Court Opinion

ID: 9795208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:22:31.166085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:27:17.239718
License: Public Domain

*683EASTAUGH, Justice,
dissenting.
Introduction. I respectfully dissent. The court affirms Bax's summary judgment because it concludes that DeNardo did not demonstrate the presence of a genuine issue of material fact about whether Bax abused the conditional privilege that attached to the statements she made to coworkers.1 I agree that Bax made out a prima facie showing that her statements were conditionally privileged because they ostensibly addressed workplace or (perhaps) mutual safety.2 But this simply means that we must decide whether, as DeNardo argued below and argues here, there are genuine factual disputes about whether Bax abused, and therefore lost, the conditional privilege. In my view, the record reveals at least two genuine factual issues material to that question: whether she had knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of her statements to coworkers that DeNardo was following her or stalking her, and whether she spoke for a privileged purpose. The record also raises questions about whether the words she actually spoke to coworkers expressed an opinion rather than a statement of fact. We should therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand.
Controlling legal principles. Before we turn to the pertinent evidence, it is useful to consider the two controlling legal principles, one substantive and one procedural, that set the stage for the analysis we should follow.
The substantive principle concerns the seope of the conditional privilege that attaches to communications about workplace safety or other matters of common interest. A declarant abuses a conditional privilege if (1) she knows the defamatory matter to be false or acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity,3 (2) the defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is given (e.g., solely out of spite or ill will), (8) the publication is made to an unnecessary recipient, or (4) the publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be nee-essary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is privileged.4 The first two grounds potentially apply here.
The procedural principle concerns the standard for granting and reviewing summary judgment in Alaska. Summary judgment may not be entered and therefore may not be sustained on appeal if there is a genuine issue of material fact.5 It is a legal question whether a genuine issue of material fact exists; we therefore exercise our independent judgment in reviewing the facts and the inferences reasonably drawn from them in favor of the appellant when we decide whether a genuine, material factual dispute exists.6
Alaska law imposes a low threshold for defeating a motion for summary judgment. In Moffatt v. Brown, a libel case, we declined to adopt the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal summary judgment standard *684announced in Amderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.7 As we explained:
Instead of adopting the summary judgment standard articulated in Anderson, we choose to continue our longstanding interpretation of our summary judgment standard as contained in Civil Rule 56(c). Civil Rule 56(c) directs a court to grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." We decline to incorporate the applicable substantive evi-dentiary standard into this state's summary judgment practice [as was done in Anderson ].... Rule 56(c) only requires a showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists to be litigated, and not a showing that a party will ultimately prevail at trial, [8]
We noted that as a consequence of this holding, "it is somewhat harder for a libel defendant to win summary judgment in our state courts, using the 'no genuine issue of material fact' standard, than in federal court.9 Although a non-movant must present more than a "scintilla" of evidence to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant need only present enough evidence to "reasonably tend[ ] to dispute or contradict" the evidence presented by the movant.10 Moreover, we have held that we will not weigh evidence when reviewing a decision on summary judgment.11 "[TJhere is a genuine issue' of material fact as long as the nonmovant has presented some evidence in support of its legal theory."12
The standard for granting and upholding summary judgments in Alaska is therefore more rigorous than the federal standard.13 It does not matter under the Alaska standard which party will ultimately bear the burden of persuasion should the case go to trial.14 "Whether a defendant has abused a privilege is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts are such that only one conclusion can reasonably be drawn." 15 Here, the question on summary judgment should be whether DeNardo raised a genuine issue of material fact about whether Bax abused the conditional privilege; stated differently, the question is whether the court file contained evidence reasonably contradicting Bax's claim that her statements were protected by the privilege.16 In this case as it is presented to us, all that matters is whether there is more than a scintilla of evidence demonstrating the existence of facts that, if believed, would permit a reasonable person to find that either (1) Bax knew her statements were false, (2) she entertained serious doubts as to their truth, or (8) her primary purpose was not to advance the identified privileged interest.17
*685Cireumstantial evidence is normally needed to establish an actor's purpose or intent, because in the context of disputed endeavors, actors often do not expressly admit their true reasons for acting.18 Cireumstantial evidence is the only evidence presently available relevant to Bax's belief and intentions and to whether summary judgment was correctly entered against DeNardo.
What are the sources of the relevant facts? We must look to sources that satisfy Alaska Civil Rule 56(c). Here these sources include DeNardo's verified complaint, his verified opposition to Bax's summary judgment motion, Bax's sworn responses to interrogatories and production requests, and the affidavits of Bax and coworker Holly Parsons.19
Factual background. DeNardo filed his defamation suit against Bax and others after Bax served and filed her April 4, 2001 affidavit in DeNardo's then-pending federal action, DeNardo v. Calista Corp., et al., Case No. A00-309 Civil. Bax's affidavit supported her motion for a protective order to require that DeNardo's unfinished deposition be completed at the federal courthouse. It also revealed to DeNardo that she had previously spoken about him to others. Thus, it stated that she and DeNardo had worked at ANI for about seven months as advertising sales representatives, and that she had been concerned about her personal safety in DeNar-do's presence and was extremely concerned because he had refused at his deposition to answer whether he had brought a weapon to the deposition. She also stated in her affidavit that
when we worked together at ANI, there were several occasions when Mr. DeNardo followed me in his vehicle. I was worried that he was "stalking" me. I have expressed concern about this to Holly Parsons and other defendants in this action, as well as to [my attorney].
What Bax said in her affidavit for the federal court was absolutely privileged, as Judge Gleason correctly ruled below.20 De-*686Nardo does not appear to argue here to the contrary. He argues instead that what Bax previously told her coworkers was actionable because Bax abused the conditional privilege that potentially applied.
What Bax said (or may have said). The court fails to address the potentially critical threshold question about what Bax actually told her coworkers. Its opinion assumes that Bax told them that she "was worried that he was 'stalking' me." 21
The court's assumption apparently derives from Bax's April 4, 2001 affidavit. But that affidavit states only that Bax was "worried that he was 'stalking' me," not that she had told coworkers that she was "worried that he was 'stalking' me." The affidavit only generally describes what she told coworkers; it does not describe the content of any conversation with precision.
It is unclear from the record exactly what Bax told her coworkers.22 There is a difference between what a declarant thinks and what a declarant actually declares. What Bax actually told coworkers is material because the court's opinion assumes she was merely expressing to coworkers an opinion (belief, concern, worry), rather than a matter of fact.23 It may also be assuming, among other things, that DeNardo must demonstrate that Bax knew she was not actually worried or that she spoke recklessly when she supposedly said she was worried, an arguably harder thing to establish than demonstrating that, when she accused him of stalking her, she either knew the accusation was false or recklessly disregarded its falsity.
Under Alaska law, defamation actions are constitutionally barred "where the allegedly defamatory statements are expressions of ideas and 'cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual.' ""24 The critical distinction is between "statements represented as 'expressions of ideas' and statements purporting to represent facts."25 To ascertain whether a statement is factual, this court considers the context of the statement, including the speaker's use of cautionary or equivocating words."26 If *687the speaker is expressing a subjective view, a speculation, or a theory, rather than claiming to possess objectively verifiable facts that confirm the truth of the statement, the statement is not actionable.27 The court's opinion today seems to analyze the defamation claim as though Bax's statements were not statements of fact.28
We must therefore start by determining whether a factfinder could reasonably find from the record that Bax told others as a matter of fact that DeNardo stalked her, or followed her under civreumstances that implied stalking. Her April 4, 2001 affidavit is ambiguous in describing what she said in 2000. Taken in isolation, it is possible to read it to imply that she told coworkers that she was "worried" DeNardo was stalking her, and that she was therefore only expressing a qualified opinion, not a statement of fact. The court's opinion seems to rely on this implication in deciding that it was not error to grant summary judgment to Bax.29
But that implication cannot be taken in isolation, and to do so would improperly take inferences in favor of the movant. Indeed, the words of the affidavit also reasonably permit an inference unfavorable to the mov-ant, that she had expressed an unqualified statement of fact to coworkers that DeNardo had stalked her.
In any event, we must look beyond the affidavit to other evidence before the superi- or court. Bax's statements in discovery, supplied to the superior court by DeNardo, contain no such qualification. An interrogatory asked her to describe her communications with others regarding the facts of this case. Her sworn answer stated that during conversations when she worked at ANI, she told Holly Parsons "that she had also noticed plaintiff follow her in his vehicle a couple of times, and seemed to be following her into a store on one occasion." It also stated that she "also told Ms. Parsons knowing plaintiff had followed her made her uncomfortable." Her answer further stated that "[oln one occasion, Ms. Bax commented to Brandy Johnson, their supervisor, about plaintiff's following her...." Likewise, when DeNar-do's discovery requests asked Bax what actions Brandy Johnson took after Bax complained of plaintiff's stalking, Bax responded under oath that she did "not know what, if any, actions were taken after she mentioned that she had seen DeNardo following her." (Emphasis added.)
For purposes of considering the propriety of Bax's summary judgment, these discovery answers compel an inference that Bax un-qualifiedly told coworkers that DeNardo had followed her, not that she merely told them that she was "worried" or was "concerned" or had formed a "belief" that DeNardo had followed her.
In my view, the opinion's misapprehension about what Bax said misdirects the remainder of the opinion's analysis, both factually and legally. If this genuine issue is material, as the court's treatment implies, we must set aside the summary judgment.
This brings us to the two main factual disputes that preclude summary judgment.
Knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity of statements. The first dispute is whether Bax knew of or recklessly disregarded the (possible) falsity of her statements that DeNardo had followed or stalked *688her. DeNardo's defamation complaint was verified. It is therefore to be treated as an affidavit.30 It alleged that Bax and others had stated that DeNardo was stalking them or had stalked them. It then alleged that "DeNardo at no time stalked, followed, and/or loitered outside defendants' residences." Although that denial may be ambiguous-it is unclear whether "outside defendants' residences" modifies "stalked" or "followed"-the verified complaint also asserted that the defendants' (and thus Bax's) statements that DeNardo had stalked Bax were "false." DeNardo also expressed an unqualified denial when Bax moved for summary judgment; his verified opposition to her motion stated: "Plaintiff never stalked Joy Bax James, Holly Parsons, or Annie Harris." In response to Bax's assertion in her summary judgment motion that plaintiff never denied stalking Bax, DeNardo stated in his verified opposition: "Au contraire, plaintiff specifically denied stalking in § III 12 in plaintiff's verified complaint."
Other cireumstances also reasonably permit inferences that DeNardo had not actually stalked or followed Bax and that Bax did not really think he had.31 This included evidence, contained in Bax's discovery responses, that Bax had not complained of stalking to anyone but her coworkers. As DeNardo points out, her discovery responses revealed that she did not complain to her husband, her two children (one of whom was then about twelve years old), police, or ANI supervisors, and that she did not tell any of them that she thought DeNardo presented a threat to workplace safety because he had followed or stalked her. Bax admitted in discovery that there were "never any verbal or written statements" that DeNardo had stalked Bax. Furthermore, in discovery Bax identified no witnesses to stalking and did not remember the dates of any stalking. DeNardo also correctly noted that Bax, who had complained to sales manager Brandy Johnson, never followed up regarding her stalking complaints and did not know what, if any, actions were taken by Parsons.
DeNardo's verified opposition described cireumstances that he contended confirmed that Bax had spoken falsely in accusing him of stalking her. Some of these cireum-stances may be suspect because they were not a matter of personal prior knowledge or observation to DeNardo. But to the extent these circumstances are based on DeNardo's interpretation of what Bax and others said in response to discovery and in other court papers, we may consider them in deciding whether summary judgment was entered erroneously. These cireumstances, if they are correct, tend to support a conclusion that DeNardo did not actually stalk or follow Bax; 32 they consequently also support a conclusion that Bax knew that DeNardo had not followed or stalked her and therefore that she was not really worried that DeNardo had followed or stalked her.33
DeNardo's verified opposition also de-seribed several cireumstances about which he had personal knowledge that would reasonably permit an inference that Bax was not actually afraid of DeNardo or that she had spoken falsely to others about DeNardo. Thus, his opposition asserted that during a March 8, 2001 intermission in his deposition, he had shared lunch with Bax, Parsons, and Harris. About that event he stated that "[njobody displayed any fear and nobody objected." This cireumstance would permit (although certainly not compel) a finding that *689Bax did not, even as of 2001, consider De-Nardo to present a threat of harm.34 Given the assertion in her 2001 affidavit that she was currently concerned about her safety in DeNardo's presence, a shared lunch also seems to raise credibility questions about the truth of the other averments in her affidavit. It thus potentially raises a question about whether it is true that in 2000 she was "worried" about her safety and whether she was truthful when she allegedly told coworkers that DeNardo had followed or stalked her. DeNardo's opposition also asserted that he had filed, when he was her coworker at ANI, an evaluation and notice of discrimination that named Bax as a "major perpetrator" in creating a hostile work place. Bax's knowledge of his complaint is some evidence that would tend to show that Bax might have had a motive-retaliation-to speak falsely or recklessly. Likewise, evidence of her alleged interest in his customer lists and commissions would tend to demonstrate another motive for knowingly false or reckless speech.
Purpose of the statements. This brings us to the last factual dispute: whether Bax in fact spoke for a purpose that was privileged. DeNardo asserted in his verified complaint that Bax's statements were made maliciously, and were intended to harm him. DeNardo asserts here that Bax was motivated to accuse him falsely by her "persistent efforts coveting DeNardo's customer lists and commissions." He asserts that Bax knew her statements were false and that "she intended to injure plaintiff in his reputation and well-being." DeNardo claims that the "malicious groundlessness" of her stalking accusations must be considered in context of her discovery responses. He claims that she admits she read DeNardo's office evaluation, which DeNardo characterizes as "detailing Bax's activities to hijack DeNardo's advertising accounts and create a discriminatory and hostile work environment." He asserts that it is "important" that her accusation took place after she read DeNardo's evaluation accusing her and the other employees of "account theft and heinous discriminatory conduct." DeNardo asserts that Bax "fabricated her stalking accusations to cause DeNardo's termination and obtain his client list." 35
The evidence that potentially supports a finding that Bax acted either maliciously or not for the privileged purpose is not necessarily compelling, but it is nonetheless sufficient to preclude summary judgment on this issue.36 DeNardo had disputes with Bax and other coworkers about retaining his accounts. There were mutual accusations of account piracy. DeNardo's ten-page "feedback" evaluation of February 11, 2000 asserted that accounts had been distributed in a discriminatory fashion that disfavored him and favored Bax. He asserted in the same document that Bax had continually attempted to claim his accounts as her own. His June 23, 2000 complaint to ANI management asserted that Bax and others had "purposely joined together to create a hostile and vindictive office atmosphere focused against me." These assertions are not easily documented; the existence of the two documents and Bax's apparent admission that she had seen them reasonably permit an inference that there were reasons why, apart from workplace safety, Bax might have told others that De-Nardo was following or stalking her.
Moreover, the facts discussed above that permit an inference that Bax had falsely *690accused DeNardo of stalking her also imply that her motive for saying those things was not to promote workplace safety. Thus, evi-denee that Bax had not complained of stalking to her husband, her children, police, or ANI supervisors and that she had not told any of them that DeNardo presented a threat to workplace safety because he had followed or stalked her, reasonably implies that Bax was not motivated by workplace safety or even personal safety when she spoke. -It implies instead that she spoke for some other-and therefore unprivileged and impermissible-purpose. Likewise, DeNar-do noted, correctly it seems, that Bax, who had complained to sales manager Brandy Johnson, never followed up regarding her stalking complaints and did not know what, if any, actions were taken by Parsons. And again, DeNardo contended that personal safety could not have been Bax's genuine reason for speaking, given that DeNardo shared Iunch with Bax and other defendants during an intermission in his 2001 deposition. Having lunch with DeNardo also seems potentially inconsistent with Bax's assertion in her 2001 affidavit that "I am very concerned about my personal safety in Mr. DeNardo's presence." This raises a credibility question that casts into doubt her predominant motive for speaking.
Conclusion. Any one of these three factual disputes precludes summary judgment and precludes affirmance. We should therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

. At 681-82.

. See Taranto v. North Slope Borough, 992 P.2d 1111, 1115 (Alaska 1999) (holding that speech on matters of public safety is conditionally privileged); Restatement or Torts § 594 (detailing conditional privilege for speech related to "sufficiently important interest of publisher").

. A conditionally privileged declarant traditionally abused the privilege if she did not believe the statement to be true or lacked reasonable grounds for so believing. As a result of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that strict liability in defamation is unconstitutional, the traditional conditional priv-flege standard was modified: "mere negligence as to falsity, being required [now] for all actions of defamation, is no longer treated as sufficient to constitute abuse of a conditional privilege. Instead knowledge or reckless disregard as to falsity is necessary for this purpose." Restate mEnt (SEconp) or Torts § 599 cmt. d (1977). This court's precedents have not been entirely clear on this point. See Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1999) (determining whether declarant abused privilege by deciding whether he had "reasonable belief" in truth of statement); accord Schneider v. Pay'N Save, 723 P.2d 619, 625 (Alaska 1986).

. Schneider, 723 P.2d at 624-25 (adopting standards set forth in Restatement (SEconp) or Torts § 599 cmt. a (1977)).

. See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(c);, Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432, 447 (Alaska 2002).

. Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 447.

. Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988) (discussing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).

. Id. at 943-44 (internal citations omitted); see also Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 449.

. Moffatt, 751 P.2d at 944.

. Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 449.

. Id.

. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Meyer v. State, Dep't of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Div. ex rel. N.G.T., 994 P.2d 365, 367 (Alaska 1999) (holding that putative father's sworn denial of paternity prevented summary judgment, even though movant had presented strong scientific evidence showing paternity, because "any evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact precludes a summary finding of paternity") (internal quotation marks omitted) {emphasis in original).

. Bax does not argue that we should jettison that standard in favor of the prevailing federal standard so we have no occasion here to reconsider the appropriate standard.

. See Ball v. Birch, Horton, Bittner & Cherot, 58 P.3d 481, 485 (Alaska 2002).

. See Schneider, 723 P.2d at 624.

. See Lull v. Wick Constr. Co., 614 P.2d 321, 325 (Alaska 1980) (holding that summary judgment was appropriately granted because plaintiff had not established triable issue of fact regarding whether declarant had abused conditional privilege).

. The court's opinion states the standard as follows: "DeNardo ... has the burden of raising a material issue of fact on the question whether Bax entertained serious doubts about the truth of her statement that she was subjectively worried DeNardo was stalking her." At 680. That would be the correct standard if the court were only required to consider whether Bax abused *685the privilege by acting with "actual malice" -Le., with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of the defamatory statements. See Schneider, 723 P.2d at 624; Briggs, 984 P.2d at 1121. But the opinion then considers whether DeNardo raised an issue about whether Bax abused the privilege by publishing the defamatory matter for some purpose other than that for which the privilege is given (Le., solely for spite or ill will). At 681-682. See Schneider, 723 P.2d at 624; Restatement (Seconp) or Torts § 603 cmt. a (1977). The opinion's recitation of the standard is apparently too narrow.

. See Kinzel v. Discovery Drilling, Inc., 93 P.3d 427, 434-35 (Alaska 2004); see also Indus. Commercial Elec., Inc. v. McLees, 101 P.3d 593, 600 (Alaska 2004) (holding that circumstantial evidence in record permitted inference that appel-lee's alleged misrepresentation in contracting was fraudulent); Phillips v. Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc., 721 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Alaska 1986) (holding that circumstantial evidence presented in expert witness's affidavit sufficed to raise genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellee acted in bad faith).

. Verified pleadings and documents are equivalent to affidavits. See Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691, 695 (Alaska 1999) (citing Smith v. Thompson, 923 P.2d 101, 102 n. 1 (Alaska 1996)).

. Bax's assertions that DeNardo was potentially dangerous did not convince the federal court.
United States District Judge H. Russel Holland denied the protective order motion, and stated:
The court has managed litigation involving Mr. DeNardo for approximately fifteen years. He has been involved in some thirty cases in this court. The court has never had a report of Mr. DeNardo behaving violently or having a weapon at any time in connection with any of these proceedings. The court is unpersuaded that there is any reason to believe that Mr. DeNar-do would attempt to harm anyone in connection with this case. If, as is suggested, any of the parties or witnesses believe that Mr. De-Nardo has been "stalking" them, that is a matter for the Anchorage Police Department to look into.
Because the order denying Bax's motion is not in the appellate record and was not before the superior court, I do not rely on its entry or text to demonstrate error here. I refer to it only to temper any premature conclusions a reader might draw about DeNardo based on the repetition in the court's opinion and in my dissent of Bax's comments about DeNardo. A court may properly rely on the order's result as an exercise in judicial notice, and on its text under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. Hess v. State, 20 P.3d 1121, 1127 (Alaska 2001) ('The evidence reliably reflects the fact of acquittal. A court thus may take judicial notice of the fact of an acquittal under Alaska Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), as implicitly requested here. Or it may allow evidence of the acquittal io be introduced as a hearsay exception under Alaska Rule of Evidence 803(8) because the acquittal is a matter of public record.").

. At 675, 680 (quoting part of Bax's April 4, 2001 affidavit).

. The superior court did not attempt to quote Bax's declarations; in granting Bax's motion for summary judgment, the court stated that it found that Bax, "to the extent that she made comments to co-workers that she felt she was being followed, that even if she used the word that she felt she was being stalked, that those comments ... were subject to privilege."

. Thus, the court's opinion frequently quotes Bax's affidavit, or characterizes her statements, as expressing "worry," "concern," "fear," or a "belief" that DeNardo was stalking her. Id. at 675, 675, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 682, 683. The opinion fails to distinguish between what Bax stated in her 2001 affidavit about what she believed and what she may have actually said to coworkers. See id. at 674-75 ("DeNardo based his claim on comments made by Bax to coworkers that she was "worried that [DeNardo] was "stalking" [her].' "); id. at 678 ('The superior court reasoned that the statements Bax made to coworkers that 'she felt she was being stalked' were conditionally privileged as statements of concern about personal safety in the workplace."); id. at 679 ('Where, as here, a worker reveals to coworkers that she is concerned that another coworker might be stalking her, a sufficiently important interest to the statement's publisher, her personal safety, is at stake."); id. at 680 ("We note that the false and defamatory comment that Bax allegedly made was that Bax was worried that DeNardo was stalking her and not that he was in fact stalking her."); id. at 681 ("DeNardo had the opportunity to question witnesses about the basis for Bax's belief that De-Nardo was stalking her ...."); id. at 682 ('But evidence that Bax might have disliked DeNardo does not cast doubt upon her statement that she feared DeNardo was stalking her.").

. Sands v. Living Word Fellowship, 34 P.3d 955, 960 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 LEd.2d 1 (1990)); see also Moffatt, 751 P.2d at 945 (holding that declarant's use of word "horrible" to describe medical procedure was "simply the opinion of the author" and was therefore protected by First Amendment).

. Kinzel, 93 P.3d at 439; see also id. at 439-40 n. 50 (noting " 'that a distinction should be made between an evaluative-type opinion and the deductive type," the latter actually imputing facts that can be proven false and thus potentially actionable") (quoting W. Pace KeEton, Er aL, Pros-ser anp on tas Law or Torts § 113A, at 814-15 (5th ed.1984)).

. Kinzel, 93 P.3d at 440 (considering whether prefatory phrase "I wonder" made allegedly defamatory statement protected conjecture); see also Haynes v. Alred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir.1993), cited in Kinzel, 93 P.3d at *687440 ("A statement of fact is not shielded from an action for defamation by being prefaced with the words 'in my opinion,' but if it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view ... the statement is not actionable.").

. Kinzel, 93 P.3d at 440.

. The court's opinion does not, however, directly consider whether Bax's statements were statements of fact or expressions of ideas. And the court's opinion suggests that the statements were Bax's opinions, but does not discuss whether the statements were protected by the First Amendment. Thus the court's opinion blends the initial phase of the defamation analysis (Le., were the statements defamatory and actionable) with the abuse-of-the-privilege analysis (ie., was there malice or publication for some other purpose). The same mistake contributed to the summary judgment order (which was entered in reliance on our opinion in Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1121 (Alaska 1999)).

. Thus, the opinion frequently refers to the affidavit and characterizes Bax's statements to coworkers in terms of "worry," "concern," "fear," or "belief" At 675, 675, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 682, 683. These characterizations all appear to derive from how Bax's affidavit impliedly described her statements.

. See Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691, 695 (Alaska 1999) (citing Smith v. Thompson, 923 P.2d 101, 102 n. 1 (Alaska 1996)).

. Because there is no direct evidence of Bax's belief in the truthfulness of her allegedly defamatory statements, DeNardo's most viable approach to showing abuse of the conditional privilege on malice grounds is to convince the fact finder that (a) Bax's statements that DeNardo stalked her were false and that (b) Bax therefore must have known her belief that DeNardo had stalked her was false.

. The superior court itself declined to grant Bax summary judgment on the falsity prong of her defamation claim. The superior court noted that DeNardo had raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether Bax's claim that DeNardo followed her was false.

. Thus, even if Bax actually did tell coworkers that she was "worried that" DeNardo stalked her, DeNardo presented sufficient evidence to put into genuine dispute whether she was actually worried that he stalked her.

. Such a finding on remand would also be supported by the fact that the federal judge who denied Bax's protective order motion apparently did not consider DeNardo to present a threat of harm, either.

. Likewise to similar effect, DeNardo asserts on appeal that Bax "deliberately made her per se defamatory stalking accusations in order to obtain DeNardo's advertising accounts, destroy his credibility, and hide the extent of her discriminatory conduct memorialized in DeNardo's case against Calista and Alaska Newspapers, Inc."

. In contrast to the impression the court's opinion might leave, at 681-682, DeNardo does not have to prove on summary judgment that Bax's predominant purpose was spite or ill will (or some other non-privileged purpose), but only needs to raise a genuine issue such that reasonable jurors could disagree over Bax's predominant purpose. See Hatten v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 778 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1989) (holding that where determining employer's predominant motive for firing employee involved balancing evidence and weighing credibility, question of predominant motive should have been decided by trier of fact).