Court Opinion

ID: 9648245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:11:21.323846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:57.847401
License: Public Domain

JOE SPURLOCK, II, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In its analysis, the majority overlooks the clear statement of the law governing lesser included offenses as stated by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
In determining whether evidence has been presented which raises the issue of a lesser included offense, the language in a few opinions of this Court has implied that a defendant’s testimony can “negate” such evidence ... or that we will consider only the testimony of a defendant in reaching that determination.... In light of the foregoing we find such an approach to be erroneous and expressly disapprove of same. We will continue to consider all the evidence presented at trial in order to determine whether an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given.
Id. at 147.
The “foregoing” the court referred to were the cases of Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) and Thompson v. State, 521 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). The basic rule is:
When evidence from any source raises a defensive issue or raises an issue that a lesser included offense may have been committed ... the issue must be submitted to the jury.
Moore, 574 S.W.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
In the case on appeal, McGahey did not raise alibi, or that he wasn’t there or that he was the wrong person accused. He admitted intercourse with complainant. *698However, he claimed it was consensual, and no force was used. This contested the issue of lack of consent, as well as the use of a deadly weapon to effect the assault. All of the cases cited by the majority do not support the result reached here.
Clearly under the facts set out in the opinion, the jury would have to find: 1) was the event consensual, or not; 2) was force used; 3) was “deadly force” used? Each of these three questions was raised by the evidence. If the jury concluded appellant was lying about the consensual aspect of his act, they might nevertheless have concluded "deadly force” was not used. No weapon was found, no cuts were made, and the complainant never said she saw a knife. In fact, the evidence in the cold print of the statement of facts is as consistent with appellant’s claims of consent as with the complainant’s. Only the fact that the jury could observe the demeanor and manner of the witnesses could cause a conclusion to be drawn.
To deprive appellant in this case of the opportunity to have the jury consider the lesser included offense of sexual assault, violates the rule announced in Lugo, and reaffirmed in the concurrence to Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The court held:
Thus if the evidence adduced at trial raises an issue that a lesser included offense may have been committed, the trial judge must include a proper instruction on the lesser included offense.
Lugo, 667 S.W.2d at 147. Judge Miller has also written:
Therefore, where the State has introduced evidence to support a charge on the primary offense, we look at all the evidence introduced to decide if a lesser included offense is raised. BUT, in looking at all the evidence to see if the “guilty only” test is met we must look at it in the context of the facts.
Godsey, 719 S.W.2d at 585 (concurrence) (emphasis in opinion).
In the case on appeal, there is evidence that if McGahey is guilty, he is only guilty of sexual assault. He testified he did not have, or use a weapon. He testified the act was consensual. The complainant’s testimony that he had a knife, was speculative only. She never saw one, nor said that he would cut, stab, or in any other way harm her with the same.
I would reverse for a new trial to permit the jury to determine if appellant was guilty of sexual assault. The harm here, is if the jury believed the assault occurred, but not the aggravated element, they had no choice but to convict of that, or else set appellant free of it all. It is not possible to determine if this is what they did.
The majority is, in my opinion, not correct in saying that the evidence does not support any inference that appellant is guilty only of sexual assault.
The cases relied upon by the majority are not appropriate to the case on appeal.
Bravo v. State is a murder case in which appellant wanted a charge of lesser included "voluntary manslaughter.” He did not testify, and the court concluded the evidence did not raise the issue. Bravo v. State, 627 S.W.2d 152, 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).
In Simpkins v. State and Thomas v. State, both were convictions for murder, in each of which the appellant wanted a lesser included offense not raised by the evidence. Each of these cases revolved around the use of a gun to effect some purpose, and the purpose, and the purposeful use alleged by the defendant therein, absolutely did not inferentially raise the missing element needed as proof for the lesser included offenses desired.
In Carter v. State, the Court concluded the appellant therein had not raised any evidence that the sexual assault was not aggravated because the appellate court concluded “1) the victim testified concerning the requisite fear [of death or serious bodily injury], and 2) her fear was reasonable under the facts of this case.” Carter v. State, 713 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref’d) (emphasis added).
In Carter, the question was not whether if guilty, he was only guilty of aggravated assault but whether or not the evidence *699was sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated sexual assault. The appellant argued that the evidence had raised the issue of sexual assault, and that he was entitled to the charge as well. However, his defense was not guilty because, he did not do it. This is the same as saying I know nothing of the offense.
In our case on appeal appellant says the event occurred when he was present but no force was used. This puts all elements of the assault and the aggravating elements into question.
The court in Carter noted:
Had there been some evidence that K.S. [complainant therein] was not really in fear of death or serious bodily injury, then the evidence would have been conflicting regarding the “fear” element and a charge on the lesser included offense would have been required.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
In Carter, the appellant did not testify and therefore couldn’t say the prosecutrix had no fear. Our case is much different. To restrict appellant herein to only the main charge, is to tell him, if you want a charge on “sexual assault” you must admit the offense, as that will be the only way the evidence of sexual assault “alone” may be raised. In the case on appeal, appellant said the event occurred, he was present, and no force was used. He clearly is entitled to the charge on the lesser offense. I do not consider appellant’s testimony that “no force,” deadly or otherwise, was used to negate his right to a charge on sexual assault.

I respectfully dissent.