Court Opinion

ID: 9903170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:31:21.462773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.359118
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                       FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JUSTIN A. LAZAROFF,

           Appellant,

 v.                                       Case No. 5D23-19
                                          LT Case No. 2016-CA-003882

LARRY MEEK,

           Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed May 19, 2023

Appeal from Circuit Court
for Duval County,
Bruce R. Anderson, Jr., Judge.

Warren B. Kwavnick and David F. Cooney,
of Cooney Trybus Kwavnick Peets, Fort
Lauderdale, and Michael P. Regan, Jr.,
Brian M. Guter, Tiffany M. Jones, and
James D. Morgan, of Florida O’Hara
Law Firm, Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Rebecca Bowen Creed, of Creed & Gowdy,
P.A., and Howard C. Coker, Daniel A. Iracki,
Stephen Watrel, and Aaron Spraque, of
Coker Law Firm, Jacksonville, for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.

      At issue in this car accident case is the trial court’s order granting a

new trial based cumulatively on allegedly improper statements by defense

counsel during the proceedings in the presence of the jury. The trial court

described one category of statements as making the plaintiff’s age a theme

of the trial, supposedly suggesting that Medicare would cover medical

expenses; the other category suggested that the plaintiff was concealing

evidence. The impact of improper evidence or argument must be so

prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial to warrant the grant of a new trial.

Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008); Barnes v. State, 303 So.

3d 275, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).

      On the trial record presented, the grant of a new trial was unwarranted

because no sufficient basis exists to conclude that the statements

individually or cumulatively rose to a level that demonstrated prejudice to the

plaintiff. Moore v. Gillett, 96 So. 3d 933, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[W]here a

trial court’s finding of cumulative error is the basis for the alleged misconduct

of defense counsel, and that finding is unsupported by the record, the

reviewing court must reverse an order granting a new trial.”).

      The trial judge concluded that the defense made the plaintiff’s age a

“theme” of the case, but the plaintiff, who was a sixty-five year old truck

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driver, was seeking only future economic and non-economic damages,

thereby making age a factor in that analysis. Questions regarding life

expectancy and retirement were to be anticipated. To some extent, the

plaintiff’s counsel and expert interjected governmental benefits on their own

questions.

      In addition, many of the statements at issue were either incomplete or

interrupted before they could possibly do any significant harm; and the trial

judge gave strong curative instructions to minimize their potential impact.

Moreover, several of the statements were made without objection from the

plaintiff, reflecting a potential lack of prejudice.

      Some of the statements were cut off unilaterally by the trial judge

before any objection could be made, despite the existence of a permissible

basis for the defense’s inquiry. For example, a topic of testimony was the

methodology for determining the cost of medical treatment, such as what

types of databases are available and what data they contain. It was in this

context that defense counsel cross-examined plaintiff’s expert witness,

asking:

      Q: Who is the—the largest provider—purchaser of healthcare
      services and products?

      A: I don’t know or even understand your question.

      Q: Okay. Well, Medicare is the entity that purchases the most—

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At this point, the trial court—before any objection from the plaintiff—cutoff

defense counsel (“I’m going to stop you there.”). A sidebar was held, during

which the trial judge expressed the belief that defense counsel had intended

the use of the word Medicare as a means for the jury to believe that plaintiff’s

medical care costs would be covered in the future. The trial court asked,

“What is the relevance of Medicare and all of this to this case?” to which

defense counsel responded, “I was going to ask him if he consulted the

Medicare in reference to the cost of the type of items that he put in his health

care plan.” Defense counsel said the question “was only to establish[] that

[the expert] didn’t consider a major database of prices and went to some

other source instead.”

      An inquiry about whether an expert used a database that includes

Medicare reimbursement rates, by itself, may be benign in this context.

Because cross-examination was halted, it cannot be determined whether

defense counsel’s inquiry would have been benign or for an improper

purpose.1

      1
       Medicare reimbursement rates are used as a metric in personal injury
protection matters, see, e.g., section 627.736(5), Florida Statutes (2023),
and are included as a metric in the recently passed tort reform legislation.
See Ch. 2023-15, § 22, Laws of Fla. (amending § 768.0427(2), Fla. Stat.
(2023)).

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     As to a curative instruction, the defense counsel suggested that the

jury be told that the plaintiff is “not getting Medicare and you shouldn’t

consider any Medicare” in any way. The trial court used the plaintiff’s

proposal instead, saying upon the jury’s return:

     Court: . . . I have a very important instruction I need to give you
     so please listen very closely. You may remember where we left
     off, before the sidebar conference, there was a statement made
     by defense counsel and I need to give you a very important
     instruction about that.
            I am granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike that statement,
     so please listen very closely.
            The statement about the greatest purchaser of medical
     services was improper in this trial. It is stricken from the record.
     You shall disregard—you shall disregard it and, further, you
     should not reduce the amount of compensation to which Mr.
     Meek is otherwise entitled on account of medical insurance
     payments or other payments from his insurance company or any
     other governmental source. The court will reduce, as necessary,
     the amount of compensation of which he is entitled on account
     of any such benefits.
            And with that, plaintiff’s counsel, are you satisfied with the
     curative instruction?

     A: Yes, sir.

Given the defense counsel’s question was interrupted, i.e., half-asked, and

a very strong curative instruction was given, the potential for prejudice was

neutralized. See Barnes, 303 So. 3d at 276–77 (stating that proper

procedure is to instruct a jury to disregard objectionable remarks “and not

that a mistrial be entered by the court, unless the remarks are such that

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instructing the jury to disregard them would not cure the error”) (citation

omitted).

      Finally, the trial court’s order, which adopted the plaintiff’s proposed

order verbatim, concludes that two statements, one in opening and one in

closing, attempted to imply that the plaintiff had concealed evidence. The

opening statement was unobjected to and the closing statement was

incomplete and subject to a strong curative instruction, such that they cannot

be said to have been so inflammatory and prejudicial as to warrant a new

trial. Salazar, 991 So. 2d at 372; Barnes, 303 So. 3d at 276.

      In conclusion, because the reasons for granting a new trial are not

supported by the record, the order granting a new trial is reversed and the

jury’s verdict is reinstated.

      REVERSED and REMANDED for entry of a final judgment consistent

with the jury’s verdict and this opinion.

MAKAR, EDWARDS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

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