Court Opinion

ID: 9733158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:55:29.737672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.812984
License: Public Domain

DAVIES, Judge
(concurring specially).
While I fully concur with the majority opinion, I would add that the claimants in this case have not proved they are “disabled.” I would reverse the AU’s decision on this additional basis as well.
Statutory words and phrases are to be given “their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1990). The term “disability” was initially defined by the Human Rights Act to mean “a mental or physical condition which constitutes a handicap.” Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 25 (Supp. 1973). While the low back anomalies in this case might be considered “physical conditions,” they do not fall within the plain meaning of the term “handicap.” See American Heritage Dictionary 591 (2d College ed. 1985) (“handicap” means “[a] disadvantage or deficiency, esp. a physical or mental disability that prevents or restricts normal achievement”). At this point, the claimants are generally asymptomatic, and cannot be considered disadvantaged, deficient, or otherwise restricted in normal achievement.
In 1983, the definition of “disability” was amended to include
any condition or characteristic that renders a person a disabled person. A disabled person is any person who (1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.
1983 Minn. Laws ch. 276, § 1. Even if the low back anomalies at issue here can be considered “physical impairments,” which is questionable, they certainly do not “substantially limit” a major life activity. Nor can it be concluded that Hibbing Taconite *510regarded the claimants in this case as having such an impairment.
The supreme court has recently rejected an expansive interpretation of this current definition of “disability.” In State by Cooper v. Hennepin County, 441 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.1989), the county rejected an individual for employment as a detention deputy based on a pre-employment physical examination that disclosed he had uncorrected vision in excess of 20/100 in both eyes and high tone hearing loss in one ear. An AU granted the county’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the individual did not qualify as a “disabled person” under Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 25a (Supp.1983). Id. at 107.
In affirming the AU’s decision, the supreme court concluded the individual failed to meet the substantially limited standard because he had only been rejected for a single position with the county. Id. at 112. The court further concluded the individual was not regarded as having an impairment by the county. Id.
Similarly, the claimants in this case have not shown they are substantially limited merely because they have been rejected for employment as general laborers with Hib-bing Taconite, a position that has been characterized as strenuous, heavy physical labor. The AU did not make any findings on this point, and its memorandum merely states: “At that time in northeastern Minnesota, not being able to perform work which required strenuous physical labor would have been a substantial limitation on each of the claimants.” However, there is little or no evidence to support this statement.
In addition, it cannot be concluded that Hibbing Taconite regarded or perceived the claimants as being disabled. Hibbing Taco-nite’s experts, the doctors from the Mesaba Clinic who performed the pre-employment physical examinations, both testified they did not consider the claimants in this case to be disabled, because all could still function normally. Hibbing Taconite determined these claimants should be disqualified from employment as general laborers not because they perceived the claimants as being substantially limited in their ability to work, but because they determined it was not wise or prudent to expose these claimants to strenuous physical labor.
Further, the claimants were not perceived by the community as “disabled.” One of the expressed purposes of the Human Rights Act is to “secure for persons in this state, freedom from discrimination.” Minn.Stat. § 363.12, subd. 1 (1990). “Discrimination,” in turn, suggests prejudice, bias, or the holding of unreasonable and preconceived judgments or convictions. See American Heritage Dictionary 404 and 977 (2d College ed. 1985). Thus, absent evidence of prejudice or bias, I do not believe the legislature intended to extend the protections of the Human Rights Act to these claimants, whose low back anomalies are detectable only by X-ray.
As such, I would also reverse the AU’s determination that these claimants are disabled within the meaning of the Human Rights Act.