Court Opinion

ID: 9559014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:20:45.324245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:42.994327
License: Public Domain

FRANCHINI, Justice. (Special Concurrence and Dissent). {24} I CONCUR with the opinion that this matter is reviewable under Carrillo v. Rostro, 114 N.M. 607, 845 P.2d 130 (1992), because it concerns collateral determinations regarding governmental immunity under Section 37-l-23(A) and is reviewable by this Court by writ of error. {25} However, I DISSENT from the analysis and the result reached in the opinion for the following reasons: {26} I do not agree with the majority that Doctor Handmaker’s contracts were ambiguous. Dr. Handmaker had a written contract for the years 1993-199b, which ended on June 30, 1994 That written contract had no provision for renewal of the administrative position as head of UAP (University of Administrative Program). Further, the contract specified that the administrative services could be terminated during the contract with a possible salary reduction. The UNM Faculty Handbook contained nothing to the contrary. {27} The Doctor’s contract for 1994-1995 does not include the directorship of UAP. He was given notice of this on June 28, 1994. He was effectively terminated as UAP director on July 1, 1994, at which time he was an at will employee regarding the directorship. {28} Therefore, since there was no written contract on July 1, 1994, the Doctor cannot sue UNM for breach of contract because of Section 37-1-23(A), the Sovereign of Immunity Statute. UNM had the right, and in fact did not choose, to renew the Doctor’s contract for the directorship of UAP after June 30, 1994. The amended complaint does not bring the case under the jurisdiction of the District Court and therefore does not moot it. {29} The majority’s reliance on the case of Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, 121 N.M. 728, 918 P.2d 7 (1996) is misplaced. Garcia held that a written personal policy manual constituted an implied-in-fact term of employment contract and was not subject to immunity under Section 37-1-23-A. Here, there are no provisions in the Faculty Handbook, like those present in Garcia, that specify particular administrative duties or personnel policies which might support a written contract claim against UNM by Dr. Handmaker to continue as director of UAP. {30} In my opinion, this case is controlled by Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 176, 793 P.2d 855, 861 (1990), and Trujillo v. Gonzales, 106 N.M. 620, 621, 747 P.2d 915, 916 (1987). These cases both support the proposition that Section 37-1-23(A) supplies immunity from implied contracts and that the Doctor’s claim, in order to survive summary judgment, must be supported by explicit language appearing in the contract. No such explicit language is present here. Further, Dr. Handmaker cannot rely on representations by University officials concerning the contract. See id. {31} Claims against other people at UNM do not prevent us from issuing a writ of error. I believe this is the case even though there may be issues of fact to be determined as to those individuals. These issues were stated by the trial court as its reason for denying UNM a summary judgment. For the reasons I have stated, I believe this was error. {32} I would remand this case to the District Court with instructions to enter a Summary Judgment for UNM. {33} The majority holding otherwise, I respectfully dissent. MAES, J., concurs.