Court Opinion

ID: 9596567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:15.750509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:35.573067
License: Public Domain

BRYANT, Judge.
NW Sign Industries of North Carolina, Inc., (NW Sign of N.C.) a North Carolina Corporation, Ronald Brodie (Brodie) and Chris Reedel (Reedel), collectively defendants, appeal from an order filed 18 February 2004 denying a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) (subject matter jurisdiction) and 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). Brodie is President and CEO of NW Sign Industries, Inc., (non-party NW Sign of N.J.) a New Jersey Corporation. Reedel is Vice President of non-party NW Sign of N.J. and General Manager of NW Sign of N.C.
This dispute arose out of the employment contract between Alan Capps (plaintiff) and non-party NW Sign of N.J. Capps was employed as a salesperson by non-party NW Sign of N.J. from December 2000 until November 2002. He began working in New Jersey and in January *4102001, worked for NW Sign of N.C., at which time he was added to the NW Sign of N.C. payroll. Plaintiff alleges NW Sign of N.C. terminated his employment in November 2002 in order to avoid paying him a draw against his 9.09% commission ($70,000.00) of his sales.
Plaintiff commenced an action against defendants1 on 20 June 2003 by the issuance of a summons and leave of the trial court to file a complaint within twenty days pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 3(a)2. In plaintiffs complaint he alleged all three defendants violated the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act, and brought claims of wrongful discharge and breach of contract against NW Sign of N.C. On 15 October 2003, plaintiff filed and served an Amended Complaint, which added a claim for punitive damages against NW Sign of N.C.
On 19 November 2003, defendants filed an Answer, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion to Dismiss, and Counterclaims against plaintiff. On 18 February 2004, the Honorable J. Gentry Caudill of Mecklenburg County Superior Court filed an order denying defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and motion to dismiss.
Defendants appeal. Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as interlocutory. For the following reasons, we grant plaintiff’s motion to dismiss.
A judgment is either interlocutory or a final determination of the rights of parties. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 54(a) (2003); see Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). An order is interlocutory if it is entered during the pendency of an action and does not dispose of the case, but requires further action by the trial court to finally determine the rights of all the parties involved in the controversy. Veazey at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381; see, e.g., Country Club of Johnston County, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 135 N.C. App. 159, 161, 519 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1999). Generally, there is no right to appeal from an interlocutory order. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b) (2003). Our courts, however, have recognized an appeal may be allowed under the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ l-277(a) and 7A-27(d), if a substantial right is affected, the order determines the *411action and prevents a judgment from which an appeal may be taken, or discontinues the action. See N.C.G.S. §§ l~277(a), 7A-27(d) (2003); Hoots v. Pryor, 106 N.C. App. 397, 401, 417 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1992).
The right to immediate appeal under the substantial right exception is determined pursuant to a two step process. Id. The appellant must first show that: (1) the order affects a right that is indeed ‘substantial,’ and (2) “enforcement of that right, absent immediate appeal, [will] be ‘lost, prejudiced or be less than adequately protected by exception to entry of the interlocutory order.’ ” Country Club at 162, 519 S.E.2d at 543; see, e.g., Dalton Moran Shook, Inc. v. Pitt Dev. Co., 113 N.C. App. 707, 710, 440 S.E.2d 585, 588 (1994). Neither denial of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction nor motion for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) affects a substantial right and neither is immediately appealable. See Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ & State Employees’ Ret. Sys., 108 N.C. App. 357, 365, 424 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1993) (denial of motion to dismiss is generally not appealable); Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 327, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)); Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Constr. Co., 54 N.C. App. 486, 487, 283 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1981) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction not immediately appealable); O’Neill v. Southern Nat’l Bank, 40 N.C. App. 227, 231-32, 252 S.E.2d 231, 234-35 (1979) (failure to state claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)).
Here, the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss is interlocutory, does not affect any substantial right of the parties and is therefore not immediately appealable. Defendants argue because their motion was based on the existence of a valid forum selection and arbitration clause in the “written enforceable employment contract between the parties,” the denial of the motion to dismiss affects a substantial right. We disagree.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss does not affect a substantial right of the named defendants: NW Sign Industries of N.C.; Brodie; or Reedel. In 2000, plaintiff and non-party NW Sign of N.J. entered into an employment contract. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff went to work for NW Sign of N.C. Whether or not the terms of such employment contract are valid and enforceable is a question of fact still pending in the trial court. By denying defendants’ motion to dismiss based on failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court has not made a final determination as to the rights of the parties involved in the liti*412gation. Further, defendants have failed to show that a substantial right has been implicated in order for this matter to be properly considered by this Court.
Dismissed.
Judge JACKSON concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents in a separate opinion.

. In his original complaint, plaintiff also named Daniel Clower, Senior Vice President of Sales for non-party NW Sign of N.J. Clower was dismissed from plaintiffs Amended Complaint, filed 15 October 2003.

. A second action against NW Sign Industries of N.J. was commenced; however plaintiff did not file a complaint and that action abated.