Court Opinion

ID: 9897290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:44.786541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:04.288825
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Sep 14 2023, 8:41 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Megan Shipley                                             Andrew B. Howk
Marion County Public Defender Agency                      John D. French
Appellate Division                                        Hall, Render, Killian, Heath &
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Lyman
                                                          Indianapolis

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Civil                                September 14, 2023
Commitment of:                                            Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-MH-2960
C.P.,
                                                          Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court
        v.                                                The Honorable Steven R.
                                                          Eichholtz, Judge
St. Vincent Hospital and Health                           The Honorable Marc J. Lloyd,
Care Center, Inc. d.b.a. St.                              Senior Judge
Vincent Stress Center,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D08-2211-MH-38929
Appellee-Petitioner

                                  Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023                       Page 1 of 16
[1]   In 2019, our Supreme Court held that a consolidated appeal of two temporary-

      commitment orders was moot where the terms of those commitments had

      expired before the appeal of those orders was ripe for appellate review. In re

      Commitment of T.W., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1042 (Ind. 2019). However, because the

      parties before the Court had not developed a record on possible “harmful

      collateral consequences” from the commitment orders aside from the terms of

      those commitments, the Court “left open the possibility that respondents in

      [temporary-commitment appeals] could seek relief” from allegedly invalid

      orders due to any such consequences. Id. at 1044 n.5; E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. &

      Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022) (per curiam).

[2]   Today, on a properly presented record, we reach the question left open by our

      Supreme Court. On these facts, we hold that the collateral consequences that

      accompany C.P.’s order of involuntary civil commitment make his appeal from

      that order not moot even though the term of his commitment has expired.

      Because meaningful effects of C.P.’s commitment will remain long after his

      appeal period has passed, and because there is still meaningful relief that can be

      had from our review of his commitment, his appeal is properly before us on its

      merits. On the merits, we conclude that the St. Vincent Stress Center presented

      sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be involuntarily

      committed for not more than ninety days. We therefore affirm the trial court’s

      judgment.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023    Page 2 of 16
      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In 2022, C.P. was twenty-one years old and owned his own construction

      business. He had also owned a handgun since he was eighteen, and he and his

      father would go to the gun range and shoot together. Around late September or

      early October 2022, C.P. seemed to be “doing fine,” according to his father. Tr.

      Vol. 2, p. 10.

[4]   However, over the ensuing four to six weeks, C.P.’s father “noticed a major

      shift” in C.P.’s “approach to things,” and C.P. suddenly seemed “very

      delusional.” Id. C.P. would say that “God [wa]s speaking to him,” and he

      would call various people, including doctors, “the devil.” Id. at 11. C.P. began

      spending money “left and right until . . . he basically” did not have “much left.”

      Id. at 11. He made “unusually large purchases,” including “a shotgun, a

      rifle, . . . two handguns, . . . two knives,” and “about $10,000 worth of tools.”

      Id. at 11-12. He also purchased a “holster that he mounted inside of his boot,”

      and he started carrying one knife on the side of his belt and the other on the

      back of his belt. Id. at 12. C.P. stated that he was “going to buy a bow and

      arrow set . . . to be silent when he shoots . . . so no one can hear it.” Id. at 13.

      C.P.’s actions along with his “delusional talking” left C.P.’s father “scared” for

      and “concerned about” C.P. Id. at 12.

[5]   Sometime after making those purchases, C.P. had an “out-of-body experience”

      where “God . . . told him to go to Florida to help the residents” there following

      a hurricane. Id. at 23, 30. C.P. then drove a truck with a trailer, his tools, and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023       Page 3 of 16
      one of his firearms to Sarasota. But then C.P. “left his truck” and the other

      items in Sarasota and, sometime later, “ended up in Orlando.” Id. at 14. He

      called his parents from a hotel, and they flew to Orlando and met him at the

      hotel. C.P. was “trying to come back” to Indiana, but he was unable to use his

      credit cards and could not pay for a hotel room or an Uber driver who had

      brought him to the hotel. Id. at 17-18. C.P.’s parents “help[ed] him out” with

      those costs and then flew him back to Indiana. Id. at 18.

[6]   In early November, C.P. drove to his old high school several days in a row

      during the high school’s basketball practices. According to C.P., he went to the

      practices to “teach these kids because I am financially free.” Id. at 36. On the

      third or fourth day in a row, he took a firearm and ammunition with him,

      which he placed in the front seat of his car.

[7]   That evening, C.P., with the assistance of his former high school basketball

      coach, checked himself into the St. Vincent Stress Center in Indianapolis.

      There, he was examined by Dr. Carl Ratliff. Dr. Ratliff observed that C.P. had

      “rapid, illogical statements and thoughts” and exhibited “grandiose delusions”

      and “religious preoccupations.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Ratliff also observed that C.P.

      exhibited a “fluctuating mood, from irritability[ and] aggressive behavior[] to

      pleasant and cooperative at very rapid shifts [that we]re difficult to predict,

      and[,] at times, difficult . . . to manage.” Id. at 23.

[8]   As an example of C.P.’s rapid and illogical statements, Dr. Ratliff later

      recounted C.P. stating that he

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023      Page 4 of 16
                want[ed] to leave the unit to return to Florida to be with his
                various employees, pick[] up his car at the DMV or he’s going to
                go to jail, visit[] his grandparents at their grave[s], as well as
                statements indicating that he has chlamydia, he needs to leave
                the unit to get treated, and[,] finally, he needs to leave the unit
                because he cannot drink the water on our unit because he can
                taste the salt.

       Id. at 22. Dr. Ratliff emphasized that it was the manner in which C.P. made

       those statements, not the substance of the statements themselves, that was

       indicative of mental illness. Specifically, Dr. Ratliff clarified that C.P.’s

       statements were all made “in one sentence,” which indicated “pressured

       speech” and “rapid, illogical thoughts . . . .” Id. at 23-24.

[9]    Regarding C.P.’s “grandiose delusions,” Dr. Ratliff recounted C.P. stating that

       “he owns at least five businesses, that he sold approximately $70,000 of stock at

       a $40,000 loss to help the residents of Florida, and that he plans on being a

       millionaire, if not[] trillionaire.” Id. at 22-23. Dr. Ratliff also noted that C.P.’s

       “religious preoccupations” include believing that God is talking directly to him,

       “that no one is able to hold the [B]ible except himself, and that he is able to

       identify devil worshippers,” which included Dr. Ratliff and a case manager. Id.

       at 23.

[10]   Dr. Ratliff diagnosed C.P. with bipolar I disorder, most recent episode manic,

       which is a mood disorder where the patient fluctuates between depressive

       episodes and episodes of mania. Dr. Ratliff concluded that C.P.’s treatment

       plan would be a medicinal regimen. However, C.P. refused to take his

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023          Page 5 of 16
       prescription medication and stated that he did not need it. Dr. Ratliff concluded

       that C.P. does not have any insight into his condition and that, if left untreated,

       C.P. would likely relapse into mania or depression.

[11]   The Stress Center then filed a petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary

       commitment. The trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the Stress Center’s

       petition, and Dr. Ratliff and C.P.’s father both testified in favor of C.P.’s

       involuntary temporary commitment. During his testimony, Dr. Ratliff stated

       that C.P.’s clinical symptoms were such that C.P. “will have a difficult time

       functioning” independently as an outpatient, that Dr. Ratliff had “concerns

       about [C.P.’s] . . . safety” because C.P.’s symptoms “will predispose him to

       poor decision-making,” and that C.P.’s access to firearms was “very

       concern[ing]” and, “potentially,” made C.P. “a danger to himself.” Id. at 26.

[12]   Similarly, C.P.’s father testified that he was concerned about C.P.’s ability to

       function independently, noting that C.P. is “not working right now,” “hasn’t

       worked in the last few weeks,” “ran out of gas twice,” and has “depleted the

       money he’s had.” Id. at 18. C.P.’s father also noted that C.P. will not listen to

       his parents and “gets really angry at us.” Id. C.P. testified against the Stress

       Center’s petition at the hearing, insisting that he was not suffering from a

       mental illness but, rather, “life.” Id. at 32.

[13]   Following the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found that C.P. is both a

       danger to himself and also is gravely disabled. The court then granted the Stress

       Center’s petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary commitment. C.P. now

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023     Page 6 of 16
       appeals that order. On February 14, 2023, six days before C.P.’s initial brief in

       our Court was due, his ninety-day term of commitment expired.

       1. Where, as here, commitment orders carry consequences
       beyond the terms of the commitments and appellate review
       can provide meaningful relief from those collateral
       consequences, appeals from expired involuntary civil
       commitment orders are not moot, and they are properly before
       us on their merits.
[14]   Indiana law provides that a trial court may order a mentally ill person who is

       dangerous or gravely disabled to be committed to a facility for either a

       temporary period of not more than ninety days or for a regular period of more

       than ninety days. Ind. Code §§ 12-26-6-1, 7-1 (2023). In 2002, a panel of this

       Court sua sponte declared that an appeal from a temporary-commitment order

       was moot because the ninety-day term of the commitment had expired by the

       time the appeal was ripe for our review, and, thus, we were unable to provide

       the respondent the relief of his release from that term of commitment. In re

       Commitment of J.B., 766 N.E.2d 795, 798-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[15]   Although the “long-standing rule in Indiana courts has been” that a moot

       appeal “will be dismissed,” instead of dismissing the J.B. panel applied a

       narrow exception for matters of “great public interest” to reach the merits of its

       appeal based on the respondent’s liberty interests in not being unlawfully

       committed. In re Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 37 (Ind. 1991); J.B., 766 N.E.2d at

       798-99. In the several years that followed the panel opinion in J.B., our Court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023     Page 7 of 16
       “routinely considered the merits” of temporary-commitment appeals by

       following the same analytical approach as the panel in J.B., namely, by

       declaring the appeals moot but nonetheless reaching their merits under the

       purportedly narrow great-public-interest exception. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467; see,

       e.g., In re Commitment of J.M., 62 N.E.3d 1208, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App 2016).

[16]   In 2019, our Supreme Court, for the first time, declared an appeal from two

       temporary-commitment orders moot because “[t]he period [of the

       commitments] . . . ha[d] passed.” T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1042. A few years later,

       our Supreme Court clarified that its opinion in T.W. was not intended to

       “disapprove of [the] practice” of applying the great-public-interest exception to

       reach the merits of temporary-commitment appeals. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 467.

       But the Court added that we are “not required to issue an opinion in every

       moot case,” that we “should avoid issuing advisory opinions,” and that each

       temporary-commitment appeal should be considered “on a case-by-case basis.”

       Id. at 465, 467. Following E.F., various panels of our Court have continued to

       dismiss some temporary-commitment appeals while other panels have

       continued to decide some of these appeals on their merits. See, e.g., In re

       Commitment of K.K., ___ N.E.3d ___, 2023 WL 4875197, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App.

       Aug. 1, 2023) (deciding the appeal on its merits); In re Commitment of J.G., 209

       N.E.3d 1206, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (dismissing the appeal as moot).

[17]   However, our Supreme Court’s opinions in this area have made it a point to

       leave open the possibility of an alternative analytical framework in which to

       reach the merits of expired involuntary civil commitment orders on appeal. In

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023    Page 8 of 16
       particular, because the parties before our Supreme Court had not developed a

       record on possible “harmful collateral consequences” from those commitment

       orders aside from the terms of those commitments, our Supreme Court “left

       open the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could

       seek relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any such consequences. E.F.,

       188 N.E.3d at 466; T.W., 121 N.E.3d at 1044 n.5. Here, C.P. properly raises for

       our review the question left open by our Supreme Court. And, on this record,

       we agree with C.P. that the collateral consequences that accompany his

       involuntary civil commitment order make his appeal from that order not moot

       even though the term of his commitment has expired.

[18]   As we have long recognized:

               An appeal or an issue becomes moot when:

                        1. it is no longer “live” or when the parties lack a legally
                        cognizable interest in the outcome;

                        2. the principal questions in issue have ceased to be
                        matters of real controversy between the parties; or

                        3. the court on appeal is unable to render effective relief upon an
                        issue.

               Haggerty v. Bloomington Board of Public Safety (1985), Ind. App.,
               474 N.E.2d 114, 115-116. Because this court decides only real
               controversies or questions, we dismiss appeals which raise moot
               or abstract propositions. Perkins v. Kocher (1988), Ind. App., 531
               N.E.2d 231, 233. However, the appeal before us is not moot. An

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023                 Page 9 of 16
               appeal may be heard . . . where leaving the judgment undisturbed might
               lead to negative collateral consequences. In Re Marriage of Stariha
               (1987), Ind. App., 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123. The reasoning behind
               this exception is that “it is far better to eliminate the source of a
               potential legal disability than to require the citizen to suffer the
               possibly unjustified consequence of the disability itself for an
               indefinite period of time.” Id.; citing Sibron v. New York (1968),
               392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917.

       Roark v. Roark, 551 N.E.2d 865, 867-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (emphases added).

[19]   Indiana’s appellate courts have applied the “collateral consequences” doctrine

       to hold that appeals are not moot where meaningful relief may still be had by

       our review of those appeals on their merits. For example, in In re S.D., our

       Supreme Court considered the validity of a Child in Need of Services

       (“CHINS”) adjudication. 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 2014). However, while the

       appeal was pending, the child was returned to her mother’s care, and the

       CHINS case was closed. Accordingly, the Indiana Department of Child

       Services (“DCS”) moved to dismiss the appeal as moot.

[20]   Our Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot based on the following

       “long-lasting collateral consequences” that accompany CHINS adjudications:

               a CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for terminating
               parental rights. Under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
               4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2013), the State may terminate parental
               rights if a child has been adjudicated [a] CHINS on two prior
               occasions, without proving either that the conditions resulting in
               a child’s removal will not be remedied or that continuing the
               parent-child relationship threatens the child’s well-being. And a
               prior CHINS finding may have adverse job consequences as well,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023      Page 10 of 16
               such as precluding Mother from employment with any DCS
               contractor. See generally Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., Ind. Child
               Welfare Policy Manual § 13.4 (2013), available at
               http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/13.4_Evaluation_of_Background_
               Checks_ for_DCS_Contractors.pdf. Similarly, a CHINS finding
               may preclude her from become a licensed foster parent. Id. at §
               13.10, available at http://www.in.
               gov/dcs/files/13_10_Evaluating_Background_Checks_for_Foste
               r_Family_Licensing. pdf. Reversal cannot change the efforts Mother
               expended in complying with the CHINS case, but it still affords her
               meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens. We therefore
               decline to find the case moot.

       Id. at 1285, 1290 (emphasis added).1

[21]   Our appellate courts have likewise repeatedly invoked the collateral-

       consequences doctrine to review the merits of appeals where the order at issue,

       if invalid and left undisturbed, could contribute to a future adverse finding

       against the appellant. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. 2012)

       (reviewing the merits of the trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated

       the conditions of his placement in community corrections due to possible

       “negative collateral consequences” from such a finding, even though the

       defendant had “served his sentence”); Hamed v. State, 852 N.E.2d 619, 622-23

       1
         Our Supreme Court’s analysis in S.D. was based on collateral consequences that attach to any CHINS
       adjudication; the analysis was not based on a showing of specific facts that the mother in S.D. was facing a
       termination petition, that she sought employment with a DCS contractor, or that she sought to become a
       licensed foster parent. Id. at 1285-86, 1290. No matter how compelling a comparison of CHINS and mental-
       health consequences may be, we limit our holding to these specific facts and need not reach the question of
       whether the same showing C.P. makes would suffice to enable appellate review of the merits of every
       involuntary civil commitment order.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023                          Page 11 of 16
       (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing the merits of an expired no contact order

       because, if a violation of the order were later alleged, it could contribute to a

       contempt proceeding or a criminal charge); Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097,

       1101 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing the merits of a post-conviction

       petition, even though the sentence for the underlying conviction had been

       served, because “convictions have collateral consequences inasmuch as

       they . . . may form the basis of a habitual offender enhancement”), trans. denied;

       McBain v. Hamilton Cnty., 744 N.E.2d 984, 987-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)

       (reviewing the merits of a tax sale, even though the original owners had

       redeemed their property, based in part on “negative collateral consequences

       that would be unjustified if the sale w[ere] invalid . . . .”); Roark, 551 N.E.2d at

       867-68 (reviewing the merits of a CHINS adjudication, despite the matter being

       closed, “because of the potentially devastating consequences” of the

       adjudication); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1987) (holding that a father’s appeal of his contempt conviction for failure to

       pay child support was not moot, even though his sentence had been served,

       because of “possible collateral consequences”); see also S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1290

       (holding that a closed CHINS case is not moot in part because a CHINS

       adjudication can result in “relax[ing] the State’s burden for terminating parental

       rights”).

[22]   We agree with C.P. that the order for his involuntary civil commitment carries

       significant negative collateral consequences from which appellate review may

       afford him meaningful relief. In particular, federal law prohibits a person who

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023    Page 12 of 16
       has been committed to a mental institution from knowingly possessing a

       firearm, the violation of which may result in a fifteen-year sentence. 18 U.S.C.

       §§ 922(g)(4), 924(a)(8) (2022). Likewise, Indiana law generally prohibits a

       person who has been involuntarily committed from knowingly or intentionally

       carrying a handgun, the violation of which can be a Class A misdemeanor or a

       Level 5 felony. I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5(a)(3)(B), (b)(7)(C), (e) (2022). Here, the record

       is clear that C.P. has long exercised his right to possess a handgun, having

       owned at least one since he was eighteen and having spent time shooting it at

       gun ranges with his father. Thus, the collateral consequence of C.P.’s loss of his

       right to lawfully possess a handgun makes his appeal worthy of appellate

       review.2

[23]   For all of these reasons, we reach the question that our Supreme Court left open

       in T.W. and E.F., we decline to follow the sua sponte analysis of J.B. here, and

       we hold that C.P.’s appeal from his expired involuntary civil commitment order

       is not moot but, rather, is properly before us on its merits based on the negative

       collateral consequences that accompany that order. We therefore turn to the

       merits of this appeal.

       2
         C.P. also argues that a history of commitments itself is a collateral consequence that enables appellate
       review, noting that Indiana Code section 12-26-3-9 expressly restricts the type of commitment a trial court
       may order based on the respondent’s history of commitments and that our Court has likewise recognized that
       a “history of mental illness requiring hospitalizations” may be probative of whether a person is “gravely
       disabled and should be involuntarily committed.” Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
       trans. Denied. However compelling this argument may be, since we hold that C.P.’s loss of his right to
       lawfully possess a handgun is sufficient to enable appellate review of his commitment, we need not consider
       this additional possible basis for reviewing the merits of his commitment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023                         Page 13 of 16
       2. The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to support
       C.P.’s temporary commitment.
[24]   We thus turn to C.P.’s argument on appeal that the Stress Center failed to

       present sufficient evidence to support his temporary commitment. In our review

       of such issues, we consider “only that evidence most favorable to the judgment,

       along with” the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re Commitment of T.K., 27

       N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up). We will not reweigh the evidence or

       reassess witness credibility on appeal. Id. at 273. It is the petitioner’s burden in

       the trial court to support the petition for an involuntary civil commitment by

       clear and convincing evidence. Id.

[25]   To support its petition for C.P.’s involuntary temporary commitment, the Stress

       Center was required to show that C.P. was (1) mentally ill; (2) either dangerous

       or gravely disabled; and (3) that his commitment was appropriate. I.C. § 12-26-

       2-5(e) (2022) (emphasis added). On appeal, C.P. challenges only whether the

       Stress Center’s evidence was sufficient to show that he was either dangerous or

       gravely disabled. As the Stress Center’s burden on that element was disjunctive,

       we need only consider whether the Stress Center’s evidence was sufficient to

       show that C.P. was gravely disabled.

[26]   The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to show that C.P. was gravely

       disabled. According to Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 (2022), “gravely

       disabled,” as relevant here, “means a condition in which an individual, as a

       result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the

       individual . . . has a substantial impairment . . . of that individual’s judgment,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023     Page 14 of 16
       reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual’s inability to function

       independently.”

[27]   The Stress Center presented sufficient evidence to satisfy that definition. C.P.

       suffered a rapid deterioration of his sense of reality, going from “fine” to “very

       delusional” in a matter of four to six weeks. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. C.P. believed that

       God was talking to him and that his caregivers were the devil or devil

       worshipers. He began experiencing very rapid mood swings, from irritable and

       aggressive to pleasant and cooperative, which sudden shifts were difficult for

       skilled caregivers to predict and manage.

[28]   He began spending unusually large amounts of money to the point that he had

       none left. He purchased multiple weapons and began carrying them around,

       including to a local high school and across state lines. Believing he was

       following God’s directions, he drove himself to Sarasota, Florida, with a truck,

       tools, and a firearm, only to end up in Orlando without his personal property

       and without access to money. C.P.’s parents ended up flying to Orlando,

       covered C.P.’s expenses, and then flew him back to Indiana.

[29]   At the time of the fact-finding hearing on the Stress Center’s petition, C.P. was

       not working and appeared to be unable to provide for basic needs such as gas

       for his car. He had started becoming unusually angry at his parents. He refused

       to acknowledge his mental illness and refused to take prescribed medication.

       Ultimately, Dr. Ratliff opined that C.P.’s mental illness was such that C.P.

       “will have a difficult time functioning” independently as an outpatient, and Dr.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023    Page 15 of 16
       Ratliff had “concerns about [C.P.’s] . . . safety” because C.P.’s symptoms “will

       predispose him to poor decision-making.” Id. at 26. We hold that a reasonable

       fact-finder could conclude from those facts that C.P. was gravely disabled.

[30]   Still, C.P. asserts that the Stress Center’s evidence was insufficient to show that

       he was “in danger of coming to harm,” as required under Indiana Code section

       12-7-2-96. But we cannot agree. The Stress Center’s evidence readily supported

       the trial court’s conclusion, and C.P.’s argument to the contrary is merely a

       request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. We affirm

       the trial court’s judgment.

       Conclusion
[31]   In sum, we hold that C.P.’s appeal of his temporary-commitment order is not

       moot, even though the term of his commitment has expired, based on the

       collateral consequences that accompany his order of involuntary civil

       commitment. On the merits of this appeal, we hold that the Stress Center

       presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order that C.P. be

       committed for not more than ninety days. Accordingly, we affirm the trial

       court’s judgment.

[32]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MH-2960 | September 14, 2023   Page 16 of 16