Court Opinion

ID: 9663304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:00.296223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:47.718561
License: Public Domain

EICH, C.J.
(dissenting). Baumann's "vagueness" challenge to the ordinance, in its entirety, is that because the ordinance contains no "time, place and manner" restrictions, its "lack of specificity" impermissibly delegates to Madison police officers "discretion in choosing whom to prosecute for . . . violating the ordinance."
The majority has ruled in Baumann's favor and in doing so: (1) holds that the presumption of constitutionality usually accompanying legislative acts does not attach to the Madison ordinance because of its infringement on the exercise of First Amendment rights, and, as a result, the city has the burden of establishing that the ordinance does not violate the constitution; (2) rejects the principle that whether a given noise disturbs the public peace depends upon the circumstances of the particular case; and (3) appears to hold that, to survive a constitutional challenge, an anti-noise ordinance must be (a) "written specifically for [a particular] context," majority op. at 405, (b) limited in its applicability to "fixed times" and "fixed place[s]," id., (c) proscribing only noises "tending to cause or provoke an immediate or 'imminent threat of violence' ... or public disturbance," id., and (d) drawn so that users of a public street *407for artistic performances or discussions of public issues could "know in advance whether their speech would disturb the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity." Id.
I am unable to join in that opinion because the City of Madison has satisfied me that the ordinance is not so vague that one can only guess at its meaning.
A statute or an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague only if persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its applicability. State v. Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d 497, 507, 164 N.W.2d 512, 517, appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 26 (1969). We do not, however, impose impossible standards of specificity, Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951), and laws will not be struck down simply by a showing that the boundaries of the area of proscribed conduct are somewhat hazy. Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 33, 426 N.W.2d 329, 333 (1988). A fair degree of definiteness is all that is required. Id. Finally I note that, to a degree at least, vagueness is more tolerable in a civil law than in laws with criminal sanctions. This is so because the consequences of imprecision are less severe in the former case. Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1381 (7th Cir. 1983).
The Madison ordinance prohibits persons from making, or assisting in the making of, noise of such a nature as "to unreasonably disturb the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity thereof," unless the noise cannot be prevented and is necessary to protect property, health or safety. It appears in a chapter of the Madison General Ordinances entitled "OFFENSES AGAINST PEACE AND QUIET," and I see little difference between the conduct it proscribes and that proscribed by the statute upheld in Zwicker, which punished — as a crime —"unreasonably loud . . . conduct under circum*408stances in which such conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance . . Sec. 947.01, Stats. (1967).
Like the criminal statute1 in Zwicker, the Madison ordinance — which provides only civil penalties — "does not imply that all [noise] which tends to annoy another is [a violation]." Zwicker, 41 Wis. 2d at 508, 164 N.W.2d at 517. Rather, only such conduct as "unreasonably disturb^] the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity" is proscribed. Noise so loud as to unreasonably disturb the peace and quiet of even a single person in the area should be no less subject to regulation by the community than noise or other conduct that "tends to cause or provoke a disturbance" involving several people.
The majority quotes George Gershwin. Majority op. at 395 n.2. While my own admiration for Gershwin's music is, I am sure, no less than that of the author of the majority opinion, I believe it is entirely possible that even a Gershwin melody, played at such ear-splitting levels as to unreasonably disturb the peace, might well constitute the type of "noise" that the city may reasonably regulate.
The Madison ordinance does not regulate the nature or content of music or any other protected form of "speech." It reaches only noise that unreasonably disturbs another's peace and quiet; and in my opinion it does so under standards that are sufficiently specific to survive Baumann's constitutional challenge.
I disagree with Baumann's assumption, apparently adopted by the majority, that the word "unreasonably" is a term so vague that one must necessarily guess at its meaning. Instead, I agree with Justice Brennan who, writing for the Court in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. *409611, 616 (1968), stated that" [i]t is a widely used and well understood word" and quoted a district judge's remark that " [t]he word 'unreasonable' seems to have been well understood by the founders of the Republic when they used it in the Fourth Amendment, where it remains, and is enforced, as it should be, to this day." Id. at 616 n.7, quoting Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873, 879 (S.D. Miss. 1966). As in Cameron, the word "unreasonably" does not stand alone in the ordinance. It is even more readily understandable when taken in context — that is, that the noise is prohibitable only when it "unreasonably disturb[s] the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity thereof."
In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court upheld a Rockford, Illinois, noise ordinance prohibiting people from "willfully mak[ing] or assisting] in the making of any noise or diversion" adjacent to school grounds "which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof. . ..'' Id. at 107-08. Noting that because we are " [condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language," the Court concluded that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 110. As the majority opinion in this case notes, the Grayned Court dispelled its initial concern over the possible vagueness of the terms "noise” and "diversion" by noting that not all noises and diversions were prohibited by the Rockford ordinance, but only those that were (a) willfully done, (b) actually incompatible with school activities, and (c) caused a disruption of those activities. Id. at 113-14.
So, too, the Madison ordinance does not prohibit all noise — or music — that someone might consider annoy*410ing. It only prohibits persons from (a) willfully2 (b) making or assisting in the making of noise (c) that causes an unreasonable disturbance (d) to the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity of the noise, (e) and which is not justified as necessary for the protection of property, health or safety.
I would hold, therefore, that the Madison ordinance, like Rockford's, "does not permit people to 'stand on a public sidewalk . . . only at the whim of [a] police officer,' " Grayned at 114, quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965); rather, there must be a demonstrated intentional and unreasonable disturbance of the peace and quiet of persons in the vicinity in order for the prohibition to apply. It is true in this case, as it was in Groyned:
As always, enforcement requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment, but, as confined, that degree of judgment here is permissible. The . . . City Council has made the basic policy choices, and has given fair warning as to what is prohibited. ”[T]he ordinance defines boundaries sufficiently distinct" for citizens, policemen, juries, and appellate judges. It is not impermissibly vague. Id. at 114, quoting Chicago v. Fort, 262 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ill. 1970).
The constitution does not insist upon the impossible; it asks only what the subject will reasonably permit. In my opinion, the Madison ordinance is not unconstitutional per se.
It is, on its face, a constitutionally valid approach to an invasive noise problem that can be attested to by any walker of the city's streets. Whether, in a particular case, *411the "boombox" or the car or apartment stereo blaring out of open windows — or even, as here, the "live" performance of music — violates the ordinance will, as it must, be determined on a case-by-case basis.

 The statute, sec. 947.01, Stats. (1967), punished "disorderly conduct," as defined therein, by a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than thirty days.

 While the words "willful" or "intentional" do not appear in the ordinance, its language — "no person shall make or assist" — plainly require a volitional act. (Emphasis added.)