Court Opinion

ID: 9534871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:18.318122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:06.726772
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
(dissenting):
Reluctantly, I join Justice Durham’s dissent. I agree with the majority that the legislature quite probably did not intend that one convicted of second degree felony murder would receive a sanction no harsher than one convicted of aggravated robbery. However, the plain language of section 76-l-402(3)(a) gives no indication that the legislature addressed this issue. Given the rather unusual historical background of the crime of felony murder, see, e.g., State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986), it seems quite likely that the legislature was entirely unaware of the unique conceptual problems presented by the offense when it passed the criminal code. If there were any way to construe the plain language of the statute to reach the result argued for by the chief justice, I would join his opinion. However, I find no ambiguity in the statute or in our prior precedents.
On the question of McCovey’s probable punishment, if we were to reverse McCo-vey’s conviction for aggravated robbery, I am not as sanguine as Justice Durham that the board would keep McCovey in prison as long for one first degree felony as it would for two. But that is no reason to ignore the plain language of the statute by affirming both convictions. We should follow the law and trust that the parole board will examine the details of the underlying crime instead of counting convictions.