Court Opinion

ID: 9940417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:07:01.008924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:50.516356
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

        In the Interest of J.R., N.R., C.R., A.R., and L.R., children.

               STATEWIDE GUARDIAN AD LITEM OFFICE,

                                 Petitioner,

                                      v.

   S.S. and B.S., Prospective Adoptive Parents, and DEPARTMENT OF
                       CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,

                               Respondents.

                              No. 2D23-2529

                             February 14, 2024

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Pasco County;
Kimberly Campbell, Judge.

Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Amanda
Victoria Glass, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Statewide Guardian
ad Litem Office, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Ana-Maria Carnesoltas of the Law Office of Ana-Maria Carnesoltas, P.A.,
Indian Rocks Beach, for Respondents S.S. and B.S., Prospective Adoptive
Parents.

Bruce Bartlett, State Attorney, and Leslie M. Layne, Assistant State
Attorney, Clearwater, for Respondent Department of Children and
Families.

SLEET, Chief Judge.
      The Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Office (GAL) petitions this court
for certiorari relief to quash the trial court's order granting the
prospective adoptive parents S.S. and B.S.'s motion to intervene as
parties in the underlying dependency action regarding five minor
children—J.R., N.R., C.R., A.R., and L.R. Because the trial court
departed from the essential requirements of the law when it relied on
T.R.-B. v. Department of Children & Families, 335 So. 3d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA
2022), and permitted the prospective parents to intervene as parties, we
grant the petition and quash the order.
                            I.     BACKGROUND
      In July 2019, the children were sheltered due to their mother's
mental health and physical abuse. By final judgment entered on
January 27, 2022, the trial court terminated the parental rights of the
children's parents and committed the children to the permanent care
and custody of the Department of Children and Families (the
Department) for the purposes of adoption. Four of the children were
moved to a therapeutic foster home, and two years later, the fifth child
was reunified with her siblings.
      In late 2022, the children were matched with two prospective
adoptive families who were willing to adopt the children together.
Because one of the families lived in Virginia, the Department prioritized
S.S. and B.S. (the Prospective Parents), a local family. The children were
placed with the Prospective Parents in April 2023 as a prospective
adoptive placement.
      On June 21, 2023, GAL filed a motion to change placement,
making several allegations regarding the Prospective Parents as the basis
for the placement change. The Prospective Parents subsequently filed a
motion for continuance, arguing that they were notified on July 18,

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2023, that a hearing would be held on the removal of the three girls on
July 24, 2023, and that they needed to appear in person in court if they
wanted to be heard. As such, they requested more time to ensure that
they could present all relevant evidence to the court. The following day,
GAL filed a motion to strike and/or dismiss the Prospective Parents'
motion for continuance, explaining that while GAL was not opposed to a
brief continuance, the Prospective Parents were not a party to the action
under section 39.01(58), Florida Statutes (2023), and thus lacked
standing to motion the court. On July 26, 2023, the trial court granted
GAL's motion to strike and continued the matter. Thereafter, the
Prospective Parents filed a motion for leave to intervene as parties. The
court held a hearing on the motion, and on October 20, 2023, the court
entered an order granting the Prospective Parents party status.
                              II.   ANALYSIS
      GAL now seeks certiorari relief to quash the trial court's order
granting the motion to intervene.
      To be entitled to certiorari relief, the petitioner "must establish (1) a
departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in
material injury for the remainder of the trial (3) that cannot be corrected
on postjudgment appeal." See Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature
Works, Inc., 658 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The last two
elements, often referred to as irreparable harm, are jurisdictional and
must be analyzed before the court may even consider the first element.
Id. at 649.
      "A petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate to review an order
granting a participant's motion to intervene as a party in a dependency
proceeding." Statewide Guardian Ad Litem Off. v. J.B., 361 So. 3d 419,
422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (quoting Chew v. Roberts, 122 So. 3d 493, 496

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(Fla. 5th DCA 2013)); see also Dep't of Child. & Fams. v. S.T., 353 So. 3d
1246, 1247 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) ("[I]n a post-termination [sic] matter, a
'petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate to review an order granting a
participant's motion to intervene as a party in a dependency proceeding,'
and '[t]he jurisdictional requirements for certiorari review are met
because the erroneous granting of a participant's motion to intervene as
a party "may reasonably cause material injury of an irreparable
nature." ' " (second alteration in original) (quoting Chew, 122 So. 3d at
496)). Therefore, because the jurisdictional requirements for certiorari
are met, we turn our attention to whether the trial court departed from
the essential requirements of the law.
      GAL argues that the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law when it relied on T.R.-B., 335 So. 3d at 729, and
permitted the Prospective Parents to intervene as parties.1 We agree.
      Dependency proceedings are governed by chapter 39, Florida
Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. "To keep the
focus on the children's best interests, the juvenile rules limit who may be
a party to a dependency proceeding, designating other interested persons
as participants with lesser rights . . . ." K.N. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams.,
359 So. 3d 741, 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). Specifically, rule 8.210(a)
defines "party" as "the petitioner, the child, the parent(s) of the child, the
department, and the guardian ad litem or the representative of the
guardian ad litem program, when the program has been appointed." Fla.
R. Juv. P. 8.210(a); see also § 39.01(58) (defining "party" to include the

      1 The Department filed a response to the petition explaining that it

does not oppose the issuance of a writ of certiorari on the basis that the
"order granting the motion to intervene constitutes a departure from the
essential requirements of the law that creates irreparable harm that
cannot be remedied on direct appeal."

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same limited people). A "participant" on the other hand "means any
person who is not a party but who should receive notice of hearings
involving the child." Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.210(b). This includes "identified
prospective parents." Id. ("Participants include foster parents or the legal
custodian of the child, identified prospective parents, actual custodians of
the child, grandparents entitled to notice of an adoption proceeding as
provided by law, the state attorney, and any other person whose
participation may be in the best interest of the child." (emphasis added));
see also § 39.01(57) (" 'Participant,' for purposes of a shelter proceeding,
dependency proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding,
means any person who is not a party but who should receive notice of
hearings involving the child, including the actual custodian of the child,
the foster parents or the legal custodian of the child, identified
prospective parents, and any other person whose participation may be in
the best interest of the child." (emphasis added)).
     The plain language of section 39.01(58) and rule 8.210(a) does not
allow either S.S. or B.S. the designation of "party" status based on the
fact that they are the children's prospective parents. See Daniels v. Fla.
Dep't of Health, 898 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 2005) ("When the statute is clear
and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain
language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction
to ascertain intent."). Rather, S.S. and B.S more appropriately should be
designated as participants. However, despite the language of the statute
and rule, the trial court concluded without further elaboration that the
facts and holding of T.R.-B. supports the Prospective Parents' position
that they should be allowed to intervene as parties. This was error.
     In T.R.-B., the Third District reversed the trial court's denial of a
grandmother's motion to intervene as an interested party in the

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dependency proceeding of her grandchild. 335 So. 3d at 730. The Third
District relied on Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 in concluding that
intervention is a matter of the trial court's discretion but that it should
be liberally construed. It further held that the legal test to determine
party status is that the movant's interest "must be in the matter in
litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect
of the judgment." Id. at 736 (quoting I.B. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 876
So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). It found that the grandmother
satisfied this test by being the child's grandmother and custodial
caregiver for four years and by being the petitioner in her adoption
petition. Id. at 737.
      "Although the concept of intervention is liberally applied in general
civil procedure, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, not the Rules of Civil
Procedure, apply in this case." See K.N., 359 So. 3d at 743. Notably, in
1992, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure were amended and specified that
"[r]eference to the civil rules, previously found in rule 8.200, has been
removed because the rules governing dependency and termination of
parental rights proceedings are self-contained and no longer need to
reference the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure." In re Amends. to Fla. R. of
Juv. P., 608 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 1992). "Accordingly, the liberal
intervention standard of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 does not
apply in dependency proceedings." K.N., 359 So. 3d at 743.
      Unlike Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.230 or Florida Family Law
Rule of Procedure 12.230, which both allow "[a]nyone claiming an
interest in pending litigation . . . to assert a right by intervention,"
neither chapter 39 nor the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide
for a mechanism to "intervene" during a chapter 39 proceeding. Instead,

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they allow for "participants" to be added to a chapter 39 proceeding
"without the necessity of filing a motion to intervene." Fla. R. Juv. P.
8.210(b); § 39.051(57); see also K.N., 359 So. 3d at 745 ("[W]hile a court
'may add additional participants,' that same language is absent from the
definition of parties. Its absence must be construed as intentional, as
the Juvenile Rules Committee 'knows how to say what it means, and its
failure to do so is intentional.' " (citation omitted) (first quoting Fla. R.
Juv. P. 8.210(b); then quoting Paragon Health Servs., Inc. v. Cent. Palm
Beach Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 859 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2003))).
      In fact, Florida courts have restricted party designation in several
cases, limiting parties to those specifically designated by statute. See
J.P. v. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 12 So. 3d 253, 254 (Fla. 2d DCA
2009) (concluding that the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law when it allowed the maternal grandmother to
intervene as a party in the dependency proceeding); Statewide Guardian
Ad Litem Office v. S.O., 361 So. 3d 433, 434 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)
(granting GAL and the Department's petition for certiorari and quashing
an order that granted the maternal grandmother's motion to intervene as
a party); K.N., 359 So. 3d at 742 (concluding on direct appeal that the
trial court did not err in denying intervention, as the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure do not provide for party status to foster parents);
S.T., 353 So. 3d at 1247 (concluding that the trial court departed from
the essential requirements of the law when it allowed the paternal aunt
and grandfather to intervene as a party in the dependency proceeding
because they did "not fall within the definition of 'parties' under the
statute and rule"); J.L. v. G.M., 687 So. 2d 977, 977-78 (Fla. 4th DCA
1997) (concluding that the trial court departed from the essential

                                        7
requirements of the law by allowing the child's maternal grandmother,
aunt, and uncle to intervene in a dependency hearing when they did not
fall within the definition of parties).
      Furthermore, to the extent that the Prospective Parents argue that
pursuant to section 39.522, Florida Statutes (2023), the issue of
intervention became moot on January 14, 2024, we disagree. Although
the Prospective Parents allege that on that date the children had been
placed with them for nine continuous months, thus triggering the
provisions of section 39.522, that statute provides for party status in a
limited capacity only.
      Section 39.522 pertains to postdisposition change of custody. If a
caregiver objects to the change in custody, then it must notify the court
and the Department of the objection and intent to request an evidentiary
hearing. § 39.522(3)(c)2.
      4. Within 7 days after receiving written notice from the
      caregiver, the court must conduct an initial case status
      hearing, at which time the court must:
      a. Grant party status to the current caregiver who is seeking
      permanent custody and has maintained physical custody of
      that child for at least 9 continuous months for the limited
      purpose of filing a motion for a hearing on the objection and
      presenting evidence pursuant to this subsection.
§ 39.522(3)(c)4.a (emphasis added). Thus, caregivers may become limited
parties for the purposes of the change of placement hearing but do not
enjoy unlimited party status throughout the dependency hearing. See
J.B., 361 So. 3d at 427 (Tanenbaum, J., concurring) (noting that section
39.522(3) provides a very "narrow exception that allows for intervention
by a non-relative caregiver only when several very specific criteria are
met").

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     As such, even if the children have been living with the Prospective
Parents for nine continuous months as of January 14, 2024, and the
Prospective Parents met the criteria of section 39.522, the issue of
intervention as a party would not be moot because the trial court
improperly granted unlimited party status to the Prospective Parents
rather than limited party status as contemplated by section
39.522(3)(c)4.a.
     Accordingly, we grant GAL's petition for writ of certiorari and quash
the trial court's order granting the Prospective Parents' motion to
intervene as a party in the underlying dependency action.
     Petition granted; order quashed.

KELLY and ATKINSON, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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