Court Opinion

ID: 9418520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:29:19.931061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:04.765711
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brandéis,
dissenting.
A concern, doing a general upholstering business in New York, directs one of its regular employees, resident there, to make repairs on a vessel lying alongside a New York dock. The ship, then temporarily out of commission, is owned and enrolled in New York, and when used is em*229ployed only within the State. While on the vessel engaged in making the repairs, the employee is injured without the fault of anyone and is disabled for life. A statute of New York provides that, in such a case, he and his dependents shall receive compensation out of funds which employers are obliged to provide. To such state legislation Congress has, in express terms, given its sanction. Under the rule announced by the Court, the Federal Constitution prohibits recovery.1 If, perchance, the accident had occurred while the employee so engaged was on the dock, the Constitution would permit recovery.2 Or, if happily he had been killed and the accident had been due to the employer’s negligence, recovery (which is provided for by another state statute) would likewise be permitted under the Constitution, eveii though the accident had occurred on board the vessel.3
The Constitution contains, of course, no provision which, in terms, deals, in any way, with the subject of workmen’s compensation. The prohibition found by the Court rests solely upon a clause in § 2 of Article III: *230“ The judicial power [of the United States] shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 4 The conclusion that the state law violates the Constitution and that the consent of Congress cannot save it, is reached solely by a process of deduction. The chain of reasoning involved is a long one. The argument is that the grant of judicial power to the United States confers upon Congress, by implication, legislative power over the substantive maritime law; that this legislative power in Congress (while not necessarily exclusive) precludes state legislation which “works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations; ” that there is a rule of the general maritime law by. which an employer is not liable, except in case of negligence, for an occupational injury occurring on board a vessel; that the rule applies whenever the vessel on which the injury occurs is afloat on navigable water, even if the vessel, made fast to a dock, is out of commission; that the rule applies to occupations which, like upholstering, are not in their nature inherently maritime; that the rule governs the relations not only of the ship and its owners to their •employees, but also the relations of independent contractors to their employees who customarily work on land; that this rule is a characteristic feature of the general maritime law; that for a State to change the rule, even as applied to independent contractors doing work on craft moored to a dock, temporarily disabled, and normally employed wholly within the State, interferes with the *231proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law in its international and interstate relations; and that, hence, a statute of a State which provides that employers within it shall be liable to employees within it for occupational accidents occurring within it violates the Federal Constitution, notwithstanding the state statute is expressly sanctioned by Congress.
Such is the chain of reasoning. Every link of the chain is essential to the conclusion stated. If any link fails, the argument falls. Several of the links are, in my opinion, unfounded assumption which crumbles at the touch of reason. How can a law of New York, making a New York employer liable to a New York employee for every occupational injury occurring within the State, mar the proper harmony and uniformity of the assumed general maritime law in its interstate and international, relations, when neither a ship, nor a ship owner, is the employer affected, even though the accident occurs on board a vessel on navigable waters? The relation of the independent contractor to his employee is a matter wholly of state concern. The employer’s obligation to pay and the employee’s right to receive compensation are not dependent upon any act or omission of the ship or of its owners. To impose upon such employer the obligation to make compensation in case of an occupational injury in no way affects the operation of the ship. Nor can it affect the ship owners in any respect, except as every other tax, direct or indirect, laid by a State or municipality may affect, by increasing the cost of living and of doing business, every one who has occasion to enter it and many who have not.5 This is true of the application of the workmen’s compensation law, whether the service rendered by the independent contractor is in its nature non-*232maritime, like upholstering, or is inherently maritime, like stevedoring. The requirement by the State is a regulation of the business of upholstering or stevedoring. It is not a regulation of shipping. It in no respect attempts to modify, or deal with, admiralty jurisdiction or procedure, or the substantive maritime law. It is but an exercise of the local police power.6 To impose upon the independent employer the obligation to provide compensation for accidents occurring on a vessel in port, while the vessel is made fast to the dock, in fact, cannot conceivably interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of the general maritime law in its international or interstate relations.
Moreover, it is not a characteristic feature of the general maritime law that the employer, in case of accident, is liable to an employee only for negligence. The characteristic feature is the very contrary. To one of the crew, the vessel and her owners are liable, even in the absence of negligence, for maintenance, care and wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued. To him, they are liable, also, even in the absence of negligence, for indemnity or damages, if the injury results from unseaworthiness of the ship, or from failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances.7 The legal rights,-in case of accident to persons other than members of the crew, were not determined by the maritime law until recently. The admiralty court, instead of extending to these persons this characteristic feature, borrowed the rule of negligence from the common law courts, making modifications conformable to its views of justice.8
*233The mere fact that the accident is an incident of a maritime contract, and the service performed thereunder is inherently maritime, does not preclude the application of the workmen’s compensation law. The stevedore can recover under the workmen’s compensation law, if the injury happens to occur on land, although the contract of the stevedoring concern is confessedly a maritime one; and the stevedore is employed in a maritime service quite as much while he is on the dock as after he crosses the gangplank and enters the ship.9 Underlying the whole chain of reasoning, by which the conclusion is reached that the state and federal statutes are unconstitutional, will be found the legally indefensible assumption that the liability under the workmen’s compensation law is governed by the law of the locality in which the accident happened; that is, by the rule that in tort the test of admiralty jurisdiction is presence on navigable waters. There is no more reason why the mere fact that the injury occurs on navigable waters should make applicable the maritime law to liabilities arising under the workmen’s compensation law, than that it should make the maritime law applicable, in such cases, to the liability under a general accident insurance policy. Tort is, in fact, not an element in the liability created by the workmen’s compensation law.10 On the contrary, the basis of this legislation is liability without fault. Nor does the workmen’s compensation law create a status between employer and employee. It provides an incident to the employment which is often *234likened to a contractual obligation, even where the workmen’s compensation law is not of the class called optional. It will hardly be contended that an act occurring beyond the geographical limits of a State cannot be made the basis for the creation of rights to be enjoyed or enforced within it. Workmen’s compensation laws which provide for compensation for injuries occurring in States other than that of the residence of the employer and the employee are held constitutional.11 Why should they not be deemed valid where they provide for accidents occurring within the State but upon navigable waters?
A further assumption is that Congress, which has power to make and to unmake the general maritime law, can have no voice in determining which of its provisions require adaptation to peculiar local needs and as to which absolute uniformity is an essential of the proper harmony of international and interstate maritime relations. This assumption has no support in reason; and it is inconsistent (at least in principle) with the powers conferred upon Congress in other connections. The grant “ of the . . . judicial power ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ” is, surely, no broader in terms than the grant of power “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.” Yet as to commerce, Congress may, at least in large measure, determine whether uniformity of regulation is required or diversity is permissible.12 Likewise, Congress is given exclusive power of legislation over its forts, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful places and buildings. But it may permit the *235diverse laws of the several States to govern the relations of men within them.13 Congress has exclusive power to legislate concerning the Army and Navy of the United States, to declare war, to determine to what extent citizens shall aid in its prosecution, and how effective aid can best be secured. But state legislation directly affecting these subjects has been sustained.14 In respect to bankruptcy, duties, imposts, excises and naturalization the Constitution prescribes uniformity. Still, the provision in the bankruptcy law giving effect to the divergent exemption laws of the several States was held valid.15 Absolute uniformity in things maritime is confessedly not essential to the proper harmony of the maritime law in its interstate and international relations. This is illustrated both by the cases which hold constitutional state regulation of pilotage and liens created by state laws in aid of maritime contracts, and by those which hold that there are broad fields of maritime activity to which admiralty jurisdiction does not extend. A notable instance of the latter is the liability in tort for injuries inflicted by a ship to a dock, or to maritime workers on the dock engaged in the inherently maritime operation of stevedoring.16
The recent legislation of Congress seeks, in a statesmanlike manner, to limit the practical scope and effect of our decisions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, and later cases, by making them hereafter applicable only to the *236relations of the ship to her master and crew. To hold that Congress can effect this result by sanctioning the application of state workmen’s compensation laws to accidents to any other class of employees occurring on the navigable waters of the State would not, in my judgment, require us to overrule any of these cases. It would require merely that we should limit the application of the rule therein announced, and that we should declare our disapproval of certain expressions used in the opinions. Such limitation of principles previously announced, and such express disapproval of dicta, are often necessary. It is an unavoidable incident of the search by courts of last resort for the true rule.17 The process of inclusion and exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule, cannot end with its first enunciation. The rule as announced must be deemed tentative. For the many and varying facts to which it will be applied cannot be foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law.
If the Court is of opinion that this act of Congress is in necessary conflict with its recent decisions, those cases should be frankly overruled. The reasons for doing so' are persuasive. Our experience in attempting to apply the rule, and helpful discussions by friends of the Court, have made it clear that the rule declared is legally unsound;18 that it disturbs legal prin*237ciples long established; and that if adhered to, it will make a serious addition to the classes of cases which this Court is required to review.19 Experience and discussion have also made apparent how unfortunate are the results, economically and socially. It has, in part, frustrated a promising attempt to alleviate some of the misery, and remove some of the injustice, incident to- the conduct of industry and commerce. These far-reaching and unfortunate results of the rule declared in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen cannot have been foreseen when the decision was rendered. If it is adhered to, appropriate legislative provision, urgently needed, cannot be made until another amendment of the Constitution shall have been adopted. For no federal workmen’s compensation law could satisfy the varying and peculiar economic and social needs incident to the diversity of conditions in the several States.20
*238The doctrine of stare decisis should not deter us from overruling that case and those which follow it. The decisions are recent ones. They have not been acquiesced in. They have not created a rule of property around which vested interests have clustered. They affect solely matters of a transitory nature. On the other hand, they affect seriously the lives of men, women and children, and the general welfare. Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command. The instances in which the Court has disregarded its admonition are many.21 The existing admiralty jurisdiction rests, in large part, upon like action of the Court in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 456. In that case the Court overruled The Thomas Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428, and *239The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; and a doctrine declared by Mr. Justice Story with the concurrence of Chief Justice Marshall, and approved by Chancellor Kent, was abandoned when found to be erroneous, although it had been acted on for twenty-six years.

 Compare Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121, a stevedore; also, Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Danielsen, 235 N. Y. 439; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756; Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Warren, 235 N. Y. 445; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756;Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Connelly, 235 N. Y. 602; certiorari denied, 262 U. S. 756, all drydock employees. In Industrial Accident Comm. v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., 218 Pac. 563; certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 722, the injury occurred in connection with the operations of a harbor dredger, not engaged in commerce or navigation. In Industrial Accident Comm. v. Alaska Packers Association, 218 Pac. 561; certiorari denied, 263 U. S. 722; the accident occurred on an Alaska fishing vessel while laid up for the winter at San Francisco, alongside the dock.

 State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263, a stevedore.

 Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U. S. 479, a member of the crew; Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, a stevedore. See also Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398.

 Article I, § 8, confers upon Congress power “ To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.” The conclusion reached by the Court emphasises not the breadth of the congressional power, but the limitations upon it.

 That the obligation to contribute to the compensation fund may be deemed a tax, see Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 237.

 Compare New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102; Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648.

 The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158; Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255.

 See Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U. S. 52; Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221-2.

 In my opinion, the state law, being sanctioned by Congress, is valid, also, as applied to accidents suffered in port by persons, other than the master or member of the crew, even if the persons injured are employees of the vessel or of the owners, and notwithstanding their occupations are inherently maritime, like stevedoring.

 See Ernest Angelí, " Recovery Under Workmen’s Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad,” 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 620. See, also, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 375. Compare Pound, Spirit of the Common Law (1921), 30.

 Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 35-37, 39, 44, 45; 255 U. S. 445. Compare Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106. See Ernest Angell, supra, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619, 628, 636.

 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 244-251; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 564.

 Compare Fort Leavenworth B. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; Chicago & Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274; Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343.

 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325. Compare Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34.

 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181. See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 168.

 See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 219-220.

 Compare, e. g., Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U. S. 506, qualifying Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642; Askeren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S. 444; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389, and Baltimore & Ohio S. W. R. R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U. S. 166, 173, overruling dicta in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403.

 See Edgar Tremlett Fell, Recent Problems in Admiralty Jurisdiction (1922), 1-53; John Gorham Palfrey, “The Common Law Courts and the Law of the Sea,” 36 Harv. L. Rev. 777; also, Vol. 31, p. 488; Vol. 34, p. 82; Vol. 35, p. 743; Vol. 37, p. 478; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr-, “The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common Law,” 21 Col. L. Rev. 647; also, Vol. 17, p. 703; Vol. 20, p. 685; Frederic Cunningham, “ Is Every County Court in the United States *237a Court- of Admiralty?'’ 53 Amer. L. Rev. 749; “The Tables Turned — Lord Coke Demolished,” 55 Amer. L. Rev. 685; J. Whitla Stinson, “Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction,” 54 Amer. L. Rev. 908; Yale L. Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 255, 924-; Vol. 28, pp. 281, 835; Vol. 29, p. 925; Mich. L. Rev., Vol. 15, p. 657; Vol. 16, p. 562; Vol. 18, p. 793; Calif. L. Rev., Vol. 6, p. 69; Vol. 8, p. 338; Vol. 10, p. 234; Minn. L. Rev., Vol. 2, p. 145; Vol. 4, p. 444; Vol. 6, p. 230; Southern L. Q., Vol. 2, p. 304; Vol. 3, p. 76; Francis J. MacIntyre, “Admiralty and the Workmen’s Compensation Law,” 5 Cornell L. Q. 275; 91 Central L. J. 43; 6 Ill. L. Q. 157; 3 Va. L. Reg. (n. s.) 290-296; 61 Amer. L. Reg. (n. s.) 42-45.

 By making the substantive maritime law the rule of decision in the common law courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction, the rule of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen introduces into every case in a state court involving maritime law, even if it is not affected by any state statute, a federal question which may be brought to this Court for review either by writ of error or by petition for a writ of certiorari. Compare Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 293-303; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U. S. 285, 290.

 Compare New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 169. See Andrew Furuseth, “ Harbor Workers Are Not Seamen: An Essential Distinction in Compensation Legislation,” 11 Am. Labor *238Leg. Rev. 139; T. V. O’Connor, “The Plight of the Longshoremen,” ibid, p. 144; J. P. Coughlin, “Accident Protection for Ship Repairmen,” ibid, p. 146; J. P. Chamberlain, “ The Conflict of Jurisdiction in Compensation for Maritime Workers,” ibid, p. 133; L. W. Hatch, “ The ‘ Maritime ’ Twilight Zone from the Standpoint of Compensation Administration,” ibid, 148; J. B. Andrews, “ Legislative Program of Accident Compensation for ‘ Maritime' Workers,” ibid, p. 152. See also, ibid, Vol. 10, pp. 117, 241; Vol. 12, pp. 53, 69, 103, 104.

 See Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U. S. 653, 659, overruling Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449; Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U. S. 529, 533, overruling Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, and Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8, 25, and Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U. S. 502, 518, overruling Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1; United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591, 601, overruling Matter of Heff, 197 U. S. 488; Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, overruling Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171; Roberts v. Lewis, 153 U. S. 367, 379, overruling Giles v. Little, 104 U. S. 291; Brenham v. German American Bank, 144 U. S. 173, 187, overruling Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654, and Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 118, overruling Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 504; Morgan v. United States, 113 U. S. 476, 496, overruling Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 553, overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603.