Court Opinion

ID: 9681836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:57:27.479878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.148061
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The contention addressed by the Court is ground for review number one in both petitions for discretionary review. Each certificate of service therein states that counsel served a copy of the petition on the state prosecuting attorney and the local district attorney. Our rules provide thirty days for the opposing party to file a reply to a petition. Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 202(h). Neither attorney for the State took the opportunity to make a reply.
Now, for the first time, in its brief on the merits the State asserts that the ground for review “should be dismissed as improvidently granted because appellant’s contention was not advanced in the court of appeals.” State’s Brief, at 6.
A more timely and orderly medium for raising questions of that nature is the reply to petition for discretionary review; it will alert the judge responsible for making an initial review to a putative problem, so that he may inform himself and, in making his report on the petition to the Court, direct its attention to the matter at the threshold of its determination of whether to grant or refuse the petition. See Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 202(k).
In any event, that assertion is at odds with recognition by the State in its appellate brief below that appellants’ argument went to “the alleged irrelevant, inflammatory and prejudicial testimony,” State’s Brief, at 34-35.1 It also flies in the face of one reason given by the court of appeals for overruling the related point of error, viz:
“_ The testimony [of Troopers Wayne Williams and Frank Frausto] was properly offered, however, on another independent basis. Appellant’s car was legally stopped for a traffic offense. The testimony of Officer Williams and Officer Frausto regarding the drug courier profile was properly admitted to show that upon his own observations and the gathering of further information from William Valcarcel [or appellant], Officer Frausto had grounds to be suspicious and acted reasonably in requesting to search the vehicle. Cf. Accaria v. State, 661 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no pet.).”
Valcarcel v. State, 718 S.W.2d 359, at 364 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1986); Id., at 374. This Court properly exercised its judicial discretion in determining to review that reason for decision of the Amarillo Court. Articles 4.04, § 2, and 44.45(b) and (c), V.A.C.C.P.; Tex.R.App.Pro. Rules 200(b) and (c)(2), and 202(a), (d)(5) and (k); see Degrate v. State, 712 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
The Court is also right on the merits of ground for review number one. The testimony in question was inadmissible for reasons that lend themselves to a progressional explanation.
For any evidence to be admissible it must be relevant to a material issue in dispute at trial. Garza v. State, 715 S.W.2d 642, at 644 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 344, at 346 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663, at 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), quoting from Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (concurring opinion, at 506); Stone v. *420State, 574 S.W.2d 85, at 89 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978).
Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 154, 160 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Tex.R.Cr.Evid. Rule 402.
“Relevancy is that which makes the proposition at issue more or less probable.” Garza v. State, supra, at 644; Waldrop v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 166, 133 S.W.2d 969 (1939), quoting from Branch’s Ann.Penal Code (1916) 62, § 97:
“Relevancy is defined to be that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis — a pertinent hypothesis being one which, if sustained, would logically influence the issue. Hence it is relevant to put in evidence any circumstance which tends to make the proposition more or less probable.”
Id., 133 S.W.2d at 970; 1 Branch’s Ann.Penal Code (2d ed. 1965) 136, § 120; Tex.R. Cr.Evid. Rule 401.
“No circumstance is relevant which does not make more or less probable the proposition at issue.” Branch’s Ann.Penal Code (1916) 62, § 97; 1 Branch’s Ann.Penal Code (2d ed. 1965) 137, § 120. Compare Franks v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 42, 138 S.W.2d 109, at 114 (1940), with Stewart v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 286, 135 S.W.2d 103, at 104-105 (1939).
Whether Trooper Frausto “had grounds to be suspicious and acted reasonably in requesting to search the vehicle” were not contested issues before the jury — much less issues at all. The state of mind of an officer stopping a speeding motorist does not make more probable that the motorist is possessing a controlled substance concealed in, on or about the motor vehicle; his request to search may reflect a belief that could be the situation, but reasonableness of his belief per se is not an issue on the merits of the charge, nor is it probative of the fact of knowing possession of a controlled substance. See Vines v. State, 479 S.W.2d 322, at 324 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Therefore, testimony admitted for the purpose of showing grounds for suspicion and reasonableness of a request to search was not relevant to any disputed material issue at trial of this cause.
That is to say, such evidence has no tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of this criminal action more probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex.R. Cr.Evid.Rule 401. See and compare, e.g., Johnson v. State, supra, at 160 (that informant mentioned “a gun” not relevant when there was no contested issue regarding gun nor did it tend to make identity of killer more or less likely); Franks v. State, supra, 138 S.W.2d at 114 (testimony that uncle influenced accused to rob banker not relevant to any issue in trial for murder of banker). The court of appeals erroneously upheld admitting the testimony on that basis.
Thus I agree with the conclusion of the Court in that respect; we must now consider whether the error contributed to the verdict of guilty returned by the jury.2
Indeed, in every case where there is error in proceedings below the mandate of Tex.R.App.Pro.Rule 81(b)(2) is that the appellate court shall reverse the judgment unless the court determines “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.”
The error here was committed prior to conviction, and the prosecution appropriated that inadmissible evidence to urge the jury to find appellants guilty, viz:
“The purpose of final argument is to summarize the evidence.... so that you can come to a final decision whether you are satisfied in your mind that the State *421has proved that these Defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Valcarcel, are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The first witness you heard was Trooper Williams, and one thing that he specifically stated in his testimony was that he was in no way involved in this case.
What he is involved in is developing these Drug Courier Profiles; he has taken a part, not just himself, but other law enforcement officers, not just in this state, but in other states, in developing these profiles.
The reason these are developed is because these are common characteristics that they have observed on many arrests of drug traffickers. They don’t just come up with one or two common characteristics ....
He listed some odd 17 characteristics that they look for when they are arresting when they want to — after they have stopped the Defendants.”
Counsel then reiterated most of the characteristics listed by Trooper Williams, and proceeded to place testimony of Trooper Frausto in juxtaposition with each characteristic he claimed to have observed vis a vis appellants, summing up as follows:
“Now, folks, he noted almost 15 of 17 characteristics for these folks. Now, it’s conceivable to me that a Cuban husband and wife could be traveling down the highway on vacation going to Las Vegas from Miami in a rented car in another person’s name carrying this vial of cocaine without them being drug traffickers.

But, isn’t it coincidental that 15 out of 17 factors were noted with these folks. Fifteen.”

United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the geographical boundaries of which embrace ports of entry at or near the southernmost borders of this country from Texas to Florida, are most experienced with “drug courier profiles,” and they are uniform in believing that using them as evidence — even to establish reasonable suspicion — “should be viewed critically.”3 The Eleventh Circuit has found that “drug courier profile testimony is inherently prejudicial,” “is nothing more than the opinion of those officers conducting an investigation,” and, accordingly, has denounced “use of this type of evidence as substantive evidence of a defendant’s innocence or guilt.” United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, at 555 (11th Cir.1983).
Here the major substantive evidence relied on by the State to support its indictment is testimony of the drug courier profile, that appellants matched it and how successfully first Trooper Williams and then Trooper Frausto utilized it.
In all those circumstances, one surely must harbor a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the verdicts of the jury. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988).
Therefore, I concur in the judgment of the Court to reverse the judgment as to conviction.
MILLER, J., joins this opinion.

. All emphasis is mine throughout unless other- wise noted.

. Bearing on prejudicial nature of the error is further testimony by Trooper Williams upon being recalled by the State, presumably in rebuttal, as noted by the Amarillo Court of Appeals, Valcarcel v. State, supra, at 362, 371. After the prosecutor drew his attention to "some of these drug courier busts that [he] personally [had] made” and "specifically ... to those involving Cuban suspects traveling [west] on Interstate 40,” before Trooper Frausto stopped appellants, Trooper Williams said he "made three large narcotics seizures” and “two of those three were of Cuban descent;” over objection Trooper Williams was permitted to testify in detail as to dates, weight of substances seized and, again, both were Cubans.

. See cases cited and discussed in opinion of the Court at 2, n. 2; see also State v. Brown, 370 So.2d 547 (La.1979).