Court Opinion

ID: 9539903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:11:30.261684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:27.217797
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons stated in Chief Justice Givan’s dissent in German v. State, (1981) Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234, which I joined. We are certainly straining logic and our knowledge of human behavior to say that a person did not know and understand what he was doing in making voluntary waivers while entering a guilty plea when he knew and understood those things at the time he entered a written plea agreement, and that written plea agreement is placed in the record at the time of the guilty plea in open court. In North Carolina v. Alford, (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, the United States Supreme Court enunciated the standard for determining validity of guilty pleas pursuant to their decision in Boykin v. Alabama, (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. In Alford, the Supreme Court said: “The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” 400 U.S. at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 164, 27 L.Ed.2d at 168.
Here we have a post-conviction relief petition under I.R.P.C. 1, § 5, where the petitioner has the burden of proof and stands in the shoes of one appealing from a negative .judgment. As the majority states:
“[T]he trial judge, as trier of fact, is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Rufer v. State, (1980) Ind., 413 N.E.2d 880, 882. It is only where the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion and the trial court has reached an opposite conclusion, that the decision will be disturbed as being contrary to law. Walker v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 649, 651, 372 N.E.2d 739, 740.”
Here, we again have a situation such as that in German, supra, Williams v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 373, 363 N.E.2d 971, and Clark v. State, (1978) 270 Ind. 104, 383 N.E.2d 321, wherein the defendant has entered into a written plea agreement with the State, agreeing to take a conviction for a certain crime, agreeing to take a certain amount of punishment for that crime, subject to approval by the court only, and acknowledging therein that he understands all of his rights enumerated in the plea agreement, and freely, voluntarily, and knowingly waives all of those rights. The majority recognizes that the plea bargain agreement of defendant Early contained a paragraph in which each and every advisement required by sub-section (a), (b), and (c), of Ind.Code § 35-4.1-1-3 were found, and Early indicated his understanding by placing his initials next to each stated right.
It is my view that when a defendant with the aid of counsel enters into a plea agreement such as this with the State, and joins with the State in presenting this plea agreement to the trial court, virtually asking the judge to approve this agreement and sentence him in the manner designated in that agreement, the defendant has therein expressly waived any and all rights he has to be instructed any further by the judge. It is clear here that the trial judge had this plea agreement before him and examined it and was therefore aware that the defendant had entered into this agree*1074ment and acknowledged that he knew and understood everything contained in it, including the waivers of his rights. We are, therefore, engaging in nothing short of legal fictions to say there are grounds for reversing the judgment of the trial judge because he failed to ritualistically utter a certain phrase.
Defendant has made his agreement with the State and the State has kept its part of the bargain. I would require the defendant to do likewise. The trial court should be affirmed.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs.