Court Opinion

ID: 9373014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:09.351649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.034921
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JULIA HAMILTON JONES,                           DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-20-0570-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,                      DATE: January 25. 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Julia Hamilton Jones, Spartanburg, South Carolina, pro se.

           Gretchen M. McMullen, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal for medical inability to perform and excessive absenteeism.
     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Atlanta Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        At all times relevant to this appeal, beginning on October 6, 2016, the
     appellant served as a GS-7 Food Inspector - Slaughter. Jones v. Department of
     Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-20-0570-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 3 at 17-20, 77. Shortly thereafter, the appellant elected to file an Office of
     Workers’ Compensation Programs claim pursuant to which she was awarded wage
     replacement and health care benefits, and thus she was consistently absent from
     work beginning in March 2017. IAF, Tab 7 at 40-44, Tab 17 at 29. On October
     24, 2018, the appellant’s doctor submitted a Department of Labor Work Capacity
     Evaluation, certifying that she was permanently disabled due to her cervical spine
     condition, and stating that she was unable to work any hours at all in her current
     job or in any other job. IAF, Tab 24 at 152. Therefore, on October 7, 2019, the
     Acting Branch Chief, Labor and Employee Relations Division, issued a letter of
     decision removing the appellant based on two charges of medical inability to
     perform and excessive absenteeism, effective the date of receipt. IAF, Tab 3 at
     17-20.
¶3        The appellant amended an existing equal employment opportunity (EEO)
     complaint alleging that her removal was due to disability discrimination (failure
     to reasonably accommodate) and in retaliation for prior EEO activity beginning in
     2016. IAF, Tab 30 at 85-87. After the agency issued a final agency decision
     finding no support for either of her claims, the appellant timely filed her Board
     appeal. IAF, Tab 23 at 17-34; IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge issued an
     initial decision affirming the appellant’s removal, sustaining the agency’s charges
     and rejecting the appellant’s affirmative defenses, including her defenses of
     disability discrimination and retaliation based on prior EEO activ ity and filing a
                                                                                              3

     previous Board appeal in 2016. 2        Jones v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB
     Docket No. AT-0752-20-0570-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 16, Initial Decision (I-2 ID)
     at 7-12.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review, challenging, in part, the
     administrative judge’s finding that she was not subject ed to unlawful retaliation. 3
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 13-14. The agency has responded in
     opposition to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶5         We agree with the administrative judge’s findings sustaining the agency’s
     charges, especially in light of the fact that the appel lant’s medical provider
     certified that she was permanently disabled and unable to work any job as of
     October 24, 2018, and she had been continuously absent from duty for
     2
       The administrative judge also rejected the appellant’s claim that the agency retaliated
     against her for filing a disability retirement application with the Office of Personnel
     Management. Jones v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. AT-0752-20-
     0570-I-2, Appeal File, Tab 16, Initial Decision at 12. To the extent that the appellant
     disputes this finding on review, she has cited to no legal authority that stands for the
     proposition that filing a disability retirement application constitutes protected activity
     under EEO statutes, and we are unaware of any such authority.
     3
       With her petition for review, the appellant has submitted a brief statement from a
     physician dated August 10, 2021, indicating that she is clear to work but cannot lift
     over 10 pounds. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 34. To the extent the appellant
     suggests that this statement establishes that she is recovered and thus the agency action
     must fail, the Board has held that when an appellant recovers from the medical
     condition that resulted in her removal before the administrative judge has issued an
     initial decision in her removal appeal, the removal action does not promote the
     efficiency of the service. See Morgan v U.S. Postal Service, 48 M.S.P.R. 607, 613
     (1991) (“Thus, when it is apparent that the appellant’s inability to perform is temporary
     in nature and, in fact, that the appellant has recovered even before the Board can render
     an initial decision in an appeal, the Board correctly and properly refuses to hold that the
     agency’s removal action is for the efficiency of the service.”) . Here, the agency
     removed the appellant in 2019 and the administrative judge issued the initial decision in
     July 2021. Thus, the appellant’s new medical evidence is from after the initial decision
     and is not material. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980)
     (finding that the Board generally will not grant a petition for review based on new
     evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different
     from that of the initial decision).
                                                                                            4

     approximately 2½ years. I-2 ID at 7-9. Nevertheless, we must remand this matter
     to the regional office for further adjudication because the appellant was not
     provided with proper notice regarding her claim of whistleblower reprisal.
¶6         The appellant asserted that the agency removed her in retaliation for filing a
     Board appeal in 2016 challenging her probationary termination. 4 PFR File, Tab 1
     at 13-14; IAF, Tab 1 at 6; I-2 ID at 12. In the initial decision, the administrative
     judge rejected the appellant’s retaliation claims because she failed to present
     evidence that any agency official acted with actual animus or that any other
     employee with similar medical absences, but with no prior complaints, was
     treated differently or more favorably, and the agency’s evidence powerfully
     rebutted her argument that her removal was illegitimate and retaliatory. I-2 ID
     at 12. However, in her prior Board appeal, Jones v. Department of Agriculture,
     MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-16-0475-I-1, IAF, Tab 12 at 54, the appellant alleged
     whistleblower reprisal. Accordingly, a basis of the appellant’s retaliation claim
     here, i.e., the 2016 Board appeal, is ostensibly covered by 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), which refers to retaliation for the exercise of any appeal,
     complaint, or grievance right with regard to remedying a claim of whi stleblower
     reprisal.   Thus, this affirmative defense should have been analyzed under the
     whistleblower protection framework set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). Alarid v.
     Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015).
¶7         Under some circumstances, the Board might be able to adjudicate a
     whistleblower claim such as this without remand. Here, however, because the
     administrative judge never informed the appellant of her burden and elements of

     4
       The appellant previously worked as GS-5 Food Inspector in a different plant. She was
     terminated from that position for misconduct, ostensibly during probation, effective
     September 15, 2016. It was determined during adjudication of the appellant’s appeal
     that she had, in fact, completed her probationary period, prompting the parties to settle
     the appeal which was dismissed on that basis. Jones v. Department of Agriculture,
     MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-16-0475-I-1 (Initial Decision, Dec. 9, 2016). As a result,
     the appellant was reassigned to the position in which she served at the time of the
     action under review.
                                                                                            5

     proof for establishing a claim of whistleblower reprisal, we must remand the
     appeal so that the appellant might receive such notice. Guzman v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 114 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 18 (2010); see Burgess v. Merit Systems
     Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that the
     appellant must receive explicit information on what is required to establish an
     appealable jurisdictional issue).
¶8         Additionally, at the time the initial decision was issued, the administrative
     judge did not have the benefit of the Board’s decision in Pridgen v. Office of
     Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 44-46, which holds that requesting a
     reasonable accommodation and complaining of disability discrimination are
     activities protected by the American with Disabilities Act Amendment Act
     (ADAAA), 5 not Title VII, and thus, the more stringent “but-for” standard applies.
     Accordingly, on remand the administrative judge should apply Pridgen and
     determine whether the appellant established that her prior EEO activity, i.e., her
     complaints    of    disability   discrimination     and    requests     for   reasonable
     accommodation, was the “but-for” cause of her removal. 6              The administrative
     judge should then issue a new initial decision that identifies all material issues of
     fact and law, summarizes the evidence, resolves issues of credibility, and includes
     his conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which
     that reasoning rests. Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R.
     587, 589 (1980).

     5
       The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in connection w ith an
     otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of section 501 of the
     Rehabilitation Act. Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35. The standards under the Americans
     with Disabilities Act, as amended by the ADAAA, have been incorporated by reference
     into the Rehabilitation Act and the Board applies them to determine whether there has
     been a Rehabilitation Act violation. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 791(f).
     6
       Regarding the appellant’s failure to reasonably accommodate claim, the administrative
     judge should also consider whether the appellant is a qualified individual with a
     disability under the ADAAA, and whether the agency was obligated to reasonably
     accommodate her. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); Haas v. Department
     of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 29.
                                                                                      6

                                         ORDER
¶9        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

     FOR THE BOARD:                               /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
     Washington, D.C.