Court Opinion

ID: 9396450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 17:01:53.601156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:17.059250
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14099
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JASON M. MORIARTY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:04-cr-00005-CEM-GJK-1
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14099

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Jason Moriarty appeals his 72-month total sentence, consist-
        ing of three consecutive statutory-maximum 24-month sentences,
        upon the revocation of his supervised release as to three original
        counts of conviction. On appeal, he argues that the District Court
        imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence by relying on an al-
        legedly clearly erroneous fact when imposing his sentence, namely,
        that he was actively in sex-offender treatment at the time he vio-
        lated his supervised release. He also argues that his sentence was
        substantively unreasonable because the District Court exceeded
        the guideline range and stacked three consecutive, statutory-maxi-
        mum terms of imprisonment. Finding Moriarty’s sentence to be
        both procedurally and substantively reasonable, we affirm.
                                          I.
               In 2004, a federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida
        indicted Jason Moriarty on one count of attempting to receive, and
        receiving and possessing with intent to sell, material containing im-
        ages of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)(B), and (b)(1); one count of attempting to
        possess and possessing material containing images of child pornog-
        raphy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); and one count of
        receiving and possessing with intent to distribute an obscene visual
        depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, in vio-
        lation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A(a)(1) and (2).
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        21-14099              Opinion of the Court                        3

               Moriarty pleaded guilty to all three counts. The District
        Court sentenced him to 240 months’ imprisonment, followed by a
        lifetime term of supervised release, which included the standard
        conditions of supervision. Moriarty appealed his sentence, arguing
        that the District Court erred by imposing a general sentence of 20
        years when the statutory maximum for Count Two was ten years.
        We agreed, and we vacated Moriarty’s initial sentence and re-
        manded the case for resentencing. United States v. Moriarty, 429
        F.3d 1012, 1025 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). On resentencing, the
        District Court imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment as
        to Count One, and 120 months each for Counts Two and Three,
        to run concurrently to Count One. This term of imprisonment was
        followed by a lifetime term of supervised release as to Count One,
        a five-year term of supervised release for Count Two, and a three-
        year term of supervised release for Count Three. The standard
        conditions of supervision applied.
               Moriarty was released, and his period of supervision com-
        menced, on July 1, 2021. On July 6, Moriarty agreed to modify the
        terms of his supervised release. The new terms (1) required that
        Moriarty participate in a mental health program specializing in sex-
        ual-offender treatment; (2) required Moriarty to submit to poly-
        graph testing for treatment and monitoring purposes; and (3) pro-
        hibited Moriarty from “possessing, subscribing to, or viewing, any
        video, magazines, or literature depicting children in the nude
        and/or in sexually explicit positions”; and (4) prohibited Moriarty
        from either “possessing or using a computer (including a smart
        phone, a hand-held computer device, a gaming console, or an
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14099

        electronic device) capable of connecting to an online service or an
        internet service provider,” without prior written approval of his
        probation officer. The last requirement included accessing a com-
        puter “at a public library, an internet cafe, [Moriarty’s] place of em-
        ployment, or an educational facility.”
               On August 19, Probation Officer Matthew Zorn filed a
        memorandum with the District Court, alleging that Moriarty vio-
        lated the terms of his supervised release. On August 14, Deputy
        Diaz of the Orange County Sheriff’s Office contacted Zorn and
        stated that she made contact with Moriarty at a public library in
        Orlando, Florida. On August 13, a staff member at the library no-
        ticed Moriarty viewing sexually explicit images of minors on a pub-
        lic computer. The staff member recognized Moriarty when he re-
        turned on August 14 and promptly contacted the authorities. Mo-
        riarty told Deputy Diaz that he was looking into adults wearing
        baby clothes and wearing diapers and was taking photos of those
        images with his cell phone to masturbate at home. Moriarty con-
        tacted Zorn on August 14 as well and informed Zorn that he had
        been in contact with law enforcement at the library; he admitted
        to using a computer to look up photos of adults wearing diapers.
        He further admitted that some photos of children appeared as well,
        but his intention was to look up photos of adults. Finally, Moriarty
        admitted to Zorn that he knew he was not permitted to access the
        internet through the library computers.
              On August 16, Zorn spoke with the library employee. She
        confirmed that she had seen Moriarty’s screen on August 13, and
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        21-14099               Opinion of the Court                         5

        she believed she saw a video depicting a minor female touching
        herself in a sexual way. She observed images of bondage and minor
        children who were duct taped. She also said that Moriarty was tak-
        ing photos of the computer screen with his phone. After speaking
        with the library employee, Officer Zorn and Probation Officer Cur-
        ran met Moriarty. He admitted to using the internet on the library
        computer on August 13 and stated that he entered search terms
        such as “diaper punishment,” “diaper bondage,” and “diaper kid-
        napping,” and that he took photos using his cell phone, though he
        deleted the photos. Moriarty also admitted to accessing the inter-
        net from the public library again on August 14 to create an email
        address. Officers Zorn and Curran confiscated Moriarty’s phone
        for further review. Officer Zorn’s memo informed the Court that
        it may revoke Moriarty’s supervised release and impose a term of
        imprisonment up to two years for each count of conviction, and
        that these statutory maximums could be imposed concurrently or
        consecutively under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3584(a). Officer Zorn
        petitioned the Court to issue a warrant for Moriarty because he vi-
        olated the terms of his supervised release. The Court issued the
        warrant as requested.
               The probation officer filed a recommendation with the Dis-
        trict Court. After recounting the details of the violation, the report
        noted that a preliminary review of Moriarty’s phone revealed over
        400 images of possible child erotica—with many of the images in-
        volving minors in bondage or kidnapping scenarios. The recom-
        mendation also stated that the conduct in Moriarty’s presentence
        investigation report for his original arrest reflected that he kept
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-14099

        handwritten narratives outlining sexual assaults of and bondage ac-
        tivities involving minors. Moriarty’s landlord also notified the pro-
        bation office that, while cleaning out Moriarty’s room for another
        resident to move in, she found books titled Design Ideas for Baby
        Rooms and Backyards for Kids. Another resident notified the proba-
        tion office that when the new renter moved into Moriarty’s room,
        he found a pair of boy’s underwear within the bedding on the bed.
        The probation office recommended two years’ imprisonment fol-
        lowed by a lifetime term of supervised release with all the same
        special conditions.
                At Moriarty’s revocation hearing, the District Court found
        that Moriarty had violated one condition of his supervised release
        and adjudicated him guilty of one grade C violation. The Court
        further found that the guideline range was four to ten months, with
        a statutory maximum of two years’ imprisonment, and a maxi-
        mum of a lifetime term of supervised release. The government
        clarified that the maximum sentence was two years per count, and
        that Moriarty was originally sentenced on three counts. The gov-
        ernment offered 12 photographs into evidence. These photo-
        graphs included images of children tied up, children in bondage re-
        straints, children tied to a bed, children wearing diapers, and vari-
        ous other images of children.
              Moriarty spoke on his own behalf. He said:
              I’m sorry. I got curious about the Internet. I haven’t
              seen a computer in 18 years. . . . I got scared and I
              went back to my old way of thinking. I had treatment
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        21-14099               Opinion of the Court                        7

              in prison, but I lost that support when I got released,
              and I was lost.
        Revocation Hr’g Tr., Doc. 148, at 9. He claimed that he was sorry
        about the images, and that he had second thoughts almost imme-
        diately and deleted them and he noted that he was about to start
        with a treatment group, but got arrested before he could start.
               Moriarty’s attorney objected to a sentence of six years,
        which he anticipated the government was going to ask for. Accord-
        ing to the attorney, the original sentence was imposed concur-
        rently, the terms of supervised release were imposed concurrently,
        and the violation was a single violation. He asked the Court to
        consider something far less than even the guideline range, and let
        Moriarty try again with treatment, guidance, and supervision. And
        if Moriarty stumbles a second time, then impose a sentence like the
        government was requesting.
               The government requested that Moriarty be sentenced to 24
        months per count, to be run consecutively, followed by a lifetime
        of supervised release. The government noted that the type of sen-
        tence they were recommending for Moriarty was not something
        that should be done in every case.
               The government reiterated that just over one month after
        Moriarty was released, he was caught taking photos of individuals
        wearing baby clothes and diapers, and that he admitted that he
        took those photos to masturbate at home. The government be-
        lieved Moriarty to be a danger to society for several reasons. First,
        because after being incarcerated for almost 20 years and after
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                21-14099

        receiving sex-offender treatment in prison, Moriarty violated his
        supervision after just one month. The government stated that the
        12 photos it had entered into evidence were representative of the
        approximately 500 images of child erotica found on Moriarty’s
        phone—images that were created between July 10, 2021 and Au-
        gust 13, 2021. Particularly alarming to the government was that
        one of the photos on the phone was of a live child—not a photo of
        a child from the internet—standing in the checkout line of a store.
               The government also described the relevant facts of Mori-
        arty’s underlying case—facts which, according to the government,
        made Moriarty’s actions here even more concerning. In that case,
        a search of Moriarty’s bedroom uncovered a book titled Hollywood
        Kids, and inside the book were 50 to 100 printed and photographic
        images of children, including some of a sadistic nature and some of
        children in diapers. At Moriarty’s original sentencing hearing, his
        neighbors testified that their six-year-old son woke up crying and
        not wearing the diaper they had put him in before bed. The
        mother believed Moriarty had come into their house and taken the
        diaper—the child’s window had been left open and photos of the
        child had been found in Moriarty’s home. The government was
        concerned that (1) Moriarty’s past conduct, (2) his own statements
        that he went back to his old ways of thinking, (3) the fact that he
        went to the library on two consecutive days just one month after
        being released, and (4) the number of images he possessed that
        were created between July 10 and August 13 all showed that he was
        not able to follow the conditions of his release.
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        21-14099              Opinion of the Court                      9

                The government asserted that it was recommending a sen-
        tence of two years on each count, to be served consecutively. Mo-
        riarty’s attorney again requested that the Court “[g]ive him the
        high end of the guideline sentence, get him back on supervision,
        get him into treatment, and if he does it again, Your Honor, then
        lower that kind of boom.” Id. at 19.
              The Court then began to impose its sentence. The Court
        was concerned that Moriarty violated his supervised release so
        quickly. Addressing Moriarty, the Court said:
              [T]he only rational explanation for why someone in
              your situation on the heels of a 17-year prison sen-
              tence would be willing to risk [returning to prison]—
              I mean, you indicated that you were grateful to your
              probation officer because he helped you find a place
              to stay and got you back on your feet. You were get-
              ting treatment. So why would you do what you did?
              You did it because you can’t control it.
        Id. at 20. The Court believed Moriarty was dangerous because,
        looking at the evidence, it looked like Moriarty was “either plan-
        ning on kidnapping a child or [was] aroused at the thought of a
        child being kidnapped.” Id. at 21. While the Court believed that
        Moriarty should get some benefit for accepting responsibility, it
        also noted that this was not a particularly difficult violation to
        prove.
              The Court again mentioned that Moriarty could not control
        his urges, and that he admitted to his probation officer that he
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-14099

        collected this material for sexual stimulation, which was alarming.
        While the Court believed that the type of sentence the government
        requested should be used sparingly and only for the most danger-
        ous people, it said that Moriarty was that type of person. According
        to the Court:
                [T]his is almost an episode of Law and Order . . . .
                That’s how bad this is. Everything is in line here.
                The photos of the kids bound and gagged, his admis-
                sion that this turns him on. Less than 60 days after
                getting released from a 17-year prison sentence he’s
                in a public library downloading this stuff and taking
                photos of it with his phone. Every single thing is
                here. If this were a movie script, someone would say
                “This doesn’t happen in real life,” but it did.
        Id. at 22.
               While the Court believed Moriarty should get some kind of
        benefit for accepting responsibility, the judge said “I couldn’t live
        with myself if the next time you’re in here there are parents on the
        front row of that pew talking about what happened to their child
        because someone made the wrong decision.” Id. at 23. According
        to the Court, Moriarty had made clear what his obsessions were
        and he was not going to stop. The Court noted that Moriarty’s
        probation officer should be commended for going above and be-
        yond to try to help him, and that he was “getting the treatment [he]
        needed to get.” Id. at 23.
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        21-14099                Opinion of the Court                          11

               Ultimately the Court determined that Moriarty was “a dan-
        gerous person engaged in dangerous activity,” as he had “this treas-
        ure trove of photos of children bound and gagged as if you’re either
        going to plan to kidnap one or you are just sexually aroused by the
        thought of a child being kidnapped, which could turn into some-
        thing much worse.” Id. at 23–24. The Court revoked Moriarty’s
        supervised release and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment
        for each count, to run consecutively to one another, followed by a
        lifetime term of supervised release. In reaching this sentence, the
        Court considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the
        advisory guidelines and policy statements issued by the United
        States Sentencing Commission. When asked if either side had ob-
        jections, Moriarty’s attorney said “Yes, Your Honor. I object to
        procedural and substantive reasonableness,” in addition to the ob-
        jections he had previously stated.
                                           II.
               We review the reasonableness of a sentence, including the
        imposition of supervised release, under a deferential abuse-of-dis-
        cretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586,
        597 (2007); see United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir.
        2003) (stating that supervised-release sentences are reviewed for
        abuse of discretion). “With respect to Sentencing Guidelines is-
        sues, this Court reviews purely legal questions de novo, a district
        court’s factual ﬁndings for clear error, and, in most cases, a district
        court’s application of the guidelines to the facts with due defer-
        ence.” United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (internal quotation marks omitted).
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                     21-14099

                When reviewing for reasonableness, we must ﬁrst ensure
        that the district court committed no signiﬁcant procedural error,
        such as failing to calculate the guideline range, treating the Guide-
        lines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
        tors, selecting the sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail-
        ing to adequately explain the chosen sentence, including any devi-
        ation from the guideline range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at
        597. A factual ﬁnding is clearly erroneous “when although there is
        evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
        is left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that a mistake has been
        committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105
        S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985). Even if the district court erred, “we are
        not required to vacate the sentence and remand the case if the
        court would have likely sentenced [the defendant] in the same way
        without the error.” United States v. Scott, 441 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th
        Cir. 2006).
                Here, the District Court did not impose a procedurally un-
        reasonable sentence by allegedly relying on a clearly erroneous fact
        because, in the full context of the sentencing hearing, the District
        Court was not under the misapprehension that Moriarty was ac-
        tively in sex-oﬀender treatment when he violated his terms of su-
        pervised release. 1 The Court made two statements during the

        1 The government argues that plain error, and not abuse of discretion, is the
        appropriate standard of review because Moriarty’s objection to “procedural
        and substantive reasonableness” at the sentencing hearing was not suﬃcient
        to preserve that objection for appeal. Because Moriarty’s sentence is
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        21-14099                  Opinion of the Court                              13

        sentencing hearing that referenced Moriarty’s treatment. While
        one way to interpret the Court’s comments is that it believed Mo-
        riarty was actively receiving sex-oﬀender treatment at the time he
        violated the terms of his supervised release, another way of inter-
        preting those statements is that the Court knew Moriarty was
        about to start sex-oﬀender treatment.
               The record shows Moriarty agreed to modify the terms of
        his supervised release to include sex-oﬀender treatment only a
        month before he violated his supervision. At the sentencing hear-
        ing Moriarty, his attorney, and the government all made statements
        to the eﬀect that Moriarty lost his treatment when he left prison
        and was about to start treatment again. Moriarty explicitly said “I
        was about to start with the ITM treatment group, but got arrested
        before I could start.” In light of the entire record, the District
        Court’s comments are best read as a statement that Moriarty’s pro-
        bation oﬃcer had gotten him into treatment and Moriarty was
        about to receive it. We are not left with a deﬁnite conviction that
        an error has been committed.
               But even if the Court was under the mistaken impression
        that Moriarty was receiving treatment at the time of his arrest, the
        Court would likely have sentenced Moriarty in the same way with-
        out the error. See id. Based on the Court’s comments, it was ap-
        palled by the more than 400 photos on Moriarty’s phone, the

        procedurally reasonable even under the less rigorous abuse of discretion stand-
        ard, we do not reach this argument.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14099

        content of those photos, and the quickness with which he violated
        the terms of his supervision. The Court’s concern that Moriarty
        was a danger to society drove its decision.
                The District Court did not abuse its discretion and Mori-
        arty’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
                                           III.
                Because the District Court imposed a procedurally reasona-
        ble sentence, we next examine substantive reasonableness. Mori-
        arty essentially makes two arguments regarding substantive rea-
        sonableness. At bottom, his ﬁrst argument is that his sentence is
        substantively unreasonable because it is longer than necessary to
        achieve the purposes of sentencing. His second argument is that,
        regardless of whether the Court’s variance was warranted, his sen-
        tence was substantively unreasonable because the Court lacked au-
        thority to impose consecutive sentences.
                                            A.
                We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un-
        der a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, considering the to-
        tality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
        Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will only vacate the de-
        fendant’s sentence if we are “left with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm convic-
        tion that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
        weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
        outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
        the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (en banc). The Supreme Court has stated that a defendant is not
        required to raise a speciﬁc objection that the sentence is
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        21-14099                Opinion of the Court                         15

        unreasonable, which is the standard of review for appeal, but need
        only bring to the district court’s attention his view that a longer
        sentence is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sen-
        tencing to preserve a claim that the longer sentence is unreasona-
        ble. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020).
               We look to whether a sentence is substantively reasonable
        considering the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. A court imposes a substantively unrea-
        sonable sentence only when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors
        that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant
        factor signiﬁcant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment
        by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v.
        Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omit-
        ted). Further, a district court must evaluate all the § 3553(a) factors,
        but the weight accorded to each factor is within the sound discre-
        tion of the district court. United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d
        1267, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2014). An appeals court may not apply a
        heightened standard of review to sentences outside the guideline
        range. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 536–37, 133 S. Ct. 2072,
        2080 (2013).
               The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentence imposed
        upon revocation of supervised release should sanction primarily
        the defendant’s “breach of trust” for failing to abide by the condi-
        tions of the court ordered supervision, while also accounting for,
        “to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation
        and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, in-
        tro. cmt. (3(b)). The Guidelines explain that the Sentencing
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   21-14099

        Commission chose not to sanction violators for the conduct of the
        revocation as if that conduct was being sentenced as new federal
        criminal conduct because “the court with jurisdiction over the
        criminal conduct leading to revocation is the more appropriate
        body to impose punishment for that new criminal conduct,” and
        “as a breach of trust inherent in the conditions of supervision, the
        sanction for the violation of trust should be in addition, or consec-
        utive, to any sentence imposed for the new conduct.” Id. We have
        “consistently held that the policy statements of Chapter 7 are
        merely advisory and not binding.” United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d
        795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006).
                A district court may revoke a term of supervised release and
        require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of
        supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The relevant § 3553(a)
        factors that a district court must consider in determining whether
        to impose an imprisonment term upon revocation of supervised
        release include: the nature and circumstances of the oﬀense; the
        history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sen-
        tence to aﬀord adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and pro-
        tect the public from further crimes of the defendant; the kinds of
        sentences available; any pertinent policy statements; and the need
        to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.                         See
        18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7), 3583(e)(3).
                In determining whether to impose a variance, a district court
        may consider the nature of a prior oﬀense under the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors, because it “ﬁts squarely into . . . the history and characteristics
        of the oﬀender” under § 3553(a)(1). United States v. Williams, 526
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        21-14099              Opinion of the Court                       17

        F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court has broad dis-
        cretion to decide whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance.
        Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The sentencing court may
        impose an upward variance based on a defendant’s uncharged crim-
        inal conduct, the defendant’s history and characteristics, and the
        need to promote respect for the law, aﬀord adequate deterrence,
        and protect the public. United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627,
        637-38 (11th Cir. 2013).
               Here, the District Court’s sentence was not substantively un-
        reasonable. Moriarty’s argument that the Court failed to consider
        the Chapter 7 sentencing statement is without merit, because the
        Court explicitly stated that it did. With respect to sentencing dis-
        parities, the Court acknowledged that imposing three consecutive
        statutory maximum sentences was strong medicine that should be
        used sparingly. But given the quickness with which Moriarty vio-
        lated the terms of his supervision, the number of photos found on
        Moriarty’s phone, the content of those photos, and the similarity
        to Moriarty’s underlying convictions, the Court believed such a
        sentence was appropriate here. Further, the Court acknowledged
        Moriarty’s acceptance of responsibility and weighed it along with
        the other factors it considered. The Court discussed all those fac-
        tors in both explaining why it varied upward from the guideline
        range and why it ordered the statutory maximum sentences to be
        served consecutively. The Court considered all relevant factors and
        did not abuse its discretion in balancing them.
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                                           B.
                Moriarty also argues that the Court lacked the discretion to
        impose consecutive sentences. If multiple terms of imprisonment
        are imposed on a defendant at the same time, the terms may run
        concurrently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). “Multiple terms
        of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently un-
        less the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to
        run consecutively.” Id. A court must consider the § 3553(a) factors,
        as to each oﬀense for which a term of imprisonment is being im-
        posed, in determining whether to order a sentence to run concur-
        rently or consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b); United States v. Ballard,
        6 F.3d 1502, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993).
                In United States v. Quinones, a defendant was serving concur-
        rent terms of supervised release for two diﬀerent convictions in
        two separate district courts. 136 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 1998).
        He violated the conditions of his supervised release, and his two
        separate cases were consolidated for a single revocation hearing.
        Id. The district court revoked his terms of supervised release and
        sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment for each violation, to
        be served consecutively. Id. Quinones appealed, arguing that the
        district court lacked the discretion to sentence him to consecutive
        terms of imprisonment following the revocation of his concurrent
        terms of supervised release. Id. at 1295. We held that whether the
        terms of imprisonment for each violation were to be consecutive
        or concurrent was a question that § 3584(a) entrusts to the court’s
        discretion. Id. We then noted that the Sentencing Guidelines’s pol-
        icy statements that address revocation say nothing about
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        21-14099               Opinion of the Court                       19

        concurrence or consecutiveness, leaving intact the district court’s
        statutory discretion. Id.
                Moriarty argues that Quinones does not apply because his
        terms of supervised release were not imposed by two diﬀerent ju-
        risdictions in two separate cases—he has one case with supervised
        release imposed by the same court simultaneously for multiple
        counts of the same indictment. But our holding in Quinones was
        not limited to such a scenario. We said: “Quinones had two such
        terms [of supervised release], and the district court could therefore
        revoke both and sentence Quinones to a term of imprisonment for
        each violation. Whether these terms were to be consecutive or
        concurrent was a question that § 3584(a) entrusts to the court’s dis-
        cretion.” Id. Here, Moriarty had three terms of supervised release.
        The District Court had the discretion to revoke and sentence him
        on all three.
                Moriarty further argues that the Supreme Court under-
        mined Quinones in Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S. Ct.
        1795 (2000). But Johnson did not address the same type of situation.
        Johnson concerned a circuit split about whether § 3583(h) applied
        retroactively to cases in which the initial oﬀense conduct occurred
        before the date of its enactment. The Supreme Court determined
        that it did not apply retroactively, and that Johnson’s case did not
        present any ex post facto issue. Id. at 701–02, 120 S. Ct. at 1802.
        Thus, Johnson’s case turned on whether § 3583(e)(3) permitted the
        imposition of supervised release following a recommitment. Id.
        at 702–03, 120 S. Ct. at 1802. The Court went on to hold, as a
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14099

        textual matter, that § 3583(e)(3) left open the possibility of super-
        vised release after reincarceration, such that even before § 3583(h),
        courts could properly impose supervised release following reincar-
        ceration. Id. at 713, 120 S. Ct. at 1807. Nothing in the Court’s dis-
        cussion addressed § 3584 or whether a district court may impose
        new terms of imprisonment consecutively.
               Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior panel’s hold-
        ing is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is over-
        ruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme
        Court or by this [C]ourt sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531
        F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Johnson did not undermine Qui-
        nones to the point of abrogation. And even if it had, post-Johnson
        we have cited Quinones to hold that a district court acts within its
        discretion when imposing a consecutive sentence upon revocation
        of two terms of concurrent supervised release. United States v.
        Sweeting, 437 F.3d 1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006).
                                   *      *       *
               Here, the District Court did not impose a substantively un-
        reasonable sentence in sentencing Moriarty to three consecutive
        statutory-maximum terms of imprisonment because he violated a
        condition that applied to all three of his terms of supervised release,
        the Court had discretion to do so under law, and the Court appro-
        priately weighed the § 3553(a) factors.
               AFFIRMED.