Court Opinion

ID: 9753945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:35:48.471687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.488375
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the trial court’s order constitutes compliance with the provisions of D.C. Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(l) and (2) [now D.C. Code 1981, § 24-301(d)(l) and (2)(A) and (B) ]. The court, in acquitting appellee by reason of insanity, met the “mandatory” or “automatic” requirement of subsection (1) by ordering appellee’s commitment. But the court also found, pursuant to subsection (2), by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that appellee was now sane, “will not in the reasonable future be a danger to himself or others” (see id. 24— 301(e)) and was entitled to release. Its findings are supported by ample evidence, including the representations of both defense and government experts, submitted after extensive diagnoses and treatment (both voluntary and imposed as a condition of pretrial release).
Unless we are prepared to say that the findings of the trial court are clearly erro*1318neous, I do not see the logic or the justification for the action we take today. We are holding that a sane man who has been released into the community for two years and who is now leading a productive life, must be confined in a mental hospital for the sole purpose of triggering his right to seek subsequent release. See id. § 24-301(d)(2). As the trial court noted, this confinement will not advance either one of the two-fold purposes of the statute “to provide ... treatment and to protect the public.” See United States v. Shorter, D.C.App., 343 A.2d 569, 572 (1975). We are courting the proverbial “exalt[ation of] form over substance.”
I respectfully dissent.