Court Opinion

ID: 9919396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:05:16.349309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.784366
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13375

               COMMONWEALTH   vs.   BLAKE SCANLON.

                        January 18, 2024.

Supreme Judicial Court, Superintendence of inferior courts.
     District Attorney. Attorney at Law, Disqualification.
     Constitutional Law, Separation of powers.

     The Commonwealth appeals from a judgment of a single
justice of this court denying its petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

     Background. In April 2019, a Hampden County grand jury
indicted the defendant, Blake Scanlon, on one count of murder in
the first degree, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 1; and one
count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, in
violation of G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b). Two years later, in April
2021, a Hampshire County grand jury indicted Scanlon on one
count of solicitation to commit witness intimidation and two
counts of solicitation to commit murder, all in violation of
G. L. c. 274, § 8. The victim of one of the counts of
solicitation to commit murder in the Hampshire County case is
the prosecutor in the Hampden County case, Matthew Green. On
the basis that, through certain of his own actions, Green made
himself a potential witness at trial, Scanlon filed a motion to
disqualify him, as well as the whole of the district attorney's
office for the Hampden district, from prosecuting the Hampden
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County indictment, and to instead appoint a special
prosecutor.1,2

     After a hearing, a judge in the Superior Court allowed
Scanlon's motion to the extent that it sought to disqualify
Green, but she denied it to the extent that it sought to
disqualify the entire office of the Hampden district attorney.3
The Commonwealth thereafter filed a petition pursuant to G. L.
c. 211, § 3, arguing that the judge abused her discretion in
disqualifying Green. A single justice denied the petition on
the basis that the disqualification order did not constitute an
abuse of discretion. The Commonwealth appeals.

     Scanlon's motion to disqualify Green stems from Green's
involvement with Christopher Fiorentino, a so-called jailhouse
informant, who was incarcerated with Scanlon at the Hampshire
County house of correction. Fiorentino told State police
investigators that Scanlon had made statements and admissions
about the murder, and that Scanlon had tried to engage
Fiorentino in a murder-for-hire plot targeting both Green and
several Commonwealth witnesses. The Commonwealth and Fiorentino
entered into an agreement providing that in exchange for

     1 Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7, as appearing in 471
Mass. 1434 (2015):

     "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the
     lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

          "(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

          "(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of
     legal services rendered in the case; or

          "(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work
     substantial hardship on the client."

     2 Although the defendant initially appeared to indicate that
the basis for the disqualification motion was that the
prosecutor was the victim of one of the counts of solicitation
to commit murder, he later clarified that this was not the basis
for the motion.

     3 The judge subsequently denied the Commonwealth's motion
for reconsideration, in a written decision after a second
hearing, and then issued yet another (third) written decision,
on the Commonwealth's second motion for reconsideration.
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Fiorentino's cooperation with the Hampden district attorney's
office regarding the investigation and prosecution of Scanlon,
the Commonwealth would take Fiorentino's cooperation into
consideration in two contexts: (1) in resolving his pending
criminal matters within the Hampden district attorney's office;
and (2) to "assist and inform" the Worcester district attorney's
office regarding the resolution of his pending probation
violation in that county. The agreement was signed by Green.

     In the course of upholding the cooperation agreement, Green
appeared in court in Worcester County as least twice to, in
Green's own words, "advocate[]" for a lower sentence for
Fiorentino in connection with his probation violation in that
county.4 Green also advocated on Fiorentino's behalf several
times when Fiorentino sought modifications of certain conditions
of release that would apply once he becomes eligible for
release.

     These actions are what makes Green a potential witness at
Scanlon's murder trial. The Commonwealth has indicated that it
intends to call Fiorentino as a witness. If Fiorentino
testifies in conflict with any of the disclosures made by Green
regarding the cooperation agreement and Green's role in securing
lesser penalties for Fiorentino, Green may be called to testify.
Even if that does not happen -- that is, even if Fiorentino's
testimony is in line with what Green disclosed -- Scanlon has
indicated that he intends to deny the conversations with
Fiorentino and to vigorously cross-examine Fiorentino so as to
call Fiorentino's credibility into question and show bias in
favor of the Commonwealth. Either way, it seems likely that the
details of Green's involvement in Fiorentino's cooperation with
the Commonwealth will come to light at trial.

     Discussion. Disqualification of counsel is not a measure
to be taken lightly. See, e.g., Adoption of Erica, 426 Mass.
55, 58 (1997). In considering whether to disqualify counsel, a
judge "must closely scrutinize the facts before [him or her] to
determine whether a lawyer's 'continued participation as counsel
taints the legal system.'" Smaland Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Genova,

    4  In connection with Fiorentino's probation violation in
Worcester County, the Worcester district attorney's office
initially requested a longer sentence; Green persuaded them to
agree to a lower recommendation, which the judge ultimately
imposed, over the objection of the probation department. Green
also agreed to reduce Fiorentino's bail on a pending matter in
Hampden County.
                                                                   4

461 Mass. 214, 224-225 (2012), quoting Borman v. Borman, 378
Mass. 775, 788 (1979). See also, e.g., Slade v. Ormsby, 69
Mass. App. Ct. 542, 546 (2007) (motions to disqualify are, by
their nature, intensely fact specific, and charges of conflict
of interest warrant searching review before ordering
disqualification). There is no question that the judge did that
here, that she engaged in the requisite analysis and gave due
consideration to the facts and circumstances of this case, as
evidenced by the multiple hearings and her three written
decisions.

     Pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.7 (a), as appearing in 471
Mass. 1434 (2015), a lawyer "shall not act as advocate at a
trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness."
See note 1, supra. The Commonwealth argues that the judge erred
in disqualifying Green on the basis that he is only a
"potential" witness and not inevitably "likely to be a necessary
witness." Moreover, the Commonwealth argues, even if Green were
a necessary witness, there are other means by which information
within Green's personal knowledge could be elicited at trial,
i.e., other witnesses who could testify to the same information
or certain facts to which the Commonwealth would stipulate,
obviating the need for some witness testimony. See Smaland
Beach Ass'n, Inc., 461 Mass. at 221 ("judges . . . should
consider whether the information sought from the attorney-
witness can be presented in a different manner").

     It is not, however, clear that this is so, and indeed,
Scanlon argues that there is certain information that is not
otherwise obtainable if not from Green himself, due in part to
the degree to which Green inserted himself into Fiorentino's
cases. To the extent that the Commonwealth suggests that
Scanlon is using Green's role as a potential witness to
"tactical advantage" and "as a weapon to maneuver [opposing
counsel's] withdrawal," see id., we find no merit to this
argument. Although a cooperation agreement between the
Commonwealth and one of its witnesses, and the revelation of
such an agreement at trial, is by no means extraordinary, the
level of Green's involvement with Fiorentino was extensive, and
Scanlon's concerns are well founded. The judge, in short, did
not err in concluding that precluding Scanlon from calling Green
as a witness was not a viable option in the circumstances.

     The Commonwealth also argues that the judge's
disqualification of Green raises separation of powers concerns,
and violates art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
because it constitutes improper judicial interference in an
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executive branch decision, i.e., the district attorney's
discretion to choose the prosecutor. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Cheney, 440 Mass. 568, 574 (2003), and cases cited (judicial
review of decisions within executive discretion of prosecutor
constitutes "intolerable interference by the judiciary in the
executive department" and violates art. 30 [citation omitted]).
The argument is not persuasive. The judge's decision was not
baseless -- she did not arbitrarily or with no reason disqualify
a prosecutor, and she only disqualified Green, not the entire
office as Scanlon had requested. Additionally, this is not a
case of a judicial ruling that bears on whether to prosecute.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rosa, 491 Mass. 369, 372 (2023), and
cases cited (decision to proceed with prosecution lies
exclusively with executive branch). In short, the judge's
decision does not amount to an "intolerable interference by the
judiciary" in the executive branch. This is simply a case where
a judge made a discretionary decision, based on the particular
circumstances of the case, to disqualify an attorney who may
well be a witness at trial.

     Conclusion. The single justice did not err or abuse his
discretion in affirming the trial court judge's decision and in
denying relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3.5

                                   Judgment affirmed.

     Lee Baker, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Marissa Elkins for the defendant.

    5  The judge's decision to allow the motion to disqualify
Green was based in part on the appearance of impropriety. Our
decision is not based on that issue -- and we express no view on
that issue -- but rather on the level to which Green was engaged
with Fiorentino's cases and circumstances.