Court Opinion

ID: 9534187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:24.943047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:32.303620
License: Public Domain

Bashara, J.
Defendant Green Delano Peoples was convicted by jury of second-degree murder,*
1 and appeals. He raises several issues concerning jury instructions at his trial.
On October 18, 1974, defendant and several other people, including the deceased, Will Liddell, were drinking and socializing at a private home in Detroit. Defendant and Liddell began to quarrel and subsequently left the house and engaged in a fistfight. After reentering the house the parties continued to argue. Defendant pulled a revolver and fired a shot into the wall above the deceased’s head. It appears from the testimony that the defendant then told Liddell either that he "could” or "wanted” to kill him or that he, the defendant, "could have” killed Liddell during the fistfight.
After the shot was fired defendant surrendered his gun to one of the bystanders and continued drinking. The argument flared again, with Liddell possibly threatening to beat up the defendant. The other occupants of the house acted to avoid further conflict. Defendant was asked, to leave and Liddell was taken into another room. Defendant did leave, only to return in a few moments to retrieve the cap to a bottle of whiskey. The defendant again left. The record is unclear whether the defendant took his revolver with him on the first or second departure.
The witnesses testified that they restrained Lid-dell from going out to face the defendant. Approximately one to five minutes after the defendant left *619the house for the last time, Liddell was also allowed to leave the building.
After Liddell’s exit, the remaining people in the house heard two shots. Outside they discovered Liddell’s body and observed the defendant’s car leaving the scene. No weapon was found on or near the deceased.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated that the argument started when Liddell began verbally abusing him. He admitted shooting the handgun over Liddell’s head while in the house, testifying that he did so in an effort to scare Liddell into ending the confrontation.
Defendant stated he was in the process of putting the whiskey bottle in the trunk of his car when he saw Liddell approaching him. He yelled at Liddell to stop while reaching into the car’s trunk for a shotgun, which had been in the car in preparation for a hunting trip. Defendant maintained that he saw a "shiny object” in Liddell’s hand as the deceased neared. He then fired a warning shot into the air, which only appeared to hasten Liddell’s approach. He testified that he was at this time in fear for his life. The defendant admitted to then firing directly at Liddell. He did not see the deceased fall or check to see if Liddell indeed was armed, but instead immediately drove away.
At trial the defendant relied on the theory of self-defense. He now claims that the judge’s instructions were erroneous and incomplete on the law, thus depriving him of the use of this defense.
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
"To make the plea available it must appear that the respondent, or the accused was without fault on his part — why? If he himself was the aggressor, in the conflict — brought it upon, brought it on by word or *620deed, he cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense as an excuse for the killing unless he was at that time in immediate danger, danger of losing his own life or suffering some grievous bodily injury, and that there was no retreat open to him and his only safety lay in committing the act which caused the death of the now deceased. Some defense in proper cases is the right of every person, that [sic] it will not justify the taking of human life unless the jurors shall be satisfied from the testimony, first that the defendant was not the aggressor, by that meaning the other party bringing on the conflict by word or deed, that is, that he was without fault.”
These instructions were drawn nearly verbatim from 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 906, form #404, p 1283.
Defendant contends that the court erred when it failed to instruct, sua sponte, that an aggressor’s communicated withdrawal from a confrontation revives his right to self-defense. There was no request for such an instruction and no objection to the instruction as given. While normally the absence of a request or objection precludes appellate review, reversible error may be found where any charge omits an essential or material element of an offense or defense. People v Liggett, 378 Mich 706; 148 NW2d 784 (1967), People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974).
The basic question facing this Court is whether the failure of the trial court to include an instruction on communicated withdrawal from the conflict was an omission of a material element of the defense theory of the case. Our review of Michigan law reveals no case that has spoken directly to the issue of a communicated withdrawal. We must therefore look to other sources to determine if this theory of self-defense is part of the jurisprudence of the state.
At common law, the exception to the general *621rule that an aggressor2 cannot claim the right to self-defense in cases in which there has been a communicated withdrawal is well recognized. The exception is explained in La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law, pp 394-395.
"It is generally said that one who is the aggressor in an encounter with another — i.e., one who brings, about the difficulty with the other — may not avail himself of the defense of self-defense. Ordinarily, this is certainly a correct statement, since the aggressor’s victim, defending himself against the aggressor, is using lawful, not unlawful, force; and the force defended against must be unlawful force, for self-defense. Nevertheless, there are two situations in which an aggressor may justifiably defend himself. * * * (2) So too, an aggressor who in good faith effectively withdraws from any further encounter with his victim (and to make an effective withdrawal he must notify the victim, or at least take reasonable steps to notify him) is restored to his right of self-defense.
"Once again, one who knows (and perhaps one who should know) that he is in no danger because his opponent has withdrawn uses unlawful force when he then attacks his opponent.” (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
A survey of other commentators reveals consistent acceptance of this theory.3 Cases cited in these authorities indicate acceptance of this theory in a great number of state and Federal jurisdictions.
This body of law is strong evidence that the communicated withdrawal theory is a deeply entrenched element of the common law of self-de*622fense. Whether that element exists in Michigan is a more difficult issue. While our courts apparently have not either accepted or rejected the theory, there are cases dealing with highly analagous situations.
In People v Townes, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court held a self-defense instruction virtually identical to that in the present case reversibly erroneous because it effectively denied the defendant, on the facts of the case, the use of a self-defense argument. The defendant had entered a store owned by the decedent in order to confront one of the store’s employees on a personal matter. The decedent appeared with a gun and ordered the arguing parties out of the store. The owner was subsequently shot and killed by the defendant under disputed circumstances.
The Townes Court held that the instruction was erroneous, given these facts, because, the jury may have been misled as to the scope of the term "aggressor”.
"The court apparently focused on appellant’s conduct with respect to Odom McMillion [the employee] and erroneously assumed that if appellant was at fault in provoking a disturbance in the tire store, he could then be held legally accountable as an aggressor for any response to his conduct, whether by McMillion or any other person. This was error. Appellant may only be held legally accountable as an aggressor for responsive conduct by another that is reasonably attributable to appellant’s own conduct.” 391 Mich at 592.
Even though the defendant in Townes neither requested a different instruction nor objected to the one that was given, the Court found reversible error:
*623"We again note that no objection was offered to the instruction as delivered; however, we nevertheless find reversible error herein. The appellant did not deny killing Burnett and his sole defense was self-defense, certainly then, the presence or absence of a situation under which appellant would be foreclosed from claiming self-defense was very material to his cause. 'The rule is well settled in this State that if an erroneous instruction is given on a material matter and the error is not corrected * * * such error must be regarded as prejudicial.’ ” (Citations omitted.) 391 Mich at 593-594.
In People v Smith, 67 Mich App 145; 240 NW2d 475 (1976), lv den, 397 Mich 821 (1976), the defendant became involved in an argument with a gas station employee over how much the defendant owed for gas. The owner of the station interjected himself into the argument and subsequently was shot by the defendant. The defense at trial was that the defendant was not the aggressor, and could thus claim self-defense, since the owner first pulled a gun.
The trial court instructed the jury on the absence of the right of self-defense to an "aggressor”, and ordered the jury:
" '[T]o consider all the circumstances and facts surrounding the beginning of this incident in order to determine who was the aggressor in the situation.’ ” (Emphasis supplied.) 67 Mich App at 153.
The Court, per Judge Maher, found this instruction, as in Townes, supra, may have prejudicially misled the jury into consideration of whether the defendant’s conduct toward the employee, in which no force was involved, rendered the defendant an "aggressor” incapable of claiming self-defense. This author concurred in the self-defense portion of Smith, also citing Townes as authority.
*624The present case involves a factual situation related to those in Townes, supra, and Smith, supra. The defendant admits to have been the first to use deadly force on the date in question. However, he claims to have abandoned his aggression at the time of the actual shooting. If the communicated withdrawal theory is applicable, a jury could have found that the defendant was no longer an aggressor at the time he shot Liddell and that the homicide was therefore potentially excusable.
We hold that the theory of a communicated withdrawal was a part of the law of self-defense at the time of the trial and that the failure of the trial court to sua sponte instruct on this area is reversible error. It is conceivable that the instruction as given caused the jury to consider the defendant’s initial aggression, his "fault”, as a bar to any subsequent right to use self-defense. While it is equally conceivable that the jury rejected the defendant’s claim of self-defense because they did not believe his testimony at all, or his claim to have been in fear for his life, we cannot assume the course of the jury’s deliberations where error was possible. See Townes, supra, at 591. The instruction was incomplete because it omitted a material element of the defense, foreclosing the defendant from his only potential excuse for an otherwise admitted homicide.
Having so decided, this panel feels the need to add a number of caveats. First, this decision should not be read as either a rejection of the Gillespie form instruction or as precedent requiring an instruction on communicated withdrawal in all cases where self-defense is raised. The Gillespie instruction is a generally accurate statement of basic self-defense principles. The instruction on withdrawal of the initial aggressor is necessary only in those cases where the particular factual *625situation supports such an instruction.4 Likewise, the error in the present case arose solely because of the factual substance of the defendant’s claim of self-defense.
Second, we do not wish this opinion to be read as a criticism of the trial judge. Where no instruction on this subject was requested, no objections were raised, and no prior Michigan case spoke directly to the problem, the error of omission cannot be attributed to misfeasance on the part of the court.
Finally, even though the decision in Townes, supra, mandates us to find reversible error in the case at bar absent any request or objection, we do not agree with the wisdom of the required result. We hope that the Supreme Court will reevaluate its decision in Townes, and place the burden of raising error more squarely on the defendant.
In view of the foregoing, we need not discuss the other issues which present no reversible error.
Reversed and remanded.
W. F. Hood, J., concurred.

 MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549.

 By "aggressor” we mean the party that initiates the use of force, either deadly or nondeadly, that justifies a response in like force.

 See 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 232, p 504; Miller, Criminal Law, § 67(g), pp 207-208; Perkins, Criminal Law 2d, Chap 10, § 4, pp 1009-1012; 1 Warren, Homicide, § 152, p 694; Anno: Withdrawal, After Provocation of Conñict, As Reviving Right of Self-Defense; 55 ALR3d 1000 (1974); 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 150, p 438.

 For an example of the form an instruction on communicated withdrawal should take, see Proposed Michigan Criminal Jury Instruction, 7:9:04 (Deadly Aggressor).