Court Opinion

ID: 9940284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 20:08:31.255616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:42.517747
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

                                            COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
                                        FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    MICHAEL C. HOAGUE                                         :   JUDGES:
                                                              :
                                                              :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
           Plaintiff-Appellant                                :   Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                              :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-                                                      :
                                                              :   Case No. 23 CAE 05 0030
                                                              :
    COTTRILL SERVICES, LLC, ET AL.                            :
                                                              :
                                                              :
         Defendants-Appellees                                 :   OPINION

  CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                        Appeal from the Delaware County Court
                                                                  of Common Pleas, Civil Division, Case
                                                                  No. 22 CV C 07 0341

  JUDGMENT:                                                       AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
                                                                  REMANDED IN PART

  DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                         February 13, 2024

  APPEARANCES:

    For Plaintiff-Appellant:                                      For Defendants-Appellees:

    GEOFFREY A. SPALL                                             LISA C. HAASE
    43 S. Franklin St.                                            ROBERT S. ROBY
    Delaware, OH 43015                                            30 Northwoods Blvd., Suite 300
                                                                  Columbus, OH 43235

                                                                  BRIAN T. WINCHESTER
                                                                  JESSE M. SCHMIDT
                                                                  4608 St. Clair Ave.
                                                                  Cleveland, OH 44103
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 Delaney, J.

          {¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Michael C. Hoague appeals the April 6, 2023 judgment

 entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Civil Division.

                                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

                                                Storm Damage

          {¶2} Plaintiff-Appellant Michael C. Hoague, an attorney and former municipal

 court judge, is the owner of a residential home located in the City of Delaware, Ohio. On

 or about June 4, 2020, Hoague was out of state when a significant storm came through

 the City of Delaware. Hoague returned to his home on June 6, 2020 and discovered the

 interior of the home was damaged due to the storm. Upon Hoague’s inspection, the

 majority of the damage appeared to be water-related, with resulting mold and mildew.

          {¶3} Hoague contacted Defendant-Appellee Cottrill Services, LLC d/b/a Servpro

 of Delaware, OH (hereinafter “Cottrill Services”) and scheduled an in-home inspection to

 assess the damages and provide an estimate for repair. Defendant-Appellee Xact

 Drafting, LLC and its sole owner and statutory agent, Keith Richard Cottrill, were

 associated with Cottrill Services.

                                       Servpro Inspection of Home

          {¶4} On June 26, 2020, Keith Richard Cottrill met with Hoague at Hoague’s

 home for an inspection and estimate. Xact Drafting emailed Hoague a preliminary

 estimate for the repair and renovation of the storm damage. Hoague contacted Cottrill

 1
  Because this matter is before the Court upon an appeal of the trial court’s judgment granting a Civ.R.
 12(C) motion, we consider only the facts from the pleadings.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 Services on June 29, 2020 and accepted the estimate. The work was scheduled to

 commence on July 11, 2020.

                                         Contractual Agreements

          {¶5} Prior to the commencement of the work, Cottrill Services did not provide

 Hoague with a contractual agreement. Cottrill Services and its employees commenced

 work on July 11, 2020. On that same day, Hoague met with a Cottrill Services

 representative on the front porch of the home. The Cottrill Services representative told

 Hoague that due to the COVID-19 restrictions, the usual contract paperwork and related

 documents would not be provided at that time. In lieu of exchanging a paper copy of the

 contractual agreement, the Cottrill Services representative gave Hoague an oral summary

 of the paperwork and said he would email Hoague a copy of the contractual agreement.

 According to Hoague, the representative did not explain the entirety of the contractual

 agreement, including the Terms and Conditions of Service.

          {¶6} The Cottrill Services representative had Hoague provide his digital

 signature to the contractual agreement on an electronic device.

          {¶7} At 6:19 p.m. on July 11, 2020, Cottrill Services emailed the contractual

 agreement to Hoague. The contractual agreement included the following provisions

 relevant to this appeal (Exhibits A and B of the Amended Complaint):

                Customer Agreement: Mold Remediation and Related Services

          ***

          Note: This contract contains a limitation of liability.

          ***
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

         LIMITATION OF LIABILITY: IN NO EVENT SHALL PROVIDER, ITS

         OWNERS, ANY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, OR AGENTS,

         FRANCHISOR, OR AFFILIATES BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INDIRECT,

         SPECIAL, NOMINAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL

         LOSSES OR DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY PENALTIES, REGARDLESS OF

         THE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE THEORY ASSERTED, INCLUDING

         CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE, WARRANT, STRICT LIABILITY, STATUTE

         OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY

         OF SUCH DAMAGES OR THEY ARE FORESEEABLE; OR FOR CLAIMS

         BY A THIRD PARTY. THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE LIABILITY SHALL

         NOT EXCEED THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT PAID BY CUSTOMER FOR

         THE SERVICES OR ACTUAL PROVEN DAMAGES, WHICHEVER IS

         LESS. IT IS EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT CUSTOMER’S REMEDY

         EXPRESSED HEREIN IS CUSTOMER’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. THE

         LIMITATIONS SET FORTH HEREIN SHALL APPLY EVEN IF ANY OTHER

         REMEDIES           FAIL      OR       THEIR          ESSENTIAL     PURPOSE.   SOME

         STATES/COUNTRIES                 DO      NOT         ALLOW   THE    EXCLUSION   OR

         LIMITATION OF INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO

         THE ABOVE MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU.

         ***

         [Signed by Michael Hoague]

         ***
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

              AUTHORIZATION TO PERFORM SERVICES AND DIRECTION OF

                                                   PAYMENT

          ***

          I have read this Authorization to Perform Services and Direction of

          Payment, including Terms and Conditions of Service on the reverse side

          hereof, and agree to same.

          [Signed by Michael Hoague]

          ***

                               TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

                                             READ CAREFULLY

           Note: This Contract includes a limitation of liability and limitation of

                                                   remedies.

          ***

         1. SERVPRO is one of the largest nationwide cleaning and restoration

         franchise systems in the United States. The SERVPRO franchise owner

         identified on the front of this Contract (the “Provider”) is an independent

         contractor who agrees to perform the services identified on the front of this

         Contract (the “Services”). * * *

         ***

          4. Limitation of Liability: IN NO EVENT SHALL PROVIDER, ITS OWNERS,

          ANY OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, EMPLOYEES, AGENTS, FRANCHISOR,

          OR     AFFILIATES         BE     RESPONSIBLE         FOR   INDIRECT,   SPECIAL,

          NOMINAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, OR CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES OR
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

         DAMAGES, OR FOR ANY PENALTIES, REGARDLESS OF THE LEGAL

         OR      EQUITABLE          THEORY         ASSERTED,     INCLUDING    CONTRACT,

         NEGLIGENCE,             WARRANTY,            STRICT   LIABILITY,   STATUTE    OR

         OTHERWISE, EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

         SUCH DAMAGES OR THEY ARE FORESEEABLE; OR FOR CLAIMS BY

         A THIRD PARTY. THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE LIABILITY SHALL NOT

         EXCEED THREE TIMES THE AMOUNT PAID BY CUSTOMER FOR THE

         SERVICES OR ACTUAL PROVEN DAMAGES, WHICHEVER IS LESS. IT

         IS EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT CUSTOMER’S REMEDY EXPRESSED

         HEREIN IS CUSTOMER’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. THE LIMITATIONS

         SET FORTH HEREIN SHALL APPLY EVEN IF ANY OTHER REMEDIES

         FAIL THEIR ESSENTIAL PURPOSE. Some states/countries do not allow

         the exclusion or limitation of incidental or consequential damages, so the

         above may not apply to you.

          ***

          7. Any claim by customer for faulty performance, for nonperformance or

          breach under this Contract shall be made in writing to Provider no later than

          sixty (60) days before instituting any suit or filing any complaint in a court of

          law. Failure to make such a written claim for any matter which could have

          been corrected by Provider shall be deemed a waiver by Customer. NO

          ACTION, REGARDLESS OF FORM, RELATING TO THE SUBJECT

          MATTER OF THIS CONTRACT MAY BE BROUGHT MORE THAN ONE

          (1) YEAR AFTER THE COMPLETION OF SERVICES.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          8. CUSTOMER AND PROVIDER EACH WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE

          RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY WITH RESPECT TO ANY AND ALL

          CLAIMS OR CAUSES OF ACTION (INCLUDING COUNTERCLAIMS)

          RELATED TO OR ARISING OUT OF OR IN ANY WAY CONNECTED TO

          THIS CONTRACT AND AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM OR CAUSE OF

          ACTION WILL BE TRIED BY A COURT WITHOUT A JURY.

          ***

          Customer’s Initials: [initials]

          {¶8} Hoague does not dispute the five digital documents emailed to him bore his

 digital signature. The preliminary reconstruction estimate was $9,069.99.

                                 Cottrill Services Completes the Work

          {¶9} Cottrill Services completed the restoration work on July 11, 2020.

 Approximately 72 hours after the Cottrill Services crew left, Hoague examined the work.

 It appeared to Hoague that during its restoration work, Cottrill Services caused damage

 to his basement, property in the basement, and his heating and air conditioning system.

 Hoague consulted with other construction experts who agreed that Cottrill Services

 caused damage to the home during the restoration.

            Hoague Contacts Cottrill Services About Dissatisfaction with Work

          {¶10} On or about December 31, 2020, Hoague mailed a letter to Richard Cottrill,

 the owner of Cottrill Services, to complain about the destruction of Hoague’s property and

 dissatisfaction with the restoration work. Richard Cottrill responded by email on January

 7, 2021 and advised Hoague that he would contact his technicians to look into the matter.

 Cottrill sent Hoague an email on January 11, 2021 with a final report and fifty-six
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 photographs attached. Hoague responded that he had received the email but would

 review the final report at a later date due to health reasons related to COVID-19.

          {¶11} On July 1, 2022, approximately two years after the date of the contract,

 Hoague mailed Richard Cottrill a settlement demand letter with a deadline for a response.

 Richard Cottrill responded and requested an extension to respond until July 15, 2022.

 Hoague responded on July 3, 2022, stating he would grant an extension until July 10,

 2022. Hoague alleged his potential civil claims would be time barred after July 11, 2022.

          {¶12} As Hoague was preparing to file his breach of contract claim with the

 Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, he reviewed the contractual agreements to be

 attached to his pleading. He noticed for the first time that the contractual agreement

 incorporated “Terms and Conditions of Service” provisions, which included a limitation of

 liability and limitation of remedies. The “Terms and Conditions of Service” page was not

 signed by Hoague but was allegedly initialed by Hoague. Hoague stated the initials do

 not resemble his subscribed initials and were not authentic.

          {¶13} Cottrill Services did not timely respond to Hoague’s settlement demand.

 Hoague filed his initial complaint with the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on

 July 11, 2022.

                                             Original Complaint

          {¶14} Hoague filed his initial complaint, with a jury demand, on July 11, 2022 with

 the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. He named Cottrill Services, Xact Drafting,

 Richard Cottrill, John Doe, and Wade Doe as defendants. In his complaint, he alleged

 five causes of action: breach of contract, violation of Consumer Sales Practices Act,

 intentional/negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and attorney fees.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          {¶15} On August 10, 2022, Cottrill Services answered the complaint with a jury

 demand. Cottrill Services raised affirmative defenses, which included that Hoague’s

 claims were barred because he failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the

 contract.

          {¶16} Also on August 10, 2022, Cottrill Services filed a Motion to Dismiss

 Hoague’s complaint. The Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion alleged the claims raised in Hoague’s

 complaint were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations stated in the “Terms and

 Conditions of Service.” Hoague’s complaint alleged that Cottrill Services removed its

 equipment from the home on July 13, 2020. Hoague filed his complaint on July 11, 2022,

 raising five causes of action relating to the subject matter of Hoague’s contract with Cottrill

 Services. Cottrill Services argued that Hoague’s complaint should be dismissed as being

 time-barred under the one-year contracted statute of limitations.

          {¶17} Richard Cottrill filed an answer to the complaint on August 10, 2022. Xact

 Drafting filed a notice of appearance and motion for extension to respond to Hoague’s

 original complaint.

          {¶18} Hoague did not file a response to Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss. On

 August 31, 2022, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

                                            Amended Complaint

          {¶19} On August 31, 2022, Hoague filed an amended complaint naming Cottrill

 Services, Richard Cottrill, Xact Drafting, and John Doe as defendants. He alleged seven

 causes of action: civil conspiracy, intentional/negligent misrepresentation, fraud, violation

 of the Consumer Sales Protection Act, negligence, breach of contract, and reasonable

 attorney’s fees.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          {¶20} On September 1, 2022, the trial court filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry

 granting Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss. It clarified that the matter remained pending

 against Defendants Cottrill, Xact Drafting, John Doe, and Wade Doe.

          {¶21} Also on September 1, 2022, Hoague filed a motion for reconsideration of

 the trial court’s August 31, 2022 and September 1, 2022 judgment entries. He argued the

 trial court prematurely dismissed his complaint because pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A), he was

 permitted to amend his complaint. The trial court granted Hoague’s motion for

 reconsideration on September 6, 2022. Cottrill Services was reinstated as a party-

 defendant and the amended complaint controlled the proceedings.

          {¶22} On September 6, 2022, Xact Drafting filed a suggestion of death that its

 single member, Keith Richard Cottrill had died on June 9, 2022. Hoague filed a motion

 for appointment of a statutory agent for Xact Drafting. The trial court found the motion to

 be moot because Hoague failed to follow statutory procedures if Xact Drafting failed to

 maintain a statutory agent.

          {¶23} Cottrill Services and Richard Cottrill filed a joint answer to the amended

 complaint.

          {¶24} Hoague filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of Richard

 Cottrill as a party defendant.

                               Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

          {¶25} On January 17, 2023, Cottrill Services filed a motion to dismiss the amended

 complaint. Xact Drafting did not join the motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

 Cottrill Services again raised the argument that pursuant to the reasonable and

 unambiguous one-year statute of limitations provision in the contractual agreement,
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 Hoague’s claims were time-barred. Cottrill Services then addressed the new claims raised

 in Hoague’s amended complaint, arguing Hoague raised the new claims of fraud and

 intentional misrepresentation to avoid the application of the one-year statute of limitations,

 but the claims were improperly plead.

          {¶26} Hoague filed a memorandum contra on January 31, 2023. Hoague first

 claimed he did not knowingly enter into the one-year statute of limitations as stated in the

 “Terms and Conditions of Service.” He next argued the two-year statute of limitations

 period under the Consumer Sales Practices Act and R.C. 1345.10(C) was applicable to

 his claims, not the one-year statute of limitations. He finally contended that the additional

 claims for civil conspiracy, intentional misrepresentation, and fraud raised in his amended

 complaint provided sufficient grounds to rescind the one-year statute of limitations in the

 contractual agreement.

          {¶27} Cottrill Services replied that there was no dispute that Hoague filed his

 original complaint beyond the one-year statute of limitations stated in the contractual

 agreement. There was also no factual dispute that Hoague voluntarily signed the

 contractual agreement on the electronic device and that he received an electronic copy

 of the contractual agreement the same day he signed the agreement. Cottrill Services

 concluded by arguing that Hoague failed to address in his response why his additional

 claims for fraud and intentional misrepresentation as pleaded stated a claim for relief.

          {¶28} On April 6, 2023, the trial court granted Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss

 the amended complaint. The trial court considered the motion to dismiss to be a Civ.R.

 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Upon its review of the contractual agreement

 attached to the amended complaint, the trial court found that Hoague’s signature
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 appeared on a statement that read, “I have read this Authorization to Perform Services

 and Direction of Payment, including the Terms and Conditions of Service on the reverse

 side hereof, and agree to the same.” Hoague admitted in his amended complaint that he

 signed the contractual agreement, albeit on an electronic device; however, he also

 received electronic copies of the contractual agreement on the same day he signed the

 agreement. Based on his experience as an attorney and judge, the trial court found

 Hoague could not credibly claim that he was not aware of the importance of reading a

 document before signing it. The trial court found the one-year statute of limitations to be

 enforceable as a matter of law.

          {¶29} As to Hoague’s remaining claims, the trial court found that his claims of

 fraud and intentional misrepresentation did not sound in fraud, but rather in breach of

 contract.

          {¶30} The trial court granted the judgment on the pleadings in favor of Cottrill

 Services. Because the trial court found Hoague’s remaining claims against Xact Drafting

 and John Does were subject to the same contractual limitations period, the trial court

 dismissed the action against those defendants.

          {¶31} On June 2, 2023, Hoague notified the trial court that he had obtained service

 of process on the Secretary of State as the agent for Xact Drafting on April 11, 2023.

          {¶32} It is from the April 6, 2023 judgment entry that Hoague now appeals.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

                                       ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

          {¶33} Hoague raises two Assignments of Error:

          I. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

          PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S                 CLAIMS        WERE   TIME   BARRED   AND

          DISMISSED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY.

          II. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED AND VIOLATED

          PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF

          THE      OHIO        CONSTITUTION             BY    ERRONEOUSLY     DISMISSING

          PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT’S COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY.

                                                   ANALYSIS

                                             Standard of Review

          {¶34} The trial court considered Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss as a Civ.R.

 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Civil Rule 12(C) provides, “after the

 pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move

 for judgment on the pleadings.” The standard of review of the grant of a motion for

 judgment on the pleadings is the same as the standard of review for a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

 motion, which requires the appellate court to independently review the complaint to

 determine if the dismissal was appropriate. Ferreri v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,

 142 Ohio App.3d 629, 639, 756 N.E.2d 712 (8th Dist.2001). A motion for judgment on the

 pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) presents only questions of law. Peterson v. Teodosio,

 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 175, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). The determination of a motion under

 Civil Rule 12(C) is restricted solely to the allegations in the pleadings and the nonmoving

 party is entitled to have all material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 inferences to be drawn therefrom, construed in its favor. Id. In considering such a motion,

 one must look only to the face of the complaint. State ex rel. Osborne v. City of North

 Canton, 5th Dist., 2019-Ohio-1744, 135 N.E.3d 1155, ¶ 10. The court is permitted, under

 Civ.R. 10, to consider written instruments if they are attached to the complaint. (Citations

 omitted.) State ex rel. Gormley v. Jordan, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 20 CAD 07 0029, 2020-

 Ohio-4759, ¶ 9 citing Natl. City Mtge. Co. v. Wellman, 174 Ohio App.3d 622, 2008-Ohio-

 207, 883 N.E.2d 1122, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.).

                                              I. Cottrill Services

          {¶35} In his first Assignment of Error, Hoague argues the trial court erred when it

 granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of Cottrill Services. His first

 Assignment of Error raises multiple issues, and we examine each in turn.

                                   One-Year Contractual Limitation

          {¶36} Hoague does not dispute the existence of a contract between him and

 Cottrill Services for the restoration of Hoague’s home (he raises breach of contract as

 one of his causes of action). The main issue in this case is whether the one-year limitation

 provision found in the “Terms and Conditions of Service” section of the contract bars all

 of Hoague’s causes of action. The time limit provision states in pertinent part:

          7. * * * NO ACTION, REGARDLESS OF FORM, RELATING TO THE

          SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS CONTRACT MAY BE BROUGHT MORE

          THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE COMPLETION OF SERVICES.

 Cottrill Services argued, and the trial court agreed, that the one-year limitations period

 barred     Hoague’s        causes      of    action     for   civil   conspiracy,   intentional/negligent

 misrepresentation, fraud, violation of the Consumer Sales Protection Act, negligence,
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 breach of contract, and reasonable attorney fees. Hoague does not specifically dispute

 that the parties to a contract may agree to limit the time for bringing an action to a period

 less than provided by relevant statute of limitations. So long as the shortened period is

 reasonable and the contract language is clear and unambiguous, the provision may be

 enforceable. Monreal Funeral Home, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Co., 189 Ohio App.3d 1, 2010-

 Ohio-3805, 937 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.) citing Kraly v. Vannewkirk (1994), 69 Ohio

 St.3d 627, 632, 635 N.E.2d 357.

          {¶37} Hoague contends the claims raised in his amended complaint are not

 barred by the one-year limitation provision. His amended complaint brings causes of

 action that, without an alleged contractual time limitation, provide different statutes of

 limitations, such as a violation of the Consumer Sales Protection Act. Hoague also raises

 claims that could arguably be unrelated to the subject matter of the contract, such as

 fraud or intentional/negligent misrepresentation. Like the water in the basement, we wade

 through these issues under the guidelines of Civ.R. 12(C).

                                           Reading and Bargaining

          {¶38} We first examine Hoague’s argument that the time limit is not applicable

 because under the circumstances in which he signed the contract, he did not bargain for

 the provisions in the “Terms and Conditions of Service” including the one-year time

 limitation. His amended complaint described the circumstances under which he signed

 the contract with Cottrill Services. On July 11, 2020 at 9:00 a.m., Cottrill Services came

 to the home to start the restoration work. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Hoague met

 with the Cottrill Services representative on the front porch of the home, maintaining social

 distancing. Hoague states the Cottrill Services representative informed him that due to
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 the COVID-19 restrictions, the usual contract paperwork and related documents

 describing the scope of services to be performed and authorizing the work would not be

 provided at that time. In lieu of exchanging paper copies of the contract, the Cottrill

 Services representative would give Hoague an oral summary of what the paperwork

 provides. The representative promised to email Hoague a copy of the contract. The

 representative, however, provided an iPad or other electronic device, to which Hoague

 could provide his digital signature to the contract at that time.

          {¶39} After verbally explaining the provisions of the contract, the representative

 provided Hoague an iPad or other electronic device to provide his digital signature to the

 provision. Hoague believed he provided his digital signature five times. Hoague stated in

 his amended complaint that at no time during the representative’s verbal summary of the

 contract, did he advise Hoague of the provisions in the “Terms and Conditions of Service.”

 Hoague stated he would have refused to sign or excised the provisions in the “Terms and

 Conditions of Service” that limited his right to a jury trial or the one-year time limitation.

          {¶40} Hoague attached the contract to the amended complaint as Exhibit A. The

 second page of Exhibit A is an “Authorization to Perform Services and Direction of

 Payment.” It contains the statement, “I have read this Authorization to Perform Services

 and Direction of Payment, including the Terms and Conditions of Service on the reverse

 side hereof, and agree to the same.” It identifies Hoague and includes a signature line

 containing his signature. Hoague admitted in his amended complaint that he digitally

 signed that provision of the contract.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          {¶41} At 6:19 p.m. on July 11, 2020, Cottrill Services emailed Hoague a copy of

 the contract that Hoague signed in the morning prior to the commencement of the

 restoration work. The email included the “Terms and Conditions of Service” provision.

          {¶42} On July 14, 2020, Hoague viewed the restoration work and saw that it was

 not properly done. On December 1, 2020, Hoague reached out to Cottrill Services to

 express his dissatisfaction with its performance. No agreement was reached between the

 parties.

          {¶43} Pursuant to the one-year limitations period in the contract, Hoague had until

 July 11, 2021 to commence legal action against Cottrill Services. In July 2022, Hoague

 prepared to file his complaint against Cottrill Services that contained a breach of contract

 claim. He was required to attach a copy of the contract to the complaint. In doing so,

 Hoague saw for the first time that the contract documents included the “Terms and

 Conditions of Service” provision.

          {¶44} Hoague argues that because Cottrill Services did not make him aware of

 the “Terms and Conditions of Service” before he signed the contract, the terms are not

 binding upon him. The failure to read the terms of a contract is not a defense to the

 enforcement of the contract. Gartrell v. Gartrell, 181 Ohio App.3d 311, 2009-Ohio-1042,

 908 N.E.2d 1019, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.) citing Haller v. Borror, 50 Ohio St.3d 10, 552 N.E.2d

 207 (1990). The Tenth District Court of Appeals addressed this issue in the similar case

 of Hadden Co., L.P.A. v. Del Spina (Aug. 26, 2003), Franklin App. No. 03AP–37, 2003-

 Ohio-4507, 2003 WL 22006842, holding:

          One of the most celebrated tenets of the law of contracts is that a document

          should be read before being signed, and the corollary to this rule is that a
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          party to the contract is presumed to have read what he signed and cannot

          defeat the contract by claiming he did not read it. See, e.g., McAdams v.

          McAdams (1909), 80 Ohio St. 232, 241, 88 N.E. 542. Mr. and Mrs. Hadden

          are an attorney and a treasurer to a law office. Nothing excuses their failure

          to read the purchase contract prior to signing.

 Gartrell, supra at ¶ 38. The Eighth District Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion:

          A party entering a contract has a responsibility to learn the terms of the

          contract prior to agreeing to its terms. The law does not require that each

          aspect of a contract be explained orally to a party prior to signing. [ABM

          Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 81 Ohio St.3d 498, 503, 692 N.E.2d 574 (1998).] “It

          will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to

          respond to its obligations, to say that he did not read it when he signed it,

          or did not know what it contained. If this were permitted, contracts would

          not be worth the paper on which they are written.” [Id.] citing Upton v.

          Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50, 23 L.Ed. 203 (1875).

 Fry v. FCA US LLC, 2017-Ohio-7005, 143 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.) quoting Estate of

 Brewer v. Dowell & Jones, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80563, 2002-Ohio-3440, ¶ 13.

          {¶45} Hoague alleged in his amended complaint that COVID-19 restrictions

 prevented him from reading the contract before the work commenced. Hoague denied

 that he was aware of the “Terms and Conditions of Service,” but he admitted to signing

 the “Authorization to Perform Services and Direction of Payment,” which contained a

 statement that the signer had read and agreed to the “Terms and Conditions of Service.”

 The amended complaint does not detail whether the contract was available to read on the
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 iPad so that Hoague could have read it before affixing his signature (because regardless

 of COVID-19 precautions, he would have had to touch the iPad to affix his signature).

 Hoague admits, however, that he received a copy of the signed contract documents from

 Cottrill Services on July 11, 2020. Hoague admits that he did not read the signed contract

 documents until July 2022. Construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Hoague, the

 facts establish Hoague knew, or should have known, about the provisions contained

 within the “Terms and Conditions of Service” either on July 11, 2020 or within one-year

 of July 14, 2020, when Hoague stated he knew the restoration work was not done to his

 satisfaction and possibly in breach of the contract.

          {¶46} Relating to his argument that he did not bargain for the “Terms and

 Conditions of Service” due to his inability to read the contract before signing, Hoague

 contends the contested contract provisions were unconscionable, and therefore

 enforceable, because there was no voluntary meeting of the minds as to the terms. The

 defense that a contract provision is unenforceable on the grounds that it is

 unconscionable is premised on a finding that a party did not have any meaningful choice

 when entering into the contract or the contract terms are unreasonably favorable to one

 party. Fry v. FCA US LLC, 2017-Ohio-7005, 143 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 29 (6th Dist.) citing Lake

 Ridge Academy v. Carney, 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 382, 613 N.E.2d 183 (1993). “The party

 asserting unconscionability of a contract bears the burden of proving that the agreement

 is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Fry, supra at ¶ 29 quoting Taylor

 Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, ¶ 33.

          {¶47}      The      Sixth     District    Court     of   Appeals   discussed   “procedural

 unconscionability:”
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          “ ‘Procedural unconscionability concerns the formation of the agreement

          and occurs when no voluntary meeting of the minds is possible.’ ” Brunke

          v. Ohio State Home Servs., Inc., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009320, 2008-

          Ohio-5394, 2008 WL 4615578, ¶ 10, quoting Porpora v. Gatliff Bldg. Co.,

          160 Ohio App.3d 843, 2005-Ohio-2410, 828 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).

          To evaluate procedural unconscionability, courts consider factors relating

          to the relative bargaining position of the parties, including “age, education,

          intelligence, business acumen, experience in similar transactions, whether

          the terms were explained to the weaker party, and who drafted the contract.”

          Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 150, 2004-Ohio-829, 809

          N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 31 (9th Dist.). No one factor alone determines whether a

          contract is procedurally unconscionable. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122

          Ohio St.3d 63, 2009-Ohio-2054, 908 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 29. Rather, procedural

          unconscionability is determined after consideration of the totality of the

          circumstances. Id. at ¶ 30.

 Fry, supra at ¶ 30.

          {¶48} Hoague states in his amended complaint that he is an “attorney with 40

 years’ experience as a trial lawyer who has tried or presided over 500 or more jury trials

 to a verdict.” (Amended Complaint, Para. 60). As an attorney and former judge, Hoague

 had the education, intelligence, business acumen, and experience with similar

 transactions. Cottrill Services orally explained some of the terms of the contract, but

 Hoague signed the contract. Cottrill Services emailed the contract to Hoague on the

 same day he signed the contract, but Hoague did not read the terms of the contract he

 signed on July 11, 2020 until July 2022. We do not find the circumstances support
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 Hoague’s claim of unconscionability. See Hadden Co., L.P.A. v. Del Spina, 10th Dist.

 Franklin No. 03AP-37, 2003-Ohio-4507, ¶ 15 (“Mr. and Mrs. Hadden are an attorney

 and a treasurer to a law office. Nothing excuses their failure to read the purchase

 contract prior to signing.”)

          {¶49} We find with all reasonable inferences in favor of Hoague, the non-moving

 party, the time limit provision was bargained for and not unconscionable; however, this is

 not the end of the analysis. In Hoague’s amended complaint, he raises seven causes of

 action: civil conspiracy, intentional/negligent misrepresentation, fraud, violation of the

 Consumer Sales Practices Act, negligence, breach of contract, and reasonable attorney

 fees. Hoague’s claims of negligence and breach of contract state Cottrill Services

 negligently completed the contracted work and the work was in breach of the contract.

 Because the one-year time limit provision is a valid contractual bargain and the

 negligence and breach of contract causes of action indubitably arise from the subject

 matter of the contract, those claims are time-barred.

          {¶50} We conduct further analysis to determine whether the statute of limitations

 can be contractually limited as to the Consumer Sales Practices Act. We also examine

 whether some of Hoague’s causes of action are outside of the subject matter of the

 contract so that the limited time period is not applicable.

                                      Consumer Sales Practices Act

          {¶51} In Hoague’s amended complaint, his fourth cause of action alleges a

 violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act (“CSPA”) where he states that Cottrill

 Services engaged in unfair, deceptive, and unconscionable acts and practices in violation

 of R.C. 1345.02 and 1345.03. Hoague claims that Cottrill Services required him to enter
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 into a one-sided contract substantially in favor of Cottrill Services and made misleading

 statements about the work, which Hoague relied upon to his detriment. We address

 Hoague’s claims under the CSPA as to the statute of limitations period.

          {¶52} The CSPA prohibits suppliers from committing either unfair or deceptive

 consumer sales practices or unconscionable acts or practices. R.C. 1345.02 and

 1345.03. Under the CSPA, “ ‘unfair or deceptive consumer sales practices’ [are defined]

 as those that mislead consumers about the nature of the product they are receiving, while

 ‘unconscionable acts or practices’ relate to a supplier manipulating a consumer's

 understanding of the nature of the transaction at issue.” Szep v. Gen. Motors LLC, 491

 F.Supp.3d 280, 296–97, 2020 WL 5834876 quoting McKinney v. Bayer Corp., 744

 F.Supp.2d 733, 743 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (internal citations omitted). It is designed to

 compensate for inadequate traditional remedies. Loury v. Westside Automotive Group,

 2022-Ohio-3673, 199 N.E.3d 62, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.) citing Einhorn v. Ford Motor Co., 48 Ohio

 St.3d 27, 29, 548 N.E.2d 933 (1990).

          {¶53} The CSPA has a two-year statute of limitations when the party is seeking

 damages. R.C. 1345.10(C). The statute of limitations commences to run from the date of

 the occurrence of the violation, which is not necessarily the date of any underlying

 transaction. Varavvas v. Mullet Cabinets, Inc., 185 Ohio App.3d 321, 2009-Ohio-6962,

 923 N.E.2d 1221, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.) citing Montoney v. Lincoln Logs, Ltd., 10th Dist. Franklin

 No. 06AP-284, 2007-Ohio-236, 2007 WL 155451, at ¶ 26, citing Luft v. Perry Cty. Lumber

 & Supply Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP–559, 2003-Ohio-2305, ¶ 27.

          {¶54} In its motion to dismiss, Cottrill Services argued the parties contracted for a

 one-year limitation period for all claims relating to the subject matter of the contract, which
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 thereby included Hoague’s claim under the CSPA. Hoague contends the parties cannot

 contractually limit the CSPA statutory two-year statute of limitations period. The statutory

 language of the CSPA does not state that parties are permitted to or prohibited from

 contractually reducing the two-year statute of limitations. Neither Hoague nor Cottrill

 Services have presented any case law that states the CSPA two-year statute of limitations

 may or may not be contractually adjusted. Cottrill Services argues that Ohio courts have

 permitted the contractual reduction of the limitation for other remedial statutes, such as

 employment discrimination claims pursuant to R.C. 4112 et seq. See Maxwell v. Univ.

 Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-15-840036.

          {¶55} It is well-settled that the CSPA is intended to be remedial and should be

 construed liberally in favor of consumers. Nicholson v. Davis Auto Performance, 5th Dist.

 Richland No. 2023 CA 0022, 2024-Ohio-205, ¶ 19 citing Swoger v. Hogue, 5th Dist.

 Tuscarawas No. 2013 AP 011 0045, 2015-Ohio-506, ¶ 36 citing Einhorn v. Ford Motor

 Co., 48 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 548 N.E.2d 933 (1990). “The purpose of the CSPA is to protect

 consumers, not assign responsibility to consumers to recognize and avoid a business's

 deceptive acts.” Jones v. J. Duran, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1074, 2020-Ohio-4606,

 ¶ 14 quoting Einhorn, supra; Fletcher v. Don Foss of Cleveland Inc., 90 Ohio App.3d 82,

 87, 628 N.E.2d 60 (8th Dist.1993). The dearth of case law on the issue of contractually

 limiting the CSPA two-year statute of limitations is telling. Making all reasonable inference

 in favor of Hoague, the consumer in this case, and based on the remedial nature of the

 CSPA, we decline to support Cottrill Services’ argument that the one-year time limitation

 period applies to Hoague’s claim under the CSPA.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

                          Fraud, Misrepresentation, and a Civil Conspiracy

          {¶56} In its motion to dismiss, Cottrill Services argued that Hoague failed to state

 a claim for fraud and/or intentional misrepresentation and based on that failure, could not

 avoid the application of the one-year time limitation period. Hoague asserts in his second

 cause of action that Cottrill Services misrepresented material facts in order to induce his

 agreement to enter into the contract. Cottrill Services allegedly assured Hoague that the

 project would be performed with “strict caution and restraint” to protect Hoague’s property.

 Instead, Hoague claimed that Cottrill Services “intentionally and by design demolished

 and removed” sections of drywall that were unaffected by water damage. Hoague alleged

 in his third cause of action for fraud that Cottrill Services falsely made “material

 representations” with knowledge of their falsity and with the intention of misleading

 Hoague into justifiably relying upon the false representations.

          {¶57} Civ.R. 9(B) requires that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the

 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” The

 pleading must contain allegations of fact which tend to show each and every element of

 a cause of action for fraud. Zoar View Wilkshire, LLC v. Wilkshire Golf, Inc., 5th Dist.

 Tuscarawas No. 2022 AP 11 0052, 2023-Ohio-2848, ¶ 31 citing Riieger v. Podeweltz,

 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 23520, 2010-Ohio-2509, ¶9. “Failure to specifically plead the

 operative facts constituting an alleged fraud presents a defective claim that may be

 dismissed.” Id.

          {¶58} The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are (1) a representation on

 or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a fact, (2) which is material to the

 transaction at hand, (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be

 inferred, (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it, (5) followed by

 justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment by the other party, and (6)

 resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance. Funk v. Durant, 155 Ohio App.3d 99,

 2003-Ohio-5591, 799 N.E.2d 221, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court set forth the

 elements of fraud as: (a) a representation or, where there is a duty to disclose,

 concealment of a fact; (b) which is material to the transaction at hand; (c) made falsely,

 with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether

 it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred; (d) with the intent of misleading another

 into relying upon it; (e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and

 (f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance. Boehnlein-Pratt v. Ventus Corp.,

 5th Dist. Holmes No. 14CA011, 2015-Ohio-2795, ¶ 33 citing Cohen v. Lamko, Inc., 10

 Ohio St.3d 167, 169, 462 N.E.2d 407 (1984) quoting Friedland v. Lipman, 68 Ohio App.2d

 255, 429 N.E.2d 456 (8th DIst.1980), paragraph one of the syllabus.

          {¶59} In Ohio, the existence of a contract action generally excludes the

 opportunity to present the same case as a tort claim. Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide

 Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Ohio App.3d 137, 151, 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1270 (9th Dist.1996). “A tort

 claim based upon the same actions as those upon which a claim of contract breach is

 based will exist independently of the contract action only if the breaching party also

 breaches a duty owed separately from that created by the contract, that is, a duty owed

 even if no contract existed.” Id.

          {¶60} Hoague contends Cottrill Services engaged in fraud and intentional

 misrepresentation when the description of how it would complete the restoration work
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 differed from the resulting work. Hoague utilizes the same facts to support his fraud and

 misrepresentation claims as he does his claim for breach of contract. (Amended

 Complaint, ¶ 89, ¶ 94, ¶ 111). Considering all reasonable inferences in favor of Hoague,

 his claims are not separate from the breach of contract. Thus, Hoague is barred from

 presenting a tort claim regarding the subject matter of a breach of contract claim.

          {¶61} While not specifically addressed by the trial court, Hoague’s claim for civil

 conspiracy fails without the support of the underlying tort claims. A civil conspiracy is “a

 malicious combination of two or more persons to injure another person or property, in a

 way not competent for one alone, resulting in actual damages.” Bender v. Logan, 2016-

 Ohio-5317, 76 N.E.3d 336, ¶ 78 (4th Dist.) quoting Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins.

 Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 650 N.E.2d 863 (1995), quoting LeFort v. Century 21–

 Maitland Realty Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 121, 126, 512 N.E.2d 640 (1987), citing Minarik v.

 Nagy, 8 Ohio App.2d 194, 196, 193 N.E.2d 280 (8th Dist.1963). Ohio law does not

 recognize civil conspiracy as an independent cause of action. Id. citing Minarik, 8 Ohio

 App.2d at 195–196, 193 N.E.2d 280. To prevail upon a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff

 must demonstrate the existence of an underlying unlawful act. Id. citing Williams v. Aetna

 Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 475, 700 N.E.2d 859 (1998), citing Gosden v. Louis, 116

 Ohio App.3d 195, 219, 687 N.E.2d 481 (1996).

          {¶62} Therefore, we find the trial court did not err when it granted Cottrill Services’

 motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Hoague’s claims for civil conspiracy,

 intentional/negligent misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, and breach of contract.

 Hoague’s first Assignment of Error is overruled as to those issues. Upon our de novo
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

 review, we sustain in part Hoague’s first Assignment of Error as to his claim under the

 CSPA.

                                               II. Xact Drafting

          {¶63} In Hoague’s second Assignment of Error, he argues his due process rights

 were violated when the trial court granted Cottrill Services’ motion for judgment on the

 pleadings and dismissed the entirety of his complaint against all the defendants, not just

 Cottrill Services.

          {¶64} Hoague named Xact Drafting, LLC as a defendant in its amended

 complaint. Hoague described Xact Drafting as a limited liability company engaged in the

 business of structure restoration estimation and reconstruction with its principal offices

 located in Delaware County, Ohio. Hoague identified Keith Cottrill as the owner and

 authorized representative of Xact Drafting. On September 6, 2022, Xact Drafting filed a

 suggestion of death that its sole member, Keith Richard Cottrill, died on June 9, 2022.

 Xact Drafting filed an answer to the amended complaint on September 7, 2022. In its

 answer, Xact Drafting raised the affirmative defense of insufficiency of service of process.

          {¶65} On November 27, 2022, Hoague filed a motion for the appointment of a

 statutory agent for Xact Drafting. The trial court denied the motion as moot because

 Hoague failed to follow the statutory procedures for obtaining service on Xact Drafting.

          {¶66} Cottrill Services filed its motion to dismiss Hoague’s amended complaint on

 January 17, 2023. Xact Drafting did not join Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss the

 amended complaint. Xact Drafting did not file its own motion to dismiss Hoague’s

 amended complaint.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

          {¶67} On April 6, 2023, the trial court granted Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss

 the amended complaint as to all claims against Cottrill Services. The judgment entry also

 concluded, “Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Xact Drafting LLC and John Does 1-3 are

 subject to the same contractual limitations period, and therefore are dismissed.”

          {¶68} On June 6, 2023, Hoague notified the trial court that it received service of

 process on Xact Drafting through the Secretary of State on April 11, 2023.

          {¶69} Based on this procedural history and the reasonable inferences of Civ.R.

 12(C) in favor of Hoague, we find it was premature of the trial court to dismiss Hoague’s

 causes of action against Xact Drafting. Xact Drafting did not move to dismiss the amended

 complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B) or (C). It did not join in Cottrill Services’ motion to

 dismiss the amended complaint. In Cottrill Services’ motion to dismiss the amended

 complaint, Cottrill Services raised no argument on behalf of Xact Drafting that it was

 likewise protected from liability by the “Terms and Conditions of Service.” Finally, the

 record is not clear whether Hoague had proper service on Xact Drafting before the trial

 court dismissed it as a party defendant.

          {¶70} We sustain Hoague’s second Assignment of Error on the basis that the trial

 court’s dismissal of Xact Drafting was premature. Judgment in favor of Xact Drafting is

 reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

 with this Opinion and law.
[Cite as Hoague v. Cottrill Servs., L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-531.]

                                                CONCLUSION

          {¶71} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed

 in part and reversed and remanded in part.

 By: Delaney, J.,

 Hoffman, P.J. and

 Wise, J., concur.