Court Opinion

ID: 9403732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:09:13.123581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.170349
License: Public Domain

J-S14041-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    KEITH ANTHONY ROSARIO                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 931 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 25, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-63-CR-0002611-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                           FILED: JUNE 21, 2023

        Keith Anthony Rosario (Rosario) appeals from the March 25, 2022

judgment of sentence imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Washington

County (trial court) following this Court’s remand for resentencing on his

convictions for attempted homicide, two counts of aggravated assault, two

counts of kidnapping and conspiracy to commit homicide, aggravated assault

and kidnapping.1 The trial court resentenced him to an aggregate of 25 to 50

years’ imprisonment followed by one year of re-entry supervision, a reduction

from his original sentence of 35.5 to 90 years’ imprisonment.          Rosario

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901, 2501, 2702, 2901 & 903.
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challenges the discretionary aspects and legality of his sentence. We reverse

and remand for resentencing.

                                      I.

      We recounted the factual and procedural history of this matter in detail

in Rosario’s direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Rosario, 248 A.3d 599,

604-07, 612 (Pa. Super. 2021). Briefly, in September 2017, Rosario and two

other individuals assaulted the victim, Marcus Stancik, as he was walking in

an alley. They threw him into their van and drove him to a different location,

where Rosario removed him from the vehicle and shot him at the base of his

skull near his neck. He attempted to fire a second shot, but his gun jammed,

preventing him from doing so.      Stancik survived the gunshot wound and

identified Rosario as one of his assailants to law enforcement.

      Following a jury trial, Rosario was convicted of the above-mentioned

offenses.   On appeal, he argued in relevant part that his sentences for

attempted homicide and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault were illegal,

as the Sentencing Code prohibits multiple convictions for inchoate crimes

“designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime.”

Id. at 616-19 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 906) (emphasis omitted). He additionally

argued that his sentences for two counts of kidnapping under 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 2901(a)(2) and (3) violated double jeopardy principles because they arose

from the same criminal act. Id. at 619. We agreed and vacated the sentences

for conspiracy and kidnapping. Id. at 619, 621 (citing Commonwealth v.

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Lopez, 663 A.2d 746 (Pa. Super. 1995)). Because our disposition upset the

trial court’s sentencing scheme, we remanded the matter for resentencing.

      At the resentencing hearing, the parties stipulated to the entry of the

presentence investigation report (PSI) prepared prior to Rosario’s initial

sentencing hearing in 2019.    The report included details of Rosario’s prior

convictions, his family background and educational and employment history,

character statements provided by family members and a victim impact

statement. The trial court also considered excerpts of the transcript of the

original sentencing hearing of statements by Rosario’s mother and sister.

      Rosario read a prepared statement on his behalf. While not admitting

guilt, he expressed remorse to the individuals affected by the crime,

particularly his own children. He regretted that his children would grow up

without a father and said that he was working to be a productive member of

society. He was employed as a janitor in state prison and was waiting to begin

a barber shop training program. He was teaching himself Italian, learning

about the law and writing a book. He said that he turned down a favorable

plea deal for 11 to 22 years of incarceration and believed he was penalized for

going to trial when he was sentenced to 35.5 to 90 years of incarceration. He

said that he had no violent history in prison and was currently classified as a

minimum security risk. He completed classes such as thinking for a change,

violence prevention and batterers’ intervention and was on the waiting list for

additional classes such as money smart, seeking out safety, flaggers and

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building and planning. He believed that he was capable of rehabilitation and

successfully reentering society.

      After receiving this evidence, the trial court resentenced Rosario to an

aggregate of 25 to 50 years of incarceration followed by one ear of reentry

supervision.   For ease of reference, the previous and current sentencing

schemes are as follows:

Charge                     June 3, 2019               March 25, 2022
                           Sentence                   Sentence

Attempted homicide         120 to 240 months          120 to 240 months

Aggravated assault,        Merged                     Merged
(a)(1)
Aggravated assault         36 to 120 months,          60 to 120 months,
with a deadly weapon,      consecutive                consecutive
(a)(4)
Kidnapping, (a)(2)         90 to 240 months,          120 to 240 months,
                           consecutive                consecutive

Kidnapping, (a)(3)         90 to 240 months,          Merged
                           consecutive
Conspiracy                 90 to 240 months,          Merged
                           consecutive
Aggregate                  35.5 to 90 years           25 to 50 years

      In resentencing Rosario to the statutory maximum on three of the

counts, the trial court explained that it found several aggravating factors

necessitating the sentence. First, Rosario had been paroled for a different

firearms offense approximately four months prior to the instant offenses and

he had also been on probation at the time for two prior drug offenses. The

trial court considered Rosario’s supervised release at the time of his crimes to

be a separate aggravating factor from his prior record score and found that

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prior attempts at rehabilitating him had failed. Second, Rosario had involved

a juvenile with whom he had a bond “much like father and son” in the crimes.

N.T., 3/25/22, at 28. Third, the trial court stated that Rosario lacked remorse

and had failed to take responsibility for his actions. He did not specifically

express remorse to the victim during his allocution and had denied his guilt.

Finally, the trial court found that the crime had a profound effect on the victim,

who suffered medical issues stemming from the attack and still had the bullet

lodged in his face at the time of trial. Based on those reasons, it concluded

that the statutory maximum sentences were appropriate.               Notably, its

reasoning for imposing the sentences following remand were materially

identical to the reasoning it provided in support of the original sentence.

Compare N.T., 6/3/19, at 29-31, with N.T., 3/25/22, at 27-29.

        Rosario timely filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied

after argument. He timely appealed and he and the trial court have complied

with Pa. R.A.P. 1925.

                                               II.

        We begin with Rosario’s challenges to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.2 He contends that the trial court abused its discretion because his

____________________________________________

2
    Our standard of review is well-settled:

        Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
        sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
        absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and kidnapping

exceeded the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and were

unreasonable. He further contends that these sentences were excessive and

that the trial court imposed maximum sentences without considering

mitigating circumstances or his individual character.

                                               A.

       Before considering the merits of Rosario’s claim, we must consider

whether he has properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction. Commonwealth

v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).             A

defendant must preserve his claims at the time of sentencing or in a post-

sentence motion, file a timely notice of appeal, and include a statement of

reasons for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief and

raise a substantial question for review. Id. Rosario has complied with the

first three requirements. Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether he has

raised a substantial question.

____________________________________________

       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
       the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
       sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
       judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, or
       arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 244 A.3d 1261, 1278–79 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted).

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       “A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either:                (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to   the   fundamental      norms     which    underlie   the   sentencing   process.”

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281, 1286–87 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).     We have previously held that a defendant presents a

substantial question when he alleges that the trial court exceeded the

aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines without justification.              See

Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Moreover, a defendant presents a substantial question when he or she alleges

that the court imposed an aggravated range sentence without considering

mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254,

1263 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77

A.3d 1263, 1270-71 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding a substantial question for our

review when a defendant alleged that the court imposed a manifestly

excessive sentence without considering mitigating evidence).             Rosario has

alleged both of these abuses of discretion in his 2119(f) statement. 3 As a

result, we find that he has raised a substantial question and proceed to the

merits of his claim.

____________________________________________

3 These claims are not mere challenges to the consecutive nature of the
sentences, as argued by the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth’s Brief at
9-10.

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                                               B.

       When imposing a sentence, a trial court must ensure that the sentence

is “consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). “The court is

not required to parrot the words of the Sentencing Code, stating every factor

that must be considered under Section 9721(b). However, the record as a

whole must reflect due consideration by the court of the statutory

considerations     [enunciated      in   that       section].”   Commonwealth   v.

Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 145 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).             A

sentencing court is not required to impose the “minimum possible

confinement,” but rather must craft an individualized sentence after

considering “the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of

the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171 (Pa. Super.

2010) (citations omitted).

       When the court imposes a sentence outside of the sentencing guidelines,

it is required to provide a statement of reasons for the deviation.4

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. 2007).                     While the

guidelines are advisory and not binding on the sentencing court, it must

____________________________________________

4 This requirement can be satisfied by placing the statement of reasons on the
record in open court and in the defendant’s presence. See Commonwealth
v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1263-64 (Pa. Super. 2012).

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nevertheless consider the guidelines as one factor in sentencing and provide

a reasoned justification for departing from them when it chooses to do so. Id.

at 964; Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 532 A.2d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 1987)

(“The guidelines must be ‘considered’ and, to ensure that such consideration

is more than mere fluff, the court must explain its reasons for departure from

them.”). Moreover,

      the inherent seriousness of the offense is taken into consideration
      in the guideline recommendations.        If the sentencing court
      imposes a sentence that deviates significantly from the guideline
      recommendations, it must demonstrate that the case under
      consideration is compellingly different from the “typical” case of
      the same offense or point to other sentencing factors that are
      germane to the case before the court. These factors include the
      character of the defendant or the defendant’s criminal history.

Commonwealth v. Robertson, 874 A.2d 1200, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citations omitted). “Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a [PSI],

we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along

with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104,

1117 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal quotations & citation omitted).

      Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3), when the sentencing court has

imposed a sentence outside the guidelines, we must vacate and remand if

“the sentence is unreasonable,” otherwise, we must affirm. In Walls, our

Supreme Court noted that reasonableness is not defined in the statute and

“commonly connotes a decision that is ‘irrational’ or ‘not guided by sound

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judgment.’” Walls, supra, at 963. Reasonableness is assessed in two distinct

ways. First, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d) states that we shall consider the following:

      (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
      and characteristics of the defendant.

      (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
      defendant, including any presentence investigation.

      (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

      (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

Id. “A sentence may be found unreasonable if it fails to properly account for

these four statutory factors . . . [or] if the sentence was imposed without

express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general

standards applicable to sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d

316, 321 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted, bracketing in original).

      Here, Rosario challenges his sentences for aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon and kidnapping. Based on his prior record score (PRS) of four

and the offense gravity score (OGS) of eight, the standard range of the

guidelines for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was a minimum of 21

to 27 months’ incarceration, with an aggravated range of 36 months’

incarceration. Rosario was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 60 to 120

months’ incarceration on that count.     Kidnapping carried an OGS of ten,

resulting in a standard range of a minimum of 48 to 60 months’ incarceration,

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with an aggravated range of 72 months’ incarceration.5               Rosario was

sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 to 240 months’ incarceration on

that count. Accordingly, his sentences on these two counts were above the

aggravated range of the guidelines and we must assess whether they were

“reasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3).

                                               C.

       Preliminarily, the Commonwealth contends that this Court is bound by

the law of the case established in Rosario’s prior appeal when determining

whether his new sentence is reasonable.             In assessing the discretionary

aspects of his prior sentence, we explained:

       We also agree the imposition of consecutive sentences did not
       result in an “excessive aggregate sentence.” [Rosario], while on
       supervised release, kidnapped Stancik, beat him both with his fists
       and with the gun, threatened him, and forced him to a remote
       area. He dragged him from the car, shot him execution-style in
       the back of his head, and when the first shot was not fatal,
       attempted a second shot, failing only because the gun jammed.
       We find the aggregate sentence of 35½ to 90 years is not grossly
       disparate to [Rosario’s] conduct and does not “viscerally appear
       as patently ‘unreasonable.’” Commonwealth v. Gonzalez–
       DeJesus, 994 A.2d 595, 599 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Rosario, supra, at 614-15.           The Commonwealth argues that because we

concluded that a 35.5 to 90 year sentence was not unreasonable, we are

____________________________________________

5Though the trial court applied the deadly weapon used enhancement to this
count at Rosario’s initial sentencing, it declined to do so on resentencing. See
N.T., 3/25/22, at 23-24.

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bound by that assessment in evaluating Rosario’s reduced 25 to 50 year

sentence.

      “The law of the case doctrine refers to a family of rules which embody

the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter

should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or

by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Commonwealth v.

McCandless, 880 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc) (citation

omitted). The doctrine serves judicial economy, protects the expectations of

the parties, ensures consistency and uniformity, streamlines cases and

ensures that litigation can be brought to an end. Id. However, as a rule

intended to promote public policy concerns, it is not absolute. “Hence, the

law of the case doctrine might not apply under exceptional circumstances,

including: an intervening change in the law, a substantial change in the facts,

or if the prior ruling was ‘clearly erroneous’ and ‘would create a manifest

injustice if followed.’” Id. at 1268 (citation omitted).

      When this Court upsets a trial court’s sentencing scheme, we remand

for resentencing and the original sentence is rendered a legal nullity.

Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 759 (Pa. Super. 2018).            Thus, on

resentencing, a trial court must “start ‘afresh’ and re-evaluate the sentencing

factors.” Id. This reassessment includes consideration of any evidence that

was not available at the previous sentencing hearing, including evidence of

the defendant’s conduct or performance on supervision in the intervening

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time. Commonwealth v. Jones, 640 A.2d 914, 919-20 (Pa. Super. 1994).

Accordingly, on remand for resentencing, a trial court is not limited by and

should not solely consider the record of the original sentencing hearing.

Instead, it must consider all relevant factors outlined in the Sentencing Code

in light of the defendant’s background and the circumstances of the offense in

order to craft an appropriate sentence.       See Commonwealth v. Luketic,

162 A.3d 1149, 1160-61 (Pa. Super. 2017); Commonwealth v. Finnecy,

135 A.3d 1028, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2016). As discussed in Part II.B, supra, the

trial court is not bound on remand by its prior sentencing decisions, but rather

must reconsider all of the sentencing factors in light of the newly-developed

record and adequately articulate the reasoning behind the sentence it chooses

to impose.

      The fact-specific nature of this inquiry undermines the Commonwealth’s

argument that our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is bound

by the law of the case that derived from an earlier sentencing hearing. On

remand for resentencing, the trial court must start afresh in its evaluation of

the sentencing factors, see Jones, supra, and our review of the trial court’s

exercise of discretion is based on that fresh record, see Wallace, supra.

Simply put, what is “reasonable” on one sentencing record may not be

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reasonable on a subsequent one.6 Accordingly, we conclude that the law of

the case does not require this Court to adhere to a prior panel’s assessment

of Rosario’s sentence based on a different sentencing hearing.        See also

Pepper v. U.S., 562 U.S. 476, 506-07 (2011) (holding that the law of the

case doctrine does not bind subsequent sentencing court when case is

remanded for a de novo sentencing hearing).

                                               D.

       Rosario’s challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence are

related and we address them together. First, he contends that his sentences

for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and kidnapping were

unreasonable because no new information was adduced at the resentencing

hearing to justify the increase above the aggravated range of the guidelines.

He identifies two changes that occurred between the two sentencing hearings:

the trial court did not apply the deadly weapon enhancement to the kidnapping

charge, and Rosario presented new information regarding his time in

____________________________________________

6 Additionally, Rosario was previously sentenced within the aggravated range
of the sentencing guidelines on the relevant counts, so we reviewed his
sentence to determine whether it was “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9781(c)(2). The aggravated range for kidnapping was based on the
application of the deadly weapon enhancement, which the trial court did not
apply on resentencing. In the instant appeal, Rosario was sentenced outside
the guidelines entirely and we review to determine whether the sentence was
“unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3). Because we must apply a different
legal standard to review the instant sentence, in addition to a different factual
record, the law of the case doctrine does not bind our analysis.

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incarceration through his allocution.      Without more, he contends that the

increase from the aggravated range to outside the guidelines entirely was

unreasonable. Second, he argues that the trial court failed to consider any

mitigating circumstances and based his statutory maximum sentences purely

on the nature of the crimes. He acknowledges that the trial court reviewed a

PSI, victim impact statement and character statements from Rosario’s family

members, but argues that the trial court did not consider his efforts at

rehabilitation during his incarceration.

      The record reveals that the trial court considered the PSI that was

prepared prior to Rosario’s first sentencing hearing, along with written

character statements that had been provided at that time and testimony from

Rosario’s family members. While Stancik did not appear at resentencing, he

provided a victim impact statement. Finally, Rosario exercised his right to

allocution to express remorse to his family and explain the steps he had taken

toward rehabilitation. After receiving this evidence, the trial court provided

the following reasoning for its aggregate 25 to 50-year sentence:

      The Court notes that it has sentenced the Defendant to the
      statutory maximum allowed by law. The Court has considered the
      Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines but notes that the guidelines
      are advisory only. The Court does not believe that a guideline
      sentence is appropriate, given the facts and circumstances of this
      particular case. There are several aggravating factors the Court
      has considered in imposing sentence outside the sentencing
      guideline recommendations.

      First and foremost, at the time of this offense, Defendant was on
      parole for a firearms violation. He had been paroled less than four
      months at the time of this—prior to this incident and was under

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     the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
     at the time he committed this offense. He was also subject to a
     consecutive probationary sentence on two prior drug offenses.

     While the guidelines include the prior record conviction score, they
     do not take into account that the Defendant was on supervised
     release at the time of the new charges.

     It is abundantly clear to me that the Court—that prior attempts to
     rehabilitate the Defendant have failed. It is also noteworthy that
     the Defendant was on parole for a prior firearms offense when he
     committed this offense with a firearm.

     Further, the Court is troubled by Defendant involving a juvenile,
     Tyree King, in the criminal episode. Both the Defendant and Mr.
     King testified at the jury trial that the two of them had a special
     bond much like father and son. Yet Defendant exposed him to the
     violent assault on Mr. Stancik, and even encouraged him to
     remain silent after the commission of the assault.

     The Court also considers Defendant’s lack of remorse and his
     failure to accept any responsibility for his actions as an
     aggravating factor. From the outset and to this day, Defendant
     has not accepted any responsibility or expressed a scintilla of
     remorse toward the victim. His only mention of the word remorse
     in his allocution today was remorse toward his children. Further,
     he stated at the start of his allocution that it was, “[n]ot an
     admission of guilt.”

     Finally, the Court considers the profound impact this assault had
     on the victim, Marcus Stancik. At the jury trial, the Court had the
     benefit of hearing extensive medical testimony from the treating
     emergency room physician. He explained the injuries which
     resulted from Mr. Stancik being shot in the back of his head and
     even provided X-rays showing the bullet lodged in his skull.

     The Court also heard directly from the victim, Mr. Stancik, the
     horrifying account of his abduction and assault. His trial testimony
     demonstrated the extreme mental and physical cruelty inflicted on
     him by the Defendant. It’s truly a miracle that Mr. Stancik
     survived being shot in the back of his head at close range and that
     he lived to tell us about it.

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      Although Mr. Stancik somehow survived this attempted execution,
      the bullet remains lodged in his face, a lasting reminder of the
      atrocities that were committed on September 5, 2017.

      For all of these reasons, the Court finds that a guideline sentence
      would be inappropriate in this case and that the statutory
      maximum sentence is not only warranted, but it is necessary, as
      Defendant clearly poses a grave danger to society.

N.T., 3/25/22, at 27-29. As noted supra, this reasoning mirrored—and is in

fact, almost verbatim—the reasoning the trial court provided for the sentence

it imposed initially in 2019.   Compare N.T., 6/3/19, at 29-31, with id.

However, in 2019, the trial court sentenced Rosario within the aggravated

range of the guidelines for the counts of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon and kidnapping.

      We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

sentences that were substantially outside of the aggravated range of the

guidelines on these two counts. The statutory maximum sentences and the

trial court’s rationale in support were unreasonable in several respects under

Section 9781(d). As Rosario argues, the only new information the trial court

had before it in resentencing was Rosario’s allocution, which did not support

an increase in the sentences compared to his initial sentencing in 2019.

      The first two factors under Section 9781(d), “[t]he nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

defendant” and “[t]he opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the

defendant, including any presentence investigation,” are related. 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9781(d)(1)-(2). Here, the trial court relied on the presentence investigation

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that was prepared prior to Rosario’s initial sentencing in 2019 and Rosario

offered supplementary information through his allocution. He explained that

he was employed as a janitor and was waiting to begin cosmetology school.

He was considered a minimum security risk in prison and did not have any

history of violence while incarcerated. He had completed numerous classes

that were recommended by prison officials, including classes in violence

prevention and batterers’ intervention, and was on the waiting list for

additional optional classes focused on career and life skills.       He expressed

remorse to his family and a desire to become a productive member of society

upon release.    His statement represented a marked departure from the

statements he provided in 2019 in his original PSI, which focused on asserting

his innocence and downplaying any prior incidents of violence.

      While we do not discount the trial court’s opportunity to observe Rosario

at both sentencing proceedings, the reasoning it placed on the record at

resentencing evidenced a singular focus on Rosario’s statement of remorse

and the circumstances of the offenses to the exclusion of any mitigating

evidence. The trial court was entitled to consider Rosario’s lack of remorse

toward the victim as a factor in sentencing. Nonetheless, it was required to

consider   the   evidence   Rosario   presented   regarding    his   attempts   at

rehabilitation in the time since his initial sentencing. Here, the trial court did

not address that evidence in imposing sentences that were substantially

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higher than the ones it imposed prior to Rosario undertaking those

rehabilitative efforts.

      Next, we consider “[t]he findings upon which the sentence was based.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(3).     As we have already observed, the trial court’s

rationale for imposing the statutory maximums following resentencing was

substantially identical to the reasoning it provided in support of Rosario’s 2019

sentence.    However, a trial court on resentencing may not mechanically

reimpose its earlier sentence without considering any change in circumstances

that may have arisen in the intervening years. Jones, supra, at 920 (citation

omitted) (“Reimposing a judgment of sentence should not be a mechanical

exercise.”). The trial court relied on the same findings to support the 2022

sentence and 2019 sentence, but made no effort to explain why those findings

supported a sentence substantially above the guidelines on resentencing when

it initially found an aggravated range sentence to be appropriate. This was

unreasonable.

      Finally, we consider “[t]he guidelines promulgated by the commission”

in assessing the reasonableness of a sentence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d)(4). In

this respect, we reiterate that the guidelines already take into account the

inherent egregiousness of a particular offense. Robertson, supra, at 1213.

Thus, in sentencing outside of the guidelines, a trial court “must demonstrate

that the case under consideration is compellingly different from the ‘typical’

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case of the same offense or point to other sentencing factors that are germane

to the case before the court.” Id.

      Here, the minimum sentence imposed for aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon was 24 months above the aggravated range of the guidelines.

The minimum sentence for kidnapping was 48 months above the aggravated

range of the guidelines, which the trial court calculated without the deadly

weapon enhancement. While the trial court identified several “aggravating

factors” to justify its sentence, it did not acknowledge any mitigating

circumstances that emerged since the prior sentencing hearing or articulate

why those factors supported a departure of six years from the aggravated

range of the guidelines, particularly when it had previously found based on

the same information that aggravated range sentences were appropriate.

Under these circumstances, where the trial court relied on nearly identical

rationale to impose a vastly increased sentence, we cannot conclude that it

was reasonable for the trial court to exceed the guidelines.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

resentencing Rosario to the statutory maximum sentences on the counts of

aggravated assault and kidnapping. As our conclusion upsets the sentencing

scheme, we vacate the sentence in toto and remand to the trial court to

resentence Rosario and to provide adequate reasons for the length of sentence

it imposes.

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                                           III.

       Next, we consider whether Rosario’s sentence is illegal.7 He argues that

the trial court increased his sentences for aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon and kidnapping without any objective information justifying the

increase. Despite the decrease in his aggregate sentence, he contends that

the trial court cannot overcome the presumption of vindictiveness following

his successful first appeal and, as a result, his increased sentences at those

counts violate his right to due process under the federal and state

constitutions. In response to the trial court’s reasoning that it is permitted to

attempt to effectuate its original sentencing scheme on remand for

resentencing, he argues that it offends due process to allow a court to

reimpose an aggregate sentence that was deemed illegal. Additionally, he

argues that the count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon should have

merged for sentencing purposes with the count of attempted homicide and

that any additional sentence for aggravated assault is illegal.

                                               A.

       In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled in part

by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989),8 the United States Supreme

____________________________________________

7 Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law and our scope of review is
plenary. Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 932 A.2d 941, 942 (Pa. Super. 2007).

8In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court held that the presumption of vindictiveness in resentencing does not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Court held that “it would be a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment

for a state trial court to follow an announced practice of imposing a heavier

sentence upon every reconvicted defendant for the explicit purpose of

punishing the defendant for his having succeeded in getting his original

conviction set aside.” Id. at 723-24 (emphasis added).

       In order to assure the absence of such a motivation, we have
       concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence
       upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
       must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon
       objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part
       of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
       proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased
       sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the
       constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully
       reviewed on appeal.

Id. at 726.      The presumption of vindictiveness and prohibition thereon

“emanates from the protections safeguarded to individuals by the Due Process

Clause.” Commonwealth v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 565 (Pa. 2022).

       Rosario points to Commonwealth v. Pearson, 303 A.2d 481 (Pa.

1973), in support of his vindictiveness claim.      There, the defendant was

convicted of aggravated robbery on eleven separate indictments and received

____________________________________________

arise when the initial sentence was based on a guilty plea and the second
sentence followed a trial after the guilty plea was vacated. Id. at 795. It did
not disturb Pearce’s general holding that a presumption of vindictiveness
arises when a sentence is increased following a successful appeal without
objective information justifying the increase. Id. at 799. Smith is consistent
with Pearce’s pronouncement that an increased sentence should be based on
new information appearing on the record following the initial proceedings.

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sentences of five to ten years’ imprisonment, consecutively, on eight of the

cases. He received suspended sentences on the remaining three. He was

subsequently granted a new trial after a direct appeal. He was retried on six

of the indictments, found guilty on five, and was sentenced to consecutive

terms of two to four years’ imprisonment on each of the five cases, including

one in which he had previously received a suspended sentence. Id. at 482.

     On appeal, the defendant argued that his sentence of imprisonment on

the indictment for which he had previously received a suspended sentence

violated Pearce. Our Supreme Court agreed, holding that no “good cause,”

which is “limited to events occurring subsequent to the first trial,” appeared

of record to justify the increased sentence.     Id. at 485.     Notably, the

Commonwealth argued in Pearson that the sentence was not vindictive

because the aggregate sentence following the second trial was lower than that

imposed after the first. Our Supreme Court summarily rejected that argument

and held that “[t]he sentence imposed on each indictment is controlling.” Id.

     In Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en

banc), a panel of this Court sitting en banc addressed an analogous

vindictiveness claim.   There, the defendant was convicted of attempted

homicide, aggravated assault, kidnapping and recklessly endangering another

person. He was sentenced to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for attempted

homicide and consecutive terms of 2.5 to five years of incarceration for

aggravated assault and kidnapping. On appeal, this Court determined that

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the aggravated assault charge merged with the attempted homicide charge

and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court sentenced the

defendant to 20 to 40 years of incarceration for attempted homicide and a

consecutive term of five to ten years of incarceration for kidnapping, resulting

in the same aggregate sentence as originally imposed. Id. at 115.

      On appeal, the defendant argued that his increased sentence on the

count of kidnapping was the result of judicial vindictiveness. We rejected this

piecemeal approach to assessing vindictiveness and held that the aggregate

sentence is controlling for evaluating such a claim. Id. at 124-25. “Indeed,

a trial court properly may resentence a defendant to the same aggregate

sentence to preserve its original sentencing scheme.” Id. at 124 (emphasis

in original).   Thus, while the sentence for kidnapping had increased, the

aggregate sentence remained the same and the defendant was not entitled to

relief under Pearce. Id. at 125.

      Barnes is controlling here. Unlike the defendant in Barnes, Rosario

benefited on resentencing by over ten years—his second sentence was

reduced in aggregate from 35.5 to 90 years’ incarceration to 25 to 50 years’

incarceration. It is of no moment that the individual sentences imposed for

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and kidnapping were increased, as

the overall sentence was substantially reduced. The trial court explained in

its opinion that it intended to preserve the initial sentencing scheme,

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consistent with Barnes.          Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/22, at 13-15.   This is

sufficient to rebut the presumption of vindictiveness and no relief is due.

       Rosario’s argument based on Pearson is squarely foreclosed by

Barnes, which was also decided on due process grounds. In Pearson, the

defendant was convicted on different indictments for different criminal

episodes and his sentence for one of those indictments was unjustifiably

increased following his direct appeal. Here, much like in Barnes, Rosario was

sentenced for multiple counts occurring in the same indictment for the same

criminal episode.      Regardless of the individual sentences imposed on the

counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and kidnapping, his overall

sentence was reduced substantially following his successful appeal.        Under

Barnes, no presumption of vindictiveness arises in this circumstance. Rosario

is due no relief on this claim.

                                               B.

       Finally, we turn to whether the counts of attempted homicide and

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merge for sentencing purposes.9

____________________________________________

9 The Commonwealth complains in its brief that litigants should not be
permitted to raise legality of sentence claims for the first time on appeal and
“urge[s] this Court and the appellate courts of this Commonwealth to
reconsider the jurisprudence of this procedural morass.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 23-24 n.3. However, it does not dispute that our Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that merger claims implicate the legality of a sentence and
are not waivable. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130,
1136 (Pa. 2021). It is beyond cavil that this Court is bound by our Supreme
Court’s pronouncements. See Commonwealth v. Volk, 138 A.3d 659, 663
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Offenses merge when “the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of

the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements

of the other offense.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. Here, it is undisputed that both

offenses arose from Rosario’s single criminal act of firing a gun into the back

of the victim’s head. Accordingly, our analysis is limited to whether all of the

elements of attempted homicide are included in the elements of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon or vice versa.

       “A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit a specific

crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the

commission of that crime.”          18 Pa.C.S. § 901.   First-degree murder is a

criminal homicide “committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

“Thus, a conviction for attempted murder requires that the Commonwealth

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the specific intent to

kill and took a substantial step toward that goal.”          Commonwealth v.

Predmore, 199 A.3d 925, 929 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted).

As relevant here, a person is guilty of aggravated assault under subsection

2702(a)(4) if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily

injury to another with a deadly weapon.”           18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4).   The

Crimes Code defines “bodily injury” as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or

____________________________________________

(Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Friday, 90 A.2d 856, 859 (Pa.
Super. 1952)).

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substantial pain” and includes “[a]ny firearm” within the definition of “deadly

weapon.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301.

      In Commonwealth v. Edwards, 256 A.3d 1130 (Pa. 2021), our

Supreme Court explained that merger requires an analysis of the elements of

the statute, not the specific facts of the case at issue. See id. at 1137-38.

There, the Court held that aggravated assault and recklessly endangering

another person (REAP) did not merge, even when arising out of a single act,

when not all statutory alternatives for the former crime were subsumed by

the elements of the latter. Id. at 1139. The crime of aggravated assault

under subsection 2702(a)(1) prohibited both actually causing serious bodily

injury and attempting to cause serious bodily injury, while REAP required a

showing of actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 1135. The

defendant was convicted for a single act of actually inflicting serious bodily

injury on the victim. Nevertheless, our Supreme Court held that the charges

did not merge for sentencing purposes because it is possible to attempt to put

someone in danger of serious bodily injury under subsection 2702(a)(1)

without actually doing so under the REAP statute.         Id. at 1138 (citing

Commonwealth v. Cianci, 130 A.3d 780, 782 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

      While we have not previously addressed whether attempted homicide

merges with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, we have analyzed

other subsections of the aggravated assault statute for merger with attempted

homicide. We have held that aggravated assault under subsection 2702(a)(1)

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is a lesser included offense of attempted homicide. See Barnes, supra, at

120 n.8.   In contrast, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 874 A.2d 66 (Pa.

Super. 2005), we held that attempted homicide does not merge with

aggravated assault of a police officer under subsection 2702(a)(2) because

the crimes each include elements not required by the other:           attempted

homicide requires proof of a specific intent to kill, and aggravated assault of

a police officer requires proof that the victim was an enumerated officer

performing official duties. Id. at 71.

      Rosario relies on Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20 (Pa.

1994), for the proposition that aggravated assault is a lesser included offense

of attempted homicide because it is “tautologous that one cannot kill without

inflicting serious bodily injury.” Rosario’s Brief at 47 (citing Anderson, supra,

at 583). However, Anderson was decided in 1994 and predates the current

merger statute. We have previously recognized that Anderson’s approach to

merger is no longer instructive since the legislature adopted the merger

statute. See Commonwealth v. Coppedge, 984 A.2d 562, 564 (Pa. Super.

2009) (“The legislature has thus rejected the prior common law approach to

merger espoused in [Anderson]. . . . Whether or not the facts of this case

comprise both crimes, if the crimes themselves can result in committing one

without committing the other, the elements in general are different, and the

legislature has said merger cannot apply. The analyses by cases arising before

the effective date of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 are therefore not instructive here.”).

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      Here, the offenses of attempted homicide and aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon both include elements that the other does not. Attempted

homicide requires proof that the defendant had the specific intent to kill at the

time he took the substantial step toward committing the murder. Predmore,

supra. A defendant may commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

without the specific intent to kill, as long as he intentionally or knowingly

causes or attempts to cause bodily injury. Similarly, aggravated assault with

a deadly weapon requires proof that the defendant committed the offense

while using a deadly weapon. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4). Attempted homicide

does not, as it is certainly possible to attempt to kill another without employing

a weapon, such as by manual strangulation.        Thus, because both offenses

include elements that the other does not, they do not merge for sentencing

purposes under the statute even when based on the same criminal act.

Jones, supra; Edwards, supra. No relief is due on this claim.

      Affirmed in part.      Reversed in part.    Remanded with instructions.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

      President Judge Panella dissents.

      President Judge Emeritus Bender joins the memorandum.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/21/2023

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