Court Opinion

ID: 9404878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 17:09:50.433817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.111541
License: Public Domain

J-S20018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LISA MARIE PHILHOWER                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2966 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered October 31, 2022
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003445-2011.

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED JUNE 26, 2023

        Lisa Marie Philhower appeals pro se from the order denying as untimely

her petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).       42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.

        The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows. As a result of

a string of fifteen burglaries of various residences, the Commonwealth charged

Philhower with multiple counts of burglary and related charges. On February

7, 2012, she pled guilty to six counts of conspiracy to commit burglary of a

home—no one present, and one count of theft by unlawful taking or

disposition. In exchange for her early cooperation with the authorities, the

Commonwealth agreed to withdraw numerous charges related to all fifteen

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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burglaries, but nevertheless required Philhower to pay the total amount of

restitution claimed by all of her victims. On April 12, 2012, the trial court

imposed an aggregate sentence of fourteen and one-half to twenty-nine years

of imprisonment.

      Following the denial of her post-sentence motion, Philhower filed an

appeal to this Court in which she raised a discretionary challenge to her

sentence, and a claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to

impose a Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) Act sentence despite

the fact that she did not have a criminal history involving crimes of violence.

Finding no merit to either contention, on February 5, 2014, we affirmed her

judgment of sentence.    Commonwealth v. Philhower, 97 A.2d 793 (Pa.

Super. 2014). Philhower did not seek further review.

      On May 21, 2014, Philhower filed a pro se “Petition to Reinstate

Appellate Rights.”   Treating this filing as a PCRA petition, the PCRA court

appointed counsel. On September 25, 2014, PCRA counsel, at Philhower’s

request, filed a praecipe to withdraw the petition.

      Almost eight years later, on June 16, 2022, Philhower filed a pro se

“Petition for Reconsideration under [RRRI] Act.” The PCRA court treated this

filing as a PCRA petition and appointed counsel. On September 16, 2022,

PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw and “no-merit” letter pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On September 21,

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2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

Philhower’s petition as untimely filed and establishing no exception to the

PCRA’s time bar. Philhower filed a response. By order entered October 31,

2022, the PCRA court denied Philhower’s petition. This appeal followed. Both

Philhower and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1

       Philhower raises the following two issues on appeal:

          I.     Did the trial judge abuse her discretion by not
                 imposing a RRRI sentence despite [Philhower’s] lack
                 of criminal history involving crimes of violence and
                 imposing instead, a sentence that was not consistent
                 with the Sentencing Code and contrary to the
                 fundamental norms underlying the sentencing
                 process?

          II.    Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Philhower’s]
                 PCRA [petition] by rejecting [Philhower’s] claims of
                 being denied [the] right to due diligence caused by
                 statewide institutional lockdowns brought on by the
                 COVID-19 pandemic thus abusing discretion by
                 deeming [Philhower’s] PCRA [petition] as untimely?

Philhower’s Brief at 4 (capitalization adjusted).

       Philhower challenges the denial of her attempt to obtain post-conviction

relief. Using the applicable standard of review, we must determine whether
____________________________________________

1 On January 3, 2023, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) statement in which
it noted that Philhower’s failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement rendered the
court “unable to address any of [Philhower’s] perceived errors raised on
appeal at this time.” The certified record reveals Philhower’s Rule 1925(b)
statement was filed on December 23, 2022.              Therein, she presented
sentencing challenges, as well as challenges to the court’s dismissing her
second petition as untimely. Because the PCRA court fully explained, in its
Rule 907 notice, why Philhower’s petition was in fact untimely, we decline to
find waiver on this basis.

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the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record and is free of legal

error.    Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 749-50 (Pa. 2014)

(citations omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions. Id.

         Before addressing Philhower’s substantive issue regarding her sentence,

we must first determine whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that her

second petition was untimely filed, and that she failed to establish an

exception to the time bar.

         The   timeliness   of   a   post-conviction    petition   is   jurisdictional.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or

subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment

becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that an

exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

         The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

on appeal.      Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

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Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file her petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to   address    the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, Philhower’s judgment of sentence became final on March 7, 2014,

after the thirty-day period for filing a petition for allowance of appeal to our

Supreme Court expired. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Thus, in order to be

timely her PCRA petition had to be filed by March 9, 2015.2 Because Philhower

filed her second PCRA petition in 2022, it is patently untimely unless she has

satisfied her burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       After review, we concur with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Philhower

failed to plead and prove a time-bar exception. Philhower contends that her

recent discovery of our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Finnecy, 249 A.3d 903 (Pa. 2021) satisfies the newly-discovered fact

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), supra. To establish

this exception, a PCRA petitioner must allege and offer to prove that the facts

____________________________________________

2Because March 7, 2015, was a Saturday, Philhower had until the following
Monday to file a timely PCRA petition. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

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upon which the claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner

and could not have ascertained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.

Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017).

      It is now well settled, however, that a judicial opinion—even one which

may establish a new theory or method of relief—does not amount to a newly-

discovered fact under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) of the PCRA. Commonwealth

v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1148 (Pa. 2020); see also Commonwealth v.

Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 763 (Pa. Super. 2013) (explaining that judicial

decisions are not newly-discovered facts for purposes of the PCRA’s time bar

exception). Thus, because the Finnecy decision cannot be a newly discovered

fact, Philhower’s assertion that she was unable to discover the Finnecy

decision in the prison law library because of pandemic institutional lockdowns

is unavailing. See also Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 789 A.2d 728, 731

(Pa. Super. 2001) (explaining that a petitioner’s lack of prior knowledge of a

newly decided case does not excuse a failure to file a timely PCRA petition).

      Moreover, even if her petition were timely, the sentencing claims she

raised in her first issue would not entitle her to post-conviction relief. To be

eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must prove “[t]hat the allegation

of error has not been previously litigated or waived.”           42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(3). An issue will be deemed previously litigated when “the highest

appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of

right has ruled on the merits of the issue. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a). As noted

above, in affirming Philhower’s direct appeal, we found meritless her challenge

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to the discretionary aspects of her sentence as well as the trial court’s failure

to impose an RRRI sentence. Philhower, supra.

      Finally, to the extent Philhower claimed in her petition that her illegal

sentence claim cannot be waived, we note that such a claim must be presented

in a timely petition in which the court has jurisdiction.      See generally,

Commonwealth v. Winterhawk, 146 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2016).

      In sum, the PCRA court correctly determined that Philhower’s second

PCRA petition was untimely filed, and she did not plead or prove an exception

to the PCRA’s time bar. We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order denying

Philhower post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/26/2023

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