Court Opinion

ID: 9386131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 16:01:21.260947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.146978
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10785    Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 04/11/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10785
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       RONALDO GARFIELD GREEN,

                                                  Defendant- Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 0:19-cr-60313-AHS-3
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10785

       Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Ronaldo Green appeals his conviction and 78-month prison
       sentence for conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud. He con-
       tends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evi-
       dence of a simultaneous lottery scam in which he and his codefend-
       ants participated. Green also challenges the procedural and sub-
       stantive reasonableness of his sentence. All his claims fall short,
       and we affirm accordingly.
              The facts are known to the parties, and we repeat them here
       only as necessary to decide the case.
                                        I.

              Green first contends that the district court erred in admitting
       evidence of an uncharged lottery scheme in which he took part
       during the same time period as the wire and mail fraud counts for
       which he was convicted. When an appellant challenges an eviden-
       tiary ruling on appeal, we “will not disturb the [district] court’s
       judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v.
       McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998).
              Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the introduction
       of evidence of an uncharged crime to “prove a person’s character
       in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
       accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The rule
       allows such evidence, however, for other purposes, “such as
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       22-10785               Opinion of the Court                         3

       proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
       knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed.
       R. Evid. 404(b)(2), at least so long as its probative value outweighs
       its potential prejudice, Fed. R. Evid. 403.
              The evidence of the uncharged lottery scheme was admissi-
       ble because it went to Green’s motive or intent to commit the
       charged offenses, an explicit Rule 404(b) exception. By pleading
       not guilty, Green made his intent a material issue in the case, so the
       government was entitled to prove his intent through evidence un-
       der Rule 404(b). United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1345
       (11th Cir. 2007). The lottery scam evidence illustrated Green’s in-
       tent and motive to defraud the Social Security Administration and
       Veterans Administration because Green and his coconspirators ex-
       ecuted the two schemes in factually similar manners. The two
       schemes had similar targets, they both were based on financial
       fraud committed by the same individuals, and the offenses oc-
       curred for similar durations and during similar timeframes.
              Based on those similarities, we agree with the district court
       that the probative value of the lottery scheme evidence out-
       weighed the risk of undue prejudice. To make that determination,
       we consider: (1) the government’s incremental need for the evi-
       dence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the similarity
       of the extrinsic act and the charged offense; and (3) the closeness in
       time between the extrinsic act and the charged offense. United
       States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). All three of
       those considerations are present here. The government required
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10785

       the lottery scheme evidence to prove Green’s intent to commit the
       charged offenses, and the factual and temporal circumstances of
       both the charged and uncharged offenses are similar.
               Any residual prejudicial concern was ameliorated by the dis-
       trict court’s several admonitions to the jury that the evidence of the
       lottery scheme solely be considered for its legitimate uses under
       Rule 404(b). Thus, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in
       admitting evidence of the lottery scheme.
                                        II.

               We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of dis-
       cretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We review a
       district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo
       and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grant,
       397 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). In reviewing the reasonable-
       ness of a sentence, we first consider whether the district court com-
       mitted a procedural error, such as failing to calculate or improperly
       calculating the Guidelines range or failing to consider the § 3553(a)
       factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Green first contends that the district
       court erroneously imposed a two-level increase because it mistak-
       enly calculated the guidelines as if Green had harmed more than
       ten people. He alleges that he wasn’t eligible for the enhancement
       because only two of his victims had yet to be reimbursed for their
       losses.
              The Sentencing Guidelines require increasing a defendant’s
       offense level by two levels if the offense involved ten or more
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       22-10785               Opinion of the Court                         5

       victims. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i). A person is a “victim” if the
       individual “sustained any part of the actual loss” as determined by
       § 2B1.1(b)(1). Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.1. The Guidelines define an “ac-
       tual loss” as a “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted
       from the offense.” Id. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3(A)(i).
              In United States v. Lee, we held that a person who was re-
       imbursed for his losses still qualified as a victim under
       § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) because the Guidelines include reimbursed losses
       in related loss calculations. 427 F.3d 881, 894–95 (11th Cir. 2005).
       In other words, a victim who suffers losses is still a victim for
       Guidelines-calculation purposes even if she has been reimbursed.
               The district court didn’t err in imposing a two-level increase
       for the number of victims of Green’s offense. First, this Court’s
       precedent in Lee forecloses Green’s argument that the individual
       victims who were reimbursed weren’t victims under
       § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). See id. Second, to the extent that Green sepa-
       rately contends that the individual victims can’t count for
       § 2B1.1(b)(2) purposes because the PSI listed only the VA and SSA
       as victims, the PSI specified that the VA and SSA were the only vic-
       tims “for restitution purposes.” The definition of “victims” for
       § 2B1.1(b)(2) and restitution purposes aren’t identical. Compare
       U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). While reim-
       bursement renders the individual victims ineligible for restitution,
       it doesn’t negate their victim status under § 2B1.1(b)(2). See United
       States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 594 (11th Cir. 2015); Lee, 427 F.3d at
       894–95. Therefore, the district court properly calculated Green’s
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10785

       guidelines by applying a two-level increase for having harmed
       more than ten people.
               Next, Green contends that the district court committed pro-
       cedural error because his sentence reflects an unwarranted dispar-
       ity in comparison to his codefendants. A “well-founded claim” that
       the district court imposed a sentence with an unwarranted dispar-
       ity “assumes that apples are being compared to apples,” meaning
       that the defendant actually is similarly situated to the codefendants
       to whom he wishes to be compared. United States v. Dougherty,
       754 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, we have a case of apples
       and oranges. While Green’s codefendants received lower sen-
       tences than Green, all but one of them entered plea agreements.
       Green, by contrast, pleaded not guilty and went to trial. Green also
       conceded that the one coconspirator who didn’t enter a plea agree-
       ment played a less significant role in the offense than he did. Thus,
       Green’s sentence isn’t unduly disparate as compared to his code-
       fendants because his codefendants weren’t similarly situated to
       him.
              Green further alleges that the district court improperly
       weighed the relevant factors in imposing his sentence because it
       overstated the seriousness of his offense. In particular, he points to
       the district court’s failure to consider his inability to pay restitution
       while in prison, general statistics on recidivism, and his extensive
       employment history and family ties. This Court “commits to the
       sound discretion of the district court the weight to be accorded to
       each § 3553(a) factor,” United States v. Perkins, 787 F.3d 1329, 1342
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       22-10785                 Opinion of the Court                            7

       (11th Cir. 2015), and the district court is “permitted to attach great
       weight to one factor over others,” United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d
       1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). This Court
       will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if [it is] left with the def-
       inite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
       error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
       sentence that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
       by the facts of the case.” United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213,
       1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). The record shows
       the district court carefully weighed several relevant sentencing fac-
       tors. To the extent that the district court didn’t specifically name
       the particular factors that Green now raises on appeal, it wasn’t re-
       quired to. United States v. Dorman, 488 F.3d 936, 944 (11th Cir.
       2007) (holding that the district judge needn’t “state on the record
       that [he] has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to
       discuss each of the[m]”). Thus, we are not left with the “definite
       and firm conviction” that the district court abused its considerable
       discretion.
              Finally, Green contends that his sentence was substantively
       unreasonable because it was “greater than necessary” to fulfill the
       purposes of § 3553(a). “Although we do not automatically pre-
       sume a sentence within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ‘or-
       dinarily . . . expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
       reasonable.’” United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
       2008) (alteration in original). A sentence “at the lowest end of the
       applicable guidelines range” further supports the reasonableness of
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       8                     Opinion of the Court               22-10785

       that sentence. United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1377 (11th
       Cir. 2016). Green was sentenced to the lowest possible sentence
       within his sentencing guidelines range. For all the foregoing rea-
       sons, we have no reason to conclude that the sentence is substan-
       tively unreasonable, especially given the magnitude of Green’s ex-
       pansive mail and wire fraud scheme. Thus, the district court im-
       posed a substantively reasonable sentence, and we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.