Court Opinion

ID: 9518098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:43:29.226351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:23.100808
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MARA FROSSARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent because the violation of due process in the factual context of the instant case is harmless error. As noted by the majority, “[T]he United States Supreme Court [has] stated that the interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected under the fourteenth amendment.” In re K.C., 323 Ill. App. 3d at 849, quoting In re B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d 803, 806 (1993), and citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391-92 (1982); see 371 Ill. App. 3d at 98. Procedural due process constrains government action that deprives individuals of fundamental liberty and property interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 31, 96 S. Ct. 893, 901 (1976). In the instant case, the State was required to provide Delores W with fair process before terminating her parental rights and depriving her of that fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. For the reasons articulated by the majority, the State failed to do so and violated Delores W’s due process rights. However, in the instant case, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that Delores W. was unfit and that it was in the best interest of Mark W. for the trial court to terminate Delores W.’s parental rights to Mark W. An error may be harmless if overwhelming evidence supports the order of the trial court. In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 674, 680 (2002); People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 326 (1992) (“Even assuming that the trial court on remand would find an illegal seizure and suppress defendant’s confession, we find that the other evidence of defendant’s guilt introduced at trial is so overwhelming as to make the introduction of defendant’s confession harmless error”). With respect to Amy B., the record overwhelmingly supported the disposition by the trial court in the instant case. It should be noted that in the past year, based on a theory of anticipatory neglect as to Mark W, this same appellate court panel regarding a sibling of Mark W, namely, Paula W, affirmed an adjudication and disposition by the juvenile court. In re Paula W., No. 1 — 05—2674 (2006) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). As to Delores W and Amy B., the juvenile court found that Paula W, sibling of Mark W, was abused and neglected pursuant to sections 2 — 3(l)(b) and 2 — 3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 — 3(l)(b), (2)(ii) (West 1998)), in that Paula W. was exposed to an injurious environment and a substantial risk of physical injury. Amy B. appealed that adjudication. We affirmed that adjudication. Paula W, slip op. at 15. The juvenile court entered a disposition order adjudicating Paula W. a ward of the court. Amy B. appealed that adjudication. We affirmed that disposition order. Paula W., slip op. at 15. The juvenile court found Paula W. was neglected because her environment was injurious to her welfare, that she was abused because she was at substantial risk of physical injury, and that she was dependent because she was without parent due to her mother, Delores W.’s mental disability and due to her grandmother, Amy B.’s refusal to help the situation. In affirming the juvenile court we relied on the theory of anticipatory neglect recognizing that children have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside with an individual who has been found to have neglected or abused another child. In re K.T., 361 Ill. App. 3d 187, 205 (2005), citing In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 468 (2004). Paula W., slip op. at 10. In our order as to Paula W, the other child subject to abuse or neglect whom we discussed in addressing the issue of anticipatory neglect was Mark W, the minor-respondent in the instant case. In that order we detailed the evidence of abuse and neglect of Mark W. including evidence that Mark W. was removed from Delores W. after she tried to stuff toys down his throat and hit him over the head with a hammer. Paula W., slip op. at 11. We noted that Mark W. was removed from Delores W.’s care and placed in Amy B.’s care and, shortly thereafter, “while in the care of Amy B., cuts, welts, and bruises, including a burn on his stomach and foot, were found on Mark W.’s extremities.” Paula W., slip op. at 11. We noted the juvenile court’s finding that Delores W. and Amy B. were both unable and unwilling to protect the child. Paula W., slip op. at 11. In relying on the theory of anticipatory neglect based on the circumstances surrounding Mark W.’s abuse and neglect, we concluded: “The circumstances have not changed. The evidence establishes that Paula W was at a probable and substantial risk of harm as a result of neglect because she lacked care, was exposed to an injurious environment, and was at a substantial risk of injury.” Paula W., slip op. at 12. Accordingly, we affirmed the juvenile court’s order adjudicating Paula W. a ward of the court. Paula W., slip op. at 15. The circumstances regarding Mark W that we relied on in applying the principle of anticipatory neglect to Paula W.’s case have not changed. In the instant case, the record reflects that Mark W. was neglected due to exposure to an injurious environment and was abused due to exposure to a substantial risk of physical injury. Delores W. has an extensive psychiatric history of mental illness and depression. She is mentally retarded and developmentally delayed. She suffers from panic disorder, acute psychosis, anxiety and depression. The record reflects Amy B., the legal guardian of Delores W, failed to ensure that Delores W. was supervised at all times, resulting in Delores W. hitting Mark W. and putting plastic toys in Mark W’s mouth. As reflected by the service plans contained in the record, there was very little progress made by either Delores W or Amy B. As of February 2005, the only service that Delores W. and Amy B. had completed was in-home parenting classes. Amy B. did not wish to participate in reunification services because she did not believe she needed to engage in such services. The record reflects Mark W. has been placed in a stable, loving foster home since he was two years old and he will be nine years old on July 1, 2007. Since residing in the foster home Mark W.’s developmental delays have improved so much that he no longer requires therapy. He has bonded to his foster parent, her extended family, and her friends. A close review of the record reflects the evidence overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s termination order. For the reasons previously discussed, the error in the instant case was harmless. I respectfully dissent.