Court Opinion

ID: 9651478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:19:54.410919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.475248
License: Public Domain

MAJOR, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion, in my view, marks the dawn of a new era as to federal jurisdiction in habeas corpus. More than that, so far as the state of Indiana is concerned, the floodgates have been lifted and the federal courts will be deluged with petitions making every character of scurrilous attack upon the judiciary of that state. I am unable to join in the plain imputation that the state of Indiana has not provided an adequate remedy by which the legality of a prison sentence may be decided by its courts. Neither am I willing to reflect upon the integrity of the judiciary of that state by insinuating that the remedy provided is not available to one confined in its institutions.
The opinion, in my judgment, repudiates a long line of decisions of this court, notwithstanding the expressed statement to the contrary. Especially is this so as to the holding that habeas corpus in Indiana is a futile thing and need not be resorted to before coming to a federal court.
In Jones v. Dowd, etc., 128 F.2d 331, at page 333 (opinion by Minton, concurred in by Evans and Kerner), this court stated:
“There is no allegation in the petition that the petitioner applied to the State court of Indiana for a writ of habeas corpus. * * *
“The Constitution and statutes of Indiana give full recognition to the right to the writ of habeas corpus. Indiana Constitution, Article 1, Section 27; Burns Revised Statutes (1933) 3-1901. The fact that the Indiana Supreme Court has consistently held that one trial court has no authority to review the errors of another on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus does not relieve the petitioner of the duty to pursue the remedy first in the State court.”
In Davis v. Dowd, 119 F.2d 338 (opinion by Lindley, concurred in by Evans and Sparks), the court, in response to the same contention which is advanced in the instant case, said:
“Petitioner asserts that to have sought a remedy under the Indiana constitution and statutes would have been futile. But the Constitution of Indiana, Article I, Section 27, preserves the writ of habeas corpus and Section 3-1901, Burns 1933 Indiana Statutes provides that every person ‘restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom' when illegal.’ ”
In Botwinski v. Dowd, 118 F.2d 829 at page 830 (opinion by Sparks, concurred in by Major and Holly), the court stated:
“For reasons stated by this court in Achtien v. Dowd, 7 Cir., 117 F.2d 989, decided February 19, such relief as is here sought should be sought through the machinery of the state courts, from which application for review may be made directly to the Supreme Court of the United States if the applicant urges that he is wrongfully deprived of the rights guaranteed him by the Federal Constitution.”
Achtien v. Dowd, 117 F.2d 989 (opinion by Evans, concurred in by Sparks and Lindley), is the progenitor of this doctrine which we have so long embraced. In response to this same contention, now embraced by the majority, that it was futile to proceed by habeas corpus in the state courts of Indiana, this court on page 995 of 117 F.2d said:
“Regardless of the belief of counsel as to the action which the Indiana Supreme Court may take, upon the presentation to it, of a petition for habeas corpus, it was his duty in view of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406, to first apply to the state court for such a writ. Failure of the petition to show the taking of *251such action in the state court renders the petition under consideration insufficient.”
The court pointed out that the Supreme Court of Indiana might change its holding, and then stated:
“Even if it refused to change its views, petitioner would be in a position to apply directly to the Supreme Court for redress.”
I should think that if we are now going to repudiate a rule of law so thoroughly established by our previous holdings (in which every Judge of the court has at some time or another participated), we should at least be frank and acknowledge the repudiation.
This opinion will leave the federal District Courts, at least of this Circuit, in a hopeless quandary as to what is required to show jurisdiction in habeas corpus. If we pursue the direction we are now headed, it will not be long until the Indiana Judges will be on trial in the federal courts. This statement is not as fantastic as it may sound. Suppose a person serving a sentence in the Indiana penitentiary files in the United States District Court his petition for habeas corpus and alleges «that the Judge imposing sentence threatened to cut his ears off if he didn’t plead guilty (or makes some other equally absurd charge). In order to show that he has exhausted his state remedies, he need not, under the instant opinion, allege that he has applied for habeas corpus. He need not even show that he has complied with the rules and procedure of Indiana courts with reference to an application for the writ of coram nobis. It apparently would be sufficient to show as an excuse for failure to comply with such rules and procedure that he was without means to employ an attorney and that he had called his situation to the attention of the Indiana courts by letter or some other informal communication.
If and when the federal court assumes jurisdiction, the petitioner is entitled to a full and fair hearing. This no doubt would carry with it the right of subpoena, including the right to subpoena the Judge who had imposed the sentence; in fact, whether subpoenaed or not, the sentencing Judge would, in order to protect his own integrity, be compelled to appear and controvert the charge. At that moment, the prisoner would become the prosecuting witness and the trial Judge the defendant. This is not important where jurisdiction is rightly assumed but it is something to think about before we broaden the jurisdiction of the federal courts to include what has heretofore been strictly within the domain of the state courts.
At the time the above was written, I did not have the benefit of Judge Evans’ concurring opinion. The confusion which I think will arise from Judge Kerner’s opinion has been greatly increased by Judge Evans’ concurrence. It does, however, possess the virtue of a frank admission that what we have heretofore held is being repudiated. The reason assigned for such change of front is the decision in Ex parte Hawk. I apprehend that all federal Judges have read that decision many times. Its analysis would serve no good purpose. In my opinion, the interpretation placed upon it by Judge Evans is clearly erroneous. Rather than broadening the jurisdiction of federal courts in habeas corpus, as argued, it had the opposite effect and was so intended. Under that decision, the order of the District Court should be affirmed.
In my judgment, the District Court was without jurisdiction and correctly dismissed the petition. Its order should be affirmed.