Court Opinion

ID: 9452464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:41:32.019025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:13.671770
License: Public Domain

BROWNING, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
With one exception appellant’s specifications disclose no error, or error which was not fairly presented to the trial court, or error which was harmless on the whole record. The exception relates to the court’s refusal to require disclosure of a trial witness’s grand jury testimony for use in cross-examination.
The only possible conclusion that can be reached from a balancing of the interests of the government and appellant (as required by Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 871-872, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966)) is that appellant should have been granted access to portions of the grand jury transcript containing Mrs. Yergin’s testimony on subjects to which she testified at trial.
The traditional reasons for secrecy (Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959) (Justice Brennan dissenting)) were obviously inapplicable; and the government has suggested none which were peculiar to this case.
The state has no legitimate interest simply in denying the accused an opportunity to compare the grand jury and trial testimony of government witnesses. Presumably the testimony will be the same. If it is not, “it is unquestionably in the interest of the state as well as of the defendant that such be disclosed and justice assured.” Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 Mich.L.Rev. 454, 463 (1965).*
In contrast to the absence of need for secrecy, the reasons for disclosure were persuasive.
Mrs. Yergin was an important witness on the “key issue” (note 1, majority opinion) of whether it was appellant or his alleged co-conspirator, Mr. Melniek, who received the money extracted from the victims. Appellant’s defense was that he was only a hired business consultant who received small amounts of money for services actually rendered. Mrs. Yergin testified that most of the money obtained from the principal victim was paid over to appellant by Mr. Melniek. Her testimony thus struck at the heart of appellant’s defense.
*930There was reason to question Mrs. Yer-gin’s credibility. She was herself deeply involved in the fraudulent scheme. Prior to trial she obtained a notarized statement from Mr. Melnick exonerating her from having received any of the money obtained from the victims (part 111(a) (ii) of majority opinion). The net effect of her trial testimony was to exculpate Mr. Melnick at appellant’s expense.
Moreover as the Supreme Court said in Dennis, “A conspiracy case [such as this] carries with it the inevitable risk of wrongful attribution of responsibility to one or more of the multiple defendants, [citing] Under these circumstances, it is especially important that the defense, the judge and the jury should have the assurance that the doors that may lead to truth have been unlocked.” Dennis v. United States, supra, 384 U.S. at 873, 86 S.Ct. at 1851.
Appellant represented that Mrs. Yer-gin’s trial testimony differed from her grand jury testimony. Appellant’s motion was denied summarily and the basis for this representation was therefore not explored. In any event, it was not incumbent upon appellant to establish the presence of inconsistencies. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, supra, 360 U.S. at 401, 79 S.Ct. 1237. As noted, there was no apparent reason for preserving the secrecy of Mrs. Yergin’s pri- or grand jury testimony and substantial reason for a thorough testing of her credibility. In such circumstances, “there is no justification for relying upon ‘assumption’ ” that “no inconsistencies would have come to light if the grand jury testimony had been examined.” Dennis v. United States, supra, 384 U.S. at 874, 86 S.Ct. at 1851.
At the very least, the trial court should have examined the grand jury transcript in camera to aid the court in disposing of the motion for disclosure — a practice approved by the Supreme Court where a “particularized need” for disclosure has not been fully made out. Dennis v. United States, ibid.

 The numerous state statutes providing for the disclosure of the grand jury testimony of trial witnesses were adopted in order “to remove, as far as was consistent with public policy, the temptation to false swearing before the grand jury.” State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 259, 12 S.W. 643, 650-651 (1889). Calkins, supra at 465 n. 37.