Court Opinion

ID: 9700594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:36:47.907204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:11.965598
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, President Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent.
The majority holds (1) that the presence of the sole identifying eye-witness at a hearing on a motion to suppress a pre-trial on-the-scene identification is not mandatory, (2) that the absence of such a witness does not alone warrant suppression of the witness’s identification, and (3) that a third party, in this case,' police officers, who were not eye-witnesses, may testify as to the sole eye-witness’s statement of identification. Because I feel that fundamental fairness under due process guarantees requires the presence of such a witness, and especially in this case since the absent eye-witness was the sole witness against appellant, I would order a new suppression hearing and trial, if necessary, in compliance with Commonwealth v. Lee, 262 Pa.Superior Ct. 280, 396 A.2d 755 (1978). Identification testimony offered by officers at ¿ suppression hearing on the basis of what they learned from an absent and sole eye-witness is hearsay and, under the dictates of fairness, inadmissible as evidence.
An accused person is entitled to a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine the admissibility of pre-trial identifications. Commonwealth v. Lee, supra. At the suppression *367hearing, the burden of the production of evidence is on the Commonwealth. Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 429 Pa. 141, 239 A.2d 426 (1968). As this court said in Commonwealth v. Perdie, 249 Pa.Superior Ct. 406, 409, 378 A.2d 359, 361 (1977), citing Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 523, 314 A.2d 496, 498 (1974):
Evidence of an identification should not be received at trial if the circumstances of the pre-trial confrontation were so infected by suggestiveness as to give rise to an irreparable likelihood of misidentification. (citations omitted.) However, absent some special elements of unfairness, we do not believe that prompt on-the-scene confrontations fall within this ambit of suggestiveness.
The police are not competent to testify for an absent sole identifying witness and any such procedure is replete with the danger of the uncertain premise of unsubstantial identification. As our Supreme Court has said,
[I]t may be that the procedure used by the police was conducted with such fundamental unfairness as to result in a deprivation of due process of law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199] (1967). This is a recognized ground of attack, independent of any right of counsel claim. In resolving this question, all of the circumstances must be considered and the test is whether or not ‘the confrontation was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification... ’ as to constitute prejudicial unfairness. Stovall v. Denno, supra. Commonwealth v. Marino, 435 Pa. 245, 253, 255 A.2d 911, 916 (1969).
In essence, the reliability of the confrontation is what must be determined by the suppression court. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). Thus, in ascertaining the reliability of the confrontation procedure, reviewing courts have placed great emphasis on the testimony of an identifying witness as part of the Commonwealth’s burden.1
*368In Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974), the court found the on-the-scene confrontation to be reliable such that it could be introduced at trial. The defendant was apprehended near the scene of a robbery by police responding to a broadcast. He was driven two blocks so that the victim-cabdriver could observe him. Placing great weight on the cabdriver’s suppression testimony that “They asked me were these the two fellows. And I said, yes,” the court affirmed the denial of suppression.
In Commonwealth v. Alvin, 257 Pa.Superior Ct. 290, 390 A.2d 827 (1978) this court found that the trial court erred during the suppression hearing in refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine an identifying witness on his ability to observe the defendant at the scene of the crime. While this court found such error harmless, it relied heavily on the strong evidence presented at trial in the case.
... Sgt. Lang testified that his identification was based solely on the events of the day of the robbery and was not influenced by one-on-one confrontations at the police station. His testimony was unshaken on cross-examination ... Both witnesses positively identified the defendant in court. Both testified that their identifications were based on the happenings when the crime was committed.
Id., 257 Pa.Superior at 297, 390 A.2d at 830.
In the instant case, the police witnesses at the suppression hearing portrayed a one-on-one on the scene identification based on the testimony of the absent and sole eye-witness, Ms. Woodley, the victim in this case. Ms. Woodley’s absence at the suppression hearing deprived appellant’s counsel of the opportunity to hear her version of the procedure and to cross examine her. Certain facts became known at trial which would have raised proper questions by appellant’s counsel at the suppression hearing, which had been held four days earlier. Ms. Woodley testified at trial *369that after the preliminary hearing in this case, she went home and pondered about whether she identified the right man in identifying appellant. The preliminary hearing was held sixteen days after the robbery. Appellant had grown facial hair by that time and this fact made Ms. Woodley uncertain about whether she had made a mistake.
In addition, while the police testified that to their collective knowledge, they brought back four suspects for Ms. Woodley’s identification, Ms. Woodley testified that she viewed between six and twelve subjects. Had Ms. Woodley been present at the suppression hearing, counsel for the Commonwealth and for appellant could have elicited from her the particular circumstances of the robbery, that is, her ability to view appellant, how long the intruders stayed in her house, and her confidence in identifying appellant at that time. She would also have been able to convey her side of the one-on-one confrontations.
As the record stands, this invaluable information from the victim was not presented to the suppression court. And, more importantly, the defense attorney was not afforded the opportunity to cross examine the victim as to the confrontation procedure.
My consideration of this case convinces me that, following the guidance of Commonwealth v. Lee, supra, the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof at the suppression hearing. “At a hearing on a motion to suppress an ‘on the scene’ identification it is essential that the identifying witness testify.” Id. 262 Pa.Superior Ct. at 286, 396 A.2d at 757. While it is true that in the Lee case, this court chose to determine without a new hearing whether the identification was reliable, I feel that the facts of this case do not warrant such a review.2 Rather, appellant must be offered a new suppression hearing, and, if necessary, a new trial. When a defendant challenges the on-the-scene *370identification procedures involved in his case, it is incumbent on the Commonwealth, as essential to its burden of proof, to produce the only person who suffered the harm, and the only eye-witness to the crime, who alerted police, and who subsequently identified the defendant when he was brought back to the place in which the criminal incident occurred. Failure to do this should result in suppression of the identification. And for this reason, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
This case should be remanded for a new suppression hearing and, if necessary, a new trial.

. See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 227 Pa.Superior Ct. 1, 323 A.2d 799 (1974) (In the photo array situation, actual array must be dis*368played at the suppression hearing.); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 246 Pa.Superior Ct. 71, 369 A.2d 815 (1977) (Photo identification inadmissible if Commonwealth fails to produce photographs at suppression hearing.)

. Ms. Woodley, the victim, would not identify appellant, had signed a statement two weeks previous that she would ‘not prosecute’ appellant, and while she unequivocally identified appellant’s co-defendant, she indicated her fear of prosecuting the wrong person in appellant.