Court Opinion

ID: 9487444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:16:44.058705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:16.427791
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In Hudson v. Palmer, the United States Supreme Court determined that a state’s intentional deprivation of personal property does not violate an individual’s procedural due process rights as long as that state provides the inmate with a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3203, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
The question, then, for this Court becomes whether the State of Mississippi provides meaningful post-deprivation relief to state court litigants either by limiting them exclusively to the trial court forum or by providing a separate state administrative forum. This same question was considered by this Court in the unpublished opinion of Young v. Williams, 956 F.2d 264 (5th Cir.1992). Young filed suit in forma pauperis in a Mississippi state court for wrongful deprivation *187of property by a state actor. Id. The ease was dismissed sua sponte, Young appealed, and the state appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that Young could not proceed in forma pauperis at the state appellate level. Id.
Young then filed a section 1988 cause of action in federal court and again asserted the wrongful deprivation of his property. Id. The federal district court in Young, as the federal district court in this case, dismissed the suit as frivolous. Id. This Court reversed and remanded the Young case to the district court for the purpose of determining whether Mississippi inmate grievance procedures provided adequate post-deprivation remedies. Id. This remand was grounded on the implicit premise that Mississippi courts could not provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy since no appeal was available to the in forma pauperis litigant. See id.
In the present case, the record reflects that post-deprivation administrative remedies were available to Mr. Nickens in the prison. See Kecord at 2. What the record does not indicate is what those administrative remedies consisted of. While there is no exhaustion of remedies requirement for section 1983 cases, the available state administrative and judicial remedies become relevant to evaluate the adequacy of the available state remedies. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535-36, 104 S.Ct. at 3204-05. The present record presents no indication of what the administrative remedies available in the State of Mississippi’s prison system did or did not include.
Thus, this case should be remanded to the district court so that the court might hear evidence as to whether Mississippi had inmate grievance procedures capable of providing adequate post-deprivation remedies. Until a determination is made as to the adequacy of those procedures, this Court need not proceed to address whether wholly denying in forma pauperis appeals renders state judicial remedies inadequate.1
*188Accordingly, this dissent is respectfully tendered.

. It is the belief of this writer that the State of Mississippi cannot rely on its judicial system alone in order to fulfill the meaningful state post-deprivation remedy requirement. Contrary to the majority's view, this writer sees no rational basis for distinguishing between in forma pau-peris civil litigants and other litigants for appellate purposes. The fact that a litigant is proceeding in forma pauperis in and of itself is no basis to conclude that the individual’s appeal is any more or less meritless. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-01, 105 S.Ct. 830, 838-39, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) ("The right to appeal would be unique among state actions if it could be withdrawn without consideration of applicable due process norms.”); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-75, 92 S.Ct. 862, 874-75, 31 L.Ed.2d 36 (1972) (finding an equal protection violation for a state requirement that only forced appellants with FED claims to pay a double appellate bond); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496, 83 S.Ct. 774, 779, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963) ("In all cases the duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants with funds — the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contention to the appellate court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions.”); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58, 79 S.Ct: 1164, 1168-69, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959) (finding no rational basis to believe that an indigent's appellate claims were any less meritorious than any other appellate claims); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) ("It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.”) (cites omitted); Martin v. Dallas Co., Tex., 822 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir.1987) (finding adequate post-deprivation remedy for § 1983 purposes “through the right of appeal ..."); Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984, 107 S.Ct. 571, 93 L.Ed.2d 576 (1986) (finding the opportunity to appeal from state court judgment made the state’s post-deprivation remedy adequate).
Section 1983 actions frequently come before the district courts — state and federal — in forma pauperis. Such in forma pauperis cases present unique complications and problems to the district courts. Given the complexity of in forma pauperis actions coupled with the general overcrowding of state court dockets, there is a substantial incentive for district judges to dismiss these cases on frivolity grounds. Without meaningful appellate review, many § 1983 in forma pauperis inmates may fall victim to an occasional, overly-enthusiastic docket control.
Trial court judges generally do an outstanding job in managing overloaded dockets which contain more than a few frivolous complaints. Despite the vast majority of district court orders being well-reasoned decisions, there will be a substantial minority of cases in which some of the actions taken by the district judge could be classified as arbitrary and/or capricious. This is the primary reason why the appellate system has *188been put in place — to create a full spectrum of judicial review. The full functioning of the judicial system should not be contingent upon the financial well-being of the litigants.