Court Opinion

ID: 9897531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:44.882272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.790083
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                  State v. Jason M. O’Donnell (A-17-22) (087023)

Argued April 24, 2023 -- Decided August 7, 2023

RABNER, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court.

      In this appeal, the Court considers whether the bribery statute, N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2, applies to a candidate for political office who is not an incumbent and is
ultimately not elected.

      Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne in 2018.
During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper Baskin-
Robbins bag from an individual. In exchange for the money, the State asserts,
defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city. The State
charged defendant under the bribery statute. Defendant did not win the election. He
contends the law does not apply to him because it does not cover candidates who
accept improper payments but are not elected.

       The trial court dismissed the indictment, holding that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) did
not apply to defendant. The Appellate Division reversed. 471 N.J. Super. 360, 375
(App. Div. 2022). The Court granted certification limited to the scope of the bribery
statute. 252 N.J. 171 (2022).

HELD: The bribery statute applies to any “person” who accepts an improper
benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and candidates who lose. N.J.S.A.
2C:27-2. The statute also expressly states that it is no defense to a prosecution if a
person “was not qualified to act.” Ibid. So even if a candidate is unable to follow
through on a corrupt promise, the language of the bribery statute makes it a crime to
accept cash payments for a promise of future performance. The bribery statute’s
history, relevant caselaw, and commentary from the Model Penal Code, on which the
statute is modeled, confirm that the law extends to candidates.

1. The Court reviews the bribery statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. The indictment here
tracks the language of subsection (d), under which “[a] person is guilty of bribery if”
that person (1) directly or indirectly solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept a benefit
from another (2) as consideration for the performance of official duties (3) and did
so purposely. The State asserts that defendant accepted an unauthorized “benefit” of
                                           1
$10,000 as “consideration” for an official act in the future, appointing a particular
person as tax counsel for the city. That allegation lines up with the text and
elements of subsection (d) and does not call for an expansion of the law. (pp. 8-10)

2. Defendant’s argument that the bribery statute does not explicitly apply to a
candidate is unavailing. The law applies to any “person” who solicits or accepts a
bribe. Also unavailing is defendant’s suggestion that if the law applies to candidates,
it applies only to candidates who are later elected. Under that interpretation, the
offense is only complete if and when the person takes office. But the bribery statute
focuses on the exchange of a benefit for a commitment to perform. That means the
offense is complete when a benefit is solicited or accepted, not at a later point.
Further, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) does not say the recipient must be able to perform any
official duties at the time the bribe is paid; rather, it makes it a crime for “[a]
person” to accept a bribe “as consideration for the performance of official duties.”
(emphasis added). “Consideration” includes conditional promises. As the State
argues, imagine a candidate or an official who accepts a bribe in exchange for a
promise to vote for a piece of legislation. If the bill is never posted for a vote, the
person’s conduct -- accepting a payment as consideration for the performance of
official duties in the future -- is still an offense under the bribery statute. (pp. 10-13)

3. The bribery statute includes a no-defense provision: “It is no defense to
prosecution . . . that a person . . . was not qualified to act in the desired way whether
because he had not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other
reason.” N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. If anything, that provision rebuts defendant’s argument
that no crime has occurred if a person “had not yet assumed office” and therefore
could not perform official duties. The law states it is not a defense if “a person
whom the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way . . .
for any reason.” Ibid. (pp. 13-14)

4. The Court reviews the bribery statute’s history and relevant caselaw, which
confirm that the law extends to candidates. The current bribery statute has its roots
in the common law of bribery. More than 150 years ago, State v. Ellis explained
that “[t]he offence is complete when an offer of reward is made to influence the vote
or action of the official. It need not be averred . . . that the official, or the body of
which he was a member, had authority by law to do the thing sought to be
accomplished.” 33 N.J.L. 102, 105 (Sup. Ct. 1868). Decisions by the Appellate
Division applying the former and current versions of the bribery statute affirmed the
offense’s reach. See State v. Ferro, 128 N.J. Super. 353, 357-60 (App. Div. 1974);
State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115, 138-40 (App. Div. 1997). And because
N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 is modeled after the Model Penal Code, the Court reviews the
relevant Code sections and commentary. They reveal that the bribery statute was
meant to apply to candidates and that the no-defense provision applies to those who
give as well as those who receive bribes. (pp. 14-20)
                                             2
5. The Court does not give weight to the model jury charges for bribery to interpret
the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. In general, the Court does not evaluate model jury
charges other than when they are reviewed as part of an appeal. The model charges
include the no-defense provision in the charge for bribe givers but not the one for
bribe recipients. The Court asks the Committee on Model Jury Charges to revise the
model charge to conform to this opinion. (pp. 20-21)

6. Courts do not rely on unsuccessful attempts to amend a statute in order to
interpret it. Defendant focuses on legislative activity following United States v.
Manzo, in which the United States District Court found the statute did not extend to
candidates for office who are not elected. 851 F. Supp. 2d 797, 811 (D.N.J. 2012).
Afterward, legislators introduced various bills that would have added the phrases “a
candidate for public office” and “any person elected but who has not yet assumed
office” to the definition of “public servant.” The current law was enacted in 1978
and amended in 1979. Recent, unsuccessful efforts to amend the bribery statute
cannot reveal what the Legislature intended when it passed the law. (pp. 21-23)

7. The Court explains the rule of lenity, which does not apply here because the
bribery statute is unambiguous. (pp. 23-24)

8. Turning to defendant’s constitutional arguments, due process is satisfied when
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and when the offense is
defined in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. The bribery statute provides sufficient notice that no person --
candidate or incumbent -- may accept unauthorized benefits “as consideration for the
performance of official duties.” See N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d). The law plainly states it
is no defense that someone in defendant’s position was not yet qualified to act.
N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. And ordinary people can understand that New Jersey’s bribery
statute does not allow them to accept a bag of cash in exchange for promising a
future appointment to a city post. Although court rulings, like legislative
enactments, can violate the ban on ex post facto laws when a judicial construction of
a criminal statute is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had
been expressed prior to the conduct in issue, the construction of the bribery statute
outlined in the Court’s opinion is not unexpected or indefensible. Rather, it flows
from the plain language of the statute and is consistent with prior decisions by the
Appellate Division and commentary to the Model Penal Code. (pp. 24-28)

      AFFIRMED and REMANDED to the trial court.

JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER,
and FASCIALE and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join in CHIEF
JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.

                                          3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-17 September Term 2022
                        087023

                 State of New Jersey,

                 Plaintiff-Respondent,

                           v.

                 Jason M. O’Donnell,

                 Defendant-Appellant.

       On certification to the Superior Court,
   Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
       471 N.J. Super. 360 (App. Div. 2022).

       Argued                      Decided
    April 24, 2023               August 7, 2023

Leo J. Hurley, Jr., argued the cause for appellant
(Connell Foley, attorneys; Leo J. Hurley, Jr., of counsel
and on the briefs, and Alexa C. Salcito and Brian K.
Dempster, on the briefs).

Angela Cai, Deputy Solicitor General, argued the cause
for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General,
attorney; Angela M. Cai, Jeremy M. Feigenbaum,
Solicitor General, and Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy
Attorney General, of counsel and on the briefs).

Lawrence S. Lustberg argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(Gibbons, attorneys; Lawrence S. Lustberg and William
C. Martinez, on the brief).
        CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

      Defendant Jason O’Donnell was a candidate for mayor of Bayonne in

2018. During the campaign, he allegedly accepted $10,000 in cash in a paper

bag from an individual. In exchange for the money, the State asserts,

defendant promised to appoint the individual as tax counsel for the city.

      The State charged defendant under the bribery statute. The relevant part

of the law states it is a crime for any “person” to accept “[a]ny benefit as

consideration for the performance of official duties.” N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d).

      Defendant did not win the election. He contends the law does not apply

to him because it does not cover candidates who accept improper payments but

are not elected. The plain words of the bribery statute, however, do not

support that position.

      The relevant language is not limited to public servants, party officials, or

successful candidates, as defendant suggests. The law applies to any “person”

who accepts an improper benefit -- incumbents, candidates who win, and

candidates who lose. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. The statute also expressly states that

it is no defense to a prosecution if a person “was not qualified to act.” Ibid.

So even if a candidate is unable to follow through on a corrupt promise, the

language of the bribery statute makes it a crime to accept cash payments for a

                                        2
promise of future performance. Beyond the terms of the statute, commentary

from the Model Penal Code, on which the law is modeled, supports that

interpretation.

        The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, and

the Appellate Division properly reinstated the charge of bribery. We affirm

the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand the case for trial.

                                         I.

                                        A.

        We draw the facts from the State’s grand jury presentation. We make no

findings about the allegations.

        In February 2018, an individual who cooperated with law enforcement

met with defendant Jason O’Donnell.1 At the time, defendant was a candidate

for mayor of Bayonne. At the end of the evening, defendant asked for

$10,000. Defendant said that he needed street money and that the individual

would “be his tax guy.” Candidates for office ordinarily use “street money”

for get-out-the-vote efforts and related activities. See N.J.A.C. 19:25-12.6(a).

        During the investigation that followed, the cooperator met with

defendant, spoke with him on the phone, and recorded their conversations.

1
    It is not clear from the record when the individual began to cooperate.

                                         3
The two met again on April 23, 2018 at defendant’s campaign headquarters.

During the recorded meeting, the cooperator said, “street. When do you need

that, next week?” Defendant responded, “the weekend before [the race] is

good.” Defendant added, “Well it’s gonna be easy because you’ll be the tax

attorney.”

      On May 3, 2018, investigators gave the cooperator $10,000 in cash to

give to defendant. The money was inside a white Baskin-Robbins bag with

pink lettering. During a recorded conversation at campaign headquarters later

in the day, the cooperator said, “I just want to be your tax guy.” Defendant

responded, “Yeah done. That’s, that’s easy but I need.” A video of the

meeting depicts defendant holding the Baskin-Robbins bag.

      Defendant lost the election. A grand jury later charged him with bribery,

in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, in a one-count indictment. The indictment

alleges, in part, that defendant “knowingly did directly or indirectly solicit,

accept, or agree to accept from another a benefit that is, funds in excess of

$200, as consideration for the performance of official duties or the violation of

official duties.” The language tracks subsection (d) of the bribery statute.

                                        B.

      Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment prior to trial. The trial court

granted the motion. In a written opinion, the court held that N.J.S.A. 2C:27-

                                         4
2(d) did not apply to defendant because “he was merely a candidate for public

office with no real, actual, or apparent authority to perform any ‘official

duties’ at the” “moment of [the] exchange.”

      The court relied in part on a federal ruling that interpreted the statute in

the same way, United States v. Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D.N.J. 2012). In

Manzo, a thoughtful federal judge predicted how this Court would interpret

New Jersey’s bribery statute and reached a different conclusion than we have.

The Federal District Court found the statute did not extend to candidates for

office who are not elected. Id. at 811.

      The Appellate Division reversed the state trial court’s judgment. The

appellate court held that the plain language of the bribery statute “reveals an

intent to render unlawful what defendant is alleged to have done and that the

statute imposes criminal liability on . . . unsuccessful candidates for public

office” who accept bribes. State v. O’Donnell, 471 N.J. Super. 360, 363 (App.

Div. 2022). The court explained that the statute’s broad text is not limited to

“the acceptance of bribes only by public officials and public servants.” Id. at

363, 367. The court also observed that “[t]here is nothing in the statute to

suggest the State is required to prove a bribe receiver’s present ability to

perform.” Id. at 368-69.

                                          5
      The Appellate Division reviewed the statute’s common law roots, recent

precedent, and commentary in the Model Penal Code, and found that those

sources supported a broad reading of the bribery statute. Id. at 365-73. The

court also explained its disagreement with Manzo’s reasoning, id. at 371-74,

and concluded that the rule of lenity did not apply because the bribery statute

is not ambiguous, id. at 374-75.

                                        C.

      We granted defendant’s petition for certification limited to questions

related to the scope of the bribery statute -- namely, whether it “applies to a

candidate for political office who is not an incumbent and is ultimately not

elected.” 252 N.J. 171 (2022). We also granted the Association of Criminal

Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL) leave to appear as amicus.

                                        II.

      Defendant argues the language of the bribery statute is unambiguous and

does not explicitly apply to a candidate running for political office who is not

an incumbent and is not elected. He contends that the law’s “no-defense”

provision, which we discuss later, does not apply to him. Alternatively, he

presents two arguments in the event the statute is found to be ambiguous: (1)

the legislative history and proposed amendments to the law confirm that the

Legislature excluded candidates for office from the statute’s reach; and (2) the

                                        6
rule of lenity should apply. Defendant also argues that the Appellate

Division’s “expansion of the scope and reach of” the statute violates his due

process rights and operates as an ex post facto law.

      The ACDL supports defendant’s position and argues that the bribery

statute, if applied to unelected political candidates, violates the Due Process

Clause’s prohibition against vague criminal laws.

      The Attorney General argues that the text of the bribery statute plainly

proscribes defendant’s alleged conduct. Pointing to the language of the

statute, the Attorney General argues that “any individual who accepts bribes in

consideration for performing official duties if elected to office violates ” the

bribery law. Defendant’s sole defense that he was not qualified to act,

according to the Attorney General, is “no defense” under the text of the law.

The Attorney General also contends that extrinsic evidence and precedent

confirm the above reading of the statute; that neither the rule of lenity nor

“alleged legislative inaction” supports a contrary result; and that defendant’s

constitutional arguments lack merit.

                                        III.

      This is a case of statutory interpretation, for which our review is de

novo. Malanga v. Township of West Orange, 253 N.J. 291, 311 (2023).

                                         7
      To interpret the meaning of a statute, courts attempt “to determine and

give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432, 450

(2023) (quoting State v. Lopez-Carrera, 245 N.J. 596, 612 (2021)). The plain

language of a statute “is typically the best indicator of intent.” Ibid. (quoting

State v. McCray, 243 N.J. 196, 208 (2020)).

      When a criminal statute “is modeled after the” Model Penal Code, courts

may consider the Code and its “commentary to interpret the intent of the

statutory language.” State v. Robinson, 217 N.J. 594, 606 (2014).

Commentary from the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission can

similarly provide guidance. See id. at 606 n.4.

                                        A.

      We begin with the text of the bribery statute:

            A person is guilty of bribery if he directly or indirectly
            offers, confers or agrees to confer upon another, or
            solicits, accepts or agrees to accept from another:

               a. Any benefit as consideration for a decision,
               opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of
               discretion of a public servant, party official or voter
               on any public issue or in any public election; or

               b. Any benefit as consideration for a decision, vote,
               recommendation or exercise of official discretion in
               a judicial or administrative proceeding; or

               c. Any benefit as consideration for a violation of an
               official duty of a public servant or party official; or

                                        8
                d. Any benefit as consideration for the performance
                of official duties.

            For the purposes of this section “benefit as
            consideration” shall be deemed to mean any benefit not
            authorized by law.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.]

The law also includes a “no-defense” provision that states, “[i]t is no defense

to prosecution under this section that a person whom the actor sought to

influence was not qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had

not yet assumed office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.” Ibid.

      The indictment in this case tracks the language of subsection (d). The

relevant elements for the offense charged are as follows: (1) that a person

directly or indirectly solicited, accepted, or agreed to accept a benefit from

another; (2) that the person did so as consideration for the performance of

official duties; and (3) that the person acted purposely. See ibid.; State v.

Schenkolewski, 301 N.J. Super. 115, 139-40 (App. Div. 1997) (requiring

“subjective intent on the part of the actor”).

      In this case, the State asserts that defendant accepted an unauthorized

“benefit” of $10,000 as “consideration” for an official act in the future ,

                                         9
appointing a particular person as tax counsel for the city.2 That allegation

lines up with the text and elements of subsection (d) of the bribery statute.

The accusation does not call for an expansion of the law, as defendant

suggests.

      Defendant advances two principal arguments that we address in turn.

First, he contends the law does not apply to him because it does not explicitly

apply to a candidate running for office who is not an incumbent and does not

ultimately win. Defendant similarly argues that the State has not alleged he

was either a public servant, a party official, or a person with “official duties”

or authority. Subsection (d), however, does not say that a person who solicits

or accepts a bribe must be any of those things. See O’Donnell, 471 N.J. Super.

at 367. The law instead applies to any “person” who solicits or accepts a

bribe. Had the Legislature intended to exclude candidates from the statute’s

reach, it would have said so. See ibid.; State v. Ferro, 128 N.J. Super. 353,

359 (App. Div. 1974).

      Other parts of the statute use the terms “public servant” and “party

official,” but subsection (d) does not. See N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(a), (c). We do not

opine on the scope of those subsections. Nor do we rely on the statute’s

2
  The State advises that it intends to re-present the matter to the grand jury to
allege defendant’s conduct was “purposeful,” rather than “knowing.”

                                        10
definitional section, N.J.S.A. 2C:27-1. Although we look to other parts of a

statute for relevant context, State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 533 (2018), the fact

that the term “candidate” is not listed or defined in the general definitional

section for chapter 27 of the criminal code does not determine the scope of

subsection (d). Cf. Allen v. V & A Bros., Inc., 208 N.J. 114, 130-31 (2011)

(noting, in construing the Consumer Fraud Act, that the operative section of a

statute, not its definitional section, creates the basis for liability).

      At the same time that defendant emphasizes the statute does not

explicitly contain the word “candidate,” he suggests the law applies to

payments to candidates who are later elected. The operative language in the

bribery statute, however, focuses on the exchange of a benefit for a

commitment to perform. That means the offense is complete when a benefit is

solicited or accepted, not at a later point. Under defendant’s interpretation of

the law, the offense is only complete if and when the person takes office.

Despite language in the statute to the contrary, defendant maintains no offense

is committed in this situation at the time a bribe is paid.

      Second, defendant claims that he cannot have committed bribery because

he could not deliver on any bribe as an unelected candidate. But subsection

(d) does not say the recipient must be able to perform any official duties at the

time the bribe is paid. See O’Donnell, 471 N.J. Super. at 368-69. The

                                          11
subsection’s expansive language instead makes it a crime for “[a] person” to

accept a bribe “as consideration for the performance of official duties.”

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d) (emphasis added).

      “Consideration” encompasses “mutual promises to do some future act.”

Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 533 (1956) (quoting Rich v.

Doneghey, 177 P. 86, 90 (Okla. 1918)). The term also includes conditional

promises. See 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:18 (4th ed. 2023). “[A]n offer to

insure property in exchange for a premium,” for example, “constitutes a

promise to pay insurance money in case the property insured is damaged or

destroyed.” Ibid. The “conditional promise may be consideration.” Ibid.

      More specifically, for purposes of this appeal, the text of the bribery

statute does not require a bribe recipient to be able to act on a promise. As the

State argues, imagine a candidate or an official who accepts a bribe in

exchange for a promise to vote for a piece of legislation. If the bill is never

posted for a vote, the person’s conduct -- accepting a payment as consideration

for the performance of official duties in the future -- is still an offense under

the bribery statute.

      Suppose someone else makes bribe payments to two opposing

candidates, neither of whom is an incumbent. Under defendant’s approach,

only the person who wins is culpable, even though both candidates engaged in

                                        12
the exact same conduct with the same corrupt intent. That outcome is not

supported by the text of the statute.

      The statute’s no-defense provision does not lend support to defendant’s

position either. If anything, it rebuts the notion that no crime has occurred if a

person “had not yet assumed office” and therefore could not perform official

duties. To the contrary, the law states it is not a defense if “a person whom the

actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the desired way.” N.J.S.A.

2C:27-2.

      Notably, that language is not limited to individuals who have “not yet

assumed office.” It expressly applies to people who are not qualified to act

“for any . . . reason,” including, as the statute says, because they lacked

jurisdiction or did not yet hold office. Ibid. (emphasis added). Losing an

election would be another such reason. See O’Donnell, 471 N.J. Super. at 373.

      Regardless of the reason, the provision makes plain that a person’s

inability to act and fulfill a promise is not a defense. In other words, if bribe

recipients cannot deliver on a promise, the no-defense provision does not let

them off the hook. As the Appellate Division observed, “it behooves neither

party to the corrupt bargain that the person to be influenced ‘was not qual ified

to act.’” Id. at 365.

                                        13
      Defendant also contends that the no-defense provision applies only to

the individual who offers or pays a bribe. The text, however, does not say that.

And commentary in the Model Penal Code, which we discuss later, supports

the opposite conclusion.

      For all of those reasons, we conclude that the plain language of the

bribery statute encompasses candidates for office as well as elected officials.

                                       B.

      The bribery statute’s history, relevant caselaw, and commentary confirm

that the law extends to candidates.

                                       1.

      The current bribery statute has its roots in the common law of bribery.

More than 150 years ago, the State Supreme Court under the 1844 Constitution

outlined the broad reach of the common law offense. In State v. Ellis, the

court addressed an offer of $50 to a member of the common council of Jersey

City to approve an application to “lay a railroad track along one of the public

streets.” 33 N.J.L. 102, 103 (Sup. Ct. 1868). The court denied the defendant’s

motion to quash the indictment. Id. at 107.

      The court acknowledged older authority that the common law offense

could “only be predicated [on] a reward given to a judge or [an]other official

concerned in the administration of justice.” Id. at 103. The court instead

                                       14
adopted a “broader doctrine” that an “offer of anything of value in corrupt

payment or reward for any official act, legislative, executive, or judicial,” is an

offense at common law. Id. at 103-04, 106-07.

      The court rejected the argument that, if the recipient of a bribe lacks

jurisdiction to act, no offense has occurred. Id. at 105. As the court explained,

“[t]he offence is complete when an offer of reward is made to influence the

vote or action of the official. It need not be averred . . . that the official, or the

body of which he was a member, had authority by law to do the thing sought to

be accomplished.” Ibid.

      Ellis also pointed to the reciprocal nature of common law bribery. The

court observed that if “it was no crime for the defendant to offer, it would have

been no crime for the councilman to accept the bribe.” Id. at 104. The Final

Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission reinforced that

notion: “The offense is reciprocal: whenever it is a crime to receive a bribe it

is a crime to tender one.” 2 N.J. Penal Code: Final Report, § 2C:27-2 at 263

(Crim. L. Revision Comm’n 1971) (citation omitted).

      The Appellate Division affirmed the broad reach of the bribery law in

Ferro, 128 N.J. Super. at 359-60. In that case, the court interpreted N.J.S.A.

2A:93-6, the predecessor of today’s statute. The prior version of the law, like

the current statute, applied to “[a]ny person” who gave or received a bribe.

                                         15
See id. at 357 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:93-6). The court found that “any person”

could not be interpreted “to mean any governmental official,” which would

require adding limiting language to the statute. Id. at 358. Under the statute,

instead, “the bribe must be directed towards official action.” Ibid. As the

court explained, “the recipient of the bribe[] must only have or create an

understanding with the briber that he can influence matters in connection with

an official duty.” Ibid. Whether the recipient “is capable of actually effecting

such an act is irrelevant.” Ibid. The court therefore held it was “not necessary

to a conviction” under the prior statute “that the person charged with giving or

receiving the payment be a public official.” Id. at 362.

      The Appellate Division reached the same conclusion in a case that

interpreted the current statute. In Schenkolewski, the court held that “neither

the offeror nor the recipient of [a] bribe need be a public official to prove

bribery” under N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. 301 N.J. Super. at 138.

      The case involved a payment “to secure the necessary government

approval for” a development project. Id. at 121, 126-27. The project

depended on the transfer of a parcel of land, which only the township

committee could approve. Id. at 123. A proponent of the project “paid

$500,000 to a private religious school of which the [defendant] was the

principal in exchange for the promise that the [defendant] would use his

                                        16
influence to have [the] town council approve the sale of land for the project.”

Id. at 121. Although the defendant was active in other aspects of local

government as chair of the zoning board and as a liaison to the mayor, he was

not on the township committee. Id. at 122.

      The Appellate Division concluded there was ample evidence to support

an indictment for bribery. Id. at 122, 150. The court explained that, under

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, “it is sufficient if the recipient created the understanding

with the briber that he could influence matters in connection with an official

duty, whether or not he was capable of actually effecting such an act.” Id. at

138-39.

                                        2.

      Because N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 is modeled after the Model Penal Code (MPC

or Code), courts can also look to the Code and its commentary to interpret the

meaning of the statute. Robinson, 217 N.J. at 606; see also Cannel, N.J. Crim.

Code Annotated, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2 (2023) (noting that New Jersey’s

bribery statute is “based on MPC 240.1” with some modifications, including

the addition of subsection (d)).

      The Code’s model offense for bribery can be found at section 240.1.

The Commentary for that section expressly states the model offense extends to

candidates. Comment 5(b) preliminarily notes that the “Code contains no

                                        17
special provision relating to campaign contributions.” 3 MPC & Commentaries

§ 240.1 cmt. 5(b) at 27 (Am. L. Inst. 1980). In that context, the Commentary

explains, “a person may be convicted of bribery for offering a campaign

contribution, and a candidate may be guilty of bribery for receiving such a

contribution, if the other requirements of the offense are met.” Ibid. (emphasis

added). The Commentary draws no distinction between incumbents and

candidates, or between candidates who win and lose.

      The phrase “other requirements” refers to the law’s other elements. See

ibid. With that in mind, the Commentary adds, “there seems to be no better

way to put the question than to ask whether the payment was offered or

received ‘as consideration for’ official action to be taken by the candidate after

election.” Ibid. (emphases added). In short, the Model Penal Code reveals

that the bribery statute was meant to apply to candidates.

      Defendant also contends that the no-defense provision in the statute

applies only to bribe givers, not recipients. If that were the case, a person who

received a bribe but was not qualified to act could arguably have a defense to a

charge of bribery. As discussed earlier, defendant’s position is not consistent

3
  Defendant does not argue that the conduct alleged here implicates campaign
finance laws. The relationship between such laws and the bribery statute is not
before the Court in this appeal.

                                       18
with the language of the provision. In addition, the Model Penal Code makes

clear the provision applies to those who give as well as those who receive

bribes.

      The no-defense provision in the Code and the state’s bribery statute are

identical. We repeat it now for convenience: “It is no defense to prosecution

under this section that a person whom the actor sought to influence was not

qualified to act in the desired way whether because he had not yet assumed

office, or lacked jurisdiction, or for any other reason.” MPC § 240.1 at 4;

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. As the Commentary explains,

            [t]he language of the preclusion may seem to be worded
            so that literally it would apply only where the defendant
            was the person who sought to influence the official
            conduct of another. It is intended, however, to apply
            with equal force where the defendant is a public official
            who solicits or accepts a bribe.4

            [MPC § 240.1 cmt. 9 at 37 (emphasis added).]

      The drafting history of the no-defense clause offers additional support

for the same conclusion. An earlier draft of the Code had separate subsections

for giving and taking bribes, and the no-defense provision applied only to the

former. MPC § 208.10 at 102 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958); MPC § 240.1 at

4
  Manzo acknowledged the quoted language in the Model Penal Code but
nonetheless concluded that the no-defense provision applies only to bribe
givers. 851 F. Supp. 2d at 812, 818 n.9, 824.

                                       19
196 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The final version merged the sections for

giving and taking bribes, which the no-defense provision follows.

      As a result, to the extent the no-defense provision plays a role in this

appeal, it does not help defendant.

                                        3.

      Unlike the Federal District Court in Manzo, we do not give weight to the

model jury charges for bribery to interpret the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2.

See Manzo, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 824.

      The model charges include the no-defense provision in the charge for

bribe givers but not the one for bribe recipients. Model Jury Charges

(Criminal), “Bribery in Official and Political Matters (Bribe Giver) (N.J.S.A.

2C:27-2),” at 2 (rev. Feb. 14, 2011); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), “Bribery

in Official and Political Matters (Bribe Recipient) (N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2),” at 2

(rev. Feb. 14, 2011).

      Model jury charges are crafted by a committee of skilled lawyers and

judges who volunteer their time. Trial judges are strongly encouraged to

follow the charges when they instruct a jury. State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 325

(2005). But the model charges are not binding statements of law. In general,

because of practical limitations, this Court does not evaluate model jury

charges other than when they are reviewed as part of an appeal. See, e.g.,

                                       20
State v. Bailey, 231 N.J. 474, 488-89, 491 (2018) (directing the Committee on

Model Jury Charges to correct an instruction); State v. Smith, 197 N.J. 325,

338-39 (2009) (same). We respectfully ask the Committee to revise the model

charge to conform to this opinion.

                                       C.

      Defendant also contends that efforts to amend the bribery statute during

the past decade inform the meaning of the original law. As a general rule,

however, courts do not rely on unsuccessful attempts to amend a statute in

order to interpret it. The reason is simple: “A bill can be proposed for any

number of reasons, and it can be rejected for just as many others.” Solid

Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159,

170 (2001).

      “Legislative inaction is ‘a weak reed upon which to lean’” to determine

the meaning of a law enacted years before. Investors Bank v. Torres, 243 N.J.

25, 46 (2020) (quoting Amerada Hess Corp. v. Dir., Div. of Tax’n, 107 N.J.

307, 322 (1987), quoting, in turn, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction

§ 49.10 (4th ed. 1984)). The same is true for pending legislation that may

never be adopted. State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 33 (2023) (citing Johnson v.

Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 389 (2016)).

                                      21
      Defendant focuses on legislative activity following the United States

District Court’s opinion in Manzo. In that 2012 decision, the court found the

statute did not extend to candidates for office who are not elected. 851 F.

Supp. 2d at 811.

      Afterward, legislators introduced various bills that would have expanded

the definition of “public servant.” See A. 2747 (2012); A. 1223 (2014); A.

1292 (2016); A. 3799 (2018); A. 439 (2020). The proposed amendments

added the phrases “a candidate for public office” and “any person elected but

who has not yet assumed office” to that definition. Ibid. More recently, the

Legislature enacted a bill to achieve the same result, which the Governor

conditionally vetoed. See A. 2472 (2022). In a written statement, the

Governor agreed with the Appellate Division’s ruling in this matter but

recommended additional language “to strengthen the bribery law [and] even

more definitively foreclose the possibility of an incorrect interpretation.”

Governor’s Conditional Veto Statement to A. 2472 2 (May 9, 2022).

      The current law was enacted in 1978 and amended in 1979. L. 1978, c.

95; L. 1979, c. 178, § 48; see also Cannel, cmt. 1 on N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. It is

not possible to determine the Legislature’s intent at that time from efforts

taken decades later. Some current officials, like the Governor, may have been

convinced that the current law covers candidates; others may have thought it

                                        22
does not; and yet others might not have been able to agree on what, if any,

changes were needed.

      Since the Governor’s conditional veto, the Legislature has not passed a

new bill. See United States v. Streidel, 620 A.2d 905, 914 n.12 (Md. 1993)

(noting the Legislature “might well wait for an authoritative interpretation [by

the State’s highest court] before reacting to an interpretation [by an

intermediate state court] or by the United States District Court”). In any event,

recent, unsuccessful efforts to amend the bribery statute cannot reveal what the

Legislature intended when it passed the law.

                                         IV.

      We turn next to defendant’s argument that the rule of lenity should

apply.

      Courts must strictly construe criminal statutes. State v. Shelley, 205 N.J.

320, 328 (2011). Under the rule of lenity, ambiguities that “cannot be resolved

by analysis of the relevant text and the use of extrinsic aids, . . . [must] be

resolved in favor of the defendant.” State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011).

The rule should be applied only if “the statute still remains ambiguous” “after

reviewing all sources of legislative intent.” State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 165

(2007) (quoting 3 Sutherland, § 59.3).

                                         23
      The United States District Court’s ruling in Manzo is not a basis to

invoke the rule of lenity. The rule does not apply “simply because there are

competing judicial interpretations of the statutory language, in New Jersey or

elsewhere.” Regis, 208 N.J. at 452. Moreover, on questions that involve state

constitutional and statutory law, this Court looks to federal district court

opinions for their persuasive reasoning, but their conclusions are not binding

authority. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 79-80

(1990); see also Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Global Reins. Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d

417, 433 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In the absence of a controlling opinion from a state’s

highest court on an issue of state law,” federal courts “predict how that court

would decide the issue.”).

      Because we find the language of the bribery statute applies to candidates

for office and is not ambiguous, even without resort to other relevant sources,

the rule of lenity does not apply.

                                        V.

      Finally, we briefly address two related constitutional arguments.

Defendant contends that, if the bribery statute is read to encompass unelected

candidates, the law would violate his due process rights and the prohibition

against ex post facto laws. We do not agree.

                                        24
      An act of the Legislature is entitled to “a strong presumption of validity”

and “‘will not be ruled void unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is clear

beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Smith, 251 N.J. 244, 263 (2022)

(quoting State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 266 (2014)). But a statute that “is so

vague that persons ‘of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning’” violates due process and is void. Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 267 (quoting

Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 156 N.J. 254, 279-80 (1998)).

      The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal

Constitution guarantees that no “State [shall] deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,

§ 1. Article I, Paragraph 1 of the State Constitution embraces the same

guarantee. State v. Njango, 247 N.J. 533, 548 (2021); see also Jamgochian v.

State Parole Bd., 196 N.J. 222, 239 (2008).

      Embedded in that fundamental requirement is a basic principle: people

are entitled to know in advance whether their conduct is lawful or criminal.

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1997); State v. Pomianek, 221

N.J. 66, 85 (2015). Vague laws not only deprive individuals of adequate

notice, but they may also result in “arbitrary and erratic enforcement.” Town

Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 (1983).

                                       25
      On the other hand, due process is satisfied when “ordinary people can

understand what conduct is prohibited,” and when the offense is defined “in a

manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 576 (2016) (quoting Skilling v.

United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010)); see also Lenihan, 219 N.J. at 268

(rejecting a vagueness claim because “[a] person ‘of common intelligence’

should understand that” the conduct fell “within the statute’s scope” (quoting

Hamilton Amusement Ctr., 156 N.J. at 279-80)).

      For the reasons outlined above, we find that the bribery statute provides

sufficient notice that no person -- candidate or incumbent -- may accept

unauthorized benefits “as consideration for the performance of official duties.”

See N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2(d). The law plainly states it is no defense that someone

in defendant’s position was not yet qualified to act. N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2. And

ordinary people can understand that New Jersey’s bribery statute does not

allow them to accept a bag of cash in exchange for promising a future

appointment to a city post.

      The Federal and State Constitutions also forbid the enactment of ex post

facto laws. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3. Ex

post facto laws have two components: they “apply to events occurring before

[their] enactment”; and they “disadvantage the offender affected by” the law.

                                        26
State v. Bailey, 251 N.J. 101, 122 (2022) (quoting State v. Hester, 233 N.J.

381, 392 (2018)); see also Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (“An

ex post facto law . . . ‘makes an action done before the passing of the law, and

which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action.’”

(quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798))). The restriction

against such laws ensures that individuals have “fair warning of” the effect of

a statute and can “rely on [its] meaning until” it is “explicitly changed.”

Bailey, 251 N.J. at 122 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29

(1981)).

      Court rulings, like legislative enactments, can violate the ban on ex post

facto laws. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354. A violation occurs when “a judicial

construction of a criminal statute is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference

to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.’” Ibid.

(citation omitted). “[A]n unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal

statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law . . . .”

Id. at 353.

      The construction of the bribery statute outlined above is not unexpected

or indefensible; it flows from the plain language of the statute and is consistent

with prior decisions by the Appellate Division and commentary to the Model

                                         27
Penal Code. For the same reasons, the Court’s interpretation of the statute

does not represent an expansion of the law’s reach.

      Applying the bribery statute to defendant therefore does not violate his

due process rights or the bar on ex post facto laws.

                                       VI.

      For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate

Division. We reinstate defendant’s indictment and remand the case to the trial

court for further proceedings.

     JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER
APTER, and FASCIALE and JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) join
in CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER’s opinion.

                                       28