Court Opinion

ID: 9882513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:58.298563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:06.981996
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Parker, 2023-Ohio-2722.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                SHELBY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 17-23-02

        v.

ROBERT J. PARKER,                                         OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                          Appeal from Sidney Municipal Court
                             Trial Court No. 22CRB00519

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: August 7, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Jim R. Gudgel for Appellant

        David M. Busick for Appellee
Case No. 17-23-02

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Robert J. Parker (“Parker”), brings this appeal

from the March 16, 2023, judgment of the Sidney Municipal Court sentencing him

to 180 days in jail after a jury found him guilty of Assault in violation of R.C.

2903.13, a first degree misdemeanor. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                     Background

       {¶2} The evidence in this case is generally straightforward and

uncontradicted. On the evening of November 4, 2022, at approximately 8:20 p.m.,

three witnesses observed Parker physically kicking a woman who was on the ground

and pressed against a fence in Sidney, Ohio. Further, the witnesses indicated that

the victim was screaming for help. One of the witnesses recognized Parker as the

assailant, and all three witnesses identified Parker at trial as the person kicking the

woman against a fence.

       {¶3} One of the witnesses called the police, but when Parker realized he was

being observed, he got on his bicycle and left the scene. An officer arrived shortly

thereafter and spoke with those present, including the victim, who complained that

she was having trouble breathing. The victim’s blood was located on the ground

nearby. The interaction between the officer and the people present was recorded on

the officer’s body camera and played at trial.

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Case No. 17-23-02

       {¶4} Due to her injuries, the victim was taken to the hospital. The officer

investigating the matter went and spoke with the victim again at the hospital, and

that interaction was also recorded on the officer’s body camera and played at trial.

At the hospital, the victim named Parker as her assailant. She also described the

argument she had with Parker earlier that day, and indicated that she may have had

a protection order against Parker at one point. However, the victim did not testify at

trial and did not appear at trial at all despite being subpoenaed.

       {¶5} As a result of his actions, Parker was charged with Assault in violation

of R.C. 2903.13(A), a first degree misdemeanor. He proceeded to a jury trial

wherein he was found guilty, then he was sentenced to serve 180 days in jail. A

judgment entry memorializing Parker’s sentence was filed March 16, 2023. It is

from this judgment that he appeals, asserting the following assignment of error for

our review.

                                Assignment of Error

       The Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses at trial was
       violated in violation of the Confrontation Clause.

       {¶6} In his assignment of error, Parker contends that the trial court erred by

permitting the State to play body camera footage of the investigating officer

interviewing the victim at the hospital because the victim did not testify in this

matter. Parker argues that this evidence was presented in violation of the

Confrontation Clause.

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Case No. 17-23-02

                                Standard of Review

      {¶7} Generally, the admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the trial

court’s discretion, and a reviewing court should not reverse absent an abuse of

discretion and material prejudice. State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-

2815, ¶ 62. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court acted unreasonably,

arbitrarily, or unconscionably. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).

“However, we review de novo evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation

Clause.” State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 97. “De novo

review is independent, without deference to the lower court’s decision.” State v.

Hudson, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-12-38, 2013-Ohio-647, ¶ 27.

                               Relevant Authority

      {¶8} The Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides

that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be

confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.”

      The United States Supreme Court has interpreted [the Sixth
      Amendment right to confrontation] to mean that admission of an out-
      of-court statement of a witness who does not appear at trial is
      prohibited by the Confrontation Clause if the statement is testimonial
      unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior
      opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶ 34, citing Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). The United States Supreme Court “did not

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Case No. 17-23-02

define the word ‘testimonial’ but stated that the core class of statements implicated

by the Confrontation Clause includes statements ‘made under circumstances which

would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be

available for use at a later trial.’” Id. at ¶ 35, quoting Crawford at 52.

                                        Analysis

       {¶9} At trial, Parker’s attorney objected to body camera footage of the

investigating officer’s interaction with the victim at the hospital. Parker’s attorney

argued that this interaction was after-the-fact and not part of an ongoing emergency,

that the victim’s statement was testimonial, and that the statement was in violation

of the Confrontation Clause because the victim did not testify at trial. The trial court

overruled the objection and permitted the body camera footage to be played. The

footage showed the victim specifically identifying Parker as her assailant. Parker

asserts that it was reversible error for the footage to be played at trial.

       {¶10} Generally, when out-of-court statements made to law enforcement are

at issue under the Confrontation Clause, the “primary purpose” test applies. State v.

Little, 3d Allen No. 1-16-29, 2016-Ohio-8398, ¶ 18. Under this test,

       [s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
       interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
       primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
       meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
       circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
       emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to
       establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
       prosecution.

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Case No. 17-23-02

State v. Perkins, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13–10–36, 2011-Ohio-2705, 2011 WL

2345291, ¶ 4, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266

(2006).

         {¶11} When applying the primary purpose test to this case, there is no

indication that there was still an ongoing emergency at the time the officer spoke

with the victim at the hospital, and it was at that time that the victim made an out-

of-court identification of Parker as her assailant. See State v. Smith, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-180499, 2019-Ohio-3257. Contrary to the State’s suggestion, the

victim’s identification at the hospital to the officer was neither an excited utterance,

nor a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis.1 Further, the identification goes

directly to the truth of the matter asserted.

         {¶12} While a recording of an interaction on a police body camera may seem

reliable, the Confrontation Clause is designed to prohibit out-of-court statements

that are untested by cross-examination. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358, 131

S.Ct. 1143 (2011) (“Even where * * * an interrogation is conducted with all good

faith, introduction of the resulting statements at trial can be unfair to the accused if

they are untested by cross-examination. Whether formal or informal, out-of-court

statements can evade the basic objective of the Confrontation Clause, which is to

1
  Moreover, we note that while the State argues that the body camera footage met certain hearsay exceptions,
the State largely ignores the fact that the Confrontation Clause may bar admission of evidence that could
otherwise be admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (2001).

                                                    -6-
Case No. 17-23-02

prevent the accused from being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the

declarant about statements taken for use at trial.”).

       {¶13} Furthermore, we emphasize that

       The purpose of body cameras is to record events in which law
       enforcement officers are involved to improve officer safety, increase
       evidence quality, reduce civilian complaints and reduce agency
       liability * * * not to supplant the in-court testimony of witnesses. Out-
       of-court statements that would otherwise be inadmissible do not
       become admissible simply because they were captured on a police
       body camera.

State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111274, 2023-Ohio-603, ¶ 94.

       {¶14} After conducting our de novo review of the record, we do not agree

with the trial court that the body camera footage from the hospital was admissible

in this case because it is both hearsay with no exception established by the State and

because it is in violation of the Confrontation Clause. See State v. Smith, 1st Dist.

Hamilton No. C-180499, 2019-Ohio-3257 (holding that body camera footage was

inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause where witness did not testify at trial

and there was no ongoing emergency). However, this does not end our analysis

because Confrontation Clause issues (and hearsay issues) are subject to harmless

error review. State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735; State v.

Thomas, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-73, 2020-Ohio-5379, ¶ 27. Harmless error

review requires: 1) that the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the

improper evidence at trial, 2) that the appellate court believes that the error was “not

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Case No. 17-23-02

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 3) that after excising the improper

evidence, the remaining evidence overwhelmingly supports finding the defendant

guilty. State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-5052, ¶ 27-29.

       {¶15} Here, there is no question that introducing the body camera footage

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Three eyewitnesses all testified at trial

and specifically identified Parker as the assailant. Any statement made by the victim

through body camera footage hours after the incident identifying Parker as her

assailant was merely cumulative to other evidence in the record. Thomas, supra, at

¶ 26. Because the evidence from the body camera was merely cumulative, and the

evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding of guilt even without the body camera

footage, we find that any error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For

this reason, Parker’s assignment of error is overruled.

                                    Conclusion

       {¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to Parker in the particulars assigned

and argued, his assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the Sidney

Municipal Court is affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

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