Court Opinion

ID: 9378662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-11 19:08:31.470392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:35.329565
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-21-00421-CR

                                 COURT OF APPEALS

                      THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                         CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ADAM CLAYTON TUCKER,                                                                    Appellant,

                                                      v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                                      Appellee.

                      On appeal from the 377th District Court
                            of Victoria County, Texas.

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
                Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

        A jury convicted appellant Adam Clayton Tucker of one count of intoxication

manslaughter, a second-degree felony enhanced to a first-degree felony. 1 See TEX.

        1  The jury found that Tucker was previously convicted of involuntary manslaughter and indecency
with a child, both felonies other than state jail felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b).
PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08. The jury assessed Tucker’s punishment at ninety-nine years’

imprisonment. In his sole issue, Tucker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the conviction. We affirm.

                                       I.      BACKGROUND

       On or about November 6, 2018, at approximately 9:15 p.m., a single-vehicle

motorcycle collision resulted in the death of 23-year-old Kelsey Benedict and

hospitalization of Tucker. Tucker was subsequently indicted for causing Benedict’s death.

At trial, he disputed that he was intoxicated, that he was driving the motorcycle at the time

of the accident, and that his actions were the “but for” cause of Benedict’s death. See id.

       Although there were no witnesses to the accident, two bystanders attempted to

provide aid that evening and testified at Tucker’s trial: Nathan Blaine Burow and Gilbert

Garcia. Burow testified he was on his way home when he saw a man, later identified as

Tucker, “sitting down” on the side of the road, “waving for [him] to stop.” Burow testified

that after initially tending to Tucker, he returned to his vehicle to retrieve a flashlight. It

was then that Burow stumbled upon a saddle bag, which he picked up and threw toward

the motorcycle, noticing for the first time a woman, Benedict, underneath the motorcycle.

       Garcia stopped to assist shortly after Burow. Garcia testified that Tucker was

“crying in pain, yelling,” and Garcia could smell alcohol on Tucker’s breath. Benedict was

“pinned underneath the motorcycle” about six to ten feet away from Tucker. Garcia

testified that he checked Benedict’s vitals but found no pulse and called 911. 2 When

       2  Ted Thompson, 911 center communications manager for the City of Victoria, confirmed the city
received a call concerning the accident at approximately 9:41 p.m.

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asked about the road conditions that evening, Garcia stated there had been no

precipitation, there was no debris in the roadway, and the road was a “straight-ahead

road.”

         Medical records admitted at trial indicated that Emergency Medical Services (EMS)

personnel arrived at the crash site at 9:48 p.m. and notated Tucker’s breath smelled of

alcohol. Tucker reportedly told EMS personnel that he did not know the involved female.

Tucker was transported to DeTar Hospital, where nursing notes with a time stamp of

11:26 p.m. also stated Tucker “smells of alcohol.” Tucker was described as conscious

and uncooperative, and he reportedly told hospital staff that the “other person involved in

[the] accident was [an] on and off girlfriend . . . but he could not recall her name.”

         Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Trooper Oscar Garcia Jr. arrived at the

hospital at 11:29 p.m. Trooper Garcia recalled smelling “the strong odor of alcohol in the

room itself” and emitting from Tucker’s breath and body. Trooper Garcia testified that

Tucker had “thick, tongue-tied, slurred speech, [and] glassy, red, bloodshot eyes,” and

Tucker was unable to answer questions about what had happened or how the accident

was caused. Trooper Garcia surmised that Tucker “was intoxicated by not having the

normal use of his physical faculties” and requested that Tucker consent to a blood draw.

Tucker consented, and a blood sample was taken at 11:55 p.m. On cross-examination,

Trooper Garcia conceded that he had used an expired kit to collect the blood sample.

         Renee Hawkins, lead forensic scientist for the DPS toxicology crime laboratory in

Austin, testified that the expiration dates on blood collection kits concern the vacuum

capacity of the tube used to collect the blood sample:

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       That means that the vacuum that is inside a blood tube that is used to collect
       the sample from a person’s vein could start to be—to deplete. . . . That
       would mean that instead of collecting the exact volume that the tube is
       designed to collect, that it might start to collect less of that volume or be
       capable of collecting less of that volume or it may not work at all.

Hawkins opined that the use of expired tubes in this instance did not compromise the

integrity of the samples collected. Hawkins explained that the tube used here was

designed to hold ten milliliters, there were six milliliters of Tucker’s blood in the tube, and

only two milliliters were needed to “complete all the testing.”

       Tucker’s laboratory results indicated that he had a .069 BAC level and was positive

for oxycodone. Hawkins testified that, much like alcohol, oxycodone acts as a depressant

with sedative effects:

       [I]t can affect you in a way that could create dizziness, drowsiness, fatigue.
       It can cause you to slow your reactions or increase your reaction time. And
       it can also have effects on your muscular coordination, as well as your
       balance and speech, vision. And it can affect your ability to concentrate on
       more than one thing at a time.

Hawkins additionally testified to the absorption and elimination rate of oxycodone and

alcohol. Hawkins explained that alcohol impairment may begin “as soon as you start to

drink it, and your blood alcohol concentration starts to rise,” and the elimination rate for a

majority of the population is “.01 to .03 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters per hour.”

Hawkins testified that although the legal limit is .08, a “majority of studies with driving

show that .05 grams per 100 milliliters a person does not have the normal mental and

physical faculties.”

       DPS Trooper Matthew Cornett, one of several officers on scene that evening,

testified that he arrived after Tucker had already been transported to the hospital. Trooper

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Cornett located a “saddle bag” containing “cans of Bud Light, unopened, cold to the touch”

in close proximity to the motorcycle. Trooper Cornett additionally noted that the

motorcycle’s “speedometer was locked at approximately 42 miles an hour,” indicating the

speed the motorcycle was traveling at the time it impacted the bar ditch. 3 Trooper Cornett

observed “no skids or brake marks” and nothing to demonstrate “jerking or aggressive[]”

maneuvering before the vehicle left the roadway. Rather, Trooper Cornett testified, “[t]he

tire marks in the grass show a gradual movement off the roadway.” Trooper Cornett

acknowledged on cross-examination that the air pressure in the motorcycle tires had been

below manufacturer recommendations at the time of the accident. Trooper Cornett

nonetheless identified Tucker’s intoxication as the cause of the accident.

       In a statement to law enforcement two weeks following the accident, Tucker told

officers he left work between 5 and 6 p.m. and went to a strip club in Corpus Christi, where

Benedict was employed and where Tucker drank “numerous beers.” Tucker invited

Benedict to go back to Victoria with him so she could “ride his motorcycle.” Tucker

maintained his intentions with Benedict had been strictly platonic. En route to Victoria,

they stopped at a gas station in Refugio to purchase more alcohol. Tucker said that he

consumed a single oxycodone pill at some unspecified point between Corpus Christi and

Victoria. Tucker and Benedict engaged in sexual relations after arriving at Tucker’s

residence in Victoria. Afterward, Tucker allowed Benedict to drive his motorcycle to a

nearby store. According to Tucker, Benedict was driving when the accident occurred

       3   The posted speed limit was 60 miles per hour.

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about eight minutes away from his residence. Tucker was unable to name anyone else

that he had ever let drive his motorcycle before.

       Tucker’s daughter, Casey Tucker, and ex-wife, Christi Ann LeBeuf, described

Tucker as an experienced rider, and neither could recall an instance where Tucker had

allowed anyone else to drive his motorcycle. In November of 2018, Casey lived in an

adjoining residence located on the same property as her parents’ home. Although Casey

did not see her father the evening of the fatal collision, she recalled hearing his motorcycle

start up around 9 p.m. Casey and Christi visited Tucker in the hospital in the early hours

of November 7, 2018, and each testified they could smell the odor of an alcoholic

beverage on him. Christi described the odor as “strong” and indicated it could be smelled

“on his breath.”

       Marleana Ayala, Benedict’s mother, testified that she was close with her daughter

and had spoken to her earlier on the day she passed. Ayala stated that while her daughter

enjoyed riding on the back of motorcycles, Benedict had never driven one.

       Dawn Euton, co-owner of Victoria Harley-Davidson and the involved motorcycle’s

previous owner, testified that the motorcycle had been customized, and the additions

resulted in a motorcycle that was too powerful for a beginner rider to operate. Euton

further testified that she had been in a bike club with Tucker and his then-wife Christi;

Tucker was a skilled driver; and Euton had never known Tucker to allow anyone else to

drive his motorcycle. At some unspecified point after the accident, Euton confronted

Tucker, and he confessed to driving his motorcycle at the time of the accident:

       Well, I remember—sometimes I—I’m turning into a mom, and I told him—I
       told him how disappointed I was that he hurt Christi so much. And then I

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       asked him—I just asked him point blank, you know, [“]Were you driving that
       bike? You let somebody else drive it?[”] And he looked at me funny; and he
       said, [“]No, I drive my bike. Nobody else rides my bike. And[”]—which is
       true. So I said, [“]Okay.[”]

A jury found Tucker guilty and assessed punishment. This appeal followed.

                                      II.     DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

       In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, “we

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and determine whether,

based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State,

635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (adopting

the standard of review for a sufficiency challenge as set out by Jackson). “This familiar

standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in

the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.” Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; see Garcia v. State, No. PD-0679-21, 2023

WL 151989, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (“If the record supports conflicting

inferences, the reviewing court must presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in

favor of the prosecution and defer to the jury’s factual determinations.”) (cleaned up). We

remain mindful that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in

establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.”

Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2021, pet.

ref’d) (citing Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)). We measure

                                                7
the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence produced at trial against “the

essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge.”

Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik v. State, 953

S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

       To establish intoxication manslaughter under a hypothetically correct jury charge,

the State was required to prove here that (1) Tucker (2) operated a motor vehicle in a

public place (3) while intoxicated, and (4) by reason of that intoxication, (5) he caused the

death of another by accident or mistake. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08; Matamoros

v. State, 500 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, no pet.). In other

words, the State was required to prove that Tucker’s intoxication caused the fatal result,

and not just his operation of his motorcycle. See Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 98 n.57

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“[I]ntoxication manslaughter require[s] proof that it was the

intoxicated driving that caused the victim’s injuries.”); Matamoros, 500 S.W.3d at 65.

       The penal code defines “intoxication” as “not having the normal use of mental or

physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a controlled substance, a drug,

a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those substances, or any other

substance into the body.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)(A). As for causation, the

penal code provides that “[a] person is criminally responsible if the result would not have

occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause,

unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct

of the actor clearly insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a).

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B.     Operation Analysis

       Tucker first argues that the evidence at trial fails to establish that he—as opposed

to Benedict—was operating the motorcycle at the time of the accident. We disagree.

       Although there were no witnesses at the time of the accident and Tucker denied

operating the motorcycle, the jury was free to determine what, if any, weight to give to

Tucker’s statements to law enforcement and medical personnel. See Queeman v. State,

520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The jury is the sole judge of the credibility

of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimonies, and the reviewing court must

not usurp this role by substituting its own judgment for that of the jury.”). In performing its

credibility determination, the jury could have considered Tucker’s inconsistent statements

regarding whether he knew Benedict; Tucker’s concession that he drove the motorcycle

at all other points in the evening; and Tucker’s admission to Euton that he was driving—

not Benedict. See id.; see also Gandee v. State, No. 13-18-00343-CR, 2019 WL 5609703,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (“[O]ur standard of review requires that we resolve any

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the verdict.”). Other evidence also

supported the inference that Tucker had been driving: Euton, Casey, and Christi testified

that Tucker had never let anyone drive his motorcycle, and Tucker was unable to provide

the name of a single individual he had previously allowed to drive his motorcycle. See

Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723.

       Given our standard of review and considering the evidence presented during trial

as well as the reasonable inferences that the jury was free to make from that evidence,

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we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that Tucker was operating the

motorcycle at the time of the accident. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Curlee, 620

S.W.3d at 778.

C.    Intoxication Analysis

      Tucker next avers that the State failed to prove he was intoxicated at the time the

accident occurred. However, a rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that Tucker was intoxicated at the time of the accident based on the following

evidence: Tucker admitted to having consumed multiple beverages in the hours leading

up to the accident and to taking oxycodone while enroute to Victoria, approximately one

hour before the accident. See Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 140 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (concluding that, though the precise time the accident

occurred was unknown, evidence that appellant had been drinking several hours prior

could be used to establish intoxication at the time of the accident); see also Gandee, 2019

WL 5609703, at *3 (concluding that the jury could have relied on appellant’s admission to

law enforcement that he consumed alcohol prior to the accident as evidence of

intoxication); Salazar v. State, No. 13-16-00645-CR, 2017 WL 6545991, at *7 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 21, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (same). The State presented evidence that both oxycodone and alcohol were

found in Tucker’s system three hours after the accident, and the State’s expert witness,

Hawkins, testified to the depressive effects and elimination rates associated with the

substances. Hawkins further opined that Tucker’s toxicology report supported the

inference that he had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties. See Burnett

                                            10
v. State, 541 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The jury is permitted to consider

whether a defendant was intoxicated from ‘any other substance’ when there is evidence

that the defendant ingested a substance that caused him to become intoxicated or there

is sufficient evidence for a rational juror to infer such.”); Fulton v. State, 576 S.W.3d 905,

910 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. ref’d) (concluding jury was entitled to believe expert’s

testimony concerning appellant’s toxicology report and explanations of the intoxicating

effects of alcohol consumption and its absorption and elimination rates); see also Embry

v. Martinez, No. 05-20-00022-CV, 2021 WL 2309983, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).

       Moreover, several individuals testified to their observations regarding Tucker’s

intoxicated condition after the accident. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (noting that slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, among other things,

“would logically raise an inference that the defendant was intoxicated”); see also Garcia

v. State, No. 13-18-00373-CR, 2020 WL 1858285, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Apr. 9, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (providing

that lay opinion testimony may be probative evidence of intoxication as “a witness does

not have to be an expert to testify that a person he observes is intoxicated by alcohol”).

A bystander at the scene testified that he smelled alcohol emanating from Tucker—an

observation also expressed by the responding EMS medics minutes later, staff at the

hospital, Trooper Garcia, and hours later, Tucker’s daughter and ex-wife. See Foley v.

State, 327 S.W.3d 907, 915–16 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d)

(concluding evidence was sufficient to support intoxication element where evidence

                                             11
included testimony that appellant’s breath smelled strongly of alcohol). Trooper Garcia

described additional characteristics which, based on Trooper Garcia’s training and

experience, may also evidence Tucker’s state of intoxication: thick, tongue-tied, slurred

speech; and glassy, red, bloodshot eyes. See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745; Kinnett v. State,

623 S.W.3d 876, 899–900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (providing that

generally, an officer’s opinion testimony based upon experience and the observed facts

that a defendant was intoxicated is sufficient to establish the element of intoxication); see

also Garcia, 2020 WL 1858285, at *3 (same).

       Based on the aforementioned, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that Tucker was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655; Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App.

2015) (“Based on [the defendant’s] admission that he had been drinking, [the officer’s]

observation that [the defendant] appeared ‘very intoxicated,’ and the fact that no alcoholic

beverages were found in the vicinity, a factfinder could have reasonably inferred that [the

defendant] consumed alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication somewhere other

than where he was found.”); Gibson v. State, 233 S.W.3d 447, 451–52 (Tex. App.—Waco

2007, no pet.) (holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the

defendant was intoxicated where his vehicle left the road and struck a tree; a sample of

the defendant’s blood revealed the recent ingestion of methamphetamine, cocaine, and

two other drugs; forensic scientists testified how those drugs impaired motor skills and

judgment; and circumstances of the accident itself were indicative of a loss of normal

mental faculties).

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D.    Causation Analysis

      Finally, Tucker contends that the State failed to prove the requisite connection

between his intoxication and the resulting harm, namely, Benedict’s death. See TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.04(a), 49.08; Hanna, 426 S.W.3d at 98 n.57. However, “[t]he State

is not required to prove that intoxication is the sole cause of the accident,” Matamoros,

500 S.W.3d at 64, and we have already concluded that the evidence was sufficient to

show that Tucker was operating the motorcycle while intoxicated at the time of the

accident. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08. “Being intoxicated at the scene of a traffic

accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s

intoxication caused the accident, and the inference of causation is even stronger when

the accident is a one-car collision with an inanimate object.” Kuciemba v. State, 310

S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Thus, applying the necessary standard of

review, we now conclude the jury could have reasonably found Tucker’s intoxication

caused Benedict’s death, alone or concurrently with another cause, because Tucker was

too impaired to operate his motorcycle on a public road, causing him to lose control of the

motorcycle and collide into a bar ditch with Benedict as his passenger. See id.; see also

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.04(a), 49.08; Matamoros, 500 S.W.3d at 65 (“Based on the

evidence set out above, a reasonable factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that ‘but for’ appellant’s intoxication and operation of a motor vehicle on a public

street, the death would not have occurred.”).

      We overrule Tucker’s sole issue on appeal.

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                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       CLARISSA SILVA
                                                       Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
9th day of March, 2023.

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