Court Opinion

ID: 9384841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 08:09:26.23032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.853380
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                  No. 06-22-00072-CV

         IN THE INTEREST OF M.H., A CHILD

         On Appeal from the 307th District Court
                  Gregg County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 2021-1149-DR

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

            During a traffic stop of the vehicle Mother was driving, an odor of marihuana emanated

from the vehicle, and eleven-month-old M.H.1 was found unrestrained in the front passenger

seat. After an unknown amount of marihuana was found in the vehicle, Mother was arrested,

and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed M.H. from Mother’s care

on grounds of neglectful supervision. Later, Mother admitted to a Department investigator that

she had smoked marihuana before she placed M.H. in the vehicle and that she had removed M.H.

from her car seat and put her in the front seat because M.H. was hot, itching, and crying.

            Over one year after M.H. was removed from Mother’s care, the trial court determined

that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of M.H. 2 and terminated

Mother’s parental rights on four grounds set out in Section 161.001(b)(1), subsections (D), (E),

(O), and (P), of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O),

(P). On appeal, Mother3 asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support

the trial court’s findings on the statutory grounds and that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the

child’s best interest. Because we find that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding

under statutory ground E and its finding on the child’s best interest, we will affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

1
    We identify all minors by their initials and other family members by fictitious names. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
2
    See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2).
3
    Father has not appealed the termination of his parental rights.
                                                              2
I.     Standard of Review

       “The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional

dimensions.” In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting

Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). “Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to

make decisions concerning ‘the care, custody, and control of their children.” Id. (quoting Troxel

v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). “Because the termination of parental rights implicates

fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence—is required at

trial.” Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to

“engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to

support the termination of parental rights.”       Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500).

“[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent.” Id. (quoting

In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick,

685 S.W.2d at 20)).

       “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that

termination is in the child’s best interest.” Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ is that ‘degree of

proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of

the allegations sought to be established.’” Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing

In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). “This standard of proof necessarily affects our

review of the evidence.” Id.

                                                  3
       “In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief

or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005)

(per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). “We

assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a

reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have

reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted.” Id. (citing In re

J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).

       “In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial

court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209

S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). “We consider only that evidence the fact-finder

reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine ‘“whether the evidence is

such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the

. . . allegations.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108) (quoting

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))). “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed

evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so

significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then

the evidence is factually insufficient.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.

2002)). “‘[I]n making this determination,’ we must undertake ‘an exacting review of the entire

record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.’” Id. (quoting In re A.B.,

                                                 4
437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)). “We also recognize

that the trial court, as the fact-finder, is the sole arbiter of a witness’ demeanor and credibility,

and it may believe all, part, or none of a witness’ testimony.” In re A. M., No. 06-18-00012-CV,

2018 WL 3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109).

       “Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate

parental rights, ‘the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is

paramount.’” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.

2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994))) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d

534, 547 (Tex. 2003)). “A child’s emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely

to preserve parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re C.A.J., 459 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)).

II.    Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Statutory Ground E Finding

       A.      Statutory Ground E Requirements

       Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial

court’s findings under grounds D, E, O, and P. “Only one predicate finding under Section

161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that

termination is in the child’s best interest.” Id. at 923 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362). “Even so,

when the trial court’s findings under grounds D or E are challenged on appeal, due process

demands that we review the evidence supporting the findings under at least one of those grounds

                                                 5
when they are challenged on appeal.” In re S.A.W., No. 06-21-00116-CV, 2022 WL 1193667, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (“We hold that due process and due course of law requirements mandate

that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code.”). “This is because termination of parental

rights under these grounds may implicate the parent’s parental rights to other children.” Id.

(citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (providing as a

ground for termination of parental rights that the parent “had his or her parent-child relationship

terminated with respect to another child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct was in

violation of Paragraph (D) or (E)”).

       Under statutory ground E, parental rights may be terminated “if the court finds by clear

and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

“‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). “It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the

child or that the child actually suffer injury.”     In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923.       “Under

subsection (E), it is sufficient that the child’s well-being is jeopardized or exposed to loss or

injury.” Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367). Nevertheless,

“‘endanger’ means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-

than-ideal family environment.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). “Further,

termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission. Instead, a

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‘voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.’” In re L.E.S.,

471 S.W.3d at 923 (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427,

436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing In re K.M.M., 993 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 1999, no pet.))); see Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366–67.

       “[Statutory ground E] refers only to the parent’s conduct, as evidenced not only by the

parent’s acts, but also by the parent’s omissions or failures to act.” In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d 899,

902 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pet. denied); see In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366–67. “The

conduct to be examined includes what the parent did both before and after the child was born.”

In re S.K., 198 S.W.3d at 902; see In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367. “The endangering conduct

may also occur ‘either before or after the child’s removal by the Department.’” In re S.A.W.,

2022 WL 1193667, at *4 (quoting In re Z.J., No. 02-19-00118-CV, 2019 WL 6205252, at *11

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 19, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)).               “Failing to provide

appropriate medical care for a child may also be endangering conduct.” In re S.A.W., 2022 WL

1193667, at *4 (citing In re H.M.O.L., Nos. 01-17-00775-CV, 01-17-00776-CV, 2018 WL

1659981, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re

S.G.F., No. 14-16-00716-CV, 2017 WL 924541, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 7,

2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.V., 480 S.W.3d 591, 601 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).

Under statutory ground E, “a parent’s failure to complete relevant requirements of his service

plan” is a relevant consideration. In re S.A.W., 2022 WL 1193667, at *4 (citing In re Z.J., 2019

WL 6205252, at *11; In re U.H.R., No. 07-18-00318-CV, 2019 WL 81874, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo Jan. 2, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

                                                7
       “[C]onduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the

physical and emotional well-being of a child. Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and h[er]

ability to parent may establish an endangering course of conduct.” In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at

367–68 (quoting In re A.J.H., 205 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)).

“‘Because it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned,

illegal drug use may support termination under’ statutory Ground E.” In re H.M.J., No. 06-18-

00009-CV, 2018 WL 3028980, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(quoting In re A.L., No. 06-14-00050-CV, 2014 WL 5204888, at *7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Oct. 8, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.)). In addition, a parent’s inability to provide stable housing and

to adequately provide for a child may support a finding of endangerment under statutory ground

E. See In re S.I.H., No. 02-11-00489-CV, 2012 WL 858643, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Mar. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

       B.      Evidence at Trial

       The evidence relevant to the trial court’s statutory ground E finding showed that M.H.

was removed from Mother’s care after Mother was arrested following a traffic stop. The officer

conducting the traffic stop noticed the odor of marihuana emanating from the vehicle, found

M.H. unrestrained in the front seat, and discovered an unknown amount of marihuana in the

vehicle. Mother admitted to Jaqueline Ibarra, a Department investigator, that she had smoked

marihuana before she got into the vehicle with M.H. and that she took M.H., who was eleven

months old at the time, out of a car seat and put her in the front seat, unrestrained. At trial,

Mother claimed that she had M.H. in a seatbelt but also acknowledged that it was not a good idea

                                                8
to have M.H. unrestrained in the front seat of a moving vehicle. She also acknowledged that it

was not a good idea to use marihuana before she put M.H. in the vehicle, and she admitted that

there was marihuana in the vehicle when she was stopped. Ibarra testified that, based on her

training, the use of marihuana can slow reflexes and impair awareness of surroundings when

operating a motor vehicle.

       In order to obtain the return of M.H., the trial court ordered Mother, among other things,

(1) to submit to a court-ordered psychological evaluation, (2) to attend and cooperate in

counseling sessions to address the specific issues that led to removal and any other issues

identified in the psychological evaluation, (3) to submit to a court-ordered drug and alcohol

dependency assessment, (4) to follow any recommendations from the assessment, (5) to submit

to random drug testing, and (6) to comply with the Department’s original and any amended

service plans. On July 28, 2021, the original service plan required Mother, among other things,

to address her use of marihuana by (1) participating in a psychosocial evaluation, (2) following

all recommendations on the evaluation, (3) participating in counseling twice monthly,

(4) participating in substance-abuse counseling twice monthly, (5) participating in a drug/alcohol

assessment through East Texas Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse (ETCADA),

(6) completing the drug treatment program recommended by ETCADA, and (7) submitting to

random drug testing. On August 11, 2021, the trial court approved the original service plan.

       Although Mother completed her drug assessment with ETCADA and a substance abuse

evaluation with Guided Minds, she did not participate in the recommended substance-abuse

counseling, recovery groups, or a substance-abuse treatment program. Mother tested positive for

                                                9
marihuana in August, October, and November 2021, and in January, February, and March 2022.

Mother failed to submit to requested drug tests eleven times, without excuse, including each

month until one week before the final hearing. Mother also refused to stop smoking marihuana

and testified that the last time she purchased marihuana was the night before the final hearing.

       At the time of removal, M.H. also had a severe case of untreated eczema and had cracks

in her skin all over her body. Mother acknowledged that M.H. had eczema, denied that she had

very dry skin, and explained that she had M.H. “greased down.” Latoya Lister, a caseworker for

the Department, testified that, based on her training and experience, marihuana use can affect a

person’s ability to care for a young child, can impair judgment, and can impair the ability to

function correctly.

       The family service plan also required Mother to demonstrate the ability to support M.H.

by maintaining stable employment or obtaining other sources of income and to maintain safe and

hazard-free housing. Although Mother told Lister that she had worked at various places during

the course of the case, she never provided Lister with a check stub or other information to enable

her to verify the income. At trial, Mother testified that she cut hair for cash and sold plates of

food. Nevertheless, she did not know how much she made cutting hair in the month before trial,

and she did not earn anything selling plates of food that month. Mother also testified that she

lived in Longview at the beginning of the case, moved to Dallas and lived with Father for a

period of time, moved back to Longview and lived with her father, moved back to Dallas and

lived in hotels, and moved back to Longview two weeks before trial. She also testified that she

lived with Father at the beginning of this case until about six months before trial. She said she

                                                10
had lived with him for two and one-half to three years but left him because she was being

abused. Mother also admitted that, if M.H. went home with her that day, M.H. did not have a

bed, other furniture, or toys.

         The evidence also showed that Mother was inconsistent in her visitations with M.H.

Lister testified that, although the Department’s Dallas office4 scheduled weekly visits with M.H.,

Mother visited every other week since April 2022, and sometimes only once a month. Lister

attributed that inconsistency, at least in part, to Mother’s changes of residence between Dallas

and Longview. Latisha Redman, the Department’s caseworker in Dallas assigned to the case

involving Mother’s other children, confirmed that the Department had scheduled Mother for

weekly visitation, but because of her inconsistency, they changed to biweekly visitation in May

2022. Mother denied that she had ever had weekly visitation and maintained that she had bi-

weekly visitation because her children’s transporters said they did not want to do it weekly.

         Redman also testified that she had called Mother the week before trial to remind her of a

visitation and that Mother said she would not make it. They had a subsequent telephone call in

which Mother was crying, venting, and screaming, and then Mother said, “If y’all take my kids,

I’m going on a mass murder spree.” Mother denied that she said she intended to go on a killing

spree and testified that she had said, “[Y]’all wonder why people be going on killing sprees when

y’all take they [sic] kids from them, or just on drugs because y’all took they [sic] kids from

them.”

4
 Mother’s six other children were previously removed by the Department because of drug use and domestic violence
and were the subjects of an open case in Dallas. M.H. was placed in a foster home in Dallas with her three-year-old
sister.
                                                        11
         C.      Analysis

         The physical and emotional well-being of a child is endangered when her parent’s

conduct exposes her to a life of uncertainty and instability. In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367–68.

Such conduct may result from the use of illegal drugs that endangers the child because of the

parent’s impaired judgment or because of the possibility that the parent may be imprisoned. In

this case, M.H. was removed because Mother used marihuana5 then operated a motor vehicle

with eleven-month-old M.H. in the front seat, unrestrained, endangering M.H.’s physical well-

being.    Because marihuana use and possession is illegal in Texas, Mother’s conduct also

endangered M.H.’s emotional well-being by exposing M.H. to a life of instability by illegally

using and possessing marihuana. Mother continued to expose M.H. to a life of uncertainty by

continuing to use marihuana throughout the case. In addition, Mother failed to address the

problems caused by her marihuana use when she failed to complete the substance-abuse

counseling and substance-abuse treatment program required by the service plan and the trial

court’s order to specifically address the conduct that resulted in M.H.’s removal. Mother’s use

of marihuana impaired her judgment to the extent that it endangered M.H., and her continued use

of the drug and failure to address that conduct through the available services show that she

engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct and omissions that

endangered M.H.’s physical and emotional well-being. See In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923.

5
 We recognize that the current version of Section 262.116(a)(7) of the Texas Family Code provides that the
Department may not remove a child based on evidence that the parent “tested positive for marihuana, unless the
department has evidence that the parent’s use of marihuana has caused significant impairment to the child’s physical
or mental health or emotional development.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 262.116(a)(7) (Supp.). However, because
this proceeding was filed prior to September 1, 2021, this section does not apply. See Act of April 28, 2021, 87th
Leg., R.S., ch. 8, §§ 6, 16, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 10, 13, 18.
                                                        12
       A child is also exposed to a life of uncertainty and instability by a parent’s failure or

inability to provide stable housing and to adequately provide for the child’s support. In re S.I.H.,

2012 WL 858643, at *5. The evidence showed that Mother moved five times between Dallas

and Longview during the course of this case, the last time less than two weeks before trial. Even

at trial, Mother testified that she did not have a bed, furniture, or toys for M.H. Further, although

Mother testified that she made money cutting hair and selling plates of food, she did not provide

the Department with any proof of income, and she was unable to tell the trial court how much

money she had made in the month before trial. Mother’s failure to establish safe and stable

housing and her failure to secure an adequate income to support M.H. over one year after M.H.’s

removal also show a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct and omissions that

endangered M.H.

       Based on this record, we find that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the

trial court’s finding under statutory ground E. Since there was sufficient evidence supporting the

trial court’s finding under statutory ground E, we need not review its findings under grounds D,

O, and P. J.T. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-21-00070-CV, 2021 WL

2672055, at *9 (Tex. App.—Austin June 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.F., No. 14-19-

00964-CV, 2020 WL 2832166, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 28, 2020, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). We overrule this issue.

III.   Sufficient Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Best-Interest Finding

       Mother also challenges the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of M.H.

                                                 13
Mother argues that, because there was evidence that she and M.H. had a strong bond, the trial

court erred in its best-interest finding. We disagree.

       A.      Standard of Review

       “There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best

interest.” In re R.W., 627 S.W.3d 501, 516 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (quoting In re

J.A.S., Jr., No. 13-12-00612-CV, 2013 WL 782692, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 28,

2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). “Termination ‘can never be justified without the most solid and

substantial reasons.’” In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.)

(quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).

       To determine the best interests of the child, we consider the following Holley factors:

       (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now
       and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in
       the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
       programs available to assist these individuals, (6) the plans for the child by these
       individuals, (7) the stability of the home, (8) the acts or omissions of the parent
       that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and
       (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

Id. at 818–19 (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)); see In re E.N.C.,

384 S.W.3d at 807; see also TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b).              These factors are not

exhaustive, and there is no requirement that all of them be proved to terminate parental rights.

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Further, we may consider evidence used to support the grounds for

termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis. Id. at 28.

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       B.      Analysis

       M.H. was twenty-seven months old at the time of trial and was too young to verbalize her

desires. The evidence showed that Mother and M.H. were bonded and had a relationship.

Although Mother thought that M.H.’s emotional well-being would be disrupted if their bond was

severed, Lister could not say that M.H. would be emotionally damaged if the relationship ended,

and Redman did not think that it would harm M.H. because of the bond she had with her foster

mother. The evidence also showed that M.H. had strong bonds with her foster mother and with

her three-year-old sister who resided in the same home. Her foster mother opined that, because

they had become a family, it would be detrimental to M.H. to be removed from her home. This

factor weighs neither for nor against termination of Mother’s parental rights.

       As stated above, (1) Mother’s continued use of marihuana, (2) her failure to complete

substance-abuse treatment and counseling to address the issues that lead to M.H.’s removal,

(3) her failure to establish a safe and stable home for M.H., and (4) her inability to show that she

had sufficient income to provide for M.H.’s needs would continue to endanger M.H. now and in

the future. This evidence, along with Mother’s apparent inability to recognize that she had not

adequately addressed M.H.’s eczema, also demonstrated that Mother lacked the ability to

provide for the emotional and physical needs of M.H. now and in the future. In addition, this

evidence, coupled with Mother’s lack of consistency in visitation with M.H., indicated that her

parent-child relationship with M.H. was not a proper one. The evidence also showed that M.H.

had lived with her three-year-old sister in her foster mother’s home during most of the case and

was provided a safe and stable home environment. In her foster home, M.H. had all of her

                                                15
physical and emotional needs addressed, including her medical and dental needs. For these

reasons, we find that the second, third, fourth, seventh, and eighth Holley factors weigh heavily

in favor of termination.

       Finally, M.H.’s foster mother testified that, if given the opportunity, she would provide

M.H. with a forever home and would adopt her if she was able. Although Mother testified that

she was living in her cousin’s house and that he was willing to let them stay until they could get

their own house, she had lived there less than two weeks, had made no provision for M.H. to live

with her, and was unable to show that she would be able to provide for M.H. We find that the

sixth factor also weighs in favor of termination.

       Based on this record, a fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in M.H.’s best interest. As a result,

we find that factually and legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest

finding. We overrule this issue.

IV.    Disposition

       Because sufficient evidence supports at least one statutory ground finding and the best-

interest finding, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      Jeff Rambin
                                                      Justice

Date Submitted:        January 9, 2023
Date Decided:          March 30, 2023

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