Court Opinion

ID: 9661018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:26:34.09926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:24.347429
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(concurring in reversal and remand). I agree with Justice Kelly that if a driver of an automobile is guilty of gross negligence, the owner would not be liable for such gross negligence under CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2101) as only ordinary negligence would be imputed to the owner. In this case, however, we are concerned with the claimed tortious conduct of two persons— Louis Jones, the driver of the automobile that injured plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith, and Heriberto Miranda, the owner of the automobile, who was present in the automobile. The trial court refused to permit the jury to consider the question of whether Miranda’s own actions amounted to wanton misconduct on his part and as to whether plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith was entitled to exemplary damages.
Upon the trial of this case, there was testimony that on the afternoon of July 13, 1963, Miranda and Jones met at a pool hall on South Division Street in Grand Rapids. Over a period of time, Miranda and another acquaintance, Shannon Anderson, made three trips to a nearby bar, consuming at least one bottle of beer on each trip. Jones accompanied them on at least one trip. Sometime after the third trip to the bar, Jones asked to borrow Miranda’s 1955 Pontiac automobile to conduct some business. Miranda refused to loan the car. Jones made repeated requests. Miranda finally permitted him to use the car on the condition that Miranda accompany him. Jones drove a short distance. He then stopped to pick up a friend, Norris Darby. Darby *195testified that upon entering the car, he was invited to have a drink from an open bottle of wine that was in the rear seat. After pulling away from the curb, each of the men drank from the wine bottle and the drinking continued during the trip from Cass avenue to the point of collision.
Darby further testified that while Jones was driving west on Franklin street, he “told Louis Jones to take it easy, I was not ready to die yet, because he was zigzagging across the street. He almost hit one or two cars, so I said take it easy or else let me out.” He said, “Ah, what is the matter, are you chicken, or afraid, or something like that?” Darby also testified that it seemed to him that Miranda also told Jones to take it easy, or something like that. Finally, he testified that when he first encountered Jones and Miranda on Cass avenue, “there was no doubt about” the fact that they had been drinking.
Minutes before the collision, which occurred at approximately 4:55 p.m., Robert J. Miller, an attorney, was stopped at a red light at the corner of Franklin street and Jefferson avenue, headed westerly on Franklin street, when he first observed the Miranda car. The car “pulled rapidly out of the gasoline station, which is on the southwest corner of Jefferson and Franklin, pulled into Franklin street at a rapid speed, nearly hit a car that was proceeding in a westerly direction, which car was in the north lane on the westbound traffic. Having barely missed that car it then proceeded to swerve in a southwesterly direction into the south lane of the westbound traffic and proceeded westward.”
Miller saw the car stop at a red light at the Franklin-Sheldon avenue intersection and observed that the occupants were “laughing and talking boisterously.” When the light changed, the Miranda car *196pulled away “again at a rather rapid accelerated speed,” and then continued west “at a greater speed and pulled away from me probably by a block or two.” Miller watched the car continue west on Franklin street to the intersection of Grandville, it appearing “first as if the car was going to go directly through the intersection with the green light and go westward through the intersection but all of the sudden they made a quick turn to the right or north into Grandville avenue, were over the center line of Grandville avenue traffic and came into contact with another car which it hit.”
At the time of the collision, William R. Maier, a self-employed accountant, was driving an automobile southbound on Grandville avenue, near the Grandville avenue-Franklin street intersection. He was stopped in the inner southbound traffic lane, waiting for the traffic signal to change to green for Grandville avenue. After the light changed to green, he remained stationary for a short time, and then “heard this squealing of brakes, noticed the Pontiac come around the corner at a high rate of speed,” which he judged to be “between 40 and 50 miles an hour.” As the Pontiac made the right turn from Franklin street to Grandville avenue, “it was leaning on, pretty close to a 30-degree angle and I just sat there hoping that it would miss me (Maier); and as it did hit the left front headlight of my car, the left front corner of my car [, it] careened off that over and hit a porch of a house on the east side of Grandville.”
Maier testified that “Well, as we got the driver out he could barely stand up, and the odor of alcohol was all present around him. He couldn’t talk clearly, as a matter of fact, he tried to say he was not even driving, and we just helped him out from behind the wheel.” Maier also observed that “the *197front seat passenger (Miranda) also smelled strongly of alcohol. As we opened the door there were some bottles fell out. There were other bottles in the car.” The bottles were later identified as wine bottles.
John Corey was employed at a barber shop on the corner of the Franklin street-Grandville avenue intersection at the time of the collision. He heard “wheels squealing, going around the corner,” then saw the Miranda vehicle “hit the car on the opposite side of the street, that would be the west side of Grandville avenue.” He “could smell wine” on the person of the driver of the Miranda car; “it appeared that they had been drinking and as the door on the right hand side opened there I saw the wine bottle drop out.”
Police Officer Richard A. Holmgren, who investigated the collision, observed that “all the individuals that'were in the car, or had been in the car, had appeared or did appear that they had been drinking.” And with respect to Jones and Miranda, “There was odors on both of their breath, which definitely were of an alcoholic content, I couldn’t distinguish what they had been drinking; however, I do know they had been drinking.”
CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2101), to which Justice Kelly refers, relates to the civil liability of owners of motor vehicles for injury occasioned by negligent operation — imposing liability on the owner, where the motor vehicle is being driven by another, only if such operation is with the owner’s consent and, in the case of an injured guest-passenger, imposing liability only if the injury is caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle.
*198In this case, Miranda was present in the motor vehicle at all times prior to the accident. There is testimony that when Jones asked Miranda for the loan of his automobile, he was refused, that only after repeated requests by Jones did Miranda consent to allow him to use the automobile and then only if Miranda'accompanied him. From such testimony as to the stipulation upon tbe use of the automobile by Jones, a jury could find that Miranda retained the right of control of the vehicle at all times and that he was therefore a joint tort-feasor with Jones.
Whether Miranda refrained from directing or encouraging the reckless operation of his car by Jones does not change his liability because it is the right of control rather than the actual exercise of it which is material. The rule is stated in 2 Restatement, Torts (Second), § 318, as follows:
“§ 318. Duty of Possessor of Land or Chattels to Control Conduct of Licensee.
“If the actor permits a third person to use land or chattels in his possession otherwise than as a servant, he is, if present, under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of the third person as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if the actor
“(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the third person, and
“(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.”
In the comment which follows the above section, this statement appears:
“The duty to exercise reasonable care to control the conduct of third persons for the protection of others requires the actor to exercise his ability to *199control such third person’s conduct not only when he knows of the necessity for so doing, but also when as a reasonable man he should know of it.”
See, also, Dortman v. Lester (1968), 380 Mich 80, 85, and Parks v. Pere Marquette R. Co. (1946), 315 Mich 38.
Although CLS 1961, § 257.401 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2101) refers to “gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct” in connection with liability to a guest passenger, under this Court’s most recent pronouncements as to the above quoted phrase, in Peyton v. Delnay (1957), 348 Mich 238, and McKenzie v. McKenzie (1965), 374 Mich 320, the test is a “wilful and wanton disregard for public safety.” Applying the test to this case,, and bearing in mind that the totality of the facts is to be considered— Stevens v. Stevens (1959), 355 Mich 363, and Anderson v. Gene Deming Motor Sales, Inc. (1963), 371 Mich 223 — a jury could have found Jones guilty of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct within the meaning of the statute if a guest passenger had been involved. Such conduct could equally be found to be wilful and wanton with regard to other persons — a pedestrian, the occupant of another automobile, the occupant of one’s own front porch, i.e., Mrs. Smith — as it would be to a guest passenger.
If the operation of the automobile by Jones was limited in that Miranda permitted such operation only under his supervision and presence, a .jury could find that the injuries to Mrs. Smith resulted from a concert of action by Jones and Miranda in the wrongful operation of the motor vehicle. “Where there is concerted action toward a common end, both parties are liable for all acts within the scope of the undertaking.” King v. Herfurth (1943), 306 Mich 444, 448. In Benson v. Ross (1906), 143 *200Mich 452, wliere plaintiff was injured by a stray bullet shot by 1 of 3 defendants, this Court said:
“There was testimony tending to show that the three defendants were acting in concert in an act, not only violating a city ordinance, but palpably and grossly negligent. If the jury found such concert of action, all would he liable as joint tort-feasors.”
See, also, McCoy v. DeLiefde (1965), 376 Mich 198, and Fisher v. Rumler (1927), 239 Mich 224, 227, 228.
Miranda’s misconduct (if found to exist) is no different in causal relation to the injuries inflicted on Ollie Mae Smith than it would be under the guest statute. Because a jury could find that Miranda had authority to act under the circumstances, it could also find that his conduct amounted to recklessness and a wilful and wanton disregard for public safety.

Exemplary Damages.

Plaintiffs’ attorney sought an instruction on exemplary damages.1 The instruction is not a correct statement of the law with regard to exemplary dam*201ages and plaintiff Ollie Mae Smith was not entitled to have it given. Plaintiffs’ attorney also made objection to the trial court’s failure to give any instruction to the jury on exemplary damages. Defendant-appellee maintains that no instruction as to exemplary damages should have been given.
*200“It is the law of Michigan that, when a person sustains injuries as a result of the gross negligence, or willful and wanton misconduct oE another party, then the jury may award the injured person additional damages because of the gravity of the defendant’s recklessness, willfullness, wantonness or gross negligence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down, properly measuring or limiting damages which you may award if you should find that defendant Miranda was guilty of gross negligence, except that they must not be oppressive, or sueh as to shoek the common sense of fair-minded men, and they are therefore left to your reasonable discretion.
*201The question as to what constitutes exemplary damages has been considered at length in a number of Michigan cases. In Detroit Daily Post Company v. McArthur (1868), 16 Mich 447, an action for libel, the Court said (p 453):
“It is in connection with the various degrees of blameworthiness chargeable on wrongdoers, that .the discussions have arisen upon the subject of vindictive or exemplary damages, which, inasmuch as they rest upon actual fault, are by some authorities said to be designed to punish the wrong intent, while, according to ■ others, the damages, usually so called are only meant to recompense the sense of injury which is in human, experience always aggravated' or lessened in proportion to the degree of perversity exhibited by the offender. While the term exemplary or vindictive damages has become so fixed in the law that it may be difficult to get rid of it, yet it should not be allowed to be used so as to mislead, and we think the only proper application of damages beyond those to person, property or ■reputation, is to make reparation for the injury to the feelings of the person injured. This is often the greatest wrong which can be inflicted.” (Emphasis added.)
In Welch v. Ware (1875), 32 Mich 77, an action for assault and battery, the Court, in discussing the right to recover exemplary damages, said (pp 84, 85)-;
! “When the law gives an action for willful wrongs, ■it does it on the ground that the injured person ought to receive pecuniary amends from the wrong*202doer. It assumes that every such wrong brings damage upon the sufferer, and that the principal damage is mental, and not physical. And it assumes further that this is actual, and not metaphysical damage, and deserves compensation. When this is once recognized, it is just as clear that the willfulness and wickedness of the act must constitute an important element in the computation, for the plain reason that we all feel our indignation excited in direct proportion with the malice of the offender, and that the wrong is aggravated by it.” (Emphasis added.)
In Scripps v. Reilly (1878), 38 Mich 10, an action for libel, Justice Marston, writing for a unanimous Court, set forth a summary of the rules applicable to the recovery of damages. Eules 1 through 6 are pertinent here. They read as follows (pp 23 and 24) :
“1. In any injury entitling the party to redress, damages to the person, property and reputation, together with such special damage as may be shown are recoverable.
“2. Where the act done is one which from its very nature must be expected to result in mischief, or where there-is malice, or willful or wanton misconduct, carelessness or negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others, a new element of damages is allowed, vis.: for injury 'to the feelings of the plaintiff.
“3. Damages for injuries to feelings are only allowed in those torts which consist of some voluntary act or very gross neglect, and depend in amount very much upon the degree of fault evinced by all the circumstances.
“4. Where the tort consists of some voluntary act, but no element of malice, carelessness or gross negligence, is shown to have existed, but that the wrong was done in spite of proper precaution, the damages to be awarded on account of injured feel*203ings, will be reduced to such sum as must inevitably have resulted from the wrong itself.
“5. Where, however, the elements exist in a case, entitling a party to recover damages for injured feelings, the amount to be allowed for shame, mental anxiety, insulted honor, and suffering and indignation consequent on the wrong, may be increased or aggravated by the vindictive feelings, or the degree of malice, recklessness, gross carelessness or neglu gence of the defendant, as the injury is much more serious where these elements, or either of them, are shown to have existed.
“6. This increase of damages dependent upon the conduct of the defendant must be considered in this State as actual damages, although usually spoken of as exemplary, vindictive or punitory, and the amount thereof to be recovered, where recoverable at all, as they are incapable of ascertainment by any other known rule, must rest in the fair and deliberate judgment and discretion of the jury acting upon their own sense of justice in view of all the circumstances, both mitigating and aggravating, appearing in the case, and which can fairly be said to give color to or characterize the act, aided, however, by such instructions from the court as will tend to prevent the allowance of damages merely fanciful, or so remote as not fairly resulting from the injury.” (Emphasis added.)
In Lucas v. Michigan Central R. Co. (1893), 98 Mich 1, an action by a passenger who claimed he had been wrongfully ejected from a train by the conductor, this Court said (p 4):
“Under the circumstances of this case, if the jury believed the testimony introduced on behalf of plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to recover, not only those damages which ■are ordinarily termed ‘actual damages,’ but for whatever injury to his feelings or of indignity, pain, and disgrace such conduct would tend to produce in view of the time, place, *204and circumstances. Conduct may be so hasty and ill-timed, and so far disregard proper precaution, and the rights of others, as to be reckless and .'oppressive, and the law regards recklessness and oppression as aggravating the injury. [Citations omitted.] If plaintiff’s legal rights were violated by the expulsion from the- train, it was for the jury to consider the injury to his feelings that such conduct would be likely to produce, in- view of his consciousness that he was without fault, and had a right to remain upon the train to his destination.”, (Emphasis added.) ' •
Finally, in the more recent case of McFadden v. Tate (1957), 350 Mich 84, which .was an action for damages arising from an assault and battery,. Justice Carr, writing for the Court said-(p 91):
“Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable compensation for pain and suffering undergone by him and, likewise, if the injury was maliciously and wantonly inflicted, for the sense of indignity and humiliation resulting to him.”
From the above quoted discussions from'Michigan cases, it must be concluded that allowance 'of exemplary damages in a proper case is made for injury to the feelings of a plaintiff. It should be further noted that this Court has held that such a right of recovery is restricted to the person who has received the physical injury. Hyatt v. Adams (1867), 16 Mich 180. This Court has also stressed again and again that such exemplary damages are not to be allowed by way of punishment of defendant. See Stilson v. Gibbs (1884), 53 Mich 280; Wilson v. Bowen (1887), 64 Mich 133; Stuyvesant v. Wilcox (1892), 92 Mich 233; Boydan v. Haberstumpf (1901), 129 Mich 137; McChesney v. Wilson (1903), 132 Mich 252; Hink v. Sherman (1911), 164 Mich 352; and Wise v. Daniel (1922), 221 Mich 229.
*205Defendant Miranda maintains that exemplary damages in Michigan at common law have been allowed only in cases involving intentional torts. The right to recover exemplary damages arises ont of the outrageous nature of the acts of a defendant. Such acts are variously described in the cases: “the degree of perversity exhibited by the offender” (Detroit Daily Post Company, supra); “the willfulness and wickedness of the act” (Welch, supra); “willful or wanton misconduct, carelessness or negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others * * * very gross neglect * * * carelessness or gross negligence * * * recklessness” (Scripps, supra); “Conduct may be so hasty and ill-timed, and so far disregard proper precaution and the rights of others, as to be reckless * * * and the law regards recklessness * * * as aggravating the injury” (Lucas, supra); and “injury * * * maliciously and wantonly inflicted” (McFadden, supra).
The above described conduct usually, but not necessarily, involves the element of an intent to do injury to a specific person. This is by no means always the case, however, especially in this day and age when instrumentalities under the control of an individual — -such as an automobile — can be so recklessly and wantonly used as to endanger and injure whoever is unfortunate enough to encounter the wrongdoer. As we have seen, gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct in the operation of an automobile, because it can be an impersonal disregard for the life and limb of other persons, has come to be defined as a “willful and wanton disregard for public safety.” “In all cases where an act is done which from its very nature must be expected to result in mischief, or where there is negligence so great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights *206or safety of others, a new element of damages is allowed to be considered.” Detroit Daily Post Company, supra. When conduct of this kind occurs, it matters little to the innocent injured person that he or she is the victim of acts lacking in any specific intent by defendant to inflict injury upon him. This is not the mechanical action of delivering a blow from the arms of a windmill referred to in Welch, supra, or the kick in the face by bovine reaction of a cow referred to in Wise, supra — rather this is the act of a human being having the mentality to comprehend the nature of an act in utter disregard for public safety. It transcends mere negligence.
We have permitted recovery of exemplary damages for unnecessary suffering arising when a man misconceives his legal rights and proceeds in an oppressive fashion, Raynor v. Nims (1877), 37 Mich 34. In the present situation, where it could be concluded that defendants deliberately flaunted the law, the unfortunate victim should be allowed to recover damages, mental as well as physical, resulting from the injury. Since 1868, this Court has recognized that injury to the feelings “is often the greatest wrong which can be inflicted.”
It is defendant-appellee’s further contention that plaintiff failed to plead exemplary damages, that exemplary damages are items of special damage governed by GCR 1963, 112.8, and that it is required they be specifically pled. Defendant cites Sherman v. Kilpatrick (1885), 58 Mich 310. The opinion in Sherman contains no cited authority. The case has never been cited by this Court. The correct rule is set forth in Wise v. Daniel (1922), 221 Mich 229. In that case it was claimed that the declaration made no claim of exemplary damages and, therefore, none could be awarded. The Court said (p
*207“The declaration sufficiently averred the nature of the acts on the part of the defendant authorizing exemplary damages. The accompanying circumstances aggravating the injury by reason of the wanton and malicious conduct of the defendant need not be specially pleaded for they are not substantive elements of damages, but only serve in the capacity of characterizing the acts complained of and as an aid in measuring compensation to be awarded.”
In this case, the complaint avers the gross negligence and wanton misconduct of Jones and Miranda and that Ollie Mae Smith sustained personal injuries, both physical and mental, which caused her past and future pain and suffering. Based upon the authority of Wise, supra, the complaint was sufficient.
Finally, defendant-appellee asserts that there was absolutely no testimony from which a jury could find that plaintiff, Ollie Mae Smith, suffered injury to her feelings as a result of the actions of defendants. Mrs. Smith testified that at the time of the injury she was seated on her front porch combing the hair of her little girl. The questions and answers continue as follows:
“Q. After you completed combing Tamera’s hair, what did you do?
“A. When I finished Tamera’s hair, she got down, then I started combing Karen’s hair.
“Q. How old was Tamera at that time?
“A. Tamera was about four.
“Q. Where did Tamera go after you put her down ?
“A. She was standing on the steps.
“Q. What happened next?
“A. She was standing on the steps, I was sitting there combing Karen’s hair, all at once I heard something bump. I looked up, when I looked up this car was headed straight to me and my baby *208sitting on the chaise lounge so I grabbed her in my arms. I ran to the door, just as I attempted to open the door, something hit me on the leg. Tamera was standing on the steps. My husband came from work. I was trembling, crying and screaming, she was crying. I thought she was under the car, I thought she was down under the car but she had gone in the house with her dad.
“Q. Go ahead, what happened?
“A. So then after I found out she was gone in the house with her Dad, Karen was still scared. Tamera was screaming so I took her. We was just standing there shuddering, with the girls. My cousin next door, she ran the beauty shop, one of the police come up to the porch, he said, anybody hurt up there.
“Q. Now, and with respect to anybody else, don’t tell us what they said because you are not allowed to tell us what they said, but tell us what happened.
“A. Police come, say is anybody hurt. I said I don’t know I am so nervous, I don’t know what to do. About that time I looked down, blood was running down my leg.”
In this case, a mother was seated with two of her small children on her own front porch when the intrusion occurred. The circumstances of that intrusion were such, according to the testimony, that a jury could find she suffered both physical and mental injury.
Upon new trial, the jury should be properly instructed as to exemplary damages in accordance with this opinion.
I agree with Justice Kelly that the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. However, I would do so, in addition to the reasons given by him, because the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider the question of whether the actions of Miranda amounted to gross negligence *209or wilful and wanton misconduct on his part as a joint tort-feasor with Jones and because the judge refused to charge the jury as to exemplary damages.
T. M. Kavanagh, J., concurred with Adams, J.

 “I have previously instructed you that, should you find defendant Miranda guilty of gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of public safety, then you may award Mrs. Smith what are called ‘exemplary’ damages.
“Under the facts of this case, if you should find that defendant Miranda was guilty of gross negligence, or willful and wanton disregard of public safety, then any amount which you may ehoose to award Mrs. Smith as exemplary damages ‘must rest in the fair and deliberate judgment and discretion of * * * [you as members of] * * * the jury acting upon * * * [your] own sense of justice in view of all the circumstances, both mitigating and aggravating, appearing in the case.’ ”