Court Opinion

ID: 9404659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 19:04:19.563774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.899678
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                          Electronically Filed
                                          Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                          CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                          23-JUN-2023
                                          08:11 AM
                                          Dkt. 68 OP

              IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                     OF THE STATE OF HAWAI#I

                            ---o0o---

                     SURVIVORS OF PAUL JOKIEL,
           Claimant-Appellee/Appellee/Cross-Appellee,
                                  v.
             UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, STATE OF HAWAI#I,
                  Employer-Appellant/Appellant,
                                 and
            FiRMS CLAIMS SERVICES, Insurance Carrier-
                        Appellant/Appellant,
                                 and
                    SPECIAL COMPENSATION FUND,
                Appellee/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

                       NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

  APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS APPEALS BOARD
          (CASE NO. AB 2017-111 and DCD NO. 2-16-48369)

                          JUNE 23, 2023

      HIRAOKA, PRESIDING JUDGE, NAKASONE AND MCCULLEN, JJ.

               OPINION OF THE COURT BY HIRAOKA, J.
          This appeal involves a claim for dependents' death
benefits under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 386-41 (2015),
part of the Hawai#i Workers' Compensation Law. In Survivors of
Young v. Island Feeling, Inc., 109 Hawai#i 255, 125 P.3d 476
(2005), as corrected (Jan. 26, 2006), the supreme court held that
  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

the maximum weekly benefit rate (MWBR) on the date of the
employee's death, rather than the date of injury, applies to
dependents' death benefits. Id. at 260, 125 P.3d at 481. This
appeal involves a dispute over how the amount of a dependent's
weekly death benefit is to be calculated under the statute.

                              I. BACKGROUND

           Paul Jokiel was employed by Employer-Appellant/
Appellant University of Hawai#i. He died on April 28, 2016. His
surviving spouse, Carole Ann Jokiel, made a workers' compensation
claim for dependents' death benefits. The University of Hawai#i
and Insurance Carrier-Appellant/Appellant FiRMS Claims Services
(together, UH) made a claim for contribution from Appellee/
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Special Compensation Fund (SCF).1
           The Director of the Department of Labor and Industrial
Relations awarded Carole Ann weekly benefits of $812 for 312
weeks, for a total of $253,344, from UH. The Director concluded
that SCF was not liable for benefits.
          UH appealed the Director's decision to the Labor and
Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB). UH and SCF settled
their dispute over apportionment of benefits. The remaining
issue before LIRAB was: "What is the proper calculation of
[Carole Ann]'s death benefit rate for this claim[?]"
          UH filed a motion for partial summary judgment, in
which SCF joined. They sought "to correct the [weekly] death
benefit calculation [from $812] to $608.97[.]" A majority of
LIRAB denied the motion, with the Chair dissenting.
          LIRAB issued its Decision and Order on March 8, 2019.
The majority concluded that "the proper . . . weekly death
benefit rate . . . is $1,186.39."         LIRAB's Chair dissented,

      1
            SCF is a trust fund administered by the State of Hawai#i. HRS
§ 386-151(a) (2015). It is funded by annual levies upon workers' compensation
insurers, HRS § 386-153 (2015), and uninsured employers and self-insurance
groups, HRS § 386-154 (2015).

                                      2
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

determining that Carole Ann should have been awarded "weekly
dependent benefits of $608.97[.]"
          UH and SCF filed a joint motion for reconsideration.
LIRAB denied reconsideration on June 21, 2019, with the Chair
dissenting. UH appealed, and SCF cross-appealed.2

                       II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

          Appellate review of a LIRAB decision is governed by the
provisions of HRS § 91-14(g). Survivors of Young, 109 Hawai#i at
258, 125 P.3d at 479 (applying HRS § 91–14(g) (1993)). The
statute currently provides:

          Upon review of the record, the court may affirm the decision
          of the agency or remand the case with instructions for
          further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
          decision and order if the substantial rights of the
          petitioners may have been prejudiced because the
          administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders
          are:

                (1)   In violation of constitutional or statutory
                      provisions;
                (2)   In excess of the statutory authority or
                      jurisdiction of the agency;
                (3)   Made upon unlawful procedure;

                (4)   Affected by other error of law;

                (5)   Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
                      probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
                      record; or

                (6)   Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
                      abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
                      exercise of discretion.

HRS § 91-14(g) (Supp. 2021).
          UH and SCF challenge LIRAB's interpretation of HRS
§ 386-41. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law
reviewable de novo." Survivors of Young, 109 Hawai#i at 259, 125
P.3d at 480 (citation omitted).

     2
          Carole Ann did not file an answering brief.

                                    3
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

          When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to
          ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
          legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
          language contained in the statute itself. And we must read
          statutory language in the context of the entire statute and
          construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

Id. at 260, 125 P.3d at 481 (citation omitted).

                            III. DISCUSSION
          A.    Statutory Language

          HRS § 386-41 (2015) provides, in relevant part:

                (b)   Weekly benefits for dependents. In addition,
          the employer shall pay weekly benefits to the deceased's
          dependents at the percentages of the deceased's average
          weekly wages specified below, taking into account not more
          than the maximum weekly benefit rate prescribed in section
          386-31 divided by .6667 and not less than the minimum
          prescribed in the section divided by .6667.[3]

                To the dependent widow, widower, or reciprocal
          beneficiary, if there are no dependent children, fifty per
          cent.

(Emphasis added.) The record does not indicate that Paul and
Carole Ann had any dependent children.
          LIRAB found, and UH and SCF do not dispute, that Paul's
average weekly wages (AWW) were $2,372.77. Thus, for purposes of
HRS § 386-41(b), the "percentages of the deceased's [AWW]
specified below" are ($2,372.77 x .50) or $1,186.39. That was
Carole Ann's weekly death benefit rate calculated by the LIRAB
majority.
          HRS § 386-41(b), however, "cap[s] death benefits by
reference to 'the maximum weekly benefit rate prescribed in
section 386–31.'" Survivors of Young, 109 Hawai#i at 261, 125
P.3d at 482. HRS § 386-31 (2015) provides, in relevant part:

          (a) Permanent total disability. Where a work injury causes
          permanent total disability the employer shall pay the
          injured employee a weekly benefit equal to sixty-six and
          two-thirds per cent of the employee's average weekly wages,
          subject to the following limitation:

     3
          The minimum weekly benefit rate is not relevant to this case.

                                    4
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                Beginning January 1, 1975, and during each succeeding
          twelve-month period thereafter, not more than the state
          average weekly wage last determined by the director, rounded
          to the nearest dollar, nor less than $38 or twenty-five per
          cent of the foregoing maximum amount, rounded to the nearest
          dollar, whichever is higher.

(Emphasis added.) "[T]he MWBR used to calculate death benefits
is the state [AWW] last determined by the director at the time of
death." Survivors of Young, 109 Hawai#i at 261, 125 P.3d at 482.
The parties agree that the state AWW for 2016 (the year Paul
died) was $812.00. That was Carole Ann's weekly death benefit
rate as calculated by the Director.
          However, the HRS § 386-41(b) weekly benefit limit is
"the [MWBR] prescribed in section 386-31 divided by .6667[.]"
(Emphasis added.) The 2016 MWBR, $812.00, divided by .6667
equals $1,217.94. The $1,217.94 benefit limit is greater than
fifty per cent of Paul's AWW ($1,186.39). Accordingly, under HRS
§ 386-41(b), Carole Ann is entitled to a dependent death benefit
of $1,186.39 per week. The LIRAB majority's calculation was
consistent with Survivors of Young and the plain language of HRS
§§ 386-41 and 386-31.
           UH and SCF rely on Survivors of Okimoto v. State, Dep't
of Transp., Case No. AB 80-81 (2-78-26114). They argue that
under Survivors of Okimoto, because Paul's AWW ($2,372.77) were
more than the 2016 HRS § 386-41(b) weekly benefit limit
($1,217.94), the latter amount should be reduced by fifty per
cent to calculate Carole Ann's dependent death benefit of $608.97
under HRS § 386-41(b). But this runs counter to the plain
language of HRS § 386-41(b). The "taking into account" language
in the statute compares "the percentages of the deceased's [AWW]
specified below" (in this case, $1,186.39) — not the deceased's
straight AWW — with the weekly benefit limit (in this case,
$1,217.94). The calculation in Survivors of Okimoto is contrary
to the plain language of HRS §§ 386-31 and 386-41.
           UH makes an argument about the amendments to the
Hawai#i Workers' Compensation Law since 1955 and the "formulaic
expression contained in HRS § 386-41(b)" after the 1974

                                    5
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

amendments. But UH appears to misapply the statutory language by
multiplying the state AWW by .66674 instead of dividing by .66675
to obtain the maximum weekly dependent death benefit rate, as
required by HRS § 386-41(b); and by multiplying Paul's AWW by
.66676 instead of reducing it by "fifty per cent"7 to obtain "the
percentages of the deceased's average weekly wages specified
below" as required by HRS § 386-41(b) for a dependent widow with
no dependent children. UH's calculations are contrary to the
plain language of HRS § 386-41(b) applicable to this case.

          B.    Legislative Intent

          SCF makes an argument about legislative history and
intent, with which UH agrees. Legislative history is useful to
"discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to
promulgate and, thus, . . . determine if a literal construction
would produce an absurd or unjust result, inconsistent with the
policies of the statute."   Survivors of Medeiros v. Maui Land &
Pineapple Co., 66 Haw. 290, 297, 660 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983).

          A large number of cases have recognized that our workers'
          compensation statute has a beneficent purpose and should be
          afforded liberal construction in favor of the employee, to
          fulfill the humanitarian purposes for which it was enacted.
          Indeed, since the supreme court's first look at Hawaii's
          then new workers' compensation statute in 1916, analyses in
          these kinds of cases have been grounded on the humanitarian
          purposes premise.

Survivors of Young, 109 Hawai#i at 261, 125 P.3d at 482 (citation
omitted).
          The result we reach under the plain language of HRS
§§ 386-31 and 386-41 allows the spouse of a deceased employee who
was earning more than the state AWW to receive compensation

     4
          Which reduces the amount from $812 to $541.36.
     5
          Which increases the amount from $812 to $1,217.94.
     6
          Which reduces the amount from $2,372.77 to $1,581.93.
     7
          Which reduces the amount from $2,372.77 to $1,186.39.

                                    6
 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

consistent with the humanitarian purposes of the workers'
compensation law. Under UH's and SCF's interpretation of the
law, Carole Ann would receive a weekly benefit almost fifty per
cent less ($608.97) than the weekly benefit amount established by
the plain language of the law ($1,186.39). Our analysis does not
produce "an absurd and unjust result . . . clearly inconsistent
with the purposes and policies of the statute." Survivors of
Medeiros, 66 Haw. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1321 (citations omitted).
Rather, it is consistent with the humanitarian purposes for which
the workers' compensation law was enacted. It is UH's and SCF's
interpretations that are inconsistent with the humanitarian
purposes for which the Hawai#i Workers' Compensation Law was
enacted.

                         IV. CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the "Decision and
Order" of the LIRAB majority, filed on March 8, 2019, and the
"Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration" of the LIRAB majority,
filed on June 21, 2019.

On the briefs:
                                       /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Li-Ann Yamashiro,                      Presiding Judge
Staci I. Teruya,
Deputy Attorneys General,              /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Department of the Attorney             Associate Judge
General, State of Hawai#i,
for Appellee/Appellee/                 /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Cross-Appellant Special                Associate Judge
Compensation Fund,
Department of Labor
and Industrial Relations.

Kenneth T. Goya,
Steven L. Goto,
for Employer-Appellant/
Appellant University of Hawai#i
and Insurance Carrier-Appellant/
Appellant FiRMS Claims Services.

                                   7