Court Opinion

ID: 9656270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:45:13.641044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:31.095226
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with parts I and III of the majority opinion. I concur with the result in part II. I write separately to suggest some different lines of reasoning on the admission and exclusion of expert testimony.
*380The trial court’s reasoning in disallowing the hypothetical question to the expert, because it would be “invading the province of the jury,” was inappropriate under our rules of evidence. N.D.R.Ev. Rule 704 says:
“Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”
The reason for and effect of this rule is explained in the Notes of Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence, from which our rule is derived:
“The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach fully effective and to allay any doubt on the subject, the so-called ‘ultimate issue’ rule is specifically abolished by the instant rule. “The older cases often contained strictures against allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate issues, as a particular aspect of the rule against opinions. The rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application, and generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of useful information. 7 Wigmore §§ 1920, 1921; McCormick § 12. The basis usually assigned for the rule, to prevent the witness from ‘usurping the province of the jury,’ is aptly characterized as ‘empty rhetoric.’ 7 Wigmore § 1920, p. 17. Efforts to meet the felt needs of particular situations led to odd verbal circumlocutions which were said not to violate the rule.
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“Many modern decisions illustrate the trend to abandon the rule completely.
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“The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. * * * ” Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee note (Federal Criminal Code and Rules, West Publishing Company, 1985 Revised Edition, pp. 242-3.)
I believe that the view suggested by the majority opinion, and of the cases cited by it, as to the admissibility of expert testimony on the potential unreliability of eyewitness identification, may be too narrow, contrary to our rules of evidence. N.D. R.Ev. Rule 702 says:
“Testimony by Experts If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”
The explanation of this Rule in Notes of Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules, from which our Rule 702 was derived, suggests a much broader approach:
“An intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult or impossible without the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The most common source of this knowledge is the expert witness, although there are other techniques for supplying it.
“Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly recognizes that an expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are not indispensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier can itself draw *381the requisite inference. The use of opinions is not abolished by the rule, however. It will continue to be permissible for the experts to take the further step of suggesting the inference which should be drawn from applying the specialized knowledge to the facts. See Rules 703 to 705.
“Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier. ‘There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’ Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 414, 418 (1952). When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time. 7 Wig-more § 1918.
“The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the ‘scientific’ and ‘technical’ but extend to all ‘specialized’ knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.’ Thus within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called ‘skilled’ witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values.” Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee note {Federal Criminal Code and Rules, West Publishing Company, 1985 Revised Edition, p. 241).
In the context of a case like this, I believe it is also desirable to call attention to N.D.R.Ev. Rule 703 which provides that “the facts or data” reasonably relied upon by an expert in his particular field “need not be admissible in evidence.” Thus, I believe the approach of our applicable rules differs fundamentally from the approach of Chief Justice Reynoldson in State v. Galloway, 275 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Iowa, 1979).
It has been observed that “[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.... A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). This Court has struggled with the problems of eyewitness identification, State v. Denny, 350 N.W.2d 25, 30 (N.D.1984), and no doubt will have to do so in the future. Thus, I would not foreclose the reliability of eyewitness identification as a subject of expert opinion evidence.
Since I concur with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in this case, I see no need to suggest or imply any limitations on that discretion in future cases.