Court Opinion

ID: 9709326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:58.596187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.725724
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
concurring.
I concur generally in Judge Robertson’s opinion in this case. However, I wish to address specially two issues, raised by the Appellant Wiles which issues are the subject of Judge Young’s dissenting opinion.
Wiles contends that Mahan’s tendered instruction number 2, given by the trial court, constitutes reversible error. This instruction stated:
“I instruct you ladies and gentlemen of the jury, that a storekeeper must use ordinary care to keep premises in a reasonably safe condition for the customers. Ordinary care, as applied to storekeepers, is that degree of care usually exercised by ordinary prudent persons engaged in the same line of business.” (Emphasis added).
I agree that trade or industry standards, or the customary practices of a specific business, such as storekeepers, are not the standard of care which the law requires in cases such as this. P-M Gas & Wash. Co. Inc. v. Smith, (1978) Ind.App., 383 N.E.2d 357; Gilbert v. Stone City Construction Co., Inc., (1976) Ind.App., 357 N.E.2d 738; Wal*598ters v. Kellam & Foley, (1977) Ind.App., 360 N.E.2d 199.1 The standard imposed by law is the standard of reasonable care. P-M Gas & Wash. Co., Inc., supra. If the instruction in question told the jury that so long as the storekeeper behaved as other storekeepers he was exercising reasonable care, or ordinary care, the instruction would substitute custom and practice of storekeepers as the standard in place of the legal standard of reasonable care. In such event, I would agree with Judge Young that the instruction was error. However, I do not so view the challenged instruction. The instruction did not advise the jury that ordinary care as applied to storekeepers was the degree of care exercised by other storekeepers. The jury was told that storekeepers must exercise that degree of care exercise by ordinary prudent persons engaged in the same line of business. I believe this fairly can be construed as saying that the duty of a storekeeper in the maintenance of his store premises is to use that degree of care which would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent person under like circumstances, and that is the standard of care which the law requires. Further, I do not believe that this instruction confused the standard of care with evidence of the standard of care, a danger of which Judge Sullivan warned in both P-M Gas & Wash. Co., Inc., supra, and Walters v. Kellam & Foley, supra.
The instruction is not as precise as it could be, is not a model of draftmanship, and I do not recommend its use, but I do not find it to be reversible error. Further, in the court’s instructions numbered 4 and 5, the jury was properly instructed regarding the definition of “negligence” and “ordinary care.”2 Instruction No. 9 told the jury that Wiles was an invitee on Mahan’s property and that “[a]n owner and occupant owes the duty to use ordinary care to maintain his property in a reasonably safe condition suitable for the use of those who come upon its as invitees . . . Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1, given by the court, informed the jury that plaintiff had the burden of proving the defendant (Mahan) negligent in failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in keeping its premises in a reasonably safe condition for its customers, and/or in failing to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in warning its customers of the dangerous condition of its premises. Defendant’s Instruction No. 3, given by the court, while generally addressing the subject of notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition, nevertheless advised the jury that “it is the duty of a store owner to exercise reasonable care to keep his store in a safe condition for the use of his customers.” Therefore, as previously stated, while I believe an instruction on the issue of the standard of care required of storekeepers could have been framed in more precise language, considering all of the instructions as a whole, I cannot say that the jury was misled by the instruction given.
In reaching the conclusion just stated, I did not disregard the rule that a bad instruction cannot be cured by a correct one. Deckard v. Adams, (1965) 246 Ind. 123, 203 N.E.2d 303; Childs v. Rayburn, (1976) Ind.App., 346 N.E.2d 655; Hainey v. Zink, (1979) Ind.App., 394 N.E.2d 238. I do not agree that this rule applies in this case. I *599believe the rule stated by Deckard, Childs, and Hainey, supra, applies in those cases where a clearly erroneous instruction has been given together with a contradictory correct instruction. In such a case, the jury cannot be left to determine which of the two contradictory instructions is correct, and the appellate tribunal left to determine which of the contradictory instructions the jury should reasonably believe. Childs v. Rayburn, supra. However, where the instructions are not contradictory, and the challenged instruction is not clearly erroneous, the fact that an instruction, or some part of it, may not be precisely accurate does not constitute reversible error where, considering all of the instructions as a whole, it appears that the law was stated with substantial accuracy. Childs v. Rayburn, supra. In my opinion, the latter is the precise situation here, thus the imprecision of the challenged instruction was cured by other instructions.
Wiles sought to prove by the testimony of her physician that as a result of the injuries sustained she had a twenty-five percent (25%) permanent partial impairment of the person as a whole. The trial court sustained Mahan’s objection and excluded such evidence on the grounds that permanent partial impairment was a workmen’s compensation concept not applicable to civil actions for personal injuries. This ruling was incorrect and the offered evidence was admissible. 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, sec. 314, p. 412. However, under the circumstances of this case, it was not reversible error to exclude evidence of permanent partial impairment. I am inclined towards Judge Robertson’s opinion that such evidence was not vital to Wiles’s case in view of the other evidence received concerning her injuries and physical condition. There is another reason, however, why exclusion of the evidence of permanent impairment, though erroneous, was not reversible error.
In this case the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants (Mahan). A general verdict is a finding in favor of the prevailing party on all the material issues in the case. Harker v. Gruhl, (1916) 62 Ind.App. 177, 111 N.E. 457; 21 I.L.E., Negligence, sec. 221. “A general verdict against a party is a finding against him upon all issues of which he assumed the affirmative.” Scoopmire v. Taflinger, (1944) 114 Ind.App. 419, 52 N.E.2d 728. Further, it has been held in negligence actions that a general verdict for the defendant amounts to a finding that the defendant was free from negligence or that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Siivonen v. City of Oneida, (1970) 38 A.D.2d 934, 306 N.Y.S.2d 278; Snider v. Jennings, (1968) 11 Mich.App. 562, 161 N.W.2d 594; Jones v. Kline, (1955) Ohio App. 137 N.E.2d 611; See also : Kihlken v. Barber, (1935) 129 Ohio St. 485, 196 N.E. 164. But see: Mason v. Stengell, (1969) Ky.App., 441 S.W.2d 412 (rejecting the argument that a verdict for defendant as to all claims of plaintiff should be construed as a finding either that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence or defendant was not negligent, thus entitling defendant to an affirmance on appeal.)3 It also has been held that a general verdict in favor of the defendant imports that all issues submitted to the jury were found in favor of the defendant. LeBlanc v. Bray, (1975) 168 Conn. 92, 357 A.2d 926. Here, the issues of Mahan’s negligence and Wiles’ contributory negligence were submitted to the jury. Under the authorities cited, the general verdict for the defendant was a finding in Mahan’s favor on both of these issues. The excluded evidence concerning Wiles’ permanent partial impairment had no bearing upon the issues of Mahan’s negligence or Wiles’ freedom from contributory negligence. Thus, the general verdict of Mahan was not tainted by the refusal of this evidence.4 Since the general verdict *600for Mahan established either that Mahan was free from negligence or that Wiles was guilty of contributory negligence, Wiles could not have recovered in this action. Consequently, Wiles being unable to prevail on the issue of liability, the exclusion of evidence pertaining solely to extent of injuries, even though incorrect, would not constitute reversible error.
Therefore, for the reasons stated in Judge Robertson’s opinion and in this opinion, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.

. Although the standard of care is reasonable care, and not custom and practice or trade standards, evidence of such custom, practice, or standards is admissible and may be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether or not reasonable care was exercised. P-M Gas & Wash. Co., Inc., supra; Walters v. Kellam & Foley, supra; Roberts v. Indiana Gas & Water Co., (1966) 140 Ind.App. 409, 218 N.E.2d 556; 57 Am.Jur.2d, Negligence, sec. 78, p. 428-29.

. Instruction No. 4 stated:
“Negligence, either on the part of the plaintiff or the defendant, is the failure to do what a reasonable careful and prudent person would have done under the same or like circumstances, or the doing of some thing which a reasonably careful and prudent person would not have done under the same or like circumstances; in other words, negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable or ordinary care.” Instruction No. 5 was as follows:
“Reasonable care or ordinary care, on the part of both the plaintiff and the defendant, is such care as a reasonably careful and ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.”

. In Mason v. Stengell, supra, the court found error in instructions and in the refusal of evidence which could have affected the verdict. The verdict here, in my opinion, is not so tainted.

. Nor was the verdict tainted by the giving of erroneous instructions as is shown by Judge Robertson’s opinion, and by the previous discussion in this concurring opinion,