Court Opinion

ID: 9900022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 07:12:13.177865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.447664
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed November 16, 2023

                                                In The

            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                             __________

                                     No. 11-23-00143-CV
                                             __________

                      IN THE INTEREST OF I.H., A CHILD

                          On Appeal from the 35th District Court
                                  Brown County, Texas
                            Trial Court Cause No. CV2202030

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
        This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the father, R.B., to his one-year-old son, I.H. 1 On appeal,
Appellant presents two issues in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

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         The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the mother of the child after she signed an
Affidavit of Relinquishment of Parental Rights. The mother did not file an appeal.
                        Termination Findings and Standards
      The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To terminate
parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent
has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U), and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. at § 161.001(b)(2).
      In this case, the trial court found that Appellant knowingly engaged in
criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense, and confinement and
inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of filing the
petition. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). The trial court further found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. Appellant challenges both the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s findings.
      In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). “Bearing in mind the
required appellate deference to the factfinder, we look at all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the finding, assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002); (then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). In
assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the
finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably

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form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent.
In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied).
      With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513. But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id. Additionally, evidence that proves one or more
statutory grounds for termination may also constitute evidence illustrating that
termination is in the child’s best interest. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
                        Procedural and Factual Background
      The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services (the
Department) became involved with I.H. shortly after he was born on December 4,
2021, because he tested positive for methamphetamines. I.H. was placed with
relatives, who addressed his ongoing medical concerns such as congenital syphilis,
cataracts, and constant checkups for his bone density and other syphilis-related
health issues.
      The Department filed its petition for protection of the child and for termination
of the parents’ parental rights on February 7, 2022, and filed an amended petition on

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April 19, 2023, adding Appellant’s incarceration as a ground for termination. At the
time of trial, I.H. was eighteen months old. The case manager testified that, after
spending most of his life in his permanent placement, I.H. is “doing really well,” and
that “he doesn’t have a lot of concerns.”
      Appellant appeared for trial via Zoom while incarcerated in the Jordan Unit
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. He testified he found out the mother
was pregnant with I.H. during his incarceration. Appellant testified that he wanted
to be part of I.H.’s life, and that he wrote to the case manager “as much as [he
could].” However, the case manager revealed that Appellant had not followed up
with her regarding his services, and Appellant was confronted with his lack of
correspondence since December of 2022.
      Appellant testified that, while his projected release date is November 18,
2027, he will be eligible for parole in November of 2024. The trial court observed
that, “[e]ven if [Appellant] were to be paroled by his projected date, that is more
than two years from the date the actual petition was filed.” The trial court terminated
Appellant’s parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q) of the Texas Family
Code and found termination to be in the best interest of the child. This appeal
followed.
                                       Analysis
      Subsection (Q)
      Pursuant to subsection (Q), the Department had the burden to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Appellant “knowingly engaged in criminal conduct
that has resulted in [a] conviction . . . and . . . confinement or imprisonment and
inability to care for [I.H.] for not less than two years from the date of filing the
petition.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q). The petition was filed on February 7, 2022;
thus, the Department had the burden to prove that Appellant would be confined or

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imprisoned until at least February 7, 2024. See id.; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 360–
61 (Tex. 2003); In re K.G., No. 11-12-00130-CV, 2012 WL 3765058, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2012, no pet.) (“the two-year statutory period in subsection
Q” begins on the date the original petition is filed); see also In re H.O., 555 S.W.3d
245, 252 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston 2018, pet. denied) (collecting cases holding
same). Once the Department has established that a parent’s knowing criminal
conduct resulted in his confinement for more than two years, the burden shifts to the
parent to produce some evidence as to how he will arrange to provide care for the
child during that period. Hampton v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs.,
138 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.); In re Caballero, 53
S.W.3d 391, 396 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, pet. denied); see In re H.R.M., 209
S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. 2006).
      “By allowing termination based on an extended prison sentence, subsection
(Q) ‘allows the State to act in anticipation of a parent’s abandonment of the child
and not just in response to it.’” In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696, 698–99 (Tex.
2022) (emphasis in original) (quoting A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 360). While “[p]arole
decisions are inherently speculative,” the fact that a parent is serving a prison
sentence that does not expire for at least two more years “does not automatically
meet subsection Q’s two-year imprisonment requirement” because “evidence of the
availability of parole is relevant.” H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108–09. But even though
this evidence is relevant, the factfinder is free to disregard the parent’s parole-related
testimony, especially when it constitutes “barely more than conjecture.” C.L.E.E.G.,
639 S.W3d at 698–99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
      Here, it is undisputed that Appellant’s projected release date is not until
November 18, 2027. Even his parole-eligibility is nearly three years after the
Department commenced suit in February of 2022. Viewing all of the evidence in

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the light most favorable to the finding (legal sufficiency), we hold that a rational trier
of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Appellant knowingly
engaged in criminal conduct that resulted in his conviction of an offense and
confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for I.H. for not less than two years
from February 7, 2022—the date that the Department filed its petition. And with
respect to factual sufficiency, giving due deference to the trial court’s finding and
considering the entire record, we conclude that the evidence is such that the trial
court could reasonably have formed a firm belief as to the truth of the allegations
under subsection Q. See In re C.A.C., Jr., No. 09-10-00477-CV, 2011 WL 1744139,
at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 5, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upholding trial
court’s finding under subsection Q and stating that there was no guarantee of release
on parole and that a “projected release date, even in the absence of evidence of an
adverse disciplinary record, is not evidence that appellant will be released on that
date”). Appellant testified that he would not be eligible for parole until nine months
after the two-year mark following the filing of the petition. This testimony supports
the trial court’s finding under subsection Q; the trial court could also have reasonably
disregarded his testimony as conjecture. See C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d at 699;
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109. In fact, it is evidence that Appellant had no possibility
of parole until more than two years after the original petition was filed. See H.R.M.,
209 S.W.3d at 108–09. Moreover, Appellant did not present any evidence of any
arrangements that he had made to provide care for I.H. during his period of
incarceration. We conclude that this record contains legally and factually sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding regarding Appellant’s conviction,
continued incarceration, and inability to care for I.H. under subsection (Q).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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       Best Interest
       In Appellant’s second issue, he asserts that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the termination of his
parental rights is in the best interest of I.H. The trial court, as the trier of fact, is the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at
liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of fact so long as those
determinations are not unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570,
573 (Tex. 2002). Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the
evidence and the Holley factors, the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm
belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the
best interest in I.H. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
       The trial court was presented with ample evidence that Appellant failed to
comply with his required services, did not have the ability to care for the child for
more than two years from the date the Department filed its original petition, and may
have allowed I.H. to remain in the dangerous care of the mother had the Department
not intervened. As set forth above, the Department presented testimony regarding
the mother’s drug use while pregnant and after I.H. was born. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d
at 749–50 (Texas courts may consider “a parent’s willful ignorance of the significant
risk that a pregnant mother’s drug use poses”); C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. Appellant
testified that he “didn’t even know [the mother] was pregnant until [he] got to
County” and that, in 2021, “[w]hen I.H. was born, [he] was already in County.”
Appellant received his Family Service Plan in July of 2022, but made no effort to
comply. Appellant acknowledged there were classes available to him in prison, but
claimed, “[t]here’s not too much I can do while I’m in here.” Appellant likewise
offered no suitable alternative for supporting I.H. and I.H.’s physical and emotional
well-being. See H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 110; Hampton, 138 S.W.3d at 567–68.

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      Importantly, given the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we
may not discount or minimize the level of permanence I.H. has achieved with his
placement caregivers, with whom he has lived since he was eleven days old. See
J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 747. His caregivers have met and continue to meet his ongoing
medical needs, provide him with a safe, stable home environment, and prioritize his
physical and emotional well-being.
      Upon considering the record as it relates to Appellant’s actions, the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical
needs of the child now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the
drug use of the mother and criminal activity of the father, and the plans for the child
by the Department, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best
interest of the child. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. On this record, we cannot
hold the trial court’s findings are not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                                JUSTICE

November 16, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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