throughout junior high and high

4
      Because Collins and his mother share the same last name, we refer to his mother by
      her first name to avoid confusion.
5
      Kristen also testified that when Collins was a year old, he fractured several bones,
      and she and her then-boyfriend were criminally charged over the incident. Collins
      was removed from Kristen’s care until he was in elementary school. During her
      interview with the defense expert, Kristen reported that her then-boyfriend flung
      Collins against his crib out of frustration. Although Collins relies on this evidence
                                            7
school, and Collins began receiving social security disability benefits in 2013, when

he was seventeen years old. Kristen testified that 2013 and 2014 were particularly

bad years for Collins’ mental health, and Collins was admitted to several hospitals

for inpatient psychiatric treatment over the years. Kristen testified that Collins was

currently diagnosed with bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and ADHD.6 Kristen also

testified that Collins had abused drugs.

      In May 2018, two months before the July 2018 offense, Collins was admitted

for psychiatric treatment after he told Kristen that people were trying to harm him

telepathically. Kristen knew that Collins was not taking his psychiatric medication,

and she perceived his statements as a mental health crisis. Kristen called 911, but

she testified that Collins was not taken for psychiatric treatment because he denied

he was suicidal.

      The following day, Kristen called 911 again after Collins threatened to harm

himself and Kristen. Collins was involuntarily committed for inpatient psychiatric

treatment, but he was released ten days later and went to Kristen’s house. Kristen

returned Collins to the hospital because he did not appear stable and was talking to

      on appeal, his own expert witness testified that this incident did not affect Collins’
      mental illness. This evidence is therefore not relevant to Collins’ insanity defense.
6
      Collins’ grandmothers testified at trial generally about Collins’ odd behavior and
      mental illness, but they did not add anything to Kristen’s testimony. Neither
      grandmother had seen Collins since at least May 2018.

                                            8
himself. Kristen testified that the hospital refused to readmit Collins. Collins was

released with a prescription for psychiatric medication, but Kristen was unable to fill

it.

      Kristen did not want Collins to live with her after his discharge because he

had physically assaulted her previously. On one occasion, Kristen returned home

from work one day and found Collins high on the couch with homemade drug

paraphernalia next to him. She tried to remove the paraphernalia, but Collins swung

and kicked at her. On two other occasions, Collins pushed and shoved her. Thus,

when he was discharged in May 2018, Kristen found Collins a placement in a group

home. Unbeknownst to Kristen, however, Collins eventually left the group home

and moved in with the Godfreys. Kristen did not see Collins again until after the July

2018 offense.

      The trial court admitted Collins’ medical records from the May 2018

hospitalization. The records stated that Collins was aggressive towards his mother

and threatened to fight her, and he had been off his medication since his previous

hospitalization in November 2017. Kristen completed an application for emergency

detention, stating that Collins “threatened [Kristen] and others to fuck me/them up

[and] threatened to kill himself.” Collins was discharged after eleven days because

he completed treatment. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and cannabis use

disorder, and he was prescribed two medications.

                                          9
      Godfrey testified that Collins was staying at the Godfreys’ house in La Porte

at the time of the offense. A few hours before the offense, Godfrey took his daughter

and Collins bowling, and they returned home about 11:00 p.m. Collins did not

interrupt the bowling games. Collins reported that he and Godfrey also played video

games that night. At some point, Collins left the Godfreys’ house in dark clothing

and a hoodie. He returned between 2:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. wearing only shorts and

socks. Collins said nothing to Godfrey and went straight into the bathroom to

shower. Godfrey denied leaving the blood stain or the pipe that police found on the

bathroom sink when searching Godfrey’s house after Collins’ arrest.

      Both parties also called expert forensic psychologists to testify at trial on the

insanity issue. Dr. Hayes testified for the defense that she reviewed Collins’ medical

records from psychiatric hospitalizations in November 2017 and May 2018—the two

most recent hospitalizations prior to the July 2018 offense—as well as jail medical

records after Collins’ arrest. Hayes also interviewed Collins and Kristen. Hayes

testified that prior to the offense, Collins was diagnosed in November 2017 and May

2018 with schizoaffective disorder,7 bipolar disorder, and polysubstance use or

7
      Hayes testified that symptoms of schizophrenia include hallucinations and
      delusions, and schizoaffective disorder is a combination of schizophrenia and mood
      disorder symptoms.

                                          10
dependence. Hayes ultimately opined that Collins was legally insane at the time of

the offense.

      Hayes testified that she believed Collins had a severe mental illness at the time

of the offense based on his reported hallucinations prior to the offense and his odd

statements to police after his arrest. Hayes did not believe Collins intended to harm

Lara; rather, he intended to prevent a crime against his daughter. Hayes also testified

that Collins did not know his conduct was wrong. In her report, however, Hayes

stated that Collins “acknowledged knowing the wrongfulness of entering the

residence without permission at the time of the offense, but he believed he needed

to do so in order to protect his daughter from harm based on the hallucinations and

delusions he was experiencing.” Hayes also testified that Collins ran out of Lara’s

house after the offense because he knew he had hurt Lara, and Collins knew why he

was being arrested when police arrived at the Godfreys’ house.

      Hayes denied that Collins was intoxicated at the time of the offense because

Collins denied it and he was not tested for drugs after his arrest. Hayes acknowledged

that Collins had a history of abusing illicit substances, specifically synthetic

marijuana and methamphetamine, and that using these drugs can cause

hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia. Hayes testified that Collins said he had not

used synthetic marijuana since 2015, but Collins reported using two fifteen-gram

bags per day when he did use it. Collins told Hayes that when he smoked synthetic

                                          11
marijuana, he experienced hallucinations as little black speckles in his field of vision.

Collins described the hallucinations he had of his daughter’s danger before the

offense as “a bunch of black and blue floating around like electricity.”

      Dr. Genac, who testified as the State’s expert forensic psychologist, ultimately

concluded that Collins was sane at the time of the offense, that he knew right from

wrong, and that he acted under the influence of synthetic marijuana rather than a

mental disease or defect.

      Genac disagreed with Hayes that Collins exhibited symptoms of

schizophrenia at the time of the offense. Genac testified that a person must have

schizophrenic symptoms for at least six months, but Genac was not provided with

Collins’ medical records covering all six months prior to the offense. Genac also

testified that Collins’ behavior before and after the offense was inconsistent with his

self-reported hallucinatory symptoms. Genac testified that Collins seemed fine when

he played video games and went bowling with the Godfreys hours before the offense.

And Collins did not exhibit any bizarre behavior or altered mental status when he

was initially booked into jail, although he told a psychiatrist later that day that he

had experienced hallucinations and suicidal ideation.

      Moreover, during Genac’s interview with Collins, Collins claimed that he

blacked out and could not remember any incriminating details of the offense, even

though he could recall some incriminating details during the interview with Hayes.

                                           12
Genac testified that it was unusual for schizophrenia to cause a person to be unable

to recall only parts of an event; the person either remembers the event or does not

remember it because the person was “in such a weird state of mind.”

      Genac also believed that Collins may have faked his symptoms. Collins told

Genac that Kristen had previously coached Collins to say he was suicidal to gain

admission to a psychiatric facility and to say he was no longer suicidal to be

discharged. Genac testified that the medical records revealed that nearly all of

Collins’ admissions to psychiatric hospitals were due to reported suicidal ideation,

hallucinations, and bizarre behavior. The trial court admitted recordings of two jail

phone calls between Collins and Kristen, and Genac testified that Kristen was

coaching Collins in the phone calls by telling him to report his hallucinations and

his belief that he could telepathically communicate with people.

      Genac also believed that Collins understood right from wrong. Collins wore

a hoodie to Lara’s house so he could hide his identity from the unknown men he was

seeking out. Collins also entered Lara’s house quietly through the doggy door to

avoid detection rather than asking about his daughter. And Collins did not report to

police that his daughter was in any danger. Collins also told Genac during their

interview that he went to Lara’s house to kill the people trying to harm his daughter.

Collins knew that killing someone, even if the person was harming his daughter, was

wrong and he could be sentenced to prison, but he took the risk anyway.

                                         13
      Finally, Genac testified that Collins’ reluctance to provide details of the

offense to Genac that Collins had provided to Hayes indicated that Collins

experienced a drug-induced psychosis from either alcohol or cannabis. Collins told

Genac both that he had not used marijuana in several years and that he used it around

the time of his arrest to read people’s minds. Genac also testified that jail records

showed Collins reported using marijuana and alcohol on the day of the offense.

Genac testified that Collins’ mental illness symptoms arose around the same time he

began using synthetic marijuana. Finally, Genac testified that Collins had a pattern

of using “synthetic cannabis which triggered him into anger, causing [him] to assault

others,” including Kristen.8

      The jury charge in the guilt-innocence phase of trial included instructions on

the insanity defense. The charge also instructed the jury that voluntary intoxication

is not a defense to the commission of a crime. The jury rejected Collins’ insanity

defense and found him guilty of the first-degree felony offense of burglary of a

habitation with intent to commit aggravated assault. At Collins’ election, the trial

court sentenced Collins to twenty years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

8
      In his expert report, Genac stated that Collins was arrested at age seventeen for
      injuring a child under fifteen, and Collins told Genac that “on that day he had
      smoked synthetic cannabis with a friend and that he attacked the complainant
      secondary to being angry at the complainant for using an emasculating slur towards
      him.”

                                          14
                          Affirmative Defense of Insanity

      In his sole issue, Collins challenges the factual sufficiency of the jury’s

rejection of his insanity defense. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the jury’s finding of the essential elements of the offense.

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review

      Texas law presumes that an accused is sane and intends the natural

consequences of his actions. Ruffin v. State, 270 S.W.3d 586, 591 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008). Insanity is an affirmative defense, and the defendant bears the burden to prove

the issue by a preponderance of the evidence. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 2.04(d), 8.01(a);

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46C.153(a)(2); Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 591–92. A finding

of insanity excuses the defendant from criminal responsibility even if the State

proves all elements of the offense, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46C.153(a).

      Texas law defines insanity as (1) “a severe mental disease or defect” that

(2) resulted in the actor not knowing that his conduct was wrong at the time of the

offense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a). Under this definition, proof of a mental disease

or defect alone is insufficient to establish the affirmative defense. Id.; see Graham

v. State, 566 S.W.2d 941, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“The ‘mental disease or

defect’ component is one that limits the availability of the defense [of insanity], not

                                          15
one that automatically invokes its protective shield.”); McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d

622, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

      The affirmative defense of insanity is a legal issue, not a medical one, and

“the jury is not restricted to medical science theories of causation.” Graham, 566

S.W.2d at 952–53; see Petetan v. State, 622 S.W.3d 321, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(stating that insanity defense “is ultimately for the factfinder, not the expert”). The

insanity defense “intertwin[es] moral, legal, and medical judgments.” Graham, 566

S.W.2d at 950 (quotation omitted). In making its determination, the jury must

consider “the inarticulable ethical component, which includes imperatives of free

will, self control, and responsibility for one’s acts” that are fundamental to criminal

responsibility. See id. at 953; see also Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 878 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1994) (stating that “only the jury can join the non-medical components

that must be considered in deciding the ultimate issue” of sanity because

“[o]therwise the issue of sanity would be decided in the hospitals and not the

courtrooms”).

      “Although jurors may not arbitrarily disregard expert testimony as to insanity,

neither may they give conclusive effect to such testimony.” McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at

636–37; see Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951 (“Opinion testimony does not establish

material facts as a matter of law.”). The jury may accept or reject in whole or in part

                                          16
the opinion testimony of a physician, and the jury may accept lay testimony over

expert testimony. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 950–51.

      The focus of an insanity defense is on whether the accused understood the

nature of his action and whether he knew he should not do it. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at

592 n.17; Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636. In the context of

the insanity defense, “wrong” means illegal. Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592; McAfee, 467

S.W.3d at 636. “If the accused knows that his conduct is ‘illegal’ by societal

standards, then he understands that his conduct is wrong, even if, due to a mental

disease or defect, he thinks his conduct is morally justified.” McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at

636; see Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592. The circumstances of the crime itself—including

attempts to conceal incriminating evidence or elude detection by law enforcement—

can indicate knowledge of wrongful conduct. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951; McAfee,

467 S.W.3d at 637; Torres v. State, 976 S.W.2d 345, 347–48 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 1998, no pet.) (holding that, in determining insanity issue, jury

may consider circumstantial evidence, including defendant’s demeanor before and

after committing crime, defendant’s attempts to evade police or conceal

incriminating evidence, defendant’s expressions of regret or fear of consequences of

actions, other possible motives for offense, and any other possible explanations for

defendant’s behavior). Rarely will we overturn a jury’s findings concerning the

insanity defense. Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 953.

                                         17
      Finally, the insanity defense is not available when the defendant was

voluntarily intoxicated or temporarily insane due to intoxication. TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 8.04(a); Afzal v. State, 559 S.W.3d 204, 208 n.4, 214–15 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2018, pet. ref’d); Villanueva v. State, No. 01-20-00303-CR, 2021 WL 2832974, at

*11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 8, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). “Intoxication” in section 8.04(a) refers to the “disturbance of mental

or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.”

TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.04(d). Thus, “if a person experiences temporary visual and

auditory hallucinations, paranoia, and other psychotic symptoms because they are

under the influence of drugs and commits a crime in that delusional state, the

affirmative defense of insanity is not available to obtain a not-guilty verdict—it is

only relevant to punishment for the crime.” Villanueva, 2021 WL 2832974, at *11.

      Collins challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

rejection of his affirmative defense. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013) (applying civil standard of factual-sufficiency review for

challenges to rejection of affirmative defense in criminal proceeding because burden

of proof is “preponderance of the evidence,” which is same burden applied in civil

cases). By challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse

finding, Collins is asserting that the adverse finding on his affirmative defense was

so against the great weight and preponderance of the entire body of admitted

                                          18
evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Id. at 670 n.29, 671; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at

636.

       In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we view the entirety of the

evidence in a neutral light while preserving the factfinder’s weight and credibility

determinations. Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 671; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636. We may

find the evidence factually insufficient only if, “after setting out the relevant

evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the

evidence supporting the verdict, [we] clearly state[] why the verdict is so much

against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-

shocking, or clearly biased.” McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636 (quoting Matlock, 392

S.W.3d at 671); see Reyna v. State, 116 S.W.3d 362, 367 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003,

no pet.) (“The issue of insanity at the time of the offense lies within the province of

the jury, and we will overturn its decision only where insanity is undisputed or

resolved to one end of the spectrum outside the realm of discretion.”). If we so

conclude, we may reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.

Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 672; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636.

B.     Analysis

       Viewing the evidence in a neutral light while preserving the jury’s credibility

determinations, we hold that the jury’s rejection of Collins’ insanity defense was not

                                          19
so against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock,

392 S.W.3d at 671; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636.

      As stated above, the affirmative defense of insanity focuses on whether the

accused understood the nature of his action and whether he knew he should not do

it. See Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 n.17; Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; McAfee, 467

S.W.3d at 636. On appeal, however, Collins focuses on the “severe mental disease

or defect” component of insanity but provides little analysis of whether the evidence

established that he did not know his conduct was wrong. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 8.01(a).

      There is substantial evidence that Collins suffered from a severe mental

disease or defect before committing the offense. Medical records and witness

testimony showed that Collins had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and bipolar

disorder, and he had experienced sporadic hallucinations and delusions as symptoms

of these illnesses. He also received social security disability benefits. In May 2018,

two months before the incident, Collins was involuntarily committed for psychiatric

treatment after hallucinating that people were trying to telepathically harm him.

Collins had not regularly taken his prescribed psychiatric medication since his

discharge from the hospital in May 2018, and Kristen testified that Collins’

symptoms worsened when he did not take his medication. Nevertheless, a diagnosis

of a serious mental illness alone is insufficient to meet the standard for legal insanity

                                           20
under the Penal Code. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 953 (“The ‘mental disease or

defect’ component is one that limits the availability of the defense, not one that

automatically invokes its protective shield.”); see also Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S.

735, 773–76 (2006) (stating that diagnosis of serious mental illness does not

necessarily answer question of whether defendant had “cognitive, moral, volitional,

or other capacity” for “conventional guilt and criminal responsibility”).

      The evidence of Collins’ mental state during the offense, however, is

primarily limited to Collins’ own statements that prior to the offense, he experienced

a hallucination that his then-toddler daughter was in imminent danger of sexual

assault, and he committed the offense to save his daughter. He also made odd

statements to police after his arrest. Hayes, Collins’ expert witness, testified that

Collins was thus suffering from a severe mental disease or defect.

      But the State’s expert witness disagreed. Genac testified that except for the

self-reported hallucination about his daughter and the odd statements to police after

his arrest, Collins behaved normally just hours before the offense when he played

video games and went bowling with the Godfreys. Genac also testified that there

were no medical records showing that Collins exhibited symptoms for at least six

months as required for a schizophrenia diagnosis. Genac believed Collins may have

faked the hallucinations about his daughter because Collins admitted that his mother

coached him on how to present with a mental illness. Genac was also suspicious that

                                         21
Collins claimed not to remember any incriminating details of the offense when

interviewed by Genac even though Collins could remember such details when

interviewed by Hayes.

      The jury was thus presented with substantial evidence that Collins had a

severe mental disease or defect before he committed the offense, but the evidence of

his state of mind during and shortly after the offense conflicted. Primarily, the jury

was faced with two conflicting expert opinions concerning whether Collins suffered

from a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. The jury was free

to reject the defense expert’s opinion and accept the State expert’s opinion that

Collins did not have a severe mental disease or defect when he committed the

offense. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 950–51. We cannot conclude that the evidence

showing Collins did not have a severe mental disease or defect at the time of the

offense was greatly outweighed by the contrary evidence. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d

at 672; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636.

      But even were we to assume that Collins suffered a severe mental disease or

defect at the time of the offense, Collins offers no analysis on appeal showing that

because of the severe mental disease or defect, he did not know his conduct was

wrong. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.01(a). Quite the opposite, Collins’ appellate brief

concedes that he “was watchful of his surroundings before entering [Lara’s]

residence and acknowledged knowing the wrongfulness of entering [Lara’s]

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residence without permission at the time of the offense, but he believed he needed

to do so to protect his daughter from harm.” (Emphasis added.) Collins also

acknowledged that he intended to kill the people he believed were harming his

daughter and that killing a person is illegal and could result in incarceration, but he

took the risk anyway.

      Collins was charged with and convicted of burglary of a habitation with intent

to commit aggravated assault, which requires entering, without the owner’s effective

consent, a habitation and committing or attempting to commit an aggravated assault.

See id. § 30.02(a)(3); see also id. §§ 22.01(a) (assault), 22.02(a) (aggravated assault).

Collins’ statements and appellate arguments conclusively establish that he

understood the nature of his conduct and that he should not do it because it was

wrong. See Ruffin, 270 S.W.3d at 592 (stating that issue of insanity is whether “the

defendant factually [knew] that society considers this conduct against the law, even

though the defendant, due to his mental disease or defect, may think that the conduct

is morally justified”); Bigby, 892 S.W.2d at 878; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636. This

supports the jury’s rejection of Collins’ insanity defense. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 8.01(a).

      Other evidence also shows that Collins knew his conduct was wrong. For

example, he wore a hoodie during the offense, admittedly because he did not want

to be recognized. Once at Lara’s house, Collins waited outside, observing the house

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for any light or activity inside. He surreptitiously entered the house by reaching

through a doggy door and unlocking the back door. He remained quiet while in

Lara’s house, instead of demanding to see his daughter. After Lara yelled a second

time, Collins fled because, as he later stated, he was scared and knew he had entered

the house without permission. These actions indicate that Collins attempted to

commit the offense without being detected by Lara or law enforcement, and thus

that he knew his conduct was illegal. See Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951; McAfee, 467

S.W.3d at 637; see also Dashield v. State, 110 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (concluding that jury could infer defendant

debated rectitude of assault and attempted to flee before police arrived, and thus

knew right from wrong, where defendant approached store several times before

entering, placed brick on counter, picked up brick as if to throw it at storekeeper,

threw brick at storekeeper, and fled store).

      Furthermore, after the offense, Collins hid the knife he used to stab Lara and

discarded the hoodie that was likely covered in Lara’s blood. He refused to tell police

where the knife and hoodie were located. Collins also showered immediately upon

his return to the Godfreys’ house. He declined asking for help to mend a large wound

on his bicep that he received during the offense, admittedly because he did not want

the Godfreys to know about it. These actions indicate that Collins attempted to

conceal incriminating evidence, and thus that he knew his conduct was illegal. See

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Graham, 566 S.W.2d at 951; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 637; see also Hines v. State,

570 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (concluding

that defendant’s measures to conceal murder, including moving body and hiding

truck, supported finding that defendant knew conduct was illegal).

      Finally, the jury was also presented with evidence that Collins’ conduct was

caused by his voluntary intoxication, which negates the insanity defense. See TEX.

PENAL CODE § 8.04(a); Villanueva, 2021 WL 2832974, at *11. Genac testified that

Collins had a history of engaging in violent, assaultive behavior toward family

members when he ingested synthetic marijuana. Moreover, when police arrested

Collins at the Godfreys’ house, a pipe was sitting on a bathroom sink used by Collins

and Godfrey’s daughter. Collins’ description of the hallucinations he experienced

when he was high on synthetic marijuana—little black speckles—was similar to his

description of the hallucination he experienced on the night of the offense: “a bunch

of black and blue floating around like electricity.” The jury could have believed

Genac’s testimony that Collins was voluntarily intoxicated at the time of the offense

over Hayes’ contrary testimony, and thus the jury properly could have rejected

Collins’ insanity defense. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 8.04(a); Graham, 566 S.W.2d at

950–51; McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636–37.

      Collins has not established that the jury’s rejection of his insanity defense was

so against the great weight and preponderance of the entire body of admitted

                                         25
evidence as to be manifestly unjust. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 670 n.29, 671;

McAfee, 467 S.W.3d at 636. We therefore hold that the evidence was factually

sufficient to support the jury’s rejection of the affirmative defense of insanity. We

overrule Collins’ sole issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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