Court Opinion

ID: 9454819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:00:12.384313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:19.636238
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that telephone company toll records containing an individual’s long distance calls are protected by § 605 of the Communications Act. The principal issue before us is whether the Government violated that section by using the § 7602 summons to obtain the telephone records that led ultimately to Appellants’ convictions. If the Government did violate § 605 there was no probable cause for the search warrants. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). Without the toll records, the Government could not establish that a bookmaking network existed between Deming’s telephones, DiPiazza’s New Orleans telephone, and the two telephones in Lexington, Kentucky.1 Stripped of this information, the only evidence the Government had when it went before the Commissioners was an unsupported tip from Las Vegas, Nevada, and visual surveillance which disclosed nothing more than the fact that Deming was seen near the Woodford Road apartment. The U. S. Supreme Court held in Spinelli that such circumstances did not establish probable cause.
*108I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Internal Revenue summons that were used to obtain the toll slips were “other lawful authority” within the purview of § 605. I am of the opinion that the record clearly establishes that Government agents used the summons for the sole purpose of procuring evidence to prosecute and convict Appellants of conspiracy to violate, and of violating federal criminal statutes. This is contrary to the U. S. Supreme Court’s holding in Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964), where the Court said that the Government could not use the § 7602 summons for that purpose.
When the Government conducts searches for evidence of crime it must proceed by lawful authority. No less is required under § 605 which embodies a congressional mandate that the privacy of telephone users shall be free from arbitrary invasion by government officials. Consequently, the U. S. Supreme Court has held that when such an invasion does take place evidence seized as a result may not be used in a criminal prosecution against the parties to the communication, in these cases, Deming and DiPiazza.2 These holdings accord with the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, to which § 605 has often been equated.3
The record in these cases establishes that Government agents obtained the evidence which led to Appellants’ indictments and convictions through an indiscriminate abuse of civil process, the § 7602 summons.
The majority opinion states that “[t]he FBI raided DiPiazza’s hotel room in New Orleans on January 8, 1966, which was within the period of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.” It is important to note that the F.B.I. raided DiPiazza’s hotel room one month before the Government received its alleged Las Vegas information concerning Deming’s Woodford Road telephone number. It is also important to note that the Government admitted during the hearing on the motion to suppress that electronic surveil-liance had been conducted against Di-Piazza by both the F.B.I., which arrested DiPiazza, and the I.R.S., which arrested Deming, his co-conspirator.
Upon the arrest of DiPiazza on January 8, 1966, the F.B.I. obtained from his person papers containing Deming’s Wood-ford Road telephone number. Although the I.R.S. informed the Commissioners that it summoned Deming’s telephone toll records (Woodford Road) in February of 1966, supposedly at the request of its Las Vegas office, evidence developed that these toll records were summoned in January of 1966. The chronology of events in these cases emerges as follows: The F.B.I. and the I.R.S. electronically monitored DiPiazza’s conversations; F.B.I. agents raided DiPiazza’s hotel room in January of 1966 and seized Deming’s Cincinnati, Ohio telephone number; I.R.S. agents summoned the toll records for that number in the same month, procured search warrants on the basis of the information contained in them, and seized the evidence that led to Appellants’ convictions for violating wagering statutes and for conspiring to do so.
In overruling Appellants’ motions to suppress, the District Judge found that the joint F.B.I. — I.R.S. electronic surveillance did not lead to the indictments against them. He found that the Las Vegas information did. Although some argument during the hearing on the mo*109tion to suppress was devoted to the use of the § 7602 summons in obtaining the toll records, the Government did not at any time allege that the investigation conducted by its agents had civil tax ramifications.
Coming to the propriety of the Government’s use of the § 7602 summons, even if we assume that the joint electronic surveillance did not lead the Government to the evidence used to convict Appellants, which is, I believe, a highly questionable assumption, it is abundantly clear that the F.B.I. and the I.R.S. were not interested in Appellants’ civil federal income tax liability. Special I.R.S. agent Wetherill, who obtained the search warrants, revealed as much during the hearing on the motion to suppress. In the colloquy that follows, Appellants’ counsel was attempting to ascertain from Wetherill how he knew that DiPiazza was a “nationally known bookmaker” as he had alleged in the affidavits supporting the search warrants:
“Q. Now, again I ask you what makes a suspected bookmaker?
A. Suspected bookmaker is a person that I believe to be engaged as a bookmaker.
Q. But who does not have a stamp, does not pay an excise tax and who has not been convicted; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, explain to me why you refer to Sam DiPiazza, who has not been arrested, not been convicted and who has never had a stamp as a nationally known bookmaker? Look at your affidavit and tell me why you made such a statement.
Mr. Michael: I object to one part of the question if it said he has never been arrested. We have information to the contrary.
Mr. Johnson: May I rephrase the question, I didn’t mean to say arrested.
The Court: Forget the arrested.
Q. Do you know whether or not he has ever had a stamp ?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever checked it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not he has ever paid excise tax?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever checked it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever checked whether he has ever been convicted ?
A. No sir.
Q. However, you swear he is a nationally known bookmaker?
A. For the years I have been in the Service, for these years I have been in the Service I have heard and been told that Sam DiPiazza is a bookmaker.”4
But there is more than the subjective intent of the agents in these cases to show that this was from start to finish a criminal investigation. The I.R.S. Special Agent, like Wetherill and all of the agents who participated in these eases, does not assess civil tax liability. He, like his agent colleague in the F.B.I., has a far more grave responsibility:
“A special agent is a criminal law enforcement officer, and just like any state or municipal detective or policeman.” N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1081, 1087 (1962).
Congress has authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to investigate both civil and criminal offenses against the revenue. The first of these functions is carried out by the revenue agent who is usually assigned to the Service’s Audit Division. His job is to see that taxpayers accurately report their income and pay *110the tax owing on it. The special agent, on the other hand, is assigned to the Service’s Intelligence Division. His function, as stated above, is to investigate criminal offenses against the revenue. Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1966). When a taxpayer may be subject to increased liability for taxes as well as criminal penalties, the revenue agent and the special agent will work together in a joint investigation. Thus, for example, where a revenue agent suspects fraud on the part of a taxpayer that would deprive the Government of tax dollars and possibly subject the taxpayer to criminal penalties, he will call in the special agent:
“When a Special agent enters the picture, it is an entirely new investigation, for a new purpose, and the civil tax liability is no longer involved.” N.Y.U. 20th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1081, 1087 (1962).
As mentioned above, no Revenue agent ever took part in the Government’s investigation. The summoning of the telephone records, the stakeout of the Wood-ford Road apartment, and the seizure of all the evidence against Appellants was handled by special agents of the Internal Revenue Service whose function it is to “investigate criminal offenses against the revenue.” This takes on crucial significance in light of the Supreme Court’s holding that a summons authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 cannot be used where the I.R.S. has for its purpose the obtaining of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 11 L.Ed.2d 459 (1964); see Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Caplin, 255 F.Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich.1966).
I believe that the majority paints with too broad a brush when it says that the courts will grant enforcement to the § 7602 summons “[w]here the investigation may produce both civil and criminal evidence.” The cases that the majority cite in support of that statement, namely, United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964), and Ryan v. United States, 379 U.S. 61, 85 S.Ct. 232, 13 L.Ed.2d 122 (1964), say that the Commissioner must show that the investigation is “pursuant and relevant to” a legitimate purpose, which is, in the language of § 7602:
“[To] ascertain [ing] the correctness of any return * * * where none has been made, determin[e] the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability * *
I submit that none of these purposes were present here. See Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956).
While courts have granted enforcement to the § 7602 summons where the investigation might lead to a criminal prosecution the thrust, purpose and scope of the investigation at the outset was to determine the liability of the taxpayer for taxes owed to the Government. United States v. Kleckner, 273 F.Supp. 251 (S.D. Ohio, 1967), appeal dismissed, 382 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1967).
It is a far different thing to say as the majority does in defense of the summons issued in these cases that there was “a possibility that there would be a finding of civil tax liability.” We have a deep and fundamental tradition in this country given force through our Constitution that prevents Government agents from rummaging at will into the private lives of citizens with the expectation that something useful may turn up. Accordingly, I cannot condone the sweeping use of the § 7602 summons in these cases which enabled the I.R.S. to seize knowledge of Appellants’ telephone conversations. I do not believe that the executive branch of our government is entitled to wield such power, nor can I excuse its exercise here on the ground that Government agents believed that the rewards flowing from their actions would more than justify their unfettered intrusion into Appellants’ private lives.
*111While I am in accord with the ultimate goal of law enforcement agencies in stamping out organized crime in this country, these agencies must nevertheless proceed in a manner consistent with existing court decisions, congressional mandate, and constitutional limitations. It is my opinion that they have failed to do this.
Since it is my belief that the sole purpose of the investigation in these cases was to gather evidence for use against Appellants in a criminal prosecution, I submit that the § 7602 summons were not “other lawful authority” within the meaning of § 605 of the Communications Act. Accordingly, the information found in the toll slips could not be disclosed to the Commissioners. 47 U.S.C. § 605; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). Without this information, the Government could not meet the standards for probable cause established in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
I would therefore reverse.

. I.B..S. agents also summoned toll records for telephone numbers found in Deming’s telephone records, including those for two telephone numbers used by Kuhn. Kuhn was indicted along with Appellants as a co-conspirator and convicted largely on the basis of the evidence seized in the raids on Deming’s premises. This Court today affirmed his conviction, No. 19,030. Kuhn’s telephone numbers were the Lexington, Kentucky telephone numbers named in the affidavits supporting the search warrants. The toll records for his numbers showed a high volume of calls to Deming’s telephone numbers. Appendix, pp. 155 and 157. The toll records, which were summoned well before June of 1966, established the bookmaking network alleged in the affidavits. Assuming that an I.K.S. agent did place bets with parties at the Lexington, Kentucky telephone numbers in June of 1966 as alleged in the affidavits, it was not because of his own independent investigation but because of the information contained in the toll records.

. And Kuhn in No. 19,030, Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937); on second appeal, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939); Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1942). The term “sender” has been held to include both parties to the telephone conversation. United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964); see Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 113, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957) (Dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1942); see generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1947).

. As the U. S. Supreme Court said in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418-419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), “a simple assertion of police suspicion” that someone “was known * * * as a gambler” may not provide a basis for a finding of probable cause for a search warrant nor “be used to give additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient”. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).