Court Opinion

ID: 9545687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:17:41.044814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:20.725210
License: Public Domain

LUSK, J.,
specially concurring.
As I view this ease, the controlling question is whether the plaintiff is precluded from maintaining this action for damages under the Employers’ Liability Law by the fact that she applied for and received an award of compensation for the identical personal injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. This issue is raised by the so-called first “Supplemental Answer and Challenge,” which may properly be treated as a plea in bar. This answer alleged, in substance, that the plaintiff was an employee of the Estate of Rose White, Deceased, at the time she was injured, that both the plaintiff and her employer were subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and that the plaintiff filed a claim with the State Industrial Accident Commission for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and that the Commission paid to the plaintiff benefits to which she was entitled under the Act. The ruling of the circuit court which sustained the plaintiff’s motion to strike this pleading was, in my opinion, erroneous.
A decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation to a workman for disability carries with' it, of necessity, findings of the Commission that the workman sustained personal injury while employed by an employer subject to the Act, and that such disability was the result of injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such *21employment. Unless these conditions are present, the Commission is without jurisdiction to make an award. OES 656.152 (1). It, of course, must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Commission acted lawfully and within its jurisdiction. By subdivision (2) of OES 656.152, “the right to receive” the sums awarded is “in lieu of all claims against his employer on account of such injury” except as otherwise specified in the Act. The only exceptions found in the Act are these:
(1) Injury due to the negligence or wrong of a third person not in the same employ. OES 656.154.
(2) Injuries sustained by a workman of an employer engaged in a hazardous occupation in violation of the Aet. OES 653.212.
(3) Injury sustained by a workman of an employer in default. OES 653.212.
It is not for the court to read additional exceptions into the Act. Kowcun v. Bybee, 182 Or 271, 292-296, 186 P2d 790. See, also, King v. Union Oil Company, 144 Or 655, 663, 24 P2d 345, 25 P2d 1055. It is an appropriate case for application of the maxim, expressio unius est exelusio alterius. Prima facie, therefore, the pleading states facts which constitute a defense to the action. If it had been the plaintiff’s position that the case falls within any of the three exceptions set forth in the statute, that was a matter to be pleaded and proven by her.
In point of fact, the plaintiff makes no such claim. Her position from the beginning was, and still is, that she can avoid the provision of OES 656.152 (2) against double recovery by giving back the money she received from the Commission. But that section provides that: “The right to receive such sums is in lieu of all claims,” etc. (Italics added.) Plaintiff’s “right” is established *22by the award and, there being no suggestion of fraud or mistake, the Commission, no longer having jurisdiction except for the purpose of considering a change in the physical condition of the plaintiff and modifying the award if a change should be found (Dimitroff v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 209 Or 316, 333, 306 P2d 398; Hoffmeister v. State I. A. Com., 176 Or 216, 221, 156 P2d 834; 122 ALR 594-595; 58 Am Jur 893, Workmen’s Compensation § 509), is powerless to vacate or otherwise alter its decision that plaintiff is entitled to compensation under the Act, and, so far as I know, is without authority to receive the money if it should be tendered. Certainly, the verdict of the jury in this case can not have the effect of invalidating the Commission’s decision or “the right” of the plaintiff which the decision established.
Plaintiff first filed a claim for an injury sustained by her as an employee of her employer, Eose White. The portion of the claim which is required to be executed by the claimant’s employer was made out by the defendant, Norris, Beggs & Simpson, as agents for Eose White, the claimant’s employer. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed another claim for the same injury in which she named her employer in the alternative as “Norris, Beggs & Simpson, or Eose White Estate.” The second claim was received by the Commission on November 13, 1954, and on January 13, 1955, this action was commenced. On October 25, 1955, the attorneys for the plaintiff addressed to the Commission a letter which was not received in evidence, but is a part of the record before us as Defendant’s Exhibit 40 for identification. By this letter, the Commission was advised that plaintiff’s attorneys were enclosing the Commission’s form “32C-Eev.”, entitled “Election to Proceed Against Third Party”, and that the word *23“third” was stricken out and the word “another” substituted therefor. The letter continues:
“We contend in the above entitled action [the instant case] that Norris, Beggs & Simpson was the employer of the plaintiff and thus not a third party under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Oregon. Therefore, the reason for the change in this form is to comply with any possible regulation of the Commission, but by filing the same it is not to be deemed as any admission that Norris, Beggs & Simpson is a third party or is other than an employer of the plaintiff. Upon the trial of the above entitled action we presume that the defendant Norris, Beggs & Simpson will contend that the plaintiff was employed by the Bose White estate. It is our understanding that if Norris, Beggs & Simpson was plaintiff’s employer and had not complied with the Act, recovery can be had against Norris, Beggs & Simpson, but the Commission must be repaid the compensation which has been or will be awarded to Mrs. Bandy upon her claim filed with the Commission, and that no notice of election is necessary or required under any of the laws of the State of Oregon.”
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff does not seek to bring herself within any of the exceptions in the Act. In her brief, she expressly disclaims reliance on any such theory.
It is, of course, true that there is nothing in the Act to prevent an employee from suing his employer for negligence where neither is under the act. But the question here is as to the effect of the award which the plaintiff sought and obtained from the Commission. While it is not res judicata in the technical sense, for the defendant was not a party to the proceeding before the Commission, it does, as I view it, have the force of a judgment for the purposes of the present *24cáse. It establishes the fact that plaintiff was the employee of an employer under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, who was awarded compensation for an injury. ' The pleading under consideration shows that the injury for which she now sues was the same one for which she received compensation. The statute steps in to prevent maintenance of this action.
It was entirely proper, in my judgment, for the plaintiff to proceed in the alternative in filing her claim with the Commission, and also to file the present action. It is stated in 1 Schneider, Workmen’s Compensation (perm ed) 239, §98: “It is not unusual in instances of doubt as to jurisdiction to file suits at common law and also make claim for compensation within the jurisdictional period.” If this is not done, the claimant may lose in both forums by the running of the short jurisdictional time for filing a claim with the Commission, and by an adverse decision in the action in court. In this case, had the Commission rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation, she would have been entitled to maintain the present action, but, since she successfully invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission and has received the sums awarded, she is precluded by having done so from a second recovery for the same injury against the defendant in this action.
I ám unable to see validity in the suggestion that the plaintiff is placed in a “very precarious position” by what the court holds today. She was represented by able and experienced counsel, who took the very steps necessary to protect her rights. She has received an award from the Commission which presumably is adequate to compensate her for her injury. Her position is no different than that of .thousands of others who every year receive eompensátion for injury under the *25Workmen’s Compensation Law in lieu of the right which, but for that law, they would have had to maintain an action for damages at common law or under the Employers’ Liability Act.
I concur in the result of Judge Millard’s opinion.
Warner, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.