Court Opinion

ID: 9544808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:55.636502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.958860
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The basic facts of this case are relatively simple and bear restating. Mickey L. Clifton, an attorney-at-law, was convicted of one count of theft by false pretenses, a felony. At his trial, at the close of the State’s case and again at the close of defendant’s case, Clifton moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20a, Rules of Criminal Procedure. These motions were denied. After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, the motion for acquittal was renewed pursuant to Rule 20b. The Superior Court granted the motion, set aside the jury’s verdict, and ordered the entry of a judgment of acquittal. Since Rule 20b provides that “A motion for judgment of acquittal made before verdict may be renewed by a defendant within ten days after the verdict was returned”, it cannot be doubted but that the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to hear and decide the motion.1
After the entry of the judgment of acquittal, this special action was initiated in the Court of Appeals. It held that the judgment of acquittal was not appealable “as an order made after judgment” (the only judgment was the judgment of acquittal); and, consequently, there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal. It examined the evidence to determine whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the jury’s verdict, and concluded that there was.
In the posture of this case, although neither party suggested or argued that certiorari was an appropriate remedy, the Court concludes, nevertheless, “Allegations of abuse of discretion, such as that made by the state in the case at bar, had come to fall more commonly within the grounds for issuance of a writ of certiorari” and “An examination of the Special Action rules, however, reveals that the reviewing court may consider whether a determination by a judicial tribunal constituted an abuse of that tribunal’s discretion”, citing Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, Rules 2(a) and 3(c), 17A A.R.S. It is these conclusions which compel my dissent.
The Supreme Court, by the Arizona Constitution, Art. 6, § 5, subd. 5, has the “Power to make rules relative to all procedural matters in any court.” Pursuant to that power, this Court in 1969, effective the first day of January, 1970, promulgated the “Rules of Procedure for Special Actions— [Extraordinary Writs — Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition].” By Rule 1(a) of the Rules, it was expressly provided that:
“ * * * nothing in these rules shall be construed as enlarging the scope of the relief traditionally granted under the writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.”
The State Bar Committee notes, which were included in the order promulgating the Rules, stated:
“The writs [prohibition, mandamus and certiorari] are constitutional in Arizona, Ariz.Const. art. 6, §§ 5, 18, as amended, and the rule does not alter their substance but merely establishes the procedure for obtaining their remedies. Under the special action, the relief obtainable includes any relief which was formerly *226granted under the labels of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. The Rule, which does not ‘abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights of a litigant’ is authorized by A.R.S. § 12-109A, * *
This is consistent with Art. 6, § 5, 5, of the Constitution of Arizona, since obviously the power is not granted to change the substantive law of the State by rules of court — in other words, to act as a super legislature.
The substantive law of this State in 1969 as it related to certiorari was set forth in State v. Kingman Justice Precinct Court of Mohave County, 88 Ariz. 342, 356 P.2d 694 (1966), from which I quote:
“This Court has on many occasions held that certiorari tests only the jurisdiction of the tribunal whose order is under review; that is, whether the tribunal had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, and had power to render the particular order; not whether its conclusion was right or wrong. See A.R.S. § 12-2001; also, e. g.: Welker v. Stevens, 82 Ariz. 233, 311 P.2d 832; Hazard v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 211, 310 P.2d 830; Wall v. Superior Court, 53 Ariz. 344, 89 P.2d 624; City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P.2d 1062; State ex rel. Andrews v. Superior Court, 39 Ariz. 242, 5 P.2d 192.” 88 Ariz. at 344.
Clearly the majority decision, when it concludes that “it is not unreasonable to review the evidence supporting that ruling” — the lower court’s ruling on the motion for acquittal — conflicts with the constitutional powers granted to this Court.
Moreover, the Court’s opinion patently offends the specific mandate of A.R.S. § 12-2001. There, the scope of certiorari by specific legislative mandate is limited to cases where the inferior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. It provides:
“The writ of certiorari may be granted by the supreme and superior courts or by any judge thereof, in all cases when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.”
The only power this Court has on certiorari is to determine whether the Superior Court had the jurisdiction to grant the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, and not whether the trial court decided the motion incorrectly on the merits.
The majority justify their opinion because the Court of Appeals has “increasingly expanded the scope of review”, a statement which, after examining the cases cited, I question. But, in any event, this cannot justify the utter disregard of the constitutional limitation the people have placed on the Court or the arrant disregard for the statute.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

. The word “jurisdiction” means the authority to decide or judge and is not dependent on the correctness of the decision made by the court. Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Greater Arizona Savings & Loan v. Tang, 97 Ariz. 325, 400 P.2d 121 (1965); City of Phoenix v. Rodgers, 44 Ariz. 40, 47, 34 P.2d 385 (1934). The words “right”, “power” and “authority” are often used loosely as synonymous and interchangeable with the word “jurisdiction.”