Court Opinion

ID: 9400814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 15:14:08.739335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:48.079563
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 60

                                                                    APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                             June 9, 2023

TAYLOR SCOTT MEECE,

Appellant
(Defendant),

v.                                                                      S-22-0249

THE STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee
(Plaintiff).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County
                        The Honorable James Michael Causey, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Office of the State Public Defender: Diane Lozano, Wyoming State Public
      Defender; Kirk A. Morgan, Chief Appellate Counsel; Robin S. Cooper, Senior
      Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen
      R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and John J. Woykovsky, Senior
      Assistant Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Taylor Scott Meece of two counts of second-degree sexual abuse
of a minor. On appeal he contends the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by
misusing a forensic interviewer’s testimony in his opening statement and closing
argument. We find no misconduct and affirm.

                                         ISSUE

[¶2] The sole issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in the
way he referred to and used the testimony of a forensic interviewer in his opening
statement and closing argument.

                                         FACTS

[¶3] RR was born in February 2010. During the years 2017 to 2019, she lived with her
grandfather in Gillette, Wyoming along with her younger brother, her mother, and her
mother’s then-boyfriend, Taylor Meece. RR’s parents had known Mr. Meece since they
were teenagers, so RR had known him her entire life. She got along well with him, called
him “Uncle Shorty,” and considered him a “bonus dad” when her mother started dating
him.

[¶4] One night in 2017 or 2018, RR was lying in bed trying to sleep when Mr. Meece
entered her bedroom and laid down in bed next to her. He unzipped his pants, took her
right hand, and masturbated while holding her hand around his penis. He did that for a
couple of minutes and then reached under her pajamas and underwear and rubbed her
vagina with his fingers for a couple of minutes. He then got up and left. RR recalled that
she was scared, pretended to be asleep while it was happening, and did not understand
what had happened or know what to do.

[¶5] RR became withdrawn and less talkative after the incident. About a year later, she
told her younger brother MR what happened but made him promise not to tell anyone
because she was scared something else would happen. MR recalled that RR “said it might
have been [Mr. Meece], but she doesn’t really know.” He also recalled that she was
crying and begged him not to tell their parents.

[¶6] Sometime after telling her brother what had happened, RR told her soon-to-be
stepsister LW. In March 2021, RR told LW’s mother, CB, about the incident while they
were at a family gathering. CB told RR she needed to tell her mother, who was attending
the same event, and took RR to her. RR told her mother, who told RR’s father, and RR’s
father took RR to the Gillette Police Department to report the incident. About a month
later, a forensic interviewer, Brandi Tonkel, interviewed RR about the incident.

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[¶7] The State charged Mr. Meece with two counts of second-degree sexual abuse of a
minor. In its pretrial submission, it listed Ms. Tonkel as a witness, stating she “may
testify regarding her education, training and experience in the area of forensic
interviewing, her interview of the victim in this case, consistent with her report and CD
of said interview.” Shortly before the pretrial conference, Mr. Meece filed a motion
asking that the State be required to provide the defense a written expert report from Ms.
Tonkel.

[¶8] At the pretrial conference, the State objected to providing the requested report. It
pointed out defense counsel was relying on the rule for retained experts. The State
contended it had not retained Ms. Tonkel as an expert for trial but was instead calling her
as a fact witness. It asserted Ms. Tonkel would not be testifying to any opinions about
matters in the case or offering any ultimate conclusions. Concerning her expertise, the
State argued:

              [T]he State is not offering her, per se, as an expert witness;
              moreover, she does have an area of expertise, that’s why we
              provided the curriculum vitae to the defense, we’ve provided
              the reports and [defense counsel] could see that. We’re not
              going after opinions at this time. Now, if there’s cross-
              examination, that could change things, I – I don’t believe
              we’re quite there yet.

[¶9] The district court took Mr. Meece’s motion under advisement and then issued a
written order denying it. The court reasoned:

                      In this case, the Defendant has been provided with Ms.
              Tonkel’s curriculum vitae, interview report, and a copy of the
              interview. The State has declared that it does not intend to
              elicit expert opinion testimony from Ms. Tonkel, and it
              further does not appear as though her proposed testimony is
              of the type which requires an expert report to be prepared.

[¶10] At trial, the State elicited the following testimony from Ms. Tonkel over defense
counsel’s objection:

              Q.    So, Ms. Tonkel, what is your understanding of what a
              delayed disclosure is?

              A.      So a delay in disclosure would be based on research as
              well as what we see in practice that children will often wait to
              tell, and between 25 and 30 percent of child abuse victims
              will never tell. And the average age of disclosure is 55, and

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             that’s a national average. So what we know is that most
             children will delay a disclosure.

             Q.     In other words, something happens to the child and
             they don’t immediately go and tell, is that as simple of what a
             delayed disclosure is at its most elemental level?

             A.     Yes; so that could be hours, days, years, again, a
             lifetime.

[¶11] On cross-examination, defense counsel followed up on Ms. Tonkel’s testimony
concerning delayed disclosure:

             Q.     You talked a little bit about sometimes in your
             experience, children’s – children will wait to tell you – you
             talked about a little bit about delayed disclosures; do you
             remember that?

             A.     In practice and in research, yes.

             Q.     Okay.

                    And one of the things that can be a predictor for when
             a child might disclose is safety; is that right?

             A.     Yes.

             Q.    So once the perpetrator no longer lives in the house,
             that – that would be a piece that could keep them safe,
             maybe?

             A.     Physical safety.

[¶12] On redirect, the prosecutor elicited further testimony, without objection, detailing
the myriad reasons a child might delay disclosure, along with an explanation. Those
reasons included: the relationship between the child and offender; social and
developmental factors (not understanding sex and the need to tell); fear of not being
believed; and fear of what may happen to the offender and the victim’s family.

[¶13] In the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor did not discuss or refer to Ms.
Tonkel’s testimony concerning delayed disclosure. Defense counsel then argued in
closing:

                                            3
              You heard from Brandi Tonkel. She’s great on the witness
              stand, there was no doubt about that. She told you a lot about,
              “Well, sometimes there are reasons why delayed reporting
              happens,” but did she tell you anything about why delayed
              reporting in this case didn’t happen? And the answer to that is
              no.

                      She’s a great speaker. She has a lot of information, but
              when you shift (sic) through that, what does she tell you
              about this case? This defendant? Because, remember, every
              child is different, every case is different. What does she
              actually tell you about this case? And the answer to that is
              very little. She can’t tell you why [RR] delays reporting[.]

[¶14] In the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor responded by discussing at
length Ms. Tonkel’s testimony concerning the reasons for delayed reporting and
correlating those reasons to the evidence the jury heard concerning RR’s circumstances.
Defense counsel did not object.

[¶15] The jury found Mr. Meece guilty on both counts of second-degree sexual abuse of
a minor, and the district court entered judgment and sentenced him to a prison term of
eight to thirteen years on each count, to be served concurrently.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶16] Mr. Meece contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his opening
statement and closing argument. Because Mr. Meece did not object to either instance, we
review for plain error. King v. State, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 33, 527 P.3d 1229, 1242 (Wyo.
2023). To establish plain error, Mr. Meece “must show (1) the record is clear about the
incident alleged as error; (2) a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) he
was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice.” Id. (quoting Ridinger v.
State, 2021 WY 4, ¶ 33, 478 P.3d 1160, 1168 (Wyo. 2021)).

                                      DISCUSSION

[¶17] We have defined prosecutorial misconduct as follows:

              Prosecutorial misconduct is a prosecutor’s improper or illegal
              act (or failure to act), especially involving an attempt to
              persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or assess an
              unjustified punishment. Prosecutorial misconduct claims are
              not intended to provide an avenue for tactical sandbagging of
              the trial courts, but rather, to address gross prosecutorial

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              improprieties that have deprived a criminal defendant of his
              or her right to a fair trial. A prosecutor’s conduct is not
              misconduct unless he knew or should have known it would
              deprive the defendant of the right to a fair trial. It is
              something more than evidentiary error. We distinguish
              prosecutorial misconduct from evidentiary error because
              otherwise, any evidentiary error which favors the State would
              be considered prosecutorial misconduct.

King, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 16, 527 P.3d at 1238 (cleaned up).

I. There was no plain error committed in the State’s opening statement.

[¶18] During the State’s opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury:

                     I anticipate that as part of that investigation, you’ll
              hear about [RR] submitting to a forensic interview where she
              goes and provides a detailed account by someone who’s
              trained in dealing with these types of situations where you
              have a child victim or witness to get their side of the story.

[¶19] Mr. Meece contends this statement was misconduct because “[w]hile the State said
that they would not offer Ms. Tonkel as an expert, they referenced her expertise in their
opening.” Because the record clearly reflects the incident alleged as error, the first prong
of the plain error analysis is met. Mr. Meece cannot, however, show that this alleged
error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

[¶20] First, what Mr. Meece is truly claiming is that the State strayed from its pretrial
designation of Ms. Tonkel’s testimony. That is an evidentiary error, not misconduct.
King, 2023 WY 36, ¶¶ 16, 31, 527 P.3d at 1238, 1241-42 (rejecting argument that
prosecutor’s attempt to elicit expert testimony in violation of case management order was
misconduct and instead treating it as an alleged evidentiary error). Moreover, the
prosecutor’s statement during opening aligned with the State’s witness designation for
Ms. Tonkel, which said, in part, that she “may testify regarding her education, training
and experience in the area of forensic interviewing, [and] her interview of the victim in
this case[.]”Mr. Meece has therefore not established that the prosecutor’s statement
violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

II. There was no plain error committed in the State’s closing argument.

[¶21] Mr. Meece contends the following argument made during the State’s rebuttal
closing was misconduct:

                                             5
        We’ve heard test – or [defense counsel] brings to your
attention Ms. Tonkel’s testimony; how she’s able to provide
information concerning delayed disclosures, what delayed
disclosure is, and what are causes for delayed disclosures.
Let’s consider to what Ms. Tonkel did testify to. Again, go
back to Instruction Number 4 and draw reasonable inferences
from the evidence that has been presented to you.

        Ms. Tonkel talked about a reason for delayed
disclosure is the relationship between the offender and the
child. Consider the relationship between this offender and the
child; a close relationship, one [RR] revered until things went
south. The nature of that relationship was absolutely a
contributing factor to that delayed disclosure. You heard the
evidence, you heard from Ms. Tonkel. Draw reasonable
inferences to reach that conclusion.

        Another consideration for why disclosures are delayed
is social development. As Ms. Tonkel testified, all these kids
are different, they all approach the world differently, they see
it through different eyes at various stages of development.

        Curiously, Ms. Tonkel talked about the fifth grade as
being a time when these delayed disclosures will often come
forward because they might have some type of sex education
class. This disclosure occurred last year. [RR’s] presently in
the sixth grade, meaning last year, she was in the fifth grade.

       Looking to the reasons why Ms. Tonkel testified that
there are delayed disclosures corresponds to this case with
respect to the victim’s age at the time of that disclosure.

       Ms. Tonkel further testified about reason[s] for those
delayed disclosures: Fear of being believed. Ladies and
gentlemen, we’re here in court now testing [RR’s] account of
what happened. Another reason was fear of what might
happen to the offender. And she characterize (sic) this in a
couple different ways. One, the offender might be some type
of a breadwinner in the household; or two, mother might not
be one who can actually care for them if they are to report.

      So what happened to the offender? We know that [RR]
was very close with this defendant. We know that she resided

                               6
              with him for a period of time. We know she had very positive
              views of him, but we also know that the relationship between
              her mother and this defendant ended, and it was only after
              that relationship ended that she came forward with this
              disclosure.

                     Ms. Tonkel provided circumstances of where these
              delayed disclosures come into play. I submit to you the
              evidence that has been presented to you neatly corresponds
              with all of those bases.

[¶22] Mr. Meece asserts that through this argument the State relied on Ms. Tonkel to tell
the jury that R.R.’s disclosure “had all the hallmarks of truth given her expertise in
delayed disclosures.” He contends this was improper because it amounted to vouching for
RR’s credibility. He further contends the State argued matters not in evidence “by saying
that R.R.’s nature of disclosure was truthful because it bore the hallmarks of delayed
disclosure.” The first prong of our plain error review is met because the record is clear as
to the incident alleged as error. As with his first claim of misconduct, however, Mr.
Meece cannot show that this alleged error violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

[¶23] Vouching occurs when a prosecutor offers his opinion of a witness’s credibility, as
distinguished from when he infers credibility from the same evidence the jury has before
it. Byerly v. State, 2019 WY 130, ¶ 21, 455 P.3d 232, 242 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Collins v.
State, 2015 WY 92, ¶ 36, 354 P.3d 55, 64-65 (Wyo. 2015)). In the above-quoted
argument, the prosecutor made no reference to or comment on RR’s credibility. He
instead asked the jury to consider Ms. Tonkel’s testimony and correlate that to the
evidence it heard concerning RR’s circumstances. We have previously addressed much
the same scenario and held it did not constitute impermissible vouching.

[¶24] In Budig v. State, a psychologist testified to the nature of disclosures by child
victims of sexual abuse, and the prosecutor argued the evidence showed that was what
happened in that case. 2010 WY 1, ¶ 16, 222 P.3d 148, 154-55 (Wyo. 2010). On appeal,
the defendant argued “that by saying that the behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg are
‘exactly what happened’ in this case, the prosecutor gave more credibility to the
victims[’] testimony, thereby improperly vouching for their credibility.” Id., 2010 WY 1,
¶ 17, 222 P.3d at 155-56. We rejected the argument.

                     After reviewing the entire record on appeal, and
              particularly the trial transcripts, we find that the prosecutor’s
              comments relating the victims’ actions to the general
              behaviors described by Dr. Lindberg were not tantamount to
              vouching for the victims’ credibility. The prosecutor’s
              statements merely informed the jury about the relevance of

                                             7
             Dr. Lindberg’s testimony and suggested how that testimony
             might assist the jury in determining the facts at issue. Such
             use of expert testimony is proper. See Lessard v. State, 719
             P.2d 227, 233-34 (Wyo. 1986) (expert testimony as to why
             sexual assault victim would ask assailant not to tell about
             sexual encounter was admissible in that it did not constitute
             testimony with respect to veracity of victim, but rather
             assisted jury in understanding evidence).

Id., 2010 WY 1, ¶ 18, 222 P.3d at 156.

[¶25] Given our clear precedent, it is again apparent that what Mr. Meece is truly
claiming is that the State’s closing argument strayed from its pretrial designation of Ms.
Tonkel’s testimony. But, as we noted above, that is an evidentiary error, not misconduct.
King, 2023 WY 36, ¶¶ 16, 31, 527 P.3d at 1238, 1241-42. Mr. Meece has not challenged
the admissibility of the evidence on appeal or offered any analysis of its admissibility.
Moreover, although Mr. Meece objected to the State’s initial examination of Ms. Tonkel
concerning delayed disclosures, defense counsel was the first to ask Ms. Tonkel about a
reason for delayed disclosures, and he did not object when the State followed up with a
more extensive inquiry into those reasons. The evidence concerning the reasons for
delayed reporting was thus admitted without objection, and the prosecutor was free to
comment on it and suggest reasonable inferences from it. Bogard v. State, 2019 WY 96,
¶ 19, 449 P.3d 315, 321 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 30, 169
P.3d 512, 524 (Wyo. 2007)). Mr. Meece has therefore failed to establish that the
prosecutor’s statement violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.

[¶26] Affirmed.

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