Court Opinion

ID: 9788266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:34:27.417765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:45.477318
License: Public Domain

*569STEWART, Senior Court of Appeals Judge,
concurring.
I concur with Chief Judge Coats's lead opinion. I provide additional comment in light of Judge Mannheimer's dissent.
An appellate court must apply its own independent judgment when deciding questions of constitutional law1 and "adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy."2 The Alaska Supreme Court provided the following guidance for interpreting a constitutional provision: "Constitutional provisions should be given a reasonable and practical interpretation in accordance with common sense. The court should look to the plain meaning and purpose of the provision and the intent of the framers."3
But in this case, because we are interpreting a constitutional provision that necessarily was approved by the voters, our foremost concern should be discerning the likely meaning placed on the provision by those voters.4 In Gibson v. State,5 this court concluded that the official statement in support of the ballot measure enacting the amendment to Article I, Section 19 of the Alaska Constitution was more important to discerning the intent of the voters than the legislative history of the Legislative Resolve that was presented to the voters; and this was despite the substantial amount of legislative history that would have supported a conclusion that the voters did not intend to limit the longstanding public safety regulation of firearms possession by intoxicated persons.6
Judge Mannheimer concludes that this court's decision in Gibson is in doubt because members of the legislature and some witnesses promoted a strict serutiny standard of review. But there is no indication that the voters who approved the amendment to the constitution were privy to the proceedings before the legislature, or if they were, that they would understand the significance of adopting that standard of review.. And even if the voters were apprised of the legislative proceedings, there is support in that record for the voters to reach the same conclusion this court reached in Gibson.
Most importantly, in the voter's pamphlet explaining the question on the ballot, the advocates of the ballot measure flatly stated that the amendment would "NOT overturn or invalidate state laws restricting access or possession of arms by convicted felons...." 7 Therefore, I conclude that a reasonable and practical interpretation of the amendment to Article I, Section 19 in light of common sense is that the voters never intended to undermine state laws restricting the possession of firearms by convicted felons.
Furthermore, it has been more than a decade since Gibson was decided, and almost a decade since this court decided Demars v. State,8 a case in which this court relied on Gibson to reject the claim that Article I, Section 19 invalidated the felon-in-possession statute presently before us.9 If the analysis in these two cases was flawed, the legislature could have undertaken action to correct that flaw. That is, if the legislature concludes that the felon-in-possession statute is unconstitutional, the legislature may act to repeal that statute.
Finally, even if this issue was debatable at the time we decided Gibson, I conclude that stare decisis now compels us to uphold that decision. Stare decisis is a practical and flexible doctrine that balances the State's *570competing interests in the stability of legal norms and the need to adapt those norms to society's changing demands.10 When balane-ing these interests, a court should overrule a prior decision only when "clearly convinced [that] the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent...." 11 As discussed above, I am not convinced that Gibson was erroneously decided. Moreover, I am not convinced that (Gibson is unsound because of any changed conditions. Nor do I see that more good than harm would result from our repudiation of Gibson. Accordingly, I join Chief Judge Coats in affirming Wilson's conviction.

. Arco Alaska, Inc. v. State, 824 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska 1992).

. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).

. Arco Alaska, 824 P.2d at 710 (internal citations omitted).

. See, e.g., Hickel v. Halford, 872 P.2d 171, 176-77 (Alaska 1994); Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162, 169 (Alaska 1991); State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 637-38 (Alaska 1977).

. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska App.1997).

. Id. at 1301-02.

. Id. at 1302.

. Alaska App. Memorandum Opinion and Judgment No. 4100 (Aug. 18, 1999), 1999 WL 652444.

. Id. at 4-5, 1999 WL 652444 at *2.

. See State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996).

. State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (quoting State v. Souter, 606 P.2d 399, 400 (Alaska 1980)).