Court Opinion

ID: 9390260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:07:59.56113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.124249
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Shields v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2023-Ohio-1368.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MICHAEL R. SHIELDS,                                    :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :
                                                               No. 111774
                v.                                     :

BUREAU OF WORKERS’                                     :
COMPENSATION, ET AL.,
                                                       :
                Defendants-Appellants.

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-20-931460

                                            Appearances:

                Grubb & Associates, LPA, Natalie F. Grubb, and Mark E.
                Owens, for appellee.

                Janet E. Burney, Anna Hlavacs, and Brian R. Gutkoski, for
                appellant.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority

(“RTA”) appeals the jury verdict rendered in favor of plaintiff-appellee Michael R.

Shields (“Shields”). For the following reasons, we affirm.
Factual History

               From 1989 through 2019, Shields was employed as a mechanic for

RTA where he worked on the paratransit buses:

      On an average day, we would bring a bus in from the main facility
      garage. We would set it up on a lift. We would inspect the bus, the
      outside. We would lift it up, remove all the tires and then we would
      jack it up six feet over our heads and do maintenance work over our
      head, either changing oils or looking at certain suspension parts or
      changing parts, changing transmissions, heavy leaf springs, rear ends,
      front ends, shock absorbers or front end coil springs.

Tr. 199.

               On May 21, 2015, Shields suffered a left shoulder injury during the

course and scope of his employment with RTA that was subsequently an allowed

claim under the workers’ compensation fund. The parties did not dispute the

allowance of Shields’s left shoulder injury. The issue presented in the instant case

was Shields’s claim of bicipital tendinitis to his right shoulder, a flow-through injury

that was allegedly caused by the allowed left shoulder claim. We will detail Shields’s

relevant medical care following the May 2015 left shoulder injury.

               Following the May 2015 injury, Shields continued working full-time

at RTA. Shields also received chiropractic care for his left shoulder from August 12,

2015, through October 21, 2015. Shields “gingerly” used his left arm at work. Tr.

223. Further, Shields testified that he gradually and continuously used his right arm

more at work and in daily activities to compensate for his left shoulder injury.

Shields testified that despite chiropractic care, his left arm and shoulder pain
became progressively worse, and he was referred to Dr. Kase, a surgeon with the

Crystal Clinic in August 2016.

               In August 2016 — approximately one year following Shields’s left

shoulder injury — Shields experienced an increase in left shoulder pain while

removing tires at work. On August 19, 2016, Dr. Kase diagnosed Shields with a

traumatic partial tear of the left bicep tendon, partial tear of the left subscapularis

tendon, and a lesion of the left shoulder, and he administered a cortisone injection

in the left shoulder. Dr. Kase’s physical examination encompassed both the left and

right shoulders, and Shields’s right shoulder tested positive on the Speed and

Yergason tests.1 Dr. Kase made no diagnosis regarding Shields’s right shoulder.

Shields denied that he experienced a work injury in August 2016.

               On January 9, 2017, Dr. Kase examined Shields due to complaints of

right shoulder pain that had persisted for a few months. Shields testified at trial that

his work duties at that time incorporated continuous overhead work and overhead

lifting that aggravated both his shoulders.        Shields further testified that he

experienced less pain if he did not perform overhead work throughout his entire

shift. During the January 2017 office visit, Shields received a cortisone injection in

his right shoulder, and an x-ray of the right shoulder was obtained. The right

shoulder x-ray found no fractures or dislocations and some degenerative changes.

      1  The Speed and Yergason tests are completed during a physical exam, and positive
results for either test suggest the presence of bicipital tendinitis.
                   On March 21, 2017, nearly two years after Shields sustained his left

shoulder work-related injury, Dr. Kase performed surgery on Shields’s left shoulder.

Shields testified that following surgery he continuously wore a left arm sling and

used his right arm for all activities. On April 3, 2017, during a follow-up visit with

Dr. Kase, Shields complained of right shoulder pain greater than his left shoulder

pain. Dr. Kase’s office note stated Shields believed the right shoulder pain was

caused by his need to overuse his right arm for the two years between his May 2015

left shoulder injury and his March 2017 left shoulder surgery. Dr. Kase’s office note

stated he would seek approval from the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for a

diagnosis of bicipital tendinitis in Shields’s right shoulder. Dr. Kase referred Shields

for post-operative physical therapy for his left shoulder.

                   RTA’s medical expert, Dr. Mease, examined Shields on May 9, 2017,

and concluded that Shields did not have bicipital tendinitis in his right shoulder as

a flow-through injury from his 2015 left shoulder injury. At the time of that review,

no MRI test of Shields’s right shoulder had been completed.2 In conjunction with

her examination, Dr. Mease reviewed records from Wadsworth Chiropractic, Dr.

Kase with Crystal Clinic, Crystal Clinic’s emergency room, and physical therapy

notes.

                   On May 15, 2017, Shields returned home from a physical therapy

appointment and began speaking with his wife who was working in the yard. Shields

         2   In July 2017, Dr. Mease reviewed Shields’s right shoulder MRI.
remembered he had left a physical therapy pole in his car and went to retrieve it.

When Shields reached for the pole in the back seat of his car, he experienced right

arm pain. Shields testified that he immediately returned to the physical therapist

who referred him to the emergency department. Emergency room notes dated May

16, 2017, include a diagnosis of bicipital tendinitis of the right shoulder. Dr. Kase’s

May 19, 2017 office note stated Shields complained of right shoulder pain that began

when he lifted a heavy object in August 2016, and became worse as Shields used his

right arm more to compensate for his left shoulder injury. Dr. Kase’s office note also

stated that Shields thought his right shoulder was reinjured when he reached for a

therapy pole a few days earlier. The Speed and Yergason tests were positive on

Shields’s right arm. Dr. Kase diagnosed Shields with bicipital tendinitis of the right

shoulder and provided a cortisone injection.

               A May 23, 2017 physical therapist’s note stated Shields “report[ed

that] he was working in the yard on 5/19/17 pulling with his right arm when he felt

a sharp, stabbing pain from his elbow to the middle of his chest.” At trial, Shields

denied that he provided those details to the physical therapist and stated the injury

occurred when he picked up the physical therapy pole.

               On July 6, 2017, Shields’s chiropractor referred him for a right

shoulder MRI. The findings were consistent with a high-grade partial tear of the

right shoulder.

               On July 17, 2017, Shields reported to Kase with right shoulder pain

greater than left shoulder pain and numbness in his hands. Dr. Kase’s office note
stated Shields did not feel fully recovered from the left shoulder surgery, but he

wanted to return to work. On that same date, Dr. Kase released Shields to return to

work full-time. While not reflected in Dr. Kase’s office note, Shields testified that he

felt RTA required him to return to work despite his ongoing right and left shoulder

pain.

               Shields returned to work on July 25, 2017. Shields testified that he

experienced no problems with his left shoulder, but had a constant, dull, ache in his

right shoulder while working. On August 3, 2017, while lifting a wheelchair at work,

Shields heard a pop in his right shoulder. Shields sought medical treatment from

Dr. Kase that same day. According to Dr. Kase’s office notes, Shields had been

feeling better until the incident that day. Dr. Kase felt the MRI findings were

consistent with right bicep tendinosis and a partial tear. Dr. Kase also felt the August

3, 2017 incident likely exacerbated the bicep tendinosis and partial tear although it

was possible Shields experienced a rotator cuff tear.

               On August 29, 2018, Shields’s medical expert, Dr. Kimberly Togliatti-

Trickett (“Dr. Togliatti-Trickett”), completed an independent medical examination

of Shields. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett performed a physical exam of Shields, obtained a

verbal medical history from him, and reviewed the following medical records:

Shields’s first report of injury dated May 22, 2015; Dr. Kase’s office notes dated May

23, 2017 and April 3, 2017; Dr. Mease’s independent medical report dated May 12,

2017; a May 23, 2017 physical therapy note; July 6, 2017 MRI results; the Industrial

Commission’s records of proceedings dated September 14, 2017 and November 9,
2017; and a Bureau of Workers’ Compensation letter requesting allowance of

Shields’s right shoulder bicipital tendinitis. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett related Shields’s

right bicipital tendinitis to his 2015 left shoulder injury.

               In August 2019, Shields underwent right shoulder surgery and was no

longer able to work at RTA.

Procedural History

               On February 9, 2018, Shields filed a complaint in Cuyahoga C.P. No.

CV-18-892797, seeking a right to participate in the Ohio workers’ compensation

fund for the additional condition of bicipital tendinitis of his right shoulder. On

March 28, 2019, Shields dismissed that case without prejudice, and refiled the

instant case on March 27, 2020.

               Discovery progressed and the case was set for trial. The discovery

deposition and videotaped trial testimony of Shields’s medical expert, Dr. Togliatti-

Trickett were secured on June 11, 2021, and January 24, 2022, respectively. On

February 18, 2022, RTA filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Togliatti-

Trickett’s videotaped expert medical testimony. On April 21, 2022, April 25, 2022,

April 26, 2022, and April 28, 2022, Shields filed motions in limine to exclude trial

testimony.

               Trial commenced on May 6, 2022. The trial court did not rule on the

outstanding motions in limine but held the motions in abeyance. On May 7, 2022,

after the close of Shields’s case in chief, RTA moved for a directed verdict. The trial

court held the directed verdict motion in abeyance until the close of RTA’s case.
Following RTA’s case-in-chief, the trial court stated the ruling on its directed verdict

was postponed pending the jury’s verdict.3

                  The parties agreed upon and submitted to the jury a joint set of jury

instructions, verdict forms, and jury interrogatories. On May 10, 2022, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of Shields. On June 7, 2022, RTA filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) or, alternatively, a motion for a new

trial. After the motions were fully briefed, the trial court denied them on June 27,

2022.

                  On July 25, 2022, RTA filed a timely notice of appeal, presenting

verbatim three assignments of error for our review:

        Assignment of error one: The trial court erred in permitting Dr.
        Trickett’s purported expert opinion, elicited through leading questions,
        to reach the jury, despite the “internal and elusive” nature of the alleged
        injury and Dr. Trickett’s admitted lack of an accurate and complete
        medical history and lack of knowledge regarding Appellee’s use of his
        upper extremities for his job duties.

        Assignment of error two: The trial court erred by not directing a verdict
        in GCRTA’s favor.

        Assignment of error three: The trial court erred by not granting
        GCRTA’s Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
        or, alternately, motion for a new trial.

On September 16, 2022, the trial court granted RTA’s motion to stay proceedings

pending the outcome of the appeal.

        3   The record does not indicate the trial court ruled on the outstanding directed
verdict.
Legal Analysis

Introduction of Expert Testimony

              In his first assignment of error, RTA contends that the trial court

erred when it allowed the introduction of Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s videotaped trial

testimony. Specifically, RTA argues that Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s testimony was

unreliable and inadmissible because (1) Dr. Togliatti-Trickett performed an

inadequate review of Shields’s medical records, (2) Dr. Togliatti-Trickett obtained

an insufficient oral history from Shields, (3) Dr. Togliatti-Trickett did not review a

description of Shields’s job duties but relied on hypothetical questions posed by

Shields’s counsel, and (4) Shields’s counsel utilized leading questions.

              A trial court has discretion to admit expert testimony. Evid.R. 104(A).

On appeal, a trial court’s decision to admit medical expert testimony is subject to an

abuse-of-discretion standard. Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

100759, 2014-Ohio-4208, ¶ 23, citing Valentine v. Conrad, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-

Ohio-3561, 850 N.E.2d 683, ¶ 9; Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 616,

687 N.E.2d 735 (1998). The term abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude

is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983); Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463.

              Pursuant to Evid.R. 702,

      [a] witness may testify as an expert if all of the following apply:
      (A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the
      knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a
      misconception common among lay persons;

      (B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill,
      experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the
      testimony;

      (C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or
      other specialized information. To the extent that the testimony reports
      the result of a procedure, test, or experiment, the testimony is reliable
      only if all of the following apply:

      (1) The theory upon which the procedure, test, or experiment is based
      is objectively verifiable or is validly derived from widely accepted
      knowledge, facts, or principles;

      (2) The design of the procedure, test, or experiment reliably
      implements the theory;

      (3) The particular procedure, test, or experiment was conducted in a
      way that will yield an accurate result.

Evid.R. 702.

               There is no argument that the opinions presented by Dr. Togliatti-

Trickett related to matters beyond the knowledge of laypersons and that the doctor’s

credentials and experience qualified her as an expert. Evid.R. 702(A) and (B). RTA

argues that Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s testimony was not reliable under Evid.R. 702(C).

               “In determining whether the opinion of an expert is reliable under

Evid.R. 702(C), a trial court examines whether the expert’s conclusion is based on

scientifically valid principles and methods.” Valentine, 110 Ohio St.3d 42, 2006-

Ohio-3561, 850 N.E.2d 683, at ¶ 16, citing Miller, 80 Ohio St.3d 607, 687 N.E.2d

735 (1998); Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100759, 2014-Ohio-4208, at ¶ 29.
               Here, RTA does not question the principles and methodology

underlying Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s testimony, but the reliability and correctness of

the facts she relied upon to reach her medical opinion. RTA’s arguments ignore the

premise of Evid.R. 702(C), which looks at novel scientific theories, and therefore the

arguments lack merit. See State v. Jordan, 7th Dist. Harrison No. 06 HA 586, 2007-

Ohio-3333, ¶ 20 (Defendant’s argument that an expert witness’s trial testimony was

erroneously admitted in contravention to Evid.R. 702(C) was baseless because

defendant’s challenges to the expert testimony related to the reliability and

correctness of the facts the expert relied upon rather than the expert’s

methodology.); see also Goddard v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 1st Dist. Hamilton

Nos. C-95-0278 and C-950295, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2388, 3 (June 12, 1996)

(“Evid.R. 702 appears to be limited to cases in which there are novel scientific

theories.”).

               RTA’s contention that some of Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s opinions based

upon hypothetical questions were inadmissible is also unpersuasive. Pursuant to

Evid.R. 705, experts may provide an opinion in response to a hypothetical question.

However, “[a]n expert cannot base his opinion upon facts assumed in a hypothetical

question unless evidence tending to establish them is admitted into evidence, either

through other witnesses or through the expert testifying upon his own personal

knowledge.” Evid.R. 703.

      The purpose of the rules governing the assumed facts which underlie
      the hypothetical question and the opinion-answer is to insure that the
      trier of the facts is aware of the facts upon which the opinion rests, so
      that in the event the trier of the facts rejects these facts as not having
      been established by the evidence, it will then be warranted in rejecting
      the opinion also.

Calvey v. Fairview Gen. Hosp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67417, 1995 Ohio App.

LEXIS 2612, 3 (June 22, 1995), quoting Mayhorn v. Pavey, 8 Ohio App.3d 189, 191,

456 N.E.2d 1222 (10th Dist.1982).

              RTA contends that Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s expert testimony was

inadmissible when the doctor answered two hypothetical questions for which the

assumed, underlying facts were not introduced as evidence during the trial.

Specifically, Shields’s counsel asked Dr. Togliatti-Trickett to assume Shields worked

overhead on buses for fifty to ninety percent of his work day. Shields’s description

of his average work day indicated the majority of an average work day was spent

working overhead and, thus, we find the record presented sufficient evidence

supporting the hypothetical questions at issue. However, even assuming no trial

evidence was introduced to demonstrate that Shields worked fifty to ninety percent

of his work day on overhead activities, any concerns about Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s

related opinion go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility, and

the trier of fact would determine the weight to be attributed to the opinion. Williams

v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 188 Ohio App.3d 715, 2010-Ohio-1719, 936 N.E.2d 972,

¶ 26 (12th Dist.); Mayhorn at paragraph one of the syllabus (“consideration of the

sufficiency of the factual content of the hypothetical question to be addressed as a

factor in determining the weight to be given the opinion-answer.”).
               RTA further argues that the use of leading questions during Dr.

Togliatti-Trickett’s trial testimony rendered the testimony inadmissible. Pursuant

to Evid.R. 611(C), “leading questions are not the appropriate mode of eliciting

testimony on direct examination,” but the admissibility of such testimony is within

the trial court’s broad discretion. Lambert v. Shearer, 84 Ohio App.3d 266, 275-

276, 616 N.E.2d 965 (10th Dist.1992). We do not find the trial court’s introduction

of Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s testimony obtained through leading questions was

prejudicial or amounted to an abuse of discretion.

               As part of her review of Shields’s case, Dr. Togliatti-Trickett reviewed

medical records, examined Shields, and obtained a medical history from Shields.

Dr. Togliatti-Trickett was not provided with copies of all of Shields’s medical records

related to his left and right shoulder injuries. The trial record also demonstrated

that Shields’s oral medical history to Dr. Togliatti-Trickett did not encompass all of

Shields’s complaints, diagnostic tests, and treatment he experienced related to his

right shoulder. However, RTA’s counsel cross-examined Dr. Togliatti-Trickett to

address the defense’s concerns about these potential deficits. It was then within the

jury’s province to discount the doctor’s opinion if they found the expert testimony

was lacking. See Roscoe-Herbert v. Fabian, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88558, 2007-

Ohio-3263, ¶ 26 (“[B]ecause [the medical experts] based their causation opinions

on an incomplete medical history, the jury could reasonably discount their

opinions.”) Compare Jolett v. ATLM, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99173, 2013-

Ohio-3143 (The trial court in a bench trial excluded medical expert testimony that
did not consider whether claimant’s current medical condition was caused by an

intervening cause where the expert medical testimony was submitted in the form of

a report and opposing counsel was unable to cross-examine the expert witness.).

Further, “a physician who examines a patient is competent to testify concerning the

probable cause of an injury, even if he has no knowledge of other injuries suffered

by the patient.” Johnson v. Talley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 73581 and 73622, 1999

Ohio App. LEXIS 289, 11 (Feb. 4, 1999), citing Baird v. Cincinnati Transit Co., 110

Ohio App. 94, 168 N.E.2d 413 (1st Dist.1959).

               All of RTA’s arguments about Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s expert

testimony go towards the credibility of her opinion rather than the admissibility of

the evidence, and “[q]uestions of credibility and the weight to be given to each expert

is a question for the jury to decide.” Warner v. DMAX Ltd., LLC, 2015-Ohio-4406,

46 N.E.3d 202, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.); Dejaiffe v. KeyBank USA Natl. Assn., 6th Dist. Lucas

No. L-05-1191, 2006-Ohio-2919, ¶ 19 (Insufficiency of an expert witness’s

underlying facts relates to the weight of evidence rather than admissibility.). For the

foregoing reasons, RTA’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Directed Verdict and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

               In its second assignment of error, RTA argues that the trial court

erred when it denied RTA’s motion for directed verdict. RTA argues in its third

assignment of error that the trial court erred when it denied RTA’s motion for
judgment notwithstanding the motion (“JNOV”).4 For ease of discussion, we will

address RTA’s arguments about a directed verdict and JNOV collectively.

                 A motion for directed verdict under Civ.R. 50(A) tests the sufficiency

of the evidence, not the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of witnesses.

Wagner v. Roche Laboratories, 77 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 671 N.E.2d 252 (1996).

Under Civ.R. 50(A)(4), a court may properly grant a motion for directed verdict

when, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom

the motion is directed, it finds that reasonable minds could come to but one

conclusion on a determinative issue, and the conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving

party.

                 In evaluating the denial of a Civ.R. 50(B) motion for JNOV, a

reviewing court applies the same test as that applied in reviewing a motion for a

directed verdict. Kanjuka v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 151 Ohio App.3d 183, 2002-

Ohio-6803, 783 N.E.2d 920, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Grau v. Kleinschmidt, 31 Ohio

St.3d 84, 90, 509 N.E.2d 399 (1987). In reviewing a judgment on a motion for

JNOV,

         [t]he evidence adduced at trial and the facts established by admissions
         in the pleadings and in the record must be construed most strongly in
         favor of the party against whom the motion is made, and, where there
         is substantial evidence to support his side of the case, upon which
         reasonable minds may reach different conclusions, the motion must be
         denied.

         4RTA’s third assignment of error also argues that the trial court erred when it
denied RTA’s motion for a new trial. RTA’s arguments pertaining to a motion for a new
trial raised in RTA’s third assignment of error will be discussed separately.
Posin v. ABC Motor Court Hotel, 45 Ohio St.2d 271, 275, 344 N.E.2d 334 (1976). As

with motions for directed verdict, the trial court does not consider either the weight

of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses when ruling on a motion for JNOV.

Id.

                Because both motions for directed verdict and JNOV test the legal

sufficiency of the evidence, we review them de novo, with no deference to the court’s

decision. Osler v. Lorain, 28 Ohio St.3d 345, 347, 504 N.E.2d 19 (1986); Goodyear

Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 512, 2002-Ohio-2842,

769 N.E.2d 835, ¶ 4.

                The Ohio workers’ compensation system provides an exclusive

statutory remedy for workplace injuries. Clendenin v. Girl Scouts of W. Ohio, 150

Ohio St.3d 300, 2017-Ohio-2830, 81 N.E.3d 438, ¶ 9; R.C. 4123.74. The statutory

requirements of Chapter 4123 must be liberally construed in favor of the employee.

R.C. 4123.95.

                To prevail on a workers’ compensation claim, the employee must

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her injury occurred “in the

course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.” R.C. 4123.01(C).

There must exist a direct and proximate cause between the work-related accident

and the claimed injury. Munday v. S. Ohio Coal Co., 4th Dist. Meigs No. 03CA12,

2004-Ohio-2872, ¶ 11. The issue of proximate causation must be established

through expert medical testimony. Leasure v. UVMC, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-
21, 2017-Ohio-7196, ¶ 15, quoting Randall v. Mihm, 84 Ohio App.3d 402, 406, 616

N.E.2d 1171 (2d Dist.1992).

              An employee’s workers’ compensation claim may consist of a flow-

through injury. A flow-through injury “is a condition developing in a body part not

originally alleged to have been injured, but having been injured as a result of

conditions previously allowed” in a workers’ compensation claim.          Wilson v.

Conrad, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-980582, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1661, 5 (Apr. 16,

1999), citing R.C. 4123.84(C). In other words, a flow-through injury subsequently

develops in a body part not originally alleged to have been injured and arises out of

a compensable physical injury. Lewis v. Trimble, 79 Ohio St.3d 231, 238, 680

N.E.2d 1207 (1997), citing Dent v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 38 Ohio St. 3d 187, 189,

527 N.E.2d 821 (1988); Munday at ¶ 11. To receive benefits for a flow-through

injury, a claimant must demonstrate through expert medical testimony that a

previously allowed injury was the proximate cause of the new, alleged flow-through

injury. Jones v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82924, 2004-Ohio-746,

¶ 9; Munday at ¶ 11; Leasure at ¶ 15, citing Kenyon v. Scott Fetzer Co., 113 Ohio

App.3d 264, 266, 680 N.E.2d 1034 (8th Dist.1996); Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

100759, 2014-Ohio-4208, at ¶ 21.

              RTA argues that the trial court should have granted RTA’s directed

verdict or JNOV because construing the evidence most strongly in favor of Shields

on the issue of proximate cause, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion

based on the submitted evidence and that conclusion was adverse to Shields.
Specifically, RTA contends that Dr. Togliatti-Trickett failed to present reliable

medical testimony that established Shields’s right shoulder injury was directly and

proximately caused by his previously allowed left shoulder injury. Shields contends

that he presented sufficient evidence to support his right to participate in the

workers’ compensation fund for the flow-through condition of right shoulder

bicipital tendinitis.

               Expert medical testimony was provided by a board-certified medical

doctor, Dr. Togliatti-Trickett, on Shields’s behalf. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett testified that

she completed a physical examination of Shields, obtained a medical history from

him, and reviewed several of Shields’s medical records as well as Dr. Mease’s report

that provided detailed information regarding Shields’s treatment and diagnosis by

his chiropractor, physical therapist, and surgeon.          Shields’s medical records

indicated that Shields had reported intermittent right shoulder pain since August

2016, with the pain becoming more continuous in nature starting in March 2017.

Shields attributed the right shoulder pain to his left shoulder workers’ compensation

injury that caused him pain and limited the use of his left arm from May 2015

through March 2017. Shields specifically testified that to compensate for his left arm

and shoulder work-place injury, he had to increase the use of his right arm and

shoulder. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett testified that she found no records or reports that

demonstrated a preexisting, non-work-related medical condition caused Shields’s

right shoulder injury. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett testified that Shields’s July 6, 2017 MRI

did not diagnosis Shields with right bicipital tendinitis, but the findings supported
such a diagnosis. Based upon her review of the MRI; Dr. Mease’s clinical notes and

report; and the physical examination of Shields including his medical history, Dr.

Togliatti-Trickett found that Shields’s constant use of his right arm and/or increased

overuse of this right shoulder resulted in right shoulder bicipital tendinitis that was

a flow-through injury caused by his original May 21, 2015 workplace injury.

               On cross-examination of Dr. Togliatti-Trickett, RTA’s counsel

established that Dr. Togliatti-Trickett was not Shields’s treating physician and she

was hired to provide Shields with a written medical opinion. Dr. Togliatti-Trickett

testified on cross-examination that she was not provided with all of Shields’s

medical records and those additional records would have provided more

information. While such testimony served as an attempt to discredit Dr. Togliatti-

Trickett, it did not demonstrate the introduction of insufficient medical testimony

that would support the trial court’s granting of a directed verdict or JNOV.

               In contrast to Dr. Togliatti-Trickett’s expert medical testimony, RTA

introduced the expert testimony of Dr. Mease. Dr. Mease opined that the MRI did

not demonstrate bicipital tendinitis and Shields did not have bicipital tendinitis in

his right shoulder. The jury was to evaluate the competing opinions of Drs. Togliatti-

Trickett and Mease and determine which expert witness was the most credible.

Warner, 2015-Ohio-4406, 46 N.E.3d 202, at ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) (“[T]he difference in the

two experts’ underlying factual assumptions may affect credibility, but do not affect

admissibility. Questions of credibility and the weight to be given to each expert is a

question for the jury to decide.”)
                The trial court’s denials of RTA’s motion for directed verdict and

motion for JNOV were supported by the evidence. Thus, we overrule RTA’s second

assignment of error and that portion of its third assignment of error that addresses

a motion for JNOV.

Motion for New Trial

                Additionally in its third assignment of error, RTA argues that the trial

court erred when it failed to grant RTA a new trial. RTA does not present new

arguments in support of its motion for new trial, but reiterates the arguments

previously presented in the first and second assignments of error.

                A motion for new trial is governed by Civ.R. 59 that reads, in pertinent

part:

        (A) Grounds for new trial. A new trial may be granted to all or any of
        the parties and on all or part of the issues upon any of the following
        grounds:

        ***

        (6) The judgment is not sustained by the weight of the evidence;
        however, only one new trial may be granted on the weight of the
        evidence in the same case;

        (7) The judgment is contrary to law;

        ***

        (9) Error of law occurring at the trial and brought to the attention of
        the trial court by the party making the application.

        In addition to the above grounds, a new trial may also be granted in the
        sound discretion of the court for good cause shown.
                The standard of review we apply to a trial court’s ruling on a Civ.R. 59

motion for new trial depends upon the grounds for the motion. Robinson v. Turoczy

Bonding Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103787, 2016-Ohio-7397, ¶ 23.

      A motion for new trial brought under Civ.R. 59(A)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
      (6), or (8) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gateway Consultants
      Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs., Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
      104014, 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 12, 13; Johnson v. Johnson, 5th Dist. Stark
      No. 2015CA00076, 2015-Ohio-4748, ¶ 16-17; GMS Mgt. Co. v. Coulter,
      11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-071, 2006-Ohio-1263, ¶ 20-21. A motion
      for new trial brought under Civ.R. 59(A)(7) or (9), is reviewed de novo.
      Gateway Consultants Group at ¶ 12, 22.

Moore v. Moore, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-17-011, 2018-Ohio-1545, ¶ 14.

                Upon a review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion when it denied RTA’s motion for new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(6),

and the court did not err when it denied RTA’s motion for new trial under Civ.R.

59(A)(7) and (9). RTA’s third assignment of error regarding a motion for new trial

is overruled.

                Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR