Court Opinion

ID: 9545721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:18:17.118082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:26.127149
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion. However, in view of the fact situation here, which is not too uncommon in post-divorce proceedings of this character, I desire to add these further comments.
It is not open to question that the general rule is established by the decisions of this court that accrued payments of alimony and support money have the effect of a judgment. But like all general rules it is applicable under the conditions for which it was formulated, and is subject to exceptions under particular circumstances. The principle of recognizing such exceptions is stated in the Openshaw case, relied upon by the appellant. After reciting that the right to collect accumulated payments vests, the court states further: “ * * * unless the party who claims the right has acted in such manner as to clearly prejudice the substantial rights of the party against'whom the right is sought to be enforced.” 1 An apt illustration of such an exception is the case of Larsen v. Larsen. There we upheld a determination by the trial court that the wife (defendant) was estopped from claiming payments for a period of three and one-half years because she had encouraged the plaintiff (husband) to go on a church mission and had otherwise permitted him to assume that she and her second husband would take the responsibility of the child and release him from such obligation.2
I propose no defense of husbands who wilfully or carelessly fail to meet their family obligations. One who abandons the support of his children to others is guilty of a grievous wrong and should be dealt with sternly and justly. However, there is another side of the coin. In many cases the circumstances require that the husband be loaded with as heavy a burden as he can bear. Sometimes, through no fault of his own, circumstances become worse; the expense of going into court prevents him from seeking adjustment of the decree; and when he is cited for contempt, an insuperable debt has accumulated. Different from other obligations, it cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. So he finds himself floundering in deep waters with such *242a weight around his neck that he will never be able to extricate himself. This is particularly true if it happens, as it sometimes does, that a vindictive or avaricious spouse is more interested in causing him misery than in cooperating so that he may produce the best possible income for the welfare of all concerned.
The fact that the marriage has terminated does not obliterate whatever results it may have produced. They cannot be wished away nor ignored. Both spouses continue to sustain some duties toward each other and to the children. It is important to remember that these duties do not all run one way: they are reciprocal and must be faced up to if the proper objective is to be served. The purpose of the divorce decree and of the conduct of the parties under it must be calculated toward the solution of existing problems and the sustenance of the parties so they can reconstruct their lives on the most wholesome foundation possible under the circumstances. The purpose of the provision for alimony and support money is to provide for the current needs, and not to allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to harass the defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live a respectable existence. Even though the decree may impose the responsibility of support upon the husband primarily, the wife also has a duty to see that the children are furnished the necessities of life. It is because of the recognition of the continuing obligations of the parties for the welfare of the children that the statute provides that they are subject to such further orders of the court with respect thereto as the court “shall deem reasonable and proper.” 3
In regard to these matters the court is endowed with powers over property and persons far broader than in any other type of civil action. It may make such disposition of the property and impose such controls upon their persons as it deems necessary for their welfare. If they refuse to abide by its orders, the court may hold the parties in contempt and enforce its decrees by the extraordinary means of incarceration. In view of the importance of the court’s functions in such cases it seems necessary that it have and exercise the power to compel the wife as well as the husband to conform her • conduct to reasonable requirements consistent with the purpose.
If the issuance of an execution (and the attachment or garnishment used to implement it) will have the effect of destroying the husband’s employment or seriously impairing his ability to provide the income necessary to meet the terms of the decree, there is no good reason why the court should not exercise its broad powers and *243restrain the plaintiff wife from executing on the judgment for such time as may be necessary for the welfare .of all parties concerned.
It is appreciated that it may seem somewhat anomalous to declare on the one hand that accumulated payments of support money or alimony have the effect of a judgment, and on the other, to recognize the power of the court to stay the execution of such judgment. Anomalous though it may be, it is like other areas of the law where the assertion of legal rights must be left to the discretion of the court upon the balancing of reciprocal rights of others. The trial judge, having the parties before him, will be able to determine when the facts justify making such an order. It must be presumed that such an extraordinary measure of staying execution would be resorted to with caution and only when necessary. That the court may do so under proper circumstances, see Mason v. Mason, 148 Ore. 34, 34 P.2d 328; Franklin v. Franklin, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 385, 171 F.2d 12; Wassung v. Wassung, 136 Neb. 440, 286 N.W. 340; Parenti v. Parenti, 71 R.I. 18, 41 A.2d 313. Although in those jurisdictions there are admittedly some differences from our statutory and case law in regard to the effect of a judgment, the fundamental doctrine upon which they rest is that the court has broad supervisory powers over the parties whose rights are dependent upon the decree and may stay execution of the judgment if and when it appears to be necessary to serve their interest and welfare.
I have added this comment because we are affirming a judgment for many thousands of dollars against a man who apparently has been unable to meet the requirements of what proved to be a very burdensome decree, a fact recognized by the abortive agreement of the parties. When the matter is remanded to the district court, it must be presumed that there will be further proceedings. Such being the case, it does not seem to me to be amiss to comment on a matter of procedure, which I firmly believe to be sound in principle, and which it is conceivable the trial court might deem helpful in solving difficulties which exist in this case. As to the advisability of commenting on questions of law that may arise in further proceedings, see Rule 76(a), U.R.C.P.; Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814.

. Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 574, 144 P.2d 528, 580.

. Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 596; second appeal, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340 P.2d 421.

. See Sec. 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953.