Court Opinion

ID: 9712414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:20.79798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.994409
License: Public Domain

*386Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I believe that the entertaining of declaratory judgment proceedings was properly for the discretion of the trial judge, and therefore I dissent.
It is an ongoing source of amazement to me that a májority of this Court can continue to ignore the explicit language of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ¡ Act of June 18, 1923, P. L. 840, §6, as amended, 12 P.S. §836, which should control this case. That statute provides in no uncertain terms that the availability of other relief, legal or equitable, “shall not debar a party from the privilege of obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in any case where the other essentials to such relief are present. . . .” See Sheldrake Estate, 416 Pa. 551, 554-57, 207 A. 2d 802, 803-04 (1965) (dissenting opinion). In the face of this explicit statutory language, the majority almost incredibly continues to state that “a declaratory judgment proceeding should not be entertained if there exists another established and appropriate remedy.” The majority thus stubbornly clings to what it apparently sees as a veto power over declaratory judgment legislation. I can no more accept this over-reaching of judicial power here than I could in Sheldrake.
Since the only issues of fact in this case are irrelevant to the determination of the question presented by the declaratory judgment suit, I believe that a declaratory judgment does lie. Although it would have been within the discretion of the trial judge to refuse to entertain declaratory judgment proceedings, see Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. P.T.C., 435 Pa. 316, 255 A. 2d 516 (1969) (concurring opinion), he was not required to do so, and I would affirm his decision.