Court Opinion

ID: 9824522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 10:48:45.947569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:48.047906
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, VICE PRESIDING JUDGE:
CONCURRING IN RESULT
¶ 11 concur in affirming the judgment and sentence but cannot agree with the analysis that the majority uses to resolve the case.
¶ 2 As to Proposition One, I note that challenges can be made which may require a Daubert/Kuhmo/Taylor evidentiary hearing to permit a party to show that an accepted scientific method or principle is no longer valid.
¶ 3 Title 12 O.S.2011, § 2702 governs the admissibility of opinion testimony based upon scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, ¶ 14, 889 P.2d 319, 326. This Court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), as the proper method to address the admissibility of all types of scientific evidence. Id., 1995 OK CR 10, ¶ 16, 889 P.2d at 329. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150-51, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the United States Supreme Court explained that the Daubert analysis is not limited to “scientific evidence” but applied to all novel expert testimony. We adopted Kumho in Harris v. State, 2000 OK CR 20, ¶ 9, 13 P.3d 489, 492-93. Harris v. State, 2004 OK CR 1, ¶ 29, 84 P.3d 731, 745.
¶ 4 Application of the Daubert standard is not limited to novel or unconventional techniques or methods. Id., 509 U.S. at 592 n. 11, 113 S.Ct. at 2796 n. 11 (“Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended.”); Day v. State, 2013 OK CR 8, ¶ 1, 303 P.3d 291, 300 (Lumpkin, J., concurring) (“Just because something has been accepted in the past does not mean it continues to meet the Daubert criteria for admissibility into evidence.”). Similarly, the plain language of 12 O.S.2011, § 2702 reveals that the requirements of relevance and reliability equally apply to both novel and accepted scientific principles and methods. See State v. Young, 1999 OK CR 14, ¶ 27, 989 P.2d 949, 955 (“[Statutes are to be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning of their language.”).
¶ 5 This is not to say that a Daubert hearing is necessary in every case where a party seeks to introduce scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. Trial judges possess “the discretionary authority needed *911both to avoid unnecessary ‘reliability' proceedings in ordinary cases where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted, and to require appropriate proceedings in the less usual or more complex cases where cause for questioning the expert’s reliability arises.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176; See Gilson v. State, 2000 OK CR 14, ¶ 64, 8 P.3d 883, 907. Where an expert’s factual basis, data, principles, methods or their application are called sufficiently into question by competent evidence the trial judge must determine whether the proffered testimony meets the Daubert/Kuhmo standard. Id., 526 U.S. at 149, 119 S.Ct. at 1175.
¶ 6 In the present case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the accident reconstruction expert’s opinions were relevant and reliable under § 2702. I agree that no relief is required.
¶ 7 As to Proposition Two, I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence concerning Cripps’ blood alcohol concentration. I likewise agree that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013), did not render 47 O.S.2011, § 10-104(B) unconstitutional but it does bring its validity into question. Thus, I cannot agree with the majority’s determination that McNeely is inapplicable to the present case.
¶ 8 The Supreme Court in McNeely held that “in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute [a per se] exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1568. Instead, “[wjhether a warrant-less blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined ease by case based on the totality of the circumstances.” Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1563. A warrantless search may be reasonable when “ ‘there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.’” Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)). While McNeely expressly affirmed Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court clarified that its determination in Schmerber was strictly based on the facts of the case after consideration of all of the facts and circumstances of that particular ease. Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1560, citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836.
¶ 9 McNeely is applicable to the present ease because § 10-104(B) provides for the administration of a drug and alcohol test to any driver of any vehicle involved in accident who could be cited for any traffic offense where said accident resulted in death or great bodily injury. Section 10-104(B) does not require either a warrant or exigent circumstances prior to the administration of a nonconsensual drug and alcohol test. Thus, it would appear that § 10-104(B) is contrary to the holding set forth in McNeely, unless the narrow grounds upon which a warrantless drug and alcohol test can be conducted is a sufficient narrowing under McNeely.
¶ 10 Although § 10-104(B) does not explicitly meet the requirements of McNeely, the statute can be applied in a constitutional manner. Murphy v. State, 2012 OK CR 8, ¶ 32, 281 P.3d 1283, 1292 (“[I]t is the duty of the courts, whenever possible, to harmonize acts of the Legislature with the Constitution.”). Requiring officers to only cause a nonconsensual blood draw in reliance upon either a warrant or exigent circumstances allows § 10-104(B) to be construed as constitutional.
¶ 11 The majority contends that McNeely is not applicable to the present case because the Supreme Court noted with approval that a majority of states either prohibit noncon-sensual blood testing or significantly restrict it to, for instance, cases involving an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury. (citing McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566-67). However, the cited passage is not part of the Supreme Court’s opinion. Instead, this passage is part of the plurality opinion of Justices Sotomayor, Scalia, Ginsburg and Kagan. Justice Kennedy, who made up part of the majority opinion for the holding of the case, did not join this part of the opinion. Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1568-69. Instead, Justice Kennedy emphasized “that every case be determined by its own circumstances” and explained that *912the Court, in due course, might find it appropriate and necessary to consider what rules, procedures and protocols that states and other governmental entities can adopt to meet the reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id., 133 S.Ct. at 1569 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Justices Roberts, Breyer and Alito did not join in any part of the majority opinion, however, they agreed that in the absence of a compelling need to prevent the imminent destruction of important evidence, an officer must seek a warrant before blood can be drawn. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Accordingly, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in McNeely applies to the war-rantless blood draw in the present case.
¶ 12 The circumstance is further complicated by our interpretation of the Oklahoma statute which the plurality of Justices in McNeely relied upon in reaching this conclusion. The plurality cited to Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, § 753 (West Supp.2013) as an example of a state placing significant restrictions as to when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect’s refusal. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 n. 9. It must be noted that in State v. Shepherd, 1992 OK CR 69, 840 P.2d 644, this Court construed § 753 so that it would harmonize with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Title 47 O.S.Supp.1988, § 753 allows an officer to take blood against the objections of a conscious person whom he has placed under arrest when, “the investigating officer has probable cause to believe that the person under arrest, while intoxicated, has operated his motor vehicle in such a manner as to have caused the death or serious physical injury to any other person or persons.” This statutory provision does not require the constitutional mandates set forth in Schmerber. However, although section 753 is not constitutionally adequate on its face, it may be applied in a way that satisfies constitutional requirements if the investigating officer only instructs that blood be drawn from the driver when the officer reasonably believes that under the circumstances, any delay necessary to secure a warrant may result in the loss of evidence. Thus, the determination of whether section 753 has been applied in a constitutionally sound manner must be made on a ease by case basis.
Shepherd, 1992 OK CR 69, ¶ 6, 840 P.2d at 646. For these reasons, it is inadvisable to put weight in the plurality’s language in McNeely.
¶ 13 McNeely requires that the finding of exigency be determined on a case-by-case basis review of the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, the determination of whether § 10-104(B) has been applied in a constitutionally sound manner must be made on a ease by case basis.
¶ 14 In the present case, the trial court actually conducted this review and determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Ohnesorge’s decision to cause Cripps’ blood to be drawn was reasonable and supported by exigent circumstances. Noting that Cripps’ was unconscious and was scheduled to go into surgery, the trial court found that the officer’s decision to have blood drawn was necessary to avoid loss of this evidence and the officer had no time to secure a warrant. (1/23/14 Mtn. Tr. 68-69).1 As these facts clearly establish exigent circumstances, I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cripps’ motion to suppress. No relief is required.
¶ 15 At this stage of the development of the law on this issue, judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and individuals who instruct law enforcement personnel regarding the methods to conduct Constitutional searches should emphasize the necessity to rely on the guidelines of Schmerber v. California, supra, rather than the carte blanche language in our statute.

. It goes without saying that if Cripps were taken into surgery, other drugs would be administered and the blood alcohol content of his blood would be compromised and contaminated thus affecting the validity of a subsequent test.