Court Opinion

ID: 9634318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:08:42.469358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:19.100260
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although it may seem at first glance somewhat counterintuitive to say that the *877federal courts do not have general or plenary subject matter jurisdiction over murder and other crimes in the national forests, that is, in fact, the situation. That is the situation because our system of federalism requires that Congress act by clear positive legislation to create such criminal jurisdiction, and Congress has not done so. There is no common-law, federal criminal, subject-matter jurisdiction in national forests or elsewhere, and this concept has been a part of our system of checks and balances limiting the power of the federal government from the beginning.1
Instead Congress has by positive legislation in 16 U.S.C. § 480 sought affirmatively to maintain the jurisdictional status quo ante when the federal government acquires and creates national forest lands. Once the several constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to federal legislative and judicial jurisdiction over national forests are parsed and understood, it should become clear that my colleagues’ solution to the problem will not bear close analysis. Not only that, but my colleagues’ claim of general federal criminal jurisdiction is directly contrary to the position that the Forest Service and the Lands Division of the Department of Justice adopted many years ago, as I will explain at the end of this opinion, once I have led the reader through a reasoned analysis of the pertinent statutory and constitutional provisions.
I. Section 480, Title 16, Specifically Regulates Federal Jurisdiction Over National Forests
The subject-matter jurisdiction defense raised by the defendant Gabrion is based on the “Organic Administration Act of 1897,”2 combined with the “Weeks Act” of 1911, which are now codified together as 16 U.S.C. § 480:
The jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, over persons within national forests, shall not be affected or changed by reason of their existence, except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein is concerned; the intent and meaning of this provision being that the State wherein such national forest is situated shall not, by reason of the establishment thereof, lose its jurisdiction, nor the inhabitants thereof their rights and privileges as citizens, or be absolved from their duties as citizens of the State.
(Emphasis added.) The underlined sentence is in the passive voice. The subject is the noun “jurisdiction” modified by the adjectives “civil and criminal.” This refers to the judicial authority to adjudicate civil and criminal cases. The verbs are “to change” or “to affect,” and the sentence is in the negative stating that “jurisdiction” *878is “not” “changed” or “affected.” The prepositional phase “within the national forests” modifies the verbs, and the meaning is that the “existence” or creation of “national forests” will not change the jurisdiction of state or federal courts, ie., that the status quo existing before the creation of the national forest concerning jurisdiction will continue after their creation. The “except” clause limits the duration of that pre-existing state of affairs and makes its continuation dependent on whether Congress acts to create and define any federal “offenses ... therein.” The conditional “except” clause requires Congress to act affirmatively to legislate criminal offenses “therein.” Unlike legislation with respect to military bases and other federal enclaves, Congress has not acted affirmatively under the Interstate Commerce, Federal Enclave or Property Clauses of the Constitution to bring murder in the “national forests” within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” or any other category of federal, judicial, subject-matter jurisdiction. In order for federal offenses within the national forests to exist, the offense must be a regular federal crime of general nationwide application or a crime specially defined and enacted by Congress within one or more national forests. The crime of murder is not such a crime. Congress has not made the crime of murder either generally applicable nationwide or specially applicable in one or more national forests. There is no federal crime of murder applicable outside the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” and Congress has not acted to bring the national forests within that “special jurisdiction” category.
Rejecting this common sense interpretation based on our federalist tradition, the main thrust of the separate opinions of both Judge Batchelder and Judge Moore is that § 480 on national forests itself somehow provides the necessary plenary, federal “concurrent” criminal subject matter in national forests. They derive such broad federal criminal jurisdiction directly from § 480. That statute is the basic source of their argument in favor of jurisdiction. Using § 480 they would read the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” to include all such forest lands.
Section 480 applies specifically and only to “national forests,” not to any other government lands. It states flatly and unequivocally that no change in the status quo ante respecting federal and state criminal jurisdiction shall occur by virtue of the acquisition or designation of lands as a “national forest.” It specifies expressly that “civil and criminal jurisdiction” in national forests, other than for general federal “offenses” applicable in the country at large, is not “affected” and does not “change” when lands become part of the national forests.
The only way my colleagues can arrive at their conclusion is by holding that only “state jurisdiction” does not change when a national forest is created, but that is not what the section says. Section 480 does not say that only “state jurisdiction” shall not change. It says “the jurisdiction, both civil and criminal” shall not change as a result of federal acquisition of forest land. This language includes both state and federal jurisdiction over forests, and that interpretation has become well-settled by the administrative practices of the Forest Service and the Department of Justice over the past 100 years, as explained later.
Federal jurisdiction under § 480 exists only for “offenses” of general nationwide or special local application which are criminalized by a specific federal statute. In other words, the language in § 480, “except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States therein *879is concerned,” means that offenses that are federal regardless of where the crime is committed within the United States are federal offenses in national forests — for example, crimes like bank robbery, counterfeiting, the sale of illegal drugs, murder of federal law enforcement officers, use of interstate facilities to commit murder for hire, and other crimes of general, nationwide application, ie., regular federal crimes. In addition, “offenses” would include crimes specifically described and enacted by Congress for local application in one or more national forests. The federal statute at issue in this case, § 1111, cannot fall within the “except” clause of § 480 because § 1111(b) requires that the murder occur within “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” which in turn requires that Congress act to create “exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.” Congress has not asserted in § 480 or elsewhere either concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction in such cases; consequently, no territorial jurisdiction exists as defined by § 7(3).3
The apparent policy behind § 480 is that the national forests make up such a large percentage of the United States that it would be impossible to effectively enforce all criminal laws therein without establishing a large national police force. These lands comprise 193 million acres or 8.5% of the total land area of the United States. National forests extend across the nation from Hawaii, California and Alaska to Maine, Florida and Puerto Rico. Manistee National Forest itself occupies several counties in Western Michigan and includes private farms, lakes and home sites. The consistent administrative practice of the Forest Service and the Department of Justice, as described in Section III of this opinion, support this policy of relying on state criminal jurisdiction rather than federal jurisdiction. In addition, it would obviously be inconsistent with the long tradition of federalism and plenary state criminal jurisdiction for the government to take over the responsibility (without a clear federal statute) for law enforcement in such large, noncontiguous, scattered groups of lands throughout the *880United States, areas in which cities, villages, residences, farms and other private lands are interspersed with public forest lands, logging trails, recreation facilities and lakes.
Another section of the same federal, national forest statute, provides a limited misdemeanor exception to the “no-change-in-jurisdiction” rule of § 480 by delegating to the Secretary of Agriculture authority to “make such rules and regulations ... to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction.” 16 U.S.C. § 551. The statute authorizes a punishment for violations of such regulations of “not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than six months” with the case to be “tried and sentenced by any United States magistrate judge .... ” Id. This statute provides an exception to the “no change” rule of § 480,4 but there is no similar federal statute creating any type of federal felony jurisdiction over national forest laws.
Section 480 itself creates a specific national forest exception to a more general, statutory rule regarding acceptance of exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over government lands. The more general statutory rule was first established by statute in 1940. It provides that concurrent federal law enforcement jurisdiction over “lands or an interest in land it acquires” may only be accepted by the federal government by the filing of formal notice that the government in fact accepts such jurisdiction.5 The statute provides for a procedure by which federal exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction may be acquired. The statute, 40 U.S.C. § 255 (now codified as 40 U.S.C. § 3112), reads as follows:
§ 3112. Federal jurisdiction.
(a) Exclusive jurisdiction not required. It is not required that the Federal Government obtain exclusive jurisdiction in the United States over land or an interest in land it acquires.
(b) Acquisition and acceptance of jurisdiction. When the head of a department, agency, or independent establishment of the Government, or other authorized officer of the department, agency, or independent establishment, considers it desirable, that individual may accept or secure, from the State in which land or an interest in land that is under the immediate jurisdiction, custody, or control of the individual is situated, consent to, or cession of, any jurisdiction over the land or interest not previously obtained. The *881individual shall indicate acceptance of jurisdiction on behalf of the Government by filing a notice of acceptance with the Governor of the State or in another manner prescribed by the laws of the State where the land is situated. [No official of the federal government has ever filed such a notice with the State of Michigan asserting concurrent jurisdiction.]
(c) Presumption. It is conclusively presumed that jurisdiction has not been accepted until the Government accepts jurisdiction over land as provided in this section.
(Emphasis added.) The 1940 statute modified a previous, judicially-created rule that in some circumstances the courts would “presume” that the federal government had accepted concurrent jurisdiction from a state if the government agency in charge of the land did not expressly refuse to accept jurisdiction offered by the state. See Adams v. United States, 319 U.S. 312, 315, 63 S.Ct. 1122, 87 L.Ed. 1421 (1943) (setting aside under § 255 [now § 3112] the rape convictions of three soldiers at a military base because the government had not accepted exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction and “concurrent jurisdiction can be acquired only by the formal acceptance prescribed in the Act”); Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885) (acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction may sometimes be “presumed” if the federal government does not object to a state’s cession of jurisdiction and no statute forecloses acceptance); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1114-15 (7th Cir.1970) (affirming a burglary conviction in a Veterans Administration hospital on land acquired for naval purposes in 1918 on ground that concurrent jurisdiction would be “presumed” in the absence of an objection by the federal government). Because § 480 expressly forbids and preempts such a presumption of jurisdiction (federal “jurisdiction ... within national forest shall not be affected or changed”), neither the pre-1940, rebut-table “presumption” of concurrent jurisdiction nor the post-1940 conclusive presumption against concurrent jurisdiction has ever been applied to national forests. Notwithstanding my colleagues’ argument to the contrary, it is clear that section 480 specifically covering national forests is an exception to § 255 [now § 3112] which is applicable to other federal lands but not national forests. Even if § 255 could somehow be held applicable to the national forests, it could not create federal concurrent jurisdiction because it creates a conclusive presumption against such jurisdiction and because the forest service has consistently denied such jurisdiction, as will be discussed in Section III below.
II. My Colleagues’ Opinions are Mistaken about the Meaning of §§ 480, 1111, 7(3) and 255
In opposition to the analysis and arguments outlined above, Judges Batchelder and Moore randomly cite seven principal cases and two constitutional provisions (the “Property” and “Federal Enclave” Clauses), as well as two statutes discussed above (18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 40 U.S.C. § 255 [now § 3112]). I will discuss each one of the arguments they make and the principal authorities they rely on.
The citation and reliance on United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1980), for the proposition that federal courts automatically have concurrent jurisdiction with the states over national forests is misplaced and indicates their confusion about the meaning of § 480. In that case the federal government sued the State of California as plaintiff because State actors negligently started a fire in a national forest. Although the federal courts clearly have jurisdiction of such actions under 28 *882U.S.C. § 1345 (providing for “original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States”), the court dismissed the action because the government failed to bring its negligence action within the appropriate statute of limitations. In passing, the court mentioned that it is the states, not the federal government, which have general “criminal and civil jurisdiction over national forests” under § 480. The Ninth Circuit in its dicta is simply saying — as I would hold here in respect to criminal cases — that if there is a federal statute of general nationwide application that gives federal courts civil jurisdiction over tort cases in a national forest, as does § 1345 when the federal government is the plaintiff, then federal civil concurrent jurisdiction exists along with state court concurrent jurisdiction. But if there is no federal statute like § 1345 on the civil side or a general, federal, criminal statute like one forbidding bank robbery or drug distribution or § 551 discussed above on the criminal side, then there is no federal jurisdiction. That is what § 480 means when it says no federal civil or criminal jurisdiction exists “except so far as the punishment of offenses against the United States.” The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 480 in the California case is the same as my analysis and contrary to my colleagues’ interpretation.
Likewise, my colleagues are mistaken when they say that 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) provides federal jurisdiction over murder cases in national forests. Section 1111(b) only criminalizes murder within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” covered by § 7(3), not within the national forests. Section 7(3) in turn defines this “special” jurisdiction as federal lands which by statute have been placed under the “exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction” of the federal government. My colleagues fail to understand that in order to create murder or other criminal jurisdiction in the national forests Congress must act to do so. Instead, in § 480, Congress has expressed the opposite intent. Neither § 7(3), nor § 1111, mentions or purports to create jurisdiction over national forests, and § 480 expresses a clear intent to leave in place the status quo excluding such federal criminal jurisdiction and leaving it up to the states to deal with such cases, as has been the consistent practice since the national forests were established more than 100 years ago.
My colleagues also appear to suggest that the Constitution itself may directly— in a self-executing manner — somehow give the federal courts jurisdiction over murders in national forests. They seem to believe that the Federal Enclave Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 itself, without further federal legislation, creates federal criminal jurisdiction over murder cases in the Manistee National Forest. This Clause just gives Congress the power to create' federal criminal jurisdiction over lands “purchased ... for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful building.” Congress must exercise that power by legislation. The clause is not self-executing. It requires an act of Congress. In § 480 Congress has explicitly acted to decline such general jurisdiction “within national forests,” stating clearly that “civil and criminal jurisdiction ... shall not be affected or changed” by virtue of the acquisition of national forest lands. In this case, the government does not and would have no basis to claim that it has acquired such jurisdiction under this Clause of the Constitution, and no case authority exists for the exercise of such federal criminal jurisdiction under this Clause.
Likewise, the Property Clause (“Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting ... property belonging to the United States,” Article IV, Section 3, *883Clause 2) requires an act of Congress to create general federal criminal jurisdiction over ordinary murder cases in the national forests. This clause is not self-executing. Congress must act positively by statute to create such jurisdiction.
Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976), is the case relied upon by both judges in arguing that the Property and Federal Enclave Clauses create federal criminal felony jurisdiction in national forests. In Kleppe, the Supreme Court simply upheld the constitutionality of the Wild Free-roaming Horses and the Burros Act of 1971, insofar as it prohibited the state livestock board in New Mexico from entering public lands of the United States and removing wild burros under the State’s estray laws. The case recognizes that the Property and Enclave Clauses are not self-executing and require specific legislation in order to regulate and create federal jurisdiction over public lands. Both judges rely heavily on Kleppe. Judge Batchelder argues for direct federal criminal subject matter jurisdiction from the Court’s statement in Kleppe that the federal government may “apply derivative legislative power from a state pursuant to the [Enclave Clause] ... by consensual acquisition of land, or by ... the state’s subsequent cession of legislative authority over the land.” 426 U.S. at 542, 96 S.Ct. 2285. The Kleppe opinion is clear that the Court is referring to “legislative jurisdiction” which must be exercised by statute before it is turned into federal, criminal, subject-matter, judicial jurisdiction. My colleagues appear to confuse “legislative jurisdiction” or authority, i.e., constitutional authority, with federal, judicial, subject-matter jurisdiction, which may only be created by positive action of Congress.
This confusion becomes absolutely clear in footnote 5 of Judge Batchelder’s opinion in which she has somehow persuaded herself to believe that § 480 is only referring to “legislative jurisdiction,” not to “the federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” She states that “only ... legislative jurisdiction ... is actually at issue or determinative in this case.” This indicates a complete misunderstanding of the issue before us. No one denies that Congress has “legislative jurisdiction” over the national forests. The Interstate Commerce, Property and Federal Enclave Clauses each provide for some legislative jurisdiction over national forests. The only question is whether Congress has acted to create “federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction” over a murder case in the national forests. It is no wonder that my colleagues are mistaken in their answer to this question when they think that the issue is one of the existence of “legislative jurisdiction.” They are both quite right that there is “legislative jurisdiction” but quite wrong that there is “federal court subject matter jurisdiction.”
Likewise, my colleagues are mistaken in finding support for federal jurisdiction over murders in national forests in United States v. Raffield, 82 F.3d 611 (4th Cir.1996). There the Fourth Circuit in a doubtful holding stated that “the state and federal governments ... enter[ed] into a relationship of concurrent jurisdiction” because “the Assimilative Crimes Act specifically contemplates convictions for ‘operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol’ while on federal lands. 18 U.S.C. § 13(b)(1).” Id. at 613. The question of the treatment of drunk driving in national forest lands is not before us in the instant case. The, Assimilative Crimes Act has provisions authorizing federal misdemeanor jurisdiction regulating traffic infractions, and § 551 of the Weeks Act has a misdemeanor provision for driving violations in national forests. Neither Act authorizes federal jurisdiction over felonies. The national forest regulations issued under § 551 make drunk driving in a national *884forest a federal misdemeanor. Section 13(b) of the Assimilative Crimes Act states:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2) and for purposes of subsection (a) of this section, that which may or shall be imposed through judicial or administrative action under the law of a State, territory, possession, or district, for a conviction for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol, shall be considered to be a punishment provided by that law. Any limitation on the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle imposed under this subsection shall apply only to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
(2)(a) In addition to any term of imprisonment provided for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of a drug or alcohol imposed under the law of a State, territory, possession, or district, the punishment for such an offense under this section shall include an additional term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or if serious bodily injury of a minor is caused, not more than 5 years, or if death of a minor is caused, not more than 10 years....
(Emphasis added.) The Raffield case based its drunk driving jurisdiction on this specific language, a doubtful holding unless the Court intended to rely on § 551 which relates specifically to national forests. The Raffield case criminalizing drunk driving in a national forest is not on point. There is no language in § 13(b) or § 551 that would in any way alter § 480’s rejection of concurrent jurisdiction in the national forest for murder or other state felonies.6 My colleagues, therefore, err in “presuming” or implying general federal jurisdiction over state felonies in national forests based on the Raffield drunk driving case — if, in fact, this is my colleagues’ purpose in citing the case.
Neither does the case of Stupalo-Thrall v. United States, 70 F.3d 881 (6th Cir. 1995), have anything whatever to do with the question in this case. First, in Stupak the en banc court issued no authoritative ruling because it split four to four, which resulted in an affirmance of the District Court. Second, the question in the case had to do with the governmental regulation of riparian or littoral rights in private property owners in the Sylvania Wilderness Area under the Michigan Wilderness Act, Public Law No. 100-184, 101 Stat. 1274 (1987), and the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b). Congress clearly and specifically acted by positive law to create limited federal jurisdiction. In the Michigan Wilderness Act, Congress clearly authorized the Department of Agriculture to engage in the regulation of water craft and pollution in the Sylvania Wilderness Area. Third, § 480 and the question of subject matter jurisdiction in national forests were never mentioned in the case and would have been completely irrelevant to any possible issue presented there.
Equally strange is the reliance on Han-kins v. Delo, 977 F.2d 396 (8th Cir.1992). In that case the Eighth Circuit held that it was the state government that had jurisdiction over murder in the national forests in opposition to the habeas petitioner’s argument in a capital murder habeas case from the State of Missouri that the state court lacked jurisdiction over a murder committed in the Mark Twain National *885Forest. In direct opposition to my colleagues’ claim, the Eighth Circuit said that “even when the state purports to cede land to the federal government, the United States does not have jurisdiction unless it accepts it,” 977 F.2d at 398, a conclusion equivalent to holding that only the state had jurisdiction over murder cases in the Mark Twain Forest — the same conclusion I reach here.
The cases of Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 186, 58 S.Ct. 233, 82 L.Ed. 187 (1937), and Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 S.Ct. 60, 36 L.Ed. 991 (1892), also have no bearing on this case. They do not even involve jurisdiction in national forests or purport to deal with § 480 or any law relevant to national forests.
Finally, my colleagues’ expansion of “concurrent,” federal, subject-matter jurisdiction in the national forests to include state criminal laws would make all of the laws of the states referred to in § 13 (the Assimilative Crimes Act) apply as federal crimes in federal court: State laws ranging from zoning and land use to hunting and fishing to auto, driver’s and occupational licensing would all create federal judicial jurisdiction — an unheard of expansion of federal jurisdiction that would create general federal court jurisdiction over the enforcement of all state laws in all 193 million acres of the national forests.
III. The Administrative Agency in Charge of the National Forests Has Consistently Opposed Federal Concurrent Jurisdiction
In the past the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which operates the national forests, as well as the Department of Justice and other agencies of the federal government, have interpreted § 480 to preclude federal jurisdiction over general state crimes like murder committed in national forests. The record reflects the following legislative, executive and administrative agency opinions stating that § 480 negates and prohibits the exercise of either exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction over state crimes committed in national forests.
1. Opinion of Robert H. Shields, Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Opinion 4311, July 18, 1942, (filed as Defendant’s Exhibit B):
“It is our opinion, therefore, that § 480, supra, precluded the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction as well as exclusive jurisdiction by the United States over national forest lands.... ”
2. Opinion of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., to President Eisenhower, April 27,1956, Re: “Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States” (filed as Defendant’s Exhibit D):
The Attorney General’s report notes: “Where the Federal Government has no legislative jurisdiction over its land, it holds such land in a proprietorial interest only and has the same rights in the land as does any other landowner.” Defendant’s Exhibit B, p. 21. The report notes at pages 64 and 101 that the Department of Agriculture Forest Service holds almost all of its lands in “proprietorial” ownership.
3. Follow-Up Opinion of Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. to President Eisenhower, June, 1957, Re: “Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States” (filed as Defendant’s Exhibit E p. 114):
“State criminal jurisdiction retained.— State criminal jurisdiction extends into areas owned or occupied by the Federal Government, but as to which the Government has not acquired exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect to crimes. And as to many areas owned by *886the Federal Government for its various purposes it has not acquired legislative jurisdiction. The forest service of the Department of Agriculture, for example, in accordance with a provision of Federal law (16 U.S.C. 480), has not accepted the jurisdiction proffered by the statutes of many states, and the vast majority of federal forest lands are held by the Federal Government in a proprietorial status only.”
Id. at 114.
4. Opinion of W. Mone, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 29, 1963, (Defendant’s Exhibit H):
“The United States has neither concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over the national forest lands, but holds such lands in a proprietary capacity only. (Reference: Op. Sol. 2979, dated December 18, 1940; Op. Sol. 4311, dated July 18, 1942; and Op. Sol. 4658, dated April 27, 1943.) The proprietary capacity means merely that the United States owns the land, insofar as legislative and law enforcement jurisdiction is concerned, in the same manner that an individual owns land.... In no case where national forest lands, acquired under the Weeks Law, are involved have there been jurisdiction accepted by the United States.”
5. Report on “Federal Legislative Jurisdiction” of the Public Land Law Review Commission, incorporating the Report and opinion of the Land and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Depart of Justice, September, 1969. The Public Land Law Review Commission consisted of 18 members, 6 each appointed by the Senate, the House and the President (filed as Defendant’s Exhibit 3, p. 77):
“The Weeks Forestry Act of 1911 (16 U.S.C. § 480), a statute which authorizes acquisition of privately owned land for national forest purposes, provided against change of jurisdiction by reason of such acquisition.” The report at page 75 lists “only seven of the Forest Service’s 245 properties [that] contain other than proprietorial jurisdiction,” none of which are in the Manistee National Forest. These seven are exceptions because the federal government had previously acquired them as arsenals, military bases or courthouses over which it has asserted concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction before converting them to national forest lands.
I believe that the language of section 480 itself is clear that federal jurisdiction does not exist in murder cases in national forests, including the Manistee National Forest. Basically, the statute says that such cases should be tried in state court because ordinary criminal jurisdiction “shall not be affected or changed.” But if there were ambiguity or doubt, well settled principles of administrative law require that we give deference to administrative interpretations of statutes that the agency administers, for as Justice Stevens wrote for the Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984):
We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations
“has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the *887given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulation [citations omitted].”
Therefore, the clear language of § 480 itself, plus the consistent administrative interpretation of the statute over the last 100 years, leaves no room for doubt as to the question of jurisdiction in this case. The federal government has not heretofore asserted or accepted concurrent jurisdiction over murder cases or other state-law-type felony cases in the national forests. Normal principles of federalism still apply, leaving such crimes to the state courts to deal with under state laws.
In the face of the clear language of § 480 rejecting federal concurrent jurisdiction in national forests, longstanding principles of federalism relying on the states for general enforcement of the criminal law, the policy reasons against creating a large national forest service police force to enforce state laws, and the longstanding rejection of such jurisdiction by federal executive agencies, the District Court, the government and my colleagues have erred in “presuming” federal jurisdiction and giving § 480 a meaning opposite to congressional intent to maintain the status quo ante regarding general criminal jurisdiction in the national forests.

. See United. States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) ("The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offense.”).

. The Supreme Court has described the purpose of this Act as follows:
From the various acts relating to the establishment and management of forest reservations it appears that they were intended "to improve and protect the forest and to secure favorable conditions of water flows.”
It was declared that the acts should not be "construed to prohibit the egress and ingress of actual settlers” residing therein [and] not "to prohibit any person from entering the reservation for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, and locating and developing mineral resources; provided that such persons comply with the rules and regulations covering such forest reservation.” (Act of 1897, c. 2, 30 Stat. 36).
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 515, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).

. My colleagues assert § 480 federal criminal jurisdiction over this federal death penalty case in the national forest under the so-called "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” referred to in 18 U.S.C. § 7(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Section 7(c) defines and limits the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” to lands owned by the government over which Congress has created "exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction”:
§ 7. The term "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” as used in this title, includes "(1) [Waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States]. (2) [Vessels on a voyage on waters connected to the Great Lakes]. (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof....”
(Emphasis added.) My colleagues rely on § 1111(b) of Title 18, which limits criminal jurisdiction to impose the death penalty to first degree murder cases committed on government property over which the government has created "exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction,” the jurisdiction required by § 7(3) above. Section 1111(b) limits such federal criminal subject matter jurisdiction as follows:
(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life....
(Emphasis added.) To create federal criminal jurisdiction, § 1111 is totally dependent on § 7(3), which requires a federal law creating “exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction” over the "required” lands. There cannot be federal criminal jurisdiction in national forests under §1111 unless Congress acts by positive law to assert such jurisdiction. Section 480 does the exact opposite saying that "no change” shall occur as the result of the creation of a national forest.

. The National Forest Service has exercised the delegation of authority granted by this statute. See 36 C.F.R. § 261 — "Prohibitions” (prohibiting interfering with Forest Service officers, disorderly conduct, cutting timber and similar behavior in national forests and regulating the use of motor vehicles, fishing and hunting, etc.) No regulation issued by the Forest Service purports to accept concurrent jurisdiction under the Assimilative Crimes Act or create federal subject matter jurisdiction to enforce state criminal laws in federal court. The regulations follow the rule of § 480 that provides for no change in civil and criminal jurisdiction by virtue of the "existence” of national forests.
The National Park Service within the Department of the Interior operates under a quite different system of concurrent legislative jurisdiction which depends on contracts with state governments approved by a congressional committee. See 16 U.S.C. § la-3. ("The Secretary shall diligently pursue the consummation of arrangements with each State ... to the end that insofar as practicable the United States shall exercise concurrent legislative jurisdiction within units of the National Park System”).

. In 1923, the State of Michigan by statute granted to the United States "concurrent jurisdiction ... in and over lands so acquired” for national forests. Mich. Comp. Laws § 3.401 (2007). All concede that the federal government has never accepted such jurisdiction by notice or other action.

. In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit held that federal jurisdiction did exist for a murder committed in a national forest despite the defendant's objections that § 480 precludes such an exercise of jurisdiction. See United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 2008 U.S.App.LEXIS 4018 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2008). The Tenth Circuit’s treatment of § 480 mirrors that of my colleagues and similarly misunderstands that the Weeks Act specifically preserved the status quo ante absent Congressional action.