Court Opinion

ID: 9537640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:20:47.94888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:51.717957
License: Public Domain

LOPEZ, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent.' The majority base their reversal of this appeal upon the “inadvertent submission of plaintiffs’ requested instructions to the jury.” The majority opinion states “[t]he judge and counsel went into the jury room. The judge told the jurors of the mistake, and asked them if they could disregard the incorrect instructions and consider only the correct ones. All said they could.” (Emphasis added.) Only the jurors know what occurred inside their deliberation chamber. The jurors reported to the court that they could fairly decide the case, notwithstanding the inclusion of incorrect instructions. I believe that we should abide by what the jurors told the court. The majority opinion concludes by stating that “[w]e hold that under the circumstances presented here, the defendants did not receive a fair trial.” I would agree with much of the majority’s holding if I accepted the premise that the facts, circumstances and legal authorities can reasonably be read and interpreted only as they would do so. But I do not agree with that premise. My conclusion is that there are other reasonable constructions and interpretations of the facts, circumstances and legal authorities applicable to the case at bar. The late Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Oliver Wendel Holmes, once said that the trial of a case is never perfect because it is conducted by human beings and not machines. Errors do frequently occur, and that is the reason why a motion for a mistrial or new trial is directed by law to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See also State v. Perrin, 93 N.M. 73, 596 P.2d 516 (1979); Hill v. Burnworth, 85 N.M. 615, 514 P.2d 1312 (Ct.App.1973). Applying the above principles to the case at bar, and considering all facts, circumstances and legal authorities, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s mistrial and new trial motions. Since the majority has not addressed the issue of excessiveness of damages, I will only state my opinion that the award of damages was not excessive. See Lujan v. Reed, 78 N.M. 556, 434 P.2d 378 (1967). I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects and order that the appellants pay the costs on appeal.