Court Opinion

ID: 9687892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:52:44.474737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:32.675828
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The opinion appears to hold that Speedway cannot recover indemnity or contribution against third-party defendant James Ferguson (Merchant Police) for the reason that his agents “ ‘personally participate^] in an affirmative act of negligence’ ”, etc., under Degen v. Bayman & Outboard Marine, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134. Additionally, the affirmance is based on the ground that as a matter of law there is “no credible testimony” that Ferguson (Merchant Police) was “explicitly” told to keep spectators out of the designated area. I believe there was sufficient evidence on the contribution theory (see SDCL 15-8-15) to submit to the jury the question of duty and violation thereof.
As to the Knigge plaintiffs, it appears that they were regular attendants at the races, having attended some ten times; *181therefore, defendant’s proposed Instruction No. 13, which was South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction No. 13.01, on the assumption of risk should have been given. This does not apply to plaintiff Rogers as she had not attended a race before, and not having prior knowledge of the danger cannot be held to have assumed the risk.
The majority opinion mentions that Speedway complains that the question of assumption of risk should have been .presented to the jury, but it does not state that the only possible instruction involving assumption of risk was Instruction No. 10, which provided as follows:
“A speedway operator owes its spectators the duty of exercising ordinary care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition for use by its spectators and to warn them of dangerous conditions upon the premises which are known or should be known to it but not known to its spectators.
“The foregoing rule does not require, however, that the speedway operator guarantee the safety of its customers.
“Before the speedway operator can be held liable for injuries to its spectators as a result of a dangerous condition on its premises, it is necessary that it have knowledge of the presence of the dangerous condition.”
In my opinion Instruction 10 does not take the place of an instruction on the assumption of risk by the Knigges; it deals with the duty of a speedway operator and not with assumption of risk by plaintiffs.
Under this reasoning, it appears that the failure to give an instruction on the assumption of risk as to the Knigges requires reversal of the judgments as to them; however, the Rogers’ judgment should be affirmed. The directed verdict in favor of Merchant Police on the contribution theory should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Wollman joins in this dissent.