Court Opinion

ID: 9584502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:49:05.116482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:04.289488
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). I am not in accord with the result reached in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kelly. It is undisputed that the collision occurred on August 30,1949, about 9:30 p.m., on a dark night; that plaintiff drove her car east along a private driveway, and where the driveway entered the through highway she stopped, looked both ways, proceeded into the intersection, turned right, and ar*508rived at a point of about 165 feet south from the intersection when the collision occurred. At the time of the collision she was traveling at a speed of not to exceed 10 miles an hour.
For the purpose of this opinion I shall relate the testimony given by defendant most favorable as to him. Defendant testified:
“Q. Describe to us what took place?
“A. I was going south.
“Q. What speed were you traveling?
“A. I would say I was going between 40 and 45 miles an hour. * * *
“A. He was heading north. I cannot judge how far he was. I don’t say he was too far away. He blinked his lights, and dimmed his lights, and I dimmed my lights back immediately. Right after that I seen an object coming out of the driveway, and I was almost on top of the car,—maybe 1, 2, 3 car lengths, I don’t know. I swerved my car to the left, jammed the brakes on, and I saw this ear coming, and the only thing I could do was avoid a head-on and wheeled my wheels to the right again, and had my brakes on. From then on I don’t remember.”
At the close of all testimony plaintiffs’ counsel requested the court to give the following instructions, among others, to the jury:
“That one must.so drive his automobile so as to be able to stop same within the range of vision requires one to operate his automobile so that he can perform all of the manual actions necessary to bring his automobile to a complete stop within such range. Thompson v. Southern Michigan Transportation Company, 261 Mich 440; Russell v. Szczawinski, 268 Mich 112; Buchel v. Williams, 273 Mich 132.
“That if the defendant in these cases was so blinded by the lights of another approaching automobile so that ho could not see ahead for the distance within which he could stop, it was his duty to bring his automobile under such control that he could stop *509immediately, and it is further his duty that if he could not see, he must then stop his automobile. Ruth v. Vroom, 245 Mich 88 (62 ALR 1528).
“That it is the duty of the defendant in these cases to anticipate the possibility of interference with his vision by the said lights of an approaching automobile and if he cannot see because of such blinding lights he must slow his automobile to such a speed that he can, at all times, stop within the distance he can see ahead clearly, and if he cannot so see ahead, then it is his duty to bring said automobile to a complete stop. Ruth v. Vroom, supra.
“That if the lights of the approaching automobile, proceeding in the opposite direction, interfered with the vision of the defendant, it was his duty to slacken his speed and have his car under such control that he could have stopped it immediately, if necessary. Sellon v. Tanner, 252 Mich 231.”
The trial court refused plaintiffs’ request, but instead gave the instructions as related in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kelly. The principal question in this case is the claimed error on the part of the trial court in failing to give the requested instructions. The answer to this question can be found in the testimony as related by plaintiff, Willie L. Barner, and defendant, Stephen Kish. Assuming that plaintiff, Willie L. Barner, was traveling at a speed of 10 miles an hour and defendant at a speed of 40 to 45 miles an hour, then defendant was traveling 4 to 4-1/2 times as fast as plaintiff just prior to the collision. Assuming that plaintiff traveled a distance of 165 feet after she entered the highway, then defendant must have traveled, during that time, a distance of from 660 to 742.5 feet. It follows that at the time plaintiff entered the highway defendant was from 495 to 577.5 feet north of the intersection. It is also worthy of note that Elwood Van Loon, a witness for defendant, testified that at the time of the collision he was traveling at a speed of 35 miles an hour and *510that lie stopped Ms car witMn 40 feet. MicMgan statute CL 1948, § 256.305 (Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp § 9.1565), provided:
“(a) Any person driving a veMele on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the highway and of any other condition then existing, and no person shall drive any vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.”
In Lewis v. Yund, 339 Mich 441, 444, we quoted with approval the following:
“In Winslow v. Veterans of Foreign Wars National Home, 328 Mich 488, we said (p 493):
“ ‘The fixed, unchangeable and mandatory duty of this statute is imposed upon all drivers. The statute is invoked with equal force when a driver runs into an object whether it is moving or at rest and whether he is overtaking the object or the object is approaching toward him.’
“In Nevill v. Murdey, 333 Mich 486, we said (p 488):
“ ‘It is well settled by many decisions of this Court that it is negligence as a matter of law for one to drive an automobile along a public highway in the dark at such speed that it cannot be stopped within the clear distance that objects can be seen ahead of it by the driver.’ ”
In Lewis v. Yund, supra, defendant’s truck driver was traveling west on US-12 and reached a point about 500 feet east of plaintiff’s car when he first noticed plaintiff’s car. He was traveling at a speed of about 45 miles an hour. He continued at this speed until he was about 200 feet east of plaintiff’s car. At this point 'a Pontiac car traveling in the same direction passed defendant’s truck and turned *511back in tbe right lane of traffic, turned left and went around plaintiff’s car. Defendant’s driver approached to about 100 feet behind plaintiff’s car when the Pontiac car turned to the left in passing-plaintiff’s car. When the Pontiac car turned to the left defendant’s driver for the first time noticed that plaintiff’s car was not moving. Defendant’s driver applied his brakes, but was unable to avoid a collision. We there held that defendants were guilty of negligence as a matter of law. In that case defendant’s driver first saw plaintiff’s car at a distance of about 500 feet. In the case at bar defendant should have seen plaintiff’s car when she entered the intersection. At this time defendant was not less than 495 feet to the north and while it was dark, yet defendant should have seen the lights on plaintiff’s car immediately before it was turned to the right upon entering the main highway. In each case the defendant was confronted with a situation where he could not turn to the left because of a car coming in the opposite direction. In the Lewis Case, supra, defendant was approximately 100 feet behind the parked car when he noticed that it was not moving. In the case at bar defendant was traveling at a speed of 40 to 45 miles an hour and “maybe 1, 2, 3 car lengths” away when he first noticed plaintiff’s car.
Under CL 1948, § 256.346 (Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp § 9.1606), defendant was required to have head lamps of sufficient intensity to reveal a person or vehicle at a distance of 350 feet, and he is therefor charged with seeing plaintiff at a distance of 350 feet. The fact that defendant may have been watching the car coming from the opposite direction or not watching- the road ahead does not release him from his duty to see objects ahead, either stationary or moving, and in accord with the “assured clear distance” rule. In the case at bar the court could have charged the jury that where a vehicle is struck from *512the rear it is prima facie evidence of the negligence of the defendant. See CL 1948, § 256.511 (Stat Ann § 9.1691).
Under the facts in this case it was error on the part of the trial court to refuse to give the instructions requested by plaintiffs. It follows that a new trial should be granted. Plaintiffs should recover costs.
Carr, J., concurred in reversal.