Court Opinion

ID: 9458682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:59:22.037929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:51.735912
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part):
While I agree with the majority that Lackman’s interrogation of some of the employees of Scoler’s was violative of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), I cannot agree that a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy on the facts of this ease. I would therefore modify the Board’s order by deleting the direction to bargain with the union.
I recognize that in fashioning remedies for employer violations of section 8(a) (1) the Board has broad discretion.1 But, as Chief Judge Friendly said for this court in General Stencils: “Bargaining orders are not immune from the great principle that like cases must receive like treatment.” 2 I do not believe that the Board applied the “great principle” in this case.
For example, in Restaurant Associates Industries,3 the Board refused to issue a bargaining order even though it agreed with the trial examiner that the employer committed seven independent 8(a)(1) violations, including promises of benefits made to at least nine out of twelve unit employees and an anticipatory refusal to bargain with the union. In refusing to issue a bargaining order the Board emphasized that the employer appeared to be willing to cooperate in and be bound by an election.4
In New Alaska Development Corporation5 the Board similarly refused to issue a bargaining order even though the employer had committed 8(a)(1) violations by threatening loss of benefits and elimination of the entire maintenance force. In a unit of fewer than twenty employees, the employer told the three most active union adherents on the day of the election that the union was no good and that they had better watch out “because if you go union you will see what will happen.” 6 In refusing to issue a bargaining order the Board emphasized that there was little likelihood that the employer’s illegal conduct would recur.7
One other example should suffice. In Stoutco, Inc.,8 the Board refused to issue a bargaining order even though it agreed with the trial examiner that the employer committed violations of section 8(a) (1) in that its foreman told employees that if the union won recognition the employer would (1) hire a new foreman who would force more work out of the employees, (2) charge for items then provided free of charge, (3) penalize employees for any negligent handling of equipment, and (4) possibly close the plant if the union after recognition attempted to obtain more money from the employer. The foreman also told the employees that if they formed an independent executive committee and shunned the union, the employer would *1295treat them favorably. The foreman also interrogated one member of the union’s negotiating committee as to whether he had signed a union authorization card.9
These eases are simply not distinguishable from the instant one and mandate the same result. Given the preference for elections over authorization cards to establish a union’s majority status,10 given the close count as to the union’s majority status in this case (11 out of 18, with two of the signing employees arguably not realizing what they were signing),11 and given that the employer after retention of labor counsel demonstrated a willingness to abide by the results of an election, I would modify the Board’s order by refusing to enforce the bargaining mandate.

. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n. 32, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed. 2d 547 (1969).

. NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894, 904-905 (2d Cir. 1971).

. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 79 L.R.R.M. 1145 (1972).

. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 137, 79 L.R.R.M. 1065 (1972).

. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 137, at 10, 79 L.R. R.M. at 1067.

. 194 N.L.R.B. No. 137, at 4, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1066.

. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 11, 73 L.R.R.M. 1107 (1969).

. See also Central Soya of Canton, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 86, 73 L.R.R.M. 1069 (1970) (no bargaining order even though 8(a)(1) violations in prohibiting employees from wearing union badges on company time, in promulgating and maintaining a rule prohibiting solicitation and distribution of any kind on premises without prior approval of management, in temporarily laying off employees who wore union badges; emphasis on, inter alia, unlikelihood of recurrence).

. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596, 602-603, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969).

. Employee Cyr testified that “[t]he only reason I put my name down on there was I didn’t want to hear anymore about the union. And it was to get rid of her [Carol Watson, a fellow employee], and that’s it.” Cross-Examination of Albertine Cyr, Transcript of Hearing at 228, reprinted in Appendix at 165. Employee Marjorie Cianci testified that she signed a card without reading it and on the advice that anyone who did not sign a union card would lose his job if the union were recognized as the employees’ bargaining agent. Id. at 308-309, Appendix at 188.