Court Opinion

ID: 9381766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 18:02:22.21568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.450123
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

      IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 22-0235
                                  FILED 3-23-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JS21163
           The Honorable Wendy S. Morton, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Thomas Vierling Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant

Tanya S., Phoenix
Appellee
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
                        Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1           Candelario H. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to D.S. (“Child”). For the following reasons,
we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Father is the biological parent of Child, born in 2015. Tanya S.
(“Mother”) and Father never married, and Child has lived with Mother
since birth. Child has low-grade cerebral palsy, is hearing and vision
impaired, and has aphasia and feeding issues; Child requires ongoing
therapies for his medical needs.

¶3            Father has been repeatedly incarcerated for most of Child’s
life. When Child was about two or three years old, Father provided a small
pack of diapers and a toy for Child. From that time until 2019, Father did
not try to contact Child or provide financial support.

¶4           In November 2019, Father was released from prison with
probation. His probation terms included an order that prohibited contact
with Mother unless authorized by the Adult Probation Department.
Despite the no contact order, Father visited Mother and Child once in
December 2019. Father testified that around this time, he also had a
Facebook video visit with Mother, Child, and Child’s brother.

¶5             Authorities arrested Father again in February 2020, and he
remained in jail until April 2020. During this time, Father did not try to
contact Child or arrange a visit. After his release in late April, Father
remained out of custody for five months. During those five months, he
made no attempt to contact Child. He was arrested again in September 2020
and has been incarcerated since. According to Father, he may be eligible for
early release in 2025, but his official release date is in 2026.

¶6           In December 2021, Mother petitioned to terminate Father’s
parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, neglect and abuse,

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
                        Decision of the Court

incapacity, and criminal conviction, arguing that termination is in Child’s
best interests. Mother also requested that the statutory social study
requirement be waived because her son is well-adjusted, the study could
“confuse [her] son,” and she could not afford hiring someone to conduct
the study.

¶7            Father virtually appeared before the juvenile court in March
2022 to contest Mother’s petition. He objected to Mother’s request to waive
the social study, and the court ordered that the social study be completed
before the September 2022 hearing. Pursuant to this order, Mother hired a
private social worker to prepare the report. In April 2022, Father wrote to
Child: “I’m sorry I lost contact with you my son. It shouldn’t happen.”

¶8            After the September 2022 contested hearing, the juvenile court
found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had abandoned Child;
the court determined Mother did not meet her burden to establish the other
alleged grounds. The court found that Father failed to vigorously assert his
parental rights to see Child, especially noting Father’s concession that he
never sought permission to have contact with Child when he was released.

¶9             In its ruling, the court rejected the social worker’s study,
finding it failed to provide an objective discussion of the facts. The court
then considered whether the current placement with Mother was meeting
Child’s needs and whether any bond existed between Child and Father.

¶10            The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination was in Child’s best interests because Child “has not bonded
with Father,” “does not know Father,” and “[f]or nearly all of [Child’s] life,
Father has failed to be a consistent, reliable parent.” The court also found
that Child is “flourishing” in Mother’s care, and Father has “no present
ability to care for the child because he is still incarcerated and will remain
so until 2025, at minimum.” The court granted Mother’s petition, citing to
Child’s need for stability, especially given his health needs.

¶11           Father challenges the juvenile court’s decision to reject the
social study and its best interests findings. He does not challenge the court’s
finding of abandonment. We have jurisdiction. Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S.
§§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), 12-2101(A)(1); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601, 603.

                               DISCUSSION

¶12           We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of
discretion. Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 369, ¶ 15 (App.
2018). On appeal, due process requires us to assess whether a reasonable

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
                        Decision of the Court

factfinder could conclude, based on the record, that the moving party has
met its clear and convincing evidentiary burden to sustain the termination
of parental rights. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 769 (1982);
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 1988) (party
seeking termination bears the burden of persuasion). We will uphold the
court’s findings of fact “if supported by adequate evidence in the record.”
Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52, ¶ 19 (App. 2007)
(cleaned up).

I.     Social Study

¶13          Father argues the juvenile court erred in rejecting the social
study and ruling in its absence. He also argues the court erred when it ruled
without a waiver of the study.

¶14           In a termination proceeding, the court must order that a
“complete social study” be submitted before the hearing. A.R.S. § 8-536(A).
The study must address the “circumstances of the petition, the social
history, the present condition of the child and parent, proposed plans for
the child, and such other facts as may be pertinent to the parent-child
relationship.” Id. The study must also include a specific recommendation
and the reasons the parent-child relationship should or should not be
terminated. Id.

¶15            Though the study should be relevant to the court’s decision,
the court need not adopt its findings or recommendation. See DePasquale v.
Superior Court, 181 Ariz. 333, 336 (App. 1995) (the court must not “abdicate
its responsibility to exercise independent judgment”). And the court has the
discretion to waive the study if doing so would be in the child’s best
interests. A.R.S. § 8-536(C).

¶16            Upon review, the court found that the social worker’s study
“appears to derive from only one source of information,” “contains
opinions and inflammatory statements that demonstrate bias and
prejudice,” and “fails to cite any additional sources considered.” Father
argues that without a social study, nothing else can corroborate the court’s
finding that Mother is meeting Child’s needs. But as the court stated in its
ruling, the study was written in bullet points and provides “no discussion
or analysis of the information presented as it applies to the best interests of
the child.” For these reasons, the court concluded that the study was of no
evidentiary value and relied only on the testimony presented at trial.
Mother, Father, and Child’s aunt—also Child’s foster mother—each offered
testimony. “The juvenile court is in the best position to weigh the evidence,

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
                        Decision of the Court

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make
appropriate findings.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231,
234, ¶ 13 (App. 2011). The court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the
study.

II.    Best Interests

¶17            Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of
statutory abandonment. He argues generally that he has a fundamental
right to parent. But “a parent’s right to custody and control of [his] own
child, while fundamental, is not absolute.” Sheena W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 11, 522 P.3d 686, 689 (App. 2022). He also argues that
the court’s best interests determination contradicts the record evidence.
When there is clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness under
Section 8-533(B), the juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights upon
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best
interests of the child. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 281–82, 288, ¶¶ 7,
41 (2005); A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

¶18            Father is correct, to find that termination is in Child’s best
interests, the court must find either an affirmative benefit to termination or
that the Child would be harmed by a continuation of the parent-child
relationship. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13
(2018). But we are not persuaded by his argument that the court erred in
finding a detriment to maintaining the parent-child relationship.

¶19            The court presumes that the interests of the parent and child
diverge upon proof of one of the statutory grounds for termination. Alma
S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12. And “in considering best interests, the court must
balance the unfit parent’s ‘diluted’ interest ‘against the independent and
often adverse interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.’” Demetrius
L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016). The primary concern in this
regard is the child’s interest in stability and security. Id.

¶20            The record evidence reveals that Father failed to provide
food, clothing, and basic necessities for Child, even while not incarcerated,
and he has taken no part in Child’s medical care or therapies. The court
concluded that Child “deserves to have the stability afforded by Mother,”
and “[i]t would be a detriment to the child to disrupt that stability by
reintroducing a parent who has never made a consistent effort to be a part
of his life.” Mother has established a safe and secure home and is meeting
Child’s special and educational needs. Reasonable evidence supports the
court’s findings.

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           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO D.S.
                       Decision of the Court

                           CONCLUSION

¶21           We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Father’s
parental rights to Child.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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