Court Opinion

ID: 9404872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 17:09:46.97439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.714924
License: Public Domain

J-A15014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 JACOB G. PIFER, MARY LOUISE           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 RUFFNER AND RAYMOND PIFER             :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 SNYDER BROTHERS, INC.,                :
 GREYLOCK CONVENTIONAL, LLC,           :   No. 1323 WDA 2022
 GREYLOCK PRODUCTION, LLC,             :
 SENECA-UPSHUR PETROLEUM, LLC,         :
 DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTION, LLC,          :
 BAKER GAS, INC., ALLEGHENY            :
 MINERAL CORPORATION, AND              :
 GLACIAL SAND AND GRAVEL               :
 COMPANY                               :
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: JACOB G. PIFER

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 2, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Civil Division at
                       No(s): No. 2022-0646-CIV

 JACOB G. PIFER, MARY LOUISE           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 RUFFNER, AND RAYMOND PIFER            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 SNYDER BROTHERS, INC.,                :
 GREYLOCK CONVENTIONAL, LLC,           :   No. 1324 WDA 2022
 GREYLOCK PRODUCTION, LLC,             :
 SENECA-UPSHUR PETROLEUM, LLC,         :
 DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTION, LLC,          :
 BAKER GAS, INC., ALLEGHENY            :
 MINERAL CORPORATION, AND              :
 GLACIAL SAND AND GRAVEL               :
 COMPANY                               :
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: JACOB G. PIFER
J-A15014-23

                Appeal from the Order Entered October 12, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Civil Division at
                          No(s): No. 2022-0646-CIV

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                   FILED: JUNE 26, 2023

        Jacob G. Pifer (Appellant)1 appeals from the trial court’s order sustaining

the preliminary objections filed by Snyder Brothers, Inc. (Snyder), Baker Gas,

Inc., Allegheny Mineral Corporation, and Glacial Sand and Gravel Co. (the

Snyder and Baker defendants) and dismissing several counts of a multi-count

complaint with prejudice.2        Appellant additionally appeals the trial court’s

October 12, 2022, order, entered following the grant of reconsideration, which

ultimately    rejected    Appellant’s     challenge   to   the   constitutionality   of

Pennsylvania’s Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (GMRA), see 58 P.S. § 33.3.

We quash the appeal.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1The remaining plaintiffs, Mary Louise Ruffner and Raymond Pifer, did not join
Appellant’s notice of appeal or appellate brief.

2 Defendants Greylock Conventional, LLC, and Greylock Production, LLC
(collectively, Greylock), did not join the preliminary objections filed by the
Snyder and Baker defendants. On December 5, 2022, the parties stipulated
to voluntarily discontinuing the actions against Diversified Production, LLC,
and Seneca-Upshur Petroleum, LLC.

                                           -2-
J-A15014-23

       The trial court provided the following summary of facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs, Pifer, Mary Louise Ruffner and Raymond Pifer

(collectively, the Pifers or plaintiffs), as the non-moving parties:3

             [The Pifers] own approximately 141 acres of land, including
       the rights to the oil and gas underneath them. In 1983, their
       predecessors in interest, Sarah Pifer and Cyrus Pifer, signed an oil
       and gas lease with Kepco, hereafter the “1983 lease”. It provided
       for a 1/8[FN] royalty, calculated at the point of sale. It allow[ed]
       for the lessee to use oil and gas recovered from the land in its
       production operations. There is a typed provision in the lease
       concerning pooling and unitization rights, but it was crossed out
       in pen and initialed by the parties signing it. There are other
       references to pooling and unitization rights, but those were not
       crossed out. Kepco assigned their interest in the lease to other
       parties and those interests eventually became vested in the [the
       Snyder and Baker defendants, as well as the remaining
       defendants].

       [FN]1/8 is the same as 12.5%. [The trial court] uses both terms
       interchangeably.

             Sarah Pifer also signed an oil and gas lease with Snyder
       Brothers in 1990, hereafter, the “1990 lease”. The purpose of this
       lease was to allow Snyder Brothers to rework, recondition,
       produce, and maintain existing abandoned and non-producing
       wells on the property, but not to drill any new ones. The lease
       provided for a 1/8 royalty, calculated at the wellhead[,] and allows
       for the deduction of taxes and reasonable costs of the lessee. It
       also allows the lessee to use water, oil, and gas and other
       materials from the property for operating purposes and for
       repressuring.

____________________________________________

3 “[W]hen considering preliminary objections, a trial court is required to admit
as true all material facts set forth in the pleadings as well as all inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom.” Calabro v. Socolofsky, 206 A.3d 501, 507
(Pa. Super. 2019).

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            In 2020, the [Pifers] and Snyder Brothers discussed the
      possibility of modifying the 1983 lease to allow unitization and
      pooling for Marcellus Shale depths only. The lease was never
      formally amended to allow for the pooling and unitization of the
      property. Snyder Brothers filed a declaration in 2021 creating a
      unit which includes the Plaintiffs[’] property.

             In response to this development, the [Pifers] filed a lawsuit
      alleging quiet title, ejectment and mesne damages, trespass,
      conversion, breach of contract, and violations of the United States
      and Pennsylvania Constitutions….

Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/22, at 2-3 (footnote in original).

      The complaint alleged twelve counts:

      Count I:    Quiet Title (against all defendants)

      Count II:   Ejectment and Mense Damages (against all
                  defendants)

      Count III: Trespass (against Snyder)

      Count IV:   Conversion (against Snyder)

      Count V:    Trespass (against Greylock)

      Count VI:   Conversion (against Greylock)

      Count VII: Breach of Contract (against Snyder)

      Count VIII: Declaratory Judgment (against all defendants)

      Count IX:   Quiet Title (against Snyder and Baker defendants)

      Count X:    Ejectment and Mense Damages (against Snyder and
                  Baker defendants)

      Count XI:   Trespass (against Snyder and Baker defendants)

      Count XII: Conversion (against Snyder and Baker defendants)

                                     -4-
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Complaint, 5/20/22.        The Snyder and Baker defendants filed preliminary

objections challenging the legal sufficiency to all but Counts V and VI of the

Pifers’ complaint.     Greylock did not file preliminary objections but filed an

answer and new matter on August 19, 2022.

       On September 2, 2022, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion

and order dismissing with prejudice Counts I, II, III, IV, VII, IX, X and XI).

See Trial Court Opinion and Order, 9/2/22.         Appellant filed a motion for

reconsideration on September 19, 2022. The next day, the trial court granted

reconsideration only as to Count VIII of the complaint, Appellant’s

constitutional challenge to the GMRA. On October 12, 2022, the trial court

again dismissed with prejudice Count VIII of the complaint. Trial Court Order,

10/12/22. The trial court concluded that the GMRA did not “impair” the 1983

and 1990 leases, as the leases are silent with respect to pooling and

unitization. Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 10/12/22, at 2.

       On October 13, 2022, Greylock filed a motion for judgment on the

pleadings. However, Appellant timely filed notices of appeal of the trial court’s

September 2, 2022, and October 12, 2022, orders.4 The trial court stayed

Greylock’s motion for judgment on the pleadings pending this appeal.

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. The appeals

are consolidated for our review.

____________________________________________

4 On December 30, 2022, Appellant filed with this Court a copy of the notice
of constitutional challenge directed to Pennsylvania’s Attorney General.

                                           -5-
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      Before addressing the issues raised by Appellant, we first consider

whether the appeal is properly before this Court. See Stahl v. Redcay, 897

A.2d 478, 485 (Pa. Super. 2006) (the “appealability of an order goes directly

to the jurisdiction of the Court asked to review the order.” (citation omitted)).

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals taken from a

final order. In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super.

2012). Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 provides an appeal may

be taken from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final order “disposes of all

claims and of all parties[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).

      As a general rule, an order dismissing some but not all counts of
      a multi-count complaint is interlocutory and not appealable. In
      adhering to this policy, the courts have sought to
      avoid piecemeal litigation.

Bombar v. West Am. Ins. Co., 938 A.2d 78, 85 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

      Rule 341 further authorizes an appeal where the trial court has issued a

determination of finality. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(3), (c). The Rule explains:

      (c) Determination of finality.-- When more than one claim for
      relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim,
      cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are
      involved, the trial court or other government unit may enter a final
      order as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties
      only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal
      would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such an order
      becomes appealable when entered. In the absence of such a
      determination and entry of a final order, any order or other form
      of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties
      shall not constitute a final order.

Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).

                                      -6-
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      On December 28, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the

instant appeal should not be quashed. Appellant responded to the rule on

January 5, 2023. Appellant claims the trial court’s orders

      disposed of all claims against all parties and put the plaintiffs out
      of court because those orders were based on findings the Trial
      Court made as a matter of law that mooted the plaintiffs’ operative
      theory against all parties. That placed the plaintiffs “out of court”,
      with nothing left to adjudicate in the Trial Court. It is therefore
      submitted that this appeal was, and is, timely and proper.

Appellant’s Response to Rule, 1/5/23, at 2.

      Appellant asserts that the counts dismissed by the trial court “are all

predicated on the 1983 Lease being invalid and not conferring any oil and gas

development rights because it violated the GMRA.” Id. at 7. According to

Appellant, his remaining claims against Greylock and the other defendants are

“wholly contingent on the 1983 Lease being invalid under the GMRA.” Id. In

his docketing statement, Appellant additionally claimed his appeal is taken

from an order disposing of a request for declaratory judgment.

      By letter to this Court dated January 11, 2023, Greylock disagreed with

Appellant’s claim regarding the appealability of the trial court’s order:

      Greylock was not a party before the [trial court] on
      Preliminary Objections which were disposed of by Order of
      September 2, 2022. Rather, Greylock filed an Answer to [the
      Pifers’] Complaint and thereafter a Motion for Judgment on the
      Pleadings relative to the claims against Greylock and based upon
      the [trial court’s] September 2, 2022, [order] sustaining the other
      [the Snyder and Baker defendants’] Preliminary Objections to any
      and all counts involving Greylock. Greylock’s Motion for Judgment
      on the Pleadings was scheduled for Oral Argument and briefed by
      both sides. However, upon the taking of the instant appeal(s)[,]
      Oral Argument was canceled because the trial court viewed it[s]

                                      -7-
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      jurisdiction as usurped. Accordingly, no disposition was made as
      to Greylock’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Thus, the
      trial court’s September 2, 2022 Order is not a “final order” which
      disposes of all claims and all parties in accordance with Pa.R.A.P.
      341(b)(1). Greylock’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
      remains pending – a fact to which [Appellant’s] Counsel is
      aware. Given the lack of disposition as to Greylock, I cannot
      concur with [Appellant’s] Counsel.

Greylock’s Response to Rule, 1/11/23 (emphasis added).

      On its face, the trial court’s order did not dispose of all claims of all

parties, as the counts against Greylock remain pending before the trial court.

The trial court issued no express determination “that an immediate appeal

would facilitate resolution of the entire case.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c). Although

Appellant appears to argue a controlling question of law that would facilitate

resolution of the entire case, he did not seek a determination of finality from

the trial court, as required by Rule 341(c). Accordingly, the trial court’s order

is not appealable as a final order under Rule 341.

      Our Supreme Court, as well as this Court, has recognized that certain

interlocutory orders involving declaratory judgment claims may be appealable

as of right. See Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Ass’n. Ins. Co. v. Johnson

Matthey, Inc., 188 A.3d 396, 399 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam); Schmitt v. State

Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 245 A.3d 678, 681 (Pa. Super. 2021).

However, appeal of an interlocutory declaratory order is not an “automatic”

right. Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 684-85.

      Our Supreme Court “provided a rather straightforward two-part test for

appellate courts to apply when considering whether an order declaring the

                                      -8-
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rights of parties is final and appealable[.]” Pennsylvania Manufacturers’

Ass’n Ins. Co., 188 A.3d at 399. Specifically, we must determine:

      (1) what is the effect of the lower court’s decision on the scope of
      the litigation; and (2) what practical effect does the court’s
      decision have on the ultimate outcome of the case….

Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 685 (quoting Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Ass’n

Ins. Co., supra, 188 A.3d at 399-400).          “[A]n order in a declaratory

judgment action, which merely dismisses one or some of several alternative

theories for relief without ultimately deciding the case, is not appealable under

Rule 341.” United States Orgs. for Bankr. Alts., Inc. v. Dep’t of Banking,

26 A.3d 474, 478 (Pa. 2011) (citing Pa. Bankers Ass’n v. Pa. Dep’t of

Banking, 948 A.2d 790, 798 (Pa. 2008)).

      Appellant’s declaratory judgment count sought a declaration that the

GMRA, as applied in this case, unconstitutionally impaired Appellant’s oil and

gas leases.   Complaint, Count VIII.    The trial court resolved this issue as

follows:

      [The Snyder and Baker defendants] argue that the constitutional
      issue could only arise if an existing contractual right is impaired,
      and that since the lease is silent with respect to pooling and
      unitization[,] there is no existing contractual right. [Appellant]
      counter[s] that there must have been a contractual right, because
      an oil and gas lease is a contract.

            Although an oil and gas lease is a contract, there is not
      within this contract any contractual obligation regarding pooling
      and unitization. [Appellant] continue[s] to maintain that the
      deletion of the pooling and unitization clause has the effect of an
      express prohibition.    But the [trial c]ourt has rejected that
      argument and so this lease falls within the purview of [the GMRA].
      In short, the constitutional argument must fail because [the

                                      -9-
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      GMRA] does not “impair” the terms that were agreed to in the
      lease….

Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 10/12/22, at 2 (emphasis added). Thus,

the constitutional issue had no bearing on the outcome of the case and did

not narrow the scope of the litigation. See Schmitt, 245 A.3d at 685.

      Finally, we point out that Appellant’s declaratory judgment issue

dismissed only one of many alternate theories.      As Appellant explained in

response to this Court’s rule to show cause, the complaint sought alternative

theories for relief:

      Counts I through VI of the Complaint were principally premised on
      the overarching claim that the 1983 Lease was invalid because
      it violated the GMRA. Therefore, the 1983 Lease should be
      designated as invalid in the public records (Count I, quiet title),
      the parties claiming rights in/participating in oil and gas
      development on or under the Subject Property under the 1983
      Lease should be ejected (Count II, ejectment)[,] and the plaintiffs
      were entitled to damages for unauthorized oil and gas extraction
      from the Subject Property (Counts III through VI, trespass and
      conversion).

      A subsidiary alternative theory, associated with [] Counts II, III,
      and IV, was that even if the 1983 Lease was valid, … oil and
      gas development and production activities undertaken pursuant
      to pooling and unitization activities were unauthorized by the 1983
      Lease[,] and that the party engaging in oil and gas development
      via pooling and unitization, Snyder Brothers, Inc., should be
      ejected from the Subject Property (Count III) and was liable for
      trespass and conversion damages associated with its oil and gas
      production via the unauthorized pooling and unitization (Counts
      III and IV).

      Along these lines, Counts VII, and VIII take the position that
      if the 1983 Lease was valid (i.e., it did not violate the GMRA),
      oil and gas development via pooling and unitization were not
      authorized. Count VII (Breach of Contract) asserts that Snyder
      Brothers, Inc.’s pooling and unitization activities under the 1983

                                    - 10 -
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       Lease breached that contract. Count VIII (Declaratory Judgment)
       seeks a judicial declaration that 53 P.S. 34.1 is an unconstitutional
       impairment of oil and gas lease contracts, because it purports to
       allow pooling and unitization of oil and gas properties under lease
       as long as the lease does not expressly prohibit pooling and
       unitization, thereby overriding the parties’ bargained-for
       exchange in the original lease.

       Counts IX through XII are based on the premise that the
       1990 Lease was invalid, void and inoperative because it
       violated the GMRA, thereby conferring no rights to oil and gas
       development. That rendered ongoing oil and gas development to
       be unlawful. Therefore, the 1990 Lease should be designated as
       invalid in the public records (Count IX, Quiet Title), the parties
       claiming/participating in oil and gas development on or under the
       Subject Property under the 1990 Lease should be ejected (Count
       X, Ejectment) and the plaintiffs were entitled to damages for
       unauthorized oil and gas extraction from the Subject Property
       (Counts XI and XII, trespass and conversion).

Response to Rule at 5 (emphasis added).

       As the trial court’s order ruling on the declaratory judgment dismissed

one of several alternative theories for relief, but did not ultimately decide the

case, we conclude the it is not an appealable interlocutory order.             See

Schmidt, 245 A.3d at 685-86 (recognizing the interlocutory nature of a trial

court’s order that decided a declaratory issue, but left the damages issue

unresolved). For these reasons, we quash the appeal.5

____________________________________________

5 While the trial court’s order arguably applies to the causes of action against
Greylock, the procedural posture of this case bars Greylock from participating
in the instant appeal. Greylock’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
remains pending before the trial court. Further, not all plaintiffs joined
Appellant in this appeal. An appeal at this stage in the proceedings would
result in the piecemeal litigation our rules are designed to avoid.
See Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Ass’n. Ins. Co., Inc., 188 A.3d at 400
(emphasizing the “well-founded policy against piecemeal litigation.”).

                                          - 11 -
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     Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/26/2023

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