Court Opinion

ID: 9578002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:29.091874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:18.096636
License: Public Domain

Ellington, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. In Division 8 (b), supra, the majority finds that Harmon’s testimony that Pitts was unemployed and “sold drugs” for a living was admissible to prove the crimes as charged. I *566believe that the testimony was inadmissible bad character evidence, that counsel’s failure to raise an appropriate objection or timely move for a mistrial constituted deficient performance, and that Pitts was prejudiced thereby. Accordingly, I would reverse his convictions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and would remand this case for a new trial.
A thorough reading of the record shows that, during trial but outside the presence of the jury, the trial court prohibited the State and Pitts’ co-defendant, Harmon, from introducing evidence of Pitts’ criminal history.41 Shortly thereafter, Harmon testified that Pitts had lived with her about four months immediately before the arrest. Harmon’s counsel then asked, “So . . . what did [Pitts] do for a living [during this time]?” Harmon responded, “Nothing. Sold drugs.”
Pitts’ counsel objected “to this whole line of questioning.” Counsel, however, did not object on the basis of improper character evidence, ask for curative instructions, or move for a mistrial. The witness then intexjected, “That’s the truth,” and the trial court reprimanded her, saying, “Ma’am, we have discussed this earlier. I’m going to instruct the jury to disregard the last statement of the defendant, and I’m going to excuse [Harmon] to sit down if she can’t abide by the rulings of court already stated.” Harmon’s counsel then changed his line of questioning. After Harmon rested, the parties gave closing arguments before the court recessed for the evening.
When court reconvened the next morning, Pitts’ counsel moved for a mistrial based upon Harmon’s statement that Pitts was unemployed and sold drugs for a living. Counsel stated that the testimony “came so quickly . . . that, frankly, I didn’t leap to my feet.” Counsel requested, in lieu of a mistrial, a curative instruction telling the jury to disregard the testimony. Counsel acknowledged that there was a risk the instruction would reemphasize the testimony. The court denied the motion for mistrial and instructed the jury that there was no evidence that Pitts sold drugs for a living and that they were to disregard Harmon’s statement. Pitts’ counsel did not renew the motion for mistrial following the curative instruction.42
As the majority recognizes, in order to prove ineffective assistance, Pitts has the burden on appeal of showing “both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him such that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the attor*567ney’s errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Byrd v. State, 274 Ga. 58, 60 (2) (548 SE2d 2) (2001); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). We find Pitts has established that, under the circumstances of this case, counsel’s oversight constituted deficient performance. Evidence that Pitts was unemployed and “sold drugs” for a living was inherently prejudicial in a trial based upon charges that he trafficked cocaine and possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute. Apparently recognizing this, the trial court specifically excluded such evidence. Within minutes of the court’s ruling, however, the co-defendant ignored the ruling and intentionally injected Pitts’ alleged history as a drug dealer into the trial. It was not a simple “passing reference” to Pitts’ past general criminal behavior, but referred specifically to the type of behavior for which he was on trial. Cf. Owens v. State, 250 Ga. App. 61, 62 (550 SE2d 464) (2001) (testifying officer made a “passing reference” about the defendant’s parole officer); Holt v. State, 248 Ga. App. 334, 336 (2) (546 SE2d 83) (2001) (no abuse of discretion for denial of mistrial following a comment that was unresponsive to the question asked). We are unable to see any purpose for the testimony other than as inadmissible evidence of Pitts’ propensity to sell drugs.
Admission of this type of general bad character evidence is severely restricted, because
evidence of an independent offense or act committed by the accused is highly and inherently prejudicial, raising, as it does, an inference that an accused who acted in a certain manner on one occasion is likely to have acted in the same or in a similar manner on another occasion and thereby putting the accused’s character in issue. An accused is . . . entitled to be tried for the offense charged in the indictment, independently of any other offense not connected with the transaction upon which the indictment was based.
(Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641-642 (2) (a) (409 SE2d 649) (1991); see also OCGA § 24-2-2; Gearin v. State, 208 Ga. App. 878, 881 (2) (432 SE2d 818) (1993).
In order to protect an accused and to insure him of a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased jury, we have long embraced the fundamental principle that the general character of an accused is inadmissible unless the accused chooses to put his character in issue. As a corollary of this fundamental principle, we have also long adhered to the rule that where an accused is on trial for the commission of a *568crime . . proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is never admissible, unless there is some logical connection between the two, from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other.
(Citations omitted.) Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 641 (2) (a); see also OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) (evidence of bad character or prior convictions are inadmissible unless the defendant first puts his character in issue); Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 (D) (accord); Hancock v. State, 210 Ga. App. 528, 529-530 (2) (437 SE2d 610) (1993) (accord).
Although the majority contends evidence that Pitts, had a history of dealing drugs was admissible to show Pitts’ “motive” and “intent” for possessing drugs on the day of his arrest, this contention lacks any support, as does its position that the testimony goes to the “gravamen” of the charges. Unless the defendant places his character in issue at trial, which did not happen in this case, similar bad acts of the accused that were not part of the res gestae of the crime charged can only be admitted if there is notice to the accused, the trial court conducts a hearing, and the party seeking to admit such evidence makes certain affirmative showings.43 USCR 31.3 (B); Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b). In this case, no one attempted to admit evidence of a specific drug sale by Pitts as a similar transaction in this case, so the trial court heard none of the affirmative showings necessary for it to consider admitting Harmon’s testimony. Further, prior bad acts evidence can only be admitted for specific, limited purposes at trial, and the trial court must instruct the jury of the limited purposes for which they may consider the evidence, something that did not happen in this case. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b), n. 2. Finally, even if the trial court had conducted the required USCR 31.3 (B) hearing, it is obvious that a general allegation that Pitts “sold drugs,” without any details as to when and where this alleged drug dealing occurred, could not meet the admissibility requirements under Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b). Therefore, this is clearly inadmissible, general bad character evidence going only to Pitts’ propensity to sell drugs.
In fact, the cases relied upon by the majority for its finding that the evidence was admissible to prove the crimes are clearly distinguishable from this case, since they either involved cases where the defendant took the stand in his own defense or presented other testi*569mony of his good character, thereby making bad character evidence admissible for impeachment;44 were decided before the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the similar transaction admissibility requirements of Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b);45 or involved separate criminal acts that were entirely different from the crimes for which the defendant was being tried, so that they were not “similar transactions” requiring a USCR 31.3 hearing.46 In this case, Pitts did not testify at trial, presented no evidence regarding his character, and was being tried for drug trafficking, precisely the type of act referred to by Harmon’s testimony that he “sold drugs” for a living. Accordingly, the majority’s analysis is flawed.
Because I believe Harmon’s testimony was clearly inadmissible bad character evidence that was introduced in direct violation of an express ruling by the trial court that prohibited such evidence, I would find that counsel’s failure to preserve a proper objection or to timely move for a mistrial constituted deficient performance. Mann v. State, 252 Ga. App. 70, 72-73 (1) (555 SE2d 527) (2001) (failure to object or request a mistrial to clearly objectionable evidence constituted deficient performance). Counsel did not object on the basis of impermissible character evidence or even relevance. She simply objected “to this whole line of questioning.” She later admitted that her failure to timely and properly object was not a tactical decision but simply a result of her failure to “leap to [her] feet” after Harmon’s statement. Cf. Rogers v. State, 247 Ga. App. 219, 232 (18) (b) (543 SE2d 81) (2000) (counsel’s trial strategies and tactics do not equate with deficient performance).
*570As to the second prong of an ineffective assistance claim, that is, whether Pitts was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, the test is whether, absent counsel’s mistake, there is a reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different. Byrd v. State, 274 Ga. at 60 (2). In this case, both defendants attempted to win acquittal by demonstrating to the jury that the drugs belonged to the other defendant. The trial court’s abbreviated jury instruction to disregard the evidence was insufficient to address the serious consequences of Harmon’s testimony that Pitts “sold drugs.” See Anderson v. State, 252 Ga. 103, 104 (312 SE2d 113) (1984) (conviction reversed when trial court failed to appropriately address an objection that officer’s testimony constituted impermissible character evidence). In fact, given the highly prejudicial nature of the co-defendant’s statement, it is unlikely that any curative instruction would have been sufficient to ensure that the jury did not consider the comment during their deliberations. See Gearin v. State, 208 Ga. App. at 881-882 (2);47 cf. Binns v. State, 237 Ga. App. 719, 720 (2) (516 SE2d 583) (1999) (following officer’s reference to defendant’s previous drug sales, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement and specifically asked the jurors if there was anyone who would be unable to do so); Tidwell v. State, 219 Ga. App. 233, 237 (4) (464 SE2d 834) (1995) (instruction sufficient to cure improper testimony that defendant was intoxicated). Further, contrary to the majority’s position, a statement that Pitts “sold drugs” for a living over several months was not merely cumulative of his co-defendant’s testimony that, within minutes before his arrest, Pitts purchased some cocaine. Therefore, we cannot say that the erroneous admission of the evidence was harmless. Cf. Johnson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 845-846 (1) (383 SE2d 346) (1989) (no harmful error when bad character evidence was merely cumulative).
I believe that Pitts has carried his burden of demonstrating prejudice by counsel’s oversight and that, absent this oversight, there is at least a reasonable probability that Pitts would not have been convicted by this jury or, given the trial court’s prior ruling that this prejudicial evidence was inadmissible, that the trial court would *571have granted a timely motion for mistrial. King v. State, 261 Ga. 534, 535-536 (2) (407 SE2d 733) (1991) (mistrial required when officer, immediately after being told not to mention defendant’s previous jail term, testified that defendant had just been released from jail); Gearin v. State, 208 Ga. App. at 882 (2) (trial court erred in denying motion for mistrial after wrongful admission of evidence of other crimes); Hancock v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 529-530 (2) (finding admission of bad character evidencé was harmful error as a matter of law); see also Owens v. State, 250 Ga. App. at 62 (evidence of bad character not sufficiently prejudicial to require a mistrial). Accordingly, I would reverse Pitts’ convictions and remand for retrial.
Decided March 26, 2003.
Franklin & Hubbard, Brooks S. Franklin, Cynthia G. Morris, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Amira A. Arshad, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Barnes joins in this dissent.

 The State did not seek to admit any evidence of prior drug sales as similar transactions.

 Because counsel failed to object to the evidence on the basis that it was impermissible bad character evidence, to timely move for a mistrial, or to renew the motion for mistrial after the curative instruction, counsel failed to preserve this error for appellate review. McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) (544 SE2d 709) (2001).

 These showings include (1) that the evidence is being introduced “not to raise an improper inference as to the accused’s character, but for some appropriate purpose which has been deemed to be an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility”; (2) that there is sufficient evidence to establish that the accused committed the prior act; and (3) that there is sufficient connection or similarity between the independent act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. at 642 (2) (b).

 See majority footnotes 35 and 36, citing Harris v. State, 260 Ga. 860, 865 (6) (401 SE2d 263) (1991) (evidence that defendant beat his wife was admissible to impeach his testimony that he was a gentle, loving man with a good relationship with his wife), and Taylor v. State, 254 Ga. App. 150, 153 (4) (561 SE2d 833) (2002) (after the defendant took the stand to testify to his own good character and to deny any recent involvement in the drug trade, evidence that the defendant recently associated with convicted drug dealers was admissible to prove that defendant was dealing drugs); see also USCR 31.3 (D).

 See majority footnote 35, citing Frazier v. State, 257 Ga. 690, 698-699 (16) (362 SE2d 351) (1987) (evidence of a similar crime occurring two months earlier admissible to show crime was not committed inadvertently, accidentally, involuntarily, or without guilty knowledge, given that defendant took the stand to minimize his involvement in the crimes), and Harris v. State, 260 Ga. at 865 (6).

 See cases cited in majority’s footnotes 33 and 34, including Stafford v. State, 275 Ga. 337, 338 (2) (566 SE2d 663) (2002) (evidence that defendant possessed drugs was not a similar transaction in a murder case, and was part of the res gestae of the marijuana possession charges); Speed v. State, 270 Ga. 688, 691 (8) (512 SE2d 896) (1999) (evidence that defendant was a “drug dealer” was relevant to his motive in a murder case and was not a similar transaction); Sterling v. State, 267 Ga. 209, 211 (4) (477 SE2d 807) (1996) (evidence that defendant needed money for drugs was relevant to his motive in a murder case and was not a similar transaction that required a USCR 31.3 hearing); Motes v. State, 229 Ga. App. 489 (1) (494 SE2d 283) (1997) (evidence that defendant needed money for drugs was not a similar transaction in an armed robbery case).

 The general rule that a curative instruction will cure the error caused by having admitted evidence later ruled inadmissible is subject to exceptions when the illegal evidence has worked such harm or injury to the accused as to render it probable that the subsequent withdrawal did not heal the injury inflicted by its improper admission. Jurors, like other human beings, are unconsciously too much affected by strong mental impressions for these impressions to be nicely segregated from the mass of evidence by a mere direction that these impressions are to be obliterated, though they be told, even by the judge, that the object which created those impressions has been removed and is now out of their sight.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gearin v. State, 208 Ga. App. at 881-882 (2).