Court Opinion

ID: 9836799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:06.661055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:18.923722
License: Public Domain

*297CRAWFORD, Chief Judge
(concurring in the result):
I concur with reversing this conviction based solely on appellate government counsel’s concession. Presumably, the Government prefers to have the findings of guilt set aside and to shoulder the expense of a rehearing rather than to fashion a remedy to provide appellant the benefit of his plea bargain. See United States v. Mitchell, 50 MJ 79, 82-83 (1999); United States v. Olson, 25 MJ 293, 299 (CMA 1987). Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Government counsel’s capitulation despite the Court of Criminal Appeal’s findings, a shared belief that United States v. Mitchell, supra, serves as controlling precedent for this case, and the glaring absence of citation to more persuasive precedent requires that I write.
Facing a maximum punishment that included, inter alia, 145 years and 6 months’ confinement, appellant negotiated a pretrial agreement with his convening authority. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to making and uttering 29 checks (the value of which exceeded $20,000) with intent to defraud, and to obtaining services (of a value exceeding $1200) under false pretenses. The convening authority agreed to suspend any adjudged confinement exceeding 12 months, and to suspend all forfeitures and fines as well as to waive, for 6 months, automatic forfeitures imposed pursuant to Article 58b, UCMJ, 10 USC § 858b. Neither the defense counsel, trial counsel, staff judge advocate, nor military judge knew that servieemembers, such as appellant, who are held beyond the expiration of their service commitments for trial by court-martial, and are later convicted and incarcerated, are not entitled to pay. See United States v. Albert, 30 MJ 331 (CMA 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1028, 111 S.Ct. 681, 112 L.Ed.2d 672 (1991); 39 Comp. Gen. 42 (1959).
At trial, appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, confinement for 10 months, total forfeitures, and reduction to E-l. The convening authority approved the sentence and upheld his end of the bargain by suspending all forfeitures of pay for 12 months and waiving all automatic forfeitures required by Article 58b for 6 months. Because he was entitled to no pay, appellant did not reap the benefit of the pretrial agreement as it related to fiscal considerations.
Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant asserted that the only reason he entered into the pretrial agreement was to secure the financial benefits therein, and ensure his family members would receive his full pay and allowances for the 6 months following his court-martial. The Court of Criminal Appeals found otherwise. 49 MJ 542, 547 (1998).
I agree with the majority that the issue is whether this appellant understandingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into his pretrial agreement. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 and n. 4, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). RCM 705(c)(1)(A). A guilty plea that is induced by threats, misrepresentations, or false promises will fall. See United States v. Burnell, 40 MJ 175,176 (CMA 1994). A plea bargain that is otherwise voluntarily proposed, but based on a misunderstanding (that is not substantial) of the maximum sentence that could be adjudged will stand. See United States v. Mincey, 42 MJ 376, 378 (1995); United States v. Hemingway, 36 MJ 349 (CMA 1993); United States v. Poole, 24 MJ 539 (ACMR 1987), affd 26 MJ 272 (CMA 1988); United States v. Hunt, 7 MJ 985 (ACMR 1979), affd 10 MJ 222 (CMA 1981). Similarly, plea bargains that have unforseen collateral consequences will be upheld. United States v. Albert, supra; United States v. Bedania, 12 MJ 373 (CMA 1982).
In my opinion, this ease fits squarely within the four corners of United States v. Albert, supra, a unanimous opinion of this Court which has been overlooked by both counsel and the courts below. The issue in Albert was whether the Government fully complied with the terms of a pretrial agreement, similar in nature to the one in the case sub judice. While this appellant has phrased the granted issue differently from that in Albert, the core question remains identical — voluntariness of the plea. I can find nothing in *298the record that convinces me that the Government induced or tricked appellant into pleading guilty with a false promise of financial relief. Further, I share the lower court’s view that a misunderstanding of the potential monetary benefit accompanying this guilty plea did not significantly contribute to appellant’s decision to plead guilty.
Should the Government distinguish Albert and decide that the financial relief for which appellant bargained was material to his guilty plea, it still has the option of making appellant whole in lieu of treating the plea as improvident. See United States v. Olson, supra; United States v. Cooke, 11 MJ 257, 261 (CMA 1981)(when accused enters a guilty plea believing that a pretrial agreement exists, the lack of such agreement does not negate the plea’s voluntariness when the Government grants the relief for which appellant had bargained). As we found in Olson, our jurisdictional limitations on adjudicating pay disputes, coupled with the abundant experience and expertise in interpreting service regulations found in the Courts of Criminal Appeals, augur well for resolving this matter in the court below. See Art. 66, UCMJ, 10 USC § 866 (1994); see generally Mitchell, supra at 83. Inexplicably, the Government has declined to make any such argument.
In both United States v. McLaughlin, 50 MJ 217 (1999), and United States v. Clark, 53 MJ 280 (2000), we acknowledged the Manual for Courts-Martial remedy for impermissible pretrial-agreement terms — do not enforce them. RCM 705(e)(1)(B). I would adopt the reverse side of that coin in this and similar cases — make an appellant whole by paying him.
Notwithstanding the force .of precedent from this Court, and the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals below, the Government has elected to support appellant’s position. Accordingly, I concur, albeit reluctantly, with setting aside the findings and sentence.