Court Opinion

ID: 9786244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:51:37.860724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:43.225633
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge:
Special Concur.
T1 I concur in Judge Arlene Johnson's well reasoned application of this Court's jurisprudence relating to the warrantless search of an automobile. I write separately to address further the history of this jurisprudence.
T2 The relationship between Article II, § 830 of the Oklahoma Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution was decided just two years after statehood. In DeGraff v. State, 1909 OK CR 82, 2 Okla.Crim. 519, 103 P. 588 this Court said:
This provision of our Constitution [Article II Section 80] is almost an exact copy of 'the fourth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which is as follows: "Article IV(80). The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." -It is true that the language is not in all respects the same in the two provisions; but the substance is identical. For a proper understanding of the question before us, it is important to find out what construction the United States courts have placed upon this provision.
108 P. at 541.
13 This was subsequently reaffirmed in Keith v. State, 30 Okla.Crim. 168, 171, 285 P. 631, 632 (1925) ("[slection 21 [of the Oklahoma Constitution] corresponds in substance with article 5 [of the federal constitution], and section 30 [of the Oklahoma Constitution] is identical with article 4, respectively, of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States"); Buxton v. State, 37 Okla.Crim. 402, 258 P. 814, 815 (1927) ("this court has followed the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing section 21 and 30 [of the Oklahoma Constitution]"); Layman v. Webb, 1960 OK CR 19, 1 24, 350 P.2d 328, 835 ("[tlherefore, for an answer to the problem we must determine whether in view of Sections 21 and 80, Art. II, Oklahoma Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of Rights, found as the 5th and 4th Amendments to the United States Constitution ...").
1 4 More recently in State v. McNeal, 2000 OK CR 18, 110, 6 P.3d 1055, this Court stated:
We have previously held that article II, section 30 of the Oklahoma Constitution *1147and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contain almost exactly the same wording, and in substance are identical. Years ago this Court recognized the close relation of the Oklahoma Constitution's Article II, § 30 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution when we stated "[this provision of our Constitution [Art. II, Section 30] is almost an exact copy of the fourth amendment of the Constitution of the United States...." Long v. State, 1985 OK CR 119, 16, 706 P.2d 915, 917 (quoting DeGraff v. State, 2 Okl. Cr. 519, 1083 P. 538 (1909)).
2000 OK CR 13, 1 10, 6 P.8d at 1057.
T5 In Long, this Court specifically rejected a request to apply a different standard to Article II, § 80 than the United States Supreme 'Court bad applied to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 1985 OK CR 119, ¶6, 706 P.2d 915, 917. See also my separate writing in Dennis v. State, 1999 OK CR 23, 990 P.2d 277, 287 (Lumpkin, V.P.J., concur in part/dissent in part).
T6 As these cases indicate, this Court has historically chosen to interpret Article II, § 30 the same as the Fourth Amendment.2 The majority correctly recognizes that this Court's independent interpretation of Oklahoma constitutional provisions is not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of similar federal provisions. However, when the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal constitutional provisions, similar to state constitutional provisions, is based on well-reasoned legal principles, this Court has appropriately chosen to follow that reasoning. That is very apparent in our jurisprudence regarding the warrantless search of an automobile, and we should honor the doctrine of stare decisis in applying it here.
T7 The "automobile exception" was first set forth in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 548 (1925). In determining under- what cireumstances a warrantless search of an automobile was permitted, the Court held that "the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported". Id., 267 U.S. at 155-56, 45 S.Ct. at 286. This Court thereafter held that a lawful search of an automobile may be made without a warrant where there is probable cause to believe that it contains that which by law is subject to seizure. See Merwin v. State, 1954 OK CR 111, ¶6, 277 P.2d 208, 210-11; Thompson v. State, 1968 OK CR 168, ¶ 14, 444 P.2d 849, 850; Gaston v. State, 1969 OK CR 208, ¶¶ 6-7, 457 P.2d 807, 808-09.
T8 In 1970, the Supreme Court decided that the existence of probable cause alone would not satisfy a warrantless search, that only when there are "exigent cireumstances" in addition to the existence of probable cause could an officer legitimately search an automobile without a warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 899 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). This Court subsequently adopted the probable cause plus exigent circumstances standard for warrantless searches of automobiles. See Lawson v. State, 1971 OK CR 184, 18, 484 P.2d 1837, 1339; Norton v. State, 1972 OK CR 261, ¶¶ 7-8, 501 P.2d 877, 879-80; Gonzales v. State, 1974 OK CR 183, ¶11, 525 P.2d 656, 658; Hughes v. State, 1976 OK CR 164, ¶¶6-8, 552 P.2d 1154, 1155-56, Whitehead v. State, 1976 OK CR 85, ¶4, 546 P.2d 278, 275-76; Blackburn v. State, 1978 OK CR 24, 122, 575 P.2d 688, 642; Phelps v. State, 1979 OK CR 76, ¶ 10, 598 P.2d 254, 257-58; Davis v. State, 1980 OK CR 114, ¶ 4, 620 P.2d 1346, 1847.
19 However, in 1982, the Supreme Court recognized that a separate exigency requirement was not necessary in the case of an automobile search and determined that probable cause alone was sufficient to support a warrantless search of an automobile. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. *11482157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). This has since been reaffirmed in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 185 LEd.2d 1081 (1996) (per curiam) and Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467, 119 S.Ct. 20183, 2014, 144 LEd.2d 442 (1999). This Court similarly determined that separate exigent cireumstances were not necessary and the warrantless search of an automobile was permitted on the basis of probable cause to believe that the instrumentalities or fruits of a crime were contained within. See Castleberry v. State, 1984 OK CR 30, ¶ 13, 678 P.2d 720, 724; Cole v. State, 1986 OK CR 150, ¶19-10, 728 P.2d 492, 494; Davis v. State, 1990 OK CR 20, ¶23, 792 P.2d 76, 84; Lozoya v. State, 1996 OK CR 55, ¶ 35, 982 P.2d 22, 83; State v. Paul, 2008 OK CR 1, ¶4, 62 P.3d 389, 390.
10 There are admittedly certain caveats to the above history. It has not always been clear in our opinions whether a particular case was decided strictly on Fourth Amendment grounds or on both Fourth Amendment and section 30 grounds. Further, our case history is somewhat inconsistent. For instance, after the Chambers decision, certain cases from this Court relied solely on Carroll and did not discuss the exigent circumstances requirement.3 And after Ross was decided we still had an occasion to require a finding of exigent cireumstances.4
{11 However, with the exception of a few cases, it is clear that it is well established law that this Court interprets Article II, § 80 of the state constitution the same as the Supreme Court interprets the Fourth Amendment of the federal constitution. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate and consistent with our jurisprudence to follow the Supreme Court's rulings in Dyson and Ross concerning the warrantless search of an automobile.
1 12 Further, practically speaking, it would be virtually unworkable to interpret Article II, § 80 any other way and expect the officer on the street to follow two differing federal and state standards in deciding whether he or she can legally search an automobile. Interpreting Article II, § 80 consistent with the Fourth Amendment sufficiently protects the rights of Oklahoma citizens. The Court's decision in this case does not mean that an officer can search any automobile merely because the driver has been pulled over for a traffic violation. The officer must bave additional probable cause to believe the automobile contains contraband or the fruits or in-strumentalities of a crime.
1 18 Therefore, I agree with the majority opinion that the warrantless search of an automobile is legally permissible based solely upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the instrumentalities or fruits of a crime are contained therein, and the existence of exigent cireumstances is not a consideration. I further agree that cases inconsistent with this opinion should be overruled.

. Although the issue in Long was suppression of the victims' in-court identifications, and not the warrantless search of an automobile, this Court's holding indicates an intent to interpret Article II, § 30 the same as the Fourth Amendment.

. See also, State v. Thomason, 1975 OK CR 148, 538 P.2d 1080, 1086 (art. II, § 21, does not grant broader protections than that embodied within the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution.)

. See Embree v. State, 1971 OK CR 298, ¶11, 488 P.2d 588, 592-93; Davis v. State, 1973 OK CR 416, ¶15, 514 P.2d 1195, 1198; Ferguson v. State, 1974 OK CR 50, ¶5, 520 P.2d 819, 820; Hutchinson v. State, 1977 OK CR 125, ¶15, 562 P.2d 867, 871; Gilreath v. State, 1981 OK CR 44, ¶ 6, 627 P.2d 443, 444.

. See Lucas v. State, 1985 OK CR 100, 1919-10, 704 P.2d 1141, 1143.