Court Opinion

ID: 9964288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-29 17:00:42.751303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:16.952422
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PEGGY CHU,                                      DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                  DC-1221-17-0172-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,                         DATE: April 26, 2024
            Agency.

          THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Peggy Chu , Alexandria, Virginia, pro se.

      Benjamin K. Ahlstrom and Jennifer Williams , Alexandria, Virginia,
        for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied her request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                   2

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were
not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and
the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence
or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not
available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this
appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under
section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the
petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to clarify the findings on
exhaustion, the scope of the appellant’s protected disclosures, and the
contributing factor analysis and findings and to adjust the Carr factor analysis.
We VACATE the finding that the agency met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence it would have relocated the appellant to a cubicle absent her
protected disclosures. We otherwise AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant is employed by the agency as an Information Technology
(IT) Specialist, GS-2210-13. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 64 at 5-6, Tab 24
at 4. She filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), alleging
that the agency moved her from a shared office to a cubicle, lowered her fiscal
year (FY) 2015 performance appraisal, forced her to work overtime without pay,
withheld a performance bonus and award, and suspended her for 1 day in reprisal
for disclosing her officemate’s harassing conduct that violated Government
policies against disturbances and contractors’ nonperformance that violated the
Federal Acquisitions Regulations (FAR) and resulted in a gross waste of
Government resources. IAF, Tab 45 at 7-17, Tab 70 at 116-22.
      The appellant filed a Board appeal after OSC failed to resolve her
complaint within 120 days, reasserting many of the claims that she raised before
                                                                                    3

OSC.    IAF, Tab 1 at 840-58.    During the adjudication of her case below, she
alleged that her disclosure to the agency’s Chief Investigator of the Workforce
Relations Division (WRD) (formerly known as the Employee Relations Division)
in February 2016—that she had worked over 2,000 hours of overtime without pay
and with the knowledge of her supervisor—constituted a protected disclosure of a
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) violation. IAF, Tab 51 at 13, Tab 68 at 22,
Tab 70 at 15-16. The appellant initially requested a hearing; however, through
counsel, she withdrew her request. IAF, Tab 3 at 4, Tab 59 at 4.
       After the close of the record, the administrative judge issued an initial
decision based on the written record, finding that the appellant had established
Board jurisdiction over her appeal, but denying her request for corrective action.
IAF, Tab 63 at 1, Tab 73, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 22.         He found that the
appellant made the following protected disclosures: (1) Government contractors
violated the FAR; (2) the contractors’ nonperformance constituted a gross waste
of funds; and (3) she was denied overtime pay in violation of the FLSA.           ID
at 8-10. However, he found that the appellant’s disclosures about her officemate
were not protected. ID at 7. He further found that the appellant proved that her
two protected disclosures about contractors’ nonperformance were a contributing
factor in her lowered performance rating and 1-day suspension, but not in the
agency’s decision to reassign her to a cubicle. ID at 11-12. He nevertheless
denied the appellant’s request for corrective action because the agency proved by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have reassigned her to a cubicle,
lowered    her   performance     appraisal,    and   suspended     her   absent   her
contractor-related disclosures. ID at 12-22.
       The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative
judge erred in denying her request for corrective action.        Petition for Review
(PFR) File, Tab 7. She claims that all of her disclosures were protected and that
the agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
lowered her performance rating, relocated her to a cubicle, or suspended her
                                                                                  4

absent her protected disclosures. Id. at 7-21. The agency has filed a response to
the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 11.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW 2
The appellant exhausted with OSC her disclosure that she was forced to work
uncompensated overtime hours in violation of the FLSA.
       Although the administrative judge found that the appellant made a
protected disclosure that the agency violated the FLSA, he did not make any
findings addressing whether she exhausted this claim with OSC. ID at 9-10. We
turn now to consider in the first instance whether the appellant exhausted it with
OSC.
       The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant proves by
preponderant evidence that she exhausted her administrative remedy before OSC
and makes nonfrivolous allegations that:     (1) she made a protected disclosure
described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described
under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the protected
disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).
Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 8, aff’d, No. 2022-1967,
2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023); Salerno v. Department of the Interior,
123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). The substantive requirements of exhaustion are
met when an appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an
investigation that might lead to corrective action.   Chambers v. Department of
Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to
those issues that have been previously raised with OSC. Skarada v. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7.
       However, an appellant may give a more detailed account of her
whistleblowing activities before the Board than she did to OSC. Id.; Chambers,

2
  The parties do not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that the Board has
jurisdiction over the appeal, and we decline to disturb that finding. ID at 5.
                                                                                  5

2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through her initial
OSC complaint, evidence that she amended the original complaint, including but
not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing
any amended allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC
referencing the amended allegations. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7. An appellant
may also establish exhaustion through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as
an affidavit or declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the
substance of the facts in the Board appeal.      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
Finally, the appellant must prove exhaustion with OSC by preponderant evidence,
not just present nonfrivolous allegations of exhaustion.        Id.; see 5 U.S.C.
§ 1214(a)(3); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(1).
      The appellant alleged in her OSC complaint that she worked a significant
number of overtime hours without pay.       IAF, Tab 45 at 14-15.    In additional
submissions to OSC, she asserted that her supervisor was aware that she was
working overtime. IAF, Tab 2 at 22, 296, 356-68, 375. In her submission to the
Board, the appellant clarified that she disclosed that she was denied overtime pay
to the Chief Investigator of the WRD during a meeting on February 25, 2016,
concerning the agency’s investigation into her apparent time and attendance
discrepancies. IAF, Tab 1 at 823-28, Tab 6 at 13. The appellant also provided a
written summary the Chief Investigator of the WRD produced detailing his
February 25, 2016 meeting with the appellant. These notes corroborate her claim
that she made disclosures that her supervisor permitted her to work excessive
hours. IAF, Tab 1 at 823-28. Id. at 824, 826-28. The record reflects that the
appellant provided these documents to OSC during its investigation of her
whistleblower retaliation complaint. IAF, Tab 23 at 16-17 (November 20, 2016
email providing OSC with additional documents related to her whistleblower
complaint and requesting OSC to reconsider its stay decision); Tab 45 at 18-19
(September 15, 2016 email from OSC seeking additional information regarding
the appellant’s unpaid overtime claim), 20-21 (October 5, 2016 email denying the
                                                                                     6

appellant’s stay request); see Chu v. Department of Commerce, MSPB Docket
No. DC-1221-17-0018-S-1, Stay File, Tabs 1-2 (providing the OSC investigator
with the February 25, 2016 meeting summary). 3 Accordingly, we find that the
appellant exhausted with OSC her claim that she disclosed to the Chief
Investigator of the WRD that she was forced to work significant amounts of
overtime without pay and with the knowledge of her supervisor.
      The administrative judge found that a disinterested observer in the
appellant’s position could reasonably believe that her statements to the Chief
Investigator alleging that she was required to work uncompensated overtime
evidenced a violation of the FLSA. ID at 9-10. The parties do not question this
finding on review. 4

The administrative judge properly found that the appellant’s disclosures about her
officemate were unprotected, but erred in finding that all of her disclosures about
contractors’ nonperformance were protected.
      Disclosures concerning the appellant’s officemate’s disruptive behavior
      An employee discloses a gross waste of funds when she alleges that a more
than debatable expenditure is significantly out of proportion to the benefit
reasonably expected to accrue to the Government.            Fisher v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 108 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 9 (2008).           On review, the appellant
challenges the administrative judge’s finding that her officemate’s behavior was

3
   The appellant filed a stay request with the Board in October 2016, but an
administrative judge dismissed the request as premature. Chu v. Department of
Commerce, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-17-0018-S-1, Order Dismissing Stay Request
at 1-2 (Oct. 14, 2016).
4
  We find it unnecessary to revisit this finding here. The parties do not dispute this
determination. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (reflecting that the Board generally will
consider only the issues raised on review). As discussed below, we agree with the
administrative judge that the agency met its burden to prove that it would have taken
the actions at issue here absent the appellant’s disclosure. Therefore, any error is
harmless. Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984)
(explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive
rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision). However, we observe that
according to a Standard Form 50 the appellant submitted below, she was designated as
FLSA “exempt”. IAF, Tab 25 at 4.
                                                                                   7

too trivial to constitute a protected disclosure. PFR File, Tab 7 at 7-10. She
asserts that she reasonably believed that she disclosed that her officemate violated
41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390, a Federal regulation prohibiting disturbances on public
property, and that any violation is the basis for a protected disclosure, even if de
minimis. 5 Id. at 9-10. Under 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390, all persons are prohibited
from “creat[ing] loud or unusual noise or a nuisance” or otherwise disrupting
employees in the performance of their duties.       A violation of that regulation
carries a criminal penalty. 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.450. A disclosure of a violation of
a criminal law is a disclosure of a law, rule, or regulation. Scalera v. Department
of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R. 43, ¶ 18 (2006).
      We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant disclosed a trivial
office dispute between she and her coworker.         ID at 6-7 (citing Langer v.
Department of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (concluding
that disclosures of “trivial violations do not constitute protected disclosures.”))
Specifically, the appellant alleged that her officemate was loud and disruptive
when she used the speakerphone, held meetings, and gossiped and spoke in a
foreign language with another coworker in their shared office. PFR File, Tab 7
at 7; IAF, Tab 70 at 6, 16. The appellant also described her coworker’s behavior
as “treat[ing] the office space as though it was her own,” “us[ing] the office as a
conference room,” “belligerent,” and “inconsiderate.” IAF, Tab 70 at 6, 17, 60,
62, 82-84, 238-42.    It appears that the appellant and her officemate generally
disagreed about the use of the office space and the arrangement of office
furniture.   Id. at 17, 60, 62-63, 238-42.    In fact, the appellant’s officemate
requested to be moved at one point due to the appellant’s “offensive and
disrespectful” conduct. Id. at 251-53.

5
  The parties do not dispute that 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390 applied to the appellant’s
office. IAF, Tab 24 at 4, Tab 31 at 33-34; PFR File, Tab 7 at 8-9 (citing 41 C.F.R.
§§ 102-2.10, 102-2.20). We make no finding on this issue, but we agree with the
administrative judge’s implicit finding that a reasonable person in the appellant’s
position would have believed the regulation applies. ID at 7.
                                                                                     8

      We find that any reasonable person in the appellant’s position could not
believe her coworker’s actions were the type of criminal conduct contemplated by
the identified regulation.   Cf. Drake v. Agency for International Development,
543 F.3d 1377, 1380-82 (2008) (finding that, based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, it was reasonable for the appellant to believe that he
had disclosed that his colleagues violated agency policy by being intoxicated
while on duty); see generally United States v. Broxton, 666 F. App’x 149, 150,
153 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming the criminal conviction, under 41 C.F.R.
§ 102-74.390, of a Federal security guard for creating a disturbance by engaging
in a physical altercation with a coworker in the employee locker room). 6
Therefore, the appellant has shown no error in the administrative judge’s finding
that her disclosure was not protected.

      Disclosures concerning contractor wrongdoing
      As for the appellant’s disclosures of contractors’ nonperformance, they
generally fall into two categories—disclosures of substantial nonperformance by
a Government contractor, Phacil, and several disclosures about other contractors’
more discrete performance issues.        From August through October 2015, the
appellant disclosed that Phacil should not be awarded an IT contract for FY 2016
because of its documented nonperformance. IAF, Tab 2 at 35-39, 49-160, Tab 70
at 125-28. At least as early as October 12, 2015, the appellant further disclosed
that the agency was wasting money paying Phacil because it performed
substantially below expectations and had serious product delivery delinquencies
that significantly affected the agency’s ability to fulfill its mission, especially
regarding an applications system, which accounted for nearly 10% of the
agency’s annual operating budget. IAF, Tab 2 at 19-20, 164, Tab 8 at 4-11.

6
  While decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are controlling
authority for the Board, other circuit courts’ decisions are considered persuasive, but
not controlling, authority. Morris v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 662,
¶ 15 n.12 (2016).
                                                                                      9

         The appellant also disclosed that another contractor failed to maintain
appropriate staffing levels as required by the contract and other contract
employees failed to meet individual performance expectations.                IAF, Tab 2
at 41-49.      She contended that the contractors’ failure to perform constituted a
violation of FAR § 9.104-1 and § 52.249-13 and that the agency’s failure to take
remedial action for their nonperformance constituted a gross waste of funds. 7
IAF, Tab 23 at 4-7. The administrative judge did not distinguish the appellant’s
disclosures, finding instead that she “produced sufficient evidence to show that
she reasonably believed that the contractors violated the FAR, and that the
contractors’ nonperformance resulted in a misuse of [G]overnment funds.” ID
at 9.    This distinction is significant, as only the disclosures about Phacil are
protected. 8
         Federal agencies generally may only award a competitive contract bid to a
responsible contractor.       41 U.S.C. § 3703(c).      Under FAR §§ 9.104-1(c) and
9.104-3(b), a prospective contractor is presumed to be “nonresponsible” if it “is
or recently has been seriously deficient in contract performance.”             When the
appellant made her disclosure, the agency had awarded Phacil the FY 2016
contract. IAF, Tab 8 at 7-8. Based on the appellant’s expertise, observations,
and confirmation from other management officials, it was reasonable for her to
believe that Phacil’s nonperformance was substantial enough such that the
agency’s decision to award Phacil the FY 2016 contract violated the FAR. IAF,
Tab 8 at 4-11; see Embree v. Department of the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85
(1996) (considering the appellant’s asserted subject matter expertise in finding

7
    The FAR regulations are located in Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
8
  The administrative judge also erred in finding that the appellant reasonably believed
that she disclosed a violation of FAR § 52.249-13. ID at 8-9. That provision, which
concerns facilities contracts, was eliminated over 8 years before the appellant’s
disclosures. Id.; Federal Acquisition Regulations, 72 Fed. Reg. 27364-02, 27381,
27394 (May 15, 2007). The administrative judge’s error was not harmful, as we have
nevertheless found that the appellant reasonably disclosed a violation of the FAR on
another basis. Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. at 282.
                                                                                   10

that she made a nonfrivolous allegation of gross mismanagement); Van Ee v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 64 M.S.P.R. 693, 698 (1994) (considering the
appellant’s expertise in finding that she made a nonfrivolous allegation of a gross
waste of funds).
      Further, it was also reasonable to believe that the agency was committing a
gross waste of funds by paying millions of dollars for services it was not
receiving due to Phacil’s nonperformance and that its nonperformance affected a
project that accounted for nearly 10% of the agency’s operating budget. 9 IAF,
Tab 3 at 7, Tab 8 at 4-11; see, e.g., Smith v. Department of the Army, 80 M.S.P.R.
311, ¶¶ 6, 10 (1998) (finding that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation
that he had disclosed a gross waste of funds by disclosing that the agency spent
$15,000 on a fuel management system that would provide no benefit to the
Government); cf. Jensen v. Department of Agriculture, 104 M.S.P.R. 379, ¶ 10
(2007) (finding no protected disclosure of a gross waste of funds when the
appellant failed to indicate the scale of the expenditure she claimed was
improper). In contrast, the appellant could not reasonably believe that she was
disclosing a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or a gross waste of funds by
disclosing her concerns about other contractors’ staffing issues and minor,
discrete performance issues.     See Lane v. Department of Homeland Security ,
115 M.S.P.R. 342, ¶¶ 17-18 (2010) (finding that the appellant did not prove he
reasonably believed he disclosed Government wrongdoing by disclosing that

9
   The appellant’s disclosures—that agency officials ignored contract violations by
failing to remediate Phacil’s nonperformance—reveal wrongdoing on the part of the
agency, as opposed to only identifying wrongdoing by a private Government contractor
because Phacil’s nonperformance implicated the Government’s interest. See Johnson v.
Department of Health and Human Services, 93 M.S.P.R. 38, ¶¶ 10-11 (2002) (finding
that the appellant’s disclosures of wrongdoing by a private Government contractor were
protected because the identified wrongdoing implicated the Government’s interest and
reputation); see also Covington v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 5, ¶¶ 15-19
(finding that the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 did not change the
longstanding principle that a disclosure of wrongdoing committed by a non -Federal
Government entity may be protected only when the Federal Government’s interests and
good name are implicated in the alleged wrongdoing).
                                                                                 11

contractors failed to fulfill their contractual obligations to maintain staffing
levels).

The appellant proved that her disclosure concerning contractor nonperformance
was a contributing factor in the agency’s decisions to lower her FY 2015
performance rating and to issue a 1-day suspension.
      The administrative judge found that the appellant proved that her
disclosures of contractors’ nonperformance, beginning in August 2015, were a
contributing factor in the agency’s October 2015 decision to lower her FY 2015
performance rating and October 2016 decision to suspend her for 1 day.           ID
at 10-12. Based on our modifications to the administrative judge’s findings as to
the appellant’s disclosures, we further modify the initial decision to find that she
proved that her protected disclosures about the agency’s failure to act on Phacil’s
nonperformance were a contributing factor in those two personnel actions. We
also vacate the administrative judge’s finding that she proved contributing factor
as to her disclosures concerning other contractors.
      To prevail in an IRA appeal, an appellant also must prove by preponderant
evidence that her disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action.
5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 19. To
prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action, the
appellant need only demonstrate that the fact of, or the content of, the disclosure
was one of the factors that tended to affect the personnel action in any way.
Covington v. Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 5, ¶ 43.            One way to
establish contributing factor is the knowledge/timing test. Smith, 2022 MSPB 4,
¶ 19. The appellant can satisfy the test by proving that the official taking the
action had actual or constructive knowledge of the disclosure, and the action
occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude
that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action.     Id. The
knowledge portion of the knowledge/timing test can be met with allegations of
either actual or constructive knowledge. Abernathy v. Department of the Army,
                                                                                 12

2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 15. However, the knowledge/timing test is not the only way to
prove contributing factor. Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480,
¶ 14 (2012).    The Board will also consider other evidence, such as evidence
pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the
personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed towards the
officials taking the action, and whether these individuals had a desire or motive to
retaliate against the appellant. Id., ¶ 15.
      The appellant’s former supervisor rated the appellant’s performance for
FY 2015 as fully successful on October 9, 2015, and suspended her on October 3,
2016. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 31 at 33, 35-36. As previously noted, the appellant
disclosed that Phacil should not be awarded an IT contract for FY 2016 and that
the agency was wasting money on Phacil from August through October 2015.
IAF, Tab 2 at 19-20, 35-39, 49-160, 164, Tab 8 at 4-11, Tab 70 at 125-28. Thus,
the appellant has proven, under the knowledge/timing test, that her protected
disclosures concerning the agency’s FAR violation and gross waste of funds as to
Phacil were contributing factors in the agency’s decision to take both personnel
actions. See Abernathy, 2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 15.
      Regarding contributing factor as it relates to the appellant’s move to a
cubicle from her shared office, although the appellant raises other arguments on
review as to her office move, she does not contend that the responsible officials—
the Director of Program Management, the Director of the Workforce Management
Division (WMD), and a Labor Relations employee—had knowledge of her
protected disclosures regarding Phacil. PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-12; IAF, Tab 70
at 20, 22, 49. She also does not contend that they were influenced by anyone
with knowledge of her protected disclosures.      PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-12; IAF,
Tab 70 at 20, 22-24, 47-53; see Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 11 (explaining that
an appellant may establish constructive knowledge by showing that an individual
with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official accused of taking
the retaliatory action).
                                                                                13

      As to non-knowledge/timing evidence, the agency provided strong evidence
supporting its decision to move the appellant to a cubicle.           See Dorney,
117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15. Specifically, the WMD Director provided a declaration
detailing the agency’s efforts in resolving the dispute between the appellant and
her officemate and explaining its decision to move her into a cubicle instead of
into a single-occupancy office or another double-occupancy office with a
different officemate. IAF, Tab 68 at 17-20. The WMD Director explained that
WMD recommended to the Union President that the appellant be moved into a
cubicle from her double office because the appellant’s division was facing
significant space limitations at the time and so no GS-13 employees were being
provided with single offices, and further, because the appellant’s statements and
behaviors led the agency to believe that moving her into another double office
with a different officemate would be futile. Id. Additionally, the WMD Director
noted that although WMD made the recommendation that the appellant be moved
into a cubicle, the final decision on the office assignment was made by the union.
Id. at 18, 20.
      Although the appellant reasserts that the decision to move her to a cubicle
was retaliatory, she has not specifically disputed the agency’s explanation for its
decision on review. PFR File, Tab 7 at 15-16. Additionally, there is no evidence
in the record that any of the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures were directed
at any of the officials that were involved in the decision to move the appellant to
a cubicle—the Director of Program Management, the WMD Director, and the
Labor Relations Specialist—or that any of these officials had any motive to
retaliate against the appellant. IAF, Tab 2 at 377-79, Tab 23 at 56-57, Tab 68
at 17-21, Tab 70 at 47-49, 75-76; see Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15.
Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has not
proven that the agency moved her from a shared office to a cubicle in reprisal for
her protected disclosures. ID at 11-12.
                                                                                    14

The appellant proved that her disclosure of potential FLSA violations was a
contributing factor in the agency’s decision to issue the 1-day suspension.
       The administrative judge did not make specific findings addressing whether
the appellant’s February 25, 2016 FLSA disclosure was a contributing factor in
the agency’s October 2015 decision to lower her FY 2015 performance rating, the
October 2016 decision to suspend her for 1 day, or the July 19, 2016 decision to
move her from a double-occupancy office to a cubicle, and so we do so in the
first instance.
       The timing prong of the knowledge/timing test is met for the 1-day
suspension and the move to a cubicle because the agency took those actions less
than 1 year after the appellant made the disclosure to Chief Investigator of the
WRD on February 25, 2016. IAF, Tab 1 at 823-28, Tab 2 at 377, Tab 31 at 33,
35-36, Tab 68 at 20; see Abernathy, 2022 MSPB 37, ¶ 15 (recognizing that
personnel actions occurring within 1 to 2 years after the protected disclosures are
sufficient to meet the timing portion of the test). However, because the appellant
first disclosed the potential FLSA violations on February 25, 2016, after the
October 2015 decision to lower her FY 2015 performance rating, the disclosure
could not have contributed to the agency’s decision to take that action. IAF,
Tab 5 at 4; see Johnson v. Department of Justice, 104 M.S.P.R. 624, ¶ 26 (2007)
(determining that a disclosure made after the personnel actions at issue could not
have been a contributing factor in those personnel actions).
       Regarding the knowledge prong of the test, as set forth in greater detail
above, the only agency official the appellant alleged was aware of her disclosure
was the Chief Investigator of the WRD. 10 IAF, Tab 1 at 823-28, Tab 70 at 63-64.
The appellant also alleged that the Chief Investigator was involved in the
suspension decision by assisting her former first-line supervisor with the

10
  Although the appellant noted that her former first-line supervisor was aware that she
often worked overtime hours, she did not allege that she made a protected disclosure of
wrongdoing to her supervisor in connection with her overtime work, nor did she exhaust
any such claim with OSC. IAF, Tab 70 at 30-31.
                                                                                15

suspension proposal and decision and by coordinating the oral reply. IAF, Tab 23
at 17, 51, Tab 70 at 35, 65.         Accordingly, we conclude, based on the
knowledge/timing test, that the appellant proved that her disclosure of potential
FLSA violations was a contributing factor in the decision to issue the 1-day
suspension.
      With respect to the decision to move her from an office to a cubicle, the
appellant has not alleged that the Chief Investigator of the WRD played any role
in that decision, nor has she alleged that any of the other agency officials
responsible for that decision had knowledge of her FLSA disclosure.            The
appellant also has not alleged that any person involved in the cubicle move
decision was influenced by the Chief Investigator—the only official with
knowledge of the FLSA disclosure.        See Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 11.
Further, as previously set forth in greater detail, the agency’s reasons for moving
the appellant to a cubicle were valid and there is no evidence that the appellant’s
FLSA disclosure was directed at any of the officials involved in the office move
decision, and so the appellant failed to prove contributing factor based on
non-knowledge/timing evidence.
      In summary, we conclude that the appellant established that her
February 25, 2016 disclosure of potential FLSA violations was a contributing
factor in the agency’s decision to issue the 1-day suspension, but it did not
contribute to the decisions to lower the appellant’s FY 2015 performance rating
or to move her from a shared office to a cubicle.

The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have lowered
the appellant’s performance rating and suspended her absent her protected
disclosures.
      In determining whether an agency has met this burden, the Board will
consider all of the relevant factors, including the following (“ Carr factors”):
(1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the action; (2) the
existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
                                                                                16

officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency
takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are
otherwise similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB
6, ¶ 11; see also Carr v. Social Security Administration , 185 F.3d 1318, 1323
(Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does not view these factors as discrete elements,
each of which the agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence. Rather,
the Board will weigh the factors together to determine whether the evidence is
clear and convincing as a whole.        Lu v. Department of Homeland Security,
122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). The Board considers all of the evidence presented,
including evidence that detracts from the conclusion that the agency met its
burden. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

      We vacate the administrative judge’s finding that the agency met its burden
      of proving that it would have relocated the appellant to a cubicle absent
      her protected disclosures.
      On review, the appellant alleges that the administrative judge erred in
finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
have moved her to a cubicle absent her protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 7
at 15-16. Given that we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did
not prove that her disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
to move her to a cubicle, it is unnecessary to determine whether the agency
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action at
issue in the absence of her protected activity.      ID at 11-12; see Fisher v.
Department of the Interior, 2023 MSPB 11, ¶ 10. Accordingly, we decline to
consider the appellant’s other challenges to the administrative judge’s findings on
this point.
                                                                                      17

      The agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      lowered the appellant’s performance rating and suspended her in the
      absence of her protected disclosures.
      Regarding the first Carr factor and the appellant’s lowered performance
rating, the administrative judge found that the agency offered evidence supporting
its decision. ID at 16-17. In reaching that finding, he relied upon the explanation
of the appellant’s former supervisor and rating official as to why he rated the
appellant commendable in FY 2014, and lowered her rating in FY 2015 to fully
successful. Id. In FY 2014, the rating official rated the appellant commendable
in all performance elements, earning her a summary rating of commendable. 11
IAF, Tab 4 at 23. In FY 2015, he rated her commendable in three performance
elements and fully successful in two performance elements, from which she
earned enough points for a summary rating of fully successful. IAF, Tab 5 at 26.
      On review, the appellant argues that her work product was outstanding, as
shown by the seven statements from “high level directors” attesting to her
performance in FY 2015, and so the agency failed to clearly and convincingly
show that her performance was deserving of a performance rating less than
commendable. PFR File, Tab 7 at 13-14. We agree that these statements show
she performed at a high level, and her former supervisor expressly recognized her
positive contributions by rating her commendable in three categories.               IAF,
Tab 43 at 62-66, Tab 70 at 191-202.         Nevertheless, his decision to lower her
rating to fully successful in the areas of “Individual Leadership” and “Customer
Support” was supported by the record. He received several complaints from a
manager about the appellant’s conduct during meetings and other interactions
indicating that she was increasingly challenging to work with, overstepped her
boundaries, dominated meetings, and had difficulties working on a team. IAF,
Tab 67 at 8-12.     The appellant has provided no reason for discrediting the

11
  The agency rated the appellant on a five-tier scale with potential ratings, from lowest
to highest, of unacceptable/unsatisfactory, marginal/minimally satisfactory, fully
successful, commendable, and outstanding. IAF, Tab 4 at 18, 21.
                                                                                 18

veracity of the complaints and has set forth no persuasive argument for excluding
them from consideration in her performance appraisal.
      Regarding the appellant’s 1-day suspension, the agency suspended the
appellant based on one charge of improper conduct, supported by four
specifications—one specification based on her failure to work at her assigned
workstation and three specifications of sending inappropriate and highly critical
emails concerning contractors’ nonperformance.       IAF, Tab 32 at 32-37.      The
administrative judge failed to consider that specification 2 was grounded in the
appellant’s protected disclosure. ID at 19-21. The specification was based on an
email the appellant sent to agency officials that criticized Phacil for its
nonperformance. IAF, Tab 32 at 32, Tab 42 at 7-18. The highly critical nature of
the appellant’s email is not unexpected and is insufficient to render her disclosure
unprotected. See Greenspan v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 464 F.3d 1297,
1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (recognizing that a disclosure is not exempt from
protection simply because it may have been presented in a critical manner).
Thus, specification 2 cannot serve as evidence in support of the agency’s burden
of establishing that it would have disciplined the appellant for reasons unrelated
to her protected disclosure. Id. at 1305 (finding that the agency failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it would have disciplined the appellant absent
his protected disclosures when those same disclosures served as the basis for the
discipline); see also Chambers v. Department of the Interior, 602 F.3d 1370,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating that discipline may not be based on a protected
disclosure).   The critical question is whether the agency proved by clear and
convincing evidence that it would have suspended the appellant for 1 day based
on her misconduct as set forth in specifications 1, 3, and 4 alone. See Parikh v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R. 197, ¶¶ 8, 40 (2011) (assessing
whether the agency would have removed an appellant for unauthorized release
and disclosure of private and protected information based only his disclosures of
                                                                                       19

information that were not protected whistleblowing). We find that the agency
met its burden. 12
      As to specification 1, the agency stated that the appellant had worked over
700 hours from an unauthorized location within the agency’s headquarters. IAF,
Tab 32 at 32. The appellant admitted that she was not working at her assigned
workstation during those hours but rather in the lobby and cafeteria of the
agency’s headquarters. PFR File, Tab 7 at 17; ID at 21. Although the appellant
argues that she was permitted to work in those other locations, PFR File, Tab 7
at 17-18, the administrative judge correctly found that the evidence supported the
agency’s contention that agency policy prohibited her from using those
unapproved alternate worksites as her primary workstation.                ID at 21; IAF,
Tab 66 at 81-88 (deposition testimony of the appellant), Tab 67 at 13-14, 17-22,
Tab 68 at 5-6, 12-13.       The administrative judge also found that the agency
provided evidence in support of specifications 3 and 4. ID at 21.
      On review, the appellant argues that her emails were not improper, but
rather were protected disclosures of wrongdoing that she was permitted to raise
directly with the contractors. PFR File, Tab 7 at 18-20. However, as explained
above, these disclosures were not protected. The appellant’s former supervisor,
who was the deciding official, emphasized that it was not within the appellant’s
job   duties   to    supervise   contractors   and   that,   based   on    her   improper
communications, she risked binding the agency to unauthorized contractual
obligations or exposing it to added liabilities. IAF, Tab 68 at 7. The appellant

12
   The appellant submits emails dated August to September 2016 regarding her oral
reply and an undated instant message conversation with her former supervisor about
properly recording her telework in the time and attendance system. PFR File, Tab 7
at 22-30. These documents, which are dated prior to the issuance of the initial decision,
do not appear to be in the record below, and the appellant has not explained why she
failed to submit them below. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board will not consider
evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing that
it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence.
Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). Thus, we decline to
consider these documents.
                                                                                 20

also disputes that she admitted her emails were improper.         PFR File, Tab 7
at 18-19. Regardless of the lack of admission, it is apparent, given the tone and
content of the identified emails, that her conduct was improper. IAF, Tab 31
at 70-71, Tab 42 at 22-23, 27-30; see Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326 (observing that
Federal whistleblower protections are “not meant to protect employees from their
own misconduct”); Redfearn v. Department of Labor, 58 M.S.P.R. 307, 316
(1993) (recognizing that an agency is entitled to expect its employees to conform
to certain accepted standards of civil behavior and decorum). In any event, the
deciding official stressed that the agency was particularly concerned with time
and attendance issues and that he would have suspended the appellant for 1 day
based on specification 1 alone. IAF, Tab 68 at 6. Accordingly, the agency has
submitted strong evidence showing that it would have suspended the appellant for
1 day even absent specification 2 and her other protected disclosures.
      Regarding the second Carr factor, the administrative judge found that the
appellant’s former supervisor had no motive to retaliate against her. ID at 17.
On review, the appellant argues that he had a motive to retaliate against her
because he was implicated by her disclosures, given that he was the Branch Chief
overseeing the Phacil contract in 2014. PFR File, Tab 7 at 14-15.
      Agency officials may have a motive to retaliate even when they are not
directly implicated by the disclosures, are not directly involved in the retaliatory
actions, or are not personally named in the disclosure because the disclosure
could reflect poorly on them in their capacity as managers and employees.
Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370-72; Mattil v. Department of State, 118 M.S.P.R. 662,
¶ 27 (2012). Although the appellant identifies evidence showing that Phacil was
not performing to the terms of its contract in 2014, she has not identified any
evidence in the record showing that her former supervisor was responsible for
overseeing the Phacil contract in 2014, and thereby directly or indirectly
implicated by her disclosures. PFR File, Tab 7 at 15; IAF, Tab 70 at 123. To the
extent that the Phacil disclosures may have reflected poorly on the appellant’s
                                                                                   21

former supervisor as a manager or employee, we find that her former supervisor
had a strong motive to retaliate against her based on those disclosures.          See
Robinson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 923 F.3d 1004, 1019 (Fed. Cir.
2019) (considering under the second Carr factor whether there was a professional
motive to retaliate); Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 7,
¶ 65 (addressing the second Carr factor consistent with Whitmore to find that the
appellant’s disclosures generally put higher-level management officials in a
critical light by disclosing problems for which they were responsible); Chavez v.
Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶¶ 32-33 (2013) (finding that
an appellant’s disclosures of subordinate employees’ wrongdoing created a
motive to retaliate on the part of their first- and second -level supervisors).
      The appellant does not argue that the Chief Investigator of WRD—the only
official to whom she disclosed potential violations of the FLSA—had any motive
to retaliate against her based on her disclosure. There is also no evidence in the
record that the Chief Investigator influenced any of the officials responsible for
taking any of the challenged personnel actions.        However, the appellant does
suggest that her former supervisor was implicated in the disclosure because he
was aware that she was working excessive hours and permitted or encouraged her
to do so.   IAF, Tab 70 at 15-16, 30-31.        Accordingly, to the extent that the
appellant’s disclosure of potential FLSA violations reflected poorly on her former
supervisor, we find that the supervisor had a strong motive to retaliate.         We
modify the initial decision in this regard.
      Further, the appellant argues that her former supervisor sent an email on
April 14, 2016, showing that his decision to take “adverse actions” against the
appellant was motivated by her protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 7 at 15. In
the email, he commented on a string of emails forwarded to him by a human
resources employee from the appellant complaining about another supervisor’s
decision to move her to another shared office.        IAF, Tab 70 at 231-42.      The
appellant does not allege that she exhausted that disclosure with OSC; therefore,
                                                                              22

the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider it in connection with the instant IRA
appeal.   Mason v. Department of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8
(2011) (explaining that the Board may only consider those disclosures of
information and personnel actions that the appellant raised before OSC). There is
no indication that her former supervisor was discussing or otherwise referencing
the appellant’s protected disclosures. Accordingly, this email is not a basis for
finding that her former supervisor had a motive to retaliate against her.
      Finally, the administrative judge weighed the third Carr factor in the
agency’s favor. ID at 17, 21. As to her FY 2015 performance evaluation, the
appellant does not dispute the administrative judge’s findings that her former
supervisor issued fully successful ratings to non-whistleblowers for FY 2015. ID
at 16-17. As to her 1-day suspension, she argues that the comparators that the
agency offered were not similarly situated because they engaged in more severe
misconduct. PFR File, Tab 7 at 20-21. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit clarified that employees may be similarly situated even if there are
differences in the degrees of misconduct, but that such differences “should be
accounted for” in “arriv[ing] at a well reasoned conclusion.” Whitmore, 680 F.3d
at 1373-74. With regard to the lowered performance rating, the agency offered
evidence showing that the appellant’s former supervisor rated eight of his twenty
employees fully successful, five of whom were also GS-13 employees. ID at 17;
IAF, Tab 68 at 9.
      Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s former
supervisor rated non-whistleblowers the same as the appellant under similar
circumstances. ID at 17. The agency also submitted a spreadsheet listing over
180 instances in which the agency proposed discipline for employees’ time and
attendance-related misconduct between 2013 and 2015. IAF, Tab 68 at 24, 27-45.
Further, the agency submitted a declaration from the Chief Investigator of the
WRD, in which he asserted under penalty of perjury that the agency “considered
employees working from an unauthorized location to be absent without leave.”
                                                                                     23

IAF, Tab 68 at 23. The agency also identified two employees that received more
severe punishment for their time and attendance abuse—primarily for claiming
time not worked. IAF, Tab 31 at 15-16. The evidence shows that the agency
consistently punishes employees for time and attendance violations and issues
proportionate punishment relative to the severity of the misconduct, regardless of
their whistleblowing activities or lack thereof.
      When balancing the three Carr factors, we find that the agency met its
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have lowered
the appellant’s performance rating and suspended her in the absence of her
protected disclosures, even considering the presence of a strong retaliatory
motive, because of the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its
decisions and the comparator evidence presented. Accordingly, we affirm the
initial decision as modified.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 13
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

13
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                 24

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.          5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following
address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
                                                                                 25

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC    review    of   cases   involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.    5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.         See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
                                                                                     26

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 14 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).

14
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                27

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.