Court Opinion

ID: 9461207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:08:34.230774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:56.748103
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLEE’S SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Appellant has filed a suggestion for hearing en bane. On consideration thereof, it is
Ordered by the Court en banc that the suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied, a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
Statement of Chief Judge BAZELON, as to why he voted to deny rehearing en banc.
I agree with the result expressed in the per curiam opinion issued by the motions panel in support of its order of June 28. However, in view of the over-broad language the motions panel employs in reaching that result, language which, to my mind, may be misunderstood as signaling a retreat from the position advanced in A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 460 F.2d 854 (1971) and Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 472 F.2d 1273 (1972), I am compelled to state my individual views concerning the basis of the order of June 28.
My point of departure with the Court’s opinion is the assertion that camping on public property is per se a regulatable activity and can never have a connection with protected lobbying activity. I see no need to go that far in this case which has been heard in a summary manner and which has not offered us an opportunity to explore the full ramifications of the connections, if any, between camping and protected lobbying activities. While the matter is certainly not free from doubt, it is at least an open question whether in the proper case the denial of safe1 public *61facilities which could be used for camping by lobbyists might result in an impairment of First Amendment values. This impairment could occur through discriminatory denial of camping facilities to unpopular groups, by detering any lobbying in the first place or by limiting the media exposure ,of such lobbying to a significant degree.
I believe the case before us can be disposed of without reference to the broad assertions in the Court’s opinion. The Superintendent, while denying the request for a camping permit, did grant a number of other permits which greatly facilitated the lobbying efforts by the Veterans.2 His exercise of discretion in the past in regard to camping on the Mall has also been to facilitate lobbying activities.3 There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record that the Veterans’ efforts were in any respect retarded by the denial of the camping permit. It follows that the Superintendent’s exercise of discretion in this case and past cases concerning camping and other nocturnal activities on the Mall indicates the sort of affirmative respect for First Amendment values required from administrators. For that reason, and that reason alone, I concur in the grant of summary reversal of the District Court’s order in this matter.
I hasten to add that we might have a different ease if we were confronted with a clear legislative judgment that dictates of public order and safety require a prohibition on camping. However, we are faced instead with a broad and undefined grant of power to the Superintendent.4 Since ad hoc decisions pursuant to that power are not, to my mind, entitled to the same respect and weight as a considered legislative or even administrative policy on camping, I am unwilling to hold in this case that judicial review of such ad hoc administrative decisions cannot in the proper case include a requirement that the administrator permit lobbying groups to use public facilities for symbolic or actual campsites. In sum, I believe that in judicial review of this sort of administrative discretion, we are authorized to take a broader view of First Amendment values than if we were faced with a considered legislative judgment.5
I am also disturbed by the Court’s heroic efforts in erecting the 1971 Supreme Court summary order affirming a preliminary injunction into a definitive precedent on the issues I have just discussed. It is certainly elementary jurisprudence to note that the scope of a precedent is defined by the reasons advanced in support of the decision. Here we have a precedent with absolutely no supporting reasons and, indeed, with no exact statement of the issue being decided. Thus, that order could very well be no more than a decision that the litigation should proceed through normal channels to facilitate complete judicial consideration of the issues the case presented. It could also be a holding that on the specific facts of the 1971 permit request there was no First Amendment issue. In sum, the per curiam,’ s sweeping statements must stand or fall on their own reasoning and not that imputed by speculation to the Supreme Court.

. I recognize, of course, that an administrative judgment that certain camping activity will jeopardize the public health and safety would, if supported by a record compiled in an adversary hearing, be entitled to great *61weight in any adjudication of the relation of camping and First Amendment values. There is no such record in this case. Cf. EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 439 F.2d 584 (1971). See also A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 460 F.2d 854 (1971); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 472 F.2d 1273 (1972).

. See note 3 of the per curiam, opinion.

. See p. 58 of the per curiam, opinion.

. See 16 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).

. See Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 88 S.Ct. 682, 19 L.Ed.2d 799 (1969); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506-508, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1957). See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 585, 593, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963) (Harlan, J. dissenting); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957); Banzhaf v. FCC, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 25-28, 405 F.2d 1082, 1093-1096 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842, 90 S.Ct. 50, 24 L.Ed.2d 93 (1969).