Court Opinion

ID: 9402938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 15:08:22.041616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.470292
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 15, 2023

                                   In The

                            Court of Appeals
                                  For The

                       First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                           NO. 01-17-00668-CR
                         ———————————
                      CHARLES LYNCH, Appellant
                                     V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 405th District Court
                        Galveston County, Texas
                    Trial Court Case No. 15-CR-3172

                MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND

     Charles Lynch was convicted for possession with intent to deliver between

4 and 200 grams of cocaine, for which he was sentenced to 45 years’
imprisonment.1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.102(3)(D), 481.112(a),

(d). On appeal, Lynch argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting

two extraneous offenses in the form of penitentiary packets and by admitting

testimony, which he alleges was hearsay, regarding who lived in the house where a

search warrant was executed. On original submission, this Court reversed the

judgment, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the extraneous offenses.

Lynch v. State, No. 01-17-00668-CR, 612 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2020), rev’d No. PD-1089-20, 2022 WL 3640526, at *1 (Tex. Crim.

App. Aug. 24, 2022). On petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal

Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the extraneous offenses. See Lynch v. State, 2022 WL 3640526, at *8–9

(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 24, 2022). The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the

appeal to this Court to consider Lynch’s remaining issue: whether the trial court

reversibly erred by admitting certain testimony. Id. at *9.

      We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the

testimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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      Authorities found 7.8 grams of a rock-like substance in Lynch’s home. At trial, a
      chemist testified that he tested 4.7 grams of the substance, concluding that it
      contained cocaine. The chemist did not test the remainder of the substance because
      the minimum quantity for a first-degree felony offense of possession with intent to
      deliver, 4 grams, had been established.
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                                   Background

      The case is before us on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals. The

factual and procedural backgrounds of the case are fully discussed in the prior

opinions of this Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Lynch, 2022 WL

3604526 at *1–4 (Court of Criminal Appeals); Lynch, 612 S.W.3d at 606–08 (court

of appeals). We do not repeat them here.

                                     Hearsay

      On remand, we consider whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony

from Sergeant Gandy regarding who lived in the house where a search warrant was

issued. Lynch argues that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The State argues

that the testimony was not hearsay, and if it was hearsay, it was admissible under

the rule of optional completeness. See TEX. R. EVID. 107. The State also argues that

even assuming the admission was erroneous, it is not reversible error.

A.    Relevant Testimony

      Sergeant Gandy was the State’s first witness. Among other topics, he

testified about the surveillance he conducted on Lynch’s house as a narcotics

officer and about the day he executed a search warrant at the residence. When the

search warrant was executed, Sergeant Gandy encountered four people in the

house: Lynch, Tina Moreno, Norma Myers, and Phillip Darden. Everyone was

interviewed separately. Sergeant Gandy testified that Lynch said that all four

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people lived in the house and had access to it. Later, on cross-examination by

Lynch’s attorney, Sergeant Gandy was asked how many of the four people said

that Lynch was the only person who lived in the house. Before Sergeant Gandy

could answer, the following transpired:

      Lynch’s attorney: I’ll make it easier for you. None of those people
                        said Mr. Lynch is the only person that lived there;
                        is that correct?

      Sergeant Gandy     Correct.

      Lynch’s attorney: Okay, every one of those people that lived, that
                        were in that home, said that Tina Moreno also
                        lived in that home?

      Sergeant Gandy:    Correct.

      Outside the presence of the jury, Lynch’s attorney requested to admit into

evidence videotaped interviews with each of the four people. Sergeant Gandy

watched all four videos during a break in his cross-examination. Lynch’s attorney

eventually offered only Moreno’s interview into evidence, and it was admitted

without objection.

      On redirect examination, the State asked Sergeant Gandy who Lynch said

lived in the house with him. Sergeant Gandy replied that Lynch said “everybody”

lived in the house and “everybody had access to everything.” The State next asked

Sergeant Gandy who Norma Myers said lived in the house. Lynch’s attorney

objected based on hearsay. The State responded that there had been a misstatement

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of the facts in evidence when Sergeant Gandy responded to Lynch’s attorney’s

cross-examination that “everyone” said that Moreno and Lynch lived in the house.

The State argued that each of the four people had a different answer when asked

who lived in the house. The court overruled Lynch’s hearsay objection, and

Sergeant Gandy testified that Norma Myers told him that Moreno and Lynch lived

in the house. Myers did not mention Phillip Darden.

      The State then asked Sergeant Gandy who Phillip Darden said lived in the

house. Lynch’s attorney objected again, and the objection was overruled. Sergeant

Gandy responded that Darden stated that Moreno, Myers, and Lynch lived in the

house. Finally, Sergeant Gandy testified without objection that Moreno stated that

she lived in the house with Lynch and had done so for a month. Sergeant Gandy

testified that each of the four individuals had a different story about who lived in

the house.

B.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A

trial court abuses its discretion if the decision falls outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Id. at 83. Before we may overrule a trial court’s evidentiary

decision, we must hold that the trial court’s ruling was “so clearly wrong as to lie

outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Id. (quoting

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Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). We will uphold the

trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to that

ruling. De la Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

C.    Analysis

      Lynch argues that statements to Sergeant Gandy by Myers and Darden

regarding who lived in the house were inadmissible hearsay. The State responds

that the testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and

therefore, is not hearsay. The State contends that the testimony was offered to

show that each of the four people had a different response to Sergeant Gandy when

asked who lived in the house. We agree.

      Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying

at trial, which is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID.

801(d). Thus, a statement not offered to prove the truth of the matter, but offered

for some other reason, is not hearsay. Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 152 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999) (testimony regarding name and phone number in address book

not hearsay because not offered to prove owner of phone number but offered as

circumstantial evidence of conspiracy involving defendant). “An extrajudicial

statement or writing which is offered for the purpose of showing what was said

rather than for the truth of the matter stated therein does not constitute hearsay.”

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Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (emphasis in

original).

      Statements by Myers and Darden to Sergeant Gandy regarding who lived in

the house were not offered to prove the identity of the actual occupants of the

house. The statements were offered to prove that each person, Lynch, Moreno,

Myers, and Darden, gave Sergeant Gandy a different answer when he asked who

lived in the house. The State did not assert that the statements were truthful, and

their relevance does not turn on their accuracy. See Humphrey v. State, No. 01-08-

00820-CR, 2012 WL 4739925, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2012,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding statements by officer

during interview were not hearsay because offered to prove what officers said

during interview to elicit responses from defendant). Thus, the extrajudicial

statements were offered for the purpose of showing what was said, rather than for

proving the truth of the matter, and they do not constitute hearsay. Dinkins, 894

S.W.2d at 347. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

overruling Lynch’s hearsay objections to the statements made by Myers and

Darden to Sergeant Gandy.

      Moreover, even assuming the statements were erroneously admitted hearsay,

the error does not require reversal. The erroneous admission of evidence is non-

constitutional error. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93

                                        7
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Non-constitutional error requires reversal only if it affects

the appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at

93. “A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d

266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)). We will not overturn a criminal conviction for non-constitutional error if,

after examining the record, we have fair assurance the error did not influence the

jury or influenced the jury only slightly. See Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93.

      An examination of the entire record demonstrates that the complained-of

testimony was unlikely to have influenced the jury’s verdict. The jury was required

to decide whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, Lynch intentionally and knowingly

possessed cocaine with intent to deliver it. The ultimate dispute was between

Lynch’s culpability and Moreno’s culpability. The complained-of statements from

Darden and Myers to Sergeant Gandy neither enhanced Lynch’s culpability nor

weakened Moreno’s culpability. Both Darden and Myers said that Lynch and

Moreno lived in the house. The State did not focus on which of the four people

should be believed over any other regarding who lived in the house. The focus at

trial was on the physical evidence at the scene and challenging Moreno’s

credibility, since she changed her story several times. Even assuming the

admission of the statements was erroneous, the error does not require reversal

                                         8
because it did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury’s

verdict. Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93.

      We overrule Lynch’s hearsay issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               Peter Kelly
                                               Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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