Court Opinion

ID: 9726227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:38:22.389521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:10.229287
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) sets forth the standard of review which an appellate court must utilize when considering the appeal of a trial court judgment entered after a bench trial This rule states that "the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous." TR. B2(A). See also Spurlock v. Fayette Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n (1982), Ind.App., 436 N.E.2d 811, 815. A trial court's conclusion is clearly erroneous only where the "evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, which is contrary to that reached by the trial court." Ransburg v. Kirk (1987), Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 867, 872. Furthermore, our examination of the evidence must be in the light most favorable to the judgment. ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. RTM Development Co. (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 201, 208. Because I conclude that the trial court's findings and conclusions were not clearly erroneous, I respectfully dissent.
The defendant, the Court of Appeals, and the majority view the issue in this case in terms of the propriety of piercing the corporate veil. I perceive it rather to be whether the defendant dealt with the plaintiff on behalf of an undisclosed principal.1 In fact, neither the plaintiff's complaint nor the initial trial court judgment makes any mention of "piercing the corporate veil." Record at 7-8, 37-44. The trial court found that, prior to and during his dealings with the defendant, *870the plaintiff was not informed of the existence of a corporate body by any of the employees; that none of the advertising signs indicated a corporate entity; and that none of the forms, invoices, or business cards which the plaintiff received showed any evidence of the existence of a corporate entity. Record at 38. These are facts which are not seriously disputed by the parties. See Brief in Support of Petition to Transfer at 7. See also Brief in Opposition to Petition to Transfer at 5-6.
Based on this finding, the trial court found that "having failed to disclose from the outset the existence of the corporation, [the defendant] cannot rely on that corporation to escape personal lability in a transaction where, as here, [the plaintiff] was unaware that he was dealing with a corporation." Record at 38. This conclusion, that the defendant dealt with the plaintiff as an agent with an undisclosed principal, was not clearly erroneous and accordingly should be upheld.
In this case, it is clear that the defendant acted as the Haison with the plaintiff. See Brief in Opposition to Petition to Transfer at 6. See also Record at 107, 285-294, 297-304. Based on this fact and the whole of the record, there seems to be little question that the defendant was the agent of the corporation. See Gross Income Tax Div. v. Indianapolis Brewing Co. (1940), 108 Ind.App. 259, 265, 25 N.E.2d 653, 655 (defining an agent as "one who, by the authority of another, undertakes to transact some business or manage some affairs on the account of such other"). In addition, there is little doubt that his agency was undisclosed to the plaintiff. When an agent deals with a third person without revealing that he is representing a principal or the identity of that principal, he will be held liable as the principal. Merrill v. Wilson (1855), 6 Ind. 426, 427. Accord Tolliver v. Mathas (1989), Ind.App., 538 N.E.2d 971, 976; Brown v. Owen Litho Serv., Inc. (1979), 179 Ind.App. 198, 201-02, 384 N.E.2d 1132, 1135.
I would allow the judgment of the trial court to stand.

. These are two very different concepts. When courts pierce the corporate veil, they do so because of misconduct by the shareholders, directors, or officers. See, e.g., Stacey-Rand, Inc. v. J.J. Holman, Inc. (1988), Ind.App., 527 N.E.2d 726, 728; Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. H.L.C. Enterprises, Inc. (1982), Ind.App., 441 N.E.2d 509, 514. However, when an agent is held liable for dealing on the behalf of an undisclosed principal, it is his actions as an agent that impose liability. See Brown v. Owen Litho Serv., Inc. (1979), 179 Ind.App. 198, 201-02, 384 N.E.2d 1132, 1135.