Court Opinion

ID: 9607845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:02:28.632049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:41.005235
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the affirmance of the defendant’s guilt, in the finding of special circumstances and in parts IV B and C of the majority opinion, but I must dissent from the reversal of the penalty judgment as provided in part IV A of the opinion.
Had there been several grounds requiring reversal of the penalty, I would have considered concurring under compulsion of People v. Lanphear (1984) *54636 Cal.3d 163 [203 Cal.Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081], and People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858 [196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]. However, because the majority’s only basis for reversal is the giving of the standard instruction advising the jury against being swayed by “mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” (CALJIC No. 1.00), I must once again urge they are in error.
Rather than repeat my analysis of that commonly given instruction, I refer to the reasons expressed in my dissents in People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 619 [83 Cal.Rptr. 184, 463 P.2d 408], Lanphear, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 169, and Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 886.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.