Court Opinion

ID: 9424968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:19.987595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:54.313812
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring.
Although the Court rejects petitioner’s, speedy trial claim and affirms denial of his petition for habeas corpus, *537it is apparent that had Barker not so clearly acquiesced in the major delays involved in this case, the result would have been otherwise. From the Commonwealth’s point of view, it is fortunate that the case was set for early trial and that postponements took place only upon formal requests to which Barker had opportunity to object.
Because the Court broadly assays the factors going into constitutional judgments under the speedy trial provision, it is appropriate to emphasize that one of the major purposes of the provision is to guard against inordinate delay between public charge and trial, which,wholly aside from possible prejudice-to a defense on the merits, may “seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on.bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.” United States v. Manon, 404 U. S. 307, 320 (1971). These factors are more serious for some than for others, but they are inevitably present in every case- to some extent, for every defendant will either be incarcerated pending trial or on bail subject to substantial restrictions on his liberty. It is also, true that many defendants will believe that time is on their side and will prefer to suffer whatever disadvantages delay may entail. But, for those who desire an early trial, these personal factors should prevail if the only countervailing considerations offered by the State are those connected with crowded dockets and prosecutorial case loads. A defendant desiring a speedy trial, therefore, should have it within some reasonable time; and only special circumstances presenting a more pressing public need with respect to the case itself should suffice to justify delay. Only if such special considerations are in the case and if they outweigh the inevitable personal prejudice resulting from delay would *538it be necessary to consider whether there has been or would be prejudice to the defense at trial. “[T]he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused’s defense.” United States v. Marion, supra, at 320.
Of course, cases will differ among themselves as to the allowable time between charge and trial so as to. permit prosecution and. defense adequately to prepare their case. But unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill, criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided by the State’s criminal-justice system are limited and that each case must await its turn. As the Court points out, this approach also subverts the State’s own goals in seeking to enforce its criminal laws.