Court Opinion

ID: 9931095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 16:00:55.61046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:18.725810
License: Public Domain

22-3059-cv
     Jeffreys v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company et al.

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1              At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
 2   Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40
 3   Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of February, two thousand
 4   twenty-four.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                    Chief Judge,
 9              JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
10              SUSAN L. CARNEY,
11                    Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   Mr. Thomas J. Jeffreys,
15
16                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18                      v.                                       22-3059
19
20   Deutsche Bank Trust Company,
21   Americans For Rali 2004 Q512,
22   Ocwen Loan and Servicing, LLC,
 1
 2                      Defendants-Appellees.
 3
 4   _____________________________________
 5
 6
 7   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                   Thomas J. Jeffreys, pro
 8                                                              se, Waterbury, CT.
 9
10   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                  Marc James Ayers, Evan
11                                                              A. Ward, Bradley Arant
12                                                              Boult Cummings LLP,
13                                                              Birmingham, AL.
14

15         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

16   of Connecticut (Sarala V. Nagala, J.).

17         UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT    IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

18   ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

19   AFFIRMED.

20         Plaintiff-Appellant Thomas J. Jeffreys, proceeding pro se, appeals from a

21   judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

22   (Nagala, J.) dismissing his pro se “wrongful eviction” complaint for lack of subject

23   matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and denying his subsequent

                                              2
 1   motion for reconsideration. The instant litigation arises from a Connecticut state

 2   foreclosure action, in which Defendant-Appellee Deutsche Bank Trust Company

 3   (“Deutsche Bank”) successfully foreclosed on Jeffreys’s home, from which he was

 4   then evicted.   Jeffreys filed a federal complaint in the District of Connecticut

 5   against Deutsche Bank and Ocwen Loan and Servicing, LLC (“Ocwen Loan and

 6   Servicing”), alleging wrongful conduct by several parties resulting in his eviction

 7   and challenging the state court’s foreclosure judgment and eviction order. We

 8   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history,

 9   and the issues on appeal.

10         “We consider questions of subject matter jurisdiction de novo and are not

11   limited in our right to refer to any material in the record.” Platinum-Montaur Life

12   Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 943 F.3d 613, 616 (2d Cir. 2019)

13   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “we review a district

14   court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion and will

15   affirm its decision unless the movant can point to controlling decisions or data that

16   the district court overlooked.” See Contant v. AMA Cap., LLC, 66 F.4th 59, 65 (2d

17   Cir. 2023) (internal alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).
                                              3
 1         We agree with the district court that any direct challenge to the state

 2   foreclosure and eviction action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under

 3   which a party who lost in state court cannot seek appellate review in a United

 4   States district court. This is a “narrow” doctrine that applies only if a four-part

 5   test is met: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff

 6   complains of injuries caused by a state court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites

 7   review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment was rendered

 8   before the district court proceedings commenced.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th

 9   62, 68–69 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted).

10         An independent review of the record shows that the district court properly

11   dismissed Jeffreys’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as to his

12   claims that directly challenged, and invited review of, the state judgment granting

13   foreclosure and eviction. Jeffreys lost in state court, the main injury (loss of his

14   home) was caused by the state court’s foreclosure judgment, the central relief he

15   sought was reversal of the state court’s foreclosure judgment, and the judgment

16   was final before he filed the district court action. Jeffreys’s arguments to the

17   contrary, which primarily dispute the finality of the state judgment, are
                                               4
 1   unavailing. Specifically, Jeffreys contends that the state judgment was not final

 2   because the trial judge made no certification of finality and the Chief Judge of the

 3   Connecticut Appellate Court did not concur.                However, this argument

 4   misconstrues Connecticut Rule of Appellate Procedure § 61-4(a), which requires

 5   those steps only if a court wishes to certify a nonfinal judgment for immediate

 6   appeal. By its plain terms, § 61-4(a) does not apply to judgments that dispose of

 7   all claims against all parties. See Ahern v. Bd. of Educ. of Reg’l Sch. Dist. No. 13, 295

 8   A.3d 496, 505 & n.12 (Conn. App. Ct. 2023) (discussing Connecticut’s final

 9   judgment rule and the exception to that rule contained in § 61-4(a)).

10         While Rooker-Feldman bars those portions of the complaint that invite review

11   and rejection of the state judgment, we are mindful of the obligation to afford

12   liberal construction to a pro se complaint, reading it to raise “the strongest

13   arguments that [it] suggest[s],” Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)

14   (internal citation omitted). So construed, Jeffreys’s complaint appears to raise

15   claims against Deutsche Bank, state judges, and other unnamed individuals that

16   would not require the district court to sit in a forbidden appellate capacity. For

17   instance, Jeffreys seems to accuse certain defendants of misconduct in connection
                                                5
 1   with the then-ongoing state foreclosure proceeding, and claims he was evicted in

 2   violation of an alleged automatic stay. 1      Rooker-Feldman might not bar claims

 3   arising from alleged misconduct during the underlying state court litigation or in

 4   executing the state judgment. See Hunter, 75 F.4th at 67, 71–72 & n.12; Plymouth

 5   Venture Partners, II, L.P. v. GTR Source, LLC, 988 F.3d 634, 641–42 (2d Cir. 2021).

 6         Nevertheless, the circumstances of this case do not warrant remand as to

 7   those claims.    On appeal, Jeffreys does not contend that the district court

 8   misconstrued his complaint and has therefore abandoned this argument.               See

 9   LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995) (pro se appellant’s

10   failure to raise an argument in his appellate brief resulted in waiver).

11         Finally, the district court appropriately denied Jeffreys’s motion for

12   reconsideration. In moving for reconsideration, Jeffreys failed to identify any

13   “controlling decisions or data” that the district court overlooked in its initial

14   dismissal of Jeffreys’s complaint.       Contant, 66 F.4th at 65 (internal citation

15   omitted).

     1
      We note that the record on appeal belies Jeffreys’s claim that an automatic stay was in
     place, but we need not reach that question to resolve this appeal.
                                                 6
1         Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint or

2   abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. We have considered Jeffreys’s

3   remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.         Accordingly, we

4   AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

5
6                                       FOR THE COURT:
7                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                           7