Court Opinion

ID: 9796086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:48:24.016176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:57.660438
License: Public Domain

McGREGOR, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
¶ 38 I respectfully dissent. Today’s decision, without compelling reason or justification, essentially overturns this Court’s recent decision in State v. Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. 27, 39 P.3d 1131 (2002). Because I cannot join an approach that so casually ignores the basic doctrine of stare decisis, I cannot join today’s Opinion.
¶ 39 Despite the majority’s assertions otherwise, this case fits precisely within the rule of law we established in Wilkinson. The action against Matykiewicz, like the action against the defendant in Wilkinson, began when dissatisfied homeowners filed a complaint against a contractor with the Registrar of Contractors. In both instances, the homeowners then learned that the person with whom they had contracted was not licensed. In both cases, the unlicensed contractor was convicted of violating Arizona Revised Statutes (AR.S.) section 32-1151 (2008). In Wilkinson, we concluded:
As a direct result of [the defendant’s] offer to act as a licensed contractor, [the victims] agreed to pay, and did pay, all or a portion of the amounts due under their agreements with [the defendant]. [The defendant’s] criminal actions directly caused those losses____ Under Arizona’s statutes, these victims are entitled to recover them payments to [the defendant] as restitution.
202 Ariz. at 29 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d at 1133.
¶40 The doctrine of stare decisis thus compels that Matykiewicz be ordered to return all monies paid under the agreement as restitution because his criminal actions caused those losses without the intervention of additional causative factors. See White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 114, 358 P.2d 712, 714 (1961) (“The fact that the construction of the statute in question rests on a single case does not render it any less the duty of this court to utilize the doctrine of stare decisis----”).
¶ 41 The rule of law depends to a great extent upon a healthy respect for precedent. “The doctrine of stare decisis, which requires us to give weight to previous decisions addressing the same issue, seeks to promote reliability so that parties can plan activities knowing what the law is.” Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252, 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003) (McGregor, J.). “Stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) (internal quotation omitted). Stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991).
¶42 Because an evenhanded, predictable, and consistent approach to applying the law is essential to the integrity of the judicial process, we do not lightly overrule precedent; we do so only for compelling reasons. “[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984); see also State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 384 n. 4 ¶ 34, 79 P.3d 64, 71 n. 4 (2003) (Bereh, J.) (A relatively recent decision of this Court is not “lightly overrulefd].”). “While the phrase ‘special justification’ defies simple definition, it does require more than that a prior case was wrongly decided.” State v. Hickman, 205 *475Ariz. 192, 200 ¶ 37, 68 P.3d 418, 426 (2003) (Ryan, J.). Even when this Court has doubted the wisdom of precedent, we have followed previous opinions based upon our respect for the doctrine of stare decisis and our recognition of its importance. See State v. Lara, 171 Ariz. 282, 285, 830 P.2d 803, 806 (1992) (restating the holding of a previous case despite the fact that if the Court had been “writing on a clean slate” it might have taken another approach); Stewart v. Damron, 63 Ariz. 158, 165, 160 P.2d 321, 324 (1945) (doubting the wisdom of prior decisions, but finding the matter foreclosed by stare decisis).
¶43 Our failure to apply the doctrine of stare decisis in this case is especially troubling for two reasons. First, resolving the issue presented here and in Wilkinson required us to interpret a statute. “When a court proposes to abandon precedent in a ease involving ... statutory interpretation^] the burden is highest.” Hickman, 205 Ariz. at 201 ¶ 38, 68 P.3d at 427; see also State v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 554, 561 ¶ 26, 115 P.3d 594, 601 (2005) (Hurwitz, J.) (“[0]ur deference to precedent is strongest when prior decisions construe a statute.” (quoting Galloway, 205 Ariz. at 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d at 27)). The reason we give the most deference when construing a statute is because “if we have interpreted] the statute other than as the legislature intended, the legislature retains the power to correct us.” Hancock v. Bisnar, 212 Ariz. 344, 349 ¶ 22, 132 P.3d 283, 288 (2006) (Hurwitz, J.) (internal quotation omitted). In the six years since Wilkinson, the legislature has given no indication whatsoever that we incorrectly construed Arizona’s restitution statutes. Today, the majority simply ignores the legislature’s apparent approval of the statutory interpretation of Wilkinson and adopts a new interpretation.
¶ 44 Second, the majority neither provides any compelling reason nor points to any change in the law that justifies overturning our prior decision. That approach is inconsistent with our insistence that some strong reason justify a departure from prior decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior
decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.” White, 89 Ariz. at 113, 358 P.2d at 714; see also Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996) (finding that once a court has determined a statute’s meaning, the court should adhere to that ruling absent “intervening development of the law” or “compelling evidence bearing on [the legislature’s] original intent”). The ordinary reasons for failing to adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis are not present in this case. No intervening development in the law pertaining to criminal restitution has occurred since Wilkinson was issued in 2002. Also, the result directed by Wilkinson, that all monies paid under the contract must be returned, is not clearly erroneous. It remains true that forcing a criminal to yield the fruits of his crime to his victim furthers the original conception of restitution. See Wilkinson, 202 Ariz. at 29 ¶ 9, 39 P.3d at 1133. It remains true that the rule of Wilkinson protects the public from unlicensed contractors by rehabilitating offenders and thus preventing them from again contracting without a license. Id. at 30 ¶ 13, 39 P.3d at 1134. Further, the result in Wilkinson prevents the problems that arise when we “too broadly combine civil liability with criminal sentencing.” See id. at 30 ¶ 12, 39 P.3d at 1134 (“The sentencing phase of a criminal case is not the ideal forum for the disposition of a [civil] case.” (quoting State v. Garner, 115 Ariz. 579, 581, 566 P.2d 1055, 1057 (App.1977))). Today’s opinion will transform restitution hearings into the equivalent of complex civil trials, held without benefit of a jury.
¶ 45 The doctrine of stare decisis ensures that a court’s current decisions remain tied to precedent, not simply to respect precedent, but to promote the continuity and predictability so essential to the rule of law. My greatest concern with today’s decision is that it separates this Court’s analytical framework from our long adherence to stare decisis. When we ignore precedent without a compelling reason for doing so, we undermine public trust in the integrity of the law. I do not believe this case justifies undermin*476ing such trust and confidence, and therefore dissent.