Court Opinion

ID: 9588784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:45.822343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:25.425408
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the grant of Ms. Bartley’s petition for habeas corpus relief, but I am compelled to write separately so as to explain my reasons for doing so.
As the majority notes, there is a fundamental distinction between an extradition premised upon OCGA § 17-13-23 and an extradition proceeding brought pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-25. By its terms, OCGA § 17-13-23 requires a showing “that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state. . . .’’No such showing is required when seeking extradition under OCGA § 17-13-25. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 45 (2), fn. 6 (453 SE2d 698) (1995). The extradition proceedings brought against Ms. Bartley were based upon OCGA § 17-13-23. Therefore, proof of her presence in South Carolina at the time of the commission of the alleged crime was necessary in this habeas corpus proceeding.
Although Ms. Bartley’s presence in South Carolina was in issue, her guilt or innocence of the alleged crime clearly was not. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U. S. 282 (99 SC 530, 58 LE2d 521) (1978); Hutson v. Stoner, 244 Ga. 52, 53 (257 SE2d 539) (1979). The majority concedes that the distinction between these two issues is a “subtle” one, but it does not discuss that distinction. Absent an explanation, the majority’s holding appears incongruous, suggesting that, although the issue of Ms. Bartley’s guilt or innocence may not be addressed directly, the habeas court nevertheless was authorized to address that issue indirectly.
I believe that the distinction between the two issues is best understood when considered from the perspective of the technical differences which exist between an extradition proceeding and a criminal trial. The issue in an extradition proceeding is not the accused’s guilt or innocence, but only whether the accused should be extradited in order for that determination to be made in the demanding state. OCGA § 17-13-23 requires, as a condition of Ms. Bartley’s extradition from Georgia, a showing that she was present in South Carolina at the time of the crime and that, thereafter, she left that state. The demand for Ms. Bartley’s extradition and supporting documents are prima facie evidence that she was in South Carolina at the relevant time and that she subsequently fled. Baldwin v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 390 (116 SE2d 207) (1960); Dawson v. Smith, 150 Ga. 350, 351 (2) (103 SE 846) (1920). If uncontested, the demand and supporting docu*99ments, as prima facie evidence, would authorize Ms. Bartley’s extradition to South Carolina. DeWitt v. O’Neal, 225 Ga. 645 (171 SE2d 144) (1969). However, the law allows Ms. Bartley the opportunity to contest the validity of that prima facie evidence by means of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. OCGA § 17-13-30. Unlike a criminal trial in which the State would have the burden of proving her presence at the scene of the crime, the burden was on Ms. Bartley in the habeas proceeding to show that she was not in South Carolina on the date the crime was committed. Baldwin v. Grimes, supra; Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 700 (4) (75 SE2d 427) (1953). She presented testimony that she was not and the State offered no additional evidence whatsoever. The issue for resolution is, therefore, whether her testimony authorized the habeas court to refuse to order her extradition to South Carolina for a determination of her guilt or innocence. Ms. Bartley’s testimony certainly did not demand that South Carolina’s request for her extradition be denied. Ward v. Jarvis, 240 Ga. 668 (242 SE2d 134) (1978). However, the habeas court found that her testimony was credible and, having so found, it was authorized to refuse to order her extradition. Rutledge v. Tolbert, 240 Ga. 116 (239 SE2d 520) (1977). An accused who meets the evi-dentiary burden of proving that she “ ‘was not within the demanding State at the time stated in the indictment, nor at any time when the acts were, if ever, committed, is not a fugitive from justice. . . .’ [Cit.]” Dawson v. Smith, supra at 351 (3). However, unlike a criminal trial, the fact that Ms. Bartley prevailed in the present extradition proceeding would not constitute a res judicata defense to a subsequent effort on the part of South Carolina to obtain her extradition. Broughton v. Griffin, 244 Ga. 365 (260 SE2d 75) (1979). Therefore, if Ms. Bartley did not commit the crime, it is certainly in her best long-term interest to have her innocence conclusively established in a South Carolina proceeding.
Extradition should be facilitated in order that the ultimate question of guilt or innocence can be determined in the demanding state, but the accused’s “ ‘expense, inconvenience, and jeopardy involved in defending against a criminal charge in another state’ ” must also be considered. State v. Hedman, 195 NW2d 420, 423 (Minn. 1972). Rather than accede to having her innocence conclusively determined in South Carolina, Ms. Bartley exercised her statutory right to attempt to avoid extradition by contesting her presence in South Carolina on the date the crime was committed. According to the majority, Ms. Bartley’s challenge to extradition was successful because she satisfied her evidentiary burden by a “preponderance of the evidence.” If the appropriate evidentiary standard was an issue of first impression in this state, I would hold that an accused can avoid extradition only if the habeas court finds that the demanding state’s *100prima facie evidence has been countered by “clear and convincing evidence.” See State v. Hedman, supra at 422-423. However, the Georgia cases cited by the majority adopt the “preponderance of the evidence” standard and, adhering to the principle of stare decisis, I agree that those decisions are controlling authority here. Moreover, even if the applicable standard were “clear and convincing evidence,” the judgment in this case would still be affirmed, since Ms. Bartley’s uncon-tradicted testimony is sufficient to meet that higher evidentiary standard. Dawson v. Smith, supra at 351 (3). Under the present law of this state, I agree that, unless and until South Carolina brings an extradition proceeding in which Ms. Bartley fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence her absence from that state at the relevant time, she cannot be extradited pursuant to OCGA § 17-13-23.
Decided January 26, 1998
Reconsideration denied February 23,1998.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, David T. Lock, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Davis Cohen, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this special concurrence.