Court Opinion

ID: 9694338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:38:11.75778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:59.867685
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
ROBERTS, Justice.
I agree with the majority that appellant has not waived his claim. I concur in the result because I do not agree with the majority’s analysis of the issue.
The proper procedure to challenge the validity of a guilty plea is to file a petition to withdraw the plea with the court which accepted the plea. Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 383 A.2d 898 (1975); Commonwealth v. Lee, 460 Pa. 324, 333 A.2d 749 (1975). However, appellant filed his appeal before the decisions which mandated this procedure. Accordingly, at the time appellant sought to challenge the validity of his plea, he had the option of petitioning the trial court to withdraw the plea, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 301 A.2d 592 (1973), or attacking the validity of the plea on direct appeal,1 see Commonwealth v. *112Zakrzewski, supra; Commonwealth v. Lee, supra. In this case, appellant followed neither route, but instead sought relief under the Post Conviction Hearing Act [hereinafter “PCHA”].2 Section 4 of the PCHA3 provides:
“(b) For the purposes of this act, an issue is waived if:
(1) The petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted, or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this act; and
(2) The petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue.
(c) There is a rebuttable presumption that a failure to appeal a ruling or to raise an issue is a knowing and understanding failure.”
The majority states that “[sjince guilty pleas are properly attacked in the first instance in the trial court, it follows that appellant cannot be faulted for failing to attack his plea on direct appeal.” I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis.
First, in this case, appellant was free to assert his claim on direct appeal without first filing a petition in the trial court. See note 1, supra and accompanying text. Moreover, even if appellant should have first sought relief in the trial court, it does not follow that discontinuance of his appeal was proper. In that situation, the proper procedure would have been to *113assert, in the appeal, that some extraordinary circumstance, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, excused the failure to petition the trial court to withdraw the plea. Failure to follow this procedure on appeal creates a presumption of waiver if the validity of the guilty plea is subsequently challenged in a PCHA proceeding. See 19 P.S. § 1180-4 (Supp.1976); Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975). I cannot agree with the majority’s suggestion that one waiver — failure to raise a claim in the trial court, somehow excuses a second waiver — failure to appeal.
In my view, since appellant was not obliged, in 1974, to petition the trial court and did not waive his claim by failing to do so, see note 1, supra, the sole issue is whether appellant waived his claim that his plea was invalid when he failed to appeal from judgment of sentence. I conclude that appellant’s failure to appeal was not knowing and understanding and therefore did not constitute a waiver under section 4 of the PCHA.
Every person convicted of a crime has the right to have the conviction and sentence reviewed through appeal. E.g., Commonwealth v. Maloy, 438 Pa. 261, 264 A.2d 697 (1970). While a defendant may waive his right to appeal, this Court has stated that
“to be an effective waiver, the accused must be aware of all of his rights incident to an appeal, and with such knowledge intentionally abandon or fail to exercise them
Id. 438 Pa. at 263, 264 A.2d at 698; accord, Commonwealth v. Jones, 447 Pa. 228, 286 A.2d 892 (1971); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A.2d 760 (1968); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 231 Pa.Super. 190, 331 A.2d 824 (1974); Commonwealth v. Wallace, 229 Pa.Super. 172, 323 A.2d 182 (1974). See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
Here, appellant clearly wanted to exercise his right of appeal. The appeal was withdrawn only because counsel *114erroneously advised him that review could be effectuated by filing a PCHA petition. The right of appeal is personal to the accused and cannot be waived by a tactical decision of counsel. ABA Project on Standards For Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Criminal Appeals § 2.2(b) (Approved Draft 1970). See Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Myers, 427 Pa. 104, 233 A.2d 220 (1967). See generally Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 449 Pa. 584, 297 A.2d 456 (1972); Commonwealth v. Snyder, 427 Pa. 83, 233 A.2d 530 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 983, 88 S.Ct. 1104, 19 L.Ed.2d 1281 (1968). It cannot be concluded that appellant, as a lay person, understood that counsel’s action amounted to an abandonment of his appellate rights. In these circumstances, appellant was not “aware” of his rights and did not intelligently waive his right to appeal from his conviction. See Commonwealth ex rel. Light v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 215, 220 A.2d 883 (1966) (counsel’s erroneous advice that defendant could be convicted for murder of the first degree if his conviction for murder of the second degree was reversed “precludes a finding that the decision to forego ... an appeal was an intelligent waiver of that right”), followed in Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Myers, 427 Pa. 104, 233 A.2d 220 (1967). Compare Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 93 S.Ct. 71, 34 L.Ed.2d 194 (1972) (per curiam).
Accordingly, appellant’s claim is not waived under section 4 of the PCHA. In light of our decisions in Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, supra, and Commonwealth v. Lee, supra, he should be permitted to file a petition to withdraw his plea in the trial court. Since that is the effect of the majority’s mandate, I concur in the result.

. In Commonwealth v. Lee, 460 Pa. 324, 333 A.2d 749 (1975), we reached the merits of a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea on appeal notwithstanding Lee’s failure to petition the trial court for relief. We found no waiver because of the uncertainty which prevailed as to the appropriate method to challenge a guilty plea. Id. 460 Pa. at 327 n. *, 333 A.2d at 750 n. *. Thus, for appeals filed prior to Lee, failure to petition the trial court to withdraw the plea does not constitute a waiver. Since appellant’s appeal preceded our decision *112in Lee, his failure to petition the trial court does not constitute a waiver. The majority suggests that we considered the merits of the appeal in Lee because the claim involved the validity of the guilty plea colloquy which was of record and notes that appellant’s claim involves allegation outside the record. For purposes of waiver, it is irrelevant that appellant alleges facts which are not of record. The fact that his claim involves allegations not of record is relevant only to this Court’s determination whether to resolve the merits of the appeal or remand for an evidentiary hearing.

. Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, §§ 1 et seq., 19 P.S. §§ 1180-1 et seq. (Supp.1976).

. 19 P.S. § 1180-4 (Supp.1976).