Court Opinion

ID: 9848205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:14:34.936404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:07.423213
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with parts II and III of the majority opinion. With respect to part I, I agree that the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence that Fields had been charged with issuing checks without sufficient funds was admissible.1 However, I do not believe that the error was harmless, and would therefore reverse.
The critical issue leading to Fields’ conviction was whether he actually intended to defraud anyone, with Fields testifying that he did not and the prosecution contending that he did. Any evidence suggesting that Fields had a dishonest character could be extremely damaging to his defense. Since cashing checks with insufficient funds con*54notes the same type of dishonest intent that is required in the crimes for which Fields was charged, such evidence could not help but undercut his defense. Wigmore warns of the prejudicial effect of this type of evidence:
The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court.
1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 57 at 456 (3rd ed. 1940). Because Fields’ credibility and integrity was crucial to his defense and because the evidence admitted has a strong tendency to discredit these qualities, I cannot fairly say that the evidence did not appreciably affect the jury’s verdict,2 and would therefore reverse.
I reach this conclusion in full awareness of the rule that the trial court’s determination of a motion for mistrial is entitled to considerable deference. Peters v. Benson, 425 P.2d 149, 152 (Alaska 1967). The trial court is better situated than are appellate judges reviewing a cold record to determine the impact on the jury of the evidence. Here, the trial judge concluded that, except for his belief that the evidence in question was independently admissible, he would have been compelled to grant a mistrial.3 He stated:
[I]f I hadn’t been able to fit it in my own mind into two or three of those exceptions, I think it clearly goes to the intent question as to whether or not he intentionally defrauded, if I hadn’t been able to fit it into those exceptions after looking at the rule, why, I’d had no choice but to grant a mistrial.

. The evidence in question was presented in the following colloquy:
Q. (Prosecutor) And do you know when Mr. Fields was indicted?
A. On November 4, 1976, the case I should say, was issue — from issuing checks without sufficient funds. The case was combined ....

. This is the harmless error formulation which we adopted in Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 631-32 (Alaska 1969).

. That conclusion, of course, is in conflict with the majority’s view that the evidence was not prejudicial.