Court Opinion

ID: 9700381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:25:07.750184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:08.298390
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
JOYCE, J.
¶ 1 I agree with my esteemed colleague’s disposition of the issues regarding the trial court’s denial of the Commonwealth’s right to a jury trial and the ability of the judge to find manslaughter following a guilty plea to murder generally. However, I write to separate myself from the Majority’s consideration of the recusal issue.
¶ 2 By itself, I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the recusal issue is interlocutory under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). However, the recusal issue was only one of three issues the Commonwealth raised on appeal, which were all part and parcel of the same series of events. In fact, only one order disposes of all three issues. See Certified Record, Docket Entry D-9, Order dated 1/1/2001. If each issue is to meet the requisites set forth in case law and Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), why did the Majority also consider the issue regarding a court’s ability to find manslaughter following a degree of guilt hearing? The order pertaining to this issue also would be interlocutory, yet it was considered in the Majority’s opinion. In my view, to avoid piecemeal litigation and to resolve the conflict from which this appeal arose, I would consider each of the issues raised herein.10 Hence, I will turn to the merits of the Commonwealth’s recusal issue.
¶ 3 The standard for recusal in Pennsylvania is well settled.
It is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially. As a general rule, a motion for recusal is initially directed to the jurist whose impartiality is being challenged. In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first make a conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist must then consider whether his or her continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make. Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that decision will not be overturned on appeal but for an abuse of discretion. In reviewing a denial of a disqualification motion, we recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent.
Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79 (1998) (internal citations *564omitted). “Because the integrity of the judiciary is compromised by the appearance of impropriety, recusal is necessary where the judge’s behavior appears to be biased or prejudicial. Accordingly, even if the court determined that there is no actual prejudice, the court must recuse itself if it appears that there is any improper influence.” Commonwealth v. Benchoff, 700 A.2d 1289, 1295 (Pa.Super.1997) (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). “The impartiality of the court, which is a fundamental prerequisite of a fair trial, must be deemed compromised by appearance alone, thus eliminating the need for establishing actual prejudice.” In the Interest of McFall, 533 Pa. 24, 617 A.2d 707 (1992).
¶ 4 The Commonwealth cites to various portions of the record to support its contention that the trial court demonstrated an appearance of impropriety. First, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court’s expression of anger towards it is evidence of bias and the appearance of impropriety. Specifically, the Commonwealth refers to the following statement:
To say I am angry is just — doesn’t even begin to equate to you the level of hostility that I feel right now; because number one, I thought it was clear to everyone in this room that I do not think the traditional judicial system is prepared to accommodate the case that is in front of us, and that it required the acknowledgment that Miriam White was; A, not necessarily appropriate to be in the community; and B, it required us to not necessarily think like DA[’]s and defense lawyers and to look for a resolution that was not only in the community’s best interests but in this child’s best interests.
N.T., Status Hearing, 12/02/99, at 5. In addressing the Commonwealth’s concern, some history is required to put the comment into context. The trial court was faced with a nearly unprecedented situation where an eleven-year-old girl fatally stabbed a total stranger. Based upon a report of Appellee’s mental heath professional, the trial court was operating under the belief that Appellee was decompensat-ing in adult prison. N.T., Bail Hearing, 11/19/99, at 7, 27. As a result of this information and the trial court’s impression that all the parties wanted to resolve the case with a nontraditional disposition, there was a lengthy discussion about the need to have Appellee’s mental health evaluated and who the appropriate party was to conduct the evaluation. Id. at 34. The hope was that this evaluation would assist the parties and the court in finding a more appropriate facility in which to house Appellee which was secure enough to protect the community while still addressing her needs. The parties all seemed to agree on this course of action. It appears, however, that the Commonwealth drafted a letter to the agreed upon mental heath professional on the same day as the status hearing. The record indicates the trial court’s belief that the letter resulted in Appellee not being evaluated as planned. N.T., Status Hearing, 12/02/99, at 4-5. The trial court then expressed her anger at this development, borne out of frustration and what the court perceived as deceit by the Commonwealth to undermine its efforts at facilitating a disposition of the case.
¶ 5 Later, during the same status hearing, the trial court met with Appellee. Upon Appellee entering the courtroom, the trial court introduced itself, showed Appel-lee the stenographer’s machine and explained that her responses needed to be verbal. It was explained that nothing was going to happen that day and that the trial court just wanted to meet her. Appellee was advised that a doctor was going to see her and the trial court elicited a promise that she would cooperate so that the trial *565court could send her to the “right place” that would be “good for [her]” and where she can grow. Id. at 22-23. The trial court told Appellee how “absolutely beautiful” she is, that she has a “gorgeous smile,” and that the court wanted “to send [her] to a place where [she] can grow up to be a beautiful young woman.” Id. at 23. The trial court then engaged Appellee in the following dialogue:
THE COURT: Is everything going all right?
[APPELLEE]: Kind of.
THE COURT: Are you eating? [APPELLEE]: Yes. I eat a lot.
THE COURT: You eat a lot. Okay. Good food?
APPELLEE: Yes. A lot of bad food. THE COURT: Really. Food’s not very good?
APPELLEE: Uh-uh.
THE COURT: Do they give you any fruit?
[APPELLEE]: Yes, I eat that too.
THE COURT: Good, good, good. What do they give you that you don’t like? [APPELLEE]: I don’t like the vegetables.
THE COURT: The — oh, the vegetables. But vegetables are good for you. What do they do, cook them too long? [APPELLEE]: It tastes like they not all cooked done.
THE COURT: Oh, you know why. Crunchy vegetables are better for you. When you cook them until they get mushy, then they’re no good. Yeah, crunchy vegetables are better for you, you know. Do they have anything you like?
[APPELLEE]: Yes. I just like peanut butter and jelly, raw carrots, and I like hamburgers.
THE COURT: I like raw carrots too. I eat them every day for lunch. Honest to goodness. Every day for lunch I eat raw carrots. And what else?
[APPELLEE]: I like hamburgers, hot dogs, chicken.
THE COURT: Me too. I like hamburgers, hot dogs and chicken. You know, my son’s favorite thing in life. [APPELLEE]: I like pizza too.
THE COURT: What kind?
[APPELLEE]: I like sausage.
THE COURT: You like sausage. See, I like mushrooms.
[APPELLEE]: I like mushrooms too.
THE COURT: Yeah, mushroom is good stuff. It’s good stuff. I have to see if I can get you some pizza.
[APPELLEE]: Okay.
THE COURT: I don’t know. I can’t promise.
[APPELLEE]: I know.
THE COURT: But I can call and see if they can get you a pizza every now and again....
N.T., Status Hearing, 12/02/99, at 24-26. In conclusion, the trial court told Appellee it was “glad to meet [her]” and that it would “work very hard on getting [her] in a good place” but that Appellee had to cooperate and be good. The trial court then shook Appellee’s hand and stated it was “so pleased to meet” her. Id. at 27-28.
¶ 6 The Commonwealth argues “[t]his conversation between the lower court and a defendant who concededly stabbed an innocent pedestrian to death is disturbing. The court’s fulsome praise of the defendant; its exclamations of pleasure; its solicitous concern; and condonation of defendant’s characterization of murdering [the victim] as a mistake; create an appearance of improper personal involvement.” Commonwealth’s Brief, at 32.
*566¶ 7 Although I disagree with the Commonwealth’s characterization of this conversation, I do agree that this type of dialogue is rarely seen between a court and a defendant. It is unquestionable that the subject matter is peculiar in the courtroom setting, although it appears that the trial court was attempting to gauge Appel-lee’s mental stability and chose a level of conversation appropriate for a twelve-year-old in order to do so. The trial court’s intention to assess Appellee’s mental health in a casual manner is evidenced by its comment “Miriam seems okay, you know. At least she presented well for the five minutes that I was able to interact with her, .... ” Id. at 66. However, in doing so the trial court managed to share personal information about itself and its family. Worse yet, the trial court told Appellee that it would attempt to get her pizza while she was incarcerated, which would certainly constitute special treatment as I doubt that the trial court often attempted to obtain pizza for other alleged murderers who await trial. Whether or not the trial court’s conduct during the 12/02/99 status hearing amounts to an appearance of impropriety is a very close question. However, the Commonwealth asks that other portions of the record be reviewed to further support the appearance of impropriety.
¶ 8 The Commonwealth next cites to the trial court’s statement that it would not be “forced to treat this like a normal case” to support the existence of an appearance of impropriety. Certainly, Appellee’s case was far from normal and to that end the trial court attempted to persuade the Commonwealth and the defense to work together to reach a disposition that would protect the community while addressing the best interests of Appellee. However, when it became evident that the parties could not approach Appellee’s case amicably, the trial court stated:
I have always fully appreciated both of your need to, if you have to go to trial, not to have disadvantaged one another by your desire to cooperate at this point in time, but I have got to have something. Even if I subpoena the records and hold them in camera for me, and I am permitted to do that, but I have got to have — I need something now because now what you’re leaving'me with if we can’t get past this hurdle, and this is a significant hurdle in my mind, if we can’t get past this hurdle, what you are leaving me with is to treat this case like any other case in the system. And I don’t care who knows this from [Chief] Justice Flaherty all the way down. This system is not equipped to deal with this case, and I don’t want to treat it this way. And unless I am ordered to by higher-ups, I am not going to, and I am still not going to disadvantage either one of you. And so I may have to do some things that are unusual. I don’t want to be boxed into treating this like a regular case. It’s not appropriate. It’s not appropriate. And at this point in time nobody can force me to do this unless /all come in here with an order from [Chief Justice] Flaherty. You can’t force me to treat this like a regular case.
Id. at 41-42.
¶ 9 I am greatly concerned with the trial court’s statements. While I can appreciate the fact that no one enjoys seeing a twelve-year-old child standing in adult criminal court charged with murder, the fact remains that the law does provide for this type of situation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322 states:
Transfer from criminal proceedings
(a) General rule. — ... If it appears to the court in a criminal proceeding charging murder or any of the offenses excluded by paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the *567definition of “delinquent act” in section 6302, that the defendant is a child, the case may similarly be transferred and the provisions of this chapter applied. In determining whether to transfer a case charging murder or any of the offenses excluded from the definition of “delinquent act” in section 6302, the child shall be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer will serve the public interest. In determining whether the child has so established that the transfer will serve the public interest, the court shall consider the factors contained in section 6355(a)(4)(iii) (relating to transfer to criminal proceedings).
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(e), entitled “Transfer to criminal proceedings” provides: “(e)Murder and other excluded acts.— Where the petition alleges conduct which if proven would constitute murder, ... the court shall require the offense to be prosecuted under the criminal law and procedures, except where the case has been transferred pursuant to section 6322 (relating to transfer from criminal proceedings) from the division or a judge of the court assigned to conduct criminal proceedings.”
¶ 10 Thus, the legislature has determined that certain crimes, when committed by children, are so heinous that the perpetrators are to be treated as adults. Murder, the most heinous crime, falls squarely into this category, as it is specifically enumerated. However, the legislature also created an exception that would allow the case to be transferred from criminal to juvenile court if the child proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the public interest would be served by transferring the case. This is the law and this is the manner in which the trial court was required to proceed with Appellee’s case. Contrary to the trial court’s belief that “this system is not equipped to deal with this case” the legislature has already made a determination as to how this type of case is to be handled. The trial court’s pronouncement that it was not going to be “boxed into treating this like a normal case” unless it was “ordered to by higher-ups” indicates that the trial court prejudged the case and was unwilling to follow the law as set forth by the legislature, and as it is required to do.
¶ 11 Ultimately, Appellee’s case did proceed in the fashion proscribed by §§ 6322 and 6355 in that the defense moved to transfer the case from criminal court. However, the decertification court, which was different than the trial court, denied the motion. Following the decertification hearing, Appellee’s case was again presided over by the trial court. Because of the trial court’s prior declarations regarding how it believed the case should be handled, the Commonwealth expressed concern about the trial court’s ability to be impartial. In response, the trial court candidly admitted. “I think the law is wrong. However, I think any fair examination of my record reveals that I absolutely uphold the law in all instances. Miriam White will be tried as an adult. That decision has been made by a court over which I have no review authority.”11 N.T., Status Hearing, 11/17/00, at 3.
¶ 12 The Commonwealth also cites to the trial court’s response to its motion to re-cuse as further evidence of its inability to be impartial. “Adverse rulings alone do not, however, establish the requisite bias warranting recusal, especially where the rulings are legally proper.” Abu-Jamal, supra, 720 A.2d at 90. An oral motion was *568made where the trial court was asked to recuse itself during the ■ 11/17/00 status hearing. N.T. 11/17/00, at 2. The motion was again argued to the trial court on November 20, 2000. In response to the motion the trial court referred to the Commonwealth as “arrogant” and found the motion to be “patently offensive”. N.T., Status Hearing, 11/17/00, at 16. A review of the record makes- obvious the trial court’s displeasure with the Commonwealth’s motion.
¶ 13 The vehement reaction of the trial court to a motion that is reasonably meritorious is the proverbial final nail in the coffin, in my opinion, when examining this case. While the examples I have reviewed, standing alone, may not warrant the conclusion that there exists an appearance of impropriety, I would find that in the aggregate, such a determination is compelling. While I can appreciate the efforts of the trial court in attempting to reach a resolution favorable to all the parties involved, in doing so the overall effect was to create an appearance of impropriety. Thus, in my view, the trial court should have recused its'elf from Appellee’s case. Accordingly, I would reverse on this issue as well.

. The temporal relationship between the issues is of primary importance. Simply because one issue is appealable does not open the door to raise all other issues.

. The trial court’s reference to a court over which it has no authority is the trial judge who conducted Appellee's decertification hearing.