Court Opinion

ID: 9400212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 18:04:26.978937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:43.023399
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/7/23 P. v. Trujillo CA5

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F081571
             Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF120858B)
                     v.
                                                                                          OPINION
    JOSE ANDRES PINEDA TRUJILLO,

             Defendant and Appellant.

    In re                                                                                    F083774

             JOSE ANDRES PINEDA TRUJILLO

                              On Habeas Corpus.

                                                        THE COURT*
            APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Michael G. Bush,
Judge. ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus. Gary T.
Friedman, Judge.
            Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, Samuel Weiscovitz, Deputy State
Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant
and for Petitioner.

*           Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Michael A. Canzoneri, Eric L.
Christoffersen and Barton Bowers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent and for Respondent.
                                              -ooOoo-
       Petitioner Jose Andres Pineda Trujillo seeks a writ of habeas corpus. Also
pending before this court is an appeal following the denial of his petition for resentencing
on charges affected by the writ. The People agree that the writ is proper, but the parties
disagree on two issues. First, they disagree on the effect the writ will have on the ability
to retry petitioner upon remand. Second, they disagree on whether issuing the writ moots
petitioner’s appeal. In the writ proceedings, this court previously issued an order to show
cause, the People filed a return, and petitioner filed a traverse. Upon review of the
record1 and arguments, we agree that the writ is warranted and determine that the verdict
in petitioner’s original trial precludes the People from convicting petitioner of an offense
that requires proof petitioner acted with specific intent to kill. Although recent changes
in the law likely affect the People’s options with respect to retrying petitioner, we do not
agree that ordering the People be precluded from retrying petitioner on any theory is
proper at this time. We therefore issue the writ of habeas corpus, vacate petitioner’s
convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder, and remand with instructions
that, should the People elect not to proceed with a retrial in light of the preclusive effect
of the prior verdict, the trial court enter a conviction of second degree murder.
       We further take this opportunity to dismiss the appeal as moot. This court
recognizes the merit of the appeal in light of the current case law and the fact that the
People concede both the error alleged and that petitioner may file a new petition for

1       Both parties request this court take judicial notice of this court’s records in petitioner’s
direct appeal from the conviction (People v. Trujillo (Sept. 30, 2011, F060330) [nonpub. opn.]).
With no objection and finding judicial notice proper, this court agrees.

                                                 2.
resentencing upon any future conviction. The court concludes, however, that in light of
the potential future proceedings and the legal status of the case following the grant of
petitioner’s writ, there is no relief the court can provide in the appeal.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       As detailed in People v. Trujillo, supra, F060330, on February 22, 2010, an
amended information was filed against petitioner and Pedro Trujillo,2 charging them with
premeditated murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a);3 count 1), premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664; counts 2 & 3), shooting at an inhabited dwelling
(§ 246; counts 4, 5, & 6), and discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (§ 12034,
subd. (c); counts 7, 8, & 9). The special circumstance of drive-by murder (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(21)), and special allegations that petitioner and Pedro personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) were attached to count 1. Special allegations that petitioner and
Pedro personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7) were
attached to counts 2 and 3. Special allegations that petitioner and Pedro inflicted great
bodily injury as a result of discharging a firearm (§ 12022.55) and causing the offenses to
become serious (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) and violent (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(8)) felonies were
attached to counts 4 through 9.
       Petitioner and Pedro were jointly tried and convicted. Pedro was found guilty of
all substantive charges. Further, the special circumstance allegations and all of the
enhancement allegations were found to be true, except for the great bodily injury
enhancement allegations attached to counts 6 and 9, which were found to be not true.
Petitioner also was found guilty of all substantive charges, but the special circumstance

2      We refer to Pedro Trujillo as Pedro only to differentiate him from petitioner.
3      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                               3.
allegation of committing a drive-by murder and all of the enhancement allegations were
found to be not true with the exception of the premeditation allegations attached to
counts 2 and 3, which were found to be true.
       As petitioner argues, and the People do not dispute, the result of the jury’s findings
was a verdict that Pedro, not petitioner, was the actual shooter in the crime. This is
consistent with the manner in which the case was tried. One theory presented by the
People at trial was that the events were part of an uncharged conspiracy. In the jury
instructions for this theory, the jury was instructed that to prove petitioner was part of a
conspiracy, and thus to potentially hold him liable for all of the offenses charged that
were a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy, they must find true one of six
alleged overt acts. These overt acts alleged that petitioner was in a car with Pedro and
leaned back so that Pedro could fire a gun at a crowd of people. The theory only alleged
that Pedro fired a gun.
       Relevant to resolution of this case, the jury was also instructed on an aiding and
abetting theory, a natural and probable consequences theory, and a “kill zone” theory for
various aspects of the case. With respect to the aiding and abetting theory, the jury was
instructed the people must prove: (1) the perpetrator committed the crime; (2) the
defendant knew the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; (3) the defendant intended
to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; and (4) the defendant did aid and
abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. The instruction explained that one “aids
and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he or she
specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate
the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.”
       Also relevant are the instructions for the special circumstance of murder by means
of intentional discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle attached to the first degree
murder charge. The jury was specifically instructed that it “must consider the alleged
special circumstances separately for each defendant.” The instructions then provided that

                                              4.
in order to prove this special circumstance “for a defendant who is not the actual killer
but who is guilty of first degree murder as (an aider and abettor/ [or] a member of a
conspiracy), the People must prove that the defendant acted with the intent to kill.” The
special circumstance further required proof that the “murder was perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,” the “perpetrator intentionally discharged the
firearm at another person or persons outside the vehicle,” and the “perpetrator, at the time
[he] … discharged the firearm, specifically intended to inflict death.”
       Petitioner was eventually sentenced to an unstayed term of 25 years to life, plus
two terms of life with the possibility of parole.
       On January 28, 2019, petitioner requested resentencing under former
section 1170.95. The People opposed petitioner’s request. Reciting the facts of the case
as detailed in People v. Trujillo, supra, F060330, the People argued petitioner was not
charged or convicted under a felony murder or natural and probable consequences theory,
but instead was accused as an aider and abettor to a drive-by shooting. Alternatively, the
People argued the facts underlying petitioner’s conviction demonstrated he was both a
major participant in the offense and harbored an intent to kill, which could be inferred
from his actions. On August 10, 2020, the trial court entered a minute order denying
petitioner’s petition with no explanation. The appeal was timely filed on August 20,
2020. The appeal has been fully briefed and the People concede the trial court erred in
failing to order an evidentiary hearing.
       On January 19, 2022, petitioner filed the writ petition. After informal briefing,
this court issued an order to show cause and granted petitioner’s motion to stay the
proceedings in the appeal until resolution of the writ. The People then filed a return, and
petitioner filed a traverse.
       On April 17, 2023, the court issued an order lifting the stay in the appeal and
consolidating the writ petition filed in case No. F083774 with the appeal in case
No. F081571 for all purposes.

                                              5.
                                          DISCUSSION

       In this court’s order to show cause, issued October 7, 2022, we permitted both
parties to rely upon arguments contained within their informal responses, with the caveat
that they “should separately address the timeliness of petitioner’s claim relying on People
v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, whether a retrial is permitted if the Chiu claim is timely,
and any effect granting writ relief will have on petitioner’s appeal in case No. F081571.”
The parties have properly complied with the court’s order.
       The Merits Are Conceded
       In their informal briefing, the People conceded that petitioner had demonstrated a
prima facie case for relief under both People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591
(Canizales) and People v. Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu). The People argued,
however, that petitioner’s Chiu claim appeared untimely. In their return, however, the
People now concede the Chiu claim is timely and warrants writ relief. The People further
affirm petitioner’s Canizales claim warrants writ relief.
       Chiu held that one cannot be convicted of first degree premeditated murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but rather must satisfy the requirements
for direct aiding and abetting as the law then defined that crime. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at pp. 166–167.)4 The People concede that the holding in Chiu is now equally applicable
to attempted murder charges against one who was not the actual killer. (See § 189,
subd. (e) [applying to participants in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of listed
offenses].)

4       At the time, and as petitioner’s jury was instructed, aiding and abetting a first degree
murder could occur when one “aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating its commission.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)
Subject to exceptions not relevant here, the law now applies first degree murder to one who “was
not the actual killer, but, with intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.”
(§ 189, subd. (e)(2).)

                                                 6.
       Canizales held that the standard instructions used to inform the jury of the “kill
zone theory” of liability were inadequate and should be revised to ensure one is not
convicted when they act with only a conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or
death for those around the primary target. (Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 607–609.)
The People concede the instruction used with respect to petitioner’s attempted murder
charges was immaterially different from that rejected in Canizales and contend that the
circumstances of the trial do not indicate whether the jury relied on an uncharged
conspiracy, aiding and abetting theory, or kill zone theory to convict.
       Finally, the People concede that both Chiu and Canizales are to be given
retroactive effect and that petitioner has properly demonstrated prejudice. (See In re
Lopez (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 350, 359–360 [Chiu applies retroactively to final cases];
In re Rayford (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 754, 770, 776–777 [Canizales applies retroactively
to final cases].) For Chiu error, reversal is required “unless the reviewing court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid theory
in convicting the defendant of first degree murder.” (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th
1216, 1218.) For Canizales error, a “reviewing court must reverse the conviction unless,
after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant
circumstances, it determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People
v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 13.)
       Upon review of the record, case law, arguments, and concessions, this court agrees
that petitioner has demonstrated he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus with respect to
his first degree murder and attempted murder convictions. The jury was presented with
theories for liability subsequently invalidated by Chiu, and the record does not clearly
indicate the jury did not rely upon those theories when convicting petitioner of first
degree murder. Likewise, the jury was presented with similar theories for finding
petitioner guilty of attempted murder, but also including the “kill zone” instructions since

                                             7.
found improper under Canizales, and the record does not demonstrate the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Application of Collateral Estoppel
       Although both sides agree a writ should issue, they disagree on the implications of
issuing the writ and thus on whether this court should prevent the People from retrying
petitioner on the vacated convictions. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to collateral
estoppel on the factual claim that he possessed an intent to kill in his role in the shooting
and therefore his relief should include an order that he not be retried on any of the
vacated convictions. The People do not agree petitioner has demonstrated that collateral
estoppel applies and argue the case should be remanded so that the district attorney may
make the decision whether a retrial is appropriate.
       Although retrial after acquittal is generally controlled by the double jeopardy
clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15,
of the California Constitution, in narrow circumstances where two offenses involve a
common issue of ultimate fact the doctrine of collateral estoppel may also apply such that
“ ‘the retrial of an issue can be considered tantamount to the retrial of an offense,’ even if
the elements of the two offenses differ.” (People v. Sanchez (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 961,
974.) The analysis for obtaining such a result is a demanding one that requires us “ ‘to
say that “it would have been irrational for the jury” in the first trial to acquit without
finding in the defendant’s favor on a fact essential to a conviction in the second.’ ” (Id. at
p. 975.) “In other words, a second trial is prohibited only if conviction would require the
prosecutor to prevail on a factual issue the jury necessarily resolved in the defendant’s
favor in the first trial. [Citations.] It is not sufficient that the jury likely acquitted based
on the factual issue in question.” (Ibid.)
       To consider applying this doctrine, we examine the record of the prior proceedings
to determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on an issue other
than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. (Sanchez, supra,

                                                8.
49 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) The defendant bears the burden of establishing the facts
necessary to prove the ultimate issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment
of acquittal. (Id. at pp. 975–976.)
        The applicability of this doctrine to cases such as this, where the second
proceedings are technically a continuation of the initial proceedings,5 is not well settled.
Indeed, in at least three instances our Supreme Court has acknowledged this as an open
issue, indicated a belief the doctrine should not apply to continued prosecutions, but
specifically failed to resolve the issue because other facts indicated to the court that the
preclusion did not apply. (See People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 253–254
[noting applicability of the doctrine was “a threshold issue that we have not yet decided”
before noting past analysis showing it likely inapplicable but determining “we need not
resolve this threshold question because defendant’s res judicata claim fails for other
reasons”]; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 881–882 [noting it was “questionable
whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel even applies to further proceedings in the same
litigation” but stating that “at most it would bar retrial” of only an enhancement that had
not been recharged]; People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 913–916 (Santamaria)
[refusing to resolve dispute after noting the historical need for a subsequent prosecution,
that the United States Supreme Court might well not apply collateral estoppel to a retrial
of a count the jury had previously convicted on, and that at least two potentially
distinguishable federal cases had found the doctrine applicable to certain issues on
retrial].)
        In this case, petitioner has made a compelling showing that the jury specifically
found he did not harbor an intent to kill when it convicted him. As noted, the jury found
the drive-by murder special circumstance to be true for Pedro and not true for petitioner.

5       As noted in In re Cruz (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1346, habeas corpus proceedings
correct erroneous convictions by invalidating the conviction and restoring the defendant to the
position she or he would be in if there had been no trial and conviction.

                                                9.
Thus, as to Pedro, the jury necessarily found the “murder was perpetrated by means of
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle,” the “perpetrator intentionally discharged the
firearm at another person or persons outside the vehicle,” and the “perpetrator, at the time
[he] … discharged the firearm, specifically intended to inflict death.” Also, as the People
concede, “the jury found that Pedro … was the actual killer.” Thus, under the relevant
instructions, to convict petitioner of the same special circumstance after finding him
guilty of first degree murder as an aider and abettor or member of a conspiracy, the jury
was instructed the prosecutor “must prove that [petitioner] acted with the intent to kill.”
This was the only difference between the required proof between petitioner and Pedro,
and the jury’s not true finding shows they harbored a reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s
intent.6
       Historically, this finding would not preclude retrial because petitioner could still
be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory or under an uncharged conspiracy
theory under a lower mental state than actual intent to kill. (In re Martin (1987)
44 Cal.3d 1, 53 [“It is the general rule that even when on habeas corpus it is determined
that the judgment is void, the petitioner is nevertheless subject to retrial unless he has

6       The People do not discuss the implications of the jury’s findings on this point when
contesting petitioner’s argument for application of collateral estoppel principles. Rather the
People focus on the concededly flawed kill zone theory instructions associated with the
attempted murder charges. These instructed, “If you have a reasonable doubt whether
[petitioner] intended to kill Valerie Leyva and/or Josefa Villarreal or intended to kill Rene Puga
and/or Eric Rodriguez by harming everyone in the kill zone, then you must find [petitioner] not
guilty of the attempted murder of Valerie Leyva and/or Josefa Villarreal.” The People argue the
instructions prove the jury determined petitioner had an intent to kill. We do not agree. The kill
zone instruction standing alone required consideration of petitioner’s intent to kill, but the overall
instructions as a whole did not. Rather, as petitioner points out, the uncharged conspiracy
instructions permitted petitioner’s conviction on all substantive charges, but not of the special
circumstances attached to the murder charge, if the jury found Pedro guilty of any one charge
and the remaining counts were the natural and probable consequences of the conspiracy. There
was no intent to kill mental state required to enter into the conspiracy. As such, there was
nothing irrational or irreconcilable about the jury finding no intent to kill while convicting
petitioner of attempted murder.

                                                 10.
effectively been acquitted of the offense in question.”].) In such a circumstance, the case
would fall in line with those like Santamaria, where the fact the jury harbored a
reasonable doubt whether the defendant used a knife did not preclude them from
convicting of murder under an aider and abettor theory. (Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 922.)
       However, in this instance the law has changed dramatically since petitioner’s
conviction. While intent to kill was not required to convict under an aiding and abetting
or an uncharged conspiracy theory in the past, amendments to the Penal Code now
specifically require that intent. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
[noting amendment to § 188, subd. (a)(3) requires that “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime”]; People v. Rivera
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1357 [finding instructional error where jury could find the
defendant guilty of first degree murder if it found the target crime of the uncharged
conspiracy was discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle and that first degree murder
was a natural and probable consequence of that target crime]; People v. McCoy (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 [explaining that “when the charged offense and the intended
offense—murder or attempted murder—are the same, i.e., when guilt does not depend on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, is that the aider and abettor must know
and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator”].)7

7       While these changes also now apply to second degree murder, our Supreme Court has
explained that “the Legislature intended [former] section 1170.95 to be the exclusive avenue for
retroactive relief under Senate Bill [No. ]1437[ (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)].” (People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 853.) We thus find Chiu’s statement “that punishment for second degree
murder is commensurate with a defendant’s culpability for aiding and abetting a target crime that
would naturally, probably, and foreseeably result in a murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 166) remains true for those convicted of
first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine prior to Chiu and,
therefore, that Chiu’s relief in the form of forcing the People to either retry the defendant or
accept a reduction to second degree murder remains proper (see id. at p. 168). While later

                                              11.
       We must therefore determine whether collateral estoppel principles should apply
to a potential retrial where petitioner was originally convicted but the jury made a
necessary factual finding when acquitting petitioner of a different offense that would now
preclude conviction under the law as it has changed in the interim. We conclude that
under the unique facts of this case, collateral estoppel principles can and do apply.
       As noted previously, in the times our Supreme Court has considered similar
questions, it has been skeptical that the United States Supreme Court would extend
collateral estoppel principles to continued prosecutions, as opposed to subsequent
prosecutions. Since those rulings, the United States Supreme Court has provided
additional guidance in this area.
       In Yeager v. United States (2009) 557 U.S. 110 (Yeager), the court discussed what
it considered “the second interest at the core” of the double jeopardy clause, an “interest
in preserving the finality” of an acquittal. (Yeager, at pp. 118–119.) In that case, the jury
had acquitted the defendant on certain fraud charges but failed to reach a verdict in others
related to insider trading, all of which required a factual finding that the defendant
possessed insider information. (Id. at pp. 115–116.) In barring a retrial on the charges
where the jury hung, the court explained that the “reasoning in Ashe [v. Swenson (1970)
397 U.S. 436] is … controlling because, for double jeopardy purposes, the jury’s inability
to reach a verdict on the insider trading counts was a nonevent and the acquittals on the
fraud counts are entitled to the same effect as Ashe’s acquittal.” (Id. at p. 120.) While
the court spent considerable time explaining why a count upon which the jury hung
should not be considered in the preclusion analysis, it made clear that the principles set
forth in Ashe applied to the attempt to continue the current prosecution and that the final
analysis requires the court “identify what a jury necessarily determined at trial.” (Id. at

changes to the law have modified this logic, section 1172.6 remains a viable avenue for
retroactive application of these changes.

                                              12.
p. 122.) In doing so, “courts should scrutinize a jury’s decisions” while recognizing that
a “verdict of acquittal represents the community’s collective judgment regarding all the
evidence and arguments presented to it.” (Ibid.) Turning to the facts before it, the high
court reasoned that “if the possession of insider information was a critical issue of
ultimate fact in all of the charges against petitioner, a jury verdict that necessarily decided
that issue in his favor protects him from prosecution for any charge for which that is an
essential element” under the principles set forth in Ashe. (Id. at p. 123.)

       The high court’s analysis in Yeager puts to rest our Supreme Court’s concerns
regarding the application of certain double jeopardy principles to continuing
prosecutions, making clear that at least in the context of an acquittal that necessarily
forecloses conviction of a charge that shares an essential factual element, the doctrine
may apply if the jury’s intent is discernable. The high court’s analysis does not, however,
specifically deal with the potential incongruency highlighted in Santamaria that arises in
situations where the jury previously convicted on one charge but acquitted on another.
As our Supreme Court wrote, “it would be odd if a conviction that is clearly inconsistent
with an acquittal or not true finding may be retried without constraint after an appellate
reversal, but a conviction that may, in theory at least, be reconciled with another verdict
would, as here, be significantly affected by that verdict following a similar reversal.”
(Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 915.)
       Although not directly resolved, the United States Supreme Court’s focus on the
importance of the jury’s acquittal in the overall context of the case leads us to conclude
that preclusion principles can apply in such circumstances and do apply in this case. As
detailed above, the record in this case does not support a conclusion that the jury acted in
an inconsistent manner in convicting petitioner of all substantive charges despite finding
not true a special allegation that he had the specific intent to kill. Rather, in light of the
theories presented, the instructions given, and the verdict rendered, it requires no great
feat of deduction to conclude the jury convicted petitioner based on an indirect role in the

                                              13.
drive-by shooting through either a conspiracy or aiding and abetting theory that relied on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. There is no evidence in the record that
would justify a contention the jury’s verdict should be “explained by ‘mistake,
compromise, or lenity’ [citation] or ‘confusion or ennui’ ” or any of the other grounds
that raised concerns for our Supreme Court in Santamaria. (Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 915.)
       While the jury’s guilty verdict on the substantive charges is an important
difference from the nonevent of the hung jury in Yeager, the overall record shows that
any suggestion of inconsistency between the conviction of either the first degree murder
or the attempted murder charge and the not true finding on the drive-by shooting special
circumstance rests on a truly thin reed. (Yeager, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 125 [“In this case,
there is merely a suggestion that the jury may have acted irrationally. And instead of
resting that suggestion on a verdict, the Government relies on a hung count, the thinnest
reed of all.”].) While a prior guilty verdict may create an irreconcilable inconsistency
with an acquittal and thus permit retrial, the ultimate analysis is not whether a guilty
verdict was reached but whether the jury actually acquitted on the critical issue. (See
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States (2016) 580 U.S. 5, 21 [noting when rejecting a bar to
retrial after inconsistent verdicts that retrial would not “be tolerable if the trial error could
resolve the apparent inconsistency in the jury’s verdicts,” as in a situation where review
of the instructions could reconcile the verdicts].) In this case, the proper analysis clearly
shows an acquittal by the jury on the contested issue of intent to kill.
       For these reasons, collateral estoppel issues can and do bar retrial in this case of
any offense that requires the jury to determine petitioner had an intent to kill. Petitioner
contends that our conclusion on this issue requires us to remand with instructions he be
resentenced to second degree murder and not retried. However, in light of the substantial
changes to the law in this area and the lack of focused argument on whether any theory
remains under which petitioner may be retried, we do not agree with this result. “It is the

                                               14.
general rule that even when on habeas corpus it is determined that the judgment is void,
the petitioner is nevertheless subject to retrial unless he has effectively been acquitted of
the offense in question.” (In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 53.)
       In this case, petitioner has shown that he has been acquitted of harboring an intent
to kill at the time of the shooting. This acquittal is binding upon any retrial dependent
upon such a factual finding. However, petitioner has not conclusively demonstrated that
there remains no theory upon which a conviction could be had. While this court sees no
obvious option, the substantial recent changes in the law leave this court convinced that
such an analysis regarding the ability and efficacy of retrying petitioner should be made
by the district attorney in the first instance. Should the district attorney be unable to or
elect not to retry petitioner under a viable theory of guilt, the court shall enter a judgment
of conviction for second degree murder and sentence petitioner accordingly. (See Chiu,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 168.)
       Dismissal of the Appeal
       In the order to show cause issued in the writ proceedings, we requested the parties
brief how the relief contemplated in the writ proceedings would affect petitioner’s
pending appeal. The People argue, and we agree, that relief on the writ moots the appeal.
       As petitioner acknowledges, “[a]n appeal becomes moot when ‘ “ ‘ “the
occurrence of events renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant appellant any
effective relief.” ’ ” ’ ” (Becerra v. McClatchy Co. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 913, 927,
fn. 4; but see People v. Delong (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 482, 486–489 [discussing the
unsettled nature in which criminal appeals are reviewed for mootness].) In this case, we
have vacated petitioner’s convictions for first degree murder and premeditated attempted
murder. Petitioner contends that he remains convicted of second degree murder and,
therefore, relief on his appeal from denial of resentencing could be granted. But this is
not technically correct.

                                              15.
       As it stands, petitioner has been returned to his status pretrial, with his prior
relevant convictions vacated. (See In re Cruz, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346
[explaining “the conviction is set aside but the prosecution is not ended”].) Further
action is required by the trial court to enter a judgment of second degree murder, if one is
to be entered, and petitioner remains to be sentenced on that count. Given that the
resentencing statute only allows one “convicted of … murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime” and attempted murder to
“file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner” on those crimes, the lack of a
current conviction or sentence means no relief can be provided on petitioner’s appeal.
(See § 1172.6, subd. (a).) Moreover, it is possible that petitioner could be retried,
rendering any relief advisory at best.
       We note, however, that the People concede error with respect to the court’s entry
of an order without an evidentiary hearing in this instance and concede petitioner may file
a new request for resentencing at the conclusion of these proceedings. (See People v.
Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 980 [“However, this authority to make
determinations without conducting an evidentiary hearing pursuant to [former]
section 1170.95, subd. (d) is limited to readily ascertainable facts from the record (such
as the crime of conviction), rather than factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or
the exercise of discretion (such as determining whether the petitioner showed reckless
indifference to human life in the commission of the crime).”], abrogated on another
ground in People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963.) The People’s well-taken
concessions should ensure a similar error does not arise again if petitioner eventually files
a new resentencing request.
                                         DISPOSITION
       The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. For the reasons set forth above,
the superior court shall vacate petitioner’s convictions on counts 1, 2, and 3. Petitioner’s

                                              16.
convictions on the remaining counts shall not be affected. If the prosecution cannot or
elects to not retry petitioner, the trial court shall enter judgment reflecting a conviction of
second degree murder on count 1 and resentence petitioner on all remaining counts
accordingly.
       For the reasons set forth above, it is further ORDERED that petitioner’s appeal is
dismissed as moot.

                                              17.