Court Opinion

ID: 9659975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:59:51.24341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.518060
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
BEJACH, J.
In her petition to rehear, the plaintiff in this cause, as defendant-in-error in this Court, plants herself on the proposition that, because the memorandum of authorities from which this Court deduced and applied the law of the State of Illinois to the facts in this case,— a copy of which memorandum plaintiff’s attorney admitted in open court that he had received at or before one of the former trials of this cause, — -was not incorporated in the bill of exceptions nor otherwise made a part of the record of this cause, this Court could not properly consider same, and that therefore this Court had no authority to apply the Illinois law.
The petition to rehear cites and relies on Cosmopolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Woodard, 7 Tenn. App. 394; Steele v. Davis, 52 Tenn. 75; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 84 Tenn. 736, 737; Jones v. Burch, 71 Tenn. 747; Shelby Co. v. Bickford, 102 Tenn. 395, 406, 52 S. W. 772; Burkett v. Burkett, 193 Tenn. 165, 245 S. W. (2d) 185; Frierson v. Smithson, 21 Tenn. App. 591, 113 S. W. (2d) 778, and Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 316, 143 S. W. (2d) 1042, as authorities for this proposition. These eases amply support the proposition of law that a bill of exceptions can not be altered nor added to in this Court, nor even in the lower court after the expiration of the term. Indeed, this Court, in its opinion filed February 22,1956, applied that principle of law when it denied the suggestion of diminution of the record for the purpose of bringing before this Court *398special requests of defendant •which, had not been incorporated in the bill of exceptions.
The fallacy of plaintiff’s position is, however, that we do not consider it necessary that this memorandum of authorities should have been incorporated in the hill of exceptions, or otherwise made part of the record, as a prerequisite to the consideration of same by this Court and consequent application of the law of Illinois embodied in same to the facts of this case. When plaintiff’s attorney admitted in open court that he had received a copy of the memorandum of authorities in question, that established the notice required as a prerequisite to defendant’s right to rely on same. In his brief, and to a considerable extent in the oral argument before this Court, plaintiff’s attorney contended that defendant could not be permitted to rely on the law of Illinois, nor apply same to the facts of this case, because, as presented at the trial in the lower court, plaintiff had had no notice of defendant’s intention so to do, as is required by Section 9773.7, 1950 Supplement to the Code of Tennessee. It was the contention of plaintiff’s attorney, as this Court understood his contention, not only that he had had no such notice, but, also, that the absence of any showing in the bill of exceptions that such notice had been given, precluded the right of defendant or defendant’s counsel to put the trial judge in error for not having applied the Illinois law to the facts of the case. To meet this contention of plaintiff’s attorney, counsel for defendant undertook to suggest a diminution of the record, and to have this Court issue the writ of certiorari to bring up one or both of the two wayside bills of exception which had been filed in the lower court after each of two former mistrials, —which wayside bills of exception he claimed would *399establish, as a fact that the notice reqnired by Section 9773.7, 1950 Supplement to the Code of Tennessee had been given by delivering to plaintiff’s attorney a copy of the memorandum of authorities relied on to establish the common law of Illinois. Jnst how that fact wonld appear if said wayside bills of exceptions were brought up to this Court, whether from cross examination of witnesses at one or both of said former trials, by statement of counsel during one or the other of said trials, statement of the trial judge in the course of the trial at one or the other of said trials, or otherwise, was not stated; but certainly, it was the contention of defendant’s counsel that if said wayside bills of exception were brought to this Court, they would meet and answer the objection made by plaintiff’s counsel that no such notice had been given. In that connection, defendant’s counsel went so far as to state that the only object of bringing up said wayside bills of exception was to establish that the notice in question had been given, and that if plaintiff’s counsel would simply admit as a fact that a copy of the memorandum of authorities referred to had been delivered to him, the suggestion of diminution of the record would be unnecessary. Thereupon, plaintiff’s attorney in open court, and before the argument of this case in this Court had been concluded, admitted as a fact that he had received from defendant’s attorney a copy of the memorandum of Illinois cases as stated, but he denied that that fact would or could make any difference to the rights of defendant as appellant in this Court. Evidently, that denial of the right of defendant’s attorney to rely on same in this Court, was predicated upon the contention now advanced in the petition to rehear, viz., that because said memorandum of authorities was *400not incorporated in the bill of exceptions nor otherwise made a part of the record, defendant’s attorney should not be permitted to rely on same in this Court.
The members of this Court, and especially the author of this opinion, are just as reluctant to state the exact language used in making the admission as is plaintiff's counsel, but we do not consider the exact language used by plaintiff’s counsel to be material. Suffice it to say, that, on the day this case was argued in this Court, to wit, November 3, 1955, in preliminary consultation by the members of this Court, they were unanimous in the opinion that the admission made by plaintiff’s attorney had rendered unnecessary a suggestion of diminution of the record for the purpose of bringing up either or both of the wayside bills of exception. Likewise, this was the unanimous opinion of the members of this Court in consultation before the opinion was filed on the 22nd day of February, 1956. Such is still the opinion of this Court, and we do not now consider it material whether the wayside bills of exception would or would not in fact disclose the presentation of the memorandum of authorities, as contended for by defendant’s. attorney. The materiality of the admission made by plaintiff’s attorney, as viewed by this Court, is that, regardless of the particular language in which the admission was phrased, it established as a fact that the notice required by Section 9773.7, 1950 Supplement to the Code of Tennessee, had been given and that defendant’s right to have the trial court and this Court take judicial notice of the Illinois law had been established. Section 9773.7, 1950 Supplement to the Code of Tennessee is as follows:
*401“9773.7. Evidence thereof after notice. — Any party may also present to the trail court any admissible evidence of such laws, but, to enable the party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise.” (Emphasis ours.)
 As we construce this Code Section, its purpose is to prevent any party to a law suit from being taken by surprise by having an adverse party, without previous notice, present to a trial court law from another jurisdiction and have the trial court take judicial notice of same. In our view of the situation, pleading of foreign law is not now necessary, where reasonable notice of the intention to rely on such foreign law has been given in any appropriate manner, although pleading of same is also expressly authorized by statute. In our opinion, the delivery to plaintiff’s attorney of the memorandum of Illinois cases at either the first or second trial of this cause, constituted, “reasonable notice”, under the head of, “or otherwise”. Certainly, plaintiff’s counsel could not thereafter contend that plaintiff had been taken by surprise.
With reference to the right of plaintiff’s attorney to make the admission in question, and to bind his client thereby, there can be no doubt. Hammon v. Miller, 13 Tenn. App. 458, 462; Utley v. Louisville & N. R. R., 106 Tenn. 242, 61 S. W. 84; Fuller v. Jackson, Tenn. Ch. App., 62 S. W. 274. With reference to the duty and propriety of counsel in the making of said admission, we quote from - the case of Pemiscot Co. Bank v. Central State National *402Bank, 132 Tenn. 152, 168, 177 S. W. 74, 78, wherein Mr. Justice Samuel Cole Williams, speaking for the Supreme Court, said:
“The result is that the decree of the chancellor must be reversed; but in justice to that able official it should be explained again that the bill of complaint, as construed and put by counsel to this court, differed from the bill as drafted and filed, and as it may have been considered by the chancellor, in the court of trial. The course of counsel in thus fairly phasing the case for test on appeal is most commendable. ’ ’
Plaintiff’s petition to rehear also challenges that part of the opinion of this Court filed February 22, 1956 which holds that the trial judge should have granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant whether the law to be applied to the case be that of the State of Illinois or that of the State of Tennessee. The basis of our ruling on that point was and is the well settled principle of law that, “Established physical facts are controlling over direct testimony when it is impossible to reconcile the physical facts with the direct testimony.” In applying this principle of law to the facts of the instant case, it was and is the opinion of this Court that the testimony of plaintiff’s witness, Gerald Galbreath, was completely irreconcilable with the undisputed physical facts, and should, therefore, have been disregarded. The testimony of Galbreath was to the effect that all of the debris resulting from the collision was on the west or left hand side of the road, from the point of view of defendant’s driver, and that the gouge marks caused by the Pontiac automobile began at the center line and *403continued to the west thereof. From that testimony, it was argued that the jury was authorized to find as a fact, and did so find, that the point of impact was on the west side of the highway, from which finding of fact, the jury was further authorized to infer and did infer that the driver of defendant’s vehicle was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the death of plaintiff’s intestate. Viewing this testimony, however, in the light most favorable to the contentions of plaintiff, it was and is the opinion of this Court that the physical facts demonstrated beyond peradventure of a doubt that the point of impact was not on the west side of the highway, but on the east side, and that, therefore, the jury was not entitled to find as a fact that the collision occurred on the west side of the highway, and that defendant’s driver was therefore guilty of negligence which caused the death of plaintiff’s intestate. The physical facts as established by the undisputed evidence in this cause were, that the tractor-trailer unit of defendant, weighing about 52,000 pounds, with its front wheels locked and turned sharply to the left as a result of the impact, pushed the Pontiac automobile driven by deceased, which weighed about 4,000 pounds, northwestwardly across the highway to the point where the two vehicles came to rest, and that in this pushing movement, the Pontiac dug out gouge marks in the highway. Taking the testimony of witness Galbreath to be true, which is the view most favorable to the plaintiff, the gouge marks made by the Pontiac automobile began at the center line of the highway. Taking that to be true, and assuming that the gouge marks did not extend to the east of the center of the highway, the physical facts demonstrate nevertheless that the point of impact of the two vehicles must have been on the east *404side of the highway. Of necessity, it required an interval of time after the collision before the gouge marks were made by the front part of the Pontiac, the tractor-trailer must have pushed it from somewhere on the east side of the highway back to the center of the highway before the gouge marks could begin at the center.
The rule of law, that “Established physical facts are controlling over direct testimony”, has been recognized and applied in several Tennessee eases.
In the case of Nashville, C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Justice, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 69, plaintiff sued the railroad to recover the value of a trunk and its contents which she claimed were damaged by the seeping in of molasses while the trunk was in custody of the railroad company. She had recovered a judgment in the lower court, but on appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, the trunk, itself, which had been made an exhibit, was examined by the court. In reversing the judgment of the lower court, Mr. Justice Higgins, speaking for the Court of Civil Appeals, said:
“The contention of the plaintiff below was that the molasses was spilled upon her trunk while in the care of the railway company and permeated the joints or cracks thereof, and thus reached the interior and spoiled the contents. The insistence of the railway company primarily was that the contention of Mrs. Justice was an impossible one, and that its improbability or absolute untruthfulness was established by the physical condition of the trunk. This trunk was before the lower court and was certified to this court as a part of the record. It is insisted by the railway company that an examination of the *405trunk demonstrates that the fluid was originally on the inside and that it could not have entered from the exterior.
“It seems to be now firmly established that appellate courts may disregard impossible or palpably improbable testimony and treat it as no evidence: [Quock Ting] v. U. S., 140 U. S. 417 [11 S. Ct. 733], 35 L. Ed. 501. Tested by this rule, plaintiff’s explanation of the seeping of the fluid from the outside must be discredited. This case was and is demonstrably impossible, and no court could proceed to judgment satisfactorily under the circumstances.” Nashville, C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Justice, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 69, 70-71.
In Oliver v. Union Transfer Co., 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S. W. (2d) 478, the facts were much more closely analogous to the facts involved in the instant case. In that case, plaintiff, Mrs. Oliver, sued for damages for personal injuries received while she was riding as a passenger in defendant’s bus when it was turned over into a ditch on the side of the highway. The plaintiff’s theory, as to which she and other witnesses on her behalf testified, was that the bus was traveling at the rate of 35 to 40 miles an hour while passing another automobile, and that the bus did not check its speed, and suddenly turned over into the ditch. The defendant’s theory was that the bus was practically at a standstill on the side or shoulder of the road with the outside wheels more than two feet from the edge of the shoulder, when the shoulder suddenly caved in and turned the bus over. In sustaining the testimony of plaintiff and her witnesses, Crownover, *406J., speaking for the Middle Tennessee Section of the Court of Appeals, said:
“The bus was not damaged, and the other passengers suffered no injuries of any consequence. The uncontradicted evidence shows that the bus turned over at right angles and did not plow into the ditch; hence, taking the uncontradicting evidence and the physical facts, we think the defendant was guilty of no negligence that proximately contributed to the accident.
“The physical facts show that the bus could not have been traveling 35 or 40 miles an hour, or anything like that rate of speed, when it turned over, as it did not plow into the ditch or embankment, and the shoulder of the road was broken off or caved in for a distance of only the length of the bus. These things could not have happened had the bus been traveling at that rate of speed.
“ ‘A statement of alleged facts inherently impossible and absolutely at variance with well-established and universally recognized physical laws will not supply the required scintilla of evidence, a theory inherently impossible based upon a statement of alleged facts certainly cannot supply it.’ Louisville Water Co. v. Lally, 168 Ky. 348, 182 S. W. 186, 187, L. R. A. 1916D, 300.
‘ ‘ ‘ Courts * * * are not required to give credence to a statement that would falsify well-known laws of nature.’ Weltmer v. Bishop, 171 Mo. 110, 71 S. W. 167, 169, 65 L. R. A. 584, Writ of Error Dismissed in 191 U. S. 560, 24 S. Ct. 848, 48 L. Ed. 302.
*407“ ‘When tlae testimony introduced by plaintiff is shown by tbe physical facts and surroundings to be absolutely untrue, or when it is so inherently improbable as that no reasonable person can accept it as true or possible, the Circuit Judge should take the ' case from the jury, notwithstanding oral statements . tending to show a right of action.’ Nashville, C. & St. L. R. [Co.] v. Justice, 5 Tenn. Civ. App. 69.
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“In view of the physical facts and the other evidence adduced, we cannot see that the bus company is guilty of negligence or that it failed to observe the highest degree of care imposed on it as a common . carrier.” Oliver v. Union Transfer Co., 17 Tenn. App. 694, 698-699, 71 S. W. (2d) 478, 480-481.
In Harris v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 332, 335, 144 S. W. (2d) 7, 8, although in that case the physical facts were reconciled with the oral testimony, the Court of Appeals' (Eastern Section) speaking through Portrum, J., said:' ■
“Established physical facts are controlling over direct testimony when it is impossible to reconcile the physical facts with the direct testimony, but where the testimony as a whole can be reconciled then it it the duty of the court to reconcile the physical facts with the direct testimony and not disregard the direct testimony as impeached testimony. ”
But it is argued that the testimony of Captain Sam-Manning of the Memphis Police Department, introduced as an expert witness by the plaintiff, was necessary to establish the physical facts as above stated, and that the. jury was entitled to disregard his testimony just as it *408disregarded the testimony of all the witnesses except Galbreath. Numerous authorities are cited in the petition to rehear for the proposition that, “The general rule is that the value of an expert’s opinion is for the jury to determine and is never conclusive in a case of this character.” Among the authorities cited are, 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 1208, Evidence; 32 C. J. S., Evidence, Sec. 572, and the cases of Act-O-Lane Gas Service Co., Inc., v. Clinton, 35 Tenn. App. 442, 450, 245 S. W. (2d) 795, 799; East Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Peltz, Tenn. App. 270 S. W. (2d) 591, 603; American National Insurance Co. v. Smith, 18 Tenn. App. 222, 227, 74 S. W. (2d) 1078, 1081; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 187 Tenn. 202, 217, 213 S. W. (2d) 116, 122; Standard Oil Co. of La. v. Roach, 19 Tenn. App. 661, 671-672, 94 S. W. (2d) 63, 69; and Duling v. Burnett, 22 Tenn. App. 522, 124 S. W. (2d) 294.
The fallacy of this contention made by plaintiff’s counsel lies in the fact that, independent of the testimony of Captain Manning, both the lower court and this Court could take judicial notice of the matters about which he testified. The testimony of Captain Manning was that in one-tenth of a second a vehicle traveling at 30 miles per hour will travel four and four-tenth feet. This is but a matter of mathematical calculation which this Court is certainly capable of making. Other facts testified to by Captain Manning embody merely the application of the laws of Physics, of which this Court may take judicial notice.
On the subject of judicial notice, from the treatise on Evidence in 20 Am. Jur. beginning on page 46 of volume *40920 and continuing through, page 133, the following excerpts are quoted:
“There are, however, many facts which need not be proved, since they are judicially noticed by the court and jury. Judicial notice of such facts tabes the place of proof and is of equal force. It displaces evidence since it stands for the same thing. Judicial knowledge may be defined as the cognizance of certain facts which a judge under rules of legal procedure or otherwise, may properly take or act upon without proof because they are already known to him or because of that knowledge which a judge has, or is assumed to have by virtue of his office.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 47.
“Judicial notice will be taken of well established facts of common knowledge even though the pleadings contain allegations to the contrary. Such matters of common knowledge may receive the same recognition, in the courts of both original and appellate jurisdiction, that they would have received if formally proved and made a part of the record. This rule is of practical value in the law of appeal, for the missing links in the testimony may often he supplied by judicial knowledge.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 54.
“Proof is never required of a fact of which the court is bound to take judicial notice. The courts repeatedly refuse to hear evidence concerning matters of which they take judicial notice. On the other hand, as a general rule, when a fact is properly subject to judicial notice, evidence cannot be received to deny its existence. This rule proceeds upon the obvious premise that to admit such contradictory *410evidence would create the anomaly of an indisputable fact being disputed.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 54.
“In several instances the appellate courts have, without attempting to formulate any rule upon the subject, recognized facts which have been ignored by the trial court. It seems clear that the failure or refusal of the trial court to take notice of a fact brought before it does not prevent the higher court from giving effect thereto.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 55.
“Courts will ordinarily take judicial notice of the operation and effect of natural laws and of nature’s powers and forces, with the limitation that such notice is limited to those natural laws which are of universal occurrence, invariable in their action and of common knowledge. ’ ’ 20 Am. Jur. p. 92.
“Judicial notice will also be taken of the rules of arithmetic.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 113.
“Judicial notice is taken of matters commonly and generally known with reference to automobiles and their operation.” 20 Am. Jur. p. 130.
“Courts take judicial notice of the general rules governing the operation of mechanical powers, and recognize the mechanical devices in general use, the nature of the use of a specific device, its efficiency, and the nature and method of its construction. ’ ’ 20 Am. Jur. pp. 131-132.
The suggestion made in the petition to rehear, that since no eye witness saw the gouge marks being made, the jury could just as readily have inferred that they began at the place where the automobiles came to rest *411and went back to or towards tbe center of tbe highway, rather than that they began at the center of the highway and extended to where the automobiles came to rest, is so naive and unreasonable as to require no further comment in this opinion.
The prayer of the petition to rehear “that the motion of plaintiff-in-error to suggest the diminution of the record be granted so as to make it abundantly clear in the record that the granting of such motion would not supply the omitted facts which plaintiff-in-error seeks to establish”, is, in the opinion of this court, without merit.
As pointed out above, it is immaterial whether the wayside bills of exception filed in connection with the former trials of this cause, do or do not include the memorandum of authorities indicating the law of Illinois, or even whether or not said wayside bills of exception establish as a fact that such memorandum of authorities was delivered to plaintiff’s attorney. This Court is interested only in knowing that the notice required by Section 9773.7, 1950 Supplement to the Code of Tennessee, was given; and the admission made by plaintiff’s counsel has already established that as a fact.
In the opinion of this Court, the petition to rehear is without merit and same is accordingly denied.
Avery, P. J. (W. S.), and Carney, J., concur.