Court Opinion

ID: 9594474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:30:19.782226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:26.136836
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that as the sole shareholder of the corporation, “[Cain] was the sole ‘owner’ of the corporation” within the meaning of the insurance policy, and that such a finding “is not synonymous with a finding that the corporate veil has been pierced.” Shelby Ins. Co. v. Ford, 212 Ga. App. 303, 304 (441 SE2d 764) (1994).
Under Georgia law, “contracts of insurance are to be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured when language contained therein is susceptible to two or more constructions. Where the insurer grants coverage to an insured, it must define any exclusions in its policy clearly and distinctly. [Cits.]” American Southern Ins. Co. v. Golden, 188 Ga. App. 585, 586 (373 SE2d 652) (1988).
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 214 Ga. App. 23, 29 (447 SE2d 89) (1994). In my view, “sole owner” is susceptible to more than one definition (as evidenced by the difference of opinion between this court and the Court of Appeals), and the insurer has failed to adequately define an exception to coverage. Thus, the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured.
Construing a similar provision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the application of an insurance policy to a corporation, where the language of the policy limited coverage to “a business of which [the insured individual] is the sole proprietor.” State of N. Y. v. Blank, 27 F3d 783, 792 (2nd Cir. 1994). The court held that *235since the individual was the sole shareholder of the corporation and “exercised close control over the operation of’ the corporation, id., the business could be characterized as a sole proprietorship even though it was organized as a corporation, and could not be denied coverage. Similarly, in Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhee, 160 Ga. App. 468 (287 SE2d 257) (1981), the court held that an insurance policy issued to Rhee as an individual covered the fire damage to property purchased by Rhee’s corporation, because Rhee was the sole shareholder and “a loss to the corporation was an equivalent loss to him,” id. at 470.
Decided March 6, 1995
Reconsiderations denied March 30, 1995.
Hobgood & Toler, T. Tucker Hobgood, for appellant.
Moore & Moore, W. Newton Moore, Barksdale, Irwin, Talley & Sharp, David B. Irwin, Clay M. Westbrook, William G. Gainer, for appellees.
In this case Cain is the sole shareholder and president of the corporation, and exercised close control over the operations of the day care center. I would hold that the insurance policy covered Cain’s corporation.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.