Court Opinion

ID: 9949044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 17:11:11.604066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.602418
License: Public Domain

J-S43013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CARMELO RIVERA, JR.                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 823 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 9, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-06-CR-0002192-2020

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                          FILED: MARCH 8, 2024

       Carmelo Rivera, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on

his convictions for robbery and related charges. Rivera challenges the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence and raises a discretionary sentencing

claim. We affirm.

       The court summarized the facts presented at the jury trial as follows.

       On September 23, 2019, at approximately 2am [sic], Angel
       Torres, along with his girlfriend, Reyni Meliton, left the Rancho
       Merengue club located on Franklin Street, near the intersection
       with Orange Street, in the city of Reading, Berks County, PA and
       began the walk to his car. An armed masked man, in long pants
       and a hoodie, ran up to him, directed him not to move and [to]
       be quiet. At that time, the man removed Mr. Torres’ designer
       cross-body handbag, containing his wallet with $700 in cash inside
       and designer sunglasses. The man also removed the watch from
       his wrist. The assailant returned Mr. Torres’ wallet with his
       identification and keys.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     As the robbery was occurring, a black Infiniti pulled up next to
     them. The driver was not wearing a mask (and was later identified
     as Jason Myers). He exited the car. Henry Jiminez was also
     walking down Franklin Street at the time. He testified that he
     turned and suddenly was confronted by a masked man with a gun.
     While he struggled to push the gun away, he was struck on his
     head with something hard. Mr. Torres was watching the assault of
     Mr. Jiminez and described Mr. Jiminez as being pistol-whipped.
     After Mr. Jiminez fell to the ground because of the blow to the
     head, he was kicked by the assailant and the driver of the car. The
     two men rummaged in his pockets, taking approximately $400 in
     cash, [a] phone, [a] watch and [a] belt and then ran away on
     Orange Street. As a result of the attack, Mr. Jiminez suffered a
     fractured skull, a concussion, a broken finger, and needed a blood
     transfusion.

     Police were dispatched and found the black Infiniti which was still
     running. The black Infiniti was approximately a half block from the
     club. In the cup holder was a live shell casing and a white hat with
     a cell phone underneath it on the front passenger seat. A person
     who was standing in front of the Infiniti told police, upon arrival,
     that the men ran down Orange Street and that one of them was
     wearing a red sweatshirt. Officer Morrison proceeded down
     Orange Street and saw two people mid-way down the block, one
     of whom was wearing a red sweatshirt. As he pursued, he heard
     two-to-three-gun shots coming from the area of Orange and
     Chestnut Street. Surveillance video footage obtained from the
     Southwest Middle school showed the second suspect (previously
     the masked suspect) raising his hand followed by two light flashes,
     purported to be muzzle flashes. Two shell casings were obtained
     from the area where these two light flashes occurred. The shell
     casings found on the street were of the same type and caliber as
     those obtained from the black Infiniti. Surveillance video was
     obtained from 116 Orange Street which showed one of two
     running persons throw an object in the air and land on the ground.
     A mask was recovered in front of 114 Orange Street. In the 100
     block of Orange Street, a ski mask was recovered. DNA was
     obtained from the mask showing that [Rivera] was main
     contributor to the DNA profile recovered from the mask. However,
     there were three contributors to the DNA profile.

     Mr. Myers’ probation officer identified Mr. Myers in a picture of two
     men (admitted as Commonwealth Exhibit 7). The photo was
     obtained on Facebook from [Rivera’s] public Facebook page. He
     also established that Mr. Myers’ known vehicle was a black Infiniti,

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       although he was not the registered owner. The probation officer
       then provided the license plate number of the vehicle. It was a
       match to the vehicle found on the night of the incident.

       [Rivera’s] parole agent identified [Rivera] as the second person in
       the photo admitted as Commonwealth Exhibit 7. [Rivera’s] parole
       agent also provided a phone number associated with [Rivera],
       although she never used that number to call him. A SIM card was
       extracted from the cell phone found in the Infiniti and [it] matched
       the phone number provided by the parole agent. Police obtained
       two other pictures of [Rivera] with Mr. Myers . . . from [Rivera’s]
       Facebook page [and they were] admitted as Commonwealth
       Exhibit 11 and 14. In Commonwealth Exhibit 11 he is wearing a
       hat that is the same brand, color, and style as the hat collected
       from the black Infiniti on the night of the incident. No identifiable
       DNA was able to be extracted from the white hat in the black
       Infiniti.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/7/23, at 3-5.

       The jury convicted Rivera of two counts of robbery, two counts of

conspiracy to commit robbery, and one count each of firearms not to be

carried without a license, theft by unlawful taking, conspiracy to commit theft

by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, conspiracy to commit receiving

stolen property, terroristic threats, and simple assault.1 Rivera was found not

guilty of aggravated assault, simple assault, and assault with a deadly weapon

as to the physical assault of Jiminez.

       The court imposed an aggregate sentence of 21 to 42 years’

incarceration followed by 20 years’ probation on the two counts of robbery,

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(a)(1) (of 3701(a)(1)(ii)),
6106(a)(1), 3921(a), 903(a)(1) (of 3921(a)), 3925(a), 903(a)(1) (of
3925(a)), 2706(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.

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two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery, and firearms not to be carried

without a license.2 It considered the other convictions to have merged.

       Rivera filed a post-sentence motion. The court granted the post-

sentence motion in part. It vacated the judgment of sentence for firearms not

to be carried without a license and imposed a new sentence on that count,

reducing the aggregate sentence to 20.5 to 41 years’ incarceration followed

by 20 years’ probation.3 It denied the post-sentence motion in all other

respects. Rivera appealed.4, 5

       Rivera raises the following issues:

       A. Whether the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish
       beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of firearms not to be
       carried without a license, when there was no testimony concerning

____________________________________________

2 On the robbery convictions, the court imposed sentences of eight to 16 years’

incarceration and six to 12 years’ incarceration. On the conspiracy counts, the
court imposed sentences of three to six years’ incarceration and 20 years’
probation. On the firearms charge, the court imposed a sentence of four to
eight years’ incarceration. It ran each sentence consecutively.

3 The court reduced the sentence on the firearms charge to three and a half

to seven years’ incarceration.

4 Rivera did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the new judgement of

sentence. However, the court reinstated his direct appeal rights on May 9,
2023, as relief granted on a Post Conviction Relief Act petition.

5 The notice of appeal erroneously states the appeal is from the order granting

in part and denying in part the post-sentence motions. The appeal properly
lies from this order, not because it disposed of post-sentence motions, but
because it amended Rivera’s judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Garzone, 993 A.2d 1245, 1254 n.6 (Pa.Super. 2010); Commonwealth v.
Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc).

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      concealment of the firearm on [Rivera’s] person or that the
      firearm was inside a vehicle and therefore requiring licensure?

      B. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant a new trial
      because the convictions on all counts were contrary to the weight
      of the evidence where there was no witness who provided direct
      identification of [Rivera] as the perpetrator and the circumstantial
      evidence was insufficient because the perpetrator was masked for
      the entirety of the event, the car involved was registered to
      another person, the mask had the DNA of two other unidentified
      individuals, and another hat in the vehicle had so many
      individuals’ DNA on it that it could not be separated for
      comparison?

      C. Whether under all the circumstances of the within case, the
      within sentence imposed is manifestly excessive so as to inflict too
      severe a punishment on [Rivera]?

Rivera’s Br. at 8-9 (unpaginated)

      Rivera first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

conviction for firearms not to be carried without a license. He argues the

Commonwealth did not establish that he ever “had the gun concealed on his

person or that he had the gun in the [b]lack Infinit[i].” Id. at 28

(unpaginated). He points out that both Torres and Jiminez testified that the

masked assailant – allegedly Rivera – approached them on the street, armed

with a handgun. They testified that after the robberies, the assailants ran

away. He stresses that neither victim ever testified that the masked assailant

had been seen without a gun or inside the car.

      We review this issue pursuant to the following standard.

      When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
      must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in a light
      most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, support
      the conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is
      sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element

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       of the crime has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, the
       sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. This standard applies
       equally where the Commonwealth's evidence is circumstantial.

       In conducting this analysis, we do not weigh the evidence and
       substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally,
       the Commonwealth’s evidence need not preclude every possibility
       of innocence in order to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
       The fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Clemens, 242 A.3d 659, 664-65 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(cleaned up).

       A person commits firearms not to be carried without a license when that

person “carries a firearm in any vehicle or . . . concealed on or about his

person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of business, without a valid

and lawfully issued license under this chapter[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

       Here, the Commonwealth presented sufficient circumstantial evidence

that Rivera had transported the firearm in a vehicle. The evidence was that

Myers pulled up in his car seconds after the first robbery began. After Myers

and the masked assailant fled on foot, police found inside the vehicle a

baseball hat matching one that Rivera had worn in a Facebook picture he took

with Myers. They also found a cell phone bearing the phone number that

Rivera used to communicate with his parole agent, as well as a live bullet that

was the same caliber and brand – a .40 caliber Smith & Wesson bullet6 – as

the shell casings discarded when the previously-masked assailant fired the

handgun. Nearby, the police found a ski mask that had primarily Rivera’s DNA

on it. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
____________________________________________

6 See N.T., 8/30/22, at 119-20, 121-22, 125, 126.

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it was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Rivera rode with Myers in

Myers’ vehicle to the crime scene and had the handgun with him in the car at

the time.

      Rivera next challenges the weight of the evidence supporting all the

convictions. He maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in

determining that the jury’s finding that he was involved was not against the

weight of the evidence. He points out that while the mask found by the police

had his DNA on it, it also had the DNA of two other people. Rivera further

alleges the hat found in the vehicle was of a popular style and had so many

individuals’ DNA on it that they could not be separated for comparison. He

asserts there was also no indication of the age of the photo of him wearing a

similar hat. Rivera claims there was testimony establishing that the phone

found in the car was registered to someone else, and his parole officer had

only ever used that number to send text messages to Rivera, not to call him

directly.

      This issue calls for our review of the trial court’s discretion:

      When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, we
      review the trial court’s exercise of discretion. A reversal of a
      verdict is not necessary unless it is so contrary to the evidence as
      to shock one’s sense of justice. The weight of the evidence is
      exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none
      or some of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
      witnesses. The fact-finder also has the responsibility of resolving
      contradictory testimony and questions of credibility. We give great
      deference to the trial court’s decision regarding a weight of the
      evidence claim because it had the opportunity to hear and see the
      evidence presented.

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Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned

up).

       The trial court rejected the weight claim, finding “[t]he Commonwealth

proved that [Rivera] was the masked assailant by circumstantial evidence.”

Trial Ct. Op. at 8. It noted that “the jury was free to accept or reject the

various arguments put forth by the defense in this case.” Id. It concluded,

“After reviewing the record, the verdict, while disappointing to [Rivera], is

certainly not shocking.” Id.

       On the present record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding the verdict did not shock the conscience.

       In his final issue, Rivera contends his aggregate sentence is manifestly

excessive. Rivera asserts that the court “deviated from the sentencing

guidelines [by] imposing sentences above the guidelines on two counts, a top

of the standard range sentence on one count and an illegal sentence beyond

the statutory maximum on one count (later corrected).” Rivera’s Br. at 17

(unpaginated).7 He highlights that the court ran all sentences consecutively,

for a total sentence of 20½ to 41 years’ incarceration followed by 20 years’

probation. He also argues that in imposing the sentence, the trial court failed

to adequately consider his age and the fact that Myers pleaded guilty and

received a much shorter sentence of 10 to 20 years’ incarceration, even

though Myers, and not Rivera, physically assaulted Jiminez, whereas Rivera
____________________________________________

7 Rivera does not explain which sentences he claims were above the
guidelines.

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did not injure either victim. Rivera contends the court imposed a relatively

lengthier sentence for his crimes as punishment for having asserted his right

to a trial.

       Before we review a challenge to the court’s exercise of discretion in

imposing sentence, “we must assess whether [the appellant] has raised a

substantial question that the court violated a provision of the Sentencing Code

or that the sentence is contrary to the norms underlying the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Goodco Mech., Inc., 291 A.3d 378, 405

(Pa.Super. 2023).8 “The key to resolving the preliminary substantial question

inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate

sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of

the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Commonwealth v. Dove, 301

A.3d 427, 437 (Pa.Super. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Rivera has stated a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1271-72 (Pa.Super. 2013) (concluding the appellant's

claim that the imposition of consecutive sentences was disproportionate to his

crimes, and that the court disregarded the nature and circumstances of his

offense, presents a substantial question); Commonwealth v. Perry, 883

A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding an excessive-sentence claim, in

____________________________________________

8 Rivera has satisfied the other requirements for raising a discretionary
sentencing claim. See Goodco Mech., Inc. at 405 n.21 (noting requirements
of the timely filing of the appeal, proper preservation of the sentencing issue,
and inclusion of a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in the appellate brief).

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conjunction with an assertion that the court did not consider mitigating

factors, raises a substantial question).

      On the merits, we find no abuse of discretion. A court has broad

discretion over sentencing because it is “in the best position to determine the

proper penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the

individual circumstances before it.” Goodco Mech., Inc., 291 A.3d at 405

(citation omitted). “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because

an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a

result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,

or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Pursuant to Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code, the court must follow

the general principle that the sentence “should call for confinement that is

consistent with section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life

of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The court may impose a sentence of total

confinement “if, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime

and the history, character, and condition of the defendant,” it finds

confinement necessary because (1) there is an undue risk that the defendant

will commit another crime if subject to lesser restrictions, (2) a correction

institution can provide needed treatment, or (3) “a lesser sentence will

depreciate the seriousness of the crime of the defendant.” Id. at § 9725.

Where a court has been informed by a pre-sentence investigation report

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(“PSI”), we presume that it was aware of all information relevant to assessing

the defendant’s character and any mitigating circumstances. Goodco Mech.,

Inc., 291 A.3d at 407.

       The court must also consider the ranges suggested by the sentencing

guidelines. Id. at § 9721(b). When the court imposes a sentence falling within

the ranges suggested by the sentencing guidelines, we will only vacate if “the

case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be

clearly unreasonable.” Id. at § 9781(c)(2). When the court deviates from the

guidelines ranges, we will vacate where “the sentence is unreasonable.” Id.

at § 9781(c)(3).

       Here, the court stated at sentencing that it was going to use the

Sentencing Guidelines ranges applicable to a defendant who possessed a

deadly weapon while committing the offense, and Rivera did not object. See

N.T. 9/1/21 at 4, 7. Nor did Rivera object when the Commonwealth recited

the guidelines ranges calculated with the deadly weapon possessed

enhancement (“DWE”). Id. at 4-6.

       Given the application of the DWE, contrary to Rivera’s assertions, the

court did not impose “sentences above the guidelines on two counts, a top of

the standard range sentence on one count and an illegal sentence beyond the

statutory maximum on one count (later corrected).”9 Rather, the court

imposed sentences within the guidelines on all but one count, for which it
____________________________________________

9 We preliminarily note that Rivera received sentences on five counts, and this

recitation only includes four.

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imposed a period of probation.10 We must therefore leave the sentence

undisturbed unless the circumstances of the case made application of the

guidelines    clearly   unreasonable      or   the   imposition   of   probation   was

unreasonable.

____________________________________________

10 On count 1 (robbery), the standard range with the DWE was 57-69 months’

minimum incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for the mitigated and
aggravated ranges. See N.T., 9/1/21, at 5. The court imposed a sentence of
72 months’ minimum incarceration, which was an aggravated range sentence.

On count 2 (conspiracy to commit robbery), the standard range with the DWE
was 45-57 months’ minimum incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for the
mitigated and aggravated ranges. See id. The court imposed a sentence of
36 months’ minimum incarceration, which was a mitigated range sentence.

On count 13 (robbery), the standard range with the DWE was 81-99 months’
minimum incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for the mitigated and
aggravated ranges. See id. at 4-5. The court imposed a sentence of 96
months’ minimum incarceration, which was a standard range sentence.

On count 14 (conspiracy to commit robbery), the standard range with the
DWE was 69-87 months’ minimum incarceration, plus or minus 12 months for
the mitigated and aggravated ranges. See id. at 5-6. The court imposed a
sentence of 20 years’ probation. This sentence constituted an upward
departure from the guidelines, and the statutory maximum. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1103(1) (stating maximum sentence for a first-degree felony is 20 years).

Finally, on count 5 (firearms not to be carried without a sentence), the DWE
did not apply. See N.T., 9/1/21, at 5. The standard range was 36-48 month’s
minimum incarceration. See id. at 4, 6 (Rivera’s prior record score is 4), 5
(stating standard range); see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.15 (providing offense
gravity score of 9); 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (basic sentencing matrix).
However, the statutory maximum for the offense was 42 to 84 months’
incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1) (grading violation as third-
degree felony), 1103(3) (providing maximum sentence for third-degree felony
is seven years). While the initial sentence was 48 months’ minimum
incarceration, which was a standard-range sentence, that sentence exceeded
the statutory maximum. Rivera’s corrected sentence was 42 months, which,
while it was the statutory maximum, also fell within the standard range.

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      We do not find such circumstances existed. The court stated that it

reviewed the PSI, the recommendations of counsel, and the ranges suggested

by the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 13-14. It noted that while Myers received

a lesser sentence because the Commonwealth offered him a plea deal, it

stated it does not penalize defendants for exercising their right to a trial. Id.

at 12. It noted Rivera had four prior robbery convictions and had committed

the instant offenses after serving 10 years and a short period of parole. Id. at

13. The court stated,

      And the scenario that’s presented by the facts of this case is that
      the defendant and Mr. Myers were, in effect, roaming the area
      waiting for people to get out of the Rancho Merengue, which is
      well known as a place where at closing time, the streets are –
      there are a lot of people in the streets – and apparently robbing
      people at gunpoint. This is extraordinarily dangerous conduct.

Id. at 13. The court noted Rivera was 31 at the time of sentencing and had

“not been rehabilitated in the slightest way” by his first 10-year sentence, “so

his rehabilitative needs are huge.” Id. at 14.

      The record reveals that the court adequately considered all relevant

sentencing factors and that its imposition of guidelines sentences and        an

above-guidelines sentence of probation, while consecutively imposed, was not

unreasonable or an abuse of discretion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2024

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