Court Opinion

ID: 2966091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:48:44.20879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:08.642366
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 99-1039

                         MICHAEL ELBERY,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

       BRADFORD LOUISON, ROBERT BREEN, JAMES HURLEY, ROBERT
  MCGUINLEY, JAMES V. SAMPSON, CHESTER GUS JOHNSON, AND TOWN OF
                            SHREWSBURY,

                      Defendants, Appellees.
                       ____________________

No. 99-1319

                         MICHAEL ELBERY,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                          JAMES HESTER,

                       Defendant, Appellee.
                      _____________________

      MICHAEL SALLOUM, TOWN OF SHREWSBURY, ROBERT MCGUINLEY,
                  DANIEL MORGADO, WAYNE SAMPSON,

                            Appellees.

          APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

            [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
               Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
                                
                                
                                
                                
     Michael Elbery on brief pro se.
     Elizabeth M. Fahey and Pierce, Davis, Fahey & Perritano, LLP 
on brief for appellees, James Hurley, Robert McGinley, James V.
Sampson, Chester Gus Johnson and Town of Shrewsbury.
     Bradford N. Louison and Merrick, Louison & Costello on brief
for appellee James Hester.

December 17,1999

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
            Per Curiam.  In these consolidated cases, appellant
  Michael Elbery appeals from two orders entered by the district
  court in two separate, but related, actions.  These orders
  forbid appellant from filing any complaints against the Town of
  Shrewsbury Police Department and certain individuals without
  first obtaining approval from the district court.  After
  briefly setting out the facts and the law, we address each
  order separately.
                          I.  Background
            Appellant has filed various lawsuits, including the
  two below, concerning the events surrounding, and following,
  his arrests by the Shrewsbury, Massachusetts police on two
  separate occasions.  The first arrest arose out of a fight
  outside a bar in Worcester in 1992.  In connection with his
  prosecution for this fight, appellant was arrested and charged
  with intimidating a witness (the bartender who had seen the
  fight).  According to appellant, he was tried in a state
  district court and found guilty of this charge, but on appeal
  to the superior court, the charge was dismissed.
            The second arrest took place in 1994 after a fire at
  a warehouse storage facility in which appellant rented a
  storage unit.  According to appellant, he kept his collection
  of guns, for which he had a license, in this unit.  Shrewsbury
  police arrested appellant on five charges of possession of
  firearms and one charge of carrying a firearm.  Appellant
  states that the district attorney did not appear at the trial
  and that he was acquitted of the charges.
            Based on these arrests, appellant filed two actions
  listing claims for malicious prosecution and various
  constitutional violations against the Shrewsbury police and
  others.  These actions are entitled Elbery v. Hester and Elbery
  v. Sklut and are pending in the federal district court. 
  Appellant also commenced an action against Linda Schlener, the
  individual who had filed the complaint with the Shrewsbury
  police concerning appellant's intimidation of the witness to
  the bar fight.  This case remains in state court and is
  entitled Elbery v. Schlener (Schlener I).
            Not content with having three pending actions,
  appellant filed three more suits in the federal district court
  concerning events that had transpired during the arrests and
  also events which had occurred in the pending cases.  In Elbery
  v. Schlener (Schlener II), appellant sued, among others, Linda
  Schlener, Schlener's lawyer in Schlener I, and the state judge
  in Schlener I.  Appellant alleged in this case that the
  defendants had retaliated against him for filing his original
  actions against Schlener and Hester.  In particular, appellant
  stated that Schlener had asserted counterclaims in the state
  case as an act of retaliation.
            In the second case, Elbery v. Louison, appellant
  filed a complaint which named as a defendant attorney Bradford
  Louison.  Louison was then representing the Town of Shrewsbury
  and its police officers.  The other defendants were Shrewsbury
  police officers.  Appellant alleged that the police had started
  the fire at the storage warehouse so that they could frame him
  on the gun charges and stop him from filing his federal
  lawsuits.
            Finally, in Elbery v. Klug, the third lawsuit,
  appellant again listed attorney Louison as a defendant.  He
  also sued various Shrewsbury police officers, the United Parcel
  Service, Day's Inn Motel, and a bartender at Day's Inn.  He
  essentially claimed that these defendants had engaged in a
  cover-up concerning what he perceived to be constitutional
  violations in the defense of the Loiuson case.
                         II.  The Law    
            It is well-established that "[f]ederal courts . . .
  possess discretionary powers to regulate the conduct of abusive
  litigants."  Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island, 985 F.2d 32,
  34 (1st Cir. 1993) (per curiam).  Thus, "in extreme
  circumstances involving groundless encroachment upon the
  limited time and resources of the court and other parties, an
  injunction barring a party from filing and processing frivolous
  and vexatious lawsuits may be appropriate."  Castro v. United
  States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1985) (per curiam).  Such
  an injunction, however, must be "narrowly drawn to fit the
  specific vice encountered."  Id. at 410.  The issuance of an
  injunction aimed at preventing vexatious litigation is reviewed
  for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 408.
                  III.  The District Court Orders
            A.  Appeal No. 99-1039
            This appeal arises out of the Louison case, the first
  action in which appellant sued attorney Louison concerning
  Louison's representation of the Shrewsbury defendants in the
  prior cases.  In their motion for an injunction, the defendants
  alleged that after appellant's deposition was taken by
  Elizabeth Fahey, the new attorney representing the Shrewsbury
  defendants in Sklut and Louison, appellant called Fahey and
  stated that he might sue Fahey and the court reporter present
  at the deposition based on Fahey's alleged falsification of the
  deposition transcript.  The defendants therefore requested that
  appellant be required to seek leave of court before filing a
  complaint against Fahey or the court reporter.
            When no opposition was forthcoming, the district
  court granted the motion by endorsing it as "allowed."  The
  following entry also was made on the docket sheet:  "Endorsed
  Order entered granting . . . motion to require plaintiff to
  seek leave of court before plaintiff files new complaint." 
  Soon thereafter, appellant filed a belated opposition to the
  motion, alleging that Fahey intended to deprive him of his
  constitutional rights.
            We think that the injunction entered by the district
  court must be read as ordering that appellant seek approval
  prior to filing a new complaint against Fahey or the court
  reporter only, not that he must seek approval before filing any
  new complaint.  As read, it is plain that appellant received
  notice, via the defendants' motion, that the district court was
  contemplating such an injunction.  Also as read, the injunction
  is tailored to the specific circumstances facing the court and
  was not entered just to curtail appellant's ability to initiate
  litigation.
            While appellant is correct that litigiousness alone
  will not support an injunction, see Castro, supra, 775 F.2d at
  408-09, we believe that appellant's particular affinity for
  suing attorneys who represent defendants in the pending cases
  amounts to behavior which is vexatious and harassing.  In
  particular, appellant already has sued Louison and Schlener's
  attorney in the state case.  We note that when such an attorney
  is so sued, the attorney often will be required to cease
  representing his or her client, with the result that the client
  will be forced to find new counsel.  Given appellant's belief
  that Fahey and the court reporter are part of the ongoing
  conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights, an injunction
  requiring appellant to secure approval before filing a
  complaint against either of them was not an abuse of
  discretion.
            B.  Appeal No. 99-1319
            This appeal arises out of Elbery v. Hester in which
  appellant sued James Hester, the police officer who had
  arrested him on the charge of intimidating a witness.  In this
  case, Hester moved for an order requiring appellant to seek
  court approval before filing any more lawsuits against Hester,
  other members of the Shrewsbury Police Department, or Louison
  (the attorney then representing Hester).  The district court
  granted the motion, pointing out that appellant already had
  filed five pro se lawsuits against the Shrewsbury Police
  Department and that two of the cases named Louison as a
  defendant.  The court thus ordered appellant "not to file an[y]
  additional lawsuits against the Shrewsbury Police Department,
  its members, Bradford Louison, or any of the attorneys who have
  filed an appearance in these suits without obtaining advance
  court approval."  The court added that "[d]efense counsel may
  file a motion to deem any such case as 'related.'"
            Appellant initially argues that the above order does
  not set out sufficient record support for the injunction. 
  Although the court did not list by name, or discuss, all of the
  actions appellant had filed, this is not fatal.  Hester's
  motion adequately reviewed the pending cases and pointed out
  how they were connected.  Further, this court may take judicial
  notice of "proceedings in other courts, both within and outside
  of the federal judicial system, if the proceedings have a
  direct relation to matters at issue."  Green v. Warden, United
  States Penitentiary, 699 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1983).  There
  is no question that the pending lawsuits listed above are
  related to the injunctions entered by the district court.
            Turning to the merits, appellant primarily contends
  that the injunction was an abuse of discretion because the
  cases he has filed are not vexatious or harassing.  Rather, he
  states, the cases are meritorious and he is merely exercising
  his right of free access to the courts.  We disagree.
            At the time the motion for an injunction was filed,
  appellant already had initiated the two suits challenging his
  arrests for intimidating a witness and for firearms violations
  (Hester and Sklut).  Had appellant stopped here, this would be
  a different case.  However, as described above, appellant
  continued to file more actions concerning what he perceived to
  be conspiracies related to, and arising out of, the two
  original suits.  As defendant pointed out in the motion for an
  injunction, since the parties and underlying events were
  connected, the proper course was for appellant to have asked
  the district court for leave to amend the already pending cases
  so that he could add new claims and/or defendants.  In most
  instances, though, this would have required prior court
  permission.
            The injunction entered by the district court
  essentially achieves this result by ordering appellant to seek
  approval before filing new actions against the Shrewsbury
  Police Department, its members, or any of the attorneys
  representing these parties.  Furthermore, in light of the
  purpose of the order and the language added at the end
  referring to relatedness, we read the injunction as limited to
  new cases connected to the ones currently pending.  So read,
  the injunction is "narrowly drawn to fit the specific vice
  encountered," see Castro, supra, 775 F.2d at 410, instead of
  being overbroad as it arguably would have been if it had
  prevented appellant from filing any new cases against these
  defendants.
            Finally, that appellant's behavior is vexatious and
  harassing is obvious.  That is, by filing new actions,
  appellant forces the defendants to answer each new complaint
  and to defend each new suit.  If appellant must obtain
  permission prior to filing a new case, as he would if he sought
  to amend the existing complaints, the defendants will be spared
  this additional effort and the associated expense.  As a
  result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
  entering the above injunction.
            The judgments of the district court are affirmed.