Court Opinion

ID: 9406071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 18:03:55.091123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.761553
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/29/23 Del Pozo v. Lemke CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 ELIZABETH S. DEL POZO, as Trustee,                                           D080312
 etc.,

            Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        (Super. Ct. No. 37-2017-
                                                                            00000227-PR-TR-CTL)
            v.

 RICHARD G. LEMKE,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey S. Bostwick, Judge. Affirmed.
          Richard G. Lemke, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
          Brierton, Jones & Jones, Gary D. Jander, and Ricsie M. Hernandez for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

          Richard G. Lemke, former trustee of the Moore Family Trust, appeals a
minute order of the probate court requiring him to pay a fiduciary bond
premium to forestall the sale of real property held by the trust, which Lemke
seeks in the underlying probate case. Lemke, who is self-represented, has
not shown the court erred by ordering the payment. Accordingly, the order is
affirmed.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
      As outlined in the prior opinion of this court in this case, Del Pozo v.
Lemke (July 19, 2022, D078673) [nonpub. opn.], Marvin G. Moore and
Lorraine L. Moore executed the Moore Family Trust in 2004. Lorraine had
four children, including Chas Moore Rundberg and Diane Marie Ferguson
Bosio. In 2015, Marvin and Lorraine executed an amendment to the trust
appointing Lorraine’s daughter Bosio as first successor trustee and her son
Rundberg as second successor trustee.
      Shortly after Lorraine’s death in 2015, Marvin executed an amendment
to the trust, and appointed Lemke as successor trustee. The following year,
Marvin passed away. Bosio and Rundberg initiated the underlying probate
case in January 2017 by filing a petition to remove Lemke as trustee. The
petition alleged that Lemke, who Bosio and Rundberg had no former
knowledge of, was not qualified to serve as trustee and that he was hostile to
them as beneficiaries of the trust.
      The next month, Bosio and Rundberg filed an ex parte application
seeking the appointment of an independent fiduciary to serve as trustee and

1     Lemke asks this court to take judicial notice of several orders of the
probate court, including the February 2017 order suspending him as trustee,
the March 2017 order appointing Del Pozo as interim trustee, and an order
dated June 28, 2022—after the notice of appeal was filed in this case—
denying Lemke permission to file a motion to dismiss the case in the probate
court. The request for judicial notice also includes probate notes of the
probate court and a printout from this court’s website showing the case
numbers for seven appeals filed by Lemke. The request for judicial notice is
denied. The court orders submitted with the request are irrelevant to the
present appeal and the other documents are not subject to judicial notice
under Evidence Code sections 451 and 453.
                                        2
to restrain Lemke from transferring title or managing the trust property.
Bosio and Rundberg’s application asserted that after filing their petition,
Lemke responded that he did not believe they were beneficiaries of the trust
and that he believed that all of the assets in the trust belonged to him.
      A few days later, the probate court issued a minute order precluding
Lemke from taking any action pertaining to trust assets without the court’s
permission. Thereafter, Bosio and Rundberg’s counsel discovered that Lemke
had transferred title to two real properties from the trust to himself, in his
individual name, in January 2017. As a result, the siblings filed another ex
parte application requesting that the court remove Lemke as trustee and
order an immediate accounting of the trust. Lemke, who has been self-
represented throughout these proceedings, filed a response to the application
asserting that he was the rightful trustee and sole beneficiary of the trust.
      On February 14, 2017, the probate court suspended Lemke as trustee
and ordered him to return all property and assets to the trust. Bosio and
Rundberg then nominated respondent Elizabeth S. Del Pozo, who is a
licensed professional fiduciary, to serve as an independent trustee. The next
month, the court appointed Del Pozo as the temporary, interim trustee of the
Moore Family Trust. After the court appointed Del Pozo, Lemke repeatedly
sought to remove her as trustee.
      In the subsequent years, Del Pozo remained trustee and managed the
assets of the trust under the probate court’s direction, facing challenges by
Lemke throughout. In August 2020, the court granted Bosio and Rundberg’s
motion for summary judgment, concluding they are beneficiaries of a portion
of the trust based on the first amendment to the trust. Thereafter, the
probate court authorized Del Pozo to sell some trust property if certain
conditions were satisfied.

                                        3
      Lemke continued unsuccessfully to seek Del Pozo’s removal as trustee.
In the spring of 2021, he filed three ex parte applications seeking removal
and asserting the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Lemke also
immediately appealed each denial of his three removal applications. This
court consolidated the appeals and on July 19, 2022 issued Del Pozo v. Lemke,
supra, D078673, which determined that the probate court properly denied
Lemke’s removal applications.
      While the appeal was pending, on August 27, 2021, Del Pozo filed an
“ex parte petition to confirm the sale” of certain commercial property and
related business inventory. Lemke objected to the petition and asked the
court to deny it. Lemke argued, among other things, that the probate court
lacked jurisdiction while Del Pozo v. Lemke, supra, D078673, was pending.
The court denied the ex parte petition, concluding the sale was not urgent
and thus not appropriately considered on an emergency basis.
      After being referred to a mandatory settlement conference, in January
2022, Lemke filed an “Ex Parte Petition Pursuant to Probate Code
[section] 10308 Confirmation by the Court Sale of Real Property” seeking to
stay the sale of the commercial property and related assets. At an initial
hearing on the petition, the probate court set a further hearing to consider
whether the still-pending appeal prevented the sale of the property under

Probate Code section 1310, subdivision (b).2 The court then stayed the sale
of the property and set an evidentiary hearing.
      At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing on March 18, 2022, the
court determined that the sale of the property should be delayed on the
condition that Lemke bring current premium payments on an existing bond
obligation related to Del Pozo’s performance of her fiduciary duties. At the

2     Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Probate Code.
                                       4
hearing, Lemke agreed to pay the outstanding bond premium to prevent the
sale of the property. To make the fiduciary bond current, the court ordered
Lemke to pay the $22,500 outstanding premium within 10 days of the date of

the hearing.3
      Lemke filed a timely notice of appeal from the March 18, 2022 minute

order issued after hearing.4
                                 DISCUSSION
      Lemke’s opening brief lists five issues for this court’s consideration:
(1) “Whether or not the [probate court] and the Court of Appeal ... ha[ve]
jurisdiction over the Moore Family Trust?” (2) “Whether or not former
Beneficiary lacked jurisdiction for a failure to contest The Moore Family
Trust within 120 day?” (3) “Whether or not the former beneficiaries of a Trust
lack standing to nominate Elizabeth del Pozo as Temporary Interim
Trustee?” (4) “Whether or not the [probate court] presiding on 03/18/2022 ...
had the legal jurisdiction and authority to require the Appellant to pay
Twenty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($22,500) for the approximately
two and half year delinquent fiduciary bond for Elizabeth del Pozo, for the
Moore Family Trust Second Amendment?” And (5) “Whether or not the
[probate court] presiding on 03/18/2022 ... had the legal jurisdiction and
authority to threaten the Appellant with Probate Code [section] 1310[,
subd.] (b).”

3     According to Del Pozo’s appellate brief, Lemke paid the bond premium
on the date of the hearing.

4     After these proceedings, on June 16, 2022, the probate court issued an
order finding Lemke to be a vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure
section 391, subdivisions (b)(1), (2), and (3). That order is currently on appeal
in Case No. D080857.
                                        5
      As Del Pozo points out in her brief, the first, second, and third issues
Lemke raises are not encompassed within the order on appeal and thus fall
outside the purview of Del Pozo’s appeal and our consideration. (See Estate
of Stoddart (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126 [“ ‘There is no right to appeal
from any orders in probate except those specified in the Probate Code.’ ...
[¶] … In the absence of specific statutory authority authorizing” the appeal,
an order is not appealable]; see also Griset v. Fair Political Practices
Commission (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 696 [appellate courts cannot entertain an
appeal taken from a nonappealable judgment or order].) Lemke’s remaining
two issues arise from the order Lemke appeals and are appealable under
section 1300, subdivision (d), which authorizes appeals from orders
“[d]irecting or allowing payment of a debt, claim, or cost.” With respect to
these issues, Lemke asserts only that the court erred by “threaten[ing]” him
with section 1310, subdivision (b) if he did not pay the fiduciary bond
premium.
      As an initial matter, this assertion suggests a misunderstanding of the
court’s order. At the March 18, 2022 hearing, Del Pozo’s attorney asserted
that the sale of the commercial property at issue was necessary to cover the
trust’s expenses because the property was operating at a loss. The probate
court, however, rejected this accounting of the trust’s operations, instead
finding that the commercial property was operating at a slight profit each
month. The court’s understanding was based on its determination that
certain one-time liabilities and other costs associated with the litigation were
not properly considered as part of the monthly operating costs of the property
for purposes of the court’s decision. One such cost, which Del Pozo asserted
the trust did not have sufficient liquid assets to pay, was the fiduciary bond
premium owed by Lemke.

                                        6
      The court found that payment of the overdue bond premium by Lemke
would allow the property to maintain profitability, making the immediate
sale of the property to prevent its loss unnecessary. Accordingly, the court
concluded that if Lemke paid the bond premium, section 1310 subdivision (b)

did not authorize the court to direct the sale of the property.5 As Del Pozo
points out, this decision actually benefited Lemke, whose goal at the March
18, 2022 hearing was to prevent the sale of the property. (See Marich v.
MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 415, 431 [A
ruling in appellant’s favor may not be challenged on appeal.].)
      Second, Lemke has not explained why the court’s order requiring
payment of the bond constituted error. As we stated in Del Pozo v. Lemke,
supra, D078673, as appellant, Lemke has the burden of providing an
adequate record, of showing that an error occurred, and of showing the error
was prejudicial. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296; Aguilar
v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 132.) Absent an
appellant’s demonstration of error, a reviewing court presumes the judgment
or order is supported by the evidence. (In re Angel L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th
1127, 1136–1137.) Lemke’s brief consists of recitations of earlier proceedings
in the probate court that are not the subject of this appeal, quotations of
statements made by Lemke and the court at the March 18, 2022 hearing and
earlier hearings, and an unsupported assertion that his due process rights
were violated.

5     Section 1310, subdivision (a) stays the operation and effect of judgment
or order on appeal (here, the order denying Lemke’s applications to remove
Del Pozo), but subdivision (b) provides an exception to that stay to allow the
court to “direct the exercise of the powers of the fiduciary ... as if no appeal
were pending” if doing so will prevent “injury or loss to a person or property.”
                                       7
      As noted in Del Pozo v. Lemke, supra, D078673, as a self-represented
litigant Lemke remains bound by the rules of appellate procedure and must
present an argument for reversal supported by the record and applicable
legal authority. The absence of any cogent legal argument or reasoned
explanation by Lemke of how the court’s order constitutes error requires us to
presume the trial court’s order is correct. (See Foust v. San Jose Construction
Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [It is a “cardinal rule of appellate
review that a judgment or order of the trial court is presumed correct and
prejudicial error must be affirmatively shown.”].) Accordingly, we must
affirm the order.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed. Costs of appeal are awarded to the Respondent.

                                                            McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, J.

DATO, J.

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