Court Opinion

ID: 9473801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:39:59.771274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:44.448152
License: Public Domain

FARRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The majority has interpreted the mandatory language of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) as Congress intended. However, the majority opinion may be read to permit the district court on remand to grant an immediate and unconditional release. I write separately to emphasize that the district court remains free to impose appropriate conditions of release under § 3142(f).
I. The continuance from December 6 to December 14, 1984.
On December 6, 1984, the government moved for pretrial detention of the defendant as a serious flight risk and danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The presiding magistrate stated that he *1147was prepared to hold the § 3142(f) detention hearing immediately. However, Al-Azzawy’s counsel asked for a continuance until December 14. Upon motion of defense counsel for “good cause” — here freely acknowledged by the defendant whose liberty interests were at stake — the court granted an eight-day continuance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The majority rejects defense counsel’s acknowledgement of “good cause” and holds that “a continuance to suit the schedule of counsel for a detained individual is not a continuance for good cause, at least in the absence of a showing that no other lawyer is available to handle an earlier hearing, that the time is in fact necessary for preparation, or of some other valid reason clearly set forth in the record.” Majority Opinion at 1146.
As defense counsel argued on December 6, the continuance was necessary for Al-Azzawy to prepare a detailed constitutional challenge against the freshly-enacted provisions of the Bail Reform Act. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), recognizes that “the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 59, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1985, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (“[w]here counsel has ... no opportunity to plan a defense, the result is that the defendant is effectively denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel”); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446, 60 S.Ct. 321, 322, 84 L.Ed. 377 (1940). Strict adherence to the mandatory language of § 3142(f) may ironically result in the loss of an even greater liberty interest, for a defendant unable to prepare for the immediate detention hearing could as a result receive indefinite pretrial detention for a period far exceeding the few days’ continuance.
Nevertheless, whether an immediate hearing would protect the defendant’s liberty interests better than the time he requested to prepare an adequate defense is irrelevant to our reading of the unequivocal terms of the statute. I agree with the majority that Congress intended strict adherence to the time constraints of § 3142(f).
II. The continuance from December 14 to December 17.
The majority concludes that the continuance from December 14 to 17 was improper. The record reflects that defense counsel neglected to deliver its constitutional challenge to the district court clerk’s office until less than 48 hours before the detention hearing was to be held; by the morning of the hearing, neither the government’s attorney nor the judge had yet received counsel’s papers. The judge therefore found “good cause” to grant the December 17 continuance.
In the absence of § 3142(f)’s mandatory language, a three-day continuance may well have been appropriate to assure that the government and the court had an opportunity to review a detailed constitutional challenge against a newly-enacted statute. A finding of good cause would have been particularly apt when the continuance was spawned by defense counsel’s failure to file its challenge in a timely manner.
The record reflects, however, that the continuance to December 17 occurred on motion of the court. I agree with the majority that the statute does not provide for a continuance on the court’s own motion.
I part company with the majority when it minimizes the fact that the continuance was the material consequence of the late delivery of defendant’s papers and the request by the government, “I would like to read the pleadings.” While the government had prepared a “stock response” to Al-Azzawy’s constitutional challenge and could arguably have proceeded, the U.S. Attorney also stated that he had not himself done the legal research for the response and “would care to revise it myself” before arguing the issue. We deal (or should deal) with reality in a court setting. Courts must act responsibly. Postponing the hearing was a responsible action. Proceeding without reviewing the brief and *1148providing time for a response by the government would have been irresponsible. To bar a continuance under such circumstances would have rewarded the defendant for its belated filing and threatened the ability of the court and the government to give due consideration to defendant’s claims. This would also have impaired the defendant’s ability to present a meaningful defense — i.e., a defense weighed with care rather than disposed of without adversarial input or due deliberation by the court.
The majority observes that the government had prepared a “stock response” and had a number of witnesses ready on December 14, see Majority Opinion at n. 6. These facts may simply indicate that the government had prudently made provisions to argue its case in the event the court denied the requests for a continuance. Furthermore, even if these circumstances demonstrate that the government was “[unjconcerned about the constitutional arguments raised and its lack of time to consider those arguments,” id, the court is not without responsibility.
The district court’s responsibility should now be discharged on remand. The majority implies that the district court may now grant immediate and unconditional release pursuant to §§ 3142(b) and (c) — even though the district court in the pretrial detention hearing found no appropriate combination of conditions for release under § 3142(c). I would emphasize that the district court remains free to impose appropriate substantial conditions for release under § 3142(c), including maintaining Al-Azzawy in the custody of a court-appointed person. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2)(A). Without such conditions, tragic consequences could result whenever § 3142(f)’s time constraints are violated. Furthermore, an unconditional release may well be disproportionate to the violation — particularly when defense counsel’s own negligence may have caused the violation — and would contradict the intent evinced in § 3142(c) to protect society. Finally, should Al-Azzawy fail to comply with such conditions as the court may set, a motion for revocation of release and detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3148 would be appropriate. See United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 764 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.1985) (available July 8, 1985, on WESTLAW, CTA5 file).
The district court, after a full hearing on the merits, ordered that the accused be detained. The majority, because of defense counsel’s delay, may appear to order defendant’s unconditional release. I write separately to emphasize that while the language of the statute is mandatory, the court has power to consider appropriate conditions for release.