Court Opinion

ID: 9712759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:23.412851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.257104
License: Public Domain

Frank T. Gallagher, Justice
(concurring specially).
Inasmuch as we are bound by the principle enunciated in Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 80 S. Ct. 215, 4 L. ed. (2d) 205, that scienter or knowledge of the contents of the alleged obscene and indecent printed matter is necessary, it seems to me that we should define what we mean by “knowledge.”
*23Mr. Justice Brennan in the majority opinion in the Smith case stated (361 U. S. 154, 80 S. Ct. 219, 4 L. ed. [2d] 211):
“It is argued that unless the scienter requirement is dispensed with, regulation of the distribution of obscene material will be ineffective, as booksellers will falsely disclaim knowledge of their books’ contents or falsely deny reason to suspect their obscenity. We might observe that it has been some time now since the law viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual state of a man’s mind. See Pound, The Role of the Will in Law, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1. Cf. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 411. Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller’s perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in proving his awareness of its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial.”
He then went on to state:
“We need not and most definitely do not pass today on what sort of mental element is requisite to a constitutionally permissible prosecution of a bookseller for carrying an obscene book in stock; whether honest mistake as to whether its contents in fact constituted obscenity need be an excuse; whether there might be circumstances under which the State constitutionally might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on him the burden of explaining why he did not, and what such circumstances might be. Doubtless any form of criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not obscene, but we consider today only one which goes to the extent of eliminating all mental elements from the crime.”
It is obvious from the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan that while he limited his opinion strictly to the Los Angeles ordinance in that case, which he claimed (361 U. S. 155, 80 S. Ct. 220, 4 L. ed. [2d] 213) “opens that door [barring intrusion upon the freedoms of speech and press] too far,” he was still recognizing but not passing upon the question of what kind of knowledge a bookseller must have with respect to the books he is selling.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion in the Smith case also *24recognized the question of the extent of knowledge required by sellers of various types of printed matter. In that connection he stated (361 U. S. 161, 80 S. Ct. 223, 4 L. ed. [2d] 216):
“The Court accepts the settled principle of constitutional law that traffic in obscene literature may be outlawed as a crime. But it holds that one cannot be made amenable to such criminal outlawry unless he is chargeable with knowledge of the obscenity. Obviously the Court is not holding that a bookseller must familiarize himself with the contents of every book in his shop. No less obviously, the Court does not hold that a bookseller who insulates himself against knowledge about an offending book is thereby free to maintain an emporium for smut. How much or how little awareness that a book may be found to be obscene suffices to establish scienter, or what kind of evidence may satisfy the how much or the how little, the Court leaves for another day.”
That justice then went on to say in effect that while he did not favor deciding cases beyond what the immediate controversy required, nevertheless a case before the supreme court is not just a case. It was his contention that inevitably its disposition carries implications and gives directions beyond the particular facts of the case involved. He further stated (361 U. S. 162, 80 S. Ct. 223, 4 L. ed. [2d] 216):
“* * * It ought at least to be made clear, and not left for future litigation, that the Court’s decision in its practical effect is not intended to nullify the conceded power of the State to prohibit booksellers from trafficking in obscene literature.”
It appears to me that we have such a situation here. It is undisputed that Minn. St. 617.24, involved in the instant case, has been repealed by L. 1961, c. 664, which provides that “it is unlawful for any person knowingly * * While § 617.24, the statute applicable here, will be of no effect with respect to any alleged violations of c. 664, it still .seems to me that our opinion here will necessarily carry implications which may be considered by some as directions pertaining to violations of that chapter. For that reason, I believe that some consideration should be given herein as to interpretation of the instant case with reference to future cases under the new law.
*25Where the word “knowingly” is used in a criminal statute, it is necessary to prove knowledge of facts on the part of the accused sufficient to constitute the act or omission a crime but not that the accused knew that the act or omission itself was unlawful. People v. Shapiro, 4 N. Y. (2d) 597, 176 N. Y. S. (2d) 632, 69 A. L. R. (2d) 973; 5 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 2409.
From an examination of the exhibits involved in this case it would seem that a jury could conclude under the record here that a reasonably prudent person having opportunity to observe would have knowledge of the type of publications he was selling even though he expressly denied such knowledge.
It therefore follows that even though the accused should deny knowledge of the contents of the printed matter which he allegedly sold the state should .still be permitted to show the facts and circumstances under which the sales were made, and whether from displays, advertisements, and other conditions in the .seller’s place of business it is so obvious that the printed matter was indecent and obscene that any ordinary dealer could observe for himself the nature of the material without investigating each page of its contents.
If any effect is to be given to a law passed for the purpose of eliminating or suppressing obscene and indecent printed material, which is flooding the country to the recognized detriment and demoralization of countless people, particularly youth, the .seller of such materials should not be permitted to defeat the purpose of the law merely by saying he has no knowledge of the contents of the publications he is selling when such publications are so openly and flagrantly obscene and indecent that an ordinary person passing a newsstand, for example, can recognize them as .such. In my opinion, courts and juries would indeed have to be naive to exonerate a dealer under such circumstances by a mere disclaimer on his part, when in many cases a casual glance or examination of the publications would almost instantly reveal their obscene and indecent nature.
In conclusion, while the element of “knowledge” must be proved to sustain a conviction under the statute here involved, the jury can find the existence of such knowledge from any relevant circumstances pointing to the probability that the defendant obtained knowledge of the na*26ture of the materials sold by him prior to the sale, including the direct exposure of the “literature” to his sense of sight. See, 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3 ed.) §§ 244, 245. “Knowledge” is like “intent,” of which this court has said: “The only practical way of proving intent is to prove facts which will raise a reasonable inference as to the intent.” State v. Anderson, 159 Minn. 245, 251, 199 N. W. 6, 8.
“Knowledge” may be positive or imputed and may result from personal observation or from information imparted by others and while “knowledge” is distinguishable from belief, information, and suspicion, means of knowledge may be equivalent to knowledge. State v. Perkins, 181 La. 997, 160 So. 789.
Mr. Justice Otis, not having been a member of the court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.