Court Opinion

ID: 9751090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:03:54.814616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:34.870517
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
The majority’s disposition of the jurisdictional issue on appeal does not differ from that of the original division opinion. In re Siracusa, 445 A.2d 663, 665-66 (D.C.1982). That holding was unchallenged. Rehearing by the division was granted, over my objection, presumably on the basis of a memo*411randum from the Public Defender Service as amicus curiae in support of appellant’s alternative petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc. Contempt is the issue here. The case is uncomplicated; respondent’s dereliction is clear — the question is whether his conduct was contumacious.
Respondent began a trial before Judge Tim Murphy and a jury on May 21, 1980. The following morning, at approximately 9:58 a.m., he asked to be excused to attend to another matter.1 That matter was a plea hearing in the ease of United States v. Cunningham, No. M-2104-80, set before Judge Donald S. Smith at 10:00 a.m. Respondent acknowledges that he did not arrive in Judge Smith’s courtroom until 10:07, by which time his absence had been discussed at length by Judge Smith, Mr. George Dreos, Assistant United States Attorney Paul Knight and a Mr. Wecher, who represented Ms. Cunningham in yet another case set for sentencing that morning. Mr. Dreos was counsel on a multi-count felony indictment; Mr. Siracusa was counsel on a misdemeanor Bail Reform Act violation. Judge Smith was told that as far back as the time of arraignment respondent had said he would not be present at the plea hearing and that Mr. Dreos could handle the matter for him. He had so informed Mr. Knight, Mr. Dreos, Mr. Wecher and his client, Ms. Cunningham, who, when asked, was more than willing to proceed. The court continued with the pleas to one count of the felony indictment (false pretenses) and to the BRA violation, an extended proceeding during which Judge Smith, in his customary careful manner, interrogated Ms. Cunningham as to her understanding of, and her willingness to enter, the pleas.2 At some point respondent entered the courtroom, but since he said nothing we must rely upon the court’s statement at its conclusion that respondent was present and had been throughout most of the plea. A date for sentencing was agreed upon and respondent left.
The transcript of the plea proceeding, which Judge Murphy had before him at the contempt hearing, says that it concluded at 10:20 a.m. The majority writes that “the court reporter subsequently certified that the transcript was in error; in fact the plea hearing did not terminate until 10:35.” This is indeed so according to an attachment to the amicus memorandum.3 I clarify this change in the record only because I anticipate that it will come as much of a surprise to the trial judge as the unorthodox submission to this court was to me. Now it appears that a trip which took close to seven minutes from Murphy to Smith took no time at all from Smith to Murphy, respondent having reappeared for trial also at 10:35.4
*412The above recital is relevant only insofar as it bears on respondent’s explanation of his failure to return to Judge Murphy’s courtroom at the appointed hour, with its heavy emphasis on the alleged complex nature of the pleas, his lead role in arranging them, and the necessity of his presence when taken. It is suggested that respondent, faced with a conflict between a judge presiding over a trial in progress and his obligation to a client, inadvertently fell into a trap from which he could not escape. He could not abandon his client in mid-plea without being unprofessional and/or disrespectful to Judge Smith. Neither could he be so unwise as to “irritate” Judge Smith by interrupting the proceedings to explain his plight.5 So he stayed. My guess is (again for the benefit of trial judges) that some such considerations lurk beneath the ipse dixit of the majority opinion, but who knows. It appears to me that here, as in In re Hunt, 367 A.2d 155, 157 (D.C.1976), “[t]he trial court properly inferred from appellant’s actions and his explanation that he had deliberately and willfully substituted his own judgment for a direct order of the court even though his actions represented a good faith attempt to straighten out his conflicting obligation with two other courts.” I say again that respondent’s decision to give priority to Judge Smith’s plea proceeding reflected a “deliberate choice, based on the assessment of the importance of the conflicting matters. This was not his choice to make.” In re Gregory, 387 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C.1978). There is clearly sufficient evidence in this record to support a finding of a deliberate, or, at the very least, a reckless disregard of professional obligations.
I agree that there is an urgent need for mutual understanding and cooperation between judges and lawyers in the Superior Court. Understanding requires an intelligent concern for the obligations of each; cooperation presupposes flexibility in meeting those obligations. What appears to be lacking most in the manner of dealing with many of the conflicts is a discipline short of contempt which also serves to preserve the integrity of the court. The remedy is elusive, however, and is best left to the conscientious efforts of the judges of that court. I would affirm.

. The actual colloquy was:
MR. SIRACUSA: Your Honor, may I be excused to go to Judge—
THE COURT: We’re just about to start your case.
MR. SIRACUSA: Your Honor, just for a few minutes.
THE COURT: All right. Be back by 10:15. MR. SIRACUSA: Thank you.

. Ms. Cunningham had earlier pled guilty in another case and was familiar with the questions to be asked.

. The court reporter states:
At your request, I have examined my notes and records in the case of United States v. J. Cunningham heard before the Honorable Donald Smith on May 22, 1980, to determine when the plea proceedings on that date concluded and to ascertain whether my certification that they were concluded at approximately 10:20 a.m. was accurate. In checking the calendar for that date, my notation indicates unequivocally that the proceedings ended at 10:35 a.m. My certification that the proceedings terminated at approximately 10:20 a.m. had been based, upon an estimation of the length of the proceedings and was in error by fifteen minutes.

.The majority seems not to have considered a remand for Judge Murphy to weigh the effect of this late development. It surely is a fact of significance, for even the Public Defender Service, while deploring the original division holding, concedes its validity by telling us, albeit with some lack of grace, that
Of course, had Mr. Siracusa waited 15 minutes after the completion of the matter before Judge Smith to return to Judge Murphy’s court or had he lied to Judge Murphy about the duration of those proceedings, as the *412present opinion almost suggests was the case, this would be a far different — and far easier — case, and a finding of contempt would have been clearly proper.
Having conceded as much, I find the professed confusion as to which particular act this court originally deemed contumacious — was it some improper action that created a scheduling conflict? was it a violation of a newly imposed “actual necessity” standard? — curious indeed. Judge Murphy’s contempt order, which was affirmed, might be of help.

. It is pointed out that not even Judge Smith’s clerk had such temerity.