Court Opinion

ID: 9950424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 21:04:41.654953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:08.476320
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 210907-U

                                             No. 1-21-0907

                                                                            THIRD DIVISION
                                                                              March 13, 2024

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
     the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                             IN THE
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                         FIRST DISTRICT

                                                      )
     PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                 )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                      )      of Cook County.
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )      No. 04 CR 18035
     v.                                               )
                                                      )      Honorable
     JUAN RODRIGUEZ,                                  )      Diane Gordon Cannon,
                                                      )      Adrienne E. Davis,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )      Judges, Presiding

             JUSTICE D.B. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
             Justices Mikva and Van Tine concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

          Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order denying defendant relief on his postconviction
          petition. We correct the mittimus to reflect that defendant’s 6-year sentence for aggravated
          battery with a firearm and 5-year sentence for aggravated discharge of a firearm are to run
          concurrently with one another, and consecutively with his 21-year sentence for first-degree
          murder.

¶1           Defendant Juan Rodriguez appeals from the Circuit Court of Cook County’s order

          denying him the relief requested in his post-conviction petition. Following a jury trial,

          defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and
     No. 1-21-0907

         aggravated discharge of a firearm in connection with the August 11, 2004 murder of David

         Reyes and shooting of Rosendo Diaz. Defendant filed an initial post-conviction petition on

         August 29, 2013. After revision, defendant’s post-conviction petition alleged that he was

         actually innocent, multiple constitutional violations, and an error in sentencing. The circuit

         court conducted a third-stage evidentiary hearing and subsequently denied the petition.

         Defendant asserts on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying him a new trial and that

         the resentencing court erred in determining his sentence. We affirm the circuit court’s

         decision and correct the mittimus.1

¶2                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶3                                         A. Undisputed Facts

¶4          It is undisputed that at about 12:30 a.m. on June 27, 2004, a black pickup truck traveling

         westbound on 59th Street arrived at the intersection with Pulaski Road and stopped a few

         car-lengths back from the traffic light there. The truck was driven by Dean Valera. Riding in

         the cab were Ernest Villa in the passenger seat and Virginia Rojas in the middle. Seated in

         the bed of the truck were Rosendo Diaz, David Reyes, Raul Rivera, and Luis Torres.

         Everyone in the truck except Rojas was a member of the Satan Disciples gang. The truck’s

         position three or four car-lengths from the intersection placed it in front of a yard where four

         Hispanic males were standing. The men in the yard were Shaid Frausto, Juan Garcia, Saul

         Herrera, and defendant. The two groups exchanged words, gang signs, and gang slogans, as it

         became apparent that the men in the yard were members of a rival gang, the Saints. At some

         point during this exchange, someone in the yard discharged a firearm multiple times.

     1
       In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018),
     this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
                                                      2
       No. 1-21-0907

          Rosendo Diaz was struck in the cheek, while David Reyes was struck in the back and killed.

          Beyond these core facts, the facts of this case are largely disputed.

¶5                                                B. Pretrial

¶6           Defendant moved to suppress Torres’ lineup identification. At a pretrial hearing on the

          motion, defendant asserted that he was the only member of the lineup that matched the

          description of “long hair, male Hispanic, with a tear drop” and therefore the lineup was

          impermissibly suggestive. The State argued in response that the participants in the lineup

          were made to wear handkerchiefs “so that the hair for the most part was covered,” and that

          the participants were all of approximately the same height and age. The State asserted that

          the teardrop was “one of the least noticeable things about everybody in that lineup.”

          Defendant argued in response that the fact that even those witnesses who were unable to give

          a description picked defendant demonstrates that his teardrop tattoo rendered the lineup

          impermissibly suggestive. The trial court concluded that the lineup was not “overly

          suggestive” and denied the motion.

¶7                                                  C. Trial

¶8           The State argued at trial that defendant was the shooter, while defendant asserted that it

          was Juan Garcia who fired the shots that night.

¶9                                              1. Luis Torres

¶ 10         Torres testified that he had attended a block party earlier in the night with Diaz, Villa,

          and Valera. After leaving that party, the four went and picked up Reyes and Rivera, followed

          by Rojas. Torres believed that only Villa had begun drinking before the group left the block

          party. The group of seven was heading to a club when they stopped at the intersection of 59th

          and Pulaski. Torres testified that four or five men were gathered near a car parked on the

                                                        3
       No. 1-21-0907

          street on the passenger side of the truck, including defendant, who he noted to have had long

          hair at the time. Those men initiated the exchange by “[throwing] down the pitchfork,” which

          is to say displaying the symbol of the Satan Disciples upside-down to show disrespect. An

          exchange of gang signs and slogans followed.

¶ 11         Torres testified that after the initial exchange ended, defendant “yelled something” and

          ran into the gangway beside the house in front of which the group had been standing. Torres

          lost sight of defendant. During that time, the exchange of “yelling and hand signs” continued

          and a “bald headed gentleman came out” and began yelling at the people in the truck to not

          cause any problems. Torres testified that he was trying to tell the bald-headed man that they

          were leaving, at which time defendant returned to the yard and Torres heard the first gunshot.

          Torres stated: “I looked towards him again and I just seen sparks coming.” Torres saw the

          sparks from in front of defendant while defendant had his hands extended forward and held

          together in front of him. Immediately after this first gunshot, Torres felt glass hit his elbow,

          and he ducked down into the bed of the truck as the truck sped away.

¶ 12         As the truck was leaving the area, Torres noticed that Diaz was bleeding from his cheek

          and Reyes was slumped over, unresponsive, and bleeding from the back. As they were

          fleeing, Torres noticed a police car in pursuit with its emergency lights activated. Valera

          pulled the truck over and a plain clothes officer approached with his weapon drawn. The

          occupants of the truck explained that their friends had been shot and the officer called for

          backup. Two of the officers went back with Torres to the house where the shooting took

          place. Upon seeing defendant, Torres identified him as the shooter. Torres confirmed that

          defendant was the only long-haired individual present when he and the police returned, as

          well as the only individual present with a teardrop tattoo. Torres went with the police to the

                                                       4
       No. 1-21-0907

          police station and viewed a lineup, in which he identified two of the five individuals in the

          lineup, defendant and Alexea Gutierrez, the so-called “bald headed man” who had asked the

          people in the truck not to cause trouble. Later testimony from Detective Michael Hughes

          established that Torres identified a third individual in the lineup, Herrera, as present in the

          yard at the time of the shooting. Torres was also shown an array of photographs in which he

          identified Garcia as one of the people in the group on the sidewalk. Torres testified that he

          had not seen any of the three identified individuals holding a gun, but had only seen sparks

          coming from in front of defendant’s hands at the time of the shooting.

¶ 13         Torres testified on cross-examination that he had been told by someone that a King (a

          rival gang member) with long hair and a teardrop tattoo lived at the house where the shooting

          unfolded. Torres also stated that after he and others from the truck were at the police station,

          they were put in a room together. Torres testified on redirect examination that he did not

          speak with anyone else in the truck about the identity of the shooter in the time between

          when the truck sped away and when he viewed the lineup and photo array.

¶ 14                                          2. Virginia Rojas

¶ 15         Rojas, who was seated in the cab of the truck, also testified that the truck arrived at the

          light, four or five men were standing in the yard, and an argument ensued. She saw

          defendant, whom she recognized from meeting him once previously at a party, coming from

          the gangway next to the house where the truck was stopped. Valera then pushed Rojas down

          in her seat and she heard three gunshots. Rojas picked the defendant out of a lineup on the

          night of the shooting and also identified defendant in court as the person she saw coming into

          the front yard from the side of the house just before she heard shots.

                                                       5
       No. 1-21-0907

¶ 16                                              3. Rosendo Diaz

¶ 17         Diaz, who was in the back of the truck, testified similarly to Torres as to the events

          leading up to the verbal confrontation and the content of the confrontation. Diaz identified

          defendant in court as one of the people he saw in the yard. He saw defendant run in the

          direction of the gangway beside the house. He said an older man was present and was yelling

          that he did not want trouble. Diaz stated that while the older man was yelling, he felt his face

          get very warm on the left side. Diaz confirmed that although he could not recall it clearly at

          the time of his testimony, he did previously testify to a grand jury that he saw defendant with

          his hand under his shirt at his waist, as if to draw a weapon, though he never saw a gun. He

          realized he was bleeding and heard “like four” gunshots as the truck sped away. After the

          truck was stopped by the police, Diaz was taken to the hospital by ambulance. He was later

          taken to Chicago Police Department’s Area 1 with the others from the truck. Diaz confirmed

          that all of the people from the truck were placed in the same room and had an opportunity to

          talk about what happened before the lineup occurred. He denied, however, that anyone

          discussed the shooter’s name, clothing, hairstyle, tattoos, description, or identity prior to the

          lineup. Diaz identified defendant in the lineup as the person who ran toward the gangway. He

          identified Gutierrez as also present.

¶ 18                                              4. Ernest Villa

¶ 19         Villa, who was sitting in the passenger seat of the truck, testified similarly to Torres

          about the events leading up to the arrival of the truck at the intersection of 59th and Pulaski.

          He testified that while the truck was at the light, he glanced over and saw four or five men in

          the yard next to the truck. After he stopped looking in that direction, he heard arguing and a

          bottle breaking behind him, followed by gunshots. The truck pulled away and was pulled

                                                         6
       No. 1-21-0907

          over shortly afterward, at which point he saw that Reyes and Diaz had been shot. Villa made

          no identifications.

¶ 20                                     5. Sergeant David Berglind

¶ 21         Sergeant David Berglind testified that at the time of the shooting, he was in plain clothes

          in an unmarked police car stopped facing southbound at the intersection of Pulaski and 59th.

          While stopped at the intersection, he heard gunfire to his left and saw the “reflection of

          muzzle fire” before seeing “a dark pickup truck leave the scene quickly as the light was

          changing heading westbound on 59th Street.” Berglind’s testimony from this point

          corroborated Torres’ testimony: he pursued the truck, ascertained the situation, and having

          identified Torres as a cooperative witness, held him to the side until another car arrived.

¶ 22                                      6. Officer Robert Marshall

¶ 23         Officer Robert Marshall testified that he arrived at the scene where Officer Berglind had

          stopped Valera’s truck after Officer Berglind put out a “shots fired” call. Officer Marshall

          subsequently left the scene with Torres and two other officers to return to the location where

          the shooting had taken place in search of the shooter, who Torres had described as having

          “longer black hair with a teardrop under his left eye.” Upon arriving at the house in front of

          which the shooting took place, Marshall and the other officers went to the back yard and

          conducted field interviews with those present, none of whom had long hair or a teardrop

          tattoo. While the officers were conducting those interviews, defendant emerged from the

          back door of the house and was placed under arrest.

¶ 24                                    7. Officer Mark Cunningham

¶ 25         Officer Mark Cunningham testified that he was one of the officers who responded to the

          call from Berglind. He was sent to Christ Hospital with Reyes and Diaz, who were shot. He

                                                       7
       No. 1-21-0907

          was able to speak with Diaz. Though he did not testify as to the content of their conversation,

          Cunningham stated that after the conversation, he advised his fellow officers to be on the

          lookout for “a male Hispanic with a teardrop underneath his left eye and long hair, a male

          Hispanic bald headed, and a male Hispanic with glasses.”

¶ 26                                    8. Detective Michael Hughes

¶ 27         Detective Michael Hughes testified that he was assigned to investigate the case and was

          in the room with the witnesses that morning as they viewed the lineup. He testified that the

          individuals in the lineup were all men who had been brought from the scene of the crime.

          Torres identified defendant as the shooter, as well as Gutierrez and Herrera as individuals

          present at the scene. Rojas identified defendant as the person she saw running toward the

          truck from the gangway. Diaz identified defendant as the person holding the gun. Villa did

          not identify anyone. Rivera and Valera also viewed the lineup, but Hughes gave no testimony

          as to whether they identified anyone or not.

¶ 28         On cross-examination, Hughes testified that the individuals in the lineup were dressed in

          do-rags and similar clothing in the lineup. He stated that although he did not make the choice

          to put them in do-rags for this lineup, it was a procedure he would regularly use when the

          individuals in the lineup had differing hair lengths.

¶ 29                                          9. Ellen Connolly

¶ 30         The parties established via stipulation that a gunshot residue test was conducted on

          defendant’s hands at about 2:00 a.m. on the day of the shooting. Testimony from forensic

          scientist Ellen Connolly established that defendant tested positive for gunshot residue on his

          left hand and while he had residue on his right hand, the amounts were insufficient to

          constitute a positive result. Connolly testified that residue could indicate that an individual

                                                         8
       No. 1-21-0907

          fired a firearm, that they were within about three feet to either side or within eight feet in

          front of a firearm when it discharged, or that the person came into contact with a surface that

          had gunshot residue on it.

¶ 31                                        10. Martin Rodriguez

¶ 32         Martin Rodriguez (Martin), defendant’s father, testified that on the night of the shooting,

          he was at his home, where the shooting took place and where defendant also lived. Martin

          and Gutierrez were in the backyard. Martin was aware that defendant had friends over,

          namely Frausto, Garcia, and Herrera. After midnight, defendant, Frausto, Garcia, and Herrera

          left through the front door and proceeded toward Garcia’s car, which was parked at the curb.

          Martin testified that a dark-colored pickup truck carrying about six people passed in front of

          the house and the people in the truck started yelling “gang words” back and forth with the

          four men in the front yard. Gutierrez went to the front yard, got in between the two arguing

          groups, and yelled at those in the truck that he did not want any problems.

¶ 33         As Martin was walking to the front yard, he saw one of the men in the truck push Garcia.

          Garcia then ran to the trunk of the car parked at the curb, retrieved a gun, and fired four shots

          at the people in the truck. As Garcia shot, “everyone started running toward the back,”

          including defendant. Afterward, both Garcia and defendant ran into the house. Martin and

          defendant both told Garcia to leave. Garcia left with the gun still in his hand. Martin was

          talking to Gutierrez in the back yard, asking him what happened and why there was shooting,

          when the police arrived about five minutes later. The police told those in the yard, consisting

          of Martin, Frausto, and Gutierrez, not to move, and had them stand against the wall of the

          garage. Martin testified: “[The police] put us against the garage and they didn’t let us say

          anything. He said, shut the fuck up.” The police then brought Herrera and defendant from

                                                       9
       No. 1-21-0907

          inside the home and lined them up as well. A civilian was brought into the back yard and

          identified defendant, Frausto, and Herrera. Defendant, Frausto, and Herrera were then

          arrested and removed from the yard. The police searched the house for an additional half an

          hour and then departed. Martin was not asked about any interview that may have occurred

          the morning of the shooting, but testified that he went to the police station around 5:00 p.m.

          the same day to speak with detectives and gave them all of the same information contained in

          his testimony.

¶ 34         On cross-examination, Martin testified that Garcia was about four feet away from

          Gutierrez and defendant when he fired the first shot, and that he did not see, but only heard

          the other three shots. When the police arrived, Martin did not say anything to them about

          Garcia being the shooter or anything else about what had happened because the police yelled

          at them to not speak.

¶ 35                                        11. Alexea Gutierrez

¶ 36         Gutierrez’s testimony was largely consistent with Martin’s. Gutierrez testified that after

          the two groups had been yelling at one another and he had arrived to tell the men in the truck

          to leave, those in the back of the truck jumped out of the truck. One of the men from the back

          of the truck “ripped off the chain of Juan Garcia.” At that point in time, defendant ran back

          toward the back of the house. Garcia then produced a gun from the trunk of his car.

          Defendant attempted to return to the front yard, but Gutierrez did not let him pass. Garcia

          began “shooting shots like crazy.” Gutierrez ran to the back yard. Gutierrez testified

          consistently with Martin that the police arrived soon after and would not let them speak.

¶ 37         On cross-examination, Gutierrez testified that when the groups were arguing, they were

          all in front of him and he was not in fact separating the groups from one another. He stated

                                                      10
       No. 1-21-0907

          that he was still at the curb, but backing toward the back yard, along with “everybody else,”

          and pulling out his phone to call the police when Garcia started shooting. He testified that

          defendant, Herrera, and Martin were all three attempting to come to the front just before and

          as Garcia started shooting, but that Gutierrez physically held them back and warned them not

          to come out. Gutierrez also stated that he was only telling them to stay back and was not

          physically blocking them. Gutierrez testified that the first shot was fired from behind

          Garcia’s car and then Garcia “passed right in front of” him. After the shooting, Martin,

          Gutierrez, defendant, Frausto, Garcia, and Herrera were in the back yard. Martin yelled at

          Garcia to leave, and Garcia left with the gun in hand.

¶ 38         After the shooting, around 3:45 a.m., Gutierrez spoke to police at the station, but did not

          name Garcia as the shooter. When confronted with whether Gutierrez had told the police a

          different story about hearing shots and seeing defendant run into the house, he stated that he

          had given that information to police, but it was because he was scared, stating: “they were

          gang members. I was panicking.”

¶ 39         On redirect examination, Gutierrez testified that Garcia tried to hand off the gun to

          defendant, but defendant did not take it from him. Gutierrez did not specify where this

          attempt to hand off the weapon took place.

¶ 40                                   12. Defendant Juan Rodriguez

¶ 41         Defendant took the stand in his own defense. He testified to the same events leading up to

          the shooting that Martin described. When defendant and his friends were standing by

          Garcia’s car, the dark truck passed by and stopped in front of the house. Defendant testified

          that one of the men in the back of the truck, who wore a basketball jersey, yelled to “get the

          guy with the teardrop,” at which point defendant ran toward the gangway next to the house.

                                                       11
       No. 1-21-0907

          When defendant reached the gangway, he encountered Gutierrez, who, after defendant

          informed him about what was going on, continued toward the front. Defendant stated that he

          returned to the front yard seconds later. Upon returning to the front yard, he saw Gutierrez

          yelling at those in the truck. The man in the jersey and one other in the back of the truck

          jumped out of the truck. The other man started walking toward defendant, but turned and

          started to return to the truck after Gutierrez physically blocked his way. The man in the

          jersey approached Garcia and “snatch[ed] something off his neck.” Garcia then went to the

          trunk of his car and retrieved a gun. Garcia ran past defendant and Gutierrez and fired one

          shot. Defendant began to back away and, once he saw Garcia run toward the street, he turned

          and ran toward the gangway. Defendant heard additional shots as he ran to the back yard.

¶ 42         All of the others from the front yard arrived in the back yard shortly thereafter. Defendant

          told Garcia to leave. Garcia attempted to hand off the gun to defendant, “pushing it toward

          [him].” Defendant refused and pushed the gun away with his hand. Garcia went into the

          house to the basement and defendant followed. Garcia again tried to hand off the gun,

          defendant again pushed it away with his hand. Garcia left and defendant did not see where he

          went. The police arrived shortly thereafter, entered the home, and arrested defendant.

¶ 43         On cross-examination, defendant denied that any of the men in the front yard yelled at the

          men in the truck or made any sort of gang representations. Defendant testified that when

          Garcia began shooting, defendant was standing next to Gutierrez with no others nearby.

          When questioned as to Frausto’s whereabouts and Herrera’s whereabouts at that moment, he

          stated that he did not remember. Defendant’s testimony on what he told police after being

          taken to the police station was mixed. He stated that he told them what happened, but they

          did not want to listen. Then he stated he did not tell the officers questioning him that Garcia

                                                      12
       No. 1-21-0907

          was the shooter. He stated that he was not aware that he was being charged at that time and

          that he did not want to get Garcia in trouble. On redirect examination, he stated that he

          initially withheld the truth because he did not want to get Garcia in trouble, but later told the

          officers about Garcia’s involvement.

¶ 44                                      13. Detective Jean Romic

¶ 45         Detective Jean Romic testified that on the day of the shooting, she spoke with Martin and

          Gutierrez, and in neither conversation did they mention various specific details included in

          the version of events that they testified to at trial. On cross-examination, Romic testified that

          Martin did state that Garcia was the shooter at the time of her interview with him.

¶ 46                                     14. Detective John Yniguez

¶ 47         Detective John Yniguez testified that he was present during Romic’s interview with

          defendant and worked on the case with Romic and a third detective, Michael Hughes. During

          the interview, defendant did not state that he saw Garcia shoot at the truck. Neither did

          defendant state that Garcia attempted to pass the gun off to him. Yniguez further stated that

          he did not subsequently learn from any source that defendant had made statements

          implicating Garcia as the shooter or asserting that Garcia attempted to hand off the gun to

          him.

¶ 48                                          15. Nicole Tewell

¶ 49         Nicole Tewell testified that she is defendant’s half-sister and was watching television in

          the front room of the house at the time of the shooting. She was alone in the house and heard

          gunshots outside. She testified that the house also contained two dogs that would bark when

          non-family members entered the house alone, including Garcia. She testified that about five

          minutes after the gunshots, she heard the back door open, but she did not hear anyone

                                                       13
       No. 1-21-0907

          descend into the basement, nor did she hear the dogs bark. After she heard the back door

          open, defendant and Herrera entered the room and sat down on the sofa. On cross-

          examination, Nicole stated that she does not remember where the dogs were while she was

          watching television, and that it was normal to lock the dogs in one of the rooms of the house

          at times.

¶ 50                                            16. Conviction

¶ 51         Following closing arguments and deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of first-

          degree murder and both counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. Defendant was

          sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment for first-degree murder, six years’ imprisonment for

          aggravated battery with a firearm, and six years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a

          firearm to be served consecutively, for a total of 62 years’ imprisonment. Defendant

          appealed.

¶ 52                                          D. Direct Appeal

¶ 53         Defendant filed a direct appeal that this court heard in People v. Rodriguez, 408 Ill. App.

          3d 782 (2011). In that appeal, defendant argued (1) that he was denied his right to a fair and

          impartial jury because the trial court failed to appropriately question the prospective jurors;

          (2) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) that the trial

          court erred in denying his motion in limine to bar the State from introducing defendant’s

          juvenile adjudication for impeachment purposes; (4) that the trial court deprived him of a fair

          trial when it provided a certified copy of defendant’s juvenile adjudication to the jury, but not

          copies of the convictions of the State’s witnesses; (5) that his mittimus should be corrected to

          reflect four additional days of sentencing credit and a single conviction of first degree

          murder. Id. This court agreed with defendant regarding the mittimus and adjusted it

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       No. 1-21-0907

          accordingly. Id. This court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Id. One justice

          dissented, asserting that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of defendant’s

          juvenile adjudication. Id.

¶ 54         Our supreme court exercised its supervisory authority to direct this court to vacate and

          reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Villa, 2011 IL 110777, to determine if another

          result was warranted. People v. Rodriguez, 960 N.E. 2d 563 (2012). Villa concerned the

          introduction of a juvenile adjudication for impeachment purposes. Villa, 2011 IL 110777.

          This court found that the introduction of defendant’s juvenile adjudication was improper, but

          that the introduction was harmless error. People v. Rodriguez, 2012 IL App (1st) 072758-

          B, ¶ 59. The same justice again dissented, opining that he would find that the State did not

          meet its burden to establish harmless error. Id. ¶ 84.

¶ 55                                   E. Post-Conviction Proceedings

¶ 56         On August 16, 2013, defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition. After passing to

          the second stage, defendant filed the amended post-conviction petition that is of concern in

          this appeal on June 13, 2018. In his petition, defendant raised claims of actual innocence,

          ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel, multiple violations under Brady v.

          Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that his sentence was unconstitutional under Miller v.

          Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The State answered the petition and it advanced to a third-

          stage evidentiary hearing. The hearing commenced June 12, 2019, and testimony was heard

          from seven witnesses.

¶ 57                                         1. Dr. Deryn Strange

¶ 58         Dr. Deryn Strange was called first to testify as an expert witness. Dr. Strange testified

          that she was at that time a tenured professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, who

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       No. 1-21-0907

           worked primarily as a research psychologist focused on studying false memories and the

           ways in which memories can be corrupted or distorted. Dr. Strange was offered as an expert

           in the area of “reliability of eyewitness identification, specifically under the umbrella of

           memory distortion.” Dr. Strange explained memory as a process that can be broken down

           into three stages: encoding, storage, and retrieval.

¶ 59          Dr. Strange testified that there were a number of issues in this case that she believed

           would cause issues with an accurate encoding of the event. First, the streetlights were likely

           dim enough to interfere with the encoding process, and it is “simply improbable that

           [defendant’s teardrop tattoo] could have been visualized from a distance given those lighting

           conditions.” Second, in instances where there are multiple potential perpetrators, the attention

           of a witness tends to be split and that leads to more mistakes in identification. Since there

           were several men in the yard who were potential perpetrators, that likely affected the

           witnesses’ identifications. Third, people who have had two or more drinks tend to narrow

           their focus of attention such that they have poor recollection of information beyond “essential

           details” and are more subject to outside suggestion regarding their memory after the fact.

           Some of the witnesses had been drinking at the time of the shooting. 2 Fourth, stress tends to

           further narrow focus to those things the individual needs to most focus on, for example a

           weapon, “at the expense of peripheral information,” such as the face of the person holding

           the weapon. In this case, the event being recalled was stressful. Fifth, a short period of

           exposure to a face can lead to unreliable identification, and the events surrounding the

       2
              The testimony as to who had been drinking is mixed and conflicting. Diaz, Gutierrez, and
       Martin all testified that they had imbibed alcohol near to the time of the shooting, though only
       Diaz mentioned that he was significantly intoxicated. Villa stated that he and Valera drank “a
       couple of beers” at a baseball game earlier in the day, but did not partake further as the evening
       went on. Diaz stated that Torres, Valera, and Villa were also drinking, but did not recall how
       much.
                                                        16
       No. 1-21-0907

          shooting happened very quickly. Sixth, post-event information, such as discussing the event

          with another witness after the event, can influence a witness’ recollection of the event and

          lead to that witness being unable to distinguish between what they actually saw and what

          they heard from the other witness. In this case, the witnesses in the truck were put in the

          same room prior to making their identifications, so it is possible that each was exposed to

          post-event information from the others during that time.

¶ 60         Dr. Strange identified a number of issues that she believed could have interfered with the

          process of recollection in this case: First, feedback of any kind from the officers conducting

          the lineup could have influenced the witnesses. Second, if any individual in the lineup stood

          out from the others in any way, that would likely bias the witnesses. In this case, defendant

          was the only member of the lineup with a teardrop tattoo, with visible hair and wearing the

          clothing described by one of the witnesses. Third, if the lineup procedure was conducted by

          an officer who believed they knew who the perpetrator was, that officer could, purposely or

          not, lead witnesses to identify the person they believed to be the perpetrator. In this case, Dr.

          Strange interpreted the affidavit provided by Joel De Luna, who was one of the men in the

          lineup, to state that “it was the detectives who were pointing out the suspect.” Fourth, threats

          from officers toward witnesses would impact the reliability of their identification of suspects.

¶ 61         Lastly, Dr. Strange testified that there is zero correlation between a witness’ confidence

          that their identification is accurate and the actual accuracy of the identification. A witness’

          pre-identification confidence that he or she can correctly identify the perpetrator can correlate

          with accuracy if none of the previously-mentioned complications are present. Dr. Strange’s

          ultimate conclusion is that one or more of the enumerated factors likely impacted the

          witnesses’ identifications in this case. On cross-examination, Dr. Strange confirmed that she

                                                       17
       No. 1-21-0907

          had only read the record and had not spoken to any of the witnesses in this case. Dr. Strange

          confirmed that she cannot be certain that an error occurred here and that all of her testimony

          regarded generalizations, not what was or was not actually witnessed in this case.

¶ 62                                           2. Saul Herrera

¶ 63         Herrera testified to his version of the events around the shooting. Herrera’s timeline of

          events leading up to the arrival of the truck was largely in line with defendant’s testimony at

          trial, aside from the fact that Herrera estimated that he left the house with defendant, Garcia,

          and another individual at about 11:15 or 11:30. Herrerra testified that after the truck stopped

          in front of the house, the people in the truck left the truck and approached Herrera and the

          others in the yard. One of them said “that’s the dude with the teardrop.” At that point,

          defendant ran toward the backyard and the same person who had mentioned the teardrop

          “snatched something from Juan Garcia’s neck.” An older man, whom Herrera did not

          recognize came to the front yard from an unspecified origin and attempted to defuse the

          situation. Garcia ran to his vehicle, retrieved a handgun from the trunk, and shot “a couple of

          times” toward the truck. After the shots were fired, Herrera ran to the backyard.

¶ 64         Per Herrera, after the shooting, defendant had returned to the front yard and Garcia

          approached defendant “right by the front of the house on the sidewalk.” Garcia attempted to

          give the firearm to defendant “to stash in the house.” Defendant pushed the firearm away

          from himself and told him to leave with the firearm. Garcia ran to his car and drove away.

          Police officers arrived within ten minutes and arrested “everybody who was in the house,”

          including both defendant and Herrera. Herrera was placed in a lineup and later in an

          interview room. He spoke with a detective in the interview room, but, when asked, could not

          remember the race of that detective. The detective told him that someone had identified him

                                                      18
       No. 1-21-0907

           as the shooter. Herrera testified that he told the detective that someone else had done the

           shooting. He gave the detective a description, but no name for the shooter. He denied that

           defendant was the shooter. The detective told him that if he did not cooperate by stating that

           defendant was the shooter, he would “go down as the accessory to murder.”

¶ 65          Herrera also testified that police spoke to him again later that day when he was being

           released. At that point, he signed a statement implicating defendant because he did not want

           to be charged. Herrera was subsequently subpoenaed to testify at defendant’s trial. Prior to

           trial, Herrera met with an attorney from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office in a

           courtroom. He told that attorney that defendant was not the shooter. The attorney told him

           that if he did not testify in accordance with his written statement, he would be “charged with

           perjury and something else.” After hearing this, Herrera left the courtroom and did not return.

           Herrera stated that he was eventually arrested later in 2004 and sentenced to two years in

           prison for “perjury and contempt of court.” Years later, Herrera was contacted by a private

           investigator who questioned him about the events of the shooting, prepared an affidavit, and

           had Herrera read and sign it. 3

¶ 66          On cross-examination, Herrera testified that he grew up with defendant and went to

           elementary school with him. He stated that the people in the truck did not immediately get

           out, but “represented gang slogans” and then about four of the people in the truck got out.

           When asked if he told the police that two people got out and started swinging at him, he

           stated that he did not remember. When asked if he told the police that he did not actually see

           who fired the gun, he stated that he did not remember. He estimated that the encounter lasted

           7-8 minutes. After the shooting, defendant came back to the front yard and Garcia attempted

       3
               Although Herrera did not specify when he was approached by the investigator, his
       affidavit was notarized on October 23, 2017.
                                                       19
       No. 1-21-0907

          to give defendant the gun. When asked when it was that he learned that the person who

          arrived at the house with Garcia that night was Garcia’s cousin, Herrera stated that he had not

          ever learned that fact. Herrera confirmed that his affidavit stated that the person with Garcia

          was Garcia’s cousin. The State also confirmed with Herrera that he had testified that four

          people had jumped out of the truck, while his affidavit stated that only two jumped out of the

          truck. Herrera confirmed that although his affidavit stated that “Garcia and the other guy

          made contact with one another but I could not see exactly what happened,” he had testified

          that one of the men from the truck had snatched something from Garcia’s neck. Herrera

          stated on cross and on redirect that the events took place a long time ago and he had

          difficulty remembering them. On re-cross examination, Herrera confirmed that the statement

          he did not remember giving and the statement that he was forced to sign were in fact the

          same statement.

¶ 67                                         3. Carlos Figueroa

¶ 68         Carlos Figueroa, who was the boyfriend of defendant’s half-sister, Nicole, at the time of

          the shooting, testified that he was at the Rodriguez house on the night of the shooting. At

          around midnight, Figueroa got in his truck, which was parked in the garage behind the house,

          and drove to Jewel-Osco. He was accompanied by two passengers: Nicole’s sister, named

          Natalie Rodriguez, and Adam Rodriguez, who is Nicole and defendant’s brother. Carlos

          estimated they were gone from the house for about 25 minutes. Upon returning and opening

          the garage, Carlos found that there was an unfamiliar car inside, which he later learned was

          Garcia’s. Carlos’ passengers, Natalie and Adam, left the truck to approach the car, at which

          point Garcia ran up to the side of the truck and told Natalie and Adam to get back in the

          truck. Garcia seemed “very excited and nervous.” Adam refused and continued past Garcia,

                                                      20
       No. 1-21-0907

          but Natalie got back into the truck. Garcia got into the back seat of the truck and told Carlos

          “go, go, go.”

¶ 69          Carlos testified that Garcia told him and Natalie that he had gotten into an altercation and

          that he believed he had shot and killed someone. Garcia showed the two of them a gun under

          his shirt and told Carlos to take him to his house. Carlos complied and drove Garcia 10

          minutes away, to Garcia’s home. Garcia told Carlos not to go anywhere and got out of the

          truck. Garcia went behind the fence behind his house before returning to the truck. Garcia

          told Carlos to return to the house and Carlos complied. Carlos “came around back to the

          alleyway” and stopped to let Natalie out before proceeding to the corner and letting Garcia

          out. Carlos drove the truck around and parked across the street in front of the house, where

          he found there to be a number of police cars and police officers present. Carlos “informed [a

          police officer] of the situation of what happened with Juan Garcia.” Carlos was not allowed

          back in the home until defendant, Herrera, “another friend,” and Nicole were handcuffed and

          taken away. Carlos testified that he spoke to defendant’s attorney at defendant’s home some

          day after the incident and during that interview, he gave the attorney the same information

          contained in his testimony. He stated that he was never called to testify.

¶ 70          On cross-examination, Carlos testified that when Garcia initially approached the truck, he

          had come from the back gate of the backyard. Carlos confirmed that the affidavit that he

          wrote himself in 2013 stated that after driving Garcia to his home, Carlos drove away. Carlos

          stated that he “did not put that part in.” Carlos also confirmed that his written affidavit

          contained a number of additional details about what Garcia told him after entering his truck.

          The affidavit states that after getting into the truck, Garcia stated:

                                                        21
       No. 1-21-0907

                  “[S]ome guys jump out a car and jump him and ripped off his chain and that they

                  were fighting and then he went to the back of his vehicle trunk (which at that time

                  was in front of [defendant’s house]) pulled a [g]un from his trunk and started shooting

                  at the people who had attacked him and that he believed that he had shot and killed

                  somebody.”

          Garcia then threatened Carlos and Natalie after telling them that he had shot someone,

          stating: “just drive me to my house and no one gets hurt.” Carlos attested in the affidavit that

          he drove away after dropping Garcia off at his house, then returned to defendant’s house and

          parked in front of it.

¶ 71                                         4. Natalie Rodriguez

¶ 72          Natalie testified in line with Carlos’ testimony up to the point when Garcia was in the

          back seat of the truck. She stated that Garcia told them that “some guys jumped out of a

          vehicle and one of them took his chain so he got a gun and he shot at them.” Natalie’s

          additional testimony about the time Garcia was in the truck up to when she got out of the

          truck matched Carlos’ testimony. Natalie entered the backyard and found police officers

          arresting her family members. An officer instructed Natalie to sit and be quiet. A man came

          into the backyard with police officers and was instructed to identify the shooter. When the

          man identified defendant, Natalie stood up and said “no, it wasn’t him, it wasn’t him.”

          Natalie was again told to sit down and be quiet.

¶ 73          Natalie testified that she spoke with defendant’s attorney and gave him the same

          information contained in her testimony. She was not called to testify at trial. She denied that

          defendant’s attorney had ever told her he did not believe her but stated that it did feel like he

          did not believe her. Defendant asked Natalie some time around 2013 or 2014 to write an

                                                       22
       No. 1-21-0907

          affidavit and she did so. She stated that no one told her what to include and that she wrote the

          affidavit personally.

¶ 74         On cross-examination, Natalie stated that, at her parents’ request, she never spoke with

          police about the events of that night. When shown exhibits depicting defendant and Garcia as

          they appeared at the time of the shooting, Natalie agreed that they looked nothing alike and

          indeed looked like exact opposites of one another. Natalie stated that when Garcia was in the

          truck, he never mentioned killing anyone. She confirmed that when she, Carlos, and Garcia

          left to go to Garcia’s home, the garage door was open, but it was closed when they returned.

¶ 75         When questioned by the circuit court on her discussion with defendant’s attorney, Natalie

          stated that defendant’s attorney told her that he was not going to call her as a witness because

          she was related to the defendant and therefore the jury would not believe her.

¶ 76                                         5. Adam Rodriguez

¶ 77         Adam Rodriguez testified consistently with Carlos and Natalie regarding the events

          leading up to encountering Garcia. Adam stated that Garcia was tucking something black

          with a handle under his shirt when he approached the truck. Adam entered the house and was

          there 5 to 10 minutes before police arrived. At some unspecified point in time, Adam told

          family members about what he had seen, and they told him not to worry, because they would

          hire a lawyer. Adam told defendant’s lawyer what happened but was never called to testify.

          On redirect examination, Adam stated that the item he had seen Garcia holding was a gun.

          When further questioned by the circuit court and defendant, Adam stated that although he

          only saw the handle, it looked like a gun handle, and he deduced that the item he had seen

          was a gun.

                                                      23
       No. 1-21-0907

¶ 78                                           6. Mike Gillespie

¶ 79         Mike Gillespie, defendant’s trial attorney, testified that he did in fact represent defendant,

          but had little to no specific recollection of the events of his representation. Gillespie testified

          that he did not remember if he told defendant that he could file a motion for substitution of

          judge, but it is his standard procedure to inform his clients of their rights. He stated that he

          did not have the file from defendant’s trial. He stated that it was his assumption that he had

          thrown it out, as it is his practice to do so after keeping the file for the mandated period of

          years. He stated that he made no personal effort to interview any of the State’s witnesses, but

          he would have had an investigator attempt to talk to them. Gillespie stated that it appeared

          based on his answer to discovery that he identified four witnesses that he might have called

          in support of defendant’s defense, including Natalie Rodriguez and Adam Rodriguez.

          Gillespie had no specific recollection but assumed that if their names were on the list, he

          would have spoken to them. He did not recall which witnesses he called or did not call but

          agreed that the record provided an accurate representation of who was called. He did not

          recall why he did not call Carlos, Natalie, or Adam, but assumed that if he did not call them,

          it was because their testimony did not support his theory of defense. Gillespie testified that if

          anyone had said they saw someone else do the shooting, he would have called that witness.

          He stated that he would have put names on the list based on somebody telling him they knew

          something about the case.

¶ 80                                     7. Defendant Juan Rodriguez

¶ 81         Defendant testified that Gillespie spoke to him about the possibility of calling Natalie,

          Adam, and Carlos at trial and that he expected Gillespie to call them.

                                                        24
       No. 1-21-0907

¶ 82                                    8. Postconviction Court Order

¶ 83         On February 18, 2020, the circuit court entered an order denying defendant’s post-

          conviction petition. Regarding defendant’s actual innocence claim, the circuit court found

          that Herrera’s testimony was not new, was cumulative, was not sufficiently conclusive, was

          impeachable, and was not credible. The circuit court found that Dr. Strange’s testimony was

          not sufficiently conclusive and, further, went to the issue of reasonable doubt rather than

          presenting evidence of actual innocence. The circuit court found defendant’s Brady claim

          based on Herrera’s testimony to be immaterial and to not represent a reasonable probability

          that the withheld evidence would have changed the outcome of the case.

¶ 84         The circuit court found that defendant failed to establish that defendant’s trial counsel’s

          representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudiced defendant.

          The circuit court found that defendant’s claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

          failing to appeal the trial court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress also failed to meet

          defendant’s burden. Lastly, the circuit court declined to consider defendant’s Miller claim,

          stating that the claim was filed in a supplement to the post-conviction petition for which

          defendant never sought leave and that had not been answered or fully heard before the court.

          In the same order, the circuit court denied defendant leave to supplement or amend the

          petition with additional claims.

¶ 85         On April 9, 2020, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration regarding the denial of his

          Miller claim. The State agreed to a new sentencing hearing and the circuit court granted the

          motion for reconsideration on August 6, 2020. A resentencing hearing was held June 8, 2021.

          On July 14, 2021, the resentencing court sentenced defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment for

          first-degree murder, 6 years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm, and 5

                                                       25
       No. 1-21-0907

          years’ imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm, all to run consecutively for a total

          of 32 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 86         On July 16, 2021, defendant timely appealed, and this appeal follows.

¶ 87                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 88         Under section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act), an individual serving

          a term of imprisonment may institute a proceeding pursuant to the Act asserting that “in the

          proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or

          her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both.” 725

          ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2012). Postconviction petitions are subject to three stages of review

          before the circuit court. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 32. “First, the circuit court

          may dismiss postconviction petitions that are frivolous or patently without merit.” (Internal

          quotation marks omitted.) Id. “If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition, it advances to

          the second stage. At the second stage, counsel may be appointed to an indigent defendant and

          the State may file a motion to dismiss or an answer to the petition.” Id. ¶ 33. “At this stage,

          the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying documentation

          make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

          Id. “If the petitioner makes the requisite substantial showing that his constitutional rights

          were violated, he is entitled to a third stage evidentiary hearing.” Id. ¶ 34. “At such a hearing,

          the circuit court serves as the fact finder and, therefore, it is the court’s function to determine

          witness credibility, decide the weight to be given testimony and evidence, and resolve any

          evidentiary conflicts.” Id. “At this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the

          evidence introduced demonstrates that the petitioner is, in fact, entitled to relief.” Id.

                                                        26
       No. 1-21-0907

¶ 89         Defendant asserts that the circuit court erred in several ways in its final order denying

          relief following a third-stage evidentiary hearing. Defendant states that the circuit court

          erred: (1) when it declined to grant defendant a new trial based on his actual innocence

          claims, particularly with regard to the testimony of Herrera and Dr. Strange; (2) when it

          denied defendant relief based on his Brady claim regarding Herrera’s testimony; (3) when it

          found that defendant failed to establish that trial counsel’s representation fell below an

          objective standard of reasonableness; and (4) when it found that defendant failed to carry his

          burden to establish that appellate counsel was ineffective. Defendant also argues that the

          resentencing court erred when it ordered that defendant’s terms of imprisonment all run

          consecutively to one another.

¶ 90                                       A. Standard of Review

¶ 91         “When a petition is advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, where fact-finding and

          credibility determinations are involved, we will not reverse a circuit court’s decision unless it

          is manifestly erroneous.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). A decision is

          manifestly erroneous “if the court committed an error that is clearly evident, plain, and

          indisputable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 47.

          If no fact-finding or credibility determinations are necessary at the third stage, “i.e., no new

          evidence is presented and the issues are pure questions of law, we will apply a de novo

          standard of review, unless the presiding judge has some ‘special expertise or familiarity’ with

          the trial or sentencing of the defendant and that ‘familiarity’ has some bearing on disposition

          of the postconviction petition.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 (citing People v. Caballero, 206

          Ill. 2d 65, 87-88 (2002)). “A de novo review entails performing the same analysis a trial

          court would perform.” Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011).

                                                       27
       No. 1-21-0907

¶ 92                                        B. Actual Innocence

¶ 93         “[I]n order to succeed on a claim of actual innocence, the defendant must present new,

          material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive that it would probably change the

          result on retrial.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96 (citing People v. Washington,

          171 Ill. 2d 475, 489 (1996)). “New means the evidence was discovered after trial and could

          not have been discovered earlier through exercise of due diligence.” Id. “Material means the

          evidence is relevant and probative of the petitioner’s innocence.” Id. “Noncumulative means

          the evidence adds to what the jury heard.” Id. “And conclusive means the evidence, when

          considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead to a different result.” Id.

          “[T]he sufficiency of the State’s evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt is not the

          determination that the trial court must make.” Id. ¶ 97. “Probability, not certainty, is the key

          as the trial court in effect predicts what another jury would likely do, considering all the

          evidence, both new and old, together.” Id.

¶ 94                                1. Freestanding Nature of the Claim

¶ 95             The State argues that defendant’s actual innocence claim must be rejected because the

          Herrera affidavit is used both to support defendant’s actual innocence claim and his Brady

          claim, and thus the claim is not freestanding. The State grounds this argument on People v.

          Hobley, in which our supreme court interpreted its own holding in Washington to establish

          that “[a] ‘free standing’ claim of actual innocence is ‘one in which the newly discovered

          evidence is not being used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation with

          respect to the defendant’s trial.’ ” People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 443-44 (1998) (citing

          Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 490). This so-called “Hobley rule” has been echoed explicitly only

          once by our supreme court, in People v. Orange, 195 Ill. 2d 437, 459-60 (2001). The State

                                                       28
       No. 1-21-0907

          also cites the more recent case of People v. Taliani, 2021 IL 125891, but that case reflects the

          original text of Washington and makes no holding with regard to the meaning of

          “freestanding,” nor does it mention Hobley.

¶ 96         Defendant argues that the State misapprehends the holdings of Hobley and Orange and,

          in fact, those cases were never intended to be read to forbid the alternative pleading of

          different constitutional violations based in separate legal theories, but the same evidence.

          Defendant correctly points out that it is clear in the original text of Washington that the

          language relied on in Hobley and Orange was present not to create a mandate, but to

          distinguish the freestanding claim that was cognizable under the Illinois constitution, but not

          under the federal constitution, from a gateway claim, which was the only form in which an

          actual innocence claim was cognizable under the federal constitution. Washington, 171 Ill. at

          479-489.

¶ 97         The defendant in Hobley was convicted of multiple counts of felony murder and arson.

          Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d at 404. The defendant articulated an actual innocence claim based on a

          fingerprint test conducted on a gas can found at the scene that had produced a negative result,

          as well as upon the fact that a second gas can was found at the scene. Id. at 443. The

          defendant’s postconviction petition also asserted a constitutional violation under Brady based

          on the State’s suppression of the fingerprint report, the State’s suppression of the fact that a

          second gas can was found, and the State’s destruction of the second gas can. Id. at 428-29.

          The Hobley defendant’s Brady claims were based on “two subpoenas; the affidavit of one of

          defendant’s post-conviction attorneys; the affidavit of a defense investigator; a lab report

          related to defendant’s case * * *; and several other police reports * * * including a fingerprint

                                                        29
       No. 1-21-0907

          report and report referencing a one-gallon can.” Id. at 429. The Hobley court did not specify

          which pieces of evidence the actual innocence claim was based on, but opined:

                       “In this appeal, we have already held that the State’s actions regarding the

                 fingerprint report and second gasoline can may establish a violation of defendant’s

                 constitutional right to due process under Brady. Consequently, this evidence does not

                 support a ‘free-standing’ claim of actual innocence. Rather, the newly discovered

                 evidence defendant points to here is being used to supplement his assertions of

                 constitutional violations with respect to his trial. Defendant has therefore not properly

                 raised a claim of actual innocence under Washington.

                       In addition, defendant briefly mentions that he has newly discovered evidence

                 showing that the officers at Area 2 engaged in a pattern and practice of police torture.

                 This evidence, however, is being used to supplement defendant’s assertion * * * that

                 his confessions were coerced and involuntary and that the introduction of these

                 confessions violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, this evidence also fails to

                 support a ‘free-standing’ claim of actual innocence under Washington.

                       In conclusion, defendant is not entitled to either an evidentiary hearing or a new

                 trial on his actual innocence claim.” (emphasis in original) Id. at 444.

¶ 98         Our court’s opinion in Martinez provides an insightful analysis on the subject of the

          Hobley rule. People v. Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490. The most common interpretation

          of Hobley to date, as described in Martinez, has been that “[w]hereas Washington held that a

          defendant was not required to rely on an underlying constitutional claim to assert actual

          innocence, Hobley found that the defendant was not allowed to rely on the same evidence to

          pursue both a constitutional claim of trial error and a freestanding actual innocence claim.”

                                                       30
        No. 1-21-0907

           Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490, ¶ 99. This interpretation narrows the door opened by

           Washington by requiring largely pro se petitioners to assiduously separate evidence used to

           support an actual innocence claim from all evidence offered to support other constitutional

           claims in the same postconviction petition. To impose such a requirement does not

           effectively weed out claims lacking a valid claim of actual innocence, but only serves to

           block any actual innocence claim not pled in accordance with this arbitrary requirement.

           Further, such an additional limitation is unnecessary in light of the extremely high bar for

           actual innocence claims established in Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489.

¶ 99          Martinez went on to assert:

                        “It would seem that the decision in Hobley attempted to track Washington’s

                  application of the law, but in doing so, deviated from both the spirit and letter of the

                  law as set forth in Washington. Hobley identified no principle or purpose that would

                  be furthered by prohibiting a defendant from using the same evidence to assert both a

                  constitutional claim of trial error and an actual innocence claim. Furthermore, the

                  Hobley rule would potentially force a defendant to choose to forgo a meritorious

                  claim of trial error in order to pursue an actual innocence claim.” Martinez, 2021 IL

                  App (1st) 190490, ¶ 102.

¶ 100         We agree with Martinez that Hobley, thusly interpreted, would represent an unprincipled

           modification of the law established in Washington. Martinez found Hobley to be

           inapplicable, as its holding was inconsistent with our supreme court’s more recent opinion in

           People v. Coleman:

                  “Coleman * * * stated that ‘a freestanding actual-innocence claim is independent of

                  any claims of constitutional error at trial and focuses solely on a defendant’s factual

                                                      31
        No. 1-21-0907

                  innocence in light of new evidence.’ Thus, Coleman’s explanation of a freestanding

                  actual innocence claim contemplates that the claims be independent, not that the

                  actual innocence claim be independent of the evidence underlying his other

                  constitutional claim of trial error.” Martinez, 2021 IL App (1st) 190490, ¶ 104 (citing

                  Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 83).

¶ 101         In Martinez, our court went on to assert that, per Coleman, “a court should grant relief if

           the defendant has presented evidence that is (1) new, (2) material, (3) noncumulative, and (4)

           so conclusive that it would probably change the result on retrial.” Id. ¶ 105 (citing Coleman,

           2013 IL 113307, ¶ 84). This court reasoned that Hobley effectively added a fifth requirement

           and since that fifth requirement was not present in Coleman’s articulation of the requirements

           of an actual innocence claim, Hobley was not reconcilable with Coleman. Id. ¶ 105-06.

           Coleman does not make note of Hobley’s fifth requirement, and asserts that “[i]n the 17 years

           since we decided Washington, nothing has changed,” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 93, and

           that “[o]ur commitment to [Washington’s] holding is unwavering.” Id. We conclude that

           Hobley’s fifth requirement is no longer part of our supreme court’s definition of a

           freestanding actual innocence claim.

¶ 102         Since the text of Coleman asserts that a freestanding claim is one in which the claim is

           separate from any other claim of a constitutional violation, we will review the facts of this

           case through that lens. Here, defendant alleges a Brady violation with regard to the State’s

           withholding of evidence regarding a statement from Herrera, but Herrera’s affidavit also

           includes testimony regarding the events surrounding the offense and that testimony supports

           a freestanding claim of actual innocence unrelated to any state action. There is no assertion of

                                                       32
        No. 1-21-0907

           a constitutional violation related to Dr. Strange or the evidence she presented. Accordingly,

           defendant’s actual innocence claim is freestanding.

¶ 103                                    2. Testimony of Saul Herrera

¶ 104         Defendant argues that it was manifest error for the circuit court to deny defendant a new

           trial where Herrera’s testimony was new, noncumulative, and sufficiently conclusive.

           Defendant’s argument on this subject contains a number of complaints about the circuit court

           judge, as well as conclusions about that judge’s intentions. It is clear from the record that

           defense counsel found the judge’s demeanor less than ideal. However, this court’s role is to

           review circuit court decisions for error, not to settle tensions between attorneys and the court.

           Defendant does not argue that the circuit court judge’s demeanor amounted to error of any

           kind, and such extraneous commentary is irrelevant to our appellate review. Instead, we will

           address the issue before us: whether it was manifest error for the circuit court to deny

           defendant a new trial based on Herrera’s testimony. We will not examine the question of

           whether Herrera’s testimony was material as the circuit court made no finding on that point

           and it is unnecessary to our analysis.

¶ 105                                           a. New Evidence

¶ 106         To qualify as new evidence suitable for a postconviction actual innocence claim, it must

           be evidence that was “discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier

           through the exercise of due diligence.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96. The State argues that

           because defendant knew that Herrera was present when the shooting took place, Herrera’s

           testimony about the events of the shooting is not newly discovered evidence. Even if it is

           newly discovered, the State argues, defendant could have discovered it prior to trial through

           due diligence and has not demonstrated that he performed such due diligence.

                                                        33
        No. 1-21-0907

¶ 107         Our supreme court’s guidance in People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, is instructive on

           this point. In that case, the petitioner presented alibi affidavits as newly discovered evidence

           of his innocence. Id. ¶ 12. The Edwards court stated that “[p]etitioner does not dispute that he

           knew of the alibi at the time of the trial. Petitioner’s argument is that this evidence was

           unavailable to him.” Id. ¶ 35. The petitioner there asserted that the evidence was unavailable

           because the alibi witnesses refused to testify, a claim that was supported only by assertions to

           that end from the witnesses in their affidavits. Id. Our supreme court held that since no

           evidence was presented that there was an attempt to subpoena the two alibi witnesses, the

           evidence could have been discovered sooner through the exercise of due diligence and

           therefore was not newly discovered. Id. ¶ 37. However, the Edwards court opined: “We do

           not conclude that such evidence could never be considered unavailable where, as here, the

           witnesses rejected the petitioner’s attempts to persuade them to testify.” Id.

¶ 108         While, in the case at bar, there is no evidence that an effort was made to persuade Herrera

           to testify on defendant’s behalf at the time of trial, we believe that this case falls into a very

           narrow category wherein the evidence is newly discovered despite a lack of showing from

           defendant that he did his due diligence. The reason for this conclusion is that the specific

           facts of this case present a scenario in which there was no action defendant could have taken

           at the time of the trial to constitute due diligence. In Edwards, there was nothing put into the

           record to confirm that the potential witnesses had refused to testify. In this case, Herrera had

           signed a statement implicating defendant, he was listed as a prosecution witness, and

           defendant even moved to exclude his testimony. As far as defendant was aware, Herrera

           intended to testify against him. To subpoena him to testify on defendant’s behalf would have

                                                        34
        No. 1-21-0907

           been nonsensical without the information provided in Herrera’s affidavit and postconviction

           testimony, neither of which were available to defendant’s attorney at trial.

¶ 109         The State argues that defendant should have been on notice that Herrera was not

           cooperating with the State because he had failed to answer the State’s subpoena and a

           warrant had been issued for his arrest. Defendant argues that if the State could not produce

           Herrera to testify, defendant could not be expected to have better luck producing him. Even if

           we were to accept, arguendo, that efforts constituting due diligence could have resulted in

           contact with Herrera, we do not believe that those efforts constituting due diligence include

           divining that a prosecution witness’ non-cooperation indicates availability and interest in

           testifying on defendant’s behalf. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred in finding

           that the evidence was not new.

¶ 110                                     b. Noncumulative Evidence

¶ 111         Defendant argues that the circuit court erred by finding that Herrera’s testimony was

           cumulative. “Noncumulative means the evidence adds to what the jury heard.” Coleman,

           2013 IL 113307, ¶ 96. While an actual innocence claim as a whole must overcome a heavy

           burden to warrant a new trial, the bar for evidence to qualify as non-cumulative is quite low.

           The State argues that the circuit court was right when it expressed doubt that a witness whose

           testimony largely echoes that of Gutierrez, Martin, and defendant would sway a jury, but that

           is an argument as to the conclusiveness of the testimony, not whether or not it is cumulative.

¶ 112         Defendant offers three facts that Herrera testified to that he argues are not cumulative to

           other testimony offered at trial. Most notably, Herrera stated that one of the men in the truck

           shouted “get the dude with the teardrop tattoo” before defendant ran toward the gangway.

           Regardless of what value a trier of fact might assign to this piece of testimony, we cannot say

                                                       35
        No. 1-21-0907

           it is cumulative with any of the other testimony. Accordingly, we disagree with the circuit

           court and at least a portion of Herrera’s testimony was noncumulative.

¶ 113                                       c. Conclusive Evidence

¶ 114         “[C]onclusive means the evidence, when considered along with the trial evidence, would

           probably lead to a different result.” Id. ¶ 96. Our task is not to reweigh the circuit court’s

           credibility determinations, it is to determine whether the circuit court’s decision was

           manifestly erroneous. Is it “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable” that the circuit court’s

           decision was erroneous? People v. Eubanks, 2021 IL 126271, ¶ 47. The circuit court found

           that Herrera’s testimony was not sufficiently conclusive because (1) defendant, Gutierrez,

           and Martin testified to “essentially the same thing,” (2) Herrera’s testimony about the

           attempted hand-off of the gun was contradictory to defendant’s testimony because the

           handoff occurred in a different place, (3) Herrera’s testimony was impeachable with his

           signed statement implicating defendant, (4) the court found Herrera’s testimony regarding

           police coercion to not be credible.

¶ 115         The circuit court’s assertion that Herrera’s testimony was largely in line with that of

           defendant, Gutierrez, and Martin is an accurate reflection of the record, though it was not

           identical. Although defendant insists otherwise, the record reflects that defendant testified

           that Garcia tried to hand off the gun to him twice: once in the back yard and once in the

           house. Gutierrez testified that Garcia attempted to hand off the gun to defendant but did not

           specify where that interaction took place. Herrera’s testimony that the attempted handoff

           occurred “right by the front of the house on the sidewalk” is inconsistent with the other

           witnesses’ testimony at trial. The circuit court was not wrong in its assertion that Herrera

           could be impeached with his signed statement, even if he would testify that that statement

                                                       36
        No. 1-21-0907

           was coerced. Though the circuit court did not mention it in its decision, there were also

           significant differences between the version of events described in Herrera’s affidavit and

           Herrera’s postconviction testimony, such as how many people got out of the truck. Such

           discrepancies could also be used to further impeach Herrera. Lastly, the circuit court’s

           credibility finding regarding Herrera’s testimony about police coercion was not manifestly

           erroneous.

¶ 116         The proposed value of Herrera’s testimony is that (1) he is an additional eyewitness

           testifying that Garcia was in fact the shooter, (2) his testimony that someone in the truck

           yelled “get the guy with the teardrop” shows why defendant ran toward the gangway and

           militates against the idea that he went to fetch a firearm, (3) his testimony regarding the

           attempted handoff of the weapon would explain why defendant tested positive for gunshot

           residue, and (4) he could also testify to police officers’ efforts to coerce him into implicating

           defendant.

¶ 117         The bar for granting a new trial based on a claim of actual innocence is a high one—the

           question, again, is not whether there is any value to the evidence provided in the

           postconviction petition, but whether it was clearly evident, plain, and indisputable that the

           circuit court’s decision was erroneous. People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶152.

           Comparing the potential value of the testimony Herrera could offer if a new trial were

           granted against the trial court’s findings and the testimony provided at the third-stage

           evidentiary hearing, we cannot say that the circuit court’s holding that Herrera’s testimony

           was insufficiently conclusive was manifestly erroneous.

                                                        37
        No. 1-21-0907

¶ 118                                 3. Testimony of Dr. Deryn Strange

¶ 119         Dr. Strange submitted a report and testified to the unreliability of eyewitness

           identification testimony and her impression, based on a reading of the record, of the

           likelihood that the factors that tend to make identifications unreliable affected the

           identifications in this case. Our supreme court has held on multiple occasions that

           impeachment evidence is insufficient to justify the grant of a new trial. People v. Prante,

           2023 IL 127241, ¶ 80; People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 335 (2009); People v. Smith, 177 Ill.

           2d 53, 82 (1997). Dr. Strange’s testimony is valuable solely for the purpose of impeachment.

           Accordingly, without needing to address the question of whether Dr. Strange’s testimony is

           new, noncumulative, and conclusive, we find that Dr. Strange’s testimony was insufficient to

           warrant a new trial.

¶ 120         Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s actual innocence claim.

¶ 121                                           C. Brady Claim

¶ 122         Defendant argues that his due process rights under Brady were violated because the State

           did not disclose to the defense that Herrera told the police that defendant was not the shooter

           and later, upon responding to a subpoena to testify in defendant’s case, told an assistant

           state’s attorney (ASA) that defendant was not the shooter.

¶ 123         Defendant fails to articulate anything more about the violated right and makes no citation

           whatsoever to the record or case law to support this argument, failing even to properly cite

           Brady itself. In its response, the State raises defendant’s failure to support his Brady claim

           with legal citation. Defendant states in his reply brief that he “saw no reason to cite factually

           distinguishable cases that will not aid this Court’s analysis or cite cases that merely

           regurgitate the relevant Brady standard which is not in dispute.” An assumption, no matter

                                                        38
        No. 1-21-0907

           how safe it may be, that this court already understands the basis for one’s argument does not

           justify a disregard for the court’s rules governing the requirements for appellate briefs.

           However, we will consider defendant’s argument despite these flaws.

¶ 124         In Brady, “the Supreme Court held that the prosecution violates an accused’s

           constitutional right to due process of law by failing to disclose evidence favorable to the

           accused and material to guilt or punishment.” People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56, 73 (2008).

           For the purposes of Brady violations, undisclosed information known to police, but not the

           prosecutor still constitutes a violation. Id. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must

           show that “(1) the undisclosed evidence is favorable to the accused because it is either

           exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the State either willfully or

           inadvertently; and (3) the accused was prejudiced because the evidence is material to guilt or

           punishment." Id. at 73-74.

¶ 125         We first address the question of whether the evidence was suppressed by the State. Our

           case law is of little help in discerning what quantum of proof is necessary to satisfy the

           required showing that evidence was suppressed, as the question is usually either undisputed

           or elided in favor of the other requirements laid out in Brady. Here, however, no evidence

           whatsoever is presented on the subject. In his post-conviction petition, defendant alleges that

           the State “failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that Saul Herrera first told the police and

           later disclosed to prosecutors directly that [defendant] was not the shooter.” The State

           responded to the petition with a blanket denial. Accordingly, even if the trial court had found

           Herrera to be credible and accepted that Herrera had in fact made the alleged statements to

           police and prosecutors, not one iota of evidence was adduced showing that the evidence was

           suppressed. We are left only with a bare allegation.

                                                       39
        No. 1-21-0907

¶ 126         In his post-conviction petition, defendant focused wholly on establishing, via Herrera’s

           affidavit, that the evidence existed, and then arguing that the evidence was favorable and

           material. Defendant cited no evidence establishing nondisclosure or suppression in either his

           petition or this appeal, and Herrera’s affidavit asserts only what he told police and

           prosecutors, not whether that information made its way to defendant. At defendant’s third-

           stage evidentiary hearing, defendant and his trial attorney were both called to testify, but in

           neither case were they asked whether they were made aware of Herrera’s statements to police

           and prosecutors. Defendant testified that he never saw the discovery in this case prior to post-

           conviction proceedings and that he barely had the opportunity to speak with his trial attorney,

           so we cannot say the record demonstrates that defendant had a sufficiently comprehensive

           awareness of what evidence was available to the defense to testify to non-receipt of this

           evidence, even if he had been asked. In closing arguments, defense counsel asserted that

           “[c]ertainly even Mr. Gillespie probably would have used that evidence if he had known.”

           This is an assumption. It is not evidence.

¶ 127         While the circuit court’s decision did not make note of the lack of evidence on this point,

           our concern as a reviewing court is the lower court’s result, not its rationale. People v.

           Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128 (2003). Without reaching the questions of favorability and

           materiality, where no shred of evidence is presented to establish suppression of evidence, we

           cannot say the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s Brady claim was against the manifest

           weight of the evidence.

¶ 128         Furthermore, the only evidence suggesting the existence of the allegedly-withheld

           information consists of Herrera’s affidavit and his testimony at the third-stage evidentiary

           hearing. The circuit court stated twice in its order that it did not find Herrera’s testimony to

                                                        40
        No. 1-21-0907

           be credible. Defendant notes that the circuit court did not indicate specific portions of

           Herrera’s testimony that were not credible, nor did it explain the basis of its credibility

           finding, but defendant cites no caselaw to establish that the circuit court is obligated to do so.

           We defer to the circuit court’s determinations of credibility as the fact-finder in a third-stage

           evidentiary hearing except where those determinations are manifestly erroneous. People v.

           Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 97.

¶ 129         It is arguable that Herrera’s willingness to flee rather than testify lends credibility to his

           story, but that requires inferring that his actions were predicated on an insistence on recanting

           coerced testimony and instead testifying to the truth rather than the equally valid inferences

           that his refusal to appear in response to the State’s subpoena was out of fear of retaliation

           from the gang to which defendant belonged or that the action was out of loyalty to a friend he

           had known since elementary school. Whatever unspecified inferences the circuit court may

           have drawn, it is true that Herrera’s signed statement to police in the wake of the offense

           contradicts his affidavit and post-conviction testimony, and it is true that Herrera’s post-

           conviction testimony contradicted his affidavit with regard to some of the specific facts of

           what happened on the night of the shooting. When confronted with a contradiction between

           his affidavit and his testimony regarding his knowledge or lack thereof as to whether Garcia

           and defendant were cousins, he responded: “I mean, you’re asking me if I read this. I didn’t

           read this. Now you’re asking me if that’s what I said. If that’s what I said, that’s what I

           wrote, that’s what I said.” When confronted with a contradiction between his affidavit and

           his testimony regarding the number of people who jumped out of the back of the truck prior

           to the shooting, the following exchange occurred:

                  STATE: So that is, in fact, also inaccurate, right?

                                                        41
        No. 1-21-0907

                  HERRERA: Two people jumped out. It’s like you’re asking me something I might

                  not recall, I don’t remember it. It’s been a long time. You have to understand that.

                  STATE: It could have been two people, it could have been four people; you don’t

                  recall, right?

                  HERRERA: Correct.

¶ 130         The question before us is not how we would have weighed Herrera’s credibility, but

           whether the circuit court’s credibility determination was manifestly erroneous. Considering

           all of the above, we cannot say it was, so we affirm the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s

           Brady claim.

¶ 131                              D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶ 132         Defendant asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was

           violated by his trial counsel’s failure to present the testimony of Natalie, Adam, and Carlos.

           We find no error in the circuit court’s factual finding that defendant’s trial counsel, Gillespie,

           spoke to Natalie, Adam, and Carlos, but did not call them at trial. All three testified to those

           facts during the third-stage evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the question before us under a

           de novo standard of review is whether Gillespie’s decisions rose to the level of ineffective

           assistance of counsel. People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 43 (“In general, the standard of

           review for determining if an individual's constitutional rights have been violated is de

           novo.”). To determine whether a defendant was denied his or her right to effective assistance

           of counsel, we must apply the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

           668 (1984). People v. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d 125, 135 (2007) (citing People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.

           2d 504 (1984) (adopting Strickland)). Under Strickland, a defendant must prove both (1) his

           attorney’s actions constituted errors so serious as to fall below an objective standard of

                                                        42
        No. 1-21-0907

           reasonableness and (2) absent these errors, there was a reasonable probability that his trial

           would have resulted in a different outcome. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36

           (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694). To prevail, the defendant must satisfy both prongs

           of the Strickland test. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135.

¶ 133         Under the first prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must prove that his counsel’s

           performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness “under prevailing

           professional norms.” Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004).

           In considering whether counsel’s performance was deficient, a court must indulge a strong

           presumption that the challenged action or inaction was the result of sound trial strategy.

           People v. Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000); People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93 (1999).

¶ 134         Under the second prong, the defendant must show that, “but for” counsel’s deficient

           performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

           been different. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135; Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220. “[A] reasonable

           probability that the result would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine

           confidence in the outcome—or put another way, that counsel’s deficient performance

           rendered the result of the trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair.” Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 220;

           Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135. In other words, the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney’s

           performance. People v. Lacy, 407 Ill. App. 3d 442, 457 (2011).

¶ 135         Defendant asserts that the testimony offered by Natalie, Adam, and Carlos was highly

           compelling and that “failure of trial counsel to call a witness who would contradict the

           State’s evidence and support the defense reflects deficient performance.” Defendant cites to

           four cases for this proposition: People v. Ramirez-Lucas, 2017 IL App (2d) 150156, ¶ 44;

           People v. Makiel, 358 Ill. App. 3d 102, 108 (2005), People v. Butcher, 240 Ill. App. 3d 507,

                                                         43
        No. 1-21-0907

           510 (1992), People v. Skinner, 220 Ill. App. 3d 479, 485 (1991). All four cited cases concern

           otherwise-uncorroborated theories of defense and therefore are not comparable to the case at

           bar. Here, Gutierrez and Martin corroborated defendant’s testimony that he was innocent and

           that Garcia was the shooter. While defendant is correct in his assertion that the circuit court

           made no explicit finding that trial counsel’s decisions were sound trial strategy, defendant

           also makes no demonstration that such an explicit finding is necessary. There were

           inconsistencies between the versions of events presented by Natalie, Adam, and Carlos.

           Presentation of their testimony could have led to contradictions with the testimony presented

           by Martin and Gutierrez, both of whom testified that after Garcia left, they were speaking in

           the backyard, yet neither of whom made any mention of a vehicle entering the garage during

           that time. Even if we assume that a jury would find it believable that Garcia’s course of

           action after shooting someone was to leave his car in the garage at the scene of the crime, it is

           doubtful that he could have done so without Gutierrez and Martin noticing.

¶ 136         Further, none of the three proposed witnesses saw the shooting. Carlos saw Garcia with a

           gun near the scene of the crime and testified that Garcia told him that he had shot at someone

           and thought that he had killed him. Natalie was present with Garcia at all times that Carlos

           was, but denied that Garcia ever showed them a gun or stated that he killed anyone. Adam

           saw Garcia near the scene of the crime with what he believed to be a gun. It would not have

           been unreasonable for an attorney in Gillespie’s position to decide that corroborating

           defendant’s theory of defense with Martin and Gutierrez, who saw the events themselves,

           would present a cleaner and more coherent story for the jury without the risk of perceived

           contradictions from the additional testimony of Natalie, Carlos, and Adam. Defendant has

           not overcome the presumption that defendant’s trial counsel’s decision not to call Natalie,

                                                        44
        No. 1-21-0907

           Carlos, and Adam was sound trial strategy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision

           with regard to the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

¶ 137                            E. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

¶ 138         Defendant argues that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to assert

           that the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to suppress Torres’ identification

           of defendant in the lineup. “Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are

           measured against the same standard as those dealing with ineffective assistance of trial

           counsel.” People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 175 (2000). “Appellate counsel can only be

           ineffective for failing to raise issues that were apparent on the face of the record.” People v.

           Dixon, 2019 IL App (1st) 160443, ¶ 43. However, appellate counsel “is not obliged to raise

           every conceivable issue on appeal and it is not incompetence to refrain from raising issues

           which, in counsel’s judgment, are without merit, unless counsel’s appraisal of the merits is

           patently wrong.” People v. Jones, 399 Ill. App. 3d 341, 372 (2010).

¶ 139         As no new evidence was presented on this issue and the question is purely a question of

           law, our review is de novo. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473. “A trial court’s factual

           determination that an identification procedure was not unduly suggestive should not be

           reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, i.e. an opposite conclusion is

           apparent or the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.”

           People v. Ortiz, 2017 IL App (1st) 142559, ¶ 21. “However, the ultimate determination of

           whether the trial court’s suppression ruling was proper given the factual circumstances at

           issue is a legal question, which we review de novo.” Id.

¶ 140         “When challenging a lineup identification, the defendant bears the initial burden to show

           it was impermissibly suggestive.” People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 181070, ¶ 36 (citing

                                                         45
        No. 1-21-0907

           People v. Clifton, 2019 IL App (1st) 151967, ¶ 60). “If the defendant makes such a showing,

           the burden shifts to the State to show by ‘clear and convincing evidence that the witness is

           identifying the defendant based on his or her independent recollection of the incident.’ ” Id.

           ¶ 36 (citing People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 126 (1999)).

¶ 141         Notwithstanding whether or not the lineup in question was impermissibly suggestive,

           appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the denial of the motion to suppress

           on appeal. The trial court held that the lineup was not impermissibly suggestive without the

           burden of proof ever shifting to the State to prove that Torres’ identification had an

           independent basis. However, the trial court judge heard testimony at the pretrial hearing that

           established that Torres described the shooter as a male Hispanic with long hair and a teardrop

           tattoo, within minutes of the shooting. Upon returning to the scene of the crime with police,

           Torres observed multiple individuals in the back yard and did not identify any of them as the

           shooter, but, upon seeing defendant, pointed him out as the shooter. The trial court did not

           base its denial on these facts, as the question before it was whether the lineup was suggestive.

           The trial court did, however, deny a motion to quash the arrest based on that testimony,

           indicating that the trial court found the testimony to be credible.

¶ 142         There is no testimony in the record that contradicts the fact that Torres identified

           defendant at defendant’s house within minutes of the shooting. Defendant’s appellate counsel

           may have judged that it was likely that, even if defendant were to prevail on the matter of the

           suggestiveness of the lineup identification, the only relief would have been a remand for a

           hearing to give the State the opportunity to present the same evidence a second time to show

           an independent basis for Torres’ identification. It would have been reasonable for

           defendant’s appellate counsel to conclude that the State would almost certainly prevail upon

                                                        46
        No. 1-21-0907

           remand, so it would not have been an unreasonable strategic decision to forgo the issue and

           focus on those more likely to lead to meaningful relief for defendant. Accordingly, we cannot

           find that appellate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

           reasonableness and so defendant’s claim fails. As defendant has failed to satisfy the first

           prong of Strickland and both prongs must be satisfied for an ineffective assistance of counsel

           claim to succeed, we need not consider the second prong. Colon, 225 Ill. 2d at 135.

¶ 143                                            F. Sentencing

¶ 144             The resentencing court sentenced defendant to 21 years’ imprisonment for first-

           degree murder, 6 years’ imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm, and 5 years’

           imprisonment for aggravated discharge of a firearm, with all three terms to run

           consecutively. Both parties agree that this sentence was erroneous. One of the circumstances

           in which consecutive sentencing is mandatory is when “[o]ne of the offenses for which the

           defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1 felony and the

           defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West 2020). Our supreme

           court has since held that this provision applies only where the defendant inflicted severe

           bodily injury during the commission of the triggering felony. People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d

           91, 98-99 (1999). Both parties agree that in the case at bar, each of the three charges have

           separate victims and neither the original sentencing court nor the resentencing court made a

           finding of severe bodily injury. We find that the resentencing court erred in ordering all three

           terms of imprisonment to run consecutively.

¶ 145         This court possesses the authority to order correction of the mittimus rather than

           remanding to the sentencing court. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 615 (eff. Jan 1, 1967); People v. Denis,

           2018 IL App (1st) 151892. Accordingly, we order the mittimus to be corrected to reflect that

                                                       47
        No. 1-21-0907

           the 21-year term of imprisonment is to run consecutively with the 6-year term for aggravated

           battery with a firearm and the 5-year term for aggravated discharge of a firearm, but that the

           6-year term and 5-year term are to run concurrently with each other, for a total term of 27

           years.

¶ 146                                         III. CONCLUSION

¶ 147         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decisions of the circuit court, but order that the

           mittimus be corrected.

¶ 148         Affirmed; mittimus corrected.

                                                      48