Court Opinion

ID: 9477987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:36:15.868461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:09.275253
License: Public Domain

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge,
with whom PIERCE, Circuit Judge, joins; concurring in part; dissenting in part
I fully concur in the en banc dissenting opinion of Judge Pierce and I concur in the dissenting opinion of Judge Mahoney for substantially the same reasons set forth in the original panel majority opinion in United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1987), except for part “D”. Instead, I concur in the per curiam opinion insofar as it holds that bona fide fees actually paid to counsel are exempt from post-conviction forfeiture because otherwise, as Judge Pierce notes, the government by threat of forfeiture after conviction could severely limit a defendant’s choice of counsel at the pre-trial and trial stages of the prosecution.
The broad remedial language of the statute which authorizes post-indictment pretrial restraint of potentially forfeitable assets contains no intimation that it does not reach legitimate attorneys’ fees, see 21 U.S. C. § 853(a)(1), (b), (c), (e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The legislative history does not support the claim that Congress excluded legitimate attorneys’ fees from , the forfeiture provisions, see S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 198-201, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3381-84 (describing provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1963 identical to those of 21 U.S.C. § 853). Insofar as Congress considered the issue, it left it for the courts to decide. See H.R.Rep. No. 845, Part 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 & n. 1 (1984) (report accompanying draft of 1984 CCE forfeiture amendments). Consequently, the original panel’s unanimous view — endorsed by amici for Monsanto— that the statute reaches legitimate attorneys’ fees is one that I adhere to. See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 641-42 (4th Cir.1988) (en banc) (same view of statute); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.1988) (same).
Further, the use of the word “may” in 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1), should be read sensibly to allow for certain invasions into otherwise restrainable assets. It is appropriate therefore to allow a district court to provide for subsistence, necessary medical care, shelter costs, and court-appointed counsel for an accused possessing questionable assets because these necessary expenses justify such an invasion for those assets. In light of the broad remedial purposes and liberal construction of the statute, see § 853(o), it is hard to imagine that the statute, on its own terms, strictly limits these legitimate expenses, but permits unlimited legal expense. The adversarial hearing held to be a “reasonable compromise” by the Monsanto majority, 836 F.2d at 82-85, provides procedural safeguards sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment due process concerns. Moreover, the hearing mandated by the Monsanto panel majority, 836 F.2d at 83, satisfies the qualified Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and a district court has authority under the statute to conduct such a hearing.
To the extent that the filed opinions of my other colleagues disagree with the *1420above, I respectfully dissent from their views.