Court Opinion

ID: 9710205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:22.562131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.083251
License: Public Domain

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the second trial justice acted improperly in purporting to dismiss an information in the circumstances of this case which are clearly set forth in the majority opinion.
However, I respectfully disagree that the second trial justice had discretionary power to dismiss the information and that her decision to do so should be reviewed under the deferential abuse of disei-etion standard.
For the reasons set forth in State v. DiPrete, 710 A.2d 1266 (R.I.1998), I contend emphatically that Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, neither explicitly nor implicitly confers upon a justice of the Superior Court discretion to dismiss an information or indictment save under the most extraordinary and compelling circumstances. A majority of the Court held in DiPrete that a justice of the Superior Court exceeded his authority in dismissing twenty-two counts of an indictment because of delayed discovery. Id. at 1267. The Court issued this decision even though the justice had found as a fact that the delayed disclosure was deliberate. Id. at 1270. We pointed out that in no case save State v. Quintal, 479 A.2d 117 (R.I.1984), had this Court ever approved the dismissal of an indictment for a discovery violation. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1271-72. We also observed that in Quintal a justice of the Superior Court had entered a conditional sixty-day order specifying that if the state failed to comply with the court’s discovery command, the case would be automatically dismissed with prejudice. We emphasized that the state had agreed to the entry of this conditional order of dismissal. Id. at 1272-73. The exact language of the opinion in Quintal was as follows:
“A conditional sixty-day order was entered specifying that if the state failed to comply with the court’s command, the ease would automatically be dismissed with prejudice. This was agreed upon by defense counsel and the representative from the Office of the Attorney General, and the order was entered on November 30, 1982, setting January 24, 1983, as the deadline for compliance.” Quintal, 479 A.2d at 118.
Consequently, the first time that this Court had been squarely presented with the issue of the propriety of the dismissal of an *68indictment in the absence of a conditional order entered by consent was DiPrete. The majority confronted this question and answered it without equivocation by holding that in the absence of flagrant misconduct by the state resulting in incurable prejudice to the defendant, a Superior Court justice had no power to dismiss an indictment. Id. at 1276. To put it another way, the trial court’s discretion to dismiss can only be called into play when the circumstances present the two-prong requirement of flagrant misconduct and incurable prejudice. The existence or nonexistence of these predicate conditions cannot and should not be reviewed by an appellate court using a deferential abuse of discretion standard. This Court has never so held and from our research it appears that federal courts applying a similar rule of discovery have not so held.
It is true that a dissenting justice in DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1292, did cite the case of State v. Rawlinson, 526 A.2d 1278 (R.I.1987). This Court pointed out that the per curiam opinion in Rawlinson had no relevance to the issue of dismissal. An unpublished order of remand did not present the question of the propriety of dismissal in an adversarial context. DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1274 n. 3. Consequently, DiPrete is the sole prior opinion of this Court that squarely deals with the issue of dismissal of an indictment for a discovery violation. A minimal respect for the doctrine of stare decisis would require that this Court be guided by that opinion. The mere fact that the present majority of this Court did not either concur or participate in that opinion does not vitiate the doctrine of stare decisis. All members of this Court are bound by its prior decisions regardless of whether they were members of the Court who participated or even dissented in respect to prior opinions.
Probably the greatest judicial craftsman of the mid-twentieth century was Justice John Marshall Harlan of the Supreme Court of the United States. His respect for stare decisis is illustrated by the fact that after dissenting from such major opinions as Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2066, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 719 (1969) (making the ban on double jeopardy applicable to the states); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1643, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 740 (1966) (setting standards for in-custodial interrogation); and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1497, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 663 (1964) (making Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the states), he went on in later opinions to concur with the majority of the Court on the ground that the prior opinions from which he dissented had become the law of the land. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1196, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 478 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring) (following the mandate announced in Benton v. Maryland, which had overruled Justice Harlan’s majority opinion in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 78 S.Ct. 829, 2 L.Ed.2d 913 (1958)); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 744, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2085, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 680 (1969) (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, 110 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring). Although he dissented in the first instance, he recognized that the opinions of the majority in these cases were binding and should govern future decisions of the Court. He thus contributed to the stability and predictability that this doctrine provides. A tribunal that shifts its position every few months may satisfy the individual predilections of its members, but in the long run will diminish its credibility. An outstanding characteristic of Justice Harlan’s judicial career was that he no longer questioned the holding of the majority after an opinion had been rendered even though he saw fit to dissent. Justice Harlan’s example is worthy of emulation.
Another great judicial craftsman, Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., commented on stare decisis and judicial restraint in the following terms:
“Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the public and by the other branches of government rests in large part on the knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected judges free to write their policy views into law. Rather, the Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise the judicial power prescribed by the Constitu*69tion. An important aspect of this is the respect that the Court shows for its own previous opinions.” Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and, Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16.
Underlying our opinion in DiPrete was a rationale based upon enormously important policy considerations. The dismissal of an indictment or an information for a discovery violation is a drastic step. Both the majority and the dissent in this case would recognize that dismissal of an indictment or an information should take place only as a last resort to save a defendant from incurable prejudice brought about by egregious prosecutorial misconduct. Reviewing such an action by the deferential standard of abuse of discretion is inadequate. If this Court is to establish clear and definitive standards for the trial courts of our state, we must insist upon uniformity, particularly in respect to the vitally significant question of the propriety of the dismissal of a criminal indictment or information.
The Supreme Court of the United States in order to achieve uniformity in determining the correctness of holdings relating to probable cause and reasonable suspicion has determined that such findings should be reviewed de novo and not by the deferential standard of clear error. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996). The Court had previously held that the voluntariness of a confession should be reviewed de novo as a mixed question of law and fact and not by a clearly erroneous standard even in habeas corpus petitions. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111-12, 106 S.Ct. 445, 450-51, 88 L.Ed.2d 405, 411-12 (1985).
Certainly uniformity in enforcement of such a drastic remedy as dismissal of an indictment or information is equally essential as the establishment of standards for determining reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and voluntariness. It must be remembered that a practical definition of discretion without legalism is the right to be wrong without being reversed. I recognize that there are varying degrees of discretion as we set forth in Albertson v. Leca, 447 A.2d 383 (R.I.1982). In that case we noted that there are two broad categories of discretion. “The first category of discretion accords to judges freedom of choice unhampered by legal rules. For example, a decision to recess court or to grant a continuance in a case would not normally be reviewable by an appellate court. The second class of judicial discretion involves freedom of choice, but the choices are limited, bounded by law, and reviewable.” Id. at 387.
Nevertheless, even the second category which would include admission and exclusion of evidence on the ground of relevance gives considerable freedom of choice. I believe that this freedom of choice is inappropriate in the context of dismissal of an indictment. We cannot have such a question measured by the legendary length of the chancellor’s foot. See Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 403, 414, 36 Eng.Rep. 670, 674 (1818); 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence 16 (13th ed. 1886) (citing Selden’s Table Talk, title “Equity;” 3 Black. Comm. 432, note (y)). Consequently, the establishment of a predicate upon which dismissal of an indictment or information may be based should be reviewed as a mixed question of law and fact de novo by this Court and not under an abuse of discretion standard. It would be unconscionable as in the present case for one justice of the Superior Court to deny a motion to dismiss a criminal ease and another justice of the same court allowed to grant it unhampered save for deferential review based upon abuse of discretion. It is the function of this Court to set and maintain standards, not to foster the potential chaos of inconsistent determinations subject only to correction if an abuse of discretion may be found to have existed.
The majority suggests that the square holding in DiPrete was dictum. I am convinced that the definition of “obiter dictum” does not fit the determination of the majority in DiPrete that the trial justice had exceeded his authority in dismissing twenty-two counts of an indictment. This was a case of first impression in which the issue of the authority of a justice of the Superior Court to dismiss an indictment was presented in an adversarial context for the first time in this jurisdiction.
*70“Obiter dictum” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as
“[A]n observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion upon a cause *** or the solution of a question suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its determination ***.” Black’s Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed.1990).
In DiPrete the holding of the majority was clear and specific. A trial justice does not have the authority to dismiss an indictment in the absence of having made two predicate findings: (1) flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, (2) incurable prejudice. Whether the majority in this case agrees or disagrees with that holding, it would be hard to say that it was not essential to the judgment in DiPrete.
An analysis of the majority’s assertion respecting dictum would probably lead one to conclude that its real thrust would assert that the DiPrete majority could have reached the same result by another route. It is, of course, conceivable that the majority might have made the same determination under an abuse of discretion standard. This, however, is not a definition of obiter dictum. In fact, Justice Harlan in a dissenting opinion in Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 237, 79 S.Ct. 276, 282, 3 L.Ed.2d 260, 267 (1959), made a pertinent observation concerning a similar suggestion:
“The idea that the ground on which a court actually decides a case becomes dictum because the case might have been decided on another ground is novel doctrine to me.”
One of the more frequently cited illustrations of obiter dictum is that portion of the opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), in which he discussed extensively substantial issues in respect to the merits of a petition for mandamus prior to holding as a matter of law that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that the section of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 which purported to grant such jurisdiction was constitutionally invalid. The opinion of the majority of this Court in DiPrete certainly did not meet the definition of obiter dictum.
The majority, in a textbook example of obiter dictum, also suggests that it was significant that two members of the majority in DiPrete were retired justices, as though that fact somehow diminishes the precedential value of the opinion. I would point out that the two retired justices who participated in that case had a combined background of more than sixty years of judicial experience, both trial and appellate. Their familiarity with Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rhode Island cases which were enunciated subsequent to its adoption was comprehensive and lucid.14 A retired justice who is called into service has all the powers of an active judge. His or her status is' not dissimilar to the senior judges of the United States Courts of Appeals. The late Chief Justice Burger of the Supreme Court of the United States observed in a year-end report on the judiciary that, “[s]enior (semi-retired) federal judges, who literally “work for nothing,’ annually contribute the equivalent work of about 70 full-time, active judges. Without the work of the Senior Judges the federal judicial system would have foundered.” Warren E. Burger, 1985 Year-End Report on the Judiciary, 4.
I agree with the majority that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inexorable command, but it is an important element in buttressing the legitimacy of a court’s opinions. I also emphasize that the dismissal of an indictment or an information is so drastic a sanction that it should not be reviewed by the most deferential standard of abuse of discretion. The instant case demonstrates eloquently that two trial justices may come *71to opposite conclusions on the same set of facts. It would be wholly inappropriate in a somewhat closer case to determine that although this Court disagreed with the holding of one of the judges, it would be precluded from correcting the error because of inhibitions imposed by the standard of review. As stated earlier in this opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States now demands uniformity in determinations of probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and voluntariness of confession. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d at 920 (probable cause; reasonable suspicion); Miller’ v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 111-12, 106 S.Ct. at 450-51, 88 L.Ed.2d at 411-12 (voluntariness of confession). Uniformity is at least as important in setting the predicate standards for dismissal of an indictment or an information.
The dissenting justice in DiPrete clearly illustrated the standard of review which he applied.
“That was clearly his [the trial justice’s] discretionary judgment call to make, and while the majority may disagree with that choice of sanction, mere disagreement can not translate itself into a holding that the trial justice clearly abused his discretion. This Court should not second guess the trial justice on what is a discretionary judgment call simply because the majority might have made a different call. Unless this Court can say that the trial justice clearly abused his discretion, we should not disturb his action.” DiPrete, 710 A.2d at 1282.
I cannot subscribe to such a standard of review that would abdicate this Court’s appellate supervision of the dismissal of an indictment or an information. Only de novo review on the basis of the correctness of predicate findings will guarantee the essential element of uniformity in this area of paramount significance.
I agree with the majority that even under the deferential standard it applies, the second trial justice did abuse her discretion. However, I would have followed the teachings of DiPrete and determined that she exceeded her authority as a matter of law and that the circumstances of this ease did not trigger the exercise of discretion on her part to dismiss the information.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result reached by the majority though I depart from portions of their rationale.

. The majority suggests that both the retired justices and the Chief Justice had authored a number of opinions recognizing the abuse of discretion standard. See footnotes 11, 12, and 13 to the majority opinion. It should be noted that none of the opinions cited in these footnotes involve the dismissal of an indictment. I recognize that the abuse of discretion standard has been utilized in reviewing the granting or denial of a mistrial, the granting or denial of a new trial, and the determination of whether to impose the sanction of exclusion of evidence. I reiterate my position that the ultimate sanction of dismissal of an indictment or an information should be reviewed de novo.