Court Opinion

ID: 9764510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:25:07.449796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.617500
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting:
I am compelled to note the following and, therefore, respectfully dissent. The appellants, Catherine and William Wills, commenced this action by filing a complaint in September, 1988. All of the defendants filed answers raising new matters, preliminary objections and served interrogatories upon appellants at various times following the filing of the complaint. In *546general, discovery proceeded for thirty-three months before, on June 12, 1991, several of the defendants, the appellees, filed a petition to transfer venue based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In their petition to transfer venue, the appellees contended that venue should be transferred to Bucks County for the following reasons: 1) the appellants resided in Bucks County; 2) the moving defendants had their offices in Bucks County; 3) all of the treatments complained about occurred in Bucks County; 4) a Bucks County trial would be more convenient for all parties because of the parties’ ties to that county; and, 5) transfer of the lawsuit to Bucks County would result in its faster disposition because, unlike Philadelphia County, the Bucks County civil docket is not overcrowded.
The appellants, in their answer to the appellees’ petition to transfer venue, averred that one of the non-moving defendants, Louis S. Pearlstein, D.O. maintains his residence and a separate office where he provides services to patients on a routine and continuous basis in Philadelphia County; thus, all of the defendants would not be unduly burdened by a trial in Philadelphia County. The appellants also averred in their answer that Ms. Wills’ received the bulk of her treatment for her injuries which were allegedly caused by the defendants’ negligence in Philadelphia County. Additionally, the appellants averred that none of the doctors who treated Ms. Wills for her injuries and were potential witnesses at trial are residents of Bucks County. Finally, the appellants averred that the appellees failed to specify how they would be prejudiced if the case remained in Philadelphia County in light of their tardiness (thirty-three months) in filing their petition to transfer venue. However, the trial court, without receiving any evidence on the appellees’ averments, summarily entered an order transferring the case to Bucks County.
In its opinion explaining the transfer of venue to Bucks County, the trial court based its decision upon the averments contained in the appellees’ petition to transfer venue to Bucks County and upon the civil case backlog currently existing in Philadelphia County. Accordingly, I would find the methodol*547ogy employed by the trial court in disposition of the appellees’ petition to transfer venue to Bucks County to be erroneous. Thus, I would reverse the order directing the transfer of venue to Bucks County and remand to the trial court for the taking of depositions on the disputed issues of fact pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 209(a) and (b). I would reach this result for the following reasons.
The standard of review for an appeal of a trial court order transferring venue is to determine whether the trial judge’s determination was an abuse of discretion. Brown v. Del. Val. Transplant Prog., 371 Pa.Super. 583, 538 A.2d 889 (1988). An abuse of discretion includes not only an error of judgment but also an error of law. Incollingo v. McCarron, 611 A.2d 287 (Pa.Super.Ct.1992); St. Vladimir Orthodox Church v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. 239 Pa.Super. 492, 497, 362 A.2d 1052, 1056 (1976).
A plaintiff/appellant should not be deprived of a choice of forum unless the defendant/appellees “clearly adduce facts that either (1) establish such oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant so as to be out of all proportion to plaintiffs convenience.... or (2) make trial in the chosen forum inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems. These private and public interest factors must weigh strongly in favor of the defendant before the court can disturb the plaintiffs choice of forum.” Okkerse v. Howe 521 Pa. 509, 518, 556 A.2d 827, 832 (1989); Alford v. Phil. Coca-Cola Bottling, 366 Pa.Super. 510, 531 A.2d 792 (1987).
While the trial court is capable of determining matters of public interest without supporting evidence, an “informed assessment of the private interests at stake and of the particular circumstances that affect the public interest often requires the court to resolve disputed issues of fact....” Id. at 515, 531 A.2d at 795. This Court concluded in Alford that “[o]n petitions to transfer pursuant to rule 1006(d), the parties and the court must resolve all material issues of disputed fact through procedures established by Pa.R.C.P. 209.” Id. at 515, 531 A.2d at 795; see also Okkerse v. Howe, *548521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827 (1989); Petty v. Suburban General Hospital, 363 Pa.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1230 (1987). There are several means by which this resolution can occur. First, pursuant to Rule 209(a) and (b), the petitioner must either “take depositions of disputed issues of fact” or “order the cause for argument on petition and answer.” Secondly, if the petitioner chooses to order the cause for argument rather than take depositions, the court may, pursuant to Philadelphia County Local Rule of Civil Procedure 140(D), order the parties to proceed as required by Rule 209 where the petition and answer present a factual dispute on material points. And finally, if the petitioner does not take Rule 209 discovery and the court does not order it, the court must, under Rule 209, consider as true all responsive allegations of fact in the answer of the petition. Alford [366 Pa.Super.] at 515, 531 A.2d at 795.
Burns v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n., 417 Pa.Super. 631, 612 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1992).
Instantly, after receiving the appellants’ answer, the appellees did not comply with the dictates of Pa.R.C.P. 209 as they neither proceeded to take depositions on the disputed issues of fact nor attempted to order cause for argument on petition and answer even though there were factual disputes on material issues. First, the appellants disputed whether all defendant doctors were residents of Bucks County. Secondly, the appellants disputed the appellees’ contention that all of her treatments performed in Bucks County by averring that the bulk of her treatment for the injuries caused by the defendants’ alleged negligence occurred in Philadelphia County. Finally, the appellants averred that the doctors who treated her injuries and were potential witnesses at trial were not residents of Bucks County. See Petty v. Suburban General Hospital, 363 Pa.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1230 (1987) (in a medical malpractice action, trial court abused its discretion in granting a motion to transfer for convenience of parties and witnesses where although the facilities at which alleged negligent treatment occurred were outside forum chosen by patient, physicians conducted business in' forum chosen by patient and there *549was no evidence to support allegations concerning inconvenience of the majority of physicians and other medical personnel who would testify if action were tried in forum chosen by patient). Thus, the trial court was compelled either to direct the taking of depositions on the disputed issues or have deemed the factual averments in the appellants’ answer as true before disposing of the appellees’ petition to transfer venue to Bucks County. As the trial court failed to follow either of the above courses of action, I would find it erred in summarily ordering the case transferred to Bucks County.
In addition to my disapproval of the methodology employed by the trial court in its approval of the appellees’ petition to transfer venue, I also disagree with the trial court’s and the majority’s failure to consider the thirty-three month interval between the filing of the appellants’ complaint and the appellees’ petition to transfer venue. I believe that a party’s timeliness in filing the petition to transfer venue, the amount of discovery which has been completed in preparing for litigation in the chosen forum, and the status of the case on a trial court’s calendar (ie. whether the case is scheduled and ready for trial) are additional considerations which must be factored into the equation. At the federal level such considerations are indeed weighed by the courts when determining whether transfer is appropriate. See e.g. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.1965) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying transfer when motion was not made until five months after the suit was filed); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F.Supp. 254 (W.D.Mo.1980) (delay in moving for a change of venue is a consideration); Meinerz v. Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co., 343 F.Supp. 681 (D.C.Wis.1972) (nine month delay sufficient to deny petition to transfer); McFarlin v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 210 F.Supp. 793 (D.C.Pa.1962) (when pretrial proceedings had gone on for nearly one year, court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to transfer to another forum).
Recently, in rejecting a trial court’s sua sponte transfer of a case under the guise of forum non conveniens, a panel of this Court recognized that the trial court had ignored the fact that *550neither party had, to that point (nearly four years after filing of the complaint), even suggested they were unhappy with the forum and both parties were fully prepared to proceed with trial in the chosen forum. See Greenfeig v. Seven Springs Farms, 416 Pa.Super. 580, 611 A.2d 767 (1992) (in the absence of a timely petition from one of the parties, trial court may not transfer a case to a forum deemed more convenient to the transferring court).
Finally, although I am cognizant of the increased congestion in the Philadelphia trial courts (and in other trial courts in our large urban centers), this factor alone should not be viewed as giving trial judges carte blanche authority to transfer any case, at any time, which may be as conveniently litigated elsewhere. Indeed, as Justice Musmanno once observed, “If case load is to determine availability of the courts to injured persons, then justice has become a commodity dependent on the size of the courthouse and the number of personnel therein rather than on the intrinsic merit of claims filed by the litigants.” Rini v. New York Central Railroad Company, 429 Pa. 235, 242, 240 A.2d 372, 376 (1968) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); see also Greenfeig v. Seven Springs Farms, Inc., supra 416 Pa.Super. at 586, 611 A.2d at 770 (“Although we certainly recognize the tremendous burdens placed upon our courts by inadequate and unreasonable funding limitations, such circumstances do not provide the basis for a forum non conveniens transfer of a case from one county to another, when venue is properly laid in the first county”).
The underlying factors supporting the transfer of the instant case, should have been, or were known to exist by appellees within a reasonable time after the filing of the complaint (i.e. location of appellees’ offices, appellants’ county of residence, location of fact witnesses, county in which cause of action arose). The thirty-three month delay in seeking the transfer and the trial court’s apparent disregard for this factor are further examples of the emphasis trial courts are placing on the congestion in the courts of our large urban centers when granting petitions to transfer. As this Court has cogently observed, a “trial court may not utilize a transfer of *551venue merely to control its docket, to preserve judicial resources, or to avoid deciding cases which are properly before it.” Horn v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 373 Pa.Super. 186, 189-90, 540 A.2d 584, 586 (1988). Therefore I respectfully dissent.