Court Opinion

ID: 9763821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:56:29.806039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:49.856855
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. Because the record supports the award of sole legal parental rights and responsibilities concerning medical care to the mother, I would affirm on the understanding that the court ordered' ‘legal parental rights and responsibilities” modified by granting medical care decision-making solely to mother. I would also affirm because the changes in the child’s schedule since the modified order support the court’s finding of changed circumstances regarding parent-child contact, and the court did not abuse its discretion in reducing father’s weekend schedule.
Mother and father divorced in 1992 and shared joint legal rights and responsibilities for their one child Zachary, born in 1990. Mother was awarded sole physical rights and responsibilities. In 1996, based on a stipulation of the parties, the court amended the final order to allow father more parent-child contact during the summer and holidays. The amended order also awarded father parenUchild contact during the school year every weekend, alternating one and two-day weekends. In March 2000, father filed a motion to enforce parent-child contact, and to amend the 1996 order to incorporate modifications to which the parties had agreed. Mother moved to modify the final order based on the parties’ inability to cooperate regarding medical decisions and to minimize problems regarding parent-child contact. After hearing testimony from mother and father, the court granted mother’s motion and modified the 1996 order as follows: the court modified father’s school year parent-child contact schedule, eliminating his Friday overnight and Saturday contact during the alternate week, but awarding father one overnight every Wednesday. The summer schedule was also modified to allow the child to spend alternate weeks with each parent.
On appeal, father first contends the court erred in transferring sole legal custody to mother. Father claims there were no findings regarding whether the transfer of sole legal rights and responsibilities to mother would be in the best interests of the child. Father also claims that mother’s motion was based solely on medical decision-making and that there was no evidence or findings to support a transfer of all legal rights and responsibilities to mother. Modification of a parental rights and responsibilities order is governed by 15 V.S.A. § 668. A court can modify a parental rights and responsibilities order upon a showing of real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances and if a modification is in the best interests of the child. Id. Read in context — that mother asked merely that medical care decision-making be transferred to her — the order is not so broad as the majority reads it. It is apparent from the wording of the order that the court was not awarding all parental rights and responsibilities solely to mother. If it did so intend, the language, “[s]he will make all routine decisions about his medical treatment” would have been unnecessary.
The court made specific findings regarding the parties’ inability to make joint medical decisions. The court found that “[mjediation between the parties is futile because they cannot deal with each other.” Because the parties could no longer agree or communicate regarding issues affecting their child’s medical care, the court was required to award sole legal rights and responsibilities to one parent. See Shea v. Metcalf, 167 Vt. 494, 499, 712 A.2d 887, 890 (1998) (where parties cannot agree or communicate, joint decision-making is not in the best interests of the child). The family court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole legal rights and responsibilities regarding medical decisions to the *468custodial parent, mother. Accordingly, I would affirm.
Father next claims no real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances occurred since the 1996 order that justified modification of his weekend parent-child contact. Father argues the court measured the change of circumstances from the original 1992 order, instead of the 1996 amended order. The family court supported its modification decision with the fact that the child’s school schedule, including after-school activities, did not permit him to spend substantial amounts of time with his mother, that the child had previously spent his weekdays home with the mother, and that the current order was entered when the child was an infant. Although the last finding was incorrect, the change in the child’s after-school schedule and decreased amount of time spent with mother are changed circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the parent-child contact schedule. See Circus Studios, Ltd. v. Tufo, 145 Vt. 219, 222, 485 A.2d 1261, 1263 (1984) (Court may affirm trial court judgment upon grounds different from grounds stated by trial court).
The majority holds, however, that a child’s maturation and resulting rise in activity level does not warrant a change in circumstances sufficient to modify parent-child contact. Under the majority’s approach, a court cannot modify a visitation schedule to adapt to the child’s changing activity level and needs. Instead, a court, the parties, and more importantly the child, must endure a schedule that although appropriate when the child was five, no longer works or serves the child’s best interests. In this case, mother testified that she wanted a full weekend with her child in which to share family time. Mother testified that she has had little opportunity for such bonding time in the years she has been denied a full weekend with her child. The child’s after-school schedule further limits mother’s time and opportunity to bond with the child. I see no error in the court finding a change of circumstances sufficient to modify a change in the visitation schedule. Not to so find on this record would mean that visitation schedules that do not match a child’s development would remain outmoded and unworkable.
Father’s final argument is that there was no evidence that reducing his weekend schedule vras in the child’s best interests. Modification of a visitation order is within the discretion of the family court “and will not be reversed unless its discretion was exercised upon unfounded considerations or to an extent clearly unreasonable upon the facts presented.” Gates v. Gates, 168 Vt. 64, 74, 716 A.2d 794, 801 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The family court modified the contact schedule so that each parent had a full weekend with the child. In addition, the court awarded father an additional weekday overnight. I see no abuse of discretion in allowing the child uninterrupted weekends with each parent and, thereby, eliminating transitions and opportunities for discord.
For the aforementioned reasons, I would affirm.