Court Opinion

ID: 9838451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:06:04.739214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:31.385644
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                                State of Florida

                       Opinion filed September 6, 2023.
        Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
                              ________________

                               No. 3D23-208
                        Lower Tribunal No. F20-9309
                           ________________

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Petitioner,

                                      vs.

                            Tyquane Williams,
                                 Respondent.

     On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, Robert T. Watson, Judge.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Kayla Heather McNab, Assistant
Attorney General, for petitioner.

     Kenneth P. Speiller, for respondent.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

     LOGUE, C.J.

     The State seeks certiorari relief from a non-final order granting

Defendant Tyquane Williams’ motion for disclosure of the identity of a

confidential informant in a pending criminal prosecution. Because the trial
court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law, we deny the

petition.

                                Background

      Williams was charged in a seven-count information with three counts

for sale of a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church in violation of

section 893.13(1)(e)(2), Florida Statutes; three counts for sale of a controlled

substance on public housing property in violation of section 893.13(1)(f)(1),

Florida Statutes; and one count for trafficking phenethylamine over ten

grams in violation of section 893.135(1)(k)(2)(a), Florida Statutes.

      The charges stem from incidents that occurred on July 2, 2019, July

15, 2019, and August 7, 2019, when the City of Miami Police Department

sent a confidential informant to purchase illegal narcotics from Williams. In

each transaction, the confidential informant was the sole participant. The

confidential informant was equipped with an audio and video recording

device during each transaction. Law enforcement officers also observed

each transaction from afar and were able to listen to conversations between

the confidential informant and Williams.

      Williams filed a verified motion to compel disclosure of the identity of

the State’s confidential informant. He argued disclosure was required to

prevent infringement of his constitutional rights to confrontation and due

                                       2
process because he was being accused of selling drugs directly to the

confidential informant, the only active participant in the alleged drug

transactions.

      The State filed a response and argued Williams had not established

that the confidential informant’s identity was relevant to a specific defense or

essential to a fair determination of the case. The State further averred that,

as of the filing of the response, it had not listed the confidential informant as

a witness and did not intend to call the confidential informant as a witness at

a hearing or trial. Finally, the State argued its case does not rely solely on

the testimony of the confidential informant because it possessed the audio-

video recorded conversations and transactions, which would substitute for

the witness.

      The State intends to introduce the audio-video recorded interactions at

trial pursuant to a “silent witness” theory and asserted that it was “not

introducing testimonial evidence from the confidential informant against the

Defendant.” Instead, the State argued it would introduce the audio-video

recording of Williams as a party opponent admission, and any statements

made by the confidential informant would be conversations that placed

Williams’ statements into context.

                                       3
      The trial court conducted a hearing on Williams’ motion and viewed the

audio-video recordings provided by the State. At the conclusion of the

hearing, the trial court ordered disclosure of the confidential informant’s

identity. The trial court reasoned that binding case law required disclosure

because the confidential informant was the sole participant other than the

accused in the three transactions charged and, therefore, the only witness

able to amplify or contradict the testimony of the State’s witnesses.

      The trial court further concluded there was no exception in the

precedential case law precluding disclosure in situations where the

transactions were recorded and declined to carve out such an exception.

Nevertheless, having viewed the audio-video recordings proffered by the

State, the trial court noted that they favored, rather than precluded,

disclosure because they failed to show several of the transactions that

formed the basis of the seven-count information against Williams.

                                  Analysis

      A non-final order granting a motion to disclose the identity of a

confidential informant “is reviewable by certiorari, as it presents the

possibility of irreparable harm.” State v. Rivas, 25 So. 3d 647, 650 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2010) (citing State v. Ayala, 713 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998);

State v. Roberts, 686 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). See also State

                                      4
v. Burgos, 985 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (quashing order requiring the

disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant); State v. Borrego, 970

So. 2d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (same). “Rulings as to the necessity of

providing the names and addresses of witnesses for the defendant to have

a fair trial are rulings which must of necessity rest upon the broad discretion

of the trial court.” State v. Jones, 247 So. 2d 342, 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971).

      While it is well settled in Florida that the state has a limited privilege to

withhold the identity of a confidential informant, it is equally well settled in

Florida that this limited privilege must give way under certain compelling

circumstances. State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864, 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988).

In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957), the Supreme Court

held that disclosure of a confidential informant is required if an informant's

identity “is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential

to a fair determination of a cause[.]”

      Williams argues Roviaro’s second exception here. This exception

“necessarily concentrates on general due process considerations and is not

confined to a defense raised by the defendant in the case[.]” Zamora, 534

So. 2d at 868. Florida courts have ordered the disclosure of a confidential

informant’s identity under this exception where disclosure was deemed

essential to guarantee the defendant his due process right to a fair trial. Id.

                                         5
at 867-68 (listing cases). Such cases have centered around the defendant's

right to be informed of the charges against him or to confront the witnesses

against him. Id. at 869. Notably, “this component has nothing to do with

whether the confidential informant has valuable testimony for the defense[.]”

Id.

      In Roviaro, the defendant was convicted of selling heroin to a

confidential informant. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 55. During the transaction, an

officer was in the trunk of the confidential informant’s vehicle where he could

hear the conversation between the confidential informant and the defendant.

Id. at 56-57. The officer was also able to raise the lid of the trunk slightly and

observe the defendant pick up the drugs and bring them over to the

confidential informant’s vehicle. Id. at 57. Meanwhile, another officer was

standing on the sidewalk about 100 feet from the confidential informant’s

vehicle and also observed the defendant pick up the drugs and bring them

over to the confidential informant’s vehicle. Id.

      Both officers testified at trial and yet, despite having testimony of what

the officers saw and heard during the drug transaction, the Supreme Court

nevertheless held that the trial court committed prejudicial error in allowing

the government to withhold the identity of its confidential informant. Id. at 64-

65. In doing so, the Supreme Court emphasized that the confidential

                                        6
informant “had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and had played a

prominent part in it”; that as far as the defendant knew, he and the

confidential informant “were alone and unobserved during the crucial

occurrence for which he was indicted”; that the confidential informant was

the defendant’s “one material witness”; and that the defendant’s opportunity

to cross-examine the officers in question “was hardly a substitute for an

opportunity to examine the man who had been nearest to him and took part

in the transaction.” Id. at 64. The Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he

desirability of calling [the confidential informant] as a witness, or at least

interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather

than the [g]overnment to decide.” Id.

      In Styles v. State, 780 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), a detective

sent a confidential informant to purchase drugs while he observed from his

vehicle parked about fifteen to twenty feet away. The detective was able to

see the drug exchange from his vantage point. Id. at 1040. The Fourth

District nevertheless similarly held it was error for the trial court to deny the

defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. Id.

at 1041. Citing Roviaro, the Fourth District explained that due process

considerations compelled disclosure because the crime involved the delivery

                                        7
of drugs directly to the informant, thus rendering the case within the

exception to the limited informant privilege. Id.

      The Styles court further reasoned that the goal of preserving the

anonymity of confidential informants is not implicated in situations in which

the informant is the sole participant in the transaction charged. Id. This is

because, unlike a tipster who provides information to the police, the

informant in such situations has already disclosed his or her identity by

coming face to face with the defendant to purchase drugs. Id.

      Ultimately, Roviaro and Styles establish that, as this Court previously

stated in Zamora, disclosure of a confidential informant is “required where

the defendant is charged with selling or delivering illegal drugs to the subject

informant” and the informant is the sole participant in the transaction.

Zamora, 534 So. 2d at 869. See also Monserrate v. State, 232 So. 2d 444

(Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (holding that where state offered proof of defendant's

sale of heroin to a police informant, refusal to require state to divulge to

defendant's counsel name of police informant to whom sale was allegedly

made was prejudicial error).

      It cannot be said, therefore, that the trial court here departed from the

essential requirements of law in ordering disclosure of the confidential

informant’s identity as Williams is charged with seven substantive counts of

                                       8
selling controlled substances to the confidential informant, the only other

participant in the transactions.

      Despite this clearly established principle of law, we note that the State

argues in its petition that the audio-video recordings of the transactions at

issue render Roviaro distinguishable. In support of this proposition, the State

relies on federal district court orders. See United States v. DeAraujo, 471 F.

Supp. 3d 382, 386 (D. Mass. 2020); United States v. Royal, No. CR421-135-

6, 2022 WL 677577 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 7, 2022); United States v. Cantrell, No.

1:10–Cr–00131–MHS, 2010 WL 3800684 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2010). For

purposes of certiorari review, however, “[t]he term ‘clearly established law’

refers to ‘recent controlling case law, rules of court, statutes, and

constitutional law.’” State, Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Carnley v. Lynch, 53 So.

3d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Allstate Ins.

Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So. 2d 885, 890 (Fla. 2003)). The State does not

cite us to any Florida case law directly supporting its position in this regard,

nor have we found any. “Accordingly, in the absence of any controlling

precedent, it follows that the circuit court did not violate clearly established

                                       9
law in ruling the way that it did.” Balzer v. Ryan, 263 So. 3d 189, 191 (Fla.

1st DCA 2018).1

     Petition denied.

     LOBREE, J., concurs.

     GORDO, J., concurs in result only.

1
 Having seen the audio-video recordings ourselves, moreover, we agree
with the trial court’s assessment regarding their contents.

                                     10
                                            State of Florida v. Tyquane Williams
                                                            Case No. 3D23-0208

      LOBREE, J. (specially concurring)

      I agree with the conclusion of the majority on this record. However,

any analysis of whether a trial court properly compelled disclosure of the

identity of a confidential informant “must begin with recognition of well-settled

Florida law which grants the State a limited privilege to withhold the identity

of its confidential informants.” State v. Simmons, 944 So. 2d 1122, 1127 (Fla.

3d DCA 2006) (Rothenberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(citing State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1977); State v. Diaz, 678

So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); State v. Zamora, 534 So. 2d 864,

867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)). “The burden is on the defendant to establish why

either or both of [the exceptions recognized in Roviaro v. United States, 353

U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957),] should be invoked.” Simmons, 944 So. 2d at 1127.

      In this case, Williams did not contend that disclosure of the informant’s

identity would aid his defense in any particular way. Rather, his motion to

compel invoked the second exception to the privilege of non-disclosure

based on his general rights to due process. The trial court correctly applied

our existing precedent that disclosure was required under Roviaro and

Zamora where the defendant is charged with selling or delivering illegal

drugs to the subject informant and no officer or other witness was present.

                                       11
      In Roviaro, the Supreme Court of the United States noted:

            We believe that no fixed rule with respect to
            disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls
            for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow
            of information against the individual’s right to prepare
            his defense. Whether a proper balance renders
            nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the
            particular circumstances of each case, taking into
            consideration the crime charged, the possible
            defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s
            testimony, and other relevant factors.

353 U.S. at 62; see also Hassberger, 350 So. 2d at 2. Here, the State

contends that the holding in Roviaro, requiring disclosure of the subject

informant’s identity as necessary to the defendant’s due process right to a

fair trial, should be modified in favor of non-disclosure where it will introduce

video and audio recordings of the transactions and does not intend to call

the informant as a witness. See United States v. DeAraujo, 471 F. Supp. 3d

382, 386 (D. Mass. 2020) (finding defendant failed to meet burden to show

disclosure of identity of confidential informant involved in alleged firearm sale

where entire encounter was recorded by video and audio). Given the quality

of the recordings in the record, I concur that the trial court did not depart from

the essential requirements of the law in rejecting the State’s position in this

case. But in my view, the majority decision should not be read to foreclose

a case-specific balancing in future cases with clear audio-visual recordings

of the entirety of an alleged narcotics transaction.

                                       12
GORDO, J., concurs.

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