Court Opinion

ID: 9740879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:43:49.744066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.228533
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Prime, J.
— The majority opinion states that it is unnecessary to set forth a rendition of the evidence. In my opinion it is absolutely necessary to set forth the evidence in order to arrive at an equitable result.
Lyle Culbert Ropp died January 30, 1962, a resident of the state of California. He was survived by his widow and also his mother, Blanche Eliza Quinlan, and a sister, Margaret Glissman.
On September 4, 1962, an ancillary probate proceeding was commenced in Lake County, Indiana. Margaret Glissman qualified as executrix. The first publication of notice of administration was made on September 20, 1962.
On May 1, 1964, the appellant herein, Blanche Eliza Quinlan, filed a petition for an order and Authority to Pay a Claim. *8The appellant is the mother of the deceased and of the executrix.
At the time of the filing of the petition, the estate was still open and assets were in the hands of the executrix. The assets consisted of money realized from the sale of a half interest in certain real estate previously owned by the deceased as a tenant in common with his wife. This was the only asset in the estate and the sale was made after petition and proper order of the court. The sale was made and approved by the court December 3, 1963.
The appellant’s claim, as set out in her petition, was for $8,398.00 which had been deposited in the Calumet National Bank of Hammond, Indiana in an account held by appellant and her son as joint tenants with rights of survivorship.
The son, during his lifetime, checked out all the money from that account without the knowledge of his mother. His acts were discovered after his demise.
The mother, the appellant herein, filed her petition to have the estate pay her the money which was allegedly appropriated by the son in a fraudulent manner.
The court heard and considered the matter and made the following findings and judgment.
“Although the executrix agreed with petitioner that petitioner’s claim was just and ought to be paid, the executrix failed to pay said claim within the provisions of the law made and provided for the allowance and payment of claims and therefore the petitioner has failed to substantiate the allegations of her petition accordingly by a fair preponderance of the evidence and further the law is with the executrix and further the petitioner has a claim pending in the proceedings now being had in the State of California concerning an estate of decedent, Lyle Culbert Ropp. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that petitioner, Blanche E. Quinlan, take nothing by her petition against the estate of Lyle Culbert Ropp, herein, with costs taxed against the said estate.”
The appellant filed a motion for a new trial setting out several grounds. All but one, that the decision was .contrary *9to law, were argumentative. Our consideration is limited to that alleged error.
The court held that the claim of the appellant was barred by reason of Burns’ Sec. 7-801, Acts 1953, Ch. 112, § 1401, P. 295.
“All claims against a decedent’s estate, other than expenses of administration and claims of the United States, and of the state and any subdivision thereof, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract or otherwise, shall be forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, the heirs, devisees and legatees of the decedent, unless filed with the court in which such estate is being administered within six [6] months after the date of the first published notice to creditors.”
The appellant contends that her claim was allowed by the executrix within the six months period and thus was not barred by the statute. The appellant did not file a formal claim with the clerk. Our task here is to determine if the claim was allowed or whether or not the court was correct in finding that it was not filed and therefore barred.
The appellant, Blanche Eliza Quinlan was a widow, seventy-six years of age. She opened an account in the bank with her son, Lyle Ropp. After his death she discovered there was no money in the bank and that it had been drawn out and the account closed. There was an understanding between Mrs. Quinlan and her daughter that her claim would be paid. She did not file a claim because she was told by the executrix that she would be paid as soon as the house was sold. The matter was discussed after Mrs. Glissman was appointed executrix. After the sale of the house she told her daughter that she did not get the money. Appellant did not understand what is meant by filing a claim, nor did she come to court to file a claim. Her daughter assured her that claim would be paid. The executrix told appellant she would give her the money as soon as she got the proceeds from the sale.
*10Margaret Glissman, the executrix, testified as follows:
“After the death of my brother, my mother and I went to the bank ix> change the account over to her name and mine or the survivor. We learned that the account was closed. I had an understanding with my mother concerning payment of the money that was withdrawn. I told her I would give her as much as I could get after other bills were paid because she had it coming. I knew it was a just debt and claim so she didn’t file any claim. I didn’t have any understanding about filing a formal .claim against the estate. I told her that I would put her bid in later. I found out that is what you call a claim. I didn’t know the law words. I received the proceeds of the sale of the house, about $5500.00, two weeks ago, but I did not pay her because Mr. Hand said I couldn’t pay her. I told my mother that and that is why she filed the petition. I told her the house was sold and said: “Well, the house is sold, you can get your money.”
We believe that the uncontraverted testimony and evidence shows beyond doubt that the claim in question was allowed within the six months period although it was not paid because there were no assets in the estate until after the sale of real estate. This situation is then brought within the procedure set out in Burns’ Annotated Statutes — Sec. 7-819 (c).
“Upon the expiration of six (6) months after the date of the first published notice to-.creditors and the final adjudication of all claims filed against the estate, the personal representative shall proceed to' pay the claims which have theretofore been allowed against the estate in accordance with the provisions of this code, but which he has. not theretofore paid.”
An executrix may allow a claim against the estate of his testator, if found to be a just debt, though the claim not be made out in an itemized form, and not filed with the clerk of the court. Lancaster, et al. v. Gould, et al. (1874), 46 Ind. 397.
We are cognizant of the changes wrought in the common law by successive recodifications of probate law in Indiana. However, the ruling precedent enunciated in the Lancaster *11case has not, in our opinion, been superseded or overruled by any provision extant in the current version of the Probate Code.
A claim' is sufficient if it shows legal liability on the part of the estate, and indicates to its representative what he is called upon to meet with reasonable certainty. Hull v. Burress (1950), 120 Ind. App. 507, 93 N. E. 2d 213; Logan v. Hite, Admr. (1938), 214 Ind. 233, 13 N. E. 2d 702.
All that is necessary by way of a complaint is a statement containing sufficient substance to apprise the administrator or executrix of the nature of the demand. Ayres v. Smith (1948), 227 Ind. 82, 84 N. E. 2d 185.
While it is true that appellant did not file a formal claim, there is sufficient evidence to establish the issuable facts constituting the cause of action set out in her petition. Stanley’s Estate v. Pence (1902), 160 Ind. 636, 66 N. E. 51; Masters v. Jones, 158 Ind. 647; Caldwell v. Ulsh (1916), 184 Ind. 725, 112 N. E. 518.
The non-claim statute has been circumvented in other cases. A valid contract entered into by the decedent creates a valid debt against the estate, even if no claim is filed, when the executor or administrator acknowledges the justness of the debt. Baker v. Happ (1943), 114 Ind. App. 591, 54 N. E. 2d 123. It was repugnant to Judge Royse’s idea of justice to permit that executor to deny liability for lack of a claim; it is just as repugnant to ours.
It is our opinion that the appellant’s claim was properly allowed by the executrix, and that its adjudication is not barred by operation of the non-claim statute. This finding is not in conflict with the resolution of Donella, Admx. v. Crady (1963), 135 Ind. App. 60, 185 N. E. 2d 623. In that case, the claim was originally filed after the six month period had elapsed. The instant holding is that a claim allowed before the expiration of six months may meet the statutory filing requirements. A claim may be technically filed even though *12the only action taken upon it is a verbal allowance and recogr nition of its justness. To deny this claim would be to strip away all vestiges of fairness.
Here we have an elderly perón, who is practically blind being told by her own daughter, the executrix, that the claim was allowed and would be paid. To say that she could not rely on this statement and had to perform the mechanical function of “filing” in the office of the clerk is to deviate from settled principles of law.
To serve the cause of justice this case should be reversed.
Note. — Reported in 232 N. E. 2d 384.