Court Opinion

ID: 9704476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:36:57.400242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.822697
License: Public Domain

Justice VERNIERO,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all but one critical aspect of the Court’s thoughtful and comprehensive opinion. I agree that the insurance agent in this case breached no duty of care to the insured. I endorse the Court’s meticulous analysis in that respect, especially its conclusion that “the evidence was so one-sided [in support of the agent] that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of [that party].” Ante at 569, 858 A2d at 258 (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540, 666 A.2d 146 (1995)).
Unlike my colleagues, I would apply a similar rationale and hold that no reasonable jury could conclude that Dr. Jenkins’s expectations were anything but as argued by the insurer. Thus, even assuming that the policy here is ambiguous (a close question but one that I answer in favor of the insured for the reasons expressed by my colleagues), I nonetheless would find that the evidence clearly indicates that Dr. Jenkins reasonably expected no coverage in these circumstances. In that regard, I essentially share the observation of Judge Parrillo who, writing for the Appellate Division’s majority, stated:
In this case, the insured specifically understood the terms of the policy and got exactly what he bargained for. In fact, the “retroactive date” of February 1, 1998 was set because of representations made by Jenkins both orally and in writing.
In August 1997, Jenkins told the C & E representative that he was presently insured with Princeton [Insurance Company] and that his coverage with Princeton would expire on February 1, 1998. Shortly after their conversation, on August 18, 1997, Jenkins faxed a completed “Non-Binding Information Quote Form,” which represented that his present insurer was Princeton under an “occurrence plus” policy. On this form Jenkins also requested an effective date of “2/98 ”. Along with this form, Jenkins forwarded, among other things, a claims and coverage history form from Princeton dated April 19, 1996, documenting policy periods beginning and ending February 1st of every year from 1987 through 1997. After meeting next with the C & E agent on January 8, 1998, the following day Jenkins prepared, signed and dated an “Individual Physicians Application” for insurance, *571which represented that his current policy would expire on February 1, 1998. In response to a specific inquiry on the application, Jenkins represented that his professional liability insurance had never been denied, canceled or non-renewed. The application also contained the following language above Jenkins’ signature:
I understand that the coverage offered is provided by a claims made policy and that incidents that occurred prior to the prior acts or retroactive date are not covered and claims reported after the expiration date are not covered unless I purchase or otherwise obtain an extended reporting endorsement provided by Zurich [Insurance Company], (emphasis added.)
And on January 12, 1998, in his application for financing of the premium, Jenkins again represented a policy effective date of February 1,1998.
In sum, we think it plain that ... February 1, 1998 ... was specifically understood, indeed requested, by the insured as the date on or after which his acts of negligence would be covered if reported during the policy period. The record is devoid of any evidence that the insured expected, bargained, or for that matter, paid for anything more in the way of coverage.
[President v. Jenkins, 357 N.J.Super. 288, 306-07, 814 A.2d 1173 (2003) (footnote omitted).]
When construing ambiguity in this setting, we defer not to any or ail expectations articulated by an insured during the course of litigation, but rather to the objectively reasonable expectations at the time the policy was issued. See DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257, 269, 398 A2d 1274 (1979). From that perspective, whether an insured’s expectation is objectively reasonable should depend on the totality of the circumstances in a given case. I am persuaded that Dr. Jenkins’s own words and deeds surrounding the issuance of the policy lead to only one conclusion as a matter of law, namely, that the insured did not expect what he now seeks as coverage from his insurer. As indulgent as we might like to be in insurance-coverage cases, this case will not be helped by requiring a jury to resolve a question that, in my view, lends itself to only one reasonable answer.
In sum, in respect of the agent, I join in the Court’s disposition. Regarding the insurer, I accept that the policy is ambiguous, a finding that requires us to modify the Appellate Division’s judgment. I agree, however, with the Appellate Division’s ultimate holding in favor of the insurer because I believe that Dr. Jenkins received precisely the coverage that he reasonably expected as evidenced by the totality of the circumstances. Hence, I would *572modify and affirm the judgment below. To the extent that my colleagues reach a contrary conclusion, I respectfully dissent.
For Affirmance in Part/Reversal in PartjRemandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices ZAZZALI, ALBIN, and WALLACE — 4.
Concurrence in Part/Dissent in Part — Justices VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 2.
Not Participating — Justice LONG.