Court Opinion

ID: 9829120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:00:45.134207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:57.564471
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants ask us to make some corrections in and additions to our statement of the pleadings of the parties and findings of fact. Some of the errors have been corrected in the original opinion; others will be corrected here.
In addition to alleging that the Del Carmen Mining Company failed to secure a permit to do business in Texas, it was also alleged that said corporation was organized by citizens of Texas for the purpose of doing business in Texas and conducted its business wholly in Texas; the acts relied upon as constituting the doing of business in Texas being set out in detail. It was also alleged that Kincaid knew, when purchasing the land, that the tramway had been placed thereon at great expense and was unpaid for, and that plaintiff was claiming and entitled to a lien thereon. It was further alleged that Kincaid was a stockholder in said *1028mining company at the time he bought the land; that the lanil was of little or no value except by reason of the location of the tramway thereon; that he paid a small sum for the land, knowing the tramway was thereon; and that he was estopped to deny the right of plaintiff! to enforce its lien upon the tramway or for said tramway to exist upon said land.
Appellant earnestly contends that the material sued for in this case was furnished under the written contract entered into between Moser and appellant and, admitting that the entire sum contracted to be paid under the original contract for material has been paid, contends that the material furnished upon orders thereafter made and specified in the sworn account was all furnished under the original contract. This contention is based upon the testimony of H. J. Leschen to the effect that no new contract was entered into between the A. Leschen & Sons Rope Company and Moser; that the original contract was not annulled, but the same sto.od as modified. The original contract was complete in itself and does not call for delivery of any further material than is therein described. In fact, the contract provides that “there are no contracts or agreements not specifically specified” in the same. The transactions involving the purchase of other material are distinct and separate and constitute no part of the original contract. This is recognized by appellant by his filing a sworn account for such items and not relying upon his filing of the contract. Leschen testified the prices in the invoices for material furnished additional to that called for in the contract were charged as in “open accounts.” In several places he speaks of the material as additional to that called for in the contract, and he testified the prices charged in the invoices constitute the fair market value of the items of material. It is clear that the material for which a lien is sought to be fixed was sold on open account; and, in deciding whether a lien has been fixed, we must apply the law applicable to sworn itemized accounts and not that relating to contracts in writing. The salary to be paid Graham was provided for in the original contract, and therefore, in determining whether a lien exists for same, we are governed by the law applicable to such contracts. As the salary was made payable at the end of each week according to the terms of the contract itself, each of said items stands alone so far as fixing the lien is concerned, and the lien exists only for those items which became due within four months of the filing of the contract. It follows that the provision of the contract calling for payment of one-third within 14 days after tramway is in operation applies only to the material mentioned in the contract, all of which is paid for, and therefore such provision may be entirely discarded in passing upon the issue of the extent to which a lien may be asserted upon the tramway. We see no reason to change our views in regard to the matter complained of in the first specification of error.
Appellant contends that there is testimony from which a jury could find that Kincaid knew the tramway was on the land purchas-: ed by him at the time of his purchase and knew it was unpaid for, or, if not, that he had notice of such facts as would put him upon inquiry thereof when he purchased the lands. This contention is sustained by us, but in our opinon it has absolutely no bearing upon the question whether appellant can assert a lien against Kincaid’s land. Neither Moser nor the Del Carmen Mining Company had any interest in the land which could be subjected to a lien, and there was no contract or transaction between appellant and Max B. Ernst which would entitle appellant to fix a lien on the land. Therefore Kincaid was at liberty to buy the same from Ernst’s administrator without danger of' having a lien fixed for transactions taking place between appellant and Moser or appellant and the company. There is absolutely no evidence that Kincaid bought the land for the company.
We are of the opinion that the jury could find from the evidence that the Del Carmen Mining Company was transacting business in Texas in so far as it sold ore for delivery in Texas, also that it kept an office in Texas within the meaning of article 1314 of the Revised Statutes of 1911, and, as testified by Brooks, that it never intended to take out a permit to do business in Texas, and still we believe its stockholders cannot be held liable as partners. Appellant contends for the enforcement of article 1318 (Revised Statutes of 1911) as it is written and undertakes to show that we have ignored or overridden said article. The article reads as follows: “No such corporation can maintain any suit or action, either legal or equitable, in any of the courts of this state upon any demand, whether arising out of contract or tort, unless at the time such contract was made, or tort committed, the corporation had filed its articles of incorporation under the provisions of this chapter in the office of the Secretary of State, for the purpose of procuring its permit.” According to the plain reading of said article and the construction placed thereon by our courts, the same merely denies the right of a foreign corporation to bring suit upon any cause of action arising from contract or tort, if such contract was made or tort committed prior to the filing of the articles of incorporation for the purpose of procuring a permit. Security Co. v. Nat. Bank, 93 Tex. 580, 57 S. W. 22; Bank v. Holland, 103 Tex. 269, 126 S. W. 564; Smythe Co. v. Glass & Sand Co., 142 S. W. 1162. In the last two cases it is held that our statutes do not make contracts void because made by a foreign corporation without a permit, and *1029in the first cited case the court says that it was not intended by article 745 (Statutes of 1895, now article 1314) to deny foreign corporations the comity usually extended throughout the states of the Union of bringing suits in the courts of this state, because, if such was the intention, article 746 (Statutes of 1895, now article 1318) was wholly unnecessary. It follows from the holdings in said cases that our laws do not go to the extent of refusing to recognize the existence of foreign corporations but prescribe only one penalty for doing business without taking steps to secure a permit, and that is they cannot bring a suit in our courts. If the Legislature had desired to do so, it could easily have added the penalty that the stockholders of foreign corporations would be liable as partners on all demands arising from business done in this state without a permit, but it did not see proper to do so. We have no authority to go further than the penalty prescribed.
Appellant requests that we find that Thos. B. Palfrey, Ike T. Pryor, W. D. Kincaid, F. J. Rheiner, Oarlos Moser, and R. E. Brooks were stockholders in the Del Carmen Mining Company since prior to June 1, 1909. We find mention in the minutes prior to June 1, 1909, of the following persons: Carlos Moser, P. J. Rheiner, R. E. Brooks, and Thos. B. Palfrey. W. D. Kincaid’s and Ike T. Pryor’s names appear for the first time in the minutes of January 28, 1910. We find no evidence that Kincaid and Pryor were stockholders prior to June 1, 1909. This finding is made in deference to appellant’s request; the same being immaterial if we are correct in holding that the stockholders cannot be held liable as partners.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.