Court Opinion

ID: 9480472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:48:59.027333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:42.694230
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to express concern over the majority’s apparent conclusion that 20 C.F.R. § 404.354(b) is not a reasonable interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). I disagree with this conclusion, but because of the peculiar circumstances of this case, I join in a remand for the limited purpose of determining whether plaintiff can inherit under the 1987 amendment to the Texas probate code. See Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § 42(b) (Vernon 1988).
Congress has placed upon the Secretary the responsibility of interpreting and administering the complex package of legislation dealing with health and welfare which is embodied in the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Section 205(a) of the Act provides:
The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.
42 U.S.C. § 405(a). The Secretary must balance difficult and sensitive interests in making decisions which affect benefits and impact upon the lives of claimants and beneficiaries, both young and old. Conceding that the regulation relied upon by the Secretary “obviously serves an interest in administrative efficiency,” I would add that it serves important interests of logical consistency, certainty, and prompt determination of rights, not only of those who claim to be illegitimate children, but also of those who are legitimate family members of deceased wage earners.
Section 216(h)(2)(A) of the Act states in relevant part:
In determining whether an applicant is the child ... of a fully or currently insured individual ..., the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ... by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death....
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A). In making a determination that Amanda DeSonier was not the child of Russell Phillis, the AU applied 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 which provides in pertinent part:
To decide your relationship to the insured ... [i]f the insured is deceased, we look to the laws that were in effect at the time the insured worker died in the State where the insured had his or her permanent home.... The State laws we use are the ones the courts would use to decide whether you could inherit a child’s share of the insured’s personal *236property if he or she were to die without leaving a will.
20 C.F.R. § 404.354(b) (1988) (emphasis added). In accordance with the regulation at issue, the Secretary applied the laws of Texas in effect at the time of Mr. Phillis’ death to determine that Amanda DeSonier was not entitled to benefits.1 The Secretary also considered whether Amanda could inherit under the laws of Texas in effect at the time of the filing of her claim.
Retroactive application of Texas law would not usually be mandated. The law of the domiciliary state in effect at time of death generally controls who inherits and to what extent there is inheritance. Statutes of descent and distribution typically are not to be construed retrospectively unless such construction is plainly intended by the legislature. See generally 26A C.J.S. Descent & Distribution § 6. The interpretation given by the Secretary in this case was in accord with the usual rule of inheritance and descent. See Schaefer ex rel. Schaefer v. Heckler, 792 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir.1986).
After Phillis’ death and almost a year after the filing of the claim in September of 1986, Texas amended its law of intestate succession adding an additional method by which illegitimates can inherit from their father.2 See Tex.Prob.Code Ann. § 42(b) (Vernon Supp.1988). The real issue in this case is whether the AU should have considered the 1987 amendment in determining plaintiff’s right to inherit. Prior to the 1987 amendment, Texas provided three ways for illegitimate children to inherit from their father. See Henson v. Jarmon, 758 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex.Ct.App.1988).
In Henson, the Texas Court of Appeals discussed the impact of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977)3, and in Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 106 S.Ct. 2234, 90 L.Ed.2d 858 (1986), on the retroactive application of the 1987 amendment to the Texas probate code. The court stated that Reed “held that the illegitimate’s claim to a share in her father’s estate was protected by the full applicability of its earlier decision in Trimble, regardless of when the decedent died or when the illegitimate’s claim was filed.” Henson, 758 S.W.2d at 370. The court in Henson, therefore, held that Reed mandated the retrospective application of the 1987 amendment, which provides a fourth way by which an illegitimate can inherit from his or her father.
Even if we were to apply the principle of Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1982), it would not necessarily avail plaintiff here a different result. Cox set the law of the state at the time of application on behalf of the illegitimate as the appropriate controlling time. This court, at least by dictum, may have adopted this standard in Childress v. Secretary, H.H.S., 679 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.1982); however, the Cox rationale has been rejected in Morales v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.1987), which applied an equivalent standard to the one adopted by the Secretary in regulation 20 C.F.R. § 404.354(b). See also Gonzales v. Harris, 514 F.Supp. 995, 996 (E.D.Cal.1981); Allen v. Califano, 452 F.Supp. 205, 209 (D.Md.1978). I agree with the principles expressed in Morales,4 which did not reject the validity and reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpretation of the applicable law.
I would REMAND for the express purpose of affording the Secretary an opportunity to consider whether plaintiff has made this fourth showing as mandated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Reed. I would also AFFIRM the action of the Sec*237retary and the district court. I also would confirm that regulation § 404.354(b) (1988) is in the usual case, absent the peculiar circumstances evident here, a reasonable interpretation of the statute in controversy.

. I agree with the Secretary’s decision that under Ohio law Denise DeSonier, Amanda’s mother, was not the common law wife of Phillis, nor was there any valid union recognized by the laws of Ohio where they resided together for some period of time.

. The amended statute provides that a child can prove his paternal heirship by demonstrating that he or she is the biological child of the deceased.

. Henson noted that the 1977 Trimble decision determined only that the “1976 version of section 42 of the Texas Probate Code was unconstitutional.” 758 S.W.2d at 370.

. I do not understand Jones v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 924 (4th Cir.1983) to be contrary to Morales.