Court Opinion

ID: 9943592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:02:58.939328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:24.922581
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 In re R.G. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 In re R.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court                                          C098371
 Law.

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                       (Super. Ct. No. JV141161)

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 R.G.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Sixteen-year-old minor R.G. shot and killed one person and injured another in
June 2014. A jury found him guilty of second degree murder and found various
enhancements true. In his first appeal, another panel of this court conditionally reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for a juvenile transfer hearing pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 707.1 On remand, the juvenile court granted the People’s

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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petition to transfer R.G. to a court of criminal jurisdiction. R.G. contends the juvenile
court’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm.
                                              I
                                     BACKGROUND
       R.G. and 17-year-old E.G. were Norteño gang members. A short distance from
the victim’s home, R.G. climbed onto the handlebars of a bicycle piloted by E.G. R.G.
had a rifle and a handgun, while E.G. had a handgun. E.G. pedaled the bicycle to the
front of Roy Ravana’s home where Ravana and his friend K.O. were out front doing yard
work. Ravana and K.O. were members of the Tongan Crip gang, a rival gang to the
Norteños. (People v. R.G. (Feb. 6, 2020, C083218) [nonpub. opn.] (R.G.).)
       E.G. fired his handgun toward Ravana and K.O. from the bicycle, while R.G. fired
the rifle on foot next to the bicycle. When R.G. and E.G. opened fire, Ravana ran inside
and came back with a “Uzi” submachine gun and returned fire. In the exchange of
gunshots, one bullet killed Ravana and another bullet injured K.O. After Ravana
collapsed in the street, R.G. and E.G. moved away from the home while still firing at the
victims. (R.G., supra, C083218.)
       When detectives arrived, they found R.G. and E.G. trying to put the rifle in R.G.’s
pants. The detectives took R.G. and E.G. into custody. R.G. had a rifle, three magazines
loaded with rifle ammunition, a nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun, and a red
bandana. E.G. was holding a cell phone, had a .357 magnum revolver, and was wearing
clothing indicating his membership in the Norteño gang. The police found 36 expended
shell casings on the ground near Ravana’s home. (R.G., supra, C083218.)
       A nine-millimeter handgun was connected to two shootings in the month prior to
the killing. In the first shooting, a gun of the same caliber was fired twice near a local
television station. Witnesses saw two Hispanic males on a bicycle or bicycles near the
station. In the second shooting, a nine-millimeter gun was used to fire 13 rounds into a

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local market. Text messages from E.G. implicated R.G. and E.G. in both of these earlier
shootings. (R.G., supra, C083218.)
       Ballistics evidence also connected R.G.’s nine-millimeter handgun with yet two
more shootings. In the first, the gun was used to fire five rounds in the neighborhood. In
the second shooting, the gun was used to fire 10 rounds at the home across the street from
Ravana’s home. (R.G., supra, C083218.)
       The jury found R.G. guilty of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd.
(a).) The jury also found true various enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced
R.G. to an aggregate indeterminate term of 40 years to life in state prison. On direct
appeal, a different panel of this court modified the judgment to strike the gang
enhancements, conditionally reversed the modified judgment, and remanded the case to
the juvenile court for a juvenile transfer hearing. (R.G., supra, C083218.)
       On remand, the People filed a juvenile wardship petition and sought to have the
case transferred to the jurisdiction of the criminal court. At the hearing on the transfer
petition, the People read into the record the victim’s impact statement provided by
Ravana’s mother. The People also submitted 26 exhibits documenting the facts of the
crime, victim impact statements, reports concerning the uncharged shootings, and
disciplinary reports of R.G.’s misconduct while in custody. We will summarize the
relevant disciplinary reports, post.
       R.G. presented the testimony of a social worker who had known him for five years
preceding the murder. The social worker described R.G. as caring, kind, respectful, and
well-behaved. R.G.’s mother suffered from severe mental illness that led to instability in
R.G.’s family. R.G. struggled developmentally and with school stability. The social
worker testified R.G. had told her he was bullied at school by his peers. R.G. lived in a
low-income, poverty-ridden neighborhood and there was domestic violence and sexual
abuse in his home. During his young life, R.G. lost his house twice due to house fires.

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       R.G. also presented the testimony of a witness who had known him for
approximately 10 years through his participation in an Aztec dance group. The witness
echoed the social worker’s testimony about R.G.’s chaotic housing situation, the house
fires, and his mother’s mental illness. She testified that R.G.’s father was in and out of
jail during R.G.’s life.
       R.G. testified on his own behalf. His mother had mental and physical health
issues and disabilities and he did not really know his father who was in prison most of
R.G.’s life. R.G. testified his father used methamphetamine, drank, and “smoke[d]
dope.” R.G.’s father and mother regularly fought, and his father abused his mother. R.G.
thought of school as an escape from home, but R.G. would get into fights at school
because he was bullied for having a speech impediment.
       R.G. testified his house burned down when he was 15 years old and that is when
he hit rock bottom and started smoking weed, taking drugs, and drinking. His mother
went into a shelter, but the shelter would not house him, so he began to sleep on whatever
couch he could find. He felt useless and worthless.
       R.G.’s family was involved in gangs, including his father, brothers, and uncles.
While R.G.’s brother was in prison his brother wrote to him and told R.G. he was
destined to go to prison. His brother also told R.G. that if someone asked R.G. to stab
someone else while in prison, he should do it. R.G.’s brother claimed he had been
stabbed when he refused an order to stab another inmate.
       R.G. told the juvenile court he tried to get in touch with his victim’s mother to tell
her he was trying to be a better person. In this regard, R.G. obtained his high school
GED, was in college, and completed some self-help programs. R.G. testified he was
unable to get into any rehabilitation programs while he was awaiting trial and was not
automatically considered after he was placed in the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) due to his status as a lifer. Despite these barriers, R.G. completed
an anger management program. He was also unable to participate in any programs when

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he was in the special housing unit for 32 months for stabbing his fellow inmate. When he
returned from the special housing unit, he enrolled in and completed multiple
rehabilitation classes on a correspondence basis. On cross-examination, R.G. admitted he
engaged in only two rehabilitative programs prior to receiving this court’s prior opinion
directing that the case be transferred to juvenile court.
         R.G. addressed the murder and two other convictions during direct examination.
As to the murder, R.G. claimed he had some guns in his house, and he was taking them to
another house to try to sell them. As they were taking the guns from the house, R.G.
claimed the victims chased him down the street and fired at him. On cross-examination,
R.G. admitted he did not tell this story to the police when initially questioned.
         As to the two convictions while in custody, R.G. claimed he stabbed an inmate
because he was told to do so by another inmate. He followed that order because he did
not want to be stabbed himself. He justified his possession of a weapon convictions
because he needed a knife to protect himself in prison.
         On cross-examination, the prosecutor walked R.G. through each of his disciplinary
write-ups while he was in custody. R.G. got into a fight with another resident within one
month of being locked up in juvenile hall and had many disciplinary write-ups until he
was released to the main jail pending trial. There were over 100 different incidents, most
of which were for being disrespectful to other residents and staff. The more serious of
these write-ups are specifically described in the juvenile court’s findings, post. R.G.
received disciplinary write-ups in the main jail and at CDCR. These are also summarized
in the juvenile court’s order, post.
         Despite R.G.’s claim he was not in a gang, he admitted he was housed as a
Norteño in juvenile hall, the main jail, and at CDCR. He wrote gang graffiti on his door,
threw gang signs, and yelled gang slurs from his room while he was in juvenile hall.
R.G. also admitted he had documents in his main jail cell that only a Norteño would be
given.

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       As to one of the uncharged shootings, R.G. said the other person flashed gang
signs at him. R.G. flashed gang signs back and when the other person came at him, he
told E.G. to shoot, and pulled out his own gun and fired. Regarding the second shooting,
R.G. claimed the victim asked him if he gang banged. R.G. reported he saw the victim
had a gun, so R.G. preemptively shot at him.
       The juvenile court issued a 13-page decision granting the motion transferring the
case to the criminal court. In that decision, the juvenile court identified the test set forth
in section 707, the proper standard of proof, and the five criteria it was required to
analyze, including the requirements under each criterion. The juvenile court concluded
the circumstances and gravity of the offense and R.G.’s amenability to rehabilitation
weighed in favor of granting the motion, while the criteria related to criminal
sophistication, delinquent history, and prior rehabilitative efforts weighed in favor of
denying the motion. When the juvenile court considered all five criteria together, it
found the People had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that R.G. was not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
       Three of the criteria did not support the motion to transfer. First, while there was
some evidence R.G. was criminally sophisticated, there was significant mitigating
evidence stemming from his upbringing and his environment that counseled against
finding criminal sophistication. The juvenile court also found R.G.’s juvenile justice
history prior to this crime was insignificant and his chaotic life contributed significantly
to his misbehavior in custodial settings. R.G. had received no rehabilitative services
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, thus, the success of prior juvenile court
rehabilitation attempts counseled against transferring the matter.
       But the juvenile court found the last two criteria did support transfer. On the
criterion of the gravity of the offense, the juvenile court recited the facts of the crime and
the four uncharged shootings. The court noted R.G.’s version of the murder was contrary

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to the evidence at trial and his exculpatory descriptions of the other shootings defied
common sense.
       As to the criterion of amenability for rehabilitation while under the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, the juvenile court reviewed R.G.’s extensive custody discipline
record over the nine years he had been incarcerated. The juvenile court credited R.G.’s
efforts at rehabilitation courses but found his work on those courses had no discernible
impact on reducing his serious acts of violence.
       While in the juvenile hall between 2014 and 2016, R.G. was involved in nine
serious disciplinary incidents. These included possessing contraband, writing gang
graffiti, fighting, threatening a teacher, and attacks on other residents, including stomping
the back of the head of one resident and smashing his head into the concrete for which
R.G. admitted he committed assault in violation of Penal Code section 245.
       During his time at the main jail during 2016, and between 2021 and 2023, R.G.
engaged in seven serious misconduct incidents. Twice he punched his cellmate and the
second time he left his victim with a broken lower spine and nose. R.G.’s write-ups also
included fighting, possession of marijuana, possession of a toothbrush with a razor
melted into its tip, and being under the influence.
       While confined by the CDCR, R.G. committed two felonies. In one, he stabbed
another inmate with a manufactured knife and pled guilty to assault of an inmate with a
deadly weapon causing great bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 4501, subd. (a).) In the other,
he had a plastic shank in his pocket with a metal tip and officials found a knife at his feet;
R.G. pled guilty to possession of a weapon by an inmate. (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a).)
       The juvenile court found R.G.’s self-serving testimony that he was not a gang
member disingenuous in light of overwhelming evidence of his gang ties and acts. At his
CDCR orientation, he told the intake officers he was a Norteño from Sacramento. He
had possession of documents in his cell entrusted only to Norteño members. Further, he
tried to recruit one of his cellmates into the gang.

                                              7
       The juvenile court rejected R.G.’s claim he only carried out violence on the orders
of others given the many false exculpatory claims R.G. made throughout the proceedings.
The juvenile court also discounted Dr. Eugene Roeder’s 2016 evaluation of R.G. that
concluded R.G. was not impulsive, egotistical, oppositional, or predisposed to
delinquency. Instead, Dr. Roeder claimed R.G. presented as “depressed, inhibited,
doleful and submissive, with significant levels of peer insecurity and someone who has
been affected by his childhood abuse.” Dr. Roeder went on to state if R.G. was able to
“take advantage of the opportunities available to him through [CDCR], he has good
potential for developing a much more healthy adult adjustment than was present at the
time of this evaluation, and his prognosis for someday being successful on a grant of
parole would then become positive.” The juvenile court gave Dr. Roeder’s opinion little
weight because Dr. Roeder did not have R.G.’s record of violent misconduct since the
date of that report.
       Based on its evaluation of the relevant factors, the juvenile court granted the
motion to transfer the matter to a court of criminal jurisdiction. R.G. filed a timely notice
of appeal with this court in April 2023. His opening brief was filed in September 2023,
and this case was fully briefed on January 29, 2024.
                                             II
                                       DISCUSSION
       R.G. argues the juvenile court’s decision to transfer him was not supported by
substantial evidence. Specifically, R.G. argues the court failed to consider “anything
regard[ing] R.G.’s mental state at the time of the shooting, or his mental and emotional
development during the time just prior to and during the shooting.” As to the factor of
R.G.’s amenability to rehabilitation, R.G. argues the juvenile court fell short of the
Legislature’s intent in the recent change to the juvenile law. We disagree.
       Section 707, subdivision (a)(1) allows prosecutors to move to have a minor who is
16 years or older transferred from the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to criminal court

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when the minor is alleged to have committed one of a list of criminal offenses. The
enumerated offenses include murder. (§ 707, subd. (b)(1).)
       Effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature amended section 707, requiring that
“[i]n order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction,
the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3);
Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1.) It also added a requirement that the juvenile court “include the
reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Ibid.)
       In rendering its decision, the court must consider the five specified criteria the
juvenile court considered in this action: (1) the “degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by the minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”; (3) “the minor’s previous delinquent
history”; (4) the “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the
minor”; and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to
have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
       The People’s burden is to prove the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction by clear and convincing evidence. (In re S.S.
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1284.) “The standard of proof known as clear and
convincing evidence demands a degree of certainty greater than that involved with the
preponderance standard, but less than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998; see also Evid.
Code, § 115.)
       “[T]he fundamental question before an appellate court reviewing for sufficiency of
the evidence is the same, regardless of the standard of proof that applied below: whether
any reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding that is now challenged on
appeal.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) “[W]hen presented with

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a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear
and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a
whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have
made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.” (Ibid., fn.
omitted.) In other words, “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as
a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at pp. 995-996.) In so doing, we
“view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give due
deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses,
resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.”
(Id. at p. 996.)
       A.      Gravity of the Offense
       R.G. argues the juvenile court erred in considering the criterion of the gravity of
the offense because it failed to consider “anything regard[ing] R.G.’s mental state at the
time of the shooting, or his mental and emotional development during the time just prior
to and during the shooting.” In evaluating this criterion, the statute directs the juvenile
court to “give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the actual
behavior of the person, the mental state of the person, the person’s degree of involvement
in the crime, the level of harm actually caused by the person, and the person’s mental and
emotional development.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(ii).)
       We conclude the juvenile court adequately reviewed the gravity of the offense and
substantial evidence supports its finding that this criterion supported transfer. The
juvenile court recited the facts of the crime, R.G.’s behavior, R.G.’s degree of
involvement in the crime, and the level of harm R.G. caused in this unprovoked shooting
that left one person dead and another injured. The court considered the proffered mental
state of R.G. in his claim he was acting in self-defense during the murder and two of the
shootings. But the juvenile court rejected R.G.’s claims in light of the evidence presented

                                             10
at trial and based on its finding that R.G.’s exculpatory versions of the two other
shootings did not make sense.
       The juvenile court conducted the review the statute requires and gave weight to
the factors it deemed relevant. To the extent R.G. argues the juvenile court should have
considered other matters, R.G. is attempting to turn the list of relevant factors the court
may consider into a list it must consider. That is not what the plain language of the
statute requires.
       We also note that the juvenile court expressly considered R.G.’s emotional health
at the time of the offense and the effect of his environment and childhood trauma when it
examined R.G.’s criminal sophistication. There, the court noted significant mitigating
evidence stemming from the subject’s upbringing and environment. The juvenile court
acknowledged R.G.’s mother’s serious and chronic mental illness, leaving R.G. to fend
for himself. The juvenile court noted that R.G.’s housing was unstable, his family was
without adequate resources, and his neighborhood was plagued by violence and gang
activity. Under these circumstances, the court acknowledged R.G.’s upbringing was
chaotic, and this chaos contributed to his gang affiliations and firearm violence. Thus,
we conclude the juvenile court’s analysis of the gravity of the offense was proper and
supported by substantial evidence.
       B.     Rehabilitation While Under the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction
       Under this claim of lack of substantial evidence, R.G. argues the juvenile court’s
recitation of R.G.’s lengthy record of misconduct in prison, his limited attempts at
rehabilitation, and his lack of credibility “misses the point of this criterion and falls short
of the Legislature’s intent in the recent changes in juvenile law.” We disagree.
       “When evaluating the criterion [of whether a minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction], the juvenile court shall give weight to
any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and
mature.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).)

                                              11
       Here, R.G.’s argument does not attack the juvenile court’s conclusion the People
established he did not have potential to grow and mature and could be rehabilitated
within the time left in the juvenile court system. To the extent R.G. did not make this
argument below it is forfeited. (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351.)
       R.G.’s argument suggests evidence of his actual track record in prison and
credibility should not be relied upon to determine whether he is amenable to
rehabilitation. We disagree and conclude the juvenile court’s finding that R.G. could not
be rehabilitated in the time he had left in the juvenile justice system (he was 25 years two
months old as of the time of the hearing and 26 as of the date of this opinion) is supported
by substantial evidence. As a result, we have no occasion to further delve into the
legislative intent underlying the express language of the statute.
       R.G. presented himself as having made serious attempts at rehabilitation,
including evidence of his obtaining his GED, taking college classes, and taking multiple
correspondence rehabilitation courses. Against this backdrop, however, R.G. again and
again engaged in violent misconduct and continued his gang affiliations in prison. He
engaged in fights. He punched people. He stabbed an inmate. He stomped a resident’s
head and smashed his face into the ground. He broke another cellmate’s spine and nose
while trying to recruit him into a gang. He identified as a gang member and engaged in
gang activities. He pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and possession of a
weapon in prison. Further, R.G. made false statements about his culpability in the instant
murder and assault. He attempted to deflect blame for the uncharged shootings with
baseless claims. R.G.’s nine-year history of violence coupled with his lack of credibility
is substantial evidence under the clear and convincing standard that supports the juvenile
court’s finding that R.G. could not be rehabilitated while in the juvenile justice system.2

2 We are cognizant of this court’s decision in In re S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at page
1291, in which we noted that “this criterion generally requires ‘expert testimony

                                             12
       We conclude the juvenile court’s findings support the transfer of R.G. to a court of
criminal jurisdiction by clear and convincing evidence. (D.W. v. Superior Court (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 109, 116 [“The weight to be given each of these factors is within the
court’s discretion”].
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                      /s/
                                                  BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

    /s/
WISEMAN, J.

concerning the programs available, the duration of any of the programs, or whether
attendance would rehabilitate [the minor] before termination of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction.’ ” We are also cognizant the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over R.G. could be
retained for a period if discharging him “would be physically dangerous to the public
because of the person’s mental or physical deficiency, disorder, or abnormality that
causes the person to have serious difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.”
(§ 1800, subd. (a).) R.G. did not raise the lack of expert testimony on this point. This
appears to be one of the rare cases in which expert witness testimony was not necessarily
required on this subject given R.G.’s nine-year history of violence while in custody,
strong gang ties to the Norteño gang, and the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings that
R.G. lacked credibility.
 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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