Court Opinion

ID: 9742089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:32.953346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.475629
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the holding of the majority opinion that the testimony of Donna Eckstein regarding the speed of plaintiffs car at the time of the accident was properly admitted. I also agree with the majority opinion that the jury instruction in question was inapplicable and should not have been given in this case. I dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that the majority holds that the instructional error was harmless.
The decision to give a particular instruction to the jury is within the discretion of the trial court. Williams v Coleman, 194 Mich App 606, 623; 488 NW2d 464 (1992). If after reviewing the instructions as a whole we determine that the theories of the parties and the applicable law were adequately and fairly presented to the jury, we will conclude that reversal is not warranted. Id.; Wiegerink v Mitts & Merrill, 182 Mich App 546, 548; 452 NW2d 872 (1990).
The instruction in question in this case, SJI2d 10.08, instructs the jury that it is permitted to infer that a decedent exercised ordinary care be*118fore and during the event in question because the individual has died and cannot testify. In Johnson v White, 430 Mich 47, 58-61; 420 NW2d 87 (1988), our Supreme Court discussed the background of SJI2d 10.08, explaining that before the adoption of comparative negligence in this state, contributory negligence acted as a complete bar to a plaintiffs negligence claim. Under contributory negligence, a plaintiff was therefore required to demonstrate that the plaintiff had acted with due care. Id., 58. In a wrongful death case, and where there were no eyewitnesses, the plaintiff was given the presumption that the decedent had acted with ordinary care, enabling the plaintiff to establish this element of the prima facie case. In this way, a plaintiff was relieved of the burden of going forward to prove that the decedent had used due care until the defendant demonstrated the contrary. Id., 58.
It is unclear whether SJI2d 10.08 has any application to a defendant. There is some authority that where the plaintiff and the defendant are both deceased, both are entitled to this presumption, see, e.g., DAIIE v Powe, 348 Mich 548, 550-551; 83 NW2d 292 (1957), and the instruction itself appears to be drafted for application to either party. The instruction traditionally referred to a presumption given to a plaintiff with respect to the actions of the plaintiffs decedent, however, and decisions of this Court imply that the presumption is only applicable to a plaintiffs decedent. In Sells v Monroe Co, 158 Mich App 637, 649; 405 NW2d 387 (1987), this Court, discussing the applicability of SJI 10.08, stated that "[t]he effect of the presumption is to place upon a defendant the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent failed to exercise due care.” This Court similarly implied that the *119instruction applied only to a plaintiffs decedent in Duke v American Olean Tile Co, 155 Mich App 555, 567; 400 NW2d 677 (1986), by stating that "the court should have given SJI2d 10.08, which provides for a rebuttable presumption of due care as a result of the injured party’s death.” See also, e.g., Kovacs v Chesapeake & O R Co, 134 Mich App 514, 535; 351 NW2d 581 (1984), where SJI 10.08 was applicable to a plaintiffs decedent. The purpose of permitting such a presumption for a plaintiffs decedent is easily seen, whereas the defendant effectively has a "presumption” in that the plaintiff must carry the burden of proof. Logic therefore dictates that this instruction has no application to a defendant.
There is also authority limiting the use of this instruction to situations in which the deceased person died as a result of the incident that gives rise to the suit. In Potts v Shepard Marine Construction Co, 151 Mich App 19, 27; 391 NW2d 357 (1986), this Court stated that SJI2d 10.08 concerned "the presumption that a decedent exercised ordinary care during the incident leading to his death.” Once again, the practical purpose of such a rule can be seen, because the decedent would have had no opportunity to testify with regard to the facts of the incident leading to the decedent’s death.
Under either analysis, the reasons for giving the instruction do not exist in this case. The decedent in this case is not a plaintiffs decedent, but was instead in the position of defendant before his death. Similarly, unlike the deceased person in Potts, Mr. Eckstein did not die during the incident or as a result of the incident, but, instead, died from an unrelated incident before the trial but after giving his deposition. Given that Mr. Eckstein’s deposition testimony was read into the *120record at trial, the concerns here are not the same as those in a case where the decedent dies during or as a result of the incident giving rise to the suit. Moreover, even if the instruction were generally warranted in a case such as this, there was sufficient evidence raised in this case to rebut the presumption that the decedent was not negligent, precluding the instruction in this case. See Potts, supra, 27-28. Because the reasons behind the rule would not be served in this case, I agree with the majority opinion that SJI2d 10.08 had no application.
I dissent from the majority opinion, however, because I cannot say that the trial court’s error in giving a jury instruction that did not adequately and fairly reflect the applicable law was harmless. This was a close case in which the testimony related primarily to the speed and location of the vehicles at the time of the collision. The jury was incorrectly instructed that it was to presume that defendant exercised due care, and we must presume that the jury followed this instruction. It is probable that the erroneous instruction unfairly tipped the scales in favor of defendant, thereby affecting the verdict. I must therefore conclude that failure to reverse on the basis of the erroneous instruction would be inconsistent with substantial justice. See Jennings v Southwood, 198 Mich App 713, 717; 499 NW2d 460 (1993); Reisman v Regents of Wayne State Univ, 188 Mich App 526, 532, 537; 470 NW2d 678 (1991).
I would therefore reverse and remand. Because I would dispose of the case on this issue, I would not reach defendant’s issue on cross appeal regarding attorney fees.