Court Opinion

ID: 9571822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:32.717086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:03.521753
License: Public Domain

T. R Pickard, J.
(dissenting). Appellant appeals by leave granted the decision and report of the Crime Victims Compensation Board (CVCB) affirming the board’s earlier denial of appellant’s compensation claim.
Appellant was the minor daughter of Wayman Adams. Adams was robbed and murdered while selling illegal drugs on May 8, 1993, and appellant filed a claim with the CVCB shortly thereafter. The board denied appellant’s claim on the ground that the victim, Wayman Adams, contributed substantially to the infliction of the injury and loss to the appellant. After a subsequent evidentiary hearing, the board issued a report affirming its earlier decision. From this report appellant appeals.
The CVCB was created and empowered by public act in 1976. MCL 18.351 et seq.; MSA 3.372(1) et seq. The act provides, in part, that the following persons are eligible for awards:
(b) A surviving . . . child ... of a victim of a crime who died as a direct result of the crime. [MCL 18.354(1); MSA 3.372(4)(1).]
Section 1 of the act provided the following pertinent definitions at the times relevant to this case:
As used in this act:
* * ;};
*289(b) “Claimant” means a victim or intervenor who is injured, or any other person eligible for an award pursuant to section 4(1) . . . who files a claim pursuant to this act.
* * :|:
(i) “Victim” means a person who suffers a personal physical injury as a direct result of a crime [MCL 18.351; MSA 3.372(1) (emphasis added).]
Section 11(5) of the act discussed various aspects of the award process and provided, in relevant part, at the times relevant to this case:
The board shall determine whether the claimant contributed to the infliction of his or her injury and shall reduce the amount of the award or reject the claim altogether, in accordance with the determination. [MCL 18.361(5); MSA 3.372(H)(5).]
Appellant contends that because she is the claimant, and because she did not contribute to her injury, she is therefore not disqualified under § 11(5) and is entitled to compensation. Appellant contends that she is qualified despite the fact that her claim derives through her father, the “victim,” who was illegally selling drugs and contributed substantially to the infliction of his own injury at the time of his murder.
In determining whether a “claimant” contributed to his own injuries, we must look to the definition of the term “claimant.” Section 1 of the statute, which defines “claimant,” is ambiguous because of the qualifier “who files a claim pursuant to this act.”
If the qualifier “who files a claim pursuant to this act” were applied to each category of claimant, the board would need to look at each individually. For example, if the victim filed a claim, the board would examine whether the victim substantially contributed *290to his injury. This would be the same for intervenors and others entitled to make a claim. The board would look at each individual claimant’s conduct to determine the viability of the claim. This is the analysis appellant wishes this Court to adopt.
The other possible analysis of this statute is that the qualifier “who files a claim pursuant to this act” applies only to the last category of claimant in § 1(b), “other person eligible for an award pursuant to Section 4(1).” Under this interpretation, the board would look at the conduct of the claimant — meaning the victim, intervenor, or other eligible person who files a claim, to determine the availability of relief. This analysis would require the board to look at the injured victim or intervenor’s conduct in determining the other eligible person’s claim. This is the interpretation apparently used by the board in denying appellant’s claim.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet Twp (After Remand), 217 Mich App 7; 551 NW2d 199 (1996).
Analysis of the language of the entire act gives insight into the legislative intent concerning a statutory provision to be interpreted. Kizer v Livingston Co Bd of Commr’s, 38 Mich App 239, 249, 250; 195 NW2d 884 (1972). See also Weems v Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679, 700; 533 NW2d 287 (1995), and General Motors Corp v Erves (On Rehearing), 399 Mich 241, 273; 249 NW2d 41 (1976) (opinion of Williams, J.).
The doctrine of the last antecedent, a rule of statutory construction, provides that qualifying words and phrases refer solely to the last antecedent where no *291contrary intention appears. General Motors Corp, supra at 252 (opinion of Coleman, J.).
In applying the rule to this case, the qualifying words “who files a claim pursuant to this act” in § 1(b) refers to the last antecedent “any other person eligible for an award pursuant to Section (4)(1),” not to the previous antecedent, “a victim or intervenor who is injured.”
I would find that no contrary intention appears in the statute. As applied in this case, “claimant” as defined by statute means both Wayman Adams, the injured victim, as well as his daughter, who was eligible to file a claim. Because Wayman Adams is in the class of those defined as “claimant,” the board was obligated under § 4(1) to determine if Adams contributed to his own injuries and, if so, reduce or reject the claim.
Further support of my opinion that this appellant was not intended to recover under the act is provided by the legislative intent. The 1996 legislative amendments of MCL 18.361(6); MSA 3.372(11)(6), which replaces MCL 18.361(5); MSA 3.372(11)(5), replaces “claimant” with “victim.”1 This change is obviously intended to clarify what the board is to consider when determining to reduce or reject any claim made. The amendment requires the board to determine if the victim’s misconduct contributed to the victim’s injury. If such a finding is made, the amended rule allows the board to reduce or reject any claim made under this act.
The previous rule stated:
*292(5) The board shall determine whether the claimant com tributed to the infliction of his or her own injury and shall reduce the amount of the award or reject the claim altogether, in accordance with the determination. The board may disregard for this purpose the responsibility of the claimant for his or her own injury where the record shows that the injury was attributable to efforts by the claimant to prevent a crime or an attempted crime from occurring in his or her presence or to apprehend a person who had committed a crime in his or her presence. [MCL 18.361(5); MSA 3.372(H)(5) (emphasis added).]
The 1996 amended rule states:
The commission shall determine whether the victim’s misconduct contributed to his or her injury and shall reduce the amount of the award or reject the claim altogether, in accordance with the determination. The commission may disregard for this purpose the victim’s responsibility for his or her own injury if the record shows that the injury was attributable to the victim’s efforts to prevent a crime or an attempted crime from occurring in his or her presence or to apprehend a person who had committed a crime in his or her presence. As used in this subsection, “misconduct” includes but is not limited to provocation of or participation in a crime contemporaneous with or immediately preceding the injury. [MCL 18.361(6); MSA 3.372(H)(6) (emphasis added).]
Pursuant to the federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA), 42 USC 10601 et seq., Michigan’s crime victim compensation program receives forty percent of its funding from the federal government. 42 USC 10602(a)(1). In 1988, Congress amended the VOCA to require that federally funded state programs comply with certain mandates. The mandate relating to this case is found at 42 USC 10602(b)(7):
*293(b) A crime victim compensation program is an eligible crime victim compensation program for the purposes of this section if—
* * *
(7) such program does not, except pursuant to rules issued by the program to prevent unjust enrichment of the offender, deny compensation to any victim because of that victim’s familial relationship to the offender, or because of the sharing of a residence by the victim and the offender. [Emphasis added.]
This federal mandate was intended to protect victims of domestic violence and drunken driving where the offender was a family member of or resided with the victim. This mandate is an exception to the general principle that a claim will not be paid under a crime victim compensation program if it would unjustly enrich the offender.
To properly interpret the applicability of this mandate to the facts of this case we must again turn to the definition section provided by the Michigan Crime Victims Compensation Act, because no definition section is provided by the federal act.
Section 1 of the Michigan crime victims compensation act provides the following definition:
As used in this act:
* * *
(i) “Victim” means a person who suffers a personal physical injury as a direct result of a crime. [MCL 18.351(i); MSA 3.372(1)©.]
Using this definition, it is clear that our appellant is not a victim as defined by the act. She did not suffer a physical injury as a direct result of a crime. This *294appellant was not a physically injured victim of domestic violence or drunken driving where the offender was a family member or shared a residence with her. Under the facts of this case the appellant is not even a victim as defined. She is merely a claimant as defined earlier in this opinion.
It is patently clear from the reading of the federal statute that it was intended to provide compensation for victims injured by family members or by members of the same household. This is not what happened in this case. Our appellant was not injured by a family member or by a member of her household. Our appellant was not physically injured at all. She does not qualify as a victim as defined and is therefore not entitled to compensation under the act.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the findings of the Crime Victims Compensation Board.

 The 1996 legislative amendments became effective January 13, 1997.