Court Opinion

ID: 9840212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 16:05:52.520698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:25.727595
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                               FIRST CIRCUIT

                               NO. 2023 KA 0086

                           STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                   VERSUS
      00
                          RICKEY J. LAFONT, JR.

                                     Judgment Rendered:
                                                             SEP 15 2023

                               Appealed from the
                          17th Judicial District Court
                       In and for the Parish of Lafourche
                               State of Louisiana
                               Docket No. 599618

                The Honorable Marla M. Abel, Judge Presiding

Kristine M. Russell                        Counsel for Appellee,
District Attorney                          State of Louisiana
Jason L. Chatagnier
Assistant District Attorney
Thibodaux, Louisiana

Barry S. Ranshi                            Counsel for Defendant/Appellant,
John J. Mason                              Rickey J. Lafont, Jr.
Kenner, Louisiana

          BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ.
MILLER, J.

        The defendant,        Rickey J.      Lafont, Jr.,    was charged by amended bill of

information with indecent behavior with a juvenile (count I), a violation of La. R. S.

14: 81( A)( 1)( H)(2);    and     sexual     battery ( count         II),   a   violation   of La.   R. S.

14: 43. 1( A)(2) & ( C)( 2).'    He pled not guilty on both counts. Following a jury trial,

he was found guilty on both counts by unanimous verdicts.                               On count I, the

defendant was sentenced to twenty- five years at hard labor, two years without

benefit of probation,        parole,    or   suspension     of   sentence.        On count II, he was

sentenced to a concurrent term of forty years at hard labor, twenty- five years without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant now appeals

designating four assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the

convictions and sentences.

                                                FACTS

        In July of 2020, S. M.,2 the nine-year-old victim, confided in her mother, A.M.,

that the defendant touched her between her legs. The defendant was A.M.' s live-in

boyfriend at that time.         S. M. subsequently gave a statement to the Child Advocacy

Center regarding those allegations.               In that statement, S. M. recounted that the

defendant began touching her when she was seven or eight years old. According to

S. M., the first incident occurred when S. M. and the defendant were lying on the

                                                                 3
couch, covered by a blanket and watching anime.                        S. M. stated that the defendant

         Count lZ of the bill of information ( erroneously identified as " Count I") set forth the
essential facts corresponding with La. R.S. 14: 43. 1( C)( 2), but cited La. R. S. 14: 43. 1( 0)( 3). This
error, however, is harmless because the defendant neither alleges nor proves he was misled to his
prejudice. See La. C. Cr.P. arts. 464 & 921.

        2W reference the victim and her mother herein only by their initials.                See La. R.S.
46: 1844( W).

        3" Anime" is defined by Merriam -Webster Dictionary as " a style of animation originating
in Japan that is characterized by stark colorful graphics depicting vibrant characters in action -
filled plots often with fantastic or futuristic themes. Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary,
https:// merriain- wenster.cortttdictionat- rfanirne ( last visited August 22, 2023).

                                                     2
began to rub her private parts,4 and continued to do so after she told him to stop. She

further stated that the rubbing continued to occur, both over her clothes and under her

shorts   and underwear.      S.M. recalled that these incidents usually took place when

everyone else in the house was sleeping, and often while the defendant watched

anime or movies.       The incidents allegedly occurred at the defendant' s residence in

Galliano.    S. M., who was age eleven at the time of trial, testified at trial.       Her trial

testimony was consistent with her statement given to the Child Advocacy Center.

         The defendant testified at trial.    He denied having sexual tendencies toward

children, denied being sexually aroused by children, denied touching S. M.' s vagina,

and denied rubbing her vagina under her clothes.

                                   MOTION IN LIMINE

         In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in

denying his motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of a 2019 conviction for

indecent behavior with a juvenile and in failing to enforce its limiting instruction to

the jury. He asks this court to analogize La. C.E. art. 412.2 to La. C.E. art. 404(B)( 1)

and reverse the conviction under State v. Taylor, 2016- 1124, 2016- 1183 ( La.

1211116),    217 So. 3d 283,       arguing that the minds of the jury were " unduly

prejudiced"
                because the State presented graphic testimony concerning his 2019

conviction and turned the trial into a " mini -trial" of the prior offense. The defendant

argues that the State could have proven the prior conviction without witness

testimony, and the State presented more evidence than was necessary for the limited

purpose allowed by the trial court.

         Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of intent to use evidence of other crimes,

in particular, a June 12, 2019 conviction of the defendant for indecent behavior with

another juvenile, M.N. The State contended it wished to introduce evidence of the

prior conviction in the instant case, pursuant to La. C. E. art. 412.2, as evidence of the

         4I her statement given to the Child Advocacy Center, S. M. referred to her vagina as her
 coonie" and pointed to her private parts, which the examiner understood to mean her genitalia.

                                                3
defendant' s character for sexually assaultive behavior and/ or as having a lustful

disposition towards children.

        The defendant filed a motion in limine arguing the 2019 convictions had

minimal probative value and would only serve to convince the jury he was a

dangerous person where the prior conviction involved a fourteen -year-old girl, rather

than a nine-year- old girl, and alleged a different type of assault. The State argued the

instant offense and the prior offense both involved indecent behavior with a minor

under the age of seventeen years old, and the earlier conviction demonstrated the

defendant' s lustful disposition towards children because it showed he had committed

more than one lewd and lascivious act with minors.

        The trial court found La. C. E. art. 412. 2 applied because the 2019 conviction

for sexually assaultive behavior involved a minor child under the age of seventeen

years old at the time of the offense.        The court noted it was unable to locate any

jurisprudence holding a different standard applied based on the age difference

between the victim in the earlier case and the victim in the instant case. The court

further determined that the probative value of the evidence of the 2019 conviction

was high and was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Additionally,

the court noted the State' s notice complied with Article 412.2( B) by specifically

articulating the previous acts' and how they were similar to the allegations in the

instant case.   Accordingly, the court held that evidence related to the 2019 conviction

would be admissible in the instant case, but it would give a limiting instruction

regarding any evidence introduced in connection with the conviction. The defendant

objected to the ruling of the court.

        The motion also sought to prevent the presentation of evidence concerning an unrelated
incident in which the defendant had allegedly choked his son. The State, however, did not offer
evidence of that incident at trial.

        6The notice set forth details of the 2019 offense consistent with the testimony of M.N.,
the victim in that case.
         Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412. 2,        entitled, "   Evidence of similar

crimes, wrongs, or acts in sex offense cases," provides in pertinent part:

         A.  When an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually
         assaultive behavior, or with accts that constitute a sex offense involving a
         victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense,

         evidence of the accused' s commission of another crime, wrong, or act
         involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful
         disposition toward children may be admissible and may be considered
         for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant subject to the
         balancing test provided in Article 403.

         B. In a case in which the state intends to offer evidence under the
         provisions of this Article, the prosecution shall, upon request of the
         accused, provide reasonable notice in advance of trial of the nature of
         any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes.

         Louisiana Code of Evidence article 412. 2 was enacted to loosen restrictions on

 other    crimes"   evidence,   and to allow evidence of " lustful disposition"           in cases

involving sexual offenses.      State v. Wrigh , 2011- 0141 ( La. 12/ 6/ 11), 79 So. 3d 309,

317.     Following enactment of the law, the legislature amended the language of the

article from allowing admission of "evidence of the accused' s commission of another

sexual offense" to allowing " evidence of the accused' s commission of another crime,

wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive behavior or acts which indicate a lustful

disposition toward children."        See La. Acts 2004, No. 465, §          1.        This revised

language significantly broadened the scope of evidence admissible under La. C.E.

art. 412.2. State v. La    on, 2014- 1910 ( La. 3/ 17/ 15), 168 So. 3d 358, 360. However,

the balancing test set forth in La. C.E. art. 403, which insures the fundamental

fairness of proceedings, specifically applies to La. C. E. art. 412.2.           La    on, 168 So.

3d at 362.

         Although relevant,      evidence may be excluded if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La.

C. E. art. 403.     Thus, in its vast discretion, the trial court may exclude relevant

                                               RJ
evidence after finding that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its

probative value.
                         Ultimately, questions of relevancy and admissibility of evidence

are discretionary calls within the trial court' s " great gatekeeping discretion."

Wri     t,    79   So.   3d   at   317.   Such   determinations   regarding   relevancy   and

admissibility should not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion.           State v.

Tate, 2020- 0523 ( La. App. I" Cir. 4/ 16/ 21), 2021 WL 1475325 * 6 ( unpublished),

writ denied, 2021- 00690 ( La. 9/ 27121), 324 So. 3d 92.

         At trial, M.N., the victim from the 2019 case, testified that her date of birth is

January 24, 2003.          M.N. stated that on July 21, 2017, she was at the defendant' s

house,       along with several members of her family.            According to M.N., after

everyone, except for MN., the defendant, and the defendant' s three young children,

left to go to the grocery store, the defendant insisted that she lay on her stomach and

 hovered over" her with his knee between her legs and began massaging her back,

shoulders, and thighs,         M.N. testified that the defendant reached under her shirt to

massage her back and shoulders and massaged her thighs over her pants. She further

testified that later, as she stood in the kitchen cooking supper, the defendant tickled

M.N. against her wishes, pulled her underwear up, and then reached into her pants

and pulled her underwear out from between the cheeks of her buttocks. M.N. also

testified about how she felt during and after the assault and how it affected her

relationship with her family.

         Following M.N.' s testimony, the court issued the following instruction to the

jury:

                   E] vidence that the defendant was involved in a commission of
         an offense other than the offense for which he is on trial is to be
         considered only for a limited purpose. The sole purpose for which such
         evidence may be considered is whether it tends to show a lustful
         disposition towards children.       Remember, the accused is on trial only
         for the offense charged.You may not find him guilty of [t]his offense
         merely because he may have committed another offense.

                                                  T
      To the extent that the defendant relies on Tai for in support of his argument

that M.N.' s testimony should be excluded, we note that in Tgylo , the Louisiana

Supreme Court re- examined the requirements and procedures for introduction of

 other crimes, wrongs, or acts"   evidence under La. C. E. art. 404( B). T_
                                                                          aylor, 217 So.

3d at 291- 292.   The court held that, when seeking to introduce evidence pursuant to

La. C.E. art. 404( B), the State need only make a showing of sufficient evidence to

support a finding that the defendant committed the other crime, wrong, or act.

Taylor, 217    So.   3d at 291.     Further,       the court maintained the longstanding

requirement of a pre-trial hearing to determine the admissibility of other crimes

evidence,
            but cautioned the hearing was not a " mini -trial" of the prior offenses.

Taylor, 217 So. 3d at 292.   Lastly, the court noted, even when other crimes evidence

is offered for a purpose allowed under Article 404( B)( 1),       the evidence must have

substantial relevance independent from showing the defendant' s general criminal

character and thus is not admissible unless it tends to prove a material fact at issue or

to rebut a defendant' s defense. Taylor, 217 So. 3d at 292.

      On review, we find the trial court properly held that evidence related to the

2019 conviction was admissible at the instant trial under La. C.E. art. 412.2.      The

defendant was on trial for a charge involving sexually assaultive behavior, or with

acts that constitute a sex offense,   involving a victim who was under the age of

seventeen at the time of the offense, and the evidence at issue concerned his

commission of another crime, wrong, or act involving sexually assaultive behavior or

acts which indicated a lustful disposition toward children. See La. C. E. art. 412.2( A).

Further, as noted by the trial court, the probative value of the evidence related to the

2019 conviction was not outweighed ( much less substantially outweighed)          by the

danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,          misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay or waste of time. See La. C.E. art. 403; Wri      t, 79 So.

                                               7
3d at 316- 319; La   an, 168 So. 3d at 360- 362; State v. Dawson, 2019- 1612 ( La. App.

1St Cir. 1. 1117120), 316 So. 3d 77, 88- 89.

       As previously mentioned, the defendant invites us to analogize La. C. E. art.

412.2 to La. C. E. art. 404( B)( 1) and incorporate the requirements and procedures for

introduction of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" evidence under La. C.E. art. 404( B)

into La. C.E. art. 412.2.    In particular, the defendant wants the court to restrict the

State' s evidence and thus prevent the " mini -trial" discussed in Taylor. In TUlor, the

Supreme Court limited its discussion to only La. C. E. art. 404( B) other crimes

evidence.   There is no mention in Taylor of La. C.E. art. 412.2 or La. C. E. art. 412.4,

and to expand the narrow scope of the case to Article 412.2 would be inappropriate.

See State v. Tate, 2021 WL 1478325 at * 5.            Further, while the court in Taylor

cautioned against turning " this hearing" into a mini trial, it was referring to the " pre-

trial hearing to determine the admissibility of other crimes evidence," not the trial on

the merits. Tabor, 217 So. 3d at 292.

        Additionally, we find that the State did not violate La. C.E. art. 412.2 or any

other law in the manner in which it presented M.N.' s testimony at trial. The district

attorney has constitutional authority over criminal prosecutions.      See La. Const. art.

V, § 26( B); La. C. Cr.P. art. 61.   The district attorney has entire charge and control of

every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district and determines whom,

when, and how he shall prosecute. La. C. Cr.P. art. 61; State v. Papizan, 2017- 0028

La. App. 1St Cir. 1112117), 256 So. 3d 1091, 1095, writ denied, 2017-2028 ( La.

10/ 29/ 18), 255 So. 3d 572.     The district attorney' s broad discretion in prosecuting

matters encompasses his selection and presentation of evidence as permitted by the

Code of Evidence.      Cf. Statey. Eason, 2019- 0614 ( La. App. I'    Cir. 12127/ 19), 293

So. 3d 61, 71.    Here, the defendant specifically complains that the district attorney
put on evidence about " how [ M.N.]        felt after the act( s) were committed, how it

affected her relationships with her family, and how she felt during the subsequent

                                               8
trial,"   which evidence goes beyond the limited purpose approved by the court, i.e.,

proving lustful disposition. Yet, at trial, no objection was made by the defendant at

trial to the brief testimony given by M.N. Further, we have carefully reviewed the

manner in which the State questioned M.N. and find the questions to be focused on

the prior offense and not its aftermath. We further note that as Article 412.2 allows

for evidence of wrongs or acts, even when outside the scope of a previous conviction,

the article does not require a presentation restricted to the sterile introduction of a

minute entry or to otherwise limit witness testimony.

          We find the State did not violate the limiting instruction imposed by the trial

court.
           To the contrary, in closing argument, the State emphasized the limited

admissibility of M.N.' s testimony, to -wit:

                 You heard testimony from [ M.N.]. And ... you' ve been
          instructed that there' s a limited purpose, [ for which] that testimony, that
          evidence has been presented to you.       And I agree.    It' s not that [ the
          defendant] committed this offense because he committed the offense of
          indecent behavior back in 2017. It' s being submitted to you that it' s
          evidence of his character that [ the defendant] has a lustful disposition
          towards children.

          This assignment of error lacks merit.

                     INADMISSIBLE PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE

          In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court

erred in failing to exclude inadmissible prejudicial evidence, in particular, testimony

concerning the defendant' s proclivity for watching anime, in contravention of State

v. Barnes, 28, 835 ( La. App. 2" d Cir. 12111196), 685 So. 2d 1148.           The defendant

contends that the State attempted to conflate cartoons shown on Cartoon Network

with pornography to " create the image of a bad person in the eyes of the jury."

          In Barnes,   the defendant argued on appeal that reference to his gang

membership elicited by the State was inadmissible character evidence that did not fall

within any of the exceptions in La. C.E. art. 404(B)( 1).       Barnes, 685 So. 2d at 1155.

The appellate court found the defendant failed to object at trial that certain

                                                9
questioning elicited evidence of other crimes, and thus, the issue was not preserved

for review. Barnes, 685 So. 2d at 1155. Thereafter, the court nonetheless found that

the evidence should have been excluded,            noting that while a defendant' s gang

membership may be probative under certain conditions, whether the defendant was in

a gang was not relevant to the elements of his armed robbery charge.           Even so, the

court found that the error was harmless. Barnes, 685 So. 2d at 1155.

        Subsequent jurisprudence has distinguished Barnes when evidence of gang

affiliation,   and presumably other Article 404( B)        evidence,   was   relevant   to   an

essential element of the crime.       See State v. Gray, 2014- 1213 ( La. App. 4" Cir.

11/ 25/ 15), 179 So. 3d 936, 942, writ denied, 2016- 0006 ( La. 1/ 13/ 17), 215 So. 3d

241 (" This case is distinguishable from Barnes in that the State introduced evidence

of [the defendant' s] gang affiliation to show motive for the murder.").

        In the instant case, the defendant failed to object to testimony from S. M. that

the defendant touched her vagina " almost every night" while watching anime with

her.'   He also failed to object to testimony from S. M.' s mother, A.M., that he

watched provocative anime every day. A.M. also testified that during her sexual

relationship with the defendant, she learned he was interested in Hentai, which she

indicated was Japanese anime in which the characters engaged in sexual relations.

        Amanda Aten, who was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of sex

offender evaluation and treatment, testified at trial that the defendant " did not present

himself with pedophiliac tendencies" during her evaluation. Defense counsel asked

Aten if her opinion would change had there been testimony that the defendant and his

girlfriend viewed Japanese Hentai pornography. Aten answered that she believed the

defendant told her that he viewed pornography with his girlfriend at the time of the

evaluation.

        7S.M. identified pictures of anime programs showing women and young girls in tight or
revealing clothing as programs she watched with the defendant when he touched her vagina.

                                              10
       Aten stated the first picture of the anime program shown to S. M. at trial was

not " child appropriate,"   but was not pornographic. She agreed the second picture of

the anime program shown to S. M. at trial was " sexualized."      The State asked Aten if

it would be problematic if the defendant viewed Hentai.           Aten replied that while

certain pornography is legal, a condition of sex offender treatment is that the person

in treatment not view pornography.

       The only objection raised by the defense during the State' s questioning of

Aten was that it was unfair to ask her questions about the content of the anime shows

when she had only been provided photographs from the shows.            The court sustained

the objections and cautioned the State to ask her about the photograph being a

representation of the actual cartoon.

       It is well settled that defense counsel must state the basis for an objection when

it is made, pointing out the specific error to the trial court. The grounds for objection

must be sufficiently brought to the court' s attention to allow it the opportunity to

make the proper ruling and prevent or cure any error. See La. C.E. art. 103( A)( 1)

  Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits ...            evidence   unless a

substantial right of the party is affected, and ... [ w] hen the ruling is one admitting

evidence, a timely objection or motion to admonish the jury to limit or disregard

appears of record, stating the speck ground of objection [.]") ( emphasis added); La.

C. Cr.P. art. 841( A) ("An irregularity or error cannot be availed of after verdict unless

it was objected to at the time of occurrence....   It is sufficient that a party, at the time

the ruling ... is made ... makes known to the court ... his objections to the action of

the court, and the grounds therefor.") ( emphasis added). State v. Williams, 2010-

1392 ( La. App. 1' Cir. 2/ 11111), 2011 WL 2178767, * 5 ( unpublished), writ denied,

2011- 1028 ( La. 3/ 9112), 84 So. 3d 542.

       In the instant case, the La. C.E. art. 412. 2 notice of intent to use evidence of

other crimes listed not only the prior conduct of the defendant demonstrating his

                                            11
lustful disposition towards children, but also the circumstances of the instant offense,

i.e.,   the inappropriate touching of S. M. allegedly occurred while the defendant

watched anime with her. The defendant' s motion in limine, however, did not object

nor move to exclude the references to anime.            Additionally, the defendant failed to

object to the references to anime and Hentai at trial.        Accordingly, this assignment of

error was not preserved for review.

        FAILURE TO SUBJECT THE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM TO
                 MEANINGFUL ADVERSARIAL TESTING

         Next, the    defendant contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by questioning the State' s expert witness, rather than the victim, S. M.,

concerning S. M.'s account of when the incidents occurred.'

         Defense counsel questioned Shannon Gros, who conducted the interview with

S. M. at the Children' s Advocacy Center, concerning S.M.' s alleged statement that

the incidents occurred when she was between seven and nine years old. Gros replied

that S. M. stated the incidents started when she was seven or eight years old. Defense

counsel then asked, " But you didn' t attempt to define the dates?"              Gros replied, " I

interview 17- year- olds and I don' t ask for specific dates."        Thereafter, S. M. testified

at trial.   After the State completed its direct examination of S. M., defense counsel

stated he had no questions for her.

         Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is relegated to post-

conviction proceedings, where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted, unless

the record permits definitive resolution on appeal.             State v. Miller, 99- 0192 ( La.

916100), 776 So. 2d 396, 411, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S. Ct. 1196, 149

         BThe defendant states in brief that the defense counsel also failed to ask any questions of
the " prior victim," M.N. at trial. However, the defendant failed to argue or brief how this
amounted to error.     Assignments of error that are neither briefed nor argued are considered
abandoned. Uniform Rules —Courts of Appeal, Rule 2- 12.4(B)( 4); see State v. Laue, 2020-0225
 La. App. 1St Cir. 12130120), 326 So. 3d 267, 282, writ denied, 2021- 01329 ( La. 11117121),    327
So. 3d 993 (" Restatement of an assignment of error in brief is nothing more than a listing of the
assignment and certainly does not constitute briefing of the assignment.").

                                                 12
L.Ed.2d 111 ( 2001);     State v. Allen, 94- 1941 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 1119195), 664 So. 2d

1264, 1271, writ denied, 95- 2946 ( La. 3/ 15/ 96), 669 So. 2d 433.

        Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel,

the vast array of trial decisions, strategic, and tactical, which must be made before

and during trial, rest with an accused and his attorney. State v. Folse, 623 So. 2d 59,

71 ( La. App.   1'   Cir. 1993).   The fact that a particular strategy is unsuccessful does

not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.      State v. Moody, 2000- 0886 ( La. App.

1 St Cir. 12/ 22/ 00), 779 So. 2d 4, 8- 10, writ denied, 2001- 0213 ( La. 1217101), 803 So.

2d 40; see State v. Johnson, 2006- 1235 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 12128/ 06), 951 So. 2d 294,

302 ("[ A] defense attorney' s examination of witnesses falls within the ambit of trial

strategy for purposes of evaluating an ineffectiveness claim.").        In the instant case,

however, the defendant' s claim that trial counsel failed to adequately cross- examine

S. M.   requires an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the alleged deficient

performance concerned a matter of strategy.         Thus, it cannot possibly be reviewed on

appeal.   See State v. Allen, 664 So. 2d at 1271, citing State v. Martin, 607 So. 2d

775, 788 ( La. App. 1'      Cir. 1992) ( the investigation of strategy decisions requires

an evidentiary hearing and, therefore, could not possibly be reviewed on appeal).

        Accordingly, the defendant' s claim of ineffectiveness, as it relates to the

strategic choice made by counsel between alternative defenses available, is more

properly raised by an application for post -conviction relief where a full evidentiary

hearing may be conducted. See Allen, 664 So. 2d at 1271.

                                   VIOLATION OF McCOY

        Finally, the defendant contends trial counsel " admitted" the defendant' s guilt

in his closing argument in violation of McCoy v. Louisiana,            U.S. ,     138 S. Ct.

1500, 1505, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 ( 2018) ("[ A] defendant has the right to insist that

counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel' s experienced -based view is

                                               13
that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death
         91 ).

penalty -

       In McCoy, the United States           Supreme Court held that trial counsel' s

concession of guilt, against the defendant' s clearly and persistently stated wishes,

violates the defendant' s Sixth Amendment autonomy rights and amounts to structural

error entitling the defendant to a new trial without the need to demonstrate prejudice.

The Supreme Court reasoned that although some aspects of the defense, such as trial

management,        including strategy, objections, and evidentiary matters, are within

counsel' s purview, the Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with "[ a] utonomy to

decide that the objective of the defense is to assert innocence ... at the guilt phase of a

capital trial.     These are not strategic choices about how to best achieve a client' s

objectives; they are choices about what the client' s objectives in fact are." McCoy,

138 S. Ct. at 1508 ( emphasis in original); see State v. Brown, 2016- 0998 ( La.

1128122), 347 So. 3d 745, 809, cert, denied,             U.S. ,      143 S. Ct. 886, 215

L.Ed.2d 404.

       The defendant argues defense counsel           violated McCoy during closing

argument by stating, " Do you want to take [ the defendant] out of the workforce and

put him in jail for virtually the rest of his life over this? Are the victims so harmed

that we' re gonna make this the equivalent of a murder?"

       The challenged statements were part of the foIIowing closing argument:

                  The Judge is going to instruct you on the law and I won' t go
       through all of it. But it' s not just an either or choice. You have ... the
       power to do what you think is right, including find him guilty of an
       attempt or doing what I think is actually the right thing in this case is
       to find him not guilty. He' s already on probation. He' s already served
       two years in jail. Do you want to take him out of the workforce and put
       him in jail for virtually the rest of his life over this? Are the victims so
       harmed that we' re gonna make this the equivalent of a murder? I think
       not.
                 I think the right thing to do here is to find him not guilty and
       that' s what I ask you to do at the end of this case.           Thank you.
        Emphasis added.]

                                             14
       We have thoroughly reviewed the transcript contained in the record herein.

We find the challenged statements, viewed in context, were neither an admission nor

a concession of guilt, and thus, did not violate McCoy.        They were made between

counsel' s statements, "   what I think is actually the right thing in this case is to find

him not guilty[,]" and " I think the right thing to do here is to find him not guilty and

that' s what I ask you to do at the end of this case."

       We find no merit to this assignment of error.

       CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

                                              15