Court Opinion

ID: 9858346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:20:46.319473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:57.521368
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I. As explained in division II of my dissent in City of Fort Dodge v. Iowa Public Relations Board, 275 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1979), filed separately this date, I do not believe the terms identifying mandatory subjects of bargaining should be given a narrow as opposed to ordinary meaning. Because I agree with the court that the insurance proposal in the present case comes within the ordinary meaning of insurance, I concur in that holding.
II. However, I do not agree that the grievance proposal falls outside the “grievance procedures” subject matter for mandatory bargaining under § 20.9. The proposal is: “That grievance committee members be allowed to investigate and process grievances during working hours and without loss of wages.” We do not pass on the merits of the proposal; we have only to decide whether the subject is included in the parties’ duty to negotiate “grievance procedures.”
“Grievance procedures” are described in § 20.18 as “procedures for the consideration of public employee grievances and disputes over the interpretation and application of agreements.” The only provision of § 20.18 relating to costs refers to costs of arbitration, not the cost of investigating and processing grievances by grievance committee members.
Plainly, permitting committee members to investigate and process grievances dur*776ing working hours without loss of pay is nothing more nor less than one aspect of procedure for handling grievances.
This is manifest from § 20.18. It contains this provision: “Public employees of the state shall follow either the grievance procedures provided in a collective bargaining agreement, or in the event no such procedures are so provided, shall follow grievance procedures established pursuant to chapter 19A.”
The grievance procedures under chapter 19A, governing merit employment, include this provision: “All grievances and complaints shall be discussed on state time, except no overtime or compensatory time shall be allowed if the proceedings extend beyond the employee’s normal working hours.” IAC § 570-15.2(3). Therefore, if the collective bargaining agreement does not establish grievance procedures, the statute requires the parties to use procedures promulgated under chapter 19A which include a provision for conducting proceedings on employer time without loss of pay. It should be apparent from this that the legislature views the subject of the present grievance proposal as part of grievance procedure.
Furthermore, I do not believe the employer’s right to direct work under § 20.7 affects this issue. As acknowledged by the court, the provisions of § 20.9 are exceptions to employer rights under § 20.7. As exceptions, the provisions of § 20.9 are not in conflict with § 20.7 and .are entitled to be given effect. Grievance procedures, hours, vacations, leaves of absence, transfer procedures, health and safety matters, in-service training, and perhaps other § 20.9 mandatory bargaining subjects, impinge upon the employer’s prerogative under § 20.7 to direct the work of employees. However, that fact does not alter their nature as mandatory bargaining subjects. Therefore, once a proposal is identified as a grievance procedure, it is a mandatory bargaining subject notwithstanding § 20.7.
Therefore I would hold that the grievance proposal in this case is a mandatory bargaining subject.
UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ., join in this dissent.