Court Opinion

ID: 9966167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 09:09:58.787608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.420261
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 30, 2024

                                 In The

                           Court of Appeals
                                 For The

                       First District of Texas
                          ————————————
                           NO. 01-23-00575-CV
                         ———————————
      LANA M. STRANGE AND ROBERT F. STRANGE, Appellants
                                   V.
 DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE, IN
TRUST FOR REGISTERED HOLDERS OF LONG BEACH MORTGAGE
LOAN TRUST 2004-4, ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-4,
                           Appellee

           On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1
                         Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 1201046

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

     Appellants Lana M. Strange and Robert F. Strange challenge the trial

court’s judgment entered in favor of Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust
Company1 in Deutsche Bank’s forcible detainer action against Appellants.

Deutsche Bank moves to dismiss the appeal, arguing that because Appellants have

been evicted from the property at issue, their appeal is moot. Appellants respond

that a bankruptcy stay precluded the trial court from issuing the writ of possession

pursuant to which they were evicted. Thus, they argue, they were wrongfully

evicted from the property and their appeal is not moot.

      We agree with Deutsche Bank that Appellants’ appeal is moot. We thus

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                    Background

      Appellants purchased property in Houston’s Tanglewood subdivision in

May 2004. The security instrument executed by Appellants in connection with

their purchase of the property states:

      If the Property is sold [in a foreclosure sale], Borrower or any person
      holding possession of the Property through Borrower shall
      immediately surrender possession of the Property to the purchaser at
      that sale. If possession is not surrendered, Borrower or such person
      shall be a tenant at sufferance and may be removed by writ of
      possession.

Deutsche Bank acquired the property at a foreclosure sale in April 2022. Months

later, upon discovering that Appellants were still living at the property, Deutsche

Bank served Appellants with a written notice to vacate pursuant to Section 24.001

1
      Appellee’s full name is Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in
      Trust for Registered Holders of Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2004-4, Asset
      Backed Certificates, Series 2004-4.
                                          2
of the Texas Property Code. Despite the notice, Appellants refused to surrender

possession.

      Deutsche Bank twice filed a Complaint for Forcible Detainer and Original

Petition against Appellants in the Justice of the Peace Court.            The first suit

resulted in judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank, which Appellants appealed to the

County Court at Law.        According to Deutsche Bank, the appeal “got ‘lost’

somewhere along the way” and the trial court’s judgment “went stale, thereby

prompting [Deutsche Bank] to file another lawsuit.” In the second lawsuit, the

Justice of the Peace Court again found in favor of Deutsche Bank and Appellants

appealed to the County Court at Law for a trial de novo.2

      Deutsche Bank filed a motion for summary judgment in the County Court,

arguing it had a superior right to possession of the property because (1) it

purchased the property at a foreclosure auction in April 2022, (2) Appellants

became tenants at sufferance when Deutsche Bank bought the property, (3)

Deutsche Bank properly gave notice to Appellants to vacate the property, and (4)

Appellants refused to vacate the property.3 Deutsche Bank argued that its lawsuit

2
      See Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 433–34 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“Any party dissatisfied with a justice-court
      judgment in such a [forcible detainer] suit may appeal to the county court, in
      which trial is de novo.”).
3
      To establish a superior right to immediate possession in a forcible detainer action,
      the purchaser of a foreclosed property must prove:

                                           3
was not barred by res judicata, because Appellants’ corresponding appeal had

been “lost” resulting in the judgment becoming stale thus necessitating a second

lawsuit. Appellants responded arguing only that res judicata precluded the trial

court from granting summary judgment in favor of Deutsche Bank. Appellants

did not address the merits of Deutsche Bank’s forcible detainer action.

      The County Court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion for summary judgment

on July 6, 2023. Five days later, on July 11, 2023, Robert Strange filed a petition

for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, triggering an

automatic stay of all proceedings in the County Court, subject to certain

exceptions.4,5 On July 12, 2023, Deutsche Bank requested that the court issue a

             (1) it has a landlord-tenant relationship with the borrower; (2) it
             purchased the property at foreclosure; (3) it gave proper notice to the
             occupants of the property to vacate; and (4) the occupants refused to
             vacate the premises.
      Trimble v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 516 S.W.3d 24, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ezell, 410 S.W.3d 919,
      921–22 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2013, no pet.)).
4
      See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (discussing automatic stay and exceptions thereto).
5
      Lana Strange did not file a bankruptcy petition. However, to the extent a stay
      was in effect for Robert Strange, it would apply to her as well. See Lovall v.
      Chao, No. 01-02-01019-CV, 2005 WL 110372, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
      Dist.] Jan. 20, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hen one spouse is in bankruptcy
      proceedings and a forcible detainer action is filed against the non-bankrupt
      spouse, the stay would apply to both spouses.”); Marroquin v. D & N Funding,
      Inc., 943 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1997, no writ)
      (holding stay of forcible detainer action against wife, who sought bankruptcy
      protection, also applied to husband, who did not file bankruptcy petition); cf. In re
      Small, 286 S.W.3d 525, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2009, no pet.)
                                            4
writ of possession. On July 14, 2023, Robert Strange filed a Notice of Bankruptcy

in the trial court reflecting the automatic stay.6 That same day, the County Court

issued a writ of possession to Deutsche Bank. Deutsche Bank did not enforce the

writ until after the bankruptcy stay was lifted.

        Appellants filed their notice of appeal on August 3, 2023. They did not

post a supersedeas bond. The bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay on

September 13, 2023 and Deutsche Bank had the writ served on Appellants the

following day. Appellants were evicted on September 18, 2023. Following the

eviction, Deutsche Bank moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal is moot

because Appellants have been evicted from the property. In response, Appellants

argued their appeal is not moot because the issuance of Deutsche Bank’s writ of

possession violated the automatic stay imposed when Robert Strange sought

bankruptcy protection and thus, they were wrongfully evicted. Deutsche Bank

replied arguing the bankruptcy stay did not apply to the writ of possession because

as a result of the foreclosure sale, Appellants became tenants at sufferance under

the relevant security instrument, thus triggering an exception to the bankruptcy

stay.

        (orig. proceeding) (noting bankruptcy court’s order provided all community
        property was property of bankruptcy estate even though wife did not file
        bankruptcy petition).
6
        It is unclear whether the writ of possession was issued before Appellants filed
        their Notice of Bankruptcy, or vice versa. The docketing sheet in the record lists
        the issuance of the writ before the Notice of Bankruptcy.
                                            5
                                   Discussion

A.    Mootness

      When a defendant fails to file a supersedeas bond, “the judgment in a

forcible entry and detainer action may be enforced and a writ of possession may be

executed, evicting the defendant from the property.”        Richardson v. Daka

Investments, LLC, No. 02-20-00360-CV, 2021 WL 4621762, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Oct. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Brigandi v. Am. Mortg. Inv.

Partners Fund I Tr., No. 02-16-00444-CV, 2017 WL 1428726, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. dism’d) (mem. op.)). The appeal from a forcible

entry and detainer action “becomes moot upon an appellant’s eviction from the

property unless the appellant asserts a potentially meritorious claim of right to

current possession of the property or unless damages or attorney’s fees remain at

issue.” Id. (citing Gillespie v. Erker, No. 02-20-00331-CV, 2021 WL 733084, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)); Soza v. Fed.

Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-11-00568-CV, 2013 WL 3148616, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 18, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When . . . the

appellant is no longer in possession of the subject property, the appeal from the

forcible-detainer action becomes moot unless the appellant holds and asserts ‘a

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession’ of the

                                        6
property.”) (citing Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d

782, 787 (Tex. 2006)).

      We lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy. See State

ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (“When a case becomes moot,

the court loses jurisdiction and cannot hear the case, because any decision would

constitute an advisory opinion that is ‘outside the jurisdiction conferred by Texas

Constitution article II, section 1.’”); Ex parte Huerta, 582 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d) (“A court of appeals has no jurisdiction to decide

moot controversies and issue advisory opinions.”) (citation omitted); see also Olley

v. HVM, L.L.C., 449 S.W.3d 572, 576–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,

pet. denied) (holding after eviction, no justiciable controversy existed, appeal was

moot, and dismissal was warranted because appellate court lacked jurisdiction);

Holloway v. Revelstoke Venture, LLC, No. 02-23-00375-CV, 2024 WL 191221, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“Because

[appellant] no longer has possession of the property, her appeal is moot, and we

have no jurisdiction over her appeal.”).

B.    Bankruptcy Stay

      In their combination appellate brief and response to Deutsche Bank’s

motion to dismiss, Appellants argue only that their appeal is not moot because the

trial court issued the writ of possession after Robert Strange sought Chapter 13

                                           7
bankruptcy protection and while the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. §

362(a)(1) was in effect. Deutsche Bank responds that the automatic stay did not

apply to its forcible detainer action and that it obtained a ruling from the

bankruptcy court to that effect, which Deutsche Bank attached to its reply.

      “When a defendant files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay goes into

effect and abates judicial proceedings against that party.” Lovall v. Chao, No. 01-

02-01019-CV, 2005 WL 110372, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 20,

2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 604 (Tex.

2000)). There are limits, however, to the protection afforded by a bankruptcy

stay. Relevant to this appeal, the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not operate

as a stay

      of the continuation of any eviction, unlawful detainer action, or
      similar proceeding by a lessor against a debtor involving residential
      property in which the debtor resides as a tenant under a lease or rental
      agreement and with respect to which the lessor has obtained before
      the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a judgment for
      possession of such property against the debtor[.]

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(22). To that end, we take judicial notice7 of the bankruptcy

court’s holding that the bankruptcy stay was inapplicable to the issuance of the

7
      We may take judicial notice of a fact “capable of accurate and ready
      determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
      questioned.” TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). See Ramey v. Bank of New York, No. 14-
      06-00824-CV, 2010 WL 2853887, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July
      22, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (taking judicial notice that bankruptcy court
      annulled stay for period of time covering foreclosure sale, thus validating sale).

                                          8
writ of possession against Appellants because they were tenants in sufferance at

the time the bankruptcy proceeding commenced. During a hearing on Deutsche

Bank’s motion for a “comfort order,”8 the bankruptcy court held that the

bankruptcy stay was not applicable to Deutsche Bank’s forcible detainer action

against Appellants. It held that the exception to the stay described in “[11 U.S.C.

Section 362] (b) (22) would apply based upon the language of the contract, tenant

in sufferance.   That’s what the contract said.”         Thus the bankruptcy court

implicitly held that the stay did not preclude the issuance of the writ of possession

in Deutsche Bank’s forcible detainer action.9

      Because the bankruptcy court concluded the automatic stay did not apply to

the forcible detainer action, and Appellants have now been evicted from the

property, we must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction unless Appellants have

asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current possession of the

property.

C.    Meritorious Claim for Right to Current Possession

      In a forcible detainer action, evicted Appellants may still pursue an appeal

if they have advanced a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual
8
      A party may seek relief from a bankruptcy court in the form of a “comfort order”
      to affirm an automatic stay does not apply to a certain circumstance. See In re
      AMRCO, Inc., 496 B.R. 442, 444 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013).
9
      The bankruptcy judge stated during the hearing that even if Section 362(b)(22)
      were not applicable, he would have lifted the stay “for cause” pursuant to Section
      362(d)(1).

                                          9
possession of the property. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787 (in forcible detainer

action, appellant’s giving up possession of premises “did not moot [appellant’s]

appeal so long as appellate relief was not futile; that is, so long as [appellant] held

and asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession”

of premises); see also Gallien v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 01-07-

00075-CV, 2008 WL 4670465, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23,

2008, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (“If the evicted party claiming possession has

a potentially meritorious claim to possess the residential premises, [] displacement

by eviction does not render the appeal moot.”).

      Appellants have not presented a potentially meritorious claim of right to

current possession. Indeed, they have presented nothing for our review. In their

appellate brief, Appellants argue only that they were wrongfully evicted due to the

bankruptcy stay, which argument they advance in response to Deutsche Bank’s

argument of mootness. They present no other argument.

      In addition, their four-paragraph brief is deficient because it lacks most of

the required elements under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The brief

does not contain a section identifying the parties and counsel, a table of contents,

an index of authorities, a statement of the case, issues presented, a statement of

facts supported by record references, or a summary of the argument. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(a) (identity of parties and counsel), (b) (table of contents), (c) (index

                                          10
of authorities), (d) (statement of the case), (f) (issues presented), (g) (statement of

facts), and (h) (summary of the argument).

      The scant argument in the brief lacks also citations to the record or to any

authority other than a citation to one section of the Bankruptcy Code. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(a)(i) (stating argument must contain “appropriate citations to

authorities and to the record”). “Only when we are provided with proper briefing

may we discharge our responsibility to review the appeal and make a decision that

disposes of the appeal one way or the other.” In re Marriage of Sauls & Worley,

648 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, no pet.) (citation omitted)

(holding inadequate briefing presented nothing for our review); see also Trammell

v. Frost Nat’l Bank, No. 01-05-00216-CV, 2006 WL 3513596, at *1–2 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 7, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding brief that

did not contain record citations for given issue waived issue, stating, “A party

asserting error on appeal bears the burden of showing that the record supports the

contention raised and of specifying the place in the record where matters upon

which it relies or of which it complains are shown.”) (citing Sisters of Charity of

Incarnate Word, Hous., Tex. v. Gobert, 992 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.)).

                                          11
      In light of the foregoing deficiencies, we hold Appellants waived their

arguments and have not presented a potentially meritorious claim of right to

current, actual possession of the property. Their appeal is thus moot.

                                   Conclusion

      We grant Deutsche Bank’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

                                             Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Countiss, and Rivas-Molloy.

                                        12