Court Opinion

ID: 9668317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:09:22.814246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:44.578004
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I would strike all of the sanctions imposed by the district court as I believe its actions violated defendants’ procedural due process rights.
This chain of events was started in motion when the district judge fired up his own engine and, on August 1, 1985, with nothing pending before him, sua sponte directed the sheriff to serve "orders to appear” at an evidentiary hearing on all attorneys and subpoenas on Richard Ottewell and Marion K. Hanson. These orders are memorialized in the district court’s docket entries. Actual written court orders are not provided this Court and are not contained in the record below.
When the parties convened on the hearing date as directed by the district judge on August 29, 1985, an attorney, Clarence Ledwon, representing Messrs. Ottewell and Levant moved on the record for a specification by the court of the nature of the *759hearing and sufficient opportunity to prepare for it. He requested an adjournment for time to prepare and also that supporting affidavits be filed. He objected to the hearing on the further ground that subpoenas were served only the day before, contrary to MCR 2.506(C)(1), which requires two days. The district judge replied:
All right, I’m not going to adjourn this case. I realize that maybe some of you have no idea why you’re here. The record will show that this case is on the docket at my own initiative. I’m here to gather some truth, I guess. I intend to take some testimony. Mr. Ledwon, you will have ample opportunity to see whatever it is to be seen, and if after the conclusion of this hearing something further needs to be done, or whatever, I’ll address that issue, but I think this Court has inherent power to call lawyers into court who are involved in a case that is before the court as well as any other persons for that matter who may have an interest in this subject matter of the lawsuit. It’s inherent power. This is not necessarily a contempt proceeding, nobody’s on trial, I just have some questions that I feel compelled to ask. Maybe nothing will come of it, I don’t know.
Witnesses were sworn and examination was conducted by the judge. Ten marked exhibits were handed by the judge to the first witness, Attorney David Foster. Mr. Foster testified to conversations he had with Attorney Julian Levant. Counsel (Mr. Ledwon) objected asserting the attorney-client privilege. The judge overruled the objection. Mr. Ledwon then cross-examined Mr. Foster on matters pertaining to the exhibits. At one point Mr. Ledwon asked the judge:
Mr. Ledwon: Can the court instruct the witness to answer the question?
*760The Court: This entire line of questioning is not relevant, Mr. Ledwon. I’ve — I’ve let you go quite long.
Mr. Ledwon: Your Honor, I would ....
The Court: Not relevant to these proceedings. I realize you’re at somewhat of a disadvantage because you didn’t know why we’re here, and that’s why I permitted you to go as far as you have on these — in this matter, but it’s not relevant.
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, representing Miss Hansen in this regard, who is nothing but a young, recently trained, legal secretary, this question with respect to notarization, attorney signature, and what not is deemed irrelevant by the Court, I do not see the basis for the relevance for Miss Hansen’s order to appear in Court today in that respect.
The Court: It is relevant as it pertains to your client; not relevant as to how Mr. Foster runs his office. Big difference.
Mr. Keller: Well, in that respect, your Honor, I —I do not see the differentiation or relevance. If ... .
The Court: Well, perhaps it will become clearer as we go on. Maybe some of you are having a difficult time understanding what’s important and what isn’t. I realize you don’t know why you’re here, perhaps, or you claim you don’t know why you’re here. Whether or not Mr. Foster signs pleadings with somebody else’s consent or whatever, is not relevant to exhibits one through ten, which are in this file.
This led to a further exchange between the court and counsel for Marion Hansen in the course of which Mr. Keller objected to the order requiring Ms. Hansen’s appearance in court. At this time the court expressed its concern that improper pleadings had been filed in the court which prompted Mr. Ledwon to ask if the court were attacking the documents on the basis of forgery or being ill prepared. The court replied:
*761The Court: You’re getting warm, you’re getting warm, Mr. Ledwon.
Mr. Ledwon: —then we’re getting into contempt proceedings, your Honor, and we’re ....
The Court: It’s not a contempt proceeding yet ... .
Mr. Ledwon: —entitled to have it heard by another judge.
The Court: —it is not a contempt proceeding yet.
If it comes to that, I agree with you, some other Judge is going to hear it. I’m trying to learn some truth right now.
Later on the court called Attorney Julian Levant to the stand. Mr. Ledwon objected to any testimony by Mr. Levant on the basis of the attorney-client privilege. The court, which throughout was conducting the questioning, ruled:
Well, I realize that there is an attorney-client relationship, but that relates only to matters that are not public. I can ask him questions about these exhibits, because they are not privileged. They are place [sic] in the court file for the entire world to see. There ....
Mr. Ledwon: If the ....
The Court: —is no privilege that attaches to those documents.
Mr. Ledwon: —if they are, your Honor, and if there’s any allegations relating to any criminal matters or anything of that nature, then this becomes a very important question relative to the attorney-client privilege.
The Court: I don’t understand what you mean.
Mr. Ledwon: I — I don’t know — again, this is a hearing, your Honor, I don’t know how far the Court’s gonna go. Whether there’s an intent on the Court to prove forgery, or a crime, and if so, that is the duty delegated to a prosecutor, and not to a judge, your Honor, I respectfully submit.
*762The Court: Well, I agree, it could conceivably be a criminal matter. It is, however still a matter of contempt, might be a matter of contempt, which is within the power of this Court.
Thereafter the same procedure was followed, the court calling James R. Nair, an accountant and an officer of Northside Cars, during which the court conducted the examination and both made and ruled on objections. At the conclusion of seventy pages of such testimony the court made the following statement:
The Court: All right, at the very least I’m going to impose some sanctions, and I’m not quite sure to what extent and against whom at this point in time. I’m not going to rule on that today, but I’m going to do at least that. I think there’s been some real unauthorized pleadings filed at the very least, and I think Mr. Foster’s been run around the flag pole, and he’s entitled to be compensated for that.
While the court did not thereafter make findings of contempt it did issue two orders, both purporting to issue at a session of the court held on January 23, 1986, at which it ordered the Secretary of State to revoke the notary commissions of Richard S. Ottewell and Marion K. Hansen. Never did the court identify the source of its authority for those orders.
Court was again convened on February 20, 1986, at which time the court stated it was going to impose sanctions " under the court rules.” At this time the court referred to MCR 2.114. Mr. Ledwon addressed the court as follows:
Mr. Ledwon: Before the Court proceeds, your Honor, I wonder — I’m wondering if the Court would ah, have the two exhibits filed, which were the Motions ah, that were presented to the Clerk *763here, I left 'em at the ah — I believe they were here before . . . they’re here, right here now, your Honor?
One is a Motion that we have made and ah, if I may be permitted to expound upon the same?
The Court: No, have a seat, Mr. Ledwon. I’m about to do whatever I’m going to do.
Mr. Ledwon: Can we make a separate record, or have the ah ... .
The Court: No, please sit down.
Mr. Ledwon: —the offer of proof?
The Court: Sit down.
The court imposed sanctions against Messrs. Ottewell and Nair under MCR 2.114(E). Those are referred to in the majority opinion. I would reverse the district court as to all sanctions, not only the penal sanctions, because there was no due process notice reasonably calculated to inform the parties of the matters called into question by the district judge. The subpoenas were violative of MCR 2.506(C)(1). The district court judge conducted the hearings as an interested party, as a prosecutor and presided over the proceedings as the judge. The witnesses were required to testify against themselves in violation of both federal and state constitutions. This was not a process; this was a mess.
To those who would observe that the court rule permits a trial court "on its own initiative” to impose appropriate sanctions for violation of MCR 2.114, I would reply that any court that orders a hearing should give notice of what that hearing is about. Such notice, to be timely, should be consonant with the time restrictions for motion practice in the local venue or in accordance with MCR 2.119.
Finally, I would observe that the appellants did not receive due process on appeal to the circuit *764court. In an appropriate case an appellate tribunal is empowered to enter a peremptory affirmance. This is not the case for such an order. The opinion dated October 1, 1986, and order entered November 3, 1986, in the circuit court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law. In fact in a separate order the circuit judge denied appellants’ motions for findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied rehearing for failure to grant oral argument. The circuit judge abused her discretion. Appellants had a right to oral argument in their circuit court appeal pursuant to MCR 7.101(K). Although there is no specific rule requiring the circuit court, sitting as an appellate court, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, I believe that due process requires something more than was afforded the appellants in this case by the circuit court. Since I am again rattling in the dissent basement I am not going to undertake the sketching of those perimeters and parameters.
I would reverse each and every order of the district court and award costs to the appellants.