Court Opinion

ID: 9743066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:25:00.089648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.012831
License: Public Domain

*289Levin, J.
(dissenting). The constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal case to present a defense1 may not be conditioned on the surrender of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.2
The majority holds that a defendant may be precluded from presenting any evidence relating to the issue of sanity if the trial court finds that he has not cooperated fully in a psychiatric examination conducted by personnel of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry.3 The impermissible effect of this decision is to impose a trade-off of fundamental constitutional rights; a defendant is required to relinquish the right to decline to speak if he wishes to exercise the right to respond with competent and probative evidence to an element of the charged offense.
I
Defendant Larry Hayes was charged with first-degree murder.4 He filed notice of his intent to offer an insanity defense. The circuit judge ordered him committed to the Center for Forensic Psychiatry to determine his competency to stand trial and the extent of his criminal responsibility because of the possibility of mental illness at the time of the offense. The forensic examiner testified at pretrial competency hearings that Hayes refused to cooperate and that, therefore, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Hayes was mentally ill or legally insane at the time of the offense. *290The prosecutor filed a motion seeking to bar the defendant from presenting testimony relating to his alleged insanity.5 The circuit judge granted the motion6 and Hayes was not allowed to "present [his] version of the facts”7 on the issue of his sanity. Several lay witnesses for the people, however, offered testimony concerning Hayes’ behavior and statements that would be probative of his sanity or insanity at the time of the offense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
*291II
The statute provides that a defendant who indicates an intention to assert an insanity defense is required to submit to a psychiatric examination by personnel of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry.8 The statute further provides that the defendant may be barred from presenting testimony relating to his insanity if he fails to cooperate fully in the examination.9
A
The fundamental right to remain silent protects an accused person against "testimonial compulsion” and "enforced communication.”10 In Estelle v Smith, 451 US 454; 101 S Ct 1866; 68 L Ed 2d 359 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment bars the state from using at a sentencing hearing the testimony 11 of a psychiatrist who conducted a court-ordered pretrial examination when the defendant was not informed of his right to remain silent.12 The Court rejected the argument that the examination and the in form a - tion received during the examination were not testimonial. Id., pp 463-465. •
A defendant also has a fundamental right to *292present witnesses to establish a defense.13 It is generally a defense that the defendant is not criminally responsible for his actions because of insanity. The sanity of a defendant is presumed;14 the right to present a defense includes the right to offer competent evidence to rebut that presumption.15 Such evidence need not be in the form of expert testimony; it might include presentation of medical records or lay testimony16 or the defendant’s own testimony. This Court has held that while a defendant who failed to give notice of an alibi defense might be precluded from offering testimony of other persons in support of such a defense, he may not himself be precluded from giving alibi testimony. People v Merritt, 396 Mich 67; 238 NW2d 31 (1976).
The statute bars the defendant from presenting any testimony relating to insanity if he remains silent at the mandatory psychiatric examination. The bar is lifted, however, if the defendant cooperates fully. The threat of an absolute preclusion of the insanity defense may induce some defendants to discuss the details of the offense with the forensic examiner.17 Those who refuse to do so will be *293penalized18 for exercising their constitutional right to remain silent.
The people bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense.19 The people by charging that the defendant committed a criminal offense implicitly assert that he was sane at the time it was committed. The state may not preclude the defendant from exercising his constitutional right to offer evidence on the issue of sanity/insanity because he refused to submit to an examination by a psychiatrist employed by the state.
B
Expert testimony offered on behalf of a defendant probative of his insanity is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. Accordingly, a defendant who gives notice of an insanity defense may be required to submit to a psychiatric examination so that if he calls an expert witness, the people can offer responsive expert testimony without delaying the trial to interview the defendant. If, however, the defendant decides, after submit*294ting to an examination by a psychiatrist employed by the state, not to call an expert witness, the people may not offer the testimony of the state psychiatrist since the reason for the pretrial psychiatric examination — facilitating the trial — is no longer operative.20
In Estelle v Smith, supra, the United States Supreme Court, while holding that the Fifth Amendment protects against use of statements made during a compelled psychiatric examination, indicated that required "sanity examinations” may be permissible where the defendant seeks to introduce his own "supporting psychiatric testimony.”21 Both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure22 and the recently adopted American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice23 provide that failure to cooperate during a court-ordered psychiatric examination permits the court to exclude testimony by expert witnesses offered by the defendant. The ABA standards expressly provide that *295the court should not exclude other proof of the defendant’s mental condition.24
If the consequence of failing to cooperate with a forensic examiner is limited to the preclusion of expert testimony offered by the defense, the constitutional rights to present a defense and remain silent are not necessarily infringed.25 A defendant might choose to remain silent during a compelled psychiatric examination and yet be permitted to offer competent evidence, other than expert testimony, probative of insanity.
Ill
MCL 768.20a(4); MSA 28.1043(1)(4) is unconstitutional to the extent that it precludes a defendant from offering any evidence probative of insanity unless he submits to a court-ordered psychiatric examination.
Because the defendant was barred from presenting any evidence probative of insanity, his conviction should be reversed and the cause should be remanded for a new trial.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin,

 Const 1963, art 1, §§ 13, 20; US Const, Am VI, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment; Washington v Texas, 388 US 14; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1967).

 Const 1963, art 1, § 17; US Const, Am V, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment; Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964).

 MCL 768.20a(4); MSA 28.1043(1)(4).

 MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548.

 At the time of trial the statute provided:
"The defendant shall fully cooperate in his examination by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry and by any other independent examiners for the defense and prosecution. If he fails to cooperate, and that failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant shall be barred from presenting testimony relating to his insanity at the trial of the case.” MCL 768.20a(4); MSA 28.1043(1)(4).
The statute was amended by 1983 PA 42 to provide:
"The defendant shall fully cooperate in his or her examination by personnel of the center for forensic psychiatry or by other qualified personnel, and by any other independent examiners for the defense and prosecution. If he or she fails to cooperate, and that failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a hearing prior to trial, the defendant shall be barred from presenting testimony relating to his or her insanity at the trial of the case.” (Changes emphasized.)

 The order prohibited the defendant from "offering any evidence as to the defense of insanity in any trial held in this matter.” The defendant testified at trial. Consistent with the order, he offered no testimony concerning his sanity or insanity. Nevertheless, the jury was instructed on insanity because the circuit judge felt that the issue had been raised implicitly by the defendant’s mannerisms and actions at trial.
The jury instruction on insanity did not negate the defendant’s claim that his right to present a defense had been denied. Psychiatric diagnoses based only on the observation of mannerisms, facial expressions, speech patterns, and the like may differ from those based on the verbal content of communications. See Estelle v Smith, 451 US 454, 464, fn 8; 101 S Ct 1866; 68 L Ed 2d 359 (1981). If professional diagnoses may vary depending on such factors, so too may a jury’s finding on the defendant’s sanity under the reasonable doubt standard.

 Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 19; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1967).

 MCL 768.20a(2); MSA 28.1043(1)(2).

 MCL 768.20a(4); MSA 28.1043(1)(4). See fn 5.

 Schmerber v California, 384 US 757, 765; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966).

 The testimony was used to establish the defendant’s "future dangerousness,” proof of which was required under the Texas statute as a predicate for imposition of the death penalty.

 In the instant case, there is no indication in the record that the defendant was informed of his right to remain silent before the psychiatric examination. It appears, rather, the defendant was informed that failure to cooperate would preclude him from raising an insanity defense.

 Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 19; 87 S Ct 1920; 18 L Ed 2d 1019 (1967).

 People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 463; 331 NW2d 152 (1982).

 Once evidence of insanity is introduced, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing defendant’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 463-464; 331 NW2d 152 (1982). The Court declares that since this burden is particularly difficult in the context of the insanity defense and since the defendant’s cooperation is essential to psychiatric evaluation, preclusion of testimony "is not too harsh a sanction.” Ante, p 281. The prosecution’s need for evidence cannot, however, justify the outright denial of a fundamental constitutional right. Further, the rationale based on the necessity of the defendant’s cooperation for reliable psychiatric evaluation applies only where the defendant seeks to introduce expert psychiatric testimony and the prosecution seeks to offer responsive expert testimony. See part B.

 See Blaisdell v Commonwealth, 372 Mass 753, 763-766; 364 NE2d 191 (1977).

 See Lefelt, Pretrial mental examinations: Compelled cooperation *293and the Fifth Amendment, 10 Am Crim L R 431, 463 (1972).
The inducement cannot be excused on the basis that statements made to the examiner are admissible under MCL 768.20a(5); MSA 28.1043(1)(5) only to show sanity or insanity. Any use of an involuntary confession in a criminal trial is violative of the Due Process Clause, Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 398; 98 S Ct 2408; 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978), and cannot constitute harmless error, Malinski v New York, 324 US 401, 404; 65 S Ct 781; 89 L Ed 2d 1029 (1945).

 See Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1, 8; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964); Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511, 515; 87 S Ct 625; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967). The denial of a constitutional right — such as the right to present a defense — itself constitutes a penalty. Preclusion of competent evidence of insanity, moreover, effectively eliminates the possibility of responding to the presumption of sanity and thus increases the likelihood of conviction and imprisonment regardless of the actual mental culpability of the defendant. See Note, The preclusion sanction — A violation of the constitutional right to present a defense, 81 Yale L J 1342, 1361 (1972).

 In re Winship, 397 US 358; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970).

 See Battie v Estelle, 655 F2d 692, 702 (CA 5, 1981) (submission to a psychiatric examination does not constitute waiver of Fifth Amendment privilege unless defendant introduces testimony of a mental health expert); People v Brown, 399 Mich 350, 365; 249 NW2d 693 (1976) (Levin, J., dissenting).

 "When a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof.. . .” Estelle v Smith, 451 US 454, 465; 101 S Ct 1866; 68 L Ed 2d 359 (1981).

 FR Crim P 12(d).

 "If the court determines that an adequate evaluation of defendant’s mental condition at the time of the alleged crime has been precluded because defendant has refused to cooperate with the mental health or mental retardation professional, and that the refusal was not a result of defendant’s mental illness or mental retardation, the court, in its discretion, may exclude the introduction at trial of testimony by a mental health or mental retardation professional offered by defendant concerning defendant’s mental condition at the time of the alleged crime. Other proof of defendant’s mental condition at the time of the alleged crime may be offered by defendant and, if otherwise competent, such evidence should be admissible.”
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 7-3.4(c) (2d ed, 1980) (adopted August 7, 1984).

 Id

 The view has been expressed that even the preclusion of expert testimony offered by the defense is an improper sanction for failure to cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist. Lefelt, Pretrial mental examinations: Compelled cooperation and the Fifth Amendment, 10 Am Crim L R 431 (1972); Note, Requiring a criminal defendant to submit to a government psychiatric examination: An invasion of the privilege against self-incrimination, 83 Harv L R 648 (1970).