Court Opinion

ID: 9392305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 16:10:54.216918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.334777
License: Public Domain

J-S06021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JAI-MICHAEL HUDSON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 898 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 20, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0004098-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                               FILED: MAY 4, 2023

        Appellant Jai-Michael Hudson appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of strangulation and simple assault.1

Appellant claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the

elements of strangulation.         Appellant also challenges sufficiency and the

weight of the evidence. We affirm.

        The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

        The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Stephen
        Staats, who was working as a patrol officer for the Lower Paxton
        Township police department on August 29, 2020.          He was
        dispatched to 31 Beacon Drive at 10:03 p.m. on that date after a
        911 call was made regarding a domestic dispute. Officer Staats
        testified that when he arrived at the home, the victim, Pamelita
        Roberts, opened the door. He noticed that she was visibly upset
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2718(a)(1) and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
J-S06021-23

     and crying, and he observed a scratch on her cheek that was
     bleeding. Upon entering the home, he observed the victim’s
     young son in the living room. The young boy was visibly scared,
     and it appeared that he had been crying.

     The victim relayed to Officer Staats that earlier in the day she had
     ended her relationship with Appellant. She further explained that
     the two shared a joint banking account and she left a check for
     Appellant under the door mat of the house for $3,500.00. The
     victim was under the impression Appellant had already retrieved
     the check when she was awoken by her son, their barking dog and
     knocking on the front door of the home. She told Officer Staats
     that upon answering the door, Appellant put his hands around her
     neck and threw her to the ground. Once on the ground, Appellant
     put his hands around the victim’s neck for approximately 60
     seconds and she was unable to breathe. During the interview, the
     victim told Officer Staats she thought she was going to die multiple
     times. Officer Staats also [audio-]recorded the victim’s statement
     regarding the events of the incident.

     [At trial, t]he Commonwealth called [the victim,] who stated that
     she was intoxicated at the time of the incident. Under questioning
     by the [Commonwealth], she admitted that she told the police
     that the Appellant strangled her shortly after the incident. [The
     victim also testified that her statements to the police were not
     accurate because she was intoxicated at the time, and she denied
     that Appellant had strangled her. Further, she stated that she
     instructed her son to call the police because she was upset that
     Appellant was leaving her.]

     The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Roxanne
     Snider, a detective with the Dauphin County criminal investigation
     division. Detective Snider testified that she spoke to a witness in
     this matter, Zhaunte Crenshaw, who indicated that the victim and
     Appellant were still involved in a relationship. Ms. Crenshaw
     further relayed to Detective Snider that she was unsure how often
     the two were seeing each other while the case was going through
     the court system.

     Finally, the Commonwealth also introduced the recording of the
     911 call made by the victim’s 10-year-old son[, during which the
     victim also spoke to the 911 dispatcher at the time of] the August
     29, 2020 incident and pictures taken of the victim shortly after
     the incident.

                                    -2-
J-S06021-23

Trial Ct. Op., 8/24/22, at 3-5 (unpaginated) (citations omitted and formatting

altered).

       We note that on the second day of trial, the trial court held a brief

conference with counsel. Thereafter, the trial court indicated it would adopt

the Commonwealth’s proposed jury instruction regarding the strangulation

count and Appellant did not object. N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 80. The trial court

then instructed the jury that physical injury is not an element of strangulation,

and that the lack of physical injury is not a defense to the offense of

strangulation. N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 100-01.2 Appellant did not object after

the trial court completed its jury instructions. Id. at 107.

       During its deliberations, the jury submitted a request for the trial court

to instruct the jury again on the applicable law. Id. at 108-09. The trial court

provided supplemental instructions and referenced the intent necessary to

commit murder when explaining mens rea. Id. at 110. Additionally, the trial

court repeated its previous instructions regarding the offense of strangulation

____________________________________________

2 We note that the trial notes of testimony from February 2, 2022 are not
included as part of the certified record, but they are included as part of
Appellant’s reproduced record. The Commonwealth did not object to the
accuracy of these notes of testimony. Because “their veracity is not in dispute,
we rely on the copy contained within the reproduced record.” See C.L. v.
M.P., 255 A.3d 514, 518 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc); see also
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012) (holding that
an appellate court can consider a document that only appears in the
reproduced record when “the accuracy of the reproduction has not been
disputed” (citation omitted)).

                                           -3-
J-S06021-23

and physical injury, or the lack thereof. Id. at 111. Appellant did not object

to any portion of the trial court’s instructions. Id. at 119.

        Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of strangulation and simple

assault.    The trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-

sentence investigation (PSI) report. Id. at 123. On April 20, 2022, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten to twenty

years’ incarceration for strangulation as a second-strike offender3 and

imposed no further penalty for simple assault.       See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g,

4/20/22, at 10-11. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging

the weight of the evidence, which the trial court denied.

        Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.4 Both Appellant

and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which

we reorder as follows:

        1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding
           the lack of physical injury, which was confusing and prejudicial.

____________________________________________

3   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1), (a.1).

4 In his notice of appeal, Appellant purports to appeal from “the conviction of
February 2, 2022, judg[]ment of sentence[] entered on April 20, 2022, and
the order denying post-sentence motion entered in this matter on . . . May
23, 2022.” Notice of Appeal, 6/20/22 (some formatting altered). It is well-
established that “in criminal cases appeals lie from judgment of sentence
rather than from the verdict of guilt, . . .” Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 578
A.2d 1334, 1335 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations omitted). Therefore, we have
amended the caption accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger,
788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc).

                                           -4-
J-S06021-23

       2. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by
          instructing the jury on the elements of murder in the closing
          charge, which was confusing and prejudicial.

       3. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
          where the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the
          elements of strangulation.

       4. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in
          accepting the jury’s verdict which was so contrary to the weight
          of the evidence which established the [victim] was intoxicated
          when she spoke with the police and recanted her initial
          allegation.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.5

                                  Jury Instructions

       We address Appellant’s first two issues regarding the jury instructions

together. First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the

jury that it is not a defense to the charge of strangulation that the victim was

not physically injured. Id. at 14-15. Appellant contends that this instruction

was prejudicial because it created confusion regarding whether the jury could

consider the victim’s lack of physical injuries when assessing her credibility.

Id. at 16-17.

       Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using murder as

an example when defining mens rea after the jury requested supplemental
____________________________________________

5 We note that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also argued that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of simple assault. See Rule 1925(b)
Statement, 7/19/22, at 2 (unpaginated). Appellant has not raised this claim
in his appellate brief; therefore, Appellant has abandoned this issue on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. McGill, 832
A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where the appellant
abandoned claim on appeal).

                                           -5-
J-S06021-23

instructions.   Id. at 11-13.       Appellant contends that this instruction

referencing murder was prejudicial because Appellant had been charged with

assault-related offenses.     Id. at 13-14.        Appellant also claims that this

instruction was confusing as it only defined the mens rea of intentionally and

not knowingly. Id. at 13.

      Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine

whether he has preserved them for appeal. This Court may raise this issue of

waiver sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 903 A.2d 1178, 1184

(Pa. 2006). “[T]he applicability of waiver principles . . . is a question of law,

over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is

plenary.”    Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018)

(citations omitted).

      “Issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). It is well-established that “[a]

specific and timely objection must be made to preserve a challenge to a

particular   jury   instruction.   Failure    to    do   so   results   in   waiver.”

Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation

omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant did not object to the jury

instructions that he seeks to challenge on appeal. Indeed, Appellant did not

raise any objections at the charging conference, during or after the trial court’s

initial jury instructions, nor when the trial court provided supplemental

instructions to the jury during deliberations. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 107,

                                      -6-
J-S06021-23

119. Therefore, Appellant has waived his challenges to the jury instructions

on appeal. See Olsen, 82 A.3d at 1050; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, no

relief is due.

                           Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Appellant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the

elements of strangulation. Appellant’s Brief at 19-21. Appellant contends that

there was no physical evidence of any strangulation and that the victim

testified that Appellant did not place his hand on her throat, nor did he impede

her ability to breathe. Id. at 20-21 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 49).

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

      The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
      evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
      the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
      evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
      crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
      may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
      fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced
      is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

      Furthermore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do
      not review a diminished record. Rather, the law is clear that we

                                      -7-
J-S06021-23

      are required to consider all evidence that was actually received,
      without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or
      whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are correct.

Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted and formatting altered)); see also Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213

A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that “[a] successful sufficiency-of-

the-evidence claim requires discharge” (citation omitted)).

      Further, “the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient

to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that testimony can

address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged crime.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Additionally, the prior inconsistent statements of a witness who testifies at

trial, are sufficient to sustain a conviction “as long as the prior inconsistent

statements, taken as a whole, establish every element of the offense charged

beyond a reasonable doubt, and the finder-of-fact could reasonably have

relied upon them in arriving at its decision.” Brown, 52 A.3d at 1171.

      Lastly, any challenge to the credibility or reliability of the witnesses goes

to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.

Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that a claim that

the Commonwealth’s evidence lacked credibility “attacks the weight, rather

than the sufficiency, of the evidence” (citation omitted)).

      The Crimes Code defines strangulation, in relevant part, as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.—A person commits the offense of
      strangulation if the person knowingly or intentionally impedes the
      breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by:

                                      -8-
J-S06021-23

          (1) applying pressure to the throat or neck . . .

                                       *       *   *

       (b) Physical injury.—Infliction of a physical injury to a victim
       shall not be an element of the offense. The lack of physical injury
       to a victim shall not be a defense in a prosecution under this
       section.

                                       *       *   *

       (d) Grading.—

                                       *       *   *

          (2) A violation of this section shall constitute a felony of the
          second degree if committed:

              (i) against a family or household member as defined in 23
              Pa.C.S. § 6102 (relating to definitions)[.6]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1), (b), (d)(2)(i).

       Here, at trial, the Commonwealth played a recording of the 911 call that

the victim’s son made on the night the incident occurred.       See N.T. Trial,

2/1/22, at 32-33; Commonwealth’s Ex. 1. During the call, the victim told the

dispatcher that her boyfriend, Appellant, had beaten her up and almost choked

her to death. See id. Officer Staats testified that he arrived at the victim’s

apartment minutes after the 911 call and made an audio recording of the

victim’s statement. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 5-7, 11-12; Commonwealth’s

Ex. 2. At that time, the victim explained that after she opened the door for

Appellant, he placed his hands around the victim’s neck and threw her to the

floor. See Commonwealth’s Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10. The
____________________________________________

6The term “family or household members” includes, among others, “current
or former sexual or intimate partners . . . .” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).

                                           -9-
J-S06021-23

victim also said that Appellant had his hands around her neck for around sixty

seconds, and during that time, she could not breathe. See Commonwealth’s

Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10. The victim repeatedly said that she

believed she was going to die when Appellant was choking her.                See

Commonwealth’s Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10-11.

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s

sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as follows:

      Officer Staats credibly testified that the victim stated that
      Appellant placed his hands around her throat, and she was unable
      to breathe for approximately 60 seconds. Officer Staats also
      observed injuries to the victim, which were also preserved in
      photographs. The 911 call by the victim’s son strongly indicated
      the Appellant assaulted [the victim]. Accordingly, there was
      sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of strangulation . . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (unpaginated).

      Based on our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the

trial court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for

strangulation. See Gray, 867 A.2d at 567.

      At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the victim’s initial

statements in which she described how Appellant had placed his hands around

her throat, forced her to the floor, and that she was unable to breathe during

that time. Although the victim recanted her prior statements at trial, the jury

was free to believe, all, part, or none of the evidence. See Brown, 52 A.3d

at 1171; Gray, 867 A.2d at 567. Therefore, in light of the totality of all the

                                     - 10 -
J-S06021-23

evidence presented by the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we agree with

the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s

conviction for strangulation. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718; see also Brown, 52

A.3d at 1171 (holding that a witness’s prior inconsistent statements are

sufficient to sustain a conviction so long as the statements “taken as a whole,

establish every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt”).

Further, because physical injury is not an element of strangulation, the

presence or absence of physical injuries on the victim does not affect our

conclusion. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(b).7 Therefore, Appellant is not entitled

to relief on this claim.

                              Weight of the Evidence

       In his last issue, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 17-19. Specifically, Appellant

notes that at trial, the victim testified that Appellant did not strangle her. Id.

at 18 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 49, 54). Additionally, the victim testified

that she was intoxicated on the night of August 29, 2020, and that she

____________________________________________

7 Nevertheless, we note that the record belies Appellant’s claim that the victim
did not have physical injuries. The victim did not have any marks or bruises
on her throat. See N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 56-57, 74; N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 23.
However, the victim had scrapes on both of her knees and a scratch on her
face. See N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 58-59; N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 13-16;
Commonwealth’s Ex. 3, 4. Further, the victim told the 911 dispatcher that
she was injured but that she could handle her injuries at home. See
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 9, 23-24 (Officer
Staats testified that the victim declined aid from paramedics because she is a
nurse and could treat her own injuries).

                                          - 11 -
J-S06021-23

instructed her son to call the police because she was angry at Appellant for

leaving her. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 42, 49). Appellant also refers to

Crenshaw’s testimony that the victim becomes belligerent when she drinks

excessively, and the victim had been drinking heavily earlier on the day of the

incident. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 42). Lastly, Appellant asserts that

the victim did not have any physical injuries. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at

23). Therefore, Appellant concludes that the verdict shocks one’s sense of

justice. Id. at 19.

      In reviewing a weight claim, this Court has explained:

      The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
      of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
      and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
      not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
      must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
      credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
      determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
      clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
      weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

      On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
      verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
      weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court
      may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence
      as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v.

Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1036 (Pa. 2007) (holding that an appellate court

reviews a trial court’s denial of a weight of the evidence claim for an abuse of

                                     - 12 -
J-S06021-23

discretion and stating that “the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings”

(citation omitted)).

      When a weight claim “is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony,

our review of the trial court’s decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless

the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict

based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on

appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super.

2009) (citation omitted).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim

as follows:

      [T]he jury’s guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the
      evidence. Officer Staats credibly testified that moments after the
      August 29, 2020 incident, the victim stated that Appellant placed
      his hands around her neck for approximately 60 seconds and she
      was unable to breathe. The victim also told Officer Staats multiple
      times during his interview of her, that she thought she was going
      to die. Finally, Officer Staats observed visible injuries to the
      victim’s face. The jury also viewed pictures of the victim’s injuries
      and listened to the 911 recording from the night of the incident.
      The 911 call made by the young boy was stunningly compelling as
      he related to the dispatcher what Appellant did to his mother.

      While [the victim] offered testimony during the trial that she was
      drunk during the incident and she did not recall what happened,
      the observations Officer Staat[s] made shortly after the incident
      were credible and reliable. The victim’s testimony was not
      credible, especially in light of the fact that testimony was offered
      suggesting that the victim and Appellant were still romantically
      involved. Because the fact finder found the victim’s testimony at
      trial to be not credible, and the verdicts were supported by the
      credible evidence of record, we reject Appellant’s argument.

                                     - 13 -
J-S06021-23

Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (unpaginated).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claim. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d

at 723.     The jury, as fact-finder, was entitled to make credibility

determinations concerning the victim’s trial testimony and her prior

statements, and was free to believe all or part or none of the witness

testimony, in addition to deciding which evidence presented at trial has

greater weight. See id.; see also Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 282. Accordingly,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. For these reasons, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/04/2023

                                     - 14 -