Court Opinion

ID: 9774817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:34:48.990708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:16.493728
License: Public Domain

*548SEILER, Chief Justice.
I respectfully dissent. The question of whether uninsured motorist coverage “stacks” was before the court of appeals in Automobile Club Inter-Insur. Exch. v. Diebold, 511 S.W.2d 135, 137-39 (Mo.App.1974). There, as here, the single policy insured two automobiles which were separately listed with separate premiums. There, as here, it was contended the statute, Sec. 379.203, RSMo 1969, rendered anti-stacking provisions illegal. The court refused so to hold. The reasoning of the court was as follows:
. . [DJefendant asks that we address the validity of the separability clause in light of our uninsured motorist statute requiring a minimum amount of coverage on each policy of automobile liability insurance issued in this state. The parties to an insurance contract are free to place limitations and restrictions on the insurer’s liability as the contracting parties may be willing to agree unless prohibited by statute or public policy . A contract of insurance is a voluntary contract and as long as the terms and conditions are not unreasonable or in violation of legal rules and requirements, the parties may incorporate such provisions and conditions as they see fit to adopt . . . Our uninsured motorist statute is a legislative mandate requiring that no automobile liability insurance be delivered or issued in this state unless uninsured motorist coverage is provided for not less than the limits set forth in the motor vehicle responsibility law, which in this case is $10,-000.00. This coverage was ‘designed to close the gap in the protection afforded the public under existing financial responsibility laws, and within fixed limits, to provide recompense to innocent persons injured by motorists who lack financial responsibility’ . . . There is no doubt that the policy which plaintiff issued to defendant provided the minimum statutory coverage. This court has held where such coverage has been provided, the insurer may not avoid its statutorily imposed liability by insertion in the policy of a limiting clause which restricts the insured from receiving the benefits of that coverage . , . However, in this case, the clause in question only limits plaintiff’s liability to the statutory minimum; it does not avoid the minimum altogether. Consequently, the separability clause does not undermine the purpose of Sec. 379.203.
“. . . Here, the insurer is seeking only to limit its liability for each policy to the statutory minimum. The separability clause involved herein is not the same as the ‘other insurance’ clause held invalid in Steinhaeufel [v. Reliance Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo.App.1973)].
“Defendant infers that because the two cars were listed separately in the policy and separate premiums were charged for each, he has a right to separate coverage under the uninsured motorist provision. However, the statute makes no such demands on the insurer. Our uninsured motorist statute requires a minimum amount of coverage on each policy issued in this state. The policy in question is one contract, not two. Under it, two automobiles are insured. By its express provisions, the terms of the policy apply ‘separately’ to each automobile. We are not persuaded by the argument that plaintiff, by charging two separate premium payments for Diebold’s two automobiles has in essence issued two separate policies of insurance. While the issue in this case is one of first impression in the State of Missouri, most jurisdictions have resolved this issue in accordance with the decision here

“. . . This case involves only one policy which provided separate coverage for each insured automobile, neither of which was involved in the accident. Because the policy provides the minimum uninsured motorist coverage required by Missouri law, we do not find the separability clause to be void as against public *549policy. We agree with plaintiff that Sec. 379.203 contains no language which would require the insurer to provide more than the minimum coverage per policy.”
The principal opinion relies on a Florida case, Tucker v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 288 So.2d 238 (Fla.1973), and an Alabama case, Great Central Insurance Co. v. Edge, 292 Ala. 613, 298 So.2d 607 (1974), which allow stacking, as being more persuasive than our Diebold case, but I do not find them so. Neither the Florida case nor the Alabama case makes a thorough analysis of what was the intent and purpose of the legislature in requiring a minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage in statutes such as our Sec. 379.203, which is, as I see it, the key issue, nor do these cases consider the illogical consequences of “stacking” which are pointed out later herein. The principal opinion also places much reliance on the proposition that stacking or non-stacking ought not to be resolved on the basis of mere form of policy used— whether two separate policies or a single combination family policy — but I do not believe this is the real issue before us. The real issue is what the legislative intention was and what the policy provides. In my opinion, the Diebold case correctly analyzes the matter and I would follow it. I would not overrule it.
The principal opinion accepts the premise of Galloway v. Farmers Insurance Company, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 339 (Mo.App.1975), that where an insured has two separate policies containing uninsured motorist coverage, one on one automobile and the other on another, effect shall be given to both coverages without reduction or limitation by policy provisions. This means that the coverage is cumulative or “stacked”, so that although the insured has only $10,000/$20,000 coverage on one car to begin with, as soon as there is a second car with $10,000/$20,-000 coverage on it, there immediately is $20,000/$40,000 coverage available to either automobile. Having made the assumption that only by cumulative coverage can the statute be satisfied, the principal opinion then concludes that the same result must obtain with a family policy which covers two automobiles at the same time.
The Missouri appellate courts first examined Sec. 379.203 in Sterns v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510 (Mo.App.1966). After quoting and discussing at length various authorities,1 all of them consistent in their tenor on the subject, the court adopts in summary a statement found in 7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance, Sec. 135, p. 461:
“The purpose of the statute making uninsured motorist coverage compulsory . is to give the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have had if he had been injured in an accident caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability insurance policy . . [at 517, emphasis by court of appeals].
I fail to see how stacking of coverage is consonant with — let alone required by — a statute with such a purpose. On its face the statute does no more than call for certain minimum coverage in every automobile liability policy. I do not believe the legislature intended to do more than make sure that a Missouri insured who had taken out liability insurance himself would at the same time be protected against the motorist who had not done so. It seems somewhat farfetched to believe that the legislature intended to require that the minimum motorist coverage on a single automobile would be $10,000/$20,000 but that for two or more vehicles it would be cumulative, so that if an insured owned not two but twenty vehicles and had uninsured motorist coverage on each, he would have $200,-000/$400,000 uninsured motorist coverage *550on each. He would be much better off to collide with an uninsured motorist than with a responsible motorist who had complied with the statute and taken out $10,-000/$20,000 liability coverage.
Looking at the matter another way, under the stacking theory, where an insured has two cars, the statute would be satisfied by taking out only $5,000/$10,000 uninsured coverage on each car, because stacking would operate to make it $10,000/$20,000 per car. If he had three, $3,333/$6,667 per car would do; with four, $2,500/$5,000, and so on.
I doubt if either the insurer or the insured harbored any of the foregoing expectations. In the policy before us, for example, the premium for the $10,000 uninsured coverage on automobile No. 1 is $3.00. The premium on automobile No. 2 for the same coverage is also $3.00. Under the principal opinion this means that the $3.00 which purchased $10,000 coverage on automobile No. 1, suddenly by virtue of a second automobile being added for an additional $3.00, now purchases $20,000 coverage. With a premium of $3.00 per automobile, there is no reason to suppose either does more than stand on its own bottom. Otherwise, the insurance company is forced to expand its uninsured motorist coverage every time the insured adds another vehicle to his policy, not only by the coverage specifically provided on the vehicle added for which the same premium is charged, but also by increasing the coverage on all vehicles previously covered by the policy without any additional premium for the increased coverage. Insurance premiums are usually arrived at by an actuarial allocation of risks, but under the theory adopted by the principal opinion, the insurer is a gratuitous benefactor with no way to calculate its exposure on the vehicles first insured as other vehicles are added to the policy. The insurer cannot tell what to charge for the first car because there is no way to foretell how many additional cars the insured may acquire during the policy period and each time he adds another car the insurer’s exposure is increased on all the automobiles ahead of it on the policy. The insurer is presented with an after-the-fact increase in risk and exposure after the original premium has already been fixed.
A family owning, operating and insuring more than one automobile obviously offers greater risks to an insurer. A family usually owns more than one automobile because it wishes or needs to drive more. Mileage is an important factor in calculating risks. The increased automobile use (which may involve simultaneous use of several cars) poses a greater likelihood of damages. A multi-vehicle policy will require multiple premiums because there are multiplications of risks, but it does not follow that successive premiums should provide cumulative exposure as to amount of liability on each vehicle. Stacking of coverage ignores this economic and actuarial reality.
The principal opinion mentions that the law does not permit insurers to collect a premium for certain coverage and then take that coverage away by a limiting clause, quoting from Great Central Insurance Co. v. Edge, supra. But this assumes that the coverage provided is stacked or cumulative, whereas that is the point at issue. If all the statute requires is that the policy provide minimum uninsured motorist coverage, regardless of the number of automobiles insured, then no coverage is taken away by giving effect to the policy provisions which prevent stacking.
It should be noted also that the language of the statute speaks in terms of contract provisions of the policy. It refers to a policy “for the protection of persons insured thereunder ” (emphasis mine). This, means the parties to the contract can agree who is insured thereunder and what the extent is of the insurance. The statute does not require that the parties must agree uninsured motorist coverage must stack or that they cannot agree otherwise. So long as the policy provides the required minimum coverage, I believe the statute leaves unimpaired the general rule that the parties can *551contract for risks and coverage as they see fit, adjusting the premiums accordingly. Under the contract before us, I do not believe the parties contracted for stacked risks and coverage.
I find nothing unfair about the insurer charging a separate premium for uninsured motorist coverage on a second or third automobile, anymore than would be the case in the charging of a separate premium for the ordinary public liability coverage on the second or third car. No one expects an insurance company to take on the risks of an additional automobile without being entitled to collect a premium therefor.
So long as there is coverage of at least $10,000 per automobile, as there is here, I see no reason why the insurer cannot provide, as I believe it has done by the policy provisions before us, that the maximum liability to its insured or spouse is whatever the stated coverage is on the automobile which is involved in the accident. I therefore dissent.

. Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 516 (1960); Anno., Rights and Liabilities under “Uninsured Motorist” Coverage, 79 A.L.R.2d 1252; Murphy and Netherton, Public Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 Georgetown L.J. 700 (1959); Comment, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 12 Drake L.Rev. 119 (1962).