Court Opinion

ID: 9759465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:17:21.214681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.943455
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
A summary judgment is appropriate only when there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56.03. In the case at bar, there is indeed a dispute as to the facts. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that there was no question as to his status as & trespasser. If an owner acquiesces to a particular use of his property, such acquiescence is tantamount to the owner’s implied consent for the person to use the property.
Habitual or customary use of property for a particular purpose, without objection from the owner or occupant, may give rise to an implication of consent to such use to the extent that the users have the status of licensees, where such habitual use or custom has existed to the knowledge of the owner or occupant and has been accepted or acquiesced in by him.
Bradford v. Clifton, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 249, 250 (1964).
Appellant contends that he was not a trespasser, but that he had an implied invitation to play in the field and on the tower. He claims the appellee knew of the children playing there and made no attempts to stop it, thus inviting his actions.
Appellant should be given the opportunity to develop the facts that may prove he was not a trespasser. If successful, he would no longer fit into the strict confines of KRS 381.232, and he would indeed be able to seek compensation for his injuries. Granting him the opportunity to prove he was not a trespasser does not guarantee recovery, for he must further prove liability. Nevertheless, it is certainly preferable to slamming the courthouse door in his face and never allowing him the chance to try.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.