Court Opinion

ID: 9758095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:11:09.698786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:04.148124
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
If an accused enters a plea of guilty to and is sentenced for a criminal offense defined during the guilty plea colloquy, may he subsequently withdraw his plea of guilty after it has been determined that the guilty plea colloquy was erroneous and that as a consequence he was sentenced for an offense which he did not commit and with which he was not charged? The majority holds that such a plea cannot be withdrawn. I respectfully dissent.
Jeffrey Muller entered pleas of guilty to seven counts of forgery, theft by deception and theft by receiving stolen property. The charges arose from seven incidents in which Muller allegedly had used forged checks to purchase merchandise at retail stores in Montgomery County. The informations charging forgery did not recite the grades of the crimes. Muller entered pleas of guilty, and during the guilty plea colloquy he was told that his forgeries were felonies of the second degree, punishable by a maximum of ten years in prison. Muller was thereafter sentenced to serve concurrent terms of not less than four nor more than ten years on two counts of forgery. On two other counts he was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of probation for five years, to be served after completion of the prison *239sentences.1 Without filing post-sentencing motions, Muller filed a direct appeal to the Superior Court. Upon the advice of newly appointed counsel, this appeal was withdrawn in favor of a motion filed in the trial court to withdraw the guilty pleas. This motion was filed four months after sentencing. It was premised upon the fact that appellant’s forgeries were in fact felonies of the third degree, not felonies of the second degree. After hearing, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty. It attempted to remedy the resulting injustice, however, by reducing the sentences of imprisonment to concurrent terms of not less than three and one-half nor more than seven years. The sentences of probation were not altered. Muller appealed from the order denying his motion to withdraw the pleas of guilty.
The majority has correctly observed that the invalidity of Muller’s guilty pleas was not waived by his failure to file a timely motion to withdraw the pleas. In the first place, Muller’s guilty plea counsel was clearly ineffective. Not only did counsel fail to advise his client correctly about the offenses with which he had been charged, but he also allowed him to be sentenced for offenses which he had not committed. Muller was never advised prior to the appointment of present counsel that he had erroneously been sentenced for offenses which he did not commit and with which the Commonwealth had not charged him. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that he knowingly waived the invalidity of his plea by failing to file a timely withdrawal motion. See: Commonwealth v. Pulling, 323 Pa.Super. 142, 145, 470 A.2d 170, 172 (1983); Commonwealth v. Cofield, 310 Pa.Super. 356, 362, 456 A.2d 650, 653 (1983); Commonwealth v. McCall, 267 Pa.Super. 351, 353, 406 A.2d 1077, 1078 (1979). Moreover, the sentencing court failed to advise Muller at the time of sentencing, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 1405(c)(3), that a motion challenging the validity of his guilty pleas could be filed within ten days thereafter.
*240In order to withdraw a plea of guilty after sentence has been imposed, a defendant must show prejudice in the nature of manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 490, 301 A.2d 592, 595 (1973). The law is clear, however, that manifest injustice occurs when a plea of guilty is entered involuntarily or without knowledge of the offense charged. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 346, 446 A.2d 591, 593 (1982); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 309 Pa.Super. 214, 219, 455 A.2d 126, 128 (1983). A guilty plea, to be knowingly and intelligently entered, must be preceded by a colloquy which demonstrates that the accused is fully cognizant of the nature and elements of the offense charged. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 203-204, 316 A.2d 77, 80 (1974). See: Commonwealth v. Reed, 488 Pa. 221, 227, 412 A.2d 477, 480 (1980); Commonwealth v. Hare, 486 Pa. 123, 129, 404 A.2d 388, 391 (1979); Commonwealth v. Tabb, 477 Pa. 115, 119-120, 383 A.2d 849, 851 (1978); Commonwealth v. Belleman, 300 Pa.Super. 209, 213, 446 A.2d 304, 306 (1982). The accused must also be informed accurately of the permissible range of the sentence which may be imposed for an offense charged. See: Commonwealth v. Kulp, 476 Pa. 358, 361, 382 A.2d 1209, 1211 (1978); Commonwealth v. Fay, 294 Pa.Super. 332, 336-337, 439 A.2d 1227, 1229 (1982). Adherence to the guidelines set out in the Comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 is a minimum requirement. Failure to satisfy those requirements will, in most cases, require that a defendant be permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty. Commonwealth v. Dilbeck, 466 Pa. 543, 547, 353 A.2d 824, 827 (1976). Accord: Commonwealth v. Willis, 471 Pa. 50, 52, 369 A.2d 1189, 1190 (1977). Compare: Commonwealth v. Schultz, 505 Pa. 188, 477 A.2d 1328 (1984). During the colloquy in this case, appellant’s offense was incorrectly defined as a felony of the second degree and the permissible range of the sentence was erroneously stated.
The existence of manifest injustice in the instant case is clear. It is undisputed that Muller entered pleas of guilty after being told that his offenses were felonies of the *241second degree. His offenses, however, were felonies of the third degree. The difference between forgery which is a felony of the second degree and forgery which is a felony of the third degree is not merely one of degree. The two offenses are separate and distinct. They are defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(c) as follows:
(c) Grading. — Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be part of an issue of money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the government, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or claims against any property or enterprise. Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be a will, deed, contract, release, commercial instrument, or other document evidencing, creating, transferring, altering, terminating or otherwise affecting legal relations....
Thus, it is incorrect to say, as the majority does, that the substantive elements of the two grades of forgery are the same. The offenses with which Muller was charged were forgeries of commercial instruments. These offenses were felonies of the third degree. He entered pleas of guilty, however, to felonies of the second degree, which are forgeries of “money, securities, postage or revenue stamps, or other instruments issued by the government, or part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or claims against any property or enterprise.” This offense he did not commit. Such a scenario, it seems to me, demonstrates unequivocally the existence of prejudice in the nature of manifest injustice which may be corrected by a post-sentencing withdrawal of guilty pleas.
Despite the fact that Muller unknowingly entered pleas of guilty to offenses which he did not commit and with which he was not charged, the majority refuses to allow him to withdraw the pleas of guilty. His invalid pleas, the majority says, must stand. The prejudice can be corrected by reducing the illegal sentences of imprisonment imposed on two counts of forgery so that they will conform to the *242statutory maximum for felonies of the third degree. As a result, Muller’s defective guilty pleas remain. They appear as admissions of guilt to felonies of the second degree, which he did not commit. In the remaining cases, the sentences imposed by the court for felonies of the second degree have not been altered because when imposed they did not exceed the statutory maximum for felonies of the third degree.
The majority is persuaded that this result is reasonable. I am not. Therefore, I dissent. I would permit appellant to withdraw his pleas of guilty and remand for a new trial.

. The theft convictions merged in the forgery convictions for sentencing purposes.