Court Opinion

ID: 9743706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:40:55.843915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:42.871693
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOPF, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would have affirmed the conviction. The majority postulates its position on the point that the evidence presented was entirely circumstantial. I do not know whether we can quite go that far as to say the case was entirely circumstantial. There was certain direct evidence, e.g.: defendant’s admissions, testimony concerning the dead baby and the bloody blanket. Nonetheless, even if the case is considered circumstantial, I believe there was sufficient evidence to convict. It is true that in a circumstantial case the evidence must be sufficient to establish to a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant committed the offense charged (People v. Einstein (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 526, 532, 435 N.E.2d 1257, 1262), and that the evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of the defendant’s innocence. People v. Rogers (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 326, 328, 432 N.E.2d 975, 977. In a homicide prosecution where the accused is the sole person who can testify as to what happened, the trier of fact is not compelled to accept everything the accused states to be conclusive, but may consider surrounding circumstances and the probability of his story. People v. York (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 243, 248, 373 N.E.2d 90. What constitutes recklessness or gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the given situation has been described as a question of fact for the trier of fact. (People v. Schwartz (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993, 382 N.E.2d 59; People v. Rodgers (1971), 2 Ill. App. 3d 507, 511, 276 N.E.2d 504.) Also, whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted recklessly, the defendant’s requisite mental state must be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Recklessness is no different; and, unless we find the inference of mental state accepted by the jury to be inherently impossible or unreasonable, the findings of the trier of fact should not be disturbed on appeal. People v. York (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 243, 248, 373 N.E.2d 90; People v. Parker (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 870, 343 N.E.2d 52. There is not a great disparity between what the defendant testified to in her defense and what was offered by the State by way of the officer’s testimony. The primary difference is the period of time that she heard the child whimpering before she passed out. Therefore, it is for the jury to interpret her actions. People v. Schwartz (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 989, 993, 382 N.E.2d 59. The majority is of the opinion that there is a reasonable hypothesis that the defendant was physically incapable of assisting the child at that time and that it was only speculation that she recklessly failed to render assistance. In People v. Brechon (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 178, 181, 390 N.E.2d 626, it is stated: “Although the defendant argues that there is a reasonable hypothesis of his innocence, the jury should not disregard the inferences from the evidence and are not required to search out explanations compatible with innocence or to elevate those explanations to the status of reasonable doubt.” Here the defendant, through her testimony and by various admissions made to the police, admitted she gave birth to a premature baby and that she covered the baby with a blanket. One of the officers testified that she had told him that the baby whimpered for a period of 15 to 30 minutes. She testified that she did not call out for help because she was embarrassed, that the pregnancy was an unwanted pregnancy brought about by contact with a man who was now her sister’s boyfriend. I believe there were sufficient facts to support the jury’s finding that defendant’s reckless conduct in not providing care for the baby was the act which brought about its death. I do not deem that this was so inherently impossible or unreasonable to warrant substituting our judgment for the jury’s. People v. Daily (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 928, 937, 398 N.E.2d 923, 929. The majority also takes the position that the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was physically capable of further care for the infant. I do not agree, and I further note that the defendant had time to care for herself, e.g., that she removed the placenta. This would militate against her claim that she was physically unable to care for her infant or to call out for help for her child. I simply believe that in all of these issues there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant’s criminal agency is what caused her daughter’s death, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.