Court Opinion

ID: 9585521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:19.919613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:46:35.352647
License: Public Domain

WEBB, Judge.
G.S. 7A-289.32 provides that a court may terminate parental rights on seven different grounds. The court in this case concluded that two of the grounds for termination existed. These were under subsections (2) and (4) which provide in part:
“(2) The parent has . . . neglected the child. The child shall be deemed . . . neglected if the court finds the child to be ... a neglected child within the meaning of G.S. 7A-517(21).
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services . . . and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child.”
G.S. 7A-517(21) provides in part:
“Neglected Juvenile. — A juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent ... or who is not provided necessary medical care or other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare . . . .”
There was evidence that the respondents did not understand the importance of proper food for the infant and as a result, he suffered from malnutrition requiring hospitalization on one occasion. There was also evidence the respondents did not make an adequate effort to see the infant received prescribed medication. There was also evidence the respondents allowed the child to live in a filthy home. The court made findings of fact based on this evidence and concluded the child was neglected as defined in G.S. 7A-517(21). We affirm this conclusion of the court. Having concluded the child was neglected, it was within the discretion of the *348court as to whether to terminate the parental rights. We hold the court did not abuse its discretion by so doing.
If the court properly concluded that parental rights should be terminated on any of the seven grounds enumerated under G.S. 7A-289.32, we cannot disturb its judgment. See In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E. 2d 236 (1981). We have affirmed the termination pursuant to subsection (2). We do not pass on the termination pursuant to subsection (4).
The respondent Mona F. Webb contends the court did not adequately consider her efforts to improve herself as a mother after she voluntarily relinquished custody of the child. She also argues that there was evidence that she and her husband had separated and evidence that they were making an effort to reunite which should provide the infant with a good home. Ronnie O. Webb, Jr. argues that the evidence shows his economic condition had improved and this was not taken into account. These were considerations for the district court in exercising its discretion as to termination. When the district court concluded the child was neglected, it was within the court’s discretion taking into account the best interests of the child as to whether parental rights should be terminated. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E. 2d 246 (1984).
The respondents argue that the petitioner has not met its burden of proof which requires that proof of all facts be by “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.” We believe the facts on which the court based its conclusion were virtually not in dispute. Once the court had made this conclusion it was within its discretion as to whether the parental rights should be terminated. The exercise of this discretion is not subject to the burden of proof.
Affirmed.
Judge Eagles concurs.
Judge Becton dissents.