Court Opinion

ID: 9635671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:59:09.496592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:32.342052
License: Public Domain

Justice ZAPPALA,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I do not believe the court adequately instructed the jury on the aggravating circumstance of torture as embodied in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8). In Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728 (1987), we stated that “[ijmplicit in subsection 8 is the requirement of an intent to cause pain and suffering in addition to the intent to kill. There must be an indication that the killer is not satisfied with the killing alone.” 523 A.2d at 737.
In comparing the shortcomings of the instruction given in Nelson, with an instruction that we approved in Commonwealth v. Pursell, 508 Pa. 212, 495 A.2d 183 (1985), we stated:
The critical distinction between Commonwealth v. Pursell, [ ] and the case at bar is that in Pursell, the trial judge gave the jury a charge which contained a sufficiently guiding definition of the word “torture.” That charge conveyed to the jurors the idea that the “torture murderer”, besides having an intent to kill, has an additional specific intent— “ ‘an intention to inflict pain, suffering or both pain and suffering.’ ” ... 495 A.2d at 197 n. 13.
523 A.2d at 737 (emphasis in original). We reiterated this principal in Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305 (1996), adding that “[njeither the efficacy of the means employed by a defendant to murder his victim nor the immediacy of death is in itself determinative of the question whether the offense was committed by means of torture.” 681 A.2d at 1321. The majority cites to several cases since Auker *294where we have reviewed the instruction given with approval. As the majority also correctly notes, the trial court has broad discretion in phrasing instructions, and the court may choose its own wording. Additionally, jury instructions must be read and reviewed in their entirety.
I believe, however, that the measuring stick for the propriety of an instruction on torture must remain the principle we stated in Nelson, that is whether the instruction clearly informs the jury that the aggravating circumstance of torture may only be found if an additional and separate intent to inflict pain and suffering beyond that involved in the specific intent to kill, which is an element of first degree murder. Instead, the majority opinion accurately chronicles this Court’s gradual movement away from requiring a jury to find an additional and separate intent element to the torture aggravating circumstance.
I do not believe that the jury instruction on torture given in this case conveys to the jury the requirement of intent, on the part of the defendant, which is separate and additional to that required by the crime of first degree murder.
Because the jury found a mitigating circumstance in addition to other aggravating circumstances, I would remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.