Court Opinion

ID: 9689290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:27:02.565716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:46.707414
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(concurring, in part; dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s treatment of the superintending control issue. However, I respectfully dissent as to the appropriate construction of rule 37.15.
*108In ruling that rule 37.15 gave plaintiff the right to a discovery deposition, the trial judge weighed the ambiguity in plaintiffs favor. This approách is not the law. In Boyer-Campbell Co v Fry, 271 Mich 282, 296; 260 NW 165 (1935), the Court quoted United States v Moore, 95 US 760, 763; 24 L Ed 588, 589 (1877): "[T]he construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.” Furthermore, although an administrative agency’s interpretation is not controlling, it must be regarded as extremely persuasive. Artman v College Heights Mobile Park, Inc, 20 Mich App 193; 173 NW2d 833 (1969).
Plaintiff cites Gregory Boat Co v Detroit, 37 Mich App 673; 195 NW2d 290 (1972), and Rand v Civil Service Comm, 71 Mich App 581; 248 NW2d 624 (1976), in support of the trial judge’s ruling. In Gregory Boat, the Court states that, if a rule’s language is clear and unambiguous, reviewing courts will not go beyond its language. However, I find rule 37.15 somewhat ambiguous. The first clause, "in accordance with the Michigan general court rules”, does not clearly state to what it refers. Furthermore, it does not specify the extent of the agency’s discretion. The rule could be interpreted to vest complete discretion in the commission, or it could be interpreted just as easily to require the commission to give up its discretion and deny discovery depositions only where a circuit court judge would deny them. Therefore, Gregory Boat is inapplicable. Rand is also inapposite inasmuch as the Rand Court stated only that if an agency should depart from established procedure or rules, it must have sufficient evidence to support such a departure. However, the commis*109sion’s established procedure has been the routine denial of discovery depositions, as it has done in the instant case.
Overall, plaintiff has no constitutional right to discovery. In the Matter of Del Rio, 400 Mich 665; 256 NW2d 727 (1977). In fact, it has no statutory right to discovery depositions in administrative hearings because the APA (MCL 24.274; MSA 3.560[174]) provides that an agency may adopt rules allowing for discovery depositions to the extent and in the manner appropriate to its own proceedings. Plaintiff’s appearance before this Court is due to the ambiguity of rule 37.15, and the circuit court did not take the proper approach in interpreting this rule. Therefore, since defendant’s interpretation of rule 37.15 is in accord with its previous practice, and since the rule’s history makes it clear that defendant intended at least to retain discretionary power over allowing depositions, defendant’s interpretation of the rule should have been accepted. I would reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss.