Court Opinion

ID: 9553496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:27.12687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:18.059956
License: Public Domain

Steffen, J.,
with whom Young, J., joins,
dissenting:
The majority has hastily painted a picture highlighting the blemishes on the challenged initiative (hereafter “initiative” or “Question 7”). Unfortunately, the majority’s preoccupation with the blemishes seems to have obscured what I believe to be the more comely part of the picture. Discussing perspective has little value, however, as the metaphoric picture to which I make reference has the force of law behind it that disenfranchises the right of Nevada’s citizens to participate in the completion of the painting. Casting aside this court’s tribute to the value of public sentiment, Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 910, 802 P.2d 1280 (1990), the majority hastens to resolve highly complex issues of first impression to create a foundation for issuing a discretionary writ enjoining a public vote on a subject of great current interest in this nation. My basis for dissenting has far more to do with the timing and the scope of the majority opinion than it does with its analysis of the defects in the initiative and the prospects for the initiative’s constitutional validity if it were to succeed as an amendment to the Nevada Constitution. The majority, not unreasonably convinced that passage of Question 7 would provide but a fleeting victory to be dashed by a subsequent challenge in the courts, has elected to spare the electorate the possible frustration of being advised that they have voted in vain. For reasons I shall endeavor to express hereafter, I *837believe that, from the voters’ standpoint, it is “far better to have spoken and lost, than to have never spoken at all.”
I suggest initially, that stare decisis demands that this court ask and answer in a legally defensible way at least one threshold question before reaching the merits of petitioners’ federal constitutional arguments. In Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, 131 P.2d 516 (1942), this court held that a proposed amendment to the state constitution “may be enjoined” (emphasis added) where the question, if enacted, would constitute a plain and palpable violation of the United States Constitution and would “inevitably be futile and nugatory and incapable of being made operative under any conditions or circumstances.” Id. at 425, 137 P.2d at 519 (quoting Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1934)). I emphasize the discretionary word “may” because it is clear that even where this court is convinced that an initiative is fatally endowed with unconstitutionality, we may nevertheless choose not to interfere in the process of public expression.
Less than two years ago this court announced:
[E]ven if an initiative measure is unconstitutional, there is great political utility in allowing the people to vote on the measure. Such a vote communicates clearly to the representative branches of government the popular sentiment on a particular issue or issues.
See Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 910, 917, 802 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1990). Thus, while simultaneously reaffirming the vitality of Caine, we proceeded in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce to recognize a predominate value in public expression even if an initiative measure is unconstitutional. In brief, Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce represented a policy decision by this court that our decision to intervene in such matters should be strongly tempered by deference to the people’s right to express themselves through the ballot. Stated otherwise, Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce emphasizes in unmistakable terms this court’s recognition of the guarantees of freedom of expression and the right to vote as among the most cherished rights conferred by the constitution. In light of our ruling in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, the threshold question now should be, why should this court hastily exercise its discretion in order to deprive Nevada voters of the right of expression that we found to be so significant and compelling in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce?
This matter came to this court slightly less than one month ago. Orderly and measured appellate consideration of the issues presented by the parties has been severely constrained by the need to allot adequate time to election officials to carry out their statutory *838duties and to prepare and disseminate the general election ballots to resident and absentee voters. See NRS 293.253; 293.309. We have been required to employ expedited procedures in an effort to accelerate resolution of the merits of this matter and in order to prevent significant disruption to the election process. We have been equally pressed by the demands of the oral argument calendar and the time limitations resulting therefrom. Thus, in the abbreviated period devoted to briefing, research, argument, and deliberation, neither the parties nor this court have been able to provide exhaustive efforts to the resolution of the intricate and complex issues presented. Under similar circumstances, this court has in the past declared that it would decline to determine the merits of a ballot election challenge. See Beebe v. Koontz, 72 Nev. 247, 302 P.2d 486 (1956). Our holding in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce also recognizes the reality that federal constitutional questions are simply too important and complex to resolve in haste, without careful and measured consideration.
The majority concludes that there is no utility in facilitating the needless expenditure of money and other resources in campaigning for and against the measure before us. I remind my colleagues, however, that untold lives and fortunes have been expended in defense of the right to advance ideas and concepts in free elections — a right so cherished that it may not be valued in terms of monetary cost. On the basis of this argument alone, and without due and careful deliberation, I am not prepared to cast aside established precedent reflecting a policy of deference to that fundamental right.
I do not suggest that our established precedents should never be subject to limitation and revision. To the contrary, there may be valid and persuasive reasons to revisit and reexamine our prior holdings. Prior to interdicting the foremost rights of the people, however, due regard for the concept of stare decisis demands that this court devote adequate time to undertake the research and careful consideration necessary to analyze our precedents in cautious, principled, and deliberate manner.
As the majority observes, it is beyond cavil that no single state may supersede, amend or qualify any provision of the United States Constitution. With all due respect, however, I am not prepared to state with absolute assurance that resolution of the questions presented is susceptible to such a superficial and facile analysis. Recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was faced with the identical federal constitutional issues now before this court. With understandable restraint, the Massachusetts court observed:
The United States constitutional issues presented ... in addition to being highly complex, are ones which have not as *839yet been considered, in any respect, by the United States Supreme Court or by Federal trial or appellate courts. In fact, only one State appellate court has reported a decision regarding the question of political term limitations, and that court declined to formulate an opinion on the Federal issues involved. See Advisory Opinion to the Attorney Gen., 592 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1991). Therefore, for this court to address the questions posed by the Senate regarding the constitutionality of the initiative under the United States Constitution we would have to predict the view the Supreme Court ultimately would take on the issue of Federal term limitations, speculating as well as to the basis on which the Justices would rely to support that view.
See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 595 N.E.2d 292, 302 (Mass. 1992). If this court is to be the first to confront the constitutionality of state-imposed federal term limits, it should devote more than mere passing, superficial consideration of the Constitution’s text, structure and history, as well as the Supreme Court decisions that bear on the question. See Troy Andrew Eid and Jim Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1992).
It is at least arguable that the federal term limits measure could be viewed by the United States Supreme Court as constitutionally valid. By way of illustration, I set forth below a number of questions which lurk below the surface of petitioners’ claims which would seem to require an informed and careful analysis prior to reaching any conclusions concerning the position that will eventually and inevitably be taken by the final arbiter of the subject (absent a constitutional amendment), the United States Supreme Court.
Consideration of the express text of the United States Constitution gives rise to a number of complex questions that demand in-depth analysis. Nowhere in that document is it expressly provided that the states are precluded from imposing conditions on the election of federal legislators. To the contrary, the constitution expressly provides that members of the United States House of Representatives are to be “chosen ... by the People of the several states,” and that “the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Senators from the respective states are to be “elected by the people thereof. . .” and “[t]he electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.” See U.S. Const. amend. XVII. Perhaps a state constitutional *840limitation of federal congressional terms can be considered as merely one way in which the people of the respective states are permitted to chose their representatives. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 107 (1991). Further, it has been argued that, in expressly conferring upon the “people” of the respective states the right to “choose” and “elect” their representatives and senators, the framers may also have intended to reserve directly to the people, as opposed to the federal or state legislatures, the right to enact, through the initiative process, state constitutional provisions adding reasonable qualifications beyond those specified in the qualifications clauses. Id.
The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” In the proper performance of our duties, this court should at least take time to reflect on the history and meaning of these amendments to consider whether they may support a conclusion that the qualifications clauses merely establish a “floor” below which the states may not go. Certainly, it can be argued that the constitution’s broad grant of authority to the states to determine who shall vote in congressional elections might imply that the people of the respective states also possess the power to provide in their state constitutions qualifications or conditions for election as a federal legislator. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97 (1991).
Provisions in our own constitution, for example, mandate that “[n]o person shall be eligible to any office who is not a qualified elector under this constitution” and that no person may be an elector “who has been or may be convicted of treason or felony in any state . . . unless restored to civil rights . . . .” See Nev. Const. art. 15, § 3; Nev. Const. art. 2, § 1. Can we say with certainty that there is no reason to the argument that such provisions merely operate as state imposed “limitations” on candidates for public office, including the federal congress, rather than additional qualifications beyond those of age, residency and citizenship contained in the qualifications clauses? In other words, if a state may constitutionally deny a place on the ballot to a convicted felon, thus effectively precluding his election as a federal legislator, perhaps a state could also limit ballot access for federal office to those who have not already served in such office for a period of time specified by state law. After all, the United *841States Supreme Court has validated some forms of state-imposed restrictions denying access to the ballot. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (Georgia regulation barring independent candidates who fail to collect signatures of five percent of the electorate from ballot held to be a valid election regulation); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (California restriction denying access to ballot to independent candidates who had formerly registered with political party within preceding year held to be valid election regulation).
I do not suggest affirmative answers to such questions. Nor do I suggest that exhaustive research validates the questions. I do suggest, however, that if it is determined that the constitutional issues need to be decided, there is wisdom in taking the time to see that necessary questions are asked and that sufficient research is undertaken to provide incisive answers before any conclusion respecting the constitutionality of Question 7 can be stated with confidence.
With adequate time, there is little doubt that a thorough examination of other traditional sources of constitutional history would enlighten and inform this court’s consideration of the issues presented. The cursory research thus far completed by this court indicates that the records of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the writings of Madison and Hamilton contained in the Federalist Papers, and the writings of the Anti-Federalist pamphleteer Cincinnatus all provide useful insight into the intent of the framers with respect to the questions before us.
A focused review of the history of certain Congressional actions would also seem to be in order. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have had occasion to address election contests involving alleged violations of state-imposed requirements. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 97, 128 (1991). The light in which Congress itself views the import of state-imposed regulations on its members should at least be reviewed.
I note as well that NTL contends that the thirteen-county requirement mandated in article 19, § 2(2) of the Nevada Constitution is violative of the one person, one vote principle of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. NTL argues that such a requirement unconstitutionally provides the less populous counties with a veto power over initiatives supported by the more populous counties. See generally Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969). Such contentions are of precisely the type which we declined to reach in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 910, 917, 802 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1990). They are simply not reasonably suscep-*842tibie to resolution by resort to accelerated and summary procedures without time for adequate briefing, argument, research and deliberation.
Although I entertain serious doubts respecting the constitutional validity of the ballot question in issue, due to the imperatives of haste and the complexity of the issues, those doubts have not as yet attained that measure of certitude which would permit me to conclude confidently that the initiative is plainly and palpably unconstitutional. See Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, 427, 131 P.2d 516, 520 (1942).
Moreover, I suggest that proper appellate procedure would question the necessity or wisdom of reaching the constitutional issues and rushing to be at the forefront of a concern that has yet to be addressed by any of the federal courts. In cases too numerous to list, this court has repeatedly held that it will not consider constitutional issues that are unnecessary to the court’s determination of the case. See, e.g., Spears v. Spears, 95 Nev. 416, 596 P.2d 210 (1979); Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Adams, 77 Nev. 282, 362 P.2d 450 (1961); State v. Curler, 26 Nev. 347, 67 P. 1075 (1902). Where, as here, the majority confidently decides that the initiative violates Nevada law, there is simply no basis for reaching issues involving the federal constitution.
Turning to petitioners’ claims relating to the validity of the initiative petition documents, it is at least safe to say that the validity of the documents is problematic. It is also clear that issues surrounding validity include not only challenges to the legality of the language or clarity of the initiative, but also fact intensive problems regarding the validity of signatures. For the most part, petitioners have requested this court to resolve these factual issues on the basis of conflicting affidavits. Ordinarily, of course, an appellate court is not an appropriate forum in which to resolve disputed questions of fact. See Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 637 P.2d 534 (1981). When disputed factual issues are critical to the proper resolution of a request for extraordinary relief, the writ should be sought in the first instance in the district court, with appeal from an adverse judgment to this court. Id. The time constraints applicable here, however, have foreclosed such an orderly and traditional fact-finding process.
It is true that some of the critical facts petitioners have sought to establish by way of affidavits remain uncontroverted. I nevertheless find it difficult to resolve many of these matters with certainty, given the minimal time limits under which the respondent, the initiative proponents, and this court were forced to proceed. And where it is alleged that technical deficiencies render the petition documents a few signatures short of the required *843number, I suggest that doubts concerning such technicalities should be resolved in favor of the people’s right to express themselves through the ballot process.
Although disqualifying shortages may exist in one or more counties, we were informed on the eve of oral argument that it has now been determined that signatures previously thought to have been invalid in White Pine County may have now been validated in sufficient numbers to qualify that county for inclusion among the counties that have met the requirements for a valid initiative. Moreover, allegations of deficiency concerning Carson City were raised on the eve of oral argument, and the Secretary of State and NTL had no opportunity to review and refute those allegations. I do not purport to know what the facts may eventually show concerning the various contentions of technical invalidity in certain of the petition documents, but I would most certainly not decide the issues precipitantly in order to prevent our citizens from voting on Question 7.
During oral argument I expressed my concerns regarding the fact that the initiative language made no reference to the measure as an intended means of amending our state constitution. In truth, the language facially suggests an initiative designed to produce a state statute. Although my concerns remain, and the issue is significant, a lingering question prevents me from prematurely accepting the disqualifying conclusion reached by my brethren in the majority. May the lack of clarity be cured by definitive ballot language supplied by the Secretary of State? It seems clear that if the intendments of the initiative are clearly set forth on the ballot, voters will not be misled as they cast their votes on the subject. I respect the fact that an affirmative answer to the question posed could be viewed as a major step in the direction of rendering the formal initiative process unacceptably lax. I emphasize again, however, that in asking the question, I suggest neither the answer nor the validity of the question. I merely underscore the wisdom of those courts that have exercised restraint in favor of the voters rather than disqualifying technicalities.
In my view, where, as here, severe time constraints prevent this court’s resolution of complex issues without significant disruptions to the election process, any doubts respecting the validity of a proposed initiative should be resolved in favor of allowing the measure to go before the voters. Two centuries of successful democracy in this country amply justify an abiding faith in the wisdom of the electorate to determine such matters in the first instance. See, e.g., Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce v. Del Papa, 106 Nev. 910, 917, 802 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1990) (even if an initiative measure is unconstitutional, there is great utility in allowing the people to vote on the measure; such a vote communi*844cates clearly to the representative branches of government the popular sentiment on a particular issue). Accordingly, I would decline to resolve at this time the merits of the factual and legal issues presented.
Nonetheless, as justices we cannot ignore our obligation to protect and defend the paramount law of the nation and of this state. If our citizens had been allowed to vote on Question 7, due regard for our obligation and the electorate would have mandated that the voters of this state be forthrightly apprised of the strong possibility that a public vote in favor of Question 7 may ultimately be declared invalid in future judicial proceedings. Accordingly, I would have had this court direct the Secretary of State to include the following language in the ballot question arguments formulated, pursuant to NRS 293.250(5), both for and against passage of Question 7:
The Nevada Supreme Court has expressed strong concern about the validity of Question 7 under both the Nevada State Constitution and the United States Constitution. Voters are cautioned that their vote for or against this measure may ultimately have value only as an expression of public sentiment on the subject.
Such a cautionary instruction regarding the constitutionality of Question 7 would serve to dispel any false expectations among voters who support such restrictions and would encourage term limit advocates and opponents alike to weigh the prospects of an eventual ruling of invalidity as they plan their efforts and expenditures on the measure.

CONCLUSION

I have carefully avoided irrelevant inferences concerning the merits of term limitations on federal legislators. This court has no legitimate interest in the wisdom of the proposed measure, and would indeed be presumptuous to assume that its members possess greater insights on the subject than our voting citizens. Rather, my major concerns have focused on the fundamental right of our citizens to access the ballot. The Secretary of State has determined that 32,853 Nevadans have requested that federal term limits be placed before the people on the November 1992 general election ballot. My colleagues in the majority speculate that the signatures were induced by “mercenaries.” I am far more interested in the fact that such large numbers of our citizens have indicated a desire to have the measure placed on the ballot than I am the citizenship of those who labored in the initiative process.
This court was faced with two basic alternatives: the exercise *845of its discretion to precipitantly exalt technicalities over the predominate right of public sentiment recognized by this court in Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce or the exercise of its discretion in favor of the public right to communicate “clearly to the representative branches of government the popular sentiment on a particular issue or issues.” Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, 106 Nev. at 917, 802 P.2d at 1282. Nevada’s voice will not be heard among the numerous states that will be voting on federal congressional term limitations this year. I do not fault the bona fides of my colleagues and recognize that many will respect their willingness to take a stand now rather than later. My position, however, is simple. Time constraints have summoned haste in deciding complex issues of great importance that, under this court’s precedents, should have remained undecided or delayed in favor of contemplative thoroughness and allowing a public vote on Question 7. This nation has achieved greatness by promoting and protecting free expression — the world of ideas. Whether the idea of federal term limitations moves to a crescendo capable of producing an amendment to the United States Constitution, a favorable or adverse decision by the United States Supreme Court, or simply withers on the vine, our federal society will have been enriched by the discourse. It is unfortunate that the views of Nevadans will not be part of the enriching process, at least during this moment in our nation’s history.
For the reasons abbreviated above, I would deny the relief requested in the instant petition, and vacate our prior order of August 19, 1992, granting an alternative writ and imposing a stay. Further, I would direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Secretary of State to include the aforementioned cautionary language in the arguments presented on the ballot both for and against passage of Question 7, and let our people vote.