Court Opinion

ID: 9676445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:24:44.174523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.687743
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE 1, Judge,
concurring.
The majority opinion correctly holds, but for the wrong reasons, that given the unique facts and circumstances of this theft case, the trial court reversibly erred by not instructing the jury on the statutory *653meanings of the word “Deception”, as provided by V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 31.-01(2). I only concur in the result that the majority opinion reaches because I find that, given the facts and circumstances of this unique case, such omission from the trial court’s jury charge deprived and denied Arthur G. MacDougall, hereinafter referred to as the appellant, of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973), as well as due course of law as guaranteed by Art. 1, Section 19, of the Texas Constitution. I only dissent to the failure of the majority opinion to overrule two decisions of this Court, see infra, which cases I now find represent a departure from what I find was previously the law of this State.
Although a trial judge in Texas is given broad discretion in formulating his charge to the jury, nevertheless, if the charge that is given is erroneous because of commission or omission, and such error so infected the entire trial of the defendant that it deprived or denied him of a fair and impartial trial, then such charge is violative of due process of law. Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir.1981). A due process violation may occur even if the defendant failed to object to such commission or omission. In this instance, however, the appellant did timely and properly object to the complained of omission in the court’s charge, and, but as pointed out by the majority opinion, “Deception was the only theory available to the State on the evidence,” i.e., because of the facts and circumstances of the case, “Deception” became an element of the offense for which the appellant was then on trial. Of course, in making the determination whether the error of omission deprived or denied the appellant of a fair trial, “Not only must the charge be read as a whole, but it must be laid in the courtroom scene with all the props and scenery that there existed.” Plunkett v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.1983). Given the facts and circumstances of this case, with such omission in the charge, the jury was clearly unable to correctly apply the law to the facts of this case, or to correctly judge the merits of the case; thus, the appellant was deprived and denied the fair trial that the Constitutions guaranteed him. Cf. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir.1984); Plunkett v. Estelle, supra; United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1972).
Such decisions of this Court as Meanes v. State, 668 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Where the defendant was on trial for the offense of capital murder, held, it was not error not to define for the jury in the abstract the offenses of capital murder and murder), and Mosley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 180 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Where an element of the offense was “bodily injury”, held, it was not error not to give the jury the statutory definition for that term), should be expressly overruled.
For the above stated reasons, I concur in the result, but dissent to the majority opinion’s refusal or failure to overrule Meanes and Mosley, supra.

. Hon. Robin Norris, who previously represented the appellant on appeal and in the proceedings that pertain to the appellant’s petition for discretionary review, but who is now employed this Court as research assistant to the author of this opinion, had absolutely nothing to do either with any research that was involved in this case, the preparation of or the drafting of this opinion.