Court Opinion

ID: 9795571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:31:41.749494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:19.005820
License: Public Domain

BOUDREATU, J.,
with whom SUMMERS, J., joins: concurring in part; dissenting in part.
1 1 I agree with the portion of the majority opinion that allows the judgment below to stand. I dissent to the portion of the opinion which concludes that by dismissing Courville from the suit for the second time, plaintiff lost the capacity to refile his claim against Courville. The majority opinion is flawed in that it fails to treat 12 0.8. § 100 as a true statute of limitations.
T2 A statute of limitations prescribes a time period within which an action must be brought upon a claim. It is remedial rather than substantive, in that it bars only the remedy-not the right or obligation. Anderson v. Merriott, 1976 OK 74, 550 P.2d 1320. A statute of limitations is not a limitation of authority or jurisdiction, but is instead a legal defense. Kimberly v. DeWitt, 1980 OK CIV APP. 2, ¶ 15, 606 P.2d 612, 617. We have previously recognized that the savings statute, 12 0.8. § 100, is remedial, not substantive. Cruse v. Board of County Commissioners of Atoka County, 1995 OK 143, 910 P.2d 998, 1001. Hence, § 100 is a true statute of limitations.
1 3 Section 100 cannot be considered either a jurisdictional limitation period or a statute of repose. A jurisdictional limitation period is defined as a prescribed time period that is so specifically attached to the subject of the claim that it must be construed as an element of the claim.1 Cruse, supra., 910 P.2d at 1004 n. 32. A jurisdictional limitation period is an absolute requirement. When a statute prescribes a time period that meets this definition, the failure to file within the prescribed period deprives the court of jurisdiction. Shanbour v. Hollingsworth, 1996 OK 67, 918 P.2d 73, 75. A jurisdictional time period is *63not an affirmative defense. It is not subject to waiver or estoppel (tolling).
T4 A statute of repose sets an outer chronological time boundary beyond which no cause of action may arise for conduct that would otherwise have been actionable.2 Neer v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1999 OK 41, ¶ 19, 982 P.2d 1071, 1078. A statute of repose marks the outer boundary of a substantive right. It is different than a statute of limitations in that a statute of limitations only procedurally bars the remedy after the substantive right has vested. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816, 820.
T5 As a statute of limitations, § 100 does not deprive the court of jurisdiction if the claim is not timely filed.3 Section 100 is an affirmative defense. 12 O.S. § 2008(C)(18). Failure to plead it as an affirmative defense operates as a waiver. Furr v. Thomas, 1991 OK 93, ¶ 23, 817 P.2d 1268. Similarly, as a statute of limitations, § 100 is also subject to tolling. Kordis v. Kordis, 2001 OK 99, 37 P.3d 866. As an affirmative defense, unless the § 100 defense is pled and proved and a judgment is rendered on the defense, the plaintiff's remedy is not extinguished.
T6 In sum, § 100 is a statute of limitations, not a jurisdictional limitation period and not a statute of repose. Accordingly, even after plaintiff dismissed Courville the second time, plaintiff retained the capacity to refile his claim against Courville. If plaintiff had chosen to refile his claim against Cour-ville, then it would have been incumbent upon Courville to plead and prove the affirmative defense of § 100 (4.e., to plead and prove that § 100 bars plaintiff's remedy against Courville). Until such time, neither plaintiff's right nor his remedy was extinguished. Therefore, plaintiff's second dismissal of Courville did not have the legal effect of a release of plaintiff's claim against Courville.
WATT, C.J. with whom SUMMERS, J. joins in large part.
T1 The majority today holds Sisk's claim against Hunt was released because Sisk's second dismissal of Courville without prejudice operated to release Courville. The majority explains this "release" occurred because of the impact of 12 0.8.2001 § 100 which created an absolute bar to future refil-ings. In other words, the majority holds Sisk's dismissal of Courville without prejudice, under 12 O.S. § 683, extinguished his claim. I respectfully dissent.
1 2 The majority contends the common-law release rule of Mid-Continent Pipeline Co. v. Crauthers, 1954 OK 61, 267 P.2d 568, cited in Burke v. Webb Boats, Inc., 2001 OK 83, 37 P.3d 811, is still good law in Oklahoma. That rule provides the release of the servant/tort-feasor in a respondeat superior case releases the master, whose liability is purely vicarious. While I agree that rule is good law in Oklahoma, I take issue with the majority's conclusion that it is applicable here, or that Sisk's affirmative act of dismissing Courville had the effect of releasing Hunt.
13 The majority's holding would allow a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which accords no finality to a claim, to end the litigation, as if the claim had been determined on the merits In so holding, the majority mischaracterizes the impact of § 100. Clearly, plaintiffs second dismissal places the protection from § 100 just beyond Sisk's grasp as to cases filed in the future. That is because the dismissal occurred outside the statute of limitations. However, the problems associated with recommencing the claim against the servant arises, not because of $ 100, but because any refiling would occur outside the statute of limitations affecting this particular claim. Moreover, the claim against the servant is not "extinguished", as *64it would be in a "release" of the servant; it is merely subject to dismissal upon limitations grounds raised as an affirmative defense. I agree these actions do not occur in a vacuum. I do not agree, however, that the impact of § 100 on Sisk's dismissal of Courville without prejudice changed the nature of Hunt's lHability from that of an employer with vicarious liability for its employee's negligence, to no more liability than that of a pre-UCATA joint tortfeasor whose co-defendant was released, i.e., none whatsoever.1 The majority has gone to great lengths to place the present case in the same category as the claim in Burke v. Webb Boats, supra, in which the plaintiff released the employee/agent, thus releasing the employer/owner. However, the facts are different, and Burke does not apply here. There simply has been no release of Courville by Sisk in the present case.
T 4 Sisk should be able to proceed against Hunt alone. Oklahoma law provides that master and servant can be pursued separately in a respondeat superior case. See Hooper v. Clements Food Company, 1985 OK 6, 694 P.2d 943; Employers Casualty Co. v. Barnett, 1951 OK 186, 235 P.2d 685, 205 Okla. 73. I disagree with the majority's characterization of the language in Hooper as dicta (that the employee's negligence, not the employee's liability), is imputed to the master. The majority explains the release rule was not at issue in Hooper. In my opinion, the release rule is not at issue in the present case because Sisk did not release Courville. Moreover, the Hooper case contains basic tenets of respondeat superior law recognizing the nature of vicarious liability which applies in this case. Even as far back as 1939, this Court recognized that the pertinent issue in a respondeat superior case is that the employee's negligence determines an employer's liability. See Southern Kansas Stage Limes Co. v. Crain, 1939 OK 216, 89 P.2d 968, 185 OK. 1, in which the negligence of a defendant/employee was litigated, despite his dismissal from the case by the plaintiff,. The second defendant/employee, who remained in the case, was exonerated by the jury. However, a verdict was rendered against the employer. On appeal, this Court explained the verdict and judgment entered against the employer represented its liability for the negligence of the previously dismissed defendant, and the judgment was upheld. It made no difference that the negligent employee was absent from the proceedings. It would make no difference if no employees were present; the case could proceed against the employer/master alone from the beginning.
15 Under the majority's decision, the dismissal of a party without prejudice now creates the potential for barring a suit, despite a plaintiff's compliance with 12 0.8.2001 § 100 and 12 0.S8.2001 § 688. Clearly, under § 100, the second dismissal without prejudice places Sisk in a difficult position as to refiling the case against Courville The claim is clearly subject to dismissal if the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations is raised at that time. It does not, however, prevent the case from proceeding against Hunt to determine Courville's negligence, if any, and Hunt's Hiability to Sisk. See gen., Hooper v. Clements Food Company; Employers Cas. Co. v. Barnett, supra.
T6 Until today, under the Oklahoma statutes and our extant jurisprudence, plaintiffs have had the right to choose their defendants. That right has been extinguished by the majority opinion and its disregard of the plain reading and meaning of the statute, 12 0.9$.2001 $ 688. Clearly, the dismissal of the employee was without prejudice, regardless of what the trial court concluded. The majority contends it is irrelevant whether we term Sisk's dismissal of Courville a "dismissal with prejudice" or a "dismissal without prejudice". However, these terms have specific legal connotations. The dismissal in this case was not the equivalent of a release or an adjudication on the merits.2 Although the *65statute of limitations makes Sisk's claims against Courville subject to dismissal if refiled, it had no effect upon the plaintiff's right to continue its litigation against the employer under Oklahoma law, which was clear until the majority made a radical departure from our statutory and case law. I respectfully dissent.

. An example of a jurisdictional limitation period is the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act, 51 0.8. § 151 et seq. Judicial power is invoked by the timely filing of the governmental tort claims action pursuant to § 157 and expiration of the 180 day time period in § 157(B) operates to bar judicial enforcement of the claim against the government to which the Legislature waived sovereign immunity. Shanbour v. Hollingsworth, 1996 OK 67, 918 P.2d 73, 75.

. An example of a statute of repose is 12 O.S. § 109, which bars, after 10 years, actions in tort dealing with deficiencies in design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction to real improvement.

. Although the language of § 100 says "may commence a new action within one (1) year'", the word "commence" is used liberally throughout the chapter on limitations of actions. See Title 12, Oklahoma Statutes, §§ 91 et seg. For example, 12 O.S. § 92 reads: "civil actions can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this article." The use of the word "commence" does not raise limitations to a matter of jurisdictional dimensions. It is still an affirmative defense.

. The UCATA eliminated the harshness of this common law rule regarding joint and several lability, which this case does not involve. Moreover, this Court held in Burke that respondeat superior cases are not included in the UCATA's coverage.

. The term "dismissal with prejudice" is equivalent to an adjudication on the merits and operates as a bar to further action. See Perfect Investments, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 1989 OK 148, 782 P.2d 932, citing Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Hess, 1942 OK 55, 126 P.2d 534, 536, 190 Okla. 669. "A judgment is rendered on *65the merits 'when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties, based on the ultimate facts or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings, and evidence upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical, or dilatory objections or contentions.' " Pettyjohn v. Plaster, 1998 OK CIV APP 38, 956 P.2d 948, 950, citing Crow v. Abraham, 86 Or. 99, 167 P. 590, 591. " '[MJerits' means the real or substantial grounds of action or defense as distinguished from matters of practice, procedure, or form". Pettyjohn v. Plaster, 956 P.2d at 950, citing Flick v. Crouch, 1967 OK 131, 434 P.2d 256, 261; Providential Devel. Co. v. U.S. Steel Co., 236 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir.1956).