Court Opinion

ID: 9636869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:46:22.878282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:50.470120
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell :
Defendant-appellant was indicted on two bills, one for murder and one for manslaughter. Both indictments allege that on or about September 21, 1958, in Philadelphia County, Boy Ladd, with force and arms, feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, assaulted Dorothy Pierce and wilfully and with malice aforethought, killed and murdered her; and in another count charged that Boy Ladd feloniously, wilfully and with malice aforethought, gave Dorothy Pierce a mortal wound from which mortal wound she died on November 1, 1959. Defendant moved to quash the indictments because death occurred more than a year and a day after the stroke, and consequently he could not, under the common law definition of murder, be guilty of murder or manslaughter. The court below overruled the motion and defendant appealed.
We are all agreed that the crucial question is whether the year and a day rule is part of the present law of Pennsylvania. Mr. Justice Bok and Mr. Justice Musmanno have made an exhaustive review of common law murder.* I agree with Justice Bok’s conclusion, *176but I reach that conclusion by a very different route. From my examination of the authorities I am convinced that the year and a day rule was, at common law, part and parcel — and an absolutely essential indispensable part and parcel — of the substantive law of murder: Statutes of Gloucester, 6 Edward I, Ch. 9 (1278); Sir Edward Cohe, Lord Chief Justice of England, 3rd Institutes of Laws of England, Ch. VII, page 52 (Circa 1620); IV Blackstone’s Commentaries, Ch. 14, page 197; Hawkins “Pleas of the Crown”, Vol. 1, 8th Ed. (1824), Ch. 13, §9, page 93; Stephens’ History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol. 3, pages 7, 8; Bussell’s Law of Crimes, 7th Ed., page 690; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 9, 2nd Ed., §734, page 428; Chitty, The Criminal Law, Vol. 3, page 276; Wharton’s American Criminal Law, Vol. 2, §1073; Warren on Homicide, Vol. 1, page 60; Perkins on Criminal Law, page 605; 40 C.J.S., Homicide, §12, page 856; 26 Am. Jur., §46, page 190; Louisville E. & St. L. R.R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230.
A few quotations will suffice:
Sir Edward Coke said: “Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully killed within any county of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king’s peace, with malice aforethought, either expressed by the party, or implied by law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, &c. die of the wound, or hurt, &c. within a year and a day after the same.”
IV Blackstone’s Commentaries, Ch. 14, page 197: “In order also to make the killing murder it is requisite that the party die within a year and a day after the stroke received or cause of death administered.”
In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 9, 2nd Ed., §734, page 428, the following appears: “If death does not ensue until after the expiration of a year and a day from the date when the injury was inflicted, it is an *177irrebuttable presumption of law that the death is attributable to some other cause and the person who inflicted the injury is not punishable for either murder or manslaughter.”
In Bussell’s Law of Crimes, 7th Ed., page 690, it is stated: “Time of Death. No person can be convicted of murder or manslaughter of another, who does not die within a year and a day after the stroke received, or cause of death administered in the computation of which the whole day upon which the hurt was done is to be reckoned the first.”
In Wharton’s American Criminal Law, Yol. 2, §1073, (6th Ed.) it is said: “An indictment upon which it does not appear that the death happened within a year and a day after the wound was given is fatally defective; because, when the death does not ensue within a year and a day after the wound is inflicted, the law presumes that it proceeded from some other cause.”
The Act of January 2-8, 1777, 1 Smith’s Laws 429, §2, 46 PS §152, provides: “Each and every one of the laws or acts of general assembly that were in force and binding on the inhabitants of the said province on the 14th of May last shall be in force and binding upon the inhabitants of this state . . . and the common law and such of the statute laws of England as have heretofore been in force in the said province. . . .”
We are then presented with the question: Was the common law rule of a year and a day part of the common law of the Province or of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1777 and if so, has it been changed or should it now be changed? My answer to the first part of this question is that there is no Statute or decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which was created on May 22, 1722 which expressly or by necessary implication holds that the year and a day rule is or ever was part of the law of Pennsylvania; *178on the contrary numerous decisions of this Court by their definition of “murder” clearly negate the existence of any such rule.
It is hornbook law that the common law is not and was not as immutable as the law of the Medes and the Persians; it was a gradual development of law which slowly changed to meet changing conditions. Murder has often been defined by the Courts of this Commonwealth but we repeat has never been defined to include the rule of a year and a day, and consequently that rule is not an essential element or part of the substantive law of Pennsylvania.
It is inaccurate to say that murder in Pennsylvania today is common law murder as it was adopted originally in 1777. Our theory and our definition of murder were initially derived from, and even today, with certain exceptions hereinafter referred to, are largely based upon the common law.* In Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 510, 113 A. 2d 464, the Court said: “The theory of the common law was that anyone who committed a common law felony** possessed legal malice; and where a killing naturally resulted therein or therefrom, even though the killing was unintentional or accidental, the legal malice was carried over from the original felony and the original felon was guilty of murder.
“To summarize: If there was an unlawful killing with (legal) malice, express or implied, that will con*179stitute murder even though there was no intent to injure or kill the particular person who was killed and even though his death was unintentional or accidental: [citing 12 prior decisions of this Court, Blackstone and numerous text authorities].n
Murder in Pennsylvania is common law murder (a) as extended or modernized or changed by Statute, and (b) as interpreted and applied to modern conditions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. For example, (1) the Legislature has declared (a) that death resulting from trainwrecking is deemed to be murder;1 and (b) that death resulting accidentally, unintentionally or otherwise from the common law misdemeanor of kidnapping is murder;2 and (c) that death resulting accidentally, unintentionally or otherwise, in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate statutory arson,3 statutory burglary,4 and statutory rape5 (each of which was a misdemeanor at common law and not a felony or murder) is murder; and (d) that petit treason is murder;6 and (e) that a killing of a prisoner during an attempt to rescue or release him from lawful authorities is murder;7 and (f) that a killing of any person by a mob of three or more persons acting in violation of law is murder.8 (2) This Court (a) has also made important changes in felony *180murder;9 and (b) has modernized the definition of murder.10
Murder in Pennsylvania was first authoritatively defined in the famous ease of Commonwealth v. Drum,11 58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868) : “At the common law murder is described to be, when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being and under the peace of the Commonwealth, with malice aforethought, expressed or implied.” This definition has been followed in substance ever since.
From Commonwealth v. Drum to the most recent decision of this Court, the year and a day rule has never been an essential element of or a substantive part of the law of murder in Pennsylvania. What was the origin, the reason and the basis for the rule? (a) Was it based on a lack of medical knowledge in medieval and later times, or (b) was it an alleviation of the rigors of the common law, or (c) was its origin the protection of persons accused of this heinous crime at a time when their witnesses may have died or disappeared, and hence a rule of (a) substance, or (b) evidence, or (c) limitation? In view of the limited medical knowledge of those times and the definition of murder given supra by leading text authorities, doesn’t it seem likely — realistically, logically, and authoritatively — that the rule was substantive if the rule ran from the stroke (as nearly all the leading authorities said it did), and evidential, procedural or limitational if it ran from the death of the victim?* Cf. also Sir *181Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England, 3 Institutes of Law of England, Ch. VII, page 52, circa 1620.
It is clear from the authorities herein cited that the rule is not and in the light of modern medical knowledge should not be a part of Pennsylvania’s substantive law of murder. Furthermore, there can be no justifiable reason today for the year and a day rule as a rule of evidence or procedure or limitation irrespective of whether the time be computed from the fatal stroke or from the death of the victim.*
The reason for approving it as a rule of evidence does not clearly appear. With respect to indictment or prosecution, a murder may not be discovered, or the identity of the killer may not become known until more than a year after the crime, or the public authorities may not discover for years that an apparently natural death or a supposed suicide resulted from an unlawful killing. Why should a murderer receive the protection of this antiquated common law indictment or evidentiary rule, and Society be further shackled in its already heavily handicapped fight against killers? The safety, the protection, and the welfare of Society are paramount, and require that there be no rule of evidence or of limitations for murder or for the prosecution of the murderer. It is as simple as that.
Furthermore, if authority be needed to support such an obviously wise and just position, it can be found in §77 of the Act of March 31, 1860,** as amended by §1 *182of The Penal Code of April 6, 1939, and in Commonwealth v. Dans, 211 Pa. 507, 60 A. 1070. The Code provides in effect that there shall be no limitation in indictments for murder.
In the Dans case, the husband of Mrs. Danz, the defendant, died on June 27, 1901, of chronic arsenic poisoning.* It was believed he died a natural death. Nearly two years after his death, his body was removed from the grave and exhumed and traces of arsenic poison were found. Mrs. Danz was indicted for murder on June 12, 1903. The evidence of the Commonwealth was aggressively disputed, controverted and denied — factually, medically and legally. If the year and a day rule applied in Pennsylvania — either as a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure or limitation, it would have been urged and applied in that case. Nevertheless, Mrs. Danz’s conviction of murder in the first degree was sustained unanimously by this Court.
This opinion could stop here were it not for the majority’s definition of murder. That definition — taken by the majority (although not quite verbatim) from the highly controversial case of Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 493, 137 A. 2d 472, (which was in substance the same as the murder-definition in Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa., supra) — is: “a felonious homicide** (i.e., murder) occurs when a person of sound
*183memory and discretion,* unlawfully and feloniously kills any human being in the peace of the sovereign with malice, prepense or aforethought.”
In order to define murder, why employ (if it can be avoided) antiquated verbiage, or words or expressions which today have a different meaning, instead of using modern words and language which clearly express and explain to a jury “what is murder”? Let’s analyze the majority’s definition. In the first place there is no “sovereign” in Pennsylvania or in the United States of America today, so why mention it? In the next place, a jury does not know and how can a trial judge clearly explain to a jury the meaning of “felonious” in a killing by poison, stabbing, lying in wait, or any other wilful deliberate and premeditated killing? Furthermore, it is inaccurate to limit murder to a “felonious” killing, since it includes a killing resulting from an aggravated assault and battery which is a misdemeanor. Cf. §709 of the Penal Code of 1939, Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291, 74 A. 2d 125. In other words, isn’t “felonious” as used in the majority’s definition, misleading or confusing and inaccurate?
Next, the Commonwealth does not have to prove-as the majority’s definition of murder implies it must— that the defendant was “a person of sound memory and discretion”. No jury and few Judges would be able to agree upon what is meant by “a person of sound memory and discretion,” if they are interpreted literally; — and how could a trial judge explain to a jury accurately and aptly the meaning of these words? If these words, contrary to their present ordinary and popular meaning, merely mean (as I believe they mean) a person who is “sane”, then the majority’s definition is erroneous because the Commonwealth (we repeat) does not have to prove that an accused *184murderer was sane: Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, 369 Pa. 190, 85 A. 2d 391; Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 A. 823.
In Commonwealth v. Carluccetti, the Court speaking through (the present Chief)' Justice Jones, said (page 199) : “As sanity is the legally recognized normal condition of human beings, its existence in any given instance is presumed. Consequently, the burden of proving insanity as a defense to a criminal charge is upon the one asserting it. It is incumbent upon him to establish the alleged defective mental condition by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 68, 178 A. 823.”
Still further, the majority’s definition of murder would make a person who committed suicide guilty of murder, and a person who unsuccessfully attempted to commit suicide guilty of an aggravated assault and battery on himself, or an assault and battery with intent to kill himself — contrary to the existing law of Pennsylvania. See: Commonwealth v. Wright, 11 Pa. D.R. 144; Cf. Article I, §19 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; cf. also Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A. 2d 98. Suicide or attempted suicide is not a crime against or a menace to Society; it is a frowned upon or deplorable act by a perpetrator against himself which deserves and should receive not (a jail sentence or) punishment by Society but the sympathy of Society.*
It is clear, therefore, that the modern and the most accurate definition of murder is not that which is stated in the majority opinion, but that which was set forth in Commonwealth v, Buzard, 365 Pa. 511, 515, 76 A. 2d 394, and in Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa., supra; “Murder is defined as an unlawful *185killing of another [human being] with malice aforethought express or implied.” The word “malice” is used legally. It is universally agreed that legal malice is not only an essential ingredient of murder, it is the hall-mark and distinguishing criterion of murder. Furthermore, its legal meaning which is so well established, can be easily and clearly explained to a jury. See: Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 113 A. 2d 464 (and twelve decisions and six leading text authorities cited therein) ; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A. 2d 204; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa., supra; Commonwealth v. Malone, 354 Pa. 180, 47 A. 2d 445; IY Blackstone Comm. §198, page 1596.
Why not stick to this clear and easily understandable definition of murder?
For each and all of the aforesaid reasons I concur in this Court’s affirmation of the Order of the lower court which overruled a motion to quash the indictments because they showed on their face that death occurred more than a year and a day after the fatal blow.

 We must compliment counsel for defendant on Ms exceptionally able brief.

 Cf. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9; Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 510, 113 A. 2d 464; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 641, 117 A. 2d 204; Commonwealth v. Guida, 341 Pa. 305, 19 A. 2d 98.

 At common law there were 8 or 9 felonies, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, sodomy, robbery, larceny, arson, burglary, and perhaps mayhem: Clark & Marshall, Crimes, §3 (4th ed. 1940) : 1 Wharton, Criminal Law §26 (12th ed. 1932).

 Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A. 2d 569; §§701 and 919 of the Penal Code of 1939, P.L. 872, 18 PS §§4701, 4919.

 §701 of the Penal Code of 1939.

 Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa., supra; §§701. and 905 of the Penal Code of 1939.

 Commowwealth v. Maloney, 365 Pa. 1, 73 A. 2d 707; §§701 and 901 of the Penal Code of 1939.

 Commonwealth v. Gossard, 383 Pa. 239, 117 A. 2d 902; §§701 and 721 of the Penal Code of 1939.

 Section 702 of the Penal Code of 1939.

 Section 4, Act of July 8, 1947, P.L. 1477.

 Section 5 (a), Act of July 8, 1947, P.L. 1477.

 See the majority, the concurring and the dissenting opinions in Commonwealth v. Redime, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A. 2d 472.

 See Infra.

 Commonwealth v. Drum is still the basis for much of the homicide law of Pennsylvania today.

 The crime of murder does not exist and cannot arise uni il a human being dies as a result of an unlawful killing by another human being with-malice aforethought expressed or implied. It is *181indisputable that until the death of the victim there is not and cannot be a murder.

 The crime of murder does not exist and cannot arise until a human being dies as a result of an unlawful killing by another human being with malice aforethought expressed or implied. It is indisputable that until the death of the victim there is not and cannot be a murder.

P. L. 427, 19 PS §211.

 The Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence indicated defendant had been placing antimony in her husband’s food and drink for several years before his death and this had contributed to or accelerated his death.

 The Redline majority opinion was here quoting from Blackstone, who was distinguishing a felonious homicide from (1) a justifiable homicide, and (2) an excusable homicide. See supra. Moreover in this connection the Redline opinion was discussing “felony-murder”.

 Italics throughout, ours.

 Many leading text authorities and some jurisdictions disagree • with this view.