Court Opinion

ID: 9723684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:27:13.939172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.079972
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J.
I concur in the judgment and in the holding that equitable title to the dominant parcel is sufficient for purposes of the “common ownership” requirement for an easement by necessity. I decline, however, to join in the majority’s discussion on the question of “undevelopability.” That discussion is wholly unnecessary to the resolution of this case, and I am not convinced that it makes a positive contribution to the law.
The majority declares that no easement of necessity should be recognized when the dominant parcel is undevelopable, because there is no necessity for access in such a case. This proposition was not raised by the parties, below or here. The whole issue has apparently grown out of a single sentence in defendant’s brief (i.e., “Defendants were foreclosed from offering evidence of the difficulty of developing the Roemer parcel and of the diminution in value of defendants’ parcel caused by the imposition of a right-of-way”). This sentence appears in a discussion of the trial court’s supposed error in rejecting the “defense” of “balancing of the equities.” Since the majority apparently agrees with me that no such defense was available to defendants, the exclusion of evidence in connection with such a defense cannot be error.
The majority concludes, however, that some such evidence (though not this evidence) would be admissible (in a proper case) to show that the element of necessity is missing. At this stage of the case it makes no difference whether the excluded evidence might have been admissible on this theory because there is no indication that the evidence was ever offered for any such purpose. (See Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a) [no reversal for exclusion of evidence unless record shows trial court was apprised of purpose of evidence]; People v. Wiley (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 149, 162 [129 Cal.Rptr. 13], disapproved on another point in People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 286-287 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] [on appeal, defend*210ant could not rely on theory of admissibility not imparted to trial court].) Therefore the majority’s consideration of the “undevelopability” issue is not necessary to the resolution of this case.
Nor am I prepared to agree that the theory announced by the majority is sound. I cannot determine what it means to say that land is “incapable of development,” and I fear litigants and judges will be as perplexed by this language as I am. I can think of three possible senses in which this phrase might be applied. The first is the sense of “absolute impossibility.” This seems to be the sense intended by the majority, for as noted below it declares evidence of economic infeasibility “clearly irrelevant.” Yet the idea of absolute impossibility has almost no meaning in the context of real estate development. Aside from the crater of an active volcano, there is probably no piece of land that cannot be developed, given a big enough investment of money and effort. Therefore the majority’s discussion seems to render this new defense largely unusable.
Although it does not say so, the majority may mean that the defense applies only where development is legally impossible, that is, barred by some regulation or ruling. Laws can be changed, however, and I wonder whether the majority really means to say that access to a given parcel can be forever precluded just because development happens to be prohibited when suit is brought.
If the defense announced by the majority is to have any reasonable application in the real world it must be predicated on a showing that development is economically infeasible. Yet the majority flatly rejects such a test, holding the evidence offered in this case “clearly irrelevant” (ante, at p. 207); that evidence consisted of the opinion of an expert that “it would not be economically feasible to construct a single family residence upon the Roemer parcel.”
I, too, doubt the wisdom of a rule which would condition the granting of an easement by necessity on a finding of economic feasibility. Economic feasibility, particularly in the residential setting, is in the eye of the potential owner. The offer of proof here suggested that construction of a house on the Roemer parcel might cost up to $200 per square foot, in contrast to $100 for other properties in the neighborhood. Yet who is to say that some buyer would not be willing to absorb the additional cost? And who is to say that economic and legal factors will not change in two, five, or twenty years, to make the infeasible feasible? I fail to see why such nebulous and transitory conditions should foreclose the use of land.
In this regard it should also be noted that the opinion equates the “utilization” of property and its “development.” Undeveloped property may be *211“utilized,” as any lover of nature will attest. One apparent effect of the suggested rule is to prevent the enjoyment of lands which must be left in a natural state. I am not satisfied that this is a good idea.
I also find unnecessary and inaccurate the majority’s discussion of plaintiffs’ motives for bringing suit. There is no evidence that plaintiffs intend to develop the property rather than sell it. In 1982 their attorney proposed that the Sparlings grant an easement in exchange for a share of proceeds from the sale of the property. Nor does anything in the record support the majority’s assertion that plaintiffs have demonstrated a “willingness to pay the cost of constructing [an] access road.” (Ante, at 207.) Plaintiffs have merely demonstrated a willingness to sue for a right to build such a road. Having prevailed, they can sell this right along with their property, the value of which it undoubtedly enhances. The bringing of suit may therefore reflect nothing more than a cost-benefit analysis whose particulars we can only guess at.
I would affirm the judgment without reaching issues not properly before us.