Court Opinion

ID: 9582210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:54.249494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:32.540273
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 71. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). The majority defers too much to great weight deference. The Labor and Industry Review Commission's determination that William E. Larsen suffered an injury covered by Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1) is neither reasonable nor in accord with the purpose of § 102.03(1).1 The Commission could not have simultaneously concluded both that there was a compensable injury here and that Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries, where the accident causing the injuries did not arise from Larsen's employment, but from a cause solely personal to him — that is, his intoxi*85cation. The Commission's determination thus contravenes the statutory directive that there is coverage only "[w]here the accident. . .causing injury arises out of the employe's employment." Wis. Stat. § 102.03(l)(e).
¶ 72. Wisconsin Stat. § 102.03(1) imposes liability upon an employer for a traveling employee's injury only where the accident that caused the injury arises from the employment relationship.
In order for liability to accrue, it is necessary both that the employee at the time of the accident be performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment and that the accident causing injury must arise out of his employment. The phrase "arising out of' refers to the causal origin of the injury and the "course of employment" phrase refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment.
The "travelling employee" statute does not modify these two requirements, it merely provides the employee with a statutory presumption in favor of both of these requirements. . . .[E]ven in those cases where the travelling employee presumption applies, the "accident. . .must arise out of a hazard of such service...."
Goranson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 549-50, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980) (citations, footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).2 Typically, this court has *86addressed the "course of employment" element of liability rather than the causation or the "arising out of the employment" element. Id. at 549 n.3. However, this court did address the causation element, which is determinative here, in Goranson.
¶ 73. This case is strikingly similar to Goranson. Goranson was a bus driver for Whitie's Transportation, which provided a charter bus to a Green Bay Packers football game in Green Bay from Barron, Wisconsin. Id. at 542. On the night of the injury for which Goran-son sought worker's compensation, he consumed a large amount of alcohol — a couple of drinks upon arrival at the hotel where he and the bus passengers were staying, and four more with a late dinner. Id. A witness reported that at about 1:30 a.m., Goranson was in the lobby and had been drinking. Id. at 543. At about 2:30 a.m., another witness reported hearing "screaming and cussing" from Goranson's room and saw Goranson, "dazed or drunk, or something," climbing out of a window; then he jumped. Id. at 544.
¶ 74. Goranson claimed that he had gone to sleep and awoke to find someone in the room, with whom he scuffled. Id. at 542-43. According to Goranson, he was pushed out of the window and was hanging on the ledge until he dropped to the roof of the hotel kitchen. Id. at 541, 543. When the police examined his room, they found that other than a tipped over chair and some blood on sheets and pillowcases, there was no sign of a struggle and nothing was missing from the room. Id. at 544. There was also no sign of forced entry and Goran-son's room had been locked from the inside. Id. at 542, 556. Goranson suffered a broken hip and other injuries from jumping from his third floor room. Id. at 541.
¶ 75. The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations determined that Goranson's injuries *87were not compensable.3 Id. at 540. The Department concluded that although Goranson was performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment, Goranson's injuries did not arise out of his employment. Id. at 542.
¶ 76. This court agreed. In determining whether the injury arose out of Goranson's employment, the court applied the "positional risk doctrine."
The definition of the positional risk doctrine can be stated as follows: "[Ajccidents arise out of employment if the conditions or obligations of the employment create a zone of special danger out of which the accident causing the injury arose. Stated another way, an accident arises out of employment when by reason of employment the employee is present at a place where he is injured through the agency of a third person, an outside force, or the conditions of special danger."
Id. at 555 (quoting Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 5 Wis. 2d 247, 254, 92 N.W.2d 824 (1958)).
¶ 77. This court has, where appropriate, applied the positional risk doctrine to uphold a determination that an employer is liable for a traveling employee's injury. "Such cases include, among others, accidents *88arising from horseplay, weather conditions, and assaults." Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 266 Wis. 81, 86, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954). Goranson apparently tried to fit into the assault category. However, unlike the applicant in Nash-Kelvinator, Goranson was not subjected to mob violence by coworkers. Id. at 83. There also was not an assault as there was in Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 208 Wis. 2d 95, 99-100, 559 N.W.2d 588 (1997) where the employer released confidential information about an employee who was subsequently harassed by her ex-husband.
¶ 78. Rather, the court concluded that Goran-son's injuries "arose out of a cause solely personal to the employee and did not arise out of the employ-ment_" Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 556. The court found that credible evidence supported the Department's determination as such.4 Goranson "voluntarily allowed someone" into his hotel room. Id. at 556. And, "for reasons known only to Mr. Goranson he crawled out of the window, stood on the ledge, and jumped." Id. In other words, Goranson's actions, and not his employment, created a zone of special danger or hazard out of which his injuries arose. "The situation in which Mr. Goran-*89son found himself was not one which was created by the risk of staying at the hotel." Id. at 557.
¶ 79. Similarly, here, the situation in which Larsen found himself was not one created by the risk of staying at his mobile home. The situation Larsen found himself in was created by his own, voluntary actions, namely, his intoxication. Indeed, because of that fact, this case indicates, more strongly than in Goranson where the court did not rely upon any finding that Goranson was intoxicated, that the injuries did not arise from the employment relationship.
¶ 80. Here, the Commission failed to apply, reasonably, the positional risk doctrine when it ignored its own finding that Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries. For the positional risk doctrine to be applied correctly, "[a]ll that is required is that the 'obligations or conditions' of employment create the zone of special danger' out of which the injury arose." Butler v. Industrial Comm'n, 265 Wis. 380, 385, 61 N.W.2d 490 (1953). The Commission initially concluded that sub-zero temperatures created a special zone of danger out of which Larsen's injuries arose. More importantly, the Commission also concluded that Larsen's intoxication caused his injuries, and reduced his compensation correspondingly. See majority op. at ¶ 55; see also Wis. Stat. § 102.58 (benefits are reduced where there is a causal connection between the'intoxication and the injury).5 It was not the weather that was the special zone of danger or hazard f<?r Larsen. It was his intoxication. But for the fact that he passed, out, and that he *90lost consciousness, while half inside, half outside of his mobile home, the weather would have been of no effect. The accident that caused Larsen's injuries — passing out — did not arise "out of a hazard of such service [of employment]." Wis. Stat. § 102.03(l)(f). Thus, the accident could not "be deemed to arise out of the employe's employment." Id.
¶ 81. Rather, here, as in Goranson, the cause of Larsen's injuries was solely personal to him. When Larsen arrived in Tigerton, he consumed five to six alcoholic drinks within less than two hours at the Split Rock Tavern. There was no connection between his employment and his drinking. He was not entertaining potential clients. "It cannot be said the intoxicants he ordered were in any way in the furtherance of his employer's business." Dibble v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 350, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968) (intoxication relevant to issue of personal deviation). As in Goranson, Larsen "deliberately acted to place himself in a position where he sustained an injury which was not a risk incidental to his employment relationship. . .." 94 Wis. 2d at 557. The cold was not, and would not have been, a risk for Larsen, but for his self-induced intoxication.
¶ 82. The Commission admits that Larsen was intoxicated and that that intoxication caused his injuries. But the Commission fails to make the required and necessary connection to find a compensable injury here — that the accident causing the injury was related to Larsen's employment. Here, the accident, losing consciousness or passing out, was not caused by the weather. It was not caused by an outside force or third person. Here, as in Goranson, there was no special zone of danger that arose from the employment relationship, but instead a self-created zone of danger, even though the place of the injury was connected to the *91requirements of his employment. Simply, there was nothing about his employment that put him in harm's way.
¶ 83. Although it is not necessary to find that the Commission also unreasonably concluded that Larsen had returned to the "course of employment" if he had deviated from his business trip (see majority op. at ¶¶ 41-42), there is certainly a basis for such a finding, given the extent of Larsen's deviation. Larsen's deviation—imbibing at least 4 or 5 drinks of Kessler Whiskey and diet Coke without dining — could reasonably be considered as unnecessary for living or not incidental thereto. Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 550 n.3. As this court indicated in Dibble v. ILHR Dep't, 40 Wis. 2d 341, 161 N.W.2d 913 (1968), "[w]hile a cocktail or two before dinner probably is an acceptable social custom incidental to an act reasonably necessary to living, the department could conclude that Dibble's indulgence was beyond reasonableness." Id. at 350.
¶ 84. Indeed, Larsen's consumption of at least 4 or 5 alcoholic drinks in less than two hours is more reasonably considered as a break in the employment nexus. See Bush v. Parmenter, Forsythe, Rude & Dethmers, 413 Mich. 444, 457, 320 N.W.2d 858 (1982). In Bush, the applicant employee had attended a seminar out of town, and, on his way back home, had become intoxicated. Id. at 448-49. A restaurant where he had stopped had attempted to have him take a cab home, but he refused. Id. at 448. He left, and was murdered shortly thereafter. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated the award of worker's compensation benefits, finding that the "nexus between the employment and the injury was dissolved" by the employee's deviation. Id. at 460. Similarly here, Larsen's drinking and subsequent intoxication whs a deviation from the purpose of *92his business trip, so that it dissolved any connection — if any there was — between his employment and his injuries.
¶ 85. Nonetheless, the Commission unreasonably concluded that the accident causing Larsen his injuries arose from his employment. The Commission's conclusion is not only unreasonable, but also directly contravenes the requirement of Wis. Stat. § 102.03(1)(f) that there is coverage only where the accident arises out of a hazard of such service of employment. Accordingly, the Commission determination, even under a great weight deference standard of review, must be overturned. CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 573, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998). Certainly the legislature did not intend to provide worker's compensation for those injuries caused by an employee's intoxication where there is no connection whatsoever between the employment relationship and the intoxication.
¶ 86. The conclusion that Larsen is not entitled to worker's compensation benefits because his injury did not arise from his employment, but arose from a self-created zone of danger due to his intoxication, does not ignore Wis. Stat. § 102.58, or, as the majority suggests, undermine the travelling employee protections in § 102.03. The legislature's intent to limit, but not preclude, compensation where the employee's injury results from intoxication presumes that there already is a compensable injury. Where the injury does not arise from the employment, there is no compensable injury. Wis. Stat. § 102.03(l)(e), (f). Here, Larsen's intoxication is not the cause of an otherwise compensa-ble injury, so § 102.58 does not even come into play. Nonetheless, I concur in the majority's conclusion that, *93at the very least, the Commission correctly reduced Larsen's award by 15% on account of his intoxication.
¶ 87. For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority's opinion that upholds the Commission's decision to award Larsen worker's compensation benefits.
¶ 88. I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX and Justice DIANE S. SYKES join in this opinion.

 As noted in the majority opinion (at ¶ 27), even under the great weight deference standard of review, if the Commission's interpretation is unreasonable — that is, the interpretation "directly contravenes the words of the statute, is clearly contrary to legislative intent, or is otherwise. . .without rational basis" — it cannot be upheld. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. LIRC, 226 Wis. 2d 778, 787, 595 N.W.2d 23 (1999) (citations omitted).

 It is noteworthy that the Commission did not discuss the traveling employee presumption. Presumably, the Commission concluded that even if the presumption dropped out of consideration because evidence to the contrary had been presented (see Goranson v. ILHR Dep't, 94 Wis. 2d 537, 551, 289 N.W.2d 270 (1980)), the Commission's conclusions would have been the same.

 The Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations is now known as the Department of Workforce Development. The legislature renamed the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations the Department of Industry, Labor and Job Development, effective July 1, 1996. However, the Department was given the option to use the name Department of Workforce Development which it did. The legislature recognized the name change in 1997. Wisconsin Blue Book 1999-2000 493 (Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau ed., 1999). The Labor and Industry Review Commission now reviews decisions of the Department of Workforce Development. Id. at 496.

 At the time that Goranson was decided, this court applied a credible evidence standard of review to determinations of whether there was a deviation from employment or whether the injury arose from the employment. Goranson, 94 Wis. 2d at 553; Hansen v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis. 623, 626, 46 N.W.2d 754 (1951). Now, such determinations are reviewed as questions of law — statutory interpretation — by way of great weight deference. See CBS, Inc. v. LIRC, 219 Wis. 2d 564, 584-85, 579 N.W.2d 668 (1998) (Crooks, J., concurring). Accordingly, here, whether Larsen's injuries arose from his employment is considered a question of law.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 102.58 provides in pertinent part: "[I]f injury results from the intoxication of the employe by alcohol beverages,. . .the compensation and death benefit provided in this chapter shall be reduced 15% but the total reduction may not exceed $15,000."