Court Opinion

ID: 9708057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:28:50.984376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:41.705636
License: Public Domain

PAPADAKOS, Justice, dissenting.
I concur fully in the rationale adopted by the Majority to dispose of the substantive issues presented in the case. However, I must object to the acceptance of this case by *12our Court and by the Superior Court since no appeal has ever been filed from the imposition of sentence.
In this case, the Appellant filed a notice of appeal to Superior Court on January 19, 1984, fifteen days before he was sentenced on February 3, 1984. He has not appealed from the judgment of sentence within thirty (30) days thereafter, as required by our Rules of Appellate Procedure at 903(a), nor has he ever sought to correct his error with a petition for leave to file his appeal nunc pro tunc.
How often must we tell the world that the courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals that have not been timely filed and that no appeal is timely filed unless filed within thirty days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. “A defendant may appeal only from a final judgment of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 500 Pa. 313, 456 A.2d 145 (1983), unanimous opinion authored by Mr. Justice Zappala (Commonwealth v. Myers, 457 Pa. 317, 322 A.2d 131 (1974) cited therein.)
I fear the paternalistic approach taken by the majority in footnote 1, Maj. opinion, page 1102, to forgive the filing of a timely appeal from the judgment of sentence will mislead the bar and the public into thinking that our rules shall be selectively applied and that we will overlook these errors and assume jurisdiction where none exists.
In the Myers case, supra, Mr. Justice Nix (now Chief Justice) writing for a majority of five, stated, “It is unquestionably the law that a defendant may appeal only from a final judgment of sentence and an appeal from any prior order will be quashed as interlocutory.” Myers, 457 Pa. at 319, 322 A.2d at 132. This is still the law and I do not believe we should change it simply because we have the power to do so or because the Superior Court inexplicably overlooked the fatal defect and decided the case on its merits. We should not compound the error and do likewise.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.