Court Opinion

ID: 9748088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:51:35.958762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.426661
License: Public Domain

BENKE, J.,
Concurring. — I concur in the result reached by the majority only insofar as it denies petitioner’s writ.
*1588I
As the majority notes, this case presents the following question: Is the county counsel’s office ever permitted to place itself in the position of acting in a dual capacity as an advocate for one party in a contested administrative hearing while at the same time serving as legal adviser to the decision maker at that hearing?
In response to this question the majority opinion states “ ‘yes’ provided there is compliance with the guidelines set forth in this opinion.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1579.)
The majority’s answer, however, is but a judicial wink which I find remarkable in its ambiguity.
Superficially, this immediate and direct response by the majority appears to accept the premise that as a general matter it does not offend established principles of due process for a county counsel’s office to act in a dual role of adviser and advocate.
To the contrary the majority actually adopts the opposite premise, i.e., that such dual capacity offends due process and is unacceptable unless certain conditions are met by the county counsel’s office. This premise is apparent throughout the majority’s opinion, where for example, it concludes: “The role [of advocate] is inconsistent with true objectivity, a constitutionally necessary characteristic of an adjudicator. [Citations.] Here, as part of an adversary process, the county counsel will be asked to advise the Board about legal issues which Board members feel are relevant in deciding whether one of his subordinates wins or loses the case. To allow an advocate for one party to also act as counsel to the decision maker creates the substantial risk that the advice given to the decision maker, ‘perhaps unconsciously’ as we recognized in Civil Service Commission (163 Cal.App.3d at p. 78, fn. 1), will be skewed.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1585, italics added.)
Likewise, in citing with approval Advisory Opinion 1990-1 of the State Bar of New Mexico (which concludes due process principles are violated when a government entity acts as both advocate for a party and adviser to the adjudicatory body) the majority states: “It is the attorney’s dual role as both advocate for a party and adviser to the tribunal which does violence to [the] constitutional ideal [of a neutral decision maker].” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1586.)
I do not perceive my quarrel with the majority’s premise as trivial. Respectfully, the premise in fact adopted by the majority turns firmly *1589established principles of administrative law on their heads and creates irreconcilable conflict with existing case law.
ÍI
As noted, the premise of the majority is that the county counsel’s dual representation, standing alone, offends petitioner’s due process rights. This view, however, runs counter to the established principles which underlie the law of administrative hearing process.
The principles which govern the propriety of dual representation in the setting of administrative hearings emerge clearly in Withrow v. Larkin (1975) 421 U.S. 35, 46 [43 L.Ed.2d 712, 723, 95 S.Ct. 1456] (Withrow). There, the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board had served as both investigator of petitioner doctor’s alleged wrongdoing and as the adjudicatory body which temporarily suspended his license because of that wrongdoing.
In concluding the dual function permissible, the Supreme Court observed that in pursuit of the goal of preventing even the probability of unfairness, “various situations have been identified in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Among these cases are those in which the adjudicator has a pecuniary interest in the outcome and in which he has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.
“The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.” (Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 47 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 723-724], fns. omitted, italics added.)
“That is not to say that there is nothing to the argument that those who have investigated should not then adjudicate. The issue is substantial, it is not new, and legislators and others concerned with the operations of administrative agencies have given much attention to whether and to what extent distinctive administrative functions should be performed by the same persons. No single answer has been reached. Indeed, the growth, variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have made any one solution highly unlikely. . . .
*1590“It is not surprising, therefore, to find that ‘[t]he case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process. . . .’ [Citation.] Similarly, our cases, although they reflect the substance of the problem, offer no support for the bald proposition . . . that agency members who participate in an investigation are disqualified from adjudicating. The incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing principle.” (Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at pp. 51-52 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 726-727], fns. omitted.)
“Here, the Board stayed within the accepted bounds of due process. Having investigated, it issued findings and conclusions asserting the commission of certain acts and ultimately concluding that there was probable cause to believe that appellee had violated the statutes.
“The risk of bias or prejudgment in this sequence of functions has not been considered to be intolerably high or to raise a sufficiently great possibility that the adjudicators would be so psychologically wedded to their complaints that they would consciously or unconsciously avoid the appearance of having erred or changed position.” (Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 57 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 729].)
Having rejected the general proposition that the dual capacity of investigator and adjudicator standing alone violates due process, the court noted that on a case-by-case basis, a judge in a given situation might deem the risk of bias or conflict constitutionally impermissible: “That the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Findings of that kind made by judges with special insights into local realities are entitled to respect.” (Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 58 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 730], italics added.)
In Kloepfer v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1989) 49 Cal.3d 826, 827-828 [264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239, 89 A.L.R.4th 235] (Kloepfer), the California Supreme Court joined in Withrow's conclusion that combined investigative and adjudicative functions of the Commission on Judicial Performance does not, alone, create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of bias. There, the court rejected a judge’s general argument that the commission’s combined investigative and adjudicatory functions constituted a denial of due process. The court further noted the commission’s functions involved even less overlap than the examining board’s in Withrow because while the commission’s staff initially investigates complaints against judges, the prosecutorial responsibility shifts to the Attorney General’s office once formal *1591proceedings are instituted, ultimately with the Supreme Court acting as the final decision maker charged with reviewing the evidence and independently assessing its weight and relevance.
Although Withrow and Kloepfer concern a dual capacity argument where one governmental entity is acting as investigator and adjudicator, I find in those cases guidance necessary to resolve the issue before us.
The conduct of governmental entities, including both the Employment Appeals Board (the Board) and the county counsel here, are entitled to a strong presumption of honesty and integrity. (Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 47 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 723-724]; Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Assn. (1976) 426 U.S. 482, 492, 497 [49 L.Ed.2d 1, 9, 96 S.Ct. 2308]; Kloepfer, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 834.) In this regard, it is important at the outset to keep in mind the posture of petitioner’s argument. It is not that the county counsel’s office or anyone in it has, or will, act improperly. Nor has petitioner ever argued the Board here, or any of its members, has or will act improperly.
Given this posture of the case, it cannot be said that petitioner has overcome the presumption of propriety, integrity and honesty which attaches to the Board. Contrary to the majority view, this presumption has not been rebutted merely because the county counsel’s office represents one party and serves as legal adviser to the Board. Said another way, dual representation by the county counsel’s office has not been shown to carry with it the unacceptable risk of actual bias on the part of the Board such that that office must be precluded from the dual representation.
Focusing upon the dual function of the county counsel’s office vis-k-vis the Board, it is apparent that the county counsel’s office is not a direct participant in the decisionmaking function of the Board and assumes none of the independent authority of that Board on procedural or substantive issues. That office acts as legal adviser to the Board, in such capacity advising on matters of county policies and procedure, ordinances and hearing procedures. While it advises the Board in such matters, the chairman of the board makes all final adjudications of such procedural issues. Moreover, the county counsel’s legal adviser to the Board does not participate in the decisionmaking process of the Board members but remains “on call” for legal advice. Once the Board makes its decision, it may direct the legal adviser to prepare the Board’s written decision and findings for Board signature. I cannot conclude this relationship between the county counsel’s office and the Board poses actual risk of bias or prejudgment such that the relationship must be forbidden.
*1592Given the county counsel’s minimal intrusion into the autonomy of Board decisions and the failure of petitioner to demonstrate or even allege specific impropriety on the part of the county counsel’s office or the Board, I would decline to adopt the blanket rule petitioner urges here and which the majority adopts. Indeed, in adopting the rule petitioner suggests, the majority rejects the settled legal presumptions of propriety explicit in Withrow and Kloepfer and utilizes instead a presumption of impropriety which is ameliorated by establishing a prophylactic rule to guarantee fairness.
Consistent with the analysis in Withrow, supra, 421 U.S. at page 58 [43 L.Ed.2d at pages 729-730], I would approach issues of the propriety of dual representation in administration hearings by allowing judges on a case by case basis to examine the particularities of local governmental agencies to assure fairness.
Here, in a letter to petitioner’s counsel, the county counsel stated: “In practice, we endeavor to insulate the legal advisor of the Board from information and discussion with the attorneys acting in a representative capacity before the board. In fact, but for your inquiry and the necessity to respond to your request for recusal, I would not have become involved in this hearing matter until the date of the hearing.” Although the possibility of raising this specific issue was known to him, petitioner’s broad constitutional challenge did not allege inadequate screening procedures led to an unconstitutional risk of bias or conflict on the part of the Board. In the absence of such a challenge, I would assume adequate screening provisions are provided within the office of county counsel.
Ill
I would respectfully suggest the premise adopted by the majority runs contrary to direct authority which concludes principles of fairness and due process are not necessarily violated when the county counsel’s office represents a party before an administrative tribunal and also acts as the legal advisor to the tribunal. (Rowen v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 633, 640-641 [174 Cal.Rptr. 185]; Greer v. Board of Education (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 98, 119-120 [121 Cal.Rptr. 542]; Ford v. Civil Service Commission (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 692, 697 [327 P.2d 148]; Chosick v. Reilly (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 334, 337-338 [270 P.2d 547].) (Compare Midstate Theatres, Inc. v. County of Stanislaus (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 864, 870-871 [128 Cal.Rptr. 54] [impropriety exists where the same individual acts as adviser and advocate].) It is apparent existing authority is consistent with the Withrow-Kloepfer analysis: dual representation is permissible until in a given case actual bias or conflict is so intolerably high as to make such *1593dual representation impermissible. I find unpersuasive the majority’s attempt to distinguish these authorities.
IV
Because I conclude there is no inherent denial of due process in dual representation of the type at issue here, I agree the petition should be denied.
If petitioner again objects to the county counsel’s dual role, the question before the lower court is whether in this specific case dual representation denies due process.
While the county counsel may be required by the trial court as part of a due process inquiry, to explain how it insulates its advisory function from its advocating function, once it has done so, the burden is then on petitioner to demonstrate the insulation is inadequate. Unlike the majority, I would not require the trial court presume that the dual representation is violative of due process.