Court Opinion

ID: 9854926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:16:59.213977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.451505
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the imposition of the penalty of death in this case.
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the validity in general of Georgia’s death penalty statute in murder cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 44 USLW 5230 (74-6257, decided July 2, 1976). This does not mean, however, that our duties under that statute are any less than they were before.
The sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case was ground 7: "The offense of murder . . . was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(7).
In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, the court referred to this provision, saying (44 USLW 5244): "It is, of course, arguable that any murder involves depravity of mind or an aggravated battery. But this language need not be construed in this way, and there is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court of Georgia will adopt such an open-ended construction.”
Florida has a comparable provision in its death statute. In Proffitt v. Florida, 44 USLW 5256 (75-5706, July 2, 1976), decided with Gregg, the court approved Florida’s comparable provision only after noting that the Florida Supreme Court had given it a restrictive construction in State v. Dixon, 283 S. 2d 1 (1973). 44 USLW at 5260.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 44 USLW 5244, fn. 52, after saying that this court had not given ground 7 an open-ended construction, the Supreme Court cited Proffitt v. Florida and State v. Dixon, supra. As I read Gregg and Proffitt, the Supreme Court upheld our statute because we had not then adopted an open-ended construction of ground 7.
*331In my view, the majority in this case has now adopted an open-ended construction of ground 7 and has placed at least that ground of our statute in peril of being held invalid as being vague and overbroad and tjius capable of capricious and unconstitutional application.
The majority cite 18 similar cases considered by the court as showing that this sentence of death was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. The only case out of the 18 cited in which the death penalty was imposed based solely (as here) on ground 7 was House v. State, 232 Ga. 140 (205 SE2d 217) (1974), cert. denied, 44 USLW 3762. In House, the defendant was found guilty of strangling two seven-year-old boys to death after committing rape (anal sodomy) upon them.
In only one other case decided by this court has the death penalty been approved based solely on ground 7. That was McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369 (211 SE2d 577) (1974). In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, in observing that we have not given ground 7 an open-ended construction, the Supreme Court pointed out that McCorquodale was a horrifying torture-murder. 44 USLW 5244. It was. McCorquodale beat, whipped, burned, bit and cut his bound victim, put salt on her wounds, and sexually abused her prior to murdering her by strangulation.
In the case at bar, we could have followed the Florida example of giving our ground 7 a restricted construction, particularly since we cannot point to any similar case where the jury imposed-the death penalty based solely on ground 7 other than the horrifying torture-murder in McCorquodale and the child rape and strangulation in House.
I would save ground 7 for cases in which torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery are, as the statute says, outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. I would not impose the death penalty in this case where ground 7 is the only ground approved by the jury and the evidence as to it does not rise to the level of torture, depravity, outrageousness or wantonness required by our statute and the Constitution.
On the other hand, in double murder cases such as this, I could approve one death penalty under ground 2 of *332our statute, Code Ann. § 27-2534.1(b)(2) ("The offense of murder... was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony..to wit: the other murder). However, the jury did not place the burden of this death penalty upon ground 2, the evidence does not support ground 7, and I therefore must dissent for the reasons stated above.
I am authorized to state that Justice Ingram joins in this dissent.