Court Opinion

ID: 9861757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:28:05.733731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:56.053464
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BUCKLEY, dissenting: I thoroughly agree with the majority’s findings that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest defendant and that the State proved him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, I cannot agree with its conclusion that defendant’s conviction should be reversed because he was denied a fair trial due to the court’s failure to sua sponte strike the juror in question. Because I find People v. Bowman persuasive, I must dissent. Our court time and again has affirmed that the extent and scope of voir dire, and the determination of a prospective juror’s ability to follow the law, lie soundly with the trial court and its decisions will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 476 (2000); People v. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d 411, 424-25 (2001). Such abuse occurs only when the court has conducted itself in a manner that prevents selection of an impartial jury. See People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17 (1994); Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. In Bowman, the court conducted extensive voir dire in a rape case of a prospective juror whose relatives had been raped. When asked if this would cause her to be unfair, the prospective juror answered “probably.” Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 417, 424-25. Defense counsel chose not to use his peremptory challenges to excuse her, and the court did not dismiss her for cause. Thus, she was seated on the jury, which convicted the defendant. While finding that her response to the court’s voir dire questions were somewhat “troubling,” the reviewing court declared that there was no reason to reverse the conviction. Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. First, it noted that even an equivocal response from a prospective juror does not mandate her dismissal for cause if, upon review of her entire voir dire examination, she also indicated that she would try to disregard her bias and follow the law. See Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 422-23. Second, it declared that a trial court has no sua sponte duty in these situations to ask a prospective juror more questions or strike her for cause. See Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. This is for defense counsel, who, along with making considered decisions during jury selection, has various avenues open to him in challenging prospective jurors, including asking additional questions, challenging for cause and using peremptory challenges. See Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 425. A defendant who does not pursue these options and instead accepts such a juror without complaint cannot later attack her presence on the jury that convicted him. See Bowman, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 426. In the instant case, it is clear to me that the trial court thoroughly examined the juror in question, prior to defense counsel inquiring even further. The entire examination reveals that the juror stated she would listen to the evidence and make her judgment accordingly, that she understood the concept of reasonable doubt and that she would have no problem finding defendant not guilty if the State failed to prove its case. As the majority notes, she then answered some questions posed by defense counsel in an equivocal manner. However, defense counsel did not ask that the juror be removed for cause and did not use a peremptory challenge to remove her from the panel. Instead, he accepted her without complaint. Perhaps, had defense counsel asked the court to conduct further inquiry and had it refused, a different situation would have arisen. But as it stands, the juror here, as the juror in Bowman, was not forced upon defendant, nor did the court conduct itself in any manner that prevented the selection of an impartial jury. Therefore, it is my view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not dismissing the juror sua sponte for cause. Moreover, I would clarify as well that I do not believe defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel during jury selection. To succeed on such a claim, defendant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable and, but for his error, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 697-98, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). Defense counsel’s decision whether to use a peremptory challenge is a matter of strategy, and from the record, I do not believe defendant will be able to effectively prove that incompetence played a role here. Moreover, even if he were so able, there was no indication of actual prejudice on the part of the juror against this particular defendant, nor in the trial itself, that would have changed the outcome. As both the majority and I noted initially, the evidence against defendant was strong. For these reasons, I would adopt both the reasoning and decision of Bowman and, therefore, it is my opinion that defendant did receive a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, I would affirm his conviction.