Court Opinion

ID: 9791540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:13:24.03592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.813152
License: Public Domain

ERWIN, Justice,
with whom CONNOR, Justice, joins (dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion on the ground that the exclusion of all hut a small percentage of the military from the reapportionment plan’s population base violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Alaska Constitutions.1
In Egan v. Hammond,2 this court recognized that military personnel as a class cannot be denied the right to vote in a state election or be arbitrarily eliminated from the population base in a reapportionment plan solely because of their military status, although some military may be excluded as a permissible device for limiting the impact of transients and non-residents. One plan suggested in Egan for achieving this goal was to limit the population base to state citizens by adopting a registered voter base, even though such a base inherently eliminates a much higher proportion of the military than civilians. But, as we were careful to point out, the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, and presumably the Alaska Constitution, require specific factual justification for eliminating any portion of the military from the population base. When a particular class of the state’s population — namely the military — is singled out in a reapportionment plan for exclusion on the basis of the nature of their employment alone, the burden is squarely upon the proponents of the plan to demonstrate the reasonableness of that course of action, because such an exclusion is prima facie invalid. In the absence of sufficient justification, the military must receive the same treatment as their civilian counterparts.3
My examination of the record reveals that appellees clearly failed to justify application of any version of the Washington formula in Alaska. I thus cannot agree with the majority’s assumption that the basic principle of the formula is as applicable to Alaska as it was to Washington. On the contrary, I find the majority’s acceptance of the formula without sufficient proof of its validity in Alaska to be remarkable in itself, for in upholding many other aspects of the proposed reapportionment plan the majority has repeatedly emphasized Alaska’s uniqueness.4
I also cannot accept the Board’s tolerance of civilian transients while at the same time excluding apparent military transients from the population base. As we indicated in Egan v. Hammond, population bases grounded upon state citizenship are acceptable only when supported by accurate and statistically reliable data for discriminating between citizens and transients.5 In this case, the Board’s assumption that military but not civilian transients would distort the population base is without foundation or justification in *884the record. And the majority’s effort to justify the Board’s tolerance toward civilian transients with documentation on Alaska’s employment patterns which is not part of the record is patently inconsistent with their earlier conclusion that the duty of this court is to exercise de novo jurisdiction based “upon the record developed in the superior court.” 6
In fact, the record is almost completely devoid of data on civilian transients. For example, there is little, if any, support for the majority’s observation that at the time of year when the census was taken — April —most of the civilian transient elements were absent from the population base. Without concrete data it cannot be merely assumed that migrants and seasonal employees are not present in the state in significant numbers during the month of April, for it is common knowledge that an increasing number of transients are present in Alaska during the winter months. It also cannot be assumed that because the census counts a person at the place “he lives and sleeps most of the time” most of the civilian transients are necessarily excluded from Alaska’s population base. As the majority itself points out, the census enumerates not only those migrants who claim ties to no other state but also those individuals who maintain a permanent residence elsewhere and spend a majority of their time in Alaska. Yet the record reveals that the Board made no effort to determine the impact of these transient groups upon the population base. Surely these transients have no greater contacts with the state than military residents who live here on a year-around basis and whose children attend local schools.7
The majority attempts to justify the inclusion of these transient groups in the population base by concluding that it would be a “herculean task” to determine who among them actually consider themselves citizens of Alaska. Again the record fails to support the majority. The record reveals that Robert Sharp, City Manager of Anchorage, testified before the Board that it cost the City only $40,000 in 1968 to conduct a door-to-door canvass of the entire Anchorage area, which has approximately 65 per cent of Alaska’s population.8 Assuming this to be a fair measure of the cost of surveying the incidence of state citizenship among civilians, it becomes apparent that such a survey would hardly be a “herculean task.” Even if it were, however, the greater difficulty of determining the incidence of state citizenship among the civilian population is a weak excuse for singling out the military for discriminatory treatment.9
The majority goes on to assert that the dissent “ignores the fundamental reason for the exclusion of military personnel— their want of any contact with the state.” In support of this cold assertion they cite to a body of law which, in short, indicates only .that the involuntary nature of military assignments points toward retention of the domicile established prior to entering the service. They also cite to a federal statute exempting servicemen from various forms of state taxation and then sum*885marily conclude that as a result of this law and the “economics of military life, a serviceman and his family may remain completely aloof from the state of his assignment . . .
This argument is unpersuasive for three basic reasons. One, it ignores the location of the burden of proof; two, it indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the economic facts of military life; and three, it ignores the fact that the same argument can be made with regard to other classes of federal public servants who serve in Alaska for limited terms but were not excluded from the population base.
First, it is not disputed that a serviceman has an option to remain economically aloof from the state of his assignment, neither contributing to its treasury nor utilizing its services. But the burden nevertheless remains squarely upon the state to establish that each and every military person excluded from the population base in a reapportionment plan has in fact exercised this option. By silently condoning the state’s failure to meet this burden, the majority is overruling our holding in Egan v. Hammond respecting the burden of proof on the military exclusion issue.
Second, no doubt the “economics of military life” — which presumably refers to the tax exempt status of servicemen and the bonuses offered nondomiciliaries stationed in Alaska' — are largely responsible for the failure of many military personnel stationed in Alaska to publicly admit domicile by registering to vote. But what the majority fails to discern is that an unwillingness to register to vote is not conclusive of a serviceman’s intentions or desire to become a state citizen. All that it demonstrates is a perfectly expectable reluctance, even on the part of bona fide military residents, to risk losing significant economic advantages by registering to vote. The “economics of military life” indicate not that the military lack “any contact with the state beyond mere presence” but rather only that the military, both resident and nonresident, are subjected to unique economic pressures to which civilians are not exposed. Forcing military residents to withstand these pressures at the cost of surrendering their fundamental right to be included within the population base effectively penalizes them for exercising constitutional rights.10
Third, the same argument regarding minimum contacts with the state that the majority makes with respect to the military also applies to a body of federal public servants who serve for limited terms in Alaska and enjoy many of the same trappings and benefits as the military. Yet the majority ignores the fact that no attempt was made to exclude them from the population base. Certain employees of the federal Public Health Service and the Coast and Geodetic Survey, who enjoy military rank similar to Coast Guard rank, are assigned to Alaska for limited terms of duty, as are certain employees of the Federal Aviation Administration and the Army Corps of Engineers. Certainly these groups should be treated on a par with the military if the military are to be subjected to a state citizenship test.
The majority goes on to point out that the “largest claim” to representation of the military in the population base lies in the 25-30 per cent of military personnel and their dependents who at the time of the 1970 census had lived in the state for more than five years. They then note that the *886present plan includes a far larger percentage — 65 per cent — of the military and their dependents than the 25-30 per cent that would be included if a 5-year residency were taken to be conclusive of state citizenship. The majority then observes that the opponents of the military exclusion formula have failed to argue for a higher inclusion figure than 25-30 per cent and imply that the formula is valid because, while it does not provide statistical certainty, it is more than generous to the military.11
Again the majority has lost focus of the location of the burden of proof. The burden is not upon the opponents of the plan to argue for a higher inclusion figure but upon the proponents to justify exclusion of any military. Even if it were to the contrary, however, the conclusion that the formula is valid because it resolves doubts in favor of increased military representation does not justify adoption of a formula which discriminates between military and civilian transients. The fact remains that the formula does not accurately reflect residency among the military. It is thus contrary to all notions of fairness and equal protection to utilize it in the reapportionment plan.
I also cannot accept the majority’s assumption that voter registration can be taken as an indication of a person’s state citizenship in Alaska. In the Hawaii reapportionment plan litigated in Burns v. Richardson,12 the state’s registered voters were accepted as a permissible population base only because this base purportedly produced a distribution of legislators not unlike that which would have resulted from the use of a more conventional population base such as state citizenship or total population. This correlation was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that Hawaii exerted a monumental reapportionment and voter registration effort.13 The Court in Burns was quick to point out, however, that, even though it was accepting a voter registration base in Hawaii, it considered such a population base generally suspect:
Such a basis depends not only upon criteria such as govern state citizenship, but also upon the extent of political activity of those eligible to register and vote. Each is thus susceptible to improper influences by which those in political power might be able to perpetuate under-representation of groups constitutionally entitled to participate in the electoral process ... 14
Thus, at the very least, a voter registration base must be shown to correlate with state citizenship, total population, or some other permissible reapportionment base.
The record amply demonstrates that no such showing has been made in this case. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence that voter registration does not correlate with state citizenship or total population. For example, Alaska alone among the northern states was singled out by the 1965 federal Voting Rights Act15 as a state that possibly abridges the rights of its citizens to vote because of the low percentage of votes cast by its eligible voters.16 Although Alaska has since rid itself of that dubious status by a declaratory judgment, that judgment remains reviewable.17
*887Also, it is not uncommon for a particular segment of Alaska’s citizens to exhibit a reluctance to register to vote. For example, statistics compiled from the 1970 census and the 1972 official primary and general election returns reveal that a very low percentage of Alaska’s large aboriginal population registers to vote, although they are undeniably state citizens.18 Without a showing that the military do not exhibit a similar reluctance to register, even though they are citizens, voter registration behavior alone cannot be used to estimate the number of state citizens among the military.
Further, Burns v. Richardson,19 which recognized that if voter registration is indicative of state citizenship, it may be used as a reapportionment base, was decided before the United States Supreme Court and this court began to move toward de-empha-sizing the role of state citizenship in the election process. The recent decisions of Dunn v. Blumstein20 and State v. Van Dort,21 which disapprove of durational residency requirements conditioning the right of franchise, severely restrict the use of objective state citizenship tests in determining voter eligibility. And State v. Adams22 goes even further to suggest that no objective test for state citizenship which inherently infringes upon a fundamental right — e. g., franchise — should be permitted to condition the exercise of that right. Even more importantly, however, these cases squarely place the burden upon the proponent of such a test to demonstrate a compelling justification for it. While I am not persuaded that the compelling state interest standard should be applied to reapportionment, I believe that these cases nevertheless place a heavy burden of persuasion upon the proponents of any reapportionment plan based upon a state citizenship test to demonstrate that the test in fact excludes only non-citizens from exercising their fundamental right of franchise. In this case the proponents have quite clearly failed to meet this burden for they have established no reliable correlation between voter registration and state citizenship. I would thus hold that voter registration has not been demonstrated to be a sufficiently reliable population base for a reapportionment plan in Alaska and remand the case to the Board to change the population base.
Both this case and Egan v. Hammond pointedly illustrate the perils of expedited litigation. Twice within the space of two years this court has been called upon at the eleventh hour to review reapportionment plans under the pressures of an imminent election. And twice these pressures have forced us to make decisions on the basis of records which, in my opinion, have been inadequate. I, for one, hesitate to reach a decision on an issue as far-reaching and important as reapportionment without an adequate record. Were it not for the fact that small numerical variations in the apportionment of people between the election districts are greatly magnified by Alaska’s comparatively- small population, I would not be so insistent that the record provide adequate justification for each attempt by the Board to depart from the constitutionally mandated goal of mathematical equality. But since a variation of only 68 people causes a one per cent variation in the population of each election district in Alaska, great care must be taken to assure that the exclusion of each and every person from the population base is constitutionally permitted. If any reapportionment case reaches us in the future with an inadequate record like the present one, I will vote to remand the case for further findings.
*888OPINION
ON OBJECTION TO THE REVISED REDISTRICTING PLAN PROCLAIMED ON JUNE 14, 1974
BOOCHEVER, Justice.
On June 6, 1974, we remanded this case to enable the governor of the State of Alaska to resubmit the reapportionment plan to the Advisory Reapportionment Board for the purpose of revising it to bring the population of districts specified in our order within federal constitutional standards. In the event a revised plan was submitted on or before June 20, 1974, written comments or objections were to be filed by 12:00 noon on June 24, 1974. The Advisory Reapportionment Board submit • ted to the governor of the State of Alaska its Proposed Revised Plan of Reapportionment and Redistricting which the governor adopted by proclamation on June 14, 1974. Objections were filed by the appellants. In addition, a notice of objection and a motion for leave to intervene as a party or to file an amicus curiae brief was also filed by the Kenai Peninsula Borough. After denying the Kenai Peninsula Borough motion to intervene but granting the Borough the right to file a memorandum as amicus curiae, the court, upon request for oral argument on the objections, specially heard such arguments on June 26. Counsel for the Borough was permitted to participate in the oral arguments.
The objections filed by the appellants pertained to the redistricting of the Anchorage area, the termination of Anchorage senate terms and the exclusion of some military personnel from the population base. None of these objections was addressed to the revisions set forth in the revised plan proclaimed by the governor on June 14, 1974.1 The objections reiterated and amplified arguments previously advanced against the original reapportionment plan of December 11, 1973. We have again carefully considered those objections and find no reason to alter our opinion with reference to the issues raised.
The Kenai Peninsula Borough objected to the portion of the revised plan which severed the southern end of the Kenai Peninsula from the Borough, the peninsula and House District No. 13 (Kenai-Cook Inlet) and joined it to House District No. 16 (Bristol Bay) in order to achieve a less-than-five-percent deviation in House District No. 16. The area transferred to District No. 16 comprised about 680 residents or slightly more than ten percent of the entire population of District No. 16, most of which is located across sea and mountains from the Kenai Peninsula area. The Borough points out that the residents of the Kenai area so transferred had interests similar to those of other residents of the Kenai-Cook Inlet District No. 13 and little in common with the residents of House District No. 16 (Bristol Bay). The Borough argues that the residents of the severed portion of House District No. 13 would be disenfranchised because their influence would not be of sufficient weight to receive attention from Bristol Bay District Legislators.
We found in our order of June 6, 1974 that District No. 16 exceeded constitutionally permissible population variances as delineated by decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and that the state had failed to demonstrate that the variance was based on ligitimate considerations incident to the implementation or rational state poli*889cy. We stated in out opinion partially rejecting the original plan:
No valid reasons were advanced for the 10.9 percent overrepresentation with reference to House District 16 (Bristol Bay). We can agree with the Board’s decision not to combine the Bristol Bay area with the Aleutian Chain because of conflicts between the residents of the two areas, but that does not explain why other areas could not have been added to the district so as to create less of a variance.
The Reapportionment Board has made a good faith effort to correct the overrepre-sentation of House District No. 16 by adding to the district the southern end of the Kenai Peninsula. Considerations incident to the implementation of rational state policy have now been advanced to us justifying the original overrepresentation of District No. 16 (Bristol Bay). It is now apparent that the only alternative to the Board’s original districting of that area is to disregard an impassible mountain range, the natural barrier formed by Cook Inlet, the lack of direct transportation or communication links, the corporate boundaries of the Kenai Peninsula Borough, the cohesiveness of interests of residents of that Borough and the disparate interests of the population of the Bristol Bay area. We now find that legitimate considerations incident to the implementation of rational state policy justify the overrepresentation of House District No. 16 (Bristol .Bay) as originally designated and override mathematical requirements.2 We accordingly have ordered that the severed portion of the Kenai Peninsula Borough, specifically the southern end thereof where the communities of Seldovia, Port Graham, English Bay, Portlock and Jakalof Bay are located, shall remain in House District No. 13 (Kenai-Cook Inlet) rather than in House District No. 16 (Bristol Bay).
We realize that reasonable arguments can be advanced to show that certain communities might be better represented by different districting. Our previous opinion in this case points out that it is not our function to develop apportionment schemes for the State of Alaska. We are limited in review to determining whether a plan adopted by the governor suffers state or federal constitutional defects alleged by the parties in the litigation before us. In our previous opinion we found no violation of those standards set forth in Art. VI of the Alaska Constitution which have not been made obsolete by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Particularly where specific objections have not been presented to us, we do not believe it appropriate to substitute out judgment for that of the constitutionally empowered authority regarding the wisdom of delicate adjustments to be made in political boundaries. It is our duty to assure that the reapportionment plan complies with the requirement of substantial mathematical equality established by the United States Supreme Court, with the state carrying the burden to demonstrate that additional deviations are based upon legitimate considerations incident to implementation of a rational state policy. Where that burden was not met, we were compelled to require revision of the plan to conform to what has been described as “the tyranny of numbers”. The Board having complied with out request, we accordingly have denied the objections to the revised plan, except where the revision demonstrated to us that the original district was properly formed in implementation of a rational state policy.
ERWIN, J., dissents.
*890FITZGERALD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

. I harbor further misgivings about whether some of the election districts in the reapportionment plan are “relatively integrated socioeconomic areas,” as required by article VI, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution. However, since a number of these districts have been found to have population deviations in excess of those allowed under federal constitutional standards and have been remanded to the Board for modification, I reserve judgment on this issue until I have had an opportunity to study the modified plan.

. 502 P.2d 856, 869-870 (Alaska 1972).

. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 330-332, 93 S.Ct. 979, 988-989, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, 333-334 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 n. 21, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1296 n. 21, 16 E.Ed.2d 376, 391 n. 21 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 779-780, 13 B.Ed.2d 675, 679-680 (1965); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691, 84 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 12 L.Ed.2d 609, 617 (1964); Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856 860, 869 (Alaska 1972).

. See the discussion in Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 865 (Alaska 1972), emphasizing Alaska’s uniqueness.

. 502 P.2d at 870-871.

. The majority has attempted to bring this material within the reviewable record by judicial notice under Civil Rule 43(a)(2) [c] and [d]. Since this material is reasonably subject to dispute and its accuracy cannot be determined by resort to ' sources of indisputable accuracy, I do not believe it to be an appropriate subject of judicial notice.

. Even the state’s 3,752 aliens who were enumerated in the 1970 census and consequently included in the population base, were not, like the military, subjected to a state citizenship test. Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 929 n. 2 (Alaska 1972).

. Transcript of the June 29, 1973, hearing in Anchorage, at 24.

. The Board did consider the effect of the state’s transient college students. But even there, in deciding that their number was statistically insignificant, the Board rested its conclusion upon admittedly inconclusive data based upon durational residency requirements which have been specifically disapproved as criteria for determining voter eligibility. See State v. Van Dort, 502 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1972).

. Another disturbing aspect of “military economics” which is ignored by the majority is that, despite the fact that all military personnel are counted for the purpose of obtaining federal revenue sharing, they are now effectively denied representation in the legislative body which sets the priorities controlling the expenditure of this revenue. Basic fairness would appear to require that a state which accepts federal funds for the purpose of providing local services to military personnel should be required to assure an effective voice to the military in determining how these funds are to be spent. Counting a mere 11 per cent of the military in the population base falls far short of achieving this goal.

. Note 20 of the majority opinion supra.

. 384 U.S. 73, 92-93, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 1296-1297, 16 L.Ed.2d 376, 391 (1966).

. See the discussion of this effort in Burns v. Gill, 316 F.Supp. 1285, 1289 (D.Hawaii 1970), quoted in Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 866 n. 16 (Alaska 1972).

. 384 U.S. at 92-93, 86 S.Ct. at 1297, 16 L.Ed.2d at 391.

. 42 TJ.S.C. § 1973 et seq. (1970).

. 1965 U.S.Oode Cong, and Admin.News, p. 2445.

.On August 17, 1966, Alaska was granted a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia in Civil No. 101-66 removing it from coverage under the Voting Rights Act. When portions of the state were again included under a 1970 amendment to the Act, Alaska again secured a declaratory judgment from the same court in Civil No. 21-22-71 removing those portions of the state from coverage under the Act. This latter judgment remains reviewable for a period of five years following its entry. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1974).

.For example, in the 1972 general election only about 19 per cent of the total populations in the predominantly aboriginal communities of Barrow and Bethel voted. Approximately 33 per cent of Alaska’s total population voted in the same election.

. 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966).

. 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).

. 502 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1972).

. 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974).

. The Anchorage districts were somewhat altered in the revised plan, but appellants’ objections again touched general concepts of dividing Anchorage into multiple senatorial districts, and the aggregate underrepresentation of the Anchorage area. No federal constitutional question regarding the propriety of the district lines in Anchorage was raised, and we disposed of the state constitutional issues in our prior opinion. Appellants’ counsel admitted at oral argument that the Anchorage area taken as a whole would be properly represented within federal constitutional standards by a 16-representative, 8-senator district. We need not further consider whether the current plan, which has the same numerical effect, unfairly represents the Anchorage area.

. Under the revised plan as amended by our order, the Bristol Bay district is slightly smaller than in the original plan, due to the Board’s inclusion of Eek in the revised House District No. 17 (Bethel) where it more properly belongs. Granting the Kenai Peninsula Borough’s objection reverses our prior order; in effect, it grants a rehearing based upon newly-discovered evidence, the evidence being the lack of reasonable alternatives to the initial plan. In granting the objection, we do not suggest that we will engage in wholesale redrafting upon request.