Court Opinion

ID: 9700958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:55:02.664565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:16.559764
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge DiSalle :
I dissent. I cannot agree that jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the Administrator lies with our Court rather than with the appropriate court of common pleas. The effect of our holding today is *8to require that we pass upon all preliminary rulings of the Arbitrator, e.g., rulings on preliminary objections, discovery, joinder of additional defendants, and motions for summary judgment, assuming, of course, that the requirements of Section 501(b) of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 19701 have been met. When the legislature has specifically enumerated those cases wherein we have exclusive appellate jurisdiction,2 I fail to see how we can construe its silence concerning appeals from preliminary rulings of the Administrator, which are by definition interlocutory, as an intention to place a whole class of cases within our discretionary appellate jurisdiction. It seems to me much more appropriate, indeed, essential, that the tribunal which must eventually try a case (here, the court of common pleas) be the one which initially passes on all preliminary matters, especially those affecting the conduct of the trial. I perceive absolutely no reason for injecting ourselves into the early stages of medical malpractice litigation, absent a clear mandate from the legislature.
Moreover, a review of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act (Act)3 convinces me that appeals of this nature should go to the lower court. Section 508 of the Act4 specifies the powers and duties of the arbitration panel. Included therein is the power to “apply to the court of common pleas to enforce the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production and examination of books, papers and records.” While these are matters preliminary to the final determination of the arbitration panel, as opposed to *9the preliminary matters upon which the Arbitrator would rule, this is a distinction without a difference.5 At the very least, it is indicative of the legislature’s intent that the court of common pleas involve itself in some aspects of these cases, prior to receiving them on appeal de novo. Since the legislature has recognized the role and expertise of the common pleas court in some preliminary matters, I see no reason why all such pre-hearing matters should not be initially passed upon by that court. To determine otherwise produces an anomalous duplication of judicial resources. At a time when we are searching for ways to expedite disposition of appeals, I do not see how today’s decision will serve that purpose.
Judge Rogers joins in this dissent.

 Act of July 31, 1970, P.D. 673, as amended, 17 P.S. §211.501(1)).

 Sections 402 and 403 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, 17 P.S. §§211.402 and 211.403.

 Act of October 15, 1975, P.D. 390, as amended, 40 P.S. §1301.101 et seq.

 40 P.S. §1301.508.

 Section 307 of the Act, 40 P.S. §1301.307, authorizes the Administrator to rule on all preliminary motions. Under the majority’s holding, if a motion to produce were filed in advance of the hearing, and then ruled upon by the Administrator, the appeal from his ruling would come to our Court, while the action of the panel on such a motion would be reviewed by the court of common pleas,