Court Opinion

ID: 9850596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:59:44.792526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:40.103280
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur with Justice Utter's concurring/dissenting opinion, thus joining the majority in parts I, II and IV, except as stated hereafter. I agree with Justice Utter's dissent to part III of the majority opinion. I write separately regarding part II, majority at 436, to state my understanding of the majority's holdings, and therefore the basis on which I partially concur with part II.
My concern arises from what I perceive to be some imprecision in the use of the phrases "just cause" and "good faith". Majority, at 438. The majority correctly recognizes that the phrase "just cause" was defined in Baldwin v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 127, 139, 769 P.2d 298 (1989). "Just cause" was an essential ingredient in Baldwin because the employment contract used that phrase as the standard for termination.
The Baldwin definition of just cause is:
(a) A fair and honest cause or reason, regulated by good faith by the employer, AND
(b) One which is not for any arbitrary or capricious reason OR
(c) Any illegal reason AND
(d) Is based on facts supported by substantial evidence AND
(e) Is reasonably believed by the employer to be true. Baldwin, at 139.
The contract provision here in question does not speak of "just cause", but rather provides immediate termination for fighting on company premises. The majority concludes that a standard similar to just cause should be applied when the employment contract provides specific grounds *458for termination. However, after quoting the Baldwin definition of just cause, it appears, at least to me, that the majority sets out quite a different standard.
The majority specifically holds that the employer's termination must rest on "the good faith and reasonable conclusion" that plaintiff was fighting on company premises. Majority, at 438. I suggest there is a substantial difference between the Baldwin definition and the "good faith and reasonable conclusion" standard set out in the majority. What an employer reasonably believed to be true (a semi-subjective criteria) is different from a reasonable conclusion (an objective standard). Further, by first stating the Baldwin definition and then recasting part of it in brief form, the standard set out in the majority seems to eliminate the elements of arbitrary, capricious or illegal motives.
I submit that the concept of "just cause" should be separated from the question presented in this case. If an employment contract provides that an employee will be terminated only for just cause, there are entirely different considerations from those presented in a case such as this one. In contrast to a contractual "just cause" requirement, when the contract specifies what particular employee acts or omissions are grounds for termination, we should be concerned with what standard the employer must meet to exercise the reserved right to discharge. We should therefore set a standard which does not invite confusion by importing Baldwin's "just cause" definition.
Whether the specific ground for dismissal stated in the contract is a "reasonable" cause for termination is not the issue. If the parties — employer and employee — have agreed that particular conduct, absent illegality or public policy, is cause for termination, the reasonableness of that ground is not open for a finding that it was an "unreasonable" ground.
Also, while I disagree with the implication in the majority that the standard there adopted is similar to the *459"just cause" analysis, I do not suggest adding elements like those in the Baldwin definition. The Baldwin words "fair and honest" and not "arbitrary, capricious or illegal" only confuse the ultimate question, i.e., what must an employer do in terminating for a stated cause? It is obvious that the reason for discharge must not be illegal or against public policy. Termination for a stated cause implies that the termination is not arbitrary and capricious.
The standard we adopt should be as objective as possible. The appropriate standard should be one of the employer acting in good faith, but what does that mean? It means that an employer should conduct an objectively reasonable investigation to ascertain the facts. It means that the facts must lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that the employee was guilty of committing the prohibited act or not doing the omitted act. It means the employee should be told of the grounds for discharge and be given a reasonable opportunity to dispute the alleged acts or omissions. If, after taking those steps, the employer reasonably concludes that the stated grounds exist, the termination is not a wrongful discharge.
Finally, I would make clear that this opinion does not imply a covenant of good faith into an employment relationship which is entirely one terminable at will. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 227-28, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984) rejected the implied covenant of good faith in a relationship entirely terminable at will. This remains the general rule. "[W]hen it comes to at-will relationships most jurisdictions have not been willing to apply the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a substantive limitation on the employer's right to discharge." 1 L. Larson, Unjust Dismissal § 3.05[2], at 3-29 (1991).
The discussion of good faith by the majority and this concurrence is necessarily limited to construction of a contract term, not the implication by law of a covenant otherwise absent.