Court Opinion

ID: 9718563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:15.68708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.367655
License: Public Domain

HANSON, J. —Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the People had a right to appeal from the order finding section 654 applies in that it is an appeal from “[a]n order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the people.” (Pen. Code, § 1238, subd. (a) (5).)
I dissent with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that section 654 applies to the case at bench. In my view the decision of the trial court that section 654 applies and the majority opinion affirming that decision run counter to both "the “legalities” of the case and the “realities” of the disastrously mushrooming drug scene which California citizens increasingly demand that its public servants, in all branches of government, including the judiciary, bring under control.

As to the “legalities” of the instant case:

The majority opinion concludes there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that an indivisible course of conduct existed in the instant case and the single intent and objective of defendant in possession of the 16 balloons of heroin was for his personal use to keep under the influence of heroin.
In my view the substantial evidence rule should not be used as a shoehorn to push defendant’s foot into the section 654 shoe. It won’t fit. My reasons are twofold.
First, the attempted application of the “single intent and objective —indivisible course of conduct” test of section 654 to the heroin *808possession (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350) and under the influence (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550) situation is illogical and inappropriate.
If the defendant intentionally injected all 16 balloons at once it would undoubtedly be a lethal dose. He would have “murdered” himself and although having effectively removed himself from the jurisdiction of the court, it would constitute a separate offense.
If he used 1 balloon a day, he would be committing 16 separate violations of section 11550, each carrying a minimum mandatory sentence of 90 days in custody for a total of 4 years in jail.
Thus, it appears to me it would be patently inconsistent and illogical to allow defendant the benefit of the “single intent and objective—indivisible course of conduct” argument of section 654 which would give him a free “fix” by allowing him to escape paying the statutory penalty for the single count of being under the influence for which he was arrested, charged and convicted when theoretically the “single intent and objective —indivisible course of conduct” of keeping under the influence with the heroin he had in his veins and on his person could either cause his death or require four years of mandatory incarceration under section 11550,
Second, in my view the results of applying section 654 to the instant case would ignore and do violence to the basic purpose of section 654.
I focus on the basic purpose of section 654 as it pertains to the case at bench. “[Sjection [654] is designed to prohibit dual punishment by judicial action” (In re Gullatt (1968) 69 Cal.2d 395, 398 [71 Cal.Rptr. 676, 445 P.2d 292] [italics added]) and in my view was not intended, as present here, to operate to permit a defendant convicted of section 11550 to escape the mandatory punishment provisions of that section.
Section 11550 provides in pertinent part: “Any person convicted of violating any provision of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sentenced to serve a term of not less than 90 days nor more than one year in the county jail. The court may place a person convicted hereunder on probation for a period not to exceed five years and shall in all cases in which probation is granted require as a condition thereof that such person be confined in the county jail for at least 90 days. In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.” (Italics added.)
*809I construe the plain language of the legislative mandate in section 11550 to mean what it says: “In no event does the court have the power to absolve a person who violates this section from the obligation of spending at least 90 days in confinement in the county jail.” The fact that defendant had 16 balloons on his person is an “event.” The fact that a section 654 motion was made is an “event.” The Legislature unequivocably and emphatically said that in “no event” does the court have the power to absolve a person of the 90-day confinement obligation. Here the defendant was convicted of violation of section 11550 and by the attempted application of section 654 the court “absolved” defendant of the 90-day minimum confinement obligation which, in my opinion, it did not have the “power” to do.
As to the “realities” of the drug problem:
All reports indicate drug abuse in the United States continues on the upswing, running virtually out of control and spreading to all levels of society. The cost of drug abuse is staggering, equivalent in my opinion in loss of life and property to a continuing earthquake with a peak reading of .9 on the Richter scale. More than 5,000 Americans die each year from drug overdose. The total cost to Americans is up to $17 billion a year. A large percentage of the absence of Americans’ personal safety on the streets, in their businesses, and homes is directly attributed to the drug problem. In fact, it is estimated that as much as one-half of all robberies, muggings and burglaries are committed by drug addicts to support their habits.1 Official reports estimate there are at least 60,000 heroin addicts in Los Angeles County alone and indicate that Southern California is now a center for heroin and cocaine. In 1975 the police seized 177 pounds of heroin in Los Angeles compared to 10 pounds seized in 1963.2
Hans W. Mattick of the Center for Research in Criminal Justice in Chicago somewhat indelicately but nevertheless accurately likened the *810criminal justice system to a vacuum cleaner: the police—the mouth and suction power; the courts—the hose; and the prisons—the bag.* 3
Here, the police (paid by public funds) “swept-up” the defendant in its “vacuum” and the case entered the court system—the “hose.”
In the court—the “hose”—the prosecuting attorney(s) (paid by public funds) filed the information in the superior court charging defendant with the violations hereinbefore described and prosecuted the case. The court (paid by public funds) in a courthouse (built and staffed by public funds) appointed a public defender (paid for by public funds) to represent the defendant. Following conviction of violation of sections 11350 and 11550 the court requested and received a probation report from the probation department (staffed and paid for by public funds) which recommended probation. At time of sentencing by the court the defendant did not go to state prison for his conviction of Health and Safety Code section 11350, a felony,4 he did not even go to county jail for the minimum 90-day period mandated by section 11550 by reason of the application of section 654—he was placed on probation and went to COLLEGE.5
In People v. Fusaro (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 877 [96 Cal.Rptr. 368] (involving the applicability of § 654 in the sale and possession situation) the court said at page 894: “Where, as here, each sale consumes only part of his inventory he may be punished separately for the possession of his unsold stock in trade.” In view of the opinions hereinbefore expressed and paraphrasing the Fusaro language above, I would hold in the instant case (involving the applicability of § 654 in the possession and under the influence situation) that: Where, as here, each “fix” consumes only part of his inventory he should be punished separately for the possession of his “unused” stock.
*811Accordingly, by reason of the foregoing I would reverse the trial court’s judgment that section 654 applies to the instant case and remand the case to the trial court to resentence defendant separately on his convictions for violation of Health and Safety Code sections 11350 and 11550 within the parameters provided by law.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 8, 1976, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 9, 1976.

One relatively recent set of statistics of a superior court judge sitting in a criminal court reflects that about 50 percent of all felonies handled involved narcotic or dangerous drug cases (sale, possession for sale, or possession); 25 percent of the felonies were to varying degrees drug related (murders, assaults, robberies, or burglaries) while only 25 percent were nondrug related.

See Drugs: A $17-Billion-A-Year Habit that U.S. Can’t Break (May 10, 1976) U.S. News & World Report.

See Revolving Door Justice'. Why Criminals Go Free (May 10. 1976) U.S. News & World Report.

Health and Safety Code section 11350 (possession of heroin) provides that a person so convicted “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not less than two years or more than 10 years . . .” and if previously convicted he “shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of not less than five years or more than 20 years . . .” and if previously convicted two or more times “he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a period of 15 years to life____”

Pursuant to Rules of Court, rule 12(a), I have augmented the record on appeal by ordering up the superior court file.