Court Opinion

ID: 9651964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:04:44.509408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:35.385062
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/23/23 P. v. Slaughter CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         A166083
    v.
    KEVIN SLAUGHTER,                                                     (Alameda County
                                                                         Super. Ct. No. 143014)
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         In 2003, defendant was sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law to a
total of 22 years and four months after being convicted of second degree
robbery (Pen. Code, § 2112) and being a felon in possession of a firearm
(former § 12021, subd. (a)). The sentence included time for firearm use
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and prior conviction allegations that were found true
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
         Since 2003, California has enacted section 3051, which now provides for
“youth offender parole hearing[s]” for certain offenders who were 25 years or

1    We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
2     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

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younger at the time of their controlling offense. (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1);
Stats. 2017, ch. 675, § 1.) That statute requires the parole board to “act in
accordance with subdivision (c) of Section 4801.” (§ 3051, subd. (d).)
Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides: “When a prisoner committed his or
her controlling offense . . . when he or she was 25 years of age or younger, the
board, in reviewing a prisoner’s suitability for parole pursuant to Section
3041.5, shall give great weight to the diminished culpability of youth as
compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent
growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant
case law.”
      In 2022, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging
his sentence and seeking a “Franklin hearing”—i.e., a proceeding where
youthful offenders can make a record to preserve evidence for an eventual
parole hearing. (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin); People
Delgado (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 95, 98–99, fn. 1 (Delgado).) Defendant
averred that he was under the age of 26 at the time of his underlying
offenses. Construing the habeas petition as a motion for a Franklin
proceeding, the trial court denied the request on the ground that defendant
was ineligible for such a proceeding under section 3051, subdivision (h),
which renders section 3051 inapplicable to defendants sentenced under the
Three Strikes law. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating that he
intended to appeal the denial of his request for a Franklin proceeding.
      On appeal, defendant contends that he is entitled to the benefit of a
section 3051 youth offender parole hearing, and that subdivision (h) of
section 3051 violates equal protection by excluding defendants sentenced
under the Three Strikes law from receiving such a hearing. He claims that
even though he has received prior parole hearings, he is entitled to a youth

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offender parole hearing where the parole board must, pursuant to
section 4801, subdivision (c), “give great weight to the diminished culpability
of youth as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any
subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with
relevant case law.”
      The People concede that defendant was under the age of 25 at the time
of his controlling offense and entitled to a Franklin proceeding pursuant to
Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th 95. We accept the People’s concession and
find Delgado directly on point. (Delgado, at pp. 101–103 [defendant entitled
to Franklin proceeding under section 4801, subdivision (c), which applies
“broadly to all parole hearings, not just [youth offender parole hearings]”].)
      As the People argue, because defendant is already eligible for parole,
and because subdivision (c) of section 4801 will apply at his eventual parole
hearings, defendant’s equal protection argument that he is entitled to a youth
offender parole hearing under section 3051 is moot. Defendant does not
suggest any way in which his eventual parole hearings will be different than
one held under section 3051, and instead appears to concede there is no
difference.
      In sum, defendant “is entitled to a limited remand to make a record of
youth-related factors for his future parole hearing under section 3041.5.”
(Delgado, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 104.)
                                 DISPOSITION
      The order of the trial court denying defendant’s request for a Franklin
proceeding is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

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                                _________________________
                                Fujisaki, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Petrou, J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

People v. Slaughter (A166083)

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