Court Opinion

ID: 9693477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:44:03.530058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:47.440096
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, for I believe the trial court erred in suppressing physical evidence seized after a warrantless entry of appellee Minick’s home. There were “exigent circumstances” obviating the need for a warrant here. See Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 320-21, 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (1970) (en banc).
Analytically, the court must address four questions: (1) At what time did the police decide they had sufficient cause to pursue Minick? (2) Did the police act reasonably in waiting that long to do so? (3) By the time the police were ready to move against Min-ick, were there exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry under Dorman, supra? (4) If so, did the police enter the premises without unreasonable delay?
I.
The crime occurred at approximately 12:35 a. m. Sometime between 1:20 and 2:00 a. m., the police found a wallet 25 feet from the victim’s body with a driver’s license showing Minick’s name and address (five blocks away). A few hours later, at approximately 4:30 a. m., the police discovered additional, crucial evidence: Minick had a prior rape conviction and previous arrests for rape, including an incident at the very location where the deceased’s body had been discovered. Furthermore, Min-ick’s description in the police file matched a witness’ description of the man leaving the scene. At that point, the police were satisfied that Minick probably had committed the crime.
II.
If the police had probable cause to seek a warrant at 2:00 a. m., can they be faulted for declining to proceed that soon? See United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974) (court evaluates claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first “had a right to obtain a warrant”). Or, did the police use reasonable judgment in seeking more conclusive evidence than a lost wallet before deciding, at 4:30 a. m., to move against their prime suspect? See United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir. 1977) (“the reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 753 (1978); United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 802 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 802, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); cf. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (applying the same rule in the context of a car search: “[W]e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment”).
The answer here may be crucial. Suppose that the court evaluates a claim of exigent circumstances from the time the police first had probable cause to obtain a warrant. If the police elect not to seek a warrant but instead to continue their investigation, their right to made a warrantless entry, after finding more evidence that *212“clinches” the case, may have evaporated because a court could find they had time, since the advent of probable cause, to obtain a warrant. Alternatively, assume that the police are not obliged to seek a warrant until, in their reasonable judgment, they are ready to do so based on evidence beyond that required to establish mere probable cause. A claim of exigent circumstances will be available at the time the police are ready to move, for they will not have been expected to seek a warrant on less conclusive evidence. In short, the court’s decision about the point in time from which the police should be expected to seek a warrant may be critical in determining whether the police acted with sufficient dispatch to claim exigent circumstances, and thus may determine the extent that the police will investigate before pursuing possible subjects.
I believe the court should start the count for a warrant as of the time the police reasonably conclude they should move against a suspect, even though by that time they may have more than minimum probable cause for the entry. I subscribe to this view for two reasons. First, an approach requiring strict timing of the inquiry from the advent of probable cause is unrealistic; it would require the court to apply “20-20 hindsight” to a fluid situation which, as it develops, is typically a difficult judgment call. United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1978). Second, an approach that forces the police to seek a warrant as soon as they arguably have probable cause may result in premature police intrusions upon individual privacy — intrusions which may not occur if the police investigate further. See United States v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 108, 629 F.2d 136, 142 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1086, 101 S.Ct. 875, 66 L.Ed.2d 812 (1981); Campbell, supra at 27. In this case, for example, a wallet lost in a tennis court area is thin evidence to support an uninvited police entry into someone’s home. I recognize that the police may obtain a warrant but not execute it until they have more evidence; but given that obtaining a warrant requires an investment of time and possible diversion from the investigation, I doubt that forbearance would be the norm once a warrant was in hand.
In this case, I conclude that the police acted reasonably in waiting until 4:30 a. m. to proceed against Minick.1 The warrant clock did not begin to run earlier. See Gardner, supra at 948; Ferrara, supra at 802; Forde, supra at 802, 329 N.E.2d at 720.2
III.
The next — and central — question is whether, at 4:30 a. m., there were exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry.
A. In Dorman, supra, the court identified seven criteria for making this evaluation.3 Five are easily disposed of here. Although there is no record basis for a conclu*213sion that the “suspect [was] reasonably believed to be armed,” id. at 320, 435 F.2d at 392, the offense obviously was a grave one, there was strong reason to believe that Minick was at home,4 and the peacefulness of the entry offset concern that the police entered at night.5
*212(1) That a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence;
(2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) a clear showing of probable cause;
(4) a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the dwelling;
(5) the likelihood of escape if not swiftly apprehended;
(6) a peaceful entry as opposed to a “breaking”; and
(7) the time of entry (night or day).
*213This leaves the other two criteria, which are determinative here: (1) “a clear showing of probable cause ... to believe that the suspect committed the crime,” i.e., a showing greater than “merely the minimum of probable cause” required for a warrant, id. at 320-21, 435 F.2d at 392-93; and (2) “a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended." Id. at 321, 435 F.2d at 393. Of particular relevance is this court’s expansive view of the latter, escape criterion: “Under limited circumstances, the ‘likelihood of escape’ inquiry properly includes consideration of the probability that evidence as well as the suspect may be lost.” Brooks v. United States, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 1297, 1303 (1976) (footnote omitted); see Thomas v. United States, D.C.App., 352 A.2d 390, 391 (1976).
The police officers testified that once they had sufficient cause to pursue Minick they did not seek a warrant because, in their experience, it had taken two or three hours at that time of the morning, and they feared losing evidence such as “dirt, clothing, . .. exchange of hairs, or anything that would show contact with the victim.”
The trial court analyzed the police explanation as follows:
It is a very close question on the probable cause. Undoubtedly they had probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, but whether they had reasonably trustworthy information to believe that the suspect committed the crime, over and beyond the minimum requirements of probable cause, is doubtful.
They had strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises. They had— they may have suspected that he might escape if not swiftly apprehended, but there are no facts to support that conclusion. It was not developed at the hearing as to how long or short a period of time he lived at the address, or if the police knew that at the time, or any of the attendant facts. There is no evidence that the identification of the Defendant was found in a truly incriminating place, or that they must have assumed it was found there.
Assuming these things to be so, the police were very candid in admitting that their purpose in going at that time without getting a warrant was twofold — one, that in prior experience, at that time of morning, the earliest they have been able to get a warrant is two or three hours. I’m not sure that it was an inconvenience, or they felt that interfered with ordinary police work.
They also went because they discovered what appeared to be knee marks in the dirt between the legs of the decedent, and they wanted to get to the Defendant before he had a chance to remove the dirt by bathing or whatever. They discovered these facts sometime after 1:30 and before two o’clock in the morning.
Taking — using their time frame, had they immediately applied for a warrant, they had reasonable expectations that they would have it by five o’clock. They made no effort whatsoever to obtain a warrant, but, instead, at five o’clock, they decided that the circumstances required their going without a warrant. There was no reason to believe that if the De*214fendant, or the suspect was going to bathe, that he had not bathed by five o’clock in the morning. It’s no more persuasive than if they had decided they were going in January rather than April because there was a greater possibility that the sooner you go, the better; but, beyond some rather generalized reasoning, there was no reason to believe that.
So, the Court does not have to address itself as to whether or not the police would have a right to make a warrantless entry for the purpose of seizing evidence, when there was no realistic exigent circumstance for preserving or believing it had been preserved by the time they went in. The right of entry of a private dwelling is a sacred trust that should not be invaded except upon exceptions to the warrant requirement.
B. As to probable cause, the trial court’s analysis is inconclusive. The court appears to say the police “had probable cause for the issuance of a warrant” at 2:00 a. m. and should have “immediately applied for a warrant” at that time. But the court also suggests that three hours later, at the time of entry, “whether they had reasonably trustworthy information to believe that the suspect committed the crime, over and beyond the minimum requirements of probable cause, is doubtful.” Both analyses cannot be correct. If there was probable cause for a warrant at 2:00 a. m. based on the discovery of the wallet and Minick’s driver’s license, there obviously was a showing of probable cause beyond the “minimum” at 4:30 a. m. when the police discovered the prior conviction, arrests, and identification evidence. If, on the other hand, there was only “minimum” probable cause at 5:00 a. m. to believe Minick had committed the crime, there could not have been probable cause for a warrant at 2:00 a. m., before the police had discovered the substantial, additional evidence.
As I see it, therefore, the court did not make a discernable probable cause finding. This court accordingly must make its own evaluation of whether, at the time of entry, there was a “clear showing of probable cause” (f.e., well beyond the “minimum”) to believe that Minick had committed the crime. Dorman, supra at 320-21, 435 F.2d at 392-93; see note 3 supra.6 I am satisfied that there was.
C. As to the final factor, possible loss of evidence, the trial court found that no exigency remained by 5:00 a. m., when the police entered Minick’s apartment. The court stated, “There Vas no reason to believe that if the Defendant, or the suspect was going to bathe, that he had not bathed by five o’clock in the morning.” Perhaps as a result of finding no exigency, the court curtailed its inquiry and thus dealt only with evanescent evidence; it did not specifically address the police concern about the suspect’s clothing.
In making its finding, the court presumably applied the following test: whether at 5:00 a. m. the police officers reasonably concluded there was a substantial likelihood that critical evidence was still on the premises and would be lost, absent immediate entry. See Brooks, supra at 1303 & n.3.
When we focus on the evanescent evidence involved — dirt, hair, and other debris — I believe it is fair to accept the trial court’s premise that this evidence can be washed off the body easily. The government, after all, did not argue that traces of such evidence will remain undisturbed for several hours, despite an effort to clean the body.7 As to the clothing, there is no obvious impediment to its disposal.8 Thus, the question is this: did the trial court clearly err in finding, in effect, that reasonable *215police officers, at 5:00 a. m., would have to conclude that if Minick were .ever going to do so, he assuredly had washed all the loose evidence off his body and disposed of his tell-tale clothing within 4Vá hours of the crime?
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that “our review of the trial court’s ruling is limited, since we are bound to accept its findings with regard to exigent circumstances absent clear error,” ante at 207-208, citing Brooks, supra at 1302. But the trial court made no finding (except an implicit one) about Minick’s clothing, which was as important to the police as the dirt, hair, and other debris on the suspect’s flesh. Moreover, in finding “[tjhere was no reason to believe” that the suspect “had not bathed by 5 o’clock in the morning” (if he were going to bathe at all), the court necessarily was speculating about what any — and every — criminal was likely to do once he knew the police were after a suspect.9 The court was not basing this finding, or its implied finding that the clothing had been disposed of, on evidence related to Minick himself, such as evidence tending to prove he knew the police were after him, see note 9 supra, testimony about his behavior pattern, or questions of witness credibility. No facts, in other words, were in dispute. Under these circumstances, therefore, the court’s “finding” as to the loss of evidence was actually in the nature of a legal conclusion: there could not have been exigent circumstances at the time of entry because every criminal, knowing the police are searching for an assailant, will wash all incriminating dirt, hair, and debris off his body, and dispose of all clothing used during the assault, within 4V2 hours of the crime (if he ever is going to do so). See Robinson, supra at 353, 533 F.2d at 580.
While I have great respeet for the trial court’s analysis, I cannot endorse it. To call it a finding of fact will mischaracterize what the trial court was doing. Basically, the court made a universal pronouncement about human behavior — in our parlance, a conclusion of law — which the appellate court has a responsibility to review, not only for its application to the case at hand but also for the norm it establishes for the future. I believe the trial court’s approach is too inflexible for this jurisdiction to adopt.10
“The exigent circumstances doctrine is to be applied to the facts as perceived by the police at the time of entry . ... ” Brooks, supra at 1302. I do not believe reasonable police officers had to assume either that their suspect would have acted so rationally and thoroughly that he eliminated all incriminating evanescent evidence and clothing within 4V2 hours of the crime or that he never would do so. See Dorman, supra at 321, 435 F.2d at 393.11 To the contrary, I conclude that the police officers acted reasonably in believing that critical evidence was still likely to be on the premises within 4V2 hours of the crime, but that every passing moment jeopardized that possibility.12
*216Accordingly, I conclude that, given our standard of review and considering all the Dorman factors, a warrantless entry was justified at 4:30 a. m.
IV.
There is the question, finally, whether the police — confronted by exigent circumstances at 4:30 a. m. — entered the premises without unreasonable delay.13 Even when the Dorman criteria are met, the court shall not excuse the unexplained failure of the police to procure a warrant if they unreasonably delayed their investigation or entry. See United States v. Chuke, 554 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1977). “The essence of exigent circumstances is the lack of time to obtain a warrant without thwarting the arrest or making it more dangerous. Where time was adequate, failure to obtain a warrant should not be excused.” Latzer, Enforcement Workshop: Police Entries to Arrest-Payton v. New York, 17 Crim.L.Bull. 156, 165 (1981).
There is no indication that the police deliberately stalled or unreasonably delayed their investigation to avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant. See note 1 supra. From the time they learned of the crime until the time they decided (at 4:30 a. m.) to make the arrest, the police continually were engaged in accumulating evidence.
Nor did the police unreasonably delay their entry. They entered the apartment and arrested Minick at 4:50 a. m.,14 only 20 minutes after concluding they had sufficient cause to do so. There is simply no room for an argument that the police moved too slowly to justify a warrantless entry; no one has suggested that the police could have obtained a warrant in 20 minutes.15 Compare Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 536, 539-40 (1st Cir. 1968) (war-rantless entry unlawful where officers delayed more than 12 hours between time they stopped accumulating evidence and seizure); Forde, supra at 801-02, 329 N.E.2d at 719-720 (same; three-hour delay); State v. Dunlap, 395 A.2d 821, 823-25 (Me.1979) (same; 15½ hour delay); State v. Beede, 119 N.H. 620, 629, 406 A.2d 125, 131 (1979) (same; one-day delay), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967, 100 S.Ct. 1659, 64 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980).
V.
In summary, the police conducted their investigation without delay and reasonably concluded they had clear probable cause to pursue Minick at 4:30 a. m. They confronted exigent circumstances justifying a war-rantless entry of his home at that time. They did not unreasonably delay; they entered with dispatch at 4:50 a.m., 20 minutes after determining they had sufficient cause to do so. They could not reasonably have been expected to obtain a warrant during this very short interval. At every critical decisional juncture, therefore, the police acted properly.
In affirming suppression of evidence on the ground of no exigent circumstances, my colleagues in effect hold the police accountable for failing to proceed against Minick *217earlier. Ironically, therefore, this decision encourages the police to seek warrants — or perhaps even to make warrantless entries— when probable cause is marginal, in derogation of the rights of privacy and freedom from unreasonable seizures. See Whitfield, supra at 108, 629 F.2d at 142; Campbell, supra at 27.
The trial court’s ruling should be reversed.
Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge; KELLY, KERN, NEBEKER, HARRIS,* MACK, FERREN, PRYOR, and BELSON, Associate Judges.
ORDER
On consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc, and it appearing that the majority of the judges of this Court has voted to grant the aforesaid petition, it is
ORDERED that appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc be granted and that the December 14, 1981, opinions and judgment of this Court are hereby vacated. The Clerk of the Superior Court is directed to return to this Court the certified copy of the opinions and judgment heretofore transmitted in lieu of mandate on January 5, 1982. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall schedule this matter for argument before the Court sitting en banc as soon as the business of the Court permits. Counsel are hereby directed to provide ten copies of the briefs heretofore filed to the Clerk on or before Monday, February 22,1982.
PER CURIAM.

. There is no indication that the police deliberately were stalling to avoid the necessity of obtaining a warrant. Compare United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1361-62 (8th Cir. 1980) with United States v. Houle, 603 F.2d 1297, 1300 (8th Cir. 1979).

. The significance of the foregoing analysis would be diminished, if not eliminated, were it possible under our local rules to obtain warrants “based on sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone,” United States v. Robinson, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 358, 533 F.2d 578, 585 (1976) (en banc). Such expeditious availability of a warrant presumably would cut down on the need to invoke the exigent circumstances exception in many cases. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2) (Warrant upon oral testimony) now authorizes a warrant sought by telephone, but our Super.Ct.Crim.R. 41 does not.

. As summarized in United States v. Lindsay, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 105, 110, 506 F.2d 166, 171 (1974), the Dorman criteria are:

. The trial court found that the police “had strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises.” Although a witness saw a man fleeing from the scene of the crime in a direction different from the direct route to Minick’s home, the fact that he lived only five blocks away and the fact that the incident occurred in the early morning hours combine to give a strong reason for believing he would be at home. See Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 321, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (1970) (en banc). But see Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974) (requiring “probable cause” to believe that the suspect is in the dwelling, defined as more than “strong reason” to believe so).

. Nighttime enhanced the likelihood that appel-lee was home.

. Appellate deference to the trial court is limited in this context to findings of fact. See Brooks v. United States, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1976).

. An argument that traces of tell-tale evidence are likely to remain after a scrubbing could prove too much. Whatever traces cannot easily be washed off are likely to remain until a warrant is available.

.It is likely to be more difficult to dispose of clothing than the other evidence, however, for it may require a trip out of the apartment if not out of the building.

. The record reflects that soon after the crime the police unsuccessfully chased a suspect identified as the man who took a woman into the woods. Although Minick, therefore, may have been running from the police, there is no evidence that he knew his wallet was missing or that he would have reason to believe the police, who never caught up with him, had a clue to his identity.

. I acknowledge that if I am wrong — if the trial court is only fact-finding — I could not hold the court clearly erroneous as to the evanescent evidence, for there is no way to disprove the court’s analysis. In contrast, I would be comfortable in holding clearly erroneous the court’s implied finding that Minick must have disposed of his clothing within 4‘/2 hours of the crime, for “on the entire evidence” I have “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). See note 8 supra.

. In Dorman, supra, the court said that after four hours “[t]he police were still dealing with a relatively recent crime, and prompt arrest might locate and recover the instrumentalities and fruits of the crime before otherwise disposed of.” Id. at 321, 435 F.2d at 393.

. The fact that it is speculative whether a criminal suspect would destroy all evanescent and other incriminating evidence during the first 4V2 hours after the crime does not diminish the urgency of pursuing such evidence as quickly as possible. I agree with the trial *216court, however, that there will come a point where one would have to say that the police waited too long after the crime, in contrast with waiting too long after a finding of probable cause, to claim exigent circumstances in lieu of obtaining a warrant. In the present case, we have not reached that point.

.Akin to this inquiry is the question whether the police could have prevented the exigency. See United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974). Here, the police could not have done so, for even if they had placed a guard at Minick’s door, they could not have prevented destruction of evidence. See Brooks, supra at 1303.

. The majority, reflecting the trial court, refers to entry “at approximately five o’clock in the morning.” Ante at 207. However, according to the only evidence of record, Officer Bryant’s testimony, the police arrived at approximately 4:50 a. m.

. Given that it was reasonable for the police not to move against Minick until 4:30 a. m. and that they did so thereafter within 20 minutes, I need not consider the reasonableness of the officers’ undocumented assertion that it would take two or three hours to get a warrant.