Court Opinion

ID: 9787019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:08:36.229712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.428893
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
T58 I respectfully dissent. Once Mr. Tiedemann effectively waived his right to remain silent, he was subject to police interrogation until he unequivocally reinvoked that right. Careful review of the record, including the video recording of the critical portion of the interrogation, makes only one thing clear: Mr. Tiedemann was not unequivocal in any attempt he may have made to reinvoke his right to silence. As a consequence, his statements to the police interrogators after voluntarily waiving his rights against self-inerimination may properly be admitted in any trial relating to his multiple murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and rape charges.
T59 All agree that Mr. Tiedemann voluntarily and effectively waived his right to remain silent when initially informed of his right to do so. After carefully reconfirming the waiver and Mr. Tiedemann's understanding of the waiver at the beginning of the video recording of the interrogation, the officers ask him what happened. Mr. Tiede-mann answers a number of questions, including some referring to one of the murder victims, Suzie. When the officer asks what happened to Suzie, Mr. Tiedemann says he does not "want to talk about it."
T 60 The confusion, if any, arises from Mr. Tiedemann's response. It is clear from review of the interrogation video that the officers were careful to inquire as to what Tiede-mann did, and did not, want to talk about. Mr. Tiedemann failed to clarify his ambiguous statements, and the officers properly continued questioning. Once Mr. Tiedemann was asked to clarify the meaning of his "I don't want to talk about it" statement, the officers were under no obligation to probe further when the defendant failed to offer any clarification. Once he waived his right to remain silent, Mr. Tiedemann assumed the duty to clearly and unequivocally reinvoke that right if that was his intention. An ambiguous statement followed by non-responsive replies to questions about what he does *1120not want to talk about does not shift the burden back to the state to figure it out.
T61 In addition, when the video of the interrogation is viewed, it becomes clear that the officers acted properly and gave ample time for Mr. Tiedemann to respond to questioning. The transcript records the questioning as follows: "Okay, what don't you want to talk about? Edgar? What don't you want to talk about, Ed? Edgar, we're not going to force you to talk about anything...." What the transcript fails to illustrate is the pauses between each question to allow time to answer. Because Mr. Tiedemann did not respond to any of the questions, the transcript shows one question after another. It could appear that the officers were barraging Mr. Tiedemann with questions, and that Mr. Tiedemann had no time to process, yet alone answer, the questions.
4 62 The unedited video, on the other hand, shows that the officers allowed ample time for Mr. Tiedemann to respond; he simply failed to do so. The officers paused between each question, sometimes for up to ten see-onds, to allow him to respond. Mr. Tiede-mann failed to clarify his equivocal statement.
T 63 As we have said before, "if the suspect is not reasonably clear in his [attempt to stop questioning after waiving his rights], officers are not required to stop questioning or focus on clarifying the suspect's statement." State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 742 (Utah 1997). The officers, in the case of Mr. Tiedemann, went beyond what our law requires. When faced with the ambiguous statement, the officers gave Mr. Tiedemann ample opportunity to clearly reinvoke his right to remain silent. Not only did he fail to clarify his intent, he listened to the officers explain again that he could stop answering at any time and that they would not force him to answer any question. Given this reemphasis and patient inquiry by the officers, however, he failed to clear the ambiguity, and, in fact, continued to answer questions about the murders and other crimes.
T 64 The law places a "heavy burden" on the state to initially establish a suspect's knowing and voluntary waiver of the constitutional right to remain silent in the face of police interrogation, and rightly so. Id. at 743. However, once a suspect has voluntarily and knowingly waived that right, any attempt to reinvoke the right shifts the burden, and the requirement of clarity, to the suspect. Id. In other words, the law only requires the state to prove the right was lawfully waived. He who claims to reinvoke the right thereafter must prove that it was done with sufficient clarity as to make it unambiguous. A statement, taken in context, that a suspect doesn't want to talk about "it," without more, is insufficient to shift the burden back to the state. A careful post-hoc parsing of the phrasing and language by a reviewing court may be helpful, but it would impose an unattainable burden on law enforcement, and likely result in the need to treat any suggestion as a "clear" re-invocation of the right waived. Such a result is neither required, nor useful.
T 65 In the parallel cireumstance of a suspect first waiving and then making an ambiguous request for counsel, we reached the same conclusion. Relying on reasoning from both our prior decision in Leyva, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), we observed that
the requirement ... that an officer limit his questioning to clarifying a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal invocation of the right to counsel must be limited to pre-waiver scenarios.... [Ajfter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. In other words, police do not need to limit their questioning to clarifying questions when a suspect who has previously waived his Miranda rights makes an ambiguous request for counsel. Furthermore, we see no reason why this same rule should be different for ambiguous assertions of the right to remain silent. Therefore, because it is undisputed that [the defendant] voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, the detectives were free to question him until and unless he unambiguously reinvoked either his *1121right to counsel or his right to remain silent.
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 985 n. 4 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
166 In the case before us, the officers were unable to determine from his statement whether Mr. Tiedemann wished to reinvoke his right to remain silent. Due to the equivocal nature of Mr. Tiedemann's statement, and despite being under no obligation to do so, the officers made reasonable attempts to understand what he meant. They asked, "What don't you want to talk about?" After allowing ample time for Mr. Tiedemann to respond and clarify his statement, which he did not do, the officers continued with questioning, and Tiedemann confessed to the murders. The officers were well within the bounds of constitutional behavior in doing so.
T 67 The trial court agreed that Mr. Tiede-mann's reinvocation of the right to remain gilent, if that was what it was intended to be, was ambiguous. My colleagues concede that the "scope of Tiedemann's invocation" was ambiguous. I do not read the record or view the video recording of the event to reveal anything other than that Mr. Tiedemann's statement was ambiguous, at most. One could very easily conclude that the statement was more of an expression of remorse and pain than one of reinvoked rights.
1 68 Ultimately, Mr. Tiedemann knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. The heavy burden that rests upon the state to establish a valid waiver in the first place shifts thereafter to the defendant to prove a reinvocation of the waived right. Onee he waived his right to silence, this burden shifted to Mr. Tiedemann. He failed to unequivocally reinvoke his right, and his confession is properly subject to admission.
T 69 I would affirm the decision of the trial court that the defendant failed to adequately reinvoke his right to remain silent.
T70 Moreover, given my analysis of the admissibility of Mr. Tiedemann's confessions to the various erimes with which he is charged, I see no possibility, as a matter of law, of any prejudice arising from the State's destruction of any of the evidence over the years. Consequently, I would affirm the decision of the trial court on that matter as well.
' 71 I would affirm.