Court Opinion

ID: 9633604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:54:01.329535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:17.136075
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from Part IV of the majority opinion. I believe the case of Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984) is controlling.
In Hartley, we also were concerned with the construction of I.C. §§ 72-332 and -422. The language “permanent physical impairment” used in I.C. § 72-332(2), is the key, and although the definition of “permanent impairment” in I.C. § 72-422 incorporated by reference in I.C. § 72-332, does not use the word “physical,” the legislature intended the plain meaning of that word as used in I.C. § 72-332(2) to be controlling.
*852The Industrial Commission in Hartley found that the claimant was totally and permanently disabled due to the combined effects of a knee injury, a preexisting knee injury and a preexisting personality disorder. The claimant’s mental disorder was termed an avoidance personality disorder, the symptoms of which include “hypersensitivity to potential rejection, unwillingness to enter relationships, depression, humiliation, anxiety, anger and an impaired ability to function socially.” Hartley, supra, 107 Idaho at 689, 692 P.2d at 333. Because of the preexisting conditions, the Commission, as here, apportioned liability for the total permanent disability between the employer/ surety and the ISIF pursuant to I.C. § 72-332. The ISIF appealed, contending that the Commission erred in that the claimant’s personality disorder did not constitute a permanent physical impairment within the meaning of I.C. § 72-332. This Court reversed and remanded the case to the Commission, stating:
[T]he definition of preexisting permanent physical impairment, as stated in I.C. § 72-422 and incorporated by reference into I.C. § 72-332, does not expressly limit that term to physical, i.e., anatomical, impairments. Nonetheless, the fund argues that the word “physical” would not appear in the phrase “permanent physical impairment” within I.C. § 72-332, had not the legislature intended some significance thereby. We agree. This Court will assume that the legislature intended what it said in a statute, and we will construe statutory terms according to their plain, obvious, and rational meanings. (Citations omitted.) We will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of the provisions included therein. (Citations omitted.) Therefore, we discern that the legislature intended the usual, common meaning of the word “physical” when it used that word in I.C. § 72-332. This interpretation of the preexisting physical impairment language in that statute is consistent with our requirement in other cases that the preexisting physical impairment be manifest. (Citations omitted.) 107 Idaho at 690, 692 P.2d at 334.
The reasoning in Hartley is equally applicable here. Claimant Mapusaga reasons that her mental disorder is a preexisting condition contributing to her total and permanent disability, but because she exhibits no physical manifestations of her disorder, such disorder is not compensable under I.C. § 72-332.
The majority opinion asserts that Paulson v. Idaho Forest Industries Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979) and Bartel v. J.R. Simplot Co., 106 Idaho 174, 677 P.2d 487 (1984), support the majority’s conclusion that claimant’s psychological disorder should be included as a non-medical factor in determining disability. I disagree. The majority has failed to recognize that in both Paulson and Bartel, the mental disorders were the result of the industrial injury which the claimant in each case had suffered. The instant case is of course different in nature in that Mapusaga’s mental condition predated the injury to her back while employed at Red Lion. Thus, the instant case is indistinguishable from Hartley, wherein the claimant’s mental condition also predated the industrial injury to his knee.
I would reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission as to that portion discussed and affirmed in Part IV of the majority decision.