Court Opinion

ID: 9955881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 17:02:23.875662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:35.002475
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 Doe v. Luster CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 LYNN DOE,
                                                                                             F084919
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. MCV086595)
                    v.

 ANDREW STUART LUSTER,                                                                    OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Madera County. Sosi Chitakian
Vogt, Judge.
         Law Offices of Robert E. Young and Robert E. Young for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Resch Polster & Berger, Michael C. Baum and Sandra Khalili, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         Defendant Andrew Stuart Luster, a judgment debtor, appeals from an order
denying his motion to quash (1) an order for appearance and examination and (2) a
subpoena duces tecum, contending service of the documents on him was invalid. We
conclude the order appealed from is not appealable and dismiss the appeal.
                                    BACKGROUND
       In 2003, a judgment was entered in Ventura County Superior Court in favor of
plaintiff Lynn Doe against Luster for $19,000,000. Doe renewed the judgment in 2012
and 2017, which now totals over $70,000,000.
       In February 2022, Doe applied for an order for appearance and examination
(“ORAP”) of Luster. Since Doe is an inmate at Valley State Prison in Madera County,
Doe filed the application in Madera County Superior Court.1 The court issued the ORAP
on March 2, 2022,2 setting Luster’s examination for April 29.
       According to a filed proof of service, a registered process server served the ORAP
and a subpoena duces tecum on “J. Delatorre, Liaison Officer,” at Valley State Prison on
April 11. On April 14, Luster signed a Notice of Remote Appearance for his scheduled
April 29 examination. Doe’s counsel filed the signed notice with the court on April 19.
       On April 28, Luster, through his counsel, moved to quash the subpoena duces
tecum and for a protective order. He argued he was never served with the ORAP and was
invalidly served with the subpoena duces tecum. In his supporting declaration, he stated
he was invalidly served with the subpoena on April 13 by his correctional counselor. A
hearing was set for June 8.
       After Luster failed to appear for his examination on April 29, the court continued
the examination and set an order to show cause as to why Luster should not be held in
contempt of court for his failure to appear. In that order, the court found the ORAP was

       1 Normally, a debtor’s examination is held in the court where the judgment was
entered. (Code Civ. Proc., § 708.160, subd. (a).) But an examinee may not be required
to attend an examination before a court that is (1) located outside the county in which the
person resides or has a place of business and (2) more than 150 miles from the
examinee’s residence or business. (Id., subd. (b).) When these mileage and county
limitations are exceeded, the examination may be held in a court of similar or higher
jurisdiction in the county where the examinee resides or has a place of business. (Id.,
subd. (c).)
       2 References to dates are to dates in 2022.

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“duly served” on Luster. The order to show cause hearing and the continued examination
were both set for June 8, the same day as the motion to quash.
       On May 11, Luster filed a supplemental declaration in support of his motion to
quash stating that the only documents he had ever received were the subpoena and the
notice of remote appearance.
       Luster did not appear at the June 8 hearing. According to a correctional officer at
the hearing, Luster refused to appear. Luster’s counsel argued that service of the ORAP
and subpoena on J. Delatorre did not constitute valid service on Luster. The court stated
it would not hold Luster in contempt and would not rule on the motion to quash that day.
The court instead asked for supplemental briefing on whether the ORAP was properly
served and whether the subpoena was overly broad.
       Both parties submitted supplemental briefing ahead of the continued motion
hearing. Doe maintained the ORAP was properly and timely served, while Luster argued
service of the ORAP was invalid. Thus, the scope of the motion was expanded to include
a motion to quash the ORAP; it was no longer just a motion to quash the subpoena.
Luster also filed another supplemental declaration stating that on June 1, his correctional
counselor gave him a copy of the ORAP.
       At the continued motion hearing on August 18, the trial court found on the record
that the ORAP and subpoena duces tecum were properly served and denied Luster’s
motion. The court set Luster’s debtor’s examination for September 19. On
September 12, the court entered an order tracking its oral pronouncement of the order.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Luster filed a notice of appeal on September 6 of the court’s August 18 denial of
his motion to quash the ORAP and subpoena duces tecum.3 He attached a copy of the
court’s August 18 minute order to his notice of appeal. In October 2022, we entered an

       3 So, Luster filed his notice of appeal before the September 12 order was entered.

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order stating that we were considering dismissing the appeal as prematurely taken since
the trial court had “yet to issue a final appealable order.” We directed Luster to file
within 30 days a copy of the “final order” or a letter brief setting forth jurisdictional
authority for the appeal. In response, Luster filed the court’s September 12 order.
       On appeal, Luster maintains the court erred in denying his motion to quash
because the ORAP and subpoena were invalidly served on him.
I.     Appealability
       Luster’s opening brief does not contain the required statement of appealability
explaining why the order appealed from is appealable.4 (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(B).) After Luster filed his opening brief, Doe moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground the order denying Luster’s motion to quash is not an appealable order under
Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a).5 Luster proffers four bases for
appealability in his opposition to the motion to dismiss. He also argues that if the order is
not appealable, this court should treat his opening brief as a petition for writ of mandate.
We conclude the order appealed from is not appealable and we will not treat this appeal
as a writ proceeding.
       A.     General appealability law
       The existence of an appealable order or “judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to an appeal.” (Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 126.) We are independently
obligated “ ‘in this as in every matter to confirm whether jurisdiction exists.’ ” (Kirk v.
Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) If an “order is not appealable, we must
dismiss the appeal.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 275, 277
(Reddish).) “This court is without power to bestow jurisdiction on itself, nor may the

       4 An appellant’s opening brief must “[s]tate that the judgment appealed from is
final, or explain why the order appealed from is appealable.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(2)(B).)
       5 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                              4.
parties create jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel.” (Mid-Wilshire Associates v.
O’Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1455.)
       “The right to appeal is wholly statutory.” (Dana Point Safe Harbor Collective v.
Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5 (Dana Point).) Section 904.1 “lists appealable
judgments and orders” in civil cases. (Dana Point, at p. 5.) Section 904.1 codifies “the
one final judgment rule,” which provides that an appeal is generally only allowable from
a final judgment. (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756.) Interlocutory
orders generally “ ‘are not appealable, but are only “reviewable on appeal” from the final
judgment.’ ” (Doran v. Magan (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292–1293.) Section 904.1
sets forth exceptions to the one final judgment rule and identifies interlocutory orders that
are appealable. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 780.)
       Neither an order denying a motion to quash an order for appearance and
examination nor an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum are listed in
section 904.1. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1)–(14).) But this does not mean the order is not
appealable. We examine in turn each of Luster’s proffered bases for appealability.
       B.     Appeal from the denial of a “special order”
       We do not understand Luster’s first offered ground for appealability. He contends
this appeal is from “the denial of a ‘special order.’ ” He does not identify the “special
order” he is referring to. As best we can tell, Luster is arguing that the order denying his
motion to quash was in effect an order improperly renewing an expired judgment. He
seems to base this argument on the fact that Doe’s ORAP application states that the
judgment was entered in September 2003 and renewed in October 2017, more than
10 years later. We would reject this argument because the judgment has never expired.
       Generally, a money judgment may not be enforced after 10 years from the date of
its entry unless it is timely renewed. (§§ 683.110, subd. (a), 683.130.) Doe’s judgment
against Luster was entered in 2003, extended for the first time in 2012, and extended
again in 2017. Luster’s counsel, in his declaration in support of Luster’s motion to quash,

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stated that the judgment was renewed in 2010 and again in 2017. Though counsel was
mistaken about when the judgment was first renewed—in 2012, not in 2010—counsel
apparently knew the judgment has never expired. We are therefore unsure why Luster is
asserting this basis of appealability. In any event, the order appealed from did not in
effect renew an expired judgment.
       C.     Order after judgment
       Luster next contends the order is appealable under section 904.1,
subdivision (a)(2), as an order made after an appealable judgment. We disagree.
       Under section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), an appeal may be taken from an order
made after an appealable judgment. But not all postjudgment orders are appealable.
(Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651 (Lakin).) Generally,
“[t]o be appealable, a postjudgment order must satisfy two requirements: (1) the issues
raised by the appeal from the order must be different from those arising out of the appeal
from the judgment and (2) the order must affect, enforce, or stay execution of the
judgment.” (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 741, 748.)
Nonappealable postjudgment orders “tend to fall into two categories: (1) orders that are
preliminary to a later judgment[,] and (2) orders that pertain to the preparation of a record
for use in a later appeal.” (Ibid.) “[T]he key test for finality … is whether the challenged
order reflects a final determination of the rights or obligations of the parties or whether it
contains language showing it is preparatory to a later ruling that will be embodied in an
appealable judgment or order.” (Finance Holding Co. LLC v. The American Institute of
Certified Tax Coaches, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 663, 679 (Finance Holding).)
       It is well-settled that a postjudgment discovery order against a judgment debtor is
nonappealable. (Rogers v. Wilcox (1944) 62 Cal.App.2d 978, 979 (Rogers).) The Rogers
court held that no appeal lies from an order denying a motion to quash an order for the
appearance of a judgment debtor because “[i]t was one of the steps taken in the course of
a proceeding to obtain an order …. It did not constitute a final order. A court should not

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be interrupted in the exercise of its jurisdiction until its judgment has become final. Error
in the course of a proceeding does not warrant a review.” (Id. at p. 979.) The Finance
Holding court reinforced this rule of nonappealability, holding that an order compelling a
judgment debtor’s examination or production of documents “can be reasonably viewed as
an intermediate step to enforcing the judgment against that judgment debtor.” (Finance
Holding, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at pp. 679–680, italics omitted.) We follow Rogers and
Finance Holding and conclude that the order appealed from here is nonappealable under
section 904.1, subdivision (a)(2).
       Luster argues that the order appealed from is a final judgment entered in a separate
and distinct proceeding because the order was issued by the Madera County Superior
Court, whereas the judgment was entered in Ventura County Superior Court. He cites
Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1 in support. There, the California Supreme Court held
that a trial court’s order compelling compliance with a legislative subpoena was
appealable. (Id. at p. 4.) The Court distinguished legislative and administrative
subpoenas from discovery orders. The Court recognized discovery orders generally are
not appealable because they “ ‘are made in connection with pending lawsuits which have
yet to be resolved. A discovery order does not determine all of the parties’ rights and
liabilities at issue in the litigation.’ ” (Id. at p. 10.) By contrast, court orders compelling
compliance with either legislative or administrative subpoenas are final and appealable
judgments because they leave no issue for future consideration except the fact of
compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the order. (Id. at p. 11.)
        The order denying Luster’s motion to quash is not an appealable final judgment
like the order appealed from in Dana Point. It makes no difference that the order was
issued by the Madera court instead of the Ventura court. This is because no matter which
California court entered the order denying Luster’s motion to quash, “further … judicial
action on the part of the court is essential to a final determination of the rights of the
parties” here. (Dana Point, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 5.) The order denying Luster’s

                                               7.
motion to quash is but part of the proceedings to enforce Doe’s judgment against Luster.
By contrast, in the case of a court order compelling compliance with a legislative
subpoena, no further court action is necessary. Dana Point does not support Luster’s
contention.
       D.     Collateral order doctrine
       Luster next contends the order appealed from is appealable as a collateral final
order. We disagree.
       The collateral order doctrine is a common law exception to the one final judgment
rule “under which some interim orders are deemed appealable ‘judgments’ because they
are essentially the same as a final judgment.” (Reddish, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 278.)
“To be appealable, a collateral order must satisfy three elements: the order must
(1) finally determine (2) a matter collateral to the litigation and (3) require the payment of
money or performance of an act.” (Ibid.)
       The second element is not satisfied. An order is not “collateral” if it is a
“necessary step” to correct determination of the main issue in the case. (In re Marriage
of Grimes v. Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 419.) Here, the order denying Luster’s
motion to quash was a necessary step in enforcing Doe’s judgment against him. The
order was thus not collateral.
       E.     Discovery order ancillary to litigation in another jurisdiction
       The generalization that discovery orders are not appealable is inapplicable “where
the order is ancillary to litigation in another jurisdiction and operates as the last word by a
California trial court on the matters at issue.” (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 879, 885–886 (H.B. Fuller).) Luster asserts the order appealed from is
appealable under this theory. He cites H.B. Fuller and Warford v. Medeiros (1984)
160 Cal.App.3d 1035 (Warford), without offering any meaningful analysis. The order is
not appealable under this theory.

                                              8.
       “In H.B. Fuller, a plaintiff litigating in Minnesota against the defendant, an
unknown former employee who allegedly posted confidential information online, served
a California subpoena to compel an Internet service provider to identify the defendant.
[Citation.] The trial court denied the anonymous defendant’s motion to quash the
subpoena, and the defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal held that the order was
appealable because the discovery question presented by the defendant’s motion to quash
was the whole end and purpose of the discovery proceeding in California.” (Doe v.
McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 647.)
       In Warford, the plaintiffs in a civil action filed in Hawaii filed in San Francisco
County Superior Court an order to show cause why three nonparty deponents should not
have to provide deposition testimony and certain documents. (Warford, supra,
160 Cal.App.3d at p. 1038.) The court denied the plaintiffs’ application, except that the
nonparty deponents were ordered to give certain identifying information. (Id. at p. 1039.)
The plaintiffs appealed, and the threshold issue for the appellate court was “whether the
trial court’s order denying the major portion of plaintiffs’ application is final and
appealable.” (Ibid.) The court held the order was appealable, observing, “[A] party
normally may not appeal from a discovery order. [Citations.] … However, we think an
exception to the general rule exists where, as here, no final review of the underlying
action will take place in a California forum.” (Id. at pp. 1040–1041.)
       H.B. Fuller and Warford are distinguishable. The order appealed from here will
not be the last word by a California court on the matters at issue in this case. (H.B.
Fuller, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 885–886.) Any review of the postjudgment
proceedings will take place in a California forum. (Warford, supra, 160 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 1040–1041.) H.B. Fuller and Warford instruct that the ancillary discovery order
exception to the nonappealability rule applies only when a discovery order is issued in
California requiring production of information to be used in an action pending in another

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state. This case involves an order issued by a California court requiring production of
information to be used to enforce a California judgment.
II.    Writ relief
       Luster argues that, if the order is not appealable, we should not dismiss the appeal,
but treat it as a petition for a writ of mandate and review the merits of his challenge to the
order denying his motion to quash. “An appellate court has discretion to treat a purported
appeal from a nonappealable order as a petition for writ of mandate, but that power
should be exercised only in unusual circumstances. [Citation.] ‘A petition to treat a
nonappealable order as a writ should only be granted under extraordinary
circumstances[.]’ ” (H. D. Arnaiz, Ltd. v. County of San Joaquin (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
1357, 1366–1367.)
       If the law is clear that an order is not appealable, the appellate court may dismiss
an appeal from a nonappealable order and refuse to deem the matter as a writ petition.
The court in Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O’Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450
(Mid-Wilshire), did just that. There, the plaintiff-appellant appealed from an order
denying its petition to vacate or correct an arbitration award as well as from an earlier
order compelling arbitration of its claims. (Id. at p. 1452.) In dismissing the appeal, the
court recognized that no appeal lies from an order denying vacation or correction of an
arbitration award. (§ 1294, subd. (b).) Instead, an appeal lies only from an order
dismissing a petition to confirm, correct, or vacate an award. (Ibid.) Since an order
denying vacation or correction of an award is not appealable, it may be reviewed “upon
appeal from the judgment of confirmation or by writ of mandate.” (Mid-Wilshire, at
pp. 1454–1455.)
       Even recognizing the order could be reviewed by a petition for writ of mandate,
the Mid-Wilshire court declined to treat the improper appeal as a writ petition. (Mid-
Wilshire, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1455.) The court explained that “the interests of
justice would not be served by treating the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. The

                                             10.
record reflects that appellant deliberately appealed from the order denying its motion to
vacate or correct so that it could prevent entry of a confirmation judgment. We will not
engage in speculation as to appellant’s motivations for so doing, but appellant must live
with the consequences of its trial court strategy.” (Ibid.) The court added that treating
the appeal as a writ petition would “encourage parties to knowingly appeal from
nonappealable orders, safe in the knowledge that their appeal will be ‘saved by the
appellate courts.’ We cannot condone or encourage such practice.” (Id. at p. 1456.)
       We decline to consider this appeal a petition for writ of mandate.
                                      DISPOSITION
       Lynn Doe’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and the appeal is dismissed.
Doe is awarded her costs on appeal.

                                                                            SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

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