Court Opinion

ID: 9476690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:02:31.388356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:27.257439
License: Public Domain

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I agree that section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act does not apply to this case, I cannot concur in the conclusion that the Federal Highway Administration has complied with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act.
Much is made of the FHWA's determination that the barriers were not “irrevocable alterations substantially altering the structure of the bridge.” National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Dole, Civil Action No. 85-2749, mem. op. at 7; see also Brief for Appellees (federal) at 18. Human nature being a constant, however, the psychological and physical factors that have made the Ellington Bridge a favored platform for plunges to eternity are not apt to disappear over time. Therefore, even though the suicide barriers can easily be dismantled, as a practical matter they must be regarded as permanent accretions. As the preservation of the appearance of a historic structure is clearly one of the principal values the law is intended to protect, I am not sure how much comfort one is entitled to take from the knowledge that if and when the barriers are removed, little physical damage will have been done to the structure.
The FHWA did not address the extent of the environmental impact of the proposed barriers on the appearance of the Ellington Bridge because, it decided, the project fell within one of the categories of action ex-cludable from the NEPA process in that the barriers “do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the environment.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(b) (1986). I do not quarrel with its conclusion that Categorical Exclusion No. 9 (which deals with “reconstruction or modification of an existing bridge structure”) does not cover the kind of work proposed to frustrate would-be suicides, at least at that particular site. It is worth noting, however, that Categorical Exclusion No. 9 specifically excepts “bridges on or eligible for inclusion on the National Register,” 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(b)(9) (1986), which underscores the FHWA’s earlier conclusion that a proposal to modify such structures must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.
What I do object to is the willingness of this court to accept at face value the FHWA’s conclusion that Categorical Exception No. 14 does apply. To demonstrate how irrelevant that exception is to the case before us, I quote the pertinent part in full: “Highway safety or traffic operations improvement projects including the correction or improvement of high hazard locations; elimination of roadside obstacles; highway signing; pavement markings; traffic control devices; railroad warning devices; and lighting.” 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(b)(14) *783(1986). In short, the exception contemplates changes and installations that are designed to lessen the risks that vehicles will collide with other vehicles or run over unwary pedestrians. It stretches belief that the drafter of Categorical Exclusion No. 14 could have intended to include, among the “highway safety or traffic operations improvement projects” to be excepted from the NEPA process, measures designed to prevent distraught human beings from jumping to their deaths away from the highway and the flow of traffic.
When an agency must rely on a forced interpretation of one of its regulations as the only means of circumventing the clear requirement of another, I can only conclude that that agency has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. I therefore believe that this case should be remanded with instructions that the FHWA be directed to prepare an environmental assessment as required by 23 C.F.R. § 771.115(c) (1986).