Court Opinion

ID: 9757376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:37:30.832593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:48.596717
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
Contrary to the majority opinion, reversal is not merely warranted in this case, it is required. In my opinion, the crux of this appeal involves the question whether appellant received the fair trial that the Maryland and federal Constitutions guarantee him. A fair reading of the entire transcript of the trial, not just that portion concerning Officer Brown, reveals that appellant did not, and, indeed, could not have, received a fair trial before this trial judge. I therefore dissent.
At bottom, the issue does involve, as the majority in part 3 of its opinion recognizes, the court’s interjection of itself in the trial by substantial and frequent interventions in the questioning of witnesses.
To be sure, a trial judge may question witnesses. In doing so, however, the trial judge must stay within appropriate bounds. We addressed the limits of those bounds in two recent cases, Cardin v. State, 73 Md.App. 200, 533 A.2d 928 (1987) and Smith v. State, 66 Md.App. 603, 505 A.2d 564, cert. denied, 306 Md. 371, 509 A.2d 134 (1986). In each, we quoted, with approval, from Bell v. State, 48 Md.App. 669, 678, 429 A.2d 300 (1981):
The trial judge’s role is that of an impartial arbitrator and that appearance is not generally compatible with an inqui*644sitorial role. It is the better practice for a trial judge to inject himself as little as possible in a jury case, United States v. Green, 429 F.2d 754, 760 (D.C.Cir.1970), because of the inordinate influence that may emanate from his position if jurors interpret his questions as indicative of his opinion. See, also, Patterson [v. State, 275 Md. 563, 578-80, 342 A.2d 660 (1975)]. The appearance that a judge may have abandoned his role as an impartial arbitrator, is especially hazardous when cross-questioning a defendant.
Yet, if counsel have faltered in their advocacies, it is not improper for the trial judge to be “meticulously careful to make sure that the full facts [are] brought out”, Jeffries v. State, 5 Md.App. 630, 632 [248 A.2d 807] (1959), or to seek to discover the truth when counsel have not elicited some material fact, or indeed when a witness has not testified with entire frankness. Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1172, 1193 (1933). Such questioning may even bear upon the credibility of a defendant in a proper circumstance. Madison v. State, 200 Md. 1, 12 [87 A.2d 593] (1952); King v. State, [14 Md.App. 385, 287 A.2d 52, cert. denied, 265 Md. 740 (1972) ] at 394 [287 A.2d 52], This should be achieved expeditiously, however, if at all, for a protracted examination has a tendency to convey to a jury a judge’s opinion as to facts or the credibility of witnesses.
Cardin, 73 Md.App. at 229-230, 533 A.2d 928; Smith, 66 Md.App. at 618-19, 505 A.2d 564.
The Court of Appeals has provided additional guidance. In Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305, 311, 206 A.2d 250 (1965), the Court held that “[t]he questioning by the trial judge showing his disbelief of the witness’ testimony [is] beyond the line of impartiality over which a judge must not step.” There, the trial judge questioned the witness repeatedly on the same subject matter and reminded the witness that he was under oath and subject to penalty for perjury. See also Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 213, 434 A.2d 555 (1981), in which the Court of Appeals stated:
*645... [A] judge presiding over a jury trial ... should exercise th[e] right [to interrogate witnesses to clarify issues] sparingly. It is a far more prudent practice for the judge to allow counsel to clear up disputed points on cross-examination, unassisted by the court. In this manner, the judge is most likely to preserve his [or her] role as an impartial arbiter, because he [or she] avoids the appearance of acting as an advocate.
The Court in Brown v. State, 220 Md. 29, 39, 150 A.2d 895 (1959), disapproved the questioning of a defendant by the trial judge in such a way as to “indicate sarcastically, so that the jury could not have failed to understand, that the judge did not believe [the story the defendant] was telling....”
The permissible bounds of interjection and inquiry thus appear to be clear. A trial judge should interject himself or herself as little as possible into the trial of the case, giving due opportunity for the advocates to present, in their own way, the facts in support of their cause. See Marshall, 291 Md. at 214, 434 A.2d 555. When the judge does interject himself or herself, it should be solely for the purpose of clarifying or sharpening issues or eliciting material facts which the advocates have not presented. The more protracted the examination of a witness, the more likely it is that the examination will convey to the jury the trial judge’s opinion concerning the credibility of that witness.
Turning to the case sub judice, the majority has very considerately characterized the trial judge’s actions in this case as stepping in “at several points to clarify questions posed by counsel or to give the witness an opportunity to explain or clarify the alleged inconsistencies.” This characterization is not supported by the record. On the contrary, the record discloses that the trial judge, totally oblivious of any bounds, interjected herself repeatedly, into the proceeding. In fact, there were more than a hundred such instances. The judge participated, to some extent, in the questioning of each witness called to testify.
*646To be fair, some of the trial judge’s interjections were innocuous and some were for the purpose of clarifying questions posed by counsel; the vast majority of them, however, were much more serious. A few examples are demonstrative. During the State’s case, the court’s interventions included participating freely and frequently in the direct examination of witnesses,1 assisting the assistant State’s Attorney in the presentation of his case,2 when he did not wish help, and, indeed, resisted it;3 interrupting cross-examination by defense counsel to assist State’s witnesses in responding to questions;4 and explaining the *647testimony of State’s witnesses.5 The trial judge also rephrased questions, rather than ruling on objections by defense.6 Moreover, in addition to correcting defense counsel in front of the jury and suggesting how questions should be phrased, the trial judge raised objections sua sponte.7 During the defense case, the judge, without regard to, and in fact, in spite of, the defense strategy, cross-examined de*648fense witnesses during their direct examination.8 In some instances, the trial judge anticipated issues which had not yet been raised and, in at least one other, questioned a witness concerning his testimony in a prior trial.9
Throughout trial, the trial judge asked questions repetitious of testimony already given by the witness, thus emphasizing that testimony for the jury.
Specific reference to the trial judge’s actions during the testimony of appellant and Wheatley further demonstrates the egregiousness of the judge’s conduct. The judge interrupted appellant’s direct examination to question appellant or make observations on seven occasions. On the first, the judge referring to appellant’s reference to a Kuti, asked, “You mean a muslim type thing? 10 The next three interruptions were for the purpose of asking questions that rehashed testimony previously given by appellant, thereby emphasizing it to the jury. During cross-examination, the judge interrupted the prosecutor to question appellant about using other names. In addition, when appellant began to respond broadly to a broad question asked by the prosecutor, the judge instructed him to “just answer the question”, and immediately thereafter interpreted his explanation as: “You mean that he [a police officer] lied.” The judge’s participation in redirect examination continued to be frequent and active.
*649The trial judge’s interjections during the testimony of Wheatley were more serious. Demonstration of the correctness of this assertion is perhaps best achieved by quoting pertinent excerpts directly from the record, as appropriate. The trial judge’s first interruption came early in the direct examination of Wheatley and it was for the purpose of asking the witness what time he had first seen appellant. The next interruption occurred as follows:
Q. (By appellant’s counsel) Let me ask a general question. Under what circumstances did you see Mr. Ferrell that day?
A. I had noticed Mr. Ferrell being arrested as I was leaving my girlfriend’s house one morning. That’s how I remember his face. Right now I am presently incarcerated and I had noticed Mr. Ferrell at the jail where I am being detained and I had remembered his face from being arrested.
Q. Had you noticed anything unusual before you noticed the arrest?
A. Yes, ma’am, I did. Early in the morning I noticed a guy running by me removing a mask from his head.
The Court: You say you were staying at your girlfriend’s house?
The Witness: Yes, I was there the night before.
The Court: Where does she live?
The Witness: On Swan. Upland Apartments.
The next significant interruption occurred after Wheatly had testified concerning the complexion and weight of the robber. At that time the court interrupted to ask “What do you consider yourself to be?”, to which the witness replied, “Well, I’m dark or medium dark I suppose.” When the focus of the examination turned to Wheatley’s observations of appellant’s arrest, the following occurred:
Q. (By appellant’s counsel) Now, did there come a time where you saw the arrest? That’s what you’ve testified, correct?
*650A. Yes, ma’am. I had noticed Mr. Ferrell being arrested after I had left my girlfriend’s house about twenty, thirty minutes later and—
The Court: Twenty or thirty minutes had gone by since you saw the man with the—taking off the mask?
The Witness: About. Yes, ma’am. I got the cigarettes, went back to my girlfriend’s house and had breakfast. In that amount of time, maybe thirty minutes is when I left for good at which time I came out. This is when I noticed Mr. Ferrell.
The Court: Being arrested.
The Witness: Yes, ma’am. That’s correct.
The Court: You had never seen him before that day?
The Witness: No, ma’am, I had not.
Similar interruptions occurred during Wheatley’s cross-examination. After the prosecutor had explored the circumstances under which Wheatley had seen appellant being arrested and had begun to develop the facts from which it could be determined whether Wheatley’s identification was reliable, perhaps' the most significant interjection on the part of the trial judge occurred:
Q. (By the prosecutor) Then you went into your girlfriend’s house, stayed twenty or thirty minutes and then when you came out you saw the defendant whom you now recognize. You didn’t know him at the time.
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. And you haven’t seen him for the past twenty months until very recently.
A. That’s correct.
Q. I believe you told us very candidly you just met him during your recent incarceration.
A. Yes, sir. I noticed him, you know. He is housed in the same section of the jail.
The Court: How much of a look at him did you get that day when you saw him being arrested?
The Witness: Pretty good. I stopped and signified.
The Court: Did you stop and watch what was happening?
*651The Witness: Yes, ma’am. Him being arrested. I stopped and watched.
The Court: What all did you see?
The Witness: The average arrest procedures.
The Court: Tell us.
The Witness: His hands being cuffed behind his back and put into the—into the, you know, truck like thing.
The Court: Did you see anybody else there besides police?
The Witness: No, just police, ma’am. Just police.
Q. (By prosecutor) You don’t recall seeing a number of ladies of all ranges in age relatively old to quite young?
A. No, sir. I couldn’t actually say.
The Court: How was he dressed?
The Witness: I can’t remember as a matter of fact, ma’am, his exact clothing.
The Court: Well, the next time you saw him was twenty months later?
The Witness: Yes, ma’am. About.
The Court: But you remembered his face?
The Witness: Yes, ma’am, I did. As a matter of fact, the shape of his head I remember.
While it is true that we do not have the benefit of having heard and seen the witnesses testify live, several things are obvious from the examination of Wheatley by the trial judge. First, the trial judge did not wait for the advocates to do their job before plunging in and asking questions. Second, the questions the trial judge asked were those affecting the credibility of the witness. Third, and most important, given the nature of the questions the trial judge asked and the context in which they were asked, “the jury could not have failed to understand, that the trial judge did not believe the story [the witness] was telling----”
As I read the transcript, it is clear that the trial judge was not an impartial arbitrator, but an advocate for the State.
*652The majority acknowledges that some of the trial judge’s interventions were “wholly unnecessary and served only to provoke an argument with defense counsel”, that “the court should certainly have exercised greater restraint”, and further, that this Court has previously admonished the trial judge for past indiscretions of this kind. See McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21, 499 A.2d 192 (1985). Nevertheless, the majority holds that the judge’s interruptions and comments were not tantamount to reversible error. It observes in passing that many of the sua sponte interjections and comments were not “immediately objected to”,11 which seems to suggest that had there been objections, the result might have been different. I can concur with the majority only insofar as it acknowledges error on the part of the trial court. As indicated, I consider the error to mandate reversal. In that regard, I call to the majority’s attention the case of Elmer v. State, 239 Md. 1, 9, 209 A.2d 776 (1965) in which the Court of Appeals, commenting upon the trial judge’s declaration, in front of a jury, that a witness was hostile, held:
We think under the unusual circumstances here presented and the unquestionably harmful effects of the judge’s remarks in the presence of the jury as we point out in more detail below, the accused was not afforded a fair and impartial trial and he was, therefore, denied due process of law, which, under the authorities cited above, would call for our review of the propriety of the court’s remarks, even if' no objection had been made thereto.
The authorities cited by the Court included Bryant v. State, 207 Md. 565, 115 A.2d 502 (1955); Wolfe v. State, 218 Md. 449, 146 A.2d 856 (1958) and Rowe v. State, 234 Md. 295, 199 A.2d 785 (1964).
*653In Bryant, although holding that the record did not show that the trial judge’s actions deprived the accused of a fair and impartial trial, the Court commented that: “[t]he degree of severity of the trial judge’s rebukes of an attorney, when the occasions require them, is left to the discretion of a judge ‘as long as they do not prevent a fair and impartial trial’ 207 Md. at 585, 115 A.2d 502. Similarly in Wolfe, in which a trial judge, attempting to assist an unrepresented defendant, made prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion, took “cognizance of and corrected] the ... error even though such error may not have been properly includable in the assignment of errors____” 218 Md. at 455, 146 A.2d 856. The Court reiterated the general rule, however, that generally an issue may not be raised on appeal unless preserved by appropriate objection. Rather than improper remarks by the trial judge, Rowe involved, the effect of the court’s failure to instruct the jury as to a finding of insanity. Even though no assignment of error was made as to that issue, the Court stated, “we think we must, under the unusual circumstances of this case, take cognizance of the plain error sua sponte.” 234 Md. at 302, 199 A.2d 785.
I also remind the majority that at issue here is whether we should exercise our discretion to review an issue which was not raised and decided below. Maryland Rule 1085 contemplates that an appellate court “will not ordinarily decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the lower court.” Its prohibition, however, is not absolute, as evidenced by the “use of the adverb ‘ordinarily’ [which] implies that there may be extraordinary circumstances in which review will be granted despite the lack of a ruling at the trial level.” Smith v. State, 64 Md.App. 625, 632, 498 A.2d 284 (1985). As this Court observed in Smith, “In the final analysis, the question of whether to review an issue not raised and decided below is discretionary with the appellate court.” 64 Md.App. at 632, 498 A.2d 284, citing Booth v. State, 62 Md.App. 26, 38, 488 A.2d 195 (1985). Moreover, *654like the exercise of discretion to notice plain error, “... this discretion should be exercised in favor of review when the ‘unobjected to error [is] compelling, extraordinary, exceptional or fundamental to assure the defendant a fair trial’ ”. 64 Md.App. at 32, 498 A.2d 284, quoting State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198, 203, 411 A.2d 1035 (1980). It cannot be gainsaid that the error in this case easily meets each of those criteria.
Thus, it is plain that “when the trial result[s] in a denial of due process”, Elmer, 239 Md. at 8, 209 A.2d 776, the Court should review the propriety of the actions of the trial court sua sponte or, at the very least, at the suggestion of appellant, even if that suggestion is presented for the first time on appeal.
To the majority’s suggestion that under these circumstances, simply an admonition is sufficient, the following should be noted. An admonition has not worked in the case of this trial judge in the past and, furthermore, an admonition will not ameliorate the adverse effects suffered by appellant as the result of the trial judge’s actions. It is my view that the failure to take definitive action in this case effects a travesty of justice and undermines the very principles of due process contained in the federal and Maryland Constitutions.
Because the trial judge’s interjections in the trial denied appellant a fair trial and due process of law, I would reverse appellant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial. Moreover, I would instruct that the new trial be conducted before another judge.
I also have a problem with the majority’s resolution of appellant’s double jeopardy/collateral estoppel issues. I agree with appellant’s “simple and direct” position: “[T]he use of a deadly weapon is a necessary element for conviction under Article 27, Section 488. Here the Appellant was found not guilty of the use of the handgun in the third trial. The only State theory of the case was that a handgun was involved.” Although appellant admittedly did not provide us with a transcript of the third trial, that appellant’s *655premise is correct is obvious and is not seriously contested. Mere conjecture, which is the only stuff of which the State’s position is made, does not suffice to sustain the majority’s holding. This is particularly so where, as here, neither the State nor the trial judge, during the argument on appellant’s motion to dismiss, disputed, or even suggested, that the State’s theory of the case was that appellant acted in concert with someone else, or that the evidence tended to prove such a theory. All the State posits is, as the majority acknowledges, the conjecture that “the third jury may have concluded that appellant was not the actual robber (or wielder of the handgun) but may have entertained some feeling, short of unanimity, that he was an accomplice of or receiver for the actual robber, who escaped.”
I also have difficulty with the majority’s position with regard to the election of a jury trial issue. At the conclusion of the colloquy with the court concerning his election, appellant specifically stated, in what I consider to be unambiguous terms, that “I am not praying no jury trial.” The court did not respond to that statement or conduct any inquiry with respect to it. I think that, at the very least, there should have been some inquiry made by the trial court to ensure that appellant’s election was freely and voluntarily made. Since that was not done, I believe that the case should be reversed for that reason as well.

. By way of example, the judge interrupted the direct examination of Mary Henderson and Cherome Hines, witnesses to the robbery, as well as Officers Brown and Wagner, on several occasions, and proceeded to conduct the questioning of those witnesses.

. During the State’s examination of Officer Brown, the trial judge interrupted direct examination to direct the officer’s attention to appellant for the purpose of identification. She also assisted the State by developing testimony concerning the time that elapsed between the officer seeing a gun and apprehending appellant. Similarly, while Officer Wagner was on the witness stand, the judge stated, "I think he can tell us what the description was”, thus suggesting that the State ask Officer Wagner to relate the description of the robber given him by one of the witnesses. Other efforts to assist the State in similar ways occurred during the testimony of Hines and Barbara Means.
In the case of Means, the judge, as she did during Brown’s testimony, asked the witness to identify the robber, which, as the State reminded her, she had already done.

. When the judge reminded the State that it had not questioned Officer Brown about a “briefcase” which the police had recovered, the State had to point out to her that his concern at that time was what the officer observed at the scene and that the officer had not seen the “briefcase” at the scene. Also see the reference to Barbara Means in n. 3, supra.

. Examples of this can be found during the cross-examinations of Officers Brown, Garrity, and Wagner and of Mary Henderson. In the case of Officer Brown, the judge provided assistance on more than one occasion. On one occasion, after defense counsel had read from the officer’s prior testimony, and before the officer had answered a question based on that prior testimony, the judge prompted:
“If you previously testified that you had the coat when you went out of the building, would that be what happened, that you did have the coat?”
On another, the court interrupted defense counsel to observe:
*647“Ms Julian, he does not deny what he said before and I believe he said if you have a record saying he said it before, that’s what he said. Is that right officer?”
The record does not reflect that the officer said any such thing.

. In addition to explaining testimony given by Officer Brown, the trial judge also interpreted the testimony of Officer Wagner.

. A good example of this occurred during the State’s direct examination of Hines. Although appellant’s counsel objected to the question, "Were you able to see anything about this individual although you couldn’t see his facial features?”, the judge never ruled on the objection. Instead, she instructed the witness:
"You can tell us what you can tell us about what he was wearing, what he looked like insofar as you were able to see him. She already said ...
Tell us everything you can remember of what you were able to observe of him.”
Other examples occurred during the testimony of Officer Brown and Mary Henderson.

. During the cross-examination of Officer Brown, the following colloquy occurred:
[by defense counsel] You also reported that Mrs. Henderson stated that she saw the suspect go into 4608 Manordene and exit a short time later after the actual robbery wearing a light windbreaker carrying a black duffel bag and then run North through the complex of—
The Court: This is all hearsay. This is something she told somebody else?
The Witness [Off. Brown]: This was told Officer Garrity.
Mr. Townsend [Prosecutor]: I have had a continuing objection to this.
The Court: I sustain.
The record does not reflect that a continuing objection had been granted the prosecutor. Later, the court sustained an objection which was never made. Although defense counsel pointed this out to her, the judge did not respond.

. In addition to appellant, the trial judge cross-examined appellant's brother (concerning the distance from Westside Skill Center, where appellant testified he was going, to 904 West Lexington Street, where appellant lived), his mother (concerning the relationship between appellant and a defense witness), L. Leurs, an investigator for the public defender, and Delano A. Wheatley, the defense witness who claimed to have seen the robber, whom he testified was not appellant.

. This occurred during the cross-examination of Leurs.

. This is significant because Henderson had testified that appellant was wearing a "muslim type of head covering” after he had changed clothes and because the judge did not await the completion of direct examination to begin her questioning.

. Appellant’s counsel did object on one occasion to the court’s interruptions and moved for mistrial. In the colloquy that followed, the trial judge declared: "I only interrupt when the questions are improper.”