Court Opinion

ID: 9518897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:30.943326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:11.872655
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: I agree with the majority that one of our fundamental rules of statutory construction is “ ‘to view all of the provisions of a statute as a whole.’ ” 218 Ill. 2d at 185-86, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). Under this rule, each provision of a statute must be construed in connection with every other section (Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000)), and not as isolated provisions {Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000)). The majority, however, fails to follow this rule by overlooking other provisions of the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 et seq. (West 2000)), relevant to the issue before us. In particular, the majority overlooks the service of summons provisions contained in section 3 — 105 (735 ILCS 5/3— 105 (West 2000)). Consideration of section 3 — 105, in conjunction with section 3 — 107 (735 ILCS 5/3 — 107 (West 2000)), leads to the conclusion that the appellate court judgment, dismissing the complaint for administrative review, should be affirmed. Accordingly, I dissent. Section 3 — 105 of the Review Law states, in relevant part: “Summons issued in any action to review the final administrative decision of any administrative agency shall be served by registered or certified mail on the administrative agency and on each of the other defendants except in the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees, regional superintendent of schools, or State Superintendent of Education, as the case may be, when a committee of 10 has been designated as provided by Section 7 — 6 of the School Code, and in such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). The relevance of section 3 — 105 to this appeal is evident. Collinsville challenged a “final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees” and a “committee of 10” was designated in accordance with the School Code. See 105 ILCS 5/7 — 6 (West 2000). Pursuant to section 3 — 105, “each of the committee of 10 shall be served.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). The focus of this appeal, therefore, is not solely section 3 — 107. Rather, we must consider the interplay between sections 3 — 107 and 3 — 105. “[Sjettled principles of statutory construction call for the specific to control over the general.” People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345 (1984). Accordingly, where a statute contains two provisions relating to the same subject, one specific and one general, the specific provision controls and should be applied. Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002). Here, sections 3 — 105 and 3 — 107 of the Review Law both involve the joinder requirements for an administrative review action. Section 3 — 107 sets out the general requirement: “the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency shall be made defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2000). Section 3 — 107(a) also contains an exception to this general rule, allowing amendment of the complaint where the omitted defendant was “not named by the administrative agency in its final order as a party of record.” 735 ILCS 5/3— 107(a) (West 2000). Section 3 — 105, on the other hand, addresses a specific casé: “the case of a review of a final administrative decision of the regional board of school trustees,” where a “committee of 10 has been designated.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). “[I]n such case only the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10 shall be served.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3— 105 (West 2000). Section 3 — 105 specifically addresses the present situation and controls over the more general provisions of section 3 — 107(a). Accordingly, the school districts’ argument that the petitioners or the Committee of Ten were not “named” in the Board’s final order as “parties of record” is irrelevant. The school districts were on notice, by virtue of section 3 — 105, that they were required to serve “each of the committee of 10.” Under the statute, and our case law, Collinsville’s failure to comply strictly with the Review Law is fatal to its complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/3 — 102 (West 2000) (barring review unless sought within the time and manner provided by the Review Law); ESG Watts, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 191 Ill. 2d 26 (2000) (affirming dismissal of administrative review petition based on failure to join the party who instituted the underlying administrative proceeding); McGaughy v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 165 Ill. 2d 1 (1995) (in consolidated appeal, dismissing one administrative review action and affirming dismissal of the other, where petitioners served respondents but failed to name those parties in their review petitions); Lockett v. Chicago Police Board, 133 Ill. 2d 349 (1990) (affirming dismissal of complaint for administrative review for failure to name a party of record). The majority maintains that because section 3 — 105 addresses service of process, and section 3 — 107 addresses who must be named as a defendant, section 3 — 105 cannot be deemed the more specific and controlling of the two statutory provisions. 218 Ill. 2d at 188. The majority’s reading of these statutory sections is artificially narrow. Section 3 — 107 is not simply a naming provision. Section 3 — 107 addresses who must be “made” a defendant in an administrative review proceeding. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107 (West 2000). A party is not “made” a defendant simply by naming that party in the caption of the complaint for administrative review. A party must be both named and served within the statutory period. Thus, section 3 — 107 allows additional time to “name and serve” an unnamed party. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107 (West 2000). Similarly, section 3 — 105 is not simply a service statute as the majority contends. To be sure, section 3 — 105 addresses how service shall be made on defendants in a review action — by registered or certified mail. Section 3 — 105, however, also addresses who must be served as defendants in a case such as the present one: “the administrative agency involved and each of the committee of 10.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). Thus, sections 3 — 107 and 3 — 105 both speak, in some fashion, as to who must be joined or “made” a defendant in a case such as the present one, but section 3 — 105 is the more specific. Even if the majority’s characterization of section 3 — 107 as a naming provision and section 3 — 105 as a service provision is correct, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that section 3 — 105 is irrelevant to this case. Lockett and its progeny firmly establish that administrative review is barred unless the complaining party is in compliance with the procedures set forth in the Review Law. As the majority states, “A party seeking to invoke a court’s special statutory jurisdiction must strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by statute.” (Emphasis added.) 218 Ill. 2d at 182. Section 3 — 105 expressly required Collinsville to serve “each of the committee of 10.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 105 (West 2000). That obligation was not made dependent on any obligation to name the committee, its members, or the underlying petitioners as defendants. Collinsville failed to serve the committee members and thus failed to “strictly comply with the procedures prescribed by statute.” I recognize that the Review Law “was not intended to be a trap for the unwary to establish a bar to relief.” Chestnut v. Lodge, 34 Ill. 2d 567, 571 (1966). In this case, however, no trap was set. Section 3 — 105 of the Review Law set forth in explicit terms how a case of this type must proceed. Accordingly, Collinsville’s failure to serve the members of the Committee of Ten cannot be overlooked. I would hold that because review was not sought in the manner provided in the Review Law, the school districts are “barred” from obtaining judicial review. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 102 (West 2000).