Court Opinion

ID: 9671681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:41:52.070379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:56.270551
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(dissenting). While I concur with Justice Levin’s dissent, I write separately.
The Legislature has specifically provided that tort liability may be imposed upon a governmental agency that owns or operates a public general hospital or county medical facility. 1986 PA 175.1 *278In providing that these public hospitals cannot claim governmental immunity, the Legislature has approved the continuing validity of this Court’s decision in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978). Although the act does not apply to these cases, the decision of the Legislature which will apply to future cases is a helpful and valuable guide.
In Parker, the majority held that public general hospitals are not immune from tort liability. None of the nine cases decided in Ross involved that issue. The Legislature decided not to grant immunity to governmental agencies that own or operate hospitals or county medical facilities and provided that the agents or employees of such hospitals were not immune from liability.
Months after the Ross decision, the Legislature held hearings on proposals to reform tort law in this state. Although the Legislature limited the noneconomic damages that some plaintiffs could recover in medical malpractice cases, other reforms were not enacted. The Legislature decided to retain tort liability for governmental agencies that own or operate certain general hospitals. Since the Legislature has expressed a clear judgment requiring certain public general hospitals to remain liable, this Court should respect that judgment. Legislators are elected representatives of the peo*279pie of this state. This decision is particularly unjust since Parker provides the plaintiffs with a remedy, and the Legislature has specifically provided redress for plaintiffs who are similarly situated whose causes of action happen to arise after 1986 PA 175 takes effect.
The government and its agents have a duty to act responsibly in the name of the people who authorize them to act. This is especially true in the area of public health where the sick and injured are especially vulnerable and must rely upon the professional expertise of their caretakers. In expanding the scope of governmental immunity in these cases, the Court is protecting the government and its agents from the legal consequences of negligent acts.
While absolute immunity from liability may be required in limited instances in order to allow some governmental agencies and employees the freedom in which to exercise their mandate from the people, such freedom is not justified in this case.
By authorizing the government to engage in certain activities, such as operating a public hospital, the public has not at the same time relieved the government of its duty to act with care.
As Justice Levin correctly observed in his partial dissent in Ross:
Virtually all government activity is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by the constitution, a statute, or other law. By perusing the statute books rather than focusing on the specific activity complained of by the plaintiff, the Court casts the net of governmental immunity too far, enabling a governmental entity to expand the scope of its immunity by promulgating an ordinance or other law relating to its activities. [Ross at 684.]
*280The majority here cites statutory authority which empowers public hospitals to function in the name of the people and then maintains that the same statute immunizes the agency and its employees when they breach the very responsibilities the statute created. The answer to the agency’s liability should be determined by focusing upon the specific act or omission of the agency, not by citing the overall governmental objective of the agency.
The determination whether a governmental agency acted within the limits of its authority still requires judicial interpretation. To state that an activity is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law adds little to the analysis we must use to determine the nature of the responsibilities of the agency and whether the specific acts alleged were beyond the public mandate.
Because the majority ignores the precedence of Parker, and extends the immunity of government to an unacceptable degree, I dissent.

 MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) provides:
This act does not grant immunity to a governmental agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility or to the agents or employees of such hospital or county medical care facility. As used in this subsection:
*278(a) "County medical care facility” means that term as defined in section 20104 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being section 333.20Í04 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
(b) "Hospital” means a facility offering inpatient, overnight care, and services for observation, diagnosis, and active treatment of an individual with a medical, surgical, obstetric, chronic, or rehabilitative condition requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. The term does not include a hospital owned or operated by the department of mental health or a hospital operated by the department of corrections.
The act became effective July 1,1986.