Court Opinion

ID: 9745734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:29:41.143055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.400503
License: Public Domain

BAILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I think Hammock had a legal duty to use due care to avoid accidents and to keep his vehicle under reasonable control, and I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that summary judgment was improperly denied.
As the majority notes, the main focus of the Court's analysis is the foreseeability of the harm to Red Gold as it relates to the existence of a legal duty on the part of Hammock. This, as the majority correctly explains, is because the Indiana Supreme court explained in Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind.1991) that the existence of a legal duty depends upon the analysis and balancing of the relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of harm to the injured person, and concerns of public policy. In its comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the topic, the majority notes that this Court attempted to remedy some of the confusion created by the Webb decision in Goldsberry v. Grubbs, 672 N.E.2d 475 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Specifically, Goldsberry recognized that by addressing the foreseeability of harm both as a component of the duty analysis and as a part of the determination of proximate cause, the Webb analysis had the potential *507of rendering separate analyses of the two concepts superfluous. Id. at 479.
The Goldsberry decision resolved this problem by recognizing that if foreseeability were to be a component of both duty and proximate cause, the analysis of foreseeable harm would have to be different at each respective stage. In particular, Goldsberry concluded that while the foreseeability component of proximate cause involved an after-the-fact analysis of circumstances that actually occurred, the foreseeability component of the duty analysis necessarily entailed a lesser inquiry into "the broad type of plaintiff and harm involved, without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence." 672 N.E.2d at 479. This Court explained that
while the facts of a particular occurrence are relevant when considering whether a breach of a duty occurred and whether that breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, such facts are simply not relevant to the determination of whether a duty existed. To look to the facts of a particular occurrence when deciding the duty question would subsume the entire law of negligence, ie., duty, breach, and proximate cause, into the duty question.
Id. The majority properly highlights this aspect of the Goldsberry decision, and the approach to the foreseeability question set out in that case remains the key to harmonizing Webb's duty analysis with the common law of negligence. While I fully agree with the majority's understanding of the distinction between the different foreseeability analyses for duty and proximate cause, I disagree with the majority's application of the foreseeability component in this case.
The majority says that Red Gold was not a sufficiently foreseeable plaintiff that had suffered reasonably foreseeable harm, reasoning that Red Gold was well outside of the "zone of danger" created by Hammock's alleged negligence, and that the kind of harm suffered by Red Gold was not the kind of harm normally expected to result from a motor vehicle accident. In Goldsberry, however, this Court observed that "it is foreseeable that motorists (or their occupants) will leave the traveled portion of a road and strike utility poles set and maintained along that road." 672 N.E.2d at 480. It is true that we made this statement in connection with determining whether a telephone utility company owed a duty in connection with its placement of a telephone pole to a driver injured after colliding with the pole. Seq, id. at 477. Nevertheless, the fact remains that such collisions are foreseeable. And if it is foreseeable that motorists may crash their vehicles into utility poles, it is certainly foreseeable that such accidents may damage the utility poles as well as attached electrical wires and associated hardware. It is further rational to predict that such damage might likely lead to the interruption of electrical power service to those receiving electricity through wires attached to the damaged utility pole.
Given the nature of electrical power and its supply along extended lines of variable lengths, I do not think that the distance from the accident site to the electrical power customer is dispositive of the foreseeability question. Rather, all who are directly connected to the supply of electrical power through a utility pole constitute the "broad type of plaintiff" reasonably expected to be damaged in such accidents. Similarly, the kind of damage allegedly sustained by Red Gold amounted to the broad type of harm reasonably anticipated as a result of this kind of an accident. The majority states that the absence of reported cases involving similar damage indicates that the damage was not what would normally be expected in such accidents. *508The majority recognizes, however, that "upon some level it is foreseeable that a business which received electric service from a line which suffered damage after an electric utility pole was struck would lose electric service and its processing operation would shut down." Op. at 508. In light of G@oldsberry's instruction to analyze foreseeability from a more general level of abstraction and "without regard to the facts of the actual occurrence," 672 N.E.2d at 479, I think that the level described by the majority is precisely that at which we must judge foreseeability as part of the duty analysis in this case. Accordingly, under the general and low-threshold foreseeability analysis applicable to the duty inquiry, Red Gold was a reasonably foreseeable victim sustaining alleged damages that were to be reasonably anticipated as a result of the kind of reasonably foreseeable accident involved here. The foreseeability factor therefore supports the imposition of a duty in this case.
I also think that the relationship and public policy factors weigh more heavily in favor of the existence of a legal duty than the majority's analysis suggests. The duties owed by operators of motor vehicles in this state are well-established, and include the obligation to use due care to avoid collisions and to maintain one's automobile under reasonable control. E.g., Cole v. Gohmanm, 727 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). This basic commonsense conception reflects these Webb factors.
First, while persons injured as a result of motor vehicle accidents rarely have a pre-existing relationship with the operator of the motor vehicle involved in an accident, the general relationship between and among those driving motor vehicles on public roads, as well as the relationship between motor vehicle operators and those who might be injured by their negligent operation, is plainly sufficient to support the existence of the duty on behalf of the operator to use due care to avoid accidents that might injure such persons. As a business that could be expected to sustain damage as a result of a reasonably foreseeable accident caused by a negligent motorist, Red Gold had enough of a relationship with a driver like Hammock to support the imposition of a duty. Moreover, the imposition of such a duty is entirely consistent with the sound policies of encouraging careful driving and compensating those injured by negligent motorists.
None of this is to say that Hammock's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Red Gold's damages. As we noted in Goldsberry, "'[al negligent act or omission is the proximate cause of an injury if the injury is a natural and probable consequence which, in light of the ctreum-stances, should reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated." 672 N.E.2d at 479 (quoting City of Portage v. Lindbloom, 655 N.E.2d 84, 86 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (emphasis supplied)). For the reasons discussed above, this foreseeability inquiry is necessarily more stringent than that conducted for purposes of determining whether a duty exists, and requires an after-the-fact analysis of the cireumstances that actually occurred. See id. at 479. While the question of proximate cause is often an issue for the trier of fact, the determination may be made as a matter of law where it is clear that the injury actually sustained was not foreseeable under the cireumstances and that the imposition of liability upon the original negligent actor would not be justified. Arnold v. F.J. Hab, Inc., 745 N.E.2d 912, 917 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The majority's foreseeability analysis here, while addressed to the duty component, amounts to a persuasive case that Red Gold's damages were not the proximate result of Hammock's alleged negligence. *509Hammock did not, however, seek summary judgment on this basis, and has not presented this argument upon appeal. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that Hammock was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that he owed no duty to Red Gold.