Court Opinion

ID: 9709254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:43:46.62337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.304193
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, J.,
concurring:
I agree with the result in this case on the ground that Mr. Perez has not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years. I disagree, however, with Chief Judge Bell’s opinion which is joined by two other members of the Court.
Article V, § 4, of the Constitution of Maryland sets forth the qualifications for a person to be eligible for the office of Attorney General of Maryland. Section 4 provides (emphasis added):
“Section 4. Qualifications of Attorney General.
No person shall be eligible to the office of Attorney General, who is not a citizen of this State, and a qualified voter therein, and has not resided and practiced Law in this State for at least ten years”
*213The dispute in this case is over the meaning of the final clause in § 4, containing the single professional requirement that, to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, a person must have “practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.”
Chief Judge Bell’s plurality opinion takes the position that the final clause in § 4 actually contains two professional requirements, namely that a person, to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, (1) must have for ten years been a member of the Maryland Bar and (2) must have for ten years engaged in professional activity in Maryland which is sufficient, in this Court’s view, to be deemed the “practice of law” in Maryland. The opinion states (opinion at 196-97, 919 A.2d at 1254) (emphasis added):
“Thus, we hold, a candidate for the office of the Attorney General must be both a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years and a practitioner of law in Maryland for ten years.”
See also opinion at 150-51, 919 A.2d at 1225-26. At other places, the plurality opinion says that a candidate for Attorney General must “have more qualification than simply a bar membership” and must be “experienced in its [the law’s] practice” (opinion at 194-95, 919 A.2d at 1253). The three judges constituting the plurality “do not agree” that, “if Perez had been a member of the Maryland Bar, rather than the New York bar for the past 17 years and possessed the same professional qualifications, he would be eligible to hold the office of Attorney General” (id. at 195, n. 47, 919 A.2d at 1253, n. 47). The plurality opinion states “that a candidate for the office of the Attorney General must be an experienced attorney” (id. at 197, n. 49, 919 A.2d at 1254, n. 49, emphasis added), and that a person, to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, must “be not merely steeped in the law, generally, but steeped in Maryland law, both as a member of its bar and as an active practitioner” (id. at 206-07, 919 A.2d at 1261). Chief Judge Bell concludes that, even if Mr. Perez had been a member of the Maryland Bar from 1989 to 1999, his work for the Department of Justice and the Senate Judi*214ciary Committee “does not qualify as practicing law in this State for that period, within the contemplation of Article V, § 4” (id. at 207-08, 919 A.2d at 1261).
I.
As previously indicated, I agree with the plurality that the final clause of Article V, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution means that, to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, a Maryland resident is required to have been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years. It is true that § 4 does not expressly require Maryland Bar membership; consequently, in my view, § 4 is to some extent ambiguous. Nevertheless, when § 4 is read in conjunction with the constitutional duties of the Attorney General prescribed in Article V, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution, admission to the Maryland Bar would seem to be required. The constitutional duties of the Attorney General, which have remained essentially unchanged since 1867, could only be performed by a member of the Maryland Bar.
Furthermore, except for an out-of-state attorney being given permission by the court to try or argue one specific case, the concept of an attorney legally practicing law in a state, without being a member of that state’s bar, was likely unknown in 1864 and 1867 when the language of Article V, § 4, was formulated and adopted. The statute authorizing a United States Department of Justice attorney to represent the United States in, inter alia, “the courts of any State,” was not enacted until 1870. See Act of June 22,1870, Ch. 150, 16 U.S. Statutes At Large 162, 163 (1870). Cases dealing with the concept of legally practicing law in certain fields, in a state where the attorney was not a member of the bar, came much later. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963); Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bridges, 360 Md. 489, 508-511, 759 A.2d 233, 243-245 (2000); Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n, 316 Md. 646, 661-668, 561 A.2d 200, 208-211 (1989), and cases there cited.
Consequently, the final clause of Article V, § 4, should be read as if it said “and [admitted to] practice [ ] Law in this State for at least ten years.” Since Mr. Perez has not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years, he does not at this time meet the professional eligibility requirement set forth in *215the final clause of Article V, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution.1 In nay view, this is the only proper basis for this Court’s prior order that Mr. Perez does not meet the eligibility requirements specified in Article V, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution.
II.
Preliminarily, it is puzzling why the three-judge plurality ventures beyond the holding that Mr. Perez fails to meet the eligibility requirements of Article V, § 4, on the ground that he has not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years.
“This ‘Court’s established policy is to decide constitutional issues only when necessary.’ ” Insurance Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 614, 664 A.2d 862, 871 (1995), quoting Mercy Hospital v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 565, 510 A.2d 562, 566 (1986). See also Christopher v. Department of Health, 381 Md. 188, 217, 849 A.2d 46, 63 (2004); Murrell v. Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 191 n. 8, 829 A.2d 548, 560 n. 8 (2003); Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1134 (2000), and cases there cited.
The Court’s unanimous decision that Mr. Perez is ineligible to be a candidate for Attorney General, on the ground that he has not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years, is *216dispositive of this case. There is no reason for the Court to go beyond that holding and rule on a perceived additional constitutional requirement under the final clause of Article V, § 4.
The plurality opinion, however, goes beyond the dispositive issue of Maryland Bar membership and states that Mr. Perez, even if he had been a ten-year member of the Maryland Bar, would still be ineligible under Article V, § 4, because his professional activity did not constitute “practicing law in this State” for ten years, (opinion at 207-08, 919 A.2d at 1261). The plurality’s justification for unnecessarily deciding this latter constitutional issue is that “[w]e have interpreted Article V, § 4, nothing more” and that the bar membership issue is “but one prong of the interpretation of a single phrase, “practiced Law in this State.’ ” (Opinion at 208-12, n. 54, 919 A.2d at 1261-64, n. 54). Under the circumstances here, this is not a valid justification for deciding the second constitutional issue.
Many state and federal constitutional requirements are set forth as single phrases. For example, the constitutional phrases “due process of law” or “equal protection of the laws” or “twice put in jeopardy” are each single phrases. Nevertheless, if a court interprets and applies one of these phrases to decide that particular action violates the constitutional provision in one respect, and if that decision is dispositive of the case before the court, it is not necessary for the court to further interpret the single phrase and decide whether the action violates the same phrase in some other respect. Exploring all aspects of a constitutional phrase may be appropriate for a treatise or law review article. It does not, however, reflect the type of judicial restraint which should characterize appellate opinions.
Not only does Chief Judge Bell’s opinion reach a constitutional issue unnecessarily, but it rules upon an issue that was not presented to the Court. The appellant-petitioner, Steven N. Abrams, presented the following two questions to the Court:
*217“QUESTIONS PRESENTED
“I. Does the Constitution of Maryland require that a candidate for Attorney General be admitted to practice law before all of the courts of the State courts of Maryland for at least ten years prior to his or her commencing their term as Attorney General?
“II. Does the State Board of Elections have any duty to inquire into the representations made by a candidate for any office in Maryland when the candidate certifies under oath to the State Board of Elections that he or she meets the Maryland Constitutional requirements?”
Mr. Abrams’s sole constitutional argument was that Mr. Perez was ineligible to be Attorney General because he had not been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years. Mr. Abrams stated in his brief (emphasis added):
“In short, because the phrase ‘practiced Law in this State’ has a well-understood, common, and ordinary meaning that necessarily implies admission to practice law in Maryland, that meaning should be adopted, and there should be no need for further analysis.”
During oral argument before this Court, the following colloquy occurred:
“Judge Cathell: If a person passes the Maryland Bar and is admitted to the Maryland Bar by this Court, has a job right out of law school with a federal judge in the District of Columbia, goes directly to the District of Columbia and works for that federal judge. Then, gets a job directly from there with some federal agency in the District of Columbia and has never, twenty years later, actually practiced law in the geographical confines of Maryland, but he has been a member of the Maryland Bar.
“Mr. Abrams: And maintained his membership over that ten year period.
“Judge Cathell: Granted.
“Mr. Abrams: Right.
*218“Judge Cathell: Is he practicing law in Maryland?
“Mr. Abrams: I would argue, your Honor, that he is both practicing law, and he meets the requirement of initiating the practice of law in Maryland and continuously practicing law under that requirement for that ten year period----”
There was no contention before this Court that Article V, § 4, embodied two distinct professional requirements. The only constitutional issue raised and argued in this Court was whether Article V, § 4, required membership in the Maryland Bar for ten years. Under the circumstances of this case, the judges of this Court should not reach any other constitutional issue. See Maryland Rules 8-131 and 8-504; Simmons v. State, 392 Md. 279, 292-293 n. 1, 896 A.2d 1023, 1031, n. 1 (2006); Sweeney v. Savings First Mortgage, 388 Md. 319, 325 n. 8, 879 A.2d 1037, 1040 n. 8 (2005); Oak Crest v. Murphy, 379 Md. 229, 241, 841 A.2d 816, 823 (2004); Moosavi v. State, 355 Md. 651, 660, 736 A.2d 285, 290 (1999); Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588, 595-596, 399 A.2d 578, 582-583 (1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1419, 67 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981).
III.
Although I do not agree with three judges reaching a constitutional issue unnecessarily, and particularly one which was not raised on appeal, I shall comment on that issue “only because the [plurality] of the Court has decided to do so.” Montgomery County v. McNeece, 311 Md. 194, 213, 533 A.2d 671, 680 (1987) (concurring opinion). I strongly disagree with Chief Judge Bell’s second constitutional ruling that, in addition to membership in the Maryland Bar for ten years, a ten-year resident of Maryland, to be eligible for the office of Attorney General, must also have engaged in such professional activity that, in the judgment of the judiciary, renders the person “a practitioner of law in Maryland for ten years” or an “active practitioner” who is “steeped in Maryland law.” (opinion at 197, 206-07, 919 A.2d at 1254, 1260).
This position, adopted by three members of the Court, is neither supported by the language of Article V, § 4, nor *219supported by the constitutional history of that provision. The position also violates the principle that provisions should not be interpreted in a manner leading to unreasonable results. Numerous long-time Maryland lawyers could be disqualified from being Attorney General if the views of the three judges were to prevail in the future. Another result of the plurality opinion would be that this Court, every four years, might have to evaluate the nature or quality of the legal work performed in Maryland over a ten-year period, by each candidate for Attorney General, to determine whether such work meets the standard of actively practicing Maryland law in this State. Moreover, as Judges Harrell and Greene intimate in their concurring opinion, the plurality’s requirements concerning the nature or quality of the law practice by a ten-year member of the Maryland Bar, in order for that member to be a candidate for Attorney General, would be difficult, if not impossible, for the State Board of Elections to administer. Finally, the plurality’s interpretation of the state constitutional provision might raise questions as to its validity under the federal constitution.
(a)
Article V, § 4, setting forth the single professional requirement that the Attorney General must have “practiced law in this State for at least ten years,” contains no language furnishing any basis for a court to review and evaluate the ten-year professional “experience” of a Maryland Bar member seeking to become Attorney General, or reject a candidate for the office of Attorney General on the grounds that he was not sufficiently “active” as a “practitioner” or not sufficiently “steeped in Maryland law.” A member of the Maryland Bar representing the United States Government is “practicing law.”2
*220The plurality opinion, at one place, correctly acknowledges that the phrase “ ‘practice of law* ” encompasses “a variety of activities” (opinion at 180-81, 919 A.2d at 1244). The opinion goes on to discuss several of this Court’s opinions holding that the meaning of the phrase varies depending upon the context. (Id. at 180-86, 919 A.2d at 1244-48). Then, somewhat inconsistently, the plurality opinion states that the meaning of the phrase “ ‘practice law in this State’ has remained consistent” and that the phrase “is clear and unambiguous.” (Id. at 186, 188 n. 42, 919 A.2d at 1247-48, 1248 n. 42). Later, the opinion adopts a narrow definition of the phrase, taking the position that Mr. Perez would not have been practicing law in this State even if he had been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years (opinion at 208, 919 A.2d at 1261), and that only a lawyer who is “steeped in Maryland law” as an “active practitioner” (id. at 210-11, 919 A.2d at 1263) is eligible to be Attorney General.
This Court’s prior opinions have consistently taken the position that there are many different definitions of the phrase “practice of law,” depending upon the context and the circumstances. See In re Application of Mark W., 303 Md. 1, 7-18, 491 A.2d 576, 579-584 (1985) (“Numerous definitions of what constitutes practice of law are to be found.” * * * “These definitions have arisen in a variety of circumstances.” * * * “ ‘[Attempts to define the practice of law have not been particularly successful’ ”), and cases there cited. The predominant professional activities of many lawyers, such as legal research, teaching law, etc., are regarded as the “practice of law,” although such activities would not constitute the “unauthorized practice of law” if done by non-lawyers. As indicated previously, the plurality’s limited definition of the phrase might render a large number of Maryland lawyers ineligible to be Attorney General. Moreover, despite the plurality’s disclaimer, the opinion’s emphasis on being “steeped in Maryland law” is not consistent with the nature of many modem law practices, which in several respects is nation-wide or worldwide.
As earlier discussed, the final clause of Article V, § 4, when considered in light of Article V, § 3, reasonably means that a candidate for the office of Attorney General must be admitted *221to “practice[ ] Law in this State for a least ten years.” Except for the ten-year period, this interpretation makes the professional qualification for Attorney General the same as the professional qualifications for judges3 and State’s Attorneys.4 Nothing in the language of Article V, § 4, requires a professional qualification over and above membership in the Maryland Bar for ten years.3
In fact, the language of the Maryland Constitution furnishes a stronger basis for this Court to review the professional activity of candidates for judicial office than it does for the Court to review the professional activity of candidates for Attorney General. Article IV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, unlike Article V, § 4, contains more than one professional qualification for judges. Article IV, § 2, requires that district, circuit, and appellate judges “be selected from those [1] who have been admitted to practice law in this State, and [2] who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom and sound legal *222knowledge.” No one has ever suggested that this Court is authorized to review the careers of judicial candidates to determine if they meet the qualitative standards contained in the last clause of Article IV, § 2. Instead, it is for the Governor and/or the voters to decide upon such qualifications. Similarly, if a ten-year Maryland resident, seeking the office of Attorney General, has for ten years been a member in good standing of the Maryland Bar, it should be for the voters to decide whether the candidate’s professional activity is sufficient for him or her to be elected to the office of Attorney General.
The words “practiced law,” or the more frequently used phrase “learned in the law,” found in state constitutions, have regularly been construed to mean simply admission to the bar of the particular state involved. To the extent that such constitutional phrases have been viewed as providing for a higher level or quality of legal experience, courts have held that the matter is for the voters and/or appointing authorities and not a subject for judicial review. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 279 Ala. 38, 40-42, 181 So.2d 105, 108-109 (1965) (“The phrase ‘learned in the law5 as used by the framers of the Constitution” did “ ‘not contemplate[ ] that ... qualifications of a candidate ... should be determined by a referee or jury in a contested election case,’ ” but means “lawyers admitted to practice in Alabama”); Heathscott v. Raff, 334 Ark. 249, 257, 973 S.W.2d 799, 803 (1998) (“Based on the American and English use of the phrase, ... we hold that the constitutional qualification phrase ‘learned in the law5 means an attorney licensed to practice law in the state”);6 Littlejohn v. Cleland, 251 Ga. 597, 598, 308 S.E.2d 186, 187 (1983) (Constitutional phrase “ ‘shall ... have practiced law for seven years’ ” means that “a person cannot qualify ... unless he or she is a member of the State Bar”); Whitmer v. Thurman, 241 Ga. 569, 570-571, 247 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1978) (Constitutional eligibility re*223quirement that district attorney “ ‘shall have practiced law for three years’ ” means a person must have “been licensed to practice before our superior courts”); Wallace v. Wallace, 225 Ga. 102, 166 S.E.2d 718 (1969) (same); In re Candidacy of Daly, 294 Minn. 351, 357, 362, 200 N.W.2d 913, 917, 920, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041, 93 S.Ct. 528, 34 L.Ed.2d 491 (1972) (“To be learned in the law means that the person must have been” admitted to the bar and must not be suspended or disbarred); In re Scarrella, 300 Minn. 500, 221 N.W.2d 562 (1974) (same); State ex rel. Jack v. Schmahl, 125 Minn. 533, 147 N.W. 425 (1914) (same); Pearce v. Meier, 221 N.W.2d 94, 98 (N.D.1974) (“Our view is that the phrase ‘learned in the law’ is synonymous with and means ‘admitted to the bar’ or ‘admitted to practice’ by the Supreme Court of our State”); Freiler v. Schuylkill County, 46 Pa.Super. 58 (1910) (same); Jamieson v. Wiggin, 12 S.D. 16, 80 N.W. 137 (1899) (same).
The type of qualitative judicial review, under Chief Judge Bell’s opinion, of a candidate’s professional experience to determine his or her eligibility for constitutional office, is unprecedented as a matter of Maryland law. It is contrary to the cases in other jurisdictions. As long as a candidate for Attorney General has been a member of the Maryland Bar, in good standing, for ten years, the judiciary should not further review the candidate’s professional activity. Such review is a matter for the voters.
(b)
The constitutional history relied on in the plurality opinion does not support its conclusion that the final clause of Article V, § 4, contains two distinct professional qualifications, both of which are judicially reviewable. Although I agree that the constitutional history supports the holding that a candidate for Attorney General must have been a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years, the history actually refutes the plurality’s position that there is an additional professional qualification, pursuant to which this Court may evaluate the professional activity of an Attorney General candidate, who is a ten-year member of the Maryland Bar, to determine whether the *224candidate is sufficiently “experienced” and is an “active practitioner” who is “steeped in Maryland law.”
Chief Judge Bell points out that an earlier proposed version of Article V, § 4, contained two expressed professional requirements, namely that the Attorney General have “been admitted to practice law in the State” and that the Attorney General had “practiced law” for a certain number or years. (Opinion at 190, 919 A.2d at 1250). The plurality opinion then observes that the two professional eligibility requirements “were merged into a single requirement” {ibid.). The opinion goes on to say that it “interprets the framers’ actions as an attempt to avoid being repetitive” {id. at 191-92, 919 A.2d at 1251).
I fully agree with the plurality that the bar admission requirement and the practice of law requirement were viewed as meaning the same thing and were merged into a single requirement to avoid repetition. Later in the opinion, however, Chief Judge Bell takes the position that there are two separate professional eligibility requirements and that the final clause of Article V, § 4, means that “the Attorney General must be both a member of the Maryland Bar for ten years and practitioner of law in Maryland for ten years.” {Id. at 196-97, 919 A.2d at 1254). This later position taken by the plurality is flatly inconsistent with its earlier position based on the- legislative history. In my view, the sparse legislative history of the provision indicates that there is a single professional eligibility requirement in Article V, § 4, which is membership in the Maryland Bar for ten years.
The plurality also relies upon the debates at the 1864 Constitutional Convention regarding the salary of the Attorney General and the ten-year bar membership. Thus Delegates Negley and Bond stated {The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1861 at 1460):
. “Mr. Negley. I am as much in favor of keeping down salaries as anybody. But you better strike out this provision altogether than to put in an inadequate salary. Because if you put in an insufficient salary, you cannot get the services of a man whose services will be worth anything. *225And rather than have a second or third rate man in the office, you better strike out the provision entirely.
“Three thousand dollars a year is little enough for such an officer. They are the younger members of the bar who are elected State’s attorneys, and they will be continually calling upon the attorney general for his opinion, and perhaps require his personal assistance at the trial. He is to be besides the legal adviser of the governor, comptroller, treasurer, and even of the legislature; he will have his hands full. Three thousand dollars a year is not too large. Let us have salary enough to secure a good officer, or let us have none at all.
“Mr. Bond. In my judgment, a salary of three thousand dollars a year is little enough for a good lawyer. The attorney general, by this report, is forbidden to receive any other fee or compensation whatever, except his salary. As has been well remarked by the gentleman from Washington county (Mr. Negley,) you better strike out this provision entirely, than not get a good man in this office; and you cannot get a good one, unless you give him a good compensation.”
Delegate Stirling commented (id. at 1460-1461):
“Mr. Stirling. I think the views of my friend from Washington (Mr. Mayhugh) are correct so far as the general principle is concerned. I have myself on several occasions voted here not to put these salaries too high. I have no objection to putting the salary of the attorney general at $2,500, though I think that is full low. But I suggested that sum, because I know there is an indisposition to pay large salaries.
“Now you must have for attorney general a man who is accustomed to trying cases, or he will not be fit for the office. And any man who has a good practice trying cases makes a considerable sum of money every year by trying cases against the State. But if such a man accepts this *226office, he must give up entirely that portion of his practice. Taking all these things into consideration, I believe a competent attorney general at three thousand dollars a year will be a saving to the State at least a thousand dollars a year.”
Later, with regard to the ten-year requirement, Delegate Smith emphasized the importance of the position and the type of lawyer who should be Attorney General.
It is important to keep in mind what these debates related to and what they did not. The debates concerned the salary needed to attract good and experienced lawyers and concerned the ten-year bar admission requirement. The delegates were not suggesting that a ten-year member of the Maryland Bar must have a certain type or quality of experience in order to be eligible to seek the office of Attorney General. On the contrary, they were afraid that, if the salary were too low, the highest quality Maryland lawyers would not be candidates for the office and that lesser quality attorneys would be candidates and would be elected Attorney General.
The need to attract higher quality candidates by setting a high salary is inconsistent with the notion that a court could declare ineligible ten-year members of the Maryland Bar based upon the court’s evaluation of their professional experience. Instead of prescribing qualitative experience requirements which might be judicially reviewable, the framers of Article V, § 4, sought to attract high quality applicants for the office of Attorney General by setting what was then considered a high salary and by a ten-year Maryland bar membership requirement.
Consequently, the constitutional history discussed in the plurality opinion undermines the opinion’s conclusion that a court can review the quality or nature of the professional activity of a ten-year Maryland Bar member.
(c)
This Court, time after time, has emphasized that, in interpreting enactments and other legal provisions, we “give them their ‘most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and *227common sense,’ ” and that we “avoid constructions that are ‘illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense.’ ” Johnson v. Nationwide, 388 Md. 82, 89, 878 A.2d 615, 619 (2005), quoting Greco v. State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997), and Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). The Court refrains from a construction of enactments that leads to “consequences [that] would be quite strange.” Ponte v. Investors’ Alert, 382 Md. 689, 717, 857 A.2d 1, 18 (2004). See also, e.g., Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 663, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 (2006); Twine v. State, 395 Md. 539, 550, 910 A.2d 1132, 1138 (2006); Oakland v. Mountain Lake, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Administration, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005). This principle is violated by the plurality’s interpretation of Article V, § 4, requiring something more than ten-year Maryland residency and ten-year membership in the Maryland Bar for one to be Attorney General.
The plurality opinion could result in the exclusion of numerous Maryland lawyers who have been, for ten years or more, Maryland residents and members of the Maryland Bar. For example, it would apparently render ineligible for Attorney General ten-year Maryland residents and Maryland lawyers who, for part of the ten-year period, were employed by federal government agencies in the District of Columbia or law firms in the District of Columbia or in nearby states.7
*228The plurality opinion, if ever adopted by the majority of this Court, could also lead to an unprecedented and totally unreasonable non-judicial function to be performed by this Court every four years. To reiterate, the opinion takes the position that, even if Mr. Perez “had been a member of the Maryland Bar, rather than the New York [B]ar for the past 17 years and possessed the same qualifications,” his practice would “not qualify as practicing law in this State for [ten years], within the contemplation of Article V, § 4.” (Opinion at 195, n. 47, 208-09, 919 A.2d at 1253, n. 47, 1261-62). This conclusion is based on the plurality’s evaluation of the nature of Mr. Perez’s professional activity, upon discounting Mr. Perez’s law practice in Maryland as an attorney for the United States Department of Justice, and upon the view that “appearance in Maryland state courts ‘to attend to the interests of the United States’ ” is not the “practice [of] law in this State for purposes of Article V, § 4.” (Id. at 199-200, 919 A.2d at 1256). .
The type of professional evaluation indulged in by the plurality could well set a precedent for future elections for Attorney General. Every four years, long-time members of the Maryland Bar, filing certificates of candidacy for the office of Attorney General, could be challenged in court on the theory that their ten years or more professional activity in Maryland was qualitatively insufficient for them to be eligible Attorney General candidates. In light of the nature of such cases, they will always find their way to this Court. I cannot believe that the framers of Article IV or Article V, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution ever contemplated that the courts should be involved in this type of politically-charged evaluation activity. This is for the electorate; it is not the appropriate business of the judiciary.
(d)
It is a settled “ ‘principle that a court will, whenever reasonably possible, construe and apply [an enactment] to avoid casting serious doubt upon its constitutionality.’ ” Burch v. United Cable Television, 391 Md. 687, 703, 895 A.2d 980, 989 (2006), quoting Yangming Marine Transport v. Revon Products U.S.A., Inc., 311 Md. 496, 509, 536 A.2d 633, 640 *229(1988) . “[T]his Court will prefer an interpretation that allows us to avoid reaching a constitutional question.” Nationsbank v. Stine, 379 Md. 76, 86, 839 A.2d 727, 733 (2003). As Chief Judge Murphy for the Court stated in Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 149, 172, 638 A.2d 93, 104-105 (1994), “[i]f a [provision] is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which would involve a decision as to its constitutionality, the preferred construction is that which avoids the determination of constitutionality.” See also, e.g., Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 121, 872 A.2d 1, 10 (2005); Ponte v. Investors’ Alert, supra, 382 Md. at 718, 857 A.2d at 18; Edwards v. Corbin, 379 Md. 278, 293-294, 841 A.2d 845, 854 (2004); Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 594-595, 770 A.2d 111, 128 (2001).
It is also a well-established principle of constitutional law that “[a] state regulation is invalid ... if it ... discriminates against the Federal Government or those with whom it deals.” North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 435, 110 S.Ct. 1986, 1995, 109 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990), and cases there cited. See also, e.g., Harper v. Virginia, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 817, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 1509, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989) (state enactment “favoring retired state and local government employees over retired federal employees” held unconstitutional).
Under the plurality opinion, a Maryland attorney employed by the Maryland Attorney General’s office, a Maryland State’s Attorney’s office, a Maryland county attorney’s office, or another Maryland government agency, would be practicing law in Maryland for purposes of eligibility under Article V, § 4. On the other hand, a Maryland attorney employed by the United States Department of Justice or other federal agency located in the Nation’s Capital, and working in Maryland as well as elsewhere, would not be practicing law in Maryland under the plurality opinion.
The discrimination between state government employment and federal government employment, under the plurality’s *230interpretation of Article V, § 4, and would present a serious issue as to the constitutionality of Article V, § 4, under the United States Constitution. Under settled principles, an interpretation of Article V, § 4, which avoids this federal constitutional issue would be preferred.
Judge Raker joins this opinion, and Judges Harrell and Greene join Parts I and II of this opinion.
Concurring Opinion by WILNER, J.

. During the oral argument before this Court in the present case, counsel for the appellee Perez was asked by the Court whether Mr. Perez had challenged in the trial court, or was challenging in this Court, the validity under the United States Constitution of the final clause in Article V, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution, providing that the Attorney General must have “resided and practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.” Counsel’s attention was specifically directed to the federal constitutional equal protection principles applied in Board v. Goodsell, 284 Md. 279, 286-293, 396 A.2d 1033, 1036-1040 (1979), and the Supreme Court opinions and other opinions discussed in Goodsell. See also Green Party v. Board of Elections, 377 Md. 127, 162-163, 832 A.2d 214, 234-235 (2003).
Counsel for Mr. Perez responded by stating that Mr. Perez had not challenged in the trial court, and was not challenging in this Court, the validity of Article V, § 4, under the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, no issue regarding the federal constitutional validity of Article V, § 4, is directly presented in this case.

. It should be noted that Article 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights mandates that federal law "shall be the Supreme Law of the State. Consequently, "federal law” is "Maryland law.” See R.A. Ponte Architects, Ltd. v. Investors’ Alert, 382 Md. 689, 698-701, 857 A.2d 1, 6-8 (2004), and cases there cited.

. Article IV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution provides as follows:
"Section 2. Qualifications of judges.
"The Judges of all of the said Courts shall be citizens of the State of Maryland, and qualified voters under this Constitution, and shall have resided therein not less than five years, and not less than six months next preceding their election, or appointment, as the case may be, in the city, county, district, judicial circuit, intermediate appellate judicial circuit or appellate judicial circuit for which they may be, respectively, elected or appointed. They shall be not less than thirty years of age at the time of their election or appointment, and shall he selected from those who have been admitted to practice law in this State, and who are most distinguished for integrity, wisdom and sound legal knowledge." (Emphasis added).

. Article V, § 10, of the Maryland Constitution states:
"Section 10. Qualifications of State’s Attorneys.
"No person shall be eligible to the office of State’s Attorney, who has not been admitted to practice Law in this State, and who has not resided, for at least two years, in the county, or city, in which he may be elected.”

. Article V, § 4, contains two ten-year requirements, namely residence in Maryland for ten years and membership in the Maryland Bar for ten years. The plurality would impose a third ten-year requirement, i.e., activity for ten years which meets the three judges’ concept of practicing law.

. As the Supreme Court of Arkansas discussed in the Heathscott case, 334 Ark. at 253, 973 S.W.2d at 802, similar language appeared in the Magna Carta of 1215, and the specific phrase "learned in the law” was used in a 1344 English statute.

. Another group of ten-year Maryland Bar members who might be ineligible to be Attorney General under the plurality opinion consists of appellate, circuit, and district judges who did not practice law in Maryland, in accordance with the plurality’s standards, for ten years prior to becoming judges. Although the Chief Judge’s opinion says that "[i]t is not inconceivable that judicial service might well be included” in its definition of "practice of law” (opinion at 208-09, n. 54, 919 A.2d at 1261-62, n. 54), it is clear that judges are by law prohibited from practicing law. Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.VoL), § l-203(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, provides in pertinent part as follows:
"[N]o judge may during his term of office practice law, maintain an office for the practice of law, or have any interest in an office for the practice of law, whether conducted in whole or in part by himself or by others. * * * ”