Court Opinion

ID: 9796941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:08:54.81644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:49.573995
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
concurring in the judgment only.
The majority concludes that sex offender treatment is not a mandatory condition of probation under section 16-11.7-105(1), C.R.S. (2007). Yet the statute provides that “[e]ach sex offender ... shall be required ... to undergo treatment to the extent appropriate to such offender.” § 16-11.7-105(1) (emphasis added). In my view, the statutory language requires that each sex offender undergo treatment as a condition of probation. *756I therefore respectfully concur in the judgment only.
The majority recognizes that section 16-11.7-105(1) contains both mandatory (treatment “shall be required”) and discretionary (“to the extent appropriate”) language. Maj. op. at 752. According to the majority, this fact creates an ambiguity that must be resolved by an examination of the legislative history surrounding the statute — an examination that leads it to the conclusion that treatment is not required. Id. at 752-55. Yet the majority’s resolution of this “ambiguity” gives effect only to the discretionary, not the mandatory, language. In my view, the better reading of the statute gives effect to both: The mandatory language requires sex offenders to undergo treatment as a condition of probation, and the discretionary language tailors that treatment to the needs of the particular offender. In other words, while treatment is mandatory, the “extent” of that treatment is discretionary.
The overall statutory scheme supports the conclusion that treatment is mandatory. For example, under section 16-11.7-103(4)(b), one of the “duties” of the sex offender management board is to:
[Djevelop and implement guidelines and standards for a system of programs for the treatment of sex offenders which can be utilized by offenders who are placed on probation .... The programs developed ... shall be as flexible as possible so that such programs may be utilized by each offender to prevent the offender from harming victims and potential victims.
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute requires the board to develop treatment programs that “can be utilized by offenders who are placed on probation.” In addition, the statute gives the board the task of developing a wide array of programs so that there will be a program that “each offender” can “utilize” — one that is, in the language of section 16-11.7-105(1), “appropriate” to that offender. In sum, while the sentencing court has discretion under the statute to select a program that is “appropriate,” it is required to select a program.
Moreover, even if one were to find legislative history helpful in performing statutory interpretation, which I do not,1 the evidence cited by the majority in this case does not support its holding that treatment is discretionary. While there was some concern about the breadth of the “shall be required” language, maj. op. at 754, that language was not removed from the statute. Instead, the language stating that treatment “shall be required ... which is appropriate to such person” was changed to the current language, which is that treatment “shall be required ... to the extent appropriate to such offender.” Id. (emphasis added). In my view, the change from “which is appropriate to such person” to “to the extent appropriate to such offender” simply added emphasis to the fact that the treatment was to be tailored to the offender. Some participants in the legislative process may have hoped that they had changed the effect of the statutory language from mandatory to discretionary, but they did not succeed in doing so. The “shall be required” language remained in the final version of the legislation and remains there to this day.
The majority recognizes that “[t]he statutory scheme favors imposition of sex offender treatment.” Maj. op. at 755. The trial court’s discretion, as the majority puts it, is “tightly constrained.” Id. These observations simply reiterate what the language already expressly states: that sex offender treatment “shall be required.” Although the majority upholds the imposition of treatment in this case, its interpretation does not require such treatment. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.

. See City of Colo. Springs v. Powell, 156 P.3d 461, 468 (Colo.2007) (Eid, J., concurring in part and specially concurring in part).