Court Opinion

ID: 9662489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:10:45.922702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:40.021001
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
Appellant misconstrues our opinion as holding that a person cannot be removed from the public assistance rolls upon a certificate of capacity to perform a gainful activity. What we said on this subject applied to the admissibility of such a certificate as evidence in a hearing on an appeal from the action of the Director of Welfare removing a person from the rolls. It has no application whatever to administrative action by the’ Director of Welfare in. removing a person from the rolls. Of course, the Director of Welfare may and should frequently have all recipients of public assistance investigated, and act in accordance with his judgment upon the facts disclosed by such investigation. Sec, 208.130. If there is no appeal, his action is final (subject, of course, to his future action based on changed conditions) and thereafter no question cáñ arise concerning the basis of his action. We only have held'that if a claimant is removed from the rolls for aid to dependent children, by the Director of Welfare, and takes an appeal, then, if at the hearing the claimant produces credible, competent, substantial evidence sufficient to make a prima facie case of physical incapacity, the burden of going forward with the evidence to show his physical capacity to engage in gainful ac-tivity shifts to the Division-of -Welfare; and that the Director of Public Health and Welfare must make his decision upon consideration of all- the competent evidence produced at the hearing.
Appellant also complains of our •rulings that the rules of evidence as applied in civil cases, govern proceedings in public assistance appeals hearings; and .that medical reports stating facts are admissible under .the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Law, Secs. 490.660-490.690; saying that compliance with such requirements would impose too great -a burden on the. Division of Welfare. As to the first complaint, it is sufficient to say that inadmissible evidence is not.substantial evidence,'which,-as we pointed out, is necessary' to sustain a decision. Of course, this does not mean that any case will be reversed for improper admission of evidence.- Instead,, the court, as authorized in all nonjury cases by Section 510.310, will consider all the evidence duly preserved (whether admitted or not), which it finds to be admissible, and decide the case on such evidence.
As to the latter complaint, we think appellant overestimates the supposed difficulties of making a proper showing under the Uniform Business Records Act. (For a discussion' of essential requirements see'Hospital Records and “The Business Records as Evidence Law” — Caru-thers and Gilcrest, 6 St. Louis Bar Journal 39, Oct. 1955.) Appellant says it cannot comply -with these requirements without having 'as witnesses the examining doctor or his employee who prepared-the report. Of course, the report must be identified by someone before it is admissible and Section 490.680 makes sufficient the identification by a custodian or other qualified witness who testifies to its identity and mode of its preparation; and it is then-only necessary'-also to- show that it was made'in the regular course of-business at or-near the time of the examination. . Certainly this does not require the doctor who made the report to be a witness, as provision is specifically made for any qualified witness *642to testify to the essential facts' and this could be done by deposition, or settled at a pretrial hearing. Appellant argues that we should hold this report admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule described in Long v. United States, 59 F.2d loe. cit. 603 and seems to have the idea that such a ruling would remove all requirements of identification and showing as to preparation. However, the Business Records Act recognizes and is based on the very exception to the hearsay rule for which appellant contends; but it broadens its application and makes the requirements for identification and admissibility simple, definite and certain. See 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 385; 20 Am.Jur. 881, Sec. 1043, note 8 and cumulative supplement thereto; 5 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. 361, Sec. 1520. “A writing standing alone does not of itself constitute evidence; it must be accompanied by competent proof of some sort from which the jury can infer that it is authentic and that it was executed or written by the party by whom it purports to be unless such facts are admitted by the adversary”. 20 Am.Jur. 776, Sec. 922. Thus in holding, the Business Records Act applicable, we really are holding the report admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule which appellant invokes. That Act provides the requirements for admitting reports admissible under such exception; and it would not simplify matters to say it is an official report. See discussion of necessary showing for introduction of official reports in Snider v. Wimberly, 357 Mo. 491, 209 S.W.2d 239; 5 Wigmore 517-524, Secs. 1633-1633a. In view of the statement of Wigmore (Sec. 1520) that the reason for the Uniform Act was “the application of this Exception had gradually developed a mass of detailed petty limitations that have no relation to the practical trustworthiness of the documents offered”, our view is that it prevents rather than creates difficulties, for appellant, to hold that the Business Records Act is applicable to such medical reports.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
All- concur.