Court Opinion

ID: 9379027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 15:00:50.494124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.545574
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5017     Document: 010110825891      Date Filed: 03/14/2023   Page: 1
                                                                              FILED
                                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                            Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                    March 14, 2023

                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                             No. 22-5017
  v.

  GERARDO BENITEZ JIMENEZ, a/k/a
  Gerardo Martinez-Jimenez, a/k/a Francisco
  Romero-Marte, a/k/a Felipe Damien Ulloa,
  a/k/a Javier Romero, a/k/a Antonio
  Benetes, a/k/a Carlos Gonzales-Ulloa, a/k/a
  Damien Virgen-Perez, a/k/a Carlos
  Gonzalez-Ulloa, a/k/a Gerardo Benitez-
  Jimenez,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Oklahoma
                           (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00192-JFH-1)
                        _________________________________

 Kathleen Shen, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
 Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado for Defendant – Appellant.

 Thomas E. Duncombe, Assistant United States Attorney (Clinton J. Johnson, United States
 Attorney, with him on the brief), Tulsa, Oklahoma for Plaintiff – Appellee.
                         _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________
Appellate Case: 22-5017     Document: 010110825891         Date Filed: 03/14/2023     Page: 2

        A defendant’s right to allocution at sentencing is one of the oldest and most

 important principles in our legal system. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961);

 United States v. Jarvi, 537 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008). Allocution serves several

 critical functions in the sentencing process—it is a tool for providing information to the

 sentencing court, it encourages sentencing judges to show mercy in appropriate cases, and

 it strengthens the credibility of the criminal justice system by requiring sentencing judges

 “to personally engage” with those they sentence. United States v. Bustamante-Conchas,

 850 F.3d 1130, 1136 (10th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Thus, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) obligates district courts to “address the defendant in order to permit the

 defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.”

        Here, we consider whether a district court violates that rule when the judge stops

 short of “definitively announcing” a defendant’s sentence before allocution, but

 nonetheless implicitly limits the scope of allocution. Because reversing under such

 circumstances would represent an expansion of our existing precedents, a case on plain

 error review—such as this one—is not the appropriate occasion for us to broaden the

 application of our caselaw to new circumstances. Accordingly, we exercise jurisdiction

 under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM the district court’s judgment based on the standard

 of review.

                                              I.

        Defendant Gerardo Benitez Jimenez is a habitual violator of immigration law.

 Between 1995 and the incident that has brought him before us, Defendant has illegally

 entered the United States from his native Mexico and been returned there on nine previous

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 occasions.1 Despite this history, Defendant illegally returned to the United States yet again,

 and was convicted of heroin trafficking in Oklahoma state court. That conviction yielded

 an eight-year prison sentence, four of which were suspended. As a result of this charge,

 the Government discovered Defendant was present in the United States without status and

 issued an immigration detainer. Defendant completed his state sentence in April 2021 and

 was transferred to federal custody pursuant to his immigration detainer. The Government

 sought and obtained an indictment charging Defendant with one count of unlawfully

 reentering the United States as a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Defendant

 pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and the case proceeded to sentencing.

        The Probation Officer issued a presentence report (PSR) recommending an advisory

 guideline range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment based upon an offense level of 17 and a

 criminal history category of V. Defendant filed two motions for a downward departure

 and another motion for a downward variance, each of which the Government opposed. At

 sentencing, the district court first adopted the PSR without objection and denied

 Defendant’s motions for a downward departure.           The district court then considered

 Defendant’s motion for a downward variance. Defendant’s counsel informed the district

 judge he had nothing further to add to his previous arguments on the 3553(a) factors but

 noted that he did “know that [Defendant] would like to address the court.” The district

 judge responded that he would “give [Defendant] an opportunity to do that in a moment,”

 but then asked the Government if it had anything further to add on the subject. When the

 1
  Defendant has been removed from the United State on four occasions and voluntarily
 departed five other times.
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 Government indicated it did not wish to be heard, the district judge decided to rule on the

 motion for variance before affording Defendant the opportunity to allocute. The district

 judge explained that “[b]ased upon the information provided by the parties, I will not vary

 from the advisory guideline level as the factors fail to separate this defendant from the

 minerun [sic] of similarly situated defendants; therefore, defendant’s motion at docket

 number 38 is denied.” After making this statement, and explaining his rationale in greater

 detail, the district judge invited Defendant to allocute. Defendant apologized for his

 wrongdoing and promised he would not offend again. Apparently unpersuaded, the district

 judge sentenced Defendant to 57 months’ imprisonment—the maximum under the

 guideline range.

        On appeal, Defendant contends the district judge violated his right to allocution at

 sentencing. Defendant, however, failed to object to this alleged violation before the district

 court. Accordingly, we review Defendant’s claim only for plain error. Bustamante-

 Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1137. “To demonstrate plain error, a litigant must show: ‘(1) error,

 (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the

 fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States

 v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 691–92 (10th Cir. 2011)).

                                               II.

        We begin by discussing the right of allocution and briefly surveying some of our

 previous treatments of the issue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 “explicitly affords

 the defendant two rights.” Green, 365 U.S. at 304. First, a defendant has the right “to

 make a statement [o]n his own behalf” and second, a defendant has the right “to present

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 any information in mitigation of punishment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

 These rights are personal to the defendant and cannot be satisfied by the statements of

 counsel. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1136. Consistent with these principles and the

 right of allocution’s long history—dating back to the 17th Century—we have held that “the

 defendant has a broad right to ‘present any information to mitigate the sentence.’” Jarvi,

 537 F.3d at 1262 (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii)). Thus,

 our precedents cover a variety of scenarios where a district court violates the right of

 allocution.

        We start our survey with the clearest form of violation. As we recognized in

 Bustamante-Conchas, the right of allocution is obviously and indefensibly violated when

 the district court neglects it all together. We have never had difficulty concluding district

 courts commit reversible error—even under a plain error standard of review—when they

 fail to “personally address [the defendant] prior to imposing sentence or otherwise offer

 him an opportunity to allocute.” Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d at 1134, 1135.

        While a total denial of allocution serves as a clear, but perhaps extreme example of

 a violation of Rule 32, the right is also violated when the district court clearly limits the

 scope of material the defendant can discuss. For example, in Jarvi, we addressed a case

 where a district court refused to consider the defendant’s pro se motion objecting to the

 PSR and then ordered the defendant not to discuss the pro se motion, or any arguments

 based upon it, during allocution. 537 F.3d at 1258–59. We remanded the case for

 resentencing and held the district judge’s decision to expressly narrow the scope of matters

 available to the defendant for discussion during allocution violated Rule 32 and the right

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 of allocution. Id. at 1261–62, 1264. In so doing, we emphasized that defendants have the

 right to discuss any matter of their choosing during allocution. Id.

        Similarly, in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, we considered several potentially

 problematic statements that the district court made during sentencing. 669 F.3d 1148 (10th

 Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130. One of

 the court’s statements invited the defendant to allocute only on the issue of where within

 the guidelines range he ought to be sentenced. Id. at 1150, 1152. We concluded that

 statement satisfied the first two prongs of the plain error test because it “indicate[d] the

 court was not willing to listen to any statements or information [the defendant] might wish

 to offer in support of a sentence below the advisory Guidelines range.” Id. at 1152. We

 ultimately declined to remand the case, however, based upon an understanding of the third

 and fourth prongs of plain error that no longer applies. See id. at 1153–54; Bustamante-

 Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130.

        Perhaps most commonly, a district court violates the right of allocution when it

 “definitively announces” the sentence before it affords the defendant an opportunity to

 allocute. Our opinion in United States v. Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2010),

 illustrates this point. In that case, the district judge announced that “it is and will be the

 judgment of this Court that the defendant . . . is hereby committed to the custody of the

 Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term of 115 months” before it afforded the

 defendant an opportunity to allocute. Id. at 1265 (emphasis in original). In vacating and

 remanding the case for resentencing, we explained district courts must effectively

 communicate to defendants that they have “a meaningful opportunity to influence the

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 sentence” through allocution. Id. at 1266 (quoting United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443,

 450 (7th Cir. 2007)). When district courts speak at sentencing with “highly conclusive

 language,” the district court can ensure “the right of allocution is fulfilled only if the court

 communicates that it will ‘genuinely reconsider the sentence in light of the elicited

 statement.’” Id. (quoting Luepke, 495 F.3d at 448). Accordingly, we cautioned district

 courts against “definitively announcing” sentences before allowing defendants to allocute

 and we reminded them that “a sentencing court undermines its own legitimacy when it

 invites a defendant to speak only after making clear that his sentence is a foregone

 conclusion.” Id. at 1267, 1268 (citation omitted).

        But this does not mean the right of allocution is completely unfettered. Instead, our

 cases also show some restrictions or limitations on the right of allocution do not constitute

 reversible error. For instance, a district court does not err when it announces its “intention”

 to impose a particular sentence on a defendant. Mendoza-Lopez is instructive here. In that

 case (in addition to the statements previously discussed) the district court informed the

 defendant of its “intention to sentence within th[e] Guideline range” recommended in the

 PSR before he had the opportunity to allocute. Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1150 (internal

 quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the defendant argued this statement ran afoul of

 Landeros-Lopez’s prohibition on “definitively announcing” sentences before allocution.

 See id. at 1150–52. We rejected that argument. Instead, we held “mere statement[s] of

 intention” were not “conclusive like those made in Landeros-Lopez” and that district courts

 could announce their intention to sentence a defendant in a particular manner without

 violating the right of allocution. Id. at 1152.

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        Likewise, in United States v. Valdez-Aguirre, we held that a district court had not

 erred by “interspersing some comments suggesting that the announced sentence was

 tentative with other comments suggesting finality” prior to allocution. 861 F.3d 1164,

 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2017). In reaching this holding, we concluded that because the

 district court made “statements suggesting tentativeness” and because “the court ultimately

 offered the defendant a chance to allocute before the announcement of a ‘final sentence,’”

 reversal under a plain error standard was not justified. Id. at 1170 (citation omitted).

        In sum, we have recognized several instances where a district court violates a

 defendant’s right to allocution. The common thread between those violations is clear or

 overt action by the district court. Under our controlling precedents, a violation of Rule 32

 must be a total denial of allocution, an express limitation on allocution, or definitive

 statement of the sentence to be imposed for us to deem it reversible under plain error

 review.

                                              III.

        Defendant essentially raises two arguments on appeal. First, he claims the district

 court violated his right to allocute when it announced its ruling on his motion for variance

 by stating “I will not vary from the advisory guideline level as the factors fail to separate

 this defendant from the minerun [sic] of similarly situated defendants.” See Appellant’s

 Br. at 8–9. The main thrust of this argument is that this statement “definitively announced”

 the sentence before Defendant’s allocution. See id. Second, Defendant intimates an

 additional, related theory of error within the context of his first argument: He argues the

 district court’s statement “clearly communicated to [him] that he would receive a guideline

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 sentence, thereby denying [him] the meaningful opportunity to argue for a variant sentence

 below the guidelines in his allocution.” Id. at 10. In other words, Defendant contends the

 district court’s statement implicitly limited the scope of allocution by conveying to him

 that it would be futile to argue for a sentence below the guideline range during his

 allocution. We address each of these theories in turn.

                                              A.

        We first consider Defendant’s contention that the district court’s statement

 “definitively announced” his sentence before he had the opportunity to allocute. Defendant

 believes the district court’s use of the words “I will not vary from the advisory guideline

 level” definitively informed him that he would receive a guideline sentence and therefore

 violated Rule 32 and his right to allocution. Id. at 9 (emphasis in original). We disagree.

        Defendant’s argument misunderstands our prohibition on district courts

 “definitively announcing” sentences before defendants allocute. Defendant premises his

 argument on the notion that a district court’s use of definitive language before allocution

 is sufficient to establish a rule 32 violation. Id. at 8–10. Our precedents make clear,

 however, that a district court’s “definitive announcement” of a sentence is only reversible

 for plain error when it clearly and unambiguously communicates to the defendant the

 specific sentence he will receive before allocution.

        Take Landeros-Lopez—the case where we first used the phrase “definitively

 announc[e]”—for example. 615 F.3d at 1268. In that instance, we took issue with the

 district court’s pre-allocution statement “it is and will be the sentence of this Court that

 Defendant . . . is hereby committed to be imprisoned for a term of 115 months” because

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  “[t]he court’s conclusive statements effectively communicated to [the defendant] that his

  sentence had already been determined” before he had a chance to speak. Landeros-Lopez,

  615 F.3d at 1265, 1268 (emphasis in original). Simply put, the district court’s language

  was both definitive, demonstrating that it had made up its mind about the sentence, and

  clearly conveyed a specific sentence—115 months’ incarceration—to the defendant. The

  district court’s conduct therefore qualified as a “definitive announcement” of sentence

  before allocution.

         Likewise, United States v. Slinkard—the other allocution opinion we issue today—

  also tracks this principle.    In Slinkard, the district court clearly communicated its

  unwillingness to vary from the guideline range before it invited the defendant to allocute

  by stating:

         Based upon the information provided by the parties, I will not vary from the
         advisory guideline level as the factors fail to separate this defendant from the
         minerun [sic] of similarly situated defendants. The court finds that this
         defendant is a repeated and dangerous sex offender. There is no way in good
         conscience that I could ever allow this defendant to be among the public or
         near any child.

  Slip Op. at 2–3. At first glance, this may appear similar to the district court’s conduct here.

  Slinkard, however, contains a key distinguishing fact that explains the difference in

  outcomes between the two cases: The sentencing guideline range in Slinkard contained

  only one possible sentence—life imprisonment. Id. Thus, the district court’s decision to

  use definitive language to communicate to the defendant that he would receive a guideline

  range sentence also clearly and unambiguously communicated to the defendant the specific

  sentence he would receive before allocution. Id. at 6–10.

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           We therefore ask the following question to resolve this issue: Did the district court

  clearly and unambiguously communicate the specific sentence it would impose to

  Defendant when it ruled on his motion for variance before his allocution? The answer to

  this question is clearly no. Unlike Landeros-Lopez, the district court did not specifically

  announce the number of months Defendant would serve in prison before he allocuted.

  Similarly, unlike Slinkard, the district court’s statement “I will not vary from the advisory

  guideline level as the factors fail to separate this defendant from the minerun [sic] of

  similarly situated defendants”—issued while denying Defendant’s motion for variance—

  at most conveyed to Defendant that he would be sentenced somewhere within a guideline

  range that contained more than one possible sentence. In this case, the applicable guideline

  range called for an eleven-month range within which Defendant could be sentenced.

  Accordingly, even if the district court’s statement clearly conveyed to Defendant that he

  would receive a guideline range sentence—a fact we assume without deciding for the

  purposes of this analysis—it does not amount to the clear and unambiguous enunciation of

  a specific sentence. Therefore, the district court’s statement cannot constitute a “definitive

  announcement” of sentence in violation of Rule 32 under our precedents and is not plain

  error.

                                                B.

           Now that we have disposed of Defendant’s first—and primary—contention, we can

  proceed to the related question of whether the district court’s statement impermissibly

  limited the scope of Defendant’s allocution. Defendant asserts that he was denied “the

  meaningful opportunity to argue for a variant sentence below the guidelines in his

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  allocution” because the district court had already made clear that he would receive a

  sentence within the guideline range. Appellant’s Br. at 10.

         This theory of error fundamentally depends on the inferences Defendant may have

  drawn from the district court’s statement “I will not vary from the advisory guideline level

  as the factors fail to separate this defendant from the minerun [sic] of similarly situated

  defendants; therefore, defendant’s motion at docket number 38 is denied.” We have

  previously acknowledged the utility of considering the possible inferences a defendant

  could draw from the district court’s statements at sentencing when considering possible

  allocution violations. See Valdez-Aguirre, 861 F.3d at 1168–69. Based on Defendant’s

  framing of the issue, we are concerned with two possible inferences from the district court’s

  conduct. First, Defendant could conclude that the district court’s statement precluded him

  from arguing for a variant sentence entirely. Second, Defendant could also conclude that

  he could not revisit the arguments raised in his motion during allocution.

         As a threshold matter, we think sufficient support exists in the record to conclude

  that the district court’s statement at least implicitly limited the scope of Defendant’s

  allocution. We specifically note that Defendant did not seek a variant sentence during his

  allocution and that Defendant’s counsel acknowledged “the court’s ruling regarding the

  motions for departure and variance” and sought a sentence at “the low end of the guidelines

  [range]” immediately following Defendant’s allocution. Thus, we think it reasonable to

  conclude the district court’s statements may have discouraged Defendant from fully

  exercising his right to allocution. For this reason, along with those we address in our

  discussion of our cases below, we will assume without deciding that Defendant can satisfy

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  the error prong of plain error review. Nevertheless, as we will also explain below,

  Defendant cannot show that any such error was plain.

           We begin our analysis by noting that the first inference finds some support in

  Mendoza-Lopez. Specifically, there is a certain degree of conceptual overlap between the

  statement at issue here and the district court’s statement in Mendoza-Lopez inviting that

  defendant to allocute on “where within [the Guidelines] range this Court should sentence”

  because both statements convey, to varying degrees, that “the court was not willing to listen

  to any statements or information [the defendant] might wish to offer in support of a

  sentence below the advisory Guidelines range.” 669 F.3d at 1152 (first alteration in

  original). Nonetheless, an error is plain only when it is “contrary to well-settled law”—

  that is, it either runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s precedents or our own. United States v.

  Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The statement we

  consider here falls well below this standard. In contrast to the district court’s statement in

  this case, the district court in Mendoza-Lopez affirmatively and expressly limited the scope

  of the defendant’s allocution because it instructed him to only discuss where within the

  guideline range he should be sentenced. 669 F.3d at 1152. Mendoza-Lopez never went as

  far as to hold it was plain error for a district court to convey the same message implicitly.

  Thus, even if Defendant inferred that the district court’s denial of his motion for variance

  precluded him from arguing for a variant sentence, the fact that the district court did not

  affirmatively prohibit him from doing so means there is no plain error under Mendoza-

  Lopez.

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         Similarly, we can compare the second inference to the facts of Jarvi, where the

  district court expressly limited the scope of allocution by ordering the defendant to not

  discuss his pro se motion objecting to the PSR. 537 F.3d at 1258–59, 1261–62. Again,

  Jarvi did not address the issue of a district court limiting the scope of allocution by

  implication. And in this case, the district court did not expressly inform Defendant that he

  could not discuss the arguments he presented in his motion for variance during his

  allocution. Because neither cases nor those of the Supreme Court have held that implicit

  limitations on allocution are reversible, we cannot conclude that the district court’s

  statement here constitutes plain error.

                                              IV.

         In sum, we conclude the district court did not plainly err during Defendant’s

  sentencing proceedings. We note for future reference, however, that district courts would

  be well-advised to affirmatively inform defendants of the court’s willingness to consider

  any argument they wish to present during allocution.2 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii);

  Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1266. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

  2
    Sentencing is one of the most difficult tasks district judges perform. While each judge
  has their own style of sentencing, they are nevertheless obligated to ensure that they adhere
  to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the precedents
  governing sentencing. Judges will hopefully err on the side of explaining a defendant’s
  right to allocution clearly and indicate their willingness to consider whatever they have to
  say in good faith.
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