Court Opinion

ID: 9709119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:40:42.280262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.200706
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: The majority draws the conclusion that the defendant would have been released on bond for the ordinance violation and, hence, no need to inventory the contents of the briefcase. There is nothing in the record to indicate whether the defendant requested to be bonded out or whether there was any discussion. It is not clear that the police, in fact, have any obligation to inform the defendant that he has a right to make bond. Certainly an officer should answer a defendant’s questions at the time of booking, but the record is silent as to any conversation between the defendant and the arresting officer as to bond. The record is devoid of any testimony concerning the defendant’s desire to be released on bond until the next morning, when there was conversation and testimony concerning the defendant’s telephone call to his sister. The search was justified under Illinois v. Lafayette (1983), 462 U.S. 640, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605. The majority emphasizes that an essential element to justify the search was as a procedure prior to incarceration. The governmental objectives set forth in South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092, and as set forth in the majority opinion, apply in the instant case. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Officer Brewer. The officer testified that it was standard procedure to inventory all items and personal property of defendants for the protection of the officers and the defendants. Also, at the scene of arrest, Riser told the officer that the briefcase did contain money. I agree with the majority that when the police officer was informed that the briefcase contained money, the officer had a legitimate right to take charge of the briefcase. The majority also stated that the briefcase was locked and hence no need for police concern. This overlooks the fact that the case opened without the officer knowing the combination. Arresting officers should not engage in skullduggery to accomplish their purposes, but Officer Brewer’s testimony indicated his conduct was straightforward and evenhanded. Article 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) Rights of Accused (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 103 — 1 through 103 — 8), does not mandate or mention any requirement that an arresting officer inform a defendant of his right to make bond. Article 110 of the Code (HI. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 110 — 1 through 110 — 17) does not require the officer to inform defendant of the bonding amounts; nor does article V of the Supreme Court Rules, Rules on Trial Court Proceedings in Traffic and Conservation Offenses, Ordinance Offenses, Petty Offenses, and Certain Misdemeanors — Bail Schedules (87 Ill. 2d Rules 501 through 556). Neither the Hlinois Constitution nor the United States Constitution mandate that an arresting officer inform defendant of his right to make bond. Even if the determining factor is whether the officer had a reasonable belief that the defendant could or would be detained beyond the booking process, the testimony was that the defendant was detained and detained lawfully.