Court Opinion

ID: 9493724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:17:12.666982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:59.989517
License: Public Domain

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In deciding that Mr. Hanson was in custody for Miranda purposes, Judge Heaney recites as predicate a number of facts that the district court did not find, some of which were disputed even at the suppression hearing. Because my disagreements with Judge Heaney’s fact-finding are numerous and significant, I set them out in some detail.
1. Judge Heaney states as a fact that the room in which Mr. Hanson’s interrogation took place measured six feet by eight feet. In the first place, the only testimony to this effect occurred at Mr. Hanson’s trial, not at the suppression hearing, so the district court can hardly be faulted for denying the suppression motion when the testimony on which Judge Heaney now relies was not even before it. Just as important, the testimony on the size of the room was offered by Mr. Hanson himself, hardly a disinterested source, and that testimony was not corroborated. There is no finding in the record as to the size of the room, and Judge Heaney simply accepts a defendant’s own testimony as fact. This is of course entirely unwarranted. Can it be clearly erroneous not to believe a defendant’s testimony? Finally, it strains credulity to believe that it is possible to get three people, a table, and at least two chairs (perhaps three) in a room six feet by eight feet.
2. Judge Heaney states as a fact that during the interrogation “Agent Erickson sat across from Hanson at a desk, and Agent Rutter stood in the corner, creating a police-dominated, intimidating environment.” Judge Heaney has simply taken the defendant at his word again, and, in fact, there was testimony from the agents that Mr. Rutter was not standing but was sitting on the other side of the table from the defendant.
8. Judge Heaney seems to think that the district court found that the agents threatened Mr. Hanson with prison. There was no such finding, and the agents in fact vigorously denied that they made any such statement. What the district court actually found was that Mr. Hanson said that he was threatened, not that he was in fact threatened. Judge Heaney again decides to believe Mr. Hanson’s self-serving statement in the face of a forceful denial by the police.
4. Judge Heaney states as a fact that “[n]ot ever during the interrogation, even after Hanson offered self-incriminating statements, did the agents mention his right to counsel.” That is untrue, as Mr. Hanson himself admits. After Mr. Hanson made his incriminating oral statement, the agents gave him the warnings that Miranda requires, and Mr. Hanson then gave a written statement, executed a consent form to have his blood tested, and submitted to having his fingerprints and palm prints taken. The court does not address the question of whether the written statement was admissible and whether the fingerprints, palm prints, and blood sample were not freely given or inevitably discoverable in any case.
There is, moreover, uncontroverted proof that cuts against Mr. Hanson’s claim that he was in custody. When asked whether he felt that he “needed to go” to the federal building with the officers when they arrived at his home, he testified, “No, I was just curious.” He admitted that he was not handcuffed, that there was no “cage” in the vehicle that transported him to the federal building, that the agents told him that he was not under arrest and was free to go, and even that he was not nervous during the interview.
Under the circumstances, I therefore cannot accede to the court’s conclusion that Mr. Hanson was in custody when he *967made his oral statement. The fact that a mild sort of ruse was employed to get Mr. Hanson to accompany the officers to their office and that the interview occurred in a federal building is not enough, in my view, to support a conclusion that Mr. Hanson was in custody. The attempt to distinguish Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam), is, I think, wholly unsuccessful. Judge Heaney tries to distinguish that case from the present one partly on the ground that in our case the agents awakened Mr. Hanson (not found as a fact by the district court and not admitted) and drove him to their office. Judge Heaney also says that Mr. Hanson was dependent on the agents to get back home, but the agents testified that they told him that they would take him back home if he wished, and the district court made no finding on the matter. Finally, the record reveals that Mr. Hanson spoke with the agents for no longer than half an hour before he made his oral confession. Our case is therefore on all fours with Mathia-son in every relevant respect.
I therefore respectfully dissent from the judgment reversing the district court’s order.