Court Opinion

ID: 9567830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:13.692256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:45.125429
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the jury verdict and the trial court’s final judgment on appellee’s housing obligation constituted an illegal future modification of child support. OCGA § 19-6-15 provides
In its final verdict or decree, the trier of fact shall specify in what amount and from which party the minor children are entitled to permanent support. The final verdict or decree shall further specify in what manner, how often, to whom, and until when the support shall be paid. [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, the jury may provide for the termination of child support payments before a child reaches its majority. Fricks v. Fricks, 215 Ga. 137 (2) (109 SE2d 596) (1959).1 In the case at bar, the jury’s final verdict reflects a determination that appellee provide monetary support of $500 per child per month until each child reaches majority, and that appellee provide a home for the children and their mother until the youngest turns 18 or the mother remarries. It was well within the jury’s province to provide for a termination of the housing provision prior to the majority of the children, and to provide that appellant’s remarriage serve as the factor for termination. Id.2 While the majority holds that the jury illegally modified child support, I see only that the jury made an award of child support, the monetary portion of which covers the children through their minority, and the housing portion of which is terminable, under OCGA § 19-6-15, prior to their attainment of majority. I cannot endorse the majority’s judicial amendment to OCGA § 19-6-15, and I would not overrule Fricks v. Fricks, supra, in an effort to conform case law to the new version of *638the statute handed down today.
Decided December 4, 1990 —
Reconsiderations denied December 19, 1990.
Wall & Noonan, W. Alford Wall, Barbara B. Barker, for appellant.
Alston & Bird, Jay D. Bennett, John E. Stephenson, Jr., for appellee.
Since I believe the jury verdict on appellee’s housing obligation did not contain an illegal future modification of child support (compare Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177 (1) (304 SE2d 65) (1983), I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I respectfully dissent.

 Of course, a parent’s legal obligation to support his/her children does not terminate prior to the child’s majority or emancipation. OCGA § 19-7-2.

 The settlements entered into by the parties in Wimpey v. Pope, 246 Ga. 545 (1) (272 SE2d 278) (1980), and Laney v. Winkles, 255 Ga. 709 (341 SE2d 854) (1986), did not provide that the obligation undertaken by the father to provide a home for the children would terminate prior to the children attaining majority. In the absence of specific provisions to the contrary, the child support terminates upon the marriage or majority of the child. Golden v. Golden, 230 Ga. 867 (3) (199 SE2d 796) (1973).