Court Opinion

ID: 9956567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 15:20:26.833783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:36.400545
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Chaney, Callins and White
              Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

              INTEGRATED COMPOSITE
               CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS, LLC, d/b/a
               COR-TUF UHPC
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1423-22-4                                   JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                                   APRIL 2, 2024
              PREMIER UHPC, LLC

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
                                         Donald M. Haddock, Judge Designate

                              Todd Lee Juneau (Juneau & Mitchell, on brief), for appellant.

                              No brief or argument for appellee.

                     This case involves a dispute over the non-delivery of ultra high performance concrete

              (UHPC or “concrete”) purchased from Integrated Composite Construction Systems, LLC, a

              UHPC supplier, by Premier, Integrated Composite’s distributor. Integrated Composite appeals

              the trial court’s decision awarding Premier unjust enrichment damages, arguing that the court (i)

              erred because recovery was precluded under an unjust enrichment theory; (ii) erred in denying its

              two motions for summary judgment; (iii) erred in denying its motion to strike; and (iv) erred in

              permitting the admission of two invoices into evidence. Finding that arguments (i), (ii), and (iii)

              are all defaulted, and argument (iv) is without merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                          BACKGROUND

       Integrated Composite (also “Cor-Tuf”) is a manufacturer of UHPC. In May 2019,

Premier signed an agreement to distribute UHPC for Integrated Composite. After signing the

agreement, Premier purchased 50 units1 of UHPC. The first 25-unit purchase for $33,125 was

memorialized in a May 31, 2019 invoice. The second 25-unit purchase for $31,2502 was

memorialized in an August 9, 2019 invoice. Premier’s relationship with Integrated Composite

ended in October 2020, when Integrated Composite terminated their distribution agreement.

       Premier filed a complaint against Integrated Composite. The complaint included two

counts: the first count, for breach of contract; the second count, pled in the alternative, for unjust

enrichment. Premier alleged that Integrated Composite never delivered the 50 units of UHPC for

which Premier paid. The complaint also alleged that in May 2020, a year after Premier placed its

first order, Premier agreed to “donate” ten cubic yards of UHPC “for testing purposes.”

Accordingly, although Premier alleged that it had paid $66,375 for the 50 units of UHPC, it

credited to Integrated Composite $12,000 for the material used in the tests, leaving a total of

$54,375 “due back” to Premier.

       Integrated Composite filed both a motion craving oyer and a demurrer to Premier’s

complaint. The trial court overruled Integrate Composite’s demurrer and denied its motion

craving oyer. Several months later, Integrated Composite filed its first motion for summary

judgment, followed shortly thereafter by a second motion for summary judgment. Integrated

Composite’s second motion for summary judgment argued that “[t]here was no oral contract

between the parties, and unjust enrichment is not available as a cause of action to [Premier] due

to obligations in the prior terminated written agreement.” Integrated Composite claimed that

       1
           One “unit” of concrete is equivalent to one yard of the same.
       2
           Tax was exempted for the second, August, purchase of UHPC.
                                              -2-
certain provisions in the distribution agreement controlled the dispute, including the agreement’s

“Entire Agreement,” “Arbitration,” and “Limited Liability” provisions. Integrated Composite

also argued that the agreement’s provision 10(f)(iv) was a “No Damages for Termination or

Expiration” clause, stating that “Neither Company, nor Premier shall be liable to the other for

damages of any kind . . . on account of termination . . . of this agreement.”

       In an order dated February 17, 2022, the trial court denied Integrated Composite’s two

motions for summary judgment. The order noted that “both parties appeared via WebEx” and

that the court had considered “the memoranda and arguments of counsel.” A transcript of the

teleconference hearing was not included in the record for appellate review.

       At trial, Premier called its manager, Kyle Meyer, to testify. During Meyer’s testimony,

Integrated Composite objected to the admission of the two invoices, arguing that they were

“hearsay and parol evidence.” The trial court overruled Integrated Composite’s objections.

Meyer then testified, without objection, as to the content of both invoices.

       At the conclusion of Premier’s evidence, Integrated Composite moved to strike. It

argued that Premier was “trying to prove the existence of a separate verbal contract, when there

is already a written distribution contract that they have admitted to, that was terminated.”

Integrated Composite further argued that the parol evidence rule barred admission of the

invoices.3 The trial court denied the motion and Integrated Composite put on its evidence.

Integrated Composite did not renew its motion to strike.

       3
          In its written motion to strike, Integrated Composite argued that Premier’s evidence did
“not support[] their claim of a verbal contract (Count 1) or unjust enrichment (Count 2).” The
written motion advanced two main arguments: that “[t]here was no oral contract between the
parties, and [that] unjust enrichment is not available as a cause of action . . . due to the parol
evidence rule and to obligations in the prior terminated written agreement.”
                                                  -3-
       The trial court concluded that Integrated Composite had been unjustly enriched and

awarded to Premier judgment in the amount of $23,750. The court entered an order on August

22, 2022, affirming its ruling. Integrated Composite did not object to the order.

       Integrated Composite timely moved to set aside the trial court’s verdict. Among other

things, Integrated Composite argued that under Virginia law, “the existence of an express

contract covering the same subject matter of the parties’ dispute precludes a claim for unjust

enrichment,” and cited in support Davis Construction Corp. v. FTJ, Inc., 298 Va. 582 (2020).

On November 22, 2022, the trial court entered an order concluding that it had “lost Jurisdiction

[sic] and cannot grant [Integrated Composite’s] motion to set aside the verdict.” Integrated

Composite appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

   I. Integrated Composite’s Arguments Regarding Unjust Enrichment, its Motions for Summary
      Judgment, and its Motion to Strike are Procedurally Defaulted.

           A. Unjust Enrichment

       Integrated Composite argues that the trial court erred in “finding that a court considering

a breach of an implied contract claim may grant unjust enrichment damages where there is an

express written agreement between the parties.” Undergirding this argument is the well-

established principle that “[t]he existence of an express contract covering the same subject matter

of the parties’ dispute precludes a claim for unjust enrichment.” Davis Constr. Corp., 298 Va. at

592 (alteration in original) (quoting CGI Fed. Inc. v. FCi Fed., Inc., 295 Va. 506, 519 (2018)).4

But Integrated Composite failed to preserve its unjust enrichment argument for appellate review.

       4
         At oral argument, Integrated Composite’s counsel conceded that he did not have an
opportunity to “bring up the Davis case” in argument before the trial court and admitted that it is
“questionable” as to whether this argument was preserved for appellate review.
                                               -4-
       Rule 5A:18 provides that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis

for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,

except for good cause shown or to enable this Court to attain the ends of justice.” But not just

any objection will suffice. To preserve an issue for appeal, the objection must be “promptly

brought to the attention of the trial court with sufficient specificity that the alleged error can be

dealt with and timely addressed and corrected when necessary.” Yazdani v. Sazegar, 76

Va. App. 261, 276 (2022) (quoting Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 203, 218 (2004)

(en banc)). The contemporaneous objection requirement is not procedural superfluity. Rather, it

serves the laudatory ends of fair play and judicial economy, “to protect the trial court from

appeals based upon undisclosed grounds, to prevent the setting of traps on appeal, to enable the

trial judge to rule intelligently, and to avoid unnecessary reversals and mistrials.” Palmer v. Atl.

Coast Pipeline, LLC, 293 Va. 573, 579 (2017) (quoting Reid v. Boyle, 259 Va. 356, 372 (2000))

(analyzing Rule 5:25).

       At trial, Integrated Composite failed to assert with either precision or specificity the

argument it makes now on appeal—that the existence of an express agreement covering the same

subject matter addressed in a dispute precludes a claim for unjust enrichment. In its closing,

Integrated Composite simply argued that “there [wa]s no unjust enrichment”; that the distribution

agreement “encompasse[d]” the alleged verbal contract, and as such, should control the dispute;

and that “there was no separate contact.”5 Further, Integrated Composite did not mention unjust

enrichment in its motion to strike, arguing instead that, under the parol evidence rule, extrinsic

       5
           Neither did Integrated Composite raise this more precise argument in its second motion
for summary judgment. Instead, it argued that “unjust enrichment is not available as a cause of
action . . . due to obligations in the prior terminated written agreement.”
                                                   -5-
evidence “cannot [be] use[d] . . . to explain, modify an existing complete, unambiguous written

agreement.”6

        The unjust enrichment argument Integrated Composite makes on appeal appears to be

modeled on an argument made in its motion to set aside the trial court’s verdict. There,

Integrated Composite argued that, under the circumstances of this case, unjust enrichment was

precluded by law. Integrated Composite tied its argument to Davis, just as it does on appeal.

However, Integrated Composite failed to obtain a ruling on its motion to set aside the verdict

before the trial court lost jurisdiction of the case. Neither did it move the court to suspend the

final judgment pending a ruling on its motion. “Because [Integrated Composite] did not obtain a

ruling from the trial court on [its] [post-]trial motion, ‘there is no ruling for [this Court] to

review’ on appeal, and [its] argument is waived under Rule 5A:18.” Williams v. Commonwealth,

57 Va. App. 341, 347 (2010) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 16

Va. App. 447, 454 (1993)).

        Integrated Composite supplies various record references to establish its preserved

argument. These references crisscross the record but fail to pinpoint precisely where it preserved

its unjust enrichment argument. Four such references are included in Integrated Composite’s

opening brief. The first references the trial court’s determination that Integrated Composite had

“been unjustly enriched.” The second encompasses “Trial Exhibit 001,” the distribution

agreement between Integrated Composite and Premier. The third points to Meyer’s testimony of

the date that Premier entered into the distribution agreement with Integrated Composite. The

fourth leads to the testimony of Brett Meinheimer, Premier’s founder, acknowledging that the

distribution agreement required that Premier maintain an inventory of 100 yards of UHPC.

        6
          In its written motion to strike, Integrated Composite claimed that “unjust enrichment is
not available as a cause of action to [Premier] due to the parol evidence rule and to obligations in
the prior terminated written agreement.”
                                                  -6-
        In sum, Integrated Composite failed to state its objection with reasonable certainty at the

time of the ruling, and “[w]e will not search the record for errors in order to interpret the

appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14

Va. App. 53, 56 (1992); see also Rule 5A:20(c) (providing that “[a]n exact reference to the

page(s) of the record or appendix where the alleged error has been preserved in the trial court . . .

must be included with each assignment of error”). Moreover, Integrated Composite does not

invoke the good-cause or ends-of-justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. See Hogle v.

Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 743, 756 (2022) (“[T]he Court will not apply the [Rule 5A:18]

exceptions sua sponte.”). Accordingly, we hold that Rule 5A:18 bars consideration of Integrated

Composite’s argument regarding unjust enrichment.7

            B. Motions for Summary Judgment

        Integrated Composite next argues that the trial court erred in denying its two motions for

summary judgment. Yet, Integrated Composite did not include a transcript of the hearing for the

motions when such transcript is necessary for the resolution of the issues Integrated Composite

raises on appeal. Accordingly, Integrated Composite’s arguments as to its two motions for

summary judgment are defaulted pursuant to Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii).

        As a general matter, the absence of a transcript “does nothing to diminish our

jurisdiction.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99 (1986). “If the record on appeal is

sufficient in the absence of the transcript to determine the merits of the appellant’s allegations,

we are free to proceed to hear the case.” Id. But, “[i]f . . . the transcript [or statement of facts] is

indispensable to the determination of the case, then the requirements for making the transcript

        7
         Our colleague’s concurrence expends considerable analytical energy explaining why
Integrated Composite’s argument was preserved for appellate review. However, that such
analytical effort is required to pull a preserved argument out of Integrated Composite’s
assignment of error militates against the conclusion that it was preserved.
                                                  -7-
[or statement of facts] a part of the record on appeal must be strictly adhered to.” Bay v.

Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 528 (2012) (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)

(quoting Turner, 2 Va. App. at 99). Consequently, “[w]hen the appellant fails to ensure that the

record contains transcripts or a written statement of facts necessary to permit resolution of

appellate issues, any assignments of error affected by such omission will not be considered.”

Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii). “This Court has no authority to make exceptions to the filing requirements

set out in the Rules.” Shiembob v. Shiembob, 55 Va. App. 234, 246 (2009) (quoting Turner, 2

Va. App. at 99); see also Bay, 60 Va. App. at 528-29. “Whether the record is sufficiently

complete to permit our review on appeal is a question of law subject to our de novo review.”

Bay, 60 Va. App. at 529.

       Integrated Composite assigns error to the trial court’s decision to deny summary

judgment. Hence, in denying Integrated Composite’s motions, the trial court must have

determined that, as a matter of law, Integrated Composite’s evidence was insufficient to warrant

judgment. See Piland Corp. v. League Constr. Co., 238 Va. 187, 189 (1989) (“Upon considering

a motion for summary judgment, the court must rule, as a matter of law, on the sufficiency of the

evidence; it does not weigh the evidence as a finder of fact.”). As an antecedent matter, the trial

court would have also reviewed its own orders and the parties’ pleadings as well as any

concessions made in oral argument to determine whether there were any material facts in

genuine dispute. See Rule 3:20 (“If it appears from the pleadings, the orders, if any, made at a

pretrial conference, the admissions, if any, in the proceedings, that the moving party is entitled to

judgment, the court shall grant the motion. . . . Summary judgment may not be entered if any

material fact is genuinely in dispute.”).

       In the absence of a transcript or a written statement of facts, we are without a necessary

window into the relevant proceedings. We cannot discern what, if any, facts were delineated as

                                                -8-
genuinely in dispute, or on what basis the trial court denied Integrated Composite’s motions.

Neither can we determine what precise arguments Integrated Composite made below with

respect to each motion for summary judgment, and whether those arguments align with the

arguments made in its written motions. Moreover, the record is unclear as to what, if any,

representations the parties made regarding the disputed facts. In short, without a transcript or

written statement of facts in lieu of a transcript, we do not know what occurred in the trial court.

At oral argument, Integrated Composite attempted to close this epistemic gap by relaying to this

Court what it alleged to have occurred at the summary judgment hearing. But, in so doing,

counsel for Integrated Composite acknowledged that we need more information regarding what

occurred at the hearing to resolve the issues Integrated Composite raises on appeal.

       Thus, we hold that Integrated Composite’s omission of a transcript or written statement

of facts in lieu of a transcript precludes consideration of its arguments regarding its first and

second motions for summary judgment. See Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii).

           C. Motion to Strike

       Integrated Composite also argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to strike.

We find that these arguments are defaulted because Integrated Composite failed to preserve these

arguments below. See Rule 5A:18.

       In arguing its motion to strike to the trial court, Integrated Composite emphasized a few

specific issues raised in its written motion.8 Namely, Integrated Composite argued that there was

no oral contract because a written contract existed and that, under Cave Hill Corp. v. Hiers, 264

Va. 640 (2002), Premier improperly used extrinsic “evidence to explain, modify an existing

       8
          In its written motion to strike, Integrated Composite made several arguments focusing
on a handful of provisions in the distribution agreement which it contended were relevant to the
dispute, including the agreement’s respective integration clause, arbitration provision, limited
liability provision, termination provision, and “no termination damages” provision.
                                                  -9-
complete, unambiguous written agreement.” Integrated Composite argued against admission of

the invoices and “the testimony of [Premier’s] witness to the existence of a verbal contract.” The

trial court denied Integrated Composite’s motion to strike.

        Integrated Composite did not renew its motion to strike at the conclusion of its evidence.

In closing, Integrated Composite argued, in relevant part, that the distribution agreement

“encompasse[d] the same product, the same parties, the same terms”; that there “was no separate

contract”; that the distribution agreement “limit[ed] the damages”; that the distribution

agreement contained an integration clause which precluded collateral contracts; and that records

existed showing that “thirty-one units [of the UHPC Premier had ordered] were consumed out of

the fifty.”

        Although “an appropriate argument made during closing . . . will preserve a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial,” Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 351,

356 (2011), “not every argument made in summation is an argument attacking the sufficiency of

the evidence,” id. at 357. In other words, “the sufficiency challenge must be clear enough for the

trial court to discern its presence and to be able to distinguish it from an argument on the merits.”

Id. at 358 (emphasis added).

        Integrated Composite argued that the distribution agreement barred Premier’s claims. It

also argued, in the alternative, that the evidence showed that 31 units of the UHPC had been used

out of the 50 referenced in the purchase invoices. Integrated Composite’s closing arguments do

not clearly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, its arguments shade into a contest

on the merits of Premier’s case-in-chief. As such, Integrated Composite did not make its

“sufficiency challenge . . . clear enough for the trial court to discern its presence and to be able to

distinguish it from an argument on the merits.” Id.

                                                - 10 -
        “An argument on the merits . . . employs a . . . different evidentiary prism.” Id. at 357.

“When the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s evidence is challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court

must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff and resolve any reasonable doubt as to its sufficiency in [its] favor.” CUNA Mut.

Ins. Soc’y v. Navy Yard Credit Union, Inc., 237 Va. 679, 683 (1989) (quoting Meeks v. Hodges,

226 Va. 106, 109 (1983)). But an argument on the merits “asks the trial court to reject any of the

[plaintiff’s] evidence that is inconsistent with the [defendant’s] theory of the case and to accept

instead the [defendant’s] interpretation of the evidence.” Dickerson, 58 Va. App. at 357. Cf.

Est. of A.T. Taylor v. Flair Prop. Assocs., 248 Va. 410, 415 (1994) (“[W]e do not consider the

merits of the [appellee’s] argument because it . . . is an attack on the weight ultimately to be

given the evidence, rather than its legal sufficiency on the motion to strike.”). Here, Integrated

Composite did not raise a sufficiency challenge in its closing arguments, but rather made an

argument on the merits, asking the trial court to accept its theory of the case and interpretation of

the evidence. Accordingly, Integrated Composite failed to preserve for appellate review its

arguments regarding its motion to strike. See Rule 5A:18; Williams v. Cnty. of Gloucester

Sheriff’s Dep’t, 266 Va. 409, 411 (2003) (“The contemporaneous objection rule, embodied in

Rule 5A:18 . . . , is based on the principle that a litigant has the responsibility to afford a court

the opportunity to consider and correct a perceived error before such error is brought to the

appellate court for review.”). Further, Integrated Composite does not invoke the good-cause or

ends-of-justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18, and we will not do so sua sponte. See Hogle, 75

Va. App. at 756.

                II. Integrated Composite’s Parol Evidence Argument Lacks Merit.

        Finally, Integrated Composite contends that the trial court “erred as a matter of law by[]

permitting [p]arol evidence in the form of two invoices and testimony to support [Premier’s]

                                                 - 11 -
claim of breach of alleged verbal contract and unjust enrichment.” In so arguing, Integrated

Composite marshals Cave Hill to support the well-established proposition that “[p]arol evidence

of prior or contemporaneous oral negotiations are generally inadmissible to alter, contradict, or

explain the terms of a written instrument provided the document is complete, unambiguous, and

unconditional.” See 264 Va. at 646 (quoting Doswell Ltd. P’ship v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 251

Va. 215, 222 (1996)). Integrated Composite argues that its distribution agreement with Premier

was such a contract and that, thus, “Premier’s witness testimony and evidence alleging a separate

verbal contract and/or unjust enrichment [wa]s inadmissible evidence.”

       Integrated Composite misunderstands the parol evidence rule and its overarching

purpose. At the heart of the rule is the concern that “at some ‘future’ date[,] another party could

‘contradict or vary the plain language of the instrument itself’ by citing ‘parol evidence of the

particular meaning [that] the party affixed to his words, or of his secret intention in making the

instrument.’” Worsham v. Worsham, 74 Va. App. 151, 166 (2022) (second alteration in original)

(quoting Utsch v. Utsch, 266 Va. 124, 130 (2003)). In other words, animating the parol evidence

rule is the fear that a party may rely on parol evidence to contravene the agreement and alter its

construction. It follows that “[t]he parol evidence rule applies to verbal agreements made prior

to or contemporaneously with the execution of a simple written contract.” Piedmont Mt. Airy

Guano Co. v. Buchanan, 146 Va. 617, 626 (1926) (emphases added); see also Va. Elec. & Power

Co. v. N. Va. Reg’l Park Auth., 270 Va. 309, 316 (2005) (“[I]n controversies between two parties

to a contract, parol evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral negotiations or stipulations is

inadmissible to vary, contradict, add to, or explain the terms of a complete, unambiguous,

unconditional, written instrument.” (alteration in original) (emphases added) (quoting Godwin v.

Kerns, 178 Va. 447, 451 (1941))); Worsham, 74 Va. App. at 158 (“Under the parol-evidence

rule, when a written contract unambiguously expresses the agreement of the parties, extrinsic

                                               - 12 -
evidence of the parties’ prior or contemporaneous discussions is inadmissible to contradict the

written terms.” (emphases added)). Indeed, it is upon this kind of parol evidence that a party

would rely in making claims as to, for example, its intent at the time that it entered into the

agreement, or to argue that a collateral agreement should govern the meaning of the instrument.

       Thus, the parol evidence rule, by its own terms, cannot apply to an alleged subsequent

verbal agreement. See Piedmont Mt. Airy Guano Co., 146 Va. at 626 (“[The parol evidence rule]

has no application to subsequent parol agreements between the parties.”); John Edward Murray,

Jr. & Grover C. Grismore, Murray on Contracts § 108, at 238 (2d rev. ed. 1974) (“The rule has

no application to agreements subsequent to the writing.”); cf. J.P. Houck Tanning Co. v.

Clinedinst, 118 Va. 131, 134-35 (1915) (finding that despite defendant’s effort to “exclude from

the jury all parol evidence in support of plaintiff’s demand,” “the parol evidence rule has no

application . . . , when plaintiff’s demand was not embodied in the written agreement and rests

wholly upon a subsequent parol contract”).

       Accordingly, the trial court did not err by admitting the invoices over Integrated

Composite’s objections, since both invoices date to a period after Integrated Composite and

Premier entered into their distribution agreement.

                         III. Integrated Composite’s Appellate Practices.

       Deserving of special attention are several representations made in the opening brief filed

by Integrated Composite’s counsel. These representations occasionally shade into

misrepresentation, and vary in kind and degree. Some misrepresentations are slight, and so of an

anodyne kind. For example, though disfavored by this Court, it is not uncommon for counsel to

give pertinent caselaw a gloss that favors their argument, but which may fail to square perfectly

with the caselaw undergoing review. Counsel for Integrated Composite does that here.

                                                - 13 -
However, counsel also, at times, distorts relevant caselaw to the point of disfigurement, such that

counsel’s representations cross the boundary from slightly misleading into ineluctably false.

       But it is not Integrated Composite’s analysis of appellate jurisprudence that deserves

special attention and discussion. More serious are some of Integrated Composite’s

representations of the record. Two particular instances should not go unremarked.9 In its

argument regarding assignments of error two and three, counsel for Integrated Composite

characterizes the trial court’s ruling regarding its parol evidence objection this way:

               The Circuit Court erred in over-ruling the objection stating, in
               contradiction, that, since . . . Premier had already admitted the
               existence of a separate written distribution contract, the invoices
               were only being offered to prove Premier’s theory of a separate
               verbal contract.

Counsel gives a specific, detailed description of the trial court’s ruling. However, the

description, and all details contained within it, is a fiction. The trial court made no such ruling.

Instead, after considering the parties’ respective arguments, the trial court simply stated, “The

objection is overruled.” When Integrated Composite objected a second time, the trial court again

stated that the invoices “will be admitted over objection.” Thus, the trial court did not, as

counsel for Integrated Composite asserts, “stat[e] . . . that, since . . . Premier had already

       9
         It is neither feasible nor necessary to engage in an exhaustive, jot-or-tittle analysis of the
multiple factual and other misrepresentations. Rather, here, we tease out two illustrative
examples, both germane to the arguments Integrated Composite raises on appeal.
                                                 - 14 -
admitted the existence of a separate written distribution contract, the invoices were only being

offered to prove Premier’s theory of a separate verbal contract.”10

        A second instance serves to further illustrate the point. In the “Statement of Facts”

presented in Integrated Composite’s opening brief, counsel recounts that “Within 30 days of

signing the contract, the distributor Premier informed the supplier Cor-Tuf that they, Premier, did

not have funds to buy the minimum inventory of 100 yards and asked to buy 25 yards per

quarter.” To support this fact, counsel cites to the trial transcript, and specifically, the following

exchange between Premier’s counsel and Meyer:

               [Counsel:] Outside of these purchases for specific customers and
               specific transactions, did you ever purchase concrete just to have --
               to keep, I guess, in supply, in storage?

               [Meyer:] Yes.

               [Counsel:] How many times did that happen?

               [Meyer:] That only happened twice. We were asked to purchase it
               and then they were going to store it, and then we were hoping to
               sell it to these jobs.

Meyer did not testify that Premier was without the requisite funds to purchase 100 yards of

UHPC. Nor does Meyer testify that Premier asked to purchase 25 yards of UHPC per quarter.

To the contrary, Meyer testified that Premier was asked by Integrated Composite to purchase the

UHPC.

        10
           Integrated Composite’s characterization could be read as pertaining to its objection to
the trial court’s ruling. Even in that way, however, the fiction remains. Integrated Composite’s
objection was not that “since . . . Premier had already admitted the existence of a separate written
distribution contract, the invoices were only being offered to prove Premier’s theory of a
separate verbal contract.” Instead, when Premier sought to introduce the first invoice into
evidence, Integrated Composite simply objected, “Your Honor, I just wanted to mention, we
have an objection to these invoices as hearsay and parol evidence.” When Premier undertook to
introduce the second invoice into evidence, Integrated Composite’s objection was even more
succinct: “Same objection, Your Honor.”
                                                - 15 -
       The forgoing representations, whether the product of hurried drafting, an excess of zeal,

or something else, are troubling. Indeed, both are wholly at odds with the record they purport to

represent. Because of this, we commend to counsel the practice of reviewing future appellate

pleadings with an eye to such issues and urge their undertaking continuing legal education

focused on appellate practice.

                                         CONCLUSION

       For the reasons elaborated in Sections I and II, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

                                              - 16 -
Chaney, J., concurring in the judgment.

          Although I agree that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, I disagree with the

majority’s conclusion that Integrated Composite failed to preserve its first assignment of error

regarding the trial court’s award of unjust enrichment damages for transactions governed by

contract. Accordingly, I would resolve appellant’s first assignment of error on the merits. I

would also reserve comments upon Integrated Composite’s appellate practices to correcting the

errors necessary to resolve the issues on appeal.

          THE PARTIES’ AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE UNJUST ENRICHMENT DAMAGES

                 A. The issue was preserved.

          Integrated Composite’s primary argument before the trial court was that Premier’s claim

for damages is barred by a broad no-damages provision in the parties’ integrated “Licensing and

Distribution Agreement” (Agreement). The Agreement, § 10(f)(iv), subtitled “No Damages For

Termination or Expiration” (No-Damages Clause), provides:

                 Neither [Integrated Composite] nor Premier shall be liable to the
                 other for damages of any kind, including incidental or
                 consequential damages, on account of the termination . . . of this
                 Agreement . . . . Premier waives any right it may have to receive
                 any compensation or reparations on termination . . . of this
                 Agreement . . . . Neither [Integrated Composite] nor Premier will
                 be liable to the other on account of termination or expiration of this
                 Agreement for reimbursement or damages . . . on account of any
                 expenditures . . . or for any other reason whatsoever based upon or
                 growing out of such termination . . . .

Agreement, § 10(f)(iv).

          After the close of Premier’s evidence, Integrated Composite filed a written “Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s Testimony & Evidence In Support of a Verbal Contract.” Integrated Composite

argued:

                 There was no oral contract between the parties, and unjust
                 enrichment is not available as a cause of action to the Plaintiff due

                                                 - 17 -
                to the parol evidence rule and to obligations in the prior
                terminated written agreement.

(R. 217) (emphasis added). The trial court denied Integrated Composite’s motion to strike.

(R. 378-81).

        In its closing argument, Integrated Composite argued to the trial court that, since the

Agreement covered the subject matter of this dispute and had been terminated, the No-Damages

Clause bars Premier’s claim. Integrated Composite also argued that § 17(g), subtitled “Entire

Agreement,” precluded any purported extra-contractual obligations. Integrated Composite

further argued to the trial court that it was not, in fact, unjustly enriched.

        After the trial court entered judgment for Premier and awarded unjust enrichment

damages, Integrated Composite promptly filed a post-trial motion to set aside the verdict. This

post-trial motion specifically, and for the first time, cited James G. Davis Construction Corp. v.

FTJ, Inc., 298 Va. 582 (2020), for the proposition that “[t]he existence of an express contract

covering the same subject matter of the parties’ dispute precludes a claim for unjust enrichment.”

Id. at 592 (alteration in original) (quoting CGI Fed. Inc. v. FCi Fed., Inc., 295 Va. 506, 519

(2018)).

        However, the trial court did not rule on Integrated Composite’s post-trial motion before

losing jurisdiction under Rule 1:1. Although the trial court denied the post-trial motion, the

denial was based on jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the substance of the motion.

Consequently, Integrated Composite cannot rely on its post-trial motion to preserve its argument

under Rule 5A:18. See Brandon v. Cox, 284 Va. 251, 256 (2012) (motion for reconsideration

does not preserve arguments for appeal where appellant failed to obtain a ruling).

        Although Integrated Composite did not obtain a ruling on its express post-trial argument

that unjust enrichment damages are precluded by the Agreement, the trial court’s final judgment

necessarily rejected Integrated Composite’s general argument that all damages are precluded by
                                                 - 18 -
the Agreement’s No-Damages Clause. Rule 5A:18 only requires objections to be stated with

“reasonable certainty.” See Rule 5A:18 (“No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a

basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the

ruling.” (emphasis added)). An objection is sufficient if the trial judge understands the point and

has an opportunity to do something about it. See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 266

(2019).

          Here, Integrated Composite asserted in closing argument that Premier’s claimed damages

are precluded by the Agreement. See Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 515 (1991) (holding that

grounds for an objection stated in closing argument at a bench trial preserves the issue for

appellate review under Rule 5A:18). Integrated Composite argued to the trial court that “the

written Distribution Agreement specifically limits the damages. It specifically says it is the

entire agreement.” (R. 446). Integrated Composite also argued to the trial court that it was not

unjustly enriched because of its losses relating to the terminated Agreement and Premier’s partial

consumption of the product at issue, but this argument was made in the alternative to its primary

argument that the Agreement’s No-Damages Clause precluded Premier’s claim for any damages

whatsoever.

          Although Integrated Composite’s closing argument did not expressly argue that “unjust

enrichment” damages are specifically precluded by the Agreement, the cases that support that

precise proposition are grounded on the very argument that Integrated Composite did make:

damages for transactions covered by a contract are limited to the damages available under the

contract. See Davis, 298 Va. at 592-93. As explained in Third Restatement on Restitution and

Unjust Enrichment:

                 Considerations of both justice and efficiency require that private
                 transfers be made pursuant to contract whenever reasonably
                 possible, and that the parties’ own definition of their respective
                 obligations—assuming the validity of their agreement by all
                                                - 19 -
               pertinent tests—take precedence over the obligations that the law
               would impose in the absence of agreement. Restitution is
               accordingly subordinate to contract as an organizing principle of
               private relationships, and the terms of an enforceable agreement
               normally displace any claim of unjust enrichment within their
               reach.

Id. at 593 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 2, cmt. c, at 17).

By arguing that the No-Damages Clause of the Agreement precluded Premier’s damages,

Integrated Composite apprised the trial court of its argument that all other damages, including

unjust enrichment damages, are precluded. See Hicks, 71 Va. App. at 266. Thus, Integrated

Composite’s closing argument provided the trial court with an opportunity to reconsider the

argument Integrated Composite made in its motion to strike: “unjust enrichment is not available

as a cause of action to the Plaintiff due to the parol evidence rule and to obligations in the prior

terminated written agreement.” Consequently, I would hold that Integrated Composite preserved

its objection to the trial court’s award of unjust enrichment damages based on the argument that

unjust enrichment is precluded by the Agreement.

               B. Premier’s unjust enrichment damages are not precluded.

       Although Integrated Composite preserved its argument that the Agreement precludes

unjust enrichment damages, the argument fails because the two purchase transactions at issue are

separate from the Agreement. The purpose of the Agreement was to establish a business

relationship in which Premier acts as a distributor of Integrated Composite’s Cor-Tuf product.

Although the Agreement specifies that Premier would maintain a minimum inventory of the

product, the Agreement does not specify a definite time or quantity for any particular purchase of

the product. Moreover, the Agreement’s integration clause expressly states that the Agreement

is the entire agreement between Premier and Integrated Composite, thus precluding the

possibility that the Agreement is intended to incorporate additional terms specifying the time and

quantity of product purchases.
                                                - 20 -
       And assuming that the Agreement is the entire and exclusive contract governing

Premier’s purchases of Integrated Composite’s product, the integration clause would prevent

Premier from entering into separate purchase agreements for product, defeating the purpose of

the Agreement. See Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman’s, Inc., 218 Va. 703, 708 (1978) (“While any

ambiguity [in the contract] must be resolved against the insurer, the construction adopted should

be reasonable, and absurd results are to be avoided.”). Thus, the Agreement is limited to

specifying the licensing and distributing business relationship, and agreements to purchase

specific quantities of Integrated Composite’s product are separate from the Agreement.

Integrated Composite did not argue to the trial court or this Court that a separate written

agreement relating to the two purchases at issue precludes the award of unjust enrichment

damages. Since the Agreement does not govern the product purchases at issue, it does not bar

unjust enrichment damages relating to those purchases.

       For the foregoing reasons, I concur in affirming the trial court’s judgment.

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