Court Opinion

ID: 9590694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:57:39.006617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:30.460746
License: Public Domain

Marshall, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, the Open Records Act, OCGA § 50-18-70 to § 50-18-75, has no application to this case.
1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963), provides a method by which the appellant could obtain any exculpatory material to aid him in his petition for habeas corpus.
2. I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion in its interpretation of § 50-18-72 (a) (4) and Napper v. Ga. Television Co., 257 Ga. 156 (356 SE2d 640) (1987). The Code section in part provides that a prosecution “shall no longer be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation involving said investigation and prosecution has become fi*200nal or otherwise terminated.” (Emphasis supplied.) As long as the state is free to retry Parker for rape, the investigation and prosecution cannot, by any interpretation, be “final or otherwise terminated.”
Decided May 4, 1989.
Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, Elizabeth Finn Johnson, Sibley & Austin, Wiley A. Branton, Richard E. Young, Vincent E. Prada, for appellant.
Frank C. Winn, District Attorney, William H. McClain, Assistant District Attorney, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith joins in this dissent.