Court Opinion

ID: 9948844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 00:09:29.746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:05.446364
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion 3 °
                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                     LINA MARIE WILLSON,                                   No. 84353-COA
                     Petitioner,
                     vs.
                     THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                     COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                     IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
                                                                                   IMLF.
                     CARSON CITY; AND THE
                     HONORABLE JAMES E. WILSON,                                 EL
                                                                                                   URT
                     DISTRICT JUDGE,                                          CLER

                                                                             BY
                     Respondents,                                                  -IIEF DEPUTY CLERK

                       and
                     THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                     Real Party in Interest.

                                 Original petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order of
                     the district court denying an appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered
                     pursuant to a bench trial, of obstructing a public officer.
                                 Petition granted.

                     Charles H. Odgers, Public Defender, Carson City,
                     for Petitioner.

                     Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Jason Woodbury, District
                     Attorney, and Peter W. Srnith and Sarah E. White, Deputy District
                     Attorneys, Carson City,
                     for Real Party in Interest.

                     BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                     WESTBROOK, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
     NEVADA
                                                                                            Ob341
(0) I 947B   4614.
                                            CORRECTED OPINION'
                   PER CURIAM:
                               In this opinion, we consider constitutional challenges to NRS
                   197.190, which provides that a person may not "willfully hinder, delay or
                   obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties."
                   Petitioner Lina Marie Willson was charged and convicted under NRS
                   197.190 after yelling from her front yard at several police officers, who were
                   attending to a separate, potentially life-threatening matter involving a
                   juvenile on the street near Willson's house. After the district court affirmed
                   her misdemeanor conviction, Willson petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
                   arguing that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. We
                   conclude that (1) NRS 197.190 applies only to physical conduct or fighting
                   words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public
                   officer and, therefore, (2) NRS 197.190, as construed by this court, is not
                   unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to
                   Willson.
                               Although we hold that Willson's as-applied claims fail, we
                   recognize that Willson's claims implicate the sufficiency of the evidence in
                   light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190. Since the district court did not
                   have the benefit of our interpretation of NRS 197.190 as applying only to
                   physical conduct and fighting words, it did not consider whether there was
                   sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction. Accordingly, we grant
                   the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of certiorari
                   upholding NRS 197.190's constitutionality and instructing the district court

                        1This corrected opinion is issued in place of the opinion filed on
                   February 8, 2024.
COURT OF APPEALS

        OF

    NEVADA
                                                         2
   19.1711 •
                   to reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
                   whether, under this court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient
                   evidence supported Willson's conviction.
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               On March 25, 2021, the Carson City Sheriffs Office responded
                   to a call indicating a juvenile was contemplating suicide. Sergeant Mike
                   Cullen was the first officer to arrive and saw the juvenile walking down a
                   residential road with a knife in his hands. Sergeant Cullen followed the
                   juvenile in his car and attempted to communicate with him. At some point,
                   the juvenile stopped in the street, and Sergeant Cullen got out of his car
                   and continued to communicate with the juvenile from a distance. The
                   juvenile pressed the knife into his body a couple of times and stated he
                   wanted to kill himself.    In accord with his training, Sergeant Cullen
                   attempted to build rapport with the juvenile to prevent the juvenile from
                   committing suicide.
                               Shortly thereafter, more officers arrived on the scene. One
                   officer, Deputy Nicholas Simpson, maintained a position with a beanbag
                   shotgun while the other officers attempted to deescalate and control the
                   scene. Deputy Simpson was to use the beanbag shotgun if the public or the
                   officers became at risk. Approximately 15 minutes after the officers arrived
                   on scene, the juvenile dropped the knife. Sergeant Cullen believed the
                   situation was unstable up until that moment.
                               At some point during these 15 minutes, while the officers were
                   interacting with the juvenile, Willson, who lived next door to where the
                   incident was taking place, started yelling at the officers and the juvenile
                   from the middle of her front lawn. Willson continued to yell at the officers

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
    N EVADA
                                                        3
   1. 47B
                   even though two deputies had asked her to stop yelling several times.2 The
                   officers generally could not recall what Willson was yelling, although
                   Sergeant Cullen heard Willson yell at some point that "she was a witness of
                   sorne sort."
                                  The officers testified that Willson did not leave her yard, did not
                   threaten them with violence, and did not throw anything at them.
                   Nevertheless, the officers testified that Willson's yelling was loud and
                   disruptive and delayed their attempts to get the juvenile to drop the knife
                   because it interfered with their ability to build rapport and interact with
                   the juvenile. Deputy Simpson also testified that he had to put down the
                   beanbag shotgun to address Willson because of her yelling, which put the
                   officers at risk. Eventually, Willson's behavior "stopped enough" to where
                   the officers were able to get the juvenile over to the curb, and the juvenile
                   dropped the knife.
                                  Thereafter, the State charged Willson with obstructing a public
                   officer in violation of NRS 197.190, and Willson was convicted after a bench
                   trial in Carson City Justice Court. Willson appealed her conviction to the
                   district court, arguing that NRS 197.190 was unconstitutionally overbroad
                   and vague both on its face and as applied to her. The district court denied
                   the appeal, holding NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally overbroad or
                   vague because the statute required both due notice and the specific intent
                   to obstruct a public officer.3     Wilson then filed this petition for a writ of
                   certiorari.

                         Deputy Simpson testified that he asked Willson to stop yelling
                         2
                   between three and five times.
                         Respondent, the Honorable James E. Wilson, decided Willson's
                         3
                   appeal and entered the challenged order. He has since retired, and the
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                            4
(0) 1947B
                                                    ANALYSIS
                               In this petition, Willson challenges the constitutionality of NRS

                   197.190. This court is authorized to review a petition for a writ of certiorari
                   in cases where a district court has passed upon the constitutionality of a
                   statute on appeal from justice court. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4(1); NRS

                   34.020(3). "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
                   review de novo." Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d
                   682, 684 (2006). "Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger
                   bears the burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional." Id.
                               Willson argues NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad

                   and vague, both on its face and as applied to her. "The overbreadth doctrine
                   permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First
                   Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are
                   substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
                   sweep."   Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612, 262 P.3d 1123, 1125 (2011)
                   (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)). The First Amendment
                   of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from abridging
                   an individual's freedom of speech.4 U.S. Const. amend. I; Busefink v. State,
                   128 Nev. 525, 529, 286 P.3d 599, 602 (2012). "The vagueness doctrine holds
                   that la] conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under
                   which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
                   notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or

                   Honorable Kristin N. Luis has succeeded him in Department Two of the
                   First Judicial District Court.

                         4The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
                   Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268
                   U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
    NEVADA
                                                          5
MI 19475
                   encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement."' Ford, 127 Nev. at 612,
                   262 P.3d at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting United States u. Williams,
                   553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
                               To determine whether NRS 197.190 is overbroad or vague, we
                   must first interpret NRS 1.97.190 to determine what the statute prohibits.
                   See id. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1126 ("The first step in both overbreadth and
                   vagueness analysis is to construe the challenged statute."); see also United
                   States u. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023) ("To judge whether a statute is
                   overbroad, we must first determine what it covers."). After interpreting
                   NRS 197.190, we determine whether NRS 197.190, as construed by this
                   court, is overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Willson.
                   NRS 197.190 prohibits physical conduct or fighting words that are
                   specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the
                   discharge of official powers or duties
                               NRS 197.190 was enacted as part of the Crimes and
                   Punishments Act of 1911, reprinted in Nev. Rev. Laws § 6805, at 1928
                   (1912), and has not been amended by the Legislature or interpreted in a
                   published decision by the Nevada appellate courts since its enactment. The
                   statute reads as follows:
                             Every person who, after due notice, shall refuse or
                             neglect to make or furnish any statement, report or
                             information lawfully required of the person by any
                             public officer, or who, in such statement, report or
                             information shall make any willfully untrue,
                             misleading or exaggerated statement, or who shall
                             willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer
                             in the discharge of official powers or duties, shall,
                             where no other provision of law applies, be guilty of
                             a misdemeanor.
                   NRS 197.190.

COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                         6
(0i I94713
                                    When interpreting a statute, this court's "primary goal . . . is to
                     give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting it." Ramos u. State, 137
                     Nev. 721, 722, 499 P.3d 1178, 1180 (2021). "[W]e first look to the statute's
                     plain language to determine its meaning, and we will enforce it as written
                     if the language is clear and unambiguous." Id. In determining the plain
                     meaning of a statute, we consider both "the particular statutory language
                     at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."
                     Reggio u. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 525 P.3d 350, 353
                     (2023) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). "We
                     will look beyond the statute's language only if that language is ambiguous
                     or its plain meaning was clearly not intended or would lead to an absurd or
                     unreasonable result." Rarnos, 137 Nev. at 722, 499 P.3d at 1180. "An
                     ambiguity arises where the statutory language lends itself to two or more
                     reasonable interpretations." State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102
                     P.3d 588, 590 (2004).
                                    As an initial matter, we recognize that NRS 197.190 provides
                     three alternative means by which a person may be guilty of obstructing a
                     public officer, and each alternative is laid out in a clause that begins with
                     Gt
                          who." Willson only challenges the constitutionality of the final clause,
                     which she was charged with violating: "[e]very person... who shall
                     willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of
                     official powers or duties."5 NRS 197.190.

                           As such, all references to obstruction in this opinion refer to an
                               5

                     obstruction charge under this last clause, unless stated otherwise. We
                     express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the other provisions of
                     NRS 197.190.
COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
     NEVADA
                                                              7
(tli 1947B ,zaSDID
                               Willson contends that NRS 197.190's scope is broad, prohibiting
                   not only physical conduct but also protected speech. The State contends
                   that NRS 197.190 is limited in its scope by due notice and specific intent
                   requirements.     As such, the parties raise three issues for this court's

                   consideration: (1) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person receive "due
                   notice" that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public
                   officer; (2) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person have the specific
                   intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer; and (3) whether NRS

                   197.190 prohibits speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer.
                   We consider these issues in turn.
                         NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive "due notice" that
                         they are hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer
                               The State argues, and the district court held, that a person
                   cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person received

                   due notice that their behavior was hindering, delaying, or obstructing a
                   public officer. However, such an interpretation is at odds with the structure
                   of the statute.
                               The phrase "after due notice" succeeds only the first "who"
                   clause, which introduces the first alternative means of committing the
                   offense. The phrase's placement within only the first clause indicates its
                   application is limited to the category of persons described in that clause,
                   i.e., those who "refuse or neglect to make or furnish any statement, report
                   or information lawfully required of the person by any public officer."
                   Indeed, interpreting NRS 197.190 as requiring due notice for each means of
                   committing obstruction would lead to an absurd result, as it would require
                   that a person convicted of obstruction under the second clause have received
                   due notice that they were making a "willfully untrue, misleading or
                   exaggerated statement."
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                        8
(0) 1947B
                               Were we to follow the logic of the State and district court, to be
                   consistent, we would also have to hold that the phrase following the second
                   "who" clause—"in such statement, report or information"—would also have
                   to apply to the other two clauses. However, this would lead to a nonsensical
                   construction, prohibiting every person who, "in such staternent, report or
                   information" from "willfully hinder[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] any
                   public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties." An absurd
                   construction such as this should always be avoided. Sheriff, Clark Cnty. u.
                   Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1253, 198 P.3d 326, 329 (2008). Therefore, we
                   conclude that NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive due notice
                   that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer.
                         NRS 1.97.190 requires that a person haue the specific intent to hinder,
                         delay, or obstruct a public officer
                               The State also argues, and the district court held, that a person
                   cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person has the
                   specific intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer.
                               "Specific intent" is "[t]he intent to accomplish the precise
                   criminal act that one is later charged with." Intent, Black's Law Dictionary
                   (11th ed. 2019); accord Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 923, 124 P.3d 191, 201
                   (2005), receded from on other grounds by Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013,
                   1026-27, 195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008). In contrast, "general intent" is "Mhe
                   intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the
                   consequences that result." Intent, Black's Law Dictionary; see Bolden, 121
                   Nev. at 923, 124 P.3d at 201. With respect to NRS 197.190, specific intent
                   would require that a person intend for a public officer to be hindered,
                   delayed, or obstructed by the person's act, whereas general intent would
                   require only that a person intend to perform an act that results in the

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                           9
(0) I947B
                   hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a public officer, regardless of whether
                   the person desired such a result.
                               NRS 197.190 makes it unlawful to "willfully hinder, delay or
                   obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties." NRS
                   197.190 does not define the term "willfully"; therefore, we consider the term
                   as it is commonly understood. See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp.,
                   132 Nev. 587, 594, 377 P.3d 97, 102 (2016) ("When the Legislature does not
                   specifically define a term, this court 'presume [s] that the Legislature
                   intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning." (alteration in
                   original) (quoting Wyrnan v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 607, 217 P.3d 572, 583
                   (2009))). Although the term is generally understood to mean "deliberately"
                   or "intentional[ly]," see Willful, Merriarn-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary
                   (11th ed. 2020), the term may denote either that an act is "[Aoluntary and
                   intentional, but not necessarily malicious" or that an act "involves [a]
                   conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor," see Willful, Black's
                   Law Dictionary.
                               Because the term "willfully" does not necessarily require
                   malice, the phrase "willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer"
                   may reasonably be interpreted as requiring only that a person intend to
                   perform an act that resulted in the hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a
                   public officer. See Robey v. State, 96 Nev. 459, 461, 611 P.2d 209, 210 (1980)
                   (stating the term "willful' when used in criminal statutes with respect to
                   proscribed conduct relates to an act or omission which is done intentionally,
                   deliberately or designedly, as distinguished from an act or omission done
                   accidentally, inadvertently, or innocently"); see also Moore v. State, 136 Nev.
                   620, 624, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020) (recognizing "the term `wil[l]fully' has been
                   defined to refer to general intent" in the context of statutes aimed at the

COURT OF APPEALS

          OF

      NEVADA
                                                         10
101 It/471i
                   protection of infants (alteration in original) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 110
                   Nev. 865, 870, 877 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1994))).
                               However, because the term "willfully" may also suggest an evil
                   or malicious purpose on the part of the actor, and the terms "hinder,"
                   "delay," and "obstruct" are transitive verbs that refer to a specific object,
                   i.e., "any public officer," the phrase "willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any
                   public officer" may also reasonably be interpreted as requiring that a person
                   intend their act to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer. See Flores-
                   Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009) ("In ordinary English,
                   where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume
                   that an adverb . . . that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how
                   the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in
                   the sentence."); see also Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 234, 994 P.2d 700,
                   713 (2000) (holding "willful means intentional" and that -willful first-degree
                   murder requires that the killer actually intend to kill").      Therefore, we
                   conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether the offense is a general
                   or specific intent crime.
                               "To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative
                   history and construe the statute in a manner that is consistent with reason
                   and public policy." State u. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228
                   (2011).   We also consider "prior judicial interpretations of related or
                   comparable statutes by this or other courts," Castaneda u. State, 132 Nev.
                   434, 439, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016), as well as definitions of the offense at
                   common law, see Adler v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 641, 643, 556 P.2d

                   549, 550 (1976); see also NRS 193.050(3).         Finally, "every reasonable

                   construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
                   unconstitutionality." State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550,

COURT OF APPEALS

        OF
     NEVADA
                                                         11
(0) I947B
                   552 (2010) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); see also
                   United States u. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) ("[W]here a
                   statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
                   doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
                   questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.").
                               Unfortunately, there is neither legislative history to assist in
                   discerning legislative intent, nor any Nevada caselaw discussing the
                   reasons for NRS 197.190's passage more than a century ago. See City of
                   Milwaukee v. Wroten, 466 N.W.2d 861, 869, 871 (Wis. 1991) (declining to
                   guess the original intent of the drafters in passing a 135-year-old ordinance
                   that prohibited resisting an officer). Neither is there any Nevada caselaw
                   discussing or recognizing the common law offense.
                               Other jurisdictions appear split on whether similar statutory
                   offenses are general or specific intent crimes. Compare People v. Roberts,
                   182 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760-61 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) (holding a statute
                   that made it a crime to "willfully resist[ ], delay[ ], or obstruct[ ] any public
                   officer" required only a general intent to act), and People v. Gleisner, 320
                   N.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding a statute that made it a
                   crime to "willfully obstruct, resist or oppose" an officer required "only an
                   intent to do a certain physical act"), with Harris u. State, 726 S.E.2d 455,
                   457-58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing a statute that made it a crime to
                   knowingly and willfully obstruct or hinder an officer did not criminalize
                   any actions which incidentally hinder an officer" (quoting Hudson u. State,
                   218 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975))), and State v. Singletary, 327
                   S.E.2d 11, 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a statute that made it a crime
                   to "willfully and unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a police officee did not
                   proscribe innocent conduct but only conduct made with the intent to resist,

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
      NEVADA
                                                          12
(0) 194713
                   delay, or obstruct).6 A few state courts appear to have explicitly considered
                   whether the common law offense requires a specific intent to obstruct, and
                   those cases suggest the common law offense is a specific intent crime. See,
                   e.g., Cover v. State, 466 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Md. 1983) (holding the common
                   law offense requires the "[i]ntent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the
                   act"); Commonwealth v. Adams, 125 N.E.3d 39, 51 (Mass. 2019) (holding the
                   common law offense requires "that the defendant intended his or her
                   conduct, and intended 'the harmful consequences of the conduct—that is,
                   the interference with, obstruction, or hindrance" (quoting Commonwealth
                   v. Joyce, 998 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013))).
                               Thus, to the extent there is guidance from other jurisdictions, it
                   tends to lean toward interpreting the statute as requiring specific intent.
                   Indeed, interpreting NRS 197.190 as requiring only a general intent to act
                   would raise grave doubts as to the statute's constitutionality. In particular,
                   such an interpretation would criminalize a significant amount of
                   constitutionally protected activity. For example, "merely remonstrating
                   with an officer in behalf of another, or criticizing or questioning an officer
                   while he is performing his duty" could constitute an unlawful act. State v.
                   Leigh, 179 S.E.2d 708, 713 (N.C. 1971); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482
                   U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (stating "the First Amendment protects a significant
                   amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers").

                          "We note that NRS 199.280, which prohibits a person from "willfully
                   resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or
                   attempting to discharge any legal duty of his or her office" is similar, but
                   not identical, to NRS 197.190. However, there is also no Nevada caselaw
                   interpreting NRS 199.280 from which this court may draw guidance in this
                   matter.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                        13
(0) 194711
                               Such an interpretation would also raise vagueness concerns
                   because the statute would likely be violated with regular frequency but only
                   few would be subject to prosecution. See Scott v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 131
                   Nev. 1015, 1022-23, 363 P.3d 1159, 1164-65 (2015) (holding an obstruction
                   ordinance was impermissibly vague because its prohibitions were "violated
                   scores of times daily, . . . yet only some individuals—those chosen by the
                   police in their unguided discretion—are arrested" (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at
                   466-67)). For example, a person could be charged with obstruction for
                   intentionally walking in front of a police officer, even if the person was
                   unaware that doing so would hinder, delay, or obstruct the officer.
                               In contrast, a specific intent requirement would mitigate
                   overbreadth concerns by narrowing the scope of criminal proscriptions that
                   could reach constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 127
                   Nev. 608, 619, 262 P.M 1123, 1130 (2011) (holding a pandering of
                   prostitution statute was not overbroad in part because the statute's intent
                   requirement narrowed the statute's application); see also Stubbs v. Las
                   Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 792 F. App'x 441, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2019)
                   (Tashima, J., dissenting) (stating NRS 197.190 must be construed as
                   requiring specific intent in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny).
                               A specific intent requirement would also mitigate vagueness
                   concerns by providing an objective standard for the statute's enforcement.
                   See Ford, 127 Nev. at 621-22, 262 P.3d at 1132 (stating the determination
                   of "[w]hether someone held a belief or had an intent is a true-or-false
                   determination, not a subjective judgment such as whether conduct is
                   'annoying" (quoting United States v. Williarn.s, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008))).
                   Therefore, we interpret NR.S 197.190 as requiring that a person have the

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                        14
(0) 1947B
                   specific intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the discharge
                   of official duties or powers.

                         NRS 197.190 only applies to physical conduct and fighting words
                                Willson argues that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutional because

                   its prohibition against speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public
                   officer includes speech protected by the First Amendment.
                                Although NRS 197.190 makes it unlawful to "hinder, delay or
                   obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties," the
                   statute does not define the operative verbs "hinder," "delay," or "obstruct."
                   These terms plainly indicate a "legislative intent to prohibit that which
                   would interfere with law enforcement officers as they go about their duties,"
                   Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Wyo. 1985), but they do not clearly
                   indicate whether the statute encompasses mere speech, see Hinder,
                   Merriarn-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary ("to make slow or difficult the
                   progress of: hamper" or "to hold back: check"); Delay, Merriam-Webster's
                   Collegiate Dictionary (to "put off, postpone," "to stop, detain, or hinder for a
                   time," or "to cause to be slower or to occur more slowly than normal");
                   Obstruct, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary ("to block or close up by
                   an obstacle" or "to hinder from passage, action, or operation: impede").
                                Strictly speaking, the spoken word may slow, hamper, prevent,
                   or impede a public officer from performing their duties. See DeFusco v.
                   Brophy, 311 A.2d 286, 288 (R.I. 1973) (stating "the spoken word can be just
                   as effective in impeding an officer in the discharge of his duty as if the orater
                   [sic] had grappled with the officer"); see also Scott, 131 Nev. at 1022, 363
                   P.3d at 1164 (stating a pedestrian rnay hinder or delay a deputy sheriff by
                   asking the deputy for directions while the deputy is directing traffic at an
                   intersection).   As such, NRS 197.190 may reasonably be interpreted as
                   prohibiting speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                          15
(0) I947B
                               However, the statute does not explicitly reference speech, and
                   it does not contain all-encompassing language, such as "in any way" or "in

                   any manner," that would suggest its provisions extend to speech. Cf. Hill,
                   482 U.S. at 455 (striking down an ordinance that made it a crime to "in any
                   manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman" because it

                   prohibited speech); Wroten, 466 N.W.2d at 870 ("Thus, if it were not
                   apparent from the words themselves, the 'any way' language, as does the
                   'any manner' language of Hill, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the

                   prohibited activity includes speech ....").       The terms "obstruct" and
                   "hinder" may also connote some action (or inaction) apart from verbal
                   expression. See, e.g., State v. Snodgrass, 570 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App.
                   1977) (stating the term 'obstructing' . . impl[ies] . . . 'some physical act or
                   exertion' (third alteration in original) (quoting State v. Tages, 457 P.2d 289,
                   292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969))); Wilkerson v. State, 556 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. Dist.
                   Ct. App. 1990) (stating the term "'obstruct' . . . contemplates acts or conduct
                   apart from verbal expressions, which operate to physically hinder or impede
                   another in doing something"); Bennett v. St. Louis County, 542 S.W.3d 392,
                   401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (stating "[t]he term 'obstruct' . . . does not suggest
                   speech" but rather     connotes purely physical action").      As such, NRS
                   197.190 may also reasonably be interpreted as applying only to physical
                   conduct. Therefore, we conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether
                   it prohibits speech.
                               In light of the constitutional concerns previously identified, the
                   canon of constitutional avoidance obligates this court to further limit NRS
                   197.190's application to physical conduct and unprotected fighting words.
                   See Hill, 482 U.S. at 463 n.12 (stating "'fighting words' which `by their very
                   utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace'

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                         16
40) 1947B
                   are not constitutionally protected" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,

                   315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).       Although the specific intent requirement
                    narrow[s] and clariffies] the statute, so as to bring it at least closer to being
                   within constitutional parameters," Scott, 131 Nev. at 1027 n.6, 363 P.3d at

                   1168 n.6 (Hardesty, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it is not
                   clear that this requirement would wholly resolve the constitutional
                   concerns presented by the statute.
                                Notably, the specific intent requirement would not prevent NRS
                   197.190's application to constitutionally protected speech.        See Hill, 482
                   U.S. at 469 n.18 (stating "speech does not necessarily lose its constitutional
                   protection because the speaker intends it to interrupt an officer"): Long v.
                   Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 101 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating "speech is
                   generally protected by the First Amendment, even if it is intended to
                   interfere with the performance of an officer's duty, provided no physical
                   interference results").   The specific intent requirement also may not, in
                   itself, provide sufficient guidance to law enforcement in the statute's
                   application. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 469 n.18 (stating an intent requirement
                   would not "cabin the excessive discretion the ordinance provides to
                   officers"); Scott, 131 Nev. at 1027 n.6, 363 P.3d at 1168 n.6 (Hardesty, C.J.,
                   concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating "there is little doubt" an
                   obstruction ordinance would survive constitutional scrutiny if interpreted
                   to require both specific intent and physical conduct or fighting words).
                               Indeed, several courts have interpreted similar statutes as
                   being limited to physical conduct, and sometimes fighting words, so as to
                   ensure such statutes are constitutionally firm. See, e.g., Snodgrass, 570
                   P.2d at 1286-87 (holding a statute that made it a crime to "willfully resist,
                   delay or obstruct a public officer" required "the presence of some physical

CounT or APPLALS
       OF
      NEVADA
                                                          17
(.0) 1947B
                   act or exertion against the officer"); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 236,
                   239 (Conn. 1987) (holding a statute that made it a crime to "obstruct[],
                   resist[ ], hinder[ ] or endanger[ ] any peace officer" proscribed "only physical
                   conduct and fighting words"); Wilkerson, 556 So. 2d at 454-56 (holding a
                   statute that made it a crime to "obstruct or oppose any such
                   officer. .. without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer"
                   required some act or conduct apart from verbal expressions); People v. Raby,
                   240 N.E.2d 595, 597, 599 (Ill. 1968) (holding a statute that made it a crime
                   to "knowingly resist{ ] or obstruct[] the performance by one known to the
                   person to be a peace officer" proscribed only physical acts); State v. Krawsky,
                   426 N.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Minn. 1988) (holding a statute that made it a crime
                   to "intentionally obstruct[ ], hinder[ ]. or prevent[ ] the lawful execution of
                   any legal process, . . . or [to] interfere[] with a peace officer" was "directed
                   solely at physical acts"); State v. Williams, 251 P.3d 877, 879, 883 (Wash.
                   2011) (recognizing a statute that made it a crime to "willfully hinder[],
                   delay[], or obstruct[] any law enforcement officer" required "conduct in
                   addition to pure speech").
                               Therefore, we interpret NRS 197.190 as applying only to
                   physical conduct and fighting words. We note that NRS 197.190 does not
                   require the use of force or violence, and that a person's action (e.g., blocking
                   the path of an officer) or inaction (e.g., refusing to obey a lawful order) may
                   constitute physical conduct that hinders, delays, or obstructs an officer. See
                   State v. Hudson, 784 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that
                   Cfnonaggressive behavior" may hinder, delay, or obstruct an officer just as

                   assaultive conduct"); see also Christopher Hall, Annotation, What
                   Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting Officer, in Absence of Actual Force, 66
                   A.L.R.5th 397 (1999) (collecting cases where courts have determined what

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
      NEVADA
                                                         18
(0) 194713
                   constitutes obstructing an officer in the absence of actual force). Of course,
                   whether a person's physical conduct actually hinders, delays, or obstructs a
                   public officer is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact in a given case.
                   NRS 197.190 is not facially overbroad
                                 Having determined what NRS 197.190 prohibits, we now
                   consider whether NRS 197.190 is facially overbroad. A statute is facially
                   overbroad "if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when
                   'judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Ford, 127
                   Nev. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1125 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
                   41, 52 (1999)). Because a determination that a statute is facially overbroad
                   voids the statute in its entirety, "the overbreadth doctrine is strong
                   medicine" that should not be employed casually. Scott, 131 Nev. at 1018,
                   363 P.3d at 1162 (quoting Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 298,

                   129 P.3d 682, 688 (2006)); see also United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762,
                   770 (2023).
                                 Willson argues NRS 197.190 is facially overbroad because it
                   allows protected speech to be made a crime. In support of this argument,
                   Willson cites cases where ordinances were struck down as overbroad
                   because of their application to protected speech. See, e.g., Hill, 482 U.S. at
                   460-67 (holding an ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to "in
                   any manner" oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt a police officer was facially
                   overbroad because it applied to speech and was not narrowly tailored to
                   prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words); Lewis v. City of New
                   Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974) (holding an ordinance that made it
                   unlawful for any person to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious
                   language toward a city police officer was facially overbroad because it
                   applied to speech and was not narrowly tailored to prohibit only fighting
                   words).
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                          19
(0) I947B
                                    However, as construed by this court, NRS 197.190 does not
                   apply to protected speech; it applies only to physical conduct and fighting
                   words.        This limitation positively distinguishes NRS 197.190 from the
                   ordinances struck down in Hill and Lewis: "the statute does not apply to
                   ordinary verbal criticism directed at a police officer even while the officer is
                   performing his official duties and does not apply to the mere act of [verbally]

                   interrupting an officer, even intentionally." Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 878.
                                    This limitation and NRS 197.190's specific intent requirement
                   also        distinguishes   NRS    197.190   from   the   ordinance    deemed
                   unconstitutional in Scott.        There, the Nevada Supreme Court held an
                   ordinance that made it unlawful for "any person to hinder, obstruct, resist,
                   delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any city
                   officer . . . in the discharge of his official duties" was overbroad. Scott, 131
                   Nev. at 1018-21, 363 P.3d at 1161-63 (emphasis added). In so holding, the
                   supreme court recognized that the ordinance did not contain a specific
                   intent requirement,7 id. at 1019, 363 P.3d at 1163, and that the ordinance
                   applied to speech in light of its prohibition of "mere threats" to hinder,
                   obstruct, resist, delay, or molest a police officer, id. at 1020, 363 P.3d at
                   1163.
                                    Given our holdings that NRS 197.190 does not apply to
                   protected speech and only prohibits physical conduct or fighting words that
                   are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer, NRS

                          Although the supreme court noted that an intent requirement would
                           7

                   not, in itself, save the ordinance, Scott, 131 Nev. at 1019 n.3, 363 P.3d at
                   1163 n.3, the supreme court also indicated that invalidating the ordinance
                   would not affect NRS 199.280's validity, which is similar to NRS 197.190,
                   because that statute was "explicitly limited by an intent requirement," id.
                   at 1020 n.4, 363 P.3d at 1163 n.4; see also supra note 3.
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                           20
(0) 1947B
                   197.190 is distinguishable from the ordinances in Hill, Lewis, and Scott.
                   Moreover, the mere fact that "a person's speech may at times be implicated
                   incidentally in the enforcement of this statute" does not render the statute
                   facially overbroad. Wilkerson, 556 So. 2d at 456. Therefore, Willson fails to
                   demonstrate that NRS 197.190 is substantially overbroad relative to the
                   scope of its plainly legitimate sweep, and we conclude that NRS 197.190 is
                   not facially overbroad.
                   NRS 197.190 is not facially vague
                             Willson argues NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally vague on its
                   face because it fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
                   what is prohibited and it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
                   or arbitrary enforcement.
                               "The void-for-vagueness doctrine is predicated upon a statute's
                   repugnancy to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
                   United States Constitution." Scott, 131 Nev. at 1021, 363 P.3d at 1163-64
                   (quoting Siluar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 684-85).            A statute is
                   unconstitutionally vague "(1) if it 'fails to provide a person of ordinary
                   intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited'; or (2) if it 'is so standardless
                   that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement." Id.
                   at 1021, 363 P.3d at 1164 (quoting State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481-
                   82, 245 P.3d 550, 553 (2010)). "The first prong is concerned with guiding
                   those who may be subject to potentially vague statutes, while the second—
                   and more important—prong is concerned with guiding the enforcers of
                   statutes." Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 685. A statute involving
                   criminal penalties or constitutionally protected rights is facially vague if
                   vagueness so permeates the text that the statute cannot meet these
                   requirements in most applications." Flamingo Paradise Garning, LLC v.
                   Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512-13, 217 P.3d 546, 553-54 (2009).
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                          21
(0) 1947B
                          NRS 197_190 provides sufficient notice of what is prohibited
                                Willson argues NRS 197.190 fails to provide persons of ordinary
                   intelligence fair notice that they may be arrested for protected speech.
                   However, as previously discussed, NRS 197.190 does not prohibit protected
                   speech. Rather, NRS 197.190 prohibits only physical conduct and fighting
                   words that hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer, and the terms "hinder,"
                   "delay," and "obstruct" are words of recognized meaning that provide
                   persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice that they may not interfere with
                   or hamper the activities of a public officer. See Newton v. State, 698 P.2d
                   1149, 1152 (Wyo. 1985) (stating the terms "hinder," "delay," and "obstruct"
                   are "words of recognized meaning by those of ordinary intelligence"); see also
                   Snodgrass, 570 P.2d at 1286, 1289 (stating "a person of common intelligence
                   can easily ascertain what acts are prohibited" under a statute that made it

                   a crime to "willfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer"); Krawsky, 426
                   N.W.2d at 876, 878 (stating "[p]ersons of common intelligence need not
                   guess at whether their conduct violates" a statute that made it a crime to
                   "intentionally obstruct{ ], hinder[ ], or prevent[ ] the lawful execution of any
                   legal process, . . . or [to] interfere[ ] with a peace officer").
                                Moreover, NRS 197.190's specific intent requirement further
                   ensures that persons of ordinary intelligence have fair notice of when their
                   conduct constitutes a criminal offense. See Ford, 127 Nev. at 621, 262 P.3d
                   at 1132 (stating "a law that requires specific intent to produce a prohibited
                   result may avoid vagueness, both by giving the defendant notice of what is
                   prohibited and by affording adequate law enforcement standards"); see also
                   Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests. Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
                   (1982) (recognizing "that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's
                   vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the
                   complainant that his conduct is proscribed"). Accordingly, we conclude NRS
COURT OF APPEALS

             OF
         NEVADA
                                                            22
,:1)) I 94-7 i3
                        197.190 does not fail to provide a person of ordinary intelligence sufficient
                        notice of what is prohibited.

                              NRS 197.190 is not so stanclardless so as to authorize or encourage
                              seriously discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement
                                    Willson argues NRS 197.190 authorizes or encourages seriously
                        discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement because it grants police officers

                        unfettered discretion to arrest individuals based on their subjective belief
                        that a citizen has obstructed an arrest or investigation.
                                    Police   officers must always exercise some judgment in
                        determining whether a person has obstructed the performance of a public
                        officer's duties. And "given the wide variety of circumstances in which the
                        type of conduct [the statute] legitimately seeks to proscribe can occur," some
                        degree of judgment must be permitted. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 878-79.
                        Indeed, "it seems unlikely that a substantially more precise standard could
                        be formulated which would not risk nullification in practice because of easy
                        evasion." Id. As the United States Supreme Court has similarly recognized,
                                    [t]here are areas of human conduct where, by the
                                    nature of the problems presented, legislatures
                                    simply cannot establish standards with great
                                    precision. Control of the broad range of disorderly
                                    conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the
                                    performance of his official duties may be one such
                                    area, requiring as it does an on-the-spot
                                    assessment of the need to keep order.
                        Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581 (1974).
                                    NRS 197.190 does not provide those charged with enforcement
                        of its provisions unfettered and unguided discretion. As construed by this

                        court, NRS 197.190 prohibits only physical conduct and fighting words that
                        hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the discharge of official duties
                        or powers. As such, law enforcement has no discretion to arrest persons for

COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                              23
40) 1947B    alsalNin
                       protected speech or for physical conduct that is merely annoying or
                       offensive.     Cf. Scott, 131 Nev. at 1022, 363 P.3d at 1164 (holding an
                       obstruction ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it was "worded
                       so broadly that sheriffs [sic] deputies [were] given 'unfettered discretion to
                       arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them" (quoting
                       Hill, 482 U.S. at 465)).
                                      Moreover, NRS 197.190's specific intent requirement prevents
                       law enforcement from citing or arresting persons for innocent conduct that
                       incidentally interferes with a public officer. See Ford, 127 Nev. at 622-23,
                       262 P.3d at 1132 (recognizing that a specific intent requirement curbs the
                       amount of discretion a statute affords to law enforcement); City of Las Vegas
                       v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1041, 1051, 146 P.3d 240, 247 (2006)
                       (holding an ordinance "provide[d] an adequate standard for law
                       enforcement because officers will know that, in order to prosecute someone
                       for violating the ordinance, the prosecutor must prove that the dancer or
                       the patron fondled or caressed the other with the intent to sexually arouse
                       or excite").
                                      Accordingly, we conclude NRS 197.190 is not so standardless
                       that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory or arbitrary
                       enforcement, and that NRS 197.190 is not so permeated by vagueness so as
                       to render the statute facially vague.
                       NRS 197.190 is not unconstitutional as applied to Willson
                                 Willson argues that NRS 197.190 is overbroad as applied to her
                       because she was cited and convicted for her protected speech and that it is
                       vague as applied to her because she "had no reason to believe that she would
                       be cited or convicted for that speech."
                                      In contrast to a facial constitutional challenge, which "seeks to
                       invalidate a statute ...itself," an as-applied constitutional challenge
COURT OF APPEALS
        OF
     NEVADA
                                                               24
40) 194711   .46140.
                      ‘`concedes that a statute may be facially constitutional or constitutional in
                      many of its applications but contends that it is not so under the particular
                      circumstances of the case." See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 243 (2023).
                      In light of our holding that NRS 197.190 does not apply to protected speech,
                      Willson's claims that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutional as applied to her
                      protected speech do not actually implicate the constitutionality of the

                      statute.8 Rather, the issue that remains is whether her actions and words
                      in fact constitute protected speech: if they do constitute protected speech,
                      then they are not punishable under the statute as construed by this court;
                      but if they do not constitute protected speech, then they may be punishable
                      under the statute. For this reason, Willson's as-applied claims are more
                      properly viewed as claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
                      support her conviction. See Ex parte Carter, 514 S.W.3c1776, 780 (Tex. App.
                      2017) (recognizing the appellant's as-applied claim was actually a "veiled
                      sufficiency challenge"); see also In re Mental Commitment of K.E.K., 954
                      N.W.2d 366, 380 (Wis. 2021) (stating the petitioner's "dispute is with the
                      sufficiency of the evidence, not with the constitutionality of' the statute).
                                  The district court did not have the benefit of our interpretation
                      of NRS 197.190 as being limited to physical conduct and fighting words, and
                      it therefore did not consider whether there was sufficient evidence that
                      Willson engaged in physical conduct or uttered fighting words so as to

                      support her conviction of violating NRS 197.190. Because Willson's as-
                      applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges to

                            8For this reason, Willson's "as-applied" claims necessarily fail.   See,
                      e.g., In re Mental Commitment of KE.K., 954 N.W.2d 366, 379 (Wis. 2021)
                      (rejecting a petitioner's claim that a statute was unconstitutional as applied
                      to them because "[t]he statute ha[d] no application, constitutional or
                      otherwise, against those" in the petitioner's position).
COURT OF APPEALS
         OF
      NEVADA
                                                            25
10) 194713    .40=>
                   the sufficiency of the evidence, and because Willson raised these claims in
                   the district court, we grant the petition and instruct the district court to
                   reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
                   whether sufficient evidence supported Willson's conviction under this
                   court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.9      See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New
                   River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600, 377 P.3d 97, 106 (2016) (upholding the
                   constitutionality of the challenged statute but granting the petition with

                   instructions for the district court to reconsider the petitioner's direct
                   appeal).
                                                  CONCLUSION
                               For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that NRS 197.190
                   only applies to physical conduct and fighting words that are specifically
                   intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer and, thus, the statute
                   is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied
                   to Willson. However, in light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190, Willson's
                   as-applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges

                   to the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the district court did not consider
                   whether there was sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction, we
                   grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
                   certiorari upholding NRS 197.190's constitutionality and instructing the
                   district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal for the sole purpose of

                         9Because a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is outside the scope of a
                   petition for a writ of certiorari filed pursuant to NRS 34.020(3), see NRS
                   34.020(3) (stating "the writ shall be granted . . . for the purpose of reviewing
                   the constitutionality or validity of [a] statute or ordinance"), we do not
                   address whether there is sufficient evidence to support Willson's conviction,
                   see Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600 n.14, 377 P.3d
                   97, 106 n.14 (2016).
COURT OF APPEALS
      OF
    NEVADA
                                                         26
                   addressing whether, under this court's interpretation of the statute,
                   sufficient evidence supported Willson's conviction.

                                                                               C.J.
                                                      G b ons

                                                                               J.
                                                      Bulla

                                                                               J.
                                                      Westbi-ook

COURT OF APPEALS
       OF
    NEVADA
                                                       27
   I947B