Court Opinion

ID: 9660761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:20:17.459987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:21.917009
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion, and also join in Judge Billings’ opinion, in which he explains the denial of extra time to file amicus briefs in Fowler v. Park Corporation, 673 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. banc 1984) in a way sufficient to satisfy any fair-minded person. I write separately because of my perspective as the author of Fowler.
Fowler was argued January 26,1984. A draft opinion was prepared and circulated but failed of adoption. The case was reassigned to me and I circulated an opinion for consideration at the June Conference. The day before that Conference Judge Welliver circulated a dissent, in which he suggested that the opinion might have adverse effects on lenders on chattel security and on the chattel leasing industry. I considered his opinion and made some changes in my opinion to make it clear that Fowler ruled only a particular fact situation.1 My opinion carried by 4 to 3 vote, with three separate dissents.
In accordance with our practice, it fell to me to report to the July Conference on the motion for rehearing in Fowler. The motion papers came to my attention on my return to Jefferson City July 10, 1984. At that time I noted that motions for leave to file amicus briefs had been denied by the Acting Chief Justice on July 5, 1984. I checked with the Clerk’s Office to see if the proposed briefs had been tendered with the motions and found that they had not been. It appeared from the motion papers that the would-be amici were apparently concerned about the point raised in Judge Welliver’s opinion, which is a matter that I had considered and discussed with the other Judges at the June Conference. I was satisfied that the proposed amicus briefs would not demonstrate anything that was “overlooked” or “misinterpreted.”2 The defendant-appellant’s motions and suggestions were thorough and detailed. I studied them carefully and determined that they raised nothing new.
I reported orally at the July Conference, recommending that the motion for rehearing be overruled. No Judge expressed a desire for extended discussion. The motion was overruled without dissent.3
*58The Court’s policy has been to allow ami-cus briefs freely before submission. I agree with this policy. Judge Welliver and Judge Billings would apparently be more restrictive. Since I have been on the Court, however, I know of no instance in which the Court delayed ruling on a motion for rehearing to permit non-parties to file briefs.
There was no denial of “the same and equal treatment” in the handling of the Fowler case. There was no invitation of “accusation that the Court favors labor organizations over business interests.”
Judge Welliver also is less than candid in his statement that a non-party was permitted to appear and argue in the present case. By the Court’s established practice an amicus may argue only (1) within the consent of the supported party and (2) only for such time as the supported party is willing to yield. The amicus in this case was treated as any other. The amici in Fowler had not appeared at the time the case was argued.
I do not know what purpose Judge Wel-liver has in continuing to hold the issue of amicus briefs in Fowler in a false light. Inasmuch as he has spread his views in the Court’s official reports, response in the same medium is in order.

. See discussion, “The Flag,” 40 Journal of The Missouri Bar 280 (July — August, 1984).

. The second paragraph of Rule 84.17 reads as follows:
The purpose of a motion for rehearing is to call attention to material matters of law or fact overlooked or misinterpreted by the court, as shown by its opinion. Reargument of issues determined by the opinion will be disregarded.

.Even dissenting judges do not ordinarily vote to grant a motion for rehearing unless a judge who concurred in the opinion expresses a change of position.