Court Opinion

ID: 9554330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 17:12:50.370435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:09.960821
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        AUG 8 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENRIQUE JEVONS, as a managing member No. 22-35050
of Jevons Properties LLC; et al.,
                                      D.C. No. 1:20-cv-03182-SAB
               Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

JAY INSLEE, in his official capacity of the
Governor of the State of Washington;
ROBERT FERGUSON, in his official
capacity of the Attorney General of the State
of Washington,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Eastern District of Washington
                Stanley A. Bastian, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 10, 2023
                               Seattle, Washington

Before: BYBEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and GORDON,** District Judge.

      Plaintiffs are rental property owners who challenged the constitutionality of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
              The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, United States District Judge for
the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
Washington State Governor Jay Inslee’s state-wide moratorium on residential

evictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of Governor Inslee and Washington Attorney General Robert

Ferguson, rejecting Plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge only the

district court’s rejection of their claim for a declaratory judgment that the eviction

moratorium violated the Takings and Contracts Clauses of the U.S Constitution.1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we vacate and remand with

instructions for the district court to dismiss this case as moot.

      The eviction moratorium that Plaintiffs challenge—Proclamation 21-19—

expired in June 2021,2 and Governor Inslee’s “Bridge Proclamation” expired in

October 2021.3 Governor Inslee terminated Washington’s COVID-19 state of

emergency, and all other related emergency proclamations, in October 2022.4 In

Plaintiffs’ own words, they seek purely retrospective declaratory relief, i.e., a

      1
         Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s rejection of their Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, Washington Takings Clause, or injunctive relief
claims. Any challenge related to these claims is therefore forfeited. See Jones v.
Allison, 9 F.4th 1136, 1139 n.6 (9th Cir. 2021).
       2
         Wash. Office of the Governor, Proclamation 20-19.6 (March 18, 2021),
https://governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/proc_20-19.6.pdf.
       3
         Wash. Office of the Governor, Proclamation 21-09.2 (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/21-09.2%20%20-%20COVID-
19%20Eviction%20bridge%20transition%20Ext%20%28tmp%29.pdf.
       4
         See Wash. Office of the Governor, Proclamation 20-05.1 (Oct. 28, 2022),
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-
05.1_%20Coronavirus%20RESCISSION_%28tmp%29.pdf.

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declaration that Defendants “effected a temporary taking and unconstitutionally

interfered with their contractual rights in the past.”

      The mootness doctrine, “which is embedded in Article III’s case or

controversy requirement, requires that an actual, ongoing controversy exist at all

stages of federal court proceedings.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 861 F.3d 853,

862 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The test for determining whether a claim for

declaratory relief is moot is whether “there is a substantial controversy, between

parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant

the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511

F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

       “[A] declaratory judgment merely adjudicating past violations of federal

law—as opposed to continuing or future violations of federal law—is not an

appropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Bayer, 861 F.3d at 868. Thus, this case

is moot because the challenged activity—the eviction moratorium—has expired and

no longer has a “continuing and brooding presence” that would have “a substantial

adverse effect” on Plaintiffs. See id. at 867 (quoting Seven Words LLC v. Network

Sols., 260 F.3d 1089, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Brach v. Newsom, 38 F.4th

6, 11 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that claims for declaratory and injunctive

relief against the California Governor’s COVID-19 school-closure orders were moot

after rescission of those orders). Without a live controversy for us to resolve, a bare

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declaratory judgment that Defendants violated the Constitution in the past would

amount to an impermissible advisory opinion. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Garland,

42 F.4th 1078, 1087 (9th Cir. 2022) (“What makes a declaratory judgment a proper

judicial resolution of a ‘case or controversy’ rather than an advisory opinion is the

settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the

plaintiff.” (cleaned up)).

      We are unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments that we may issue a declaratory

judgment to “determine whether a constitutional violation occurred,” with “the

remedy [to] be fixed later.”5 The Supreme Court cases that Plaintiffs rely on for this

proposition, such as Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021), are

inapposite because they involved challenges to operative laws. And although

Plaintiffs are correct that the Declaratory Judgment Act allows a party to seek

“[f]urther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2202, the statute merely provides an additional remedy in federal court; it cannot

override the mootness doctrine. See City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.-

West, 614 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2010).

      Plaintiffs indicated they seek to use a declaratory judgment that a

      5
        Plaintiffs do not meaningfully address whether either of the recognized
exceptions to the mootness doctrine—“voluntary cessation” and “capable of
repetition yet evading review”—apply. We find these exceptions inapplicable for
the same reasons articulated in Brach. 38 F.4th at 11–12.

                                          4
constitutional violation occurred to later secure just compensation or damages in

state court. The issuance of a declaratory judgment for such a purpose is barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1985); Native

Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 552 (9th Cir. 1991)

(“[D]eclaratory relief is not available if its sole efficacy would be as res judicata in

a subsequent state court action for retroactive damages or restitution.”); see also

Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The Eleventh Amendment does

not permit retrospective declaratory relief.”).

      VACATED and REMANDED.

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