Court Opinion

ID: 9637086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:56:10.886602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:53.064663
License: Public Domain

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
It appears that on or about November 21, 1928, the defendant-appellant leased to Mildred F. Butler and Agnes L. Bibbey (the appellee) a machine for frying doughnuts, and that the lessees had the machine in their possession from some time in December, 1928, to the 5th of February, 1929, when the accident happened; that a Mr. Daly, employed by the defendant, was present the day the machine was started, which was about December 28, 1928; that about three days later a Mr. Marsh, a representative of the defendant, was there, and adjusted the turnover mechanism at the back of the machine; that about two weeks or so later Mr. Shorely, also representing the defendant, came out and did some work upon the machine in the way of repairs; that he was there January 21, 1929, and that the repairs he did were in the way of adjusting the ejector at the front of the machine; that thereafter the machine worked properly until February 5, 1929, at which time the aceident occurred. In other words, it appeared that the machine at the time of the accident was and had been in the possession and complete control of the plaintiff and her eolessee from about the 21st of January to and including the 5th of February, 1929, when the aceident occurred.
This being the ease, the defendant-appellant requested the court to charge the jury that the plaintiff could not recover on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; in other words, that the court charge the jury that the mere happening of the accident could not be considered by them as evidence of the defendant’s negligence. The trial court refused this request, subject to defendant’s exception, which is assigned as error.
On the question whether the happening of the aceident was evidence of negligence, the court instructed the jury as follows :
“So that brings you down to the question of the aceident itself as evidence of negligence. It is not evidence of negligence unless you believe that the machine was never altered or tinkered with or changed in any way after its delivery by anybody except the service men from the defendant. * * K The accident is not to be considered as evidence of negligence unless, in the first place, all outside interference with and changes to that machine are eliminated.
“Suppose you say that is so, 'We don’t believe that anybody ever did anything to that machine in the way of adjustment or repair except the defendant, or Marsh & Andrews’ service man, and we don’t believe that the plaintiff used the iron rod,’ where does that leave you? The aceident did happen. Everybody admits that. Now, do you say that the machine, being in a condition which the defendant alone is responsible for, and breaking of itself from internal changes, of course, and maladjustment, do you say that the machine ought to have lasted more than six weeks in good running condition? If those things are established and you are satisfied, you might then say that the fact of the aceident shows that there was some defect in the machine somewhere when it was put out. * * *
*638“In order to say that the accident itself is evidence of negligence you must first eliminate all outside changes in the machine made by other persons than the manufacturer or agent. You must next say that the machine, if it was in proper condition and properly serviced, would have lasted much longer than the six weeks in good running condition. Lastly, you must say that no outside interference with the operation of the machine, like the iron rod, led to the accident.
“If you resolve all those questions in favor of the plaintiff you still have the underlying question whether the accident indicates a lack of reasonable care on the part of the manufacturer.”
As I understand the rule of res ipsa loq-uitur, it is that the happening of an accident may be considered as evidence of the defendant’s negligence, provided the instrument or machine causing the accident was at that time in the possession and complete control of the defendant; and that that is the only situation under which a jury may consider the happening of the accident as evidence of the defendant’s fault. The accident then speaks for itself.
In the charge the court told the jury that the accident itself is not evidence of negligence, “unless you believe that the machine was never altered or tinkered with or changed in any way after its delivery by anybody except the service men from the defendant.” This was the negative statement of the proposition. For the positive side of it, he stated that the accident itself is evidence of negligence: First, if no changes were made in the machine by any other persons than the manufacturer or its agents; second, if the machine would have lasted much longer than six weeks in good running condition, if it was in proper condition and properly serviced; and, third, if the plaintiff did not interfere with the operation of the machine with the iron rod.
This then was the rule under which the court instructed the jury “that the accident itself was evidence of negligence.” But it is not a correct statement of the res ipsa loqui-tur rule. That rule was stated by Mr. Justice Van Devanter in San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 98, 52 S. Ct. 399, 401, 56 L. Ed. 680, as follows: “When a thing which causes injury, without fault of the injured person, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care.”
What the District Court in its charge to the jury was attempting to do was to create a new and different res ipsa loquitur rule, for it must be conceded that the machine, at the time of the accident, was not under the exclusive control of the defendant as required by the rule stated by Mr. Justice Van De-vanter and as generally understood. On the facts in this case neither the res ipsa loqu-itur rule as correctly stated by the Supreme Court, or as incorrectly stated in this case, was applicable, for, at the time of the accident, the machine was under the exclusive control of the plaintiff, and had been for some two weeks or more without the interference of the defendant or any agent of the defendant. The court erred in refusing the requested instruction.
In San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, supra, where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held to have been rightly declared and applied, the facts were that the primary wires and converters, which surcharged the subsidiary wires leading to the plaintiff’s husband’s house, where he met his death by an electric shock while adjusting an incandescent light in a light socket at his home, were exclusively under the control of the defendant charged with the continuing duty of taking reasonable precautions, in proportion to the dangers to be apprehended, to maintain them in proper condition, and under circumstances where, in the ordinary and usual course of things, the injury would not have occurred had the duty been performed. There could be no doubt that the doctrine applied to the facts in that case. But those are not the facts here.
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320, 49 S. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711, sets forth a state of facts the converse of those in San Juan Light Co. v. Requena, and where it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply. There Chatters brought suit against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company to recover damages for an injury sustained in a ear of the Southern Railway which he boarded on the Louisville & Nashville Rail- ' road at New Orleans for a trip to Washington. The accident occurred after the car had left Montgomery, Ala., which was the end of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Fkom Montgomery to Atlanta, Ga., the car was under the complete control of the Atlanta & *639West Point Railroad, extending between those two points; and from Atlanta, Ga., to Washington, it was under the complete control of the Southern Railway, and the accident occurred on the line of the Southern Railway in Virginia between the two latter points. The cause of the accident was as follows : A window screen, attached to the outside of the ear, became loosened and swung backwards on its hinges so as to strike and break the window where the plaintiff sat, causing him to be injured by pieces of flying glass. The Louisville & Nashville Railroad assigned as error the refusal of the trial court to give a certain instruction to the jury and to grant its motion for a directed verdict. The court held that on the facts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and said (page 332 of 279 U. S., 49 S. Ct. 329, 333):
“The occurrence of the accident after the ear passed beyond the control of the Louisville & Nashville and that of the intermediate carrier to the tracks of the Southern does not admit of the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, so far as concerns the Louisville & Nashville. McNamara v. Boston & Maine R. R., 202 Mass. 491, 499, 89 N. E. 131; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Mink, 168 Ky. 394, 182 S. W. 188; cf. Glynn v. Central Railroad, 175 Mass. 510, 56 N. E. 698, 78 Am. St. Rep. 507; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Merrill, 65 Kan. 436, 70 P. 358, 59 L. R. A. 711, 93 Am. St. Rep. 287.”
In the majority opinion, after quoting from the charge what is above set out, it is stated that “this is not the rule of res ipsa loquitur.” I agree' that it is not. It is a mere perversion of the rule. It was an attempt to apply it to a state of facts which do not authorize its application.
Then, again, it is said: “There is nothing in these instructions implying that, under the circumstances proven in this ease, the accident alone was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant.” This is not a correct interpretation of the charge, for the trial court gave the jury plainly to understand that the accident alone and of itself was evidence of negligence under the conditions he named. The fact remains then that the trial court told the jury that “the accident itself” was evidence of negligence under the conditions he named, which was not the rule but a violation of it. The correct rule should have been given, and, if given, the mere happening of the accident as evidence of negligence could not have been used by the jury as a basis of their verdict; while, under the instructions given, they were, under the conditions named, authorized to use it, and its use may have been the sole basis for their verdict. This court cannot speculate as to what portions of the evidence the jury made use of in finding their verdict. It is enough that they may have used what the trial court told them they might.
For these reasons, I think the judgment should be vacated and a new trial had.