Court Opinion

ID: 9581520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:45.584854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:01.994764
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from paragraph (3) of the syllabus and the• corresponding portion of the opinion. In my judgment, the court’s opinion misconceives the status of the plaintiff’s presence upon the school premises the night she was injured. For reasons hereafter stated, the plaintiff was an invitee and not a licensee.
The Community Center Room was located in the basement of the high school building in question. Access to the room from outside the building was gained through a ground-level entrance, and down a flight of stairs to the basement. The electric lights in the stairs leading to the Community Center Room were a part of *588the circuit of lights in the basement and it was White’s duty, as custodian, to turn the lights on prior to the time the room was to be used.
The evening the plaintiff was injured, the Community Center Room was reserved for the Caney Chums Home Demonstration Unit which had paid the fee of $3 for its use that evening. The evidence was undisputed the steps leading to the Community Center Room were unlighted and that White failed to turn the lights on.
In 1948, the recreation room and kitchen in the school building were opened to the public for community purposes pursuant to written rules and regulations adopted jointly by the board of education and the Lions Club of Caney. (See K. S. A. 72-1623.) Those rules and regulations provided that the Community Center Room and kitchen were available to any responsible group or individual upon the payment of a small fee to cover janitor service and replacement of equipment. Clubs, family reunions, church groups and other similar responsible groups were included. The fees, when collected, were placed in a separate fund from other school funds and designated as the Community Center Fund. Reservations for the room were made with the clerk of the Board of Education.
An invitee is a person who enters or remains on land of another upon an express or implied invitation which carries with it an implied representation or assurance that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make them safe for his reception. (Restatement, Second, Torts, Sec. 332, [a.].)
In Lemon v. Busey, 204 Kan. 119, 461 P. 2d 145, this court stated that rules set forth in Restatement, Second, Torts, Sec. 332, defining an invitee are confirmed in our decisions. An invitee, as set forth in Sec. 332, is defined as follows:
“(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
“(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
“(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings with the possessor of the land.”
No claim is made the plaintiff was a “business visitor,” as defined in subsection (3) above.
*589In the Lemon case it was said that the fact a member of the public is invited to visit does not make him a public invitee, but the purpose of his visit determines his status. However, an invitation is essential to establish the status of an invitee, and any words or conduct of the possessor which lead or encourage the visitor to believe his entry is desired may be sufficient for the invitation. In Restatement, Second, Torts, Sec. 332, it is said:
“c. Factors important in determining invitation. In determining whether a particular person is an invitee, the important thing is the desire or willingness to receive that person which a reasonable man would understand as expressed by the words or other conduct of the possessor.
.It is immaterial that the person is one whom the possessor is not willing to receive as an invitee if the possessor’s words or other conduct are understood, and would be understood by a reasonable man, as indicating the possessor’s willingness. The nature of the use to which the possessor puts his land is often sufficient to expréss to the reasonable understanding of the public, or classes or members of it, a willingness or unwillingness to receive them . . .”
From the record it is obvious to me the purpose of the written policy of the Board of Education was to invite responsible groups and members of the public of the Caney community to enter or remain in the Community Center Room and to use its facilities for clubs, family reunions, church groups and other similar responsible organizations, and to hold it open for that purpose. This is evident from the fact that for approximately 20 years the room was continuously made available for birthday parties, showers, bean dinners, reunions, meetings of the Lions Club, and other organizations, upon payment of the stipulated fee. As indicative of the extent of the Community Center Room, there was $1,505.35 in the special fund accumulated from small fees, which was used solely to buy tables, chairs and other furniture, and recently the clerk of the Board of Education had spent from $50 to $60 to replace broken dishes.
I next turn to the nature or purpose of the plaintiff’s visit since that determines her status as an invitee. (Lemon v. Busey, supra, p. 123.) The plaintiff was vice president of the Caney Home Demonstration Unit which had reserved the Community Center Room on the evening in question and had paid the stipulated fee. After she entered the building and while on her way to the kitchen of the Community Center Room, she fell as a result of the unlighted stairs. It is evident she was on the school premises as a member of the public to use the Community Center Room for the purpose for which it was held open to the public-as would be understood by a *590reasonable man from the words or conduct of the Board of Education. (Fleming v. Brown, 150 F. 2d 801; Davis v. Central Congregational Society, 129 Mass. 367, 37 Am. Rep. 368; Lemon v. Busey, supra, pp. 124-126.) In my opinion, the plaintiff had legal status of an invitee.
The district court erred in its instructions 9, 10, 11 and 12. I would reverse the judgment with directions to grant the plaintiff a new trial so as to permit the jury to determine under appropriate instructions whether the defendants, Ray McKinney, as superintendent, and Cole E. White, as custodian, failed to cany out their duties with reasonable care to make the premises safe for the plaintiff’s reception.
Fontron, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.