Court Opinion

ID: 9679259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:45:26.870967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.874406
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting).
The defendants were convicted by a jury in a consolidated trial for murder in the course of a robbery1 and kidnapping. Sentences of mandatory life imprisonment were subsequently imposed.
I. Facts
The crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendants took place in Grand Rapids on December 1, 1967. On that day one Emile Osbeck, the 67-year-old victim, ate lunch at his home in Grand Rapids. Osbeck departed from his home by car at approximately 12:30 p.m. and was next observed at a paint and wallpaper shop where he purchased several gallons of paint. Mr. Osbeck, carrying the paint which he had purchased, left the store, proceeding in the direction of the. parking lot, at *108approximately 12:50 p.m. This was the last time that he was seen, alive.
At approximately 1:15 p.m. Osbeck’s automobile is alleged to have been used by the defendants in the perpetration of an armed robbery of a Grand Rapids bank. Although the defendants were not charged with the bank robbery nor with murder committed in the course of the bank robbery, the evidence at trial consisted of proofs tending to show the defendants’ involvement in the bank robbery. In fact, establishing defendants’ involvement in the bank robbery in which the thieves fled in Osbeck’s car was imperative to the prosecution’s case, a case based entirely upon circumstantial evidence.
A few minutes after the bank robbery, at approximately 1:17 p.m., the Osbeck automobile was seen parked a short distance from the scene of the bank robbery. A witness observed three men emerge from the automobile, open the car trunk, and flee on foot. The witness, however, was unable to subsequently identify any of the defendants as the occupants of the automobile, although she did state that “one had something white on and one had something red on”. The Grand Rapids police discovered the parked automobile at approximately 1:20 p.m. and found the body of Emile Osbeck in the trunk.
A container of paint located in the front seat of the automobile had been apparently overturned and the wet white paint had been stepped in by the occupants. The police followed the footprints leading from the automobile — some paint was tracked away from the automobile and there had been a light snow in which the tracks could be discerned. The footprints led the police to an apartment building which consisted of three separate apartment units. Inside the apartment building the officers observed a spot *109of fresh white paint. As was subsequently discovered, defendant McCully and his wife had been living in the first floor apartment; the second floor apartment was rented by defendant Broyles.
Upon entering the apartment building, the officers knocked on the door of defendant Me Cully’s apartment and were greeted by Mrs. McCully. Mrs. McCully permitted the officers to search the apartment for suspects, but finding no one inside, the officers proceeded upstairs. Directly in front of the door leading to defendant Broyles’ apartment, the officers noticed “a spot on the floor that looked like water as if someone had been standing there with wet shoes”. Having failed to receive an answer, the officers cautiously entered the apartment, continuing their pursuit of the fleeing suspects. Although the apartment was subsequently found to be empty, the officers, without a warrant, seized the following items: a pair of shoes smeared with white paint, a red-hooded sweatshirt with a hole in the sleeve, a brown paper sack containing $943 in bills, the serial numbers of which matched those of like denomination stolen from the bank, a .22 caliber German revolver, and $1,740 in bills stolen from the bank.
These items were admitted into evidence at trial, notwithstanding motions to suppress and objections tendered by the defendants. A more detailed discussion of the items seized, as well as the circumstances surrounding the search, will appear in a subsequent part of this opinion.
On the following day, December 2, 1967, the police officers returned to the apartment building with a search warrant and thoroughly searched the apartment units. Pursuant to this search warrant, the following items were seized from defendant McCully’s apartment: $1,500, which appears to have *110been stolen from the bank, a .25 caliber pistol, and .22 caliber ammunition. These items were introduced into evidence at trial.
Defendant Broyles and defendant MeCully appeared at the Grand Rapids Hall of Justice at approximately 2:20 p.m. on December 1, 1967, to be sentenced on a prior conviction. After being sentenced and while in the custody of the Grand Rapids police, both defendants were arrested and charged with the murder of Emile Osbeck. Defendant Carter, although arrested on December 14, 1967, for an unrelated crime, was charged with the instant offense on January 11,1968. A Mr. Welford, who was in possession of defendant McCully’s automobile, was taken into custody later in the afternoon of December 1, 1967. Defendant Mc-Cully’s automobile, which had been parked by Mr. Welford outside a pool hall, was seized and impounded by the police at that time. On December 4, 1967, three days after the automobile was seized and impounded, the police, without obtaining a warrant, searched defendant McCully’s automobile and discovered several .22 and .25 caliber cartridges in the glove compartment. These items were likewise introduced into evidence despite timely objections and motions to suppress.
During the trial the prosecutor’s theory was that Osbeck had been accosted by the defendants shortly after departing from the paint store. The defendants forced Osbeck to get into the trunk of his car, and then the defendants proceeded to utilize Osbeck’s automobile in their perpetration of the bank robbery. Mr. Osbeck, once inside the trunk, suffered a heart attack brought on by fear and excitement.2 Since *111the heart attack was fatal and since the death occurred during the perpetration of the theft of his automobile:, and thus a robbery, under CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548), that incident constituted first-degree murder.3 None of the defendants testified at trial.
A total of 26 issues have been raised by the defendants on appeal, but I do not deem it necessary to discuss all of them. Before proceeding, I should point out that the nature of this crime, as well as the termination of an innocent person’s life, have not made the performance of my duty easy. Yet, as distasteful as the outcome of a particular case may be, or the criticism which it may evoke, a judge must steadfastly adhere to and observe the principles and safeguards of human liberty enumerated in the Constitution of the United States. For, where conflict arises between constitutionally-guaranteed rights and expediency, the latter must yield.
Having made these prefatorial comments, I turn to the legal issues which I conclude make reversal of the instant convictions obligatory.
II.

Whether it was error to admit into evidence all of the items seized by the police, without a warrant, while searching defendants’ apartments in pursuit of suspected felonsf

A warrantless search is not necessarily violative of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 Certain recognized exceptions to the *112warrant requirement have been established, based upon the premise that in those exempted situations the warrant requirement itself is unreasonable. In other words, the exigencies of the situation do not make the warrantless search unreasonable.5
Judge Levin, in People v. McDonald (1968), 13 Mich App 226, 232, 233, stated:
“Searches, incident to a lawful arrest, or following a hot pursuit for instruments used in the commission of crime, its fruits, contraband and means of escape, have been held to be reasonable. But that does not mean every search incident to an arrest or following a hot pursuit is justified(Emphasis added.)
In the instant case the search was not incident to an arrest,6 because the search was not substan*113tially contemporaneous with the arrest nor confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. See Stoner v. California (1964), 376 US 483 (84 S Ct 889, 11 L Ed 2d 856); Agnello v. United States (1925), 269 US 20 (46 S Ct 4, 70 L Ed 145); Mosco v. United States (CA 9, 1962), 301 F2d 187. The search was completely unrelated to the arrest, both as to time and place. See Preston v. United States (1964), 376 US 364 (84 S Ct 881, 11 L Ed 2d 777); Stoner v. California, supra.
The facts of the instant case do, however, bring the warrantless search, at least initially, within the scope of the so-called “hot pursuit” exception. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967), 387 US 294 (87 S Ct 1642, 18 L Ed 2d 782).7 That is, the search was made in the course of “hot pursuit” of fleeing felons. While pursuing the suspected felons inside an apartment, the police, searching from room to room or in other areas where the suspects could reasonably have been expected to he hiding, have a right to seize certain objects which fall within their plain view. Harris v. United States (1968), 390 US 234 (88 S Ct 992, 19 L Ed 2d 1067); see People v. Eddington (1970), 23 Mich App 210.
There also exists the right, if the police in good faith believe the suspected felons to he present, to make a protective search for weapons to prevent “gravely endangering their lives or the lives of others.” Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, supra.
*114The “hot pursuit” exception does not, however, provide for an unlimited warrantless search. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, supra; People v. McDonald, supra. For the warrantless search to be legal in the instant pursuit situation, a fundamental prerequisite is that the police officers reasonably have believed that the pursued suspects were present in the apartment.8 Once the officers became aware of the fact that the suspects were not in the apartment, the exigency which permitted the warrantless search no longer existed.9
Therefore, the crucial issue is whether the objects seized during this warrantless search occurred during the pursuit of the suspected felons and while the officers reasonably believed the felons to be present. I conclude that the search and seizure of some of the items occurred after the officers discovered that the suspected felons were not present and, therefore, part of the search was illegal. Thus, it was error to admit the fruits of this illegal search into evidence.
Of the items seized, I conclude that the warrant-less search and seizure which produced the following items was reasonable: a pair of shoes smeared with white paint, a red-hooded sweatshirt with a hole in *115the sleeve,10 and a brown paper bag containing $943 in bills. These items were seized by the police in the course of their pursuit of the fleeing felons. The items were discovered as the officers moved from room to room reasonably searching places where the suspected felons might be hiding. Also, the items were discovered while the police reasonably believed the felons to be present in the apartment.
However, the warrantless search and seizure which produced the .22 caliber revolver and the $1,740 in stolen bills was conducted after the police concluded that the suspected felons were not present; the necessity for a protective search at that stage had ceased.
At the preliminary examination the investigating officer testified as to what occurred after the apartment had been searched for the suspected felons:
“I then called for the Police Identification Bureau Crime Lab for a crime search team to come to the scene to search the apartment. We waited for some period of time as they were working on the car at the parking lot. Officers Karpowicz and DeBok arrived at the scene [apartment], and they proceeded to check the crime scene [apartment]. We tagged the shoes and the red, pull-over jumper. I had the money already tagged. Officer Karpowicz and I located a .22 caliber Rohm pistol in the steel cabinet in the — at the foot of the bed in the bedroom in the apartment, and Officer Karpowicz was standing. I was standing right alongside of him and lifted up the seat of an overstuffed chair in the living room, which would be the center room of the three-room apartment; and under the seat was found another package of money [$1,740].”
*116Likewise, at trial the investigating officer testified as follows with respect to the seizure of the .22 caliber revolver and the $1,740 in bills.
(Direct examination):
“Q. Now what is the next thing that you recall you observed?
“A. We had the sweatshirt and the shoes and some money so I called for the identification bureau to come to the scene and at that time Officers Karpowicz and DeBok arrived at the scene and we checked the apartment over, in the metal cabinet in the bedroom of the south apartment, upstairs south apartment we found a revolver.
“Q. What type of revolver was it?
“A. A German make, I believe a Rohm.
“Q. Do you know the caliber of it?
“A. .22 I believe.
# S» #
“Q. What next then Inspector Pierce?
“A. Officer DeBok lifted the cushion of the chair in the middle room you have the kitchen and then you have this middle room and a bedroom. He lifted the cushion on the chair and there was a package in the chair we unwrapped the packed [sic] it contained some money.
“The Court: What apartment are you talking about?
“A. The upper south apartment, 648 Prospect.
“The Court: Is that the one you refer to as the Broyles apartment?
“A. That is correct.
“Q. You said he lifted the cushion and you saw?
“A. The package was under the cushion.
“Q. And you found what under the cushion?
“A. About $1,700.
“Q. Money?
“A. Yes, sir.
*117“Q. Was it wrapped in anything?
“A. A cloth.”
*41. M TV TV
TV TV
(Cross examination):
“Q. Is this after you had already decided there was not any people in the Broyles apartment?
“A. This particular find was afterwards, yes, sir. “Q. In other words you weren’t lifting up the cushion to see if there was anybody under the cushion?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. So that search that you are now describing was done after you had made a complete determination that the people you had gone into the house and were looking for, were not in fact there?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And you still hadn’t gotten the one?
“A. That is correct.
“Q. There wasn’t any reason at this point that you couldn’t have applied for a search warrant in the normal course was there?

“A. (No answer.)

“Q. You had the house surrounded didn’t you Inspector?
“A. Yes, sir.”
This extensive warrantless search, conducted after the officers were satisfied that the suspected felons were no longer present, cannot be accomplished under the pretense of “hot pursuit”. The testimony discloses that several police officers were on the scene and that they had the apartment building surrounded. The exigencies of the situation were not such as to make the warrant requirement unreasonable. See McDonald v. United States (1948), 335 US 451 (69 S Ct 191, 93 L Ed 153); Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 US 1 (88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889). See, generally, Chimel v. California (1969), 395 US 752 (89 S Ct 2034, 23 L Ed 2d 685); *118Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 US 30 (90 S Ct 1969, 26 L Ed 2d 409). The items thus seized should not have been admitted into evidence. Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643 (81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933).
III.

Whether the search of the defendant McCully’s automobile, without a warrant, three days after McGully had been arrested and the car tahen into custody by the police constituted an unlawful search¶

The items seized as the result of this warrantless search were .22 and .25 caliber ammunition. The items were found in the glove compartment of the car. Although motions to suppress and objections at trial were timely, the trial court admitted the items into evidence, relying on Harris v. United States (1968), 390 US 234 (88 S Ct 992, 19 L Ed 2d 1067), and Cooper v. California (1967), 386 US 58 (87 S Ct 788, 17 L Ed 2d 730). Defendant relied principally upon Preston v. United States (1964), 376 US 364 (84 S Ct 881, 11 L Ed 2d 777).
Harris can be distinguished since the objects seized in the instant case were not within the “plain view” of the officers. It has been suggested that Chimel v. California (1969), 395 US 752 (89 S Ct 2034, 23 L Ed 2d 685), although not recognized by this Court as retroactive,11 instructs that the rule in Preston, decided before Cooper, is the controlling law.12 However, the most recent examination of *119this issue by the United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 US 42 (90 S Ct 1975, 26 L Ed 2d 419), persuades this writer that a new interpretation is to be given to the Fourth Amendment with respect to searches of automobiles. That is, “for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.” Id. at 52.
Under Chambers, a warrantless search of an automobile may be legally made as incident to a lawful arrest or if “there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.” Id. at 48. See Carroll v. United States (1925), 267 US 132 (45 S Ct 280, 69 L Ed 543); People v. Danny Williams (1970), 383 Mich 549.
The rule enunciated by the Court in Preston remains authority for the proposition that a warrant-less search of an automobile “made at the police station some time after the arrest * * * cannot be justified as a search incident to an arrest” because “the reasons which have been thought sufficient to justify warrantless searches carried out in connection with an arrest no longer obtain when the accused is safely in custody at the station house.” Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 47. (Emphasis added.)
However, even though a search and seizure under such circumstances cannot be justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, the warrantless search of the automobile, conducted at the police station some time after the arrest, can be justified on the *120basis of tbe existence of probable cause at tbe time the automobile was originally stopped:
“For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
“On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a search. The probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained. * * * "13
I conclude, however, after a careful examination of the record, that the officer who originally seized defendant McCully’s automobile lacked probable cause to search the automobile at that time, and, therefore, the subsequent search of the automobile at the police station was illegal.
The instant case is factually dissimilar to that in Chambers. In Chambers the police had probable cause to believe, based upon information obtained from witnesses, that the defendants had committed a felony and were fleeing in a particular car. The police had a description of the car as well as its occupants. In addition, due to the proximity be*121tween the commission of the crime and the pursuit of the escaping felons, the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the felons fleeing in the automobile were in possession of guns and fruits of the crime.
In the instant case, defendant McCully’s automobile was discovered parked outside a pool hall around 2:40 p.m., approximately an hour and a half after the discovery of the Osbeck automobile which contained Mr. Osbeck’s body. No occupants were observed in the parked automobile. The officers had no information that defendant McCully’s automobile was used either in the instant crime which resulted in Mr. Osbeck’s death nor that Mc-Cully’s automobile was connected in any manner with the bank robbery. In fact, it was Mr. Osbeck’s automobile alone which was described as being used by the fleeing bank robbers. The police had no valid reason to believe that defendant McCully’s automobile was the instrumentality of the crime. The record in the instant case is insufficient to justify the conclusion that probable cause to search defendant McCully’s automobile existed at the time it was seized. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co. (1968), 391 US 216 (88 S Ct 1472, 20 L Ed 2d 538).
Since the search of defendant McCully’s automobile was too remote in time and place to have been incident to the arrest,14 and further noting that the officers lacked probable cause to search the automobile at the time it was seized, I conclude that the warrantless search of the impounded automobile was illegal and that the items illegally obtained should not have been admitted into evidence. Mapp *122v. Ohio (1961), 367 US 643 (81 S Ct 1684, 6 L Ed 2d 1081, 84 ALR2d 933).
IV.

Whether the admission into evidence of items seised during the illegal searches constituted “harmless error”?

Having concluded that the searches, or parts thereof, were made in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this Court must determine if the use of the tainted evidence at trial constituted harmless error. The burden of establishing harmless error rests with the prosecution and the standard of review is that established by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18, 23, 24 (87 S Ct 824, 827, 828; 17 L Ed 2d 705, 710, 711):
“The California constitutional rule emphasizes ‘a miscarriage of justice,’ but the California courts have neutralized this to some extent by emphasis, and perhaps overemphasis, upon the court’s view of ‘overwhelming evidence.’ We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut [1963], 375 US 85-87 (84 S Ct 229, 230; 11 L Ed 2d 171, 173). There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ Although our prior cases have indicated that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error, this statement in Fahy itself belies any belief that all trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal. At the same time, however, like the federal harmless-error statute, it emphasises an intention not to treat as harmless those constitutional errors that ‘affect substantial rights’ of a party. An error in admitting *123plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot, u/nder Fahy, be conceived of as harmless. *■ * * We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of onr Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)
The standard to he utilized in determining the issue of harmless error, as established in Chapman, was recently reaffirmed in Harrington v. California (1969), 395 US 250, 254 (89 S Ct 1726, 1728, 1729; 23 L Ed 2d 284, 288):
“We do not depart from Chapman; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it. We do not suggest that, if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted, is harmless error. Our decision is based on the evidence in this record. The case against Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
Since the instant case was woven entirely from circumstantial evidence, albeit a strong web, I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional error was harmless to defendants. Chapman v. California, supra; Harrington v. California, supra; People v. Teal (1969), 20 Mich App 176; People v. Mason (1970), 22 Mich App 595.
Other Assignments oe Error
For the above-mentioned reasons, I would reverse the convictions and remand the cause for a new trial. In view of my decision on these issues, I will comment only briefly upon the remaining assignments of error.
*124V.

Whether the trial court’s failure to order separate trials prejudiced the rights of the defendantsf

By statute, the granting of a separate trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. CL 1948, § 768.5 (Stat Ann 1954 Bev § 28.1028). Where, as in the instant case, the defendants are charged with the same crime and the same evidence is to be used to implicate all the defendants in the joint commission of the crime, the denial of a motion for separate trials is not an abuse of discretion. See People v. Schram (1966), 378 Mich 145; People v. Cooper (1950), 326 Mich 514; People v. Newsome (1966), 3 Mich App 541.
VI.

Whether the prosecutor violated the defendant Carter’s right to due process by failing to release to Carter’s attorney an alleged exculpatory statement made by defendant Broylesf

Approximately two and one-half months before trial, a motion for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence was argued before the court. The prosecutor agreed to furnish exculpatory statements made by any of the defendants to the attorneys representing the defendants. However, prior to trial, the attorneys were not apprised of the existence of any exculpatory statements.
Shortly after trial began, the prosecutor disclosed defendant Broyles’ statement to Broyles’ attorney. However, defendant Carter’s attorney, who now alleges that the statement was exculpatory15 as to his client, did not see the statement until several days after the commencement of the *125trial, at which time counsel for defendant Broyles furnished him with the statement. There is no question in my mind but that the prosecutor acted in good faith. The prosecutor turned the statement over to one of the defense attorneys and reasonably assumed that counsel for each defendant would have access to the statement.
However, the good faith of the prosecutor is not sufficient. The Court, in Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 US 83, 87 (83 S Ct 1194, 1196, 1197; 10 L Ed 2d 215, 218), held as follows:
“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
Since I would remand this case for a new trial, I would also require that the prosecutor, upon request by defense counsel, be compelled to disclose to each attorney any exculpatory statements made by one of the codefendants. Brady v. Maryland, supra.

VII.

Whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence testimony which tended to show that defendant McGully had obtained a revolver in a previous unconnected theft?

During the course of the trial, the trial judge, notwithstanding objection by defense counsel, permitted a witness, Chatfield Young, to testify that he was the owner of the revolver discovered by the police in defendant McCully’s apartment. Mr. Young further testified that the revolver had “disappeared” from his store a few months before the instant crime. A police officer was also called as a *126witness and Ms testimony verified that Mr. Young had reported the revolver missing from his store.
The defendants objected to the testimony of both Young and the police officer on the basis that it was immaterial and prejudicial to their clients. It is argued on appeal that the sole basis for such testimony was to leave the inference that the defendants, or at least one of them, had stolen the revolver.
After the testimony of Young and the police officer had been presented, defendants moved for a mistrial. The trial judge denied the motion, reasoning that the prosecutor had carefully kept out the fact that Mr. Young’s “store was held up, or broken into or things were stolen including this gun * * * . That was very carefully eliminated.” While the prosecutor’s questions were carefully phrased so as to exclude the specific question of whether the revolver was “stolen”, the inference was clear.
In People v. Greenway (1962), 365 Mich 547, 551, the Michigan Supreme Court, quoting from People v. Harry Fleish (1948), 321 Mich 443, stated:
“ ‘There is no disposition to depart from the rule which in general is that as to a defendant who does not testify in his own behalf, evidence of former convictions or offenses is not admissible except in cases wherein such evidence is material and relevant to the issue being tried.’” (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case the defendants are charged with murder in the course of a robbery of an automobile and, in the trial judge’s own words, “established and undisputed” evidence existed which proved that the revolver was found in defendant McCully’s apartment.16 The testimony of the witness and the police officer relating to the revolver was not rele*127vant. Defendant’s possession of the revolver, which was unchallenged, is thus tainted with the inference of a prior offense. The testimony tends to show that the defendant had either committed the theft of the revolver or had received stolen property. Under the setting of this case the introduction of objected-to testimony was erroneous and prejudicial. People v. Lundberg (1961), 364 Mich 596; People v. Greenway, supra; People v. Matthews (1969), 17 Mich App 48; Boggs v. State (1958), 268 Ala 358 (106 So 2d 263).
VIII.

Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the defendants’ exercise of their right not to testify?

The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“None of the respondents in this case have taken the witness stand. Neither were they required to because of this principle of law known as the presumption of innocence. The burden is upon the prosecutor. They are not required to take the witness stand. And the fact, that fact standing alone, may not be considered by you as evidence of their guilt. The fact that they did not take the witness stand does not form a presumption, either of their guilt or of their innocence.” (Emphasis added.)
Defendants argue that the use of the words “that fact standing alone” permits the clear implication that the jury may consider that factor in conjunction with the proofs as evidence of defendants’ guilt. Having determined that the convictions must be reversed on other grounds, I do not deem it necessary to reach the issue of whether this instruction was erroneous. I merely reiterate the established principle that a defendant’s declination to testify *128at his own trial does not create any presumption against the defendant. MCLA § 600.2159 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2159).
A strict standard is to be applied in this area. People v. Mitchell (1911), 164 Mich 583. Instructions which allow the jury to consider, either by implication or inference, that a defendant’s failure to take the stand has any adverse bearing upon his guilt must be avoided. See People v. Ncmkervis (1951), 330 Mich 17; People v. Murnane (1921), 213 Mich 205; People v. Arntson (1968), 10 Mich App 718.
Other questions raised by defendants are without merit and need not be considered.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse and remand as to all three defendants.

 CL 1948, § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.548) (felony-murder).

 Three doctors, including the autopsy surgeon, testified at trial that Osbeck had an enlarged heart brought about by arteriosclerosis. However, it was their conclusion in response to hypothetical ques*111tions that the emotional trauma of the incident caused the fatal seizure.

 Por a recent discussion pertaining to Michigan’s felony-murder rule see Comment, Homicide Under the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L Rev 904, 913 (1968).

 However, the importance of obtaining a valid search warrant in most situations cannot be overemphasized. The Supreme Court, *112in Chimel v. California (1969), 395 US 752, 761 (89 S Ct 2034, 2039, 23 L Ed 2d 685, 692, 693), recently reiterated the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement:
“ * * * The Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence. In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that ‘no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part. As the Court put it in McDonald v. United States (1948), 335 US 451, 69 S Ct 191 (93 L Ed 153):
“ ‘We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Eourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. * * * And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’ Id., at 455-456.”

 E.g., Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 US 1 (88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889).

 The two defendants arrested on December 1, 1967 were in fact arrested in a different part of town, while in police custody, approximately one hour after the instant search. “If a search of a *113house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside the house, * * * not somewhere outside * * * .” Vale v. Louisiana (1970), 399 US 30 (90 S Ct 1969, 26 L Ed 2d 409).
(Emphasis and citations omitted.)

 The “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement was recently reaffirmed, by means of dictum, in Vale v. Louisiana, supra. In Vale, the Court cited, in addition to Hayden, Chapman v. United States (1967), 386 US 18 (87 S Ct 824, 17 L Ed 2d 705), and Johnson v. United States (1948), 333 US 10 (68 S Ct 367, 92 L Ed 436), as precedent for the “hot pursuit” exception.

 In Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967), 387 US 294, 299 (87 S Ct 1642, 1646; 18 L Ed 2d 782, 787), the Court stated:
“The permissible scope of search must, therefore, at the least, be as broad as may reasonably be necessary to prevent the dangers that the suspect at large in the house may resist or escape.” (Emphasis added.) See Vale v. Louisiana, supra, note 6.

 A warrantless search, legal at its inception, may be seen to traverse the boundaries of legality. As stated by the Court in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 US 1, 18, 19 (88 S Ct 1868, 1878; 20 L Ed 2d 889, 903, 904):
“[A] search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity in scope * * * . The scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”

 This sweatshirt fit the description the officers had of clothing worn by one of the fleeing bank robbers.

 People v. Sims (1970), 23 Mich App 194; People v. Herrera (1969), 19 Mich App 216.

 In Colosimo v. Perini (CA 6, 1969), 415 F2d 804, 806, the court stated:
“With the person, or persons, suspected of crime and the automobile to be searched both in police custody, the precipitous action of a warrantless search is no longer justified. It is true that in Preston the vehicle was searched at a point away from the scene of arrest, while here the vehicle remained at the place where the defendant *119was arrested. Chimel, however, persuades us that such factual distinction is not of controlling importance. We believe that Chimel instructs us that the rule of Preston, decided prior to the trial here involved, is the law that controls this case.” See People v. Sims, supra.

 Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 US 42, 52 (90 S Ct 1975, 1981; 26 L Ed 2d 419, 428). See, generally, People v. Danny Williams (1970), 383 Mich 549; People v. Zeigler (I960), 358 Mich 355.

 Preston v. United States (1964), 376 US 364 (84 S Ct 881, 11 L Ed 2d 777); People v. Dombrowski (1968), 10 Mich App 445.

 The statement in question was not introduced into evidence at trial and is not part of the record on appeal.

 The revolver at issue is the .25 caliber revolver found in defendant McCully’s apartment on December 2, 1967, pursuant to a lawful search with a warrant.