Court Opinion

ID: 9690200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:56:37.212827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:54.064762
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). In Wisconsin, actions affecting the family, as defined by section 767.02(1), Stats., are governed by statute. See Chapter 767, Stats.; Siemering v. Siemering, 95 Wis. 2d 111, 113, 288 N.W.2d 881, 882 (Ct. App. 1980). A proceeding to compel payment of child support is an action affecting the family. Section 767.02(l)(f), Stats. By statute, only "parents" are liable for child support. See sec. 767.25(1)(a), Stats. ("Whenever the court . . . enters an order or a judgment in [a child-support] action under s. 767.02(1)(f) or (j) or 767.08, the court shall . . . [o]rder either or both parents to pay an amount reasonable or necessary to fulfill a duty to support a child.1') (Emphasis added.)
Section 767.08(2)(a), Stats., details the procedure by which a parent can be compelled "to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her . . . minor child." Thus, and with critical significance here, under our current statutory scheme no court in Wisconsin may order a person to support a minor unless that person is the minor's parent, either by conception, adoption, adjudication, or — in the case of a man married to the minor's mother when the minor was conceived or born — presumption. Section 767.45(5m), Stats. Section 767.45(5m) is mandatory and unambiguous:
Except as provided under 767.458(3) [governing situations where a man has filed "a statement acknowledging paternity'1], unless a man is either presumed the child's father under s. 891.41 or adjudi*477cated the child's father either under s. 767.51 or by final order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, no order or temporary order may be entered for child support, legal custody or physical placement until the man is adjudicated the father using the procedure set forth in ss. 767.45 to 767.60. The exclusive procedure for establishment of child support obligations, legal custody or physical placement rights for a man who is neither presumed the child's father under s. 891.41 nor adjudicated the father is by an action under ss. 767.45 to 767.60. No person may waive the use of this procedure. If a presumption under s. 891.41 exists, a party denying paternity has the burden of rebutting the presumption..
(Emphasis added.) John T. Ulrich, Jr., upon whom both the trial court and the majority have placed an obligation of child support, does not come within section 767.45(5m)'s reach. He has not filed "a statement acknowledging paternity" under section 767.458(3), Stats. Section 767.45(5m). He has not been "adjudicated the child's father under s. 767.51.” Ibid. He has not been adjudicated the child's father "by final order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in another state." Ibid. He has not been adjudicated the child's father "using the procedure set forth in ss. 767.45 to 767.60." Ibid. Nor is he someone to whom the presumption of paternity under section 891.41, Stats., would apply. See ibid.
Under section 891.41, Stats. (1989-90):
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if any of the following applies:
(1) He and the child's natural mother are or have been married to each other and the child is conceived or born after marriage and before the *478granting of a decree of legal separation, annulment or divorce between the parties.
(2) He and the child's natural mother were married to each other after the child was born but he and the child's natural mother had a relationship with one another during the period of time within which the child was conceived and no other man has been adjudicated to be the father or presumed to be the father of the child under sub. (1).
Although Ulrich and Catherine Cornell were married to one another, the child was not "conceived or born after [the] marriage," which is the prerequisite to applying the presumption of paternity under section 891.41(1).1
Estoppel, the mechanism by which the majority imposes child-support obligations on Ulrich in direct contravention of section 767.45(5m), Stats., is a doctrine that, in essence, prevents a party from asserting either the truth or that which the law deems to be the truth. 2 *479E. Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England; A Commentary Upon Littleton sec. 667 (15th ed. London 1794);2 Sprigg v. The Bank of Mount Pleasant, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 257, 265 (1836). Thus, for example, although section 891.41 establishes circumstances for the application of a presumption of paternity, none of which apply in this case, this presumption may be rebutted. Section 767.45(5m) ("If a presumption under s. 891.41 exists, a party denying paternity has the burden of rebutting the presumption."); see also Rule 903.01, Stats.; Strawser v. Strawser, 126 Wis. 2d 485, 491, 377 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 1985). The doctrine of estop-pel may be used, in appropriate circumstances, to preclude a party against whom the presumption applies from rebutting the presumption. See A.M.N. v. A.J.N., 141 Wis. 2d 99, 103, 414 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Ct. App. 1987); see also In re D.L.H., 142 Wis. 2d 606, 613-618, 419 N.W.2d 283, 286-288 (Ct. App. 1987) (if circumstances appropriate, equitable estoppel could be applied to prevent wife from rebutting presumption that husband was father of child born during the marriage — section 891.41 not specifically discussed). Neither AM.N. and D.L.H., upon which the majority relies, authorize — directly, indirectly, or by implication — imposing support obligations on someone who is not a "parent," either by conception, adoption, adjudication, or statutory presumption. The majority's use of estoppel to create such an obligation where, as here, that is specifically prohibited by statute usurps the legislative function. This is one of those "hard cases" that make "bad law." See 3 V.S. Lean, Collectanea 479 (1903); see also Northern Securi*480ties Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). I respectfully dissent.

 Section 891.41(2), Stats., was recreated in its present form by 1989 Wis. Act 212 section 28, effective April 28, 1990. 1989 Wis. Act 212 sec. 32. Section 891.41(2) is thus not applicable to this proceeding, which was commenced prior to April 28, 1990. See 1989 Wis. Act 212 sec. 31. In any event, although Ulrich and Cornell "were married to each other after the child was born," there is no evidence in the appellate record that they "had a relationship with one another during the period of time within which the child was conceived," which is the prerequisite to applying the presumption of paternity under the current version of section 891.41(2).
Section 891.41(2), as it existed prior to the commencement of this proceeding, is also not applicable to Ulrich. That subsection provided that "[a] man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if . . . [h]e has acknowledged his paternity of the child under s. 69.15(3)(b)l or 3 and sub. (1) [of section 891.41] does not apply to any other person." Section 891.41(2), Stats. (1987-88).

" 'Eftoppe' commeth of the French word eftoupe, from whence the Engli/h word/topped: and it is called an e/toppel or conclu/ion, becau/e a man's owne act or acceptance /toppeth or clo/eth up his mouth to alleage or plead the truth."