Court Opinion

ID: 9796340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:55:53.772394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:04.703798
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge:
Specially Concurs.
¶ 1 I concur in the results reached by the Court in this case. However, I disagree this is a case of first impression and write to point out how this Court’s jurisprudence allows the same result.
¶ 2 First, in Leaf v. State, 1983 OK CR 167, 673 P.2d 169, this Court discussed and applied the “public service function” of the police recognizing “an important aspect of a policeman’s work is the assistance of those in need of help, the so-called ‘public service function’ ”. Id. at 171. There, the Court, citing to United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), determined when a seizure took place, stating “the test is whether, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Previously, in Workman v. State, 1971 OK CR 493, 491 P.2d 308, 309, the Court summarily dismissed an argument regarding the legality of an arrest—a sheriff stopped to check a vehicle stalled in the road—as being “patently frivolous”. The Court said, “from observing the stalled vehicle, the sheriff not only had the right, but also the duty, to lend assistance in removing the stalled vehicle from the highway”. Id.
¶ 3 Second, this Court’s jurisprudence clearly sets out the rules regarding investigative detentions and the length of time allowed to perform them. See Seabolt v. State, 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 235, 237-38 (citing State v. Paul, 2003 OK CR 1, ¶ 3, 62 P.3d 389). In State v. Goins, 2004 OK CR 5, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 767, 770, we stated, “Lengthening the detention for further questioning beyond that related to the initial stop is permissible in two circumstances. First the officer may detain the driver for questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is occurring. Second, further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is permissible if the initial detention has become a consensual encounter.” That reasoning applies in this case for we’re dealing with the analogous situation of an officer stopping to check on the health and welfare of a citizen (public service function) which evolved into a consensual encounter.
¶ 4 Third, the law in Oklahoma regarding when a seizure occurs is clear. In Skelly v. State, 1994 OK CR 55, ¶ 11-13, 880 P.2d 401, 405, the Court found that a seizure of a person occurs within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when, in light of all the attendant circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave, and went further to explain the framework of the legal basis for that rule. We have also stated that the distinction between an investigatory detention and seizure is largely a matter of degree because both involve a significant intrusion upon the privacy of the individual. Sowell v. State, 1980 OK CR 98, ¶ 3, 620 P.2d 429, 430.
The reasonableness of the seizures or detentions that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with the individual liberty.
Id. (citing U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). Thus, in a situation where an officer initiates *601an investigative detention based on a concern of a citizen’s welfare, the detention should be viewed by weighing the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure (citizen’s welfare), with the degree that the officers investigative detention interfered with the citizens liberties.
¶ 5 Fourth, the same is true for determining the validity of a consent. In Goins, supra, we set out the procedure to be followed in analyzing whether an extended stop becomes a consensual encounter. Id. at 771. In doing so we held “[t]his Court uses the same test for the voluntariness of consent as is used in federal courts; the test for volun-tariness is to be judged from a totality of the circumstances, (citations omitted)”. Id. The Court went on to explain, “[ajlthough this Court may construe Oklahoma’s Constitutional protections from unlawful search and seizure more narrowly than those found in the United States Constitution, there is no logical reason to do so here.” Id.
¶ 6 Fifth, while I think the Wisconsin Court of Appeals performed a correct analysis and delivered a well articulated decision in State v. Ellenbecker, 159 Wis.2d 91, 464 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Wis.Ct.App.1990), I do not believe we should ignore Oklahoma jurisprudence and adopt the holding of an intermediate appellate court from a non-relevant jurisdiction. Oklahoma lawyers and judges are not bound by or familiar with Wisconsin law. While we can look to other states for reference and analogy, we should not be adopting the decisions of those states carte blanche. Oklahoma lawyers and judges can foresee development of the logical progression of the law based on our jurisprudence, but they cannot foresee the cherry picking of a decision from another state and inserting that decision as a part of our jurisprudence. Foreseeability is an integral part of a lawyer’s ability to provide effective assistance of counsel and a judge to ensure error does not occur at trial. I admit my view is shaded by my years on the trial bench and an appreciation of the initiative that trial lawyers exercise in representing their clients. While the Court’s opinion states “The reasoning of the Wisconsin court is sound and consistent with our review of Oklahoma law concerning the legality of a detention”, it does not cite the Oklahoma law upon which the decision is based. In addition, the opinion proceeds to cite the Wisconsin court’s dicta, which pontificates on many possible reasons the officer would have for making contact. I can imagine the possibility in the future that Wisconsin law may change and an enterprising defense attorney or prosecutor arguing that change is applicable in Oklahoma because of the way the opinion merely adopts Ellenbecker. The trial judge is then placed in the quandary of trying to decide how much weight to give an opinion from another jurisdiction. When we can draft our opinions in such a way as to preclude that quandary, we should. In this way we ensure judicial economy and provide certainty in the law.
¶ 7 Finally, I believe Oklahoma case law supports the decision of the Court in this case as I have set out above as to the public welfare stop, seizure of the person and consent. I would affirm the conviction, apply Oklahoma law in deciding the case, and modify the sentence to ten (10) years, rather than six years, to correct the instructional error. An even better result would be to remand the case for re-sentencing pursuant to 22 O.S.2001, § 929.