Court Opinion

ID: 9839693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 19:04:13.08766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:23.825984
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 In re Chan CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

 In re                                                        B324031

 HAU CHEONG CHAN                                              (Los Angeles County Super.
                                                              Ct. No. BH014079)
                        on Habeas Corpus.

      ORIGINAL PROCEEDING on petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. William C. Ryan, Judge. Petition granted.
      Rebecca N. Rabkin for Petitioner.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Amanda Jane Murray, Acting Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Malone and Jennifer O.
Cano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
                    ______________________

       This case arises from an armed robbery of a jewelry store
committed by Hau Cheong (Peter) Chan and four confederates
that ended in a bloody shootout in which a police officer and two
of the robbers were killed, and another police officer and the
storeowner’s son were shot and suffered serious injuries. It is
undisputed that Chan “cased” the jewelry store, provided a gun to
one of the robbers, and drove one of the getaway cars. Chan was
convicted of second degree murder, two counts of attempted
murder, assault on a police officer, and robbery, with true
findings a principal was armed with a firearm. He was sentenced
to 38 years four months to life in state prison.
       Thirty-six years later (in 2021) the Board of Parole
Hearings (Board) granted Chan parole, finding Chan had no
violent rule violations in prison since 2000, had a low risk for
violence, participated in numerous self-help programs, had an
“excellent” release plan, and had made a conscious decision to
stop his “criminal thinking” that led to his commission of the life
crime. Chan described what he had learned in prison and
expressed remorse for the “horrible murders,” adding, “I am
responsible for this terrible crime and I am truly sorry.”
However, Chan maintained the other robbers came up with the
idea to rob the jewelry store, Chan provided a gun for use in the
robbery only at the request of one of the robbers, and he was not
inside the store during the robbery and ensuing shootout.
       The Governor reversed the Board’s decision, finding Chan
had minimized his role in the life crime and failed to take full
responsibility for his actions, therefore continuing to pose an
unreasonable danger to society. In support of his decision, the
Governor described Chan as having a significant role in the
robbery and shootings, including joining his confederates in the
“detailed” planning, providing “weapons” to the group, entering
the jewelry store with his confederates, attempting to rob the
owner and his son, and shooting at the two police officers. Parts
of the Governor’s version of the life crime are supported by the

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appellate opinion affirming the conviction of Chan’s codefendant
(one of the robbers), which described Chan as “the leader of this
congerie of crooks” and placed Chan inside the jewelry store
during the robbery. However, other aspects—including that
Chan shot at the police officers and provided more than one gun
used during the robbery—are unsupported by the record.
       Chan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting
we reinstate the Board’s finding that he is suitable for parole and
order him released in accordance with the Board’s decision. Chan
contends his version of the life crime was plausible given that in
response to a posttrial jury questionnaire all but one of the jurors
indicated Chan was not the “mastermind” behind the robbery,
and he was not inside the jewelry store while the robbery took
place. Given the plausibility of Chan’s account and California’s
prohibition against requiring an inmate to admit to an official
version of the life crime (see Penal Code § 5011, subd. (b)),1 the
Governor improperly inferred Chan lacked insight based on the
official version of the life crime. Further, even if we were to
accept the Governor’s finding that Chan lacked insight into the
life crime given his minimization of his role, Chan has taken full
responsibility for the deaths and other harm he caused.
Therefore, even if there is evidence of lack of insight, it does not
satisfy the requirement that the Governor’s finding of current
dangerousness must be supported by some evidence. As the
Supreme Court held in In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 219
(Shaputis II), “lack of insight, like any other parole unsuitability
factor, supports a denial of parole only if it is rationally indicative

1       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

                                  3
of the inmate’s current dangerousness.” We grant the petition,
reinstate the Board’s decision, and direct the Board to conduct its
usual proceedings for release on parole.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Commitment Offense
       Because the Governor’s decision reversing parole rested on
the differences between the Governor’s version of the crime and
Chan’s version, we provide descriptions of the crime from (1) this
court’s opinion affirming codefendant Nam Chinh’s convictions at
the joint trial with Chan (People v. Chinh (Apr. 28, 1993,
B035806) [nonpub. opn.] (appellate opinion)); (2) the probation
officer’s 1998 presentencing report for Chan; and (3) Chan’s
testimony and written statement presented at his 2021 parole
hearing.

       1.     The appellate opinion affirming Chinh’s conviction2
       On the morning of December 17, 1984, Chan and four
others—Robert Woo, John Cheong, Sang Nam Chinh, and Thong
Huynh—robbed the Jin Hing jewelry store in Chinatown. Huynh
testified for the prosecution “in return for immunity as to not
only for this crime but also for previous crimes.”
       Chan had a “sizeable gambling debt” and “[a]rmed robbery
was his mode of choice to pay his debts.” Chan was “the leader of

2     Chan and Chinh were tried together before separate juries.
Because Chan addressed in his letter to the Board the appellate
opinion in Chinh’s appeal, we assume the opinion was available
for the Governor to consider. There does not appear to be an
appellate opinion addressing an appeal by Chan.

                                 4
this congerie of crooks.” The five men met at Huynh’s house
where “[t]hey planned the manner and details of how they were
to rob the store and make their getaway.” The plan called for
Woo, Cheong, and Chinh to enter the store, while Huynh stood
guard outside with an Uzi sub-machine gun. Chan had “‘cased’”
the jewelry store, and he told the other men that only the store
owner and one employee would be inside. Chan also estimated
how long it would take for the police to arrive.
       On the day of the robbery, Chan rented a getaway car and
drove by the jewelry store to see if it was open. A second getaway
car, to be driven by Huynh, was parked behind the jewelry store.
According to Chan’s plan, one getaway car would carry away the
stolen jewelry and the other would carry away any hostages.
Chan bought hair mousse to disguise the appearance of one of the
robbers. He drove the robbers to the jewelry store and told
Cheong and Woo to enter the store first, followed by Chinh. He
directed Huynh to wait outside in the second car until the robbers
came out of the store.
       When the robbers first entered, Leon Lee, the store’s
owner, his son, Robert Lee, and Betty Yip were in the store.
Several customers entered the store during the robbery. Chan
then entered the store to determine what was causing the delay.
Robert Lee activated the silent alarm, and Officers Duane
Johnson and Archie Nagao responded to the scene. Cheong let
them in the store. A gun battle ensued. Chinh shot and killed
Officer Johnson. Robert Lee heard Chinh coming up the back
stairway and tried to stop him by jabbing Chinh with a broom.
Chinh shot Robert Lee in the chest, severely injuring him. Chinh
suffered injuries from the gunfire to his chin and backside. Leon
Lee shot and killed Woo. Cheong shot and injured Officer Nagao,

                                5
who returned fire and killed Cheong. Chinh fled the scene in
Huynh’s getaway car, and “Chan fled unharmed from the gun
battle.”

       2.     The presentencing probation report for Chan
       The probation report prepared for Chan’s December 16,
1998 sentencing hearing states, “[The] People’s version of the
case . . . has always been that Peter Chan was admitted to the
store a short time later and was also armed with a gun. [The]
[j]ury, however, rejected this version.” The report adds, “Victim,
Robert Lee, testified in court that he was in the rear of the store
and grabbed a broom and tried to stop defendant Chan, as he was
fleeing toward the rear door . . . . Further, that defendant in
return, pointed a gun at the victim before fleeing out the rear
door. His testimony was rejected by the jury.” Chan was
interviewed for the probation report. He told the probation
officer that “he became involved in the life crime because he ‘got
greedy,’ and that they anticipated getting “‘maybe $40,000 or
$50,000.’” Chan explained that “Woo talked him into
participating in the robbery and had [Chan] ‘case the shop’ . . . .”
Chan “denie[d] ever being in the store on the date of the robbery”
but admitted he drove three of the robbers to the jewelry store
and waited outside in the car. Chan explained that after waiting
outside for 15 minutes, he became impatient and drove around to
see what was happening. He heard the police sirens and drove
off. Chan submitted a handwritten statement to the trial court,
in which he “maintain[ed] that he was never inside the jewelry
store, ‘didn’t hurt anybody’ and was not ‘the mastermind’ of the
robbery.”

                                 6
      A court-ordered jury questionnaire was mailed to the
13 jurors.3 The questionnaire asked: “Did you believe that Peter
Chin [sic] was inside the jewelry store during the robbery
murder?” and “Did you believe that Peter Chan was the
mastermind of the robbery murder?” Twelve jurors responded no
to both questions, and one responded yes. In response to the
question, “What weight did you give to the testimony of Thong
Huynh?,” 12 jurors answered “very little,” and one juror indicated
“a great deal.”

      3.     Chan’s testimony and written statement at the 2021
             parole suitability hearing
       At the 2021 parole suitability hearing, Chan testified that
he met Woo in Chinatown in New York about a year before the
robbery. Chan’s then-wife was good friends with Woo’s and
Cheong’s girlfriends. At the time of the robbery, Chan had
returned to California and was living with his wife, their son, and
Chan’s family. Chan was part owner of a company in the food
business, but he was looking for an opportunity to make extra
money by selling stolen merchandise.
       A couple of weeks before the robbery, Woo told Chan about
his plan to rob a jewelry store. Woo asked Chan to “case” the Jin
Hing jewelry store. Chan did and reported back that “the store
was small, but there’s a lot of jewelry.” Shortly thereafter, Woo
decided the Jin Hing jewelry store would be the target. Chan
testified that Woo asked Chan to pick him up, and “initially I was

3    We assume the questionnaire was mailed to the 12 jurors
and an alternate.

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hesitant because . . . I didn’t want to put myself in harm’s way.”
Woo told Chan that he could sell the stolen jewelry, and Chan
thought “the more help” he provided, the more money he would
make. Woo then asked Chan for his gun (which Chan had
purchased from his business partner). Woo explained to Chan
that he wanted a gun because Woo did not trust Chinh, who
would be bringing a gun. Chan hesitated because he was afraid
the gun could be traced back to him, but Woo assured Chan the
serial number would be sanded down. Chan then gave Woo his
gun.
       On the day of the robbery, Chan and the other robbers had
a meal together, then Chan drove to the robbery location. Chan
and Huynh were the getaway drivers. Chan was supposed to
pick up Woo, and Huynh would pick up Cheong and Chinh. Chan
waited in his car but became concerned after 10 or 12 minutes
had passed and Woo had not returned. Then Chan saw a police
car with its siren on, and Chan began circling the area in his car.
Chan saw more police cars and decided to leave. Huynh paged
Chan, and Chan called him back and learned that some of the
men had been shot. Chan then headed to Huynh’s apartment.
When Chan arrived at the apartment, he saw that Chinh had
been hurt, and Huynh asked Chan to go to the Chinese market to
buy some medicine that would stop the bleeding. Chan returned
with the medicine, and Huynh told Chan he had “a couple of
guns” he wanted Chan to move to a friend’s house in case the
police searched his home. Chan was arrested after midnight
while driving on the freeway.
       The presiding commissioner then asked Chan to talk about
the impact of the crime and the gravity of the offense. Chan
responded, “Because of my actions, . . . Officer Johnson died and

                                8
was murdered . . . [at] the age of 27 . . . . I can’t even put into
words how that impact . . . and harms that I’ve done to, to his
family . . . .” Chan described the very serious injuries sustained
by Officer Nagao and Robert Lee (Lee), acknowledging, “many
people . . . were . . . affected by this crime . . . because of my
actions.” The presiding commissioner asked whether Chan
expected the use of guns and whether, after providing a gun to
Woo, the robbers “were going to need to use the guns.” Chan
answered, “Oh, no. I . . . was in denial at the time . . . .I didn’t
think of that kind of stuff. . . . I should have known, I knew
better. I was a criminal. [A]t the time I was busy thinking . . . I
just help him a little bit, you know, and, and how I’m going to
benefit, how I’m going to own that stuff. . . . I have no
empathy. . . . I have no regard for other people[’s] well-being.
[A]nd then my selfish thought was like, . . . I’m not putting
myself at risk, . . . but I did not care . . . the other people had
risk. . . . I knew what could have happened. You’re right.”
       Chan submitted to the Board a three-page, single-spaced
typed statement explaining the robbery and his role in it. Chan’s
written description was consistent with his testimony at the
parole hearing. Chan provided additional details in his typed
statement, including that when he and Woo first discussed the
robbery, Woo explained Huynh would provide two guns, Huynh
would guard the hostages at gunpoint, and Woo and Cheong
would take the jewelry. Huynh and Cheong would leave in a
rental car, and Chan and Woo would leave in another car. Woo
assured Chan he could park a safe distance away. Chan wrote, “I
was a little bit worried about exposing myself to risk of getting
caught, but my greed and my need for approval [were] very
strong and I told myself I won’t get caught.”

                                 9
      When Chan was at Huynh’s apartment after the robbery,
Huynh asked Chan to help him move his Uzi and other guns to a
friend’s home, in case the police searched Huynh’s apartment.
Chan went to Woo’s apartment, but Woo was not there. Chan
was driving home when he was arrested on the freeway.

        4.    Chan’s conviction and sentence
        A jury convicted Chan of second degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)),4 two counts of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664), assault with a firearm on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c)),
and robbery (§ 211). The jury found true as to the murder and
attempted murder counts that a principal was armed with a
firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)), and with respect to the robbery that
Chan personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Chan admitted he suffered a prior
conviction of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court
sentenced Chan to an aggregate sentence of 38 years four months
to life in prison.

       5.     The 2018 Parole Decision
       The California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation received Chan on February 1, 1989. Chan became
eligible for elderly parole consideration on October 15, 2015. In
November 2018 the Board denied parole for three years, in part
due to Chan’s “criminal thinking.”

4     Chan was charged with three murders but convicted of one.

                                 10
B.    The 2021 Parole Suitability Hearing
      At the time of the 2021 parole hearing, Chan was serving
sentences for the jewelry store robbery and the 1984 armed
robbery of a seafood distribution company. The Board considered
Chan’s central file and his comprehensive risk assessment dated
February 28, 2017. The Board also reviewed the confidential
portion of Chan’s central prison file, but the presiding
commissioner clarified that the Board’s decision was not based on
any confidential information.
      Chan provided additional testimony and documents for the
parole hearing, including his attorney’s cover letter; reentry
support letters; a typed statement about his life crime (discussed
above); handwritten statements of remorse and accountability; a
summary of his self-help efforts; book reports and reflections; his
relapse prevention plan; and post-release plans.

       1.     Comprehensive risk assessment and criminal history
       In February 2017 an evaluating psychologist prepared a
comprehensive risk assessment that considered historical,
clinical, risk management, and elderly parole factors to analyze
Chan’s risk of future violence.
       The risk assessment provided information on Chan’s
upbringing and criminal history. Chan was born in Hong Kong
in 1955 and immigrated to the United States with his family
when he was about 18 years old. He received his high school
diploma in 1975. Once in the United States, Chan “gravitated
toward delinquent peers” and participated in illegal activities for
financial gain. These activities included gambling, weapon sales,
robberies, burglaries, selling stolen merchandise, and helping
Woo run a prostitution ring. In 1976 Chan pleaded guilty to an

                                11
armed robbery he committed with an accomplice in New York, for
which he was sentenced to state prison and later paroled.
       On December 1, 1984, several weeks before the robbery of
the Jin Hing jewelry store, Chan and an accomplice entered a
seafood distribution company while armed where two men were
working. Chan and the accomplice demanded the men’s jewelry,
including a watch and gold chain, and money. The stolen Rolex
watch was later discovered in Chan’s home following the jewelry
store robbery. Chan was convicted of armed robbery.5
       The psychologist concluded Chan presented a “[l]ow risk for
violence,” meaning he presented with “non-elevated risk relative
to long-term inmates and other parolees.” (Boldface omitted.)
The psychologist noted Chan’s “disciplinary history revealed
some struggles with difficulties complying with well-established
prison rules,” but the psychologist commended Chan for the
absence of any violent behavior while in prison since 2000. With
age, Chan gained greater self-control and behavioral stability,
and “curbed his recklessness and impulsivity.” He showed
development in pausing and reflecting before acting, accepting
critical feedback, and improving his work ethic. Chan “spoke
candidly” and expressed regret and remorse about his
commitment offense and other offenses. “His regret over the
magnitude of the losses, which transpired as a result of this
crime, was apparent during this assessment.” Chan’s placement
score of 19 was the lowest possible given his commitment offense.

5     According to the cover letter from Chan’s attorney
submitted for the parole hearing, Chan denied he had
participated in the seafood company robbery, admitting only that
he had purchased the stolen watch to resell it at a profit.

                               12
        The risk assessment addressed Chan’s 2011 rule violation
report (RVR) for removing a witness statement.6 Similar to his
statements at the parole suitability hearing, Chan “‘justified’ his
actions believing that he was ‘wronged’ by the system and needed
‘to fix it.’” The psychologist noted Chan “demonstrated his
criminal thinking” when he removed the witness statement from
his central file, “[b]ut to his credit, he maintained behavioral
stability since 2011.” The psychologist observed, “[D]espite his
occasional lapses of judgment, especially in the last few years, he
presented with pro-social orientation, motivation to grow and to
change and his willingness to address problematic behaviors. . . .
He also reflects upon his decisions and how they are going to
impact people around him, which is a marked change since the
time he committed this crime.”

       2.    Rule violation reports
       From 1993 to 2011 Chan received five RVRs for gambling
and possessing gambling paraphernalia (1993), participation in a
riot (1999), battery on an inmate with a deadly weapon (2000),
possession of a cell phone (2011), and theft of state property
(2011).

6      “[A]n RVR is issued for a serious rules violation. The
California Code of Regulations gives a non-exhaustive list of
examples of serious rules violations to include such
circumstances as: use of force or violence against another person,
a breach of or hazard to facility security, a serious disruption of
facility operations, manufacturing a controlled substance, and
willfully inciting others to commit an act of force or violence.”
(Quiroz v. Horel (N.D.Cal. 2015) 85 F.Supp.3d 1115, 1143; see
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3315, subd. (a) [“Serious Rule
Violations”].)

                                13
        The RVR for theft of state property was based on Chan’s
removal of a witness statement from his case file when he gained
access to his file as part of his Olson review.7 The witness stated
Chan was inside the jewelry store at the time of the robbery.
Chan testified at the parole hearing that at the time he removed
the document, he thought he had been wronged by the witness,
the statement was an “injustice,” and Chan’s “emotions got the
best of” him. Chan “felt like . . . that piece of the document . . .
[was] already proven . . . to be inaccurate, to be wrong, you know,
and why was it still in my C-File so I used that justification.”
Chan explained he “didn’t know how to trust the process” and
took matters into his own hands. Chan explained he “was wrong”
and “that was when I recognized [I had]. . . several problems that
I still have . . . . I had [an] emotional problem.” Chan stated that
at the RVR hearing, he admitted he “was guilty” and did not
provide “any excuse or explanation.”

       3.    Statements of remorse and accountability
       Chan submitted a six-page handwritten statement of his
remorse and accountability. Chan stated, “I am responsible for
this terrible crime and I am truly sorry.” He acknowledged his
criminal lifestyle at the time of the jewelry store robbery and
added, “Because of my greediness, I decided to [be] involve[d] and
[take] many parts in this jewelry store robbery.” Chan explained,
“I did not care about what happen[ed] to my crime partners or

7     During an Olson review, an inmate’s counselor allows the
inmate to see the information contained inside the inmate’s
prison file, except for confidential sections. (In re Olson (1974)
37 Cal.App.3d 783, 784-785; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3370,
subds. (c) & (d).)

                                14
anyone else inside the store since my safety was not at risk. I
knew what could happen in an armed robbery with loaded
weapons but I did not wan[t] to think about that because my
mind was busy thinking of how to scheme for more money in the
sale.” Chan explained that utilizing the tools he had gathered in
prison participating in self-help programs, he now understood his
motivations for committing the jewelry store robbery and was
able to identify the “minimizing and blaming denial defects [that]
took [him] many years to overcome.”
      In summarizing his “accountability,” Chan wrote, “I cased
the Jin Hing store, I provided a gun to Robert Woo, and I agreed
to be a getaway driver for Robert Woo. I provided encouragement
to my crime partners and they also knew I was willing to fence
the stolen merchandis[e] so we could all profit financially.
Without me, this robbery and the horrible murders could not
[have] happened. I chose to play all these roles in the crime
because I was greedy, I didn’t care about the law and I had no
concern for people impacted by the crime.” Chan concluded,
“Because of my actions [and] based on my insecurity, greed and
lack of concern for other people, a young police officer was killed,
another police officer was badly injured, innocent people were
severely harmed and many families were traumatized. The
whole community was traumatized as well. My decision to be
involved in this crime will forever be my biggest regret.”

      4.    Self-help efforts
      Chan participated in numerous rehabilitation programs
while in prison. The Board commented that it appeared Chan
had “taken every self-help program that’s become available” to
him throughout the last 10 or 15 years. Chan completed a long-

                                15
term offender program titled Denial Management, which helped
Chan identify “denial defects” like “blaming, . . . rationalizing,
[and] minimizing,” which prevented him from coming to terms
with his conduct for a long time. In 2012 and 2013, Chan
participated in the Alternatives to Violence and Criminal Gangs
Anonymous programs, which addressed how to avoid criminality
and tendencies to commit crimes as a result of greed, laziness,
dishonesty, and the need for approval.
      Since Chan’s previous parole suitability hearing in
November 2018, Chan completed the Victim’s Impact program.
He also continued to participate in other programs, including
Guiding Rage into Power (focusing on the harm he had caused);
the Getting Real program (reflecting on past choices and building
mindfulness and emotional intelligence tools to respond to
situations); and Alcoholics Anonymous. Although in-person
programming had been shut down since March 2020 due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, Chan continued to participate in self-help
programs through mailed lessons from the program sponsors,
including programs on anger management, denial management,
and calming techniques. Chan read books about self-
improvement and spirituality, and he prepared book reports
about the lessons he had learned.

      5.    Relapse prevention and post-release plans
      Chan had in place comprehensive relapse prevention and
post-release plans for living in both the United States and Hong
Kong. Chan submitted more than 20 letters in support of his
release on parole from family members, including his mother,
brother, and son; individuals who worked with the self-help and
educational programs in which Chan had participated; and

                                16
previously incarcerated individuals who explained how Chan had
helped them while they were in prison. He also submitted letters
from four residential programs offering housing and self-help
programs upon release on parole, with statements of eligibility
for the programs.

      6.     Statements from the victims, their families, and the
             public
       At the hearing, the victims, their families, and the public
provided extensive oral and written statements expressing the
ongoing, devastating impact the crimes committed by Chan and
the other robbers had on their lives. Pamela DeLong, Officer
Johnson’s sister, expressed how Chan deprived Officer Johnson’s
then-unborn daughter of a father and the continued anguish felt
by the family.
       Los Angeles Police Detective Joshua Byers described the
impact on him of having to inform Officer Johnson’s widow,
Kathleen Johnson, about Officer Johnson’s death. He also
described his recent conversation with Kathleen Johnson in
which she stated she wanted Detective Byers to carry on her fight
because “she couldn’t do it anymore.” Detective Byers read a
letter from Officer Nagao, who expressed his belief that at the
“trial of Chan and Nam Chinh, it was obvious that the man
behind the robbery was this inmate, Chan.” Los Angeles Police
Detective Cory Farell read letters from Kathleen Johnson and
Officer Johnson’s daughter Rachel, expressing their grief and
hardship living without Officer Johnson.
       Victim representative Larry Morrison read letters from
Officer Johnson’s brothers, Sam Johnson Culwell, Dana W.
Johnson, and Lee. Culwell explained he had faced depression

                               17
and anxiety since his brother’s murder. Dana Johnson stated
that when Chan shot his brother, “he in essence shot me as I did
feel a change in my emotions up when he died. I suffer[] to this
day.”
       Lee described the impact of the crime on his brother
Norman, who, after learning of the robbery and coming to the
store (which was by then a crime scene), was not allowed inside
and instead stood outside the store for several hours in the rain.
Norman became ill and never recovered, dying four years later at
the age of 50. Lee also described the impact of the crime on
Officer Nagao, who “never fully recovered” and suffered post-
traumatic stress disorder. Lee described being inside the jewelry
store when he heard footsteps coming up the stairway, and he
“grabbed a broom and jab[bed] into the stairwell to keep [the
robbers] away,” hitting someone with the broom. Lee described
how another person came up the stairs and shot him in the side
of his chest. He expressed the “terrible guilt” he continued to feel
for pushing the silent alarm and, as a result, “ruin[ing] the lives
of [the] two policemen who responded to it.” Lee referenced a
book written by Chan’s defense lawyer, which included a chapter
about the robbery. According to Lee, Chan’s defense attorney
stated in the book that “Chan maintained that while he planned
the robbery, he was not in this [store on] the day of the robbery.
This lie became the basis for [the attorney’s] brilliant defense.”

      7.     The Board’s decision
      Using its structured decision-making tool, the Board
concluded Chan did not pose an unreasonable risk to public
safety and was suitable for parole. The Board identified the
evidence it used to reach its decision, including information from

                                 18
Chan’s central file, comprehensive risk assessment documents
submitted in preparation for the hearing, written responses from
the public, Chan’s hearing testimony, statements from the
victims’ families, and “information in the chart from the District
Attorney’s [o]ffice.”8
       The Board identified Chan’s “criminal attitude” and his
criminal and parole histories, including his lack of self-control at
the time of the robbery and association with peers engaged in
criminal and antisocial behavior, as negative factors not
supporting a grant of parole.
       The Board determined, however, that the positive factors
outweighed the negative factors. Chan’s comprehensive risk
assessment indicated a low risk for violence, and Chan
demonstrated positive behavioral changes since 2011. Chan’s
participation in work and self-help programs also mitigated his
risk of violence. Regarding work assignments, the Board noted “a
lot of positive work Chronos,” “a strong work ethic,” and
“conscientious[ness].”9 The Board commended Chan for
continuing his participation in self-help programs despite the
COVID-19 pandemic, adding that “throughout the last . . . 10 to
15 years, it looks like you’ve taken every self-help program that’s

8     The District Attorney was not represented at the hearing.
Although the presiding commissioner referenced information in a
“chart” provided by the District Attorney, the chart is not in the
record.
9     “A ‘chrono’ is an institutional documentation of information
about inmates and inmate behavior.” (In re Shelton (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 650, 658, fn. 6; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3000
[definition of “General Chrono”].

                                19
become available to you. And you’ve learned each time.” The
Board pointed out Chan had no violent RVR’s since 2000, and
around 2011 or 2012 Chan “made a conscious decision” to stop his
“criminal thinking.” Specifically, Chan was able to articulate
clearly the kind of person he was when he arrived at prison,
including his “criminal thinking attitude,” and how he had
changed over the years to become an “empathetic, caring person”
who wants to help others. The Board noted Chan’s “excellent”
release plan, whether in the United States or Hong Kong,
including evidence of a strong family support system.

C.     The Governor’s Reversal of the Board’s Decision
       On September 17, 2021 the Governor reversed the Board’s
decision granting parole. The Governor acknowledged Chan had
participated in significant self-help programming, including an
intensive anger management group and three vocational
programs, and he had been regularly employed while in prison
until a medical limitation in 2016. But the Governor concluded
these positive factors were outweighed by the fact he had
minimized his role in the crime and failed to take full
accountability for the crime, making him unsuitable for parole.
       In the statement of facts, the Governor described Chan’s
life crime: “In 1984, Hau Chan and his three crime partners
made detailed plans to rob a jewelry store. On the day of the
crime, they entered the store and attempted to rob the store
owner and his son. Two police officers responded to a silent
alarm and Mr. Chan and his crime partners shot at them. One
police officer and two of Mr. Chan’s crime partners were killed.
The second police officer, the son of the store owner, and
Mr. Chan’s third crime partner were shot but survived their

                               20
injuries. Mr. Chan was in the store during the robbery and
served as the getaway driver.”
      The Governor stated as to Chan’s minimization of his role
in the life crime: “In his past parole hearings, Mr. Chan
minimized his role in the crime. This continued at his most
recent hearing in 2021, during which Mr. Chan reported that it
was his crime partners[’] idea to rob the jewelry store and that
Mr. Chan cased the store only after he was asked.” Chan told the
Board that “he had not wanted to be involved in the life crime,
saying, ‘[I]initially I was hesitant because, uh, I didn’t want to
put myself in harm’s way.’” Chan claimed “he did not offer to
provide guns during the crime, but instead his crime partner
insisted that he do so. Despite furnishing the group with
weapons, Mr. Chan denied knowing the firearms would be used
during the robbery. When commissioners confronted him with
whether he expected his crime partners to use the guns he said,
“‘Oh, no. . . . I was in denial at the time. . . . I didn’t think of that
kind of stuff. . . . I should have known, I knew better. I was a
criminal.’”
      The Governor noted that “Mr. Chan’s efforts to avoid full
accountability for the crime resulted in him being disciplined for
removing a document from his permanent file without
permission.” As discussed, the document Chan removed in 2011
was a witness statement placing Chan in the jewelry store during
the robbery (contrary to Chan’s insistence he was never inside
the store). The Governor explained that in 2017 Chan told the
evaluating psychologist that he took the document because “he
felt wronged by the system,” and he similarly explained to the
Board that at the time he thought the statement was an
“injustice,” and his “emotions got the best of [him].”

                                   21
       The Governor acknowledged “[t]he law does not require
that Mr. Chan admit guilt for actions he did not commit.
However, he must demonstrate sufficient insight into his role in
the crime in order to avoid repeating the same thinking and
conduct errors that resulted in the death of three people.” The
Governor concluded, “I have considered the evidence in the record
that is relevant to whether Mr. Chan is currently dangerous.
When considered as a whole, I find the evidence shows that he
currently poses an unreasonable danger to society if released
from prison at this time. Therefore, I reverse the decision to
parole Mr. Chan.”

D.     Chan’s Habeas Petitions
       On June 9, 2022 Chan filed a habeas petition in the
superior court challenging the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s
decision granting parole. The superior court denied the petition,
concluding “the record contains some evidence in support of the
Governor’s decision” and “there is a rational nexus between the
evidence in the record and the Governor’s determination of
Petitioner’s current dangerousness.”
       In October 2022 Chan filed this habeas petition. After
receiving an informal response from the Attorney General and
Chan’s reply brief, we issued an order to show cause why the
relief sought in the petition should not be granted.10

10    Prior to issuing the order to show cause, we requested
supplemental briefing on whether Chan’s petition should be
dismissed as moot in light of the Board’s December 2022 denial of
parole. The Attorney General and Chan agreed the subsequent
denial of parole did not moot Chan’s petition.

                               22
                        DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       The granting of parole is the norm, not the exception. (In
re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1211 (Lawrence); In re
Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 683.) Section 3041,
subdivision (a)(2), provides that “[o]ne year before the inmate’s
minimum eligible parole date . . . [the Board] shall normally
grant parole . . . .” (Italics added.) The governing regulations
provide guidance to the Board about the circumstances “[t]ending
to [s]how” the suitability or unsuitability of granting parole.11
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subds. (c) & (d).) For inmates
eligible for elderly parole consideration, the Board must also
consider the factors set forth in section 3055.12 “[T]he

11    The factors tending to show suitability include no juvenile
record, stable social history, signs of remorse, motivation for the
crime, battered woman syndrome, lack of criminal history, age,
understanding and plans for the future, and institutional
behavior. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (d).) The factors
tending to show unsuitability include the commitment offense
(whether “[t]he prisoner committed the offense in an especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel manner”), previous record of violence,
unstable social history, sadistic sexual offenses, psychological
factors, and institutional behavior. (Id., § 2402, subd. (c).)
12     Inmates who are 50 years of age or older and who have
served a minimum of 20 years of continuous incarceration on
their sentences are eligible for elderly parole consideration.
(§ 3055, subd. (a).) By his 2021 parole suitability hearing Chan
had served more than 30 years of his sentence and was 65 years
old. Although the Governor did not address elderly parole factors
in his decision, Chan does not contend in this proceeding that the
Governor failed under section 3055, subdivision (c), to give

                                 23
fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety”
and “involves an assessment of an inmate’s current
dangerousness.” (Lawrence, at p. 1205.) “[T]he mere presence of
a statutory unsuitability factor” is not enough. (Id. at p. 1210.)
Rather, there must be “‘reasoning establishing a rational nexus
between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate
decision—the determination of current dangerousness.” (Ibid.)
       The Board’s decision whether to grant parole for an inmate
serving an indeterminate life sentence for murder is subject to
review by the Governor. (§ 3041.2, subds. (a), (b) [the Governor
“shall review materials provided by the [B]oard,” and if the
Governor modifies or reverses the Board’s decision, the Governor
“shall send a written statement to the inmate specifying the
reasons for his or her decision”].) Under Article V, section 8,
subdivision (b) of the California Constitution, “[t]he Governor
may only affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the parole
authority on the basis of the same factors which the parole
authority is required to consider.” (See In re Rosenkrantz, supra,
29 Cal.4th at pp. 663-664; In re Butler (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th
1521, 1531.) However, “the Governor undertakes an
independent, de novo review of the inmate’s suitability for
parole.” (In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1258 (Shaputis
I); accord, In re Rosenkrantz, at pp. 660-661.) “Accordingly, the
Governor has discretion to be ‘more stringent or cautious’ in
determining whether a defendant poses an unreasonable risk to
public safety.” (Shaputis I, at p. 1258.)

“special consideration to whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the elderly
inmate’s risk for future violence.”

                                24
       Our review of the Governor’s decision is “highly
deferential.” (Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204; accord, In
re Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 214.) We do not reweigh
the evidence or ask whether the inmate is currently dangerous.
(Id. at p. 221.) Further, it is irrelevant whether we would
conclude the “‘evidence in the record tending to establish
suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating
unsuitability for parole.’” (Id. at p. 210.) Instead, we “must
consider the whole record in the light most favorable to the
determination, . . . to determine whether it discloses some
evidence—a modicum of evidence—supporting the determination
that the inmate would pose a danger to the public if released on
parole.” (Shaputis II, at p. 214.) We may reverse the Governor’s
decision “[o]nly when the evidence reflecting the inmate’s present
risk to public safety leads to but one conclusion” that the inmate
is not currently dangerous to society. (Id. at p. 211.)
       Our standard of review “is unquestionably deferential, but
certainly is not toothless,” and it “must be sufficiently robust to
reveal and remedy any evident deprivation of constitutional
rights.” (Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-1211; see Shaputis II,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 215.) “‘[B]ecause the paramount
consideration for both the Board and the Governor under the
governing statutes is whether the inmate currently poses a
threat to public safety, and because the inmate’s due process
interest in parole mandates a meaningful review of a decision
denying parole, the proper articulation of the standard of review
is whether there exists “some evidence” demonstrating that an
inmate poses a current threat to public safety, rather than
merely some evidence suggesting the existence of a statutory

                                25
factor of unsuitability.’” (Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 209.)

B.     There Is Not “Some Evidence” To Support the Governor’s
       Conclusion That Chan Poses a Current Danger to Public
       Safety
       As discussed, the Governor’s decision that Chan continued
to pose a current danger to public safety was based on the
Governor’s determination that Chan lacked insight into his life
crime because he minimized his role in, and failed to take full
accountability for, the jewelry store robbery. “Some evidence”
does not support the Governor’s determination because Chan
consistently provided a plausible alternative version of how the
robbery transpired and otherwise took full responsibility for the
crime.
       “[T]he presence or absence of insight is a significant factor
in determining whether there is a ‘rational nexus’ between the
inmate’s dangerous past behavior and the threat the inmate
currently poses to public safety.” (Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 218; accord, In re Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1260
[petitioner’s failure to “gain insight or understanding into either
his violent conduct or his commission of the commitment offense”
supported denial of parole]; see Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
p. 1227 [“under the circumstances of the present case—in which
the record is replete with evidence establishing petitioner's
rehabilitation, insight, remorse, and psychological health, and
devoid of any evidence supporting a finding that she continues to
pose a threat to public safety—petitioner’s due process and
statutory rights were violated by the Governor’s reliance upon
the immutable and unchangeable circumstances of her

                                 26
commitment offense in reversing the Board's decision to grant
parole”]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (b) [information
relevant to suitability for parole includes “past and present
attitude toward the crime”]; id., subd. (d)(3) [circumstances
tending to show suitability for parole include signs of remorse,
including indications that the inmate “understands the nature
and magnitude of the offense”].) “Evidence of lack of insight is
indicative of a current dangerousness only if it shows a material
deficiency in an inmate’s understanding and acceptance of
responsibility for the crime.” (In re Ryner (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
533, 548; see In re Swanigan (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1, 16 [lack of
insight must be connected to the conclusion an inmate is
currently dangerous].)
       Inmates may show insight into their life crimes by
admitting their participation in the crime and taking
responsibility for their actions. However, section 5011,
subdivision (b), provides, “The Board of Prison Terms shall not
require, when setting parole dates, an admission of guilt to any
crime for which an inmate was committed.” (See Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 15, § 2236 [“The board shall not require an admission of guilt
to any crime for which the prisoner was committed.”].) We
recognize there is a tension between section 5011, subdivision (b),
which prohibits conditioning a grant of parole on an admission of
guilt, with the proper consideration of an inmate’s insight into
the inmate’s role in the crime. The Supreme Court in Shaputis
II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 216 addressed this tension: “It may
be that when a denial of guilt is the only evidence of an inmate’s
lack of insight, and the denial is plausible, parole may not be
denied on that basis. [Citation.] . . . [H]owever, . . . an
implausible denial of guilt may support a finding of current

                                27
dangerousness, without in any sense requiring the inmate to
admit guilt as a condition of parole. In such a case it is not the
failure to admit guilt that reflects a lack of insight, but the fact
that the denial is factually unsupported or otherwise lacking in
credibility.”
       Accordingly, where an inmate refuses to accept the official
version of how the crime occurred (typically in an appellate
opinion), but the inmate’s version is neither inherently
improbable nor physically impossible, parole may not be denied
on that basis. (See In re Sanchez (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 962, 973
[Board improperly “enshrine[ed] the appellate opinion on direct
review as ‘the official record,’” rejecting inmate’s account and
concluding inmate’s denial of official account showed lack of
insight and continuing threat to public safety]; In re Pugh (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 260, 269 (Pugh) [“an inmate’s refusal to agree
with the prosecution’s version of the crime does not support a
finding of lack of insight”]; In re Twinn (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th
447, 466 [some evidence did not support the Governor’s finding
the inmate lacked insight into his crimes where inmate’s version
of the crime “‘was not physically impossible and did not strain
credulity’”]; In re Palermo (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112
[inmate’s continued insistence that his shooting of the victim was
unintentional and resulted from his foolishly playing with a gun
he believed was unloaded, “was not physically impossible and did
not strain credulity,” and therefore, his denial of official account
did not support Board’s finding inmate remained a danger to
public safety], disapproved on other grounds in In re Prather
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 238.)13

13   The cases cited by the Attorney General are distinguishable
because in those cases the inmates’ versions of their life crimes

                                28
       The Governor contends in his return that the facts set forth
in Chinh’s appellate opinion (attached to the return), as described
in the Governor’s decision, show that Chan “orchestrated a
sophisticated armed robbery of a jewelry store in which three
people were killed.” Further, according to the Governor’s written
decision, Chan entered the jewelry store with the other robbers,
attempted to rob the owner and Lee, and shot at the police
officers. Thus, the Governor argues, there is some evidence that
Chan, in minimizing his role, lacked insight into his life crime

were implausible and contradicted by evidence in the record.
(See In re Taplett (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 440, 450 [some evidence
supported finding of lack of insight where evidence of inmate’s
conduct, including intentionally pursuing the victim even after
her accomplice shot at the victim’s vehicle, belied inmate’s
insistence she did not intend to kill]; In re Shippman (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 446, 459-460 [some evidence supported Board’s
finding inmate lacked insight into root causes of why he
murdered his third wife where inmate refused to acknowledge
and take responsibility for his history of abusive and controlling
conduct toward former wives]; In re Rozzo (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
40, 57, 61 [some evidence supported finding of current
dangerousness because life crime was particularly heinous and
inmate’s denial of racial motivation for crime was implausible in
light of “strong” and “ample” evidence to the contrary, including
inmate’s own use of racial epithets during the crime]; In re Smith
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1631, 1638-1639 [aggravated
circumstances of the life crime, inmate’s earlier confession she
was the main participant in the beating death of her two-year-old
daughter, and failure to express remorse for her personal
involvement in the beating was some evidence supporting the
Governor’s reversal of parole].)

                                29
and continued to pose a current danger to public safety.14 The
Governor is correct that the appellate opinion describes Chan as
the leader of the group (the “congeries of crooks”) and places
Chan inside the jewelry store during the robbery. Other evidence
in the record supports the Governor’s factual recitation that Chan
was inside the store during the robbery, including the
comprehensive risk assessment prepared for Chan’s 2011
disciplinary proceeding that describes the witness statement that
placed Chan inside the jewelry store (the statement Chan
removed from his file).15
       However, there is no evidence to support other significant
facts relied on by the Governor, including that Chan provided
more than one gun used in the robbery (the “weapons”), entered
the store with the other robbers, attempted to rob the Lees, or
shot at the police officers. Even the appellate opinion described

14     The Governor also submitted with his return the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s legal status
summary and the 2021 parole hearing transcript. We recognize
that because Chan was not a party to Chinh’s appeal, he did not
have an opportunity “to challenge any material flaws or
omissions in the opinion.” (People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th
448, 457) However, the Governor had discretion to consider the
facts in the opinion and to give it the weight the Governor
deemed appropriate.
15     As discussed, the probation report recounted that Lee
testified at trial that Chan was in the rear of the jewelry store
during the robbery, and Lee used a broom in an attempt to stop
Chan from escaping. However, in Lee’s letter to the Board, he
did not identify Chan as the person he hit with a broom, instead
saying he ”hit someone with a broom.” And the appellate opinion
identifies Chinh—not Chan—as the robber in the back stairwell
that Lee tried to stop with a broom.

                               30
Chan as entering the store after the robbery commenced, to
determine why his confederates had not come out of the store.
      Moreover, Chan has consistently maintained since the time
of sentencing that he was not the mastermind behind the robbery
and was not inside the store at any time during the robbery.
Further, the probation report cites the jurors’ responses to the
posttrial questionnaire, in which all but one of the jurors stated
Chan was not the mastermind behind the robbery and was not
inside the jewelry store during the robbery.16 All but one of the
jurors likewise responded that they gave “very little” weight to
Huynh’s testimony, the accomplice-turned-prosecution witness
who testified against Chan and Chinh in exchange for full
immunity.17 It is unsurprising the jurors stated Huynh lacked

16    The record does not reflect why the trial court sent the
questionnaires to the jurors, nor is it clear the authority for doing
so. Further, responses to a posttrial jury questionnaire would be
inadmissible in certain contexts. For example, in the context of a
challenge to a jury verdict, the questionnaire and responses
would not be admissible to show the “mental processes [of a juror]
by which [the verdict] was determined.” (Evid. Code, § 1150,
subd. (a); see Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1683 [“evidence about a jury’s
‘subjective collective mental process purporting to show how the
verdict was reached’ is inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict”].)
However, Chan does not offer the responses to the questionnaire
for the purpose of overturning the jury’s verdict. Moreover, the
People do not object to our consideration of the responses
contained in the probation report. We therefore consider the
questionnaire responses in determining whether there is any
evidence to support Chan’s account of the life crime.

17   Because Chan and Chinh were on trial, and the other two
accomplices were killed during the robbery, it is reasonable to

                                 31
credibility given that he was an accomplice and testified in
exchange for full immunity. (See People v. Lyons (1958)
50 Cal.2d 245, 265 [fact that accomplice testifies on promise of
lesser charge or reduced sentence “furnish[es] the defendant with
a powerful weapon for attacking the credibility of the inherently
suspect witnesses”], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 32-34; People v. Price (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 409, 438, fn. 14 [same].) Although Lee did not
have an incentive to provide false testimony, courts have
recognized that “[e]yewitness identification, particularly of a
stranger, is fraught with potential for mistake.” (In re Swanigan,
supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 19-20 [inmate’s denial of the
murder was not implausible notwithstanding eyewitness
testimony that he was the assailant].)
       Pugh, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th 260 is directly on point.
There, the Governor reversed the Board’s grant of parole to
William Pugh, who shot and killed the roommate of Pugh’s best
friend, where Pugh “consistently maintained he shot the victim
when he ‘freaked out’ after the victim made sexual advances
toward him” but the Governor found Pugh’s version was
“inconsistent with the facts in the record.” (Id. at p. 264.) The
Governor relied on (1) the statement in the probation report that
Pugh planned to confront the victim and “‘duke it out’”;
(2) statements from the victim’s family denying the victim was
gay; and (3) statements made by the deputy district attorney at
Pugh’s parole hearing claiming that when the victim answered

assume Huynh was the only accomplice who testified at trial as
to the planning of the robbery. We therefore infer that the
appellate opinion’s characterization of Chan as “the leader of this
congerie of crooks” was based on Huynh’s testimony.

                                32
the door to his apartment, Pugh quickly shot the victim at the
entrance to the residence. (Ibid.) The Governor concluded these
differences, along with “‘problematic psychological evaluations,’”
showed Pugh lacked sufficient insight into his life crime. (Id. at
p. 271.) The Court of Appeal reversed, observing that Pugh had
been consistent in “his retelling of the events,” and further, there
was evidence supporting Pugh’s version of the crime, including
physical evidence corroborating Pugh’s account that he shot the
victim while sitting in a chair (not at the entrance to the
residence). (Id. at pp. 268, 273-274.) Because Pugh’s version was
not inconsistent with the record, “no inference can be drawn from
these facts [cited by the Governor] that Pugh is lying about what
happened, and consequently no inference can be drawn that he is
still dangerous.” (Id. at p. 274.)
       Similar to Pugh, Chan’s version of the life crime did not
change over time, and it was supported by evidence in the record.
Given the plausibility of Chan’s version, the Governor could not
properly draw a negative inference that Chan lacked insight
based on discrepancies between Chan’s version of the life crime
and the official version. (Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 216;
Pugh, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 269 [“an inmate’s refusal to
agree with the prosecution’s version of the crime does not support
a finding of lack of insight”]; In re Hunter (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1529, 1539-1540 [where inmate’s version of the life crime
remained consistent and was “‘not physically impossible’” or
“‘strain credulity,’” there was “no basis for the inference that he
lacks remorse or insight” or that he would “pose an unreasonable
risk of future harm if granted parole”].)
       Even assuming there is some evidence in the record to
support the Governor’s finding of Chan’s lack of insight, there is

                                33
no evidence that Chan’s lack of insight is rationally tied to the
Governor’s finding Chan is currently dangerous. (See Shaputis
II, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 219 [“lack of insight, like any other
parole unsuitability factor, supports a denial of parole only if it is
rationally indicative of the inmate’s current dangerousness”]; In
re Powell (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1542 [“‘“[L]ack of insight”
is probative of unsuitability only to the extent that it is both
(1) demonstrably shown by the record and (2) rationally
indicative of the inmate’s current dangerousness’”]; In re
Swanigan, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 16 [“even assuming
Swanigan failed to show insight,” there must be “facts that
connect that lack of insight to the conclusion that Swanigan is
currently dangerous”].)
       Significantly, Chan has taken full responsibility for his role
in the life crime and the consequences of the crime. It is
undisputed that Chan admitted to his active participation in the
robbery and the ensuing murders by casing the jewelry store,
providing a gun to Woo, and serving as one of the getaway
drivers. And he took responsibility for “provid[ing]
encouragement to [his] crime partners” and playing a key role
with his “willing[ness] to fence the stolen merchandis[e] so [they]
could all profit financially.” Chan explained, “Without me, this
robbery and the horrible murders could not have happened. I
chose to play all these roles in the crime because I was greedy, I
didn’t care about the law and I had no concern for people
impacted by the crime.” He repeatedly expressed remorse in his
testimony at the parole hearing, his written materials, and his
psychological assessment. The psychologist noted Chan’s “regret
over the magnitude of the losses” was apparent during her
evaluation of him. “Where, as here, undisputed evidence shows

                                 34
that the inmate has acknowledged the material aspects of his or
her conduct and offense, shown an understanding of its causes,
and demonstrated remorse, the Governor’s mere refusal to accept
such evidence is not itself a rational or sufficient basis upon
which to conclude that the inmate lacks insight, let alone that he
or she remains currently dangerous.” (In re Ryner, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 549; accord, Shaputis II, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at pp. 227-228.)
       Further, notwithstanding the Governor’s acknowledgment
that “[t]he law does not require that Mr. Chan admit guilt for
action he did not commit,” the Governor’s decision runs afoul of
this principle and section 5011, subdivision (b). (See In re
Jackson (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1391 [Board’s decision
violated section 5011 and section 2236 of title 15 of the California
Code of Regulations because “the only basis for the Board to
conclude Jackson lacked insight, failed to take responsibility, and
lacked remorse was his refusal to admit guilt for the commitment
offense, [and] the Board indirectly relied on that refusal to deny
Jackson parole”].) Chan has admitted he is guilty of the life
crime but consistently refused to admit he played a more
significant role as the leader and master planner. We cannot
imagine what Chan could have done to show more insight into
the life crime given the Governor’s reliance on the official version,
without admitting he had a greater role than what he has
consistently maintained. As the Court of Appeal explained in In
re Perez (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 65, 88, in reversing the Board’s
denial of parole to an inmate who refused to admit to committing
the life crime, it is “difficult to imagine what else petitioner could
have said about his motivations and escalating criminality, as
well as the growth in his understanding and perspective over the

                                 35
years, to convince the Board that he had insight into his youthful
criminality.”
       We recognize that Chan’s conduct in removing a witness
statement from his central file in 2011 is troubling, and at least
in 2011, would have provided some evidence of his lack of insight
into the life crime. Chan explained at the parole hearing that at
the time he felt wronged by the statement placing him inside the
jewelry store because the jury had rejected that fact. Further, he
was unable to “trust the process,” and he allowed his emotions to
play a role in making the wrong choice. Chan admitted his guilt
at the RVR hearing, and at the 2021 parole hearing Chan
acknowledged he “was wrong” to remove the statement and the
incident caused him to recognize his need to continue addressing
lingering emotional problems. Moreover, by the time of the 2021
parole hearing, more than 10 years had passed since Chan had
removed the witness statement, and since that time Chan had
engaged in extensive self-help efforts, including programming to
identify his rationalization and minimization of his conduct to
justify his wrongful actions.
       “[P]rison discipline, like any other parole unsuitability
factor, ‘supports a denial of parole only if it is rationally
indicative of the inmate’s current dangerousness.’ [Citation.]
Not every breach of prison rules provides rational support for a
finding of unsuitability.” (In re Hunter, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1543; see In re Palermo, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1110
[“Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that [inmate] poses
a threat to public safety because he once engaged in the
unauthorized use of a copy machine, once participated in a work
strike, and once was found in possession of a fan stolen by his
roommate.”]; cf. In re Reed (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1085

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[recent misconduct violated specific directive from the Board
given it occurred only two months before and “was not an isolated
incident; instead, it was part of an extensive history of
institutional misconduct”].) The non-violent nature of Chan’s
rules violation committed more than 10 years prior to the parole
hearing, during which period he engaged in extensive
programming to address his need to take responsibility for his
actions, was not rationally indicative of Chan’s current
dangerousness.18

18    The Governor also observed that Chan denied knowing
guns would be used in the robbery despite “furnishing the group
with weapons.” As discussed, there is no evidence that Chan
provided more than one gun used in the robbery. Further, Chan’s
statement denying that he knew guns would be used in the
robbery was in the context of his explaining at the 2021 parole
hearing that he was previously in denial but now recognized he
“should have known, [he] knew better.”

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                         DISPOSITION

      Chan’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The
Governor’s decision reversing the Board of Parole Hearings’
June 11, 2021 decision finding Chan suitable for parole is
vacated, the grant of parole is reinstated, and the Board is
directed to conduct its usual proceedings for release on parole.19

                                     FEUER, J.
We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.          SEGAL, J.

19    We recognize that in the time since the Governor’s 2021
decision, circumstances may have changed that affect Chan’s
suitability for parole. (See In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal.4th 238,
258 [“a judicial order granting habeas corpus relief implicitly
precludes the Board from again denying parole—unless some
additional evidence (considered alone or in conjunction with
other evidence in the record, and not already considered and
rejected by the reviewing court) supports a determination that
the prisoner remains currently dangerous”].) The Board retains
discretion to decide, after following the appropriate procedures,
whether existing circumstances support the release of an inmate
on parole. (See In re Caswell (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1026
[“Even after parole is granted, the Board is authorized to rescind
the grant of parole, if unexecuted, for good cause after a
rescission hearing.”]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2450.)

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