Court Opinion

ID: 9499411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:47:50.431109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:29.334980
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the district court properly concluded that the Committee abused its discretion when it unreasonably denied Smith benefits, I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that each of the Finley factors weighs in favor of the Committee’s interpretation of the Plan. Like both the district court and the magistrate judge, I conclude that the Committee’s interpretation is contrary to the Plan’s clear language and renders the word “or” meaningless.
This court has held that the fifth Finley factor should be given “significant weight.” Lickteig v. Business Men’s Assur. Co. of Am., 61 F.3d 579, 585 (8th Cir.1995) (citing Callahan v. Rouge Steel Co., 941 F.2d 456, 460 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that the most important factor in considering whether denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious is the language of the plan)). “[I]f the interpretation is unreasonable from the beginning, such an interpretation may still be arbitrary and capricious.” Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1324 n. 4 (8th Cir.1981).
“Under an abuse of discretion standard we do not search for the best or preferable interpretation of a plan term: it is sufficient if the [ ] interpretation is consistent with a commonly accepted definition.” Hutchins v. Champion Intern. Corp., 110 F.3d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir.1997). “[W]e may not find the interpretation invalid merely because we disagree with it, but only if it is unreasonable. An interpretation is reasonable if a reasonable person could have reached a similar decision, given the evidence before him.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). “Recourse to the ordinary, dictionary definition of words is not only reasonable, but may be necessary. Words are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning as understood by a reasonable, average person.” Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Ben. Ass’n, Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir.1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The dictionary defines “or” as “l.a. Used to indicate an alternative, usually only before the last term of a series ... b. Used *1039to indicate the second of two alternative s, the first being preceded by either or whether ... c. Used to indicate the first of two alternative s.... ” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1236 (4th ed.2000) (emphasis added).
Contrary to the reasoning of the majority, none of these definitions suggest that the word “or” is synonymous with the word “and.” Indeed, each of these definitions clearly defines “or” as a disjunctive, a choice between two alternatives. To hold otherwise, would “tax [ ] ordinary English syntax to the point of uncertainty.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Barlow, 406 F.2d 687, 692 (10th Cir.1969) (holding “or” should not be substituted for “and”).
Therefore, a reasonable person would not interpret “salary or bonus opportunity” as “salary and bonus opportunity.” Thus, the Committee’s decision to use this “holistic” approach is contrary to the Plan’s clear language. See Marquette Gen. Hosp. v. Goodman Forest Indus., 815 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir.2003) (holding in a similar ERISA case interpreting “any occupation or employment for wage or profit,” that “the word ‘or’ does not also mean ‘and.’ Any other reading constrains the clear meaning of the language”).
For similar reasons, I believe that the Committee’s interpretation renders the word “or” meaningless. See Hebert v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan, 354 F.3d 796, 799-800 (8th Cir.2004) (analyzing whether an interpretation renders the Plan’s “language internally inconsistent or meaningless and is not contrary to the SBC Plan’s clear language”). Because the Committee’s interpretation renders the word “or” meaningless and is contrary to the Plan’s clear language, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.