Court Opinion

ID: 9559440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:29:07.776713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.751617
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Farangis Najmabadi is a sixty-year-old native and citizen of Iran. She has lived in the United States since April 5, 1987. In those twenty-three years, she studied fashion design, established a dress-making business, and now designs Western style clothing for Iranian women.
In March 1998, the former INS initiated removal proceedings against Najmabadi for overstaying her tourist visa. Najmabadi appeared before an IJ without counsel. She applied for asylum, withholding, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. On April 11, 2000, the IJ denied Najmabadi’s asylum claim. The IJ found Najmabadi credible, but concluded that she lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution based on the record at that time.
On July 20, 2001, Najmabadi appealed the IJ’s denial to the BIA, this time with the assistance of counsel. On February 25, 2003, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion. On August 18, 2004, this Court denied Najmabadi’s petition for review. Najmabadi v. Ashcroft, 107 Fed.Appx. 98 (9th Cir.2004).
On December 14, 2004, Najmabadi filed a motion to reopen with the BIA based on the changed circumstances in Iran following September 11, 2001. On March 31, 2005, the BIA denied Najmabadi’s motion to reopen. The majority denies Najmabadi’s petition for review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen. I would grant that petition.
Some of the evidence Najmabadi submitted shows a reasonable likelihood1 that Najmabadi has satisfied the requirement of a one in ten chance of persecution2 based on her Western appearance and affiliation. For example, the record reflects that in 2003, two long-term Iranian U.K. residents were forcibly returned to Iran. Amnesty International reported that the two Iranians may have faced torture and been held in detention. Additionally, the record contains a May 2004 U.S. State Department travel warning which states that U.S. citizens may be at risk of “harassment or kidnapping” in Iran. Further, the warning said “U.S. citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities.”
*994Although Najmabadi is not a U.S. citizen, she has lived in the U.S. for the last twenty three years and has the appearance and mannerisms of an Iranian-U.S. citizen. Najmabadi herself said that she “looks and acts like a Westerner derived from twenty years of living in the United States.” Najmabadi’s affidavit asserts that the Iranian government punishes Iranians sent back sent back to Iran from the U.S. with “torture, flogging, executions, beheadings and lashes.” As the majority notes, under Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.1991), the BIA is required to accept these facts, stated in Najmabadi’s motion to reopen, as true unless they are inherently unbelievable. Najmabadi’s assertions that the Iranian government mistreats Iranians sent back from the U.S. are not inherently unbelievable. Iran’s human rights violations are widely known and supported by the record. Therefore, Najmabadi’s assertions should be accepted as true.3
The State Department Human Rights Country Reports for Iran from 1999 to 2004 uniformly state that “citizens returning from abroad sometimes were subjected to searches and extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of anti-government activities abroad.” The reports also uniformly state that “authorities sometimes harassed women if their dress or behavior was considered inappropriate and women may be sentenced to flogging or imprisonment for such violations.”
Although the Country Reports remained consistent from 1999 to 2004, before and after Najmabadi’s immigration court merits hearing, it is difficult to understand how anyone could think that conditions in Iran for those associated with the West have not dramatically changed for the worse following September 11, 2001. Indeed, the case cited by both parties and the majority opinion on the standard for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, Malty v. Ashcroft, recognized that a “petitioner’s evidence regarding changed circumstances will almost always be related to his [or her] initial claim; nothing in the statute or regulations requires otherwise.” 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004).
The BIA’s conclusion that there is no evidence supporting the likelihood of persecution of returnees from the U.S. “outside the realm of speculation” is undermined by the above described record evidence. Najmabadi submitted some new evidence, which was unavailable at the time of Najmabadi’s hearing before the IJ, including the Amnesty International Report and the 2004 U.S. State Department travel warning. It is reasonably likely that, upon reopening, Najmabadi could establish that she faces a one in ten risk of being targeted and detained by the Iranian government or non-government agents that the government is unable or unwilling to control.
In conclusion, Najmabadi has lived in this country for twenty-three years as an entrepreneur, a small business owner, and a law-abiding member of her community. Because I believe that Najmabadi should be granted the chance to reopen her case to provide evidence regarding the persecution of individuals returned from the West to Iran, including “torture, flogging, executions, beheadings, and lashes,” I respectfully dissent.

. This court has held that a motion to reopen must be supported with new evidence, but "need only establish a prima facie case for relief, and need not conclusively establish that [the petitioner] warrants relief.” Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.2003). A "respondent demonstrates prima facie eligibility for relief where the evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied.” Id. (citing In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000)) (emphasis added).

. It is well-established that asylum may be granted where an applicant demonstrates a one in ten chance of persecution. See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2001). Thus, Najmabadi’s motion to reopen need only establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that she faces at least a one in ten chance of persecution.

. It is also worth noting that in his original decision denying Najmabadi’s claims for relief, the IJ found "no reason to doubt [Najmabadi's] truthfulness and veracity.”