Court Opinion

ID: 9386599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 00:00:24.878798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.587867
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30036        Document: 00516709947             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/12/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     April 12, 2023
                                      No. 23-30036                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Randall Lenard Berry,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:20-CR-68-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         This is an expedited interlocutory appeal from a district court order
   issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) granting the Government’s motion
   for an additional four-month period of mental health evaluation and
   treatment to determine whether the defendant could attain competency to
   stand trial. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 23-30036

   court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.
               I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Randall Lenard Berry was arrested on July 17, 2020, for allegedly
   robbing the First Bank and Trust in New Orleans, Louisiana. According to
   the Criminal Complaint and supporting affidavit, Berry entered the bank
   around 10:15 a.m. in plain street clothes that appeared to be dirty. He did not
   attempt to conceal his identity, and he was not wearing gloves. He then began
   walking slowly toward the counter, dragging his feet as if he was elderly or
   disabled. When he reached the counter, he slipped the bank teller a
   handwritten note which read: “This is a robbery. I want 15 thousand Dollars
   or I will shoot you and Every one in here this is a robbery so don’t Play Know
   games cause I will kill my gun is in my Pocket [sic].” The teller hit the panic
   button as she opened the cash drawer to show Berry that it was empty. A
   second teller then accompanied the first teller to the vault to get cash. The
   first teller put $1,100 in U.S. currency and a dye pack in a white envelope and
   gave it to Berry. Berry took the envelope and exited the bank but when the
   dye pack exploded, he jumped and ran back toward the bank, where he was
   apprehended by officers.
          Berry was charged with a one-count indictment under 18 U.S.C. §
   2113(a), arraigned, and remanded to the custody of the St. Bernard Parish
   Jail. In July 2021, Berry’s counsel moved for a psychiatric evaluation and the
   magistrate judge ordered that he begin receiving monthly mental health
   evaluations and treatment in jail. A competency hearing was then held in
   December 2021, and the magistrate judge determined that Berry was still
   incompetent to stand trial. In April 2022, Berry moved to dismiss his case
   and for his immediate release on grounds that the Government violated the

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   Insanity Defense Reform Act (“IDRA”) 1 and the Speedy Trial Act
   (“STA”) 2 by failing to hospitalize him within four months of his
   incompetency determination to determine whether his competency could be
   restored to stand trial. Consequently, the magistrate judge ordered that Berry
   undergo competency restoration efforts at the Federal Medical Center in
   Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) where he was transported and
   admitted in June 2022. After the initial four-month evaluation period expired
   in October 2022, the Government moved over Berry’s objection for an
   additional four-month evaluation period on grounds that “there [was] a
   substantial probability that [Berry would] be restored to competency in the
   future.”
          The district court conducted a hearing on the Government’s motion
   in November 2022 and heard testimony from Dr. Allyson Sharf, the forensic
   psychologist assigned to Berry’s case at FMC Butner. Dr. Sharf testified that
   Berry was acutely mentally ill and suffered from schizophrenic delusions
   such as being the President of the United States and having connections to
   the Chinese government. She further testified that Berry often hallucinated,
   yelled profanities, and was generally hostile and threatening. Dr. Sharf
   testified that once Berry began threatening to kill the medical center staff in
   August 2022, it was determined that he would be forcibly medicated with
   antipsychotic medications. According to Dr. Sharf, after Berry received his
   first injection in September 2022, he began to show gradual signs of
   improvement as far as his agitation and aggression levels and appeared to
   suffer from fewer delusions. While Dr. Sharf concluded that Berry was still
   not competent to stand trial, she opined that there was “a substantial

          _____________________
          1
              18 U.S.C. § 4241, et seq.
          2
              18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.

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   probability that he could become competent with more time [and] more
   medication.”
          The district court also heard testimony from Berry’s psychiatric
   nurse, Jessica S. Churchill, who treated Berry in the Community Care
   Hospital in New Orleans where he was judicially committed in 2017.
   Churchill testified regarding Berry’s numerous schizophrenic delusions and
   the various treatment methods that were used at the hospital. She further
   indicated that, should the district court deem it appropriate to pursue civil
   commitment in Louisiana, she would be willing to help facilitate that process.
          The district court took the matter under advisement and subsequently
   issued an order granting the Government’s motion and giving it 120
   additional days (until February 17, 2023) to evaluate Berry to determine
   whether he could be restored to competency. Berry moved for clarification
   of the district court’s order extending the evaluation period. In his motion,
   he argued that the district court’s extension of the evaluation period was a
   constructive denial of his previous motion to dismiss in which he argued that
   the Government violated the IDRA and the STA by failing to hospitalize him
   within four months of his initial incompetency determination. However, the
   district court did not, and still has not, ruled on Berry’s original motion to
   dismiss or his motion for clarification.
          Just prior to the expiration of the second evaluation period, Berry
   moved to file an expedited interlocutory appeal in this court, seeking to
   vacate the district court’s 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2) order and direct his release
   from Attorney General custody. A panel of this court granted Berry’s motion
   for an expedited appeal. While the expedited briefing period was pending
   before this court, Dr. Sharf prepared a final forensic report indicating that
   Berry’s mental health was not improving and that there was not a substantial
   likelihood that he could be restored to competency. She further opined that

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   with respect to the civil commitment requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 4246,
   Berry met the criteria for a certificate of dangerousness. The Government
   then proceeded to initiate civil commitment proceedings under § 4246 by
   filing a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness in the
   Eastern District of North Carolina. Shortly thereafter, this court heard oral
   arguments in the expedited appeal.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          A federal court such as this one “has a continuing obligation to assure
   itself of its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.” Green Valley Spec. Util.
   Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). “Legal
   questions concerning federal jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.” Elam v.
   Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 2011). Mootness is a question
   of jurisdiction that this court also reviews de novo. See Freedom From Religion
   Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 831 (5th Cir. 2023).
          We review a district court’s ultimate competency determination
   “using a species of clear error.” See United States v. Porter, 907 F.3d 374, 380
   (5th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon reviewing the facts
   and “taking a hard look at the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion, we will
   reverse only if the finding was clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” Id.
                                 III. DISCUSSION
          On appeal, Berry first argues that contrary to the Government’s
   position, his appeal is not moot. He contends that although the terms of the
   district court’s 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) order have expired, he remains in
   custody pursuant to that order. Accordingly, he still has a cognizable interest
   in the outcome of the case, so his appeal is not moot. He further argues that
   because his appeal is not moot, this court has jurisdiction to review it under
   the collateral order doctrine. Finally, he asks this court to exercise its
   authority to vacate the district court’s § 4241(d) order and release him from

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   Attorney General custody on grounds that his continued detainment violates
   the IDRA and the STA. We address each of his arguments in turn.
          1. Mootness
          “Whether an appeal is moot is a jurisdictional matter, since it
   implicates the Article III requirement that there be a live case or
   controversy.” See United States v. Heredia-Holguin, 823 F.3d 337, 340 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). To invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction under
   Article III, “a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual
   injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
   judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477
   (1990)). This case-or-controversy requirement continues to exist through all
   stages of the trial and appellate federal judicial proceedings throughout which
   “[t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
   lawsuit.” Id. (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “A case becomes
   moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
   whatever to the prevailing party.” Id. (citing Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union,
   Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). Regardless of how small, as long as the
   parties have a concrete interest in the outcome of the litigation, the case is
   not moot. Id. (citation omitted).
          We agree that Berry’s appeal is not moot because he still retains a
   cognizable interest in its outcome, i.e., his liberty. See id. at 340. The specific
   issue on review in this appeal is whether the district court erred in extending
   Berry’s detention by issuing the § 4241(d) order, and since Berry remains in
   custody pursuant to that order, a live controversy remains. Id.; see also United
   States v. Boigegrain, 155 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Because the
   defendant is appealing his commitment pursuant to section 4241(d), it is his
   release from that commitment, if anything, that would moot this appeal.”);
   United States v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 263–64 (1st Cir. 2013) (reasoning that

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   the district court’s order holding that it was unlikely that the defendant
   would attain competency in the future did not moot the appeal because the
   defendant continued “to hold a cognizable interest in the review of the initial
   determination of incompetency because the initial finding triggered a series
   of events resulting in his continuing confinement”).
          Moreover, many of the cases the Government cites in support of its
   mootness arguments are inapposite here. For example, in United States v.
   Montelongo, the defendant’s § 4241 appeal was dismissed as moot because
   the defendant had been released from Attorney General custody—but that is
   not the case here because Berry remains in Attorney General custody. 32
   F.3d 565, 1994 WL 442366, at *1 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished) (“This court
   has been advised by the parties that the examination was to be completed on
   July 20, 1994, and that the defendant would thereafter be returned to Austin,
   Texas, by the United States Marshal. The defendant’s appeal of the order of
   commitment is therefore moot and will be dismissed.”). The Government
   also cites United States v. Sosebee, 59 F.4th 151 (5th Cir. 2023), in support of
   its mootness arguments. There, this court held that the appeal was moot
   because the defendant had completed his sentence and supervised release
   term and was being held pursuant to a completely separate charge and
   conviction—again, not the case here. Id. at 153 (“While on supervised
   release, [the defendant] was again convicted of being a felon in possession of
   ammunition, resulting in revocation of his release as well as a separate
   conviction . . . again enhanced by the ACCA. [The defendant] challenges the
   ACCA sentencing enhancements in both cases. We dismiss as moot his claim
   regarding his first federal conviction and sentence, and we affirm the
   sentence of his second federal conviction.”). In other words, the
   Government fails to point us to a case or other controlling authority where
   this court has held that an appeal is moot on the basis that the terms of the §
   4241(d) order have expired, despite the fact that the defendant remains in

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   Attorney General custody and has not yet been civilly committed, even
   though it has been conclusively determined that he cannot attain competency
   under the statute. For these reasons, we hold that Berry’s appeal is not moot.
   See Heredia-Holguin, 823 F.3d at 340.
          2. Collateral Order Doctrine
          As a general rule, appellate courts review only “final decisions of the
   district courts.” See United States v. McKown, 930 F.3d 721, 725 (5th Cir.
   2019) (citing 28 U.S.C § 1291). In a criminal context such as this one, “that
   ‘rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of
   sentence.’” Id. (quoting Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984)).
   The collateral order doctrine, however, provides that “a preliminary or
   interim decision is appealable . . . when it (1) conclusively determines the
   disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from
   the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
   final judgment.” Id. (citing Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003)).
          This circuit, along with many others, has concluded that a district
   court’s ruling under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) is reviewable as a collateral order.
   Id. This is because “a commitment order conclusively determines a
   defendant’s ‘present right to be at liberty prior to trial.’” Id. (citation
   omitted). “Moreover, whether a defendant was denied due process is an
   important question that is ‘completely separate from . . . whether [he] is
   guilty or innocent of the crimes charged.’” Id. at 725–26 (citing Sell, 539 U.S.
   at 176). Additionally, a § 4241(d) order is “effectively unreviewable on appeal
   from a final judgment because if [the] defendant [was] never tried or [was]
   tried and acquitted, there would be no appellate review.” Id. at 726 (citation
   omitted). Likewise, “if he [was] tried and convicted, no meaningful relief
   would be available.” Id.

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          Because we have held that Berry’s appeal is not moot, we likewise
   conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 4241(d)
   order under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 725. Our appellate review
   under the collateral order doctrine, however, is limited to the substance of
   the district court’s § 4241(d) order because it is the only order that Berry has
   appealed at this stage in the proceedings. This distinction is relevant to our
   analysis because Berry makes numerous arguments on appeal under the
   IDRA and the STA and although Berry advanced these issues to the district
   court in his April 2022 motion to dismiss, the district court has yet to rule on
   that motion. Moreover, the record confirms that the district court has yet to
   accept Berry’s invitation to clarify that its § 4241(d) order encompasses those
   issues, as Berry urged in his motion for clarification. Accordingly, while we
   do have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the district
   court’s § 4241(d) order, we do not have jurisdiction to address any of Berry’s
   arguments regarding the IDRA or the STA because the district court did not
   address those issues in the order. See Magnolia Island Plantation, LLC v.
   Whittington, 29 F.4th 246, 252 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted) (observing that it is a “well-established general rule” that
   “this court will not reach the merits of an issue not considered by the district
   court”).
          3. Competency Determination
          “It is a denial of due process to try a defendant for a crime if the
   defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” See United States v. Ceasar, 30 F.4th
   497, 500 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Flores-Martinez, 677 F.3d 699,
   705–06 (5th Cir. 2012)). Certain safeguards have been enacted by Congress,
   however, to protect that due process right. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) permits
   both the Government and the defendant to move for a hearing to determine
   the defendant’s mental competency before moving forward with criminal
   proceedings. Id. If the district court determines that the defendant is

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   incompetent to stand trial, “it must commit him to the custody of the
   Attorney General for hospitalization ‘for such a reasonable period of time,
   not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a
   substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity
   to permit the proceedings to go forward.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
   4241(d)(1)).
          The statute further provides that the defendant may be committed
   “for one additional reasonable period of time if the court finds that there is a
   substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain
   the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” Id. (internal quotation
   marks omitted) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A)). If the defendant has not
   sufficiently improved by the end of the commitment period, “he is not
   subject to any additional commitment except by way of the civil commitment
   procedures described in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246 and 4248.” Id.; see also Jackson v.
   Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (“[A] person charged by a State with a
   criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to
   proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time
   necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will
   attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is
   not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil
   commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any
   other citizen, or release the defendant.”).
          When a district court determines, as it has here, “that an additional
   commitment period would likely allow for the defendant to regain
   competency (under subsection (d)(2)(A)), it necessarily concludes, albeit
   implicitly, that the defendant’s mental condition has not yet improved to
   permit the proceedings to go forward.” Ceasar, 30 F.4th at 502. In reaching
   a decision to extend a mental health evaluation period under § 4241(d), a
   district court may rely on expert testimony and reports as it did in this case.

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   See United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United
   States v. Pena, 429 F. App’x 405, 406 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
   (unpublished). In determining whether to grant the Government’s motion,
   the district court heard testimony from Dr. Sharf and considered her forensic
   report as well. Dr. Sharf testified that, upon receiving the proper medication,
   Berry’s mental state had improved, and his aggression and agitation levels
   had decreased. She further indicated that Berry’s delusions had decreased
   and that he had been able to join a competency restoration group for the first
   time during which he participated and behaved appropriately. 3 Dr. Sharf then
   reiterated, as she concluded in her forensic report, that she believed there
   was a substantial probability that Berry would be restored to competency in
   the future if the four-month extension was granted. She further confirmed
   that if she had any “doubt or reservations about the substantial probability”
   that Berry could be restored, she would not have agreed to requesting the
   extension. The district court also heard testimony from Berry’s former
   psychiatric nurse, Churchill, who testified that she disagreed with Dr. Sharf
   that Berry could be restored to competency to stand trial.
           The evidence as a whole, which included testimony from Berry’s
   evaluating psychologist and her accompanying forensic report, adequately
   supports the district court’s order granting the Government’s motion for an
   additional period of mental health evaluation and treatment under § 4241(d).
   See Joseph, 333 F.3d at 589 (concluding that the evidence, which included
   testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist, “provided a sound basis for
   the district court’s conclusion that [the defendant] was competent”); Pena,
   429 F. App’x at 406 (“We conclude that the evidence as a whole—which

           _____________________
           3
             Dr. Sharf testified that a competency restoration group is a “psychological
   educational group that’s provided about once a week for an hour, and it goes over various
   topics that are important to know related to competency to stand trial.”

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   included two psychiatric evaluations and testimony from one of the
   evaluating psychiatrists at the competency hearing—provided a sound basis
   for the court’s determination that [the defendant] was competent.”).
   Although the district court assigned more weight to Dr. Sharf’s testimony
   than Churchill’s because Dr. Sharf was a licensed mental health professional
   and Churchill had received different training as a registered nurse, it was
   entitled to make that discretionary call in evaluating the differing testimony
   presented at the hearing. See United States v. Wix, 416 F. App’x 338, 343 (5th
   Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (unpublished) (noting that “the district court had the
   discretion to credit or [dis]credit any evidence introduced during the
   hearing”).
          In conclusion, we hold that Berry’s appeal is not moot, see Heredia-
   Holguin, 823 F.3d at 340, and thus the district court’s § 4241(d) order is
   reviewable under the collateral order doctrine, see McKown, 930 F.3d at 725.
   We further hold that the district court did not clearly err in granting the
   Government’s motion for an additional four-month period of mental health
   evaluation and treatment, see Porter, 907 F.3d at 380, so that it could
   determine whether Berry could attain competency to stand trial, see Ceasar,
   30 F.4th at 500; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A).
          At this stage in the proceedings, the circumstances have changed since
   the district court issued the § 4241(d) order extending Berry’s period of
   mental health treatment and evaluation. Having answered the only question
   properly before us and because it has now been conclusively determined that
   Berry is not competent to stand trial and cannot be restored to competency
   under the statute, we remand to the district court for further proceedings as
   may be appropriate.

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                             IV. CONCLUSION
         For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) order extending the period of mental health treatment
   and evaluation and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
   opinion.

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