Court Opinion

ID: 9560615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:52:15.820312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:02.628605
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority that Mr. LaRosa is not subject to the financial claims of Karen J. Thomas because Mr. LaRosa is a married person. Most courts have confined this type of claim to unmarried persons who cohabit together so long as the agreement for financial support or accumulated asset division can be found to exist on grounds other than meretricious sexual services. E.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976); Boland v. Catalano, 202 Conn. 333, 521 A.2d 142 (1987); Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981); Dominguez v. Cruz, 95 N.M. 1, 617 P.2d 1322 (Ct.App.1980); Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C.App. 539, 364 S.E.2d 159, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 486, 370 S.E.2d 236 (1980); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); Warden v. Warden, 36 Wash.App. 693, 676 P.2d 1037, review denied, 101 Wash.2d 1016 (1984); Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis.2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987).
Were Mr. LaRosa not married, I believe the certified question would be answered in the affirmative. Ms. Thomas’s suit would survive the motion to dismiss and the question would then be the proof of the agreement and whether there was in fact an independent basis for the contractual considerations that were not meretricious.
The majority’s view on this issue is difficult for me to unravel. Certainly, our holding in Syllabus Point 3 of Goode v. Goode, 183 W.Va. 468, 396 S.E.2d 430 (1990), would support this view.1 In Goode, neither of the parties was married, they cohabited over a lengthy period, holding themselves out as husband and wife, and they had four children. We refused to alter our prior law and recognize a common law marriage. However, in Part III of Goode, we discussed their rights inter se and cited Marvin v. Marvin, supra, and a *381number of other cases that followed it to support our conclusion that principles of express or implied contract or constructive trust could be applied. I do not view today’s opinion as a retreat from Goode.
I believe there is some confusion concerning the language of the proviso in Goode’s Syllabus Point 3.2 Certainly, this proviso might be read, as Ms. Thomas argues, that so long as the distribution of property between the cohabiting couple does not affect the rights of a spouse and support rights of children, it is permissible. It would have been more frank for the majority to acknowledge that this could be a possible interpretation of the proviso, but to say forthrightly that it is not what was intended. Instead, the majority chooses in its Syllabus Point 1 to emphasize the proviso as if it clearly stated that under no circumstances can any financial claim be made where one of the cohabitors is married.

. Syllabus Point 3 of Goode is:
"A court may order a division of property acquired by a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and wife. Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either express or implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be considered in ordering such a division of property may include: the purpose, duration, and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties. Provided, however, that if either the man or woman is validly married to another person during the period of cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights of the children of such man or woman shall not *381in any way be adversely affected by such division of property.”

. From a purely legal standpoint, it does not belong in Goode, as neither party had been previously married or had married during the period they cohabited, nor did they have any prior children. This issue would have been more properly addressed for the first time here.