Court Opinion

ID: 9777778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:10.378253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.619595
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. First, I would vacate the trial court’s ruling for want of jurisdiction for the reasons stated in Justice McCraw’s opinion. If I were to reach the majority, I would reverse and grant the right of access to appellant as outlined herein.
*943The majority bases its First Amendment analysis on a case decided before the First Amendment right of access was fully explicated. It misinterprets the emerging jurisprudence of access and refuses to employ the United States Supreme Court’s methodology in determining the scope of access rights. From such faulty premises, a sound conclusion could not have been expected.
The majority finds that Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) provides the closest factual analog. Warner’s factual similarity is far outweighed by the differences in legal issues presented. Warner involves a request for access to the Watergate tapes and begins by distinguishing between access rights and the rights of publication. Previous cases had confirmed the press’s right to publish that information which had already come into its possession. Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). The Warner court commenced with the Cox premise stating:
[T]he issue presented in this case is not whether the press must be permitted access to public information to which the public is guaranteed access, but whether these copies of the White House tapes— to which the public has never had physical access — must be made available for copying.
Warner, 435 U.S. at 609, 98 S.Ct. at 1317. The court went on to state the often-cited proposition that the press has no greater right to information than that of the general public. Id.
Read properly, Warner only affirms that the press has no special right to information unavailable to the public. If this reading is correct, the case before us is readily distinguishable. The Times Herald is not seeking special access, only the access to which any citizen is entitled. See In re Reporter’s Committee For Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C.Cir.1985) (In Warner “the point of a First Amendment right of public access was not raised and not explicitly decided.”). It is important to note that unlike Warner, the sealed information in the case at hand was once available for inspection and reporting. Here, the actual flow of information has been impeded.
To the extent Warner reaches the question of First Amendment access rights, its import is clear. The First Amendment protects expression and dissemination, not access. This holding was dramatically affected by three subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), the Supreme Court announced for the first time a right of access to criminal trials. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, examined the history of criminal trials in Anglo-American jurisprudence. He concluded that trials had traditionally been open to the public. He further stressed the functional role of publicity in educating the public and providing an outlet for the community’s “natural yearning to see justice done.” 448 U.S. at 571, 100 S.Ct. at 2824. The right to attend trials, he stated, was implicated in the enjoyment of freedom of speech and press. 448 U.S. at 577, 100 S.Ct. at 2827. The government may not summarily foreclose the traditional open channel of public information, “absent an overriding interest articulated in findings.” 448 U.S. at 581, 100 S.Ct. at 2829.
The landmark nature of Richmond Newspapers was instantly recognized. Justice Stevens remarked:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever. [emphasis added]
448 U.S. at 582, 100 S.Ct. at 2830. (Stevens, J., concurring). With Richmond Newspapers a new day dawned and it, not Warner, must govern the case at hand.
The second access decision was Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. *944596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). The case concerned a Massachusetts statute requiring closure of trials during the testimony of minor complainants in sex offense cases. The Court ruled that mandatory closure violates the First Amendment. 457 U.S. at 602, 102 S.2d at 2617. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, again stated the rationale for access — the tradition of openness and the salutary effects of publicity on the administration of justice. 457 U.S. at 605-06, 102 S.Ct. at 2619. Although the access right is not absolute, a state seeking to inhibit disclosure must show a compelling state interest and narrowly tailor its restrictions to meet that interest. 457 U.S. at 607,102 S.Ct. at 2620.
In its third decision, Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), the Supreme Court extended access protection to jury voir dire proceedings. Again, the Court reviewed both the history of jury selection and the function of publicity in the judicial system and concluded that blanket denial of access was unconstitutional. 104 S.Ct. at 824-25.
The majority alludes to these decisions but summarily distinguishes them as “criminal proceedings” (Maj.op. 936). The majority wholly fails to discuss or analyze the distinction that it perceives between civil and criminal cases. This dissent would hold that the similarities far outweigh the dissimilarities.
The overarching flaw in the majority’s analysis is that in determining whether or not access rights apply in this case, it has not employed the method used by the Supreme Court. It reaches the wrong result because it asks the wrong question. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in the three criminal cases outlines a clear methodology for determining the scope of access rights.
When resolving issues involving these rights, the Supreme Court has not examined whether there has been a tradition of access with respect to information of a particular character involved or whether that information is of significant public interest. Rather it has inquired whether there has historically been public access to this particular part of the judicial process and whether access to that portion of the process will significantly enhance public understanding and appreciation of the judicial process or improve the process itself.
United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1114 (3d Cir.1985) (emphasis added). See In re Reporter’s Committee, 773 F.2d at 1331. The proper inquiry then is an historical and a functional one. We must examine whether the factors that demand openness in the criminal trial context apply to civil cases as well.
There is little doubt that civil as well as criminal proceedings partake of a historical presumption of openness. Reviewing courts have consistently stated that civil and criminal trials have traditionally been open for public scrutiny. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. at 2829 n. 17; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n. 15, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2908, n. 15, 61 L.Ed.2d 608; Publicker Industries v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984).
It is also evident that public access to civil proceedings plays a significant role in the proper “functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole.” Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 2619. Justice Burger has written of a “community therapeutic value,” — a type of catharsis gained by seeing justice done. Press-Enterprise, 104 S.Ct. at 823; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570, 100 S.Ct. at 2823. Perhaps access to civil trials does not provide so striking a public therapy. Nevertheless, the glare of public scrutiny is of value to the process. Requiring judges to work in the public view makes them more directly responsible for their decisions. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179; See Wilson v. American Motors, 759 F.2d at 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985). Publicity discourages perjury and *945may impel new witnesses to come forward. Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179.
Under a form of government where the assent of the governed is given primacy, it is imperative not only that the courts be just but that they appear to be just. “People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.” Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572, 100 S.Ct. at 2824. Secrecy breeds distrust and disillusionment. Abuses exposed can be remedied. Abuses concealed can only fester.
These potent policy considerations apply with equal force to the administration of both civil and criminal justice. Today, the business of the civil courts touches and concerns the whole population. Environmental concerns, race relations, the conduct of the professions, product safety, and a host of noteworthy issues pass through the civil courts. The impact of their decisions is daily felt by the whole people. To deny public access to civil proceedings is to shut away from the people an institution that governs their lives.
The historical-functional analysis provides adequate justification for a right of access to documents as well as oral proceedings. As the majority correctly states, there is a well-established common law right to inspect judicial documents. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 597, 98 S.Ct. at 1311; In the Matter of Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.1984). See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 598 (1978). Although this right is subject to limitation, Warner, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. at 1312, there is a presumption of openness in court documents. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1293-94 (7th Cir.1982) (and cases cited therein). Clearly, the tradition of access extends to records.1 This writer further notes that this state has traditionally afforded access to judicial opinions. Alamo Motor Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 229 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1950, no writ).
Access to court documents also has a vital governmental function. “Official records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.” Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 492, 95 S.Ct. at 1044. The work of our civil courts is in large measure documentary. Pleadings and motions provide the schematic for decision making. They frame the issues to be decided. Opinions are the tangible fruits of the adjudicatory process. They explain the reasoning and precedent underlying the exercise of judicial power. Judgments are the final product, the statement of the court’s command. Obviously, some proceedings, such as summary judgments, are conducted solely in documentary form. If an open judiciary is mandated, judicial records must themselves be open. Access to the records serves a vital public function in illuminating the judicial process and deterring its misuse. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C.Cir.1976), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978).
Obviously, the functional role of access to court records is somewhat diminished where, as in the present case, the litigation comes to an end without trial. Yet the writer perceives a public interest in knowing how the judicial system is used by its litigants, what types of plaintiffs opt out of the system, and what types of defendants buy their peace. The civil justice system itself has become controversial. An understanding of its functions must take into account abridged as well as completed litigation. Considering the tradition of access to court records and the vital role they play, First Amendment protection is mandated.
*946Thus the case for extending First Amendment protection to access to civil court documents is compelling. Even the majority appears to concede this grudgingly. But the majority would permit the trial court to abrogate this right on the flimsiest of grounds. Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the majority’s opinion is its failure to furnish proper guidance to trial courts in making access determinations. The majority opinion leaves the closure of records to the judicial whim; discretion is to be governed by the length of the chancellor’s foot.
Where First Amendment rights are at stake, a different standard is mandatory: “The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” Press-Enterprise, 104 S.Ct. at 824. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. at 2619-20; Smith, 776 F.2d at 1109; Publicker Industries, 733 F.2d at 1070; Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571. No lesser standard of protection exists; there are no second-class First Amendment rights. It is necessary, therefore, to apply this mandated standard in evaluating the trial court’s order to seal the record.
The majority opinion does attempt to raise what it views as compelling state interests to justify the closure order. Before examining them individually, this author would observe that some of the cited interests, settlement of litigation for example, were not employed by the trial court. Furthermore, the interests given are not discussed in terms of the case presently before us. Indeed, the majority’s language regarding the settlement interest is so broad it licenses the closure of records in every case that is settled without a complete trial on the merits. We note that the case at hand was “tried” in summary judgment proceedings, but the majority refuses to distinguish on these grounds. Finally, the majority has completely reversed the burden of persuasion by stating that “absent a showing of some extraordinary circumstances or compelling need, neither of which appear here, the limited right of access to judicial records ... does not mandate the opening of the records in this case.” Although the access cases are inconsistent, they speak with one voice in declaring that openness is the norm and is to be presumed. Those that insist on secrecy are burdened to show “extraordinary circumstances” or “compelling need.”
As this writer reads the majority, the primary factor set forth in opposition to access is the parties’ agreement to seal the records. This should be given little weight. The public has an independent interest in the record that the parties may not foreclose by mere agreement. Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571. If the matter were left entirely to the litigants and disclosure forbidden unless at least one party consented to public access, the vast majority of civil records would be screened from the public view. A drastic diminution of the stock of information available to those who pay for the creation and operation of the courts would inevitably result.
It is urged that encouraging settlement provides a compelling state interest. This is not so.
There is no question that courts should encourage settlements. However, the payment of money to an injured party is simply not “a compelling governmental interest” legally recognizable or even entitled to consideration in deciding whether or not to seal a record. We feel certain that many parties to lawsuits would be willing to bargain (with the adverse party and the court) for the sealing of records after listening to or observing damaging testimony and evidence. Such suspension of public records cannot be authorized.
Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1571-72 n. 4. See also Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1180. The majority’s analysis is curiously contradictory. On one hand, we are told that closure is needed to remove litigants from trial via settlement. On the other hand, we are informed that secrecy is needed to encourage timorous litigants to seek the *947courts. In the hands of the majority, a sealing order is a marvelously versatile tool.
Of course, both concerns are chimeras. The notion that publicity-shy persons will refuse to settle merely because the papers cannot be sealed fails of its own weight; the timorous will hardly elect the only available alternative to settlement — proceeding to trial. As for the hypothetical litigant who is too frightened to ever bring his suit to court for fear of publicity’s glare, the prospect that, if a settlement can be effected, the court might be persuaded to seal the record, could hardly be an inducement. The civil courts have never guaranteed secret justice to litigants; we turn back the clock in holding out any such hope.
However, even if one or both of these hypotheses were likely, the settlement interest remains an inadequate justification. Every right extended extracts a toll in judicial efficiency. Were we to enthrone expediency as a compelling interest, the underlying principle of judicial openness would inevitably be eroded. Historically, we have decided that the salutary effects of openness outweigh its price in efficiency. We should so hold today.
An interest worthy of much greater weight is the privacy interest of the litigants. Courts have consistently weighed privacy against access rights. Warner, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. at 1312; Smith, 776 F.2d at 1113; In re Knoxville News Sentinel, 723 F.2d 470, 477 (6th Cir.1983). The intrusion must be a serious one, exceeding mere embarrassment. Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1263. In this case, the legitimate privacy interests, though entitled to some weight do not overcome the public right of access. We have before us two civil litigants. The law has not traditionally recognized the right of privacy as to facts disclosed by court proceedings. 420 U.S. at 493, 95 S.Ct. at 1045. The Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting held that the press may not be held liable for truthfully reporting the contents of public records. 420 U.S. at 497, 98 S.Ct. at 1047.
Cases where privacy has been held to outweigh access are generally quite different from the case before us. Typical is Knoxville News Sentinel, 723 F.2d at 470. The court denied access to certain bank records that had been used as exhibits. The court upheld the privacy claims of the depositers, “who were not responsible for the initiation of the underlying litigation.” 723 F.2d at 477. The court emphasized that the confidentiality of bank records is protected by law and that the privacy of third parties was involved. On the other hand, the parties before us seek to avoid disclosure of facts not traditionally protected by law. No third parties are implicated.
Even if the purported interests were viewed as compelling, the trial court’s order is in no way “narrowly tailored.” It has sealed the entire record, without stopping to distinguish those parts of the record that are innocent from those that might be argued as intrusive upon legitimate interests. Our law disapproves of such blanket approaches. In Globe Newspapers, 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute requiring mandatory closure of trials during the testimony of minor complainants in sex offense cases. Although the privacy interests underlying the statute are more substantial than those of the parties, the Court required a case-by-case determination. Likewise, in Press Enterprise, 104 S.Ct. at 819, the Court held that a trial court could not close voir dire proceedings despite the risk to privacy of jurors, innocent third parties who are actually compelled to appear and give testimony. Again, the interests of each juror must be separately balanced. 104 S.Ct. at 825. Serious consideration of the public’s access rights demands that a compelling interest be shown with respect to each part of the record that is sealed. Such was not done in the case before us.
In summary, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny for the first time established a First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings. The historical and functional approach applied in Richmond and its com*948panions must be applied in civil actions because there is no “criminal cases only” proviso in the First Amendment. Appel-lees have failed to bring forth a compelling state interest to overcome the right of access. Further, the order of the court below is not narrowly tailored to promote any interest that may exist. The records should be unsealed.

. The precise contours of the traditional right are difficult determine. See Reporter’s Committee, 773 F.2d at 1332-1336 (No right of access to documents before judgment)-, Id. at 1348-1351 (Wright, J., dissenting) (Right of access arises at time of trial.)