Court Opinion

ID: 9787377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:21.641238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.367008
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
[¶18] I respectfully dissent because I am not convinced that the bankruptey statutes are intended to provide the kind of protection to an alleged tortfeasor that the majority ascribes to them. It is my conclusion that the standard of review governing summary judgment, the existence of genuine issues of material fact, and the applicable law require that this case be remanded for trial wherein the fact-finder will have to resolve the import of those disputed facts.
[¶19] I agree with the standard of review articulated by the majority, but I do not think the opinion is faithful to that standard in analyzing this case, nor do I coneur with the law the majority applies to the facts of the case.
[¶20] The one truly undisputed fact is that the Kolschefskys, acting pro se, filed a bankruptey petition in November of 1999, and they received the protections available to debtors in the bankruptcy court. In their bankruptcy petition, they did not list as an asset a medical malpractice claim against a chiropractor who had treated Mrs. Kolschef-sky, nor did they list a legal malpractice claim against Harris. Of course, at that point they did not know that they had such a claim against Harris because the gravamen of their complaint against him did not occur until more than six months after the filing of the bankruptey petition.
[¶21] Citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1), the majority appears to conclude that the bank-ruptey proceeding operated to relieve Harris of any obligation he had to the Kolschefskys, as their attorney in the medical malpractice action, even though Harris continued to act in that matter until into the late spring and early summer of the year 2000.1
[¶22] The majority comes close to acknowledging that Harris may never have effectively terminated his contract with the Kolschefskys (because such a termination would have had to have been in writing, and it was not), may have reaffirmed his pre-November 1999 contract with the Kolschef-skys through his actions in continuing to represent them, and/or that he may have entered into a new contract with them. These are, of course, some of the factual issues that need to be resolved by a fact-finder. However, perhaps in recognition of these factual issues, the majority then retreats to another basis on which the summary judgment order should be affirmed.
[¶23] In 118 of the majority's opinion, this second basis for affirmance is that, by operation of law, all assets of the Kolschef-skys went into the bankruptey estate, including all causes of action existing on the date of the petition, "whether or not a lawsuit has been commenced, and no matter how inchoate or unliquidated the underlying claim.... The estate exists by operation of law and is not limited to that property disclosed by the debtors on their bankruptcy schedules." Continuing, the majority concludes that the claim against Mrs. Kolschefsky's chiropractor became a part of the bankruptey estate and, therefore, she no longer had any interest whatever in it. I am not convineed that the authority cited entirely supports that proposition.
[¶24] However, the majority makes a secondary conclusion, which I do not think *1149can stand serutiny at all: "Although not argued by Harris, the same analysis would apply to any legal malpractice claim against Harris that accrued prior to the bankruptcy filing date. This result occurs by operation of law, regardless of the intent or understanding of the parties." In my view, that conclusion is not consonant with the facts (i.e., Harris did not commit his malpractice until the middle of the year 2000 when he let the statute of limitations run on Mrs. Kol-schefsky's claim against her chiropractor), nor is the proposition supported by substantiating authority. It is my opinion that the pertinent authority is to the contrary. Legal malpractice claims are not the sort of execu-tory contracts that are included within the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 865(d)(1). Although I agree with the majority that the claim against the chiropractor is an asset of the bankruptcy estate, and apparently is being treated as such while this litigation proceeds, some portions of that claim also may well not become assets of the bankruptey estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(11)(D) and (E) (1993) (exempting a payment, not to exceed $7,500, on account of personal bodily injury, not including pain and suffering or compensation for actual pecuniary loss, as well as payments for loss of future earnings). 2 David D. Epstein, Steve H. Nickles, and James J. White, Bank-ruptey, §§ 8-18 at 510-515 (1992); 11 USCS § 522, nn. 178-80 (1997); 11 USCS § 541, n. 72 (1997).
[¶25] However, that is beside the point because the medical malpractice claim is not at issue here. It is the legal malpractice claim that is now of immediate and practical importance to the Kolschefskys, and the pertinent authority holds that such a claim is not affected by a bankruptcy filing. Because it is a uniquely personal matter, a cause of action for legal malpractice is not assignable and, therefore, does not become a part of the estate of the bankrupt. Christison v. Jones, 83 Ill. App.3d 334, 39 Ill.Dec. 560, 405 N.E.2d 8, 11-12 (1980); Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Legal Malpractice, 40 AL.RA" 684 (1985 and Supp.2001); and see 1 Epstein, Nickles, and White, supra, § 3-14b at 168-69.
[¶26] Finally, I do not think the bank-ruptey statutes have such a "long-arm" as to provide protection to an alleged tortfeasor under cireumstances such as these. The bankruptey statutes serve very strictly defined purposes and principally affect the debtor-creditor relationship. The excerpts taken by the majority from the bankruptcy statutes are not designed to define or limit the sort of relationship, or the facts and cireumstances, that are at issue here. See generally Daniel R. Cowans, Bankruptcy Law and Practice, T" ed. (1998 and Supp. 2000). Reason is the soul of law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself. GGV v. JLR, 2002 WY 19, ¶ 8, 39 P.3d 1066, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2002).
[¶27] I would reverse the order of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with what I have set out above.

. Construing, or deciphering, a statute such as 11 U.S.C. § 365 is a daunting task. The statute itself is nine pages long (in USCS), and the interpretive notes and decisions section associated with that statute take up over 175 pages. Merely as an example, I point out that the general purpose of that section is to allow a debtor to reject an executory contract in order to relieve the bankruptcy estate of burdensome obligations while at the same time providing a means where- - by the debtor can force others to continue to do business with it when bankruptcy filings might otherwise make them reluctant to do so. 11 USCS § 365, n. 2 (1995); Chateaugay Corporation v. LTV Steel Company, 10 F.3d 944, 954-55 (2nd Cir.1993). While § 365 may "speak" to the issues in this case in some way I am unable to ascertain, I am at least convinced that, to the extent it speaks, it does not say what the majority attributes to it.