Court Opinion

ID: 9727453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:38:12.586375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:38.319187
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent for the following reasons:
1. Instruction number 12 contained a crucial misstatement of the law which went to the heart of Prange’s only defense.
2. The instructions tendered by Prange were not adequately covered by other instructions that were given to the jury.
3. The contention instruction did not eliminate the issue of whether Ekstrand failed to maintain a proper lookout.
I.

Instruction No. 12

Final instruction number 12 states: “A motorist has the right to assume that the other person will obey the law and will exercise due care and reasonable care.” Record, p. 124. Prange objected on grounds that this instruction was incomplete because it did not contain the phrase “absent notice to the contrary.”
The language that Prange sought to include in instruction number 12 comes directly from an Indiana Court of Appeals decision. In Brock v. Walton (1983), Ind.App., 456 N.E.2d 1087, 1092, the court opined that, “[ujnless a party has notice to the contrary, he has the right to assume others who owe him a duty of reasonable care will exercise such care.” (Emphasis added). As Brock and the cases cited in the first footnote of the majority opinion illustrate,1 the addition sought to be added by Prange is a correct statement of the law. It is not the law that, under all circumstances, a motorist has the right to assume the other person will obey the law.
A jury instruction which misstates the law will serve as grounds for reversal when the jury’s verdict could have been based on the erroneous instruction. Canfield v. Sandock (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1281, reh. denied. It is assumed that the erroneous instruction influenced the jury’s verdict unless it appears from the record that the verdict would not have been different even with a proper instruction. Id.
The record reveals there was evidence to support Prange’s contention that Ekstrand proximately caused the accident. Ekstrand testified that she proceeded into the intersection even though she saw Prange approaching from fifty feet away at a speed of fifty-five miles per hour. Prange’s theory that Ekstrand entered the intersection, despite being on notice that Prange was not slowing down, constituted the only defense available to Prange. By refusing to include the language sought by Prange, the trial court de*924prived Prange of her only chance for the jury to consider a viable defense. It is clear the jury’s verdict could have been based on the erroneous instruction.
The majority attempts to justify the rejection of the language that Prange sought to have included in instruction number 12 because:
“the word ‘notice’ is vague and connotes multiple meanings. For instance, does the word ‘notice’ mean that a motorist may not assume the other will act with reasonable care if the other’s negligence is possible? ... likely? ... apparent? ... fully appreciated? Must the ‘notice’ be from personal observation, or does it include a warning from a third party?”
Op., at 917.
“Notice” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.) as “information; knowledge of the existence of a fact or state of affairs.... ” The fact that Prange’s tendered addition to instruction number 12 was not specific as to the means by which Ekstrand obtained the notice (whether through personal observation, warning from a third-party, etc.) does not render the addition vague. The crucial question is whether Ekstrand had such notice or knowledge, not the means by which such knowledge was obtained.
Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the other instructions given by the trial court adequately covered the substance of Prange’s proposed addition to instruction number 12. The instructions to which the majority refers were merely general instructions informing the jury that negligence is the failure to do what a reasonably careful and prudent person would have done under the same circumstances. However, the trial court did not apply the same “general over specific” approach when it gave instructions that were favorable to the plaintiff.
For example, in instruction number ten, the court informed the jury of the existence of a statute requiring that every driver of a vehicle stop at any stop sign before entering an intersection. Record, p. 122. Too, Instruction number 12, discussed supra, gave a very specific and fact-sensitive (though incomplete) statement of the law.
In refusing the instructions that correctly stated the law applicable to Prange’s only defense, the trial court denied Prange a fair trial. The jury was not able to weigh Prange’s theory that Ekstrand negligently proceeded into the intersection despite having notice that it was not safe to do so. The general negligence instructions that were given to the jury failed to adequately cover the facts before it.
II.

Prange’s Rejected Instructions

I further dissent to the Majority’s conclusion that Prange waived consideration of her seven tendered instructions because she failed to object to a contention instruction, which the Majority opines is “the law of the case”. Our court has found a similar contention instruction to be nonprejudicial where the party who challenged it on appeal had presented evidence consistent with the contentions. North American Roofing, Co., Inc. v. Westmont Steel, Inc. (1992), Ind.App., 591 N.E.2d 629, 632-33, trans. denied. Here, evidence was presented that was inconsistent with the Majority’s interpretation of the contention instruction.
Too, even assuming that a contention instruction can be utilized as the Majority opinion suggests, a close examination of the instruction reveals that Prange made no concessions therein on the issue of whether Ekstrand maintained a proper lookout.
Instruction number two states in pertinent part: *925Record, pp. 113-14 (emphasis added). It can hardly be said that Prange’s contention is an admission that eliminates the issue of whether Ekstrand maintained a lookout.
*924* * * * * *
Defendant Betty Prange denied fault and contends that the fault of Maribeth Ekst-rand proximately caused the accident in question in that Maribeth Ekstrand failed to maintain a reasonable lookout after seeing the Prange vehicle approach and enter into the intersection at a time such movement could not be made with reasonable safety. As a result, the front of the Ekstrand car struck the left rear of the Prange vehicle, causing it to spin and strike the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger.
*925Because instruction number 12 contained a crucial misstatement of the law and Prange’s tendered instructions were rejected in error,
I would reverse and remand this cause for a new trial.

. Beem v. Steel (1967), 140 Ind.App. 512, 224 N.E.2d 61; and Keltner v. Patton (1933), 204 Ind. 550, 185 N.E. 270.