Court Opinion

ID: 9397797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 14:08:15.504367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.696264
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
05/26/2023 09:08 AM CDT

                                                         - 358 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        314 Nebraska Reports
                                        ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                                                Cite as 314 Neb. 358

                             Adams Land & Cattle, LLC, doing business
                              as Adams Land & Cattle Co., appellee, v.
                                 John Widdowson et al., appellants.
                                                    ___ N.W.2d ___

                                           Filed May 26, 2023.     No. S-22-534.

                 1. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
                    tion of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the
                    lower court.
                 2. ____: ____. When statutory interpretation is one of first impression, the
                    statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and an
                    appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning
                    of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
                 3. Statutes. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute
                    are the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.
                 4. Administrative Law: Legislature: Statutes. The seldom-used rule
                    of legislative acquiescence to administrative interpretations is but a
                    complement to the traditional rules of statutory construction.
                 5. Administrative Law: Statutes. An administrative agency may not
                    employ its rulemaking power to modify, alter, or enlarge provisions of a
                    statute which it is charged with administering.
                 6. Administrative Law. An administrative body has no power or authority
                    other than that specifically conferred by statute or by construction nec-
                    essary to accomplish the plain purpose of the act.

                  Appeal from the District Court for Box Butte County:
               Travis P. O’Gorman, Judge. Reversed, injunction vacated, and
               dismissed.

                 Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, Joshua E. Dethlefsen,
               Justin D. Lavene, and Maegan L. Woita for appellants.
                                - 359 -
           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
                ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 358

   Gregory C. Scaglione and Michele Young, of Koley Jessen,
P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.

  Heavican, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and
Freudenberg, JJ., and Srb, District Judge.

    Funke, J.
                        INTRODUCTION
   A commercial livestock company and the Nebraska Brand
Committee (Brand Committee) dispute the meaning of a stat-
ute governing cattle brand inspection. The livestock company
brought this action against the Brand Committee’s members
in their official capacities, seeking a declaratory judgment
and permanent injunction reflecting the livestock company’s
interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-1,122 (Reissue 2021).
Following a bench trial, the district court entered a declara-
tory judgment and permanent injunction in favor of the live-
stock company. The Brand Committee appeals. For the reasons
explained below, we reverse the district court’s judgment,
vacate its injunction, and dismiss the action.

                       BACKGROUND
   Nebraska’s Livestock Brand Act (the Act) was enacted to
detect and prevent livestock theft by establishing a regime for
recording livestock brands and inspecting livestock—particu-
larly cattle—to ensure proper ownership. 1 The Act created the
Brand Committee, whose voting members are appointed by
the Governor and confirmed by the Legislature. 2 The Brand
Committee exists to protect Nebraska brand and livestock
owners from the theft of livestock through established brand
recording, brand inspection, and livestock theft investigation. 3
1
    NE Beef Producers Committee v. NE Brand Committee, 287 F. Supp. 3d
    740 (D. Neb. 2018).
2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-191 (Reissue 2021).
3
    Id.
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           Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                    314 Nebraska Reports
                ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                        Cite as 314 Neb. 358

   Under the Act, a “brand” is an identification mark applied
to the hide of a live animal. 4 All brands must be approved and
recorded by the Brand Committee, and a recorded brand is
prima facie evidence of livestock ownership. 5 As the following
map demonstrates, geographically, the majority of Nebraska is
designated a “brand inspection area.” 6

Brand Inspection Area is outlined in BLACK
Non-Brand Inspection Area is outlined in RED

   Generally, cattle moving in or out of the brand inspection
area, as well as cattle being sold, traded, or slaughtered within
the brand inspection area, are subject to inspection by the
Brand Committee. 7 A brand inspection consists of a physical
inspection of the cattle and must be done sometime during
the hours from sunrise to sundown or during such other hours
and under such conditions as the Brand Committee deter-
mines. 8 However, if the operator of a cattle-feeding operation
4
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-199 (Reissue 2021).
5
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 54-198 and 54-1,107 (Reissue 2021).
6
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-1,109 (Reissue 2021).
7
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 54-1,110, 54-1,111, 54-1,114, 54-1,121, and
    54-1,122 (Reissue 2021).
8
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-1,108 (Reissue 2021).
                                    - 361 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                  ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                          Cite as 314 Neb. 358

registers a feedlot through the Brand Committee, that operator
can, under some circumstances, send and receive cattle without
such inspections. 9 In turn, registered feedlots must keep cattle
inventory records, which are subject to audits by the Brand
Committee. 10 Per § 54-1,120(2), the Brand Committee “may
adopt and promulgate rules and regulations for the operation
of registered feedlots to assure that brand laws are complied
with, that registered feedlot shipping certificates are available,
and that proper records are maintained.” One of the primary
benefits of the registered feedlot program is that it allows cer-
tain cattle to be received at or sent from the registered feedlot
at any hour of the day without the need to have a brand inspec-
tor physically inspect the cattle.
   Presently, Adams Land & Cattle, LLC (ALCC), operates
two registered feedlots in Broken Bow, Nebraska, with a
capacity for over 93,000 head of cattle, as well as a third
registered feedlot near Bertrand, Nebraska. ALCC and the
Brand Committee dispute whether § 54-1,122 requires brand
inspections of cattle that, after purchase, are moved to a “back-
grounding” lot and then, ultimately, to a registered feedlot.
Backgrounding is a stage intended to increase a calf’s weight
and build up the calf’s immunity to diseases before it enters a
feedlot. ALCC began using backgrounding lots in 2008.
   To address the parties’ arguments, we must first explain
the historical and factual context in which this dispute arose.
In August 2008, ALCC entered into a written agreement with
the Brand Committee that purported to govern the obtain-
ing and renewing of ALCC’s registered feedlot permits, as
well as ALCC’s exemptions from brand inspection require-
ments. ALCC subsequently received registered feedlot permits.
ALCC urged the Brand Committee to interpret § 54-1,122
in a way that exempted ALCC’s cattle from brand inspec-
tions and associated fees. On September 17, 2009, the Brand
 9
     See §§ 54-1,110, 54-1,111, 54-1,121, and 54-1,122.
10
     See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-1,120 (Reissue 2021).
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
             ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                     Cite as 314 Neb. 358

Committee held a formal public meeting, designating
“Registered Feedlots - Acceptance of documentary evidence
of ownership upon entry” as an agenda item. Meeting minutes
provide that the Brand Committee voted to,
      [u]pon approval by the [Brand] Committee’s legal coun-
      sel, allow a registered feedlot to bring cattle into their
      registered feedlot without inspection if they come from
      their back grounding [sic] feedlots, the integrity of the
      cattle remain in tact [sic] with documentary evidence of
      ownership, there is no change of ownership, and the cattle
      must be owned by the registered feedlot.
   In October 2009, the Brand Committee and ALCC executed
an “addendum” to their 2008 registered feedlot agreement,
which provided, in pertinent part:
         Cattle may be placed in the Registered Feedlot with-
      out a brand inspection being performed, provided they
      are (1) moved directly from purchase point of origin to
      the Registered Feedlot and the satisfactory evidence of
      ownership accompanies the cattle; or (2) moved directly
      from a backgrounding feedlot, whether registered or
      unregistered inside the boundaries of the Nebraska Brand
      Inspection Area or from a feedlot outside the brand
      inspection area as long as [ALCC] own said cattle and
      there is no change of ownership; (3) the integrity of
      the cattle from original purchase must remain the same;
      and (4) the satisfactory documentary evidence of owner-
      ship must accompany the cattle from the backgrounding
      lot to the registered feedlot.
   From 2009 onward, the Brand Committee did not conduct
brand inspections of cattle sent from or received at ALCC’s
registered feedlots. Instead, the Brand Committee monitored
incoming cattle at ALCC’s registered feedlots via regular audits
of ALCC’s records. ALCC successfully renewed its registered
feedlot permits annually from 2009 to 2018. Throughout
this time, ALCC regularly purchased cattle from through-
out the United States and Canada. After purchase, ALCC’s
                             - 363 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
             ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                     Cite as 314 Neb. 358

cattle were shipped either directly to its registered feedlots or
to backgrounding lots managed by a third party. After back-
grounding, ALCC’s cattle were transferred to its registered
feedlots without brand inspection. As the Brand Committee
emphasizes, ALCC was an outlier in this regard—from 2009
onward, only ALCC has operated under an addendum remov-
ing the requirement of inspection for cattle transferred from
backgrounding lots to registered feedlots. All other registered
feedlots in Nebraska have been subject to brand inspections
for incoming cattle that are not moved directly from their
points of origin. There are approximately 100 registered feed-
lots in Nebraska.
   On June 14, 2018, the Brand Committee sent a letter to
ALCC explaining that the parties’ 2009 addendum was not
authorized by state law and would not be honored. The let-
ter gave ALCC until August 31, 2018, to meet applicable
requirements. On July 13, 2018, ALCC brought action against
the Brand Committee, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Brand Committee’s letter was unlawful. Subsequently, the
Brand Committee rescinded the letter, and ALCC voluntarily
dismissed its lawsuit. In September 2018, ALCC successfully
renewed its registered feedlot permits. The Brand Committee
did not renew ALCC’s permits in 2019 and, at some point,
unsuccessfully attempted to have the Legislature amend
§ 54-1,122. Still, the Brand Committee refrained from inspect-
ing ALCC’s cattle.
   In June 2020, the Brand Committee sent another letter to
ALCC, again explaining that the 2009 addendum was not
authorized by state law and would not be honored. The new
letter gave ALCC until August 31, 2020, to meet applicable
requirements. On August 4, 2020, ALCC, by and through
counsel, demanded that the Brand Committee rescind their
June 2020 letter and continue to deal with ALCC as the 2009
addendum provided. The Brand Committee did not respond.
   On August 31, 2020, ALCC brought this action against
Brand Committee representatives, namely, John Widdowson,
                                    - 364 -
             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                  ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                          Cite as 314 Neb. 358

Adam Sawyer, Terry Cone, Jay Martindale, and Christopher
Gentry. At all relevant times, Widdowson, Sawyer, Cone,
Martindale, and Gentry have been the Brand Committee’s
executive director, chairperson, vice chairperson, and mem-
bers, respectively. Per its complaint and amended complaint,
ALCC sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
The Brand Committee moved to dismiss ALCC’s amended
complaint on the basis that ALCC had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The court denied the Brand
Committee’s motion.
   On January 4, 2021, ALCC moved for a temporary injunc-
tion, essentially seeking to prevent the Brand Committee and
its agents from physically inspecting ALCC’s cattle, charg-
ing brand inspection fees, or taking any action affecting
ALCC’s permits or registrations. The district court granted
the requested temporary injunction in favor of ALCC. On
December 1, the Brand Committee voted to formally rescind
any prior interpretation of § 54-1,122 that purported to allow
the movement of cattle from backgrounding lots to registered
feedlots under certain conditions without inspection.
   In April 2022, a bench trial was held. On June 18, 2022,
the district court granted declaratory relief and a perma-
nent injunction in favor of ALCC, concluding that the par-
ties’ “course of dealing for over a decade” together with the
Brand Committee’s “historical interpretation” of § 54-1,122
were entitled to “great weight.” The court also observed
that while it was not controlling authority, a 2016 Nebraska
Attorney General’s opinion appeared to support ALCC’s
position. 11 The court awarded ALCC court costs. The Brand
Committee appeals.
               ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
  The Brand Committee argues that the district court erred
in granting declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of
ALCC. Specifically, the Brand Committee assigns that the
11
     See Att’y Gen. Op. No. 16-002 (Jan. 22, 2016).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                 ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                         Cite as 314 Neb. 358

district court erred in (1) concluding that § 54-1,122 does not
require direct movement from the point of origin with required
paperwork to avoid a brand inspection upon entry to the reg-
istered feedlot; (2) failing to construe § 54-1,122 consistent
with the statutory purpose of the Act; (3) failing to “take into
account” the fact that the Brand Committee has administered
the registered feedlot program consistently for every other
registered feedlot since at least 2009, except ALCC; (4) fail-
ing to recognize that the 2009 vote of the Brand Committee
was abrogated by a Brand Committee vote in December 2021;
(5) finding that the 2016 Attorney General’s opinion supported
ALCC’s argument; and (6) awarding costs.
                  STANDARD OF REVIEW
  [1] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which
an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court. 12
                            ANALYSIS
   [2,3] This case raises an issue of first impression concern-
ing the meaning of § 54-1,122. When statutory interpretation
is one of first impression, the statutory language is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning, and an appellate court will not
resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory
words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. 13 If the lan-
guage of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end
of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning. 14
   We first note that § 54-1,122 was amended by the
Legislature during the pendency of this matter. However, the
amendment has no bearing on the issue currently before us.
Section 54-1,122 is titled “Registered feedlot; cattle received;
requirements.” As one might expect, the provision sets forth
requirements for cattle received at registered feedlots. First,
12
     State v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 313 Neb. 763, 986 N.W.2d 78 (2023).
13
     Diamond v. State, 302 Neb. 892, 926 N.W.2d 71 (2019).
14
     County of Lancaster v. County of Custer, 313 Neb. 622, 985 N.W.2d 612
     (2023).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                  ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                          Cite as 314 Neb. 358

§ 54-1,122 provides that “[a]ny cattle originating in a state that
has a brand inspection agency and which are accompanied by
a certificate of inspection or brand clearance issued by such
agency may be moved directly from the point of origin into
a registered feedlot.” The Act does not define “directly,” but
its intended definition appears from the context, as well as the
word’s plain and ordinary meaning, to be “with no other move-
ment in between.” 15 Nor does the Act define “point of origin,”
but witnesses testified that the term generally means where the
cattle originated or were brand inspected, or where change of
ownership takes place. Next, § 54-1,122 states: “Any cattle
not accompanied by such a certificate of inspection or brand
clearance or by satisfactory evidence of ownership from states
or portions of states not having brand inspection shall be
subjected to [brand inspection] within a reasonable time after
arrival at a registered feedlot . . . .”
   The second sentence refers back to the first sentence through
the word “such.” The determiner “such” appears at the begin-
ning of a noun phrase and qualifies “a certificate of inspection
or brand clearance.” Accordingly, the second sentence cannot
be read to require any “certificate of inspection” or any “brand
clearance.” Instead, the paperwork required to avoid brand
inspection is that which is available to prove that a cattle’s
ownership was verified at the place it was sent from. For cattle
sent from a brand inspection area, the required paperwork
consists of “a certificate of inspection or brand clearance.” 16
15
     See, e.g., Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 353, 354 (11th ed.
     2020) (defining “direct” as “proceeding from one point to another in time
     or space without deviation or interruption” and “directly” as “in a direct
     manner”).
16
     See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 54-179 (defining “certificate of inspection” as
     official document authorizing, inter alia, movement of livestock and
     designating, as needed, seller, shipper, purchaser, and destination of
     livestock, as well as relevant vehicle number) and 54-173 (Reissue 2021)
     (defining “brand clearance” as documentary evidence of ownership given
     to persons who have legally purchased cattle at livestock auction or sale
     where brand inspection service is provided).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                 ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                         Cite as 314 Neb. 358

For cattle sent from a state or portion of a state without brand
inspection, the required paperwork consists of “satisfactory
evidence of proof of ownership.” 17
   Read together, the two sentences provide that if cattle move
into registered feedlots from their points of origin with no
other movement in between and are accompanied by paper-
work that proves they have been so moved, they avoid brand
inspection. Otherwise, the statute requires brand inspection.
Thus, we agree with the Brand Committee’s interpretation:
Cattle that move from their point of origin to background-
ing lots and then later to registered feedlots do not avoid
brand inspection.
   ALCC emphasizes the Brand Committee’s 2009 vote, as
well as the parties’ course of dealing. ALCC argues that the
Brand Committee has historically interpreted the statute in
ALCC’s favor and is precluded, by legislative acquiescence,
from changing course. We have occasionally stated the follow-
ing rule: Where a statute has long been construed by admin-
istrative officials charged with its execution, and where the
Legislature has several times been in session without amend-
ing or changing such a statute, despite its full knowledge of
the interpretation, we will not disregard that interpretation
unless it is clearly erroneous. 18
   We are unconvinced, however, that any historical interpre-
tation by the Brand Committee exists or warrants our defer-
ence. The Brand Committee’s 2009 vote, taken together with
its actions and omissions thereafter, do evidence an agree-
ment that § 54-1,122 would not be enforced against ALCC.
However, ALCC’s addendum was an anomaly. The most that
can be said is that for whatever reason or reasons, the Brand
Committee enforced § 54-1,122 in one way as to ALCC
and in another way as to all others for over a decade. We
17
     See 54 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 10, § 3 (2014).
18
     See Davio v. Nebraska Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 280 Neb. 263,
     786 N.W.2d 655 (2010).
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             Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                      314 Nebraska Reports
                 ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                         Cite as 314 Neb. 358

are similarly unconvinced to stray from the unambiguous lan-
guage of the statute by ALCC’s argument of legislative acqui-
escence. Although the parties agree that the Brand Committee
tried and failed to have the Legislature amend § 54-1,122,
there is no evidence in this case that the Legislature viewed
the Brand Committee’s 2009 vote and its implementation as
an interpretation of § 54-1,122, let alone that the Legislature
had full knowledge of, considered, or agreed with such
interpretation. 19
   [4-6] More important, our seldom-used rule of legislative
acquiescence to administrative interpretations is but a comple-
ment to the traditional rules of statutory construction already
set forth. 20 It does not change the fact that an administrative
agency may not employ its rulemaking power to modify,
alter, or enlarge provisions of a statute which it is charged
with administering. 21 An administrative body has no power or
authority other than that specifically conferred by statute or
by construction necessary to accomplish the plain purpose of
the act. 22
   ALCC also argues that a January 22, 2016, Attorney General’s
opinion supports its position. 23 The Attorney General’s opinion
addresses whether the Brand Committee has statutory author-
ity “to vary the inspection fee and the registered feedlot
enrollment fee.” 24 In that context, it addresses the difference
between a brand inspection and a registered feedlot audit. The
Attorney General’s opinion does not address the question of
when cattle are subject to brand inspection upon entry to a
registered feedlot or reference § 54-1,122. Accordingly, it is
not relevant here.
19
     Cf. id.
20
     Id.
21
     Id.
22
     Murray v. Neth, 279 Neb. 947, 783 N.W.2d 424 (2010).
23
     Att’y Gen. Op. No. 16-002, supra note 11.
24
     Id. at 1.
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         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  314 Nebraska Reports
             ADAMS LAND & CATTLE V. WIDDOWSON
                     Cite as 314 Neb. 358

   The district court erred in its interpretation of § 54-1,122
and in granting a declaratory judgment and permanent injunc-
tion in favor of ALCC.
                        CONCLUSION
   The district court erred in granting a declaratory judgment
and permanent injunction in favor of ALCC. Accordingly, we
reverse its judgment, vacate its injunction, and dismiss the
amended complaint.
                             Reversed, injunction vacated,
                             and dismissed.
   Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.