Court Opinion

ID: 9519007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:07:10.175915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:43.183497
License: Public Domain

*837Wright, J.,
concurring.
On January 22, 1996, Tabatha R. arrived at St. Joseph Hospital in full cardiac and pulmonary arrest. The infant is irreversibly comatose and in a persistent vegetative state. In In re Interest of Tabatha R., 252 Neb. 687, 564 N.W.2d 598 (1997) (Tabatha I), we independently found on de novo review that the infant’s condition occurred as the result of her having sustained severe brain injury as a consequence of having been vigorously shaken. In my concurrence in Tabatha /, I stated that there are factual situations in which only one act by a parent is sufficient to provide the basis for termination of parental rights under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292 (Reissue 1993).
In Tabatha /, we concluded that the order entered by the juvenile court was, in effect, a termination of parental rights and that before such rights could be terminated, Neb. Const. art. I, § 3, required that the evidence clearly and convincingly establish the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds stated in § 43-292 and that such action was in the infant’s best interests.
In my opinion, following our decision in Tabatha I, the State could have filed a motion to terminate parental rights. The State did not file such a motion until the day of the dispositional hearing, and therefore, the juvenile court properly refused to consider the termination issue.