Court Opinion

ID: 9740894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:44:16.938323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.923423
License: Public Domain

Kendall, J.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether or not the widow’s statutory allowance, as provided by §6-711, Burns’ 1951 (Supp.), Acts of 1881 as amended by Acts of 1949, ch. 52, p. 155, §1, constitutes a prior and preferred claim to that of a welfare lien on real estate created by §§52-1213 and 52-1214, Burns’ 1951 Replacement.
Appellee’s decedent, John F. Kehr, died in Elkhart County, Indiana, March 6, 1951, leaving surviving him, among other heirs, his widow, Dora Kehr, who had been his wife for more than twenty years. The assets of the estate were insufficient to pay the widow’s statutory allowance, costs of administration and appellant’s claim. The appellant’s claim number one was filed asking for reimbursement for old-age assistance advanced by the appellant’s Department to the decedent during his lifetime from May 1, 1947, to May, 1950, in the sum of $2,589.10. There was also a claim filed by one Henry S. Weaver for $736.00 as a result of a judgment thereto*328fore rendered. Said judgment creditor is not taking-part in this appeal.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of appellee to the effect that the widow’s claim for her $1,000.00 statutory allowance had priority over that of the Elkhart County Department of Public Welfare for amounts advanced as old-age assistance, which the court held had second priority; the court further held that the judgment of the creditor, Henry S. Weaver, had third priority.
The appellant filed motion for new trial, which was overruled, and, for the purpose of this appeal, has assigned as errors as follows:
1. The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial.
2. The court erred in its finding, decision and order that the claim of the widow for her statutory allowance had priority over the lien of appellant.
The appellant’s claim was filed pursuant to §52-1214, supra, which is as follows:
“Claim against estate — Certain priority — Real estate occupied by surviving spouse. — Upon the death of any person who is a recipient of aged assistance, a claim shall be filed against his estate by the county department of public welfare for recovery of all assistance paid to or on behalf of such person from and after May 1, 1947. Such claim shall be for all amounts paid by any county beginning with any payment made on May 1, 1947 or thereafter and shall be on behalf of the state department and any county department which has paid assistance to said recipient. Any claim filed for recovery of aged assistance shall have priority in order of payment from the estate over all other claims, except prior recorded encumbrances, taxes, reasonable costs of administration, and funeral expenses in an amount not to exceed $125.00. If the real estate of a deceased recipient is occupied by a surviving husband or wife, the department of public welfare shall not assert its lien or claim during *329the lifetime of said surviving spouse unless other claimants or persons have opened an estate and are attempting to enforce their claims in which case the department shall file and assert the claim for recovery of old age assistance.”
There was a stipulation between the parties that the assets of the estate of John F. Kehr, applicant for assistance, were not sufficient to satisfy the claim of the parties hereto; that the estate had been adjudicated as insolvent; that decedent and his now widow, Dora Kehr, had lived together for more than twenty years; that said widow was the wife of the decedent at the time of his making application for old-age assistance but did not join him in executing the application or agreements pertaining thereto; that on May 31, 1951, the Elkhart County Department of Public Welfare filed claim for reimbursement for $2,589.10 for old-age assistance rendered to the decedent under the terms of the welfare act, being §52-1214, supra, and a contract executed by the decedent in said department.
The appellant contends that by the execution of the application for old-age assistance as prescribed in §52-1213, supra, that the agreement so executed takes priority over any other lien subsequently imposed. Also, that the lien in favor of appellant’s Department became the lien in the same manner as if the recipient had executed a mortgage. This question is of first impression to this state. It is necessary to determine whether or not the Legislature, by the enactment of §§52-1213 and 52-1214, supra, so intended the Welfare Act to constitute a lien on applicant’s real estate so as to have priority over the widow’s statutory allowance, being §6-711, supra.
*330*329The rights given a widow in §6-711, supra, are in the nature of a preferred charge imposed by law upon the *330estate and constitutes such a right that it is not necessary for the widow to file a claim against the estate to compel payment therefor. Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449, 73 N. E. 130, at p. 454. Sec. 52-1214, supra, does however provide that any claim in behalf of the Welfare Department filed for recovery of - assistance should have priority in order of payment from the estate over all other claims. We do not believe that section of the statute is applicable to the widow’s statutory allowance on account of its being a preferred charge for which the widow does not have to file claim.
In the case of Claypool v. Jaqua, Administratrix, et al. (1893), 135 Ind. 499, 35 N. E. 285, the court said:
“The widow’s right to this allowance of $500 is, in some of its incidents, analogous to the right of dower. The husband can not, by any act, deprive her of it against her will, and she may . . . take it, and in addition take that which the will gives.” . (See also Rush v. Kelley (1905), 34 Ind. App. 449.)
Our courts have also held that the widow’s statutory allowance is such a preferred charge against the decedent’s estate that even if the widow should die before payment that its payment may be enforced by her executor or administrator against the estate of her husband. Bratney, Administrator v. Curry, Executor (1870), 33 Ind. 399, Pierce, Ex., v. Pierce, Adm. (1898), 21 Ind. App. 184, 51 N. E. 954.
The appellant cites the case of Dixon, Sheriff, et al. v. Aldrich, et al. (1891), 127 Ind. 296, 26 N. E. 843. There the court held the right of the widow to her $500 statutory. allowance to have precedence over a levy by the sheriff of an execution on the property of a husband during his lifetime and further held that the Legislature intended in all cases to secure the widow her statutory allowance except when the husband in his lifetime had *331divested himself of ownership or in some manner encumbered the title so as to destroy the right of exemption. We do not have such facts before us in the case now under consideration. We believe the case of Dixon, Sheriff, supra, is strongly persuasive of justice, and the intention of the Legislature for in it the court said :
“The statute which gives the widow the right to Five hundred dollars is clear and comprehensive, and it expresses the intention of the Legislature to give her that sum out of property of which her husband died the owner and which he might, if living, have exempted from sale on execution.”
There is no information in the case just cited as to whether or not the property upon which execution was levied was real or. personal. The sole question in the case immediately cited was whether or not a widow could secure the $500 statutory allowance (amended 1949) where the property of her deceased husband was held under a levy made by the sheriff before the husband’s death. The court answered that question in the affirmative and stated:
“The levy did not change the title to the property, that still remained in the husband. He was the owner notwithstanding the levy, and he might have successfully claimed an equal amount in value to Six hundred dollars as exempt from execution.”
The Legislature by the enactment of §6-711, supra, provided in part, “The deficit shall constitute a lien upon the real estate of the decedent liable to sale for the payment of debts which liens may be enforced.” The Act further provides, “. . . and shall be superior to the lien of judgments upon said real estate rendered against said decedent.” Certainly it was the intention, therefore, of the Legislature to secure such widow, regardless of her station in life, the allow*332anee as therein provided if there remained that amount over and above the administration expenses, expenses of last sickness and funeral expense. We believe that §6-711, supra, is a declaration by the Legislature that the interest of society would be best served by providing for the widows to the amount of such allowance than for the creditors of said decedent.
It was held, back as early as 1843 when the widow’s statutory allowance was $150.00, that the widow might take the widow’s allowance without reference, to the debts or expenses of administration. Hays v. Buffington (1850), 2 Ind. 369.
We do not believe it was the intention of the Legislature, when enacting the Welfare Acts, to hold that the “welfare lien” would be prior to the widow’s statutory allowance and thus- deprive a widow of that allowance which the law had recognized as a preferred charge upon the estate of her deceased husband to provide her with the necessities of life until she had an opportunity to adjust herself to her new situation and as a substitute for the lost earnings of her husband during the settlement of the estate. If the Legislature had so-intended they no doubt would have provided.
The primary purpose of reinstating the “lien law” in 1947 was for the prime purpose of providing a means or method for reimbursing the Welfare agency as a department of government for funds expended for old-age assistance if the decedent left property at his death after compliance with the provisions of the statute as to payment of administration expense, last illness and funeral expense and to prohibit recipients from securing assistance at the expense of government when they had members of their own family capable and financially able to support them. The Legislature undoubtedly did not approve of granting assistance to recipients when members of their own fam*333ily were able to pay and did not and then to permit them to secure the benefits of inheritance by claiming the property of the recipient after death. The primary purpose of the court is to render justice. We believe it' would be unfair and unjust and contrary to the long-established policy of the state to permit the Welfare Department as an agency of government to place its claim ahead of the widow’s statutory allowance and that to so hold would be contrary to public policy.
The appellants contend that the welfare lien provision has the same effect as a mortgage. In the instant case, however, the widow did not sign the agreement by which appellant claims the real estate was encumbered. Neither was the agreement executed by decedent notarized and neither did it contain a description of the real estate. The court is of the opinion that the appellant’s contention in this connection is without merit.
Sec. 2-3514, Burns’ 1946 Replacement, provides as follows:
“WHEN HUSBAND’S MORTGAGE OF REALTY INVALID — No mortgage or sale of any real estate exempted under the provisions of this act shall be valid if executed by a married man, unless the mortgage or deed be signed and acknowledged by the wife in due form of law. Acts 1879 (Spec. Sess.) ch. 50, §13, p. 127.”
The only conclusion therefore to be drawn by this court is that the decedent did not so divest himself of ownership or so encumber the title to the real estate then owned by him as to destroy the right of his widow to the preferred charge upon the estate in her favor which the law gives her. We find nothing from which it can be said or an inference drawn that the widow waives any right to claim her statutory widow’s allowance.
*334From a close analysis of the statutes under consideration, it appears that they are doubtless in irreconcilable conflict. We do not believe that the Legislature, in creating the lien in favor of the Department of Public Welfare, intended to create a lien having the characteristics of a mortgage.
In the case of Cox v. Timm (1914), 182 Ind. 7, 105 N. E. 479, the court announced the rule in the construction of conflicting statutes to be as follows:
“And as this construction brings about provisions in the law which are in the particular under construction conflicting in effect, one of them (provision in the law) must give way to save the law from the objection of lack of uniform operation. In such case, if the conflict is irreconcilable, the intention embodied in the provision latest in the law, and therefore last in order of time, is deemed to prevail.”
Construing the statutes discussed herein on the basis of the principle announced in the case of Cox v. Timm, supra, we can only reach the conclusion that the widow’s allowance, as reinacted by the Legislature in 1949, must prevail over the claim of the Welfare Department under the welfare acts of 1947 which deal with the same subject matter.
Notwithstanding the fact that the creditor in this case is an agency of government created by Legislature to provide for the unfortunate, we believe that §6-711, supra, is a concise and definite statement which has declared for more than one hundred years that society can be best provided for by granting to widows a preferred allowance save costs of administration, last illness and funeral expenses. The appellant’s remedy to correct this situation lies with the Legislature.
Finding no error, judgment affirmed.
*335Kelley, J., concurs in result with opinion.
Crumpacker, P, J., dissents with opinion.
Achor, J., concurs in dissent.