Court Opinion

ID: 9941799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 22:02:02.739445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:03.029675
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24 Guzman v. Younan CA2/4
           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 JORGE GUZMAN, JR.,                                                  B317573

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BC562564)
        v.

 EDWARD YOUNAN et al.,

        Defendants and Appellants.

 __________________________________

 JORGE GUZMAN, JR.,

       Plaintiff and Appellant,

        v.

 EDWARD YOUNAN et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEALS from orders and a judgment of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Order
denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict reversed. Appeal
from order granting new trial dismissed as moot.
      John L. Dodd & Associates, John L. Dodd; Law Office of Ilia
Serpik, and Andrei V. Serpik for Edward Younan and Avalon
Foods, Inc.
      Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, Boris Treyzon, Douglas Rochen;
Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer, Shea S. Murphy, and
Kevin K. Nguyen for Jorge Guzman, Jr.
               ________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

       Jorge Guzman, Jr. (Guzman) drove a food truck owned and
operated by Philma Alvarez (Philma) and Hector Chavez
(Chavez).1 On January 11, 2014, after the truck completed its
business at one of its stops, the cook on the truck asked Guzman
to retrieve a table from outside. When Guzman stepped outside, a
car hit him, resulting in serious injuries.
       Guzman sued Philma, Chavez, Avalon Foods, Inc. (the
commissary where Philma stored her food truck) and Edward
Younan (Avalon’s president) for damages caused by the accident.2
Guzman brought the lawsuit under Labor Code section 3706,
which permits an injured employee to file a civil complaint for
damages against an employer who “fails to secure the payment of
compensation” to the injured employee.
       The case was tried in two phases: the first phase
determined whether Avalon and/or Younan were Guzman’s
employers at the time of the accident – a necessary element of

1     Because another witness in this case also has the surname
“Alvarez,” we refer to Philma by her first name to avoid
confusion.
2    Philma and Chavez defaulted and are not parties to this
appeal.

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Guzman’s claim under Labor Code section 3706. After a jury
found both Avalon and Younan were Guzman’s employers when
he was injured, the trial proceeded to the second phase to
determine other elements of liability and damages. A second jury
found in favor of Guzman, and the trial court entered judgment
against Avalon and Younan.
       Avalon and Younan moved for a new trial and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on several grounds. The trial
court denied their JNOV motion, but granted a new trial based
on instructional error concerning apportionment of responsibility
for non-economic damages in phase two of the trial.
       Avalon and Younan appeal from the trial court’s order
denying their JNOV motion, and cross-appeal from the judgment.
They contend: (1) there was no substantial evidence Guzman was
employed by Avalon and/or Younan at the time of the accident;
(2) in phase two of the trial, Avalon and Younan rebutted the
statutory presumption of negligence as a matter of law; (3) the
judgment in both phases is unsupported by substantial evidence;
(4) the trial court committed instructional error in phase one of
the trial; and (5) the trial court erred in omitting Chavez and
Philma from the special verdict form in phase one. Guzman
appeals from the order granting a new trial. Guzman also filed a
protective cross-appeal from the judgment.
       For the reasons discussed below, we agree with Avalon and
Younan’s first contention. Accordingly, we reverse the order
denying Avalon and Younan’s JNOV motion, and direct the trial
court to enter judgment in favor of Avalon and Younan. This
conclusion renders moot Guzman’s cross-appeal from the order
granting Avalon and Younan’s motion for a new trial.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       We limit our recitation of the facts to those necessary to
provide context for and resolve the issues we are deciding on
appeal.
       Younan began working in the food truck business in 1975
as a driver. He and his wife eventually owned between 50 and 60
trucks. Younan acquired Avalon, a food truck commissary, in
1999. Food trucks are required to park at a “certified
commissary,” such as Avalon, and Avalon charges its customers
for “housing space” (i.e., a parking spot), electricity, security, and
ice. At the time of trial, Avalon owned only “maybe a couple” food
trucks, which were not usually on the road, but served as spares.
       Guzman began working on food trucks in approximately
1992. He was the driver and cashier. His job duties included
“driv[ing to] the stops where they go, sell[ing] food, . . . tak[ing]
the money, get[ting] change” and “driv[ing] to the next stop.” At
the time of the accident, Guzman drove a food truck owned by
Philma. Philma parked her trucks at Avalon during the relevant
time period.
       Following the accident, Guzman filed a civil complaint
against Philma and Chavez. Guzman later named Avalon and
Younan as defendants. The operative complaint alleged that, on
January 11, 2014, while Guzman was employed by “defendants,”
“[t]he employee manager negligently instructed [Guzman] to
retrieve a serving table in a manner that subjected [Guzman] to
extreme danger of, and resulted in, [Guzman] being struck by a

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car and severely injured.”3 Avalon and Younan answered the
complaint, and, as relevant here, asserted no employment
relationship existed between them and Guzman.
       The trial court granted Avalon and Younan’s motion to
bifurcate trial into two phases, with the issue of whether Guzman
was employed by Avalon and/or Younan at the time of the
accident tried first, reserving other issues of liability and
damages to a second phase of trial, if necessary.
       Phase one of trial began on October 21, 2019. At the close of
plaintiff’s case-in-chief, defendants orally moved for nonsuit. In
response, the trial court stated “[t]here was some slightly . . .
confusing testimony frankly at various points, enough to justify
sending this to the jury” but took the motion “under advisement”
and declined to decide it at that time. On October 24, 2019, the
jury returned a verdict finding both Younan and Avalon were
Guzman’s employers at the time of the accident.
       Phase two of trial began in July of 2021. A second jury
found Guzman was injured in the course and scope of his
employment, and Avalon and Younan did not overcome the
presumption of negligence.4 The jury awarded Guzman damages

3    The operative complaint also named Kevin Robledo as a
defendant. During trial, the parties stipulated to dismissing
Robledo with prejudice.
4     Labor Code section 3708 provides that, in an action against
an employer who does not obtain workers’ compensation
insurance, “it is presumed that the injury to the employee was a
direct result and grew out of the negligence of the employer, and
the burden of proof is upon the employer, to rebut the
presumption of negligence.”

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totaling $8,245,034.00, and the trial court entered judgment in
favor of Guzman.
       Following trial, Avalon and Younan moved for JNOV and a
new trial. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied
the JNOV motion, stating there was “conflicting testimony
surrounding the issue of who [Guzman] was working for at the
time of his injury[,]” but ultimately concluded “both juries’
findings were supported by substantial evidence.” The court
granted a new trial however, on the ground that, in phase two of
the trial, “the jury should have been instructed to allocate fault
among the named defendants, including the defaulting
defendants.” As noted above, Avalon and Younan appealed from
the order denying their JNOV motion and cross-appealed from
the final judgment. Guzman appealed from the order granting a
new trial, and filed a protective cross-appeal from the judgment.

                         DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review
       We review the trial court’s denial of defendants’ JNOV
motion to determine “‘whether there is evidence in the record of
sufficient substance to support [the] verdict.’” (Sanchez-Corea v.
Bank of America (1985) 38 Cal.3d 892, 906.) In so doing, we
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to
uphold the verdict. (Id. at p. 907.)
       Although our review begins and ends with a determination
that substantial evidence supports the verdict, “this does not
mean we must blindly seize any evidence in support of the
respondent in order to affirm the judgment.” (Kuhn v.
Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633
(Kuhn).) Substantial evidence is not synonymous with “‘“any”

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evidence.’” (Ibid.) Rather, to be substantial, the evidence must be
credible and of solid value. (Ibid.) “‘“[A] judgment may be
supported by inference, but the inference must be a reasonable
conclusion from the evidence and cannot be based upon suspicion,
imagination, speculation, surmise, conjecture or guesswork.
[Citation.] Thus, an inference cannot stand if it is unreasonable
when viewed in light of the whole record.”’” (Joaquin v. City of
Los Angeles (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1219 (Joaquin).)

B.      The Jury’s Finding in Phase One is Unsupported by
        Substantial Evidence
        Applying the principles set forth above, we conclude
substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that
Guzman was employed by Avalon or Younan at the time of the
accident.
        In denying Avalon and Younan’s JNOV motion, the trial
court recognized the “evidence points to an employment
relationship with [Philma]” but the “connection to [Avalon and
Younan] is less clear.” It nevertheless held substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding, reasoning: “The evidence reflects
that there was overlap, at times, of who communicated with
[Guzman] regarding when he was going to work (such as
[Philma] calling him to tell him he would be driving ‘for
[Younan]’) and the evidence does not conclusively establish how
closely [defendants] and [Philma] worked with one another.” The
trial court, therefore, declined to “interfere with the phase one
jury’s findings regarding the employment relationship with
[defendants] and [Guzman].” We agree with the trial court that
“it was a confusing trial” based on several factors, including that
the evidence on the issue of who employed Guzman was sparse
(i.e., no employment records, pay stubs, accounting records, etc.).

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As discussed more fully below, however, the record contains no
evidence that Guzman was employed by Avalon or Younan on the
date of the accident; rather, the evidence merely demonstrates
that Guzman may have driven a truck for Avalon and Younan at
some point in 2013, before the accident occurred.
       During trial, Guzman repeatedly and unambiguously
testified he worked exclusively for Philma at the time of the
accident. For example, in response to defendants’ counsel’s
question, “But you stopped – at least your testimony is you
stopped working for [Younan] in 2013 and worked exclusively
with Philma, is that not correct?” Guzman replied that was
correct. Guzman testified that, before the accident, in 2013, he
worked for Younan doing the “same thing I did with Philma. I
drove a truck and . . . I was [the] cashier.” Guzman worked for
Younan for approximately three to five months in 2013. Then, he
stopped working for Younan, worked “odd jobs” in a warehouse,
and later came back to drive a food truck for Philma at the end of
2013. Defendants’ counsel clarified: “And you continued to work
with [Philma] from the end of 2013 through the time of your
injury, correct?” Guzman responded: “Exactly.”
       When Guzman worked for Philma at the end of 2013
through the time of his injury in 2014, Philma told Guzman what
to do and where to go. If the truck broke down, or Guzman was
sick and he could not work, he called Philma. Neither Avalon nor
Younan paid Guzman when he worked for Philma, and he never
reported to anyone at Avalon while working for Philma. Guzman
further testified that he did not wear a uniform when he worked
for Philma, but when he worked for Younan he was required to
wear a shirt Younan provided him.

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      Guzman relies on the following testimony in support of his
position that, despite his testimony to the contrary, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding he worked for Avalon and
Younan at the time of the accident: (1) In response to plaintiff’s
counsel’s question “In 2014, or 2013 who did you work for?”
Guzman responded, “It was [Philma] and [Younan].”; (2) In
response to defendants’ counsel’s question “Who were you
employed by at the time of your injury?” Guzman responded
“[Philma] and I think [Younan], too.”; (3) Guzman gave all the
cash to the Avalon cashier at the end of his shifts; (4) Guzman
was supervised by one of Younan’s employees when he drove for
Younan; (5) At “one time” Guzman damaged a door at Avalon,
and Avalon took money out of Guzman’s paycheck to pay for the
damage; (6) Younan provided Guzman with a uniform to wear
when he drove a truck for Avalon; (7) Avalon paid Guzman cash
when he worked as a food truck driver for Younan; and (8) in
2013, Guzman thought he was going to drive a food truck for
Philma, but later “found out” he was going to work for Younan.
      When we view this testimony in light of the whole record,
as we must, we cannot conclude it supports an inference that
Guzman worked for Philma and Younan when the accident
occurred. It is not substantial evidence that Younan employed
Guzman at that time. At most, it indicates Guzman thinks he
worked for both Philma and Younan at the critical time. But with
respect to Guzman, what he thinks is irrelevant absent evidence
that his belief is well founded. Although Guzman’s testimony as a
whole supports an inference that Avalon and/or Younan may
have employed Guzman at some point in 2013, no evidence
demonstrates Guzman worked for them in 2014. In other words,
Guzman’s testimony that he worked for Younan in “2013 or 2014”

                                9
and that he “thinks” he was employed by “[Younan], too” at the
time of the injury is not of sufficiently “solid value” to constitute
substantial evidence that Younan employed him at the time of
the accident. This is especially so in light of Guzman’s clear
testimony that he stopped working for Younan in 2013, “and . . .
went back to drive Philma’s truck” until the accident occurred.
(See Kuhn, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1633.) Indeed, on cross-
examination, defendants’ counsel clarified Guzman’s testimony
that he worked for Philma and Younan in “2013 or 2014” as
follows: “Q[:] “Okay. When you heard counsel ask you who you
worked for in 2013, 2014, do you remember that question? A[:]
Yeah. Q[:] Who did you work for in 2014? A[:] Philma Alvarez.
Q[:] Correct. You worked on Philma’s truck correct? A[:] Yeah.”
       In short, the issue is not whether Guzman ever worked for
Avalon or Younan – on that point there is testimony from which a
jury could find an employment relationship in 2013 between
Guzman and Avalon and/or Younan. The answer to the only
relevant issue here, i.e., whether substantial evidence supports
the conclusion that Guzman was employed by Avalon and/or
Younan at the time of the accident, is “no” based on Guzman’s
own, unequivocal testimony that he stopped working for them in
2013, went to work at a warehouse, and then came back later in
2013 to drive a food truck for Philma until the date of the
accident. Based on Guzman’s testimony, the only time Avalon
and Younan exerted control over him (i.e., provided a uniform,
paid him, etc.) was when he worked for them; when he worked for
Philma at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014, only Philma
(and/or the cook on Philma’s truck) told him where to go, what to
do, and paid him. On this record, it was unreasonable for the jury
to infer that Guzman worked for Avalon or Younan at the time of

                                 10
the accident. (See Joaquin, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1219
[“‘[T]he trier of the facts may not indulge in the inference when
that inference is rebutted by clear, positive and uncontradicted
evidence of such a nature that it is not subject to doubt in the
minds of reasonable [people]. The trier of the facts may not
believe impossibilities.’”].)
       Moreover, we reject Guzman’s argument that Philma,
Avalon, and Younan were his joint employers because Philma
purportedly worked for Younan. Guzman testified “I think
[Philma] worked for [Younan].” He provides no foundation for his
statement, however. Nor does he cite any other supporting
testimony in the record. Guzman’s speculation or surmise does
not constitute substantial evidence. (See Joaquin, supra, 202
Cal.App.4th at p. 1219 [“‘“[T]he inference must be a reasonable
conclusion from the evidence and cannot be based upon suspicion,
imagination, speculation, surmise, conjecture or guesswork.”’”].)
It does not matter that Guzman may “think” Philma worked for
Younan in 2014 if there is no substantial evidence that she did.
       Accordingly, we conclude the trial court erred by denying
Avalon and Younan’s JNOV motion. Because the trial court is
directed to enter judgment in favor of Avalon and Younan based
on Guzman’s failure to meet his burden to prove the threshold
issue (i.e., that Avalon or Younan employed him at the time of
the accident), Guzman’s appeal from the trial court’s order
granting a new trial based on allocation of damages is moot.

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                        DISPOSITION

      The order denying the JNOV is reversed. The trial court is
directed to enter a new judgment in favor of Avalon and Younan.
Guzman’s appeal from the trial court’s order granting a new trial
is dismissed as moot. Avalon and Younan are awarded their costs
on appeal.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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