Court Opinion

ID: 9735505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:19:40.435247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:59.370137
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Kluczynski, dissenting: I cannot agree with the conclusions of the majority opinion. Through Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S.Ct. 585, and its progeny, it has become well established that the equal-protection and due-process clauses of the fourteenth amendment require that a defendant not be penalized in a criminal proceeding due to a lack of wealth. I believe that this type of penalty exists in the treatment of various defendants under sections no — 7 and no — 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A disparity of treatment results because under no — 7 the clerk retains 10% of the bail deposit as a cost whereas under no — 8 or no — 2, no costs are involved. It is discriminatory in that some defendants cannot voluntarily choose under which bail provision they will be released. The defendant who, because of lack of wealth, cannot meet the requirements of no — 8 and who cannot qualify for release under no — 2, is forced to seek relief under 110 — 7, the only section which involves a cost. The majority would have us believe that there are no non-affluent defendants or that if given the choice most defendants would choose section no — 7 for economic reasons. This court must take judicial notice of the fact that many defendants cannot afford to pay the full amount of the bail. Plaintiff has cited many authorities (Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18U.S.C. 3141-3152; Congressional Record, vol. 112 Con. Rec. 89th Congress, Second Session pp. 12488-12504; S.H.A. ch. 38, art. no, Committee Comments, p. 298; Attorney General’s Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Judicial Procedure, U.S.C. Cong, and Admin. News 1966; National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, May 27, 1964) for the proposition that as the amount of bail increases, the percentage of defendants who can pay the full amount of the bail decreases. In addition, the Committee Comments (S.H.A. ch. 38, art. no, at p. 300) state that section no — 8 is an alternative to no — 7 for "those who have the means.” Once it is established that certain defendants are not financially able to proceed under section no — 8, it is no longer significant that most or all defendants would elect to proceed under section no — 7. The important consideration is not what section they would elect, but rather whether every defendant has a choice of the two sections. Realizing that certain defendants have no choice but to pay a cost under 110 — 7, while other financially able defendants can elect to pay nothing under no — 8, I must find that the sections in question deny equal protection and due process. Further, in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 15 L. Ed. 2d 447, 86 S.Ct. 518, the United States Supreme Court considered the question whether a defendant may be punished after finding him not guilty. The concurring opinion specifically found: “* * * the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to impose a penalty or costs upon a defendant whom the jury has found not guilty of any offense with which he has been charged.” (382 U.S. at 405.) This same concept has been recognized in Illinois in our constitution, case law, and legislative enactment. Section 19 of article II of the Illinois constitution provides that every person “ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, * * *.” Any defendant who is forced through economic circumstances to proceed under section no — 7 is “obliged” to pay costs for his constitutional right to pretrial liberty in violation of this provision. This court, in Wells v. McCullock, 13 Ill. 606, held that a party who is indicted under the Criminal Code, and is acquitted, is not liable for costs. While it is true that the case involved the interpretation of a statute then in effect, a statute similar to it is presently in effect. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 53, par. 32.) The court in Wells found that “An acquittal, or other legal discharge, absolves the defendant from the payment of all costs.” (Emphasis added.) (13 Ill. at 608.) Any cost, whether it be termed court cost or administrative cost, is an expense in a criminal defense, and if the defendant is acquitted, imposing such a cost, in my opinion, violates the due-process clause and section 19 of article II of the Illinois constitution. Mr. Justice Schaefer joins in this dissent.