Court Opinion

ID: 9959471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 18:08:36.815169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:19.066503
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Rastaturin v. 3165 Curtis Knoll Drive, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1378.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Alexey Rastaturin et al.,                             :

                 Plaintiffs-Appellants,               :
                                                                     No. 23AP-500
v.                                                    :        (M.C. No. 2022CVI-39009)

3165 Curtis Knoll Drive, LLC,                         :      (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellee.                  :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                       Rendered on April 11, 2024

                 On brief: Alexey Rastaturin, pro se. Argued: Alexey
                 Rastaturin.

                       APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants,          Alexey      Rastaturin       and   Kristina   Rastaturina
(individually, “Alexey” and “Kristina”; collectively, “appellants”), appeal from a judgment
of the Franklin County Municipal Court adopting the magistrate’s decision and denying
appellants’ objection thereto. The magistrate’s decision found in favor of defendant-
appellee, 3165 Curtis Knoll Drive, LLC, on both appellants’ complaint and appellee’s
counterclaims.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On August 20, 2021, appellants signed a residential rental agreement
(“lease”) with appellee for 3165 Curtis Knoll Drive, a property located in Dublin. The lease
specified the rental term would expire on July 31, 2022. Appellants paid appellee a security
deposit in the amount of $1,900 to reimburse appellee in the event appellants caused
damage or a “loss of value” to the premises during the lease term. (Rental Agreement at
No. 23AP-500                                                                                2

¶ 9.) Furthermore, if the damage or loss of value exceeded the value of the security deposit,
the lease required appellants to reimburse appellee “upon presentation of a bill.” (Rental
Agreement at ¶ 9.) The lease referred to appellants “jointly and severally” as “Tenant.”
(Rental Agreement at 1.) It also included the following provision:
              Unless another lease is signed by the parties hereto or unless
              written notice of termination is given by one party to the other
              thirty (30) days before expiration of the term of this Lease,
              this Lease shall be automatically renewed on a month-to-
              month basis and may be terminated thereafter by either party
              upon the giving of written notice to the other party thirty (30)
              days prior to the next periodic rental due date. Termination
              shall take place only on the last day of any given month unless
              otherwise agreed to in writing.

(Rental Agreement at ¶ 1.) The lease “shall not be modified, changed, altered or amended
in any way except through a written amendment signed by all of the parties.” (Rental
Agreement at ¶ 30.)
       {¶ 3} On May 4, 2022, Alexey sent an e-mail message to Bradley Block, the
authorized representative for appellee, that provided “formal notice of intent to vacant [sic]
the property” at the close of the lease term on July 31, 2022. That same day, Block
confirmed receipt of the notice to vacate. On July 1, 2022, Kristina sent Block a text
message that read as follows: “we are going to stay in the house month by month...probably
will stay till [sic] the end of May 2023.” Block responded that same day: “we aren’t doing
month-to-month leases any longer. It is fine for August but we would need a lease renewal
in place for after that. * * * Please let me know what you would like to do.” On July 9, 2022,
Block sent a text message to Kristina reiterating his prior message and asking to know her
answer “as soon as possible otherwise will have to send a lease termination notice if nothing
concluded by July 15th.” Later that day, Alexey responded via text message on Kristina’s
behalf: “seems we will need to renew our lease till [sic] the end of June 2023.” On July 11,
2022, Block sent appellants a lease renewal form. Block testified that Alexey called him on
July 12, 2022 “to rescind their July 1st and July 9th revocation of the intent to vacate” and
instead follow their original plan to vacate by the end of July. (Tr. at 11.) Block rejected
this revocation, citing the lease’s requisite 30-day notice of intent to vacate. However, he
offered a compromise in which appellants would initially pay the August rent, and Block
No. 23AP-500                                                                                           3

would promptly re-let the property and remit to appellants any August rent paid by the new
tenant. Appellants vacated the premises on July 24, 2022 and refused to pay the August
rent. Block claimed appellee retained the $1,900 security deposit to offset the lost August
rent and to repair any damage to the property.
        {¶ 4} On February 9, 2023, appellants filed a claim in the Franklin County
Municipal Court to recover $3,800, or double the value of their security deposit. Appellee
filed a counterclaim, seeking $158 to compensate for lost rent and property damage—a
great portion of which was already covered by the $1,900 security deposit. The matter was
referred to a magistrate who held a hearing on April 13, 2023 with testimony from Alexey,
Kristina, and Block. The magistrate issued a decision on April 18, 2023, finding in favor of
appellee on all claims and ordering appellants to pay appellee $158 plus court costs and
interest. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision on April 27, 2023. On May 8,
2023, appellants filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision. On July 18, 2023, the trial
court entered an order denying appellants’ objection.1
        {¶ 5} Appellants timely appealed.
II. Assignments of Error
        {¶ 6} Appellants present the following three assignments of error for our review:

                [I.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in allowing
                modification of the lease agreement in direct contravention of
                the lease’s explicit requirement for a written amendment
                signed by all parties.

                [II.] The trial court erred in finding that a mutual agreement
                existed to continue a month-to-month tenancy, despite the
                absence of consent from all of the parties.

                [III.] The trial court erred in finding that the plaintiffs
                rescinded their notice to terminate the lease, despite the
                absence of mutual consent from all of the parties.

1 Appellants filed their objection to the magistrate’s decision after the 14 days permitted under
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(i) had elapsed. For the purposes of this appeal, we presume the trial court sua sponte
granted appellants leave to file delayed objections to the magistrate’s decision. See Civ.R. 6(B) and
53(D)(3)(b)(i).
No. 23AP-500                                                                                4

III. Standard of Review
       {¶ 7} An appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision to adopt, reject, or modify
the magistrate’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. Altercare of Canal
Winchester Post-Acute Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Turner, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-466, 2019-Ohio-
1011, ¶ 14, citing Tedla v. Al-Shamrookh, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1094, 2017-Ohio-1021, ¶ 11;
Bell v. Nichols, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1036, 2013-Ohio-2559, ¶ 16; and Gallick v. Benton,
10th Dist. No. 18AP-171, 2018-Ohio-4340, ¶ 15. A trial court abuses its discretion when its
decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio
St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
       {¶ 8} “The interpretation and construction of a written contract are questions of
law.” Hanuman Chalisa, L.L.C. v. BoMar Contracting, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-406,
2022-Ohio-1111, ¶ 14, citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipeline Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978),
paragraph one of the syllabus. We review questions of law under a de novo standard of
review, meaning we do not defer “to a trial court’s interpretation of legal issues.” Id.,
quoting Gatling Ohio, L.L.C. v. Allegheny Energy Supply Co., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-
188, 2018-Ohio-3636, ¶ 12, citing Holt v. State, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-214, 2010-Ohio-6529,
¶ 9.
IV. Analysis
   A. First Assignment of Error
       {¶ 9} In their first assignment of error, appellants argue the lease required a
written amendment signed by all parties before they could rescind their notice of
termination. By finding otherwise, appellants contend, the trial court erred as a matter of
law.
       {¶ 10} Appellants seemingly equate a recission of the notice of termination with a
formal amendment to the lease. Although appellants are correct that amending the lease
would require a writing signed by all parties, rescinding the notice of termination in this
case was not a lease amendment. By its original terms, the lease made certain that without
a new lease or timely notice of termination, it would by default transform into a month-to-
month tenancy. Appellants initially provided timely notice of termination, but subsequently
both Kristina and Alexey messaged appellee expressing their intention to continue renting
No. 23AP-500                                                                                5

the property. Though they had yet to finalize an agreement to extend their lease, these
written statements reasonably caused appellee to believe appellants would continue renting
the property. For that reason, the statements negated Alexey’s initial notice of termination.
By the time they changed their minds again, it was too late to provide timely notice, causing
the lease to default to the month-to-month arrangement. Because the lease already
accounted for a scenario in which the parties neither signed a new lease nor provided timely
notice, the present case simply did not implicate any amendment to the lease. Thus, the
parties were not obliged to sign a written amendment to initiate the transition to a month-
to-month tenancy.
       {¶ 11} Appellants failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in concluding they
rescinded their notice of termination. Accordingly, appellants’ first assignment of error is
overruled.
   B. Second Assignment of Error
       {¶ 12} In their second assignment of error, appellants allege the trial court erred in
finding all parties consented to a month-to-month tenancy.
       {¶ 13} The lease specifies it “shall be automatically renewed on a month-to-month
basis” in the event the parties fail to either sign a new lease or provide a written notice of
termination at least 30 days before July 31, 2022. (Rental Agreement at ¶ 1.) As already
described, appellants invalidated their initial notice of termination by informing appellee
they changed their minds and planned to remain at the property. By the time appellants
again reversed course and decided to leave, it was too late to provide timely notice, and, as
a result, the lease by its explicit terms automatically renewed for the month of August. The
parties all consented to this automatic renewal by signing the lease. Once the lease was
finalized, no additional mutual agreement was needed to activate this provision—rather,
the new arrangement would begin “automatically” upon either party’s failure to provide
timely notice of termination. The renewal was simply the execution of a provision to which
all parties had previously consented.
       {¶ 14} The trial court correctly determined the parties consented to a month-to-
month tenancy in the absence of a new lease or timely notice of termination. Accordingly,
appellants’ second assignment of error is overruled.
No. 23AP-500                                                                                6

   C. Third Assignment of Error
       {¶ 15} In their third assignment of error, appellants dispute the trial court’s
conclusion that all parties consented to rescinding the termination of the lease.
       {¶ 16} As previously described, after Alexey’s notice of termination, Kristina sent a
text message to Block expressing her desire to continue renting the property on a month-
to-month basis. Alexey also messaged Block: “seems we will need to renew our lease till
[sic] the end of June 2023.” In other words, both Kristina and Alexey independently
expressed their desire to rescind the notice of termination. The fact they requested different
types of lease extensions—a month-to-month tenancy versus a yearlong lease renewal—is
irrelevant.   For purposes of determining whether appellants rescinded the notice of
termination, all that mattered was they expressed to appellee their intention to continue
renting the property. Both appellants did so, and it is thereby apparent they both consented
to rescinding their initial notice.
       {¶ 17} The trial court did not err in finding appellants rescinded their notice of
termination. Accordingly, appellants’ third assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
       {¶ 18} Having overruled appellants’ three assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.
                                                                        Judgment affirmed.

                      DORRIAN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.