Court Opinion

ID: 9488671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:52:08.007091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:15.802455
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur in the result and in the court’s opinion, the court’s opinion steers clear of addressing a question that is properly before us and, I think, required to decide the case fully. Evidence of Tenorio’s post-Miranda silence was introduced in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. This use is constitutional error. Thus, the important question is whether the error is harmless. The majority opinion decides this question without deciding an issue the parties present to us: Whether the district court properly admitted evidence of Tenorio’s pr e-Miranda silence. Because the most probative evidence of Ten-orio’s guilty mind was his pr e-Miranda failure to explain how he came into possession of the suitcase, I find it necessary as part of the harmless error analysis to determine whether the pr e-Miranda silence was properly admitted.*
Tenorio contends (and briefs to us) that the government cannot use his pr e-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief as substantive evidence of guilt. The constitutional basis for this extension of the prophylactic rule announced in Miranda is unclear to me. Were this issue one of first impression, I would decide that the pr e-Miranda evidence was admissible. But, this court has already decided the question: The prosecution may in*1108troduce as substantive evidence of guilt in its case-in-ehief a defendant’s pr e-Miranda reaction to a stop and search. Admissible evidence includes that no innocent explanation was offered to the officer before the arrest. See U.S. v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (“The government may comment on a defendant’s silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is arrested and given his Miranda warnings.”).
Tenorio argues that the pertinent part of Rivera is dictum. I will briefly explain why this is not so. In Rivera, a customs officer testified about the defendant’s pre-arrest demeanor as she (the defendant) was approached and as her suitcase was searched. The officer also testified about post-Miranda silence. Id. at 1567-68. On appeal, this court assumed the admission of post-Miranda silence was error, but held this error to be harmless because the prosecutor “was clearly entitled to comment on [the defendant’s] demeanor when she was first approached ... and later as [the] suitcase was being searched.” Id. at 1569. Thus, the conclusion that pr e-Miranda silence was properly admitted is not dictum, but was essential to the court’s decision that an assumed error was harmless.
This court later explained Rivera in U.S. v. Simon, 964 F.2d 1082 (11th Cir.1992). There, Simon said before arrest that he did not own a certain weapon. Later, it was discovered that he did. At trial, the government introduced in its case-in-ehief that Simon earlier failed to admit ownership of the weapon. Simon argued this violated his fifth amendment rights. This court responded, “[b]ecause Simon was not under arrest at the time in question, we reject his claim that the evidence ... was inadmissible because of the fifth amendment self-incrimination provisions. Silence is admissible in the absence of Miranda warnings.” Id., 964 F.2d at 1086 n. * (citing Rivera) (emphasis added).
The law of this circuit is settled that evidence of pr e-Miranda silence is admissible in the government’s case-in-chief as substantive proof of guilt. Cf. U.S. v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019, 1022 (9th Cir.1993) (error — if any — in admitting evidence of defendant’s reluctance to answer police questions in government’s ease-in-chief harmless given curative instruction); U.S. v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 323 (7th Cir.1991) (momentary pr e-Miranda silence at the time arrest is ongoing not admissible in case-in-chief); U.S. v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir.1991) (pre-arrest silence, where defendant has already affirmatively asserted right to silence, inadmissible in government’s case-in-chief); U.S. ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1015-17 (7th Cir.1987) (pre-arrest silence, after defendant informs police “I won’t make any statements,” not admissible in case-in-chief); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (1st Cir.1989) (pre-Miranda statement of “if you think I’m going to confess to you, you’re crazy” inadmissible because it was assertion of right to remain silent); U.S. v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981) (assuming without deciding it is error to introduce pre-Miranda silence under similar facts, but holding any error harmless because evidence clearly admissible to impeach defendant’s testimony).
Applying this rule to the record now before us, it appears that during the initial stop and inspection of his luggage, Tenorio was not in custody for Miranda purposes and had not been given his Miranda warnings. Under these circumstances, the Constitution permits the government to use Tenorio’s reaction to the stop and search (including his failure to explain how he came into possession of his suitcase) as substantive evidence of guilt in its case-in-chief. Thus, the district court did not err in admitting evidence of Tenorio’s pr e-Miranda silence or demeanor.
Despite the highly probative value of this properly admitted evidence, a review of the record leads me to accept (although I think the case is a close one) that the admission of the evidence of post-Miranda silence was not harmless. Cf. Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568 (admission of post-Miranda silence harmless because other evidence, including pr e-Miranda silence, so strong). Therefore, I concur.

 With a view toward the likely retrial, reaching this issue will aid the district court on remand and will serve the interests of judicial economy. See U.S. v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073, 1080 (11th Cir.1994).