Court Opinion

ID: 9387253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 14:01:25.974797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.547401
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2127    Document: 46     Page: 1   Filed: 04/17/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                   JAMES MCHUGH,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

      DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                        2022-2127
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CH-1221-21-0212-W-2.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: April 17, 2023
                  ______________________

    JAMES JOSEPH MCHUGH, Marion, IN, pro se.

     BRYAN MICHAEL BYRD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

    Before PROST, WALLACH, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
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 2                                           MCHUGH   v. DVA

 PER CURIAM.
     James McHugh appeals the final decision of the Merit
 Systems Protection Board (“Board”), which concluded that
 he failed to establish a prima facie case of whistleblower
 retaliation by the Department of Veterans Affairs
 (“Agency”) and denied his Individual Right of Action
 (“IRA”) bifurcated appeal that requested corrective action
 under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the
 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (collec-
 tively “WPA”). McHugh v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. CH-
 1221-21-0212-W-2, 2022 WL 1521359 (M.S.P.B. May 11,
 2022) (“Final Decision”) 1 (VA Appx. 1–12). 2 We affirm.
                       BACKGROUND
     On March 3, 2019, the Agency hired Mr. McHugh as a
 Food Service Worker Supervisor, stating on the Standard
 Form (“SF”) 50 documenting the hiring that this was a “su-
 pervisory (or managerial) position” subject to a one-year
 probationary period beginning that day. VA Appx. 2, 34.
 During this probationary period, the Agency promoted Mr.
 McHugh to Supervisory Health Technician Dietetic on Oc-
 tober 27, 2019, and the SF 50 documenting the promotion
 noted that the promotion came with a one-year probation-
 ary period, effective the same day as the promotion. Con-
 sequently, the SF 50 for the promotion did not credit Mr.
 McHugh for completing nearly eight months of his proba-
 tionary period under the first SF 50 and instead reset the
 clock.

     1    The administrative judge’s Initial Decision issued
 on May 11, 2022, became the final decision of the Board
 thirty-five days after issuance pursuant to 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.113. We refer to the administrative judge’s Initial
 Decision as the Board’s Final Decision.
      2   “VA Appx.” refers to the appendix that the Agency
 filed concurrently with its informal brief.
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 MCHUGH   v. DVA                                           3

      On September 24, 2020, Mr. McHugh acknowledged
 his receipt of the Agency’s letter dated the day before and
 titled “Failure to Satisfactorily Complete Supervisory Pro-
 bationary Period” (“Demotion Notice”), which demoted him
 for two specifications: (1) a July 14, 2020 altercation with
 a coworker, where Mr. McHugh “behaved inappropriately
 during operations yelling aggressively and not choosing to
 de-escalate the situation to the point where the Food Ser-
 vice Systems Manager, Jeremy Parsons had to step in[,]”
 and (2) a June 15, 2020 “Admonishment for Inappropriate
 Behavior” for engaging in an “inappropriate conversation
 with a co-worker.” VA Appx. 36. After receiving the De-
 motion Notice, Mr. McHugh requested ten days of admin-
 istrative leave to regroup and gather his thoughts because
 of the demotion. On September 25, 2020, the Agency ap-
 proved ten days of annual leave, telling Mr. McHugh that
 he could not use administrative leave. On September 26,
 2020, the demotion became effective, and two days later,
 Mr. McHugh requested that the Agency reconsider the de-
 motion on September 28, 2020.
      Sometime between September 23, 2020 and September
 29, 2020, Mr. McHugh filed a complaint with the U.S. Of-
 fice of Special Counsel (“OSC”) that alleged he had experi-
 enced a hostile work environment and had been demoted.
 See VA Appx. 3–4. 3 On October 2, 2020, the OSC attorney
 notified Mr. McHugh that his OSC complaint kept his an-
 onymity and did not authorize her to reach out to the
 Agency with questions. Mr. McHugh that same day replied

    3    The AJ previously determined at the jurisdictional
 phase that “[t]he exact date that [Mr. McHugh] filed a com-
 plaint of prohibited personnel practice with OSC is not
 clear from the record,” but on September 29, 2020, he re-
 ceived an OSC email acknowledging receipt of his com-
 plaint and noting that an OSC attorney was assigned to his
 complaint. VA Appx. 20.
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 4                                            MCHUGH   v. DVA

 to the OSC attorney, consenting to no longer be anonymous
 and allowing the OSC attorney to reach out to the Agency.
      On October 15, 2020, the reconsideration meeting was
 held, and the following participated: Mr. McHugh, James
 Hall (Cincinnati VAMC Associate Deputy Director),
 Charles Smith (Mr. McHugh’s Union Representative), and
 Adriana Carter (VISN 10 Human Resources ELR Special-
 ist). At this reconsideration meeting, Mr. Smith requested
 that the Agency either mitigate or rescind the demotion
 when he raised the concern that Mr. McHugh’s probation-
 ary period ended before the Demotion Notice’s issuance.
 The next day, on October 16, 2020, the Agency mitigated
 Mr. McHugh’s demotion and issued a reprimand (“Repri-
 mand”) instead.
     On March 20, 2021, Mr. McHugh filed an IRA appeal
 with the Board. The Board’s administrative judge (“AJ”)
 dismissed the appeal without prejudice to allow Mr.
 McHugh to first exhaust with the OSC the claims raised
 before the Board. Mr. McHugh re-filed his appeal with the
 Board on October 15, 2021, and the AJ ruled on February
 1, 2022, that the Board only had jurisdiction over the issue
 of whether the Agency issued its reprimand of Mr. McHugh
 in retaliation for his complaint to the OSC.
      On February 8, 2022, the AJ issued an order suspend-
 ing case processing for thirty days beginning February 8,
 2022, and ending March 10, 2022, to allow the parties to
 complete discovery and prepare for the hearing. SAppx.
 14. 4 The order did not alter any pending deadline.
     On March 25, 2022, Mr. McHugh filed a motion to com-
 pel discovery before the AJ, four days before the scheduled

     4   “SAppx.” refers to Mr. McHugh’s supplemental ap-
 pendix, see ECF No. 39, which represents the pages that
 were accepted from his submission. See ECF No. 35 at 17–
 35.
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 MCHUGH   v. DVA                                             5

 merits hearing in the matter. The AJ denied the motion to
 compel as untimely and failing to comply with other regu-
 lations of the Board as well. 5
      On March 29, 2022, the AJ held a merits hearing 6 to
 address whether Mr. McHugh had made out a prima facie
 case of whistleblower retaliation. On May 11, 2022, the AJ
 delivered an Initial Decision on behalf of the Board, finding
 Mr. McHugh had not made out a prima facie case of whis-
 tleblower retaliation because there was no evidence at the
 March 29, 2022 hearing that any person involved in the de-
 cision to reprimand Mr. McHugh in October 2020 had any
 contemporaneous knowledge of Mr. McHugh’s OSC com-
 plaint. Thus, Mr. McHugh’s request to the Board for cor-
 rective action was denied.
     Mr. McHugh then timely filed this appeal. We have
 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

     5    The AJ noted that the Board previously ordered
 that any discovery be issued by February 15, 2022, and,
 under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(d)(3), any motion to compel was
 due by March 11, 2022. The AJ also noted that Mr.
 McHugh did not provide “a statement that he attempted to
 discuss the anticipated motion with [A]gency counsel,” did
 not provide “a response of his original request and a state-
 ment showing that the information he sought was discov-
 erable,” and did “not file[] a copy of the [A]gency’s response
 to the request.”       VA Appx. 15–16 (citing 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.73(c)(1)(i)–(iii)).
     6    The AJ previously determined to bifurcate the
 hearings, with the first hearing addressing the whistle-
 blower retaliation prima facie case, and the second hear-
 ing, to be scheduled if Mr. McHugh succeeded in the first,
 addressing whether the Agency would propose the same ac-
 tion against Mr. McHugh in the absence of his OSC com-
 plaint.
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 6                                             MCHUGH   v. DVA

                         DISCUSSION
                   I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
      We must affirm the Board’s final decision unless it is
 “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
 wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
 cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
 followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5
 U.S.C. § 7703(c). “We review the Board’s legal determina-
 tions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evi-
 dence.” Bannister v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 26 F.4th 1340,
 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Substantial evidence “means such
 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ad-
 equate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y.
 v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
              II. WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION
      Mr. McHugh disputes that he failed to present a prima
 facie case of whistleblower retaliation. Certain whistle-
 blowing disclosures or activities made by an employee are
 protected under the WPA, which prohibits the agency from
 taking a personnel action against that employee as a re-
 sponse. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9). The Board will order
 a corrective action, as it considers appropriate, for certain
 statutorily described prohibited personnel practices if the
 employee demonstrates that a disclosure or protected ac-
 tivity under the WPA was a “contributing factor in the per-
 sonnel action which was taken or is to be taken against”
 the employee. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1) (citing 5 U.S.C.
 § 2302(b)(8), (b)(9)(A)(i), (b)(9)(B)–(D)). The employee es-
 tablishes a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation
 with a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the
 employee made a protected disclosure or engaged in a pro-
 tected activity, and that the disclosure or protected activity
 contributed to the agency’s personnel action against the
 employee. See Rickel v. Dep’t of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358,
 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). If the
 employee makes out a prima facie case, the burden then
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 MCHUGH   v. DVA                                            7

 shifts to the agency to “show by clear and convincing evi-
 dence that it would have taken ‘the same personnel action
 in the absence of such disclosure’” or activity. Rickel, 31
 F.4th at 1364 (citations omitted).
     The AJ recognized that filing an OSC complaint is a
 protected activity and that Mr. McHugh’s subsequent rep-
 rimand by the Agency was a qualifying personnel action.
 See VA Appx. 8–9 (first citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i);
 and then Horton v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. CH-1221-06-
 0480-W-1, 106 M.S.P.R. 234, ¶ 18 (M.S.P.B. June 22,
 2007)). However, the AJ found that Mr. McHugh failed to
 establish how his protected activity of filing an OSC com-
 plaint was a “contributing factor” for the Agency’s person-
 nel action of reprimanding him. Id. at 9.
     We acknowledge that an employee may establish a
 “contributing factor” through the so-called knowledge/time
 test using circumstantial evidence, such as “(A) the official
 taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or pro-
 tected activity; and (B) the personnel action occurred
 within a period of time such that a reasonable person could
 conclude that the disclosure or protected activity was a con-
 tributing factor in the personnel action.”         5 U.S.C.
 § 1221(e)(1)(A)–(B).
     Mr. McHugh disputes the AJ’s finding and insists that
 the AJ did not appear to consider the Agency’s inconsisten-
 cies at the hearing or erred by finding that the Agency offi-
 cials were confused on the dates. We disagree because the
 AJ recognized that
    although testimony of witnesses involved in the de-
    cision to reprimand [Mr. McHugh] was not entirely
    harmonious on the precise dates surrounding recon-
    sideration of the Demotion Notice and the decision
    to reprimand [Mr. McHugh], the witnesses offered
    unrebutted, credible testimony that they had no
    awareness of [his] OSC complaint in October 2020
    and that they mitigated the demotion to a reprimand
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 8                                            MCHUGH   v. DVA

     only after [Mr. McHugh’s] representative alerted
     them to the fact that [Mr. McHugh’s] supervisory
     probationary period had lapsed.
 VA Appx. 9–10. 7 Accordingly, we find that substantial ev-
 idence supports the AJ’s finding that “there was no evi-
 dence that any person involved in the decision to
 reprimand [Mr. McHugh] in October 2020 had any contem-
 poraneous awareness of [his] OSC complaint.” Id. at 9.
 The AJ listened to the Agency witnesses testify, and they
 indicated during either direct or cross examination that
 they lacked contemporaneous awareness of Mr. McHugh’s
 OSC complaint. Id. (collecting witness testimonies); see
 also id. (noting that Mr. Smith, Mr. McHugh’s union rep-
 resentative, did not testify that during his prior represen-
 tation of Mr. McHugh he referenced the OSC complaint to

     7    We observe that there are inconsistencies as to
 dates in the record. Compare VA Appx. 51 (affidavit states
 that “[o]n October 6, 2020, [Mr. McHugh] was issued a no-
 tice of reconsideration, which mitigated the demotion to a
 reprimand with orders for required training[,]” and asks
 affiant “[w]hat were the events that led up to [Mr.
 McHugh] being issued a notice of reconsideration on Octo-
 ber 6, 2020”) with id. at 47 (October 16, 2020 Reprimand,
 noting that “[a]fter reconsideration, a decision has been
 made to mitigate the action and reprimand you” and that
 “[a]long with this reprimand, you will be required to attend
 Sensitivity Training, Conflict Resolution and I-Care Train-
 ing”). However, we conclude that there is substantial evi-
 dence for the AJ’s finding because the AJ considered the
 “minor discrepancies regarding precise dates—each of the
 witnesses readily admitted to lack of certainty on the
 dates—do not detract from the witnesses’ clear testimony
 regarding the sequence of events that led to the Reprimand
 and their lack of awareness of [Mr. McHugh’s] OSC com-
 plaint.” Id. at 10.
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 MCHUGH   v. DVA                                            9

 the Agency). The AJ also considered and found that none
 of the admitted documents suggested otherwise, and noted
 that Mr. McHugh did not offer his witness testimony even
 with the opportunity to do so. We have considered the rec-
 ord and conclude that the AJ reasonably found that “[n]o
 other evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, supports the
 conclusion” that Mr. McHugh’s OSC complaint contributed
 to the Agency’s reprimand decision. Id. at 10. Thus, there
 is substantial evidence for the AJ’s finding that Mr.
 McHugh failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
 evidence that his OSC complaint was a “contributing fac-
 tor” for the Agency’s action to substantiate a prima facie
 case of whistleblower retaliation.
        III. EVIDENTIARY AND WITNESS CREDIBILITY
                     DETERMINATIONS
      Mr. McHugh contends that the AJ should have found
 evidence of the Agency’s contemporaneous knowledge of
 his OSC complaint based on the Agency officials’ affidavits
 or witness testimonies, including testimony of Ms. Carter’s
 supposedly frantic demeanor when recommending the mit-
 igation to Mr. Parsons and Ms. Mohler, as well as the cir-
 cumstances surrounding an OSC complaint filed by
 another Agency employee where that employee’s removal
 was stayed. The Agency responds that Mr. McHugh is re-
 questing the evidence to be reweighed on appeal. “Under
 the substantial evidence standard of review, we do not re-
 weigh evidence on appeal.” Jones v. Dep’t of Health &
 Hum. Servs., 834 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (cleaned
 up).
     Mr. McHugh appears to challenge the credibility of the
 Agency’s witnesses, even insisting that one of them lied un-
 der oath about when she found out about the OSC com-
 plaint. The Agency responds that Mr. McHugh attempts
 to ascribe the Agency’s witnesses as having an “obstruc-
 tionist motive . . . .” Appellee’s Br. 19. “We have held that
 an evaluation of witness credibility is within the discretion
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 10                                            MCHUGH   v. DVA

 of the Board and that, in general, such evaluations are vir-
 tually unreviewable on appeal.” Kahn v. Dep’t of Just., 618
 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). The AJ after
 hearing the witnesses testify concluded that they “offered
 unrebutted, credible testimony . . . .” VA Appx. 10.
     The AJ reasonably found that Mr. McHugh did not
 show a “contributing factor” based on the record evidence
 in light of his arguments, where the circumstantial evi-
 dence indicated that the relevant Agency officials did not
 have contemporaneous knowledge of the OSC complaint.
 VA Appx. 9–10. Because we do not reweigh evidence on
 appeal, we conclude that there is no reversible error here.
      IV. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES FOR DISCOVERY AND
                  EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
      Mr. McHugh insists that the AJ erred by not reopening
 discovery when denying his motion to compel discovery,
 failing to consider facts, and making certain evidentiary
 rulings at the hearing. We disagree. “Procedural matters
 relative to discovery and evidentiary issues fall within the
 sound discretion of the Board and its officials.” Reuter v.
 Dep’t of Commerce, ---F.4th---, 2023 WL 2746297, at *11
 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). We will not disturb the
 Board’s decision unless the “abuse of discretion is clear and
 is harmful.” Id. “If an abuse of discretion did occur with
 respect to the discovery and evidentiary rulings, in order
 for petitioner to prevail on these issues he must prove that
 the error caused substantial harm or prejudice to his rights
 which could have affected the outcome of the case.” Curtin
 v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
     Here, we cannot disturb the Board’s decision because
 Mr. McHugh fails to demonstrate that the AJ engaged in
 clear and harmful abuse of discretion with respect to dis-
 covery and evidentiary rulings, or that an error caused him
 substantial harm or prejudice. For example, the record in-
 dicates that the AJ did not need to reopen discovery or
 grant the motion to compel. Mr. McHugh’s motion to
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 MCHUGH   v. DVA                                           11

 compel discovery was submitted to the Board on March 25,
 2022, which was four days before the Board hearing, after
 discovery already closed, and two weeks after the last date
 for filing such a motion with the Board. Compare Appx.
 21–26 8 (noting Mr. McHugh’s motion to compel’s time
 stamp: “Submission date: 2022-03-25 10:27:42”) with VA
 Appx. 15 (“[A]ny motion to compel was due by March 11,
 2022.” (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1207.73(d)(3))). We conclude that
 the AJ exercised sound discretion in denying Mr. McHugh’s
 motion to compel discovery, when finding it untimely as
 well as deficient. Similarly, we find no reversible error in
 the AJ’s evidentiary rulings at the hearing, including ad-
 missibility of evidence, where Mr. McHugh fails to show
 how he was prejudiced by those rulings.
                   V. RESTORATION OF LEAVE
      Mr. McHugh also argues that the AJ “erred by not al-
 lowing [his] restoration of [annual] leave issue to be heard”
 at the March 29, 2022 hearing. Appellant’s Br., Attach. at
 8. Mr. McHugh alleges that Ms. Mohler made the decision
 not to restore his leave. However, the Agency counters that
 she “could not have done so in reprisal for the OSC com-
 plaint because she made clear at the hearing that she was
 not aware of the OSC complaint until June 2021 at the ear-
 liest[.]” Appellee’s Br. at 26 (citation omitted). Also, the
 record indicates that the September 25, 2020 Agency deci-
 sion to not grant Mr. McHugh administrative leave oc-
 curred before he waived his anonymity to OSC on October
 2, 2020.
     Here, we will not reweigh this evidence because the AJ
 observed Ms. Mohler’s testimony, found it credible, and
 concluded that she “did not become aware of OSC

     8   “Appx.” refers to the corrected appendix, see ECF
 No. 25, that Mr. McHugh filed for his corrected informal
 brief.
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 12                                            MCHUGH   v. DVA

 complaint until at least June 2021 and possibly only in con-
 nection with this Board appeal[.]” VA Appx. 9. We find
 that even if the AJ erred by not considering the restoration
 of Mr. McHugh’s annual leave, this error would be harm-
 less here because substantial evidence supports the AJ’s
 finding that the preponderance of evidence shows Ms.
 Mohler, the relevant Agency official making the decision,
 had no contemporaneous knowledge of the OSC complaint.
 Similarly, this would also hold true for all Agency wit-
 nesses who testified at the hearing to having no contempo-
 raneous knowledge. In other words, the OSC complaint
 could not be a “contributing factor” to Ms. Mohler or any
 other Agency official’s decision not to restore leave. Thus,
 we conclude that any failure by the Board to address the
 Agency’s decision not to restore leave was harmless error
 because “[w]e find no basis in the record on which the
 Board could have found differently had it properly consid-
 ered” the restoration of leave issue. Sistek v. Dep’t of Vet-
 erans Affs., 955 F.3d 948, 958 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 9
                        CONCLUSION
     We have considered Mr. McHugh’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
 sons, the Board’s decision is affirmed.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.

      9   Similarly, although Mr. McHugh appears to argue
 that the AJ erred by failing to consider supposed “deroga-
 tory comments” in Mr. Parsons’s March 2021 affidavit, it
 would not matter here given our deference to the Agency’s
 fact-finding.