Court Opinion

ID: 2964703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:54.284929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:00.299986
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1828

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellant,

                                          v.

                 REX W. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THOMAS FERRIS, BRIAN HOYLE,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                 [Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    _____________________

                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Todd  E. Newhouse,  Assistant United  States Attorney,  with  whom
            _________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States  Attorney, was on brief for  the United
        _______________
        States.
            Wendy Sibbison for appellees.
            ______________

                                 ____________________

                                     May 19, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN,  Circuit  Judge.   In  the  district court,  the
                          ______________

            defendants in  this criminal case moved  to suppress evidence

            as  illegally seized  and,  based on  the magistrate  judge's

            report,  the   district  court  granted  the   motion.    The

            government filed an interlocutory appeal from the suppression

            order.  We reverse.

                                          I.

                 In late February  1992, Carmen  Picknally, an  assistant

            district attorney  in Hampden County,  Massachusetts, applied

            to  the state Superior Court for a warrant, pursuant to Mass.

            Gen.  Laws ch. 272,   99(F), to authorize the interception of

            telephone  calls  to  or  from  two  specified  cellular  car

            telephone  numbers.   The  car  telephones  in question  were

            located in  cars controlled  by defendant Rex  W. Cunningham,

            Jr.,  and  the offenses  under  investigation  were suspected

            violations of state anti-gambling  statutes.  Mass. Gen. Laws

            ch. 271,   17.

                 A supporting 109-page affidavit by state trooper Timothy

            Alben described evidence that  Cunningham had used threats in

            attempting to  collect gambling  debts for bets  that he  had

            taken.   The affidavit also  set forth information  from five

            confidential   informants   about   a  large-scale   gambling

            organization  allegedly  controlled by  Cunningham, including

            specifics as  to how the  organization worked,  the names  of

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            employees, telephone numbers, and the location of records and

            cash.

                 On February 28, 1992,  Justice Constance Sweeney, of the

            state Superior  Court,  issued  the  requested  warrant,  and

            signed ancillary  orders directed  to two carriers.   Several

            incriminating calls  were intercepted between  Cunningham and

            others and were  described in another  affidavit of Alben  in

            support  of a requested  extension sought by  Picknally on or

            about March  17, 1992.  Justice Sweeney granted the requested

            extension.  Surveillance of the two telephones ended on April

            1, 1992.

                 On  April 17,  1992, Picknally  applied to  the Superior

            Court  for  a  new  warrant,  this  time  (according  to  the

            application's caption) "authorizing the interception  of oral

            communications of  . .  . Cunningham within  an establishment

            known as  Dillons (sic) Tavern."   The application identified

            Dillon's  Tavern   at  a  street   address  in   Springfield,

            Massachusetts, and said that it was on property controlled by

            Cunningham  and his  relatives.   Incorporating  a new  Alben

            affidavit,  the application  referred to  loansharking, Mass.

            Gen.  Laws ch. 271,    49, as well  as gambling, as suspected

            offenses.

                 Although  the caption referred  to interception  of oral

            communications  "within   .  . .  Dillons (sic)  Tavern," the

            first  paragraph  described  the  application as  one  for  a

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            warrant "to intercept certain wire  and oral communications,"

            and there are later references to "wiretaps" and, separately,

            to "oral communications  . . . within  Dillons (sic) Tavern."

            The affidavit  also asked  for  authority for  Alben to  make

            secret  entries  into Dillon's  Tavern  "for  the purpose  of

            installation  and activation  of oral  interception devices."

            This  application, it appears, was  a poorly edited markup of

            the original wiretap application.

                 Immediately below Picknally's  signature was a paragraph

            signed by the district  attorney for the county,  saying that

            he  had reviewed the  application and affidavit  and that the

            proposed  use of  electronic  surveillance  relative  to  two

            specified   telephone  numbers  was  consistent  with  county

            policy.  The  two listed telephone numbers  were the cellular

            telephone  numbers  specified  in the  original  application.

            Apparently the  paragraph had  been copied from  the original

            warrant application without change.  

                 The supporting  Alben affidavit,  this time 62  pages in

            length  but  attaching  the   original  affidavit  as   well,

            described  Cunningham's caution  in using  the telephone  and

            provided  reasons for  believing that  Cunningham and  others

            were using Dillon's  Tavern for meetings  in aid of  gambling

            and  loansharking.    The  affidavit  described  Cunningham's

            regular  use of  a  particular table  in  Dillon's Tavern  to

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            conduct   his  business.     It   also  explained   why  oral

            interceptions were needed to supplement other evidence.

                 Alben's affidavit  did not contain  the confusing jumble

            of references to wiretaps and oral communications that marred

            the  Picknally  application.     It  asked  for  approval  to

            intercept   oral   communications  within   Dillon's  Tavern,

            specifying that interception would

                 be  limited  to  only  such   times  that  physical
                                  ____
                 surveillances  of this  DILLONS TAVERN  and  Rex W.
                 CUNNINGHAM   Jr.   can   reasonable   (sic)   place
                 CUNNINGHAM   within   this   location    and   that
                 interceptions will  take place only at  or near the
                 particular table  within the dining area  which has
                 been  identified  within  this  affidavit  as being
                 consistently used by CUNNINGHAM or his associates.

            It  also asked approval  to enter Dillon's  Tavern to install

            technical equipment to achieve the interceptions.

                 The  warrant signed  by  Justice Sweeney  had a  caption

            similar   to  the  application,   specifically  referring  to

            interception   of   oral   communications;    but--like   the

            application--the  warrant also  referred confusingly  to wire

            communications.   It  approved  the secret  entry to  install

            equipment, and  imposed various safeguards.   The warrant was

            extended numerous times, and assault and battery was added as

            a suspected offense.  Surveillance ended on November 1, 1992.

            By then  125 cassette  tapes had  been  accumulated and  were

            sealed by the Superior Court.

                 On April 21,  1995, a federal grand jury  in Springfield

            indicted Cunningham on RICO violations, loansharking, illegal

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            gambling activities, and conspiracy to commit those offenses,

            18  U.S.C.    2,  892, 894, 1955,  and 1962(c) and  (d).  Co-

            defendants Brian  Hoyle and  Thomas Ferris were  charged with

            loansharking  conspiracy.    Most  of  the  evidence  against

            Cunningham,  and   all  of  the  evidence   against  the  co-

            defendants, derived from the electronic surveillance and from

            searches  conducted  under  state-court  issued  warrants  at

            various sites shortly before the surveillance terminated.

                 By  joint  motion  filed   on  December  15,  1995,  the

            defendants moved to suppress materials acquired by electronic

            surveillance under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and

            Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.    2510-20.  That statute

            governs  interception of  both  wire  communication and  oral

            communication, laying down detailed standards and procedures.

            Id.        2516-18.   It  also  provides  for exclusion  from
            ___

            evidence of interceptions taken  in violation of the statute.

            Id.    2515.
            ___

                 After a two-day evidentiary hearing, including testimony

            from Picknally, Alben, and  Hampden County District  Attorney

            William  Bennett, the  magistrate  judge issued  a report  on

            March 28,  1996.  In  it, he recommended  that the motion  to

            suppress  be allowed  as to  all electronic  interceptions of

            conversations at Dillon's Tavern.  He said that the confusion

            in  the warrant meant that  it did not  comply with statutory

            requirements  as to specificity,   18 U.S.C.   2518(4), nor--

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            assuming a good faith  exception existed--was reliance on the

            warrant objectively reasonable.

                 On  May  17,  1996,  the  district  court  approved  the

            magistrate judge's recommendation.  Its analysis tracked that

            of the magistrate judge  and his rejection of a  "good faith"

            defense  was adopted by cross reference.   In memoranda dated

            June 13 and July  12, 1996, the district court  addressed two

            successive  government motions for  reconsideration but stood

            by its earlier conclusion.   The government then brought  the

            case to us by interlocutory appeal.  18 U.S.C.   3731.

                                         II.

                 On  review  of a  suppression  order,  we defer  to  the

            factfinder's findings  of raw fact unless  clearly erroneous,

            and we  consider issues  of law  de novo.   United  States v.
                                             _______    ______________

            Morris,  977 F.2d  677, 680 (1st  Cir. 1992).   In  the past,
            ______

            there  has  been  deference  accorded  to   the  factfinder's

            judgment in  applying general standards  to particular  known

            facts;  but  the  Supreme  Court has  recently  stressed  our

            responsibility,  in a  related Fourth  Amendment  context, to

            review   "mixed  questions"  from   an  independent  vantage.

            Ornelas  v.  United States,  116  S.  Ct. 1657,  1663  (1996)
            _______      _____________

            (reasonable suspicion and probable cause).

                 The  government  offers  two  alternative   reasons  for

            reversal.     The  first  is  its   claim  that  the  warrant

            adequately,   although   not   perfectly,   identified   oral

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            communications  as  its   target--especially  since   Justice

            Sweeney and Trooper Alben as executing officer knew that this

            was its purpose.   The second argument is that  the so-called

            good-faith exception  of United States v. Leon,  468 U.S. 897
                                     _____________    ____

            (1984),  is available  under  the statute  in  this case  and

            applies on the present facts.  

                 At the  threshold, defendants object that  neither basis

            for appeal  was sufficiently preserved.   Because we consider

            only the first ground  on the merits, our discussion  of this

            threshold objection  is similarly limited.   To decipher that

            objection, it is necessary to understand how the government's

            defense  of  its  warrant  evolved   on  the  path  from  the

            magistrate judge to the district court and finally to us.

                 Before the magistrate judge, the government defended its

            warrant on the ground that, analyzing the wording  in detail,

            the errors were  technical or clerical.   The government  did

            not  expressly  assert that  the  personal  knowledge of  the

            authorizing  judge and executing officer were pertinent; but,

            the magistrate  judge touched obliquely on  the issue, saying

            that  the government's  "excuse" would,  if accepted,  "allow

            agents to  conduct searches so  long as they  understood what
                                                    ____

            was intended by the orders which their attorneys drafted  for
                                             _____

            signatures by the court."

                 In  its  district  court  brief,  the  government  again

            analyzed the  warrant's language,  arguing  that it  referred

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            several  times  to  interception  of oral  communications  at

            Dillon's  Tavern and that no reasonable officer would read it

            to approve wiretaps, especially because no telephone  numbers

            were listed in the  warrant.  The government did  not mention

            the knowledge of  the judge or executing  officer; indeed, in

            its  first  petition   for  reconsideration,  the  government

            complained  that the  district court  had looked  "beyond the

            four corners of the warrant."

                 The government's first attempt to emphasize what Justice

            Sweeney and Trooper Alben  knew at the time came  only in its

            appellate brief where, for  the first time, it also  cited to

            United  States v. Bonner, 808  F.2d 864 (1st  Cir. 1986), and
            ______________    ______

            similar cases  making such knowledge relevant.   Whether this

            new  emphasis is a separate  "ground" or merely  a new twist,

            the   government clearly did  not offer it  below and instead

            steered  the magistrate  judge  and district  court toward  a

            strict linguistic analysis of the  warrant.  If these  judges

            erred, it was surely error "invited" by counsel.

                 But whether we should ignore Bonner  is a more difficult
                                              ______

            question.    The  government  sought  timely  review  of  the

            magistrate judge's ruling, and it filed a timely appeal to us

            from  the district  court's ruling.   True, local  rules warn

            that  failing to  list grounds  for reviewing  the magistrate

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                                         -9-

            judge's report may be fatal;1 but we do not read this warning

            to counsel  as  preventing a  reviewing  court--where  timely

            review  is sought  at each  stage--from noticing  on its  own

            arguments not developed below.

                 The  ability of  a reviewing  court to  decide the  case

            properly  is fundamental.  Singleton v.  Wulff, 420 U.S. 106,
                                       _________     _____

            120-21  (1976).   Indeed,  the rules  expressly preserve  our

            ability  to  notice "plain  errors" that  affect "substantial

            rights," Fed.  R. Crim. P. 52(b), especially where failure to

            do so would work  a substantial injustice.  United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Olano,  507  U.S. 725  (1993);  see  also  Johnson v.  United
            _____                           _________  _______     ______

            States,  ___ S. Ct. ___, 1997  WL 235136 (U.S. May 12, 1997).
            ______

            The  threat of  substantial injustice is  not limited  to the

            interests of defendants.  United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d
                                      _____________    ________

            289, 292 (1st Cir. 1982).  

                 In this case, Bonner and similar decisions show that the
                               ______

            issue of knowledge is  not wholly distinct from the  claim of

            clerical  error; whether  an  error is  forgiven as  clerical

            depends, at least in  some situations, on whether  in context

            it actually  threatened privacy  interests; and this  in turn

            may be  affected by the  executing officers' knowledge.   The

                                
            ____________________

                 1Compare Rule  3(b), Rules for U.S.  Magistrates in U.S.
                  _______
            District Court in Massachusetts with Thomas  v. Arn, 474 U.S.
                                            ____ ______     ___
            140,  146  & n.4  (1985) (declining  to  treat such  rules as
            jurisdictional).    See  generally  15A C.  Wright,  et  al.,
                                ______________
            Federal Practice andProcedure   3901.1, at 42 (2d ed. 1992). 
            _____________________________

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            Bonner argument is not intuitively evident; but it is "plain"
            ______

            enough once the cases are consulted.  

                 A final reason  for refusing to cabin  the analysis here

            is  that the  defendants  are not  prejudiced, because  their

            ability  to  meet the  government's  Bonner  argument is  not
                                                 ______

            affected by the delay.  The knowledge  of the state judge and

            executing officer is readily inferred from documents and from

            testimony  taken  at  the  magistrate  judge  hearing,  where

            defense  counsel cross-examined  the  witnesses.   Defendants

            have  not pointed to any evidence lost or foregone due to the

            government's tardiness in making its knowledge argument. 

                                         III.

                 Turning  then to  the merits,  we face  at the  outset a

            statutory  ban  on  use  in  court  of  the  contents  of  an

            intercepted wire or oral communication,  or "evidence derived

            therefrom,"  where disclosure  would violate  Title III.   18

            U.S.C.   2515.  There is no violation if the interception was

            "authorized  by" Title  III.   Id.    2517.   The authorizing
                                           ___

            provisions, 18  U.S.C.    2516-18, elaborately  set forth the

            crimes  to  be  investigated,  the  application  process  for

            authorizing orders, and the standards to be met.

                 Pertinent  here is  18 U.S.C.    2518(4),  which governs

            each order authorizing an  interception and requires that the

            order specify five different items.  Three items (subsections

            (a), (d)  and (e)) are  not in  dispute: the identity  of the

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            target,  the  identity  of  the agency  and  the  authorizing

            official, and the  time period.   The other  two items  which

            must be included are as follows:

                 (b) the nature  and location of  the communications
                 facilities  as  to  which,  or   the  place  where,
                 authority to intercept is granted; [and]

                 (c)  a  particular  description   of  the  type  of
                 communication  sought  to  be  intercepted,  and  a
                 statement  of the  particular offense  to which  it
                 relates[.]

                 The defendants invoked  both provisions; the  magistrate

            judge  and  the  district  judge focused  upon  (b),  as  the

            government seeks to  do here.  In  truth, we think  that both

            provisions  need   to  be  read  together.     Their  thrust,

            disregarding the final clause of (c), is to identify the type

            of communication and to narrow the targeted communications by

            location  of "facilities"  (e.g.,  identifying  a  particular
                                        ____

            telephone) or "place" (e.g.,  where a "bug" is to  be located
                                   ____

            to intercept oral communications).

                 In a literal sense, the warrant does describe both  type

            and place: it refers expressly  to oral communications and to

            Dillon's Tavern.  But  this is an extreme example  of missing

            the  forest for  the trees.   By  referring randomly  to oral

            communications  and  wire  communications  or  wiretaps,  the

            warrant is garbled on the very questions posed by subsections

            (b) and (c).   Taken as a whole--but  taken alone and without

            extrinsic evidence--the  warrant does not tell  the objective

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            but  ignorant  reader  just  what  interceptions  are  to  be

            targeted.

                 Now, the extent of confusion is a matter of degree.  Any

            reader can see that the warrant has been misdrafted;  whether

            a reasonable  (but otherwise uninformed) police officer would

            solve  the   puzzle  correctly   is  probably  a   matter  of

            percentages.  In  all events, the  confusion is serious,  and

            despite the government's linguistic acrobatics, this is not a

            warrant  that we would  deem adequate if it  were signed by a

            judge  and  executed  by a  police  officer  having no  other

            knowledge of the background and objectives.  

                 The  inadequacy is  not because  of any  high likelihood

            that an otherwise uninformed officer would tap a telephone or

            would  intercept  Cunningham's  oral  communications  at some

            other  location than Dillon's.  No  telephone number is given

            in  the  body  of  the  warrant,  and  no  other  "place"  of

            interception is mentioned.   Rather, standing alone, the bare

            inconsistent words  of the warrant fail  to create reasonable

            assurance  that the signer or reader would know just what was

            intended.

                 But this is not the end of the story.  The Supreme Court

            has made clear that suppression is not automatically required

            for every  Title III violation;  rather, as a  sister circuit

            summed up the Supreme Court's precedents in United  States v.
                                                        ______________

            Johnson,  696 F.2d 115, 121  (D.C. Cir. 1982), "violations of
            _______

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            even . . . central requirements do not mandate suppression if

            the government demonstrates to the court's  satisfaction that

            the  statutory   purpose  has  been   achieved  despite   the

            violation."  See also United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,
                         ________ _____________    _______

            433-34 (1977); United States v.  Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75
                           _____________     ______

            (1974).

                 Title  III  is  designed to  protect  privacy  interests

            similar to those reflected in the Fourth  Amendment.  Whether

            or  not Leon's  good faith  exception should  be interpolated
                    ____

            into the statute--an issue we do not decide--Fourth Amendment

            precedent   is  highly   relevant  in  deciding   whether  an

            authorizing order is valid and whether a defect in wording is

            of a kind that  threatens the central interests sought  to be

            protected.  Indeed, the Supreme  Court itself has relied upon

            Fourth Amendment precedent in  implementing Title III.  Dalia
                                                                    _____

            v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 254-59 (1979).
               _____________

                 A substantial body of Fourth Amendment precedent akin to

            Bonner, representing most circuits, permits a reviewing court
            ______

            to consider the knowledge  of the officials who  approved the

            warrant   and   executed   it.     The   reason   is   fairly

            straightforward:  such knowledge  may,  on particular  facts,

            show  that there  was in  fact no  real threat  to legitimate
                                  ________

            privacy interests.  Examples  include the judge approving the

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                                         -14-

            warrant but forgetting to sign, or  the warrant's omission of

            an address known both to the judge and executing officer.2

                 In calling such mistakes  "clerical," courts do not mean

            that they are all unimportant typographical errors.  What  is

            meant  is  that  they  are  wording  mistakes  introduced  by

            accident  or  lack of  care rather  than  wilfully or  with a

            sinister  purpose.   Cases  like  Bonner  often involve,  and
                                              ______

            forgive, very serious  clerical mistakes, depending upon  the

            risk  that they posed  in fact.   E.g., Bentley,  825 F.2d at
                                              ____  _______

            1109  (personal  knowledge  of  officers  saved  warrant that

            listed wrong  office  number).    In  this  sense,  the  term

            "clerical" is highly misleading.

                 Such an approach  is not  cost free.   In an  individual

            case, a  defect may pose no threat (we will show that this is

            so here); but exclusion  of evidence in that case  will still

            make the police more careful next  time and so may prevent  a

            different  mistake that does pose  such a threat.   But there

            are  costs  either  way:   excluding  reliable  evidence  and

            possibly  freeing the guilty is also a  cost.  And cases like

                                
            ____________________

                 2See, e.g., United  States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1168-
                  _________  ______________    _____
            69  (6th Cir.), cert. denied,  116 S. Ct.  377 (1995); United
                            ____________                           ______
            States  v. Owens, 848 F.2d  462, 465 (4th  Cir. 1988); United
            ______     _____                                       ______
            States v.  Bentley, 825  F.2d  1104, 1109  (7th Cir.),  cert.
            ______     _______                                      _____
            denied,  484 U.S.  901 (1987);  United States v.  Turner, 770
            ______                          _____________     ______
            F.2d  1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1985).  An extensive collection of
            federal  cases, by circuit, is contained in 84 Geo. L.J. 717,
                                                           _________
            734 n.78  (1996).  Some additional  case authority, including
            state cases, is contained  in 2 LaFave, Search and  Seizure  
                                                    ___________________
            4.5(a) (3d ed. 1996).

                                         -15-
                                         -15-

            Bonner represent a balance  between competing objectives.  In
            ______

            any event, such is the law of this circuit and many others.

                 In sustaining the warrant in this case, we rely upon two

            major  elements.   First,  the  flaw in  this  case, although

            serious, was a discrete set of clerical mistakes in a process

            that  in  all  other  important respects  complied  with  the

            statute.  An application to a judge was made; it demonstrated

            probable  cause  and other  requisites for  the interceptions

            proposed;  it  identified  place  and  type  (although  in  a

            confusing   language);  a   warrant   was  signed;   and  the

            authorizing judge  and executing officer knew  just what they

            were doing. 

                 Second, because the judge and the executing officer knew
                         _______

            what  had   been  proposed  and  authorized,   there  was  no

            substantial   threat  that   this  officer   would  intercept

            communications other  than as authorized.   Thus, despite the

            seriously confusing  language, the error  here presented  far

            less of a  threat to  civil liberties than,  say, a  facially

            coherent warrant  that mistakenly  inverted the numbers  of a

            street address and  was executed  by an officer  who did  not

            know the actual address.  

                 It  is the combination of these two elements that, as in

            Bonner, persuades  us that the  warrant should be  treated as
            ______

            valid and,  as in Johnson,  that "the  statutory purpose  [of
                              _______

            Title III]  has been  achieved despite  the violation."   696

                                         -16-
                                         -16-

            F.2d at 121.  And, as always, substantial compliance and risk

            from error are matters  of degree.  Knowledge would  not save

            the  interception if,  for example,  Alben had  made out  the

            affidavit  but then  neglected to  present it  to a  judge to

            secure judicial approval.  Similarly,  nothing in what we say

            offers any comfort to an officer who fails to comply with the

            true object of the warrant.

                 It is also worth stressing that the knowledge of Justice

            Sweeney and of Trooper Alben are established by a paper-trail

            record that was  created before the  search.  The  affidavits
                                     ______

            submitted  to secure the telephone taps and then to authorize

            oral interceptions show beyond  serious dispute just what the

            judge  and the  executing  officer understood.   The  hearing

            record before the magistrate judge  does help knit the events

            together, but there is no threat here of  recollections being

            invented after the event.

                 This  hard  evidence  lessens,  although  it  does   not

            eliminate,   the  problems  associated  with  any  resort  to

            personal knowledge.  But proof of  the knowledge possessed by

            the police is the critical issue for most warrantless arrests
                                                 ____

            and searches, e.g.,  Chambers v. Maroney, 399  U.S. 42, 47-48
                          ____   ________    _______

            (1970); and,  of course, knowledge is  scrutinized in warrant

            cases  as well  where  (for example)  there  is a  charge  of

            fabrication or of invented information.

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                                         -17-

                 The Supreme  Court's cases do express  a special concern

            where   subjective  motivation   rather  than   knowledge  is
                                __________                  _________

            involved.  Thus,  the Court has held as a  matter of law that

            malignant motive is  irrelevant where objectively  reasonable

            conduct  is proved  to  make out  a  defense of  governmental

            qualified immunity, Anderson v.  Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641
                                ________     _________

            (1987), or  where  probable  cause exists  but  a  search  is

            challenged  as pretext.  Whren  v. United States,  116 S. Ct.
                                     _____     _____________

            1769,  1774   (1996).     But  the  special   concerns  about

            overturning  reasonable conduct  because  of bad  motive have

            nothing to do with this case.  

                 One final  word on this  issue is in  order.   Where, as

            here,  the government  seeks  to rescue  a defective  warrant

            based partly on knowledge of the judge or officer, the burden

            is upon  it to prove such knowledge--just  as it would be the

            defendant's  burden if  the warrant  were facially  valid but

            sought to be impugned  by proof of perjury.  It  is fortunate

            for  the government  that  in  this  case,  the  evidence  is

            overwhelming and  available from  the existing record.   This

            piece of luck  does not  make the mishandling  of the  matter

            look any more attractive.

                                         IV.

                 The   defendants  advance  an   alternative  ground  for

            upholding the suppression of the Dillon's Tavern tapes.  They

            claim  that the government failed  to comply with the sealing

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                                         -18-

            requirement  of  Title  III,  18 U.S.C.     2518(8)(a),  with

            respect to the cellular phone tapes.  And, since the Dillon's

            Tavern  surveillance  derived  from  this  allegedly  tainted
                                                 ____

            evidence, defendants say that  it must be suppressed.   Id.  
                                                                    ___

            2515.    The district  court ruled  that  the brief  delay in

            sealing was not material.

                 The statute authorizing an  interlocutory appeal from an

            order  of  suppression,  18  U.S.C.    3731,  gives  only the

            government  a right  to  appeal, and  for  good reason.    If

            evidence  is suppressed,  the  government cannot  appeal  the

            suppression  order after  trial for double  jeopardy reasons,

            whereas the  defendant (if convicted) can  always appeal from

            the district court's earlier refusal to suppress.

                 It is well-established that  appellate courts can uphold

            a  judgment based on a ground rejected by the district court.

            This  general  principle has  been  applied  to section  3731

            appeals.  United States v. Moody, 485  F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir.
                      _____________    _____

            1973).   But  the government  objects in  this case  that the

            defendants'  alternative ground  would not  only  support the

            order  suppressing   the  Dillon's  Tavern  tapes   but  also

            undermine  the  different  order declining  to  suppress  the

            cellular phone  tapes.  Thus, it argues  that the alternative

            ground  is   really  a  Trojan-horse  effort   to  review  an

            unappealable order.

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                                         -19-

                 The argument is clever but unpersuasive.   The fact that

            the  sealing issue  may have  implications for  two different

            orders does not prevent us from considering that issue so far

            as it  pertains to a reviewable  order.   The  cases cited by

            the government,  e.g., United States v.  Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d
                             ____  _____________     ___________

            266, 267  (6th Cir. 1994), are  not on point.   Indeed, if we
                                       

            thought that the suppression order were clearly valid, but on

            a ground different than that  offered by the district  court,

            it would be bizarre to overturn it.

                 In this instance, however,  the magistrate judge and the

            district court  amply justified their action  in treating the

            brief  sealing  delay  as "satisfactor[ily]  explained."   18

            U.S.C.    2518(8)(a).  See  United States v.  Ojeda Rios, 495
                                   __________________     __________

            U.S. 257,  265 (1990).  There was no bad faith by the police,

            no claim of alteration  to the tapes, and no  other prejudice

            even suggested.  Given these circumstances and the brevity of

            the  delay, we think  no extended  discussion is  required in

            this case.  

                 Reversed. 
                 _________

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