Court Opinion

ID: 9521976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:15.900853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:09.024546
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would find that: (1) the alimony provision of the settlement agreement constitutes an agreement for spousal maintenance between the parties that is not subject to judicial modification; *647(2) the provision excusing either party from the payment of child support is against public policy; and (3) the property division approved by the trial court is valid to the extent that it disposes of the property specified in the agreement, but that the trial court must also address the division of all marital property not included in the agreement.
The only provision in the settlement agreement addressing recurring monetary payments between the parties provides:
5. Payments to Wife: Husband agrees to make alimony payments to the wife as follows:
1. $3000.00 per month starting the first day of the month in which wife moves into 1675 W. Foxcliff, and continuing for 5 years.
2.' Starting the sixth year husband’s payments to wife shall be reduced to $1000.00 per month for Five (5) years, at which time said payments shall terminate.
Appellant’s App. p. 29, Settlement Agreement Art. IV, par. 5. Under facts similar to this case, we held that “alimony” refers to spousal maintenance and, specifically, does not include child support. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 669 N.E.2d 415, 421 Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Moreover, the Dew-brews’s settlement agreement also provides that “[a]s a result of the parenting time anticipated no support shall be paid by either party.” Appellant’s App. p. 27, Settlement Agreement Art. II, par. 1. The language in each of these clauses is clear and unambiguous-, and we should therefore enforce the agreement of the parties and require Herbert to pay spousal maintenance to Tina according to the terms of Article IV, Paragraph 5 of the settlement agreement. The trial court abused its discretion when it admitted parol evidence-— Herbert’s testimony that the parties intended the alimony provision to cover child support and spousal maintenance — to aid in its interpretation of the clear and unambiguous language of the provision. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Burns, 837 N.E.2d 645, 651 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (when terms of contract are clear and unambiguous, court will not construe contract or admit parol evidence). I cannot agree with the majority’s decision because it relies on the same parol evidence when it remands this case and instructs the trial court to modify the amount of spousal maintenance upon determination of child support.
On a related note, I cannot agree that the spousal maintenance provided for under the agreement is rehabilitative, and therefore modifiable by our courts. Indiana courts have the authority to award, and therefore to modify, spousal maintenance only where the spouse receiving payments is incapacitated, provides care to an incapacitated child of the marriage, or qualifies for “rehabilitative” maintenance to gain job skills. Ind.Code § 31-15-7-2; Zan v. Zan, 820 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (trial court may modify spousal maintenance agreements that it could have ordered pursuant to statute).2 *648In the case of rehabilitative maintenance, the court may award maintenance payments for up to three years following dissolution. Ind.Code § 31 — 15—7—2(3)(D). Nothing in the Dewbrews’s settlement agreement suggests that this spousal maintenance provision falls under any of the statutory categories of maintenance that a court may modify. Therefore, under the- clear terms of the settlement agreement, Herbert should be ordered to pay this maintenance in the manner provided therein. Again, the trial court and the majority rely on Herbert’s testimony in determining that the maintenance provided for under the settlement agreement is rehabilitative, yet neither cites to any ambiguity within the agreement that would justify the admission of parol evidence to address this issue. Absent an ambiguity, it is inappropriate to admit par-ol evidence to interpret a settlement agreement.
Next, I believe that child support was not ordered under the clear terms of the settlement agreement and therefore the child support provision is against public policy. We have previously held that “any agreement which purports to contract away a child’s right to support is unenforceable as directly contrary to the public policy of protecting the welfare of the children.” Bussert v. Bussert, 677 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. In its order, the trial court cited K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind.1996), in support of its determination that this agreement between the parties is permissible and does not constitute the contracting away of either party’s child support obligation. In K.S., a man who had a child with his married neighbor as the result of their extramarital affair established his paternity of the child, and he and the Mother entered into an agreement for equal parenting time that provided that neither party would pay support to the other. Our Supreme Court stated:
Although not without some doubt, we do not believe that this agreement constitutes contracting away [the childj’s right to child support from a parent.... This agreement merely states that, at this time, there is no need for one parent to provide another parent with support payments.... We might also add, however, ... [that this child] will not be barred by res judicata from later challenging this agreement.
Id. at 406. Given the doubt expressed in our Supreme Court’s opinion and the facts that the Dewbrew’s have significantly disparate incomes and did not, in their settlement agreement, set forth any specific agreement regarding how much time each party would have physical custody of their children, I cannot agree with the trial court that K.S. controls our decision.
The comments to the Indiana Child Support Guidelines indicate that “Federal law now requires that the Indiana Child Support Guidelines be applied in every instance in which child support is established including, but not limited to, dissolutions of marriage,.... ” Ind. Child Support Guideline 2, Comment. In Pryor v. Bostwick, 818 N.E.2d 6 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), this Court reversed a child support agreement between the parents because neither parent submitted child support worksheets to justify the amount of support provided for in the agreement.3 Because the trial *649court did not make any findings nor complete a child support worksheet itself in order to justify its order, we reversed and remanded for a calculation of child support pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines. The same reasoning applies here: because neither party submitted child ' support worksheets and because the trial court did not itself complete a worksheet or adequately justify its order in its findings, we are unable to determine whether the agreement deviates from the Child Support Guidelines or whether the deviation, if there is one, is justifiable. Therefore, the trial court should be instructed to either receive child support worksheets from the parties or to complete a worksheet itself and, if its order reflects a deviation from the support amount determined under the worksheet, it should likewise reflect sound reasoning for that deviation.
Finally, I would find that the clause providing for the division of all personal property not specifically addressed in the agreement is insufficient to address the couple’s $1 million-plus business assets, and remand is needed to remedy this. However, to the extent that it specifically provides for the division of the property listed, the agreement is valid, albeit incomplete; I therefore disagree with the majority’s decision inasmuch as it reverses the property division that is already accounted for in the settlement agreement. I would affirm the trial court’s decision to uphold those portions of the settlement agreement and remand the case for the division of all other property, including business assets. In my view, the only provision of the agreement that may be affected by such a decision is the clause wherein Herbert agrees to accept all of the marital debt. On remand, the trial court should take into account both the assets and liabilities of the couple and their businesses in determining an appropriate division of property. In addition, because I find the alimony provision to be fully binding on Herbert, the trial court should consider the alimony payments in arriving at an equitable distribution of marital property.
To reiterate, I find the alimony provision to constitute an agreement of the parties not subject to judicial modification. Further, I regard the child support provision of the settlement agreement to be an impermissible contractual agreement dispensing with Herbert’s child support obligation in conflict with the Child Support Guidelines. Finally, I find the property distribution provided for in the agreement to be valid, with the caveat that a more complete division is required and must take into consideration all of the property of the marriage, the liabilities attached to that property, and the maintenance provision of the agreement. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority cites Zan to support its assertion that a court may modify the Dewbrews’s maintenance agreement, but their reliance on Zan is misplaced. Zan concerned a settlement agreement that referred to the alimony provided therein as "Rehabilitative Maintenance,” both in the heading preceding the clause of the settlement agreement setting forth the payment structure and in the clause itself. See Zan v. Zan, 820 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Additionally, the clause provided for the payment of money for a period of three years, which is consistent with the statutory limitation on rehabilitative maintenance, and it included language providing that payments were being made "due to the fact that Mother has not worked continuously throughout the marriage and needs assistance in obtaining an education to better employment opportunities.” Id. (quoting the *648parties’ settlement agreement). No parallel language exists in the settlement agreement we review today, and therefore Zan fails to support the majority's determination.

. The trial court noted the Pryor decision, but found that it was not required to make a determination of the appropriate support amount under the Child Support Guidelines because the Dewbrews’s settlement agree*649ment did not directly request the trial court to rule on child support. See Appellant’s App. p. 52, Order on Motion to Correct Error, Conclusion 15. I find this reasoning to be in direct conflict with the comment to Indiana Child Support Guideline 2, as stated above, which indicates that a trial court is always required to apply the Child Support Guidelines whether it is asked to or not. Besides, when a divorcing couple requests that a trial court approve its settlement agreement, it is axiomatic that the couple likewise asks that the court approve the child support provision contained in that agreement.