Court Opinion

ID: 9382450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 18:07:40.655738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.440463
License: Public Domain

J-S43021-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ALEX WATSON                              :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 787 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 24, 2022,
            in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001353-2017.

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                         FILED MARCH 27, 2023

      Alex Watson appeals pro se from the order denying his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We

affirm.

      On May 18, 2015, Watson shot and killed the victim.         Following his

arrest, he was charged with first-degree murder and related charges. He

appeared for a jury trial on October 30, 2018. However, the jury could not

reach a unanimous verdict, and the trial court declared a mistrial. Prior to his

second trial, Watson filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the trial court

granted. The court appointed Watson’s counsel from his first trial as standby

counsel.
J-S43021-22

      Watson’s second jury trial commenced on April 29, 2019. Previously,

this Court reproduced the trial court’s detailed account of the evidence

presented at the second trial as follows:

             On May 18, 2015, at approximately 10:12 p.m., [the victim]
      was with his sister, Shaheen Ahmed, at her home on Allison Street
      in Philadelphia. Before [the victim] left Ahmed’s home, he told
      [Ahmed] he was “going to meet Dil and Master and Conestoga.”
      Ahmed did not know Dil’s real name, but knew he was “Aaron’s
      little brother, Leslie.” [Watson] whose legal name is Leslie
      Williams, also lived on Allison Street. Both [Watson’s] and
      Ahmed’s homes are about two blocks from the 1300 block of
      Conestoga Steet, where [the victim’s] murder later occurred.

            At approximately 11:41 p.m., on the 1300 block of
      Conestoga Street, between Master and West Thompson Streets,
      [Watson shot the victim] eighteen times, killing him. Within
      seconds of hearing the gunshots, Philadelphia Police Officers
      Michael Carey and Michael Paige arrived at the crime scene, where
      [the victim] was lying on his back with no sign of life. They
      observed multiple fired cartridge casings []. [The victim] who
      suffered from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, was
      pronounced dead at the scene. The officers secured the crime
      scene and waited for the other responding officers to arrive.

            Philadelphia Police Officers Andre Dunkley and Marvin
      Wilkins arrived to the scene about one minute after Officers Carey
      and Paige. Officer Dunkley observed the 18 [fired cartridge
      casings] on the ground trailing from [the victim’s] body, in the
      middle of the block, to the rear of a silver Buick Enclave that was
      parked at the end of the block, near the corner of Conestoga and
      West Thompson Street. When looking inside the passenger side
      window, Officer Dunkley saw a silver handgun with a black handle
      and the slide locked back. At 12:40 a.m., the Philadelphia Crime
      Scene Unit arrived and recovered all 18 [fired cartridge casings]
      from the street, [the victim’s] cell phone, and a 9 millimeter
      [R]uger handgun from the car.

            Around 2:45 a.m., Officer Wilkins, who remained at the
      scene to guard the Buick, observed a [Nissan] car pull up to the
      corner of Conestoga and West Thompson Streets. Quinn Wise got
      out of the car, walked towards the Buick and attempted to open
      the front driver’s side door. When stopped by officers, Wise

                                     -2-
J-S43021-22

     claimed it was her vehicle. When questioned by detectives at the
     Homicide Unit, Wise stated that her daughter’s father, [Watson],
     told her that the vehicle was on Conestoga Street and asked her
     to go get it for him. A swab of Wise’s DNA was taken.

            Keith Schofield arrived in the Nissan with Wise. During an
     interview with Homicide Detectives, Schofield told detectives that
     earlier in the evening, he was near Fairmount Park on Kelly Drive
     with Diashauna Coleman. At approximately 1:34 a.m., after
     Schofield drove Coleman home, he returned to a missed call from
     [Watson]. [Watson] asked Schofield to meet him on Master Street
     between 52nd and 53rd Street. When Schofield arrived, [Watson]
     proclaimed, “I f***ed up . . . I might have f***ed up.” [Watson]
     then instructed Schofield to take Wise to get the car from
     Conestoga Street. Schofield identified [Watson] in a photograph
     as the individual that told him to retrieve the car.

           The Homicide Unit focused their investigation on [Watson].
     On November 20, 2015, in an attempt to locate [Watson] and
     obtain his DNA, Philadelphia Detective Joseph Bamberski and
     Untied States Marshals Fugitive Task Force Agent Timothy
     Stevenson went to 1336 N. Allison Street, [Watson’s] approved
     parole residence. [Watson’s] mother and brother, Aaron Williams,
     indicated that [Watson] was not home. On November 23, 2015,
     Detective Bamberski and Agent Stevenson went back to
     [Watson’s] address, and were again unsuccessful in locating him.
     On February 24, 2016, [Watson] was located by Detective
     Bamberski and Agent Stevenson at an apartment on the 5100
     block of Regent Street in Philadelphia, In furtherance of their
     investigation, [Watson] was brought to the Homicide Unit for
     questioning and a buccal swab.

          A search of [Watson’s] cell phone [] revealed that on
     November 21, 2015, [Watson] had taken a screenshot of a
     conversation in which he was discussing the United States
     Marshals waiting outside his home with a search warrant. On
     November 27, 2015, [Watson] downloaded a PDF of the “Most
     Wanted” list from the Pennsylvania State Police website.

           Detective [James] Dunlap reviewed the phone records for
     [Watson’s] phone number and discovered that on the night of the
     murder between 10:01 p.m. and 1:53 a.m., [Watson’s] phone was
     within the geographical area of the crime scene.

          Brittany Rehrig, a forensic scientist at the Philadelphia
     Forensic Lab, conducted DNA analysis of the handgun and the

                                   -3-
J-S43021-22

      Buick. [Watson’s] DNA was found on the handgun’s slide, grip,
      and trigger, and the Buick’s steering wheel. Wise’s DNA was
      detected as a major source on the handgun’s magazine. Her DNA
      was also found on the gearshift and radio control area. The results
      for [Watson’s] DNA on the front and rear driver’s side door
      handles, magazine, gearshift, and radio control area were
      determined to be inconclusive, but his DNA was not excluded as a
      source.    A defense expert, Katherine Cross, concurred with
      Rehrig’s overall conclusions that [Watson’s] DNA was present as
      a major source on the handgun. On December 13, 2016, after
      [Watson’s] DNA was confirmed as a match, an arrest warrant was
      prepared.

            According to Police Officer Kelly Walker, an expert in the
      Firearms Identification Unit, all 18 [cartridge casings] were fired
      from the same handgun, the 9mm Ruger recovered from the
      Buick. The firearm was capable of holding 18 bullets, 17 in the
      magazine and one in the chamber.

            At trial, the Commonwealth presented a Certificate of Non-
      Licensure showing that on May 18, 2015, [Watson] was not
      licensed to carry a firearm.

             [In his defense, Watson] presented two lifelong friends as
      witnesses, Joshua Edwards and Bayyan Finney, who attempted to
      provide an alibi defense. Finney, who was in custody at the time
      of trial, also testified that the night before his testimony, he made
      a phone call to his friend, “Mock,” who was on the phone with
      [Watson] at the time of his call. Mock put Finney on speakerphone
      so the three of them could have a conversation. [Watson] asked
      Finney to trade shoes with him before court, because Finney had
      dress shoes, and [Watson] did not want to wear his Reebok Classic
      sneakers to trial. During cross-examination, Finney denied that
      [Watson] attempted to bribe him with a new pair of shoes in
      exchange for his testimony.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 240 A.3d 906 (Pa. Super. 2020), non-

precedential decision at 2-5).

      On May 3, 2019, the jury convicted Watson of all charges. That same

day, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate sentence of life in prison

without parole. Watson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial

                                      -4-
J-S43021-22

court denied on May 13, 2019. Watson appealed, raising four issues, including

a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. On

September 4, 2020, we rejected Watson’s claims and affirmed his judgment

of sentence. Watson, supra. On March 31, 2021, our Supreme Court denied

Watson’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Watson, 251

A.3d 780 (Pa. 2021).

      On September 2, 2021, Watson filed a pro se PCRA petition and the

PCRA court appointed counsel. On October 13, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a

“no-merit” letter and motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d

213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On October 14, 2021, the PCRA court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Watson’s petition without a

hearing.

      On November 29, 2021, Watson filed a response to the court’s Rule 907

notice in which he claimed that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not filing an

amended petition and claimed that the trial court’s April 27, 2019, waiver-of-

counsel colloquy was defective.

      Thereafter, the PCRA court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw and

appointed replacement counsel to conduct an independent investigation of

Watson’s claims.     On January 20, 2022, replacement counsel filed a

Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter and motion to withdraw. That same day, the

PCRA court issued another Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Watson’s

petition without a hearing.   The PCRA court granted Watson’s motion for an

                                    -5-
J-S43021-22

extension of time in which to file a response. Watson filed his response on

February 7, 2022.        By order entered February 24, 2022, the PCRA court

permitted new counsel to withdraw and denied Watson’s petition.1 This appeal

followed.      Both Watson and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Watson raises the following five issues on appeal:

          I.      Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
                  no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
                  counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
                  claim that [Watson’s] waiver of counsel was invalid
                  and PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
                  the claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal
                  counsel in that regard.

          II.     Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
                  no merit tin [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
                  counsel was ineffective in the manner by which he
                  litigated [Watson’s] claim of insufficient evidence to
                  support the conviction and PCRA counsel was
                  ineffective for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
                  assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?

          III.    Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
                  no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
                  counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
                  abuse of discretion, where the trial court denied
                  [Watson’s] request for a mistrial after a witness’s
                  prejudicial comments and PCRA counsel was
                  ineffective for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
                  assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?

          IV.     Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
                  no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
____________________________________________

1Review of the docket in this case reveals the PCRA court entered a second
order dismissing Watson’s petition on February 28, 2022. While it is unclear
why this order was necessary, Watson has timely appealed from either date.

                                           -6-
J-S43021-22

               counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the
               claim of judicial impropriety, where the trial court
               adopted a prosecutorial function and PCRA counsel
               was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
               ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel in that
               regard?

         V.    Did the PCRA court err, in its finding that there was
               no merit in [Watson’s] claim, that direct appeal
               counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claim of
               abuse of discretion, where the trial court allowed a
               witness to testify after she previously heard the
               testimony of all the other witnesses and PCRA counsel
               was for failing to raise the claim of ineffective
               assistance of direct appeal counsel in that regard?

Watson’s Brief at 4-5.

      This Court’s standard of review for an order dismissing a PCRA petition

is to ascertain whether the order “is supported by the evidence of record and

is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless

there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth

v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).

         The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
         a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no
         genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant
         is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no
         legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.
         To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
         petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he
         raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
         his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
         otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted).

                                      -7-
J-S43021-22

      To be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects in 42 Pa.C.S.A.

section 9543(a)(2), and that the issues he raises have not been previously

litigated or waived. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 725 A.2d 154, 160 (Pa.

1999). An issue has been "previously litigated" if the highest appellate court

in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled

on the merits of the issue, or if the issue has been raised and decided in a

proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. Carpenter, 725

A.2d at 160; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2), (3).          If a claim has not been

previously litigated, the petitioner must then prove that the issue was not

waived. Carpenter, 725 A.2d at 160. An issue will be deemed waived under

the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial,

at trial, during unitary review, on appeal, or in a prior state post-conviction

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).

      In each of his appellate issues, Watson raises a layered claim of

ineffectiveness. As part of these assertions, Watson alleges the ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). To obtain relief under

the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must

establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's ineffectiveness

so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

                                      -8-
J-S43021-22

guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966

A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s performance is presumed to

be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon

a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id. This requires the petitioner to

demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel

had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3)

counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 533.

      In making a layered claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner “must

properly argue each prong of the three-prong ineffectiveness test for each

separate attorney.” Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1190 (Pa.

Super. 2012). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical

inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective

did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel.”   Commonwealth v.

Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).           “If that attorney was

effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to

raise the underlying issue.” Id.

      Here, the PCRA court has authored a thorough and well-reasoned

opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a). The Honorable Barbara A. McDermott has

addressed each of Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claims with proper citation

to legal authorities and citation to the certified record. In addition, she has

explained why an evidentiary hearing was not necessary before disposing of

Watson’s ineffectiveness claims.

                                     -9-
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        We discern no legal errors in Judge McDermott’s analysis, and we find

her factual findings and credibility determinations fully supported by our

review of the record. As such, we adopt Judge McDermott’s 1925(a) opinion

as our own in affirming the order denying Watson’s post-conviction relief. See

PCRA Court’s Opinion, 2/24/22, at 14-17 (explaining that because Watson’s

waiver of counsel colloquy was sufficient, appellate counsel cannot be

ineffective for failing to object and preserve the issue for appeal; PCRA counsel

cannot be found ineffective for failing to assert meritless claims); at       7-9

(rejecting Watson’s layered claim of ineffectiveness because, although this

Court    found   Watson’s   Rule   1925(b)    statement   deficient,   the   court

nevertheless ruled on the merits that there was sufficient evidence to support

each of Watson’s convictions; Watson’s claim that counsel should have argued

the “equipoise” principle fails because nothing in the record indicated that “two

contrary interpretations of evidence could have been presumed by the jury’);

at 9-10 (explaining that Watson’s claim of improper admission of prior bad act

evidence was previously litigated on direct appeal; nonetheless, because

Watson’s claim is based on “a complete misstatement” of the challenged

testimony, Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim fails); at 11-13 (explaining

that Watson’s claim of judicial impropriety was waived for lack of objection at

trial and was otherwise without merit; Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim

failed because the trial court did no more than ask the witness to clarify her

answer); and 10-11 (rejecting Watson’s layered ineffectiveness claim

                                     - 10 -
J-S43021-22

concerning testimony at his second trial from the victim’s sister; no

sequestration violation occurred because the sister did not testify at Watson’s

first trial, and she was properly sequestered for the second trial).2

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2023

____________________________________________

2The parties are directed to attach Judge McDermott’s February 24, 2022,
opinion to this memorandum in any future appeal.

                                          - 11 -
                                                                              Circulated 02/28/2023 10:42 AM

                           IN THE COU11T OF COMMON PLEAS
                      FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                               CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH Or PENNSYLVANIA                           :CP-51-CR 0001353-2017

        v,
                                                                                     FILED

ALEX WATSON,                                                                      FEB 2
                                                                                      142022
                                                                                    PCRA Unit
                 Petitioner                                                     CP Criminal Listings

                                         ORDER AND OPINION

McDermott, J.                                                              February 24, 2022

Procedural History

        On December 19, 2016, the Petitioner, Alex Watson, was arrested.and charged with

Murder and related offenses. On October 29,.2018, the Petitioner appeared before this Court and

elected to proceed with ajury trial. On November 6, 2018, the jurors were unable to reach a

unanimous verdict, and this Court declared amistrial. On March.7, 2019, the Petitioner filed a

Motion to Proceed prase. On April 29, 2019, this Court granted the Petitioner's Motion and

permitted him to represent himself.'

        On May 3, 201.9, ajury.convicted the Petitioner of First-Degree Murder, Firearms Not to

be Carried Without aLicense ("VUFA 6.106"), Carrying aFirearm on the Public Street in

Philadelphia ("VUFA 6108"), and Possessing an Instrument of Crime ("PIC" ): This Court

immediately imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for rust -
                                                                         Degree Murder,

concurrent; terms of three to six years imprisonment for VUFA 6106, and one to two years

imprisonment for VUFA 61.08, for atotal sentence of life imprisonment 2That same day, this

IThis Court appointed standby counsel.
2This Court itnposed no further penalty for PIC.
                                                   1
Court appointed standby counsel, James F. Berardinelli, as appellate counsel because the

Petitioner did not want to represent himself on appeal.. On May 10, 2019, counsel filed aPost-

Sentence, Motion, which this Court denied on May 13, 2019.

        On June 7, 2019, the Petitioner. filed aNotice of Appeal and the Superior Court affirmed

his judgment of sentence on September 4, 2020. On March 31, 2021, the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.

        On.September 9, 2021, the Petitioner filed.a pro se Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA")

petition, his first. On September 10, 2021, this Court appointed George S. Yacoubian, Jr. as

PCRA counsel. On October 13, 2021, appointed PCRA counsel filed ano-merit letter pursuant.to.

Commonivealth tip. Finley;550 A.2d 213 (Pa, Super. 1988), On October 14,.2021, this Court filed

aNotice of Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

        On November 29, 2021, the Petitioner filed an Objection to the 907 Notice raising claims

that PCRA counsel was ineffective for not filing an :Amended, Petition and. that this Court's April

27, 2019 colloquy was defective. This Court appointed Gary S. Server as PCRA counsel to

conduct an independent investigation of the Petitioner's claims, On January 20, 2022,

replacement PCRA counsel filed ano-merit letter, That same day, this Court filed aNotice of

Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On February 2, 2022, after he filed aMotion for

an Extension of Time, this Court granted the Petitioner an additional twenty days to file
                                                                                      - an

objection,. On February 7, 2022, the Petitioner filed an Objection to this Court's 907 Notice. On

February 8, 2022, the Petitioner attempted ₹ofile apro se Amended PCRA Petition a

 The claims raised in the Petitioner's pro se Amended PCRA Petition are essentially the same as those raised in his
initial.pro se PCRA petition, his November 29, 2021 Objection, and his `February 7, 2022 Objection.
                                                         2
Facts

        In its September 4, 2020, Opinion, the Superior Court adopted this Court's summary of

the facts in part and recited them as follows:

                        On May 18, 2015, at approximately 10:12 pm., Victirn Was
               with his sister, Shaheen Ahmed, at her home on Allison Street in
               Philadelphia. Before the Victim left Ahmed's home, he told her he
               was "going to meet Dil at Master and Conestoga.." Ahmed did not
               know Dil's real name, but knew he was "Aaron's little brother,
               Leslie." Petitioner, whose legal name is Leslie Williams, also lived
               on Allison Street, Both Petitioner and Ahmeds' homes are about
               two blocks from the 1300 block of Conestoga Street, where the
               Victim's murder later occurred.
                        At approximately 1.1:41 p,m., on the 1300 block of
               Conestoga Street, between Master and West Thompson Streets,
               Petitioner shot Victim eighteen times, killing him. Within seconds
               of hearing the gunshots, Philadelphia Police Officers Michael
               Carey and Michael Paige, arrived at the crime seen, where the
               Victim was lying on his back with no. sign of life. They observed
               multiple fired cartridge. casings. Victim, who suffered from
               multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, was pronounced dead at the
               scene. The officers secured the crime scene and waited for the
               other responding officers to arrive.
                        Philadelphia Police Officers Andre Dunkley and Marvin
               Wilkins arrived at the scene about one minute after Officers Carey
               and Paige. Officer Dunkley observed the 18 fired cartridge casings
               on the ground trailing from the Victim's body, in the middle of the
               block, to the rear of asilver Buick Enclave that was parked at the
               end of the block, near the corner of Conestoga and West
               Thompson Street. When looking inside the passenger side window,
               Officer Dunkley saw asilver handgun with ablack handle and the,
               slide locked back. At 12:40 a.m., the Philadelphia Crime Scenc
               Unit arrived and recovered all 18 fired cartridge casings from the
               street, the Victim's cell phone, and a9millimeter Ruger handgun
               from the car.
                        Around 2:45 a.m., Officer Wilkins, who remained at the
               scene to guard the Buick, observed aNissan car pull up to the
               corner of Conestoga and West Thompson Streets. Quinn Wise got
               out of the car, walked towards the Buick. and attempted to open the
               front driver's side door. When stopped by officers, Wise claimed it
               was her vehicle. When questioned by detectives at the Homicide
               Unit, Wise stated that her daughter's father, Petitioner, told her that.
               the vehicle was on Conestoga Street and asked her to go get it for
               him. A swab of Wise's DNA was taken.

                                                  3
        Keith Schofield arrived in the Nissan with Wise. During an
inteiview with Homicide Detectives, Schofield told detectives that
earlier in the evening, he was near Fairmount Park on Kelly Drive
with Diashauna Coleman. At approximately 1:34 a.m., after
Schofield drove Coleman home, he returned amissed call from
Petitioner. Petitioner asked Schofield to meet him on Master Street
between 52n d and 53Td Street. When Schofield arrived, Petitioner
proclaimed, "If# * * ed up ... Imight have f* * $ ed up.' ,'Petitioner
then instructed Schofield to take Wise to get the car from
Conestoga Street. Schofield identified Petitioner in aphotograph as
the individual that told him to retrieve the car.
         The Homicide Unit focused their investigation on
Petitioner. On November 20, 2015, in an attempt to locate
Petitioner and obtain his DNA,, Philadelphia Detective Joseph
Bamberski and United States Marshals Fugitive Task Force Agent
Timothy Stevenson went to 1336 N, Allison Street, the Petitioner's
approved parole residence. Petitioner's mother and brother, Aaron.
Williams, indicated that Petitioner was not home. On November
23, 2015, Detective Bamberski and Agent Stevenson went back to
Petitioner's address, and were again unsuccessful in locating him.
On February 24, 2016, Petitioner was located by Detective
Bamberski and Agent Stevenson at. an apartment on the 5100 block
of Regent Street in Philadelphia. In furtherance of their
investigation, Petitioner was brought to the Homicide Unit for
questioning and a. buccal swab.
         A search of the Petitioner's cell phone revealed.that on
November 21, 201.5, Petitioner had taken ascreenshot of a
conversation in which he was discussing the United States
Marshals waiting outside. his home with asearch warrant. On
November 27, 2015, Petitioner downloaded aPDF of the "Most
Wanted" list from the Pennsylvania State Police website.
         Detective James Dunlap reviewed the phone records for
Petitioner's phone number and discovered that on. the night of the
murder between 1.0;01 p.m. and 1:53 a.m., the Petitioner's phone
was within the geographical area of the crime scene.
         Brittany Rehrig, aforensic scientist at the Philadelphia
Forensic Lab, conducted DNA analysis of the handgun and the
Buick. Petitioner's DNA was found on the handgun's slide, grip,
and trigger, and the Buick's steering, wheel. Wise's DNA was
detected as amajor source on the handgun's magazine. Her DNA
was also found on the gearshift and radio control area. The results
for Petitioner's DNA on the front and rear driver's side door
handles, magazine, gearshift, and radio control area were
determined to be inconclusive, but his DNA was not excluded as a
source. A defense expert, Katherine Cross, concurred with
Rehrig's overall conclusions that Petitioner's DNA was present as
amaj or source on the handgun. On December 13, 2016, after

                                  4
                 Petitioner's DNA was confirmed. as amatch, an arrest warrant was
                 prepared.
                          According to Police Officer, Kelly Walker, an expert in the
                 Firearms Identification Unit, all 18 fired cartridge casings were
                 fired from the same handgun, the 9mm Ruger recovered. from the
                 Buick. The firearm was capable of holding 18 bullets, 17 in the
                 magazine and one in the chamber.
                          At trial, the Commonwealth presented aCertificate of Non-
                 Licensure showing that on May 18, 201.5, Petitioner was not
                 licensed to carry afirearm.
                          Petitioner, presented two lifelong friends as witnesses,
                 Joshua Edwards and Bayyan Finney, who attempted to provide an
                 alibi defense. Finney, who was in custody at the time of trial, also
                 testified that the night before his testimony, he made aphone call
                 to his friend, "Mock," who was on the phone with Petitioner at the
                 time of his call. Mock put Finney on speakerphone so the three of
                 them could have aconversation. Petitioner asked Finney to trade
                 shoes with him before court, because Finney had dress shoes, and
                 Petitioner did not want to wear: his Reebok Classic sneakers to
                 trial. During cross-examination, Finney denied that Petitioner:
                 attempted to bribe him with anew pair of shoes in exchange for his
                 testimony at trial.

Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA 2019 at *2-5 (September 4, 2020) (non-precedential

decision) (internal brackets and footnotes omitted).

Discussion

        In his PCRA Petition, the Petitioner raises four issues for review, that appellate counsel

was ineffective for not: ( 1) properly developing his sufficiency claim and not arguing the

"equipoise principal" on appeal; (2) properly developing his claim of improper admission of his

prior bad act; (3) appealing this Court's ruling to allow awitness to testify who the Petitioner

alleges violated the. sequestration order,• and, (4) appealing this Court's discretion to question a

witness, Quinn Wise ("Wise") .4

4Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness regarding appellate counsel's failure to properly develop his claim of improper
admission of his prior bad act was not included his pro se PCRA petition filed on September 2, 2021, but was
subsequently raised in letters with his initial PCRA counsel and was addressed in his initial PCRA counsel's Finley
letter,
                                                           5
       This Court must first address the timeliness of the instant petition before reaching the

merits of the Petitioner's claims. A PCRA petition must be filed within. one, year of the date the

Petitioner's judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of three delineated timeliness

exceptions are met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), Ajudgment becomes final at the conclusion of

direct review, or at the expiration of the time for seeking review. 42 Pa. C.S. § 9545(b)(3). A final

order of the Superior Court is any order that concludes an appeal, and aPetition for Allowance of

Appeal with the. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania must be filed within thirty days after the entry

of the Superior Court. Order. Pa.R.A.P. 1112, Pa.R.A.P. 1113. A petition for awrit of certiorari

seeking review of ajudgment from alower state court is timely when it is filed within ninety

days after the entry of the order denying discretionary review. U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.

       The PCRA time requirement is jurisdictional in nature, and atrial court cannot. ignore it

to reach apetition's merits. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 736 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citing CorninonNJealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010)).

       This Court finds that the. instant petition.is timely. The Petitioner's judgment of sentence

became final on rune 29, 2021, when the ninety-day period to seek apetition fora iirit of

certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. The Petitioner had one year from that

date to bring atimely PCRA claim. The. instant petition was filed. on September 2, 2021;

therefore, the instant petition is timely.

       Defendants• who represent themselves are not entitled to relief under the PCRA for claims

of ineffective assistance based on their own failure, or that of standby counsel, at trial.

Cornnionwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759,374 (
                                             Pa. 2009). Therefore, the. Petitioner's decisionto

waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial precludes any of the Petitioner's claims

alleging his own ineffectiveness or that of standby counsel.

                                                  6
         To obtain relief on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, apetitioner must satisfy

the performance and prejudice test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052

(1984). Commonwealth v, Montalvo, 205 A,3d 274,286 (Pa. 2019). In Pennsylvania, courts

apply the Strickland test by examining whether; (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2)

counsel lacked areasonable basis for his actions or failure to act; and, (3) the petitioner was

prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance such that there is areasonable probability that the

result of the. proceeding would have been different absent counsel's error or omission, Id.     (Citing

Commonwealth v. Pi.'erce,, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987)): A petitioner's failure to satisfy any

prong. of this three-part ineffectiveness test is fatal to the claim. Commonwealth   Y,   Wholaver, 177

A.3d 13.6, 144 (Pa. 2018). Courts are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness

claim in any particular order; if aclaim fails under any prong of the ineffectiveness test, acourt

may proceed to that element first. Commonwealth v, Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1.117--18 (Pa.

2012).

         To succeed on. astand-alone claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness, "aPCRA

petitioner must demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective in the manner by which he

litigated. the claim on appeal." Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 142 (Pa. 2012). A

petitioner must establish exactly how appellate counsel was ineffective either "by offering

additional evidence or controlling authority, missed by direct appeal counsel, that would have

changed the appeal outcome; or by specifically alleging the winning claim or distinct legal

theory that appellate counsel failed to recognize; and then by showing how the appeal, as

pursued, was incompetent by comparison." Id- (citing Commonwealth v.. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431,

476 (Pa, 2011)).

         The Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective: for failing to properly

develop his sufficiency claim fails. The Petitioner claims appellate counsel was ineffective for

                                                   7
failing to specify in his 1925(b) Statement which elements of the crimes were insufficiently

proven at trial. The. Petitioner also claims his initial PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise aclaim that appellate counsel was ineffective: for waiving his. sufficiency arguments on

direct appeal.

       On direct appeal, the Petitioner's claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence was

addressed and rejected by the Superior Court. See Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA

2019 at * 8-10 (September 4, 2020) (non-precedential decision). Whilethe Superior Court did

find the Petitioner's 1925(b) Statement deficient, the Superior Coui L, ruled on the merits and

agreed with this. Court that there was sufficient evidence to support each of the Petitioner's

convictions. Id.

       Both initial PCRA counsel and subsequent PCRA counsel. addressed the Petitioner's

ineffectiveness claim regarding appellate counsel's lack. of specificity in. developing Petitioner's

sufficiency claim in their Tinley letters and concluded Petitioner's claim had no merit. Initial

PCRA counsel found, and this Court agrees, that appellate counsel's failure to properly develop

Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim does not amount to ineffective assistance because

the Commonwealth established each of the elements of the charged offenses beyond areasonable

doubt,at trial and there was no plausible sufficiency claim which could be made by appellate

counsel, Replacement PCRA counsel determined that Petitioner's sufficiency claim was not

waived due to appellate counsel's lack of specify and neither prior counsel. was ineffective

because no plausible sufficiency claim could. be made.

        The Petitioner argues that both appellate counsel and initial PCRA counsel were

ineffective for failing to argue the."equipoise principal." The "equipoise principal" holds that if

the evidence presented by the Commonwealth to establish adefendant's guilt is equally

consistent with adefendant's innocence, then there is insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.

                                                  8
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 251 A.3d 1225, * 7 (Pa. Super. March 11, 2021) (unreported

memorandum) (citing Commonwealth v. Tribble, 467 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1983)). Nothing in. the

record indicates that two contrary. interpretations of evidence could have been presumed by the

jury. The Petitioner has not offered any additional evidence or controlling authority which would

have changed. the appeal outcome or alleged a. legal theory that appellate counsel failed to

recognize.

        Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly develop on

direct appeal his claim of improper admission of his.pdor bad act and the denial of his request

for amistrial. Petitioner claims that when. Agent Stevenson visited his registered address on

November 20, 2015, Agent Stevenson. was merely attempting to arrest him because he violated

his parole when he failed to notify his parole agent of his change in address. Petitioner further

claims that since Agent. Stevenson was trying to arrest him in an unconnected matter, it cannot be

used to show evidence of flight and improperly implied to the jury that he committed aprior bad

act with his violation. of parole.

        Petitioner's argument that this Court: erred in admitting the testimony of Agent. Stevenson

regarding the Petitioner's parole status has already been rejected by the Pennsylvania Superior

Court on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Watson, No. 1694 EDA 2019 at * 13,-17

(September 4, 2020) (icon-precedential decision), As this claim has already been previously

litigated on direct appeal, it cannot be raised again in aPCRA petition. See. Connnonwealth v.

Chmiel, 30 A.3d l11.1, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (To succeed on collateral review, the petitioner must

show that. his claims were. not previously waived or litigated),

       Petitioner's claim also fails as he completely misstates Agent 9tevenson's testimony

because Agent Stevenson went to the Petitioner's address to effectuate a.DNA search warrant for

this case. N.T. 5/1/2019 at 39. At trial, Agent Stevenson described the efforts to locate the

                                                  9
Petitioner. Id. at 40-41. Although Agent Stevenson's testimony did imply to the jury that the

Petitioner committed aprior bad act, the details of the Petitioner's prior bad act were never

introduced: The jury was aware of nothing more than the Petitioner's parole status, which was

relevant to thepolice investigation and the location of the Petitioner. This Court also provided a

cautionary jury instruction to ensure that the jury consider the evidence only for lawful purposes,

Since the Petitioner's claim is based on. acomplete misstatement: of the facts and appellate

counsel. cannot. be held ineffective for failing:to raise frivolous claims and this Court could not

have erred when it denied his request for amistrial, the Petitioner's claim fails.

       During the Petitioner's mistrial, Shaheen Ahmed, the decedent's sister, was present for

testimony because she was not listed by either side as apotential witness. N.T. 4/
                                                                                 29/,19 at 183.

After the mistrial, Ahmed approached the Assistant District Attorney because she recognized her

phone number in the Commonwealth's exhibits.. Id. at 186-188. During the instant trial,, after

being sequestered and over the Petitioner's objection, this Court allowed Ahmed to testify that

on the night the decedent died, he used her cell phone to call the Petitioner. N.T. 5/02/2019 at .,26-

38. This testimony was supported by her cell and house phone records. Before her testimony, this

Court gave the following cautionary instruction:

                       Now, members of the Jury, there was aprior proceeding in
               this case and in that prior proceeding Ientered a. sequestration
               order like Idid two days ago, maybe three days ago now, saying
               that no witnesses could be present in the courtroom to hear the
               testimony of another witness. And the purpose of the sequestration
               order, Idon't know if I've explained that to. you in the past, but it's
               to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing the
               testimony of another witness. Now, Iwant you to know that
               Shaheen Ahrned was not listed by either side as apotential witness
               during that hearing and she was present. Ibelieve you're going to
               bear that she is the decedent's sister, so she was present during the
               testimony of other witnesses. Now I'm telling you. this because in
               evaluating her credibility of her testimony which is just coming up,
               you may consider the fact that she was in the courtroom at aprior
               proceeding and may have heard other witnesses testify. Idon't
               think anyone knows exactly how long she was in the courtroom or
                                                  10
                 what she heard, but there is an agreement, am Icorrect, that she
                 was present. in the courtroom for at least part of the prior
                 proceeding. So, Ijust wanted to let you know about that before ,you
                 hear her testimony. Is that satisfactory, Mr. Watson?

Id. at 23-24. In response, the. Petitioner said "
                                                Yes, Your Honor, thank you . " Id.

          The Petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal this

Court's ruling to allow Ahmed to testily fails. Since. Ahmed was not awitness in.the mistrial and

was properly sequestered for the second. trial, she did not violate any sequestration order. Ahmed

gave very limited, record supported testimony regarding the phone call the decedent inade and

her conversation with the decedent. In an abundance of caution, this Court gave acautionary

instruction that informed the jury about Ahmed's presence at aprevious hearing. Jurors are

presumed to follow the court's instructions. Cornnzonwealth. v. Rose 172 A.3d 1121 (Pa. Super.

2017). The Petitioner did not object to the cautionary instruction and agreed that the instruction

was sufficient. Therefore, by failing to object, the. Petitioner has waived this claim. See Pa.R.A.P..

302(x),

          Even if there had been aviolation of asequestration order, the remedy for aviolation of a

sequestration order is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in exercising its

discretion, the court considers the seriousness of the violation, its impact on the testimony of the

witness, and its probable impact on the outcome of the trial, Rose, 172 A.3d at 1131 (citing

Connnonwealth v. Smith, 346 A.2d 757, 760 (Pa. 1975)). The trial court's exercise of discretion

should only be disturbed if there is no reasonable ground for the action. taken. Id. There are

reasonable grounds for this Court's chosen remedy and appellate counsel cannot be held

ineffective for failing to raise afrivolous claim. Conzrnonwealth v. Plerce, 645 A, 24 189, 194

(Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2019).

          Petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert aclaim on

direct appeal that this Court abused its discretion to question Wise. The Petitioner's claim fails
                                                  11
because he did not'object to any of this Court's questioning at trial and, therefore, the issue has

been waived. Pa.R,A.P. 302(x). Since the Petitioner represented himself and was acting as his

own trial counsel, he cannot allege his own ineffectiveness for failing to object and preserve the

issue.

         Even:if Petitioner's claim was not waived, the claim.would still fail. because, pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 614, the trial court may examine awitness when the interest of

justice so requires. The trial court has.a duty to ask questions when "absurd, ambiguous, or

frivolous testimony is given or testimony is in need of further elucidation." Commonwealth v.

Smith, 245 A.3d 1120, * 6 (Pa. Super. December 31, 2020), re-argument denied (March 9, 202.1),

appeal denied, No., 175 MAL 2021, (Pa. Aug. 23, 2021) (
                                                      citing Commonwealth v.. Carson, 913

A.2d 220, 249 (Pa. 2006))..

         On December 3, 2015, Wise called the Petitioner from prison. where they talked about

their child and the Petitioner hiding from law enforcement. At trial, the Commonwealth asked

Wise if she recognized her andethe Petitioner's voice. Wise claimed she only recognized her

voice and that the other voice was the voice of her friend, she identified as "William." N.T.

4/30/2019 at 130-133. Wise's claim was absurd and aclear attempt to protect the Petitioner,

Wise had already recanted her previous statement to police incriminating the Petitioner earlier on

in her testimony. This Court allowed the Commonwealth to play more portions of the. call to

prove the Petitioner's identity, including where they talk about their child and use terms of

endearment. This Court did not abuse its discretion when it asked Wise to clarify her testimony

about the identity of the individual on the call. Cotntnonwealth v, Carson, 913 A.2d 220 (
                                                                                         Pa.

2006) (Trial court did not abuse its discretion or show partiality when it questioned awitness on

his motives).

                                                  12
        Additionally, the jury was well aware that this Court was not questioning Wise's

credibility because of this Court's introductory instruction. Before opening statements, this Court

gave the following instruction:

                         It's possible that on occasion, Imight ask some questions of
                 the witnesses myself. If Ido that, they will not -- my questions will
                 not reflect and are not intended. to reflect any opinion on my,part
                 aboutthe evidence or the case. My purpose. would be to inquire
                 about matters that Ithink should be more fully explored or
                 clarified for you.

N.T. 4129/2019 at 220-221. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions, so the

Petitioner's claim fails. See Rose 172 A,3d at 1131-1132.. Appellate counsel cannot be held

ineffective for failing to raise afrivolous claim.. Pierce, 645 A.2d at 194; Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d at

992.

        In his Objection to this Court's 907 Notice filed on, November 29, 2021, the Petitioner

asserted that: ( 1) this Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy was defective; (2) appellate counsel was

ineffective for not objecting to this Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy and preserving the issue for

appeal; and, (3) that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims set forth in his

pro se PCRA Petition. In his February 7, 2022 Objection to the 907 Notice, the Petitioner raised

an additional claim that subsequent PCRA counsel, Attorney Server, was ineffective for not

filing an Amended Petition. On February 8,2022, the Petitioner attempted to file apro se

Amended PCRA Petition. 5

sThe Petitioner is not permitted to file aprose Amended Petition while still represented by counsel, without this
Court's perinission. See Commonwealth v: Glacken, 32 A.3d 750, 753 (Pa, Super. 2011) (quashing Appellant's pro
se PCRA petition where Appellant is represented by counsel even where Appellant's.counsel has not filed a
counseled PCRA petition); see also Corunromvealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1036 (Pa. 2011) (finding "arepresented
defendant on appeal has only two options: `( 1) waive counsel and proceed pro se; or (2) proceed with appellate
counsel and, if warranted, raise appellate counsel's supposed ineffectiveness at alater date, But ` the [one) thing be
may not do' is raise his own appellate claims while still represented by counsel."'); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626
A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993) (prohibiting the court korn accepting pro se filings by arepresented defendant in the interest
of promoting judicial economy in the appellate courts). Although the Petitioner's appointed counsel, Attorney
Server; line filed aMotion to Withdraw, this Court has not granted counsel's Motion and the Petitioner is still
currently represented by appointed counsel. The Petitioner is also not permitted to File an Amended PCRA petition
                                                          13
        When adefendant elects to waive his right to representation, the trial court is required to

ensure that the waiver of counsel is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Pa.R.Crirn.P.

121(A)(2); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 .A.3d 244, 263 (Pa. 2011); Commonwealth v. Phillips,

141 A.3d 512, 518 (Pa. Super. 20.16). To ensure adefendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waiving his right to counsel, acourt must conduct "apenetrating and comprehensive

colloquy." Comnzonivealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853 (Pa. Super. 2014). On April 29, 2019,

this Court conducted athorough colloquy, which establishes that the Petitioner's waiver of his

right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. This Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy

was sufficient as it properly advised the Petitioner of all of the elements required under

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 121.

        First, this Court inquired into the Petitioner's Level of schooling, ability to read and write

English, access to the law library, history of mental illness, and if he was under the effect of any

medication that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings. N.T. 4/29/2019 at

6-7, 16. Next, this Court addressed each of the elements required under Rule 121(2). The

Petitioner was aware of his right to be represented by counsel as he expressly stated, "Iwish to

waive my right to assistance. of counsel." Id at 6. The Petitioner understood. the nature .and

elements of the charges as this Court stated the charges against him and the Petitioner again

rejected aplea offer by the Coininonwealth. Id. at 7, 16-17. The Petitioner was also aware of the

permissible range of sentences as this Court informed the Petitioner that he faced life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole if convicted of first-degree murder. Id at 7. Since

the Petitioner. has already had amistrial, he was aware of his possible defenses and arguments

while the initial PCRA is. pending without leave of court. ,
                                                           See Comnranvealth v. Porter, 35 A.3d 4,12 (Pa. 2012) (a
petitioner who wishes to amend apending PCRA petition trust first seek and obtain leave of court); see also
Pa.R:CrimA 905. The Petitioner never sought leave:of court to amend his initial pro se PCRA petition prior to filing
his Amended PCRA Petition on February 8, 2022.
                                                        14
such as the possibility o£ asecond shooter and the strength of the DN.A. evidence. The Petitioner

informed this Court that he knew which witnesses he intended to call and had decided not to

present the testimony of experts who conducted cell phone analysis. Id. at 9-13. Petitioner also

informed this Court that he knew how to pick ajury. Id. at 13. Standby Counsel, Attorney

Berardinelli, informed this Court that the Petitioner "know[s] the case inside and out as Ido." Id

at 8. The Petitioner understood that he would have to follow the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure, but could confer with standby counsel at the.appropriate times, Id. at 14-15. This

Court explained to the Petitioner that by representing himself and acting as his own trial counsel,

he loses the ability to claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Id.. at 7.

        This Court's April 29, 2019 colloquy must be viewed in the context of the entire case.

Prior to the colloquy on April 29, 2019, there were two other occasions where this Court

conducted acolloquy of the Petitioner, On April 11, 201.8, this Court conducted acolloquy

wherein the Petitioner was advised of the nature and elements of the charges against him and the

range of sentences before rejecting aplea. Offer from the Commonwealth. After amistrial and

prior to his: subsequent trial, this Court conducted another colloquy on October 19, 2018, wherein

the Petitioner was again advised of the charges ..against him and the possible penalties he faced

before he rejected the Commonwealth's offer. The Petitioner stated that lie understood the

charges, the elements of those charges, and the permissible range of sentences because the

charges were defined at his mistrial and this Court reminded him about the mandatory sentence

at the colloquy. N.T, 11/5/2018 at 27-34; N.T. 4/29/2019 at 7.

        This. Court's colloquy was not deficient and showed that the Petitioner.made aknowing,

voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A,2d 645,

655-656 (Pa. 2008) (Defendant made a.knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel after the trial

court's extensive colloquy); see also Commonwealth >>. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1336 (Pa. 1995)

                                                    15
(Defendant's understanding of his right to, counsel was adequately shown through the

combination of two different colloquies).

       In his Objection to this Court's 907 Notice filed February 7, 2022, the Petitioner cites

several cases in support of his   claim. See Commonwealth v. Clybw-n, 42 A.3d 296 (Pa. Super..

20X2); Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d         695 (Pa. Super. 1999). Both Clybui-n and Payson

involved written waiver of counsel forms signed by the defendants which were found to be

insufficient in establishing aknowing, voluntary, and intelligent waives: of counsel without the

trial court conducting acomprehensive oral colloquy. In Clybww, the trial court had the

defendant sign awritten waiver of counsel form, simply asked if the defendant would be

representing himself, and had the assistant district attorney inform the defendant about the nature

of the charges and the permissible range of sentences. See Clybur-n, 42 A.3d at 301. In Payson,

the Superior Court found. that awritten waiver of counsel form signed before a.magistrate was

not applicable to awaiver of counsel during asubsequent guilty plea. Payson, 723 A.2d at 703-

04. The trial courts in Clyburn and Payson did not conduct a. probing colloquy on the record.

Unlike in Clyburn and Payson, this case does not involve asigned written waiver of counsel

without aprobing colloquy. This Court conducted an extensive colloquy on the record, which

properly advised the Petitioner of each of the elements under Rule 121.

       Additionally, each of the cases cited by the Petitioner involved adefendant who raised an

insufficient colloquy claim on direct appeal. Here, the Petitioner failed to raise aclaim

challenging the sufficiency of this Court's colloquy on direct appeal and brings his claim in a

PCRA petition. As the Petitioner failed to raise this claim on direct appeal, the Petitioner's claim

alleging that the colloquy performed by this Court was defective has     been waived. See

Commom4)ealth v. Yarbrough, 245 A.3d 1107 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Appellant waived nine           of his

ten claims by failing to raise these   claims on direct appeal even where he raised the issues in his

                                                   16
pro se post-verdict motions and he cannot overcome waiver by alleging his own, or stand-by

counsel's, ineffectiveness); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544.

       petitioner claims that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this

Court's colloquy at the time it occurred and on direct appeal. Since this Court's colloquy was

sufficient, appellate counsel   cannot be. held ineffective for failing to object to the colloquy and

for failing to preserve the issue on appeal because the underlying claim has.no merit. Appellate

counsel and PCRA counsel also cannot:be held ineffective for failing to assert claims on appeal

that have no merit. Therefore, the Petitioner's claims that.appellate counsel was ineffective for

not objecting to this Court's .April 29, 2019 colloquy and each of his prior counsel was

ineffective for not raising aclaim challenging this Court's colloquy on appeal fail.

       Petitioner's claims that bath PCRA counsel are ineffective for failing to file an Amended

Petition fail because, as discussed above, his claims have no merit. As PCRA counsel cannot be

held ineffective for failing to raise frivolous claims, Petitioner's claims fail, Montalvo, 205 A.3d

at 286. The Petitioner has failed to show how the review and conclusions reached by either

PCRA counsel in their Finley letters were incompetent.

       For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's petition is DENIED and Gary S. Server, Esq.

is permitted to withdraw. The Petitioner is hereby notified that he has thirty (30) days from the

date of this Order and Opinion to file an appeal with the Superior Court.

                                                                 BY THIS COURT

                                                                 Barbara. A. McDermott, I

                                                    17
Coin nonivealth. v. Alex lf'atsou, CP 51-CR-00001353-2017

                                    PROOF OF SERVICE

       Ihereby certify that. Iam this day serving the foregoing filing upon the person(s), and in
the manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa. R. Crim. P. 119:

                             Philadelphia District .Attorney's
                                                        ney's Office
                             Three South. Penn Square
                             Philadelphia, PA 19107
                             Attn: Tracey Kavanagh

Type of Service:             Inter-office: Mail

                             Alex Watson
                             QF-3998
                             SCI Huntingdon
                             1100 Pike Street
                             Huntingdon, PA 16652

Type of Service:             Certified Mail

                             Gary S. Server, Esq.
                             52103 Delaire Landing
                             Pluladelplua PA 19114

Type of Service:             Regular Mail

Dated: February 24, 2022

Sean McFadden
Law Clerk to the
Honorable Barbara A. McDermott

                                               18