Court Opinion

ID: 9496212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:20:20.494271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:25.439226
License: Public Domain

MAYER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (“Beef Act”), 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2911'(2000), is an agricultural statute enacted to benefit the commercial beef industry, I would affirm the Court of International Trade’s judgment that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
The Beef Act provides a means to fund, inter alia, projects for beef promotion and research, the generation of consumer and industry information, and the improvement and expansion of beef marketing. Id. § 2901(b); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.169(a), (b) (2002). The statute describes a collection system whereby the domestic sale of cattle triggers an assessment. ' 7 U.S.C. § 2904(8)(A). One dollar per head of cattle sold is levied, and because cattle are not usually imported into the United *1381States, but arrive as beef or beef products, an equivalent assessment for imports is calculated by weight. Id. § 2904(8)(C); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.172(b)(2). Thus each commercial sale of beef in the United States, both domestic and imported, is assessed and the proceeds are remitted to the Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and Research Board to dispense pursuant to the statute. 7 U.S.C. § 2904(8); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.172. At issue is the proper forum to review the constitutionality of the sale assessment, not an import tariff, duty, or fee.
I disagree with the court that the Beef Act as applied to imports mandates the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under its residual jurisdiction. The court premises its reasoning that jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(f)(2) on the word “importation” in the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) (2000) (jurisdiction conferred over civil actions arising out of “any law of the United States providing for — (2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue.” (emphasis added)). Not all import transactions are reviewable by the Court of International Trade. See K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 182, 108 S.Ct. 950, 99 L.Ed.2d 151 (1988) (district court has jurisdiction to review Secretary of the Treasury’s regulation allowing the importation of gray-market goods). But here, the court concludes that the Beef Act with respect to imports is an international trade law because it is not the sale of beef which triggers the assessment, but its importation. I find nothing in the statute or regulations, however, to suggest that the Beef Act would apply outside the commercial realm. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1260.314 (listing persons exempted from the assessment if they did not sufficiently profit from the transfer of cattle). And the case before us involves beef imported for domestic sale.
Under my reading of the Beef Act, Congress vested jurisdiction in the district courts to hear cases such as this one in 7 U.S.C. § 2908(b): “The district courts of the United States are vested with jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to prevent and restrain a person from violating, an order or regulation made or issued under this chapter.” The court’s conclusion that this subsection does not encompass private actions for refunds because they are not “enforcement actions” is belied by the statutory language itself. A private action to collect a refund from the Board falls squarely within the bounds of' enforcement. See 7 U.S.C. § 2907(c) (“[A]ny person shall have the right to demand and receive from the Board a one-time refund of all assessments collected under section 2906 of this title ...”). And reason dictates that if the district court is directed to enforce the orders and regulations promulgated under the statute, for refunds or otherwise, it must also decide whether the statute is constitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.