Court Opinion

ID: 2723219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2014-09-03 15:00:12.323232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:57.522609
License: Public Domain

13-1403
    Quan v. Holder
                                                                                       BIA
                                                                              A200 032 131

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT
ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

              At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
    in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of September, two thousand fourteen.

    PRESENT:
                     ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
                     REENA RAGGI,
                     PETER W. HALL,
                           Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    XIU RONG QUAN,
                     Petitioner,
    v.
                                                                 13-1403
                                                                 NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
______________________________________

FOR PETITIONER:                         Charles Christophe, Christophe Law Group,
                                        P.C., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                         Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General;
                                        Anthony C. Payne, Senior Litigation
                                        Counsel; Rebecca E. Dames, Law Clerk,
                                        Yedidya Cohen, Trial Attorney, Office of
                                        Immigration Litigation, United States
                                        Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration

Appeals (ABIA@) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

the petition for review is DENIED.
        Petitioner Xiu Rong Quan, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a March

26, 2013 decision of the BIA denying her untimely motion to reopen her removal

proceedings. In re Xiu Rong Quan, No. A200 032 131 (B.I.A. Mar. 26, 2013). We

assume the parties= familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this

case.

        We review the BIA=s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See

Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking

to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after

the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. '

1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. ' 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Quan=s motion

to reopen, filed in 2012, was untimely because her order of removal became final in

2007. See 8 U.S.C. ' 1101(a)(47)(B)(i). Quan contends, however, that her

conversion to Christianity in the United States and the increased mistreatment of

                                           3
Christians in China constitute materially changed country conditions excusing her motion

from the applicable time limitation. We hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion

in denying Quan=s motion for failure to demonstrate a material change in country

conditions.

      First, the BIA did not err in determining that Quan=s conversion to Christianity in

the United States was a self-induced change in personal circumstances and not a

change in country conditions. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.

2008); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-74 (2d Cir. 2006).

      Second, the BIA=s determination that the 2011 ChinaAid Report did not reflect a

material change in country conditions was also reasonable. Quan bore the burden of

supporting her motion to reopen with Amaterial@ evidence. See 8 C.F.R. '

1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. ' 1229a(c)(7)(B); cf. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546
F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (where enforcement of a policy varies, it is the applicant=s

                                           4
burden to show that violation of the policy would be punished in a way that gives rise

to a well-founded fear of persecution in her locality). The ChinaAid report indicated that

the treatment of Christians varied by region, and it made no mention of how that

treatment manifested itself in Quan=s home province of Zhejiang. Because that report

did not provide any basis from which to conclude that there had been a change in how

Christians were treated in Zhejiang between 2006 (when Quan had her merits hearing)

and 2012 (when she filed the motion to reopen) and because that report was the only

evidence in the record discussing conditions applicable to Chinese Christians in 2006,

it was immaterial to proving changed conditions in Quan=s home province. See In re

S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (AIn determining whether evidence

accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions

that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions

submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.@).

                                            5
      Accordingly, Quan=s focused challenge asserting the BIA did not give appropriate

consideration to the ChinaAid Report is without merit. Cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep=t

of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (AAlthough we have cautioned that >the

immigration court should be careful not to place excessive reliance on published reports

of the Department of State,= the weight to afford to such evidence >lie[s] largely= within

the discretion of the IJ.@ (citations omitted)). Therefore, Quan=s overarching assertion

that the BIA erred in concluding she did not establish a material change in country

conditions fails. In so holding, we note that Quan has not challenged before this Court

the BIA=s decision to give diminished weight to other individualized items of evidence

(i.e., the letter from Quan=s parents and photocopies of certain unauthenticated notices),

which also bear on the issue of changed conditions.

      We decline to consider Quan=s challenge to the agency=s alternative finding that

she had not demonstrated her prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Bagamasbad,

                                            6
429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (AAs a general rule courts and agencies are not required to

make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they

reach.@).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have

completed our review, we DENY as moot Quan=s motion for a stay of removal; we will

address by separate order Petitioner=s attorney=s motion to withdraw as counsel.

                                      FOR THE COURT:
                                      Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

                                         7