Court Opinion

ID: 9666587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:20:53.644434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:30.691647
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
With its waiver holding in this case, this court rigidly interprets Rule 52(a), Tex. R.App.P., in a manner that totally disregards the circumstances of this case — including Union City’s substantial rights and its adversary’s blatant violation of his duty to “not serve motions or pleadings in any manner that unfairly limits another party’s opportunity to respond.” Texas Lawyer’s Creed *204111(7). In so doing, the majority firmly places its stamp of approval and indeed encourages conduct expressly prohibited by the Texas Lawyer’s Creed and promulgates a policy — both ethical and procedural — I cannot and will not endorse. I therefore dissent.
FACTS
On June 12, 1990, Ranee Bighorse was driving his UPS cargo van along his delivery route when, he alleges, he was sideswiped and forced off the road by a truck being driven by an employee of Movac Service Company. As a result of the accident, Bighorse was rendered a quadriplegic.
In his subsequent lawsuit, Bighorse, joined by his wife, sued Movac for negligence and Starr County for a “special defect” pursuant to section 101.024 of the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex.Civ.PRA.c. & Rem.Code Ann. Finally, the Bighorses also sued General Motors Corporation, Union City, TRW, and Freedman for negligence and strict products liability. The Bighorses alleged that these defendants were liable in the following respects:
• GM — negligence and strict products liability for design, manufacture, and distribution of a defective product (occupant protection system, seating assembly, interior occupant compartment, and steering wheel and steering gear assembly) and failure to warn
• Union City — negligence and strict products liability for design, manufacture, and distribution of defective product (occupant protection system, seating assembly, interior occupant compartment, and steering wheel and steering gear assembly) and failure to warn
• TRW — design, manufacture, and distribution of a defective and dangerous occupant protection system
• Freedman — design, manufacture, and distribution of a defective seating arrangement
When discovery revealed some uncertainty as to whether Freedman or Wise Company had manufactured the seat, Union City filed a third-party action against Wise alleging that, if TRW did not manufacture the seat, Wise did and its design, manufacturing, and marketing of the seat was defective; accordingly, Wise was liable to Union City for contribution or indemnity. Subsequently, Union City also filed cross-claims against its co-defendants for contribution or indemnity. Union City alleged that GM and Freedman were liable to it for contribution or indemnity because they had manufactured, assembled, or provided subassemblies that the Bighorses claimed were defective. Finally, Union City alleged that TRW and Starr County were liable to it for contribution or indemnity because of the “various wrongful acts” alleged by the Bighorses.
The ease was set for a jury trial on Monday, September 18, 1995, before the Honorable Mario Ramirez, a visiting judge in the 229th Judicial District Court in Starr County. Exactly one week prior to trial, on September 11, the Bighorses filed their Eighth Amended Original Petition. This petition nonsuited TRW and Freedman.
On the morning of trial, at 9:30 a.m., the Bighorses filed their Ninth Amended Original Petition. In this petition, the Bighorses nonsuited GM and Starr County, leaving as defendants only Movac and Union City. At 10:20 and 11:40 a.m., respectively, GM and Freedman filed handwritten special exceptions to Union City’s cross-actions, complaining that each “wholly failed to state any cause of action” and asking that each “be stricken in [its] entirety.” The basis for these special exceptions was that, because the Bighorses’ most recent petition omitted all allegations against GM and Freedman, the allegations in Union City’s cross-actions were insufficiently specific.
Judge Ramirez first heard GM and Freedman’s special exceptions. At the conclusion of GM’s argument, Judge Ramirez asked whether Union City had a response. Union City represented that it would amend its pleadings. When Judge Ramirez gave Union City an opportunity to orally amend, Union City indicated that it would amend in accordance with page references to and a summary of the Bighorses’ allegations in their superseded Eighth Amended Original Petition. At the conclusion of the argument on the special exceptions, Judge Ramirez ruled:
*205“This is the ruling of the Court: special exceptions are all sustained. And I’m going to grant severance as to everybody except for Union Body [sic] and Movac. That’s what we’re going to try today.”
At the Bighorses’ request, the court then restyled the case Bighorse v. Union Body and Movac. Then the following interchange occurred:
Counsel for Union City: I understand all special exceptions have been sustained so all cross actions are being severed at this time; is that my understanding?
Judge Ramirez: That’s correct.
Counsel for Union City: Against all cross defendants.
Judge Ramirez: We’ll come back and try it again if we have to.
Counsel for Union City: Your Honor, we do have some other motions, including that one, and one of them would be to take up special exceptions to the — the plaintiffs ninth amended petition.
Judge Ramirez: Okay, let me see the attorneys that are left in the case in chambers briefly so we can get our time straightened up.
(An off-the-record discussion is held in
chambers with the court).
Judge Ramirez: All right, are there some evidentiary matters that we need to take up.
Counsel for Union City: Yes, Your Honor.
Judge Ramirez: Mr. Morris, you’re going to be handling this?
Counsel for Union City: I suppose so. I don’t know where Mr. Dale is.
Counsel for the Bighorses: He is in Eras-mo Saenz’ office, Your Honor. He was making a call. I just left him about five minutes ago.
Judge Ramirez: Okay, Mr. Morris, I can delay or you can go ahead.
Counsel for Union City: Could we wait just a minute, Your Honor?
Judge Ramirez: Sure. Why don’t you go see if he’s available?
Counsel for the Bighorses: Judge, could we note on the record that we did file that ninth amended petition?
Judge Ramirez: Yes, sir.
Counsel for Union City: Your Honor, let’s go ahead and begin.
Judge Ramirez then proceeded to the eviden-tiary hearing on Union City’s motion to exclude the testimony of the Bighorses’ expert. After extensive testimony and argument, Judge Ramirez denied the motion to exclude and then heard the parties’ motions in limine and Union City’s motion for a continuance to allow Union City more time to get relevant documents from UPS. When these pretrial hearings concluded, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Judge Ramirez instructed counsel to return at 9:00 a.m. the following morning.
The certified copy of the Bighorses’ motion to sever filed with this court indicates the motion was filed at 9:45 a.m. on September 18. The record does not establish when this motion was served on counsel for Union City; however, unlike the Bighorses’ amended petition, which reflects service on September 18, the certificate of service on the motion to sever is undated. According to the affidavit of one of Union City’s attorneys, neither of Union City’s attorneys was aware of or had an opportunity to read the motion to sever prior to the court’s ruling. Indeed, Union City’s attorney’s affidavit states that he did not have an opportunity to read the Bighors-es’ motion to sever until after the court recessed on September 18. No controverting affidavit or verified assertion disputes Union City’s attorney’s affidavit in these respects.
The following day, at 9:25 a.m., counsel for Union City filed a motion to reconsider the severance ruling. In this motion, Union City argued that the severance was improper because the facts and issues involved in the Bighorses’ remaining claims and Union City’s cross- and third-party claims were inextricably intertwined; the claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims would involve presentation of the same proof; and severance would force Union City to “needlessly relitigate the liability issues and also the extent of the future medical damages, equipment needs, and economic losses of [the Bighorses].” Union City also argued that it would be *206severely prejudiced by a severance because “[lit will be impossible for [Union City] to present evidence on damages and liability to two different juries in order for them to make a proper determination in both cases” and because “a severance in this case will cause prejudice to the Defendants’ right to have the liability of all the defendants and third party defendants determined in one proceeding,” citing Ryland Group Inc. v. White, 723 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding). Finally, Union City asserted that “it is inconceivable that the responsibility, if any, of the Defendants against whom [Union City] has asserted cross-actions could be fairly determined by a subsequent jury after a determination by a jury in the original suit. The very size and complexity of this ease, with its numerous issues, witnesses, and experts renders a subsequent trial of these companies’ contribution responsibility to [Union City] a practical impossibility.”
Union’s City’s motion to reconsider was presented to Judge Ramirez at 9:40 a.m. Without hearing argument, Judge Ramirez orally denied the motion to reconsider, as well as a motion for a continuance pending mandamus. At 9:50 a.m. Judge Ramirez signed the order granting the severance, as well as the orders denying Union City’s motion to reconsider and motion for continuance. Judge Ramirez then opined that “[l]ots of this stuff is waived, you know” and proceeded to voir dire.
Later in the day on September 19, Union City filed its motion for leave and petition for writ of mandamus in this court. In connection with its petition, Union City asked this court to stay the proceedings in the underlying suit. The following day this court granted leave to file and issued a stay.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992) (quoting Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985)).
To establish an abuse of discretion, the complaining party must demonstrate that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159,106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). In the context of factual matters, the record must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one conclusion, and it reached a contrary conclusion. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40. However, “[a] trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.” Id. at 840.
To establish that appeal is not an adequate remedy, the complaining party must do more than show that an appeal “may involve more expense or delay than obtaining an extraordinary writ.” Id. at 842. “Interference is justified only when parties stand to lose their substantial rights.” Id. (quoting Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958)).
THE EFFECT OF THE SEVERANCE
During oral argument in this court, Union City’s attorney agreed that the effect of the severance was not immediately apparent to him. In this respect, I believe Union City’s counsel is likely in the same position as many in the Texas bench and bar. Accordingly, the potential effect of the severance must first be discussed; only then can the resulting prejudice to Union City be fuEy appreciated and the requirements for a writ of mandamus thoughtfully reviewed.
The law of contribution and indemnity in Texas legal history has been convoluted to say the least. See, e.g., First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d 74 (Tex.1993); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex.1991); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.1984). By 1993, the Texas Supreme Court noted that “Texas has four different contribution schemes; the appropriate scheme is determined by referring to the theories of liability *207by which a tortfeasor has been found culpable.” Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 78 n. 5 & accompanying text; see Tbx.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 32.001-.008 (Vernon 1986) (original contribution scheme providing for pro rata contribution among joint tortfea-sors); Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.001-.017 (Vernon 1986) (Comparative Negligence Act), amended and repealed by, Act of June 16, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2.04-2.11B, § 33.001-33.017, 1987 Tex.Gen. Laws 40-44; Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.001-017 (Vernon Supp.1995) (Comparative Responsibility Act); Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428-29 (common law pure comparative causation).
Because this case was filed after September 2, 1987 and involves allegations of negligence and strict products liability, the applicable contribution scheme is that set forth in Texas’s Comparative Responsibility Act. Garrett, 860 S.W.2d at 78 n. 5. Under the Act, “[t]he trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determine the percents age of responsibility with respect to (1) each claimant; (2) each defendant; and (3) each settling person.” Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (Vernon Supp.1995). “Percentage of responsibility” is defined as “that percentage attributed by the trier of fact to each claimant, each defendant, or each settling person with respect to causing or contributing to cause in any way, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity violative of the applicable legal standard, or by any combination of the foregoing, the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which recovery of damages is sought.” Id at § 33.011(4).
Under the Act, the court’s charge submits a question to the trier of fact to determine the comparative responsibility of all plaintiffs and all defendants, settling and non-settling. John T. Montford & Will G. Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform: The Quest for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous.L.Rev. 245, 266-70 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter Montford & Barber]. This comparative responsibility finding determines (1) whether recovery is barred because of the claimant’s percentage of responsibility; (2) the percentage by which a claimant’s damages will be reduced, if any; (3) the extent of each defendant’s liability; and (4) whether a defendant is jointly and severally liable. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 33.001(b), 33.012(a), 33.013 (Vernon Supp.1995). In the event of a monetary settlement, the Act further provides credit or offset procedures. Id. at §§ 33.012(b)-(c), 33.014.
In addition to a system of comparative responsibility between plaintiffs and defendants, the Act also provides a scheme for resolving contribution rights among non-settling defendants, cross-defendants, and third-party defendants. Id. at §§ 33.015-.016. Accordingly, “[t]he trier of fact shall determine as a separate issue or finding of fact the percentage of responsibility with respect to each contribution defendant_” Id. at § 33.016(c). Unlike the percentages of responsibility attributed to defendants, however, percentages of responsibility attributed to non-settling cross-defendants and third-party defendants do not affect the plaintiffs recovery or joint and several liability. See id. at §§ 33.012, 33.013, 33.016(e).
Under the old contributory negligence statute, all claims for contribution between named defendants “must” be determined in the main suit. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.017 (Vernon 1986), repealed by, Act of June 16, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2, § 2.11B, 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 44. The primary purpose of this provision was “to avoid separate trials of the plaintiffs claims and contribution claims against several defendants.” Arthur Bros., Inc. v. U.M.C., Inc., 647 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex.1982). Although amended section 33.016(b) uses the word “may,” rather than “must,” Senator Mont-ford and Mr. Barber indicate that contribution claims are still to be determined in the primary suit. See Montford & Barber at 296-97.
In my view, while section 33.016(b) may be couched in discretionary terms, contribution rights must still generally be determined in the primary suit for one of two reasons. First, a judgment in the primary suit may bar the subsequent contribution suit. See Getty Oil v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 845 *208S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 76, 126 L.Ed.2d 45 (1993) (when defendant/cross-plaintiff unsuccessfully asserted some but not all of its cross-claims in primary suit, subsequent suit against cross-defendant for claims arising out of same transaction barred by res judicata); Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex.1992) (adopting transactional approach to res judicata so that subsequent suit barred if it arises out of same subject matter and, with diligence, could have been tried in prior suit); Morris v. Landoll Corp., 856 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied) (cross-claims arising out of same subject matter but not asserted in primary suit barred by res judicata).
Alternatively, if for some reason the contribution suit is not barred by res judicata in these unusual circumstances, then, at the very least, determining contribution rights in a separate trial subjects the cross-plaintiff or third-party plaintiff to the very real risk of inconsistent comparative responsibility and damage findings. This would appear to be necessarily true as a matter of traditional res judicata law: as a party to the first judgment, the cross-plaintiff is bound by it, while the cross-defendants, which were neither parties nor privies, are not bound. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co., 845 S.W.2d at 800-801.
For instance, assume the jury in the main suit determines that the Plaintiff, Products Defendants 1 and 2, and Negligence Defendant 3 are equally responsible for the Plaintiffs injuries, i.e., each 25% responsible. The jury in the main suit further determines that the Plaintiffs damages (net of his percentage of responsibility) are $10 million. Each defendant is then jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for $10 million, and each is individually liable for $3⅜ million. However, in the subsequent trial of Products Defendant l’s cross-claims against Cross-Defendants 4, 5, 6, and 7 (none of whom were parties to the first judgment or in privity with a party), the jury determines that the Plaintiff was 50% responsible, and the Cross-Plaintiff and each cross-defendant only 10% responsible. The second jury also finds that the Plaintiffs damages were not $10 million but $1 million (net of the Plaintiffs percentage of responsibility). In that scenario, it would appear that Products Defendant 1 is still jointly and severally hable to the Plaintiff for $10 million and individually Hable to the Plaintiff for $3⅜ million but Products Defendant 1 can at most recover 10% of $1 million or $100,000 each from Cross-Defendants 4, 5, 6, and 7. The possible permutations are mind-boggling.1
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND INADEQUACY OF REMEDY BY APPEAL
As a result of the severance, Union City faces either a total loss of its contribution claims through res judicata or the loss of its substantial right to a determination of the Bighorses’ damages and the percentages of responsibility for all plaintiffs, defendants, cross-defendants, and third-party defendants — based upon the same evidence in the same suit by the same jury and with the same trial court rulings. See Ryland Group Inc. v. White, 723 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding). In my view, to establish the potential effect of a severance in this multi-party, mixed theory case governed by the Comparative Responsibility Act is to conclusively establish that the severance constitutes an abuse of discretion not remediable by appeal. What has been done via a severance in this case simply cannot be undone on appeal in either suit. The prejudice to Union City as a result of the severance is insurmountable other than through an extraordinary writ.
I would hold that the severance order in this case constitutes an abuse of discretion not remediable by appeal. The majority, however, only superficially analyzes the abuse of discretion issue and entirely avoids the adequacy of Union City’s appellate remedy because it places its primary reliance on its waiver holding. With this holding — and *209the policy it establishes — I vehemently disagree.
PRESERVATION OF ERROR
Rule 52(a), Tex.R.App.P., provides the general rule for preservation:
In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party’s request, objection or motion.
Tex.R.App.P. 52(a) (emphasis added). In this case, it is undisputed that Union City objected to the trial court’s severance ruling by filing its motion to reconsider, which specifically laid out why the severance was improper and how the severance would prejudice Union City. It is further undisputed that Union City obtained a ruling on its motion. The issue before this court, therefore, is not whether Union City specifically objected but whether its objection was timely.
Plainly, a “timely” objection is not always an immediate objection. Beall v. Ditmore, 867 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1993, writ denied). Rather, whether an objection is “timely” is context-sensitive; it depends upon the nature of the error asserted, as well as the surrounding circumstances. As explained by then-justice and now Chief Justice Barajas in Beall, “ ‘[tjimeliness’ defies definition,” but “it is clear from a simple reading of Texas law, that objections, in order to be considered timely, must be ... interposed at such a point in the proceedings so as to enable the trial court the opportunity to cure the error alleged, if any.” Beall, 867 S.W.2d at 795. In conducting this analysis, however, “[ajppellate courts need not be wholly insensitive to the conflicting needs of the attorney who, in the midst of a complex jury trial, is charged with both the preservation of error and the presentation of the best case possible.” Id. Thus in Beall the court held that, given the circumstances, an objection and motion for mistrial arising out of a witness’s reference to insurance, “while not immediate, was timely” when made soon after the error occurred. Id. at 796; see also Mann v. Ramirez & Tex. Dyno Chem, Inc., 905 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.App.—San Antonio, writ pending) (objection to jury array timely even though not raised until motion for new trial).
I agree that, in the usual case — when three-days notice is given pursuant to Rule 21, Tex.R.Civ.P. and a hearing is held — a party preserves the error in granting a severance by opposing the motion during the hearing. This is not, however, a usual case. In this case, Union City arrived at the courthouse on the morning of trial expecting to present its motion to exclude the testimony of the Bighorses’ expert, argue routine motions in limine, pick a jury, and then proceed to try the issues that had been framed by the pleadings on file the previous week. Instead, Union City faced a rash of pleadings that attempted to fundamentally alter the structure of the trial — an amended petition that nonsuited GM and Starr County, special exceptions that sought to strike Union City’s cross-claims, and a motion to sever Union City’s cross- and third-party claims from the Bighorses’ remaining claims. Attempting to deal with the situation, Union City responded to the special exceptions. Not surprisingly, therefore, even if Union City had been served with the motion to sever, it was not aware of it and had no opportunity to read it before the trial judge — without hearing any argument — granted the motion.
Nor is this case unusual just because there was a lack of adequate notice. A lack of notice might make no difference if all that had been filed were routine motions in limine or non-suits of the cross-defendants. What further differentiates this case from the norm are the complex ramifications of the motion to sever — ramifications that are just not apparent absent serious thought and extensive research — and the fact that, at the same time Union City’s counsel needed to study the effect of a severance, it was required to go forward with hearings on other pretrial matters. Under these circumstances, I simply cannot in good conscience join the majority in holding that Union City’s motion to reconsider, filed twenty-four hours *210after the severance ruling and before jury selection began, was untimely.
I am further compelled to dissent from the majority’s waiver holding because it represents this court’s acquiescence in violations of every Texas lawyer’s obligation to “not serve motions or pleadings in any manner that unfairly limits another party’s opportunity to respond.” Texas Lawyer’s Creed 111(7). To hold, as the majority does, that a violation of this duty is of no import unless the opposing attorney immediately objects is to render the Creed meaningless; it adds nothing to the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure. That is not consistent with my understanding that the Creed has significance as a standard of conduct that supplements the rules and fills the gap between the procedurally permissible and the professionally acceptable. Nor is it consistent with my understanding that it is this court’s responsibility to enforce the Creed through the court’s “inherent powers and rules already in existence” “when necessary.” Eugene A. Cook, The Search for Professionalism, Tex.B.J. 1302 (Dec.1989) (quoting Texas Lawyer’s Creed Order of Adoption ¶ 4). “As a realistic matter, no effort to improve the conduct of the legal profession is going to succeed without the help — ideally, the enthusiastic help — of the judges.” Sol M. Linowitz & Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession 167-68 (1994).
I would hold that, if Union City waived its objection to the severance, the Bighorses’ attorney’s violation of the Creed by serving the motion to sever in a manner that unfairly limited Union City’s ability and opportunity to respond, acquiesced in by the other real parties in interest, estops each and all of them from claiming that Union City waived its objection by failing to assert it until the following morning. See Vrazel v. Skrabanek, 725 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex.1987) (estoppel is fact-based inquiry, designed to prevent injustice, that “may be invoked against a party only when he has failed to do that which he has a duty to do”).
CONCLUSION
In sum, I would hold that the error was preserved, either because Union City’s objection was timely or because the real parties in interest are estopped from claiming waiver, and that the error constitutes an abuse of discretion not remediable by appeal. I would therefore conditionally issue a writ of mandamus directing Judge Ramirez to declare a mistrial as to the primary claims, vacate his order of severance, and proceed to trial of the reconsolidated case at his discretion.
Whether this is how litigation is to be fought — and won — in the Texas courts, and whether the majority opinion accords the Texas Lawyer’s Creed due weight, seem to me to be questions of overarching importance to the jurisprudence of this State. Accordingly, for the guidance of us all, I urge Union City to seek temporary relief and further review of this matter in the Texas Supreme Court. See Tex.R.App.P. 121(a)(1), (d).

. Concerned about this possibility, I asked counsel for the cross-defendants for their views on this issue during oral argument. Counsel for Freedman agreed, stating that in his view the cross-defendants will not be bound by a judgment in the Bighorses' suit against Union City and Movac; therefore, they can relitigate not only comparative fault but also the Bighorses’ damages in the subsequent contribution trial.