Court Opinion

ID: 9654259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:11:59.955166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:07.389008
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion we should order a new trial on the basis of *306newly discovered evidence.1 Because this all depends on certain facts and circumstances, they must first be set forth.
The state’s case against defendant depended entirely on the identification of defendant as one of the robbers by the store manager and a customer. There was no physical evidence linking defendant to the crime. The manager said his observation of the robber’s face was only 5 to 10 seconds. The customer said his observation was a minute or two. The two witnesses were not in agreement as to the number of robbers — one said there were three, the other that there were four. Both were positive that defendant was the man who jumped, vaulted, or climbed over the plexiglass into the manager’s office, that he was wearing sunglasses and a knit skull cap pulled down to his ears, and that there was another of the robbers standing near the office enclosure, dressed the same way — “dressed identical”, the manager put it. The two witnesses disagreed as to whether the sunglasses were light or dark colored. Another store employee, however, who was in the office enclosure with the manager and also saw the man jump into the office, was unable to identify the defendant as the man. The manager identified a picture of the defendant from a group of six photographs which the police showed him the day following the robbery, but the manager did not identify anybody in a lineup. The customer mentioned above picked defendant out of a lineup held 16 days after the robbery. Unquestionably, the foregoing is sufficient for the state to make a submissive case against defendant, but it is far from being airtight on identification. It leaves room for a defendant to convince a jury it was a case of mistaken identity and that he was somewhere else at the critical time.
Central to the issue, under the facts of this case, was the unquestionable fact that whoever it was who scaled the plexiglass wall or partition left a palm print and fingerprint on the glass when he did so. The witnesses were in general agreement on this.
There was a good deal of testimony about the fingerprint and palm print in the state’s case. One state witness was Officer William Hetzel, a fingerprint investigator. He recovered an identifiable fingerprint from the plexiglass and delivered the print to the identification section. The identification section said it was not the fingerprint of the defendant, that it was that of some unknown person.
The prosecution took pains to establish that the plexiglass was accessible to every employee and customer of the store and that there was no practical way to eliminate the possibility that the fingerprint might have been made by one of them. One prosecution witness testified that even if a man did put his hand on the glass in vaulting or jumping over it, he would not necessarily leave prints on the plexiglass. The state thus developed the possibility that the unknown fingerprint might be that of some innocent employee, customer or bystander — that it might not have been left by one of the robbers at all and might even have been left there on some other day. This set the stage for the jury to dismiss as inconclusive and of no major consequence the fact that the fingerprint on the plexiglass did not match that of the man the witnesses said was the one who jumped or *307vaulted over the glass into the manager’s office. The fingerprint evidence viewed in this light was not at all inconsistent with defendant’s guilt.
Then, just before the state rested, the court read to the jury a stipulation which the parties had entered into as follows:
“It is stipulated to and agreed by the parties that a palm print was discovered and lifted from the exterior plexiglass enclosure at the Kroger store located at 1700 South Jefferson on the east side of said enclosure and that a fingerprint was found on the interior plexiglass surface at the same place.
“It is further stipulated and agreed that the palm print was not of sufficient clarity to be identified, but that the fingerprint was identifiable; that it was compared with the fingerprints of the defendant, Johnnie Taylor, and found not to be the fingerprint of the defendant.”
It is to be noted that this stipulation does not commit the state to anything about the identification of the fingerprint other than that it was not that of the defendant.
As stated in the principal opinion, the defendant attempted to establish by the witness, Ray Washington, that defendant was keeping a business appointment with Washington at a location some distance away from the Kroger store at the hour of the robbery. The testimony of Washington, although also far from being airtight,-was sufficient to make a submissible issue for the jury and the court properly gave the MAI-CR alibi instruction, 3.22, as requested by defendant.
As would be expected, both sides argued the identification issue, the fingerprint evidence and the alibi testimony to the jury. In particular defendant’s counsel argued the fingerprint stipulation and that the evidence from the police was that the fingerprint was not defendant’s, that the robber “left his calling card” but didn’t get caught, that the state had stopped looking for the real robber and were trying to convince the jury that they had caught him in the defendant. In closing argument the state responded to the fingerprint argument by pointing out that the fingerprint technician did not say the fingerprint was that of the robber, that the man who vaulted over the glass did not necessarily leave a print in so doing, that the fingerprint technician was “very honest” in his testimony.
As we know, the jury resolved the question of identification against defendant. On motion for new trial the defendant offered to show through the St. Louis police records that the print on the plexiglass was that of Charles Scruggs, a convicted felon, who had an identification number with the St. Louis police department, the Missouri highway patrol and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Counsel further offered to show that Scruggs is currently serving a 10 year sentence in the penitentiary at Jefferson City for robbery. During oral argument before us the parties advised the Court that Scruggs is now confined in the penitentiary in Jefferson City; that the penitentiary records show that he was received at the penitentiary on April 28,1977; that he had been released from the penitentiary from an earlier confinement on May 4, 1976. Two facts follow therefrom: Scruggs had to be a participant in the Kroger robbery, October 8, 1976, and he had a prior record.
These facts, in my opinion, would have had a significant impact on the jury and could well have tipped the scales in defendant’s favor. It would have eliminated the state’s attempt to explain away the fingerprint evidence on the premise that it was that of some innocent person — some customer, an employee or some other third person. So long as the state had this explanation open (and it was so argued by the state to the jury in the closing argument) the jury did not have to face up to the fact that if the man who left the fingerprint in going over the glass was the robber, it could not have been defendant. Had the defendant been able to show, however, that the fingerprint belonged to Scruggs, a convicted felon, with a previous record with the St. Louis police department, who was then serving a term in the state penitentiary for robbery, it would have been apparent at *308once that the fingerprint was not left accidentally by some innocent person, but that it truly was the fingerprint of the man who vaulted over the plexiglass into the manager’s office and so could not have been the defendant. This would have seriously impaired the state’s entire case, which as earlier stated, depended on a less than airtight identification by the manager and the customer that it was defendant who vaulted over the glass and into the manager’s cubicle. At the same time it would have strengthened the likelihood that the witness, Washington, was correct and credible when he testified that defendant was keeping a business appointment with him at the time in question, not robbing the Kroger store.
This newly discovered evidence is not mere impeachment. It goes directly to the principal issue in the case: the true identity of the man who entered the plexiglass enclosure in the Kroger store on October 8, 1976, a material matter of the highest concern. It is not far-fetched or extravagant to state that were this evidence before a jury in a new trial that a different result is probable. As to what is meant by “probable” or “probably” with reference to the new evidence producing an opposite result on a new trial, the Court said in State v. Jennings, 326 Mo. 1085, 34 S.W.2d 50, 54-55 (1931):
“To be given thoughtful consideration, such evidence must be material. What then is meant by the word probably as used in its connection with the rule mentioned? We think and hold that it means nothing more than that the newly discovered evidence submitted was credible and reasonably sufficient to produce a different verdict on a retrial; or, that it must be credible and reasonably sufficient to raise a substantial doubt in the mind of a reasonable person as to the result in the event of a new trial. It is said on this subject in State v. Bailey, 94 Mo. 311, loc. cit. 316, 7 S.W. 425, 427: ‘Of course, if it be clear that the new evidence will have no effect upon another verdict, the motion for a new trial should be denied; but, if it be doubtful how the evidence would affect the result, the motion should be granted. The court, in such cases, should not attempt to pronounce for the jury in advance, but should give them an opportunity to pass upon the evidence, if competent and material, and to determine its weight for themselves.’ ”
Defendant’s counsel filed a motion for new trial, setting forth the ground of newly discovered evidence and complied with Rule 78.05 by accompanying it with defendant’s affidavit setting forth the facts. No coun-. ter-affidavits were filed and no objections were made to the affidavit. “In such posture the affidavit may be considered and is to be accorded its natural probative value.” Bailey v. Hilleman, 566 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Mo.App.1978); McCartney v. Taylor Aircraft Co., 140 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Mo.App.1940). The state did not and does not now contest the fact that the fingerprint is actually that of Charles Scruggs, the man now serving time in the state penitentiary, for robbery, nor is there any denial or doubt that defense counsel obtained the information on Scruggs from the Department of Corrections, the penitentiary records and the St. Louis police department or that the information obtained is accurate.
The newly discovered evidence here is so strong that I believe defendant’s failure earlier to tell his lawyer about what he had heard as to one Charles Struggs being involved in the robbery should not bar relief. I do not believe the failure was deliberate or devious. It probably was because defendant did not trust the man who gave him the information, because that same man had told the police defendant was one of the robbers, which, of course, defendant insists he was not. In addition, defendant was confined in jail at the time and had no way of knowing that Struggs was actually Scruggs and that the latter had left his fingerprint on the glass enclosure. Defendant was in no position at that point to appreciate what hindsight shows the name would lead to. His not saying anything about it should not be treated as though he were in full possession of the true facts and said nothing.
*309Otherwise defendant is being held to a lack of due diligence based on what hindsight reveals. He “had the key piece of information which easily led to the fitting together of this puzzle once this key was revealed”, says the per curiam, and “[h]is due diligence in disclosing this link would have expedited the identification of the fingerprints.” Based on hindsight the same could be said of the prosecution. Scruggs had a previous record with the St. Louis police department and his fingerprints were on file there. The police, also, therefore, had a “key piece of information.” Their own files would have shown at any time whose fingerprint it was. But the police did not realize it, anymore than did the defendant as to his information. It would not be fair to charge the police or prosecution with lack of due diligence in furnishing this material evidence to defendant as constituting a failure to disclose on their part, nor is it fair to charge the defendant with lack of due diligence in not sooner informing his lawyer of what he had heard about Struggs (who turned out to be Scruggs).
It is true State v. Harris, 413 S.W.2d 244 (Mo.1967) lists four requirements for newly discovered evidence. As best I can ascertain, the requisites for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence were first stated by this Court in State v. McLaughlin, 27 Mo. 111, 112 (1858). The rationale was that “Applications for new trials on the ground of evidence discovered after the trial are entertained with reluctance because of the temptation to parties smarting under defeat to make them and on account of the facility with which plausible grounds are manufactured.” The court wanted to protect itself from imposition.
But the claim here is not a manufactured one and by its assertion the court is not being imposed upon. After all, the really important part of the newly discovered evidence — the fact that the fingerprint was that of Charles Scruggs, a convicted felon, who at the time of the trial was serving time in the penitentiary for robbery — is not in dispute. This is not a case where there is something shady or manufactured about the new evidence or where improper pressure has been brought on proposed witnesses. The evidence in question is open and above board, and in my opinion the per curiam does not correctly evaluate its true significance. As pointed out earlier, the fact that in the original trial the jury was made aware that the fingerprint was not that of the defendant, but nevertheless convicted him on the basis of the identification by two witnesses, does not mean that in a second trial where the jury would know that the fingerprint came from a convicted robber that the jury would do the same. On the contrary, it is likely they would not. The state would not be able to explain away the fingerprint as having been made innocently or legitimately (as it did in the first trial). The jury would realize that if the man who made the fingerprint was the one who vaulted into the manager’s enclosure (and there is no other way Scruggs’ fingerprint would have been there) it could not have been the defendant, and that the two witnesses were simply mistaken in their identification.
No doubt both were honest and sincere in their testimony, but the fact remains that they observed the man whom they identified as the defendant for only a short time (5 to 10 seconds was all the manager saw his face); the man was wearing sunglasses and had a knit skull cap pulled down to his ears, another robber standing near the office enclosure was dressed the same way and also wearing sunglasses, and a third eyewitness, another employee of the Kroger store, in the same place as the manager, was unable to identify defendant as being the man at all. Realizing these shortcomings in the identification testimony and knowing that Scruggs, a convicted robber, left the fingerprint, and with the testimony that defendant was at a job interview elsewhere at the same time, the jury could easily conclude the manager and the customer were mistaken in their identification.2
*310We are not being fair or just when we do not give defendant a new trial under the unusual circumstances of this case. There is plain error here. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. An appellate court can reverse a trial court on this point and order a new trial accordingly. While it does not occur often, it has been done a number of times. See, for example, State v. Jennings, 326 Mo. 1085, 34 S.W.2d 50, 54 (1931) where the Court said:
“[M]any cases reported in the state and federal reports demonstrate that appellate courts reverse, remand, and order new trials [on the ground of newly discovered evidence], notwithstanding the statement that such action is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”
See also State v. Butler, 501 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. 1973); State v. McClain, 498 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. banc 1973); State v. Kyle, 259 Mo. 401, 168 S.W. 681 (1914); State v. Bailey, 94 Mo. 311, T S.W. 425 (1887); State v. Wheeler, 94 Mo. 252, 7 S.W. 103 (1887); State v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95, 3 S.W. 397 (1887); State v. Koonce, 504 S.W.2d 227 (Mo.App.1973); State v. Platt, 496 S.W.2d 878 (Mo.App.1973).
In all these cases the appellate court ordered a new trial on newly discovered evidence where the trial court had refused to do so.

. While eyewitness identification testimony is widely used, lawyers and judges know that much of it is unreliable. As Justice Felix Frankfurter has said: “The identification of *310strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials.” F. Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, at 30 (1927). For a collection of authors who have compiled case histories of miscarriages of justice resulting from faulty identifications see Note: Eyewitness Identification, 29 Stanford L.Rev. 969 (1977). “Although improper suggestive procedures used by law enforcement officials in procuring identification evidence account for many mistaken identifications, the great majority probably are attributable both to the inherent unreliability of human perception and memory and to human susceptibility to unintentional, and often quite subtle, suggestive influences. That most juries, and even some judges, are unaware of the sources of error in eyewitness testimony and consequently place undue faith in its veracity seriously aggravates this problem . . . Note, Eyewitness Identification, at 970.