Court Opinion

ID: 9384346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 17:01:20.585786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.895032
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         APR 3 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    22-30053

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                4:20-cr-00058-BMM-2
 v.

RICK JOHN MORALES, Jr.,                         MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the District of Montana
                    Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 10, 2023**
                               Portland, Oregon

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FORREST and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Rick John Morales, Jr., appeals the district court’s denial of his (1) motion in

limine to exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and (2) motion

to dismiss the indictment for a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the reasons below, we

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
                                          1
affirm.

      1.     The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Morales’s

motion in limine to exclude “other bad act” evidence under Rule 404(b).1 United

States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2013). Under that rule,

evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove character but may be admissible

for other purposes, including proving motive and identity. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

Other-act evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) if “(1) the evidence tends to

prove a material point; (2) the prior act is not too remote in time; (3) the evidence

is sufficient to support a finding that defendant committed the other act; and (4) (in

cases where knowledge and intent are at issue) the act is similar to the offense

charged.” United States v. Mayans, 17 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994); see also

United States v. Lague, 971 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2020).

      In this case, the district court permitted the government to introduce

evidence of an altercation between Morales, the victim, and a third party that

occurred at the victim’s home on the day before the charged assault in this case.

Morales contends that the district court abused its discretion because, in Morales’s

view, this evidence of the prior altercation did not tend to prove any material point.

1
 The government also contends that the district court properly admitted the other-
act evidence because it is inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes. We
need not decide that issue because we conclude the evidence was admissible under
Rule 404(b).

                                          2
We disagree. We “afford broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings,”

and that is “particularly true with respect to Rule 403 since it requires an ‘on-the-

spot balancing of probative value and prejudice, potentially to exclude as unduly

prejudicial some evidence that already has been found to be factually relevant.’”

Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) (quoting 1 S.

Childress & M. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.02, p. 4–16 (3d ed. 1999)).

The evidence of the prior altercation was relevant to proving Morales’s motive and

involvement in the crime, which Morales disputed. See, e.g., United States v.

Bowman, 720 F.2d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Although the victim in the prior

case was not involved here, there was a sufficient factual relationship between the

two incidents to render the prior conviction relevant to the issue of [the

defendant’s] motive for the assault upon [the victim].”). The evidence makes it

more probable that Morales participated in the alleged assault because he felt he

had been “set up” by the victim. Morales also contends that the evidence of the

prior altercation was dissimilar to the charged crime of assault. Even assuming that

knowledge and intent are at issue, so that similarity is required, the prior altercation

and the charged crime of assault are sufficiently similar because they involved

some of the same parties at the same location. See United States v. Berckmann, 971

F.3d 999, 1002 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Morales alternatively contends that the district court abused its discretion by

                                           3
failing to determine whether the prior-altercation evidence’s probative value was

“substantially outweighed” by the risk of undue prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. We

disagree. Although the district court did not explicitly “recite the Rule 403 test

when balancing the probative value of evidence against its potential for unfair

prejudice,” it did not need to, because we “can conclude, based on a review of the

record, that the district court considered Rule 403’s requirements.” United States v.

Gomez, 725 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). During the hearing on Morales’s motion in limine, counsel for Morales

thoroughly argued that the evidence was unduly prejudicial and should be excluded

under Rule 403, and the court expressly discussed both the probative value of the

evidence, and its potential for undue prejudice.2

      The district court acted within its broad discretion when it concluded that the

evidence’s probative value was not “substantially outweighed” by the risk of undue

prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. The evidence was highly probative of Morales’s

motive and state of mind at the time of the charged assault. Additionally, the court

mitigated any risk of unfair prejudice by offering to give a limiting instruction to

the jury explaining that the evidence could be considered only for proper purposes.

See Berckmann, 971 F.3d at 1004 (evidence of prior acts of domestic violence was

2
 Morales argued only that the evidence was prejudicial and did not raise any of the
other Rule 403 factors.

                                           4
not unfairly prejudicial when court gave limiting instruction on three separate

occasions).

      2.      The district court did not err in denying Morales’s motion to dismiss

the indictment for violation of the Speedy Trial Act.3 The Speedy Trial Act excepts

from the seventy-day speedy trial clock “[a]ny period of delay resulting from

the . . . unavailability of . . . an essential witness.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(A). A

witness is unavailable when “his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial

cannot be obtained by due diligence . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(B). The district

court found that Dr. Richardson was an essential witness and that the government

acted with due diligence in attempting to procure his presence for trial. We review

those factual findings for clear error. United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192

(9th Cir. 2009).

      The district court did not clearly err in finding that Dr. Richardson was an

essential witness. Dr. Richardson performed life-saving surgery on the victim after

the assault and would testify about the severity of his injuries, which is relevant to

proving the element of serious bodily injury. Morales argues that Dr. Richardson

was not an essential witness because his testimony would be cumulative to that of

another witness, Physician Assistant (PA) Hansen. We disagree. Although both

3
 Morales does not argue on appeal that the continuance of the trial violated his
constitutional right to speedy trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972).

                                           5
witnesses would testify to the same element (serious bodily injury), Dr.

Richardson’s testimony was qualitatively different from PA Hansen’s because PA

Hansen only provided care to the victim during his stay at a rehabilitation clinic.

Morales cites no authority that two witnesses’ overlapping testimony disqualifies

either as an essential witness for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. Cf. United

States v. Miles, 290 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A witness may be deemed

essential for the purposes of the Act, even though the government could obtain a

conviction without his testimony.” (collecting cases)).

      The district court also did not clearly err in finding that Dr. Richardson was

“unavailable” under the Act. The record establishes that the government promptly

communicated with Dr. Richardson about his availability to testify, and that Dr.

Richardson’s staff represented that he was not available until certain weeks in

October because of his surgery and on-call schedule.4 Morales contends that the

government failed to exercise due diligence because it accepted the staff’s

representation about Dr. Richardson’s availability without further inquiry, but

Morales does not dispute that Dr. Richardson was, in fact, unavailable. The record

sufficiently supports the district court’s finding that the government exercised due

diligence.

4
 The government then offered two October trial dates, and Morales rejected the
earlier date.

                                          6
      Because we conclude that no violation of the Speedy Trial Act occurred, we

need not address Morales’s contention that the statute required dismissal with

prejudice.

      AFFIRMED.

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