Court Opinion

ID: 9459300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:16:42.942544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:06.740858
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(concurring) .
I concur in the result reached by the foregoing opinion, but differ in the reasoning to be used to support the judgment for the Chief of Detectives of Allegheny County1 and the detectives working under him.
The plaintiff, Cambist Films, Inc., previously instituted a suit (Civil No. 69-300) in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on March 17, 1969, against Robert W. Duggan, District Attorney for Allegheny County, Edward G. Crone, Chief of Detectives of Allegheny County, Joseph M. Loughran, District Attorney for Westmoreland County, and Edward Gordon, Chief of Detectives of Westmoreland County.2 The plaintiff in that complaint only sought equitable relief; an injunction against the defendants and the return of the prints of its film. See Cambist Films, Inc., Inc. v. Duggan et al., 298 F.Supp. 1148 (W.D.Pa.1969), rev’d in part, 420 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1969).
On June 2, 1969, after the decision in the district court, the plaintiffs brought the present action against, among others, Crone and named Allegheny County detectives.3 In the instant case, the plaintiff now claims damages.
Where a plaintiff has had an opportunity to seek damages in its earlier action, its failure to combine all of its claims, legal as well as equitable, which could have been asserted and concluded in the earlier action, is fatal and the county detectives were entitled to a judgment in their favor on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata.4 For, as is stated by Professor Moore:
“ . . . where law and equity have been united and a litigant can present all his grounds for relief, whether legal or equitable, inconsistent, alternative or hypothetical, in a single action he should be held to have but one cause of action and final *891judgment on the merits is res judicata as to all matters, legal and/or equitable, in support or defense of that cause of action. One fair day in court is enough.”
IB Moore’s, Federal Practice, § 0.410 [1], at 1156-57 (2d ed., 1965); see also Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1972).
The plaintiff has had its fair day. Two of four principal defendants from the previous suit were named in the instant action. The previous complaint arose out of the same factual context as the instant complaint. Compare complaint in Civil Action No. 69-300, Appellees’ App. at lb, with complaint filed June 2, 1969 (Civil Action No. 69-665, W.D.Pa.), Appellant’s App. at 7a. As stated by Judge Aldisert recently in Gambocz, supra, at 841-842:
“Use of the adjective ‘collateral’ to characterize this form of estoppel grows out of the fact that the bar of the prior adjudication is not interposed directly, by parties to the prior suit, but indirectly, by new defendants, strangers to the earlier action. However, the conceptual basis of such an estoppel is closer to that of pure res judicata than pure ‘collateral estoppel,’ because the bar is interposed on the theory that the second action is but an attempt to relitigate the same cause of action, although the names of the defendants may be different. The distinction between this form of estoppel, res judicata, and ‘pure’ collateral estoppel has been frequently emphasized :
Thus, under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment ‘on the merits’ in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, such a judgment precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based on the same cause of action as the second suit.
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., supra, 349 U.S. [322] at 326, 75 S.Ct. [865] at 867 [, 99 L.Ed. 1122] (emphasis supplied). See also Judge Goodrich’s opinion in Lawlor, before this court, 211 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1965).
“We previously determined that the essential allegations of the second complaint parallel those of the first. Moreover, what was averred in the original action was a conspiracy participated in by named individuals, and the sole material change in the later suit was the addition of certain defendants, some of whom had been named in the original complaint as participating in the conspiracy but had not been named as parties defendant at that time. We conclude that the relationship of the additional parties to the second complaint was so close to parties to the first that the second complaint was merely a repetition of the first cause of action and, therefore, it is barred by application of the Bruszewski [v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950)] doctrine.”
Consequently, I would affirm the judgment of the district court as to Crone, Daily, Joller and Kumer on the basis of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Judge GREEN concurs in this opinion.

. The transcript of the pre-trial conference makes clear that the Chief of County Detectives was ill in the hospital during all the events which are the subject matter of this action.

. Paragraph 6 of the plaintiff’s complaint in Civil Action No. 69-300 alleged that Crone, “through [his] duly authorized agents, servants, employees or officers,” acting under color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “seized and confiscated a print of said film [‘The Female’]” contrary to the requirements of the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

. Detectives Daily, Joller and Kumer were not named in the first suit, but are referred to in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil Action No. 69-300. See note 2 supra.

. It is, of course, recognized that whether a plaintiff should be precluded by his earlier judgment by the doctrine of res judicata “depends upon the extent to which legal and equitable remedies have been merged in the state where the judgment is rendered.” Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co., 153 F.2d 822, 826 (7th Cir. 1946); Restatement of Judgments, § 66 (1942). However, it is quite clear that in the federal system actions in law and equity have been united into “one form of action to be known as ‘civil action’.” Rule 2, F.R. Civ.P.; see e. g., Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 67 (2d ed. 1970). And, even if one looks to Pennsylvania law, a court of equity may, once it assumes jurisdiction, grant complete relief including a judgment for money. Lafean v. American Caramel Co., 271 Pa. 276, 114 A. 622, 624 (1921); see also Helmig v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957).