Court Opinion

ID: 9353209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 08:10:21.178525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:23.339564
License: Public Domain

In The
                             Court of Appeals
               Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                                      No. 06-22-00067-CR

                    CHRISTOPHER DAYSHON CASTANEDA, Appellant

                                                V.

                               THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                             On Appeal from the 6th District Court
                                   Lamar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 29416

                        Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Morriss,* JJ.
                          Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef

–––––––––––––––––––
*Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment
                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        After a jury found Christopher Dayshon Castaneda guilty of manufacture or delivery of a

controlled substance, more than four but less than 200 grams, and evading arrest/detention with a

prior conviction, the trial court assessed punishment of thirty years’ and ten years’ confinement

in prison, respectively. Those sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Castaneda appeals,

arguing that (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, (2) there was

insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castaneda possessed

methamphetamine, and (3) there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that Castaneda intended to distribute methamphetamine. For the reasons below, we affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

I.      Castaneda Waived His Complaint Regarding the Trial Court’s Denial of His Motion
        to Suppress

        Before the commencement of trial, Castaneda filed a motion to suppress relating to

evidence that had been seized during what Castaneda maintained was an illegal search and

seizure. The trial court carried the motion with the case, denying it following the completion of

the trial.1 Castaneda contends that, at trial, police officers testified in regard to two separate

search warrants that gave them access to his house at 2116 Maple. When police arrived to

execute the first warrant, Castaneda ran from the house and was apprehended in a nearby RV

park. At that time, officers saw paraphernalia, so they obtained a second warrant to search the

house. During the final search, officers found in some luggage the methamphetamine that is the

1
The record before us does not disclose any hearing on the motion to suppress or any objection to carrying the
motion with the case.
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subject of this case. On appeal, Castaneda complains that neither of those search warrants are

contained in the record.        Consequently, according to Castaneda, he “met his burden of

establishing evidence was seized, but the State failed to establish that the evidence was legally

seized pursuant to a valid search warrant” due to its failure to include the search warrants in the

record.

          In support of his argument that the State had the duty to ensure that the warrant was

included in the record, Castaneda directs us to Handy v. State, 189 S.W.3d 296 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006), and relies on the following portions of the court’s opinion:

                  We have held that “[w]hen a defendant objects to the [trial] court
          admitting evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully seized and the State relies
          on a search warrant, in the absence of a waiver, reversible error will result unless
          the record reflects that the warrant was exhibited to the trial judge.” Cannady v.
          State, 582 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also Miller v. State, 736
          S.W.2d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (rule also applies to affidavit supporting
          warrant). As Professors Dix and Dawson have explained, the rationale for this
          rule

                 “rests on the assumption that the State has more ready access to the
                 documents at issue and thus can most easily comply with a
                 requirement for production. When the existence or terms of those
                 documents becomes crucial to the hearing, then the State is more
                 fairly given the obligation of making them available. This permits
                 the court to test the reasonableness of the State’s reliance upon
                 them and facilitates any attack upon their sufficiency the defendant
                 may wish to mount.”

          G. Dix & R. Dawson, 42 Tex. Prac., Criminal Practice and Procedure § 29.111
          (2d ed. 2001). Furthermore,

                 “[t]he basis for and formulation of the rule suggests that the State’s
                 duty [to exhibit the warrant and its supporting affidavit] does not
                 arise until . . . the defendant fulfills his initial burden of producing
                 evidence and convincing the court that the evidence at issue was
                 obtained by a search or seizure, that he has standing to contest that
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               action, and that the police action was without a warrant or was
               otherwise on its face unreasonable. Only when the analysis
               progresses to the warrant and supporting affidavit should the State
               have the duty of producing those documents.”

       Id. at § 29.112 (2d ed. 2001) (emphasis added).

Handy, 189 S.W.3d at 298–99.

       However, Handy also states,

       In the instant case, appellant never established his standing to challenge the search
       in question, i.e., he never established that he personally had a reasonable
       expectation of privacy in the premises that were searched. See Kothe v. State, 152
       S.W.3d 54, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). . . . Although appellant asserted in his
       boilerplate motion to suppress that his residence was the place searched, he
       presented no proof of such claim to the trial court. In addition, appellant never
       established that the search in question was on its face unreasonable. Under these
       circumstances, the State had no duty to exhibit the search warrant and its
       supporting affidavit to the trial court.

Id. at 299 (footnote omitted).

       Castaneda’s motion asked the court (1) to conduct a hearing to determine the

admissibility of any evidence recovered during the investigation of this case, (2) to rule, after

such hearing, that the evidence was recovered as a result of an illegal search and seizure, and

(3) to find that the evidence was inadmissible.

       On appeal, Castaneda claims that, because his motion to suppress sufficiently challenged

the legality of the drugs found in his house at 2116 Maple, the burden shifted to the State. Yet,

Castaneda’s motion failed to identify any particular location that he believed had been illegally

searched, failed to identify the particular property that he believed was illegally seized, and failed

to establish that he had standing to complain of the alleged illegality of the search that took place

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at 2116 Maple. “Under these circumstances, the State had no duty to exhibit the search warrant .

. . to the trial court.” See id.

        Consequently, without more, Castaneda failed to demonstrate that any particular

evidence, including the methamphetamine, was seized pursuant to an illegal search.

        We overrule Castaneda’s first point of error.

II.     Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Verdict of Manufacture or Delivery of
        Methamphetamine

        In his second and third points of error, Castaneda contends that there was insufficient

evidence to show (1) his intent to possess methamphetamine and (2) his intent to deliver

methamphetamine.

        A.       Standard of Review

        “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “Our

rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under

the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to

fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences

from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)).
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       “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

       The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’”

Id. at 297 (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is

based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

       “[A] person commits an offense if [he] knowingly manufactures, delivers, or possesses

with intent to deliver a controlled substance,” such as methamphetamine. TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a); see Talley v. State, 909 S.W.2d 233, 234 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d). Here, the State’s indictment against Castaneda alleged that, “on or

about MAY 13, 2021, in Lamar County, Texas, . . . [Castaneda] did then and there knowingly

possess, with intent to deliver, a controlled substance, namely Methamphetamine, in an amount

of four grams or more but less than 200 grams.”

                                                  6
       B.      There Was Sufficient Evidence to Show Castaneda’s Intent to Possess
               Methamphetamine

       In his second point of error, Castaneda contends that there was insufficient evidence to

show that he possessed the methamphetamine because the State failed to admit the

methamphetamine into evidence. Appellant cites Lake v. State, 577 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979), in support of this argument.

       Lake argued that he could not be convicted of possession of heroin because the heroin

was destroyed before trial. He had been tried previously on the same offense, but his conviction

was set aside by the trial court. After the initial conviction, the heroin was destroyed by order of

the trial court. Id. In affirming his second conviction, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

stated, “It is true, as appellant argues, that a defendant should be given access to contraband for

the purpose of analysis [w]hen available.” Id. The court continued, “There are instances,

however, when it is not available, such as when it is lost or is destroyed in the process of

analysis. Under such circumstances it is not error to convict for possession of drugs absent the

physical presence of the drug itself, providing the drug has been analyzed and the chain of

custody explicated.” Id.

       Castaneda contends that the Lake exception is limited to instances where the drugs were

not available at the time of trial and, according to Castaneda, that was not the case here. We

disagree. In Lake, the court recognized that, pursuant to the particular facts before it, the drugs

were not available to the defendant for purposes of his own analysis, nor were they admitted at

trial. Yet, despite the unavailability at trial, not necessarily because of it, the court determined

that it was not error to convict Lake for possession of heroin because (1) the heroin had been
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analyzed, (2) the chain of custody had been established, and (3) there was no showing of bad

faith on the part of the State in relation to the destruction of the drugs. Id.

        In this case, Christopher Mayfield, a detective with the Paris Police Department (PPD),

testified that, around May 13, he received information from “concerned citizens” that Castaneda

may have been selling narcotics from a house he shared with his girlfriend at 2116 Maple. After

obtaining a search warrant for the premises, officers discovered carry-on luggage containing

black plastic tubes2 that are commonly used in dispensaries to package marihuana, along with a

plastic baggie containing forty-one multicolored pills. PPD officers testified that they believed

the pills were “MDMA,” which is short for methyl dioxide methamphetamine. Further, without

objection, the trial court admitted a laboratory report prepared by the Texas Department of

Public Safety (DPS). The report noted that twenty-two of the forty-one pills had been analyzed

and that they contained methamphetamine, weighing 4.77 grams. Castaneda did not challenge

the chain of custody, and there was no evidence that the drugs received by the DPS were not the

drugs seized from Castaneda’s residence. Moreover, Castaneda does not argue on appeal, and

the record does not show, that the State acted in bad faith when it did not introduce the drugs at

trial. Consequently, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that

Castaneda possessed methamphetamine.

        We overrule Castaneda’s second point of error.

2
 Mayfield described the tubes as being about three or four inches long and about an inch and one-half in diameter.
The tubes were labeled “contains THC.”
                                                        8
        C.      There Was Sufficient Evidence to Show Castaneda’s Intent to Deliver
                Methamphetamine

        In his third point of error, Castaneda maintains that the State did not offer any evidence

of his intent to deliver the methamphetamine, beyond simple possession of it. According to

Castaneda, the amount involved was consistent with personal use and did not, alone, support the

jury’s finding of his intent to deliver it.

        The State has the burden of proving Castaneda’s intent to deliver the methamphetamine.

See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112. Intent to deliver may be established by

circumstantial evidence. Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). “Expert testimony by experienced law enforcement officers may be used

to show intent to deliver.” Biggers v. State, 634 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021,

pet. ref’d) (quoting Mack v. State, 859 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,

no pet.)). In a possession with intent to deliver case, the “intent to deliver” element may be

proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the quantity of drugs possessed, the manner of

packaging, and presence of drug paraphernalia. Williams, 902 S.W.2d at 507. “The number of

factors present is not as important as the logical force the factors have in establishing the

elements of the offense.” Biggers, 634 S.W.3d at 253 (quoting Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290,

298 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d)). “Even so, more facts than mere presence

near the drugs [are] required, particularly when there are many people present or in possession of

the premises.” Id. (citing Estrada v. State, 643 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982,

no pet.)).

                                                9
        In this case, Mayfield testified that officers located forty-one pills, which were later

identified as being 4.77 grams methamphetamine. Small black tubes commonly used to package

drugs were also found.

        PPD Sergeant Leigh Foreman testified as an expert on narcotics. According to Foreman,

drugs, such as the methamphetamine pills found in Castaneda’s house, are usually sold as an

individual unit or dose, with a price per pill. When asked how many pills a user would have in

his or her possession, Foreman stated, “If you wanted to err on the side of caution you could say

maybe four or so. But generally for people using it[,] it’s one or two tablets.” She then went on

to explain, “Forty-one dosage units is incredibly high. Then if you start breaking them down into

half tablets.[3] So, what this indicates to me, based on what I know, is that he possessed this with

intent to deliver.”

        “The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of

the strength of the evidence.” Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

(citing Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)). When faced with

conflicting inferences, we “must presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflict in favor

of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). Based on the foregoing, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support

the jury’s determination that Castaneda possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it.

        We overrule Castaneda’s third point of error.

3
 Foreman also testified that, depending on a person’s tolerance to methamphetamine, it is not uncommon for drug
users to half the dosage by cutting a pill into halves.
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III.   Conclusion

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                               Charles van Cleef
                                               Justice

Date Submitted:       December 13, 2022
Date Decided:         January 9, 2023

Do Not Publish

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