Court Opinion

ID: 9950587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:25.038983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:31.938057
License: Public Domain

TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2022-SC-0426-OA

        IN RE: JOSEPH “JS” FLYNN, PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT CLERK

                             OPINION AND ORDER

      This is an original action to consider whether Joseph “JS” Flynn should

be removed as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk. After careful consideration and

review of the entirety of the three-day hearing before the Special Commissioner,

we find removal warranted and thus remove Flynn as Pulaski Circuit Court

Clerk and declare that office vacant.

                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

      Joseph “JS” Flynn was appointed Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk in 2016

and elected to that office in 2018. One circuit clerk is elected by the citizens in

each Kentucky county, and his or her position involves the important

responsibility of managing the court records, scheduling juries, and receiving

court fines and costs for the Court of Justice. In many counties, this also

entails hiring deputy clerks to assist with these duties. Tabitha Burnett was

hired as a full-time deputy clerk in the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk’s office in

2018, a position she held until voluntarily leaving in February 2023.

      On March 23, 2022, Burnett filed a complaint against Flynn with the

Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) alleging several incidents in which

Flynn engaged in inappropriate workplace behavior. While Flynn contested
many of Burnett’s allegations, by his own admission he engaged in a brief

sexual relationship with Burnett, his subordinate, in late 2021. Flynn

acknowledges he did not report this relationship and the resulting conflict of

interest as required. Flynn also does not dispute that he physically poked

some of his employees in the office on work time to tease or scare them. He

further acknowledges yelling and cursing at office staff in front of the public in

March of 2022.

      There were other allegations brought against Flynn both by Burnett and

a co-worker and deputy clerk, Ashley Haste. Other than the admitted conduct

outlined above, Burnett also alleged that two to three years prior, she went to

lunch with Flynn and another co-worker Hanna Garner. Burnett further

alleged that while riding back from the lunch in Garner’s car, Flynn pulled

Burnett from the front seat into the back seat of the vehicle, forcefully kissed

her on the face and neck, pulled up her shirt and kissed her breast, and

exposed himself, all while Garner and Burnett screamed for him to stop. Flynn

denies the incident occurred, pointing out that he has two fourteen-inch

surgically inserted rods in his back he contends would make it physically

impossible for him to engage in the conduct described by Burnett.

      Burnett further alleged in her complaint to AOC that for years, Flynn

would rub her back, hair, and legs in the office. Burnett also alleged that in

one incident, Flynn put his hand up her dress in front of her co-worker Haste

and a bailiff, Junior Fortenberry. Haste has served as an administrative

                                        2
support specialist for the Pulaski District Court for fourteen years. Flynn

denies this incident occurred.

      Finally, Burnett also alleged that the day before she filed her complaint,

Flynn pushed her out of an office, slammed the door in her face, slammed the

door in Haste’s face, and then proceeded to curse and yell in Haste’s face,

causing a customer to cry. Burnett stated she was afraid to go to work

because she felt threatened and was verbally and sexually harassed by Flynn.

      On March 23, 2022, Haste also filed a complaint against Flynn with

AOC. In her complaint, Haste largely repeated Burnett’s allegation regarding

Flynn screaming and cursing at Haste in front of office staff and the public.

Flynn acknowledges that he yelled and cursed at Haste and that such conduct

was unprofessional. Flynn asserts his conduct was in reaction to Burnett and

Haste repeatedly interrupting an important meeting, Haste telling him that he

was always in a meeting, and Haste accidentally bumping him in the face with

the door.

      This Court placed Flynn on paid investigative leave while AOC

investigated the complaints. On June 24, 2022, the AOC Director provided

both the Chief Justice and the Circuit Court Clerks Conduct Commission (the

“Commission”) with a report concluding based upon AOC’s investigation that

Flynn had engaged in unlawful workplace harassment and retaliation and had

                                        3
created a hostile work environment. On September 19, 2022, the Commission

referred the allegations against Flynn to this Court for further proceedings. 1

       By Order entered September 26, 2022, this Court instituted removal

proceedings against Flynn. We referred the matter to a Special Commissioner

to hold an evidentiary hearing, develop a full factual record, and make findings

of fact and recommendations. Upon our invitation and request, the Attorney

General served as Special Advocate to represent the interests of the

Commonwealth in those proceedings. We ordered that Flynn be allowed to

confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence on his behalf, and

to be represented by counsel at all stages.

       The Special Commissioner held a three-day evidentiary hearing

beginning on May 10, 2023. The Special Commissioner assigned the burden of

proof to the Special Advocate to show by clear and convincing evidence that

Flynn’s removal from office is warranted. Both the Special Advocate and Flynn

presented numerous witnesses and documentary evidence during the course of

the evidentiary hearing, the record and proceedings of which we have reviewed

in full.

       On July 7, 2023, the Special Commissioner filed her Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Recommendations with this Court. The Special

Commissioner concluded that Flynn created a hostile work environment by

      1 The Commission has authority to recommend disciplinary actions and remedial

measures for circuit court clerks to the Chief Justice. Administrative Procedures of the
Court of Justice, Part XVI, § 6. However, the Commission does not have authority to
impose such actions or measures itself.
                                           4
physically assaulting Burnett in the vehicle incident, reaching under her dress

in the workplace, otherwise flirting with and touching her in the office against

her wishes, and making sexual comments to her. The Special Commissioner

found that Flynn also created a hostile work environment by pinching other

female employees on the back below their bra while making statements such as

“let daddy feel your bacon” and asking them to call him “daddy.” Flynn

acknowledges pinching employees to “scare” them but denies making reference

to “bacon.”

      The Special Commissioner further found that Flynn engaged in acts of

quid pro quo harassment because although Flynn and Burnett had a brief

sexual relationship, Flynn’s conduct toward Burnett changed markedly after

she told him she was uninterested in a relationship. More particularly, the

Special Commissioner found that Flynn became angry with Burnett, gave her

the “cold shoulder,” assigned supervision of her to a chief deputy clerk to avoid

contact with her, and referred to her in numerous derogatory terms in front of

employees and courthouse personnel.

      The Special Commissioner also found that Flynn violated his duty to act

with courtesy and respect when he screamed at Haste in front of office staff

and the public and more generally by his periodic outbursts of anger when

employees would make mistakes. Finally, the Special Commissioner concluded

Flynn violated policy when he failed to report the conflict of interest that arose

from the relationship he formed with his subordinate employee Burnett.

                                         5
        Flynn and the Special Advocate have now filed briefs with this Court.

Following careful review of the briefs, the entirety of the three-day evidentiary

hearing conducted by the Special Commissioner, and the record, we conclude

Flynn’s removal from the office of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is warranted.

                                    ANALYSIS

   I.      Proceedings For Removal of A Circuit Court Clerk.

        The Kentucky Constitution vests authority for removal of a circuit court

clerk with this Court: “The clerks of the Circuit Court shall be removable from

office by the Supreme Court upon good cause shown.” Ky. Const. § 114(3).

When duty requires us to consider exercising this authority, we proceed in an

original action in which we serve as the ultimate finder of fact and adjudicator.

See In re Overstreet, 851 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Ky. 1993). Our practice is to

appoint a Special Commissioner to conduct any evidentiary hearings required

for resolution of an original action for removal of a circuit court clerk. See id.

Additionally, our practice is to appoint a Special Advocate to represent the

interests of the Commonwealth in such proceedings. In this case, we

appointed retired Judge Jean Chenault Logue to serve as Special

Commissioner, and the Attorney General’s office to serve as Special Advocate.

        Before Commissioner Logue, Flynn and the Special Advocate disputed

who should bear the burden of proof. Flynn asserted the burden was on the

Special Advocate to show good cause for his removal, while the Special

Advocate asserted the burden was on Flynn to show good cause why he should

                                         6
not be removed. Commissioner Logue concluded the Special Advocate bears

the burden of proof to show good cause for Flynn’s removal. We agree.

      The language of the Kentucky Constitution is plain: we may remove a

circuit court clerk for “good cause shown.” Though this phrasing is passive

and thus does not specify who must show good cause, the circuit court clerk

would of course have no interest in showing good cause for his removal.

Rather, the only logical reading of the provision is that the party seeking

removal, e.g., the Special Advocate, bears the burden of showing good cause for

the clerk’s removal. Moreover, this allocation of the burden of proof to the

party seeking removal of an elected official properly recognizes the gravity of

such proceedings. Requiring the Special Advocate to show good cause is also

consistent with the rules applicable to civil actions more generally. See CR 2

43.01(2) (“The burden of proof in the whole action lies on the party who would

be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.”).

      As such, in original actions to consider removal of a circuit court clerk

pursuant to Section 114 of the Kentucky Constitution, the burden of proof is

on the Special Advocate to show good cause for removal of the clerk. That is,

the Special Advocate must show “a legal cause which affects the ability and

fitness” of the clerk “to perform the duties of the office.” Nicholson v. Jud. Ret.

& Removal Comm’n, 562 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky. 1978). The circuit court clerk of

course must also be afforded an opportunity to rebut such a showing once it is

made. See Overstreet, 851 S.W.2d at 460 (finding removal of circuit court

      2 Rule of Civil Procedure.

                                         7
clerk warranted where clerk had “not provided a reasonable explanation” for

deficiencies in discharging the duties of his office).

      In the proceedings before Commissioner Logue, the parties also disputed

the evidentiary standard applicable to circuit court clerk removal proceedings.

Flynn argued that good cause for removal must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence, while the Special Advocate asserted the evidentiary

standard is a preponderance of the evidence (assuming the Special Advocate

bears any burden at all). Commissioner Logue concluded the Special Advocate

must show good cause for removal by clear and convincing evidence, and again

we agree.

      A useful analogy is found in proceedings for removal of a sitting judge.

In such cases, our Supreme Court Rules specifically dictate that “proof shall be

by clear and convincing evidence.” SCR 3 4.160. As we have explained, this

higher evidentiary standard serves as a “safeguard[] . . . built in to protect a

judge’s rights.” Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm’n, 612 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Ky.

2020). We see no reason to apply a lower evidentiary standard in proceedings

for removal of a circuit court clerk. Circuit court clerks, like judges, are elected

by the people to serve in public office. Actions for removal of such officials are

matters of significant gravity requiring serious and careful consideration of

whether removal of the elected official is required. As such, we conclude a

higher evidentiary standard is warranted, and thus the Special Advocate must

show good cause for removal of a circuit court clerk by clear and convincing

      3 Supreme Court Rule.

                                          8
evidence. Of course, “[c]lear and convincing proof does not necessarily mean

uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of a probative and

substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince

ordinarily prudent-minded people[.]” Id. at 846 (quoting Commonwealth,

Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. V. T.N.H., 302 S.W.3d 658, 663 (Ky. 2010)).

      In their briefing to this Court, the parties also dispute what deference we

should afford to the Special Commissioner’s findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and recommendations. Flynn urges that we should conduct a de novo

review, while the Special Advocate contends we should defer to the factual

findings of the Special Commissioner and afford her determinations “great

weight.”

      As noted above, consideration of removal of a circuit court clerk proceeds

in this Court as an original action. Ky. Const. § 114 (“The clerks of the Circuit

Court shall be removable from office by the Supreme Court upon good cause

shown.”) (emphasis added). In such matters, we thus do not exercise appellate

jurisdiction, but rather original jurisdiction in which we serve as the ultimate

finder of fact and adjudicator in determining whether good cause is shown for

removal of the circuit court clerk. We name the Special Commissioner to

receive evidence and render recommendations on behalf of the Court.

However, because we serve as the final finder of fact and adjudicator (and not

in an appellate capacity), we do not defer to the findings of fact, conclusions of

                                         9
law, or recommendations of the Special Commissioner. In other words, our

review is entirely de novo. 4

         In sum, proceedings to consider removal of a circuit court clerk proceed

in this Court as an original action. In such proceedings, the Special Advocate

bears the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that good cause

exists for removal of the clerk. The circuit court clerk must be afforded an

opportunity to rebut such a showing. We review the findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendations of a Special Commissioner in a

circuit court clerk removal proceeding de novo.

   II.       Flynn’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated In The Course Of
             These Proceedings.

         Having described the general contours of an original action for removal of

a circuit court clerk, we turn now to Flynn’s contention that he was denied due

process during the proceedings before the Special Commissioner. We are not

persuaded that Flynn has been denied due process.

         First, Flynn contends an order prohibiting him from speaking with AOC

employees denied him due process. However, that order was lifted and did not

prevent Flynn from investigating the claims against him. Second, Flynn

         An apt analogy is found in the office of a master commissioner, whose reports
         4

a court may adopt, modify, or reject in whole or in part, or remand with further
instruction. See CR 53.05(2). A court may also receive further evidence on a matter
following a master commissioner’s report. Id. “In sum, the trial court has the
broadest possible discretion with respect to the use it makes of reports of . . .
commissioners[,]” including “to re-evaluate the evidence and reach a different
conclusion than the commissioner.” Eiland v. Ferrell, 937 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1997).
So too with our consideration of a Special Commissioner’s findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and recommendations in an original action to consider removal of a circuit
court clerk.
                                          10
complains that AOC employees were represented by an attorney. Again, the

mere fact that AOC employees were represented by counsel did not in any way

inhibit Flynn’s investigation or preparation of a defense. He had the ability to

confront and cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence on his behalf, and

was represented by counsel at all stages.

      Third, Flynn asserts he was denied due process by virtue of an order

prohibiting him from contacting AOC employees unless they agreed in writing

to be contacted. After a thorough review of the various protective orders issued

during the course of these proceedings—some of which were necessitated by

Flynn’s appearance outside the Pulaski County Courthouse in a manner that

some employees found unnerving—we can find no such prohibition. At most,

the record includes an order that allowed AOC employees to state their wish

not to be contacted, but we find no order prohibiting Flynn’s counsel from

contacting employees without written authorization. Moreover, even had such

an order been entered, it would not have been inappropriate given Flynn’s

conduct outside the Pulaski County Courthouse during the course of these

proceedings.

      Finally, Flynn complains that actions by the Special Clerk appointed to

serve in his absence violated his due process rights. More particularly, Flynn

contends the Special Clerk made a number of unflattering statements about

Flynn and his counsel to employees of the Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk’s office—

many of whom were potential witnesses in the case. According to Flynn, the

Special Clerk told the employees in large meetings that they should not speak

                                       11
with Flynn’s counsel because his attorneys were not “on their side,” that Flynn

was enjoying a huge vacation and living the dream by being on paid

administrative leave, and that Flynn was unethical. Allegedly, the Special

Clerk also instructed employees on methods to avoid service of subpoenas from

Flynn’s counsel.

      However, we have already considered and rejected Flynn’s argument that

this conduct rises to the level of a due process violation. Indeed, Flynn moved

to dismiss this case when he learned of the Special Clerk’s conduct. We

concluded that the conduct could be “appropriately addressed through

examination of witnesses at the evidentiary hearing” and that the “issues

raised may affect the weight and credibility of the witness testimony but do not

support dismissal of this action.” Nothing in the post-hearing briefing leads us

to a different conclusion, and thus we again do not find the conduct

complained of to rise to a due process violation. As such, we find no due

process violations in the proceedings conducted by the Special Commissioner.

   III.   Good Cause Exists to Remove Flynn from Office.

      We now turn to the merits of whether Flynn should be removed as

Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk. After careful consideration, and with due regard

for the gravity attendant to proceedings for removal of an elected official, we

conclude Flynn’s removal as Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is warranted.

      A. Flynn Created a Hostile Work Environment.

      This Court has promulgated by administrative order a Circuit Court

Clerk Code of Conduct binding on each of the Commonwealth’s circuit court

                                        12
clerks. Supreme Court Order 2014-12 (“Circuit Court Clerk Code”). This Code

requires that circuit court clerks comply with, among other things, the

Workplace Policies set forth in Part III of the Court of Justice’s Administrative

Procedures (“Workplace Policies”). Id. §§ 1-2.

      The Workplace Policies in turn mandate a “work environment free of

unlawful harassment or retaliation based on” a number of protected bases,

including sex. Workplace Policies § 3.03(1)(a). Thus, the Workplace Policies

prohibit “unlawful workplace harassment,” defined to include “unwelcome or

unsolicited speech or conduct based upon . . . sex . . . that creates a hostile

work environment.” Id. § 3.03(2)(a). The determination of whether a work

environment is hostile requires consideration of

      all of the circumstances including, but not limited to: (1) the
      frequency of the alleged harassing conduct; (2) the severity of the
      alleged harassing conduct; (3) whether the alleged harassing
      conduct was physically threatening or humiliating; and (4) whether
      the alleged harassing conduct has the purpose or effect of
      unreasonably interfering with an employee’s work performance or
      creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.

Id. § 3.03(2)(b).

      A circuit court clerk’s creation of a hostile work environment violates the

Workplace Policies and the Circuit Court Clerk Code, and thus constitutes “a

legal cause which affects the ability and fitness” of the clerk “to perform the

duties of the office.” Nicholson, 562 S.W.2d at 308. That is, creation of a

hostile work environment is “good cause” for removal of circuit court clerk. See

id. Here, we find by clear and convincing evidence that Flynn created a hostile

work environment by 1) sexually assaulting Burnett in Garner’s vehicle,

                                        13
2) placing his hand up Burnett’s dress in the workplace, 3) engaging in

unwanted touching of and flirtation with Burnett, 4) physically touching other

co-workers, asking them to call him “daddy,” and referring to parts of their

bodies as “bacon,” and 5) intimidating female staff, including by screaming and

cursing at his employees in front of other staff and the public and by referring

to female staff and customers in derogatory and sexualized ways.

      First, we find the testimony outlining the events that occurred during the

incident in Garner’s vehicle highly credible. Burnett unequivocally testified

that Flynn pulled her from the front seat to the back seat, kissed her, lifted her

shirt, kissed her chest, and exposed himself, all against her will. While Flynn

testified the events alleged by Burnett were physically impossible given the rods

in his back, Burnett explained she did not physically resist Flynn pulling her

and was not wearing a seatbelt. In her testimony, Garner corroborated

Burnett’s testimony that Flynn pulled Burnett into the back seat, that both

women had to scream before Flynn stopped, and that Flynn apologized when

he exited the vehicle. In addition, two other employees testified Burnett told

them about the incident immediately after it occurred, while a third testified

she told him about it later. And while Burnett waited a significant amount of

time to report the incident, she explained she delayed for fear of losing her job

because she had seen Flynn fire another employee who had filed a complaint

against him. Finally, while Flynn presented a number of witnesses who

testified that Burnett generally could be manipulative or dishonest, we do not

find that testimony—even crediting it as true—to significantly undermine the

                                        14
credibility of Burnett regarding the particular allegations in this case. As such,

and in considering the entirety of the record, we find by clear and convincing

evidence that the incident in Garner’s vehicle occurred as reported by Burnett.

      Flynn’s blatant sexual assault of Burnett alone is sufficient grounds for

his removal, given its physical, threatening, offensive, intimidating, and severe

nature. But unfortunately, it was not an isolated incident. Similar in severity

was Flynn’s placing of his hand up Burnett’s dress in the workplace, which

was not only reported in testimony by Burnett but also by two additional

employee eyewitnesses who observed the conduct themselves. Further

troubling is Flynn’s unwanted physical touching of Burnett’s back, hair, and

legs, which another eyewitness testified to observing as being uncomfortable for

Burnett. Given the frequency and severity of the sexual and physical assaults

endured by Burnett, we conclude without question that Flynn created a hostile

work environment as to her.

      In addition, Flynn’s conduct created a hostile work environment not only

as to Burnett, but also as to numerous other female employees in the office.

Those employees testified that Flynn engaged in repeated unwanted physical

touching of female employees, referred to himself and asked others to refer to

him as “daddy,” made crude sexual comments regarding women’s body parts

and his own sex life, and referred to women’s body parts as “bacon.” Moreover,

the photographic evidence introduced at the evidentiary hearing further

suggests Flynn permitted, if not encouraged, an inappropriately sexualized

workplace. Indeed, photographs of one office costume party depict Flynn

                                       15
surrounded by female employees wearing fishnet stockings, knee-high leather

boots, tops with plunging necklines, and extremely short dresses—one

apparently part of a cheerleader costume with “PLAYBOY” written in large

letters on the front. Finally, Flynn’s inappropriate conduct also extended to

intimidation of his female staff by screaming, cursing, and derogatory and

sexualized comments that subjected them to humiliation not only in front of

their fellow co-workers but also the public more generally.

      In sum, the overwhelming weight of the testimony and evidence

presented at the hearing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that

Flynn created a hostile work environment. Certainly, Flynn’s sexual assault of

Burnett in Garner’s vehicle satisfies that standard. Moreover, in considering

the entirety of Flynn’s conduct as whole, it is plain he frequently engaged in

severe and physically humiliating sexual harassment of Burnett and other

female employees that unreasonably interfered with the functioning of the

workplace and created an intimidating, hostile, and offensive environment. On

this basis alone we would find the admittedly severe sanction of Flynn’s

removal from office warranted.

      B. Flynn Engaged In Quid Pro Quo Harassment.

      We also find by clear and convincing evidence that Flynn engaged in quid

pro quo harassment. The Workplace Policies prohibit such harassment,

defined as

      unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
      verbal or physical conduct when submission to such conduct is
      made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
      individual’s employment, or submission to or rejection of such
                                       16
      conduct by an individual is used as the basis for an employment
      decision affecting the individual.

Workplace Policies § 3.03(2)(c). Here, the testimony established that Flynn and

Burnett both briefly pursued at least a sexual relationship that Burnett

terminated after approximately two weeks. The testimony further established

that after Burnett ended the relationship, Flynn refused to supervise her and

instead assigned a Chief Deputy Clerk to perform that role. In other words,

Flynn engaged in quid pro quo harassment by making an employment decision

affecting Burnett after she ended their relationship.

      The clear and convincing evidence further established that Flynn also

engaged in a number of other forms of harassment against Burnett after she

ended the relationship that materially changed the conditions of her

employment. Burnett testified Flynn refused to speak to her, was angry with

her, gave her the “cold shoulder,” and referred to her by numerous derogatory

terms, including “ho,” “badge bunny,” and someone needing to go to the health

department for STD 5 treatment. At least one other employee also testified to

overhearing Flynn call Burnett a “bitch.” As such, we also conclude that Flynn

engaged in quid pro quo harassment by making employment decisions and

negatively affecting Burnett’s conditions of employment after she ended their

relationship, all in violation of the Workplace Policies.

      5 Sexually Transmitted Disease.

                                         17
      C. Flynn Failed to Perform His Duties With Courtesy And Respect.

      The Circuit Court Clerk Code also requires clerks to perform their duties

“[w]ith courtesy and respect for the public, litigants, lawyers, subordinate

employees, and all others with whom the clerk interacts as a part of his or her

official duties[.]” Circuit Court Clerk Code § 4(2)(a). Failure to do so may result

in disciplinary action and/or remedial measures. Id. § 8(1).

      Flynn violated the mandate to perform his duties with courtesy and

respect when he physically pursued Haste while yelling and cursing at her, all

in front of his staff and members of the public. Flynn acknowledges the

incident occurred, and we conclude it was unquestionably a blatant violation of

his obligation to perform his duties with courtesy and respect. His failure to do

so reflected poorly not only on himself, but also unfortunately on the judiciary

he was elected to serve. While perhaps insufficient alone to warrant the severe

sanction of removal, when considered together with Flynn’s other conduct at

issue in this case it nonetheless further supports our conclusion that removal

is required.

      In sum, after reviewing the entirety of the three-day evidentiary hearing

conducted by Commissioner Logue and the record as whole, we find by clear

and convincing evidence that Flynn created a hostile work environment by

sexually assaulting Burnett in Garner’s vehicle, placing his hand up Burnett’s

dress in the office, and engaging in unwanted touching of and flirtation with

Burnett. We also find that Flynn created a hostile work environment as to

other female employees by engaging in frequent and offensive unwanted

                                        18
physical touching, asking them to call him “daddy,” and referring to parts of

their bodies as “bacon.” We further find that Flynn also engaged in quid pro

quo harassment by changing Burnett’s supervisor and referring to her in

numerous derogatory ways after she ended their relationship. Finally, we also

conclude Flynn violated his obligation to perform his duties with courtesy and

respect when he chased, yelled, and cursed at Haste in front of his staff and

members of the public.

      While we acknowledge the gravity of removal of an elected official from

office, and the severity of such a sanction, we nonetheless find removal

warranted here. As such, we hereby remove Flynn from the office of the

Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk for the remainder of his term. The Office of the

Pulaski Circuit Court Clerk is declared vacant. Flynn must pay the costs of

these proceedings.

      VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., sitting.

VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, and Nickell, JJ., concur. Thompson, J.,

concurs in result only. Lambert, J., not sitting.

      ENTERED: March 14, 2024

                                     ______________________________________
                                     CHIEF JUSTICE VANMETER

                                       19
COUNSEL FOR SPECIAL ADVOCATE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Aaron J. Silletto
Assistant Attorney General

Marc Manley
Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:

Joseph E. Lambert
Lambert & Lambert, PLLC

Jason M. Nemes
Commonwealth Counsel Group, PLLC

SPECIAL COMMISSIONER:

Judge Jean Chenault Logue (Ret.)

                                   20