Court Opinion

ID: 9570906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:27:28.87385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:21:06.381280
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
concurring specially with respect to Division 5 of the majority opinion.
I concur in the judgment of reversal and with each of the divisions of the majority opinion except Division Five. Division Five deals with the infringement by the Act upon First Amendment rights of expression.
The majority acknowledges in Division 5 that the Act prohibits the making of a contribution except to the candidate or his campaign committee. However, the majority then says that "activities” in the exercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be harshly channeled and controlled.
Were I to adopt this stated position, I would have to hold that the Act is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment. But I do not adopt that position, and I do not think that the Act, as written by the legislature, violates the First Amendment.
Section 4 of the Act says very plainly: "No contributions to bring about the nomination or election of a candidate for any office provided for in Section 2 shall be made except directly to a candidate or to his campaign committee which is organized for the purpose of bringing about the nomination or election of any such candidate . . .” This same language is later reiterated by the legislature in the same paragraph: "No contribution shall be made except to the candidate or his campaign committee.”
The majority has judicially construed this language, which to me needs no construction, to mean that contributions made to persons other than the candidate or his campaign committee are the "equivalent” of contributions made to the candidate or the campaign committee.
I would flatly hold that the making of a political campaign contribution to anyone other than the *486candidate or his campaign committee is a violation of the Act. It is plain to me that the legislature intended to prohibit the making of political campaign contributions to anyone other than to the candidate or his campaign committee.
However, it is my view that the First Amendment affords no protection to the "making of campaign .contributions” as the term "contributions” is defined in the Act. In other words, the making of campaign contributions in a political campaign is "conduct” that is not protected by the First Amendment, and the legislature can, in my opinion, place limitations and restrictions on such "conduct” without violating First Amendment rights.
I think that it is clear from the over-all content of the Act that it asserts no prohibition against free expression or association. Any person may express and urge support for or against any candidate, and there is no ban against association with any candidate for the specified offices. The Act merely says that campaign "contributions” cannot be made to anyone other than the candidate or his campaign committee, and it provides that when contributions are made in the manner specified in the Act, then they shall be reported and publicly disclosed.
"Contribution” as defined by the Act means anything of value conveyed or transferred for the purpose of influencing the nomination or election of a candidate. As I view this definition, "conveying or transferring” anything of value is not speech or expression within First Amendment terms. It is activity or conduct, and such activity and conduct can legitimately be restricted and limited in the public interest pursuant to the police power of the state.
The making of political campaign contributions, defined by the terms of the Act as transferring or conveying anything of value for the purpose of influencing the candidacy of a candidate, cannot, in my judgment, be equated with freedom of speech or freedom of association rights.
I would therefore hold that the First Amendment does not prohibit the legislature from placing restrictions *487and limitations on the making of political campaign contributions. I would also uphold the constitutionality of the Act as written by the legislature, rather than construing it to mean that contributions made to others than the candidate or his committee are to be constructively attributed to the candidate or his committee.
In United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1967), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "This court has held that when 'speech’ and 'nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms.” P. 376.
I do not agree that the Act as written affects First Amendment freedoms, but even if I did make that concession, it is my contention that the state’s interest in requiring public disclosure of campaign contributions is sufficiently important to justify any incidental limitations on expression and association imposed by this Act.
I concur in the judgment of reversal.