Court Opinion

ID: 9518519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:55:08.44874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:26.527193
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority on all but the most fundamental issue: whether the defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Ashcroft and Alexander make it clear that a defendant cannot be convicted of possession of “virtual” child pornography, i.e., computer-generated images of nonexistent children. Therefore it is incumbent upon the State, as the bearer of the burden of proof, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the images for which defendant was prosecuted are images of real children. Yet Detective Morris admitted that he did not know the identities of any of the children depicted in the images in question, nor did he take any steps to discover such information. The majority relies on the trial judge’s determination that the images were of real children, asserting that a court can utilize its “everyday observations and common experiences” in making such a finding. 346 Ill. App. 3d at 497. However, the United States Congress has recognized that new photographic and computer-imaging technologies have made it possible to produce visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually indistinguishable from images of actual children engaging in such conduct. See Alexander, 204 Ill. 2d at 477-78, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2251, Congressional Findings, Note (5) (2000). I believe that technology has rendered “everyday observations and common experience” of little value in distinguishing between real and virtual images. If proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” is to retain its meaning, some additional evidence must be required. I respectfully dissent.