Court Opinion

ID: 9403785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 18:00:49.691055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.346440
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20562        Document: 00516793980             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                        June 21, 2023
                                      No. 22-20562                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   Brent Hebert,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

   Aaron Mohammed,

                                                                                Appellant,

                                            versus

   FMC Technologies, Incorporated,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 4:20-CV-2059
                     ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
         Brent Hebert, formerly an “installation engineer” with FMC
   Technologies, Inc. (“FMC”), contends that he is owed overtime pay under
   the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207. He appeals the

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20562      Document: 00516793980           Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/21/2023

                                     No. 22-20562

   district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of FMC, arguing that the
   district court erred when it determined that his position fell under the
   “learned professional” exemption of the FLSA’s overtime requirement.
   For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
                                          I.
          FMC is a global offshore oil and gas equipment and service company.
   It employs installation engineers. Their responsibilities, requirements, and
   remuneration are particularly important in this appeal. FMC requires a
   bachelor’s degree in an engineering field for its installation engineers.
   According FMC’s job description of installation engineers, they “provide[]
   support for testing, installation, intervention, and recovery of subsea
   equipment.” Their main tasks are to “plan, create technical procedures,
   create equipment lists, provide on-site technical [support], and write the post
   activity technical report.” Stated differently, these engineers work in office
   environments and occasionally visit offshore sites to assist with the
   installation of FMC equipment. Their work in the office largely consists of
   planning and preparing for installing the complex subsea drilling equipment
   that FMC sells. Their work “in the field” consists of providing on-site
   technical support and troubleshooting during the installation process. FMC
   pays its installation engineers both (1) a biweekly salary that does not change
   based on the days or hours worked, and (2) a “field service premium” on top
   of their salaries for days spent working at an offshore site.
          Brent Hebert worked as an installation engineer at FMC from 2013 to
   2020. Consistent with FMC’s requirement, Hebert holds a bachelor’s
   degree in mechanical engineering. While at FMC, Hebert spent over half of
   his time in the office planning and reviewing installation projects. He also
   provided on-site technical support for issues and troubleshooting during the
   installation process for FMC’s equipment. If any issues were discovered

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                                           No. 22-20562

   during installation, Hebert assisted with analyzing those issues and designing
   solutions to them. Occasionally, Hebert’s on-site work required manual
   labor. Once a project was complete, Hebert and his team then conducted in-
   office reviews of that project. It is undisputed that FMC paid Hebert a salary
   and that Hebert received a field service premium for days he spent working
   at offshore sites.
           Hebert filed this lawsuit alleging that FMC owed him overtime pay
   under the FLSA because FMC improperly classified him as an exempt
   employee. FMC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the
   evidence established that Hebert was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime
   requirements under the “learned professional exemption.” The district
   court granted FMC’s motion and dismissed Hebert’s complaint with
   prejudice. This appeal followed.1
                                                 II.
           We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
   employing the same standards as the district court. Owsley v. San Antonio
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
   Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light
   most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material
   fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

           _____________________
           1
              Aaron Mohammed—whose name appears in the caption of this appeal, but
   nowhere else—submitted a consent to opt-in to a class under the FLSA in the district
   court. The district court declined to certify a class, noting that Hebert and Mohammed
   were not similarly situated employees. Hebert and Mohammed did not present any issue
   related to the district court’s certification decision in their opening brief. Thus, Hebert has
   waived any arguments related to that decision, and Mohammed is not a party to this appeal.
   See Gen. Universal Syss., Inc. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 453 (5th Cir. 2007)

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                                              III.
           Under the FLSA, employers must pay overtime compensation to
   covered employees who work more than forty hours per week. 29 U.S.C.
   § 207. That said, employers are not required to pay overtime to employees
   who work in a “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional
   capacity.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The “professional capacity” part of this
   exemption—otherwise known as the “learned professional exemption”—is
   at issue here. Hebert contends that the district court erred in concluding that
   he satisfied this exemption.
           The learned professional exemption applies when an employee: (1) is
   compensated on a salary or fee basis at a specified salary level and (2) has a
   primary duty of performing work that requires “knowledge of an advanced
   type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
   course of specialized intellectual instruction.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300. Because
   Hebert challenges both the salary basis element and the primary duty
   element, we address each argument in turn.
                                               A.
           Hebert first argues that the district court erred in concluding that he
   was paid on a salary basis.2 We disagree. An employee is paid on a “salary
   basis” if “the employee regularly receives each pay period on a weekly, or
   less frequent basis, a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the
   employee’s compensation, which amount is not subject to reduction because
   of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” 29 C.F.R. §
           _____________________
           2
             To be eligible for the learned professional exemption, an employee must receive
   a salary at a rate of no less than $684 per week. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.300(a)(1), 541.600. The
   record reflects that Hebert received a base salary of $90,000 per year during his last year
   of employment at FMC. He does not dispute that his salary met the salary-level
   requirement for the learned professional exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600.

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                                          No. 22-20562

   541.602(a). Hebert admits that he received a bi-weekly salary without regard
   to the number of hours or days he worked. That salary plainly satisfies the
   definition of “salary basis” in § 541.602(a).3
           Hebert responds that, as earlier noted, in addition to his salary, he was
   also paid a field service premium for days that he was required to be in the
   field to assist with installation projects. This premium payment for the
   specific services, he argues, means that he was not paid on a salary basis. The
   regulations foreclose that assertion. Hebert does not lose his status as an
   employee paid on a salary basis just because he is also paid a bonus on top of
   the salary that the record has established was guaranteed to him. 29 C.F.R.
   § 541.604(a).4 We thus conclude that the district court correctly found that
   Hebert satisfied the “salary basis” element of the learned professional
   exemption.5

           _____________________
           3
             Indeed, before the district court, Hebert’s counsel acknowledged that if Hebert
   were not paid the field service premium and instead was only paid this salary, Hebert would
   satisfy the salary basis element.
           4
             “An employer may provide an exempt employee with additional compensation
   without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the employment
   arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly-required amount
   paid on a salary basis.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a).
           5
             Hebert also argues that Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 15 F. 4th 289
   (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc), requires FMC to establish the reasonable relationship
   requirement of Section 604(b). Section 604(b), however, only applies to employees whose
   earnings are computed on an hourly, daily, or shift basis. 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b).
   Furthermore, in Hewitt, there was no dispute that the employee was paid solely at a daily
   rate. 15 F.4th at 292. Thus, Section 604(b) is inapplicable here because the record shows
   Hebert was paid a guaranteed bi-weekly salary.

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                                          B.
          Hebert further contends that the district court erred in concluding
   that his primary duty was the performance of work “[r]equiring knowledge
   of an advanced type.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(2)(i). Instead, he asserts that
   his primary duty as an installation engineer was “very much a technician
   role” in which he performed manual labor at offshore sites. But the record
   again does not support his assertions.
          For one, Hebert, consistent with his engineering degree, did perform
   work “[r]equiring knowledge of an advanced type.” Id. For purposes of the
   learned professional exemption, such work must satisfy three criteria: (1) the
   employee must perform work requiring advanced knowledge; (2) the
   advanced knowledge must be in a “field of science or learning;” and (3) the
   advanced knowledge must be “customarily acquired by a prolonged course
   of specialized intellectual instruction.” Clark v. Centene Co. of Tex., L.P., 656
   F. App’x 688, 693 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing 29 C.F.R.
   § 541.301(a)). And here, Hebert performed work that checks off all three.
          First, the record shows that Hebert’s work as an installation engineer
   required advanced knowledge. The FLSA’s implementing regulations
   define “work requiring advanced knowledge” as work that is
   “predominantly intellectual in character, and which includes work requiring
   the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, as distinguished from
   [the] performance of routine mental, manual, mechanical[,] or physical
   work.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(b). Such work usually requires that employees
   “analyze, interpret[,] or make deductions from varying facts or
   circumstances.” Id.
          At FMC, Hebert was required to: (1) create technical procedures for
   installation projects, (2) analyze and interpret information, (3) review
   engineering designs and documents, and (4) consult with other departments

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   on designs. Once his planning duties were complete, Hebert then assisted
   with the on-site installation of FMC’s complex subsea drilling equipment,
   which, it is true, required him, at times, to perform manual labor. His on-site
   work, however, also consisted of identifying problems during installation and
   providing technical support for the issues that arose during the process. To
   the point: Hebert’s work in the office and on-site required him to consistently
   exercise his discretion and judgment regarding the appropriate procedures
   for installing FMC’s equipment. In short, Hebert performed work requiring
   advanced knowledge.
          Second, such knowledge is in a field of science or learning. The
   regulations specifically identify “engineering” as a “field of science and
   learning.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(c).
          And third, such knowledge is “customarily acquired by a prolonged
   course of specialized intellectual instruction.” “[T]he best prima facie
   evidence that an employee meets this requirement is possession of the
   appropriate academic degree.” Clark, 656 F. App’x at 693 (citing 29 C.F.R.
   § 541.301(d)). The record shows that FMC required its engineers to hold a
   degree in engineering and that Hebert has a bachelor’s degree in mechanical
   engineering. Hebert speculates that some installation engineers did not have
   degrees in engineering. But that assertion does not advance his claim—the
   exemption only requires that the advanced knowledge be customarily
   acquired    through    prolonged,    specialized    intellectual   instruction.
   § 541.301(d) (“Thus, for example, the learned professional exemption is
   available to the occasional lawyer who has not gone to law school, or the
   occasional chemist who is not the possessor of a degree in chemistry.”).
   Thus, the record shows that Hebert performed work “[r]equiring knowledge
   of an advanced type.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300.

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          Finally, despite his contention otherwise, that work was his primary
   duty. The regulations define an employee’s “primary duty” as the
   “principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee
   performs.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a). “[E]mployees who spend more than 50
   percent of their time performing exempt work will generally satisfy the
   primary duty requirement.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b). And here, the record
   shows that Hebert spent more than 50 percent of his time at FMC planning
   and reviewing installation procedures—not performing manual labor at the
   offshore installation sites.
          Thus, the record reflects that Hebert’s primary duty at FMC was the
   performance of exempt work and that he therefore falls under the learned
   professional exemption from overtime payment.
                                       IV.
          To sum up: We conclude that Hebert was paid on a salary basis and
   that his primary duty as an installation engineer at FMC was the performance
   of exempt work. We therefore hold that the district court did not err in
   concluding that Hebert was exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirement
   under the learned professional exemption, and, consequently, the judgment
   of the district court is
                                                               AFFIRMED.

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