Court Opinion

ID: 9445973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:42:42.448616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:28.466215
License: Public Domain

MURRAH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I am convinced that Staples and Stinchcomb sustain the asserted right of action, and that Updike and New State do not take it away. It is true that both Staples and Stinchcomb speak of the right of action as for subrogation or indemnity, and apparently use those terms interchangeably or synonymously. But, in neither of the cases was the asserted action in the nature of true subrogation. The employer did not seek to stand in the shoes of his employee, and in each case the court sustained the independently asserted right of action on the “well-recognized rule, supported by a great weight of authority, that, where one has been subjected to liability, and has suffered *102loss thereby, on account of the negligence or wrongful act of another, the one has a right of action against the other for indemnity. * * * and this is no less the rule where the liability imposed is statutory.” Staples v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 62 F.2d at page 653. The authorities cited in support of that proposition were not subrogation cases. On the contrary, they each sustained an independent right of action in behalf of one who was absolutely or passively liable for a loss against one whose primary or active negligence brought about such loss. Surely rights of action should not be made to depend upon nomenclature.
The Fourth Circuit in the Crab Orchard case, and the Ninth Circuit in the Maryland Casualty Company case, recognized and acknowledged that Staples sustained the action asserted there and here. Those cases simply disagreed with the Staples case on the grounds that the relationship between the employer who paid the loss imposed by law and the negligent third party who caused it, was too remote to raise an actionable duty on which the law of negligence could operate. It is perhaps more accurate to say that those courts were concerned with applicable and controlling state law. They were not bound by the Staples case. Here, however, the Oklahoma Court in Stinehcomb adopted the Staples case under indistinguishable facts involving Oklahoma law, and the law of that State is of course binding here. True, those cases involved a personal injury for which scheduled compensation was paid, and for which subrogation was expressly granted by statute. But the asserted independent right, of action was sustained quite apart from the statute. Here, the subsequently enacted death benefit provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act are involved. But there is no valid distinction between the provisions with respect to the personal injury and death benefits since, in neither case, is the asserted right of action derivative of the employee’s right.
The question presented here was neither presented nor decided in Updike or New State. In those cases, the employer or insurance carrier sought to have the amount paid by the negligent third party in settlement of the employee’s claim credited against the death benefits payable under the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation Act. Treating the matter as for subrogation and as against the contention that to allow the employee to have both would amount to double recovery, the Oklahoma court held that the death benefits conferred by the Oklahoma Workmen’s Compensation law were in addition to an independent right of action against the negligent third party. This is so, reasoned the Oklahoma Court, because the death benefits are in the nature of accident insurance. It had no occasion to decide whether the employer has an independent right of action against the negligent third party for losses imposed upon him by law, resulting directly from the third party’s negligence.
Aside from the inapplicable theory of subrogation, the only suggested basis for rejecting the asserted right of action is that it is too remote or is only an incidental and indirect result of the negligence, hence an interest which the law does not protect. For that my brothers lean on the old Brame case which denied a right of action to a life insurance company for the wrongful death of its insured on the theory that there was no relationship between the negligent third party and the insurance company which would give rise to an actionable duty; and for the further reason that the law was loath to put a price upon human life. The answer to that objection in this modern day is, I think, that the loss in this case is liquidated — it is imposed by public law — it is a part and parcel of our social order. For my part, I can find no good reason for not extending the rule of negligence to losses of this kind. We need only say that it is within the range of foreseeability or proximate cause — an interest which the law should protect. Indeed, it is not strange or novel to say that “one who has been held legally liable for the personal neglect of another is entitled to indemnity from the latter, no *103matter whether contractual relations existed between them or not”, McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (Lloyd Royal) S.A., 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463, 472, quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987; or that an “actively negligent tortfeasor * * * is held responsible for his negligent act not only to the person directly injured thereby, but also to any other person indirectly harmed by being cast in damages by operation of law for the wrongful act.” States S.S. Co. v. Rothschild International Stevedoring Co., 9 Cir., 205 F.2d 253, 256. See also “Remoteness and Duty: The Control Devices in Liability for Negligence,” 31 Canadian Bar Rev., May 1953, pp. 471-502; “Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases”, 47 Northwestern University Law Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1953, pp. 778-816. Staples and Stinchcomb are in consonance with this modern concept of tort liability and I would not hesitate to follow them.