Court Opinion

ID: 9942613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:01:24.826372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.654101
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10386    Document: 62-1     Date Filed: 02/21/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10386
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       MARQUISE THOMAS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00122-TPB-NPM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10386

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Marquise Thomas was indicted by a grand jury for pos-
       sessing and accessing with intent to view prepubescent child por-
       nography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Thomas
       waived his right to a jury trial and the case proceeded to a bench
       trial. The district court found Thomas guilty, and he was subse-
       quently sentenced to 78 months in prison, followed by a life term
       of supervised release. A restitution hearing followed, at which the
       district court granted five victims $3,000 each.
               This appeal requires resolving two questions: (1) whether at
       the sentencing hearing, the district court failed to pronounce the
       “standard” conditions included in its written judgment; and
       (2) whether the restitution order ran afoul of the Supreme Court’s
       holding in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). After review-
       ing the record and weighing the parties’ arguments, we find that
       the district court neither erred at the sentencing hearing, nor erred
       in its restitution order, and affirm as to both.
                                  I. Background
             In November 2018, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
       undercover agents investigated the sharing of child pornography
       on a publicly available online peer-to-peer file sharing program.
       The agents determined that a computer at Thomas’s home address
       was sharing child pornography through this program. The agents
       connected directly to Thomas’s computer and downloaded files
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       23-10386               Opinion of the Court                          3

       depicting a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct. In January
       2019, the FBI executed a search warrant on Thomas’s home and
       seized three laptops and a cellphone. The investigation revealed
       that between September 2017 and January 2019, Thomas know-
       ingly possessed, or accessed with intent to view, child pornogra-
       phy. On January 20, 2023, following a bench trial, the district court
       convicted Thomas of one count of possession with intent to access
       or view prepubescent child pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
       § 2252(a)(4)(B).
               At sentencing, it was confirmed that a total of 116 pictures
       and 35 videos were recovered from Thomas’s various devices. The
       district court described the pictures and videos as “[w]orse than
       child pornography . . . what we have here is . . . actually videos and
       pictures of children being tortured.” Following a review of the
       presentence report, the district court concluded that Thomas’s ad-
       visory sentencing range was 97 to 121 months in prison, five years
       to life of supervised release, restitution to be determined, as well as
       several additional fines and monetary assessments. The govern-
       ment recommended a sentence of 97 months and the following:
       registration as a sex offender, mental health treatment, prohibited
       contact with minors, and prohibited access and use of the internet
       without permission from the probation office.
             In sentencing Thomas, the district court relied on written
       submissions including Thomas’s sentencing memorandum, victim
       impact statements, and the advisory sentencing guidelines. Prior
       to announcing his sentence, the district court declared that
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                       23-10386

       Thomas’s supervised release would require complying with the
       Middle District of Florida’s mandatory and standard conditions, as
       well as several special conditions.1 The district court then sen-
       tenced Thomas to 78 months in prison, followed by a life term of
       supervised release. Thomas timely appealed his sentence.
                                 II. Standard of Review
              When a defendant fails to object to the conditions of his su-
       pervised release at sentencing, we will review his argument for
       plain error. See United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir.
       2003). But if the defendant had no opportunity to object, we re-
       view de novo. United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1241, 1246
       n.5 (11th Cir. 2023).
              The legality of restitution orders, on the other hand, is re-
       viewed de novo, with underlying facts reviewed for clear error.
       United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2006).

       1 The special conditions include: participation in a mental health treatment

       program; participation in a sex offender mental health program; submission
       to polygraph testing for treatment and monitoring purposes; registration as a
       sex offender in any state of residence and employment; prohibited direct con-
       tact with minors under the age of 18 without written approval of a probation
       officer; prohibition from possessing, subscribing to, or viewing any image, vid-
       eos, magazines, literature, or other materials depicting children in the nude
       and/or in sexually explicit positions; prohibition of possessing or using elec-
       tronic devices capable of connecting to the internet without prior approval of
       the probation office; and prohibition of possession of any form of electronic
       data storage media.
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       23-10386              Opinion of the Court                        5

                                 III. Discussion
              Our discussion is divided in two parts. First, we address the
       alleged discrepancy between the district court’s oral pronounce-
       ment and its written judgment. Then, we review the district
       court’s restitution order.
                                       A.
              On appeal, Thomas argues that the district court errone-
       ously failed to pronounce the thirteen “standard” conditions of his
       supervised release. He asserts that we should order a limited re-
       mand so that the district court may strike these conditions from the
       judgment.
               In Rodriguez, the defendant challenged a sentence that simi-
       larly included the imposition of thirteen discretionary conditions
       that were not pronounced at the sentencing hearing. 75 F.4th at
       1240. Drawing on due process principles, we explained that:
             A defendant has a constitutional right to be present
             and represented by counsel when the district court
             pronounces his sentence. The right to be present at
             sentencing derives from the Fifth Amendment’s Due
             Process Clause. To satisfy due process, the district
             court must pronounce the sentence, giving the de-
             fendant notice of the sentence and an opportunity to
             object.
       75 F.4th at 1247 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In do-
       ing so, we followed the Fifth and Seventh Circuits in holding that
       a district court does not have to pronounce mandatory conditions
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10386

       but must pronounce discretionary conditions. Id. at 1247–49; see
       also United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 2020) (en
       banc); United States v. Anstice, 930 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2019).
       However, we also carved out an exception: district courts are “not
       required to individually pronounce each discretionary condition of
       supervised release if at sentencing the court expressly incorporates
       a written list detailing those conditions.” Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at
       1249.
                The case before us here falls squarely within this exception.
       In Rodriguez, the district court neither referenced nor indicated that
       it would adopt conditions beyond those mandated by statute. Id.
       With Thomas however, the district court pronounced that he
       would have to comply with the Middle District of Florida’s manda-
       tory and standard conditions. These conditions are part of the dis-
       trict’s judgment form which is available to the public on the court’s
       website. See Middle District of Florida Criminal Judgment Form
       AO 245B. Additionally, while not verbatim, the thirteen conditions
       Thomas challenges mirror the conditions outlined in U.S.S.G.
       § 5D1.3(c).
              Because the district court pronounced the inclusion of man-
       datory and standard conditions, we review for plain error. Under
       plain error review, Thomas is required to show: (1) the district
       court erred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his
       substantial rights. See United States v. Wiley, 78 F.4th 1355, 1361
       (11th Cir. 2023). We will not reverse under plain error “unless the
       error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
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       23-10386               Opinion of the Court                         7

       of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and
       alterations adopted). With the first prong of plain error review, an
       error will be found where there is a deviation from a legal rule.
       United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Considering our
       analysis above, we find no error. The district court pronounced, as
       required, the inclusion of standard conditions. Seeing as the first
       prong is not met, we need not continue with the remaining prongs.
       We thus affirm as to this issue.
                                        B.
              We now turn to a review of the restitution order. Thomas
       argues that the district court’s imposition of a mandatory mini-
       mum without findings from a factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt
       violates his constitutional rights under Alleyne v. United States, 570
       U.S. 99 (2013). We disagree.
             In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that:
             Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime
             is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury
             and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Mandatory
             minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime.
             It follows, then, that any fact that increases the man-
             datory minimum is an “element” that must be sub-
             mitted to the jury.
       570 U.S. at 103 (internal citation omitted). Alleyne extended a prin-
       ciple established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, where the Court held
       that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
       scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        23-10386

       proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Fol-
       lowing Apprendi, our circuit was asked to resolve whether its hold-
       ing applied to restitution—we held that it does not. See Dohrmann
       v. United States, 442 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). 2 Because Al-
       leyne is an extension of Apprendi, it follows that Alleyne, too, would
       not apply to restitution orders.
              Further, restitution in child pornography cases is manda-
       tory. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(4)(A). The defendant must pay the
       “full amount of the victim’s losses,” accounting for the defendant’s
       causal role. Id. § 2259(b)(2)(A). The statutory minimum amount
       of restitution, however, is $3,000. Id. As the government appro-
       priately notes, the facts that would trigger § 2259(a) and (b)’s ap-
       plicability are the same facts necessary for a defendant to be found
       guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
              A district court should order a restitution amount that “com-
       ports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process that
       underlies the victim’s general losses.” Paroline v. United States, 572
       U.S. 434, 458 (2014). While “[t]he government bears the burden of
       proving the restitution amount by a preponderance of the

       2 In Dohrmann v. United States, we drew from numerous sister circuits in sup-

       port of our conclusion that Apprendi is inapplicable to restitution orders. 442
       F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006) (listing several sister circuit cases, including
       United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 159 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that Apprendi
       applies only to criminal penalties that increase a defendant’s sentence “beyond
       the prescribed statutory maximum”), and United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d
       1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that restitution orders are a civil penalty
       which makes Apprendi inapplicable because it is a rule of criminal procedure)).
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       23-10386               Opinion of the Court                         9

       evidence . . . a district court may accept a reasonable estimate of
       the loss.” United States v. Rothenberg, 923 F.3d 1309, 1337 (11th Cir.
       2019) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The district
       court has broad discretion to award restitution that is reasonable
       under the circumstances. Id. at 1334.
              Here, the government received various restitution requests
       from attorneys representing the identified victims. At the sentenc-
       ing hearing held on January 20, 2023, the district court considered
       these requests, in addition to the victim impact statements, and de-
       termined that restitution would be determined within 90 days. On
       April 14, 2023, the district court held a restitution hearing. Follow-
       ing the hearing, the district court issued an order, as mandated by
       § 2259(b)(2)(B), requiring that Thomas pay $15,000 in restitution—
       $3,000 to each of the five identified victims.
              We find no error in the district court’s order, and thus affirm
       with respect to this issue as well.
             AFFIRMED.