Court Opinion

ID: 9590675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:57:30.744427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:17.810961
License: Public Domain

Banke, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The announced basis for the decision in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (105 SC 830, 83 LE2d 821) (1985), was that “[a] first appeal as of right... is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.” Id. 469 U. S. at 396. This rationale is no less applicable in a case where the appeal is dismissed because the notice of appeal was not filed in a timely manner than in a case where the appeal is dismissed for failure to follow a technical procedural rule of the appellate court. Therefore, I do not believe the basis offered by the majority for distinguishing Evitts is a valid one.
There is no suggestion in this case that the defendant, who has filed an affidavit of indigency and is represented on appeal by court-*322appointed counsel, has voluntarily waived his right of appeal. It is thus clear under Evitts that if we dismiss the appeal based on counsel’s failure to file the notice of appeal in a timely manner, the defendant will automatically be entitled to habeas corpus relief based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, I agree with Presiding Judge McMurray that we should adhere to Johnson v. State, 183 Ga. App. 168 (358 SE2d 313) (1987), and reach the merits of the appeal. Perhaps the occurrence of such situations could be reduced in the future by including in the order appointing counsel a requirement that the notice of appeal be filed in a timely manner, along with a notification that failure to do so will be treated as contempt of court.
Decided February 15, 1989.
Lawrence E. Diamond, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Benham joins in this dissent.