Court Opinion

ID: 9555753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 06:00:17.219433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:00.812199
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KIM S. MCCLAIN-LEAZURE,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                   Petitioner,                        CB-7521-17-0007-T-1

                  v.

     SOCIAL SECURITY                                  DATE: August 14, 2023
       ADMINISTRATION,
                   Respondent.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kim S. McClain-Leazure, Calera, Alabama, pro se.

           Marcus Johns, Esquire, and Natalie Liem, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for
            the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant 2 has filed a petition for review of the initial decision , which
     found she was not constructively removed from her administrative law judge

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and ad ministrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Although proceedings under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.142 do not lie within our appellate
     jurisdiction, for the sake of clarity we follow our usual practice of referring to the
                                                                                          2

     (ALJ) position.   For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to an
     ALJ for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         Prior to her resignation, the appellant was an ALJ with the agency’s Office
     of Disability Adjudication and Review in Mobile, Alabama. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 7.      In October 2015, the parties entered into a settlement
     agreement that resolved a pending complaint before the Equal Employment
     Opportunity Commission (EEOC).           IAF, Tab 53 at 3-9.        In exchange for
     consideration including a lump sum payment and leave adjustments, the appellant
     agreed to the withdrawal and dismissal of the EEOC complaint as well as all
     pending equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints and pending complaints
     with the Office of Special Counsel. Id. at 3-5. The agreement also contained a
     waiver of appeal rights concerning the events underlying the EEOC complaint
     and any employment-related actions that occurred before the agreement’s
     effective date:
            Complainant represents that she will file or submit no other
            complaints, grievances, or administrative or judicial a ctions with
            respect to the events underlying this complaint with any
            administrative agency, arbitrator, Court, or legislative body.
            Additionally, Complainant represents that she will not file a
            complaint, grievance, or administrative or judicial action ag ainst the
            agency, or any officer or employee thereof, with respect to any
            action that relates to or arises out of her employment with the agency
            and that occurred prior to the effective date of this Settlement
            Agreement.
     Id. at 5.
¶3         The appellant remained in her position, but on or about October 4, 2016,
     she submitted a letter of resignation, citing her medical condition and the

     complainant as the “appellant.” See, e.g., McDougall v. Social Security Administration,
     114 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 1 (2010).
                                                                                      3

     agency’s alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tab 55 at 7.
     On October 24, 2016, the agency issued a Standard Form 50-B recording her
     resignation effective that same day. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. The appellant subsequently
     filed an appeal form with the Board. Id. at 1-5. On the form, she indicated that
     she had involuntarily resigned and raised claims of whistleblower retaliation and
     denial of reasonable accommodation. Id. at 3.
¶4        The case was assigned to an ALJ. IAF, Tab 2. At the outset of the hearing,
     the agency moved to exclude any testimony concerning events that occurred
     before October 10, 2015, the effective date of the settlement agreement. Hearing
     Transcript (HT) (May 10, 2017) at 15-16, 22. The presiding ALJ granted the
     motion over the appellant’s objections.   Id. at 26. Following the hearing, the
     presiding official issued an initial decision finding that the appellant failed to
     show that her resignation was involuntary and that she therefore had no right to
     appeal to the Board.    IAF, Tab 56, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 28-29.       The
     presiding ALJ further found that, in the absence of an appealable action , the
     Board also lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims of whistleblowing
     reprisal and failure to accommodate. ID at 22-25, 26-27.
¶5        In her petition for review, the appellant argues that the presiding ALJ erred
     in his ruling excluding testimony concerning events before October 10, 2015.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-16.     She contends that the waiver
     provision extends no further than the specific claims at issue in the formal EEOC
     complaint and that the agency voided the agreement by breaching it. Id. She
     further asserts that the agency made misrepresentations before the Board and that
     the presiding ALJ made inappropriate comments and interrupt ions that took a toll
     on her health and deprived her of a full and fair hearing.     Id. at 16-18. She
     contests various findings of fact in the initial decision and submits additional
     evidence, including medical documentation concerning her disability.           Id.
     at 18-30, 32-91. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.
                                                                                       4

                                        ANALYSIS
¶6        Section 7521 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code provides that an ALJ may be
     removed only for good cause determined by the Board after opportunity for a
     hearing. While proceedings under 5 U.S.C. § 7521 are typically initiated by the
     employing agency, the Board’s regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.142 provides that an
     ALJ who alleges a constructive removal or other action in violation of 5 U.S.C.
     § 7521 may file a complaint with the Board, to be processed and adjudicated in
     the same manner as an agency complaint seeking disciplinary action. In such a
     case, the only issue before the Board is whether the alleged action falls under
     5 U.S.C. § 7521 3 and was taken prior to the hearing and Board decision required
     under that section. Matter of Doyle, 29 M.S.P.R. 170, 174 (1985), superseded by
     regulation on other grounds as stated in Mahoney v. Donovan, 721 F.3d 633, 637
     (D.C. Cir. 2013).   A showing to that effect is sufficient to establish that the
     agency acted unlawfully and that the ALJ is entitled to relief. Id. Like all cases
     involving actions against ALJs under 5 U.S.C. § 7521, complaints filed under
     5 C.F.R. § 1210.142 lie within the Board’s original jurisdiction. McDougall v.
     Social Security Administration, 114 M.S.P.R. 534, ¶ 6 (2010); 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.2(c).
¶7        To establish a constructive removal claim under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.142, the
     appellant must establish that her decision to leave the position of ALJ was
     involuntary under the same standard used in appeals implicating 5 U.S.C. § 7512.
     Tunik v. Social Security Administration, 93 M.S.P.R. 482, 493 (2003), vacated on
     other grounds, 407 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 70 Fed. Reg. 48081, 48081
     (Aug. 16, 2005) (revising section 1201.142 to comport with the Tunik standard),
     adopted as final, 71 Fed. Reg. 34231 (June 14, 2006); see also Mahoney,

     3
       Section 7521 covers the following actions: a removal, a suspension, a reduction in
     grade, a reduction in pay, and a furlough of 30 days or less. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(b).
                                                                                             5

     721 F.3d at 637 (acknowledging the 2005 revision). 4            Under that standard, a
     decision to resign is presumed to be a voluntary act outside the Board’s
     jurisdiction, and the appellant bears the burden of establishing by preponderant
     evidence that her resignation was involuntary and therefore tantamount to a
     forced removal. Hosozawa v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 110,
     ¶ 5 (2010).    To overcome the presumption that resignation is voluntary, the
     employee must show that it was the result of the agency’s misinformation or
     deception or that she was coerced by the agency. Id. When, as in this case, the
     appellant alleges that her resignation was coerced by the agency’s creating
     intolerable working conditions, she must show that a reasonable person in her
     position would have found the working conditions so oppressive that she would
     have felt compelled to resign. Id.; Heining v. General Services Administration,
     68 M.S.P.R. 513, 520 (1995). As is the case with all alleged constructive actions,
     the appellant must demonstrate that (1) she lacked a meaningful choice i n the
     matter, and (2) it was the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived her of that
     choice. See Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 (2013).
¶8         In determining whether a resignation is voluntary, the Board considers
     allegations of discrimination and retaliation insofar as they relate to the issue of
     voluntariness and does not address whether the evidence is sufficient to prove
     unlawful discrimination or retaliation. 5       Neice v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 105 M.S.P.R. 211, ¶ 8 (2007); Markon v. Department of State,
     71 M.S.P.R. 574, 578 (1996); Burke v. Department of the Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R.
     434, 439 (1992). Hence, for purposes of determining our jurisdiction, we do not
     reach the question of whether the appellant was subjected to a hostile work

     4
       The regulation was again revised in 2012 to correct a typographical error.          See
     77 Fed. Reg. 62350, 62359 (Oct. 12, 2012).
     5
       Conversely, if an agency’s actions do constitute unlawful discrimination or retaliation,
     the appellant still must show how those actions coerced her resignation. Tripp v.
     Department of the Air Force, 59 M.S.P.R. 458, 461 (1993).
                                                                                          6

     environment    in   violation   of    the   Whistleblower   Protection   Act   or   the
     antidiscrimination statutes. 6 For the same reason, we need not decide to what
     extent the appellant may have waived her right to assert such claims when she
     entered into the settlement agreement. 7 In any event, the settlement agreement’s
     waiver provision covers the filing or submission of complaints, grievances, or
     administrative or judicial actions “with respect to the events underlying” the
     complaint of discrimination.         IAF, Tab 53 at 3-4.    It does not prohibit the
     appellant from filing an administrative action concerning events occurring after
     the effective date of the settlement agreement, like this appeal, and submitting
     relevant evidence during the course of that permissible action that predates the
     settlement agreement. Therefore, the question before us is whether, for whatever
     reasons, a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would have found her
     working conditions so oppressive that she would have felt compelled to resign.
     See Heining, 68 M.S.P.R. at 520.
¶9         The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that in
     determining whether a reasonable person in the appellant’s position would have
     felt compelled to resign, the Board “need not limit itself to any particular
     timeframe.” Terban v. Department of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir.
     2000). The most probative evidence of involuntariness will usually be events
     occurring a relatively short period of time between the alleged coercive act a nd
     the employee’s resignation. Id. In contrast, a long period of time between the

     6
        Similarly, the agency’s alleged failure to provide the appellant reasonable
     accommodation is simply a factor to be considered in assessing whether her resignation
     was involuntary. Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 16, aff’d,
     469 F. App’x 852 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
     7
       To the extent the appellant contends the agency breached the agreement, PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 9, we are unable to address that allegation. The Board does not have authority
     to enforce or invalidate a settlement agreement reached in another forum. See Lee v.
     U.S. Postal Service, 111 M.S.P.R. 551, ¶ 4 n.2 (2009), aff’d, 367 F. App’x 137 (Fed.
     Cir. 2010). The appellant’s request for the Board to find the agency has breached the
     terms of the agreement is tantamount to a request for enforcement of the agreement.
     See Lopez v. U.S. Postal Service, 71 M.S.P.R. 461, 463 (1996).
                                                                                           7

      alleged coercive act and the employee’s resignation diminishes the causal link
      between the two events and, thus, attenuates the employee’s claim of
      involuntariness. Id. Thus, in Terban, the Federal Circuit found that the Board
      acted within its discretion in giving relatively little weight to events that oc curred
      more than 14 days prior to the appellant’s retirement in determining whether h e
      was coerced into retirement.      Id. Rather, the court found the appellant’s own
      actions in tolerating a long period of what he considered to be harassment
      indicate that he had an alternative to retirement. Id. at 1024-25. Similarly, in
      Searcy v. Department of Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281 (2010), a case involving
      an alleged involuntary resignation, the Board found that when the allegedly
      coercive acts by the agency were raised in an EEO complaint filed 5 months
      before the appellant’s resignation, the lapse in time undercut the appellant’s claim
      of involuntary resignation.      Id., ¶ 13.    Thus, events occurring prior to the
      settlement agreement, which became effective approximately 1 year before the
      appellant’s resignation, are entitled to relatively little weight.
¶10         Nonetheless, in determining whether a reasonable person in the appellant’s
      position would have felt compelled to resign, the Board is required to consider
      the totality of the circumstances, including events not immediately preceding the
      resignation. Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
      2001). As the Federal Circuit has explained, “such events must, at a minimum, be
      considered to place events occurring more immediately preceding the appellant’s
      resignation into the proper context.” Id. at 1343. In granting the agency’s motion
      to exclude testimony concerning events that occurred before October 10, 2015,
      the presiding ALJ found Shoaf was distinguishable because it did not involve a
      waiver provision such as the one at issue here. HT (May 10, 2017) at 24-25; ID
      at 6 n.4. We find, however, that the waiver provision does not preclude us from
      considering prior events for the limited purpose described in Shoaf, i.e., to
      develop the “contextual landscape” for better understanding the allegedly
      coercive acts that followed. See 260 F.3d at 1343 n.3.
                                                                                             8

¶11         Accordingly, we remand this case for further development of the record, to
      include any relevant testimony concerning events preceding the settlement
      agreement. 8 The ALJ retains broad discretion to exclude or limit testimony when
      it has not been shown that the testimony would be relevant, material, and
      nonrepetitious. See, e.g., Box v. U.S. Postal Service, 51 M.S.P.R. 401, 405 n.2
      (1991) (finding that the administrative judge properly limited the appellant’s
      cross-examination of a witness by excluding questions that the appellant failed to
      show would have produced relevant and material evidence). When the record has
      been fully developed, the ALJ should make a new finding as to whether the
      appellant’s resignation constitutes a constructive removal for purposes of
      5 U.S.C. § 7521 and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.142.

                                             ORDER
¶12         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to an ALJ for further
      adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                              /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      8
        We discern no abuse of discretion in the presiding ALJ’s decision not to admit a
      Standard Form 2810, which indicates that the appellant’s enrollment in the Federal
      Employee Health Benefits program ended effective October 2, 2016. IAF, Tab 53 at 1,
      Tab 54 at 96. Contrary to the appellant’s assertions , the document does not indicate the
      date of her termination and has no apparent relevance to the voluntariness of her
      resignation. We have also considered the appellant’s allegation that the presiding ALJ
      made inappropriate comments and interruptions that deprived her of a full and fair
      hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 17. However, we find the presiding ALJ’s conduct during
      the hearing does not evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make
      fair judgment impossible.” Bieber v. Department of the Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63
      (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).