Court Opinion

ID: 9712151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:47:41.059062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.386774
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Senior Judge,
concurring in result.
I would also affirm the judgment of the trial court, but I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the State's Certificate of Inspection and Compliance of Breath Test Instruments ("Certificate"), which was used in this case to prove that the DataMaster was in compliance with the Department of Toxicology's accuracy requirements, is nontestimonial in nature. I therefore conclude that admission of that document violated Ramirez's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him.
I read the Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), as leading to a result opposite from the result reached by the majority. The certificates of analysis in Melendez-Diaz, and the Certificate in the current case, are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony. Furthermore, just as the certificates in Melendes-Diaz proved a fact necessary for the State's case, specifically that the substance Melendez-Diaz possessed was cocaine, see id. at 2533, the Certificate in this case was necessary to establish that the DataMaster was in compliance with the requirements issued by the Department of Toxicology. See Ind.Code § 9-30-6-5(d).
Furthermore, in Melendez-Diaz, the Court noted that a key consideration for the purposes of Sixth Amendment analysis is whether the creator of the document at issue could have reasonably believed "that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2582 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)) (emphasis added). In the current case, the Certificate plainly provides that it "may be duplicated as needed for use in Court." Appellant's App. p. 98. The Certificate also provides that it is intended "for use pursuant to the Indiana law for implied consent to test for intoxication." Id. Thus, the person who executed the Certificate did so with the understanding that the Certificate was intended to support criminal investigations and prosecutions and would be available for use at a trial.
The Indiana Supreme Court's recent decision in Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703 (Ind.2009), petition for cert. filed, also provides useful guidance. In Pendergrass, a defendant was tried for molesting his daughter. Id. at 704. His daughter had become pregnant and had an abortion, and the State wanted to determine whether the defendant was the father of the aborted *221fetus. Id. Forensic testing was performed, and the State sought to introduce into evidence two documents that were prepared by a forensic analyst at the Indiana State Police Laboratory. Id. One of the documents was a "Certificate of Analysis," which was prepared by a lab analyst and consisted of an inventory of the evidence submitted to the lab, a list of the tests performed, and indications of where the evidence and test results were sent. Id. Our Supreme Court determined that the Certificate of Analysis was testimonial in nature because it fitted "the definition of testimony as clarified by Melendez-Diaz." See id. at 707.
In this case, the signer of the Certificate, like the analyst in Pendergrass, could have reasonably believed that the Certificate would be available for use at a later trial. Furthermore, like the Certificate of Analysis in Pendergrass, the Certificate in this case was the equivalent of live, in-court testimony, doing "precisely what a witness does on direct examination...." Id. at 706 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)) (emphasis omitted). In fact, the circumstances in Ramirez's case are more compelling for the application of Sixth Amendment protections than the circumstances in Pendergrass. The information provided by the Certificate of Analysis in Pendergrass, while no doubt helpful to the State's case, does not appear to have been necessary to prove an element of the offenses at issue or a foundational fact. By contrast, in this case the State submitted the Certificate to prove a statutorily mandated condition to the prosecution of the case, namely that the Data-Master was in compliance with the Department of Toxicology's requirements.
Based on the discussion and holdings in Melendez-Diaz and Pendergrass, I conclude that the Certificate is testimonial in nature. Thus, in my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting State's Exhibit 2, the Certificate, into evi-denee because admission of the Certificate violated Ramirez's Sixth Amendment protections. Without the Certificate, the State presented no evidence to establish that the DataMaster device that Officer Reese used to test Ramirez had been approved in accordance with the rules adopted by the Department of Toxicology. Therefore, the trial court also abused its discretion by admitting State's Eixhibit 6, the DataMaster test results, into evidence. See 1.C. $ 9-830-6-5(d).
I acknowledge this Court's line of cases holding that certificates of inspection and compliance like the Certificate at issue in this case are not testimonial in nature. See Johnson v. State, 879 N.E.2d 649 (Ind.Ct.App.2008); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind.Ct.App.2006); Rembusch v. State, 836 N.E.2d 979 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied, transfer denied; and Napier v. State, 820 N.5.2d 144 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), modified on reh'g, 827 N.E.2d 565 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), transfer denied, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1215, 126 S.Ct. 1437, 164 L.Ed.2d 134 (2006). All of those cases predate Melendez-Diaz and Pendergrass, and I decline to follow them because I conclude that Melendez-Diaz and Pendergrass compel a finding that the Certificate in this case was testimonial in nature.
Although I would hold that the trial court erred by admitting the Certificate and the DataMaster test results, I conclude that in this case the error was harmless. A denial of the right of confrontation is harmless error where the evidence supporting the conviction is so convincing that a jury could not have found otherwise. Garner v. State, 777 N.E.2d 721, 725 (Ind.2002). The record must establish that there is no substantial likelihood that the evidence contributed to the verdiet. Bow*222man v. State, 577 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind.1991).
In this case, the jury found Ramirez guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner endangering a person, a class A misdemeanor, and operating a vehicle while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration equivalent to .08 or more, a class C misdemeanor, but the trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the class A misdemeanor alone. The evidence that supports Ramirez's conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in a manner endangering a person is substantial and convincing. As the majority notes, Officer Reese observed Ramirez's vehicle weave back and forth within its lane and cross over the fog line. Ramirez's car almost hit a curb. After Officer Reese stopped Ramirez, he observed Ramirez display poor manual dexterity while Ramirez retrieved his license. In addition, Ramirez emanated a strong odor of alcohol and had red, bloodshot eyes. Finally, Ramirez failed all three field sobriety tests. Based upon this evidence, I conclude that there is not a substantial likelihood that the erroneously admitted DataMaster test results contributed to Ramirez conviction for the class A misdemeanor charge. Therefore, that conviction may stand despite the erroneous admission of the Data-Master evidence.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in result.