Court Opinion

ID: 9790805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:59:49.36971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:31.748580
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
This case concerns the admissibility of parol evidence. The majority holds that the trial court’s conclusion that the lease agreement was not fully integrated is supported by the evidence. Then it decides that the alleged oral agreement was not inconsistent with the written agreement. Because the question of whether the oral agreement was *563inconsistent with the written agreement is a necessary prerequisite to the question of whether the agreement was integrated, and because the oral agreement is inconsistent with the written agreement, as a matter of law, I dissent.
In O’Meara v. Pritchett, 97 Or App 329, 335, 776 P2d 866, rev den 308 Or 465 (1989), we recognized that Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 216 (1979), “is intended to provide * * * one guide to determining whether an agreement is integrated.” (Emphasis in original.) Accord Carlton Creditors v. Willamette Production Credit, 103 Or App 569, 572 n 1, 798 P2d 700 (1990), rev den 311 Or 261 (1991). That section states:
“(1) Evidence of a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement an integrated agreement unless the court finds that the agreement was completely integrated.
“(2) An agreement is not completely integrated if the writing omits a consistent additional agreed term which is
“(a) agreed to for separate consideration, or
“(b) such a term as in the circumstances might naturally be omitted from the writing.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Under section 216(1), only a consistent additional term is admissible to supplement the terms of a partially integrated agreement. Because that is the only time when parol evidence may supplement a writing, parol evidence of an inconsistent term is not admissible to contradict the terms of that writing, even if that agreement is partially integrated.1 Moreover, under section 216(2), evidence of an inconsistent term cannot be used to prove that an agreement is only partially integrated, because the inconsistent term cannot be admitted to contradict the written agreement in any case. Consequently, after a court determines that an alleged prior or contemporaneous oral agreement is inconsistent with the written agreement, it is irrelevant whether the written agreement is completely or partially integrated.
*564We have said:
“[T]he Parol Evidence Rule applies only to completely integrated agreements and because, as a consequence of that, not even evidence of a consistent term could be admitted if the agreement is completely integrated, integration is the critical issue for our review. If the trial court was correct as to the extent of the integration, § 240 and testing the oral agreement for consistency or inconsistency have nothing to do with the case.” O’Meara v. Pritchett, supra, 97 Or App at 335. (Emphasis in original; emphasis supplied.)
The emphasized passage suggests that testing for consistency is necessary only if a court finds that an agreement is integrated. That cannot be correct. Determining whether an oral agreement is consistent or inconsistent with the written agreement must be a court’s first inquiry. If it finds that the alleged oral agreement is inconsistent, evidence is not admissible to contradict the terms of the written agreement, period!2 Moreover, it cannot be used to prove that an agreement is partially integrated, because, even if it is, the parol evidence could not contradict the writing. Nevertheless, the majority adheres, without reflection or reason, to O’Meara and concludes that the agreement was partially integrated before it trudges on to conclude that patently inconsistent terms are consistent.
To determine if a term of one agreement is or is not consistent with a term of another agreement, each agreement must first be interpreted on its own terms and then compared with the other. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court. Timberline Equip. v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or 639, 643, 576 P2d 1244 (1978).
The lease provides:
“16. SIGNS:
Tenant shall not erect or install any signs or advertising media or door lettering or placards visible from outside the leased premises without the previous written consent of the Landlord.”
*565Plaintiffs (tenants) claim that defendant (landlord) orally-agreed, before the lease was signed, that they could erect a freestanding sign. Both of those agreements are unambiguous. The written agreement provides that tenants cannot erect any sign without landlord’s prior written consent. The oral agreement provides that tenants can erect a freestanding sign.
Contract terms are inconsistent if they directly contradict each other. Hatley v. Stafford, 284 Or 523, 533, 588 P2d 603 (1978). The oral agreement that tenants can erect a freestanding sign directly contradicts the written agreement requiring landlord’s written consent for any sign. A freestanding sign is any sign. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the oral agreement is inconsistent with the written agreement, and the trial court erred in admitting the parol evidence of that oral agreement.
I dissent.

 That conclusion is consistent with Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 215 (1979):
‘ ‘ [W] here there is a binding agreement, either completely or partially integrated, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations is not admissible in evidence to contradict a term of the writing.”

 An inconsistent term might be admissible for some other purpose, such as to explain an ambiguity or to show fraud. See Restatement (Second) Contracts, § 214 (1979).