Court Opinion

ID: 3267051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 16:35:26.014095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:13.942226
License: Public Domain

On March 30, 1933, W. W. Torrence and Sophronia Torrence presented their claim for $416 against the estate of Elizabeth Jordan, deceased, in due form to W. R. Benton, administrator, for allowance and classification. The claim was disallowed by the administrator, and notice waived, and claim presented to the probate court for allowance and classification. There was a trial by a jury in the probate court, and a verdict and judgment in favor of claimants for the amount of said claim. *Page 964 
On May 4, 1933, the appellee filed with the clerk of the Dallas County Probate Court an affidavit and prayer for appeal. There is no evidence showing that an appeal was ever allowed by the probate court.
On November 21, 1933, there was a trial before a jury in the Dallas County Circuit court, and judgment rendered for appellee. It is the contention of the appellants that this judgment is void, because the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction of the case. The only. question therefore for our determination is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction.
The appellant cites 2258 of Crawford  Moses' Digest, which provides, among other things, that the probate court shall order an appeal.
Attention is called to the case of Matthews v. Lane,65 Ark. 419, 46 S.W. 946. In that case there was a motion filed to dismiss the appeal, and the court held that no appeal had been granted, and the appeal was thereupon dismissed. It appears from the above case that no appeal was granted, and the court correctly held that it should be dismissed.
This court has repeatedly held that, in order to give the circuit court jurisdiction, the probate court must grant the appeal.
In the case of Speed v. Fry, 95 Ark. 148,128 S.W. 854, the court held that the granting of the appeal by the probate court was a prerequisite to the right of the court to exercise jurisdiction. In that case the claim was for $95.25. This amount was not sufficient to give the circuit court original jurisdiction.
In all matters of contract, the justice of the peace court has jurisdiction exclusive of the circuit court, where the amount in controversy does not exceed $100. In matters of contract where the claim is less than $100, the circuit court has no jurisdiction.
In the case of Miller v. Oil City Iron Works, 184 Ark. 900,45 S.W.2d 36, the probate court had granted the appeal, but it was contended that it had not been granted within the time allowed by law. Moreover, there was a motion made to dismiss the appeal because not taken in time, and this court said: "The record does not show *Page 965 
whether or not any evidence was introduced on the motion in the circuit court; and, in the absence of such showing from which this court might determine whether or not the circuit court abused its discretion in overruling the motion to dismiss, every presumption that it was correct must be indulged."
The question we have now was not involved in that case, because there the court granted the appeal.
If the case is such that the probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction, and the circuit court does not have original jurisdiction, then, under the decisions of this court, the appeal must be granted by the probate court, only  the circuit court will acquire no jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the circuit court has original jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the parties appeal and do not object to jurisdiction, they will be bond by the judgment rendered by the circuit court.
In this case the claim was for $416, and the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The parties appeared, tried the case, no objection was made to the jurisdiction of the court, and the judgment rendered was binding on the parties.
There is no question but what the circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. It is true that our statute says that a suit is begun by filing a complaint, and causing a summons to be issued. While a suit is begun in this manner, it does not follow that the case may be tried, because the summons might never be served, and the court might not acquire jurisdiction of the person.
We recently said: "A defendant appearing specially to object to the jurisdiction of the court must, as a general rule, keep out of the court for all other purposes. In other works, he must limit his appearance to that particular question, or he will be held to have appeared general and to have waived his objection. If he takes any step consistent with the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and the person, such special appearance is converted into a general one, whether it is limited in its terms to a special purpose or not." Federal *Page 966 
Land Bank of St. Louis v. Gladish, 176 Ark. 267, 2 S.W.2d 696.
The court also said in the above case: "But one cannot come into court, assert a claim, ask the court for affirmative relief, and then, when there is an adverse judgment, claim that the court had no jurisdiction over his person. If this could be done, the appellant would have the opportunity and advantage of prosecuting its claim and, in case it recovered judgment, it could collect, and at the same time take no chances of a judgment against itself."
What we have said applies in cases where the circuit court has original jurisdiction of the cause of action. If the circuit court's jurisdiction depended on the jurisdiction of the lower court, then no jurisdiction would be acquired by the circuit court unless the appeal was allowed by the probate court.
The Ohio court said, in a case appealed from the probate court: "It does not appear that any objection was made because of any lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court to hear and determine the issue, nor was there any objection respecting the way in which the controversy reached that court. Indeed, it seems to be conceded that the circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, thus possessed of power to pass upon its own jurisdiction, having also chancery powers: and such we understand to be the fact. The parties, therefore, were then in a court which, according to the theory of plaintiffs in error, was such a court as should have been resorted to in the first instance. In that court the parties joined issue, and the cause went forward to final judgment. How can the parties who then entered their appearance at the trial and submitted their controversy be heard now to dispute the jurisdiction of that court? We think they cannot. That the cause got into that court by appeal from a court which had not jurisdiction of it (if that be the case), rather than by original pleadings and process, was, after all, but an irregularity, not affecting any substantial right, and one which was waived." In re Crawford, 68 Ohio St. 58, 67 N.E. 156, 96 Am. St. Rep. 648. *Page 967 
"Within its limitations respecting subject-matter, a Federal court is a court of general jurisdiction. If organic power to hear the controversy exists, it is immaterial when or how the parties get into court; it is enough if they do come in and waive all preliminaries to the submission of their controversy. And so we deem in point those authorities from State courts which hold that, although the trial court acquired no jurisdiction by the removal of the case on appeal from an inferior court, yet, the trial court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the judgment would be sustained because the parties had voluntarily joined in submitting their controversies for decision." Toledo, St. L.  W. R. Co. v. Perenchio, 205 F. 472.
"Where a cause of action is within the general jurisdiction of a court, the voluntary appearance of the parties and submission of the cause on its merits confers jurisdiction to try the issues presented." Rio Vista Mining Co. v. Superior Court of Plumas County, 187 Colo. 1,200 P. 616.
"It is also a well-established rule that, in cases appealed from an inferior court to a superior court having appellate jurisdiction only, the appellate court acquires such jurisdiction as the inferior court had. In cases of this kind the weight of authority holds that where parties on appeal to a court having original jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action have, without objection, as in the case at bar, submitted their controversy to the court for trial and adjudication, and the cause proceeds to trial and final judgment, they will be held to have waived their right to object to the jurisdiction of the court to which the appeal is taken." Burt 
Carlquist Co. v. Marks, 53 Utah 77, 177 P. 224.
It appears that the weight of authority is to the effect that where the circuit court has original jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the parties appear and try their cases without objection, it is immaterial how the court acquired jurisdiction. Purnell v. Nichol,173 Ark. 496, 292 S.W. 686.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. *Page 968