Court Opinion

ID: 9852905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:38:42.212181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:37.083244
License: Public Domain

KIRSHBAUM, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
In parts II and III of its opinion the majority concludes that the trial court erroneously held that City of Aurora Ordinance 93-90 (the Ordinance) violates constitutionally protected free speech rights of the Denver Publishing Company, doing business as the Rocky Mountain News (the News). I believe the trial court reached the correct conclusion, and therefore respectfully dissent from parts II and III of the majority opinion. I concur in parts I and IV of the majority opinion.
In part I of its opinion the majority describes the facts relevant to the determination of the issues raised by this appeal. As the majority observes, to resolve those issues we must determine the appropriate level of scrutiny by which the Ordinance is to be measured and then ascertain whether the Ordinance withstands such scrutiny. Maj. op. at 311. The majority concludes that the Ordinance should be deemed a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction; that a heightened standard of review is sufficient for both federal and Colorado constitutional purposes; and that the Ordinance withstands such heightened scrutiny.
I agree that given the procedural posture of this ease, the Ordinance must be viewed as a time, place, and manner regulation. However, I conclude that, in view of the effect of sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance, strict scrutiny of those sections is necessary for purposes of the First Amendment as well as for purposes of the more protective provisions of article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution.1 I further conclude that sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance in essence constitute a total ban on protected speech in pedestrian-accessible median areas of streets and highways that satisfies neither strict scrutiny nor heightened scrutiny analysis.
A
The majority holds that the public streets and highways subject to the Ordinance are “traditional public fora.” Maj. op. at 311. I agree. The majority then suggests that the City’s interest in regulating these traditional public fora is in some manner enhanced because of the nature of the fora. Id. This analysis, in my view, undermines the public forum test. It is the nature of the regulated forum, not the nature of the government’s interest, that initially determines the applicable level of scrutiny of governmental regulations affecting constitutionally protected speech in such areas. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 732, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 3122-23, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 2500-01, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1985); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3447-48, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650-51, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2565-66, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (plurality opinion). The more public the forum, the more stringent the level of review.
As the majority notes, the parties have stipulated that the Ordinance should be deemed a content-neutral time, place, and *321manner regulation. Maj. op. at 313. Thus the News does not contend that the Ordinance constitutes a prior restraint,2 even though the operational effect of the Ordinance as to hawkers located in center median areas is virtually indistinguishable from a prior restraint.
However, the fact that a governmental regulation affecting protected speech in a public forum is deemed content-neutral is not the only consideration relevant to the question of which level of scrutiny should be applied to the regulation. The majority has noted the importance of examining the nature of the restriction in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny. Maj. op. at 311. Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, strict scrutiny is required of content-neutral regulations that in practical effect operate as a total or near total ban on protected expression in a public forum.3
This principle recognizes that the First Amendment is designed in part to encourage the unfettered communication of ideas in public fora. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-16, 59 S.Ct. at 963-64 (plurality opinion). Content-neutral regulations effecting a total or near total ban on all communication in a public forum constitute no less a threat to protected speech than do prior restraints. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-07, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983) (restrictions that absolutely prohibit expression in public fora “will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest.”);4 accord Perry, 460 U.S. at 55, 103 S.Ct. at 960 (“In a public forum, by definition, all parties have a constitutional right of access and the State must demonstrate compelling reasons for restricting access to a single class of speakers, a single viewpoint, or a single subject.”).5 The *322First Amendment therefore prohibits both content-based restrictions that censor particular points of view and content-neutral restrictions that in effect unduly restrict the exercise of free expression. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 46, 57-8 (1987). As the Court recently noted in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994), government regulations that foreclose an entire medium of expression are of particular concern even if such regulations do not constitute content or viewpoint discrimination. Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2045-47 (ordinance that bans a great many, though not all, signs from private residential property held invalid). See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 636-37, 100 S.Ct. 826, 835-36, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) (government may bar fraudulent political fund-raising but may not in the process prohibit legitimate fundraising); Martin v. Strutkers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-49, 63 S.Ct. 862, 864-66, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943) (ordinance banning door-to-door distribution of literature held invalid); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416, 63 S.Ct. 669, 671-72, 87 L.Ed. 869 (1943) (ordinance banning handbilling on public streets held invalid); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52, 58 S.Ct. 666, 668-69, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) (ordinance banning distribution of pamphlets within municipality held invalid); cf Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75-6, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2186, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981) (ordinance banning live entertainment held invalid). Thus, although government may target a particular evil within a broad category of speech for regulation, the fact that “some speech within a broad category causes harm ... does not justify restricting the whole category.” Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2479, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone_” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2480 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 340, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963)).
As the majority observes, sales transactions are a form of protected speech. Maj. op. at 315. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the circulation of newspapers as well as their publication. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 768, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2150, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 631, 636 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); Lovell, 303 U.S. at 452, 58 S.Ct. at 669; see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 720, 51 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1930). As the Court stated in Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877): “Liberty of circulating is as essential to [the freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the publication would be of little value.” In this case, the Ordinance completely prohibits the circulation rights of the News in designated public fora.
B
Because sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance in effect ban all protected speech from the center median areas of streets and highways, which areas are public fora,6 strict *323scrutiny analysis is required for purposes of ensuring that that section of the Ordinance does not violate First Amendment protections. Furthermore, as the majority recognizes, see maj. op. at 309 n. 4, in Bock v. Westminster Mall Company, 819 P.2d 55 (Colo.1991), this court held that the protections afforded free speech rights of Colorado citizens by article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution exceed the free speech protections established by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bock, 819 P.2d at 59, 60, and cases there cited.7 We also emphasized in Bock that the level of scrutiny required to safeguard the broader free speech protections afforded by article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution was necessarily more stringent than that associated with First Amendment analysis. Bock, 819 P.2d at 60. Whenever government seeks to ban speech protected by article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution in public fora, the regulation must be measured by the strict scrutiny standard — the standard that is “most protective of free expression.” Bock, 819 P.2d at 60.8
To satisfy the rigors of strict scrutiny analysis, the City must establish that the Ordinance achieves the goal of furthering compelling governmental interests by means that least limit the free speech rights of the News. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. at 3448 (“Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 1168, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,152-64, 60 S.Ct. 146, 149-52, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118, 112 S.Ct. 501, 509, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). The evidence at trial, as reflected in the trial court’s findings, compels the conclusion that the total ban on sales from center median areas of streets and highways achieved by sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance — the walling off of those public fora from efforts by the News to engage in constitutionally protected speech — does not satisfy this necessarily rigorous test. The center median areas of the streets and highways located in Aurora are by design accessible to pedestrians. The City has not demonstrated a compelling interest in denying hawkers or other pedestrians access to that public forum. Hawkers standing in such areas do not pose a significant safety threat to stationary vehicles. To the extent the City has a legitimate concern for the safety of hawkers and others, regulations restricting the manner in which sales of newspapers to stationary vehicles may be conducted would satisfy such goal without banning all sales.9 Assuming, arguendo, that sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance do further a compelling state interest, they do not do so by the least restrictive means available. As applied to the News, sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance therefore violate the provisions of article II, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution, as well as the First Amendment.
*324C
As indicated, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that heightened scrutiny analysis of sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance is adequate. I also conclude, contrary to the majority, that sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance do not survive even this lesser level of scrutiny.
The majority states that to survive heightened scrutiny analysis the Ordinance may not prohibit more protected speech than is essential to accomplish the City’s stated purposes. Maj. op. at 315. Relying on Ward v. Rock Against Racism,, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), the majority also indicates that this test is satisfied if the City establishes that the regulation promotes substantial governmental interests “that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” Maj. op. at 315. In Ward, the Supreme Court did state that “the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ ” Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897, 2906, 86 L.Ed.2d 536 (1985)). However, the Court also acknowledged the following principles immediately after the above-quoted sentence:
To be sure, this standard does not mean that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.
Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485, 108 S.Ct. at 2502-03). Furthermore, the Court in Ward emphasized that the regulation therein challenged did not attempt to ban all expression at issue — all rock concerts — but rather focused narrowly on the source of the effects sought to be eliminated — improper sound amplification. The Court cautioned that a “ban on handbilling, of course, could suppress a great quantity of speech that does not cause the evils that it seeks to eliminate, whether they be fraud, crime, litter, traffic congestion, or noise.” Id. at 801 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 2759 n. 7 (emphasis added). “A regulation is not ‘narrowly tailored’ — even under the more lenient tailoring standards applied in Ward and [City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) ]— where, as here, ‘a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [the State’s content-neutral] goals.’ ” Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 122 n. *, 112 S.Ct. at 511 n. * (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. at 2758); see also Turner, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2479 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In this case sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance ban all protected speech in a traditional public forum — the center median areas of all streets and highways located in Aurora. This complete ban cannot be justified on the ground that the City’s interests would be achieved less effectively by a partial ban of protected speech.
The City advances three purposes for its adoption of the Ordinance: to protect persons and property, to prevent delays, and to prevent interference with traffic flows. Sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance do not merely regulate the time, place, or manner of solicitation in median areas separating traffic lanes for travel in opposite directions; they ban all solicitation in those areas. Such total ban certainly accomplishes the City’s purposes in a manner not possible under any less restrictive regulation. Conversely, any regulation would achieve the City’s purposes more effectively than no regulation. The question to be answered, however, is whether the City’s total ban on protected speech in these public fora is unnecessarily restrictive in view of the City’s avowed purposes. Grace, 461 U.S. at 181, 103 S.Ct. at 1709 (content-neutral regulations effectuating a total ban of picketing and leafletting on United States Supreme Court sidewalks not sufficiently narrow in scope).
The record contains no evidence that the presence of hawkers on center median areas presents extraordinary safety hazards to property or persons, cause delay, or interfere with traffic flows. The evidence at trial focused primarily on various activities engaged in by some hawkers. As the trial court *325indicated, any of a number of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions could effectively address Aurora’s legitimate public safety concerns without banning all protected speech from the median areas.
The majority’s reliance on ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986), and Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now v. St. Louis County, 980 F.2d 591 (8th Cir.1991), is misplaced. In both of those cases the solicitation of funds was at issue, not the circulation of newspapers. The trial court in this case appropriately relied upon Houston Chronicle, Etc. v. City of Houston, 620 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.Civ.App.1981), which dealt with the circulation of newspapers. Accord News and Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 702 F.Supp. 891 (S.D.Fla.1988). I agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the complete ban of this protected speech in center median areas is not necessary to further the public safety interests pursued by the City.
I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Ordinance leaves sufficient alternative avenues of communication open to the News. Maj. op. at 318. The News has no alternative access to the public fora completely withdrawn from the ambit of its constitutionally protected right of circulation. Access to other fora is not the equivalent of access to public streets and highways located in Aurora. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180-81, 103 S.Ct. at 1708-09; Schneider, 308 U.S. at 163, 60 S.Ct. at 151 (“[T]he streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his [or her] liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”). The City’s reliance on general circulation and revenue statistics regarding the economic condition of the News is not persuasive.
The majority relies upon City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988), and Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), in support of its conclusion that the alternative avenues of communication test was satisfied in this case by evidence establishing the general circulation condition of the News. Maj. op. at 318. Those decisions do not support the majority’s broad conclusion. In City of Lakewood, the Court held that a complete ban on newsracks violated First Amendment protections. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 772, 108 S.Ct. at 2152. The statement in that opinion quoted by the majority, which statement characterizes the protected activity as circulation, was made in the context of determining whether First Amendment principles were implicated, not whether the First Amendment was abridged. In Frisby, the Court did not view the challenged ordinance as constituting a total ban on picketing activities in residential neighborhoods, but rather determined that the ordinance prohibited only the picketing of a single residence. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486, 108 S.Ct. at 2503. The Court emphasized that “[t]he type of focused picketing prohibited by the [challenged] ordinance is fundamentally different from more generally directed means of communication that may not be completely banned in residential areas.” Id. In Vincent, the Court emphasized that the public property subjected to governmental regulation was not a public forum and rejected an invitation to utilize the heightened scrutiny analysis required by the public forum doctrine. Vincent, 466 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 2134.
Sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance ban all circulation efforts by the News in the center median areas of streets and highways located in Aurora — traditional public fora. As applied to the News, sections b(2) and b(3) of the Ordinance do not simply bar one particular means of circulating ideas; they completely prohibit circulation of ideas in particular places. In these circumstances, the City has not satisfied its burden of establishing the availability of adequate alternative methods of circulation for purposes of heightened scrutiny analysis.
*326D
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from parts II and III of the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the Ordinance impermissibly restricts constitutionally protected rights of the News.

. The majority notes that the News did not argue that a different test should be applied to the Ordinance for purposes of the Colorado Constitution. Maj. op. at 311. However, the majority also notes "Colorado’s elevated deference for First Amendment issues.” Id. Thus, even if the Ordinance is appropriately characterized as a time, place, and manner regulation, the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to determine if the Ordinance satisfies Colorado's constitutional provisions will often be more stringent than the test required for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 60 (Colo.1991). The parties cannot, of course, stipulate to the application of an incorrect legal standard.

. Regulations that have been found invalid as prior restraints have "had this in common: they gave public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression." Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1243-44, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975). As the Court noted in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989), the relevant question in determining whether a challenged ordinance constitutes a prior restraint is whether it “authorizes suppression of speech in advance of its expression.” Id. at 795 n. 5, 109 S.Ct. at 2756 n. 5 (emphasis in original). The total ban on circulation of newspapers from the median area of a public forum imposed by the Ordinance accomplishes that result in this case.

. Because the forum-based approach acknowledges that streets and parks are public fora in which the state must be especially solicitous of free expression, it would appear to follow that content-neutral restrictions governing streets and parks should be tested by more stringent standards of justification than content-neutral restrictions that do not restrict access to public fora. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-07, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); cf. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. at 2758; Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485, 108 S.Ct. at 2502-03 (complete ban can be narrowly tailored but "only if each activity within the proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil.").

. The majority states that this statement from Grace, 461 U.S. at 171, 103 S.Ct. at 1703-04, refers only to content-based restrictions. Maj. op. at 312 n. 9. To the contrary, the Court in Grace noted that "it is clear that the prohibition is facially content-neutral_” Grace, 461 U.S. at 181 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 1709 n. 10. The Court was nonetheless convinced "that the [statute in question], which totally bans the specified communicative activity on the public sidewalks around the Court grounds, cannot be justified as a reasonable place restriction....” Id. at 181, 103 S.Ct. at 1709 (footnote omitted). In McIntyre v. Ohio, 63 LW 4279 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violates First Amendment protections. Id. at 4286. In so doing, the Court made clear that the Ohio Supreme Court's "reason-ablefcess]" and "nondiscriminatoiy” standard is significantly more lenient than was appropriate because the Ohio statute “involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 4282 (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 1891, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988)). In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the speech at issue in McIntyre "bears a marked resemblance to” the speech at issue in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994), and Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. at 1703-04, and observed that "[a]ll three decisions ... are sound, and hardly sensational, applications of our First Amendment jurisprudence.” McIntyre, 63 LW at 4286 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

. The principle that content-neutral regulations of protected expression that in effect ban all or almost all such expression are constitutionally suspect may apply even to non-public fora. In both Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (plurality opinion), and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), the fact that the regulations *322construed therein did not constitute near total bans on protected speech was crucial to the analysis. In American Mini Theatres, the plurality emphasized in three different places that "[t]he situation would be quite different if the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech.” American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n. 35, 96 S.Ct. at 2453 n. 35; see also id. at 62, 96 S.Ct. at 2448; id. at 70, 96 S.Ct. at 2452. Justice Powell emphasized in a concurring opinion that "[t]he primary concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be full opportunity for expression in all of its varied forms to convey a desired message. Vital to this concern is the corollary that there be full opportunity for everyone to receive the message.” Id. at 76, 96 S.Ct. at 2455 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 77-78, 96 S.Ct. at 2455-56. In Renton the Court observed that "the First Amendment requires only that Renton refrain from effectively denying respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city, and the ordinance before us easily meets this requirement.” Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 106 S.Ct. at 932; see also id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. at 928.

. Section b(3) of the Ordinance restricts solicitation activity to legal parking areas where the transaction can be "safely conducted].” This section in effect also prohibits sales activities from center median areas because legal parking *323areas consist of areas immediately adjacent to the outer boundaries of traffic lanes, which areas are inaccessible from the center median area unless the person performing the activity crosses the traveled portion of a street or highway to enter the parking area.

.The majority states that the News does “not argue that a different test should apply under the State Constitution.” Maj. op. at 311. However, the City argued in its opening brief that "the fact that the Colorado Constitution affords greater protection to freedom of expression than does the United States Constitution does not require a heightened level of scrutiny." Furthermore, in its consolidated response and opening brief, the News specifically relied upon our decision in Bock, 819 P.2d 55, and its recognition that the Colorado Constitution affords broader protection than does the First Amendment.

. The trial court, citing Bock, stated that it would apply strict scrutiny analysis to the Ordinance. However, as the majority notes, the trial court in fact applied the less stringent test of whether the Ordinance was narrowly tailored to carry out a substantial government interest and whether sufficient alternative means of communication remained available to the News. Maj. op. at 313.

. Section b(l) of the Ordinance accomplishes such goal. Aurora, Co., Code § 37-124 b(l) (1993).