Court Opinion

ID: 9727681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:47:34.823233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:41.433560
License: Public Domain

LONG, J.,
dissenting.
If we have learned anything from our review of capital cases, it is that juries often spare the lives of persons who have committed what society could legitimately characterize as the cruelest and most savage murders. That lenity is due, in great measure, if not completely, to the quality of the defense advanced on behalf of the accused.
*247Those who have tried capital cases have found that the competent presentation of evidence often results in sentences less than death. But the right to have any of the diverse frailties of humankind taken into account is meaningless if the accused is not provided with counsel capable of finding and effectively presenting mitigating circumstances.
[Stephen B. Bright, Counselor for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 1865 (1994) (footnotes omitted).]
It is in light of that reality that we should assess the majority’s disturbing conclusion that the meager efforts of Anthony DiFrisco’s defense team met constitutional standards. The shockingly poor defense afforded to DiFrisco, whose crime, although despicable, does not approach the savagery and cruelty we have seen in our capital case law, substantially affected the penalty phase deliberations.
The defense was plagued from its inception by the inexperience of defense counsel. It is true that inexperience does not, in and of itself, prove ineffectiveness. With industrious investigation, a coherent strategy, appropriate experts, and the advice of an experienced mentor, it is possible for a relatively unseasoned defense attorney to advance an effective case on behalf of a capital defendant.
That possibility did not come to fruition here. Not only was DiFrisco’s defense team totally devoid of capital experience, but their presentation of his mitigation case was incoherent, ill-conceived, and scattershot, betraying the internal disagreements, disregard of mentors’ advice, incompetent investigation, and lack of preparation that took place behind the scenes. As a result, DiFrisco was provided wholly inadequate representation at his resentencing trial, and has been condemned to the terrible penalty of death without having received minimally effective legal representation.
I
The majority opinion adequately recounts the facts surrounding DiFrisco’s murder of Edward Potcher. As we have previously described the offense, DiFrisco
*248Fired four bullets at close range into the head of Edward Potcher, the owner of Jack’s Pizzeria, at his Maplewood store on August 12,1986. He fired a fifth bullet into the victim’s body____[A] man named Anthony Franciotti paid him $2500 to kill Mr. Potcher.
[State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 255-56, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (DiFrisco I).]
However, in order to understand how poorly DiFrisco was represented throughout the proceedings that led to his death sentence, the circumstances surrounding that representation require fuller explication.
A. Preliminary Matters
On February 22, 1991, during a post-appeal'hearing on DiFriseo’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial court was informed that in August 1990, the prosecutor invited DiFrisco to cooperate in the State’s investigation of Franciotti. His lawyer, Samuel DeLuca, told the court that he did not answer the State’s letter because the offer did not include a waiver of the death penalty. In fact, DeLuca did not respond to the overture until March 20, 1991, when he .wrote to the .prosecutor that he viewed the offer as a bad faith attempt to buttress the State’s case. The prosecutor replied that DeLuea’s response was a further indication that DiFrisco was not, and never had been, interested in cooperating. DeLuca countered that it was the State that had refused to accept DiFrisco’s cooperation by imposing “conditions”.
In September 1991, DiFrisco wrote to the court requesting the appointment of new counsel. He enclosed a letter he had sent to DeLuca, expressing his dissatisfaction with DeLuca’s representation. DiFrisco ■ complained generally about DeLuca’s failure to consult with him and particularly about DeLuca’s failure to pursue his desire to cooperate with the State. The court allowed DeLuca to withdraw from the case, and the Office of the Public Defender was ordered to provide counsel to DiFrisco.
On November 15,1991, the court wrote to Patricia Kay, Deputy Public Defender in charge of the Essex County Regional Office,. *249reminding her that no public defender had been assigned to represent DiFrisco. Kay delegated the assignment responsibility to Joseph Krakora, chief of the homicide division. Krakora assigned Barbara Lapidus, who had no capital experience, as lead counsel, because all of the attorneys with relevant experience were busy with other capital matters. He selected Michelle Soto, who also had no • capital experience and only two years of general criminal defense experience in all, to assist with the writing of briefs. Although Lapidus was reluctant to take on a capital case, she acquiesced when Krakora convinced her she could do the job and assured her that Soto would do the necessary legal writing.
Lapidus and Soto entered their appearances on November 21, 1991, at which time the court set a trial date of April 27, 1992. Lapidus told the court that she and Soto had full caseloads, including some “ready trials and some murders,” and requested more time to prepare for DiFrisco’s trial. The court responded that the date gave defense counsel “five, almost five-and-a-half months to get ready for this matter, and I think that’s adequate time.” The court later modified that schedule, ordering the defense to file expert reports by March 2, 1992 and the State by April 6, 1992, and requiring that all pretrial motions be filed by March 16,1992. The court set a “firm trial date” of May 4, 1992.
B. The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea
On February 14, 1992, less than two months before trial, the defense moved to vacate DiFrisco’s plea of guilty to capital murder. They retained Ronald Silikovitz, a psychologist, to evaluate DiFrisco for the plea withdrawal application. At a March 2, 1992 hearing, they requested an adjournment of the May 4 retrial date on the ground that they had not yet prepared a mitigation ease. Soto told the court a continuance was necessary because the defense “need[ed] to have experts visit Mr. DiFrisco and complete reports as well as a complete investigation background of Mr. DiFrisco.” When the court asked what defense counsel had been doing since they were assigned to the case four months earlier, Soto said their focus had been the withdrawal of the guilty plea and that the sole witness who had interviewed DiFrisco had done *250so with only that purpose in mind. The court denied the adjournment and refused to hear the merits of the motion.
DiFrisco moved for leave to appeal. In its brief to the Appellate Division, the defense stated that an adjournment was necessary because defense counsel had “strenuously focused” on the motion to withdraw DiFrisco’s guilty plea and was essentially unprepared for the penalty trial. The Appellate Division granted leave and reversed, remanding for a hearing on the motion and directing that the penalty retrial be held no earlier than September 8,1992.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on DiFrisco’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on May 11, 1992. At the hearing, DiFrisco testified that DeLuca led him to believe that if he pleaded guilty and waived a jury for the sentencing phase, he would be sentenced to thirty years to life in prison. DiFrisco testified that had he known the death penalty was a realistic possibility he never would have entered a plea. DeLuca testified that he had advised DiFrisco that, in his opinion, it was extremely unlikely the court would impose a death sentence in his ease. DeLuca also explained that he never developed mitigation evidence on behalf of DiFrisco because he believed the court would impose a life sentence. Defense counsel argued that DiFrisco should be allowed to withdraw his plea because it was involuntary in view of DeLuca’s erroneous assurances that he would receive a life sentence. However, the defense made clear that its argument was not premised on ineffective assistance of counsel.
On May 12,1991, the trial court denied the motion, finding that DiFrisco knew the death penalty was a possible outcome when he agreed to plead. In so ruling, the court underscored the inconsistency between DiFrisco’s argument that he was misinformed of the consequences of his plea and his failure to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Retrial of the penalty phase was scheduled for September 14, 1992. The court ordered that all mitigating factors be filed within ten days and that expert reports be provided to the prosecutor’s *251office within 30 days. The Appellate Division affirmed the court’s decision.
Counsel then moved before this Court for the opportunity to reopen the motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground that DiFrisco had been denied the effective assistance of counsel. This Court ordered the trial court to conduct an expedited hearing on DiFrisco’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
At the hearing, which took place over four days in August 1992, DeLuca testified, as he had previously, that he had advised DiFrisco to plead guilty and to waive a penalty-phase jury because he was certain the trial court would not impose a death sentence. DeLuca said that because of DiFrisco’s confession, he believed the guilt case to be insurmountable. He could not remember how many times he consulted with DiFrisco before the guilty plea, but acknowledged that he had not done any investigation, gathered any mitigating evidence, or consulted any experts. DiFrisco testified that, in entering his plea, he relied entirely upon DeLuca’s assurances that he would not receive a death sentence. The trial court again denied DiFrisco’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, finding that DeLuca did not make improper promises regarding DiFrisco’s sentence and that DeLuca’s decision not to investigate was reasonable. The defense moved for leave to appeal, which this Court denied on October 20,1992. On November 20, 1992, the trial court informed counsel that jury selection would begin on January 11, 1993, and that a list of all possible witnesses should be produced by December 7,1992.
C. Trial Preparation & Mitigation Investigation
Defense counsel was not ready for the retrial. As will be detailed below, the mitigation investigation was incomplete; changes in counsel hampered the defense team’s preparation; and the experts — to the extent that there were any — were inadequate to the task and unprepared.
1. Ronald Silikovitz
As noted, from February through August 1992, Lapidus and Soto had focused their efforts on the motion to withdraw the guilty *252plea. To that end, they retained Silikovitz to evaluate DiFrisco. Krakora approved Silikovitz’s retention as an expert “to evaluate client for. purposes of motion to retract guilty plea in capital ease.” How Silikovitz came to counsel’s attention is unclear. Evidently, he had previously worked on cases for the Public Defender’s Office and had provided that office with brochures reflecting his education and experience. When contacted by Soto in February 1992, he was led to believe that a decision had already been made to retain him, but Soto did not discuss his experience in testifying or his areas of expertise. In fact, Silikovitz had no relevant experience. He specialized in evaluating “special needs children, sexual abuse ... the kind [of cases] that [the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services] would investigate which include also bonding [and] termination of parental rights.” He had never worked on a capital case.
On February 14, 1992, Soto sent Silikovitz a case syllabus, a detective bureau case report, a transcript of DiFrisco’s guilty plea, and a transcript of the first penalty trial for his use in evaluating DiFrisco. Silikovitz then spent three hours with DiFrisco on February 21,1992.
Although Silikovitz had been retained to evaluate DiFrisco for the motion to retract his guilty plea, he was never told the legal standards for plea withdrawal, and he never discussed those standards with trial counsel. Moreover, although trial counsel claimed to have intended that DiFrisco be evaluated for the presence of learning disabilities, they never asked Silikovitz to do so, and he did not. Indeed, he was not even provided with DiFriseo’s school records. Neither was Silikovitz asked to evaluate DiFrisco for any other disorders, and he did not.
Because trial counsel had emphasized the urgency of receiving the report before the March 2, 1992 deadline, Silikovitz produced his first report on February 25,1992, four days after meeting with DiFrisco. Notwithstanding trial counsel’s stated purpose in re*253taining Silikovitz, the report did not address the voluntariness of DiFrisco’s guilty plea. Instead, it recited DiFrisco’s version of the circumstances of his confession and discussed his overall psychological state. Silikovitz reported that DiFrisco could not “recall any phase of the confession process,” because “he was high on cocaine and probably also heroin at the time when the ‘confession’ was made,” that DiFrisco’s mother and personnel at the Parole Department had witnessed his condition that day, and that his attorney and the physician who treated him for his drug withdrawal following his arrest “witnessed and most likely documented the state that he was in while he was being questioned.”
Silikovitz found that DiFrisco manifested “guilt and remorse related to his history of criminal and drug activity,” and that “he understands fully that specific crimes deserve specific consequences.” Analyzing the results of the intelligence tests he had performed, Silikovitz reported that DiFrisco “had his greatest difficulty on tasks requiring him to arrange pictures depicting social situations in a logical sequence,” and that “Mr. DiFrisco may be more of a follower and a victim of circumstances rather than an individual who tends to initiate, originate, and create difficulty.” Silikovitz found that DiFrisco’s figure drawings similarly suggested his “tentativeness, self-doubt, and uncertainty regarding identity and, precisely, who he is.” Silikovitz further noted that DiFrisco “appears to be interested in rehabilitation,” and that he was “optimistic and goal-directed.” He said that DiFrisco was “fully cooperative with [him],” and that he “had the sense that Mr. DiFrisco was being totally candid, open and honest regarding the issues that were being discussed. This tendency further reflected his apparent credibility.” Despite his observation that DiFrisco “does have a good sense of what is right and what is wrong,” however, Silikovitz’s ultimate diagnosis was Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD)1 and multiple drug dependencies.
*254Soto testified at the PCR hearing that, upon reviewing that report, she concluded that it was harmful to DiFrisco. In particular, she was concerned that the ASPD diagnosis “may have caused the defense not to use Silikovitz as a witness.” Lapidus was less concerned about the diagnosis, and thought that, when viewed in the context of the rest of the report, it was not terribly damaging. Krakora, the only experienced capital litigator to review the report, concluded that it was “awful,” and considered it to herald “the end of Silikovitz.” In Krakora’s view, which he expressed to Soto and Lapidus, the report indicated that Silikovitz did not have a grasp of “the big picture,” and did not seem to understand that “this was a forensic evaluation in a capital murder ease for someone who pled guilty to a capital murder.”
Despite the misgivings of Soto and Krakora, Lapidus not only maintained contact with Silikovitz but also expanded his role. *255Specifically, on March 7,1992, she asked Silikovitz to evaluate and assess possible mitigating factors, sending him background materials for that purpose. Silikovitz’s notes from the March 7, 1992 conversation indicate that he understood he was to try to “save DiFrisco’s life.” Lapidus asked Silikovitz to meet with DiFrisco a second time, and to add to his report a discussion of mitigating factors in preparation for the May trial. That was the first time that anyone had discussed mitigating factors with Silikovitz. On March 11,1992, Silikovitz met with DiFrisco for three more hours. That was his last meeting with DiFrisco, thus bringing the total time Silikovitz spent with DiFrisco to six hours.
After the interview, on March 17, 1992, Pamela Cuevas, an investigator with the Office of the Public Defender, faxed to Silikovitz a witness list and a copy of the section of the New Jersey criminal code listing aggravating and mitigating factors in death penalty cases, pursuant to Lapidus’s direction. Prior to receiving that information, and given his complete lack of experience in capital cases, Silikovitz did not know what legally constituted aggravating and mitigating factors. Because he was unaware of the relevant legal standards when he conducted his second interview of DiFrisco, Silikovitz simply relied on DiFrisco’s own reasons for why he should not be put to death.
After conducting telephone interviews with four of DiFrisco’s family members and his former girlfriend, Silikovitz met with Lapidus on May 18, 1992, to discuss possible mitigating factors, and with Lapidus and Soto on June i; 1992, to discuss the pertinent diagnostic criteria listed in the DSM-III-R. Lapidus and Soto requested that Silikovitz revisit his ASPD diagnosis. Upon reviewing the DSM-III-R with trial counsel, Silikovitz concluded that his earlier diagnosis, which had been based upon his faulty recollection of the DSM-III-R criteria, had been incorrect.
On June 8, 1992, Silikovitz again met with Lapidus and Soto to discuss additional, mainly stylistic, revisions to his report. Trial counsel never asked Silikovitz to conduct further psychological or *256neurological tests on DiFrisco or otherwise to develop additional potential mitigating evidence. Soto testified that Silikovitz communicated to her that his evaluation of DiFrisco was “comprehensive” and that she therefore believed that further testing was not necessary. She stated, “I certainly relied on [Silikovitz] as the expert in this case to guide me with regard to any further testing he felt the results of the test that he had done would warrant.” (Emphasis added). Thus, because Silikovitz told her that the testing was adequate, Soto did not request additional testing. Indeed, Soto relied entirely on Silikovitz’s assessment of what tests were appropriate because, as she acknowledged, she never familiarized herself with the different types of psychological testing that were available and generally used in similar cases. She therefore was unable to review Silikovitz’s initial report with even a modicum of sophistication and was unable to form an opinion regarding the completeness of the testing to determine whether additional tests were necessary.
By Silikovitz’s own admission, however, his testing was not comprehensive. For example, he had not administered any objective psychological tests (as contrasted with projective or intelligence tests), which constitute an essential element of a comprehensive forensic psychological evaluation. Moreover, the psychological tests that Silikovitz did perform were administered in an incomplete manner. He testified that, due to time constraints, he did not perform the standard sub-parts of the intelligence test he administered. PCR counsel’s expert, Dr. Alan Goldstein, explained that only three of the nine tests Silikovitz administered were complete. Nevertheless, Silikovitz produced a revised report. It deleted the former ASPD diagnosis and replaced it with a diagnosis of “Adult Antisocial Behavior.”2 *257Although it was dated June 4, the report was not completed until August 22, 1992, and incorporated additional changes suggested at the June 12 meeting between Silikovitz, Lapidus, and Soto.
The second report, unlike the first, included a section explicitly discussing mitigating factors and summarizing interviews with DiFrisco’s family members and his former girlfriend.3 It also provided greater detail to support Silikovitz’s conclusion that DiFrisco was remorseful:
Mr. DiFrisco spoke of the grief and remorse that he has suffered as a result of the crime. He notes that “this crime has pressed so deep — it wasn’t really me — I was like a machine — I was a different person” while under the influence of drugs. He spoke about remorse and depression. He stated, with considerable affect and credibility, “if I could cut my arm off to change it, — I would. I feel bad and I feel worse than this person’s family. I feel remorse. I try to blot it out. It is hard to .identify with the other me.” He further indicated that he has had “bouts of depression” during the course of his incarceration.
In this psychologist’s expert opinion, these feelings of quilt, remorse, and depression are genuine. They reflect the thought that Mr. DiFrisco has given over the past five years to the implication of his act to the decedent’s family and to society. The crime was, in this psychologist’s view, a somewhat traumatic event for Mr. DiFrisco.
Silikovitz’s second report summarized information about DiFrisco’s childhood, in particular his lack of supervision and need for male role models, that had not been included in his first report. It also tethered those aspects of DiFrisco’s childhood to his history of substance abuse:
Mr. DiFrisco’s father was not an adequate role model and Anthony was never emotionally close with his father. Consequently, he desperately sought the approval of his siblings, his peers and ultimately Mr. Franciotti, who was clearly a father figure. Mr. DiFrisco began to become involved with drugs, first on a casual basis *258and then on a heavy, addicted basis. He is a drug addict and has been dependent on both cocaine and heroin. Predisposed to substance abuse and criminal activity, increasingly susceptible to the influence of his peers, and desperately seeking approval, Mr. DiFrisco was particularly vulnerable at the time that Mr. Franciotti made the offer that he did. ■
Silikovitz reiterated his conclusions about DiFrisco’s remorse and his susceptibility to influence by others. Finally, the second report — consistent with the first — opined that DiFrisco was candid and sensitive, and that he had rehabilitative potential.
Lapidus and Soto responded differently to Silikovitz’s second report. Lapidus found the report useful, in part because it conveyed DiFrisco’s remorse, which she considered to be the “key” to the mitigation case. She stated that “when I first met Anthony, and had the opportunity to speak with him and interview him, it was apparent to me that he was clearly remorseful.” Lapidus further believed that the report conveyed DiFrisco’s regard for Franciotti as a father figure and his susceptibility to Franciotti’s influence because of his drug dependency and need for a male role model. Finally, she approved of Silikovitz’s recitation of DiFrisco’s extensive drug use and linkage of the drug abuse to his crime. Soto, on the other hand, remained troubled by Silikovitz’s original diagnosis of ASPD and the revised “adult antisocial behavior” diagnosis. She was “adamant” that Silikovitz not be called as a witness.
Silikovitz believed he would testify as an expert witness at the trial. However, with the exception of one administrative phone call from investigator Pam Cuevas in October 1992, Silikovitz never heard from the defense team again. He learned that he had not been called to testify at trial only after the fact, when a member of his synagogue told him DiFrisco had been sentenced to death. As it turns out, Silikovitz was dropped from the defense team and was not replaced by another, more competent witness, because of a shift in DiFrisco’s counsel.
2. William Annitto
The second mitigation expert hired by defense counsel was Dr. William Annitto, a psychiatrist with expertise in the field of *259substance abuse. Although the form approving his retention indicated that Annitto would be consulted to develop mitigation evidence about DiFrisco’s drug addiction and its impact on his life, Annitto apparently believed that his testimony was to be used for plea withdrawal purposes. He submitted a brief report addressing only DiFrisco’s drug use at the time of his confession. Annitto concluded that DiFrisco’s use of cocaine, valium, and heroin, as he reported it, would have had a dramatic impact on his physical condition at the time of his arrest and confession. The report stated that DiFrisco would have been suffering severe withdrawal by the time of his confession, which would have led him to “say just about anything so as to get some relief and peace.” Annitto did not address other issues relevant to mitigation in his report, for which the Office of the Public Defender had approved his retention, and, for unknown reasons, his conclusions were not relied on in defense counsel’s motions to withdraw DiFriseo’s guilty plea.
3. Alfonso Associates
Defense counsel also retained Alfonso Associates, a consulting firm that specializes in, among other things, the collection and presentation of psychosocial mitigation evidence. Cessie Alfonso, the director of the firm, was highly regarded inside and outside the Office of the Public Defender. After retaining Alfonso Associates, Lapidus and Soto deferred entirely to Alfonso Associates in respect of the mitigation investigation. They provided no guidance to Ms. Alfonso regarding the focus of the mitigation investigation and did not inform Ms. Alfonso of any overarching theory or strategy for the mitigation case. Lapidus explained that she did not supervise Alfonso Associates, “mainly because [she] was comfortable with the fact that [Ms. Alfonso] knew what she was doing.” Although Soto acknowledged that the defense team had a responsibility to supervise Ms. Alfonso’s work, she also viewed Alfonso Associates as “the experts” and relied on them to guide the mitigation investigation. In fact, for several months, Pam Cuevas, who had no prior experience or training for capital cases, *260was the only member of the Office of the Public Defender to communicate with Alfonso Associates.
Lapidus and Soto did not provide Silikovitz’s reports to Alfonso Associates, and Ms. Alfonso and her staff never saw the reports. Likewise, the work of Alfonso Associates never was shared with Silikovitz. Although Lapidus explained that the reports never were exchanged because Silikovitz and Alfonso Associates were preparing them “contemporaneously,” that is not accurate. Silikovitz’s first report was submitted in February 1992; Alfonso Associates’ initial report was submitted in June 1992; and Silikovitz’s second report was completed in August 1992.
Ms. Alfonso and her associate, Jeffrey Hitehcock, testified that if had they seen Silikovitz’s report while they were conducting their investigation, they would have done significantly more research into a number of issues raised in his report, including DiFrisco’s relationship with Franciotti, the connection between that relationship and DiFriseo’s need for a father figure, the traumas and losses that took place during DiFriseo’s youth, and his depression and remorse. Likewise, Silikovitz testified that had he seen DiFrisco’s school records, which had been obtained by Cuevas, and which indicated a learning disability, he would have conducted further psychological testing to probe DiFrisco’s cognitive functioning.
On June 5, 1992, Alfonso Associates sent defense counsel a preliminary report prepared by Ms. Alfonso, Hitchcock, and another associate, Carmeta Albarus. The cover letter to the report indicated that it was submitted for defense counsel’s review. Ms. Alfonso did not consider the report final, as interviews of teachers, family members, and others remained to be done, and records needed to be examined. Nonetheless, according to Ms. Alfonso and Albarus, despite repeated calls, Alfonso Associates received no word from defense counsel for five months. Accordingly, Ms. Alfonso “discontinued” the investigation, believing the ease was dormant or resolved.
*2614. First Change in Counsel
In October 1992, Lapidus went to Krakora and complained of difficulty working with Soto. In response, Krakora removed Soto from the case and assigned Peter Liguori as assistant counsel. Liguori was scheduled to be married and go on a honeymoon the month before the penalty retrial. Nevertheless, Krakora picked him to replace Soto, because he “thought he was a good worker who would do a good job.” Liguori had been working at the Office of the Public Defender just over two years at the time of his assignment and, like Lapidus and Soto, had no experience working on capital cases. In his first weeks assigned to the case, Liguori familiarized himself with the file. He did not initiate new mitigation investigations or consider retaining new experts, because he was under the impression that all of the preparation had been done and he would simply be preparing for trial. ■
Soon after Liguori was assigned to the case, however, the trial preparation changed dramatically. In November 1992, Ms. Alfonso notified defense counsel that, due to health problems, she would be unable to testify at trial. She recommended Billy Feinberg, a social worker with experience testifying in capital cases, to replace her. She did not recommend to defense counsel that they rely on any of her own employees to testify as mitigation experts. At counsel’s request, and in anticipation of an adjournment motion, Ms. Alfonso provided a letter explaining the circumstances that prevented her from testifying. However, defense counsel did not file an application for an adjournment because they assumed it would be denied and feared it would anger the court.
5. Second Change in Counsel
The decision regarding Ms. Alfonso’s replacement was not made by Lapidus and Liguori because, at the same time that Ms. Alfonso withdrew from the case, there was yet another change in the defense team. On November 23, 1992, just six weeks before trial, and during the time that Liguori was out of the country on his honeymoon, Lapidus resigned from the Office of the Public Defender. Krakora re-assigned Soto as lead counsel. At the *262PCR hearing, Krakora testified that he never would have assigned two such relatively inexperienced attorneys as Soto and Liguori to a capital case at the outset. Nonetheless, one month before trial, Soto, who had only two years’ experience trying criminal cases, and had no training in the investigation and presentation of a case in mitigation of the death penalty, became lead counsel for DiFrisco’s sentencing trial. Liguori, who had the same amount of experience and training as Soto, was assistant counsel. Furthermore, Soto retained her full caseload for several weeks leading up to the trial.
6. Carmeta Albarus
Thus, it was Soto and Liguori who made the decision regarding Ms. Alfonso’s replacement. Instead of requesting an adjournment, they decided that one of Ms. Alfonso’s assistants, Carmeta Albarus, would replace Ms. Alfonso as the mitigation expert. Alfonso opposed the decision, telling counsel that Albarus was not an appropriate choice because of her lack of educational credentials and her lack of experience in testifying. Liguori explained that although Ms. Alfonso recommended social worker Billy Feinberg, she was not chosen because she did not know the case. Although Albarus lacked a degree in social work, she was “familiar with the file.”
Prior to her assignment to testify as an expert witness, Albarus was a case manager at Alfonso Associates, which meant that her involvement with the case had been limited to filing and making sure “the client was being seen and certain things were being done.” Soto characterized the decision to use Albarus as “tactical.” According to her, Albarus was preferable to Feinberg because Albarus was familiar with DiFrisco’s file, had worked on many capital cases, and was “relied on heavily” by Ms. Alfonso. Soto stated that she consulted with her supervisors, Krakora and Kapin, and other attorneys at the Public Defender’s Office, and that they agreed with her that “Albarus would be the more appropriate witness to put forth that psycho-social evidence.” However, Krakora did not recall those conversations, and Kapin *263denied that he ever discussed that decision with Soto. Indeed, Kapin testified that he never even knew “that there was a replacement witness problem.”
At any rate, in December 1992, the attention of defense counsel turned to transforming Albarus into an expert witness. Those preparations included having Albarus re-interview several of the witnesses previously interviewed by other Alfonso employees so that she would have personal knowledge of the individuals and the information; “developing” Albarus’ resume, because she had not previously testified and did not have a prepared resume; and submitting a second report, dated January 22, 1993, that reiterated the preliminary conclusions and incorporated information adduced from the additional interviews. The new information covered in the second report was described in the unsigned cover letter that accompanied the report:
Follow-up interviews conducted with Mr. Anthony DiFrisco, his father, Alfred DiFrisco; his mother, Anna DiFrisco, and his step-mother, Janet DiFrisco; and his siblings, Fred and Fran DiFrisco[.] [W]e have also conducted interviews with his aunt and uncle, Mary and Joseph Grillo. A copy of the decree of divorce granted to Alfred DiFrisco, dated 11/29/72 was also reviewed.
The letter stated that the substance of the report bore “no significant changes and the themes and issues remain consistent” with the June 9,1992 report. The bulk of the additional investigation that Ms. Alfonso originally had identified as necessary to complete the mitigation investigation interviews of teachers, family members, and former girlfriends, review of parole records, and investigation of DiFriseo’s drug addiction prior to the offense— never was done.
7. Peter Schiffman
Just three weeks before the penalty retrial, Soto retained Dr. Peter Schiffman to testify as an expert witness on drug abuse and its effects on judgment. That decision marked a departure from defense counsel’s earlier strategy, which had been to keep from the jury evidence of DiFrisco’s drug use. As Liguori explained, counsel wanted to avoid the impression that DiFrisco was a “drug-*264crazed fiend.” Soto explained that the decision to use Schiffman was tactical, because drug addiction was “a very viable explanation for committing this offense,” although she agreed it was not a replacement for other mitigating evidence, such as remorse, which she said she planned to present through a witness other than Schiffman. Soto stated that she made the decision to call Schiffman after consulting with her supervisors, Krakora and Kapin. Once again, Krakora had no recollection of speaking to Soto about the matter or advising her to use Schiffman: Kapin testified that he did not discuss Schiffman with Soto and that, if he had discussed the issue, he would have strongly advised Soto not to retain Schiffman because of a prior bad experience he had with him. Liguori testified that he actually recalled Kapin advising Soto against using Schiffman.
According to Soto, the plan was to limit Sehiffman’s testimony to the effects of drug abuse in general. He would not address whether DiFrisco had used drugs at or near the time of the offense. Soto limited the scope of his testimony because discovery deadlines had long since passed, and she was concerned the trial court would not otherwise permit Schiffman to testify. Furthermore, the investigation, such as it was, had failed to uncover sufficient documentary corroboration supporting DiFrisco’s claim that he had been using, drugs at the time of the offense.
On December 16, 1992, defense counsel made a proffer to the trial court regarding Schiffman’s testimony. Soto told the court that Sehiffinan would testify about “the pharmacology, the variations in usage which would include free-basing, IV use, [and] snorting” and the “general effects of cocaine and heroin on the individual.” Soto further represented to the court that, although Schiffman had conducted interviews with DiFrisco and his siblings and had come to the conclusion that DiFrisco had a long history of drug abuse that had continued up to the time of his incarceration for the killing of Potcher, Schiffman would not offer “an opinion with respect to the defendant’s specific state of mind at the moment when the crime was done or when he was hired to do the *265crime,” nor would he testify “that the defendant did not know the nature of his acts or what [he was] doing.” Based upon those limitations, which essentially rendered Schiffman’s testimony useless, the court allowed the witness to testify.
D. The Penalty Retrial
Jury selection took place from January 11 through January 25, 1993. On February 1,1993, the penalty trial commenced. On the morning that opening statements were to be given, Soto and Liguori met with assistant Prosecutor Norman Menz to discuss once more DiFrisco’s cooperation with the State’s investigation of Franciotti. Because the prosecutor’s office still would not offer a life sentence in return for DiFrisco’s cooperation, Soto, like DeLuca before her, cut off communication, persisting in the view that it was not in DiFrisco’s interest to cooperate.
In its opening argument, the State described DiFrisco’s confession to the Potcher killing and portrayed DiFrisco’s offense as a premeditated murder for hire. The prosecutor underscored Di-Frisco’s failure to cooperate, and concluded with the statement: “[I]f ever there were a case where someone should get the death penalty, this is the case, and the time is now.”
Liguori focused on the confession in his opening statement and argued that it was a sign of remorse. He told the jury that DiFriseo’s confession, for which he received nothing in return, could be explained only by his internal suffering for the crime he had committed. Liguori also emphasized the extent to which DiFrisco had, in fact, cooperated with the police regarding Franciotti. He described DiFrisco’s family life generally, including the absence of male role models, and pointed out that Franciotti stepped into that void, providing DiFrisco with drugs and acting as a father figure. Liguori suggested that Franciotti manipulated DiFrisco into committing the offense and had “manipulated this case ... this whole process.” DiFrisco was not, Liguori concluded, a “MU again and kill again hit man,” but a one-time, “drug dependent” killer whose crime was directed by an “older, controlling man.”
*266The State’s evidence, presented over the course of two days, was largely the same as it had been at the first penalty trial, recounting the investigation, the crime scene, and DiFrisco’s confession. DiFrisco’s testimony from the first penalty trial was read to the jury, and a dental expert testified that the tooth marks left on a slice of pizza recovered from the crime scene were made by DiFrisco. The defense case lasted one day. It consisted of the testimony of Albarus, Schiffman, and DiFrisco’s sister, father, brother, and mother.
1. Carmeta Albarus’ Testimony
Albarus testified as a mitigation specialist.4 She acknowledged that a full psycho-social history had not been completed but narrated the basic story recounted by the DiFrisco family including Fred DiFrisco Sr.’s life-long emotional unavailability to Di-Frisco; his mother’s depression; the history of drug abuse among all of the DiFrisco boys, including the 1987 death of the eldest son, Richard, by overdose. Finally, she briefly discussed DiFrisco’s relationship with Franeiotti, stating that Franeiotti supplied Di-Frisco with drugs.
Albarus was discredited as a witness when the prosecutor elicited that she did not have an undergraduate degree in psychology, let alone an advanced degree of any kind, and that she lacked training in substance abuse. She was further impeached based on the contrast between her lack of qualifications and the credentials of Ms. Alfonso. Finally, when the prosecutor elicited that the expert report submitted by Albarus was virtually identical to the prior report submitted by Ms. Alfonso, it left the jury with the negative — but accurate — impression that Albarus had adopted the findings of her supervisor, simply reproducing and signing Alfonso’s report and presenting it as her own.
*2672. Peter Schiffman’s Testimony
Schiffman’s testimony at the penalty retrial was, according to Soto, “devastating to Anthony DiFrisco’s defense.” Schiffman deviated greatly from what Soto anticipated he would say. He testified that DiFrisco had been using drugs, including cocaine and heroin, since he was 14 or 15 years old and then told the jury that heavy use of cocaine usually leads to paranoia, followed by “out and out psychosis.” Schiffman explained the addictive qualities of cocaine by relaying an experiment in which rats chose cocaine over food until they starved to death, and said that humans ¿ddicted to cocaine would “do anything to feel better” when they are going through withdrawal. Schiffman said the lives of cocaine addicts revolve around getting the drug, even to the point of “hurting people” to get it. He then told the jury that heroin, by contrast, is “a far less dangerous drug to the community than cocaine, because people only do bad things on it when they’re trying to get it.” According to defense counsel, Schiffman’s testimony left the jury with the impression that DiFrisco, as a user of both cocaine and heroin, was a danger to the community.
At the conclusion of the evidence, DiFrisco made a brief statement to the jury, asking the jurors to spare his life:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I am deeply, deeply sorry for taking the life of Mr. Potcher. Pm equally sorry for his family as well as mine. I ask you and I plead with you to spare my life, not give me the death penalty. Thank you. Thank you all.
Also at the conclusion of the evidence, but out of the jury’s presence, the court told counsel that it was considering striking remorse as a mitigating factor because defense counsel had presented no evidence of it. The only suggestion of remorse, the court observed, was in DiFrisco’s allocution, which was not evidence. Defense counsel objected, informing the court that remorse was one of the “central themes” of their mitigation case. Implicitly acknowledging that they had presented no evidence of remorse, however, defense counsel argued that the present remorse mitigating factor should not be struck, because present remorse could be inferred from “past expressions of remorse.” *268The court allowed the remorse mitigating factor to remain, ruling that “although it may be a stretch, the jury may infer the continuing presence of remorse from the [confession] and prior testimony, if they so wish.”
3. Closing Arguments
In summation, Soto argued to the jury that DiFrisco’s confession to an otherwise unsolved murder should weigh heavily against the imposition of a death sentence. She further argued that DiFrisco’s cooperation with the police in their investigation of Franciotti should be considered in his favor, and that his remorse — conveyed through both his statements to the police that he wanted to clean the slate and his inability to sleep after the murder — should weigh against a finding that he was a coldblooded killer for hire. Soto briefly discussed Franciotti’s influence on DiFriseo, stating that Franciotti had used him, manipulating him by providing him with “the one thing that he couldn’t control,” drugs, and the other thing that he craved, parental approval.
The State’s closing argument reviewed all of the evidence in the case that supported the aggravating factors and specifically contended that there was no evidence of DiFrisco’s remorse. The prosecutor painted a portrait of DiFriseo as a cold-blooded hit-man for hire.
The jury returned a verdict the next day. In terms of aggravating factors, the jury found unanimously that the murder was for pecuniary gain but rejected the existence of the second aggravating factor, that the murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection for another crime.
It unanimously rejected four mitigating factors — that DiFriseo was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions on account of intoxication; that he was dependent on Franciotti for drugs; that his motive in confessing to the murder was remorse; and “any other factor.”
*269Of the remaining factors, the jury unanimously found that nine had been established: (1) DiFrisco’s childhood and upbringing; (2) his suffering due to his father’s lack of love and attention; (3) his mother’s inability to provide discipline and guidance; (4) the unavailability of his older brothers for support due to their drug abuse; (5) his failure to develop any self-esteem; (6) his stunted maturity level due to drugs; (7) his vulnerability to Franciotti as a father figure; (8) his manipulation by Franciotti; and (9) that Potcher’s killing would have remained unsolved but for his confession.
The jury split 6-6 on whether DiFrisco had rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another for murder. Regarding whether his excessive drug use affected his ability to make sound judgments, eight voted no and four yes. Finally, on whether DiFrisco remained remorseful about the killing, eleven voted no and one yes. The jury unanimously concluded that the sole aggravating factor that had been established outweighed the mitigating factors, and DiFrisco accordingly was sentenced to death.
E. DiFrisco’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
DiFrisco’s PCR counsel carried out the kind of thorough, competent mitigation investigation that should have been conducted prior to the penalty-phase retrial. The experts they hired, whose testimony will be detailed below, rendered corporeal the evanescent mitigation case adduced by defense counsel. In brief, PCR counsel presented the expert report of Alan Goldstein, . Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, who conducted twenty-six hours of interviews with DiFrisco, interviewed DiFrisco’s family and friends, and administered a comprehensive , battery of psychological tests. Goldstein concluded that DiFrisco was remorseful after his crime and continues to be remorseful today. Goldstein found that DiFrisco does not suffer from ASPD but from a learning disability, Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which, combined with years of substance abuse, explained his poor judgment and excessive reliance on others to guide his social behavior. *270Goldstein’s report also laid out the ways in which Silikovitz’s evaluation of DiFrisco was incomplete and grossly inadequate, deviating dramatically from the standard of care of a competent psychologist.
In addition, PCR counsel presented the expert report of Wilfred Van Gorp, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist. Van Gorp attested to Goldstein’s conclusion that DiFrisco suffered from ADHD since childhood, which resulted in diminished cognitive abilities, exacerbated by years of substance abuse. Van Gorp opined that those impairments made it difficult for DiFrisco to make sense of social situations and resulted in his susceptibility to the influence of others, such as Franciotti, who Van Gorp characterized as a mentor figure.
The report of Robert L. Smith, Ph.D., a psychologist with an expertise in the diagnosis and treatment of substance abuse, also was proffered. Smith evaluated the effects of DiFrisco’s drug use on his cognitive functioning and concluded that, at the time of the offense, DiFrisco’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished.
PCR counsel offered the expert report of Jill Miller, MSW, a mitigation specialist who completed a comprehensive psycho-social history of DiFrisco. Miller found DiFrisco to be remorseful, a conclusion reinforced by her interviews with a nun who advised him in prison. By interviewing a number of individuals who knew DiFrisco throughout his life, Miller also discovered numerous incidents of kindness and generosity that indicated he was a person capable of rehabilitation. Miller also evaluated the mitigation investigation performed by trial counsel and concluded that it was deficient in many respects, falling well below established standards of practice for the development and presentation of mitigation evidence for penalty phases of capital trials.
Finally, the expert report of David I. Brack, Esq., an attorney with.significant experience in capital cases was offered. Analyzing the record in this case, Brack detailed the ways in which trial *271counsel’s performance fell far below national standards for capital defense counsel.
The court declined to allow the psychological experts to testify, although it received their reports in evidence; excluded Brack’s report altogether; and denied DiFrisco’s motion. In so doing, the PCR Court opined that DiFrisco’s defense team’s performance met constitutional standards. This appeal ensued.
II
“An accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our criminal justice system.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2043, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 664 (1984). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that in the absence of counsel, “the right to a trial itself would be ‘of little avail.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed. 158, 170 (1932)).
Both the federal and the New Jersey Constitutions guarantee not only a right to counsel, but also a right to “the effective assistance of counsel.” Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at 654, 104 S.Ct. at 2044, 80 L.Ed.2d at 664 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 (1970)); see also State v. Sugar, 84 N.J. 1, 17, 417 A.2d 474 (1980) (“Because the Constitution requires the assistance of counsel and not merely his physical presence, counsel must be effective as well as available.”). Those constitutional guarantees recognize that “the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-68, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1022, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1465 (1938); Sugar, supra, 84 N.J. at 16, 417 A.2d 474. Consequently, the assistance of counsel “is essential to insuring fairness and due process in criminal proceedings.” Sugar, supra, 84 N.J. at 16, 417 A.2d 474.
The majority has set forth the appropriate standard for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and *272State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 519 A.2d 336 (1987). Ante at 218-19, 804 A.2d 520-21. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court announced a two-prong test for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. First, counsel’s performance must fall “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Second, the prejudice prong requires a showing of a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698.
There' is, of course, no specific set of rules for judging reasonable performance. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694; Fritz supra, 105 N.J. at 52, 519 A.2d 336. Instead, “[I]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. See also State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 617, 577 A.2d 455 (1990) (noting that “[prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides.”). As a general matter, “client loyalty, adequate consultation, and legal proficiency are relevant in determining whether assistance was effective.” Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52, 519 A.2d 336.
“The duty to investigate is part of a defendant’s right to reasonably competent counsel. ‘The principle is so fundamental that the failure to conduct a reasonable pretrial investigation may in itself amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” Harris v. Blodgett, 853 F.Supp. 1239, 1255 (1994) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 583 n. 16 (9th Cir.1983); McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 217-18 (8th Cir.1974)); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389, (2000); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, (9th Cir.2001) (en banc);. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 449 (6th Cir.2001); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.2001); Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 312 (3d Cir.2001); Carter v. Bell 218 F.3d 581, 596 (6th *273Cir.2000); Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir.1999); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir.1996); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995); Workman v. Tate, 957 F.2d 1339, 1345 (6th Cir.1992); Kenley v. Armontrout, 937 P.2d 1298, 1309 (8th Cir.1991).
Courts also have found deficient performance where counsel failed to hire and call appropriate expert witnesses. Mayfield, supra, 270 F.3d at 927; Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 716 (5th Cir.2000); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir.2000); Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1049, 119 S.Ct. 2414, 144 L.Ed.2d 811 (1999); United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418-19 (2d Cir.1993); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580-81 (6th Cir.1992).
Performance has been deemed deficient where counsel failed to provide an expert with information that was critical to the expert’s analysis. Smith, supra, 189 F.3d at 1112; Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1118 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105, 120 S.Ct. 844, 145 L.Ed.2d 713 (2000); Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1385 (9th Cir.1995).
Although counsel’s failure to present available evidence favorable to a defendant may not alone constitute deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland/Fritz, “an inadequate investigation of the law or fact ... dispels the presumption of competence that might otherwise arise from a strategic choice.” State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 252, 736 A.2d 469 (1999) (Bey V). If counsel’s performance is shown to be deficient, then the inquiry turns to the second prong of Strickland analysis.
In State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 356-57, 561 A.2d 1082 (1989), this Court rejected the notion that it should alter the ineffective assistance of counsel test for the guilt phase of a capital case, stating that the Strickland/Fritz test would “adequately fulfill the constitutional guarantee.” However, when called on to apply Strickland/Fritz to a penalty-phase trial, the Court determined to alter the standard. In so doing, the Court noted that a literal application of the prejudice prong would force a reviewing court to *274step into the shoes of the sentencing jurors. Recognizing that “a reviewing court strays from its traditional function if it attempts to predict the probability that a penalty-phase jury would have changed its verdict if counsel had not been deficient,” the Court propounded a new prejudice standard to better accommodate the “circumscribed appellate review function.” State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 250, 690 A.2d 1 (1997) (Marshall III).
In our view, an adaptation of the Strickland/Fritz prejudice test to capital-case penalty-phase proceedings that more faithfully reflects our appellate function would require courts to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the jury’s penaliy-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially.

mm

After announcing the new standard, the Court said: “The reasonable probability that ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of a capital trial substantially affected the jury’s penalty-phase deliberations equates with a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Ibid, (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698). Finally, the Court explained its reasoning for changing the prejudice standard for the sentencing phase of a capital trial:
We regard our understanding of the Strickland/Fritz prejudice prong for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in penalty-phase proceedings to be a necessary adaptation of the literal Strickland standard to the realistic limitations on appellate review of jury penalty-phase deliberations. Although an appellate court cannot predict the outcome of a penalty-phase jury’s deliberations, it is entirely capable of assessing whether the production of additional mitigating evidence would have been likely to have a substantial effect on the jury’s deliberations. We are satisfied that our adaptation of the Strickland prejudice prong to penaliy-phase proceedings is faithful to the core meaning of the standard announced by the Strickland court.
[Id. at 250-51, 690 A.2d 1 (emphasis added).]
Notwithstanding that Court’s statement that the Marshall III standard “equates” with Strickland, it is clear that they are not the same. Otherwise the Court would not have felt compelled to modify the Strickland/Fritz standard. Clearly the meaning of “reasonable probability” is the same in both contexts. The difference is that Marshall III scrutinizes the process of the jury’s deliberations, whereas the focus of Strickland/Fritz is on outcome.
*275The spotlight on process is consistent with the concern expressed by the United States Supreme Court, specific to the penalty phase of capital trials:
[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. [86], 100[, 78 S.Ct. 590 (1958)] (plurality opinion),
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.
[Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976).]
More particularly,
[T]he determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts. The statutory factors give the jury broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, in effect, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability. Presumably the imposition of a death sentence is entrusted to a jury because it is a uniquely moral decision in which bright line rules have a limited place.
[Hendricks, supra 70 F.3d at 1044.]
In sum, if counsel’s unprofessional performance compromised the process of the penalty proceeding by keeping from the jury information that, if presented, was reasonably probable to substantially affect the deliberative process, prejudice is established. See, e.g., Smith, supra, 189 F.3d at 1013; Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1202 (11th Cir.1999); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1210-11 (6th Cir.1995); Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3rd Cir.1992).
That is the backdrop against which our analysis should proceed.
Ill
There were essentially two narratives about DiFrisco that could be culled from the facts. As described by capital cause expert David Brack, one was that he was a “self-indulgent, amoral and selfish individual who persistently chose the parasitic lifestyle of a chronic drag abuser, and who entered into a cold-blooded contractual arrangement with an organized crime figure to murder a stranger for money.” The other was that he committed the *276murder, not for the pittance he was paid, but because he was damaged by emotional and neurological impairments and long-term drug abuse that led him to fall under the spell of a father figure (Franciotti), and that he was truly remorseful for his actions. The former narrative cast DiFrisco as unregenerate; the latter, as capable of redemption. Whether DiFrisco’s life would be saved depended in great measure on which of those narratives the jury believed.
From that perspective, it is clear that DiFrisco’s defense team fell short of what is required of capital counsel and that the inadequate performance affected the jury’s deliberative process.
A. REMORSE
In a capital prosecution remorse always is a pivotal issue. See Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 26, 58-59 (2000) (noting that jurors who found a defendant remorseful also tended to see him as “likable as a person”); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation on Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think? 98 Colum. L.Rev. 1538, 1560-61 (1998) (referring to statistical analysis that showed that jurors were more likely to vote for death if the defendant expressed no remorse for his offense and that “only the defendant’s prior history of violent crime and future dangerousness were more aggravating than lack of remorse,” in determining the jury’s verdict); Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey, & Martin T. Wells, But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital Sentencing, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1599, 1633 (noting that statistical analysis demonstrated that “if jurors believed that the defendant was sorry for what he had done, they tended to sentence him to life imprisonment, not death”); Scott E. Sunby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 Cornell L.Rev. 1557, 1565 (1998) (stating that jurors reported that “if the defendant had made some showing of remorse they might have switched their votes from death to life” and that “in thirteen of the nineteen [cases studied in which the death penalty was imposed] at least one juror explicitly *277insisted that he would have voted for life rather than death had the defendant shown remorse”); William S. Geimer and Anthony Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote for Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J.Crim. L. 1, 39-40 (1987-88) (noting jurors report that defendant’s demeanor, including “lack of remorse,” was an operative factor in their decision to impose the death penalty in thirty-two percent of the cases examined, second in significance only to the manner of the killing).
At DiFrisco’s first penalty trial that was conducted without a mitigation investigation, the court imposed the death penalty. Finding no evidence of remorse, on direct appeal the Court characterized the ease as unique, in part because the defendant was so “remorseless.” DiFrisco I, supra, 118 N.J. at 255, 571 A.2d 914.5 At DiFrisco’s second penalty trial, the defense offered two remorse-related mitigating factors — (1) that he confessed because of his remorse and (2) that he is presently remorseful.
The jury unanimously rejected the first mitigating factor and rejected the second by a vote of 11 to 1. That outcome is unsurprising because counsel essentially presented no evidence to undergird the idea of DiFrisco’s remorse. In fact, at the close of the case, the trial court proposed striking the remorse mitigators altogether because there was no evidence to support them. Eventually, because defense counsel desperately argued that remorse was a lynchpin of their case, the Court allowed the mitigators to remain solely because the past confession was before the jury. How the PCR Court could have concluded that defense counsel’s failure to present remorse evidence passed muster is difficult to comprehend.
*278Had the defense not offered the two mitigating factors regarding remorse, the failure to present evidence might have been seen as a reasonable strategic choice. Or, if the defense had offered the mitigating factors regarding remorse and then presented some testimony to support them, that would have demonstrated a coherent strategy. Instead, the defense offered two mitigating factors about remorse, thereby drawing attention to the issue, and then presented no evidence to support them. It is impossible to justify the defense’s course of action because their performance was not reasonable.
DiFrisco’s counsel presented two supposed expert witnesses and four lay witnesses at the penalty retrial. Although they initially hired Silikovitz, who specialized in child sexual abuse and termination of parental rights, they did not use him as a witness. Silikovitz stated several times in his first report that DiFrisco was deeply remorseful for his crimes and that he wished to “undo all the really bad things” he had done. Silikovitz described him as a “sensitive individual” who is “capable of empathizing closely with the feelings and thought of others.” Silikovitz also found that DiFrisco “does have a good sense of what is right and what is wrong, and he understands fully that specific crimes deserve specific consequences.” In his second report, Silikovitz conveyed DiFrisco’s remorse even more strongly, specifically describing his remorse for Potcher’s family, a point the trial court found lacking in the first penalty phase. Silikovitz’s second report observed that, over the five years since his crime, DiFrisco had given considerable thought “to the implications of his acts to the decedent’s family and to society.”
Given the errors made by Silikovitz in his diagnosis of DiFrisco and his general lack of knowledge about capital litigation, counsel’s decision not to call him as a witness at the penalty trial was reasonable. The decision not to replace him, however, clearly was unreasonable. Once counsel determined that Silikovitz was a liability, it defied reason not to seek the opinion of a new psychological expert. If counsel determines that a particular expert’s *279report is deficient, but the area of investigation is significant to the mitigation case (which remorse obviously was), the duty to investigate requires further inquiry into the subject covered by the incompetent expert.
Significantly, defense counsel also failed to instruct Alfonso Associates to investigate remorse as a source of mitigation evidence. It goes without saying that when defense counsel hires a mitigation expert to evaluate the client, counsel remains responsible for management of the case and for monitoring and devising a coherent strategy. With respect to remorse, that did not occur.
The expert reports presented at the PCR hearing underscored the availability of remorse evidence. Dr. Alan Goldstein spent 26 hours with DiFrisco and administered a battery of psychological tests. Goldstein concluded that DiFrisco was remorseful:
Mr. DiFrisco is, at times, preoccupied with the effects that his incarceration and his sentence have had upon his family, particularly his mother. He feels considerable guilt in not being available to help her, and at times, focuses on thoughts about her eventual death. Feelings of depression and remorse stem from his failure to take advantage of school and the effects drugs have had on his life. A considerable amount of remorse focuses on the killing of Edward Potcher: “I regrei^-taking a life.” While such responses may be interpreted as self-serving, the consistency of such responses through the interviews and in other records suggests the genuineness of such feelings.
The “other records” referred to by Goldstein include DiFrisco’s statement to the police upon his arrest, in which he spoke of his desire to “clean the slate” and his feeling “very sorry for killing” Potcher. Goldstein found DiFrisco’s past and present expressions of remorse to be consistent and summarized his findings on the question of DiFrisco’s remorse:
Mr. DiFrisco acknowledges the significant role that drugs played in this crime and he recognizes the impairments and poor judgment that existed in his thinking at the time of the crime. However, while he acknowledges these newly found insights, it is clear that Mr. DiFrisco does not offer them as an “excuse” for his conduct. Rather, he recognizes the wrongfulness of his act; his feelings of shame and remorse are readily apparent ... According to Mr. DiFrisco, “If not for drugs ... [I] would not have committed a murder; never.” The Petitioner was able to express empathy, stating “I have a family — I understand ... I did a terrible, terrible thing.”
*280In his report, Goldstein explained the significance of his findings about DiFrisco’s remorse in terms that would have been highly relevant to the jury’s deliberations. He would have testified that DiFrisco’s remorse and his insight into his past acts “significantly reduces the likelihood of future violent acting-out behavior.”
The mitigation specialist retained by PCR counsel, Jill Miller, reported, based on her own observations and on numerous interviews with DiFrisco and Sister Elizabeth Gnam, a Catholic nun who worked with DiFrisco in her capacity as Chaplain of the New Jersey State Prison, that DiFrisco was sincerely remorseful. According to Miller’s report, Sister Elizabeth:
[cjonfirmed that she met with Petitioner about once a week during the time that he was in CSU, and somewhat less frequently when he was in general population from the spring of 1990 to spring, 1993. Sr. Elizabeth stated that she has had many individual sessions with Anthony over the years. In addition, she has conducted religious services on his unit. She reported that' she always found Anthony to be very responsive, adding that he “Shared deeply and at length about the events of his life.” Sr. Elizabeth noted that Anthony has always appeared to relate well to others; his overall adjustment at the prison has been good.
Sr. Elizabeth reported that Anthony has talked with her about his actions in the offense. She believes that he is genuinely remorseful. Sr. Elizabeth stated that Anthony has grown more reflective over the years and has matured. He has reflected on his own actions, including his mistakes. She stated that, in contrast to many others she sees, Anthony has always accepted responsibility for his mistakes and clearly understands the wrongfulness of his actions.
Based on her own interactions with DiFrisco, Miller reported that, “[f]rom the time of the shooting forward, Anthony states that he knew he had done something terribly wrong. He felt guilty and remorseful.” Miller’s assessment of DiFrisco was consistent with Goldstein’s assessment:
Anthony’s actions in reporting to his parole agent high on drugs could be viewed as a cry for help, to be stopped. His confession to the commission of a homicide, in order to avoid being charged with auto theft, indicates a possibility of the need to relieve his guilt about his actions and take responsibility, possibly both. His cooperation with authorities in providing details of the offense, waiving extradition and pleading guilty are further indicators of remorse, understanding of wrongfulness, and acceptance of responsibility.
There are a number of indicators of positive rehabilitative potential present on Anthony’s part. Chief among these are the behaviors he displayed at the time of *281his arrest in New York in the spring of 1987, and continuing to the time of his plea in January, 1988. His confession, waiver of extradition, cooperation with authorities, and guilty plea all indicate an acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and an understanding of the wrongfulness of his actions. Anthony has not, at any time in interviews with this author, projected blame for his actions on anyone else. He stated, “I knew (immediately) 1 did something terribly wrong ... I’m responsible 100%.” He has exhibited a clear understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct, and appears genuinely remorseful regarding the death of Edward Potcher.
The PCR court specifically recognized “the significance of remorse as mitigation in capital cases” and then inexplicably found that defense counsel had acted reasonably in their presentation of remorse. That decision is insupportable. First, as noted above, no evidence of present remorse was adduced. Second, there was ample available proof of DiFrisco’s remorse that defense counsel overlooked. Third, the decision not to replace Silikovitz with a different psychological expert to present evidence of DiFrisco’s remorse was totally inexcusable. Presumably, a competent replacement would not have reached Silikovitz’s incorrect diagnosis that troubled Soto. It was thus unreasonable for counsel not to consult another expert. Indeed, the evidence adduced at the PCR hearing made clear that Soto’s failure to replace Silikovitz with another expert occurred simply because she ran out of time and did not comprehend the terrible consequences of her decision. Although both Soto and Lapidus testified that they knew they needed a remorse witness, Soto decided not to call Silikovitz when she became lead counsel approximately six weeks before trial. Indeed, the remorse case was so thin that the trial court nearly dismissed it.
Because defense counsel’s failure to present expert testimony on remorse cannot be viewed as the result of a strategic decision, it is not entitled to any deference whatsoever. See Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1295 (10th Cir.1998) (stating that where there is “no strategy, reasonable or otherwise, to explain” counsel’s performance, no deference is warranted); Baxter v. Thomas, 45 F.3d 1501, 1513 (11th Cir.1995)(noting that if counsel’s decision “was not tactical,” court must proceed to prejudice inquiry); Bey V, supra, 161 N.J. at 251-52, 736 A.2d 469 (“An inadequate investiga*282tion of the law or fact, however, dispels the presumption of competence that might otherwise arise from a strategic choice.”); Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 622, 577 A.2d 455 (where counsel’s failure to put on additional mitigating evidence does not reflect a reasonable decision that the client’s interests would not be served by that evidence, reasonable performance will not be presumed).
Upon rejecting Silikovitz, defense counsel had a duty to either obtain the testimony of another psychologist, or, at the very least, to direct their mitigation specialists to explore and later testify about DiFrisco’s remorse. Wallace, supra, 184 F.3d at 1117 (“ ‘A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about ... essential pieces of information going to the heart of the case for mitigation does not function as “counsel” under the Sixth Amendment.’”); Smith, supra, 189 F.3d at 1112 (“A lawyer who should have known but does not inform his expert witness about essential information going to the heart of the defendant’s ease for mitigation does not function as counsel, under the Sixth Amendment.”).
In failing to present evidence to support the two mitigating factors based on remorse, defense counsel’s actions were analogous to those of the attorney found to have been ineffective in Savage:
Although defense counsel presented five mitigating factors — two specifically linked to defendant’s mental state — he offered no expert testimony regarding defendant’s mental state. In developing his ease in mitigation, defense counsel failed to explore obvious sources of information regarding defendant’s background and mental state, directly relevant to those five mitigating factors____In sum, counsel provided the jury with little or no evidence to find any mitigating factor.
[Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 623-24, 577 A.2d 455.]
There really can be no serious dispute over whether defense counsel’s actions prejudiced DiFrisco. Numerous courts have recognized the unique significance of remorse at the penalty phase of a capital trial. See, e.g., Booker v. Dugger, 922 F.2d 633, 635-36 (11th Cir.1991) (noting that instruction that precluded jurors from considering evidence of defendant’s remorse not harmless); Russell v. Lynaugh, 892 F.2d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir.1989) (holding *283evidence that defendant was “capable of remorse” to be relevant “to the question of future dangerousness”); Delap v. Dugger, 890 F.2d 285, 305 (11th Cir.1989)(instruction precluding jury’s consideration of, inter alia, evidence of defendant’s remorse, not harmless); Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 893-94 (11th Cir.1987) (holding error not harmless where evidence of remorse was excluded from jury’s consideration); cf. United States v. Page, 2000 WL 343209, at *16 (N.D.Ill.2000) (additional mitigating evidence unlikely to change outcome of proceeding where defendant’s testimony “bespoke a lack of contrition or remorse”).
The majority’s contrary conclusion suffers from a number of fundamental flaws. The first is its notion that because DiFrisco’s crime was “calculating and brutal,” the remorse evidence would not have made a difference. That analysis ignores that the crime is the point of departure in a mitigation case, not the determinant. More importantly, it flies directly in the face of what social science and judicial decisions have taught us about the power of remorse to sway juries. For remorse to be an effective mitigator, a defendant is not required to be “good.” As the cases reveal, remorse has been considered ameliorative in situations involving brutality and cruelty that greatly exceeded DiFrisco’s.
The majority is also wrong to justify defense counsel’s failure to present evidence of DiFrisco’s remorse on the ground that the remorse evidence carried with it negative information about Di-Frisco. That determination not only belies our experience in capital jurisprudence, but also misconceives the Court’s role in a case like this. Indeed, it is the rare capital murder case that does not present two-edged evidence. In the absence of a reasonable strategic decision to justify its omission — which is not even alleged here — such evidence should be weighed by the jury.
In short, defense counsel’s failure to adduce evidence of DiFrisco’s remorse, not only “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, but also unquestionably affected the jury’s deliberations, thereby prejudicing DiFrisco under the standards of Mar*284shall III. See Williams, supra, 529 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. at 1515, 146 L.Ed.2d at 420 (stating that lower court’s determination that omitted mitigation evidence required reversal of death sentence appropriately “rested on his assessment of the totality of the omitted evidence”); Jermyn, supra, 266 F.3d at 309 (stating that defendant “can show prejudice in this case if there is a reasonable probability that the presentation of the specific and disturbing evidence of childhood abuse and neglect as a mitigating factor would have convinced one juror to find the mitigating factors to outweigh the single aggravating factor the Commonwealth relied upon in this case”).
Had the jury heard the evidence adduced on the PCR petition, all of which was indisputably available to trial counsel, it is likely that it would have found the existence of the two mitigating factors submitted to it regarding remorse. Given the importance of remorse, it is also likely that the jurors would have attributed significant weight to those factors. It cannot fairly be said, therefore, that defense counsel’s omissions were not reasonably probable to substantially affect the jury’s deliberations. See Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 623-24, 626, 577 A.2d 455 (holding that counsel’s failure to produce evidence of defendant’s diminished mental capacity, despite having submitted two mitigating factors to the jury “specifically linked to the defendant’s mental state” was prejudicial).
B. Cooperation
I am convinced as well that trial counsel’s failure to pursue DiFriseo’s cooperation with the state constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. By his confession, DiFrisco had already given himself up. The prosecutors wanted Franciotti. Although the State never offered a life sentence in exchange for DiFriseo’s testimony before the Grand Jury, he still had much to gain from cooperating. Specifically, given trial counsel’s plan to submit to the jury the mitigating factor that “the defendant rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder,” DiFrisco’s cooperation, if attest*285ed to by the State, would have increased the chances that additional jurors would have found the existence of that important mitigating factor, or that the jury would have given it greater weight.
There was little evidence to support the cooperation mitigating factor because, although the prosecutor made efforts to obtain DiFrisco’s cooperation, DeLuca steadfastly rejected those efforts unless death was taken off the table, and he led the prosecutor to believe that DiFrisco was not interested in cooperating in the absence of that condition. Even if DeLuca’s actions passed muster as a negotiating tool at the early stages of the case, at the point at which he and his successors reached the court house steps, their refusal to explore the issue in the absence of a “bargain” for a life sentence was clearly ineffective assistance of counsel.
Indeed, on the morning of trial when the prosecutor again sought cooperation but refused a life sentence, DiFrisco had absolutely nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by cooperating. As the report of David I. Brack explained, trial counsel’s failure to pursue cooperation at that point reflected “inexperience” in capital defense, because “even an unsuccessful proffer would have strengthened Mr. DiFrisco’s claim in mitigation that he had done everything possible to assist the state in prosecuting Mr. Franeiotti.” Had counsel been able to present to the jury additional evidence of cooperation, more than six jurors may have found the existence of that mitigating factor and accorded it significant weight.
In rejecting that claim, the PCR court incorrectly held that the record failed to support it, because “attorney DeLuca was not called to testify as a witness” at the PCR hearing. Of course, that ignored the uncontested evidence of DeLuca’s correspondence with the State establishing his inflexible position with respect to DiFrisco’s cooperation. More importantly, the PCR court ignored altogether that portion of the claim addressing DeLuea’s successors’ failure to pursue cooperation with the State even as they prepared for the penalty retrial.
*286It is true, as the majority points out, that DiFriseo stated that he did not want to be known as a “snitch.” However, that is a far cry from a refusal to cooperate. Notably no member of the defense team testified at the PCR hearing that DiFriseo, in fact, refused to cooperate, and his letter seeking removal of DeLuca as counsel specifically stated the contrary. The testimony at the hearing focused on DeLuca’s attitude. Nothing in the record eliminated the obligation of DiFrisco’s counsel to strongly advise his cooperation in order to enhance his mitigation case, especially because he had absolutely nothing to lose by agreeing to cooperate.
In ruling out cooperation with the State because the “bargain” of a life sentence had not been offered, defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
C. Cumulative Error
Even if none of the individual omissions of trial counsel standing alone was sufficiently grievous to require a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, when considered in the aggregate, the missteps in this case cumulatively cry out for a remedy. As noted, no evidence of remorse was adduced despite the fact that two remorse mitigators were before the jury. It is not surprising that the jury rejected them 12-0 and 11-1. Second, DiFrisco’s counsel refused to pursue cooperation with the prosecutor despite advancing a cooperation mitigator. Third, the defense team totally abdicated its responsibility to secure a competent psychological evaluation that not only could have affected the jury’s overall view of DiFrisco’s character, but also could have impacted the jury’s impression of whether his ability to exercise sound judgment was impaired, a notion eight of the jurors rejected. Without psychological evidence documenting DiFrisco’s emotional and neurological impairments, the chance of presenting a true picture of his relationship with Franciotti was radically diminished. Fourth, by substituting Albarus for Alfonso, in spite of her lack of factual knowledge, professional training, and credentials, DiFrisco’s entire *287mitigation investigation and presentation, as poor as it was, was essentially eviscerated.
Contrary to the conclusions of the PCR court, the evidence proffered at the PCR hearing was different in quality and quantity from the defense case presented at trial. Indeed, it is impossible to review the facts in this case without realizing that a persuasive case for life could have been advanced on behalf of DiFrisco but was not. Given that the jury found only a single aggravator, there is a more than reasonable probability that its deliberations would have been substantially affected by the wealth of mitigating evidence adduced at the PCR hearing but omitted due to cumulative error by defense counsel. That evidence clearly supported the narrative about DiFrisco that could have saved his life.
In reaching an opposite conclusion, both the PCR Court and the majority overstepped their bounds, weighing the PCR evidence instead of simply focusing on its nature and its potential to substantially affect the deliberative process. Had the lens been properly directed, there is no question but that a new penalty phase trial, at which the jury could be fully informed, should have been ordered.
IV
Finally, DiFrisco contends that the death penalty is unconstitutional. For the reasons I expressed in State v. Koskovich, 168 N.J. 448, 776 A.2d 144 (2001), and more recently in State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 803 A.2d 1074 (2002), I would revisit State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 174, 524 A.2d 188 (1987), in light of the changes in the public’s appetite for capital punishment that have developed in the fifteen years since it was decided. In my view,
It is time for this Court to reevaluate the state’s death penalty statute. We can no longer ignore the fact that the so-called justifications in favor of the death penalty have withered and that a consensus is growing — not only at home, but across the country and around the world — that the death penalty is unfair, unjust and incompatible with present standards of decency. In light of present day realities, Ramseur must be revisited and, in the interim, a moratorium must be imposed on the use of the extreme and irreversible sanction of death.
*288[Koskovick, supra, 168 N.J. at 581, 776 A.2d 144 (Long, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ].
V
Traditionally, we have prided ourselves on the quality of defense representation in capital cases in New Jersey. In a disappointing decision that undercuts the reliability of the capital jurisprudence over which we have labored, the majority today sanctions the imposition of the death penalty in a case in which defense counsel “entirely failed[ed] to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668. I cannot agree to such a conclusion and,, therefore, I dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices COLEMAN, VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA — 4.
For reversal — Justices STEIN, LONG and ZAZZALI — 3.

 The American Psychiatric Association defines Antisocial Personality Disorder as follows:
*254The essential feature of this disorder is a pattern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior beginning in childhood or early adolescence and continuing into adulthood. For this diagnosis to be given, the person must be at least 18 years of age and have a history of Conduct Disorder before age of 15.
Lying, stealing, truancy, vandalism, initiating fights, running away from home, and physical cruelty are typical childhood signs. In adulthood the antisocial pattern continues, and may include failure to honor financial obligations, to function as a responsible parent or to plan ahead, and an inability to sustain consistent work behavior. These people fail to conform to social norms and repeatedly perform antisocial acts that are grounds for arrest, such as destroying property, harassing others, stealing, and having an illegal occupation.
People with Antisocial Personality Disorder tend to be irritable and aggressive and to get repeatedly into physical fights and assaults, including spouse- or child-beating. Reckless behavior without regard to personal safety is common, as indicated by frequently driving while intoxicated or getting speeding tickets. Typically, these people are promiscuous (defined as never having sustained a monogamous relationship for more than a year). Finally, they generally have no remorse and the effects of their behavior on others; they may even feel justified in having hurt or mistreated others. After age 30, the more flagrantly antisocial behavior may diminish, particularly sexual promiscuity, fighting, and criminality.
[American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 342 (3d ed. Revised 1987) (DSM-III-R).]

 The American Psychiatric Association explains Adult Antisocial Behavior as follows:
This category can be used when the focus of attention or treatment is adult antisocial behavior that is apparently not due to a mental disorder, such as Conduct Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, or an Impulse Control *257Disorder. Examples include the behavior of some professional thieves, racketeers, or dealers in illegal psychoactive substances.
[DSM-III-R, 359.]

 As indicated above, Silikovitz relied upon the information that DiFrisco thought would be mitigating, because Silikovitz was unaware of the statutory mitigating factors at the time of his second meeting with DiFrisco.

 It is interesting to note that during pretrial motions, the prosecutor vigorously argued that Albarus was not a mitigation expert and, indeed, not an expert in anything.

 On Proportionality Review, this. Court relied-upon DiFrisco’s lack of remorse in determining the pool of offenders against whom his death sentence should be compared and, as a result, in refusing to find his death sentence to be disproportionate. State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 204, 662 A.2d 442 (1995).