Court Opinion

ID: 9515028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:53:12.610627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:24.144759
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring and concurring in result).
[¶ 34.] I concur with the majority on Issues One and Two. As to Issue Three, I concur in the result only: there should be no doubt that the forum-selection clause is enforceable, reasonable, and fair under the circumstances of this case. Unfortunately, the reasoning in the majority opinion clouds the issue, works an injustice to Klenz, and may work an injustice to future plaintiffs who find themselves in a similar position.
[¶ 35.] In the course of its discussion, the majority adopts the four-factor test, notes that, “[u]nder these factors, the forum selection clause may be reasonable,” and then proceeds to show that all four factors are (or at least seem to be) satisfied. There is no fifth factor in the precedents, yet the majority writing claims that “it remains difficult to determine whether *741the forum-selection clause is unfair or unreasonable under South Dakota law because of the undeveloped record and incomplete reasoning on the part of the trial court.” These pronouncements are entirely unwarranted. The record is no more developed than it is because the parties agreed that it need not be further developed; they themselves did not see the need to state the amount of litigation expenses involved or the identity of the party who is to receive payment from AVI or Chubb. After all, these facts have nothing to do with whether the forum selection clause is enforceable.
[¶ 36.] The law in this area is clear and ought not to be muddied with unnecessary dicta. In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that forum-selection clauses are “prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.” Id. at 10, 92 S.Ct. at 1913, 32 L.Ed.2d at 520. A forum-selection clause is “unreasonable” where a party can make a “strong showing” either that the forum thus selected is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court,” or that the clause was procured through “fraud or overreaching.” Id. at 15-18, 92 S.Ct. at 1916-17, 32 L.Ed.2d at 523-25. No showing- — much less a “strong showing” — of these elements exists here. That there may not have been actual negotiations over the clause does not affect its validity. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 1527, 113 L.Ed.2d 622, 632 (1991).
[¶ 37.] The majority’s reasoning on Issue Three is tantamount to punishing Klenz and her attorney for allowing the case to go to summary judgment: as if doing so ensured that the record would be undeveloped and the trial court’s reasoning incomplete. Indeed, the specific lesson taken from the majority’s opinion will be that no one in Klenz’s position should agree to proceed, to summary judgment without first putting in the record every insubstantial detail possible, hoping that we might snatch some unessential fact to claim it empowers us to disregard settled law.
[¶ 38.] As the majority notes, Klenz brought this action in Butte County, South Dakota, against AVI, for “legal expenses.”In. support of its assertion that “the undeveloped record and incomplete reasoning on the part of the trial court” cause it to be “difficult to determine whether the forum-selection clause is unfair or unreasonable under South Dakota law[,]” the majority provides -two details. First," “[t]he record does not specify the litigation expenses being sought by Klenz as administratrix or the amount thereof’; second, the record-does not “disclose whether the expenses incurred in the underlying wrongful death suit have been paid to trial ■ counsel or whether Klenz is seeking reimbursement for litigation expenses already paid.” (As to the identity of the “other matters” that are supposedly “important factors to consider in determining the reasonableness and validity of the forum selection clause in this case[,]” the majority provides no hint.) Neither of these items can stand up to scrutiny.
[¶ 39.] On the first point, what possible difference could it make whether the amount Klenz seeks is $1 or $1,000,000? The absence of that fact, itself a target presumably moving upward as time passes, in the set of stipulated facts indicates that even the parties thought it irrelevant to the reasonableness of the ehoice-of-forum clause. Would we hold that if it were a substantial sum, then South Dakota *742is the right forum, but if not, let France decide?
[¶ 40.] As to the second point, again the proper question in this case is: as regards this action for attorney’s fees, is the forum selection clause unreasonable under South Dakota law? The majority invites us to consider two alternatives. First, suppose that there has been as yet no payment for attorney’s fees. In the first alternative, we must ask, who wishes to recover them? Klenz or her attorney? In either case, Klenz, the estate representative, is the ultimate beneficiary. Who will have to travel? If the case is litigated in France, perhaps her attorney and Klenz. The attorney will have expenses which, presumably, would be added to those he already claims and which, along with them, he would recover, if he prevails. If it is litigated in South Dakota, either an AVI or Chubb attorney will handle the-case. This is a wash. One side is no more inconvenienced than the other. And since other things are equal, the forum selection clause should determine. Next suppose that Klenz has paid her attorney’s fees and is seeking reimbursement from AVI or Chubb. We still have the same essential dispute: a case between two European parties seeking interpretation of a French contract under French law. The notion that such a case could be more properly adjudicated in South Dakota than in France beggars the imagination.*
[¶ 41.] The conclusion is inescapable that no material facts remain on which we need to make a' decision. As 'the majority notes, the burden was on Klenz to show that the forum-selection clause is unreasonable. Regarding the four required elements, first, the law governing the formation and construction of the contract is the law of France, not the law of South Dakota. Second, both parties are residents of Europe, not South Dakota, and even if we factor in that Klenz’s counsel is a South Dakota resident, there is equal inconvenience to whichever party has to travel or, alternatively, to arrange for an attorney to argue in a distant forum. Third, the place of execution and. performance of the contract was Europe, if not France; it was certainly not South Dakota. It is, of course, true that the attorney’s fees, for which Klenz (or her lawyer) seek reimbursement were accumulated in South Dakota. But the fee agreement reached between Klenz and her attorney is not before us and, in any case, is entirely distinct from the contract between AVI-Chubb and Klenz-Wunderlich. Finally, the location of the parties and witnesses favors litigation in France. Both nominal parties are in Europe, and given the nature of the action, no more witnesses would be necessary than Klenz, her attorney, and representatives of Chubb. Travel inconvenience, if any, would be equal, though, perhaps, a Chubb representative’s desire to see South Dakota may be greater than the desire of Klenz’s attorney to see Paris. Alternatively, the inconvenience of finding an attorney to represent claims in a foreign forum would also be equal.
[¶ 42.] In summary, the issue is squarely before us and it is unfair to suggest that Klenz and her attorney somehow failed to provide undiscovered, unknown, and unimportant information. If the majority were correct in its assertion that *743there are material facts the discovery of which might have made the forum-selection clause unreasonable, then, as a matter of simple justice, Klenz should be given the opportunity to bring those facts to light. Thus, although I concur in the result, I cannot agree with the majority’s reason for coming to that result.
[¶ 43.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this special writing.

 Although South Dakota does have a significant interest in providing citizens with a forum in which to resolve disputes, that factor is not solely determinative. See Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d at 203. Furthermore, Klenz is not a citizen of South Dakota and no evidence has been provided to support a contention that France does not provide an adequate forum in which to adjudicate this case. And I think it highly unlikely that any such evidence could be adduced.