Court Opinion

ID: 9588986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:40:21.207749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:37.895524
License: Public Domain

PLEICONES, Justice:
I agree with the majority that this termination of parental rights (TPR) action was properly brought by the petitioner, and that under the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary to appoint a second guardian ad litem. I write separately, however, because of my belief that the majority opinion may be read to construe S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1578 (Supp.1999) in a constitutionally impermissible manner.
Section 20-7-1578 requires a liberal construction of the TPR statutes “to ensure prompt judicial procedures____” *111This language is, in my opinion, an instruction to construe the procedural TPR statutes in a manner which will ensure prompt judicial action. It is not a direction to interpret the substantive TPR statutes so as to expedite terminations. The rule that we should construe TPR statutes strictly to prevent the erroneous termination of the parent-child relationship derives not just from the general rule that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed,1 but also from the constitutional rights implicated by a termination proceeding.2 I believe we err when we dilute the moving party’s burden in a termination proceeding.
For these reasons, I concur separately in the result reached by the majority.

. Natural parents have a "fundamental liberty interest ... in the care, custody, and management of their children .... [and] the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 760, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 1398, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606, 611 (1982); see also Greenville County Dep’t of Soc. Services v. Bowes, 313 S.C. 188, 437 S.E.2d 107 (1993).