Court Opinion

ID: 9840153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 14:05:24.944778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:08:56.976770
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

             BRIC McMANN INDUSTRIES INCORPORATED,

                               Appellant,

                                    v.

     REGATTA BEACH CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-2454

                          September 15, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; George M. Jirotka, Judge.

Megan Powell and Kristin M. Rhodus of Rhodus Law Firm, PLLC, St.
Petersburg, for Appellant.

Elaine D. Walter and Yvette Lavelle of Boyd Richards Parker Colonnelli,
Miami, for Appellee.

KELLY, Judge.
     Bric McMann Industries, Inc. (BMI), appeals from the trial court's
order denying its motion to amend its complaint against Regatta Beach
Club Condominium Association, Inc., to add a claim for punitive
damages. In a previous appeal we reversed in part the dismissal of BMI's
nine-count complaint after determining the trial court had erred in
dismissing some of BMI's breach of contract claims, its claims for
tortious interference with various business relationships, and its claims
for breach of express warranty, trespass, and failure to maintain
common elements/breach of contract. See Bric McMann Indus., Inc. v.
Regatta Beach Club Condo. Ass'n, 223 So. 3d 469, 469-70 (Fla. 2d DCA
2017). On remand, BMI sought leave to amend its complaint to add
claims for punitive damages on each count of its complaint except the
counts for breach of express warranty and trespass. In support of its
motion, BMI filed, among other things, deposition testimony, affidavits,
emails, and documents for the purpose of satisfying its obligation to
make an evidentiary showing in support of its motion. The trial court
denied the motion to amend "without prejudice" in an unelaborated
order.1

     1 Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 was recently amended

to add subdivision (a)(3)(G) which authorizes appeals of nonfinal orders
that grant or deny a motion for leave to amend to assert a claim for
punitive damages. In re Amend. to Fla. R. App. Proc. 9.130, 345 So. 3d
725, 726 (Fla. 2022). Previously, orders granting motions to amend
could be reviewed only by certiorari. Orders denying motions to amend
were not reviewable by certiorari but rather were reviewed on appeal from
the final judgment in the case. See Beck v. Wright, 353 So. 3d 664, 665
(Fla. 2d DCA 2022) ("Although orders granting leave to amend to add a
claim for punitive damages were subject to certiorari review prior to the
amendment [of rule 9.130], orders denying leave to amend were not.").
The order here is an order denying a motion to amend and thus is
appealable notwithstanding the trial court's addition of the phrase
"without prejudice" to its order. The phrase is superfluous because
interlocutory rulings can be revisited at any time before a final judgment
is entered. See Deaterly v. Jacobson, 313 So. 3d 798, 801-02 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2021) (stating that the trial judge had the authority to review,
vacate, and/or modify interlocutory rulings before the final judgment was
rendered). Given that a ruling denying a motion to amend can be
revisited at any time before the final judgment is entered, that it does not
expose a party to financial discovery, which was the raison d'etre of
allowing interlocutory appeals of orders granting motions to amend, and
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      We apply a de novo standard of review to the trial court's denial of
BMI's motion for leave to amend to add a claim for punitive damages.
See GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Hoy, 136 So. 3d 647, 652 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013);
Holmes v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 891 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2005).
      Section 768.72, Florida Statutes (2022), provides that a punitive
damages claim may be added after a plaintiff makes a "reasonable
showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which
would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages."
§ 768.72(1). Subsection (2) sets forth the circumstances under which a
claim for punitive damages is warranted:
      (2) A defendant may be held liable for punitive damages only
      if the trier of fact, based on clear and convincing evidence,
      finds that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional
      misconduct or gross negligence. As used in this section, the
      term:

      (a) "Intentional misconduct" means that the defendant had
      actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of the conduct and the
      high probability that injury or damage to the claimant would
      result and, despite that knowledge, intentionally pursued that
      course of conduct, resulting in injury or damage.

      (b) "Gross negligence" means that the defendant's conduct
      was so reckless or wanting in care that it constituted a

that it can be reviewed after entry of the final judgment, allowing
interlocutory appeals of such orders seems contrary to the supreme
court's long-standing policy to allow interlocutory review of only the
"most urgent" interlocutory orders. See State v. Garcia, 350 So. 3d 322,
325 (Fla. 2022) ("In the normal course of proceedings, Florida law
authorizes interlocutory appeals from only a few types of nonfinal orders.
Otherwise, appellate review is generally postponed until the matter is
concluded in the trial court . . . ." (cleaned up)). It also invites piecemeal
appeals.
                                      3
     conscious disregard or indifference to the life, safety, or rights
     of persons exposed to such conduct.
§ 768.72(2). BMI does not base its claim for punitive damages on
allegations of gross negligence. Thus, the question before us is whether
BMI's proffered evidence provided facts from which one could reasonably
conclude that the Association's conduct satisfied the statutory criteria for
the recovery of punitive damages for intentional misconduct.2
     As BMI correctly asserts, the Association's argument that BMI did
not make the required showing fails because it applies the wrong
standard to address this question. Instead of relying on the language of
section 768.72(2), the Association quotes White Construction Co. v.
Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. 1984), and argues BMI's proffered
evidence does not show conduct that meets the standard articulated in
White:
     The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of
     punitive damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character,
     evincing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of
     persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or there is that
     entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
     conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows
     wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of
     the safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless
     indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to an
     intentional violation of them."
Id. (quoting Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 n.12 (Fla. 1959)).

     2 "In the case of an employer, principal, corporation, or other legal

entity, punitive damages may be imposed for the conduct of an employee
or agent only if the conduct of the employee or agent meets the criteria
specified in subsection (2) and . . . [the] legal entity actively and
knowingly participated in . . . [or] knowingly condoned, ratified, or
consented to such conduct." § 768.72(3), (a), (b). The Association has
not argued that the requirements of section 768.72(3) were not met—only
that BMI did not make the showing required in subsection (2).
                                     4
And further it argues that this standard requires evidence of conduct "no
less culpable than what is necessary to convict of criminal
manslaughter."
      This argument is misplaced because it overlooks the fact that in
1999 the Florida Legislature revised section 768.72. See ch. 99-225,
§ 22, Laws of Fla. Under the revised statute, a plaintiff seeking to
recover punitive damages under a theory of intentional misconduct need
only proffer evidence of "intentional misconduct" as defined in subsection
768.72(2)(a). See Southstar Equity, LLC v. Lai Chau, 998 So. 2d 625,
632-33 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Most of the cases the Association relies on,
such as White, were decided before section 768.72 was revised in 1999.
The newer cases it cites still quote the pre-1999 standard citing White or
other pre-1999 decisions without reference to the statutory definition of
"intentional misconduct." See, e.g., Tiger Point Golf & Country Club v.
Hipple, 977 So. 2d 608, 610-11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing White and
other pre-1999 decisions). After reviewing the record, we conclude that
BMI's proffer was sufficient to allow it to assert a claim for intentional
misconduct as defined by subsection 768.72(2)(a) and that the
Association's arguments in support of the trial court's denial of the
motion to amend are unavailing.3 Accordingly, we reverse the order
denying BMI's motion to amend.
      Reversed and remanded.

      3 We have not overlooked the other arguments the Association has

made in support of an affirmance. We have concluded they lack merit
and do not warrant further discussion.
                                      5
LaROSE, J., Concurs.
ATKINSON, J., Concurs in result only.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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