Court Opinion

ID: 9804463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:49:21.62064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:13:46.285135
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 22] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 23] For reasons articulated in my dissent in Richter v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2010 ND 150, 786 N.W.2d 716, I would hold the officer’s approach to Schneider’s vehicle with flashing lights was a show of authority constituting a seizure. Id. at ¶ 25. At that point, a reasonable person would not feel he was free to leave the scene nor did Deputy Vyska have any reasonable and articulable suspicion any criminal activity was happening. By showing that the officer approached the vehicle under an assertion of the officer’s authority, Schneider has established the prima facie case of illegal seizure because there is nothing in the record that asserts a reasonable and articulable basis to assume criminal activity.
[¶ 24] Relying on State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 301 (N.D.1992), to say that it was the officer’s pursuit of Lang-seth’s vehicle with flashing lights that converted that encounter into a stop is nonsensical to me. It was Langseth’s decision to move the vehicle that caused the “pursuit” and, indeed, we do not generally want drivers choosing to drive away from officers who have activated their emergency lights of whatever color. See N.D.C.C. § 39-10-71. That is why it is irrelevant that Schneider “could have driven forward or could have traveled down the gravel road to the left.” Someone in Schneider’s position would not feel free to do so.
[¶ 25] I would reverse and allow Schneider to withdraw his guilty plea.
[¶ 26] Carol Ronning Kapsner