Court Opinion

ID: 9697924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:37:13.240248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.261247
License: Public Domain

WENNER, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority has concluded that the question of whether Tognocchi’s use of the Snorkelift to ascertain or illustrate how the Flaharty accident happened was properly submitted to the jury. I most respectfully dissent.
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
Snorkel contends that Tognoechi assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law while attempting to replicate the Flaharty accident. In doing so, Tognoechi drove the Snorkelift down the same ramp and in the same configuration that it had been driven by Flaharty when Flaharty was injured. I agree. In my opinion, just as Ciriago v. State, 57 Md.App. 563, 471 A.2d 320, cert. denied, 300 Md. 152, 476 A.2d 721 (1984), presented us with the “very model of the bona fide inventory of personal *247property ... [and] the very model of the spontaneous blurt,” Id., 57 Md.App. at 566, 471 A.2d 320, we are here presented with the very model of assumption of the risk.
Although I agree with the majority that “[T]he doctrine of assumption of risk will not be applied unless the undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences therefrom clearly establish that the risk of danger was fully known to and understood by the plaintiff,” I believe that that is exactly what we have here.
In the first place, Tognocchi knew the circumstances of Flaharty’s accident. Moreover, it is obvious that Tognocchi was not satisfied with the “clean bill of health” given the Snorkelift by Wampler, although Tognocchi was present during Wampler’s examination of the machine. Despite Wampler’s “clean bill of health,” Tognocchi continued to red-tag the Snorkelift because he believed there was “something peculiar about the brakes and the way the machine stopped.”
Instead of obtaining an outside expert, Tognocchi himself conducted a further investigation of the Snorkelift. After arranging for Young to videotape his examination of the machine, Tognocchi drove the Snorkelift just as Flaharty had driven it. In fact, the transcript of the videotape reveals that Tognocchi reversed the configuration of the Snorkelift and said to Young, “I’m going to take it down the other way. I think we’ll get some more impact. Okay ... I think this is the way it was.” Under these circumstances, it is inconceivable to me that Tognocchi was doing anything other than replicating the Flaharty accident. Consequently, I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that there were several inferences that could have been drawn from Tognocchi’s comment. Thus, I conclude that Tognocchi assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law.
As the Court of Appeals put it recently in Schroyer v. McNeal, 323 Md. 275, 283-284, 592 A.2d 1119 (1991),
The test of whether the plaintiff knows of, and appreciates, the risk involved in a particular situation is an objective one, ... and ordinarily is a question to be resolved by the *248jury---- Thus, “the doctrine of assumption of the risk -will not be applied unless the undisputed evidence and all permissible inferences therefrom dearly establish that the risk of danger was fully known to and understood by the plaintiff----” On the other hand, when it is clear that a person of normal intelligence in the position of the plaintiff must have understood the danger, the issue is for the court. (Emphasis in original. Citations omitted.)
Under the circumstances that I have just described, it is absolutely clear to me that Tognocchi, a person of normal intelligence, must have understood the danger of operating the Snorkelift in the manner in which it had been operated by Flaharty at the time of his accident.
Of course, there are circumstances under which one may knowingly and intentionally undertake an action that he or she knows exposes him or her to risk without foreclosing his or her ability to recover for injuries sustained as a consequence. For example, if a tenant in an apartment complex attempts to traverse an icy sidewalk that is the tenant’s only means of egress from the tenant’s apartment, the doctrine of assumption of the risk would not apply because taking the risk is neither voluntary nor unreasonable. The tenant’s alternative would constitute a form of imprisonment. See, Rountree v. Lerner Dev. Co., 52 Md.App. 281, 285-86, 447 A.2d 902 (1982).
Thus, when one is confronted with a Hobson’s choice, that is, either take a risk or give up a valuable right, e.g., reaching one’s place of employment, the reasonableness of taking the risk is a question for the jury. Nonetheless, Tognocchi was under no such compulsion. I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
Judges Bloom and Harrell have authorized me to say that they join in this dissent.