Court Opinion

ID: 9743546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:36:10.921135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.910552
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I join with Justice DeBruler in his dissent. It is my conviction that the majority opinion in Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U. S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 represents an unwarranted retrogression from the principles set forth in Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 and that the dissent thereto by Associate Justice Brennan correctly determines the major issue, which is not whether or not the evidence will or will not *691be admitted in a given case but rather whether or not the state will be bound by its own laws. I agree that the exclusionary rule has resulted in the escape from the penalty of the law by numerous criminals which has, to a great extent, contributed to a lessening of public confidence in our judicial system.
Recognizing that imperfection exists in all systems, however, the public concern should be with the selection of the system best adapted to its needs and capabilities and not merely with the results in specific instances, wherein the system may not have functioned to our liking. Departures from the system, whatever they may be, to accomplish what then appears to be a justifiable end must inevitably lead to a complete breakdown of that system and leave the administration of justice to the whim of those who happen to be in a position of authority at the moment. We have selected our adversary system of criminal jurisprudence, not because it is perfect but because the majority thus far consider it to be the best available. Recognizing certain inherent imperfections in it, we have adopted certain constitutional safeguards to protect the individual against their natural consequences. It is unavoidable that such safeguards shelter the guilty as well as the innocent. The exclusionary rule has become notorious in recent years for the abuses to which it has contributed. Yet, the rule was conceived to avert even greater abuses that appear to be otherwise uncontrollable. The remedy to the inequities that have occurred under the Miranda rule lie not in the erosion and ultimate abolition of the rule but rather in its strict application. The alternative to the exclusion of probative but inadmissible evidence is to render it admissible, not by drawing distinctions where valid differences are non-existent but by zealous avoidance by the state of the primary error of failure to properly protect and advise those in its custody. Certainly the inconvenience of giving such warnings is dwarfed into oblivion when compared even to a mere possibility that an innocent person may otherwise be erroneously convicted. I *692agree with Justice DeBruler that the Miranda rule is now ingrained in our police procedures. I believe it has served our adversary system well, notwithstanding imperfect results. I see no need to abandon it or curtail it, and I believe that the holding in Harris v. New York, supra, will, at best, lead to confusion and very likely, in many instances, to the very abuses that compelled the adoption of the Miranda rule in the beginning.
Note. — Reported in 284 N. E. 2d 517.