Court Opinion

ID: 9461211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:08:37.179018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:56.808826
License: Public Domain

WTLKEY, Circuit Judge:
I concur in the result my two colleagues reach. Certainly this ease belongs in the Northern District of Georgia, the District of appellant’s incarceration 1 if, indeed this case belongs in any court at all.
Logically and historically, imprisonment has usually resulted in a deprivation of conjugal rights. No other result could be expected from incarceration and forced separation from the rest of society. No prison is designed to be just like home. Deprivation of conjugal rights, like many deprivations flowing from imprisonment, is thus neither cruel nor unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
In the few instances where conjugal visitations have been granted, this has always been done by act of the legislative or executive, as an act of grace or experiment in rehabilitation, not because of any constitutional mandate to grant such a privilege. No decision of any court has been cited requiring conjugal visitations as a matter of constitutional right, and I am aware of none. There are decisions to the contrary.2
I would remand this “case” to the District Court to dismiss as frivolous.3

. As a matter of habeas corpus jurisdiction, it is doubtful that the District Court for the District of Columbia has even the power to entertain this action. Under the mechanical test employed in some older cases, the fact that the action was not brought in the location of the “immediate custodian” of the petitioner would alone have barred the exercise of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sanders v. Bennett, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 32, 148 F.2d 19 (1945); Jones v. Biddle, 131 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1942). Recent cases suggest a more functional approach to habeas jurisdiction. Their concern is less with identifying the actual physical custodian of the petitioner (if, indeed, he has one) and more with evaluating the meaningfulness and sufficiency of the petitioner’s contacts with the forum. Cf. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 493-494, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973); Eisel v. Secretary of Army, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 369-381, 477 F.2d 1251, 1254-1276 (1973). The contacts of the appellant in this case with the District of Columbia are minimal. If habeas jurisdiction were allowed, all prisoners dissatisfied with prison conditions anywhere in the country could bring such actions in this district. (In 1973 there were over 23,000 inmates in the Federal Prison system. Weekly Report, U. S. Department of Justice — Bureau of Prisons, Federal Prisoners Confined Week of 6/14/73.) Of course, jurisdiction may properly be obtained under an application for mandamus, an injunction, or declaratory relief; but, as our opinion makes clear, the same factors of convenience which militate against the assumption of habeas jurisdiction dictate a transfer of this case to the Northern District of Georgia under section 1404(a) if jurisdiction is laid on an alternative ground. See Young v. Director, United States Bureau of Prisons, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 367 F.2d 331 (1966).

. Mott v. Klein (U.S.District Court of New Jersey, 23 July 1974), in which the action was dismissed as frivolous.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).