Court Opinion

ID: 9485805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:30:25.668858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:22.153671
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, except for Part II.A.2, the majority’s per curiam opinion is not only well-written but also almost entirely correct. In Part II.A.2, however, the majority not only adopts an incorrect view of the law, it then proceeds to ignore its newly announced rule in order to affirm these two criminal convictions. These two holdings are not only wrong, they are totally irreconcilable. I must respectfully dissent1.

The Real Role of Intuition

The majority first goes astray in deciding whether, after a prima facie Batson violation has been established, a district court can ever find an attorney’s unsupported intuition to be a sufficient race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the answer has to be a resounding “No.”- The Eleventh Circuit long ago reached the correct answer to this same question.
Initially, we hold that the vague explanation offered by the prosecutor in the instant case was legally insufficient to refute a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination. While the reasons given by the prosecutor “need not rise to the level *1382justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” see [Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ], the prosecutor must nevertheless “give a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons’ for exercising the challenges.” Id. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 n. 20 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). The prosecutor’s explanation in the present case, “I just got a feeling about him,” obviously falls short of this requirement. As the Batson court concluded, “If [such] general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant’s prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause ‘would be but a vain and illusory requirement.’ ” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598, 55 S.Ct. 579, 583-84, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935)).
United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989); see also Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1060, 122 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993); United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir.1992); Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 513 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2795, 115 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991). In the instant case, as in Horsley, the explanation offered for striking Lula Station — that she seemed to be a follower — amounted to nothing more than a hunch or “feeling” by some of the defense attorneys. No specific, articulable factor, such as her parroting the responses of others or averting eye contact, was advanced that gave rise to this intuitive leap. Thus, the district court did not err in finding that this explanation was legally insufficient.
Unfortunately, the majority reaches a different conclusion — holding instead that a pri-ma facie case of discrimination can be rebutted by intuition alone. According to the majority opinion, this Court has repeatedly upheld peremptory challenges “based upon intuition and other objectively unverifiable considerations.” This assertion simply cannot be squared with the actual holdings of any of this Court’s previous decisions. What this Court has held is that it is permissible for the process of choosing a jury to be influenced by the “intuitive assumptions” of the attorneys. United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir.1988). However, in every single case cited by the majority, the intuitive assumptions of the attorneys accepted by various courts have been based upon specific articulable factors that were either disclosed by the prospective jurors or observed in the courtroom.2 Not one of the eases cited by the majority can possibly be read to stand for the proposition that a mere hunch by an attorney, with nothing more, can ever be a sufficient race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. No support for the majority’s position can be found in any reported case in the Fifth Circuit or, for that matter, in any other circuit since the day Batson was handed down.3 In every single case dealing *1383with intuition or “intuitive assumptions,” any subjective judgments found to be acceptable were based upon specific articulable factors or observations that were subject to proof in the courtroom.
In short, the majority’s conclusion that unsupported intuition is a legitimate race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike is absolutely without support in reported case law. The majority opinion also creates a square and irreconcilable conflict with the Eleventh Circuit4 and ignores case law in the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits strongly suggesting that intuition can never be a legitimate race-neutral explanation.5 Yet in reaching its remarkable conclusion, the majority never even acknowledges that anything unusual is afoot. Evidently everyone else is out of step except the majority.
Although the majority opinion fails to appreciate the distinction, there is a world of difference between subjective “assumptions” based upon specific articulable factors and pure hunches or “gut feelings.” As our sister circuit has explained, a strike based upon the attorney’s perception of facial expressions or body language is distinguishable from a strike based upon intuition alone. Hostile facial expressions and body language “can be observed in the courtroom; therefore the truth or falsity of explanations of this kind is subject to proof.” Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 648 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2263, 114 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991). In contrast, an explanation based upon unsupported intuition is “not subject to observation and not subject to proof.” Id.
The majority incorrectly asserts that the striking attorney’s assumption that Ms. Station was a follower is itself a specific articula-ble factor. However, this is not a fact, but rather a subjective judgment. Moreover, the majority misconstrues the relevant inquiry when it states that the assumption that Ms. Station was a follower is subject to proof. It is not the appraisal that Ms. Station was a follower that must be subject to proof, but rather it is the specific, articulable basis giving rise to that judgment that must be subject to proof. All that was provided here was an intuitive judgment with no articulable factor giving rise to that appraisal.
To further illustrate the important distinction between subjective assumptions based on articulable factors and pure unsupported intuition, consider the case of United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1818, 108 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990). This case features what has to be one of the most ridiculous explanations ever offered for a *1384peremptory strike. In Romero-Reyna, the prosecutor explained that he struck a potential juror who worked as a pipeline operator because he never accepted a juror whose occupation began with a “P.” Id. at 560. Although such an explanation is very likely to be found pretextual, it would be a legitimate race-neutral explanation. An attorney is allowed to make the intuitive assumption that people in professions that begin with the letter “P” will be prejudiced against his case. This assumption, however ridiculous it may seem, is based upon a specific articulable fact that can be evaluated by the trial court— namely, that the veniremember’s occupation began with the letter “P.” Further, there is also the possibility that the opposing attorney would be able to rebut that explanation by pointing out white veniremen whose occupations also begin with “P.”6
On the other hand, if intuition or a “gut feeling” alone is a sufficient race-neutral explanation, how can either the opponent or the trial court ever establish that the proffered explanation is pretextual? The majority assures us that this is really no different from other credibility choices that finders of fact must make. If this is true, then why did the Supreme Court in Batson specifically disallow a prosecutor’s assertion of good faith as a race-neutral reason? Such an assertion would also require the same sort of “credibility choice” that so inspires the confidence of the majority in the instant case. The answer to this question should be obvious. The Bat-son Court rejected “good faith” as a legitimate explanation for the very same reason that this Court should reject unsupported intuition: without some sort of articulable basis for the strike, no one — whether finder of fact, opponent, or appellate court — has any way to decide whether the attorney is telling the truth. The Supreme Court has recognized that allowing such an unprovabl’e explanation would make the Batson holding “ ‘a vain and illusory requirement.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598, 55 S.Ct. 579, 584, 79 L.Ed. 1074 (1935)). The only real way to rebut such an explanation based on a “gut feeling” would be to show a history of similar “gut feelings” about minority veniremen. Here, with one stroke of the pen, the majority has effectively obliterated Batson and returned this Circuit to the days of Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965).

Selective Application?

The majority’s holding — that an unsupported “gut feeling” is sufficient to explain a peremptory strike — is bad enough. What makes this decision even worse is that the majority then proceeds to ignore its own holding in order to affirm these two criminal convictions.
The main reason given by defense counsel for striking Lula Station was that she seemed to be a “follower” instead of an independent thinker. No specific basis for this impression was ever articulated by the defendants’ attorneys, and this explanation was flatly rejected by the district court. Contrary to the assertions in the majority opinion, it is clear from the record that the district court felt that such a reason could never be a legitimate race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike. The district court clearly stated that the “intuitive judgment of the defendant’s counsel” could not be considered a race-neutral explanation.7 Also, the district court specifically held that the explanation that Ms. Station was a “follower” was not a valid reason for excluding a prospective juror.8 If, as the majority now *1385holds, unsupported intuition is a legitimate race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike, it would seem obvious that the district court committed reversible error. See United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 221 (5th Cir.1993) (“The denial or impairment of the right to exercise peremptory challenges is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.”).
Surprisingly, however, the majority affirms the convictions and reaches the remarkable conclusion that the district court did “exactly as the law requires.” While I would agree that the district court applied the law as it should be, it is obvious that the district court did not apply the law adopted today in the majority’s opinion. The majority cannot have it both ways. If unsupported intuition is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of race discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes, then the district court committed error and these convictions should be reversed. There is simply no way to reconcile the majority’s holding,with its decision to affirm the convictions of the defendants. This is an example of result-oriented jurisprudence at its very worst.
Conclusion
This writer would hold that an explanation based upon unsupported intuition can never be a legitimate race-neutral explanation for a peremptory strike, and accordingly, would affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects. Because the majority not only adopts an incorrect view of the law, but also misapplies its own rule to the facts of this ease, I must dissent.

. Though I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the convictions should be affirmed, I have styled this writing a “dissent in part” to emphasize my strong disagreement with the new rule adopted by the majority.

. See Polk v. Dixie Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 83, 85-86 (5th Cir.1992) (peremptory strike based upon venireman’s lack of eye contact), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 982, 122 L.Ed.2d 135 (1993); United States v. Hinojosa, 958 F.2d 624, 631-32 (5th Cir.1992) (failure to complete high school); United States v. Clemons, 941 F.2d 321, 324 (5th Cir.1991) (age, dress, hairstyle); United States v. Roberts, 913 F.2d 211, 214 (5th Cir.1990) (disinterested demeanor, inattentiveness, involvement in political campaign of potential defense witness, statement that potential juror would not accept tape recordings as evidence, familiarity with a named defendant), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2264, 114 L.Ed.2d 716 (1991); United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 990 (5th Cir.1990) (employment with church affiliated agency), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2275, 114 L.Ed.2d 726 (1991); United States v. Romero-Reyna, 889 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir.1989) (employment as pipeline operator), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1818, 108 L.Ed.2d 948 (1990); United States v. Moreno, 878 F.2d 817, 820-21 (5th Cir.) (hostility toward police officers, age, marital status, unemployment, previous jury service, employment as commercial artist), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 979, 110 S.Ct. 508, 107 L.Ed.2d 510 (1989); United States v. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 95 n. 1 (5th Cir.1988) (same last name as someone previously convicted by prosecutor, age, eye contact, body language); United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (5th Cir.1988) (age, marital status, length of residency in the community, eye contact, demeanor); United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (5th Cir.1987) (previous convictions, age, marital status, employment, acquaintance with defense counsel).

. See, e.g., Moore v. Keller Indus., Inc., 948 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir.1991) (age, familial relationships, appearance during questioning, respon*1383siveness, background knowledge), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1945, 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir.1987) (legal troubles of family members, body language, hostility toward prosecutor); see also United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir.1992) (criminal record of cousin, lack of employment, children out of wedlock); Dunham v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 967 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th Cir.1992) (employment as hairdresser, eye contact, familiarity with two potential defense witnesses); Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir.) (answers to jury questionnaire, location and nature of employment), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 595, 121 L.Ed.2d 533 (1992); United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 849 (7th Cir.1991) (statements during voir dire, familiarity with the case, status as young, single mother); United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7th Cir.) (previous employment at penal facility, history of criminal prosecutions, residence geographically close to defendants, victim of earlier armed violence where no charges were brought), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 863, 111 S.Ct. 173, 112 L.Ed.2d 137 (1990); United States v. Davis, 871 F.2d 71, 72 (8th Cir.1989) (age, marital status, employment, residence, failure to answer questions on voir dire); United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3d Cir.) (age, marital status), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835, 109 S.Ct. 97, 102 L.Ed.2d 73 (1988).

. See United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir.1989).

. See Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting statement from Horsley that mere feeling is not sufficient race-neutral explanation), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1060, 122 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993); United States v. Casper, 956 F.2d 416, 418 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting same statement from Horsley); Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 513 (8th Cir.) (accepting explanation for peremptory challenge based upon subjective judgment but noting that challenge was not purely subjective because it was based upon specific observations of venireman's behavior and demeanor in the courtroom), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2795, 115 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991).

. In fact, in Romero-Reyna, the district court rejected the prosecution's reliance on the "P rule” for just this reason. The peremptory challenge was upheld only after the prosecution also explained that the strike was also based upon the prevalence of marijuana use among pipeline workers. Id. at 561.

. The district court stated:
Some things that are not considered to be neutral acts are as follows: denial of discriminatory motive, affirmance of his/her good faith of the defendant, nor intuitive judgment of the defendant’s counsel will serve to form the nondiscriminatory basis upon which the peremptory challenges have to be based.
Record, Vol. 13 at 159.

.In language also quoted by the majority opinion, the district court held
On Lula Station, the court cannot see any reason. Just telling the court that she is a follower clearly violates what the Supreme Court has stated that that is not a reason for *1385merely excusing a juror. And the court finds that insofar as Ms. Station is concerned, the court finds that she was excluded solely because of her race, and therefore makes such a finding.
Record, Vol. 13 at 166. It is abundantly clear from this statement — and the rest of the district court’s holding quoted in the majority opinion— that the district court felt that the defendant’s explanation for striking Ms. Station was not a race-neutral explanation.