Court Opinion

ID: 9475317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:23:56.454557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:39.058224
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Senior District Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent from the opinion of the majority. On the facts of this case, I do not think the authorities cited by the majority require reversal of the judgment of the district court.
I take no exception to the conclusion of the majority that the state court’s findings of fact are entitled to a high measure of deference. However, by reason of the unusual procedure in which the record was changed, the presumption of correctness accorded the factual finding of the trial court was compromised in my view.
The crucial issue before the trial court on the very serious charge of rape was whether there was a sexual penetration of the victim. The record as transcribed did not support the prosecution’s contention on this issue.
On the initial remand by the Virginia Supreme Court to the trial court to consider correcting the transcript, the trial court judge denied the prosecution’s motion and stated that he could not find with “reasonable certainty” what the answer of the victim was, and further remarked that he could not say that defense counsel’s contention was incorrect. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, upon direction by the trial court, examined the tape and reported that an aural examination of the designated portion of specimen Q1 revealed the following: “He jumped on top of me and stuck his fingers inside of me.” Accordingly, the prosecution’s motion to correct the transcript to reflect sexual penetration was denied by the trial court.
The prosecution at this point did not appeal the transcript decision but instead petitioned the Virginia Supreme Court for a new trial. The Supreme Court, without notifying the parties or considering any briefs or materials not considered by the trial court, remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the transcript issue. *422The Supreme Court noted that there was “ample basis” for the transcript change. On remand, the trial court, faced with this very clear mandate of its Supreme Court, quite naturally changed the transcript in accordance with the prosecution’s motion.
This procedure is what causes me concern. In my opinion, the trial court’s independence — which the majority opinion .correctly notes includes the advantages of first-hand observation and recollection— was compromised in this case by the Virginia Supreme Court’s mandate. And while the majority opinion correctly notes that federal habeas courts generally should defer to the factual rulings of state appellate courts, none of the cases cited deal with a situation in which the state appellate court’s fact-finding conflicts with that of its state trial court. In such a situation, presented here, the federalism concerns relied upon so heavily in Wainwright and Sumner are simply not dispositive.
When the motion to amend the transcript first came before him, the trial judge considered fully the available facts and explicitly denied the motion to amend. No additional facts were presented after the order remanding the case for further consideration by the trial judge.
Given the transcriber’s understanding of the tape, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s report, and the obvious uncertainty of the trial judge, concerning a crucial element of the offense charged, I would affirm the decision of the district judge.