Court Opinion

ID: 9609656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:29:34.354899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:20.598588
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This case actually presents a novel issue, i.e., whether an employer himself may commit an intentional battery upon an employee and avoid tort liability by asserting the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
It has been stated often that “when an employee’s injuries are compensable under the Act, he is absolutely barred from pursuing a common law tort action to recover for such injuries, even if they resulted from intentional misconduct on the part of the employer.” Southwire Co. v. Benefield, 184 Ga. App. 418, 419 (361 SE2d 525) (1987). However, those cases all involved the intentional misconduct of either a co-worker, agent of the employer, or a third party. Such was the case in Western Waterproofing Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ga. App. 779 (420 SE2d 606) (1992), relied upon by the majority opinion.
In Fowler v. Southern Wire & Iron, 104 Ga. App. 401, 408-409 (122 SE2d 157) (1961), this Court expressed doubt that the Act was intended to benefit employers with respect to their intentional acts, and concluded that “[a] malicious unlawful act or intentional injury by the employer is not ‘reasonably contemplated’ as a risk of the employment or the business.” Further, we quoted with approval the position expounded in other jurisdictions: “ ‘It would be abhorrent to our sense of justice to hold that an employer may assault his employee and then compel the injured workman to accept the meager *549allowance provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Law. Under such circumstances the one assaulted may avail himself of a common law action against his assailant where full monetary satisfaction may be obtained.’ ” Id. at 408.
The Supreme Court reversed this Court’s decision in Fowler, but did so because it found the case to involve the failure to provide a safe work place, rather than an intentional assault by the employer on the employee. The Court expressed no disapproval of the proposition that employers should be subject to tort liability for their own intentional acts. Southern Wire & Iron v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 730 (124 SE2d 738) (1962).
The Workers’ Compensation Act pertains to “injury by accident.” OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). The purpose of the Act is to provide relief to employees injured by accident, and to protect employers from excessive awards. Atha v. Jackson Atlanta, 159 Ga. App. 433 (283 SE2d 654) (1981). Construing the Act liberally in order to effectuate those objectives, intentional assaults by co-workers or third parties, unless directed against the employee for purely personal reasons, have been considered “accidents” within the purview of the Act. See Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga. App. 607 (271 SE2d 739) (1980).
However, as we noted in Fowler at 408, employers collectively would not be benefited by including injuries caused by their intentional assaults under the Act, and employees likewise would not benefit from including such injuries under the Act and precluding a common law tort action. Further, it is simply bad policy to hold employers unaccountable for their own intentional, unlawful acts perpetrated against their employees. There is no reason to treat such intentional acts by employers as “accidents,” and thereby deprive victimized employees of the opportunity to obtain a full recovery for their injuries.
Other jurisdictions have similarly disallowed employers shielding themselves from responsibility for their intentional torts. For example, in Arizona an injured employee may elect to bring either a compensation claim or a common law tort action for an employer’s wilful misconduct or intentional act. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1022 (A) & (B) (1983). In Michigan, the exclusive remedy provision is inapplicable where an employee is injured as a result of an employer’s deliberate act. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 17.237 (131) (1988). West Virginia allows an employee to bring a tort action to recover the excess of damages over the benefits awarded due to the wilful or intentional act of the employer. W. Va. Code § 23-4-2 (b) (1985).
I concur with the disposition of the employee’s fraud claim in Division 2 of the majority opinion. However, for the reasons stated above, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that the employee’s battery claim was *550barred by OCGA § 34-9-11. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from Division 1.
Decided March 8, 1994
Reconsideration denied March 24, 1994
Edwards & Youmas, Lonzy F. Edwards, for appellant.
Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James B. Hiers, Jr., W. Allen Evans, George N. Skene, for appellee.