Court Opinion

ID: 9885260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 06:06:26.132369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:00.209785
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                          COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                  UNPUBLISHED
                                                                  October 5, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                 No. 349544
                                                                  Genesee Circuit Court
MONTARIO MARQUISE TAYLOR,                                         LC No. 16-040564-FC

              Defendant-Appellant.

                                        ON REMAND

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and BORRELLO and O’BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        This case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated
Part II.D. of our previous judgment and remanded the case to us “for reconsideration in light of
People v Parks, 510 Mich 225[; 987 NW2d 161] (2022).” People v Taylor, ___ Mich ___; 987
NW2d 203 (2023). Only Part II.D. was vacated; the other holdings remain intact. The facts of
this case were set forth in our previous opinion:

               Defendant’s convictions arise from the October 24, 2016 shooting death of
       Montel Wright at his home on East Bundy Street in Flint. There were no
       eyewitnesses to the actual shooting, but witnesses described events they observed
       that day near the time Wright was shot.

              The two key witnesses were Hosea Mosley and William Johnson. Mosley
       was Wright’s roommate and Johnson was a friend who frequented the
       neighborhood where Wright and Mosley lived.

                Shortly before the shooting, Mosley and Rodney Hendricks were sitting in
       a vehicle parked in the driveway of Wright’s house. The two were drinking and
       talking. Johnson approached the house from the street to speak to Wright about
       borrowing some money so he could buy a bottle of beer for his bus ride home.
       Johnson testified that Wright let him in the house and lent him the money. Mosley
       testified that around this time defendant approached Wright’s home and

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       acknowledged Hendricks as he passed. Johnson testified that as he walked away
       from Wright’s home he passed defendant on the porch steps. Both Mosley and
       Johnson testified that they saw defendant go inside Wright’s home and, within
       moments, heard rapid-fire gunshots.

               When the gunshots rang out, Hendricks and Mosley drove away, and
       Johnson took cover behind a nearby tree. Johnson testified that he saw defendant
       leave Wright’s house, walk toward the street, engage in a motion with his hand
       similar to racking a gun, and then returned to the house. At that point, Johnson
       heard more rapid gunfire. He then saw defendant leave the house and run across the
       street and through a field. At some point, Hendricks, who had passed away by the
       time of trial, called 911 and identified defendant as the shooter. The 911 call was
       played for the jury.

               Wright died from multiple gunshot wounds to his chest, abdomen, and calf.
       Wright was shot eight times and the bullets entered his body from both the front
       and the back. The police recovered nine shell casings at the scene and ballistics
       testing confirmed that they were all fired from the same gun. The murder weapon
       was not recovered and there was no forensic evidence supporting defendant’s
       convictions. [People v Taylor, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
       Appeals, issued October 21, 2021 (Docket No. 349544), p 1 (footnote omitted).]

        Part II.D. of our previous opinion addressed defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality
of his sentence of life without parole. Id. at 10. In that opinion, we held that defendant’s sentence
was not cruel or unusual, “because defendant was 20 years old when he committed his crime, [and]
the imposition of a mandatory life-without-parole sentence on him [did] not violate the Eighth
Amendment[, US Const, Am VIII,] or the Michigan Constitution[, Const 1963, art 1, § 16].” Id.

         In Parks, 510 Mich at 265-266, the Supreme Court held “that Michigan’s sentencing
scheme mandating that 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree murder receive a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is cruel or unusual punishment under Const
1963, art 1, § 16.” The question before us on remand is whether this holding should be extended
to all of those 20 and younger. We decline to do so given the self-limited scope of the Parks
opinion, and in light of this Court’s recent, binding decision in People v Adamowicz (On Second
Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___ n 1; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 330612).

       Although Parks clearly held that mandatory life without parole could not be imposed on
18-year-olds, it included language which we read as reaffirming the holding in People v Hall, 396
Mich 650; 242 NW2d 377 (1976), as to those aged 19, 20, and 21. The Parks Court stated:

                We recognize that this Court has previously held that a mandatory life-
       without-parole sentence for felony murder did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
       See People v Hall, 396 Mich 650, 657-658; 242 NW2d 377 (1976). However, that
       decision did not address the issue of sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.
       Moreover, Hall was decided before the United States Supreme Court decided
       Miller and its progeny, and the Hall Court did not have the benefit of the scientific
       literature cited in this opinion. Accordingly, that decision does not preclude our

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       holding in this case. Moreover, our holding today does not foreclose future review
       of life-without-parole sentences for other classes of defendants; however, our
       opinion today does not affect Hall’s holding as to those older than 18. See Hall,
       396 Mich at 657-658, 242 NW2d 377. [Parks, 510 Mich at 255 n 9.]

Thus, Hall remains good law as applied to adults other than those aged 18, and is still binding on
this Court. This was made clear in Adamowicz, which held Hall applied to the 21-year-old
defendant, as an adult over the 18-year-old cutoff provided by Parks, and thus resolved the issue.

        Absent further extension of Parks by the Supreme Court, we are bound by Hall and
Adamowicz to reject defendant’s argument that his mandatory life-without-parole sentence for
first-degree murder is unconstitutional.1 Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                            /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien

1
  Defendant criticizes Adamowicz and urges this Court to convene a conflict panel or hold this case
in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision on the pending application in Adamowicz.
Because Adamowicz correctly reasoned this Court is bound by Hall, and that Parks itself
recognized Hall as controlling for defendants over the age of 18, there is no need for a conflict
panel or to hold this case in abeyance.

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