Court Opinion

ID: 9581625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:53.582752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:08.436717
License: Public Domain

Sears-Collins, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with Division 3 of the majority opinion and concur in the judgment of reversal based thereon. However, for the reasons that follow, I dissent to Division 2 (b) of the majority opinion and would also reverse the judgment based on the issue raised by Taylor in that division. First, for the reasons given in my dissent to Sutton v. State, 262 Ga. 181, 182-184 (415 SE2d 627) (1992), I disapprove of jury instructions that inform a jury that it has the duty to convict where the evidence proves a criminal defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the use of such language in the felony murder charge in this case perpetuates the problem created by the sequential charge we disapproved in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865 (2) (414 SE2d 463) (1992), and now hold to be error in this case, majority, p. 585. If a court charges a jury that it has the duty to convict a defendant of felony murder if it finds the state has proven the defendant guilty of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury might not “go on to consider evidence of provocation or passion which might authorize a verdict for voluntary manslaughter.” Edge, supra, 261 Ga. at 867. For this reason, a trial court should not give a felony murder charge containing the foregoing “duty” language. In fact, as suggested in fn. 3 in Edge at 867, I conclude that a trial court, after charging on the statutory definitions of the crimes involved, should instruct the jury that, if it finds the defendant killed the victim out of provocation or passion, it would be authorized to convict of voluntary manslaughter but would not be authorized to convict of felony murder. Such a charge is the only way to insure that the jury gives proper consideration to the verdict of voluntary manslaughter.
*588Decided November 5, 1992
Reconsideration denied December 2, 1992.
Russell C. Gabriel, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, Gerald W. Brown, Bradley McClung, Assistant District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Robert D. McCullers, Staff Attorney, for appellee.