Court Opinion

ID: 9765884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:23:10.564641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.558830
License: Public Domain

*121Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Jones :
These appeals were taken agreeably to the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, 12 PS §672. The scope of our review is, therefore, to be limited to a determination of the jurisdictional questions raised: Jones v. Jones, 344 Pa. 310, 311, 25 A. 2d 327.
The defendants, by preliminary objections, variously question (1) whether the State court may enjoin trespassory flights made beneath the “floor” of the federally defined navigable airspace and lower than is “necessary” for take-offs and landings, (2) whether the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics are indispensable parties to the proceeding and (3) whether the State equity court has jurisdiction to award damages for what the plaintiffs claim amounts to a taking of their properties.
The ultimate criterion of jurisdiction is the competency of the court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented belongs; and jurisdiction is not denied merely because the court may later decide that it is unable to grant the relief sought in a particular case: Witney v. Lebanon City, 369 Pa. 308, 312, 85 A. 2d 106. There can be no doubt that equity may enjoin continuing trespasses amounting to a nuisance. Whether the State equity court is inhibited from exercising its jurisdiction in the present matter depends upon whether the alleged trespasses are within the navigable airspace pre-empted by Congress in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Counsel for the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics expressly concede in the brief they filed as amici curiae that “Where flights lower than-are necessary for landing or take-offs occur, such flights are not immunized by the Civil Aeronautics Act” and “the Courts may entertain complaints that unnecessary low flying constitutes a legal nuisance *122not insulated by federal law.” Accordingly, the extent to which the State court may exercise its jurisdiction in the premises will be determined by the evidence adduced at trial.
The “floor” of the navigable airspace, except when necessary for tahe-offs and landings, has been administratively set at 500 and 1,000 feet above the ground depending, respectively, on the extent of building on the underlying land area. The mechanics of take-offs, landings and flight are closely regulated and controlled by the Federal Government acting through its appropriate agencies. However, the complaint in the instant case sets forth (and, for present purposes, we are bound to assume) that the flights complained of are but 15 to 30 feet above the roofs of the plaintiffs dwellings. The issues of fact as to whether such flights are within the permissible range of the navigable airspace for take-offs and landings, whether the alleged low altitudes of flight are necessary under the circumstances and whether the flights are pursuant to federal directions and regulations can be determined only after a hearing on the merits.
Nor is the jurisdiction of the court ousted because of the absence of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics. They are not indispensable parties. A party is indispensable where his rights are so. connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made between them without impairing such rights: Powell v. Shepard, 381 Pa. 405, 113 A. 2d 261; Hartley v. Langkamp and Elder, 243 Pa. 550, 556, 90 A. 402. Neither the Civil Aeronautics Board nor the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics bears any such relationship to the instant proceedings. And, their counsel so admit.
But, it is equally clear that a Pennsylvania court, sitting in equity,- lacks jurisdiction to assess and award *123damages for an appropriation of private property for public use. Relief in such regard is obtainable only by eminent domain proceedings or, where the Federal Government is the taker, on application to the Court of Claims: see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256. Of all the defendants here impleaded, only the County of Allegheny possesses the power of eminent domain. Section 496 of the Act of May 2, 1929, P.L. 1278, as re-enacted by the Second Class County Code of 1953, P.L. 723, 16 PS §§2151-2401 et seq., prescribes the procedure for an award of damages when the County is the taker of private. property for airdromes and landing fields. Where a statutory remedy has been provided for redress of an injury or wrong, it becomes the exclusive remedy available: Hastings Appeal, 374 Pa. 120, 97 A. 2d 11; Section 13 of the Act of March 21, 1806, P.L. 558, 4 Sm. L. 326, 46 PS §156. See, also, Jacobs v. Fetzer, 381 Pa. 262, 112 A. 2d 356. It follows, therefore, that the court- is without jurisdiction to award damages for the alleged taking of the plaintiffs-properties.
I agree to a remand of the records for further appropriate proceedings to the extent hereinabove indicated.
Mr. Justice Chidsey joins in this concurrence.