Court Opinion

ID: 7948661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 23:23:46.500683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:34:02.753325
License: Public Domain

Ostrander, J.
(after stating the facts). The question of fraudulent intent is made by the statute a question of fact, and not of law. Assuming that the commercial desirability or discount value of the notes given by complainants is not made to appear, and that there is no evidence of inadequacy of the price complainants agreed to pay for the lands, and dismissing these considerations as in any manner controlling decision, I am impressed, after a careful reading of the testimony, that it and the natural and necessary inferences which are to be drawn from it support the conclusion of the trial court. It may be truthfully said that the opinion delivered does not state some facts which counsel for complainants thinks qualify and make less bald and positive some of the findings. But it was for the court to draw inferences from the testimony, and I think he did not err in drawing the final and conclusive one that the transaction between complainants and Pen-dock was not bona fide.
As to complainants’ contention that they ought to be protected by the decree to the extent of the consideration they actually paid, it may be answered by saying that their deed conveys to them the Pendock title to lands not levied upon by defendants. It is only as to the defendant creditors that the conveyance is held to be bad. I find nothing in the record affording the information that complainants are not amply secured for the consideration actually paid by them.
The decree is affirmed.
Brooke, C. J., and Kuhn, Stone, Bird, Moore, and Steere, JJ., concurred.
The late Justice McAlvay took no part in this decision.