Court Opinion

ID: 9765991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:28:09.326464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:18.171444
License: Public Domain

Longo, J.
(dissenting). The basic issue in this case is whether the policy issued by the defendant as governed by state law and regulations affords uninsured motorist protection to the plaintiff where the alleged tortfeasor was unidentified. In this state, the interpretation of automobile liability insurance policies is affected by two considerations. As the policy constitutes a contract between the insured and the insurer, we apply the words of the agreement to execute the intentions of the parties as manifested thereby. Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 283, 278 A.2d 796. “Con*511tracts of private parties cannot vary obligations imposed by law.” Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 104, 256 A.2d 246. Accordingly, the second consideration in interpreting the policy is, in this ease, the legislation1 and regulations applicable by force of law.2
The parties bargained that the insured was to receive uninsured motorist coverage. The principle of insurance law which provides that where there is ambiguity, coverage is to be presumed, is in conformance with contract principles requiring a court to construe a clause against the party who drew up that clause. A. M. Larson Co. v. Lawlor Ins. Agency, Inc., 153 Conn. 618, 622, 220 A.2d 32; 17A C.J.S., Contracts, § 324. Furthermore, motorists purchase insurance not merely to fulfill a public responsibility, but, more fundamentally, to forestall their own possible financial suffering and ruin, arising from their use of the highways. The clear purport of uninsured motorist coverage is that where the tortfeasor cannot be made to defray the motorist’s damages from bodily injury caused by the accident, the insured’s insurance company will, at least to the limits of the policy. Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817; Southern v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 236 F. Sup. 370, 372 (W.D. Va.). *512Where the tortfeasor is unidentified, there is no source other than the insured’s policy from which recompense can be attained.
Independently of the terms of the policy, the legislature has required uninsured motorist coverage.3 In so doing, it has followed the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. See, e.g., Carter v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F. Sup. 384, 388 (E.D. Ark.), aff’d sub nom. Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 413 F.2d 539; First National Ins. Co. of America v. Devine, 211 So. 2d 587, 589 (Fla. App.); Buck v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34; Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 327, 332-33, 494 P.2d 479. Many jurisdictions make specific provision to include unidentified motorist within the definition of uninsured motorist, often styling them as “hit-and-run drivers.” At least one trial court has dicta to the contrary. Lenngren v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 26 Misc. 2d 1084, 203 N.Y.S.2d 136 (holding that there was insufficient evidence to show that the decedent was killed by an automobile, affirmed without opinion, 20 App. Div. 2d 850, 249 N.Y.S.2d 400); but contra, In re Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 360, 363, 288 N.Y.S.2d 822. In the majority of those jurisdictions where there are no specific references to the unidentified motorist with respect to statutes mandating uninsured motorist coverage, the courts have reasoned that from the injured’s point of view, where there is an unidentified tortfeasor, there is an uninsured tortfeasor, and hence the insured must be covered.4 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. *513Lambert, 291 Ala. 645, 285 So. 2d 917; Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., 22 Ariz. App. 255, 526 P.2d 779; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. McDermott, 527 P.2d 918, 920 (Colo. App.); DeMello v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d 304; Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Cooperman, 33 Ohio App. 2d 152, 293 N.E.2d 293; Webb v. United Services Automobile Assn., 227 Pa. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737; Schleif v. Hardware Dealer’s Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 489, 404 S.W.2d 490, 491. “[T]he test should not be simply whether or not the injured party can prove the offending party was uninsured, which is, in many instances, impossible in hit-and-run cases. Any other construction of the statute is unfair and unduly restricts the application intended by the Legislature.” Brown v. Progressive Mutual Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla.).
In requiring that coverage to extend to damage inflicted by unidentified motorists, the state has considerations additional to protecting the accident victim from financial disaster. In Connecticut, the coverage is part of a plan to encourage the financial responsibility of motorists. 12 H.R. Proc., pt. 8, 1967 Sess., p. 3296. The purchase of the motorist liability policy benefits the individual, the insurance company and the public. In addition to liability coverage, the policy protects the insured against the uninsured public, and the public against a motorist who would otherwise be uninsured. Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 332. The intent to close off gaps on insurance coverage has been consistently manifested, most recently in the enactment of Connecticut’s no-fault insurance law. See General Statutes c. 690; Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 363 A.2d 1. Thus, *514the intent manifested in legislation controlling the terms of motorist liability policies issued in this state, as well as in the uninsured motorist clause of the plaintiff’s policy itself, is and was that the insured must be covered for damages arising from injuries suffered from unidentified motorists. This case does not involve underinsurance as opposed to uninsurance as did Simonette v. Great American Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 472, 338 A.2d 453; nor is there any claim that the accident was not caused by an automobile as in Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 284, 278 A.2d 796.
The defendant, in its brief, contends that even if coverage with respect to unidentified motorists were mandated by a provision concerning them, such coverage should not apply to the plaintiff in the present case, because there was no contact between her vehicle and that of the unidentified motorist.5 Under the statutory schemes of some states, there is express reference to “hit-and-run” accidents. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 582, 520 P.2d 1368.
The rationale of the contact requirement is that it prevents fraud. Mason v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 13 Ariz. App. 298, 300, 475 P.2d 957, vacated on other grounds, 107 Ariz. 601, 491 P.2d 455; annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1299. Indirect physical contact, however, has been found to satisfy the requirement. Latham v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 482 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Civ. App.); Inter-Ins. Exchange of The Automobile Club of *515Southern California v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834. The contact requirement has not been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions, especially where a statutory basis for imposing a “hit” requirement is not clearly evidenced. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Colton, 264 Ore. 210, 504 P.2d 1041. Such a requirement has been attacked as unduly unjust and inflexible. “An alert, athletic pedestrian who barely manages to avoid contact with ... [a negligent unidentified hit-and-run] car by leaping through a plate glass display window receives the unkindest cuts of all for his efforts, but cannot qualify.” Notman, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: A Current Analysis, 55 Ill. B.J. 142, 147. “The argument that the policy requirement of physical contact is reasonable is fallacious. The only reason for such a requirement is to prove that the accident actually did occur as a claimant may say it did. This is a question of fact to be determined by the . . . [trier of fact] .... If the injured party can sustain the burden of proof that an accident did occur, he should be entitled to recover, regardless of the actuality of physical contact. If twenty witnesses will swear they saw the accident happen, their testimony should not be deemed worthless, as it would be under the decision here for review.” Brown v. Progressive Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 430. See Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage; cf. Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 277, 231 A.2d 531. Quite consistently with the considerations meriting mandatory uninsured motorist coverage in insurance policies, the legislature did not provide that contact should be a prerequisite to recovery under its provisions. The courts will not whittle down the terms of the stat*516nte by independently imposing a contact requirement, nor will policy provisions purporting to impose contact as precedent to recovery be upheld. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Lambert, supra, 649; Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Ins. Co., supra; Farmers Ins. Exchange v. McDermott, supra, 920; DeMello v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, supra; Webb v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra; Bryant v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., supra; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Novak, supra, 579, 585; cf. Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., supra, 279; 12 S. Proc., pt. 4, 1967 Sess., p. 1957.
This does not imply that every plaintiff should automatically recover a claim under uninsured motorist provision coverage. What is required by the statutes, as since amended, and by the terms of the plaintiff’s policy, is that the ease move to arbitration, where the claims of the plaintiff can be weighed against the insurer’s claim that the accident was caused by a phantom tortfeasor. The trier of fact would be able to judge the credibility of the claimant, and whether recovery should be barred due to her negligence.
I would find error and set aside the judgment and remand the case with direction to render judgment granting the relief prayed for in the plaintiff’s application.
In this opinion Bogdanski, J., concurred.

 See footnote I of the majority opinion.

 “[Regs. Conn. State Agencies] See. 38-175a-6. minimum provision nor protection against uninsured motorists, (a) Coverage. The insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured automobile. This coverage shall insure the occupants of every automobile to which the bodily injury liability coverage applies. 'Uninsured automobile’ includes an automobile insured against liability by an insurer that is or becomes insolvent. . .

 See footnote 1 of the majority opinion.

 This is manifested in reliance on the term “capable of being applied” as a test of whether there exists an applicable policy. See, e.g., Hodges v. Canal Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (Miss.).

 There does appear to be a duty to attempt to ascertain the identity of the tortfeasor which has been satisfied by the plaintiff;. Sari v. Doe, 261 S.C. 116, 198 S.E.2d 526; Members Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tapp, 469 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.).