Court Opinion

ID: 9657820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:38:56.306539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:48.653944
License: Public Domain

McDonald, J.
This case has been remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Sitz, 496 US —; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990). This Court previously affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that Michigan’s sobriety-checkpoint program violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and therefore Const 1963, art 1, § 11. Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 170 Mich App 433; 429 NW2d 180 (1988), lv den 432 Mich 872 (1989), rev’d 496 US —; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990). The United States Supreme Court reversed our decision and held a state’s use of highway sobriety checkpoints does not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 418. At issue here is whether sobriety checkpoints, while permitted by the United States Constitution, nevertheless violate the Michigan Constitution. We hold that they do.
The facts from which this search and seizure *693question arises are not in dispute.1 On May 17 and 18, 1986, the Saginaw County Sheriff's Department conducted a sobriety-checkpoint operation in Saginaw County. Nineteen officers were present at the checkpoint. During the approximately one-hour operation, 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint. All vehicles were stopped and the drivers briefly examined for signs of intoxication. Two drivers were retained for sobriety field tests, only one was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. A third driver, who drove through the checkpoint without stopping, was also arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol.
Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Defendants agreed to delay implementation of the sobriety-checkpoint program pending resolution of this case. Following trial, the trial court issued a sixty-page written opinion finding the sobriety checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a balancing test derived from Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 50-51; 99 S Ct 2637; 61 L Ed 2d 357 (1979). The trial court also concluded, on the basis of state law precedent, that the checkpoint violated art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, finding no basis for disturbing the trial court’s findings. Sitz, 170 Mich App 444. In our previous opinion, we agreed with the trial court that, although there is a grave and legitimate state interest in curbing drunk driving, the sobriety-checkpoint program did not significantly further that interest and subjectively *694intruded on individual liberties. Id. at 439. Thus, the use of the checkpoint was found to violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because the Michigan Constitution offers at least the same protection as the federal constitution, the trial court’s finding that the use of the checkpoint violated the Michigan Constitution was also affirmed and the question whether art 1, § 11 offers greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution was not decided. Id. at 445.
In its opinion, the United States Supreme Court held the trial court and this Court properly found the Brown balancing test the appropriate measure to determine whether the checkpoint violated the federal constitution.2 In cases involving seizures less intrusive than traditional arrests, the Brown balancing test calls for a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interests, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Brown, supra. In applying this test, the trial court concluded that, although the problems caused by drunk driving are of great public concern, sobriety checkpoints fail to effectively advance the public interest of combating the problems. The evidence at trial indicated checkpoints generally result in a very low arrest rate and therefore have a questionable deterrent value. Moreover, we note the lack of information provided regarding the arrest rate that would likely have resulted from use of the numerous officers present at the checkpoint in more traditional forms of law enforcement aimed at apprehending *695drunk drivers.3 In addition to finding the checkpoints only minimally effective in curbing drunk driving, the trial court found the overall intrusiveness of the roadblocks to the citizens to be great. Although the objective intrusion was deemed slight because of the brief length of the actual stop,4 the subjective intrusiveness was found to be substantial. Because the program calls for temporary, rather than permanent, checkpoints, and the purpose is to search for violators of the criminal law, the court found a high potential for generating fear and surprise in the motorists.5
Thus, given the low degree to which the checkpoint advanced the public interest in curbing drunk driving and the severity of the interference with individual liberty, the trial court found the checkpoint program violative of the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. As already noted, this Court previously affirmed the decision of the trial court, finding no basis upon which to set aside the court’s findings and conclusions. If now writing on a clean slate, we would again agree with the findings of the trial court. However, the Supreme Court has ruled that improper consideration and weight was given the Brown factors in such a manner that we erred in concluding the *696use of the checkpoint violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The federal constitutionality of the checkpoint settled, we must now determine whether the checkpoint program, although found permissible under the federal constitution, is violative of art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution. In other words, whether the Michigan Constitution affords its citizens greater rights than those provided by the federal constitution.
Generally, the Michigan Constitution is construed to ¿ford the same rights as those given by the federal constitution. However, where there is compelling reason to do so, the Michigan Constitution may be construed in a manner that results in greater rights than those afforded by the federal constitution. People v Nash, 418 Mich 196; 341 NW2d 439 (1983); People v Collins, 438 Mich 8; 475 NW2d 684 (1991).
In determining whether compelling reasons exist, several factors may be considered, including any significant textual differences in parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions, state constitutional and common-law history, and state law preexisting the constitutional provision. Moreover, as our Supreme Court stated in Collins, supra, the beginning of the consideration should be the application of the fundamental principle of constitutional construction to determine the intent of the framers of the constitution and of the people adopting it. Id., at 32.
We do not believe the framers of our constitution or the people adopting it intended that art 1, §11 permit suspicionless seizures of persons under the circumstances presented in this case. Before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543; 96 S Ct 3074; 49 L Ed 2d 1116 (1976), and thus at the *697time art 1, § 11 was first adopted, federal case law generally required the government to prove that it had reasonable suspicion for minimally intrusive seizures to be considered reasonable. MartinezFuerte was the first and, until this suit, the only case wherein the Supreme Court upheld a program that subjects the general public to suspicion-less seizures. 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Federal case law is replete with condemnation of suspicionless random stops of motorists for investigatory purposes. See, generally, Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648; 99 S Ct 1391; 59 L Ed 2d 660 (1979); United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873; 95 S Ct 2574; 45 L Ed 2d 607 (1975); United States v Ortiz, 422 US 891; 95 S Ct 2585; 45 L Ed 2d 623 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v United States, 413 US 266; 93 S Ct 2535; 37 L Ed 2d 596 (1973).
Likewise, a review of Michigan case law regarding the issue of warrantless stops of vehicles reveals Michigan’s longstanding adherence to the principle that an officer may not indiscriminately stop an automobile absent some reasonable grounds of suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. People v Kamhout, 227 Mich 172; 198 NW 831 (1924); People v Roache, 237 Mich 215; 211 NW 742 (1927). More recently, in People v Whalen, 390 Mich 672, 682; 213 NW2d 116 (1973), the Supreme Court established rules with respect to the stopping, searching, and seizing of motor vehicles and their contents:
1. Reasonableness is the test that is to be applied for both the stop of, and the search of moving motor vehicles.
2. Said reasonableness will be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case.
3. Fewer foundation facts are necessary to sup*698port a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved, than if a house or a home were involved.
4. A stop of a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes may be based upon fewer facts than those necessary to support a finding of reasonableness where both a stop and a search is conducted by the police.
See also People v Parisi, 393 Mich 31; 222 NW2d 757 (1974) (warrantless stop of motor vehicle improper where no evidence of "suspicious activity” was offered nor any testimony presented providing a reasonable basis for stopping the ^automobile).
Although the stop of a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes may be based upon fewer facts than those necessary to support a finding of reasonableness, the state of the law in Michigan still requires some facts constituting the basis for a particularized suspicion to justify a stop. Adoption of the recent federal standard permitting suspicionless stops by roving roadblocks results not only in a variance from prior federal law, but also in a substantial departure from the evolution of Michigan law regarding the warrantless stopping of motor vehicles. Given the advent of such an enormous departure from prior Michigan law, we believe compelling reason exists to interpret the Michigan Constitution as affording greater rights than those found in the federal constitution. Such a substantial departure, if appropriate, should be effected by our Supreme Court, not by this Court. This is especially true where, as here, the effectiveness of the roadblocks in question in preventing drunk driving is negligible, only one arrest after 126 stops.
Although we fully recognize the enormity of the problem caused by drunk driving, we do not believe the proposed elimination of the rights of *699Michigan citizens to be free from suspicionless seizure a proper response to the problem. As succinctly stated by Justice Brandéis in his dissent in Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 479; 48 S Ct 564; 72 L Ed 944 (1928):
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government’s purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.
We find the indiscriminate suspicionless stopping of motor vehicles violative of art 1, § 11 of the Michigan Constitution.
Affirmed.
Holbrook, Jr., J., concurred.

 A full discussion of the facts and history underlying this case may be found in this Court’s prior opinion, Sitz v Dep’t of State Police, 170 Mich App 433; 429 NW2d 180 (1988), and the various Supreme Court Justices’ opinions in Michigan Dep’t of State Police v Sitz, 496 US —; 110 S Ct 2481; 110 L Ed 2d 412 (1990).

 The Court noted that defendants properly conceded a Fourth Amendment "seizure” occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint. 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 420.

 It appears the majority of law enforcement, those involved in implementing the roadblocks, do not believe roadblocks are an effective method with which to address the drunk-driving problem.

 The evidence indicated each stop and perusal was completed in seconds, however no evidence was presented regarding the effect of the natural backup of traffic caused by funneling all vehicles into one lane. Likewise, no consideration was given the inconvenience caused the oncoming traffic not subject to the checkpoint but nonetheless for safety purposes also funneled into one lane.

 We believe Justice Stevens accurately noted in his dissent in Sitz, 496 US —; 110 L Ed 2d 426, that surprise is a critical element of the operation of the checkpoints. This surprise and the fear generated by the operation of the checkpoints at night and for the purpose of apprehending criminals likewise leads us to conclude that the checkpoint’s subjective intrusion on a person’s liberty is substantial.