Court Opinion

ID: 5445800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-08 18:10:30.517689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:11.000872
License: Public Domain

Beatty, C. J., dissenting.
I dissent. There is but slight and extremely unsatisfactory evidence to support the finding that Robinson acted as agent of McLean in and about the transfer of the lands in controversy; but it is impossible to say that said finding is totally without support in the evidence, and therefore the fact must be accepted as found, for the purposes of this appeal. This being assumed, the construction of the findings as a whole seems to me to present no difficulty. They mean that Robinson had an actual precedent authority from McLean to act for him in his interest in procuring the transfer, but that he had no actual authority to deal with Schultz and Von Bargen upon any other terms than an absolute sale and conveyance in consideration of the payment of the amount of the Haggin judgment; and that, in order to induce plaintiffs to execute and deliver their deed of conveyance, he made the unauthorized representations as found. *361It is, of course, clear from the evidence of Schultz that Robinson never assumed to be the agent of McLean in any of the negotiations preceding the transfer, but, on the contrary, acted ostensibly as the agent of the plaintiffs, and was so regarded by them. The court has found, however, upon evidence which, as I have said, appears extremely weak and unsatisfactory, but is yet sufficient in law to sustain the finding, that Robinson, while assuming to act for the vendors, was in fact acting for the vendee, and while so acting made the representations upon which they were induced to execute and deliver the deed which they were seeking to set aside. If so, the vendee cannot take and hold the benefit of the deed without being bound by all the consequences of the representations by which the plaintiffs were induced to make it. When he was informed of the conditions upon which the conveyance was made, and the representations of his agent, it may be conceded that he had the option either to keep the land on the conditions of the transfer, or to rescind the whole transaction; but since he chose to deny the agency and repudiate the representations, claiming to be the absolute owner of the land, freed of all conditions, it seems to me he made his election to stand upon that ground, and necessarily put the plaintiffs to their action to enforce the only right they had, — that of rescission; for they had no option. They could not compel McLean to keep the land upon terms to which he had never consented. They could not compel him to advance five thousand dollars which he had never consented to advance, and to sell the land and divide the net profits. They could only claim to be restored to their original position; and this, I think, they could claim on the facts found. In other words, I think they pursued their proper and only remedy in both the original and amended complaints, asking the only relief to which they were entitled.
I concur in the conclusions of the court that the second amended complaint did not change the cause of action; that the statute of limitations is not a defense; *362that no formal tender of repayment of the purchase-money was necessary before commencing the suit.
I think the superior court erred in admitting secondary evidence of the Haggin proposal; but whether the error was of sufficient consequence to justify a new trial it is unnecessary in this dissenting opinion to discuss. Aside from the effect of this one error, I think the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
Rehearing denied.