Court Opinion

ID: 9580748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:08:27.236013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:29.723569
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with the majority opinion, because I believe that it represents a correct interpretation of both statutory and case law. I write separately, however, to emphasize that my decision does not represent an endorsement of mandatory minimum sentences as a matter of policy.
The problems with “mandatory minimums” are numerous and well documented, and have been articulated by judges, legal scholars, and practitioners alike. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U. S. 545, 570-571 (122 SC 2406, 2421, 153 LE2d 524) (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); In re Ellis, 356 F3d 1198, 1220-1221 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Alatorre, 207 F3d 1078, 1080 (8th Cir. 2000) (Bright, J., concurring); Shimica Gaskins, Note: “Women of Circumstance” — The Effects of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1533 (2004); Stephen M. Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 Crim. Justice 28 (Spring 1999); Myrna S. Raeder, Rethinking Sentencing and Correctional Policy for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 14 Crim. Justice 1, *53 (Summer 1999); Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 185, 192-196 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199 (1993). See also Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, American Bar Association (ABA) Address (August 9,2003) at the ABA Annual Meeting, August 9-10, 2003, San Francisco, CA(2003) (“I can accept neither . . . the wisdom [, the justice nor the necessity] of . . . mandatory minimum[s]. ... In [all] too many cases [they] are . . . unjust.”).
The foregoing authorities demonstrate in detail the fact that mandatory minimums negatively affect the fair administration of the criminal justice system, do not serve as a deterrent, and result in tremendous costs — both fiscal and otherwise — to law-abiding citizens. Mandatory sentences divest trial judges of their traditional discretionary authority, instead transferring “sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the charges they decide to bring.” (Citations omitted.) Harris v. United States, supra, 536 U. S. at 571 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also United States v. *619Hiveley, 61 F3d 1358, 1363-1364 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., concurring) (mandatory minimums, in effect, allow “non-judicial persons [to] send people to jail”); Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, supra (“The trial judge is the one actor in the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the prosecutors.”).
“[Statutory mandatory minimums . . . deny the judge the legal power to depart downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that call for leniency.” Harris v. United States, supra, 536 U. S. at 570 (Breyer, J., concurring). Such mandates do not allow a trial judge to consider prior criminal history (or lack thereof), the impact on a defendant’s family, or the defendant’s history in the community. Nor do they allow a court to consider the degree of the defendant’s culpability — i.e., whether he was a kingpin rather than a mule, whether he arranged the shipment of drugs or merely served as a lookout, or whether he led the conspiracy or was caught on the fringes thereof. Instead, mandatory minimums substitute the trial judge’s discretion with a focus on one or two exclusive factors, such as the amount of drugs involved or whether the defendant was in possession of a firearm. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 16-13-31; 16-11-106. While clearly relevant in determining the length of a sentence, these factors should not be used as the exclusive means for determining either the length of the initial sentence or when a person should be eligible for parole.
In light of the numerous flaws inherent in mandatory minimum sentences, the citizens of our State would be better served by a legislative attempt to create a fair and rational sentencing scheme — i.e., by developing guidelines that permit trial judges to use their wisdom and expertise to consider all factors relevant to a defendant’s sentence, including his or her degree of culpability.