Court Opinion

ID: 9381780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 19:02:31.090747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.514875
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/23/23 P. v. Cole CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     B316819

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No. BA492587)
           v.

 GERALD COLE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed.
      Robert L. Hernandez under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Susan S.
Pithey, Assistant Attorneys General, Steven D. Matthews and
Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

                            _____________________________
        A jury convicted Appellant Gerald Cole of first degree
residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459; count 1),1 criminal threats
(§ 422, subd. (a); count 2), and contempt of court (§ 166, subd.
(c)(1); count 3). The trial court sentenced Appellant to the upper
term of six years on count 1, and eight months (one-third the
middle term) on count 2. The court imposed a concurrent one-
year term on count 3. On appeal, Appellant argues that he was
entitled to a jury instruction of the lesser included offense of
attempted criminal threat. Appellant further argues that the
case must be remanded for resentencing due to a change in the
law governing determinate sentencing. We affirm both the
conviction and sentence.
                           BACKGROUND
A.      Prior Incidents of Domestic Violence Between
        Appellant and Fae
        Appellant and his wife Fae A. were married for
approximately eight years and had three children. Over that
period of time, there were several instances of domestic violence
between them. The first occurred about a month after they met,
where Appellant slammed Fae into a bed, choked her, and
punched her in the face. Fae stayed with Appellant after that
because Appellant apologized to her.
        A few years later into their marriage, in 2014, another
domestic violence incident took place after they had both
consumed alcohol at a family birthday party. Fae testified that
Appellant was calling her offensive names and then he struck her

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
in the chest, causing her to fall. When Fae got up, she began
hitting Appellant, and they then proceeded to hit each other. Fae
ran outside, but the fighting continued. The fighting stopped
when the neighbors came out. Appellant denies that he hit or
pushed Fae that day.
       On New Year’s Day 2020, Appellant and Fae were at a bus
stop and began arguing. Appellant called Fae a “bitch” and
“whore” in front of their children. Appellant believed that Fae
had been cheating on him with another man. As Appellant
moved closer and closer to Fae, he pushed her in the head. Fae
then hit him, and they both started fighting. Eventually,
someone separated them, and the fighting stopped. Fae had
some scratches on her face, and Appellant was bleeding from his
mouth. Appellant denied striking Fae during this incident and
said she was the sole aggressor. Fae flagged down a passing
police officer. After the police interviewed Appellant and Fae, the
police officer decided to arrest Fae, but no charges were pressed.
       Appellant and Fae separated after the bus stop incident.
Sometime in March 2020, they resumed their relationship but did
not live together.
       Sometime in July 2020, Appellant was living with his
brother when another violent incident took place between
Appellant and Fae. Appellant, who had been drinking, told Fae
he wanted nothing to do with her and told her to leave. When
Fae tried to leave, Appellant prevented her from taking any
belongings that he had personally purchased. Appellant began
kicking Fae and grabbed onto her bag as she attempted to run
out into the street. Once outside, Appellant struck Fae, knocking
her to the ground. He continued punching her after she was
down for several more minutes.

                                3
      Sometime after this incident, Appellant was served with a
protective order requiring him to stay away from Fae. By
November 2020, Fae ended her relationship with Appellant.
B.    January 11, 2021 Incidents at Issue in This Case
      On January 10, 2021, Appellant called Fae asking to sleep
with her. When Fae said “No,” Appellant became angry and
threatened to kill Fae. At the time, Fae did not take the threat
seriously and hung up the phone.
      After that, Appellant continued to call back, asking to get
back together with Fae. Each time, she told him “No.” Finally,
Fae stopped answering the phone.
      The next day, Fae noticed that she had tens of missed calls
and a voice message from Appellant. The voice message said,
“Fae, man, if I can’t have you . . . ain’t nobody gonna have you,
Fae.” After hearing the voice message, Fae was afraid because
she thought maybe Appellant was serious about killing her.
However, she did not call the police at that time.
      Later that afternoon, Fae heard someone trying to break in
through the window in her apartment. Fae ran outside and went
to the next-door neighbor’s house. Fae called 911 and said she
did not see who broke in but assumed it might be a male. Fae did
not tell the 911 operator that she thought it might have been
Appellant trying to break in. At trial, Fae testified that because
of Appellant’s prior threats, she feared it was Appellant breaking
in.
      When the police arrived, one officer saw a man exiting a
broken window of the building. The officer told the man to stop,
but the man ran toward the back of the building. Another officer
went to the rear of the building and saw Appellant on the

                                4
opposite side of a five-foot wall. Appellant was then arrested.
During trial, Fae testified that she was still afraid of Appellant.
       C.    Relevant Procedural History
       Appellant was charged with three crimes. In count 1,
Appellant was charged with first degree residential burglary with
a person present (§ 459), a serious and violent felony within the
meanings of sections 1192.7, subdivision (c), and 667.5,
subdivision (c). In count 2, Appellant was charged with making a
criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)). Finally, in count 3, Appellant
was charged with misdemeanor contempt of court (§ 166, subd.
(c)(1)). On November 10, 2021, a jury convicted Appellant of all
three charged crimes.
       Appellant was sentenced on November 18, 2021. The court
sentenced Appellant to a total of six years and eight months
consisting of: the upper term of six years for count 1; eight
months (one-third the midterm of two years) on count 2, to run
consecutively to count 1; and 364 days on count 3, to run
concurrent with count 1. Appellant received credit for 235 days
(204 actual plus 15 percent conduct credit).
       Appellant timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     The Trial Court Had a Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct
       on Lesser Included Offenses and Defense Counsel
       Did Not Invite Any Error
       Because an attempted criminal threat is a lesser included
offense of a criminal threat (See People v. Toledo (2001)
26 Cal.4th 221, 230–232 (Toledo); In re Sylvester C. (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 601, 607), the trial court had a duty to instruct
the jury sua sponte on the lesser included offense of attempted
criminal threats if there was substantial evidence from which a

                                5
jury could reasonably conclude the defendant committed the
lesser, uncharged offense, but not the greater. (See People v.
Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 29; People v. Birks (1998)
19 Cal.4th 108, 118 [“even absent a request, and even over the
parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser
offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is
substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser”];
see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162
(Breverman) [trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on
all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial
support in the evidence].) Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive. (People v. Williams (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1244, 1263.)
       Further, the invited error doctrine does not apply here
when there is no evidence that defense counsel made a “tactical
decision to force the jury to an all-or-nothing choice.” (People v.
Walker (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 111, 118 (Walker).) “The trial
court’s duty to fully and correctly instruct the jury on the basic
principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence in a
criminal case is so important that it cannot be nullified by
defense counsel’s negligent or mistaken failure to object to an
erroneous instruction or the failure to request an appropriate
instruction.” (People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 229.) An
express tactical objection is required before a failure to instruct
on a lesser included offense may be found to have been “invited.”
(People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 335, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)
       Here, the record is silent as to whether defense counsel
thought about an attempted criminal threat instruction at all, let
alone made a tactical choice about whether to request it. (See

                                  6
Walker, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 118.) When the court said it
did not believe there were any lesser included offenses, defense
counsel only addressed whether an attempted burglary
instruction should be given: “No, it’s up to the jury to decide
what they decide was his reason for going in. So . . . I am not
asking for a lesser.” Accordingly, we find no invited error.
       On appeal, we review the trial court’s failure to instruct on
a lesser included offense de novo, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014)
222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.) The erroneous failure to instruct
sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is not
subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record
establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the
outcome. In other words, we apply the People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson) standard of prejudice. (Breverman,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165.)
II.    Even Assuming the Trial Court Failed to Instruct on
       Attempted Criminal Threat, Any Error Was Harmless
       “In order to prove a violation of section 422, the prosecution
must establish all of the following: (1) that the defendant
‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in
death or great bodily injury to another person’; (2) that the
defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the
statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent
of actually carrying it out’; (3) that the threat . . . was ‘on its face
and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey
to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate
prospect of execution of the threat’; (4) that the threat actually
caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or

                                   7
her own safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety’; and
(5) that the threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
circumstances.” (Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 227–228; see
also § 422.)
       Sustained fear, the fourth element of a criminal threat,
“requires proof of a mental element in the victim” (People v.
Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156 (Allen)) and “has a
subjective and an objective component.” (In re Ricky T. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1140.) “A victim must actually be in
sustained fear, and the sustained fear must also be reasonable
under the circumstances.” (Ibid.) “ ‘Sustained fear’ refers to a
state of mind,” and “describes the emotion the victim
experiences.” (People v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349
(Fierro).) Within the meaning of section 422, “sustained” means
“a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.” (Allen, at p. 1156.) However, no set time
frame exists for a victim to be in a statutorily sufficient state of
“sustained fear.” (Id. at p. 1156, fn. 6.) For example, case law
qualifies a victim’s fear as sufficiently “sustained” within the
meaning of section 422 when the fear lasts anywhere between
one and 15 minutes. (See Fierro, at p. 1349 [one minute
sufficient to qualify as sustained fear when a defendant threatens
to kill a victim with a visible weapon]; Allen, at p. 1156 [15
minutes sufficient to qualify as sustained fear].) In addition, a
“victim’s knowledge of defendant’s prior conduct is relevant in
establishing that the victim was in a state of sustained fear.”
(Allen, at p. 1156; but see In re Ricky T., at p. 1138 [a victim’s
lack of history with defendant paired with victim’s one-day delay
in calling police evidenced a fear that was merely fleeting].)

                                 8
       An attempted criminal threat is a lesser included crime of a
criminal threat. (People v. Chandler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 508, 514
(Chandler); Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 226.) “ ‘[I]f a
defendant . . . acting with the requisite intent, makes a sufficient
threat that is received and understood by the threatened person,
but, for whatever reason, the threat does not actually cause the
threatened person to be in sustained fear for his or her safety
even though, under the circumstances, that person reasonably
could have been placed in such fear, the defendant properly may
be found to have committed the offense of attempted criminal
threat.’ ” (Chandler, at p. 515.)
       We need not reach whether there was substantial evidence
to warrant the lesser included instruction of attempted criminal
threat because we conclude any error was harmless. “[E]vidence
sufficient to warrant an instruction on a lesser included offense
does not necessarily amount to evidence sufficient to create a
reasonable probability of a different outcome had the instruction
been given.” (People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1161,
disapproved on another point in People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th
363, 391, fn. 3.) We agree with the Attorney General that after
examining the entire record, we cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found Appellant
guilty of attempted criminal threat, rather than the completed
crime of criminal threat. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 165.)
       “[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to
instruct . . . on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof
which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for
prejudice exclusively under Watson.” (Breverman, supra,
19 Cal.4th at p. 178.) “Such posttrial review focuses not on what

                                 9
a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have
done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making
that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other
things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is
so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different
outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected
the result.” (Id. at p. 177.) “ ‘ “The Supreme Court [in Watson]
has emphasized ‘that a “probability” in this context does not
mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more
than an abstract possibility.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Brown (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 140, 155.) “ ‘[U]nder Watson, a defendant must
show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would
have been obtained absent the error.’ ” (People v. Beltran (2013)
56 Cal.4th 935, 955.)
       To find Appellant guilty of the lesser offense of attempted
criminal threat based on the theory that Fae did not experience
sustained fear, the jury would have had to reach a set of
conclusions about the evidence that, taken together, do not
appear reasonably probable. “[W]hen a defendant is charged
with attempted criminal threat, the jury must be instructed that
the offense requires not only that the defendant have an intent to
threaten but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained
fear.” (Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 525.) The jury would
have had to conclude that, even given Appellant’s abusive history
with Fae, Fae did not in fact experience sustained fear as a result
of the intended threat, despite her testimony that she felt afraid
when she received the second threat. (See Allen, supra, 33
Cal.App.4th at p. 1156 [“victim’s knowledge of defendant’s prior

                                10
conduct is relevant in establishing that the victim was in a state
of sustained fear”].) In addition, Fae testified that she fled from
her home later that same day when she heard noises at her
window consistent with a break-in because she feared that her
husband was attempting to get into her home. Fae then called
911 from her neighbor’s home. (See Fierro, supra,
180 Cal.App.4th a pp. 1345–1346 [holding that person who drove
away and called 911 after defendant exposed a weapon was in
sustained fear].) Further, Fae’s fear was borne out as her
husband did break into her home that afternoon. Finally, Fae
further testified that her fear persisted to the time of trial.
        The jury resolved the factual question regarding Fae’s
credibility against Appellant in convicting him of the criminal
threats, necessarily rejecting Appellant’s version of the events.
(See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690 [“erroneous
failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is not prejudicial if
‘it is possible to determine that . . . the factual question posed by
the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the
defendant under other, properly given instructions’ ”].) Having
credited Fae’s testimony about the underlying events, it is not
reasonably probable that the jury would then conclude Fae was
lying when she testified that she was afraid after hearing the
voice message, and testified that she feared it might be her
husband who was coming through the window of her apartment.
As such, Appellant’s contention that her fear of Appellant did not
continue when she heard the break-in is unavailing.
        Accordingly, any error was harmless.
III. Appellant is Not Entitled to be Resentenced
        Appellant contends a remand for resentencing is necessary
due to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg.

                                  11
Sess.) (SB 567), which took effect on January 1, 2022, and
amended the standards for imposing an upper-term sentence
under section 1170, subdivision (b). The Attorney General agrees
this amendment applies retroactively to Appellant. (See, e.g.,
People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109 (Zabelle)
[“section 1170’s current statutory language applies retroactively
in all nonfinal cases”].) The Attorney General, however, argues
that because the trial court relied on Appellant’s prior criminal
history to impose the upper term, remand is not required. We
conclude a remand for resentencing is unnecessary.
       “Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b), to
specify that, when a sentencing court chooses a term from a
statutory triad, the chosen term shall not exceed the middle term,
unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are
(1) established by the defendant’s stipulation to them, (2) proven
to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a reasonable
doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding
Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3), by amendment.)” (People v.
Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 44–45.)
       When imposing the upper term of six years on the count 1
burglary conviction, the trial court applied the pre-Senate Bill
567 version of section 1170, subdivision (b). In selecting the
upper term, the court found several aggravating factors set forth
in California Rules of Court, rule 4.4212 applied and found no
mitigating factors. The court first considered factors relating to
the crime as set forth in rule 4.421(a) and (c): Appellant made

2    All further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

                                12
death threats to the victim; the police recovered a box cutter from
Appellant’s clothing when he was arrested; Fae was particularly
vulnerable with young children and there was an approximate
age difference of 30 years; there were numerous prior acts of
domestic violence perpetrated by Appellant on Fae, but noted
that “in fairness, the victim testified, as did the defendant,
concerning an act of domestic violence that the victim
perpetrated on the defendant”; and the violence between them
was escalating, as Appellant violated a restraining order by
breaking into her home.
       The court then found aggravating factors relating to
Appellant set forth in rule 4.421(b) and again found no mitigating
factors applied. The court stated that “defendant’s prior
conviction in Texas [subjects] him, according to the defendant, to
many years in state prison if he were to violate parole” and
Appellant had suffered other prior convictions; Appellant served
prior prison time; Appellant was on parole at the time he
committed the offenses in this case; and Appellant’s prior
performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory “so the
court does not believe that probation would be appropriate to
protect the public, to protect the victim or to sufficiently address
the conduct in this matter.”
       The Courts of Appeal are divided on the applicable
standard for assessing prejudice in this situation and the issue is
pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Lynch (May 27,
2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022,
S274942.) The primary disagreement is between People v.
Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495 (Flores), a decision by Division
Three of the First District Court of Appeal, and People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez), a decision by Division

                                13
One of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. Flores concluded a
remand for resentencing is unnecessary if the reviewing court
can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found true at least one aggravating factor (Flores, at
pp. 500–501), and Lopez concluded a remand is necessary unless
the reviewing court can (1) determine beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have found true all the aggravating factors
the trial court cited, or (2) conclude, “to the degree required
by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836,” that the trial
court would have reached the same decision even if it knew it
could not properly rely on all the factors it did (Lopez, at p. 467,
fn. 11).
       Division Two of the First District Court of Appeal has
agreed with Lopez (People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962,
982, review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275942), and Division Six of
the Second District Court of Appeal has agreed with Flores
(People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 453, 465, 458, 462,
review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275788). The Third District Court
of Appeal and Fifth District Court of Appeal have articulated
other standards. The Third District essentially agreed
with Lopez, stating that “[its] approach and the Lopez court’s
approach are the same in terms of outcomes,” but described the
standard differently. (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.)
The Fifth District concluded that since the type of error at issue
has both federal constitutional and state law dimensions, “the
correct standard for harmless error lies between the standards
articulated in Flores and Lopez,” a standard we discuss below.
(People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 408–409 (Dunn),
review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275655.)

                                14
       We agree with the majority of courts to address the issue
that, contrary to Flores, “a reviewing court finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found a single
aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt is insufficient
to conclude that the error was harmless.” (Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 408.)
       Dunn described the standard for assessing prejudice as
follows: “The reviewing court determines . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found one
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt” and
whether “there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not
have found the remaining aggravating circumstance true beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 408–
410.)
       If all aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial
court would have been proved to the respective standards, any
error was harmless. “If not, the reviewing court moves to the
second step of Lopez, (2) whether there is a reasonable probability
that the trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the
upper term in light of the aggravating circumstances provable
from the record as determined in the prior steps. If the answer is
no, the error was harmless. If the answer is yes, the reviewing
court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing . . . .”
(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 410.)
       As to the crime-based aggravating factor in rule 4.421(a)(1),
Appellant concedes on appeal that the crime committed by
Appellant involving a threat of death is permissible because the
jury convicted Appellant of both burglary and making a criminal
threat. Because section 422 requires (1) that the defendant
“willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in

                                15
death or great bodily injury to another person,” the underlying
facts of this element were found true beyond a reasonable doubt
by the jury. Thus, there was no error under this factor post-SB
567. (Id., subd. (a).)
       Further, Appellant’s own admissions supported the court’s
consideration of two prior convictions. Appellant admitted
during his testimony to his Texas felony conviction and his
misdemeanor theft conviction. Appellant also concedes on appeal
that the trial court properly considered Appellant’s prior
conviction in Texas. Thus, to the extent the trial court made its
sentencing decision based on the aggravating circumstances set
forth in rule 4.421(b), no error appears.
       “Accordingly, we need not determine beyond a reasonable
doubt whether the jury would have found any one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 410.)
       Because the remaining crime-based factors were neither
established by stipulation nor submitted to a jury to find true
beyond a reasonable doubt, “[w]e must next determine whether
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have
found the remaining aggravating circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 410.)
       Appellant takes issue with the court’s finding under rule
4.421(a)(2) that he was armed with or used a weapon at the time
of the commission of the crime. However, Appellant admitted
during his testimony that he was in possession of a box cutter
and concedes on appeal that a box cutter can be used as a
weapon. Appellant testified that he only had the box cutter to cut
open “blunts” to insert marijuana into the tobacco before
smoking. Even crediting Appellant’s testimony that a box cutter

                               16
has other uses, it is a sharp blade that he had readily available to
him. In addition, he had the box cutter as he was breaking into
Fae’s home after making a death threat to her hours earlier.
Finally, the history of domestic abuse is further reason to
conclude that he was armed given that he was carrying this
blade. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that the jury if asked,
would not have found true beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was armed with a weapon.
       Under rule 4.421(a)(3), the court then found that “in this
situation the victim was particularly vulnerable with young
children that she was caring for.” We agree with Appellant that
this conclusion is not supported by the evidence. At the time of
the burglary, Fae stated that she was home alone. Indeed, at the
time of the incident in this case, custody of Fae’s children had
been taken away from her. The court also noted the 30-year age
difference between Fae and Appellant. But at the time of the
trial, Fae was 34 years old. Given that her relationship with
Appellant lasted eight years, she was approximately 26 years old
when she began her relationship with Appellant. As such, Fae
was not a child or underage. “The record, [thus] does not reflect
such a clear-cut instance of victim vulnerability that we
confidently can conclude the jury would have made the same
findings, as might be the case if, for example, the victim[] had
been elderly, very young, or disabled, or otherwise obviously and
indisputably vulnerable.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th
825, 842.) It is therefore reasonably probable that the jury would
not have found true beyond a reasonable doubt that Fae was
particularly vulnerable.
       Under rule 4.421(c), a court may consider “[a]ny other
factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or

                                17
which reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances
under which the crime was committed.” (Ibid.) The court
considered the prior incidents of violence between Appellant and
Fae. Appellant admitted in his testimony to physically or
verbally abusing Fae on all but one occasion. There was also
photographic evidence of Fae’s injuries. Appellant also admitted
to knowing Fae had a restraining order against him at the time of
the burglary. Further, the jury likely took these prior incidents
into consideration when it convicted Appellant of making a
criminal threat as part of its analysis of whether Fae’s fear was
reasonable. (In re Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140
[“A victim must actually be in sustained fear, and the sustained
fear must also be reasonable under the circumstances”].) As
such, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would not have
found true beyond a reasonable doubt these additional factors.
       Lastly, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have found facts underlying
Appellant’s probation and parole violations, as well as his
additional convictions that he did not stipulate to, true beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because a probation report is not a certified
record of conviction, the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions
and probation violations needed to be submitted to a jury. (See
Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [“[T]he People are
mistaken in their assertion that defendant’s probation report is a
certified record of conviction”].) The record is devoid of any other
evidence as to these factors, aside from a probation report.
(See Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1115, fn. 6 [“If the
record is insufficient to support a trial court’s findings about a
defendant’s criminal history, we will not presume the existence of
extrarecord materials, however likely they are to exist, to address

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this insufficiency”].) Accordingly, it is reasonably probable that
the jury would not have found true beyond a reasonable doubt
the foregoing factors.
       Because we cannot conclude that all the aggravating
circumstances relied upon by the trial court “would have been
proved to the respective standards,” the second step in Dunn asks
us to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that
the trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the
upper term. (Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.)
Given that all the aggravating circumstances would have been
proven or were stipulated by Appellant, except for some of his
criminal history outlined above and whether Fae was particularly
vulnerable, we hold that it is not reasonably probable that the
trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the upper
term. As discussed above, the remaining permissible factors
include: that the crime involved a threat of death; Appellant was
armed with a box cutter at the time of the commission of the
crime; Appellant perpetrated numerous prior acts of domestic
violence on Fae; at the time of the crimes at issue, Fae had a
restraining order against Appellant; and Appellant had a prior
felony conviction in Texas and a theft conviction in California.
Accordingly, any error was harmless.

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                        DISPOSITION
     Appellant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

                                        VIRAMONTES, J.
We Concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             WILEY, J.

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