Court Opinion

ID: 9796287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:54:20.199835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:47.056883
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom BROOKS, District Judge, joins.
[¶ 21] I respectfully dissent because I do not believe the majority opinion gives adequate credit to the district court’s role as the fact finder in this “simple,” yet profoundly troubling ease, nor does it fully credit the findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by the district court.
[¶ 22] I think it is important that we set out the applicable standard of review, at least briefly:
The trial court made express findings of fact and conclusions of law. The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo.1993). While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Id. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and our review does not entail weighing disputed evidence. Id. Findings of fact will not be set aside unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo on appeal. Id.
Springer v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wyo.1997).
Roussalis v. Apollo Electric Company, 979 P.2d 493, 495 (Wyo.1999); and see Jacoby v. Jacoby, 2004 WY 140, ¶¶ 6-7, 100 P.3d 852, ¶¶ 6-7 (Wyo.2004); and Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Wyo.1985) (Under W.R.C.P. 52(a) findings need only be sufficient to indicate the basis or steps taken for the decision upon the contested matters; they need not be set forth in elaborate detail but need only be clear, specific and complete in concise language informing the appellate court of the underlying basis for the trial court’s decision.); 9A Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d §§ 2579 and 2580, esp. pp. 550-51 (1995 and Supp.2004) (appellate court reads trial court’s memorandum/opinion liberally to find within it the required findings).
[¶ 23] It is also important that we set out the pivotal conclusions reached by the district court:
12. An action for unjust enrichment (money had and received) is equitable in nature and lies upon proof that the Defendant has received money of the Plaintiff which, in equity and good conscience, it ought not to retain. Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216 (Wyo.1991). In this case, Plaintiff paid twice for the drywall materi*1208als delivered by B.S.I. and installed by Vinluan on its construction project at 5908 Foxhill Road; it paid Paul Vinluan (d.b.a. A.O.I.) upon completion of the drywall portion of the project and then paid Defendant Aspen when Defendant asserted invalid lien rights. Because Defendant Aspen does not fit the statutory definition of a materialman, he received money from Plaintiff to which he was not entitled. Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater[ 590 P.2d 826 (Wyo.1979)], supra. Defendant received the money from the Plaintiff and was under notice that if Plaintiff pursued a remedy, Defendant would be required to repay the proceeds. Plaintiff has met its burden of proof regarding unjust enrichment. Defendant Aspen has been unjustly enriched at Plaintiffs expense and should return the proceeds to Plaintiff.
13. Duress is a legal basis for a party to seek rescission of a contract and restitution of its consideration. Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 70 (A.L.I. 1937). In order to prove economic duress by a preponderance of the evidence, Portrait Homes had to prove each of the following essential elements: (1) a party involuntarily accepted the terms of another; (2) circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) the circumstances were the result of the coercive acts of the other party. Kendrick v. Barker, 15 P.3d 734, 741 (Wyo.2001). “Economic duress does not exist, however, unless a person has been victim of a wrongful act and has no reasonable alternative but to agree with the terms of another or be faced with serious financial hardship.” Id. In the Court’s view, these elements have been established. The evidence was uneontroverted that Plaintiffs payment to Defendant was not voluntary. Defendant’s conduct was “coercive,” i.e. threatening to file an invalid lien unless money was paid. And finally, Plaintiff had no reasonable alternative but to pay the money demanded. “Bonding around” the lien, as Defendant suggests Plaintiff should have done, while it may have satisfied the lien, would not have prevented the lien from being filed. According to Larry Sutherland, a licensed broker with 27 years of experience in the real estate industry, the lien would have appeared on the title commitment. It was reasonable for Plaintiff to rely on Mr. Sutherland’s advice and recommendations concerning the potential adverse impact of the threatened lien, which was the possible loss of the sale of the property, which was a $390,000.00 sale. Defendants introduced no testimony to contradict Mr. Sutherland’s opinions. The potential loss of a sale of this magnitude, especially with an outstanding construction loan, posed a risk of serious financial harm that Plaintiff could not reasonably ignore.
14. Defendant has failed to sustain its burden of proof regarding its asserted affirmative defenses.
[¶ 24] It is apparent that the majority opinion chooses to disregard the district court’s findings as to unjust enrichment entirely. It is my conviction that they serve as an independent basis upon which to affirm the district court’s judgment. See generally, Boyce v. Freeman, 2002 WY 20, ¶¶ 12-15, 39 P.3d 1062, ¶ 12-15 (2002); and Landeis v. Nelson, 808 P.2d 216, 217-19 (Wyo.1991).
[¶ 25] Beyond that, the district court concluded, as a second independent basis for granting relief to Portrait Homes, that the transaction between the parties could be avoided by application of the theory of “economic duress.” By simply turning the numbers at stake here upside down, and by avoiding a comprehensive discussion of the concept of “economic duress,” the majority at once dismisses the applicability of “economic duress” and fully credits many of Aspen Construction’s affirmative defenses (which the trial court found had not been proved). After a detailed examination of the concept of “economic duress,” I am convinced that the district court correctly applied that law to the circumstances of this case. See generally, 28 Williston on Contracts, Chapter 71 (Duress and Undue Influence), §§ 71:1-71:33 at 423-548, §§ 71:40-45 at 566-587, and see especially § 71:28 at 539-40, (“Analogous to cases of the improper detention of goods are cases where the assertion of a hen upon real property has been used as a means of coercion, although no lien existed, or if it existed, *1209it should have been discharged; in such instances, the improper action generally constitutes duress”) (4th ed.2003). Moreover, as the Williston treatise develops in great detail, the application of the concept of “economic duress” has steadily broadened in its application, particularly to provide equitable relief in cases involving unethical business practices.
[¶ 26] Here, the district court focused on the value of the property that was to be held hostage by the lien ($390,000.00), as opposed to Aspen’s small but spurious lien ($3,615.18), whereas the majority simply reverses that equation, i.e., in order to protect the $390,000.00 sale all Portrait Homes had to do was cough up a mere $3,615.18. I think the district court’s emphasis is more apt, but certainly it is not clearly erroneous because it accurately reflects the testimony of the owners of Portrait Homes and their real estate advisor, while at the same time giving little credibility to Dobson’s self-serving testimony. In addition, the district court did make reference to the protestations of the victims of the duress, the subjective perceptions of the victims of the duress, the pressures of time and the overall circumstances of this case, the element of potential injury to the business and livelihood of the owners of Portrait Homes, and to the reputation of that business. These are all legitimate factors to be weighed in applying the concept of economic duress. Id., §§ 71:14 (“No alternative under circumstances”); 71:18 (“Protest as evidence of duress or coercion”); 71:40 (“Injury to business or livelihood”).
[¶ 27] As noted above, the district court is not required to set out in detail in its findings all of the evidentiary and ultimate facts that may be gleaned from the documentary evidence and transcripts (although, of course, the more complete the details, the better). In my estimation, the district court adequately set out both the evidentiary facts that it looked to in reaching a conclusion as to ultimate facts, and it applied those facts correctly to the applicable law. Paul Vinluan had a contract with Portrait Homes to provide drywall materials and to install them in a residence owned by Portrait Homes. Aspen Construction had no contractual relationship, nor any other relationship, with Portrait Homes. As a stranger to Portrait Homes, and as a volunteer, Aspen Construction paid for the materials that were eventually incorporated into the home owned and built by Portrait Homes.3 Aspen Construction did so, in part as á guarantor of Paul Vinluan’s credit,4 in part to gain an advantage over its competitors in the home construction business (Aspen Construction got “first call” on Vinluan’s time for its construction projects as part of its agreement with Vinluan to guarantee his creditworthiness), and in part because it furthered personal relationships between Keith Dobson, the owner of Aspen Construction, and his associates.
[¶ 28] It is unmistakable from this testimony that neither Aspen Construction nor Dobson was a “materialman” as contemplated by the governing Wyoming statutes, indeed, Aspen Construction’s argument in this case would expand the category of persons who qualify as materialmen to an absurd sort of infinity (i.e., to any person who might have provided credit of any sort to a materialman). See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 29-l-201(a)(vi) (Lexis-Nexis 2003). Nonetheless, Aspen Construction intentionally and maliciously threatened to file a materialman’s lien against the residence owned by Portrait Homes, in order to collect money owed to it by Vinluan (whether *1210the money was technically owed to Dobson or to Aspen Construction is not entirely clear, but the facts extant suggest that Vinluan owed the money at issue in this case to Aspen Construction. However, failing that, Dobson owed it to Aspen Construction, unless, of course, Dobson and Aspen Construction are, in fact, one and the same person).5
[¶ 29] The majority opinion describes what ensued as a stalemate, but I am convinced that the facts support a much darker conclusion, i.e., that Dobson used a spurious claim to a materialman’s lien in order to extort money from Portrait Homes that was, in reality, owed to Dobson solely by Vinluan. Indeed, the record is clear that Dobson did so without making any credible effort to collect the. money from Vinluan. In addition, Dobson did not threaten the filing of the lien until the last possible date for its filing, and after knowing for over three months that Vinluan had not paid him according to the terms of the oral, agreement between them. Dobson was able to employ this ruse to great effect, because he knew he had Portrait Homes over the proverbial barrel. Portrait Homes had completed construction of the residence and was about to sell it (Portrait Homes had to make a decision about how to avoid/mitigate its potential losses from this situation over a period of time that was quite brief, given the complexity of the dilemma Dobson presented for Portrait Homes). A lien against the property could have had the effect of frustrating the sale of the $390,000.00 property, even though Dobson needed to be paid only the paltry sum of $3,645.18 [Vol. Ill, 78-80]. The record is also clear that Portrait Homes could readily pay that amount, if Dobson could prove, in an appropriate forum, that he was entitled to such payment from Portrait Homes. The trouble with that scenario is that Dobson clearly could not collect from Portrait Homes because he could not prove such a debt. However, by filing the lien, and actually by merely threatening to file such a lien, and creating the necessarily resulting legal entanglements that accompany the filing of such a lien, Dobson- could coerce Portrait Homes to pay him, even though it owed him nothing. In addition, the majority elevates form over substance by concluding that Portrait Homes had reasonable alternatives other than paying Dobson in order to avert the filing of a lien. The record reveals that Portrait Homes stood to lose the sale of a $390,000.00 home, possibly its good credit, and likely its reputation as a sound business operation, if it had not done so within the very limited time strictures imposed by Dob-son’s late filed lien.
[¶ 30] For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.

. A local building supplies company actually sold the materials that form the basis of Aspen Construction’s claims in this case to Vinluan. As contemplated by the statute, that company was the materialman in this case. A representative of that company provided uncontradicted testimony that the materials used in the construction of the home were paid for and it had no basis for a materialman's lien against Portrait Homes. He also made clear that all materials that leave that business are paid for before they leave the premises ("That’s how we're able to stay in business.").

. In this regard, see 53 Am.Jur.2d Mechanics’ Liens § 97 at 160-61 (1996) ("Statutes that permit a lien for materials furnished usually apply only to a furnishing for building purposes, and do not include a furnishing for general or unknown purposes, or an ordinary sale in the usual course of trade or on a general open account, or a sale without any reference as to what will be done with the material sold.”).