Court Opinion

ID: 9485933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:34:07.386547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:27.086996
License: Public Domain

JOINER, Senior District Judge,
dissenting.
I part company with the majority opinion on a narrow but crucial point. The majority opinion is premised on the idea that because the issue was not presented to the trial court, this court should not review the claim of error. I wholeheartedly agree with this general rule. The problem I have is with its application in this case.
In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), the Supreme Court stated, “[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” (Emphasis added.) There was no such finding in this case. In my opinion, this alone requires that the award be vacated.
Moreover, since a finding is required, it follows that a prevailing defendant seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving that the action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. The burden is not on the plaintiff to prove a negative. The act of making a claim for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) brings the issue of the action’s frivolousness and unreasonableness and the claim of lack of foundation squarely before the court. Nothing is required of the plaintiff to raise this issue. Regardless of what the plaintiff does, absent express agreement, the issue has been squarely presented. We should not deny review. This is particularly true in this case, where defendants made no attempt to meet the exacting standards and burden of Christiansburg, and the court failed to make the finding required.
While I recognize and adhere to the procedural rule on which the majority relies, this rule should not be invoked to defeat legal principles of far greater importance. This court has stated that private enforcement of the Fair Housing Act “not only vindicates the civil rights of the individual victim of discrimination, but promotes the public interest by eradicating housing discrimination. The eradication of housing discrimination is a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority.” Price v. Pelka, 690 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir.1982). Consistent with this objective, the Supreme Court has stated that an award of attorney fees to prevailing defendants on the sole basis that they won the case “would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. at 701. Because of the manner in which the Barilows’ motion was presented and decided, we have no assurance that the risks envisioned in Christiansburg were not realized in this case.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.