Court Opinion

ID: 9725157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:33:04.351955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:11.423160
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THEIS, specially concurring: I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case, but because I disagree with its analysis on three issues, I specially concur. First, I disagree with the majority’s treatment of defendant’s argument concerning the witness identification jury instruction. In that discussion, the majority cites to only one case to support its holding that the version of IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15 used in this case was not erroneous and, in doing so, ignores a wealth of contrary authority. This court has repeatedly held that the use of the word “or” in between each of the five factors the jury could consider when determining the reliability of a witness’ identification in IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15 was error. See People v. Briones, 352 Ill. App. 3d 913, 920, 816 N.E.2d 1120, 1126 (2004); People v. Carrero, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 801 N.E.2d 1084, 1093 (2003); People v. Smith, 341 Ill. App. 3d 530, 546, 794 N.E.2d 367, 383 (2003); People v. Saraceno, 341 Ill. App. 3d 108, 113-16, 791 N.E.2d 1239, 1243-46 (2003); People v. Brookins, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1083, 777 N.E.2d 676, 682 (2002); People v. Mercado, 333 in. App. 3d 994, 999-1000, 777 N.E.2d 641, 645-46 (2002); People v. Furdge, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1032, 774 N.E.2d 415, 426 (2002); People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d 629, 639-41, 761 N.E.2d 198, 207-08 (2001). See also People v. Waters, 328 Ill. App. 3d 117, 130-31, 764 N.E.2d 1194, 1205 (2002).1 Despite the fact that defendant cites many of these cases in his brief, the majority fails to distinguish, or even acknowledge, them. While Tisley disagrees with these cases and holds that the giving of IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15 with disjunctive language was not erroneous, no case has followed this holding in Tisley and, in fact, this holding has been criticized and rejected by one panel of this court in Carrero. Carrero, 345 Ill. App. 3d at 11, 801 N.E.2d at 1092-93. Additionally, I note that the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases amended this jury instruction in 2003 and removed the bracketed word “or” between the factors. The Committee Note now instructs trial courts not to use “or” or “and” between the factors where more than one factor is used. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.15, Committee Note (4th ed. Supp. 2003). I agree with Gonzalez and its progeny and would hold that the use of IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15 with the bracketed word “or” in this case constituted error. However, I agree with the majority that defendant waived this issue by not objecting to this instruction or including this issue in his posttrial motion. Although the law is unsettled as to which plain error test is appropriate in this situation (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 451(c) (addressing when “substantial defects” in jury instructions can be addressed despite waiver); People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295, 299, 821 N.E.2d 233, 236 (2004) (finding that the plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to address defects affecting substantial rights if the evidence is closely balanced or if fundamental fairness so requires); Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 348, 788 N.E.2d at 1124 (applying the federal plain error test)), I would find that based on the evidence presented in this case, this error does not rise to the level of plain error under any of these tests. Thus, although I would find that the jury instruction given was erroneous, I agree with the majority that the issue is waived. Additionally, I must comment on defendant’s argument that the State improperly used Fomond’s prior consistent statement as substantive evidence. During the jury instruction conference, the assistant State’s Attorney assured the trial court that she was not introducing the statement “as substantive evidence.” However, she in fact did use this statement substantively when she admitted the statement into evidence, gave it to the jury during its deliberations, and argued the truth of that statement during closing arguments. Additionally at the jury instruction conference, the prosecutor tendered IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.11, which, she indicated, would explain to the jury not to use this statement substantively. However, IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.11 concerns the use of prior inconsistent statements and makes no mention of prior consistent statements. IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.11. In fact, the instruction is entitled “Prior Inconsistent Statements” and the Committee Note clearly states that this instruction should be used when the jury heard earlier inconsistent statements. IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.11 Committee Note. Thus, this instruction was inappropriate here where the issue concerned solely Fomond’s prior consistent statement. However, despite the fact that the State offered, and the trial court gave, the incorrect jury instruction, I find this issue to be waived where defense counsel did not offer his own jury instruction and in fact, agreed with the State to tender IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.11. Additionally, I must address one comment made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. The majority never specifically addresses this comment, finding that nearly all alleged improper comments were waived when defendant failed to object to them. The majority also finds that all of the complained-of comments were not improper. However, because I find that this comment was blatantly improper, I must mention it here. In closing argument, while addressing the fact that Lockhart failed to identify defendant until two years after the murder, the prosecutor argued: “[Lockhart] walked in[to the gas station], and she saw somebody she knew, that man right there (indicating) Antoine Smith, somebody she knew from the Evanston area. And she knew that he knew her as well. So, we are not talking about a one-way identification here. She told you their eyes met. They looked straight at each other. But she was so overwrought with fear. The best she could do is give [the police] some statements, some description, something, because she knew that she knew the offender in this case, and she knew he knew her as well. She looked at Antoine, and she recognized him, and he recognized her and she ran out.” (Emphasis added.) These comments were improper because they are clearly not based upon the evidence in this case. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 115, 803 N.E.2d 405, 440 (2003). With respect to this subject, Lockhart testified solely that she looked at defendant and he looked at her. While she recognized him, Lockhart never testified that defendant recognized her or that he knew her. Because these comments were not based on the evidence, I disagree with the majority and would find they were improper. However, I ultimately agree with the majority that such comments were waived. Accordingly, I concur with the result of the majority in affirming this case.   This issue is currently pending in the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Herron, No. 1-01-3889 (November 7, 2002) (unpublished under Supreme Court Rule 23), appeal allowed, 207 Ill. 2d 617 (2004).