Court Opinion

ID: 9746653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:32:02.542385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:51.981657
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the result of this case granting declaratory judgment in favor of petitioner Mattos, reversing the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County and remanding the case to that court. I regret, however, that justice has been so long denied those litigants who have been bogged down in this “unworkable mess”,1 especially those litigants to whom redress in courts has been unnecessarily denied because of the decision of Mr. Justice Nix writing for a majority of this Court in Parker v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978). That denial *398of justice was “unnecessary” because, despite overwhelming evidence before it, a majority of this Court did not appreciate the magnitude of the problems inherent in the medical malpractice arbitration system.
Mr. Justice Nix wrote, in Parker, that appellants there had “cited statistics which would indicate that the present performance of [the medical malpractice arbitration] procedure has been far from impressive in demonstrating its capacity to provide an expeditious disposition of these cases. Nevertheless, the period of time covered by the accumulated data is insufficient ...” to establish the failure of the arbitration system or an oppressive burden on the right to a jury trial. 483 Pa. at 121, 394 A.2d at 940 (1978). When Parker was decided, this Court was aware that, of 1270 cases filed with the administrator of the Act between January 13, 1976 (the effective date of the Act) and August 31, 1978, only two cases had been disposed of by trial by the arbitration panel. Id., 483 Pa. at 132, 394 A.2d at 945 (Larsen, J. dissenting). (In this regard, Mr. Justice Nix’s footnote 4, p. 195, is very misleading in suggesting that this Court had only a one year period to consider when we decided Parker. The fact is this Court had before it a 28 month period to consider from the effective date of the Act to oral argument before this Court (January 13, 1976-May 23, 1978).) In the face of this and similar statistical evidence, Mr. Justice Nix, and the majority of the Parker Court, were nevertheless “satisfied” that any burden on the victim’s right to jury trial was “theoretical” and that such “theoretical burden” was “counterbalanced by the substantial advantages” provided by the Act. I submit that the burden on the right to a jury trial is no less theoretical, and that the “advantages” of the Act are ho greater now, than when we decided Parker.
While I am in general agreement with the “accepted principle of constitutional law that deference to a coequal branch of government requires that we accord a reasonable period of time to test the effectiveness of legislation ... ”, Id., 483 Pa. at 121, 394 A.2d at 940, I do not believe that “deference” requires sticking one’s head in the sand to avoid difficult constitutional problems when confronted with evi*399dence of their existence and magnitude. Deference is one thing unconscionable delay in rendering justice is, however, inexcusable, whether the source of that delay be the medical malpractice arbitration panel or the courts themselves.
To the extent that the majority opinion upholds the validity of any of the medical malpractice arbitration provisions, I dissent.2 I would hold all of the provisions of the Act dealing with arbitration panels and procedures, namely Articles III, IV and V, to be unconstitutional. I would also, pursuant to this Court’s supervisory powers, order all presently pending medical malpractice arbitration cases transferred to the appropriate courts of common pleas with instructions to the courts to give due consideration, in scheduling these cases, to the delay suffered in each case (i. e., to consider when the case was filed, if and when a certificate of readiness had been applied for, whether the parties contributed to the delay, etc.).2

. “The Medical Malpractice Act of 1976 is an unworkable mess---It is a piece of social legislation which has not achieved a single one of its purposes. ... [The] backlog is growing by leaps and bounds each year. ... The only thing this Act has successfully done is create a bureaucracy which impedes the resolution of disputes by its citizens.” Parker v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 132, 394 A.2d 932, 934 (1978) (Larsen, J., dissenting).

. For additional reasons supporting the unconstitutionality of the Medical Malpractice Act of 1976, see Parker v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932 (1978) (Larsen, J., dissenting).