Court Opinion

ID: 9635522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:53:02.41354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:28.250911
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
dissenting. The majority’s decision restricts to “developing” communities the affirmative obligation to provide for regional housing needs. By allowing municipalities without sizeable land areas or significant available open spaces to ignore regional demands for multi-family housing, the Court extends its tacit approval to exclusionary zoning practices. In doing so, it disregards the intent and spirit of our decision in So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N. J. 151 (1975), cert. den. and appeal dismissed, 423 U. S. 808, 96 S. Ct. 18, 46 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1975), which we recently reaffirmed in Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Tp. of Madison, 72 N. J. 481 (1977) (hereinafter “Madison Tp.”). The majorities decision permits a significant number of communities to horde what may be the State’s most precious scarce resource: available developable land. For the reasons set forth below, I dissent.
J

DEFINING TEE DUTY TO PROVIDE FOR REGIONAL NEEDS

Two years ago this Court decided the landmark case of So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, supra (hereinafter “Mt. Laurel”). That decision followed attempts by various courts to deal with exclusionary zoning by *497attacking specific exclusionary planning techniques.1 See, e. g., Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A. 2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (invalidating two to three acre minimum lot size requirements); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A. 2d 395 (Sup. Ct. 1970) .(invalidating de facto ban on apartment buildings); Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A. 2d 597 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (striking down four acre minimum lot size requirements); Molino v. Mayor and Council of Bor. of Glassboro, 116 N. J. Super. 195 (Law Liv. 1971) (holding unconstitutional bedroom restrictions designed to restrict population). Rather than continue with piecemeal solutions, the Court in Mt. Laurel ordered developing municipalities to respond affirmatively to regional needs for multi-family housing. Justice Hall, speaking for a unanimous Court, held:
P0]very such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of the municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need therefor. These obligations must be met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that it should not be required so to do.
[67 N. J. at 174; footnote omitted.]
In Madison Tp. this Court reaffirmed its belief in the necessity of requiring affirmative action on the part of municipalities to meet regional housing needs. Accordingly, in order to determine whether the ordinance in Madison Township was exclusionary in character, the Court considered whether or not it “operate [d] in fact to preclude the opportunity to supply any substantial amounts of new housing *498for low and moderate income households now and prospectively needed in the municipality and in the appropriate region of which it forms a part.” 72 N. J. at 497. Primarily on the ground that the community had zoned the bulk of its available developable land for one and two acre family residences, this court upheld the finding of the lower court that the ordinance “ignored the housing needs of the township and the region, and failed To promote reasonably a balanced community in accordance with the general welfare.'” 72 N. J. at 492.
The emphasis on meeting regional needs in Mt. Laurel and Madison Tp. was based on the well-established principle that zoning enactments must benefit the public, health, safety, morals or the general welfare. See, e. g., Roselle v. Wright, 21 N. J. 400, 408-10 (1956). In determining what served the general welfare, in Mt. Laurel and Madison Tp., we placed primary emphasis on meeting the critical need for housing in the respective regions in which the defendant municipalities were located, and not on local fiscal pressures or social considerations. In Mt. Laurel Justice Hall stated:
It is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly an absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all local land use regulation. Further the universal and constant need for such housing is important and of such broad public interest that the general welfare which developing municipalities like Mount Laurel must consider extends beyond their boundaries and cannot be parochially confined to the claimed good of the particular municipality. It has to follow that, broadly speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within its boundaries. Negatively, it may not adopt regulations or policies which thwart or preclude that opportunity.
[67 N. J. at 179-80.]
Bather than sacrifice the development of mnltiple-family housing for low and middle income people in the interests of a *499more favorable tax base, the Court noted that municipalities would have to seek tax relief from other branches of government. See 67 N. J. at 186.
In Mt. Laurel the Court ^reviewed the statutory and constitutional basis for requiring zoning which conformed to a regional view of the general welfare. Although regional zoning can also be justified on the basis of sound planning principles, this Court was necessarily guided by statutory and constitutional considerations in holding that a community must recognize and serve the welfare of the state’s citizens beyond its own particular municipal boundaries. Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N. J. at 177. Relying on cases involving the zoning of facilities which were of broad public benefit, we noted the importance of “values which transcend municipal lines” in determining the general welfare. 67 N. J. at 178, citing Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, 47 N. J. 211 at 218 (1966). See also, Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N. J. 277, 288 (1966) (“general welfare . . . comprehends the benefits not merely within municipal boundaries but also those to the regions of the State relevant to the public interest to be served”).
We also concluded in Mt. Laurel that the zoning enabling legislation, N. J. S. A. 40:55-30, specifically required zoning which anticipated regional needs. Although the Legislature revised the zoning statute by enacting the “Municipal Land Use Law,” L. 1976, c. 291, effective August 1, 1976, we held in Madison Tp. that the new statute also required a regional approach in determining the general welfare. 72 N. J. at 496. The new law specifically provides for land use planning which will best satisfy the general welfare of all citizens of the State. Section 2 of the Act, stating the intent and purpose of the new legislation, provides in pertinent part:
a. To encourage municipal action to guide the appropriate use or development of all lands in this State, in a manner which will promote the public health', safety, morals, and general welfare;
*500d. To ensure that the development of individual municipalities does not conflict with the development and general welfare of neighboring municipalities, the county and the State as a whole;
e. To promote the establishment of appropriate population densities and concentrations that will contribute to the well-being of persons, neighborhoods, communities and regions and preservation of the environment ;
* * * * * * * * *
g. To provide sufficient space in appropriate locations fox a variety of agricultural, residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses and open spaces, both public and private, according to their respective environmental requirements in order to meet the needs of all Neto Jersey citizens.
[Emphasis added.]
The clear intent of the new statute is to implement the broad definition of the general welfare enunciated in Mt. Laurel by requiring all zoning enactments to be based on regional concerns.2
The new legislation is consistent in all respects with our State Constitution, which requires adherence to a rational approach to land use planning based on a regional perspective. See Madison Tp., supra 72 N. J. 496; Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 *501N. J. at 175. “The basic importance of housing and local regulations restricting its availability to substantial segments of the population” impelled us in Mt. Laurel to conclude that a zoning ordinance which failed to provide for regional housing needs would violate the state constitutional requirements of equal protection and due process as found in Art. I, ¶ 1.3 67 N. J. at 174-75.
Yet as the majority correctly indicates, ante at 481-482, we have never adopted a requirement that all communities, regardless of their unique circumstances, be required to accept unlimited multi-family housing. Instead, we have specifically limited each community’s obligation to a “fair share” of the regional housing need. 67 N. J. at 188, 189. Recognizing the inherent limitations of judicially imposed zoning mandates, I wrote in Mt. Laurel:
While municipalities must plan and provide for regional housing needs, no municipality need assume responsibility for more than its fair share of these needs. The purpose of land use regulation is to create pleasant, well-balanced communities, not to recreate slums in new locations. It is beyond dispute that when the racial and socioeconomic composition of the population of a community shifts beyond a certain point, the white and affluent begin to abandon the community. While the attitudes underlying this “tipping” effect must not be catered to, the phenomenon must be recognized as a reality.
[67 N. J. at 212; Pashman, J, concurring.]
Rather than call for uncontrolled growth, we advocated planning to anticipate regional demand. Only in this manner could municipalities avoid future overcrowding and cope with the urban slums and suburban sprawl which had resulted from the absence of such controls.
*502Despite the clear directive in Mt. Laurel to affirmatively require municipalities to provide for their "fair share" of regional housing needs, the majority today retreats from its constitutional duty, relying on the statutory delegation of decision-making power to the municipalities. The majority opinion states:
But the, .overriding point we make is that it is not for the courts to substitute their conception of what the public welfare requires by way of zoning for the. views of those in whom the Legislature and the local electorate have vested that responsibility.
[At 485.]
While the majority correctly states one of the fundamental precepts of law limiting this Court’s power to review local decision-making power, its over-simplification of the problem results in the misapplication of the above principle to the instant case.
Though the State Legislature may have vested the power in Washington Township and Demarest to determine the general welfare, it was constitutionally barred from granting those communities the right to ignore the welfare of citizens not living within their municipal boundaries. We underscored this principle in Mt. Laurel when we stated:
[I]t is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the same manner as is the state. So, when regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
[67 N. J. at 177; emphasis added.]
See also, Roselle v. Wright, supra, 21 N. J. at 408-10; Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N. J. 114, 122-23 (1955); Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment of Newark, 9 N. J. 405, 413-19 (1952); Collins v. Board of Adjustment of Margate City, 3 N. J. 200, 206 (1949). This basic principle was recognized by Mr. Justice Sutherland when first upholding *503the constitutionality of zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co,, 272 U. S. 365, 390, 47 S. Ct. 114, 119, 71 L. Ed. 303, 311 (1926), where he noted "* * * the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.” [Emphasis added.]
II

LIMITING OBLIGATIONS UNDER MT. LAUREL TO "DEVELOPING" COMMUNITIES

The Court in Mt. Laurel limited its discussion to "developing communities.” As a consequence, the Court’s decision was taken by some to excuse communities which could be characterized as "developed” from the affirmative duty to provide for regional housing needs. I have repeatedly criticized this proposition as being inconsistent with the spirit of that decision and an impediment to any attempt at requiring affirmative action to counteract exclusionary zoning. Mt. Laurel, 67 N. J. at 208-09, 217-18 (Pashman, J., concurring). Today, four members of the Court have indicated their desire to prolong the "developed-developing” distinction, thereby seriously impairing the ability of the Court to continue seeking broad solutions to the problem of exclusionary zoning. I would apply the dictates of Mt. Laurel to all municipalities, and therefore welcome the endorsement of this view by Mr. Justice Schreiber and Mr. Justice Sullivan. See ante at 494 (Schreiber, J., concurring), ante at 492 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
The Court in Mt. Laurel defined “developing communities” as those municipalities which have “sizeable land area outside the central cities and older built-up suburbs of our North and South Jersey metropolitan areas (and surrounding some of the smaller cities outisde those areas as well).” 67 N. J. at 160. Additionally, the Court noted that under its definition of "developing communities,” such municipalities *504have “substantially shed rural characteristics and have undergone great population increase since World War II, or are now in the process of doing so, but still are not completely developed and remain in the path of inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth.” Id. The Court today applies this definition by granting Washington Township and the Town of Demarest immunity from any affirmative obligation to plan and provide for low and moderately priced housing. Insofar as it affirms the trial court’s order striking down two acre minimum lot size requirements, the majority indicates its limited willingness to police exclusionary land use controls.
The majority’s application of the Mt. Laurel definition of “developing communities” to Washington Township and Demarest demonstrates a willingness on the part of the Court to adhere to a restrictive interpretation of the Mt. Laurel decision. Both communities are physically small; Washington Township comprises three and one-quarter square miles and Demarest amounts to less than two and one-half square miles in area. Both are located in densely populated Bergen County, adjacent to New York City. Consequently, under a literal interpretation of the Mt. Laurel definition of “developing communities,” both municipalities might be considered to have no “sizeable land area outside the . . . older built-up suburbs.” They would both be considered “developed” under either of two interpretations: (1) they have no sizeable land area at all, and (2) they are completely situated within the older built-up suburban area which completely surrounds the New' York City-Newark Metropolitan area. Under the former interpretation, most of northeastern New Jersey might also be considered developed; under the latter, a court could conceivably conclude that the major portion of the entire state was intended to be excluded from Mt. Laurel. Cf., Urb. League New Bruns. v. Mayor & Coun. Carteret, 142 N. J. Super. 11, 21 (1976) .(finding that “Middlesex County is part of the New York metropolitan region”).
*505The majority decision fails to provide lower courts with a workable definition of “developing communities.” In describing its application of the Mt. Laurel definition to the facts in Washington Township and Demarest, the majority expands rather than contracts the number of communities which might have a basis for claiming to be “developed”:
. . . sizeable, developing, not fully developed municipalities — particularly small ones — which may vary in character from such a tiny municipality as Winfield in Union County, developed in a dense, moderate-income, multi-family residential pattern to one like the subject municipality, homogeneously and completely developed as a middle-upper income, moderate to low density, single-family community.
[At 486.]
As a result, the majority’s definition can only add to the litigation which has surrounded the term “developing communities.” In addition to the instant litigation and that in the companion case, Fobe Associates v. Mayor and Council & Bd. of Adjustment of the Borough of Demarest, 74 N. J. 519, see, for example, Nigito v. Borough of Closter, 142 N. J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1976); Segal Construction Co. v. Wenonah Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 134 N. J. Super. 421 (App. Div. 1975); Urb. League New Bruns. v. Mayor & Coun. Carteret, 142 N. J. Super. 11 (Ch. Div. 1976); and unreported cases discussed in Rose, “From the Courts: The Trickle Before the Deluge from Mount Laurel,” 5 Real Estate Law Journal 69 (1976).
Ill

PRACTICAL EFFECT OF TEE MAJORITY DECISION

The Court’s characterization of some communities as “developed” allows municipalities which have already attained “exclusionary bliss” to forever absolve themselves of any obligation for correcting the racial and economic segregation which their land use controls helped to create. By re*506warding the past unlawful use of the zoning power to accomplish racially and economically discriminatory planning, we encourage future abuse of land use planning controls. The existence of developed, insular communities which are allowed to reap the benefits of their illegality without being required to share in the costs is a constant reminder to developing communities of the benefits to be gained from illegal and exclusionary zoning. Similarly, remaining communities and inner cities will be required by today’s decision to take more than their “fair share” of low and middle-income multi-housing; that specter can only encourage municipalities to avoid the label of “developing.”
The most damaging result of today’s decision is its abandonment of the innovative spirit of Mt. Laurel. Birst, in place of considerations aimed at determining whether or not a community can effectively cope with additional multifamily housing, the majority lays down a blanket exemption for municipalities solely on the basis of physical size. While in Mt. Laurel we were concerned with “over-intensive and too sudden development” which our decision might have produced, 67 N. J. at 191 and 67 N. J. at 212 (Pashman, J., concurring), and with ecological and environmental effects, 67 N. J. at 186, the majority now concludes that preserving the character of a community is more important than providing solutions for the problems created by exclusionary zoning.
Washington Township illustrates the unfortunate results of the majority’s obsession with preserving the character of the community, even if at the expense of the general welfare. Planning experts appointed by the trial court concluded that even within the Township, young married couples and older couples with grown children living elsewhere, represent a sizeable need for multi-family housing. Additionally, the planning experts noted the regional need for housing:
The failure of the Township to make provision for moderate rental apartments would not be serious if such units were available elsewhere in the Surrounding Pascack Region. Such is not the case. *507The failure to meet public need for this type of housing is general. Communities in the Region and in Bergen County have enacted land use controls which effectively limit their regional role to serving as single family residential dormitories for middle and upper income families.
Moreover, the majority ignores the findings of the conrt appointed planning experts that Washington Township would not be detrimentally affected by the proposed multi-family development:
Proposed large scale apartment development in other communities may pose difficult problems but it seems clear that Washington Township can absorb a modest amount of middle income apartment development without suffering damage to the community’s social fabric and its amenities. Moreover, if such development is properly planned and controlled, it should not only remain physically and socially stable but should contribute significantly to the housing needs of the community.
The experts pointed out that Washington Township’s schools are presently under-utilized and that existing roadways would not be adversely affected by the proposed development. In fact, apartment development would have produced a smaller volume of peak hour traffic than the office-research facilities for which the property is presently zoned.4
Second, by determining whether a community is “developed” on the basis of its physical size, the majority re*508turns to evaluating the general welfare on the basis of a municipality’s territorial limits — a methodology which this Court has consistently rejected. Chief Justice Vanderbilt commented on the impropriety of this type of analysis in Duffcon Concrete Products, Inc. v. Borough of Cresskill, 1 N. J. 509 (1949), when he said:
What may be the most appropriate use of any particular property depends not only on all the conditions, physical, economic and social, prevailing within the municipality and its needs, present and reasonably prospective, but also on the nature of the entire region in which the municipality is located and the use to which the land in that region has been or may be put most advantageously. The effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to depend upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often prescribed decades or even centuries ago, and based in many instances on considerations of geography, of commerce, or of politics that are no longer significant with respect to zoning. The direction of growth of residential areas on the one hand and of industrial concentration on the other refuses to be governed by such artificial lines. Changes in methods of transportation as well as in living conditions have served only to accentuate the unreality in dealing with zoning problems on the basis of the territorial limits of a municipality.
[1 N. J. at 513; emphasis added.]
See also, Kunzler v. Hoffman, 48 N. J. 277, 288 (1966); Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, supra, 42 N. J. at 566; Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N. J. 238, 247-49 (1954). Additionally, in Mt. Laurel we recognized "[i]t is now clear that the Legislature accepts the fact that at least land use planning, to be of any value, must be done on a much broader basis than each municipality separately.” 67 N. J. at 189, n. 22.
The inadequacies of a system of land use planning which apportions the task of accomplishing regional zoning among many different component municipalities are accentuated where the Court orders an affirmative response to housing problems, yet exempts a significant number of these communities from any responsibility. Though calling for a legislative response to the problem, Justice Mountain, concurring and dissenting in Madison Tp., noted the unsatisfac*509tory nature of relying solely on “developing” communities and municipal boundaries to accomplish regional zoning:
* * * Any municipality in the State is at liberty to adopt a zoning ordinance or plan of land use regulation, and presumably most have done so. Of these municipalities a goodly number must surely qualify — albeit reluctantly — as ‘developing.’ Their land use plans are therefore required to meet the test of Mt. Laurel. But it must be obvious that the housing needs with which we are concerned can be better met in some municipalities within a region than in others. From a purely rational point of view, it mahes little sense to apportion the regional obligation, willy-nilly, among some number of diverse political entities, set of from one another by boundary lines placed where they are by historical accident. * * * *
Any comprehensive review of our zoning problems should take account of a state-wide or regional allocation of zoning power as a possibly preferable alternative to present arrangements.
[Madison Tp., 72 N. J. at 629-630 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting) ; emphasis added.]
In spite of the repeated criticisms rejecting strict adherence to municipal boundaries as a determinant of zoning policy, the Court today returns to that discredited approach.
The Court’s decision will have a dramatic impact on the regions surrounding Demarest and Washington Township. The planning consultants appointed by the trial court found that five of the eight municipalities forming the Pascack Region, of which Washington Township is a part, have completely zoned out multi-family housing. The largest community in the region, River Vale, is only 766 acres larger than Washington Township, and hence, easily within the majority’s emerging definition of a “developed” community. As a result, the entire region, consisting of 16,265 acres, would be free to zone-out multi-family housing. Significantly, because of the size of component municipalities, the Court is exempting from our decision in Mt. Laurel an area which is over 2,000 acres larger than Mt. Laurel itself.
Similarly, the Demarest region, the Northern Valley, is a composite of small homogeneous municipalities which have no zoning for multi-family units. Ten of the fifteen towns *510in the larger Northern Yalley sector have no multi-family housing. Yet the majority indicates that 24% of the housing units in the region are multi-family. See ante at 478-479. Assuming that these statistics indicate that the remaining communities have already taken their “fair share” of the region’s multi-family housing, and have fulfilled their obligations under Mi. Laurel, where will the remaining multifamily housing be built?
The answer under the majority’s decision today is that multi-family housing will probably not be built in Bergen County. While county lines are not necessarily definitive of regional housing needs, available county statistics demonstrate the impact that today’s decision will have. See Madison Tp., 72 N. J. at 521-522. Fifty out of the seventy municipalities in the county are less than three and one-half square miles in size and hence, “developed” under today’s decision. New Jersey County and Municipal Work Sheets, at 4-7, New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, 1971. Although these communities comprise an area of almost 100 square miles, id., none of the 50 municipalities would be required to provide housing to meet regional housing needs. If housing demands are to be met anywhere in the county, the remaining 20 communities, many of which are only slightly larger in size, would be required to carry the additional burden. Such a result distorts any rational definition of a “fair share” formula.
By evaluating only the vacant land in a given municipality, the majority neglects to consider the accumulation of vacant land in the region surrounding that community. Even though a particular community may only have relatively small parcels of vacant land within its municipal boundaries, there may be sizeable amounts of developable land if the region as a whole is taken into account. For instance, the Pascack Valley Region has 3,028 acres of vacant, developable land. Bergen County, New Jersey Comprehensive Plan, Existing Land Use, Final Report, Report No. 11, June 1970. County Planning Board, County of Ber*511gen. Yet as a result of today’s decision, no community in the Paseack Region has an affirmative obligation to provide for multi-family housing. Although there are over 3,000 acres which could be used for multi-family housing, eight municipalities may block any part of that land from being used to supply any portion of the estimated 2,000 units of housing which are required annually to meet the present demand in Bergen County.
Municipal boundaries, which may have been drawn decades ago, bear no relationship to the considerations which we found relevant in Mr. Laurel. On the contrary, we held in Mt. Laurel that the “housing needs of persons of low and moderate income now or formerly residing in the township in substandard dwellings and those presently employed or reasonably expected to be employed therein” to be appropriate standards for determining a community’s “fair share.” 67 N. J. at 190. Various commentators and operative fair share allocation programs suggest additional factors which should be considered in arriving at a community’s “fair share.”5 In Madison Tp., I listed some of these factors:
*512, . . the percentage of the region’s vacant, developable land which lies within the municipality; whether this land is suitable for low cost housing in terms of its proximity to utilities, transportation facilities and other services; whether it is accessible to available or prospective employment opportunities; whether the town’s population density is smaller or greater than in the region at large; whether the town’s relative proportion of lower income families is greater or lesser than that in the region as a whole and the extent to which the municipality has heretofore violated the precepts of Mt. Laurel by excluding low and moderate income, persons.
[Madison Township, 72 N. J. at 594-595; Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting.]
On the basis of these criteria, Washington Township’s “fair share” can hardly be zero, as the municipality argues. Washington Township has allocated no space to provide suitable housing for the persons now living in the 145 substandard units already existing in that community. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Public Advocate of New Jersey, at 15. Nor has it attempted to set aside a place for the older couples and young married persons who currently seek housing in Washington Township, or the employees who would work in the office and research facilities which the Township seeks to develop. Washington Township is close to Paramus and Hackensack, and hence shopping and employment opportunities. Nevertheless, it argues that it has no obligation to provide housing for persons in the region who would take advantage of these opportunities.
Significantly, the majority omits population as a relevant criterion in evaluating a municipality’s “fair share” of multifamily dwellings. But population may be an indication of whether a community has sufficient existing facilities to accommodate an influx of new residents. Although a court must be sensitive to potential overcrowding, it is more likely that roads, schools, and sewage facilities which were constructed to meet the demands of a densely populated community are already available for the needs of a modest amount of multifamily housing. Conversely, a community which has vast open spaces but has yet to develop facilities to service that *513area may be ill-equipped to cope with au influx of new residents. The majority offers no logical reason why Washington Township, which it classifies as “moderate to low density,” should not be required to accommodate its fair ghare of multi-family housing.
Lastly, the majority carves out vast exceptions, in terms of geography, to the duty which we imposed on communities in Mt. Laurel. Obviously, this not only interferes with any attempt by this Court to implement its own decision in Mt. Laurel, but impedes any legislative or executive attempt as well. Despite numerous calls for a legislative solution, see Madison Tp., 72 N. J. at 535-536; id. at 570-571, 575 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 621 (Schreiber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 627-628 (Mountain, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 631-632 (Clifford, J., concurring), today’s decision presents a major stumbling block for any institution or agency which attempts to equitably apportion housing obligations. Because it places exclusive emphasis on municipal boundary lines, as opposed to housing needs, accumulations of vacant developable land, population, and the availability of existing municipal facilities, it makes it virtually impossible to retain the notion of a “fair share” in apportioning housing obligations.
It is hardly surprising that today’s decision conflicts with preliminary attempts to fix an equitable apportionment of housing needs among communities. For instance, in response to our decision in Mt. Laurel and Governor Byrne’s Executive Order No. 35, April 2, 1976, the Division of State and Regional Planning issued a report attempting to quantify municipal housing obligations. In arriving at each community’s “fair share” of housing needs, the report states:
In [Mt. Laurel], the New Jersey Supreme Court made it clear for first time that municipalities must take into account not only local housing needs, but also the housing needs beyond the municipality’s boundaries in the region of which it is a part. The regional delineation should be reflective of the intent of the Mt. Laurel decision and permit the equitable sharing of housing needs between areas with *514high levels of present housing needs and few resources and areas with the opposite characteristics.
[“A Statewide Housing Allocation Plan for New Jersey,” State of New Jersey, Preliminary Draft, November 1976 at 7-8.]
Contrary to the majority’s current analysis, the State Regional Planning Office concluded that an equitable allocation of present and prospective housing needs required Washington Township and Demarest to build 398 and 280 housing units, respectively. Since that calculation was based on an attempt to assure that “[n]o municipality would be responsible for more than its proportion, or ‘fair share’ of the region’s present housing need,” one can only wonder where these 678 units will be constructed if Washington Township and Demarest have, as a result of today’s decision, a “fair share” commitment of zero.
The Court’s decision is all the more unfortunate because the available data indicate that the problem of providing decent housing for the citizenry of the State is becoming more acute. Consultants appointed by the trial court cited data by the County Planning Board indicating that in the Pascack Valley Region and in Bergen County alone, a production of 2,052 units per year is needed to accommodate population growth and replacement of existing units. In spite of the expressed need for housing in Bergen County, 99.4% of the residential land supply is zoned for single family dwellings, leaving a mere 141 acres zoned for multi-family housing. Land Use Regulation, The Residential Land Supply at 10a, New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, April 1972, Table V. Uor has any attempt been made to balance housing production with future industrial development. Though 3,551 acres of vacant and developable land are zoned in Bergen County for industrial development, id. at 6A, no provision has been made for employees who will desire housing near their place of work.6
*515Moreover, the housing crisis is not confined to Bergen County. Governor Cahill spoke of the statewide crisis proportions of the problem in Blueprint for Housing in New Jersey7 (1970) and New Horizons in Housing (1972), and this Court recognized the severity of the shortage in Mt. Laurel when we noted that, “[t]here is not the slightest doubt that New Jersey has been, and continues to be, faced with a desperate need for housing, especially of decent living accommodations economically suitable for low and moderate income families.” 67 N. J. at 158. See also, Inganamort, et al. v. Bor. of Fort Lee, et al., 62 N. J. 521, 527 (1973). Yet, as in Bergen County, statewide planning has ignored the critical need for multi-family housing, particularly for low and middle income persons.8

*516
TV

APPLYING AN AFFIRMATIVE OBLIGATION TO "DEVELOPED” COMMUNITIES

The majority’s decision to limit Mt. Laurel to “developing” communities obscures the fact that “developed” municipalities must also have a role in providing low and moderate income housing. An excellent example is Englewood. Justice Hall, speaking for the Court in DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp., No. 1, 56 N. J. 428 at 435 (1970), described that municipality as “one of the older suburban residential communities adjacent to New York City,” and “as almost wholly built up.” Based on the Court’s decision today, Englewood would ;be considered “developed,” and have no obligation to provide needed low and middle income housing. Nevertheless, a unanimous court held that a special reason existed for granting a variance in Englewood, pursuant to N. J. S. A. 40:55-39(d), as a way of replacing substandard housing or of furnishing new housing for minority and underprivileged persons outside of ghetto areas.9 56 *517N. J. at 442. Although we were primarily concerned with providing decent living accommodations for persons already living in Englewood, any such limited application of our holding in that case would contradict our broad definition of the general welfare.
*516With the exception of several rural municipalities, only a very small amount of the net land supply has been zoned to permit multi-family housing. In addition, they are often restricted to small units which are not suitable for families with children.
[Id. at 25]
*517In Mi. Laurel we explicitly referred to the continuing role of “developed” communities in providing for regional housing needs. Quoting from a report by the New Jersey County' and Municipal Study Commission, Justice Hall emphasized the importance of built-up areas:
We further agree with the statement . . . ‘[w]e recognize that new development, whatever the pace of construction, will never be the’ source of housing for more than a small part of the State’s population. The greater part of New Jersey’s housing stock is found and will continue to be found in the central cities and older suburbs of the State * * (Substantial housing rehabilitation, as well as general overall revitalization of the cities, is, of course-, indicated.)
[67 N. J. at 188, n. 21.]
Cf., Sente v. Mayor and Mun. Coun. Clifton, 66 N. J. 204, 209 (1974). It would be unfair to expect cities and municipalities to revitalize and rehabilitate ghetto areas, but require no commitment from them to supply any of the multifamily housing for which there is a pressing regional demand. The affirmative obligation to provide housing for low and middle income persons must be imposed on “developed,” as well as “developing,” communities if the Court is to implement the principles it enunciated in Mi. Laurel.
Y

CONCLUSION

The majority today effectively neutralizes our holding in Mt. Laurel. The Court neglects to consider the troublesome *518effect that its decision will have on “fair share” allocations and defining appropriate regions; by exempting from any affirmative obligations under Mt. Laurel a significant number of municipalities, the majority makes an equitable distribution of the burdens of providing for low and moderate family housing impossible. Rather than order a sharing of responsibilities under Mt. Laurel, the majority fragmentizes the State by selectively targeting areas which must affirmatively provide for multi-family housing.
Furthermore, today’s opinion seriously underestimates the depth and magnitude of the measures needed to correct decades of exclusionary development. I have referred to the tactics of municipalities in avoiding their “fair share,” Madison Tp., supra 72 N. J. 567-571 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting); and the reluctance of courts to forcefully implement our decision in Mt. Laurel, supra, 67 N. J. at 83. Today’s decision can only provide new incentives to communities which seek to escape their constitutional and statutory duties. Consequently, we can offer no hope that new advances will be made in our efforts against exclusionary zoning.
Unfortunately, the effect of today’s decision will be long lasting. State regulation embodied in the zoning power deeply affects the racial, economic, and social structure of our society, and locks people into an environment over which they have no control. Generations of children are relegated to a slum schooling and playing in the overcrowded and congested streets of the inner cities. Men and women seeking to earn a living for themselves and their families are barred by distance from job markets. Society as a whole suffers the failure to solve the economic and social problems which exclusionary zoning creates; we live daily with the failure of our democratic institutions to eradicate class distinctions. Inevitably, the dream of a pluralistic society begins to fade.
This Court has been in the vanguard declaring the right of children to a thorough and efficient education, Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473 (1973); the right of all persons to *519acquire, own, and dispose of real property, Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N. J. 384, 391 (1962); and the right of all persons to share equal access to the State’s resources, Neptune City v. Avon, 61 N. J. 296 (1972). Today we make a mockery of those rights by perpetuating a ghetto system in which residents live in inferior and often degrading conditions. Unless and until we open up the suburbs to all citizens of_the State on an equal basis, the cherished ideals of our constitutional rights will remain illusive and unattainable.
Sullivan and Schreiber, J.J., concurring in the result.
For modification — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Clieeord and Schreiber and Judge Coneord — 6.
Dissenting — Justice Pashman — 1.

For a summary of the problems inherent in exclusionary zoning, see Madison Tp., 72 N. J. at 556-559 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting).

The Court’s decision today should not be read as foreclosing an argument that the new statute, which became effective August 1, 1970, goes beyond even our holding in Mt. Laurel. See Windmill Estates v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Totowa, 147 N. J. Super. 65 (Law Div. Dec. 17, 1976). The complaints in this case were filed on September 28, 1970 by Pascack Association Limited, and on August 13, 1971 by Waldy, Inc. Because all arguments have been directed to the zoning statute then in force and to the applicability of our decision in Mt. Laurel, any references to the new Act must be regarded as dicta. Nevertheless, it should be noted that one of the purposes of the new act, as enunciated in the sponsor’s statement, is “broadening the statutory municipal purposes of zoning, planning and land use control, . . . .” Additionally, since the new law was passed after our decision in Mt. Laurel, it must be presumed to have been passed with knowledge of that holding. Barringer v. Miele, 6 N. J. 139, 144 (1951) ; In Re Keogh-Dwyer, 45 N. J. 117, 120 (1965). Although the legislation clearly reflects the broad definition of the general welfare which we enunciated in Mt. Laurel, it makes no reference, either explicitly or implicitly, to any exemption for communities which are “developed.”

The paragraph reads:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.

Mt. Laurel clearly envisioned that a community which is not developed for the purposes of encouraging future employment growth would be required to provide housing to meet the needs of persons who are encouraged to work in and around that community. The Court stated: “[c]ertainly when a municipality zones for industry and commerce for local tax benefit purposes, it without question must zone to permit adequate housing within the means of the employees involved in such uses.” 67 N. J. at 187. Yet the majority encourages Washington Township to disregard Mt, Laurel; despite its cries that Washington Township cannot accommodate additional housing, the community’s current zoning anticipates office and research facilities which also burden municipal facilities. Washington Township is an example of an attempt to extract the benefits of growth while avoiding any incidental burdens.

See, e. g., Madison Tp., 72 N. J. at 593, n. 21 (Pashman, J., concurring and dissenting) ; Brooks, Lower Income Housing: The Planner’s Response (Am. Soc’y of Planning Officials 1972) ; Rubinowitz, “Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy,” 6 Mich. J. L. Reform 625 at 658-61 (1973) ; Rubinowitz, Low Income Housing: Suburban Strategies at 65-84, 219-220 (1974) ; Lindbloom, “Defining ‘Fair Share’ of ‘Regional Need’: A Planner’s Application of Mount Laurel,” 98 N. J. L. J. 633 (1975) ; Kelly, “Will the Housing Market Evaluation Model Be the Solution to Exclusionary Zoning?,” 3 Real Estate L. J. 373 (1975) ; Rose, “Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues,” 6 Rutgers-Camden L. J. 689 at 709-17 (1975) ; Rose, “From the Courts: The Trickle Before the Deluge from Mount Laurel,” 5 Real Estate L. J. 69 (1976) ; Rose, “Fair Share Housing Allocation Plans: Which Formula Will Pacify the Contentious Suburbs?,” 12 Urban L. Ann. 3 (1976) ; N. Williams, American Land Planning Law § 66.13 (o) (1975 Supp.) ; Bisgaier, “Some Notes on Implementing Mt. Laurel: An Admittedly Biased View,” 99 N. J. L. J. 729, 738, Cols. 3-5 (1976).

Employment opportunities, both present and future, are obviously an important factor to be considered in determining housing require-*515meats. The Division of Regional and State Planning notes in its report, “A Statewide Housing Allocation Plan for New Jersey” (Preliminary Draft, 1976), that employment growth is one of four indexes which reflect suitability and ability to accommodate low and moderate income housing needs. Id. at 13-14. Professor Rose in an article to appear in Suburban Sousing for the Poor (to be published in 1977) also notes that existing jobs is a valuable factor in that it would “impose the greatest obligation on those municipalities that reap the advantage of tax revenues from the industrial enterprises that now provide the jobs and that would provide suburban jobs to city residents.” In Mt. Laurel, the court stated in its discussion of fair share criteria that “in arriving at such a determination the type of information and estimates . . . concerning the housing needs of persons of low and moderate income now or formerly residing in the township in substandard dwellings and those presently employed or reasonably expected to be employed therein, will be pertinent.” 67 N. J. at 190; emphasis added.

Governor Cahill noted the relationship between exclusionary zoning and the housing crises:
Whatever the reasons for the perversion of zoning and planning-laws that exists today, I am convinced that we cannot afford the luxury of continuing the status quo in this area. My purpose today is not to condemn the ‘home rule’ concent in relation to land use. My purpose is to warn you that the system is failing. It is failing because it is not meeting the needs of our people.
[Id. at 12.]

See Land Use Regulation: The Residential Land Supply, New Jersey, Division of State and Regional Planning (1972). The study *516indicates that although 82% of the net land supply in 16 counties surveyed was allocated for residential use, only 6.2% of that land was zoned to allow multi-family housing. Id. at 6A, 10A. Further.more, 59% of the net land supply in the 16 counties was limited to one^bedroom or efficiency apartments, 20.5% was allocated to two-bedroom apartments, and only 20.5% remained for apartments consisting of three bedrooms or more. Id. at 11A. The report included in its findings:

Similarly, federal courts have granted no exemption for “developed” communities when requiring the construction of multifamily housing for low and moderate income persons as a way of correcting prior racial discrimination. See, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 47 L. Ed. 2d 792 (1976) ; Kennedy Park Homes Ass’n v. City of Lackawanna, N. Y., 436 F. 2d 108 (2 Cir. 970), cert. den. 401 U. S. 1010, 91 S. Ct. 1256, 28 L. Ed. 2d 546 *517(1971) ; Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (10 Cir. 1970) ; Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N. D. Ill. 1969).