Court Opinion

ID: 9640882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:37.205061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.496592
License: Public Domain

FONES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority says that the state unquestionably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process that would support banning solicitation of votes and distribution of campaign materials within the polling place itself. They seem to say that a ban of 25 feet from the entrance would probably pass constitutional muster. However, a 100 foot ban places an unpalatable, *215unjustified, unconstitutional restriction on free speech, according to the majority.
When a constitutional attack is made upon a legislative act, the Court is required to indulge every presumption in favor of its validity and resolve any doubt in favor of, rather than against, the constitutionality of the act. Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn.1976); Memphis Publishing Co. v. City of Memphis, 513 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn.1974) and Black v. Wilson, 182 Tenn. 623, 188 S.W.2d 609 (1945). The majority has totally ignored this presumption that binds this Court as firmly as any principle of law in the books.
The majority says that somewhere in the space of 75 feet a ban on vote solicitation becomes unconstitutional. It takes approximately 15 seconds to walk 75 feet. If the electorate of Tennessee is dependent upon the free speech available in the last 15 seconds before they enter the polling place, to cast an informed ballot, God help us.
I would indulge the presumption of validity this legislative act is entitled to receive in this Court and uphold the constitutionality of the 100 foot ban.