Court Opinion

ID: 9907866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:09:23.592883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:08:00.543631
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Petition of the Board of School          :
Directors of the Hatboro-Horsham                :
School District for the Sale of Real            :
Property                                        :
                                                :    No. 1001 C.D. 2022
                                                :    ARGUED: November 6, 2023
Appeal of: Peggy Ambler and John                :
Ambler                                          :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
                HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER                                         FILED: December 7, 2023

                Peggy and John Ambler appeal from the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Montgomery County granting the petition of the Board of School Directors
of the Hatfield-Horsham School District for the sale of unused and unnecessary
property and buildings.1 We affirm.
                On the property in question sits the long-defunct Limekiln Simmons
School. In November 2016, the Board approved an agreement of sale of the property
to the Danny Jake Corporation for $593,140. A petition to approve the sale was filed
in the trial court under Section 707(3) of the Public School Code of 1949,2 24 P.S. §

    1
       The Amblers have engaged in a long-running opposition to the sale of the Limekiln Simmons
School property, which adjoins their own. For several years the matter took a detour, as the
Amblers challenged the proper law controlling the sale, resulting in an order transferring the
petition to orphans’ court and then an appeal to this Court. See Ambler v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of
Hatboro-Horsham Sch. Dist., 223 A.3d 289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). The issues in that decision are
of no import here.

    2
        Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 7-707(3).
7-707(3). Hearings were held before the trial court in which the Amblers intervened
and objected to the sale. The Amblers cross-examined the District’s witnesses,
including the appraisers whose affidavits were offered to satisfy the requirements of
Section 707(3) and the director of business affairs for the District, Robert Reichert,
concerning the legal description of the property appended to the petition as an
exhibit.
             With respect to the appraisal, the appraisers signed affidavits which
were attached to the petition, attesting that the private sale price was more than what
could be obtained at a public sale. They were qualified as experts in the field of real
estate appraisal, without objection, and without competing experts offered to rebut
their testimony. They expressed the opinion, albeit based upon limited experience,
that properties which sold at auction sold below market price. Mark Abissi, one of
the appraisers, testified on redirect as follows:

             Q. Mr. Abissi, if the property had been taken for a public
             auction, do you believe that the value being provided in
             this Agreement of Sale and the value to which you’ve
             described -- that you have described is higher than that
             which would have been attained at a public auction?

             A. Yes.
[Notes of Test. “N.T.” Jan. 30, 2018 at 55, Reproduced R. “R.R.” at 478a; see also
id. at 57, R.R. at 480a (“[t]he only thing I have are [a] few sales that I’ve dealt with
where they sold for below market price and they were sold at a public auction”).]
             Carol Rush, the other appraiser, testified that she had been involved
with a half-dozen public sales over ten years (N.T. Jan. 30, 2018 at 77, R.R. at 500a),
and reaffirmed her affidavit statement that the private sale to the Danny Jake
Corporation was for a better price than could be obtained at public sale (id. at 75,
R.R. at 498a). Ms. Rush testified that public sales were a form of distressed sale and

                                           2
“do[] not meet the tested market value.” (Id. at 79-80, R.R. at 502a-03a.) The trial
court accepted the testimony of the appraisers as credible.3
                 Also appended to the petition was a “legal description,” identical to a
portion of the metes and bounds description contained in a 1932 deed conveyed to
the District’s predecessor. (Pet., Ex. A, Legal Description, R.R. at 11a.) The 1932
deed, but not the petition or its exhibits, states that the property “[c]ontain[s] ten and
one hundred eighty-two one thousandths [(10.182)] acres of ground.” (Joint Ex. J-
1, R.R. at 372a.) When questioned on the discrepancy with the “±10.52 acres”
proposed to be sold in the petition and agreement of sale, Mr. Reichert volunteered
the following explanation:

                 THE WITNESS: I guess to my recollection, it would not
                 surprise me because there was another piece transferred in
                 ’56.

                 Q. So, the 1932 description couldn’t have included the
                 additional land that Howard Ambler, Jr. sold to the School
                 District?

                 A. Correct.

    3
        The trial court further opined as follows:

                 A public sale is not an accepted method of valuation. And, prior to
                 public sale (or auction), before the hammer actually falls, it is
                 impossible, indeed, reckless, for one to render an opinion on fair
                 market value at auction. There is no fair market value at public sale.
                 It is pure speculation . . . . Public sales of all sorts, sheriff sales, tax
                 upset sales, and the like, draw speculators of all types, looking for
                 bargains. The expert witnesses’ testimony was candid in that one
                 cannot, responsibly, beforehand, render a specific value for public
                 sale because there is no accepted methodology in the industry for
                 the same.

[Trial Ct. Op. at 22-23 (emphasis original).]

                                                      3
(N.T. Nov. 13, 2017 at 29, R.R. at 452a.) There is no information about the size of
the land acquired from Howard Ambler, Jr., as a timeline of the Limekiln Simmons
School entered into evidence as District Exhibit 2 states:

                September 10, 1957 – Real Estate transferred from
                Howard Ambler, Jr. to Horsham Township School District
                for $100.00 (Deed Book 2819/Page 323) – Part of
                Premises of Thomas Ambler that was given to Howard
                Ambler on June 5, 1950 (Deed Book 2090/Page 399).
                There is no indication how large this piece of property
                is/was.
[Dist. Ex. No. 2, Limekiln Simmons Timeline, R.R. at 144a (emphasis supplied).]
Further, there is no information of record as to whether the additional land is part of
the parcel being sold, other than Mr. Reichert’s speculation on cross-examination.
                After an earlier interlocutory appeal had run its course,4 the trial court
set a hearing for July 29, 2022. The Amblers renewed their objections to the private
sale and raised another issue: that the husband of a Board director who had recused
herself from the vote on the private sale agreement stood to gain real estate
commission fees on the sale. After further briefing, the trial court signed an order
approving the private sale agreement. Thereafter, the Amblers filed their instant
appeal.
                On appeal, the Amblers set forth the following issues:

                [1] Did the trial court err in approving the sale despite the
                lack of any comparison to a price that could be achieved
                at public sale, as required by [Section 707(3)]?

                [2] Did the trial court err in approving the sale, despite
                [the] failure to provide a full and complete description of
                the land proposed to be sold?

    4
        See supra note 1.

                                             4
             [3] Did the trial court err in failing to consider ethical
             considerations raised by the Amblers?

(Ambler Br. at 4-5.) We address these issues in turn.
Valuation
             The Amblers’ first two issues concern Section 707(3) of the Code,
which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

             The board of school directors . . . is hereby vested with the
             necessary . . . authority to sell unused and unnecessary
             lands . . . , by any of the following methods and subject to
             the following provisions:

             (1) By public auction . . . .

             ....

             (3) At private sale, subject to the approval of the court of
             common pleas of the county in which the school district is
             located. Approval of the court shall be on petition of the
             board of school directors, which . . . shall contain a full
             and complete description of the land proposed to be sold .
             . . and shall have attached thereto an affidavit of at least
             two persons who are familiar with the values of real estate
             in the locality in which the land and buildings proposed to
             be sold are located, to the effect that they have examined
             the property, that the price offered therefor is a fair and
             reasonable one and in their opinion a better price than
             could be obtained at public sale . . . .
24 P.S. § 7-707(3) (emphasis supplied). “Public auction” and “public sale,” although
undefined by the Code, appear to be synonymous.
             Regarding the first issue, the Amblers first argue that the trial court
erred in finding that the price to be paid by the proposed buyer was “better . . . than
could be obtained at public sale,” 24 P.S. § 7-707(3), because there was “no evidence
provided” for that element of Section 707(3) “exclusive of merely conclusory
statements and speculation on cross and re-direct examination,” (Ambler Br. at 11-

                                             5
12). The Amblers also argue that the testimony was otherwise unreliable and that
the trial court made various mistakes, set forth below.
               The Amblers acknowledge that the affidavits, supported by testimony
from the appraisers, stated the appraisers’ belief that the price was better than could
be achieved at public sale. The Amblers find fault with the appraisers’ testimony
and the trial court’s reliance upon it for the following reasons: the appraisers had
limited knowledge of public sales, particularly those in Horsham Township; the
appraisers did not determine what price would be realized at a public sale and did
not compare such a price to the amount agreed upon in the proposed private sale;
and the appraisers “did not answer a concern . . . raised” regarding contingencies in
the private sale agreement, which by the terms of the contract would allow the buyer
to refuse to consummate the private sale, (Ambler Br. at 17). The Amblers suggest
that we read Section 707(3) to include a requirement that the appraisers determine a
price that might be obtained at public sale with which to compare the private sale
price and contend that the gaps in the knowledge of the appraisers revealed on cross-
examination provide sufficient rebuttal to reject their opinions that the private sale
provided a better price than might be obtained at public sale.
               In reviewing Section 707(3) of the Code,5 we find no particular
requirement that the affiants review or testify to a specific quantity of public sales,

    5
       “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Matter of Private Sale of Property by
Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 185 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2018) (Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist.) [quoting
Section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)]. Only if the
statute is ambiguous, and not explicit, do we resort to other means of discerning legislative
intent. Id.; 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).

                                                 6
public sales in a single township, or public sales of a particular type6—rather, they
are to be “familiar with the values of real estate in the locality in which the land and
buildings proposed to be sold are located[.]” 24 P.S. § 7-707(3). There is also no
requirement that the affiants suggest a particular value that might be obtained at
public sale for a piece of property with which to compare the private sale price.
Rather, under Section 707(3), the affiants need do no more than what they have done
here: provide an expert opinion that the proposed private sale would obtain a better
price than public sale.7 The trial court found the expert opinion of the appraisers to
be credible and the factual basis for their opinions to be sufficient. The Amblers
offer several reasons why the trial court should have rejected the opinions of the
appraisers, but that is beyond our purview. It was the province of the trial court, as
the finder of fact, to weigh the evidence before it, make credibility determinations,
and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented—which it did. Barylak
v. Montgomery Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 74 A.3d 414, 417 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
               Objectors raise several other contentions: the appraisers differed as to
whether the price in the private sale agreement was more or less than the fair market
value of the property, to a degree of a few thousand dollars; the appraisers “failed”
to take into account “deductions” for the “speculative” nature of the private sale
agreement (Ambler Br. at 20); the trial court erred in allowing evidence as to costs
the buyer would incur, particularly water and sewer hookups and commissions,
which the Amblers argue are irrelevant to the valuation of the property; the trial court

    6
    At oral argument, counsel for the Amblers suggested that public sales of farmland are
common but conceded that such sales are not common in the locality at issue.

    7
      Notably, it is beyond the authority of the courts to direct a public sale if they believe a better
price may be had in that manner. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 185 A.3d at 292. Rather, the sole
function of the trial court is to approve or disapprove the proposed private sale. Id.

                                                   7
erred in estimating the sales commission as being $50,000; and the trial court erred
in disallowing testimony regarding legal fees attendant to the private sale.8
                In these arguments, the Amblers are simply quibbling with the opinions
of the appraisers and details in the trial court’s rulings and discussion which do not
impact its key findings. It is not the province of this Court to reweigh the evidence.9
The appraisers, qualified as expert witnesses, testified as to the fairness and
reasonableness of the private sale price in view of their methodologies. The trial
court, as factfinder, could accept their testimony, which it did, and determine that
the price agreed upon was fair and reasonable, which it also did.
Description of Property
                Next, we turn to the Amblers’ second issue, the question of the
sufficiency of the description of the property in the petition. Section 707(3) requires
the petition to contain “a full and complete description of the land proposed to be
sold.” 24 P.S. § 7-707(3). The Amblers claim the following as alleged defects in
the description: (1) a difference of .338 acres between the description in the petition
of the property to be sold and the description in the deed conveyed to the District’s
predecessor, and (2) “[a] portion of the parcel in the evidence is completely
mislocated, creating irreconciled conflict with whose land is purportedly being
sold.” (Ambler Br. at 22.)
                The District, quoting the trial court, responds that “[p]aragraph 5 of the
[p]etition describes the property by location, county parcel number” and indicates

    8
       Of course, it is obvious that a public sale would also involve legal fees. We also note, as did
the trial court, that the legal costs of this sale have been driven, at least in part, by the activity of
the Amblers themselves in objecting to the sale.

    9
      The trial court has exclusive province over matters involving the credibility of witnesses and
evidentiary weight. Chartiers Valley Indus. & Com. Dev. Auth. v. Allegheny Cnty., 963 A.2d 587
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This Court is prohibited from making contrary credibility determinations
or reweighing the evidence in order to reach an opposite result. Id.

                                                   8
that “[t]he Property includes a total of approximately ± 10.52 acres of land . . . .”
[Dist. Br. at 23 (quoting Trial Ct. Op. at 24-25; Pet. ¶ 5, R.R. at 3a); see also N.T.
Jan. 30, 2018 at 25, R.R. at 448a (cross-examination of Mr. Reichert confirming that
the property consists of 10.52 acres).] Similarly, the agreement of sale, appended to
the petition as an exhibit, also describes the property as containing 10.52 acres. (Pet.,
Ex. C, Agreement of Sale at 1, ¶ 1, R.R. at 14a.) The alleged .338-acre discrepancy
is not internal to the petition, as suggested by the Amblers (Ambler Br. at 22), but
relies upon the description of the land contained in the 1932 deed to the District’s
predecessor. While the metes and bounds listed in the legal description in the
petition are clearly taken from the 1932 deed, the deed’s area description of 10.182
acres is not included in the petition or exhibits—to the contrary, only the 10.52-acre
figure is set forth. Furthermore, there is evidence that some parcel was added to the
School grounds by a later conveyance, and substantial, competent evidence of record
establishes that the amount of property to be conveyed is the 10.52 acres specified
in the petition.
              We believe that Section 707(3) is about effectively explaining the
property to be sold to the trial court; the words “full and complete description” couch
their meaning in sufficiency rather than absolute precision.10 Here, as pointed out by
the trial court, the petition itself identified the property at issue as containing “±

    10
       “Full” means “containing as much or as many as is possible or normal,” whereas
“complete” means “having all necessary parts, elements, or steps.” Definitions of “full” and
“complete,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com, accessed Dec. 6, 2023 (emphasis supplied). In the law as it pertains to land,
“description” means “[a] formal description of real property, including a description of any part
subject to an easement or reservation, complete enough that a particular piece of land can be
located and identified . . . .” Definitions of “description” (including definition No. 4, cross-
referencing “legal description”) and “legal description,” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
(emphasis supplied).

                                               9
10.52 acres,” as did the attached agreement of sale. While the original 1932 deed to
the District’s predecessor is for 10.182 acres, the trial court accepted the 10.52 acre
description in the petition, as confirmed by Mr. Reichert, as being “the entire
property before the [trial] [c]ourt for evaluation.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 25.) Furthermore,
a tax map and aerial view of the property were appended to the petition as Exhibit B
and were not challenged. (Pet., Ex. B, R.R. at 12a.) As the trial court was not in
doubt as to the parcel being sold, despite the allegedly incomplete/inaccurate metes
and bounds legal description appended,11 we see no abuse of discretion or error.
               Next, we reach the Amblers’ one-sentence argument that a portion of
the property is “completely mislocated,” creating “irreconciled conflict with whose
land is purportedly being sold.” (Ambler Br. at 22.) The basis of this argument is a
deed plot drawing submitted as an exhibit by the District but totally unexplained.
(Ambler Br. at App. D; Dist. Ex. No. 1, R.R. at 142a.) The drawing shows the plot
as depicted in other images in the record and a smaller, triangular lot to the
northwest. While the plot drawing was submitted and moved into evidence by the
District, the record is devoid of any testimony or other evidence explaining why it
calls into question the description in the petition. Further, we cannot find where the
Amblers raised this purported irreconciled conflict before the trial court, resulting in
its waiver. Magyar v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Lewis Twp., 885 A.2d 123, 128 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005) (“[b]y failing to raise [] issue before the trial court, [o]bjectors
waived it”); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Finally, even if the issue were not

    11
        The Amblers make much of Mr. Reichert’s testimony on cross-examination that the
description in Exhibit A was not “full and complete.” (N.T. Jan. 30, 2018 at 30, R.R. at 453a.)
This reflected earlier cross-examination wherein he acknowledged that a parcel had been added to
the Limekiln Simmons School in the 1950s, which increased its size. Whether the description was
“full and complete” within the meaning of the statute is a legal determination, not a factual one.

                                               10
waived, the Amblers have not developed this argument adequately, and we decline
to speculate as to their meaning.12
Conflict of Interest
              Third and finally, the Amblers contend that because the husband of a
member of the School Board, who abstained from the vote approving the private sale
agreement, would allegedly earn commission fees if the transaction were completed,
ethical concerns should prevent the execution of the contract. This issue, first raised
by the Amblers at the July 29, 2022 hearing, bears no relationship to whether the
District has met the requirements of Section 707(3) of the Code, which was the sole
matter properly before the trial court. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. Therefore, like the
trial court, we decline to address it.
              In light of the foregoing, we affirm.

                                            _____________________________________
                                            BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                            President Judge Emerita

    12
       The argument portion of a brief must be developed with pertinent discussion of the issues,
including citations to relevant authority. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). When parties fail to satisfy this
requirement, the Court is neither obliged, nor even particularly equipped, to develop an argument
for them. Skytop Meadow Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Paige, 177 A.3d 377, 385 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

                                               11
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Petition of the Board of School     :
Directors of the Hatboro-Horsham           :
School District for the Sale of Real       :
Property                                   :
                                           :   No. 1001 C.D. 2022
                                           :
Appeal of: Peggy Ambler and John           :
Ambler                                     :

                                    ORDER

             AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2023, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Montgomery County is AFFIRMED.

                                         _____________________________________
                                         BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
                                         President Judge Emerita