Court Opinion

ID: 9538579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:37:56.341741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:59.239177
License: Public Domain

Dore, C.J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I object to the majority's dismissal of St. Pierre's personal restraint petition, claiming that St. Pierre failed to show "actual and substantial prejudice", which is required in a collateral attack on his conviction. I believe St. Pierre's due process rights have been violated and that a new trial is in order.
St. Pierre was convicted of first degree felony murder, first degree kidnapping and second degree assault in connection with the deaths of Damon Wells and John Achord. St. Pierre was never charged with felony murder. However, the jury was given an instruction on felony murder as a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder. St. Pierre was sentenced to life in prison, 20 years, and 10 years on each conviction, respectively, to run concurrently.
*332The majority correctly states that St. Pierre's case was not yet final when this court issued State v. Irizarry, 111 Wn.2d 591, 763 P.2d 432 (1988). St. Pierre's case was still "in the pipeline". "[CJases in the pipeline when a new constitutional rule is announced must be given the benefit of that rule." Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 59-60, 36 L. Ed. 2d 736, 93 S. Ct. 1966 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Irizarry held that felony murder is not a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder. The trial court's instruction treating felony murder as a lesser included offense was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. See Irizarry, 111 Wn.2d at 592.
In order for St. Pierre to gain the benefit of Irizarry in this collateral attack, I find that his conviction was not yet final. St. Pierre's burden in this personal restraint petition is to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the constitutional error (his conviction for felony murder as a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder) worked to his "actual and substantial prejudice". In re Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 504, 681 P.2d 835 (1984). In re Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 814, 792 P.2d 506 (1990). The majority concludes that St. Pierre has not shown actual and substantial prejudice. It is from this conclusion that I dissent.
The majority analyzes St. Pierre's challenge as one of error in the charging document. This allows the conclusion that St. Pierre does not allege error of such magnitude that prejudice can be presumed: "We do not find errors in the charging document to be per se prejudicial under the higher standard for collateral review." Majority opinion, at 329. Not only does the majority fail to set out that "higher standard for collateral review", but it also fails to recognize the issue here concerns error in the jury instructions — not error in the charging document.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that St. Pierre challenged a charging document error. The majority concludes that St. Pierre had notice that he had to defend *333against felony murder, thus he was not prejudiced. It relies, in part, on a faulty assessment that courts "routinely" instructed juries that felony murder was a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder. See Irizarry, at 599 (Callow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).1 Disregarding that this is hardly more than an assumption, the majority's reliance on it misses the point. The question of prejudice arises not because St. Pierre should have known he would have to defend against felony murder. The prejudice is that the jury convicted him based on an improper instruction that was constitutional error As defense counsel aptly put it:
The trial court essentially allowed the state to amend the charge, not only after the presentation of the state's case-in-chief, but also after presentation of the defendant's case.
Brief of Petitioner, at 30.
Fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings, the touchstone of due process, begins with an accused's right to know the charge against him. In re Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80, 87, 660 P.2d 263 (1983). Cf. State v. Pelkey, 109 Wn.2d 484, 490, 745 P.2d 854 (1987); State v. Austin, 105 Wn.2d 511, 517, 716 P.2d 875 (1986). Together with that, the accused has a right to know that he will not be punished more severely than the law allows. Cf. In re Moore, 116 Wn.2d 30, 803 P.2d 300 (1991). Here, as counsel for St. Pierre effectively argue, but for the wrong instruction, jurors who decided not to convict St. Pierre of aggravated first degree murder would have had two remaining choices: acquit him or convict him of second degree murder, the lesser included offense that carried a *334maximum prison term of 25 years. RCW 9A.32.050(2), .20.020(1)(a). Instead, St. Pierre was convicted of first degree felony murder, and sentenced to life in prison for that offense. What stronger showing of prejudice is there?
The challenge St. Pierre raises is not to a simple, harmless error. He was convicted of a crime for which he was never charged and, if the trial court had properly framed the instructions, one that the jury would not have considered. St. Pierre's conviction violated Const. art. 1, § 22 (amend. 10), as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See In re Hews, supra.
Conclusion
St. Pierre is entitled to the retroactive application of Irizarry because he was still "in the pipeline" when Irizarry was filed. Michigan v. Payne, supra. Under the Irizarry rule, felony murder is not a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder. St. Pierre is able to show actual prejudice in order to gain relief in this personal restraint petition.
St. Pierre's due process rights were actually prejudiced when the trial court judge instructed the jury on felony murder as a lesser included offense of aggravated first degree murder. He was actually prejudiced when he was convicted for felony murder, a charge which was not properly before the jury. St. Pierre was further prejudiced when he received a life sentence for that felony murder conviction.
St. Pierre's conviction for first degree felony murder was prejudicial error requiring a new trial. I would reverse and remand for trial.
Utter and Johnson, JJ., concur with Dore, C.J.
Reconsideration denied March 17, 1992.

Tn citing Justice Callow's concurring/dissenting opinion, the majority states: "prior to our decision in Irizarry, Washington courts routinely instructed juries that the crime of aggravated first degree murder included the lesser offense of felony murder." Majority opinion, at 330. But in his concurrence and dissent to Irizarry he wrote more specifically: "Washington courts have in a number of cases involving aggravated first degree murder routinely instructed juries that the crime of aggravated first degree murder necessarily includes the lesser crime of first degree murder." (Italics mine.) Irizarry, at 599 (Callow, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The added emphasis qualifies the majority's conclusion that such instructions were routine.