Court Opinion

ID: 9897201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:33.409774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.881683
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                            Oct 24 2023, 11:59 am

                                                                 CLERK
                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                  and Tax Court

                            IN THE

    Indiana Supreme Court
               Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CP-115

Tonia Land, individually and on behalf of all others
                similarly situated,
                     Appellant (Plaintiff below)

                                –v–

                      IU Credit Union,
                     Appellee (Defendant below).

          Argued: June 29, 2023 | Decided: October 24, 2023

               Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court,
                       No. 53C06-2103-PL-562
               The Honorable Holly M. Harvey, Judge

     On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals,
                           No. 22A-CP-382

                      Opinion by Justice Goff
     Chief Justice Rush and Justices Slaughter and Molter concur.
            Justice Massa dissents with separate opinion.
Goff, Justice.

   A basic tenet of American contract law holds that “an offeror is master
of his offer.”1 However, the offeror’s control over the form of acceptance
may be limited to protect the offeree’s contractual freedom.2 One such
limitation arises when the offeror purports to dictate acceptance by the
offeree’s silence or inaction. While silence or inaction may, in exceptional
circumstances, constitute acceptance, we find no such circumstances here.
We thus reverse the trial court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History
   The IU Credit Union (or IUCU) is a not-for-profit, member-owned
financial cooperative that provides a variety of banking services. Tonia
Land is a member of, and maintains at least two checking accounts with,
IUCU. When she first became a member, Land received an “Account
Agreement,” the terms of which are “subject to change at any time” as
permitted by law. App. Vol. II, p. 43. IUCU agreed to notify its members
of any changes in the Agreement’s terms, either by U.S. mail or (for those
who agreed to receive notices electronically) by email.

   When Land later registered for online banking for one of her checking
accounts, she received by email a second agreement (referred to here as
the Disclosure), which permitted IUCU to “modify the terms and
conditions applicable to the Services from time to time” and to “send any
notice to [Land] via email.” Id. at 118. Under the terms of the Disclosure,
Land is deemed to have received any such notice “three days after it is
sent.” Id. Land’s agreement to these terms required her to click “Accept.”
Id. at 119.

1 K. N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, I, 48 Yale L.J. 1, 33 (1938)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 250 (1990).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023                          Page 2 of 13
   In 2019, IUCU sent to its customers a proposed modification to the
Agreement (referred to here as the Addendum). The terms of this
Addendum (1) permitted either party to require arbitration to resolve
disputes without the other party’s consent and (2) prohibited members
from initiating or joining a class-action lawsuit. Id. at 127. The Addendum
also specified, under a heading in bold and in all-capital letters, the
member’s “right to opt out” of the arbitration Addendum if he or she so
informed IUCU within 30 days of receiving notice. Id. To “opt out”
required the member to send IUCU “written notice” at a specific address.
Id. Otherwise, according to its terms, the Addendum became binding on
the member.

   Because Land maintains only one of her checking accounts online,
IUCU sends her monthly statements and change-of-terms notices by
regular U.S. mail and by email. IUCU adhered to this arrangement when
sending her the Addendum. In the email it sent, the subject line used the
same language used for monthly accounts statements, indicating only that
a “New eStatement” was available “in Online Banking.” Id. at 178. The
body of the email itself mentioned nothing about the Addendum. But a
link in the email would have directed Land to her five-page monthly
account statement, the first page of which referenced the Addendum in
bold, all-capital letters and directed her to review the updated terms “at
the end of [the] statement.” Id. at 123. The document Land received by
regular U.S. mail consisted of a two-page monthly account statement, the
first page of which likewise noted the Addendum in bold, all-capital
letters and directed her to review the updated terms “included in this
mailing.” Id. at 212. Land claims to have seen neither version of the
Addendum. And she never notified IUCU of her preference to opt out.

   Land later filed a class-action complaint against IUCU, alleging
wrongful assessment of overdraft fees, breach of contract, breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and a violation of
Indiana’s Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Citing the Addendum, IUCU
moved to compel individual (rather than class) arbitration. After a
hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of IUCU, having found “an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate” between the parties. Id. at 10.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023    Page 3 of 13
   On discretionary interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that IUCU failed to provide reasonable notice to Land by either
email or regular mail. Land v. IU Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d 246, 251 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2022). As persuasive support, the panel relied in part on its then-
vacated-but-not-yet-supplanted decision in Decker v. Star Financial Group,
Inc. Id. at 249–50 (citing 187 N.E.3d 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), vacated, 204
N.E.3d 918 (Ind. 2023)). As an alternative ground for invalidating the
Addendum, the panel held that Land’s silence and inaction did not
constitute acceptance under section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. Id. at 253.

  IUCU petitioned for transfer, which we granted, thus vacating the
Court of Appeals opinion. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
  This Court reviews questions of contract interpretation de novo. Lake
Imaging, LLC v. Franciscan All., Inc., 182 N.E.3d 203, 206 (Ind. 2022). A de
novo standard likewise applies to a trial court’s decision on a motion to
compel arbitration. Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC, 160 N.E.3d 518, 521 (Ind.
2021).

Discussion and Decision
   Indiana recognizes a strong policy interest in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements. Decker v. Star Fin. Grp., Inc., 204 N.E.3d 918, 920
(Ind. 2023). But a presumption in favor of arbitration without first
determining whether the parties agreed to such a method of dispute
resolution threatens to “frustrate the parties’ intent and their freedom to
contract.” MPACT Const. Grp., LLC v. Superior Concrete Constructors, Inc.,
802 N.E.2d 901, 906 (Ind. 2004). The party seeking to compel arbitration
carries the burden of showing the existence of an enforceable arbitration
agreement. Progressive Se. Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 88
N.E.3d 188, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In deciding whether this burden has
been met, courts apply ordinary principles of contract law. MPACT Const.,
802 N.E.2d at 906. So, an arbitration agreement, as with a typical contract,

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023      Page 4 of 13
requires “offer, acceptance of the offer and consideration.” Reitenour v. M/I
Homes of Indiana, L.P., 176 N.E.3d 505, 510–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). And while the parties may modify
their contract, such modification, which amounts to a contract itself,
requires all the elements of a contract. Stelko Elec., Inc. v. Taylor Cmty. Sch.
Bldg. Corp., 826 N.E.2d 152, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

   The parties here dispute the binding effect of the Addendum. Land
argues that IUCU’s failure to give reasonable notice, along with her
silence in response to IUCU’s offer, renders the Addendum invalid.3
IUCU, on the other hand, contends that it fulfilled its notice obligations by
sending the Addendum to Land according to the terms of the Agreement
and that Land’s silence and inaction amounted to acceptance of the
Addendum.

I. IUCU provided Land with reasonable notice of its
   offer to amend the Agreement.
  On the issue of notice, IUCU’s argument is twofold: First, IUCU
challenges the applicable standard. And second, IUCU contends that its
notice to Land sufficed as an offer to amend the Agreement. We address
these arguments in turn.

    A. A reasonableness standard applies to the interpretation
       of the parties’ agreed terms of notice.

  IUCU first argues that, by relying on the vacated opinion in Decker, the
Court of Appeals unjustifiably adopted a heightened standard for what
constitutes sufficient notice under a contract. Pet. to Trans. at 13. While the
contract itself in Decker spoke of “reasonable notice,” IUCU contends,
nothing in the court’s opinion there suggests that such a standard is “now

3Land also argues that the terms of the original account Agreement did not permit the
unilateral addition of the Addendum. Appellant’s Br. at 34–41. Because we resolve this case in
her favor on other grounds, we need not address this argument.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023                    Page 5 of 13
required as a matter of judicially created law” regardless of the terms of a
contract. Id. at 14. Instead, IUCU submits, the Agreement and Disclosure
set forth the agreed-upon terms for notice and it fulfilled those notice
obligations. Id. at 13.

   We disagree with IUCU’s characterization of the issue.

  The question is not whether a pure reasonableness standard always
governs notice. This Court will “defend the freedom of contract by
enforcing parties’ agreed terms,” whether those terms call for notice by
email, regular U.S. mail, or other means. See Care Grp. Heart Hosp., LLC v.
Sawyer, 93 N.E.3d 745, 758 (Ind. 2018). Thus, insofar as the contracting
parties agree on what constitutes effective notice, their agreement
controls. But to the extent an agreement fails to define notice, this Court
will apply a reasonableness standard as an exercise in contract
interpretation.

   Here, for example, the original Agreement’s notice-of-amendment
clause specified that members would receive an email informing them
“that a new notice is available” for review. App. Vol. II, p. 43 (emphasis
added). The Agreement thus defined what would constitute notice by
email. The Agreement does not, however, define what constitutes “written
notice,” other than saying it is effective once properly mailed. Id. In
analyzing whether IUCU complied with the Agreement’s terms of notice
by mail, we apply an “objective theory” of contract interpretation. See Akin
v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). In other words, it
becomes a question of reasonableness for the courts to decide as a matter
of law. See Indiana Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 965 N.E.2d

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023      Page 6 of 13
62, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that “what constitutes reasonable notice
is a question of law for the court to decide”) (citation omitted).4

   Land received two notices of the Addendum in the account statements
sent to her from IUCU—one by email and one by regular U.S. mail. The
email notice contained an inconspicuous subject line (making no
indication of a change in terms), and the body of the email itself said
nothing of the Addendum. Instead, it informed Land that she “ha[d] a
new eStatement to retrieve,” not that she had a “new notice” to review, as
the Agreement required. Compare App. Vol. II, p. 178, with id. at 43. But
even if the email notice did not qualify as effective notice as defined in the
Agreement, the notice sent to her by regular U.S. mail, as discussed below,
did constitute reasonable notice.

    B. IUCU’s mailing efforts met the reasonable-notice
       standard.
  In arguing that its mailing efforts were sufficient to notify Land of the
Addendum, IUCU relies on Neal v. Purdue Federal Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d
253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Pet. to Trans. at 10–13. Land distinguishes Neal
on grounds that the notice issue in that case was waived and that (waiver

4 Commensurate with this objective standard, Indiana courts have recognized the need for
“reasonable notice” in a variety of contractual arrangements, including for a contracting party
to properly assent to an offer. See, e.g., Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007) (“To determine whether a clickwrap agreement is enforceable, courts presented with the
issue apply traditional principles of contract law and focus on whether the plaintiffs had
reasonable notice of and manifested assent to the clickwrap agreement.”) (quotation and
citation omitted); T-3 Martinsville, LLC v. US Holding, LLC, 911 N.E.2d 100, 116 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that a landlord, before terminating a lease, was “required to give reasonable
notice” to a tenant, with an opportunity to cure its default); Consumers’ Gas Tr. Co. v. Littler,
162 Ind. 320, 328, 70 N.E. 363, 366 (1904) (holding that a contracting party must give the other
contracting party “reasonable notice of his intention” to claim a forfeiture) (all emphases
added).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023                          Page 7 of 13
aside) the notice there was “demonstrably better” than the one here.5
Resp. to Trans. at 8, 13–14.

   Land is correct that the notice issue in Neal was waived. See 201 N.E.3d
at 262 n.5. But, waiver notwithstanding, we disagree with Land that the
notice there was “demonstrably better” than the one here. The opinion in
Neal provides an incomplete picture of the bank’s noticing efforts. All we
know is that the bank there sent the customer hard copies of her monthly
and quarterly account statements, which included an arbitration
addendum similar to the one here. Id. at 257–59.6 The panel gave no
indication of how many pages those account statements consisted of,
whether they referenced the enclosed addendum, or whether any such
reference was conspicuously placed in those statements. See id.

   Turning to the reasonableness of IUCU’s notice efforts here, we begin
by noting that this is not a case in which a bank sent an account statement
to its customer “along with copious piles of junk mail.” See Kortum-
Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 699 (Mont. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Rather, the monthly statement itself contained
the Addendum. A monthly bank statement, much like a credit-card billing
statement, “contains information at the heart of the service relationship,”
making it “well-suited” to communicate change-of-terms notices and
other important information. See Hart v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. SA CV
17–556–DOC (RAOx), 2017 WL 6942425, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017),
aff’d, 814 Fed. Appx. 211 (9th Cir. 2020). In addition to providing Land
with a detailed list of account transactions (both debits and credits), the
monthly account statement provides important contact information for
member service, the account’s beginning and ending balance, the total
number of withdrawals, the amount of fees she incurred (including

5Land also dedicates several pages in her briefings to analogizing the notice efforts here to
those in Decker. Appellant’s Br. at 26–28, 32; Resp. to Trans. at 14–15. But because we vacated
the Court of Appeals’ opinion in that case, and because we didn’t decide the issue of
reasonableness of notice on transfer, we decline a comparative analysis.
6In a separate section of its opinion, the court notes that the arbitration addendum was sent as
a “standalone hard copy.” 201 N.E.3d at 262 n.5.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023                       Page 8 of 13
overdraft fees and returned-item fees), the total dividends paid to her (if
any), her balance due on any outstanding loans, the annual percentage
rate for those loans, and the payments she’s made toward those loans. A
monthly account statement also offers insight into spending habits. See
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Assess Your Spending,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/owning-a-home/prepare/assess-your-
spending [https://perma.cc/CV5G-F9FA] (last visited Oct. 23, 2023). And it
may help a customer discover unauthorized transactions that require
further action. It makes sense, then, for IUCU to have included its
proposed modification to the Agreement among this information.

   Second, Land’s argument that the Addendum was “buried” at the
“back of [the account] statement” carries little persuasive weight. See
Resp. to Trans. at 14. That statement was a mere two pages, the first of
which clearly referenced the Addendum (in bold, all-capital letters) and
the second of which was the Addendum itself. App. Vol. II, pp. 212–13.
Had Land simply glanced at the account statement, she would have easily
seen the reference to the Addendum and the language directing her to
“review the added language.” Id. at 212.

   In short, IUCU provided Land with reasonable written notice of its
offer to amend the Agreement. This conclusion, however, does not end
our inquiry. As noted above, a binding arbitration agreement, as with any
contract, requires not only an offer but also an acceptance of that offer.
Reitenour, 176 N.E.3d at 511. Whether Land accepted IUCU’s offer is the
question we turn to next.

II. Land’s silence and inaction did not amount to
    assent.
   IUCU argues that the terms of the Addendum gave Land “‘reason to
understand that [her] assent may be manifested by silence or inaction.’”
Appellee’s Br. at 36–37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
69(1)(b) (Am. L. Inst. 1981)). And the “course of dealing” between them,
IUCU submits (referring to the existing Agreement and Disclosure), also
“gave Land reason to know that her continued use of her accounts

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023      Page 9 of 13
without opting out would constitute acceptance of a change in the
Agreement.” Id. at 37 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
69(1)(c)). For her part, Land acknowledges that “silence can, in limited
circumstances, be used to show a party accepted and assented to an offer.”
Appellant’s Br. at 23. But acceptance by silence, she insists, is the
exception rather than the rule, and the circumstances here present no such
exception. Id.

   We agree with Land.

   Section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (on which Land
and IUCU both rely) recognizes a party’s silence or inaction as acceptance
in only three exceptional circumstances:

       (a) Where an offeree takes the benefit of offered services with
           reasonable opportunity to reject them and reason to know that
           they were offered with the expectation of compensation.

       (b) Where the offeror has stated or given the offeree reason to
           understand that assent may be manifested by silence or inaction,
           and the offeree in remaining silent and inactive intends to accept
           the offer.

       (c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is
           reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does
           not intend to accept.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023      Page 10 of 13
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 69(1).7

   Here, IUCU explicitly notified Land that the failure to opt out of the
arbitration Addendum within 30 days of receiving notice would bind her
to the Addendum. But the “mere fact that an offeror states that silence will
constitute acceptance does not deprive the offeree of his privilege to
remain silent without accepting.” Id. § 69 cmt. c. Instead, IUCU must show
that Land “in remaining silent and inactive intend[ed] to accept the offer.”
See id. § 69(1)(b). Under the Restatement, the “case for acceptance is
strongest” when the offeree’s “reliance is definite and substantial” or
when the offeree’s “intent to accept is objectively manifested though not
communicated to the offeror.” Id. § 69 cmt. c. Even assuming Land was
aware of the offer to arbitrate (which she disputes), there’s no evidence of
her “definite and substantial” reliance on the proposed arbitration
Addendum. See id. In fact, by filing a class-action complaint with the trial
court, Land’s actions point in the opposite direction.

   We likewise find no objective manifestation of intent to accept through
Land’s continued use of her checking accounts. To begin with, nothing in
the Agreement or the Disclosure suggested that silence and continued use
of the accounts would result in acceptance of any future modification to
those original contracts. Cf. Heiges v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 521 F.
Supp. 2d 641, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (holding that a customer’s use of the
credit card bound him to the original agreement’s arbitration clause);

7 While this Court has never applied section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, our
Court of Appeals has relied on it when analyzing issues of contractual assent by silence or
inaction. See, e.g., Neal, 201 N.E.3d at 262–63; Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652, 657–58 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). By joining the Court of Appeals, we aim to “promote consistency in contracting
practices among businesses and instill a greater sense of fairness among consumers in
carrying out their contractual obligations, ultimately reducing the need for judicial
intervention.” Decker, 204 N.E.3d at 924 (Goff, J., concurring in the judgment). Adopting
section 69 also aligns with this Court’s frequent reliance on other sections of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts. See, e.g., Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 309–10
(Ind. 2012) (citing section 33 for the proposition that the terms of a contract must be
“reasonably certain”); USA Life One Ins. Co. of Indiana v. Nuckolls, 682 N.E.2d 534, 539 (Ind.
1997) (citing section 202 for the proposition that words used in a contract may be construed to
avoid absurdity); Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.
1994) (citing the doctrine of promissory estoppel under section 90).

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Meyer v. Nat. City Bank, 903 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that a customer assented to a credit card agreement where the agreement
expressly stated that use of the card constituted acceptance and the
customer in fact used the credit card); Weldon v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 896
N.E.2d 1181, 1182, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding implied assent to
arbitrate a dispute where customer repeatedly used his credit card and the
original agreement contained an arbitration clause). Moreover, nothing in
IUCU’s offer to amend those original contracts (in the form of the
proposed arbitration Addendum) conditioned continued use of the
accounts on acceptance of the Addendum. To the contrary, a member
could “opt out” of the proposed agreement to arbitrate and continue to
use the accounts without being bound by the Addendum. See App. Vol. 2,
p. 127.

   Finally, we find nothing in the record to indicate a “course of dealing”
to give IUCU or Land any reason to understand that Land’s silence would
constitute acceptance.8 IUCU points to the Disclosure that Land entered
into when she first registered for online banking. Because the Disclosure
informed Land that continued use of her accounts was an
“acknowledgment” of her “inten[t] to be bound” by all agreements she
had entered into, IUCU contends, Land knew that continued use of those
accounts without opting out of the Addendum would result in acceptance
of the agreement to arbitrate. Appellee’s Br. at 37. We disagree. When
Land registered for online banking, IUCU required her to agree to the
terms of the Disclosure by clicking “Accept.” App. Vol. II, p. 119. Rather
than suggesting that Land’s silence would amount to acceptance, the
parties’ previous dealings point in the opposite direction: the need for
affirmative assent.9

8Because the Court of Appeals’ decision in Neal reached the opposite conclusion under a
strikingly similar set of circumstances, see 201 N.E.3d at 263, we expressly disapprove that
case to the extent that it conflicts with our holding today.
9 This fact also undermines IUCU’s argument that “to get an affirmative response from all of
its members to a proposed amendment would require it to hire an army to track them down
and force them to sign in wet ink or click a button.” See Pet. to Trans. at 10.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023                     Page 12 of 13
Conclusion
   For the reasons above, we hold that, while IUCU provided Land with
reasonable notice of its offer to amend the Agreement, Land’s subsequent
silence and inaction did not amount to acceptance of the Addendum.
Thus, with no enforceable agreement to arbitrate, we reverse the trial
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Rush, C.J., and Slaughter and Molter, JJ., concur.
Massa, J., dissents with separate opinion.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Tyler B. Ewigleben
Lisa M. LaFornara
Vess A. Miller
Lynn A. Toops
Cohen & Malad, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Matthew R. Gutwein
DeLaney & DeLaney LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

John Steinkamp
John Steinkamp & Associates, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
James R. Branit
Phillip G. Litchfield
Litchfield Cavo LLP
Chicago, Illinois

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CP-115 | October 24, 2023   Page 13 of 13
Massa, J., dissenting.

   On the same day the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this case, a
different panel of that Court decided an almost identical case between
Purdue Federal Credit Union and one if its members, coming out the other
way. Neal v. Purdue Fed. Credit Union, 201 N.E.3d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022),
trans. not sought. Because I concur in the reasoning of that panel, and
because I am concerned that today’s decision could upend long-accepted
business practices of companies with large customer bases in Indiana —
from Netflix to Citibank and thousands of smaller institutions in between
— I respectfully dissent. The IU Credit Union provided Land an
opportunity to opt out, without losing her banking privileges;1 all she had
to do was send written notice within thirty days. Ante, at 3. The option
was neither burdensome nor unreasonable, but the consequences of our
decision today may turn out to be both.

1While we did not reach this issue in Decker v. Star Financial Group, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 918 (Ind.
2023), I find it helpful to compare the facts of this case with Decker to show how Land was
unburdened by IU Credit Union’s directions on how to opt out of the arbitration Addendum.
In Decker, the bank sent its members an arbitration addendum that noted its terms would be
effective within ten days if members retained their accounts with Star Financial. Decker, 204
N.E.3d at 920. This meant that if members wanted to opt out of arbitration, they would have
the burden of closing their accounts with the bank within ten days of the letter. See id.
Whereas here, IU Credit Union’s Addendum informed its members that they could “opt out”
by sending written notice to IU Credit Union within 30 days but did not specify that a
member assented to the Addendum by the continued use of their account. Ante, at 3. Simply
put, IU Credit Union’s members could continue to keep their accounts with IU Credit Union
even if they opted out of the Addendum. Ante, at 12.

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