Court Opinion

ID: 9956231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 16:00:49.864151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:15.006459
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                               No. 22-3535
                      ___________________________

                         Solomon Wanyoike Nganga

                                            Petitioner

                                       v.

           Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General of the United States

                                       Respondent
                                ____________

                     Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                                 ____________

                        Submitted: December 15, 2023
                            Filed: April 1, 2024
                               [Unpublished]
                               ____________

Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

     The Board of Immigration Appeals refused to reconsider or reopen Solomon
Nganga’s case. We deny his petition for review.
                                         I.

       Nganga, a citizen of Kenya, arrived in the United States in 2005 on an F-1
student visa. Four years after his visa expired, immigration agents took him into
custody. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (allowing the removal of nonimmigrant
aliens who violate their conditions of admission). At his first removal hearing,
Nganga conceded that he was removable.

      Years of delays and continuances followed. At Nganga’s final hearing,
which took place five years after the proceedings began, he requested another
continuance because he had a new girlfriend, who was a United States citizen. See
8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (providing that an “immigration judge may grant a . . .
continuance for good cause shown”). This time, the immigration judge denied the
request, declared he was removable, and ordered him to leave the country.

       In Nganga’s appeal to the Board, he argued that he should have received the
extra time. If he had, the immigration judge would have known more, including
that his girlfriend, whom he married, had filed a petition on his behalf.
Unconvinced, the Board dismissed the appeal.

       Nganga’s next move was to file a motion for reconsideration and reopening
of the case based on two additional facts: the birth of a child and his wife’s health
difficulties. After the Board denied the motion, Nganga filed a petition for review
with us. Based on its timing, the only issue before us is whether the Board abused
its discretion in refusing to reconsider its decision or reopen the proceedings. See
Mshihiri v. Holder, 753 F.3d 785, 788–89 (8th Cir. 2014).

                                         II.

       The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (requiring a motion to reconsider to identify “the errors of
fact or law in the prior Board decision”). The standard for a continuance is good

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cause. See id. § 1003.29. And here, having a new girlfriend, which was the only
new information the immigration judge had at the time, did not provide good cause
for one. See Pacheco-Moran v. Garland, 70 F.4th 431, 440 (8th Cir. 2023)
(explaining that it is not an abuse of discretion for an immigration judge to deny a
continuance based on a “merely speculative” claim that an alien’s immigration
status will change). Apart from that fact, there was nothing to reconsider, given
that the Board had already rejected “the very arguments” Nganga was making.
Rodriguez de Henriquez v. Barr, 942 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted).

      The Board also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen the
proceedings. This type of relief is available only when “the evidence is of such a
nature that . . . if proceedings before the [immigration judge] were reopened, . . .
the new evidence would likely change the result.” Caballero-Martinez v. Barr,
920 F.3d 543, 548 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation and emphasis omitted).

       Although additional difficulties had arisen in Nganga’s life since his appeal
to the Board, they would not have changed the result. Years earlier, he had falsely
claimed United States citizenship on an I-9 form, which made him permanently
“ineligible to receive [a] visa[] [or] . . . be admitted to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I); see Downs v. Holder, 758 F.3d 994, 996 n.1 (8th Cir. 2014)
(explaining that this is “a permanent bar on reentry into the United States”). Even
now, Nganga does not deny making the false statement. See Kirong v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2008) (placing the burden on the alien “to prove
clearly and beyond doubt that he did not make a false claim of United States
citizenship”).

      Rather, he disputes its legal significance. First, relying on Mayemba v.
Holder, Nganga’s position is that he made a different false claim, one informing an
employer that he was a “national of the United States.” 776 F.3d 542, 545 (8th Cir.
2015) (citation omitted); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (applying only to false
claims of citizenship). Unfortunately for him, the plain language of the I-9 form he

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signed said otherwise. See Etenyi v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2015)
(interpreting an I-9 form).

      Second, he argues that the Board could not have considered his false
statement without engaging in “improper factfinding.” Although it is true that the
immigration judge never made a finding on the false statement, the Board can
“take administrative notice” of “[u]ndisputed facts contained in the record.”1 See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)(A)(4). And here, Nganga never challenged the
authenticity of the I-9 form, even though it had been part of the administrative
record for years and the government had repeatedly referenced it in its briefing.
Relying on it to deny reopening was not an abuse of discretion.

                                         III.

      We accordingly deny the petition for review.
                     ______________________________

      1
        The Board also did not violate due process when it relied on Nganga’s false
statement to deny relief. There is, after all, no “constitutionally[ ]protected liberty
interest at stake” in “discretionary [immigration] relief.” Vargas v. Holder, 567 F.3d
387, 391 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); accord Robles v. Garland, 23 F.4th 1061,
1065 (8th Cir. 2022); Baker White v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 600, 605 (8th Cir. 2021).
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