Court Opinion

ID: 9397152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 17:04:33.153956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.864644
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/24/23 In re M.M. CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re M.M. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           E080117

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. Nos. J290909,
                                                                          J290910)
 v.
                                                                         OPINION
 A.J. et al.,

          Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven Mapes,

Judge. Affirmed.

         William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant A.J.

         Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant N.M.

                                                             1
       Thomas Bunton, County Counsel, and Pamela J. Walls, Special Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                I.

                                      INTRODUCTION
                                                                    1
       A.J. (Mother) is the biological mother of 11-year-old S.K. and eight-year-old
                                                                              2
M.M. N.M. (Father) is the biological father of M.M. and 14-year-old J.M. The parents

came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS)

due to severe neglect and physical abuse of the children. The juvenile court bypassed

reunification services for the parents, and Mother filed a petition to modify the order
                                            3
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and Father orally requested

modification of the order denying services. The juvenile court denied the parents’

requests, found no exceptions to adoption, and terminated parental rights as to S.K. and

M.M. On appeal, the parents argue the juvenile court erred in summarily denying their

section 388 requests. Mother also argues, with Father joining, that the court erred by not

applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i))

to adoption. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

       1
          The whereabouts of S.K.’s biological father are unknown, and he is not a party
to this appeal.
       2
           J.M.’s biological mother is deceased, and he is not a subject of this appeal.
       3
        All future statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.

                                                2
                                                   II.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A. Prior Child Welfare History

       The family is known to CFS. In January 2008, a petition alleging physical abuse
                                             4
was filed on behalf of Father’s child S.L. Father was found to be S.L.’s biological father

only and not entitled to reunification services. In March 2009, CFS received a referral

concerning J.M. At his birth, J.M. was high risk for SIDS and was prescribed a breathing

monitor. However, Father and J.M.’s mother failed to pick up the monitor, despite the

fact that J.M.’s biological mother had a previous child who had passed away two months

after birth from SIDS. While on a family maintenance plan, J.M. was taken to the

hospital with respiratory distress due to second hand inhalation of his parent’s cigarette

smoke. J.M. was removed and placed in foster care. About a year later, in May 2010,

J.M. was returned to his biological mother as Father did not participate in services.

Custody of J.M. was later granted to Father after his biological mother died from an

overdose. Between 2011 and 2019, CFS received numerous referrals with allegations of

physical abuse and neglect of J.M. by Mother and Father. These referrals were closed as

unfounded or inconclusive.

       B. Current Dependency

       The family again came to the attention of CFS in September 2021 after it received

a referral alleging multiple instances of physical abuse and torture of J.M. by Father and

       4
           S.L. is not a subject to this appeal.

                                                   3
Mother. Father reportedly hit J.M. with a paddle “so hard on his ‘behind’ that he could

not sit down.” Father had also placed a shock collar on J.M. and threatened to shock J.M.

if he did not clean around the home. Father shocked J.M. with the collar even if J.M.

cleaned up. It was also reported that J.M. often slept in a tent outside, and one morning

Father lit fireworks near the tent, causing J.M. to be frightened. In addition, while J.M.

was playing outside, Father abruptly “smacked” him.

       The social worker made an unannounced visit to the parents’ home on September

17, 2021. The family, however, was not home and the social worker left a note on the

door for the parents. Father called later that day, reporting he was leaving town and

would contact the social worker upon his return. After no return contact was received

from Father, the social worker returned to the home unannounced on October 8, 2021.

Mother was present and alerted Father of the social worker’s arrival.

       J.M. was found dirty in the front yard with “numerous tiny bites on his thighs,”

which J.M. reported were from bed bugs in the home. He appeared extremely

uncomfortable talking to the social worker and denied being physically abused without

being prompted. He also denied having the shock collar on him when the social worker

asked if Father had one for the dogs. J.M. constantly looked to see if Father and Mother

were listening. The social worker eventually terminated the interview. S.K. was also

found dirty in the front yard. He denied any physical abuse or seeing a shock caller in the

home. S.K. reported that J.M. was always in trouble but did not provide details. He

appeared coached and also looked to see if anyone was listening. M.M. was also found

                                             4
to be filthy with matted hair and refused to speak with the social worker. The social

worker noted that there were 12 dogs, three cats, a bird, and rabbits inside the home with

a foul odor throughout the home and numerous roaches.

       Father reported that he was in the process of cleaning and fixing up the home but

had been out of town the previous two weeks. He admitted to having a shock collar, but

denied ever using it on any of the children. Father also denied forcing J.M. to sleep

outside in the tent, but admitted to lighting firecrackers next to the tent while J.M. was

sleeping inside as a joke. Father admitted to hitting J.M. with a paddle with holes drilled

in it. Mother admitted to having a shock collar and smoking marijuana outside the home

to deal with her anxiety and depression, but denied any physical discipline in the home.

She also denied that J.M. had ever been hit with a paddle and noted J.M.’s behavior and

ADHD.

       As the social worker was leaving, the children’s older half-sibling S.L. tossed a

handwritten note into the social worker’s car and mouthed “‘please help them.’” The

note indicated that Father and Mother beat the children, especially J.M., that they used

shock collars on J.M. multiple times, and that Mother threatened to snap J.M.’s neck.

The note further stated that Mother attacked S.L. and threatened to go on a killing spree if

the children were taken away.

       When S.L. was interviewed on October 12, 2021, she reported witnessing J.M.

being physically abused by Mother. She also noted three occasions when Father shocked

J.M. with a shock collar. Further, she reported that Father and Mother laugh when

                                              5
shocking J.M. S.L.’s statements were confirmed by the original reporting party, who

indicated that J.M. was forced to sleep outside in a tent as a form of punishment, and that

Father laughed as he lit firecrackers both inside and outside the tent while J.M. slept in it.

The reporting party also witnessed Father put a shock collar on J.M. on three separate

occasions, which caused J.M. to scream and cry while Father and Mother laughed.

Father also shot J.M. with a “BB gun” in the shoulder and chest and hit J.M. with a

paddle. The reporting party noted other instances in which J.M. was treated horribly by

Mother and Father.

       The social worker also interview J.M. on October 12, 2021. He apologized for

lying to the social worker when he was previously interviewed, and stated he had been

shocked with a shock collar at least four times. He was told not to report these

allegations because Father could go to jail and believed that Mother hated him because

she punched him in the head and pulled his hair. He reported that for two months he was

only fed “‘beans, lentils and rice for breakfast, lunch and dinner’” and forced to do chores

every day after school and was never allowed to play. Later that day, the social worker

and law enforcement made an unannounced visit to the home. Father admitted to

shocking J.M. with a shock collar once. The children were taken into protective custody,

and Father and Mother were arrested and charged with child endangerment. While being

booked into jail, Father remarked that J.M. deserved to be in jail rather than him.

                                              6
       On October 14, 2021, petitions were filed on behalf of the children pursuant to

section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to protect), (g) (no

provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling).

       The children were formally detained from parental custody at the October 15,

2021 detention hearing. The parents were present and placed on notice that the children’s

counsel may seek to bypass reunification services. The parents were offered pre-

dispositional services. Mother was provided with strict supervised visits with her

children S.K. and M.M., and Father was denied visitation unless in a therapeutic setting.

       When the parents were reinterviewed on October 21, 2021, Father denied the

physical abuse allegations. He explained that J.M. had placed the shock collar on himself

on one occasion and minimized the effects of being shocked by the collar. He appeared

to blame J.M. and claimed that the only person who was in need of services was J.M. He

stated that J.M. had ADHD and had previously been accused of sexually touching M.M.

Mother appeared anxious, and needed to leave the room multiple times during the

interview. She reported that she was agoraphobic and suffered from depression. She

denied that her mental health affected her ability to care for the children, but admitted

that she received social security disability income due to her

diagnosis. Mother dismissed all of the physical abuse allegations as lies stemming from

S.L.

       When interviewed by the social worker on October 20, 2021, M.M. admitted

witnessing Father shock J.M. with the dog collar on three occasions. She described

                                              7
Father pressing the button on the remote and J.M. crying. M.M. requested that the social

worker not take notes as Father told her not to say anything. She denied that the shock

collar had ever been put on her or S.K. J.M. noted that he had placed the shock collar on

his leg once and that Father had placed the collar on him five or six times. He thought

Father hated him because he would continue “to turn the shock collar even though he was

crying.” J.M. stated that Mother physically abused him by hitting him all over the torso.

He repeated that he was forced to sleep in a tent outside and only allowed to eat beans,

rice and lentils.

       CFS concluded the risk of abuse and neglect of the children was high based on the

parents’ abuse of J.M. and that the parents had not addressed or mitigated the issues

which led to the children’s removal. The parents had not taken responsibility for their

actions, blamed J.M. for the intervention, and did not appear to be remorseful. The social

worker opined Father was using the shock collar on J.M. as a means to torture him. CFS

recommended that the children be removed from parental custody and that reunification

services be denied to the parents.

       The parents continued to deny the allegations, stating they were “‘all lies.’”

Father claimed J.M. “‘lies and makes up stories,’” while Mother stated S.L. lied and “‘got

away with it.’” The parents were, however, participating in individual counseling, anger

management, and parenting classes.

       J.M. and M.M. underwent a forensic interview on November 21, 2021. At that

time, J.M. recanted or minimized the parents’ actions. He reported that Father only put a

                                             8
shock collar on him once, and that he had only been shocked by request or accidentally.

He noted that Mother pulled him by his ear and hair “all the time” and that Mother had

left a cut on his ear and pulled out some of his hair. He further reported instances where

the children were forced to press a penny to the wall with their forehead, nose or inner

arm while holding up milk jugs filled with water. It was later reported that on or around

November 18, 2021, a few days before the forensic interview, Father had unauthorized

communications with J.M. via his Xbox.

       M.M. appeared anxious and requested to leave. She reported that Mother told her

not to speak with authorities and if she did, she would not be able to go to visits. She,

however, alluded to her and siblings being forced to stand against the wall with their arms

above her head, noting “‘[i]t hurt.’” She also mentioned “getting ‘spankings on the butt’”

but did not elaborate. M.M. had bruising on her chest, back and buttocks. The forensic

interviewer concluded that the parents’ conduct was concerning for torture based on the

forensic interviews, the medical exams and the disclosures of repeated physical and

psychological abuse.

       M.M. and S.K. were placed with their maternal uncle and aunt on January 28,

2022 and were doing well in the home. The parents had completed their initial referral

for counseling services and indicated that they did not need additional therapy services.

When the social worker inquired them whether they had discussed the reasons that led to

the children’s removal from their home, the parents maintained that allegations were

untrue and that CFS “‘wants us to admit to a lie.’” They also stated that the therapist did

                                             9
not have a copy of CFS’s reports so they were unable to address the concerns. The

provider confirmed the therapist did have a copy of the jurisdiction/disposition report.

On February 17, 2022, the parents requested additional therapy sessions and a re-referral

was submitted.

       The contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on April 5, 2022. No

additional evidence was presented by the parties, but the parents objected to the

allegations in the petitions. The juvenile court found true the allegations in the petitions

and dismissed all of the section 300, subdivision (g) allegations, except as to Father and

J.M. The court determined that the parents had inflicted severe physical and emotional

harm which was “clear torture” and that “[M]other was, basically, consenting by, at very

least, implication to the torture of [J.M.].” The court declared the children dependents of

the court and bypassed reunification services for both parents under section 361.5,

subdivision (b)(6). The court found the parents had not proven by clear and convincing

evidence that services were in the children’s best interests because of the parents’

repeated denials of the allegations and coaching of the children. The court provided

Mother with visitation with her children, but denied Father visitation as detrimental to the

children, and set a section 366.26 hearing.

       By August 2022 366.26, the parents had not completed their case plan and

continued to be in denial about the children’s removal. Father was reportedly in and out

of jail, and had attempted suicide because of the jail time he faced for criminal charges.

Meanwhile, M.M. and S.K.’s aunt and uncle desired to adopt them, and the children were

                                              10
happy to be adopted by them. The caregivers’ reported that visits with Mother had been

inconsistent, at “once or twice a month.” The caregivers were committed to providing

M.M. and S.K. with stability and permanency. They had noted that M.M. was making

positive progress in addressing her behavioral issues. There were no behavioral concerns

as to S.K., and both M.M. and S.K. were doing well in school.

       On October 27, 2022, Mother filed a section 388 petition, seeking reversal of the

orders denying reunification services and setting a 366.26 hearing as to M.M. and S.K.

As to a change of circumstances, Mother alleged that she had classes and counseling,

visited M.M. and S.K., and improved the condition of her home. As to the best interest

of the children, Mother alleged that she had addressed the issues which led to the

children’s removal, consistently visited the children, and that it would be in their best

interest to reunify. She included a note which stated the parents had completed

approximately 36 to 37 weeks of classes, and provided certificates of completion for 12-

week parenting and anger management classes dated February 15, 2022.

       The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on November 2, 2022. At that

time, Father’s counsel noted that they were in the process of filing a section 388 petition

and made an oral motion to change the order denying Father services. Counsel also

requested a continuance to file a section 388 petition. The juvenile court found that

Mother’s petition did not present a change in circumstances, noting the classes had been

completed prior to jurisdiction and no supporting documents had been filed, and that

granting the petition was not in the children’s best interests. The court thus denied

                                             11
Mother’s section 388 petition. The court also denied Father’s oral motion under section

388, finding Father’s request to continue the matter to file a section 388 petition was not

in the children’s best interests, considering Father had three months between the

jurisdiction/disposition hearing and the section 366.26 hearing to file such a petition. The

court found Father’s request to be untimely. The court denied Father’s request for a

bonding study on the same ground. Following arguments, the juvenile court found M.M.

and S.K. adoptable and terminated parental rights. The court found that Mother had

established a relationship with M.M. and S.K. and that she had consistently visited the

children, but that M.M. and S.K. would not suffer a detriment by severing their

relationship with Mother.

       On November 2, 2022, Mother filed a notice of appeal, stating she was appealing

the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. The notice did not indicate that she

was appealing the denial of her section 388 petition. Father filed his notice of appeal on

November 8, 2022, indicating he was appealing from the termination of parental rights

and left the section for appealing a section 388 order blank.

                                            III.

                                      DISCUSSION

       A. Denial of Section 388 Petitions

       The parents argue the juvenile court abused its discretion when it summarily

denied their section 388 petitions because they had shown a prima facie case for changed

circumstances and best interest of the children. CFS initially responds that the parents

                                             12
are estopped from raising this issue as their notices of appeal were deficient. In other

words, CFS asserts we lack jurisdiction to consider this issue because the notices of

appeal filed in the juvenile court did not sufficiently identify the order denying their

section 388 petition, and thus based on the notices of appeal, the parents appealed only

the order terminating their parental rights. Alternatively, CFS contends the juvenile court

properly denied the section 388 petitions without an evidentiary hearing.

          1. Jurisdiction

       “‘[A]n appealable judgment or order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal.’”

(Hedwall v. PCMV, LLC (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 564, 571.) The notice of appeal sets

forth the scope of our review and must identify the judgment or order being appealed.

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3); Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.)

However, we generally must construe notices of appeal liberally “‘to protect the right of

appeal if it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the

respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.’” (Critzer v. Enos (2010)

187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3).)

       Applying a liberal construction to the notice of appeal in the present case, we

conclude it is reasonably clear the notices of appeal encompass the orders denying the

parents’ section 388 petition. (In re Madison W. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1450-

1451 [construing notice of appeal referencing parental rights termination order to include

order denying section 388 petition]; In re Angelina E. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 583, 585,

fn. 2 [same].) The court issued both the orders terminating the parents’ parental rights

                                             13
and the orders denying the section 388 petitions on the same date, which the parents

expressly identified in their notice of appeal. (In re Daniel Z. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th

1009, 1017 [“Liberal construction is particularly appropriate here because the

jurisdictional finding and dispositional order were rendered simultaneously on January 9,

1992—the date specified in the notice of appeal . . . .”].) Further, the parents filed the

notice of appeal in a timely manner. Mother filed her notice of appeal on the same day

and Father six days after the court issued the order denying their section 388 petitions and

well within the 60-day deadline to appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.406(a)(1).)

       In support of its argument that we lack jurisdiction to consider the juvenile court’s

ruling on the section 388 petition, CFS relies on our case In re J.F. (2019) 39

Cal.App.5th 70 (J.F.). In J.F., the juvenile court denied a parent’s section 388 petition

and, 44 days later, terminated the parent’s rights as to the child. (Id. at p. 73.) The parent

filed a notice of appeal specifying only the date and description of the parental rights

termination order—not the date or a description of the order denying the section 388

petition issued a month and a half earlier. (Ibid.) A panel of this court concluded it

lacked jurisdiction to assess the section 388 order because it “was entered many days

before the juvenile court terminated parental rights, and the notice of appeal from the

termination order did not mention whatsoever the earlier order or the date it was

entered . . . .” (J.F., supra, at p. 78.)

       The J.F. decision is distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the juvenile

court orders at issue in J.F., the section 388 orders and the parental rights termination

                                             14
orders in this case were both issued by the juvenile court on the same date at the same

hearing on November 2, 2022. Further, unlike the parent in J.F., the parents expressly

specified the date of the order denying the section 388 petition in their notice of appeal,

which Mother filed on the same and Father filed just six days after the court issued the

orders. Given these facts, we believe it is reasonably clear Mother and Father’s notice of

appeal in the present case, when subject to a liberal construction, encompasses the order

denying their section 388 petitions. Further, CFS does not contend it has suffered or will

suffer prejudice based on a liberal construction of the notices of appeal that encompass

the juvenile court’s orders denying the section 388 petitions.

       For all these reasons, we conclude we have jurisdiction to consider the challenge

to the juvenile court’s section 388 orders. (See In re Madison W., supra, 141

Cal.App.4th at pp. 1450-1451; In re Angelina E., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 585, fn. 2.)

Therefore, we now proceed to the merits of the parents’ appeal.

          2. Section 388

       Under section 388, a juvenile court order may be changed or set aside “if the

petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or

changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best

interests of the child.” (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) Section 388

thus acts as an “‘escape mechanism’” for a parent facing termination of his or her

parental rights by allowing the juvenile court to consider a legitimate change in the

parent’s circumstances after reunification services have been terminated or bypassed. (In

                                             15
re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.) “[I]f the liberally construed

allegations of the petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed circumstances

and that the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child, the court need

not order a hearing on the petition.” (In re Zachary G., supra, at p. 806; § 388, subd. (d)

[“If it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed

change of order, . . . the court shall order that a hearing be held . . . .”].) If, for instance,

the parent makes a prima facie showing of changed circumstances, the juvenile court can

still deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing if the parent fails to make a prima

facie showing the relief sought would promote the child’s best interest. (In re Justice P.

(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 188-190.)

       “‘A “prima facie” showing refers to those facts which will sustain a favorable

decision if the evidence submitted in support of the allegations by the petitioner is

credited.’” (In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 418.) Consequently, section

388 petitions with general, conclusory allegations do not suffice. Otherwise, the decision

to grant a hearing on a section 388 petition would be nothing more than a pointless

formality. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) In determining whether

the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and

procedural history of the case. (In re Jackson W. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 247, 258.) The

juvenile court may consider factors such as “the seriousness of the reason leading to the

child’s removal, the reason the problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the

child’s removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the nature of the change

                                                16
of circumstance, and the reason the change was not made sooner.” (In re Mickel O.

(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 616; see In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-

532.)

        “To support a section 388 petition, the change in circumstances must be

substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223.) Moreover, once

reunification services are ordered terminated or bypassed, the focus shifts from

reunification to the child’s need for permanency and stability, and a presumption arises

that “continued care [under the dependency system] is in the best interest of the child.”

(Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 309-310.) After reunification services are

terminated, inquiry into a child’s best interests includes consideration of his or her need

for permanency and stability. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526-527.)

        We review the juvenile court’s order on a section 388 petition for abuse of

discretion. (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445; In re Anthony W. (2001)

87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) “‘“When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced

from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of

the trial court.”’” (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.) The juvenile

court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the court “‘“has exceeded the limits of legal

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination . . . .”’”

(In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318 (Stephanie M.).) “It is rare that the denial

of a section 388 motion merits reversal as an abuse of discretion . . . .” (In re Kimberly

F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)

                                             17
       The parents contend the juvenile court should have held a hearing on their section

388 petitions because they established a prima facie showing of changed circumstances

and that the proposed change would promote the best interest of the children. On the

record before us, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding

that Mother and Father failed to make the prima facie showing necessary to warrant an

evidentiary hearing. Assuming, without deciding, the parents engagement in services

constituted changed circumstances, the juvenile court was well within its discretion in

finding M.M. and S.K.’s best interests would not be served by the requested

modification.

       Mother filed her section 388 petition on October 27, 2022, six days before the

section 366.26 hearing. And Father made his oral motion under section 388 the same day

as the section 366.26 hearing. Parent and child share a fundamental interest in reuniting

up to the point at which reunification efforts cease. (In re R.H. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th

678, 697, disapproved on another ground in John v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 91,

98-100.) By the point of a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a child’s

permanent plan, however, the interests of the parent and the child have diverged.

(Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254.) Therefore, as previously

noted, after reunification efforts have terminated or bypassed, the court’s focus shifts

from family reunification toward promoting the child’s needs for permanency and

stability. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp.

317-318.) This is a difficult burden to meet when reunification services have been

                                             18
bypassed or terminated. This is because, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services

[or bypass of services], a parent’s interest in the care, custody and companionship of the

child is no longer paramount. [Citation.]” (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454,

464 (Angel B.).) In fact, there is a rebuttable presumption continued foster care is in the

child’s best interest. (Ibid.) Such presumption applies with even greater strength when

adoption is the permanent plan. (Ibid.) “A court hearing a motion for change of

placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in

determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.”

(Stephanie M., supra, at p. 317.)

       The parents ignore this shift in focus. In her petition, Mother alleged it would be

in M.M. and S.K.’s best interest to reunify with her because she addressed the issues that

led to removal and continued to maintain a parental relationship by visiting them. In her

briefs, Mother points out that she immediately engaged in pre-dispositional services, she

had a positive relationship with M.M. and S.K., and both children indicated their desire to

be with her. Father asserts that it is in M.M.’s best interest for the court to provide him

with reunification services because M.M. wants to visit with Father.

       However, in light of the court’s focus on permanence and stability and not

reunification, the parents assertions that it is in the children’s best interest to offer them

reunification services is conclusory. Given the late stage of the dependency proceedings,

the children’s “interest in stability was the court’s foremost concern and outweighed any

interest in reunification.” (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 594.) The

                                               19
parents do not include any facts which would support a finding that the children would be

better off with them than continuing in their current placement. In other words, the

parents did not attempt to rebut the presumption that continued out-of-home placement

was in the best interest of the children. (See Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)

Neither in the juvenile court nor on appeal has Mother or Father addressed the children’s

need for permanency and stability and how those interests would be advanced by offering

them services. “The presumption favoring natural parents by itself does not satisfy the

best interests prong of section 388.” (In re Justice P., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.)

       At the time Mother filed her section 388 petition, shortly before the section 366.26

hearing, and at the time Father made his oral section 388 request, the children’s interest

in stability was the juvenile court’s foremost concern, outweighing any interest in

reunification. The prospect of allowing the parents reunification services to see if they

would and could do what they were required to do to regain custody would not have

promoted stability for the children, and thus would not have promoted the children’s best

interest. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) S.K. and M.M. were thriving in the

home of their maternal uncle and aunt who wished to adopt them and provide them with

stability, security and permanency. They were placed in their prospective adoptive home

with their maternal uncle and aunt in January 2022, and have been in that home for over a

year. Granting reunification services to the parents would only prolong the children’s

adoption into a stable and loving home. The social worker noted that the children were

doing well in their prospective adoptive home and that the maternal uncle and aunt were

                                             20
meeting the children’s developmental, emotional and educational needs. In fact, due to

the stability and love provided by the maternal uncle and aunt, M.M.’s behavior was

improving and both S.K. and M.M. were doing excellent in school.

       On the other hand, Mother and Father continued to deny the allegations, claiming

they were lies perpetuated by J.M. or S.L. and attempting to coach the children. The

juvenile court could reasonably conclude that, under such circumstances and in light of

the parents’ history with CFS, the parents had not made a prima facie showing of

changed circumstances or that reinstating reunification services would have promoted

stability for the children and be in their best interest. (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at

p. 464.)

       In Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th 454, the court rejected the mother’s contention

the juvenile court erred in denying her section 388 petition without holding a hearing.

The mother in Angel B. had a long history of drug abuse, unsuccessful rehabilitation

attempts, and failure to reunify with another child. After the mother was denied

reunification services, she began to improve, enrolling in a treatment program, testing

clean for four months, completing various classes, and obtaining employment. Regular

visits with her child also went well. (Id. at p. 459.) Nevertheless, when she filed her

section 388 petition for reunification services, the court summarily denied her petition

without a hearing. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion in the

juvenile court refusing to hold a hearing. (Id. at p. 462.)

                                             21
       The appellate court in Angel B. acknowledged the petition showed the mother was

doing well, “in the sense that she has remained sober, completed various classes, obtained

employment, and visited regularly with [the child].” (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 464-465.) The court also assumed for purposes of the appeal “that this time her

resolve is different, and that she will, in fact, be able to remain sober, remain employed,

become self-supporting and obtain housing.” (Id. at p. 465, italics omitted.)

Nevertheless, the court concluded “such facts are not legally sufficient to require a

hearing on her section 388 petition.” (Ibid.) The court explained: “[T]here is a

rebuttable presumption that, in the absence of continuing reunification services, stability

in an existing placement is in the best interest of the child, particularly when such

placement is leading to adoption by the long-term caretakers. [Citation.] To rebut that

presumption, a parent must make some factual showing that the best interests of the child

would be served by modification.” (Ibid.) The mother in Angel B. did not make such a

showing. Nor do Mother and Father here.

       We conclude Mother and Father have not made a prima facie showing that the

children’s best interest would be served by offering them reunification services. The

juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying Mother’s

section 388 petition and Father’s oral motion under section 388 without a hearing.

       B. Parental Benefit Relationship Exception

       Mother also contends, with Father joining in her argument, that the juvenile court

erred in finding the parental benefit exception to adoption did not apply and thereby erred

                                             22
in terminating her parental rights. We find the court did not err in concluding that

Mother had not established the necessary exception.

       “The sole purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a

permanent plan for the child after reunification efforts have failed” (In re J.D. (2021) 70

Cal.App.5th 833, 851-852) and “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent

children (§ 366.26, subd. (b)). At this hearing “the juvenile court has three options: (1)

to terminate parental rights and order adoption as a long-term plan; (2) to appoint a legal

guardian for the dependent child; or (3) to order the child be placed in long-term foster

care. [Citation.] Adoption is the preferred plan and, absent an enumerated exception, the

juvenile court is required to select adoption as the permanent plan. [Citation.] The

burden falls to the parent to show that the termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child under one of the exceptions.” (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138

Cal.App.4th 529, 534; see In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“‘Adoption is the

Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional

commitment from a responsible caretaker.’”].)

       One of the exceptions to the preference for adoption is the parental-benefit

exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) For this exception to apply, the parent must

show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the

child”; (2) “the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent”; and

(3) “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced

                                             23
against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11

Cal.5th 614, 636 (Caden C.).)

       The first element, visitation, is “straightforward,” requiring that the “‘parents visit

consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C.,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Here, the juvenile court found that Mother had consistently

visited M.M. and S.K.

       The second element focuses on the child and is determined by taking into

consideration factors such as “‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent

in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent

and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) For

the third element, “the court must decide whether it would be harmful to the child to

sever the relationship and choose adoption. [Citations.] Because terminating parental

rights eliminates any legal basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts

must assume that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship.” (Id. at p. 633.)

When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home outweigh the harm the child

would experience from the loss of a continued parent-child relationship, the court should

order adoption. (Id. at p. 634.)

       When deciding whether terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the

child, the court is not comparing the parent’s and custodial caregiver’s attributes. (Caden

C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Additionally, a parent’s lack of progress in addressing

the issues that led to dependency is not determinative. (Id. at p. 637.) Nonetheless, a

                                              24
parent’s inability to address the issues leading to dependency can be relevant in assessing

whether the interaction between parent and child “has a ‘“negative effect”’ on the child.”

(Ibid.) Performing this analysis is a “subtle enterprise.” (Id. at p. 634.) And “[i]n many

cases, ‘the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship’ will substantially

determine how detrimental it would be to lose that relationship, which must be weighed

against the benefits of a new adoptive home.” (Ibid.)

       There is “no requirement . . . that the juvenile court, in finding the parental-benefit

exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding

any or all of the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th

1131, 1156.) To the contrary, the juvenile court is only required to “‘state its reasons in

writing or on the record’” when it makes a finding under section 366.26 subdivision

(c)(1)(D) that “termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(D), italics added; In re A.L., supra, at p. 1156.)

       We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has maintained

regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the existence of a beneficial

parent-child relationship, for substantial evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp.

639-640.) As a reviewing court, we do “‘not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the

credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’” and will uphold the juvenile

court’s determinations even where substantial evidence to the contrary also exists. (Id. at

p. 640.) “We review its ruling on the third element under a hybrid standard, reviewing its

factual determinations concerning the detriment analysis for substantial evidence but its

                                              25
ultimate weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights for an

abuse of discretion.” (In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1068.)

       Here, the juvenile court found Mother failed to carry her burden in establishing the

parental-benefit exception to adoption. The court explained, “considering the Caden C.

factors, the children will not suffer detriment or great harm by severing the parent-child

relationship. And I don’t find that continuation of the parent-child relationship would

benefit the children despite the regular visitation and contact.” Substantial evidence

supports this determination, and we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in

terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights.

       Assuming Mother had met the second element that M.M. and S.K. have a

substantial, positive, emotional attachment to her, the parental-benefit exception does not

apply unless Mother also demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that

terminating that attachment would be detrimental to them. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 636.) Again, even if we presume for purposes of the analysis that the children have

a significant relationship with their mother, her inability to satisfy the third element is

fatal to her claim.

       In assessing whether terminating the parental relationship would be detrimental to

the child, “the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s

relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new

adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) This requires the juvenile court

to determine “how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in

                                              26
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the

child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.)

       Mother presented very little evidence at the contested hearing that terminating

M.M. and S.K.’s relationship with her would be detrimental to them. Mother argues that

she had built a bond with M.M. and S.K. and they expressed a willingness to live with

her. However, these are factors in determining the second element, not whether

terminating the children’s attachment to their mother would be detrimental to them.

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) Mother offered no evidence under which the

juvenile court could conclude that the children’s loss of their relationship with Mother

would outweigh the benefit of stability in a new adoptive home. Her appellate briefing

likewise fails to provide a compelling reason why the children should not remain with the

prospective adoptive parents, who had provided them with affection, stability, services,

and predictability. While the children liked to visit Mother and M.M. stated it would be a

“good plan” to be with her mother, Mother’s relationship with M.M. and S.K. did not

outweigh the benefits of adoption. The children did not show any signs of distress when

visitation with Mother was over, they did not ask for Mother during her absence, M.M.’s

behavior improved while in the care of her prospective adoptive parents, and the children

were happy in their home. In other words, evidence supported the inference that this was

not a situation where “the relationship with [the] parent [was] so important to the child

that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss.” (Caden C.,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)

                                            27
       As our Supreme Court in Caden C. noted, when considering how a child might be

affected by losing a parental relationship, the court may consider whether severing the

relationship results in the child suffering such issues as “emotional instability and

preoccupation leading to acting out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or

depression.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) In this case, evidence from the

caregivers, social workers, and therapists, indicated that the opposite was true. Thus,

substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the stability of an adoptive home

outweighed any harm from severing the relationship. Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the juvenile court’s order, as we must, we conclude the juvenile court

did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the parental-benefit exception to

adoption and terminated parental rights. (Id. at p. 641.)

                                             IV.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                CODRINGTON
                                                                                           J.
We concur:

RAMIREZ
                        P. J.

McKINSTER
                           J.

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