Court Opinion

ID: 9796958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:09:14.38334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:51.479465
License: Public Domain

Rosen, J.,
dissenting: I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned opinion up to the point that it declines to apply the exclusionary rule in this context. I cannot concur with a result that renders meaningless the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. For me, the balance tips in favor of Martin and requires reversal of his suspension. Resolving this case under the balancing framework as applied by the majority results in legalizing the unconstitutional seizure of our citizens to effectuate a statutory purpose. I do not interpret K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) as tolerating or now, as a result of this ruling, condoning unconstitutional searches and seizures and authorizing driver’s license suspensions to be based on the fruits of unconstitutional police conduct. Quite to the contrary, our appellate cases consistently require strict compliance with K.S.A. 8-1002 and 8-1020 to secure a driver’s licence suspension. See, e.g., State v. Conn, 278 Kan. 387, 400, 99 P.3d 1108 (2004); State v. Muck, 262 Kan. 459, 939 P.2d 896 (1997); State v. Luft, 248 Kan. 911, 912, 811 P.2d 873 (1991); Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 567, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Schulz v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 19 Kan. App. 2d 665, 667, 877 P.2d 1 (1994); Furthmyer v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 19 Kan. App. 2d 591, 593, 595 873 P.2d 1365 (1994); Anderson v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 18 Kan. App. 2d 347, 349, 853 P.2d 69 (1993); Double S, Inc. v. Northwest Kansas Prod. Cred. Ass'n, 17 Kan. App. 2d 740, 743, 843 P.2d 741 (1992). It is inconsistent and illogical that the law requires such strict compliance with statutorily created rights in administrative suspension hearings while removing from those same defendants in those same proceedings their constitutionally protected right to be free from unlawful seizures.
I am extremely mindful of the paramount public objective of removing intoxicated drivers from our public roads and highways; however, achievement of this goal should not be at the expense of *648the protections guaranteed by our Constitution. The majority’s decision now permits law enforcement officers to make random stops of vehicles for any or no reason at all in hopes of detecting impaired drivers.
“ ‘If the exclusionary rule were not applied in civil suspension proceedings, law enforcement officers could make investigatory stops based on hunches or stereotyped beliefs, or for any or no reason whatsoever, knowing that even if any evidence obtained from the stop were to be suppressed in criminal proceedings, license suspensions could still follow. Given the significance of obtaining license suspensions, allowing unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted in civil suspension proceedings could encourage disregard for the constitutional limits of a legal stop.’ See LaFave, supra, at 202-03 (highly relevant factors in determining whether to apply exclusionary rule in quasi—criminal proceedings are magnitude of consequences for individual involved and extent to which nonexclusion would encourage unlawful searches and seizures).” State v. Lussier, 171 Vt. 19, 757 A.2nd 1017 (2000). ■
Further, the majority creates a dual standard to initiate traffic stops for law enforcement. One standard allowing for no reason at all to stop a motorist for an implied consent driver’s license suspension. The other standard requiring reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist for suspected violation of K.S.A. 8-1567 (DUI offenses) or any other statute or ordinance. This duality is confusing and likely to lead to inconsistent enforcement of our laws. A bright line rule requiring reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist for suspected violation of any law regardless of whether it leads to a criminal or civil sanction is clear, enforceable, and more likely to result in consistent and uniform application of our laws upon our citizenry.
I am not persuaded that the balancing utilized by the majority compels the introduction of unlawfully obtained evidence in a civil suspension proceeding. Neither the majority nor the Kansas Department of Revenue cites to any empirical evidence indicating that applying the exclusionary rule in suspension hearings will have a harmful effect on “the remedial imperative of preventing alcohol- and/or drug-impaired drivers from injury or killing themselves or others.” See 285 Kan. at 646. One could just as easily argue that the threat of driver’s license suspensions and the suspensions themselves have had little impact on keeping drunk drivers off our highways. Our constitutional rights do not stop at the civil or adminis*649trative law doorstep. By requiring a lawful vehicle stop as a prerequisite for the imposition of a driver’s license suspension pursuant to K.S.A. 8-1020(h)(2) we establish a consistent and logical enforcement mechanism that protects our citizens’ constitutional rights to be free of unlawful government seizures and at the same time effectuates the strict and harsh penalties against drunk driving as enacted by our legislature.
Luckert, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.