Court Opinion

ID: 9741347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:54:00.093556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.628921
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although not specifically addressed by the majority in its opinion, I agree the rules of discovery are broad enough to accommodate plaintiff’s notice to preserve. And, because the rules recognize notices such as plaintiff’s, I therefore reluctantly concur in upholding the sanction imposed in this instance. (See American Family Insurance Co. v. Village Pontiac-GMC, Inc. (1992), 223 Ill. App. 3d 624, 626-28, 585 N.E.2d 1115, 1118-19; Graves v. Daley (1988), 172 Ill. App. 3d 35, 38-39, 526 N.E.2d 679, 681-82.) I believe the more appropriate method, however, would have been to secure a protective order explicitly detailing the handling, testing, and preservation of the vehicle involved in the accident. (See Klick v. R.D. Werner Co. (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 575, 578, 348 N.E.2d 314, 317.) Such protective orders not only preserve the evidence and guide the parties, they also "further the principle that litigation is best served when each party knows as much about the controversy as is reasonably practicable.” Klick, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 579, 348 N.E.2d at 317. Recognizing this, however, I must dissent as to the majority’s treatment of defendant’s objections to plaintiff’s closing argument. The parties agreed, once evidence relating to the steering column was barred, that plaintiff could not "capitalize” on the order by referring to or challenging defendant on the inadmissible evidence. Plaintiff’s counsel, however, did exactly that; he capitalized on the inadmissible evidence by suggesting a reasonable person would have attempted to negotiate the turn in the roadway. The only way defendant could have met this challenge would have been by violating the court’s order. Clearly defendant was prejudiced, and, in my mind, the trial court’s ruling to the contrary constituted an abuse of discretion. (See Wille v. Navistar International Transportation Corp. (1991), 222 Ill. App. 3d 833, 837-39, 584 N.E.2d 425, 428-29.) Because the majority concludes otherwise, I must dissent to this portion of the disposition. .