Court Opinion

ID: 9776951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:49:56.404388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:10.222669
License: Public Domain

LIVINGSTON,
Justice, dissenting.
I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s treatment of Randall’s appeals from municipal court to county court. I agree with the majority’s conclusions that: 1) the council appropriately appointed a temporary municipal judge; 2) the clerical errors in the judgments, if any, do not impact the municipal court orders; and 3) the assaults would constitute crimes of moral turpitude. I do not, however, agree with the majority’s analysis of the standard of review or its application regarding the municipal convictions. I would draw a distinction between the effect an appeal from a municipal court conviction and an appeal from a county or district court conviction has on whether a “conviction” exits or not. Additionally, I believe this court’s opinion should address whether the County Criminal Court No. 1 of Denton County had jurisdiction to hear and convict Randall on appeal because resolution of this issue would determine whether the majority’s discussion of the municipal court convictions is dicta. See majority op. at 604 n. 4.
SUBSEQUENT CONVICTIONS AFTER TRIALS DE NOVO
After his municipal court convictions, Randall filed an appeal bond to perfect his *611appeal and secure a trial de novo. On July 23, 1998, both eases were tried to a jury in the County Criminal Court No. 1 of Denton County, Texas, a court of record, and Randall was again convicted of the assaults. On August 7, 1998 appellants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the mandamus action as moot. This court denied the motion on August 28,1998, and the case was submitted for en banc oral argument on September 1,1998.
The majority opinion acknowledges the potential jurisdictional defect of the county court convictions but does not address the effect of Randall’s subsequent convictions in county court. See id. If Randall’s convictions were final when this case was submitted, then the majority’s discussion of the municipal convictions is mere dicta. However, if County Criminal Court No. 1 had no jurisdiction to hear the appeals de novo, Randall’s municipal court convictions may still not be final if he properly perfected his appeal.1 Piling an appeal bond within ten days of the municipal court conviction is the proper method to perfect a misdemeanor appeal. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 44.14(a) (Vernon Supp.1999). While the appeal bonds are not part of this causes’ clerk’s record, the appellants’ motion to dismiss and the reporter’s record acknowledge the filing of the appeal bonds. For these reasons, I would treat the appeals as properly perfected, which necessitates a discussion of whether appealed municipal court convictions constitute “convictions” within the meaning of the Flower Mound Charter so as to justify immediate forfeiture of office.
IS AN APPEALED MUNICIPAL COURT CONVICTION A “CONVICTION”?
In this appeal from the mandamus proceeding below, we are asked to review a civil district court’s authority to grant mandamus relief to Randall by suspending his forfeiture of office because of his municipal court convictions, pending his trial de novo. We must review a trial court’s grant of mandamus relief under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hardin Const. Group, Inc. v. Strictly Painting, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex.App. — San Antonio, 1997, orig. proceeding). When the issue on appeal relates only to the trial court’s determination of legal principles, the appellate standard of review is much less deferential because a trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992) (orig.proceeding); Hardin, 945 S.W.2d at 312; see also In re El Paso Healthcare Sys., 969 S.W.2d 68, 72 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1998, orig. proceeding) (citing Braden v. Marquez, 950 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1997, orig. proceeding)). The majority opinion implies that the trial court’s ruling is not entitled to deference in this case since the issues at hand are questions of law. See majority op. at 604-605. However, I believe the proper standard of review is abuse of discretion, and that the Flower Mound council members — not Randall — must show the trial court erred in applying the law to the facts. In other words, the appellants must show that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in its rulings on each of the three issues raised by their appeal.
While a conviction that is subject to reversal on appeal may be a conviction for purposes of forfeiture of office under the Flower Mound Charter, a conviction that is subject to a trial de novo is not. An appeal from the *612Flower Mound Municipal Court- — a court not of record — to a county court results in a trial de novo. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 44.17; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 30.001-.01464 (Vernon 1988 and Supp.1999).
The majority states that an appeal de novo annuls the order of the court from which the appeal is taken, but does not vacate the conviction for all purposes. See majority op. at 607-608. The majority relies on State v. Cortez, 160 Tex. 532, 333 S.W.2d 839, 841 (1960), which states in pertinent part:
[Ajppeal de novo, as in case of an appeal from the justice court to the county court, sets aside and annuls the order of the court or body from which the appeal is taken — in the absence of some saving clause in the language of an act . ...
Cortez, 333 S.W.2d at 841 (emphasis added).
The majority does not mention Cortez’s important, limiting phrase, “in the absence of some saving clause in the ... act.” Notably, article 44.17 does not contain a “saving clause”; instead, the article requires appeals of Randall’s type to be tried de novo, “the same as if the prosecution had been originally commenced in that court.” Tex.Code Ceim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.17. This provision defies the majority’s leap that, by appealing his municipal court convictions, Randall was not starting over for all purposes, but only for purposes of the criminal consequences of his conviction. See majority op. at 607. When read in light of Cortez, I believe article 44.17 directs that Randall’s timely-perfected appeal resulted in the annulment of his municipal court convictions for all purposes, i.e., it is as if those convictions never occurred.
The Austin Court of Appeals has clearly noted the distinction that is missing from the majority’s opinion:
In an ordinary appeal, the appellate court either affirms or reverses the judgment of the trial court. In an appeal by trial de novo, the appellant is given an entirely new trial.
State v. Campbell, 820 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex.App.—Austin 1991, pet. ref'd). Once a defendant properly gives notice of appeal, a municipal court judgment, like the one in this case, is deprived of any finality. See id. at 45-46.
By contrast, when parties to a family law matter have a controversy heard by a court master, either party may “appeal” to the referring court. The code provides that such an appeal shall be heard de novo. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 201.001-.017 (Vernon 1996). However, this family law scheme includes a saving clause that specifically provides that the master’s recommendation shall remain in effect pending appeal. See id. § 201.013(a).
The majority argues that the Kutner v. Russell case supports its position that only the criminal effects of the prior conviction are annulled. See majority op. at 607.2 However, Kutner applied to a narrow set of facts. See Kutner v. Russell, 658 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (orig.proeeed-ing). The defendant was initially convicted in a municipal court for a Class C misdemeanor traffic violation. At the time of his conviction, he had the option of taking a driving safety course and deferring the proceedings against him pending his successful completion of the course. The defendant did not elect to take the class that would have deferred his prosecution and, potentially his conviction. Instead he proceeded to trial in municipal court, and after being convicted, appealed to the county court at law and tried to avail himself of the driving course — deferred adjudication option. When the county court refused this alternative, he petitioned for mandamus relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals refused to grant the mandamus, noting that the defendant had already foregone his other option and had chosen prosecution and, under the statute, had no basis for changing his mind. See id. In other words, he had already chosen prosecution over the safety course and deferred adjudication, and he could not, after choosing prosecution, switch to this pretrial option. To do other*613wise would interfere with the provision’s objective of giving defendants the right to choose a deferred prosecution route before going to trial. See id. Kutner, therefore, is limited by its holding to a pretrial choice made by a defendant that could have resulted in deferral; it does not apply to Randall’s situation.
The remaining cases cited by the majority to support its theory that a “conviction” in a municipal court is final for any noneriminal consequences relate to appeals from judgments that are not subject to de novo review. See majority op. at 607-608.
In the Cumbest case, a county officer was removed from office following his conviction in a circuit court for fraud. See Cumbest v. Commissioners of Election of Jackson County, 416 So.2d 683 (Miss.1982). The majority cites this case for the proposition that one convicted may be removed, even though later successful in an appeal to overturn the conviction. See majority op. at 609. However, as noted, this was a felony case, following indictment by a grand jury. The official’s removal from office followed his conviction and was part of his sentencing as required by Mississippi statute. See Cumbest, j.16 So.2d at 687. The official had the right to an appeal but not a right to a trial de novo, and Cumbest’s holding is limited to that scenario. See id. at 689.
Likewise, the Raphalides case provides little guidance, as the points on appeal in that case challenged the forfeiture of a municipal employment position after a municipal court conviction for larceny had been affirmed on appeal to the county court. See Raphalides v. New Jersey Dep’t of Civil Serv., 80 N.J.Super. 407, 410, 194 A.2d 1, 2-3 (App.Div.1963), cert. denied, 41 N.J. 597, 198 A.2d 444 (1964).
In the Guthrie case, the Supreme Court of Washington held that a county commissioner, who had been convicted by a jury of grand larceny and later obtained a reversal of his conviction by the supreme court, had no right to reinstatement to his former office. The court held, however, that the right to reinstatement was purely dependant upon statutory law. See Guthrie v. Chapman, 187 Wash. 327, 330, 60 P.2d 245, 246 (1936). The Washington statute in effect mandated that every office be vacated upon a conviction of an infamous crime, which the court held grand larceny was. Thus, the ouster took place pursuant to a mandatory statute under a conviction for grand larceny that was ap-pealable to the state’s supreme court, but not for a trial de novo. See id. at 329-30, 60 P.2d at 245-46.
Therefore, I believe the cases cited by the majority support only a finding that an ap-pealable conviction can be a “conviction” for purposes of removal under the Flower Mound Municipal Charter when the appeal does not result in a trial de novo. Thus, appellants have failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion or failed to apply the law to the facts appropriately. For these reasons, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of mandamus relief.
DAUPHINOT, J. joins.

. An appeal from a municipal court to a county court in Denton County is governed by chapters 25 and 26 of the Texas Government Code. See Tex Gov’t Code Ann. chs. 25, 26 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.1999). According to section 25.0634(c), a statutory county criminal court has no jurisdiction over Class C misdemeanor appeals. Id. § 25.0634(c) (Vernon Supp.1999). Also, section 25.0633 provides:
(b) The County Court at Law No. 1 of Denton County has exclusive jurisdiction in Denton County over Class C misdemeanor appeals from inferior courts in Denton County....
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(d) If the juvenile board designates the County Court at Law No. 1 of Denton County as the juvenile court of the county, the court shall give first preference to juvenile matters and second preference to criminal appeals from convictions in justice or municipal courts....
Id. § 25.0633(b),(d). Thus, County Court at Law No. 1 had jurisdiction of the appeal or trial de novo, not County Criminal Court No. 1 of Denton County. However, since we must assume that the record sufficiently supports evidence of perfection of the appeals, we should presume the municipal court convictions are still not final.

. Neither party nor the majority opinion addresses the impact, if any, of section 12.03(c) of the penal code on Randall's forfeiture. That section provides: “Conviction of a Class C misdemeanor does not impose any legal disability or disadvantage.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.03(c) (Vernon 1994).