Court Opinion

ID: 9746950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:46:47.130467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:18.697476
License: Public Domain

FLIER, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority that the trial court denied outpatient status on the ground that appellant was still afflicted with the disease that brought about the murder of Flowers in 1991. The record shows that the court addressed the issue whether appellant poses a danger, that it resolved this matter adversely to appellant, and that this was the reason that the court denied appellant’s application for outpatient status.
I find that the court weighed all the evidence in a careful and thoughtful manner and found that appellant does not meet the standard for release to outpatient status. After noting, as appears in the court’s opinion, that appellant “still has that disease,” the trial court went on to state: “And what the testimony is[,] is that there is a basis to believe he won’t hurt anybody. There is a basis to believe that if he doesn’t take his—if he does, yes, take his medicine. [j[] The bottom Une is I don’t think we have it here. So I’m denying it. Okay.” This shows that the court was addressing the question whether appellant was dangerous. A Uttle later, the trial court made clear that it thought that appellant posed a danger. After discussing the advisability of an appeal, the trial court stated: “So it’s just a question ultimately of convincing me or some other judge who may hear this thing that at some *76point they’re convinced that the structure in which he would go to is such that there is more of a basis to believe—to ensure that he would take his medicine, and that he would not be a danger to the people that he is living with, or to the community. [][] And all I’m saying is based on what I’ve heard so far, I don’t have reason to believe that.”
The trial court’s focus on the issue of the danger posed by appellant was the natural result of the crime that brought about appellant’s hospitalization, and the evidence that was presented during the hearing. No one could react to the facts of Flowers’s murder with anything other than a keen concern about the question whether appellant could be trusted not to commit such a crime again. And, as the majority’s opinion reflects, every witness who testified addressed the question whether appellant posed a danger. The trial court itself referred to the issue as “risk assessment” when it questioned Dr. Sussman about the “likelihood” that appellant was “too old and too sick to do this again.”
It is also true that there is evidence that appellant still poses a danger. Dr. Sussman testified on cross-examination by the deputy district attorney that appellant could be safely treated in the community as long as he was under the supervision of the conditional release program. However, as the majority notes, Dr. Sussman added that: “I do believe he remains a danger due to his mental disorder.” When Dr. Roman was asked whether she could make a prediction as to appellant’s dangerousness if he was not taking his psychotropic medications, she replied: “I’m not making any predictions, no. I’m saying that our recommendation is that we can safely and effectively treat him in the community.” And Dr. Alder testified that appellant was at some risk for alcohol abuse, and that if he abused alcohol] that would be a significant risk.
As the trial court summed it up at one point, there were two concerns. One was the continuation of medications, and the other was alcohol. It is not disputed that if either concern materializes into an actual condition, appellant poses a danger. I think the trial court addressed these concerns, and at least in part based its ruling on the fact that no one could guarantee against a discontinuation of medications, or the abuse of alcohol.
Finally, the fact that this decision is consigned to the discretion of the trial court means that the trial court’s decision is based at least in part on subjective considerations that are not reflected by the written record. The question whether an individual with appellant’s history is, or is not, dangerous, calls for a complex calculation where observations of the individual’s demeanor may play a part. For this and other reasons, the trial court’s difficult decision should be accorded deference by a reviewing court that is limited to the written record.
*77The trial court addressed the issue of appellant’s dangerousness and resolved that issue adversely to appellant, based on evidence that is in the record. For this reason, I would affirm the order.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 8, 2005. Kennard, J., and Baxter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.