Court Opinion

ID: 9607818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:02:16.813913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:40.569471
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring in the opinion of HUNTLEY, Justice, as to Part I of the majority opinion, but dissenting from Part II.
To better understand why Justice Huntley’s views are correct, I submit that Uniroyal has been less than precise in seeking a remittitur from both Mr. Vannoy and Mrs. Vannoy. Otherwise stated, Uniroyal’s own confusion without doubt confused the trial court, and the majority of this Court may prefer to remain confused rather than examine the record.
In its opening brief, Uniroyal states as Issue No. 5:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to reduce the verdict awarded to Nadine Vannoy, or in failing to order a new trial?
Under section V of its points and authorities it states:
The award of damages to Nadine Vannoy is unsupported by the evidence.
Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575. Papp v. Cantrell, 96 Idaho 751, 536 P.2d 746. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978).
In its argument, p. 41, it states: “Uniroyal moved, at the conclusion of the trial, for remittitur or new trial upon the basis that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence and was based upon passion or prejudice. R., Vol. I, p. 241.” Uniroyal’s post-judgment motions were double-barreled, as use of the word “and” indicates:
Defendant Uniroyal moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the interest of justice, for an Order of Remittitur, reducing the jury verdict of damages to accurately reflect the Plaintiffs’ damages.
In the alternative to both foregoing Motions, Defendant moves this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rules 59(a)(1), (3), (5), (6) and (7) for an Order granting a new trial. Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial is based upon the following specific errors which occurred during the course of this case:
(3) Rule 59(a)(5) — The verdict of the jury as to damages is grossly excessive and unreasonable under the evidence, and was the result of and given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(4) Rule 59(a)(6) — The verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The verdict is contrary to law. Some of the reasons the verdict is contrary to the evidence or law are as follows:
(g) The evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding damages was speculative and based upon conjecture.
(h) No evidence was presented by Plaintiff regarding damages sustained by Nadine Vannoy.
(i) The verdict of the jury grossly exceeded any evidence of Plaintiffs damages and was based upon passion or prejudice.
R., Vol. I, p. 242-245 (emphasis added).
Uniroyal submitted no supporting brief to the trial court. The following is the sum total of Uniroyal’s oral argument directed at obtaining a remittitur of the damages awarded to both plaintiffs, Jerry Vannoy and Nadine Vannoy. Uniroyal argued this much and no more:
We’ve also brought, pursuant to Rule 59(a)(5), a motion fo,r remittitur. As this Court is aware, the jury awarded Jerry Vannoy $224,688.43. The jury awarded Nadine Vannoy $74,895.81.
*548With respect to the evidence presented by Mr. Vannoy, he did, in fact, break his arm, there was evidence his arm had been broken, and that he had lost some work, and that his arm was not fully healed. However, there was also evidence that the arm was still in the healing process, that he’s currently working, has a job, he now has a better job than he’s ever held before, that he’s lifting and using his arm, and we feel that the verdict rendered by the jury of $225,000, approximately, although it may not be enough to suggest, it may not be enough to justify a finding that it was, in fact, based on prejudice or passion, is sheerly speculation and that, the Court should grant the remittitur.
With respect to the award to Nadine Vannoy, as you recall she only testified for a few moments on the stand, didn’t put any evidence on as to her injury or her loss, only that she said Jerry periodically rubs his arm. We feel that a remittitur is absolutely essential in this case, should the judgment notwithstanding, or a new trial not be granted. Under case law the Court may weigh the evidence, and if the Court decides the jury verdict is great enough to suggest, not prove but to suggest that the jury acted improperly, it may order a remittitur.
Counsel for the plaintiffs, in his memorandum in opposition to our motion for remittitur, has listed numerous cases. We ask the Court to ignore those, to stay with the court cases, what it heard as the basis, not the hearsay statements of other publications. We would urge the Court here, as in the Van Kommen vs. Weyerhauser to grant the remittitur.
Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 704-05.
The foregoing argument is contained in four short paragraphs, the first and fourth of which are but informative. The second paragraph — addressing the claim for a remittitur of Jerry Vannoy’s damage award (a claim which would not be pursued on the appeal) — contains the only mention of passion or prejudice. Closely read it is a concession, if not absolute at least tantamount to being one, that the scant evidence recited “may not be enough to suggest, it may not be enough to justify a finding that it [the special verdict setting the figure of $225,000] was in fact based on passion or prejudice.”
The second paragraph, addressing the jury’s finding of damages sustained by Nadine Vannoy — the claim or issue brought to us on appeal, argues not passion or prejudice, but that she had not “put any evidence on as to her injury or her loss,” because of which lack of evidence, “the Court may weigh the evidence,” and, if believing the jury acted improperly, may reduce the damages.
Counsel apparently forgot that he had attacked plaintiff’s damages under both Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6), and made it far less than clear at oral argument whether he wanted the trial court to weigh Nadine Vannoy’s damages under Rule 59(a)(5) or (a)(6). It is not surprising then that the trial court, in ruling on the motions, was of the view that Uniroyal wanted it to reduce the award to Nadine Vannoy to that amount which he thought was sustained by all of the evidence. That the judge did so is evident by an order which makes no mention of Rule 59(a)(5) or of Dinneen. R., Vol. I, p. 259. That order was drawn by counsel for Uniroyal. R., Vol. I, p. 259.
Accordingly, there is much to what Justice Huntley states as to the issue of Nadine Vannoy’s damages. For certain the majority in their discussion of this issue is as guilty here of inattentive reading of the record as it is in ignoring that the primary issue — comparative responsibility under the 1980 Products Liability Reform Act — which it addresses comes up on denial of a motion for new trial — a motion the denial of which was absolutely mandated, assuming that the Court meant what it said recently in Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby and Mason, 98 Idaho 432, 566 P.2d 381 (1977).1

. A unanimous decision. Sitting on that case from today’s majority were Chief Justice Donaldson and Justice Bakes.