Court Opinion

ID: 9352926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 15:12:10.265578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:05:54.380176
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Fulton and White

              NATHAN DAVIS, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
               NATHAN ANTONIO DAVIS
                                                                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0972-22-4                                                 PER CURIAM
                                                                                        JANUARY 10, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                  FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
                                               Daniel S. Fiore, II, Judge

                               (Nathan Davis, on briefs), pro se.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Craig W. Stallard, Senior
                               Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in dismissing Nathan Davis’s

              independent action to set aside judgment by default (“independent action”) for failure to state a

              claim. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral

              argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a);

              Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                         BACKGROUND

                     By order entered September 22, 2021, the Arlington County Circuit Court found as follows:

                               [T]hat on October 17, 2013, [Davis] filed, as a civil action, a motion
                               - as a new pleading - praying for an independent action to set aside a
                               default judgment; that his civil action was assigned case number
                               CL13-2305-00; that the default judgment he referenced was actually
                               criminal convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
                               possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine, possession of
                               a firearm by a convicted felon, and child endangerment; that [Davis]
                               never caused his motion to be served on the [Attorney General]; that

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
                [Davis] let his matter sit dormant for close to five (5) years; that after
                more than three years passed with no order entered or proceeding
                scheduled in CL13-2305-00, the court administratively discontinued
                the matter pursuant to Va. Code § 8.01-335(B) on November 26,
                2018, almost five (5) years after it was filed; that on August 26, 2019
                [Davis] filed a petition in forma peuperis [sic] and motion to reopen
                CL13-2305-00, which petition in forma peuperis [sic] was granted
                by another judge of this court on September 4, 2019 and this action
                CL13-2305-01 was opened; that the Clerk of Court, without a
                request by [Davis], directed on October 9, 2019 that the motion to
                reopen be served on the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of
                Virginia; [and] that on October 21, 2019, service was effectively
                made on the Attorney General.1

        Davis’s independent action asserted that a police officer testified at trial that the car Davis

had been driving was stopped because the officer suspected it was stolen. Attached to Davis’s

motion was a document purported to be a list of cars stolen from the Shirlington and Fairlington

areas of Arlington County during the relevant time, which showed that the type of car he was

driving was not listed. Davis thus concluded that the police officer had lied, that the

Commonwealth’s Attorney was aware of the lie, and therefore moved the court to vacate his

convictions in accordance with Code § 8.01-428. Upon its review of the pleadings and exhibits, the

trial court held that Davis failed to state a claim and dismissed his independent action. Davis noted

this appeal.

                                              ANALYSIS

        Davis asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing his independent action, for failure to

state a claim, and argues that his pleadings and exhibits sufficiently proved that the Commonwealth

committed fraud upon the court in obtaining his criminal convictions. We disagree.

        1
          The supporting pleadings for these findings of fact are not contained within the record
sent to us on appeal; however, we adopt these facts because a court speaks through its written
orders. See Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 222, 226 (2011). Also, Davis’s independent
action is contained within the record because he refiled it on September 24, 2020.
                                                -2-
        We begin by noting that this motion to dismiss is akin to a demurrer for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. “In any suit in equity or action at law, the contention

that a pleading does not state a cause of action or that such pleading fails to state facts upon

which the relief demanded can be granted may be made by demurrer.” Code § 8.01-273. “A

demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the facts properly alleged in the challenged pleading and

the inferences fairly drawn from those facts, all of which are accepted as true. A demurrer does

not admit, however, the correctness of the pleader’s legal conclusions.” Jared & Donna

Murayama 1997 Tr. v. NISC Holdings, LLC, 284 Va. 234, 245 (2012). “Because the circuit

court’s ruling on a demurrer presents an issue of law, we review the decision de novo.” Id.

        Rule 1:1 makes clear that “[a]ll final judgments, orders, and decrees, irrespective of terms of

court, remain under the control of the trial court . . . for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and

no longer.” However, Code § 8.01-428 provides limited exceptions to Rule 1:1, and states in

relevant part:

                 D. Other judgments or proceedings.—This section does not limit the
                 power of the court to entertain at any time an independent action to
                 relieve a party from any judgment or proceeding, or to grant relief to
                 a defendant not served with process as provided in § 8.01-322, or to
                 set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.

        Given that Code § 8.01-428 “does not create new rights or remedies,” we construe it

“narrowly to advance the principle of finality of judgments.” Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State

Univ. v. Prosper Fin., Inc., 284 Va. 474, 483 (2012).

                 The party seeking to set aside a default judgment in an independent
                 action brought pursuant to . . . Code § 8.01‑428(D) must prove
                 each of the following five elements:

                 “(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to
                 be enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on
                 which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which
                 prevented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit

                                                   -3-
                of his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of
                the defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.

Id. (quoting Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 243 Va. 313, 317-18 (1992)).

        Davis’s written independent action asserted that, at trial, the Commonwealth conspired with

its witnesses to suborn perjured testimony and, thus, prevented the court from performing its judicial

duties. Davis now assigns error to the trial court’s finding that his pleadings failed to prove the

Commonwealth obtained his criminal convictions by fraud.

        An allegation of fraud must be sufficiently pled. “[W]here fraud is relied on, the

[pleading] must show specifically in what the fraud consists, so that the defendant may have the

opportunity of shaping his defence [sic] accordingly, and since [fraud] must be clearly proved it

must be distinctly stated.” Mortarino v. Consultant Eng’g Servs., 251 Va. 289, 295 (1996).

(second and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Ciarochi v. Ciarochi, 194 Va. 313, 315

(1952)). The party alleging fraud “must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a false

representation, (2) of a material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with intent to

mislead, (5) reliance by the party misled, and (6) resulting damage to the party misled.” State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Remley, 270 Va. 209, 218 (2005) (quoting Prospect Dev. Co. v.

Bershader, 258 Va. 75, 85 (1999)). “On review, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment unless

it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Jennings v. Jennings, 26 Va. App. 530,

534 (1998).

        Furthermore, two types of fraud are relevant to our analysis: extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.

“Extrinsic fraud is fraud which occurs outside the judicial process and ‘consists of conduct which

prevents a fair submission of the controversy to the court.’” F.E. v. G.F.M., 35 Va. App. 648,

659-60 (2001) (en banc) (quoting Peet v. Peet, 16 Va. App. 323, 327 (1993)). Under such

circumstances, “[a] collateral challenge to a judgment . . . is allowed because such fraud perverts

the judicial processes and prevents the court or non-defrauding party from discovering the fraud
                                                  -4-
through the regular adversarial process.” Peet, 16 Va. App. at 327. “Extrinsic fraud, therefore,

is fraud that . . . ‘deprives a person of the opportunity to be heard.’” G.F.M., 35 Va. App. at 660

(quoting Hagy v. Pruitt, 529 S.E.2d 714, 717 (S.C. 2000)). A judgment procured by extrinsic

fraud “is void and subject to attack, direct or collateral, at any time.” Remley, 270 Va. at 218

(quoting Jones v. Willard, 224 Va. 602, 607 (1983)).

       Intrinsic fraud, however, includes “perjury, use of forged documents, or other means of

obscuring facts presented before the court and whose truth or falsity as to the issues being

litigated are passed upon by the trier of fact.” Peet, 16 Va. App. at 326-27. “Although a

judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud is void and, therefore, subject to direct or collateral attack,

a judgment obtained by intrinsic fraud is merely voidable and can be challenged only by a direct

appeal or by a direct attack in an independent proceeding.” Id. at 326. A judgment procured by

intrinsic fraud, then, is “voidable by direct attack at any time before the judgment becomes final.”

Jones, 224 Va. at 607 (emphasis added). “A collateral attack on a judgment procured by

intrinsic fraud has been deemed not warranted because the parties have the opportunity at trial

through cross-examination and impeachment to ferret out and expose false information presented

to the trier of fact.” Peet, 16 Va. App. at 327. A “party must act by direct attack or appeal . . .

and cannot wait to [assault] the judgment . . . when[] it is enforced.” Id. “It is settled beyond

controversy that a [judgment] will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged

documents or perjured testimony.” McClung v. Folks, 126 Va. 259, 270 (1919).

       The facts set forth in Davis’s pleading do not sufficiently show that his criminal convictions

were procured by extrinsic fraud. Rather Davis’s pleadings, at best, allege intrinsic fraud. Davis’s

convictions arose out of an incident with the police that occurred on June 14, 2006, in which the car

he was driving was the subject of a traffic stop that led to the seizure of drugs from Davis’s person

and weapons from the car. Davis later filed a motion to suppress, and the court conducted an

                                                 -5-
evidentiary hearing on that motion. At the suppression hearing, Officer Matt Owens testified that he

was on the lookout for “people driving stolen cars,” when he observed a “suspicious vehicle”

matching the description of one of the vehicles that was stolen. He testified to the same facts at

trial. Although Officer Owens did not specify whether the information regarding a stolen vehicle

came from this list in his testimony, Davis’s counsel had—and took—every opportunity to

cross-examine him about his patrol, the reasons for stopping Davis, and the subsequent investigation

and arrest.

        Davis claims that, because the list of stolen vehicles from the Shirlington and Fairlington

areas of Arlington County does not include a vehicle matching the description of the car he was

driving, Officer Owens, with the Commonwealth’s knowledge, lied about his reason for the stop.

Davis concludes that the Commonwealth’s failure to provide this list before the suppression hearing

fraudulently led to the court’s failure to suppress the evidence and ultimately led to his convictions.

Davis’s pleadings fail to show that Officer Owens knowingly and intentionally made a false

representation of a material fact, relied upon by either Davis or the court, that resulted unlawfully in

his criminal convictions. The evidence reflects the fact that Davis was never denied a trial or an

opportunity to be heard. On the contrary, it shows that, even if Officer Owens had perjured himself,

Davis was afforded every opportunity to ferret that out through cross-examination. Moreover,

Officer Owens’s summary states that the vehicle Davis was driving was, in fact, stolen out of

Washington, D.C. It follows that the trial court did not err in dismissing his independent action for

failure to state a claim.

                                                  -6-
                                            CONCLUSION

        The trial court correctly determined that the facts alleged in Davis’s pleadings failed to state

a claim that entitled him to any relief. Davis failed to establish that the Commonwealth committed

extrinsic fraud on the court and, as a result, we affirm trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                        Affirmed.

                                                  -7-