Court Opinion

ID: 9385778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-09 08:11:51.331193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.385885
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in Part as Modified, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and
Memorandum Opinion filed April 6, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-21-00089-CV

                 JOE ALFRED IZEN, JUNIOR, Appellant
                                        V.

                  MOVE-IT SELF STORAGE, LP, Appellee

            On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2
                          Harris County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 1141892-101

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Joe Alfred Izen, Junior appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor
of appellee Move-It Self Storage, LP, raising eight issues. We affirm in part as
modified and reverse and remand in part.
                                        BACKGROUND

       Appellant filed suit against Move-It1 for “selling his property illegally at ‘a
storage lien auction sale.’” In the amended petition, appellant alleges that two
individuals, Ruhije and Phillip Head, rented a storage unit from Move-It and
placed appellant’s personal property into the storage unit. Appellant alleges that he
did not know, authorize, or consent to his personal property being placed into the
storage unit.2 Thereafter the Heads defaulted on their rental agreement with Move-
It. The Heads told appellant that his property was in the storage unit and that they
had defaulted on payment. Appellant contacted Move-It by phone and made a
payment to cure the default on the storage unit.

       Appellant alleges that a few months later he went to Move-It’s facility and
spoke with a manager. Appellant informed the manager that the Heads had placed
appellant’s personal property inside the storage unit without his permission or
consent and that he wanted to reclaim his personal property. The manager would
not allow appellant access to the storage unit and indicated that Move-It intended
to sell the property within the unit at a public auction unless the most recent default
was cured.      Appellant paid the default amount as indicated by the manager.
Appellant alleges that the manager agreed to send any further notices of default or
sale to appellant. Two months later, Move-It sold the contents of the storage unit
at an online auction. Appellant alleges that Move-It never sent the notice of sale to
appellant.

       1
          Appellant filed suit against Move-It and three individuals. The three individuals are not
parties to this appeal.
       2
          The Heads were supposed to move appellant’s personal property to another location
while they repaired the roof on appellant’s property. Instead, they placed the personal property
into a storage unit leased from Move-It.

                                                2
       Appellant brought claims against Move-It for violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(TDCA), and Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA), as well as for breach of contract,
conversion, and unjust enrichment. Move-It filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss
appellant’s claims. The trial court granted Move-It’s motion to dismiss in part,
dismissing appellant’s TDCA and TTLA claims with prejudice. Appellant then
filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and Move-It filed a cross-motion for
final summary judgment. The trial court granted Move-It’s motion for summary
judgment in full and denied appellant’s motion. Move-It then filed an “application
for attorneys’ fees related to dismissed TTLA claim and summary judgment.” The
trial court granted Move-It’s application and awarded Move-It attorney’s fees in
the amount of $7,237.88 for “legal services rendered . . . while defending against
the [TTLA] claim” and $13,123.50 for “legal services rendered . . . while
responding to [appellant’s] Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment.” After
severing the claims against Move-It, the judgment became final.

                               MOTION TO DISMISS

      In appellant’s sixth issue he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing
his claims under the TTLA and TDCA pursuant to Rule 91a. Appellant argues that
the facts pleaded established his claims under the TTLA and the TDCA.

A.    General Legal Principles

      If a cause of action has no basis in law, a party may move for dismissal
under Rule 91a. Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a; see also In re Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mutual Ins.
Co., 621 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. 2021).        “A cause of action has no basis in law if
the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from
them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a. We
review whether a cause of action has any basis in law de novo. San Jacinto River
                                         3
Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618, 628 (Tex. 2021). We accept as true the factual
allegations in the pleadings and liberally construe the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff. HMT Tank Serv. v. Am. Tank & Vessel, Inc., 565 S.W.3d 799, 808 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.). If needed, the trial court may draw
reasonable inferences from the factual allegations to determine if the cause of
action has any basis in law or fact. Vasquez v. Legend Nat. Gas, LP, 492 S.W.3d
448, 450 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied). A court may not consider
evidence and must decide the motion “based solely on the pleading of the cause of
action.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.6. “A motion to dismiss . . . must state specifically
the reasons the cause of action has no basis in law, no basis in fact, or both.” Tex.
R. Civ. P. 91a.2.

      Under the TTLA, a person who commits theft as defined in the Penal Code
is liable for the damages resulting from the theft. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§
134.002(2), 134.003(a).      Theft is defined in the Penal Code as “unlawfully
appropriat[ing] property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” Tex. Pen.
Code § 31.03(a). Appropriation is unlawful if “it is without the owner’s effective
consent” or “the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing
it was stolen by another.”3 Id. § 31.03(b)(1)–(2). “‘Appropriate’ means, among
other things, ‘to acquire or otherwise exercise control over property other than real
property.’” State v. Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting
Tex. Pen. Code § 31.03(a)). Appropriation “has been interpreted to mean ‘any
exercise of control over the personalty in question.’” State v. Fuller, 480 S.W.3d
812, 820 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d) (quoting McClain v. State, 687
S.W.2d 350, 353 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “Appropriation by itself does not
establish theft––there must also be an intent to deprive the owner of the property . .
      3
         The penal code has a further provision defining “unlawful appropriation” that is
inapplicable to the facts herein. See Tex. Pen. Code § 31.03(b)(3).

                                           4
. .” Ford, 537 S.W.3d at 24. “Relevant intent to deprive the owner of property is
the accused’s intent at the time of the taking.” Wilson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 834,
836–37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Deprive means “to withhold property from the
owner permanently or for an extended period of time that a major portion of the
value or enjoyment of the property is lost to the owner.” Tex. Pen. Code § 31.01.

      “The TDCA provides remedies for wrongful debt collection practices used
by a debt collector in debt collection.” Burton v. Prince, 577 S.W.3d 280, 290
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.). Debt collection is “an action,
conduct, or practice in collecting, or in solicitation for collection, consumer debts
that are due to or alleged to be due a creditor.” Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(5). A
“consumer debt” is “an obligation, or an alleged obligation, primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes and arising from a transaction or alleged
transaction.” Id. § 392.001(2).    To recover under the TDCA, the plaintiff must
also prove that defendant committed a wrongful act against the plaintiff in
violation of the TDCA. See id. § 392.301. Such wrongful acts include using
threats or coercion, harassment or abuse, any unfair or unconscionable means, or
making misleading representations. See id. § 392.301–.304.

B.    Relevant Background

      Appellant alleged that all of Move-It’s actions “constitute civil theft” and
Move-It should be held liable for civil theft under the TTLA. Regarding his
TDCA claim, appellant alleged that Move-It accepted rental payments from
appellant and agreed to notify him of any future default. The petition alleges the
following facts, and under the standard of review, such facts are taken as true:

         • [Appellant] discovered that [the Heads] who had contracted
           with [appellant] to repair the flat roof at the building [appellant]
           occupied and was leasing . . . had removed various items of
           personal property owned by [appellant] . . . and, without
                                          5
   [appellant’s] knowledge or permission, had taken such items to
   the premises operated by [Move-It] . . . and placed [appellant’s]
   items, allegedly comingled with some of his own property in a
   storage unit.
• The storage unit was listed under the name of [the Heads] as
  tenants and [Move-It] as the lessor.
• [Appellant’s] property was removed and stored by the Heads
  without [appellant’s] knowledge and authorization . . . .
• [The Heads] received a notice from [Move-It] of [its] intent to
  sell all the personal property in the storage unit including
  [appellant’s] property at a public auction based on the Heads’
  default.
• [Move-It] has produced a Ledger History which states and
  proved that [Move-It] announced a default by the Heads in the
  Heads’ payment of storage rental under the Heads’ lease.
• [Appellant] contacted [Move-It] by telephone and spoke to the
  on site manager.
• The . . . manager confirmed that an auction had been threatened
  and was actually going to take place.
• The . . . manager accepted [appellant’s] tender of payment for .
  . . the amount of rental which the . . . manager claimed the
  Heads owed under their contract with [Move-It].
• [Appellant] placed the . . . manager on notice . . . that
  [appellant’s] property was placed inside the Heads’ storage unit
  without [appellant’s] permission and that [appellant] wanted to
  view and reclaim his property.
• The . . . manager . . . informed [appellant] that [he] could not
  enter the storage unit . . . or reclaim his property and that
  [appellant] would have to “deal through” the Heads to get his
  property.
• The . . . manager represented that if [appellant] would pay the
  Heads’ overdue lease payments and cure the Heads’ default . . .
  that [Move-It] would provide [appellant] with notice of any
  future auction threatened . . . based on . . . future default . . . .

                                 6
          • Relying on these representations, [appellant] agreed to pay the .
            . . rent owed by the Heads . . . .
          • [Appellant] paid [Move-It] . . . to bring the Heads’ account . . .
            current.
          • [Just over two months later], . . . without providing any prior
            notice to [appellant], [Move-It] claims it sold [appellant’s]
            items of personal property . . . at a “storage auction” on or about
            December 29, 2017.
          • [Appellant] received no prior notice of the alleged default or the
            sale from either the Heads or [Move-It] . . . .
          • [Move-It] produced a Ledger History . . . which states that the
            Heads were mailed a “notice of claim.”
          • [The] manager confirmed that all of the personal property
            located in the Heads’ storage unit had been sold including
            [appellant’s] personal property.

      Appellant further alleged that he never received any notice of default or sale
from Move-It and that Move-It instead sold the contents of the storage unit without
notice to appellant or allowing him an opportunity to cure the default.

      In its motion to dismiss, Move-It argued that appellant’s claims under the
TDCA and TTLA should be dismissed.                Move-It argued that appellant’s
cursory legal conclusion” that “all of the acts committed by” Move-It “constitute
civil theft” is “threadbare, unsupported, and not entitled to assumption of truth.”
Move-It argued that appellant failed to allege any of the elements to establish
liability under the TTLA. Move-It specifically highlighted that appellant had not
alleged the presence of intent and existence of intent at the time of the taking.

      With regard to the TDCA claim, Move-It argued that appellant omitted any
elements of this cause of action and only asserted that Move-It failed to produce a
notice of default, notice of sale, or summary of the sale. Move-It further argued

                                           7
that appellant failed to allege that any debt was ever owed by appellant to Move-It
or that Move-It ever engaged in any prohibited practice under the TDCA.

       The trial court granted Move-It’s motion to dismiss on the TTLA and TDCA
grounds and dismissed those claims with prejudice.4

C.     Analysis

       Move-It argues that appellant’s TTLA claim consists of a single sentence.
However, this section of his amended petition incorporates the prior sections
containing factual allegations against Move-It, some of which are detailed above.
We disagree with Move-It that we are confined to reviewing appellant’s pleadings
so narrowly. See HMT Tank Serv., 565 S.W.3d at 808. We also disagree that no
reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a.1;
Renate Nixdorf GmbH & Co. KG v. TRA Midland Props., LLC, No. 05-17-00577-
CV, 2019 WL 92038, *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem.
op.) (“[A]fter reviewing the second amended petition under rule 91a’s factual-
plausibility standard, we conclude it is possible a reasonable person could believe
the facts alleged.”).

       With regard to appellant’s TTLA claim, from the pleadings quoted above
taken as true, we can infer the intent requirement to support the TTLA claim. See
Tex. Pen. Code § 31.03(a); Fuller, 480 S.W.3d at 823 (“Intent is typically proven
through circumstantial evidence . . . and may be inferred from [] acts, words, and
conduct.” (internal citation omitted)). Appellant alleged that his property was
being held in the unit without his consent and that such property was later sold at
auction by Move-It without notice to appellant. Appellant alleged that Move-It

       4
          Move-It moved to dismiss under Rule 91a on other claims asserted by appellant. Those
grounds were denied by the trial court. Both parties moved for fees on the 91a motion, and the
trial court declined to award any fees.

                                              8
had contracted with him to provide notice before any future auction. From those
factual allegations it is reasonable to infer that at the time Move-It took possession
of the property to sell at auction, having failed to provide notice, Move-It had the
intent to permanently deprive appellant of the property. See Morris v. Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 528 S.W.3d 187, 201 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2017, no pet.) (reversing summary judgment on TTLA ground where question
regarding wrongful or invalid foreclosure on real and personal property remained).
As a result, we conclude the trial court erred in granting Move-It’s motion to
dismiss on this ground.

      Turning to appellant’s TDCA claim, there is no allegation of any consumer
debt owed. See Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2).         Instead, appellant alleges in his
amended petition that Move-It failed to notify appellant “of the Heads’ alleged
default, and [give appellant] an opportunity to bring the Heads’ rental payment
current and cure any default.”        Appellant acknowledges it is the Heads’
indebtedness and not his own. While appellant alleged that the storage unit was
being used to store items of his own personal property, appellant failed to allege
that the indebtedness owed by the Heads was a “consumer debt” as that term is
defined. See Farkas v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, No. 05-19-01024-CV, 2021
WL 2548709, *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Although a plaintiff need not be in privity with the defendant to bring an action
under the [TDCA], the debt in question must still be a consumer debt.”); see also
Tex. Fin. Code § 392.403(a) (“A person may sue for . . . actual damages sustained
as a result of a violation of this chapter.” (emphasis added)); Tex. Fin. Code §
392.001(5) (“‘debt collection’ means an action, conduct, or practice in collecting . .
. consumer debts that are due or alleged to be due a creditor.”).

                                          9
       Appellant alleged in the amended petition that the Heads were contracted to
perform roof repairs on a property appellant was occupying and leasing. Appellant
alleged that the Heads rented the storage unit to move appellant’s personal
property and store it while they worked on the roof. The storage unit was rented
by the Heads, and there is no indication that such transaction was for the Heads’
“personal, family, or household purposes.” See Tex. Fin. Code § 392.001(2). To
the extent that appellant alleges that Move-It violated the TDCA by failing to
provide notice to him in its attempt to collect on the later default that resulted in
the auction, the same argument applies. Appellant did not allege that either he or
the Heads’ owed a consumer debt to Move-It.5                     We affirm the trial court’s
dismissal of this claim.

       We overrule appellant’s sixth issue for his TDCA claim and sustain it for his
TTLA claim.

                      CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

       In appellant’s first issue he argues that the trial court should have granted his
motion for summary judgment on his breach of contract and DTPA claims. In
appellant’s second issue, he contends the trial court should have denied Move-It’s
summary judgment on his breach of contract and DTPA claims. We review these
related issues together.

       5
         Appellant alleges that because Move-It accepted rental payments from appellant that
appellant was a tenant. However, this is not a factual assertion but instead a conclusory recital of
the elements of a cause of action. Such recitals are insufficient to support appellant’s claim
against a motion to dismiss. See Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (“But ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” (quoting GoDaddy.com, LLC v.
Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied))).

                                                10
A.    Standard of Review

      We review the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.
Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 295 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tex. 2009). “On
cross-motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of establishing
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” City of Garland v. Dall. Morning
News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000).

      To defeat a no-evidence motion, the non-movant must produce evidence
raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements.” First
United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex.
2017). If the evidence would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in
their conclusions, then a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. However, no
genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence is “so weak as to do no more
than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of the existence of the fact. Id. (quoting
Kia Motor Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. 2014)).

      The movant for a traditional summary judgment must show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Parker, 514 S.W.3d 220. “If the movant meets this
burden, ‘the burden then shifts to the non-movant to disprove or raise an issue of
fact as to at least one of those elements.’” Chavez v. Kansas City S. Ry., 520
S.W.3d 898, 900 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health
Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014)). In our review, “we take as true all
evidence favorable to the nonmovant and we indulge every reasonable inference
and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.” Dall. Morning News, Inc. v.
Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 624 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones,
520 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Tex. 2017)).

                                         11
      When, as here, the trial court “grants a motion for summary judgment
without specifying the grounds on which it relies, we affirm if any of the grounds
presented are meritorious.” City of Houston v. Cortez, 640 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

B.    Background

      Appellant moved for summary judgment on his claims for breach of
contract, violations of the DTPA, and the “illegal sale” of appellant’s personal
property.     Move-It moved for summary judgment on appellant’s claims for
violations of the DTPA, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment.6
The trial court denied appellant’s motion and granted Move-It’s motion in its
entirety without specifying or detailing the reasons therein.

C.    Breach of Contract

      In his summary judgment motion, appellant argued that because Move-It
accepted rental payments from appellant, appellant is entitled to summary
judgment on the “existence” of the contract between the parties “unless [Move-It]
produces evidence supporting its claim . . . that no rental contract existed with”
appellant.”    Appellant argued that because the evidence shows that Move-It
accepted two payments from appellant, those payments are proof of the contract
between appellant and Move-It. Appellant attested that he provided Move-It with
his address, email, phone number, and facsimile number and that appellant never
received any notice from Move-It. Appellant contended that damages were an
issue to be tried and did not attempt to obtain summary judgment on that element
of his claim. In its combined response and cross-motion for summary judgment,
Move-It argued that it did not breach any alleged contract because it provided

      6
         Appellant does not appeal the trial court’s summary judgment on his conversion or
unjust enrichment claims.

                                           12
notice of default and sale by publication. Attached to its motion was the notice
published in the Daily Court Review.

      We conclude appellant failed to meet his burden to conclusively establish his
breach of contract claim, but that appellant has met his minimal burden to raise a
fact issue on Move-It’s cross-motion for summary judgment on appellant’s breach
of contract claim. Appellant attested that he provided Move-It with where to
provide notice and Move-It agreed to provide such notice to appellant. Appellant
further attested that he never received such notice from Move-It. Making every
reasonable inference, as we must, under the facts and circumstances of this case,
this is sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Tatum, 554
S.W.3d at 624.

D.    DTPA

      Appellant also argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on his
DTPA claims. Appellant contends that he is a “consumer,” that Move-It made a
knowing misrepresentation to him, and that misrepresentation caused him
damages. Namely, appellant alleged that Move-It promised to notify appellant of
any default on the storage unit or any sale. Appellant also asserted that he was
entitled to damages under the DTPA through Chapter 59 of the Property Code. See
Tex. Prop. Code § 59.005 (“A person injured by a violation of this chapter may sue
for damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices—Consumer Protection Act.”).
Appellant contended that Move-It violated Chapter 59 by failing to give him notice
of default and sale.

      In its cross-motion, Move-It argued that it did not owe appellant any
obligations under Chapter 59 because appellant is not a “tenant” as that term is
defined, has not alleged or shown that he has exclusive possession of or access to

                                         13
the storage unit, and has not alleged or shown that any “rental agreement” between
himself and Move-It exists. See Tex. Prop. Code § 59.001.

      Appellant did not respond or provide evidence to show that he is a “tenant”
as defined in section 59.001, and his summary judgment evidence further
established that he could not meet that definition because he did not have exclusive
use of the storage space at Move-It’s facility.     See id. § 59.001(4) (defining
“tenant” as “a person entitled under a rental agreement to the exclusive use of
storage space at a self-service storage facility”). At most, appellant’s evidence
alleges that he contracted for notice from Move-It, but nothing indicated that such
alleged agreement established or modified the terms of use of the self-service
storage facility. See id. § 59.001(2) (“‘Rental agreement’ means a written or oral
agreement that establishes or modifies the terms of use of a self-service storage
facility.”). As a result, we conclude that Move-It established its right to summary
judgment on appellant’s DTPA claims.

E.    Conversion

      Appellant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on his conversion
claim because he provided evidence that he sent a demand letter to Move-It
demanding the return of his personal property and Move-It failed to return his
personal property. Conversion is defined as “the wrongful exercise of dominion
and control over another’s property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights.”
Tripp Village Joint Venture v. MBank Lincoln Centre, N.A., 774 S.W.2d 746, 750
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). Therefore, appellant had the burden of
proving that Move-It wrongfully exercised dominion and control over appellant’s
property. See Bandy v. First State Bank, Overton, Tex., 835 S.W.2d 609, 622 (Tex.
1992). A party may have a contractual or statutory lien on the property, making
dominion or control over such property authorized. See id. (concluding plaintiff

                                        14
failed to prove wrongful exercise of dominion and control and that “the Bank acted
properly in exercising its right of setoff against those assets”); Tex-On Motor Ctr.
v. Transouth Fin. Corp., No. 14-04-00366-CV, 2006 WL 664161, *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that valid lien
on property negated conversion claim).

      In response Move-It provided the contract between Move-It and the Heads
for the storage unit in question and contended that it “fulfilled its obligations to its
actual tenant by disallowing access to non-tenants,” mailed a notice of claim,
notice of the auction, and auctioned off the property under its “lien powers and
contractual rights.” Move-It argued that it exercised its rights under Chapter 59 of
the Texas Property Code, citing section 59.042 (enforcement of contractual
landlord’s lien). Move-It provided the contract showing that it had a “contractual
and statutory lien on all property in Tenant’s space to secure payment of all monies
due and unpaid by Tenant.” See Tex. Prop. Code § 59.0021 (“A lessor has a lien
on all property in a self-service storage facility for the payment of charges that are
due and unpaid by the tenant.”); § 59.006 (“A lien under this chapter attaches on
the date the tenant places the property at the self-storage facility. The lien takes
priority over all other liens on the same property.”). Thus, appellant did not
conclusively establish his right to summary judgment as a matter of law.

      Move-It moved for no-evidence summary judgment on the element of
unlawful exercise of control over property. Appellant argued that because he was
entitled to notice of any default in payment on the storage unit prior to any sale of
the property, Move-It’s exercise of control over the property was unlawful. As we
have found that there is a fact issue on appellant’s breach of contract claim in this
regard, we conclude that there is also a fact issue on his conversion claim.

                                          15
F.     Conclusion

       We overrule appellant’s first and second issues with regard to his DTPA
claim, overrule his first issue with regard to his breach of contract and conversion
claims, and sustain his second issue with regard to his breach of contract and
conversion claims.

                             APPELLANT’S ATTORNEY FEES

       In appellant’s seventh issue he argues that he is entitled to recover attorney’s
fees under Rule 91a as a “prevailing party.” Appellant argues that the award of
fees under Rule 91a is mandatory and not discretionary. In appellant’s eighth issue
he argues that he should have been awarded attorney’s fees for “preparing and
presenting” his traditional motion for summary judgment and for prosecuting this
appeal.

       As this case was filed after the effective date of the amendment to Rule
91a.7, appellant’s argument is without merit. The amended Rule 91a.7 changed
the mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a discretionary award. See Tex. R. Civ
P. 91a.7 (“[T]he court may award the prevailing party on the motion all costs and
reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred with respect to the challenged
cause of action in the trial court.” (emphasis added)).7

       With respect to appellant’s eighth issue, appellant does not cite to any law or
statute that would allow for an award of attorney’s fees for the preparation and
presentation of his motion for partial summary judgment or for the prosecution of
this appeal. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d
469, 483 (Tex. 2019) (“In Texas, . . . each party generally must pay its own way in

       7
         Under the former version of Rule 91a.7 a trial court was generally required to award to
the prevailing party “all costs and reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred.” See Tex. R.
Civ. P. 91a.7, 76 Tex. B.J. 222 (2013) (Tex. Sup. Ct. 2013, amended 2019).

                                               16
attorney’s fees. . . . When fee shifting is authorized, whether by statute or contract,
the party seeking a fee award must prove the reasonableness and necessity of the
requested attorney’s fees.”). Appellant fails to argue how or why the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to award him fees under either issue seven or eight.
After a review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying appellant’s request for fees under Rule 91a.7 or for preparing
and presenting his motion for summary judgment.

      We overrule appellant’s issues seven and eight.

                           MOVE-IT’S ATTORNEY’S FEES

      In issues three, four, and five appellant argues that the award of attorney’s
fees should be reversed. The judgment specifies an amount of fees awarded under
the TTLA and an amount awarded as sanctions. The judgment awards attorney’s
fees on appeal under both the TTLA and as sanctions. We discuss the award made
pursuant to the TTLA first and the sanctions amount second.

A.   Attorney’s Fees Under the TTLA

      Appellant first argues that because Move-It failed to plead for attorney’s
fees, an award of such fees was an abuse of discretion.

      “Texas has long followed the “American Rule” prohibiting fee awards
unless specifically provided by contract or statute.”          MBM Fin. Corp. v.
Woodlands Op. Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009). A party seeking
attorney’s fees must plead for them. See Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady
Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (prayer
for general relief like “such other and further relief at law or in equity” does not
support an award of attorney’s fees).

                                          17
      The TTLA provides that each “person who prevails in a suit under this
chapter shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.”
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §134.005(b).            Despite attorney’s fees being
mandatory under the TTLA, Move-It still must plead its request for such an award.
See Shaw v. Lemon, 427 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied)
(“[A] plea for an award of attorney’s fees for breach of contract will not support an
award of attorney’s fees under the [TTLA].”); Jones v. Frank Kent Motor Co., No.
02-14-00216-CV, 2015 WL 4965798, *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Garcia v. Gomez, 319 S.W.3d 638, 644 (Tex. 2010)).

      Move-It pleaded only a general denial with a prayer for general relief.
Move-It requested attorney’s fees in its response and motion for summary
judgment as well as in its later submitted application for fees. Appellant objected
to the award of attorney’s fees on the ground that the request was not supported by
Move-It’s pleadings. Move-It did not amend its pleadings to include the request
for fees.   There are no pleadings in support of an award of attorney’s fees under
the TTLA. See Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc., 287 S.W.3d at 885. As a result, it
was an abuse of discretion to award Move-It fees under the TTLA because no
pleading supported the award. See id.

      Further, because we have agreed with appellant that the trial court should not
have dismissed appellant’s TTLA claim, we must also reverse the award of
attorney’s fees under the TTLA. See Brown v. Ogbolu, 331 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (reversing award of attorney’s fees based on reversal
of damages awarded for breach of contract); Teal Trading & Dev., LP v. Champee
Springs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass’n, 432 S.W.3d 381, 398 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2014, pet. denied) (“Because we reverse the judgment rendered in favor of

                                         18
[the appellee], we also reverse the award of attorney’s fees to enable the trial court
to reconsider the fees after the cause is resolved on remand.”).

B.     Attorney’s Fees as Sanctions

       Appellant also contends the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees
because: (1) they were unsupported by any pleadings or proper summary judgment
evidence; (2) the award violates “the American Rule”; (3) the testimony was
controverted and “could not support” the attorney fee award; (4) the expert
testimony and exhibits should have been stricken; and (5) the appellate fees
awarded are “too speculative.”          Move-It contends the trial court has broad
discretion to award attorney’s fees as a sanction and did so in this case. Move-It
contends that the trial court was permitted to award sanctions under Chapter 10 of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or
under its inherent authority to do so.8 See In re D.Z., 583 S.W.3d 284, 292–93
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.).

       1. General Legal Principles

       “We review a trial court’s sanctions order for abuse of discretion.” Brewer
v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 717 (Tex. 2020) (inherent
authority); Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2014) (Nath
I) (Chapter 10 and Rule 13).          “Various rules and statutes imbue courts with
authority to sanction attorneys for professional lapses of one kind or another with
or without bad faith.” Brewer, 601 S.W.3d at 717–18; see also Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code §§10.001–.006 (trial court permitted to award sanctions for
“groundless allegations and other pleadings presented for an improper purpose”);
Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 576 S.W.3d 707, 709 (Tex. 2019) (Nath II). Courts

       8
          Appellant represented himself both in the trial court and on appeal. Appellant is an
attorney licensed in Texas.

                                             19
also have “inherent powers,” including the power to discipline an attorney’s
behavior. Brewer, 601 S.W.3d at 718.

      “Before a court may exercise its discretion to shift attorney’s fees as a
sanction, there must be some evidence of reasonableness because without such
proof a trial court cannot determine that the sanction is ‘no more severe than
necessary’ to fairly compensate the prevailing party.” Nath, 576 S.W.3d at 709.
As a result, when seeking attorney’s fees as sanctions, “the burden is on that party
to put forth some affirmative evidence of attorney’s fees incurred and how those
fees resulted from or were caused by the sanctionable conduct.” CHRISTUS
Health Gulf Coast v. Carswell, 505 S.W.3d 528, 540 (Tex. 2016). “[A]ll fee-
shifting situations require reasonableness.” Nath, 576 S.W.3d at 710; see also
Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 492 (Tex.
2019).

      2. Background

      In its application for attorney’s fees, Move-It requested its fees incurred in
responding to appellant’s baseless summary judgment motion. Move-It alleged
that appellant’s traditional motion was, in substance, a no-evidence motion on his
affirmative claims.        Move-It argued that it warned appellant to withdraw the
motion because it was impermissible under the Rules of Civil Procedure. While
appellant withdrew his no-evidence motion, Move-It argued that appellant re-filed
it changing “no-evidence” labels to “traditional” and copied the first seventeen
pages of the no-evidence motion to the “traditional” motion.9                             Move-It’s
application does not indicate under which rule or statute it seeks fees, but states
that the “legal contentions made in [appellant’s] motion were not warranted by
existing law.” On appeal, Move-It argues that the trial court may have properly
      9
          The first seven pages of the traditional motion are recitations of alleged facts.

                                                  20
awarded the fees under Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Rule
13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or the trial court’s inherent power. The order
awarded Move-It “$13,123.50 for the legal services rendered by Move It’s
attorneys while responding to Plaintiff’s Traditional Motion for Summary
Judgment through Move-It’s Combined Response and Cross-Motion.”

      3. Analysis

      First appellant contends that Move-It failed to plead for attorney’s fees and
therefore, the award as sanctions was an abuse of discretion.10 Appellant cites no
cases on point with relation to attorney’s fees awarded as sanctions and makes no
argument for the reasonable extension of such a requirement. However, because
the trial court has the inherent authority to impose sanctions and because both
Chapter 10 and Rule 13 allow a trial court to impose sanctions on “its own
initiative,” we find appellant’s argument unpersuasive. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 10.002(b) (“The court on its own initiative may enter an order . . . .”);
Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 (“If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative . . . .”). We also
disagree with appellant’s argument that in every instance the issue of attorney’s
fees “must be tried on the merits.” See Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504
(Tex. 1984) (per curiam) (holding party has no right to jury trial on amount of
attorney’s fees awarded as sanctions); see also Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits Int’l,
LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 148 (Tex. 2019) (upholding summary judgment because
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of attorney’s fees that
were reasonable and necessary).

      Appellant also argues that he controverted the attorney’s fees evidence.
However, because the amount of the sanction is left to the discretion of the trial
      10
           Appellant does not argue a lack of notice or due process.

                                                21
court, absent evidence of clear abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse the trial
court’s award. See Brantley. 677 S.W.2d at 504. Appellant has not argued how
the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount to award, but instead
merely repeats his argument that the issue must be tried to a jury.

       Appellant next argues the award violates the “American Rule” and was not
authorized by statute or law. However, the attorney’s fees awarded as sanctions are
authorized by statute, rule, and the trial court’s inherent authority. Appellant raises
no argument that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the attorney’s fees
as a sanction or that the evidence does not support the award.11

       Appellant next contends that because evidence of attorney’s fees “was not
supported by timely designated expert testimony” the award must be reversed.
Appellant contends that Move-It’s expert designation was “late” and “violated []
Rule 193.6” of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The crux of appellant’s argument is
that because Move-It failed to supplement its discovery, including the designation
of its expert witness on attorney’s fees, more than thirty days prior to the
submission of appellant’s motion for summary judgment, that the designation was
late and automatically excluded under Rule 193.6 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
He contends that for purposes of the application of Rule 193.6 that a summary
judgment is a “trial” and, therefore, any discovery supplemented or provided
within thirty days of a summary judgment submission must be automatically
excluded under Rule 193.6.             See Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n v.
Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Tex. 2009) (holding the evidentiary exclusion
under Rule 193.6 applies equally to trials and summary judgment proceedings); see

       11
          In this section appellant does not specifically state or analyze the attorney’s fees
awarded as sanctions in his brief. Instead, appellant argues such fees have no “statutory basis”
and could not be awarded to Move-It for either breach of contract or unjust enrichment; or under
Rule 91a, Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or the DTPA.

                                              22
also Nichols v. Bridges, 163 S.W.3d 776, 782 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no
pet.) (“Summary judgment proceedings have been held to be a trial within the
meaning of Rule 63.”).

       However, appellant misapplies the rule announced in Gillenwater. The
supreme court did not hold that a summary judgment is a “trial” for the purposes of
Rule 193.6, but that Rule 193.6 applies to summary judgment motions.                        See
Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d at 882.             Gillenwater did not hold that a summary
judgment proceeding limited the discovery period, and the commentary to the
Rules further bears that out. See id.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.3, cmt. 8 (“For purposes
of defining discovery periods, ‘trial’ does not include summary judgment.”).
Appellant cites to no cases applying the exclusionary rule of 193.6 to discovery
provided, amended, or supplemented while the discovery period was still open but
within thirty days of a summary judgment proceeding.                   Rule 193.6 does not
operate to automatically exclude Move-It’s expert designation and billing
summaries under these facts.12

       Finally, appellant contends that the appellate fees awarded were “too
speculative.” Appellant argues that the “expert testimony was speculative and
non-specific as to the details of the legal work on appeal which would have to be
performed.” Move-It partially concedes the issue, arguing the appellate award
should be reformed because the award was not made contingent upon appellant’s
loss on appeal.

       12
          Move-It contends that the discovery period was still open under the applicable Rules of
Civil Procedure regarding discovery level and time limitations. Reviewing the record and
applying the Rules of Procedure in effect at the time of these proceedings, the discovery period
had not expired when Move-It served its expert witness designation.

                                               23
      Move-It requested more than $100,000 in appellate fees in its proposed
order to the trial court. However, the trial court awarded fees as follows:

      Appellant argues generally that Move-It’s “expert testimony on appellate
fees does not comply with Rohrmoos standards” because it is non-specific as to the
details of the legal work on appeal that would have to be performed. The supreme
court recently clarified that the lodestar analysis does not apply to appellate fees
because they are contingent and have not yet been incurred. See Yowell v. Granite
Op. Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020). However, “a party seeking contingent
appellate fees . . . need[s] to provide opinion testimony about the services it
reasonably believes will be necessary to defend the appeal and a reasonable hourly
rate for those services.” Id. The expert testimony in this case is similar to what
was held sufficient in Yowell. See id. (overruling legal sufficiency challenge to
contingent appellate attorney fee award without detailing evidence).

      However, we agree that the award should be reformed to be contingent upon
the success of the appeal. See ASEP USA, Inc. v. Cole, 199 S.W.3d 369, 380 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see also Ventling v. Johnson, 466
S.W.3d 143, 156 (Tex. 2015) (“An award of conditional appellate attorney’s fees
to a party is essentially an award of fees that have not yet been incurred and that
the party is not entitled to recover unless and until the appeal is resolved in that
party’s favor.”).

                                         24
         Therefore, we modify the judgment as follows:

         ORDERS that in the event Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of the TTLA
         claim, denial of his summary judgment, or grant of Move-It’s
         summary judgment, Move-It is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees,
         conditioned upon Move-It prevailing on appeal, in accordance with
         the following schedule[.]
C.       Conclusion

         We overrule appellant’s issue four, overrule appellant’s issue five but
modify the judgment, and overrule in part and sustain in part appellant’s issue
three.

                                    CONCLUSION

         We modify the trial court’s judgment for appellate fees as specified above,
making such an award conditional upon Move-It prevailing on appeal. We reverse
and remand the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s Texas Theft Liability Act
claim, dismissal of appellant’s breach of contract and conversion claim, and the
award of attorney’s fees to Move-It for defending against the Texas Theft Liability
Act claim. We affirm the remainder of the judgment.

                                        /s/    Ken Wise
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Poissant, and Wilson.

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