Court Opinion

ID: 9493037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:56:09.662452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:36.616390
License: Public Domain

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join all of the majority’s opinion except for Part III.B. My concern is footnote 6, which states that “the requirements of section 851 are jurisdictional in nature. See United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir.1999). Consequently, the fact that Lawuary did not raise this argument at sentencing does not constitute waiver.” I do not think that 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) affects the jurisdiction of the district courts, so we should review Lawuary’s contention only to determine whether the *378district court committed plain error— which it did not.
Section 851 specifies procedures for recidivist sentencing under the drug-control laws. Subsection 851(a) reads:
(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part [21 U.S.C. §§ 841-63] shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon a showing by the United States attorney that facts regarding prior convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of a plea of guilty, the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts. Clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.
(2) An information may not be filed under this section if the increased punishment which may be imposed is imprisonment for a term in excess of three years unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed.
None of this language purports to affect the jurisdiction of the district courts. The statute does no more than establish a condition precedent. Subject-matter jurisdiction comes from 18 U.S.C. § 8231. Because a violation of § 851(a) does not deprive a court of jurisdiction, the normal rules of waiver and forfeiture are applicable. Lawuary did not waive his entitlements under § 851(a), but neither did he assert them, so his position is forfeited, and only if the district court committed plain error may we reverse. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). But if § 851(a) really is jurisdictional, then neither waiver nor forfeiture matters. Indeed, the court of appeals must examine the subject of its own volition in every case, even if none of the parties complains. What sense does that make? Why should the omission or misstatement of an element of the offense be subject to plain-error analysis, as Johnson holds, but an error with respect to sentencing be treated as jurisdictional?
It is easy to find opinions saying that § 851(a) is a jurisdictional rule. Our circuit has at least three. United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir.1999); Kelly v. United States, 29 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Belanger, 970 F.2d 416, 418 (7th Cir.1992). It is considerably harder to find an explanation for this assertion. Jackson just cites Belanger, which cites United States v. Wright, 932 F.2d 868, 882 (10th Cir.1991), which cites a chain of cases back to United States v. Cevallos, 538 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (5th Cir.1976), which does not support the proposition for which Wright used it. Cevallos, which concerned § 851(b), said in dictum, 538 F.2d at 1126, that the fifth circuit requires “strict compliance” with § 851(a). Another court said much the same thing in United States v. Kennedy, 133 F.3d 53, 59 (D.C.Cir.1998). A demand for “strict compliance” is unrelated to jurisdiction. So our circuit’s cases rest in the end on a misreading of Cevallos and no reading at all of the statutory text. None of the opinions offers a reason independent of precedent for a jurisdictional characterization. Nor can I think of a reason.
“Jurisdictional” problems fall into two broad categories, plus many shadings. See Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077-79 (7th Cir.1987). One concerns the constitutional or statutory limits of adjudicatory authority. All of the questions here arise under federal law, however, so Article III does not impose a limit, and Congress has autho*379rized federal courts to adjudicate. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The other category includes rules that cannot be waived by the parties, and which are loosely called-“jurisdictional” because they have this feature in common with the genuine jurisdictional limits. Yet permitting defendants to make choices is the norm in federal criminal procedure, even when the right in question is expressed in absolute terms. See, e.g., New York v. Hill, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which provides that a defendant transferred to another state “shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days,” does not preclude waiver or forfeiture); United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995) (Fed. R. Evid. 410 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), which provide that statements during plea bargaining are inadmissible, does not preclude waiver or forfeiture). That § 851 is unqualified does not distinguish it from many other entitlements that defendants possess and may surrender — often in exchange for valuable concessions as part of plea bargains. A defendant who may waive indictment, despite the fifth amendment’s unqualified language (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury”) may waive the filing of an information listing prior convictions. Section 851(a) therefore cannot properly be placed in this second class of “jurisdictional” rules.
Only two courts of appeals have addressed this subject with independent reasoning, as opposed to citations. Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 42-46 (1st Cir.1999), holds that § 851(a) is not jurisdictional, and United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539, 543-44 (D.C.Cir.1996), resolves a similar issue under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) against a jurisdictional classification. Judge Selya’s opinion in Prou is well thought out, but one passage may mislead. Prou says that “[wjithout exception, [in] the cases ... that have called the procedural requirements of section 851(a)(1) ‘jurisdictional’, ... nothing turned on the choice of phrase.” 199 F.3d at 44. Confined to direct appeals, as Prou may have intended, this is true, but there is at least one exception when we consider collateral attacks too: this circuit’s opinion in Kelly. The district court rejected Kelly’s argument under § 851(a) because it had not been raised in a timely fashion; we reversed, holding that because § 851(a) is jurisdictional, the defendant did not have to raise the point at all, let alone on time. 29 F.3d at 1112-14. Thus we have a conflict among the circuits: this circuit is on one side (and may be joined by Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1306-09 (11th Cir.1998)); Prou and Baueum are on the other; and remaining circuits have dicta but not holdings.
Instead of asking us to reexamine the subject, as in Prou, 199 F.3d at 42, here the United States has embraced the jurisdictional characterization; Its brief proclaims that “[n]on-eompliance is a jurisdictional defect.” Obviously the United States Attorney for the Central District of Illinois and the United States Attorney for the District of Rhode Island are not in close communication. I could appreciate reluctance to revisit a subject that does not affect the outcome for Lawuary, when the parties have not made adversarial presentations, but instead my colleagues say that “we do not agree with the concurrence’s approach to section 851” (211 F.3d at 376 n.6)—though they do not give reasons beyond citing cases that themselves contain none, plus another case (Kennedy) that, while citing Kelly, does not endorse Kelly’s assertion about the jurisdictional status of § 851 (or mention jurisdiction at all).
Two years ago, United States v. Martin, 147 F.3d 529, 531-33 (7th Cir.1998), tackled an argument that failure to establish the interstate-commerce element of an offense is a jurisdictional flaw. Recognizing that some earlier panels had used the word “jurisdiction” in a loose way to denote “unauthorized,” we held in Martin that the *380only genuine jurisdictional element in a federal criminal prosecution is subject-matter jurisdiction under § 3231. Once that has been established, Martin concluded, other issues are subject to normal rules of waiver and forfeiture. Accord, United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 971-73 (7th Cir.2000); Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir.1999). These cases are equally instructive concerning § 851(a).
Section 851(a)(1) affects the maximum length of sentences. Oodles of similar limits exist (including minimum and maximum sentences and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines); these are unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 88-93, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998), makes that point clearly. The statute in Steel Co. specifies limits on the extent of a remedy, and Congress even used the word “jurisdiction” to describe those limits. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c). But the Court concluded that rules of law curtailing judges’ remedial powers do not affect “jurisdiction” in the strong sense— that is, do not require judges to disregard rules of waiver and forfeiture, do not require judges to address the issue even if the parties are content with the district judge’s disposition. That is equally true of § 851(a)(1).
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 2102-03, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999), puts the subject to rest. Jones contended that he had been sentenced to death without observance of some statutes that create extra safeguards for capital cases, and he argued that his failure to make timely objection was excused by 18 U.S.C. § 3595(c)(2)(A), which can be read to give the court of appeals an independent role in preventing arbitrary sentences. But the Supreme Court replied that because “[t]he statute does not explicitly announce an exception to plain-error review” the normal rules of waiver and forfeiture apply. 119 S.Ct. at 2102. The Court went on to hold that Jones had not established plain error. If this is the right approach for a sentence of death, it is certainly the right approach for a sentence of life imprisonment, which Lawuary has received. Section 851(a) “does not explicitly announce an exception to plain-error review”. Given Jones, Steel Co., Martin, and Prou, we ought to hold that the rules of waiver and forfeiture apply to § 851(a)(1).