Court Opinion

ID: 9705527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:10:40.08647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.088986
License: Public Domain

STRINGER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s definitions of the terms “assessment” and “levy of an illegal tax” for the purposes of Minn.Stat. § 278.01, subd. 1 (2000) are overbroad and result in the application of the strict statute of limitations set forth in section 278.01 to claims the section was not intended to extinguish.
For purposes of section 278.01, assessment should be limited to determinations of valuation and classification because they are discretionary judgments that are difficult to defend after an extended period of time and are typically facially apparent on the property tax notices — consequently the taxpayer should be expected to move expeditiously to challenge them. In Fichtner v. Schiller we defined assessment as “the quasi-judicial act consisting of making a *531list of the taxpayer’s property and fixing its valuation for appraisement and for tax purposes.” 271 Minn. 263, 267, 135 N.W.2d 877, 880 (1965). We held that an objection to an increase in real estate valuation was a matter relating to assessment and therefore must be brought under section 278.01. Fichtner, 271 Minn, at 267, 135 N.W.2d at 880. We determined that assessment extends to another area of discretionary judgment — classification—in Summit House Apartment Co. v. County of Hennepin, 312 Minn. 358, 361, 253 N.W.2d 127, 128 (1977). In Summit House we concluded that classification is an assessment function involving “factual judgments concerning compliance with specified statutory criteria,” id. at 362-63, 253 N.W.2d at 129, a discretionary determination. We reasoned that classification is the assessor’s duty in part because classification involves a fact-finding responsibility rather than the “administrative calculation of the appropriate tax that may be performed by the auditor.” Id. at 362, 253 N.W.2d at 129.
Discretionary judgments are not only central to the assessment process — their expedited resolution was an important factor triggering the reform of property tax administration that led to the adoption of chapter 278 in the first instance. Until chapter 278 was adopted in 1936, a taxpayer could only challenge a property tax in delinquency proceedings. Historical records indicate that one of the objectives of chapter 278 was to expedite the resolution of challenges to valuation because the long passage of time between assessment and delinquency made valuation judgments difficult to defend. Tax Delinquency, Report and Recommendations of a Committee Appointed by Governor Floyd B. Olson, Jan. 1, 1935, 1, 4. We recognized in Petition of Slaughter that the legislature put chapter 278 in place to shorten the time frame between the assessment and payment of property taxes. 213 Minn. 70, 72, 5 N.W.2d 64, 66 (1942).
Assigning the appropriate class rate to the taxpayers’ property, the matter before the court here, is not an exercise of discretion in any sense because the property’s classification has already been determined and the assessor has no further discretion — assuming the taxpayer qualifies under the single parcel per county limitation, the reduced rate must be applied. I would conclude therefore that applying class rates is not assessment for purposes of the taxpayers’ remedies under section 278.01.
The majority also employs an overbroad definition of the expression “levy of an illegal tax.” For purposes of section 278.01, the term “levy” should be limited to the legislative determination to raise money by taxation. See Saxhaug v. County of Jackson, 215 Minn. 490, 494, 10 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1943) (“As applied to the determination to raise money by taxation, to levy a tax means to impose on persons or property by the exercise of legislative power a tax of a certain amount or of a certain percentage according to a determined tax base.”).1 Legislative levies are public information and are available to the taxpayer before the March 31 deadline set forth in section 278.01 arrives, as local jurisdictions must set their levies during the year taxes are assessed. Minn.Stat. § 275.065 (2000). Taxpayers have an opportunity to contest those levies at local meetings, Minn.Stat. § 275.066, subd. 6 (2000), and, if not satisfied, seek judicial review before March 31 of the following year when taxes are due, Minn.Stat. *532§ 278.01, subd. 1. Limiting the term “levy” to the legislative determination of the property tax rate has the added benefit of setting reasonable parameters on the scope of “illegal tax.” Levy rates exceeding statutory authority are illegal, but also are determinable by the taxpayer before the March 31 deadline for challenge. If, as the majority holds, misapplication of a class rate is the levy of an illegal tax, and therefore the March 31 challenge deadline applies under 278.01, the taxpayer may not even know of the misapplication until the very day the tax notice is received.2 Applying the statute of limitations set forth in section 278.01 to a claim that becomes knowable on the very date of expiration is an “absurdity too gross to be insisted on.”3
Where the taxpayers unknowingly overpaid their taxes in reliance upon a nondis-cretionary, ministerial act of a tax official incorrectly applying the class rate, as here, we have awarded taxpayers relief from property tax overpayments. In Wheeler v. Board of Commissioners of Hennepin County, a property owner applied to the county auditor for a statement showing the amount of property taxes due on his property for the year in question. 87 Minn. 243, 244, 91 N.W. 890, 890 (1902). The county auditor overstated the amount due, and the property owner paid the overstated tax. Id. We ordered the county to refund the overpayment because the property owner “could safely presume, when reading the statement * * * that the auditor had performed his duty * * *.” Id. at 245, 91 N.W. at 890. We observed that the case before the court was distinguishable from those where the taxpayer paid the tax knowing it was incorrect and then sought equitable relief. Id. at 245^6, 91 N.W. at 890-91. The taxpayers here were similarly entitled to rely on the several property tax statements and assume that the assessors and auditors had properly discharged their duty and applied the correct class rates. The legislature has provided no judicial remedy to recover their overpayments,4 and as the parties do not dispute that a taxpayer without an adequate statutory remedy may proceed in equity to seek recovery, I would hold they are entitled to do so under theories of common law or equitable relief.

. See also Fichtner, 271 Minn, at 266, 135 N.W.2d at 880; State ex rel. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n v. City Council of Minneapolis, 161 Minn. 103, 105, 200 N.W. 932, 933 (1924).

. Tax bills prepared by the county treasurer must be sent to the taxpayer no later than March 31. Minn.Stat. § 276.04, subd. 3 (2000).

. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).

. It appears that the legislature may also have concluded that there was a need for relief, as in 2000 it adopted Minn.Stat. § 278.14 (2000), which provides that a county must refund a “mistakenly billed tax” as provided in the section. Act of May 15, 2000, ch. 490, art. 5, § 19, 2000 Minn. Laws 2014, 2086 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 278.14). While the question of whether a misapplied class rate is a "mistakenly billed tax” is not before us, adoption of section 278.14 suggests that the legislature saw the need to provide an administrative remedy for mistakenly billed taxes because a statutory remedy was not available under section 278.01.