Court Opinion

ID: 9528716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:19.711657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:14.044974
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the lead opinion that the issue is whether the instant automobile, parked on the shoulder of the highway at the time it was struck by the snowmobile, "was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.” MCL 500.31Q6(l)(a); MSA 24.13106(l)(a).
My disagreement is with the analysis that enables the lead opinion to conclude that plaintiff is not included among those persons intended to be protected by the parking statute that was allegedly violated by the automobile being parked on the shoulder of the road, without its lights on, where it was struck by the snowmobile.1
I also take exception to the lead opinion’s willingness to decide the question whether "unreasonable risk” is to be decided as a question of law, rather than as a factual determination, when that issue was not presented by either of the parties to this lawsuit or given any substantive analysis by the lower courts.2_
*217I conclude that the parking statute was violated and that the plaintiff snowmobiler was within the class of persons intended to be protected by that statute. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for a determination whether the driver parked his automobile in a manner that created an unreasonable risk in view of the inference that the violation of such statute suggests.3
i
Although sounding in tort, the phrase "unreasonable risk” adopted by the Legislature in § 3106(l)(a) is not utilized to determine whether a particular insured was at fault for an accident involving a parked motor vehicle. Rather, it is set forth as one of the standards for determining when a parked motor vehicle should be considered as being in use "as a motor vehicle.” The definition of "unreasonable risk” is not defined within the no-fault act itself, or within any other legislation of which I am aware. Accordingly, I think it is helpful to look to the tort analogy where these words have a familiar meaning.
Reasonableness is one of the most significant elements of the tort of negligence. As we stated in Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425; 254 NW2d 759 (1977):
*218Negligence is conduct involving an unreasonable risk of harm. [Id. at 433. Emphasis in original. See also Cavaliere v Adults for Kids, 149 Mich App 756; 386 NW2d 667 (1986).]
Therefore, it would appear that conduct intended to be covered by the term "unreasonable risk” is very much akin to, if not identical with the negligence standard, and, accordingly, that standard should be controlling in our interpretation of the clause at issue.
A
In negligence jurisprudence, the violation of a statute creates an inference of negligence which the factfinder is entitled to consider in rendering its decision. See Klanseck v Anderson Sales, 426 Mich 78; 393 NW2d 356 (1986). Because of the similarity between the standard of negligence and the phrase "unreasonable risk,” it would seem that an identical inference from the violation of a parking statute should be permitted to establish the "unreasonable risk” standard within § 3106(l)(a).
A corollary of the statutory violation inference is the statutory purpose doctrine which insures that the statutory violation has a causal relationship to the injury. See Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117; 243 NW2d 270 (1976). In a negligence action the jury instruction permitting an inference of negligence from violation of a statute, SJI2d 12.01, can be given to the jury only if the statutory purpose requirements are satisfied.
This instruction [SJI2d 12.01] should be given only if defendant or plaintiff has alleged a statutory violation as a ground for negligence, and only if—
*2191. the statute is intended to protect against the result of the violation;
2. the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute; and
3. the evidence will support a finding that the violation was a proximate contributing cause of the occurrence. [Note on Use, SJI2d 12.01, Violation of Statute — Negligence; see also Klanseck, supra.][4]
I therefore agree with the lead opinion that a statutory-violation and statutory-purpose analysis should be employed to determine if an inference of "unreasonable” risk may be established from the violation of a statute and whether the plaintiff is within the class intended to be protected by the statute.
B
The lighted-vehicle statute requires certain lighting to be visible on a vehicle when it is parked upon a highway.
Whenever a vehicle is parked or stopped upon a highway . . . there shall be displayed ... 1 or more lamps projecting a white or amber light visible . . . from a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle and projecting a red light visible . . . from a distance of 500 feet to the rear .... [MCL 257.694; MSA 9.2394. Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff asserts this as part of the basis for recovery of benefits from the defendant; thus, it must be determined whether this statute is appli*220cable to the circumstances of this accident.5 The automobile was parked upon the shoulder of the highway rather than upon the paved portion, therefore we first decide whether the vehicle was "upon a highway” as that phrase is used in the lighted-vehicle statute.
The term "highway” is uniformly defined in three different provisions within the Motor Vehicle Code.
"Highway or street” means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. [MCL 257.20, 257.64, 257.1501(g); MSA 9.1820, 9.1864, 9.3200(l)(g). Emphasis added.]
This statutory definition of "highway” is broader in scope than the common understanding of that term which would be limited to the traveled or paved portion. Roy v Dep’t of Transportation, 428 Mich 330; 408 NW2d 783 (1987). The statutory definition of the term "roadway” is closer to a lay person’s belief of what constitutes a "highway.”
"Roadway” means that portion of a highway [or street] improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel. [MCL 257.55, 257.1501(h); MSA 9.1855,9.3200(l)(h).] .
Therefore, if the Legislature had intended the lighted-vehicle statute application to be limited to the paved portion of the highway it could have used the phrase "upon a roadway” instead of "upon a highway.”_
*221In Ballinger v Smith, 328 Mich 23, 32; 43 NW2d 49 (1950), this Court opined that the lighted-vehicle statute should apply to a motor vehicle parked on any portion of the right of way adapted, maintained, or intended for use of vehicular traffic.
We think the statute in question here must be construed as requiring the displaying of lights, during the period specified, on a parked vehicle left on that part or portion of the right of way adapted and maintained or intended for the use of vehicular traffic in an ordinary and reasonable manner. One parking the vehicle might reasonably have been held to anticipate such use. [See also Hoopingarner v Tucker Freight Lines, Inc, 6 Mich App 429; 149 NW2d 219 (1967).]
Therefore, in deciding when a parked vehicle is "upon a highway,” as that phrase is used in the lighted-vehicle statute, it must be determined whether that portion of the right of way where the vehicle is parked is subject to vehicular travel. If the parked vehicle is located on that portion of the right of way maintained or designed for vehicular travel, which has been extended as far as a gravel shoulder in Ballinger, the lighted-vehicle statute is applicable. Defendant-appellee asserts that the parked vehicle in this case could not be considered "upon the highway” because of the definition of "shoulder” enacted in 1974 PA 152, subsequent to the decisions in Ballinger and Hoopingarner.
"Shoulder” means that portion of the highway contiguous to the roadway generally extending the contour of the roadway, not designed for vehicular travel but maintained for the temporary accommodation of disabled or stopped vehicles otherwise permitted on the roadway. [MCL 257.59a; MSA 9.1859(1). Emphasis added.]
*222This statutory definition of shoulder appears to state that shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, thus not within the statutory definition of highway and in effect reversing the Ballinger decision. However, the Legislature also adopted a different statutory definition of "shoulder.”
"Shoulder” means that portion of a highway on either side of the roadway which is normally snowplowed for the safety and convenience of vehicular traffic. [MCL 257.1501(k); MSA 9.3200(l)(k).6 Emphasis added.]
These two statutory definitions of "shoulder” conflict since one states shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel while the other states they are for the safety and convenience of vehicular travel. This Court has addressed the conflict of these different statutory definitions of "shoulder” in the context of a governmental immunity case. See Gregg v State Hwy Dep’t, 435 Mich 307; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). In Gregg, it was held that the shoulder of a highway was intended to accommodate vehicular travel, even if only for a brief amount of time.
At the high speeds of modern vehicles, such an endeavor often results in significant travel, "in the ordinary sense,” on the shoulder of a highway. Indeed, it seems quite extraordinary, if not fictional, to assume that vehicles do not travel on shoulders or that shoulders are not designed for vehicular travel, albeit of a temporary sort. [Id. at 315.]
Additionally, we noted the distinction between the statutory definition of "roadway” and "high*223way” to support the broad interpretation to be given the term "highway.”
More technically, the Motor Vehicle Code is quite precise in its definitions. It defines roadway quite narrowly as "that portion of a highway improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel.” On the other hand, it defines "[h]ighway or street ... [as the] entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel.” If the Legislature had intended liability for the failure to maintain safe roadways only, it seems the Legislature would have done just that. It did not. [Id. at 315-316. Citations omitted.]
Therefore, from the standpoint of clear precedent and statutory development, I conclude that the phrase "upon a highway” that is used in the lighted-vehicle statute should include the entire width between the boundary lines, including the shoulder, which is subject to vehicular travel by the general public.7 Since there is no factual dispute that the automobile was parked on the shoulder of the highway without its lights on, I would find that it was parked in violation of the statute.
c
Once it is determined that the lighted-vehicle statute is applicable to the motor vehicle involved in this case, it then must be decided whether plaintiff is within the class of persons intended to be protected by that statute. The lead opinion concluded that a "passenger on a snowmobile, traveling unlawfully on the shoulder of a high*224way,8 is not in the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute.” Ante, p 214. The lead opinion also states that plaintiff is not within the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute since it was "designed to protect the safety of other vehicles traveling on a roadway,” citing a quotation from Ballinger in support of this proposition. Ante, p 214. However, it concedes that the language in Ballinger at 31, stated that the lighted-vehicle statute was intended to protect traffic on the highway and not merely the roadway.
The purpose of the statutory requirement that vehicles parked on a highway at night should display lights of the character specified is obvious. It was intended to protect traffic on the highway. Its application also resulted in the protection of a parked vehicle. [Emphasis added.]_
*225It is apparently conceded by the lead opinion that the snowmobile must have been operated upon the highway in order to be considered as "illegal operation” of the snowmobile.9 Thus whether the snowmobile constituted "traffic” on the highway when it collided with the automobile parked upon the shoulder of the highway is the remaining consideration for determining if the plaintiff was intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute.
"Traffic” means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, street cars and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for purposes of travel. [MCL 257.69; MSA 9.1869. Emphasis added.]
Therefore, the statutory definition of traffic includes all vehicles using a highway for the purpose of travel.10 Therefore, the snowmobile traveling upon the shoulder of the highway constitutes traffic "upon a public highway” because it is a vehicle being operated on the public highway for the purpose of travel. The plaintiff, a passenger upon the snowmobile which collided with the automobile parked on the shoulder of the highway, must have been intended to be protected by the *226lighted-vehicle statute since he constituted traffic traveling upon the public highway.
For the reasons stated above, I conclude that the statutory definition of shoulder does not preclude it from being considered a part of the "highway,” as that term was defined in Ballinger and Gregg; thus, traffic on the shoulder of a highway, including the plaintiff, may be considered as being within the class intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute.
D
The final issue in interpreting the "unreasonable risk” standard concerns how to factor in the injured party’s conduct that contributed to the "bodily injury which occurred.” In view of the fact that § 3106(l)(a) is not a standard to determine the fault of either party, or the comparative fault as between them, it is at this point, in my judgment, that the tort analogy breaks down.
The clear emphasis of this statutory standard is on the manner in which the vehicle is parked, not the manner in which it is struck. The question posed is whether the motor vehicle was parked in a manner that creates an "unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred.” It is not any risk but an unreasonable one, and not an injury that is reasonably or unreasonably incurred but an injury that did occur. The tort-like determination is focused on the parking event, not the injury-causing event.
Accordingly, I would pose the question as whether the owner of the automobile parked it in a manner that created an unreasonable risk of the event that occurred, namely, being struck by a snowmobile. The answer, of course, depends on whether it was in an area of the highway that is *227frequented by snowmobiles and whether, for instance, it was summer or winter.11 The insured automobile, parked as it was — in the nighttime without lights activated and facing in a direction that prevented the visibility of its reflector lights— did not create an unreasonable risk of being struck by an airplane falling from the sky, but it may well have created an unreasonable risk of the very event that occurred here.
In conclusion, I would only factor in the snowmobiler’s conduct to the extent that it made what occurred unlikely or unforeseeable and thus made the parking circumstances reasonable rather than unreasonable.
E
It is a matter of judicial discretion whether violation of a statute is relevant to the issues involved in a particular case and whether an inference of negligence from violation of that statute is available to either party. See Klanseck and Zeni, supra. Therefore, the trial court should interpret the applicability of a particular parking statute, in light of the facts of the case presented, to determine if an inference of "unreasonable risk” should be permitted.
Therefore, I would hold that a claim for recovery of damages, pursuant to § 3106(l)(a) of the no-fault act and based upon violation of a parking statute, would require the statutory-purpose doctrine to be initially applied by the Court for a determination whether the cited parking statute was intended to address the situation presented in that particular case. If the statutory purpose of the relevant parking statute or ordinance was not *228intended to cover the particular situation or risk presented, summary disposition would be the appropriate remedy when that is the only basis for the claim under § 31Q6(l)(a). This analysis is in accord with part of the lead opinion; however, I do not feel that the granting of summary disposition was appropriate in this case in view of my conclusion that plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the lighted-vehicle statute.
ii
The determination whether "unreasonable risk” is a question of law or fact is more problematic, especially in light of our decision in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986). The Court of Appeals panel determined that the question of "unreasonable risk” in § 3106(l)(a) is a matter of statutory construction for the court when the facts are not in dispute, relying upon Autry v Allstate Ins Co, 130 Mich App 585; 344 NW2d 588 (1983). The lead opinion adopts a similar approach regarding this issue, but attempts to distinguish between the DiFranco determination of "serious impairment of body function” and the determination of "unreasonable risk” predicated upon violation of a parking statute.
I am not as willing as the lead opinion to render an opinion in regard to whether the determination of "unreasonable risk” in § 3106(l)(a) is a question of law or fact. The Court of Appeals relied upon the Autry decision for its determination in regard to this issue; however, Autry is of questionable precedential authority after our decision in Di-Franco, and the Court of Appeals in this case was *229not presented with an opportunity to address the effect of DiFranco on Autry. Additionally, this issue, including the significance of our DiFranco decision, has not been presented for review by us by the parties.
Therefore, on the basis of the lack of consideration and analysis of our DiFranco opinion by the Court of Appeals, the failure of the parties to raise this issue for review, and the lack of briefing thereon, I would not address this issue.12
in
I would vacate the Court of Appeals decision and reverse the findings of the trial court which held that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was not the type of harm intended to be protected by this parking statute and remand for redetermination of whether the automobile was parked in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of the bodily injury that occurred, in light of the inference of unreasonableness resulting from a statutory violation and in light of the statutory prohibi*230tion regarding a snowmobiler’s presence on the shoulder of the highway.13
Levin, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Mallett, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 It should be noted the Court of Appeals did not determine whether plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the parking statute, and the trial court had merely concluded it was not convinced "the ordinance in question was to prevent the type of injury suffered herein.”

 The Court of Appeals stated within its opinion that the determina*217tion whether an automobile " 'was parked in such a way as to cause unreasonable risk of the bodily injury which occurred’ ” is an issue of statutory construction for the court to resolve, when the facts are undisputed. 178 Mich App 263, 266; 443 NW2d 396 (1980). However, this determination was based upon a previous Court of Appeals decision in Autry v Allstate Ins Co, 130 Mich App 585; 344 NW2d 588 (1983), which has been called into question after our decision in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986). This issue was not addressed by the trial court.

 1 would permit the parties to raise arguments concerning the propriety of summary judgment which had not been previously presented.

 This modified the requirements of the statutory purpose doctrine as they were stated in Zeni v Anderson, supra.

 It should be noted that the majority asserts that it does not address the issue whether the lighted-vehicle statute is applicable to the motor vehicle involved in this accident because it was determined that the plaintiff was not a person within the class intended to be protected by the statute.

 Interestingly, this definition of shoulder is located in the section of the Motor Vehicle Code which regulates the operation of a snowmobile, which was involved in the accident in this case.

 Additionally, in Gregg, supra at 314, n 4, we cited Ballinger with apparent approval for requiring lamps to be displayed on a vehicle which is parked on a shoulder of a highway that was intended for the use of vehicles in an ordinary and reasonable manner.

 We note that while a snowmobile may not be operated on the shoulder of the highway, it may be legally operated on the extreme right of the open portion of the right of way.
A person shall not operate a snowmobile upon a public highway . . . not specifically designated for the use of snowmobiles except under the following conditions and circumstances:
(a) A snowmobile may be operated on the right of way of a public highway, except a limited access highway, if it is operated at the extreme right of the open portion of the right of way and with the flow of traffic on the highway. [MCL 257.1512; MSA 9.3200(12). Emphasis added.]
"Right of way” means that portion of a highway or street less the roadway and any shoulder. [MCL 257.1501(j); MSA 9.3200(l)(j). Emphasis added.]
Therefore, the operation of the snowmobile upon the shoulder of the highway in this case was contrary to MCL 257.1512; MSA 9.3200(12) since the shoulder is an excluded portion of the highway for the legal operation of a snowmobile. Thus, the snowmobile must have been operated "upon a highway” when it struck the automobile parked on the shoulder of the highway because the snowmobile is operated illegally only when it is operated upon certain portions of the highway.

 See n 8.

 A snowmobile constitutes a vehicle as that term is defined within the Motor Vehicle Code.
"Snowmobile” means any motor driven vehicle designed for travel primarily on snow or ice of a type which utilizes sled type runners or skis .... [MCL 257.1501(e); MSA 9.3200(l)(e).]
"Vehicle” means every device in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices exclusively moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and excepting a mobile home .... [MCL 257.79; MSA 9.1879. Emphasis added.]

 We note that this accident occurred in January in Tuscola County, which is an area where it is not an uncommon phenomenon for snowmobiles to be operated on the side of the roadway.

 In Autry, Judge Kelly stated, in his dissent, that the trier of fact should decide the question of "unreasonable risk”:
I merely note at this time one important distinction that I see between the serious impairment question and the parked car question. Unlike the term "serious impairment of body function [as defined in Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982)],” the term "parked in an unreasonable manner” is one that I would expect juries to clearly understand. In negligence actions, for example, reasonableness as a standard of care has always been reserved for the trier of fact. [Id. at 596.]
A similar analysis was employed by us in DiFranco regarding the "serious impairment of body function” question. Therefore, I believe it would be premature for us to claim that DiFranco has no effect upon the determination of "unreasonable risk” for § 3106(l)(a).

 Upon remand, I would permit the parties to raise issues not previously presented for review by the lower courts, see n 3, and to argue, if they wish, whether the "unreasonable risk” determination should be a question of law or fact.