Court Opinion

ID: 9838497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:29.449941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.269674
License: Public Domain

J-S12021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES WATSON                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1048 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 8, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-08-CR-0000449-2001

BEFORE:       KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

       James Watson (Appellant), appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Bradford County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing as untimely his third Post

Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. We note Appellant was found guilty in

2002 of first-degree murder, conspiracy, kidnapping,2 and related offenses.

The underlying petition raised several claims of Brady violations,3 including

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), 903(a), 2901, respectively.

3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  A Brady violation claim avers:
the Commonwealth suppressed evidence, either willfully or inadvertently, that
was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or
impeaching, and prejudice ensued. Commonwealth v. Natividad, 200 A.3d
11, 25-26 (Pa. 2019).
J-S12021-23

that the Commonwealth failed to provide: DNA test results, the audio

recordings and transcripts of Appellant’s police interview, as well as the police

interviews of co-conspirators and defendants. We affirm.

      We briefly summarize the underlying facts adduced at trial:

      [On] April 17, 2001, an argument developed between Jason Ryans
      (Victim) and the Watson brothers (Kenny Watson and Appellant)
      at Kenny Watson’s home in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The
      Watsons believed [Victim stole] a handgun and a safe containing
      marijuana and money. . . . Kenny Watson punched [Victim]. In
      an ensuing struggle, Appellant grabbed a knife and inflicted
      multiple wounds to [Victim’s] hands and arms. [Victim] was also
      punched and kicked repeatedly by the Watsons. The Watsons
      then bound the wrists of [Victim], either [to stop] his bleeding or
      to prevent his escape, or both. [Victim] was then placed in a
      vehicle and transported to a rural area near the Village of
      Camptown in Bradford County. There, [Victim] was taken from
      the vehicle and shot twice in the back of the head by Appellant.
      [Victim] apparently died immediately.

      The evidence against Appellant and Kenny Watson diverged with
      respect to their criminal culpability following the altercation in
      Wilkes-Barre.   After [Victim] was bound, the Watsons then
      informed others at the house that they would [take Victim] to a
      hospital, but would seek a rural hospital. The evidence revealed
      that Appellant was in fact simply looking for a secluded place to
      murder [Victim], but the evidence also suggested that Kenny
      Watson, among others, was duped into accompanying Appellant
      to Bradford County. . . .

Commonwealth v. Watson, 1884 MDA 2002 (unpub. memo. at 1-2) (Pa.

Super. Aug. 20, 2004) (record citation and some punctuation omitted), appeal

denied, 884 MAL 2004 (Pa. Apr. 18, 2005).

      Appellant and his brother Kenny were jointly tried before a jury. On

September 12, 2002, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder,

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conspiracy, kidnapping,4 and related offenses. We note the jury found Kenny

not guilty of all charges of homicide and conspiracy to commit homicide.

       The trial court imposed a sentence of life without parole for first-degree

murder, as well an aggregate term of 46 to 92 years, to run consecutive to

the life sentence.

       Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence

on August 20, 2004. Our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April

18, 2005. Watson, 1884 MDA 2002, appeal denied, 884 MAL 2004.

       Appellant filed a timely first PCRA petition, and subsequently a second

PCRA petition.       Both were denied, and on appeal, this Court ultimately

affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Watson, 202 MDA 2011 (unpub. memo.)

(Pa. Super. Jun. 1, 2012) (affirming in part and remanding in part denial of

first PCRA petition), appeal denied, 136 MAL 2013 (Pa. Jul. 31, 2013);

Commonwealth v. Watson, 216 MDA 2015 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super.

Jan. 15, 2016) (affirming denial of first PCRA petition after remand);

Commonwealth v. Watson, 1332 MDA 2020 (unpub. memo.) (Pa. Super.

Jan. 20, 2022) (affirming denial of second PCRA petition).5

____________________________________________

4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 2901.

5 Following this Court’s affirmance of the denial of his second PCRA petition,

Appellant filed a petition with our Supreme Court for leave to file a nunc pro
tunc petition for allowance of appeal. This petition was denied on June 22,
2022. Commonwealth v. Watson, 33 MM 2022 (order) (Pa. June 22, 2022).

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       On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed the underlying pro se PCRA petition, as

well as a “Motion for Leave of Court to Compel/Conduct PCRA Discovery and/or

Motion for Sanctions for Violation of Duty to Disclose.”6 Appellant alleged the

investigating state troopers and/or the Commonwealth violated Brady, as well

as the trial court’s discovery orders, when they intentionally suppressed: (1)

the audio recordings and transcripts of his police interviews, where his

“confession to murder” was read aloud at trial; (2) the audio recordings and

transcripts of the police interviews of “co-conspirators/defendants-turned-

witnesses;” (3) “exculpatory scientific evidence,” where there was partial or

insufficient DNA and gun shot residue testing on a “ziploc bag found next to

the murder weapon[, which contained 11] live rounds of ammunition [and a]

pair of latex rubber gloves;” and (4) all the “promises made, understandings,

[or] agreements” with respect to leniency given to co-conspirators and co-

defendants.7 Appellant’s Motion for Leave of Court to Compel/Conduct PCRA

Discovery and/or Motion for Sanctions for Violation of Duty to Disclose (Motion

for Discovery), 5/6/22, at 1-4, 8 (some punctuation omitted).        Appellant

concluded he was unlawfully arrested, unfairly tried, and falsely convicted.

____________________________________________

6 Appellant also filed an 87-page memorandum of law.

7 On appeal, Appellant avers his “nephew, Rodney [W]atson, was an alleged

Co-conspirator-turned-key-Prosecution    witness,”  and     gave     “false
testimony . . . based upon self-serving quid pro quo . . . Consideration
Agreements worked out behind the scenes[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 34-35.

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Id. at 1. We note Appellant did not refer to the timeliness of his petition under

the PCRA, but briefly argued: the above “governmental interference [was] the

sole cause for all unjustifiable procedural defaults;”8 and he and his prior

counsel have exercised due diligence in attempting to retrieve “impeachment

evidence.” Id. at 6 (quotation marks omitted).

       On June 7, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. The court reasoned

Appellant’s petition was untimely filed, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction

to review it.     Appellant filed pro se responses, but the court issued the

underlying order, on July 8th, dismissing the petition.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

       Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

       A. Whether the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s] rights to
       due process of law under the [P]ennsylvania and United States
       Constitutions by subjecting [Appellant] to a known Miscarriage of
       Justice, through the suppression of exculpatory evidence, coupled
       with the intentional fabrication of inculpatory evidence, to
____________________________________________

8 On the pre-printed PCRA petition form, Appellant checked the box indicating

he should be entitled to relief because of “[t]he improper obstruction by
government officials of [his] right of appeal where a meritorious appealable
issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court.” Appellant’s
Motion for Post Conviction Collateral Relief, 5/6/22, at 2 (emphasis added).
This provision, however, specifically refers to interference with one’s right of
appeal, and Appellant did not present any argument relevant thereto. Indeed,
we note this Court disposed of his direct appeal on the merits.

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      perpetrate a fraud on the Court & jury, in order to gain a known
      false conviction[?]

      B. Whether Appellant’s Petition was timely, because any delay was
      a product of the due process violation[?]

      C. Whether Appellant’s Petition was timely because it was based
      on facts demonstrating these violations that were unknown to
      Appellant right before the filing of his PCRA Petition on May 6,
      2022, despite his exercise of due [diligence?]

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (some punctuation omitted).

      “In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA

court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error.”

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25.

      The PCRA’s time requirements are “jurisdictional, and a court may not

ignore it and reach the merits of an untimely PCRA claim.” Commonwealth

v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1134 (Pa. Super. 2023). A PCRA petition, “including

a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the

judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves”

one of the enumerated exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Pertinently, the

government-interference exception may provide relief where: “the failure to

raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government

officials with the presentation of the claim[.]”   42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

“Any petition invoking an exception . . . shall be filed within one year of the

date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

      “It is well-settled a Brady violation may fall within the governmental

interference exception.”     Natividad, 200 A.3d at 28.          Nevertheless,

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“[a]lthough a Brady violation may fall within the governmental interference

exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously raise

the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the

information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due

diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008)

(citation omitted).

      Previously, this Court determined that for PCRA purposes, Appellant’s

judgment of sentence became final on July 17, 2005 (at the expiration of time

to file, on direct appeal, a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court). Watson, 1332 MDA 2020 (unpub. memo. at 5). The general one-

year deadline to file a PCRA petition thus fell on July 17, 2006. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(1). The instant petition, filed more than 15 years later, on May 6,

2022, was therefore patently untimely.

      The PCRA court observed that in the underlying petition, Appellant

“seemingly relies” on the governmental-interference exception. PCRA Ct. Op.,

8/6/22 at 2. The court reasoned:

      Appellant indeed pleads that government official, to wit: police
      and prosecutors[ ] acted in violation of his rights, but the actions
      of which he complains all relate to his arrest and prosecution more
      than two decades ago.

           He does not plead that any government official interfered with
      his ability to pursue his present claims at any time post trial, on
      direct appeal, or in either his first or second PCRA petition, nor
      does his petition suggest that he learned of the alleged
      governmental interference within one year prior to the filing of his
      new petition. His petition therefore fails to meet the PCRA’s
      requirement that an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time

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       bar must be pleaded within one year of the date the petitioner
       learns of the exception. 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9545(b)(2).

            Appellant has not pleaded facts establishing an exception to
       the PCRA’s one-year time limit. This court therefore lacked
       jurisdiction to consider his claims. . . .

Id. at 2-3.

       Although Appellant objects to this reasoning, we agree with the PCRA

court.9 See Appellant’s Brief at 73, quoting PCRA Ct. Op. at 2.

       Appellant misconstrues the exception.     While his petition complained

that alleged misconduct by the investigating state troopers was the

governmental interference, which in itself merited relief, a proper Subsection

9545(b)(1)(i) claim would be that present governmental officials prevented

Appellant from bringing a PCRA claim — separate from the purported

governmental interference by the police. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i) (“the

failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by

government officials”). Furthermore, as the PCRA court reasoned, Appellant

failed to explain when he learned of his new, potential claim, nor how

governmental officials interfered with his ability to bring it previously. See

id.

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9 Furthermore, we disagree with Appellant’s summation that the PCRA court

“openly agree[d] to appearances of government interference by way of Police
[and] prosecutorial Misconduct from ‘more than two decades ago.’” See
Appellant’s Brief at 73. Instead, the PCRA court was merely summarizing
Appellant’s position; it did not agree with or endorse it. See PCRA Ct. Op. at
2.

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      Appellant continues to advance these claims on appeal. He again avers

it is the alleged pre-trial “fabrication of evidence,” Brady violations, and

improper DNA testing that amount to governmental interference, which in

itself warrants relief.   Appellant’s Brief at 33, 64.   See also id. at 59-60

(arguing Appellant’s false arrest, illegal detainment, and wrongful convictions

were based on the “intentional fabrication of false evidence [and] willful[ ]

suppression of exculpatory evidence, by way of known ‘government

interference’”).

      Finally, we note that on appeal, Appellant refers to the newly discovered

evidence exception. See Appellant’s Brief at 72. As this exception was not

pled before the PCRA court, any present reliance on it is waived for appellate

review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209,

1216 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the PCRA court’s

determination that the underlying PCRA petition was untimely filed.       See

Natividad, 200 A.3d at 25. We thus affirm the dismissal order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

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