Court Opinion

ID: 9881632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 15:28:36.793564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:17.579243
License: Public Domain

J-A17033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: B.E., A MINOR :          IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :               PENNSYLVANIA
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  APPEAL OF: I.E., MOTHER           :               No. 505 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered February 6, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000553-2022

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 3, 2023

       Appellant, I.E. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed the dependency

petition filed by the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services

(“DHS”), transferred legal and physical custody of her minor child, B.E.

(“Child”), to K.K. (“Father”), and entered a finding of abuse against Mother.

We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and Father are the natural parents of Child, who was born in December

2020. Mother and Father are not married, and their relationship ended around

the time of Child’s birth. After her birth, Child resided with Mother.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      On April 28, 2022, DHS received a Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

report alleging that Mother had taken Child to Saint Christopher’s Hospital for

Children earlier that day. Mother initially decided to take Child to the hospital

because Child’s “asthma was flaring up[.]”          (Dependency Petition, filed

6/10/22, at ¶b). On the way to the hospital, however, Mother claimed that a

car struck Child’s stroller. The collision allegedly “tipped forward” the stroller,

causing Child to hit her head on the ground. (Id.) Mother and Child arrived

at the hospital shortly thereafter. While in the waiting room of the hospital’s

emergency department, Child “had pauses in her breathing and was in an

altered mental state.” (Id.) Based on these symptoms, the doctor suspected

that Child had ingested an opiate.        The doctor administered a dose of

Naloxone, and Child “became alert and returned to her normal behavior[.]”

(Id.) Child subsequently tested positive for fentanyl. (See id. at ¶e).

      Mother denied having any legal or illegal drugs in her home.          When

asked to explain how Child might have come into contact with an opiate,

Mother “stated that a bystander’s purse fell and the contents of the purse

spilled out when the car struck [Child’s] stroller; and [Mother] implied that the

contents of the purse had caused [Child’s] altered state.” (Id. at ¶b). DHS

interviewed Mother on April 29, 2022. During the interview, Mother “repeated

the timeline of events” leading up to Child’s hospitalization.       (Id. at ¶e).

Mother added that she and Child took a bus for part of their trip to the hospital.

“[W]hile they were exiting the bus, a car drove around and hit [Mother] and

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[Child].” (Id.) Mother reiterated “that a bystander helped them and that

something in the bystander’s purse may have exposed [Child] to fentanyl.”

(Id.)

        At the conclusion of its investigation, DHS “indicated” the CPS report,

and it “upgraded [the report] to reflect that the incident was a near fatality.”

(Id. at ¶b). DHS contacted Mother’s great-aunt, who agreed to serve as a

placement resource for Child. Mother and her great-aunt signed a safety plan,

and Child was discharged from the hospital to Mother’s great-aunt. Around

this time, Mother’s great-aunt presented Father to DHS and the Community

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) as a potential placement resource.1

        On June 10, 2022, DHS filed a petition alleging that Child was a

dependent child under the Juvenile Act,2 and she was a victim of child abuse

under the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”).3 The court conducted an

adjudicatory hearing on February 6, 2023.        At the hearing, DHS provided

testimony from Child’s treating physician, the DHS social worker who

investigated the incident, and the CUA case manager. Mother did not testify

____________________________________________

1 In June and July of 2022, Father and Child underwent genetic testing, which

confirmed Father’s paternity. Following the genetic testing, a CUA case worker
met with Father, assessed his home, and deemed it appropriate for Child.
(See N.T. Hearing, 2/6/23, at 78-79). Child has resided with Father since
October 2022. (Id. at 86).

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

3 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6387.

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or present any witnesses.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that DHS provided clear

and convincing evidence to warrant an adjudication of Child’s dependency as

to Mother. The court also entered a finding of child abuse against Mother.

Nevertheless, the court found that Father was “ready, willing and able” to care

for Child. (N.T. Hearing at 101). Thus, the court dismissed the dependency

petition, transferred legal and physical custody of Child to Father, and

permitted Mother to have supervised visitation. On February 28, 2023, Mother

timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of errors.

      Mother now raises four issues for our review:

         Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
         discretion by finding Mother to be a perpetrator of child
         abuse in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
         Mother recklessly caused bodily injury to [Child] by recent
         act or failure to act?

         Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
         discretion by finding Mother to be a perpetrator of child
         abuse in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that
         Mother recklessly perpetrated serious physical neglect of
         [Child] through a repeated, prolonged, or egregious failure
         to supervise?

         Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
         discretion by finding Mother to be a perpetrator of child
         abuse pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(d) in the absence of
         clear and convincing evidence that [Child] was the victim of
         child abuse of such a nature as would ordinarily not be
         sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions
         of the parent?

         Did the trial court err as a matter of law and abuse its
         discretion by awarding sole legal and physical custody of
         [Child] to Father in the absence of clear and convincing

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           evidence that [Child] would be without proper parental care
           and control in Mother’s custody?

(Mother’s Brief at 3-4).4

       The applicable scope and standard of review for dependency cases is as

follows:

           [T]he standard of review in dependency cases requires an
           appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility
           determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the
           record, but does not require the appellate court to accept
           the [trial] court’s inferences or conclusions of law.
           Accordingly, we review for an abuse of discretion.

In re A.B., 63 A.3d 345, 349 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting In re R.J.T., 608 Pa.

9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)).

           We accord great weight to this function of the hearing judge
           because [the court] is in the position to observe and rule
           upon the credibility of the witnesses and the parties who
           appear before [the court]. Relying upon [the court’s] unique
           posture, we will not overrule [its] findings if they are
           supported by competent evidence.

In re A.H., 763 A.2d 873, 875 (Pa.Super. 2000).

       Mother’s first three issues are related, and we address them together.

In all three issues, Mother insists that the record did not support the court’s

finding of abuse.         Citing Section 6303(b.1)(1) of the CPSL, Mother

acknowledges that the definition of “child abuse” includes intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly “[c]ausing bodily injury to a child through any recent

____________________________________________

4 In addition to the briefs from Mother and DHS, the guardian ad litem filed a

letter with this Court stating that she joins the brief filed by DHS. (See Letter,
filed 6/4/23).

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act or failure to act.” (Mother’s Brief at 15). While Mother concedes that DHS

offered sufficient medical evidence to prove that Child suffered bodily injury,

Mother contends that this evidence did not prove that she caused the injury

through an act or omission or that she acted with the requisite intent. Mother

also cites Section 6303(b.1)(7), defining child abuse as intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly “[c]ausing serious physical neglect of a child.” (Id.

at 20). Again, Mother maintains that DHS failed to demonstrate that Mother

provided Child with inappropriate supervision.

      Regarding Section 6381(d), Mother recognizes that this section of the

CPSL provides a rebuttable presumption that a caretaker has perpetrated

abuse where there is evidence that the child has suffered abuse that would

ordinarily not exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of the parent.

Mother argues, however, that DHS could not rely on Section 6381(d) because

it “failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the injury Child suffered

… is the type of injury that could not occur except by reason of an act or

omission of a caretaker.” (Id. at 28) (emphasis in original). Mother further

argues that Section 6381(d) is a “very limited exception” to the “more

stringent evidentiary standards” applicable to child abuse findings, and

Section 6381(d) does not apply here because the identity of Child’s caretaker

is not at issue. (Id. at 29) (quoting In re L.Z., 631 Pa. 343, 378, 111 A.3d

1164, 1184 (2015)).       Mother concludes that DHS presented insufficient

evidence of child abuse, and this Court must reverse the trial court’s finding.

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We disagree.

       “Although dependency proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Act …,

the [CPSL] controls determinations regarding findings of child abuse, which

the juvenile courts must find by clear and convincing evidence.” Interest of

L.V., 209 A.3d 399, 417 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).         Section 6303 of the CPSL defines child abuse as

“intentionally, knowingly or recklessly … [c]ausing bodily injury to a child

through any recent act or failure to act.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1)(1). Bodily

injury is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or substantial pain.”

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(a).

          [T]he requisite standard of proof for a finding of child abuse
          pursuant to Section 6303(b.1) of the CPSL is clear and
          convincing evidence. In re L.Z.[, supra at 360, 111 A.3d
          at 1174] (“a petitioning party must demonstrate the
          existence of child abuse by the clear and convincing
          evidence standard applicable to most dependency
          determinations, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6341(c)”). Clear and
          convincing evidence is “evidence that is so clear, direct,
          weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to
          come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth
          of the precise facts in issue.” G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub.
          Welfare, 625 Pa. 280, [288,] 91 A.3d 667, 672 (2014).

In the Int. of N.B.-A., 657 Pa. 137, 149, 224 A.3d 661, 668 (2020).

       Here, the trial court made a finding of abuse under the presumption of

abuse standard as set forth in Section 6381 of the CPSL.5 “Section 6381(d)

____________________________________________

5 The court also made findings of abuse pursuant to Section 6303(b.1)(1), (5),

but we need only address the court’s reasoning under Section 6381 for
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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of the CPSL … establishes a rebuttable, evidentiary presumption when a child

sustains abuse not ordinarily suffered absent acts or omissions of a parent or

other responsible party.[6]        Under such circumstances, the fact of abuse

suffices to establish prima facie evidence of abuse by the parent or person

responsible.”    Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en

banc), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 270 A.3d 1098 (2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). “Prima facie evidence is not the standard that

establishes the child has been abused, which must be established by clear and

convincing evidence; it is the standard by which the court determines whom

the abuser would be in a given case.” In Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019,

1024 (Pa.Super. 1993).

          Under section 6381(d), a parent or other responsible
          caregiver may rebut the prima facie presumption with
          evidence:

____________________________________________

purposes of this appeal. See In re A.J.R.-H., 647 Pa. 256, 287-88, 188 A.3d
1157, 1175-76 (2018) (reiterating that appellate court can affirm trial court’s
decision on any basis supported by record).

6 Section 6381 of the CPSL provides, in part:

          (d)       Prima facie evidence of abuse.—Evidence that
          a child has suffered child abuse of such a nature as would
          ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the
          acts or omissions of the parent or other person responsible
          for the welfare of the child shall be prima facie evidence of
          child abuse by the parent or other person responsible for
          the welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d).

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               [d]emonstrating that [the parent or responsible
               person] did not inflict the abuse, potentially by
               testifying that they gave responsibility for the child to
               another person about whom they had no reason to
               fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental
               rather than abusive. The evaluation of the validity of
               the presumption would then rest with the trial court
               evaluating the credibility of the prima facie evidence
               presented by … [DHS] … and the rebuttal of the parent
               or responsible person.

Interest of G.R., 282 A.3d 376, 382 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting In re L.Z.,

supra at 379, 111 A.3d at 1185).

        Instantly, the court found that Child suffered bodily injury as required

for a finding of child abuse based upon testimony from Dr. Norrell Atkinson,

Child’s treating physician and an expert in the field of pediatrics and child

abuse. Dr. Atkinson explained that Mother originally wanted Child to see a

doctor for asthma symptoms, but Child’s stroller was struck by a vehicle on

the way to the hospital. While in the waiting room of the hospital’s emergency

department, Child “started to become … less alert, was exhibiting difficulties

with breathing, and wasn’t acting like herself[.]” (N.T. Hearing at 11). Child’s

respiratory rate decreased, and “her pupils were noted to be very small in

size.” (Id.)

           When those things are seen, it raises concern for there being
           an opiate in the system, and so, that is typically what
           physicians use to then give—or administer Naloxone, or
           what is more widely known as Narcan.

(Id.)

        After receiving a single dose of Naloxone, Child recovered. Subsequent

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testing confirmed the presence of fentanyl in Child’s system. Dr. Atkinson

could not provide a precise time when Child ingested the drug: “I wouldn’t say

it was days, but … I don’t think I can narrow it down any—anymore.” (Id. at

18). Nevertheless, the ingestion of fentanyl created a “near fatal condition”

for Child. (Id. at 43). Dr. Atkinson also opined that Child’s symptoms were

inconsistent with the accident described by Mother.7

       In addition to the testimony from Dr. Atkinson, DHS social worker

Annitra Bolger testified about her investigation into the CPS report. Ms. Bolger

interviewed Mother, who provided the following account of her trip to the

hospital:

            [E]n route to the doctor, they had to get off … the bus
            because there was … some construction and the bus was
            going to detour.

            And so, from there, unfortunately, as they were trying to
            cross the street, a car went around the bus and [Child’s]
            stroller was hit and tipped over, and Mother reported that
            there were different people at the scene who helped her
            pretty much pick up her belongings.

            There was also possibly … a woman at the scene who was
            very helpful, and the contents of her purse had … spilled out
            while she was trying to help Mom pick [Child] up in her
            stroller. Once they realized that … everything appeared to
            be okay, they continued [on] their journey to the hospital.

            Mother said she walked down. She didn’t get on any more
            buses. She walked down, pretty much pushing [Child’s]
____________________________________________

7 Dr. Atkinson confirmed that Child had some “swelling to her head[.]”  (N.T.
Hearing at 14-15). Dr. Atkinson ordered a CT scan of Child’s head, which
ruled out a brain injury “that might cause [Child] to act less responsive[.]”
(Id. at 14).

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         stroller, and they stopped to get something to eat and then,
         once they came from getting food, then they went to the
         appointment for [Child’s] breathing.

(Id. at 52-53).

      Ms. Bolger testified that Mother did not call the police to report that a

vehicle had struck the stroller. (See id. at 54). Ms. Bolger inspected the

stroller, but it did not appear damaged. (Id. at 55). When Ms. Bolger asked

Mother how Child could have ingested the fentanyl, “[t]he only explanation

that was given was possibly by the female bystander, who kind of … helped

her … when the stroller was hit by the car.” (Id. at 56). Ms. Bolger did not

find this explanation credible:

         [I]t was just hard for me to believe that the child’s stroller
         was hit by a car and an impact that could tip the stroller
         over, and there was no ambulance called, no police
         assistance called, that Mother continued to walk with the
         child.

         They stopped to get food first before they presented for
         what the original reason was, which was to check on her
         breathing issues. So, that was my concern.

(Id. at 68-69). At the conclusion of her investigation, Ms. Bolger indicated

the CPS report “[b]ased on medical evidence,” as well as the fact that “Mother

was unable to explain how the ingestion occurred.” (Id. at 66, 67).

      After considering this testimony, the court made the following findings

at the conclusion of the hearing:

         Let me be clear. Prima facie evidence of abuse is a
         rebuttable presumption, and case law is clear that parents
         can provide testimony and evidence to rebut the
         presumption that they are, in fact, perpetrators of child

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        abuse.

        No such testimony was provided today. No such explanation
        was given to DHS when the investigation was conducted by
        DHS on April 29 of 2022, or when Dr. Atkinson spoke to
        Mother on April 28 of 2022.

        As such, Mom has not effectively rebutted the presumption
        that there is prima facie evidence that she was the
        perpetrator of child abuse as to [Child], albeit not knowingly
        or intentionally.

        Let me be clear. The whole explanation of Mom walking
        around a bus, a car coming through the intersection, coming
        around the bus, knocking a stroller over, such that the child
        didn’t fall out but her head hit the ground, somebody helping
        pick her up whose—contents of their purse may have fallen
        on the ground, and [Child] may have ingested an opiate that
        way is beyond my ability to comprehend.

        Similar to what DHS testified, that the story made no sense
        to them, and Dr. Atkinson in her child abuse report indicated
        it didn’t really make sense—so, even if I weren’t finding child
        abuse as to Mother, at a very minimum, I would find
        dependency as to Mother, because for a 16-month-old to be
        in a stroller, if I take as truth—which I’m not—the story that
        a car hit [Child’s] stroller, she was knocked over, hit her
        head … it would seem to me that every parent should note
        if a child hits their head, they must immediately go to the
        doctor or a hospital or something to be looked at for possible
        concussions.

        Mom didn’t have anybody call 911. She didn’t call 911. And
        maybe she didn’t have a phone, but she didn’t … even [ask]
        anybody on the scene to call 911. Then, not only did she
        not call 911; she … stopped to get food instead of taking
        [Child] directly to the hospital to be looked at….

(Id. at 99-101).

     Upon review, we conclude that the record supported the court’s finding

that Child was a victim of abuse “of such a nature as would ordinarily not be

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sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions of” Mother. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d).         Specifically, DHS demonstrated that Mother was

responsible for Child at the time when Child ingested the fentanyl, and the

resulting injuries were abusive in nature. See Interest of A.S., 255 A.3d

1282 (Pa.Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (explaining Section

6381(d) presumption applied to father where child suffered from cocaine and

opiate poisoning while in mother and father’s care, regardless of whether

father was physically present when poisoning occurred).8             After DHS

presented its evidence, Mother offered no testimony or other evidence to rebut

the presumption against her.          See Interest of G.R., supra (holding that

Superior Court was constrained to affirm trial court’s finding that parents

perpetrated abuse where trial court deemed DHS’ witnesses credible, and

parents did not testify or present rebuttal witnesses). Absent more, Mother

is not entitled to relief on her first three issues. See In re A.B., supra.

       In her fourth issue, Mother contends that the record does not support

the court’s decision to transfer custody to Father. Mother asserts that DHS’s

evidence “focused solely on a single incident which occurred approximately

[nine] months prior to the hearing[.]” (Mother’s Brief at 33). Mother insists

that she provided a safe home for Child prior to the incident, and DHS received

no other reports about Child while she was under Mother’s care. Mother also

____________________________________________

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating non-precedential decisions of Superior Court

filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for persuasive value).

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emphasizes the CUA case manager’s testimony that: 1) she did not have any

concerns about Mother’s ability to care for Child; 2) Mother had obtained safe

and appropriate housing; 3) Mother demonstrated a close bond with Child

during their visits; and 4) Mother provided for Child’s needs and safety during

the visits.   To the extent the court criticized Mother for her conduct

immediately prior to Child’s hospitalization, Mother maintains that “there was

no testimony that any delay in Mother presenting to the emergency room had

any adverse impact on Child’s health or welfare.”        (Id. at 34).   Mother

concludes that this Court must reverse the order that transferred custody. We

disagree.

      The Juvenile Act defines a dependent child, in pertinent part, as follows:

         § 6302. Definitions

                                  *     *      *

         “Dependent child.” A child who:

         (1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
         education as required by law, or other care or control
         necessary for his [or her] physical, mental, or emotional
         health, or morals. A determination that there is a lack of
         proper parental care or control may be based upon evidence
         of conduct by the parent, guardian or other custodian that
         places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk,
         including evidence of the parent’s, guardian’s or other
         custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled substance that
         places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.

      A court may adjudicate a child as dependent if the child meets the

statutory definition of a dependent child by clear and convincing evidence.

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See In re E.B., 898 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2006).

         If the court finds that the child is dependent, then the court
         may make an appropriate disposition of the child to protect
         the child’s physical, mental and moral welfare, including
         allowing the child to remain with the parents subject to
         supervision, transferring temporary legal custody to a
         relative or a private or public agency, or transferring
         custody to the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. §
         6351(a).

         The definition of a dependent child contained in section 6302
         clearly states that a child must lack a parent, guardian or
         other legal custodian who can provide appropriate care to
         the child. A child whose non-custodial parent is ready,
         willing and able to provide such care does not meet this
         definition.

                                  *     *      *

         The plain language of the statutory definition of a dependent
         child compels the conclusion that a child is not dependent if
         the child has a parent who is willing and able to provide
         proper care to the child. When a court adjudges a child
         dependent, that court then possesses the authority to place
         the child in the custody of a relative or a public or private
         agency. Where a non-custodial parent is available and
         willing to provide care to the child, such power in the hands
         of the court is an unwarranted intrusion into the family.
         Only where a child is truly lacking a parent, guardian or legal
         custodian who can provide adequate care should we allow
         our courts to exercise such authority.

In re M.L., 562 Pa. 646, 649-50, 757 A.2d 849, 850-51 (2000). “In other

words, if a dependency petition is filed against the custodial parent and there

is sufficient evidence for the court to adjudge the child dependent but for the

intervention of the non-custodial parent who is willing and capable of caring

for the child, the trial court may properly grant custody to the non-custodial

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parent in a dependency proceeding.” Interest of J.B., 247 A.3d 447, 453

(Pa.Super. 2021).

     Instantly, DHS’s witnesses testified about Child’s injury, as well as

Mother’s explanation of the circumstances leading to Child’s hospitalization.

DHS also presented testimony from the CUA case manager, Quaemia Sanders,

regarding Father’s involvement with Child.    Mother’s great-aunt presented

Father to CUA and DHS. A CUA worker met with Father, assessed his home,

and deemed it safe and appropriate for Child. Child moved into Father’s home

in October 2022, and Child is “well bonded with Father[.]” (N.T. Hearing at

79). CUA workers have visited Father’s home on a weekly basis since Child’s

placement.    During this period, Father has kept Child up to date with her

medical appointments, and Child is developmentally on target.

     Based upon this testimony, the court made the following conclusions:

        [T]he court addressed a finding of Child Abuse under … the
        rebuttable presumption rule … indicating that Mother was
        the sole caregiver of the child when she suffered a near
        fatality and offered no testimony to successfully rebut the
        presumption that she was responsible for the injuries the
        child endured. Moreover, Mother’s changed storyline which
        varied slightly, was completely bizarre, making Mother non-
        credible and therefore unable to overcome the presumption.
        For the same reasons, Mother’s parenting capacities gave
        such concern to the court that but-for Father’s … status, the
        trial court would have found the child to be dependent as to
        Mother. However, because the child had successfully lived
        in Father’s care with supervision by the social work team for
        approximately four (4) months pursuant to a temporary
        custody order made by the trial court, nothing prevented
        Father from continuing to care for the child as a ready,
        willing and able parent….

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(Trial Court Opinion, filed 3/30/23, at 1-2) (emphasis in original) (internal

citations and come capitalization omitted).

      Here,   the   court   credited   the   evidence   demonstrating   Mother’s

questionable parenting decisions.       The court also credited the testimony

establishing that Father is willing and capable of caring for Child. In light of

the competent record evidence, we decline Mother’s invitation to disturb these

credibility determinations. See In re A.H., supra. Therefore, we cannot say

that the court abused its discretion by placing Child in Father’s custody under

these circumstances.      See Interest of J.B., supra; In re A.B., supra.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/3/2023

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