Court Opinion

ID: 9918449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 23:02:21.934027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.181657
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/12/24 P. v. Reyes CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084152
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. F21902147)
                    v.

 STEVEN JOSEPH REYES,                                                                     OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Alvin M.
Harrell III, Judge.
         Scott Concklin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill, and
Catherine Tennant Nieto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                      INTRODUCTION
       Almost 50 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation
of due process and fundamental fairness to use a defendant’s postarrest silence following
Miranda1 warnings to impeach a defendant’s trial testimony. (Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426
U.S. 610, 617–618 (Doyle); see Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615, fn.
omitted (Griffin) [“[T]he Fifth Amendment … forbids either comment by the prosecution
on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt.”].) Defendant Steven Joseph Reyes was interrogated post-Miranda warnings and
remained mostly silent when confronted by law enforcement with the victim, A.P.’s2
sexual assault allegations. During the trial, an audio recording of the interrogation was
played for the jury; the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 357 (Adoptive
Admissions); and the prosecutor told the jury, during both her closing and rebuttal
arguments, defendant had the opportunity to deny the allegations made against him, but
“[h]e chose not to say anything at all.”
       After the jury was instructed and told it could consider defendant’s post-Miranda
silence as an adoptive admission of guilt, it convicted him of two counts of sexual
intercourse or sodomy with A.P., a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7,
subd. (a), counts 1 & 2),3 and two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with
A.P., a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b), counts 3 & 4). Subsequently,
defendant was sentenced to two indeterminate terms of 50 years to life, and two
indeterminate terms of 30 years to life, for a total aggregate sentence of 160 years to life.
       On appeal, defendant raises numerous errors associated with his interrogation.
Defendant contends: (1) “[i]t was error to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 357

1      Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
2     Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90, we refer to some persons by their first
names or initials. No disrespect is intended.
3      All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                                2.
because [his] silence cannot be reasonably characterized as an adoptive admission, but
was instead an exercise of his Miranda rights”; (2) “[i]t was also improper for the [trial]
court to inform the jury that [his] conversation with [the d]etective supported the adoptive
admission instruction”; and (3) “[i]t was misconduct for the prosecutor to comment on
[his] post-arrest, post-Miranda silence and to argue, over objection, that such silence
served as an adoptive admission of guilt .…”
       We conclude both the trial court and the prosecutor erred in violation of Doyle and
Griffin, and we further find defendant was prejudiced by the trial court instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 357, along with the prosecutor’s subsequent references to his
silence during her closing and rebuttal arguments. We therefore reverse the judgment.4
                                   STATEMENT OF CASE
       On May 10, 2021, the Fresno County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with A.P., a child 10
years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a), counts 1 & 2), and two counts of oral
copulation or sexual penetration with A.P., a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7,
subd. (b), counts 3 & 4). As to all offenses, the information further alleged a prior strike
offense for robbery (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d), 211). On
September 7, 2021, a jury found defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant admitted the
prior strike offense for robbery.
       On February 9, 2022, trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial. Specifically, trial
counsel argued “[t]he court erroneously provided the jury with [CALCRIM No.] 357, the
adoptive admission instruction, in violation of [defendant’s] right to remain silent under
custodial questioning by law enforcement, after finding that part of defendant’s interview
by law enforcement officials was done without first being advised of his Miranda

4       Defendant raises other claims as set forth in part II. of the Discussion, but we do not
reach the merits of those claims.

                                                 3.
Rights.” On March 4, 2022, after hearing argument from both trial counsel and the
prosecutor, the trial court denied the motion finding “insufficient evidence to grant the
Motion for a New Trial .…” The trial court then set the matter for sentencing.
       Subsequently, as to count 1, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
term of 25 years to life, doubled to 50 years to life because of the strike prior. As to
count 2, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life,
doubled to 50 years to life because of the strike prior, to run consecutive to count 1. As
to count 3, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life,
doubled to 30 years to life because of the strike prior, to run consecutive to count 1. As
to count 4, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life,
doubled to 30 years to life because of the strike prior, to run consecutive to count 1. The
total aggregate sentence imposed was 160 years to life.
                                 SUMMARY OF FACTS
I.     The Prosecution Case-in-chief
       In 2017, A.P.’s mother (Amy) moved with her two children A.P. and O.P. to a
house in Reedley—the same city where her mother (Carmen) and Carmen’s husband
(David) lived. Both A.P. and O.P. were born with disabilities and Carmen assisted in
taking care of them.
       In December 2017, defendant was released from custody and began living with
Amy, A.P., and O.P. Defendant and Amy continued their ongoing sexual relationship.
Carmen liked defendant and testified he “was good with [A.P.] … [a]nd [A.P.] …
enjoyed his company.”
       A.     Carmen’s Testimony
       At the end of A.P.’s third grade year, Amy told Carmen A.P. “was using her hands
to stimulate herself … [¶]… [¶] [and] would go into a little closet in their house and take
care of business.” During this time, defendant was staying at the house off and on, but
“was down with them … once or twice a week at least during the summer .…”

                                              4.
       Subsequently, during the summer before A.P.’s fourth grade year, A.P. “would
come over [to Carmen’s house] a lot of weekends and spend the night and she would—
when it was time to go, she would just cry and beg [Carmen] not to make her go back.”
During A.P.’s fourth grade year, when she was nine years old, A.P.’s teacher told Carmen
“[A.P.] was humping the floor.” Carmen observed this behavior at her home.
Specifically, Carmen testified:

               “[A.P.] would go back into the [play]room and close the door, and
       when I would go check on her, she would be laying face down, her hands
       between her legs and she—this is where the grunting was coming in, so it
       all started to, you know, make some sense. And I would ask her why she
       was doing that, of course, she didn’t know what to say and she didn’t know.
       And I asked her, you know, how she learned to do that. You know, she
       didn’t know.”
       On December 6, 2019, A.P. disclosed to school psychologist, Patty Mendoza, that
she had been sexually abused. Carmen then picked up A.P. and O.P. from school and
drove them to the police station for an interview. At the police station, Detective
Vasquez interviewed A.P. while Carmen was present in the interview room. During the
interview, A.P. told Detective Vasquez, “So, [defendant] did touch me.” Specifically,
she said defendant touched her two times and that she was scared defendant would have
to go back to jail.
       Days later, Carmen discovered A.P. was “taking pictures of herself naked in
interesting positions” and also found a video of A.P. that she described as looking like
porn. She also “started finding poop places in the house, primarily her bedroom[] [a]nd it
got so bad she actually shared with her therapist that she would put her finger up her butt,
and scoop out poop, and her desire was to flick it and put it all over the walls .…” A.P.
also made herself throw up all over the carpet and would shove her finger up her nose,
causing her nose to bleed, and then blow snot out the other side of her nose.
       Finally, Carmen testified she did not tell A.P. or O.P. what to say during their
statements or testimony, but rather only to “just be truthful and just tell [their] story.”

                                               5.
       B.     A.P.’s Testimony
       A.P. was born in 2010 and was 11 years old at the time of the trial. She testified
via one-way closed circuit television. She promised to tell the truth, but did tell the trial
court she was “[s]cared and nervous.” A.P. testified she was eight years old and in the
third grade when defendant moved into the house. Defendant “ha[d] a bunch of tattoos
everywhere on him” and he “slept with [her] mom,” Amy. A.P. testified that when
defendant initially moved into the house “[h]e was nice, really nice. He always [took her
and O.P.] to stores and g[ot] [them] candy.”
       One day, A.P. walked into Amy and defendant’s bedroom to cuddle with Amy.
“When [A.P.] walked in, [she] didn’t know [Amy and defendant] were doing sex, and
[she] didn’t know that.” Amy got mad at A.P. A.P. then got into the bed and Amy “took
her underwear off and her leg was up, and … [defendant] grabbed [A.P.’s] hand and
made [her] put it in [Amy’s] butt, and [she] smelled [her] hand. It was weird, and …
[she] didn’t like it.” A.P. tried to leave, but defendant said, “‘Stay,’ and [she] was like,
‘Oh,’ and [she] had to say, ‘Fine,’ but—and then [she] wanted to go out again and then he
still wouldn’t let [her] go out.” Subsequently, defendant “told [her] to get on top of him.”
She had to touch his “[p]enis.” She described defendant’s penis as “hairy.”5 Defendant
then grabbed A.P.’s hand “and he told [her] to cup it, and [she] smelled [her] hand, and it
… [¶] … [¶] … smelled gross.”
       A.P. then testified that defendant “laid down … and he … he wanted [her] to take
[her] underwear off and [her] pants. [Her] butt wasn’t clean, and he started licking it
[her] butt and [her] vagina.” She described it as feeling “like a dog licking [her].” A.P.
then went to the bathroom and “when [she] was going to the bathroom, [defendant] told
[her] to leave the door open[] [when she] was going pee, and he took a video of [her]
going pee.”

5      She also described defendant’s penis as “look[ing] red, like—like—like [her] brother’s.”

                                               6.
       In a separate incident,6 when A.P. was either eight or nine years old, defendant
made her kiss him on the lips while she was in the bathroom. She described the kiss as
“just wet.” A.P. also testified that while she was in the bathroom, defendant “put his
penis inside [her],” but did acknowledge she was not sure he “put it inside [her]” because
“[i]t would hurt if it was in [her].” She testified she “was wearing some short—skirts.”
       During cross-examination, A.P. described an incident where defendant put his
fingers up her vagina and “butthole.” Specifically, she testified the incident occurred
inside Amy and defendant’s bedroom during the day. Defendant was “wearing pants,”
while A.P. “was wearing a t-shirt and shorts.” He was lying down and he used one hand
and “put his fingers inside [A.P.’s] butthole, and it started hurting.” She testified he “put
his fingers kind of in deep, not all the way deep but a little deep” and A.P. described it as
“[w]eird and hurt.” During this incident, defendant told A.P. “to keep it a secret.” As to
all these incidents, A.P. testified she did not practice her testimony with Carmen before
going to court.
       A.P. further testified she knew about porn and stated “[p]orn is sex.” Defendant
made her watch porn on his phone and described one video where “there’s two girls that
are licking a boy’s penis.” She watched porn with defendant multiple times. Defendant
also told A.P. “he would be [her] boyfriend and marry [her]” and to “keep this a secret.”
After testifying, A.P. was physically brought into the courtroom and identified defendant
as the individual she described during her testimony.
       C.      O.P.’s Testimony
       O.P. was 12 years old at the time of trial. O.P. testified he lived with his mother
(Amy) and defendant7 for approximately three years before moving in with Carmen on

6      A.P. testified she believed these incidents “happened on different days.”
7      O.P. was unable to identify defendant in court, but referenced defendant by his first name
throughout his testimony.

                                               7.
December 4, 2019. He recalled times when A.P. would go into the bedroom while
defendant and Amy were inside the room. He testified “the door was locked” and that
she had to go into the room because “[defendant] said so.” At one point, O.P. observed
both Amy and defendant lying on the bed naked. He observed defendant’s penis. Later
on, A.P. told O.P. that defendant “F-U-C-K-E-D” her.
       D.       The Multi-disciplinary Interview Center (MDIC) Interview8
       On January 2, 2020, Caroline Dower-Serrano, a forensic interview specialist,
interviewed A.P. A.P. told Dower-Serrano she was nine years old and in the fourth
grade. A.P. promised to tell the truth and if she did not understand a question, she agreed
to respond, “I don’t know .…” She also indicated she “was really nervous to talk about
[defendant].”
                1.    First Incident
       During the first incident, when A.P. was nine years old, she knocked on Amy and
defendant’s bedroom door and they said, “‘[G]et away.’” She insisted and “they said[,]
‘okay, come in[]’ and then they started doing sex … in the … in the room.” Amy and
defendant were also watching porn, but A.P. hid because she “didn’t want to see it.”
Subsequently Amy and defendant started having sex, and A.P. observed Amy “biting his
penis.”9 Amy then went to sleep. Defendant then “told [A.P.] to lick it and then he told
[her] to do like what [her] momma was doing.” She started “biting [defendant’s] penis,”
which she described as “wet.” A.P. said it “hurt[] [her] tooth.” Eventually, Amy woke
up and saw A.P. oral copulating defendant. Amy “got really mad and threw [A.P.] out of
the room.” A.P. “got so angry that [she] threw glass.”

8    During the interview, A.P. told Dower-Serrano about three separate incidents of abuse.
However, A.P. went back and forth in describing the three incidents.
9      The People introduced the video recording of the MDIC interview as People’s exhibit
No. 2. To describe the act of biting a penis, A.P. made an oral copulation motion with her head.

                                               8.
              2.     Second Incident
       During the second incident, A.P. was in bed with both defendant and Amy, when
Amy got up to get coffee for herself and defendant. Defendant then “told [A.P.] to get on
him and [she] said[,] ‘[U]h fine.’ And then he told [her] … he told [her] to kiss him, and
[she] didn’t want to .…” He then “put his whole fingers inside [A.P.’s] private, like
inside the middle and then in the butthole.” A.P. got up and went to the bathroom, and
defendant walked in, closed the door, and started kissing her. He then “put his penis …
inside [her].” He “was rubbing [her] legs and then his hand … [his] whole fingers in
[her] butthole and then [her] vagina.” She said “[i]t really hurt[].” Defendant then
“licked [her] private and then he told [her] to … bite his penis but [she] didn’t want to.”
A.P. started bleeding. Amy found out about A.P.’s injuries and took her to the hospital.
              3.     Third Incident
       Further, A.P. described a third incident of abuse. She told Caroline she “was in
third grade … and [she] was nine and then when [defendant] … came home from Prison
he was touching [her] a lot and then he told [her] to kiss him and then touch his penis and
[she] didn’t want to.” He also placed his fingers inside her vagina and “butthole.”
       E.     Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Evidence
       Cynthia Reyes worked as “a clinician with Uplift Family Services.” She worked
with A.P. as her therapist since late December 2020. She testified regarding PTSD.
Specifically, she testified that PTSD occurs when “[a]fter a traumatic incident that a
person has either witnessed or directly experienced, they’re left with … traumatic
symptoms or behaviors .…” She further testified that A.P. exhibited symptoms and
behaviors consistent with PTSD.
       F.     Child Sexual Assault Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) Evidence
       Psychologist Anna Washington provided a description regarding CSAAS
evidence. Specifically, Washington explained CSAAS as follows:

                                             9.
       “So there are five different components to CSAAS, and they are secrecy,
       helplessness, entrapment and accommodation, delayed, unconvincing and
       conflicting disclosures and retraction or recantation, and these five
       components, again, describe common behaviors that we might see in
       children who have been sexually abused, and they’re also describing things
       that people often have misconceptions about, and we know it’s not really a
       cookie cutter type of a format, so some of these factors can apply to some
       of the children, but all of them don’t have to apply to every victim of child
       sexual abuse, and so there’s some variability in how children may respond
       to sexual abuse.”
She continued to explain that CSAAS “is not meant to be a diagnostic tool or a means of
determining whether or not sexual abuse has occurred,” but rather it “helps explain
behaviors of children who have been sexually abused.”
II.    The Defense Case-in-chief
       A.     Defendant’s Testimony
       Defendant took the stand and testified in his defense. He was 47 years old at the
time of trial and has five biological children. Defendant testified he lived in Squaw
Valley up until the time of his arrest. He would drive to Amy’s house once a month to
visit his daughter, granddaughter, and dogs, except when his car was inoperable from
July to November 2019.
       Defendant further testified he had no romantic or sexual relationship with Amy.
However, he admitted to sleeping in the same bed with Amy, but stated he never had sex
with her, nor was he ever naked with her. Finally, he testified all the allegations made
against him were false.
       B.     District Attorney Investigator Lorena Jimenez’s Testimony
       On April 23, 2021, Fresno County District Attorney Investigator Lorena Jimenez
interviewed Carmen by telephone. Carmen told Jimenez that she had asked A.P. in the
car, “‘So tell me, if they ask you what happened, can you tell me what you might say?’”
Further, Carmen told Jimenez about a time when Detective Vasquez had come over to
her house to view videos of A.P. on a tablet. Carmen then emailed the videos to Vasquez

                                            10.
and deleted them off the tablet. Lastly, on July 30, 2021, Jimenez interviewed O.P., and
O.P. told her that A.P. had said defendant “fucked” her. However, O.P. told Jimenez that
Carmen had told him to say that.
       C.     Character Witnesses
       Daniel P. testified he had employed defendant for five years and described him as
“completely trustworthy, [a] great employee.” He further testified he never observed
defendant act inappropriately towards his grandchildren and “there’s no way in [his]
mind that he would be part of anything like this.”
       Further, both defendant’s brother, Paul R., and Paul R.’s wife (Monica R.) testified
they never had concern with having defendant around their children. Monica also
testified she did not believe defendant and Amy were romantically involved.
       D.     Medical Evidence
       On December 23, 2019, Nurse Practitioner Janie Salazar examined A.P. as a
possible “victim of sexual abuse.” She testified her vaginal and anal examinations were
normal. However, she also testified its more likely to find evidence of sexual assault if
the child is examined within 24 hours of the assault, and that 95 percent of the time no
physical findings are found.
III.   The Prosecution Rebuttal
       On January 15, 2020, defendant was arrested following a vehicle stop. The People
played a recording of this exchange for the jury. During the exchange, Detective
Vasquez asked defendant, “Are you at all sorry for doing what you did to [A.P.]? Huh?”;
defendant said nothing.

                                            11.
                                        DISCUSSION

I.     Both the Trial Court and the Prosecutor Committed Doyle/Griffin Error by
       Instructing the Jury It Could Rely on Defendant’s Post-Miranda Silence as
       Substantive Evidence of Guilt
       Defendant contends: (1) “[i]t was error to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 357 because [his] silence cannot be reasonably characterized as an adoptive
admission, but was instead an exercise of his Miranda rights”; (2) “[i]t was also improper
for the [trial] court to inform the jury that [his] conversation with Detective Vasquez
supported the adoptive admission instruction”; and (3) “[i]t was misconduct for the
prosecutor to comment on [his] post-arrest, post-Miranda silence and to argue, over
objection, that such silence served as an adoptive admission of guilt .…”10
       The People contend that defendant “forfeited this [Doyle error] claim by failing to
object on that ground below.” However, the alleged Doyle error only became evident
once the prosecutor requested for the jury to be instructed with CALCRIM No. 357,
which allowed the jury to use defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt. This request
occurred after Detective Vasquez had testified. As we discuss in detail below,
defendant’s post-Miranda waiver statements were still admissible and, thus, it is
reasonable to presume trial counsel had no issue with defendant’s statements being
admitted into trial through Vasquez’s testimony. (See Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560
U.S. 370, 381 (Berghuis); see also Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459
(Davis).) With that being said, during the jury instruction conference, and immediately
after the prosecutor requested the adoptive admission instruction, trial counsel objected to

10      Defendant further contends “[i]t was also error/abuse of discretion for the court to
prevent [him] from explaining the reasons for his silence when he testified.” Because we
conclude both the trial court and the prosecutor committed prejudicial error when it instructed
the jury with CALCRIM No. 357, and informed the jury it could use defendant’s silence as
evidence of guilt, we do not address this additional claim.

                                               12.
the jury being instructed with CALCRIM No. 357. Accordingly, defendant has preserved
the issue on appeal and, thus, we address the merits of his claim.
       A.     Additional Factual Background
       On January 15, 2020, Detective Vasquez arrested defendant. Prior to arresting
defendant, Vasquez spoke with defendant. Per the full transcript of the conversation,
there was a brief discussion between the two of them before Vasquez provided defendant
with Miranda warnings. Later on, defendant invoked his right to counsel. The trial court
subsequently excluded everything that was said before the Miranda warnings were given,
and everything that was said after the invocation of counsel, including the invocation
itself. The following exchange was admitted into evidence as People’s exhibit No. 9:

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: You’re in custody so I’m going to
       read you your rights all right? You have the right to remain silent.
       Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You
       have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while
       you’re being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
       appointed to represent you before any questioning if you wish. You could
       decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or
       make any statements. You understand? I need a verbal yes or no.

              “[DEFENDANT]: Uh-huh.

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Thank you sir. How long were you
       with Amy? [O]r your booty call? Whatever relationship you guys had,
       bro. I want to make sure you get your side of the story too, right?

              “[DEFENDANT]: I—

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Right?

              “[DEFENDANT]: I don’t know. I don’t know what this is about.

               “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: I tried calling you. I tried calling you
       that night. Okay?

              “[DEFENDANT]: Tried calling me?

                                            13.
              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Yes. I tried calling you and it went to
       voicemail and I got that number, the same number you text the grandpa of
       [A.P.] and you said, ‘Hey, is everything that’s being said true?’

              “[DEFENDANT]: Yeah, because I—

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: So obviously you know, bro. You
       know what the hell is going on. You’re not dumb. I’m not trying to say
       you’re dumb, but you know exactly what the hell we’re talking about.
       Right?

              “[DEFENDANT]: No.

             “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Well, you tell me your version then.
       You tell me your version.

              “[DEFENDANT]: Version of what?

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Of this whole ordeal from the get-go
       man.

              “[DEFENDANT]: I… Man this…

             “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Are you at all sorry for doing what
       you did to [A.P.]? Huh?

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Is it true, yeah or no?

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Is it true or no?

              “[UNKNOWN SPEAKER]: The door was open.

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Yours was?

              “[UNKNOWN SPEAKER]: Yeah, my passenger door was open.

              “[DETECTIVE] VASQUEZ: Uh-huh. Is it true bro?”11
       (Capitalization added.)
       Subsequently, during the jury instruction conference, the prosecutor requested an
instruction on adoptive admissions pursuant to CALCRIM No. 357. The trial court

11     This is a transcript of the audio recording of defendant’s interrogation, which was marked
as People’s exhibit No. 9. The transcript, which is reflected in this opinion, was premarked as
People’s exhibit No. 9A. The redacted audio version of the interrogation was played for the jury.

                                              14.
responded, “[T]here are a number of times within that interview where the Detective is
making statements, um, that is clear that the defendant heard and was standing right
there, was made in the defendant’s presence … [and] under regular circumstances,
naturally would have denied it, and he did not.” Trial counsel objected to the instruction.
The trial court agreed to provide the jury with CALCRIM No. 357 and stated the
following in relevant part:

              “ … All right. Well, in terms of—well, I’m not sure if he heard the
       officer asked him multiple times, multiple times the same thing, and he still
       didn’t say anything, and as the Court indicated, it definitely appears to the
       Court the statement was made to defendant, the defendant heard or
       understood the statement, he’s standing right next to the officer, uh, the
       defendant would, under all circumstances, naturally have denied the
       statement had he thought it was not true, and the defendant could have
       denied it but did not.” [¶] … [¶]

       “So the Court, in looking at that, um, series of questions and what appear[s]
       to be inability or refusal to deny it, uh, as far as the Court’s concerned, meet
       the elements of an adoptive admission, and the Court is going to give the
       adoptive admission under [CALCRIM No.] 357.”
The trial court then instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 357:

              “If you conclude that someone made a statement outside of court
       that accused the defendant of the crime or tended to connect the defendant
       with the commission of the crime and the defendant did not deny it, you
       must decide whether each of the following is true:

              “Number one, the statement was made to the defendant or made in
       his presence;

              “[N]umber two, the defendant heard and understood the statement;

              “[N]umber three, the defendant would, under all circumstances,
       naturally have denied the statement if he thought it was not true;

              “[A]nd number four, the defendant could have denied it but he did
       not.

                                             15.
             “If you decide that any of these requirements have not been met, you
       must not consider either the statement or the defendant’s response for any
       purpose.”12
       B.     Applicable Law
       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person
… shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .…” To
safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination from the
“inherently compelling pressures” of the custodial setting (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at
p. 467), the high court adopted a set of prophylactic measures requiring law enforcement
officers to advise a suspect of his right to remain silent and to have counsel present prior
to any custodial interrogation (id. at pp. 444–445).
       As stated above, “[i]n Doyle, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a
violation of due process and fundamental fairness to use a defendant’s postarrest silence
following Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony. (Doyle, supra,
426 U.S. at pp. 617–618.)” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 203 (Collins); see
People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 856.) “Post-arrest silence also may not be used
against a defendant at trial in order to imply guilt from that silence.” (Stone v. United
States (6th Cir. 2007) 258 Fed.Appx. 784, 787, citing to Doyle, supra, at p. 611.) “The
Supreme Court has explained the rationale of this holding in these terms: ‘[The] use of
silence for impeachment [is] fundamentally unfair … because “Miranda warnings inform
a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence
will not be used against him.… Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of
silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances.”’” (People v. Evans (1994)
25 Cal.App.4th 358, 367; see People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1092 (Hurd).)

12      Both the written and oral versions of CALCRIM No. 357 provided to the jury were
missing a key phrase from the standard instruction. The missing phrase is as follows: “If you
decide that all of these requirements have been met, you may conclude that the defendant
admitted the statement was true” (CALCRIM No. 357).

                                              16.
       “The prosecutor cannot use the defendant’s invocation of his right to remain silent
or refusal to answer questions as evidence against him. [Citations.] Particularly, the
defendant’s silence may not be used to impeach his credibility. [Citations.] [¶] To
establish a violation of due process under Doyle, the defendant must show that the
prosecution inappropriately used his postarrest silence for impeachment purposes and the
trial court permitted the prosecution to engage in such inquiry or argument.” (People v.
Champion (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1448.) “‘To assess whether these questions
constitute Doyle error, we ask whether the prosecutor referred to the defendant’s post-
arrest silence so that the jury would draw “inferences of guilt from [the] defendant’s
decision to remain silent after … arrest.”’” (People v. Hollinquest (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1534, 1556 (Hollinquest), quoting Smith v. Jones (6th Cir. 2009) 326
Fed.Appx. 324, 330.)
       “Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the
hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content
thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth.”
(Evid. Code, § 1221.) “The statute contemplates either explicit acceptance of another’s
statement or acquiescence in its truth by silence or equivocal or evasive conduct.”
(People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 843.) Generally speaking, “‘[w]hen a person
makes a statement in the presence of a party to an action under circumstances that would
normally call for a response if the statement were untrue, the statement is admissible for
the limited purpose of showing the party’s reaction to it. [Citations.] His silence,
evasion, or equivocation may be considered as a tacit admission of the statements made
in his presence.’” (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189, quoting Estate of
Neilson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 733, 746.)
       However, as noted above, “the Fifth Amendment … forbids either comment by the
prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt.” (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615, fn. omitted.) “The rationale of

                                            17.
Griffin implicitly proscribes drawing an inference adverse to the defendant from his
failure to reply to an accusatory statement if the defendant was asserting his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” (People v. Cockrell (1965) 63 Cal.2d
659, 669–670.) For Evidence Code section 1221 to apply, the circumstances cannot
“‘lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution .…’” (People v. Riel, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 1189.)13 Therefore, “[w]here a defendant’s failure to reply is based on
his constitutional right to remain silent, instructing the jury that it can treat the failure to
reply as an adoptive admission violates the Fifth Amendment.” (Arnold v. Runnels (9th
Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 859, 869.)
       C.      Analysis
       Defendant argues a prejudicial Doyle/Griffin error occurred when the jury was
improperly instructed it could use his post-Miranda silence against him, and that the
prosecutor committed error when she argued the jury was permitted to draw an inference
of guilt from that silence.14 We agree.

13      Although at least one federal court appears to have placed a blanket prohibition on the
use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence because such silence “is ‘insolubly ambiguous .…’”
(Franklin v. Duncan (N.D.Cal. 1995) 884 F.Supp. 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995) 70 F.3d 75), the
California Supreme Court has not drawn such a bright line rule (see People v. Medina (1990) 51
Cal.3d 870, 890–891 (Medina), affd. Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 453). The
Medina court held the Fifth Amendment’s right to silence was not implicated because the
“record d[id] not suggest that [the] defendant believed his conversation with his sister was being
monitored, or that his silence was intended as an invocation of any constitutional right.”
(Medina, supra, at p. 890.) However, the court did not address “the situation in which an in-
custody, Mirandized, suspect is confronted with an accusatory statement in circumstances where
he may be presumed to suspect the monitoring of his conversation” and “d[id] not decide
whether, in such circumstances, application of the adoptive admissions rule would be unfair,
essentially requiring the defendant to respond to avoid an adverse inference of guilt if he remains
silent.” (Id. at p. 891.)
14     We do not address the People’s argument as to whether defendant expressly or implicitly
waived his Miranda rights because, as we discuss in detail below, irrespective of a valid waiver,
defendant maintained his right to remain silent throughout the interrogation.

                                               18.
      “After a defendant waives his or her Miranda rights, the police are free to
interrogate until the defendant invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to silence.”
(Hurd, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1090.) “A defendant may invoke his or her Fifth
Amendment right to silence by refusing to continue an ongoing interrogation subsequent
to waiving that right.” (Ibid.) As Doyle makes clear:

              “‘When a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that
      he may remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and
      that he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not
      comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call
      attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did
      not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not
      do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial
      testimony.… Surely [the defendant] was not informed here that his silence,
      as well as his words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone
      would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be
      the case.’” (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 619, fn. omitted, quoting United
      States v. Hale (1975) 422 U.S. 171, 182–183 (conc. opn. of White, J.).)
Because “every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous,” we presume that “[s]ilence in
the wake of these [Miranda] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise
of these Miranda rights.” (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 617.)
      At the outset, defendant’s post-Miranda statements to Detective Vasquez were
admissible as opposing party statements pursuant to Evidence Code section 1220. (See
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478 [“Any statement given freely and voluntarily without
any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.”].) However, the trial
court violated both Doyle and Griffin when it instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 357, which permitted the jury to use defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of
guilt. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617–618; Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615.) The
People argue this is a case where defendant failed to unambiguously invoke his right to
silence after a Miranda waiver and, thus, his silence could be used against him.
However, the People improperly conflate Miranda, which focuses on police interrogation
tactics, and the Fifth Amendment’s absolute right to remain silent. Miranda is a

                                            19.
prophylactic rule, rooted in the Fifth Amendment, that prevents law enforcement from
interrogating an in-custody suspect, who after a valid Miranda waiver, unequivocally
invokes either their right to remain silent or their right to counsel. (See Berghuis, supra,
560 U.S. at p. 381 [holding that after a suspect has been provided the Miranda
advisements, law enforcement must cease questioning only after the suspect “invoke[s]
his or her right to remain silent … unambiguously”]; Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459
[after being provided with the Miranda advisements, a suspect must invoke the Miranda
right to counsel “unambiguously”].) Unlike Miranda, which requires custodial
interrogation to apply, the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against self-incrimination, i.e.
the right to remain silent, is constant and applies to both custodial and noncustodial
situations. This is best illustrated by two distinct examples. In the first example, a
suspect is brought into an interrogation room in handcuffs, provided their Miranda rights,
waives these rights, and is then questioned by law enforcement about a crime. If the
suspect makes incriminating statements, these statements are admissible because they
were made after a Miranda waiver was provided. Therefore, law enforcement must
cease questioning only after the suspect unambiguously invokes either their right to
remain silent or right to counsel. These statements are admissible even if they occur after
two hours of constant silence. A Miranda violation occurs if law enforcement continues
its questioning after the suspect unambiguously invokes.
       In contrast, in the second example, a suspect is brought into an interrogation room
in handcuffs, provided their Miranda advisements, waives these rights, and is then
questioned by law enforcement. In this example, the suspect chooses not to engage with
law enforcement and instead remains mostly silent. The suspect need not invoke his right
to remain silent because it is presumed the individual is simply acting upon their Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent when they choose not to speak or answer questions.
(Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617–618.) Although the suspect chooses to remain silent,
law enforcement does not violate Miranda by continuing to ask questions and, in fact,

                                             20.
any subsequent statements made by the suspect after any continued silence are
admissible. (See Berghuis, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. 379–381 [our Supreme Court held that
in the context of post-Miranda silence, a defendant’s confession was admissible because
he failed to invoke the privilege when he refused to respond to police questioning for two
hours and 45 minutes].) Although the defendant’s post-Miranda statements are
admissible in court, a jury cannot use the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of
guilt.
         Here, the trial court violated both Doyle and Griffin when it instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 357. We find the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hurd v. Terhune (9th
Cir. 2010) 619 F.3d 1080 (Terhune) instructive. In Terhune, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals granted the defendant’s writ of habeas corpus because “the state trial court
improperly admitted as evidence his refusal to reenact the shooting in violation of his
Fifth Amendment rights .….” (Id. at p. 1085.) Specifically, Terhune stated the
following:

         “[Berghuis] makes clear that a criminal defendant must affirmatively and
         unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent if he wishes to cut off
         police interrogation. [Citation.] When a suspect remains ‘largely silent’ in
         response to officers’ questions, the interrogation does not automatically
         have to cease. [Citation.] At the same time, when a defendant remains
         silent or refuses to answer a question posed by police, that silence or refusal
         is inadmissible. As the Court held in Doyle, a defendant’s silence in
         response to a question is ambiguous because it may be no more than a
         reliance on the right to silence. [Citations.] That silence may not require
         police to end their interrogation, but it also does not allow prosecutors to
         use silence as affirmative evidence of guilt at trial. [Berghuis] stands for
         the proposition that a voluntary confession should not be suppressed just
         because a defendant has refrained from answering other questions.
         [Citation.] It does not alter the fundamental principle that a suspect’s
         silence in the face of questioning cannot be used as evidence against him at

                                              21.
       trial, whether that silence would constitute a valid invocation of the ‘right
       to cut off questioning’ or not.” (Terhune, supra, 619 F.3d at p. 1088.)15
       Similarly here, the only answers defendant provided to Vasquez were denials,
which as we noted above, were admissible as opposing party statements.16 However, his
statements were not only introduced to the jury as evidence of guilt, but also his silence.
Although “[t]hat silence [did] not require [Vasquez] to end [his] interrogation” (Terhune,
supra, 619 F.3d at p. 1088), it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury “that
such silence is evidence of guilt.” (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615, fn. omitted.)
       The trial court improperly instructed the jury it could consider defendant’s silence
to Vasquez as an adoptive admission if they concluded: (1) “that someone made a
statement outside of court that accused the defendant of the crime or tended to connect
the [d]efendant with the commission of the crime”; (2) “[t]he statement was made to the
defendant or made in his presence”; (3) “[t]he defendant heard and understood the
statement [¶] [and] would, under all the circumstances, naturally have denied the
statement if he thought it was not true”; and (4) “[t]he defendant could have denied it but
did not.” The jury was instructed it could use defendant’s silence, in response to
Vasquez’s accusations, as substantive evidence of guilt. Because this instruction
permitted the jury to use defendant’s silence as evidence of guilt, this instruction violated
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, as articulated in both Doyle and
Griffin.

15      In contrast, the Court of Appeal, held that “[a] defendant has no right to remain silent
selectively [and] [o]nce a defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her
refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that
such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights.” (Hurd, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 1093.) As
discussed in detail above, the Ninth Circuit disagreed and concluded, “The California Court of
Appeal’s Miranda and Doyle analysis is incorrect.” (Terhune, supra, 619 F.3d at p. 1087, fn.
omitted.)
16     Although defendant’s statements were admissible as opposing party admissions, it is
questionable whether his minimal responses to Vasquez’s questioning would even satisfy the
relevancy requirement. (See Evid. Code, § 350.)

                                               22.
       Nonetheless, the People contend that “Doyle is inapplicable absent invocation of
the right to remain silent” (boldface omitted), which did not happen in this case.
Specifically, the People argue “where a suspect has not invoked his right to remain silent,
the [United States] Supreme Court has held that Doyle does not apply.” In support of this
proposition, the People refer this court to both the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404 (Anderson) and our Supreme
Court’s decision in Collins.
       In Anderson, the defendant was arrested while driving a stolen car. (Anderson,
supra, 447 U.S. at p. 404.) Detectives interviewed the defendant and provided him
Miranda warnings. (Id. at p. 405.) The detective “asked [the defendant] about the stolen
automobile … [and he] said that he stole the car … about two miles from the local bus
station.” (Ibid.) The defendant testified on his own behalf and stated he took the
unattended vehicle from a different parking lot. (Ibid.) On cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked a general question regarding why the defendant at the time of the arrest
did not tell anybody where he stole the automobile. (Id. at pp. 405–406.) The prosecutor
then asked the defendant why he told the arresting officer a different story. (Id. at
p. 406.) The Anderson court concluded that Doyle did not apply to this case. (Anderson,
supra, at pp. 407–409.) Specifically, the court stated the following:

              “Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence
       maintained after receipt of governmental assurances. But Doyle does not
       apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent
       statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use of silence because a
       defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not
       been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his statements,
       the defendant has not remained silent at all.” (Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at
       p. 408, italics added.)
       Additionally, in Collins, the defendant argued “the prosecutor committed error
under Doyle …, during her cross-examination … and in her guilt phase argument [and]
[s]pecifically, defendant complain[ed] the prosecutor improperly questioned his failure to

                                             23.
inform the police or prosecutor of his alibi before trial.” (Collins, supra, 49 Cal.4th at
p. 199.) The prosecutor questioned the defendant about his failure to reveal an alibi to a
detective and commented on the defendant’s failure to raise the alibi in her closing
argument. (Id. at pp. 199–202.) The Collins court held the prosecutor did not violate
Doyle because the “[d]efendant was not ‘silent’ on his whereabouts at the time of the
murder[] [and] he chose to provide varied explanations that differed from his trial
testimony.” (Id. at p. 204.) Further, “the prosecutor’s questions regarding [the]
defendant’s failure to come forward earlier with his alibi were asked in the context of
those interview statements [and, thus,] [t]he questions were a legitimate effort to elicit an
explanation as to why, if the alibi were true, [the] defendant did not provide it earlier.”
(Ibid.) “As such, neither the questions nor the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument
were ‘designed to draw meaning from silence.’” (Ibid., quoting Anderson, supra, 447
U.S. at p. 409.)
       Both Anderson and Collins reiterate the proposition that “a defendant who
voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain
silent.” (Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 408.) Any statements made post-Miranda
warnings are admissible because the suspect is not relying on his or her right to remain
silent if they willingly choose to speak with law enforcement. As stated above, the
prosecutor in this case had every right to impeach defendant’s testimony with his prior
statements or refer to these statements during her closing and rebuttal arguments.
Instead, the trial court improperly instructed the jury that defendant’s silence, in addition
to his prior statements, could be used to support guilt, and the prosecutor improperly
argued during both her closing and rebuttal arguments his silence was evidence of guilt,
in violation of both Doyle and Griffin.
       D.     Prejudice
       We now turn our focus to an examination of the prejudicial impact of the
admission and jury instruction regarding defendant’s silence, and the prosecutor’s use of

                                             24.
his silence during her closing argument in violation of Doyle and Griffin. “The test of
prejudice is the standard enunciated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24:
we must reverse the judgment unless beyond a reasonable doubt the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict.” (Hollinquest, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1558, citing
People v. Waldie (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 358, 366; accord, People v. Champion, supra,
134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1453; United States v. Williams (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3d 1148,
1163.) As this court stated in People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551
(Galloway), “prejudice is demonstrated (1) if the evidence against [the] defendant is less
than overwhelming, and (2) if the improper comment[s] touched ‘a live nerve in the
[appellant’s] defense’” (id. at p. 560, quoting People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695,
714, disapproved on another ground in Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375,
383, fn. 8), and “reach[ed] the proportions of ‘machine-gun repetition .…’” (Galloway,
supra, at p. 560.)
       Here, we are unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the errors committed
by both the trial court and the prosecutor did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. First,
the evidence against defendant was “less than overwhelming.” (Galloway, supra, 100
Cal.App.3d at p. 560.) In a sexual assault case, such as this one, the evidence of guilt
primarily depended on the testimony and statements by A.P. (See generally People v.
Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 515 [“‘By their very nature, sex crimes are usually
committed in seclusion without third party witnesses or substantial corroborating
evidence. The ensuing trial presents conflicting versions of the event and requires the
trier of fact to make difficult credibility determinations.’”].) Apart from the evidence
regarding A.P.’s erratic and sexual behavior during her third and fourth grade years, this
case lacked other corroborating evidence. This trial was essentially a credibility contest
between defendant and A.P.
       Second, because of this lack of corroborating evidence, the prosecutor drew the
jury’s attention to defendant’s silence during both her closing and rebuttal arguments,

                                             25.
which made this evidence even more prejudicial. (See Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615.)
“‘When deciding whether a prosecutor’s reference to a defendant’s post-arrest silence
was prejudicial, this court will consider the extent of comments made by the witness,
whether an inference of guilt from silence was stressed to the jury, and the extent of other
evidence suggesting [the] defendant’s guilt.’” (United States v. Lopez (9th Cir. 2007) 500
F.3d 840, 845.) We find the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Guam v. Veloria (9th Cir. 1998)
136 F.3d 648 (Veloria) instructive. In Veloria, “[t]he government presented convincing
evidence … that the three-year-old child had suffered injuries to her vaginal area which
were consistent with sexual assault,” however, “[t]he evidence as to the perpetrator was
circumstantial and required the jury to weigh the credibility of the mother against the
defendant.” (Id at p. 650.) During the prosecutor’s case-in-chief, “[t]he prosecutor
impermissibly elicited testimony about [the defendant’s] post-arrest silence.” (Id. at
p. 652.) Although the government argued “the prosecutor made no further reference to
[the defendant’s] post-arrest silence,” the court found prejudice because “the jury was
never cautioned or instructed to disregard [the officer’s] testimony regarding the
defendant’s post-arrest silence” and “the evidence that the defendant committed this
crime was simply a question of credibility—the defendant’s word against that of his
former girlfriend, who reported the crime … [and] [t]he only evidence other tha[n] her
testimony that implicated [the defendant] was the officer’s testimony regarding [the
defendant’s] post-arrest silence.” (Id. at pp. 652, 653.) Therefore, “[c]onsidering all
factors, the improper reference to [the] defendant’s silence was prejudicial enough to
affect the outcome of the proceedings.” (Id. at p. 653.)
       The prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s silence in this case was even more
egregious than that of the prosecutor in Veloria. The prosecutor argued at the end of her
closing argument the following:

            “Now, one of the last instructions I want to talk to you about is
       [CALCRIM No.] 357. It’s called, ‘Adoptive admissions.’ And this goes to

                                            26.
      that recording that the defendant had with Detective Vasquez. And it says
      this, ‘If you conclude that someone made a statement outside of court that
      accused the defendant of the crime or tended to connect the defendant with
      the commission of the crime, and the defendant did not deny it, you must
      decide whether each of the following is true: One, the statement was made
      to the defendant or made in his presence.’ We know that this was made to
      the defendant. Detective Vasquez was right next to him. ‘The defendant
      heard and understood the statement.’ You heard the recording. It was
      extremely clear, and the defendant had understood all of the other things
      that detective had asked him. ‘Three, the defendant would, under all the
      circumstances, naturally have denied the statement if he thought it was not
      true.’ He was asked four different times about whether or not he molested
      [A.P.], and ne never denied it. ‘And four, the defendant could have denied
      it but did not.’ You all heard the moments of glaring silence after those
      questions were asked on that—on that recording. The first question, ‘Do
      you feel bad for what you did to [A.P.]?’ Huge amount of time. And then
      asked ‘Is it true?’ Huge amount of time. And that happened three different
      times. The defendant who had been talking to Detective Vasquez had every
      opportunity to say, ‘No, it’s not true.’ Anyone who had not molested a
      child and was being asked if they molested a child would say, ‘No, it’s not
      true.’ And the law tells you that you can consider this. And lastly, ‘If you
      decide that any of these requirements has not been met, you must not
      consider either the statement or the defendant’s response for any purpose.’
      But they have been met. These four requirements are all very clearly met,
      and the defendant chose not to deny the allegations that were very specific,
      um, and that were caught on tape.”
Subsequently, at the end of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, she argued the following:

              “And the last thing I’d like to talk about is this concept of adoptive
      admissions. We’ve spent a lot of times talking about [A.P.] and how her
      behavior supports that this is what happened. But the defendant also told us
      in his interview with Detective Vasquez, um, essentially, that he was not
      willing to deny what had happened. [¶] … [¶] In this recording that we got
      to hear that was part of the evidence, the defendant was asked four different
      questions. During a silence that gave him ample time to respond to
      questions that any reasonable person would have responded with a denial,
      the defendant chose not to say anything. He did not deny the allegations.
      He participated in other parts of the conversation wherein he answered
      questions. You know that he heard the questions. Detective Vasquez
      stated that this was an appropriate recording. The defendant was asked if
      he felt bad about what he did to [A.P.]. He said nothing. He was asked if it
      was true. Again, he said nothing. Twice more he was asked if it was true,

                                           27.
       and he said nothing. Four opportunities to make a denial when asked
       specifically, ‘Is this true? Did you do this? Are these allegations correct.’
       And he chose not to deny. I’d like you to listen to the audio one more time.

              “(Thereupon an audio recording was played, not reported.)

               “… The defendant was asked four different questions, three times if
       it was true, and once if he felt bad for what he did to [A.P.]. Each of those
       was followed by a pause of 10 to 15 to 20 seconds of silence, during which
       time anyone—a reasonable person who had been asked those questions
       would have said, ‘No, it’s not true.’ And the law tells you that that can be
       considered an adoptive admission. He had the right to remain silent, yes.
       But he was participating in the other questions that were being asked of
       him. He did not respond when asked if it was true or not true, when he had
       an opportunity to say, ‘No, I did not do this. I did not molest [A.P.]. This
       did not happen.’ He chose not to say anything at all. And based on that—
       combining that with everything else that we know about [A.P.] about
       [A.P.’s] full sexual assault and everything we heard from her, I put before
       you, and I ask you to find the defendant guilty of Counts One through Four.
       Thank you.”
       The prosecutor used defendant’s silence as a pivotal part of her case. This
repeated reference to defendant’s silence, during both her closing and rebuttal arguments,
represented a type of “‘machine-gun repetition .…’” (Galloway, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d
at p. 560.) Because weighing credibility was the ultimate issue for the jury to consider
(see People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1426 [this case involves “the
typical scenario of a one-on-one sexual assault, in which victim credibility is often
determinative”]; see also Veloria, supra, 136 F.3d at pp. 652–653), any corroborating
evidence of guilt was vitally important. Defendant’s silence, which the jury was
instructed could be used to support his guilt, carried with it an imprimatur of guilt. In this
he-said, she-said type case, the jury could feel confident in finding defendant guilty when
it was told it could use defendant’s silence as an admission of guilt to corroborate the
accusations made against him. The prosecutor knew how important defendant’s silence
was to her case because it represented one of the few pieces of corroborating evidence.
In fact, it is arguable defendant’s silence was the most important piece of evidence, which

                                             28.
is why the prosecutor drove this point home to the jury by strategically referencing his
silence at the end of both her closing and rebuttal arguments. (See generally People v.
McDaniel (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 986, 1008, fn. omitted [“Thus, harnessing the
instruction on adoptive admissions, the prosecutor was able to argue that [the defendant]
had effectively confessed to committing the [crimes]. In doing so, she lobbed into the
case ‘“‘[the] kind of evidentiary bombshell [that] shatters the defense.’”’”].)
       Finally, it appears from the record that trial counsel’s entire defense rested on the
fact this case lacked corroborating evidence and, thus, depended primarily on the
credibility of defendant and A.P. Specifically, at the end of trial counsel’s closing
argument, she argued the following:

       “And I trust, and I hope that when you deliberate, you will think about, like
       I said, this isn’t an exhaustive list, these are just some things [the prosecutor
       is] looking to ignore, that there is no evidence of physical trauma—physical
       sexual trauma to [A.P.], no evidence of these photos, no evidence of those
       videos. [Defendant] never fled. He stayed. He stayed in the county. He
       stayed in the state. And then he has a reputation for good moral character
       when it comes to sexual—when it comes to matters of—sexual matters
       involving minors. [The prosecutor] want[s] you [to] accept some of the
       things [A.P.] said and ignore others. [¶] … [¶] … When [A.P.] asked—
       and maybe it wasn’t very clear, I think you read it in the transcripts, ‘I lied,’
       and then she says, ‘I’m sorry, just kidding, just kidding. I wanted to prank
       you.’ This is not a joking matter. This is some serious stuff. And she’s a
       child, I get it, I get it. I understand that, but those are things that you’ve got
       to keep in mind when you’re deliberating.”
Trial counsel focused on A.P.’s credibility issues. Her entire defense was predicated on
the theory that A.P. was fabricating the entire story, and that this case lacked
corroborating evidence, such as “physical sexual trauma” and “videos.” Therefore,
evidence that defendant himself admitted to sexually assaulting A.P. completely negated
trial counsel’s entire defense strategy. (See People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d
450, 465 [when “The case is a close one, turning primarily upon the respective credibility
of the … principal witnesses … ‘“any substantial error tending to discredit the defense, or

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to corroborate the prosecution, must be considered as prejudicial.”’”].) Accordingly,
defendant was prejudiced by this error.
       Nonetheless, the People contend defendant is unable to establish prejudice because
the trial court “omitted the critical phrase that would have instructed the jurors as to how
they could use an adoptive admission” and, therefore, the instruction “had no teeth and
was essentially useless.” We disagree.
       As noted above, both the written and oral versions of CALCRIM No. 357
provided to the jury were missing a key phrase from the standard instruction. The
missing phrase was as follows: “If you decide that all of these requirements have been
met, you may conclude that the defendant admitted the statement was true.” (CALCRIM
No. 357.) Although the trial court’s omission of this language may have benefitted
defendant (see People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 932 [“Under these
circumstances, any failure to instruct on causation could only have inured to [the]
defendant’s benefit.”]), it still did not remove the probability the jury used his silence as
an adoptive admission. The jury was still instructed it could use defendant’s silence as
evidence of guilt if it concluded all four elements of the adoptive admission instruction
were met. It was clear these elements had been met based on Vasquez’s testimony and
the interrogation recording.
       With that being said, any potential ambiguity in the CALCRIM No. 357
instruction was removed by the prosecutor during her closing and rebuttal arguments. As
stated above, the prosecutor clearly spelled out how the jury was to apply CALCRIM
No. 357. She told the jury “[a]nyone who had not molested a child and was being asked
if they molested a child would say, ‘No, it’s not true’ … and the defendant chose not to
deny the allegations that were very specific … and that were caught on tape.” (Italics
added.) Before concluding her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again reminded the jury,
“He chose not to say anything at all. And based on that—combining that with everything
else that we know about [A.P.,] about [A.P.’s] full sexual assault and everything we

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heard from her, I put before you, and I ask you to find the defendant guilty of Counts One
through Four. Thank you.” (Italics added.) Defendant’s silence, in the face of
Vasquez’s questioning, was the final piece of evidence the jury heard before deliberating.
Therefore, even assuming we accept the People’s argument that the CALCRIM No. 357
instruction provided to the jury “gave the jurors no direction as to how they were to use
the evidence,” the prosecutor provided plenty of direction on how to apply this
instruction during both her closing and rebuttal arguments. Accordingly, based on the
jury being instructed with CALCRIM No. 357, coupled with the prosecutor’s repeated
reference to his silence during his interrogation, we are forced to conclude the Doyle and
Griffin errors committed by both the trial court and prosecutor were prejudicial because
we are unable to find “beyond a reasonable doubt the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict” and, thus, the conviction must be reversed. (Hollinquest, supra,
190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1558.)
II.    Other Claims
       Defendant raised several other claims in this appeal. He contends the trial court
erred when it: (1) permitted A.P. to testify via one-way closed circuit television, in
violation of his confrontation rights, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal
Constitution; (2) forced him to be the only individual in the courtroom required to wear a
COVID-19 mask in violation of his right to face-to-face confrontation; (3) “addressed
[defendant] by name and asked him if he wore glasses when he knew [A.P.]” because
“[i]t forced him to admit that he knew [A.P.], which thereby established that he was the
[individual] that [A.P.] named in her testimony as her abuser” in violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination; (4) allowed evidence of A.P.’s PTSD
diagnosis as substantive evidence of sexual abuse, which is foreclosed by People v.
Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236 and its progeny; and (5) instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 1193 because “[t]he last sentence of [the instruction] is ambiguous in a
manner that makes it erroneously misleading” in that “the double-negative phrase ‘not

                                            31.
inconsistent’ can be read to mean ‘consistent,’” which permitted the jury “to conclude
that [A.P.’s] claim of abuse is more believable because her subsequent conduct was
consistent with the conduct of someone who has been molested … tend[ing] to prove that
she was molested.” Additionally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed
misconduct when she repeatedly violated the motion in limine instruction limiting the use
of CSAAS evidence. Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
when she “exploited the ambiguity in CALCRIM No. 1193 by arguing in summation that
the instruction permitted the jury to use PTSD and CSAAS evidence as affirmative
evidence of abuse and … urg[ed the] jury to do so.” Alternatively, in the event this
argument is forfeited by trial counsel’s failure to object, he contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we are reversing the entirety of the judgment,
we do not reach these additional claims.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed.

                                                                              MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

FRANSON, J.

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