Court Opinion

ID: 9957429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 15:12:30.041176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:20.102229
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wood Brothers Bar, Inc.,                      :
                 Appellant                    :
                                              :
       v.                                     : Nos. 1406 and 1407 C.D. 2021
                                              :
Pennsylvania State Police Bureau              :
of Liquor Control Enforcement                 : Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
                HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                     FILED: April 4, 2024

       Wood Brothers Bar, Inc. (Licensee), appeals the November 9, 2021 order of
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), denying, in part,
Licensee’s appeal from a decision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board
(PLCB), which found Licensee served a visibly intoxicated person (VIP), in
violation of Section 493(1) of the Liquor Code.1 The trial court granted, in part,
Licensee’s appeal by modifying the fine imposed from $650.00 to $50.00, because
Licensee had no similar violations within the preceding four-year period.
Additionally, the trial court affirmed the PLCB’s decision dismissing as untimely
Licensee’s appeal of a citation issued for violating the restrictions on amplified
music set forth in Section 493(34) of the Liquor Code.2

       1
           Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. § 4-493(1).

       2
        47 P.S. § 4-493(34). Section 493(34) of the Liquor Code prohibits a licensee from using
a loudspeaker or other device that allows the sound of music or other entertainment to be heard
beyond the licensee’s property line.
       Also before this Court is a Motion to Quash Licensee’s appeal filed by the
Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement (BLCE),
which argues that Licensee failed to preserve the issues raised in its appeal because
Licensee’s Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Statement of Errors) was
untimely.
       The issues before this Court are whether Licensee waived the issues raised in
this appeal, having filed its Statement of Errors one day late, or whether Licensee’s
Statement of Errors should be accepted nunc pro tunc. Should this Court grant
Licensee nunc pro tunc relief, Licensee argues that the trial court’s findings of fact
are not supported by substantial evidence. After careful review, we grant BLCE’s
Motion to Quash Licensee’s appeal.3
                                          I. Background
       Licensee operates Woody’s, a bar located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On
April 3, 2018, the BLCE issued a citation alleging that a VIP was served alcohol at
Woody’s on January 17, 2018, in violation of Section 493(1) of the Liquor Code.

       3
          Licensee’s brief does not address whether the trial court erred in dismissing Licensee’s
appeal of the amplified music violations as untimely. Therefore, this issue is waived, and we will
not address it further, or summarize the evidence relating to the amplified music violations.
Browne v. Dep’t of Transp., 843 A.2d 429, 435 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (waiver occurs when a party
elects to file a brief but fails to effectively set forth argument on an issue).

        Even if Licensee had not waived the issue, it would not be entitled to nunc pro tunc relief,
which is appropriate where an appeal is untimely due to non-negligent circumstances, as they relate
to the appellant or the appellant’s counsel, where the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed shortly
after the expiration date, and where the appellee is not prejudiced by the delay. Criss v. Wise, 781
A.2d 1156, 1159 (Pa. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Licensee argued before the trial court that
it received an administrative law judge’s (ALJ) adjudication of the amplified music violations in
the same envelope as the ALJ’s VIP adjudication. Licensee mistakenly believed the enclosed
papers only related to the VIP adjudication, and, therefore, its appeal of the amplified music
violations was filed with the PLCB six days late. Licensee’s failure to thoroughly inspect the
contents of the envelope mailed by the ALJ does not constitute non-negligent circumstances that
warrant an appeal nunc pro tunc.

                                                 2
The ALJ conducted a hearing on January 22, 2020, at which the BLCE presented the
testimony of Michelle Cooke, a liquor enforcement officer with the BLCE. Licensee
presented the testimony of Rob Cosme, a former bartender at Woody’s, who worked
on the evening of January 17, 2018, and Martin Gillespie, a supervisor for Woody’s
who also worked that evening.
       Officer Cooke testified that she entered Woody’s on January 17, 2018, at
approximately 8:00 p.m., accompanied by her field training officer, John Bernesky.
Officer Cooke’s attention was drawn to a male patron named Sean 4 sitting four
barstools to her right, who swayed on a barstool and “looked very unstable.”
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 27a. A can of Red Bull and a cocktail glass sat on the
bar in front of him. Officer Cooke overheard Sean speaking with the bartender, Mr.
Cosme, and she observed that Sean’s speech was slurred. Sean ordered two shots,
one of which he consumed. Mr. Cosme drank the other shot. Officer Cooke
determined that Sean was visibly intoxicated when he stumbled after attempting to
stand. Sean appeared to have difficulty putting his jacket on and he staggered while
walking to the exit door. Officer Cooke overheard Sean say prior to exiting the bar,
“thank God I’m walking home[,] I’m drunk.” Id. at 35a. At the time, Sean was
approximately five feet from Officer Cooke and three feet from Mr. Cosme, who
stood at the register. Officer Cooke observed Sean smoke a cigarette in the
designated smoking area located outside and reenter the premises. Officer Cooke
stated that Sean “almost missed” the barstool when he sat down. Id. at 32a. Mr.
Cosme approached and took Sean’s order, which consisted of “a very generous
amount” of Ketel One vodka topped with Red Bull. Id. After consuming his
beverage, Sean “stumbled over” to the stage to participate in a karaoke event taking

       4
          Officer Cooke did not speak with the patron, but he responded to the name “Sean” when
called to participate in karaoke. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 48a.

                                              3
place that night. Id. at 33a. Officer Cooke described Sean as staggering and
“tripping over his own feet.” Id. She advised that Sean’s singing was unintelligible,
“like there were marbles in his mouth[,]” and he could not keep up with the lyrics
on the karaoke screen. Id. at 34a. After Sean finished singing, he “staggered back
to his barstool.” Id. Officer Cooke’s investigation lasted an hour. She stated that
she had eyes on Sean throughout the hour-long investigation.
      On cross-examination, Officer Cooke acknowledged that she had only been
an officer for a month on January 17, 2018, and that this was her first investigation
of a VIP. Officer Cooke agreed that she did not know what Sean had been drinking
when she first arrived at Woody’s. Officer Cooke also agreed that she did not
communicate with Sean during the one-hour investigation, and she did not obtain
Sean’s blood alcohol content that night.
      Mr. Cosme testified that Woody’s had between 10 and 12 patrons on January
17, 2018, and that he was the only bartender working that night. On a busy night,
Woody’s typically has over 100 patrons. Mr. Cosme did not recall seeing Officer
Cooke, but he did remember seeing Sean. Mr. Cosme admitted drinking a shot with
Sean, which resulted in the termination of his employment with Woody’s. Mr.
Cosme acknowledged having served Sean a two-ounce shot of vodka and a “vodka
Red Bull,” but he denied that Sean was visibly intoxicated at the time. Id. at 72a.
Mr. Cosme was certified by the Responsible Alcohol Management Program
(RAMP), during which he received training on how to identify a VIP. Mr. Cosme
estimated that during a busy shift, he would refuse service to at least 10 patrons
based on a determination that they were visibly intoxicated.
      Mr. Gillespie testified that he was seated at the bar in Woody’s for a business
meeting that began at 7:00 p.m. and lasted for two hours. Mr. Gillespie also met

                                           4
with an alcohol distributor later that evening. He did not notice any patrons who
could be described as stumbling or falling and visibly intoxicated.
      An ALJ for the PLCB sustained the citation and ordered Licensee to comply
with RAMP for one year and pay a fine of $650.00. Licensee filed a timely appeal
to the PLCB, which sustained the ALJ’s adjudication. Licensee appealed to the trial
court, which considered the record before the ALJ as well as testimony presented
during an October 26, 2021 de novo evidentiary hearing.
      Officer Cooke testified briefly during the October 26, 2021 hearing that she
worked as a cocktail waitress prior to her employment with the BLCE. In her
capacity as a cocktail waitress, Officer Cooke had occasion to observe intoxicated
individuals. She also received RAMP training in that position, which enabled her to
identify individuals who are visibly intoxicated. Officer Cooke conceded that the
first citation she issued as an officer with the BLCE was the VIP violation stemming
from the January 17, 2018 investigation. Officer Cooke’s decision to issue the VIP
violation citation, however, was made in consultation with Officer Bernesky.
      Mr. Gillespie also testified before the trial court on October 26, 2021. Mr.
Gillespie advised that, prior to his employment at Woody’s, he worked as a police
officer in Florida, and was familiar with identifying individuals who were
intoxicated.   Mr. Gillespie stated that determining whether an individual is
intoxicated requires interaction with that person, such as observing how the
individual responds to questions and whether he or she smells of alcohol. Mr.
Gillespie described the interior design of Woody’s as an open concept, which
allowed one to see the entire space from any seat. Regarding the evening of January
17, 2018, Mr. Gillespie did not recall seeing anyone fitting Sean’s description in the

                                          5
bar, and Mr. Gillespie did not see any visibly intoxicated patrons during his shift.
Mr. Gillespie did not observe Mr. Cosme drink a shot with Sean.
      Based on the record from the ALJ and the testimony presented at the de novo
hearing, the trial court affirmed the PLCB’s decision on the VIP violation but
reduced the fine from $650.00 to $50.00.              Licensee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the trial court denied. Following Licensee’s appeal to this
Court, the trial court issued an order on December 14, 2021, directing that Licensee
file its Statement of Errors within 21 days. The trial court’s order specified that
“[a]ny issues not properly included in the Statement [of Errors] timely filed and
served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) shall be deemed waived.” Original Record
(O.R.), Item No. 19. Licensee filed its Statement of Errors one day late, on January
5, 2022.
      In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
acknowledged the untimeliness of Licensee’s Statement of Errors. However, given
the delay was only one day and the 21-day period for filing the Statement of Errors
included the holiday season, the trial court elected to address the merits of Licensee’s
appeal and “leave it to” this Court to determine whether Licensee waived the issues
raised. R.R. at 368a. As to the VIP violation, the trial court found that Officer Cooke
testified consistently and with specific detail regarding the evening of January 17,
2018, and that no part of her testimony cast doubt on her memory. The trial court
rejected any suggestion that Officer Cooke’s inexperience, in the absence of
contradictory testimony, should affect her credibility. Additionally, the trial court
accepted that Officer Cooke would not have taken any action against Licensee
without input from Officer Bernesky. Based on the record before the ALJ and the
live testimony presented at the October 26, 2021 de novo hearing, the trial court

                                           6
concluded that the evidence “overwhelmingly demonstrated” that Licensee
knowingly served a VIP. Id. at 366a.
      The PLCB filed a Motion to Quash Licensee’s appeal, arguing that Licensee
waived all issues raised, having filed an untimely Statement of Errors. This Court
granted the PLCB’s Motion to Quash on June 10, 2022. Licensee filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that its counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to file
the Statement of Errors on the evening of January 4, 2022. Because the Office of
Judicial Records (OJR) was closed for the day, Licensee’s counsel was unable to
obtain technical assistance. Therefore, Licensee’s counsel emailed the Statement of
Errors to the trial court that evening. The Statement of Errors was successfully filed
the next morning, on January 5, 2022. Based on Licensee’s averments, this Court
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Licensee should be
permitted to file its Statement of Errors nunc pro tunc.
      The trial court conducted hearings on September 28, 2022, and October 12,
2022, at which Steve Wulko, the former deputy director of the OJR, testified
regarding the OJR’s electronic filing system.
      Licensee’s counsel, John Griffin, advised that his secretary attempted to file
the Statement of Errors at 10:12 p.m. on January 4, 2022; however, technical issues
arose, and the filing was not completed. As a result, Mr. Griffin emailed a copy of
the Statement of Errors to the trial court and successfully filed the Statement of
Errors the next day. Mr. Griffin argued that the purpose of a Statement of Errors is
to provide the trial court with the issues that a party intends to raise on appeal, which
the trial court may then address in its 1925(a) opinion. Mr. Griffin argued that the
trial court did not suffer any prejudice by the one-day delay in filing the Statement
of Errors, as the trial court did, in fact, address the merits of Licensee’s appeal in its

                                            7
1925(a) opinion. Counsel for the PLCB countered that the standard for nunc pro
tunc relief would require an administrative breakdown on the OJR’s part, and
Pa.R.Civ.P. 205.4(e)(1) expressly provides that a party filing documents
electronically is responsible for any delay or disruption in filing unless the delay is
“caused by the failure of the electronic filing system’s website.”
      Mr. Wulko testified that he is familiar with the OJR’s electronic filing system.
To his knowledge, the system did not experience any system outage on January 4,
2022, and the OJR’s information technology (IT) department did not record any such
outage having occurred that night. Mr. Wulko reviewed screenshots of Licensee’s
filing history with the OJR, which indicated that Licensee created two filings on
January 4, 2022; however, those filings were not submitted to OJR and remained in
draft status. Two additional filings were created by Licensee and submitted to OJR
on January 5, 2022, which accepted the filings later that day. Mr. Wulko could not
say whether the January 5, 2022 filings were identical to those created the previous
day. Mr. Wulko advised that draft documents that are uploaded to the electronic
filing system but remain in draft status are eventually purged from the system.
Therefore, Mr. Wulko could not verify whether any documents were uploaded with
the filings created by Licensee’s counsel on January 4, 2022.
      The trial court issued a supplemental 1925(a) opinion October 28, 2022,
which concluded that Licensee should be permitted to file its Statement of Errors
nunc pro tunc. The trial court noted that Licensee’s counsel emailed the trial court
a copy of its Statement of Errors the evening of January 4, 2022, advising the trial
court that he had difficulty electronically filing the document, and that Licensee’s
counsel successfully filed the Statement of Errors the next morning on January 5,
2022. Based on Mr. Wulko’s testimony, the trial court agreed that an administrative

                                          8
breakdown prevented Licensee from filing its Statement of Errors on January 4,
2022. Although the trial court acknowledged it was not advisable to wait until after
the close of business to file the Statement of Errors, Licensee’s counsel acted
diligently by advising the trial court of the technical issues encountered during the
filing process and, ultimately, filing the Statement of Errors on January 5, 2022.
                                                II. Issues
       On appeal, Licensee argues that this Court should deny the PLCB’s Motion
to Quash because the trial court accepted Licensee’s Statement of Errors as timely
filed nunc pro tunc. Additionally, Licensee argues that the trial court’s findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.
                                         III.     Discussion
       At the outset, we must address the PLCB’s Motion to Quash and whether the
trial court erred in permitting Licensee to file its Statement of Errors nunc pro tunc.5
In arguing that the trial court correctly accepted Licensee’s Statement of Errors nunc
pro tunc, Licensee relies on the testimony presented at the September 28, 2022 and
October 12, 2022 hearings before the trial court. Licensee does not otherwise
analyze the requirements for a grant of nunc pro tunc relief.
       The standard for nunc pro tunc relief when filing a late Rule 1925(b) statement
is identical to that which is applied to an untimely appeal.6 A party must strictly
adhere to the statutory provisions for filing an appeal, and the time for taking an

       5
         Where the trial court permits an untimely filing nunc pro tunc, our review is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Puckett v.
Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 804 A.2d 140, 143 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

       6
          A note to Rule 1925(b)(2) pertinently provides that nunc pro tunc relief is generally
allowed only when there has been a breakdown in the process that constitutes extraordinary
circumstances. See, e.g., In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843
A.2d 1223, 1234 (Pa. 2004) (a fraudulent, wrongful, or negligent act by a court official may justify
the filing of an appeal nunc pro tunc).

                                                  9
appeal will not be extended as a matter of grace or mere indulgence. Criss, 781 at
1159. A nunc pro tunc appeal acts as an exception to this general rule, vindicating
the right to appeal that was lost due to extraordinary circumstances. Union Elec.
Corp. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Rev. of Allegheny Cnty., 746 A.2d 581,
584 (Pa. 2000). An appeal nunc pro tunc may be granted upon a showing that
extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from filing a timely appeal.      In re
Borough of Riegelsville from Bucks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment & Revision of Taxes,
979 A.2d 399, 402-03 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (internal citations omitted).             The
procedural circumstances of the appeal must be extraordinary, not the merits or
perceived importance of the underlying issues. Bethke v. City of Phila., 282 A.3d
884, 890 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Generally, an appeal nunc pro tunc is only granted
in civil cases where fraud or a breakdown in the court’s operations occurred. Com.
v. Stock, 679 A.2d 760, 763 (Pa. 1996).
      Nunc pro tunc relief is also appropriate where an appeal is untimely due to
non-negligent circumstances, as they relate to the appellant or the appellant’s
counsel, where the appellant’s notice of appeal was filed shortly after the expiration
date, and where the appellee is not prejudiced by the delay. Criss, 781 A.2d at 1159.
A nunc pro tunc appeal in non-negligent circumstances only applies “in unique and
compelling cases” in which the appellant establishes that it attempted to file an
appeal but was precluded from doing so by “unforeseeable and unavoidable
events[.]” Id. at 1160. Furthermore, the appellant must demonstrate that the delay
in filing is not attributable to the appellant’s negligence. Cook v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev., 671 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1996). The party seeking relief bears the
burden of demonstrating that it meets the requirements for nunc pro tunc relief.
Criss, 781 A.2d at 1159.

                                          10
      Instantly, the trial court entered an order on December 14, 2021, directing that
Licensee file its Statement of Errors within 21 days. The order further provided that
“[a]ny issues not properly included in the [Statement of Errors] timely filed and
served . . . shall be deemed waived.” O.R., Item No. 19. There is no dispute that
Licensee filed its Statement of Errors on January 5, 2022, or 22 days after the trial
court issued its order.
      The trial court recognized in its supplemental 1925(a) opinion that the OJR’s
electronic filing system was “fully functional” on January 4, 2022, but it credited the
explanation of Licensee’s counsel that he attempted to file the Statement of Errors
but was unable to do so.      R.R. at 379a. Thereafter, Licensee’s counsel acted
diligently to advise the trial court of the technical problem he encountered, and he
successfully filed the Statement of Errors the following day. Although the trial court
accepted that this technical problem did not originate with the OJR, the trial court
nevertheless concluded that a “breakdown” prevented Licensee’s counsel from filing
its Statement of Errors on January 4, 2022. Id.
      We disagree with the trial court that these circumstances warrant nunc pro
tunc relief. While the record demonstrates that Licensee’s counsel apprised the trial
court on the evening of January 4, 2022, that he was unable to file the Statement of
Errors, and that he forwarded the trial court a copy of that document, there is no
evidence to suggest that an administrative breakdown in the trial court or the OJR’s
electronic filing system precluded Licensee’s counsel from timely filing the
Statement of Errors. Moreover, Licensee’s counsel did not attempt to file the
Statement of Errors until after the close of business on January 4, 2022. The
potential for technical issues arising at a time when assistance from the OJR’s IT
department would be unavailable is neither unforeseeable nor unavoidable.

                                          11
      Even if this Court accepted the trial court’s conclusion that Licensee was
entitled to file its Statement of Errors nunc pro tunc, Licensee’s appeal of the VIP
adjudication would fail.
      In that regard, Licensee argues that substantial evidence does not support the
trial court’s decision affirming the ALJ’s adjudication, as the BLCE’s evidence
consisted solely of Officer Cooke’s uncorroborated testimony. Licensee suggests
that the trial court should have favored the testimony of Licensee’s employee, Mr.
Gillespie, over that of Officer Cooke, given Mr. Gillespie’s greater experience
identifying intoxicated persons. Licensee also argues that the trial court made an
impermissible inference that Officer Bernesky supported Officer Cooke’s decision
to issue a citation for the VIP violation.
      In a de novo hearing, the trial court may consider both the record submitted
by the PLCB and any additional evidence received at the de novo hearing before
making its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pa. State Police, Bureau of
Liquor Enf’t v. Kelly’s Bar, Inc., 639 A.2d 440, 442 (Pa. 1994). The trial court, as
the ultimate finder of fact, is empowered to determine the weight and credibility of
the evidence, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and is free to reject even
uncontroverted evidence. Hotel Liquor License # H-2892 v. Tabs Ent., Inc., 125
A.3d 487, 490 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). It is also within the trial court’s exclusive
province to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Earl Twp. v. Reading
Broadcasting, Inc., 770 A.2d 794, 798 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Our review in a Liquor
Code enforcement appeal is limited to determining whether the trial court committed
an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control
Enf’t v. Big D. Rests., LLC, 149 A.3d 890, 896 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). In reviewing
evidentiary issues, this Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports

                                             12
the factual findings of the trial court. Pa. State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control
Enf’t v. Goodfellas, Inc., 850 A.2d 868, 872-73 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
      Licensee is correct that, during the October 26, 2021 de novo hearing, the trial
court stated it would draw a “reasonable inference” that Officer Cooke would not
have taken the actions she did without agreement from her field training officer,
Officer Bernesky, whom the trial court felt would have otherwise “stepped in and
taken some kind of action.” R.R. at 258a-59a. This inference is supported, however,
by Officer Cooke’s acknowledgment that her decision to cite Licensee for the VIP
violation was made in consultation with Officer Bernesky. It is also noteworthy that
Officer Bernesky was available to testify at the trial court’s October 26, 2021
hearing. Although the trial court stressed Officer Bernesky’s availability at the time
it drew the reasonable inference that Officer Bernesky agreed with Officer Cooke’s
actions, Licensee’s counsel indicated he had “no interest in questioning” Officer
Bernesky, who was then excused from testifying. Id. at 259a.
      Ultimately, Licensee is requesting that this Court reweigh the evidence and
substitute our credibility findings for that of the trial court. That is not our role;
rather we are to determine whether the trial court’s findings have the requisite
measure of support in the record. The trial court fully articulated its reasons for
crediting Officer Cooke’s testimony, despite her lack of experience working for the
BLCE. Officer Cooke observed Sean, the VIP, for an hour, during which he had
difficulty standing and walking, and spoke with slurred speech.       Officer Cooke
testified that Sean staggered outside the bar, where he smoked a cigarette. Upon
reentering the bar, Sean nearly missed the barstool when he sat down. Thereafter,
Mr. Cosme served Sean a vodka with Red Bull. It is noteworthy that Mr. Gillespie
testified he was seated at the bar throughout this period, during which Mr. Cosme

                                         13
admitted to consuming a shot with Sean. Although Officer Cooke testified that she
saw Mr. Cosme drinking, Mr. Gillespie did not.
      Having reviewed the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s November 9, 2021 order, which denied Licensee’s appeal of the VIP
adjudication, in part, and granted the appeal to the extent the fine was reduced to
$50.00.
                                 IV.    Conclusion
      Although substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order, Licensee’s
Statement of Errors was untimely. As Licensee has not demonstrated that it is
entitled to nunc pro tunc relief, we grant the BLCE’s Motion to Quash Licensee’s
appeal.

                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                        14
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Wood Brothers Bar, Inc.,            :
                 Appellant          :
                                    :
      v.                            : Nos. 1406 and 1407 C.D. 2021
                                    :
Pennsylvania State Police Bureau    :
of Liquor Control Enforcement       :

                                   ORDER

      AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2024, the Pennsylvania State Police Bureau
of Liquor Control Enforcement’s Motion to Quash the appeal of Wood Brothers Bar,
Inc. is hereby GRANTED. The appeal is QUASHED.

                                    ELLEN CEISLER, Judge