Court Opinion

ID: 9697992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:39:01.521909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:37.605109
License: Public Domain

VERGERONT, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority decision on mootness, I write separately because I conclude the public notice for the February 10, 1998 meeting of the common council of the City of Stoughton does not meet the requirements of § 19.84(2), STATS.
In my view, State ex rel. Schaeve v. Van Lare, 125 Wis. 2d 40, 370 N.W.2d 271 (Ct. App. 1985), does not support the decision of the majority that the public notice satisfies the statutory requirements, nor does it provide guidance for the resolution of this appeal. In Schaeve, the identification of the subject to be discussed in the closed session — "to conduct a hearing to consider the possible discipline of a public employee" — was more specific than the identification in this case — "licenses." Id. at 47, 370 N.W.2d at 275. Moreover, the plaintiff in Schaeve was not arguing that the subject matter should be more specifically identified in the public notice; for example, she was not contending that the name of the *489employee — hers—should have been included, or the reason for the possible discipline. (Indeed, she had elected to have this subject addressed in a closed session, which she had a statutory right to do.) Rather, she was contending that the public notice should have informed the public that she had a right to demand that the hearing be held in open session. Id. We held that such a statement was required in the actual notice given to the public employee under § 19.85(1), STATS., but was not required in the public notice under § 19.84(2), STATS. Id. It was in this context that we held, without further discussion, the "information [in the public notice] was specific enough to apprise members of the public as to the subject matter of the hearing." Id.
Since I do not find Schaeve to assist in resolving the issue whether more specific subject matter notice is required by § 19.84(2), STATS., I turn to the declaration of the policy underlying the open meetings law. Section 19.81(1) and (4), Stats., provide as follows:
Declaration of policy. (1) In recognition of the fact that a representative government of the American type is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the policy of this state that the public is entitled to the fullest and most complete information regarding the affairs of government as is compatible with the conduct of governmental business.
(4) This subchapter shall be liberally construed to achieve the purposes set forth in this section, and the rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed shall be limited to the enforcement of forfeitures and shall not otherwise apply to actions brought under this subchapter' or to interpretations thereof.
*490The connection between these policies and the public notice requirement was discussed in State ex rel. Badke v. Village Bd., 173 Wis. 2d 553, 494 N.W.2d 408 (1993), in the context of deciding whether the public notice of a plan commission meeting was sufficient, where the court had found the meeting also constituted a meeting of the village board. The village argued that the notice of the plan commission meeting informed the public of the meeting and the subject matter. The court rejected the argument that this notice satisfied the requirement of public notice of the meeting of the village board:
However, notice of only the Plan Commission meeting contravenes the policies behind the open meeting law because it does not give citizens the fullest public knowledge. The notice of the Plan Commission meeting alone does not alert the public of the importance of the meeting because it does not notify the public that a quorum of the Village Board will also be present to gather information upon which they will base their final vote. If the public knows that the Village Board's trustees are going to the Plan Commission meeting they will likely realize that the meeting is important and that the proposal discussed is probably something over which the Village Board will ultimately exercise final decisionmaking authority. Notice of a Village Board meeting alerts the public that what might otherwise be a relatively innocuous meeting of the Plan Commission might be more than that. Notice that a quorum of the Village Board will attend informs the public that it can go to the meeting and obtain the same information upon which the Village Board may be basing its decision.
Id. at 577-78, 494 N.W.2d at 417.
*491The Badke court's discussion of the requirement in § 19.81(2), Stats., that "all meetings . . . shall be publicly held in places reasonably accessible to members of the public and shall be open to all citizens at all times ..." is also instructive in deciding how to interpret the requirement in § 19.84(2), STATS., that the public notice "set forth the time, date, place and subject matter of the meeting,-... in such form as is reasonably likely to apprise members of the public and the news media thereof." (Emphasis added.) The court concluded absolute accessibility was not necessary, and "[t]he word 'reasonably' suggests a balancing by the court on a case by case basis to review whether a meeting was reasonably accessible to the public." Id. at 580, 494 N.W.2d at 418. The court also emphasized that the accessibility requirement should not be interpreted in a way that "would unduly burden local government," and suggested that a reasonableness standard, properly applied, avoided that. Id. at 581, 494 N.W.2d at 419. After considering the facts of the meeting at issue — the number of people who were able to fit into the space in which the meeting was held compared to the number denied admission because of space — the court held that the location of the meeting provided reasonable access.
In my view we should consider whether the general heading of "Licenses" under "New Business" was reasonably likely to inform the public that the common council would be reconsidering its denial of an application for a liquor license, taking into account, among other factors, the burden on the municipality of a more specific designation of subject matter. The only reasonable inference from the record is that the disposition of this application was of considerable public interest, and that the reconsideration of the denial was not routine. I conclude the public would not likely understand *492from the public notice that reconsideration of the Pick 'N Save application was going to take place at the February 10,1998 meeting.
Nothing in the record indicates that it would have been burdensome to the City of Stoughton to state in the public notice that the denial of the license was going to be reconsidered: there are, indeed, many other items at least as specific, under both Old Business and New Business. The record also indicates that the City knew that reconsideration of the license would be taken up at the February 10 meeting in sufficient time to prepare the public notice of it at least twenty-four hours before the meeting as required by § 19.84(3), Stats. There is also no indication that it was urgent that a decision of reconsideration be made on February 10,1998, if for some particular reason the item was not able to be included in the public notice in spite of the fact that it was known ahead of time.
It is true that the attorney general opinions cited by the City indicate that general headings such as Citizens and Delegations," 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 70 (1977), and "agenda revisions," 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 93, 96 (1977), may be sufficient notice under the statute in some situations. However, these decisions also state that where members or the presiding officer know of specific items in advance of the meeting, specific notice should be given. See 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 93, 96; 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 70; 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 143,144-45. Indeed the very next sentence in the paragraph quoted in the majority opinion states: "I would caution, however, that where the presiding officer of a governmental body has specific knowledge that matters may come before the body, they should be included on the agenda." 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 70. The attorney general opinions also indicate that matters of importance or of wide *493interest that come up unexpectedly should be postponed until more specific notice can be given, unless it is urgent that action be taken immediately. See 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 93, 96; 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 68, 70. Attorney general opinions are not, of course, binding on courts. However, I believe it worth noting that those cited by the City do not approve general headings as a substitute for a more specific description of the subject matter, when the governmental entity knows beforehand that a particular item of business that is of wide interest will be taken up at a meeting.
I do not find persuasive the majority opinion's reference to H.D. Enterprises' knowledge that the general heading "Licenses" was used in the public notice for the January '27 meeting, at which Pick 'N Save's initial application was discussed. Even if that general heading under "New Business" might be reasonably likely to inform the public that new license applications of all sorts will be discussed (taking into account all the circumstances, including the burden on the City of being more specific in that context), such a conclusion does not adequately address the issue on this appeal.
Finally, I do not agree that interpreting § 19.84(2), STATS., to require more specificity than "Licenses" in the circumstances of this case, constitutes "changing" the statute. The legislature has chosen to require public notice of meetings to include the subject matter in a "form as is reasonably likely to apprise members of the public and the news media thereof." Section 19.84(2). It is most definitely the task of this court to interpret and apply that language in the light of the stated policy of the statute and case law precedent.
I also acknowledge that the City of Stoughton took a number of actions after the February 10, 1998 meeting to address the complaints of these plaintiffs and *494others over the way in which the reconsideration of the denial of Pick 'N Save's application was handled. The City is to be commended for those efforts. I do not intend to suggest that the City was intentionally trying to keep the public from knowledge that the reconsideration of the denial of Pick 'N Save's application was to be taken up at the February 10 meeting. However, I do not believe the City's intent bears on the question whether the public notice of that meeting fulfills the requirements of § 19.84(2), Stats. See Badke, 173 Wis. 2d at 560, 494 N.W.2d at 410.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent on the issue of public notice under § 19.84(2), Stats.