Court Opinion

ID: 9589395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:44:01.599429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:01.950968
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion there was no reversible error committed in the trial below. I would hold that the trial court correctly struck the testimony of appellant’s character witness on the ground that the witness gave her personal opinion of appellant’s good character rather than testifying as to her knowledge of appellant’s reputation in the community.
On direct examination defense counsel asked the witness if she was familiar with appellant’s reputation in the community for peaceableness or violence. The witness replied in the affirmative. Defense counsel then asked the witness to state her opinion as to that reputation. The witness gave her personal opinion of appellant’s character rather than her reputation. She answered: “As far as I know she’s a nice person.” Attempting to elicit a correct response, defense counsel asked: “What I’m asking is: Would it be peaceable or violent?” The witness responded: “It would be peaceable.” This concluded the direct examination.
The state then began cross-examination (portions of which are quoted in the majority opinion). Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority that the state was seeking the witness’ personal knowledge of the subject, my reading of the transcript is that the state was simply trying to impeach the witness. By suggesting adverse facts in evidence (which distinguishes this case from Watson v. State, cited by the majority), the state was obviously hoping the witness would staunchly maintain her initial position, with the desired effect being to discredit her before the jury.
That the state was not seeking the witness’ personal knowledge *850is evinced by the fact that the questions posed (see majority opinion) were all variations of the first one, to which the witness responded incorrectly, and were designed to elicit a responsive answer. The state asked: “If you knew that she had regularly had fights with the father of her children, James Ridley — .” The witness cut in: “I don’t know anything about him.” The following dialogue illustrates the state’s objective. “Q: I’m saying if you knew that. . . would your opinion change? [Objection. Objection overruled.] Q: If you knew that she had had fights with this fellow regularly, all the time, would your idea of her reputation change? A: You’re talking about if I had saw it? Q: If you knew it. If you knew... would your answer change? A: I couldn’t never say they fighted, ‘cause I never saw him but a time or two.” “The Court: Answer the question. . . .”
After several more attempts to ascertain from the witness if having known the suggested facts would have led her to give a different opinion as to appellant’s reputation in the community, the witness finally answered: “Well, I don’t know.” The state then began to probe into the basis of the witness’ final answer on direct, that is, whether the answer given was based upon what she herself knew about appellant or upon what other people in the community had told her. The witness eventually answered: “Well, like I said, as far as I know about her she was always peaceable.”
The state then moved to strike the entire testimony. The court reserved ruling on the motion, allowing defense counsel the opportunity to conduct re-direct examination first. The answers during re-direct were much the same as those during direct and cross: unresponsive. Both counsel having failed to get any clear answers from the witness, the court interposed and asked her: “. . . Is this based upon your knowledge or on your knowledge of her reputation in the community?” The witness answered: “It’s in the community, ’cause I always figured she was just quiet.” The court asked the question again and the witness responded: “It’s on my knowledge ....” The court then instructed the jury to disregard any testimony of the witness. Defense counsel voiced no objection.
While being fully cognizant that the Supreme Court reversed a judgment because of a ruling under substantially similar circumstances in Gravitt v. State, supra, I would hold that the ruling here was not reversible error. In dicta, the Gravitt court stated, “If, under the entire testimony of each of these witnesses, it had appeared that his testimony as to the character and reputation of the defendant was based entirely on his personal opinion, the trial judge could properly have excluded his testimony.” Gravitt, supra at 788. I am persuaded that, from the entire testimony of the witness in this case, she was giving her personal opinion of appellant’s good *851character rather than testifying as to her opinion of appellant’s reputation in the community.
Unlike the situation in Gravitt, defense counsel in this case never established the basis of the witness’ testimony. The witness answered the statutory question from the standpoint of her personal knowledge of appellant’s character. Defense counsel’s follow-up question was ambiguous, rendering the meaning of the witness’ answer uncertain. On cross-examination it was shown the witness was testifying from personal knowledge. On re-direct it was again shown. Thus, this case is distinguishable from Gravitt, where the statutory basis was established, but then on cross the witness contradicted himself as to the basis. Here, the only basis established was that of personal knowledge. The transcript speaks for itself on this point and defense counsel’s failure to object to the striking of the testimony, after having objected to the state’s line of questioning, was a tacit admission of this. Therefore, I find no error in striking the testimony and, there being no other reversible error, I would affirm the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Banke join in this dissent.