Court Opinion

ID: 9648988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:40:02.290767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:06.900380
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, Justice,
with whom SCOL-NIK, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with Parts I and II of the court’s opinion but disagree with Part III that the trial justice’s use of the prima facie language in a limited context requires us to vacate the judgment.
At the close of the evidence, after final argument by the State and the defendant, the trial justice found the defendant guilty as to both charges, finding the testimony of the victim “coached to some degree” but “very credible.” The trial justice then used the prima facie language in discussing the child’s knowledge of sexual matters in explaining an already announced verdict. Although the term “prima facie” is incompatible with the State’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case, I am not persuaded that the trial justice’s comments suggest any misapplication of the standard of proof on his part. The prima facie remarks did not address the sufficiency of the State’s evidence with respect to the elements of the offenses charged, but rather were made in a limited context, the child victim’s knowledge of sexual acts. The trial justice’s language was imprecise and confusing, but I would not interpret his extemporaneous oral remarks too literally. See Moreland v. State, 154 Ga.App. 375, 268 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1980). We should presume the trial justice is familiar with the correct standard of proof to be applied, and a review of the record and his entire verdict announcement justifies such a presumption. Id. I am not convinced by the trial justice’s choice of words in a limited context that he failed to put the State to its appropriate proof.
I would affirm the judgment.