Court Opinion

ID: 9524133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:50:17.089766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:17.678051
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
0dissenting). I write separately because I would affirm the court of appeals' holding that the circuit court denied the defendant his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Shortly before the defendant's jury trial was scheduled to begin, three charges — battery, resisting an officer and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent — then pending against the State's star witness (Wade)1 were dismissed upon motion of the prosecutor who had been assigned to try the case against the defendant. Moreover, Wade's testimony changed during the interval between his initial interview with the police and his testimony at trial.
The defendant should have been afforded an opportunity to question Wade regarding whether Wade's testimony at trial was influenced by a subjective belief that the State would treat him more leniently if his testimony contributed to the defendant's conviction. I conclude that in denying the defendant this opportunity, the circuit court violated his right to confrontation.
The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying represents "a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." *46Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974) (citation omitted).2 See also State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 446, 247 N.W.2d 80 (1976);3 State v. Lindh, 161 Wis. 2d 324, 371-72, 468 N.W.2d 168 (1991) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
1 would agree with the majority when it observes that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not prevent the circuit court from imposing limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Majority op. at 43-44 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1985)). But as the VanArsdall opinion also makes clear in the very next paragraph, it does not follow that a court may *47prohibit "all inquiry into the possibility that [a witness] would be biased as a result of the State's dismissal'' of pending charges. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. In prohibiting defense counsel from questioning Wade regarding whether his testimony might have been influenced by the State's decision to drop pending charges against him, the circuit court imposed precisely the sort of blanket prohibition that the Van Arsdall court found unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I conclude that the court of appeals was correct when it determined that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated. I would affirm the court of appeals' mandate, reversing the judgment and remanding to the circuit court.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.

 As the majority points out, Majority op. at 36, "the accuracy and truthfulness of Wade's testimony were key elements in the State's case" because he wds the sole eyewitness who testified for the prosecution.

 In Davis, the Court held that it was error to bar cross examination of a state witness on probation because he was a juvenile. There was no suggestion in Davis that the State of Alaska had actually threatened to revoke the witness's probation or that the witness was a suspect in the underlying case. Nevertheless, the Court refused to dismiss the possibility that the jury, as sole judge of the credibility of a witness, would have accepted defense counsel's theory that the witness made a mistaken identification because he was anxious that if he did not cooperate with the police, his probation might be revoked or he himself might become a suspect. Therefore, stated the Court, " [t]he State's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." Davis, 415 U.S. at 320.

 Even though that expectation were absurd, defense counsel had the right and duty to explore the witness' motives. When a witness has been criminally charged by the state, he is subject to the coercive power of the state and can also be the object of its leniency. The witness is aware of that fact, and it may well influence his testimony. A defendant, as an ingredient of meaningful self-examination, must have the right to explore the subjective motives for the witness' testimony.
Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d at 447-48.