Court Opinion

ID: 9846263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:38:08.215571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:37.925226
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, State’s counsel urges that defendant’s motion as to the witnesses was too general to be treated as a motion to sequester. The trial judge did not experience any difficulty in so interpreting the motion, because he used this language: "All right, the rule of sequestration has been asked for for both sides, which means all witnesses must remain outside the courtroom during the progress of the trial. . .” (Emphasis supplied.)
Next, State’s counsel urges that defendant waived the right to complain by failing to object to the witness testifying when called to the stand. There was nothing that could have been done to prevent the witness from testifying. A party has the absolute right to place his witnesses on the stand even in cases when they deliberately violate the rule of sequestration. Howard v. Echols, 31 Ga. App. 420 (120 SE 815); Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 (1) (141 SE2d 776); Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398 (6) (154 SE2d 803). If defendant had objected to the witness testifying, the trial court would have been required to overrule said objection. A party is never required to do a vain and useless thing before undertaking to assert his rights. Finney v. Blalock, 206 Ga. 655, 660 (58 SE2d 429). State’s counsel cites several cases on this point but each of them deals with the question of introduction of testimony, whereas in the case sub judice we do not reach that point; the *317error here committed was in that the trial judge refused to grant the right of sequestration as to the State’s witnesses, when motion was made therefor by defendant’s counsel, under Code § 38-1703, and then refused to grant defendant’s motion that the witness who was allowed to remain in the courtroom be first sworn, so he would not be permitted to hear the testimony of the other witnesses for the State before delivering his own testimony.
It is quite true that the trial judge has broad discretion in such matters, but no facts appear in the record on which he could premise his discretion, and more important, the record shows he did not exercise discretion in his rulings.
State’s counsel did not request the presence of the witness so the witness might aid in the prosecution; he merely stated that "I would like to have permission to have Detective Burgess sit at the table. He helped to conduct the investigation, and I’d like to call him as a witness.” (Emphasis supplied.) Such language suggests that the only reason for wanting the witness to sit at the table was so he would be readily available when called upon to testify.
Then when defendant’s counsel moved to require the witness to be first sworn if the trial judge were going to permit him to remain in the courtroom (Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538, 542) State’s counsel argued that the law did not require that the witness be first sworn, but that it would make better sense to the jury "if I were to put him up in order.” He did nothing to advise the trial judge or opposing counsel as to what he meant by "in order,” nor at what point in the case he would be sworn, nor was anything stated to show why he could not be sworn first. The trial judge then ruled: "Well, the law states that it is a discretionary matter, but you’re entitled to have with you a witness who aids in the prosecution of the case, and also it’s been the policy in this court in every case that you be allowed to place the witness during the particular order of the proof that you desire.” (Emphasis supplied.) These rulings were erroneous, because: a. State’s counsel was not entitled to have such witness with him; it was a discretionary matter and unless the situation was one on which the discretion of the judge could properly rest, the witness was not entitled to remain in the courtroom, b. Absolutely no statement was made to show that the witness was needed to "aid in the prosecution of the *318case.” c. The trial judge refused to exercise any discretion as to whether he would require the witness to be first sworn (see Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538, 542, supra), but simply followed his "policy” (which policy he followed "in every case”) of allowing the State’s counsel to use any order of proof that he desired, without regard to its propriety or clarity in that order. It has been held repeatedly by the appellate courts of Georgia that where a judge has a discretion, he must exercise that discretion, and his failure to use that discretion is error. Sanders v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 225 Ga. 796 (171 SE2d 539); Cotton States Seed &c. Co. v. Macon D. & S. R. Co., 23 Ga. App. 206 (98 SE 108); Scribner v. Adams, 36 Ga. App. 754, 756 (138 SE 264).
Once the rule of sequestration is invoked, it is mandatory that said rule of sequestration be complied with by the court. Montos v. State, 212 Ga. 764, 765 (95 SE2d 792).