Court Opinion

ID: 9477165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:16:06.509311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:44.115460
License: Public Domain

STAPLETON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands has established judicial review of final administrative action as the general rule. 5 V.I.C. § 1421, et seq. This is in accord with the strong presumption favoring judicial review of final administrative action that prevails throughout the United States. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); 5 Davis, Administrative Law § 28.11 (2d ed.1984).
The references in the Criminal Victims Compensation Act to the finality of the Commission’s disposition of a claim can as easily be read to establish the point at which such dispositions become judicially reviewable as they can be read to preclude such review. Given this ambiguity, the presumption favoring judicial review should prevail. See Monsanto v. Quinn, 674 F.2d 990, 992-93 n. 5 (3d Cir.1982) (“Despite the language in 3 V.I.C. § 530(b) that ‘the [Government Employees Service] Commission’s decision shall be final,’ ... the Commission’s actions are reviewable pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 1421, et seq.”); Bryan v. Christian, 550 F.2d 890, 891 n. 1 (3d Cir.1977) (same). Thus, I would read Section 166(a) as providing that a writ of review may be sought pursuant to 5 V.I.C. *101§ 1421 as soon as the Commission enters its order of disposition even though the claimant may seek reconsideration by the Commission at any time within a year following that order.
The court’s opinion reflects justifiable concern over the consequences of its holding when it suggests that there may be a distinction between reviewing a final decision of the Commission on its merits and reviewing it to see if it has been reached in the manner contemplated by the statute. I, too, doubt that the Virgin Islands Legislature intended the Commission to be free to ignore with impunity the procedural dictates of the Act. I also doubt, however, that the Legislature intended the Commission to be free to ignore with impunity the substantive criteria found in the Act or to apply with impunity criteria, not found in the Act, that would otherwise be impermissible under Virgin Islands law. Moreover, I see no basis in the text of the Act for distinguishing between procedural and substantive review.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the district court and direct it to take jurisdiction over this matter. Since the Virgin Islands Legislature obviously intended that the Commission was to have broad discretion over the disposition of claims, the court’s review should be limited to determining whether the Commission’s decision was contrary to law, arbitrary or capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence.1 In this instance, the Commission’s decision clearly satisfies the applicable criteria. Accordingly, I would also direct that the district court deny the petition for review.

. I note that Section 158(h) of the Act requires that “[e]very determination of the Commission shall be based on the evidence before it and shall be supported by substantial evidence.” For me, this provision clearly evidences a legislative expectation that there would be judicial review of the merits of Commission determinations. Section 158(h) of the Act, unlike Section 156(b) referenced by the Court, is directed to the Commission and not its Executive Secretary.