Court Opinion

ID: 9725066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:27:43.392462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:08.819691
License: Public Domain

HUPP, J.*
I dissent.
The majority opinion makes a full and fair recitation of the facts. However, one item of testimony is not covered in the recitation. A San Francisco probation officer was called by the People to testify regarding certain alleged admissions by the minor. The admissions were excluded because the judge was not satisfied that they were voluntary. However, without objection, the probation officer did testify that all three minors were from Canoga Park in Los Angeles County. It seems to me that this circumstance added to the evidence summarized in the majority opinion pushes the case over the substantial evidence line. The trial judge was entitled to consider the odds against the minor being in the stolen car in *1004Yuba City with two other minors, all three from the same community, one of whom was identified as one of three robbing a victim in San Francisco three hours earlier (the approximate driving time to Yuba City) as a result of some chance meeting on the road after the robbery. The evidence supports the inference that the minor was one of the three involved in the San Francisco robbeiy.
The evidence also supports the conclusion that the minor aided and abetted the robbeiy. The totality of the circumstances is that three minors from Los Angeles County appeared in San Francisco and approached a parked occupied automobile where one of them robbed a man at knife point of his car and its contents while the other two stood by; then all three immediately got in the car and drove to Yuba City. When arrested in Yuba City, the minor David K. was seated in the back seat of the stolen vehicle with the victim’s wallet between his legs on the seat and the victim’s binoculars on the seat beside him. The circumstances are similar to, if not stronger than, those held sufficient for a finding of guilty in In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094-1095 [126 Cal.Rptr. 898], where the court said: “Among the factors which may be considered in making the determination of aiding and abetting are: presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense. [Citations.] In addition, flight is one of the factors which is relevant in determining consciousness of guilt. [Citation.]” To this list might be added, in this case, facts showing possession of part of the loot. (I disagree with the majority that the trial court could not draw an inference of possession from the placement of the wallet on the seat between the minor’s legs or the binoculars beside him.) Lesser circumstances were present in People v. Perryman (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 813 [58 Cal.Rptr. 921], and were held sufficient to sustain the finding of guilt.
With regard to the commitment to the California Youth Authority (C.Y.A.) I do not agree that the juvenile court judge could not consider the minor’s state of mind, including its state of contrition, as a factor in determining the correct disposition. The Supreme Court tells us that the juvenile court judge may consider “candor and contrition” in determining the proper disposition. (Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 587 [102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079].) It follows that the judge may consider whether the minor has been candid and cooperative with the probation officer, which he was not here.1 The rule against using C.Y.A. for *1005punishment is not violated by consideration of factors which go toward predicting the type of custodial facility necessary to set the minor on a noncriminal path. However, I would agree that the judge should be satisfied that factors other than obduracy, such as an attorney’s advice, have not caused the minor to refuse to talk to the probation officer.
I would affirm all three orders.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 3, 1978, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 15, 1978. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

 Any fear that, if reversal is obtained, the admissions to the probation officer will be used against the defendant on a retrial was set at rest by the Supreme Court in People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991, 999 [88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961], wherein it is said: *1005“In addition, admissions made to a probation officer in the hope that candor will persuade the probation officer to make a favorable report to the court are not admissible either for substantive evidence or for impeachment in any retrial on the same issues.” (See also Bryan v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d.575, 586-587.) It follows that refusal to talk to a probation officer after trial is not justified on such ground. In addition, in this case, the Yuba City offense was admitted by the minor in the Sutter County Juvenile Court.