Court Opinion

ID: 9412577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 20:04:46.304912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.418932
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 Nguyen v. City of Los Angeles CA2/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
 not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
 has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION FIVE

HOANG NGUYEN,                                                      B321033

        Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. BC696016)
        v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
 Angeles County, Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed.
       The Blue Law Group and Michael K. Blue for Plaintiff and
 Appellant.
       Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Scott Marcus, Chief
 Assistant City Attorney and Blithe S. Bock, Assistant City
 Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

                               ___________________________
       Plaintiff Hoang Nguyen appeals from the imposition of a
joint and several $10,000 discovery sanction against him and his
counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020 for
failing to adequately meet and confer prior to filing motions to
compel further discovery.1 We affirm the order.
                 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Nguyen worked for the City of Los Angeles (City) in its
advanced water purification facility at Terminal Island. In 2018,
Nguyen brought suit against the City and two supervisors. He
alleged nine causes of action for racial discrimination and
fostering and maintaining a racially-hostile work environment.
       According to Nguyen, litigation progressed smoothly until
2021, when Deputy City Attorney James Autrey transferred into
the case. Although only indirectly related to this appeal, Nguyen
accuses Autrey of discovery abuse, including denying him access
to key witnesses at the last minute, making inappropriate
speaking objections during depositions, coaching witnesses, and
issuing improper written discovery responses.
       On November 10, 2021, the City provided responses to
Nguyen’s third set of written discovery. Nguyen determined the
responses were inadequate.

1     Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020 provides:
“Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery motion,
the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any
party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by
anyone as a result of that conduct.”

     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise specified.

                                2
       On December 27, 2021, at 8:00 p.m., Nguyen’s counsel sent
an email to Autrey “as an attempt to meet and confer on the
responses issued by the City in connection with Plaintiff’s written
discovery, set number three.” “As an example of the numerous
unresponsive answers,” Nguyen cited to the City’s response to his
Special Interrogatory No. 126, setting out four ways in which the
answer was noncompliant. Nguyen noted the deadline to file a
motion to compel expired the next day and asked for a one-week
extension.
       Autrey responded the next morning and agreed to a two-
week extension. That afternoon, Nguyen replied by email and
attached a “detailed meet and confer letter piggybacking upon
[our] email on December 27, 2021 and your response this
morning.” In contrast to his brief email the day before, Nguyen’s
December 28, 2021 letter was 36 pages long and described the
City’s purportedly deficient responses to Nguyen’s requests for
production of documents, special and form interrogatories, and
requests for admissions. The letter also demanded supplemental
responses by January 3, 2022, because Nguyen’s opposition to the
City’s motion for summary judgment was due January 10, 2022.
       On January 5, 2022, having received no response from
Deputy City Attorney Autrey, Nguyen filed four motions to
compel, seeking further responses to his form interrogatories,
requests for admission, special interrogatories, and requests for
production of documents. Nguyen also sought monetary
sanctions totaling $9,440 for filing the motions. The City opposed
Nguyen’s motions to compel and additionally sought monetary
sanctions for Nguyen’s failure to make a reasonable and good
faith attempt to resolve the dispute informally.

                                3
       On January 31, 2022, Nguyen filed a separate motion for
monetary sanctions against Autrey and the City as well as
terminating sanctions against the City for Autrey’s “egregious”
discovery abuse.
       By order dated March 24, 2022, the trial court denied
Nguyen’s four discovery motions on the ground he had failed to
provide an adequate and complete separate statement as
required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345. It also denied
Nguyen’s January 31, 2022 motion for monetary and terminating
sanctions. Nguyen cannot and does not challenge these
interlocutory orders in this appeal. (Doe v. United States
Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1432 [absent
specific statutory authorization, discovery motions are not
appealable; review may be available by extraordinary writ].)
       The instant appeal instead takes issue with the court’s
order granting the City’s request for monetary sanctions. That
part of the order is appealable under section 904, subdivision
(a)(12).2 The court found Nguyen and his counsel misused the
discovery process when they failed to make a reasonable and good
faith attempt to resolve the issues informally before filing the
motions to compel. The court explained Nguyen and his counsel
obtained an extension of time to file the motions through
“trickery.”
       The court found Nguyen deceived Autrey into believing he
would meet and confer in good faith if granted an extension to do
so. Rather than “attempt to talk the matter over, compare their

2     Section 904.1, subdivision (a)(12), permits an appeal to be
taken from an order “directing payment of monetary sanctions by
a party or an attorney for a party if the amount exceeds five
thousand dollars ($5,000).”

                                4
views, consult, and deliberate” (Townsend v. Superior Court
(1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1439), Nguyen instead demanded
supplemental responses to “almost all” of the written discovery
within three days.3 In short, the court concluded there was no
attempt at informal resolution despite the December 27 and 28
communications to Autrey.4 The trial court awarded the City
monetary sanctions pursuant to section 2023.020.
      The court accepted Autrey’s proposed hourly rate of $500,
finding it was reasonable for an attorney with 32 years of
experience. It also found that, in its experience, 20 hours to draft
and argue the opposition was realistic. The court imposed a joint
and several $10,000 sanction against Nguyen and his counsel.
      Nguyen appealed from the sanctions award.

3     Noting that December 31, 2021, was an official City holiday
and January 3, 2021, was the Monday following the New Year’s
holiday, the court calculated that Nguyen demanded
supplemental responses within three days of the December 28
meet and confer letter.

4     The court’s exact words were: “Plaintiff obtained an
extension of time to file his motion through trickery on
December 27, 2021, i.e. obtaining a two-week extension based on
a dispute regarding one interrogatory, and then using that
extension to put the discovery responses that are the subject of
this motion in issue the next day, December 28, 2021. The letter
demanded that supplemental responses be served no later than
January 3, 2022! The motion was filed on January 5. This
demand over the holidays is about as far from a ‘reasonable and
good faith attempt at informally resolving a discovery dispute’ as
one might see in an entire judicial career.”

                                 5
                          DISCUSSION
       The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred
when it imposed monetary sanctions jointly and severally against
Nguyen and his counsel.5 We find no error.
       We review an order imposing discovery sanctions for abuse
of discretion. (Van v. Language Line Solutions (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 73, 80; Pratt v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2008)
168 Cal.App.4th 165, 183 [trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to impose sanctions and in setting the amount
of monetary sanctions].) We defer to the trial court’s factual
findings and credibility determinations if they are supported by
substantial evidence. (Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1562.)
       The discovery statutes require a trial court to impose
sanctions for “misuse of the discovery process” unless it finds the
losing party acted with “substantial justification” or “other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
(§ 2023.030, subd. (a).) A moving party’s failure to confer with
the opposing party “in a reasonable and good faith attempt to
resolve informally any dispute concerning discovery” prior to
filing a motion is a misuse of the discovery process that subjects
the party to sanctions. (§ 2023.010, subd. (i); see also

5     Nguyen did not challenge the amount of the sanction in his
opening brief on appeal. He did so in his reply brief, contending
Autrey’s five-page opposition and one-page “sloppy” declaration
warranted “perhaps” $250 to $300 per hour and 15 hours in total.
By Nguyen’s calculation, the trial court should have imposed
sanctions in an amount between $3,750 and $4,500. “We do not
consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”
(Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 607, 636.)

                                 6
§§ 2030.300, subd. (b)(1) [requiring meet and confer declarations
to accompany motions to compel further responses to written
interrogatories], 2031.310, subd. (b)(2) [production of documents],
2033.290, subd. (b)(1) [request for admissions].)
       “Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery
motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that
any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by
anyone as a result of that conduct.” (§ 2030.020.)
       “A determination of whether an attempt at informal
resolution is adequate also involves the exercise of discretion.
The level of effort at informal resolution which satisfies the
‘reasonable and good faith attempt’ standard depends upon the
circumstances. In a larger, more complex discovery context, a
greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a
simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may
suffice. The history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction
between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of
discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar
factors can be relevant. Judges have broad powers and
responsibilities to determine what measures and procedures are
appropriate in varying circumstances.” (Obregon v. Superior
Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431 (Obregon).) “The trial
judge’s application of discretion in discovery matters is presumed
correct, and the complaining party must show how and why the
court’s action constitutes an abuse of discretion in light of the
particular circumstances involved.” (Id. at p. 432.)
       Here, the trial court found Nguyen’s attempt at resolving
his discovery disputes to be inadequate. We agree with the
observation made by the court in Obregon that “[w]hether

                                 7
reviewed according to the substantial evidence or the abuse of
discretion standard, or an amalgam of the two, the trial judge’s
decision that a greater effort at informal resolution should have
been made is amply supported by this record.” (Obregon, supra,
67 Cal.App.4th at p. 433.)
       The record shows that, less than 24 hours before the
deadline for filing his own discovery motion, Nguyen sent a meet
and confer email that identified one special interrogatory as an
“example” of the City’s unresponsive answers. Nguyen did not
identify any problems with the City’s responses to his requests
for admissions, form interrogatories, or requests for production of
documents in that email. After the City granted him a two-week
extension to file a motion to compel, Nguyen demanded the City
provide supplemental responses within three court days to
“almost all” of his written discovery requests, not just to the
special interrogatories. Once the court found that “[t]his demand
over the holidays is about as far from a ‘reasonable and good faith
attempt at informally resolving a discovery dispute’ as one might
see in an entire judicial career,” the trial court was required to
impose sanctions under section 2030.020. The statute is
mandatory: the court “shall” impose a monetary sanction against
any party or attorney who fails to confer as required.
(§ 2030.020.)
       Nguyen contends the trial court erred by entirely failing to
consider the factors identified in Obregon, particularly that any
additional efforts at an informal resolution would not likely bear
fruit.6 According to Nguyen, “the relationship was atrocious and

6     We summarily reject Nguyen’s argument that sanctions are
unwarranted because his prediction that the City would not
provide further responses came true: the City failed to provide

                                8
the likelihood of getting any discovery from Mr. Autrey was
zero—and thus very little was needed to meet the required
reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution, and
that such requirement had to be met with the 36-page meet and
confer letter and the eight days provided before filing the motion
to compel.”7 (Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 431.)
       As an initial matter, we observe Obregon does not address
monetary sanctions under section 2023.020, the statute relied
upon by the trial court. Obregon instead relied upon former
section 2030, subdivision (l), which required a declaration
showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal
resolution prior to filing a motion to compel further responses to
interrogatories. (Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.)
       Notwithstanding this distinction, the Obregon court
specified factors that were “relevant,” not mandatory, to the
court’s inquiry in evaluating the adequacy of a party’s meet-and-
confer process. Nor must the trial court make express findings as
to each factor. Obregon instead “entrusted to the trial court’s
discretion and judgment” the determination of what level of effort
is reasonable to meet the statutory requirement. (Obregon,

any further discovery between the initial meet and confer email
on December 27, 2021, and the hearing on March 24, 2022. This
misses the mark: The discovery statutes require attempts at
informal resolution before the filing of a motion to compel, not
based on counsel’s subjective view that the meet and confer
process would likely fail.
7     Nguyen counts eight days between his initial December 27,
2021 email and when he filed his motions to compel on
January 5, 2022. The trial court disagreed, finding that the time
within which the City had to act according to Nguyen’s demand
was three court days.

                                9
supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 433.) In the absence of express
findings, this court may imply any findings necessary to support
the trial court’s order. This is especially so when the record does
not affirmatively disclose the failure to consider any relevant
matters. “The doctrine of implied findings requires the appellate
court to infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary
to support the judgment. [Citation.] The doctrine is a natural
and logical corollary to three fundamental principles of appellate
review: (1) a judgment is presumed correct; (2) all intendments
and presumptions are indulged in favor of correctness; and (3) the
appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record
affirmatively proving error.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors
Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.) The parties explicitly
presented their contentious discovery disputes to the trial court.
The court observed that Deputy City Attorney Autrey’s discovery
conduct was “questionable.” The record, thus, indicates a
weighing of the matter and reflects the court’s reasoned
allocation of blame.
       If anything, Obregon supports the trial court’s order. In
Obregon, the plaintiff sent a letter requesting further responses
to discovery with approximately 13 days left before a motion to
compel had to be filed. The plaintiff received the defendant’s
response one day before the filing deadline. Due to the
impending deadline, the plaintiff filed her motion to compel
without asking for an extension or making further contact.
(Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 428.) The court noted, “[a]
single letter, followed by a response which refuses concessions,
might in some instances be an adequate attempt at informal
resolution,” but ultimately concluded, under the circumstances
presented, “the trial judge’s decision that a greater effort at

                                10
informal resolution should have been made [was] amply
supported by [the] record.” (Id. at pp. 432–433.)
      Nguyen’s efforts at an informal resolution were less than
the paltry efforts made by the Obregon plaintiff. Nguyen
attempted to meet and confer with the City with hours left to file
a motion to compel, not 13 days. Unlike in Obregon, where the
defendant provided a substantive response, Nguyen gave the City
no time to meet and confer. Within hours of the City’s agreement
to a two-week extension to file a motion to compel, Nguyen
unilaterally imposed a deadline to submit supplement responses
to extensive discovery that was three court days away and
immediately following a holiday weekend. Nguyen then filed the
motion to compel without any further effort at informal
resolution. Under these circumstances, Obregon does not help
Nguyen.
      Again relying on Obregon, Nguyen states the court erred in
imposing monetary sanctions rather than considering other
available remedies. Obregon does not support this argument. As
we have observed, Obregon is not a monetary sanctions case
under section 2023.020. There, the trial court denied the
plaintiff’s motion because she failed to adequately meet and
confer as required by former section 2030, which expressly
permitted monetary, issue, terminating, and other sanctions.
The Obregon court held that discovery should not have been
automatically denied; “instead the trial court should consider
whether it would be more appropriate to specify additional efforts
which will be required before the court will turn to the merits of
the discovery dispute.” (Obregon, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 434–435.)

                               11
       By contrast, the trial court here imposed sanctions
pursuant to section 2030.020, which provides that the trial court
“shall impose a monetary sanction” in the form of attorney fees
once it finds a party or attorney failed to confer as required. We
conclude the trial court faithfully followed the statutory mandate.
The trial court had before it a complete failure to try to meet and
confer and a procedurally deficient motion. Under these
circumstances, we find no error.
       Lastly, we reject Nguyen’s attempt to reverse the sanctions
order by citing to this court’s inherent powers of equity and
justice. Nguyen provides no reasoned analysis or legal authority
for this argument, only an attempt to reargue facts that the trial
court found unconvincing.
                              DISPOSITION
       The March 24, 2022 order imposing discovery sanctions
against Nguyen and his counsel is affirmed. The City to recover
its costs on appeal.

                                     RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                  MOOR, J.

                  KIM, J.

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