Court Opinion

ID: 9381720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:07:20.958045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.213704
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.C., 2023-Ohio-938.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.C., ET AL.                           :
                                                      No. 111975
Minor Children                               :

[Appeal by M.B., Mother]                     :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 23, 2023

           Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                  Juvenile Division
      Case Nos. AD20908201, AD20908202, AD20908203, AD20908204, and
                                   AD20908205

                                       Appearances:

                 Michael Gordillo, for appellant Mother.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

                    Appellant, M.B., the mother of five minor children, appeals the

juvenile court’s award of permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Department

of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS or the Agency”). M.B. alleges that the

juvenile court’s award of permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We find that the juvenile court’s judgment to award permanent custody

was based on competent, credible evidence in the record. Further we find that the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that permanent custody

was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

juvenile court.

    I.    Procedural History and Relevant Facts

          A. Procedural History

                  On September 24, 2020, the Agency filed five complaints alleging that

each of M.B.’s five children were neglected and dependent requesting temporary

custody of the children. After a hearing held on November 16, 2020, the children

were placed in the temporary custody of the Agency and then on December 15, 2020,

the children were placed in the temporary custody of their paternal grandfather. The

order of temporary custody had been extended twice. On March 16, 2022, the

Agency filed motions to modify temporary custody to permanent custody in each of

the children’s cases.1

          B. Motion for Permanent Custody and Evidence Presented at
             Hearing

                  On June 13, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the motions

for permanent custody. The magistrate issued opinions finding that the children’s

continued residence in or the return to the home of M.B., mother, and to C.C., father,

1 In this matter, the record of proceedings for each of the five children’s individual cases
is nearly identical and M.B. does not raise any individual argument as to any single child’s
case. As such, we will refer to the record and the matter in the singular throughout this
opinion unless necessary to do otherwise.
would be contrary to the children’s best interest and granted permanent custody of

the children to the Agency. M.B. filed objections to the magistrate’s decisions and

on August 23, 2022, the juvenile court overruled the objections and granted the

motions for permanent custody in favor of the Agency.

               At the hearing, the trial court received as exhibits the plea and

sentencing entries from M.B.’s criminal case. The entries indicate that M.B. entered

guilty pleas to six counts of endangering children in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A),

felonies of the third degree, and to the felony offenses of disseminating matter

harmful to juveniles in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3) and cruelty against a

companion animal in violation of R.C. 959.131(C). The offenses to which M.B.

pleaded guilty to occurred over a period of time from on or about May 1, 2019, to

November 16, 2020. M.B. was sentenced to community-control sanctions which

included placement into a sex offender unit for supervision and she was ordered to

have no contact with the victims of her offenses, i.e., her children.

               The juvenile court received testimony from the CCDCFS extended

services worker who was assigned to the children’s family. The worker testified that

she was familiar with the family and that there were five children, then aged 5 to 11

years old, who were all in the temporary custody of the Agency. The children were

placed with their paternal grandparents, their needs, including counseling, were

being met, and they were bonded with their grandparents.

               The extended services worker testified that the children were placed

into temporary custody in part due to M.B.’s substance abuse and parenting issues
along with educational and medical neglect of the children and an inability to meet

the children’s needs. M.B. had a case plan that included referrals for service for M.B.

to address substance abuse issues, parenting and household maintenance, and

meeting her children’s basic needs. The case plan initially had a goal of unification

of the family, but that become unworkable after M.B.’s criminal case.

               M.B. completed a nonintensive outpatient program to address

substance abuse. Because of the no-contact order in the criminal case, M.B. did not

have contact with any of the children since October 2021. The extended services

worker further stated the children were bonded with their grandparents and that the

children’s needs were being met. M.B. also completed a parenting class, but due to

her continuing no-contact order, the Agency could not assess whether she benefitted

from the parenting services she completed or that she could presently meet the

children’s basic needs.

               The guardian ad litem testified to the children’s living environment.

She stated that they received appropriate medical and dental care, including mental

health treatment for several of the children. The guardian ad litem submitted a

recommendation to the court that permanent custody be granted, basing the

recommendation on the children’s need for a stable secure placement. Further, the

guardian ad litem testified that in light of the parents’ criminal convictions and

sentences, they would not be able to provide the care necessary for the children. As

to the children, the guardian ad litem report submitted to the juvenile court noted
that the children “want to speak about how bad their parents were to them and also

indicated fear of removal from their grandparents” home.

         C. Decision Granting Permanent Custody to the Agency

              In awarding permanent custody to the Agency, the juvenile court

determined the allegations within the motions for permanent custody were proven

by clear and convincing evidence. It further found that each of the children had been

in the temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing

agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that reasonable

efforts were made to prevent the continued removal of the children from her home,

or to return the children to the home, and to finalize the permanency plan, to wit:

reunification. It further found that custody with M.B. would be contrary to the

children’s best interest under the factor’s listed within R.C. 2151.414(E) because

M.B. and C.C. had both committed abuse against the children or caused or allowed

the child to suffer neglect and had been convicted of violations of R.C. 2919.22(A),

endangering children, felonies of the third degree; a violation of disseminating

matter harmful to juveniles, a felony of the fourth degree; and cruelty against a

companion animal, a felony of the fourth degree.         The juvenile court further

determined that “the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or
neglect makes the child[ren]’s placement with the child[ren]’s parent a threat to the

child[ren]’s safety.”

               The juvenile court also made the following determination:

      Upon considering the interaction and interrelationship of the child
      with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents; the
      wishes of the child; the custodial history of the child, including whether
      the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services
      agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate
      orders of disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive
      twenty-two month period; the child’s need for a legally secure
      permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be
      achieved without the grant of permanent custody; and, the report of the
      Guardian ad Litem, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence
      that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child
      and the child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. The Court
      further finds, it is in the best interest of the child to be placed in the
      permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and
      Family Services.

The juvenile court explained the reasoning supporting its finding by noting that the

focus of the case was the best interest of the children, that R.C. 2151.414(C) provided

that “the court shall not consider the effect the granting of permanent custody to the

agency would have upon any parent of the child.” It stated that there was clear and

convincing evidence of multiple, independent legal grounds for the granting of

permanent custody and noted the argument of counsel for the grandparents “that

the parents’ request to extend temporary custody to repair the parent-child

relationship is in effect letting the perpetrators of an offense tell this court what

should happen to the victims of their crime.”
   II.      Law and Argument

         A. Assignment of Error

                 M.B.’s sole assignment of error reads:

         The trial court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights is against the
         manifest weight of the evidence.

                 M.B. argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental

rights pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E) because of her criminal convictions without

finding that she posed an ongoing risk to the children and further if the court did

make such finding, that finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She

argues that she demonstrated sobriety to the juvenile court and completed her case

plan.

                 The Agency argues that because M.B. and C.C. were found guilty of an

offense listed within R.C. 2151.414(E)(6), the statute requires the juvenile court to

find that the children could not or should not be placed with their parents and that

the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that permanent custody was

in the children’s best interest.

         B. Relevant Law and Standards of Review

                 R.C. 2151.414(B) provides that permanent custody of a child may be

awarded to a children services agency if the court finds, by clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of

the child to the agency, and (2) that any of the conditions listed in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply. “A juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody
will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence [when] the

record contains competent, credible evidence by which it could have found that the

essential statutory elements for an award of permanent custody have been

established.” In re B.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107732 and 107735, 2019-Ohio-

2919,¶ 22; R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). This court has stated clear and convincing evidence

is

      that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere
      “preponderance of the evidence” but not to the extent of such certainty
      required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will
      produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to
      the facts sought to be established.

In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th Dist.1994), fn. 2, citing

Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979

(1987).

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides the factors to consider when

determining the best interests of a child, it reads:

      (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
      parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
      providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

      (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through
      the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the
      child;

      (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
      been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
      agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of
      a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division
      (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously
      in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state;

      (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
      whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
      permanent custody to the agency;

      (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
      apply in relation to the parents and child.

              When determining the best-interest of a child pursuant to

R.C. 2151.414(D), “[t]he court must consider all of the elements in R.C. 2151.414(D)

as well as other relevant factors. There is not one element that is given greater

weight than the others pursuant to the statute.” In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498,

2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

              If it is in the best interests of a child that permanent custody be

granted, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) provides, in pertinent part, conditions upon

which the juvenile court may grant permanent custody:

      (1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may
      grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines
      at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and
      convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant
      permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for
      permanent custody and that any of the following apply:

      (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
      of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
      temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
      child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

      * * *

      (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
      children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
      or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child
      has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
      services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more
      months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
      division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
      previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another
      state.

               Where a child is the victim of a crime committed by a parent or

parents, R.C. 2151.414(E)(6) provides that the juvenile court is to consider all

relevant evidence as to “whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within

a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents.” The statute

specifically addresses the impact of specific crimes on the trial court’s determination

and reads in relevant part:

      If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing
      held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of
      division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more
      of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall
      enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within
      a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:

      ***

      (6) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense
      under division (A) or (C) of section 2919.22 or under section 2903.16,
      2903.21, 2903.34, 2905.01, 2905.02, 2905.03, 2905.04, 2905.05,
      2907.07, 2907.08, 2907.09, 2907.12, 2907.23, 2907.25, 2907.31,
      2907.32, 2907.321, 2907.322, 2907.323, 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11,
      2911.12, 2919.12, 2919.24, 2919.25, 2923.12, 2923.13, 2923.161,
      2925.02, or 3716.11 of the Revised Code, and the child or a sibling of
      the child was a victim of the offense, or the parent has been convicted
      of or pleaded guilty to an offense under section 2903.04 of the Revised
      Code, a sibling of the child was the victim of the offense, and the parent
      who committed the offense poses an ongoing danger to the child or a
      sibling of the child.

R.C. 2151.414(E).

              An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in

an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority.

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

Such an abuse “‘implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140

(1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).

      C. The Juvenile Court’s Grant of Permanent Custody to the
      Agency Was Based on Credible, Competent Evidence, Was
      Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence, and Did Not
      Constitute an Abuse of the Juvenile Court’s Discretion

              Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B), permanent custody of the children in

this matter could be awarded to the Agency if the juvenile court found by clear and

convincing evidence 1) that any of the conditions listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e)

were present; and 2) that the award of permanent custody is in the best interest of

the children. The children were in Agency custody for 15 months within the past 24

months at the time of the filing of the permanent custody. Accordingly, the trial

court’s finding that the condition listed in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), that the children

were in the temporary custody of the Agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive

22-month period, was met and is not in dispute.
               As to whether the grant of permanent custody was in the best interest

of the children, M.B. argues that the juvenile court erred by finding the children

could not be returned to her on the basis of her criminal convictions without finding

that she posed an ongoing risk to the children. However, the juvenile court made

this specific finding, stating in the journal entries in each of the children’s cases that

“the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or neglect makes

the child[ren]’s placement with the child[ren]’s parent a threat to the child[ren]’s

safety.” M.B. argues that this finding is an abuse of discretion where the juvenile

court received evidence that she completed parenting and substance abuse

programming and demonstrated a period of sobriety to the juvenile court. She

further notes that within the case plan, the Agency made plans to provide visitation

between her and her children, but legally could not allow visitation due to the no-

contact order in place in her criminal cases.

               The Agency argues that because M.B. and C.C. were found guilty of an

offense listed within R.C. 2151.414(E)(6) the juvenile court was required to find that

the children could not or should not be placed with their parents. Further, the

Agency noted that the sentence imposed in the criminal case mandated that M.B.

have no contact with the victims of her crimes, i.e., her children. The Agency argues

that this condition of M.B.’s community-control sanctions support the finding that

M.B. presented an ongoing risk to her children. It further argues that permanent

custody was in the children’s best interest because the children required a

permanent placement, there was no reasonable ground to continue temporary
custody, and the remaining factors to be considered by the juvenile court supported

the finding.

               In making its determination that permanent custody would be in the

best interests of the children in this case, the juvenile court was required pursuant

to R.C. 2151.414(D) to consider the children’s interaction with their parents, siblings,

relatives, the wishes of the children, the custodial history of the child, and the child’s

need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement

can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency, and whether

any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the

parents and child.

               As to the interaction and relationship of the children with their

parents and extended family pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the juvenile court

found that the children were victims of abuse by their parents over a period of time.

Further, the children were placed with their paternal grandparents and that

placement was suitable where the children’s needs were being met.                  As to

consideration of the children’s wishes pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the

juvenile court found that the children wished to remain in their current placement

and did not want to return to the custody of their parents. This finding was

supported by the testimony and report of the guardian ad litem as well as testimony

from the extended services worker.

               The juvenile court’s finding that the children were in temporary

custody under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) is supported by the record and not contested.
The juvenile court’s consideration of the children’s need for a permanent placement

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) and that M.B. or C.C. could not provide the placement

was supported by the sentence imposed in their criminal cases. Although M.B.

argued that the no-contact condition could be changed by the sentencing court,

there was no evidence presented that such change was being pursued or that change

would be made in a reasonable time. Additionally, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E)(6),

the record supported the juvenile court’s finding that the children’s parents pleaded

guilty to multiple violations of R.C. 2919.21(A). Because of these convictions, the

juvenile court was required to find that the children cannot or should not be placed

with either parent within a reasonable time.

               M.B. specifically alleges that the record did not support the

determination that she presented an ongoing risk of harm to her children. However,

the record reflects that M.B. committed multiple criminal offenses against her

children over the course of 18 months. Further M.B. was prohibited from contact

with her children as a condition of her criminal sentence for a period of time up to

five years. In light of this evidence, we cannot say the juvenile court’s determination

that “the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or neglect

makes the child[ren]’s placement with the child[ren]’s parent a threat to the

child[ren]’s safety” was an abuse of discretion.

               The juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent custody was based

upon a review of the appropriate statutory considerations and supported by

competent, credible evidence. Accordingly, we do not find the judgment is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. In re B.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107732 and

107735, 2019-Ohio-2919, at ¶ 22.      The record reflects that the juvenile court

considered the appropriate factors in determining that permanent custody was in

the best interest of the children. Further, the record contains competent, credible

evidence that supports the juvenile court’s determination.

               The sole assignment of error presented is overruled.

   III.   Conclusion

               We find that the juvenile court’s judgment to award permanent

custody was based on competent, credible evidence in the record. Further, we find

that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that permanent

custody was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

the juvenile court.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR