Court Opinion

ID: 9650424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:36:28.130409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:14.193328
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that: (1) under the zoning code of the City of Philadelphia (City), a first-floor restaurant may not provide, as an accessory use, a second-floor location for patrons to engage in, or view, consensual, noncommercial, adult sexual activity; and (2) MAJ Entertainment, Inc. (MAJ) does not have a vested right in the permit issued to MAJ in 2000 (2000 Permit), which allowed MAJ to operate a restaurant with accessory live entertainment and dancing by patrons, provided such accessory use does not fall within any definition in section 14-1605 of the City’s zoning code.1 For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
MAJ owns a three-story building at 712-714 South Street in the City (the Property). In November of 2005, the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections (L & I) issued an order directing MAJ to cease operating a private sex club on the Property without a proper permit. MAJ filed an appeal with the Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia (ZBA), arguing that MAJ has a proper permit, i.e., the 2000 Permit.
At the hearing before the ZBA, MAJ presented evidence showing that MAJ owns a restaurant that is open on Friday and Saturday nights, that no one under the age of twenty-one years is allowed to enter and that customers must show identifica*850tion. Customers pay for a buffet dinner, which is served on the first floor. The second floor contains cubicles where customers may engage in consensual sexual activity or view others engaging in such activity. MAJ argued that the consensual, non-commercial, adult sexual activity is a proper accessory use to the restaurant, 1.e., it is the accessory live entertainment and dancing allowed under the 2000 Permit, and that MAJ has a vested right in the 2000 Permit. The ZBA held otherwise, and the Court of Common Pleas of the First Judicial District (trial court) affirmed.
I. Accessory Use
MAJ’s 2000 Permit authorizes the following use: “Restaurant eat in only firs (1-3) with acc [i.e., accessory] live entertainment and dancing by patrons not as defined in 14-1605.... ” (R.R. at 1) (emphasis added). Section 14-102 of the zoning code defines an accessory use as a use subordinate to and on the same lot as the main use and customarily incidental to the main use. The only accessory use question properly before -this court is whether consensual, non-commercial, adult sexual activity is customarily incidental to a restaurant.2
“[A]n accessory use may exist even where there is no evidence that a majority, or even a substantial number, of similar properties are engaged in a similar accessory use.” Southco, Inc. v. Concord Township, 552 Pa. 66, 75, 713 A.2d 607, 611 (1998).
Indeed, savvy entrepreneurs always hope to discover unique restaurant concepts that are not in the mainstream, but would attract a particular clientele. Thus, in our society, adults who enjoy the theater might be able to find a dinner theater in their area showing a Las Vegas-style Revue involving some audience participation. People who enjoy mysteries might be able to find a live murder mystery dinner show that involves audience participation. People who fantasize about being professional singers might be able to find a restaurant with karaoke that allows patrons to lip-sync and gyrate to recorded music. People who enjoy gambling might be able to find a restaurant that features off-track betting by patrons. Yet, no one would expect most restaurants to offer such' entertainment for patrons.3
A specific entertainment activity constitutes an accessory use to a restaurant if it is “an entertainment activity akin to [or of the same general character as] other forms of entertainment provided in restaurants.” Id. To be “akin to” or “of the same general character as,” a specific entertainment activity need not be identical to other forms of entertainment provided in restaurants. Thus, in Valley Forge Plaza Associates v. Upper Merion Township Zoning Hearing Board, 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 686, 596 A.2d 1201 (1991), this court held that an *851off-track betting parlor is akin to, or of the same general character as, an assembly hall because both are places where people gather for entertainment.
Here, there can be no question that engaging in or viewing consensual, noncommercial, adult sexual activity is a form of entertainment for some people.4 It is akin to audience participation in a burlesque act at a dinner theater’s Las Vegas-style Revue or audience participation in a murder mystery dinner show. The patrons “get into the act” and the act may have a sexual component. In karaoke restaurants, the patrons are the unpaid and exclusive providers of entertainment; in that sense, the entertainment at MAJ’s place is of the same general character as that at a karaoke restaurant. As to the exclusively adult nature of the entertainment at MAJ’s place, the entertainment is of the same general character as that at a restaurant with off-track betting.
Finally, our supreme court has stated that legislation may support a finding that a particular use is customarily incidental, and thus an accessory use, to a restaurant. See Southco. Here, in the City’s own zoning ordinance, the City has contemplated restaurants with live entertainment that consists of paid entertainers performing sexual activities. See section 14-1605 of the zoning ordinance (defining a “cabaret”).5 Thus, I would conclude that, in the City, consensual, non-commercial, adult sexual activity may be provided as an accessory use to a restaurant.6
II. Vested Right
The vested rights doctrine applies to situations where a municipality has erroneously issued a zoning, building or use permit. Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Board, 485 Pa. 501, 402 A.2d 1385 (1979). In determining whether a party has acquired vested rights in a permit erroneously issued by a municipality, courts weigh five factors: (1) the party’s due diligence in attempting to comply with the law; (2) the party’s good faith throughout the proceedings; (3) the party’s expenditure of substantial and unrecoverable funds; (4) the expiration without appeal of the period during which an appeal could have been taken from the issuance of the permit; and (5) the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that individual property rights or the public health, safety or welfare would be adversely affected by the use of the permit. Id.
With respect to the first factor, our supreme court has stated that a citizen exercises due diligence in attempting to comply *852with the law by making inquiry of officials who should be expected to have knowledge of the law. Id. Here, MAJ exercised due diligence by applying for and obtaining from the proper authorities a permit to operate a restaurant with live entertainment and dancing. A year later, when MAJ became aware of limitations placed on the use of the Property, MAJ sought advice from L & I, the entity that issued the cease order here.7 Section 14-1702 of the City’s zoning code vests L & I with the duty and power to administer and enforce the zoning code, and, after MAJ’s inquiry, L & I allowed MAJ to continue its operations despite the limitations.8 Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of MAJ.
With respect to the second factor, MAJ has operated the restaurant in good faith since 2000. The City contends that MAJ knew that its use of the Property was illegal. However, the undisputed testimony is that L & I, which has the duty and power to enforce the zoning code, went into the restaurant and inspected the operations after a newspaper article was written about it in August 2001. “L & I was fully, 100 percent aware of all the activities that went on in this club.” (R.R. at 57.) Yet, L & I allowed MAJ’s operations to continue.9 Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of MAJ.
With respect to the third factor, there is no dispute that MAJ has expended substantial and unrecoverable sums of money to adapt the Property for its present use. In fact, the City does not even address this factor in that portion of its brief discussing the vested rights argument. (See City’s brief at 12-17.) Thus, the City appears to concede that the third factor weighs in favor of MAJ.
With respect to the fourth factor, the period during which an appeal could have been taken from the issuance of the 2000 Permit has expired, and no one filed an appeal during the appeal period. Thus, obviously, the fourth factor weighs in favor of MAJ.
Finally, with respect to the fifth factor, there is no evidence that the public health, safety or welfare would be adversely affected by MAJ’s reliance on the 2000 Permit. In fact, MAJ presented a letter from thirty businesses stating that they have no problem with MAJ’s use of the Property. (ZBA’s Findings of Fact, No. 5; R.R. at 8-9.) The City argues that the restaurant threatens the public health, safety and welfare because the unprotected sexual activity on the Property increases the risk of spreading sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS. However, the ZBA did not find that there was unprotected sexual activity on the Property. To the contrary, the ZBA found that MAJ distributes condoms, (ZBA’s Findings of Fact, No. 9), and this finding is supported by testimony stating, ‘We don’t sell condoms. We give out con*853doms. (R.R. at 19.) Thus, the fifth factor weighs in favor of MAJ.
Inasmuch as all five factors weigh in favor of MAJ, I conclude that MAJ has a vested right in the 2000 Permit.
III. “Cabaret” Permit
The majority and concurring opinions suggest that MAJ needs a permit to operate a “cabaret” under section 14-102(24) of the zoning code. However, I submit that MAJ’s 2000 Permit is, in effect, a permit for a “cabaret” under section 14-102(24) of the zoning code.
Initially, I presume that the City knows and intends that its zoning code contains two different definitions of “cabaret.” Indeed, in construing the City’s zoning code, we must give effect to all of its provisions. Section 1921(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a); see Beers ex rel. P/O/A Beers v. Zoning Hearing Board, 933 A.2d 1067 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007) (noting the rules of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of zoning ordinances).
Section 14-102(24) defines a “cabaret,” generally, to include a restaurant featuring “entertainers”10 performing specified sexual activities. Section 14-1605 defines a “cabaret,” in a special way for regulated uses, to include a restaurant featuring entertainers performing specified sexual activities for monetary consideration. In other words, the City has distinguished between “cabarets” with paid performers and “cabarets” without paid performers.11
MAJ’s entertainers are not paid performers.12 Thus, MAJ’s restaurant fits within the definition of a “cabaret” in section 14-102(24), but not within the definition in section 14-1605. As indicated above, the 2000 Permit only prohibits live entertainment that falls within a definition in section 14-1605.13 A section 14-102(24) “cabaret” without paid performers does not fall within a definition in section 14-1605. Thus, a section 14-102(24) “cabaret” without paid performers is not prohibited by the 2000 Permit, which makes the 2000 Permit, in effect, a permit for a “cabaret” without paid performers.
Accordingly, I would reverse.

. Section 14-1605 of the City’s zoning code governs regulated uses, such as adult book stores, adult movie theaters and cabarets.

. The majority discusses whether the consensual, non-commercial, adult sexual activity in this case is subordinate to the Property's use as a irestaurant and concludes that the sexual activity “does not appear to be subordinate,” (majority op. at 844), or it is “highly questionable whether the Property's use as a club was subordinate to its use as a restaurant.” (Majority op. at 845.) However, neither the ZBA nor the trial court addressed this issue, and the City does not suggest the issue in its appellate brief as a basis for affirming on other grounds. Moreover, the tentative nature of the majority’s conclusion suggests that the discussion is mere dicta.

. Similarly, restaurants targeting families with children might provide entertainment areas for children, e.g., the outdoor playground at McDonalds or the indoor playground at Chuck E. Cheese. Nevertheless, no one would expect most restaurants to have playgrounds for children or, as in this case, playgrounds for adults.

. I note that, in his concurring opinion, Judge Pellegrini agrees that "engaging in sex in public with others watching ... would be considered entertainment under the regulatory scheme set forth in the Philadelphia Zoning Code.” (Concurring op. at 848.)

. The majority recognizes that, in Southco, "legislation created a custom whereby offtrack wagering was associated with fine dining.” (Majority op. at 845.) However, the majority then states, "Currently, we are aware of no such legislation associating semi-public sexual activity with haute cuisine.” Id. However, it is clear that the definition of "cabaret” in the City’s zoning code is legislation associating "semi-public sexual activity” with restaurants. The majority’s reluctance to acknowledge as much suggests that, even if there were a hundred lawful “cabarets” in the City, the majority would not recognize the live performance of sexual activities as an accessory use to a restaurant.

.I note that the 2000 Permit does not allow MAJ to provide live entertainment that falls within any of the definitions in section 14-1605 of the zoning code, and MAJ’s entertainment does not fall within the definition of “cabaret” because MAJ does not provide paid entertainers to perform sexual activities. In MAJ’s restaurant, the patrons perform for no monetary compensation.

. MAJ presented correspondence dated August 8, 2001, from MAJ to Claire Gaztner, a Zoning Administrator at L & I who appears to have signed the ZBA's decision in this case. (See Trial ct. op. at 5; R.R. at 71.)

. Considering that MAJ contacted an official at L & I for advice regarding the limitations, I reject the City’s argument that MAJ did not contact a zoning official charged with enforcing the zoning code. (See City’s brief at 16.)

. The majority notes that "mere delay” in enforcement of a zoning ordinance does not create a vested right. (Majority op. at 847 n. 9) (citing Marzo v. Zoning Hearing Board of Abington Township, 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 225, 373 A.2d 463 (1977)). Of course, this is correct. However, the fact that the City could have enforced its ordinance at a later date does not mean that MAJ did not rely in good faith on the City’s failure to act for five years. Moreover, as indicated, there are other factors to consider in determining whether a property owner has a vested right.

. Although one might think of a "cabaret” as a restaurant that provides live entertáinment for its patrons to view, there is nothing in the general definition that prohibits the patrons of a restaurant from providing their own entertainment by engaging in sexual activities for others to view.

. I note that the definition of "cabaret” in section 14-102(24) is a general provision, and the definition of "cabaret” in section 14 — 1605 is a special provision. When a general provision conflicts with a special provision, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both. Section 1933 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933.

. Indeed, there is no allegation or evidence that MAJ’s patrons receive any compensation for engaging in sexual activities.

. The two definitions of “cabaret” in the zoning code give the City some flexibility in its issuance of permits for "cabarets.” If the City wanted to restrict further the live entertainment that MAJ could present at its restaurant, the City could have referenced section 14-102(24) instead of section 14 — 1605 in the 2000 Permit.