Court Opinion

ID: 9673194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:03.111017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.616694
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from my learned colleagues in this case. I would hold that Illinois Central has failed to meet its burden in negating personal jurisdiction based on the theory of general jurisdiction.
The issues briefed and presented to this Court concern the trial court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over Illinois Central. Under the facts of this ease, the trial court and the Majority have found that the trial court lacks such power. I disagree. In addressing this case, the Majority has attempted to apply convenience factors into a personal jurisdiction analysis, thereby reach-*602mg a forum non conveniens result through personal jurisdiction.1 Although I do recognize the equities of such a result, the facts and relevant law dictate a different result.
Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Once it has been determined that a nonresident defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state,2 the contacts are evaluated in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 228, 228 (Tex.1991). In this inquiry, it is incumbent upon the defendant to present a compelling case that the presence of some consideration would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Id. at 231. The following factors, when appropriate, should be considered: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id.
The minimum contacts analysis now encompasses many of these fairness considerations, and as such, it has become less likely that the exercise of jurisdiction will fail a fair play analysis. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex.1990). Therefore, only in rare eases will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state. Guardian Royal Exch., 815 S.W.2d at 231. The present case is not one of those rare cases.
The rare cases have generally been restricted to those involving international defendants. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-15, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); Guardian Royal Exch, 815 S.W.2d at 232-33; Juarez v. United Parcel Service de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 933 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1996, no writ). In these eases, the presence of an international defendant tends to be a determinative factor in finding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The present ease contains no such determinative factor.
Discussion
The Majority states that although the burden on Illinois Central in defending this lawsuit would be minimal, all other factors indicate that personal jurisdiction over Illinois Central would be unreasonable. The Majority has attempted to make the lack of interest Texas would have in adjudicating the dispute a determinative factor in finding the exercise of jurisdiction to be unreasonable. The Majority reasons that because James’s injury has no relation to Illinois Central’s activities in Texas, subjecting Illinois Central to our court system would not protect our citizens from potential future actions of Illinois Central. I respectfully disagree.
This is not a case like Asahi, Guardian Royal, or Juarez. This case concerns an Illinois railroad which has substantial contacts with Texas. As indicated by the Majority’s opinion, Illinois Central generates millions of dollars worth of business in Texas. In 1990, Illinois Central generated $75 million of business in Harris County. Illinois Central operates trains and tracks in Texas. Illinois Central maintains an office in Harris County which employs an agent of Illinois Central who solicits business from the citizens of Texas. In addition, Illinois Central has defended other lawsuits in Texas.
The burden on Illinois Central in defending this suit is minimal. In fact, the nature and extent of Illinois Central’s contacts with Texas justify a conclusion that Illinois Central should expect to be called into our courts. See Project Engineering USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 723 *603(Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).3 Additionally, Texas does have an interest in adjudicating the dispute in that such litigation could affect how Illinois Central conducts its business in Texas, and how Texas is able to regulate these types of interstate activities. Finally, I would also note there are more appropriate methods for addressing eases such as this, i.e., forum non conveniens.
Conclusion
Based on the facts of this ease, I would find that having to defend a lawsuit in this state based on an event that took place outside the state by a party who has so clearly availed itself of the benefits and protections offered by this state, does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Accordingly, I would hold the trial court erred in granting Illinois Central’s special appearance.

. The issues presented by this case are more properly addressed through a forum non conve-niens analysis, but because of the trial court decision, we will only address the personal jurisdiction issues.

. I am in agreement with the Majority’s finding that Illinois Central has sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support jurisdiction.

. In Gator Hawk, this Court stated:
The nature and extent of appellants’ contacts with Texas justify a conclusion that appellants should expect to be called to our courts. Nothing in the record indicates that litigation in a Texas court would be excessively burdensome or inconvenient to appellants. Litigation in Texas has provided both sides with benefits and protection of our laws. We hold that the exercise of jurisdiction over appellants by a Texas court did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Project Engineering USA Corp. v. Gator Hawk, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 716, 723 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).