Court Opinion

ID: 9792177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:26.529355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.956294
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that the Board lacked authority to invalidate the director’s temporary rule and that the director acted properly in promulgating a temporary rule awarding claimant zero disability. I disagree with both holdings and respectfully dissent.
I begin with the Board’s authority to review the validity of temporary rules adopted pursuant to ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C). In Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 124 Or App 538, 863 P2d 530 (1993),1 we held that, under ORS 656.295(5), “the Board has the authority to review the correctness of the director’s application of standards,” and, under ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C), to remand to the director to amend those standards when they do not address a worker’s disability. 124 Or App at 541-42. We cited the mandatory language of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) in rejecting SAIF’s contention that the director has sole discretion to determine whether a temporary rule is required. Id. at 541 (“the director shall stay further proceedings * * * and shall adopt temporary rules”).
The Board’s power to remand for adoption of temporary rules must necessarily include the authority to review the rules actually adopted. Otherwise, those rules are unreviewable,2 and the director is effectively granted sole discretion to determine whether a temporary rule is required. That *718is contrary to the mandatory language of ORS 656.726-(3)(f)(C) and our reasoning in Gallino. If the legislature had intended to insulate the director’s temporary rules from Board review, it would have employed discretionary language (for example, “the director may stay further proceedings * * * and may adopt temporary rules”). By using mandatory language, however, the legislature intended to carve out a specific exception to the director’s general authority to adopt disability standards. See ORS 174.020; Smith v. Multnomah County Board of Commissioners, 318 Or 302,309,865 P2d 356 (1994) (specific statute is deemed exception to inconsistent general statute).
Although it was not a part of our reasoning in Gallino, other language in ORS 656.295(5) and similar language in ORS 656.283(7) also reveal the legislature’s intention that the Board review the temporary rules of the director. ORS 656.283(7)3 and ORS 656.295(5)4 provide, in part, *719that the ALJ at the hearing of a claim and the Board on review of a claim shall apply the standards for evaluation of disability as may be adopted by the director pursuant to ORS 656.726. Application of disability standards by the ALJ and the Board must necessarily include the authority to determine the validity of those standards. The majority is wrong to conclude that the Board does not have the authority to review the validity of a temporary rule adopted by the director pursuant to ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C).
As to the validity of the rule, claimant contends that the director cannot adopt a rule that does not award PPD pursuant to ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C). The Board disagreed, holding that promulgation of a temporary rule does not always result in compensation. Rather, the impairment must satisfy the director’s disability standards before a claimant is entitled to a PPD award. The Board concluded that claimant’s impairment did not meet those standards here, because the screw-removal surgery was designed to improve the function of claimant’s shoulder, and Dr. Brenneke failed to explain why he believed that the surgery resulted in a 10 percent impairment.
ORS 656.726(3)(p(C) delegates to the director “certain rule-making authority.” See Hadley v. Cody Hindman Logging, 144 Or App 157, 160, 925 P2d 158 (1996) (reaching same conclusion regarding ORS 656.210(2)(c)). There are three classes of statutory terms that delegate rule-making authority to an agency, “each of which conveys a different responsibility for the agency in its initial application of the statute and for the court on review of that application.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217, 223, 621 P2d 547 (1980). Those classes are:
“1.) Terms of precise meaning, whether of common or technical parlance, requiring only factfinding by the agency and judicial review for substantial evidence;
*720“2.) Inexact terms which require agency interpretation and judicial review for consistency with legislative policy; and
“3.) Terms of delegation which require legislative policy determination by the agency and judicial review of whether that policy is within the delegation.” Id.
The application of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) in this case involves “inexact terms” — i.e., the legislature has completely expressed its meaning, but that meaning must be spelled out in the agency’s rule or order.5 England v. Thunderbird, 315 Or 633, 638, 848 P2d 100 (1993).
“An inexact term gives the agency interpretive but not legislative responsibility. With respect to an inexact term, the role of the court is to determine whether the agency ‘erroneously interpreted a provision of law,’ ORS 183.482(8)(a), and the ultimate interpretive responsibility lies with the court in its role as the arbiter of questions of law.” Id. (citations omitted).
In assessing whether the director “erroneously interpreted a provision of law,” it is necessary to determine whether a temporary rule that awards no compensation “accommodate[s] the worker’s impairment,” as required under ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C). In construing a statute, our task is to discern the legislature’s intent. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). That analysis first requires an examination of the statute’s text and context, proceeding to legislative history if, and only if, intent remains unclear. Id. at 610-12.
Although ORS 656.726(3)(f) grants the director authority to promulgate disability standards, subsection (C) requires the director to “adopt temporary rules amending the [disability] standards to accommodate the worker’s impairment” when “it is found that the worker’s disability is not *721addressed by the standards adopted pursuant to this paragraph.” It is first necessary to determine whether there was a finding that claimant’s disability was not addressed by the disability standards. In its initial order, the Board found as fact that claimant suffered a permanent impairment as a result of the screw-removal surgery. That finding was based on a report by Brenneke, who concluded that claimant suffered a loss of motion in his left arm and shoulder. Under ORS 656.214(1),6 “permanent partial disability” includes the permanent and partial loss of use of an arm. The Board also found that neither the surgical procedure nor the resulting impairment was addressed by existing disability standards. Accordingly, the director was required, pursuant to the mandatory language of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C), to adopt “temporary rules amending the standards to accommodate the worker’s impairment.”
The text of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) does not define “accommodate.” In examining the text of a statute, we must apply rules of construction bearing directly on how to read that text, including the principle that words of common usage should be given their plain, natural and ordinary meaning. PGE, 317 Or at 611. The dictionary defines “accommodate” as “ADAPT: * * * make fit, suitable or congruous[.]” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 12 (unabridged ed 1993). The rule adopted here does not “adapt” the disability standards to “fit” claimant’s impairment. Instead, it essentially ignores the Board’s impairment finding, summarily concludes that this type of surgery “does not result in recognized loss of shoulder function” and assigns an impairment value of zero. The rule “accommodates” the surgical procedure, not the resulting impairment. That is not what the text of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) authorizes.
*722I acknowledge that the director generally is granted authority to promulgate disability standards, ORS 656.726-(3)(f), and an impairment typically is not rateable unless it is covered by those standards. However, the entire thrust of subsection (C) is to require the director to make an impairment rateable when existing standards do not apply. As we held in Gallino, the director does not have discretion to determine whether a temporary rule is required under ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C). 124 Or App at 541. Allowing the director discretion to determine whether an impairment not covered by the standards is rateable, as the Board did here, involves an impermissible construction of the statute under Gallino. In my view, claimant is correct that a compensation award is a necessary consequence of remanding a case for adoption of a temporary rule pursuant to ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C). I would hold that the Board erred in concluding otherwise.
Leeson, Haselton, and Armstrong, JJ., join in this dissent.

 In Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 124 Or App 538, 863 P2d 530 (1993), we referred to the director of the Department of Insurance and Finance (DIF), which has since been renamed the Department of Consumer and Business Services.

 For example, while his case was pending before the Board, claimant moved that this court determine whether we had jurisdiction outside of the contested case process to pass on the validity of the rule at issue. In an unpublished order, we ruled that we did not have jurisdiction because
*718“petitioner is a party to a contested case pending before the Workers’ Compensation Board in which the validity of the rule is at issue, and the validity of the rule may be determined by this court on judicial review of the Board’s order in that case.” Shubert v. Department of Consumer and Business Services, CA No. A86479, citing ORS 183.400(1).
In other words, we can determine the validity of the rule only as part of this contested case proceeding — i.e., on review of the Board’s order. However, if the Board lacks authority to address that issue, then so do we, because the validity of the rule is not part of the Board’s order.
The majority asserts that “[pletitioner is a party to a contested case and the rule may be and is, in fact, being reviewed, pursuant to ORS 183.400, by this court in this judicial review.” 151 Or App at 715 (emphasis in original). That is so, however, only because we have determined that the Board had authority to review the validity of the rule. “We are unable to review an agency’s action without the agency first making a decision.” Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp. v. Griggs, 112 Or App 44, 49, 827 P2d 921 (1992). If the Board lacks authority to review the rule, as the majority would hold, then the Board has made no substantive decision as to that rule, and there is no agency action for this court to review.
Furthermore, although ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) requires the director to submit temporary rules to the Workers’ Compensation Management-Labor Advisory Committee for review at its next meeting, the committee is only authorized to make recommendations “to the director for such action as the director deems appropriate.” ORS 656.790(2) (emphasis supplied). The committee cannot bind the director. Accordingly, in the absence of review by the Board, the director has unfettered discretion in adopting temporary rules. But see Gallino, 124 Or App at 541.

 ORS 656.283(7) provides, in part:
“The Administrative Law Judge shall apply to the hearing of the claim such standards for evaluation of disability as may be adopted by the director pursuant to ORS 656.726.”

 ORS 656.295(5) provides, in part:
*719“The board shall apply to the review of the claim such standards for the evaluation of disability as may be adopted by the director pursuant to ORS 656.726. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent or limit the right of a worker, insurer or self-insured employer to present evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the standards adopted pursuant to ORS 656.726 for evaluation of the worker’s permanent disability were incorrectly applied in the reconsideration order[.]”

 The application of ORS 656.726(3)(f)(C) does not involve “exact terms,” which “impart relatively precise meaning, e.g., 21 years of age, male, 30 days, Class II, farmland, rodent, Marion County.” Springfield Education Assn. v. School Dist., 290 Or 217,223,621 P2d 547 (1980). Nor does it involve general “delegative terms,” such as “good cause,” “fair,” “unfair,” “undue” and “unreasonable,” which the legislature uses when it cannot foresee all possible applications of a statute. Id. at 228.

 ORS 656.214(1), provides, in part:
“(a) ‘Loss’ includes permanent and complete or partial loss of use.
“(b) ‘Permanent partial disability’ means the loss of either one arm, one hand, one leg, one foot, loss of hearing in one or both ears, loss of one eye, one or more fingers, or any other injury known in surgery to be permanent partial disability.”
Reading those two subsections together, “permanent partial disability” means the permanent and complete or partial loss of use of one arm, one hand, one leg, one foot, etc.