Court Opinion

ID: 9599709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:20:53.295884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:18.111082
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Division 1 but respectfully dissent as to Divisions 2 and 3.
1. Wingate voluntarily admitted himself to the facility pursuant to OCGA § 37-7-20. The majority’s conclusion that OCGA § 37-7-20 does not apply to Wingate’s admission is based (i) on its legal analysis that the statute applies only to patients received for observation and diagnosis, not for treatment, and (ii) on its factual analysis that Wingate requested only the latter. Neither of these is correct.
First, it is true that OCGA § 37-7-20 (a) refers to patients voluntarily applying for “observation and diagnosis.” But the statute is purposely broad and includes such as parts of the definition of treatment. “ Treatment’ means the broad range of emergency, outpatient, intermediate, and inpatient services and care, including diagnostic evaluation. . . OCGA § 37-7-1 (20). Thus, a request for treatment *653would include a request for observation and diagnosis, although the converse is not necessarily true. One may be diagnosed and observed without being treated, but one may hardly be effectively treated without ongoing observations and diagnoses as part of the treatment itself. Wingate’s request for treatment fell under the statute. OCGA § 37-7-20 (a) states that once a person is found to be suitable for treatment for alcoholism, “such person may be given care and treatment at such facility; and such person may be detained by such facility until discharged pursuant to Code Section 37-7-21 or 37-7-22.”
Second, in his admission form Wingate requested not only standard treatments but also “routine diagnostic procedures.” During his stay the records reflected he was extensively observed and evaluated for diagnostic purposes. Certainly Wingate did not want treatment without being observed and diagnosed as part of that treatment.
2. Wingate requested discharge in writing on June 9, 1993. OCGA § 37-7-22 (a) provides that the patient must be discharged within 72 hours after the chief medical officer receives the discharge request “unless the chief medical officer finds that the discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others, in which case proceedings for involuntary treatment must be initiated. . . .”
The definitions section of the statute elucidates how a physician finds a discharge unsafe for the patient or others. OCGA § 37-7-1 (3) defines an “ ‘[a]lcoholic, drug dependent individual, or drug abuser requiring involuntary treatment’ [as] a person who is an inpatient. . . .” “ ‘Inpatient’ means a person who is an álcoholic, a drug dependent individual, or a drug abuser and: (A) (i) Who presents a substantial risk of imminent harm to that person or others, as manifested by either recent overt acts or recent expressed threats of violence which present a probability of physical injury to that person or other persons; or (ii) Who is incapacitated by alcoholic beverages, drugs, or any other substances . . . on a recurring basis; and (B) Who is in need of involuntary inpatient treatment.” OCGA § 37-7-1 (14.1).
The statute further defines “incapacitated by alcohol or drugs” to mean that “a person, as a result of the use of alcoholic beverages, any drug, or any other substances . . ., exhibits life-threatening levels of intoxication, withdrawal, or imminent danger thereof, or acute medical problems; or is under the influence of alcoholic beverages or drugs or any other substances ... to the extent that the person is incapable of caring for himself or protecting himself due to the continued consumption or use thereof.” OCGA § 37-7-1 (13).
Thus, there are two ways a chief medical officer can determine a discharge would be unsafe for the patient or others. Either (a) the patient’s overt acts or threats mean that he likely will physically harm himself or others, or (b) the patient is incapacitated by the substance abuse, i.e., he cannot take care of himself or life-threatening *654levels of intoxication or withdrawal are present or imminent.
OCGA § 37-7-163 (e) refers to the presence of grave emergencies or dangers and to serious physical consequences or death. It does not apply to the retention of patients needing treatment for alcoholism. By its express terms it applies only to “immediate surgical or other intervention,” not to retention. Understandably, the General Assembly imposed a higher standard of findings before involuntary surgical procedures could invade a patient’s body.
The doctors here concluded that Wingate was incapacitated by his alcoholism, particularly considering his history and attitude. On the day after Wingate’s discharge request, Dr. Seese, Dr. Bowling and the chief medical officer signed a Georgia Department of Human Resources form entitled “Certificate Authorizing Retention In Evaluating Facility Pending Transfer To Treatment Facility,” which tracked the statutory language. It stated that Drs. Seese and Bowling had examined Wingate that very day and that Wingate was “an alcoholic, drug dependent individual, or drug abuser requiring involuntary treatment in that he is an alcoholic, a drug dependent individual, or a drug abuser (circle applicable term) AND (a) presents a substantial risk of imminent harm to himself or others as manifested by either recent overt acts or recently expressed threats of violence which present a probability of physical injury to himself or to other persons, or (b) is incapacitated by alcohol or drugs (circle applicable term) on a recurring basis; (underline criteria used)!’ Because section “b” of the sentence was underlined and the word “alcohol” circled, the requisite finding that discharge would have been unsafe to Wingate or others was present.
The certificate and other required notices were filed with the superior court that same day. Ridgeview thereby promptly commenced judicial proceedings so as to protect Wingate’s rights regarding involuntary treatment, as the law required. See OCGA § 37-7-81. “Such filing shall authorize the detention of the patient by the facility pending completion of a full and fair hearing. . . .” OCGA §37-8-81 (a). Wingate was discharged prior to the hearing date.
The language of the certificate and the filings rigidly followed the procedural safeguards of the statute. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 714 (2) (348 SE2d 50) (1986), held that “[w]hen the detention is predicated upon procedurally valid process, false imprisonment is not an available remedy, regardless of the motives upon which the process was secured, because detention effectuated pursuant to procedurally valid process ... is not ‘unlawful,’ ” an essential element of a false imprisonment claim. (Emphasis omitted.) See Ridgeview Institute v. Handley, 224 Ga. App. 533, 534-535 (1) (481 SE2d 531) (1997); see also Scott Housing Systems v. Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 24 (1) (329 SE2d 154) (1985) (essential element of false *655imprisonment is unlawfulness of detention).
Decided July 14, 1998
Reconsideration denied July 30, 1998
Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White & Williams, Richard N. Hubert, for appellant.
Troutman Sanders, Daniel S. Reinhardt, Jennifer K. Campbell, for appellee.
The court did not err in entering summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim. Because Wingate argues false imprisonment as the only basis for his FBPA claim, we should affirm summary judgment on this claim also.
The trial court’s decision was correct in its entirety.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Pope join in this opinion.