Court Opinion

ID: 9802727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 14:49:01.250757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:49.156860
License: Public Domain

*394Tomasi, Supr. J.,
¶ 39. Specially Assigned, concurring. I agree with the majority that we should reject the totality-of-the-circumstances test set out in the plurality opinion in State v. Marcy, 165 Vt. 89, 680 A.2d 76 (1996). I do so, however, based on an alternate rationale and come to a different result concerning the admission of recorded recollections based on claims of “general honesty.” Because I conclude that the trial court’s use of the incorrect standard requires reversal, I concur in the Court’s judgment reversing and remanding for a new trial.6
I. Vermont Rule of Evidence 803(5)
¶ 40. My review of the Reporter’s Notes to V.R.E. 803(5), Vermont’s common law, and the views of commentator leads me to conclude that the drafters of Rule 803(5) did not intend to allow admission of prior recorded recollections based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Decisions from elsewhere endorsing that test have done so without consideration of the specific history of the Vermont rule.
¶ 41. United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1017 (6th Cir. 1993), and its progeny have relied primarily on two textual bases for adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances standard. First, those cases note that Rule 803(5) itself does not specify any particular method for determining the accuracy of the prior statement. See, e.g., State v. Nava, 311 P.3d 83, 93 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). In that regard, the federal and Vermont rules contain similar general provisions, requiring that the statement “accurately reflect[ ] the witness’s knowledge,” F.R.E. 803(5)(C), and that the statement be “shown ... to reflect [the witness’s] knowledge correctly,” V.R.E. 803(5). Second, the cases point to the notes of the Federal Advisory Committee. See, e.g., Nava, 311 P.3d at 93-94. Those comments provide the following guidance on this issue: Rule 803(5) makes no attempt “to spell out the method of establishing the initial knowledge or the contemporaneity and accuracy of the record, leaving them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate.” F.R.E. 803 advisory committee’s notes. Armed with the text of the rule and *395that comment, a number of courts have felt comfortable adopting a test of accuracy that allows the trial court to examine all relevant evidence to determine the likely veracity of a recorded recollection.
¶ 42. While the language of Vermont Rule 803(5) is nearly the same as Federal Rule 803(5),7 the advisory notes accompanying the two rules differ. See State v. Oscarson, 2004 VT 4, ¶ 19, 176 Vt. 176, 845 A.2d 337 (relying on Reporter’s Notes to interpret hearsay exception); see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 160 (1995) (plurality opinion) (explaining that advisory committee’s notes are “a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules”). Importantly, the Reporter’s Notes accompanying Vermont Rule 803(5) do not reference or cite to the Federal Advisory Committee’s guidance concerning proving the accuracy of the recorded recollection. Instead, the Reporter’s Notes explain that the rule is “consistent with Vermont law,” and cite four principal Vermont cases to support that conclusion.
¶ 43. An examination of those decisions reveals that, historically, Vermont required some type of in-court confirmation from the author of a recorded recollection that the record was correct. In Downer v. Rowell, 24 Vt. 343 (1852), and Mattocks v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 113 (1844), the witnesses had sufficient general memory to testify affirmatively that the prior writing was correct when made. In Davis v. Field, 56 Vt. 426 (1884), the Court expanded the type of vouching that could establish the correctness of the recorded recollection:
It is enough prima facie if he swears to his signature, and that it would not have been affixed but for the purpose of attestation.
The old notion that the witness must be able to swear from memory is pretty much exploded. All that is required, is, that he be able to swear that the memorandum is correct.
Id. at 428 (citations omitted); see Alvord v. Collin, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 418, 430-31 (1838) (accepting evidence where witness was able to identify a prior certification signed by him and testify that, *396based on the prior signing, the certification was accurate) (cited with approval in Davis).8
¶ 44. Any doubt as to whether Vermont intended Rule 808(5) to be a relaxation of the common-law standard is answered by State v. Paquette, 146 Vt. 1, 497 A.2d 358 (1985). There, the Court reviewed a case where the trial occurred prior to the adoption of Vermont Rule 803(5), but the appeal occurred after the rule had taken effect. The Court concluded that the change did not impact the analysis of the recorded-recollection issue. The Court determined that Rule 803(5) “is a codification of the common law rule” and that “the common law rule is co-extensive with the rule as codified in V.R.E. 803(5).” Id. at 3 n.2, 497 A.2d at 360 n.2.
¶ 45. Vermont’s approach of requiring the proponent of a prior statement to vouch for its accuracy was consistent with the common law in general. As set out in Wigmore:
The witness must be able now to assert that the record accurately represented his knowledge and recollection at the time. . . .
... If the witness can say, “I distinctly remember that when I made or saw this memorandum, about the time of the events, I was then conscious of its correctness,” his verification is satisfactory.
[ ]But if he relies, not on a present recollection of his past state of mind, but on other indications, such as a habit, a course of business, a check-mark on the margin, or merely the genuineness of his handwriting, then the certainty is of a lower quality, though still satisfactory for most practical purposes. In general, it is conceded that when the witness’ certainty rests on his usual habit or course of business in making memoranda or records, it is sufficient.
3 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 747, at 97-98 (1970) (footnotes omitted); see also D. Binder, Hearsay Handbook § 15:5 (4th ed. 2013) (“An *397important prerequisite to admission of recorded recollection is that the witness vouch for its accuracy. ... At least this was the general rule prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence”).
¶ 46. As a result, even if the witness had no present recollection of recording the event, his or her testimony before the factfinder that the recorded recollection was truthful provided sufficient justification for admission of the statement. While the opportunity for cross-examination may not have been extensive in light of the failed memory, the witness was still subject to some questioning. She may have been examined about inconsistencies within the recorded recollection or between the recorded recollection and other evidence. She could have been examined as to any bias and as to any other area potentially relevant to her credibility. Compare J. Beilin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to Impeaching Criminal Defendants With Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289, 296-97 (2008) (explaining how early common law’s preclusion of testimony from witnesses who had been convicted of felonies and “infamous crimes” evolved into a standard allowing impeachment based on such convictions), with V.R.E. 609 (allowing impeachment by certain past criminal convictions), and United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating common law and F.R.E. 608 permit impeachment based on witness’s character for truthfulness). Whatever the scope of the testimony, it would have been under oath and the jury or judge would have been able to evaluate the witness’s demeanor, sincerity, and believability.
¶ 47. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that there needs to be some direct affirmation from the witness that the recorded recollection is truthful and accurate.9 I also agree that testimony that the witness is “generally honest” is insufficient — standing alone — to admit the prior recollection. Where I respectively depart from the majority is the narrow instances where the witness can apply his character or trait to the circumstances of the recorded recollection and proceed to testify as to his belief *398that the statement itself is truthful and accurate. If he is able to testify to that, it meets the requirement that the witness “adopt his prior statement as his own or aver that the statement accurately reflected his knowledge at the time of its making.” State v. Lander, 155 Vt. 645, 645, 582 A.2d 128, 128 (1990) (mem.).
¶ 48. In my mind, the key to admissibility under Rule 803(5) is the witness’s confidence and verification under oath — whether based on memory, habit, trait, practice, marking, or firm conviction — that, under the circumstances in which the statement was made, she would have been truthful in making it. Where there is a significant loss of memory, the witness simply cannot testify as to the actual facts underlying an event. Pursuant to Rule 803(5), she relies, instead, on a contemporaneous record concerning the event that she is confident is accurate. The witness adopts that recorded recollection, it is read to the factfinder, and it substitutes for her memory as to that part of her testimony. Polite v. State, 116 So. 3d 270, 279 (Fla. 2013) (per curiam). The factfinder may then evaluate it along with the other testimony from that witness, giving it the weight the factfinder chooses. It is the witness’s endorsement of the prior statement under oath and the opportunity for the judge or jury to evaluate her credibility that satisfies the accuracy component of the Rule 803(5) analysis. See id. “‘[T]he reliability of the assertions [sought to be admitted under Rule 803(5)] rests upon the veracity of a witness who is present and testifying.’ ” (quoting 2 K. Brown, McCormick on Evidence § 279, at 294 (6th ed. 2006)).
¶ 49. As noted above, such an approach is consistent with prior Vermont and related law as endorsed in the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 803(5). See Davis, 56 Vt. at 427-29 (admitting statement where witness testified based on practice that he would not have affixed signature unless document were truthful); Alvord, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) at 430-31 (similar).10
*399¶ 50. It is also in keeping with the views of a number of commentators. Wigmore provides:
Is it enough that the witness (as is usual with attesting witnesses to a document) merely recognizes his handwriting and knows that he would not have written or signed without believing the record to be correct? Here the witness is really calling to his aid, not his specific business custom, but his general moral attitude; but, as a rule, the indication should be and is treated as sufficient.
3 Wigmore, supra, § 747, at 99. The Federal Practice and Procedure treatise is similar:
The witness may testify either that he remembers making an accurate recording of the event in question which he now no longer sufficiently remembers, that he routinely makes accurate records of this kind, or, if the witness has entirely forgotten the exact situation in which the recording was made, that he is confident from the circumstances that he would not have written or adopted such description of the facts unless that description truly described his observations at the time.
30C K. Graham, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 7046 (2014) (emphasis added). As is Weinstein:
[T]he foundation for their own record must include testimony either that the witness recalls having made an accurate record or that, even though the witness does not now recall his or her state of mind when making or adopting the record, the witness would not have made or adopted it without knowing it was correct.
5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 803.07[3][c], at 803-53 to 803-54 (2d ed. 2013) (emphasis added).
¶ 51. Case law generally supports that approach as well. Polite v. State, relied upon by the majority, would admit statements under Rule 803(5) if: “(1) although the witness does not recall the statement, the witness has a habit of recording such matters correctly or (2) the untness believes the statement is correct because the witness would have been truthful in providing the *400statement.” 116 So. 3d at 279 (emphasis added); accord United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 230-31 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding trial court properly admitted statement where witness testified she “would not have lied” in making statement to the police); State v. Gorman, 2004 ME 90, ¶¶ 36-40, 854 A.2d 1164 (affirming trial court’s decision to admit statement of witness with post-traumatic stress disorder and declining health who could not recall testifying before grand jury where witness was able to testify that she would have been truthful to the grand jury); see also Key v. State, 890 So. 2d 1043, 1052 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (concluding there was no error in admitting grand jury testimony of witness whose memory was lost due to medication where witness testified that she “would have told the grand jury the truth”), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds by Ex parte Key, 890 So. 2d 1056 (Ala. 2003).
¶ 52. At base, admission of recorded recollections under Rule 803(5) relies on dual claims of honesty of the testifying witness. The witness who testifies that she remembers making a prior statement and intending to be truthful at that time relies on her honesty on the stand and at the time she made the statement. A business owner who claims her habit or practice was to make specific entries only upon reviewing inventory stores relies on her honesty at trial and when the entry was made. I fail to see a difference in kind between those situations — which the majority endorses — and the circumstance where a person is able to swear at trial that, based on her character and beliefs, she would have been truthful in giving a prior statement to the police, to a grand jury, or at a deposition.
¶ 53. Unfortunately, people lose their memories for many reasons. They may suffer from amnesia, have Alzheimer’s disease, take powerful and debilitating medications, or incur a traumatic brain injury. If they are still able to testify in open court as to their honest belief that a statement they previously made was truthful, I believe that should be sufficient to sustain its admission under Rule 803(5). As the court stated in Walker v. Larson: “to exclude such a record when honestly made would be to reject the best and frequently the only means of arriving at the truth.” 169 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1969).11
*401¶ 54. I reach that conclusion cognizant that the endorsement provided by the witness is not the only indicator of the prior statement’s accuracy. Both the Federal Advisory Committee Notes and the Vermont Reporter’s Notes to Rules 803(5) provide that a recorded recollection’s contemporaneousness guarantees its accuracy. See F.R.E. 803 advisory committee’s notes (“The guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the reliability inherent in a record made while events were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them.”); Reporter’s Notes, V.R.E. 803 (“Contemporaneousness is the guarantee of [a recorded recollection’s] trustworthiness.”). Given that additional assurance of reliability, a witness’s statement that she would not have signed or made a statement unless it was truthful, or a similar affirmation, should be enough to allow admission of the statement.12 It would then be up to the finder of fact to assess the weight to give the recorded recollection in light of all of the circumstances and other evidence in the case.
II. Harmless Error
¶ 55. The trial court noted that admitting complainant’s statement was a “close” call, even under Many’s totality-of-theeircumstances analysis. The question of admissibility under the test I would adopt is even closer. On the one hand, complainant did not merely state that she is an honest person; she actually tied her claim of honesty directly to the statement at issue in the case. From a review of the transcript, it is apparent that she was either holding a copy of the statement or had it with her on the witness stand. She first identified as her own the signature that accompanied the notarized statement. The following colloquy ensued:
[Q] Would you sign something that you had written that you didn’t believe was true?
A. No.
*402Q. Would you lie to the police?
A. No.
THE COURT: I’m sorry, what was your answer to that?
THE WITNESS: I wouldn’t lie to the police.
On cross-examination, she reaffirmed that she would never lie to the police.
¶ 56. On the other hand, the witness also testified that her ability to accurately record what happened on the day -in question was severely impaired. The witness candidly admitted that she was not only inebriated, but polluted with alcohol. On the day complainant wrote the statement, she claimed to have consumed a gallon of whiskey and two thirty packs of Budweiser. By her own admission, she had been drinking all day in the hot sun, was “extremely drunk,” “trashed,” and “a train wreck.” She was also on medication. Based on those considerations, she conceded that the statement might not have been completely accurate.
¶ 57. As noted above, the trial court employed an improper standard in assessing the admissibility of the complainant’s prior recorded statement. In light of the circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraph, I cannot with confidence say beyond a reasonable doubt that the court would have admitted the statement had it employed the standard I propose today. The complainant vouched for her truthfulness in making the statement but also gave cause for serious doubt as to the statement’s accuracy. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding witness’s intoxication at time of making prior statement went to weight of evidence, as opposed to its admissibility, where witness testified at trial that he believed the statement was accurate).
¶ 58. Because I cannot conclude as a matter of law in this case that the statement was admissible under the correct standard, the error in applying the improper standard was not harmless. See State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 553, 674 A.2d 1258, 1264 (1996) (explaining that error is harmless only if appellate court “can state a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (quotation omitted)); State v. Barber, 157 Vt. 228, 232, 596 A.2d 337, 339 (1990) (remanding for a new trial where, although trial court could have found breach of peace, it did not reach issue and evidence was not so overwhelming as to show breach of peace as *403a matter of law). As a result, I would remand for a new trial and leave the admissibility of the statement under the new standard for consideration in the first instance by the trial judge.

 I also join the majority’s determinations with regard to defendant’s sufficieneyof-the-evidence argument and the prosecution’s repeated and inappropriate invocation of “golden rule” comments in its closing and rebuttal arguments.

 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5) was amended in 2011 for stylistic purposes. See F.R.E. 803, cmt. 2011 amend. These stylistic amendments have not been incorporated in Vermont Rule 803(5).

 The fourth decision referred to in the Reporter’s Notes, Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631, 648 (1869), does not provide great detail as to the precise foundation laid by the witness but suggests that the witness testified that the document was created based on a prior accurate memory that the witness wished to preserve.

 That conclusion is in tension with the Court's ruling in Paquette. 146 Vt. at 4, 497 A.2d at 360-61. The Paquette Court affirmed the admission of a recorded recollection based only on the witness’s testimony that she had signed the statement around the time of the underlying event. Id. Absent some further testimonial confirmation as to the veracity of the statement, I do not believe a proper foundation supported the admission of the statement.

 The majority suggests that the fact that a wilting is signed under oath is insufficient to meet the admissibility demands of Rule 803(5). Ante, ¶ 31. I believe the citation supporting that proposition was concerned with the idea that a document that has been signed under oath should not be able to establish its own admissibility without testimony from its author. See 2 Brown, supra, § 283, at 299 (explaining that witness must acknowledge accuracy of statement at trial and an assertion of accuracy on the statement is not sufficient). Consistent with Davis, if the witness examines the jurat and can testify that she would not have signed a *399statement under oath unless she was confident that it was accurate, it should be admissible. 56 Vt. at 428.

 Given the multi-part test of admissibility under Rule 803(5) and the fact that it is only applicable in cases where a witness’s memory is unable to be refreshed by *401the prior statement, see V.R.E. 612, I do not share the majority’s concern that extending Rule 803(5) to such situations would amount to a catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. The exception here is limited and well cabined.

 Of course, each witness’s endorsement would need to be examined carefully. Some witnesses may testify with confidence as to the veracity of the recorded recollection. Others may testify with less fervor as to the truthfulness or accuracy of the prior statement. See Marcy, 165 Vt. at 99-100, 680 A.2d at 82-83 (Allen, C.J., concurring). It is up to the trial judge to evaluate the vouching and determine whether it establishes sufficient reliability to admit the prior statement.