Court Opinion

ID: 9946472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 19:10:20.488247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:29.036717
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cruz, 2024-Ohio-733.]

                                    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

                 Plaintiff- Appellant,          :
                                                            No. 112776
                          v.                    :

KEVIN CRUZ,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellee.            :

                                     JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 29, 2024

              Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                  Case No. CR-22-667525-A

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Craig J. Morice, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellant.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

        {¶ 1} The state of Ohio sought and was granted leave to appeal the trial

court’s denial of its motion to quash a subpoena and for protective order (“Motion
to Quash”) that allowed appellee Kevin Cruz to call an assistant prosecutor to testify

at a pretrial hearing. Because the trial court did not apply the correct standard of law

in denying the state’s motion and the record before this court does not support the

denial of the protective order sought by the state, we reverse the judgment of the

trial court and remand.

             RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶ 2} On February 8, 2022, Cruz was indicted for five felony offenses: one

count of attempted murder with a firearm specification, two counts of felonious

assault with firearm specifications, and two counts of improperly handling firearms

in a motor vehicle following a January 31, 2022 shooting in Cleveland, Ohio. On

August 15, 2022, Cruz entered a plea bargain to one count of felonious assault with

a one-year firearm specification. On August 19, 2022, Cruz filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, which was granted on August 30, 2022. Thereafter, Cruz

filed an affidavit of disqualification of the assigned judge, which was granted by the

Ohio Supreme Court. State v. Cruz (In re Disqualification of Saffold), 169 Ohio

St.3d 1235, 2022-Ohio-4429, 204 N.E.3d 577.

      {¶ 3} The criminal case was transferred to another judge, and trial was set

for March 8, 2023, which date was continued to April 24, 2023. On the date of trial,

the state served Cruz’s attorney with supplemental discovery. Cruz again entered

into a plea bargain with the state, but then on April 25, 2023, Cruz moved to

withdraw his plea; the state did not oppose the motion. The trial court granted the
motion to withdraw his plea on May 2, 2023. The case was then set for trial on May

19, 2023.

      {¶ 4} On May 9, 2023, Cruz’s counsel filed a motion to disqualify and appoint

a special prosecutor (“Motion to Disqualify”) in which he asserted, along with other

reasons, that the assistant prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to timely

disclose exculpatory evidence, the name of a witness, A.G., who had given police a

copy of his home surveillance system recording. On May 18, 2023, the state filed a

brief in opposition to the Motion to Disqualify. The trial court cancelled the May 22,

2023 trial date and set a hearing on the Motion to Disqualify instead.

      {¶ 5} On the morning of the hearing, Cruz’s counsel filed a motion to dismiss

arguing that the assistant prosecutor committed misconduct by suppressing the

identity of A.G. and the existence of the surveillance video until the April 24, 2023

trial date and that the state allowed A.G.’s original surveillance video to be

destroyed. He further argued that by suppressing the evidence, the state

intentionally violated his right to a speedy trial.

      {¶ 6} The trial court began a hearing on May 22, 2003, on Cruz’s motions.

Cruz’s counsel informed the court he had subpoenaed two witnesses, A.G. and a

Cleveland Police Department detective, to testify. He also requested the testimony

of the assistant prosecuting attorney assigned to Cruz’s case. The state filed a

Motion to Quash in which it set forth that there was no subpoena issued to the

assistant prosecutor and the legal standard to be used to determine whether a

prosecuting attorney may testify in a criminal matter — that the attorney’s testimony
is the only evidence available. The state noted that no subpoena had been served on

the assistant prosecutor and argued that it would be improper for the assistant

prosecutor assigned to the case to testify because this was not the extraordinary case

that required her testimony. The state asserted that there were other witnesses who

could testify to the issues raised by the Motion to Disqualify.

      {¶ 7} Having heard argument from the parties, the trial court recessed the

hearing for the morning and ordered the assistant prosecutor to return to the

courtroom in the afternoon when the hearing resumed. The trial court further told

Cruz’s counsel to have a subpoena served on the assistant prosecutor. After the

hearing resumed, the trial court heard further argument as to whether the assistant

prosecutor should testify. Cruz’s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that he never

served a subpoena on the assistant prosecutor despite the trial court’s order to do

so. The trial court ultimately determined that the assistant prosecutor “ought to be

subject to subpoena, oral, or otherwise. No prejudice is done, but — to the State, by

her awareness that there was high likelihood she would have to testify, and I am not

persuaded by the State that the subpoena ought to be quashed or the protection

order ought to be granted.”

      {¶ 8} The state informed the trial court of its intention to appeal the denial of

the Motion to Quash. The trial court recessed the hearing and allowed the state time
to appeal its ruling. The state sought leave to appeal the trial court’s denial of its

Motion to Quash, which leave was granted by this court.1

                             LAW AND ARGUMENT

                       The State’s Assignments of Error

      {¶ 9} The state filed two assignments of error, which read:

      1.     The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of
             law in denying the State of Ohio’s Motion to Quash Appellee
             Cruz’s subpoena directed to, thereby ordering the Prosecutor
             assigned to a felony case to testify in said case where the
             Defendant failed to demonstrate the requisite “extraordinary
             circumstance and compelling need” to compel the assigned
             prosecutor to so testify.

      2.     The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of
             law in ordering the assigned prosecutor prosecuting a criminal
             case to provide testimony in a pending criminal prosecution
             based solely upon a baseless assertion made by Defendant’s
             counsel absent an actual subpoena having been filed and served
             pursuant to Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.

Because the facts and law raised within these assignments of error overlap, we

address them concurrently.

                             Final Appealable Order

      {¶ 10} Generally, a trial court’s denial of a motion to quash and protective

order seeking privileged information is a final appealable order. Am. Environmental

Group, Ltd. v. H.M. Miller Constr. Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100854, 2014-Ohio-

4681, ¶ 12-15 (denial of motion to quash subpoena seeking privileged material is

1 Cruz’s trial counsel did not appear in these proceedings. This court appointed the
Cuyahoga County Public Defender to represent Cruz for the purposes of this appeal only.
final appealable order). The failure to serve a subpoena raises for this court an issue

of whether the denial of the Motion to Quash is a final appealable order.

      {¶ 11} Most often a party seeks to quash a subpoena or move the court for a

protective order only after being served with a subpoena. But in this case, Cruz’s

counsel never served a subpoena on the assistant prosecutor before the hearing date,

despite issuing subpoenas for witnesses he intended to call, nor did counsel serve a

subpoena after being ordered to do so by the trial court. Despite this failure to serve

a subpoena, the trial court nevertheless heard argument on the state’s Motion to

Quash.

      {¶ 12} In resolving the state’s motion, the trial court stated that the assistant

prosecutor “ought to be subject to subpoena, oral, or otherwise.” Our research of

Ohio law does not provide support for the existence of an “oral subpoena.” See, e.g.,

State ex rel. Ghoubrial v. Herbert, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-470, 2016-Ohio-

1085, ¶ 11 (Trial court could not verbally order nonparty to testify at deposition

without a subpoena being served.).

      {¶ 13} In this matter however, despite no subpoena being served, the trial

court ordered the assistant prosecutor to appear and give testimony. Although the

trial court put the cart before the horse procedurally by holding a hearing to quash

a subpoena that was never served, we find the record reflects that the trial court did

order the assistant prosecutor to attend a hearing and testify. As such, we find that

denial of the state’s Motion to Quash to be a final appealable order.

                  Standards of Review and Applicable Law
      {¶ 14} A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to quash or deny a protective

order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re J.F., 6th Dist. Huron

No. H-10-002, 2010-Ohio-4385, ¶ 9. A court abuses its discretion when it “exercises

its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which has discretionary

authority.” State v. McFarland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111390, 2022-Ohio-4638,

¶ 20, citing Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d

463, ¶ 35. “‘In other words, [a] court abuses its discretion when a legal rule entrusts

a decision to a judge's discretion and the judge’s exercise of that discretion is outside

of the legally permissible range of choices.’” Id. at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Hackett,

164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 19. Additionally, a court

abuses its discretion when it “‘applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the

correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.’” S. Euclid v.

Datillo, 2020-Ohio-4999, 160 N.E.3d 813, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Thomas v.

Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.);

State v Nix, II, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111803, 2023-Ohio-1143, ¶ 10.

      {¶ 15} Attorneys engaged in the prosecution of a case are prohibited from

acting as both a witness and advocate in the same proceeding. In re Carney, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110034, 2021-Ohio-1819, ¶ 27, citing Prof.Cond.R. 3.7(A).

However, where there exist exceptional circumstances and there are no other means

of presenting relevant and material evidence, a prosecuting attorney may offer

testimony in a criminal case in which she is engaged. As explained by the Ohio

Supreme Court:
      In State v. Coleman (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622,
      paragraph two of the syllabus, we held, “A prosecuting attorney
      should avoid being a witness in a criminal prosecution, but where it is
      a complex proceeding and substitution of counsel is impractical, and
      where the attorney so testifying is not engaged in the active trial of the
      cause and it is the only testimony available, such testimony is
      admissible and not in violation of DR 5-102.” See, also, United States
      v. Johnston (C.A.7, 1982), 690 F.2d 638, 644 (prosecutor’s testimony
      may be permitted in extraordinary circumstances and for compelling
      reasons, usually where the evidence is otherwise unavailable).
State v. Conway, 108 Ohio St.3d 214, 2006-Ohio-791, 842 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 106.

       The Trial Court Did Not Apply the Correct Standard of Law

      {¶ 16} A review of Cruz’s Motion to Disqualify, Motion to Dismiss, and the

transcript of the hearing reveals Cruz sought to disqualify the Cuyahoga County

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office and have his case dismissed because he alleged the

assistant prosecutor assigned to his case withheld exculpatory evidence, that the

police allowed for the destruction of exculpatory evidence, and that the assistant

prosecutor and police were in conflict because the gun Cruz used in the shooting was

previously owned by a city of Cleveland police officer. In arguing the necessity of the

assistant prosecutor’s testimony, Cruz’s counsel argued that the “gravamen” of his

motions was that the assistant prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence and he

did not “think there is anybody else that can testify but [the assistant prosecutor]

about what she did.” Based on these arguments, the trial court ordered the assistant

prosecutor to be present and provide testimony.

      {¶ 17} However, the trial court did not consider on the record, nor was

evidence presented, that the assistant prosecutor’s testimony was the only evidence
available. Coleman, supra. The record in this case reveals Cruz had available

testimony in support of his motions on the issue of the surveillance video from A.G.,

the owner of the surveillance system, who would presumably be able to testify as to

the dates, times, and manner in which the Cleveland Police Department obtained

his video and how it was transmitted to the police. Cruz further had the testimony

of the Cleveland Police detective to testify as to the receipt, storage, and delivery of

A.G.’s video to the prosecutor’s office.2 Further, the dates of the state’s discovery

responses and a description of the contents were filed on the docket. Moreover, the

specific content of the discovery responses was available to present to the trial court.

      {¶ 18} The trial court was aware of the legal standard in denying the state’s

motion seeking to prevent the testimony of the assistant prosecutor, but denied the

motion “in an abundance of caution.” However, the legal standard announced by the

Ohio Supreme Court in Coleman and iterated in Conway is not just one of caution,

but rather to determine whether the prosecuting attorney’s testimony is “the only

testimony available.” Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622, at paragraph

two of the syllabus; In re J.F., 6th Dist. Huron No. H-10-002, 2010-Ohio-4385, at ¶

2 Given that these witnesses were available and prepared to testify, the trial court could

have heard their testimony before proceeding on hearing the state’s Motion to Quash a
subpoena that was never served. Had the trial court done so, the record may have
contained information upon which it could have determined whether the assistant
prosecutor’s testimony was the only testimony available on the issues raised by Cruz.
Nonetheless, the record is devoid of that information and we address the issues raised
within the appeal on the record presented.
12 (“We further note that the record clearly reflects the availability of multiple other

witnesses to testify, who were not subject to the conflict of interest of simultaneously

serving as counsel of record, to the same meetings which the prosecutor attended.”);

State v. Pettit, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980261, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 53, 25-26

(Jan. 15, 1999) (affirming denial of request for prosecutor’s testimony where

defendant had other witnesses to testify to issue). The trial court did not find that

the assistant prosecutor’s testimony was the only testimony available on the issue

raised.

      {¶ 19} Applying the standard in Coleman as to whether the assistant

prosecutor’s testimony was the only testimony available, our review of the record

precludes a finding that the assistant prosecutor’s testimony was the only testimony

available to Cruz in support of his motions.3 Accordingly, we find that on the record

before us, the trial court abused its discretion. The first and second assignments of

error are sustained.

                                   CONCLUSION

      {¶ 20} In ruling on the Motion to Quash, the trial court did not apply the

correct legal standard to determine whether the assistant prosecutor’s testimony

was the only evidence available to Cruz in support of his motions. The record did not

support such finding were there were other witnesses to testify about the collection,

3 We recognize that upon remand the trial court may hear testimony and receive evidence

at hearing that might allow for a finding pursuant to Coleman that the assistant
prosecutor’s testimony is, in fact, the only testimony available.
storage, and transmission of the evidence alleged to be withheld, as well as records

of what evidence was provided in discovery. Because the trial court did not find that

the assistant prosecuting attorney’s testimony was the only testimony available, it

abused its discretion by denying the Motion to Quash.

      {¶ 21} Judgment reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings.

      It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS;
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., DISSENTING:

      {¶ 22} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial

court’s denial of the state’s motion to quash a subpoena and for protective order. I

disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not apply the correct

standard of law.

      {¶ 23} It is an extremely high burden to find that the trial court abused its

discretion. Under these unique facts and circumstances, where the trial court has
presided over these proceedings, the record is devoid of anything to satisfy this

burden.

      {¶ 24} The standard articulated in State v. Coleman is that while a

prosecuting attorney should avoid being a witness in a criminal prosecution, such

testimony is admissible where it “is the only testimony available.” State v. Coleman,

45 Ohio St.3d 298, 544 N.E.2d 622 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. The

majority concludes that the trial court did not consider on the record, nor was there

evidence presented, as to whether the assistant prosecuting attorney’s testimony

was the only evidence available. To the contrary, the record reflects that defense

counsel explicitly argued that the assistant prosecuting attorney’s testimony was the

only testimony available as to whether or not her office withheld evidence. Further,

the record reflects that the state attempted to rebut this argument by pointing, as

the majority does, to the additional witnesses that defense counsel wished to call.

      {¶ 25} We review the trial court’s decision here for an abuse of discretion.

While applying the wrong legal standard, or misapplying the correct legal standard,

can constitute an abuse of discretion, an appellate court’s disagreement with the

application of the correct legal standard does not amount to an abuse of discretion.

Although the majority holds that the trial court did not apply the correct standard of

law, it goes on to perform its own analysis of whether the testimony in question was

the only testimony available. It is not the function of this court to second-guess a

trial court’s decision, especially in a case such as this, where the trial court was
significantly more familiar with the nature of the proceedings and the arguments on

the motion to quash the subpoena.

      {¶ 26} Although the trial court did not recite the exact language from

Coleman in ruling on the state’s motion, a review of the record shows that the trial

court considered whether the testimony in question was “the only testimony

available.” Whether this court agrees or disagrees with the conclusion of the trial

court, nothing about the conclusion was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and

the trial court applied the correct legal standard in ruling on the motion.

      {¶ 27} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.