Court Opinion

ID: 9855355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:12.004271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:46.488325
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting in part):
I respectfully dissent from so much of the majority opinion as affirms the conspiracy convictions of appellants Edward Lee Gunn, Sr., Evelyn Gunn, Earl Childers, and Harold Moss. I would reverse their convictions for conspiracy on the grounds that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow appellants to inspect a South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) file on prosecution witness Roxanne Gregory and to use evidence revealed in the file for the purpose of impeaching the witness.
The majority concedes error on the part of the trial judge in holding that the SLED file evidence was not subject to disclosure under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. (2d) 215 (1963); and that the trial judge erred in weighing the prejudicial impact against the probative value of the controverted evidence where the issue was impeachment of a critical witness — instead of a defendant. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed. (2d) 481 (1985); State v. Bryant, 307 S.C. 458, 415 S.E. (2d) 806 (1992); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E. (2d) 103 (1979). Nonetheless, the majority affirms based upon its finding that the appellants failed to establish prejudice by the trial court’s rulings. The majority concludes that the excluded evidence was cumulative to other testimony by the witness that she was a drug user, had lied to police officers, and that when she was a junkie, she would do and had done anything to support her habit, including lying, cheating, stealing and prostitution.
The evidence at issue surrounds the arrest of Roxanne’s mother in 1986 on drug charges and the magistrate’s reduction of the mother’s initial cash bond to a personal recognizance. The magistrate resigned after an ensuing SLED investigation. Evidence in the SLED file indicated that the bond was reduced after Roxanne agreed to a sexual encounter with the magistrate. The trial judge reviewed the evidence in camera and refused to allow the appellants to inspect the SLED file or to use evidence from the file to impeach Roxanne.
I discern a pivotal distinction between the specific, documented SLED file evidence and a broad, ambiguous admission *141by an admitted drug user that she had lied about her involvement in the drug business, that she had prior drug-related and forgery convictions, and that she would do and had done anything to support her habit while she was a junkie.
Based upon a finding of cumulativeness, the trial court excluded the SLED file evidence — which tended to show that the witness had intentionally manipulated the judicial system to gain an advantage; that her questionable action had occurred even as the unlawful conspiracy was ongoing; and that there was an inference that she would engage in illegal or harmful conduct with a calculated, reckless disregard for the interests of others. Conversely, the admitted testimony that the trial court found to be ample on the issue of Roxanne’s credibility constituted little more than a confession to the stereotypical vices generally associated with the chronic drug dependency of a “junkie.”
I am convinced that any act tending to demonstrate a willingness to undermine the judicial system is far more egregious than other misdeeds and evinces a greater degree of culpability. In my view, the excluded evidence has unique relevance to Roxanne’s character with regard to the case on trial, and the appellants were entitled to disclosure and use of the evidence for witness impeachment.
The complex, bloated prosecution growing out of this case spanning from 1982 to 1989, involving several states, multiple counties in South Carolina, and numerous individuals tended to obscure significant issues and resulted in a convoluted trial. However, two facts are clear and undisputed; one, that there was a single constant in the conspiracy — each of the appellants had dealings with Roxanne; and two, that Roxanne was a crucial witness for the state. Given the fact that a substantial portion of the evidence required to establish a conspiracy is — by nature — subjective, witness credibility assumes paramount importance in arriving at the truth. See State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 454, 298 S.E. (2d) 215 (1982).
I would hold that the appellants were prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to permit counsel for the appellants to examine the SLED file and that their inability to conduct impeaching cross-examination of Roxanne based upon pertinent evidence from the SLED file denied the appellants the right to a fair trial. I would reverse appellant’s convictions for conspiracy.