Court Opinion

ID: 9579413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:54:54.566717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:29.889408
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Justice,
with whom SIMMS, Justice joins, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree with the Court that allowing jurors to take notes should be within the discretion of the trial judge. I disagree with the jury instructions adopted by the Court. While recognizing the benefits of jurors taking notes, the instructions suggested by the Court discourage such conduct. Likewise, I would hold that it was improper for the trial court to grant a new trial.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the only court which requires an instruction such as the one advanced by this Court, and that instruction only applies to criminal cases.1 In fact, this Court’s preliminary instruction is nearly identical to the one required by the Texas court.
Other jurisdictions, while providing safeguards, encourage the use of more neutral *1389instructions.2 The A.B .A Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management encourages courts “to permit jurors to take notes and use them during deliberations.” 3 The right of jurors to take notes and use them in deliberations, “rests upon the conclusion that the advantages of note taking outweigh any disadvantages.” 4
There are times a judge may wish to encourage jurors to take notes, such as lengthy or complex trials.5 Notes taken in complex trials are likely to be more accurate than memories alone.6 Thus, note-taking by jurors would actually improve the decision-making process.7 “[T]he advantages of allowing jurors to take notes outweighs any disadvantages.”8
The appropriateness of allowing juror note-taking was well stated at the Second National Conference on the Judiciary:
[tjhere sits the learned judge, scribbling away — along with the prosecutor, the defense lawyer, the press and even the defendant — while the least trained in the chamber must trust to memory. The strains of a three-week or even a three-day trial burden the storage and retrieval faculties of most jurors beyond tolerable limits.9
Students in the classroom are encouraged to take notes. Business people in meetings find that it is necessary to take notes for future reference. Few people in this age of information explosion can entirely escape note-taking.
The Court proclaims it is within the discretion of the trial judge to allow jurors to take notes. However, the instructions required by the Court so discourage jurors that few will exercise their choice in favor of note-taking even when the trial judge believes note-taking should be encouraged.
The Court finds that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in granting a new trial because of “the unsettled appearance of the law, the judge having forgotten to keep her promise to take up the notes, and the absence of cautionary instructions.” Since 1969 when this Court upheld the practice of juror note-taking, the law in civil trials in Oklahoma has been clear on the issue of note-taking.10
In State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Lehman,11 this Court held that the trial judge abused his discretion when he granted á new trial on the basis that a juror had taken notes and used them in deliberations. In Lehman, the defendant did not voice an objection for fear of resentment, and no cautionary instruction was given.
There is little logic in allowing jurors to take notes but taking them up before deliberations. The main benefit of jurors taking notes is to provide a means of refreshing their memories. To take up the notes before deliberations begin is inconsistent with the main purpose of allowing jurors to take notes.
For these reasons, I agree that jurors should be allowed to take notes but disagree *1390with the instructions and with the conclusion that the trial court did not abuse her discretion in granting a new trial. The failure to take up the notes before deliberations or to give cautionary instructions does not warrant a new trial.

. See Price v. State, 887 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Cr.App. 1994).

. Esaw v. Friedman, 217 Conn. 553, 586 A.2d 1164, 1169 (1991); Watkins v. State, 216 Term. 545, 393 S.W.2d 141, 147 (1965).

. ABA Standards Relating to Juror Use and Management 150 (1993) [hereinafter Standards Relating to Juror Use].

. A.B.A. Standards Relating to Trial by Jury 97, 98 (1968).

. Leonard Pertnoy, The Juror’s Need to Know vs. the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 97 Dick. L.Rev. 627, 628 (1993).

. Dillon v. State, 27 Md.App. 579, 342 A.2d 677, 679 (1975).

. Pertnoy, supra note 6, at 628, 648, 650-51.

. Standards Relating to Juror Use, supra note 3, at 151.

. Fred W. Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 70, 73 (T. Fettered., 1978).

. State ex rel. Dept. of Highways v. Lehman, 462 P.2d 649 (Okla.1969).

. Id.