Court Opinion

ID: 9710220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:37.873866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:50.116449
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
This case involves a claim for workers’ compensation benefits for the chronic alcoholism suffered by plaintiff. We must determine whether, under the circumstances extant in this case, chronic alcoholism suffered by plaintiff who, during breaks drank beer provided free by Stroh Brewery pursuant to a collectively bargained contract provision negotiated by the union is compensable under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act1 as a personal injury which arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment. This is a matter of first impression in the courts of this state.2_
*614On the basis of the record before us, we are unable to discern from the opinion of the wcab whether it applied the appropriate legal standard and found as fact that plaintiffs chronic alcoholism was not an ordinary disease of life to which brewery workers are no more prone than the general public. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the board for further findings of fact. We retain no jurisdiction.
i
FACTS
Plaintiff Casimer Gacioch3 began working for Stroh Brewery on February 24, 1947. At this time, Mr. Gacioch was predisposed to alcoholism, however, he had not become an uncontrolled alcoholic. Beer was provided free and was available to all employees on the job at "designated relief areas” at the Stroh Brewery plant. The beer was made available through a collectively bargained contract provision negotiated by the union. Employees could drink the beer during their breaks and lunch periods. There was no limit on how much beer an employee could drink during these breaks. Mr. Gacioch testified that at the time he was hired he drank three to four bottles of beer on the weekends. He did not drink alcohol during the week. Over the years of his employment at Stroh Brewery, Gacioch drank free beer during his breaks and at lunch until his consumption increased to nine to twelve bottles a day. Gacioch was not required to drink the beer. He was not, for example, a taster. Gacioch worked in production. *615He was responsible for running a machine, feeding cases of beer to a "soaker” at a set speed.
Stroh Brewery became aware of Gacioch’s drinking problem, and in 1973 plaintiff entered a written agreement with the company and the union which stated that he was no longer allowed to drink on the job. Gacioch breached the agreement and signed a second agreement some seven months later. Notwithstanding the written agreement, he continued to drink on the job and gradually became unable to perform his work. Gacioch was fired on August 30, 1974, because he was intoxicated on the job. Dr. Smith, one of plaintiff’s experts, testified that at the time Mr. Gacioch was terminated he was drinking more off than on the job.
From April, 1976, until September, 1978, Mr. Gacioch worked part-time as a custodian for a parish church. He continued to drink while working at the church. During the time he was employed at the church, he was pursuing a workers’ compensation claim against Stroh Brewery. On August 18, 1977, he filed a petition for hearing which alleged that he was disabled because of alcoholism.4 Deposition testimony of three experts was received into evidence. Dr. Smith testified that the "[a]vailability of alcoholic beverages at work were [sic] not causative in Mr. Gacioch’s disease but did shape its course.” Dr. Tanay testified that the free availability of alcohol during working hours was a significant contributing factor to the development of Mr. Gacioch’s alcoholism. Notwithstanding this testimony, the hearing referee found that "although free alcoholic beverages were provided by the defendant as a fringe benefit pursuant to a union contract, the plaintiff abused this *616privilege on his own volition and said abuse was not condoned or tolerated by the employer.” The hearing referee denied benefits, concluding that "the plaintiffs illness (chronic alcoholism) was not caused, aggravated or accelerated by conditions characteristic and peculiar to the business of the defendant-employer.”
Plaintiff appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. While that appeal was pending, Mr. Gacioch died, and his widow, Wanda Gacioch, was appointed personal representative and was substituted as party plaintiff. In a comprehensive twenty-three page opinion, the appeal board reversed the decision of the hearing referee. The appeal board found that alcoholism is a disease, and, therefore, plaintiff did not abuse the free-beer policy on his own volition. The board also found that the free-beer policy accelerated plaintiffs alcoholism. The board concluded that plaintiff was disabled due to alcoholism and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff compensation benefits. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the award of compensation benefits was affirmed two to one in an unpublished per curiam opinion.
ii
The statute in effect on the last day of plaintiffs employment at Stroh Brewery read:
An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is subject to the provisions of this act, at the time of such injury, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent provided in this act, or in case of his death resulting from such injuries the compensation shall be paid to his dependents as defined in this act. Time of injury or date of injury as used in this act in *617the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event shall be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability or death. [1969 PA 317, MSA 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1).]
"Personal injury” shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable. A hernia to be compensable must be clearly recent in origin and result from a strain arising out of and in the course of the employment and promptly reported to the employer. [1969 PA 317, MCL 418.401(c); MSA 17.237(401)(c). Emphasis supplied.][5]_
*618Defendants contend that alcoholism is not a disease, but, rather, a "social aberration.” All three experts testifying in this case, Drs. Smith and Tanay, plaintiffs experts, and Dr. Rauch, defendants’ expert, referred to alcoholism as a disease. Dr. Smith described alcoholism as a "lifelong metabolic disease, much like diabetes.” Dr. Tanay testified that alcoholism is associated with particular personality disorders which begin during a person’s childhood. The wcab treated plaintiffs chronic alcoholism as a disease. Our review of the professional literature on the subject indicates that various organizations representing health care professionals have officially pronounced alcoholism as a disease.6 Hence, plaintiffs chronic alcoholism is a disease for purposes of the above statute.7
Plaintiff asserts that his chronic alcoholism was an occupational disease. We disagree. A review of the record indicates that the wcab also did not conclude that plaintiffs alcoholic condition was an occupational disease. The board treated plaintiffs *619alcoholism as an ordinary disease of life. The proper inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether plaintiffs chronic alcoholism was a disease or disability which was due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of Stroh and which arose out of and in the course of employment. In reaching the question concerning whether chronic alcoholism is a disease which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of Stroh and which arose out of and in the course of plaintiffs employment, we must be careful not to equate "circumstance” of employment with "out of and in the course of’ employment. McClure v General Motors (On Rehearing), 408 Mich 191; 289 NW2d 631 (1980). If chronic alcoholism can be categorized as an ordinary disease. of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment, plaintiff is not entitled to a workers’ compensation award. See Mills v Detroit Tuberculosis Sanitarium, 323 Mich 200; 35 NW2d 239 (1948).8 The pertinent question then is whether the board made specific findings as to whether brewery workers are more prone to develop chronic alcoholism than is the general public.
As the Court of Appeals stated in McClary v *620Wagoner, 16 Mich App 326, 328; 167 NW2d 800 (1969), in exercising our appellate function we must have more than conclusory statements to review. We must know how the board reached its conclusions. "The appeal board should indicate the testimony adopted, the standard followed and the reasoning it used in reaching its conclusion.”
We are unable to discern from the opinion of the board whether it found as fact that brewery workers are more prone to suffer from chronic alcoholism (an ordinary disease of life) than is the general public. Mills, supra. We note that none of the experts testifying in this case stated that plaintiffs alcoholism was due to the inherent characteristics and peculiarities of his employment in the brewery industry as a production worker responsible for running a machine.9 Dr. Smith, for example, testified that "Mr. Gacioch would have most likely become an alcoholic anyway and his drinking outside of work eventually [was] far greater than during work.” Dr. Rauch opined that individuals who are predisposed to alcoholism, like plaintiff herein, are likely to become an alcoholic no matter where they work.
We are unable to determine from the opinion of the wcab whether it understood the applicable legal standard and what facts it specifically relied upon in reaching its conclusion that plaintiffs alcoholism was compensable under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act.
We therefore remand this case to the wcab for its statement of the law and the specific facts *621relied upon to support its conclusion. McClary, supra. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Williams, C.J., concurred with Archer, J.
Levin and Cavanagh, JJ., concurred in the result only.

 MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301), which has been amended several times since the last day of plaintiffs work.

 We note that only one other case involving a workers’ compensation claim for chronic alcoholism has ever been filed with the wcab. In that case, the wcab concluded that the record did not support the "notion that . . . alcoholism which occurs in all walks of life is more prevalent in the brewery industry than in any other occupation . . . .” The board declined to find that alcoholism is an occupational disease for purposes of Chapter 4. The board denied the plaintiffs workers’ compensation claim, finding that the plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff did not appeal the wcab decision. See Kuttney v Stroh Brewery, unpublished opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, No. 815, decided November 15, 1982.

 Mr. Gacioch died on June 25, 1982, and his wife was substituted as party plaintiff under the wcab’s order dated November 10, 1982.

 Plaintiffs petition did not allege a Chapter 3 personal injury.

 Both of these provisions have been amended several times since plaintiff left work. MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301) presently provides:
An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. In the case of death resulting from the personal injury to the employee, compensation shall be paid to the employee’s dependents as provided in this act. Time of injury or date of injury as used in this act in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event shall be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions that resulted in the employee’s disability or death.
MCL 418.401(l)(b); MSA 17.237(401)(l)(b) provides:
"Personal injury” shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. An ordinary disease of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment is not compensable. Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions, shall be compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities shall be compensable *618when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof. A hernia to be compensable must be clearly recent in origin and result from a strain arising out of and in the course of the employment and be promptly reported to the employer.

 Organizations which have each officially pronounced alcoholism a disease include: The American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Public Health Association, American Hospital Association, American Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, World Health Organization, and the American College of Physicians. See Gitlow, "Alcoholism: A Disease,” in Alcoholism: Progress in Research and Treatment (1973), and Jellinek, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism (New Haven, Conn.: College & University Press, 1960).

 We note that some experts contend that calling alcoholism a disease is merely a "semantic trick” to counter the lingering belief that it is a vice. These experts, as well as other members of our society, decline to recognize alcoholism as a disease and refer to it instead as a behavior disorder, social problem, or a symptom. See Vaillant, The Natural History of Alcoholism (1983).

 In Mills, we were confronted with a workers’ compensation claim for tuberculosis. The plaintiff in Mills worked in the kitchen of the defendant’s sanitarium, washing dishes used by patients. The evidence showed that the only opportunity that the plaintiff had to come into contact with a bacillus of tuberculosis, the cause of the disease, was from the kitchen dishes.
The statute involved in Mills, like the statute in the instant case, provided that ordinary diseases of life were not compensable. While we recognized tuberculosis as an ordinary disease of life, we held that that fact alone did not render the resulting disability noncompensable. Because "plaintiff was exposed in his employment to the risk of contracting tuberculosis in a far greater degree and in a wholly different manner than is the public generally,” we found his disabling tuberculosis to be compensable. Id., 209.

 In 1975, the year after plaintiff’s last day of work at Stroh Brewery, almost ten million American adults were estimated to be either alcoholic or problem drinkers. This represented seven percent of the population eighteen years or older. See United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service Alcohol Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health National Data Book (January, 1980).