Court Opinion

ID: 9954452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:08:29.071937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:17.684324
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3517-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

L.E.E.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued February 6, 2024 – Decided March 26, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County,
                   Indictment No. 22-02-0196.

                   Esther Yongjoo Kim, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer
                   Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Esther
                   Yongjoo Kim, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   Patrick F. Galdieri, II, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Esther Suarez, Hudson County

1
  We use initials to protect H.E.'s privacy. See Rule 1:38-3(c)(9) and Rule 1:38-
3(c)(12).
            Prosecutor, attorney; Patrick F. Galdieri, II, of counsel
            and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      On leave granted, Defendant L.E.E. appeals from a June 8, 2023 order

denying his motion to dismiss the first count of a five-count indictment. Since

we conclude the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion,

we affirm the order.

      We glean the facts from the motion record. On February 3, 2022, the State

presented two complaints to the grand jury. The first complaint related to an

alleged incident of sexual assault and endangering the welfare of H.E . that

occurred in September 2021.      The second complaint related to an alleged

incident of aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault contact, and endangering

the welfare of H.E. that occurred in November 2018.

      Detective Yosselyn Barrios was summoned to testify before the grand

jury. Detective Barrios testified that in October 2021, H.E.'s mother reported to

the Harrison Police Department that H.E., then age eight, had disclosed to her

that she was sexually assaulted by defendant.

      Barrios further testified that she interviewed H.E. in November 2021.

According to Barrios, H.E. stated that in September 2021, defendant went to her

home and while in the living room, picked H.E. up and placed his hands

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underneath H.E.'s vagina over her clothes. H.E. stated she ran and told her

mother. Her mother corroborated the information.

         Further, Barrios testified H.E.'s mother advised her that about a week after

the September 2021 incident, H.E. told her something was wrong. H.E. told her

mother that in 2018, defendant "touched H.E.'s breasts with his hands on one

occasion" and "on at least one occasion . . . placed his penis inside her vagina."

H.E. was six years old in 2018.

         The grand jury returned a five-count indictment, and in the first count,

charged defendant with aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1), upon

six-year-old H.E., specifically by knowingly penetrating H.E.'s vagina with his

penis.

         Not disclosed during the grand jury proceeding was that during Barrios's

interview of H.E., H.E. reenacted the 2018 incident using two dolls. During the

interview, H.E. took off all the female doll's clothes and took off only the shirt

of the male doll, leaving on the male doll's pants. H.E. rolled up the pant legs

of the male doll stating, "he put his pants like this, up a bit," indicating that the

waistband of defendant's pants was at his waist. H.E. could not remember if

defendant took his pants off. H.E. reenacted the 2018 incident by sitting the

male doll on top of the female doll with the two dolls facing each other.

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        Also not disclosed during the grand jury proceeding was H.E.'s interview

at Audrey Hepburn Children's Hospital (AHCH) in December 2021, where she

was questioned by an evaluator. H.E. was asked what a male does with his

genitalia; H.E. answered, "they pee," and indicated that a man would put his

genitalia in the toilet. H.E. also denied having seen a male's genitalia at any

time.

        Defendant moved to dismiss count one of the indictment for the State's

failure to present the statements H.E. made to Barrios and the AHCH evaluator

to the grand jury. Defendant argued the statements were exculpatory because:

(1) H.E.'s re-enactment with the dolls revealed penetration was "impossible"

because defendant's "pants never came off the doll" and there is "no allegation

anywhere in the evidence that his fly was down, that he lowered his waistband,

none of it"; and (2) H.E.'s statement to AHCH that she "never saw male

genitalia" could not be accurate, considering how she simulated the sexual

assault using AHCH's dolls. Therefore, relying on Hogan,2 defendant argued

the State was hiding the truth and the indictment should be dismissed.

        The judge held oral argument. In his oral opinion, he stated "it [wa]s

certainly conceivable that [defendant's] penis was exposed through his pants

2
    State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216 (1996).
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with his zipper down and the waistband of the pants remain[ed] at waist level,"

the judge rejected defendant's argument "that [defendant] could not have

penetrated H.E. with his penis presumably because his pants never came down

from the waist." Moreover, in terms of H.E. denying having seen male genitalia,

the judge noted "it's certainly conceivable that sexual penetration could occur

regardless of whether or not the victim saw the defendant's penis." Thus, the

court held H.E.'s statements "[we]re not clearly contradictory to the sexual

penetration element of [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1),] as sexual penetration could

have occurred regardless of whether defendant took his pants off or whether

H.E. saw [his] penis." Accordingly, the trial judge denied defendant's motion

to dismiss count one of the indictment.

      On appeal, defendant presents the following arguments for our

consideration:

            THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
            CREATING FACTS TO FIND THE EVIDENCE
            WITHHELD FROM THE GRAND JURY IS NOT
            CLEARLY EXCULPATORY.

            THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED
            THE LUNSFORD[3] CHARGE FOR FAILURE TO
            PRESENT CLEARLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.

3
  Jessica Lunsford Act—"imposes a term of incarceration of twenty-five years
to life, with a period of parole ineligibility of at least twenty-five years, on an

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            H.E.'S STATEMENTS THAT SHE WAS TOUCHED
            DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS AN ELEMENT OF THE
            LUNSFORD     CHARGE   WHICH    REQUIRES
            PENETRATION, AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN
            PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY.

            H.E.'S   STATEMENTS    ARE    CLEARLY
            EXCULPATORY BECAUSE SHE IS MORE
            RELIABLE AND CREDIBLE THAN HER
            MOTHER[,] WHO WAS NOT AN EYEWITNESS TO
            THE INCIDENT.

More specifically, defendant contends:     (1) the trial court did not base its

decision on evidence in the record, but instead, had to "imagine" defendant was

wearing pants with zippers and the zipper was down to expose his penis; and (2)

"the only evidence of penetration that the grand jury heard was [H.E.'s] mother's

purported re-telling of her unrecorded conversation with H.E., which took place

a month before the mother made a police report" and H.E. "did not claim that

any penetration happened" to Detective Barrios and told AHCH "that she had

never seen male genitalia."

      We review "[a] trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment

offender convicted of an aggravated sexual assault in which the victim is less
than thirteen years old." State v. A.T.C., 239 N.J. 450, 455 (2019) (citing
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1)).
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. . . for abuse of discretion." State v. Tucker, 473 N.J. Super. 329, 341 (App.

Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 544 (2018)). "We will not

disturb the denial of such a motion 'unless [the judge's discretionary authority]

has been clearly abused.'" State v. Saavedra, 433 N.J. Super. 501, 514 (App.

Div. 2013) (alteration in the original) (quoting State v. Warmbrun, 277 N.J.

Super. 51, 60 (App. Div. 1994)).

      "[T]he grand jury must determine whether the State has established a

prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the accused has

committed it." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 227 (citations omitted). "The grand jury's

role is not to weigh evidence . . . but rather to investigate potential defendants

and whether a criminal proceeding should be commenced." Id. at 235 (citing

U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974)). "Credibility determinations

and resolution of factual disputes are reserved almost exclusively for the petit

jury." Ibid. (citation omitted). "In seeking an indictment, the prosecutor's sole

evidential obligation is to present a prima facie case that the accused committed

the crime." Ibid. "A grand jury may return an indictment based largely or

wholly on hearsay testimony." State v. Vasky, 218 N.J. Super. 487, 491 (App.

Div. 1987) (citing State v. Thrunk, 157 N.J. Super. 265, 278 (App. Div. 1978);

State v. Farrante, 111 N.J. Super. 299, 3034-06 (App. Div. 1970)).

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      "Once the grand jury has acted, an 'indictment should be disturbed only

on the clearest and plainest ground,' and only when the indictment is manifestly

deficient or palpably defective." Hogan, 144 N.J. at 228-29 (internal quotation

and citations omitted).    However, New Jersey has "demonstrated a greater

willingness to review grand jury proceedings where the alleged deficiency in the

proceedings affects the grand jurors' ability to make an informed decision

whether to indict." Id. at 229.

      Under Hogan, "[a] grand jury cannot be denied access to evidence that is

credible, material, and so clearly exculpatory as to induce a rational grand juror

to conclude that the [S]tate has not made out a prima facie case against the

accused." Id. at 236. A prosecutor's duty to present exculpatory evidence to a

grand jury only arises "'in the rare case in which . . . evidence . . . both directly

negates the guilt of the accused and is clearly exculpatory'; the evidence must

'squarely refute[] an element of the crime.'" State v. Saavedra, 222 N.J. 39, 63

(2015) (quoting Hogan, 144 N.J. at 237) (alteration in the original). The trial

court should "view[] the evidence and rational inferences drawn from that

evidence in the light most favorable to the State." Id. at 56-57.

      Defendant's argument the judge "imagined" the facts is unavailing.

Initially, we note during argument, it was defendant, not the judge, that

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                                         8
introduced the concept of defendant having a fly or zipper. Defendant raised

there was "no allegation anywhere in the evidence that his fly was down."

Nonetheless, in discussing the zipper, the judge merely highlighted an

alternative to defendant's argument. The judge did not imagine facts but instead,

as he was required to do, viewed the evidence and made rational inferences in

the light most favorable to the State. See Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 56-57.

       Further, neither Detective Barrios's nor AHCH's interviews were

exculpatory. In neither interview did H.E. "directly negate" or "squarely refute"

the penetration element of sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2. Her silence on the

penetration element in those interviews does not rise to the level of negating or

refuting the element.

       Lastly, defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the

Lunsford charge because "[t]he only evidence of penetration that the grand jury

heard was the mother's purported re-telling of her unrecorded conversation with

H.E., which took place an entire month before the mother made a police report."

However, this argument goes to the weight of evidence, which is not part of the

grand jury's role, Hogan, 144 N.J. at 235; and, even if the mother's statement is

considered hearsay, it would support the indictment, Vasky, 218 N.J. Super. at

491.

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Affirmed.

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