Court Opinion

ID: 9896973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:04:56.689076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:56.575117
License: Public Domain

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    STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TRAVIS LANIER
                 (SC 20620)
             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                        Ecker and Alexander, Js.

                                   Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree, the defendant
   appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court
   had violated his constitutional rights to confrontation, to present a
   defense, and to a fair trial when it limited defense counsel’s cross-
   examination of the victim with respect to matters pertaining to the
   victim’s bias and motive to fabricate allegations against the defendant.
   The victim, who had been serving probation for a felony conviction,
   encountered the defendant, with whom he was acquainted, and another
   individual, M, at a bar, when the defendant asked the victim if he could
   borrow some money. The victim gave the defendant twenty dollars and
   remarked that he had additional money at home that he was saving for
   his rent. When the bar closed, they all went to the defendant’s apartment,
   where M struck the victim several times and accused him of stealing
   his wrist watch. The defendant and M then ordered the victim to take
   them to the victim’s apartment, and, when they arrived, the defendant
   demanded that the victim give him his money. The victim gave the
   defendant an envelope containing $800 in $100 and $50 bills. The defen-
   dant took some of the money and told the victim that he would hurt
   him if he contacted the police. Once the defendant and M departed, the
   victim called 911. A police officer responded to the call and encountered
   the defendant and M walking near the victim’s apartment. The defendant
   continued to disregard the officer’s multiple orders to stop and continued
   walking around a corner and onto a side street. A second police officer
   arrived on the scene, and, while that officer secured the defendant and
   M, the first officer searched the side street and discovered two $100
   bills. In anticipation of trial, the defendant sought permission to question
   the victim concerning his prior felony conviction, his probationary status
   at the time of the incident, his arrests while on probation, and the
   specific conditions of his probation, which required that the victim
   undergo substance abuse treatment and that he not be arrested. The
   defendant argued that the victim’s probationary status was a legitimate
   area of inquiry because the jury reasonably could infer from it that the
   victim had an interest in currying favor with the state and that the
   specific conditions of the victim’s probation were relevant to his state
   of mind at the time of the incident and his motive to fabricate the
   allegations against the defendant. Specifically, the defendant argued that
   the victim was motivated to fabricate the allegations to avoid being
   accused of stealing M’s watch and to recover the money that was taken
   from him as payment for M’s watch. The trial court ultimately permitted
   defense counsel to question the victim about his prior felony conviction,
   his probationary status, and his financial concerns and hardships at the
   time of the incident but prohibited her from cross-examining the victim
   about his recent violation of probation, his arrests while on probation,
   or the specific conditions of his probation. In doing so, the trial court
   determined that the defendant’s proffered theory in support of the pro-
   hibited lines of questioning, namely, that the victim had fabricated his
   allegations to recover the money the defendant took from him and to
   avoid being arrested for stealing M’s watch, which could have affected
   his probationary status, was too speculative. The Appellate Court
   affirmed the judgment of conviction, concluding that, because the trial
   court had allowed defense counsel to conduct an extensive and robust
   cross-examination of the victim, during which she emphasized the vic-
   tim’s felony probationary status and the many inconsistencies in the
   victim’s testimony, the trial court did not violate the defendant’s constitu-
   tional rights or otherwise abuse its discretion by limiting defense coun-
   sel’s cross-examination. On the granting of certification, the defendant
   appealed to this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to
    confrontation, to present a defense, or to a fair trial:

   The trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s cross-examination did
   not foreclose her from cross-examining the victim on matters tending
   to show the victim’s motive, bias, or interest to fabricate his allegations
   against the defendant but merely set reasonable limits on the scope of
   that inquiry, and defense counsel was permitted to expose facts from
   which the jury could have appropriately drawn inferences relating to
   the victim’s credibility.

   Defense counsel was afforded an adequate opportunity to cross-examine
   the victim, which included questions about M’s allegedly stolen watch
   and the victim’s financial difficulties, and to present the defense’s theory
   of the case, namely, that the victim was motivated to fabricate the
   allegations against the defendant so that he could recover the money
   the defendant had taken from him and avoid arrest for allegedly stealing
   M’s watch.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court had
    abused its discretion by limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination
    of the victim because, even if the trial court had abused its discretion,
    the defendant failed to demonstrate that the error was harmful:

   Although the victim’s testimony was critical to proving that the defendant
   had committed the burglary, the state’s case was strong, and there was
   ample corroborating evidence demonstrating that the defendant had
   unlawfully entered and remained in the victim’s apartment while placing
   the victim under threat of physical harm and with the intent of stealing the
   victim’s money, and that evidence included photographs of the victim’s
   injuries, medical records, and testimony from emergency room person-
   nel; M’s testimony that the victim had been assaulted, that the defendant
   was present for the assault, and that the defendant and M walked the
   victim to his apartment to get his money; and dispatch call sheets,
   testimony from a police dispatcher, and 911 call transcripts all indicating
   that the victim had not led the defendant and M back to the victim’s
   apartment voluntarily.

   Moreover, the defendant’s conduct upon encountering the police, includ-
   ing his ignoring the officers’ commands, his walking away from one of
   the officers, and his disposal of two $100 bills on the sidewalk before
   returning to the officers, supported the inference that the defendant had
   acted in that manner because the money was evidence of the burglary,
   and he did not want the police to find it on his person or to observe
   him disposing of it.

   Defense counsel was otherwise permitted to conduct cross-examination
   and to introduce evidence to adequately advance the defense’s theory
   that the victim had fabricated the allegations against the defendant, as
   counsel elicited testimony from the victim that he had been convicted
   of a certain felony, that he was on probation, and that he faced certain
   financial difficulties at the time of the incident, counsel impeached the
   victim’s credibility by highlighting the many inconsistencies in his state-
   ments, M’s testimony provided a basis for the defendant’s claim that the
   victim had stolen M’s watch and offered him money as compensation
   for the theft, and defense counsel’s closing argument, which drew from
   the testimony elicited during cross-examination of the victim and direct
   examination of M, demonstrated that counsel was able to cogently pres-
   ent the defense’s theory of the case.

   Furthermore, there was no merit to the defendant’s contention that the
   prosecutor’s rebuttal argument that the defendant had failed to show
   any motive for the victim to fabricate his allegations compounded the
   harm allegedly caused by the trial court’s limits on defense counsel’s
   cross-examination of the victim, as the trial court mitigated any potential
   harm by instructing the jury that statements made by counsel during
   closing arguments are not evidence and by reminding the jury to draw
   its own conclusions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, and the
   prosecutor’s rebuttal argument did not change the fact that defense
   counsel, during her own closing argument, relied on the evidence that
   she was able to introduce to argue that the victim had been motivated
   to fabricate the allegations against the defendant due to the victim’s
   probationary status.

   In addition, this court could not conclude that the trial court’s limits on
  defense counsel’s cross-examination would have had any meaningful
  impact on the jury’s verdict, as it was unlikely that testimony regarding
  the specific conditions of the victim’s probation would have made
  defense counsel’s presentation of the defense’s theory of the case any
  more persuasive, as the jurors reasonably could have surmised, on the
  basis of their own common knowledge, that a probationer would seek
  to avoid arrest.
      Argued October 11, 2022—officially released July 11, 2023

                          Procedural History

   Two part substitute information charging the defen-
dant, in the first part, with the crimes of robbery in the
first degree, robbery in the second degree, conspiracy
to commit robbery in the first degree, conspiracy to
commit robbery in the second degree, assault in the
second degree, and burglary in the second degree, and,
in the second part, with being a persistent felony
offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Middlesex, where the first part of the information
was tried to the jury before Suarez, J.; verdict of guilty
of burglary in the second degree; thereafter, the defen-
dant was tried to the court on the second part of the
information; finding of guilty; subsequently, the court,
Suarez, J., rendered judgment in accordance with the
verdict and the finding, from which the defendant
appealed to the Appellate Court, Bright, C. J., and Moll
and Bear, Js., which affirmed the trial court’s judgment,
and the defendant, on the granting of certification,
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
  Pamela S. Nagy, supervisory assistant public defender,
for the appellant (defendant).
  Melissa L. Streeto, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom were Russell Zentner, senior assistant
state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Michael A. Gailor,
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
                          Opinion

   ALEXANDER, J. In this certified appeal, the defen-
dant, Travis Lanier, challenges the judgment of the
Appellate Court, which affirmed the defendant’s convic-
tion of burglary in the second degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-102 (a). The defendant claims
that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that (1)
the trial court did not violate his constitutional rights
to confrontation, to present a defense, and to a fair
trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States constitution, and (2) the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it limited defense counsel’s
cross-examination of the victim, Alejandro Marrinan.1
We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
   The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On the evening of January 28, 2018, the victim
went to the Corner Pocket, a bar in Middletown, where
he encountered the defendant, who was there with a
small group, including Mason Moniz. The defendant,
who was acquainted with the victim, bought him a drink
and, at some point, asked if he could borrow some
money. The victim gave the defendant $20 and remarked
that he had additional money at home that he was saving
for his rent. After the bar closed at 1 a.m., the defendant
invited the victim and Moniz back to his apartment.
When they arrived at the defendant’s apartment, Moniz
struck the victim several times2 and accused him of
stealing his watch. Moniz testified that, about two
weeks prior to the night in question, the victim had
been at his apartment and stolen a watch while Moniz’
back was turned. Moniz further testified that, when he
confronted the victim about the watch, the victim had
denied taking it but offered to pay Moniz $300 as com-
pensation for it. The victim testified that he ‘‘had no
idea what [the defendant and Moniz] were talking
about’’ when they confronted him about the watch.
He further testified that the defendant and Moniz had
demanded that he take them to his apartment to get
money or they were going to hurt him.
  While the three men walked to the victim’s apartment,
the victim secretly dialed 911 on his cell phone in his
pocket, hoping that the call would alert the police to
his location.3 When the three men arrived at the victim’s
apartment, the defendant ordered him to open the door,
and the defendant and Moniz forced him inside. Once
inside, the defendant demanded that the victim give
him his money. The victim had $800 in a bank envelope
in his bedroom closet, in denominations of $100 and
$50 bills, that he was saving for his rent payment. After
the victim removed the envelope from the closet, the
defendant grabbed it, removed a portion of the money,
and told the victim that he would hurt him if he talked
to the police. He then invited the victim back to his
apartment to drink some more beer, which the victim
declined to do.
   After the defendant and Moniz left the apartment,
the victim again called 911 and told the operator that
two individuals had just robbed him and that these
individuals were walking down the street. The victim
said that he was afraid for his life because one of them
had threatened to shoot him if he talked to the police.
He also informed the operator that, before leaving his
apartment, the individuals had invited him back to their
apartment. After receiving the 911 dispatch, Officer Kyle
Pixley of the Middletown Police Department encoun-
tered the defendant and Moniz walking down Main
Street, a short distance from the victim’s apartment.
When Pixley ordered them to stop, both men continued
walking. After Pixley ordered them to stop several more
times, Moniz complied, but the defendant continued to
disregard Pixley’s orders and walked around the corner
from Main Street onto Rapallo Avenue. A second officer
arrived and ordered the defendant to comply several
times, after which the defendant walked back toward
Main Street. While the second officer secured the defen-
dant and Moniz, Pixley walked over to Rapallo Avenue
to see whether the defendant had disposed of something
when he had walked around the corner. Pixley discov-
ered two $100 bills on the sidewalk.4 The officers also
found two $50 bills on Moniz.
   Middletown police officers interviewed the victim at
his apartment and then took him in a police cruiser
to the area where the defendant and Moniz had been
detained. After the victim identified the defendant and
Moniz as the individuals who stole his money, the police
took him back to his apartment. He subsequently was
transported by ambulance to a hospital after complain-
ing to an officer about a head injury. The hospital medi-
cal staff observed blunt trauma to the victim’s face and
determined that he had a broken nose. At the hospital,
the victim conveyed to the emergency department staff
that he was concerned that he might have been drugged.
    The defendant was arrested and charged in a six
count information with committing various crimes.5
‘‘[I]n count six, the state alleged that the defendant
committed burglary in the second degree [in violation
of § 53a-102 (a)] by entering or remaining unlawfully
in the victim’s apartment sometime between 1 and 2:50
a.m. on January 29, 2018, while the victim was present,
with the intent to commit a crime therein . . . .’’ State
v. Lanier, 205 Conn. App. 586, 594, 258 A.3d 770 (2021).
‘‘Following a jury trial . . . the defendant [was found]
guilty of burglary in the second degree as alleged in
count six and not guilty of the charges in counts one
through five.’’ Id.
   The victim was the state’s key witness at trial. At the
time of the incident, the victim was on probation for a
2017 felony conviction for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs
(felony DUI conviction). Id., 595. Prior to trial, the
defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking permission
to question the victim concerning (1) his 2017 felony
DUI conviction, (2) his probation status during the
events underlying the defendant’s criminal charges, (3)
his arrests while on probation and his violation of proba-
tion,6 and (4) the specific conditions of his probation.
   In the motion in limine, the defendant argued that
the jury reasonably could infer that the victim may
‘‘wish to curry favor with the prosecuting authorities’’
because of his probation status, and, therefore, it was
a legitimate area of inquiry for cross-examination. He
further argued that the specific conditions of the vic-
tim’s probation were relevant to the victim’s state of
mind at the time of the incident and his motive to
fabricate the allegations against the defendant. Specifi-
cally, the defendant sought to ask the victim ‘‘whether
. . . he knew that one of the conditions of his probation
was substance abuse treatment’’ and that the authorities
could find that he violated his probation if they became
aware that he had been intoxicated on the night in
question. He also sought to ask the victim ‘‘whether
one of the standard conditions of his probation was
not to be arrested.’’ The defendant argued that this
question was relevant because, if the victim knew that
one of the conditions of his probation was not to have
any new arrests, he may have been motivated to fabri-
cate his allegations against the defendant to avoid being
accused of ‘‘stealing [Moniz’] watch.’’ In addition to
establishing any concerns the victim may have had due
to his probationary status, the defendant sought to
establish that the victim fabricated his allegations to
recover the money that the defendant and Moniz took
from him as payment for the allegedly stolen watch.
   At trial, the prosecutor moved to preclude defense
counsel from cross-examining the victim on whether
he believed that his consumption of alcohol on the night
in question could result in a violation of his probation.
The prosecutor also objected, on relevancy grounds, to
defense counsel’s questioning the victim on whether an
arrest would violate the victim’s probation.
   The trial court allowed defense counsel to question
the victim about his prior felony conviction, his current
probation status, and his financial concerns and hard-
ships at the time of the incident, but prohibited him from
cross-examining the victim about his recent violation
of probation, his prior arrests while on probation, or the
specific conditions of his probation. The court reasoned
that the defendant’s proffered theory in support of those
lines of questioning was ‘‘too speculative.’’ As to the
questions regarding the victim’s possible fear of a future
violation of probation, the court observed that ‘‘[t]here
are many reasons why somebody can get violated [on]
probation’’ and that the proposed questions were ‘‘spec-
ulative.’’7
  Consistent with the court’s rulings, during cross-
examination of the victim, defense counsel elicited tes-
timony that, at the time of the incident, the victim had
been on probation for a prior felony DUI conviction
and that he was still on probation at the time of the trial.
Defense counsel also asked questions eliciting responses
revealing that, at the time of the incident, the victim
had been experiencing financial difficulties arising from
an ‘‘expensive’’ divorce, a desire to provide for his son,
and employment that he believed ‘‘wasn’t giving [him]
what [he] needed for money.’’ Additionally, defense
counsel drew attention to several inconsistencies in the
victim’s testimony, including what beverages he drank
on the evening in question, how many drinks he con-
sumed, how much money was actually stolen from him,
and the fact that the victim told hospital staff that he
might have been drugged but never brought that con-
cern to the attention of the 911 operator or the police.
   The Appellate Court concluded that, because the trial
court allowed defense counsel to conduct an ‘‘extensive
and robust cross-examination of the victim,’’ during
which she emphasized the victim’s felony probationary
status and the ‘‘many inconsistencies in the victim’s
testimony,’’ the court did not violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights by declining to permit cross-exami-
nation regarding the victim’s recent violation of proba-
tion, his prior arrests while on probation, or the specific
conditions of his probation. State v. Lanier, supra, 205
Conn. App. 614. The Appellate Court also held that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding
the line of inquiry as speculative and, consequently,
irrelevant. Id., 613–15.
                             I
   We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial
court’s limitations on defense counsel’s cross-examina-
tion of the victim violated the defendant’s constitutional
rights. ‘‘[T]he sixth amendment to the [United States]
constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a
criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses against
him.8 . . . The primary interest secured by confronta-
tion is the right to cross-examination . . . . [P]reclu-
sion of sufficient inquiry into a particular matter tending
to show motive, bias and interest may result in a viola-
tion of the constitutional requirements of the sixth
amendment. . . . Further, the exclusion of defense
evidence may deprive the defendant of his constitu-
tional right to present a defense. . . .
  ‘‘However, [t]he [c]onfrontation [c]lause guarantees
only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way,
and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. . . .
Thus, [t]he confrontation clause does not . . . suspend
the rules of evidence to give the defendant the right to
engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . .
  ‘‘Although [t]he general rule is that restrictions on
the scope of cross-examination are within the sound
discretion of the trial [court] . . . this discretion
comes into play only after the defendant has been per-
mitted cross-examination sufficient to satisfy the sixth
amendment. . . . The constitutional standard is met
when defense counsel is permitted to expose to the
jury the facts from which [the] jurors, as the sole triers
of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw infer-
ences relating to the reliability of the witness. . . .
Indeed, if testimony of a witness is to remain in the
case as a basis for conviction, the defendant must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to reveal any infirmi-
ties that cast doubt on the reliability of that testimony.
. . . [A] claim that the trial court unduly restricted
cross-examination generally involves a two-pronged
analysis: whether the aforementioned constitutional
standard has been met, and, if so, whether the court
nonetheless abused its discretion . . . .’’ (Emphasis
added; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) State v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500, 510–12, 131 A.3d
1132 (2016).
   Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s
restriction of defense counsel’s cross-examination of
the victim did not violate the defendant’s constitutional
rights. The trial court did not foreclose defense counsel
from cross-examining the victim on matters tending to
show motive, bias, or interest, but merely set reasonable
limits on the scope of that inquiry regarding the victim’s
probationary status, conditions, and the like. Compare
State v. Francis, 228 Conn. 118, 122–24, 635 A.2d 762
(1993) (trial court’s prohibiting all inquiry into proba-
tionary status of state’s witness to show bias violated
defendant’s constitutional rights), with State v. Gibson,
340 Conn. 407, 422–23, 264 A.3d 83 (2021) (limiting
defense counsel’s cross-examination of state’s witness
regarding his pending criminal charges to show bias
was appropriate when trial court did not prohibit all
inquiry about them). In cases such as the present one,
in which the trial court did not foreclose cross-examina-
tion of the witness to show motive, bias, or interest,
we inquire whether the limitations imposed by the trial
court permitted defense counsel to expose facts from
which the jury could appropriately draw inferences
relating to the witness’ credibility or reliability. See,
e.g., State v. Bermudez, 341 Conn. 233, 271, 267 A.3d
44 (2021).
   In the present case, the trial court allowed defense
counsel an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
victim and to introduce evidence supporting the defense’s
theory of the case—that the victim fabricated his allega-
tions against the defendant to recover the money the
defendant took from him and to avoid being arrested
for stealing Moniz’ watch, which could have affected
the victim’s probationary status. See, e.g., State v. Tor-
res, 343 Conn. 208, 218, 273 A.3d 163 (2022) (‘‘[i]n order
to determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right
to cross-examination has been satisfied, [w]e consider
. . . whether the field of inquiry was adequately cov-
ered by other questions that were allowed’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Defense counsel also cross-
examined the victim about the stolen watch and his
financial difficulties at the time of the incident to show
that the victim was motivated to make false allegations
against the defendant to recover his money and to avoid
arrest. The trial court also permitted defense counsel
to cross-examine the victim about his felony DUI con-
viction, as well as the victim’s current probationary sta-
tus.
   During closing argument, defense counsel relied on
this testimony and other evidence to make the very
argument that the defendant now claims the trial court’s
rulings prevented him from being able to make. Specifi-
cally, defense counsel argued: ‘‘[The victim] testified
that, at the time this happened, he was on a supervised
probation for a felony DUI [conviction]. He testified
that he had been drinking that night. . . . He owed
money. His rent was due. He was so concerned about
money . . . . How badly did he need that $300 back?
. . . He had been accused of stealing some watch, and
what if [Moniz] had reported the stolen watch to the
police? What would happen if [the victim] had been
arrested and charged with stealing that watch? What
would be the consequence to him? Does it make sense
that he’d want to get ahead of it? Now, he didn’t know
that [Moniz] wasn’t going to report the stolen watch
because [Moniz] had [outstanding] warrants [for his
arrest]. [The victim] had no way of knowing that.’’
   Thus, the evidence of the victim’s prior felony convic-
tion, his probationary status, his financial difficulties,
and his inconsistent statements were sufficient to allow
the jury to draw appropriate inferences relating to the
victim’s alleged bias and motive to fabricate his allega-
tions against the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Mark R.,
300 Conn. 590, 614–15, 17 A.3d 1 (2011) (restriction on
cross-examination of state’s witness for alleged motive
to fabricate was not constitutional violation when per-
mitted cross-examination and closing argument gave
jury fair opportunity to consider facts supporting defen-
dant’s theory of case); see also Barresi v. Maloney, 273
F. Supp. 2d 144, 154 (D. Mass. 2003) (‘‘[w]hen a [wit-
ness’] credibility is at issue, the trial court may impose
limits on [cross-examination] without violating a defen-
dant’s confrontation right so long as the court grants the
defendant sufficient leeway to establish a reasonably
complete picture of the [witness’] bias and motivation
to fabricate’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). A
court is not constitutionally obligated to permit a defen-
dant to present every piece of evidence that might sup-
port his theory of defense. See, e.g., State v. Jordan,
329 Conn. 272, 287 n.14, 186 A.3d 1 (2018) (‘‘[t]he consti-
tutional right to present a defense does not include
the right to introduce any and all evidence claimed to
support it’’). Because the trial court permitted defense
counsel sufficient latitude in her cross-examination of
the victim to present evidence that the victim was moti-
vated to fabricate the allegations due to his probation-
ary status, the trial court’s ruling permitted the defen-
dant to expose to the jury the facts from which it could
appropriately draw inferences relating to the victim’s
credibility or reliability. Accordingly, we conclude that
the defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.
                            II
   We next address the defendant’s evidentiary claim
that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting
defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim on
the ground that the proffered line of questioning was
speculative. We need not consider whether the trial
court’s restriction on defense counsel’s cross-examina-
tion of the victim constituted an abuse of discretion
because, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court
abused its discretion, we conclude that the defendant
has failed to satisfy his burden of proving harm.
   ‘‘When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitu-
tional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of dem-
onstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether
[an improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case
depends [on] a number of factors, such as the impor-
tance of the witness’ testimony in the [defendant’s] case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting
the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and,
of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.
. . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of
the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and the result of
the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining
whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless
should be whether the jury’s verdict was substantially
swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a nonconstitu-
tional error is harmless when an appellate court has a
fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect
the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Mark T., 339 Conn. 225, 251, 260 A.3d 402 (2021).
   The defendant claims that the trial court’s restriction
on defense counsel’s cross-examination of the victim
was harmful because it prevented him from demonstra-
ting to the jury that the victim was motivated to fabri-
cate his allegations against the defendant, which was
central to the defendant’s defense. The defendant con-
tends that the state’s case was weak, relying primarily
on the victim’s testimony, which exhibited several
inconsistencies.9 Lastly, the defendant contends that
the harm resulting from the trial court’s restriction was
compounded by the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument
insofar as he emphasized that the defendant had failed
to present any such motive, thereby capitalizing on the
defendant’s inability to fully expose the victim’s motive
to fabricate. We disagree.
   The state’s case for burglary was strong. In order to
prove that the defendant committed burglary in the
second degree in violation of § 53a-102 (a), the state
had to prove that the defendant entered or remained
unlawfully in a dwelling, while a person other than a
participant in the crime was actually present in such
dwelling, with the intent to commit a crime therein.
Undoubtedly, as the state’s key witness, the victim’s
testimony was critical to proving that the defendant
had committed the offense. Ample evidence introduced
at trial, however, corroborated his testimony, demon-
strating that any error in excluding the testimony sought
by the defendant was harmless.
   The state produced evidence demonstrating that the
defendant had unlawfully entered and remained in the
victim’s apartment by forcing the victim to provide the
defendant and Moniz access under threat of physical
harm with the intent of stealing the victim’s money.
Photographs of the victim’s injuries, medical records,
and testimony from emergency room personnel indi-
cated that the victim had shown signs of blunt trauma
and sustained a broken nose, substantiating the victim’s
testimony that he had been assaulted. Moniz provided
testimony confirming that the victim had been assault-
ed, that the defendant was present for the assault, and
that the defendant and Moniz walked the victim to his
apartment to get his money. Dispatch call sheets, testi-
mony from the Middletown police dispatcher, and 911
call transcripts confirmed that the victim had made a
silent 911 call, followed by a second call immediately
after the defendant and Moniz left his apartment, indi-
cating that the victim had not led Moniz and the defen-
dant back to his apartment voluntarily.
   Furthermore, the defendant’s actions upon encoun-
tering police officers—ignoring commands to stop,
walking away from Pixley and around the corner, and
disposing two $100 bills on the sidewalk—supported
the inference that the defendant had entered and
remained in the victim’s apartment with the intent to
unlawfully obtain the victim’s money. It is reasonable
to infer that the defendant disposed of the $200 because
it was evidence of the burglary that he did not want to
have found on his person. Moreover, the defendant
continued walking to round the corner on Main Steet,
in defiance of several orders to stop, only to turn back
around and to comply after dropping the two $100 bills,
which created a strong inference that he did so to dis-
pose of the money without being observed by the police.
   Notwithstanding the trial court’s restriction of por-
tions of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the vic-
tim, she was otherwise permitted to conduct cross-
examination and to introduce evidence to adequately
advance the defense’s theory that the victim had fabri-
cated the allegations against the defendant. To demon-
strate the victim’s motive to fabricate, defense counsel
elicited testimony from the victim that he had been
convicted of a felony DUI in 2017 and was on probation.
Defense counsel was also permitted to cross-examine
the victim about the financial difficulties he faced at
the time of the incident. Moniz’ testimony provided the
basis for the defendant’s claim that the victim had stolen
a watch from Moniz and offered him money as compen-
sation for the theft. Defense counsel also highlighted
many inconsistencies in the victim’s statements, includ-
ing his testimony relating to the amount of money taken
and his consumption of alcohol, and that he did not
tell the 911 operator or the police that he believed that
he may have been drugged, but only made the assertion
to medical personnel. By exposing these inconsisten-
cies, defense counsel impeached the victim’s credibility,
thereby strengthening the defense’s theory that the vic-
tim had fabricated his allegations. See, e.g., State v.
Bermudez, supra, 341 Conn. 278 (exclusion of testi-
mony was harmless when defense counsel was granted
ample opportunity to impeach witness). Moreover,
defense counsel’s closing argument, which drew from
the testimony she had elicited during cross-examination
of the victim and direct examination of Moniz, demon-
strated that she was able to cogently present the
defense’s theory that the victim was motivated to fabri-
cate his allegations. See, e.g., State v. Lugo, 266 Conn.
674, 696, 835 A.2d 451 (2003) (erroneous exclusion of
testimony to support defendant’s theory of defense was
harmless when defense counsel presented theory of
defense through other testimony and closing argu-
ment).
   Additionally, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, that
the defendant had failed to show any motive for the
victim to lie, did not compound the harm that the defen-
dant claims he suffered.10 The prosecutor specifically
argued: ‘‘What possible motive or reason did [the
defense] try to explore through either [the victim’s or
Moniz’] testimony as to why [the victim] would accuse
the defendant . . . of these crimes if it didn’t happen?
There’s no motive presented. You know why? Because
they have none, why [the victim] would make it up.’’
The prosecutor further argued: ‘‘When you look at all
[the evidence] and key here, no motive was ever brought
out through the cross-examination or questioning of
[the victim] or . . . Moniz as to what motive [the vic-
tim] would have [had] to accuse [the defendant] of
crimes like this if it didn’t happen. No motive was ever
presented through their testimony. You know why? I
would respectfully submit they have none. They have
no motive for him to fabricate that.’’
   The defendant correctly notes that ‘‘it [is] significant
in evaluating harm to look to see how the state use[s]
. . . evidence in its closing argument.’’ State v. Ayala,
333 Conn. 225, 235, 215 A.3d 116 (2019). Here, the prose-
cutor was clearly responding to defense counsel’s asser-
tion that a motive, in fact, existed—namely, the victim’s
desire ‘‘to get ahead of’’ the situation by reporting the
defendant and Moniz to the police before they could
report him for stealing the watch, which could have
affected the victim’s probationary status. See, e.g., State
v. Singh, 259 Conn. 693, 717, 793 A.2d 226 (2002) (‘‘[t]he
state may . . . properly respond to inferences raised
by the defendant’s closing argument’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). The jury, however, would have
recognized that the prosecutor’s argument that the
defense had presented no motive as to why the victim
would fabricate his charges was incorrect. The defense
did present a motive—the victim’s precarious financial
situation and desire to get ahead of any allegations
about the watch. It would have been more accurate for
the prosecutor to argue that the defense had presented
no persuasive argument as to motive. In any event, the
trial court mitigated any potential harm by instructing
the jury that statements made by counsel during closing
arguments are not evidence and reminding the jury to
draw its own conclusions concerning the credibility of
witnesses.11 See, e.g., State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn.
593, 613, 142 A.3d 265 (2016) (‘‘[t]he jury is presumed,
in the absence of a fair indication to the contrary, to
have followed the court’s instructions’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). Importantly, the prosecutor’s
rebuttal does not change the fact that defense counsel,
during her closing argument, relied on the evidence she
was able to introduce to make the very argument that
the defendant is now claiming the trial court’s eviden-
tiary rulings precluded him from presenting to the jury.
   We cannot conclude that the excluded cross-exami-
nation would have had any meaningful impact on the
jury’s verdict. It is unlikely that testimony regarding the
specific conditions of the victim’s probation would have
made defense counsel’s presentation of the defense’s
theory any more persuasive, as the jury reasonably
could have surmised that a probationer would seek to
avoid arrest. We have repeatedly stated that ‘‘[j]urors
are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowl-
edge or their own observations and experiences, but
rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive
at an intelligent and correct conclusion.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Abraham, 343 Conn. 470,
478, 274 A.3d 849 (2022). The notion that a probationer
would have been motivated to avoid an arrest—a point
that defense counsel was given adequate opportunity
to make—was within the jurors’ common knowledge.
Indeed, defense counsel leveraged this precise intuition
in asking the jury, ‘‘[w]hat would happen if [the victim]
had been arrested and charged with stealing that watch?
What would be the consequence to him? Does it make
sense that he’d want to get ahead of it?’’ For the forego-
ing reasons, we conclude that the defendant has failed
to prove that the trial court’s restriction on defense
counsel’s cross-examination of the victim was harmful.
      The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other justices concurred.
  1
      We granted the defendant’s petition for certification to appeal from the
judgment of the Appellate Court, limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did the
Appellate Court properly uphold the trial court’s restriction of defense coun-
sel’s cross-examination of the complainant about matters relevant to the
complainant’s motive to fabricate his allegations?’’ State v. Lanier, 338 Conn.
910, 910–11, 258 A.3d 1280 (2021). We agree with the state that the certified
issue is imprecisely worded in that it presumes to resolve in the defendant’s
favor the central issue raised by this appeal, the relevance of the line of
questioning defense counsel sought to introduce during cross-examination.
Accordingly, we reword the certified issue to add ‘‘allegedly’’ before ‘‘rele-
vant.’’ See, e.g., State v. Lavigne, 307 Conn. 592, 594 n.1, 57 A.3d 332 (2012)
(‘‘this court may modify certified [issues] to render them more accurate in
framing issues presented’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    2
      There was conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant also struck
the victim. The victim claimed that both Moniz and the defendant assaulted
him. According to Moniz, however, he alone assaulted the victim. Moniz
testified that, prior to the defendant’s trial, he had pleaded guilty to the
assault under the Alford doctrine. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
    3
      Dispatch call sheets and testimony from a Middletown police dispatcher
presented at trial corroborated the victim’s testimony that he had made this
911 call without speaking to an operator.
    4
      Moniz’ testimony at trial confirmed that the defendant had had two $100
bills on him.
    5
      ‘‘[I]n a third substitute information [the defendant was charged] with
. . . committ[ing] the following crimes: in count one, conspiracy to commit
robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and
53a-134 (a) (1); in count two, conspiracy to commit robbery in the second
degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-135 (a) (1) (A);
in count three, robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (1);
in count four, robbery in the second degree in violation of § 53a-135 (a) (1)
(A); in count five, assault in the second degree in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1); and in count six, burglary in the second degree in
violation of § 53a-102 (a).’’ State v. Lanier, 205 Conn. App. 586, 593–94, 258
A.3d 770 (2021).
    6
      The record indicates that the victim was arrested twice while on proba-
tion, that he was charged with violation of probation on October 20, 2017,
and that he admitted the violation and was resentenced on January 8, 2018.
See State v. Lanier, supra, 205 Conn. App. 596 n.4.
    7
      We address two ancillary rulings by the trial court regarding the cross-
examination sought by the defendant. First, the trial court evaluated the
admissibility of the requested cross-examination under § 6-7 of the Connecti-
cut Code of Evidence, which governs the admissibility of evidence of a prior
conviction. Although the trial court’s ruling under that section was pertinent
to questions about the victim’s prior felony conviction, it was inapposite
in determining the admissibility of the additional inquiries sought by the
defendant. Second, notwithstanding its ruling that the defendant’s proffered
line of inquiry was inadmissible, the trial court also ruled that the probative
value of the proposed cross-examination was outweighed by its prejudicial
effect. Given the trial court’s determination that the evidence was inadmissi-
ble, it was unnecessary for the court to take the additional step of weighing
its probative value against any prejudicial effect. Cf. State v. Hill, 307 Conn.
689, 698, 59 A.3d 196 (2013) (‘‘evidence is admissible . . . if, first, it is
relevant, and second, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect’’
(emphasis added)); State v. Pappas, 256 Conn. 854, 887, 776 A.2d 1091 (2001)
(‘‘evidence . . . is properly excluded if its prejudicial impact outweighs its
probative value, even if it is otherwise admissible’’ (emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted)).
    8
      The sixth amendment right to confrontation is made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States constitution. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403,
406, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923 (1965).
    9
      The defendant further asserts that the fact that the jury found him not
guilty on five out of the six charges illustrates that it did not find the victim’s
testimony to be reliable, undermining the strength of the state’s case. We
are unpersuaded. We have repeatedly recognized that a split verdict does
not necessarily signal that the state’s case against a defendant is weak but
may instead indicate that a defendant was not prejudiced by the conduct
that is challenged as harmful on appeal. See, e.g., State v. David N.J., 301
Conn. 122, 154, 19 A.3d 646 (2011) (‘‘[W]e disagree with the defendant’s
claim . . . that [a] split verdict, acquitting the defendant of [some] charges
. . . but convicting him on the other counts, demonstrates the weakness
of the state’s case and prejudice to the defendant from the impropriety. In
the absence of reports of deadlock . . . our cases have relied on split
verdicts as evidence that a jury was not so prejudiced . . . that it could
not treat the defendant fairly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); State
v. Long, 293 Conn. 31, 52–53, 975 A.2d 660 (2009) (jury’s finding of not guilty
of more serious charge indicated that defendant was not prejudiced).
   10
      The defendant has not challenged the prosecutor’s remarks on the basis
of prosecutorial impropriety.
   11
      The trial court instructed the jury: ‘‘You should keep in mind that argu-
ments and statements by the attorneys in final arguments or during the
course of the case are not evidence. You should not consider as evidence
their recollection of the facts nor their personal belief as to any facts or as
to the credibility of any witness nor any facts that any attorney may have
presented to you in argument from the attorney’s knowledge that was not
presented to you as evidence during the course of this trial.’’