Court Opinion

ID: 9625378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:38:31.827575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:07.381847
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting.
The Department of Public Safety, after a hearing requested by appellant, revoked his driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol. An appeal was taken by him to the superior court, and the trial judge entered a judgment affirming the ruling of the agency. The appellant came here for review, and the court has today reversed the judgment of the trial court. I would *416affirm the trial court’s judgment and respectfully dissent.
The majority decision holds that the failure to advise the appellant of his right to have a test administered by a qualified person of his own choice in addition to the one. administered at the request of the arresting officer prohibits revocation of the appellant’s driver’s license, and, for this reason alone, the trial court’s judgment was erroneous.
In this case, a chemical test was not administered to the appellant by either the state or by a person of his own choosing. Therefore, because no test was administered in this case, the provisions of Code Ann. § 68A-902.1 are inapplicable. This statute merely says that where "such a chemical test is made” five enumerated paragraphs are applicable, one of them being in part: "The arresting officer at the time of arrest shall advise the person arrested of his right to a chemical test or tests according to this section.” Code Ann. § 68A-902.1(a)(4).
This case is quite different from Nelson v. State, 135 Ga. App. 212 (217 SE2d 450) (1975) in that there a chemical test was administered; that case was a criminal action; and the appellant there moved to suppress the test administered to him by the state because he had not been advised by them of his right to have his own independent test made to refute that test made by the state. I fully agree with the rationale of and the result reached in Nelson.
The instant case is not a criminal prosecution; no chemical test was administered to the appellant; and he had a statutory right pursuant to Code Ann. § 68B-306(c) to refuse the request of a law enforcement officer to submit to a chemical test.
The record in this case clearly shows that the appellant refused to submit to a chemical test; this record also shows that there was ample evidence, irrespective of what the appellant was advised or not advised by the arresting officer, to support the revocation action taken by the agency and affirmed by the superior court judge; and although I agree that the appellant here was fully justified in not submitting to a chemical test, I find no basis whatsoever in this record for reversing the trial court’s judgment in this civil action that merely affirmed *417the revocation for six months of appellant’s license to operate a vehicle in this state.
I would affirm the judgment.
I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hill joins in this dissent.