Court Opinion

ID: 9853875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:35.944941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:13.088943
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the court’s opinion except with respect to the affirmance of the downward variance. The district court properly calculated an advisory Guideline sentencing range of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment, yet it only imposed a sentence of 72 months’ imprisonment. By varying downward four levels, the district court imposed a sentence that is not reasonable under the unique and disturbing facts of this case.
In calculating a downward variance, the district court considered several factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including White’s age, health, and lack of criminal history. The “big factor” for the district court was “to weigh the nature and circumstances of [White’s] offense.” The nature and circumstances of White’s offense do not support the extent of the district court’s downward variance.
White downloaded approximately fifty images of child pornography. White then printed an image of child pornography, falsely labeled it as an image of A.M. taken by A.M.’s mother, and anonymously mailed it to the Iowa Department of Human Services. In the context of deciding whether to apply the vulnerable victim enhancement, the district court found White should have known this course of action would cause A.M. and A.M.’s family “terrible emotional stress,” and the district court correctly concluded “it was a vicious, vindictive act.”
Generally, child pornography causes much harm, including:
(1) the use of children in the production of sexually explicit material is a form of sexual abuse that can result in physical or psychological harm, or both, to the children involved;
(2) child pornography permanently records the victim’s abuse, and its continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years;
(3) child pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing other children into sexual activity; a child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of other children “having fun” participating in such activity;
(4) child pornography is often used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with children; such use of child pornography can desensitize the viewer to the pathology of sexual abuse or exploitation of children, so that it can become acceptable to and even preferred by the viewer;
(5) the existence of and traffic in child pornography creates the potential for many types of harm in the community; presents a clear and present danger to all children; and inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers who prey on children, thereby increasing the creation and distribution of child pornography; and
(6) the sexualization and eroticization of minors through any form of child pornography has a deleterious effect on all children by encouraging a societal perception of children as sexual objects and leading to further sexual abuse and ex*650ploitation of them, and it creates an unwholesome environment that affects the psychological, mental, and emotional development of children and undermines the efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound mental, moral, and emotional development of children.
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-26 (1996).
By receiving, distributing, and possessing child pornography, White harmed (1) the child victim by viewing the recording of the child’s abuse, (2) himself by desensitizing himself to the sexual abuse of children, by thinking of children as sexual objects, and by inflaming his own desire for child pornography, and (3) other children (and more generally, the community at large) by providing demand for the production of child pornography. White is neither less culpable nor less deserving of punishment than the typical defendant who receives, distributes, and possesses child pornography. Rather, White is at least as deserving of punishment (and possibly more so) as the typical defendant who receives, distributes, and possesses child pornography because White distributed child pornography with the specific intent to cause harm to A.M.’s family directly and A.M. indirectly.
As a direct result of White’s course of action, A.M. (1) was taken from school, (2) physically examined and questioned by a doctor, and (3) temporarily removed, together with her siblings, from her parent’s home and care. A.M. now is embarrassed in front of her doctor. She reports related nightmares. She is afraid of having her picture taken, and she feels angry, fearful for herself and her siblings, unsafe, sad, scared, and confused. In addition to all of the well recognized abstract harms caused by child pornography, White’s distribution of child pornography specifically harmed A.M. and AM.’s family in a manner that is uniquely deserving of punishment.
The panel opinion correctly observes White received two 2 level enhancements due to White’s distribution of child pornography. The 4 level downward variance offsets the two 2 level enhancements, effectively not holding White responsible for “a vicious, vindictive act” of distributing child pornography.
In addition, besides being convicted of one count of distributing child pornography, in violation of § 2252(a)(2), White was convicted of one count of receiving child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and one count of possessing child pornography, in violation of § 2252(a)(4). Both the district court and the panel majority place emphasis on the atypical nature of White’s distribution of child pornography. Although a conviction for distributing child pornography to the Iowa Department of Human Services is atypical, there is nothing about White’s convictions for receiving and possessing child pornography that justifies a downward variance. By varying downward based on the atypical nature of White’s distribution of child pornography, both the district court and the panel majority ignore the seriousness of White’s receipt and possession convictions.
At sentencing, the district court noted White only possessed approximately fifty images of child pornography. The 2001 version of the Guidelines contained no enhancement based on the number of images of child pornography involved in the offense. See U.S.S.G. app. C. amend. 649 (2003); compare U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b) (2001), with U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(A) (2006) (“If the offense involved ... at least 10 images, but fewer than 150, increase by 2 levels.”). In comparison to the defendants with only a single image of child pornography, the defendants with hun*651dreds of images deserve more punishment due to the nature and circumstances of the offense as well as the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A). That the defendants with hundreds of images deserve relatively more harsh sentences only logically supports the conclusion that the defendants with only a single image deserve relatively less harsh sentences; it does not logically support a conclusion that a defendant with fifty images deserves leniency in the form of a downward variance. Cf. United States v. Feemster, 483 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir.2007) (“The absence of grounds that justify further punishment is not a ground for a downward variance.”).
The district court varied downward based on several other factors, including White’s age at the time of sentencing. Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Guidelines policy statements must be considered in imposing a sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5)(A). The Guidelines provide “[a]ge ... is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1, p.s. Significant variances based on a defendant’s age produce unwarranted sentencing disparities because judges do not uniformly treat age as a mitigating factor. See United States v. Maloney, 466 F.3d 663, 669 (8th Cir.2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). A sentencing judge reasonably could conclude White’s age of 51 should reflect more maturity and intelligence when dealing with child pornography, and that judge also reasonably could enhance White’s sentence due to his age. Although relevant to the inquiry conducted under § 3553(a) as a characteristic, White’s age does not justify the extent of the downward variance. See Feemster, 483 F.3d at 590.
The district court also varied downward in part based on White’s poor health, specifically, White’s diabetes, high blood pressure, weak extremities, and difficulty in walking. Again, although no longer mandatory, the Guidelines provide “[pjhysical condition ... is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s. Moreover, despite his health, White has painted signs, repaired a garbage truck, occasionally hauled garbage, and annually set up and torn down a haunted house. White’s health has little, if any, relevance and is not so extraordinary as to justify the extent of the downward variance. See United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352, 359 (8th Cir.2006).
Finally, the district court varied in part based on White’s lack of criminal history. White’s criminal history calculation used in the advisory Guideline sentencing range expressly accounted for White’s lack of criminal history and likelihood of recidivism.8 See United States v. Garate, 482 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir.2007), petition for cert. filed, (No. 07-5051) (June 28, 2007); United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir.2006), petition for cert. filed, (No. 06-8086) (Nov. 28, 2006). The district court’s downward variance based on White’s lack of criminal history and likeli*652hood of recidivism places undue weight on factors already accounted for by the Guidelines.
The panel opinion also compares White’s actions to what charges could be filed against "White in Iowa state courts. A hypothetical conviction under Iowa law is not a relevant consideration in deciding the reasonableness of White’s federal sentence. See United States v. McCormick, 474 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir.2006); United States v. Jeremiah, 446 F.3d 805, 807-08 (8th Cir.2006).
Thus, I respectfully dissent.

. In passing, the district court briefly noted a "psychological concern.” The panel opinion interprets this reference to mean the district court concluded White had a low likelihood of recidivism. At sentencing, the district court never specifically addressed the psychological reports discussed in the panel opinion's footnote 4. Moreover, Dr. Smith concluded White was "at the low to moderate risk level” and the district court recommended White be considered to participate in the sex offender treatment program, although Dr. Rosell concluded White was a low risk and did not require sex offender specific treatments.