Court Opinion

ID: 9915520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 17:01:07.668931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:31.097814
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13625    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 01/05/2024    Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13625
                           ____________________

        MULTIMEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        GEOFFREY ANDERSON, et al.,
                                                                 Plaintiﬀs,
        versus
        CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01280-VMC
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13625

                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This case concerns two signs that Multimedia Technologies
        owns. One sign hangs on the side of a building owned by Peach
        Hospitality of Georgia, LLC; the second sits on top of the building.
        The City of Atlanta permitted both signs in 1993. But after a sign
        code change, state-court litigation, and some time passed, Atlanta
        demanded that Multimedia remove its signs. When Multimedia re-
        fused, Atlanta issued arrest citations to Multimedia’s president and
        Peach’s registered agent.
                Multimedia, its president, and Peach sued Atlanta, claiming
        that it sought to unconstitutionally apply the sign code to Multime-
        dia’s signs. Because Multimedia had lost the state-court litigation,
        the district court requested briefing on whether Rooker-Feldman, a
        doctrine precluding a party who lost in state court from trying to
        remedy that loss in federal district court, barred Multimedia’s
        claims.
               Convinced that Rooker-Feldman applied, the district court
        dismissed Multimedia, stayed the remaining claims in the lawsuit,
        and certified its order for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 54(b). On appeal, Multimedia and Atlanta urge us to decide
        whether the district court properly applied Rooker-Feldman. To do
        so, we must have jurisdiction under Rule 54(b). But jurisdiction un-
        der Rule 54(b) requires that a case present unique or unusual
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        22-13625               Opinion of the Court                        3

        circumstances. This case lacks those circumstances; we thus lack
        jurisdiction. We therefore dismiss this appeal.
                             I.     BACKGROUND
              Multimedia owns two signs that Atlanta permitted in 1993,
        under the 1982 sign code. Atlanta amended the code in 2015 but
        allowed nonconforming signs to stay up if they were lawfully
        erected under the 1982 sign code and properly maintained by their
        owner.
                A few years after Atlanta enacted the 2015 sign code, Multi-
        media sought permits to convert its signs to LED faces. Atlanta
        granted the conversion permits, but three parties appealed that de-
        cision to the Board of Zoning Adjustment. After the Board denied
        the appeal, two parties challenged the Board’s decision before the
        Superior Court of Fulton County. The superior court reversed the
        Board’s decision and set aside the conversion permits, determining
        that the signs were illegal under the 2015 sign code and were not
        legally nonconforming because the original permits were improp-
        erly issued.
               Almost a year after the superior court’s decision, Atlanta de-
        manded that Multimedia remove its signs. When Multimedia re-
        fused, Atlanta issued arrest citations to Multimedia’s president and
        Peach’s registered agent commanding them to appear in municipal
        court. Multimedia, its president, and Peach sued in federal district
        court, claiming that Atlanta violated the First, Fifth, and Four-
        teenth Amendments when it tried to enforce the 1982 sign code
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                         22-13625

        against Multimedia’s signs. After this action was filed, Atlanta
        agreed to stay the pending actions in municipal court.
              The parties completed discovery. Multimedia, its president,
        and Peach together moved for summary judgment.
                After the briefing on summary judgment was complete, the
        district court asked the parties for supplemental briefing on Rooker-
        Feldman, a doctrine that precludes “state-court losers” from “com-
        plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “inviting
        district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mo-
        bil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 1 After
        receiving briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to
        Atlanta and against Multimedia, determining that Rooker-Feldman
        barred Multimedia’s claims. In its order, the district court left un-
        addressed whether Multimedia’s president and Peach were entitled
        to summary judgment. The court instead stayed the case as to the
        two other plaintiffs and certified a Rule 54(b) appeal.
                                    II.      DISCUSSION
               “We have a threshold obligation to” address any jurisdic-
        tional questions before discussing an appeal’s merits. Peden v. Ste-
        phens, 50 F.4th 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
        omitted). That obligation remains even though Multimedia and At-
        lanta each urge appellate review. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville

        1 Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine derived from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v.

        Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.
        Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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        22-13625                Opinion of the Court                           5

        Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997). The jurisdictional
        question before us is whether the district court properly certified
        its order under Rule 54(b). See id. (“Rule 54(b) certifica-
        tion[s] . . . implicate the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.”). Be-
        cause we conclude that the district court improperly certified this
        appeal under Rule 54(b), we lack appellate jurisdiction.
               We ordinarily have jurisdiction to review only “decisions of
        the district courts” that are “final.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A final decision
        exists when “the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action
        have been adjudicated.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 165.
                But Rule 54(b) provides “a limited exception” that permits
        us to “entertain an appeal of an order that does not dispose of all
        claims against all parties if the district court properly certifies such
        an order as ‘final.’” Scott v. Advanced Pharm. Consultants, Inc.,
        84 F.4th 952, 959 (11th Cir. 2023). Rule 54(b) “codif[ied] the historic
        practice of prohibiting piecemeal disposition of litigation and per-
        mitting appeals only from” final decisions of the district court, “ex-
        cept in the infrequent harsh case in which the district court
        properly makes the determinations contemplated by the rule.” In
        re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1547 (11th Cir. 1995) (alteration
        adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
               To properly make the determinations Rule 54(b) contem-
        plates, district courts must follow a two-step analysis: the district
        court first determines whether the order is a “final judgment” and
        then decides whether there is “no just reason for delay.” Lloyd
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        6                           Opinion of the Court                 22-13625

        Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
        Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                The district court’s order satisfies the first step. We review
        de novo whether the district court’s order constitutes a final judg-
        ment. Id. at 778 & n.5. During that review, we must “decide
        whether the district court completely disposed of one or more
        claims.” In re Se. Banking Corp., 69 F.3d at 1546. Because the district
        court’s order “dismisse[d] a party entirely,” id. at 1547, it qualifies
        as a final judgment under Rule 54(b).
                At the second step, we are unconvinced that there is no just
        reason to delay this appeal. We usually review the second step for
        an abuse of discretion. Lloyd Noland Found., 483 F.3d at 778 n.5.
        “Deference to the district court’s determination, however, depends
        upon our ability to discern the reasoning that motivated the
        Rule 54(b) certification.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166. The district
        court here never explained itself. Although it concluded that “there
        is no just reason for delay for the reasons given above,” Doc. 48 at
        23, 2 the reasons it gave above did not implicate sound judicial ad-
        ministration and efficiency, the cornerstones of Rule 54(b)’s analy-
        sis, see Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167. We therefore analyze de novo
        whether there is any just reason to delay this appeal.
               We have stressed that the no-just-reason-to-delay require-
        ment contemplates special circumstances beyond the delay inher-
        ent in ordinary appeals. That is because “[t]he federal concept of

        2 “Doc.” refers to the district court’s docket entries.
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        22-13625                Opinion of the Court                          7

        sound judicial administration and efficiency will not normally be
        furthered by having piecemeal appeals,” which “require two (or
        more) three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given
        case.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Judicial administration and efficiency instead favor “having the trial
        judge, who sits alone and is intimately familiar with the whole case,
        revisit a portion of the case if he or she has erred in part and that
        portion is overturned following the adjudication of the whole
        case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[a]bsent
        special circumstances,” pretrial appellate review should be denied.
        Id. at 168.
                We noted some special circumstances in Doe #1 v. Red Roof
        Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714 (11th Cir. 2021). There, multiple sex traffick-
        ing victims sued several individuals and hotels, alleging violations
        of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act and
        Georgia state law. Id. at 721. The district court dismissed the com-
        plaints against three hotels, concluding that they failed to state
        claims. Id. It also certified its orders under Rule 54(b) and “stayed
        discovery pending the anticipated appeals.” Id. Each of the four
        Does appealed, and we consolidated the four appeals.
               We then determined that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion when it certified its orders under Rule 54(b). We con-
        cluded that the certification was proper for four reasons. First, ad-
        dressing the appeal enhanced the litigation’s efficiency because the
        four consolidated cases were related. Id. at 723. Second, the litiga-
        tion remained in early stages, with all four cases at the motion-to-
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                        22-13625

        dismiss stage. Id. Third, the litigation involved multiple defendants.
        Id. And fourth, the parties had yet to engage in discovery. Id.
               “Those special circumstances are absent here.” Peden,
        50 F.4th at 979. There are no consolidated appeals. The litigation is
        no longer in its early stages, having progressed all the way to the
        summary judgment stage. This litigation involves only one defend-
        ant. And the parties have already finished discovery.
               Of course, the exact special circumstances found in Red Roof
        Inns are unnecessary for Rule 54(b) jurisdiction. Multimedia and
        Atlanta argue that their case involves special circumstances for
        three reasons. But we find their arguments unconvincing.
               First, Multimedia argues that permitting the appeal will fur-
        ther judicial economy because the district court stayed the other
        plaintiffs’ claims. But our past cases have given no weight to stays
        when considering whether special circumstances existed to justify
        Rule 54(b) certification. In Red Roof Inns, for example, we noted that
        the district court stayed discovery pending the appeal but never
        mentioned it as a reason to support jurisdiction. 21 F.4th at 721.
                 That makes sense. District courts “possess[] inherent pow-
        ers . . . to manage their own affairs.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40,
        45 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 They therefore have

        3 A district court’s power to manage its own docket allows it to avoid issuing

        piecemeal orders, which can lead to piecemeal appeals. For example, the dis-
        trict court may resolve all pending motions in omnibus orders. Or it may re-
        solve legal issues that affect only a single party or claim posttrial, rather than
        pretrial.
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        22-13625               Opinion of the Court                          9

        discretion to stay proceedings whenever they certify Rule 54(b) ap-
        peals. If staying proceedings “alone justified an immediate appeal,
        Rule 54(b) certifications would cease to be reserved for the unusual
        case.” Peden, 50 F.4th at 979 (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Rule 54(b) is a narrow exception to our general prohibition against
        piecemeal appeals. In this case, we decline to broaden that narrow
        exception by giving weight to whether the district court stayed the
        underlying proceedings.
                Second, Multimedia argues that permitting the appeal will
        not cause piecemeal appeals or require us to relearn facts because
        we will need to hear the Rooker-Feldman issue only once. That is
        true. But the “relevant equitable concerns” go beyond avoiding
        piecemeal appeals and include “limit[ing] Rule 54(b) certification to
        instances in which immediate appeal would alleviate some danger
        of hardship or injustice associated with delay.” Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d
        at 166. No danger of hardship or injustice exists here because the
        arrest citations “have been stayed[] pending the outcome of” this
        litigation. Doc. 6 ¶ 37.
               And third, Multimedia and Atlanta argue that judicial econ-
        omy will suffer if we delay this appeal, noting that the district court
        will need to duplicate its efforts if the case proceeds without Multi-
        media, only for us to reverse its dismissal on direct appeal. But the
        possibility of reversal pervades every case and provides no special
        circumstance for Rule 54(b) certification. See Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at
        167. Atlanta, which failed to respond to our jurisdictional question,
        stated at oral argument that judicial economy will suffer if the
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13625

        district court ends up conducting two nearly identical trials. This
        case, however, is before us on a summary judgment motion. It is
        by no means clear that this case will involve one trial, let alone two.
               Put simply, “there is no indication that the delays here
        would cause anything other than inconvenience.” Peden, 50 F.4th
        at 979. We have cautioned against Rule 54(b)’s “liberal construc-
        tion,” stressing that it should be “reserved for the unusual case.”
        Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 166–67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
        This is not the unusual case.
                                 III.   CONCLUSION
                For the reasons given above, we dismiss this appeal for lack
        of jurisdiction.
               DISMISSED.