Court Opinion

ID: 9927680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 19:03:22.763511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:14.581789
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CFGI, LLC,                              )
                                        )
                    Plaintiff,          ) C.A. No. N23C-03-032 MAA CCLD
                                        )
             v.                         )
                                        )
COMMON C HOLDINGS LP (d/b/a             )
COMMON CITIZEN) and                     )
COMMON C GP LLC,                        )
                                        )
                    Defendants.         )

                           Submitted: October 23, 2023
                            Decided: January 29, 2024

                   Common C Holdings LP’s Motion to Dismiss:
                     GRANTED in part, DENIED in part.

                    Common C GP LLC’s Motion to Dismiss:
                  DEFERRED pending jurisdictional discovery.

                     CFGI’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant
                    Common C Holdings LP Counterclaim:
                   GRANTED, with leave to amend (in part).

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

John P. DiTomo, Esquire, (Argued) and Alexandra M. Cumings, Esquire, of
MORRIS, NICHOLS, ARSHT & TUNNELL LLP, Wilmington, Delaware,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

R. Bruce McNew, Esquire, (Argued), R. Grant Dick IV, Esquire, and Andrew A.
Ralli, Esquire, of COOCH AND TAYLOR P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys
for Defendants.

Adams, J.
                                       1
                              I.    INTRODUCTION

      This is a contract dispute between Plaintiff, CFGI, LLC, and Defendants

Common C Holdings LP and Common C GP LLC, wherein CFGI performed

accounting and financial services and has not yet received full payment. CFGI

asserts that Defendants have, among other claims, breached the contract and owe

unpaid invoices. Defendant Common C Holdings LP alleges in its Counterclaim

that CFGI failed to perform properly under the contract and therefore CFGI’s

invoices are inflated and incorrect. Defendant Common C GP LLC maintains that

it was not a party to the contract and consequently should be dismissed from this

action for lack of personal jurisdiction.

      CFGI alleges five counts against Defendants and Defendant Common C

Holdings LP alleges four counts in its Counterclaim against CFGI. This is the

Court’s decision on Common C Holdings LP’s Motion to Dismiss CFGI’s First

Amended Complaint, Common C GP LLC’s Motion to Dismiss CFGI’s First

Amended Complaint, and CFGI’s Motion to Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim.

For the reasons that follow, the motions are GRANTED in part, DENIED in part,

and DEFERRED in part.

                                            2
                                        II.     FACTS1

A.     THE PARTIES

       Plaintiff CFGI, LLC (“CFGI”) is a financial consulting and advisory firm.2

Defendants are Common C Holdings LP (“Common C Holdings”) (d/b/a Common

Citizen) (“Common Citizen”) and Common C GP LLC (“Common C GP”), both of

which have a principal place of business at 11300 17 Mile Road, Marshall,

Michigan.3       Common Citizen produces, distributes, and sells medical and

recreational cannabis.4

B.     THE AGREEMENT

       On approximately April 18, 2022, CFGI and Common Citizen entered into a

contract (the “Agreement”) wherein CFGI agreed to provide consulting services to

Common Citizen.5 Joseph Jarvis (“Jarvis”), Chief Operating Officer of Common

Citizen, executed the Agreement as Common Citizen’s authorized representative.6

Jarvis is also manager and authorized representative of Common C GP.7 The

1
  The facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and the exhibits attached thereto, which
includes the Agreement (Ex. A), the Amendment (Ex. B), and the Account Statement (Ex. C).
When the Court considers CFGI’s Motion to Dismiss Common C Holdings LP’s Counterclaim,
the Court also draws facts from the Counterclaim and Answer.
2
  Am. Compl. ¶ 1.
3
  Id. ¶¶ 2–3. The Amended Complaint lumps both Common C Holdings and Common C GP
together for pleading purposes. This Court has attempted to distinguish the entities where possible.
4
  Id. ¶ 4.
5
  Id. ¶ 7. The Court notes that CFGI signed the Agreement on 3/28/22; Common Citizen, by
Joseph Jarvis, signed on 4/19/22. The Agreement is dated 4/18/22. Id. Ex. A.
6
  Am. Compl. ¶ 8.
7
  Id. ¶ 9.
                                                 3
Agreement lists the entities as CFGI and Common Citizen, with no indication of

which entity or entities “Common Citizen” represents.8 CFGI asserts that Common

C GP is a party to the Agreement.9 Defendants deny that Common C GP is bound

by the Agreement or any other obligations related to this suit because it did not sign

the Agreement.10

       The Agreement obligated CFGI to “assist the Company with financial,

accounting, and tax consulting services—including technical accounting, interim

management, business transformation, risk management, transaction advisory,

robotic process automation, and valuation services—as requested by Company

management.”11 The Agreement required CFGI’s fees to consist of hourly rates,

“administrative and out-of-pocket expenses [] billed at 5% of service fees,” and

travel expenses.12      CFGI provided monthly invoices to Common Citizen, and

Common Citizen owed payment within fifteen days of being invoiced.13

C.     INCREASING INVOICES AND COMMON CITIZEN’S FAILURE TO PAY

       By June 2022, “the scope of work that Common Citizen required CFGI to

perform had begun to exceed the parties’ expectations at the time of the

8
  Id. ¶ 10; Agreement at 1.
9
  Am. Compl. ¶ 29.
10
   E.g., Answer ¶¶ 9–10.
11
   Agreement at 1.
12
   Id. at 2.
13
   Id.
                                          4
[Agreement’s] execution.”14 CFGI informed Common Citizen that May 2022’s

invoice would likely exceed budgetary expectations and Common Citizen replied

“acknowledging that the scope of work had increased dramatically and noting that

the invoice did not come as a surprise.”15 One cause of the workload increase was

that CFGI had to remediate accounting and financial errors Common Citizen made

prior to the Agreement.16

       CFGI attempted to assist Common Citizen with hiring accounting and

financial employees as a way to reduce CFGI’s workload and invoices.17 Common

Citizen, however, did not hire enough new employees.18 CFGI proposed “several

methods” for reducing Common Citizen’s invoices and “endeavored to collaborate

with Common Citizen as to solutions.”19

D.     THE AMENDMENT

       By September 2022, Common Citizen had failed to pay several monthly

payments.20 On September 16, 2022, CFGI and Common Citizen amended the

Agreement “for the purpose restructuring [sic] Common Citizen’s payments to

CFGI” (the “Amendment”).21 Common C Holdings disputes that the Amendment is

14
   Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
15
   Id. ¶ 16.
16
   Id. ¶ 17.
17
   Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
18
   Id. ¶ 20.
19
   Id. ¶¶ 21, 25.
20
   Id. ¶ 23.
21
   Id. ¶ 26; Ex. B.
                                          5
a binding amendment to their Agreement.22 CFGI executed the Amendment, in part,

because Common Citizen represented that it was “on the verge of receiving a capital

investment that would improve its ability to make payments.”23 Jarvis edited a draft

of the Amendment to account for the expected timing of the capital investment.24 In

exchange for entering into the Amendment, CFGI “forewent pursuing its rights

under the Contract,” including by choosing not to discontinue performance.25

       The Amendment was signed by CFGI and Common C Holdings, with Jarvis

signing as Manager for Common C Holdings.26 The Amendment was the first time

CFGI had transacted with Common C Holdings; prior correspondence only included

the name “Common Citizen.”27 CFGI alleges that by bifurcating Common C

Holdings from Common C GP for the first time in the Amendment, “Common

Citizen intended to obscure the identity of the party or parties to be bound by the

Contract and Amendment.”28

       The Amendment noted that Common Citizen owed CFGI $2,156,920 and

would make bi-weekly payments of $50,000 until the balance was paid in full.29 If

Common Citizen received financing in any amount up to $15,000,000, it would

22
   Answer at ¶¶ 26–27.
23
   Am. Compl. ¶ 31.
24
   Id. ¶ 32.
25
   Id. ¶ 33.
26
   Amendment at 3.
27
   Am. Compl. ¶ 28.
28
   Id. ¶ 30.
29
   Amendment at 1.
                                         6
“immediately pay one-half of the Outstanding Balance to CFGI with the remaining

Outstanding Balance to be paid to CFGI on the earlier of 30 days of Company’s

receipt of such funding and December 30, 2022.”30

E.    COMMON CITIZEN’S CONTINUED FAILURE TO PAY

      In October 2022, Common Citizen requested supporting documentation for

CFGI’s invoices and budgets, to which CFGI complied.31 In November 2022,

Common Citizen still had not paid, so CFGI submitted several inquiries to Common

Citizen and received delayed responses.32 In December 2022, Common Citizen and

CFGI discussed another possible payment plan.33

      CFGI alleges in the Complaint, on information and belief, that Common

Citizen did receive additional financing in excess of $15 million.34 Common Citizen

paid $485,700 of the $492,804.45 due for May 2022 and $400,000 of the

$793,829.93 due for June 2022.35 Common Citizen has not made any payments for

the invoices from July through December 2022.36 Despite CFGI allegedly fully

performing pursuant to the Agreement, Common Citizen has not paid

$2,160,033.50, plus interest.37

30
   Id.
31
   Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.
32
   Id. ¶ 37.
33
   Id. ¶ 38.
34
   Id. ¶ 39.
35
   Id. ¶ 40.
36
   Id. ¶ 41.
37
   Id. ¶¶ 42–43; Ex. C.
                                        7
F.     COMMON CITIZEN’S DISPUTE OF THE INVOICES

       The Agreement obligated CFGI to perform in a professional manner and in

accord with the applicable professional standard of care.38 Prior to payment, CFGI

was required to provide, if requested, “sufficient detail and support” to show that the

billed work was “performed in a proper professional manner.”39 Common C

Holdings, in its Counterclaim, alleges that CFGI “had no right to payment for work

that was unnecessary, duplicative, unproductive, inefficient, faulty, or of no value”

nor “work not authorized, work not performed in a professional manner,

inefficiencies in its professional staffing and work assignments, non-productive

work, or overbilling by its employees.”40 Common C Holdings requested CFGI to

complete basic accounting work, consisting of “tak[ing] its general ledger and []

prepar[ing] a balance sheet and income statement as well as acquisition accounting,

tax assistance (sales and use tax filings), and proper[] maintenance of the accounting

system.”41

       Common C Holdings asserts that CFGI “over staffed this work and under

managed its professionals.”42 As evidence of incorrect billing, Common C Holdings

detailed that as many as 45 different employees billed over 6,400 hours in only 4

38
   Countercl. ¶ 6.
39
   Id. ¶ 7.
40
   Id.
41
   Id. ¶ 9.
42
   Id. ¶ 10.
                                          8
months, some invoices listed the same employee twice, and some bills had no hours

identified or failed to identify the tasks being performed.43 CFGI refused to explain

or back up these invoices when asked by Common C Holdings.44 After the parties’

relationship terminated, Common C Holdings’ employees checked CFGI’s work and

discovered many errors, indicating that CFGI’s work had “not been performed in a

proper professional manner.”45 When Common C Holdings disputed the invoices

and made only partial payments, CFGI “improperly withheld information and work

product it knew were time critical” in order to extract the Amendment.46

                          III.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On March 6, 2023, CFGI filed a Complaint alleging three Counts. On June

13, 2023, CFGI filed an Amended Complaint alleging five counts:

      • Count I: Breach of Contract;47

      • Count II: Unjust Enrichment;48

      • Count III: Fraud;49

      • Count IV: Promissory Estoppel;50

43
   Id.
44
   Id.
45
   Id. ¶ 11.
46
   Id. ¶ 13.
47
   Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–50.
48
   Id. ¶¶ 51–57.
49
   Id. ¶¶ 58–64.
50
   Id. ¶¶ 65–69.
                                         9
       • Count V: Award of Costs and Fees under the Contract, as Amended.51

       On May 5, 2023, Common C Holdings filed its Counterclaim52 alleging five

counts:

       • Count I: Breach of Contract;53

       • Count II: Breach of Contract Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair

           Dealing;54

       • Count III: Negligence;55

       • Count IV: Contractual Attorney’s Fees;56

       • Count V: Fraud.57

       On June 12, 2023, CFGI filed a Motion to Dismiss Common C Holdings’

Counterclaim. On July 12, 2023, Common C Holdings filed an Answer, Affirmative

Defenses, and a Motion to Dismiss CFGI’s First Amended Complaint. Also on July

12, 2023, Common C GP filed a Motion to Dismiss CFGI’s First Amended

Complaint.

51
   Id. ¶¶ 70–74.
52
   The Counterclaim was filed with the original Answer. This is the operative pleading for the
Counterclaim.
53
   Countercl. ¶¶ 16–17.
54
   Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
55
   Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
56
   Id. ¶¶ 23–25.
57
   Id. ¶¶ 26–30. On July 21, 2023, the Court granted a stipulated dismissal of Common C Holdings’
Count V for Fraud.
                                               10
           Briefing concluded on August 28, 2023. The Court held oral argument on

October 23, 2023 and granted Common C Holdings’ Motion to Dismiss Count III

for Fraud on the record. The Court took all other issues under advisement.

      The issues presently before the Court on the three Motions to Dismiss are as

follows:

      • Defendant Common C Holdings’ Motion to Dismiss:

           o Count I for lack of consideration;

           o Count II for failure to state a claim; and

           o Count IV for (1) failure to state a claim and (2) for lack of consideration;

      • Defendant Common C GP’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal

           jurisdiction; and

      • Plaintiff CFGI’s Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim:

           o Count II as duplicative; and

           o Count III for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, (2) failure to plead

              with particularity, and (3) as barred by the economic loss doctrine.

                          IV.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

      When deciding a motion to dismiss, “(i) all well-pleaded factual allegations

are accepted as true; (ii) even vague allegations are ‘well-pleaded’ if they give the

opposing party notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party; and (iv) dismissal is inappropriate

                                           11
unless the [non-moving party] would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably

conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”58 The Court does not need

to accept merely conclusory allegations “without specific supporting factual

allegations.”59 The court may only consider the complaint and extrinsic documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference.60 When analyzing a motion to dismiss

a counterclaim, the court considers only the answer and its incorporated

documents.61

                                     V.     ANALYSIS

A.     DEFENDANT COMMON C HOLDINGS’ MOTION TO DISMISS CFGI’S
       AMENDED COMPLAINT

       1)     Count I is Dismissed as it Pertains to the Amendment for Lack of
              Consideration.

       To prove a valid, enforceable contract, a party must prove three elements: “(1)

intent of the parties to be bound, (2) sufficiently definite terms, and (3)

consideration.”62 Consideration is the “benefit of a promisor or a detriment to a

promise [sic] pursuant to the promisor’s request.”63 Consideration is valid when a

58
   In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006) (internal quotations
omitted).
59
   In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 65–66 (Del. 1995).
60
   Furman v. Del. Dept. of Transp., 30 A.3d 771, 774 (Del. 2011) (citing Vanderbilt Income &
Growth Assocs. v. Arvida/JMB Managers, 691 A.2d 609, 613 (Del. 1996)).
61
   Brightstar Corp. v. PCS Wireless, LLC, 2019 WL 3714917, at *3 (Del. Super. Aug. 7, 2019)
(citing Otto Candies, LLC v. KPMG, LLP, 2018 WL 1960344, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 25, 2018)).
62
   Gallagher v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 2010 WL 1854131, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 30,
2010) (internal citations omitted).
63
   SARN Energy LLC v. Tatra Def. Vehicle a.s., 2018 WL 5733385, at *5 (Del. Super. Oct. 31,
2018) (internal quotations omitted).
                                               12
promise is made to “forbear enforcement and to dismiss a lawsuit[,]” and “a

forbearance to sue is valid consideration whether the suit would have been successful

or not.”64 However, under the pre-existing duty rule, “a contract cannot be based

upon a duty which one is already legally obligated to perform.”65 So, “a commitment

to honor a pre-existing obligation works neither benefit nor detriment; therefore, ‘[a]

promise to fulfill a pre-existing duty, such as a promise to pay a debt owed, cannot

support a binding contract’ because consideration for the promise is lacking.”66

Consequently, contract modifications require new consideration to be enforceable.67

       Here, Common C Holdings argues that the Amendment is not a valid

modification for lack of new consideration because both parties were under a pre-

existing legal duty pursuant to the Agreement.68                  CFGI responds that valid

consideration was in the form of “forbearance from pursuing legal action against

Common Citizen for its repeated failure to make payments owed to CFGI under the

Contract.”69 CFGI also identifies Common Citizen’s benefit as “the form of new

64
   Se. Chester Cty. Refuse Auth. v. BFI Waste Servs. of Pa., 2015 WL 3528260, at *3 (Del. Super.
June 1, 2015) (quoting Hensel v. U.S. Elecs. Corp., 262 A.2d 648, 650 (Del. 1970)).
65
   Kelly v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2002 WL 88939, at *8 n.18 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2002) (citing
Seidel v. Lee, 954 F. Supp. 810, 817 (D. Del. 1996)).
66
   James J. Gory Mech. Contr., Inc. v. BPG Residential P’rs V, LLC, 2011 WL 6935279, at *2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2011) (quoting First State Staffing Plus, Inc. v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 2005
WL 2173993, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 6, 2005)).
67
   See Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Rutledge & Co., 750 A.2d 1219, 1233 (Del. Ch. 2000).
68
   Defs.’ Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 9–11.
69
   Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 9.
                                               13
payment terms in exchange for CFGI’s forbearance of legal action.”70 Common C

Holdings argues that such forbearance was illusory because CFGI reserved all rights

to sue.71

       Both parties discuss James J. Gory Mechanical Contracting, Inc. v. BPG

Residential Partners V, LLC,72 to support their respective position. In that case, the

Court of Chancery found a superseding agreement was not supported by

consideration where the defendant had a pre-existing duty to pay a debt pursuant to

a previous contract.73 The defendant argued the plaintiff gave consideration by

accepting installment payments for the outstanding debt and implicitly promising

not to sue.74 The court, however, highlighted that defendant failed to indicate what

consideration the defendant gave.75 Since plaintiff had already fully performed on

the original contract, defendant already had to pay what was due on the original

contract.76

       BPG Residential Partners is factually similar to the present issue. Here, CFGI

also entered into an agreement to alter the payment structure for payments owed for

completed performance, and Common C Holdings failed to pay. Like in BPG, while

70
   Id. at 10.
71
   Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 8–10.
72
   BPG Residential P’rs V, LLC, 2011 WL 6935279.
73
   Id. at *3.
74
   Id.
75
   Id.
76
   Id. at *2.
                                               14
CFGI may have given consideration by opting not to sue on the contract, CFGI fails

to establish Common C Holdings’ consideration. BPG did not find the change to

the payment structure was sufficient consideration because the amount owed

remained the same. “The Defendant cannot use its pre-existing duty to pay the

Plaintiff for its work as consideration for the Plaintiff’s agreement to accept

installment payments . . . rather than seek full and immediate payment, which

payment is long past due.”77             While CFGI asserts that the agreement to an

“acceleration” of payments created a new obligation, CFGI fails to identify how this

changes the obligation of Common C Holdings wherein, even on accelerated terms,

they were paying amounts already due, late, and unpaid on the Agreement.78

       CFGI attempts to distinguish the holding in BPG from this case by noting that

in BPG, there was discussion of a contingency in the amended agreement wherein

the obligation would only be imposed if this contingency took place. This Court

agrees with Common C Holdings’ reading of BPG; the contingency was not

considered by the court at all when deciding on the pre-existing duty rules’

application. Therefore, this Court holds that Common C Holdings did not give

77
  Id.
78
  See id. at *3 (“[Defendant’s] argument is focused on the wrong party. What is the consideration
given by the Defendant in return for the Plaintiff’s promise? The Plaintiff agreed to accept
installment payments over a one-year period for an amount that was already due in full, and the
Plaintiff also implicitly promised not to sue the Defendant provided that the Defendant kept up on
the installment payments. The Defendant, on the other hand, promised only to pay a debt which it
already had a legal obligation to pay. To be clear, that is a pre-existing duty and is not sufficient
consideration to support a contract under Delaware law.”) (emphasis in original).
                                                15
consideration for the Amendment and the motion to dismiss the breach of contract

claim for the Amendment is granted.

       2)     Count II and Count IV of CFGI’s Amended Complaint are
              Sufficiently Pled as Quasi-Contract Claims and May be Pursued in
              the Alternative at this Stage.

       “Unjust enrichment is ‘the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another,

or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles

of justice or equity and good conscience.’”79                To sufficiently plead unjust

enrichment, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) an enrichment, (2) an impoverishment, (3) a

relation between the enrichment and the impoverishment, (4) the absence of

justification, and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.”80 Unjust enrichment

can be pled as an alternative to breach of contract, but if the relationship is

“comprehensively governed by contract, the contract alone must provide the

measure of the plaintiff’s rights, and a claim for unjust enrichment will be denied.”81

When there is “doubt surrounding the enforceability or the existence of the contract”

alternative pleading is permissible.82

79
   Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1130 (Del. 2010) (quoting Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 539 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Del. 1988)).
80
   Windsor I, LLC v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 875 (Del. 2020) (quoting Nemec,
991 A.2d at 1130).
81
   Lyons Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Kirtley, 2019 WL 1244605, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing
Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1130).
82
   Khushaim v. Tullow Inc., 2016 WL 3594752, at *8 (Del. Super. June 27, 2016) (quoting Albert
v. Alex. Brown Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2005 WL 2130607, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 2005)).
                                               16
       To plead a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show: “(i) a promise

was made; (ii) it was the reasonable expectation of the promisor to induce action or

forbearance on the part of the promisee; (iii) the promisee reasonably relied on the

promise and took action to his detriment; and (iv) such promise is binding because

injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”83 Promissory estoppel

exists to prevent injustice.84 If there is a fully integrated, enforceable contract

governing the issue, then promissory estoppel does not apply.85 For example, in

Grunstein v. Silva,86 the court found promissory estoppel was not precluded by the

existence of a contract because: (1) the contract did not directly involve the

subsequently-litigating parties, and (2) “more importantly,” the contract did not

directly involve “the contours of the agreement at issue in the litigation.”87

Similarly, in 1 Oak Private Equity Venture Capital Limited v. Twitter, Inc.,88 the

court held that the plaintiff cannot succeed on both a breach of contract and

83
   Chrysler Corp. (Del.) v. Chaplake Hldgs., Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1032 (Del. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted).
84
   Ramone v. Lang, 2006 WL 905347, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2006) (citing Lord v. Souder, 748
A.2d 393, 398–99 (Del. 2000)).
85
    SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 330, 348 (Del. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
86
   Grunstein v. Silva, 2009 WL 4698541 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2009).
87
   Id. at *8.
88
   1 Oak Priv. Equity Venture Cap. Ltd. v. Twitter, Inc., 2015 WL 7776758 (Del. Super. Nov. 20,
2015).
                                              17
promissory estoppel claim, but allowed both to proceed past the motion to dismiss

stage as alternative theories of liability.89

       Common C Holdings argues that the Agreement entirely governs the parties’

relationship, and therefore, unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel cannot be

pled in the alternative.90 CFGI asserts that despite the Agreement, the dispute about

the enforceability of the Amendment allows CFGI to proceed in the alternative on

both quasi-contract claims to ensure some avenue for recovery.91 Common C

Holdings responds that because the Agreement has not been challenged, the

Agreement itself provides sufficient recovery.92

       The parties do not dispute that the Agreement is a valid, enforceable

contract.93 To the extent that CFGI performed services pursuant to the Agreement,

up until the execution of the Amendment on September 16, 2022, 94 the Court finds

the Agreement entirely covers the dispute. Because the Court held that there was no

consideration for the Amendment, the services provided after September 16, 2022

89
   Id. at *12.
90
   Defs’. Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 11–15.
91
   Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Defs’. Mot. to Dismiss at 11–15. CFGI distinguishes its unjust
enrichment claim from the promissory estoppel claim by noting the enrichment arises from CFGI’s
continued provision of services whereas the promissory estoppel claim arises from Common C
Holdings’ promise to make payments with intent to induce the continued services. CFGI, LLC v.
Common C Hldgs. LP, C.A. No. N23C-03-032 MAA CCLD (Del. Super. Oct. 23, 2023) (Oral
Argument); D.I. 42.
92
   Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 10–12.
93
   See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 11 (“The validity of the Consulting
Agreement as a binding agreement between the parties has not been challenged, only the issues of
breach and damages.”).
94
   Am. Compl. Ex. B.
                                               18
may fall outside of the scope of the Agreement. Without the Amendment, CFGI

asserts it would not have continued performing.95 Therefore, the Court denies the

Motion to Dismiss as to the promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment claims to the

extent that any amount may be deemed due since the Amendment, but not covered

by the Agreement, specifically $121,416,76.96

B.     COMMON C GP’S MOTION TO DISMISS CFGI’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

       Common C GP has moved, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2), to

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Once a defendant brings such a motion, the

burden is on the plaintiff to show that there is proper jurisdiction over the challenging

defendant.97 Despite this burden, “[t]he facts necessary to demonstrate the existence

of personal jurisdiction are often in the exclusive control of the defendant.”98

       The Court will analyze a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in

two steps.99 First, if the defendant is a non-resident, the Court must determine if

Delaware’s long arm statute, 10 Del. C. § 3104(c), is applicable.100 Personal

jurisdiction exists when the claims “arose from [the defendant’s] activities in

95
   Am. Compl. ¶ 33.
96
    Id. Ex. C (encompassing the invoices since September 2022, including: SIN044107
($34,200.00), SIN046351 ($24,080.26), SIN045848 ($45,100.13), and SIN046666 ($18,036.37)).
97
   AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 437 (Del. 2005) (internal
citations omitted).
98
   Harris v. Harris, 289 A.3d 277, 296 (Del. Ch. 2023) (internal citations omitted).
99
   Matthew v. Fläkt Wood Grp. SA, 56 A.3d 1023, 1027 (Del. 2012).
100
    Id.
                                             19
Delaware[.]”101 Second, the defendant must have “sufficient ‘minimum contacts

with [Delaware] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice’” as is required by due process.102

         A party can also waive personal jurisdiction by either express or implied

consent.103 Consenting to a valid forum selection clause is an express waiver. 104 If

a court determines that a valid forum selection clause applies, the court need not

analyze minimum contacts because the contractual language is sufficient.105

      1) The Court Will Defer Ruling on Common C GP’s Motion to Dismiss
         Count I as it relates to the Agreement based on Personal Jurisdiction and
         Permit Limited Jurisdictional Discovery.

         The parties, in their briefing, focused on the Amendment and how it does (or

does not) subject Common C GP to personal jurisdiction in this Court because of the

forum selection clause contained in the Agreement. The Court has dismissed Count

I (Breach of Contract) as it pertains to the Amendment, and therefore the fact that

Common C GP signed the Amendment as authorized representative for Common C

Holdings cannot serve as a basis for jurisdiction under the Agreement. The Court’s

101
    Cuppels v. Mountaire Corp., 2020 WL 3414848, at *4 (Del. Super. June 18, 2020) (internal
citations omitted).
102
    Matthew, 56 A.3d at 1027 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
103
    Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 130 (Del. 2016).
104
    BACO Hldgs., Inc. v. Arria Data2Text, Ltd., 2023 WL 2199871, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 24,
2023) (citing Nat’l Indus. Grp. (Hldg.) v. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C., 67 A.3d 373, 381 (Del. 2013)).
105
    Id. (quoting ActiGraph Hldgs., LLC v. Cyntech, Inc., 2023 WL 1989141, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb.
14, 2023)).
                                                20
analysis, therefore, will focus on whether Common C GP can be subject to the forum

selection clause in the Agreement, even though it is not a signatory to the Agreement.

       Non-signatories to a contract subject to forum selection can also be bound by

the forum selection clause if three questions are answered affirmatively: “(1)

whether the forum selection clause is valid; (2) whether the [defendants] are either

parties, third-party beneficiaries, or closely related to the [contract]; and (3) whether

the present claim arises from their standing relating to the [contract]” (the “Hadley

elements”).106       Regarding the first element, “forum selection clauses are

presumptively valid and should be specifically enforced unless the resisting party

clearly shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause

is invalid for such reasons as fraud and overreaching.”107

       As to the second element, “[f]orum selection clauses bind non[-]signatories

that are closely related to the contractual relation or that should have foreseen

governance by the clause.”108           Foreseeability is “by virtue of the relationship

106
    Hadley v. Shaffer, 2003 WL 21960406, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 2003). See, e.g., Aviation W.
Charters, LLC v. Freer, 2015 WL 5138285, at *4 (Del. Super. July 2, 2015) (applying the three
elements); Florida Chem. Co., LLC v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 262 A.3d 1066, 1090 (Del. Ch. 2021)
(same).
107
    Ingres Corp. v. CA, Inc., 8 A.3d 1143, 1146 (Del. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
108
    Hadley, 2003 WL 21960406, at *6 (quoting Jordan v. SEI Corp., 1996 WL 296540, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. June 4, 1996)). See also Qlarant, Inc. v. IP Commercialization Labs, LLC, 2022 WL 2527278,
at *6 (Del. Super. July 6, 2022) (“The closely-related test is an expanded form of equitable estoppel
where either the party receives a direct benefit from the agreement or it was foreseeable that the
party would be bound by the agreement.”).
                                                21
between the signatory and the party sought to be bound.”109 “Under principles of

estoppel, a forum selection provision can bind the non-signatory if (i) the non-

signatory accepted a direct benefit from the agreement or (ii) the non-signatory had

a close relationship to the agreement, a signatory to the agreement controlled the

non-signatory, and the circumstances establish that the signatory agreed to the forum

selection provision on behalf of its controlled affiliate.”110 The direct benefit can

arise either at the time of contracting or after the contract was executed.111 The

benefit can be either pecuniary or nonpecuniary, but it cannot be indirect;

“contemplation” of a benefit such as one arising from a separate agreement with a

signatory is insufficient.112 “The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the non-

signatory from accepting the benefits of the agreement without also accepting its

burdens, including the forum selection provision.”113

       The entities’ principal place of businesses are at same address, but Common

C Holdings is incorporated in Delaware, whereas Common C GP is incorporated in

Michigan.114      Jarvis is an employee of both entities—he serves as the Chief

109
    Freer, 2015 WL 5138285, at *4–5 (finding that the second factor was not met when plaintiff
conceded they had no facts to allege any direct benefit and plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
“solicited [plaintiff’s] involvement in the acquisition, nor that [they] managed the negotiation,
drafting or execution of the transaction”).
110
    Flotek, 262 A.3d at 1090.
111
    Id. at 1091 (internal citations omitted).
112
    Neurvana Med., LLC v. Balt USA, LLC, 2019 WL 4464268, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2019)
(outlining multiple cases that analyze the direct benefit element).
113
    Flotek, 262 A.3d at 1074.
114
    Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3.
                                                 22
Operating Officer for Common C Holdings, and as a manager of Common C GP.115

The Agreement was signed by CFGI and Jarvis, identified as COO, as the

representative for “Common Citizen.”116 Nowhere in the Agreement, however, is

Common C GP mentioned by name.               Common Citizen is identified in the

Agreement, and thereafter, referred to as “the Company” throughout.           CFGI

interprets this Agreement to be between CFGI and Common Citizen without

“specify[ing] which business entity purporting to do business simply as ‘Common

Citizen’—whether a parent, subsidiary, or otherwise—is to be bound.”117

       The Amended Complaint’s artful pleading does not distinguish between

Common C Holdings and Common C GP. Instead, the Amended Complaint refers

to both entities together as “Common Citizen”118 and alleges that “in respect of the

Contract and Amendment there is no meaningful distinction” between Common C

Holdings and Common C GP.119 Curiously, however, when defining Common C

Holdings, the Amended Complaint alleges that Common C Holdings “d/b/a

Common Citizen.”120

       The first and third Hadley elements are not in dispute—the parties agree the

Agreement’s forum selection clause is valid and the present claim arises from the

115
    Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
116
    Agreement at 5.
117
    Am. Compl. ¶ 10.
118
    Id., preamble.
119
    Id. ¶ 29.
120
    Id. ¶ 2.
                                        23
parties’ standing as a result of the Agreement. Therefore, the question remains as to

whether Common C GP is a third-party beneficiary or closely related to the

Agreement. To be “closely related,” CFGI must be able to show that Common C

GP either received a direct benefit from the Agreement or it was foreseeable that

Common C GP would be bound by the Agreement.121

       The parties focused their briefing and oral argument on whether Common C

GP was subject to jurisdiction in Delaware due to the fact that Jarvis, who works for

both entities, signed the Amendment for Common C GP on behalf of Common C

Holdings. Nonetheless, the Court finds that CFGI has also alleged a non-frivolous

nexus to Delaware based on the “closely related” or “foreseeability” aspect of the

Hadley elements. The Court, therefore, will permit limited jurisdictional discovery

on this issue to see if CFGI is able to meet the second Hadley element.122 The Court

will defer ruling on Common C GP’s Motion to Dismiss Count I as it relates to the

Agreement until such discovery is complete.

121
    See Baker v. Impact Hldg., Inc., 2010 WL 1931032, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010).
122
    See Reid v. Siniscalchi, 2011 WL 378795, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2011) (“The Court generally
may not preclude jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff asserts any non-frivolous basis for
jurisdiction over the defendant in light of the factual allegations in the complaint.”) (internal
citations omitted).
                                               24
      2) The Court Will Permit Jurisdictional Discovery as to Whether Common
         C GP is Subject to Jurisdiction in Delaware for the Quasi-Contract
         Claims.

        The parties did not brief the issues of whether, if Count I as it relates to the

Amendment was dismissed, the Court would have jurisdiction over Common C GP.

The Court, therefore, will also permit jurisdictional discovery as to Common C GP

as it relates to CFGI’s unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel claims, as they

have been limited by the Court. The Court will defer ruling on Common C GP’s

Motion to Dismiss Counts II and IV until such discovery is complete. 123

C.      CFGI’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM

        1)    Counterclaim Count II is Dismissed as Duplicative.

        “The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract

and requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or

unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the

contract from receiving the fruits of the bargain.”124 The implied covenant “only

applies where a contract lacks specific language governing an issue and the

obligation the court is asked to imply advances, and does not contradict, the purposes

123
    The Court notes that Count V (attorneys’ fees) has not been challenged by Common C
Holdings’ motion to dismiss. If the Court determines there is personal jurisdiction over Common
C GP with this analysis, Common C GP will also be subject to the remaining Count V as well.
124
    Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quoting Dunlap v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005)) (internal quotations omitted).
                                              25
reflected in the express language of the contract.”125 If a contract expressly addresses

a particular matter, “an implied covenant claim respecting that matter is duplicative

and not viable.”126

       A court should look at “the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of

contracting and not rewrite the contract to appease a party who later wishes to rewrite

a contract he now believes to have been a bad deal.”127 Courts are also cautioned

about implying contractual protections “when the contract easily could have been

drafted to expressly provide for it.”128

       To sufficiently allege a breach of the implied covenant, the plaintiff must

“allege a specific implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the

defendant, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.”129 “Consistent with its narrow

purpose, the implied covenant is only rarely invoked successfully.”130 “The Court

will resort to the implied covenant only when a contract is truly silent with respect

125
    All. Data Sys. Corp. v. Blackstone Cap. P’rs V L.P., 963 A.2d 746, 770 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citing
All. Cap. Corp. v. GC-Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2006)). See also Airborne
Health, Inc. v. Squid Soap, LP, 984 A.2d 126, 146 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2009) (citing Dave Greytak
Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 23 (Del. Ch. 1992)) (“The implied
covenant does not apply when ‘the subject at issue is expressly covered by the contract.’”).
126
    Edinburgh Hldgs., Inc. v. Educ. Affiliates, Inc., 2018 WL 2727542, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 6,
2018) (citing Narrowstep, Inc. v Onstream Media Corp., 2010 WL 5422405, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec.
22, 2010)).
127
    Nemec, 991 A.2d at 1126 (citing Rutledge, 750 A.2d at 1234).
128
    Squid Soap, 984 A.2d at 146 (quoting GC-Sun Hldgs., 910 A.2d at 1035).
129
    Kuroda v. SPJS Hldgs., L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (quoting Fitzgerald v.
Cantor, 1998 WL 842316, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998)).
130
    Id. (citing Superior Vision Servs., Inc. v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2521426, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 25, 2006)).
                                                26
to the contested issue. And then only when the Court finds that the parties’

expectations on the issue were so fundamental that they clearly would not need to

negotiate about nor memorialize them.”131

       CFGI argues the implied covenant is duplicative because “it merely replicates

Common Citizen’s breach of contract claim.”132 CFGI notes the Agreement already

contains provisions dealing with both the challenged substance of the work

performed and the billing practices.133 Common C Holdings asserts that the silent

provisions protected by the implied covenant include the requirement that work

performed would be “professional” and that “the information provided via the

invoices [should] adequately show a customer that the work was done according to

contract.”134 CFGI argues that Common C Holdings is trying to include provisions

in a contract they failed to bargain for at the contract’s creation.135

       The Court agrees with CFGI. The Agreement specifically outlines the work

CFGI is to perform and how CFGI should bill Common C Holdings for it. Common

C Holdings can argue that CFGI breached the Agreement by a failure to follow the

terms as bargained for, but this Court is not prepared to imply or add a higher

standard of performance than is specifically outlined in the Agreement. The Court

131
    GWO Litig. Tr. v. Sprint Sols., Inc., 2018 WL 5309477, at *6 (Del. Super. Oct. 25, 2018) (citing
GC-Sun Hldgs., 910 A.2d at 1032–33).
132
    Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Def.’s Countercl. at 4.
133
    Id. at 4–6.
134
    Def.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss Countercl. at 9–10.
135
    Pl.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Countercl. at 4–5.
                                                27
notes that these are sophisticated parties who were capable of adding additional

required terms into the Agreement when formed. Counterclaim II is dismissed.

       2)      Counterclaim Count III is Dismissed with Leave to Amend.136

       To plead negligence, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) the defendant had a legal

obligation—a duty—to protect the plaintiff from a risk of injury; (2) the defendant

breached the duty toward the plaintiff; and (3) that breach proximately caused the

plaintiff injury.”137 Negligent misrepresentation requires the plaintiff to plead that:

“(1) the defendant had a pecuniary duty to provide accurate information, (2) the

defendant supplied false information, (3) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable

care in obtaining or communicating the information, and (4) the plaintiff suffered a

pecuniary loss caused by justifiable reliance upon the false information.”138 “An

equitable fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim lies only if there is either: (i) a

special relationship between the parties over which equity takes jurisdiction (like a

fiduciary relationship) or (ii) justification for a remedy that only equity can

afford.”139    The Court of Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction over claims of

136
    The Court notes Plaintiff’s additional challenges to Count III for lack of particularity and as
barred by the economic loss doctrine, but declines to address these arguments substantively
because Count III is dismissed on other grounds.
137
    Roman Oil Co. v. Bibbs, 2013 WL 1143630, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 14, 2013) (citing Roberts
v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 2 A.3d 131, 136 (Del. Super. 2009)).
138
    Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 822 (Del. Ch. 2014) (citing Corp. Prop.
Assocs. 14 Inc. v. CHR Hldg. Corp., 2008 WL 963048, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2008)).
139
    Envo, Inc. v. Walters, 2009 WL 5173807, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2009) (citing Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. AIG Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3742596, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 12, 2006)).
                                               28
negligent misrepresentation, with the exception of cases arising under the Consumer

Fraud Act.140

       In analyzing subject matter jurisdiction, “the Court must look beyond the

‘labeling’ of the claim and examine its substance to determine the true nature of the

claim.”141 In Van Lake v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc.,142 the court found, despite a

negligent misrepresentation label, that plaintiff actually alleged a simple negligence

claim. In Van Lake, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a duty to provide

accurate information, the defendant breached its duty by negligently making

misrepresentations, the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representations, and as the

proximate result of the misrepresentations, plaintiff was damaged. 143 The elements

for negligence were thus sufficiently pled.

       Atwell v. RHIS, Inc.144 is instructive in distinguishing the two claims. In

Atwell, the court found negligence instead of negligent misrepresentation when the

defendant failed to disclose the true condition of a home and the facts alleged

negligence: “the duty (that a seller must disclose known defects), who breached it

([defendant]), the breaching act (failing to disclose the condition of the home), and

140
    Van Lake v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc., 2013 WL 1087583, at *11 (Del. Super. Feb. 15, 2013) (citing
Iacono v. Barici, 2006 WL 3844208, at *5 (Del. Super. Dec. 29, 2006)).
141
    Id. (citing Radius Servs., LLC v. Jack Corrozi Constr., Inc., 2009 WL 3273509, at *3 n.10 (Del.
Super. Sept. 30, 2009) (refusing to dismiss a negligent misrepresentation claim for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction merely because of the claim’s title).
142
    2013 WL 1087583.
143
    Id. at *12.
144
    Atwell v. RHIS, Inc., 2006 WL 2686532 (Del. Super. Aug. 18, 2006).
                                               29
the injured party (Plaintiffs).”145 As to another count, the court found negligent

misrepresentation because plaintiffs “expressly contend[ed] that there was a

pecuniary duty to provide accurate information, that [defendant] failed to exercise

reasonable care in obtaining and communicating false and inaccurate information to

Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as a result.”146

       During briefing and oral argument in this case, Common C Holdings argued

that its negligence claim was for “professional malpractice.”147                    To plead a

professional malpractice claim, the plaintiff must allege a breach of the standard of

professional care owed.148 Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young,

L.L.P.149 details what is required to successfully plead malpractice. The plaintiff

there should have plead “that each of the defendant advisors was engaged by

[plaintiff] to provide professional advice of a particular kind, specifying what the

advisors did in those capacities, and identifying how what the advisors did fell short

145
    Id. at *1.
146
     Id. See also Radius Servs., 2009 WL 3273509, at *2 (distinguishing negligent
misrepresentation from negligence based on if the defendants “knew” or only “should have
known” that their representations were false: if defendant “knew,” then common law fraud could
be plead; if defendants merely “should have known,” then negligent misrepresentation or equitable
fraud is pled). But see WyPie Invs., LLC v. Homschek, 2018 WL 1581981, at *16–17 (Del. Super.
Mar. 28, 2018) (dismissing complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and holding plaintiff
pled a claim for negligent misrepresentation where plaintiff asserted that defendants “knew or
should have known” that the statements were materially false, that plaintiff relied upon them, and
they would be damaged as a result of the misrepresentation).
147
    CFGI, LLC v. Common C Hldgs. LP, C.A. No. N23C-03-032 MAA CCLD (Del. Super. Oct.
23, 2023) (Oral Argument); D.I. 42; Def.’s Answering Br. at 10–12.
148
    See Trenwick Am. Litig. Tr. v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 216 (Del. Ch. Aug. 10,
2006).
149
    Id.
                                               30
of applicable standards of care.”150            Further, Delaware courts usually require

professional malpractice claims to be supported by expert testimony.151 Expert

testimony may not be required to show the standard of care when “the professional’s

mistake is so apparent that a layman, exercising his common sense, is perfectly

competent to determine whether there was negligence.”152

       To support its claim for negligence, Common C Holdings points to paragraphs

6 through 11 and 21 of its Counterclaim.153 CFGI argues that the claim is for

negligent misrepresentation because it challenges the information detailed in the

150
    Id. at 217. See also Shandler v. DLJ Merch. Banking, Inc., 2010 WL 2929654, at *17 (Del. Ch.
July 26, 2010) (dismissing a professional malpractice claim because the plaintiff made “no claim
about what the industry standards were, or what the [defendants] did that was below those
standards.”).
151
    See Alston v. Hudson, 700 A.2d 735 (Table), 1997 WL 560883, at *2 (Del. 1997) (citing Weaver
v. Lukoff, 511 A.2d 1044 (Table), 1986 WL 17121, at *1 (Del. 1986)).
152
    Weaver, 511 A.2d 1044 (Table), 1986 WL 17121, at *1 (citing Larrimore v. Homeopathic
Hosp. Ass’n, 181 A.2d 573, 577 (Del. 1962)).
153
    D.I. 42. Paragraph 6 refers to the contractual obligation to perform in a professional manner,
and to “provide its services in accord with the applicable professional standard of care.” Countercl.
¶ 6. Paragraph 7 detailed invoicing procedures and clarified that CFGI “was not entitled to be
compensated for work not authorized, work not performed in a professional manner, inefficiencies
in its professional staffing and work assignments, non-productive work, or overbilling by its
employees.” Id. ¶ 7. Paragraph 8 noted that CFGI was “required to see that its employees properly
performed requested work without material errors and in an efficient manner and that its billings
reflect only such work.” Id. ¶ 8. Paragraph 9 detailed the work CFGI was contracted to complete,
noting that it was “basic accounting work.” Id. ¶ 9. Paragraph 10 detailed Common C Holdings’
reasons for believing CFGI “over staffed this work and under managed its professionals” including
unreasonably large billable hours, repeats of employees names on the invoices, and insufficient
descriptions. Id. ¶ 10. Paragraph 11 claims that Common C Holdings found “multiple errors” in
CFGI’s work and “that the work had not been performed in a proper professional manner.” Id.
¶ 11. Paragraph 21 noted that “CFGI was obligated by the applicable standard of care to perform
and bill for its services in a reasonably prudent manner” and that CFGI breached its “professional
duties under the applicable standards.” Id. ¶ 21.
                                                31
invoices provided to Common C Holdings and is therefore outside of the Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction.154

       The Court finds that Common C Holdings has pled a claim for negligence,

rather than negligent representation. Like in Van Lake v. Sorin CRM USA, Inc.,

Common C Holdings alleged facts that pled duty, breach of a duty, causation, and

the harm that CFGI allegedly caused. Common C Holdings does not plead that CFGI

“knew or should have known” that the representations in the invoices were false, nor

that the representation in the invoices is what caused the injury. Instead, Common

C Holdings focuses on CFGI’s work product itself as negligently performed, rather

than the creation of the invoices as the negligent behavior. Nor has Common C GP

pled that it “justifiably relied” on the misrepresentations in the invoice that would

give rise to a negligence misrepresentation claim.

       A question remains, however, as to whether Common C Holdings has pled a

claim for professional negligence (i.e., malpractice).155 CFGI correctly identifies

that Common C Holdings failed to plead professional negligence because it failed to

plead a professional standard of care.156

        While expert testimony is usually required for professional negligence, if

negligence is “so apparent that a layman, exercising his common sense, is perfectly

154
    Pl.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8.
155
    Def.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 10.
156
    Pl.’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Partial Mot. to Dismiss at 6.
                                               32
competent to determine whether there was negligence,” expert testimony is not

necessary.157 As evidence, Common C Holdings refers to CFGI’s invoice which

contained “‘disorganized, inefficient, and wasteful expenditures of time,’ over-

billing, fraudulent billing, and represented faulty work.”158 Despite Common C

Holdings asserting that CFGI performed basic accounting work, this Court is not

convinced that the errors and flaws alleged are such that the negligence would be

clear to a lay person. Since expert testimony has not been provided to allege what

the standard of care is for an accountant, as a professional negligence claim, the

Court grants Common C Holdings leave to amend. Common C Holdings can amend

its pleading to the extent, if it can, that CFGI’s alleged insufficient performance is

so deficient that it would be clear to a reasonable layperson.

                                    VI.    CONCLUSION

          As to Common C Holdings’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, the Court:

(1) grants the dismissal of Count I, breach of contract, as it pertains to the

Amendment for lack of consideration; and (2) denies the motion as it pertains to both

Count II, unjust enrichment, and Count IV, promissory estoppel.

          As to Common C GP’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court defers ruling at this time,

pending jurisdictional discovery.

157
      Weaver, 511 A.2d 1044 (Table), 1986 WL 17121, at *1 (citing Larrimore, 181 A.2d at 577).
158
      Def.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 11.
                                               33
      As to Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Common C Holdings LP’s counterclaim,

the Court: (1) grants the dismissal of Count II, breach of the implied covenant of

good faith and fair dealing; and (2) dismisses with leave to amend Count III,

negligence, for failure to provide an expert to explain the professional duty of care,

but denies the motion to the extent it alleges lack of subject matter jurisdiction for a

pleading of negligent misrepresentation.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                           34