Court Opinion

ID: 2964286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:23:14.107195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:44.864807
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1236

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                              AMADOR IRIZARRY-SANABRIA,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
                                                ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                          Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                _____________________

               J.  Michael McGuinness,  by Appointment  of  the Court,  for
               ______________________
          appellant.
               Jos   A. Quiles-Espinosa,  Senior  Litigation Counsel,  with
               ________________________
          whom Guillermo  Gil, United  States Attorney,  and Nelson  P rez-
               ______________                                ______________
          Sosa,  Assistant  United  States  Attorney,  were  on  brief  for
          ____
          appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   August 22, 1996
                                 ____________________

                    Per  curiam.     Defendant-Appellant  Amador  Irizarry-
                    Per  curiam.
                    ___________

          Sanabria  pled guilty to conspiracy to  import marijuana into the

          United  States, in violation of 21 U.S.C.     952 & 963.  For the

          reasons stated herein, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND

                    Irizarry-Sanabria  was indicted  in  March of  1993 and

          pled not guilty  at his  arraignment.  His  motion to dismiss  on

          double jeopardy  grounds, premised  on a  previous conviction  of

          conspiracy to import  marijuana,1 was denied.   In October  1993,

          Irizarry-Sanabria entered a change of  plea to guilty pursuant to

          a plea  agreement.  In  December 1993, he  filed a pro  se motion
                                                             _______

          seeking a  withdrawal of that plea; his counsel filed a motion in

          support of  the pro se motion  and memorandum of law  in February
                          ______

          1994.   The district  court denied the  motion to  withdraw plea,

          without an  evidentiary hearing.  Irizarry-Sanabria was sentenced

          to 121 months imprisonment.

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION

                          A.  Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
                          A.  Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
                              ______________________________

                    We  review the  court's refusal  of Irizarry-Sanabria's

          motion to withdraw his guilty plea, made prior to sentencing, for

          abuse of discretion.   See United States v. Tilley,  964 F.2d 66,
                                 ___ _____________    ______

          72 (1st Cir. 1992).  To prevail,  Irizarry-Sanabria must persuade

          the  court that  he has shown  a "fair  and just reason"  for his

          request.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e).   We follow an establishedtest:

                              
          ____________________

          1  His conviction for the  first conspiracy was affirmed by  this
          court in United States v. And jar, 49 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1995).
                   _____________    _______

                                         -2-

                      A court must  consider several factors in
                      weighing whether  a defendant  meets this
                      burden,
                         the  most significant  of which  is
                         whether  the   plea  was   knowing,
                         voluntary  and  intelligent  within
                         the  meaning  of [Federal  Rule  of
                         Criminal Procedure] 11.   The other
                         factors include:  1) the force  and
                         plausibility   of   the   proffered
                         reason;  2)   the  timing   of  the
                         request; 3)  whether the  defendant
                         has asserted  his legal  innocence;
                         and  4)  whether  the  parties  had
                         reached a plea agreement. 

          United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 834 (1st Cir. 1996)  (quoting
          _____________    ____

          United States v.  Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3-4  (1st Cir.), cert.
          _____________     ____________                              _____

          denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 94 (1995) (citation omitted)).  If
          ______

          defendant meets the rigors of  this test, we evaluate whether the

          government will suffer any demonstrable prejudice.  See id. 
                                                              ___ ___

                    First, we find,  and counsel for defendant  admitted at

          oral argument,  that the Rule  11 plea colloquy was  thorough and

          comprehensive.    Irizarry-Sanabria  argues  that  his  plea  was

          nonetheless not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because it was

          made under duress, due to the pressure of his attorney.  However,

          during  the colloquy, Irizarry-Sanabria  denied that he  had been

          coerced  to accept  the  plea bargain,  acknowledged that  he had

          discussed its  terms  with  counsel, and  affirmed  that  he  was

          satisfied with  his legal  representation.   "Such statements  in

          open court during  a plea hearing 'carry a  strong presumption of

          verity.'"  United  States v.  Mart nez-Molina, 64  F.3d 719,  733
                     ______________     _______________

          (1st Cir. 1995)  (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431  U.S. 63, 74
                                    __________    _______

          (1977)).  The pro se motion offers nothing more than a conclusory
                        ______

                                         -3-

          statement  that the  plea  was  "made under  duress,  due to  the

          urgency and  pressure of  all the  [co-defendants'] attorneys  of

          this case,"  including Irizarry-Sanabria's  counsel.   In denying

          the motion, the  district court noted that  Irizarry-Sanabria was

          informed at the change  of plea hearing that he could  proceed to

          trial that  same  day if  he  chose, and  commented  that he  was

          "alert, calm,  confident and  knowledgeable of  his rights,"  and

          "never showed  any hesitancy or  reservation about his  desire to

          plead guilty."   Order at  6.  In  these circumstances, where  we

          have a thorough, comprehensive Rule  11 colloquy on one hand, and

          a naked conclusory claim of duress unsupported by any allegations

          of fact on  the other, we find that Irizarry-Sanabria's eleventh-

          hour claim of  duress lacks merit, and accordingly  find that his

          plea was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently within the

          meaning of Rule 11.

                    Our  second factor weighs the force and plausibility of

          the proffered reasons.  We have already weighed the duress claim;

          we briefly  examine Irizarry-Sanabria's  other asserted  reasons.

          First, Irizarry-Sanabria claims he is innocent, and that he could

          prove it,  without specifying  anything regarding  the nature  of

          such proof.  At the same time,  during the change of plea hearing

          he corrected the court's account  of the events of the conspiracy

          several times,  clarifying what his  participation had been.   In

          such circumstances, we find that the district court did not abuse

          its discretion  by "refusing  to give weight  to a  self-serving,

          unsupported claim  of innocence."   United  States v.  Ramos, 810
                                              ______________     _____

                                         -4-

          F.2d 308, 313 (1st Cir.  1987) (finding that defendant's claim of

          innocence  lacked merit  where  he did  not  assert innocence  at

          change  of plea  hearing and  did not  substantiate his  claim of

          exculpatory  evidence); see  Isom,  85  F.2d  at  837  (rejecting
                                  ___  ____

          defendant's  pro   se   motion  asserting   innocence  where   no
                       ________

          information was provided regarding  alleged exculpatory evidence,

          and  defendant provided specific information regarding the events

          of the crime at Rule 11 hearing).  

                    Second, Irizarry-Sanabria's claim that  he did not have

          access to the files on the case gives us little pause,  given the

          thoroughness of the  Rule 11 hearing and the  fact that Irizarry-

          Sanabria does not offer any indication of what he expects to find

          in the files, or what prejudice  he has suffered.  Similarly, his

          claim that his requests for  legal assistance "in this matter" --

          presumably, his motion  and claim of innocence and  duress -- had

          been to no avail is unconvincing, as his attorney followed up the

          pro se motion with a motion in support and memorandum of law.  
          ______

                    As for  the timing  of  the motion,  almost two  months

          elapsed between the  change of plea hearing on  October 21, 1993,

          and Irizarry-Sanabria's pro  se motion of December 15,  1993.  We
                                  _______

          have   previously  found  that   such  a  delay   weighs  against

          defendant's position.2   See,  e.g., Isom, 85  F.3d at  839 (two-
                                   ___   ____  ____

                              
          ____________________

          2   Appellant  argues that  this  measure ignores  the fact  that
          Irizarry-Sanabria's  change of heart undoubtedly occurred at some
          time prior to the date of service.  Nonetheless, in such cases we
          take as our measure the date of  the motion to withdraw the plea,
          regardless  of  when  the  defendant's  subjective  decision  was
          actually made.  See Isom, 85 F.3d at 838-39 (collecting cases).
                          ___ ____

                                         -5-

          month delay);  United States  v. Pellerito,  878 F.2d  1535, 1541
                         _____________     _________

          (1st Cir. 1989) (eight week  delay); United States v. Crosby, 714
                                               _____________    ______

          F.2d 185, 192  (1st Cir. 1983) (eight week  delay), cert. denied,
                                                              ____________

          464 U.S. 1045 (1984).

                    As for  the final  two factors,  we  note, first,  that

          Irizarry-Sanabria has  claimed his innocence.   Nonetheless, "the

          mere protestation of  legal innocence cannot in and  of itself be

          issue-determinative."  United  States v. Kobrosky, 711  F.2d 449,
                                 ______________    ________

          455  (1st  Cir.  1983).    Second, the  parties  reached  a  plea

          agreement, which neither alleges has been broken.

                    As our  analysis of all  the factors weighs  heavily in

          favor  of  the district  court's  decision, we  need  not address

          whether granting  the  motion would  result in  prejudice to  the

          government before affirming the decision below.

                    Irizarry-Sanabria asserts that the district court erred

          in  denying him an  evidentiary hearing to  factually bolster his

          claims.  However, we note that

                      evidentiary hearings  on motions  are the
                      exception,  not   the  rule.     We  have
                      repeatedly  stated  that,   even  in  the
                      criminal  context,  a  defendant  is  not
                      entitled as  of right  to an  evidentiary
                      hearing  on   a  pretrial   or  posttrial
                      motion.    Thus,   a  party  seeking   an
                      evidentiary hearing  must carry  a fairly
                      heavy burden of  demonstrating a need for
                      special treatment.

          United  States  v. McGill,  11  F.3d  223,  225 (1st  Cir.  1993)
          ______________     ______

          (citations  omitted).     Irizarry-Sanabria's   naked  conclusory

          statements offer us no basis  for finding that the district court

          abused  its discretion in  not holding an  evidentiary hearing on

                                         -6-

          his  claims.   See, e.g., Ramos,  810 F.2d at  314; Kobrosky, 711
                         ___  ____  _____                     ________

          F.2d at 457; see also Isom, 85 F.3d at 838 (collecting cases).
                       ________ ____

                    On  appeal, counsel  for  defendant  argues that  "most

          individuals" are too intimidated by  the circumstances of a  Rule

          11 plea colloquy to stop and  tell the court that they have  been

          coerced  into pleading  guilty.    Such  generalizations  do  not

          persuade  us that  the district  court  abused its  discretion in

          making its decision -- a  decision "facilitated because the judge

          has  overseen   pretrial  proceedings,  conducted  the   Rule  11

          inquiries, accepted the original guilty  plea, and heard at first

          hand the  reasons bearing upon  its withdrawal."   Pellerito, 878
                                                             _________

          F.2d at 1538.  Indeed, the fact  that during the Rule 11 colloquy

          Irizarry-Sanabria  corrected the court's account of the events on

          several points belies the image of a timid defendant.

                    We are given more pause by appellant's contention, made

          at  oral argument, that  a potential conflict  arises because the

          counsel who Irizarry-Sanabria  alleges put him under  duress also

          helped him litigate the motion for withdrawal of his guilty plea.

          However,  in this  circumstance,  where we  have  a complete  and

          detailed plea colloquy, a detailed order denying the  motion, and

          only  the  most sparse  allegations  on  the  part  of  Irizarry-

          Sanabria, we  cannot  find that  the  district court  abused  its

          discretion,  even taking  into  account  the  pro  se  nature  of
                                                        _______

          Irizarry-Sanabria's motion.

                              B.  Double Jeopardy Claims
                              B.  Double Jeopardy Claims
                                  ______________________

                    Irizarry-Sanabria next  argues that the  district court

                                         -7-

          erred in failing to dismiss the indictment against him because he

          had previously  been found  guilty in a  case involving  the same

          conspiracy.  He alleges that  the indictment in this case amounts

          to  prosecuting a single conspiracy as two separate conspiracies,

          in violation of his double  jeopardy guarantee.  However, we find

          that under Local Rule  510.2 of the  District of Puerto Rico,  he

          has waived this  argument by failing to object  to the magistrate

          judge's report and recommendation in  writing within ten days, as

          the  report and  recommendation warned.   See  United States   v.
                                                    ___  _____________

          Valencia-Copete,  792 F.2d  4, 6  (1st Cir.  1986) (after  proper
          _______________

          notice,  failure to  file a  specific  objection to  magistrate's

          report  will  waive the  right  to  appeal);  see,  e.g.,  Henley
                                                        ___   ____   ______

          Drilling Co. v.  McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 151 (1st  Cir. 1994); Borden
          ____________     _____                                     ______

          v. Secretary of  Health and Human  Services, 836 F.2d  4, 6  (1st
             ________________________________________

          Cir. 1987).

                    Although we acknowledge an appellate court's discretion

          to excuse  waiver "in  the interests of  justice," see  Thomas v.
                                                             ___  ______

          Arn, 474 U.S.  140, 155 & n.15  (1986), in this  case we find  no
          ___

          basis   for  such  action  because  we  conclude  that  Irizarry-

          Sanabria's arguments likely would not  prevail on the merits.  We

          weigh  five factors in determining whether two charged conspiracy

          are actually one  for double jeopardy purposes:   the timing; the

          personnel; the locations involved; the evidence used; and whether

          the same statutes  were implicated.  See United  States v. G mez-
                                               ___ ______________    ______

          Pab n, 911 F.2d 847, 860 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,  498 U.S.
          _____                                     ____________

          1074  (1991).   The  only facts  Irizarry-Sanabria  points to  in

                                         -8-

          arguing that  there are two  distinct conspiracies here  are that

          they both  involve the  same amount of  marijuana, and  that they

          occurred within several weeks of each other.  However, given that

          it was not  the same shipment of  marijuana, that it was  not the

          same Colombian supplier,  that the only common  participants were

          the  defendant  and  a  confidential informant  Irizarry-Sanabria

          introduced to his co-conspirators, and that the importation route

          was different, see And jar, 49 F.3d at 18-19 (setting out facts),
                         ___ _______

          we  are hard pressed to  see how these  two conspiracies would be

          viewed as one.

                                   C.  Other Claims
                                   C.  Other Claims
                                       ____________

                    Irizarry-Sanabria  also  alleges  that  the  government

          should have  been collaterally estopped  from relitigating  these

          issues.   However,  he does  not  specify what  ultimate fact  he

          contends has  been resolved in  his favor.  Similarly,  he argues

          that   his  substantive  due  process  rights  were  violated  by

          prosecution for  conduct that  he was  already convicted  of, and

          that the totality of the  trial court's errors and the cumulative

          effect  thereof constituted prejudicial  error, depriving  him of

          his  due process,  both without  pointing to any  error.   To the

          extent  that these arguments have  not already been deemed waived

          under our  double jeopardy holding,  we now find them  waived, as

          "[i]t is  not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the

          most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create

          the  ossature for  the argument,  and  put flesh  on its  bones."

          United  States v.  Zannino,  895  F.2d 1,  17  (1st Cir.),  cert.
          ______________     _______                                  _____

                                         -9-

          denied,  494 U.S.  1082 (1990); see,  e.g., Damon v.  Sun Co., 87
          ______                          ___   ____  _____     _______

          F.3d 1467, 1485 (1st Cir. 1996).

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    For  the reasons presented  above, the decision  of the

          district court is affirmed.
                            affirmed
                            ________

                                         -10-