Court Opinion

ID: 9531981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:48.730257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:38.217633
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice
(concurring specialty)-
While in agreement with the result reached by the majority in the opinion in this case, I am not • fully in accord with some of their supporting reasoning. Appellant’s counsel wished before trial to inquire of the veniremen if they understood the presumption of innocence, the right of the accused not to testify and the burden on the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court refused to allow this line of questioning and that refusal, although assigned by the accused •as error, has been upheld here. There are two interrelated reasons given by the- ma-jority for this holding. 'The first is that the scope of the voir dire examination lies *245in the sound discretion of the trial court and that such discretion will not be reversed except in case of abuse. And, secondly, the reason why there was no abuse in this instance is that appellant’s counsel’s questions are said to have sought to test the veniremen’s understanding of the law, which is an invasion of the province of the court. In my opinion such rule will fall short of what our state and federal constitutions require.
A person accused of serious crime is entitled to trial by jury as matter of constitutional right in the State of Idaho and the United States of America.1 This is a right to an impartial jury, “that is a jury unbiased^ — -just; a jury that will give [the defendant] the benefit of all his rights, including that of the presumption of innocence of crime until proven guilty.” 2 In order that this right to trial by an impartial jury may be assured, the State has, by statute, allowed parties to examine veniremen and to reject those who evidence some bias against either side.3
The theory which underlies the statutory right to challenge for cause for bias is simple. A juror harboring some form of prejudice precludes a fair trial for the defendant. By hypothesis, he may not accord the defendant the presumption of innocence, he may require an explanation from the defendant and he may be willing to vote for a conviction even with a reasonable doubt. Any juror who is, for any reason, unable to understand and accord the defendant’s rights to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, not to have to come forward with testimony, and, most importantly, to be presumed innocent, no less denies an accused his right to an impartial jury than does a juror who holds some special prejudice against the defendant.4 To fetter an accused’s right to avoid jurors who would not honor his substantive rights, is to limit his right to trial by an impartial jury. To the extent that the majority’s opinion would allow trial courts uncontrolled discretion to deny an accused the opportunity to ascertain if these procedural rules will be given effect by the fact finders, it would jeopardize the freedom to exercise the right to have a constitutional jury trial without even an opportunity for appellate review. With such reasoning I cannot agree.
There are holdings in other jurisdictions which recognize that it is the inability or unwillingness of a juror to follow the law which is the true basis of the challenge for cause for bias, and which, therefore, approve the practice of allowing counsel to give veniremen hypothetical questions on voir dire.5 And this Court has held that allowing such hypothetical questions by a prosecutor in his effort to test a venireman’s ability and willingness to follow the law, is not improper as an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.6 But, as the majority opinion points out, we have generally adhered to the rule that it should be the court *246and not counsel who gives the jury the law of the case. This need not, however, compel us to disregard the constitutional requirement that a defendant have a jury which will accord him his rights under the law. The better rule is one which respects the province of the court to give the law and the right of criminal defendants to remain secure in their right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. If a defendant’s counsel (or, in the interest of justice, counsel for the State) wishes to examine veniremen on their understanding of and willingness to follow the rules of law which are designed to control the cognitive processes of fact finders, and if the trial court holds such examination improper as an invasion of the court’s sphere, then counsel has the right to ask for general or stock instructions to the veniremen on that matter at that time. After such instructions counsel for both sides will be able to examine veniremen to test their ability to understand and to follow the law as given by the court. If this rule is followed it will still be the court’s function to determine and announce the law, but the accused will at least have the opportunity to safeguard his right to trial before a jury which is prepared to do justice impartially according to the precepts of our law.
This rule not only secures the defendant in his constitutional right to a fair trial by jury, it is also more rational than the traditional practice of giving these instructions at the end of the trial. Of course it is true that charging the jury after all of the evidence has been presented is generally the best way to deal with most issues of law. But this should not be true as to such rules as the prosecution’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the right to remain silent.7
These are precepts which are referred to above as “rules of law which are designed to control the cognitive processes of fact finders.” Their application does not turn on any particular fact situation or any primary rule of substantive law. They are, rather, expected to be applied in every criminal trial. And they are designed to control the process by which fact finders perceive, understand, and apply any evidence presented in any trial as to any criminal charge.
In Idaho, for example, it is the rule that the presumption of innocence is supposed to abide with the accused throughout his entire trial, and that the jurors are expected, on a proper instruction, to keep that in mind when they consider the evidenced.8 But is it not the sheerest folly to suppose that jurors wait until the conclusion of a trial to consider the evidence? A jury is not made up of twelve tape-recorders, carefully transcribing everything set before them to disgorge it for consideration at some future hour. The jurors are men and women who think about, select, and correlate information as they receive it. Legal concepts, such as the presumption of inno-, cence and the State’s burden of proof, which are supposed to control the jury’s decision-making processes, can have only limited effect at best if they are brought out after all the evidence is in and preliminary judgments have already been made. It seems utterly contradictory to say that the presumption of innocence stays with the defendant all through the trial, until the last evidence is in, and that the jury ought to keep this in mind, and at the same time not even to inform the jurors about this presumption until the jury is ready to render its verdict. If, however, the instruction were given before the commencement of trial, the jurors could approach the evidence in an informed and understanding way. They would be able to interpret the evidence in light of the presumption and the prosecutor’s duty. And the defendant’s right to have the presumption last through*247-out his trial would be a meaningful reality because it would be invoked before the jury members had actually begun to form opinions which could be crucial to the outcome of the case. In other words, if the stock instructions were given before the trial began, as well as at the conclusion of the trial with other written instructions, the rules which were designed to control jurors’ cognitive processes would be more likely to have effect.9
The problem of the instruction on the right not to take the stand is more difficult than those of the instructions on the proof burden and the presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that it is a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment for either prosecutor or judge to comment on a criminal defendant’s failure to take the stand on his own behalf.10 The rationale of this case is that such comments ought not to be made because no adverse inferences may be drawn from such a failure to testify. This result is said to be compelled by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled testimony by criminal defendants and the general requirement that the entire burden of showing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is on the State. This reasoning would seem to require that the jury be warned not to consider a failure to testify lest they draw some improper adverse conclusions therefrom. But if such an instruction is given at the end of the trial it may be improper as a comment on the failure to testify, and, if any improper inferences have been drawn,' it may only serve to remind the jurors of their unconstitutional conclusions. On this rationale there are already cases holding that such an instruction, as necessary as it may seem, is unconstitutional and prejudicial.11 This impasse would be broken if the instruction on the right to remain silent were given before trial begins. Not only would the jury’s possible mistaken conclusions not be reinforced, but, because the jury had been informed in advance that an accused’s silence meant nothing, it would be less likely to develop any expectations of his testifying and less likely to be negatively impressed when he did not.12
I, therefore, believe that as a constitutional necessity to safeguard a meaningful right to a trial before an impartial jury and as a matter of a sound and rational decision-making process, an accused has a right to have an instruction on the rules of law which are designed to govern the frame of mind with which the jurors are to approach the evidence at the time when such an instruction would be of value, on voir dire. But the right is only one of having a special instruction out of the normal order of trial if it is asked for. Like any other right to special instructions, a defendant must ask for the instruction before a failure to give it will be considered error in this Court.13 *248The appellant failed to request the necessary instructions below, but preferred instead to stand on his right to ask the questions. He may not delay litigation indefinitely by attempting to cure that failure here.
I concur in the result and opinion of the majority except for the qualification set out above.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.

. Constitution, of the United States, Amendment 6; Constitution of the State of Idaho, art. I, sec. 7. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), in the course of holding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury in serious criminal cases is operative in state court proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment, includes a lengthy and valuable discussion of the importance of the right to trial by an impartial jury. It is in service of the principles announced therein, that the rule urged in this opinion is offered.

. Olive v. State, 11 Neb. 1, 7 N.W. 444 (1881).

. I.C. §§ 19-2017 and 19-2019(2).

. State v. Harness, 10 Idaho 18, 27, 76 P. 788 (1904) ; State v. Messer, 99 W.Va. 241, 128 S.E. 373, 40 A.L.R. 608, 610 (1925); People v. Redola, 300 Ill. 392, 133 N.E. 292 (1921); Annotation, Failure to Understand or Unwillingness to Accept Presumption of Innocence or Rule as to Reasonable Doubt as Rendering Juror Incompetent, 40 A.L.R. 612 (1926).

. See Annotation, Propriety and Effect of Asking Prospective Jurors Hypothetical Questions on Voir Dire, as to How They Would Decide Issues of Case, 99 A.L.R. 2d 7, 47-59 (1965).

. State v. Pettit, 33 Idaho 326, 193 P. 1015 (1920).

. See generally Archer v. Shields Lumber Co., 91 Idaho 861, 865-866, 434 P.2d 79 (1967).

. State v. Dong Sing, 35 Idaho 616, 629-630, 208 P. 860 (1922). See also State v. Stevart, 46 Idaho 646, 651-652, 270 P. 140 (1928) ; State v. Bubis, 39 Idaho 376, 381, 227 P. 384 (1924).

. See generally, People v. Izzo, 14 Ill.2d 203, 151 N.E.2d 329, 89 A.L.R.2d 187 (1958) (Schaefer, J. for the Court) ; and the Annotation following at 89 A.D.R. 2d 197.

. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965).

. E. g., People v. Molano, 253 Cal.App.2d 841, 61 Cal.Rptr. 821, 18 A.L.R.3d 1328 (1967) (Hearing denied Cal.S.Ct., 1967) ; State v. Zaragosa, 6 Ariz.App. 80, 430 P.2d 426 (1967) ; Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966).

. Thereby avoiding the confusing and difficult situation which confronted this Court in State v. Darrah, 92 Idaho 25, 435 P.2d 914, 917 (1968).

. The rule on the necessity of requests for instructions in criminal cases is discussed in a well-reasoned opinion in State v. Patterson, 60 Idaho 67, 74-78, 88 P.2d 493 (1939). The distinction which was made in that ease was between “stock,” general, or necessary instructions, and instructions “on a particular point” or “special” instructions. Id., at 77-7S, SS P.2d 493. The distinction sought to bo made here is between necessary instructions at the “stock” time and necessary instructions at a “special” time, in other words, deviations from the normal order of trial. State v. Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 180, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953).