Court Opinion

ID: 9649409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:52:28.308267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:10.497881
License: Public Domain

REILLY, Chief Judge
(dissenting) ;
In my opinion, the only conceivable ground for holding that the Commission’s denial of petitioner’s application did not constitute a “contested case” within the meaning of D.C.Code 1973, § 1-1502(8), is that the legislativé history of the relevant portion of the Zoning Act of 19381 indicates that unless the Commission decides to amend a zoning map or regulation a public hearing is not required by statute. We are dealing here with “specific parties”, viz., a' single landholder and the agency itself, so that the discussion of whether the agency action was legislative or adjudicative is beside the point, even assuming arguendo that the Chevy Chase case 2 was correctly decided.
But it is not enough to say that a case is not “contested” if the determination of the legal rights of the parties is not required by some law, as the term is also applicable to cases where a hearing is required by “constitutional right.” As there are no provisions in the Constitution which expressly confer on any parties to an admin*426istrative proceeding a right to a hearing, it is obvious that what Congress meant is that a hearing is required whenever a party’s claim for relief presents a substantial question of an asserted infringement upon a constitutional right — in this particular instance, a taking of property without due process of law. In this case, petitioner’s papers appear to meet the substantial question test as they allege that certain intervening events since the original zoning — • the building of a shopping center on adjacent land and the transformation of upper Massachusetts Avenue to a busy traffic artery — have made the tract virtually unmarketable, for there would be no purchasers of single dwellings at this location — the only kind of structure which could legally be erected under the current classification.
Of course, it is true that no landholder is entitled to a particular zoning classification by the Constitution,3 but if he contends that the classification imposed upon his property violates a constitutional right, I see no way in which this question can be determined without a hearing. But this is precisely the question which this court is determining when it holds that no hearing was constitutionally required. In other words, it is deciding on the merits the very issue on which petitioner vainly sought to be heard.

. D.C.Code 1973, § 5-415.

. Chevy Chase Cit. Ass’n v. District of Columbia Coun., D.C.App., 327 A.2d 310 (1974).

. Aquino v. Totriner, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 13, 298 F.2d 674 (1961), which supports this proposition, cannot be relied upon by the majority for its holding that no hearing was required. In that case there was a hearing and all that the court decided was that the subsequent agency order (adverse to petitioner) was not so arbitrary or unreasonable as to violate the Constitution.