Court Opinion

ID: 9371155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 17:00:38.308869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.886636
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11521     Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 02/15/2023   Page: 1 of 4

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11521
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       KAREN C. YEH HO,
       Individual, Vested Beneficiary,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH
       INCORPORATED,
       A Delaware corporation, Doing business in New York
       corporation,
       A foreign for profit corporation Sunbiz.org
       (Document #813294),
USCA11 Case: 22-11521      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 02/15/2023     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11521

                                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-81852-AMC
                           ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ANDERSON,
       Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Karen Yeh Ho appeals pro se the dismissal with prejudice of
       her second amended complaint against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
       ner & Smith for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P.
       12(b)(1). We affirm.
               Yeh Ho’s initial complaint alleged that Merrill Lynch owed
       her inheritance money as a beneficiary of her late parents’ Merrill
       Lynch accounts. It alleged that diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
       § 1332, existed because the amount in controversy was more than
       $640,000, she was a “citizen of the State of Florida,” and Merrill
       Lynch was “incorporated under the laws of the State of ?????, and
       has its principal place of business in the State of New York.” Merrill
       Lynch moved to dismiss the complaint because it failed to allege
       Merrill Lynch’s state of incorporation. The district court dismissed
       the complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend.
USCA11 Case: 22-11521      Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 02/15/2023     Page: 3 of 4

       22-11521               Opinion of the Court                         3

              Yeh Ho’s amended complaint alleged that diversity jurisdic-
       tion existed because she had been “a full-time resident of Florida
       since 1987” and Merrill Lynch was “established in Delaware since
       11/10/1958” and was “[d]oing business in New York.” Merrill
       Lynch again moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which al-
       leged Yeh Ho’s residence, instead of her citizenship, and failed to
       allege Merrill Lynch’s principal place of business and state of incor-
       poration. The district court again dismissed without prejudice and
       granted Yeh Ho a final opportunity to allege jurisdiction by includ-
       ing “Yeh Ho’s citizenship” and “Merrill Lynch’s principal place of
       business.” It warned Yeh Ho that a failure to cure the pleading de-
       fects would result in a dismissal with prejudice.
               Yeh Ho’s second amended complaint alleged that diversity
       jurisdiction existed because she was a “citizen of Florida since 1987”
       and Merrill Lynch was a “citizen of Delaware.” Merrill Lynch filed
       a third motion to dismiss based on Yeh Ho’s failure to allege diver-
       sity of citizenship. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
       with prejudice because Yeh Ho failed to allege facts necessary to
       establish subject matter jurisdiction. The district court ruled that
       “without any allegations regarding Merrill Lynch’s principal place
       of business, the [second amended complaint] fails to adequately es-
       tablish subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332” and
       must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
              We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
       de novo. Travaglio v. American Exp. Co., 735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th
       Cir. 2013). “When a plaintiff files suit in federal court, she must
USCA11 Case: 22-11521      Document: 17-1       Date Filed: 02/15/2023     Page: 4 of 4

       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11521

       allege facts that, if true, show federal subject matter jurisdiction
       over her case exists.” Id. If the factual allegations of a complaint “do
       not assure the court it has subject matter jurisdiction, then the
       court is without power to do anything in the case.” Id. at 1269. Fed-
       eral diversity jurisdiction requires that all parties be completely di-
       verse. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 141 F.3d 1464, 1465 (11th
       Cir. 1998). Natural persons are citizens of the state where they are
       domiciled. McCormick v. Aderholt, 293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.
       2002). A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation
       and the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C.
       § 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 88 (2010).
              The district court did not err in dismissing Yeh Ho’s second
       amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sec-
       ond amended complaint failed to establish diversity of citizenship
       because it failed to allege Merrill Lynch’s principal place of busi-
       ness. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Although Yeh Ho’s initial com-
       plaint alleged that Merrill Lynch had “its principal place of business
       in the State of New York,” Yeh Ho failed to include this allegation
       in her second amended complaint even after the district court in-
       structed her to do so. See Reynolds v. Behrman Cap. IV L.P., 988
       F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2021) (“An amended complaint super-
       sedes and replaces the original complaint.”). The factual allegations
       in Yeh Ho’s second amended complaint did “not assure the court
       it ha[d] subject matter jurisdiction.” Travaglio, 735 F.3d at 1269.
            We AFFIRM the dismissal of Yeh Ho’s second amended
       complaint.