Court Opinion

ID: 9898745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 00:07:56.495194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:24.104203
License: Public Domain

11/14/2023

                                         DA 22-0132
                                                                                  Case Number: DA 22-0132

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                        2023 MT 217N

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

MATTHEW ROBERT ALLEN,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DC-21-35
                      Honorable Matthew J. Cuffe, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      Nathan D. Ellis, Ellis Law, PLLC, Helena, Montana

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Bjorn Boyer, Assistant
                      Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                      Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Jeffrey Zwang, Deputy
                      County Attorney, Libby, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: August 30, 2023

                                                          Decided: November 14, 2023

Filed:
                                Vir--
                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Matthew Robert Allen appeals the Nineteenth Judicial District Court’s judgment

imposing a three-year commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) after

Allen was convicted by a Lincoln County jury of criminal possession of dangerous drugs.

Allen also challenges the court’s imposition of fees and costs. We affirm Allen’s sentence

and remand to the District Court to strike imposition of the fees and costs.

¶3     On March 4, 2021, Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office Detective Holzer stopped Allen

for driving with excessive speed and a malfunctioning brake light. Detective Holzer

recognized Allen as someone involved in controlled drug purchases on previous occasions

when Allen was not the target but was present during the transactions. Allen refused to

roll down the windows of his vehicle and give Detective Holzer his driver’s license,

registration, and proof of insurance. Detective Holzer observed that Allen had a Pitbull in

the backseat of his vehicle showing signs of aggression. Detective Holzer called for a

second officer; Deputy Fisher arrived and took over the investigation.

¶4     Allen initially refused to provide Deputy Fisher with his driver’s license,

registration, and proof of insurance but eventually handed it to him. After Allen lowered

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his vehicle’s window about five inches, Deputy Fisher detected a strong odor of marijuana

coming from inside the vehicle. He asked Allen to step out of the vehicle to perform a

field sobriety test; Allen refused several times but eventually complied. After observing

several indicators of impairment, Deputy Fisher requested a sample of Allen’s blood,

which Allen refused. Deputy Fisher arrested Allen and transported him to the Lincoln

County Detention Facility.

¶5    Detective Holzer requested a narcotics dog to respond to the scene. The dog alerted

to the presence of drugs in Allen’s vehicle. Detective Holzer seized the truck and had it

towed to the Sheriff’s Office pending a search warrant. The next day, Detective Holzer

obtained a search warrant for Allen’s vehicle and discovered a syringe in the glovebox

containing a clear liquid later confirmed to be methamphetamine.

¶6    The State charged Allen with felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs, in

violation of § 45-9-102, MCA; misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol or

drugs (DUI), in violation of § 61-8-401, MCA; and misdemeanor obstructing a peace

officer or public servant, in violation of § 45-7-302, MCA. The State later moved to

dismiss the DUI charge due to the unavailability of a material witness, which the District

Court granted. Allen’s case proceeded to trial on the remaining two charges of criminal

possession of dangerous drugs and obstructing a peace officer. The jury found Allen guilty

of both counts.

¶7    On January 6, 2022, Probation and Parole Officer Watson filed a presentence

investigation report (PSI). The PSI listed Allen’s employment status as “disabled” and

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noted that Allen receives $760 in Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) payments each

month. The PSI also listed Allen’s criminal history dating back to 1989, which includes

nine misdemeanors and numerous traffic violations. Under the psychological information

section, the PSI noted that, with Allen’s consent, Officer Watson spoke with Allen’s

therapist, Mavis Vaillancourt. She reported that Allen did not want to take his prescribed

medication, preferring instead to self-medicate with marijuana.

¶8     The District Court held a sentencing hearing the following week. Allen did not raise

any factual inaccuracies in the PSI, but he noted that his only source of income was his

SSDI payments and objected to the recommended financial conditions of his sentence. The

court confirmed that Allen does not own a home and is “in the process” of buying a vehicle.

The State called Officer Watson to testify to the PSI. Officer Watson stated the following

about his PSI interview with Allen:

       He made it clear that he wouldn’t comply with the rules of probation and that
       he doesn’t answer to anybody. Specifically he said that he would have
       firearms at his residence, and me and my supervisor, David Dowell were
       trying to explain to him that there are certain conditions he’d have to follow.
       At one point we made a comment, well, it’s a violation of federal law and
       state probation. And he made a comment, well, ATF will have to come take
       my firearms away.

¶9     The State recommended that Allen be committed to the DOC for three years for the

criminal possession of dangerous drugs conviction and given a concurrent six-month

suspended sentence for the obstruction conviction. The State acknowledged that it was

Allen’s first felony conviction for a drug-related offense, for which defendants are

presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence. It argued, however, that there

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were substantial aggravating circumstances that justified Allen’s commitment to the DOC.

Allen requested a deferred sentence and objected again to imposition of the fees, stating

that he did not have the ability to pay.

¶10    Noting that it had heard the testimony at trial and reviewed the PSI, the District

Court commented on the difficulties the officers had in getting the PSI, the circumstances

surrounding the PSI, and the concerns of Officer Watson. The court then stated,

       This is a difficult one for me, Mr. Allen. I believe that you do need some
       mental health help . . . and so, I think the best course of action and the only
       way that I can see to get that in a scenario where you are in a position where
       you can utilize that, take advantage of that, and have that available to you is
       through the Department of Corrections.

¶11    The court then sentenced Allen to a three-year DOC commitment for the criminal

possession of dangerous drugs conviction and ordered a mental health evaluation.

Immediately following the pronouncement of that sentence, Allen had an outburst—

shouting at the court and refusing to follow the directives of law enforcement—requiring

that he be restrained. The court quickly imposed a six-month concurrent suspended

sentence for the obstruction conviction, and Allen was removed from the courtroom. The

court did not impose fines or costs before it adjourned.

¶12    In the written judgment, the court recognized the presumption of a deferred sentence

for a first felony drug possession conviction but made the following findings:

       2. Here, at the time of arrest, Defendant was encouraging his dog to be
       aggressive to law enforcement. Defendant’s son had to come to the scene to
       retrieve the dog. He advised law enforcement to stay back as he did not know
       how the dog would respond to law enforcement.

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       3. In responding to the PSI Defendant was defiant and continued with his
       behavior indicating he would not comply with any conditions of community
       supervision.

       4. Defendant specifically stated he would not recognize any authority over
       him and would not comply with any terms or conditions of community
       supervision.

       5. Additionally, Defendant continued this behavior at his sentencing hearing.
       He shouted at the Court. He refused to follow the directives of the Court and
       law enforcement. He had to be restrained and removed from the Court all
       while he was shouting. It took multiple officers to remove him.

       6. These factors all rebut the presumption to be entitled to a deferred
       imposition of sentence of imprisonment. Community safety and in order to
       enforce a just punishment [sic], a commitment is required.

¶13    The District Court’s written judgment imposed no fines but included numerous fees

and costs, totaling $3,729.31. The fees included a $15 surcharge on the fine for each felony

offense, a $100 victim and witness advocate surcharge, a $10 court information technology

fee, an $800 public defense counsel fee, a $50 PSI fee, and $2,754.31 for the costs of jury

service, prosecution, and pretrial services.

¶14    When a defendant’s sentence is reviewable by the Sentence Review Division—that

is, if the defendant is sentenced to one year or more of actual incarceration—this Court

reviews sentences for legality only. State v. Herd, 2004 MT 85, ¶ 22, 320 Mont. 490, 87

P.3d 1017; State v. Montoya, 1999 MT 180, ¶ 15, 295 Mont. 288, 983 P.2d 937. “We

determine legality by considering only ‘whether the sentence falls within the statutory

parameters, whether the district court had statutory authority to impose the sentence, and

whether the district court followed the affirmative mandates of the applicable sentencing

statutes.’” State v. Steger, 2021 MT 321, ¶ 7, 406 Mont. 536, 501 P.3d 394 (quoting State

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v. Ingram, 2020 MT 327, ¶ 8, 402 Mont. 374, 478 P.3d 799). “In our discretion, we may

also invoke plain error review to ‘review an unpreserved objection if it implicates a

fundamental constitutional right and plain error review is necessary to avoid a manifest

miscarriage of justice, leaving an unsettled question regarding the fundamental fairness of

the proceeding, or otherwise compromising the integrity of the judicial process.’” State v.

Tippets, 2022 MT 81, ¶ 9, 408 Mont. 249, 509 P.3d 1 (quoting State v. Trujillo, 2020 MT

128, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 124, 464 P.3d 72). “To invoke plain-error review, we still require the

assertion of plain error to be raised and argued on appeal.” State v. Strizich, 2021 MT 306,

¶ 33, 406 Mont. 391, 499 P.3d 575 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

¶15    Allen argues that his sentence is illegal because the District Court took improper

evidence into consideration when it determined that substantial aggravating circumstances

negated the presumption of a deferred sentence under § 45-9-102(3), MCA, thereby failing

to comply with the governing statutory parameters and requirements of the sentencing

statute. Allen alleges that the District Court violated his equal protection and due process

rights, respectively, because its “main basis” for committing him to the DOC was Allen’s

mental health, and it relied on hearsay evidence from a police report within the PSI. Allen

also contends that the District Court erred by including in its written judgment events that

occurred after the pronouncement of the oral sentence.

¶16    The State argues that Allen’s sentence is legal because Allen’s three-year DOC

commitment was within the statutory parameters of § 45-9-102(2), MCA. The State

therefore maintains that Allen’s claims are not entitled to further review. On the merits,

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the State contends that the District Court properly relied on the entire record, including the

evidence at trial, the PSI, Officer Watson’s testimony at sentencing, and Allen’s statement

to find sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of a deferred sentence.

¶17    A person convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs may be sentenced to

a term not to exceed five years at the Montana State Prison and a fine not to exceed $5,000,

or both. Section 45-9-102(2), MCA. A defendant convicted of a first violation of criminal

possession of dangerous drugs is statutorily entitled to a presumption of a deferred

imposition of imprisonment under § 45-9-102(3), MCA.             This presumption may be

overcome, however, by evidence of “substantial aggravating circumstance[s].” State v.

Wilkes, 2021 MT 27, ¶ 18, 403 Mont. 180, 480 P.3d 823 (citation omitted).

¶18    Although Allen did not preserve most of his claims for appeal, we recognize an

exception that allows appellate review of a criminal sentence alleged to be illegal, even if

the defendant raised no objection in the trial court. Tippets, ¶ 12 (citing State v. Lenihan,

184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979)). Alone, however, a sentencing court’s

failure to abide by a statutory requirement constitutes an objectionable sentence, not

necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan exception. Tippets, ¶ 12 (citation

omitted).

¶19    Before the District Court, Allen made no objection to the court’s consideration of

his mental health or of other statements in the PSI. Allen’s sentence falls within the

statutory parameters of § 45-9-102(2), MCA. The District Court followed the affirmative

mandates of the sentencing statute when it recognized the presumption afforded by

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§ 45-9-102(3), MCA, and considered whether to apply it. The court’s judgment makes

clear that it considered the entire record and articulated reasons other than Allen’s mental

health to find the presumption of a deferred sentence had been overcome. We conclude

that Allen failed to preserve an argument that the District Court considered improper

evidence in determining his sentence. Allen does not ask this Court to conduct plain error

review. We decline to consider his arguments about evidence on which the court relied in

fashioning the sentence. The court did not impose an illegal sentence.

¶20    Allen next argues that the District Court imposed an illegal fine when it failed to

consider all the required factors determining a defendant’s ability to pay under

§ 46-18-231(3), MCA. The State concedes that the fees and costs should be stricken from

the judgment because they were not imposed at the sentencing hearing.

¶21    A district court’s oral pronouncement of a criminal sentence “is the ‘legally

effective sentence and valid, final judgment.’” State v. Thompson, 2017 MT 107, ¶ 8, 387

Mont. 339, 394 P.3d 197 (quoting State v. Johnson, 2000 MT 290, ¶ 15, 302 Mont. 265,

14 P.3d 480). “A district court may not substantively increase a defendant’s orally imposed

criminal sentence in the subsequent written judgment.” State v. Reynolds, 2017 MT 317,

¶ 33, 390 Mont. 58, 408 P.3d 503 (citing Johnson, ¶ 24).

¶22    At sentencing, the District Court inquired about Allen’s financial resources after

Allen objected to the imposition of costs. The court confirmed that Allen’s only source of

income was his SSDI pension and asked about his vehicle, on which Allen still has an

outstanding loan. After committing Allen to the DOC, the court did not orally impose any

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financial obligations. The court first imposed the financial obligations in its written

judgment. In doing so, the court abused its discretion by substantively increasing Allen’s

orally imposed criminal sentence in the written judgment. Johnson, ¶¶ 38-40 (holding that

where the district court’s written judgment included a “cost of prosecution” absent from

the oral pronouncement of sentence, the court unlawfully increased the defendant’s

sentence). We conclude that the court improperly included financial obligations in its

written judgment when it had not mentioned them in the oral pronouncement of sentence.

¶23    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review. We affirm Allen’s three-year commitment to the DOC and

remand to the District Court to strike the financial conditions of Allen’s sentence.

                                                  /S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ JIM RICE

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