Court Opinion

ID: 9773130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:38:04.07668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.280164
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge,
dissenting.
With due respect, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the judgment in this case, particularly appellant’s conviction for first degree murder for want of an instruction on murder, second degree. I do so because I cannot agree with the majority’s premise that “[t]he evidence is contradictory and confusing, and presents a question of fact for the jury as to whether Stepter deliberated.” I do agree with the explication made by the Honorable Gary M. Gaertner for the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, and adopt it in support of this dissent:
In his first point on appeal defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of second degree murder. The court ruled that the evidence did not support giving an instruction on second degree murder. Second degree murder is a lesser included offense of first degree murder. See RSMo § 565.025 (1986). The basic difference between first and second degree murder is the presence of deliberation in first degree murder. Compare RSMo § 565.020.1 (1986) and RSMo § 565.021.1(2) (1986). An instruction on a lesser included homicide offense will generally not be given unless there is a basis for acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and convicting of the lesser offense. RSMo § 556.046.2 (1986); see also Supplemental Notes on Use MAI-CR3d 313-3.
The record in this case is devoid of an evidentiary basis for convicting defendant of second degree murder. The only evidence presented at trial revealed that the argument between Payton and defendant had ceased for a period of time during which defendant left the apartment and returned; thus showing deliberation. Defendant’s theory of defense was that he did not kill Payton or assault Jackson and that he was not there when the shooting occurred. He did not argue absence of deliberation or present any evidence to support lack of deliberation. The possibility that a jury may disbelieve the State’s evidence regarding deliberation or decline to draw permissible inferences does not entitle defendant to an instruction otherwise unsupported by the evidence. See State v. Thompson, 695 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Mo.App.1985). There was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that one of the essential elements of second degree murder, i.e., lack of deliberation, was present. See Williams v. Armontrout, 679 F.Supp. 916, 925 (W.D.Mo.1988). The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on a crime for which there was no evidence presented that the defendant committed. State v. Pettis, 655 S.W.2d 513, *659514-15 (Mo. banc 1983); State v. Lett, 715 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Mo.App.1986).
I would affirm the judgment in this case including the conviction for murder, first degree, subject to remand for resentencing on the conviction for first degree assault.