Court Opinion

ID: 9395015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 19:11:45.038533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.612719
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   May 16, 2023
                                                                                EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                                SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA                                  OF WEST VIRGINIA

                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

J.W.,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

vs.)   No. 22-0330 (Ohio County 21-C-169 & 22-C-47)

Shawn Straughn, Superintendent,
Northern Regional Correctional Center,
Respondent Below, Respondent

                               MEMORANDUM DECISION

       Self-represented petitioner J.W.1 appeals two orders of the Circuit Court of Ohio County,
entered on April 7, 2022, and April 8, 2022, denying his third and fourth petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus. 2 Upon our review, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a
memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P. 21.

        On October 28, 2011, petitioner was sentenced in the Circuit Court of Ohio County to an
aggregate term of incarceration of 215 to 705 years and fifty years of supervised release upon his
conviction of four counts of first-degree sexual assault, five counts of first-degree sexual abuse,
and nine counts of sexual abuse by a person in a position of trust to a child. Thereafter, petitioner
filed a direct appeal of his convictions with this Court. In State v. [J. W.], No. 11-1643, 2013 WL
1632091 (W. Va. April 16, 2013) (memorandum decision) (“J.W. I”), this Court affirmed
petitioner’s convictions. Id. at *1.

       1
        Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials
where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e)(1).
See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); In re Jeffrey R.L., 190 W. Va. 24, 435
S.E.2d 162 (1993); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990).
       2
        Petitioner is self-represented. Respondent Shawn Straughn, Superintendent, Northern
Regional Correctional Center appears by Attorney General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant
Attorney General Mary Beth Niday.

                                                 1
        On July 17, 2013, petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit
court, asserting twenty-three grounds for relief.3 The circuit court appointed habeas counsel to file
an amended habeas petition on petitioner’s behalf and set an omnibus habeas corpus hearing for
October 31, 2013. Subsequently, the circuit court continued the October 31, 2013, omnibus hearing
and held a status hearing on January 10, 2014. Petitioner was not present at the status hearing.
However, habeas counsel stated that he had met with petitioner to review the Losh checklist and
that petitioner insisted on raising all of the grounds set forth in his original petition.4 Habeas
counsel further stated that given the size of the record, he needed “additional time . . . to review
the balance of the [trial] transcripts.” Accordingly, the circuit court gave habeas counsel additional
time and directed that an amended petition be filed on or before April 1, 2014. No amended petition
was filed,5 and the circuit court denied petitioner’s original habeas petition by order entered on
May 21, 2015.

       3
           Petitioner’s twenty-three grounds for habeas relief were: (1) erroneous admission of
evidence under Rule 404(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence; (2) trial counsel’s failure to
file a motion to quash the indictment; (3) trial counsel’s failure to subpoena and call defense
witnesses; (4) trial counsel’s failure to investigate petitioner’s case; (5) trial counsel’s failure to
challenge “carbon copy” counts of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds; (6) trial counsel’s
failure to give proper advice as to whether to accept a plea offer; (7) trial counsel’s failure to
challenge the lack of a preliminary hearing; (8) trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for a change
of venue due to prejudicial media coverage; (9) trial counsel’s failure to strike unqualified jurors;
(10) trial counsel’s failure to protect petitioner’s right not to incriminate himself; (11) trial
counsel’s failure to request that the investigating officer be sequestered; (12) the State’s failure to
timely produce exculpatory evidence in the form of original statements by the victims; (13)
prejudicial delay in prosecuting petitioner; (14) failure by an adult witness to immediately report
the alleged crimes to the police; (15) unconstitutionally disproportionate sentence; (16) misconduct
in obtaining a superseding indictment; (17) knowing use of perjured testimony; (18) prejudicial
statements during closing arguments; (19) erroneous denial of petitioner’s motion to set aside the
verdict; (20) erroneous denial of petitioner’s motion to suppress evidence; (21) appellate counsel’s
failure to raise all available issues in petitioner’s appeal in J.W. I; (22) use of improper techniques
during interview of the complaining witnesses; and (23) cumulative error denying petitioner of a
fair trial.
       4
        The checklist of grounds typically used in habeas corpus proceedings, usually referred to
as the Losh checklist, originates from our decision in Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277
S.E.2d 606 (1981), where we set forth the most common grounds for habeas relief. See id. at 768-
70, 277 S.E.2d at 611-12.
       5
         Rather than filing an amended habeas petition, habeas counsel filed a document with the
circuit court titled a “Certificate of No Merit” informing the court that he could not “ethically, and
within the applicable rules, argue any of the issues asserted in the pending [h]abeas [c]orpus
[p]etition” and that “there exists no other viable grounds for [h]abeas [c]orpus relief by virtue of
an [a]mended [p]etition for [h]abeas [c]orpus as a [h]abeas [c]orpus action would have no merit.”

                                                   2
        On appeal, in [J.W.] v. Ballard, 238 W. Va. 730, 798 S.E.2d 856 (2017) (“J.W. II”),6 this
Court found that the circuit court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law
justifying its denial of relief on the grounds asserted in the habeas petition. Id. at 733, 798 S.E.2d
at 859. Accordingly, this Court reversed the May 21, 2015, order and remanded petitioner’s case
to the circuit court with directions to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support its ruling. Id. at 736, 798 S.E.2d at 862. On remand, the circuit court entered an order on
August 24, 2017, denying petitioner’s habeas petition and making comprehensive findings of fact
and conclusions of law showing that each of petitioner’s twenty-three grounds for relief was
without merit. Petitioner did not immediately appeal the second denial of his habeas petition, but
on September 25, 2017, filed a motion for relief from the August 24, 2017, order pursuant to Rule
60(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion
by order entered on December 27, 2017.

       On January 4, 2018, petitioner appealed the denial of his first habeas petition a second time.
In [J.W.] v. Ames, No. 18-0003, 2019 WL 2499329 (W. Va. June 17, 2019) (memorandum
decision) (“J.W. III”), petitioner appealed both the circuit court’s August 24, 2017, denial of his
habeas petition and its December 27, 2017, denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. However, this Court
declined to review the August 24, 2017, denial of the habeas petition, finding that it was not timely
appealed. Id. at *2. The Court affirmed the denial of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion. Id. at *4.

        On July 24, 2019, petitioner filed his second habeas petition in the circuit court, reasserting
his grounds for relief from his first petition. Petitioner further alleged that habeas counsel failed to
provide effective assistance in the first habeas proceeding. The circuit court, by order entered on
April 14, 2020, denied the second habeas petition. Petitioner appealed the April 14, 2020, order on
May 5, 2020.

        While the appeal of the denial of his second habeas petition was pending, petitioner
discovered, based upon his review of a transcript, that Judge Michael J. Olejasz, who entered the
April 14, 2020, order being appealed, attended a hearing in petitioner’s criminal case as an assistant
prosecutor. Accordingly, on February 8, 2021, petitioner filed a motion for Judge Olejasz’s
disqualification. Pursuant to West Virginia Trial Court Rule 17.01(b)(2), Judge Olejasz transmitted
the disqualification motion to this Court’s Chief Justice for a ruling. In his letter to the Chief
Justice, Judge Olejasz stated that he did not recall his minimal involvement in petitioner’s criminal
case because he assisted another assistant prosecutor for one hearing only. The Chief Justice, by
administrative order entered on March 11, 2021, disqualified Judge Olejasz from presiding over
petitioner’s second habeas proceeding.

        Five days later, this Court affirmed Judge Olejasz’s April 14, 2020, order denying
petitioner’s second habeas petition in [J.W.] v. Ames, No. 20-0540, 2021 WL 982758 (W. Va. Mar.

        6
        In [J.W.] v. Ballard, 238 W.Va. 730, 798 S.E.2d 856 (2017) (“J.W. II”), petitioner filed
his appeal as a self-represented litigant. However, “[b]y order entered on September 14, 2016, we
scheduled this case for oral argument; ordered the Public Defender Services Appellate Division to
provide counsel for . . . petitioner; and directed the parties to re-brief the matter with any necessary
supplemental appendix.” Id. at 732 n.4, 798 S.E.2d at 858 n.4.
                                                    3
16, 2021) (memorandum decision) (“J.W. IV”). While not expressly addressing Judge Olejasz’s
disqualification, this Court in J.W. IV found that the critical findings for affirming the second
habeas petition were not found in the April 14, 2020, order, but in the August 24, 2017, order
entered by Judge James P. Mazzone following the remand from J.W. II. See J.W. IV, 2021 WL
982758, at *3-4. In J.W. IV, we found that the comprehensive findings in the August 24, 2017,
order showed that all of petitioner’s claims had been adjudicated and/or waived, and therefore, (1)
no habeas hearing was required in the first habeas proceeding, and (2) the doctrine of res judicata
was triggered by the first habeas proceeding to bar successive petitions outside of the narrow
exceptions permitted by that doctrine. Id. at *3. While ineffective assistance of habeas counsel is
one of the grounds that can be raised in a successive petition, we further found in J.W. IV that the
findings in the August 24, 2017, order showed that the outcome of the first habeas proceeding
would have been the same regardless of any deficiency of habeas counsel. Id. at *4. Thus, we
affirmed the denial of petitioner’s second habeas petition. Id. Following this Court’s decision in
J.W. IV, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, but, in that petition, he did not raise the issue of
Judge Olejasz’s disqualification. This Court, by order entered on September 21, 2021, refused the
petition for rehearing, and the decision in J.W. IV subsequently became final with the issuance of
the mandate. See W. Va. Rul. App. P. 26(a).

         Petitioner filed his third habeas petition in 2021 and his fourth habeas petition in 2022.
With each petition, petitioner filed a motion for a habeas hearing, a motion for appointment of
habeas counsel, and a motion asking the circuit court to certify to this Court certain questions that
petitioner asserted needed to be answered regarding his prior habeas proceedings.7 The circuit
court, by separate orders entered on April 7, 2022, and April 8, 2022, denied the third and fourth
habeas petitions, finding that petitioner previously “exhausted his grounds for habeas corpus
relief” based upon the denial of the first habeas petition. In the April 8, 2022, order, the circuit
court further found that all of petitioner’s issues were “fully addressed or waived in prior
[p]etitions[.]”8

       Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s denials of his third and fourth habeas petitions.
This Court reviews a circuit court order denying a habeas petition under the following standards:

               “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court
       in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review
       the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard;
       the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions
       of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va.
       417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006).

                 ....

       7
        In his third habeas proceeding, petitioner did not file his motion to certify questions to this
Court until after the circuit court entered its April 7, 2022, order denying that petition.
       8
           The circuit court’s April 7, 2022, and April 8, 2022, orders were entered by Judge David
J. Sims.
                                                   4
                “‘A court having jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings may deny a
        petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing
        counsel for the petitioner if the petition, exhibits, affidavits or other documentary
        evidence filed therewith show to such court’s satisfaction that the petitioner is
        entitled to no relief.’ Syllabus Point 1, Perdue v. Coiner, 156 W.Va. 467, 194
        S.E.2d 657 (1973).” Syl. Pt. 2, White v. Haines, 215 W.Va. 698, 601 S.E.2d 18
        (2004).

Syl. Pts. 1 & 3, Anstey v. Ballard, 237 W. Va. 411, 787 S.E.2d 864 (2016). Because we have before
us the denials of petitioner’s third and fourth habeas petitions, we note that, once the doctrine of
res judicata is triggered, a habeas petitioner my not raise “[any] matters [previously] raised and . .
. [any] matters known or which with reasonable diligence could have been known[.]” Syl. Pt. 4, in
part, Losh v. McKenzie, 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981). Pursuant to Syllabus Point 4 of
Losh, one of the narrow exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata is ineffective assistance of habeas
counsel. 166 W. Va. at 762-63, 277 S.E.2d at 608.

        On appeal, petitioner argues that he is entitled to a habeas hearing and the appointment of
counsel on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial and habeas counsel. However, the circuit
court rejected petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the August 24, 2017,
order that we found petitioner failed to timely appeal in J.W. III. 2019 WL 2499329, at *2. We
rejected the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim in J.W. IV because the findings in the
August 24, 2017, order showed that the outcome of the first habeas proceeding would have been
the same regardless of any deficiency of habeas counsel. 2021 WL 982758, at *4.

        Knowing the rulings from J.W. III and J.W. IV, petitioner attacks the fundamental fairness
of those proceedings. Respondent counters that petitioner improperly attempts “to appeal prior
decisions of the circuit court that this Court has already affirmed.” We agree with respondent. In
J.W. III, we affirmed the denial of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion and rejected his argument that
the circuit court failed to comply with our directive from in J.W. II that it set forth specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support its denial of the first habeas petition. 2019 WL 2499329,
at *3. Then, due to the comprehensive findings set forth in the August 24, 2017, order, we
determined in J.W. IV that the first habeas proceeding constituted an omnibus habeas proceeding
which triggered the doctrine of res judicata. 2021 WL 982758, at *3.

        While petitioner subsequently filed a petition for rehearing in J.W. IV, which was refused,
he did not argue in the rehearing petition that the April 14, 2020, order denying the second habeas
petition was entered by Judge Olejasz, who was later disqualified. Even if that omission did not
constitute a waiver of the issue of Judge Olejasz’s disqualification, we have found that West
Virginia Trial Court Rule 17.01, regarding motions for disqualification for judges, is subject to a
harmless error analysis. Shenandoah Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Assessor of Jefferson Cnty., 228 W. Va.
762, 773, 724 S.E.2d 733, 744 (2012). As petitioner concedes, he did not file his disqualification
motion until February 8, 2021, after the entry of the April 14, 2020, order by Judge Olejasz.
Furthermore, Judge Olejasz did not recollect his minimal involvement in petitioner’s criminal case
until the filing of the disqualification motion activated his memory of the matter. Due to our
determination in J.W. IV, that the ineffective assistance of habeas counsel claim could be denied
                                                   5
based upon the findings in the August 24, 2017, order, entered by a different circuit court judge,
we conclude that any error in the entry of the April 14, 2020, order by Judge Olejasz, which denied
the second habeas petition, was harmless.

         Finally, petitioner challenges the adequacy of the findings in the circuit court’s April 7,
2022, and April 8, 2022, orders denying his third and fourth habeas petitions. In Syllabus Point 1
of State ex rel. Watson v. Hill, 200 W. Va. 201, 488 S.E.2d 476 (1997), we held that “West Virginia
Code section 53-4A-7(c) (1994) requires a circuit court denying or granting relief in a habeas
corpus proceeding to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each
contention advanced by the petitioner, and to state the grounds upon which the matter was
determined.”9 We explained in Watson that a circuit court must include its reasoning for denying
habeas relief in its order for “this Court [to] exercise . . . meaningful review.” Id. at 204-05, 488
S.E.2d at 479-80. We find that we have no difficulty in exercising meaningful review in this case
due to the circuit court’s correct findings that petitioner previously “exhausted his grounds for
habeas corpus relief” and that all of his issues were “fully addressed or waived in prior
[p]etitions[.]” Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court’s findings were adequate and that it
did not abuse its discretion in denying the third and fourth habeas petitions.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s April 7, 2022, and April 8, 2022,
orders denying petitioner’s third and fourth petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.

                                                                                                  Affirmed.

ISSUED: May 16, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice Tim Armstead
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

       9
           West Virginia Code § 53-4A-7(c) provides, in pertinent part:

       When the court [in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding] determines to deny
       or grant relief . . ., the court shall enter an appropriate order . . . . In any order entered
       in accordance with the provisions of this section, the court shall make specific
       findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to each contention or contentions
       and grounds (in fact or law) advanced, shall clearly state the grounds upon which
       the matter was determined, and shall state whether a federal and/or state right was
       presented and decided.

                                                     6