Court Opinion

ID: 9623945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:46:55.019504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:37.340853
License: Public Domain

MOLLISON, Judge.
I concur in the excellent majority-opinion of my colleagues and the legal! conclusions therein. In view of the importance of the subject matter, I feel impelled to state some of my own views.
Although the reciprocal trade agreements act has been on the statute books, for 24 years and has been extended and' amended and actively implemented, and' although its constitutional validity has. been challenged heretofore, the constitutionality of the act has not until now-been the subject of direct adjudication and determination by a court having jurisdiction to decide such a question.1
Plaintiff contends that the Reciprocal' Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (section. 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 48. Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351) is an unconstitutional and improper delegation to-the President of power expressly reserved in the Constitution - to the Congress; that there is no prescribed formula, factual or otherwise, to regulate-the President’s discretionary power and. action in determining the taxing policy-on imports into the United States; that, in providing for the administration of' the trade agreements policy established by Congress, the Congress exceeded its-. *281constitutional authority and conferred upon the President “unfettered discretion” of a kind similar to that contained in sections 9 and 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, and which statutory grants of discretionary power were held by the Supreme Court to be invalid and unconstitutional delegations of legislative power to the Executive in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra and A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra. Plaintiff argues that, in enacting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Congress followed the statutory pattern or plan of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933; that “its declaration of policy and its delegation to the President of ‘unfettered discretion’ is alike in each statute,” and, as a consequence, the reciprocal trade agreements act contains an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and authority to the Executive. Plaintiff’s argument is based upon the authority of the Panama Refining Co. and Schechter Corp. decisions of the Supreme ■Court.
The attorneys for the United States contend that'the Congress' may delegate to the President the discretion to determine when certain action shall be taken, and within predetermined limits what action shall be taken, provided the statute in question furnishes to the President an “intelligible principle” to guide his action. They maintain that the trade agreements act here in question contains an intelligible principle guiding the President’s discretion and that such statute complied with the constitutional standards existing at the time of the enactment of said statute.
It is further contended in behalf of the United States that the trade agreements act does not contain the defects and constitutional infirmities present in sections 9 and 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (48 Stat. 200 and 196-197) struck down by the Supreme Court in the Panama and Schech-ter decisions. The defendant’s attorneys further claim that the statutory plan, on which the reciprocal trade agreements act was based, embodied legislative elements, features, and plans of prior tariff legislation, enacted at various times during a period of 44 years, some of the enactments having been declared valid and upheld by the Supreme Court. And, further, that the reciprocal trade agreements act is constitutional by the standards set forth in decisions rendered by the Supreme Court subsequent to the Panama Refining and Schechter decisions.
Plaintiff asserts that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company v. United States, supra, decided the very issue under consideration here and is directly in point. With this contention I do not agree since the facts of the instant case involving the President’s power to negotiate trade agreements and those in the Hampton case involving the validity of flexible tariff provisions are different. The statute involved in the case at bar is a different subject matter than that in the Hampton case so that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Hampton case is not in itself controlling of the issue here. However, it is true that the principles of law relative to the delegation of legislative power to the Executive enunciated in the Hampton decision have a very important bearing upon the decision of this case. It is also true that the legislative expedient of enabling the President to adjust or change tariff duties to meet changing conditions — the flexible tariff provision in section 315 — ■ is a legislative feature or statutory element which was upheld in the Hampton decision.
Plaintiff, in its brief, states that the “standard involved in the Hampton case * * * was the equalization of cost of production of a foreign made article to a similar domestic made article.” Plaintiff then states: “The statute was only to be invoked and the increase in duty permitted where the rates of duty provided for in the Tariff Act were not sufficient to equalize the cost of production between the foreign and the domestic article.” This is an inaccurate in*282terpretation of section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922 and an erroneous statement of the conditions or facts which were to exist at the time when the powers granted were to be exercised and the statute invoked.
The statute was to be invoked and the powers might be exercised under section 315 whenever the President, upon investigation of the differences in costs of production of the domestic and like or similar foreign articles, finds that the duties fixed in the tariff act do not equalize the differences in the costs of production of articles grown or produced in the United States and of like or similar articles grown or produced in the foreign countries; upon such a finding the President was empowered to ascertain said differences and determine and proclaim the changes in classification or increases or decreases in any rate of duty provided in the act shown by said ascertained differences in such costs of production necessary to equalize the same, but by not more than 50 per centum.
The standard or declaration of congressional policy in the flexible tariff provision in section 315 which was to be administered or executed by the President was not a declared direct equation composed of the cost or production of a domestic article on the one side and the cost of production of a like or similar foreign article on the other. The standard or policy declared was the President’s finding as a fact, upon investigation, that the duties fixed in the act did not equalize the differences in the cost of production of the domestic article and of the like or similar foreign article.
The standard or declaration of congressional policy or plan set forth in the flexible tariff provisions involved in the Hampton case were far from the definite and precise standard, as claimed by the plaintiff’s counsel, but, on the contrary, section 315 of the Tariff Act of 1922 gave to the President a fairly wide latitude of discretion, as indicated in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the Hampton case. Plaintiff apparently believes that the President’s determination of the differences of cost of production involved no discretion or judgment. However, section 315(c), 42 Stat. 942-943, authorized the President “in so far as he finds it practicable” to take into consideration various conditions, facts, and factors. Far from supporting the claims of the plaintiff that there is no sufficiently precise standard or statutory plan for the guidance of Executive action contained in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the decision of the Supreme Court in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Company v. United States, supra, with reference to the constitutionality or validity of delegation of legislative power to the Executive, supports as constitutional and valid a legislative standard or plan to be executed or administered by the President which seems no more definite or precise than that contained in the trade agreements act. Cf. United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 944, 84 L.Ed. 1259.
The plaintiff also relies upon the Supreme Court case of Field v. Clark, supra. In that case, certain commodities were placed on the free list, and it was provided in section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, 26 Stat. 612, that where a country producing any of the named articles imposed duties upon imports from the United States which the President deemed to be “reciprocally unequal and unreasonable,” the President was empowered to suspend the duty-free treatment on such articles which were the product of that country. The above standard or congressional declaration of policy to be executed and administered by the President was held valid and constitutional in Field v. Clark, supra, and not open to the objection that it unconstitutionally transfers legislative power to the President.
Section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, authorized the President to enter into reciprocity trade agreements, within a narrowly defined area or scope, which when concluded would not require the approval of either the Senate or the *283Congress.2 As a sanction to put pressure on the several countries to enter into these reciprocal trade agreements, section 3 instructed the President to impose specified penalty duties on certain named articles (sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides) on the free list of the United States tariff whenever the supplying country’s treatment of imports from the United States was deemed “to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable.” Upon the authority of section 3, 10 reciprocal trade agreements were concluded with foreign countries and proclaimed by the President.3
Not only is the Supreme Court’s decision in Field v. Clark adverse and contrary to plaintiff’s claim that there is an improper and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, but also the Executive action taken under section 3, held valid and constitutional, and the conclusion and proclaiming of 10 reciprocal trade agreements based thereon is a precedent and practice in support of the validity and constitutionality of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934.
In the reciprocal trade agreements act, the President was authorized to enter into trade agreements with foreign Governments when he found as a fact that “any existing duties or other import restrictions of the United States or any foreign country are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States” and when the purposes of the act will be promoted thereby; the President was also authorized to modify by proclamation existing duties and other import restrictions as would be required or appropriate to carry out such trade agreement. The standard, statutory plan or declaration of congressional policy contained in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 for Executive guidance and execution is just as precise, definite, or adequate as were the statutory plans involved in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra, and Field v. Clark, supra, relied upon by plaintiff.
The reciprocal trade agreements act prescribes specific purposes to be accomplished in accordance with an understandable statutory plan and policy for the guidance of the President. There are predetermined limitations upon the authority granted, and the act contains an intelligible standard or principle for the guidance of the President’s discretion.
The Supreme Court has upheld many other statutes of the contingency type4 where the President or some selected *284instrumentality has been authorized to do some act or take some action when the existence of a particular fact or condition was ascertained or determined.
In Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834, the Supreme Court, in upholding the wartime Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 901 et seq., said that Congress had stated the legislative objective — -to stabilize prices and prevent inflation — and had prescribed the method of achieving that objective — maximum price fixing — and had laid down standards to guide the administrative determination of both the occasions for the exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular prices to be established. It found the Emergency Price Control Act to be valid and not an improper delegation of legislative power to the price administrator. The Supreme Court relied upon J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra, and Field v. Clark, supra, and other Supreme Court decisions, cited at page 424, of 321 U.S., at page 667 of 64 S.Ct. The Supreme Court found that the directions in the Emergency Price Control Act conferred “no greater reach for administrative determination than the power to fix just and reasonable rates”—
«* * * or the power to approve consolidations in the ‘public interest,’ sustained in New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25, 53 S.Ct. 45, 48, 77 L.Ed. 138 (compare United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 60 S.Ct. 248, 84 L.Ed. 208) ; or the power to regulate radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting ‘as public interest, convenience or necessity requires,’ upheld in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, 319 U.S. 190, at pages 225-226, 63 S.Ct. 997, at pages 1013, 1014, 87 L.Ed. 1344; or the power to prohibit ‘unfair methods of competition’ not defined or forbidden by the common law, Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 54 S.Ct. 423, 426, 78 L.Ed. 814; or the direction that in allotting marketing quotas among states and producers due consideration be given to a variety of economic factors, sustained in Mulford v. Smith, supra, 307 U.S. [38], at pages 48-49, 59 S.Ct. [648] at page 652, 653, 83 L.Ed. 1092; or the similar direction that in adjusting tariffs to meet differences in costs of production the President ‘take into consideration’ ‘in so far as he finds it practicable’ a variety of economic matters, sustained in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra; * *
The Supreme Court further said, in the Yakus decision at page 426 of 321 U.S., at page 668 of 64 S.Ct., that the authority to fix prices under certain circumstances to prevent inflation was no broader than “the authority to suspend tariff provisions upon findings that the duties imposed by a foreign state are ‘reciprocally unequal and unreasonable’, held valid in Field v. Clark, supra.”
It is now a commonly accepted principle of law that legislative power can be conferred upon the executive branch of the Government provided that the grant of authority is limited by prescribed standards. The discretion conferred must not be so wide and extensive *285that its limits cannot be discerned. There must exist an ascertainable legislative policy to which the exercise of the delegated power must conform. J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, supra; Field v. Clark, supra; Yakus v. United States, supra, 321 U.S. at page 424, 64 S.Ct. at page 667; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441; United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S.Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092; Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 783, 785, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030.
The scope and extent of the discretion allowed the executive branch in delegated legislation is set forth in the Yakus decision of the Supreme Court, where it held:
“ * * * These essentials [of the legislative function] are preserved when Congress has specified the basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its statutory command shall be effective. It is no objection that the determination of facts and the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the exercise of judgment, and for the formulation of subsidiary administrative policy within the prescribed statutory framework. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, supra, 312 U.S. 126, at pages 145, 146, 61 S.Ct. [524], at pages 532, 533, 85 L.Ed. 624, and cases cited.”
Although the Yakus decision upheld a wartime emergency act, the Court’s opinion shows that the standards therein were sufficient and adequate for normal peacetime legislation. Another case showing the extent of permissible delegation of legislative power to the Executive is Lichter v. United States, supra. The law in question provided for the renegotiation of contracts made by the Government during the war and authorized administrative officers to recover profits which they determined to be “excessive.” The term “excessive profits” was not defined by the act with any specificity, but the Supreme Court held that the term considered in the context of the statute was an adequate statement of legislative policy and, therefore, constitutional.
In the case at bar, there was no “unfettered discretion” and authority granted to the President by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934; the act did not give the President a “blank check” to make tax laws, as claimed by the plaintiff; the prescribed standards of the statute were adequate and sufficient to regulate the President’s discretion, especially in view of the expressed limitations upon his action. There are directions in the statute which give specific form and content to the statutory policy when it is considered in the light of the expressed purposes of the act, the objectives sought to be accomplished, and the background of the statutory subject matter. The trade agreements act contains a declaration or policy informing the President when he might act and specifying the limits or the extent of his authority with respect to customs duties, i. e., that duties might not be altered by more than 50 per centum. The act further provided ' that products might not be transferred between the dutiable and' free lists. It provided for the duration of trade agreements and made them subject to termination within specified time limits. There was no unwarranted, improper, or unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Executive in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 under which the trade agreement with Iceland was negotiated.
I agree with my colleagues that the Panama Refining and the Schechter Poultry Corp. cases are inapplicable and furnish no precedents or legal authority which should be applied in the instant *286case. In the Panama Refining decision, the Supreme Court stated that section 9(c) went beyond the limits of permissible delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. It held that there was an absence of sufficient and adequate congressional policy for the guidance of Presidential action. The Supreme Court summed up the matter at page 430 of the decision in 293 U.S., at page 252 of 55 S.Ct., in the following manner:
“ * * * As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.”
The reasons for declaring section 3 ■of the National Industrial Recovery Act invalid in the Schechter Poultry Corp. case were stated by the Supreme Court in the Yakus decision at page 424 of 321 U.S., at page 667 of 64 S.Ct.:
“ * * * ii prescribed no method of attaining that end save by the establishment of codes of fair competition, the nature of whose permissible provisions was left undefined. It provided no standards to which those codes were to conform. The function of formulating the codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible to Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals ■engaged in the industries to be regulated.”
At the time of the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, such legislation was without precedent insofar as regulation of an .entire industry was concerned. There was no background of similar legislation or’ prior Executive or legislative practice with respect to such legislation. On the other hand, the situation as regards the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was entirely different. In such latter situation, there was a considerable body of contingency legislation precedents involving the regulation of foreign trade and commerce; also much prior tariff legislation, some of which involved features, elements, and statutory plans similar to the statutory plan used in the reciprocal trade agreements act. Many of these tariff features, plans and legislative formulas in various statutes, as has been previously seen, had been declared valid and constitutional by the Supreme Court, and the Executive actions and practices under them sustained.
Various statutes dealing with the foreign trade and commerce of the United States have authorized the President to ascertain the existence of a particular fact or condition and to issue a proclamation to make effective the purposes of the act. Report No. 1000, 73d Congress, 2d Session, accompanying H.R. 8687, Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, pages 7-9. On the authority of such contingency statutes, numerous arrangements and reciprocity agreements involving the suspension of tariff duties have been made with foreign countries and made operative by proclamation.5
Pursuant to section 4228 of the Revised Statutes, 46 U.S.C.A. § 141, executive agreements were entered into providing for reciprocal abolition of discriminating duties on imports; and these agreements were brought into force by proclamations issued by the Presidents. These agreements were not submitted to the Senate. Report No. 1000, supra, page 9. Section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890 (McKinley Act), 26 Stat. 612, conferred upon the President authority to suspend by proclamation the free introduction of sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, when he is satisfied that any country producing such articles imposes duties or other exactions upon agricultural or other products of the United States, which he may deem to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable.
*287Section 3 was used as a basis for the negotiation and conclusion of 10 reciprocal trade agreements which were proclaimed and made effective but not submitted to the Senate for ratification or to the Congress for any action or approval.6
Between January 31, 1891, and May 26, 1892, the 10 reciprocal trade agreements were negotiated, concluded, and made effective by proclamation. The constitutionality of section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, on the authority of which the 10 reciprocal trade agreements were concluded, was challenged in the case of Field v. Clark, supra, on the grounds that it delegated and transferred legislative and treaty-making powers to the President. The Supreme Court held that the act was not liable to the above-mentioned constitutional objections.7 Field v. Clark, supra, 143 U.S. at pages 681, 694, 12 S.Ct. at pages 500, 505. The decision in Field v. Clark, supra, is a supporting authority for the view of Congress, when it enacted the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, that it had the authority to authorize and empower the President, under prescribed standards and upon specified limitations upon his discretion, to negotiate and conclude reciprocal trade agreements and to make them effective by proclamation. The effect of the decision in Field v. Clark, coming after 6 of the 10 reciprocal trade agreements had been concluded and made effective by proclamation,8 was an approval of such trade agreements and the exercise of such Executive authority and practice.
Section 3 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897 (the Dingley Act), 30 Stat. 203-204, specifically provided for the negotiation and conclusion by the President of reciprocal trade agreements with countries producing certain enumerated articles, in which reciprocal and equivalent concessions in favor of products of the United States might be secured. On the authority of section 3 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, the President concluded and made effective by proclamation at least nine reciprocal trade agreements. See Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, supra, page 215. See also 17 C.J., page 543, Customs Duties, section 14, note 8; 25 C.J.S. Customs Duties § 18. These reciprocal trade agreements were concluded under the authority of section 3 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, and were not submitted to the Senate but were brought into force by proclamation by the President. House Report No. 1000, supra, page 10. See also Senate Report No. 871, 73d Congress, 2d Session, accompanying H.R. 8687, Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 (incorporating majority House report) page 13.
Full force and effect to various of these reciprocal trade agreements, concluded under section 3 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, were given by decisions of the courts of the United States. Nicholas v. United States, C.C., 122 F. 892; United States v. Tartar Chemical Co., 2 Cir., 127 F. 944; United States v. Luyties, 2 Cir., 130 F. 333; United States v. Julius Wile Bro. & Co., 2 Cir., 130 F. 331; Migliavacca Wine Co. v. United States, C.C., 148 F. 142; La Manna, Azema & Farnan v. United States, 2 Cir., 144 F. 683; Mihalovitch, Fletcher & Co. v. United States, C.C., 160 F. 988; Shaw v. United States, 1 Ct.Cust.App. 426, T.D. 31500.
A reciprocal trade agreement authorized by section 3 of the Tariff Act of' July 24, 1897, negotiated, concluded, and proclaimed under the authority of the President, was likewise given recogni*288tion, force and effect in B. Altman & Co. v. United States, supra. It can hardly be doubted that the Congress has the authority, in regulating foreign trade and commerce, to authorize the President, under prescribed standards and limitations, to negotiate, conclude, and make effective by proclamation reciprocal trade agreements lowering customs duties in return for concessions granted the United States. Field v. Clark, supra; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 S.Ct. 349, 48 L.Ed. 525; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 30 S.Ct. 356, 54 L.Ed. 435; Greene Cattle Company, Inc., v. United States, 36 C.C.P.A., Customs, 52, C.A.D. 397; George E. Bardwil & Sons v. United States, 42 C.C.P.A., Customs, 118, C.A.D. 583.
In the drafting or passage of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, the Congress might have provided, as it did in section 4 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, for submission of the reciprocal trade agreements authorized thereunder to the Senate for its advice and consent. However, in drafting the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, it followed the legislative plan adopted in Section 3 of the Tariff Act of October 1, 1890, and section 3 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897; it deliberately chose not to provide for submission of the reciprocal trade agreements concluded by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent or to the Congress for its approval or action. See House Report No. 1000, 73d Congress, 2d Session, pages 5, 6, 15; Senate Report No. 871, supra, pages 8, 9, 18.
I concur in the conclusions of my colleagues that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 is valid and does not grant legislative and treaty-making powers to the President in violation of the Constitution. I concur further in the holding that the merchandise is properly dutiable under paragraph 718(b), as modified by the trade agreement with Iceland, and that the protest should be overruled.

. The constitutionality of the act was challenged in the case of Ernest E. Marks Co. v. United States, 117 F.2d 542, 28 C.C.P.A., Customs, 286, C.A.D. 156; affirming C.D. 305, 4 Cust.Ct. 126, which held that a* party cannot contend that subsection (b) 19 U.S.C.A. § 1351 is unconstitutional and at the same time seek relief under subsection (a) since both sections are to be construed as a whole, and if one portion is unconstitutional, the other must fall with it. gee also Wislar v. United States, 97 F.2d 152, 26 C.C.P.A., Customs, 138, C.A.D. 7, certiorari denied 305 U.S. 629, 59 S.Ct. 93, 83 L.Ed. 403, where it wac likewise not necessary to decide the constitutional issue raised.

. U. S. Tariff Commission, Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties (1919), p. 149; U. S. Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, Part II (Rept. No. 160, 2d Series), p. 1.

. Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, Part II (Rept. No. 160, 2d Series), p. 2.

. For a history of some contingency type legislation see Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, at pages 308-309, 53 S.Ct. 350, at page 356, 77 L.Ed. 796: “The powers of the President under the flexible tariff provisions of the Act of 1922 differ in degree rather than in kind from powers that have long been his. By an act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. 224), the President was empowered to give effect to a repeal of duties upon imports whenever he was ‘satisfied that the discriminating or countervailing duties’ of the foreign nation affected, ‘so far as they operate to the disadvantage of the United States,’ had been abolished. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 685, 12 S.Ct. 495, 36 L.Ed. 294. Powers very similar were conferred in later years. See, e. g., Act of March 3, 1817, c. 39, 3 Stat. 361; Act of January 7, 1824, c. 4, 4 Stat. 2, 3; Act of May 31, 1830, c. 219, 4 Stat. 425; Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, 23 Stat. 57; Field v. Clark supra, at pages 686, 689, of 143 U.S., at pages 502, 503 of 12 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed. 294.1 The Tariff Act of 1890 went farther than those before it. Whenever the President became satisfied that the government of any country producing and exporting certain enumerated articles had imposed duties upon the agricultural or other products of the United States which he found to be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he was to have power to suspend the provisions of the tariff law whereby importation of the enumerated articles had pre*284viously been free. 26 Stat. 567, 612, c. 1244. Broader still was the delegation of power under the Tariff Act of 1909, which set up a system of maximum and minimum rates with permission to the President to adopt the one set or the other. 36 Stat. 11, 82, c. 6. Under none of these statutes was executive action conditioned upon an inquiry and report by any officer or department. In the fulfilment of his duties, the President con-suited whatever sources of information appeared to be appropriate, and when satisfied as to the facts, made proclamation of his action.” See also Field v. Clark, supra, 143 U.S. at pages 681-692, 12 S.Ct. at pages 500-504.

. “For other instances see Comer, Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities, pp. 64, et seq.”

. Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, 2d ed., pp. 121-122.

. U. S. Tariff Commission, Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties, page 149; U. S. Tariff Commission, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, Report No. 160, 2d Series, Part II, pp. 1, 2.

. See concurring opinion at page 697, of 143 U.S., at page 506 of 12 S.Ct. of Field v. Clark, supra, indicating that the issue of treaty-making power was involved in the decision of the case.

. Crandall, op. cit., p. 122. Field v. Clark was decided by the Supreme Court February 29, 1892.