Court Opinion

ID: 9491093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:03:32.153307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:38.519946
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case, but I write separately to clarify my views on the Fourth Amendment issues raised in this appeal.
I would not conclude, as the majority does, that a canine sniff is never a Fourth Amendment search. I agree with the rationale of United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir.1985), which distinguishes between a canine sniff at a public airport, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), and one that takes place in a private home. The former does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy, but the latter may under some circumstances because of the heightened privacy expectations in a private home. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1366-7. See also Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 103 S.Ct. at 2644-45 (concluding “that the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here—exposure of [Place’s] luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine—did not constitute a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”) (emphasis added).
The two cases which the majority identifies as criticizing the Thomas decision are easily distinguishable from the instant case. The Colyer case involved a trained canine sniff of “the exterior of an Amtrak roomette,” an intrusion on privacy far different, in my view, from a search of dresser drawers in one’s apartment. United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 473 (D.C.Cir.1989). The Ninth Circuit’s Lingenfelter decision is similarly inapposite. That ease involved a trained canine search of a warehouse, and the court criticized Thomas in dicta only after holding that the defendants challenging the police action lacked standing. United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 636-8 (9th Cir.1993). This ease differs from Colyer andLingenfelterbotb because of the heightened privacy interest in one’s home and because Reed consented only to a search for a suspected intruder in his residence, and not to a search of his private belongings for contraband. Under these circumstances, I believe the actions of Cheddy, the trained canine, may have constituted a Fourth Amendment search.
Even so, I would agree that the canine team was lawfully in Reed’s apartment, and I note that the police in this case did not handle Cheddy improperly. Furthermore, I agree that any contraband seen by the human officer or sniffed by the trained canine fell within either the “plain view” doctrine or Judge Ryan’s “canine sniff’ rule. Moreover, there was other evidence observed by the police, including Cheddy’s alert on the sofa in the living room, to indicate probable cause to believe that contraband was located in Reed’s apartment even without considering the contents of Reed’s dresser drawers. The officers properly obtained a warrant before making a full-scale drug sweep. The police, in short, did not overreach, nor did they intentionally violate Reed’s constitutional rights.
I would, accordingly, AFFIRM the district court’s decision in all respects, and I concur in my colleague’s analysis as to all but that portion of Section III.A. holding that a canine sniff can never be a Fourth Amendment search.