Court Opinion

ID: 9556124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 06:09:49.798035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:27.904905
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed August 10, 2023

                                       In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00111-CR
                                No. 05-22-00112-CR
                                No. 05-22-00117-CR
                                No. 05-22-00118-CR

                  CARLOS RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

              On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6
                            Dallas County, Texas
              Trial Court Cause Nos. F21-40350-X, F19-57743-X,
                       F21-75380-X, and F20-71001-X

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Molberg, Reichek, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Molberg

      Carlos Rodriguez Zuniga appeals judgments convicting him of four felony

offenses involving the same female complainant, who was once his girlfriend: two

for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, each a second-degree felony, see TEX.

PENAL CODE § 22.02(b), and two for assault family violence with a previous felony

conviction, each a third-degree felony. See id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). After Zuniga

pleaded guilty to all four offenses in an open plea proceeding, the trial court entered
judgments convicting him of each offense and sentencing Zuniga to fifteen years’

confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s Institutional Division

(TDCJID) in the second-degree felony cases (cause numbers F19-57743-X and F21-

75380-X) and ten years’ TDCJID confinement in the third-degree felony cases

(cause numbers F20-71001-X and F21-40350-X). On appeal, Zuniga argues we

should reverse the judgments and remand for further proceedings because he claims

he did not waive and was not provided an interpreter during the proceedings, which

he argues deprived him of due process and rendered his guilty pleas involuntary, and

because he claims the evidence is insufficient to support his guilty pleas in cause

numbers F20-71001-X and F21-40350-X. We disagree and affirm the judgments in

this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                       ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

A.       Due Process
         In his first two issues, Zuniga argues (1) he did not waive his right to an

interpreter and (2) the trial court’s failure to provide an interpreter at the time of his

plea violated his right to due process1 and rendered his guilty pleas involuntary.

     1
      While Zuniga does not raise any argument regarding other constitutional rights besides due process,
we note that issues regarding an appellant’s right to an interpreter in a criminal case often implicate the
right to confrontation as well. See U.S. CONST. amend VI; Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 136 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004) (“We must decide whether Garcia’s conviction violates the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude that it does.”); Cheng v. Zhaoya Wang,
315 S.W.3d 668, 671–72 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“In a criminal proceeding the accused’s right
to an interpreter is part of the constitutional right to confrontation.”). Because Zuniga raises no
confrontation issue, we need not address any such issue in this appeal.
                                                   –2–
      A trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless the plea

is free and voluntary. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(b); Smith v. State, 857

S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d). When the record shows the

court properly admonished a defendant, it presents a prima facie showing that the

defendant entered a knowing and voluntary plea, and the burden then shifts to the

defendant to show that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. Smith,

857 S.W.2d at 73.

      Fundamental fairness and due process of law require that an interpreter be

provided to translate between English and the accused’s own language if a defendant

cannot hear or does not speak English well enough to understand the trial

proceedings or communicate with counsel. Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 500

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In Linton, the court stated, “The question on appeal is not

whether the ‘best’ means of interpretive services were employed, but whether the

services that were actually employed were constitutionally adequate such that the

defendant could understand and participate in the proceedings.” Id.

      The trial judge has “wide discretion” in making this determination, as the

judge has the defendant in the judge’s presence, can observe the defendant’s level

of comprehension, and can ask the defendant questions. Id.; see Perovich v. United

States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) (stating alleged error in refusing to appoint an

interpreter when a defendant testifies “is a matter largely resting in the discretion of

the trial court”). Decisions on the adequacy of interpretive services “depend upon a

                                          –3–
potpourri of factors,” including the testimony and “the defendant’s understanding of

the English language and the complexity of the pertinent law and its procedures.”

Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 500.

         In the trial court, Zuniga did not file a motion requesting an interpreter2 or

object to the lack of an interpreter. However, if Zuniga has a problem understanding

the English language and the trial court was aware of that problem, the trial court

had an independent duty to implement Zuniga’s right to have an interpreter translate

the proceedings into a language he understands. See Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 145.

Garcia states:

         [W]hen a trial judge is aware that the defendant has a problem
         understanding the English language, the defendant’s right to have an
         interpreter translate the trial proceedings into a language which the
         defendant understands is a category-two Marin[3] right. In these
         circumstances, the judge has an independent duty to implement this
         right in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver by the
         defendant. The judge may become aware of the defendant’s language
         problem either by being informed of it by one or both parties or by
         noticing the problem sua sponte.

Id. However, “the mere fact that an accused may be more fluent in speaking Spanish

does not, in and of itself, make it incumbent upon a trial court to appoint an

interpreter for an accused who speaks and understands the English language.”

Flores v. State, 509 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).

    2
        See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.30.
    3
     See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (describing our system of justice as
having three distinct kinds of rules: “(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which
must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be
implemented upon request”).
                                                     –4–
      Zuniga does not argue, and did not argue in the trial court, that he cannot speak

or understand the English language. The record plainly shows he can do both. The

record includes three transcribed proceedings—two admonishment hearings, and the

open plea hearing—and in each of these proceedings, the transcript reflects that

Zuniga communicated in English and without an interpreter with both the trial court

and his own lawyer, responded in English to questions posed to him in English, and

posed questions of his own in English.

      During the first admonishment hearing in the record, after the trial court asked

two questions in English and Zuniga answered affirmatively to both—including one

regarding whether he understood the punishment ranges and what he was charged

with in the two third-degree felony cases—the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: You understand, or no, you don’t?

      [ZUNIGA]: I understand.
      THE COURT: You understand.

      [ZUNIGA]: I understand a little bit, yeah.

      THE COURT: A little bit?

      [ZUNIGA]: Well, like –
      THE COURT: If you don’t, now is the time to ask for an explanation.
      Tell me what you don’t understand.
      [ZUNIGA]: Well, you got a translator for me? Like, it’s better for me
      in Spanish, like . . .

      THE COURT: [referring to and questioning defense counsel] have you
      been having to communicate with him with a translator?
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
                               –5–
      THE COURT: Why do you need one today, Mr. Zuniga?

      [ZUNIGA]: Yes, ma’am.

      THE COURT: Why do you need a translator today when you haven’t
      needed one before to communicate with your lawyer?

      [ZUNIGA]: Well, I understand, like, a bit. Like I – like, I understand
      what you are saying.

      THE COURT: Okay. Well, we will get through this hearing, and then
      if you feel like you need someone to translate for you in future
      proceedings, you can let [defense counsel] know. But it’s uncommon
      if you speak to your lawyer, usually you can speak to everybody else –
      not you, but people in general – in English. So I had no idea that we
      needed a translator.
      THE DEFENDANT: M-h’m.

      Throughout the remainder of that first admonishment hearing, the trial court,

Zuniga’s counsel, and Zuniga all continued speaking English, and Zuniga provided

answers in English or asked questions in English more than fifteen more times in

that hearing after this exchange.

      In the second admonishment hearing, the trial court, Zuniga’s counsel, and

Zuniga all continued to communicate in English, and Zuniga provided answers in

English or asked questions in English at least eight times in that hearing. Although

there is no indication an interpreter was requested, sworn, or used, the record does

indicate that a licensed interpreter was present during that hearing.

      When the open plea hearing began, once again, the trial court, Zuniga’s

counsel, and Zuniga all communicated in English, as did the prosecutor. Before the

State rested, Zuniga answered in English at least fourteen questions from the trial
                                         –6–
court. After the State rested, Zuniga’s counsel indicated that Zuniga would testify,

and the record indicates that at that point, the same licensed interpreter that was in

attendance at the second admonishment hearing was sworn and gave her name and

license number. However, the record lacks any indication that she conducted any

interpreting during the proceeding or that Zuniga requested her to do so.

      Unlike Garcia, where the defendant could not speak, read, or write English

and “at trial the judge was aware [the defendant] needed a translator,” see 149

S.W.3d at 136–37, 145, in this case, the record does not show the trial court was

aware of any problem Zuniga has understanding the English language, or that he

even has any such problem. In fact, the record shows Zuniga could understand and

participate in the proceedings and did so—in English.

      Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to require, sua sponte, an intrepreter to interpret for Zuniga

during the open plea proceedings, and we reject his argument that the trial court’s

action in this regard violated his due process rights and rendered his guilty pleas

involuntary. See Flores, 509 S.W.2d at 581 (mere fact an accused may be more

fluent in speaking Spanish does not, in and of itself, make it incumbent upon a trial

court to appoint an interpreter for an accused who speaks and understands the

English language); Diaz v. State, Nos. 05-00-00693-CR, 05-00-00694-CR, 05-00-

00695-CR, 2000 WL 1867985, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 22, 2000, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (stating court could not conclude from

                                         –7–
record that appellant required an interpreter and concluding no abuse of discretion

was shown).4 We overrule Zuniga’s first two issues.

B.       Sufficiency of Evidence
         In his third issue, Zuniga argues the evidence is insufficient to support his

guilty plea in cause numbers F20-71001-X and F21-40350-X.

         When a defendant pleads guilty, he cannot be convicted upon his plea alone

without sufficient evidence to support the plea. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15;

McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). A judicial

confession, standing alone, constitutes sufficient evidence to support a guilty plea.

See Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op.

on reh’g) (describing this as “well settled”) (citations omitted); see also Menefee v.

State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

         Sufficient evidence to support Zuniga’s guilty plea in cause numbers F21-

40350-X and F20-71001-X exists in the judicial confessions offered and admitted

into evidence as State’s Exhibits 2 and 3, respectively.5 In those exhibits, Zuniga

     4
      See also Simcoe v. State, 268 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (concluding trial
judge did not commit error when he allowed the trial to proceed without appointing an interpreter because
record did not show appellant was unable to understand English or to participate in the trial in a meaningful
manner without the assistance of an interpreter); Saucedo v. State, No. 11-15-00045-CR, 2017 WL
1366647, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 13, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding trial court was not required to appoint an interpreter for appellant when the record reflected
appellant could understand and clearly communicate in English); Morales v. State, No. 06-16-00071-CR,
2017 WL 429587, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 1, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (same).
     5
      Zuniga incorrectly argues the trial court did not admit State’s Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 into evidence. While
the trial court stated, “State’s Exhibits 1 is admitted in each case,” the trial court did so after the State
offered exhibits one through four, without any objection from Zuniga. The trial court’s statement reflects

                                                     –8–
judicially confessed that he “committed the offense with which [he was] charged

exactly as alleged in the indictment” and agreed and stipulated to the following facts:

        on or about the 11th day of May, 2020, in Dallas County, Texas,
        [Zuniga] did unlawfully, then and there, intentionally, knowingly and
        recklessly cause bodily injury to another, namely: [the complainant], a
        member of [Zuniga’s] household and with whom [he] had a dating
        relationship, by GRABBING AND BY SQUEEZING AND BY
        STRIKING AND BY SCRATCHING AND BY PULLING
        COMPLAINANT WITH A HAND AND HANDS, [and]

        on or about the 14th day of February, 2021, in Dallas County, Texas,
        [Zuniga] did unlawfully, then and there, intentionally, knowingly and
        recklessly cause bodily injury to another, namely: [the complainant], a
        member of [Zuniga’s] household and with whom [he] had a dating
        relationship, by BITING COMPLAINANT[.]
        Additionally, both judicial confessions stipulated that, prior to the commission

of the offenses alleged in the above two paragraphs, Zuniga

        had been previously duly and legally convicted of the following
        assaultive offense . . . against a person who was a member of [his]
        family and household and with whom [he] had a dating relationship and
        such offense of offenses constitute the type of offense or offenses that
        render the offense alleged [in F20-71001-X and F21-40350-X] a felony
        of the third degree under Section 22.01(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code:

        In Cause Number MA1652058-L in the COUNTY CRIMINAL
        COURT NO. 10 of Dallas County, Texas, [Zuniga] was convicted of
        ASSAULT FAMILY VIOLENCE on or about the 4TH day of
        NOVEMBER, A.D., 2016[.]
        Based on the record before us, we conclude sufficient evidence exists to

support Zuniga’s guilty plea in cause numbers F20-71001-X and F21-40350-X. See

Dinnery, 592 S.W.2d at 353. We overrule Zuniga’s third issue.

an intention to admit the information offered in each case, and the reporter’s record, which includes Exhibits
1, 2, 3, and 4, reflects that all four exhibits were admitted into evidence.
                                                    –9–
                                  CONCLUSION
      We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                          /Ken Molberg/
220111f.u05                               KEN MOLBERG
220112f.u05                               JUSTICE
220117f.u05
220118f.u05
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                      –10–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA,                      On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                     Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F21-40350-X.
No. 05-22-00111-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Reichek and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August, 2023.

                                       –11–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA,                      On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                     Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F19-57743-X.
No. 05-22-00112-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Reichek and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August, 2023.

                                       –12–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA,                      On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                     Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F21-75380-X.
No. 05-22-00117-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Reichek and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August, 2023.

                                       –13–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

CARLOS RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA,                      On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                     Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F20-71001-X.
No. 05-22-00118-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                              Molberg. Justices Reichek and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 10th day of August, 2023.

                                       –14–