Court Opinion

ID: 9588787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:48.370358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:29.713533
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent as to Division 1 (a). In my view, refusing to recognize the application of Edmonson v. State, 219 Ga. App. 323 (464 SE2d 839) (1995), to the instant case only creates another basis upon which the bench and bar may scratch their collective heads in bewilderment at our seemingly random employment of the law.
1. (a) The majority does not recognize that the point for which they rely upon Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232 (236 SE2d 748) (1977), i.e., “force must be proved in a ‘forcible rape’ case against a child,” is not good law. One need only follow the progression of case law to see this:
(1) In Drake, while explaining the connection between “force” and “willingness,” the Supreme Court found that “[w]hen the victim is physically or mentally unable to give consent to the act, as when she is intoxicated, drugged, or mentally incompetent, the requirement of force is found in constructive force, that is, in the use of such force as is necessary to effect the penetration made by the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 234-235.
(2) Then, this Court in Cooper v. State, 180 Ga. App. 37 (348 *663SE2d 486) (1986) (“Cooper F), analogized the above language of Drake to a situation involving a child victim, because such victim is unable to give consent to the act. This Court determined that “in rape (and perforce in sodomy) the force necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance was the force meant by the statute. Since in one incapable of resisting or of consenting or dissenting there is no predicate in law for the showing of force as a reaction in resisting defendant, the force that must be shown is simply the force necessary to commit the sexual act on one whom the law views as, in fact, having no legal capacity to resist or deny consent. From the beginning this included children of tender years and under the age of criminal responsibility[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 38. In establishing this precedent in Cooper I, we recognized that such rule applied “in rape and perforce in sodomy” when a victim is unable to consent.2
(3) Then, in its 1987 decision in Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 631 (352 SE2d 382) (1987) (“Cooper IF), the Supreme Court of Georgia agreed with our analysis that the “constructive force” language in Drake applied to a child victim of a sexual offense, because such child is unable to give consent to the act. The Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s holding in Cooper I. In so doing, the Supreme Court expanded and laid down the precise rule of law. Justice Weltner, for a unanimous court, wrote “[a] five-year-old child cannot consent to any sexual act. [Cits.] Sexual acts directed to such child are, in law, forcible and against the will. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 631 (2).3 “Any sexual act” was the language used; no distinctions were made.
(4) Then, the Supreme Court reiterated this rule of law in Richardson v. State, 256 Ga. 746 (353 SE2d 342) (1987), with regard to a 12-year-old victim: “Sexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 747. No distinction was made with regard to types of sexual acts.
(5) Then in Edmonson v. State, 219 Ga. App. 323 (464 SE2d 839) (1995), utilizing the language of Drake, we reiterated this rule of law as it relates to children and sex crimes: “A female under 14 years old is legally incapable of consenting to sex. Drake, [supra]. Where this is the case, ‘the requirement of force is found in constructive force, that is, in the use of such force as is necessary to effect the penetration made by the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 324. We made no distinction between sexual acts perpetrated against children. There*664after, the Supreme Court denied application for writ of certiorari in Edmonson, Case No. S96C0552.
(6) Then, this year in Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154 (486 SE2d 178) (1997), the Supreme Court again reiterated this rule of law as it relates to children and sexual offenses: “Because children do not have the capacity to give consent to or resist a sexual act directed at them, such acts ‘are, in law, forcible and against the will’ of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 155. Again, no distinction was made between any particular type of sex act perpetrated against children.
How much clearer can it get? By what form of logic do we take the rule, “sexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will,” and, from that, derive the notion that the rule excludes the sexual act of “forcible rape” against a child? What Supreme Court decision has negated the evolution of Drake over the last 20 years as reflected in Cooper I, Cooper II, Richardson, Edmon-son, and Brown?4
The majority attempts to distinguish both this Court’s prior cases and the above Supreme Court cases by the simple pronouncement that “none of those cases involves a charge of forcible or common-law rape.” This is no answer at all. We applied the rule to rape in the language of both Cooper I and Edmonson. And, although given ample opportunity to do so (including application for certiorari in Edmonson), the Supreme Court has declined to establish any type of sexual act against children to which the rule would not apply. Simply because the Supreme Court first laid out the rule of law in an “aggravated sodomy” case means nothing when the Supreme Court’s rule repeatedly states that sexual acts, without distinction, directed at children are, in law, forcible and against the will. In my view, the only body which appears confused about this point is this Court. See Luke v. State, 222 Ga. App. 203 (474 SE2d 49) (1996); see also Durr v. State, 229 Ga. App. 103 (493 SE2d 210) (1997).
(b) Immaterial, also, is the majority’s concern that, “the crime of statutory rape would cease to exist,” if the elements of “lack of consent” and “force” are supplied by virtue of the victim’s age. The Legislature was aware of this “inclusive” aspect when first enacting statutory rape in 1918.5 As enacted, statutory rape was never meant to have the effect of creating a new and separate crime of rape, but sought only to raise the age of consent from that of the common law, which was under ten years of age, to fourteen years of age. Harrison *665v. State, 71 Ga. App. 369 (31 SE2d 119) (1944). In statutory rape, as it was enacted, a defendant “shall be guilty of rape, and on conviction thereof shall be punished as prescribed by Section 94 of the Penal Code of Georgia of 1910 [forcible rape], unless the jury trying the cause shall recommend that the defendant be punished as for a misdemeanor.” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1918, p. 259; see also Harrison, supra. That the elements of “force” and “lack of consent” are “presumed” when the offense of rape is committed against a child comes to us from the common law: “A child under ten years of age [then the age of consent], cannot consent to carnal intercourse, so as to rebut the presumption of force.” Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225 (15) (1852); see also Wright v. State, 184 Ga. 62 (190 SE 663) (1937); Cooper I. Throughout its incarnations since 1918, statutory rape has not changed in this regard: substantively, it is still inclusive in the offense of rape.6
Moreover, contrary to the position of the majority, the substantive offense of statutory rape does not “cease to exist” because “sexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will.” When statutory rape is charged, the jury has the option to find a defendant guilty thereof, in addition to or in lieu of rape. “[T]he jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts.” Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI. “Juries in criminal cases in this country are free to render verdicts that are inconsistent or even the result of mistake or compromise. Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390, 393 (52 SC 189, 76 LE 356) (1932).” Dixon v. State, 157 Ga. App. 550, 551 (278 SE2d 130) (1981). The majority’s real concern is that the statutory rape sentencing options “cease to exist” when, as here, a defendant is found guilty of both statutory rape and forcible rape, because the offense of statutory rape is merged into the offense of forcible rape for purposes of sentencing. Wofford, supra. However, the creation of different sentencing options, wherein the judge may use his discretion to sentence as for rape or for statutory rape when a defendant is convicted of both (a choice the jury used to have), is beyond the authority of this Court. Meanwhile, the substantive offense of statutory rape still *666“exists” and still relates to the substantive offense of forcible rape in the same manner the Legislature intended from the beginning: as inclusive.
Decided December 4, 1997
Kendal D. Silas, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Lee A. Mangone, Robert M. Coker, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
2. In the instant case, the trial court charged the jury that “Sexual acts directed at children are, in law, forcible and against the will of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.) As noted by the majority, no evidence of force was presented. Thus, the jury convicted the appellant of forcible rape on the authority of the rule of law contained in this charge. Notably, appellant does not claim that this charge is error.
The above charge does not come from Edmonson. This is the language of the rule of law as laid out by the Supreme Court in Cooper II, Richardson, and Brown. This Court cannot reject those cases and their holdings. Procedurally, overruling our decision in Edmonson provides no basis whatsoever upon which to reverse appellant’s conviction for forcible rape when Edmonson provided no basis whatsoever for appellant’s conviction in the first place. Accordingly, the majority may overrule Edmonson, but the trial court still correctly charged the jury that “sexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will,” and the jury had the authority to so find.
3. In my view, what seems to drive this case is the fact that we are faced with a less than sympathetic 13-year-old child/victim. See majority, Division (1) (b), supra. That a victim’s youth, alone, should be sufficient to elevate a defendant’s act to “forcible rape” may go against the grain when the victim’s actions appear not particularly naive or “youthful” and no “force” was necessary. However, the majority’s dislike of the end result does not justify the means by which they seek to alter it. As I have stated, the harder course, always, is to dispassionately examine the law, and how it relates to the facts as alleged in the indictment and as proved at trial. Unless and until the Supreme Court of Georgia declares differently, the rule of law is that “sexual acts [without distinction] directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will.” Richardson, supra at 747; see Drake; Cooper I; Cooper II; Edmonson; Brown; see also Huggins, supra; Luke, supra. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient in this case for a rational trier of fact to have found appellant guilty of the sexual act of “forcible rape” against the 13-year-old victim.

 Aggravated sodomy requires the same elements of “force” and “lack of consent” as does forcible rape.

 As a practical matter, one does not need to use force when consent is given. “Consent: a concurrence of wills. Voluntarily yielding the will to the proposition of another; acquiescence or compliance therewith.” (Emphasis supplied.) Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed., p. 276. Thus, when consent is not an issue, a showing of force is needless.

 See also Huggins v. State, 192 Ga. App. 820 (386 SE2d 703) (1989): “the Supreme Court has ruled that ‘sexual acts directed to children are, in law, forcible and against the will.’ Richardson, [supra]. See also Cooper [II].”

 See Buice v. Dixon, 223 Ga. 645 (157 SE2d 481) (1967); City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Constr. Co., 223 Ga. App. 819 (479 SE2d 171) (1996).

 Statutory rape is included in the offense of rape when an act of sexual intercourse is perpetrated against a child and forms the basis for an indictment. Wofford, v. State, 226 Ga. App. 487 (486 SE2d 697) (1997); compare Andrews v. State, 200 Ga. App. 47 (406 SE2d 801) (1991); see Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 700-701 (234 SE2d 918) (1977) (the “alternative test”: a crime is included in the other when (a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime charged, or (b) it differs from the crime charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission); see also Marcello v. State, 220 Ga. App. 284 (3) (469 SE2d 252) (1996); cf. Hill v. State, 246 Ga. 402, 405 (271 SE2d 802) (1980) (statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape as a matter of law because of the additional element of “age”).