Court Opinion

ID: 9407042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 18:01:52.885738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.054591
License: Public Domain

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                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10445
                           ____________________

        ESMELDA RUIZ,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                               Respondent.

                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A096-091-552
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10445

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
                The Court sua sponte VACATES its prior opinion, published
        at 67 F.4th 1321 (11th Cir. 2023), and substitutes the following in its
        place.
                                        * * *
                Esmelda Ruiz, a native and citizen of Peru, appeals the
        Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that she is ineligible
        for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2), a provision whose language
        was originally adopted as part of the Violence Against Women Act
        of 1994 and that outlines the conditions under which certain “bat-
        tered spouse[s] or child[ren]” qualify for discretionary cancellation
        of removal. As relevant here, it requires a petitioning alien to show
        that she “has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by her
        spouse or parent. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i).
               Ruiz contends that the Immigration Judge and the BIA made
        two errors in refusing her cancellation request. First, she maintains
        that, as a matter of law, they misinterpreted the statutory term “ex-
        treme cruelty” to require proof of physical—as distinguished from
        mental or emotional—abuse. And second, she asserts that, having
        misread the law, the IJ and the BIA wrongly concluded that she
        doesn’t qualify for discretionary relief.
              We agree with Ruiz that the IJ and the BIA misinterpreted
        § 1229b(b)(2) and thereby applied an erroneous legal standard in
        evaluating her request for cancellation of removal. Accordingly,
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        22-10445               Opinion of the Court                         3

        we grant her petition for review and remand to the BIA for further
        consideration.
                                          I
                                          A
                Esmelda Ruiz entered the United States with her son on a
        six-month nonimmigrant visa in 2001. Shortly thereafter, she mar-
        ried Gavin Blanco. Only a year into her marriage, Ruiz was diag-
        nosed with breast cancer. She received chemotherapy and, as a re-
        sult, lost her hair and broke out in hives. Ruiz testiﬁed that follow-
        ing her diagnosis Blanco’s attitude toward her changed, and he be-
        came “rude” and “obnoxious.” He told her that “if they remove[d]
        [her] breast, that was the end of it.” After she underwent a mastec-
        tomy, he “got [her] out of [the] bed” in “a cruel way,” grabbed her
        arm, forced her in front of a mirror, and said, “You are not a
        woman for me anymore.” Ruiz’s son, Cristian, corroborated that
        incident and testiﬁed that, in general, Blanco “scream[ed] at” her.
        Cristian also reported that he once heard “something break” while
        Ruiz and Blanco were arguing.
              Following Ruiz’s mastectomy, Blanco ﬁled for divorce,
        sought a restraining order against her, and, she says, took $2,500
        from their joint bank account. Save for the one instance in which
        he grabbed her arm, Ruiz has not alleged that Blanco physically
        abused her. She has alleged, however, that as a result of Blanco’s
        treatment of her, she suﬀered from post-traumatic stress disorder
        and required psychotherapy. Happily, Ruiz is now cancer-free.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10445

                                             B
               In 2009, the government initiated removal proceedings
        against Ruiz on the ground that she had long overstayed the six
        months that her nonimmigrant visa allowed her to stay in the
        United States. 1 She ﬁled for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.
        § 1229b(b)(2), which is titled “Special rule for battered spouse or
        child.” The cancellation proceedings have been ongoing ever since.
                Congress enacted what is now § 1229b(b)(2) as part of the
        Violence Against Women Act to enable certain victims of domestic
        abuse to obtain discretionary deportation relief. See Bedoya-Melen-
        dez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 680 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2012), overruled
        on other grounds by Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1278 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (en banc). To qualify for cancellation of removal under
        § 1229b(b)(2), an alien must establish ﬁve prerequisites: (1) that she
        has been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty” by a spouse or
        parent; (2) that she has been continuously present in the United
        States for at least three years immediately preceding her applica-
        tion; (3) that she has been a person of good moral character during
        that period; (4) that she doesn’t have any disqualifying criminal con-
        victions or other speciﬁed grounds of inadmissibility or deportabil-
        ity; and (5) that removal would result in extreme hardship to her,

        1 Ruiz had earlier applied to adjust her immigration status based on her mar-
        riage to Blanco, but her application was denied on the ground that she had
        married “for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws of
        the United States.”
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        22-10445              Opinion of the Court                        5

        her child, or her parent. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)–(v). The lone
        dispute here is whether Ruiz was “battered or subjected to extreme
        cruelty” within the meaning of the statute.
               The IJ concluded that although Ruiz met the statute’s other
        requirements, she hadn’t been “battered or subjected to extreme
        cruelty.” He explained his determination as follows:
              Even taking into account Cristian’s testimony that Re-
              spondent and Mr. Blanco would often ﬁght after she
              was diagnosed with cancer, and that he once heard
              something break when they were ﬁghting, there is
              still no indication of physical violence or physical
              harm to Respondent. Additionally, Respondent has
              failed to submit any documentary evidence that sup-
              ports her contention of abuse, aside from her own
              written statement and a letter from a mental health
              counselor stating that she is attending psychotherapy
              sessions as of July 2015 as “ordered” by the court and
              that she suﬀers from posttraumatic stress disorder.
              Both of these documents fail to indicate additional
              facts of physical abuse or violent harm that would
              support Respondent’s claims.

               Ruiz appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. Specifically, she
        argued that the IJ improperly interpreted § 1229b(b)(2)’s phrase
        “extreme cruelty” to require proof of physical violence and to ex-
        clude mental or emotional abuse. In a non-precedential single-
        judge order, the BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed]” the IJ’s decision
        and expressly “disagree[d] that the [IJ] used the wrong standard in
        this case.” The BIA went on to explain itself as follows:
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                22-10445

                  [W]e concur with the Immigration Judge that the re-
                  spondent did not establish extreme cruelty at the
                  hands of her former husband. The primary issue here
                  is that the respondent’s former husband abandoned
                  the respondent once she became ill. He was no
                  longer willing to act in support of the respondent and
                  made hurtful comments to her about this fact. His
                  rejection of her when she was ill and especially after
                  her mastectomy is exceedingly unfortunate. How-
                  ever, this kind of abandonment is not the type of
                  treatment that we generally consider to be “extreme
                  cruelty” for purposes of the VAWA. See Matter of A-
                  M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 72 (BIA 2009) (explaining that
                  “[a]ccording to the legislative history, the purpose of
                  the VAWA provisions amending the Act was to permit
                  battered spouses to leave their abusers without fear of
                  deportation or other immigration consequences.”).

                  The Immigration Judge properly considered the “in-
                  sults and lack of support [the respondent] endured
                  during such a diﬃcult time.” Like the Immigration
                  Judge, we are not unsympathetic with the respond-
                  ent’s situation. Nevertheless, we concur that the re-
                  spondent did not establish eligibility for cancellation
                  of removal under the VAWA.

                  Ruiz timely petitioned this Court for review of the BIA’s de-
        cision.
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        22-10445                Opinion of the Court                           7

                                           II
                 First things first: The government contends that we lack ju-
        risdiction over Ruiz’s petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2). That
        statute contains two relevant subsections. The first is a jurisdic-
        tion-stripping provision. In pertinent part, it states that “[n]otwith-
        standing any other provision of law . . . no court shall have jurisdic-
        tion to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief un-
        der section . . . 1229b . . . of this title.” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The
        second, as relevant here, preserves jurisdiction over “questions of
        law”: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) . . . which limits or eliminates
        judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of consti-
        tutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review
        . . . .” Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
               As an initial matter, we clearly have jurisdiction to consider
        Ruiz’s threshold contention that the IJ and the BIA misinterpreted
        § 1229b(b)(2) to require proof of physical abuse as a precondition
        to showing “extreme cruelty.” That argument—about “the mean-
        ing of a statutory . . . provision”—presents a quintessential “ques-
        tion of law.” McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1258
        (11th Cir. 2004). In Patel v. U.S. Attorney General, 971 F.3d 1258, 1278
        (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), we expressly overruled our earlier deci-
        sion in Bedoya-Melendez v. U.S. Attorney General, 680 F.3d 1321 (11th
        Cir. 2012), on which the government relies here, and in so doing
        distinguished between questions of fact, over which we lack juris-
        diction, and questions of law, over which we retain it. See Patel,
        971 F.3d at 1278. The Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10445

        and affirmed our decision, emphasizing the same distinction. See
        Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1623 (2022).
                We conclude that we also have jurisdiction to consider the
        question whether Ruiz’s particular case meets the statutory stand-
        ard. In Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, the Supreme Court held that the
        phrase “questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) should be read to “in-
        clude[] the application of a legal standard to undisputed or estab-
        lished facts.” 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067 (2020); see also Patel, 971 F.3d at
        1275–76 (citing Guerrero-Lasprilla for the proposition that while
        § 1252 strips our jurisdiction to review purely factual determina-
        tions, an “[a]pplicant[] who ha[s] been denied a form of discretion-
        ary relief enumerated in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)”—including § 1229b—
        “can still obtain review of constitutional and legal challenges to the
        denial of that relief, including review of mixed questions of law
        and fact”), aﬀ’d, Garland, 142 S. Ct. at 1623 (likewise citing Guerrero-
        Lasprilla).
                                          III
               We proceed, then, to consider Ruiz’s contention that the
        BIA misinterpreted the phrase “extreme cruelty” in § 1229b(b)(2)
        to require proof of physical abuse.
                                           A
               As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the BIA so
        construed the statute: Ruiz, of course, contends that it did; the gov-
        ernment insists that it didn’t. Needless to say, if the government is
        right, and in fact the BIA didn’t interpret the term “extreme cru-
        elty” to require proof of physical abuse, then we needn’t consider
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        22-10445                Opinion of the Court                          9

        whether such an interpretation would be improper. For reasons
        we will explain, though, we agree with Ruiz that the BIA’s decision
        is best understood to impose the sort of physical-abuse prerequisite
        about which she complains.
                Because the BIA expressly “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed] the Im-
        migration Judge’s decision,” we begin with the IJ’s opinion. See,
        e.g., Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2013)
        (holding that when the BIA’s decision adopts the IJ’s, we review
        both). It seems perfectly clear to us that the IJ imposed a physical-
        abuse requirement. Here’s the key paragraph of the IJ’s opinion
        once again, this time with our emphasis:
               Even taking into account Cristian’s testimony that Re-
               spondent and Mr. Blanco would often ﬁght after she
               was diagnosed with cancer, and that he once heard
               something break when they were ﬁghting, there is still
               no indication of physical violence or physical harm to Re-
               spondent. Additionally, Respondent has failed to sub-
               mit any documentary evidence that supports her con-
               tention of abuse, aside from her own written state-
               ment and a letter from a mental health counselor stat-
               ing that she is attending psychotherapy sessions as of
               July 2015 as “ordered” by the court and that she suf-
               fers from posttraumatic stress disorder. Both of these
               documents fail to indicate additional facts of physical
               abuse or violent harm that would support Respondent’s
               claims.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-10445

        By its terms, the IJ’s opinion requires a petitioner to come forward
        with proof of “physical violence,” “physical harm,” or “physical
        abuse” in order to meet § 1229b(b)(2)’s “extreme cruelty” standard.
                 The BIA’s summary, 1½-page opinion leaves a lot to be de-
        sired and, to boot, sends mixed messages regarding the meaning of
        “extreme cruelty.” On the one hand, the BIA said that “[t]he pri-
        mary issue . . . is that [Blanco] abandoned [Ruiz] once she became
        ill,” refused to “support” her, “made hurtful comments to her,” and
        “reject[ed] her when she was ill”—and that “this kind of abandon-
        ment is not the type of treatment that we generally consider to be
        ‘extreme cruelty’ for purposes of the VAWA.” Those comments
        might be understood to suggest that while non-physical, emotional
        abuse can generally suffice to establish “extreme cruelty” within
        the meaning of § 1229b(b)(2), the particular mistreatment that Ruiz
        suffered doesn’t qualify. On the other hand, though, the BIA cited
        one of its earlier decisions referring to the “purpose of the
        VAWA”—of which, again, § 1229b(b)(2)’s operative language was
        part—as protecting “battered spouses.” That invocation would
        seem to indicate a focus on physical abuse.
               In any event, the BIA ultimately, and explicitly, “adopt[ed]
        and affirm[ed]” the IJ’s decision—which, as we have explained,
        clearly interpreted the term “extreme cruelty” to require a showing
        of physical violence, harm, or abuse—and expressly “disagree[d]
        that the Immigration Judge used the wrong standard.” Accord-
        ingly, we conclude that the BIA’s opinion is best understood, like
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        22-10445                Opinion of the Court                          11

        the IJ’s opinion that it affirms, to require a showing of physical
        abuse as a prerequisite to a finding of “extreme cruelty.”
                                           B
                We come, then, to the pivotal legal question that underlies
        Ruiz’s petition: Is the term “extreme cruelty” in § 1229b(b)(2)
        properly interpreted to require proof of physical violence and to
        exclude mental or emotional abuse? And because we are reviewing
        the BIA’s interpretation, we must first consider a threshold ques-
        tion: Is the BIA’s reading of the statute entitled to deference, and,
        if so, what kind?
                                           1
               In its brief to us, the government urged us to defer to the
        BIA’s interpretation under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
        Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As we pointed out to the parties
        in a pre-argument notice, however, the BIA’s decision in this case
        is memorialized in a non-precedential single-member order. And
        we have been clear that such an order merits Chevron deference only
        when it “relie[s] on” existing federal-court or BIA precedent—and,
        in turn, that such an order will be deemed to “rel[y] on” existing
        precedent only when it is “actually dictated” or “compelled” by that
        precedent. See Barton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1302 n.5
        (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Quinchia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 552 F.3d 1255
        (11th Cir. 2008)), aff’d sub nom. Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020).
               As already noted, the BIA’s order here does cite one of its
        earlier decisions, as follows: “See Matter of A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 72
        (BIA 2009) (explaining that ‘[a]ccording to the legislative history,
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                      22-10445

        the purpose of the VAWA provisions amending the Act was to per-
        mit battered spouses to leave their abusers without fear of depor-
        tation or other immigration consequences.’).” The question for
        Chevron purposes, therefore, is whether the BIA’s interpretation of
        § 1229b(b)(2) in this case was “actually dictated” or “compelled” by
        Matter of A-M-. See Barton, 904 F.3d at 1302 n.5. It was not. Matter
        of A-M- held (1) that lawful permanent residents are eligible for
        § 1229b(b)(2) relief but (2) that a woman who had already escaped
        an abusive relationship didn’t qualify because VAWA’s “purpose”
        was to “enable aliens to leave their abusive citizen or lawful per-
        manent resident spouses who may use the threat of deportation or
        sponsorship for an immigration benefit to maintain control over
        them.” Matter of A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 76–78. As the government
        has acknowledged, the issues there had little (if anything) to do
        with those here, and they certainly didn’t dictate or compel the
        BIA’s decision in this case. 2

        2 To its credit, when confronted at oral argument with Barton and Quinchia,
        the government abandoned its contention that the BIA’s single-judge order in
        this case warrants Chevron deference:
               Court: Do you think this single-member, unpublished BIA
               opinion is entitled to Chevron deference?
               Government: No, your Honor. As you discussed previously,
               in order for a single-board-member decision to get Chevron def-
               erence, that decision either needs to rely on a precedential
               Board decision or a precedential Board decision [needs to be]
               subsequently issued.
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        22-10445                    Opinion of the Court                              13

               So, no Chevron deference. In Chevron’s absence, we review
        the BIA’s decision through the lens of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
        U.S. 134 (1944), and “defer” to it only to the extent that it has the
        “power to persuade.” Quinchia, 552 F.3d at 1259 (quoting Skidmore,
        323 U.S. at 140); accord Serrano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 1260, 1266
        (11th Cir. 2011). 3

                Court: So you acknowledge that the citation to Matter of A-M-
                in the BIA’s decision is not reliance, as we described in Barton
                and Quinchia—not good enough, and so we are out of Chevron
                and into Skidmore.
                Government: Correct, your Honor. Because while Matter of
                A-M- supports the Board’s decision, it does not control or dic-
                tate the outcome, which would be necessary for this case to
                merit Chevron deference.
        Oral Arg. at 13:30–14:25.
        3 There is one loose Chevron-related end. The portion of the Immigration and
        Nationality Act that includes § 1229b is subject to a general provision, 8 U.S.C.
        § 1103(a)(1), which states, in part, that “determination[s] and ruling[s] by the
        Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.”
        Although, on one reading, § 1103(a)(1) might appear on its face to embody a
        freestanding rule of deference (or even obeisance) to BIA interpretations of
        immigration-related statutes, in practice the provision has been cited only as a
        basis for applying ordinary Chevron principles. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555
        U.S. 511, 517 (2009); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999); Amez-
        cua-Preciado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 943 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2019). As we
        have already explained—and as the government concedes—Chevron deference
        doesn’t apply in this case, and no one has suggested that § 1103(a)(1) does an-
        ything to change that. See Oral Arg. at 25:00–25:30 (government’s lawyer con-
        ceding that § 1103(a)(1) doesn’t require deference independently of, or in ad-
        dition to, Chevron).
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-10445

                                         2
               At last, therefore, the merits of the interpretive question.
        For the reasons that follow, we find ourselves un-“persuade[d],” see
        Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, by the BIA’s reading of § 1229b(b)(2) to
        require proof of physical abuse as a prerequisite to “extreme cru-
        elty.”
                VAWA-era dictionary definitions4 demonstrate that the
        term “cruelty” both (1) has an ordinary meaning that generally en-
        tails both physical and mental abuse and (2) more specifically, is a
        term of art in the family-law context that plainly encompasses both.
        Here, for instance, is how the Sixth Edition of Black’s defines “cru-
        elty”:
              The intentional and malicious inﬂiction of physical or
              mental suﬀering upon living creatures, particularly hu-
              man beings; or, as applied to the latter, the wanton,
              malicious, and unnecessary inﬂiction of pain upon
              the body, or the feelings and emotions; abusive treat-
              ment; inhumanity; outrage. Chieﬂy used in the law
              of divorce, in such phrases as “cruel and abusive treat-
              ment,” “cruel and barbarous treatment,” or “cruel
              and inhuman treatment.” In domestic relations, term
              includes mental injury as well as physical.

        Cruelty, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added) (in-
        ternal citations omitted). Webster’s Third says much the same

        4Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act—and again, the lan-
        guage later recodified in § 1229b(b)(2)—in 1994.
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        22-10445                Opinion of the Court                           15

        thing. As particularly relevant here, it defines the term “cruelty” to
        mean the “[c]onduct of either party in a divorce action that endan-
        gers the life or health of the other; also: acts that cause mental suffer-
        ing or fear.” Cruelty, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
        186 (1981) (emphasis added).
              Even more to the point, Black’s defines the full statutory
        phrase “extreme cruelty” as a term of art that denotes a ground for
        divorce and that specifically includes mental injury:
               Extreme cruelty: As grounds for divorce, may consist
               of personal injury or physical violence or it may be acts
               or omissions of such character as to destroy peace of mind
               or impair bodily or mental health of person upon whom in-
               ﬂicted or be such as to destroy the objects of matri-
               mony.

        Extreme Cruelty, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (emphasis added).
               The ordinary meaning of the term “cruelty” and the term-
        of-art understanding of the phrase “extreme cruelty” not only cor-
        roborate one another, but are also themselves corroborated by ev-
        idence from the larger corpus juris. Ruiz, for instance, points to 8
        C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi). Although that regulation was promulgated
        under diﬀerent statutes, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 and 1255, it deﬁnes an al-
        most identical phrase, “[b]attery or extreme cruelty.” Cf. Bedoya-
        Melendez, 680 F.3d at 1326–28. It says, with our emphasis added—
               For the purpose of this chapter, the phrase “was bat-
               tered by or was the subject of extreme cruelty” in-
               cludes, but is not limited to, being the victim of any
               act or threatened act of violence, including any
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10445

               forceful detention, which results or threatens to result
               in physical or mental injury. Psychological or sexual
               abuse or exploitation, including rape, molestation, in-
               cest (if the victim is a minor), or forced prostitution
               shall be considered acts of violence.

        8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi). The regulation thus expressly deﬁnes the
        phrase “was battered or was the subject of extreme cruelty” to in-
        clude “act[s] of violence” and, in turn, expressly deﬁnes the phrase
        “act[s] of violence” to include “[p]sychological . . . abuse.” Again,
        § 204.2(c)(1)(vi) applies by its terms only to the particular chapter
        of the C.F.R. under which it was promulgated, but it conﬁrms the
        plain-language understanding of the term “extreme cruelty” as en-
        compassing mental and emotional abuse.
                As does 42 U.S.C. § 608, even if from somewhat further
        aﬁeld. That statute prescribes certain conditions regarding federal
        grants to states providing welfare assistance to needy families. One
        of its provisions generally prohibits a state from using federal funds
        to assist a family for more than ﬁve years. Id. § 608(a)(7)(A). It
        carves out an exception, though, for families that include an indi-
        vidual who has been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.” Id.
        § 608(a)(7)(C)(i). The statute, in turn, expressly “deﬁne[s]” that
        phrase to include not only “physical acts” that threaten or result in
        “physical injury” but also, as relevant here, “mental abuse.” Id.
        § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii)(I)–(VI).
              The evidence, we think—both textual and contextual—over-
        whelmingly demonstrates that the term “extreme cruelty” is best
        understood to include mental and emotional, as well as physical,
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        22-10445                Opinion of the Court                          17

        abuse. We therefore conclude that the BIA’s contrary interpreta-
        tion is unpersuasive, undeserving of Skidmore deference, and erro-
        neous.
                                           IV
                For the foregoing reasons, we agree with Ruiz—and hold—
        that the BIA misinterpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). The term “ex-
        treme cruelty” does not require a petitioning alien to prove that she
        suﬀered physical abuse in order to qualify for discretionary cancel-
        lation of removal; proof of mental or emotional abuse is suﬃcient
        to satisfy the “extreme cruelty” prong of § 1229b(b)(2)’s ﬁve-prong
        standard. Although we have jurisdiction to decide the ensuing
        question whether Ruiz satisﬁes the statutory standard as we have
        explained it, see supra at 8, we exercise our discretion to remand to
        the BIA to consider that issue in the ﬁrst instance. See Calcutt v.
        Federal Deposit Ins., 143 S. Ct. 1317, 1321 (2023) (following the “or-
        dinary remand rule” to remand a case to the BIA for consideration
        under the proper legal standard); cf. Zarate v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 26 F.4th
        1196, 1214 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Although we have jurisdiction to re-
        view the legal question of whether a crime involves moral turpi-
        tude de novo, I think remand is appropriate in this case to promote
        the development of BIA case law in this area.”) (Tjoﬂat, J., concur-
        ring).
               Accordingly, we GRANT the petition in part and REMAND
        to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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        22-10445               Newsom, J., Concurring                          1

        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:
               I’d like to briefly investigate the curious case of 8 U.S.C.
        § 1103(a)(1). As the majority opinion explains, see Maj. Op. at 14
        n.3, that subsection—and in particular its concluding proviso
        “[t]hat determination[s] and ruling[s] by the Attorney General with
        respect to all questions of law shall be controlling”—has tradition-
        ally been cited as support for the ho-hum proposition that princi-
        ples of Chevron deference apply in immigration-related cases. See
        INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (“It is clear that prin-
        ciples of Chevron deference are applicable to this statutory scheme.
        The INA provides that . . . the ‘determination and ruling by the At-
        torney General with respect to all questions of law shall be control-
        ling.’ 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III).”); accord, e.g., Ne-
        gusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (same). That, it seems to
        me, is the one thing that § 1103(a)(1) almost certainly does not
        mean. Let me explain.
               Here’s § 1103(a)(1)’s full text:
               (a) Secretary of Homeland Security

               (1) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall be
               charged with the administration and enforcement of
               this chapter and all other laws relating to the immi-
               gration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as
               this chapter or such laws relate to the powers, func-
               tions, and duties conferred upon the President, Attor-
               ney General, the Secretary of State, the oﬃcers of the
               Department of State, or diplomatic or consular oﬃc-
               ers: Provided, however, That determination and ruling by
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        2                    Newsom, J., Concurring                 22-10445

              the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law
              shall be controlling.

        8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (emphasis added).
                The way I see it, there are two plausible readings of
        § 1103(a)(1)’s proviso. First, it could mean that the Attorney Gen-
        eral’s legal determinations are “controlling” vis-à-vis the other Ex-
        ecutive Branch officials mentioned in § 1103(a)(1)—the President,
        Secretary of State, diplomatic and consular officers, etc. On that
        understanding, the proviso has nothing to say about—nothing to
        do with—the question of how reviewing courts should treat the At-
        torney General’s legal determinations. Second, the proviso could
        (at least as a linguistic matter) mean that the Attorney General’s
        legal determinations are “controlling” more generally—including
        on the judiciary. For reasons I’ll explain, the former seems to me
        the far more natural reading; the latter seems both strained and
        quite likely unconstitutional.
                                          I
                Before we get there, though, what about the mushy-middle,
        in-between interpretation that some of the Supreme Court’s cita-
        tions would appear to suggest—i.e., that § 1103(a)(1)’s proviso is
        just support (code, really) for the application of ordinary Chevron-
        deference principles? That reading, I submit, is neither convincing
        as a matter of semantics nor sensible in the larger scheme of admin-
        istrative law.
               As for language, here’s how Black’s defined the word “con-
        trol” when § 1103(a)(1) was enacted: “To exercise restraining or
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        22-10445              Newsom, J., Concurring                          3

        directing influence over. To regulate; restrain; dominate; curb; to
        hold from action; overpower; counteract; govern.” Control, Black’s
        Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). That hardly describes the Chevron
        inquiry. Under Chevron’s familiar framework, a reviewing court
        must first decide whether a particular statute is ambiguous and
        then, if it is, assess the agency’s interpretation to determine
        whether it represents a “permissible,” “reasonable” reading—and
        then, if it does, but only if it does, defer to it. See Chevron, U.S.A.,
        Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
        Ultimately, the courts are in charge; they exercise “directing influ-
        ence” over agencies, not the other way around. Not even the most
        ardent Chevron enthusiast would contend that it requires a court
        not just to defer to an agency’s interpretation, but to mindlessly
        acquiesce in it.
               Moreover, understood as a directive that reviewing courts
        should give the Attorney General’s legal determinations ordinary
        Chevron deference, § 1103(a)(1) is superfluous—effectively mean-
        ingless. Presumably, the Board of Immigration Appeals—as the At-
        torney General’s designee for immigration-related adjudications—
        either is or isn’t entitled to Chevron deference to the same extent
        that any other administrative agency is. But that’s a determination
        made by reference to the usual administrative-law criteria—for ex-
        ample, whether the agency has been either explicitly or implicitly
        delegated authority to interpret a particular statute, see Chevron, 467
        U.S. at 843–44, and whether the regulation or adjudication in ques-
        tion has “the force of law,” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
        231–32 (2001). And indeed, that’s exactly how the Supreme Court
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        4                        Newsom, J., Concurring                       22-10445

        has often approached the question of Chevron deference in immi-
        gration-related cases—i.e., by diving right in, rather than pausing
        to check the § 1101(a)(3) box. See, e.g., Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S.
        798 (2015) (declining to defer under Chevron to the BIA’s interpre-
        tation of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) without reference to
        § 1103(a)(1)); Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (defer-
        ring under Chevron to the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153
        without reference to § 1103(a)(1)). 1 The Court has bypassed
        § 1103(a)(1) for good reason—as I’ll explain next, whatever else it
        is, § 1103(a)(1) is not an explicit (or even implicit) delegation of gen-
        eral interpretive authority to the Attorney General or his designees
        vis-à-vis the courts.
                                               II
              So we know—or, speaking only for myself, I think I know—
        what § 1103(a)(1)’s proviso is not: It is not the one thing it has been
        (vaguely) suggested to be. But what is it, then? Again, I think there
        are two ways that one might possibly understand the proviso—one
        more modest, the other much more robust. The proviso either
        means—and means only—that the Attorney General’s

        1 To be sure, in Negusie v. Holder, the Court said (in what has become an oft-
        quoted dictum) that “[j]udicial deference in the immigration context is of spe-
        cial importance, for executive officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political
        functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” 555 U.S. at 517. Even
        there, though, the Court applied only ordinary Chevron deference. See id. at
        516–17. We have followed suit, quoting Negusie’s dictum while applying plain-
        old Chevron principles. See, e.g., Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 56 F.4th 951, 962
        (11th Cir. 2022).
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        22-10445               Newsom, J., Concurring                          5

        “determination[s]” regarding “questions of law” are “controlling”
        as against the other Executive Branch officials mentioned in
        § 1103(a)(1), or it means that the Attorney General’s legal determi-
        nations are “controlling” more broadly, including on reviewing
        courts.
                The former, I submit, is the far better reading—more faith-
        ful to § 1103(a)(1)’s text, context, and history. The latter is both less
        defensible on its own terms and quite likely unconstitutional. I’ll
        consider each possibility in turn.
                                           A
                Section 1103(a)(1)’s proviso is best understood, I submit, to
        empower the Attorney General to make legal determinations that
        are “controlling” vis-à-vis other Executive-Branch actors—but not
        vis-à-vis the courts. I say so for at least three reasons.
                First, and most importantly, that’s the best understanding of
        § 1103(a)(1) on its own terms. The provision opens by “charg[ing]”
        the Secretary of Homeland Security with the duty to “administ[er]
        and enforce[]” the Immigration and Nationality Act and all other
        immigration- and naturalization-related laws, “except insofar as
        [they] relate to the powers, functions, and duties” of other desig-
        nated Executive-Branch officers—the President, Secretary of State,
        diplomatic and consular officials, etc. The statute thus carves out
        of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s general purview preroga-
        tives that are reserved to other executive officials. All of these intra-
        branch allocations, though, are subject to the subsection’s conclud-
        ing proviso: “Provided, however, [t]hat determination and ruling by
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        6                      Newsom, J., Concurring                    22-10445

        the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be
        controlling.” The upshot seems clear: As against the various Ex-
        ecutive Branch officers who might play a role in the administration
        of the country’s immigration laws, the Attorney General may
        make “determination[s]” regarding “questions of law” that are
        “controlling”—i.e., binding on those officers.
                Second, the context in which § 1103(a)(1) is situated con-
        firms that plain-meaning interpretation. Nearly every subsection
        that follows § 1103(a)(1) explains the circumstances in which the
        Secretary of Homeland Security may delegate his powers to, or
        otherwise arrange duties among, officials within the Executive
        Branch. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(4) (giving the Secretary the abil-
        ity to “require or authorize any employee of the [Immigration] Ser-
        vice or the Department of Justice” to perform any of the Secretary’s
        duties); id. § 1103(a)(6) (authorizing similar delegation to “any em-
        ployee of the United States, with the consent of the head of the
        Department”); id. § 1103(a)(7)–(9) (empowering the Secretary to
        “establish offices” for immigration enforcement in foreign coun-
        tries “with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,” station for-
        eign countries’ officers in the United States to enforce their immi-
        gration laws, and make reciprocal agreements with foreign coun-
        tries to these effects); cf. also, e.g., id. § 1103(a)(10) (authorizing the
        Attorney General to delegate his powers to “any State or local law
        enforcement officer,” with the “consent” of his or her supervising
        entity, to address “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens ar-
        riving” at the border). Put simply, § 1103(a)(1)’s statutory neigh-
        bors seem to underscore that the entire section’s thrust is allocating
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        22-10445              Newsom, J., Concurring                       7

        functions within the Executive Branch and among its various of-
        fices and officers.
               Finally, § 1103(a)(1)’s unique history suggests the very same
        thing. Congress amended § 1103 in 2003, just a year after creating
        the Department of Homeland Security. See Homeland Security
        Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, § 1102(2), 117 Stat.
        526, 531 (West); History, Dep’t of Homeland Security, https://
        www.dhs.gov/history (2022). It made two notable alterations.
        Section 1103(a)(1) was kept exactly as-was, save for one change: To
        reflect that the head of the newly created Department would as-
        sume principal responsibility for administering the country’s immi-
        gration laws, Congress replaced the words (and office) “Attorney
        General” with the words (and office) “Secretary of Homeland Se-
        curity” in both the title and the prefatory clause:
              (a) Attorney General Secretary of Homeland Se-
              curity

                   The Attorney General Secretary of Homeland Se-
                   curity shall be charged with the administration
                   and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws
                   relating to the immigration and naturalization of
                   aliens, except insofar as this chapter or such laws
                   relate to the powers, functions, and duties con-
                   ferred upon the President, the Secretary of State,
                   the oﬃcers of the Department of State, or diplo-
                   matic or consular oﬃcers: Provided, however, That
                   determination and ruling by the Attorney General
                   with respect to all questions of law shall be con-
                   trolling.
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        8                      Newsom, J., Concurring            22-10445

        Homeland Security Act Amendments of 2003, § 1102(2) (codified
        at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1)).
               In conjunction with its establishment of the Department of
        Homeland Security and its revision of § 1103(a)(1), Congress also
        enacted a new subsection, § 1103(g), which remains in the statute
        today:
              (g) Attorney General

              (1) In general

                 The Attorney General shall have such authorities
                 and functions under this chapter and all other laws
                 relating to the immigration and naturalization of
                 aliens as were exercised by the Executive Oﬃce for
                 Immigration Review, or by the Attorney General
                 with respect to the Executive Oﬃce for Immigra-
                 tion Review, on the day before the eﬀective date of
                 the Immigration Reform, Accountability and Se-
                 curity Enhancement Act of 2002.

        See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 1102,
        116 Stat. 2135, 2274 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1)).
               So, when Congress created DHS, amended § 1103(a)(1) to
        specify the respective roles of (among others) the Secretary of
        Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and added § 1103(g),
        it specified that the Attorney General’s “authorities and func-
        tions”—presumably including his authority to issue “controlling”
        legal determinations—extended only as far as the Executive Office
        for Immigration Review’s authority had previously reached.
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        22-10445              Newsom, J., Concurring                        9

        Before 2002, as today, the EOIR included the Immigration Judges
        and the Board of Immigration Appeals. See About the Office, U.S.
        D.O.J., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (2022). The
        BIA’s legal determinations did not then and do not now “con-
        trol[]”judicial interpretations; rather, as today’s majority opinion
        explains, the courts review the IJs’ and BIA’s legal decisions, as ap-
        propriate, under the various deference regimes. See Maj. Op. at 11–
        14. So, if the Attorney General has “such authorities and functions”
        as the EOIR, which includes the IJs and the BIA, and those admin-
        istrative entities don’t “control[]” court dispositions, then neither
        does the Attorney General. Reading § 1103(a)(1) to vest the Attor-
        ney General’s legal determinations with “controlling” force vis-à-
        vis the courts would flatly contravene § 1103(g).
               In sum, § 1103(a)(1)’s plain text, the statutory context in
        which it’s situated, and its unique history all counsel the same con-
        clusion: The statute empowers the Attorney General to render
        “determination[s]” on “questions of law” that are “controlling” as
        against other Executive Branch officials. But it says nothing
        about—and has nothing to do with—the weight that the Attorney
        General’s legal determinations are due in court.

                                          B
              On a contrary reading, § 1103(a)(1)’s proviso purports to
        make the Attorney General’s legal determinations “controlling” as
        a general matter—including on reviewing courts. That far more
        sweeping construction, while linguistically plausible—and
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        10                           Newsom, J., Concurring                  22-10445

        perhaps (?) even suggested in Supreme Court dicta 2—suffers from
        two significant problems. Initially, as a matter of pure statutory
        interpretation, it wrenches the proviso out of context and thereby
        elevates literalism over proper textualism. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clay-
        ton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
        (“As Justice Scalia explained, ‘the good textualist is not a literalist.’”
        (quoting Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 24 (1997))).
        Moreover, so reading § 1103(a)(1) would almost certainly render it
        unconstitutional. I say that for several related reasons.
               First, and most obviously, for more than 200 years now, it
        has been “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
        partment to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
        Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). No need to gild that lily: A reading of
        § 1103(a)(1) that would make the Attorney General’s legal determi-
        nations “controlling” on reviewing courts would impermissibly di-
        vest the judiciary of its authority to “say what the law is”—and, in
        the doing, lodge that power in the executive. And it should go
        without saying that Congress can’t mend that separation-of-pow-
        ers breach simply by waving a wand and purporting to vest binding
        interpretive authority in the Executive Branch. In fact, to do so
        would be to commit the sin of Hayburn’s Case, only in reverse.
        There, the Court held that Congress couldn’t imbue judicial offic-
        ers with executive authority because “neither the legislative nor
        the executive branches, can constitutionally assign to the judicial
        any duties, but such as are properly judicial, and to be performed

        2   See, e.g., Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516–17; see also supra note 1.
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        22-10445               Newsom, J., Concurring                          11

        in a judicial manner.” 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 410 (1792). In so holding,
        the Court explained that “the legislative, executive and judicial de-
        partments are each formed in a separate and independent manner
        . . . .” Id. Infusing the Executive Branch with judicial authority—
        as § 1103(a)(1) would if it made the Attorney General’s legal deter-
        minations of law binding on courts—would be no less unconstitu-
        tional.
                Second, giving the Attorney General’s legal determinations
        “controlling” force vis-à-vis reviewing courts would transgress the
        limits that Article III places on the activities of so-called non-Article-
        III tribunals. In Stern v. Marshall, for instance, the Supreme Court
        emphasized that “Article III could neither serve its purpose . . . nor
        preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking if the other
        branches of the Federal Government could confer the Govern-
        ment’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.” 564 U.S. 462,
        484 (2011); see also id. at 483 (“[T]here is no liberty if the power of
        judging be not separated from the legislative and executive pow-
        ers.”) (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton)
        (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961)). Indeed, in Stern, the Court invali-
        dated a bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction even though its
        decision was subject to “ordinary appellate review” by Article III
        courts. Id. at 494 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
        473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985)). Needless to say, an interpretation of
        § 1103(a)(1) that accorded the Attorney General’s legal determina-
        tions “controlling” weight in court wouldn’t allow for anything
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        12                       Newsom, J., Concurring                       22-10445

        approaching—indeed, would positively thwart—“ordinary appel-
        late review.” 3
               Finally, reading § 1103(a)(1) to give the Attorney General’s
        determinations of law “controlling” force vis-à-vis courts would ex-
        acerbate already-existing concerns about unlawful delegations of
        judicial power. As matters stand, even ordinary Chevron deference
        is on thin non-delegation ice. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
        2116, 2131–48 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). If Executive Branch actors
        were freed from the obligation to provide even a “reasonable” in-
        terpretation to get their way, that ice would surely break.
                                            * * *
                Section 1103(a)(1) is something of a mystery to me. The Su-
        preme Court has invoked it as a warrant for applying Chevron-def-
        erence principles in immigration-related cases—but for reasons
        I’ve explained, I don’t think that’s a particularly good fit. Read (hy-
        per)literally, § 1103(a)(1)’s proviso might seem to make the Attor-
        ney General’s determinations of law “controlling” in some sort of
        general, absolute sense—but as I’ve said, I don’t think that can pos-
        sibly be right. By far the best understanding of § 1103(a)(1), it

        3This lack of Article III supervision would be particularly pronounced—and
        problematic—in cases involving questions about citizenship. Section
        1103(a)(1) applies to Chapter 12 of Title 8, which contains subchapters con-
        cerning nationality and naturalization. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (“Eligibility for
        naturalization”); id. § 1435 (“Former citizens regaining citizenship”). The Su-
        preme Court has held that citizenship claims are constitutional questions that
        must be adjudicated by Article III courts, not agencies. See Ng Fung Ho v. White,
        259 U.S. 276, 284–85 (1922).
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        22-10445             Newsom, J., Concurring                      13

        seems to me, is that it really has nothing to do with the weight or
        deference that reviewing courts should give to the Attorney Gen-
        eral’s legal determinations. Instead, it simply divides immigration-
        related labor among various Executive Branch officials and, as be-
        tween them—and them only—authorizes the Attorney General to
        make binding legal determinations. That’s all.
              The real problem is that no one really knows what
        § 1103(a)(1) means—or, to be more precise, the Supreme Court
        (even while invoking it) has never really told us what it means. I,
        for one, would welcome the explanation.