Court Opinion

ID: 9952123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 19:18:56.122329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:54.501193
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                         March 19, 2024

      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                          DIVISION II
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                            No. 57976-6-II

                                 Respondent,

           v.

    JASON STEWART FERGUSON,                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                 Appellant.

          LEE, J. — Jason S. Ferguson appeals his judgment and sentence following a Blake1

resentencing hearing. Ferguson argues that (1) the resentencing court abused its discretion when

it failed to exercise discretion during the resentencing hearing and (2) the resentencing court

exceeded its authority when it later amended Ferguson’s judgment and sentence. Because the

record shows that the resentencing court exercised discretion, we hold it did not abuse its

discretion. Additionally, because the resentencing court modified a judgment and sentence that

had not yet been entered, the resentencing court did not exceed its authority. Accordingly, we

affirm.

                                               FACTS

A.        BACKGROUND

          In 2004, a jury convicted Ferguson of second degree murder and first degree assault. Both

of Ferguson’s convictions included a deadly weapon enhancement (DWE).

1
    State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021).
No. 57976-6-II

       Ferguson was 25 years old at the time of the crime. Ferguson had been at a nightclub with

his then-girlfriend and another friend, Jeremy Seley. State v. Ferguson, 131 Wn. App. 855, 856,

129 P.3d 856, review denied, 158 Wn.2d 1016 (2006). The victim, Lavell Lindsey, was also at the

nightclub with several friends, including L.G. Harvey and Gregory Dalton. Id.

       Later, as the club was closing, Ferguson, his girlfriend, and Seley got into Ferguson’s

vehicle. Id. Ferguson was the driver and Seley sat in the back seat. Id.

       As Ferguson began to drive out of the parking lot, Seley instructed Ferguson to stop. Id.

at 857. From the back of the car, Seley yelled at Harvey to confront him about an altercation they

had in junior high. Id. The argument became heated, and Ferguson and his girlfriend told Seley

to be quiet. Id. Lindsey then approached the front of Ferguson’s car. Id. Ferguson told Lindsey

to move out of the way, and Lindsey responded with an invitation to fight. Id. Ferguson grabbed

a knife from his car’s console and then exited his car. Id. Lindsey started punching Ferguson, and

Ferguson responded with his knife. Id.

       Ferguson stabbed Lindsey 12 times, including twice in the head and six times in the back.

Id. at 858. Ferguson also cut Dalton in the neck when Dalton came up from behind to assist

Lindsey. Id. at 857. Lindsey later died from his wounds and Dalton’s injury would have been

life-threatening had he not received medical attention. Id. at 858.

       During the 2004 sentencing hearing, the State asked the trial court to sentence Ferguson to

the high end of his sentencing range, which was 487 months. Ferguson, on the other hand,

requested an exceptional downward sentence based on the fact that Lindsey was an aggressor and

Ferguson had an imperfect self-defense.        Specifically, Ferguson requested an exceptional

downward sentence of 192 months with a 48-month DWE for a total of 250 months.

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No. 57976-6-II

       The trial court agreed with the State.2 The trial court sentenced Ferguson to the high end

of the standard range: 340 months for the second degree murder conviction (which includes 24

months for the DWE) and 147 months for the first degree assault conviction (which includes 24

months for the DWE). The sentences ran consecutively for a total of 487 months’ confinement.

This court affirmed Ferguson’s convictions on direct appeal. Ferguson, 131 Wn. App. at 856.

B.     BLAKE RESENTENCING

       In 2022, Ferguson filed a motion to correct his offender score and for resentencing pursuant

to Blake. Ferguson’s criminal history included two convictions for possession of a controlled

substance.

       1.      Mitigating Factors

       Prior to the hearing, Ferguson filed a resentencing memorandum. He requested the

resentencing court to impose an exceptional downward sentence of 250 months. Ferguson argued

his youth and relative immaturity were mitigating factors. Specifically, Ferguson argued that

because he had a traumatic childhood, his “trajectory of development was lower and slower than

most from his earliest years and it has taken significant time into adulthood for increased

maturation.” Clerks Papers (CP) at 42.

       To support his argument, he attached a comprehensive, 25-page forensic mental health

evaluation conducted by a forensic psychologist. The mental health evaluation stated that

Ferguson had been neglected and abandoned by his mother; was in the foster care system from the

2
  The trial court noted that Ferguson had an extensive violent criminal history. Ferguson’s
criminal history includes multiple assault convictions, including hitting a man in the face with a
golf club and an instance of domestic violence where he punched his ex-girlfriend’s sister in the
eye for which she required several stitches.

                                                3
No. 57976-6-II

age of five; struggled to find connections; had a history of noncompliance and delinquency; had

early risk factors for violence, substance use, impulsivity, and engagement with a deviant peer

group; and was in custody since 2004. The evaluation also stated that Ferguson had matured while

in custody: he did not have any disciplinary infractions for over a decade, his peer groups are more

prosocial, and he now sets education and work skill development goals. The evaluation concluded

that Ferguson’s “overall risk for future violence is estimated to be low at this time.” CP at 47.

       Ferguson also argued that the resentencing court should impose an exceptional downward

sentence on the basis that Ferguson did not instigate the fight that led to Lindsey’s death; rather, it

was initiated by Lindsey. See generally RCW 9.94A.535(1)(a). Additionally, Ferguson submitted

several letters of support from friends and family members.

       In response, the State argued that an exceptional downward sentence was not appropriate.

Specifically, the State asserted that Ferguson’s extensive criminal history indicated “maturity

beyond his stated age,” and the facts leading to his 2004 convictions did not warrant leniency as

Ferguson was the only armed individual during the fight. CP at 101.

       2.      January 2023 Resentencing Hearing

       On January 18, 2023, the resentencing court held a sentencing hearing. Ferguson and his

counsel appeared remotely.

       Ferguson and the State agreed on his offender score and sentencing ranges. Based on

Ferguson’s new offender score of 4, the standard sentencing range for his second degree murder

conviction was 189 to 289 months. For Ferguson’s first degree assault conviction, the new

standard range was 117 to 147 months. The State requested the high end of the standard ranges,

to be served consecutively, which the State stated was 336 months.

                                                  4
No. 57976-6-II

       During the hearing, Dalton and members of Lindsey’s family made statements. They each

expressed a desire for Ferguson to receive the highest possible sentence.

       Ferguson’s counsel argued that Ferguson is a very different person today than he was in

2004. Ferguson’s counsel asserted that Ferguson’s difficult childhood contributed to delayed

maturity as compared to his peers. Throughout Ferguson’s incarceration, he took several steps

towards rehabilitation. For instance, Ferguson completed his education and enrolled in various

classes for which he received certificates, including classes in carpentry, blueprint reading,

welding, and non-violent conflict resolution. Upon release, Ferguson would have a stable home

to live in with his grandmother, and his cousin, who owns a tow truck business, would offer

Ferguson employment. Finally, Ferguson’s counsel contended that Ferguson did not instigate the

fight that led to Lindsey’s death; rather, it was an imperfect self-defense and one for which

Ferguson expressed remorse. Ferguson also addressed the court and apologized to Dalton and

Lindsey’s family members.

       The resentencing court noted that it was “coming in now after the fact” and that it had not

been the original court to sentence Ferguson back in 2004. 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Jan.

18, 2023) at 31. The resentencing court acknowledged and expressed familiarity with Ferguson’s

position. However, the resentencing court then stated:

               My concern is this. Coming in now at this stage and not having been the
       trial court judge, it’s clear that the process went through a jury trial, the jury
       convicted and the trial court judge at that time gave a high end sentence, a very
       substantial sentence, with significant criminal history and significant indications of
       violent crime in the history. And, certainly, this crime in this case involving Mr.
       Lindsey and Mr. Dalton, those are particularly violent crimes. So, I think I can
       surmise what that Court was thinking at the time of sentencing.

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No. 57976-6-II

               Now, by virtue of the Blake decision and resentencing requirements, there’s
       a very substantial, even best case scenario for the State, there’s a very substantial
       reduction in the sentence to a maximum end of 336 months. So, that’s about 151
       months less than what was originally sentenced back post-trial.

              Again, the question before this Court is whether the defense has persuaded
       this Court for one or more reasons as cited in the briefing, that the Court should
       depart and not hold out the letter and the spirit of that high end sentencing range,
       which my predecessor gave back after the trial.

               It’s the conclusion of this Court and after having also received impact from
       the victims, which is very important in this Court’s view, that the case for that has
       not been made. And, I’m going to order the sentence to remain at the high end,
       albeit, with the new sentencing range, consecutive terms, constituting and
       calculating up to a total of 336 months.

               So, that’ll be the judgment of this Court. The other terms and conditions of
       the judgment and sentence to remain the same.

1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 32-33 (emphasis added) (underlining in original).

       The State asked the resentencing court whether it considered Ferguson’s argument

regarding his youthfulness at the time of the crime. The resentencing court replied that it had and

“ultimately did not sustain that argument.” 1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 33.

       Ferguson’s counsel then clarified with the resentencing court whether it understood it was

not bound by any prior sentencing determination and that it had discretion to impose any new

sentence that was lawful. The resentencing court stated:

                Absolutely. There’s . . . nothing legally binding about the previous sentence
       at the high end. This Court understands that it has the ability and the legal authority
       to sentence within the standard sentencing range or above or below if the legal basis
       is established for that. But, I am exercising my discretion. And, in doing so, I give
       some presumptive weight to the high end sentencing range, which was already
       given. And, the fact that there’s already now a massive discount from that on the
       basis of the changed law, and based on the totality of the circumstances, I’m just
       not persuaded to . . . go other than the high end sentencing range on the present
       scoring and guidelines.

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No. 57976-6-II

1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 34. The resentencing court then signed but did not enter the judgment

and sentence.

       3.       February 2023 Resentencing Hearing

       The parties appeared before the resentencing court again on February 10, 2023.

Apparently, after Ferguson and his counsel had departed from the January hearing, the court clerk

discovered a mathematical error with the judgment and sentence. The judgment and sentence

indicated the correct offender score and standard ranges for Ferguson’s convictions; however,

Ferguson’s total term of confinement should have been 436 months instead of 336 months.3 The

State took responsibility for the “scrivener’s error in the addition of the two correct ranges” and

requested the resentencing court to “correct [the] addition error.” 1 VRP (Feb. 10, 2023) at 44-45.

       Ferguson argued that during the January hearing, the State requested 336 months and the

resentencing court agreed to 336 months; accordingly, it was not a scrivener’s error. Ferguson

requested that the resentencing court not impose anything more than the 336 months and

alternatively, “potentially impose less time as a result of reviewing the materials” he had

previously submitted. 1 VRP (Feb. 10, 2023) at 48. Ferguson again argued that Lindsey was an

aggressor, which was a mitigating factor.

       The resentencing court stated:

               I think the argument that the defense would be asking for would be to argue
       that there should be some kind of a windfall because of an oral ruling where there
       was a functional equivalent of the Court, you know, misspeaking. Maybe the Court
       misidentified the victim or said a wrong name or something. But, the . . . written
       version is really where the judgment and sentence come down to.

3
  289 months, the high end for Ferguson’s second degree murder conviction, added to 147 months,
the high end for Ferguson’s first degree assault conviction, equals 436 months.

                                                7
No. 57976-6-II

              ....

              So, the 436, the Court’s gonna stay with that, because that is the
       mathematically correct number, which represents the sum and substance of the
       Court’s ruling therefore.

1 VRP (Feb. 10, 2023) at 49-50.

       The resentencing court sentenced Ferguson to 436 months’ total confinement. The

resentencing court entered the judgment and sentence reflecting 436 months of total confinement.

       Ferguson appeals.

                                          ANALYSIS

       Ferguson argues that the resentencing court committed reversible error when it failed to

exercise its discretion during his Blake resentencing hearing and that the resentencing court

exceeded its authority when it amended Ferguson’s judgment and sentence to correct a “judicial

error.” Br. of Appellant at 1. We disagree.

A.     RESENTENCING

       1.     Legal Principles

       Trial courts generally must impose sentences within the standard sentencing range

established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW.                RCW

9.94A.505(2)(a)(i); State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 94, 110 P.3d 717 (2005). However, the SRA

allows trial courts to depart from a standard sentencing range. RCW 9.94A.535. Trial courts have

the discretion to impose exceptional sentences above or below a standard sentencing range

depending on various aggravating or mitigating factors. See RCW 9.94A.535.

       Generally, a party may not appeal a standard range sentence. RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v.

Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d 356, 376, 465 P.3d 382, review denied, 196 Wn.2d 1021 (2020). “The

                                               8
No. 57976-6-II

rationale is that a trial court that imposes a sentence within the range set by the legislature cannot

abuse its discretion as to the length of the sentence as a matter of law.” Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d at

376.

       Nevertheless, a party may challenge the underlying legal determinations from which the

trial court made its decision. State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017).

Further, while no party is entitled to an exceptional sentence below the standard sentencing range,

“every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the

alternative actually considered.” State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005);

accord Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 376-77 (stating “a defendant may appeal a standard range

sentence when a trial court has refused to exercise its discretion or relies on an impermissible basis

for its refusal to impose an exceptional sentence downward.”). A trial court abuses its discretion

if it “categorically refuse[s] to impose an exceptional sentence downward or to mistakenly believe

that it does not have such discretion.” Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 377.

       2.      Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion

       Ferguson argues that the resentencing court failed to exercise its discretion because it did

not consider his evidence of mitigating factors—specifically, Ferguson’s difficult childhood, his

rehabilitation, and his immaturity when he committed the crime. We disagree.

       During the January 2023 resentencing hearing, Ferguson presented evidence of his

background, of his rehabilitation efforts, and that Lindsey was an aggressor who initiated the fight

with Ferguson. The resentencing court acknowledged and expressed familiarity with Ferguson’s

arguments. However, the resentencing court stated that Ferguson did not persuade the court to

depart from the high end of the standard sentencing range, noting that Ferguson’s 2004 crimes

                                                  9
No. 57976-6-II

were particularly violent and that Ferguson had an extensive and violent criminal history prior to

2004. The resentencing court also relied on the statements of Dalton and Lindsey’s family

members.

       The resentencing court expressly stated that it took Ferguson’s youth into account and “did

not sustain that argument.” 1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 33. When Ferguson’s counsel verified

whether the resentencing court knew it was not bound by the prior sentencing decision, the

resentencing court responded in the affirmative. The resentencing court stated that it gave

consideration to the prior sentencing decision, but otherwise, “based on the totality of the

circumstances,” it was not persuaded to grant an exceptional downward sentence. 1 VRP (Jan. 18,

2023) at 34.

       Ferguson argues that the resentencing court only “paid lip service to his authority to

exercise discretion but simply reimposed what he believed to be the high-end sentence without

actually exercising independent discretion.” Br. of Appellant at 8. However, Ferguson’s argument

is unpersuasive. The record clearly shows that the resentencing court considered Ferguson’s

request for an exceptional downward sentence, considered mitigating factors presented, and

exercised its discretion to impose a high end standard-range sentence in light of all the information

presented. See Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342.

       To support his argument, Ferguson relies entirely on Dunbar, which held that a party’s

resentencing pursuant to Blake must be conducted de novo. State v. Dunbar, 27 Wn. App. 2d 238,

246, 532 P.3d 652 (2023) (“Without a limitation, the resentencing court should consider sentencing

de novo and entertain any relevant evidence that it could have heard at the first sentencing.”).

                                                 10
No. 57976-6-II

Dunbar concluded that the sentencing court had committed reversible error when it “refus[ed] to

entertain Dunbar’s request for a lower sentence based on his purported rehabilitation.” Id. at 243.

       The State asserts that Dunbar should be rejected because Dunbar purportedly conflicts

with Washington Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the State argues that the resentencing

court did not need to consider evidence of Ferguson’s rehabilitation efforts because RCW

9.94A.340 prohibits “‘exceptional sentences based on factors personal in nature to a particular

defendant.’” Br. of Resp’t at 13 (quoting Law, 154 Wn.2d at 97); see RCW 9.94A.340 (stating

“[t]he sentencing guidelines and prosecuting standards apply equally to offenders in all parts of

the state, without discrimination as to any element that does not relate to the crime or the previous

record of the defendant”). The State contends that considerations such as rehabilitation and

familial support are personal.

       However, the State does not address recent cases such as McFarland and Glant, which

hold that every defendant is entitled to have a request for an exceptional downward sentence

actually considered, and it is reversible error for a sentencing court to categorically not consider

such requests. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d at 56; Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 376-77; see also Grayson,

154 Wn.2d at 342 (“The failure to consider an exceptional sentence is reversible error.”).

Accordingly, Ferguson was entitled to have his request for an exceptional downward sentence

considered by the resentencing court, and depending on the basis for the resentencing court’s

decision, to appeal his sentence.

       The State next argues that Dunbar fails to address forerunners such as Kilgore and

Barberio, which stand for the proposition that a resentencing court has the discretion to choose

whether it conducts a full de novo sentencing. See State v. Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 42, 216 P.3d

                                                 11
No. 57976-6-II

393 (2009); State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d 48, 51, 846 P.2d 519 (1993). But regardless of the

applicability of Dunbar, the record shows that the resentencing court actually considered

Ferguson’s request for an exceptional downward sentence, comporting with McFarland and Glant.

And the resentencing court considered Ferguson’s rehabilitative efforts.           An exercise of

independent discretion does not dictate the sentencing court to accept or agree with a defendant’s

request.

       The resentencing court did not fail to meaningfully consider Ferguson’s request or fail to

exercise its independent discretion. The resentencing court’s exercise of independent discretion

necessarily means it did not categorically refuse to entertain Ferguson’s request for a mitigated

downward sentence. Glant, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 377. Therefore, the resentencing court did not

abuse its discretion when it resentenced Ferguson.

B.     MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

       Ferguson argues that the resentencing court exceeded its authority under CrR 7.8 by

amending a “valid sentence” based on “judicial” error. Br. of Appellant at 13. The State argues

that the resentencing court did not amend the judgment and sentence between the January and

February 2023 hearings because the January judgment and sentence, which provided for 336

months, was never filed. Accordingly, the State argues, CrR 7.8 does not apply. The State also

argues that even if CrR 7.8 did apply, the modification would have been proper under CrR 7.8(a).

We agree with the State.

       1.      Legal Principles

       “Washington is a written order state.” State v. Huckins, 5 Wn. App. 2d 457, 469, 426 P.3d

797 (2018). A trial court’s oral statements are no more than a “‘verbal expression of [its] informal

                                                12
No. 57976-6-II

opinion at that time,’” subject to further alteration or modification. Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Dailey, 93 Wn.2d 454, 458, 610 P.2d 357 (1980)). It has no final or binding

effect unless incorporated into a written judgment. See State v. Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d 388, 394-

95, 341 P.3d 280 (2015).

       CrR 7.8 allows a trial court to grant a party relief from a final judgment or order in certain

circumstances. See CrR 7.8. Clerical mistakes, resulting from “oversight or omission,” may be

corrected by the trial court at any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of a party. CrR

7.8(a). Additionally, a party may move for relief from a final judgment if there was a mistake;

newly discovered evidence; fraud; the judgment was void; or any other reason justifying relief.

CrR 7.8(b).

       A clerical mistake is one that does “not embody the trial court’s intention as expressed in

the trial record.” State v. Morales, 196 Wn. App. 106, 117-18, 383 P.3d 539 (2016), review denied,

187 Wn.2d 1015 (2017). An amended judgment, correcting a clerical error, simply “corrects the

language to reflect the court’s intention or adds the language the court inadvertently omitted.”

State v. Rooth, 129 Wn. App. 761, 770, 121 P.3d 755 (2005). If an amendment to a judgment and

sentence does not do either of those things, then the error is judicial and a court cannot amend the

judgment and sentence. Id.

       2.      Trial Court Did Not Exceed Authority

       Ferguson argues that the resentencing court “intended to impose 336 months, and its oral

and written orders from the [January] resentencing comport with that intent.” Br. of Appellant at

20. Ferguson further argues that the error existed at the time of the judgment and sentence’s

“entry” in January 2023. Br. of Appellant at 20.

                                                13
No. 57976-6-II

       Here, the record shows that the high end of Ferguson’s sentencing range should have been

436 months. During the January hearing, the State correctly stated the individual sentencing

ranges for Ferguson’s convictions: “189 to 289 months” for second degree murder and “117 to

147 months” for first degree assault. 1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 15. However, when the State added

the ranges together, it stated, “336 months.” 1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 15. Following the State’s

use of “336 months,” the resentencing court stated:

       [T]he question before this Court is whether the defense has persuaded this Court
       for one or more reasons as cited in the briefing, that the Court should depart and
       not hold out the letter and the spirit of that high end sentencing range, which my
       predecessor gave back after the trial.

              It’s the conclusion of this Court . . . that the case for that has not been made.
       And, I’m going to order the sentence to remain at the high end, albeit, with the new
       sentencing range, consecutive terms, constituting and calculating up to a total of
       336 months.

1 VRP (Jan. 18, 2023) at 32-33. It is evident from the record that the resentencing court was

merely repeating the number used by the State.

       Regardless, the January judgment and sentence that included the 336 month number was

never entered.   The record shows that the court clerk discovered the mathematical error

immediately following the January hearing and notified the resentencing court. The court never

entered the judgment and sentence. See Friedlund, 182 Wn.2d at 394-95. CrR 7.8 simply does

not apply as it governs circumstances for relief from a final judgment or order. See CrR 7.8.

“Washington is a written order state” and any oral statements are informal expressions that are

subject to alteration. Huckins, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 469.

       During the follow-up hearing in February, the resentencing court stated that its reference

to 336 months was the “functional equivalent of the Court . . . misspeaking.” 1 VRP (Feb. 10,

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No. 57976-6-II

2023) at 49. The resentencing court further stated: “[I]t was clearly the intent of the Court, based

upon prior ruling of the case in the trial for the high end of the range. . . . So, the 436, the Court’s

gonna stay with that, because that is the mathematically correct number, which represents the sum

and substance of the Court’s ruling therefore.” 1 VRP (Feb. 10, 2023) at 49-50. The resentencing

court entered the judgment and sentence reflecting a total confinement of 436 months.

       Because a judgment and sentence reflecting 336 months was never entered, CrR 7.8 does

not apply. And because the sentencing court corrected a mathematical miscalculation prior to

entering the judgment and sentence and Washington is a written order state, the resentencing court

did not exceed its authority when it corrected Ferguson’s judgment and sentence before entering

the judgment and sentence after the February hearing.4

                                              CONCLUSION

       The resentencing court exercised its discretion and considered Ferguson’s request for an

exceptional downward sentence. And the resentencing court merely modified an unfiled judgment

and sentence to correct a mathematical error before entering the judgment and sentence. Therefore,

the trial court did not err, and we affirm.

4
  We note that no party filed a CrR 7.8 motion specifically pertaining to the discrepancy between
336 months and 436 months. Regardless, even if CrR 7.8 applied, the resentencing court would
have had authority to modify the judgment and sentence under CrR 7.8(a). A clerical mistake
results from oversight or omission and any modifications to a final judgment simply “correct[] the
language to reflect the court’s intention.” Rooth, 129 Wn. App. at 770; CrR 7.8(a).

       Here, the record is clear that the resentencing court merely corrected the 336 months to 436
months to reflect its intention to re-sentence Ferguson to the high end of the sentencing range.
Therefore, the resentencing court would have had authority to amend the judgment and sentence
under CrR 7.8(a).

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No. 57976-6-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    Lee. J.
 We concur:

 Maxa, J.

 Glasgow, C.J.

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