Court Opinion

ID: 9906827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 15:01:06.73911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:13.705751
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1675   Document: 31     Page: 1    Filed: 12/05/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

           JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC,
                    Appellant

                            v.

        GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL,
                    Appellee
             ______________________

                       2023-1675
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
 91274194.
                  ______________________

                Decided: December 5, 2023
                 ______________________

    J. SCOTT GERIEN, Dickenson Peatman & Fogarty,
 Napa, CA, for appellant. Also represented by JOY L.
 DURAND.

     JEFFREY H. GREGER, Hauptman Ham, LLP, Alexan-
 dria, VA, for appellee.
                  ______________________

     Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
Case: 23-1675    Document: 31     Page: 2    Filed: 12/05/2023

 2                              JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.
                               GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

     Jackson Family Farms, LLC (“opposer”) appeals from
 a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) decision
 dismissing its opposition to a trademark application filed
 by Grands Domaines Du Littoral (“applicant”). The Board
 determined that as a matter of law there is no likelihood of
 confusion between applicant’s mark and opposer’s mark.
 We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
     Grands Domaines Du Littoral filed a trademark appli-
 cation (No. 90184859) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) to
 register the following mark:

 The mark was sought to be registered for “wines made from
 grapes from Côtes de Provence in accordance with adapted
 standards” in International Class 33. J.A. 1.
     Jackson Family Farm filed a notice of opposition. It
 pleaded that it owned the registration for the “standard
 character mark VÉRITÉ in connection with ‘alcoholic bev-
 erages except beers’ in International Class 33 and prior
 common law rights in the same mark for wine.” J.A. 2 (ci-
 tation omitted). It opposed the registration on “the sole
Case: 23-1675    Document: 31      Page: 3    Filed: 12/05/2023

 JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.                               3
 GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

 ground of likelihood of confusion” between applicant’s
 mark and opposer’s mark. J.A. 2.
      Applicant moved for judgment on the pleadings, argu-
 ing there is no likelihood of confusion because the marks
 are not confusingly similar. The Board considered that ap-
 plicant had conceded that the other DuPont factors of re-
 latedness (articulated in In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours &
 Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)) favored opposer
 and analyzed whether “based on the single factor of dissim-
 ilarity of the marks, [o]pposer cannot prevail as a matter of
 law, even if all of the other [DuPont] factors weigh in favor
 of [o]pposer.” J.A. 4.
     The Board considered that “the marks share the iden-
 tical term VÉRITÉ.” J.A. 6. However, the Board deter-
 mined that in opposer’s mark this term stood alone. In
 applicant’s mark it was part of a three-word phrase—
 VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR—and was just one of twenty-two
 words in the applicant’s mark. The Board concluded that
 CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is the dominant part of appli-
 cant’s mark because those words are displayed in a larger
 font and in a different color. The Board also noted that the
 additional “design elements of [a]pplicant’s mark, in com-
 bination with the larger wording CHATEAU LA
 GORDONNE, result[] in a mark which is ‘visually readily
 distinguishable from’ [o]pposer’s mark.” J.A. 7 (citation
 omitted). Based on these determinations, the Board con-
 cluded there was “no genuine dispute of material fact that
 the marks at issue are distinct in appearance,” J.A. 6, and
 this alone demonstrated that “a likelihood of confusion can-
 not exist as a matter of law,” even when considering all
 other DuPont factors to weigh in the opposer’s favor, J.A.
 8.
     Opposer appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(4)(B).
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 4                               JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.
                                GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

                         DISCUSSION
      “Likelihood of confusion is a question of law based on
 underlying factual findings regarding the DuPont factors.”
 Spireon, Inc. v. Flex Ltd., 71 F.4th 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
 2023). We review the Board’s decision to dismiss the oppo-
 sition as a matter of law de novo. Id.
                               I
     Opposer first argues that the marks standing alone are
 not sufficiently dissimilar to show that there can be no like-
 lihood of confusion as a matter of law. “The first DuPont
 factor requires consideration of ‘[t]he similarity or dissimi-
 larity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
 sound, connotation and commercial impression.’” In re
 I.AM.Symbolic, LLC, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
 (quoting DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361). “The proper test is not
 a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
 ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of
 their commercial impression’ such that persons who en-
 counter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
 between the parties.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learn-
 ing LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
 Leading Jewelers Guild, Inc. v. LJOW Holdings, LLC, 82
 U.S.P.Q.2d 1901, 1905 (T.T.A.B. 2007)).
     Opposer argues that the Board erred in determining
 that the marks are dissimilar, or that there are at least
 material issues of fact as to the degree of their dissimilar-
 ity. Opposer contends that the marks are in fact similar
 because the “VÉRITÉ mark appears as the first term of
 [a]pplicant’s three-word mark VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR” and
 VÉRITÉ is therefore the dominant portion of applicant’s
 mark. Appellant Br. 13. Opposer further argues that six-
 teen of the twenty-two words on the label have been dis-
 claimed and are entitled to less weight in the likelihood of
 confusion analysis. We agree with the Board.
    Opposer’s focus on the word “VÉRITÉ” ignores other,
 more prominent portions of applicant’s mark and does not
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 JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.                                5
 GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

 consider applicant’s mark as a whole. The Board did not
 err in determining that CHATEAU LA GORDONNE, not
 VÉRITÉ, is the dominant part of applicant’s mark. As the
 Board explained, CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is displayed
 in a larger font and different coloring relative to other ele-
 ments of the label. Therefore, the Board did not err in at-
 tributing greater weight to the dominant CHATEAU LA
 GORDONNE portion of applicant’s mark when analyzing
 the similarities of the two marks.
     Opposer argues that CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is a
 house mark and VÉRITÉ DU TERROIR is “its own unitary
 composite product name,” and that the presence of the
 CHATEAU LA GORDONNE portion does not avoid confu-
 sion as a matter of law because both marks contain the
 term VÉRITÉ. Appellant Br. 15–16. In other words, con-
 sumers would perceive CHATEAU LA GORDONNE as a
 house mark and would ignore it in comparing the use of the
 term VÉRITÉ in the two marks. Even if this were the cor-
 rect approach to the treatment of house marks, which we
 do not decide, there is no support for the notion that
 CHATEAU LA GORDONNE is a house mark that can be
 stripped out for likelihood of confusion purposes. The
 Board was correct to consider the presence of CHATEAU
 LA GORDONNE and the fact that it is the dominant por-
 tion of the mark.
      Opposer also cites cases finding similarity between
 marks when one mark entirely encompasses the other. But
 those cases involved situations in which the only differ-
 ences between the marks was the addition of a few words
 to the dominant portion of the mark, see, e.g., Stone Lion
 Cap. Partners, L.P. v. Lion Cap. LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319
 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (comparing “STONE LION CAPITAL” to
 “LION CAPITAL”); In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340,
 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding likelihood of confusion be-
 tween “JOSE GASPAR GOLD” and “GASPAR’S ALE” be-
 cause “GASPAR” and “GASPAR’S” were the dominant
 features of the two marks and the commercial impression
 of the additional words were discounted), whereas here the
Case: 23-1675     Document: 31      Page: 6    Filed: 12/05/2023

 6                               JACKSON FAMILY FARMS, LLC v.
                                GRANDS DOMAINES DU LITTORAL

 difference in marks includes the addition of over twenty
 words, some of which are more prominently displayed than
 VÉRITÉ. The Board’s conclusion that the marks are dis-
 similar was not erroneous.
     Opposer finally argues that disclaimed words in the
 mark should not be given consideration. While opposer is
 correct that those elements may receive less weight in con-
 sidering the similarity of the marks, they cannot be ig-
 nored, see In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305
 (Fed. Cir. 2018), and opposer concedes that GORDONNE
 was not disclaimed.
                               II
    Opposer argues that the Board erred in not properly
 weighing all of the other DuPont factors against the dis-
 similarity of the marks, particularly the fame of opposer’s
 mark. We disagree.
      There is nothing inherently improper about making a
 likelihood of confusion determination solely based on dis-
 similarity of the marks at the pleading stage. See Ava En-
 ters. Inc. v. P.A.C. Trading Grp., Inc., 86 U.S.P.Q.2d 1659
 (T.T.A.B. 2008). “[O]ne DuPont factor may be dispositive
 in a likelihood of confusion analysis, especially when that
 single factor is the dissimilarity of the marks.” Champagne
 Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373,
 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:79 (5th ed. 2023)
 (“It is possible that the first [DuPont] factor, the similarity
 or dissimilarity of the marks themselves, may be disposi-
 tive of the issue.”). We agree with the Board’s conclusion
 that a likelihood of confusion between the marks could not
 exist as a matter of law, even when taking all of the other
 DuPont factors to weigh in favor of opposer.
                         AFFIRMED