Court Opinion

ID: 9810808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:00:17.855863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:14.926837
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring in result only. I concur’ in the opinion of the Court only in so far as it holds that the release of the Sheriffs by the plaintiff operated as a release of the defendant. I can not concur in the remainder of the opinion either upon reason or authority, nor is it at all necessary to do so for a determination of this case.
It may at times create unmerited hardship; but I feel compelled to adhere to the principles laid down by this Court in *178Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C., 100. It should be remembered that in the case at bar the plaintiff is, and was at the time of the eviction, a married woman; that she was not a party to the action of ej ectinent, and that she held possession of the land, from which she was evicted, as a tenant in common under a title admittedly good and entirely disconnected from her husband. As is said in the opinion of the Court, it is stated in the mortgage that the plaintiff Martha joined in the deed for the purpose of relinquishing, her right of dower and claim to homestead. She acquired one undivided fourth of the land after the execution of the mortgage, which therefore could not possibly have been conveyed in the mortgage. To say that a married woman, is estopped by any covenants of warranty contained in a deed professedly made for the sole purpose of conveying only her dower and homestead, is an extension of the doctrine of “feeding an estoppel” which I am not prepared to accept. Neither can I admit that a married woman can lose her rights of property by failing to intervene in a suit to which the then plaintiff did not see fit to make her a party.