Court Opinion

ID: 9678771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:31:48.220791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:07.803468
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
Evidence of a victim’s threats against the defendant, while not admissible to prove the character of the victim to show that he acted in conformity therewith,
*194may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident....
Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 404(b). Thus, as appellant argues, evidence of the victim’s threats may be admissible if they have relevance apart from a tendency to prove character conformity. The Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the admissibility of the questioned evidence under this portion of Rule 404(b). To this extent I agree with the majority.
The majority goes on to examine whether the evidence has relevance beyond character conformity. Majority op. at 198. The Court of Appeals ought to have the opportunity to address this question in the first instance.1
I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that Court to consider whether there is an “other purpose” for which the evidence has relevance, apart from character conformity.2

. The Court of Appeals recognized the victim’s character was relevant "to support the inference that he acted in conformity with his character; that is, was the aggressor as the defendant claims." 956 S.W.2d at 847. But, that court concluded, under Rule 404(b), despite its relevance in showing character conformity, such evidence was inadmissible for that purpose, op. at 848. They did not further question any other relevance of or purpose for such evidence. It is possible that court does not believe such evidence has other relevance.

. The majority decides the question of "other purposes” in the first instance, and vacates and remands to the Court of Appeals with instructions to conduct a harm analysis. I concur in the majority’s action to vacate and remand, but dissent to the content of the majority’s instructions to the Court of Appeals.