Court Opinion

ID: 9700972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:55:44.818979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:27.941907
License: Public Domain

BELSON, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion’s holding that appellant, because she offered uncontested evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of consent, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As the trial judge perceptively observed, the very fact that appellant held the status of joint owner of the car with her husband implies her consent to her co-owner husband’s operation of the car. Add to that fact the unre-butted evidence that over a long period she routinely assented to his operation of the car, and the absence of any indication that she ever took steps to withdraw her consent or to end their joint ownership, and it becomes clear that there was ample basis for the trial court’s finding of consent.
Under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, D.C.Code §§ 40-401 et seq. (1981), there is a statutory presumption that the driver of a vehicle operates the vehicle with the owner’s consent. D.C. Code § 40-408 (1981). While this presumption can be rebutted,1 to do so requires *1077“uncontradicted proof sufficient to destroy the inference supporting plaintiff, and which raises no doubts against the defendant.” Miller v. Imperial Ins. Inc., 189 A.2d 359, 360 (D.C.1963) (footnotes omitted); accord, Alsbrooks v. Washington Deliveries, Inc., 281 A.2d 220, 221 (D.C.1971); Farrall v. Ellis, 157 A.2d 127, 128 (D.C.1960). Where there is such uncontradicted proof, the owner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Love v. Gaskins, 153 A.2d 660, 662 (D.C.1959). But “[wjhere the evidence is not so convincing or positive— 1.e., where it has revealed inconsistency or where contradictions are present — the trier of fact must assume its usual role of resolving the conflict presented.” Hancock v. Morris, 173 A.2d 922, 923 (D.C.1961); accord, Alsbrooks, supra, 281 A.2d at 221; Farrall, supra, 157 A.2d at 128; Love, supra, 153 A.2d at 662; see also Miller, supra, 189 A.2d at 360 (trial court properly decided consent as question of fact, rather than of law, when evidence rebutting defense, although not expressly contradicted, was “not convincing” and thus was insufficient to overcome presumption of consent).
It is undisputed that appellant and her now-deceased husband were co-owners of the vehicle in question. The majority acknowledges that such joint ownership creates an implied mutual consent by each co-owner to the use and operation of the vehicle by the other co-owner. Supra at 1074; see Joyner v. Holland, 212 A.2d 541, 542 (D.C.1965). This implied consent does not arise merely from the presumption of agency created by D.C.Code § 40-408, but rather is inherent in the mutual entitlement to the benefits of ownership enjoyed by co-owners.
The implied consent created by appellant’s co-ownership with her husband presented an inconsistency with her denial of consent. See Williams v. Baines, 257 A.2d 762 (D.C.1969). In Williams, the appellant car owner urged that she had rebutted the statutory presumption by her un-contradicted testimony denying consent. Id. at 763. This court disagreed. We held that evidence of implied consent, along with the questionable credibility of the appellant’s testimony, raised a conflict that prevented the denial of consent from being “uncontradicted,” and thus precluded a directed verdict for the defendant. Id.
As in Williams, appellant’s implied consent to use by the co-owner created a conflict with her testimony that she did not consent to his use. Furthermore, appellant’s testimony itself was not “so convincing or positive” to show a lack of consent: appellant did not actually testify that she did not consent to her husband’s driving the car, but rather that she would not have consented if he had asked her if he could drive it.2
Here the fact of appellant’s co-ownership conflicted with her assertion that she did not consent to her husband’s use of the car. The long history of his use of the jointly owned car with her permission, never withdrawn, also conflicts with appellant’s self-serving testimony. Accordingly, it was proper for the trial judge to resolve the question as a matter of fact rather than of law. In resolving that question, his determination that appellant’s testimony did not overcome the presumption of consent was not clearly erroneous.
Significant circumstantial evidence supports the trial judge’s finding that appellant had implicitly consented to her husband’s use of the car. There is no indication in the record that appellant ever withdrew the ongoing consent which she had given at the inception of their ownership, and which was confirmed by years of usage. Appellant and her husband had been married for almost fifty years, and had purchased the automobile from their pooled finances seven years before the incident that gave rise to this case. Although both appellant and her husband drove the car during the first five years of ownership, her husband was its primary driver. The record unmistakably establishes that con*1078tinuing mutual consent to drive existed for several years.
While appellant did testify that, because of her husband’s illness, she would not have agreed to his driving at the time of the accident, there is no evidence in the record that she had ever communicated to him any withdrawal of her longstanding consent. A consent granted by the fact of co-ownership and confirmed by many years of usage should be presumed to continue unless it is withdrawn. Cf Amicar Rentals, Inc. v. Moore, 294 A.2d 361, 362 (D.C. 1972) (filing of complaint for not returning rental car revoked prior consent to drive car); Neary v. Hertz Corp., 231 F.Supp. 480, 482 (D.D.C.1964) (notification to lessee not to let employee drive car negated previous consent).
This is not a case where the person sued held naked legal title to an automobile for the convenience of the driver. See Spindle v. Reid, 277 A.2d 117, 118-19 (D.C.1971); Busk v. Johnson, 215 A.2d 850, 852 (D.C. 1966); Johnson v. Keyes, 201 A.2d 24, 26 (D.C.1964). Appellant was, as the majority concedes, an owner in the full sense of the word. Nor is this a case where a non-owner driver exceeded the scope of his limited authority to drive, and thus drove without the owner’s consent. See Lancaster v. Canuel, 193 A.2d 555, 558 (D.C.1963). Instead, this is a suit against a full-fledged owner and co-purchaser of an automobile who used it and benefited from its use for a number of years. When she began to live separately from her co-owner spouse, she did not surrender ownership or her right to control the automobile. Nor did she ever revoke her longstanding consent to his driving the automobile. Under these circumstances, I think the policy served by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act calls for the car’s owner, rather than the person injured by the automobile, to sustain the resulting loss. At the least, the set of circumstances presented the trial court with a contested issue of fact regarding consent, and the court’s resolution of that issue was not clearly erroneous.

. The presumption of consent arises from the strong public policy of assuring that a person who enjoys the benefits of owning an automobile must bear the burden of compensating persons who are injured by its use. Presumptions such as this that are "buttressed by weighty social policies” place the burden of persuasion on the party controverting the presumed fact. Green v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 499 A.2d 870, 874-75 & n. 3 (D.C.1985); see Brown v. Brown, 524 A.2d .1184, 1188 & n. 3 (D.C.1987). This is in contrast to presumptions that operate under the "bursting bubble” theory, under which "the presumption vanishes” as soon as evidence is offered against the fact presumed. Brown, supra, 524 A.2d at 1188; Green, supra, 499 A.2d at 874.

. Although appellant did not testify at trial, her deposition was presented to the trial court, and is part of the record on appeal.