Court Opinion

ID: 9669669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:04:40.569793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:59.566196
License: Public Domain

*872Dissenting Opinion by
Justice BRIDGES.
I respectfully dissent. Because I conclude the 1987 postnuptial agreement precludes Christy Calvert Collins’ claim for economic contribution, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The 1987 postnuptial agreement partitioned property as follows:
2.01 Wife’s Property
Wife will own, possess, and enjoy as her sole and separate estate, free from any claim of Husband, the property listed in Schedule A; and Husband partitions to Wife all that property, together with any insurance policies covering that property and any escrow accounts that relate to that property; and Husband grants, releases, and confirms to Wife and to her heirs and assigns all right, title, and interest in and claims to that property, to have and to hold the same, with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging forever.
2.02 Husband’s Property
Husband will own, possess, and enjoy as his sole and separate estate, free from any claim of Wife, the property listed in Schedule B; and Wife partitions to Husband all that property, together with any insurance policies covering that property and any escrow accounts that relate to that property; and Wife grants, releases, and confirms to Husband and to his heirs and assigns all right, title, and interest in and claims to that property, to have and to hold the same, with all and singular the heredita-ments and appurtenances thereto belonging forever.
2.03 Community Property
Husband and Wife will own, possess, and enjoy as their community estate, the property listed in Schedule C, together with any insurance policies covering that property and any escrow accounts that relate to that property.
“Schedule C” listed two items: “The house and lot located at 5106 DeLoache, Dallas, Texas” and “[a]ll funds in the Union Bank Household Account.”
As the majority sets forth, the paragraphs partitioning each party’s separate property contain identical language providing that each party “grants, releases, and confirms to [the other party] all right, title, and interest in and claims to that property....” However, the majority notes, the provision describing community property contains no such “grants, releases, and confirms” language. Based on this difference, the majority states neither Thomas nor Christy “grant[ed], release[d] and confirm[ed] ... all right, title, and interest in and claims to” the DeLoache property. Though the majority opinion does not specifically say so, the majority appears to conclude that Christy thus did not waive any economic contribution claim related to the DeLoache property. The majority then cites paragraph 6.01 of the agreement which provides that “All property not listed on any schedule attached to this agreement will be owned by Wife as separate property. Husband grants, conveys, and assigns to Wife an undivided one hundred percent (100%) interest in any such unlisted property owned in the name of either party.” The majority concludes that, “[t]o the extent Christy’s separate property claim for economic contribution against the community estate was an asset at the time of the postnuptial agreement, that claim continued to be hers.”
On the contrary, I would conclude that the provision regarding community property contains no “grants, releases, and confirms” language because such a grant is unnecessary. The agreement clearly sets aside the DeLoache property as community property, effectively “granting” an interest in the property to both Thomas and Christy. Under paragraph 2.04 of the agreement, each party’s earnings, recover*873ies for loss of earning capacity, and all property acquired in the future are partitioned as each party’s separate property. I would conclude paragraph 6.01 applies, as it is entitled, to “Undisclosed property” only. The majority seems to interpret “undisclosed” as applying to Christy’s funds used as the down payment and mortgage payment on the DeLoache property and for the first phase of renovation. As I read the agreement, its plain terms set aside the DeLoache property, in its entirety, as Thomas and Christy’s community property. The agreement partitions each party’s separate property and all earnings and property acquired in the future but does not include, as a separate item, any reference to money paid by Christy toward the DeLoache property. I would conclude the agreement thus precludes Christy’s economic contribution claim for funds paid in relation to the DeLoache property.
Accordingly, I would sustain Thomas’ first and second issues and remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings.