Court Opinion

ID: 9846712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:46:32.164101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.928896
License: Public Domain

Melton, Justice,
dissenting.
OCGA § 16-8-60 (b)3 prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally-protected speech, including anonymous political speech which has long been acknowledged to play “an important role in the progress of mankind.” Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 64 (80 SC 536, 4 LE2d 559) (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U. S. 334, 342 (II) (115 SC 1511, 131 LE2d 426) (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”). As a result, I believe that OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) is unconstitutionally overbroad and must be severed. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority to the extent that it holds otherwise.4
A content-neutral statute or ordinance, i.e., one that is justified without reference to the content of the regulated *336speech may limit speech if the law: (1) furthers an important governmental interest; (2) is unrelated to the suppression of speech; and (3) its incidental restriction of speech is no greater than essential to further the important governmental interest.
(Punctuation omitted.) McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265 (626 SE2d 77) (2005). See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968). Furthermore, “[a] statute that is clear about what it prohibits can nevertheless be unconstitutionally over-broad if it stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the Constitution.” State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444, 445 (629 SE2d 252) (2006); Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 590 (1) (449 SE2d 94) (1994). OCGA § 16-8-60 (b)’s unlimited restriction on all recorded anonymous speech violates both of these constitutional standards.
OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) prohibits the sale, distribution, circulation, or possession for these purposes of any videotape, disc, or other article on which sounds or visual images have been transferred unless the videotape, disc, or other article also bears the actual name of the transferor of the sounds or visual images. Thus, any sale, distribution, circulation, or possession for these purposes of any recorded material, irrespective of its content, the owner of the content, or the transferor of the content, is a criminal act if the transferor of the images or sounds remains anonymous. Furthermore, with regard to the circulation or distribution of such material, the act remains criminal irrespective of whether it is circulated or distributed with commercial intent or otherwise.
In Talley v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court struck down a remarkably similar ordinance criminalizing the anonymous distribution of pamphlets, irrespective of the content therein.5 In doing so, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of anonymous speech in our society, stating: “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices either anonymously or not at all. ... It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.” Id. at 64-65. Although California maintained that the ordinance in *337question in that case was enacted to prevent fraud, false advertising, and libel, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the ordinance actually contained no such limitation. As such, the ordinance was subject to the infirmity that its mandate requiring the identification of a hand-bill’s author and “fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance.” Id. at 65.
The only difference in the California ordinance struck down in Talley and the criminal statute in this case is the manner of communication of the speech. In Talley, the speech was written, and in this case it is recorded. For purposes of the constitutional analysis, however, this is a distinction without a difference, as both laws attempt to prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech. In application, OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), without any stated reason, would prohibit an individual from anonymously distributing recorded videotapes, discs, or the like, on which the individual transferred his or her political views by subjecting the person to criminal prosecution.6 As one of many examples, an amateur film maker concerned about the deforestation of his or her neighborhood could not anonymously distribute a videotape or DVD chronicling this concern to members of his neighborhood and his elected officials. In criminalizing such speech, OCGA§ 16-8-60 (b) steps far outside its constitutional bounds and “stifles expression or conduct that is otherwise protected by the Constitution.” Fielden, supra at 445.
Although this Court has the authority to narrowly interpret a statute to avoid constitutional infirmities, there is no way to do so in this case because we would have to substantially revise OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), imposing upon it a purpose it unambiguously omits, namely its application only to “pirated” recordings. Although the Legislature chose to clearly and explicitly limit the application of OCGA § 16-8-60 (a) (1) and (2) to the copying, sale, distribution, or circulation of recorded sounds or images “without the consent of the person who owns the master [recording],” the Legislature decided to leave this limitation out of OCGA § 16-8-60 (b). Instead, as described above, the Legislature chose to prohibit the sale, distribution, circulation, or possession for these purposes of any and all recordings unless the transferor’s name is displayed on any such recording, irrespective of the content of the recording or the intent behind its distribution.
*338Decided November 29, 2006.
John W. Donnelly, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, C. Rebecca Smith, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, “statutory construction belongs to the courts, legislation to the legislature. We can not add a line to the law.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 353 (1) (519 SE2d 210) (1999). To make OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) constitutional, we would have to do just that. We would have to add a line to the law limiting it to a purpose the Legislature specifically chose not to include within it. Such an act would not just limit OCGA § 16-8-60 (b). It would change its substance altogether. Such changes must be made by the Legislature, not this Court. OCGA § 16-8-60 (b), therefore, must be severed from the statute.7 OCGA § 1-1-3. See also Nixon v. State, 256 Ga. 261, 264 (3) (347 SE2d 592) (1986) (“Where one portion of a statute is unconstitutional, this court has the power to sever that portion of the statute and reserve the remainder if the remaining portion... accomplishes the purpose the legislature intended.”). While I may not prefer this result, I believe that it is the one that a true separation of powers requires.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) provides:
It is unlawful for any person ... to sell; distribute; circulate; offer for sale, distribution, or circulation; or possess for the purposes of sale, distribution, or circulation any phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film, or other article on which sounds or visual images have been transferred unless such phonograph record, disc, wire, tape, videotape, film, or other article bears the actual name and address of the transferor of the sounds or visual images in a prominent place on its outside face or package.

 I agree with the majority’s conclusions that OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) is neither vague nor preempted by federal copyright law.

 The Supreme Court considered Section 28.06 of the Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
No person shall distribute any hand-hill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the name and address of the following: (a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled, or manufactured the same, (b) The person who caused the same to be distributed.

 OCGA § 16-8-60 (c) excepts transfers “[s]olely for the personal use of the person transferring or causing the transfer and without any profit being derived by the person from the transfer.” This exception, however, does not reach the nonprofit distribution of political material.

 Even after OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) is severed from the statute, the act of pirating recorded work will remain illegal, as that act is fully covered by OCGA § 16-8-60 (a).