Court Opinion

ID: 9514833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:00.705341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:21.497972
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 51.] I concur with Issues 2, 3, and 4 but dissent on Issue l[g]. I vote to reverse and remand for purposes of limiting public access to Meinders’ sex offender registry information and the lifetime requirement of registration, without any mechanism for relief.
[¶ 52.] We should affirm the application of the registration requirements to Meinders for law enforcement purposes. However, the retroactive application of SDCL 22-22-40 to Meinders as it relates to public access is unconstitutional. We should hold that the portion of SDCL 22-22-40 providing for unlimited public access is unconstitutional as it applies to these facts - where the conviction is for statutory rape arising out of a dating relationship, where there was consent, although illegal, giving rise to a crime not shown to likely be repeated, as opposed to child molestation - because it is punitive, not remedial, and such punishment is more burdensome now than when the crime was committed. Therefore, Meinders should be released from the registration requirements of SDCL 22-22-30 through 22-22-39 and SDCL 22-22-40, unless procedures are instituted to limit public access to Meinders’ registry information and provide a mechanism for relief from the lifetime registration requirement.
[¶ 53.] In determining whether this sex offender registration law is punitive, the majority opinion applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors;
[a.] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraintf;]
[b.] Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment[;]
[c.] Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter[;]
[d.] Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment -retribution and deter-renee[;]
[e.] Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime[;]
[f.] Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it[;] and
[g.] Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned!.]
*266Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 661 (1963). The majority opinion concluded that Meinders did not meet his burden under these factors. I disagree. More specifically, I disagree with the conclusion that Meinders did not meet his burden under [g.] - whether the broad public dissemination of the registration information allowed under SDCL 22-22-40 and the lifetime requirement of registration, without any mechanism for relief, is excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
[¶ 54.] Other states provide for varying degrees of public notification based on the offender’s risk of recidivism. See, e.g., DeLCode Ann. tit. 11, § 4121 (Supp. 1998) (providing for different periods of registration and different levels of public notification based on risk assessment tier assigned to offender); Idaho Code § 18-8314 (Supp. 1999) (authorizing a sexual offender classification board to determine whether an offender is a violent sexual predator with a high risk of reoffense); Ky.Rev. StaiAnn. § 17.572 (Supp. 1998) (providing for different levels of public, notification depending on the risk assessment of the offender); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 34-A, § 11141 (Supp. 1998) (requiring the utilization of a risk assessment instrument to determine the extent of notification to law enforcement and public); Minn.Stat.Ann. § 244.052 (Supp. 2000) (providing for a risk assessment scale which is used to identify the offender’s risk level; the extent of disclosure is determined by the offender’s risk level); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-4013 (Supp. 1998) (providing three levels of notification based on risk of recidivism).
[¶ 55.] South Dakota’s sex offender registration statutes provide no provisions for classifying offenders according to their risk of recidivism. Instead, South Dakota law provides that all individuals convicted of one of the specified offenses must register for life, and it allows the public unrestricted access to the registration information, regardless of the offender’s risk of recidivism or threat to the community. Under the particular facts of this case, this application of SDCL 22-22-40 to Meinders is excessive because it goes beyond the regulatory purpose of the sex offender registration statutes and is punitive.
[¶ 56.] We note that the sex offender registration statutes initially enacted in 1994 did not apply to the offense of statutory rape. See 1994 SD Session Laws ch. 174, § l.9 Although statutory rape is a serious crime, it must be noted that this was a “consensual relationship” between a rebellious fifteen-year-old, incapable of legal consent, and a nineteen-year-old. Á.G. characterized the relationship as a dating relationship. Although far from ideal, similar relationships grow into reasonably good marriages from time to time. Mein-ders’ crime is not the type of crime that the sex offender registration statutes are intended to address. Although one cannot discern with certainty the motivating factors of Meinders' conduct, these facts do not show that Meinders poses a significant risk of reoffending justifying the retroactive application of the public dissemination portion of the sex registration statutes. See State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 923 P.2d 1024, 1042-43 (1996).
[¶ 57.] Although the legislative purpose for allowing public access to the information is regulatory and not intended to punish the offenders, “[t]he unrestricted public access given to the sex offender registry is excessive [as applied to Meinders] and goes beyond that necessary to promote public safety.” Myers, 923 P.2d at 1043. *267While the legislative aim may have been remedial, the repercussions, regardless of the justification, are great enough to be considered punishment as applied to Mein-ders. South Dakota then takes this “punishment” one step further and requires lifetime registration and provides no mechanism for sex offenders to petition for relief from the registration requirement.10
[¶ 58.] In contrast, other states limit the length of registration and provide for classification of offenders into levels based on risk of recidivism. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-3821 (Supp. 1998) (limiting length of registration requirement); Colo. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 18-3-412.5(6.5) & (7) (1999) (providing for varying periods of registration depending on degree of crime committed; limiting public access to registry information); Del.Code.Ann. tit. 11, § 4120(a) (Supp. 1998) (allowing offender to petition for release from registration requirement if no subsequent conviction within fifteen years and not likely to pose threat to society); Idaho Code § 18-8310 (Supp. 1999) (allowing offender to petition for relief from registration requirement after ten years, unless designated as a violent sexual predator); Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.2 (Supp. 1999) (requiring registration for ten years if first offense; second and third offenses result in lifetime registration); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 17.520 (Supp. 1998) (providing for ten year registration period if offender is designated low or moderate risk; lifetime registration required for high risk offenders only, but includes provision for relief from lifetime registration); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 34-A, § 11003 (Supp. 1998) (providing for fifteen year registration requirement; offender may petition for relief from registration requirement after five years and sentencing court may waive registration for good cause); MinmStat. § 243.166 (Supp. 2000) (requires registration for ten years or until “probation, supervised release, or conditional release period expires, whichever occurs later”); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-4005 (Supp 1998) (requires registration for ten years, unless the individual is found to be a sexually violent offender); N.D.Cent.Code § 12.1-32-15(8) (1999) (requires registration for a ten year period for first offense; lifetime registration is required for specific offenders); Or.Rev.Stat. § 181.600 (1997) (allowing offender to petition for relief from registration requirement after ten years). In addition, the federal version of this law limits registration to only ten years, unless the individual has one or more prior convictions for designated offenses, has been convicted of an aggravated sex offense, or has been classified as a “sexually violent predator.” 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b)(6).
[¶ 59.] Under the facts of this ease, unlimited public access to registry information for the lifetime of the offender without any mechanism for relief therefrom is punishment as applied to Meinders.11 See Myers, 923 P.2d at 1043. Would-be sex offenders have been on notice since July 1, 1994 that they will be subjected to public disclosure if they commit specific sex offenses. Meinders was convicted of statutory rape in July of 1990. He could not possibly be charged with having notice of these unlimited public disclosure statutes. Based on the punishment effect of these statutes as well as the lack of notice to Meinders, the application of SDCL 22-22-40 to Meinders as it relates to unlimited public access without any mechanism for relief from the lifetime registration requirement violates the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
[¶ 60.] In conclusion, we should affirm the application of the registration require*268ments to Meinders for law enforcement purposes. However, the retroactive application of SDCL 22-22-40 to Meinders as it relates to public access is unconstitutional. We should hold that the portion of SDCL 22-22-40 providing for unlimited public access is unconstitutional as it applies to these facts - where the conviction is for statutory rape arising out of a dating relationship, where there was consent, although illegal, giving rise to a. crime not shown to likely be repeated, as opposed to child molestation - because it is punitive, not remedial, and such punishment is more burdensome now than when the crime was committed. Therefore, Meinders should be released from the registration requirements of SDCL 22-22-30 through 22-22-39 and SDCL 22-22-40, unless procedures are instituted to limit public access to Meinders’ registry information and provide a mechanism for relief from the lifetime registration requirement.
[¶ 61.] We should reverse and remand Issue 1.
[¶ 62.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this special writing.

. Under the law as enacted in 1994, the definition of "sex crime” included first and second degree rape as defined in SDCL 22-22-1, but not third degree. Although Meinders was indicted for second degree rape January 25, 1990, the legislature amended SDCL 22-22-1 effective July 1, 1990 and reclassified statutory rape as third degree rape. Therefore, when the legislature passed the sex offender registration statutes in 1994, the crime of statutory rape was classified as third degree rape and was not a crime for which registration was required.

. SDCL 22-22-31.2 does provide a mechanism for a individual convicted of a sex offense while a juvenile to petition the court for removal from the registry “upon a showing that the person has not been adjudicated or convicted of any sex offense for at least ten years and no longer constitutes a threat to reoffend.”

. My proposed holding would be limited to the specific facts of this case and we should express no opinion as to the constitutionality of retroactive application of SDCL 22-22-40 to other offenders convicted prior to the enactment date of the statute.