Court Opinion

ID: 9521875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:14:22.061456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:23.768610
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: In my dissent to the first opinion in this case (68 Ill. 2d 276, 284-85) I stated that in my judgment the testimony concerning defendant’s admission was inadmissible, and “Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony were in some manner rendered admissible, it should nevertheless have been excluded. There are many situations in which the admissibility of evidence depends upon whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant.” The majority opinion demonstrates conclusively that by reason of this admission defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Er the original opinion the majority said: “The admission here was not that defendant shot Gwen, but that he had previously told his wife he had.” (68 Ill. 2d 276, 282.) The instruction of which defendant complains told the jury: “You have before you evidence that the defendant made admissions of facts relating to the crime charged in the indictment. It is for you to determine what weight should be given to the admissions. In determining the weight to be given an admission, you should consider all of the circumstances under which it was made.” As defendant argues, the admission that he had made a statement to his wife has now been transformed into an admission “of facts relating to the crime charged in the indictment.” Without an additional cautionary instruction to the jury to the effect that this evidence showed only that he had made the statement to his wife and was not an admission of the commission of the offense, defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial. The conviction should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.