Court Opinion

ID: 9849998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:48.645327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.208075
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the ruling in division 7 of the opinion and from the judgment of affirmance. The court charged that “to authorize a finding for punitive or exemplary damages the jury must be satisfied from the evidence that there was some wilful misconduct on the part of the defendant or his employees [emphasis supplied], as the case may be, which would give rise to the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. There must be some evidence satisfactoiy to the jury either of malicious wantonness or of an *42oppression by the defendant against the person claimed to have been injured.” The charge as to defendant’s employees was not authorized by the pleadings or evidence and was presumably harmful to the defendant. The statement in division 7 by the majority shows that the charge might have been harmful. The jury was not authorized by the pleadings or evidence to hold the defendant responsible for aggravated acts of his employees. The last statement above quoted states the law correctly but the erroneous charge was not called to the jury’s attention or corrected or withdrawn.