Court Opinion

ID: 9764205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:14:38.159973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.732740
License: Public Domain

*349BARAJAS, Justice,
concurring.
While I find myself in agreement with the majority’s holding, I find it necessary to concur with the majority opinion.
I agree with the majority opinion that a threshold requirement for an in camera inspection of allegedly privileged matter requires that a prima facie showing be made that the client was contemplating the commission of a fraud or crime. A mere allegation of fraud in the pleadings of fraud are insufficient. Cigna Corporation, 838 S.W.2d at 569.
While the majority opinion seeks to broadly define “fraud” as a generic term, I would choose to define “fraud” by the standards of professional conduct to which attorneys, as officers of the court, are held.7 In holding attorneys to a much higher standard, I would find that “fraud”, as envisioned by the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, includes the commission and/or attempted commission of fraud on the court as well as the established principles of common law fraud and criminal fraud. See Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 4.01 (1989). Moreover, I would find that a prima facie showing of fraud is made once the attorney, whose services were sought for the purposes of making such false statement, has complied with the ethical responsibility of disclosing a material fact to a third party, including a judicial tribunal, when such disclosure is necessary to avoid making the attorney a party to a fraudulent act perpetrated by a client. See Tex.Disciplinary R.Prof.Conduct 4.01(b) (1989). If the in camera inspection is conducted as set forth in the majority opinion, I would hold that the attorney-client privilege does not exist if it is shown by a preponderance of evidence that the services of the attorney in the instant case were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a fraud, including a fraud on the court, for personal advantage. See Cigna Corporation, 838 S.W.2d at 569; See Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 503(d)(1).

. A critical distinction must be made between an attorney who evaluates the merits of a difficult case, and commences litigation based on his interpretation of existing law, and an attorney who opines, based on facts presented to him by the prospective client, that his services are sought for the purpose of enabling another to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably shoüld have known to be a crime or fraud.