Court Opinion

ID: 9585530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:01:25.943045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:20.050962
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
I agree that the evidence proved that the mother’s move from Virginia may be a material change in circumstances. See Wilson v. Wilson, 12 Va. App. 1251, 1255, 408 S.E.2d 576, 579 (1991). The record did not establish, however, that the mother’s move to Wisconsin for economic reasons justified a change in custody because it would be in the best interest of the child. See Keel v. Keel, 225 Va. 606, 611, 303 S.E.2d 917, 921 (1983).
The trial judge gave no reason for his conclusion that the child’s best interest warranted a change in custody. Therefore, this Court is not in the position to review whether the trial judge properly reasoned his way to a permissible conclusion; instead, we are forced to examine the record for evidence upon which the trial judge possibly could have properly reasoned his way to a permissi*327ble conclusion. The difference is more than semantic. The Code of Virginia invests the trial judge with the discretion to weigh the relevant factors in determining child custody. D’Auria v. D’Auria, 1 Va. App. 455, 461, 340 S.E.2d 164, 168 (1986). If, however, the trial judge does not explain in any fashion the reasoning or factors that led to a particular conclusion, review of the trial judge’s decision is limited to this Court’s after-the-fact speculation about what the trial judge might have reasoned in arriving at a conclusion. See Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 344, 349 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986) (“When ... the chancellor fails to state any basis for a . . . conclusion, the reviewing court is hindered in its task”). Such a review may ultimately focus on the propriety of a weighing or reasoning process that the trial judge never actually undertook. As a consequence, the effect of the trial judge’s failure to place his reasoning on the record is to place the trial judge’s decision beyond review.
That result is not what I understand the phrase “sound discretion of the trial judge” to imply. Indeed, were that the result, we could never ascertain if a trial judge had abused his discretion. Any fact in evidence that offered some theoretical support for the decision could be given significant weight by the reviewing court even if the trial judge had ignored that fact in reaching his or her conclusion.
The testimony proved that the child was well adjusted, interacted well with both his parents, and would suffer no harm by relocation to Wisconsin. The trial judge made no finding and stated no view regarding Dr. Lordi’s testimony, the child and family psychiatrist who interviewed the child and both parents. The record gives no indication that the trial judge even considered what effect being separated from his siblings might have upon the child.
“Where it is reasonably possible, brothers and sisters of tender years should be reared together, and have the full benefit of natural ties and affection and interest that such association develops.” Hepler v. Hepler, 195 Va. 611, 623, 79 S.E.2d 652, 659 (1954). Dr. Lordi testified that the child has positive feelings toward both parents, that both parents demonstrate appropriate parenting skills, and that the relocation of the child to Wisconsin would not be harmful to the child. Additionally, however, the psychiatrist testified that the child should not be separated from his brother *328and his sisters, with whom he has a very close bond.
No evidence in this record suggests that the best interest of this child required a change in custody. Moreover, nothing in this record suggests that anything in this child’s best interest outweighed the harm he will experience from severing the bond with his siblings. As it stands now, we cannot know the trial judge’s actual findings or reasoning, and we are left to speculate about the trial judge’s findings. I would reverse the decision.
I, therefore, dissent.