Court Opinion

ID: 9734675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:42:20.207848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:26.771877
License: Public Domain

Cynar, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the grant of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the negligence count of plaintiffs complaint, which summary judgment was certified as a final order. We affirm.
On August 24, 1973, defendant-attorney, Gary C. Berger, commenced a civil action in Wayne County Circuit Court in favor of his clients, Linda and Gerald Koras, against Suburban Radiology Associates, P.C., and Herbert Schunk, M.D. In the action, Mr. and Mrs. Koras sought damages because of Dr. Schunk’s failure to diagnose an ectopic pregnancy from X-ray films taken of Mrs. Koras which were reviewed by Dr. Schunk. Mrs. Koras had been referred to Dr. Schunk for a hysterosalpingogram, *166a a procedure whereby an opaque substance is introduced and an X-ray is taken of the patient’s uterus, ovaries, and fallopian tubes. The procedure is intended to indicate the existence of an ectopic pregnancy when the opaque substance is not able to fully circulate due to an obstruction in the fallopian tube.
Dr. Schunk’s review of Mrs. Koras’ hysterosalpingogram on June 28, 1972, detected no ectopic pregnancy. On July 2, 1972, Linda Koras required surgery for a ruptured fallopian tube.
On August 25, 1976, a notice of discontinuance of the Koras medical malpractice action against Dr. Schunk was filed. This notice was signed by Dr. Schunk’s and plaintiffs’ attorneys. No settlement money was paid, nor were costs assessed.
On November 2, 1977, the instant cause of action was commenced. Dr. Schunk complains that defendants, in their representation of Mr. and Mrs. Koras in a malpractice action wherein Dr. Schunk was named as a defendant, breached various duties allegedly owing to Dr. Schunk. Plaintiff specifically complains of defendants’ alleged failure to investigate the merits of the Koras claim prior to the commencement of the medical malpractice action against Dr. Schunk. The complaint was framed in two counts, negligence and malicious prosecution.
After the commencement of Dr. Schunk’s action herein, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to count I, or the negligence count of plaintiffs complaint, indicating that under the current state of the law an attorney does not owe a legal duty to his client’s adversary, the breach of which would support a negligence action. The trial court denied defen*167dants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim of malicious prosecution.
In affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the negligence count, we rely on Friedman v Dozorc, 83 Mich App 429; 268 NW2d 673 (1978), lv gtd 405 Mich 823 (1979), and Gasis v Schwartz, 80 Mich App 600; 264 NW2d 76 (1978).
In Friedman, the Court noted that an attorney has a duty to be a zealous advocate. The lawyer’s obligation to his client thus permits the lawyer to assert that view of the law most favorable to the client. Accordingly, the attorney is not to be liable in negligence to a third party.
This Court in Friedman cited other decisions addressing a factual situation similar to that in the case before us. The holding of those cases was that the attorney was not to be held liable to one other than the client. Free access to the courts was the rationale underlying the conclusion of those courts. Public policy demands that persons shall be entitled to resort to the courts for redress of wrongs; the law is intended to protect them when, in resorting to the courts, individuals act in good faith and upon reasonable grounds.
This Qourt in Friedman also commented that, notwithstanding the demise of the privity requirement, plaintiff must show the existence of a duty in order to recover. That question normally is to be resolved by the judge. Thus, it was decided that the trial court had acted properly in finding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim of negligence.
In the case of Gasis, the plaintiff, a medical doctor named as a defendant in a medical malpractice action brought by the defendant-attorney’s clients, sued the attorneys for negligence in the commencement of a medical malpractice ac*168tion. The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court, in granting the defendant-attorney’s motion, found that the attorneys owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs.
In affirming the decision of the trial court in that regard, this Court stated as follows:
"Plaintiffs allege, however, that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants Stanley Schwartz and Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz, Tyler and Gordon, P.C. That claim, plaintiffs allege, was not for malicious prosecution but for negligence. Defendant attorneys, plaintiffs argue, have a duty to adverse parties not to institute lawsuits without first undertaking a thorough investigation to determine whether the action is meritorious, and failure so to investigate constitutes actionable negligence vis-á-vis the adverse parties.
"This novel theory has apparently not been ruled upon heretofore by an appellate court of this state. A similar claim was recently rejected, however, by the California Court of Appeals in Norton v Hines, 49 Cal App 3d 917; 123 Cal Rptr 237 (1975). The California court said, Norton, 49 Cal App 3d 917, 921:
" 'In the case at bar a former litigant is suing adverse counsel. Clearly, an adverse party is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel’s client. If a cause of action exists against attorneys for the reasons alleged here, it must be pleaded as an action for malicious prosecution. We see no reason to extend applicable law now found in cases involving attorneys and third parties when there is sound and recognized public policy for limiting the cause of action to malicious prosecution under the facts as pleaded by Norton.’ ” Id., 602-603.
In addition to the Michigan cases cited herein, a number of other states have reached a similar result. The New York Court of Appeals in Drago v *169Buonaguiro, 46 NY2d 778; 413 NYS2d 910; 386 NE2d 821 (1978), held that a doctor’s complaint did not state a cause of action against the attorney in negligence.
The complaint in O’Toole v Franklin, 279 Or 513; 569 P2d 561 (1977), contained allegations that the defendant-attorneys had commenced a medical malpractice action against the plaintiff-physicians alleging that the physicians had improperly administered certain drugs to the attorneys’ client. The second count of the physicians’ complaint alleged that the attorneys had been negligent in not properly investigating the case and in not advising their client that he had no just claim against the plaintiffs. The trial court concluded that the physicians’ complaint did not state a cause of action.
The finding of no duty was made by the court in Hill v Willmott, 561 SW2d 331 (Ky App, 1978). The issue addressed by that court was whether a former litigant can sustain an action based on the theory of negligence against the adverse party’s attorney in a prior suit. Plaintiff in that case was a physician who had been sued for giving an incorrect diagnosis. The court examined the elements of a cause of action for negligence and found that the main flaw in the physician’s reasoning lay in his assumption that a duty was owing from the attorneys to him:
"Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, it is readily apparent that Willmott did not owe the alleged duty urged by Hill nor was the appellant an intended beneficiary of Willmott’s services. Willmott’s alleged failure to investigate the facts and law prior to the filing of the suit in his name would have been material as to the question of 'probable cause’ in a malicious prosecution action if such had been pleaded. *170However, his alleged failure to investigate was not a duty owing to Hill and as such does not constitute a cause of action by him.” Id., 335.
In Lyddon v Shaw, 56 Ill App 3d 815; 372 NE2d 685 (1978), attorney Shaw was retained by defendant Trembath to bring a medical malpractice action against a surgeon. As a result of that medical malpractice action, the plaintiff-physician brought an action against both Shaw and Trembath stating that they had filed claims against him without first investigating the relevant X-rays and without first obtaining the opinion of a qualified physician. Plaintiff alleged causes of action pertaining to defendant’s duty to refrain from bringing suit without having reasonable cause to believe that the action was tenable, defendant’s failure to exercise the skill required of an attorney at law in filing and maintaining the lawsuit, and the attorney’s alleged violation of the Illinois barratry statute.
Plaintiff cited no express basis for the patient’s duty to refraim from willfully and wantonly filing baseless suits, but, in support of his cause of action against the attorney, plaintiff cited only the Disciplinary Rules of the Canons of Ethics. The Lyddon court refused to impose liability on the attorney on those grounds and stated as follows:
"However, in spite of the increasing scope of the malpractice problem and the growing interest in curbing frivolous malpractice suits, courts in reported cases have refused to enlarge the tort remedies available to physicians, holding that the physicians’ remedy for the wrongful filing of a medical malpractice action is limited to a cause of action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process * * *.
"* * * While we acknowledge the seriousness of the medical malpractice problem, we believe there is a *171more basic and important consideration of public policy which prohibits any enlargement of the potential tort liability incurred by those who file even groundless lawsuits. Free access to the courts as a means of settling private claims or disputes is a fundamental component of our judicial system, and '* * * courts should be open to litigants for the settlement of their rights without fear of prosecution for calling upon the courts to determine such rights.’ * * * This same public interest demands that we reject any effort to extend the tort liability for the wrongful filing of a lawsuit beyond the ambit of an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. These considerations apply with equal force, not only to a party litigant, but to his counsel [citation omitted] since a litigant’s free access to the courts would frequently be of little value to him if he were denied counsel of his choice by a rule which rendered attorneys fearful of being held liable as insurers of the merits of their client’s case, and therefore unwilling to undertake representation in close or difficult matters. The very purpose of a court of law is to determine whether an action filed by a party has merit and we refuse to recognize a rule which would render a litigant and his attorney liable in tort for negligently (or even, willfully and wantonly) failing to determine in advance that which, ultimately, only the courts could determine.” Id., 821-822.
In Pantone v Demos, 59 Ill App 3d 328; 375 NE2d 480 (1978), the case involved an action by two doctors against an attorney for the latter’s alleged wrongful naming of them as defendants in a medical malpractice action. The physicians sought to allege a cause of action entitling them to new legal remedies which they argued should be available to doctors whose livelihoods may be endangered by the filing of supposedly frivolous malpractice actions. The Pantone court cited Lyddon in reaffirming the public policy of free access to the courts. It concluded that there was no historical basis for the willful and wanton cause of action *172proposed therein that the plaintiffs alleged: that the defendants owed them a duty to refrain from willfully and wantonly bringing suit against them without having reasonable cause to believe that they were guilty of medical malpractice. The court alluded to the overriding public policy of free and unfettered access to courts by potential suitors and said that such policy required rejection of the plaintiffs’ position. As to the issue of whether an attorney could be held liable to a former adverse litigant for professional negligence, the court stated that the answer must be no:
"Establishment of such a negligence cause of action would clearly inhibit free access to the courts. * * * Even those courts which have liberalized the scope of an attorney’s duty of care to include intended beneficiaries of the original attorney-client relationship have refused to recognize a duty under the facts of the instant case.” Id., 335. See also Berlin v Nathan, 64 Ill App 3d 940; 381 NE2d 1367 (1978).
A similar holding was reached by the court in Bickel v Mackie, 447 F Supp 1376 (ND Iowa, 1978). That case grew out of an unsuccessful medical malpractice action by defendant acting on the advice of his counsel. The medical malpractice suit was summarily dismissed, and plaintiff-physician brought a cause of action against the attorney alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process and negligence. As to the negligence cause of action, the physician alleged that the patient’s attorney had acted improperly in advising his client with regard to commencement and prosecution of the medical malpractice action and was thus liable to the physician for damages. However, the court refused to allow the physician’s cause of action:
*173"However, in the present case there is no question of reliance of third parties who are adversaries in judicial proceedings. The attorney owes his primary and paramount duty to this client. The very nature of the adversary process precludes reliance by opposing parties. While it is true that the attorney owes a general duty to the judicial system, it is not the type of duty which translates into liability for negligence to an opposing party where there is no foreseeable reliance by that party on the attorney’s conduct.” Id., 1381.
The court in Brody v Ruby, 267 NW2d 902 (Iowa, 1978), was cognizant of the public policy which encourages clients to solve their problems in the courts. In the physician’s counter-suit involved there, the doctor alleged a right to recovery on account of defendants’ alleged negligence. That court held that, absent special circumstances, an attorney will be held liable only to the client for the consequences of the attorney’s professional negligence. The third party, in order to proceed successfully in a legal malpractice action, must be a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services. Where such a special relationship between the attorney and the third party is lacking, courts will refuse to impose liability based on legal malpractice.
In Spencer v Burglass, 337 So 2d 596 (La App, 1976), the plaintiff-physician sought damages against the defendant-attorney. The latter party had commenced an earlier medical malpractice action on behalf of his client against the doctor. The physician complained of the attorney’s alleged failure to consult with any expert witnesses prior to trial, to refrain from filing frivolous suits having no basis in law or in fact, and to consult with witnesses prior to the filing of suit or trial. The court rejected the doctor’s claim to a right to recover for the breach of any duty owed her.
*174Similarly, in Norton v Hines, 49 Cal App 3d 917; 123 Cal Rptr 237 (1975), the appellate court found the trial court to have acted properly when it dismissed the plaintiffs cause of action for professional negligence. Plaintiff in Norton, in a separate suit, had been an adversary of the defendant-attorney’s client. In Norton, plaintiff claimed that the attorney owed a duty to him as a foreseeable third party to exercise reasonable care in advising the client to commence a lawsuit against the third person when the attorney knew that advice would cause the client to commence the suit and that the client lacked probable cause to sue. The court found that an adverse party clearly is not an intended beneficiary of the adverse counsel’s client. Thus, if any cause of action exists against an adverse counsel, it might be an action for malicious prosecution, but certainly not for negligence. The court alluded to sound and recognized public policy reasons for not extending recovery to causes of action sounding in negligence.
Following the policy and case law discussed above, we decline to allow a cause of action in negligence against an attorney by a client’s adverse party under the circumstances of the instant case.
Affirmed.
Danhof, C.J., concurred.