Court Opinion

ID: 9897439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:34.451189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:46.611215
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Mar 28 2023, 8:31 am

                                                                         CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew D. Anglemeyer                                     Theodore E. Rokita
Marion County Public Defender                             Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Evan Matthew Comer
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael T. Owens,                                         March 28, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          21A-CR-1900
        v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Angela Dow
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Davis, Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D27-1902-F3-4274

                                Opinion by Judge Weissmann
                                Judges May and Crone concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023                           Page 1 of 8
      Weissmann, Judge.

[1]   Twenty-one days before Michael Owens’s scheduled jury trial, the State

      amended its charging information to allege that Owens was a habitual offender.

      Owens did not then object to the amendment, but needing additional time to

      secure certain witnesses, he requested a continuance of his trial date. Eighteen

      months later, Owens was tried and convicted of all charges and sentenced to a

      total of 40 years in prison, including a 10-year habitual offender enhancement.

      Owens appeals only the enhancement, claiming the State’s habitual offender

      amendment was untimely. Because his claim rests on a faulty reading of

      Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(e), we affirm. However, we sua sponte remand to

      correct a sentencing error.

      Facts
[2]   In February 2019, Owens twice punched his girlfriend, Candiance Day, in the

      face. He then pulled a gun on Day and shot her in the face, back, and leg. The

      gun was loaded with “birdshot,” and Day survived the attack. Tr. Vol. II, pp.

      196-97. However, the shooting left her blind in one eye.

[3]   In connection with the incident, the State charged Owens with attempted

      murder, aggravated battery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious

      violent felon (SVF). The trial court initially set the case for a jury trial to begin

      on April 29, 2019. But due to court congestion and continuances, the trial date

      was reset numerous times.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023            Page 2 of 8
[4]   On February 3, 2020—21 days before Owens’s fifth trial setting and a year after

      charges were initially filed—the State amended its charging information to

      allege that Owens was a habitual offender. Two weeks later, the fifth trial

      setting was continued because Owens needed additional time to secure certain

      witnesses. After several more trial settings, Owens’s jury trial finally began on

      August 10, 2021.

[5]   At the outset of trial, Owens moved to dismiss the habitual offender

      enhancement as untimely. The trial court took the motion under advisement

      but eventually denied it, noting that the State had filed its habitual offender

      amendment 18 months earlier. Ultimately, Owens was convicted of all three

      charges and found to be a habitual offender.

[6]   At sentencing, the trial court “merged” Owens’s convictions for aggravated

      battery and attempted murder due to double jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. III, p.

      159; App. Vol. II, p. 9. The court then sentenced Owens to 30 years in prison

      for attempted murder, plus a 10-year habitual offender enhancement. The court

      also sentenced Owens to a concurrent prison term for unlawful possession of a

      firearm by a SVF. Thus, Owens received an aggregate sentence of 40 years.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Owens only appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the habitual

      offender enhancement. But we also address sua sponte the trial court’s attempt

      to resolve its double jeopardy concerns by merging, without vacating, Owens’s

      conviction for aggravated battery.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023         Page 3 of 8
      I. Habitual Offender
[8]   Owens argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the

      habitual offender enhancement because the State failed to show good cause for

      its allegedly belated filing of the habitual offender amendment. The State claims

      it timely filed the amendment and, therefore, was not required to show good

      cause. Resolution of this issue hinges on our interpretation of Indiana Code §

      35-34-1-5(e), which states:

               An amendment of an indictment or information to include a
               habitual offender charge under IC 35-50-2-8 must be made at
               least thirty (30) days before the commencement of trial. However,
               upon a showing of good cause, the court may permit the filing of
               a habitual offender charge at any time before the commencement
               of the trial if the amendment does not prejudice the substantial
               rights of the defendant.

      (emphasis added).

[9]   Owens contends that the phrase “before the commencement of trial” means

      before the trial date on the books when the habitual offender amendment is

      filed. The State counters that the phrase means before the beginning of trial,

      whenever that may occur. We agree with the State.1

      1
        In arguing that the deadline is measured from the trial date in place when the State files its habitual offender
      amendment, Owens cites to this Court’s decision in Campbell v. State, 161 N.E.3d 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
      But Campbell only concerned whether good cause existed for the State’s belated habitual offender
      amendment. Id. at 376-77. The untimeliness of that amendment was not contested, and this Court did not
      interpret Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(e) and its phrase “before the commencement of trial.”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023                                    Page 4 of 8
[10]   “When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to fulfill the legislature’s

       intent.” Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “And the ‘best evidence’

       of that intent is the statute’s language.” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d

       793, 798 (Ind. 2012)). “If that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply

       apply its plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it ‘does say’ and what

       it ‘does not say.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind.

       2003). Moreover, “[w]hen interpreting a statute, we seek to give effect to its

       enacted terms.” State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 154 (Ind. 2022).

[11]   The word “commencement” plainly and ordinarily means “the beginning of

       something.” Commencement, Cambridge Online Dictionary, https://dictionary.

       cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/commencement (last visited Mar. 9,

       2023).2 Read together, the two sentences of Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(e) clearly

       and unambiguously require a showing of good cause only when a habitual

       offender amendment is filed less than 30 days before the beginning of trial.

       They do not measure the deadline simply from a trial date.

[12]   In fact, the phrases “commencement of trial” and “trial date” are both used to

       establish deadlines throughout the Indiana Criminal Code. See, e.g., Ind. Code §

       35-34-1-10 (using “commencement of trial” as deadline for joinder motion);

       Ind. Code § 35-34-1-12 (using same as deadline for severance or separate trial

       motion); Ind. Code § 35-36-8-3 (using same as deadline for pretrial conference);

       2
        See also Commence, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
       commence (last visited Mar. 9, 2023) (defining “commence” to mean “start” or “begin”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023                           Page 5 of 8
       Ind. Code § 35-36-8-1(c)(3) (using “trial date” as omnibus date); Ind. Code § 35-

       36-11-2 (using same to measure deadline for prosecution to file notice of intent

       to introduce the laboratory report); Ind. Code § 35-36-9-5 (using “initial trial

       date” to measure deadline for trial court to rule on defense petition alleging

       intellectual disability).

[13]   The repeated use of both terms throughout the Criminal Code demonstrates our

       legislature’s intent that a habitual offender amendment be filed no less than 30

       days before the beginning of trial as opposed to a particular trial setting. See Ind.

       Code § 35-34-1-5(e). If the legislature intended the deadline to be measured

       from the “trial date” in place when the State files its amendment, it would have

       chosen that language. We therefore conclude that the 30-day deadline of

       Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5(e) is measured from the date on which trial actually

       begins.

[14]   Our Supreme Court seemingly has reached a similar conclusion in the context

       of a joinder motion under Indiana Code § 35-34-1-10(b). Dorsey v. State, 490

       N.E.2d 260, 265 (Ind. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658

       N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). That statute generally allows a trial court to join for

       trial separate informations charging a defendant with two or more related

       offenses. Ind. Code § 35-34-1-10(b). However, a motion for such joinder must

       be made “before commencement of trial on either of the offenses charged.” Id.

       (emphasis added).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023          Page 6 of 8
[15]   In Dorsey, the State moved for a continuance on the morning of a burglary trial,

       before prospective jurors were brought in for voir dire, because the defendant’s

       alibi witnesses were unavailable to testify. The State also filed a motion under

       Indiana Code § 35-34-1-10(b), seeking to join for trial a related theft charge

       against the defendant. The trial court granted both motions, and on appeal, the

       defendant argued that the joinder was erroneous “due to the possible confusion

       and prejudice to a defendant facing multiple charges.” Dorsey, 490 N.E.2d at

       265. Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding the

       alleged prejudice was only “that which is inevitable in every joinder case.” Id.

       In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that joinder motions must be filed

       “before commencement of trial.” Id. The Court also observed: “the submission

       of the [burglary] case to trial was withdrawn and thus, for the purposes of

       [joinder], the trial had not yet commenced.” Id.

[16]   In Owens’s case, the State filed its habitual offender amendment on February 3,

       2020. Though his trial was then-scheduled to begin 21 days later, it did not

       actually begin for another 18 months. Accordingly, the amendment was filed

       within 30 days of the commencement of Owens’s trial. Because the amendment

       was timely, the State was not required to show good cause under Indiana Code

       § 35-34-1-5(e), and the trial court did not err in denying Owens’s motion to

       dismiss the habitual offender enhancement.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023         Page 7 of 8
       II. Merger
[17]   We sua sponte address the trial court’s “merger” of Owens’s convictions for

       aggravated battery and attempted murder. Both the abstract of judgment and

       sentencing order list “Conviction Merged” as the disposition of the aggravated

       battery charge. App. Vol. II, pp. 23, 25. Because it appears the trial court

       entered judgment of conviction on the aggravated battery charge, merging the

       offenses was not enough to resolve the court’s double jeopardy concern. See

       Spry v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“Merging, without

       also vacating [lesser included] convictions, is not sufficient.”). As the parties do

       not contest the trial court’s double jeopardy determination, we remand this case

       to the trial court to vacate the “merged” conviction for aggravated battery in

       both its sentencing order and abstract of judgment.

[18]   Affirmed and remanded.

       May, J., and Crone, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 21A-CR-1900 | March 28, 2023          Page 8 of 8